



François Laruelle

Dictionary of Non-Philosophy

Translated by Taylor Adkins

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Preface

Non-philosophy is constituted under a double aspect: doctrinal, with the objective appearance of a philosophical type of thought; methodical and disciplinary, with a more theoretical than systematic will of extending its modes of argumentation and its vocabulary to all fundamental knowledges. For these two reasons, it appealed to a dictionary destined to form the pinnacle of theoretical acquisitions, to present the essentials of the technique, and to distinguish parallel, neighboring, or variant thoughts in the midst of which it has developed. In terms of dictionaries, this one has the benefits, insufficiencies, and illusions which are attached to this genre of works—nothing here is added from this order. On the other hand, it is important to emphasize that in virtue of the style proper to non-philosophy, this dictionary presents several particularities:

1. It does not retrace the internal, somewhat hesitant, non-philosophical history of the concepts: it is instead prospective and leads to the elaboration of articles in a theoretical point that often surpasses the *Principles of Non-Philosophy* themselves and is not content with merely specifying them. It is, so to speak, a dictionary for the non-philosophy to come.
2. After the definition of the term and before the explicative commentary, each article reserves a short paragraph destined not to compose the philosophical history of this term but to mark some of the most significant points of this history for us. They are simple indications without erudite pretention, but which each time attempt an interpretation of philosophy as “philosophical Decision.”
3. The vocabulary of non-philosophy is that of philosophy principally, but each term is constantly reworked in its sense, its cut, and sometimes in its signifier. This language is taken from whichever point in the tradition—a toolbox, no doubt, but where the box is itself a tool, where every tool is inseparable from the box. Non-philosophy does not attach itself to a particular tradition, for it is a theory and a pragmatics of all actual or possible philosophy, past or to come. Hence the effects of over-determination, a wide variety of languages required, and a fluidity of “language games,” which is itself a term capable of entering into seemingly non-philosophical, i.e. philosophically contradictory, combinations. This is why the title that names each article is often completed by a parenthesis that specifies the literal form such as it is effectively utilized. Only the most theoretical and most universal vocabulary is called upon here.

Each of the three types of consideration—the non-philosophical definition, the philosophical meanings, the non-philosophical explication—is distinguished from the others simply by typography.

The articles have been proposed by the members of the “Non-philosophy” collectif, collectively discussed, and harmonized by F. Laruelle who has adjusted them on the actual theoretical level of non-philosophy, not without exceeding the latter, as we said. The collaborators are those who make up the “Non-philosophy collectif”: T. Brachet, G. Kieffer, F. Laruelle, L. Leroy, D. Nicolet, A.-F. Schmid, S. Valdinoci.

Lastly, the dictionary is preceded by one of F. Laruelle's essays: "Theory of the Non-Philosophical Dictionary," which the journal *Furor* (1994) in the person of D. Wilhem has had the amicability to let us reprint—amend and lengthen—from the special numero which the former consecrated to Voltaire's philosophical Dictionary for the tricentennial of his birth.

Auto-Position

The highest formal act of the philosophical Decision through which philosophical faith in the real enables the latter to be posited as the Real in an illusory way. It is consequently the real cause of the appearance of philosophy. Auto-position as real of the transcendental Unity proper to philosophy is that which prioritizes the vision-in-One.

The formal trait of auto-position is structural and completely exceeds the presence of this concept in Fichte (Self=Self). Not only the transcendental One—the peak of philosophical knowledge—but whichever concept (cf. Deleuze) is itself posited or is in a state of pairing, doubling, self-survey...Philosophizing is concentrated in the inasmuch and the as [*l'en tant que et le comme*], in the repetition of a more or less differentiated Same. This trait forms a system with philosophy's no less structural debt to perception as its point of departure and to transcending it as its essential organon. Object and objectivity, phenomenological self and disinterested and philosophical self, consciousness of object and self-consciousness, transcendent One and transcendental One, all philosophy repeats itself because it copies itself. This is the activity of philosophical faith and this faith itself.

The vision-in-One supports the specific faith-in-the-real of philosophy, i.e. the philosophical hallucination of the Real. But this support is still nothing but a partial condition which is completed through a different suspension, the unilateralization of the transcendental One, of the divided One of philosophy. This suspension is performed by the transcendental Identity which the vision-in-One clones on the basis of the former. Auto-position (its sufficiency, its desire for mastery, its violence) is annulled while non-philosophical thought renounces every idealism so as to be allowed-to-be determined-in-the-last-instance by the Real. Hence the characterization of non-philosophical *a priori*s as non-auto(decisional, positional, donative, etc.). Concretely, the vision-in-One dismantles the importance of any dyad. The object is seen-in-One or dualized on a noetic and transcendental side and on a noematic content on the other side which is the reduction of this object to the state of occasion.

Being-in-One (Being-According-to-the-One)

In the order of phenomenal instances, Being takes "third" place after the One-in-One and transcendental Identity, or second in the order of the (non-)One, between the One and the equivalent of Being (the experience or given of philosophy): it is the transcendence or non-autopositional Distance of the force (of) thought. If understood in a broad, for example Heideggerian, sense, we shall say that it is decomposed into transcendental Identity and a priori Identity which then correspond to their respective symptoms which are transcendental being or being proper (philosophically convertible with the One) and division or duality which are, for example, the Intelligible (Plato) or Intentionality (Husserl), etc.

Being or more precisely the existent is primarily one of the transcendentals (alongside the one, the multiple, the true, the good, etc.) and the support of the other transcendentals which are its predicates that, as such, are in it by essence.

They add nothing real to it and form ontological knowledge, knowledge without reality if not specularity. When the existent is understood on the basis of the meta- which makes it the *transcendens par excellence* and the meta- thematizes as such in turn, together they form “Being” insofar as it is distinguished or differentiated from the existent now assigned to functions of the empirical pole of ontological Difference. Difference (being of the existent, existent of being [etre de l'etant, etant de l'etre]) is then speculative and ontology is primarily ignorant of the existent fulfilled as speculation. The becoming-speculation of ontology takes on its divided-doubled structure by the meta- which adds nothing to the existent but relates it to itself as existent. This doublet or this auto-position of the existent, and thus also of Being, is the heart of the speculative or non-naive experience of philosophy.

Heidegger tried to reunite in “Being” as ontological Difference (with the existent) the multiple significations and modalities of Being which philosophy had elaborated and dispersed. There is then no concept not only more general and more transcendent, but also more enveloping than that of Being and then its own unity and provenance (sense, truth, locality, etc.). Heidegger confirms the *telos* of every philosophy, even if Being is his principal object (Being qua Being) and its element, even if it is an originary-transcending, an ekstatico-horizontal and temporal opening, a “rift” and “clearing,” (Heidegger), or even a void and a pure multiple (Badiou). A law of essence wills that the concepts of “being” be inseparable from the duality of a division and from a more or less divided, indeed disseminated, horizon; from a multiple and a void without which it is unthinkable. Hence Heidegger’s effort to simultaneously protect nothingness, the void, the nihilist “vapor” and to deliver them from Being by “barring” it in a non-metaphysical way. But nothing of this touches upon philosophy, upon its effort to think itself and discharge itself from the metaphysics which cannot avoid positing Being as a presupposed which has primacy not only over the Existent but also over the One which it affects from its own division, and partially over the Other.

In non-philosophy, the nomination “Being” is still possible but under the reserve of its universalization of-the-last-instance. It only intervenes in the nomination and formulation of non-philosophical instance via a mode of separation or abstraction of the axiomatic type: the One-without-Being, outside-Being, etc. But it is possible to elaborate a “non-ontology” taking general metaphysics and ontology–autoposition, either speculative or not, of Being–for material: a theory of Being such as it is cloned on the basis of Being as such. The instances of which it is the philosophical symptomatic indication decompose the totality of functions which it has fulfilled through becoming: on the one hand pure transcendental Identity, whose symptom is the One as convertible with Being or intricated with it, or ordered in it: on the other hand, *a priori* Identity, i.e. transcending here reduced to its phenomenal nucleus of Exteriority or non-autopositional Distance. Together they are the “force (of) thought” which henceforth takes the place of Being or is Being-in-One.

The most extensive suspension of metaphysical authority is this: Being is determined or given in-the-last-instance-in-One. “In-the-last-instance” because it must be–as force (of) thought–cloned

from philosophical and metaphysical Being. The “question of Being” is attached to philosophy and transformed into a problem capable of resolution according-to-the-One. As non-ontology, non-philosophy secedes from the “first science of Being” or, better yet, radically effectuates it by making of Being-according-to-the-One, and not “as One,” the object of a science in effect first but having lost the priority of metaphysics because this science is “divorced” from the One, which indeed is not the object of a first science but determines it. Finally, the statements of non-ontology, cloned from ontology under the effect of the One-in-One, are knowledges said of Being-in-One-in-the-last-instance or related to the force (of) thought.

(Epistemic, Non-Philosophical) Break

First Science’s mode of constitution as “unified theory” or identity-in-the-last-instance of science and philosophy, distinct from the unitary theory that mixes it in-Unity. The non-philosophical break must be called “epistemic” rather than “epistemological,” for all relations of the logos or epistemological relations arise from a unitary synthesis and break.

Every philosophical Decision programs its break with the previous state of philosophy, science, culture, etc. This break is inscribed in the structure of the philosophical Dyad, then in synthetic or systematic unity itself. It can take on local specified forms according to the doctrines, for example the “rupture” (Bachelard), the “epistemological break” (Althusser), but also the difference-break (Deleuze), the *différance*-break (Derrida), the literal break (Lacan, etc.). This specification depends upon what overdetermines the properly philosophical break (“scientific practice,” the “pathos of distance,” or the affect of Judaic alterity, etc.).

After having elaborated an “epistemic break” separating first Science (of the One) from philosophy, non-philosophy has complicated and displaced this distinction. 1) Every phenomenon of breakage is second in relation to the Real, to the vision-in-One, and not first as in the philosophical Decision. Or, if it is “first,” it is in the radical and not absolute sense of non-philosophy: first operation of thought but not an operation of the Real. The “epistemological break” instead remains under the ultimate authority of philosophy despite the “mobile” force of science’s rupture in relation to ideology, a force that still too simply proceeds from a reversal of hierarchy. 2) Every non-philosophical break discovers its element in the oldest duality of philosophy and the Real, a duality each time articulated by a certain type of foreclosure. 3) To the extent that a break exists in non-philosophy, it is in the same proportion less “first” than equivalent to the *a priori*, and not transcendental, instance that “terminates” the constitution of the force (of) thought. The latter is non-self-positional and non-self-decisional Distance or Exteriority and thus distinguishes itself from the self-decisional decision of philosophy. 4) The non-philosophical decision is determined-in-the-last-instance by the Undecided (of the) Real, whereas philosophy is intricated in the Undecidable (to various degrees of irreducibility). It is what distinguishes a decision, break, or axiomatic-transcendental abstraction from its philosophical forms. 5) The *a priori* break of the non-philosophical type is not that through which non-philosophy globally distinguishes itself from philosophy—this distinction is first of all real, then transcendental and inseparable from the uni-versality of the vision-in-One—but is the organon of this dual distinction.

(Non-Philosophical) Chora

Sense (of) identity of supposedly Real philosophical faith when the vision-in-One transforms it into its correlate (unilate) or gives it its sense (of) identity. The chora is the site through unilateralization that philosophy has become (as identity) by wanting to be equal to the Real (still not as transcendental unity). It is the phenomenon or given-without-giveness (of) this real hallucination.

Chora designates the spatial emplacement, or better yet the receptacle, indeed the *prima materia* through which it ends up being confused with Chaos, thus generating the dialectic of the One and the Multiple developed from that of the One and Being. Chora is the site of a pure multiplication: after its idealist reduction, when chaos becomes sensible diversity, the chora becomes its transcendental condition as spatiality, indeed, for certain philosophers, a name for a particular mixture of the transcendental and empirical, the...feminine.

The vision-in-One is the Given, it gives-without-giveness. Its first correlate (it should be said: its first uni-late) is that which it extracts or manifests from the first object to which it is opposed and which is philosophy: not as doctrine or system, but as faith-in-the-real that finally supposes itself to be the Real. Philosophy is not the only site of its doctrines and all existents, a universal site, it is the total site, that which envelops itself and which can thus only believe itself to be the Real or the absolute Site, including its self-knowledge. The vision-in-One can only exclude this belief or more precisely back up its supposed validity. But it gives it also without giveness under the form it extracts, that of an identity or a sense (of) identity which is that (of) this Site. The theoretical illusion, the supposed validity is supported but not the materiality of this belief consubstantial with philosophy. We shall call chora not this Site spontaneously aware of itself, but that which the vision-in-One sees of this pretention, including the reduced identity (of the) philosophical Site. This chora is not an emplacement of the spatial order in the manner of the philosophical imagination. It is the instance which, in the order of the sense (of) identity (of the "noema"), determines-in-the-last-instance the other philosophical contents (more specific and constituting the structure of the philosophical Decision) as at least given-in-One and reduced to their sense (of) identity. The One thus determines through its acting a more originary or more transcendental site equally foreign to every topo-logy, where the World and its contents, the Authorities, and the philosophical Decisions themselves come to be emplaced.

As an expression of being-separated/given from the One, the chora is "unilateralized," it is a non-self-positional position (of) the World, impossible to be dialectized or topologized, to be scanned by a transversal gaze. The One is in effect indifferent to what it determines due to the fact that it determines it in-the-last-instance and through its being-foreclosed. The chora is the absence of every reciprocal determination, every unitary correlation of contraries, every sufficient philosophy. It is more than an *a priori*: if the Real is nowhere, utopic, it finally gives a real Site (in-the-last-instance...) to philosophy which no longer magically springs from the head of the latter but where it finds its emplacement. Instead of constituting an (anti-)thetic *a priori* susceptible to being-coupled, which would only be at the price of some "infinite task" or "différance" with its philosophical contrary within some unitary dyad of the One and the Other, the chora is the extreme counterpart of the Vision-in-One, that which, without forming a relation or correlation but a unilation, "faces" it after philosophical faith. It defines the object of the world *par excellence*; it is even its first determination.

(Non-Philosophical) Definition

Identity-in-the-last-instance of a proper name and a first term.

The definition posits the equivalence of a “word” and a combination of other words such that they explain the signification of the first. The theory of the definition is historically rich and complex, passing through Pascal, Leibniz, Gergonne. The important works of the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century pertaining to numbers and sets of numbers have enabled specifying the characteristics of definitions through abstraction and inductive definitions above all: works pertaining to the concept of distance in geometry have explicated the so-called definition through postulates. Definitions can be classified either according to a “structural” point of view, according to how they bear upon an individual (“nominal” definitions), or how they bear upon a structure or a property (definition “through postulates”); either according to a more metaphysical criterion, according to how they give the rule of production of what they define (“real” definitions), or how they are admitted as purely conventional (“nominal” definitions”). This double acceptance of the nominal definition has enabled the most complex passages in the tradition between the individual, the real, and the conventional.

The definition does not enjoy in non-philosophy the same role as in philosophy, where its functioning as conventional equivalence supposes the unitary closure of the system. Non-philosophy posits the identity-in-the-last-instance of the individual and the philosophical system, or better yet of the conventional and the effective, its problem not being of knowing if a definition is pertinent or not for the Real. It dualizes the classical definitions by affirming the identity-in-the-last-instance of two heterogeneous functions, the name of the One and the first term. It thus assures the non-formalist character of the transcendental axiomatic, the first term being obtained by rules of transformation on the basis of relatively autonomous materials that are philosophical, ethical, aesthetic, technical, mystical, etc.

The non-philosophical definition functions on the transcendental level which does not affect the One but is said according to it for the occasion of an “Existent” which is related to it in-the-last-instance. It thus participates in the contingency of this Existent, but it is conventional to the extent that it is a name according to identity. It is as a name according to the One and its clones that it is implicit, only being explicit via the way in which the first term and its conceptual symbol are obtained. The non-philosophical definition thus receives something of the opacity and mystery of the One. It does not deny the philosophical definition but emplaces it in effectivity by giving it a new function: no longer simply giving a signification to the functioning of a quasi-closed system, but enabling a dictionary from one philosophy to another cut out from translations between various systems. This magnification of the philosophical definition by the implicit definition of non-philosophy is one of the elements that contributes to non-philosophical poetics and “artificial philosophy.” A dictionary of non-philosophy makes use of this generalization of classical definitions because it sets off from philosophical material; but it also entrusts them with an implicit function which no effectivity can account for.

Democracy (Democracy-of-Strangers)

Internal form of non-philosophical thought as unified theory of philosophy and a particular region. Here democracy is not an object of thought or reflection but the essence of knowledges produced by the force (of) thought or in-the-last-instance by the vision-in-One which assures against the transcendental equality of unified terms against every form of hierarchy. Non-philosophy is a transcendental theory of human multitudes in a manner through which humans of-the-last-instance are em-bodied [en-corps], but it takes for material philosophical inequality in general and in particular the ego-xenological Difference typical of philosophy.

The philosophical Decision, when it studies politics and more particularly democracy, poses the question of the relation established between individuals, but on the grounds of the World or the City, and as belonging to the World. This relation signals the reciprocity among parties and the appearance of equality bound to reciprocity. Thus, historically speaking, modern democracy is imposed by the idea of a social contract (Rousseau). In general, the problem of democracy is tied to that of the management of contractual and intersubjective situations. Certainly, the structure of the problem will be different according to whether one proceeds from Greco-European being-in-the-world (Heidegger) or from the “Most-High” (Levinas) of the Other. The democratic question of the contract, and which is more of a social bond, can be complexified into that of a communicational action (Habermas), that of grand anti-nihilistic politics (Nietzsche), or that of a political overdetermination of the last instance (Althusser). But in every philosophical scenario, equality through reciprocity or difference implies philosophical hierarchy as the most “abstract” equality subtending the spirit of inequality proper to philosophy. Philosophy, or the “thought-world,” is an objective democratic appearance and a real anti-democracy.

The philosophers’ political thought mimics human struggles and thus can only explain them. The problem of a philosophy of democracy no longer makes rigorous human sense. A mode of non-hierarchized and non-anarchic democracy presupposes a unilateral duality: I...am (and not “is”), thus I am an Other, a democratic multitude, a Stranger. The Stranger is not the Other encountered in the space of the World or as Infinite, but myself in-the-last-instance. This is the transcendental organon of the World and the absolute condition of democracy.

The Stranger “makes” the void; it transcendently anesthetizes every type of conditioning (psychological, sociological). The void is also fully positive, as identity of universal law, which is itself in the flesh. The content of this void is precisely a transcendental multitude, a non-autopositional democracy. Completely understood, democracy, which neither acts on the logological center nor on the margins or inequalities, destabilizes and utilizes authoritarian autopositions henceforth made secondary. The theoretico-pragmatic human-in-the-last-instance is substituted for the violence of the democratic State and its philosophical expression.

Desire (non-desiring (of) self)

Designates, for non-psychoanalysis, the side of reality of jouissance, itself determined by the Real or Enjoyed-without-enjoyment [Joui-sans-jouissance]. Deprived of its philosophical essence of self-desire or desire of the Other's desire, it loses its determining role which philosophy through Plato and psychoanalysis through Lacan granted it.

Desire, at least when it's not understood, as in the classical, notably Thomist tradition, as a mask of the will or, in Kant, as having its destination in the latter which would constitute its superior form, is often defined as the essence of man: either under its simple form (Spinoza), or under the reflected or duplicated form of a desire-of-desire (Kojève), or finally under the triadic form mediated by representation (Plato, Girard). In the desire of Hegelian recognition, "the two fall together as three," because recognition is created in relation to the Idea of man intervening in the third position among animals that are mistrusted, being understood that Hegelian desire is the consequence of life.

In psychoanalysis, desire is itself triadic since it is advisable to discern here, either in Freud, the representation of the affect (desire itself differing from the one as well as the other, representation not being libidinal as such and anxiety, for example, consisting in a non-desired and even undesirable affect); or in Lacan, the object of the cause. The cause of desire is the castration of the "subject;" the object is contingent. Desire "not giving up on its desire" (Lacan) founds the ethics of psychoanalysis.

Verdiglione and Deleuze, in different directions, dissociate desire and castration: the former, because he situates desire and jouissance (whose condition is castration) on opposed sides of the unconscious; the latter, because he rejects law and castration in general, affirms the plenitude of desire identified with creativity and subtracts it from the lack to which, on the contrary, he submits all psychoanalysis.

"Non-analytic" desire is "simplified" since it finds its non-Platonic essence in the nonautopositional transcendence of jouissance or affect of the Other in the sense that non-philosophy intends; like it, desire has its condition in the Enjoyed or Real-of-the-last-instance. Its transcendence constitutes it into the desire (of) the Other. The way in which Lacan grasps it is a redundant structure; indeed the desire (of) desire testifies not only to his affiliation with Kojève but also to the structure of the philosophico-analytic mixture in general where the philosophy of desire obviously has a privileged place. Desire can only escape from philosophical and psychoanalytic authority if its cause is no longer the Real as lack or castration, but the Enjoyed-without-enjoyment insofar as it determines it in-the-last-instance.

In fact, desire finds its identity in jouissance with the syntax which is the property of the Unconscious. This identity defetishizes it and dismantles its relation with repetition, *différance*, the letter, and the symbolic as it has been advanced by the restrained deconstruction which sets its post-Lacanist in the Idea of a constitutive Alterity and a One insufficient to itself via the

mode of an “I desire, thus You Enjoy.” Its setting in relation with its essence of the non-autopositional Other dismantles the circle of desire and liberates thought from phantasmatic desire: enjoyed loss—thus Freud designates it—of the hallucinatory object of satisfaction. A loss which neither grounds an identifying “hysteria” nor a traditional lack of desire (in aphanisis), nor the unconscious insistence on incest as in schizoanalysis. Desire is not desiring (of) self or (of) the desire-of-the-Other by its essence; it is instead a clone enjoyed-in-the-Real, even if it is cloned from philosophico-analytic desire.

Determination-in-the-last-instance (DLI)

Central concept, along with the One-in-One, of non-philosophy that distinguishes it from all philosophies. It is said of the causality proper to the One as such or vision-in-One, of the Real in virtue of its primacy over thought and its object (like Being). This causality exerts itself upon what is given as non(-One) and serves as experience or data for thought-according-to-the-One: philosophy itself as form-experience of the World; and upon the universal noematic structures or theoretical knowledge that is extracted by it from this material. It is therefore also the specific causality of non-philosophy in general. This concept has a Marxist origin and is here extracted from historical Materialism, transferred and radicalized into first Science or according to the One which gives it its radical sense and enables its full employment (it should rigorously be called: givenness-in-the-last-instance).

The DLI only has stifled attempts in philosophy whose most complete concept of causality is the category of reciprocal Determination, decisive for philosophical systems with its immediate modes (reciprocity, convertibility, reversibility, systematicity) and its more remote mediate modes, the four forms of causality distinguished by Aristotle, which themselves instead arise from the causality of Being (efficient, final, formal, material) than from the One. The Real which is not Being thus has its original mode of efficacy, whereas thought-according-to-the-One or non-philosophy distinguishes itself from the DLI of every ontology and simultaneously excludes, at least in its essence, finality, formalism, materialism, and technologism.

The DLI is not simply an immanent causality but radical immanence itself—which distinguishes it from every “Spinozistic” immanence or every immanence derived from Spinozism. Reciprocal determination and the DLI are distinguished in many ways. 1) In the first case, causality is divided between two terms (cause and effect) which belong to a set or an ontological or ontico-ontological couple; in the second case it is attributed to one of these alone: the effect then supposes an objective or passive, merely occasional “receptacle” of this causality. 2) This occasion is already reduced to the moment when it manifests itself, in return deprived of determinant or real action. The DLI thus supposes a unilateral, non-reciprocal duality of causes. 3) In the first case, causality goes in two opposed yet circular or infinitely convergent directions (action/reaction; real opposition; dialectical contradiction; differential relations of two terms, etc.); and, in the second case, causality goes in a single direction (from the Real towards the effectivity of the thought-world; from immanence towards transcendence). 4) In the first case, it supposes an alienating continuity and an identification of the cause in a supposedly given other

term; in the second, cause is not alienated in its effect but supposes, being nothing but a universal negative condition, a functional transcendental instance which is that through which the Real can be said to act.

This rigorously irreversible character excludes that it is a question of a “linear” causality, “mechanistic” causality always being de jure irreversible and dialectizable by philosophy, as if by showing it the constant philosophical reinterpretations of historical Materialism which are so many re-normalizations. The necessity of the DLI is understood through the essence of the One: how can a radical immanence, which does not escape from itself or alienate itself, act upon an exteriority or a non(-One)? There is no causality of the One to answer for a cause or an occasional exteriority. If therefore and for example a thought adequate to the One or according-to-the-Real must exist, then it will necessarily be rejected outside of the One itself or outside of its essence without the latter alienating itself in this representation. This rejection is the primitive form of deduction: if a non(-One) exists, then it comes, either it or its clones, radically after the One itself of which it can only constitute a premise. The support for this argument is the radical immanence of the One which is here not simply its essence, which one could survey and treat as an object, but the performed point of view where the argumentation and what argues (the One itself in-the-last-instance) are enclosed together. When the One is taken as a point of view for a thought which can only emanate or proceed from it, then this thought is posited after the One at the same time as its material and that which has already supported the efficacy of the One. “Last-instance” signifies that the One is the real unique cause despite the distance of the effect or the mediations that separate it from the One: a cause that reasoning or description never abandons and does not objectify surreptitiously by setting it in a face-to-face (= dyad) with another given. The latter is always-already proved through the One or “in-One”—it is the radical performativity of immanence—or has always-already sustained its efficacy. Vision-in-One and DLI describe the same phenomenon. We shall thus say of the One and every given = X: the One and X are not the Same but only identical in-the-last-instance. Non-philosophy’s destruction of the universal pretensions of philosophy’s Parmenidian matrix guarantees the radical autonomy of the One and the relative autonomy of the thought-world. The DLI is the causality of philosophically unforeseeable (non-definable and non-demonstrable) theoretical and pragmatic emergence.

What should be understood now by this rejection or foreclosure outside the One and by the One of every given = X and thought in particular? The efficacy of the DLI is double: 1) it invalidates or suspends theoretical authority (claims to knowledge of the Real) of form-philosophy as circularity (variously open and distended according to the philosophy): it is unilateralization in the narrow sense of the word; 2) it inscribes the mark of the One or Identity upon the content or diversity of form-philosophy itself (its material): this is unidentification. This vision of form-philosophy “in” and “after” the One, which remains in itself without identifying with its object, is the “cloning” of non-philosophy on the basis of the latter. Cloning expresses itself through various operations or operator rules that make it equivalent to radical Identity in the core of the philosophical Decision (its dyadic duality of terms and its unity, the tissue of relations, thetic and autopoitional disjunctions and syntheses, etc. which internally structure it). This quasi-operator side of the One can be called noetic, even though it does not exert itself through any intentionality of consciousness. It consists in relating every given to the One-of-the-last-instance and to describe its being-lived or its (transcendental, aprioritic) identities thus cloned from it. On the other hand, we shall call noematic the phenomenal state of affairs that is grasped when it is

reduced to its sense (of) identity (*philosophy* ["la" philosophie]), i.e. sense of occasion and foreclosure of the Real. This sense of form-philosophy as grasped in-identity takes on different forms according to the levels or moments considered in form-philosophy. The DLI is not, for example, exclusive of the noetico-noematic duality, but only of its origin in consciousness or Being and its aspect of infinitely reversible bi-lateral correlation

(Non-phenomenological or non-autopositional) Distance

Non-autopositional a priori extracted from the autopositional transcendence of philosophy constituting the last noetic determination of the force (of) thought or the subject-Stranger.

The concept of distance functions as a general rule in an implicit way along the interior of "philosophical distinctions;" for example, the distinction of the given that imposes itself upon the establishment of a philosophy (the "present," the "contemporary," the "inauthentic," etc.) and the empirical that agrees with "its" transcendental. It is a critical concept (via the distinction of specific spaces, the philosophical theories of geometrical space always being the result of the superposition of various sensible, geometric, physical, Euclidean, non-Euclidean spaces) and synthetic (which re-articulates the divisions of the empirical and therefore the site of every schematism). From the point of view of aesthetic reason, distance is presupposed by metaphor and the cancelation of metaphor in catachresis. It is the protection a philosophy grants itself through the rhetoric against an overly individuated style. From the point of view of practical reason, there exists a distance, never completely identifiable or known, that separates us not only from inauthentic values but also from their cause, radical evil. Post-Husserlian phenomenology has made explicit use of the minimal "phenomenological distance" given by phenomena or representations (Max Scheler, Michel Henry) in the "return to the things themselves." Deconstructionists have exacerbated the necessity of distance over the non-topological mode of deference or *différance*, particularly under the form of metaphor of metaphor, thus revealing that no distance is evaluable along the interior of philosophy (topology) or in its margins, but that it is "unavoidable" in order to understand the "gestures" of the latter (its mixtures, its distinctions, its operations).

The Real as Given-without-giveness excludes any "phenomenological distance" and its modes (nothingness, distinction, division, transcendence, alterity, etc.). It radically limits the philosophical importance of distance. Even the determination-in-the-last-instance of philosophy proceeds without recourse to it. It only appears as noesis (in the structure of the force (of) thought) and noema (in the correlate—"unilate"—of this structure) which correspond to transcendence as the essence of philosophizing and more particularly the essence of apriority, obviously via the non-autopositional mode. It is then determined-in-the-last-instance by the Real and takes on the noetic form of a "non-phenomenological distance" deprived of its autopositional doublet. It is designated in general as non-autopositional Exteriority or Distance (NAP-D) and

creates the *a priori* element that contributes to the force (of) thought or that gives it its character as organon.

(Non-autopositional) Drive

Other name for the force (of) thought as organon of the One and for its action of a pragmatic nature on the World or philosophy-material.

The notion of “drive” is consecrated by psychoanalysis rather than its philosophico-psychological equivalents (as tendency, and notably an altruistic tendency with Maurice Pradines). In psychoanalysis, it is a question of a “borderline” concept which Freud situates at the limit of the psychic and the somatic, if it is not elsewhere in metapsychological mythology. In every case, the most exact equivalent of drive (sexual/death) would be the physical image-concept of force, itself valorized by Freud. It would no longer be interesting, from this perspective, to ask what would a drive become, in the psychoanalytic sense, if it were no longer understood as a force in the sense of pre-relativistic imagery, but as a field: perhaps, as certain analysts have suggested, a function (of repression or resistance).

The force (of) thought (or drive in the first forms of non-philosophy) takes its character of force/drive from its cloned nature (not clone of the One but of the World as seen-in-One). The clone is not distinct from the One, it is the universality of the One effectuated by a givenness. Therefore, it is itself through one of its aspects One-in-One, radical immanence. Consequently, the clones in question here—transcendental and *a priori* instances—are radical immanence on one of their “faces;” on the other, they are primarily relation-without-relation (transcendental) to the World, and, secondly, relation of transcendence or (aprioritic) exteriority to this same World. The force (of) thought is intrinsically an action, a pragmatics of the thought-world. This drive is deprived of negativity or representativity and ignores the play of forces as well as the functions which engage in transcendence or in the logico-real order. It constitutes thought or reason in an action without principle, but not without cause, and “attains” the World in its identity. This is not an immediate given but rather a given-without-givenness of action as the ultimate transcendental residue of activity as mediation. The One is effectuated as pulsional. Drive [pulsion] is the Other or the Unconscious, whereas in its psychoanalytic sense, drive is the mark of the Other.

Dual

Fundamental matrix of non-philosophy that defines a general order founded upon the being-foreclosed of the One and the generator of irreversibility and unilaterality between the experience of the immanence of the One and the object to which it is foreclosed, the World. Whereas the dual is still not unilateral duality (which sets cloning in play), it is opposed par excellence to the mixture as form of philosophy founded upon reversibility and reciprocity.

The dual exists via several attempts in logic and in algebra. It is also attempted and missed by philosophy via the form of a dyad between man and world, being and non-being, being and nothingness, etc. But these contraries are unified in a synthesis or a unity. Phenomenology tried to elucidate it through the idea of a parallelism between noesis and noema. Nevertheless, this Husserlian form only divides the duality of the subject and the object by internalizing it and replicating it. The set forms two pairs of terms that cannot avoid redundancy: on the one hand, the subject-object pair of the natural attitude; on the other hand, the noesis-noema pair of the reduced transcendental attitude. Trying to surpass a so-called natural duality, Husserl doubles the dual function through the heroic synthesis of these two elements in a noetico-noematic correlation that simulates radical immanence. Thus, there are in philosophy certain attempts to explain the concept of dual; but these initiatives fall short because the duality of the two terms is always thought according to a reciprocity, to the reversible limit, and not according to a more originary foreclosure. The One and the World are neither distinguished really as two terms radically “separated” by a foreclosure, nor unilateralized by the specific causal relationship that follows from them, that of the determination-in-the-last-instance. The structural mode of the philosophical Decision, despite certain attempts at unilaterality (Difference), is on the contrary that of the unitary or reversible (reciprocal, convertible) unity of contraries.

The dual is a key concept for non-philosophy that allows it to distinguish itself from philosophy. First, it signifies the existence not of a double givenness but of the duality of the given-without-givenness and givenness: of the One and the mixture of the World. This “duality” of experiences prior to any synthesis and unitary analysis is formulated in terms of foreclosure: the given-without-givenness is foreclosed to the givenness-of-the-given, and the latter in turn forecloses it in another, less originary way.

The dual therefore implies an “epistemic” break between non-philosophy and philosophy. Not only in its way of thinking (according to the real-One or man), but also in its will to liberate the essence of thought. Through its real and transcendental essence, non-philosophy is not decidable by philosophy; it possesses a “radical,” somewhat relative autonomy of thought that it inherits from the non-sufficiency of its cause.

Finally, the dual engenders an order characterized by its irreversibility. It orders the duality of man or its instances in a relation of unilaterality. This relation of causality is formulated in terms of determination-in-the-last-instance or “unilateral duality.” It enables the reduction of philosophy to the state of contingent given occasion, thus a non-philosophical science of philosophy. By situating the real site of the different protagonists (science, philosophy...), the dual introduces an opening of uni-versal thought ordered in the Real alone.

It is important to distinguish between the dual, duality, and dualism. The dual, having a real essence, excludes dualism as a philosophico-religious decision in transcendence. (Unilateral) duality is established between the World-occasion and the clones of the Real, but not with the One itself. Lastly, dualism supposes a duality or a first syntax, thus a philosophical position.

Essence (of) science (*the Science*)

One of the objects of first Science or unified Theory of thought; that by which it is a theory of science and not simply a theory of philosophy; that by which it distinguishes itself also from the philosophical reduction of science to its knowledges.

Philosophy only recognizes science or sciences under the classical, i.e. metaphysical form of essence (Plato; Husserl: the Idea of science); then under the nihilistic or degraded forms of an essence that denies itself: sciences as formations of power-knowledge (Foucault); as microsocieties in a laboratory, objects of a sociology; as techno-sciences, reduced to the technical and losing their theoretical specificity; as formula: “science does not exist, only sciences exist,” etc. Via all these modes, even the most vulgar, philosophy still claims to dictate the essence of science in-itself.

First Science or unified Theory of science and philosophy proposes, among other tasks, to determine the science-essence [essence (of) science] of the sciences. Such an object is thus not philosophical. It forms the hypothesis, also of the “unified” type, scientific as well as philosophical, that this science-essence is distinct from any essence of the simply philosophical type, for it finds in the real-One the cause that determines it in-the-last-instance. To this end, it requires the philosophy of the sciences or epistemologies, but simply as occasion or material. Philosophy only posits an essence produced and masterable by itself, denying science any scientifically recognizable essence, requiring the remainder of the regional knowledges or empirical theories to isolate their processes of production and to serve as supports for the essence of substitution that it projects onto the sciences. Non-philosophy is the refusal of this operation; it radically distinguishes between the essence (of) science (as a science itself it is able to determine it in its specific nature) and the knowledges it produces in its observation. The essence (of) science is thus no longer this mixture of local knowledges that philosophy and the ontological decision reifies or fetishizes, because from Plato to Heidegger it has projected itself onto the sciences, denying any autonomy to the latter and devoting them to their nihilist destiny foreign to thought in its identity.

First Science has a guiding formula in common with the philosophy-of-science: “the science of science in general” (Fichte), indeed “absolute science” containing the foundations of the other sciences (Husserl). But while philosophy and epistemology circularly interpret the relation of the science-subject and the object-subject by reducing the latter to facts of knowledge, first Science discovers the object that hides or suppresses this formula and that philosophy does not see because it cannot: “the science of identity or essence (of) science.” It reestablishes the real object of a theory of science and reduces the philosophical or epistemological mixtures to the state of material which helps it determine, this time via operations of a “unified” type, the identity that science comprises. The latter is thus no longer one of these abstract generalities with which epistemology surveys [survole] the sciences and claims to safeguard their essence while simply annihilating it.

The essence (of) science appears under two associated forms. From the side of the Real, it appears as force (of) thought insofar as it is the identity-in-the-last-instance of theory (science)

and pragmatics (philosophy), whereas the force (of) thought is not subject-(of/for)-science without being subject-(of/for)-philosophy. From the side of the object, it appears as identity or sense (of) identity of the philosophy of the sciences or even epistemo-logical Difference, etc.

Europanalysis

Phenomenological method of auto-analysis in the Internal (One). Neighboring doctrine of non-philosophy, also referred to the One but through other axioms which understand it as Internal. These axioms do not form a non-phenomenology or a non-philosophy of phenomenology but posit the possibility of a thought and a language of the One (and not simply according to the One).

Every philosophical investigation concerning the concept of Europe—not to mention its corresponding mythologies—, including that of Husserl, constitutes “Europe-philosophy,” i.e. a synthetic—not analytic—mode of approach of this same concept, and must be overcome.

The point of—non-methodological—departure for europanalysis (S. Valdinoci) is the immanence of impression. Together these notions separate it from phenomenology—which is justifiably nothing but a methodology—and from empiricism. These notions both in fact rest upon the concept of interior completely foreign, for example, to Hume. Furthermore, indifferent to the break of inside and outside, the internal—immanent and impressive—determines a new regime of thought, for example concave or opposed to the convexity of philosophy.

If philosophy is a thought-space marked by perceptual duality, it is a question of passing from perception—and from the conception with which it pairs—to endoception, a fundamental europanalytic notion. Endoception as internal intuition is tact without contact or without spatial distantiation, a disidealized intuition without chora, which sees itself replaced by internal chaos. Here Identity becomes a complex Identity receiving an internal Universe—certainly distinct from the cosmological Universe as well as Schellingian psychocosmism. Open, fractured, or fractalized Identity, it offers itself to method, zigzagging as representation of the unrepresentable by means of an impressive language transmissible within all mankind.

The hypothesis of an impressive language or an internal speech leads to affirming the identity of the analysis bearing upon the real and the autoanalysis of the real, or precisely “immense man.” Europanalysis skirts alongside psychoanalysis, for which everything is also internal since the latter abstracts from the sexual drive.

Europanalysis declares itself distinct from and complementary to non-philosophy to the extent that, far from claiming to be a first science where the syntax of language is detached by the foreclosure of the real, it endeavors a prescience or a genealogy of science by means of an impressive language. Moreover, by affirming, as analytical induction, the identity of the last instance of givenness and reduction, it overcomes one of the *a priori*s of formal ontology; on the other hand, radicalizing the concept of One-Multiple obtained by the fractalization of generalized deconstruction, it incorporates the Other in the One, which has become the Open by

integralization. Indifferently, at the limit: Opening of Universe or effect, Opening of Man or affect. An ultimate difference then certainly separates europanalysis from an idealist philosophy: this is because, recusing the concept of synthesis, it does not endeavor the autogiveness of an absolute Opening which had also rejected it under the name of the signifier, so much the less that it admits language as external relation into psychoanalytic alterity.

Experimentation

Effectuation of the system of hypotheses of non-philosophy by the object “philosophy” as reduced to the state of occasion (symptomatic indication, nomination, cloning). The experimentation of non-philosophy neither verifies nor falsifies it, but effectuates it as “simple” hypothesis determined-in-the-last-instance by the Real.

An experimental thought only exists by excess or passages to the limit: Hegel experiments with but idealizes experience according to Kant and extracts a dialectic of the Logos from transcendental appearance. Heidegger, reading Kant, experimented with the ontological status of temporality on the basis of the experience of inner sense. Philosophy, correlating the hypothesis and experimentation in a mixture, renders them convertible at the limit, finally knowing neither the one nor the other or ignoring them in their identity. Despite the epistemological discussions on the necessity or non-necessity and status of experimentation, the sciences offer a more solid conception of experimentation. In effect, after the concept of “crucial experience” (Bacon)—still philosophical—has been relativized, the sciences proceed by permanent experimentation either in a goal of verification or falsification.

While non-philosophy conserves the identity of the hypothesis form and prevents it from philosophically converting with the Real, either by verification (logical empiricism), or by falsification (critical epistemology), or by absolute identification (Hegel, Nietzsche, for example), it conserves the necessity and relative autonomy of experimentation. But it suspends the philosophical sense of these latter: the experience (here philosophy) is necessary but limited to its function of occasion, material, symptom, etc. There is no transcendental philosophy outside the field of philosophy as its object, but the transcendental is no longer determined in its essence even by this object (the “occasional” cause).

Experimentation indeed has effects of verification and falsification for non-philosophy, more exactly for its previous hypotheses as investments in another philosophical material. But contrary to what happens with philosophical hypotheses, it does not realize those of non-philosophy but effectuates them in their conditions of existence without alienating them. It respects and thus confirms the status of non-philosophy to be a valid hypothesis because it is determined—and protected—in-the-last-instance by the vision-in-One. When transcendental thought is ordered in the Real, it demands more than ever an experimentation relative to its conditions of existence (against Platonism and its “digression,” Kant), but more than ever resists it and does not progressively fall into it. It affirms the unilateral duality of the transcendental and the empirical, of the force (of) thought and of experimentation, and thus avoids the epistemological (positivist, critical, etc.) and philosophical (realist, idealist, “absolute,” etc.) solutions which are all founded on their *de jure* convertibility (with a verification, a falsification, a rectification close...to a

“labor” of adequation). By making experimentation pass from its epistemological status to its “occasional” status, it liberates it from philosophical idealism simultaneously as it liberates the transcendental from the empirico-transcendental circle.

First Name

Symbolic element of the transcendental axiomatic, formed on the basis of a philosophical concept and entering into the constitution of the axioms that describe the One.

A first term is that which resists every regression according to Aristotle’s demand. One can relate it to other terms either by definition or by a system of principles. In philosophy, first terms can give the hope of breaking the circularity of the commencement and at least to introduce an appearance of deductive rigor in it against its “hermeneutic” penchant: which can include the cogito as axiom belonging to a quasi-mathematical order of reasons; or the first notions posited by Spinozist definitions. But these attempts arise from an ontological axiomatic to the extent that every philosophy remains structured like a metaphysics. These terms thus in fact remain intuitive (intellectual intuition) and can at any moment be re-introduced into the philosophical circle of the given and the demonstrated, of premises and consequences.

When a term no longer results from a conceptual and metaphysical abstraction but a really-axiomatic abstraction (somewhat non-formal), i.e. when it is related to the One-in-One in-the-last-instance, employed on the basis of the philosophical concept by the force (of) thought, referred to this intuitive usage of the concept but deprived of its philosophical sense, it is “formalized” and “symbolized” in a transcendental and first manner *par excellence*. The first terms of non-philosophy, which principally describe the One and the subject-force (of) thought, are first both due to their uniquely axiomatic abstraction and due to their transcendental status.

These are first names, but only in-the-last-instance, even when they are said of the One, the Real, etc. There are no—save in onto-theo-logy—absolutely proper names, but radically proper or proper in-the-last-instance alone. Even though by their occasion or philosophical extraction they have an aspect of representational content, regional-and-fundamental, but by their real essence—their identity (of) concept, non-conceptual identity—they are indifferent to philosophical hierarchies and to the deconstruction or dissemination of the latter. With an equal intraphilosophical interpretation, which restores it to the transcendental and finally to the “One,” which it can always serve to describe, any philosophical concept whatsoever can be treated as a first name and inserted into the axioms. In this sense, first names result from the cloning of words from philosophy by the One-of-the-last-instance. These are no longer mixtures of language and Being said of the metaphysical One in the signboard of the reversibility of words and things. They no longer designate the inherence of the referent within the word either from the point of view of performativity (analytic philosophies) or from the point of view of the “mystical” (Wittgenstein). They result from a usage that could be called “mystical-in-the-last-instance,” according to the One and not simply when they are said of the One. These proper or first names arise from a

transcendental and uni-versal pragmatics which produces them as non-conceptual symbols on the basis of conceptual material.

Force (of) thought (existing-subject-Stranger)

Organon or means through which the One can enact or possess a causality without being alienated in the material of its action. Instance which is not real like the One but produced through cloning. Transcendental and aprioritic, it has its real essence in the One without adding or subtracting anything to the Real itself which determines it in-the-last-instance to a local occasion.

Marxism recognizes an equivalent concept which it places at the foundation of historical Materialism: labor power [*la force de travail*]. This is an energetic concept of human energy which only exists in the personality of the worker and which is irreducible to his functions or operations, to work output or expended. This concept is necessary so as to transform the object of work into exchange value and is thus creative of value. According to the plan of the Marxist systematic, it articulates the Marxian ontology of the individual and the theory of capitalism. Nietzsche and Deleuze propose an idea of thought as a symptom of forces, establishing its cause in a differential play of multiple forces rather than in a Real-of-the-last-instance.

Whether idealist or materialist, philosophy recognizes “*thought*” [*la-pensée*] as a continuously differentiated generality beginning from an empirical tracing of the faculties (intuition, understanding, reason, and finally philosophy itself as objective auto-reflection). In its concepts of thought, philosophy is content to idealize, sublimate, or critique an image of thought. Under its most ethereal forms, it conforms to its origins and internalizes a final intuitive content, topological in the best case, which reifies or thingifies it into an ontic element or into a transcendental imagination, at best. Philosophy is nothing but the mobilization of this inertia or this substantialization which continues to burden its experience of thought and which at best proceeds to the “act” (Fichte, Nietzsche, Husserl), or to the Unthought (Heidegger), but never to the Real which determines thought in-the-last-instance as force (of) thought.

In opposition to the gregarious generality of “*thought*,” non-philosophy discovers the content of the latter to be foreclosed by philosophical authority. The force (of) thought is the first possible experience of thought—after the vision-in-One which is not itself a thought—and a defetishizing experience. Whereas “*thought*” is a fetishized and auto-factualized generality, susceptible of circulating among all philosophies and all their objects and dimensions—in the manner of an abstract exchange or a common sense—the force (of) thought is the reality of thought insofar as the former is not alienated in the latter or in its historico-philosophical forms. Under the dependence of the vision-in-One in-the-last-instance, but only from its practice, it transforms the material of philosophical statements and particularly the datum of the images of thought so as to give them the scientifico-transcendental (“unified”) sense of non-philosophical knowledges.

The force (of) thought is a complex concept. The One cannot act of itself, for only Being or

Transcendence can act upon philosophical material, i.e. a universal exteriority which is employed by the organon for the One. Since the force (of) thought serves to determine Being itself on the basis of experience, there is a circle, but this circle must be understood as that which is characteristic of the *a priori* and which is broken with the transcendental. In effect, Being is the *a priori* which structures every theory produced by thought and which, as such, is itself presupposed in its existence, but the transcendental Identity which precedes it and which makes of the force (of) thought a transcendental subject in its radical manner puts an end to this circularity because it is a clone entirely produced “under” One or “according to” the One. The force (of) thought contains two constituents: transcendental Identity and aprioritic Identity, the latter being directly open to experience. Why “force?” Nothing here is either mechanical or energetic: it is called “force” because the transcendental Identity, cloned according to the One, concretely effectuates—thanks to the occasion of philosophy and its transcendental identity—the immanent universality of the vision-in-One. The latter, because it is turned-towards...the World or given to...that which it gives, is for that a force, but still “negative” or in-effectuated. Transcendental Identity is necessary in order to effectuate this real or immanent uni-versality and to make it the transcendental force which is thought.

Formal Ontology (uni-versalized transcendental Logic)

Equivalent of transcendental Logic (under its “analytic” aspect) generalized under the universal conditions of the vision-in-One. It contains the a priori non-autopositional moments which are equal to Position as dimension of the philosophical Decision. Counterpart of material ontology as generalized transcendental Aesthetic, the former would also be under the same universal conditions and would correspond to Givenness.

A formal ontology does not exist as such in philosophy, but it does find its restrained forms here, for example in Kant’s “transcendental Analytic” (ontology or “transcendental” philosophy) “considers the understanding and reason even in the system of all the concepts and principles which are related to objects in general without admitting the objects which would be given,” *Critique of Pure Reason*, version B, part II, chapter III); and in Husserl’s “formal ontology” (the aprioritic doctrine of the object but taken on the modes of something in general).

Non-philosophy contains a “material ontology” or a “generalized transcendental Aesthetic,” universalized in-the-last-instance, which is a theory of “something in general” insofar as it is given. It results from the work of the force (of) thought on the aspects of Givenness which are those of the philosophical Decision and in particular of this givenness *par excellence* that is that of the regional. It also contains its counterpart from the perspective of the Position which belongs to Decision. To the *a priori* of position correspond the non-autopositional *a prioris* of Transcendence, Position, and Unity. Why are these formal?

These *a prioris* are all generalized and simplified in a non-autopositional mode in the sense that each of them, as cloned identity, in-the-last-instance escapes from or leaps beyond the contrasted couple which it forms with another or with itself in its being-doubled: they are all expressed in an equal way of philosophy in accordance with the One-real.

In particular, transcendental logic is generalized because it leaps beyond the disjunction of forms as intellectual or sensible: it also contains the clones of the sensible or intuitive forms (“Transcendence” and “Position” insofar as they are simultaneously intellectual and intuitive, ideal and sensible—topological), provided that they form, posit, or objectify something in general. The givenness/position couple (the guiding thread in the research of the *a priori*) must be distinguished from the intellectual/sensible couple (which completely remains internal to philosophy, its frontiers being indeterminate and porous). The terms “formal” and “material” intend to surpass the formal/material philosophical couple and its internal folding, the Kantian projection of the intellectual form and the sensible intuitive form. These couples are restrained, even when they are no longer understood “metaphysically” but “transcendentally” (neo-Kantianism) and when form conditions matter *a priori*. This transcendental direction, still understood as circle or empirico-transcendental doublet, does not succeed in generalizing form (the formal) or matter (the material), i.e. in breaking the circle of their correlation or reciprocal determination and in positing relatively autonomous orders (in regard to the force (of) thought) of a generalized transcendental logic and aesthetic. This generalization is only acquired when the “transcendental subject” and its circle yields to the force (of) thought which alone is uni-versal and which alone can determine the *a prioris* of form and matter, of position and givenness, in their universal and equal validity for philosophical material.

Two complementary points follow:

1. Being given the uni-versal generality of non-philosophy, it is less a question in this universal transcendental logic of “categories” than transcendentals (the Other, Being, Unity, the Multiple, etc. and the One equally as objects of a theory); consequently, it is a question of transcendentals in their non-autopositional usage.
2. When non-philosophy breaks away from theories of something in general (object in general + given or matter in general), in the theory of some object X (the Event, the Subject, the Multiple, the Affect or something still more concrete), it must establish that which we will call the transcendental equation of this object X, i.e. to preliminarily define the type, order, nature and syntax of the non-autopositional transcendentals which in some sense establish the proper formula or “algorithm” for this object. The syntax of this system of transcendentals is always a mode of the determination-in-the-last-instance or envelops the latter.

Generalization (generalization and uni-versalization)

Said of the reigning redirection of a structure of philosophical or scientific representation and responsible for adjusting it in-the-last-instance to the immanent Real. Generalization is the fundamental operation of non-philosophical knowledge, that which gives it its explanatory and deconstructive force, but on condition of being ordered in the uni-versality of the vision-in-One.

Philosophy generalizes: autoposition, autoreflexion, and primarily every type of metaphysical abstraction, etc. Logos, Kosmos, and Polis are structural invariants, Greco-occidental foundations which are called earth, horizon...according to the eras. The philosophical work has an essence of reflexively forming a logos of

these stabilized invariants: this reflection is either pure logology (Aristotle's *Organon*), or cosmic logos, or political logos. Philosophical generalization is an amplification of reflexive interactions, an operation with a traditionally unitary and systematic goal; hence the multiplication of tautological effects and reflexive symmetries. After the intervention of Hume and Kant, critiquing the possibility of metaphysical reflection, two simulacra of generalization are set in place: 1) Hegel has conserved the effect of symmetry (bilaterality). Philosophy is then the extrapolation of topology. The invariant foundations are assimilated by totalizing variation as Concept. Hegel simultaneously idealizes and naturalizes thought by revealing real immanence. 2) In the 20th century, the inverse operation was attempted: interpolate or disintegrate. The Other loses the support of Being and provokes effects of asymmetry, differe(a)nance, singularity. These effects after Nietzsche and Husserl are still generated in a foundation of the logos which they affect by unilaterality (the differentialists and M. Henry via a completely different mode). In a general way through its metaphysical nucleus, philosophy is generality and totality, and thus its universality is divided and does not manage to constitute itself in really universal thought. Despite or because of its claims, philosophy remains a particular thought (for example, "Greek," to which "Jewish" thought can be opposed).

Non-philosophical generalization stems—this is the meaning of the "non-Euclidean" metaphor—from a non-, an effect of the vision-in-One or the Real. This is not an immediate negation but a unilateralizing of the claims of philosophy about the Real. It does not destroy the reality of philosophical mixtures by dissociating the sides of one another (M. Henry), but conserves this reality as support for sense, the sense (of) identity equivalent to philosophy. The vision-in-One does not deny the World but simply unilateralizes its claims. It gives or clones via its own mode in-the-last-instance on the basis of the experience of the World or philosophy, on the one hand the identities which constitute the subject as force (of) thought, and on the other the correlative identities which are equivalent to these objects, their sense (of) identity such that it is lived by the force (of) thought. But this play of "unilateralization" and "unidentification," which extracts from philosophy identities-in-the-last-instance, is a radical universalization. More precisely, a uni-versalization: everything (received-)given-in-One is on the mode of the immanent universality of the One or is given-in-the-last-instance, as an identity turned-towards...X (insofar as X exists). We thus oppose to the universality by and in the transcendence of philosophy, always divided into generality and totality, the identity of immanent uni-versality which enables constituting on the basis of philosophy's terms a transcendental axiomatic of uni-versal first terms in-the-last-instance.

A true generalization accepts losing the always illusory foundations, as well as logological manipulation, on behalf of continual work of redirection. The destabilization of Greco-occidental invariants loses the intuitive references which are found in a thought annexed to space and time. The thought that arises, but only in-the-last-instance, from immanence is atopic. Philosophical reflection with its reflexive, bilateral returns [renvois] then appear as the symptom of a unilateral sending [envoi]. The positive destabilization of thought deploys itself without the flattening philosophical symmetries. We could call, for example, "generalized fractality" the uni-versal alterity (in-One) that affects thought and suspends representational closures. Fractal-real objectivity rectifies and generalizes knowledges by continuously adjusting their closures over the uni-versal Other and its non-representational identity. The universalizing redirection must be

distinguished from an artificializing philosophy that naturalizes thought. It is a question of simulating—without returning to a philosophy of simulacra—philosophical statements through non-philosophical means of a generalizing fractality and of producing “statements of synthesis” irreducible to reflexive syntheses and thus capable of explaining them.

Generalized Fractality

One of the other possible names of the unilateral structure of non-philosophical representations. It attests to the practice of theoretical and experimental generalization—a radical universalization—of a particular physico-geometrical theory: the fractals of Mandelbrot, from which it releases a fractal identity being able to call itself from philosophy and then constitute an “artificial philosophy.”

The philosophico-spontaneous treatment of the Mandelbrotian concept of fractals—which is the quantification of the degree of irregularity and fragmentation of a physico-geometrical object—is revealed from a decisional gesture of philosophy in regard to the sciences. The mechanism of philosophical universalization, illegitimate or “delirious” (cf. Kant) but inevitable, of a local scientific theory, is the following: knowledges are isolated from their practico-experimental and auto-positional processes as transcendent “facts,” only insofar as they ideologically sustain the representation of Being. The result of this universalization, indispensable to the survival of philosophy, is a mixed, empirico-transcendental concept of fractality. That is to say scientific modeling (dimension D) is confused with reality or being: it is the real itself that “fractalizes itself” (Serres). Suppose that this is re-appropriated “schizoanalytically” to become a unitarily split representation of being: the “fractal” model describes “the smooth space” of non-metric, nomadic multiplicities (Deleuze). It is then supposed that the thought of being or the being of thought acts under the pretext of the “reconciliation of science and philosophy,” of the claim of the “transcendental” right of philosophy over the sciences.

Generalized or uni-versalized fractality is a specific experimentation which gives up its destiny as the desire of philosophy to be science. Instead of being a simple analogical transference of the scientific knowledge for the representation of Being, it is the experimental non-philosophical work of scientific concepts: 1) let this be such a particular scientific theory in its own legitimacy without intervening there as philosophy wants to 2) do not “apply” or imprudently generalize this particular theory for the benefit of philosophical authority. The universalization of fractality is rather a modeling, similar to the theoretico-experimental work of Mandelbrot, but under other conditions of experimentation—the universal of the vision-in-One—and with a broad object consequently “larger” than geometrico-physics, the philosophical object itself.

These conditions are those of first Science rather than philosophy: 1) the One or the condition of identity-of-the-last-instance replaces the internal principle of homothety or constancy in Mandelbrot; 2) the Unilateral as the very structure of thought according to-the-One replacing the condition of irregularity or fragmentation; 3) the object of fractalization, maintaining natural

language in its various philosophical, poetic, literary uses....replaces the geometrico-physical object. These conditions given, the fractalization of philosophy is possible as a potential example of non-philosophical work effectuated under the condition of the last-instance of the One and the force (of) thought. This work produces an open set, a universe of really universal fractal knowledges that “reflect” the One adequately. Such a practice is distinguished from the task of the wise-philosopher who, believed to hold the authority of transcendental approval, repeats the mixed epistemo-philosophical gesture of expropriation and reappropriation, instead of using the sciences themselves only under the conditions of a transcendental axiomatic.

Given-without-giveness

Other first name for the One or the Real, considered from the philosophical and phenomenological angle of Givenness. The Given in this radical sense is immanence (to) self and has no need of forming the object of knowledge. “Given-without-giveness” itself signifies foreclosure to any operation of givenness (manifestation, etc.) or thought and not simply any giving instance. Therefore, we shall call Givenness the first operation of thought-according-to-the-Given. It is givenness-of-the-Given, but is itself determined-in-the-last-instance by the latter.

The given-giveness couple or fold has a phenomenological origin and undergoes several variations that mark the post-Husserlian history of phenomenology. According to Husserl, it is the “originally giving intuition” of things “in the flesh” or as object, which is the evidence or “principle of principles.” For Heidegger, it is the deconstruction of this givenness, which is still metaphysical, through the givenness of Being itself; through it, there is (es gibt das Sein). For Derrida, it is “Giving Time,” a formula that translates and deconstructs “Being and Time.” The history of this notion continues (J.L. Marion), but in every case and whichever deviation emplaced to differ the coupling or to privilege one of the terms, it is characteristic of philosophy to no longer separate the given and givenness in a unilaterality. These notions serve together to think the manifestation of the Real in the state of phenomenon (Being or Existent, indeed the Gift itself) and its constitution as that to which thought must yield as the most originally possible.

Non-philosophy makes a problem of thought according to the One or to the Real, but not of the Real itself. It dissolves the amphibology or the “fold” of the given and givenness and treats it as a simple material to be dualized after serving as occasion (nomination and indication) for speaking the Real. It is the non-phenomenology of givenness. We shall call Given the real-One and it alone. It can only be given without the excess or the other-world of an act of givenness, and certainly not with a giving instance on which it would depend; it is the phenomenon itself. The Given implies in its essence that it is radically immanent (to) self and to nothing else (the Existent, the World, Being, Substance, Givenness, Appeal, etc.). Non-constituted and “separated,” the Real is firstly and only given (to) itself; it is the vision-in-One without the supplementary aid of an operation of thought. As for it, Givenness is first, but would be impossible if the Real weren’t already given; it would cease being the stability,

exteriority, and objectivity proper to thought if the Given did not “precede” it, radically or without return, due to its primacy without priority or its status as “last-instance.”

We shall globally call Givenness the sphere of non-real or real-in-the-last-instance “reality” that comes after the Given, thus the transcendental essence of thought that finds its cause in the One-Given. It is in turn a phenomenal given and is also called “given,” but only in-the-last-instance. Insofar as it distinguishes itself from the One, unlike the latter, it supposes an operation of givenness that sets philosophy in play, the givenness of philosophy. Non-philosophy thus manifests the essence of thought, but not the One which, being manifested by itself, has no need of being a second time; but which also can exist under the conditions of objectivity to which it must then satisfy in its own way.

God-without-Being

[Original translation by Anthony Paul Smith]

First name for the identity (of) “God,” human identity in-the last-instance of a simple onto-theological material. Necessary symbol for a non-theology or a unified theory of philosophy and religious faith.

The expression “God without Being” comes from Jean-Luc Marion and testifies to at least a Heideggerian deconstruction, and more so, of onto-theo-logy. It is the idea of God represented in a particular mode of philosophy, onto-theo-logical, from the matrix of combining the great opposites (Being/being [Être/Étant], One/Multiple) characteristic of the metaphysical Decision and added on to the causality of the One. Instead of one of the opposites simply being split—at the assistance of language—in order to achieve the status of a principle (for example and in particular the Platonic One), each of the opposites are here subjected to that splitting: the One of the aforementioned example would appear as One-for-the-dyad, the two of the dyad itself appears as “One divided into two,” and God as the conceptual gathering of that double division—the All of things which Kant said was composed by the unity of the One and the Multiple. In other words, God is the principle of the enclosure of onto-theo-logical language, indeed philosophical.

In the ontological demonstration, God is the name of the combination of essence and existence, or even of Being [Être] and being [l'Étant], since God is the being-which-is [l'Étant-qui-est]. In the cosmological demonstration, God appears in the inverse as the difference between Being [Être] and being [l'Étant], in the play of the two demonstrations, God is then the difference of the identity and difference of Being [Être] and being[l'Étant], pure amphibology.

The contemporary attempts (Lévinas, Marion) to think God without being, essence, or existence, leads to the identification of God with the Other, an Other non-thetic in and by the definitions of an ethical God for the former and of a God without theology—liberated from the amphibology—in the latter. But the amphibology reappears as crossing from the philosophical Decision insofar as it is structured as a metaphysics that these attempts cannot radically invalidate.

The One-in-One, not being Self [Moi], could not be God (as in Schelling who confused the One and Being). The Stranger-subject [subject-Étranger] not being non-Self [non-Moi], could not be (in particular) God. God is a specific and irreducible mode of the Stranger - it is at the least that which imposes the onto-theo-logical material. The vision-in-One determines in-the-last-instance the experience of the identity (of) God, identity (of) a transcendence or of an absolute height (and not only of an exteriority). This is the only manner of returning to God his transcendence, as it is lived-in-One [vécue-en-Un], or his sense (of) identity, while it is compromised by all the modes of arguing for its subject by presence, or, in the inverse, by withdrawal, or lastly by the withdrawal in presence which would qualify God as “gift.” It brings from dualysis the confusion One-God, identifying in the identity (of) God, always presupposed by theology, an effect of vision in-One. If the “given” precedes givenness and, as such, necessarily the gift, the only error of the dialectic is of having attributed this being-given [être-donné] (“givenhood” [donnéité]) to Being [Être], in forming the expression of “Being-given” [Être-donné] (Kojève), and in also consequently refusing to God appearance in the non-real order of donation. Being [Êtant] given the One, as well as in-the-last-instance the givenhood of the Other-as-givenness, the new gift of non-philosophy may consist in admitting, in its manner, the being-given-without-givenness of the givenness of a non-theological-God, of an atheistic or human God in-the-last-instance, all the more transcendent, where the paradox dissolves the amphibology without resurrecting the dialectic of God and man (Hegel, Feuerbach). It is only from the radical phenomenal point of view of the-last-instance (and not phenomenological) that one knows that it is non-sufficient, that man is the measure of God himself.

Hypothesis (philosophizing-by-hypothesis)

“Applied” or variant usage of non-philosophy (proposed by A.F. Schmid) that adds to its axioms a supplementary axiom bearing upon the philosophical Decision: that of the de jure multiplicity of philosophical decisions. This axiom is simultaneously added to those of the vision-in-One and those formalizing the philosophical Decision.

This problem has no meaning in philosophy and must not be confused with the philosophical problem of the One and the Multiple. At most, a historian-philosopher of philosophy (M. Gueroult) has elaborated a theory of the philosophical decision in a Fichtean spirit under the hypothesis of an empirical or *de facto* spatio-temporal multiplicity of philosophies.

Sufficiency demands the certitude and absoluteness ending in the principles of philosophy. Non-philosophy can on the contrary support and promote a practice of philosophy—and not a “pure” non-philosophy—by hypothesis rather than speculation, without sufficiency or exhaustiveness. The hypothesis is in every way a fundamental concept of non-philosophy, but it is even more so for this “application” to which it gives rise. It allows admitting the coexistence of multiple positions, contrary from the point of view of their sufficiency, yet no longer understanding them as contraries or even as “positions” but as transcendental orders or transcendental Identities. Veritable differences of order are no longer determined by the war of philosophical interests but arise from multiple transcendental identities which are so many hypotheses. The engagements of

philosophies, concepts, and names of philosophers are no longer the occasion of a hierarchization, the hypothesis being in-the-last-instance the form of equivalence of engagements. Likewise, we could suppose that the simulation has modified relations between theory and experience in the contemporary sciences, we could suppose that, understood in this sense, the hypothesis will transform the relations in philosophy which rule over the transcendental and the empirical while displacing one of the major problems of philosophical objectivity: the respect of the sciences and facts must accommodate themselves for the philosophers in their personal philosophical histories, that which leads them to perpetuate a vicious dialectic between the model and the elevated, the master and the disciple, against the other supposedly inauthentic positions. “Philosophizing by hypothesis” is a way of giving a meaning to a love-without-master-and-without-disciple in philosophy, and making of the latter a veritable *oecumene* for the Stranger. Philosophical individuation is then considered “ordinary” and no longer as the effect of a narcissistic difference.

Of non-philosophy rigorously takes philosophy as reduced occasion and as “object,” nothing prevents us from supposing that this object possesses the degree and nature of autonomy which accords it this new axiom. In this case, non-philosophy modifies the practice of philosophy itself. It is a postulate there in the sense that no rule can allow us to preview the concrete nature of such effects. It is not simply a question of relating the content of the material to the One according to rules which deliver philosophy from its sufficiency, but of practicing philosophy, psychoanalysis, ethics, etc. in such a way that they satisfy the requisites of non-philosophy under this axiom. This schematism of non-philosophy in this material contributes to transforming the practice of philosophy in several ways. From the point of view of “pure reason,” philosophy would proceed by hypotheses and first terms, there would be as many philosophies as examples of the mixtures between the empirical and the transcendental. From the aesthetic point of view, every philosophical project would have its own style which could individuate it: this is one of the meanings that could be given to “artificial philosophy.” From the ethical point of view, radical evil, which concerns the World, would be judged as the lure that the distance of philosophy from the Real produces on the basis of radical misfortune, the essence of human solitudes. Every concept elaborated by non-philosophy could be reintroduced into its original discourse and enrich it without for all that reproducing a logic of sufficiency. This schematism would be a positive and liberating transformation of the material in itself.

Such a schematism confirms that non-philosophy is in no way the end of philosophy but its salvation in multiple and non-exclusive practices. Philosophy continues as one of the forms of non-philosophy. This axiom in question is thus the condition of the reality of philosophy in non-philosophy. It saves philosophy from the edge of non-philosophy which it softens but without returning to the forms of its most spontaneous sufficiency.

Language-Universe

Cloned-according-to-the-One from the Logos, from the philosophical mixture of thought and language. Language and its function of ontological opening, of language-world, is received in its sense (of) identity by the force (of) thought as language-universe, or uni-versal in-the-last-instance for philosophy, the World, and the Logos itself. Language-universe is the identity (of

the) language-world or Logos.

Before the various philosophical conceptions of language, a philosophical invariant consists in bestowing upon language a transcendental function (in a broad sense) of world, opening, and being. Hence its status simultaneously as (real) referent and as explicit or implicit organon of philosophy. To speak is always and in every way to open, to tear, to surpass, to transcend. This transcendental opening is a dimension that discovers its empirical condition of existence in the variable linguistic digressions between the signifier, the signified, signification, sense, sign, etc. The “linguistic turn” is nothing but a possibility programmed by the essence of the philosophical Decision and actualized by supplementary historical causes.

Non-philosophical pragmatics recognizes itself as an activity of language, but it treats language as an inert material concerning its properties of the Logos, the One determining it in-the-last-instance without the mediation of philosophy’s operations. We shall thus distinguish:

language as claiming to be constitutive or co-constitutive of the Real itself (philosophy), a linguistico-philosophical appearance or language-world which non-philosophy transforms into a simple material;

the transcendental-axiomatic usage of language as clone in-the-last-instance of language-in-philosophy;

language in its signifying wrapper and signified as support of the reality of the force (of) thought and its non-philosophical *a priori*s, i.e. the duality of the (non-)One, the support being a function which is more than the clone-according-to-the-One and less than the constitution of the Real (philosophy) through language or Logos.

Language is necessary for the axiomatic formulation of the One and the force (of) thought, if at least we propose to think according-to-the-One. On the other hand, it is not necessary to the essence of the One or to its internal structure. The axiomatic position of the Real, i.e. thought according to the One as non-philosophy, is contingent in relation to it: it indeed has its determination in it but only in-the-last-instance. By using language as a simple material inseparable from the philosophical concept, non-philosophy restores its essence: it transforms the latter into a mode of the (non-)One. The axiomatic descriptions of the One, of the force (of) thought, and of the philosophical material’s sense (of) identity no longer designate the fine-infinite form of a World but arise through their being-manifested-in-the-last-instance from the immanent Uni-verse which shelters the vision-in-One. The usage of language’s logos supposes a spontaneous autofactualization and fetishization of language. Its setting-in-universe defetishizes it as much as possible by relating it to its aprioritic, transcendental, and finally real conditions. We call “language-universe” this clone produced on the basis of the logos or the language-world. In the vision-in-One, language is given-without-givenness, ungenerated and ungenerating, sterile, delivered from the goals and slavery of poetry. This usage of language without closure—where language is no longer its own closure as in Wittgenstein—supposes that it stops defining and delimiting the pragmatic aspect of thought and that it become instead the object of a pragmatics which furthermore defines it.

Lived Experience (lived-without-life)

Every act of thought or experience, of theory or life, insofar as it is related in-the-last-instance to the One as lived (of) lived experience or immanent “in-lived-experience” and insofar as it thus defines the cause of a non-phenomenology.

After Descartes, transcendental phenomenology achieves the *telos* of “lived experience” (Erlebnis) which traversed certain idealist philosophies of life (Plotinus, Fichte, Hegel). “Lived experience” then designates every intentional act as related to consciousness on its subjective side (hyle and noesis). Lived experience is thus conscious by definition and “ready for perception” (Husserl); immanent or absolutely and adequately given without attempts, unlike the object; individualized and capable of plurality; finally, pure as transcendental and not psychological. Not even in transcendental phenomenology does it attain the purity of radical immanence or the ultimate and reversible character which is the mark of the Real. It is always slightly of the transcendental order of an object or an attribute that forms a frontier, if not violence, -to the (rational) subject. A radicalization of phenomenological lived experience, but which remains at the limits of philosophy, is given by immanent “Life,” auto-generative and auto-affective in the sense of Michel Henry.

Non-philosophy universalizes what philosophy gives it occasion of thinking as “lived experience.” The unilateralizing suspension and unidentification of the transcendence of phenomenological lived experience makes the sense of the latter seem like an existent yet a foreclosure of non-phenomenological or radically immanent experience. This sense is in some way the non-phenomenological noema of the “lived” phenomenological object. Under this form, it can then serve to name, as first term, the One itself or the Real of-the-last-instance, the “thing” of real lived experience. Released from its autoposition and its perceptibility of consciousness reduced to its identity-in-One, it finally possesses a transcendental purity and a universality which allow it to be said of whichever thought or experience as related to this lived-experience-of-the-last-instance. In effect, always in non-philosophy but here more particularly, we distinguish (lived experience as) Real or One-in-One from the “lived” as original conceptual symbol but having undergone a non-conceptual treatment of first term, a symbol through which the Real forms the object of a position of thought obviously without being posited in its essence itself. The term “lived experience” is thus also a vocable among others without a phenomenological type of privilege and without giving rise to a philosophy of Life. Within the framework of non-phenomenology, it can be “re-worked” as “lived-without-life,” a first term that effectively marks its neutralization as philosophical concept.

Man (Humans)

In their complete notion, men or humans are existing-subject-Strangers, determined-in-the-last-instance by the Real or the One as Ego-in-Ego. Ego-man, contrary to the philosophical Ego, is foreclosed to the subject, but the latter, insofar as it presupposes it, effectuates its uni-versality

for the World.

As a philosophical concept, man is a humanoid simultaneously traced from the anthropoid which has hardly gone beyond Greek anthropological thought and the Judeo-Christian “creature.” Philosophy has oriented the human around the Cosmos, Physis, Being, Spirit, Will to Power, etc. as so many abstract and puppet [fantoche] entities which imply the dismemberment of man into attributes (power, language, sex, society, politics, etc.) with which it has attempted to artificially recompose him. The pro-thetic, anti-thetic, syn-thetic—artificial—man of philosophy (and not only of anthropology or the human sciences to which the thought-world assigns its dirty work) is this “sublime abortion” which must give birth to the “overman.” Philosophy desires the inhuman, the pre-human, the all too-human, the over-human without recognizing the “ordinary” nothing-but-human. The philosophical heaven is populated with anthropoid and artificial creatures, Dasein included, which escape from a cloven thought and lead to a host of masks and travesties, after which demons and angels become fully rationalized. Humanism is an inferior angelism and a lie concerning man. Because of this dishonor, philosophy is saved with great difficulty through the thesis of a theoretical anti-humanism (Althusser) which will not have been sufficiently radicalized.

Non-philosophy is like a negative universal thought which can be effectuated, for example, in the language of a science-of-men rather than sciences-of-man. Determined-in-the-last-instance according to the Ego-in-Ego, radically non-anthropoid, it manifests the essence of the existing-subject-Stranger essentially from the force (of) thought. But the latter is a general and even universal matrix and must be modulated by the *a priori*s of a unified theory of philosophy and sociology, psychology, psychoanalysis, ethnology, etc. It is a question of making equivalent in the disciplines of the human sciences a thought whose content-in-human and content-in-science are assured without demanding the exclusion of philosophy pure and simple. The civil war between philosophy and the human sciences can only find its peace treaty outside itself and in a different conception of man. Non-philosophy is a rigorous heresy: it makes of man a being-Inseparable (from) self, and thus Separated-without-separation from the World. In other words, for one of the first times it has become possible to define man in a “formal” way without formalism; to constitute him as an axiomatic rather than philosophical object. Man is precisely the Real foreclosed to philosophy. The latter can only imagine what is alone the “existent” and “non-existent” which can be set into axioms and which only tolerates—so great is its autonomy—axioms. Where there is man, the thesis and principle are excluded. Where there is the human, thought must be axiomatized and renounce its sufficiency.

Material Ontology (chôra, uni-versalized transcendental Aesthetic)

That which philosophy becomes or the function which it fulfills in relation with experience when its sufficiency is suspended by the force (of) thought and when it is reduced to its sense (of) identity. It then becomes the material a priori through which all phenomena are necessarily

given; equal to the term of chôra in its non-philosophical usage.

Philosophy claims to give regional or singular phenomena through its form and submits them to its legislation. Consequently, it posits them according to the very diverse modes in its interior and from its relation to the experience of universal and necessary structures of the “*a priori*” type, which are all generally copied from the sciences. It therefore supposes: 1) a certain contingency or autonomy, indeed alterity, of experience in relation to these *a priori*; 2) a certain superiority, which is proper to it, over experience through the means of the *a priori* itself—to which it is however not reduced—through which it is the superior form still called “transcendental”: the principle of reason, for example, must be “grounded” in turn or “ungrounded” accordingly. Philosophy presents itself as both the ultimate legislator of experience as well as its *a priori* organon. As a whole, philosophy wills or desires its unity with experience, but this unity remains contingent, menaced, aleatory: reassuring it is the motor of the creation of new philosophies supposedly more in control of the real than preceding philosophies.

The suspension of the Principle of sufficient philosophy (PSP) in its different stages (real, transcendental, *a priori*) liberates the identity (of) philosophy and transforms the latter in a general way into a noematic *a priori* of the World or all possible experience, but into an *a priori* itself of the non-philosophical type. Thesis: “everything, from experience, is philosophizable” never ceases being a new philosophical and antinomical decision, while philosophy is necessarily and universally equal to all phenomena without exception, if the diverse dimensions of the mixture of philosophy insofar as it is givenness—and from the latter with experience—are lived in their sense (of) identity through the force (of) thought. Philosophy ceases being the legislator of the event in order to become the *a priori* giverr: mixture itself is given as identity. The contingent relations of experience and philosophy are then intrinsically indissoluble or thought beyond all hierarchies. Hence an equivalence (without exchange or reciprocity) of identities (non-mixtures) which introduces democracy into the heart of the given or new experience. Every ontic or ontological and philosophical term of object or action, every statement, etc. is henceforth treatable as such an identity in which experience is immediately inscribed philosophically and philosophy immediately incarnated ontically in the same movement. This radical diversity of “material” identities forms a chôra to which philosophy and its necessary relation to experience are reduced. Philosophy is reduced to the state of simple “material” *a priori*, or “material” rather and thus itself becomes, under this form, the basic material of non-philosophy. This is the “uniformal” form of the material givenness of phenomena. It fulfills a function, but only from a simple *a priori* organon of experience. It corresponds to a “transcendental aesthetic” of the World or to whichever experience possible on the basis of transcendence. “Aesthetic,” but which substitutes philosophy itself (its identity) and thus its relation to whichever experience for regional and limited models of givenness which are scientific, perceptual, artistic, etc. which would be grasped so as to be assured of givenness and its mastery over phenomena. “Transcendental,” but only because of the origin of this reduction in the force (of) thought. Its principle being the identity—but exercised in its real origin, not posited dogmatically—of Being and the Existent, it thus generalizes the fundamental axiom of a recent materialist ontology: mathematics=ontology (Badiou) by intending it for all experience possible beyond mathematics and by transcendently determining this equation instead of passing over to

a dogmatic thesis lacking any legitimacy other than being one decision among others. Philosophy as simple material ontology is a way of cutting materialism short as a hidden philosophical decision. Furthermore, by limiting philosophy to a simple aprioritic ontology of experience, non-philosophy legitimates it or validates it—in certain limits which precisely returns to the extrication of the violent and arbitrary act of auto-legitimation (including its Kantian auto-limitation or its deconstructive hetero-limitation) but which better assures it a necessary and positive function.

Metascience

Ensemble of discourses of a philosophical type that finds its origin in the object of science, the elucidation and foundation of its essence, but which in turn are treated as the object or the phenomena of first Science.

This concept does not have a special use in philosophy since it spontaneously recognizes the right to legislate over science, and that it is thus by definition “meta-science” sometimes the absolute science or science of sciences, sometimes the discourse of elucidation or commentary, interpretation, critique, and foundation of the sciences.

Non-philosophy defines a precise content and status of metascience. Content: the whole of the nonscientific discourses that aim at the essence of science; that is to say directly: epistemologies, philosophies-of-sciences, and philosophies-to-science (which are based explicitly on a given empirical theory); that is to say indirectly, philosophy in general as it is implicitly determined by scientific breaks. Status: “metascience” conjoins with “science,” and this generalized couple is that of “mathematics” and “metamathematics” posited by Hilbert in his theory of the demonstration of the absolute consistency of formal systems. This concept thus has sense only within and according to science and its priority over metascience.

This generalization answers a precise objective:

1. To show the similarity between the programs of formal (Hilbert) and logical (Frege, Russell) foundation of arithmetic, and the programs of foundation of science in general which are implicitly all philosophies and explicitly the “theories of science” (Aristotle; Fichte; philosophy as “science of science in general”; Husserl: philosophy as rigorous science or “science with absolute foundation,” etc).
2. To make metascientific discourses a type of operation similar to what Godel did to metamathematics: instead of supposing, without evidence other than philosophical faith, that philosophies are really able to found and anticipate sciences and that this objective has some sense that it does, reversing the situation and giving itself the means of a science of metascience or philosophy. It is “first science,” still known as “non-philosophy” (or “science of philosophy,” but this is only one aspect of its activity). Philosophy corresponds indeed to the area of the phenomena of which this new or “unified” science uses in order to determine not the traditional “essence of science,” but the knowledge of the essence (of) science.

3. To show through this new discipline in the character of “unified theory” that if metascience aims at the essence of science, it aims at it in illusion or repression, seeing its foreclosure, and that it is for these two reasons that philosophy functioned through materiality.

The concept “metascience” makes it possible to renew the parallel problem of ‘metalanguage’ and to draw a possible treatment of this question. First Science poses the following statements which are also applicable to metalanguage: 1) there is, in any event, metascience, that is to say a discourse which is posed or is presented in the form as such (resp. metalanguage); 2. The statements: “there is no metascience (...),” or; “there is a metascience, and it is valid,” are excluded as an expression of the sufficiency of philosophy; in the same way, though to a lesser degree: “there are effects of metascience (...),” effects of a play of “textual forces” or a “language game” in the immanence through which metascience plunges. First Science is a transcendental science of metascience, it reintroduces it into the immanence-of-the-last-instance of the One-real; it is not a philosophy that would reintroduce it into the immanence of a (philosophical) decision.

Mixture

[Original translation by Anthony Paul Smith]

Other first name for the philosophical Decision insofar as it is founded on reversibility as structure or limit-tendency of the mélange, fold, relation, correlation, synthesis, convertibility, etc.—characteristic of specifically philosophical unitary syntaxes.

The mixture such that philosophy itself thematizes it (Deleuze, Derrida) is not only the form of its material or its object (Anaxagoras), but its own autoposition, its point of view (Plato, the *Philebus*), thus the system-essence and sufficiency of philosophy. From this point of view, the mixture can grow and transform along its external edges through which it is affected (Derrida) or through its internal edges and its mid-place [*mi-lieu*] (Deleuze). But in all these scenarios, the mixture itself thinks itself and deconstructs itself and exceeds the simple mélange, the synthesis, etc. The “transcendental-empirical doublet” (Foucault) is only one particular mode of the mixture-form of which the more universal forms are autoposition, autogiveness, autoreflexion, etc. Mixture in this “total” or “absolute” sense is not always realized, philosophy burdening itself in its various objects, in its objectives and its foreign materials, its regional representations. But it is its limit-form or tendential. And philosophy only thematizes the mixture by itself.

Non-philosophy finds this theme of mixture by generalizing it—in an approximate interpretation—in all philosophy, then by demonstrating its identity (of) mixture for the subject. In effect, all philosophical decisions necessarily obey one structural and transcendental rule which is the unity of contraries. Primarily, contraries are posited as more or less antagonistic or even reciprocal in a Dyad; then one of them has the privilege of supporting the third that it identifies,

unifying the other two in a synthesis. For example, philosophy thinks the One and the Multiple as opposites but capable of being united in the synthesis of “multiplicities” (Deleuze) and in general in One/Multiple hierarchies. The end thus produced is a mixture.

From the ancient and contemporary indications on the mixture as object and as form of philosophy, non-philosophy is made up of the symptoms from which it extracts the identity (of) mixture. This signifies that mixture, in the sense which we have defined it, is not only the form of philosophy but the philosophical form *a priori* to all experience, the interior form of the thought-world, and not a simple regional or even “fundamental” form, i.e. irreducibly contingent.

As self-will, the philosophical mixture believes to be able to think itself because it wills to think itself thus. Hence the philosophical faith in the Real that it is (without being more), that it desires (without obtaining), etc. It is then the place *par excellence* of the transcendental illusion and indeed a “real appearance” even more profound than transcendental dialectic appearance (Kant), because it is the appearance of philosophy itself and not simply that of metaphysics. Amphibological by essence, philosophy is structurally incapable of dualizing contraries, which is only possible for the immanence in-the-last-instance of the One. It is the ideological place *par excellence* (the concept of ideology from Marx-Althusser is here generalized), the place of real, then transcendental illusion (in a non Kantian sense, or in a generalized Kantism). On the other hand, mixture is in itself indestructible, and non-philosophy, differently from a philosophy of transcendental immanence (Michel Henry), does not believe itself able to dissolve it as without reality or consistency, but only to suspend its importance in the constitution of a subject as existing-Stranger or the force (of) thought.

Multiple

Nature of the aprioritic instance, the last in the constitution of the force (of) thought as transcendence or non-autopositional Distance. Exteriority, restored to its identity-of-the-last-instance-in-the-One, is the element of a radical multiple or multiple without multiplicity (without Unity to recover it or “set-theorize” it), multiple which is neither qualitative nor quantitative nor quantitative-qualitative, but purely primary and phenomenal.

Philosophy knows of purely qualitative concepts (Bergson), or even purely quantitative and numerical (Badiou); explicitly the majority of the time, but implicitly for all the others, the mixed concepts, qualitative and quantitative (Nietzsche, Deleuze: difference of quantity as quality). But the two former conceptions are justifiably not pure despite their claim, since we relate them to the structure of the philosophical Decision which their concept of the Multiple employs. Every philosophical theory of the Multiple or even of the One is structured as a metaphysical mixture of the One and the Multiple. The Multiple is amphibological with the One and, for the same reasons, the dyad One/Multiple, the vertical axis crossing in metaphysics the horizontal axis of Being/Existent.

When the One is itself recognized as “separated,” without any abstraction but axiomatic, from the structure in crossed doublets of metaphysics, as “separated-without-separation,” it is neither qualitative (Plotinus), nor quantitative (Pythagoras), nor qualitative and quantitative (Plato). Everything that sustains its mark as clone is perfectly protected from these adventures. This is the case of the Multiple that appears on the last level of the force (of) thought after the real One and transcendental Identity under the form of a non-autopositional Exteriority, simple and single, not duplicated or folded. The *a priori* has always contained not an empirical multiple but no longer exactly a “pure” multiple, for it is still conditioned by its relation to experience. The non-philosophical concept of the *a priori* also shelters the first appearance of a multiple-without-unity, precisely of the identity (of the) Multiple. The identity (of the) Multiple is this concept that enables avoiding the quantitative/qualitative mixtures as the amphibology or convertibility—with a hierarchy and its reversals—of the One and the Multiple. The Multiple is not itself multiple, does not predicate itself of itself. But the fact that there is no multiple of the multiple does not mean that it forms a metaphysical entity: the One determines-in-the-last-instance the Multiple as such or in its identity.

Noema-Universe

Immanent object of the force (of) thought or the subject-Stranger that univerts towards and through it, relating itself in a non-intentional way as its correlate (its unilate) of sense. The universal noematic form is an identity (in-the-last-instance) of sense. The thought-world is given to the Stranger through the sense of being occasion-in-the-last-instance, i.e. foreclosure of the Real or even Other-than-the-One. A more restrained concept of the noema would designate the occasional sense acquired by the phenomenological noema as correlate of non-autopositional Distance (“equivalent” of intentionality).

In phenomenology where this notion has found its full usage, the noema is the correlate of the sense of noesis, a sense of the object, and is constituted by the multiplicity of the modes or ways in which the latter is given. The noema is thus the intentional sense of an object in the World, still not uni-versal sense (by universion) of the World itself or its identity for the subject-Stranger. Like noesis, the noema is constrained in this context to a circularity more or less differing with noesis, a parallelism founded upon an identity or a self-sameness rather than broken by a determination-in-the-last-instance, upon a correlation rather than a “unilation.”

If the subject-Stranger constitutes itself by a play of (philosophical) occasions which are universion (effects of the universality of the One), it thus does not manifest itself without the series of philosophy’s “occasional” interventions being manifested in relation to it. The first reduction, called “real,” of philosophical sufficiency precisely transforms the thought-world into a simple occasion of cloning by the One. The state of “occasional cause” is thus the noematic sense in person which is said of the thought-world. For philosophy, this sense is of being foreclosed to the One. In other words, the noematic identity (of) philosophy gives it as “Other-than-One,” first appearance of an alterity as object of the Stranger. Finally, the non-philosophical noema contains a variety of determinations corresponding to the principle modes of philosophy’s autopresentation. These determinations are all occasional or determined in-the-last-instance by their first state of occasion. The latter has allowed them to enter into the noematic sphere of non-

philosophical sense and of the being of the modes of the Other-than-One. But they all participate in the universal essence of the non-philosophical noema–noema (of the) World and unilate of the Stranger—which we shall call “noema-universe” to distinguish it from the “noema-world” which is that, restrained to intentionality, of phenomenology.

Non-Aesthetics

Said of the application, under several forms, of the non-philosophical process to aesthetic material itself. Either—first distinction—from theoretical non-philosophy (first science) alone, or in the complete rigor of non-philosophy intrinsically modified, in an aesthetic sense, to “logico-aesthetic” material. Or—second distinction—from its application to aesthetic discourse or directly to the artistic matter itself, to “art” (under the condition of the addition of axioms relative to the autonomy of art and irreducible to those of the vision-in-One).

It would be necessary to say: non-aesthetics. The plural designates the fragmentation of the grand traditional text of the thought of art, and the eventual extraction of possible aesthetics issuing from particular generalizations (non-Bachelardian, non-Kierkegaardian, non-Baudelairian, etc.) which are still philosophical symptoms of a universal non-aesthetic in the radical sense of this word. The term is not directly present in philosophy. It nevertheless retains an air of familiarity with the philosophical concept of non-philosophy from which it seems to present a sort of analogical prolonging under the form of a particular application to the artistic domain. This is a new way of thinking philosophy in recourse to peripheral categories traditionally belonging to the artistic domain. For example, to this procedure corresponds the reflection on hypnotism in Bergsonian Givens. The aesthetic illusions surrounding storybook hypnotism intends the restoration of a simulation of duration through the fragmented tools of expression. The “non-”philosophical is then a peripheral manner of recommencing philosophy. This activity of philosophy since its pictorial, literary, etc. margins is not merely contemporary (Derridian or Deleuzian). It corresponds to a very ancient use incessantly reactualized. Let us designate it with the term “non aesthetics,” without the feature of a union, so as to differentiate it from its rigorous or non-philosophical usage. This is essentially a more or less differentiated mimesis, thus a cloning still imaginary or intra-philosophical.

The usage of non-aesthetics instead should be found in the specificity of the activity of the “non,” indeed in a specifically artistic concept if not of the Real at least of the “force (of) creation.” The latter is radically distinguished from the Bachelardian type of generalization of a philosophy of the “non,” even understood in its domains other than the epistemological. It is universal according-to-the-One-in-the-last-instance. Nonetheless, the extension of the “philosophy of the non” to domains other than the epistemological on the grounds of a non-Bachelardian philosophy itself is already a sort of basic approximation of non-philosophy, in which it would nevertheless lack this primacy of identity inherent to non-philosophy. We shall indicate three principle directions:

At the limit, any artistic act can be combined with any act of thought, without any limit; such is the first axiomatic constant. It is necessary, from this point of view, to rethink the concept presently used by the “avant-garde” in a non-historical context, since all linearity as well as circularity of history is excluded.

A second constant of axiomatic creativity rests on the fact that combinations can be made, combinations of particular non-aesthetics, according to a principle of generalized relativity, and which form together like fractal-islands of thought on art, which can touch upon the works themselves, at best by constituting an equivalent poetics. Different particular non-aesthetics can then spring up, stretch out, and combine so as to describe the most diverse works, ancient, traditional, recent, or futuristic. This is an activity to which no limits can be fixed. The reorganization of fractal-islands of non-aesthetic making could then design continents under internal homothety with the constitutive unities. On this terrain, one could see increasingly dense non-aesthetics appear as continental regroupings of scattered islands.

But, third constant, everything must be able to be erased and return to the non-system-of-the-last-instance.

This constant protects non-aesthetics from congealing into a system of sufficiency, again returning to a philosophical illusion.

Non-philosophical pragmatics is at the base of this unlimited aesthetic production. Some of these theoretical non-aesthetic islands have appeared, like, for example, the non-philosophical *a priori* of “non-Euclidean perspectives.”

Non-Dictionary

Collection of non-autopositional universes obtained by the reiteration of a universal pragmatics in a material of philosophical and regional terms; open list of non-conceptual symbols obtained on the basis of a list of philosophical concepts.

This expression does not exist in philosophy but could here designate a negative or suspended moment in the economy of a dictionary, a dialectic or differential economy, etc.

A non-dictionary is produced from a pragmatics on the basis of the vision-in-One and its ordination of conceptual, philosophical—indeed philosophizable—material (regional terms). It opposes the sufficiency-to-the-Multiple of the real One to unitary philosophical autosufficiency rather than the multiplicity of philosophical and semantic decisions. Whereas philosophical dictionaries constitute an inventory, in the name of unity, of the multiple opinions in the subject of a presupposed-Being or (psychoanalytic variant) of a supposed-Other, a non-dictionary—without another supposition—translates the real multiplicity inherent to the force (of) thought beginning from an empirical plurality of concepts. The force (of) thought manifests the repertory terms as so many non-unitary universes.

Non-Epistemology

Unified theory of science and philosophy that takes for its object and material the discourse which lays claim to a particular mixture of science and philosophy: epistemology.

Philosophy recognizes epistemology in two ways which are not always exclusive. It can treat it as a continuation of traditional philosophy of science, crystallized around the Kantian question of the possibility of science, often relating precise and delimited scientific problems to philosophical systems, whether classical or modern (Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Russell, Quine, etc...) along with traditional philosophical positions (realism, empiricism, idealism, etc.). It can also consider it as a relatively autonomous discipline—simultaneously more regional and more technical—whose sources or occasions are extensions beyond the mechanical or Euclidean geometry of the physical, or even “exact” model of the concept of science; or still it can consider the technological interpretations of this concept. With this more specific preference, the epistemological tradition, going strong for over a century, has become extremely multiform and varied in regard to the nature and order of grandeur of its objects and methods. Nevertheless, its object or its final interest always more or less explicitly remains the criteria of scientificity for science or the sciences. This question, in its constantly displaced and renewed repetition, is always understood as aporetic and even at times gives rise to an admission of failure, which is the motivation for “external” perspectives (technological, sociological, economic, political, and ethical) on science. The advent of epistemology under these hypotheses seems like a becoming-network of its concept of science in a complex, non-linear, and unstable system.

This “future” of epistemology is explained, according to non-philosophy, by the fact that it treats (and only treats) local problems in a spontaneous way beginning with the reduction of science to isolated knowledges and theories, consequently to the detriment of the nature of its extreme poles of constitution which are supposed in advance and without examining the fundamental supports which are decided upon. Therefore, it supposes the general rule of an implicit continuity between scientific and philosophical concepts, the possibility of an amphibological recovery of the ones through the others. It simultaneously acts as though one could produce statements about science—which is already in itself problematic—and as though philosophy were on the contrary a simple passage to the limit of an object defined or definable by a universal correspondent, a passage which makes it impossible to speak specifically about this envelopment which is philosophy. Instead, non-philosophy admits that we cannot take science for an object in the manner in which epistemology has done by imposing a philosophical objectification and reduction on it, but that we can describe an “invariant” of philosophy, which, far from being reified in a model, enriches and multiplies the effects and in particular makes their experimentation possible. For its own account, it will use the material of epistemology; it will relate its amphibologies, justifiably that which functions as “continuity” and “recovery,” to an identity that determines them in-the-last-instance, but by conserving the terms and the words of epistemology which, in a certain way, it will axiomatize according to a transcendental, but not logical, mode. This labor will make it possible not to give this discipline up to its mechanically

foreseeable future and to liberate the sciences and philosophy from an overly narrow and historical image. It will then have to shed light on new problems which are embarrassing and poorly thought: the impoverishment of the notion of “domain,” the formation of disciplines whose interest is not simply theoretical, taking into account the conjunctions around analogies in the formation of a scientific problem, the status of applied sciences, the signification of ethical discourses accompanying scientific and technological developments, etc... The latter only appear for an instant and in this epistemological framework in a symptomatic form, because the inexplicitness of its concepts and an overly narrow, not quite universal comprehension of philosophy insist that it always proceeds under the same hypotheses, occasionally reversed and intensified, not recognized as such, but always given up to philosophical sufficiency. Hence some of the very narrow and consequently moral descriptions (it’s necessary to “get your hands dirty” in order to comprehend science, etc.).

The dualization of epistemology in accordance with its two sources permits the liberation of the latter as transcendental orders, their unification without hierarchy or non-unitary unification. But, as a result, the object of epistemological discourses seems as though it never had anything to do with science since these discourses essentially suppose a continuity between their object and the knowledge of this object. Epistemology effectively yet confusedly makes use of philosophy on behalf of the sciences. By transforming it into material, non-philosophy will be able to utilize these discourses as a source of new scientific and philosophical problems and knowledges in the occasion from which philosophy and science work on an equal footing. For example, the geometrical concept of fractality can find a scientific usage without being geometrical for all that; it can also be formulated in natural language without becoming a philosophical or epistemological mixture through a non-philosophical process of universalization. Hence the new non-epistemological conceptions of induction, deduction, axiomatization, hypotheses, definitions, and other notions of traditional epistemology.

Non-Erotics

Ensemble of the modes of approach and non-philosophical formulations of duality that constitutes the subject-Stranger as a uni-sex subject.

We shall call erotics the converging ensemble of doctrines which, from Plato to Badiou passing through Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, attempt to assure consistency to the thematic of an originary Two—an attempt more recently explored by psychoanalysis. Philosophical erotics tends to sexualize duality, by imposing on it the dyadic form of the union of contraries, relayed by the unity that imprints it on the philosophical One: the sex of philosophy is, in fact, nothing but a contrary for-the-One.

In psychoanalysis, we could speak of contrary-for-the-Other, being only the misrecognition, instead of the Other, of sexualization. This results in the assumption of a sex without sexuality and the erotics of a relation-without-relation where, however, “the three falls together from the two” (Lacan), i.e. that in the nonsexual relation is superposed an external relation in the Other: the contrary thus becoming

the contradictory, on condition that the real of the One is understood as the impossible. We shall thus distinguish from philosophical erotics or the erotics of contraries a psychoanalytic erotics of contradiction that can at least testify to a jubilating consummation of the Logos.

Like the Enjoyed through and through, thus without the other-world of jouissance, the One is (non-)erotic since it has nothing to do with contraries and never participates in any logico-real mixture.

This Enjoyed, without the subject-object of aesthetics or the desiring ethical subject, separates the One from every *telos* of given difference, in-One or outside it, a *telos* still called love, because in non-philosophy every difference is instead dualytic.

The vision-in-One certainly does not ignore the horizon of the Two and the Multiple. But far from being extracted from the Multiple in a subtractive way, in a manner in which it would fundamentally appear sexuated under the effect of this deduction and which, according to Badiou's powerful proposition, love would always be heterosexual, non-produced from a rupture, non-femininity is to itself only sex-without-sexuation, or sexual-without-sexuality. This is why it appears as Enjoyed and determines-in-the-last-instance "sexual difference," cloning from the latter a non-eroticism which is not the negation of Eros but the constitution of every human into a uni-sex subject. In this sense, every non-erotic subject is sex-Stranger or sexually-existing-Stranger. Uni-sex is not the marketable indifference of the sexes but sex insofar as it makes every subject a Stranger.

Non-Ethics

Effectuation of non-philosophy in the ethical- or philosophical-world, this term does not designate the negation of ethics but its universalization according-to-the-One as well as its exclusive subordination to man; this is the theory and use of ethics adequate to the essence of man as radical immanence or radical evil.

Despite certain empirical interpretations which confuse it with the description of mores or ethos in opposition to morality that would be prescriptive, ethics designates either a more universal form of commandment than morality (it is addressed to all moral beings and to the personality as society and not to the individual—cf. Schelling) or the universality of a science. From this perspective, it is either theoretical science of moral judgment or practical science teaching what should be desired.

Non-ethics recovers this latter and double determination of ethics and transforms it. It is identically presented as a theory or a science and as a pragmatic bearing upon philosophical and regional (sociological, biological, etc.) doctrines of morality or practice—on the ethical-world. It demonstrates that the relations of philosophy and ethics are ethico-philosophical mixtures, i.e. aporetic. On the one hand, these mixtures subordinate ethics to philosophy as "superior ethics" which is partially excluded from communal moral legislation and implies an exception through

hierarchy; or it is subordinated to a religious affect of radical transcendence which implies exception by election. The ethico-philosophical is equivocal, the ethico-religious antidemocratic. On the other hand, these mixtures prevent ethics from positing a truly unconditioned imperative since that of philosophy and that of the transcendent-religious are still more unconditioned than that of ethics. Finally, they partially subordinate man to ethics, philosophy, and the Law. The implication of philosophical ethics in particular is that the Law is made circularly by and for man, thus reciprocally that man is made by and for the Law. This idealism and this voluntarism culminate in the “moral vision of the world” (Kant and Fichte) where the being of man is reabsorbed in the obedience to the commandment or better in the project of freedom.

On the contrary, non-philosophy posits that man is the immanent cause of ethics or that it determines it in-the-last-instance by excluding the relations of metaphysical causality between it and ethics. The essence of man as radical solitude—also called “radical evil” of being foreclosed—is not directly this cause. It acts as this cause when it takes not the form of the will, but of the existing-subject-Stranger, of the force (of) thought whose ethical modality is here not the Law but the force (of) law. The force (of) law does not derive from the existing Law, but designates the element of height or alterity so that it is at least susceptible of being received in-One and brought to the subject-Stranger. In other words, this non-ethical subject—for the ethical-world—is deprived of auto-positionality which would make its essence, for example, into the Law as form of the ought (Kant) or into the Project (Fichte), and which still exists under a residual form only inhibited by the radical transcendence of the Face or the Other (Levinas). Radical evil, the subject-Stranger, and the force (of) law are the major concepts of non-ethics, for they determine the theoretical and practical usage of ethics. Non-ethics or ethics-according-to-the-Stranger does not claim to create new morals (cf. Kant) or to be satisfied with giving the rigorous formula of existing morals, but invents/discovers the formula of a new use of existing morals and ethics. This formula being determined by the real essence of man alone, non-ethics is the limitation of the inhuman Law and ethics on behalf of man, who is no longer defined as being reasonable, i.e. ultimately as philosopher, but as “ordinary man” or Stranger. More positively, it universalizes ethics from the point of view of experience precisely because it deprives them of their philosophical pretention to define the essence of man. By definition it refuses entering into the philosophical circularity of the ethical-world, it more reasonably refuses entering into the contemporary marketplace of ethics. One thing alone is good—i.e. human and only human, in the World or above all outside the World, i.e. for the World—which is the force (of) law exercised by the Stranger. But it is only good because one thing alone is determinant of the usage of the World, and that is radical evil, the solitude of being-foreclosed or separated.

Non-Intuitive (non-spatial and non-temporal)

Mode of being of thought produced by the force (of) thought on the basis of materials of scientific and philosophical representations, intuitive or spontaneously spatialized and temporalized; it only renders visible according to the Invisible-of-the-last-instance, thus without leading thought back to its philosophical virtualization and temporalization.

To grasp the problem of space in the constitution of thought, the philosophical work supposes the interaction, for example, of three spatial structures. The first spatial structuration concerns writing which, according to Plato, represses Speech

(myth of Teuth). Classical authors are not disturbed by this problematic of inscription. In the second place, space is *partes extra partes*, the unlimited milieu (apeiron) or Chaos. Finally, these still spatial determinations virtualize Chaos into a positive Logos. In Plato, these three structurations are intricated and constitute the philosophical Order. In Kant, space, the pure form of intuition, is more particularly related to the Logos of the categories disciplining the rhapsody of the sensible. Husserl is disturbed, on the contrary, by the idealizing function of mathematized space, just like Bergson. The differentialists return to shifting writing, sometimes topology, sometimes difference disseminating space. However, by doing so they duplicate space which simultaneously becomes concept and unlimited milieu. Their radicalization does not escape from the doubling interaction of Chaos and Logos. The entirety of philosophy, explicitly or not (Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger), reinforces the spatial intuitivity of thought through its temporal intuitivity, never completely eradicated despite Heidegger's efforts, to the extent that philosophy essentially remains a work of the language-world.

Non-philosophy abandons the differe(a)ntialist spirit which does not really escape from the doublet of the empirical and the transcendental or the doublet of space and time. Language takes on a functional and no longer originary role on behalf of the force (of) thought. This order of the functional is structured in-the-last-instance by the vision-in-One which supports the supposedly necessary intuitivity of thought. With the end of the importance attached to its intuitivity (common and/or philosophical or ontological), language is brought to the so-called "non-conceptual" state of "words-without-language." It no longer serves to name Being and to make its ultimate sense appear (that it be topological or temporal), but it is transformed into the reserve of terms or "first names" which enter into the axioms formed on the objects of non-philosophy. If a residue of sensible and ontological intuitivity accompanies thought and its "words-without-language," it only serves as some manner of support for the noemata that philosophy extracts from the operations and concepts of philosophy. This residual intuitivity is transcendent and no longer determines the essence of thought as ontology but belongs to the pure transcendental axiomatic which it has become as a trace of its occasional philosophical origin and as a testimony to the relative autonomy of the latter. Non-philosophy is the "choice" of the Real against the philosophical choice of space and time, i.e. finally, of Being. More generally and independently of language, intuition as mode of representation of the object is here dualized in: 1) intuition in the philosophical sense, now recognized as auto-intuition and not simply intuition of an object; 2) intuition as starting-from-the-intuited, not as exclusion of every intuition, but as "simple" or "non-self-intuitional" intuition (non-self-positional Distance).

(Non-)One

Other name for unilaterality, form of suspension or invalidation which, no longer arising from Being but from the One, is a mode of the One's being-foreclosed, either real and not effectuated ("uni-laterality"), or transcendental and effectuated by the occasion of philosophical "nothingness" ("unilaterality"). It testifies to the primacy of (real) foreclosure over (philosophical) negation.

From Plato to Fichte, negation arises from the logico-real order of an anti-thesis. Several philosophers have supposed the contingency of negation thus understood, from the fact of the reapplicability of the logical order to itself or double negation (Hegel). For philosophy, with several close exceptions (Bergson), the category of negation has its reason in non-Being or Nothingness (Heidegger, Sartre), whether matched with the negative dialectic or not. Contemporary philosophy replaces negation through more positive experiences of alterity which mitigate it (difference, multiplicity, dissemination, singularities, finitude, etc.) without for all that the unitary illusion being broken, these substitutions taking place in the linguistic element alone and remaining conditioned by the horizon, if not of Being, at least of the structure of the philosophical Decision.

In the sciences, the non- is bound in particular to non-classical, multivalued, or intuitionist logics. But the usage of the non- from which non-philosophy's departure is inspired is that of "non-Euclidean geometry" in the sense that the non- (which has finally replaced the expressions "metageometry" or "pangeometry") simultaneously determines the limits of the Euclidean in geometry and generalizes the latter. This generalization has been thought differently, according to how one understands Euclidean geometry as a model of non-Euclidean geometry (Poincare), a position which allows admitting as such an infinite number of non-Euclidean geometries, or according to how one postulates the radical heterogeneity of these geometries (Russell) and thus their restriction to spaces in constant curvature. These two attitudes—between which could be ranked those of Riemann, Klein, Helmholtz, Cayley, or Hilbert for example—differ in the interpretation of the axioms' role, and in particular of the so-called "parallel lines" postulate—"disguised definition of distance" (Poincare) (hence the idea of a "dictionary" allowing the passage from one geometry to another), whereas it harbors an empirical value for the others. The treatment of the "non-" thus involves diverse conceptions of models and axiomatics, concepts of which philosophy also makes use.

The (non-)One, suspensive causality of the One over philosophy and one of the roots of non-philosophy, is not a negation but an invalidating suspension of philosophy's claims. Non-philosophy is not a negation, no more than in its order non-Euclidean geometry is a non-geometry, it is the identity (of) philosophy liberated from its principle of sufficiency. Its essence is the being-foreclosed or real indifference of the One and its immanent uni-versality ("negative" condition of the givenness of philosophy). The (non-) One thus itself has a real "negative" form, which directly expresses this foreclosure or this "uni-laterality" of the One and an "applied" form or "unilaterality" of-the-last-instance which exerts itself upon the transcendental Unity, among others, of the philosophical Decision. Negation is thus no longer—despite the expression "non-philosophy"—the resource of this thought. Only being-foreclosed as real essence can enable a non-technological usage of negation, to explain it or manifest its phenomenal identity outside its metaphysical sense. Non-philosophy abandons negation and Nothingness, their mitigated forms as well as their metaphysical forms, for the same reason that it released itself from Being—i.e. from the resources of philosophy. The "non-Euclidean metaphor" is thus subordinated to being-

foreclosed as the “non-Euclidean” generalization of philosophy is in the immanent uni-versality of the vision-in-One...

Non-Philosophy

Autonomous and specific discipline of an identically scientific and philosophical type, which describes in-the-last-instance according to the One-real and by means of philosophy and science considered as material, on the one hand the force (of) thought or the existing-subject-Stranger, on the other hand the object of non-philosophy, the identity (of) the thought-world.

Non-philosophy is regarded by philosophy either as the state of immediacy of naive and sensible opinions (the judgments of common sense), or as its other which it remains to think (sciences, technologies, politics, the arts...) that is to say as the presuppositions of philosophy itself (the innumerable “non-thoughts” [*impensés*]) which are in turn philosophizable). Merleau-Ponty’s report in connection with post-Hegelian thinkers (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Marx...) is very revealing when he wonders whether our century “does not enter the age of non-philosophy.” But the expression initially has a negative content, even depreciated, which can become positive as it has among contemporary thinkers of difference, such as Derrida (cf. *Positions*), and especially Deleuze (cf. *What Is Philosophy?*) who still synthesizes to the extreme this very “negative” vagueness which is at bottom the thought of the Other, by writing: “the philosopher must become non-philosopher, so that non-philosophy becomes the ground and the people of philosophy.”

Distinct from this becoming that intertwines Being and Difference, the vision-in-One (as immanent and manifest Real) is the transcendental “thread” of a non-philosophical thought consisting and positively distinct from this non-philosophical current flowing in the recesses of philosophy.

Non-philosophy is an autonomous and specific discipline which has its own concepts (One-real, vision-in-One, first science, cloning...) ; its theoretical operations which are transcendental by their real or in-One cause (induction and deduction); its non-autopositional pragmatic rules; its philosophically undecidable objects such as; the One, Being, the Other, the Existent, and which, non-philosophically transformed, gives: the One-real; the *a priori* structure of Representation; the philosophical as the Principle of resistance of the thought-world; the chaotic universe (of) multiple representations obtained by acting it of the One-cause on the philosophical material as forms of the World. Autonomy means the epistemic cut (foreclosed being, determination-in-the-last-instance, unilaterality, the dual...) between the non-philosophical posture and the philosophical Decision. The specificity of non-philosophy wants to speak of a practice (pragmatic and theoretical) strictly immanent for philosophy but also sciences, art...with determined rules, as for example the rule of the chora, the suspension of philosophical Authority, and the staging of philosophy’s material.

Non-philosophy is initially a theory by or according to the One, therefore a unified theory of science and philosophy. It is over time a theoretical, practical and critical discourse, distinct from philosophy without being a meta-philosophy. It is specified according to the regional material inserted into the structure of the philosophical Decision (non-aesthetics, non-ethics, etc).

Non-Psychoanalysis

Real and transcendental uni-versalization of psychoanalysis which suspends its theoretical authority rather than its objects (Unconscious, Identification, Symptom, etc.) by relating it to the Real as vision-in-One rather than to a final philosophical definition of the Real. Non-psychoanalysis is the unified theory (not unitary or auto-legitimizing) of psychoanalysis and philosophy.

All philosophy is by definition anti-psychoanalytic instead of non-psychoanalytic insofar as it refers to Being or the transcendent Other. Even through its essence it denies (Sartre) or ignores (Leibniz's "tiny perceptions") the autonomy or immanent alterity of the unconscious. Psychoanalysis affirms on the contrary, through its essence, the irreducibility of the unconscious to any philosophical operation. This incompatibility does not exclude certain philosophers (Ricouer, Deleuze, Henry, Derrida); even certain analysts (to begin with, Lacan) tried several allergic combinations which would join these two domains, particularly around the notion of a supposed subject (of the unconscious). Lacan notably believed to be able to affirm, after Michel Henry whose research would confirm this genealogy if it was authentically analytic, that the subject of the unconscious is the Cartesian subject.

On its behalf, in a final homage to philosophical authority, psychoanalysis lays claim to its own autonomy, its sufficiency, and the critique of philosophy. The double yet always unequal bind of philosophy and psychoanalysis is the Ariadne's thread leading through the labyrinth of 20th century "continental" thought, and the ground upon which psychoanalysis' pretensions of autonomy are dismantled. These types of unitary relations inaugurated by the "Judaic turn" of thought at the beginning of the century only allows imagining—the concept (still) does not exist in this framework—a very restrained form of "non-psychoanalysis," for example through a simple transference of the non-Euclidean style. The topological generalization, de-biologization, and de-psychologization of psychoanalysis, along with the primacy of theory over the system performed by Lacan, are undoubtedly the most fruitful tendencies in the transformation of psychoanalysis (not by its own means but under its own authority and under that of the thought-world) and the preparation of non-psychoanalysis.

Non-philosophy is concretized and exposed in diverse "unified theories" or according-to-the-One in-the-last-instance. In particular, it substitutes a unified theory of psychoanalysis and philosophy in their confused, unstable, and violent relations. From this perspective, simultaneously of its own necessity and through that which the Lacanian occasion offers, it reorganizes every analytic

problematic including the Real/Symbolic/Imaginary structure around the primacy of the Real and the One but understood as vision-in-One, foreclosed to the order of knowledge and thought, not simply to the symbolic. Any knot between any circle merely ties these essential instances in a structure or simultaneity, but a series of clonings articulates the Real and the thought-world. For example, if Lacan-thought is given as simple material, it is necessary, on the one hand, to treat its philosophico-analytic complex as the Imaginary object of non-psychoanalysis and the symbolic and in general all the structures of the Unconscious and the Other as occasion and symptom of the transcendental and aprioritic instances of a non-analytic “subject” through which the force (of) thought gives its universal matrix. From this point of view, these are all analytic instances which are transformed and displaced: the Unconscious itself, the Other, Object, Symptom, Identification, Desire, Jouissance, etc. On the other hand, the structural and “Borromean” organization of these instances, forcibly unitary, circular, and knotted, finally yields to a cloning process. The Real clones non-analytic instances on the basis of the philosophico-analytic given.

Unified theory thus radically differs from the syntheses described, which it considers as mixtures that, in their entirety, together constitute the Imaginary or philosophico-analytic symptom. Hence the dyads of the subject and the object, of the conscious and the unconscious, the signifier and the signified, metaphor and metonymy in their pre-pragmatic use in a large number of Lacanian analysts or several “Derridanalysts.”

The Real is given prior to the Imaginary or the transcendental appearance of the philosophico-analytic, what unified theory will call, in this particular case, the Enjoyed, or Enjoyed-without-enjoyment. The Enjoyed [Joui] is distinguished from enjoyment [jouissance] which is furthermore so poorly defined that a number of contemporary analysts gladly identify it with the unconscious. The Real—contrary to Lacan’s lack-oriented ontology—adequate, with the exclusion of any other, to the Freudian discovery—never lacks even though it is of itself radically foreclosed. Radical jouissance is distinguished completely from “Jouissance,” which the philosophico-analytic mixture characterizes as the return of the repressed, the subversion of the subject, jouissance of the Other, phallic jouissance, indeed jouissance of being or the open, proliferations of disseminated signifiers where the One-experience of the Enjoyed is completely lost in “La-Jouissance.” Non-psychoanalysis admits jouissance as an analogue of the Stranger, organon of the Enjoyed as the cause-of-the-last-instance of the Unconscious. This latter is thus a jouissance neither connected to a mixture nor a symptom (which marks a decisive rupture with psychiatry). With this title, we shall speak of the non-self-signifying Unconscious, never signifying or coming to overdetermine jouissance.

The fundamental tendencies of this lack-oriented ontology in Lacan—rather than those of subtractive ontology—constitute the privileged, but not only, material submitted to non-psychoanalysis.

Because it is not a question of destroying psychoanalysis but of transforming it into an object-material and occasion of a different, more rigorous, and more universal knowledge. Non-psychoanalysis intends to put an end to the confused conflict between philosophy and psychoanalysis; by universalizing the latter under conditions which are no longer philosophical and scientific (mathematical), but in-One-in-the-last-instance; by making theoretical and pragmatic activity prevail over the system; finally, by establishing the theory of a non-analytic

subject. Rather than the discourse of the Other, non-psychoanalysis is the discourse of the Stranger-of-the-last-instance, of man as existing-Stranger.

Non-Rhetoric

Usage of rhetoric and its philosophical employment according to the vision-in-One. More than a philosophically “generalized rhetoric,” it is a uni-versal rhetoric for the thought-world.

Primarily, rhetoric is less a specific domain than an organon. Nevertheless, classical philosophy treated it in a specified way as fulfilling two functions: ornamentation—excluding, if you will, being taken for the “whole dry truth” (Leibniz)—and persuasion, which was confined at best to writings classified as “synthetic” (for example, *The Principles of Philosophy* or the *Monadology*), more apt to be read by those who let themselves be led by their imagination. Philosophy excludes rhetoric to protect itself from the inessential and the ignorant as well as from the multiplicity of other contemporary philosophies (this is why it requires all the same a force of conviction) and the existence of autonomous exteriorities. It internalizes the latter by postulating a non rhetorical usage (in a negative and restrained sense) of language to protect itself from the modifications and falsifications unmastered by it. The relations between classical philosophy and rhetoric will then be all the more complex since the latter equally supposed a simple and natural manner of speaking after being able to evaluate turns and figures, and that this simplicity has been founded on a non-figural figure, “catachresis” or dead metaphor (cf. in particular Fontanier). The Moderns have taken account of the ambiguous complexity of these relations, either in a weak fashion by postulating that philosophy seeks to convince the public of its readers (Perelmann-Obrecht-Tytecka), or in a stronger way by postulating a philosophical anaphora as veritable gesture of establishment (Souriau). In effect, after one admits that all interpretations of philosophy, even the most contradictory, belong to it (Leibniz, German Idealism), rhetoric can invest all philosophy. But it is above all with and after Nietzsche, around him, that rhetoric becomes an explicit theme investing a field equivalent to Being and organizing its own modes of manifestation. Rhetoric is then required more or less strategically, like the signifier, to semi-objectively describe the operations or gestures of philosophy (Derrida, Galay). The margins, disseminations, ashes, monstrosity, forgetfulness, the Other, etc. become philosophical terms on the same rank as classical themes; they even belong as the at least partial conditions of their apprehension. There is thus no truth without rhetoric. No metaphor is a catechresis but a metaphor of metaphor, the classical example appearing as a rhetorical turn. It is not a question of reducing philosophy to rhetoric but of setting ontology between parentheses in philosophy. This is the meaning of a “generalized rhetoric,” an active affirmation of the Other or drive in philosophy.

The goal of generalized rhetoric is not to specify these deviations but to administer their ensemble into distinct singularities: it is a transcendental rule of relations

between forms and contents, between syntaxes and themes, between multiplicities and exteriorities. Rhetoric is thus simultaneously means and metastable variance of deviations, of differences of philosophical potentials. Philosophy only conserves the rhetoric that allows the distinction and mastery of alterity and exteriority according to its own structure of doublet and redoubling (of simulacra). It even becomes (cf. Nietzsche) the possibility of an almost rigorous reversibility between philosophy and its alterities, its exteriorities, in such a way that the former does not lose itself; it is conserved in its consistency and its coherence by giving itself the means of mastering these sets of relations. Hence Deleuze's extreme thesis: there is no metaphor, which is the opposite of generalized rhetoric.

Liberated from philosophical sufficiency, non-philosophy does not have to reduce the "turns" for the example or denial of rhetoric, nor to exclude the multiplicity of philosophies founded on the recourse to the latter. On the contrary, it liberates rhetoric after enriching and modifying the philosophical material. Non-spatializing, it enables recognition in Being and the discourse of all possible spaces, and even those which found the distance that each philosophy gives itself in the empirical which is given to it, in that which it constructs according to its transcendentals, or even in that which it calls "real." The rules of transformation of the material are indifferent to rhetoric and hence liberate the latter from its philosophical restrictions.

"Non-rhetoric" is the manifestation of language according to the One which is not language, but such that it is no longer measured by an efficacy (persuasion) or an inefficacy (the obscuring of relations of transparency with the real). This latter division between force of conviction and force of transparency has no place here, for it merely reinforces philosophical divisions and hierarchies. Let us simply speak of a force (of) language which transforms the relations of transparency and conviction. Non-rhetoric treats these relations as so many identities and no longer seeks in the use of a metaphor that which is "properly" philosophical and that which is not—the distinction of disciplines is no longer subordinated to philosophy. We shall call "style" the "strangerhoods" which are no longer related to the non-figural or to the normal but each comprised as identity (of the) philosophical and (of the) non-philosophical. Every attempt will be able to be recognized as individuated, each turn or figure treated as a mode of the identity of the subject-Stranger. Nothing can then limit the play of figures: they are so many proper names of the identities of the Ego and the Stranger. Style justifiably posits the identity of heterogeneous elements without seeking to reduce them according to a supposedly normative or fundamental wrapper of language. Thus, rhetoric is no longer evaluated according to representational contents nor limited in view of the control and mastery of alterity after protecting a certain traditional image of thought. Considered as identities rather than as relations or differences of potential, figures can be posited in-the-last-instance either as radically different or individuated without there being a relation of active indifference between these two solutions, for it is no longer a question here of dividing and hierarchizing Being.

Non-Sufficiency (of the Real or the One)

The "principle" of in-sufficient Real is that which alone invalidates without remainder, if not a material, the Principle of sufficient Reason and its universalization, at least the Principle of sufficient philosophy. It signifies that the Real as vision-in-One is a uni-versal but simply

negative condition, necessary but non-sufficient, and which must be effectuated by the givenness of the thought-world. In itself it is not insufficient, but “radical” rather than “absolute,” yet becomes so in relation to thought: it is thus as cause or principle that it exists.

The real, such as it is posited by philosophical decisions with which they reciprocally determine themselves through various equivalent operations, is of a completely relative insufficiency. It requires decisions of thought even in its essence because thought has already contributed to defining it and affects its essence—it is the system of insufficient sufficiency. It forms with thought a system of sufficiency or the absolute which takes on the name of “philosophy” and expresses itself in different layers of the philosophical Decision (faith-in-the-real, transcendental-and-real unity, autopoitional transcendence, primacy-and-priority of philosophy over regional knowledges, etc.). Philosophy can describe itself in this way, but only in partial or particular descriptions (according to some decision, etc.) which misrecognizes the sense (of) identity of these descriptions.

Precisely because it is radical (and not absolute), the sufficiency of the Real, that of its immanence without desire or need of thought, implies also its completely “radical” insufficiency for thought which could develop itself on the basis of it and according to it. From this point of view, non-philosophy articulates itself on a “principle” of the Real’s non-sufficiency which invalidates, by dualizing them, the mixtures which are the Principles of Reason and sufficient philosophies. The Real is not a problem, it is the presupposed grace in which thought becomes a problem rather than a question. But it supplies nothing but the immanent uni-versality specific to the vision-in-One. It is also necessary to supply it with the World in the form of thought, thus of philosophy, but now in the sense of simple “occasional” material or field of properties with which transcendental and empirical effectuation becomes possible. If it is itself foreclosed to the World, thought is not, and the vision-in-One “extracts” it from the mixture it forms with the World. The non-sufficiency of the Real is completely positive, it concerns nothing but its function of cause in relation to thought. It justifies the recourse to an experience—undoubtedly special because it is the experience that philosophy has become—and legitimates non-philosophy’s claim of possessing an experimental aspect without being an experimental discipline in the positivist sense.

Non-Technology

Unified theory of technics and philosophy. It takes for material or object their unitary relations of techno-scientific mixture and above all the engineer sciences—engineering—which it treats as its proximate symptom. It extracts from it a thought through orders (of) identity qualitatively different and transcendently distinct. It relates the technico-philosophical complex, with its ideologies (all-technology, technologism, techno-science, end of philosophy, etc.) to the Real which enables the critique of these illusions and determines these heterogeneous orders in-the-last-instance.

The term “technology” has a minor but momentous history whose invariant is the articulation of technics and logos. It has primarily designated the limited domain of description of know-hows, of their tools and ingredients, to now designate the mixtures of technics and sciences in their interpretations and political, economic,

and social usages. This latter preference finally tends to identify technology with knowledge of networks, systems, and complexity, its essence being to articulate heterogeneous elements on all levels and all orders. This concept thus almost naturally discovers its place in monist philosophies and sociologies, in the case where the real is identified with the complexity of networks. Scientific technics, through their imitation, can function as breaks, but the continuities are privileged the moment when technology is thought of as the silent and omnipresent transcendental of so-called “postmodern” society whose philosophical finesse is exerted in a sort of sceptical relativism, where the grand categories of Man, Science, and Work appear as products of networks and lose their autonomy.

The philosophical critique of this concept consists in creating its genealogy and showing that it is the result of the reversal and intensification of a narrow and reductive conception of science, characterized by the opposition of theory and experience, thus in several proximate displacements of the logos and technics. In contrast, philosophy does not destroy the amphibology essential to this concept which would allow it to extract its most positive value. Technology seems to be the schematizing articulation of two heterogeneous orders. The first is formed by extremely diverse multiplicities of finite events or problems, simultaneously technical and scientific—it is somewhat a question of the sciences of engineering in their broadest conception. The second is its imaginary continuation and totalization which functions in the manner of a schematism that relates these events to Being. Technology thus has two types of existence, almost always confused, which makes it oscillate between the engineering sciences and philosophy. This inequality confers upon it in the same stroke the traits of competency and humanism, often considered as the foundations of the good in democracy. One then finds that the definitions of technology are too narrow and that philosophy itself is technology: the former explaining the latter.

Non-philosophy does not content itself in treating technologism as a transcendental illusion. It takes the technological discourses and metadiscourses seriously but as a disguised description of that which would make us forget the illusion: that which is “at the heart” of the epistemological opposition between “theory” and “experience,” between “logos” and “technics.” In effect, the engineering sciences, which almost have no place in classical epistemology and which are in some way the “truth” of technology, are its symptom. The transformation of technological statements outside “sufficiency” allows these sciences to emerge, to designate a broader and more specific conception of them, to destroy the epistemological limits of the classical concept of science, and to renovate the comprehension of its technical usages.

The engineering sciences are not completely independent of the classical image of science but imply a new relation to scientific knowledges. They do not define domains and are more difficult to identify than the classical sciences. They are instead generic disciplines capable of treating widely different problems in project or objective. They thus articulate knowledges of different origin and multiple levels of “concretude”: models then become more important than theories in the resolution of problems. Theory appears as a “theoretical given,” simultaneously condition of knowledge and compatibility of the models employed in this project. It is one of the

reasons why engineering is often identified with design (C.A.O. or C.M.A.O.) and divided by philosophy between analysis and conception, or even between the formal character of knowledges and the articulation of models on the one hand, and the empirical and sensible content of the technologies they modify on the other.

Non-philosophy refuses this division and posits an identity-of-the-last-instance which allows specifying the engineering sciences in light of its technoscientific and epistemological interpretations. The usage of theory by the engineering sciences is then characterizable not by economical, political, or ideological protraction and projections, but by the fact that its knowledges are indecomposable in-the-last-instance, that they are investments in the models. This identity allows radically distinguishing between the conception of engineering and the philosophical project: the constraints of a problem of engineering are defined, internal to its project, although the engineer discovers simultaneously as he or she invents. At the same time, the multiplicities of the engineering sciences are neither unifying nor sensible like those of philosophy: their identity does not depend upon the terms it unifies, it is what ensures, on the contrary, the identity of the most heterogeneous terms.

Thus, non-philosophy dualizes the concept of technology elaborated on the occasion of the systematic engagement of the classical sciences and technics. It therefore distinguishes the engineering sciences from the ethical discourses with which they are accompanied in a continual way as a substitute for a lackluster ideology. If ethics simply concerns the prosthetic bodies and philosophical anthropoids but not at all Man as subject-Stranger while non-philosophy posits it, the ethical problem transforms into a non-ethical problem, radically distinct from that of technology: only a transcendental illusion confuses them. Technology will then lose its function of Grand Transcendental, like what previously happened to the categories of History and Language, while its imaginary dimensions will be effectively assumed from their aspect by fiction and science-fiction.

Occasion (occasional cause)

[Original translation by Anthony Paul Smith]

Said of the specific causality of philosophy or the thought-world in general—with regard to the causality of the One or the Real, the Determination-in-the-last-instance. This concept thus belongs to non-philosophy rather than to philosophy itself: it is the non-philosophical sense or the noema which receives the causality of philosophy that is foreclosure-in-the-last-instance of the One.

The occasion stems from a double register. In practical and everyday ethics, it is a notion similar to that of *kairos* but of a distinct temporality. In metaphysics, it has given rise to the “occasionalist” theory of Malebranche who attributes the reality of causality to God alone and thus reduces physical causality to functions of simple impulsion and relay.

To the vision-in-One, ultimate and necessary but non-sufficient (“negative”) point of view, an object may be given that effectuates it. This givenness of an Other-than-the-Real, enjoying a relative autonomy, is certainly indispensable but it cannot make itself so under the condition of the Real, consequently of its determination-in-the-last-instance by the latter. Such a real suspension of the causality of philosophy is that of its real then transcendental illusion. It does not destroy the mechanism proper to philosophy but transforms the sense or the importance that it spontaneously attributes to itself as thought-world possessing all possible causality and a unitary causality which it believes to be the Real. Occasionality is therefore the noematic sense to which the determination-in-the-last-instance reduces the alleged causality of philosophy. Because of this sense, we do not speak of philosophical causality as reduced “occasionally” but “occasional” [*occasionnelle*]. The simply occasional status of philosophy specifies itself in turn in three functions which it then fulfills in the constitution of non-philosophy or the force (of) thought: a function of nomination or symbolic support for the first terms of non-philosophy; a function of symptomatic indication by which philosophy indicates itself or signals itself in the vision-in-One, for example as transcendental structure, or as *a priori* and transcendence; finally, a so-called function of material for cloning by which it allows the One to clone a function of radical transcendental Identity alongside itself; then cloning a function of *a priori* Identity alongside itself as philosophical *a priori*. The Real does not universalize itself—it is already universal—, but there is an agent of its effectuation, and it is the philosophical occasion, precisely its sense of occasional causality.

Ordinary Mysticism

Usage of mysticism in accordance with the instance of radical immanence, of the One-in-One, itself called “the” mystical. The mystical, although foreclosed to thought, is the negative universal condition of man as Stranger.

“Mysticism” designates the experience of a supposedly immediate and rationally impenetrable access to a transcendent order of reality. On the one hand, it is a question of an immediate supra-rational or supra-discursive coincidence, indeed supra-intuitive, proceeding without the aid of a form or a concept. On the other hand, this so-called “mystical” access—when it turns itself into the “inspiration” or “recesses” of the soul, or better to a super- or non-human calling—to a phenomenon which reveals itself but which exceeds the possibilities of language, follows the path of an identification immanent to a transcendent order of reality always supposedly being the authentic real, or a real beyond the limits of discourse and language. Since it is a question of the transcendence of a superessential God in the immanence of the (Christian mystical) soul or of a reality which reveals itself without being able to be spoken, in the manner of an alterity (Wittgenstein), this excess, so as to be able to be called “mystical,” should not be a simple delimitation, lack, or absence, as in deconstruction, but an ekstasis, be it blocked or prohibited, a phenomenal given or an experience of transcendence given “in person” on the mode of immanence.

If all philosophical concepts of mysticism or the mystical are polarized by transcendence which

is supposedly the object of immanent experience, non-philosophy reduces the mystical to designate immanence alone, but having become to itself its own phenomenal given or even the Real. “Mysticism” is a possible nomination for the essence of the Real or the vision-in-One. The reduction of transcendence, of its ekstastic essence and its religious modalities, rightly understood only suspends the mystical or mysticism, save for the phenomenon which is mystical experience, its reality, and the act deploying its uni-versality into the heart of thought. Real or mystical identity thus “precedes” mystical identification, as it determines-in-the-last-instance the usage of discourse and language, without for all that giving place to the aporias of an undecidability or an ineffability of “negative theology.” On the contrary, because it is now radically immanent and without ek-stasis, but not without uni-versality, mystical experience is the content in the real of a new non-theological usage of language. In the latter, the logos ceases being itself denied in the name of the immanence of a transcendence, thus of an antinomic reciprocation that implies the autonomy of the logos with itself. It is suspended by a force (of) thought which no doubt possesses a grasp on language but which, on its side and through its real essence, is not grasped by the latter. Because the mystical thus understood is only an immanent cause through its essence, and consequently in radical heteronomy to the logos, the non-philosophical usage of language does not end in a negative henology, the negation or suspension of the logos no longer belonging to the essence of the real cause or the mystical since it still belongs to the religious relation to a superessential.

Whereas philosophy calls “mysticism” the real, which it touches upon or approaches in a transcendence, or even beyond, but without being able to penetrate it, being satisfied by an intuition or representation which it denies, non-philosophy takes its departure in the same Real as mystical given-without-givenness and endeavors, on this universal yet insufficient basis, to transform our relation to philosophy, science, art—to mysticism itself from which it liberates non-philosophical and non-religious *a priori*s. From this perspective, it is not a question of a secularization—still rational and transcendent—of an extraordinary experience, but of the possibility of rendering the usage of an exceptional or superhuman experience in every “ordinary man” which was supposed to be refused to him. Philosophy is this organon, this *a priori* form which, giving us the World, forecloses the mystical experience which intrinsically constitutes humans and which is a question of rediscovering, not in its reality which has never abandoned us, but on the mode of thought and by the non-philosophical force of the latter. The mystical is the real essence of the Stranger and that which turns it, that which uni-verts it towards the World.

Other (non-autopositional Other, non-thetic Transcendence)

Aprioritic structure which is a mode of the force (of) thought and the non-autopositional Distance which belongs to it. It corresponds to the symptom-material of transcendence yet insofar as the latter is not reduced to simple exteriority or distance but adds a “vertical” dimension or height to it.

The philosophical history of the Other is punctuated by three epochs. 1) The Other as belonging to the Same or expelled by it, as deprived of being and more or less identical to the pure multiple or simulacra (Plato). 2) The Other as real opposition, existence irreducible to logic (Kant). This Other founds the modern concept of the

subject as denying its particularity and transcendence towards self. But it is finally re-absorbable into rational autoposition. 3) The Other, in the Judaic and psychoanalytic extraction, characterized by a real transcendence affecting the ideal transcendence of the Logos (Derrida). This Other, proper to the “Judaic turn” and posterior to Nietzsche, marks the “attack” or real excess of alterity over philosophy but always under the ultimate authority of the latter, supposedly valid. Furthermore, the Other being grasped dialectically as alterity from the theoretical angle (Plato) as well as the practical (Fichte), all philosophy of the Other as such is thus carried off in a speculation up to the fiction of an Other of the Other, which psychoanalysis (Lacan) intends to prohibit. On the other hand, when ethics intends to become primary, indeed an-archic (Levinas), the Other is grasped as identity of an absolute Other or infinite distance (of) the “Most-High.” But when this Judaic Other affects philosophy itself, the rigor of this identity is again attenuated and the Other menaced by duplication—this is *différance* (double, proxy, supplement, vicariousness, etc. cf. Derrida).

It’s advisable to distinguish, against the philosophical amphibology of the Other, between a transcendence of pure exteriority or *ek-stasis*—non-horizontal in every way, non-autopositional and non-autodecisional position, organon of thought—and the secondary dimension of a real alterity of transcendence whose symptoms are ethics and theology and whose manifestation constitutes the specific organon of a non-ethics and a non-religion.

The experience of alterity implies a non-autopositional transcendence prohibiting both the absolute Levinasian reversal of the hierarchy of Being to the Other as well as the Derridean semi-dialectization of this reversal under the name of *différance*. This dialectization implies that the Other is only present as a symptom; instead it is performatively given, but in the vision-in-One in-the-last-instance. There is an identity-of-the-last-instance of the Other, and this objective structure is not obtained by the reversal of a philosophical hierarchy, but given once and for all without which it can be divided: this is the Other such as it is and not as such [*tel quel et non comme tel*], with its own action in the force (of) thought.

The vision-in-One is not the vision-in-Other (cf. Lacan: “discourse of the Other”) which would make the Other primary. It no longer presents the One and the Other as a mixture subtending a thought of relation such as is fashionable in psychoanalysis: the Other is not the immanent content of the One, no more than its final transcendent(al) condition. The existing-subject-Stranger is defined by the force of thought, while alterity is here no longer one of its specifications. Non-philosophy distinguishes, in contrast to philosophy, three concepts entangled in the generality of the “Other”: 1) the immanent Uni-versality of the vision-in-One, which gives the World without-giveness or which is disposable for it, uni-verts towards it; 2) non-autopositional Distance or Exteriority; 3) finally, its modality of real alterity or “vertical” transcendence. Alterity is an ethical specification of the existing-Stranger, but is not itself essentially defined by this alterity as philosophy would have it in its dyad of ego and alter-ego.

The “Other” or “Alterity” with its various ancient and recent modes is nothing but a symptom of the existing-Stranger. In its beginnings, non-philosophy itself, under the term of “non-thetic

Transcendence (NTT),” does not distinguish between these three layers.

Performativity (performed, performance, performatonal)

Term borrowed from the philosophy of ordinary language (Austin and Searle), transposed and generalized here outside the linguistic sphere to characterize the radical type of immanence and of the One's acting, compared to the efficacy of language and Being in a philosophical regime or Logos.

In the sphere of language, a performative is said of certain enunciations in which the signifying value and the value of action, the sense and the operation, the signified and the practical are supposed to identify with one another: they “do what they say,” or more precisely: they do something (and do not content themselves to saying it) by saying this same thing or doing it by saying it (Austin). This concept has been critiqued by Ducrot (1980 and 1984) as illusory, arising from a “confusion committed by linguists between the words they study and the words of which they make use, a confusion furthermore prefigured in language itself insofar as it is the site of an illocutionary derivation conceptualizing the words that it sets in the disposition of the speaking subject.”

If we now suppose, as non-philosophical practice authorizes, a radical identity of saying and doing (doing (by-) saying, saying (by-) doing), but which is no longer itself of the order of doing or saying, the only instance that defines itself by this identity without fail and sufficiency is the One, i.e. the Real itself such as it is defined by a pure immanence or a self-inherence of the phenomenon. The Real is performative because it is given-without-givenness by knowing (itself) given, thus without this knowledge still opposing itself to a transcendent object. The non-philosophical usage therefore manifests the phenomenal or real nucleus which is always at the foundation of this concept despite everything somewhat divisible and effectively illusory in the usage that philosophy makes of language. In particular, it restores its verbal and active dimension and inscribes performativity into the radical passivity of the Real: we could speak of “passive performativity,” of which Husserl's “passive synthesis” would give a first but still transcendent indication.

Thus understood as cause in-the-last-instance of thought, radical performativity completes dismantling its antinomic pairing with the “constative” function of language; it introduces piece-by-piece its identity-in-the-last-instance into the linguistic pairings that it “unilateralizes” outside the Real. It prohibits on its account the reflexive and philosophical usage of language and shows that, in non-philosophy, language is required without it speaking of the ground itself because it speaks facing the Real or according to it.

If performativity designates the immanence of the force (of) thought which does not arise from itself, i.e. in-the-last-instance from the Real alone, it radicalizes the Marxist criterion of practice, which precisely designated a certain real immanence against the transcendence of ideology, indeed of philosophy. Against practice as scission (Hegel), we shall oppose practice as performativity, eventually by also calling it “passive” (“passive practice”; cf. “praxis” according to M. Henry). The force (of) thought is identically passive in-the-last-instance (Descartes) and active (Spinoza)—this is another possible reading of performativity.

Lastly, for more rigor and axiomatic clarity, we shall distinguish between the Performed-without-performance or the already-Performed (the real-One itself, not the result of the action but the self-immanent phenomenal state-of-affairs), and the Performance as activity or labor of the force (of) thought on its material. It is performational-immanent via its specific mode—without being the Performed itself.

Philosophical Decision

Principal and formalized invariant or structure of philosophy according to philosophy which does not indicate it without also simultaneously auto-affecting and affecting its own identity; instead, non-philosophy gives it a radical identity (of) structure or determines it in-the-last-instance. Its synonyms: dyad and unity, ambiguity, unity-of-opposites, mixture, mélange—are likely even to have a double use, intra-philosophical and non-philosophical, which changes their sense. The philosophical Decision is a mixture of indecision and decision, never pure decision.

1) The decision in the traditional rational sense is the act determined by reasons of a structural nature, of the economic situation or individual (choice), through which the individual puts an end to a deliberation. The economist and specialist in artificial science, H.A. Simon, defines it: “the process at the end of which each moment one chooses one of these alternatives. The series of decisions that determine behavior during a given amount of time can be called a strategy.” 2) The philosophical Decision, variable according to the philosophers, corresponds to a certain invariant, explicit, or repressed distribution of transcendental and empirical functions. Compared to an ensemble of facts known as “empirical,” or a “technico-experimental” work, etc., the philosopher reactivates the decision of the question of the essence of phenomena, which he considers fundamental. He makes a double distinction, that of the empirical and the *a priori*, whatever it be; then that of the *a priori* and the transcendental, which is an ascent such that he calls it beginning, origin, substance, Being, etc, but which is always presumably authentic reality, equipped with transcendental functions (in a broad sense). 3) These concepts were obviously generalized and criticized in Deconstruction and the philosophies of Difference by the interrelated concepts of play, effects, and strategies. But the empirical, *a priori*, transcendental levels and reality are structural invariants and do not apply only to Kant and Husserl, with the provision of understanding them as invariants and not as entities or essences.

The philosophical Decision is an operation of transcendence which believes (in a naïve and hallucinatory way) in the possibility of a unitary discourse on Reality. This authoritative claim is expressed through autoposition, an operation made possible by its being mixed or ambiguous. The philosophical Decision thus has as a structure the coupling of the Unity of opposites and as a function to hallucinate the One-real and thus to foreclose. To philosophize is to decide Reality and the thoughts that result from this, i.e. to believe to be able to order them in the universal order of the Principle of Reason (Logos), but also more generally in accordance with the “total” or unitary order of the Principle of sufficient philosophy. Hence the ambiguities that relate to Reality (as Being...) and to thought (as philosophy), and which are at the same time the element

and the result of the auto-decisional process. This comprises the various operations which are the fundamental moments of any philosophical Decision, and to which corresponds, under a non-auto-decisional form, the transcendental and *a priori* identity of the subject of non-philosophy, the force (of) thought. Broadly, the philosophical Decision, as the philosophical formalization of philosophy itself, is used as a symptomatic indication and occasion for the development of the force (of) thought which, in addition, has for its “correlate” the identity, the sense (of) identity of the philosophical Decision, which is equivalent to foreclosure of the Real or the One.

Philosophy

Object (occasion, material, symptom) of non-philosophy.

When it tries to be thought rather than to be practiced spontaneously and naively, philosophy is for itself the object mid-speech, of a semi-definition, a set of speeches and silences. It is embarrassing to say “the” philosophy is the true philosophy. Philosophical systems are a fallen or menaced effort to say what they are, to dissimulate the impossibility of saying it, to avoid having to keep themselves silent.

Philosophy is an *a priori* discourse on the one hand with a systematic goal on the other. It posits the world of which being is preformed in the logos with a predicative structure. This predicative structure of philosophical discourse is organized in a speculative reflection, as the last absolute philosophy shows (Hegel). The essence of speculative reflection is specularity or the dyad. Since Parmenides, the suture of being and thinking forms the unsurpassable mirror stage of philosophy. Since Heidegger, certainly, the deconstructive philosophers have tried to break the mirror by substituting it for the specularity of Being and its residue dispersed or disseminated by the Other. However, this Other of the logos has efficacy only in an ultimate reference obligated to the logos that is presumably relevant for Reality. The philosophical Decision has become a forcing. Since Plato at least, it homogenizes, idealizes, quantifies, and qualifies Reality and the foreclosed. To philosophize means to decide on a strategy of positing the world. It is not to know, but to form *a priori* decisional speech acts in an action of culture. Always (re)stated in a diversity of styles of writing and following the example of myth and its primordial metaphors, form-philosophy expresses the repetition of itself and the inertia of its auto-reproduction. Nietzsche shows extremely well that philosophy is brought to think itself by thematizing the absolute and primordial metaphor of the Eternal Return of the Same. Form-philosophy is then a metaphorical discourse (supported by the logos, being, etc. and basically anointed by primordial Greece). In general and non-Nietzschean terms, philosophy is finally a priest conveying to the Occident the sacred Greeks overdetermined by the holy Judeo-Christian.

Through its principal process—to transcend it as it overrides the transcendent—, it is a faith, with the sufficiency of faith, intended by necessity to remain empty but which necessarily evades this void by its repopulation with objects and foreign goals provided by experience, culture, history, language, etc. Through its style of communication and ‘knowing’ it is a rumor—the occidental rumor—that is transmitted by hearsay, imitation, specularity, and repetition. Through its internal structure, or “philosophical Decision,” it is the articulation of a Dyad of contrasted terms and a

divided Unity, immanent and transcendent to the Dyad; or the articulation of a universal market where concepts are exchanged according to rules specific to each system and from an authority with two sides: one of the philosophical division of labor, the other of the appropriation of part of what the market of the concepts produces. The philosopher is thus capital or quasi-capital in the order of the thought, or the shape of the World understood in its more inclusive sense.

The preceding descriptions of philosophy find their occasion in philosophical descriptions, but they actually already suppose non-philosophical ground. If it is embarrassing to say that philosophy is the criterion of the philosopher, the transformation of this aporia into a problem and its solution is the criterion of the non-philosopher who substitutes, in connection with philosophy, i.e. its identity, knowledge of the sufficiency of its faith. He or she does it using radically unknown means of philosophy (vision-in-One as “presupposed reality”), or foreign to it (cloning and the determination-in-the-last-instance of the force (of) thought; the reduction of philosophy to the state of symptom and occasion). Non-philosophy breaks with auto-heterocritical philosophy, typical of modernity and post-modernity. In its manner it develops philosophy by releasing it from its authority over itself and by releasing its identity or its sense for the force (of) thought, which is the authentic subject of (for) philosophy. It gives philosophy even a broader relevance through which it seems like the span or the dimension of the World, i.e. like the identity (of) its Greek, cosmopolitan determination; like the thought-world that only the vision-in-One can take for an object.

Presentation (non-autopositional presentation)

Immanent structure of reference of non-philosophical statements. It is a clone or reflection-without-reflecting, a theoretical givenness effectuated by and as the force (of) thought.

The metaphysics of Representation, or of autopositional representation as primary presence of the World, established itself in the 17th century. It is rediscovered beyond the doctrinal differences in every classical author, and it continues to predominate in the scientific psychology of perception. For classical authors, consciousness is a doubling of presence which, despite the subjective closure and cloistering, secretly reproduces an exterior of things for interior representation, a represented that prevails over its representation. Husserl and phenomenology have wanted to constitute this primary and presupposed relation to the World. But the difficult and extreme passage in the world-of-life (*Lebenswelt*) only signals the difficulty inherent to autopositional representation. The constitutive Representation only re-poses this relation to the world by positing the Real in thought. Thus it only posits what was presupposed by the classical authors. The theoreticians of deconstruction no doubt limit and displace the representation by *différence*. However, this critique is still caught in the critiqued from which it originates: and the displacement of Representation is nothing less than its adequate emplacement by the Real. In short, Representation is the element of specularity (of the double reflection or divided reflection), of speculation, and finally of speculative thought.

The circle or triad of Representation (represented, representative, and mixture of representation) in turn only serves as material in the elaboration of the concept of non-autopositional presentation. From this point of view, an exercise of dualysis would show this. The Real would be the representative, the force (of) thought the (transcendent) representation, and the World the represented, but everything changes around “presentation.” The repetition or reduplication included in Re-presentation can do nothing but disappear on behalf of a simple presentation, non-autorepresentational presentation. The Real is instead the Presented, but Presented-without-presentation. It is named with the occasion or aid of presentation as the radical past of presentation, as the Presented which has never formed the object of a presentation. As for the World, the simple but “heavy” presenter completely supports the philosophical triad; it is also presented, but through and by the force (of) presentation, thus presented-by-presentation non-representational (of) itself—there it is the noema or the sense in which the world simply gives itself. Representation is the concept of the World, an autopositional concept, but here given to the vision-in-One, i.e. to the presented-without-presentation as noema or identity of the presented (through presentation). It would remain to combine and reformulate this thematics on behalf of that of the mirror, the reflection, and specularity equally under the reserve of its dualysis.

Non-philosophy, as force (of) thought, dismantles fetishism of thought-representation, of its critical or modern, differentialist, or postmodern avatars. In reality, the full usage of Representation is philosophy itself insofar as it is autoposition or autogiveness or autorepresentation in person. All philosophical critiques of Representation are not extensive enough, giving themselves a restrained concept of the latter and remaining captive to the real illusion of the philosophical Decision as sufficient.

Primacy (primacy-without-priority)

Characteristic of the One-in-One of inalienable being, or of the Real being foreclosed to thought, yet able to determine the latter. Primacy understood as determination-in-the-last-instance dismantles the philosophical mixture proper to the principles of primacy and priority, their power-in-domination or ontological primacy. Primacy-without-priority precisely determines thought (as force (of) thought) to be primary in relation to philosophical material.

Ontology and metaphysics attribute a mixture of primacy and priority, of power and originarity in “first causes” and in “first principles” (Heidegger included: the ontico-ontological primacy of Dasein). Primacy is not without being primary, priority without participating in the primacy of principles, it is the manifestation of the philosophical circle and hierarchy within the heart of metaphysics itself. This trait subsists in every philosophy whatsoever insofar as it is structured as a metaphysics and insofar as it receives a secret politics in this structure. Mao and then Althusser’s de-Hegelianized dialectic has exploited this logic of primacy and domination in the theory of contradiction as “dominant structure” and primacy of practice over theory, of the dialectic over materialism (or the other way around).

The radicalization of the One-in-One posited as non-ontological ground of thought subtracts it from the transcendental characteristics of Being, in particular from the spirit of hierarchical domination and the priority of principles—from their commandment and their commencement. The Real cannot be primary—lest it be submitted to an order more powerful than it. It subtracts itself from this order for reasons of radical being-separated and being-foreclosed rather than for

reasons of super-ontology or super-essential domination surpassing Being itself. Thus simultaneously de-politicized and de-ontologized, the Real can still be said to harbor a primacy-without-domination insofar as it determines—but precisely in-the-last-instance alone—not an object but another cause called “occasional.” The “presupposed real” is thus deprived of every ontological power and sets an end to philosophy’s specific desire-of-hierarchy. On the other hand, this being-foreclosed, foreign to every philosophical politics, is capable of determining thought: no longer by a mastery using a form or an information, but by a cloning or transmission of radical identity to a material prepared to receive it and in turn divested of its original will of domination. The specific primacy of the “last-instance” thus extracts as “unilateral duality” the real nucleus of contradiction as structure from primacy. It liberates a radical democracy or a non-politics that transforms the politics-world which philosophy is by submitting it to a “minimally” and strictly human pragmatics, in some fashion without principles or “an-archic,” but without contenting itself in deconstructing the supposedly relevant power of philosophy.

Priority (priority-without-primacy)

Characteristic of the force (of) thought as primary, actually and performatively “radical commencement.” Transcendentally primary in relation to philosophical material, precisely as ordered in the primacy of the real-One and itself deprived of any primacy of the philosophical type (mastery or domination).

Priority, joined together with primacy, is characteristic of “first” principles and cause of metaphysics. “First philosophy” is first somewhat by its objects themselves (Aristotle), somewhat by the order it establishes in knowledge (Descartes), somewhat by the mode of obvious givenness of its objects (Husserl), but this priority is marked also by ontological dignity. “Ontico-ontological primacy” could also under certain conditions be called “ontico-ontological priority.” This ideal emerges with Descartes and above all with Husserl on the urgency of a “radical commencement.” But the divided or mixed structure of priority-primacy ensures philosophical priority neither priority nor commencement. Hence a delay installed in the transcendental commencement, a powerlessness in the radicality of the origin, consequently the philosophies that attempt to register this failure as positive and that “commence” through difference, milieu, becoming-as-origin (Nietzsche, Deleuze) or through differance, deference, and supplement (Derrida).

If thought—as fetishized philosophical object—can not be first without also being second and delayed, at least postponed, if the “radical commencement” is a myth or a constituting philosophical fantasy, the “force (of) thought” cloned by the vision-on-One on the basis of philosophical material is necessarily undivided in its essence and consequently radically primary (but without-primacy). The commencement is nothing but commencement and radical if it is that of a performatational thought which does not divide itself even when it makes use of division or distance. The force (of) thought does not know of deference, delay, differ(a)nce, or supplement to the origin, because nothing separates or divides it from its “real presupposed,” the One, in the primacy through which it is ordered but which itself is not primary or “anterior” to thought or proto-originary in some way. The force (of) thought—or the Stranger—comport themselves “with” philosophy and are turned towards it. The radical commencement is the same thing as the

powerlessness of the force (of) thought to turn itself around towards its “origin” or towards the Real, being turned by definition towards the thought-world. It is every post-modern philosophy and its style of deviation, of difference, just like every modern philosophy and its fantasy of the identity-of-the-origin, that is invalidated when radical identity ceases being original and becomes cause-of-the-last-instance.

Radical Immanence

Under its really radical form, i.e. self-immanent or thoroughly under some hypothesis of thought that validates it, it is equivalent to the One-in-One and consequently implies the uni-versal vision-in-One, but foreclosed to thought and/or the World, the Real as given-without-givenness and separated-without-separation.

The immanence/transcendence couple is one of the fundamental operators of philosophy. This dyad reciprocally relativizes its terms, whereas the philosophies that lay claim to immanence (Spinoza, Nietzsche, Deleuze on the one hand, M. Henry on the other and via a completely different mode) are nothing but halved (in a close inequality) and are equally thoughts that “divide” transcendence. In a philosophical dyad, the opposed terms are convertible with their close opposition: immanence participates there in the transcendence that it presupposes either as element where it is surreptitiously inscribed, or as effect that revolves around it and from which, as its condition, it constitutes or develops meaning. Every procedure of reduction of transcendence to immanence remains a philosophical operation of division and is reversible at the limit, such that immanence is not a “real presupposed,” i.e. given-before-every-presupposition or supposed-without-position, i.e. without-transcendence.

Non-philosophy re-assumes the notion of radical immanence investigated by M. Henry, but on condition of submitting it pragmatically and theoretically to the vision-in-One. It is not a thought of immanence—it is still a philosophical decision that would objectify it, that would posit supposedly radical immanence generally through means of transcendence. A thought is itself effectively immanent and not an auto-negation of philosophy when it operates according-to-immanence or proceeds by cloning philosophy and the World. Radical immanence itself stops being an excessive slogan in the philosophical tradition (the slogan as the other face of destiny, consignment, or calling) when it is no longer posited by philosophical or constitutive operations but simply axiomatic operations; when it forms the object of an axiomatic (transcendental) decision rather than theses. It has been fundamental for the specificity of non-philosophy and its distinction from the philosophies of immanence to concurrently elaborate the axioms of radical immanence and the axiomatic style (here transcendental and determined-in-the-last-instance) of thought.

Real (One-in-One, Vision-in-One)

Instance defined by its radical immanence under all possible conditions of thought: thus by its being-given (of) itself, yet called Vision-in-One or One-in-One, and by its being-foreclosed to

thought. The Real is neither capable of being known or even “thought,” but can be described in axioms. On the other hand, it determines-in-the-last-instance thought as non-philosophical.

There is no notion vaguer and more “ideological,” also more “modern,” than that of the “real,” if not that of “thought.” Every philosopher wants by definition to “think the real,” even the most diehard idealist. Its indetermination and its overdetermination nevertheless find certain (generative and critical) limits in Parmenides’ initial equation: “Being and Thinking are the Same,” thus in its “etymological” origins (*res*) determining the field of its possible variations. The latter are as various as philosophical decisions, but each one requires the primacy and the priority of the real (substance and its treatments, being, spirit, will to power, faith, sense, moral law, etc.) in relation to which the other instances of the philosophical decision are distributed and hierarchized. That the real lays claim to a primacy-and-priority implies that it is inscribed in the element of transcendence and exteriority (immanence being one of its secondary properties, even in the so-called “philosophies of immanence”): (Spinoza, Nietzsche, Deleuze), and that it is reciprocally determined—in an operation, a negation, a difference, etc.—with thought. The philosophical real is at best repressed because it is a desired real, cloven by transcendence. The philosophy of the 20th century in the opening of the “Judaic turn” has innovated by ceasing to identify with the Same and/or with Being so as to identify with the Other. It has contributed to dislocating the philosophical Decision without suspending its authority.

In virtue of its usage of philosophy as its “occasional cause,” non-philosophy recurses to the “Real” as non-conceptual first term. It conserves its primacy without priority, thus a non-metaphysical primacy over thought, the primacy of an only-in-the-last-instance determination that respects the relative autonomy of thought, which can on the other hand be called “primary” or transcendental. Non-philosophy is only a primary thought because it lacks effect over the Real henceforth called radical immanence or identity through and through. No ontic or ontological content, not even feeling, affectivity, or life, can serve to define the essence of the One, lest it introduce a hidden transcendence into it. Even “immanence” only serves to name the Real which tolerates nothing but axiomatic descriptions or formulations. Its function does not exceed that of first term having a primacy over others. It cannot be a question of a simple formal symbol, precisely because axiomatics is, if not in the Real, at least in-Real or according-to-the-Real and thus operates only via a transcendental mode.

Non-philosophy interrupts for itself the philosophical path of the real, identified with various instances during the course of its history (existent, *ousia*, being, one, substance, concept, multiplicity, etc., and finally Other through various modes). This is a particular interruption that does not consist in radicalizing its transcendence in an exacerbated neo-Platonic lineage or in a Lacanian lineage (as the impossible of the symbolic, hole of the signifier, etc.), lest it claim to exceed philosophy by an ultimate philosophical means, but consists in radicalizing the bit of immanence the tradition has accorded to philosophical thought, to the point of no longer claiming even to “attach” it once and for all, to the point of axiomatizing it as being-foreclosed. One-in-One as well as outside-being, outside-representation, outside-possibility, it enables transforming the philosophical (Marx) and psychoanalytic (Lacan) discourse on the real into a particularly “indicative” and fruitful symptom of an emergent experience of thought emerging beyond philosophical possibilities.

Real Essence

Instance of radical phenomena in opposition to the proper order of philosophy or occasion. We are therefore speaking of “real” essence, for essence in general must be ordered in the Real and determined by it, insofar as it is a characterization operated by thought, lest it reintroduce a metaphysical interpretation.

In the history of philosophical ideas, essence serves as an ideal and stable reflection against the mobility of becoming. According to Heidegger, this reflection feeds upon the metaphysical difference, codified by the scholastics, between *essentia* (quidditas) and *existentia* (quodditas). For Heidegger, authentic difference ignores ideal reflection as *essentia*. It indicates another essence (Wesen) of thought, less positive and less affected by in-essence.

“Essence” is an ambiguous conceptual operator in non-philosophy and has not always been rigorously utilized. “Real essence” alone enjoys a precise usage: here it is not transcendental possibility but the Real as determination-in-the-last-instance. Non-philosophy globally substitutes a thought (of the) Real of the last instance for a metaphysical thought of essence and coupling of essences. The invalidation of the mixture of the Real and language orders thought in the Real rather than in the essences and subordinates the latter as operators instead of techniques. An axiomatization and dualization of essence and existence are possible. For example, on the basis of essence as metaphysical entity, essence as *a priori*, essence as real or transcendental, essence as form, as sense, etc. Hence the variable games of interpreting according to the context: essence (of the) Real or the One, essence (of) real of the transcendental, the Real as that which “precedes” essence...and existence, etc. The plasticity and style of non-philosophy demand a continuous labor of internal interpretation and taste or affect simultaneously, i.e. the sensibility of solitary terms.

Reflection (reflection according to the One or non-autoreflexive)

Thought’s status as clone according to the One, determined according to the philosophical schema of specularity and speculation. Another way of understanding the cloning of thought by the vision-in-One on the basis of philosophy.

To the extent that philosophy, taken in its most invariant and most general structure of dyad and decision, is an operation of division and doubling, it integrates a mirror moment, specular and speculative, that forms the double or image of every term, to the closest difference, of another or itself. It thus knows of reflection, but the latter is necessarily in turn divided into two reflections that divide representation, the latter being on the one hand a reflection of the real and on the other a reflection of itself. Reflection is thus divided by the duality of the thing and the representation-as-mirror of the thing; the mirror is then the common

and mediating form of the thing and representation, and relates the latter to the form because it also (for example, the ego) participates in both, or is thing and representation. Materialism (with Lenin and the concept of knowledge as “reflection without mirror”) has simplified this problematic and begun to denounce the idealist functioning of the metaphysical doubles of the Real. On the one hand, it autonomizes the process of knowledge which no doubt is referred to the Real or is its “reflection,” but without being it in the sense of an image in the mirror, without knowledge and duplicating such a fantasy, cloud, or mirage. On the other hand, it affirms the nature relative to the Real of this process of knowledge by narrowly subordinating the latter to form and by thus prohibiting every idealism, i.e. the speculative autoposition of knowledge as being the Real itself. Another critique, that of transcendental idealism against transcendental realism, denounces in the latter the presence of a mirror (Fichte and Husserl against Spinoza and Descartes).

The materialist solution poses the problem of knowledge in a simpler and more exact way than idealism, but without perceiving that the latter defines every philosophy, materialism included, and not simply theories of knowledge (Althusser). This is because it still poses it in the element of transcendence—that of matter or “being” in relation to “knowledge”—whereas it is still obliged to conceive the latter via the model of the reflection of a thing (the objectivity of matter). Such a reflection implies, being given the transcendence of matter, the dissimulated existence of a mirror, like in idealist philosophy, but materialism can only simplify this structure in the sense of the identity or the immanence of the “in-itself” of matter which determines consciousness without being determined in return by it (primacy of materialist theory over the gnoseological thesis). It thus arbitrates the problem by recognizing the existence of reflection but by denying that of the mirror.

Non-philosophy takes its departure in the identity of immanence, unbound from all objectivity or transcendence, from the One-Real rather than that of “matter.” The simplification of the philosophical structure is more radical than it but precisely less resolved. On the one hand, the in-objective immanence of the Real excludes that it can give itself as a thing to a mirror, that it can alienate itself in an image which would be its representation, i.e. its auto-representation. The One is thus not bilaterally reflected, not because it does not “exist,” but because it is itself foreclosed to the possibility of being: if there is a reflection and mirror through the World, this will be a reflection without the positive cooperation of the reflected. Furthermore, transcendence and its modes (indicated and presented in particular by philosophy), if they give themselves to the One, are from the latter’s point of view given and lived in-One. But, from their point of view, that of their relative autonomy, they function as a mirror. They undoubtedly do not dispose of a thing which would be given to be reflected but, unlike the intra-philosophical mirror, they enjoy a relative autonomy and are seen to extract a reflection according to the One which they convey or support: their clone. The One does not reflect itself, does not produce the reflection, is not its own mirror; but there is a mirror that lays claim to the One from its solitary authority. The Real is the necessary and “negative” condition of the reflection or clone, which it extracts in some way. This reflection, which supposes the relative autonomy of transcendence (of “being”), is the transcendental, then the *a priori* as specific orders without their own autonomy, caught between the Real cause of this forced reflection and the World which effectuates it. These orders thus

articulate the Given-without givenness and the Given-by-givenness. Together they constitute the transcendental and *a priori* syntax of the subject or force (of) thought.

Thus transferred onto the terrain of radical immanence which dualyzes it, the specular and speculative structure that obviously has the form of a triad (things to be reflected, mirror, image or reflection) is not dismembered: it always comprises three terms, but otherwise disposed. We could speak, except through anti-metaphysical abstraction, of a reflection without mirror in the sense of an absolute absence of mirrors. But it is transformed in depth by being-separated or foreclosed to the Real—through its immanence—and gives rise to a new syntax which characterizes it, from the fact itself that the Real is not divided and does not give itself to be reflected or to reflect itself due to its non-autopositional simplification. The clone is the identity of the speculative structure which is reflection according to the Real. In effect, the speculative structure in and of philosophy is itself divided in each of these three instances along with the conditions of the vision-in-One, without removing the reflection (for the World not for the One), the mirror, and the reflection, by extracting simplicity or identity in some way. These conditions suffice to attach the speculative triad to its own autoreflection and in general to the philosophical circle. It is now formed by three terms which are identities, the first being real identity, never divided (the One); the second, certainly a divided identity but which can no longer spread its division (the World); the third, the transcendental order of the reflection which is reflection according to the Real, but undivided, non-autopositional reflection and never double reflection. These three instances no longer form a system like the philosophical Decision. Admittedly, we shall not say that non-philosophy is “antispeculative”—it is never the negation or reversal of philosophy—but that it is non-speculative, which signifies that it is the identity (of) philosophical speculation and in general the identity (of) philosophy.

Relative Autonomy

Irreducibility of the transcendent orders of reality to the Real, or of transcendence in general to the immanence of the One-in-One as radical autonomy. It justifies their function of occasional cause or material for every theory determined in-the-last-instance by the Real and justifies even the existence of a theory.

It is in Marxism rather than in a philosophy of substance and accidents that the concepts of relative and absolute autonomy take on a precise and theoretically grounded sense, consequently in the framework of an ontological dualism of the infrastructure, which defines the real *par excellence*, and the superstructure, which conjugates a type of reality and specific or autonomous organization with a causal dependence in regard to the infrastructure. These concepts connect a distinction of regions of reality with a distinction of types of causality in the original but poorly elucidated concept of “determination in the last instance.”

If the real-One is defined by a radical immanence which does not support anything empirical, ontic, or even ontological, neither object nor objectification, if it does not itself fall under any objectifying or even surreptitiously intuitive act, then necessarily nothing can be concluded from it concerning existence or non-existence, the reality or inconsistency of the sphere of transcendence. A thought according to the One, if it wishes to be thematized, thus supposes

transcendence to be given—and it along with the latter. This thought thus renounces every “why?” (why transcendence instead of nothing?), every hypothesis about this type of reality and does not concern itself with it insofar as it can be given in turn, even though it is transcendence, under the conditions of radical immanence or the phenomenon. But it must also, if it analyzes all its conditions, integrate this relative autonomy—which in part explains its own—in the total operation of thought which cannot be deduced, if not by idealism, from the real-One alone. It is prevented from claiming to completely dissolve, with regard to the One alone, the antinomies and amphibologies of which transcendence is composed under the form of philosophy in particular. This relative autonomy explains that there is a causality of the Real upon transcendence—a causality supposed in every way by the exercise of thought—because it takes on the form of Determination-in-the-last-instance and because the latter concretizes itself into a third but not synthetic instance, the force (of) thought as identity of the Real (and) thought, of the One (and) Being.

To use another formulation, the real-One itself is defined by an indifference or an autonomy of being-foreclosed (immanent uni-laterality) without necessary relation to the empirical, even of immediate negation. But it has an effect of unilaterality which is unilaterality-of, which is a transcendental property and is said of a necessary “empirical” given as occasional cause or material. It is necessary to admit that the force (of) thought, as *a priori* organon in-the-last-instance, real through its essence, conserves from its occasional origins a nucleus of identification with philosophy or mixture-form or semi-reciprocity, insofar as, without being essentially determined by it, it has need of a support or sup-poses the mixture-form without being with it in a relation of mixture. This interminably reduced or suspended nucleus, but transformed and indestructible, manifests itself as function-support. It is obvious that its “transcendental” situation, which does not make it the Real but a “relation” identical to the Real in the Real alone and thus without synthesis, forces the force (of) thought to symmetrically maintain a unilateral relation to the empirical, in some ways a relation without reciprocity with reciprocity. That it has “need” of a support which is the mixture itself reduced to this function signifies that it is identical to the support not in the latter by in itself and through it alone, that it is thus a question of a unilateral transcendental identity. This nucleus of identification not reciprocal with the mixture-form or occasional cause could be called the “fantasy” of the force (of) thought. It represents the effective, if not real, condition of non-philosophy.

Reversibility (reciprocity, convertibility, exchange)

Syntax and operation of the dyad that form the basis of the philosophical Decision and are reflected on the superior or transcendental level of the system. Tendency-limit of all philosophy to which the apparently least fluid syntaxes can be reduced (reciprocity, convertibility, exchange, contract, etc.). To reversibility is opposed the unilateral duality of cloning (whose principle is the vision-in-One) which should instead be characterized as “unitax.” Or still, to reciprocal determination is opposed the determination-in-the-last-instance.

As duality and synthesis of a “syntax” and a “semantics” (experience of the real), philosophy defines a specific “form of order” which it interprets and mixes with scientific forms of order—this is “philosophical rationality.” The essence of

philosophical syntax is precisely to be a syn-taxis (a synthetic order *par excellence*, unifying analysis in this same sense). This is reversibility, fully realized only in certain cases of absolute idealism (Hegel—above all Nietzsche), but which is a tendential limit of all philosophy as such, again relieved of its procedures taken from the sciences with which it is combined (convertibility, dialectics, difference, reciprocal determination, relation-without-relation or semi-reversibility, etc.). Reversibility is the mixture of a formal relation of equivalence and of the intuitive given of spatiality which is the element of philosophical topology. It is in the principle of philosophy itself insofar as the latter commences with a dyad, a coupling of terms or a line of demarcation; particularly in the principle of the order of phenomena in Plato, of the essence of matter in Aristotle, of the cosmological dialectical illusion in Kant, and forces every philosopher to reject the irreversible as semblance or to reabsorb it into circularity. In psychoanalysis, reversibility is a fundamental dimension of the topological approach of the Other and assures its footing on the One; instead of the determination by the One in-the-last-instance, there is a reciprocal determination of the One by the Other, and consequently the impossibility of thinking Unilaterality and Time. This reversible coupling of the One and the Other is the analogue of that of the One and Being in philosophy and demonstrates that, in the best of cases, psychoanalysis is structured like a philosophy.

Non-philosophy treats this syntax as a simple material. It prohibits it from entering into play, at least for its own account, not in philosophy itself, but its relating to self or being autopoised. It transforms it into a simple symptom of the transcendental identity constitutive of the force (of) thought at the same time that it manifests the sense (of) identity as foreclosure of unilateral duality. Stated otherwise, it determines it in-the-last-instance. The preceding descriptions, carried out beginning from philosophical indications, already suppose the perspective of the vision-in-One.

Rule (of the force (of) thought)

Syntax or immanent form of the usage of language-material (philosophy). The rules of non-philosophy constitute an a priori pragmatics of the unilateral action of the force (of) thought.

The concept of rule has been subtracted from its purely (methodo-)logical usage (Descartes, Durkheim) by Kant who defines the understanding as the faculty of rules. Consequently, the rule is constitutive of the theoretical usage of reason yet is, however, not reduced to it. Reason, the faculty of principles, is moreover less constrained in its practical or teleological usage. Kant thus refuses the reduction of thought to regularity, a refusal which for example also characterizes the reflection of Wittgenstein, who emphasizes the necessary hiatus between the rule and its application and inscribes complete regularity into the fabric of a form of life.

The vision-in-One or given-without-giveness is deprived of rules, unlike the regulated use in immanence—thus “non-regulated” but not uncontrolled—of non-philosophical pragmatics.

Immanent expression of the force (of) thought whose essence is the determination-in-the-last-instance, the rule naturally accompanies the procedure of reception and transformation of philosophical material. It takes as many determined configurations—which are not transcendent or autopoietic—as this procedure needs for its operations. The non-philosophical rule is neither the rule of the rule nor exception to the rule, but a non-autopoietic rule (not autoregulated).

Thus the first rule of non-philosophy prescribes, under the (misleading) term of “reciprocal redescription,” the determination of material by the One and the reformulation of the One with the symptomatic aid of material. The second rule hurls the ensemble of material into the “general equivalent” of the *chôra* or a generalized Aesthetic. The third and fourth rules characterize the cloning and “redescription” in language-material of the (transcendental and *a priori*) structures that are equivalent to the philosophical Decision. The fifth rule announces the function support fulfilled by the material itself in the course of the preceding operations. Finally, the sixth rule explains the results of the procedure itself (rules 2 and 4) under the form of a non-thetic universe, i.e. a clone or reflection.

One can then no longer speak of a transcendent opposition, within use, of a material and a rule—which confirms the immanentization of the latter—but of a unilateral duality between the transcendental essence of the rule and the given to be transformed. As for the rule, it is contingent-and-necessary through its own occasional material (the philosophical concept of the rule and *a priori* rules of philosophy) and determined-in-the-last-instance by the Real or the vision-in-One. Thus is broken the supposedly immanent “systematic necessity” of a “body of rules,” the last fetish from which pragmatics must be liberated if it wants to focus on philosophical language itself.

Science-of-men

Science according to the One-as-man exposing the unifying effects of the vision-in-One to the variety of philosophical, anthropological, sociological, psychoanalytic, etc. matrices of the description of man. The science of men or human multitudes must explain, in a unified theory of the Stranger, the “sciences of man.”

Form-philosophy regulates the relations between man and the city, man and the logos, man and the cosmos. This preoccupation of the Ancients has been appropriated by the Moderns and above all by the Postmoderns who are hooked on man as being-in-the-world or being-in-the-city, etc. Thus the indifference or being-foreclosed of man is the central phenomenon that is always repressed. If treatises of human nature have existed, no Treatise of man as real Identity has ever seen the light of day. The human sciences have divided a territory which is not the domain of the One-man, but a territory dispersed in hallucinated or supposedly human attributes (power, language, desire, politics, etc.).

The vision-in-One is cause or real essence in-the-last-instance of the existing-subject-Stranger. Conversely, one can symbolize or name the One by man or at least by the real essence of man or

real-Ego (Ego-in-Ego). It is not man in general who is submitted to the Real (philosophy, psychoanalysis), it is the subject which is appointed but in-the-last-instance to man-as-One. The secret of the non-philosophical, non-Platonic One is the same secret as man as Ego—it is being-foreclosed to the World. Man is the non-sufficient radical, neither the absolute nor a deficiency of the absolute. This is because man himself can determine, in a radical but not sufficient manner, a transcendental science for him but only as subject-Stranger, not as immanent Ego or given-without-giveness. The only real and rigorous science is not a theory of the Ego-One but justifiably a theory of the subject as Stranger. This thesis invalidates, if not philosophy and the human sciences, at least their pretensions over so-called “man,” their belief in “man,” their anthropo-logical faith. Since the subject-Stranger exists radically by right and is not numerically multiple, non-philosophy gives rise, in accordance with the material of the human sciences and anthropology, to a “science of men” rather than to “sciences of man”: it exhibits the anthropo-logical identity (of) difference that sustains them and gives it as an “object” to the subject-Stranger.

Sense (sense (of) identity)

Ensemble of knowledges related to philosophical material insofar as they are manifested by the force (of) thought as its “correlate.” Non-philosophical sense is always sense (of) identity. The content of this identity of philosophy or its structures is of being foreclosure-in-the-last-instance of the Real. Philosophy takes on a sense of foreclosure and simple occasion: it is its identity as “constituted” by the force (of) thought and the vision-in-One in-the-last-instance.

Sense is the element of philosophy as transcendence in immanence (Husserl), enveloping every given in a “halo of generality” (Merleau-Ponty). It can be defined as irreducible tension, digression, distance, or as ensemble of the way in which the ideal identity of an object is given. Analytically, sense is said of a sign or proposition and is reduced either to another sign which interprets the first (Peirce), or reduced to this proposition itself, i.e. to the ensemble of the rules that govern its usage (Wittgenstein). After having insisted it in the line of phenomenology, Heidegger rejects this concept as relevant or seemingly arising too directly from a certain human performativity, in order to come to Truth as *Aletheia*.

If philosophical sense and in particular phenomenological sense is of the order of generality, non-philosophical sense is uni-versal in-the-last-instance: it is an identity which is said or is related to the philosophy-object but which is only related by the uni-versality in-the-last-instance of the vision-in-One. Immediate consequences:

1. The philosophical doublet of sense (a halo—itsself “general”—of generality...) is eliminated and the non-autopositional identity (of) sense consists in being the sense (of) identity.
2. Sense is determined in philosophy by referential, situational, actional, interpersonal contexts. It arises now in its essence from the determination-in-the-last-instance alone: it is thus identically theory or explanatory and pragmatic or the usage of philosophy.
3. It can be said that non-philosophical sense is determined by the structure of the force (of) thought as “subject,” yet that this structure does not form a set of rules but a game of

rules itself determined-in-the-last-instance by the Real, which suffices to distinguish non-philosophy from Wittgenstein's solution.

4. Thus understood, sense is a first term of non-philosophy whose formulation and representation are in turn elaborated by the force (of) thought on the basis of the concepts of sense as simple material, in particular of sense in its various relations to the noema, the signifier, the signified, signification, usage, etc. In other words, the non-philosophical representation of sense can make use of extremely diverse conceptual materials. According to the preceding points, this representation of the "sense" object can do nothing but form a circle with the latter but is determined-in-the-last-instance by the sense of this "sense" object. As for these latter, the "sense" object and its sense—the sense of sense—are identical to the equal diversity of philosophical material.

Solitude (Solitary)

Pure affect without affection of the human in man, of his essence "separated" from radical essence, of his self-identity independent of the World or foreclosed to the thought-world. Solitude is also with Veracity that through which the One-in-One determines (in-the-last-instance) its objects and their non-philosophical descriptions.

In general, solitude takes on an anthropological value: a means of moral asceticism, instrument of introspection (Montaigne, Rousseau, Amiel, Passoa) for an intimate self-knowledge. It becomes a specifically philosophical problem with the Cartesian position of the Cogito menaced by metaphysical solitude or solipsism. Henceforth, even when Husserl defines a transcendental solitude of the Ego, it is a question of reducing solipsism through intersubjectivity and to show that it is only an appearance or a necessary stage. The philosophers' fear facing human Solitude is still marked in Heidegger: boredom, anxiety, care, being-towards-death, by elevating Dasein to authenticity, promoting a non-human, if not superhuman solitude, giving it a status of effect or attribute and refusing it that of strictly real and simply human essence.

Solitude can primarily be understood in a simple manner as identity of self-immanence. It then radicalizes in a positive way the idea of a finitude intrinsic to the human in man as being-foreclosed, more precisely of the human-of-the-last-instance in the existing-subject-Stranger. It implies that man never coincides with the World, not even "with" itself in distance—contrary to the thesis of philosophy which thus makes of solitude a naturally unthinkable numerical concept. Prohibiting the autoposition of the Ego and the subject-Stranger which it determines, it definitively signifies that man is deprived of all substance (res) and all ideal essence as mode of such a substance. Solitude is the real nucleus of the Ego, its being-separated-without-separation which "precedes" the existence that is the subject-Stranger and more reasonably the philosophical type of essence. It implies the abandonment of every metaphysical anthropology as well as every humanism. Man, in the duality of the Ego, positively alone by himself, and of the subject turned as Stranger towards the World, is not even a transcendental Robinson and does not arise from number and quantity from which Solitude precisely protects him.

A more differentiated axiomatic distinguishes between the Ego as Solitary (the One without attribute, even of solitude), and Solitude properly speaking as non-worldly or non-philosophical position of the Solitary as subject-Stranger, in the same way that Given-without-giveness is

distinguished from Givenness. Another possible distinction is still that of the Solitary and Solitude now as the effect of unilateralization through which the Solitary (i.e. the vision-in-One) affects every thought. Solitude then receives an ethical type of function parallel to that of Veracity which expresses the unidentity in the non-ethical order through which the Solitary affects its objects and their descriptions. In both cases, it is a problem of axiomatic usage, of rigorous pragmatics rather than a problem of conceptual systematicity.

Stranger (existing-subject-Stranger)

Other first name for man (as) subject 1) existing beyond its [his/her] nucleus of real immanence; 2) in occasional relation with the World; 3) not as opposed to another [un autre] or facing an Other [un Autrui], but as radical form or clone of the Other itself [him/herself].

If it is not Plato who makes of the Stranger, in relation to Being and Non-Being, to the One and the Multiple, the introducer and spokesperson of the highest doctrines, the Stranger is one of the greatest unknowns of philosophy which has sometimes substituted it for the linguistico-cultural problem of “strangers” received from the social and political sciences, sometimes and more frequently the problem of the “Other” which it has believed to be able to rule in the best of cases (Fichte, Husserl) through that of Intersubjectivity as simple reconstruction of the old specular topos of the alter ego. Only Levinas at the Judaic limits of philosophy has developed a reflection on the conditions of man as Stranger, but always within the context of the equation: man = the Other man as absolute inversion of the modern philosophical equation: man = Self, and Other = other Self. In every scenario and in their socio-political degradations, the Stranger is always Other than the Self to various degrees, face to face with the Self, consequently lacking identity and harboring danger and aggressiveness. Philosophy has never yielded to the idea that the Self, the man that I am, could be the Stranger itself [him/herself]. The stubborn search for exception and unicity (in the name of the subject) has made it mistake the identity of the Stranger.

Non-philosophy, through the reconstructed and successive concepts of the individual, minorities, unary multiplicities, has finally found in the Stranger its strategically most adequate concept of man, more exactly of the subject as existing beyond the real immanence that it nevertheless is in its ultimate cause. Determined-in-the-last-instance by the real or radically immanent Ego, the subject exists in certain transcendental and aprioritic functions produced by the real Ego cloning them on the basis of the occasion that is the World. But if these functions create it as Other-of-the-World by definition, its real essence makes it Other-than-the-World or Stranger.

Thus, the Self (the real Ego) and the Stranger cease being opposed, that is, cease being face-to-face and at war. They are identical-in-the-last-instance. The Stranger does not lack identity, for she possesses it in-the-last-instance; and the Self is no longer encroached upon and divided by the Other (self), but she can be, she and she alone, the Stranger. There are only Egos without Strangers of which they have no need, or Strangers unopposed to Egos, nothing but a democratic society of Strangers who are a Self-in-the-last-instance, each and everyone. Democracy is thus

primarily given under the real conditions of thought, not in the World where, by definition, it can be nothing but an objective appearance; and then, during their interval, under the form of these existing-subject-Strangers who form a transcendental City that is not of this World without consequently being abstract, for it is cloned from this World or the philosophical City. It is the excess of the explanation over what it must explain: the default universal war of uni-versality, i.e. identity.

Thought (continent of thought)

Uni-versalized concept, identically equivalent for philosophical thought and scientific knowledge. Thought is in this sense that which is determined-in-the-last-instance or cloned from these two disciplines.

The relations of thought and the real are given by the Parmenidian matrix: “Being and Thinking are the Same.” Thought and Being are in a relation of reciprocal dominance. Their identity can thus take on several forms: from the supposedly adequate correspondence of perception and object up to the identity of self-consciousness and consciousness of the object; subjective “reflection” and objective reflection, dialectical identity of the real and the rational, but always in the respect of this co-respondance. Broken under the form of a (co-)respondance of a response-listening to Being (Heidegger), or a difference, a thought-in-the-trace (Derrida), this adequation subsists as one of the major presuppositions—one of the halves—of deconstructions and one of the most inherent criteria of the philosophical style.

First science introduces another “experience of thought”—this is its object—under the form of a triple innovation. 1) From the point of view of its origin: it abandons the Parmenidian matrix and breaks every *a priori* and non-*a posteriori* correspondence of thought to the Real. Instead of thought being supposed to co-determine the Real as Being, it is the Real—but as One—that determines it more than unilaterally or without reversibility (without reflection under some unspecified form of the one in the other): by foreclosure. This is the formula of their relations: “the One and thought, or the One and Being, are identical but only in-the-last-instance.” Thought can thus only hope to change itself according to the Real-One rather than changing the Real. 2) From the point of view of its nature: first science distinguishes its cause and its specific operations; on the one hand, the vision-in-One, the immanent lived experience proper to the One alone which responds to a third type of experience, of “knowing” or manifestation which is neither Consciousness nor Reflection, nor the Unconscious or some unspecified logico-natural procedure, but that which can only call itself Given-without-givenness or Manifested-without-manifestation, etc.; on the other hand, its specific mechanisms which are no longer philosophical operations (reflection, dialectic, difference, etc.) or psychoanalytic (condensation, displacement, etc.) but the henceforth transcendental operations of induction and deduction. 3) From the point of view of its “subject” and its extension: a thought-science in the fullest sense of the term is finally recognized against the impoverishment of thought through which philosophy would affect the latter. Real thought in-the-last-instance by its cause: thinking by its practical immanence, somewhat deprived of all reflexivity or consciousness; rigorous by its non-circular operations, somewhat effective upon the natural language of philosophy.

Thought-science (unified theory of thought)

A unified theory of thought is the first objective of non-philosophy consequently understood as first science. Its field of properties is philosophy-as-metascience (epistemology, philosophy of the sciences, etc.); its specific object is thought as identity-in-the-last-instance of science and philosophy. Only a theory rather than a new philosophy thus introduces democracy into thought itself.

Philosophy spontaneously presents itself as a thought rather than a theory, a thought distinct from knowledge or on the contrary coordinated with it—as a thought of thought. Its *telos* is thus the autoposition of thought as being or determining the Real. It is the only claimant to this privilege which it exerts in an ultimate way through empirical materials via autoreflexion or autoposition. If the Same is Thinking and Being, thought can simultaneously be a term opposed to Being and the superior synthetic form of their opposition. Philosophical thought is the complement or the supplement, but also the enveloping recollection of all experiences, science included, thus the absolute thought (*Ge-danke*). In its structure, philosophy is thought-without-knowledge that needs science's knowledge-without-thought—it is a double structure of division or lack. We call unitary, indeed “unitary theory of thought,” this self-division and setting-in-hierarchy of science and philosophy. The unitary motivations of certain sciences or even the empiricist Idea of a “unified Encyclopedia of the sciences” through a common logical language (Vienna Circle) are projections or avatars of the unitary style. Conversely, what philosophy fetishizes under the term “thought” are always unstable mixtures of philosophy and science (Idea, Concept, Act, Reason, etc.).

By determining the mixtures of philosophy and science as material and occasion, first Science, the initial realization of non-philosophy, proposes not to separate a pure thought from science or to elevate science to the state of a new thought, but to produce the emergence of a new entity, thought-science, which will have for its object—this is another way of saying it—the thought-world or this mixture. It must guide under the form not of their synthesis but of their identity-of-the-last-instance, a theory through which thought-science relates itself to its mixture form like a science to its object and identically like a philosophy relates itself to its object. It therefore constitutes this mixture of the thought-world, of “thought” and “knowledge” in a new “scientific continent,” scientific yet transcendental, unified for every saying according-to-the-Real. It sets and end to philosophy's pretention to hierarchical domination over science and to the perpetual scientific revolution in “thought.”

Such a thought-science does not yet exist and only knows of the attempts of Marx and Freud, and Lacan, for example. But the thought-world is the (non-philosophical) symptom and occasion of thought-science. At each time and on each side, science and philosophy are inseparable via the more or less compact modes. When this inseparability is simply that of a philosophical connection, science is dispersed and reified in knowledges isolated and requisitioned for their external ends, philosophy in antagonistic decisions. When it is more compacted, more-than-connected or bound, science and philosophy, from the point of view of their objects and that of their specific procedures, fuse together in a common matrix, or more precisely in a matrix unified-in-the-last-instance by the Real: the force (of) thought. The emergence of this utopia is

the objective of non-philosophy beyond measures with a new alliance of science and philosophy somewhat on behalf of the former, somewhat on behalf of the latter.

Thought-world

Other name for philosophy in the broadest non-philosophical comprehension of its concept. Thought-world is any thought founded upon the principal resource of transcendence and the secondary resource (by right or in fact) of immanence—over their hierarchized mixture.

Philosophy has always involved the narrowest relations with the World, primarily as thought positing cosmic order or cosmopolitical order: hence its more properly physical, indeed physicalist interest for the “World” (Descartes for example) or metaphysical for the origin of the World and its antinomies (Kant); or phenomenological for the “World-of-life,” Heidegger has believed this Greco-philosophical theme and the Christian theme of the “World” and its wisdom-madness in the elucidation of being-in-world to be the basic structure of Dasein.

If the World belongs to the ultimate concept of philosophy, non-philosophy radicalizes this belonging by deciding to call philosophy the thought-world in its identity, i.e. every thought that uses transcending as its principal operation or that simply has recourse to it so as to constitute the Real, including the so-called “philosophies of immanence”—Spinoza, Nietzsche, Deleuze—who still have recourse to transcendence through which they ground an overly limited concept and which they believe to have wrongly eliminated. It more narrowly binds the World and philosophy by making the latter in some way the general form of the former which, in this manner, is no longer defined by its content of existents. And it is this thought-world with its congenital empiricism and its powerless desire of the One that it gives as unique object to the vision-in-One. The thought-world then auto-presents itself under several distinct but continuously linked forms (philosophical faith: transcendence as *a priori* essence of the latter). All in all, non-philosophy posits not co-belonging but the identity-of-the-last-instance of philosophy and the World (of experience) under a form that definitively limits the former to the latter and more narrowly ties the fundamental and the regional together without contingency.

Time-without-temporality (radical past, transcendental future, present-world)

Said of the radical past, self-immanence of time, its identity through and through which does not exist nor has existed, which is, but negatively or without being. It determines-in-the-last-instance a transcendental and subjective temporality that it clones from the philosophical mixture of the time and temporality proper to Being or the Other—of the present as time-world. This pure transcendental temporality constitutive of the subject-Stranger is the “mobile” clone of the present-world under the condition of the “immobile” Past: non-Platonism.

It is useless to systematically categorize the philosophies of time. Their aporias (thinking time or the unstable, temporally or not) stem from the unitary opposition between metric, chronological, or ontic time and ontological time (or not: Judaic diachronics). Hence the doublet of a “temporal time” or “(self)-temporalizing,” of

a temporalized time and a temporalizing time, which testifies to a failure of the identity (of) time conceived as mixture.

Temporality is more often an interpretation by philosophy of the scientific theories of time (for example, physico-cosmological time conceived as linearity and irreversibility, cf. the second principle of thermodynamics). Contemporary philosophy wishes to avoid this overly passive course and reattaches temporality to Being or the Other. Already in Kant, time, as *a priori* form of sensibility, enjoyed a privilege in relation to space, understood in a more originary way (cf. Heidegger). Heidegger radicalizes exiting the Husserlian circle of objective or metric time by opposing it, in an almost Bergsonian way, to subjective duration: the originary lived time said of intimate consciousness. Husserl, through the opposition he establishes between constituting time and constituted time, reveals the originary autoconstitution of time in its different modalities (retention, protention, presentation, representation). It is through these latter that the autoconstitution of the so-called “immanent” temporality of consciousness effectuates itself. Heidegger displaces this problematic by radicalizing it with the three ekstases of time as Dasein’s modes of temporality. If temporality—as question—exists, it signifies the sense of Being as veiling and unveiling of Dasein’s ek-sistence; but as manifestation of Being in its triple and unique dimension.

Unlike the philosophy of the 19th and 20th centuries, of Nietzsche and Heidegger after Hegel, non-philosophy renounces to make of time (of history or even becoming) the essence of the Real, to desubstantialize the latter by the former. These operations are so diverse that they repeat the philosophical gesture of the search for an originary and hierarchizing essence which is the “time of time,” an originary temporality, indeed a transcendental or existential temporalization, etc. Recent philosophical decisions multiply the forms of the doublet of time and temporality, deviating it, bringing time back to the alterity of a diachrony, but still not finding the cause of time, nor the subject (of) temporality, nor the identity of this time-world which is philosophical time, precisely because they temporally transcend towards the essence of time on the basis of the presupposition of the (empirical) time-of-the-World and only posit this essence of time as sufficient or mixed essence. The time-world on the contrary can only be a material or occasion for naming, indicating, and effectuating the vision-in-One (of) time. This time-seen-in-One can only be on its side the radical past of pure immanence and identity, a past which not only has never been present but also will never be in the future (and for the future) as trace, but which will remain immanent past even in the future when it clones from the present of the time-world.

It can also not be a question of understanding time-according-to-the-One via the onto-chronological model of Being or that of its semi-specular image (Judeo-philosophical: the infinite Other whose structure takes on the simply inhibited unitary autoposition: temporality as memory or even diachronic past). It is no longer a question of connecting with a particular scientific theory (Einsteinian space-time, for example). It is instead a question of employing a theory and pragmatics (of) the essence of identically philosophical and scientific time (in the cosmological sense, for example), but as determined in-the-last-instance by the One-past.

Hence the clones or instances, rather than dimensions or ekstases, that form the theory of temporality. We shall remark that it implies new conceptions of the “past,” the “present,” and the “future,” i.e. three symptoms of time-in-One or according-to-the-One.

1. Time as Given or Past-without-temporalization, as seen-in-One or “in-time,” etc.—these first names of time symbolize not a past time but a past which simultaneously possesses a primacy over synchrony and diachrony and determines these transcendent dimensions themselves at least as comprising the object of philosophical interpretations. The radical past is uni-versal immanent time, of which one could say that it is-without-existing or even that it is a non-temporal time. It is less a question of a memory capable of forgetting and anamnesis than of a past which cannot be forgotten and which, precisely for this reason, is foreclosed to memory which itself, in its sufficiency, believes to be able to forget and repeat by anamnesis. This One-time, even effectuated as future, remains in its necessary sterility and in no way participates in the present-world such as non-philosophy conceives it and no longer—this is what distinguishes it from the Levinasian Other, and from the “trace”—in the ontological present or the “Same.”
 2. The mixture of time and the World—the sense or identity of this mixture—elevates time to the form of the World under the authority of philosophy: it is the time-world, which is not simply a regional time nor even the time of the world, but the philosophical experience of time insofar as it structures a “world” whose sense is foreclosed in turn to the One-time of the past. In its non-philosophical sense, the “present” is no longer a dimension nor even ekstasis of time, but the entirety of the decisions-of-time already operated or still to come according to the World. It is the time-material, the time-occasion in which non-philosophy extracts its language from time.
 3. Finally, from the past-in-One to the Present-world is deployed the instance of the transcendental future or the temporalizing force. The future is the identity cloned or produced on the basis of the time-world as One. The way of the future is to be an effectuation of the uni-versal past under the conditions of the time-world. This effectuation signifies that, by definition and in distinction with the past which does not exist, the future exists in the sense that it is transcendental identity turned towards the present of the time-world. Instead of disposing the three instances in the ekstastic or universal-through-transcendence element that generalizes the so-called linearity of time, non-philosophy produces the experience of a time of exteriority or the stranger, existing-Stranger for the present, addressed to rather than thrown into the time-world. The subject-Stranger with which the transcendental future is confused “aims” at the World in its identity, aims at it in a non-phenomenological or non-intentional sense without fulfillment, simply sufficing for it to aim at it to completely assure its possible relation to it. If the future is subject (of) time or temporalizing force (indicated, named, effectuated on the basis of the present of the time-world), it is turned towards the latter which it transforms or from which it extracts itself through the power of the past. The future is the clone obtained by the radically “immobile” past on the basis of the mobile time of the World. The existing-subject-Stranger liberates time from its Platonic as well as Bergsonian and Heideggerian images. It brings about the manifestation of the phenomenon of time, prohibited from applying the structure of a philosophical Decision to it but instead proceeding to a theory and a pragmatics of philosophical time on the basis of the past as radical immanence (of) time to itself. It is heretical time or the heretical conception of time, without history or becoming.
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Transcendental (pure transcendental Identity)

First instance after the Real or the One constitutive of the subject as force (of) thought. It is the clone of the transcendental Unity proper to the philosophical Decision and produced by the vision-in-One on the basis of this symptomatic indication. Transcendental Identity is no longer the transcendental One of philosophy associated with a division; it is an undivided identity which finds nothing in it but its occasion.

The transcendental obviously has a long philosophical history marked by Aristotle, certain scholastics, Kant (who is nothing but an important turn for it), Husserl, etc, but under these labels, there is the transcendental as invariant of the structure of the philosophical Decision as transcendental Unity, immanent and transcendent to the basic Dyad, consequently divided and claiming to be real, the Real, through its autoposition. In this very general sense, the transcendental is the superior dimension of all philosophy. This is how non-philosophy understands it, as that which forms a circle or doublet with the empirical on the one hand through the *a priori*, and with the Real on the other hand through autoposition.

In its philosophically overdetermined beginnings, non-philosophy is radically equivalent to the transcendental, and then has understood that its project—which risked passing for a radicalization of Husserl—demanded more than a supplementary overcoming of the transcendental, which is in every way first or commencement in the order of thought: that it required ordering it in the primacy of the Real as though in a cause by immanence, not present and positive but non-sufficient or negative. Non-philosophy thus displaces itself on four and not three orders: the Real or the One (foreclosed to the transcendental), the “empirical” given (or the thought-world), the transcendental (which the Real clones on the basis of the Unity of experience), the *a priori* (also cloned but on the basis of the Transcendental which is the organon of philosophy). The transcendental forms the first instance of the force (of) thought. Now it is an undivided identity although cloned—thus also “separated”—on the basis of divided transcendental Unity; or given-without-givenness in-the-last-instance on the basis of the givenness of this most cloven philosophical Unity. It is related from the point of view of its genesis and its function not in the *a priori* but even in the transcendental which serves as occasion for it. Thus, non-philosophy effectively separates the amphibologies of the philosophical transcendental (with the empirical and with the Real) and the “subjective” identities which are its symptom, and all this without claiming to dissolve these amphibologies. Such an immediate dissolution of the latter would suppose that the One-in-One, the Real, be identical to one of their sides: this unilateral identification without fail leads to a new transcendental philosophy (M. Henry) and again to the disappearance of the Real.

Transcendental Axiomatic

The nature and procedure of the formation of the primary terms of non-philosophy, of its nonconceptual symbols, starting from philosophical concepts concerned with philosophical intuitiveness and naïveté.

Axiomatics is initially a scientific object. It is the organization of a theory or a fragment of a theory in order to empty the terms of their empirical or regional

contents and to explicitly reveal the logical apparatus that connects them and becomes through this their only contents. There is a philosophical reflection on the axiomatic (Aristotle), but there are few examples of axiomatization in philosophy itself, if not perhaps in Descartes' *Responses*, Spinoza's *Ethics*, and Fichte's *Science of Knowledge*. In all these cases it is a matter of an ontological axiomatization, still largely intuitive. In the sciences, more or less complete attempts at axiomatization were made in particular by Hilbert in geometry, by Jean-Louis Destouches in quantum physics—i.e. above all in fields where unexpected innovations (non-Euclidean geometries, Heisenberg's "uncertainty" principle) required theoretical reorganization to legitimate their rigor. The epistemology of Mario Bunge draws conclusions from the postulate that it is in theory possible to axiomatize any scientific discipline. But axiomatization is an effort of reorganization that comes with the aftermath—even after a crisis—in view of examining the validity of a theory and the formalization of its relations to other theories which, in any event, has known limits (Godel). It is more a theoretical instrument than a theoretical project of the foundation of science.

In opposition to a formal axiomatic applied to a body of scientific knowledge, and an ontological and intellectualist axiomatic that is still intuitive (for example, Descartes' I think, therefore I am or Husserl's I am—the World is), the pure transcendental axiomatic forms the first terms or first names, the non-conceptual symbols, on the basis of the intuitive and naïve concepts of philosophy. It explicitly inscribes in the writing of these names the first suspension of their philosophical sense (e.g. One-without-being, lived-without-life, given-without-givenness, One-beyond-being, etc.), of its worldly and/or ontological intuitiveness. It gives them a radical, indivisible theoretical universality in "generality" and "totality" and a transcendental or univocal universality applying to any philosophy. This decision of nomination, non-philosophical decision itself given-in-the-last-instance by the vision-in-One, is the primary transcendental act of the force (of) thought. This is to say that far from being subservient to a philosophical project of foundation, even of the auto-foundation of science, it is only a transcendental instrument given-in-the-last-instance by the Real, thought (thought according to the One) thus using science as much as philosophy.

It is no longer a question of a logico-formal, scientific axiomatization of philosophy—an absurd project that misunderstands its irreducibly transcendental style. Non-philosophy does not claim to reorganize the system of philosophy after its crisis. To axiomatize is its primary ordinary practice of philosophy, according to the "abstraction" or the being-separate-without-separation of the Real-of-the-last-instance. Thought is condemned to resort to philosophy and its language while rendering it adequate to the non-philosophical essence of this thought, which wants to be the measurement of the Real.

Transcendental Science

Other name of non-philosophy in its form of unified theory of science and philosophy or first Science.

Transcendental philosophy aspires to constitute itself into a transcendental science (into a transcendental logic variously associated with an intuition and experience—

Kant, Husserl). Science here fulfills a philosophical goal that conserves its primacy. The former supports theoretical knowledges or forms, the latter fulfills the immanent or transcendental dimension of the relation of truth to experience or the World. Philosophy pursues its scientific dream through transcendental science: to become a rigorous science in the critique of metaphysics (Kant) or in the foundation of the positive sciences (Husserl).

Transcendental science in its non-philosophical realization as first science can be characterized 1) by its material: the scientific forms of theory or even particular scientific theories and the philosophical forms of thought or the philosophical Decision; 2) by its unifying-without-synthesis cause, the vision-in-One rather than the structure of the philosophical Decision; 3) by its “method,” which is the unification-of-the-last-instance, of scientific or theoretical explanation irreducible to the explained properties of its objects and the philosophical or transcendental relation to these objects; 4) by its internal object: on the one hand, on the side of the vision-in-One or the Real, the subject of this transcendental science, cloned transcendental subject, motivated but not co-determined by the objects of experience; on the other hand, on the side of the latter or the material, this material’s sense (of) identity (and its modalities) such that it is lived by the subject, i.e. the Essence (of) science, which is not the existence of “science” but the essence of the philosophy-science mixture.

Transcendental science in its philosophical version is of metaphysical origin (its cause is Being, the transcendental here has the primacy of the Real): of unitary (it is the mixture of science and philosophy) and inegalitarian (it is hierarchy, domination of the latter over the former) spirit. In its non-philosophical version, it is real before being transcendental (its cause is the vision-in-One); of “unified” (it is the identity-in-the-last-instance of science and philosophy, or thought-science) and egalitarian (science and philosophy intervene here equally and in-identity) spirit. It is the “combination” of the Real’s primacy under the form of the “determination-in-the-last-instance”; of the priority of thought-science under the form of transcendental commencement or first transcendental; finally, of specific scientific urgency under the form of theoretical explanation as non-image, non-representation of the object to be explained.

Unconscious (non-psychoanalytic Unconscious)

Syntactic dimension of jouissance through which desire is a dimension of reality.

The unconscious designates one of the modes of representation, initially in Descartes a negative mode under which representation comes to be deficient, since, in Leibniz, there is an intimate representation itself as unperceived representation. It can also be interpreted as position of an unconscious absence, in Kant, of a radical or real foundation of representations. Following this path, the unconscious becomes the quasi-synonym of the will (Schopenhauer), at least being simply nature or the idealized object (Schelling), even life (Nietzsche, Bergson, Deleuze). A transcendental reduction, à la Michel Henry, illuminates the genealogy of the unconscious in its transmission from philosophy to psychoanalysis. In fact, psychoanalysis treats under the name of the unconscious not only one of the local proprieties of the psychic apparatus—the product of repression constituted from representations of things (Freud, Klein)—but also the

dimension of the imaginary (Jung) or symbolic (Lacan) Other, nevertheless generally endowed with a “subject” that Lacan estimates as being “nothing but the Cartesian subject.” It is thus legitimate, on behalf of this transcendental solidarity which makes the unconscious appear as the support of an epistemological circle, to consider this notion as the major axis of the philosophico-analytic Complex (or Mixture) or moreover to identify the unconscious as an invention (but not an illusion) of psychoanalysis.

Non-psychoanalysis extricates a radical transcendental unconscious from the result of the Real (the One). The unconscious is the syntactic side of jouissance, which is itself, in non-psychoanalysis, a concept on the same level as the Stranger. But, in opposition to the restrained unconscious or the unconscious determined by the signifier, logic, or the combinatory, the non-psychoanalytic unconscious has nothing to do with the transcendence of “the autonomy of the symbolic”: it is the identity of jouissance and a unilateral duality. Together they form with the Enjoyed or the Real such a duality, which does not exclude that other syntactic aspects would be able to overdetermine jouissance, yet only overdetermine it—which excludes every concept of phallic jouissance, or jouissance itself determined by the “signifier of the unconscious.” Finally, the expression “jouissance of the Other” appears redundant since the unconscious is already united with jouissance and the Other. On the other hand, there is no jouissance of the One, the One is Enjoyed-without-enjoyment.

To the degree that the signifier, conforming here to the “generalized” tendencies of linguistics, is dual or unilateral, it never represents the subject (of the) unconscious, but jouissance itself. Jouissance is the identity of desire and syntax. That it is non-self-signifying specifies the unconscious as non-phallic, as transcendental autonomy without repetition, without Other of the Other (one last form of the Other’s autoposition). The unconscious does not even have the Other for its subject, because what psychoanalysis calls subject is simultaneously transcendent and immanent to the signifier, and because the signifier signifies nothing but the Other—which is a way of calling it pulsional. It is void without forming an ontological void, Other rather than Being, but an Other whose essence resides, in-the-last-instance, in the One. In fact, the unconscious is so estranged from the Cartesian concept of the subject that such a subject of the unconscious would be equivalent to the foreclosure of jouissance. This foreclosure is perhaps materialized, in psychoanalysis, by the concept of sex as signifier of a hole in knowledge and (non-)truth of the signifier.

Universal Noesis

Non-real dimension of the subject-Stranger constituted by two functional (transcendental and aprioritic) identities cloned from phenomenology and supposing their universion by the One. Noesis is not, in its essence, of the nature of objectifying or intentional transcendence, but of the uni-versal nature of a being-turned-without-return-towards...(the World), even if its last moment is non-autopositional or non-phenomenological Distance. It could be called determined-in-the-last-instance by the Real in reference to its occasion.

Husserl has re-introduced the ancient thematic of noesis and noema behind intentionality into modern philosophy. Noesis designates the act of aiming at the intentional object (of the noema), an act susceptible to various qualities. It is a

lived experience but a non-hyletic or non-real lived experience which only has sense in its correlation with the noema. It is thus of the general nature of transcendence to which its nature of immanence remains subordinate. Hence the typically philosophical, unscientific idea of a correlation, parallelism, or semi-circularity of noesis and noema. It is the fundamental dyad of the phenomenological decision insofar as it is structured like a philosophical Decision.

It is possible to re-employ under another reason—the vision-in-One—the noetico-noematic correlation, after expunging it of every philosophical circularity. Noesis will designate the instances cloned by the Real on the basis of the phenomenological material of the transcendental Ego and intentional noesis. These instances, uni-versal by definition, are consequently determined in-the-last-instance by the One, as if henceforth the intention were no longer mixed or co-exclusive with the “hyle” but determined unilaterally by the latter (itself uprooted from its state of sensual and thus worldly exteriority). These two functions motivated by the occasion of philosophy, which indicates them in a symptomatic way, are identities and not modes of transcendence: transcendental and aprioritic identities. The latter, however, for content have a distance or “open” exteriority not self-enclosed in an auto-position, but they are also already oriented by essence and in an immanent way “towards” the World as such in its identity rather than towards an object-pole or a world-pole like that towards which phenomenological intentionality transcends. Universion is obviously that which gives its non-philosophical uni-versality to the force (of) thought, to the subject-Stranger, its power of accessing the thought-world itself. The functional and universal nature attributed to the intentionality of consciousness by Husserl is as radicalized as intentionality is thus originally oriented towards the World itself in its noematic identity rather than towards the object in a world-horizon and determined by the last-instance of the One which alone gives it this amplitude of uni-versality. We thus substitute a noesis-universe for the intention-world of phenomenology at the same time as a noema-universe for the noema-world.

Universal Pragmatics

One of the two styles—alongside the theoretical—of non-philosophy. Far from being its own essence as in philosophy, pragmatics is this non-objectifying proximity, here radical, of the One to the World, the usage of the latter by the former or by the force (of) thought. Its essence is thus the cloning universion by the Real that dedicates the subject-Stranger to the usage of the World. In virtue of this essence, it is transcendental and universal (uni-versal).

Rather than enumerating the explicitly pragmatist (James, Dewey) or pragmaticist (Peirce) philosophies with their avatars (Rorty), or rather than tracing the grand lines of pragmatics as theories of discourse, it is more interesting to isolate the elementary syntactic nucleus of every pragmatics as usage or *pragmateia* of things (including discourse) in opposition to the theoretical attitude. One labels pragmatics the semi-relation of usage or proximity, of the identification of a term Y with a term X (which is independent or distinguishes itself from Y from its side alone). This identification is a way of turning towards, a turning point, a turn of Y towards X, thus a non-objectification of an objective term X, in some sense a semi-objectivity distinct from theoretical objectification which is bilateral and reciprocal more or less to a lengthy term. Hence—this is an example but which

gives the essence of pragmatics—the spontaneous pragmatics of phenomenology that describes independent objects in a quasi-mimetic or identificatory way, yet the latter refusing to identify themselves with their description and affirming their autonomy “in-itself,” such that the givenness of ideal objectivity or the identity of the thing in person throughout the multiplicity of goals or attempts (Husserl); or the usage of Being by being and being by Being (Heidegger). These examples demonstrate the extent of the pragmatic posture within the heart of all contemporary philosophy. It is essential to note that, despite the independence of the term X distinguishing itself from Y which does not distinguish itself from it, this schema of unilaterality veers toward a semi-circularity or a broken circularity, no doubt, but which conserves as essence the autopositional circularity of the identification (of Y with X) itself. This syntactic aspect in general combines with an experience of the real as acting or action and is better known as the criterion of pragmatic thought. Action is then the ultimate criterion that enables dissolving the conceptual confusions of metaphysics, it is to distinguish really clear ideas from those which are only seemingly so, because this action is itself conceived rationally (Peirce) or conceived in a more practical and sensible manner (James).

Non-philosophy conserves the irreducible syntactic nucleus of a proximity or a certain identification of the subject with the World in general in the usage it creates. But by transferring this nucleus onto the terrain of the Real or the vision-in-One, it changes its essence, its real status, and consequently its importance for thought. The unilateral semi-relation loses the essence of circularity which it possesses in a secret or ultimate in philosophical pragmatics and which determines that the immediate identification of Y with X be finally auto-positional, reversible, and alienating of Y. If Y is the inalienable Real, it cannot itself be identified with the World, but only under the “mediating” form of a cloned transcendental function, which it is not but to which it contributes through cloning, the latter being provoked by the occasion that the World is. Thus the non-objectifying syntax of proximity to an “objectivity” subsists, but only by receiving for essence the cloning operation of the Real which is itself substituted for the autoposition or circularity of philosophical identification. The Real only identifies with the World through cloning and through this occasion that ensures safeguarding it against the return to it of the turning-towards...the World, simultaneously as it safeguards the relative autonomy of the World and its unilaterality. As for the force (of) thought, it is dedicated to the thought-world, the Stranger is turned-towards the World. But instead of being two-times-each-time and thus being shut off in the magic orbit of philosophy, they are only one-time-each-time, delivered from the oldest slavery so much the less tempted by the vain hope of a metaphysical flight whose Heideggerian “Turn” towards Being through Being does not sufficiently protect them. When man ceases to be at Being’s use and when Being comes to the use of man-as-One, the “turning” towards Being will only be “occasionally” motivated by the latter and determined by man-One as cloning.

Thus understood or “dualized,” pragmatics defines one of the two aspects of non-philosophy, the other being the theoretical aspect. It gives rise certainly to a primary pragmatics, but without primacy, no longer being autopositional and claiming to be real like pragmatic philosophies, i.e. “pragmatisms.” But more than ever pragmatics is transcendental (not claiming to be real but determined in the last instance by the Real) and uni-versal (produced by uni-version): a pragmatics for philosophy and the World themselves. As for the active aspect or action of this uni-versal pragmatics, it arises from the Real as being-Performed in-the-last-instance and from

the force (of) thought as performatonal. Thought is precisely force (of thought) for reasons of pragmatic syntax, reasons of usage of the World by the subject that unilaterally identifies with it.

Universality (Uni-versality and Generality)

Characteristic of the vision-in-One of giving or manifesting every X via the mode of the One itself or the mode of given-without-givenness and separated-without-separation. Far from being self-enclosed, it is de jure open-without-ekstasis to the World in an immanent way. Uni-versality determines-in-the-last-instance the “non-Euclidean” generality of non-philosophy and gives it its sense.

Universality is an overdetermined concept issuing from the combination of the proper structure of the philosophical Decision and the scientific knowledges the latter requires. The Decision presents two levels of universality: that of the Dyad as level of the universal and necessary *a priori* (universality in the *a priori* mode); that of the Unity of synthesis or system (universality in a transcendental mode) in the sense of totality or the One-all. Another proximal description of the preceding discerns in metaphysics the onto-theo-logical triangulation of an ontological base, the Dyad of Being and the Existent, and of a summit constituted by the Existent cause *par excellence*, God, who determines the base or horizontal plane. But perhaps in this case it is still a restrained, historical, and doctrinal version of a more universal structure which would be the crossing of two axes: the horizontal axis of Being and the Existent, and the vertical axis, instead ontic, of the One and the Multiple, a structure on the verge of closing through a double process of recovery: of the Existent and the Multiple, of Being and the One. The so-called formalization of the “philosophical Decision” extracts the minimal structure common to these models and makes the two connected planes of universality appear. The essential philosophical type of universality is in the connection of these two planes, thus in a unitary conception of the universal as divided in generality and totality, itself founded on division or the dyadic type. Completely understood, this structure varies throughout diverse positions and doctrinal decision, throughout the tangle of the “theories” of generality and universality.

We emphatically distinguish generality and universality (sometimes written uni-versality in order to indicate its veritable bearing and to distinguish between its philosophical concept), but on a non-unitary mode, without division or philosophical decision, in some way losing their connection or form-mixture.

Uni-versality is the essence of the vision-in-One which, far from being self-enclosed like an “inside” or mixed with transcendence, is an immanence without transcendence but not without uni-versality. The distinction of a uni-versality specific to the most radical immanence without transcendence, yet which forms a system with the being-foreclosed of the latter, is the fundamental theoretical acquisition of non-philosophy that distinguishes it from the mixed solutions of the “philosophies of immanence” (M. Henry included). This uni-versality is taken in a “literal” sense: as the being-turned of immanence or the One towards..., as non-ekstatic-openness, availability-without-transcending, in the sense that the vision-in-One can always give the World but give- it -without-givenness. It is also to be taken as a completely negative condition just like the vision-in-One, *sine qua non*, absolutely necessary but also totally

insufficient, refusing to confuse the necessity and sufficiency in the Principle of reason with philosophy. The vision-in-One is a “principle” of radical non-sufficiency that precisely gives the bearing and sense of its uni-versality to philosophy. We can say of the latter that without being a completely negative doctrine or negative philosophy, it is a uni-versal but non-sufficient theory that must be effectuated in different philosophical vocabularies, which in a sense means that it takes on an axiomatic.

On the other hand, the generality of non-philosophy is a feature of its organon, of the force (of) thought or the subject-Stranger. If uni-versality is real, neither transcendental nor logical, generality is transcendental and not real, it is a property of first terms, of axioms, and of what is deduced in the theory of the subject and in that of the identity (of) the thought-world. It can also be said of this generality that due to its origins, which are neither philosophical nor scientific, it is determined-in-the-last-instance by uni-versality. Their philosophical relations are redistributed in a non-unitary sense. The generality of the force (of) thought is indeed also an identity. It is said of mixtures or pairings, it is no longer divided by decision or philosophical faith, for it is the transcendental effectuation (through cloning) of real “negative” uni-versality. It is thus also a universality, but positive and more concrete than the vision-in-One. Cloning excludes unitary mixtures, the connection of universality and generality. Non-philosophy stops “generalizing” philosophy itself, but it can only do this in recourse to the last-instance of a real uni-versality ignored by philosophy. The “non-Euclidean” model has helped non-philosophy constitute itself, and it effectively functions on a certain level of elaboration; it is a possible scientific material. But it is itself ordered in the experience of the vision-in-One as universal.

Universion

Effectuation of the “negative” uni-versality of the One in the occasion and its causality; but not of the One itself, foreclosed and inalienable under whichever effect. It is one of the three effects of the Real, alongside unidentification and unilateralization.

The philosophies of the One in the Platonic tradition obviously experienced conversion as return to the One “according to” procession; for mystics, it was the reversion of the soul to its identity with God; for metaphysical ontology, the convertibility of the One and Being, the thought of truth and Being, the “turn” (*Kehre*) as semi-version; schizoanalysis, the reversion of desire to its autoproduktive essence. Every philosophy in fact knows of “circumversion,” the circular version with various degrees of breakage and opening, of transcendentality and empiricity, of topography and topology, of inversion and reversal of extremes, etc. In every scenario, the circle is the primary element of the “version,” which is nothing but an abstract arc and always carries the dotted-line tracing of this circularity specific to philosophy.

Defined as One-in-One, the Real is inalienable in effects or objects, for example in the unidentity and unilaterality through which it affects the grasping of any given. It also exists in the functional instances to which it gives rise on the basis of its “negative” uni-versality or in which it is, so to speak, effectuated (rather than simply following or converting with it) under the “occasional” effect of philosophy or the thought-world. The occasional cause is thus univerted towards the One or immanent-in-the-last-instance. It is under this aspect that it will constitute the material for the cloning of the force (of) thought.

The possibility of universion itself must be sought not in an external and brute causality of the thought-world over the supposedly isolated vision-in-One, but in the latter's essence insofar as it is the site of the uni-versal and obligated, somewhat negative, being-given of the thought-world. Its radical immanence and its "empty" indifference does not signify a closure but the negative condition of a uni-versal opening to every form of transcendence, consequently an opening itself immanent or without transcendence and which univerts this transcendence. Uni-version is thus the *de jure* operation of the uni-versality of the One which indeed depends on no occasion but on the essence of the One's radical inherence alone. From this point of view, non-philosophy is the discovery and exploitation of the uni-versality specific to radical Identity which philosophy has ignored.

Thus replaced on the real terrain of uni-version, the "version" loses its philosophical nature of "turning," bi-lateral or di-rectional turning. It acquires an identity, identity (of) turning, which it has never had, even in the Heideggerian *Kehre*. It is the ultimate condition of cloning in general in its noetic forms, since the former is transcendental and aprioritic. But it is its essence, the uni-versality of the One, which in general makes of the subject a Stranger devoted to the World, subject-for-the-World, facing the One rather than facing the World, turned one time each time towards it; consequently, from which it is impossible to "turn away." From a perfect mystical essence, by definition given but which gives- the World -without-givenness, man can only be turned irreversibly towards the World and can only pretend to "return" to an essence which it never lost.

Universion in particular transforms the *a priori* of phenomenological intentionality. The latter, without being annihilated as a movement from one goal to another, ceases on one hand being held by transcendence (the latter is only its occasional cause); on the other hand, it stops being an essence of itself or autopoitional; lastly, it stops being commanded by a pole-object with which it would have to identify and alienate itself in. Restored to its essence of uni-versality, intentionality is liberated from form-consciousness as well as the form-object: it is only "of" to the extent that it is primarily "for" or "towards." Universion gives to the force (of) thought its universality which allows it to be equal to the World itself and no longer to such and such an object.

Vision-in-One (One, One-in-One, Real)

[Original translation by Sid Littlefield]

Primary concept of non-philosophy, equivalent to the "One-in-One" or the "Real." That which determines the theory of in-the-last-instance and the pragmatics of the Thought-World ("philosophy"). The vision-in-one is radically immanent and universal; it is the given-without-givenness of the givenness of the Thought-World.

Philosophy is the desire and oppression of the One, divisible or associated with division. The problematization of Being (Heidegger included) supposes this barred One without really thematizing it. Philosophies of the One (Plato, neo-Platonism,

Lacan) suppose a final convertibility with Being based on the fact that Being is given a final objectivity which is ordered by the criteria of Being or abstracted from them. All ‘thoughts of the One’ are still structured like that of metaphysics: They hold an ultimate bound between the metaphysics of the science of Being and the science of the One. Hence the necessary disqualification of the One of the Greek from its empirical component, the one of the count or counting (Badiou), a point of extreme conflict between Being and the One and the ‘death’ of the former. The philosophy that wishes to be post-metaphysical oscillates, in the best cases, between the end of Being and the end of the One, while never ceasing to honor metaphysics.

Non-philosophy enunciates a series of axioms on the One understood as vision-in-One and no longer as the desire of the One:

The One is radical immanence, identity-without-transcendence, not associated with transcendence or division.

The One is in-One or vision-in-One and not in-Being or in-Difference.

The One is the Real insofar as it forecloses all symbolization (thought, knowledge, etc).

The One is the given-without-givenness and separation-without-separation—of the given.

The One is that which determines in-the-last-instance the Thought-World as given (the object of givenness).

Non-philosophy renounces the thought-of-the-One or the desire-of-the-One, but this renunciation has a higher purpose than the renunciation of desire: the One-in-One is the unknown of philosophy, that which is certainly foreclosed but, by confusing the transcendental One with the transcendent One, that which philosophy believes to be within its power to think, sometimes close to repression. Philosophy represses its own “One” but forecloses the being-foreclosed of the One-in-One in its own way. This confusion is the faith and sufficiency of philosophy that starts by supporting the vision-in-One. Non-philosophy is installed on a different ground than philosophy or, better still, on “the absurd” that is the Real. Philosophy occurs upon a ground which it delusionally takes as the Real but which is “real” only for experience, while non-philosophy takes its departure from the utopia of the Real. This is not a “utopia” in the vulgar philosophical sense, but a thought-according-to-utopia. Utopia determines-in-the-last-instance thought which takes the Thought-World for its object. Rather than the interminable end of metaphysics, it is a question of its identity, such that this identity (of) metaphysics invalidates or unilateralizes its sufficiency and its authority. With this substitution of thought-according-to-the-One for the thought of the science of the One, the triumph or victory over the Greek One, over the desired One, whether it is conveyed or spoiled by the Multiple (Deleuze/Badiou), is of little importance: the philosophical adventures of the One are property of the objects of non-philosophy as vision-in-One, and nothing more.

In any case, the vision-in-One “gives” the One and it alone; it is “the” given entirely, the given as the identity of the given, as the given-without-givenness, unfolding or doublet of the given and givenness. It is thus radical phenomenon, without the background phenomenological world in its vastest sense: without Being behind the phenomenon or related to it. But if it does not give the One and if it neither exceeds it nor is alien to it, it also gives the Thought-World, but it still gives

it in-One or in the form of given-without-givenness. The givenness-of-the-given (Thought-World) is the object of a non-philosophical givenness by force (of) thought, the latter itself given-without-givenness or given-in-the-last-instance. The vision-in-One is thus universal-in-immanence instead of universal by transcendence, extension, generality, etc. It is necessary to write uni-versal: with the sense of the One, while remaining in an immanence foreclosed as the Thought-World, receiving it without being effected by it, or offered and opened to it as an openness-without-horizon, from a completely immanent in-stasis [*instase*].

In a sense the One is “for the World,” understanding that “for” does not signify any end, internally or externally, but is available through indifference (and not an indifference through abstraction as this abstraction is generally understood).

World

[Original translation by Anthony Paul Smith]

Alongside “philosophy,” other first name for the mixture of philosophy and the world. Philosophy is the pure and general form of the World and the World is the immanent object of philosophy. In short: the “thought-world.” It is the identity of this mixture and not simply this mixture thought after itself in an intra-philosophical or intra-mundane manner.

The world is the object of cosmological meditation, either in terms of pre-Kantian metaphysics or in terms of a transcendental constitution by principles. In Husserl, the natural, even regulatory, thesis of the World is suspended, while in Heidegger that which is the horizon of the World, correlate of an infinite potential intentionality, becomes, over-determined by the Christian experience of the world, the first phenomena of the existential analytic of Dasein as being-in-the-world [*être-dans-le-monde*] (or in-the-world [*au-monde*]). Philosophy has always had a special affinity with the World as its originary dimension (the Greeks and Kant) to the point of reciprocating itself with it (Marx, the becoming-world of philosophy, the becoming-philosophy of the World).

The distinction of the World and the One (or of man) is at the heart of non-philosophy—its dual dimension. The World is the Authority of Authorities, whereas the One defines the order of Minorities or Strangers. In this sense, the World is radically transcendent to the One-essence of man, and we are not in-the-world [*au-monde*]. But it is unilateralized by the One which simultaneously determines it in-the-last-instance in the contingency of its “occasional” givenness and in its usage. The World ceases to be an object of philosophy, of special or fundamental metaphysics, to become its immanent object when this one is thought in its greatest generality as thought-world. In other words, now it forms with the World, seen-in-One-in-the-last-instance, no longer a unitary mixture, a simple reciprocation, but the noematic sense or the identity (of) this mixture.

In this enveloping mixture, man-in-One is the real condition of the only science possible. As transcendental science and determined by man in-the-last-instance, it possesses a mystical aspect linked to a real difference of the One and the World, or unilateral dual(ity). This expression

signifies that it does not exist due to the reversibility of the givenness of the World and the given of the One, contrary to the postulate of unitary and philosophical thought.

The unitary illusion, real then transcendental appearance, is specific to the World which necessarily resists the One with all its philosophical forces. The reason for such resistance is that the World is a mixture of the (hallucinated) Real and of the philosophical logico-real, this mixture thus not being the Real itself but effectivity. Yet the sense of this resistance only appears with the vision-in-One that manifests the thought-world as a sort of foreclosure of the Real that could not forget the latter but only hallucinate it and, as a result, hallucinate its relation of foreclosure as simple “forgetting.” The One thus manifests this resistance and suspends it by revealing it as a foreclosure. The relation of man and the World is dialyzed in this one, the latter emplaced or unilateralized, treated as correlate (unilate rather) of the One. What does this mean?

The World is no longer an object or an envelopment from which the One should incessantly try to distinguish itself, an object flooded by intentionality or vice versa. It remains, as reduced, the phenomenon (in a non-phenomenological sense) of the occasion and the triple function (nomination, indication, cloning) that it fulfills with regard not merely to the One itself, but to the subject or the force (of) thought. Thus, non-philosophy escapes from the hatred fascinated with the World (philosophy) which it takes “such that it is” [*“tel quel”*], man abandoning the World and its thought, philosophy, to their destiny and not pursuing any project with respect to that which they are in themselves. On the other hand, as simple opportunity, it gives rise to a theoretical and pragmatic acting that expresses the generosity of-the-last-instance of the One recognizing a right to the World [*un droit au Monde*]. The World is thus the material from whence the non-philosophical pragmatic extracts the sense of the World, not objective sense but occasional (without auto-position). This occasional sense (the equivalent of a noema), rather than “the World itself” or a “being-in-the-world” [*être-dans-le-monde*], is the identity (of) the thought-world. Thus, the Stranger, who is constituted except in its [his/her] real essence, with the support of occasional causality, frees itself of every essential relation to the World (but not every “relation”) and as a result releases the World itself from the primacy of Being [*Être*]. Non-philosophy gives up every transcendental deduction of the World, which is supposedly given, but proceeds to a transcendental “deduction” of the Stranger with the support of the World.