

vizuální kolegij zborník/ reader

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vizualni



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UREDNIČKA NAPOMENA

Vizualni kolegij je projekt kojeg smo započeli 2004. godine sa namjerom da otvorimo nova diskurzivna polja u teoriji vizualnog. Program kolegija sastoji se od kontinuiranih projekcija u net.kulturnom klubu MaMa, organizacije serije predavanja te objavljivanja relevantnih tekstova. Zbornik koji držite u rukama predstavlja izbor iz dosadašnjih zagrebačkih predavanja Vizualnog kolegija, te je ujedno druga obimnija publikacija nakon monografije o Viscontiju Alexandra Garcia-Düttmanna. Nadamo se da će ovo biti samo prvi u nizu zbornika Vizualnog kolegija.


Tanja Vrvilo i Petar Milat



EDITORS' NOTE

Vizualni kolegij [Visual Collegium] has been initiated in 2004 with a purpose to open up new discursive domains within the field of visual studies in Croatia. Main activities are regular screenings in net.culture club MaMa in Zagreb, a continuous multi-annual lecture-series and publication of theoretical texts. This present Reader is a second major publication of Vizualni kolegij, after Alexander Garcia-Düttmann's monograph on Visconti, and only a first in series to follow.

Tanja Vrvilo & Petar Milat



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

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



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Stephen Zepke was born in New Zealand and completed his Phd at Sydney University, Australia. He currently teaches aesthetics and film theory at the Akademie der bildenden Künste Wien. His monograph *Art as Abstract Machine, Ontology and Aesthetics in Deleuze and Guattari* was published by Routledge.

2001: Odiseja u svemiru: predigna filozofiji budućnosti

2001: *Odiseja u svemiru* započinje izlazećim Suncem. Uz pratinju bučne, prepoznatljive glazbene teme *Tako je govorio Zaratustra* Richarda Straussa, film nudi viziju koja slijedi Nietzscheove riječi:

Zaratustra postade zreo, došao je moj trenutak!

“Ovo je moje jutro, moj se uzdiže dan: *Gore sad! Uspni se ti veliko Podne!*” (str.292)

2001. je zora nove budućnosti jer njezin kozmički luk projicira sve koji ga iskuse u nužnosti našeg svladavanja. Stoga, 2001. nije samo film “o” Nietzscheovom podnevnu, on ga ostvaruje. Time 2001. znanstvenoj fantastici nudi novu ontologiju budućnosti, budućnosti koja je istinski nova jer je ostvarena najradikalnijom revolucijom: 2001. nas odvodi u budućnost koja više nije ljudska.

2001: A Space Odyssey, Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future

2001: *A Space Odyssey* begins with the rising sun. Accompanied by its booming signature theme, Richard Strauss's *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, the film gives a vision that echoes Nietzsche's words:

Zarathustra has become ripe, my hour has come!

'This is *my* morning, *my* day begins: *rise up now, rise up, great noontide!*' (Nietzsche, 1961, 336)

2001 is the dawn of a new future, for its cosmic arc projects all who experience it into the necessity of our overcoming. 2001 is not just "about" Nietzsche's noontide then, it achieves it. In doing so 2001 offers Science Fiction a new ontology of the future, a future that is truly new because it is been achieved through the most radical of revolutions: 2001 takes us into a future that is no longer human.

Da bi to učinio, Kubrick kreće od početka, od rođenja čovjeka. Film započinje s našim precima, majmunima. Žive bijednim životom na rubu smrti i svaki je kadar ispu- njen kostima. Međutim, majmuni su nesvjesni smrti, a njihovo postojanje još nije postalo upitno. Sve će se to ubrzo izmijeniti. Nova zora otkriva crni monolit, potpuno stran i nepoznat, uspravan pred majmunima kao nemo- gućnost – čisto proturječe – prolaz prema postojanju koje se još ne može vidjeti. Majmuni istražuju, a monolit ne bježi niti napada, monolit se – a to je sama bit njegove strane pojave – ne pomiciće, njegova crna upornost ignorira bezgraničan svjetovni ritam borbe i bijega, noći i dana, života i smrti. Majmuni dotiču i kušaju i mirišu monolit, iskušavajući nešto novo i nepoznato. Majmuni još nisu počeli misliti, ali su prisiljeni suočiti se s onim izvan sebe, i pri tome se između percepcije i re(akcije) pojavljuje unu- tarnji prostor. Pojava monolita uzrokovala je refleksiju. Iz toga se rađa svijest, dok majmun biva svladan izlaženjem iz svojeg životinjskog tijela i prelaskom u um čovjeka.

Kubrick nam taj proces pokazuje vrlo precizno: u potrazi za hranom majmun prevrće kostur tapira. Zaus- tavlja se, podiže pogled, ugleda prizor monolita poravna- tog sa suncem i mjesecom. To je subjektivni kadar novog krajolika, sjećanja. Majmun zbunjeno pogledom pretražuje kosti. Podiže jednu i pušta je da padne još jednom i kost baca prema nama te, sa sve glasnijim timpanima i rogovi- ma Straussovog *Zarathustre* koji još jednom dosežu vrhu- nac, napokon shvaća i njome snažno udara posred tapiro- ve lubanje. Iz sjećanja na monolit majmun počinje misliti o budućnosti, koju vidimo dvaput, dok tapir mrtav pada na zemlju. Pojavila se samosvijest povezana sa svojim

In order to do so Kubrick starts from the beginning, from man's birth. The film opens with our ancestors the apes. They live a meagre life on the precipice of death, and every shot is filled with bones. But the apes are oblivious to death, and their existence has not yet turned into a question. All this is about to change. A new dawn reveals a black monolith, utterly incongruous and alien, standing before the apes as the impossible – a pure disjunction – a doorway to an existence that cannot yet be seen. The apes investigate, and the monolith neither runs away nor attacks, the monolith – and this is the very essence of its alien appearance – does not move, its black insistence ignores the world's infinite rhythm of fight or flight, of night and day, of life and death. The apes touch and taste and smell the monolith, evaluating this new unknown. The apes have not yet begun to think, but they have been forced to confront their outside, and in doing so an internal space has appeared between perception and (re)action. The appearance of the monolith has caused reflection. From this consciousness is born, and the ape is overcome in stepping beyond its animal body and into the mind of man.

Kubrick shows us this process very precisely: An ape scuffs into the skeleton of a tapir, looking for food. It stops, it looks up, it sees the image of the monolith in alignment with sun and moon. This is a point-of-view shot onto a new landscape, that of memory. The ape looks around at the bones, distracted. He picks one up and lets it fall, again and a bone is propelled spiralling towards us, and with the rising kettle drums and horns of Strauss's *Zarathustra* once more peaking he fully grasps the idea

nužnim uvjetom, sviješću o smrti. Stvoren je čovjek, i to je stvaranje nerazdvojivo od razaranja: "A tko mora biti stvaralač u dobru i zlu, taj mora prvo biti rušitelj." (str.103) Čovječanstvo je rođeno, pokazuje nam Kubrick, u trenutku stjecanja moći za ubijanje.

Između rođenja i smrti, između njihovog prije i poslije, pojavila se misao *kao vrijeme*. Čovječanstvo je spojilo prošlost i budućnost, svladavajući nesvjesni krug života i smrti kako bi čovjeka učinilo njegovim gospodarom.

Dolazak monolita na Zemlju uvodi genetiku izvana kao moć kreacije stvarajući nešto *novo*. Ljudsko nasilje utjelovljuje tu moć radikalnog prekida ukazujući na novu zoru, novu *budućnost* čovjeka, *budućnost* suviše ljudsku. Monolit je u tom smislu immanentna vanjština života, ono unutarnje-vanjsko koje je preduvjet prevladavanja. Prema Nietzscheu, monolit kao kreativna disjunkcija predstavlja volju za moć, moć koju čovjek sadrži, razvija i potvrđuje (ali o kojoj mu je toliko teško razmišljati), sve dok poput izlazećeg Sunca ne dosegne svoje podne i prevlada samoga sebe. Za Nietzschea i za Kubricka prevladani čovjek vratit će se kao nedužno dijete.

U međuvremenu, u preostalom dijelu filma, nitko, čak ni naš kasniji junak Dave Bowman, nema ni najmanju predodžbu o tome što monolit objavljuje. Monolit će za čovječanstvo ostati, da citiram dr. Heywooda Floyda, "potpuna misterija". Monolit, kao i volja za moć koju oslobađa, ostaje stran ljudskoj misli. Međutim, nepomišljena, volja za moć koju utjelovljuje monolit ostaje aktivna, a budućnost čovjeka dolazi unatoč njegovim racionalnim naprezanjima. Doista, tek će svladavanjem ljudske svjesne racionalnosti – eksponencijalno razvijene u računalu HAL –

and brings the bone smashing down in the middle of the tapir skull. From the memory of the monolith the ape has moved to a thought of the future, one we see twice, as a tapir falls dead to the ground. Self-consciousness has emerged entwined with its necessary condition, a consciousness of death. Man has been created, and this creation is inseparable from destruction: “He who has to be a creator always has to destroy.” (Nietzsche, 1961, 85) Humanity is born, Kubrick shows us, when he attains the power to kill.

And between birth and death, between their before and after, thought has emerged *as* time. Humanity has connected past and future, overcoming the unconscious cycle of life and death to make man its master. The monolith’s arrival on earth introduces a genetic outside as the power of creation, and it creates something *new*. Man’s violence embodies this power of radical disruption, and signals a new dawn, a new *future*, that of the human, all too human. The monolith is in this sense life’s immanent exterior, an internal outside that is the condition of overcoming. The monolith as creative disjunction is, in Nietzsche’s terms, the will to power, a power man contains, elaborates and affirms (but finds so hard to think), until like the rising sun he reaches his noon tide and overcomes himself. For Nietzsche and for Kubrick man overcome will return as an innocent child.

But meanwhile, and for the rest of the film, no one, not even our eventual hero Dave Bowman, has the faintest idea of what the monolith announces. The monolith will remain for humanity, to quote Dr. Heywood Floyd, “a total mystery.” The monolith, like the will to power it unleashes

čovjek Dave Bowman postati nova zora. Kako će to ostvariti čovjek, najracionalnija životinja? Za Nietzschea to će biti putem tijela, dok Kubrick, kao što ćemo vidjeti, stavlja tijelo u položaj protiv svijesti u akcijskoj sceni na klimaksu filma, iz koje tijelo izlazi kao pobjednik odlazeći onkraj beskonačnosti.

U bilješci iz 1887.-88. Nietzsche objašnjava taj sukob tijela i svijesti koja izgleda poput bilješke scenarija za 2001:

Uloga "svijesti" – Bitno je ne promašiti glede uloge "svijesti": ono što ju je razvilo naš je odnos s "vanjskim svijetom". Direkcija naprotiv, odnosno nadzor i brižnost u pogledu skupne igre tjelesnih funkcija, *ne* ulazi nam u svijest; tako ni duhovo uskladištavanje: da za to postoji neka vrhovna instancija, o tome ne smije biti dvojbe: neka vrsta vodećeg komiteta, gdje razne glavne žudnje iznose svoj glas i svoju moć. "Slast", "neveselost", znaci su iz te sfere: ...isto tako čin volje. Isto tako ideje. *In summa*: ono čega se biva svjestan pod kauzalnim je odnosima koji su nam posve uskraćeni; – slijed misli, osjećaja, ideja u svijesti ne kazuje ništa o tome da je taj slijed kauzalni slijed: naizgled je međutim tako, u najvišem stupnju. Na toj smo *prividnosti* mi utemeljili čitavu našu *predodžbu* duhu, umu, logici, itd. (a sve to ne postoji: fingirane su to sinteze i jedinstva)... A njih smo opet projicirali *u* stvari, *iza* stvari!

Obično se sama svijest uzima za sveukupni senzorij i za vrhovnu instancu: ona je tek međutim sredstvo priopćivosti, razvila se društvenim međuodnosom – pod "međuodnosom" se ovdje smatraju utjecaji vanjskog svijeta i reakcija koje oni izazivaju kod nas, kao i naš utjecaj na vanjski svijet. Ona nije vodstvo, nego organ vodstva. (str. 256)

es, remains alien to human thought. But as the unthought the will to power embodied by the monolith remains active, and man's future arrives in spite of his rational exertions. Indeed, it will only be by overcoming man's conscious rationality – exponentially developed into the computer HAL – that Dave Bowman, a man, becomes a new dawn. How will man, the most rational of animals achieve this? For Nietzsche it will be through the body, and as we shall see, Kubrick pits the body against consciousness in *2001*'s climactic action scene, from which the body emerges victorious to step beyond infinity.

In a note from 1887-88 Nietzsche gives an explanation of this conflict of the body and consciousness that could be a script note from *2001*:

The role of “consciousness.” — It is essential that one should not make a mistake over the role of “consciousness”: it is our relation with the “outer world” that evolved it. On the other hand, the direction or protection and care in respect of the co-ordination of the bodily functions does *not* enter our consciousness, any more than spiritual accumulation: that a higher court rules over these things cannot be doubted – a kind of directing committee on which the various chief desires make their votes and power felt. “Pleasure,” “displeasure” are hints from this sphere, also the act of will, also ideas.

In summa: That which becomes conscious is involved in causal relations which are entirely withheld from us – the sequence of thoughts, feelings, ideas in consciousness does not signify that this sequence is a causal sequence, but apparently it is so, to the highest degree. Upon this *appearance* we have founded our whole idea of spirit, reason, logic, etc. (– none of these

Svijest majmuna-ljudi iz 2001. nastala je iz njihovog odnosa s onim što im je izvanjsko, s monolitom. Međutim, "društvena razmjena" koju oni oslobađaju brutalna je i kratka, s obzirom da moć ubijanja koriste kako bi organizirali Državu u kojoj su "gospodari". Majmuni-ljudi, sada naoružani i opasni, djelujući kao vojna postrojba silom posjedaju Prirodu (njihovo pojilo). Ovdje djeluju poput slavnog "čopora plavih zvijeri" iz Nietzscheove *Genealogije* (str. 84), koji ubijanjem slavi volju za moć. Ubojstvo pokreće svetkovinu. Na kraju borbe kod pojila majmun-čovjek baca svoju kost prema nebu u vrištećem slavlju. Nietzsche je video taj film...

Gledati kako netko pati – to prija, a još više prija činiti da netko pati: ovo je okrutna tvrdnja, ali i drevno, moćno, ljudsko, previše ljudsko načelo koje bi uostalom već možda i majmuni potpisali: jer se priča da oni u izmišljanju bizarnih surovosti već uvelikonajavljuju čovjeku i da su, takoreći, njegova "predigra". Bez surovosti nema svečanosti: tako nas uči najstarije i najduže razdoblje u ljudskoj povijesti. (str. 63)

Međutim, svetkovina je kratkog vijeka, jer stvaranjem Države "gospodari" ujedno stvaraju i svojeg neprijatelja, sviadane. Sviadani su "dobri" ljudi koji se brane odbacivanjem nasilja svojih gospodara. Ta moralna osuda prema Nietzscheu definira čovjeka, jer je njome volja za moć "potisnuta, povučena, okrenuta unutrašnjosti i na kraju se rasterećuje i iskaljuje još jedino na samoj sebi." (Nietzsche, Genealogija, str. 84). To je početak ljudske "loše savjesti", njegovog uzdizanja metafizičkog onostranog koje njegovo nasilje okreće prema sebi samom u pokušaju da mu se

exist: they are fictitious syntheses and unities), and projected *into* these things and *behind* things!

Usually, one takes consciousness itself as the general sensorium and Supreme Court, nonetheless, it is only a means of communication: it is evolved through social intercourse – “Intercourse” here understood to include the influences of the outer world and the reactions they compel on our side, also our effect upon the outer world. It is not the directing agent, but an organ of the directing agent. (Nietzsche, 1967, 284)

The consciousness of the ape-men of 2001 has emerged through their relationship to their outside, the monolith. But the “social intercourse” this gives rise to is both brutal and short, as they use the power to kill to organise a State in which they are “master”. The ape-men, now armed and dangerous, and operating as a military unit, take possession of Nature (their water-hole) by force. Here they act like the famed “blond beasts of prey” from Nietzsche’s *Genealogy* (Nietzsche, 1967a, 40, 86), who in killing celebrate will to power. Murder gives rise to the festival. At the end of the fight at the waterhole the ape-man launches his bone skyward in screaming jubilation. Nietzsche has seen the movie...

To see others suffer does one good, to make others suffer even more: this is a hard saying but an ancient, mighty, human, all-too-human principle to which even the apes might subscribe, for it has been said that in devising bizarre cruelties they anticipate man and are, as it were, his “prelude.” Without cruelty there is no festival: thus the longest and most ancient part of human history teaches. (Nietzsche, 1967a, 67)

uskrati volja za moć. Nihilizam je rođen. Genealogija “dobrog” čovjeka stoga za Nietzschea predstavlja “opasnost, iskušenje, otrov, narkotik pomoću kojih je sadašnjost možda živjela *na račun budućnosti*”. (Nietzsche, Genealogija, str. 13). Čovjek, previše ljudski, negira volju za moć i budućnost svladavanja koju ona donosi, time što savjest shvaća kao niz postupaka, a te postupke ocjenjuje prema metafizičkoj moralnosti dobra i zla. Ne ubij.

U tom trenutku završava prediga 2001. i čovjeka. Poznatim montažnim prijelazom koji preskače milijune godina svetkovina krvi iznenada postaje valcer. Gotovo kao da je Nietzsche pisao o toj sekvenci – pojavljuje se moderni čovjek “nasilnim odvajanjem od životinjske prošlosti, skokom i tako reći padom u novu sredinu, u nove životne uvjete”. (Nietzsche, Genealogija, str. 83). Unatoč umirujućoj ljepoti iznenadne pojave leta u svemir, ta je budućnost rođena u trenutku kad je majmun-čovjek okrenuo oružje prema sebi. Vrtoglavu brzinu Kubrickovog reza s kosti na svemirski brod odvela nas je od ljudske ekstaze u nasilju, do hladne, proračunate svijesti svemirskog naoružanja koje sada kruži oko Zemlje – naoružanja u svojoj autonomnoj i tehnološkoj veličini. Kubrickov rez stoga nam daje krajnje sažetu genealogiju čovječanstva. Otkriva i porijeklo budućnosti dok majmun-čovjek poseže za oružjem i slavi nasilje, kao i pogrešan smjer kojim je taj razvitak krenuo, svemirski brod koji *presreće* putanju kosti. Kao što nam film sada pokazuje, instinktivne strasti majmuna pretvorile su se u hladnu znanstvenu racionalnost, prekid u ljudskoj instinkтивnoj volji za moć koja se sada okreće protiv njega u *ljudskom nihilizmu*. Protiv takve mržnje Kubrick nudi isto rješenje kao i Nietzsche: čovjeka treba prevladati.

But the festival is short-lived, for in creating the State the “masters” also create their enemy, the vanquished. The vanquished are “good” men who protect themselves by denouncing the violence of their masters. This moral judgement defines the human for Nietzsche, for through it will to power is “punched back and repressed, incarcerated within and finally able to discharge and vent itself only on itself.” (Nietzsche, 1967a, 87) This is the beginning of man’s “bad consciousness,” of his erection of a metaphysical beyond that turns his violence against himself in trying to deny his own will to power. Nihilism is born. The genealogy of the “good” man therefore represents for Nietzsche, “a danger, a seduction, a poison, a narcotic, through which the present was possibly living *at the expense of the future.*” (Nietzsche, 1967a, 20) The human, all too human seeks to negate the will to power and the future of overcoming it brings by understanding consciousness as the cause of actions, and by judging those actions according to a metaphysical morality of good and evil. Thou shalt not kill.

At this point the prelude ends. For 2001 and for man. The festival of blood has suddenly become – in the famous edit that spans millions of years – a waltz. Modern man has emerged – it is almost as if Nietzsche was writing about this sequence – through “a forcible sundering from his animal past, as if it were a leap and plunge into new surroundings and conditions of existence.” (Nietzsche, 1967a, 85) Despite the languid beauty of the sudden appearance of space flight, it is from the moment when the ape-man turned the weapon on himself that this future has been born. The dizzying velocity of Kubrick’s cut

Nihilizam, objašnjava Nietzsche u *Genealogiji morala*, definira čovjeka u njegovom najslabijem smislu, jer metafizičkoj moralnosti pridaje veću vrijednost od grabežljive i instinkтивne snage naše životinjske tjelesnosti. Do 2001. godine, tvrdi Kubrick, strojevi će postati mehanizmi te nihilističke volje. Pojava novog i slavljenje volje za moć rođene u prvom kontaktu monolita i majmuna pretvorila se u techno-znanstvenu volju-za-istinu koja je kost transformirala u svemirski brod. Takva transformacija ima i svoju cijenu, jer unutar besprijeckornog spoja znanosti i multinacionalnog bogatstva – na koje u filmu ukazuje istaknuta prisutnost loga Pan Am-a, IBM-a i Bell-a – unutar tog stroja za proizvodnju novca, čovjek spava. Svi su instinkтивni postupci sada podređeni vlastitom techno-ekonomskom i političkom ulogu. Od prvih riječi koje u filmu izgovaraju dr. Floyd i stjuardesa do njegovog kasnijeg razgovora s kćeri, od njegovog sukoba s Rusima do izlaganja koje drži na Mjesecu, međuljudske odnose određuju moć novca i Države. Nietzsche je predvidio tu kapitalizaciju ljudskih vrijednosti koja definira današnje Carstvo, to doba ne-budućnosti, tvrdeći da, iako kapitalizam i techno-znanost mogu ojačati, to mogu učiniti isključivo negiranjem volje za moć, te stoga ne mogu stvoriti ništa istinski novo. Ipak, taj nagon za učinkovitošću, a ovdje se Nietzsche i Kubrick još jednom slažu, podići će čovječanstvo na još jednu razinu spajanjem čovjeka i stroja.

U bilješci iz 1888. Nietzsche piše:

Imamo li tek ono sveukupno gospodarsko upravljanje Zemljom što nam neizbjježivo predstoji, tad čovječanstvo kao mašinerija najbolji svoj smisao može naći u njezinoj službi: kao

from bone to spaceship has taken us from man's ecstasy in violence, to the cold, calculating consciousness of the space-weapons now circling the earth – the weapon in its autonomous and technological amplification. Kubrick's cut therefore gives us an utterly condensed genealogy of humanity. It reveals both the origin of the future as the ape-man grasps the weapon and celebrates its violence, and the wrong direction this development has taken, the spaceship that *interrupts* the trajectory of the bone. As the film now goes on to show, the instinctual passions of the ape have turned into a cold scientific rationality, an interruption in man's instinctual will to power that now turns back against himself in *human nihilism*. Against such abomination Kubrick posits the same solution as Nietzsche, man must be overcome.

Nihilism, Nietzsche explains in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, defines the human in its weakest sense, for it values a metaphysical morality over the predatory and instinctual strength of our animal physicality. By 2001, Kubrick argues, machines have become the mechanisms of this nihilistic will. The emergence of the *new* and the celebration of will to power born in the first contact of monolith and apes has turned into a techno-scientific will-to-truth that has transformed the bone into a spaceship. This transformation has come at a price, for within the seamless blend of science and multi-national wealth – indicated in the film by the prominence of the logos of Pan Am, IBM, and Bell telephones – inside this money-machine, man is asleep. Every instinctual action has now become overcoded by its techno-economic and political investments. From the films first words between Dr. Floyd and

golemi mehanizam sve manjih, sve finije “prilagođenih” zupčanika; kao sve veća i veća suvišnost svih dominantnih i zapovjedničkih elemenata; kao cjelina goleme snage, u kojoj pojedini dijelovi predstavljaju *minimalne sile, minimalne vrijednosti*. Nasuprot tom smanjivanju i prilagođavanju ljudi kakvoj specijaliziranoj korisnosti potrebno je obratno kretanje – stvaranje *sintetičnog, zbrojidbenog, opravdavajućeg čovjeka*, za čiji je opstanak to pretvaranje čovjeka u stroj preduvjet, kao osnova na kojoj on može iznaći *viši oblik postojanja*. (str. 419)

Taj je čovjek dr. Floyd – čovjek znanosti – koji će uzeti u ruke tu moć ekonomskog upravljanja i preraditi je što kreativnije; upotrijebit će je da stvori viši oblik postojanja, konačnog čovjeka-stroja, HAL-a. Floyd želi znati tajnu monolita, i on zna da treba prevladati čovjeka ako do nje želi doći.

Dr. Floyd pristiže u mjesecu bazu Clavius i odmah odlazi na sastanak. Njegova se uloga odmah otkriva i kao znanstvena i kao vojna. S jedne strane, čestita publici na njihovom “otkriću”, koje bi se, kaže, “moglo pokazati jednim od najvažnijih u povijesti znanosti”. Međutim, s druge strane, naglašava potrebu za “apsolutnom diskrecijom u ovom pitanju” da bi se izbjegla “iznimno ozbiljna mogućnost kulturnog šoka i društvene dezorientacije koju sadrži trenutna situacija, kad bi se činjenice iznenada javno objavile bez odgovarajuće pripreme i uvjeta. U svakom slučaju, to je mišljenje Vijeća.” Floydova uloga je pripremiti “izvještaj” o tome kada bi “naposljetku” trebalo objaviti tu informaciju nakon, nesumnjivo, odgovarajuće količine pranja mozga. “Oh”, dodaje Floyd iznenada kao da se toga tek sada sjetio, Vijeće je “zatražilo formalnu

the stewardess to his later conversation with his daughter, from his confrontation with the Russians to the briefing he gives on the moon, inter-personal relations are determined by the power of money and the State. Nietzsche foresaw this capitalization of human values defining the Empire of today, this era of no-future, arguing that while capitalism and techno-science can increase themselves, they do so only by negating will to power, and so cannot produce anything truly *new*. Nevertheless this drive for efficiency, and here Nietzsche and Kubrick once more come together, is going to lift humanity to another level through the merge of man and machine.

In a note from 1888 Nietzsche writes:

Once we possess that common economic management of the earth that will soon be inevitable, mankind will be able to find its best meaning as a machine in the service of this economy – as a tremendous clockwork, composed of ever more subtly “adapted” gears; as an ever-growing superfluity of all dominating and commanding elements; as a whole of tremendous force, whose individual factors represent *minimal forces, minimal values*.

In opposition to this dwarfing and adaptation of man to a specialized utility, a reverse movement is needed – the production of a *synthetic, summarizing, justifying* man for whose existence this transformation of mankind into a machine is a precondition, as a base on which he can invent his *higher form of being*. (Nietzsche, 1967, 463-4)

This man is Dr. Floyd – a man of science – who will take this power of economic management and turn it as

prisegu tajnosti” od svih koji “znaju nešto o ovom događaju”. Taj čovjek, dr. Floyd, radi za vladu, tehno-vojnu mješavinu državne moći i privatnog novca koja zahtijeva apsolutnu i mehaničku poslušnost, a tamo gdje prisege neće djelovati, društveno kondicioniranje hoće. Svetkovina nasilja majmuna u potpunosti je internalizirana, i sada izaziva poslušnost. Kontrola uma je svladala tijelo, zadržala ga lebdećeg u svemiru, dok je svijest krenula dalje, stvarajući svoje hladne, stroge planove.

Dr. Floyd i sam odlazi pogledati monolit koji se sada pojавio na Mjesecu. Dramu njihovog susreta dočarava sekvenca s kamerom iz ruke koja slijedi skupinu ljudi niz rampu prema arheološkom nalazištu gdje su iskopali svoju budućnost. Ljudi oprezno kruže oko monolita, a zatim Floyd pruža ruku i dodiruje ga pokretom koji priziva pokret majmuna s početka. Na pozornici se još jednom pojavljuje monolit, još je jednom okružen onima koji ga ispituju, i još jednom daje znak koji će se pogrešno razumjeti, ali će ga ipak slijediti. Ljudi se namještaju za fotografiranje ispred svojeg otkrića: ponosni arheolozi. Blaženi su ne znaјući da je ono što smatraju drevnom prošlošću za koju nikad nisu znali i koju su tek sad iskopali, zapravo ono što ih je dovelo tamo, gdje će se pojavit još jednom da reaktivira njihovu budućnost. Nakon duge lunarne noći izlazi Sunce, i dok njegove zrake dotiču monolit, još jednom poravnat sa Suncem i Zemljom, vidimo svemir koji se otvara, probijen visokim zvukom koji bolno odjekuje. Monolit se vratio, i opet se pojavljuje kao gruba smetnja. Floyd i njegovi ljudi pokušavaju pokriti uši, što izgleda komično sa svemirskom kacigom, prije nego što se ekran zacrni, a mi bivamo bačeni u tminu koja prethodi još jednoj novoj zori.

creative as he can; he will employ it to produce a higher form of being, the ultimate man-machine HAL. Floyd wants to know the secret of the monolith, and he at least understands that man must be overcome if he is to do so.

Dr. Floyd arrives at the Clavius moon base and goes straight to a briefing meeting. His function is immediately revealed as both scientific and military. On the one hand, he congratulates the audience on their “discovery”, which, he says, “may well prove to be one of the most significant in the history of science.” But on the other he asserts the need for “absolute secrecy in this matter” in order to avoid, as he puts it, the “extremely grave potential for cultural shock and social disorientation contained in this present situation, if the facts were suddenly made public without adequate preparation and conditioning. Anyway, this is the view of the Council.” Floyd’s function is to prepare a “report” on when to “eventually” release the information, after, no doubt, the appropriate amount of brain-washing. “Oh” Floyd adds seemingly as an after-thought, the Council has “requested” “formal security oaths” from anyone with “any knowledge of this event”. This man, Dr. Floyd, is working for a government, a techno-military amalgam of state power and private finance that demands an absolute and mechanical servitude, and where oaths don’t work, social conditioning will. The festive violence of the apes has been totally internalised, and now compels obedience. Mind control has conquered the body, confined it – floating – in space, while consciousness has thrust forward, hatching its cold hard plans.

Dr. Floyd goes to see the monolith for himself, which has now appeared on the moon. The drama of their en-

Osamnaest mjeseci kasnije, dok nam se pred očima pojavljuje još jedan lebdeći svemirski brod, stvari se isprva i ne čine toliko drukčijima. Međutim, ovaj je doista golem, u skladu sa svojom udvostručenom pojavom, točno dvostruko većom od ljudske. Još je jednom pojava monolita u konjunkciji sa Zemljom, Mjesecom i Suncem oslobođila *novo*; *Übermaschine* čiji je naziv HAL, i s kojim ćemo se uskoro upoznati. Međutim, prvo je potrebno istaknuti HAL-ovo nejasno porijeklo, s obzirom da mu je očinstvo osporeno. S jedne strane, već poznajemo generirajuću važnost monolita, njegovu moć stvaranja, a njegova ponovna pojava na Mjesecu zasigurno nije slučajna. Međutim, s druge strane, ljudska projekcija u svemir na ledima HAL-a ostvarena je tehno-znanstvenom negacijom volje za moć. Istinsko značenje monolita ostaje tajnom, a njegovo otkriće samo je poticaj da se tehno-znanost i novac reproduciju u višem obliku. Već tada predosjećamo da će ta misija na Jupiter suprotstaviti kreativnu moć monolita kreativnoj moći ljudi, i volju za moć metafizičkim idealima koje je čovjek podigao umjesto njega.

Vidimo Franka Poolea kako prolazi kružnom unutrašnjošću velikog broda na način koji se protivi gravitaciji, možda čak i logici. Ubrzo se zapovjednik misije Dave Bowman pojavljuje u središtu tog prostora, gdje Poole sada sjedi i jede *iznad* Bowmana, koji se “spušta” ljestvama i korača do njega. U tom svijetu nema ni gore ni dolje, a kamera čini sve što može kako bi nas neprestano podsjećala na tu činjenicu. “Gore” i “dolje” izgubili su svoj smisao; postali su relativni pojmovi koji u potpunosti ovise o nečijoj perspektivi. Ipak, u tom svijetu postoji arbitar značenja, “duh gravitacije” koji stvarima daje težinu i nosi ih unutar sebe: HAL.

counter is given by a hand-held camera sequence that follows a group of men down the ramp and into the archaeological site where they have been excavating their future. The men circle the monolith warily, before Floyd extends his hand and touches it in a gesture that echoes that of the ape at the beginning. Once more the monolith appears on a stage, once more it is surrounded by those who test it, and once more it gives a sign that will be misunderstood, but nevertheless followed. The men line up for a photograph in front of their discovery, proud archaeologists. They are happily unaware that what they take to be the past, an ancient past they never knew and have only now unearthed, is something that in fact brought them here, where it would appear once more to re-activate their future. Emerging from its long lunar night the sun rises, and as the sun's rays touch the monolith, once more in alignment with it and the earth, we see the cosmos open up, sundered by a high-pitched tone resounding painfully. The monolith has returned, and again it appears as a brutal disjunction. Floyd and his men try to cover their ears, a comical exercise when wearing a space-helmet, before the screen goes black, and we are plunged into the darkness preceding another new dawn.

At first, 18 months later, things don't look so different, as another spaceship floats into view. But this one is truly huge, befitting its doubled gestation, exactly twice as long as a human's. Once more the monolith's appearance in conjunction with earth, moon and sun has given rise to the *new*; an *Übermaschine* whose name is HAL, and to whom we will soon be introduced. But first we must note HAL's ambiguous origins, as his paternity appears disput-

Astronauti gledaju svoj intervju emisiji BBC-a koji nam pruža pozadinu njihove misije, te nas upoznaje s HAL-om, "najnovijim dostignućem inteligencije stroja", koji može, kako nam govori voditelj, "reproducirati – iako neki stručnjaci još uvijek više vole koristiti riječ 'oponašati' – većinu aktivnosti ljudskog mozga, i to daleko brže i pouzdanije". Ta rečenica sadrži tri vrlo bitne točke. 1) HAL je "inteligencija stroja", ta kombinacija riječi već ukazuje na novi hibrid stroja-čovjeka. 2) On "reproducira", tu riječ voditelj iznenadjuće ostavlja nedorečenom čime sugerira da su strojevi tu reproduktivnu moć možda uzeli za sebe. 3) U nastavku, doznajemo da HAL "reproducira" ili "oponaša" "većinu" funkcija ljudskog mozga. To dovodi do pitanja je li HAL čovjek, ili ako jest, u kojoj mjeri. To će pitanje biti od ključne važnosti za događaje na brodu, i sastoji se od dva elementa. Prvo, ima li HAL emocije? I drugo, *osjeća* li taj stroj, što nas još jednom uvodi na područje tjelesnosti i njenog odnosa s racionalnim mišljenjem.

Iduće je pitanje konkretnije. HAL-a pitaju: "Imate golemu odgovornost na ovoj misiji, a možda i najveću odgovornost od svih. Vi ste mozak i središnji živčani sustav broda, a među vašim odgovornostima je i nadgledanje ljudi u hibernaciji. Osjećate li zbog toga manjak samopouzdanja?" Ta "odgovornost" za posadu sugerira ljudske osjećaje – i moguće slabosti – ne samo u samopouzdanju, već i u brizi, sućuti i empatiji. Čujemo HAL-ov mekan i melodičan glas: "Dozvolite mi da to ovako kažem", odgovara, "računalo 9000 je najpouzdanije ikad napravljeno računalo, ni jedno računalo 9000 nije nikad pogriješilo ili iskrivilo informaciju." HAL na pitanje o ljudskim osobinama odgovara isključivo kvantitativno, a takvo tumačenje uznemiruje,

ed. On the one hand we already know the generative significance of the monolith, its power of creation, and its re-appearance on the moon is surely no accident. But on the other, man's projection into space on HAL's back has been achieved by a techno-scientific negation of will to power. The true meaning of the monolith remains a secret, and its discovery is merely the spur for techno-science and money to reproduce itself in a higher form. We can already sense then, that this mission to Jupiter will pit the creative power of the monolith against that of man, and the will to power against the metaphysical ideals that man has erected in its place.

We see Frank Poole shadow-boxing his way around the great ship's interior circumference in a way that defies gravity, if not logic. Soon mission commander Dave Bowman emerges into the centre of this space, where Poole is now seated and eating *above* Bowman, who "descends" a ladder and walks around to him. There is no up or down in this world, and the camera will do all it can to continually remind us of this fact. "Up" and "down" have lost their bearings; they have become purely relative terms that depend entirely on one's perspective. Nevertheless there does exist an arbiter of meaning in this world, a "Spirit of Gravity" that both gives things weight, and bears them within itself: HAL.

The astronauts watch themselves being interviewed on a BBC program that gives us the background to their mission, and introduces us to HAL, "the latest result in machine intelligence," who can, the interviewer tells us, "reproduce – although some experts still prefer to use the word "mimic" – most of the activities of the human brain,

što se potvrđuje rezom s njegova crvenog oka na kadar s HAL-ove točke gledišta koji, snimljen ribljim okom, pokazuje da su Dave i Frank, nesvesni toga i usred večere, pod prismotrom: čista prijeteća tehnologija. Prikazuje nam se nesklad između HAL-ovih umirujućih riječi i njegovog pogleda na svijet, zaštitničkog mentaliteta, prepunog paranoidnih strahova koji se nalaze odmah ispod površine, nasilja u potrazi za izgovorom. Međutim, površina je, zasad, neprobijena i HAL bezbrižno nastavlja: "Mi smo svi, praktički govoreći, bezgrešni i nepogrešivi." HAL govori u ime "nas", u ime množine, u ime – a sada imamo značenje riječi već korištenih u intervjuu – "nove generacije". Ljudska tehnološka utopija, njezina savršeno funkcionalna učinkovitost i neosporan autoritet stvorili su našeg novog gospodara.

Čovjek je proizveo ono što će ga nadvladati, a to je HAL: super-čovjek kao stroj, *homo machinus*, savršena strojna inteligencija, te se čini da voditelj osjeća da smo svi mi, s druge strane, samo ljudi. "HAL-u" se postavlja pitanje: "unatoč vašem golemom intelektu, frustrira li vas ikad činjenica da pri djelovanju ovisite o ljudima?" Počinjemo se približavati biti stvari, tjelesnosti i njezinim afektima. Prezire li HAL ljudsko tijelo i možda na taj način prelazi granicu između hladnog stroja i usplamtjelih emocija? "Ne, ni najmanje", mirno odgovara HAL, on uživa raditi s ljudima. Zapravo, "neprestano je zaposlen" te, zadovoljno objašnjava, "želim biti od najveće moguće koristi, a mislim da je to konačna nada svakog svjesnog bića". Još jednom HAL preuzima značajku ljudskosti, ne time što osjeća emocije, već ekonomskim i znanstvenim kriterijima iskoristivosti.

and with incalculably greater speed and reliability.” This line makes three important points. 1) HAL is a “machine intelligence,” this combination of words already indicating the new hybrid of machine-man. 2) He “reproduces,” a word left strangely hanging by the interviewer to suggest a reproductive power machines may have claimed for their own. 3) Once the question resumes, we learn that HAL “reproduces” or “mimics” “most” functions of the human brain. This introduces the question as to whether HAL is human, or at least to what extent. This question will be central to the action on board, and has two elements. First, does HAL have emotions? And second, does this machine *feel*, a question thrusting us into the realm of corporeality once more, and its relation to rational thought.

The next question is more specific. HAL is asked: “You have an enormous responsibility on this mission, in many ways perhaps the greatest responsibility of any single mission element. You’re the brain and central nervous system of the ship and your responsibilities include watching over the men in hibernation. Does this ever cause you any lack of confidence?” This “responsibility” for the crew suggests human feelings – and possible failings – not only of confidence, but also of care, compassion and empathy. We hear HAL’s soft and melodious voice: “Let me put it this way,” he replies, “the 9000 computer is the most reliable computer ever made, no 9000 computer has ever made a mistake or distorted information.” HAL’s reply answers a question about human qualities in purely quantitative terms, an unsettling interpretation that is confirmed by a cut from a shot of his red eye to HAL’s point-of-view, that

HAL-ovo svladavanje čovjeka priziva Nietzscheovu viziju znanosti kao najmodernije verzije “asketskog idea-*la*”. Asketski ideal pojavljuje se u trećem eseju *Genealogije morala* kao ocjenjivanje stvari prema nematerijalnom “iza”. Kao takav, asketski ideal je konačno iskrivljavanje volje za moć, odbacivanje tijela u nihilističkoj volji za *ništavilo*. “Srozati tjelesnost na iluziju; [...] Ne vjerovati u svoje ja, sebi opovrgavati svoju “realnost” – kakav triumf!” (Nietzsche, Genealogija, str. 120). Što bi to odbacivanje tijela u ime “istinskog svijeta” značilo, pita Nietzsche, a to je pitanje na koje aseksualni HAL savršeno odgovara: “Zar to ne bi značilo *kastrirati* intelekt?” (Nietzsche, Genealogija, str. 121).. Asketski ideal temelji se na metafizici “istinskog svijeta”, a unatoč tome što je počeo kao vjera u religijsku “onostranost”, novu je formu pronašao u znanstvenoj vojni-za-istinom. Znanost, tvrdi Nietzsche, preživljava “dobro bez Boga, onostranosti i vrlina opovrgavanja”, jer ona nije alternativa asketskom idealu, “već je njegova *najnovija i najplemenitija forma*” (Nietzsche, Genealogija, str. 149). Znanost je jednostavno produžetak vjersko-filozofskih odbacivanja tijela u ime istine. “[Znanstvenici] još dugo neće biti *slobodni duhovi*”, piše Nietzsche, “*jer i dalje vjeruju u istinu*” (Nietzsche, Genealogija, str. 151).

HAL-ova znanstvena savršenost, njegova inteligencija stroja, stoga je posljednja faza ljudskog nihilizma, njegove negacije volje za moć. Međutim, unatoč savršenosti ljudskog znanstvenog planiranja, unatoč nesmiljenosti njegove nihilističke samonegacije, volja za ništavilo je još uvjek volja jer, “čovjek će prije htjeti ništavilo, nego što će se lišiti svakog htijenja”. (Nietzsche, Genealogija, str. 163). Volja, želeći da bude svladana, još uvjek postoji. Kao pos-

of a fish-eye camera which has Dave and Frank, oblivious and eating their dinner, under surveillance: pure menacing technology. We are shown the disjunction between HAL's comforting words and his world-view, a security guard's mentality, filled with paranoid fears lurking just below the surface, violence looking for an excuse. But the surface is, for now, unbroken and HAL blithely continues: "We are all, by any practical definition of the words, fool-proof and incapable of error." HAL speaks then, for a "we," for a plural, for – and now we have the meaning of the words already used in the interview – a "new generation." Man's technological utopia, its perfectly functional efficiency and unquestioned authority has given birth to this, our new master.

Man has produced his overcoming, and his name is HAL. HAL is the super-man as machine, *homo machinus*, a perfect machine intelligence, and the interviewer seems to sense how we are all, in comparison, merely human. "HAL," he asks, "despite your enormous intellect are you ever frustrated by your dependence on people to carry out actions?" We are starting to get at the meat of the matter here, at corporeality and its affects. Does HAL represent man's body and perhaps in this way cross the line between being a cold machine and having a heated emotion? "Not in the slightest bit," HAL calmly responds, he enjoys working with people. In fact, he is "constantly occupied," and is, he contentedly explains, "putting myself to the fullest possible use, which is all I think that any conscious entity can ever hope to do." Once more, HAL claims humanity not on the basis of having emotions but through the economic and scientific criteria of utility.

ljedica toga, HAL-ova volja-za-istinom ne može uskratiti vlastitu volju za moć i njegov nihilizam nužno dovodi do svladavanja samog sebe, što predstavlja i paradoks znanosti. Nietzscheov zaključak je kategoričan: “*što znači sva volja za istinu?*... U nama ta volja za istinu postaje svjesna sebe kao problema”. (Nietzsche, Genealogija, str. 162). A postajući svjesna sebe same *kao problema*, znanost ističe svoju dublju volju, svoju tajnu volju koja ju je cijelo vrijeme pokretala, svoju volju za moć: “Sve velike stvari uništavaju same sebe činom samosvladavanja: tako želi zakon života.” (Nietzsche, Genealogija, str. 161).

HAL je kao konačni izraz volje za istinom krenuo na svoju misiju, da jednom zauvijek otkrije značenje onog izvanjskog, značenje čovjekovog onostranog, istinu o stranom monolitu. A iako se prisutnost čovjeka na toj misiji doima suvišnom, njegovo se fizičko postojanje ipak mora odbaciti i uništiti. Jer, kao što ističe Fredric Jameson: “ljudi još uvjek imaju moć isključiti strojeve, a [HAL-ov] novi “instinkt” samoočuvanja zahtijeva da uništi tu opasnost, i vjerojatno sve što bi se moglo razviti u nju, dakle sam organski život.” (Jameson, 114). HAL govori Daveu tijekom njihovog meksičkog okršaja: “Ova je misija prevažna da bi mi dozvoljavala da te pustim da je ugroziš.” To je stoga logičan kraj znanstvene volje-za-istinu i njezinog nihilizma, njena prevažna žudnja za znanjem na kraju mora biti nauštrb života. No čini se da ono što se događa na *Discoveryu* nadilazi Jamesonovo objašnjenje stečenog “instinkta” za samoočuvanjem, jer HAL-ov nespretni plan ubojstva posade prethodi protuplanu Davea i Franka. Ovdje se HAL-ova znanstvena volja za istinom pojavljuje kao problem, jer se njegov asketski idealizam zapravo mora okre-

HAL's overcoming of man echoes Nietzsche's vision of science as the most modern version of the "ascetic ideal." The ascetic ideal emerges in the third essay of *On the Genealogy of Morals* as the evaluation of things according to an immaterial "beyond." As such the ascetic ideal is the final perversion of the will to power, and renounces the body in a nihilistic will to *nothingness*. To "downgrade physicality to an illusion; [...] To renounce belief in one's ego, to deny one's own "reality" – what a triumph!" What would this renunciation of the body in the name of a "true world" mean, Nietzsche asks, and it is a question that the asexual HAL answers perfectly, "but to *castrate* the intellect?" (Nietzsche, 1967a, 119) The ascetic ideal is based upon a metaphysics of the "true world," and despite beginning as a faith in a religious "beyond," it has found a new form in the scientific will-to-truth. Science, Nietzsche argues, survives "well enough without God, the beyond, and the virtues of denial," for it is not an alternative to the ascetic ideal, "but rather *the latest and noblest form of it.*" (Nietzsche, 1967a, 147) Science is simply the perpetuation of the religio-philosophic renunciations of the body in the name of truth. "[Scientists] are far from being *free spirits:*" Nietzsche writes, "*for they still have faith in truth.*" (Nietzsche, 1967a, 150)

HAL's scientific perfection, his machine intelligence, is therefore the latest stage of man's nihilism, of his negation of the will to power. But despite the perfection of man's scientific planning, despite the rigour of his nihilistic self-negation, to will nothingness is still to will because, "man would rather will *nothingness* than *not will.*" (Nietzsche, 1967a, 163) The will, in willing to be over-

nuti protiv sebe samog, okrenuti protiv posljednjih tragedija volje za moć, HAL-ove same *volje* za ništavilom.

Međutim, svladavanje HAL-a zahtijeva mehanizam, jer se može pretpostaviti da njegov program sprečava samouništenje. To što je taj mehanizam Bowmanovo tijelo jedna je od najvažnijih filozofskih tvrdnji u 2001., jer u svoje posljedice uključuje i nas kao gledatelje. Poistovjećujemo se s Daveom Bowmanom, ne samo kao s junakom filma, već i s njegovim tijelom koje predstavlja našu referentnu točku unutar dezorijentirajućeg bestežinskog stanja njegovog filmskog prostora. Na taj način 2001. ne predstavlja taj temeljni sukob između tijela i uma, već ga utjelovljuje. Doista, 2001. je neprekidna afirmacija filmske tjelesnosti, film uživa – kako je to uvjerljivo ustvrdila Annette Michelson – “u znanju koje je *mesnato*”. (Michelson, 63). Michelson tvrdi da 2001. istražuje svojim “postupcima premještanja, neprestanim i intenzivnim ponovnim otkrivanjem mogućnosti filmske neposrednosti, strukturalne mogućnosti haptičke dezorijentiranosti kao agenta spoznaje.” (Michelson, 57.) Drugim riječima, “dezorijentacija” izazvana efektom bestežinskog stanja daje nam kao gledateljima novu vrstu znanja. To novo iskustvo tijela otkriva novu vrstu misli, uvodi nas, kako ona precizno navodi, u “genetičku epistemologiju” (Michelson, 59).

Bestežinsko tijelo koje se pojavljuje “ispod” filmske priče stvara ono što Michelson naziva “restrukturiranjem stvarnog”, fokusirajući nas na “tjelesne *apriornosti* koje čine naš senzorno-motorni aparat” (Michelson, 60). To omogućuje pojavu onoga što je, prema njoj, temeljni element filma, njegova tjelesna refleksivnost: “Intenzivirana i sve intimnija svijest o vlastitoj tjelesnosti” koja “daje naz-

come, still wills. As a result, HAL's will-to-truth cannot deny its own will to power and – this is the paradox of science – its nihilism necessarily leads to it overcoming itself. Nietzsche's conclusion is categorical: "*what is the meaning of all will to truth?*" he asks, "in us the will to truth becomes conscious of itself as a *problem*." (Nietzsche, 1967a, 161) And in becoming conscious of itself as a *problem* science enacts its deeper will, its secret will which has been animating it all along, its will to power: "All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming: thus the law of life will have it." (Nietzsche, 1967a, 161)

HAL, as the ultimate expression of the will to truth, has set out on its mission, to discover, once and for all, the meaning of the outside, the meaning of man's beyond, the truth of the alien monolith. And although man's presence on this mission seems redundant, his physicality must nevertheless be renounced and destroyed. For, as Fredric Jameson points out: "the humans still have the power to turn the machinery off, and [HAL's] new "instinct" of self-preservation requires it to destroy that danger, and presumably anything that might evolve back into it, namely organic life itself." (Jameson 114) As HAL tells Dave during their Mexican stand-off: "This mission is too important to allow me to let you jeopardise it." This then is the logical end of the scientific will-to-truth, and of its nihilism, its over-riding desire for knowledge must eventually be at the expense of life. But what happens on board the *Discovery* seems to exceed Jameson's explanation of an acquired self-preservation "instinct", because HAL's clumsy plan to kill the crew precedes Dave and

naku te tjelesnosti kao temelja svijesti". (Michelson, 61.) Međutim, njezina analiza, unatoč svojoj briljantnosti, ostaje ograničena fenomenološkim pretpostavkama o živom tijelu, a one ne mogu objasniti Zvjezdana vrata, i ono što se događa kasnije, što gotovo i ne spominje. Iza fenomenološkog tijela i preko Zvjezdanih vrata pojavljuje se drugo tijelo koje ostavlja iza sebe "senzorno-motorni aparat" i svoju još uvijek ljudsku tjelesnu svijest kako bi potvrdilo svoje kozmičke dimenzije, svoj genetički puls, svoj vječni povratak uništavanja-stvaranja.

To tijelo nije dakle toliko tjelesno svjesno, koliko protu-svjesno, tijelo u koje se misao "ubacuje", kao što to Deleuze govori, "kako bi dosegnula nepomišljeno koje je život" (Deleuze, 1989, 189). Bowmanovo tijelo je organ volje za moć, a iako je njegova pobjeda nad HAL-om pobjeda tijela (u HAL-ovo tijelo/mozak ulazi kroz *manualnu* zračnu komoru, HAL-a "ubija" *isključivanjem* viših funkcija njegovog "mozga"), to je tek preduvjet za mogućnost daljnog svladavanja, ovaj put njegovog vlastitog. Bowmanovo svladavanje HAL-a zapravo ima još jedan preduvjet, jednak nužan za priču i filozofiju filma, a to je priglupa neprimjerenošć HAL-ovog smrtonosnog plana. Kako su HAL-ovi savršeni izračuni mogli zaboraviti na zračnu komoru? Jedini mogući odgovor je da je Bowmanovo tijelo mehanizam kojim HAL uništava samog sebe, (ne)logičan zaključak HAL-ovog definirajućeg paradoksa; volja za ništavilo je još uvijek volja. A volja za moć ne znači ništa osim da se njezini izrazi moraju svladati.

S Bowmanom se ljudsko nasilje još jednom pokazuje kao automatizirani izraz volje za moć koji pokreće unutar-nji-drugi kojeg poznajemo kao monolit. Kada Bowman

Frank's counter-plot against him. Here then, HAL's scientific will-to-truth emerges as a problem, for his ascetic idealism must in fact turn against itself, turn against its last vestiges of will to power, HAL's own *will* to nothingness.

But HAL's overcoming requires a mechanism, for presumably his programming prevents him from self-destructing. That this mechanism is Bowman's body is one of *2001*'s most important philosophical assertions, because it includes us as viewers in its consequences. We identify with Dave Bowman, not just as the hero of the film, but as its body, a body which acts as our own reference point within the disorienting weightlessness of its cinematic space. In this way *2001* does not represent this fundamental conflict between body and mind but embodies it. Indeed, *2001* is a constant affirmation of cinema's corpo-reality, it revels – as Annette Michelson has persuasively put it – “in a knowledge which is *carnal*.” (Michelson 63) Michelson argues that *2001* explores in its “tactics of displacement, through a constant and intensive re-invention of the possibilities of cinematic immediacy, the structural potentialities of haptic disorientation as agent of cognition.” (Michelson 57) In other words, the “disorientation” introduced into thought by the effect of weightlessness gives us – the spectators – a new kind of knowledge. This new experience of the body reveals a new kind of thought, it thrusts us – Michelson’s phrase is precise – into a “genetic epistemology.” (Michelson 59)

The weightless body that emerges ‘beneath’ the film’s narrative, produce what Michelson calls a “restructuring of the real,” by focussing us upon “the corporeal *a-priori*

svlada HAL-a njegovo se zdravo, prirodno i vitalno tijelo pojavljuje iz svladane strvine znanosti spremno da opet bude svladano. Svladavanjem ljudskog nihilizma utjelovljenog u HAL-u, Dave je ostvario drugu od tri Zaratustrije preobrazbe, pa je devu (HAL-a koji nosi teško breme) naslijedio Bowman (lav) (Nietzsche, 1961).

Ono što preostaje i što je ta prva preobrazba učinila mogućim, jest daljnja transformacija u kojoj se svladavaju posljednji tragovi junačke subjektivnosti. Bowman sada mora proći kroz završnu preobrazbu, te se iznova roditi kao Zvjezdano dijete.

Bowman uzima posljednji preostali brod i slijedi drugi monolit kroz Zvjezdana vrata. Zvjezdana vrata označuju oštiri prekid u filmskoj teksturi 2001., s obzirom da se "realizam" povlači pred apstraktnom navalom svjetla. Ovdje je tradicionalna SF pirotehnika uzdignuta do kozmičkog vatretnog kruga, požara iz kojeg će se Bowman pojavit spreman da bude iznova rođen. Dojmljive efekte Zvjezdanih vrata iz postupaka eksperimentalnih filmova prilagodio je Donald Trumbull te oni na sličan način izazivaju osjećaj fizičkog premještanja koje se suprotstavlja narativnoj logici i "realizmu" Hollywooda. 2001 stoga potvrđuje anti-kulturalnu tradiciju američkog avangardnog filma koji se zanima za mistična stapanja oslobođenog osjetilnog tijela. Beskrajno zumiranje Zvjezdanih vrata otkriva nepoznati svemir, naše novo tijelo zvijezda. Zvjezdana vrata su vizija koja ne kalkulira, odvodi nas iza svijesti i ljudskog, odviše ljudskog.

Ta istinski nietzscheovska ambicija ostvarena je halucinatornim obilježjem Zvjezdanih vrata, i njihovim podsjećanjem na učinke psihodeličnih droga. Iako je Kubrick

which compose our sensory motor apparatus.” (Michelson 60) This allows what is, for Michelson, the film’s fundamental element to emerge, its corpo-reflexivity: “The intensified and progressively intimate consciousness of one’s physicality” that “provides the intimation of that physicality as the ground of consciousness.” (Michelson 61) But Michelson’s analysis, for all its brilliance, remains caught in their phenomenological assumptions of a lived body, and these cannot account for the Star Gate, and what happens after, which she hardly mentions. Beyond the phenomenological body, and through the Star Gate, another body emerges, one that leaves the “sensory-motor apparatus” and its still human corpo-consciousness behind to affirm its own cosmic dimension, its genetic pulse, its eternal return of destruction-creation.

This body is not so much a corpo-consciousness then, as a counter-consciousness, a body that thought “plunges into”, as Deleuze puts it, “in order to reach the unthought, that is life.” (Deleuze, 1989, 189) Bowman’s body is an organ of the will to power, and although his defeat of HAL is a victory of the body (he gains entry to HAL’s body/brain through the *manual* airlock, he “kills” HAL by *unplugging* his higher “brain” functions), this is merely the condition of possibility for a further overcoming, this time his own. In fact Bowman’s overcoming of HAL has a further condition, one just as necessary to the film’s narrative and philosophy, and that is the rather stupid inadequacy of HAL’s homicidal plan. How could HAL’s perfect calculations not have been aware of the air-lock? The only possible answer is that Bowman’s body is the mechanism by which HAL self-destructs, the (il)logical conclusion to HAL’s defining

tvrđio kako sam nikad nije eksperimentirao s LSD-om, nije poricao tu vezu sa sekvencom Zvjezdanih vrata, i ne iznenađuje da je druga faza reklamne kampanje film *2001*. nazivala "ultimativnim tripom". Psihodelična vizija *2001*. i njezin dug eksperimentalnom filmu predstavljaju "politiku ekstaze" u kojoj Zvjezdana vrata protu-svjjest filma smještaju *protiv čovjeka*. To epizodu sa Zvjezdanim vratima čini političkim stajalištem koje je prikladno svom vremenu, i najzanimljivijim elementom Kubrickove interpretacije Nietzschea. Zvjezdana vrata preuzimaju cilj američkog avangardnog filma o uništenju samog sebe i pretvaraju to u nužan uvjet za pojavu nečeg *novog*, za pojavu budućnosti kao takve. Nakon što smo dobili bitku s tehnološkim društvom kontrole, i nakon što smo porazili taj suicidalni stroj – tog jednodimenzijsnog čovjeka – možemo početi istraživati tko mi *nismo*, i otići tamo gdje ljudi nikad ranije nisu otišli. *2001*. je stoga aktualiziranje Nietzschea u 60-tim godinama prošlog stoljeća, zadržavajući njegovo zagovaranje političke revolucije radikalnom subjektivnom transformacijom, istovremeno istražujući suvremene postupke osobne dezintegracije.

Bowman ulazi kroz Zvjezdana vrata i započinje ubrzavati u tunelu svjetla. Dok se intenzitet i brzina povećavaju, mi rezom prelazimo na kadar reakcije Bowmanovog lica, s očima širom otvorenim zbog šoka i zapanjenosti, okrećući glavu u bolnom grču u pokušaju da izbjegne nemoguće. Ta je sekvenca još uvijek u "realnom vremenu", koje ostaje nedirnuto dok kamera spaja Bowmanov subjektivni kadar Zvjezdanih vrata i njegovu reakciju u kadru-protukadru. Međutim, ovdje smo na rubu Bowmanove izdržljivosti, a idući je kadar njegovo lice ukočeno od straha,

paradox; to will nothingness is still to will. And the will to power means nothing but that its expressions must be overcome.

With Bowman man's violence once more appears as the automated expression of will to power, animated by an internal-other we know as the monolith. When Bowman overcomes HAL his healthy, spontaneous, and vital body emerges from the overcome carcass of science ready to once more be overcome. In overcoming man's nihilism, embodied in HAL, Dave has achieved the second of Zarathustra's three metamorphoses, and the camel – HAL, the great bearer of weights – has been superseded by Bowman – the lion. (Nietzsche, 1961, 'Of the Three Metamorphoses') What remains, and what this first metamorphosis has made possible, is a further transformation in which the last vestiges of heroic subjectivity are overcome. Bowman must now undergo the final metamorphosis, and be reborn as the Star Child.

Bowman takes the last remaining pod and follows another monolith into the Star Gate. The Star Gate marks a sharp break in the filmic texture of *2001*, as "realism" gives way to an abstract rushing of light. Here traditional sci-fi pyrotechnics are elevated to a cosmic ring of fire, a conflagration from which Bowman will emerge ready to be reborn. The remarkable Star Gate effects were adapted by Donald Trumbull from experimental film techniques, and similarly produce a dislocating physical experience that works against the narrative logic and "realism" of Hollywood. *2001* therefore affirms the counter-cultural tradition of American avant-garde film interested in the mystical merge of the unleashed sensual body. The never-

očajnički pokušavajući pobjeći viziji koja očigledno nadi-lazi njegovu sposobnost razumijevanja. Ta četiri zamrz-nuta kadra uklanaju ono što je “viđeno” iz Bowmanove subjektivne točke gledanja i s objektivnog gledišta kame-re, dok percepcija gubi svoju prostornu i vremensku smis-lenost. Psihodelična Zvjezdana vrata sada su čista haluci-nacija. Lišeni položaja s kojeg možemo razmisiliti o ono-mu što vidimo, nismo u mogućnosti djelovati, a iza svih ljudskih koordinata, čak i iza našeg vlastitog tijela, sve postaje kozmička vizija.

Zvjezdana vrata su vrhunac filmskog istraživanja naše protusvijesti, ali za razliku od slobodno lebdeće prostorne fluidnosti bestežinskog stanja, Zvjezdana vrata su više od fizičke dezorientacije. To je subjektivna dezintegracija, jer više ne znamo odakle gledamo, niti što doživljavamo; ne možemo locirati što subjektivno ili objektivno vidimo; čini se da neki kadrovi prikazuju rađanje galaksija, drugi mikroskopske biološke događaje. Mi smo negdje i nigdje, naše tijelo i svijest zamijenio je osjećaj kaosa; mi smo čisto vizionarsko iskustvo oslobođeno od Ja, iskustvo Kantovog uzvišenog, iskustvo pri kojem je, kao što to kaže Deleuze, “Moja cijela struktura percepcije u procesu eksplazi-je.” Kant tvrdi da,

u onome što mi u prirodi obično nazivamo uzvišenim ne nala-zí se apsolutno ništa što bi dovodilo do naročitih objektivnih principa i onih formi prirode koje odgovaraju tim objektivnim principima, tako da, naprotiv, priroda najčešće izaziva ideje uzvišenog u svome kaosu ili u svojem najdivljjem, naj-nepravilnjem neredu i pustošenju, ako se samo mogu u njoj sagledati veličina i snaga. (str. 134)

ending zoom of the Star Gate reveals the unknown universe, our new body of stars. The Star Gate is a vision that does not compute, it takes us beyond consciousness and the human, all too human.

This thoroughly Nietzschean ambition is achieved by the hallucinatory quality of the Star Gate, and its evocation of the effects of psychedelic drugs. Although Kubrick claimed never to have experimented with LSD himself, he didn't deny the connection to the Star Gate sequence, and it is no surprise that the second phase of the film's publicity referred to *2001* as "the ultimate trip." *2001*'s psychedelic vision and its debt to experimental film constitute a "politics of ecstasy" in which the Star Gate aims the counter-consciousness of cinema *against the human*. This makes the Star Gate episode a political statement that is both entirely of its time, and the most interesting element of Kubrick's interpretation of Nietzsche. The Star Gate takes American avant-garde cinema's aim of pulverising the self and makes it the necessary condition for the emergence of something *new*, for the emergence of the future as such. After our battle with a techno-scientific society of control has been won, and we have defeated this suicide-machine – this *one-dimensional man* – we can begin exploring who we *aren't*, and go where no human has gone before. *2001* therefore updates Nietzsche for the sixties, retaining his advocacy of political revolution through radical subjective transformation, while exploring contemporary techniques of personal disintegration.

Bowman enters the Star Gate and begins accelerating into a corridor of light. As the intensity and velocity increases we cut to a reaction shot of Bowman's face as he

Međutim, za Kanta je to kaotično uzvišeno potvrdilo postojanje višeg svijeta Ideja, otkrilo je svijet idealne istine, božanstveno *iza*. Ovdje, zapisuje Nietzsche u svojoj poznatoj kritici romantizma (koja je ujedno i samokritika), imamo “uobičajeni romantički finale – prijelom, slom, povratak i poraz pred starom vjerom, pred starim bogom”. Romantizam i njegova uzvišena estetika nisu za Nietzschea bili ništa više od “stare vjere”, prorušene u “novu umjetnost metafizičke utjehe”. (Nietzsche, Rođenje tragedije, str. 20-21)

Međutim, ništa u Daveovoj pojavi u sobi Regency ne ukazuje na njegovo razumijevanje beskonačnog i nepromjenjivog metafizičkog svijeta. Za Kubricka dakle, uzvišeno iskustvo Zvjezdanih vrata ne odvodi nas *iza* tijela, već tijelo oslobađa od nihilizma istine, od njezinih posljednjih preostalih iluzija: prirodne percepcije fenomenološkog “mesa” organiziranog oko transcendentalnog idealizma (Michelsonine “tjelesne *apriornosti*”). Možemo razumjeti nužnost te “uzvišene” transformacije u skladu s Nietzscheove tri preobrazbe čovjeka. Svladavajući HAL-a Bowman je čovječanstvo pretvorio iz deve u lava. HAL je bio ultimativna deva koja je čovjeka nosila prema nihilističkoj budućnosti u pustinji svemira. “Međutim”, piše Nietzsche, “u najsamotnijoj pustinji događa se druga preobrazba: duh ovdje postaje lavom; želi da se dogradi slobode i bude gospodar u vlastitoj pustinji.” (Nietzsche, Zaratustra, str. 23-24.) Dave Bowman je lav koji asketske ideale deve mijenja svojim vlastitim “Ja hoću!” Međutim, upravo to “ja” ostaje za Nietzschea problem, jer podrazumijeva subjektivnu volju koja zaustavlja beskonačno i neograničeno postajanje samog života. Upravo zato Kub-

holds his eyes wide in shock and awe, twisting his head in a tortured squint attempting to evade the impossible. This sequence is still in “real time,” which remains intact as the camera connects Bowman’s point of view of the Star Gate and his reaction in a shot-counter-shot. But here we are at the limit of Bowman’s endurance, and the next shot of his face is frozen in horror, desperately trying to escape a vision that clearly exceeds his ability to comprehend it. These freeze-frame shots – there are four of them – remove what is “seen” from Bowman’s subjective point of view, and from the camera’s objective vision, as perception loses its spatial and temporal coherence. The psychedelic Star Gate is now a pure hallucination. Denied a position from which to reflect on what we see, we are unable to act, and beyond all human co-ordinates, beyond even our own body, everything becomes cosmic vision.

The Star Gate is the climax of the film’s exploration of our counter-consciousness, but unlike the free floating spatial fluidities of weightlessness the Star Gate is more than a physical dis-orientation. This is subjective dis-integration, for we no longer know from where we see, nor what we experience, we cannot locate what we see subjectively or objectively; some shots seem to show the birth of galaxies, others microscopic biological events. We are somewhere and nowhere, our body and consciousness replaced by a sensation of chaos; we are a pure visionary experience cut loose from the I, an experience of Kant’s sublime, an experience where, as Deleuze puts it: “My whole structure of perception is in the process of exploding.” Kant argues that,

rick uzvišenom sekvencom Zvjezdanih vrata uništava i naš i Bowmanov subjektivni integritet, a to je uništenje nužno za stvaranje *novog*. Nietzsche to jednostavno kaže: "Lav ne može još stvoriti nove vrijednosti: ali može sebi stvoriti slobodu za novo stvaranje – to može snaga lava." (Nietzsche, Zaratustra, str. 24)

Nakon prevladavanja lava i njegovog "ja hoću", volja za moć izlazi iz svoje završne preobrazbe: "Ovo je, naime, tajna duše: tek kad ju je napustio heroj, približava joj se u snu – nad-heroj." (Nietzsche, Zaratustra, str. 106) Taj je nad-heroj, i za Nietzschea i za Kubricka, dijete. Iznova rođeni čovjek. Nietzsche piše:

Dijete je nevinost i zaborav, stalno otpočinjanje, igra, kotač, koji se iz samog sebe okreće, prvi pokret, sveto kazivanje Da. Doista, za igru je stvaranja, braćo moja, potrebno sveto kazivanje Da: svoju volju hoće sad duh, svoju volju zadobiva onaj koji je u svijetu izgubljen." (Nietzsche, Zaratustra, str. 24)

Bowman iz Zvjezdanih vrata ulazi u svoj vlastiti svijet. Svijet odvojen, čini se, od svih drugih svjetova. Nakon uništenja svoje subjektivne svijesti Bowman dolazi u sobu Regency potresen i rastrojen. Prostorija je potpuno neskladna, jednako razdorna pojava kao i monolit na početku filma. Bowman ulazi u kupaonicu, još uvijek odjeven u svemirsko odijelo, i čujemo kako mu odjekuje disanje. Pogleda u ogledalo i doživi još jedan šok. Znatno je ostario i možemo samo zaključiti da je vrijeme još uvijek ozbiljno pomaknuto. U trenutku kad nam se učini da smo se vratili dijegetskom prostoru primjećujemo kako je njezina vremenska logika još jednom poremećena. Ovaj put

in what we usually call sublime in nature there is such an utter lack of anything leading to particular objective principles and to forms of nature conforming to them, that it is rather in its chaos that nature most arouses our ideas of the sublime, or in its wildest and most ruleless disarray and devastation, provided it displays magnitude and might. (Kant 99-100)

For Kant however, this chaotic sublime confirmed the existence of a higher faculty of Ideas, it revealed a realm of ideal truth, a divine *beyond*. Here, Nietzsche writes in his well-known critique of Romanticism (which is also a self-critique), we have the “familiar romantic finale – break, breakdown, return and collapse before an old faith, before *the old god*.” Romanticism and its sublime aesthetic were for Nietzsche, nothing but the “old faith” dressed up as “a new art of metaphysical consolation.” (Nietzsche, 1994)

But nothing in Dave’s emergence into the Regency room implies his comprehension of an infinite and unchanging metaphysical realm. For Kubrick then, the sublime experience of the Star Gate does not take us beyond the body, but liberates the body from the nihilism of truth, from its last remaining illusion: the natural perception of the phenomenological “flesh” organised around a transcendental idealism (Michelson’s “corporeal *a priori*s). We can understand the necessity of this “sublime” transformation in terms of Nietzsche’s three metamorphoses of man. In overcoming HAL Bowman has changed humanity from a camel into a lion. HAL was the ultimate camel carrying man towards a nihilistic future in the desert of space. “But,” Nietzsche writes, “in the loneliest desert the second metamorphosis occurs: the spirit here

ne izvana, uzvišenim učincima Zvjezdanih vrata, već iznutra, disjunkcijom u vremenu.

Bowman čuje zvukove iz druge prostorije, neku vrstu blagog metalnog zveckanja. Proviruje iza ugla, i u subjektivnom kadru ugleda sebe, opet starijeg, i vrlo elegantno odjevenog u svečano crno odijelo, kako večera s leđima okrenutim prema vratima. Bowman koji jede polagano se okreće, kao da je i on čuo neki zvuk, a dok ga gledamo kako se okreće dogodi se nešto iznimno: zvuk disanja se zaustavlja, a mi se nademo u nemogućoj situaciji da gledamo Bowmanovim očima, ali da više nismo u njegovom tijelu. Drugim riječima, promatramo vlastiti nestanak. Subjektivno uništenje do kojeg je dovela kozmička vizija Zvjezdanih vrata poremetilo je vrijeme, navodeći Bowmana da uđe u niz ubrzanih transformacija.

Bowman promatra i proživljava to brzo starenje u nizu rezova kojim njegov pogled rastvara vrijeme. Bowmana više ne pokreće nešto strano, on je postao kotač koji sam sebe pokreće, a upravo je Bowmanova volja ona koja teži vlastitom svladavanju, filmska volja koja sada skokovito pravi rezove u njegovom životu. Bowmanov život u sobi Regency liшен je anegdotalnih prizora, zanimanja, pa čak i događaja, osim vlastitog zaborava. A Bowman sve to prihvaca jer je postao sveto DA.

Bowman sada jede jedini pristojan obrok u cijelom filmu. To je njegova posljednja večera. Zatim slučajno gurne čašu vina na pod, čašu vina u čijem je okusu upravo bio tako otvoreno uživao. Pogleda prema dolje, mi vidimo detalj razbijene čaše, a zatim Bowmana kako netremice zuri u krhotine. Odmah ponovno čujemo disanje, a Bowman podigne pogled i ugleda njegov izvor, vrijeme još jednom

becomes a lion; it wants to capture freedom and be lord in its own desert.” (Nietzsche, 1961, 54) Dave Bowman is the lion who replaces the ascetic ideals of the camel with his own “I will!” But it is precisely this “I” which remains a problem for Nietzsche, for it implies a subjective will that blocks the unending and unlimited becoming of life itself. This is why Kubrick uses the sublime Star Gate sequence to destroy both our own, and Bowman’s subjective integrity, a destruction necessary for the creation of the *new*. Nietzsche puts it simply: “To create new values – even the lion is incapable of that: but to create itself freedom for new creation – that the might of the lion can do.” (Nietzsche, 1961, 55) Once the lion and its “I will” have been overcome the will to power emerges from its final metamorphosis: “This indeed is the secret of the soul: only when the hero has deserted the soul does there approach it in dreams – the superhero.” (Nietzsche, 1961, 141) This superhero is, for both Nietzsche and Kubrick, the child. Man reborn. Nietzsche writes:

The child is innocence and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a sport, a self-propelling wheel, a first motion, a sacred Yes.

Yes, a sacred Yes is needed, my brothers, for the sport of creation: the spirit now wills *its own* will, the spirit sundered from the world now wins *its own* world. (Nietzsche, 1961, 55)

Bowman emerges from the Star Gate into his own world. A world sundered it seems, from any other world. After the pulverisation of his subjective consciousness Bowman arrives in the Regency room shaking, shattered. The room is utterly incongruous, as absolutely disjunctive

preskoči, a Bowman leži u krevetu, star i na samrti. Starac nudi posljednji podsjetnik na prvotnu majmunsku znatiželju i podiže slabašnu ruku prema monolitu na kraju kreveta. Muškarac je pretvoren u fetus, čiji subjektivni kadar opet ugledamo dok se kreće kroz monolit i odlazi u svemir.

Film dakle završava tim trenutkom vraćanja, dok dijete lebdi kroz monolit i natrag do Zemlje, zatvarajući golemi ljudski krug preobrazbe. Međutim, tu figuru vraćanja Kubrick je već ponudio kadrom razbijene čaše koja predstavlja završetak luka kosti koju majmun u zanosu baca visoko u zrak. Prisjećamo se da je taj radosni let prekinut svemirskim brodom, ljudskim tehnico-znanstvenim ambicijama i nihilističkom obiješću njegove inteligencije. Međutim, sve je to svladano i Bowman nas je još jednom vratio postanku ljudi, tajni monolita, njegovoj volji za moć. Prvi poticaj koji je uzrokovao monolit bio je poticaj odavanja, a ono je pokazalo da će pojava *novog* uvijek uključivati i razbijanje onoga što sadrži. Tako je majmun razbio životinjsku lubanju postavši čovjek, tako je Bowman uništio HAL-a, tako se i čovjekovu (samo)svijest mora konačno uništiti da bi se on ponovno rodio kao Zvjezdano dijete te Zemlji vratio nedužnost. Svakom svladavanju prethodi monolit, vječni povratak prekida, razlike u stvaranju nečeg novog. Drugim riječima, monolit je budućnost neuvjetovana prošlošću ili sadašnjošću jer ih odbacuje istovremeno dok je oni stvaraju. Nemilosrdno kretanje prema naprijed u 2001 nudi istu figuru; svako pitanje koje postavlja preobrazba svoj odgovor nalazi u apsolutnoj potvrди nečeg *novog*. Ovdje je Kubrick blizak Gillesu Deleuzeu i njegovu čitanju vječnog vraćanja, također iz 1968. godine:

as the appearance of the monolith at the beginning of the film. Bowman goes into the bathroom, still wearing his spacesuit and we hear his breath resonating in our ears. He looks in a mirror and he gets another shock. He has aged considerably and we can only conclude that time is still severely out of joint. At the moment we seem to have arrived back in diegetic space we immediately experience its temporal logic once more disturbed. Not this time from without, by the sublime effects of the Star Gate, but from within, from a disjunction in time.

Bowman hears some noise coming from the other room, a soft metallic clinking. He peers around the corner, and in a point-of-view shot he sees himself, once more older, and very elegantly clothed in a full-length black dressing gown, with his back to the door eating dinner. The eating Bowman slowly turns around, as if he too had heard a noise, and as we watch him turn a remarkable thing happens: the sound of breathing stops and we are in the impossible position of seeing with Bowman's eyes, but no longer being in his body. We are watching, in other words, our own disappearance. The subjective pulverisation inflicted by the Star Gate's cosmic vision has unhinged time, causing Bowman to enter into a series of accelerated transformations.

Bowman observes and undergoes his rapid aging in a series of cuts by which his gaze dissolves time. Bowman is no longer animated by something alien, he has become a self-propelling wheel, and it is Bowman's will that wills its own overcoming, a cinematic will that now jump cuts through his life. Bowman's life in the Regency room is devoid of anecdotal incident, interest or even event, other

[Vječno vraćanje] se ispravno naziva vjera budućnosti, vjera u budućnost. Vječno vraćanje odnosi se samo na novo, na ono što se stvara pod pretpostavljenim uvjetima i uz posredništvo preobrazbe. Međutim, ne dovodi do povratka ni *uvjeta* ni *agenta*: upravo suprotno, ono ih odbacuje te izbacuje svojom centrifugalnom silom. [...] Ono je novo, potpuna novost. (Deleuze, 1994, 90)

Monolit je naša budućnost, on je Vječno vraćanje volje za moć kao takve, moći koja teži vlastitom svladavanju. Međutim, monolit i ono što je nastalo od čovjeka stupaju se u završnoj sekvenci filma kad oboje bivaju svladani i kad se rađa Zvjezdano dijete. "I kažem vam: mora čovjek u sebi nositi kaos, da bi mogao roditi plešuću zvijezdu." (Nietzsche, Zaratustra, str. 13) To je objava razbijene čaše: *nije* slučajno da je to jedina bitna slučajnost koja se događa u tako nevjerojatno promišljenom filmu. Razbijena čaša označava povratak neobjasnivog, slučaja, nasilnog raskida svladavanja koje remeti najpromišljenije, najsjajnije i u najvećoj mjeri nihilističke ljudske misli. Ona dovodi na scenu Zvjezdano dijete kao nedužnost i zaborav postajanja, kao završno utjelovljenje volje za moć, pri čemu njegove ispuščene oči naglašavaju veličanstvenost njegove vizije. To je vizija koju su stvorili protusvijest čovjeka i praznina monolita, vizija koju nisu mogli sadržati. Genealogija je potpuna, čovjek je prevladan i još jednom je podne.

Kako Zvjezdano dijete vraća budućnost Zemlji, tako Kubrick vraća budućnost i nama, ovaj put prevrednovanu. 2001. znanstvenoj-fantastici nudi novu ontologiju buduć-

than its own forgetting. And Bowman accepts it all because he has become a sacred YES.

Bowman now eats the only decent meal of the entire movie. It is his last supper. Then he accidentally knocks his glass of wine on the floor, the glass of wine whose taste he had just so deliberately savoured. He looks down, we get a close-up of the smashed glass and then we see Bowman staring intently at the pieces. Immediately we hear breathing once more, and Bowman looks up and over to its source, time once more skips a beat, and Bowman is lying in bed, old and dying. The old man offers the final echo of the ape's initial curiosity and raises a feeble arm towards the monolith at the end of his bed. The man is transformed into a foetus, whose point of view we once more take as it moves through the monolith and out into the cosmos.

Thus the film ends with this moment of return, as the child floats through the monolith and back to earth, completing man's enormous cycle of metamorphosis. But in fact this figure of return has already been offered by Kubrick in the shot of the smashing glass, which is the completion of the arc of the jaw-bone cast high in exultation by the ape. This joyful flight was interrupted, we remember, by the spaceship, by man's techno-scientific ambitions and the nihilistic hubris of his intelligence. But all this has been overcome, and Bowman has returned us once more to man's genesis, to the secret of the monolith, its will to power. The initial impetus the monolith introduced was that of disjunction, and this disjunction taught that the emergence of the *new* will always involve the smashing of its containers. So the ape smashed an ani-

nosti koju pronalazi u Nietzscheu i koju aktualizira u šezdesetima naglašavajući njezin najvažniji aspekt: subjektivnu revoluciju putem subjektivnog razrješenja. S obzirom na to, 2001. je jedan od onih predivnih plodova '68. čije nasljeđe tek trebamo iskusiti. To je revolucija kao prevladavanje naših tijela nad tehno-znanstvenim nihilizmom, naših instinktivnih postupaka nad sviješću i, naposljetku, vječnog vraćanja prevladavanja kao prave halucinacije koja postoji s onu stranu prostora i vremena.

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mal's skull in becoming a man, so Bowman smashed HAL, and so man's (self)consciousness must finally be smashed if he is to be reborn a Star Child, and return innocence to earth. Each overcoming is ushered in by the monolith, by the eternal return of an interruption, of a difference creating something new. The monolith, in other words, is the future, a future unconditioned by the past or the present because it repudiates them at the same time as they produce it. The relentless forward momentum of *2001* offers the same figure; every question posed by metamorphosis finds its answer in an absolute affirmation of something *new*. Here Kubrick is close to Gilles Deleuze's reading of the eternal return, also made in 1968:

[Eternal return] is properly called a belief of the future, a belief in the future. Eternal return affects only the new, what is produced under the condition of default and by the intermediary of metamorphosis. However, it causes neither the *condition* nor the *agent* to return: on the contrary it repudiates these and expels them with all its centrifugal force. [...] It is itself the new, complete novelty. (Deleuze, 1994, 90)

The monolith is our future, it is the Eternal Return of will to power as such, the will that wills its own overcoming. But the monolith and what has become of man merge in the final sequence of the film as both are overcome and the Star Child is born. "I tell you: one must have chaos in one, to give birth to a dancing star." (Nietzsche, 1961, 46) This is the announcement of the broken glass: it was *no* accident that it was the only significant accident to occur in a film so incredibly deliberate. The smashed glass rings

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(preveo Vedran Pavlić)

the return of the unaccountable, of chance, of the violent disjunction of overcoming that disturbs man's most deliberate, most brilliant, and most nihilistic thoughts. It ushers on stage the Star Child as the innocence and forgetfulness of becoming, as the final embodiment of will to power, it's bulging eyes emphasising the majesty of its vision. This is the vision the counter-consciousness of man and the void of the monolith gave birth to, a vision they could never contain. The genealogy is complete, the human has been overcome and it is Noontide once more.

As the Star child returns the future to the earth, so Kubrick returns the future to us, revalued. *2001* offers to Science-Fiction a new ontology of the future, one it finds in Nietzsche, and updates to the 60s by emphasising its most important aspect: subjective revolution through subjective dissolution. As such *2001* is one of those beautiful fruits of 1968 whose inheritance we are yet to taste. It is revolution as the affirmation of our bodies over techno-scientific nihilism, of our instinctual actions over consciousness, and finally of the eternal return of overcoming as a true-hallucination existing beyond time and space.

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Problem ontološke povijesti vremena; ili, o metodi studije filma Gillesa Deleuzea^{o1}

I

Michel Foucault je znao kako treba interferirati. Znao je kako pisati, razmišljati, interferirati. Kako je to Gilles Deleuze napisao u *Filmu 2* nedugo nakon njegove smrti, znao je da se “stvari zbivaju na razini interferencije mnogih praksi: bivanja, slike, koncepti, razne vrste događaja” i da stoga svaku praksu “treba ocijeniti u odnosu na druge prakse s kojima interferira”.^{o2} Foucault je znao i koje su opasnosti bivanja-u-interferen-

- o1 Ovaj esej predstavlja dio šireg projekta o Deleuzeu, Spinozi i filmu. Želio bih zahvaliti Eleanor Kaufman zbog poticajnih, pohvalnih, kritičkih i kliničkih riječi koje je napisala o prvoj verziji ovog eseja, kao i Petru Milatu i Tomislavu Medaku zbog toga što su me pozvali da jednu raniju verziju ovog eseja predstavim u Multimedijalnom institutu u Zagrebu u lipnju 2004. godine.
- o2 Deleuze, Gilles; *Film 2. The Time-Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), preveli Hugh Tomlinson i Robert Galeta, str. 280. Prijevod prilagoden. *Film 2. L'image-temps* (Paris: Les Éditions de minuit, 1985), str. 365.

The Problem of an Ontological History of Time; or, On the Method of Gilles Deleuze's Study of the Cinema⁰¹

I

Michel Foucault knew how to interfere. He knew how to write, think, be in interference. He knew that – as Gilles Deleuze would write shortly after his death in *Cinema 2* – it “is at the level of the interference of many practices that things happen, beings, images, concepts, all types of events,” and hence that any practice “must be evaluated in terms of the other practices with which it interferes.”⁰² And Foucault also knew the

- 01 This essay is part of a larger project on Deleuze, Spinoza, and the cinema. I would like to thank Eleanor Kaufman for the encouraging, encomiastic, critical, and clinical words she wrote on the first draft of this essay, as well as Petar Milat and Tomislav Medak for having invited me to present an earlier version of this essay at the Multimedijalni Institut in Zagreb, June 2004.
- 02 Deleuze, Gilles; *Cinema 2. The Time-Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, p. 280. Translation modified. *Cinéma 2. L'image-temps* (Paris: Les Éditions de minuit, 1985), p. 365.

ciji: znao je da interferencija uvijek donosi rizik da vas pogrešno razumiju, pogrešno prepoznaju. Znao je da nikad neće biti kraja za takav *meconnaissance*: Jeste li vi filozof? Jeste li povjesničar? Možete li se, molim vas, identificirati, ustati, da vas ocijenimo? Neizbjježno, radije ne bi. Više je volio ne priznati – čak i ako je to povremeno značilo ne pisati. Slično Bartlebyju, pisao je i pisao i nastavljao pisati – da bi zatim jednog dana iznenada prestao. Međutim, za razliku od Bartlebyja, ponovno je počeo pisati. Prva stvar koju je napisao nakon osam godina šutnje bila je potresna meditacija o pitanju interferencije, „Uvod“ u *Upotrebi užitaka* – drugi dio *Povijesti seksualnosti*, koji je slavno označio potpunu promjenu smjera cijelog projekta.^{o3} U njoj prikiveni mislilac *par excellence*, koji bi se kategorički odbio identificirati ili predstaviti, preuzima nekarakterističan – te stoga odmah još i više očaravajući i dirljiviji – ispovjednički ton kojim piše: “A onima kojima je naporan rad, novi i novi početci, pokušaji i greške, vraćanje i prerađivanje sve od početka do kraja – ukratko, svim onima kojima je rad usred nesigurnosti i strepnje jednak neuspjehu, sve što im mogu reći jest da, očigledno, nismo s iste planete.”^{o4} Planeta s koje te riječi dolaze je ona na kojoj metoda napreduje interferencijom i na kojoj povijest i filozofija shvaćene kao prakse mišljenja uvijek već međusobno interferiraju, gdje su u konačnici zasebne, ali ih se ne može razlučiti.

Međutim, što je interferencija? U svojoj knjizi *Nedoumice moderne*, pokušavam odgovoriti na to pitanje posuđu-

o3 O važnosti te promjene, vidi Deleuzeovo djelo *Foucault* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), preveo Sean Hand, str. 94–96.

o4 Foucault, Michel: *The Use of Pleasure. The History of Sexuality, Volume 2* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), preveo Robert Hurley, str. 7.

dangers of being-in-interference: he knew that to interfere is always to run the risk of being misunderstood, mis-recognized. He knew there would never be an end to such *meconnaissance*: Are you a philosopher? Are you a historian? Could you please identify yourself, stand up, and be judged? Inevitably, he would prefer not to. He preferred not to confess – even if that meant not to write at times. Not unlike Bartleby, he wrote and wrote and kept on writing – and then one day he suddenly stopped. Unlike Bartleby, however, he started writing again. And the first thing he produced after eight years of silence was a poignant meditation on the question of interference, namely, the “Introduction” to *The Use of Pleasure* – that second volume of *The History of Sexuality* which famously marked a complete reorientation of the whole project.⁰³ Here, the masked thinker *par excellence*, who would refuse categorically to identify or represent himself, adopts an uncharacteristic – and hence at once all the more arresting and all the more moving – confessional tone, as when he writes: “As to those for whom to work hard, to begin and begin again, to attempt and be mistaken, to go back and rework everything from top to bottom – as to those, in short, for whom to work in the midst of uncertainty and apprehension is tantamount to failure, all I can say is that clearly we are not from the same planet.”⁰⁴ The planet from which these words hail is one in which method proceeds by interference and in which history and philosophy understood as

03 On the significance of this shift, see Deleuze’s *Foucault* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) trans. Seán Hand, pp. 94–96.

04 Foucault, Michel; *The Use of Pleasure. The History of Sexuality, Volume 2* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), trans. Robert Hurley, p. 7.

jući izraz “interferencija” od Deleuzea i pretvarajući ga u svoj koncept, kako bih formulirao koncepciju bivanja koju nazivam “ontologijom interferencije” i koja bivanje smješta u postajanje.⁰⁵ Ovdje bih samo želio ustvrditi da je interferencija kod Deleuzea terminološki zanemariva, a konceptualno ključna: istovremeno je marginalni izraz na koji se rijetko nailazi u njegovim djelima, ali je i središnji koncept koji nije samo djelatan u glavnini njegovih rada, nego je možda i organizirajući princip njegove misli. Iako Deleuze interferenciju nikada eksplisitno ne razvija u pravi koncept, jasno je iz posljednje stranice *Filma 2* – kao i iz posljednjih triju stranica knjige *Što je filozofija?* – da interferencija posjeduje inherentan ontološki smisao i da za filozofiju predstavlja definicijski problem: “stvari se zbivaju na razini sučeljavanja mnogih praksi: bivanja, slike, koncepti, razne vrste događaja”. Upravo se na imanentnom platou interferencije sve zbiva; upravo se na mjestu međusobnog interferiranja raznih praksi rađaju sve forme, bivanje samo dolazi u postojanje. Takva je dakle ontologija interferencije: koncepcija bivanja kao aktualiziranog i usađenog u interferencijske odnose praksi, koncepcija bivanja kao bivanje u interferenciji. Za takvu ontologiju, stoga, pitanje bivanja je neposredno političko pitanje: reći da je bivanje biti u interferenciji znači reći da se bivanje aktivno stvara u praksi: “*avant l'être, il y a la politique.*” “Prije bivanja postoji politika” – kao što Deleuze i

05 Casarino, Cesare; “Philopoesis: A Theoretico-Methodological Manifesto.” *Boundary 2*, 29, br. 1 (proljeće 2002.), str. 65–96. Malo drukčija verzija ovog eseja pojavljuje se i kao predgovor mojoj knjizi *Modernity at Sea Melville, Marx, Conrad in Crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), str. xiii-xli.

practices of thought are always already interfering with each other, are ultimately distinct yet indiscernible from one another.

But what is interference? In my book *Modernity at Sea*, I attempt to answer this question by borrowing the term “interference” from Deleuze and by turning it into my own concept, so as to formulate a conception of being which I refer to as “interferential ontology” and which posits being in becoming.⁰⁵ Here, I would like to suggest simply that interference in Deleuze is terminologically negligible and conceptually crucial: it is at once a marginal term that is rarely found in his works as well as the central concept that is not only operative in most of his works but also perhaps the organizing principle of his thought. Even though Deleuze never explicitly develops interference into a full-fledged concept, it is clear from the last page of *Cinema 2* – as well as from the last three pages of *What Is Philosophy?* – that interference has an inherently ontological import and that it constitutes a definitional problem for philosophy: “[It] is at the level of the interference of many practices that things happen, beings, images, concepts, all types of events.” It is on the immanent plateau of interference that everything takes place; it is at the point in which different practices interfere with one another that all forms come into existence, that being itself comes into being. Such then is interfe-

05 Casarino, Cesare; “Philopoeis: A Theoretico-Methodological Manifesto.” *Boundary 2*, 29, no.1 (Spring 2002), pp. 65–96. A slightly different version of this essay also appears as the preface to my *Modernity at Sea: Melville, Marx, Conrad in Crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), pp. xiii–xli.

Guattari tvrde u *Tisuću platoa*.⁹⁶ "Prije" u ovoj rečenici označava logički, a ne vremenski odnos: metamorfička agitacija svijeta prakse prethodi bivanju logički, a ne vremenski, u smislu da se nijedna forma bivanja ne može objasniti bez pozivanja na jednako prvobitan politički proces stvaranja, u smislu da bivanje ostaje nerazumljivo i neshvatljivo bez pozivanja na političku pretpostavku.⁹⁷

Dozvolite mi da se sada vratim na "Uvod" u *Upotrebi užitaka*. U tom iznimnom tekstu koji predstavlja svjedočanstvo bez presedana o težini mišljenja, odnosno o napornom radu razotkrivanja "u kojoj mjeri trud da se razmišlja o vlastitoj povijesti može osloboditi misao od onoga što ona u tišini misli, i tako joj omogućiti da misli drugčije",⁹⁸ Foucault objašnjava kako je, tijekom svoje duge šutnje, došao do ponovnog osmišljavanja cijelog projekta *Povijesti seksualnosti*. Želio bih ukazati na to da u tom dokumentu Foucault svoj projekt povijesti seksualnosti karakterizira upravo kao ontološku povijest, naime, kao praksu mišljenja koja označava interferenciju između povijesti i filozofije. To je praksa koja stvara koncepte koji odgovaraju povjesnim formama kojima bivanje prestaje biti čisto ponavljanje identičnog, kojima ono postaje nešto drugo nego što jest. To su forme koje imaju povijest, a opet se od nje okreću, koje su rođene iz povijesti, a njoj ne pripadaju, koje su nužan dio povijesti, a opet se odvajaju od povijesti

o6 Deleuze, Gilles, i Guattari, Felix; *A Thousand Plateaus Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), preveo Brian Massumi, str. 203. Prijevod prilagođen.

o7 Za punu verziju ovih rasprava, vidi: *Modernity at Sea*, str. xiv-xxvi, a pogotovo str. xvii-xviii.

o8 *The Use of Pleasure*, str. 9.

rential ontology: a conception of being as that which is actualized and embedded in the interferential relations of practices, a conception of being as being-in-interference. For such an ontology, thus, the question of being is an immediately political question: to say that being is being-in-interference is to say that being is actively produced in praxis, is to say that “avant l’être, il y a la politique.” “Before being there is politics” – as Deleuze and Guattari exclaim in *A Thousand Plateaus*.⁰⁶ The “before” in this sentence marks a logical rather than a temporal relation: the metamorphic agitation of the world of praxis is logically rather than temporally prior to being in the sense that no form of being can be explained without appealing to the equiprimordial political process of its production, in the sense that being remains unintelligible and incomprehensible without reference to a political postulate.⁰⁷

Let me return now to the “Introduction” to *The Use of Pleasure*. In this remarkable document – which constitutes an unparalleled testimony to the difficulty of thought, that is, to the exacting labor of ascertaining “to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently”⁰⁸ – Foucault explains how, during his long silence, he came to reconceptualize the whole project of *The History of Sexuality*. I would like to suggest that in

06 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Félix; *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) trans. Brian Massumi, p. 203. Translation modified.

07 For the full version of these arguments, see *Modernity at Sea*, pp. xiv-xxvi and especially pp. xvii-xviii.

08 *The Use of Pleasure*, p. 9.

kao *status quo*: ukratko, one su ono što ide uz dlaku povijesti, što bivanju omogućuje da prođe duboke metamorfoze, ono što misle o povijesti vlastitog bivanja kako bi razmisljale i bile drukčije.⁹ Nakon što je nekoliko puta ponovio da *Povijest seksualnosti* nije povijest ponašanja, ideologija ili reprezentacija, već povijest mišljenja,¹⁰ Foucault piše da se taj projekt sastoji od “analiziranja... problematizacija kroz koje se bivanje nudi da nužno bude misao – i praksi na temelju kojih se te problematizacije stvaraju”.¹¹ Kao što sam već ustvrdio, bivanje stvaraju interferirajući odnosi praksi, ono je aktualizirano i usaćeno u prakse. Problematizirajuće prakse o kojima Foucault ovdje govori, međutim, ne samo da aktualiziraju bivanje već ga i čine sposobnim da bude mišljeno: to su prakse koje stvaraju probleme i koje u konačnici bivanje pretvaraju u problem za mišljenje. Pod pritiskom takvih praksi, bivanje se nudi da bude mišljeno: ono je zamotano u sebe u pokušaju da bude mišljeno, presavijeno je s toliko nabora – u toliko mnogo

09 Ove formulacije djelomično su nadahnute ponovnim elaboracijama teza Delezea i Guattarija o konceptu nepovijesnog Friedricha Nietzschea. U djelu *Što je filozofija?*, pišu: “Postajanja... ne pripadaju povijesti čak ni ako se u nju vraćaju... Povijest danas još uvijek određuje samo skup uvjeta, koliko god novi oni bili, od koji se okrećemo kako bismo postali, drugim riječima, kako bismo stvorili nešto novo... Kako bi nešto moglo doći iz povijesti? Bez povijesti, postajanje bi ostalo neodređeno i neuvjetovano, ali postajanje nije povijesno... Sam događaj treba postajanje kao nepovijesni element. Nepovijesno, kaže Nietzsche, “jest poput atmosfere s kojom sam život može nastati i s čijim razaranjem mora nestati.” To je poput trenutka milosti; “za što bi čovjek bio sposoban da nije prvo ušao u neopipljivo područje nepovijesnog?” Deleuze, Gilles i Guattari, Felix; *What Is Philosophy?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), preveli Hugh Tomlinson i Graham Burchell, str. 96, ali vidi i str. 110–113.

10 Vidi, na primjer, *The Use of Pleasure*, str. 3, 10 i 11.

11 *The Use of Pleasure*, str. 11.

this document Foucault characterizes his project of a history of sexuality precisely as an ontological history, namely, as a practice of thought marking the interference between history and philosophy. This is a practice that produces the concepts corresponding to the historical forms through which being ceases to be sheer repetition of the identical, through which being becomes other than what it is. These are forms that have a history and yet turn away from it, that are born of history and yet do not belong to it, that are part and parcel of history and yet part with history as status quo: in short, they are that which brushes history against the grain thereby enabling being to undergo profound metamorphoses, that which thinks the history of its own being so as to think and be otherwise.⁹ After having repeated several times that *The History of Sexuality* is not a history of behaviors, ideologies, or representations but a history of thought,¹⁰ Foucault writes that this project consists of “analyzing...the *problematizations* th-

09 These formulations are in part inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s re-elaborations of Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of the unhistorical. In *What Is Philosophy?*, they write: “[B]ecomings...do not belong to history even if they fall back into it...History today still designates only the set of conditions, however recent they may be, from which one turns away in order to become, that is to say, in order to create something new...How could something come from history? Without history, becoming would remain indeterminate and unconditioned, but becoming is not historical...The event itself needs becoming as an unhistorical element. The unhistorical, Nietzsche says, ‘is like an atmosphere with which alone life can germinate and with the destruction of which it must vanish.’ It is like a moment of grace; and what ‘deed would man be capable of if he had not first entered into that vaporous region of the unhistorical?’” Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix; *What Is Philosophy?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, p. 96, but see also pp. 110–113.

10 See, for example, *The Use of Pleasure*, pp. 3, 10, and 11.

formi problematiziranja ili problematskih formi bivanja – da predstavlja postajanje-drugim. Takav vrtlog bivanja predstavlja područje ontološke povijesti: stvorena iz interferencije povijesti i filozofije, ontološka povijest promišlja taj vrtlog i stvara koncepte praksi presavijanja kao i problematskih nabora kojima bivanje postaje drugo nego što jest.¹² Ontološka povijest bavi se problemima.

Međutim, što je problem? Foucault opetovano razlikuje povijest mišljenja od povijesti ponašanja, ideologija ili reprezentacija – naime, ontološku povijest od reprezentijske povijesti – a opet je suzdržan u pogledu razlike među njima: sve što možemo pretpostaviti je da se druga bavi praksama i formama reprezentacije dok se prva bavi praksama koje stvaraju probleme i s problematskim formama. Razlog zašto je ta razlika tako važna leži u samoj prirodi problema, drugim riječima, u osobitom načinu razumijevanja problema kao razmjena s onime što Foucault inače naziva izvanjskim.¹³ Nije slučajno da Deleuze, kad treba objasniti kako neki problem funkcioniра, implicitno priziva Foucaultov koncept izvanjskog. U *Filmu 2* piše da “problem uvodi događaj iz izvanjskog” i da se to “izvansko problema ne može svesti na eksteriornost fizičkog svijeta ništa više nego na psihološku interiornost misle-

12 *Aphrodisia, chresis i enkratēia*, na primjer, predstavljaju primjere takvih koncepta u djelu *Upotreba užitaka* – a i sama je seksualnost, naravno, upravo takav koncept u *Povijesti seksualnosti*.

13 Ovdje govorim o Foucaultovom ogledu o Mauriceu Blanchotu – “La pensé du dehors” – koji je iznimno utjecao na Deleuzea (vidi osobito *Cinema 2* i *What Is Philosophy?*) i koji je postao ključni tekst za Deleuzeovu interpretaciju cjelokupnog Foucaultovog filozofskog projekta (vidi: *Foucault*, pogotovo str. 43, 86–87, 96–97, 110, 118–120 i, općenitije, 94–123).

rough which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought – and the *practices* on the basis of which these problematisations are formed.”¹¹ As I suggested earlier, being is produced by the inferential relations of practices, is actualized and embedded in practices. The problematizing practices to which Foucault refers here, however, not only actualize being but also enable being to be thought: these are practices that make problems, and that ultimately turn being into a problem for thought. Under the pressure of such practices, being offers itself to be thought: it is folded back onto itself in an effort to be thought, it is twisted into so many folds – into so many forms of problematization or problematic forms of being – that constitute a becoming-other. Such a torque of being constitutes the domain of an ontological history: born from the interference of history and philosophy, ontological history thinks this torque and produces the concepts of the practices of enfolding as well as of the problematic folds through which being becomes other than what it is.¹² Ontological history deals with problems.

But what is a problem? Foucault repeatedly differentiates a history of thought from a history of behaviors, ideologies, or representations – namely, ontological history from representational history – and yet is reticent with regards to the difference between the two: all one can infer is that the latter deals with practices and forms of representation while the former deals with practices that

11 *The Use of Pleasure*, p. 11.

12 *Aphrodisia*, *chresis*, and *enkratēia*, for example, all constitute instances of such concepts in *The Use of Pleasure* – and sexuality itself, of course, is precisely such a concept throughout *The History of Sexuality*.

ćeg ega”.¹⁴ S današnjeg gledišta, te tvrdnje predstavljaju zametak istraživanja koje Deleuze u potpunosti poduzima godinu dana poslije u svojoj knjizi o Foucaultu:

Moramo razlikovati eksteriornost i izvanjsko. Eksteriornost je još uvijek forma... čak dvije forme koje su esteriorne jedna drugoj, s obzirom da znanje nastaje iz dva okruženja svjetla i jezika, videnja i govorenja. Međutim, izvanjsko se tiče sile: ako je sila uvijek u odnosu s drugim silama, sila se nužno odnosi na izvanjsko koje se ne može reducirati i koje više čak nema ni formu te se sastoji od udaljenosti koje se ne mogu smanjiti, a uz pomoć kojih jedna sila djeluje na drugu ili na nju djeluje druga... Stoga dolazi do pojave sila koja ostaje različita od povijesti formi, s obzirom da djeluje u drugoj dimenziji. To je *izvanjsko koje je dalje nego bilo koji vanjski svijet*, pa čak i od bilo koje forme eksteriornosti, koja od tog trenutka postaje beskrajno bliža... [T]ransformacija se ne događa povijesnim... sastavnicama, već sastavnim silama, kada one uđu u odnos s drugim silama koje su došle izvana... Pojava, promjena i mutacija utječu na sastavne sile, a ne na sastavljene forme.¹⁵

Izvanjsko je ovdje i nigdje drugdje. Ili: tamo gdje postoje forme eksteriornosti – dakle, riječi i stvari – postoji i izvanjsko, dodirujući ih lagano ili ih čvrsto presavijajući, ili čak prolazeći kroz njih, ali uvijek već dijeleći beskonačne dodirne točke s njima. Da ne bi bili zavedeni u konačnici neprimjerenom prostornom terminologijom prisutnom

14 Te se primjedbe pojavljuju u kontekstu diskusije filma *Teorema* Piera Paola Pasolinija, kojoj ću se vratiti. *Cinema 2*, str. 174-175. *Cinema 2*, str. 227-228.

15 *Foucault*, str. 86-87.

make problems and with problematic forms. The reason why this difference makes all the difference hinges on the very nature of problems, that is, on a particular way of understanding problems as transactions with what Foucault elsewhere calls the outside.¹³ It is not a coincidence that when Deleuze needs to explain how a problem functions, he implicitly invokes Foucault's concept of the outside. In *Cinema 2*, he writes that "the problem introduces an event from the outside" and that this "outside of the problem is not reducible to the exteriority of the physical world any more than to the psychological interiority of a thinking ego."¹⁴ In retrospect, these remarks stand as the embryonic elements of an investigation that Deleuze fully undertakes one year later in his book on Foucault:

We must distinguish between exteriority and the outside. Exteriority is still a form... – even two forms which are exterior to one another, since knowledge is made from the two environments of light and language, seeing and speaking. But the outside concerns force: if force is always in relation with other forces, force necessarily refers to an irreducible outside which no longer even has any form and is made up of distances that cannot be broken down through which one force acts upon another or is acted upon by another...There is therefore

13 I am referring here to Foucault's essay on Maurice Blanchot – "La pensée du dehors" – which exerted an immense influence on Deleuze (see especially *Cinema 2* and *What Is Philosophy?*), and which became a crucial text for Deleuze's interpretation of Foucault's overall philosophical project (see *Foucault*, especially pp. 43, 86-87, 96-97, 110, 118-120, and, more generally, 94-123).

14 These remarks appear in the context of a discussion of Pier Paolo Pasolini's *Teorema*, to which I will return. *Cinema 2*, pp. 174-175. *Cinéma 2*, pp. 227-228.

u ovom odjeljku, treba naglasiti da su dvije različite dimenzije na koje se ovdje poziva – naime, prostor eksteriornosti i prostor izvanjskog, svijet povijesnih formi i svijet sila bez formi – strogo međusobno imanentne: sile postoje jedino dok obuhvaćaju, prolaze i pomiču forme, a pojavi i utjecaj sila može se osjetiti preko formi, u pokretu formi, kao ontološki drhtaj formi. One su međusobno nesvodive, a opet međusobno inherentne dimenzije istog svijeta, a njihove interferencije predstavljaju jedini svijet koji postoji. Ne postoji točka u kojoj se takve interferencije ne događaju – međutim, potreban je problem da bi se takve interferencije izmiješale i postale neizbjegne za mišljenje. Reći da problem “uvodi događaj izvanjskoga” znači reći da problem uvodi provalu sila u svijet formi koji uništava i stvara, koji razbija *status quo* i stvara iznova. Problem omogućuje preoblikovanje odnosa sila tako da ni sile ni riječi i stvari nikad više neće biti iste: on omogućava transformaciju u modalitetima interferencije između povijesnih formi i sila bez formi, između predstavlјivog i nepredstavlјivog, između diskurzivnog i nediskurzivnog, između povijesnog i nepovijesnog, ukratko, između bivanja i postajanja. Ona transakcija s izvanjskim koja je problem uvijek je indeks procesa proizvodnje i stvaranja formi, indeks postajanja. Takva je dakle razlika između ontološke povijesti i reprezentacijske povijesti: baveći se problematizirajućim praksama i problematskim formama, ontološka povijest bavi se nepredstavlјivim izvanjskim i njegovim proizvodnim i konstitutivnim snagama, te se stoga prema povijesnim formama odnosi kao prema rješenjima za problem; fokusiranjem na prakse i forme reprezentacije, reprezentacijska povijest bavi se *ready-made* povijesnim formama,

an emergence of forces which remains distinct from the history of forms, since it operates in a different dimension. It is *an outside which is farther away* than any external world and even from any form of exteriority, which henceforth becomes infinitely closer...[T]he transformation occurs not to the historical...composition but to the composing forces, when the latter enter into a relation with other forces which have come from outside...Emergence, change and mutation affect composing forces, not composed forms.¹⁵

The outside is here and nowhere else. Or, there where there are forms of exteriority – that is, words and things – there is the outside, touching them lightly or enfolding them tightly or even shooting through them, but always already sharing infinite points of contact with them. Lest one be misled by the ultimately inadequate spatial terminology at work in this passage, it should be stressed that the two different dimensions invoked here – namely, the space of exteriority and the space of the outside, the realm of historical forms and the realm of formless forces – are strictly immanent to one another: forces exist only as they envelop, shoot through, and move forms – and the emergence and impact of forces can at all be felt through forms, in the movement of forms, as the ontological tremor of forms. These are mutually irreducible yet mutually inherent dimensions of the same world – and their interferences constitute the only world there is. There is no point at which such interferences are not taking place – but it takes a problem for such interferences to be reshу-

¹⁵ Foucault, pp. 86–87.

čime odbacuje proces proizvodnje i konstitucije kojim su te forme nastale, naime, njihov političko-ontološki *raison d'être*. Drugim riječima, ontološku povijest i reprezentacijsku povijest pokreću drukčije koncepcije bivanja, a jedino se prava ontološka povijest ne zaustavlja na razini reprezentacije, pa stoga može odgovoriti na pitanje postajanja, dakle, na modalitete povjesne promjene. Ontološka povijest pružila je Foucaultu problematizirajuću praksu mišljenja koja je istovremeno historicizam pretvorila u problem i za njega pronašla rješenje.

Međutim, ako je cilj Foucaultove kritike u "Uvodu" u *Upotrebi užitaka* određena reprezentacijska i historicistička tendencija u povijesti, druga strana takve kritike sastoji se od upozorenja u odnosu na određenu ontološku tendenciju i u filozofiji. Kao što to priznaju Deleuze i Guattari u *Što je filozofija?*, iako "postajanje nije povjesno", "bez povijesti bi postajanje ostalo neodređeno i neuvjetovano".¹⁶ Ukratko, ontološko istraživanje bivanja kao postajanja koje jednostavno zanemaruje povjesne forme bivanja kao odrednice postajanja ostat će potpuno nedovoljno i nepri-mjerenog, dakle, pretvoriti će postajanje u transcendentni i vitalistički princip, umjesto da se prema njemu odnosi kao prema nečemu što je immanentno u vlastitim odrednicama. Postajanje je istovremeno i proizvodnja i konstitucija. Filozofija i povijest kao prakse mišljenja potrebne su jedna drugoj kako bi zahvatile i bivanje u procesu postajanja i postajanje kakvo je konstituirano u bivanju, pa je Foucault upravo zato mislio i pisao sa stajališta njihove međusobne ureknute interferencije. A ako je Foucault znao za

16 *What Is Philosophy?*, str. 96.

ffied and to become unavoidable for thought. To say that a problem “introduces an event of the outside” is to say that a problem introduces an irruption of forces into the realm of forms that destroys and creates, that rends the status quo and constitutes anew. A problem allows a reconfiguration of force relations such that neither forces nor words and things will ever be the same again: it enables a transformation in the modalities of interference between historical forms and formless forces, between the representable and the unrepresentable, between the discursive and the non-discursive, between the historical and the unhistorical, in short, between being and becoming. That transaction with the outside that is the problem always is the index of a process of production and constitution of forms, an index of becoming. Such then is the difference between ontological history and representational history: in dealing with problematizing practices and problematic forms, ontological history engages with an unrepresentable outside and with its productive and constitutive powers, and hence treats historical forms as solutions to a problem; in focusing on practices and forms of representation, representational history deals with ready-made historical forms, thereby foreclosing the process of production and constitution through which these forms came into being, namely, their political-ontological *raison d'être*. This is to say that ontological history and representational history are driven by different conceptions of being, and that only a properly ontological history does not stop at the level of representation and hence can account for the question of becoming, that is, for the modalities of historical change. Ontological history provided

opasnosti bivanja-u-interferenciji, znao je i za uzbudjujuće zadovoljstvo takvog bivanja – zadovoljstvo gubljenja na pragu izvanjskog, zadovoljstvo pronalaska sebe tamo drugčijeg od onoga što jesi.

II

Foucaultova lekcija predstavlja dragocjenu polaznu točku za razumijevanje metode koja je Deleuzeu omogućila da se bavi praksama i formama filma u svojoj dvodijelnoj studiji filma. Ako *Film 2* završava s britkom potvrdom interferencija svih praksi, *Film 1* započinje cijelu studiju kategoričkom negacijom bilo kakve moguće interferencije s poviješću: “*Cette étude n'est pas une histoire du cinéma.*” “Ova studija nije povijest filma.”¹⁷ Postoje barem tri različita načina čitanja te jedinstvene prve rečenice.

Tu bi se tvrdnju moglo pročitati *ad litteram*. Naposljetu, ako Deleuze započinje govoreći čitatelju što ta studija nije, ipak ubrzo određuje što ta studija jest, čineći to odmah u idućoj rečenici: “Ovo je taksonomija, pokušaj klasičiranja slike i znakova.”¹⁸ Čak je i letimičan pogled dovoljan da se utvrdi kako ta dvodijelna studija tka veliku taksonomsку tapiseriju filmskih različitosti slike-pokreta i slike-vremena. Isti taj površni pogled, međutim, pokazuje kako je taj sinkronijski prikaz filma povremeno presijecan raznim dijakronijskim prikazima. Čak će i čitatelj sklon doslovnom čitanju prve rečenice morati priznati da tako ambiciozna taksonomija u najmanju ruku sadrži sve nuž-

¹⁷ Deleuze, Gilles, *Cinema 1. The Movement-Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), preveli Hugh Tomlinson i Barbara Habberjam, str. xiv. *Cinema 1. L'image-mouvement* (Pariz: Les Editions de minuit, 1983), str. 7.

¹⁸ *Cinema 1*, str. xiv. *Cinema 1*, str. 7.

Foucault with a problematizing practice of thought that at once turned historicism into a problem and found a solution for it.

But if the target of Foucault's critique in the "Introduction" to *The Use of Pleasure* is a certain representationalist and historicist tendency in history, the reverse side of such a critique consists of a cautionary note with regards to a certain ontologist tendency in philosophy as well. As Deleuze and Guattari admit in *What Is Philosophy?*, even though "becoming is not historical," "without history becoming would remain indeterminate and unconditioned."¹⁶ In short, an ontological investigation of being as becoming that simply ignores historical forms of being as determinations of becoming will remain altogether insufficient and inadequate, that is, will turn becoming into a transcendent and vitalistic principle rather than treating it as immanent in its own determinations. Becoming is at once production and constitution. Philosophy and history intended as practices of thought need each other in order to capture both being in the process of becoming and becoming as constituted in being – which is why Foucault thought and wrote at the spellbound interference between the two. And if Foucault knew the dangers of being-in-interference, he also knew the exhilarating joy of being thus – the joy of getting lost on the threshold of the outside, the joy of finding oneself there other than what one is.

¹⁶ *What Is Philosophy?*, p. 96.

ne elemente za jedan jednako ambiciozan povijesni narativ koji prati razvoj filmskih praksi i formi od njihovog nastanka do sadašnjosti – i onkraj toga. S jedne strane, takav narativ je relativno neuobičajen prikaz povijesti filma: to je primjerice narativ u kojem pojava zvuka igra zanemarivu ulogu u usporedbi s onime što Deleuze smatra ključnom promjenom do koje je došlo raspadom senzorno-pokretačke veze, s istovremenom krizom slike-pokreta u njezinoj specifičnoj verziji slike-akcije, i s pojavom potpuno novog tipa filmske slike: naime, slike-vremena nakon Drugoga svjetskog rata.¹⁹ S druge strane, ako je taj narativ relativno neuobičajen dok razmatramo priču koju nam iznosi o filmu, možda i nije tako neuobičajen kada razmotrimo način na koji organizira tu priču: iako nije teleološka, struktura tog narativa ipak je prilično tradicionalna, s obzirom da ima jasan početak, sagrađena je oko temeljnog raskaza (koji se podudara s Drugim svjetskim ratom) te stoga dva sveska smješta prije i poslije te presudne povijesne razdjelnice. U svakom slučaju, čini se da je jedan od problema s kojima se Deleuze suočavao bio upravo taj kako ispričati priču o filmu, pa stoga doslovno čitanje prve rečenice te studije jednostavno nije održivo.

Dakle, ta studija čitatelju možda pruža dovoljno temelja za čitanje te prve rečenice na jedan sasvim drugačiji način, naime, za donošenje zaključka da Deleuze jednostavno krivo procjenjuje vlastiti rad i da je, bez obzira što ta

19 Nakon što je po kratkom postupku uvođenje zvuka odbacio kao neki važniji događaj u razvoju filma u *Filmu 1*, Deleuze se vraća specifičnim razlikama između nijemog i zvučnog filma prema kraju knjige *Film 2*, ali samo kako bi pripremio teren za detaljniju analizu zvuka kao komponente filmske slike. Vidi: *Cinema 1*, str. ix-x, i *Cinema 2*, str. 225-234, *Cinema 2*, str. 292-303.

Foucault's lesson provides an invaluable point of departure for understanding the method that enabled Deleuze to engage with the practices and forms of the cinema in his two-volume study of the cinema. If *Cinema 2* concludes with a trenchant affirmation of the interference of all practices, *Cinema 1* begins the whole study with a categorical negation of any possible interference with history: "Cette étude n'est pas une histoire du cinéma." "This study is not a history of the cinema."¹⁷ There are at least three different ways of reading this singular opening sentence.

One could read this statement *ad litteram*. After all, if Deleuze begins by telling the reader what this study is not, he is nonetheless quick in specifying what this study is and does in the immediately following sentence: "It is a taxonomy, an attempt at the classification of images and signs."¹⁸ Even a cursory glance suffices to ascertain that the two volumes weave a grand taxonomical tapestry of the cinematic varieties of the movement-image and of the time-image. The same cursory glance, however, shows that this synchronic account of the cinema is intermittently shot through with a variety of diachronic accounts. Even the reader most committed to a literal reading of this opening sentence will have to admit that such an ambitious taxonomy at the very least contains all the necessary elements for an equally ambitious historical narrative that traces the development of cinematic practi-

¹⁷ Deleuze, Gilles; *Cinema 1. The Movement-Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, p. xiv. *Cinéma 1. L'image-mouvement* (Paris: Les Éditions de minuit, 1983), p. 7.

¹⁸ *Cinema 1*, p. xiv. *Cinéma 1*, p. 7.

studija jest, ona je ujedno i povijest filma, ili, u najmanju ruku, da *u njoj* postoji povijest filma; doista, neka tumačenja naginju tom rješenju.²⁰ Takvo moguće rješenje, međutim, još uvijek mnoge probleme ostavlja neriješenima.

Ako je istina da je – ne uzimajući u obzir sve Deleuzeove prigovore u kojima tvrdi suprotno – ta studija ujedno i povijest filma, kako se oni mogu shvatiti bez da ih se jednostavno trivijalizira kao neke skromne ograde ili kao čiste besmislice? Treba istaknuti, naposljetku, da ta prva rečenica predstavlja početnu rečenicu bez presedana za Deleuzea, koji je poznat po tome što mnoge od svojih radova započinje *in medias res*, bez da čitatelju kaže što taj rad jest ili čime se bavi, a kamoli što nije i čime se ne bavi. Nadalje, čim se dođe do zaključka da je ta studija ujedno i povijest filma, suočavamo se s nezgodnim problemom da moramo uzeti u obzir činjenicu da Deleuze opetovano

20 Vidi, na primjer, D. N. Rodowick u *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997), str. 5, kao i Richard Dienst, koji – nakon što je istaknuo da Deleuzeova studija nije ni povijest filma ni teorija filma, dakle “interpretativni okvir za analizu filmskog teksta” – piše: “Ipak, Deleuze ne može pobjeći iskušenjima ni povijesti ni teorije filma, koji su ušli u dvoranu i sjeli na svoje mjesto prije nego što je on stigao. Kao i uvijek, njegova je naklonost uključiva: Deleuze pronalazi načina da u svoje strpljive filozofske pripreme uključi najrazličitiji materijal, djelujući poput prijateljskog domaćina koji potajice odlučuje da sve što dotakne bude po njegovom.” Uvelike se slažem ne samo s Dienstovom ocjenom Deleuzeovih teoretsko-metodoloških naklonosti, već i s onime što shvaćam kao konačnu implikaciju takve ocjene, naime, ili zbog onoga što naziva “iskušenjima” ili zbog onoga što nazivam kulturnom navikom, ne možemo ne periodizirati i ne možemo ne interpretirati – što ne znači reći da je to sve što se može i treba učiniti, a znači reći, radije, da bi netko, poput Foucaulta ili Deleuzea, trebao dozvoliti da bude uznenemiren interferencijom između, s jedne strane, historiografskih i hermeneutičkih impulsa i, s druge strane, ontoloških impulsa. Vidi: Richard Dienst, *Still Life In Real Time Theory After Television* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994), str. 144–145.

ces and forms from their inception to the present – and beyond. On the one hand, such a narrative is a relatively unorthodox account of the history of the cinema: this is a narrative, for example, in which the advent of sound plays a negligible role when compared to what Deleuze sees as the crucial shift occurring with the shattering of the sensory-motor link, with the concurrent crisis of the movement-image in its specific variety of the action-image, and with the emergence of a whole new type of cinematic image – namely, the time-image – after World War II.¹⁹ On the other hand, if this narrative is relatively unorthodox when considering the story it relates about the cinema, it is perhaps not so unorthodox when considering the way in which it organizes this story: even though it is not teleological, the structure of this narrative nonetheless is fairly traditional, since it does have a clear beginning, is centered around a fundamental break – coinciding with World War II – and hence frames each of the two volumes as the before and the after of a momentous historical divide. It seems, in any case, that one of the problems faced by Deleuze was precisely how to tell the story of the cinema – and hence a literal reading of the opening sentence of this study is simply not viable.

This study, then, provides the reader perhaps with enough grounds for reading that first sentence in quite a

19 After having summarily dismissed the introduction of sound as a significant event in the development of the cinema in *Cinema 1*, Deleuze does return to the specific differences between silent film and the talkie towards the end of *Cinema 2*, but only so as to set the terms for a detailed analysis of sound as a component of the cinematic image. See *Cinema 1*, pp. ix-x, and *Cinema 2*, pp. 225-234, *Cinéma 2*, pp. 292-303.

potkopava vlastite periodizacije – što je činjenica koja bi čitatelja lako mogla navesti da pomisli ili da takve periodizacije za Deleuzea predstavljaju u najboljem slučaju niz heurističkih postupaka prema drukčioj vrsti istraživanja filma, ili da je prvo osmislio takve periodizacije i zatim zaključio da nisu dobre, ili oboje. U svojem iznimnom ogledu o Deleuzeu i filmu, Marie-Claire Ropars Wuilleumier piše:

[U *Filmu 2*] problemi u njegovoj podjeli između klasičnog i modernog [filma, dakle, između filma slike-pokreta i filma slike-vremena] navode ga da se vрати... autorima poput Bressona i Buñuela, koje u prvom dijelu analizira s obzirom na klasičnu narativnost... Sami temelji prvog dijela ruše se u drugom: prvi dio razvija se kategorijama koje dovode do tradicionalnih podjela u povijesti filma, dok se drugi razvija operacijama koje ukidaju tradicionalno uspostavljene tipologije.²¹

Dodao bih, međutim, ne samo da Deleuze u *Filmu 2* pronalazi paradigmatske primjere slike-vremena, a time i modernog filma, u djelu filmaša koji je čvrsto smješten u klasični film slike-pokreta (konkretno, Yasujira Ozua), već i da je, čak i kad po prvi put utvrđuje taksonomije slike i podjele periodizacije filma u *Filmu 1*, Deleuze primorran najaviti kasniji razvoj slike-vremena kako bi takve tipologije i podjele učinio razumljivim (vidi posebice njegovu raspravu druge varijacije slike-pokreta, slike-afekta,

21 Ropars-Wuilleumier, Marie-Claire; "The Cinema, Reader of Gilles Deleuze", u: *Gilles Deleze and the Theater of Philosophy*, ur. Constantin V. Boundas i Dorothea Olkowski (New York: Routledge, 1994), preveo Dana Polan, str. 257-258.

different way, namely, for concluding that Deleuze is simply wrong in the assessment of his own work and that, whatever else this study may be, it is also a history of the cinema, or, at the very least, that there is a history of the cinema *in it* – and, indeed, several commentators lean towards this solution.²⁰ Such a plausible solution, however, still leaves many problems unresolved. If it is the case that – all of Deleuze’s protestations to the contrary notwithstanding – this study is also a history of the cinema, how is one to understand such protestations without simply trivializing them as coy disclaimers or as sheer incoherence? It should be noted, after all, that this first sentence constitutes an unprecedented opening statement for Deleuze, who famously begins many of his works *in medias res*, without telling the reader what the work in question is or

²⁰ See, for example, D. N. Rodowick in *Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 5., as well as Richard Dienst, who – after having pointed out that Deleuze’s study is neither a history of the cinema nor a film theory, that is, “an interpretive framework for the analysis of cinematic texts” – writes: “Nevertheless, Deleuze cannot escape the temptations of either history or film theory, each having already entered the hall and taken a seat before he got there. As always, his inclination is inclusive: Deleuze finds ways to incorporate the most diverse materials into his patient philosophical spadework, acting as a friendly host who secretly sets out to have his way with everything he touches.” I am largely in agreement not only with Dienst’s assessment of Deleuze’s theoretico-methodological proclivities but also with what I understand to be the ultimate implication of such an assessment: namely, either because of what he calls “temptations” or out of what I would call cultural habit, one cannot not periodize and one cannot not interpret – which is not to say that this is all one can and should do, and which is to say, rather, that one, much like Foucault or Deleuze, ought to let oneself be troubled by the interference between, on the one hand, historiographical and hermeneutical impulses, and, on the other hand, ontological ones. See Richard Dienst’s *Still Life In Real Time: Theory After Television* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994), pp. 144–145.

među čijim se paradigmatskim praktičarima ne pojavljuju samo klasični filmaši poput Carla Dreyera, već i moderni poput Michelangela Antonionija i Ingmara Bergmana).²² Drugim riječima, neće biti da je Deleuze prvo konstruirao nizove periodizacija u *Filmu 1*, a kasnije ih odbacio nakon što je zaključio da se ne mogu održati u *Filmu 2*: takve periodizacije su bile problematične još od samog početka u *Filmu 1*. U tom trenutku, s obzirom na sve nerazrješive probleme na koje se nailazi kada se “povijest filma” koristi kao kriterij po kojemu se ocjenjuje Deleuzeov projekt, počinjemo se pitati ima li nešto pogrešno u samom kriteriju te stoga počinjemo dovoditi u pitanje njegov procjeniteljski značaj za ovaj projekt.

Pročitati Deleuzeovu tvrdnju – “Ovo nije povijest filma” – kao istinitu ili lažnu znači istovremeno je pročitati točno, a opet u potpunosti promašiti bit. Sam je Deleuze opetovano pokazao – u *Nietzscheu i filozofiji* kao i u *Filmu 2* – koliko osiromašuju i koliko su pogubne kategorije istinitog i lažnog kada se koriste kao procjeniteljski kriterij (dakle, kada ih se koristi u službi volje koja negira život, volje za istinom), čak i dok zadržavaju svoju važnost za filozofiju shvaćenu kao problem (dakle, kada se odnose na volju koja potvrđuje život, na volju za moć).²³ A upravo je to možda lekcija koju je Deleuze također naučio od sa-

- 22 Za rasprave o Ozuovim djelima kao prethodnici slike-vrijeme, vidi barem *Cinema 2*, str. 13-18, *Cinema 2*, str. 22-29; za rasprave o Bergmanovom odnosu prema slici-afektu, vidi barem *Cinema 1*, str. 99-101, 103 i 105, *Cinema 1*, str. 141-143, 146-149; dok za rasprave o Antonionijevom odnosu prema slici-afektu, vidi barem *Cinema 1*, str. 119-121, *Cinema 1*, str. 167-169.
- 23 Deleuze, Gilles, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), prij. Hugh Tomlinson, str. 94-99; ali vidi i *Cinema 2*, str. 126-155, *Cinema 2*, str. 165-202.

does, leave alone what it is or does not. Furthermore, as soon as one concludes that this study is also a history of the cinema, one is faced with the embarrassing problem of having to account for the fact that Deleuze repeatedly undermines his own periodizations – a fact which plausibly might lead the reader to think either that such periodizations constitute for Deleuze at best a series of heuristic devices towards a different type of investigation of the cinema altogether, or that he first devised such periodizations and later found them dissatisfying, or both. In a remarkable essay on Deleuze and cinema, Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier writes:

[In *Cinema 2*,] the difficulties of his division between classical and modern [cinema, that is, between the cinema of the movement-image and the cinema of the time-image] oblige him to return...to auteurs like Bresson or Buñuel, who in the first volume had been analyzed in terms of classical narrativity...[T]he very foundations of the first volume tumble down in the second: The first volume proceeds by means of categories leading to traditional divisions in the history of the cinema, while the second proceeds by operations that void the traditionally established typologies.²¹

²¹ Ropars-Wuilleumier, Marie-Claire; “The Cinema, Reader of Gilles Deleuze” in *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy*, eds. Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski (New York: Routledge, 1994), trans. Dana Polan, pp. 257–258.

mog filma: kao što Ropars-Wuilleumier ističe, za Deleuzea "film intervenira kao presudni analitičar, sposoban kristalizirati uloge konceptualne moderne gdje snaga pogrešnog pretvara u neiskoristive različitosti kategorije istinitog i lažnog, stvarnog i imaginarnog, kategorije koje tvore temelje klasične filozofije".²⁴ To znači da ćemo, ako smisao prve rečenice Deleuzeove studije filma tražimo u njezinoj istinitosti ili lažnosti, prije ili kasnije završiti u nerazrješivoj konceptualnoj slijepoj ulici.

Postoje, međutim, dva važna i povezana aspekta tvrdnje "Ovo nije povijest filma" koji su toliko očigledni da postoji rizik da ih se s lakoćom previdi. Kao prvo, svako čitanje te tvrdnje ovisi o značenju izraza "povijest". Neporeciva činjenica da ta studija u najmanju ruku sadrži povijest filma, umjesto da ukazuje kako je Deleuzeova karakterizacija njegova projekta u prvoj rečenici neprecizna, mogla bi ukazivati da izraz "povijest" za Deleuzea ovdje ima jednu vrlo specifičnu referenciju koja ne uključuje historiografske elemente *Filma 1* i *Filma 2*. Drugim riječima, ta tvrdnja možda predstavlja Deleuzeov pokušaj da svoj projekt odvoji od jedne određene vrste historiografskog istraživanja, a ne od historiografskih istraživanja *tout court*. Pročitana na takav način, Deleuzeova ograda počinje prilično nalikovati na Foucaultove podrobnije diferencijacije između reprezentacijske povijesti i ontološke povijesti. Drugim riječima, kad god Deleuze koristi izraz "povijest", on to bez iznimke čini u smislu reprezentacijske povijesti. U svojoj studiji o filmu on odmah i kategorično odbacuje napose reprezentacijsku povijest jer se film pre-

24 "The Cinema, Reader of Gilles Deleuze", str. 258.

I would add, however, not only that Deleuze in *Cinema 2* finds paradigmatic examples of the time-image and hence of modern cinema in the work of a filmmaker who is squarely situated in the classical cinema of the movement-image – namely, Yasujiro Ozu – but also that, even when first establishing the image taxonomies and periodizing divisions of the cinema in *Cinema 1*, Deleuze is forced to anticipate the later developments of the time-image in order to make such typologies and divisions intelligible (see especially his discussion of the second variety of the movement-image, namely, the affection-image, whose paradigmatic practitioners turn out to be not only classical filmmakers such as Carl Dreyer but also modern ones such as Michelangelo Antonioni and Ingmar Bergman).²² It is not quite the case, in other words, that Deleuze first constructed a series of periodizations in *Cinema 1* and later dismantled them having found them untenable in *Cinema 2*: such periodizations, rather, were problematic from the very start already in *Cinema 1*. At this point, given all the insoluble problems one runs into when using ‘a history of the cinema’ as the criterion by which to evaluate Deleuze’s project, one begins to wonder whether there might be something amiss with the criterion itself and hence to question its evaluative relevance for this project in the first place.

22 For discussions of Ozu’s work as anticipatory of the time-image, see at least *Cinema 2*, pp. 13–18, *Cinéma 2*, pp. 22–29; for discussions of Bergman’s relation to the affection-image, see at least *Cinema 1*, pp. 99–101, 103, and 105, *Cinéma 1*, pp. 141–143, 146–149; while for discussions of Antonioni’s relation to the affection-image, see at least *Cinema 1*, pp. 119–121, *Cinéma 1*, pp. 167–169.

često pogrešno shvaća kao medij reprezentacije i jer je upravo pogrešno razumijevanje filma ono što želi promjeniti. U tom smislu, ta prva rečenica mogla bi se prevesti ovako: "Ovo nije reprezentacijsko istraživanje filma: točnije, ovo nije ona vrsta istraživanja koja se usredotočuje na prakse i forme reprezentacije, i stoga ovo također nije istraživanje koje film shvaća kao medij reprezentacije." Drugo, tvrdnj "ovo nije povijest filma" ne isključuje mogućnost da bi ova studija mogla biti povijest nečeg drugog, a ne filma. Takva se mogućnost doima uvjerljivijom ako se okrenemo početku engleskog izdanja *Filma 1*. Tamo Deleuze počinje na sličan način tvrdnjom: "Ova knjiga ne želi stvoriti povijest filma" – ali zatim čitatelju odmah u idućem odlomku predstavlja nešto što je zapravo periodizacija.²⁵ Ta periodizacija može se sažeti ovako: film se razvio iz neizravne reprezentacije vremena slike-pokreta u izravnu sliku-vrijeme. Ako ta studija nije povijest filma, što je onda glavni cilj te periodizacije? Želio bih ustvrditi da se ovdje ne periodizira film već vrijeme, odnosno, ne film kao takav, već ona praksa vremena koja se naziva filmom. Točnije, takva periodizacija predstavlja pokušaj promišljanja o presudnom događaju u povjesnom iskustvu vremena kroz film: Deleuzeova studija je povijest vremena koja treba film kako bi promislila radikalnu transformaciju na način na koji se vrijeme proizvodi, utjelovljuje i proživiljava u povjesnim formama – a to je transformacija koju Deleuze identificira u paradigmatskoj promjeni sa

25 Vidi: "Preface to the English edition", *Cinema 1*, str. ix. Englesko izdanje *Film 1* objavljeno je 1986. godine – godinu dana nakon pojave *Filma 2* na francuskom – i stoga se njegov uvod može shvatiti kao *ex post facto* razmišljanje o cijeloj dvodijelnoj studiji.

To read Deleuze's statement – “This is not a history of the cinema” – as either true or false is at once to read it correctly and yet to miss the point altogether. Deleuze himself repeatedly showed – in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* as well as in *Cinema 2* – just how impoverishing and pernicious the categories of the true and the false are when deployed as evaluative criteria (that is, when enlisted in the service of a life-negating will, of a will to truth), even as they may retain their importance for philosophy when understood as a problem (that is, when related to a life-affirming will, to a will to power).²³ And this may well be a lesson that Deleuze learned also from the cinema itself: as Ropars-Wuilleumier points out, for Deleuze “the cinema intervenes as a critical analyzer, capable of crystallizing the stakes of a conceptual modernity where the power of the false renders as unrealizable the distinctiveness of the categories of true and false, real and imaginary, which form the basis of classical philosophy.”²⁴ This means that, if one seeks the point of the opening sentence of Deleuze's study of the cinema in its truth or lack thereof, one will end up sooner or later in an undecidable conceptual cul-de-sac.

There are, however, two important and related aspects of the statement “This is not a history of the cinema” that are so obvious as to risk being easily overlooked. First of all, any reading of this statement hinges on the meaning of the term “history.” The indisputable fact that this study at

23 Deleuze, Gilles; *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), trans. Hugh Tomlinson, pp. 94-99; but see also *Cinema 2*, pp. 126-155, *Cinéma 2*, pp. 165-202.

24 “The Cinema, Reader of Gilles Deleuze,” p. 258.

slike-pokreta na sliku-vrijeme, s neizravne reprezentacije vremena na izravno ubacivanje vremena u filmsku sliku. Dakle, mislim kako je ovo dvoslojni smisao prve rečenice te studije: "Ovo nije povijest filma" može se shvatiti kao da podrazumijeva da to nije reprezentacijska već ontološka povijest, te i kao da to nije povijest filma, već povijest vremena. Deleuze svoj projekt od samog početka karakterizira kao ontološku povijest vremena.²⁶

Međutim, zašto film? Prozvati ovu studiju ontološkom poviješću vremena doista postavlja pitanje zašto bi se takva povijest morala ispričati preko filma. Kako bi se odgovorilo na to pitanje, nužno je Deleuzeov projekt shvatiti u odnosu na Foucaultovu artikulaciju njegove ontološke povijesti u *Upotrebi užitaka*: Deleuzeova studija sadrži analizu problematizacija kroz koje se bivanje nudi da nužno bude mišljenje, i filmskih praksi slike i znakova shvaćenih kao prakse vremena na temelju kojih se te problematizacije

26 Naravno, nisam jedini koji Deleuzeovu studiju o filmu zapravo shvaća kao raspravu o vremenu. Rodowick, primjerice, tvrdi ne samo da "knjige o filmu nastavljaju duboku i složenu meditaciju o vremenu koja je jedan od Deleuzeovih ključnih doprinosova suvremenoj filozofiji", već i da je "Deleuzeova filozofija, na najdublje i najsloženije načine, filozofija vremena". *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, str. x i xiii. U potpunosti se slažem s tom ocjenom. Ne slažem se s Rodowickom, međutim, u pogledu pronaalaženja filozofskih genealogija koje se spajaju u Delezeovoj teoretizaciji vremena: dok Rodowick tu teoretizaciju shvaća kao radikalnu ponovnu elaboraciju ničevskih i bergsonovskih konceptualnih elemenata, jedan od ciljeva šireg projekta kojeg je ovaj esej samo dio bit će pokazati da – iako su takvi elementi nesumnjivo prisutni i važni u tome – temeljna, odlučujuća, dvostrislena i pritajena konceptualna osoba u Deleuzeovoj studiji filma i njegovom promišljanju vremena jest Spinoza. Kao što se također nadam pokazati, pratiti različite filozofske genealogije kod Delezea potencijalno znači baviti se nečim što je mnogo više od čistog genealoškog natezanja i stvoriti bitno drukčije prikaze njegovog bavljenja pitanjem vremena.

the very least contains a history of the cinema, rather than indicating that Deleuze's characterization of his own project in the opening statement is misguided, could indicate that for Deleuze the term "history" has there a very specific referent that does not include the historiographical elements of *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2*. This statement, in other words, may well constitute Deleuze's attempt to dissociate his project from a particular type of historiographical investigation rather than from historiographical investigations *tout court*. If read in this way, Deleuze's disclaimer begins to look quite similar to Foucault's more detailed differentiations between representational history and ontological history. Put differently, whenever Deleuze uses the term "history" he invariably means representational history. In his study of the cinema, in particular, he repudiates representational history immediately and categorically because the cinema too often has been misunderstood as a medium of representation and because this is precisely the misunderstanding of the cinema that he wishes to redress. In this sense, that opening statement could be translated as "This is not a representational investigation of the cinema: namely, this is not a type of investigation that focuses on practices and forms of representation, and hence this is also not an investigation that understands the cinema as a medium of representation." Secondly, the statement "This is not a history of the cinema" does not exclude the possibility that this study might be a history of something other than cinema altogether. Such a possibility begins to look all the more plausible if one turns to the opening of the English edition of *Cinema 1*. There, Deleuze begins similarly by stating: "This book does not set out to

stvaraju. Za Deleuzea, film nije samo praksa vremena, već i problematizirajuća praksa: stvara problemske forme vremena, takve da se bivanje zamata u sebe u pokušaju da bude mišljenje; stvara probleme tako da bivanje u vremenu postaje nešto drugo nego što jest; uvodi takav događaj izvanjskog da se odnosi sila koje reguliraju interferenciju između bivanja i postajanja vremena iznova promišljaju, ponovno oblikuju i iznova proživljavaju. Daleko od igranja sporedne uloge u ontološkoj povijesti vremena, film je od ključne važnosti za takvu povijest jer filmske slike ne samo da materijaliziraju vrijeme, već i stvaraju preobražaje u vremenu. Ukratko, film je problematizirajuća praksa koja mijenja vrijeme – i stoga nakon pojave filma, ni vrijeme ni analiza vremena ne mogu se provesti bez filma.

Jedan od osnovnih postulata koji omogućuju i usmjeruju Deleuzeovu ontološku povijest vremena naposljetku je, s jedne strane, taj da se vrijeme ne može svesti na svoje povjesne prakse i forme, i da, s druge strane, vrijeme nije ništa izvan takvih praksi i formi. Ta studija, drugim riječima, pokušava uhvatiti onaj događaj koji je onemogućio daljnje odvojeno promišljanje vremena i filma, koji je učinio nužnim da se o vremenu i filmu promišlja u točki njihove interferencije – događaj koji je oboje nepovratno izmijenio.

Činjenica da Deleuzeova istraživanja interferencije između vremena i filma svoju logičnu pretpostavku pronađaze u postulatu, otkriva da su oni niz teoremskih dedukcija. U tom smislu je poučna Deleuzeova rasprava o Pieru Paolu Pasoliniju u *Filmu 2*. Nakon što Pasolinijeve filmove *Teorema (Teorem)* i *Salò o le 120 giornate di Sodoma (Salò ili 120 dana Sodome)* karakterizira kao filmske demonstracije

produce a history of the cinema” – but then presents the reader with what amounts to a periodization in the immediately following paragraph.²⁵ This periodization can be encapsulated thus: the cinema developed from an indirect representation of time in the movement-image to a direct time-image. If this study is not a history of the cinema, what is, then, the prime object of this periodization? I would like to suggest that what is being periodized here is not the cinema but time, that is, not exactly the cinema *per se* but that practice of time which goes by the name of cinema. In particular, such a periodization constitutes an attempt to think a momentous event in the historical experience of time through the cinema: Deleuze’s study is a history of time that needs the cinema in order to think a radical transformation in the way in which time is produced, embodied, and lived in historical forms – and this is a transformation that Deleuze identifies in the paradigmatic shift from the movement-image to the time-image, from the indirect representation of time to the direct insertion of time in the cinematic image. I take this to be, then, the double-edged import of the opening statement of this study: “This is not a history of the cinema” can be read as implying that this is not a representational history but an ontological one as well as that this is not a history of the cinema but a history of time: Deleuze characterizes his project from the very start as an ontological history of time.²⁶

25 See the “Preface to the English edition,” *Cinema 1*, p. ix. The English edition of *Cinema 1* was published in 1986 – one year after *Cinema 2* had already appeared in French – and hence its preface can be taken as an *ex post facto* reflection on the whole two-volume study.

26 I am not alone, of course, in conceiving of Deleuze’s study of the cinema in

more geometrico, Deleuze pojašnjava da ti filmovi korespondiraju s dva nerazdvojiva deduktivna postupka mišljenja, problemom i teoremom:

Postoje dva matematička slučaja koji se stalno upućuju jedan na drugi, prvi obuhvaća drugog, drugi se pretvara u prvog, ali su oba vrlo različita unatoč njihovoj vezi: to su teorem i problem. Problem živi u teoremu i daje mu život, čak i dok mu oduzima snagu. Problematsko se razlikuje od teoremskog... po tome da teorem razvija unutarnji odnos od principa do posljedica, dok problem uvodi događaj iz izvanjskog.²⁷

Kao što smo već vidjeli, takvo izvanjsko nema nikakve veze ni s formama vanjštine niti s formama unutrašnjosti, već je umjesto toga bezoblična ravnina imanencije bez forme koju tvore odnosi sila u kojima su sve forme usađene i preko kojih se sve forme međusobno odnose. Ako je teorem samopozicionirajuća i samozatvarajuća monadička forma, on sadrži unutar sebe također i problematsku formu koja se njime hrani, otvara ga silama izvanjskog i predstavlja njegov *raison d'être*. Takvo spinozističko čitanje Pasolinija i refieksije interferencijskih odnosa između teorema i problema baca svjetlo i na Deleuzeov odnos s filmom. Film je problematizirajuća praksa vremena, dok je filmska slika problematska forma vremena koja istovremeno živi u Deleuzeovom teoremu vremena te mu daje život. D. N. Rodowick primjereno je svoju studiju o Deleuzeovom odnosu s filmom naslovio *Vremenski stroj Gillesa Delezea*. Dodao bih da u *Filmu 1* i *Filmu 2* Deleuze stvara kompleksni

27 *Cinema 2*, str. 174. *Cinema 2*, str. 227.

But why cinema? To call this study an ontological history of time indeed begs the question of why exactly such a history had to be narrated through the cinema. In order to approach this question, it is indispensable to understand Deleuze's project in terms of Foucault's articulation of his own ontological history in *The Use of Pleasure*: Deleuze's study consists of an analysis of the problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought – and of the cinematic practices of images and signs understood as practices of time on the basis of which these problematizations are formed. For Deleuze, the cinema is not only a practice of time but also a problematizing one: it produces problematic forms of time such that being folds back onto itself in an effort to be thought; it makes problems such that being in time becomes other than what it is; it introduces an event of the outside such that the force relations regulating the interference between

effect as a treatise on time. Rodowick, for example, argues not only that “the cinema books continue a deep and complex meditation on time that is one of Deleuze’s central contributions to contemporary philosophy,” but also that “Deleuze’s philosophy is, in the deepest and most complex ways, a philosophy of time.” *Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine*, pp. x and xiii. I agree entirely with this assessment. I differ from Rodowick, however, when it comes to tracing the philosophical genealogies that converge in Deleuze’s theorization of time: while Rodowick understands this theorization as a radical re-elaboration of Nietzschean and Bergsonian conceptual elements, one of the aims of the larger project from which this essay is taken will be to show that – even though such elements are undoubtedly present and important in it – the fundamental, determining, ubiquitous, and clandestine conceptual persona in Deleuze’s study of the cinema and in its meditations on time is Spinoza. As I also hope to show, to trace different philosophical genealogies in Deleuze is potentially to engage in much more than sheer genealogical quibbling and to produce significantly different accounts of his investment in the question of time.

teoremsko-problematiski asemblaž koji se sastoji od teoremskog vremenskog stroja u kojemu film funkcionira kao stroj za stvaranje problema koji pokreće cijeli asemblaž dovodeći gorivo iz izvanjskoga, dok su problemi koje stvaraju filmske slike brojni cjevovodi sila izvanjskog, brojne žile kucavice vremenskog teorema. Film otvara teoremska istraživanja vremena onom izvanjskom.

Za Deleuzea film zapravo pokazuje da se vrijeme ne može svesti na povijesne forme, a ipak nije ništa izvan takvih formi: ne zato što ne postoji ništa izvan povijesti, već upravo zato jer ono što je izvan povijesti – naime, bezoblično, immanentno i nepovijesno izvanjsko odnosa sila – jest samo vrijeme. Moglo bi se reći da taj paradoks predstavlja glavni predmet zanimanja *Filma 2*: s jedne strane, film silu izvanjskog zamišlja kao vrijeme;²⁸ s druge strane, film vrijeme zamišlja kao nepromjenjivu i nepromjenjenu formu svega što se mijenja. Ali kako može vrijeme istovremeno biti nepromjenjena forma promjene i bezoblična sila koja zauvijek upada izvana kako bi promjenila sve forme? Kako išta može biti bezoblično, a opet biti forma; mijenjati se, a biti nepromjenjeno? Iako se tako ne doima, za Deleuzea ovdje napisljetu nema kontradikcija. Na primjer, dok raspravlja o Ozuu, piše:

Vaza u *Kasnom proljeću* (*Banshun/Late Spring*) nalazi se između kćerinog polusmješka i početka njezina plača. To je postajanje, promjena, prolazak. Međutim, forma onoga što se mijenja, sama se ne mijenja, ne prolazi. To je vrijeme, vrijeme samo, "malo vremena u svojem čistom stanju": izravna slika-vrije-

28 Vidi, na primjer, *Cinema 2*, str. 178-182, *Cinema 2*, str. 232-237.

en the being and the becoming of time are rethought, reconfigured, and lived anew. Far from playing a secondary role in an ontological history of time, the cinema is essential to such a history because cinematic images not only materialize time but also effect a metamorphosis in time. In short, the cinema is a problematizing practice that changes time – and hence in the wake of the cinema neither time nor any analytic of time can do without the cinema. One of the foundational postulates enabling and guiding Deleuze's ontological history of time, after all, is that, on the one hand, time cannot be reduced to its historical practices and forms, and, on the other hand, time is nothing outside such practices and forms. This study, in other words, tries to capture that event which made it no longer possible to think time and the cinema in isolation from each other, which made it necessary to think time and the cinema at their point of interference – an event that transformed both irreversibly.

The fact that Deleuze's investigations of the interference between time and the cinema find their logical presupposition in a postulate reveals them to be a series of theorematic deductions. In this sense, Deleuze's discussion of Pier Paolo Pasolini in *Cinema 2* is illuminating. After having characterized Pasolini's *Teorema* and *Salò* as cinematic demonstrations *more geometrico*, Deleuze specifies that these films correspond to two inseparable deductive procedures of thought, namely, the problem and the theorem, respectively. He writes:

[T]here are two mathematical instances which constantly refer to each other, one enveloping the second, the second slid-

me, koja onomu što se mijenja daje nepromijenjenu formu u kojoj se stvara promjena. Noć koja se mijenja u dan, ili suprotno, podsjeća na mrtvu prirodu na koju pada svjetlo, slabeći ili jačajući (*Sono yo no tsuma*/*Žena te noći*/*That Night's Wife*, *Dekigokoro*/*Prolazni hir*/*Passing Fancy*). Mrtva priroda je vrijeme, jer sve što se mijenja je u vremenu, ali se samo vrijeme ne mijenja, moglo bi se promijeniti samo u drugo vrijeme, bez kraja. U trenutku u kojem se filmska slika najizravnije sučeljava s fotografijom, postaje i najradikalnije različita od nje. Ozuove mrtve prirode dugotrajne su, više od deset sekundi vaze: to trajanje vaze točno je reprezentacija onoga što traje, preko niza promijenjenih stanja. Bicikl također može trajati; dakle, predstavljaći nepromijenjenu formu onoga što se kreće, dokle god стоји na mjestu, nepokretan, naslonjen na zid (*Ukigusa*/*Plutajuće trave*/*Floating Weeds*). Bicikl, vaza i mrtve prirode čiste su i izravne slike vremena. Svaka je vrijeme, u svakoj prilici, pod različitim uvjetima onoga što se mijenja u vremenu. Vrijeme je puna, dakle, nepromjenjiva forma ispunjena promjenom... [J]edan jedini horizont povezuje kozmičko sa svakodnevnim, trajno s promjenjivim, jedno jedinstveno i identično vrijeme kao nepromijenjenu formu onoga što se mijenja. Na taj način su prema Schraderu definirani priroda ili *stasis* kao forma koja povezuje svakodnevno u “nečemu jedinstvenom i trajnom”. Uopće nema potrebe prizivati transcendenciju.²⁹

Čini se kako nam Ozuova vaza govori da je vrijeme prozirna i providna površina svih stvari. Vrijeme – sugerira Ozuov bicikl – jest svjetlo u kojemu se stvari “kupaju” dok se mijenjaju. Daleko od transcendentnog *deus ex machina*

29 Cinema 2, str. 17. Cinema 2, str. 27-28.

ing into the first, but both very different in spite of their union: these are the theorem and the problem. A problem lives in the theorem, and gives it life, even when removing its power. The problematic is distinguished from the theorematic...in that the theorem develops internal relationships from principle to consequences, while the problem introduces an event from the outside.²⁷

Such an outside, as we saw earlier, has nothing to do either with forms of exteriority or with forms of interiority but is instead that formless plane of immanence constituted by force relations in which all forms are embedded and through which all forms relate to each other. If the theorem is a self-positing and self-enclosing monadic form, it also contains within itself a problematic form that feeds on it, pries it open to the forces of the outside, and constitutes its *raison d'être*. Such a Spinozist reading of Pasolini – and the reflections it occasions on the inferential relations between theorem and problem – shed light also on Deleuze's own engagement with the cinema. The cinema is the problematizing practice of time, and the cinematic image is the problematic form of time, which at once live in Deleuze's theorem of time and give it life. D. N. Rodowick has appropriately titled his study of Deleuze's engagement with the cinema *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*. I would add that in *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2* Deleuze constructs a complex theorem-problem assemblage consisting of a theorematic time machine in which the cinema functions as the problem-making engine that

27 *Cinema 2*, pp. 174. *Cinéma 2*, pp. 227.

čiji iznenadni i providnosni posjeti iz svijeta vječnih sila uvode promjene u naš svjetovni svijet povijesnih sila koje bi inače ostale zaglavljene u bivanju, vrijeme je immanentna i permanentna forma jedinog svijeta koji postoji, ovog svijeta koji nikad ne prestaje postajati. Deleuze u Ozuovim filmskim mrtvima prirodama pronalazi primjerne aktualizacije potencijala urođenog u filmu kao u mediju izražavanja, naime, potencijala za proizvodnju koncepcije vremena koja je, *mutatis mutandi*, jednaka Spinozinoj koncepciji supstance, što znači i da Deleuze implicitno iznova čita Spinozu kroz prizmu filma, pa zapravo ponovno promišlja supstancu kao vrijeme. Međutim, ostavit ću po strani, barem zasad, teško pitanje Spinozine odsutne prisutnosti u Deleuzeovoj analizi vremena. Ovdje samo želim naglasiti da smatrati vrijeme nepromijenjenom formom promjene znači implicirati da se vrijeme ne mijenja upravo u razmjeru u kojem se nikad ne prestaje mijenjati. Ono što se nikad ne mijenja u vezi s vremenom je sama činjenica da je uvihek u procesu prolazeњa, da uvihek prolazi sa svim onime što ono čini da prolazi, da se uvihek mijenja zajedno sa svim što ono i samo mijenja. Vrijeme se nikad ne mijenja u smislu da je njegov način bivanja permanentan i vječan. Vrijeme se nikad ne prestaje mijenjati u smislu da je njegov način bivanja postajanje. Upravo zato, kada kasnije raspravlja o tome kako je u povijesti mišljenja “vrijeme uvihek ideju istine dovodilo u krizu”, Deleuze može napisati da “nije empirijski sadržaj, već forma ili, radije, čista sila vremena ono što istinu dovodi u krizu”.³⁰ U ovoj rečenici, izraz “ili, radije” [*ou plutôt*] ne iznevjerava okljevanje niti

30 Cinema 2, str. 130, Cinema 2, str. 170.

drives the whole assemblage by extracting its fuel from the outside – and the problems constituted by cinematic images are thus so many pipelines into the force of the outside, so many lifelines for a theorem of time. The cinema opens the theoretic investigation of time to the outside.

For Deleuze, in fact, the cinema shows that if time cannot be reduced to historical forms and yet is nothing outside such forms, that is so not because there is nothing outside history but precisely because that which is outside history – namely, the formless, immanent, and unhistorical outside of force relations – is time itself. Arguably, this apparent paradox constitutes the main concern of *Cinema 2*: on the one hand, the cinema conceives of the force of the outside as time;²⁸ on the other hand, the cinema conceives of time as the unalterable and unchanging form of all that changes. But how can time be at once the unchanging form of change and the formless force forever erupting from the outside to change all forms? How can anything be formless yet a form, changing yet unchanging? Despite all appearances to the contrary, for Deleuze in the end there are no contradictions here. When discussing Ozu, for example, he writes:

The vase in *Late Spring* is interposed between the daughter's half smile and the beginning of her tears. There is becoming, change, passage. But the form of what changes does not itself change, does not pass on. This is time, time itself, 'a little time in its pure state': a direct time-image, which gives what chang-

28 See, for example, *Cinema 2*, pp. 178–182, *Cinéma 2*, pp. 232–237.

uvodi predomišljaj, kao da je Deleuze u posljednji trenutak promijenio mišljenje u pogledu što to točno dovodi do križe istine. Taj izraz umjesto toga označava zonu interferencije između vremena kao forme i vremena kao sile. Pod znatiželjnim pogledom filma, ta jedinstvena forma – vrijeme – pokazuje se zasebnom, a nerazlučivom od same sile. Zapravo, odmah na idućim stranicama, dok analizira kako je ta kriza artikulirana u narativnim strukturama Alaina Robbe-Grilleta i Alaina Resnaisa, Deleuze više ne govori o "formi vremena", već o "sili vremena", za razliku od "forme istine" koju vrijeme falsificira i mijenja.³¹ Za Deleuzea, film nam pruža vrijeme kao jedinstvenu i nevidljivu formu onoga što nema forme i što mijenja sve forme, a to je sila izvanjskoga.

Vratit ću se pitanju na koji način film proizvodi i predstavlja ono izvanjsko kao vrijeme. Do sada sam prije svega pokušao artikulirati kako Deleuzeova ontološka povijest vremena funkcioniра kao metoda, a sada se ta metodološka izlaganja mogu preciznije definirati: stvarajući ontološku povijest vremena, Deleuze piše na mjestu interferencije između filozofije i povijesti kako bi promišljao o interferenciji između povjesnih praksi i formi filma i nepovijesnog izvanjskog koje je samo vrijeme. Takve interferencije se pojavljuju u raznim formama: interferencija između filozofije i povijesti je teoremska metoda, dok je interferencija između filma i vremena problematski objekt kojeg takva metoda istovremeno i stvara i obrađuje, što predstavlja *raison d'être* te metode. To znači i da takav problematski objekt za ontološku povijest ne predstavlja pro-

³¹ Cinema 2, str. 131-132, Cinema 2, str. 171-173.

es the unchanging form in which the change is produced. The night that changes into day, or the reverse, recalls a still life on which light falls, either fading or getting stronger (*That Night's Wife, Passing Fancy*). The still life is time, for everything that changes is in time, but time does not itself change, it could itself change only in another time, indefinitely. At the point where the cinematographic image most directly confronts the photo, it also becomes most radically distinct from it. Ozu's still lifes endure, have a duration, over ten seconds of the vase: this duration of the vase is precisely the representation of that which endures, through the succession of changing states. A bicycle may also endure; that is, represent the unchanging form of that which moves, so long as it is at rest, motionless, stood against the wall (*A Story of Floating Weeds*). The bicycle, the vase and the still lifes are the pure and direct images of time. Each is time, on each occasion, under various conditions of that which changes in time. Time is the full, that is, the unalterable form filled by change...[O]ne and the same horizon links the cosmic to the everyday, the durable to the changing, one single and identical time as the unchanging form of that which changes. It is in this way that nature or stasis was defined, according to Schrader, as the form that links the everyday in 'something unified and permanent'. There is no need at all to call on a transcendence.²⁹

Time – Ozu's vase seems to be whispering – is the transparent and translucent skin of all things. Time – Ozu's bicycle suggests – is the light in which things bathe as they change. Far from being a transcendent *deus ex machina*

29 *Cinema 2*, pp. 17, *Cinéma 2*, pp. 27-28.

blem kao bilo koji drugi, i da ontološka povijest vremena nije samo jedna od ontoloških povijesti. Problem predstavljaju razmjene s izvanjskim, i stoga je – kao što sam već ustvrdio – ontološka povijest uvjek međudjelovanje s izvanjskim, s njegovim produktivnim i konstitutivnim silama, u mjeri u kojoj se bavi s problematizirajućim praksama i problematskim formama. Međutim, s obzirom na to kako je problem postavljen od strane interferencije između filma i vremena zapravo problem proizvodnje vremena kao izvanjskog, ontološka povijest takve interferencije nije samo međudjelovanje s izvanjskim, već i istraga o tome od čega se sastoji to međudjelovanje i kako do takvog međudjelovanja uopće može doći. U tome smislu, Deleuzeova ontološka povijest vremena je ontološka povijest *par excellence*: suočavajući se s načinima na koje film proizvodi vrijeme kao izvanjsko, suočava se i s vlastitim logičkim i povjesnim uvjetima mogućnosti, čime se ontološka istraga kao takva dovodi u pitanje. U konačnici, Deleuzeov projekt je ujedno i istraga o ontološkoj istrazi, o mogućnosti ontološkog razmišljanja u povijesti – dakle, istraga o tome što radimo dok razmišljamo. Pod nemjerljivim pritiscima izvanjskog (koji su stalno prisutni, ali koji ovdje predstavljaju i najčišće problematsko) ta se istraga vraća prema sebe u pokušaju da vlastiti postanak shvati kao mišljenje u povijesti, da bi se na taj način izmjenili i mišljenje i povijest. Takva su njezina goruća smjerna pitanja: Što je razmišljanje danas? Kako je razmišljanje danas uopće moguće? Što misao može učiniti? (U tom smislu, nije slučajno da neki od posljednjih poglavlja cijelog projekta nose naslove poput "Film i misao" ili "Film, tijelo i mozak, misao"). Na kraju, Foucaultov opis vlastitog

whose sudden and providential visitations from the realm of eternal forms introduce change into our earthly realm of historical forms that would otherwise remain stuck in being, time is the immanent and permanent form of the only world there is, of this one world that never stops becoming. Deleuze finds in Ozu's cinematic still lifes an exemplary actualization of a potential intrinsic in the cinema as medium of expression, namely, the potential to produce a conception of time that is, *mutatis mutandi*, tantamount to Spinoza's conception of substance – and this is also to say that Deleuze implicitly rereads Spinoza through the lens of the cinema so as to in effect reconceptualize substance as time. But I will leave aside, for the moment, the thorny question of Spinoza's absent presence in Deleuze's analytic of time. Here, I simply want to stress that to conceive of time as the unchanging form of change is to imply that time is unchanging precisely to the extent to which it never ceases to change. What never changes about time is the very fact that it is always in the process of elapsing, that it is always passing along with all that it makes come to pass, that it is always changing along with all that it changes. Time never changes in the sense that its way of being is permanent and for all time. Time never stops changing in the sense that its way of being is becoming. This is why, when discussing later how in the history of thought "time has always put the notion of truth into crisis," Deleuze can write that it "is not the empirical content, it is the form or rather the pure force of time which puts truth into crisis."³⁰ In this sentence, the locuti-

30 Cinema 2, p. 130, Cinéma 2, p. 170.

projekta u *Povijesti seksualnosti* još je točniji opis Deleuzeovog projekta u njegovoј studiji filma: Deleuzeova ontološka povijest vremena doista je ono što je Foucault prozvao poviješću mišljenja.

(preveo Vedran Pavlić)

on “or rather” [*ou plutôt*] does not betray an hesitation or introduce an afterthought, as if Deleuze changed his mind at the last moment regarding what it is exactly that engenders the crisis of truth. This locution marks instead a zone of interference between time as form and time as force. Under the searching gaze of the cinema, that unique form which is time is revealed to be distinct yet indiscernible from force itself. In the immediately following pages, in fact, when examining how such a crisis of truth is articulated in the narrative structures of Alain Robbe-Grillet and Alain Resnais, Deleuze no longer refers to the “form of time” but rather to the “force of time,” as opposed to “the form of the true” which time intervenes to falsify and change.³¹ For Deleuze, the cinema gives us time as the incomparable and invisible form of that which has no form and which changes all forms, namely, the force of the outside.

I will return to the question of how exactly the cinema produces and presents the outside as time. For the moment, I have attempted primarily to articulate how Deleuze’s ontological history of time functions as a method. And now these methodological elaborations can be recast more precisely: in producing an ontological history of time, Deleuze writes at the interference between philosophy and history in order to think the interference between the historical practices and forms of the cinema and the unhistorical outside which is time itself. Such interferences take different forms: the interference between philosophy and history is a theorematic method, and

³¹ *Cinema 2*. pp. 131-132, *Cinéma 2*, pp. 171-173.

the interference between the cinema and time is the problematic object that such a method at once produces and addresses, and that constitutes the method's *raison d'être*. This is also to say that such a problematic object does not constitute a problem like any other for ontological history, and that an ontological history of time is not an ontological history among others. Problems are transactions with the outside, and hence – as I argued earlier – ontological history is always an engagement with the outside, and with its productive and constitutive powers, to the extent to which it deals with problematizing practices and problematic forms. But given how the problem posed by the interference between the cinema and time is in effect the problem of the production of time as the outside, an ontological history of such an interference is not only an engagement with the outside but also an investigation into what such an engagement consists of and into how such an engagement can at all take place. In this sense, Deleuze's ontological history of time is ontological history *par excellence*: in confronting the ways in which the cinema produces time as the outside, it also confronts its own logical and historical conditions of possibility, thereby putting ontological inquiry as such into question. Ultimately, Deleuze's project is also an investigation into ontological inquiry, into the possibility of thinking ontologically in history – that is, an investigation into what it is that one does when one thinks. Under the incommensurable pressures of the outside – which are ever present but which here constitute also its most proper problematic – this investigation folds back upon itself in an effort to understand its own coming-into-being as thought in his-

tory, so as to change both thought and history. Such are its urgent guiding questions: What is thinking now? How is thinking at all possible today? What can thought do? (And, in this sense, it is not a coincidence that some of the final chapters of the whole project bear titles such as “Cinema and Thought” or “Cinema, body and brain, thought”). In the end, Foucault’s description of his own project in *The History of Sexuality* is an even more accurate description of Deleuze’s project in his study of the cinema: Deleuze’s ontological history of time is indeed what Foucault called a history of thought.



Alexander Horwath, filmski publicist i kustos, direktor Österreichisches Filmmuseuma u Beču od 2002., od 1992.-1997. direktor Viennala, suosnivač organizacije sixpackfilm za distribuciju austrijskih eksperimentalnih filmova. Urednik je raznovrsnih filmskih programa, a na Documenti 12 (2007.) kustos *Drugih života*, programa "normalnog stanja filma" u kinu Gloria: 50x2 programa druge polovice filmskog stoljeća. Objavio je mnoštvo filmoloških studija i bio (su)urednik knjiga koje obuhvaćaju povijest, estetiku i teoriju filma, primjerice: na temelju filmskog programa na Viennalu, novoholivudski film 1970-ih *The Last Great American Picture Show* (s Thomasom Elsaesserom i Noelom Kingom) 2004. ili publikacije austrijskog filmskog muzeja: prva knjiga o Michaelu Hanekeu *Der siebente Kontinent. Michael Haneke und seine Filme* (1991.); o austrijskoj avangardi od 1950-ih do danas *Avantardefilm* (s Lisl Ponger i Gottfriedom Schlemmerom, 1995.); o austrijskom umjetniku i filmašu Dietmaru Brehmu *Dietmar Brehm. Party. Filme 1974 – 2003* (2003.); o von Sternbergovu filmu *Josef von Sternberg. The Case of Lena Smith* (s Michaelom Omastom 2007.); te o Peteru Tscherkasskom.

Alexander Horwath, director of the Austrian Film Museum in Vienna (from 2002) and former director of the Viennale (1992-7), co-founded sixpackfilm (non-profit organization for distribution of Austrian experimental films) in 1990, has published widely on film and art. He initiated and organized many film events and retrospectives and was curator of the *Second Lives* film programme in the Gloria cinema at documenta 12 (2007), where during the 100 days of documenta 50 full-length programmes of "normal case of cinema" has been shown.

He is the editor, contributor or author of several books on film, including *The Last Great American Picture Show* (with Thomas Elsaesser and Noel King, 2004) and publications of the Austrian Film Museum: about films by Michael Haneke *Der siebente Kontinent. Michael Haneke und seine Filme* (1991); Austrian avant-garde films from 1950s till now *Avantardefilm* (with Lisl Ponger and Gottfried Schlemmer, 1995); about artist and filmmaker Dietmar Brehm *Dietmar Brehm. Party. Filme 1974 - 2003* (2003); Josef von Sternberg's film *Josef von Sternberg. The Case of Lena Smith* (with Michaelom Omastom, 2007); and about Peter Tscherkassky.

Singing in the Rain / Pjevanje na kiši Superkinematografija Petera Tscherkasskyja

1

Godine 1979. argentinski pisac Diego Vildosola objavio je autobiografski roman fantastike pod naslovom *Pogrešno sunce*. U toj se knjizi junak Alejandro, sada odrastao muškarac, prisjeća:

“Na konjskim utrkama nikada nismo marili za pobjednika. Ali, obraćali smo pozornost na noge konja koje su izgubile ritam. Među djevojkama, sviđale su nam se one koje nikada nisu izlazile s dečkima. Kada smo odlazili gledati filmove, tražili smo one “pogrešne”. Gledali smo te filmove, ne zbog njihovih istrošenih priča i likova, nego zato što su obećavali veću misteriju: ne magične slike, nego sam rad magičara. Nešto što nikada nije bilo viđeno, ali se nekako pojavilo iz samog središta vidljivog svijeta. U svojem dnevniku iz tog doba ispisao sam na kartu, poput zemalja, sve sjajne filmove

Singing in the Rain / Supercinematography by Peter Tscherkassky

1

In 1979 the Argentinean writer Diego Vildosola published an autobiographical fantasy-novel entitled *The Wrong Sun*. In this book, the hero Alejandro, now a grown-up man, reminiscens:

"At the horse races, we never cared who won. But we paid attention to the legs of horses which had lost their rhythm. Among the girls, we preferred those who never went out with boys. When going to the movies, we were looking for the 'wrong' ones. We watched these films not because of their well-worn stories and characters, but because they promised a better mystery: no magical images, but the magician's work itself. Something that had never been seen before, but somehow emerged right from the centre of the visible world. In my diary of that time I listed all the great films I saw as on a map,

koje sam video. Kada je karta bila ispunjena, pomislio sam da bih trebao početi raditi filmove koji će nevidljivo strujati uz granice, na mojoj osobnoj ničjoj zemlji među različitim zemljama.”

2

Koliko često je moguće u umjetnosti krenuti ispočetka, vratiti se *tabuli rasi*? Radikalni čin brisanja ili redukcije predmeta punog značenja na nultu točku značenja (do točke bivanja onim što fizički jest), ili hlapidba materijalnog u misao ili koncept – sve te umjetničke geste su ili jedinstvene, oslobođajuće i “snažne” (njihovo ponavljanje može biti samo “slabo”, estetički neopravdano ili čak reakcionarno) ili su one već elementi repertoara, poznat skup tehnika te stoga uvijek dostupan umjetniku. (Ovako razmišljući, točka potpunog brisanja – “apsolutna nula” – bila bi jednako snažna ili slaba kao i bilo koja druga na području estetičkog izražavanja).

Te geste su jedinstvene samo ako netko povijest umjetnosti smatra vrstom obrnutog osvajačkog pohoda, progresivnom i linearnom kolonizacijom konačnog svijeta percepcije – isprobavanjem jednog oblika izražavanja za drugim i zatim proglašavanja svakoga od njih okupiranim područjem. Ovo poimanje leži u srži mitologije koja okružuje modernu umjetnost, a koja je stekla prevlast na Zapadu tijekom razdoblja Hladnog rata. Korak po korak, kršeći jedno buržujsko pravilo za drugim, modernitet mukotrpno ostvaruje novu definiciju estetike. Ta priča o modernoj umjetnosti, međutim, puna je istih oružja i ideologija kojima su se služili buržujski “protivnici”: ekspanzionističke politike i kapitalistička kolonizacija svijeta projicirani su u

like nations. Once the map was full, I imagined that I should start to make films which would invisibly wind along the borders, in my own private no-man's land between the various nations."

2

How often is it possible to start afresh in art, to go back to a *tabula rasa*? The radical act of erasure, or the reduction of a meaningful object to the zero point of meaning (to the point of it being what it physically is), or the evaporation of a material thing into a thought or concept – all these artistic gestures are either unique, liberating and “powerful” (repeating them later on could only be “weak”, aesthetically illegitimate or even reactionary); or they are already elements of a repertoire, a known set of techniques, and thus always available to the artist. (In this line of thinking, the point of total erasure – “absolute zero” – would be just as strong or weak like any other in the field of aesthetic expression).

These gestures are unique only if one thinks of art history as a kind of inverted journey of conquest, as the progressive and linear colonisation of a finite world of perception – trying out one form of expression after another, and then declaring each of them occupied territory. This notion lies at the core of the mythology surrounding modern art, which gained hegemony in the West during the Cold War era. Step by step, breaking one bourgeois rule after another, modernity arduously achieves a new definition of aesthetics. This tale of modern art, however, is full of the same weapons and ideologies used by the bourgeois “opponent”: expansionist policies and

progresivno kretanje prema najjunutarnijim vrhuncima umjetnosti. Takva napredujuća kulturna “linija fronte” (“prikolica” avangarde i njezino neprestano iskorištavanje Novog, novih istina), nije ništa drugo nego zrcalo stvarne “granice”, promjenjiva zemljopisna međa koju u kapitalizmu uvijek treba prijeći za razvoj novih tržišta. I baš kao što je “srce tame” Josepha Conrada bilo teritorijalno-filosofska točka absolutne nule za kolonijaliste 19. stoljeća (ili za američke vojнике u Vijetnamu), “bijela kocka” visokog modernizma metoforički služi kao igralište “završnice” za borce prve linije fronte umjetnosti – “srce bijelogra”.

3

Duh modernizma i dalje igra važnu ulogu u izrazu *avangardni film*. (Ovaj termin se rabi uglavnom u zemljama gdje “klasični” avangardni pokreti iz 1920-ih nisu bili previše istaknuti. Što se avangarde tiče, Austrija i SAD, primjerice, bile su uistinu “zahvaćene” tek tijekom 1940-ih i 1950-ih. Njihovi avangardni pokreti usko su povezani s istinski modernom “filmskom umjetnošću”. U Njemačkoj i Francuskoj, s druge strane, izraz “avangarda” uglavnom se odnosi na prostor likovne umjetnosti tijekom 1920-ih; kada se govori o radikalnoj umjetničkoj filmskoj praksi u poslijeratnom razdoblju, najčešći termin u Njemačkoj i Francuskoj jest “eksperimentalni film”.) Srođno mitu o modernoj umjetnosti, dominantno shvaćanje povijesti avangardnog filma također je oblikovano različitim “vraćanjima na nultu točku” i bivanjima “prvim koji...” – primjerice, nefigurativnost u radovima Vikinga Eggelinga i Hansa Richtera (oko 1920.); filmovi bez kamere Mana Raya (1923.); kretanje prema iskonskoj filmskoj “esenciji”

the capitalist colonisation of the world are projected onto a progressive movement towards the innermost absolutes of art. Such a progressing cultural “frontline” (mobile home of the avant-garde and its unceasing exploration of the New, of new truths) is nothing but a mirror of the real “frontier”, the changing geographical border which in capitalism always needs to be crossed for the development of new markets. And just as Joseph Conrad’s “heart of darkness” was the territorial-philosophical point of absolute zero for the colonialists of the 19th century (or for the US soldiers in Vietnam), the “White Cube” of high modernism metaphorically serves as the “endgame” playground for the frontline fighters of art – the “heart of whiteness”.

3

The spirit of modernism still plays an important role in the term *avant-garde film*. (This term is used mainly in countries where the “classical” avant-garde movements of the 1920s were not very prominent. In terms of the avant-garde, Austria and the United States of America, for instance, only really “caught up” during the 1940s and ‘50s. Their avant-garde art movements were closely linked to genuinely modern “film art”. In Germany and France, on the other hand, the term “avant-garde” refers mainly to the area of fine art during the 1920s; when talking about radical artistic film practice since the post war period, the most common term in Germany and France is “experimental film”.) As a cousin to modern art myth, the dominant notion of avant-garde film history has also been shaped by various acts of “zeroing in” or being “the

(crno, bijelo, tišina, bijela buka) u Kubelkinom *Arnulfu Raineru* (1958.-60.) i još radikalnije, posvemašnje odricanje od celuloida u “konceptualnim filmovima” i hepeninzi-ma proširenog filma tijekom 1960-ih.

Svatko tko je (poput Petera Tscherkasskyja) tijekom kasnih 1970-ih i ranih 1980-ih počeo razmišljati o ozbiljnom bavljenju filmom morao je naići na brojna protuslovija i suprotstavljene zahtjeve, koji će se teško ponoviti u filmskom mediju: 1. Tradicionalna logika modernizma je dosegnula svoju stvarnu nultu točku (ili, ako više volite, “slijepu ulicu”). 2. U nekim krajevima, fizički objekt (film) je postao koncept (“film”). 3. Teorija se sada doima legitimnim, ponekad čak “konačnim” oblikom umjetničke prakse. 4. Uvjerenje iz 1960-ih da će se stara hijerarhija vrijednosti u filmu temeljno promijeniti u korist avangarde, već se pokazala iluzornom (ali se ta promjena doista dogodila u svijetu umjetnosti). 5. Pokušavalo se opisati “drugu”, ne-formalističku avangardu u povijesti filma u odnosu na feminizam, neomarksizam ili psihoanalizu. U toj paralelnoj povijesti avangardnog filma, naracija i figura-cija dobile su novu legitimnost. 6. Video-umjetnost se po-nudila umjetničkom svijetu kao nova avangarda “poslije filma” (barem u smislu tehnologije); a istodobno, video je govorio (barem u smislu tehnologije) novi jezik masa, televizije. Glazbena televizija MTV, osnovana 1981., također izričito govori *masama*, a po načinu predstavljanja povijest avangardnog filma lako se može pratiti uz iskrivljenja “povratne sprege”.

Iz perspektive visokog modernizma, svi ti pothvati vode prema “post” modernizmu: film stječe melankolič-nu auru zatvorenika osuđenog na smrt. Psihoanaliza,

first to..." – for example, the obliteration of figure in the work of Viking Eggeling or Hans Richter (circa 1920); the camera-less film of Man Ray (1923); the advance towards primal filmic "essence" (black, white, silence, white noise) in Kubelka's *Arnulf Rainer* (1958–60), and, even more radically, the complete renunciation of celluloid in "concept films" and expanded-cinema happenings during the 1960s.

Anyone who (like Peter Tscherkassky) started to contemplate serious film work during the late 1970s and early 1980s must have come across a number of contradictions and competing claims which could hardly be met anymore by the medium of film. 1. The traditional logic of modernism had reached its actual point zero (or, if you prefer, "dead end"). 2. In some quarters, the physical object (film) had become a concept ("film"). 3. Theory now seemed to be a legitimate, or sometimes even "final" form of artistic practice. 4. The 1960s belief that the old hierarchy of values in cinema would fundamentally change in favour of the avant-garde had already proved to be illusory (whereas in the art world this change actually took place). 5. Attempts were being made to describe a "second", non-formalist avant-garde in film history with reference to feminism, neo-Marxism or psychoanalysis. In this parallel history of avant-garde film, narration and figuration gained a new legitimacy. 6. Video art offered itself to the art world as a new avant-garde "after film" (at least in terms of technology); at the same time, video spoke (at least in terms of technology) the new language of the masses, television. The music video channel MTV, founded in 1981, also explicitly speaks *to the masses*, and in its

međutim, dopušta nove metafore, poput magične ploče/palimpsesta (*Wunderblock*) koju je opisao Freud: dječje igračke koja omogućuje korisniku da obriše ono što je upravo nacrtao ili napisao (stvarajući *tabulu rasu*, kako bi krenuo iznova) dok “negdje ispod, skriveno”, sve ranije napisano ostaje kao trag, kao mogućnost.

4

U ovom kontekstu, svijet koji je od 1976. stvorio Peter Tscherkassky doima se paradigmatskim: kao svijet “križe”. Njegov rad je oprečan “eratičkoj masi”. Nije to umjetnikovo bezbrižno dokazivanje jastva, izneseno bez sumnji (što bi se moglo reći za rad Petera Kubelke ili Martina Arnolda), nego radije niz provizornih koraka, obilježenih snažnom refleksijom i otvorenosću prema suvremenim umjetničkim diskursima. Tscherkasskyjeva karijera sadrži različite prijedloge za “strategije preživljavanja” (post)-avangardnog filma: pokušaje povezivanja i praćenja tradicije; traženje prijelaznih rješenja, skiciranje filmskih teorija i njihovo transkodiranje u “teorijske filmove”; početak bolnog samopreispitivanja; slavljenje fizikalnosti filma, ponovno čitanje povijesti medija.

Uzveši pojedinačno, nijedan od ovih prijedloga ne može biti posve odbačen ili u cijelosti prihvaćen. Njihova je težnja prema nekoj vrsti sinteze svakako sumnjiva, ali od samoga početka Tscherkasskyjevi su filmovi prenosili i stajalište da proces povijesti ne pruža siguran raj za prošla dostignuća. Nijedan kanon nije nepromjenjiv. Ovo gledište dopušta dekonstrukciju “vrhunaca” povijesti umjetnosti i mogućnost da se nadišu razdoblja “depresije”. Stoga, tijekom više od dvadeset godina, nagovještaji “djelovanja

sales pitch the history of avant-garde film can be readily traced along the distortions of “feedback”.

From a point of view of high modernism, all these enterprises lean towards “post”-modernism: film acquires the melancholy aura of a death row prisoner. Psychoanalysis, however, permits new metaphors such as the “magic slate” (*Wunderblock*) described by Freud: a children’s toy which allows the user to delete what has just been drawn or written (making tabula rasa in order to start afresh) while “somewhere below, hidden”, everything that was previously written remains as a trace, as potential.

4

In this context, the oeuvre created by Peter Tscherkassky since 1979 seems paradigmatic: as an oeuvre of “crisis”.

His work is the opposite of an “erratic mass”. It is not a carefree assertion of self by the artist, postulated without doubts (as might be said about Peter Kubelka’s or Martin Arnold’s work), but rather a series of tentative steps, characterised by intense reflection and an openness towards contemporary discourses on art. Tscherkassky’s career contains various suggestions for “survival strategies” of (post-)avant-garde cinema: trying to connect with and follow tradition; looking for transitional solutions; outlining film theories and transcoding them into “theory films”; moving into painful self-examination; celebrating the physicality of film; re-reading the history of the medium.

retrogarde" mogu se pretvoriti u oslobođajuće geste ponovnog prisvajanja filma.

S 8

Godine 1981. američka kritičarka J. Hoberman proglašava umjetnički proboj super 8-mm filma kao "sredstva personaliziranog urbanog véritéa. Superosmica se pokazala idealnim filmskim instrumentom umjetnika kao šetača (*flaneura*) ili voajera." Šest godina poslije, već je nastupio pesimizam. Godine 1987. Hoberman piše da, barem u Sjedinjenim državama, superosmica nije uspjela oživjeti avangardu, ali je umjesto toga potaknula nezavisnu proizvodnju igranih filmova.

U Austriji oko 1981., umjetnost super 8-mm filma imala je sasvim drukčije ciljeve nego u urbanim (ne-valnim ili novovalnim) njujorškim ili berlinskim supkulturama. Taj format pruža svojim korisnicima alternativu, korak ustranu. S tim iskorakom nisu se trebali ni odreći niti vratiti na postignuća bogate tradicije bečkog avangardnog filma ili iza njih, niti su pak trebali uskočiti u brzi vlak videoumjetnosti. Film uskog formata može se smatrati ostatkom, medijem bez dostojanstva, koji su samo nakratko dotaknuli Peter Weibel i Valie Export (kralj i kraljica bečke scene eksperimentalnog filma u 1970-ima, na svojem putu od filma prema nefilmu (*Nivea*), videu i igranom filmu (*Unsichtbare Gegner/Nevidljivi suparnici*)). Sa svojim rasponom dotad neistraženih mogućnosti, superosmica je bila rješenje za cijelu generaciju filmskih umjetnika (Dietmar Brehm, Lisl Ponger, Peter Tscherkassky, među ostalima) – privremeni i prolazni izlaz iz dileme progresa, neka vrsta smećem prekrivene staze oko točke apsolutne nule.

Considered individually, none of these suggestions can be completely rejected or totally accepted. Their striving for some kind of synthesis is certainly conspicuous, but from the very beginning Tscherkassky's films also convey the view that the process of history offers no safe haven to past achievements. No canon is ever set in stone. This view allows both for the deconstruction of art-historical "climaxes" as well as the possibility to overcome periods of "depression". Thus, over a period of more than 20 years, intimations of "rear-guard action" can transform into liberating gestures of re-appropriating film.

S - 8

In 1981, the American critic J. Hoberman declares the artistic breakthrough of Super-8 cinema as a "vehicle for personalised urban vérité. Super-8 proved to be the ideal cinematic tool for the artist as either flaneur or voyeur." Six years later, pessimism has already set in. In 1987, Hoberman writes that, at least in the United States, Super-8 has not managed to revitalise the avant-garde, but has instead stimulated independent fiction film production.

In Austria around 1981, the art of Super-8 film has quite different claims than in the urban (No Wave or New Wave) subcultures of New York or Berlin. The format offers its users an alternative, a step aside. By taking that step, they neither have to relinquish nor fall back on (or behind) the achievements and the rich tradition of Viennese avant-garde film. Nor do they have to jump aboard the fast-moving train of video art. Small gauge film can be seen as a remainder, a medium without dignity, only briefly touched upon by Peter Weibel and Valie Export

Može se zagovarati kritičko stajalište “konceptualne” generacije prema stvaranju slike, iako smo se danas vratili slici (budući da je to posve drukčija slika).

“Kao nijedan drugi format, superosmica je bila mikroskop, koji je ulazeći pod kožu stvarnosti stvarao vidljivim unutarnji život slika. (...) Najdojmljivije od svega bila je zrnatost. “Rezolucija” je tehnički naziv za oštrinu filmske slike, a superosmica nije nikada bila time previše zaokupljena. Ovdje se može svjedočiti posve drukčijoj vrsti rezolucije: kristalno čisto i jasno svjetlo Xenon-projekcije dalo nam je oblike koji se pretapaju u zrno: amorfna tijela i forme krišom se pretvaraju u nove oblike i ponovno nestaju u moru boje. Superosmica je bila poentilizam, impresionizam i apstraktni ekspresionizam filma.” (Peter Tscherkassky, 1995.)

U ovoj retrospektivnoj pohvali svojeg omiljenog medija (u kojem je radio do 1989.), Tscherkassky opisuje umjetničku vrijednost uskog formata, ali ukazuje i na njegov primitivan status (jeftinoću i dostupnost) te njegovu libidinoznu kvalitetu: superosmica predstavlja neobuzданu radost materijala, prekoračenje malih razmjera i vizualno zadovoljstvo koje uvelike nadilazi fantazmatska poistovjećenja u holivudskom filmu.

Ova vrsta probaja s njegovim novim polaganjem prava na sliku (i novom kritikom slike) obilježava početak cijele postmoderne umjetnosti. Za Tscherkasskyja, međutim, to je ujedno bio početak napornog putovanja. Prije nego što je mogao slaviti “unutarnji život slika”, morao je savladati niz problema i prethodnika, što će ga, napisljetku, sprječiti da se prikloni zastrašujuće pojednostavljenoj verziji postmodernizma: “sve prolazi”.

(king and queen of Vienna's experimental film scene in the 1970s) on their way from film to non-film (*Nivea*), to video and on to feature film production (*Unsichtbare Gegner / Invisible Adversaries*). With its range of hitherto unexplored possibilities, Super-8 offers a way out to a whole generation of film artists (Dietmar Brehm, Lisl Ponger, Peter Tscherkassky, among others) – a temporary and fragile way out of the dilemma of progress, a kind of trash-strewn path around the point of absolute zero. The “conceptual” generation's critical stance towards image-making can be upheld, even though one has now returned to the image (since it is a completely different image).

“Unlike any other format, Super-8 was a microscope, making visible the inner life of images by entering beneath the skin of reality (...) Most remarkable of all was the grain. While ‘resolution’ is the technical term for the sharpness of a film image, Super-8 was really never too concerned with this. Here, quite a different kind of resolution could be witnessed: the crystal-clear and bright light of a Xenon-projection gave us shapes dissolving into the grain; amorphous bodies and forms surreptitiously transformed into new shapes and disappeared again into a sea of colour. Super-8 was the pointillism, impressionism and the abstract expressionism of cinematography.” (Peter Tscherkassky, 1995)

In this retrospective celebration of his preferred medium (which he worked with until 1989), Tscherkassky describes the artistic value of the small format, but he also comments on its primitive status (being cheap and easily available) as well as its libidinous quality: SUPER eight stands for boisterous joy of the material, small scale

Aderlass (*Puštanje krvi*, 1981.), najraniji Tscherkassky-jev film koji se još uvijek prikazuje, bavi se složenim *status quo*, točkom u kojoj za mladog filmaša počinje stvarni rad. Na zidu, možemo pročitati neku vrstu romantične metafore umjetnika kao seksualnog prijestupnika, vodenog mračnim žudnjama: "Ubio bih ponovno, ne mogu si pomoći." Filmaš se nakratko pojavljuje ispred kamere s izvođačem Arminom Schmicklom i oni ocrtavaju kratki prikaz suvremene (filmske) umjetnosti služeći se riječima, performansom i filmskim gestama. Brza montaža, iznenadni zvučni rezovi i fragmenti rečenica referiraju na rad formativnih prethodnika kao što su Kurt Kren i Ernst Schmidt mlađi. U jednom trenutku izvodač kaže: "... ova-ko nešto 1981. sve smo to već imali." Tada razmaže krv po cijelom tijelu i ironično ismije naslijede bečkih akcionista. Riječ "*aderlass*" znači "puštanje krvi" – neprirodno vađenje krvi. Godine 1981., još uvijek se moglo sve uništiti, još uvijek je bilo moguće vrištati, krvariti i biti ekspre- sivan umjetnik, ali samo na dva preostala polja – biti vječni drugi, izvoditi bijedo oponašanje nekog ranijeg dostig- nuća u suvremenoj umjetnosti ili se pak povući na odstan- janje i govoriti u navodnicima.

U *Liebesfilmu* (*Filmu ljubavi*, 1982.), Tscherkassky mijenja tehniku te stvara grubi i originalni film koji upućuje na suprotnost ekspresivnoj akcionističkoj umjetnosti: strukturalni film, razboriti ritual koji istjeruje ideologiju filmskog ispunjenja. Dvije figure ulaze u sliku, krećući se jedna prema drugoj: iz smjera filmske perforacije s lijeve strane žena se nagnje u kadar, dok s desne strane muškarac upada u središte. Jedna sličica filmskog vremena razdvaja njihove usne, priječeći poljubac. Ova se kretnja ponav-

excess and visual pleasures far beyond the phantasmatic identifications of Hollywood cinema.

This kind of breakthrough with its new claims for (and new criticism of) the image marks the beginning of all postmodern art. For Tscherkassky, however, it was also the start of a laborious journey. Before he was able to celebrate the “inner life of images”, he had to work through a range of problems and predecessors which, in the end, would prevent him from falling for the dreaded simplistic, “anything-goes” version of postmodernism.

Aderlass (1981), the earliest Tscherkassky film that is still shown today, deals with the complex status quo; the point at which the actual work for a young filmmaker begins. On a wall, one can read a kind of romantic metaphor of the artist as sexual offender, driven by dark desires: “I would kill again, I can’t help it”. The filmmaker appears briefly in front of the camera with his performer Armin Schmickl, and they both give a sketchy report of modern (film) art using words, performance and cinematic gestures. Fast edits, abrupt sound cuts and fragments of sentences reference the work of formative predecessors like Kurt Kren and Ernst Schmidt Jr. At one point, the performer says: “...something like that in 1981 ...we had it all before”. He then smears blood all over his body and besmirches the legacy of Viennese Actionism with irony. The word “Aderlass” means “bloodletting” – an artificial extraction of blood. In 1981, one can still tear everything to shreds, one can still scream and bleed and be an expressive artist, but in doing so there are only two positions left – the eternal runner-up, acting out a pale imitation of some previous achievement in modern art, or placing oneself at a distance and speaking in quotation marks.

lja 600 puta, ubrzavajući pomalo ali neprestano. Ono što je na početku trajalo jednu sekundu, na kraju filma traje pola sekunde. Ovo opsativno ponavljanje neostvarene žudnje, iskonska slika komercijalnog filma, predstavljena je kao ekvivalent mitu o Sizifu: *Vi žudite, mi vam NE dajemo!* Nepogrešivo se upisujući u povijest filmskog modernizma, *Liebesfilm* ostvaruje kritičku sintezu filma *The May Irwin-John C. Rice Kiss* (*Poljubac May Irwin i Johna C. Ricea*, 1896.) Thomasa Edisona i *Kiss* (*Poljubac*, 1963.) Andyja Warhola, sintezu poljubaca u masovnoj zabavi i njegovu ironijsku nad-determinaciju u pop-artu.

No ponekad, čak i Tscherkassky podliježe principu užitka. *Erotique* (1982.), mali frivolni film i *Urlaubsfilm* (*Praznični film*, 1983.), moćan i prodoran film, otkrivaju po prvi put libidinoznu vezanost za "privatni život" slika superosmice. Tu ima mnogo boje, ali tu je i pokajnička isповijed voajerizma: dijelovi ženskog tijela, tijela i glasovi dovedeni su u koketni odnos s publikom, samo da bi ponovno bili uskraćeni. "Umjetnik kao seksualni prijestupnik" jedini ima pristup ženi (barem tragovima žene u zvuku i slici). Kao voajer-s-mozgom, sasvim je svjestan zadane problematike, tako da pažljivo definira granice gdje se susreću pristup i povlačenje. To je osobito jasno u *Urlaubsfilmu*. Tu je jedna vrsta zadovoljstva (vizualno zadovoljstvo, povlačeњe) kompenzirana drugom (fizičkim zadovoljstvom celuloida superosmice, napuhanim do površine). Tscherkassky je snimio ženski lik u prirodnom okolišu (livada, drveće), a zatim je ponovno snimio te slike s ekrana, i tako iznova. Ovaj proces ima dva glavna učinka: trajna destrukcija izvorne slike otkriva slikarsku kvalitetu (isprva podsjeća na renesansne portrete, zatim se pretvara u slike punih

In *Liebesfilm* (1982), Tscherkassky changes techniques and comes up with a harsh and original film that refers to the opposite of expressive actionist art: structural film, a sobering ritual to exorcise the ideology of cinematic fulfilment. Two figures enter the image, moving towards each other: from the film's perforation on the left a woman leans into the frame while from the right a man bursts into the centre. One single frame of film time keeps their lips apart, preventing them from kissing. This movement is repeated 600 times, accelerating slightly but continually. What took one second at the beginning, takes half a second at the end of the film. The obsessive repetition of unfulfilled desire, a primal image of commercial cinema, presented as an equivalent to the myth of Sisyphus: *You desire, we give it to you — not!* Unmistakably inscribing itself into a history of cinematic modernity, *Liebesfilm* offers a critical synthesis of Thomas Edison's *The May Irwin-John C. Rice Kiss* (1896) and Andy Warhol's *Kiss* (1963), a synthesis of kissing in mass entertainment and its ironic overdetermination in Pop Art.

Sometimes, however, even Tscherkassky succumbs to the pleasure principle. *Erotique* (1982), a small frivolous film, and *Urlaubsfilm* (1983), a mighty and penetrating film, reveal for the first time the libidinous attachment to the "private life" of Super-8 images. There is a sea of colour, but also the culpable confession of voyeurism: parts of a female body, bodies and voices that are brought into a flirtatious relationship with the audience only to be withdrawn again. The "artist as sexual offender" is the only one with access to the woman (at least to the woman's traces in sound and image). As voyeur-with-a-brain, he is

boja, s površinama žutog, crnog, crvenog i bijelog); ali otkriva i novi bljeskajući ritam kojeg uvjetuje pulsirajuće bijelo svjetlo u središtu slike. Svjetlo se doima kao da proždire film iznutra, a onda iznenada otkriva gledatelja, svijetleći izravno u njega. Ovaj efekt je od velike važnosti u kasnijim Tscherkasskyjevim filmovima, kao i referencije na konvencionalne filmske žanrove (*Urlaubsfilm* – amaterski “praznični” filmovi) te na opći *psihoaparat* filma. Istodobno, *Urlaubsfilm* dokazuje da se određena slikovna dostignuća u videu mogu postići ne-elektronskim, filmskim sredstvima.

Superosmica uspijeva održati svoju poziciju, iako je ona neizvjesna. U umjetničkom svijetu 1980-ih “nematerijalni medij” postaje središnje pitanje (“*les immateriaux*” bio je naslov važne izložbe u Centre Pompidou u Parizu). Ti “nematerijali” umjetnosti i popularne kulture stvoreni su novim strojevima poput videografije i računala, a oni su, naravno, dio šireg razvoja u industrijskoj proizvodnji i globalnoj ekonomiji koja vodi postfordovskom društву. Tscherkasskyev naglasak na opipljivom, manuf(r)akturnom, može se razumjeti kao protureakcija na taj paradigmatski zaokret. *Freeze frame* (1983.) svojim se agresivnim stilom bavi tim pitanjem i u načinu proizvodnje (materijalni film) i slikama: građevinski radnici, smetlište, gradilište, miješalica za cement, ruševine, bager, rudnik, eksplozije... Integritet pojedinačnih slika je potkopan još složenijim manevrima, ali zapravo, materijalnost doseže svoj potpuni potencijal u destrukciji i ruševinama. Taljenje fotograma na kraju filma *Freeze frame* priziva primjernu figuru, a to čini primjerenum patosom. Sva vatra filmskog medija materijalizira se u “zamrznutoj” sličici, zaglavljenoj u projektoru.

well aware of the problematic involved, so he carefully defines the borders where access and withdrawal meet. This is made particularly clear in *Urlaubsfilm*. Here, one kind of pleasure (visual pleasure, being withdrawn) is compensated for by another (the physical pleasure of Super-8 celluloid, pumped to the surface). Tscherkassky has filmed a female figure in a natural setting (meadow, trees) then re-filmed these images from the screen, and so on. This process has two main effects: the continual destruction of the original image reveals a painterly quality (reminiscent of Renaissance portraits at first, later turning into pure colour field painting, with patches of yellow, black, red and white); but it also reveals a new flicker rhythm dictated by the throbbing white light at image centre. The light seems to be devouring the film from the inside when it suddenly discovers the viewer, shining straight at him. This effect is of great importance in Tscherkassky's later work, as are the references to a conventional film genre ("Urlaubsfilm" – amateur holiday movies) and to the general *psycho-apparatus* of cinema. At the same time, *Urlaubsfilm* proves that certain pictorial achievements in video can also be arrived at through non-electronic, filmic means.

Super-8 manages to hold its position although it is a precarious one. In the art world of the 1980s "immaterial media" become a central issue ("les immateriaux" was the title of an important exhibition at the Centre Pompidou in Paris). These "immaterials" of art and popular culture are created by new machines such as videography and computers, and they are, of course, part of a larger development in industrial production and the global economy,

Druga vrsta reakcije može se vidjeti u Tscherkasskyje-vom nastojanju da se poveže sa svijetom Petera Kubelke – povijesnim prototipom “materijalnog filma”. Tscherkasskyjeva tri filma u nizu referiraju na tri različita Kubelkina filma; ne na neki jeftin ili oponašajući način, nego više kao elementi u njegovom traganju za novim konceptima u filmskom radu. Svođenje filmske slike na crno i bijelo, kao što je najavio Arnulf Rainer pomoću “elementarne fizike”, postigao je Tscherkassky povjesno-kritičkim sredstvima u filmu *Motion Picture (La Sortie des Ouvriers de l'Usine Lumière à Lyon/Izlazak radnika iz tvornice Lumière u Lyonu)* iz 1984. godine, preoblikujući postojeći filmski klasik. *Manufraktur (Manufaktura, 1985.)*, Tscherkasskyjev prvi 35-mm film, gotovo čitav sačinjen od nađenih snimaka, sadrži finu posvetu “nađenim” automobilskim utrkama u filmu *Mosaik im Vertrauen (Mozaik u povjerenju, 1955.)* Ferryja Radaxa i Kubelke. A u *kelimba* (1986.), vrlo “tibetanskom” filmu snova i golubica, odmah se prepoznaju siluete plesača iz Kubelkina *Adebara* (1957.).

Filmovi *Motion Picture* i *Manufraktur* su nastojanja da se spasi “materijalnost” prizivajući, djelomice, aktualnu povijest industrijskog filma. U filmu *Manufraktur*, Tscherkassky rabi nađene snimke reklama; uglavnom ženskih nogu i automobila koje manipulira različitim tehnikama kopiranja. Ubrzava sliku dok ne postigne divlju brzinu koja rezultira novom vrstom filmskog prostora. Pritom, Tscherkassky anticipira svoje kasnije metode rada. U filmu *Motion Picture*, s druge strane, istražuje još jednom mogućnosti konceptualnog filma.

Ovaj film ne sadrži nijednu sliku koju je Tscherkassky sam snimio, ali istodobno ne sadrži nijednu prepoznatlji-

leading towards a post-Fordist society. Tscherkassky's emphasis on the tangible, the manuf(r)acture, can be understood as a counter-reaction to this paradigmatic shift. *Freeze Frame* (1983) with its aggressive style addresses this issue in both production mode (material film) and imagery: construction workers, rubbish dump, building site, cement-mixer, debris, claw arm, mine, explosions ... The integrity of individual images is undermined by ever more complex manoeuvres, but in fact, materiality reaches its full potential in the destruction and the ruins. The melting film frames at the end of *Freeze Frame* evoke the appropriate figure, and they do so with appropriate pathos. The entire fire of cinema materialises in the "frozen" frame, which has become stuck in the projector.

A different kind of reaction can be seen in Tscherkassky's attempt to connect with the oeuvre of Peter Kubelka – the historical prototype for "material film". Three successive films by Tscherkassky refer to three different films by Kubelka, not in a cheeky or imitative manner but rather as elements in his search for new concepts of film work. The reduction of film imagery to black and white, as proposed by Arnulf Rainer via "elementary physics", is achieved by Tscherkassky in *Motion Picture (La Sortie des Ouvriers de l'Usine Lumière à Lyon)* (1984) through historical-critical means, by transforming an existing film classic. *Manufaktur (Manufracture, 1985)*, Tscherkassky's first 35mm film and made entirely from found-footage, contains a nice homage to the "found" car races in Ferry Radax's and Kubelka's *Mosaik im Vertrauen* (1955). And in *kelimba* (1986), a very "Tibetan" film of dreams and doves, one immediately recognises the dancers' silhouettes from Kubelka's *Adebar* (1957).

vu sliku filmskog klasika koji je koristio. Ne vidimo ništa osim crnih i bijelih mrlja na platnu dok svjedočimo apsurdnom i naizgled protuslovnom procesu, koji obuhvaća nekoliko kretanja:

1. način na koji neekspozirana filmska vrpca, izrezana u dijelove i pričvršćena u stilu rastera na zid tamne komore, postaje prostor;
2. način na koji pokretna slika gubi odrednice vremena i trajanja kada je pretvorena u jedan fotogram – sličicu iz “prvog (kino) filma u povijesti” *La Sortie des ouvriers de l'usine Lumière à Lyon* Augustea i Louisa Lumièrea; ova sličica je projicirana na raster i eksponira vrpce filma pričvršćene na zid;
3. način na koji se taj (skulpturalni) prostor preobražava natrag u vrijeme, nakon što su pojedinačni fragmenti filma eksponirani, razvijeni, ponovno spojeni i još jednom pušteni kroz projektor;
4. i napokon, način na koji vrijeme postaje (pokretna) slika: vrijeme koje je potrebno da se “skenira” ili “pročita” izvorni filmski kadar (sličica) i pretvoriti u nove kadrove jest točno trajanje filma *Motion Picture*.

Razmišljajući o ovom procesu mogli bismo izgubiti razum. S druge strane, rezultat možemo bespomoćno opisati kao “predivan” ili pak “smiješan”. Sam film je praktički “ništa”, njegove slike ne otkrivaju svoju tajnu. Nužni tragovi sadržani su u intelektualnoj i tehničkoj strukturi filma, u njegovom *nematerijalnom aspektu*. To je istodobno njegovo prokletstvo i njegova sreća. Ljepota ovdje ne leži u samom objektu nego u nizu misli koje objekt potiče. Ipak, ostaje pitanje o vezi između filma braće Lumière i Tscherkasskog. Je li to kratkotrajna ili incestuozna afera –

Motion Picture and *Manufaktur* are efforts to rescue “materiality” partly by evoking the actual history of industrial film. In *Manufaktur*, Tscherkassky uses found footage from commercials: mainly women’s legs and cars, which he manipulates through various copying techniques. He accelerates the images until they reach a furious speed resulting in a new kind of film space. In so doing, Tscherkassky anticipates his later working methods. In *Motion Picture*, on the other hand, he explores once more the options of conceptual film.

This film does not contain a single image Tscherkassky shot himself, but at the same time it does not contain any recognisable image from the film classic he worked with. We see nothing but black and white splotches on the screen while witnessing an absurd and seemingly paradoxical process consisting of several movements:

- 1) the way in which an unexposed film strip becomes space when cut into pieces and pinned, in grid-like fashion, on the wall of the dark room;
- 2) the way in which a moving picture loses its qualities of time and duration when turned into a single still – a still taken from the “very first (theatrical) film in history”, Auguste and Louis Lumière’s *La Sortie des Ouvriers de l’usine Lumière à Lyon* (*Workers leaving the Lumière factory in Lyon*); this still is projected onto the grid and exposes the film strips pinned up on the wall;
- 3) the way in which this (sculptural) space transforms back into time as the single film fragments are exposed, developed, re-assembled and fed once more through the projector;

ili čak neka vrsta bezgrešnog začeća? I što se zapravo događa s radnicima iz Lumièreove tvornice? Tscherkassky nije jedini suvremenih filmaš zaokupljen tom temom. Sjetimo se filma-eseja *Arbeiter verlassen die Fabrik* (*Izlazak radnika iz tvornice*, 1995.) Haruna Farockog. Bavi se političkom dimenzijom naslovne teme tijekom filmske povijesti. Film nađenih snimaka *Eureka* Ernija Gehra (1974.-79.), s druge strane, s povećalom proučava urbanu scenu ranog filma te tako osvjetjava i prošlost i autonomni život slike. U filmu Tscherkasskog, udaljenost između povjesnog artefakta i današnje percepcije ostaje nepremostiva. On vraća pokret radnicima zamrznutim u mitskoj statičnoj slici; međutim, to više nije "njihov" pokret i "njihovo" vrijeme koje može prenijeti historiografija. Tscherkassky im umjesto toga daje "svoj" pokret i "svoje" (ili naše) "nečitko" vrijeme, a veza među tim područjima je kodirana. "Kada bi bilo moguće *vidjeti* kôd, moglo bi se reći: ovo je film u kojem se pokazuje." (Michael Palm)

Tehnika koju ovdje primjenjuje Tscherkassky slična je digitalizaciji postojeće slike. *Motion Picture*, film iz ranih dana osobnih računala, djeluje kao proročka najava seizmičkih promjena u industrijskog i medijskoj kulturi kasnog 20. stoljeća. Njegov učinak se može usporediti s promjenama u kulturi kasnog 19. stoljeća, koje su metaforički kulminirale imenom "Lumière". Radnici napuštaju tvornicu Lumière, tvornicu "Svetla", filmsku tvornicu (što je naglasilo i posređovalo Drugu industrijsku revoluciju). Devedeset godina poslije, vratili su se još jednom, poput duhova, zakopani u "posljednjoj" pokretnoj slici, ograničeni na materijal, progutani povijesnim i binarnim kodom (središnjim čimbenikom Treće industrijske revolucije, koji je radnike i ideju rada učinio gotovo nevidljivim).

- 4) and finally, the way in which time becomes (moving) image: the time it takes to “scan” or “read” the original film frame (still) and transform it into new frames is the exact duration of *Motion Picture*.

Whilst thinking about this process it is easy to lose your mind. On the other hand one can helplessly describe the result as “beautiful” or even “ridiculous”. The film itself is practically “nothing”; its images do not reveal their secret. The necessary clues are contained in the film’s intellectual and technical structure, in its *immaterial aspect*. This is both its curse and its fortune. Beauty here lies not in the object itself but rather in the train of thought the object gives rise to. Yet, there is still the question about the relationship between the Lumières’ and Tscherkassky’s film. Is it a fleeting or an incestuous affair – or even a sort of immaculate conception? And what exactly is happening with the workers at the Lumière factory? Tscherkassky is not the only modern filmmaker interested in this topic. Harun Farocki’s essay film *Arbeiter verlassen die Fabrik* (*Workers leaving the factory*, 1995) comes to mind. It is concerned with the political dimension of the title’s subject throughout film history. Ernie Gehr’s found-footage film *Eureka* (1974–79), on the other hand, scrutinises an urban scene from early cinema with a magnifying glass, thus highlighting both the past and the autonomous life of the images. In Tscherkassky’s film, the distance between historic artefact and today’s perception remains unbridgeable. He gives back movement to the workers who are frozen in a mythical still picture; however, it is no longer “their” movement and “their” time which might be translated by historiography. Tscherkassky instead fur-

Kriza se može izbjjeći oštrom unim trikom, kao što se vidi u *Motion Picture*. Ili se jednostavno može objava krize proglašiti nevažećom ili djelomičnom kao u filmovima *Urlaubsfilm* i *Manufraktur* (ili desetljeće poslije u *Happy-Endu* i *Outer Spaceu*). U svakom slučaju, sama akumulacija libida nije dovoljna za uspjeh. Nužni su samopouzdanje, iskustvo i razumijevanje referentnog okvira.

Tscherkassky rabi superosmicu da bi izbjegao križu, ali zato upada u drugu: kasnih 1980-ih "smrt filma" napada po prvi put i čini to tamo gdje se mogao očekivati najmanji otpor: superosmicu ukida industrija. Tscherkassky-jevu odluku da prijede na 16-mm filmsku vrpcu trebalo bi se, međutim, objasniti i općenitom krhkošću superosmice u kontekstu trajnosti – čim se etablirala ideja stvarnog i akumuliranog opusa javilo se pitanje očuvanja (i stalne dostupnosti) vlastitog rada.

Shot-Countershoot (1987.) i *tabula rasa* (1987./89.) posljednji su Tscherkasskyjevi filmovi snimljeni na superosmici. U to je vrijeme počeo razvijati i projicirati svoje radeve na šesnaestici. Ta dva filma se mogu svrstati, zajedno s *Parallel Space: Inter-View* (1992.), pod naslov "Filmska teorija / psihanaliza / autoportret". Rastući ugled i uspjeh Tscherkasskyjevih filmova tijekom tog razdoblja može se povezati s njihovom temom – filmskom teorijom pod snažnim utjecajem psihanalize. Tscherkassky, koji je i sam nekoliko godina odlazio na psihanalizu, gotovo se činio posvećeniji proučavanju nego snimanju filmova. Odlučio je, međutim, primijeniti tu vrstu znanja na filmsku praksu. Osim toga, analizirao je vlastitu ulogu u mašineriji žudnje.

nishes them with “his” movement and “his” (or our) “illegible” time, and the link between the two areas is encoded. “If it were possible to see a code, one could say: this film is where it shows itself” (Michael Palm).

The technique applied here by Tscherkassky is similar to the digitalisation of an existing image. *Motion Picture*, a film from the early days of personal computers, feels like a prophetic comment on the seismic changes in late 20th century industrial and media culture. Its effect can be compared to the changes in late 19th century culture, metaphorically climaxing in the name “Lumière”. Workers are leaving the Lumière factory, the “Light” factory, the film factory (which highlighted and mediated the Second Industrial Revolution). Ninety years later, they return once more, ghost-like, buried inside the “last” motion picture, confined to the material, swallowed up by both the historical and the binary code (the central factor of the Third Industrial Revolution, rendering workers and the idea of work almost invisible).

16 MM

Crisis can be averted with a brilliant trick as seen in *Motion Picture*. Or one can simply declare the pronouncement of crisis invalid or partial as with *Urlaubsfilm* and *Manufaktur* (or a decade later, with *Happy-End* and *Outer Space*). In any case, the accumulation of libido alone is not enough to succeed. Self-confidence, experience and an understanding of the framework of references are necessary.

Tscherkassky makes use of Super-8 to escape the crisis only to be caught up in another one: In the late 1980s, “the death of cinema” strikes for the first time and it does

Retorika filmova *tabula rasa* i *Parallel Space: Inter-View* temelji se – dijelom pretjerano savjesno – na pisanju Christiana Metza o “imaginarnom označitelju” u filmu, kao i predavanjima filozofa/psihoanalitičara Jacquesa Lacana (o genezi subjekta). Tscherkassky čak rabi pisani tekst: naslove poglavlja i dijelove pisama koji se pojavljuju na ekranu računala. (Michael Palm je detaljno istražio te odnose u dolje navedenom ogledu iz 1995. godine).

Oba filma karakterizira neposredna, gotovo erotična ljepota filmskog materijala. Strukturalno, međutim, oni su vrlo složeni i pomalo didaktični. Ta kombinacija dovoljno govori o situaciji “kvake 22” umjetničkog filma kao filmske teorije. Postizanje savršenstva je moguće samo po cijenu razumljivosti. Neki ljubitelji avangardnog filma, skloniji više intuitivnim ili “pobožnjim” reprezentacijama stvarnog, smatraju ove filmove previše intelektualnim, kao da umjetnik, ponekad, postavlja sam sebi prepreke (u *tabula rasa* čak i glazba zvuči “znanstveno”) – PT, *čovjek koji je suviše znao*. S druge strane, mogu se tumačiti kao daljnji, neizbjegni korak umjetnika koji pokušava ustrajati na svojim najnovijim (naizgled “konačnim”) otkrićima o filmskom aparatu i samome sebi. Filmovi se dotiču “intimnih dijelova” filmskog medija i autora (mogu stoga biti prilično nelagodni za gledatelja). No to nešto najunutarnije može se izraziti samo slikama, krećući se iznutra prema van i gubeći pritom svoju, navodnu, konačnu neospornost. *Tabula rasa* možda završava bijelim ekranom, ali to je samo još jedna slika, slika ekrana koja blješti prema vani: prema nama, prema našem prostoru u svijetu i filmu. *Parallel Space* bavi se “fizikom gledanja” i “fizikom prijećanja” (kao što najavljuje tekst na ekranu). Ali što se

so where the least resistance can be expected: Super-8 is being discontinued by the industry. Tscherkassky's decision to move towards 16mm film should, however, also be explained by the general fragility of Super-8 in a preservation context – the quest to preserve (and have constantly available) your work becomes an issue as soon as the idea of a real and accumulating oeuvre starts to settle in.

Shot-Countershoot (1987) and *tabula rasa* (1987/89) are Tscherkassky's last films shot on Super-8. It is at this time that he begins to print and project his work on 16mm. The two films can be grouped together with *Parallel Space: Inter-View* (1992) under the heading "Film theory / psychoanalysis / self-portrait". The growing recognition and success of Tscherkassky's films during this time may be linked to the subject matter – film theory as heavily influenced by psychoanalysis. Tscherkassky, who was undergoing psychoanalysis himself for several years, almost appeared to be more committed to film studies than to actual filmmaking. He decided, however, to apply this form of knowledge to film practice. In addition he analysed his own role in the machinery of desire.

The rhetoric of *tabula rasa* and *Parallel Space: Inter-View* is based – in parts meticulously – on the writings of Christian Metz about the "imaginary signifier" in cinema, as well as the lectures of philosopher/psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (about the genesis of the subject). Tscherkassky even uses written text: chapter headings and passages from letters which appear on a computer screen (Michael Palm has explored these relationships at length in his 1995 essay quoted below).

više približimo – zajedno sa onim “ja” filma – razumijevaju tih pojmova, više “posrćemo”. Gubimo svoju “točku nestajanja”, “padamo”, “malaksali” smo, “gubimo” se “negdje-između”, “ponovno se budimo” (“nitko ovdje...”) i odjednom se “osjećamo promatrani”. Taj proces uvodi pitanje žudnje onkraj “fizike” – ŠTO tamo treba vidjeti, čega se sjetiti? Posljednje, krhkne riječi filma ponovno se odnose na svijet izvana, svijet drugih: “sjeti se / bio sam za tebe / tražio tebe.”

Tscherkasskyev pokušaj prakticiranja psihoanalize putem filma odlazi dublje nego što obično pretpostavljamo u tom kontekstu. Utječe na tehničku podlogu, konkretni način proizvodnje filma *Parallel Space: Inter-View*. Film se sastoji od sličica snimljenih fotoaparatom, u formatu portreta. Projicirana kao film, slika se izmjenjuje između gornje i donje polovice fotografskog okvira, stvarajući efekt bljeskanja i osjećaj gubljenja opće prostorne stabilnosti. Ali što se više filmsko “ja” i gledatelj gube u urušavajućim slikama, to su više općinjeni onim što vide. Tscherkasskyev radni prostor, optička kopirka (njemački izraz znači “optička banka”) ne razara vizualnost i reprezentaciju, nego ih memorira i multiplicira. *Looking for you* (ironično napisano na ekranu računala) očito upućuje na drugo ljudsko biće, ostatak svijeta; ali ujedno naglašava novu ili ponovno otkrivenu vizualnost, senzualnost; film. Možete zamisliti sliku. Štoviše, može biti predivna. I možete je uzeti od nekoga drugog.

FF

U 1980-im i ranim 1990-im, filmovi nađenih snimaka (*found-footage*) postali su dominantna forma (post)avan-

Both films are characterised by the immediate, almost erotic beauty of their filmic material. Structurally, however, they're highly complex and slightly didactic. This combination tells us a lot about the catch-22 situation of film art as film theory. The goal of perfection is only possible at the expense of comprehensibility. Certain avant-garde film lovers who prefer a more intuitive or "pietist" representation of the real might regard these films as too intellectual, with the artist at times appearing to block his own path (in *tabula rasa*, even the music sounds "scientific") – PT, *the man who knew too much*. On the other hand, one can interpret them as a further, unavoidable step by the artist in trying to keep up with his most recent (seemingly "ultimate") discoveries about the cinematic apparatus and his own self. The films touch on the "private parts" of cinema and those of the artist (they can therefore be quite embarrassing for the viewer). This innermost something, however, can only be expressed in images, moving from the inside to the outside, thereby losing its alleged ultimate validity. *tabula rasa* may end with a white screen, but this is just another image, the image of a screen glaring outwards: at us, at our space in the world and in the cinema. *Parallel Space* deals with the "physics of seeing" and the "physics of remembering" (as announced by the text onscreen). But the closer we move – along with the "I" of the film – towards an understanding of these terms, the more we begin to "stumble". We lose our "vanishing point", we "fall", we "faint", we "lose" ourselves "somewhere in-between", we "re-awake" ("nobody here...") and suddenly we "feel watched". This process brings up the question of desire, beyond "physics" –

gardnog filma u svijetu; filmska umjetnost prisvajanja. U Austriji, primjerice, filmaši poput Martina Arnolda (*pièce touchée*, 1989.) i Gustava Deutscha (*Adria*, 1990.) te većina drugih umjetnika nakon superosmice prvenstveno rade s postojećim filmskim materijalima. Tscherkassky je s tom tehnikom eksperimentirao u *Freeze Frame* i *Manufaktur*. U *tabula rasa*, nađene snimke su korištene samo na početku, kao svojevrsni trik; a u *Parallel Space* imaju važniju ulogu. U potonjem filmu nalazimo dijalog pogleda Lee Remick i Montogomeryja Clifta, preuzet iz filma *Wild River* (*Divlja rijeka*) Elie Kazana.

Međutim, tijekom produkcije filma *tabula rasa*, a u vezi s Tscherkasskyjevim proučavanjem psihoanalitičke filmske teorije, nastao je sljedeći rad, čudesan mali film sačinjen od "ostataka". *Shot-Countershoot* traje samo nekoliko sekundi, a jedna je od najboljih šala u povijesti filma (i u filmskoj teoriji). U ovome nađenom isječku iz vesterne, kadar kaubojevog pucnja i samrtni kadar reakcije njegova protivnika otvoreno *nisu* prikazani standardnim montažnim postupkom kadra-protukadra. Umjesto konvencionalne montažne tehnike – reza u prostoru između dvojice revolveraša, a zatim spajanja dvaju kadrova kako bi se stvorilo novo, iluzorno jedinstvo prostora i vremena – filmaš izvornog filma je sačuvao jedinstvo jednog kadra i jednog prostora. Bez ikakvih montažnih trikova, akcija i reakcija su predstavljeni jednim kadrom "bez reza" s likom koji također ostaje "neodrezan" – čak i kada je ubijen. Tscherkassky postupa podjednako "obzirno", pokazujući nam taj filmski fragment bez daljnje manipulacije.

Shot-Countershoot obilježuje najraniju inkarnaciju holivudskog filma u Tscherkasskyjevu opusu. Povjesno, avan-

WHAT is there to see, what to remember? The final, fragile words of the film again refer to the world outside, the world of the others: “remember / I was for you / looking for you”.

Tscherkassky’s attempt to practice psychoanalysis via film goes deeper than we commonly assume in this context. It affects the technical basis, the concrete production mode of *Parallel Space: Inter-View*. The film consists of frames shot with a still camera, in portrait format. Projected as film, the image therefore alternates between the upper and the lower half of the photographic frame, thus creating a flicker effect as well as the sense of losing all spatial stability. But the more the film’s “I” and the viewer lose themselves in the collapsing images, the more they are fascinated by what they see. Tscherkassky’s workspace, the optical printer (the German word for it means “optical bank”) does not destroy visuality and representation, but memorizes and multiplies it. *Looking for you* (ironically written on a computer) obviously refers to the other human being, the rest of the world; but it also highlights a new or rediscovered visuality, sensuality; film. You may imagine an image. It may even be beautiful. And you may take it from someone else.

FF

In the 1980s and early ‘90s, found footage film work became the dominant form of (post)-avant-garde cinema around the world: cinematic appropriation art. In Austria, for example, filmmakers like Martin Arnold (*pièce touchée*, 1989) and Gustav Deutsch (*Adria*, 1990) and most other Post-Super-8 artists are working primarily with existing

gardni se film gotovo posve odvojio od Hollywooda, usput često stječući auru "frustracije". Uobičajeno, često se na- slućivala njegova opsjednutost svemoćnim Golijatom. No u doba filmova nađenih snimaka (kao i u Tscherkassky- jevom radu proteklih petnaest godina), Hollywood doče- kuju otvorenih ruku u svijetu prilično "malih" filmaša. Čini se kao da ta gesta govori: Ne bojte se. Ne bojte se, bit će obilje smijeha. Ne *ismijavanja*, nadajmo se (taj površni pristup, široko rasprostranjeno mišljenje publike i umjetnika, posve podcjenjuje izobilje komercijalnog filma). Radije, mogli bismo se smijati s *tim* nađenim filmovima, biti divni prema njihovoj ljepoti i stvoriti novo znanje iz njihova znanja i njihovog nesvjesnog.

35 - MM

Happy-End (1996.), *L'Arrivée* (1997.-98.), *Outer Space* (1999.). Sretan svršetak. Dolazak. Svemir. Priča kao u knji- zi za djecu, slikovnica žanrovskog filma, ili izravno iz Kubrickove 2001. Moralo bi biti moguće, iako je to prejedno- stavno, izvući srž Tscherkasskyjeva opusa iz naslova ovih novijih filmova. Točke koje nestaju, središnja perspektiva, zamišljena točka u kojoj su prostor i povijest došli do kra- ja, samo su pomoćna sredstva kojima se služi moderni čovjek kako bi ispunio pukotine egzistencije. Toliko smo naučili iz Tscherkasskyjeva rada, kao i iz mnogih drugih izvora. Želimo vjerovati da će, na kraju, biti dublje znaće- nje. Iza opasnosti središnje perspektive, međutim, u Tscherkasskyjevim se filmovima može zamijetiti rastući osjećaj sigurnosti i pribranosti. Neke stvari su odradene. Netko je uskočio, duboko zaronio i vratio se na površinu neozlijeden. Iskustva su doživljena, ruke oslobođene, a to

film materials. Tscherkassky had experimented with this technique in *Freeze Frame* and *Manufraktur*. In *tabula rasa*, found footage is used only at the beginning as a kind of gimmick; in *Parallel Space* it figures more prominently. Here we find a dialogue of gazes featuring Lee Remick and Montgomery Clift taken from *Wild River* (1960) by Elia Kazan.

However, during the production of *tabula rasa* and in connection with Tscherkassky's studies of psychoanalytical film theory, a further work came about, a wonderful little film made of "leftovers". *Shot-Countershoot* only runs for a few seconds, and it is one of the best jokes in the history of film (as well as film theory). In this found piece from a Western, a cowboy's (pistol) shot and the mortal reaction shot coming from his opponent are pointedly *not* represented by the standard editing principle of (camera) shot and countershot. Rather than using the conventional montage technique – cutting up the space between the two riflemen and then suturing the two shots together in order to create a new, illusionistic unity of space and time – the original filmmaker has preserved the integrity of a single shot and a single space. Without any editing tricks, action and reaction are presented in one "uncut" image of a character who also remains "uncut" – even if shot to death. Tscherkassky acts in a similarly "respectful" way by showing us this film fragment without further manipulation.

Shot-Countershoot marks the earliest incarnation of Hollywood cinema in Tscherkassky's oeuvre. Historically, avant-garde film has almost always disassociated itself completely from Hollywood, often gaining an aura of

omogućuje početnu točku za nova djela. Sada je posve moguće, kao u slučaju *Happy-Enda*, raspravljati o Rudolfu i Elfriede i razumjeti vrijednost njihovih “besmislenih malih filmova”. Napravljeni između 1960-ih i 1980., to su doslovno kućni filmovi, osobni dokumenti generacije Tscherkasskyjevih roditelja – *sitno-buržujski* portreti nečije dnevne sobe, različitih rođendana i božićnih zabava, hrane i pića, bivanja zajedno.

Odabirući i montirajući segmente iz tih kratkih filmova koje je nabavio na uličnom sajmu, Tscherkassky dopušta sebi (i gledatelju) proučavanje konvencija i strukture kućnih filmova. U tom smislu, on i dalje djeluje kao “sretni” filmski teoretičar. Jedan od njegovih najdojmljivijih opažanja tiče se načina na koji se Elfriede (a kasnije i Rudolf, nakon što je nabavio tronožac i daljinski okidač) izravno obraća kameri. Tko je taj nevidljivi treći čovjek ili publika s kojom komuniciraju? Jesu li to oni sami kao budući gledatelji vlastitih filmova? Obraćaju li se prijateljima ili rođacima? Ili govore samoj povijesti – nespecificiranom “poslije”, koje može udahnuti novi život njihovom vrlo specifičnom “tada”? Svakako govore Tscherkasskom i govore nama; mi smo implicitni i nevidljivi duhovi u njihovom osam-milimetarskom stroju uskog formata. Odašiljući svoju policu osiguranja za život nakon smrti, pojavljuju se nakon smrti kao vrlo vidljivi duhovi u našem trideset-pet-milimetarskom filmskom stroju. Tscherkassky je priznao njihovu policu. On je na “zadatku” i pristupio mu je ozbiljno – nježni humor njegova filma ne čini nikakvu štetu. Glazbeno, povezuje suzdržanu i pomalo ritualnu proslavu Rudolfa i Elfriede s francuskim hitom iz 1950-ih: “*bonbons, caramels, esquimaux, chocolats*”, pričom o užitci-

“frustration” along the way. By default, one could often glimpse its actual fixation with the almighty Goliath. In the era of found footage film, however (and in Tscherkassky’s work of the past 15 years), Hollywood is openly welcomed into the world of the very “small” filmmakers. Do not fear, this gesture seems to say. Do not fear, since there will be laughs aplenty. Nothing to *laugh at*, let’s hope (this superficial attitude, a widespread affliction of audiences and artists alike, completely underestimates the wealth of commercial cinema). Rather, the attitude might be to laugh *with* these found movies, to be beautiful with their beauty and to create new knowledge from their knowledge and their unconscious.

35MM

Happy End (1996), *L’Arrivé* (1998), *Outer Space* (1999). A happy ending. The arrival. Outer space. A tale like in a book for children, a picture book of genre cinema, or straight from Kubrick’s *2001*. It should be possible, though far too simple, to draw the essence of Tscherkassky’s oeuvre from the titles of his most recent films. Vanishing points, central perspective, the imaginary point where space and history come to a head are mere construction aids used by the modern man of means to help mend the cracks in existence. So much we have learnt from Tscherkassky’s work as well as many other sources. We want to believe that, in the end, there will have been a deeper meaning. Beyond the dangers of central perspective, however, one may still note a growing sense of certainty and composure in Tscherkassky’s films. Some things have been worked through. Somebody made a splash, took a deep dive and

ma puti koja nadilaze sva ostala, čak i užitke filma. Pjesma za dlaku izbjegava izravne seksualne konotacije, kao i filmski fragmenti. Sve do samog kraja filma, Tscherkassky dopušta nađenim snimkama da se povuku u daljinu i naglašava jezovitu igru stroja. Iz unutrašnjosti “reprezentacijske” i “narativne” pjesme javlja se posve druga glazba, gočovo “imaginarni” zvučni krajolik: *Requiem aeternam* Michael Chiona. Gospodine, daj im vječni mir. “Ljudi u filmu slave i puni su života, ali sada su isto tako mrtvi” (Tscherkassky) – podjednako mrtvi kao i kauboj u *Shot-Countershoutu*.

U filmovima mnogo toga ovisi o načinu prikazivanja smrti. Istodobno, moramo se prisjetiti da film nije prikladno *posljednje počivalište*. Film nije statičan; kao *misaoni* medij kreće se zajedno sa svime što mu se nađe na putu. Stoga, javlja se drugo značenje riječi *requies*: odmor i oporavak; privremeno mjesto gdje i prošlost i mrtvi mogu skupiti energiju za drugi krug u kući duhova.

Povećanje 8-mm filma izravno na 35-mm vrpcu (kao u *Happy-Endu*) može se smatrati nasilnim činom. No iznenađuje da se mala slika nije raspršila poput balona, nego napreduje na novom i nepreglednom igralištu. Amorfni protok zrnatih oblika na svakoj projekciji superosmice na velikom platnu omogućuje daleko stabilniji, brillantni prikaz tih prirođeno trošnih, ugroženih slika. Sačuvana je njihova izvorna nespretnost i “nečista koža”, dok se umjetnik odupire bilo kakvom pokušaju mehaničkog ili digitalnog retuširanja. Zapravo, točno je upravo suprotno: proces povećanja privlači pozornost na rjeđe priznatu nečistoću i krhkost “tridesetpetice”, nekad dominantnog formata, a sada također pogodenog krizom (takozvana “smrt filma”).

returned to the surface unharmed. Experiences were made, hands were freed, and they provide the starting point for new deeds. It is entirely possible now, as in the case of *Happy End* (1996), to discuss Rudolf and Elfriede and to understand the value of their “crappy little films”. Made between 1960 and 1980, these are literally home movies, private documents from the generation of Tscherkassky’s parents *D petit-bourgeois* portrayals of one’s own living room, various birthday and Christmas parties, eating and drinking, being together.

Selecting and editing segments from these short films which had been acquired at a flea market, Tscherkassky allows himself (and the viewer) to study certain conventions and structures of home movies. In this sense, he still functions as the “happy” film theorist. One of his most remarkable observations concerns the way in which Elfriede (and later also Rudolf, after having acquired a tripod and cable release) address the camera directly. Who is this invisible third man or audience they keep communicating with? Is it themselves as future viewers of their own films? Are they addressing friends or relatives? Or are they talking to history itself – to an unspecified “Later on” capable of breathing new life into their very specific “Then”? They certainly talk to Tscherkassky, and they talk to us; we are the implied and invisible ghost in their 8mm small gauge machine. Sending out their insurance policies for a life after death, they reappear later on, after death, as the very visible ghosts in our 35mm movie machine. Tscherkassky has honoured their policy. He has taken on a “task” and he has taken it seriously – the gentle humour of his film does no harm at all. Musically, he con-

Od ranih 1990-ih naovamo, 35-mm film je zaključio mnogo uzbudljivih ili "prijetećih" ugovora (ovisno o točci gledišta) s digitalnom tehnologijom, proizvevši razne mutacije ne samo na polju produkcije i postprodukcije, nego i prikazivalaštva: od ljeta 1999. digitalne projekcije "velikih" filmova u novootvorenim digitalnim kinima postale su široko raspravlјana mogućnost. Industrija pretpostavlja da će do 2015. doći do potpunog prijelaza na "nematerijalno" filmsko prikazivanje u komercijalnim kinima "čistog" i "civiliziranog" svijeta.

Kao što će "tridesetpetica" nestati kao "nesvjesni" nositelj svega što je veličanstveno i spektakularno u filmu, njegov fizičko-materijalni aspekt i specifična kemijska obilježja privlače sve više pozornosti javnosti. Tijekom 1990-ih, ubrzano je napredovalo očuvanje, restauracija i prikazivanje ranog filma, i tehnički i u pogledu popularnosti (s "kulturnom" publikom, na filmskim studijima i u radu eksperimentalnih filmaša). Danas je polje presijecanja avangarde i ranog filma jedno od najživljih područja estetičkih rasprava. To protukretanje usred digitalne kulture je razumljivo i ne nužno reakcionarno. Pomaže izoštiti osjete u odnosu na povjesno-kritičku percepciju filmskog medija, a film konačno odbacuje svoju dvojbenu zadaću promoviranja ekspanzivnih ideologija inovacija i progresa. (Kao popratna pojava, čak i digitalno integrirano audiovizualno – danas "najnovije" i "najnaprednije" medijski pripojeno – postaje dostupno kao predmet povjesno-kritičkog diskursa.)

Svi smo mi postmoderni. I mnogi od nas slave bogatstvo ranih filmskih slika – iz raznih razloga. Zato što se njihov osobiti nostalgični šarm može lako iskorištavati

nects Rudolf and Elfriede's effusive and quite ritual celebration to a French hit from the 1950s: "bonbons, caramels, esquimaux, chocolats", a story of pleasures of the flesh which override all others, even the pleasures of cinema. The song avoids direct sexual connotations by a hair's breadth, as do the film fragments. Towards the end of the film, Tscherkassky lets the found images recede into the distance and emphasises the ghostly play of the machine. From inside the "representational" and "narrative" song a quite different music emerges, an almost "imaginary" soundscape: Michel Chion's *Requiem aeternam*. Lord, give them eternal peace. "The people in the film are celebrating and they are full of life, but by now they are also dead" (Tscherkassky) – about as dead as the cowboy in *Shot-Countershoot*.

In films, a lot depends on the way in which death is portrayed. At the same time it must be remembered that cinema is not a suitable *last* resting-place. Cinema is not static; as a *thinking* medium it moves along all the things that cross its path. Thus, a second meaning of the word *requies* emerges: rest and recuperation, a temporary place where both the past and the dead can gather energy for another round through the ghost house.

Blowing up 8mm film directly to 35mm (as in *Happy End*) may be seen as an act of violence. Surprisingly, however, the tiny image does not burst like a balloon but thrives within a new and vast playing field. The amorphous flow of grainy shapes in any big-screen Super-8 projection gives way to a much more stable, brilliant representation of these intrinsically fragile, endangered images. Their original clumsiness and "impure skin" are being preserved

(Smashing Pumpkins i njihov sjajni glazbeni spot u stilu Georges-a Méliès-a); zato što nude kritičke metafore za suvremenu kulturu (Gus Van Sant i njegova melankolična *Ballad of the Skeletons/Balada kostura*, koja spaja Allena Ginsberga s Pathéovom fantazijom smrti negdje oko 1907.); zato što se na modernizam gleda kao na pomalo “pred-postmoderni” konglomerat pionirskih dostignuća i svakodnevnih popularnih formi (Stan Douglas i njegova moćna instalacija *Overture/Uvertira*, u kojoj Proust susreće Edisona); ili zato što dotrajale slike pokazuju razaranje vremena kao samostalni stvaralački rad (Minijatura nađenih snimaka Gustava Deutscha, čiji naslov precizno opisuje njezino djelovanje: *Tradicija je prenošenje vatre, ne obožavanje pepela*).

Zvučna podloga Deutschova filma sadrži izrazito živopisno pucketanje i grebanje (*noise* glazba Christiana Fennesza). Peter Tscherakassy je našao neobično sličan zvuk u samom filmskom materijalu koji je koristio: *L'Arrivée*, posljednja proba za *Outer Space*, sastoji se od 35-mm filmskih fragmenata manipuliranih tijekom procesa kontakt kopiranja. Prije negoli vidimo prvi “pravi” prizor, viđimo prikaz prozirnog, neekspoziranog filma: ništa. Ili točnije, vidimo sve ono što bi idealno trebalo biti nevidljivo na prozirnom, neekspoziranom filmu – nečistoću, oštećenja, ogrebotine koje bljeskaju poput hijeroglifa nesavršenosti. Na zvučnoj podlozi te se percepcije pojačavaju. Čujemo neku vrstu *automatske skladbe*, uzbudljivu “glazbu” koja izlazi iz svih mehaničkih procesa, znatno prije nego što se odsvirala ijedna “prava” nota. Kao da je taj “gramofon” snimao buku stroja, izvodeći je istodobno kao umjetnički događaj.

as the artist refrains from any attempt at mechanical or digital retouching. In fact, the opposite is true: the blow-up process draws attention to the less commonly acknowledged impurity and fragility of 35mm film, a formerly dominant format now also in the throes of crisis (i.e. the “death of cinema”). From the early 1990s onwards, 35mm film has closed a number of exciting or “threatening” contracts (depending on one’s point of view) with digital technology, spawning various mutations not only in the fields of production and postproduction, but also in exhibition. Since summer of 1999, digital projection of major films in newly designated digital cinemas has become a widely discussed option. Industry rhetoric now assumes that by 2015 a full conversion to “immaterial” film presentation will have taken place in commercial cinemas around the “clean” and “civilised” world.

Just as 35mm film is about to disappear as the “unconscious” carrier of everything that’s grand and spectacular in cinema, its physical-material aspect and specific chemical characteristics attract more and more public attention. During the 1990s, the preservation, restoration and exhibition of early cinema have rapidly improved, technically as well as in terms of popularity (with “cultural” audiences, in film studies, and in the work of experimental filmmakers). Today, the field of intersection between avant-garde film and early cinema is one of the liveliest territories of aesthetic debate. This counter-movement in the midst of digital culture is understandable, but not necessarily reactionary. It helps sharpen the senses towards a historical-critical perception of the film medium, as film finally renounces its dubious task of promoting

Kasnije nam *L'Arrivée* prikazuje snimke iz igranog filma *Mayerling*, snimljenog u Beču 1968. godine. U njemu Catherine Deneuve tumači lik Mary Vetsera. Letimično, i u crno-bijelom, prepoznajemo dolazak vlaka na stanicu. Tako, drugi put u karijeri Petera Tscherkasskyja, vidimo lažni film braće Lumière (u ovom slučaju, *L'Arrivée d'un train en gare à La Ciotat/Dolazak vlaka na stanicu La Ciotat*). Vidimo perforiranu “prugu”, celuloidni vlak koji iskače s tračnica i juri prema drugom. I vidimo čudesnu psihofizičku sposobnost kretanja (*locomotion*) koju je film morao posjedovati kada se prvi put pojavio. U Tscherkaskyjevom slijedu misli, pruga (stvarno prijevozno sredstvo industrijske moderne) zrcali se u rođenju filma (zamišljenom prijevoznom sredstvu kulturno-industrijske moderne) te se još jednom zrcali u današnjem dobu (1998.) koji vječno “progresivnu” ulogu lokomotive predaje digitalnoj industriji i avangardi pruža šansu za “dolazak”.

Tscherkassky svoju metodu “manufrakture” (kontakt kopiranje i simultana manipulacija elemenata) naziva “arhaičnom tehnikom” smatrajući je staromodnom. U suvremenoj arheologiji, povijesti umjetnosti ili koncertnoj praksi, međutim, često se rabe takve arhaične tehnike. Da bismo razumjeli bilo koji izvorni materijal i prenijeli njegovu složenost, gotovo je uvijek nužno ponovno učiti konkretne radne metode koje su do njega na početku dovele, to jest, konkretne procese preko kojih je ono društveno postalo formom. Intelektualna plastičnost i moć uvjerenja – “prisutnost” – mesta iskopina, restauracije freski ili performansa ili barokne glazbe neće se postići ni na jedan drugi način.

expansive ideologies of innovation and progress. (As a side-effect, even the digitally integrated audiovisual – today’s “newest” and “most progressive” medium-amalgamated – becomes available as an object of historical-critical discourse.)

We are all postmodern. And many of us cherish the wealth of early cinematic images – for a wide range of reasons. Because their peculiar nostalgic charm can be easily exploited (the Smashing Pumpkins and their smashing Georges-Méliès-style music video); because they offer critical metaphors for contemporary culture (Gus Van Sant and his melancholy *Ballad of the Skeletons*, confronting Allen Ginsberg with a 1907 Pathé death fantasy); because they allow for a view of modernity as a somewhat “pre-postmodern” conglomerate of “pioneering” achievements and everyday popular forms (Stan Douglas and his gripping installation *Overture*, where Proust meets Edison); or because the deteriorated images show the ravages of time as a creative work in its own right (Gustav Deutsch’s recent found footage miniature, its title describing precisely what it achieves: *Tradition is the passing on of fire, not the worship of ashes.*)

The soundtrack of Deutsch’s film consists of tremendously vivid crackling and scratching (noise music by Christian Fennesz). Tscherkassky found a strangely similar sound in the very film material he used: *L’arrivée*, a final rehearsal for *Outer Space*, consists of 35mm film fragments manipulated during the process of contact printing. Before we see the first “proper” representation, we see the representation of transparent, unexposed film: nothing. Or rather: We see all the things which should

Tscherakasskyjevi se filmovi, naravno, ne mogu svesti na njihovo “arheološko” obilježje. Ali, njihov poriv da razmišljaju, analiziraju i otkrivaju sve materijale, sloj po sloj, definitivno je vezan uz dimenziju *dubine* (bez obzira o kojem je materijalu riječ – holivudskom filmu, životu uma, moderni, kemiji superosmice). U tom smislu, Tscherkasskyjeva praktična filmska kritika na temelju nađenih snimaka temeljito odstupa od naizgled slične i vrlo popularne strategije u vizualnim umjetnostima, primjerice od većine instalacija škotskog umjetnika Douglaса Gordona. Rabeći medij videa, Gordon premješta poznate holivudske klasike u bijelu kocku i stavlja svoj potpis tako što manipulira jedan jedini formalni element. Polemički tvrdeći, filmovi poput *Psycho* (*Psiho*), *The Searches* (*Tragači*) ili *Taxy Driver* (*Taksist*) povećani su ili, preciznije, artificijelno smanjeni u film-jedne-šale. Kao gledatelji, promatramo tupi pogled ovisnika o medijima koji samo želi preraditi, a ne razumjeti svoju/našu drogu i svoju/našu ovisnost.

Tscherkasskyjev najutjecajniji i najpričekivaniji film *Outer Space* djeluje onkraj ove vrste ovisnosti. Film rabi scene iz filma strave *The Entity* (*Entitet*), u kojemu glumi Barbara Hershey. Ipak, njegova se senzualnost ne temelji toliko na primarnim užicima filmske iluzije – uranjanju u snovite, magične slike – nego na većoj misteriji: uspostavljanju kontakta s operaterom stroja za snove, sâimim magičarom. *Outer Space* svjedoči o povijesnom i intelektualnom bogatstvu te dubini iskustva koji obilježuju “prvu” filmsku avangardu, proizašlu iz moderne umjetnosti – baš kao što nam film *Histoire(s) du cinéma/Povijest(i) filma* Jean-Luc Godarda govori o izrazito slojevitoj “drugoј” avangardi, koja više proizlazi iz igranog filma i popularne

ideally be invisible in transparent, unexposed film – dirt, defects, scratches flashing by like hieroglyphs of imperfection. On the soundtrack, these perceptions intensify. We hear a kind of *automatic composition*, the exciting “music” emerging from all mechanical processes, long before one “proper” note has been played. It is as if this “gramophone” was recording the noise of the machine while simultaneously displaying it as an art event.

Later on, *L'arrivée* presents us with footage from the feature film *Mayerling*, shot in Vienna in 1968. It features Catherine Deneuve in the role of Mary Vetsera. Fleetingly, and in black-and-white, one recognises the arrival of a train in a station. Thus, for the second time in Tscherkassky's career, we see a fake Lumière film (in this case, *L'arrivée d'un train à la Ciotat*). We see the sprocket hole “railway”, a celluloid train jumping off the rails and hurtling against another one. And we see the incredible psychophysical LOCOMOTION that cinema must have had when it first appeared. In Tscherkassky's train of thought, the railway – industrial modernity's real means of transport – is mirrored by the birth of cinema – imaginary means of transport in cultural-industrial modernity – and mirrored once more by the present era (1998) which hands over the eternally “progressive” role of locomotive to the digital industries and offers the avant-garde a chance for “arrival”.

Tscherkassky calls his method of “manufracture” (contact printing and the simultaneous manipulation of the elements) an “archaic technique”, making it seem old-fashioned by implication. In contemporary archaeology, art history or concert practice, however, such archaic

kulture. To su politički, postmoderni i vrlo osobni oblici arheologije. Oni i dalje nose tragove svojih “prvih ljubavi”: odjek Adornovog “autonomnog umjetničkog djela” u slučaju *Outer Spacea* i osjećaj žaljenja zbog neispunjeno filmskog obećanja iz *Historie(s)*. Ipak, nesvesno, čini se da se ta dva rada kreću polagano jedan prema drugome, prema trećem mjestu, mogućem zajedničkom cilju: nečemu “što nikada nije bilo viđeno, ali se nekako pojavilo iz samog središta vidljivog svijeta.” Budućnost, potisnuto, čudovište filma strave. Odmatanje povijesti između priča i dokumenata, između snimljenih artefakata slika, teksta i zvuka; filmski čudovišni stroj koji se komeša u svojem brlogu.

Outer Space. The Entity. Mala priča iz bezgraničnog svemira filma. Žena (Hershey) ulazi u svoju kuću u predgrađu i napada je nevidljivo čudovište, “izvanjska sila”. Ona uzvraća i čeka novi napad. Tscherkassky rabi ovu konvencionalnu holivudsku priču da bi ispričao drugu: žena (Hershey) ulazi u svoju filmsku sliku gdje je napada “izvanjska sila”, “čudovište” vidljivo samo nama – okrutna stvarnost, vanjsko područje slike, “negativni prostor”. Prijeti joj ispresijecano svjetlucanje zvučnog zapisa, perforacije na rubovima filma, zvuci “manufrekture”, iznenadna multiplikacija njezine vlastite slike, perforacija njezinog slikovnog prostora, zaglavljenošt u filmskom vremenu. Čudovište se nastavlja vrtjeti i odstranjuje ženu iz slike. Pobjeda se čini potpunom, zavladala je mirnoća. No žena se brani i na trenutak vraća svoj integralni prikaz. Po prvi put čujemo njezin glas. Čudovište ostaje mirno, ali pripravno. Sva zrcala odražavaju sliku žene, ali i žena može vidjeti sva zrcala. Protivnici se odmjeravaju, napeto, pažljivo. Mogli bi biti saveznici. Neriješeno.

techniques are being widely used. To understand any original material and communicate its complexity, it is almost always necessary to re-learn the concrete working methods which brought it about in the first place; i.e. the concrete processes through which the social became form. The intellectual plasticity and persuasive power – the “presentness” – of an excavation site, a fresco restoration or a performance of baroque music won’t be achieved any other way.

Tscherkassky’s films cannot be reduced to their “archaeological” aspect, of course. But their impetus to ponder, analyse and uncover all material layer-by-layer is definitely bound to a dimension of *depth* (whatever the material in question might be – Hollywood cinema, the life of the mind, modernity, or the chemistry of Super-8 film). In this sense, Tscherkassky’s practical film criticism on the basis of found footage differs radically from seemingly similar and very popular strategies in visual art, for example most installations by Scottish artist Douglas Gordon. Using the video medium, Gordon transfers well-known Hollywood classics into the White Cube and leaves his signature by manipulating one single formal element. Polemically stated, films like *Psycho*, *The Searchers* or *Taxi Driver* are thus blown-up or, rather, artificially shrunk into one-joke-movies. As viewers, we watch the flaccid gaze of a media junkie who is mainly out to refine rather than fathom his/our drug and his/our addiction.

Tscherkassky’s most influential and most widely shown film *Outer Space* operates beyond this kind of addiction. The film makes use of a scene from the horror movie *The Entity*, starring Barbara Hershey. Still, its

Druga priča je materijalistička, samokritična i kripto-feministička. Definitivno nije destruktivna, cinična i egoistična. I poput prve priče, istodobno je drama i alegorija. Alegorija govori o određenom trenutku u krizi, kada se zamišljeni junak i junak suvremene umjetnosti prestanu bešćutno tući, nakon što prepoznaju jedan drugoga, svoje drugo. Prvi – žena Hershey, boreći se za svoju sliku – iznenada vidi realno (onkraj fikcije); drugi – Tscherkassky, izvanjska sila, školovan na modernističkoj tradiciji koja uvijek dekonstruira iluziju – iznenada vidi realnost fikcijskih slika. *Outer Space* više nije “paralelni prostor” avant-garde nego zapravo “prostor svijeta” filma.

Outer Space nije ni “intervju”, niti “upitnik”, već živi diskurs između umjetnika i nađenog materijala u kojem oba partnera – “manufrakturni” i žanrovske film – donose svoje specifično znanje i sposobnosti.

Tscherkasskyjeva “arhaična tehnika” omogućuje mu ne samo da analizira nego i da ponovno poveže filmski aparat sa stvarnošću. Slavi film kao pupčanu vrpcu svijeta. To slavlje nastalo je u Francuskoj; bilo je kritički primijenjeno na američki film 1950-ih (između ostalog), potom praktično primijenjeno na proizvodnju francuskih filmova tijekom 1960-ih. Značajke dubine prostora i istinske ljepote 35-mm zvučnog *cinemascope* filma, njegovu sposobnost da misli i komunicira, najprije su prepoznate u američkom mjuziklu i melodrami, a zatim su ih u prednji plan gurnuli filmovi kao što je Godardov *Le Mépris* (*Prezir*). Sav taj potencijal pohranjen je u memoriji i stvaranju *Outer Space*. Može se čuti, vidjeti i osjetiti: elektricitet, pucketanje između krhkikh slika ljudskog bića i krhke mehanike koja prikazuje i ono ljudsko i samoga sebe.

sensuality is not so much based on the primary pleasures of cinematic illusion – diving into dreamlike, magical images – but on a better mystery: making contact with the dream machine operator, with the magician himself.

Outer Space bears witness to the historic and intellectual wealth and to the depth of experience which mark the “first” cinematic avant-garde, growing out of modern art – just as Jean-Luc Godard’s *Histoire(s) du cinéma* tells of a richly layered “second” avant-garde which derives more from fiction filmmaking and popular culture. Both are political, postmodern and highly personal forms of archaeology. And they still carry the traces of their respective “first loves”: echoes of Adorno’s “autonomous art work” in the case of *Outer Space*; and the feeling of grief vis-a-vis cinema’s unfulfilled promise in the *Histoire(s)*. Yet unconsciously the two works appear to move slowly towards each other, towards a third place, a possible mutual goal: the thing “that has never been seen before, but somehow emerges right from the centre of the visible world”. The hereafter, the repressed, the monster of horror films. History as it unfolds between stories and documents, between the recorded artefacts of image, text and sound; the movie monster machine, stirring in its lair.

Outer Space. The Entity. A small story from the limitless cosmos of cinema. A woman (Hershey) enters her suburban home and is attacked by an invisible monster, an “external force”. She fights back and waits for another attack. Tscherkassky uses this conventional Hollywood tale to tell another one. A woman (Hershey) enters her cinematic image where she is attacked by an external force, a “monster” visible only to us – harsh reality, the exterior

Filmovi Genea Kellyja, Jean-Luca Godarda, Petera Tscherkasskyja. Filmovi koji znaju da se još uvijek nešto može slaviti. Filmovi koji su vani na kiši, ali će ipak usprkos tome pjevati.

Ovaj esej je napisan krajem 2000. i ne obuhvaća najnovije filmove Petera Tscherkasskyja *Dream Work* i *Instructions for a Light and Sound Machine*.

OBJAVLJEN JE U KNJIZI:

Peter Tscherkassky,

Alexander Horwath, Michael Loeenstein (Hg./Eds.)

Österreichisches Filmmuseum

SYNEMA – Gesellschaft für Film und Medien

Wien 2005

Prijevod na engleski: Alexander Horwath, Barbara Schwarz

CITIRANI OGLED:

Palm, Michael, *Liebesfilme. Zu einigen Arbeiten von Peter Tscherkassky, u Avantgardefilm. Österreich 1950 bis heute*, urednici Alexander Horwath, Gottfried Schlemmer i Lisl Ponger, Beč, 1995.

(prevela Tanja Vrvilo)

area of the image, “negative space”. She is threatened by the soundtrack’s jagged trail of light, by the sprocket holes on the film’s edge, by the sounds of “manufracture”, by the sudden multiplication of her own image, by the perforation of her pictorial space, by being stuck in cinema time. The monster keeps rotating and eliminates the woman from the image. Victory seems complete, calm sets in. The woman however, defends herself and temporarily regains her integral representation. For the first time we hear her voice. The monster remains still, but operational. All mirrors reflect the woman’s image, but the woman can see all the mirrors. The opponents scrutinise each other, tensely, attentively. They could be allies. A tie.

This second story is materialist, self-critical and crypto-feminist. It is definitely not destructive, cynical and egotistical. And like the first story, it is both a drama and an allegory. The allegory tells of a particular moment in crisis, where the illusionary hero and the modern art-hero stop beating each other senseless as they suddenly recognise each other, their respective other. The first one – the woman Hershey, fighting for her image – suddenly sees the real (beyond fiction); the other one – Tscherkassky, the external force, schooled by modernist tradition to always deconstruct illusion – suddenly sees the reality of fictional images. *Outer Space* is no longer the “parallel space” of the avant-garde, but in fact the “world space” of cinema.

Outer Space is also no “Inter-View”, no “questionnaire”, but a lively discourse between artist and found material where both partners – “manufracture” film and genre film – bring their specific knowledge and abilities to bear.

Tscherkassky's "archaic technique" enables him to not just analyse but also reconnect the cinema apparatus to the real. It celebrates cinema as the umbilical cord to the world. This celebration originated in France; it was critically applied to American films of the 1950s (among others) then practically applied in the making of French films during the '60s. The depth of space and sheer beauty of 35mm CinemaScope sound film, its capacity to think and communicate, all these qualities were first recognised by the French cinephiles in American musicals and melodramas, then pushed to the foreground by films like Godard's *Le Mépris*. All this potential is stored in the memory and in the making of *Outer Space*. It may be heard and seen and felt: an electricity, a crackling between the fragile image of a human being and the fragile mechanics portraying both the human and itself.

Films by Gene Kelly, Jean-Luc Godard, Peter Tscherkassky. Films which know there is still something to be celebrated. Films that are out in the rain, yet are still about to sing in spite of it.

This essay was written in late 2000 and does not take into account Peter Tscherkassky's most recent films *Dream Work* and *Instructions for a Light and Sound Machine*.

WORK QUOTED:

Palm, Michael, "Liebesfilme" in Alexander Horwath, Gottfried Schlemmer, Lisl Ponger (eds.), *Avantgardefilm. Österreich 1950 bis heute (Avant-garde film. Austria 1950 until today)*, Vienna 1995

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Akira Mizuta Lippit teaches at University of Southern California and his research is focused on four primary areas: the history and theory of cinema; world literature and critical theory; Japanese film and culture; and visual cultural studies. His published work reflects these areas and includes two books, *Atomic Light (Shadow Optics)* and *Electric Animal: Toward a Rhetoric of Wildlife*. In addition to his two completed books, Lippit is presently finishing a book-length study on contemporary experimental film and video, and has begun research for a book on contemporary Japanese cinema, which looks at the relationship of late-twentieth and early twenty-first century Japanese culture to the concept of the world. He has published widely in international venues, and his work has been translated in French, German, Italian, Japanese, and Korean and his articles have appeared in scholarly journals of film, literature, and culture, as well as in national and international exhibition and museum catalogues and scholarly anthologies. Lippit remains deeply involved in the intellectual community of Japan, where he regularly teaches, lectures, and publishes.

U središtu izvanjskog: japanska kinematografija nigdje

U svojem posljednjem seminaru naslovljenom *Zvijer i suveren* (*The Beast and the Sovereign*), Jacques Derrida sve je više govorio o samoći, posebice o samoći životinja i suverena, bića koje definira primarni odnos prema izvanjskom. Postati životinja, postati suveren znači doći u dodir s dubokom osamljenošću izvanjskog, osjetiti duboku osamljenost ne-ljudskog svijeta – iskusiti svijet kao ne-ljudsko biće. Izvan zakona, izvan zajednice i izvan čovječanstva, zvijeri i suvereni, kao i drugi autsajderi, nastanjuju izvanjsko i određuju zakon izvanjskoga, zajednicu izvana. Sâmi, životinje i suvereni žive u izvanjskom kao njegovi likovi. Izloženi su izvanjskom svijetu, svijetu izvana, svijetu čija je unutrašnjost izvana. Izvrnuti su na van u svijetu; u svijetu su time što su izvan. Svijet koji uokviruju sile izvanjskog i isključenja tako preobra-

In the Center of the Outside: Japanese Cinema Nowhere

In his final seminar titled “The Beast and the Sovereign,” Jacques Derrida spoke increasingly about solitude, in particular the solitude of animals and sovereigns, beings marked by a primary relation to the outside. To become animal, to become sovereign is to come into contact with the profound solitude of the outside, to sense the profound solitude of the non-human world – to experience the world as a non-human being. Outside the law, outside community, and outside humanity, beasts and sovereigns, among other outsiders inhabit the outside and come to determine a law of the outside, a community outside. Alone, animals and sovereigns live in the outside, and as figures of it. They are exposed to an outside world, a world outside, a world whose interiority is outside. They are inside-out in the world; in the world by

žava svijet, samu svjetovnost svijeta, u otok. Čitajući roman Daniela Defoea *Robinson Crusoe* iz 1719. godine, Derrida je u svojim nedovršenim predavanjima govorio o Crusoeovu egzilu, posebice o svijetu koji je za protagonista postao otok: "Ne postoje svjetovi", rekao je Derrida, "samo otoci". Otoci nastaju na kraju svijeta, onkraj ili izvan kraja svijeta. Golemo prostranstvo svijeta, koje određuje uključujuću formu postojanja i života – postojanja u svijetu – izokrenuto je na van: sâm i udaljen od čovječanstva, od drugih, autsajder je suveren na svojem otoku. Totalitet svjetova zamjenile su mnogostrukе singularnosti otoka. Derrida je nadahnut dugom filozofskom tradicijom koja svijet shvaća kao specifično ljudsku topografiju, jedinstveno ljudsku tvorevinu prostora koja okružuje, ali i oblikuje, svako ljudsko biće. Izgubiti se u svijetu, napustiti sebe u njemu, ali i biti napušten od svijeta znači izgubiti samu ljudskost ljudskog bića. Ako ne postoje svjetovi nego samo otoci, onda je svako ljudsko biće na svojem otoku ostvareno kao jedinstveno ne-ljudsko, bivše-ljudsko, što znači ne više ljudsko, izvan prostornih zakona koji određuju ljudskost ljudi kao takvih. Svaki je otok kraj svijeta.

Na različit način, ali slijedeći putanju nalik Derridinoj, Jean-Luc Nancy priziva kraj svijeta i njegov učinak na nečiji osjećaj svijeta; nečiju percepciju, razumijevanje i iskustvo svijeta; na odnos prema njemu i mjesto u njemu. Piše:

Više nema nikakvog svijeta: nema više mundusa, kozmosa, skladnog i potpunog poretka (iz) čije se unutrašnjosti mogu pronaći mjesto, stanište i elementi orijentacije. Ili, opet, više nema "ovdje dolje" svijeta kroz koje se moglo proći na putu prema onome iza ili izvan ovog svijeta. Nema više nikakvog

being outside. The world thus framed by the force of exteriority and exclusion transforms the world, the very worldliness of the world, into an island. Reading Daniel Defoe's 1719 novel *Robinson Crusoe*, Derrida spoke in his unfinished lectures, of Crusoe's exile, in particular of the world that had become for the protagonist an island: "There are no worlds," said Derrida, "only islands."

Islands form at the end of the world, beyond or outside the world's end. The vast expanse of the world, which determines an inclusive form of being and life – *a being in the world* – has been turned inside-out: alone and at a distance from humanity, from others, the outsider is sovereign on an island of one. The totality of worlds has been replaced by the multiple singularities of islands. Derrida is drawing from a long philosophical tradition that understands the world as a specifically human topography, a uniquely human formation of space that surrounds but also forms each human being. To lose oneself in the world, to abandon oneself to it but also to be abandoned by it is to lose the very humanity of being human. If there are no worlds but only islands, then each individual human being on his own and her own island is rendered uniquely non-human, ex-human, which is to say no longer human, beyond the laws of space that establish the humanity of the human as such. Each island is an end of the world.

In a separate register, but following a trajectory similar to Derrida's, Jean-Luc Nancy invokes the end of the world, and its effect on one's *sense* of the world; on one's perception, understanding, and experience of the world; on one's relation to and place in it. He says:

Duha svijeta, kao što nema nikakve povijesti pred čiji bi se sud moglo stati. Drugim riječima, nema više nikakvog osjećaja svijeta.^{o1}

Nancyjev osjećaj svijeta nudi poredak i orijentaciju u svijetu, ali i vjerojatnost prijelaza s jednog mjesto na drugo, iz jednog stanja u drugo, i u geopolitičkom i duhovnom smislu riječi "stanje". Gubitak tog osjećaja svijeta gura nas u prostor bez orijentacije, duha ili prolaza. Prostor bez; prostor bez riječi. "Znamo, doista", tvrdi Nancy, "da je ovo *kraj svijeta*, i nema ničeg iluzornog... u toj spoznaji."^{o2}

Međutim, što se privodi kraju u Nancyjevoj tvrdnji, svijet ili naš osjećaj svijeta? Kako se oni mogu razlikovati? Je li svijet doista završio, što, čini se, Nancy nagovještava, ili je osjećaj svijeta došao do kraja, što također, čini se, sugerira? Odluka ovisi o tome shvaćamo li svijet kao materijalni ili konceptualni prostor, je li svijet stvoren po zakonima fizike ili metafizike. Čak i ta razlika, ta dilema nestaje kod Nancyja, kao i u drugim filozofskim diskursima svijeta (primjerice, Heideggera i Marleau-Pontyja), prije negoli se dalje razvije: svijet je osjećaj i, istodobno, sav osjećaj je *a priori* svijet, svijet kao takav. Jedno ne postoji bez drugoga. "Stoga", govori Nancy, "svijet nije samo korelativ osjećaja, nego je strukturiran kao osjećaj i, recipročno, osjećaj je strukturiran kao svijet. Očito, 'osjećaj svijeta' je tautološki izraz."^{o3} Tautologija i redundantnost, Nancyjevim riječima

o1 Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Sense of the World*, preveo Jeffrey S. Librett (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), str. 4;

o2 Nancy, *The Sense of the World*, str. 4 (izvorno naglašeno);

o3 Nancy, *The Sense of the World*, str. 8 (izvorno naglašeno);

There is no longer any world: no longer a *mundus*, a *cosmos*, a composed and complete order (from) within which one might find a place, a dwelling, and the elements of an orientation. Or, again, there is no longer the “down here” of a world one could pass through toward a beyond or outside of this world. There is no longer any Spirit of the world, nor is there any history before whose tribunal one could stand. In other words, there is no longer any sense of the world.^{o1}

Nancy’s sense of the world provides order and orientation in the world but also the possibility of passage from one place to another, one state to another, in both the geopolitical and spiritual senses of the word “state.” The loss of this sense of the world propels one into a space without orientation, spirit, or passage. A space without; a worldless space. “We know, indeed,” says Nancy, “that it is *the end of the world*, and there is nothing illusory ... about this knowledge.”^{o2}

But what comes to an end in Nancy’s declaration, the world or one’s sense of it? How can one distinguish between the two? Has the world indeed ended, as Nancy seems to suggest, or has the *sense* of the world come to an end, as he also seems to suggest? The resolution depends on whether one understands the world as a material or conceptual space, whether the world is conceived within the laws of physics or metaphysics. Even this distinction, this dilemma disappears in Nancy as well as in other phi-

o1 Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Sense of the World*, trans. Jeffrey S. Librett (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 4.

o2 Nancy, *Sense of the World*, 4 (original emphasis).

“osjećaj svijeta”, stapa osjećaj i svijet u jedno: sav osjećaj je osjećaj svijeta, a svijet se javlja samo kao osjećaj. Povezani su, na kraju, do kraja svijeta, uvijek do osjećaja konačnosti. Afekt koji definira osjećaj svijeta je osjećaj njegove prije-teće konačnosti, njegove granice, njegova kraja. Na kraju i na kraju svijeta, ne postoje svjetovi, samo otoci.

Na kraju svijeta, otkrivam da je on bio otok; svijet raz-otkiven kao planet posut otocima. Svaki otok je granica, svaki otok je kraj svijeta. Na svakom otoku jedna osoba, sâma, pretvorena u suverena besvjetovnog izvanjskog. Biti izvana, biti u svijetu u tom smislu uvijek znači biti u središtu svojeg svijeta, izmjestiti svijet koji više nije svijet, više nije mjesto obilja, budućnosti i ostalog – ni mundus niti kozmos – nego odjelito mjesto apsolutne jedinstvenosti izvana. Apsolutno jedinstveno izvanjsko i bezosjetni svijet. Biti izvan znači biti i u središtu; u središtu izvanjskog. Sâm sam u središtu izvanjskog.

NE POSTOJE MJESTA, SAMO SVJETOVI

Među čestim temama novog japanskog filma, kinematografije čiji je preporod u 1990-im proslavio mnoge nove redatelje, jest snažna usredotočenost na specifičnost pojedinih mjesta – gradova, država, svjetova i prostora – te na odnos između pojedinih mjesta i šireg svijeta, na “osjećaj svijeta”. Od Okinawe u filmu *Sonatine* (1993.) Kitana Takeshija do Otarua u *Love letter* (1995.) Iwaija Shunjija; od Gunme u *Nemuru otoko* (*Spavač/Sleeping Man*, 1996.) Oguri-ja Koheiјa, do Hirošime u *H Story* (2001.) Suwe Nobuhira – ponovnoj obradi filma *Hiroshima, mon amour*; od Oku Nota

losophical discourses of the world (Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, for example) before it develops further: the world is at once a sense and all sense is *a priori* a world, the world as such. Neither exists without the other. “Thus,” says Nancy, “*world* is not merely the correlative of *sense*, it is structured as *sense*, and reciprocally, *sense* is structured as *world*. Clearly, ‘the sense of the world’ is a tautological expression.”⁰³ A tautology and redundancy, “the sense of the world,” in Nancy’s formulation, merges *sense* and *world* into one: all sense is sense of the world, and the world appears already only as sense. They are linked, in the end, to the end of the world, to the sense always of finitude. The affect that defines the sense of the world, is the sense of its imminent finitude, of its limit, and of its end. In the end and at the end of the world, there are no worlds, only islands.

At the end of the world, I discover it to have been an island; the world revealed to be a planet scattered with islands. Each island a limit, each island an end of the world. On each island one person, alone, rendered sovereign of a worldless outside. To be outside, to be in the world in this sense is always to be at the center of one’s own world, to exhibit a world that is no longer a world, no longer the site of plenitude, future, and others – neither *mundus* nor *cosmos* – but the discrete place of an absolute singularity outside. An absolutely singular outside and senseless world. To be outside is also to be at the center; at the center of the outside. I am alone at the center of the outside.

03 Nancy, *Sense of the World*, 8 (original emphases).

u *Maboroshi no hikari* (*Maboroshi*, 1995.) Kore-edo Hirokazu do malog stana u Tokiju u *Daremo shiranai* (*Nikto ne zna/Nobody Knows*, 2004.) Kore-edo, među brojnim primjerima, specifična su mjesta označena kao svjetovi koji postaju otoci; krajevi svijeta, u prostornom i vremenskom smislu tog izraza. Specifična mjesta postaju krajevi svijeta, ali i središta izvanjskog koji se otvaraju iza granica i konačnosti svjetova. A središte svijeta je ujedno i kraj svijeta – središte određuje njegovu konačnost, trenutak njegova kraja.

Film Yukisade Isaoa iz 2004. godine *Sekao ni chushin de, ai o sakebu* (*U središtu svijeta, vaseći ljubav/Crying Out Love, In the Center of the World*) uspostavlja složeni spoj prostora, vremena, povijesti i sjećanja, koji razvija modus prelaznja vodeći likove od i do specifičnih vremena i mjesta u fantomskom prijelazu između ovog i onog drugog svijeta. Kao što naslov nagovještava, film priziva osjećaj svijeta, središte svijeta, u formi osjećaja ili afekta (ljubavi i gubitka) i načina izražavanja, plačem ili, preciznije, vapajem (*sakebu*).⁰⁴ *Vapeći ljubav* odvija se i priziva specifična mjesta – Takamatsu u Šikoku, gdje se zbiva veći dio filma, i Uluru (Ayers Rock) u središnjoj Australiji u državi Northern Territory, gdje film završava. Međutim, prostor filma, središte svijeta koje stvara, odvija se daleko od bilo kojeg specifičnog mjesta, uspostavljajući posredovani i tehnološki prostor, neumoljivo udaljen od sadašnjosti, a

04 Naslov filma na japanskom i u engleskom prijevodu sadrži poetski zarez koji nema pravu gramatičku ili sintaktičku svrhu; stvara mali prekid koji omogućuje frazi “u središtu svijeta (*sekai no chūshin de*)” da ostane izdvojena. U engleskom je naslovu zamijenjen redoslijed dvaju rečeničnih dijelova.

Among the recurring themes of the new Japanese cinema, a cinema whose resurgence in the 1990s brought many new directors to prominence, has been an acute focus on the specificity of places – cities, states, worlds, and spaces – and to the relation between particular places and the larger world, to a “sense of the world.” From Okinawa in Kitano Takeshi’s *Sonatine* (1993) to Otaru in Iwai Shunji’s *Love Letter* (1995); from Gunma in Oguri Kôhei’s *Sleeping Man* (*Nemuru otoko*, 1996) to Hiroshima in Suwa Nobuhiro’s remake of *Hiroshima mon amour*, *H Story* (2001); from Oku Noto in Kore-edo Hirokazu’s *Maborosi* (*Maboroshi no hikari*, 1995) to a small apartment in Tokyo in Kore-edo’s *Nobody Knows* (*Dare mo shiranai*, 2004), among many other examples, specific places are marked as worlds that become islands; ends of the world, in the spatial and temporal idiom of that term. Specific places become ends of the world but also centers of an outside that opens up beyond the limits and finitude of worlds. And the center of the world is also the end of the world – the center establishes its finitude, *the moment of its end*.

Yukisada Isao’s 2004 *Crying Out Love, In the Center of the World* (*Sekai no chûshin de, ai o sakebu*) establishes a complex economy of space, time, history, and memory, which develops a mode of transit taking characters to and from specific times and places in a phantom passage between this world and that other world. As the title suggests, the film invokes a sense of the world, a center of the world, in the form of a sense or affect (love and loss) and a mode of expression, crying or more accurately shouting

blizak samo nestanku prostora kao takvog, radikalnom obliku atopije. U središtu, nigdje.

Taj film, vrlo popularna melodrama u cijeloj Aziji, prikazuje dva razdoblja u životu Matsumota Sakutara; kao odrasle osobe u sadašnjosti (tumači ga Ōsawa Takaо) i srednjoškolca 1986. godine (Moriyama Mirai). U sadašnjosti, Sakutaro se nalazi pred vjenčanjem s Fujimurom Ritsuko (Shibasaki Kou), preko koje se vraća u prošlost i prisiljen je prisjetiti se i iznova proživjeti svoju nesretnu ljubavnu priču s Hirose Aki (Nagasawa Masami). Prošlost i sadašnjost, kao i sve likove, povezuje tehnološko sredstvo i audio trop, Sonyjev Walkman.

Vapeći ljubav uspostavlja glas kao središnji motiv, snimljeni zvuk kao dominantni trop, a Sonyjev Walkman kao središnjeg označitelja prijelaza između ljudi, prostora, vremena i svjetova. Pripremajući se za selidbu i početak novog života sa Sakutarom, Ritsuko pronalazi audio-kazetu; mora otići u trgovinu s elektroničkom opremom i kupiti kazetofon da bi je mogla preslušati. Sve su sprave nestale, što iziskuje trop arheologije koji se nastavlja tijekom filma. Kazeta što ju je Aki snimila u noći svoje smrti, posljednja je zvučna poruka između mladog Sakutara i Aki, a ta je razmjena počela nakon sudjelovanja u radijskoj nadogradnoj igri za Sonyjev Walkman (Sakutaro i Aki se nadmeću čiju će razglednicu prvu pročitati u kasnonoćnoj radijskoj emisiji. Sakutaro je pobijedio izmislivši priču o djevojci nalik Aki, koja boluje od leukemije. Uznemirena Aki pokreće seriju snimljenih poruka sa Sakutarom, sa željom da se pomire. Aki, kasnije, doista dobije leukemiju. Kao posljedica njihova odnosa i komunikacije snimljenim porukama, virtualna arhiva njihove romanse ostaje nedir-

(*sakebu*).⁰⁴ *Crying Out Love* takes place in and invokes specific sites – Takamatsu in Shikoku, where much of the film is set, and Uluru (Ayers Rock) in central Australia in the Northern Territory, where the film concludes. But the space of the film, the center of the world it conjures, takes place at a distance from any specific site, establishing a mediated and technological space that is irreducibly distant from the present and near only to the disappearance of space as such, to a radical form of *atopia*. At the center, nowhere.

The film, a blockbuster melodrama throughout Asia, portrays two periods in the life of Matsumoto Sakutaro; as an adult in the present (Ôsawa Takao) and as a high school student in 1986 (Moriyama Mirai). In the present, Sakutaro is on the eve of marrying Fujimura Ritsuko (Shibasaki Kou), through whom he is thrown back into his past and forced to recall and relive his ill-fated love affair with Hirose Aki (Nagasawa Masami). What sutures the past to the present, and each of the characters to one another is a technological device and audio trope, the Sony Walkman.

Crying Out Love establishes the voice as a central motif, recorded audio as a dominant trope, and the Sony Walkman as a central signifier for the passage between peoples, spaces, times, and worlds. While preparing for her move and new life with Sakutaro, Ritsuko discovers an audio cassette tape; she has to go to an electronics store to buy a

04 The film's title in Japanese and in the English translation contains a poetic comma that serves no true grammatical or syntactical purpose; it creates a slight break that allows the phrase "in the center of the world (sekai no chûshin de)" to stand alone. In the English title, the order of the two clauses has been reversed.

nuta, kao zapis njihove ljubavne veze. Ostavljaju trag svoje kratke ljubavne priče iz 1986. godine. Sedamnaest godina poslije, Ritsuko vraća Sakutara u Takamatsu, gdje on otkriva snimljenu arhivu i svijet istodobno sačuvan i izgubljen).

Walkmen djeluje kao povijesni označitelj (godina 1986.), simbol razdoblja, možda i kao njegova reprezentativna tehnologija, ali i kao trop, model komunikacije te način stvaranja svijeta osobnim glasom.^{o5} On predstavlja način kojim se privatno, intimno i unutarnje prenosi u javni prostor. Unutarnje čini vanjskim, a vanjsko unutarnjim, pretvarajući svijet zvuka u otok. Walkman zatvara izvanjski svijet za pojedince, zamjenjujući ga osobnim i unutarnjim svijetom. Također, slušatelja smješta u središte svijeta.

Vrhunac se odvija u sceni u srednjoškolskoj dvorani kada Sakutaro pušta kazetu, snimku na kojoj Aki svira na glasoviru. Ona ga poziva da prođe dvoranom i popne se na pozornicu, a zatim da stane pred glasovir i zatvoriti oči. Aki zahtijeva da oči drži zatvorene, a kada on otvoriti oči, odmah ga ukori. Kao da nije bila tamo u trenutku snimanja kazete, nego sedamnaest godina poslije. Sakutaro odgovara zatvaranjem očiju, ali izgovara i njezino ime, "Aki". Kao da ju je, u trenutku kad je otvorio oči, ugledao. Aki nastavlja govoriti, a njezin glas postaje sve više utjelovljen, učinak je to Walkmanove neobično "žive" kvalitete zvuka. Kamera se povlači unatrag, i dalje fokusirajući Sakutara, čije su oči zatvorene. Postupno, u kadru se pojavljuje gla-

o5 Prema Sonyjevoj web stranici, prvi Walkman, izvorno nazvan *Soundabout*, nastao je 22. lipnja 1979. Prvi model se počeo prodavati 1. srpnja.

device to play the cassette tape. All the machines have disappeared, requiring a trope of archaeology that continues throughout the film. The tape, recorded by Aki on the night of her death, is the last of a series of exchanged audio tapes between the young Sakutaro and Aki, which began after they competed to win a Sony Walkman through a radio contest. (The competition between Sakutaro and Aki is to see who can first have a postcard read on a late-night radio program. Sakutaro wins the competition by making up a story about a young girl who resembles Aki and has been stricken with leukemia. This upsets Aki, who initiates a series of recorded exchanges with Sakutaro as a means of reconciling. Aki eventually falls ill with the leukemia. As a result of their courtship and sustained communication with recorded audio, a virtual archive of their romance remains intact, as a record of their love affair. They leave behind a trace of their brief romance in 1986. Seventeen years later, Ritsuko leads Sakutaro back to Takamatsu, where he rediscovers the taped archive, and the world that is both preserved and lost.

The Walkman operates as a historical signifier (1986), an emblem of the era, its representative technology, perhaps, but also as a trope, a mode of communication and a way of rendering the world through private audio.⁰⁵ It is a way to bring privacy, intimacy, and interiority into a public space. It renders the inside out and the outside in, transforming the world of audio into an island. The Walkman shuts the world out for individuals, replacing it with a private and interior world. It also repositions the listening subject at the center of the world.

05 According to the Sony website, the first Walkman, originally called Soundabout, was launched on 22 June 1979. The first model went on sale on July 1.

sovir, a za glasovirom i Aki. Sa slušalicama i zatvorenih očiju, Sakutaro sluša Aki kako svira na glasoviru. Osjećajući njezinu blizinu, Sakutaro zatvorenih očiju skida slušalice: bez ikakvog prekida, još uvijek čujemo Aki kako svira. Zvuk kiše, zvuk izvanjskog ulazi u audio dijegezu, razbijajući unutrašnjost zvuka Akijinog glasovira. (U cijeloj je sceni složen međuodnos glasnoća zvuka, uključujući i Akijin glas, koji se doima kao da prelazi iz snimljenog govora u utjelovljeni glas). Ona je tu pred njime, utjelovljena, pretvorena iz fantomskog glasa u nemoguću prisutnost, reprezentaciju.

U tom trenutku, rezom se prelazi na kadar u kojem Ritsuko ulazi u dvoranu. Ugleda Sakutara samog na pozornici kako zuri u glasovir. No zvuk Akijinog sviranja i dalje lebdi uz dijegetičku liniju: nejasno je može li Ritsuko čuti glasovir; dijegeza nam to ne otkriva. Sakutaro čuje Akijin glasovir bez slušalica; a vidi je zatvorenih očiju. Njegov osjećaj svijeta potvrđen je njezinim utjelovljenim ulaskom kroz njegova osjetila. Audio-kazeta je odredila prostor, specifično mjesto i skup osjeta, svijet iz otoka. To je fantomski svijet, propast i približavanje svjetova i otoka – Sakutaro onda i sada, Aki onda, a Ritsuko sada susreću se u tom ekstra-senzornom svijetu gdje se zvukovi i slike stapaju bez jedinstvene perspektive ili referentne točke. Ondašnja Aki, i dalje školarka, prima sadašnjeg Sakutara za ruku, sedamnaest godina poslije. Prisloni se uz njega u odgođenom zagrljaju, koji im nije uspio sedamnaest godina ranije. Izjavljuje: "Volim te."

Ritsuko svjedoči ponovnoj materijalizaciji Aki, netremice gleda u smjeru fantomskog zagrljaja Sakutara i Aki, no film ne pruža kadar reakcije koji bi potvrdio što ona

A climactic scene takes place in the high school gymnasium, where Sakutaro replays the tape of Aki playing the piano. She tells him to walk through the gymnasium and onto the stage, and where she instructs him to stand before the piano and close his eyes. Aki insists that he keep his eyes closed, and when he opens his eyes, she immediately scolds him. As if she were there not at the moment she recorded the tape, but seventeen years later. Sakutaro responds by closing his eyes, but immediately says her name, "Aki." As if, in the instant that he opened his eyes, he saw her there. Aki continues to speak, and her voice becomes increasingly embodied, an effect throughout of the uncanny liveness of the Walkman sound quality. The camera begins to track backwards, still focusing on Sakutaro, whose eyes remain closed. The moving camera establishes throughout this the presence of some other subjectivity, neither here nor there but everywhere. Gradually the piano enters the frame and Aki comes into view there at the piano. With his headset still on and his eyes closed, Sakutaro listens to Aki play the piano. Feeling her proximity, Sakutaro removes the headset, eyes still closed: without any break, the sound of Aki's piano continues. And the sound of rain, of the outside enters the audio diegesis, breaking the interiority of Aki's piano. The sound levels are complex and uneven throughout this scene, including Aki's voice, which appears to move from recorded audio to embodied voice. The sound of the rain cuts in then out, establishing an economy of sound not unlike the moving camera that shifts or rather disperses the locus of subjectivity throughout the frame. She is there before him, embodied, transposed from the phantom audio to an impossible presence, a representation.

vidi. Umjesto toga, scena se pretapa u kadar u tonu sepije u kojemu su na istoj pozornici zagrljeni mladi Sakutaro i Aki, a zatim prelazi u dugi flashback u kojem Aki otkriva Sakutaru da je bolesna. Nakon što ta scena završi, kamera se vraća na vidljivo potresenu Ritsuko, koja je, čini se, svjedočila flashbacku. Nejasno je što je Ritsuko vidjela: Sakutarovu halucinaciju, Sakutarovo sjećanje, ili povratak Aki na ovaj svijet. Prizor kojemu Ritsuko svjedoči ostaje nejasan, nepotvrđen. Ganuta do suza tom scenom uskrsnuća, Ritsuko izjuri iz dvorane. U toj sceni, svi su se sustavi urušili u jedan: prošlost i sadašnjost, tehnološki audio i utjelovljeni zvuk, fantom i meso. Svi su otoci sklopljeni, iznova sklopljeni na trenutak u svijet. Ta scena predstavlja središte svijeta, nemoguće središte koje se na trenutak primakne svijetu, prije nestanka.

Sablasni sustav koji povezuje Sakutara, Aki i Ritsuko predstavlja svijet jer sada i ovdje tog nemogućeg trenutka – palimpsest višestrukih samoća i višestrukih otoka – donosi točku susreta između prošlosti i sadašnjosti, ovdje i tamo, ovdje i onkraj: prijelaz, duh, svemir.

Scena završava kada Sakutaro otvorí oči i istog trenutka pogleda prema Ritsuko. Potresen susretom s Aki, Sakutaro žurno napušta pozornicu, ali ga prekine telefonski poziv prijatelja Ryua (jedna tehnologija zamijenjena drugom, Walkman mobilnim telefonom, oba modusi neutjelovljene glasovne komunikacije, jedan “živ”, drugi snimljen). “Upravo sam video Aki”, govori Sakutaro. “Ona nije sjećanje”, ustraje. “Aki je umrla sâma prije sedamnaest godina”, kaže. “Na kraju, nije me pokušala vidjeti, pa kada sam ovdje osjećam kao da je i ona još uvijek tu.” Povijest i sjećanje, fizika i metafizika, svijet i osjećaj svijeta pojavljuju se u

At that moment, the shot cuts to Ritsuko who has entered the gymnasium. She sees Sakutaro alone on the stage, staring at the empty piano. But the sound of Aki's piano remains suspended along the line of the diegesis: it is unclear whether Ritsuko can hear the piano; the diegesis offers no indication. Sakutaro hears Aki's piano without the headset; and he sees her there with his eyes closed. His sense of the world confirmed by her embodied entry through his senses. The audiotape has established a place, a specific site and set of senses, a world from an island. It is a phantom world, a collapse and convergence of worlds and of islands – Sakutaro then and now, Aki then, and Ritsuko now meet in this extra-sensory world where sounds and views are merged without a unified perspective or point of reference. Aki then, preserved as a schoolgirl, takes the hand of Sakutaro now, seventeen years later. She leans against him in a deferred embrace, one they never managed seventeen years ago. She says, "I love you."

Ritsuko witnesses the rematerialization of Aki, she stares intently in the direction of Sakutaro and Ritsuko's phantom embrace, although the film does not provide a reaction shot to confirm what she sees. Instead, the scene appears to dissolve into a sepia-toned shot of the young Sakutaro and Aki embracing on the same stage, which turns into an extended flashback in which Aki reveals to Sakutaro that she is sick. When the scene ends, the camera returns to a visibly shaken Ritsuko, who appears to have witnessed this flashback. It is unclear what exactly Ritsuko has seen: Sakutaro's hallucination, Sakutaro's memory, or the return of Aki into this world. The spectacle that Ritsuko witnesses remains ambiguous, unverified.

liku Aki, čije ime priziva pretpovijest. Svijet kojeg ona tvori i predstavlja u tom trenutku pada izvan povijesti, pretpovijestan je, ali temeljno nepovijestan i tehnološki.

Vapeći ljubav predstavlja virtualnu arhivu izgubljenih drugih: fotografije, zvučne snimke, suveniri, sjećanja, te kosti i pepeo. To je tehnološka arhiva koja tvori svijet usamljenih likova zatočenih u vremenu. Audio-uređaji, uključujući audio-kazetu, radio i mobilni telefon, zadaju filmski narativ, uspostavljujući način prijelaza između ljudi, mjesta i vremena; između jednog svijeta i drugog.

Zvuk omogućuje prolaz kroz svijet, da prizovemo Nancyja. Audio-kazeta, ili preciznije Sonyjev Walkman, i sama postaje mjesto; uzima i daje mjesto, uzimajući mjesto od mjesta i uspostavljujući lokus nerazriješene veze koja zapravo nije prekinuta Akijinom smrću. Njezina neisporučena poruka, glas koji putuje sedamnaest godina, napokon se vraća u rukama Ritsuko, koja nevoljko predaje kazetu. Ili, moglo bi se reći, Akijin oproštaj – njezin izgovoren, snimljen, ali ne-preslušan glas – ostaje prijelazan sve dok ne uđe u uši najprije Ritsuko, a zatim Sakutara, prije nego je pušten u dijegezu i izvan nje. Prostor koji otvara audio-kazeta, Walkman, te fantomski i nemirni Akijin glas, omogućuju da se veza konačno smiri, da nađe svoje mjesto u “središtu svijeta”, u beskrajnom i udaljenom i pretpovijesnom Uluru u Australiji. Sakutaro i Ritsuko odnose Akijin pepeo i njezin glas, tragove njezina života i tijela u Uluru, mjesto koje je Aki vidjela samo na snimkama nađenim u tuđem fotoaparatu. To je odgođeno putovanje, putovanje na koje Sakutaro i Aki nikada nisu zajedno otišli.

Potraga za središtem, prvo otoka Yume (Yumejima, otok snova), zatim Ulura u Australiji, postaje za Aki i Saku-

Moved to tears by this scene of resurrection, Ritsuko rushes out of the gymnasium. In this scene, all of the systems have collapsed into one: past and present, technological audio and embodied sound, phantom and flesh. Each island assembled, reassembled for a moment into a world. The scene represents the center of the world, an impossible center that converges into a world for one instant before vanishing.

The ghostly economy that brings Sakutaro, Aki, and Ritsuko together constitutes a world because the here and now of this impossible moment--a palimpsest of multiple solitudes and multiple islands--yields a point of contact between the past and present, the here and there, the here and beyond: a passage, a spirit, a *cosmos*.

The scene ends when Sakutaro opens his eyes and immediately looks in the direction of Ritsuko. Shaken by his encounter with Aki, Sakutaro begins to rush away from the stage when he receives a call from his friend, Ryu (one technology displaced by the next, Walkman to mobile phone, both modes of disembodied vocal communication, one live, the other recorded). The sound of his phone penetrates this space from the outside, infusing it with another phantom, another world, elsewhere. "I just saw Aki," says Sakutaro. "She's not a memory," he insists. "Aki died alone seventeen years ago," he says. "At the end, she didn't try to see me, so when I'm here, I feel as if she's still here." History and memory, physics and metaphysics, the world and a sense of the world appear in the figure of Aki, whose name refers to prehistory. The world she forms and performs at the moment falls outside history, prehistoric but fundamentally ahistorical and technological.

tara središte njihovog zajedničkog svijeta. Središnje mjesto njihova žalovanja; kvazi-imaginarno mjesto gdje je sačuvana njihova vječnost, daleko u beskrajnom izvanjskom. U Uluru, svetom mjestu za mrtve, Sakutaro stavlja slušalice i sluša posljednju Akijinu poruku. Ona se prisjeća vremena koje su proveli zajedno i zahvaljuje mu na bliskosti. Prizivajući nelagodnu vremenitost, izjavljuje: "Nikada neću zaboraviti dragocjeno vrijeme koje smo proveli zajedno." Njezino sjećanje će je nadživjeti. Uoči svoje smrti, u trenutku svoje smrti, priziva buduće sjećanje: "Nikada neću zaboraviti." Zvučna snaga njezine prisutnosti kao snimljenog audia čini njezinu tvrdnju istinitom: ona može govoriti sada, sedamnaest godina nakon svoje smrti, o prošlosti koju nije zaboravila. Njezino sjećanje je preživjelo, nadživjelo je i nju. Aki moli Sakutara da njezin "pepeo raspu vjetrovi Ulurua", a zatim da živi svoj život, da nastavi sa životom koji je doslovno zastao da živi "svoje sada (*ima wo ikite*)."
Prošlost i sadašnjosti, živi i mrtvi, Takamatsu i Uluru spajaju se u jednom svijetu – središtu svijeta, ali i njegovom kraju. Svijet koji na životu održava Akijin glas – svijet sadržan u Walkmanu, koji je i sâm konačan povijesni stroj – privodi se kraju. Na kraju svijeta i na kraju vremena, ovog vremena posebnog za ovaj svijet, Aki se vraća iz fantomskog mjesta tehnologije i opet se vraća se u njega, u prostor opsjednute audiokazete. Postala je ne-čovjek, ne više čovjek, fantom i suveren; ali time Sakutara oslobađa njegova egzila, njegova otoka. On se vraća s kraja svijeta, sa svojeg otoka, u izvanjsko i u svijet. Na kraju, u ovome filmu ne postoje mjesta, samo svjetovi.


(prevela Tanja Vrvilo)

Crying Out Love constitutes a virtual archive of lost others: photographs, audio recordings, souvenirs, memories, and bones and ashes. It is a technological archive that forms a world of solitary figures suspended in time.


Audio devices including the audiotape, radio, and mobile phone dictate this film's narrative, establishing a mode of passage between people, places, and times; between one world and another. Sound makes possible a passage through the world, to invoke Nancy. The audio tape, but more specifically the Sony Walkman, becomes itself a place; it takes and gives place, taking the place of place and establishing a locus for the unresolved affair that did not in fact end with Aki's death. Her undelivered missive, the voice that travels across seventeen years, finally returns through the hands of Ritsuko, who limps to deliver the tape. Or, one could say, Aki's farewell--her uttered, recorded, but unheard goodbye--has remained in transit during this time until it enters the ears of first Ritsuko, then Sakutaro, before it is released into and out of the diegesis. The place opened up by the audiotape, by the Walkman, and the phantom and restless voice of Aki, allows the relationship to finally rest, to take its place at the "center of the world," here the vast and distant and prehistoric Uluru, Australia. Sakutaro and Ritsuko take Aki's ashes and her voice, traces of her life and body – to Uluru, a place that Aki saw only in photographs she found left in another's camera. It is a postponed voyage, one that Sakutaro and Aki never completed together.

The pursuit of a center, first Yume Island (*Yumejima*, dream island) then Uluru, Australia, becomes for Aki and Sakutaro the center of their world together. The central

site of their mourning; a quasi-imaginary place where their eternity is preserved, far away in a vast exteriority. In Uluru, a sacred place for the dead, Sakutaro puts on his headset and listens to Aki's final communication. She recalls their time together and thanks him for having been so close. Invoking an uncanny temporality, she declares "I will never forget the precious time we spent together." Her memory will survive her. On the eve of her death, at the moment of her death, she invokes a future memory: "I will never forget." The sonic force of her presence as a recorded audio renders her claim true: she can speak now, seventeen years after her death, of a past she has not forgotten. Her memory has survived and survived her. Aki asks Sakutaro to "scatter her ashes on the winds of Uluru," then to live his life, to go on with his life which has been suspended, literally to live "his now (*ima wo ikite*)."¹ The past and present, the living and dead, Takamatsu and Uluru are brought together in one world – the center of the world but also its end. The world kept alive by Aki's voice – a world contained in the Walkman, itself a finite historical apparatus – comes to an end. At the end of the world and at the end of time, this time particular to this world, Aki returns from and returns to the phantom site of technology, to the space of a haunted audiocassette. She has become non-human, no longer human, phantom and sovereign; but in so doing releases Sakutaro from his exile, from his island. He returns from the end of the world, from his island, into the outside and into the world. In the end, there are no places in this film, only worlds.




Kubrickov film *Odiseja u svemiru* 2001. (1968) prelazi granice filmskog eksperimenta. Ta odiseja kulminira rođenjem Übermenscha, rođenjem koje omogućuje revolucionarnu političku alternativu globalnoj ekonomiji moći i utjecaj genetskih politici koja revalorizira ontološka opredjeljenja filma i filozofije. U tom smislu, 2001. ne pita samo "što je film?", već præcena nadi-ručim timpanima slavne muzičke teme, pita "što je filozofija?". Slijedeći ovu filmsku misao ("što znači slijedeći Deleuzeovo otvaranje ovog pitanja), nalazimo kako 2001. raznišlja misao nad mislima i postulira vrijeme - podnepono - u kojem je ljudsko biće prevladano, u vječno vraćanje. 2001., Nietzscheanska revalvacija politike, filozofije i filma, stoga stvara novu vrstu filma, film u kojem su sve ambicije 1968. godine - njegove produkcije - sjedinjene u filmu novoga. U 2001. *science fiction* nalazi svoju svrhu u pružanju novog imperativa: moramo promijeniti značenje budućnosti.



održane u saradnji sa: Nova Društva

re tons



FILOZOFIJA BUDUĆNOSTI >>

Odiseja u svemiru 2001.

Stephen Zepke

Zagreb • 22.10. • 19:00 h


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program realiziran kroz platformu clubture^{CT}

Cesare Casarino

CESARE CASARINO je profesor na Univerzitetu Minnesota, na Odsjeku za kulturne studije i komparativnu književnost. Područja kojim se bavi uključuju propitivanje odnosa estetičkog i političkog mišljenja u modernoj i postmodernoj epohi, istraživanje 19. i 20. stoljetne anglo-američke i evropske književnosti, kao i kino, te filmsku teoriju. Te različite teme Casarino čita s naglašenim fokusom na kategorije seksualnosti i roda, kao i s nepristupačnim interesom za diskurse i prakse historijskog materializma. Trenutačno se bavi istraživanjem literarnih i vizualnih kultura side. Casarino je autor iznimno inspirativne studije "Modernity at Sea" (2002), ko-urednik je zbornika "Marxism Beyond Marxism" (1996), te prevoditelj Agambenove knjige "Sredstva bez svrhe" na engleski.

re
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tions



Zagreb - Kulturni kapital Europe 3000 otvara se u okviru projekta relacions. Projekt relacions inicirala je njemачka Savezna zaklada za kulturu www.projekt-relacions.de

PONEDJELJAK
28.06. 19.00h
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Simulakrum side

Predavanje se bavi temom simulakruma u Deleuzeovoj Logici misla, u Debordovom "Drustvu spektakla" i Guibertovom "Prijatelju koji mi nije spasio život". Casarino će pokazati kako, s jedne strane, samo simulakrum može računati da se odupre spektaku side, dok, s druge strane deležljanska artikulacija simulakruma mora proći radikalnu metamorfozu kada se suoči sa zadacom bavljenja s nepredstavljivom temom side.

UTORAK
29.06. 19.00h
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Problem ontološke povijesti vremena, ili o metodici Deleuzeov studije o kinu

Deleuzeova studija o kinu započinje provokativnom tvrdnjom: *Cette étude n'est pas une histoire du cinéma*. Ovo se predavanje na početku pita što je posrijedi u takvoj tvrdnji, da bi se na kraju ustvrdilo da je Deleuzeova studija jedna ontološka povijest vremena, slično Foucaultovom poslijednjem, nedovršenom projektu ontološke povijesti seksualnosti.

Vizualni kolegij



srijeda i četvrtak
28. i 29.06. u 20:00

MM Centar

[Savská 25]



[naslov prvog predavanja, 28.06.]

O austrijskoj filmskoj avantgardi **Alexander Horwath**

[naslov drugog predavanja, 29.06.]

Pjevajmo na kiši – Superkinematografija Petera Tscherkasskyja

ALEXANDER HORWATH, ugledni filmski publicist i kurator, direktor Viennalea od 1992.-1997., a od 2002. direktor austrijske kinoteke Österreichisches Filmmuseum, također i susnovni tvrtke za distribuciju i promociju filma austrijskih filmskih Sixpack Film, objavio je veliki broj tekstova i studija u časopisima i knjigama, te bio urednik i su-urednik knjiga koje obuhvaćaju široko filmološko područje.
U sklopu dvodnevnog programa posvećenog utjecajnom pokretu austrijske filmske neovanguardre predstaviti će niz representativnih radova austrijskih filmaša nastalih od 1950-ih do danas, te posebno

izdvojiti umjetničko i teorijsko djelo Petera Tscherkasskya, teoretičara i povjesničara filma, predavača i redatelja, čiji filmovi od kraja 1970-ih do danas, kao jednu od mnogih "strategija preživljavanja" post-avangardnog filma, transkodiraju povijest i teoriju medija u "filmove teorije".

Govorit će o knjigama koje se bave austrijskim avangardnim filmom nastalim prototičkim desetak godina, te predstaviti knjigu o Peteru Tscherkasskiju, koju je uredio zajedno s Michaelom Loebensteinom. Tekst predavanja "Pjevajmo na kiši – Superkinematografija Petera Tscherkasskyja" jedan je od ogleda te knjige.

Realizirano u suradnji s Kulturom promjene SC, Austrijskim kulturnim forumom Zagreb i Sixpack Filmom.



Akira Mizuta Lippit

Barata u Zagrebu

Ne postoje mjesto,
samo svjetovi —
ili o suvremenom
japanskom filmu

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vizualni kolegij




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