THE NORWEGIAN ROOTS OF DEEP ECOLOGY



WISDOM IN THE OPEN AIR

EDITED BY
PETER REED & DAVID ROTHENBERG

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Peter Reed, 1961-1987

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Preface

Peter Reed and I both found ourselves attracted to Norway at the same time in our lives, just after graduation from college in the United States. Here was a land with deep, dark fjords and shining mountains, home to a uniquely philosophical kind of environmentalism that we had both heard fragments of back home. Why Norway? What were they up to in this idealistic northern land that might be of interest to the rest of the world?

People told us we were crazy when we got there. "What?" they laughed. "Norwegians don't care any more about nature than anyone else. It's just that there are fewer of us." But outsiders can always concoct particular visions of the countries they visit, where they see what they want to see, and write down what they think reflects the essence of the foreign land. Sometimes this picture is sharper than the one seen from inside its borders, even if it might not always be true to life.

Soon after we began to learn Norwegian we conceived of this rather ambitious project—collecting the writings of the various native philosophers of nature, translating them if necessary, to present a vision of why this particular country has developed a particularly thoughtful strain of environmentalism.

It has only been over the last five years that this kind of thinking has become generally known as "deep ecology." Though this is a term that

has been interpreted in many different directions, this collection of readings should help to establish what kind of place it came from.

Norway remains a land that alternates between dark and light, from beauty to despair. It can be a dangerous place if you do not know where to go.

In the midst of work on this project, Peter Reed died under an avalanche in the Jotunheimen mountains in the spring of 1987. All who knew him were devastated by the loss of so energetic and promising a thinker. What can one do after losing someone who would have been close by for many years, on the same path, bushwhacking through a wilderness of ideas? When I heard of this tragedy I wrote the following lines to our friend and collaborator, Esben Leifsen:

To Peter:

"the blue mountains are constantly walking"
—Dogen

and the ice dissolves you
as you hide in your hair

you knew

the rocks and skies teach us,
of what we cannot speak

we will not use useless
words—

but we will not stop
we will not go
away from here,
into the dark

for the snow is dark—
it falls light, but can crush us

as light can blind:
as fright can . . .

(and do not doubt that the mountains do walk
and the Earth itself is change)

All our ecologies are less deep without him.

Thanks to everyone who helped us. All the authors whose works we have included, and Ola Glesne, Dag Hjelle, Gunvor Berge, Tore Brænd, Chris Butters, Manhar Patel, Jan Borring, Paul Hofseth, Sven Erik Skjønberg, Randi Viberg, Britt Hveem, Hermod Haug, Dag Polyszinski, Olav Benestad, Vanja, Astrid, Jennifer, Solveg, Bård, Ulv, the Blokksberg crowd, Gabrielle, Carol, Jill, June, Ane, Bendik, Esben, Barbro, Abha, Anja, Kristin, Leen, Thale, and everyone else. Thanks to Jørn Siljeholm for checking to see if the manuscript is up to date, and for carting things back and forth from Boston to Oslo. I am grateful to Barbara Coffin at the University of Minnesota Press for renewing my interest in this project, and to Ole Rikard Høisæther at Grøndahl-Dreyers Forlag for help in locating illustrations. Thanks also to Doug Tompkins and the Ira-Hiti Foundation for providing a grant to fund the completion of this work. I hope someone out there will benefit from what we went to the arctic spaces to find. It was not always an easy trip.

David Rothenberg
Cambridge, Massachusetts
June 1992



Solen (The Sun, Edvard Munch)

Chapter 1

Introduction: Deep Ecology from Summit to Blockade

What is deep ecology? Put simply and broadly, it is the belief that today's environmental problems are symptomatic of deeper problems in our society, and that this belief requires an effort to solve these fundamental problems, not just retrofitting our current practices to be in line with environmentally correct mores.

It means, for example, that we should not stop with the building of more fuel-efficient automobiles, but question whether we need to be so dependent on these machines at all, and devise a society that would not need so many of them. It means not only developing methods of sustainable forestry, but recognizing that some lands might be preserved for their own sake, giving nature value in itself, independent of human need.

We would like to keep the definition as open as this, so that deep ecology involves real interrogation of the current way we use the Earth, offering up the *possibility* that the world might be appreciated apart from what we can humanly enjoy of it. It begins as a reaction against our current path, and proceeds by asking us to pay attention to the richness and diversity of the land in all its forms.

The term "deep ecology" was coined by Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess in 1972. His use of the term and its gradual proliferation has been described many times before.[1] When the word was introduced, its precise meaning was left very much up for grabs. Since then, it has been turned

and twisted in quite different directions. Much of the writing on this idea tends to retool it to apply to specifically normative, particularly radical visions of the human relationship with nature,[2] or else decide that it properly belongs to those few thinkers who have devoted themselves to a philosophical refinement of the special terminology invented by Naess.[3] But the words continue to have an evocative, popular appeal somewhat akin to the influence of "existentialism" in the fifties and sixties. And in this case, there is no use trying to artificially limit the meaning of the term through careful reading. The word is out there—it touches some, and turns others off.

Some scientists worry that it "softens" ecology away from their rigid domain. Others say, "Fine, let 'deep ecology' refer to soft ecology, and we field ecologists will be safer using 'ecology' to refer purely to science." Some find that it seems to feign spirituality in a disturbingly thin way.[4] Others experience it as the beginning of a genuine religious reawakening with nature.[5] These debates are more than semantic ones, and no pronouncement can end them. The meaning of a word develops through time and social change. We can only coax it and follow its progress. (Let us not forget that the word "ecology" was invented by Ernst Haeckel in Germany just over a hundred years ago[6]—and he was not so much a scientist as a popularizer, really a "new age" figure of his time, with all the pluses and minuses that go along with that term.)

This book grew out of a hypothesis, or more accurately a hunch, that both of us came to independently: it was no accident that the man who named this concept came from Norway, and he could not stand alone. Deep ecology, or thoughtful environmentalism, must have roots far down in Norwegian culture if it is to have any genuine depth.

Living in Norway for several years, the outlines of its roots and branches began to come clear to us. This is a work of cultural geography more than anything else, presenting an enveloping vision of a nation as viewed from the vantage of a single idea, asking: how much of this country can we now understand with this one concept in mind? With miles of open space, acres of crisp air, Norway is a land of many philosophers far away from each other working in the rocky heights. Not all have formal training, but they believe in the power of systems of thought to influence mundane affairs. We found a unique tradition of interconnected thinkers, touched by each other and the Earth—innovative, yet tied to the past and the rhythm of their land.

They each work in their own style and their own forms, but we believe they would be sympathetic to the notion of deep ecology as it has been broadly endorsed above; a *questioning* ecology sees beyond the forest and the trees to the root metaphors and acts of the way humanity has framed the world. They each have their own preferred labels, and words that they invent or usurp and then fill with elaboration of meaning.

Though Norwegian reverence for nature can be traced as far back as the Viking days, the trend in this century was awakened in the work of Peter Wessel Zapffe. Humorist, poet, mountaineer, and gruff raconteur, Zapffe wrote in an encompassing style not so far from that of another Scandinavian iconoclast, Søren Kierkegaard. He coined his own term "biosophy" in the 1940s to refer to the greatest of existential tragedies discovered by humankind by virtue of our own biological predicament: we have learned enough about the world and our place within it so that we realize the planet would be better off without us. Our only choice now is to abdicate our reigning role, gracefully die out, and let some other species do what it can with this best of possible worlds.

Zapffe remains by far the most pessimistic of these proto–deep ecologists. The others all harbor at least some hope for humanity in all this mess. Arne Naess comes next, and with his long career as educator and harbinger of controversy, he has exerted profound influence on most of the other writers in this book, who have all either climbed or studied with him at some point in their careers. He came to name deep ecology after a long career in logic, semantics, and the philosophy of nonviolent resistance according to Gandhi, all the while stressing precise expression, attention to values in arguments, and the importance of thinking for oneself and accepting no dogma in its place.

Sigmund Kvaløy is known as the most vocal of ecoactivists in Norway, introducing the seminal distinction between "complexity" and "complication" to deep ecology. On the other hand, he prefers the term "ecophilosophy"—which sounds less imposing in Norwegian—to refer to a wisdom from nature that demands action. His essay here presents the musing of a committed practitioner who believes that ideas can and do *work*.

Nils Faarlund has elaborated the Norwegian tradition of *friluftsliv* (literally, "open-air life") into a way of reestablishing contact with our home, the Earth. More than just outdoor recreation, it points the way to

new lifestyles and a new society. He teaches these values in seminars held up on the white spacious glaciers, in sun and in storm.

These writers were inspired largely by the ecological problems that seized global attention at the beginning of the sixties. Their work deserves to be called deep ecology because it searches for the roots (and solutions) of ecological problems in the metaphysical and ethical assumptions that drive them. The kinds of thoughts that grow out of examinations like these can sprout up in very different forms. Finn Alnæs, himself an active part of the environmental resistance movement, deals with the battle of ideas in fictional form. Johan Galtung, a master theoretician in the domain of peace research, presents here an ecological schema for development issues. Erik Dammann is included as a man who started an organization to make people feel they could themselves be the catalysts for radical social change. His group, "The Future in Our Hands," has made some of the more nebulous ideology of attention to nature into a galvanizing political force.

Here we have come full circle from Zapffe, who asked for the timely demise of human-induced blight—*Homo sapiens* as tragic species, whose peculiar mental capacity drives us implacably to render the world uninhabitable. With Dammann, the emphasis is on improving the human condition. Our world is one in which eighty thousand children die each day from hunger and malnutrition. *This* is the tragedy of humankind, a tragedy produced on a global stage and played out again and again with the support of a grossly inequitable resource distribution. He believes we must exercise our free will to create a society where the worth of every individual is cherished. Pessimism becomes optimism, but has it been blinded in the process?

We present the full range of historical options for you to decide.

Whatever its particular expression, deep ecology is intimately mixed up with political, social, artistic, and intellectual currents of its setting, both present and traditional. It is nothing in isolation. In a volume tracing the concept's Norwegian origins, one needs to give a rough idea of what those currents were and are.

First a sketch of the land, what is unique about it and how it has shaped the politics and culture of Norway. Of special interest in this regard are literary traditions and the formation of political attitudes that remain central in today's environmental disputes.

Then a look at the history of the environmental movement in Norway, leading up to the period during which most of these pieces were written. At the end of the book, we will return to examine how these writings of the sixties through the eighties have influenced current environmental thinking in Norway and the world.

Environmentalism in Norway has a rich history, from the political watershed of hydropower controversies to a debate on the nature of green politics. What stands out is a shift from a "classical" concern for protecting isolated natural phenomena to a broader, more inclusive notion of what environmental protection must imply. Making such implications explicit is one of the main tasks of deep ecology, and we discuss the role of these writers in this development. The discussion follows a thread running through the whole fabric of the Norwegian eco-movement: what is the role of deep, often very abstract, thinking in the attempt to avert a very real ecological crisis?

The Land and the Culture

Norway has always been a country where nature, rather than human settlement, dominates the landscape. Its four million people are sprinkled unevenly over 124,500 square miles of breathing room, making it the "emptiest" land in Europe after Iceland.[7] Only 1 percent of the country is built up, and since most people live along the coast, wide open spaces are plentiful in the interior. Indeed, the relatively pristine condition of Norwegian nature is probably as much a result of a low population density as of an enlightened environmental ethic.

Mountains, forests, and the coast are the defining natural features: trees cover 24 percent of the country; high moors and mountain ranges wrinkle 73 percent of the land area, raising Norway on average 650 feet higher than the norm for continental Europe. The coastline, deeply cut with narrow fjords, doubles back on itself for fully 12,000 linear miles as it winds its way northward over 13 degrees of latitude.

Norway's boreal setting means long, dark winters and short, brilliant summers. But although Norway stretches as far north as Alaska's Point Barrow, it is washed by the warm waters of the Gulf Stream, which moderates its climate and makes agriculture possible much further above the Arctic Circle than in North America. Geographically, Norway is a mix of harsh terrain and moderate weather, where rich coastal fisheries and

pockets of arable land have historically provided a living within definite, fairly narrow bounds.

Norway has been inhabited for around ten thousand years, and the pressures of a convoluted coastline and barren mountain ranges led to the growth of small, isolated communities supporting themselves by a combination of fishing, hunting, and farming. The internal economic diversity of these settlements was mirrored by a diversity among them: different styles of clothing, architecture, and farming methods and a tremendous number of linguistic dialects attest to the effect of that isolation. "The sea unites us, the land divides us," runs one Norwegian expression, emphasizing the difficulty of overland travel throughout most of its history. Even the sea could be an infrequently traveled highway; it was not unknown for people in settlements on opposite sides of the same island to speak two different dialects. Regional differences with roots in geographic barriers persist today.

The mark the land has left on Norwegian culture is deeper than regional differences in speech and dress, though less easy to demonstrate. The length and gloom of the winters, it is said, inflicts Norwegians with a "dark sickness," which has left its traces in a folk literature filled with trolls, goblins, and other mystic beasts. Patience, tenacity, courage, and strong kinship ties are also said to be the bequest of a landscape that split people into small communities and only grudgingly yielded them a living.[8] But a "rugged individualism," a sense of living every day on the frontier, was not the whole story: nature was a challenge, to be sure, but nothing one could expect to triumph over. Philosopher Gunnar Skirbekk writes: "One must learn that nature is not always something that can be conquered. We ourselves are small and vulnerable, and we must understand that we do not stand outside of nature as all-powerful engineers, but that we belong to nature, as a part of the whole."[9] In fact, Skirbekk continues, Norway is a "state that to a great degree builds its national identity on nature." Nature precedes human culture, and culture precedes the individual. Rather than try to extract glittering generalizations about Norwegian culture and nature, it is best to let Norwegians speak for themselves.

The past two hundred years of Norwegian literature reveal much about traditional attitudes toward the environment, and contain kernels of thought that have been expanded by modern environmental philosophers. The links between traditions and philosophy are not deterministic,

nor would we want to argue that deep ecology is a triumphant realization of what writers only haltingly tried to put forth in their work. Instead, through a brief look at these traditions, we want to suggest that the new turn in philosophy was not a wild card in Norwegian traditions, but a development quite in line with the country's cultural history.

Norwegian Literature and Ecology: Romanticism and Beyond

To what extent can literature be seen as the carrier of a philosophy linking humanity and nature? There are arguments for and against such a connection. Yi-Fu Tuan writes, "Literature is a force. . . . Unfortunately, great works of art are only a force, capable of swaying the masses, when their meanings are simplified beyond recognition and lifted out of context."[10]

From a different angle, Whitehead comments that "it is in literature that the concrete outlook of humanity receives its expression."[11] It is within literature that we can find, time and again, the recurring, basic inward thoughts of a nation and its people.

So literature is valuable evidence in justifying any point in a critique of a society. But we must be wary of taking things too far out of context, twisting their meanings too far from that which was intended.

Norway is a land of astonishingly beautiful nature, full of perilous contrast, yet safe and sublime when seen from afar. The mountains are broad and gentle in their highest parts, but then plunge dramatically down to the fjords and the sea. It is a nature embraceable and accessible, where diversity is linked and continuous.

As with the rest of Europe, in the middle of the eighteenth century a change appeared in the predominant praising of nature—from the appreciation of the ordered and productive landscapes that sustained human life to an inflation of the beauty and grandeur of rough and primal landscapes. Rousseau, Wordsworth, and others ushered in the age of romanticism.

Some have called deep ecology a return to idealistic and impractical longing in the midst of a pragmatic age of machines. It is not enough, then, to show how successful Norwegian literature was in its romantic portrayal of nature. It serves our aims far better to show how Norwegian literature has given clues on how *to move beyond* romantic yearning to two different places:

1. There is poetry of a phenomenological kind, where the writer loosens or expands himself in or through nature, thereby making possible the kind of identification and participation with nature that this book encourages. Here Henrik Wergeland, Tarjei Vesaas, and Knut Hamsun have been chosen as only three examples out of many possibilities.

2. There is literary expression of the conflict between longing and harsh reality, or between an individual's criticisms and the will of the majority, the kind of conflict that so marks the ecological struggle. And here Henrik Ibsen, whom many Norwegians see as an anomaly because he "never went to the mountains," becomes a central figure as he tries to chart a way out of the idealism of romanticism.

Critics of romanticism often remark that it is themselves that the poets are praising, not the presence of nature. This is an easy line of attack, but in Norway, at least, there was a development that Nils Faarlund later elaborates as "deep romanticism"—a true entrance into the awe of nature for its own sake as the greatest of possible wonders. Henrik Wergeland was so admired in his own time (the mid-nineteenth century) for the very reason that he saw the great in the little; "divine ideas lifted up on the weak straws of the grass . . . from tiny gnat-sparks and mammoth flames to the conflagration of suns":[12]

> Concealed there is a spirit in the dimmest grain of dust
> Just as the word
> Slumbers hidden in the idea

And the "idea" slumbers hidden in nature, what Wergeland called the "mirror of innocence." Nature can speak directly to the Creator as nothing else can. And humanity can stand on and with it as participant and equal.

This can scarcely be called a conception of nature that comes entirely from within the poet, but one that comes from a nature that is itself stirring and vivid, so linked to people's lives. Literary historian Harald Beyer speaks of a triad of inspiration for all of Norwegian literature, the mountains, the sea, and the forests:

> A literature that has grown up among mountains may lack luxuriance and gaiety, but it has the advantages of seriousness and greater perspective. . . . Such a (vision) may bubble away in the aimless backwash of the eddying fjord, but more often it finds its way to the open sea. . . . Whether by contrast or association, these two features

> have the deepest possible significance for Norwegian writing. But to these we must add a third feature, the forest. The forest generally calls upon the mystical. In the woods the poet can dream of hidden and secret forces.[13]

Contrast among the three is the essence. There is a trend in Norwegian literature that is essentially dramatic, with change and decision at the center of things, with shifting identities linked so closely to a nature of *mangfold*, diversity.

Tarjei Vesaas is a twentieth-century master of deceptive simplicity in language, drawn from the Earth. He describes what this type of identity means, linking all of the three elements Beyer describes. The following excerpt from a poem, "Snow and Fir Forests,"[14] describes the Norwegian sense of place with a language that is as cleanly etched as the pattern of snow on trees that it seeks to evoke:

> Talk of what home is—
> snow and fir forests
> are home.
>
> From the first moment
> they are ours.
> Before anyone has told us,
> that it *is* snow and fir forests,
> they have a place in us—
> and since then it is there
> always, always.
>
> . . .
>
> Come home.
> go in there
> bending branches
> —go on til you know
> what it means to belong.

So it is not always easy, the pull of roots in a rootless world, where all are beckoned away from this tradition of a nature of contrasts toward the city. But the work of Vesaas and much other postromantic Norwegian literature beckons toward a grounded past that is still within reach of Nor-

wegians, while many of us in more modernized countries could dismiss it all as mere romantic longing. In the poem "One Rows and Rows,"[15] the mountain plunges starkly down into the sea, while we sail humbly on beneath it, trying to find a place. The search does involve a certain longing for the past, winter wanting summer, a longing for a time of daylight at the end of darkness:

The day is over
—and one rows and rows.

The dark mountain,
darker than the evening,
hangs over the water
with black creases:
A sad plunging face
with its mouth in the sea.
No one knows all.

. . .

One rows and rows tonight.
One sees and sees nothing.
No one knows
who laps at the mountain
when it is dark.
No one knows the bottoms
of the Fearful Sea.
No one knows
who it is who cannot row.

Amid these living archetypes of landscape, the modern world continues to paddle on, through and past, oblivious to such real pulls of natural heritage. And soon we as a society may forget how to row through these strengths of the past, and only glide forward with determination, but without direction. Yet there does remain a hope that we can weather the trembling of realizing "what it is to be where we belong." Another route beyond the traps of romanticism is to openly see nature as a route toward the inner workings of humanity. Knut Hamsun explicitly sought to look more within the human soul, while at the same time going further into

nature. Nearly all of his novels introduce the modern and implacable Wanderer who travels widely on Earth, and endlessly within the soul, upon "voyages of thoughts and feelings into the unknown, footless, trackless journeys by brain and heart, strange activities of the nerves, the whisper of the blood, the prayer of the bones, . . . the sudden intuition of an approaching danger in the midst of a carefree hour—"[16]

In the novel *Pan*, the wandering Lieutenant Glahn explains how it is nature that makes his restless life so satisfying, speaking to his future love, Edvarda:

> If you only knew all the things I see out in the fields. In the winter I might be walking along and I perhaps see the marks of ptarmigan in the snow. Suddenly the tracks disappear. The birds have flown. But I can tell from the marks of the wings in which direction the birds have gone. . . .
>
> Many a time in the autumn there are shooting stars to watch. Then I think in my solitude: what, was that a world in convulsion? A world disintegrating before my very eyes? And to think that I in my life have been granted the spectacle of a shooting star! But when the summer comes, perhaps there is a small living creature on every leaf: I can see that some have no wings, they can never get far. They must live and die on that little leaf, where they came into the world. Imagine! Well, all this does not sound like much, I don't know if you understand.[17]

Complicity in the changes of nature leads Glahn into a personal and unsettled world, where encounters with people, the land, and the imagination become blurred in a tantalizing, brooding existence that gives him no peace.

The character of the Wanderer appears in most of Hamsun's novels, but when he is finally able to come to rest in *Growth of the Soil*, it is only the land and the Earth that can hold him. The preromantic praise of the cultivation of nature has not died out in Norway; there is a way for yearning to end. As the farmer Isak reflects on his situation:

> No, a man of the wilds did not lose his head. A man of the wilds was not put out by great things he could not get: art, newspapers, luxuries, politics and the like were worth just what folk were willing to pay for them, no more. Growth of the soil was something different, a thing to be procured at any cost, the only source, the origin of all. A dull and desolate existence? Nay, least of all. A man had everything; his powers able, his dreams, his loves, his wealth of superstition.[18]

Superstition? Is there something here opposed to truth in this life as idyll?

There is a problem. It is the same thing Henrik Ibsen points out in his poem *Paa Vidderne* (literally "On the Heights," translated as "In the Mountain Wilderness")[19] when he poses the question, What does wild nature really *mean* for us down in the valleys of civilization? From the urban perspective, nature begins to be seen as an escape from the problems of "real" life.

The young protagonist bids his mother goodbye, kisses his sweetheart farewell, and heads for the mountains, the *viddas*, a particularly Norwegian mountain landscape of broad plateaus and braes above them, expansive and gentle, but still striking enough to beckon to the settlers of the valleys. Up there he plans to hunt and fish for a while before returning to the lowland life. But he meets another ubiquitous Wanderer, of the sort who never finds rest, who takes him under his wing, urging him onward toward the inexhaustible beauties of nature:

> "Why do you each night keep yearning
> For your mother's little cottage? . . .
> Dreams are dreams—why dream and slumber?
> Truly deeds and days are better!"
>
> "Well, then come!
> In wind and rainstorm,
> 'Cross the highland's rolling heather!
> He who wants may take the church road:
> I will not, for I am free!"

The young man tries to defend the beauties of things of the valley, such as the possible salvation through religion, but the Wanderer defends the beauties of the mountain, and in the end the young hunter is convinced:

> In the lonely seter-corner,
> My abundant catch I take.
> There's a hearth, and a table,
> And *friluftsliv* for my thoughts.

Here Ibsen introduces in print for the very first time a word that is essential to our book—*friluftsliv*: Open air life, life in nature. Nils Faarlund will argue that this is a creation of urban man, a view of and longing to be

in nature that can only come from an initial distance from the object described.

But there is danger in this distance, and Ibsen carries it to extremes. Our young mountain traveler is happy for a time, but he knows he has to go back. The moment he hears the Christmas bells ringing in the village he knows it is time to return (in this metaphoric *vidda* country, home is always visible and audible below). But at this instance he looks down in horror:

> A light shot up round door and roof
> By my mother's cottage frame.
> It looked like the white-red winter dawn;
> but black rolled the smoke,
> the illusion was gone,
> And then came the crimson flame.

The house burns to the ground; the youth grieves at his mother's death. But the Wanderer calmly explains how "red fire could flow right into the moonlight glow, and combine for a night-time of glory." The stranger is oblivious to human feelings and troubles. Nature is so much more true and living. Here is where true kin and passion lie.

But our friend is not so sure. By summertime he descends, interrupting the wedding of his sweetheart to another. Now nothing remains for him at home. He knows the Wanderer was right, and he takes to the hills again, leaving *lavlandsliv* behind:

> Now I am steel-set, I accept the command,
> To live in the regions you show me.
> I have expended my lowland life,
> Up on the viddas are freedom and God—
> The others are groping below me.

To be alone in nature—is this the best answer? Most readers of the poem probably feel strangely twisted at its end. Must a life in nature in contrast to our present world draw one so far from other people? Or is this only the view of an urban man, who can characterize nature, at a distance, in any way he pleases, and decide if it holds the answers to hopes and fears? Does nature itself remain intact through such perceptions?

We can rhapsodize nature in another way, by exalting its hidden treasures that only we can discover. John Gabriel Borkman also saw his destiny in the wilds. But he saw it as something he should hack out of nature, for the benefit of all humanity. And he saw himself as the only one who could hear this music in nature, which was singing out to him, and to him alone:

> *The music ceases. A pause.* BORKMAN: Can you guess where I first heard tones like these? FRIDA (*looking up at him*): No, Mr. Borkman. BORKMAN: It was down in the mines. . . . The metal sings down there. FRIDA (*not understanding*): Really—Sings? BORKMAN: Yes, when it is loosened. The hammer strokes that loosen it—they are the midnight bells striking it to set it free. That's why the metal sings, in its own way, for gladness. FRIDA: Why does it do that, Mr. Borkman? BORKMAN: It wants to come into the light of day, and serve mankind. (*He paces up and down the gallery, always with his hands behind his back.*)[20]

Here is a different kind of romanticism—the supreme joy of a nature yearning to serve humanity! Here is a depiction of the spiritual root of the belief that the resources of the Earth exist only for us to enjoy.

But Borkman is a man driven by this passionate view of his own destiny toward shady business practices that end in a five-year prison sentence and financial ruin. Afterward he spends eight years in self-imposed confinement, pacing back and forth in his study without ever facing the light of day. Finally, a last glimmer of hope leads him up to the mountains again with the woman he once loved. But at this point he has no feeling for any part of humanity, only for his private piece of nature, which he believes cries out to him alone:

> BORKMAN: . . . I sense their presence—those captive millions. I feel the veins of metal reaching out their twisting, sinuous, beckoning arms to me. . . . But let me whisper to you, here in the stillness of the night, I love you: you who lie in a trance of death in the darkness and the deep. I love you! You and your life-seeking treasures and all your bright retinue of power and glory. I love you, love you, love you! ELLA (*In suppressed but rising agitation*): Yes, now—as always, Johan —your love lies buried there.[21]

And shortly after this last glimpse of his beloved ore-rich fells, Borkman feels a "metal hand" grasp at his heart as it beats for a last time. There was something gravely evil in his vision. It had actually destroyed him long before, but it finishes him off with one fateful clutch.

Borkman was one man with an evil vision, one that he used to inflate himself toward the infinite. But what happens to the man who believes he has discovered that the whole of society itself is built upon an evil vision, a lie that threatens the well-being of the whole community? So it is with Dr. Stockmann in *The Enemy of the People*, probably the single best-known classic of world literature that deals with a specifically environmental conflict. Dr. Stockmann discovers that the waters of the spring that feeds the town's profitable health spa are polluted with toxic bacteria. The health of all locals and all guests is in serious danger. He at first believes the town will hail him as a hero and a defender of the truth. But how do they react? See the conflict between Dr. Stockmann and his brother, the mayor:

> DR. STOCKMANN: The source is poisoned, man! Are you mad? We are making our living by retailing filth and corruption! The whole of our flourishing municipal life derives its sustenance from a lie!
> PETER STOCKMANN: All imagination—or something even worse. The man who can throw out such offensive insinuations about his native town must be an enemy to our community.[22]

It is an understandable reaction. Arne Naess will write that ecologists, including strugglers against pollution, cannot hope to be more than Socrates was: "a pest, but at least a respectable pest." And the same can be said for anyone who looks beyond the narrow, short-term interests of the community toward long-term, *deeper* ideals.

But what happens to Dr. Stockmann? He is shocked that he finds any resistance to his revelations of the "truth" at all. He sees quickly that the problem is far greater than he imagined: "No—it is the whole of our social life that we have got to purify and disinfect." He changes his original message to something even more distasteful to the populace: "All the sources of our *moral* life are poisoned and the whole fabric of our community is founded on the pestiferous soil of falsehood!" He gives a rousing but raving speech that makes everyone angry. Soon he is left without a single supporter. But at the play's end he is not fazed in the least; on the contrary, he believes he is more powerful than ever:

> DR. STOCKMANN: Hush! . . . I have made a great discovery.
> MRS. STOCKMANN: Another one?
> DR. STOCKMANN: Yes. It is this, let me tell you—that the strongest man in the world is he who stands most alone.[23]

So he too, like the young man on the *viddas*, must forge on alone. We are led to believe there is something great, noble, and natural in such an existence. But Dr. Stockmann must give up his aims of changing society with his new recognition of lonely strength.

So if Ibsen has any message for deep ecology, it is this: If our ideals drive us too far from the very world we want to change, we need to think again. No matter how rotten we believe the core to be, there can be no hope if we renounce all else save ourselves. Then any practical possibility of change becomes reduced to romantic introversion, the poet praising himself through nature and none else. The poet must change the world, not only sing it.

Despite this push toward loneliness and redemption *from* humankind, there remains within the spirit of Norwegian literature a tone of hope and optimism (singing from the mountains, if you like) that feeds the energy behind all of this longing. The early twentieth-century author Olav Duun tried to catch it:

> Even if they try to take the Earth from under us,
> or the heavens from above us,
> we are human just the same:
> We will *freeze* our way through.
> We ourselves do not know how much we can endure.[24]

Politics and the Land

Turning now to political history, it is easy to see how Norway's geographical position has also influenced its political tradition. Perched on the outskirts of Europe, Norway was spared much of the turmoil of wars and migrations that plagued its southern neighbors. Although intra-Scandinavian infighting was sporadic throughout Norway's early years, Roman conquests never reached its shores, nor was it invaded from the east. Political isolation was in this sense a boon, but it did not entail cultural isolation: Norway's seafaring tradition stretches back at least five hundred years before Christ, and developed early on into a wide net of trading contacts.

In fact, the Norwegians' tremendous skill in shipbuilding was one factor behind Norway's debut as a geopolitical force during the Viking period (A.D. 800-1100). While to begin with these sea rovers embarked on isolated raids based out of their local communities, it did not take long

for the strategic weight of large, coordinated attacks to become apparent, and outposts and settlements were established from North America to Sicily.

Although many of these Viking voyages were carried out in concert with Sweden and Denmark, the internal political development of Norway took a different path from these countries, indeed, from most of contemporary Europe. In purely physical terms it was rare to find enough arable land in one place to support more than a few farms, and in contrast to almost anywhere else at the time, most Norwegian farmers were freeholders in small homesteads rather than tenant farmers huddled in villages.

Despite the efforts of small kings to unify Norway beginning in about 900, geographical barriers and a widely scattered population made administration of a kingdom practically impossible. Allegiance to a national king was nominal, and Norwegian nobility was almost nonexistent. Virtually unique to Norway was a body of commonly agreed-upon laws that made social life less susceptible to chaos than was common in other countries. This uneasy combination of local independence and an acceptance of lawful decision making, we will see, remains operative in modern environmental disputes.

A relatively egalitarian political structure and the lack of a rigid law of royal succession up to the twelfth century were partly responsible for a line of dynamic, able leaders who expanded Norway's national power and prestige. But the looseness of the union was also a disadvantage, as the country was unable to present a unified front against ambitious neighbors. The lack of a clear heir to the Norwegian throne at the end of the fifteenth century led to a union between Norway and Denmark under a Danish king that lasted until 1814. During these four hundred years Norway became a more and more obscure "county" in the Danish kingdom. It was only Denmark's unlucky allegiance with Napoleon and the latter's defeat at Waterloo that severed the union and once again threw Norway on its own.

Norway lost no time in writing a constitution and declaring itself independent, but its freedom was short-lived. Under the agreement between the nations allied against Napoleon, Sweden was to receive Norway as a prize of war. And despite a two-week struggle to preserve its independence, Norway was forced to submit to Swedish rule. Anxious to avoid a prolonged conflict, however, Sweden allowed Norway to keep its Constitution and a large degree of self-governance.

In foreign relations, however, it was the Swedish government that made decisions for Norway. To a country with a long tradition of foreign trade and one of the world's largest merchant fleets, this condition became increasingly onerous. Things came to a head in 1905, when vacillation on this issue forced the resignation of the Norwegian parliamentary government. The central government in Sweden was unable to quickly form a replacement government. Seizing the excuse that the Swedish king was thereby not living up to the terms of union, Norway seceded from Sweden.

With full independence under its belt, Norway turned its attention to speeding the transformation from a predominantly rural, agricultural land to a modern industrial state. Rich in natural resources but poor in development capital, Norway chose to lease its forests, mines, and waterfalls to foreign concerns in exchange for their development. It was especially the waterfalls that were attractive to investors: Norway's "white coal" offered a cheap and inexhaustible source of electricity for power-hungry chemical and metallurgical industries.

These concessions offered industrial growth—but not everyone in Norway was happy about the terms. Jealous of their newly won independence, many leaders in parliament were worried that indiscriminate leases would indenture the country to extranational firms. The dispute over these concession laws in fact prompted Norway's first major parliamentary crisis in its young independence.

The conflict was resolved in 1909 when parliament stipulated that waterfalls were to revert to Norwegian control after a certain number of years. The episode marks the growing political importance of natural resources, the first steps down the road that would lead to the hydropower controversies at Mardøla and Alta.

From Beaver Protection to Ecopolitics

It is on the road to the nonviolent protests of the 1960s and 1970s that we see the growth of modern Norwegian environmental activism and the traditions now known as deep ecology. That these developments are fellow travelers is no coincidence, since Norwegian ecophilosophy from its beginnings has concerned itself with practical improvements on the state of the environment. To see it in its proper context, then, we need to consider the environmental movement as a whole.

In 1910, five years after Norwegian independence, the parliament passed the first nature conservation law. This statute deemed that "certain natural phenomena or places shall be preserved when it is necessary to protect wild plants or animals, geological and mineralogical formations, if such preservation is in scientific or historical interests."

There were, however, examples of a broader view toward protection of the environment: Norway, the last bastion of the European beaver, totally protected this beleaguered species in 1899. This was an easy step to take, since the beaver by that time played no significant role in the Norwegian economy. But with a population predominantly dependent on farming and animal husbandry, the attitude toward predators has been until recently much less gentle. Wolves, bears, wolverines, and lynx were brought to the edge of extinction in Norway by defensive farmers and a generous government bounty.

It was only in 1932 that a new attitude toward predators came out in the laws: new regulations recognized the role these animals played in the ecosystem, along with a human need to experience an ecosystem whose original cast had not been decimated. Larger and larger areas were set aside as predator reservations, but it was not until 1973 that the hunting of bears and wolves was banned nationally. The issue, however, did not end there. The triangle of sheep, wolves, and farmers remains unstable, and newspapers still devote a good deal of space to the issue. Arne Naess addressed this delicate relationship in his 1979 article "Self-realization in Mixed Communities of Humans, Bears, Sheep and Wolves," suggesting that it was possible to develop a concept of community in which these predators have a place.[25]

From single species and isolated natural phenomena, environmentalists gradually set their sights higher. Ecological research was making plainer the dependence of species on their wider ecosystems—ecosystems the environmental conservation law of 1910 was poorly suited to protect. If the integrity of the environment were to be preserved, preservation efforts could not be limited to single natural phenomena and small areas: in 1914 conservation groups like the Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature (Norges Naturvernforbund) started pressing for national parks. The idea was not new: the United States established the world's first national park, Yellowstone, in 1872; Sweden had eight national parks by 1909.

With its weak 1910 law, however, Norway suffered from a legal handicap. A necessary first step in the pursuit of parks was a revised conser-

vation law. Accordingly, the Norwegian Conservation Society in 1953 drafted an amended law, which was passed in parliament the following year, foreshadowing the clout private associations were to have in shaping Norwegian environmental policy. In addition to its historic or scientific interests, the new law called the "natural beauty or uniqueness" of an area sufficient grounds for its preservation and was a turning point in the Norwegian conservation movement.

It was not until 1962 that the first national park was established in the Rondane Mountains, due in no small part to the fame Harald Sohlberg's paintings had brought the area. Over the next two decades there followed fourteen more national parks, which afford the area's natural "resources" much stronger protection from human interference than their U.S. counterparts do. Today, the various categories of protected lands in Norway make up nearly 4 percent of the mainland. But some valuable areas are still in peril. Environmental groups are still struggling to save Saltfjellet, a mountainous area lying on the Arctic Circle, and Breheimen, one of the most spectacular glacier landscapes in the world.

Baby Carriages in the Wilderness

Go into the forests around Oslo on Sunday and you may be one of about a hundred thousand other people who had the same idea. Every weekend about one-quarter of Norway's largest city can be found on the paths and lakes of Oslomarka, a green lung that is 80 percent of the city's official area—large enough to hide the other 99,999 hikers.

They travel on skis, foot, bicycle, sled, or baby carriage, depending on season, age, and temperament. The reason for this weekly migration isn't really that the city proper is a horrible place to live. City dwellers, in fact, head for the hills no more (and no less) frequently than their rural counterparts. Wherever they live, Norwegians have an exceptionally strong interest in outdoor recreation: 90 percent of the population gets out to the forests, mountains, or coast at least once a year, and the average person gets out more than sixty times a year. On any day of the week almost a fourth of the population spends about two hours doing some form or other of outdoor recreation. A typical Norwegian idyll is a holiday at a small cabin in the country. And the dream is a reality for many: there is about one vacation cabin for every thirteen Norwegians.

"Å gå på tur"—to go for a hike—is something of a national hobby. Norwegians are supposed to be "born with skis on their feet," and there's

a palpable peer pressure to get out into the woods fairly frequently—otherwise one is not *really* Norwegian.

"To go skiing," writes Gunnar Skirbekk, "is not only healthy, it is good. If you go on a skiing trip through Norwegian nature, you are a good person. The moral undertone is there, and cannot be ignored."[26] The late King Olav's skiing trips rated headlines in Norwegian dailies, and instead of going south to the sun during their spring break, nearly half of Norwegian vacationers go north to catch the last of winter's snow. And as if this were not enough, statistics show that most Norwegians would prefer to get out into nature even more than they do.

It is easier to do this in Norway than almost anywhere else. Since the earliest settlement in Norway, access to key natural resources such as streams, lakes and forests was too important to allow them to be fenced off by private landowners. Similarly, overland travel was difficult enough already without its being further hindered by closing off private lands. There grew up, accordingly, a tradition of *allemannsferdselsrett*: a legal right of anyone to hike through private property and to use rivers and lakes for recreation. The eventual rise of a capitalist economy was bound to collide with this tradition. First threatened were coastal areas, where private landowners were determined to seal off sections of the beach for their exclusive use. Conflicts between recreationists and farmers also became serious, and in 1957 a comprehensive outdoor recreation law was drafted to settle the conflict.[27]

The 1957 Friluftsloven codified the tradition of free travel explicitly. Hikers and campers are today entitled to walk or camp nearly anywhere they like, on private or public lands, provided they do not damage the area. Deep ecologists Sigmund Kvaløy and Nils Faarlund have since been active in setting limits to the kinds of recreation that can legitimately take place in these areas, arguing for uses that do not rely on motorized transport and the products of a technological society. But however one travels through the Norwegian countryside, the freedom of movement guaranteed by law is virtually unknown outside of Scandinavia, and is a legal illustration of the importance of outdoor recreation in the Norwegian lifestyle.

With this in mind, it is not surprising that interest in outdoor activities is mobilized into political activism when recreation areas are threatened. The history of Oslomarka is a good example. Landscape artist Peter Balke claimed as early as 1873 that he knew of no other capital city in the world blessed with such beautiful natural surroundings, but warned that

without the political will to preserve them these riches would soon be squandered. The Oslo Municipal Outdoor Recreation Council was sympathetic, and they eventually bought up 270 square miles of farmsteads and forests for recreational use.

But the city government soon faced a dilemma: a growing Oslo required a larger and larger area for outdoor activities, but at the same time required land for housing and corridors through which to feed in electric current. The result was inevitably compromise—and not always in the interest of the forest. When in 1946 a new powerline was to slash through Oslomarka, it sparked a demonstration of thirty thousand angry citizens, probably the largest single protest in postwar Norway. That show of support for the woods around Oslo resulted in a rerouted corridor and a comprehensive plan for the management of the area. Subsequent planning has succeeded in reducing logging activities in the forest and establishing inviolate residential boundaries.

The history of Oslomarka is more than just a quaint example of how a city saved some woodlands for Sunday strolls. Like the "People's Park" movement in America, it is symbolic of how a devotion to outdoor recreation can come to dominate the political agenda of a municipality—or a country. Deep ecologist Nils Faarlund, for example, will argue later in this volume that not only is *friluftslivpolitikk* rooted in a Norwegian tradition of "nature-life," but it is also a tool for the transformation to an ecologically sensitive society.

The Sixties: Laying the Groundwork

With the sixties, the environmental movement began to pay attention not only to land use, but to a broader range of ecological problems as well. Not surprisingly, this was in part because the country's all-out drive for industrial growth had *created* new problems. The determined reconstruction drive in the wake of World War II had prioritized industrial development, and for twenty years thereafter the god of economic growth reigned secure. By the 1960s, most of the goals on Norway's growth agendas had been fulfilled: aluminum smelters were going full blast, rural Norway was electrified, and material scarcity was a receding memory.

With growing material prosperity, "standard of living" began to mean more than the number of refrigerators per household. It took on a qualitative form as well, and among the most important indicators of quality was the condition of Norwegian nature. The government was not entirely

deaf to the new tone. The year the first national park was established, 1962, also saw a nationwide environmental education campaign: *Bruk Naturvett!* (Use nature-sense!) The campaign encouraged individual responsibility for environmental protection, the removal of litter, and the like. Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* was at the same time helpful in turning the official spotlight on pollution problems, especially air and water pollution from metal and chemical industries. Gradually people became aware that the Norwegian environment was being encroached upon by its industrial growth.

On the whole, though, the sixties were more a time of awakening public opinion and environmental organizing than of positive legislation. The Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature gathered momentum, and a number of other study groups were formed around environmental issues. The last year of that decade saw the establishment of (snm), the Ecopolitical Ring of Cooperation[28] at the University of Oslo, initiated by ecophilosopher and activist Sigmund Kvaløy. Most of these groups originated in academic and certain political circles that had no immediate access to more influential political, administrative, or opinion-forming elites. But when the problems going along with industrial and economic growth became more conspicuous toward the end of that decade, the relevance of these early contributions became evident to a broader audience.

The Seventies: The Blossoming of the Eco-Movement

Hampered by this ad hoc and diffuse character, the environmental movement had to bide its time during much of the sixties. But the groundswell had begun. The results of the preparatory work became clear when the following decade opened with European Environmental Protection Year. Strong legislation was introduced controlling water pollution. A path-breaking international environmental conference was held in Stockholm in 1972, and Norway was both an initiative taker and an active participant in that conference.

Perhaps the most significant event on the Norwegian environmental stage was the introduction of a new Nature Conservation Law in 1970, whose preamble read, "The environment is a national treasure which must be conserved. Environmental conservation means the use of resources guided by recognition of the close interconnections between man and nature and the principle that nature's quality must be preserved for coming generations." The new legislation still saw the environment as a

stock of natural resources, and no mention was made of a possible intrinsic value of nature. Despite these biases, the law set for the first time theoretical limits to the consequences of resource use. More than merely granting authority to set up nature preserves, this law made environmental impact a guiding concern in national resource policy—an issue raised over sixty years earlier by the Concession Laws.

"Let the Rivers Live!"

If there is one issue the modern Norwegian environmental movement has revolved around, it is hydropower. The beginning of the seventies swept this issue to the front of the environmental scene, and in the past twenty-five years it has never really been upstaged. Continued damming of Norwegian watercourses during the seventies released a flood of protest from, among others, an active ecophilosophical community.

To understand the controversy raging around hydropower, it is necessary to understand the special position of hydroelectricity in the Norwegian economy. Norway has far and away the world's highest per capita consumption of electricity. Over 60 percent of all energy consumed by the country is electric, and virtually all of that is spewed out of hydropower turbines. (By comparison, the United States produces only 1.2 percent of its energy with waterpower.)

In countries struggling with the ecological consequences of nuclear-, oil-, and coal-based energy systems, the chance to supply their electricity demand with this renewable resource seems idyllic. But hydropower on Norway's scale is far from ecologically harmless. Damming and diversion schemes affect wildlife, flora, and climate along the entire watershed, and a huge dam is the quintessential example of an irreversible environmental impact.[29]

When the majority of Norwegian rivers must either hop over, slide through, or stagnate behind hydropower installations, the *symbolic* importance of a free-running river also takes on a new dimension. The image of rivers as the bloodstream of a living earth is not uncommon in the history of Western Europe, where the macrocosm of the globe was thought to reflect the microcosm of man and his vital function. And for Norway in particular, as Kjell Haagensen and Atle Midttun describe it,

> hydropower conflicts mean far more than waterfalls and reservoirs. Hydropower projects have become something of a symbol for the industrial growth society and for the materialistic philosophy of life that

> claims a majority in our political organs and support from the centers of economic power. Against this stands a political opposition that puts more emphasis on ecology and an alternative society.[30]

How have Norwegians treated these symbols of nature's vitality? It was the early concession laws, as we saw, that marked the first public discussion about the fate of Norwegian rivers. And although they put the rivers in the hands of Norwegians, the new masters were no less eager than foreign companies to develop their economic potential. While a few of the most spectacular falls were preserved for a time as tourist attractions, electrical turbines promised to generate money faster than foreign visitors. One by one even these cascades disappeared down the throats of electricity works.

Such losses set the pace for a line of dammings that marched up through the sixties with only an occasional missed step. Arguments for protection were mostly cast in aesthetic terms, came usually from a small cadre of naturalists, and were regularly drowned out by the clamor for economic growth. But as Norway's electrification gained speed, protests began to spring up in farming communities who would be dried up or otherwise hurt by diversion schemes. And by the end of the sixties hydroprojects were as a rule getting opposition from environmentalists in one organization or another. Moreover, the protests were taking on a new form.

The Great Protests: Civil Disobedience in the Fight against Hydropower

Sigmund Kvaløy, active with the group (snm) in most of these cases, covers the development of ecophilosophical action against hydropower in his article "Complexity and Time," and we will leave most of that saga to him. But it is useful to take a quick glance at the impact the protests of the seventies had on a country that had by and large taken a healthy environment "for granted."

The impact was, simply put, tremendous. In 1970, Mardøla Falls, a stepped cascade nearly two thousand feet high in central Norway, was threatened by a huge hydropower project. The nonviolent resistance to that project was probably the key event that shaped the next decade of environmentalism. The ecologically attuned writer and photographer Finn Alnæs (included in this anthology) had already made the cascade

known to the nature-loving public. When plans to destroy the fall became known, (snm) quickly moved to establish residence on the construction road toward the site.

A tent camp attracted hundreds of activists from all over Norway, as well as counterdemonstrations from communities who were to benefit economically from the project. Training sessions in Gandhian nonviolence were conducted in the camp. Several demonstrators, including Kvaløy and Arne Naess, chained themselves to the earth to prevent the machines from chewing their way up into the mountains. They were carried away by the police, but the nonviolent protest "lead to a revolution both in the attitudes within the environmental movement and in the administrative and political handling of hydroprojects. Purely aesthetic motives for protection were widened to a holistic view where local community interests became central. Mardøla was . . . the transition from classical environmentalism to ecopolitics."[31] This transition influenced the philosophy of action that was to characterize the environmental movement up to the present.

The reason this action was so revolutionary for the movement was that it was hitherto virtually unheard of in Norway. By using this form of nonviolent protest, the activists had stepped into a political no-man's-land. The result, not surprisingly, was that the eyes of the nation were suddenly focused on Mardøla: "The rules of the game had been changed—and some of the players were bound to cry 'Foul!' "[32] As Kvaløy remarks, there was usually some local opposition to such demonstrations, and it was more than just a few farmers hoodwinked by false promises of economic benefits. It was also a deep-seated loyalty to the laws of the land—political attitude playing opposite a traditional desire for local self-determination. This loyalty made Norway a relatively ordered society during the middle ages, but came close to creating violent conflict between supporters and opposers of a lawful decision to build a modern dam.

The use of civil disobedience thus stirred up a debate that has not completely died down. Critics of the demonstration argued that it constituted a threat to democracy, while supporters retorted that such protests were the *essence* of democracy. Moreover, the choice of a *nonviolent* style of protest made philosophical and political sense: philosophically, because it was grounded in Arne Naess's work on Gandhian conflict solving, and consistent with the "view of man as an integrated part of the web of life"[33]—a theme Kvaløy will develop in his article. A nonviolent demon-

stration was politically clever because it helped defuse a counterprotest. Coming across as "the underdog versus the system," the protestors struck a chord with a traditional Norwegian suspicion of centralized power. Their nonviolent protest also demonstrated sympathy with the belief that conflicts should be settled peaceably.

The advantages of civil disobedience were, in the eyes of the environmentalists, decisive. And the same methods would spring up in protests further downstream. The most important of these was the Alta case, which came to a head in 1981.

The background for the Alta controversy, "one of the most dramatic political confrontations we have had in modern Norwegian history,"[34] was much the same as for Mardøla. Rising estimates of electricity demand led to plans to dam one of Europe's richest salmon rivers, Alta, which runs through Norway's northernmost county. The ecological damages threatened to be considerable. But there was also a new twist: the hydroproject would severely impact the lifestyle of Norway's Samé (Lapp) minority. It would be too simple to say that all Samé were against the dam—Samé culture is as complex as any other, and there were varying views on the project. Still, those Samé whose lives still turned on seminomadic reindeer herding claimed that their rural life and patterns of reindeer herding would be irrevocably disrupted by the flooding of scarce pasturage. Environmental and minority interests dovetailed.

Alta had been a live issue since the beginning of the seventies, but it wasn't until 1979-80 that a protest action was set in motion. Two camps were established, and when winter came, participants took cover from the dark and the cold in, among other things, a special ice-tepee shaped after the traditional Samé shelter. They chained themselves across the construction road as in Mardøla, and as in Mardøla they were borne away by a six-hundred-man police force shipped north for that express purpose.

Kvaløy had been central in the planning of Mardøla, and intellectuals such as he and Naess played only a supporting role in Alta. Still, as sociologist Ron Eyerman writes,

> the struggle at Alta reveals a new relationship between intellectuals and popular social movements. At Alta, university trained intellectuals provided special skills to be sure, but they came as equal, even secondary, participants in common cause and in common criticism of "authority" with a local and regional community.[35]

Differences in professional training were of less moment than a unity behind a common cause. Indeed, participants who sought to preserve their distinction as "academics" were eyed with suspicion by most other demonstrators.

The conflict at Alta, like that at Mardøla, transcended traditional political and social lines: "The main impression in Alta," write sociologists Midttun and Andersen, "was that both supporters and opposers of the hydroproject had been able to mobilize a wide spectrum of different socioeconomic groups . . . there was no overwhelmingly strong connection between measures of social position and attitude to the project."[36]

Alta seems to represent another bend in the river that sprang from Mardøla. The environmental movement was broadened and the issue was expanded to include the protection of cultural as well as ecological integrity. Moreover, the demonstration mobilized a wider public; public that realized more and more clearly that environmental problems were not "someone else's."

Other Environmental Issues in Norway

Oil

Oil policy has been an intermittent continual sparring partner for the environmental community since the discovery of massive oil fields on Norway's continental shelf in the beginning of the sixties. Anticipating major revenues, Norway had declared sovereignty over continental shelf waters in 1963, which was a smart move fiscally speaking—by 1980 "petro-kroner" were contributing 16 percent of the country's gross national product. Norway produces ten times as much oil as it consumes, so oil issues are treated as a part of foreign policy more often than of energy policy. Formerly the oil lobby was pitted against the fishing lobby, as it was assumed that these communities were at odds with each other. But by now, so many former fishermen are employed by the petroleum industry that the conflict has become moot on many counts.

From the perspective of the environmentalist community, however, things weren't so rosy. Worries over possible oil disasters were confirmed by hundreds of thousands of annual seabird deaths, an ocean floor littered with the debris of oil production, and the spectacular "Bravo" blowout of 1977. Movements in both mid- and north Norway were quickly out with alternative plans for slower and more careful extraction

of this resource, which had some effect on official policies. Partly as a result of this pressure, the Norwegian oil industry has by international standards a fairly clean environmental record.

Clipping Atomic Wings: The End of Nuclear Power in Norway?

Although Norway has a few research reactors, and was an early investigator of nuclear technology, it was also the first country outside of the nuclear club that decided to keep the nuclear genie in the bottle. This is in no small degree thanks to a bountiful supply of other energy resources, but it is in part also due to effective maneuvering by the environmental community.

The state-owned Norwegian Electricity Directorate (NVE) was the first on the table with plans for national atomic power plants in 1972, following a decision in the parliament to move into the nuclear age. Almost immediately, plans to locate these reactors were protested by the "victim" communities. These communities protested against too rapid economic growth brought by plant construction, the loss of recreational lands, and radiation hazards. Taking a cue from Mardøla, farmers and townspeople in one community used civil disobedience to prevent engineers from surveying a potential site.

Efforts by the authorities to dodge these protests by changing location plans were blocked in 1974 by a nationwide, cross-political coalition of antinuclear groups: AMA (Askjon mot atomkraft [the movement against atomic power]). If no community in Norway wanted the plants, they argued, there should be no plants—period. In the best tradition of ecophilosophy, the coalition began to ask deeper questions about nuclear power. To build or not to build was not the question; the question was, Who decides? How much energy a growing economy was supposed to need was less important than a discussion of whether the economy need grow at all.

Two characteristics of these arguments are worth emphasizing: First, the nuclear controversy is another manifestation of a center-periphery power struggle that has been around since the Viking period. Second, as in waterpower conflicts, the coalition was successful because it cast the nuclear episode as a *political* issue—a shift underlined by the use of civil disobedience. At stake was not just the procedural legality or technical accuracy of the nuclear decision, but more importantly the underlying values concerning material living standards, political power distribution,

and a relationship to the environment. The tactics of the opposition were arresting, and their strategy was far-sighted. Four years after their original decision to go ahead with the reactors, parliament reversed itself, declaring that nuclear power plants would not be built in this century.

Nuclear power may, however, lie just over the horizon for Norway, as with each new dam hydropower becomes more controversial. The country still spends three times more money on nuclear research than on alternative energy forms. Nuclear energy was always a part of the national energy strategy until 1986, when the Chernobyl accident sent radioactive clouds right over the Jotunheimen mountains. The exact consequences of this "hot rain" are still not known, though thousands of kilos of reindeer meat were destroyed because their radiation count was a tad above acceptable limits. But public memory of disaster is short, and no doubt the technology will evolve, and continue to be reintroduced and tested within energy policies.

EEC: Are We In or Are We Out?

The battle over whether to join with the European Economic Community (EEC) in the early seventies became one of the most divisive issues in modern Norway. Arguments against membership included losing political autonomy to a centralized power, EEC's imperialistic attitudes toward developing countries, the risk of losing the Norwegian tradition of small fishing and farming, and the blind economic growth encouraged by EEC.

All of these themes continue to crop up in Norwegian ecophilosophy. Arne Naess wrote against membership because "EEC encourages neither fellowship, well-being, nor small but personal enterprises; but instead a mechanical society, efficiency and rationality in means, indifference in ends, consumerism, meritocracy, and a mobility in the population that only increases today's stress, restlessness, and rootlessness."[37]

The group (snm) came out with *Ecopolitics or the Common Market?*, which included specifically ecological arguments against membership in a multinational economic coordinating system: "The industry-serving collective society tries to break the earlier diversity of strong, self-sufficient and diverse societies to pieces, a simplification that, according to ecology, increases vulnerability. . . . Ecologically speaking, EEC is a catastrophe."[38]

Favoring membership were those who argued that Norway as a whole would profit economically, and that artificial life support for those sec-

tors of the economy unable to compete on an open market (especially agriculture) was too heavy a burden for Norway to bear.

The Common Market controversy was a bitter division in a normally homogeneous society. But in the end, those opposing membership carried the day: in 1972 a national referendum voted 53 percent against 47 percent to reject EEC membership. Beyond achieving their immediate goal, the "People's Movement against EEC" drew a good deal of attention to environmental and resource problems, which stood the environmental movement in good stead over the rest of the decade.

In the 1990s, the issue has returned. With the expansion of EC powers expected in 1992 plus the tremendous upheaval in Eastern Europe, membership seems hard to pass up. Nevertheless, a majority of Norwegians still opposes it, though an even larger majority believes Norway will join the Union anyway.[39] One can only fight the spirit of a continent and age so far.

The Ecofeminists

Finally, there is the feminist involvement in ecological issues. As early as 1969 there had been a movement composed largely of women concerned about the pollutive effects of phosphate detergents in Norway. By 1975 articles were appearing in the environmental magazine *Miljømagasinet* criticizing poor living conditions for women who had to stay at home to take care of children. The Norwegian Women's Association came out around that same time against development that would destroy arable land.

But the first explicit integration of the ecology and women's movements was in 1977, when a small group of feminists reacted against a lack of attention to sexual liberation issues among environmentalists. The new group called themselves the Ecofeminists (*økofeministene*). "Ecology and feminism," they wrote,

> are two concepts that belong naturally together but that have been split up. We have an environmental movement that doesn't address the connections between our male-dominated society's suppression of women and the ecological crisis we are currently faced with. . . . We in the women's movement have also been remiss in our attention to ecological concerns, as a result of two factors: that we have not had access to information that would motivate us to change our lifestyle, and that in addition there is such an overwhelming complexity of environmental problems that to fight against them is a luxury of those with hefty time surpluses. . . .

> The Ecofeminists try to integrate ecopolitics with women's politics. One of feminism's main principles is the right to control one's own body, and that implies more than the right to abortions and determining one's own sexuality. The right to breathe clean air should be equally self-evident, as well as the right to eat healthy and poison-free food, and the right to take responsibility for ourselves and our environment.[40]

Although not a formal member of the Ecofeminists, Siri Naess in 1982 took a more formally philosophical perspective on feminism and ecophilosophy in "Self-realization," comparing Arne Naess's "Ecosophy T" (see the introduction to Naess's articles in this anthology) with her own system, "Ecosophy F" (for "Feminism"). "Ecosophy T and Ecosophy F have much in common," she pointed out;

> both emphasize 1) activation and creativity, 2) egalitarianism, and 3) support of the suppressed and exploited. . . . [But] Ecosophy T maintains, as a hypothesis, that one cannot support long-term self-realization by short-term suppression; while system F maintains that one often can. In feminist argumentation this is expressed as a conflict of interest . . . [and] feminists are more inclined to fight for their interests than to resolve conflicts.[41]

Women have also been central in other environmental conflicts. Ellen Marit Gaup Dunfjell, for example, almost singlehandedly galvanized international support for the Samé's cause at Alta, speaking before international European councils, establishing cooperation with natives in Canada and the United States, and even meeting with the pope. Women active in the Ecofeminists have also lent their critical comments to the Alternative Future project of Erik Dammann's The Future in Our Hands group.

There is still, however, resistance among some in the environmental movement who fear that too close an integration of ecology and feminism would divert energy from environmental issues. Most feminists with environmental leanings see this as a red herring. And although the Ecofeminists as an organization has dissolved, there are coalitions of women in Norway and other Scandinavian countries who work with environmental problems from a feminist perspective.

The Political Impact of Environmental Activism

Even this cursory look at the Norwegian environmental movement sug-

gests that activists mobilized themselves on a wide variety of fronts. The work begun at Mardøla did not remain narrowly interested in saving a river or a lake, but became a hub on which turned a debate central in modern Norwegian society. Their methods were something of a bombshell in a normally quiescent country and inspired an ecological awareness among a wider public. But what, more concretely, did they actually achieve?

The successes of the antinuclear and anti-EEC movements are respectable feathers in environmentalists' hats, but the record of hydropower conflicts is bleaker. A divided Norwegian Supreme Court ruled in 1982 that the dam on the Alta River was legal and should be built. The demonstration broke up, and the river went under. Twelve years earlier, parliament had ordered the development of Mardøla and that magnificent cascade, the highest in northern Europe, now runs only a few months of the year for the benefit of tourists. A protest at Innerdalen had met the same fate in 1980. Why did the movement persist with peaceful civil disobedience when concrete results were so slow in coming? What good did the protests do?

Whether they did any "good" depends on what kind of goal the protests had in mind. A first, and obvious, goal was to stop the hydroprojects. While the Mardøla, Orkla-Grana, and Alta protests were all able to reduce the scale of the projects, they failed to stop them. But in addition to saving the river, the activists had wider goals in mind from the start. One, in Kvaløy's words, was "to *live out* these ideas of Gandhian nonviolence and ecological concern through building a miniature society in a natural place, far away from the material conveniences of 'modern living.' "[42] The goal of communicating with and uniting people with widely divergent backgrounds into an environmental community was very successful, as the seventies brought with them an unprecedented level of environmental activism. "It is clear," wrote Per Arild Garnåsjordet and Kjell Haagensen,

> that the Mardøla demonstration lead to increasing political consciousness among the groups that had been previously engaged in environmental issues. Without the careful analysis of energy policy that followed in the wake of Mardøla, (snm) would have scarcely taken a position on membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1972. Nor would the environmental movement as a whole have worked against Norwegian membership in the International Energy Agency (IEA).[43]

Still, what of the goal to protect nature? Here the story is not simple: while the activists lost some rivers, they won important victories in the way government machinery churned out decisions on hydroprojects. The record of regulation changes in the wake of the early protests is impressive. In terms of hydropower laws, "the best example" of these changes, wrote Garnåsjordet and Haagenson, sociologists of the environmental movement, "is probably the Protection Plan for Rivers, which can perhaps be considered a direct result of the Mardøla action."[44] This 1973 plan, the first of three, examines and permanently protects "virgin" watercourses of special recreational or ecological significance, and has to date placed sixty-five rivers under total protection.

Perhaps even more significant, though, was the founding of the Norwegian Ministry of the Environment in 1972. Though the ministry had been under discussion for five years by that time, it was the Mardøla controversy that underlined the need for haste and that was the single most important external factor leading to the ministry's establishment.[45]

These are fairly large dragons for a group of a few hundred demonstrators to slay. Attributing these systemic changes to Mardøla alone would be an oversimplification. Nevertheless, ecoactivist demonstrations were the needed catalyst.

The kind of changes in the wake of Alta were more subtle: the political system had stretched as much as it could, and public organs were in place to deal with a whole variety of environmental problems. But how they would deal with them was as unpredictable as ever. And the cause behind the Alta protest was as much as anything a frustration within the environmental community over the fact that these new ministries and due process laws were still in the pocket of the old "economic growth" paradigm. Did Alta do anything to change this? Not overnight. But Alta, in the opinion of many observers of Norwegian society, may have prepared the ground for such changes:

> The activists pretty consciously intended to both *mobilize* and *politicize* the basic value issues in the Alta case. That goal was definitely achieved. The demonstrators dragged the case out of the bureaucratic maze and gave it a place on the political agenda that it otherwise would never have had. In so doing, they to a great degree influenced the very definition of the issues, which was no longer allowed to be limited to a question of hydroelectricity alone. Despite considerable political inertia, they forced the system to cooperate, and by thus expanding the number of implicated groups they torpedoed the familiar tendency of these cases

> to be monopolized by a technocratic-economic-administrative decision-making process. At the same time, they added an antielitist element to the dispute. . . .
>
> In short, *the activists influenced the process more than the decision.* . . . In the long run, this influence can be significant. . . . Our political culture and democratic system has been permanently changed. Political responsibility is one thing, but general moral responsibility is something else, and more comprehensive. . . . Here lies perhaps one of the most important long-run effects of the movement: Power-holders have been forced to recognize their responsibility to represent nontraditional values as well as the conventional ones. . . . Alta not only organized a demonstration, it created a new understanding of the problem.[46]

New attitudes are less obvious dragons to stuff and mount on one's wall than are new ministries, but as Arne Naess will remind us, they are the stuff of which an ecologically sensitive ethic is made. And Alta is a classic answer to the chestnut about which is more important for the environmental movement: to change political institutions or to change people's attitudes? Clearly, both are important—because each leads to the other. And environmental activism in Norway, as the articles in this collection should demonstrate, has chosen to face this dilemma by seizing both its horns.

In the essays that follow, the priority given to abstract thinking varies widely. So do the diagnoses of our eco-social crisis, the prognoses and prescriptions for recovery, and the very notion of what deep ecology is. We will not attempt to smooth over the differences in the messages of these writers with some all-encompassing generalization. That would only destroy their lively, suggestive diversity of responses to the great crises of our time and the unknown future that awaits us.

Peter Wessel Zapffe and the Mountains (Sigmund Kvaløy)

Chapter 2

Peter Wessel Zapffe

> It is in the wilderness that the line must be drawn; there we must begin to build a wall of silence around those values in nature that die when they are taken by force, and that unfold their deepest wonders only in the still hour of prayer.
>
> —from *Stetind*, 1937

When Peter Wessel Zapffe penned this homage to Stetind, a stark horn of granite jutting out of the sea in northern Norway, the population of that country was but three-fourths of its current four million. Before most Norwegians had begun to think of nature's beauty as something that required protection, Zapffe was already warning against the roads, dams, and tourism that threatened to desecrate nature's quiet sanctuary. And though a sensitivity to natural grandeur was nothing new in Norway, Zapffe was the first Norwegian thinker to develop a philosophical critique of man's relationship with the environment; he is in that sense Norway's first deep ecologist.

Born in 1899, Zapffe grew up in Tromsø, far to the north in Norway. The landscape around this island city is spiked with gray, barren peaks, and Zapffe, an early and accomplished mountaineer, at one time or another scaled most of them. The pious atmosphere of home, school, and church was much less liberating, and it was only when he came to the University of Oslo in 1918 that his philosophical inclinations were given free rein. Originally he studied law (writing his bar exam in verse), but later took a degree in philosophy.

"Philosophy," he says, "has not been a job for me, but a way of orienting myself in life."[1] Zapffe's writing spans an impressive range—

criticism, plays, poetry, and humorous climbing stories. We have tried to represent this breadth in the selections that follow.

Zapffe modestly calls this range of achievements "a hodgepodge of half- and quarter-finished beginnings,"[2] but his influence on Norwegian ecophilosophy is nothing less than tremendous. Themes as diverse as the value of cultural diversity, of a sense of identity with nature, and of a suspicion of technology all have roots in Zapffe's work.

His own philosophical style, however, remains unrepeated. Perhaps more than any of his colleagues, Zapffe bases his ecophilosophy on a painstaking, empirical evaluation of humankind's existential situation. His magnum opus is the six-hundred-page *Om det tragiske* (On the Tragic), written in 1941 as his doctoral thesis. Tragedy for Zapffe is not where a hero fails to save something of great value. Rather, it is where the hero's *own prowess* leads to his downfall, and the very value he was striving after is revealed at the last to be irrelevant to the world he is placed within.

For Zapffe, "the tragic" is not only a literary phenomena, but is the key to understanding human existence. The universe we find ourselves in is purely material—matter and energy petering out into oblivion by the ticking of the entropic clock. "What we call nature," he says, "shows neither morality nor reason; its degeneration is inevitable, and nothing, not even man's most glorious achievements, can escape final annihilation."[3]

It is the human gift and curse to try to *find* morality and reason in this senseless cosmos. An evolutionary wild card, *Homo sapiens* is possessed of a brain too large, a mental and spiritual dimension that sets us apart from all other life. An heir to the philosophical tradition of Protagoras, Berkeley, and Kant, Zapffe sees our psychological makeup as the only thing that lends measure, order, and value to a chaotic universe. Naturally, our belief in order is only a comforting illusion:

> Because of the world's ecological aimlessness, we feel the need for an "absolute truth" that cannot be sullied by practical realities, a final, utter security that can give normative direction to our behavior and free us from the "eternal choice." But the whole question of "purpose" is really a pseudoquestion, since both the questioner and his object have been overequipped by an abiological fluke. . . . [A]ll "categories" are created by ourselves as a means to orient ourselves in the "surrounding X." Their existence, their legitimacy, dies with us.[4]

Uncovering this illusion and coming face-to-face with the essential mean-

inglessness of life is usually enough to reduce a person to stammering nonsense. And, as Zapffe describes here in "The Last Messiah," people have devised clever techniques to keep these existential skeletons in the closet—which we must, if we are to get on with the business of life at all.

And this is the essence of the human tragedy: the human being is fantastically unsuited to his environment. We are "a noble vase in which fate has planted an oak."[5] Our demand for ultimate meaning and its categorical absence combine to make this existence fundamentally untenable. Between an eternal rock and a hard place, we cannot give up the quest for meaning without abandoning our deepest essence. There is no "objective" meaning in the universe, and all heroic human attempts to create it will, in the end, fall prey to the march of entropy.

A more resigned pessimism is difficult to find. And Zapffe makes no secret of his bleak view of the future, though often cloaking it with comic relief. His "Farewell Norway," included below, is among other things an odds-on bet against humankind's—and nature's—survival, as recounted by an old mountain curmudgeon sad to see his land fall to ruins.

"Epilogue?" also treats these themes, in a poem of impish complaint written late in his life with a bit of the devil's laughter worked in. In contrast, we include an earlier, more gentle "Lullaby," depicting the quiet hope that children hold (and should hold) in the years and days before discovery of the great tragedy, and the comedy of living through it.

Zapffe does not believe we should therefore abjure our spiritual nature. Instead, since our essence and highest gift is for developing body *and* spirit, it is essential that we preserve the opportunities for that development. Free, wild nature presents the best challenges, experiences, and inspiration of all. If we blindly exploit our technological talents, we are bound to simplify, standardize, and impoverish nature—and with it, the potential for spiritual unfolding. For Zapffe, wilderness is important not for its value as a resource, nor even for its necessary part in the ecosystem: Deeper still, it is there, like Vesaas's snow and fir forests, *for us*. Our existential well-being depends on its preservation.

Free nature is not only necessary. Much of Zapffe's prose and poetry communicates a strong *delight* in nature, an appreciation for its beauty, stillness, and color. Mountaineering, for example, may be "as meaningless as life itself," but is it any less wonderful for that? Reaching the top, the climber relaxes in the "bright, incomprehensible, awful beauty" of his surroundings: "I am everything, and everything is in me, and my heart follows in dying rhythms the breath of the ages."[6]

"For me," he writes, "a desert island is no tragedy, neither is a deserted planet."[7] Nature, though beautiful only in the eyes of man, seems to have a value for itself. It would be wrong for us to destroy the world simply because it is not ours to keep. We must eventually vacate this house, but there is no need to set fire to it as we close the door behind us. Indeed, Zapffe reserves some of his most evocative prose for his beloved mountains, treating them almost as autotelic beings. His elegy to Gausta, desecrated with roads and towers, shows his disdain for compromise, and his love for the pristine and the free:

> To save you, Gausta, is no longer in the power of any man. You have been a victim of a people who are the enemy of the heights, in landscapes as well as in their own minds . . . a new species, one that does not know that values grow in the earth of renunciation, one that rattles around from "victory" to "victory" without realizing that they pay for these with the joy to be had in creation's innocence. . . . Whether a later being will raise you up again, in humble apology, and remove the last rusty scraps of the dark age of technological naïveté—that, we cannot tell. Without hope your faithful mourn your passing, and your fate is illuminated by a tragic, holy light: because you were beautiful, you had to die.[8]

On the occasion of Zapffe's own death in October 1990, Sigmund Kvaløy had this to say about his old friend and source of inspiration:

> [His presence] was a genuinely honest one, now impossible to approach. What would Peter himself have wanted? Taking death in stride, he has at last penetrated "those thousand consoling fictions." Peter addressed the drudgery of life with a perspective as wide as the Norwegian oceans and mountains. In everything he wrote and thought, he believed that all of us are seekers deep inside, after "an answer to the single burning question—what does it mean to be human?"[9]

For a man hell-bent on the end of the human race, he certainly lived a long and fruitful life. But we all go to the realm beyond questions in the end.

The Last Messiah

I

One night in times long since vanished, man[10] *awoke and saw himself. He saw that he was naked under the cosmos, homeless in his own body.*

Everything opened up before his searching thoughts, wonder upon wonder, terror upon terror, all blossomed in his mind.

Then woman awoke, too, and said that it was time to go out and kill something. And man took up his bow, fruit of the union between the soul and the hand, and went out under the stars. But when the animals came to their waterhole, where he out of habit waited for them, he no longer knew the spring of the tiger in his blood, but a great psalm to the brotherhood of suffering shared by all that lives.

That day he came home with empty hands, and when they found him again by the rising of the new moon, he sat dead by the waterhole.

II

What had happened? A break in the very unity of life, a biological paradox, a monstrosity, an absurdity, a hypertrophy of the most catastrophic kind. Nature had aimed too high, and outdone itself. A species had been too heavily armed—its genius made it not only omnipotent over the outer world, but equally dangerous for itself. Its weapon was like a sword without hilt or cross guard, a two-edged blade that could cleave through anything; but whoever used the sword had to grip it by its blade and turn one of its edges against himself.

In spite of its new eyes, mankind still had its roots in base matter; its soul was woven into matter and subject to its blind laws. But at the same time man could scrutinize matter as though it were a stranger; he could compare himself with other phenomena, uncover and categorize his own vital processes. He came to nature as an unbidden guest; now in vain he extends his arms and prays to be united with that which created him. Nature no longer answers, it made a miracle with man but has refused to acknowledge him since. Man has lost his citizenship in the universe, he has eaten from the tree of knowledge and has been banished from paradise. He is powerful in his world, but he curses his power because he has bought it with his soul's harmony, his innocence, his comfort in life's embrace.

He stands there with his visions, betrayed by the universe, in bewilderment and angst. Animals, too, know angst, under the roll of thunder and the claw of the lion. But man feels angst for life itself—indeed, for his own being. Life—for animals it is to feel the play of forces, of rut and play and hunger, and at the last, to bow before necessity. Suffering in an

animal is limited to itself; for men it builds itself up and spilled out into angst for the world and for life.

From the moment the child embarks on his journey down the river of life, the roar of death's waterfall fills the valley, always nearer and nearer; it gnaws, gnaws at the child's happiness. Man looks out over the earth, and it breathes like a great lung; when it exhales, delicate and graceful life teems out of its pores, and all the creatures stretch out their arms to the sun; but when it takes in its breath, a rustle of fragile spirits breaking sweeps through the multitudes, and their corpses lash the ground like showers of hail. Nor did man see only the number of his own days, but graveyards were exhumed to his view, and the cries of grotesquely decomposed cadavers, the anguish of sunken millennia, beat against him; motherhood's dreams, gone again to earth. The veil of the future was torn aside, and it showed him a nightmare of endless repetitions, a senseless squandering of organic stuff.

The suffering of humanity's billions passes into him through the gate of his empathy; every event sneers at his demand for justice, the principle he holds most dear. He sees his genesis in his mother's womb, he holds out his hand and sees that it has five branches. Where does this accursed *five* come from, and what does that have to do with his soul? He is no longer simply at one with himself; in terror he touches his body: this is *you* and you extend so far, and no farther. He carries a meal inside himself, yesterday it was an animal running freely about by its own will, now he is absorbing it, making it a part of himself; where does he begin and where does he end? Things blend into each other in sequences of cause and effect, and everything he tries to seize and hold dissolves before his probing thoughts. Soon he sees mechanics behind everything, even behind that which he used to hold dear, his beloved's smile—there are other smiles, too, toes peeping through a torn boot. At last the nature of things is only his own nature, nothing exists but himself, every road winds back to himself, the world is but a ghostly echo of his own voice—he leaps up with a shriek and wants to vomit himself onto the earth, together with his foul meal, he feels insanity approaching, and tries to kill himself before he loses the power to do even that.

But as he stands an instant away from death, he sees the essence of death as well, and the cosmic significance of the step he was about to take. His creative imagination shapes new, terrifying possibilities behind death's door and he understands that there is no escape even in death. Now at last he can begin to trace the outlines of his cosmic situation: he

is the universe's helpless prisoner, he is kept so that he can be condemned to nameless possibilities.

From that moment on he finds himself in a state of chronic panic. Such "cosmic panic" is basic to every human mind. The species, in this light, seems predestined to destruction, since any effort to preserve and continue life is crippled when one's undivided attention and energy is required to stave off the catastrophic pressure of one's inner being. That a species thus becomes unfit for life by reason of an overdevelopment of a single faculty is a tragedy that has befallen not only man. Some contend, for example, that a certain species of deer once walked the earth but was rendered extinct by a set of antlers that had become far too large. Mutations, after all, are blind, thrown into life without a thought to their viability in the environment.

When one is depressed and anxious, the human mind is like such antlers, which in all their magnificent glory, crush their bearer slowly to the ground.

III

Why, then, was the human race not wiped out long ago in great, raging epidemics of insanity? Why are there so few individuals who succumb to the pressure of life because their acuity reveals to them more than they can bear?

A consideration of the spiritual history and present state of our species suggests the following answer: most people manage to save themselves by artificially paring down their consciousness.

Had the great-antlered elk from time to time managed to break off the outermost prongs of its magnificent headgear it might have trod the earth a bit longer. In feverish, continual agony, true; but also in betrayal of its essence, its central characteristic, for from the hands of the creator it had received a commission to be the horned standard bearer above all the beasts of the field. What it won in continued existence it would have lost in meaning, in existential pride; it would have been a life without hope, a march not toward confirmation of its essence, but past confirmation's ruins, a self-destructive race against the sacred will of its blood.

The goal of life and life's own annihilation is common to both the giant elk and the human race; it is their tragic paradox. Faithful to its own essence, the last *Cervus giganticus* bore the standard of its species to the bitter end. Man saves himself, and continues. Ironically, man's survival is

made possible by a more or less conscious suppression of his hazardous surplus of consciousness. This suppression is, for all intents and purposes, continuous; it goes on as long as we are awake and active, and becomes a condition for social adjustment and what is popularly called "healthy" and "normal" behavior.

Today's psychiatry operates under the assumption that this health and adjustment is the highest goal one can aspire to. Depression, angst, a refusal to eat, and so forth, are taken without exception to be marks of a pathological condition, and are treated accordingly. In many cases, however, these phenomena are indications of a deeper, more immediate experience of what life is all about, bitter fruits of the genius of the mind or emotion, which is at the root of every antibiological tendency. It is not the soul that is ill, but its defense mechanism that either fails or is abjured because it is considered—correctly—as a betrayal of man's most potent gift.

All life before our eyes is, from its innermost depths to its outermost rim, spun through and through with a crisscrossing net of suppression mechanisms, and we can trace their threads in the most trivial aspects of daily life. These mechanisms are of an almost infinitely colorful variety, but it seems justifiable to indicate at any rate four main types, which naturally occur in all manner of combinations: *isolation, attachment, diversion*, and *sublimation*.

By *isolation* I mean a completely arbitrary rejection of disturbing and destructive thoughts or feelings. Fully developed and in an almost brutal form, isolation can be observed in doctors who, with an eye to their own self-protection, see only the technical side of their profession. It may also degenerate into pure vulgarity, in ordinary thugs or medical students who try to exorcise any sensitivity to life's tragic sides with violence (e.g., playing soccer with the heads of cadavers).

In our daily social life, isolation manifests itself through universal, unwritten agreements to conceal our existential condition from one another. This concealment begins with children, in order to save them from being rendered senseless by the life they have just begun, to preserve their illusions until they are strong enough to lose them. In return, children are forbidden to embarrass their parents by untimely allusions to sex, shit, and death. Among adults there are rules about "proper" behavior, and we see them quite plainly when a man who cries in the streets is taken away by the police.

The mechanism of *attachment* is also at work from early childhood, where parents, home, and neighborhood are taken for granted by the child, and give him a sense of security. This embracing ring of secure experiences are the first and perhaps most successful protection against "the cosmos" we come to know throughout the rest of our lives, and in these experiences lies an explanation of the much-discussed phenomenon "infantile bonding." Whether these bonds are also sexual is immaterial in this light. When the child discovers in later life that even these secure attachments are just as accidental and fleeting as any other, he experiences a crisis of bewilderment and anxiety, and quickly looks for new attachments (for example, "Next fall I'm off to college!"). If for some reason the new attachment does not "take," the crisis can either become life-threatening or develop into what I call "attachment paralysis": one clings to one's dead values, and tries to hide from oneself and from others their inadequacy and one's own spiritual bankruptcy. The result is permanent insecurity, feelings of inferiority, overcompensation, nervousness. To the extent that the condition can be analyzed, it becomes an object for psychoanalytical treatment, through which one tries to make a successful transferral to new attachments.

Attachment can be seen as an attempt to establish fixed points in, or a wall around, the shifting chaos of consciousness. Usually this is an unconscious process, but sometimes it is quite conscious, as for example in an attempt to set some sort of goal for oneself, some reason to live. Generally useful attachments are looked upon with sympathy, and those who give their all for their attachments (their company, or a project) are set up as role models for the rest of us. These heroes have managed to set up a strong bulwark against the dissolution of life, and others are supposed to profit by their example. Even bon vivants, we say, settle down, get married, have children—the necessary walls are built automatically. We build a certain necessity into our lives, we welcome that which formerly might have seemed an evil, only as a balm for our frayed nerves, a high-walled container for a feeling for life that had become slowly saturated with insecurity.

Every social unit is a large, rounded attachment system, built on the solid beams of basic cultural ways of thinking. The common man manages with these shared cultural beams, his personality almost builds itself. Our personality has stopped developing, and rests on inherited cultural foundations: God, the church, the state, morality, destiny, the laws of life, the future. The closer a norm lies to the bearing beams, the more danger-

ous it is to disturb it. As a rule, those close-lying norms are protected by laws and threats of punishment—the Inquisition, censorship, conservative attitudes, and so forth.

The strength of any one link in a chain of norms depends either on our not seeing through its fictive nature, or on everyone's recognizing that it is a necessary norm, even though we realize that it *is* a fiction. An example is religious instruction in schools, which is supported even by atheists because they see no other way to compel children to act according to socially accepted norms.

As soon as the link's illusory nature or needlessness is perceived by someone, they quickly try to exchange the old norms with newer (there is a saying, "Truths have a limited life expectancy")—and this is the cause of all spiritual and cultural infighting, which, together with economic competition, constitutes the dynamic of world history.

The lust for material goods or power is not motivated so much by the direct usefulness of wealth, since nobody can sit on more than one chair at a time or eat more than their fill. The real value of great wealth is that the wealthy have at their disposal a much wider variety of possible attachments or distractions.

For both individual and collective attachments, a break in the norm chain precipitates a crisis that is ever more serious the closer the break is to fundamental social norms. In one's inner self, where one is protected by outer walls, crises are encountered daily, but more often minor frustrations than life-threatening disasters. Here one can still toy with attachments, flouting them with mild swearing, "social" drinking, vulgar behavior, and so on. But playing these games can unwittingly dig too deeply at a weak spot in one's protective walls and break a hole through into the yawning void. The situation can change in the blink of an eye from a lighthearted caper to a dance of death. The terror of existence stares us in the face, and we realize with a staggering gasp that our minds hang suspended by a web of their own making, and that the abyss of hell gapes below.

The most basic beams supporting our culture can only rarely be changed without causing a major social spasm and a threat of total social dissolution, as during a reformation or a revolution. At such times the individual is thrown back upon his own resources, he must develop his *own* attachments, and there are few who can manage that. Depression, riotous living, and suicide are the result—as was the case for German officers after the First World War.

Another weakness in the system is that one must use very different defenses to confound the variety of dangers on all fronts. Each of these bulwarks comes with its own logical superstructure, and the unfortunate result is that conflicts between incommensurable sets of values inevitably arise. The superstructures collide, and despair seeps in through the resulting cracks. Then one can be possessed of a wanton destructiveness, a lust to dismember the entire life-support system and, in gleeful terror, try to sweep away the whole mess. The terror is due to the loss of all comforting norms; the glee comes from the resulting purposeless identification and harmony with the deepest acknowledgment of our being—its biological transience, its tendency toward death.

We love our attachments because they save us; but we hate them, too, because they hinder our sense of freedom. So when we feel strong enough, it is a pleasure to come together and bury some anachronistic value, to the funerary chime of church bells. Material objects are useful as symbols, here, and these ceremonies are sometimes called expressions of "radicalism." When someone has slain all the attachments he could lay eyes on, he calls himself a "liberated" man.

Diversion is a third popular defense mechanism. With diversion we keep our field of vision within acceptable bounds by keeping it busy with a ceaseless stream of new impressions. This is a typical dodge in childhood; without diversions a child can't stand himself—witness the common complaint, "Mom, there's nothing to do!" A little English girl I met while she was visiting relatives in Norway used to come constantly in from her room and ask, "What's going on?" Babysitters become virtuosos at diversion: "Look, child, see? They're painting the castle!" The phenomena is too well known to require further illustration. Diversion is the whole lifestyle of high society. It can be compared to an airplane—built of the earth, but able, with self-contained energy, to hold itself in the air as long as the energy is maintained. It must always be moving forward, because the air can only support it for an instant. The pilot can become lazy and secure from habit, but once the engine misfires, the crisis becomes acute.

Diversion tactics are often quite conscious. We need to steadily divert our attention from ourselves, because despair can lie just under the surface, in a catch of breath or a sudden sob. When all possible diversions are exhausted, we end up in a kind of "spleen" or peevishness. This ranges from a mild sulk to a lethal depression. Women, as a rule, seem to

be more at peace with their existential situation, and are more likely to calm their anxieties through diversion.

In fact, a central aspect of punishment by imprisonment is that most opportunities for diversion are denied the prisoner. And, there being few other means for protecting oneself against angst, prisoners are for the most part constantly on the brink of utter despair. Any measures he can find to stave off this despair are justified as an attempt to preserve life itself; for the moment he experiences his soul alone in the universe, there is nothing else to see but the categorical impossibility of existence.

Pure, unadulterated despair, "life-panic," will probably never come to fullness, since defense mechanisms are complex, automatic, and, to some extent, constantly operating. But the no-man's-land in proximity to despair can also be a kind of death zone, and in them life can continue only under great duress. Death always offers a way out, despite the phantoms that are supposed to lurk behind it; and since the way one feels about death changes with the circumstances, it can even come to seem a welcome escape from life in the death zone. Some people manage, in fact, to build up a "proper death"—ringing elegies, a glorious last stand, the whole bit—as a final diversion, so there really can be "fates worse than death." Newspapers with their gentle obituaries are in this case a mechanism for social suppression (for a change), since they always manage to find a soothing explanation for a death that was really due to despair; for example, "It is thought that the deceased took his own life because of the sudden fall in the price of wheat on the commodities market."

When a man kills himself in despair, it is an entirely natural death, resulting from *spiritual* causes. The modern barbarity of trying to "save face" for the deceased is, then, a horrible misunderstanding of the nature of existence.

Few people can survive arbitrary, meaningless changes in their situation, whether it be a change of jobs, a change in the social life, or a change in the way they relax. Most "spiritually developed" people demand that these changes have a sort of continuity, direction, or progression. For them, no situation can be ultimately satisfying, they must always go a step further, gathering new information, pursuing a career, and so on. These people suffer from an ineradicable yearning to overstep limits, to demand more and more from life, a restless ambition that is never satisfied. When one's previous goal is reached, it becomes only a step to some higher goal—the goal itself, in fact, is immaterial; it is the yearning itself that is important. The absolute height of one's goal is less

important than how much higher it is from where one momentarily finds oneself; it is the *marginal* degree of yearning that counts. The promotion from private to corporal is often more important than from lieutenant to general. Accordingly, this "law of marginally increasing demands" destroys any hope that "progress" will be satisfying; there is no end to progress. Human yearning, then, means not just longing after something, but also longing to be saved *from* something, wherever we are at the moment. And if we use "save" or "salvation" in its religious sense, it becomes clear that this is precisely what characterizes the religious experience. Nobody has ever managed to explain what it is they are longing after in religion, but it is quite clear what they are trying to escape from—this earthly vale of tears, one's untenable existential situation. And if becoming aware of this situation is the greatest truth our souls can reach, it is also clear why religion is thought to be a fundamental need of human beings. In light of the above, however, the hope that there might be some ultimate confirmation for the existence of God seems utterly in vain.

With the fourth defense mechanism, *sublimation*, the mode of operation is transformation rather than suppression: with creative talent or unshakable panache, one might be able to transform the very agonies of life into pleasant experiences. One takes on the evils of life with a positive attitude, which can then twist them into useful experiences. It seizes, for example, on their dramatic, heroic, lyric, or even comic aspects and thus dissolves the terror in them.

Sublimation, though, only works so long as these evils have already lost their most bitter sting, or if one manages to sublimate them before despair sinks its fingers firmly into one's mind. Mountaineers, for example, take no pleasure in gazing into the nauseating abyss below them until they have reached a nice, solid belay. Only then can they relish their exposed situation. Writers of tragedy are another example: to write a tragedy one must first free oneself from—betray—the essence of tragedy, so that one can look at it in a calm, detached way, appreciating its aesthetic qualities. In writing tragedy one has the luxury of being able to dance from one situation to another and another, steadily worse; there is really no end to the heights the writer can reach; in a way it is quite embarrassing. The author chases his ego through a countless variety of desperate situations, watching with glee as the situation gets worse and worse, glorying (from a safe distance) in the power of consciousness to destroy itself.

This article, in fact, is a classic example of sublimation. Despite his perilous subject, the present writer is not suffering at all; he is merely filling pieces of paper with words, and will probably get paid for the manuscript.

IV

Is it possible for so-called "primitive" peoples to manage life without all these philosophical spasms and gymnastics? Is it possible for them to live in harmony with themselves in the undisturbed pleasures of work and love? If these beings are to be called humans at all, I think the answer must be no. The most one could say about these children of nature is that they stand a bit nearer the beautiful biological ideal than we urbanized folk. That we have managed to save ourselves in spite of our harrowing existence is mostly due to those sides of our nature that are hardly or appropriately developed. Our heretofore successful defense, of course, cannot create human life, only delay its extinction. Still, our most positive traits are the proper use of our bodies' strengths and the biologically useful part of our souls. And these traits must operate under stringent conditions—the limitations of our senses, the frailty of our bodies, and the energy-demanding task of keeping our bodies in one piece and our need for affection satisfied.

And it is just these conditions, the narrow range of possibilities for happiness, that are so crassly flouted by our modern, growing civilization, its technology, and its standardization. And since a large part of our best biological talents are superfluous in the modern, complicated technological game we play with the environment, we are victims of increasing spiritual unemployment. The value of technological advances for human life must therefore be evaluated according to their ability to afford us increasing spiritual activity—without at the same time destroying the nature that gives us the opportunity to practice these activities. The limits of proper technological development are unclear, but I would venture that the earliest flint scrapers were a good discovery.

Every single other technological innovation has had more value to the inventor himself than to anyone else. They represent grand and ruthless larceny from the possibilities for others' experiences, and should be punished with the most stringent penalties if they are made public against the better judgment of an institution established to evaluate them. One crime among many of this sort is the use of aircraft to map unknown areas. In

one fell swoop the tremendously rich possibilities for others' experiences are destroyed, experiences that could have been held in trust for the common interest, such that everyone could have had the joy of discovery after his own efforts.

The global fever of life is at the moment characterized by the continual impoverishment of the possibility of spiritually developing experiences. The absence of biologically natural possibilities for fulfilling experience is evidenced by the mass flight to diversions: amusements, competitive sport, radio—"the rhythm of the times." Attachments are in a bad way—all the inherited cultural attachments have been shot full of holes by criticism, and dread, anxiety, bewilderment, and despair pours in through these same holes. Communism and psychoanalysis, as different as they are in other respects, both try to construct new versions of the old defense mechanism: with violence and cunning, respectively, to make people useful by cutting down their surplus of insight into life's precariousness.

Both of these methods are uncannily logical. But even these attempts will be, in the end, unsuccessful. A purposeful degeneration to a practically useful lower level of consciousness might save the race for a short time, but human nature being what it is, we would not find lasting peace in such a resignation, or in any resignation.

V

If we follow this train of thought through to the bitter end, the conclusion is inescapable: As long as humankind blunders along under the dire misconception that we are biologically preordained to conquer the earth, no alleviation of our angst for life is possible. As the number of people on the earth grows, the spiritual atmosphere will become tighter, and defense mechanisms will have to become ever more brutal.

And we will continue to dream of salvation, redemption, and a new Messiah. But after many saviors have been nailed to trees and stoned to death in the marketplace, then the last Messiah will appear.

A man will come forth, who before all other men has dared to strip his soul naked and give himself wholly over to our most profound questioning, even to the idea of annihilation. A man who has grasped life in its cosmic context, and whose agony is the agony of the world. But such a rising wail will assail him from all the people of the earth, crying for his thousandfold execution, when his voice blankets the world like a shroud, and his peculiar message is heard for the first and last time:

The life on many worlds is like a rushing river, but the life on this world is like a stagnant puddle and a backwater.

The mark of annihilation is written on thy brow. How long will ye mill about on the edge? But there is one victory and one crown, and one salvation and one answer:

Know thyselves; be unfruitful and let there be peace on Earth after thy passing.

And when he has spoken these words, they will fall upon him, with midwives and wet nurses at their head, and they will bury him under their fingernails. He is the last Messiah. From father to son, from son after father, he is descended from the archer at the waterhole.

Farewell, Norway

This story, an interview with Jørgen, the "old man of the mountains," did not turn out quite the way we expected. Jørgen's ideas are both untimely and extremely controversial. Even so, the editor doesn't wish to waste the report, and besides, even the most unlikely things sometimes have their purposes.

Editor: To get right to the point, sir, what do you think is the best way to make our mountain ranges accessible to as many people as possible—seeing that these areas are still, as far as recreation is concerned, undeveloped?

Jørgen: I beg your pardon?

Ed.: I mean areas where visitors still run the risk of bumping into something that's not in the brochure. Are you in favor of small public cabins or big hotels? Which do you think is better—highways, railroads, aerial cable-lifts, or tunnels for cog railways—as a means of getting as many people as possible into the heart of our alpine grandeur?

J.: Hearts should not be exposed to heavy tourist traffic at all. Up to 1910, maybe, it was appropriate to "'open up the mountains." Nowadays the need is quite the opposite—to lock up the few mountainous areas that are left. The last reserves. Not to people who are really their friends. Just to the ones called "engineer" and "restaurant chain."

Ed.: You mean, "'wilderness preservation"?

J.: "Preservation" is a pain to virgin wilderness, the same way that a vaccination hurts a still healthy body. These days we do not even have the chance to "preserve wilderness." The only hope is to save ourselves from the total *norwegische Apparatslandschaft*—Norwegian Techno-land-

scape I have to say it in German, we don't have a word for it in our own language.

Ed.: You mean, save ourselves from high tension lines and such?

J.: I mean from the whole filthification of Norway. We have already desecrated the most beautiful places to make room for foreign exchange factories: mountain resorts. Concrete boxes called "Sunnycrest" and "Shady Glade" to entice asphalt gypsies who soon discover that "Sunnycrest" is a parking lot and that the "moist air from alpine cascades" is tainted by the avalanches of garbage from the tourist corral down below; while the "silvery mountain brook" is sucked down the gullet of a hydroproject up above.

Ed.: Now, now (*we say mildly*), maybe it does get a little tacky sometimes, and things happen so fast nowadays that resorts will do almost anything to keep their costs down. But think of all the people who . . .

J.: Who turn around in disgust with a lump in their throat? Ah, they have competitors up there, do they? Ha. If it is going to be dog eat dog, I don't really care which dog eats which.

Ed.: Whom are you thinking of, exactly?

J.: I am thinking of the plague of development. I mean the mountain lakes turned into stone-dead, concrete-lined tanks, garnished slag heaps from construction projects. I went trolling in one of those lakes last year. I caught a twenty-eight-pound rusty baby carriage.

I am thinking of all the waterfalls dried up by hydroprojects, and with them the waterfalls of the Norwegian spirit. I am thinking of mountain plateaus turned into shattered corpses by the twentieth-century treasure hunt. I am thinking of idiotic roads that are supposed to "ease access," scabby scars over moors and passes, through undisturbed forests emptied of wildlife, along dried-up rivers and fished-out lakes, flanked by drifts of trash, by the waste products of the last link in the metabolism of resource processing. Look at Vassfaret, look at Fæmundmarka. Words like "barbaric" or "vandalism" do not describe what happened to those beautiful places, we have to resort to words like "treason" to describe the rape that has been committed here.

Look at Lake Alta in Bardo—formerly a dream beach, seventy miles of cloudberries and birch forests. Now, with a shout of victory, it has been transformed into thousands of acres of foul, stinking, coal-black mire. They were going to dam the lake and drown the forest, and these easterners got worried that they wouldn't be able to float their boats or pull their nets through the lake, because they'd get caught on the drowned

trees. So they plan the dam so that the water level will come to 60 feet above the treetops. Nobody told them that in winter, when they draw the water level down 120 feet lower than it used to be, that the forest would hang high overhead, the macabre skeletons of birch trees marching down the mountainside. You cannot land a boat on the shore, it's just rocks and cliffs now; a nightmare-landscape, it is the River Styx you are rowing in, Norway's grave, Norway emptied to the dregs of its soul.

And nobody complains. Nobody wants to be a wet blanket at the celebration of Progress. Young peoples' interests have already made the leap from farming to hanging out at hamburger stands and girlie-mag racks. Hydropower engineers come on the radio and say how sorry they are for the poor little birch trees that unfortunately happened to be hindering the march of Progress. "We need economic growth one way or the other," they say. They do it for the good of Norway.

Ed.: Things like that are unfortunate, I admit. But isn't it a good thing that the village gets electricity?

J.: Of course—but that is not why they build the dams. That is only a come-on. The villages can neither finance nor use all that hydropower. Buyers must be found, interest payments covered, we have to get people to build factories and subdivisions to consume all that electricity. The hydroproject has the village, not the other way around. "*Die ich reif, die Geister*"—"the genie's out of the bottle." It's too late for apologies, and no good to despair.

Goodness knows there is enough reason to despair. But the municipality is caught between a rock and a hard place. Look at Lake Gjende! In view of the economic benefits they were supposed to get from the project, the farmers there demanded half a million dollars a year in compensation if it *wasn't* built. These same farmers can't "afford" to let their daughters sit around at home and wait for a man who doesn't know the first thing about investments, but is free enough with kindness and affection. No—send them down to the streets of the big city. They can earn a lot there: twenty dollars a night, almost eight thousand a year. Multiply that by hundreds of girls! It's no worse than prostituting the landscape, anyways.

Ed.: You're joking, of course.

J.: It is only a matter of degree. We are in the grip of development Neanderthals. It is embarrassing that they are descended from humans, these lummoxes with blunt, sterile minds. They are not really alive, they can only keep going on economic stimulants. We're being replaced by people

who don't deserve a healthy Earth. People for whom the only important thing is how big their paychecks are.

Ed.: Yes, the self-reliant family made way for the money economy. But that's inevitable, it's just another part of development. If we want to get something, we have to give something up.

J.: Let me tell you what "development" really is. "Development" is pure panic, an itching of the soul that has to be scratched and clawed at until every stone and every little hill in the country is covered with incurable eczema. Where is the "philosophy of life," where is the "vision of the future," where is the goal that gives development direction? What is Norway after? What is the idea, the intention, the purpose, to its life as a nation?

Ed.: Well . . . "The greatest happiness for the greatest number," or something like that. Just like anywhere else in the world.

J.: What you call "happiness," my friend, is more a description of our frivolous chase than a description of actually being somewhere, having something. "Happiness," like anything else, can be a means to an end. But nothing can help a person or a people to "get" happiness unless they have the ability to be happy *in themselves*. Those who throw away the present for the sake of the future will never achieve it. People have tried that way off and on for over six thousand years. Where do you suppose it's gotten us, we who sit here, the result of a hundred generations' blood, sweat, and tears? We still have a few priceless, uninfected bits of Norwegian wilderness left that could help us bear life the way it is. Instead we blindly and to a man shove real happiness aside and chase after shadows. From one "means" to another to another—and "means" to what? To a spiritual rescheduling of our loans, to a collective psychological deficit that is only renewed, never repaid. And pity the man who tries to slow down, to shout a warning. He's an outsider, an enemy of the people, he doesn't deserve to live. Nobody even bothers to argue with him, they just toss him away, with all the other garbage.

Ed.: Now, just a minute. You make it sound like it's somebody's fault. Development, you know, feeds on itself, we can't really rein it in or direct it anymore. The population is always growing, they assert their demands, they can't live on gardening and sportfishing; they need more electricity, more industry. It's as plain as day. You can't dispute it.

J.: Oh? And who said we should increase the population?

Ed.: My dear Jørgen (*we say, with an anxious glance at the way the conversation is going*), you can't very well stop life, can you? Life must go on!

J.: There isn't anything called "Life." In any case, it is something that *we* have, not something that has us. It has no metaphysical substance—that is just one of the clever myths we've made for ourselves to keep us from staring truth in the face. The truth is life does not appear from nothing, but is a result of the deliberate decisions of every set of parents. As an old bachelor, I am sure of it. I made a decision to be childless, and I stick to it. That's how much your "life must go on" means. When man became self-conscious, that was the end of "life" as a natural force. Our awakening consciousness laid that specter to rest. Or should have.

Ed.: But people—

J.: Have no self control. The day is coming when they will *have* to stop breeding like rabbits. Today the Norwegian population weighs 220,000 tons. The only common goal in this country is to increase, double, quadruple the number of people-on-the-hoof the earth has to bear. Row houses with row people; apartment blocks with block people; mass production of efficient little nothing people. In this world of mathematicians nobody bothers to ask what all these numbers are supposed to mean.

Ed.: Well, we need these people to maintain vital industries and things, to innovate, to make things better. Besides, these social problems are being worked on by both public institutions and private citizens, everyone is concerned about them.

J.: Yes, the outlook for these problems is pretty grim if we can't raise children to look after them. If there were fewer people instead of more we would be in danger that these problems would disappear, taking with them 96 percent of what makes life interesting, both for the current and future generations. So, of course, we need the clerks and the clerks need electricity so they can design new, endless housing developments for helpless people who need electricity. And one day we'll reach ten million people.

Ed.: By using up all of our natural resources, draining the last wetland area, building atomic-powered greenhouse skyscrapers, we'll be able to feed twelve or fifteen million.

J.: Wonderful. But it won't stop there, you know. What are you going to do when twenty million wage slaves stand tight as blades of grass, from one end of the country to the other, with the smell of each other's welfare wafting up their nostrils?

Ed.: Not everyone will be a wage slave.

J.: Quite right. Some will drive bulldozers, others will scurry around picking up the droppings of herds of tourists. And what do you think the

tourists will come here to see, anyway? Corrugated iron they have at home.

Ed.: Well, there are the museums . . .

J.: Ah, yes. I had forgotten about the museums. Somehow it never occurred to me that everything worth seeing could be packed into a display case.

Ed.: Well, but nature takes care of itself. If the population gets too high, there will be a war or a plague.

J.: And that's what you want for your children.

Ed.: Well, actually I figure that by that time we'll be able to emigrate to Mars.

J.: Sure, and it'll be exciting the first week. Eventually, though, people will start worrying about how much to tax the uranium mines in order to keep the price of margarine down. Yes, yes—we can certainly look forward to at least *that* relief: the whole thing will repeat itself.

Ed.: But you forget, Jørgen; people adapt. What seems like an impossible way of life to us will seem commonplace to our descendants, who will never have experienced anything else.

J.: True. A dog is happy being a dog. If our descendants become dogs they surely won't miss Beethoven. Only the transition will be hard.

We're going through that transition now, our generation, the last that remembers what Norway was. We are homeless already, linguistically and geographically. We have lost our sense of place. Not like refugees, for even if their home is forever closed to them it still lives in their dreams. We're homeless because we've sold nature's innocence to the technological despots and made her into a ravaged whore; when we look to her we see not a smiling face but a sickly deathgrin, blackened with swarming flies. There's a bitter irony in Reiss Andersen's poem:

> One must take a seven-league step
> Away from the picture
> In order to see it
> The way the master wanted it seen.

Ed.: Well, Jørgen, you certainly don't mince words. But people are going to call you a misanthropist.

J.: Because I am thinking about the generations to come? They're the ones who will become the "human cog wheels," "the Wheel of Life," as sculptor Gustav Vigeland called it—have you seen the statue in the park in

Oslo? Misanthropic? Because I think future generations should not have to suffer this fate? The word means different things to different people.

Ed.: But you wouldn't go so far as to take someone's life?

J.: That would only increase suffering. There's a world of difference between saying we should level Oslo and saying we shouldn't build a new Oslo in the middle of the wilderness. When I say, with Nietzsche, "*Verdober ist die Erde durch die Viel-zu-vielen*"—the earth is destroyed by the all-too-many—that doesn't mean that I'd kill anyone. If someone has to die, I'd be the first to volunteer. Figure it this way: the yet-unborn are always the majority. If you add up all the people living now and all those "waiting in the wings," the sum is always infinite, no matter how many actually get born. We can't fit all the unborn on the earth at the same time; every hour an astronomical number of potential people are "cheated" out of life by people deciding not to get pregnant. Ergo, it's no more barbaric to limit the present population to one million than it would be to limit it to twenty million.

Ed.: But what's so special about a population of exactly one million?

J.: That's just a number. But if we only had a million people in Norway there'd be ample room for all. Everyone could have as much land as he was interested in cultivating, empty beaches to build on, unexplored terrain for skiing, all the fishing and hunting one could possibly want. Then we wouldn't need to be "managed" by some bureaucracy. Life's problems would not be solved, but they would not be made worse.

Ed.: But a primitive society like the one you envision couldn't maintain a television system, for example.

J.: Just so.

Ed.: But you also forget the most important thing: Norway would become a power vacuum, militarily speaking. How long do you think it would take before the vacuum were filled—by *others?*

J.: Ah, yes. We must continue to bring Norwegians into the world so that we don't get invaded by the Russians. That's something I had not considered.

Ed.: Well, Jørgen, you're old and wise. But why do you only talk about these things with your old mountaineering comrades? Surely they're hardly a philosophical bunch.

J.: I talk with them because in their sport is a deep philosophy. It touches a piece of the incomprehensible, the magnificent, the consciousness-expanding cosmic adventure of what it is to be a human being in the world.

Its face is turned toward death and nature, not toward the stilted, galling artificiality of human fellowship.

I talk with them about it because they still have some of their earthly nature intact, they live in a yet uncontaminated nature. From there will come the fight to turn the tide, if it comes at all. Rocks may be dead, but they are not diseased. The more you climb, the more your body purges itself of the poisons accumulated in human society; when you have enough air under your heel, the poisons loose their grip and sink into the depths like mustard gas. You become purified, and more: you get an antibody in your system, you can go back into the world and remain immune. You become an antibiotic in a degenerating world.

Ed.: Do you think it would do any good to talk about this to the youth?

J.: Of course not. But it doesn't matter. I belong to a vanishing breed. That is why I say, "Farewell, Norway! The country is in foreign hands."

Poems

EPILOGUE?

In the heart's hollow, in the mind's bitter order,
in secret closets and the shelter of night
is the incomprehensible world of All,
and the mistgloom dawn of time—
billions of years pressed together
to one second of mutatoric light,
where *mankind* sprang out of smelting flames
and *saw itself* as an appalling sight:
A strange guest who stirs the clouds around
and belongs to All and Nothing.
He goes from "mild surprise" to "wild surmise"
and observes, delighted, form and size—
with five protrusions on feet and hands
with chemical wonders in his innards,
a skeleton like a decked-up Christmas tree,
with polished kidney stones and guts displayed—
putting on the mask and scowling at the others
who grope from his crock in the ribcage as

his stealthy glances see the world's injustice.
The old passion confines him to his life—
he thanks no one for what has been given him.
He notices more but catches less,
until *this* harsh fact he takes for granted
—that the globe's burly belly
is a pregnant mother from
which trees and birds, fish and seals come
and He with them. But the *Animals'* even place
in the *Self-evident* spreading stratum
was not his. A mighty *Bomb* is he
of chromosomic-isotopic strength,
and the fuse fizzles the whole time he
in play and love, in war and work,
will always be tilling his own soul
going from gnome to dizzy phantom.
He draws himself up and bears his head high,
and claims all wins as his own,
believing all his profits are pure.
The poor fool, he knows hardly a thing—
for all is a mire of chance
which metes out his wailings and barks.
His journey goes forth from the atom's kernel,
scheming, to the last stars of space;
—but look! He returns in triumph from the Moon
and is met at his own disdainful door
by the heart's secret gremlin voice:
"You forgot something, though your machine was
impressive,
that Someone awaited you back home—
what you found on the Moon's golden plains
was your final truth, namely this:
You were there, but you are not there now!

If you wish, we can celebrate
'cause you came back safe and sound,
and did not lead us to speculate
on your likeness to the One who knows."

He builds for his unrest cathedrals
and forms golden altars for his fears,
yet through high halls and portals
hypocrisy's cock crows on,
vying with the grinding of organ tones while the
church pew imprisons his heart.
He storms out, perhaps, in the free
seeking peace from the lying litany
by the starry sky's shining idiocy.

He is thus Life's unchallenged master:
Now see—from the Church to the castle
and take your captured place on the throne:
—But here he ferments from bad to worse
as the Throne is transformed to the Scaffold.
—and He, who was pioneer of the Spirit
commands no longer, but believes and begs.
When the Best is no longer in power
what is this Abel on the pedestal sees
beyond integrals and kabbalas—?
From *your* back which can bear no more—
while abyss-winds rise up in his hair?
That he is lucky who becomes cast in metal
while others lie beaten as autumn's hay?
That the *name* endures into coming eons?
No—in times of war, it is melted for cannons
his bronze soul, and the pulpits, stand empty;
each gram now weighted as lifeless machine.

But this is not *me*, but him:
I protest with a veritable NO!

Yet time races on and the day shall come
when no one who knows them recalls me.
And painmarkers flame to the pyre
when, spit living to the needle of Now,
he casts his wisdom's fraying net—
and all he finds on its empty bottom
is, in the final stand of the spirit,
the single Gnosis as borne by the Dead,
that only the embracing of NOTHINGNESS frees us.
And we are afraid that our children shall suffer
so we cease our propagation in time.
It is the last solid counsel we know
against Heaven's faithless love.

LULLABY

The night is great and silent,
the child sleeps under cover.
Little guest from stranger shores,
now your journey's over.
Love's command has called to you—
and no way goes back—
Little guest from stranger shores,
now your journey's over.

But still you are not ours
—you belong to them out there—
Flowers, deer, and standing stars,
pressed against your shoulder.
From a land where wonder lies,
came you to your Elders—
Flowers, deer, and standing stars,
pressed against your shoulder.

Frightened of the stream of change
see my eyes are plunging.

Is that you, you little life,
which I have laid sleeping?
Or has your quiet spirit-pull
lulled to rest *my* thinking?
Go then in the mighty stream
here my eyes are plunging.

A world which is of joy unfolds,
Spring comes into meadows.
You who grow in dreamers' mold
must sleep safe and longer.
Wild and strong the day that dawns—
stirs our hearts' adventure.
Little seed in dreamers' mold—
sleep a little longer.

To Arne Naess, on his seventy-fifth birthday (Peter Reed)

Chapter 3

Arne Naess

There is a photograph of Arne Naess being carried away by policemen in flat-topped caps during the Mardøla demonstration. He is smiling gently, and seems to be enjoying the whole thing or accepting the whole procedure as being inevitable. Another photograph, from twenty years before, shows an Arne Naess with a heavy, bushy beard, staring intently with furrowed brow at a copy of Spinoza's *Ethics*, taken inside a tent high in the Himalaya.

These two images show but two extremes of Arne Naess's multifaceted Self, in theory and praxis, in reflection and in the public view. Both are a mixture of intensity, humor, criticism, and joy, and show just some of the reasons Naess has had such an influence as a philosopher and public "authority," both in Norway and abroad.

As professor of philosophy from 1936 to 1970, his career has been crucial in shaping the whole higher education system in Norway, with its stress on a basic grounding in philosophy and the history of ideas for all students, and a particular concern with linking academics with the present problems in the outside world of our century. This concept also forms the backbone of deep ecology, the term he invented, for a "wisdom related to action." Nearly all of the other contributors to this volume have studied with Naess or been influenced by his ecosophical method in other ways.

From the very beginning of his career, Naess has generated controversy

through his insistence that philosophy can confront "real" and "common" people directly. One of his earliest works was on the idea of *"Truth" as Conceived by Those Who Are Not Professional Philosophers* (1939). The twenty-six-year-old Arne sent out questionnaires to all kinds of people, posing the basic questions that have occupied "professional" philosophers for thousands of years. Today he remarks, "This work still influences me greatly, as I have learned from schoolboys and housewives that a thing is true if *it is so*. But that is just one of a vast diversity of answers received; as diverse, in fact, as the views on the question voiced by major philosophers through the ages."

From then on, Naess has been concerned with the most basic norms and values that characterize the way all kinds of people view the world and justify their actions. Later in his career he elaborated this concern through an investigation of the way people communicate and use words in his work in empirical semantics. The essence of his largest philosophical work, *Interpretation and Preciseness* (1953), can be summarized as follows: when two people communicate, they do not use a shared language, but interpret what the other says, according to their particular understanding of the meanings of each other's words and syntax. So the question of what the other person *means* can only be addressed by using our own system and style of interpretation.[1]

This explains the multiplicity and diversity of possible interpretations of what people say. An analogy can be made with a piece of written music—hear how many ways the same piece can be played, or interpreted, while we still recognize it as the same piece. It is the same with words and ordinary conversations.

Yet there is a common core that we identify as the original piece of music, or the substance of the conversation. Naess describes this core in many ways, most often making reference to our perception of the *gestalt* of the thing in question, its shape, or its identity in the relational field. The gestalt is the entity or meaning we can recognize within the limits of the variation. It is evident with our use of very general words, such as "self-realization," "ecophilosophy," "complexity," "diversity," and "symbiosis." Naess avoids explicit definitions of these key concepts, instead encouraging the reader to gradually come to his or her own understanding of the terms.

At a general level (or "low level of precisation," in Naess's terminology), we admit many possible interpretations and use such wide words to unite them. Our own individual interpretations may make the terms more

precise, specific, or operational in certain contexts, but *less* wide-ranging and perhaps less useful in wide communication.

The spectrum and parade of oneness to diversity, generality to precision, runs through all of Naess's work. He has been trying this out on pragmatic disputes on the meanings of words for a long time. Prompted by accusations from Eastern Europe that the term "democracy" was being misused in the West, he led a UNESCO project in 1949 that sought to clarify its meaning. A multitude of meanings and usages were found, characterized "not only by diversity, richness, and multiplicity, but also nonviolence, aloofness, and equal-mindedness. The resulting volume, *Democracy in a World of Tensions* (1951) was quickly sold out and never reprinted due to the politically dangerous character of its contents."[2]

Naess later tried out his method of interpretation and clarification upon the practical philosophical system of Gandhi. The resulting schematic analysis broke down Gandhi's recommendations and pronouncements into *norms*—statements inducing us to think and act in certain ways, and *hypotheses*—testable statements to support, connect, and logically derive the norms. Gandhi's system stems out from the crucial norm *Self-realization* and its close association to norms of nonviolence. Naess's most recent volume on this system, *Gandhi and Group Conflict* (1974), can be used as a practical guide for those planning and executing nonviolent actions.

Enough recounting of accomplishments. It is impossible to understand Naess's philosophies without realizing his deep connection to nature, which led him naturally toward ecophilosophy. He describes some of these first encounters:

> From when I was about four years old until puberty, I could stand or sit for hours, days, weeks in shallow water on the coast, inspecting and marvelling at the overwhelming diversity and richness of life in the sea. The tiny beautiful forms which "nobody" cared for, or were even unable to see, were part of a seemingly infinite world, but nevertheless my world. Feeling apart in many human relations, I identified with "nature."
>
> From about the age of eight a definite mountain became for me a symbol of benevolent, equal-minded, strong "father," or of an ideal human nature. These characteristics were there in spite of the obvious fact that the mountain, with its slippery stones, icy fog and dangerous precipices, did not protect me nor care for me in any trivial sense. It required me to show respect and take care.

When fifteen years old I managed through sheer persistency of appeals to travel alone in early June to the highest mountain region of Norway—Jotunheimen. At the foot of the mountain I was stopped by deep rotten snow and I could find nowhere to sleep. Eventually I came across a very old man who was engaged in digging away the snow surrounding and in part covering a closed cottage belonging to an association for mountaineering and tourism. We stayed together for a week in a nearby hut. So far as I can remember, we ate only one dish: oatmeal porridge with dry bread. The porridge had been stored in the snow from the previous autumn—that is what I thought the old man said. Later I came to doubt it. A misunderstanding on my part. The porridge was served cold, and if any tiny piece was left over on my plate he would eat it. In the evenings he would talk incidentally about mountains, about reindeer, hunting, and other occupations in the highest regions. But mostly he would play the violin. It was part of the local culture to mark the rhythm with the feet, and he would not give up trying to make me capable of joining him in this. But how difficult! The old man's rhythms seemed more complex than anything I had ever heard!

Enough details! The effect of this week established my conviction of an inner relation between mountains and mountain people, a certain greatness, cleanness, a concentration upon what is essential, a self-sufficiency; and consequently a disregard of luxury, of complicated means of all kinds. From the outside the mountain way of life would seem Spartan, rough, and rigid, but the playing of the violin and the obvious fondness for all things above the timberline, living or "dead," certainly witnessed a rich, sensual attachment to life, a deep pleasure in what can be experienced with wide open eyes and mind. These reflections instilled within me the idea of modesty—modesty in man's relationships with mountains in particular and the natural world in general. As I see it, modesty is of little value if it is not a mutual consequence of much deeper feelings, a consequence of a way of understanding ourselves as part of nature in a wide sense of the term. This way is such that *the smaller we come to feel ourselves compared to the mountain, the nearer we come to participating in its greatness.* I do not know why this is so.[3]

It is easy to see that Naess would, in time, try to discover "why this is so" by elaborating a philosophical system that leads from the self into the world of nature, through norms and hypotheses. Like Gandhi, he chooses Self-realization as the central norm or key word, and proceeds to enter a system in which one's identity and sense of place are only enhanced by greater understanding of the universe:

> It is often said that the discovery that the Earth is not the center of the universe has made man smaller, diminishing his status. I have always felt that I grew bigger and bigger with the extensions in time, space, and cultural diversity. The universe is my universe, not my ego's but that of the great Self we have in common. This is metaphysics, but through philosophical research it can be developed in the direction of clarity and cognitive responsibility. From the fundamental norm "Self-realization!" plus hypotheses about the world, I derive a set of principles for "green politics." In this way abstract problems of philosophy are connected with concrete issues of contemporary political conflict.[4]

And these principles are what Arne refers to as an "ecosophy." This is one's own personal "philosophy," a code of values and a view of the world that guides one's own decisions in regard to the natural world. Arne Naess introduces simply one ecosophy, which he chooses to call ecosophy T. One is not expected to agree with all of its values and paths of derivation, but to learn the means for developing one's own systems or guides, say, ecosophies X, Y, or Z.

For Arne Naess, ecosophy T serves as the grounds for supporting the principles espoused by the now worldwide deep ecology movement. Arne introduced the term in several short paragraphs that begin an article published in the interdisciplinary journal *Inquiry* in 1973:

> The emergence of ecologists from their former relative obscurity marks a turning point in our scientific communities. But their message is twisted and misused. A shallow, but presently rather powerful movement, and a deep, but less influential movement, compete for our attention. I shall make an effort to characterise the two.
>
> 1. *The Shallow Ecology movement*:
>
> Fight against pollution and resource depletion. Central objective: the health and affluence of people in the developed countries.
>
> 2. *The Deep Ecology movement*:
>
> a. Rejection of the man-in-environment image in favour of *the relational, total-field image*. Organisms as knots in the field of intrinsic relations. An intrinsic relation between two things A and B is such that the relation belongs to the definitions or basic constitutions of A and B, so that without the relation, A and B are no longer the same things. The total field model dissolves not only the man-in-environment concept, but every compact thing-in-milieu concept—except when talking at a superficial or preliminary level of communication.

> b. *Biospherical egalitarianism—in principle.* The "in principle" clause is inserted because any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression. The ecological field worker acquires a deep-seated respect, even veneration, for ways and forms of life. He reaches an understanding from within, a kind of understanding that others reserve for fellow men and for a narrow section of ways and forms of life. To the ecological field worker, *the equal right to live and blossom* is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom. Its restriction to humans is an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects upon the life quality of humans themselves. This quality depends in part upon the deep pleasure and satisfaction we receive from close partnership with other forms of life. The attempt to ignore our dependence and to establish a master/slave role has contributed to the alienation of man from himself.[5]

Now this is full of terms and phrases that seem to demand explanation, and it has engendered quite a debate in deep ecological circles because of this. Since then Arne has chosen to elaborate the definition of deep ecology with a list of eight points called the Platform of Deep Ecology, a minimum list with which supporters should be more or less in agreement. In the first article we include here, we present this platform and a way it can be used to get "experts" and politicians to address the questions: Where do you stand in relation to these values? Do your ideals conflict with practice? Should you change either? How?

The second article discusses what the practicalities of a green politics would entail. What are issues specific to its domain, and how would it connect with present political patterns and streams?

Finally, we include a less formal attempt to get at the core of Arne's ecosophy T, simply by asking questions. As he himself has remarked, "One only has to ask the question 'why?' a few times before one moves from practice to philosophy." And any useful answers must bring one quickly back to the ground. Behind all of Arne's work is the methodology of forging a connection from all people's values to their decisions in concrete situations. This changes the very way people think. And then, the way people act.

Intrinsic Value: Will the Defenders of Nature Please Rise

The venerable German philosopher Immanuel Kant insisted that we

never use a human being *merely* as a means to an end. But why should this philosophy apply only to human beings? Are there not other beings with intrinsic value? What about animals, plants, landscapes, and our very special old planet as a whole?

I hope you all answer yes. Is it my privilege as a philosopher to announce what is of intrinsic value, whereas scientists, as such, must stick to theories and observations? No, it is not—because you are not scientists as such; you are autonomous, unique persons, with obligations to *announce* what has intrinsic value without any cowardly subclass saying that it is just your subjective opinion or feeling. On the other hand, it does not follow that you are entitled to "beat up on" those who disagree with you. The rational solution of value conflicts is not something that is impossible to achieve.

But what is intrinsic value?

Expressions such as "this should be preserved *for its own sake*" are very common: but pseudoscientific philosophers and scientists find them objectionable when they are applied to natural phenomena. They insist that there must be a being valuing things—that is, there must be humans in the picture. In a sense this is true. Theories of value, like theories of gravity and rules of logical or methodological inferences, are human products. But this does not rule out the possibility of truth or correctness. The positions in philosophy often referred to as "value nihilism" and "subjectivity of value" reject the concept of valid norms. Other positions accept the concept. I accept it.

The world of experience is the only world with which we are firmly acquainted. The world as spontaneously experienced, including appropriateness and truth, cannot be denounced as less real than that of scientific theory, because we always ultimately refer to the immediate reality. Recent developments in physics substantiate the primacy of immediate experience. As long as atoms were conceived of as small, hard things, physical reality could be conceived of as the real world. Recent developments in quantum theory, however, offer us a picture so abstract, so mathematical, that it is reasonable to see it as furnishing only the abstract structure and outline of the real world, not its content. Color hues are real in their own way, just as electromagnetic "waves" are real in their function as abstract entities. We experience good old friends as values in themselves on a par with ourselves, and we do things for their sakes as naturally as for our own. Our friends may be useful to us, but that is not all. Why shouldn't this also apply to living beings other than humans? We

are forced by modern science back to nature, basically as the earlier naturalists conceived it. And it is, in its essential features, worth protecting for its own sake.

The position that nothing in the natural world has intrinsic value, that the whole conservation movement is motivated only by narrow utilitarian aims centered on human health and prosperity, corrodes in the long run the public image of the movement. Highly dedicated persons who cannot help but work for conservation and for whom it is a vital need to live with nature are confused by what they take to be the utter cynicism of scientists and experts who use purely utilitarian, flat language in their assessment of environmental risks, "genetic resources," and extinction. These experts are often seen as traitors.

There is an important philosophical argument against talking about protecting natural entities for their own sake. Is there not always, in any sort of valuation, a human subject that projects value into an object? Therefore, is not everything we do basically something we do for our own sake? I may answer "yes" insofar as we may use the expression "for our own sake" in a very abstract way. But everyday use of the expression is also legitimate. We undertake a hike for the sake of ourselves and our dog, but sometimes, in bad weather and having pressing things to do, we take the dog for a walk for its own sake. There are cases of doubt, but to announce that we do everything for our own sake, that is, that we, each of us, are the sole intrinsic value, is plain rubbish from a semantic point of view. In short, the argument against the *possibility* of doing things for the sake of others is untenable.

Spontaneous value experience is something to be conveyed to others even in our capacity as scientists. What we feel spontaneously has weight when we decide how to act, for instance, in regard to conservation policies. And the public and politicians should know what carries weight for biologists.

Let me mention a rather touching sentence I found in a standard handbook of how to treat our domestic animals. It was extensively used in the 1920s and 1930s. The author talks about caressing pigs. The sentence reads approximately like this: "Those who have experienced the satisfaction of pigs stroked in this way cannot but do it." How can *the author* experience the satisfaction of a *pig?* The question is badly posed. It assumes a cleavage between the human subject and animal object. Actually such a cleavage does not belong to spontaneous experience, and should not be introduced in order to make the sentence more scientific. Much

that passes for objectivity in scientific talk is really pseudoscientific and renders the language of scientists gray and flat!

The quoted sentence is instructive in another way. The last part, about compulsion, is marvelous: "Those who have experienced the satisfaction of pigs stroked in this way *cannot but do it.*" The farmer may say to himself, "Dear pig, I don't have time to stroke you today," but in vain. He just goes on stroking the pig. Here also a so-called scientific textbook writer would object: of course the farmer *can* refrain from stroking the pig.

Of less importance but perhaps worth mentioning is the way the sentence reminds us that when we talk about technical progress in the agricultural sector, we do not include techniques for caressing. Why? Better to be incomplete than to be accused of being sentimental or unscientific.

Back to Immanuel Kant and the use of a human being merely as a means to an end. What makes possible a vivid experience of intrinsic value corresponding to a vastly generalized Kantian maxim? In short, what makes intense personal appreciation of diversity of life forms and the whole ecosphere possible?

There is one process that perhaps is more important in this respect than any other: the process of so-called *identification.*[6] We tend to see ourselves in everything alive. As scientists we observe the death struggle of an insect, but as mature human beings we spontaneously also experience our own death in a way, and feel sentiments that relate to struggle, pain, and death. Spontaneous identification is of course most obvious when we react to the pain of persons we love. We do not observe that pain and by reflecting on it decide that it is bad. What goes on is difficult to describe; it is a task of philosophical phenomenology to try to do the job. Here it may be sufficient to give some examples of the process of identification, or "seeing oneself in others." A complete report on the death struggle of an insect as some of us experience such an event must include the positive and negative values that are attached to the event as firmly as the duration, the movements, and the colors involved.

There is nothing unduly romantic or poetic here. Given our biological endowment, each of us has the capacity to identify with all living beings. In addition, given the physiological, psychological, and social basis of gestalt perception and apperception, humans have the capacity to experience the intimate relations between organisms and the inorganic world—that is, between the biosphere and the ecosphere in general. So we have

natural expressions such as "living landscapes" and "the living planet." There is nothing here that goes against the scientific attitude.

I take it therefore to be an empirically testable hypothesis that the attainment of well-rounded human maturity leads to *identification with all life forms* in a wide sense of "life" and including the acknowledgment of the intrinsic value of these forms. The process of maturation is here conceived as something different from the mere learning of new skills. It encompasses the realization of different kinds of capabilities inherent in human nature. These capabilities are not necessarily related to increasing one's biological fitness. Through this conception of identification and maturity, ecologically sound policies gain a basis of justification that is not entirely homocentric, but is biocentric in the wide sense of *bios*.

Let me eliminate a couple of misunderstandings of this hypothesis about maturity. Even if 90 percent of humanity developed a high degree of identification with other life forms and openly acknowledged their intrinsic value, this might not stop governments from implementing policies resulting in large-scale extinctions and further destruction of wilderness and habitats. Social conditions such as hunger, war, and power conflicts on individual or group levels, along with mismanagement, may override considerations that spring from the genuine feelings and value priorities of the majority.

A tragic situation may arise: that attitudes toward nature show a high degree of maturity, but that social and political chaos make the forceful expression of these attitudes impossible. Or, biologists may conclude that the biological programming of *Homo sapiens* simply is such that human overpopulation and cruel dominance of other life forms are inevitable. In other words, mature realization of the social and political potential may not make a "live and let live" attitude realizable.

Let us not take such a pessimistic view too seriously—though it does point out the fact that an increase in the breadth and intensity of the identification process in large numbers of individuals does not automatically increase the political strength of the conservation movement. The fight for basic policy changes is a necessary corollary of the effort to assist the development of identification through education and otherwise.

Let us look more closely at the complex relationship between basic value positions and concrete environmental policies. It has been encouraging for me to lead a project of systematic interviews of so-called ordinary people on the rights of animals, plants, and landscapes, and on their intrinsic value. In spite of what one would guess from the way they vote

(and I am speaking now as a Scandinavian), there is a substantial majority with quite far-reaching ideas about the rights and value of life forms, and a conviction that *every life form has its place in nature* that we must respect.

On the other hand, there is one widespread opinion among ordinary people that should be disturbing to biologists. This is the opinion that scientists and so-called environmental experts have largely deserted them. It is not difficult to see some of the causes of this feeling. For example, people read about an expert who favors Plan A over Plan B as to where to place a dam, or how to increase the production of energy. The public has no available information about what the expert thinks in his heart. He may be of the opinion that both plans are irresponsible, that to increase energy production is sheer nonsense, and that the implied interference in natural processes is a calamity. But he or she (rarely a she, I am sorry to say) has been asked only to compare plans. If the expert publishes his real opinions, he will not be asked by authorities to function as an expert in the future.

In any case, whatever the causes of widespread silence, many people would give up their own passivity if offered more support or leadership by those whom they consider to be experts, or at least more knowledgeable and articulate than themselves.

Let me mention the questions raised in the interviews. The first part asks whether the interviewee thinks we have duties or obligations toward animals, plants, rivers, and landscapes. The great majority of persons interviewed maintain that we do have duties and obligations toward the nonhuman world, organic and inorganic. The second part asks analogous questions about rights. Answers have the same positive character. The third part concerns intrinsic value, or value in itself. Most people think they understand these expressions. Things may have value, people say, without having value for humans.

The last questions concern population, extinction, and territorial conflicts between humans and nonhumans. "Animals *have* equal rights but humans take away the right" is a common answer. When asked what they think about the prediction that a million species may be wiped out if policies are not changed, it is pathetic to see how this idea elicits horror, indignation, and despair. In short, the answers of so-called ordinary people were such that one might, perhaps naively, expect them to press for substantially different conservation policies.

Are the experts really narrowly utilitarian in their views, and are they really in favor of present environmental policies? In an attempt to find out I recently sent a long personal letter to 110 people who influence national environmental policy in Norway. About one out of four has responded, some with long, interesting essays. The respondents include high-level personnel in the Departments of Finance, Justice, and Energy—persons with comprehensive educations in various branches of natural science and technology. The experts were asked to react to the following eight points, which, incidentally, I call "the platform of deep ecology," or rather, one formulation of such a platform.

1. *The flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth has inherent value. The value of nonhuman life forms is independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes.* The great majority indicated their agreement.

2. *Abundance and diversity of life forms are values in themselves and contribute to the flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth.* The great majority agrees.

3. *Humans have no right to reduce this abundance and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.* The great majority *tend* to agree. Many comment on the term "vital."

4. *The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease in the human population, and the flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease.* The great majority agree.

5. *Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.* The great majority agree.

6. *Policies must therefore be changed. The changes in policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs would be deeply different from the present and would make possible a more joyful experience of the connectedness of all things.* The great majority tend to agree. Some find the last sentence rhetorical and doubtful.

7. *The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great.* The great majority tend to agree.

8. *Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation,*

directly or indirectly, to participate in the attempt to implement the necessary changes. The great majority agree.

The eight formulations are of course in need of clarification, elaboration, and comment. In the letter to the experts more than two pages of comments were added. One may suspect that some of those who did not answer my letter largely disagreed or at least did not find the formulations acceptable as expressions of their personal views. But the main point is clear: a tendency among respondents to concur.

These results do not confirm the belief of ordinary people that "the experts" have deserted them in their basic views on the man/nature relationship and in their views as to the necessity of fundamental changes in policy. *There is no pronounced technocratic philosophy of value.* The concrete governmental decisions that ordinary people find lamentable are rather based on priorities of a nonfundamental character plus the conviction of those experts that "people" can have *both* a steadily higher (material) standard of living *and* unspoiled nature. At least this is a general impression, though there is no scientific evidence that it is the case.

It is easy to accept lofty principles verbally. Hundreds of wars that we now consider more or less crazy were glorified by reference to God, patriotism, love of mankind, and supreme justice. Likewise it is easy to agree upon the intrinsic value of the richness and diversity of life on the planet Earth. What is needed is a methodology of persistently connecting basic value judgments and imperative premises with decisions in concrete situations of interference or noninterference in nature. What I therefore suggest is that those who are thought to be experts and scientists should repeatedly and persistently deepen their arguments with reference to basic value judgments and imperative premises. That is, they should announce their normative philosophy of life and discuss environmental problems in their most comprehensive time and space frame of reference—ultimately in terms of millions of years of evolution and most intimate and profound global interactions.

Neither the so-called deep ecology movement nor any other movement that attributes intrinsic value to the richness and diversity of life forms today meets antagonists with an opposite *articulated* philosophy.[7] The movement to institute responsible, respectful treatment of nature is up against much more formidable forces than well-articulated antagonistic philosophies. Strong economic, social, and political forces are operating against it, as well as lifestyles, habitual attitudes, and the preferences of

individuals who are encouraged to adopt a consumerist style. Old habitual attitudes find expression in such phrases as "fight nature," "improved land," "push back the jungle," or "conquer Mt. Everest."

To some it may appear that there is a conflict between what I have said about identification and what might be called fundamental human nature as it is understood by evolutionary biologists. Let us consider the hypothesis that all-around maturity among human beings inevitably fosters a high level of identification with all life forms. It is justifiable to doubt the compatibility of such a view with the contemporary theories of evolution and ethology. One may ask whether a rather impartial "live and let live" attitude implies a kind of altruism incompatible with the egoism or very narrow altruism of the human genetic heritage. Before answering we should agree that the concepts of egoism and altruism as understood by evolutionary and genetic theorists are not those shared by most people in everyday life. No criticism of either concept is implied by saying this; there is room for many concepts, each useful within its limits.

Without going into detail I will venture to say that deep changes of environmental policies in favor of nonhumans do not imply anything definite about any particular view of biological fitness. What is good for nonhumans obviously may also be good for humans; furthermore, there is nothing in the current theories about the evolution of behavior that contradicts the possibility of human management of the human population size.

In the conclusion of his book *Natural Selection and Social Behavior*, Richard D. Alexander says:

> We are, then, hedonistic or selfish individualists to the extent that such behavior maximizes the survival by reproduction of those copies of our genes residing in our own bodies; and we are group altruists to the extent that this behavior maximizes the survival by reproduction of the copies of our genes residing in the bodies of others. At least this is what we have evolved to be—and to all accounts it is all that we have evolved to be.
>
> It is paramount to realize, however, that—as opposed to what we have evolved to be—what we actually are or become is whatever we can make of ourselves, given our history, and our propensities and talents, which are great, for creating novelty in our environments, at rates and of kinds that the process of genetic evolution has no possibility of controlling or keeping up with. Nowadays we are closer than ever before

> to being able to become what we wish to be, if for no other reason than because we know about ourselves the things I have just mentioned.[8]

Personally I would perhaps be a little more cautious about whether we are today more able than before to become what we wish to be. But at least we have more knowledge about the practical obstacles we face, and one obstacle is lack of articulate leadership.

How do environmental experts express themselves when they are hired to take part in vital environmental decisions, or when they are asked their views about what is going on on this planet? Not like the poets, and I think that is good. But the predominant way the experts express themselves in public needs some comment.

The so-called language of metaphors, used to a certain extent within the old naturalist tradition, is not competing, nor should it be competing, with the language of tough modern biology. On the other hand, there is not a single theorem in natural science that can undermine the reality of any person's wealth of spontaneous experience. But biologists have the precious privilege to be acquainted with certain worlds, and in a vital sense to feel at home in these worlds, largely outside the experiences of others—worlds of microscopic living beings, and of life processes that amaze us all. These are sources of joy and wonder that the biologists should be able to expose and communicate, not only in the form of textbooks, but also through the direct language of spontaneous experience.

Spontaneous experience is not limited to so-called pure sense experience. It has cognitive elements, elements of acquaintance and insight rather than of abstract knowledge. These must not be left unexpressed in the name of science. There may of course be biologists who suspect that an expert who uses spontaneous language is incapable of scientific rigor, but we should not neglect our linguistic abilities out of a fear of such misunderstandings. When biologists refrain from using the rich and flavorful language of their own spontaneous experience of all life forms—not only of the spectacularly beautiful but of the mundane and bizarre as well—they support the value nihilism that is implicit in outrageous environmental policies.

The high-level experts I asked to comment on the eight points of deep ecology answered in a way favorable to a remarkably strong conservation policy. But they answered a personal letter from me, and I guaranteed not to reveal their names. These experts and most others do not propagate

their strong views on conservation in public. Why? Here are some of my suggested reasons:

1. Time taken away from professional work.

2. Consequent adverse effects of this on promotion and status.

3. Feeling of insufficient competence outside their "expertise."

4. Lack of training in the use of mass media and in facing nonacademic audiences.

5. Negative attitude toward expressing "subjective" opinions and valuations, or violating norms of "objectivity"; reluctance to enter controversial issues.

6. Fear that colleagues or bosses think that they dabble in irrelevant, controversial fields, and that their going public is due to vainglory and publicity seeking.

7. Fear of fellow researchers, institution personnel, or administrations; fear of the stigma of being "unscientific."

For example, when Barry Commoner says "Nature knows best!" and explains what he means, some philosophers who like to be scientific tend, nevertheless, to class this as rubbish because nature, not being an organism, cannot "know" anything. For some of them, to speak of "destruction" is taken to be unscientific because ecosystems only *change*, man's interaction with the system being a factor of change on a par with all others. And one should not in serious discussion use a slogan such as "Let the river live!" because it affirms old superstitions of vitalism and animism. "Mysticism" is bad, they say; when somebody exclaims, "This place is part of me," and points to a place along a river, it is assumed to be nonsense from the strict point of view of logic and physics.

But why choose this very particular way of interepreting these exclamations? Let us recognize that whereas some terms and phrases are scientific and others unscientific, most are neither. That is, the context is such that the distinction is irrelevant. The expression "the life of a river" may be introduced in a scientific text by using the terminology of ecosystemics. And the slogan "Let the river live!" has had an important function in situations of social conflict. When biologists participate in such conflicts they generally use the language of social conflict as others do, but if challenged they should be willing and able to clarify their use of this language. They may point out that exclaiming "Let the river live!" does

not imply that the river is a biological organism, and that "Nature knows best!" does not imply that nature "knows" in the same sense as a person "knows." It is up to the challenger to justify the claim that there is a relation of implication.

What can be done to counteract the tendency to public silence among the experts who are in sympathy with strong conservation measures? Here are some suggestions:

1. Find them.

2. Listen to their explanations about why they are silent.

3. Find out whether they are willing in principle to expose their views publicly. If they are:

4. Help find suitable occasions at which they can enter public discussion, or:

5. Suggest themes of articles they can write or how they might add certain paragraphs to what they are writing. (We presuppose that they, as experts, touch upon problems of relevance to the intrinsic value of natural richness and diversity.)

6. Propose that they talk to their colleagues about the social and political issues discussed at their professional meetings.

7. Propose special sessions on these issues at their professional meetings.

In environmental conflicts today, deep motivation is necessary for dedication and persistence. Philosophical views encompassing ethical views are therefore relevant. The way we experience reality largely determines our ethical norms, including our environmental ethics.

What I have said so far is not meant to invalidate or make unnecessary narrow, utilitarian, short-range arguments. We need them in order to get things done. Let me end by mentioning an example of one such narrowly utilitarian proposal: There are wolves in many European countries. Controversies abound. Protection of all habitats is extremely costly and is often energetically fought against by the local communities affected. Recently wolf specialists have started to work out a plan for the conservation of wolves within the framework of a market economy. One simply tries to *sell* the idea that protection of wolves in large, thinly populated areas in many countries has local commercial advantages. Hunting, photography, and viewing safaris are recommended. The chorus of howling

wolves should be "sold" as nature's most intense, most wild wilderness experience. (Actually, musical composers are already studying and using the howling structure.)[9] An essential point is that the local population, not urban capitalists or the state, should earn the money. At least in this century, local people will shoot the wolves if they cannot make any money off them. The wolf specialist Ivar Mysterud, with whom I collaborate,[10] uses the term "experience product," and the source of the product is termed "experience resource." It is the idea of Mysterud and others that we must adapt to the prevalent market economy, and not rely indefinitely on public funds. Wolves require extensive territories, and in Europe there are no more large uninhabited areas. The fight against shrinking habitats must use commercialism as a regrettable but necessary means of our present age.

Is this a "shallow" solution? I have mentioned this in order to emphasize that "romanticism" and "cynicism" must be combined. By this I mean that philosophical or religious views, labeled romantic and sentimental by some, must be combined with what others will label cynicism and opportunism. But even the use of all these means may prove insufficient, and we may face the decision to give up protecting some wolf territories. There is much work to be done.

In short, biologists endowed with the necessary energy and enthusiasm should talk and act on the basis of a normative total view—what I call an *ecosophy*, or wisdom of household, not mere ecology, or knowledge of household. The biologists will combine philosophical, including ethical, fundamental positions with practical arguments. If they do this full of trust in doing the right thing, and without too many negative utterances against the opponents of strong conservation, they are unlikely to be hurt in their capacities as experts and scientists.

You know, Socrates was not popular among the Athenians. He pestered them, but in a way that made them respect him. That is all we can hope for as devoted conservationists: to be pests, but *respected* pests.

The Politics of the Deep Ecology Movement[11]

Some Key Slogans of the Deep Ecology Movement

By definition, what is called the deep ecology movement explicitly bases its activity upon philosophical or religious premises. These can differ considerably without disturbing the fairly uniform character of the aims of

supporters of the movement. I shall quote some statements typical of those environmentalists who support what is now often called deep ecology:

1. "Earth First!" This is a slogan expressing the opinion that the maintenance of the richness and diversity of life on our planet must be considered a first-priority goal. It supersedes the goal of a maximum number of people with a maximum standard of living. It supersedes any other goals but implies the maintenance of a population of humans sufficient for cultural diversity and a high quality of life. This is accepted because it is necessary for realization of the maintenance goal for the Earth itself.

2. "Why more than 100 million humans on Earth?" This rather rhetorical question is posed in order to make people familiar with the conception that the present number of humans has a tremendously negative impact upon conditions for life on the planet, and that a long-term plan for substantial reduction would not threaten life quality. Of course, the plan would have to be consistent with the basic rights of man *as a living being*, and never resort to crude coercion.

3. "An injury to where I belong is an injury to me!" This reminds us of the fact that the human self is a part of many gestalts. The skin is not our limit. Therefore the term "environment" is not popular among some supporters of deep ecology, because an environment may imply the separation of the organism from such, and does not foster such feelings of participation, identification, or expanded notions of the self.

4. "Animals, plants, and landscapes have intrinsic or inherent value independent of narrow human usefulness." This slogan is used to undermine the tendency to rely only on short-term, opportunistic economic and health arguments when supporting the fight against pollution, resource depletion, the extermination of species, the destruction of ecosystems and other calamities for long-run survival and well-being. The slogan is intended to make us fight also for the planet and its phenomenal qualities.

5. "Simple in means, rich in ends!" Human interference in the ecosphere can only be reduced to tolerable levels if people, and especially those of us in the industrial states, adopt lifestyles requiring simpler material means. This is compatible with, or even favorable toward, richness of goals.

6. "Increase the sensitivity to and appreciation of what there is enough of for all!" This instructive slogan fights against the confusion of real value

with market price: a way to maximize our ability to derive deep satisfaction from the goods of which there still are, or could be, enough. The present lifestyle of people in industrial societies cannot be a global lifestyle without irreversible and colossal destruction of the conditions of life on Earth.

7. "Mother Earth has no use for modern war!" Modern armaments and wars are ecological catastrophes. The peace movement is not only a movement on behalf of humans. Deep ecology embraces movements for disarmament and for nonviolent solutions of conflicts.

Philosophers of the deep ecology movement may be said to be people who never found biological, political, or other arguments that undermined those attitudes implicit in childhood, whereas those in the shallow environmental movement seem to have fallen sway to the times, letting narrow human interests dominate: Other beings are seen as beings only to be used, enjoyed, and managed by humans. From these hints about what supporters of deep ecology think and feel, I shall discuss some political aspects of the movement.

The Three Poles of the Political Triangle and the Limitations of Triangular Analysis

"Ecopolitics" is a widely used term in Northern Europe. Sometimes it is used synonymously with what I would call "good ecopolitics" or "responsible ecopolitics." I prefer to use it, like "ecophilosophy," as a fairly neutral term for "politics with reference to ecology" or "political aspects of ecological problems." Instead of "good or responsible ecopolitics" I use the term "green politics." There are five general points about green politics I would like to mention here:

1. One convenient way of naming main contemporary currents and parties in industrial countries is to present a political *triangle*:



It illustrates three main political poles. These colors are familiar symbols in European discussion.

Essential for supporters of green policies: to maintain and to show that they cannot be placed on the line between red and blue. A second dimension is needed. Roughly around 10 percent of Swedish and Norwegian voters feel at home around the green pole. Also essential: political abstractions such as green, red, and blue are dangerous if taken as being merely points. They are more like *magnetic* poles: dynamic pulls in more or less singular directions. They must be distinguished, then, from particular parties or platforms themselves, which are definable in relation to the poles.

So we can try circles:



If circles are used, they are overlapping. Most supporters of green politics see a greater affinity between green and red than between green and blue. But from a wide historic and systematic point of view it is prudent to let the circles overlap equally, rejecting any quantitative interpretation of the overlapping areas.

Examples of similarity between green and blue: stressing the value of personal enterprise (overlapping the blue private enterprise); very high priority of fighting bureaucracy. Similarity between green and red: stressing social responsibility; very high priority of fighting undesirable ethical, social, and cultural consequences of the unrestrained market economy.

Political parties can roughly be located within or along the borders of

the political triangle, more accurately (but still in a rough way, of course) in three dimensions, using an ordinary Cartesian coordinate system:



But the essential point here is that green is *not merely another point, circle, or dimension.* It is a dynamic wavelike force, an intuition or sudden realization that should affect all points along any shallowly conceived spectrum or frontier of political opinions. Hence the British Ecology Party makes it clear that its own existence will be rendered unnecessary by its success, as "all parties will in time become more or less ecological."[12] A quite ecological attitude about one's own existence!

So probably the most satisfactory diagram would be one that indicates clearly the more dynamic nature of the green influence upon the other two. We may see it as an axis, which pulls the others toward it as asymptotes:



2. Every political decision has green relevance; as a consequence, green parties must be big enough to have people well versed in each of the major issues. (No single politician can really be well informed on all.) It is not enough to take up the problems that people in general perceive as being typically ecological (nuclear energy, acid rain, etc.).

3. In industrial democracies, the supporters of green policies must keep track of how the politicians of the various parties talk *and vote* on specific matters, evaluating them as seen from the green outlook. Their ecology "score" should be widely publicized. The same holds true for party platforms, but experience, at least in Scandinavia, suggests that every party platform can look as if a responsible ecological policy is being taken seriously, while decisions may nevertheless turn out to be consistently ungreen.

4. A major part of political debate is today economic. In order to take part in it supporters of green politics should try to get a clear conception of the main factors of the economic system of their country and try to articulate how the system differs from a green economics.

One of the characteristics of green economics is the insistence of distinguishing need from demand on the market. The so-called need for more parking space is a demand that may or may not express a need. There is a need to work not far from home, but public transport may largely decrease the demand for parking space. Demand for luxurious foods in a starvation area is practically zero—there is no money available and no market. The maximum demand for foodstuffs is in the richest areas of the world—to feed animals or to fuel industry. But where is the need greatest?

5. People have reason to be suspicious about societies planning to implement green policies: do they not ask for still more regulations (laws, coercive rules, etc.) than we already have? The tame answer is "not necessarily!" But in order to avoid such, keeping down regulations must constantly be in the minds of organizers. A typically blue attitude? Yes and no: private industry is, in spite of its official "free and competitive" nature, shot through with regulations, mostly unknown to the general public, but no less coercive for that. The smaller unit industry of green societies will, because of less hierarchical power structure among other reasons, need less regulation. Much depends on change of mentality: the less change in the green direction, the more regulations.

If-Statements and Exponential Growth

Politicians suggesting the wisdom of radical green programs have sometimes been discredited as doomsday prophets. Through the mass media the public was, in the late sixties and early seventies, told that there were ecologists predicting catastrophe very soon. As nothing seemed to happen that fulfilled these prophecies, the public was placated.

No well-known ecologist has *predicted* a human-caused ecological catastrophe. By the term "ecologist" I here refer only to trained active researchers in ecology, and I limit my contention to published predictions. (What some ecologists may utter in private I do not pretend to know.) Therefore, it is not today a high priority to discuss political moves under immediate threat of ecocatastrophe. On the other hand, many well-known ecologists have predicted that *if* certain trends continue, destruction of gigantic dimensions will take place on our planet within a hundred years or less.

An example of such if-statements: "*If* the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, *then* the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years."

Other statements are of a much graver kind, *but still if-statements* and still with comments implying that we have not reached a "point of no return." An example: "Humanity will ultimately destroy itself if we thoughtlessly eliminate the organisms that constitute essential links in the complex and delicate web of life of which we are part."

Such statements are meant as warnings, and the authors most likely hope that action will be taken to change politics deeply so that they will not be realized as truths. Also politically significant are the predictions that the longer we wait before we start making radical changes, the more terrifying will be the necessary political and other means to reestablish planetary richness and diversity of life, including a decent human quality of life.

The doomsday terminology is the invention of *opponents* of the deep ecological movement. The same holds true for expressions like "zero growth." This is borrowed from demography and is rarely used by supporters of deep ecology today. They criticize the GNP calculations as basically misleading as they are used in blue economics, and still more as they are used in blue politics. Green politics cannot have as part of its

program the increase of GNP, which perhaps should be read as "Gross National Pollution." And there is no new measurable quantity, say "Gross National Life Quality," which could take over the role of GNP. The whole way of thinking that lays such weight on a single statistic is in question.

The frantic efforts to maintain economic growth in terms of GNP mean that, on the whole, damaging interventions in ecosystems increase exponentially rather than arithmetically. When a forest is reduced in an arithmetic way, life conditions tend to worsen in an exponential way when the area approaches zero. The difference between exponential and arithmetic growth cannot be overemphasized. If you place pages of paper on top of one another, and each page is one millimeter thick, you need 1,000 pages before you reach the thickness of 1 single meter. If, however, you fold a single piece of paper over and over again, then the thickness grows exponentially as the series 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, . . . which means you reach the thickness of a meter, more accurately of 1,024 millimeters, after only ten foldings, and a thickness of 1,048,576 millimeters, that is, a thin column of paper 1,048 kilometers high, after folding it only twenty times. The public needs to fully understand the *exponential character* of growth measured in percentage.

Politically the decrease of life quality in general is a theme that has been largely neglected. Attention has been concentrated on immediate health problems for humans and the economic loss through death of fish in hundreds of thousands of lakes, and, very recently, economic loss through dying forests. The shallow approach asks for acid resistant fish and trees, or questions the economic importance of fishing and forestry when compared with industry, or going as far as to say: "Why even have forests in West Germany if they are not compatible with the country's industrial growth?" The contribution of these forests to life quality is being neglected.

Checklist of Ecopolitical Issues

Questions: What is the proposed politics of x in regard to subject y?

x = a person, an institution, a nation, a group

y = any of the subjects listed below:

I. A. Politics of *pollution* of human environment

1. short versus long time perspective
2. local versus regional versus national versus global perspective
3. class aspect: local versus regional versus national versus global perspective

I. B. Politics of *pollution* of the habitat of other life forms
1. short versus long time perspective
2. local versus regional versus national versus global perspective
3. discrimination: favored versus unfavored life forms
4. politics related to specific species, ecosystems, landscapes

II. A. Politics of *resources* for humans
1. short versus long time perspective
2. local versus regional versus national versus global perspective
3. class aspect: local versus regional versus national versus global perspective

II. B. Politics of *resources* for nonhuman life forms
1. short versus long time perspective
2. local versus regional versus national versus global perspective
3. discrimination: favored versus unfavored life forms
4. politics related to specific species, ecosystems, landscapes

III. A. Politics of *population* of humans
1. short versus long time perspective
2. local versus regional versus national versus global perspective
3. class aspect: local versus regional versus national versus global perspective

III. B. Politics of *population* of nonhumans
1. short versus long time perspective
2. local versus regional versus national versus global perspective
3. discrimination: favored versus unfavored life forms
4. politics related to specific species, ecosystems, landscapes

These three classes of issues constitute the core of ecopolitical issues in a narrow, standard sense. The above list may be helpful. But there is a wider, and in my terminology, deeper sense in which ecopolitical issues also cover many

problems within traditional politics. In relation to I.A to III.B, green politics opposes the red, and especially the blue, in the following ways:

1. We have a long time perspective. We intimately feel that we are parts of an emanation of life where a million years is a short time. We are concerned with soils that can be destroyed in five minutes but that would take a thousand years to restore. We are unimpressed by short political election periods and reject the superstition that a few years of research and technical development can solve any major ecological problems of any kind. Nevertheless, we must be alert and try to anticipate the next moves of our governments, and main unecological agencies such as the so-called forest services or the Environmental Protection Agency in the United States.

2. Green politics combines local and global perspectives, trying to tone down the excessive role of national and international structures. What is known as "national identity" should be based on local communities. Interlocal communication largely supplants international. So-called assistance to the Third World, for instance by the organization The Future in Our Hands (see article by Dammann in this collection), is done through direct contact between local communities. It is difficult to avoid governmental institutions, but nearly a thousand global nongovernmental institutions have their seats in Geneva and can be used to facilitate interlocal rather than international contact.

Education will largely concern the local and the global. Green schools are available in many places today, but there are thousands of graduates who cannot find work along their preferred line. The public and the bureaucracy should come to realize the great value of the interdisciplinary education provided by such schools, and thus welcome their graduates heartily into many kinds of respectable employment positions.

The main arguments used in Norway when rejecting membership in the European Common Market (EEC) in 1972 were main-line ecopolitical (issues I.A and III.B). We rejected centralism endangering local and "peripheral" populations, forced worker mobility, increased competitiveness on the world market. We said no to the introduction of four times as many officially accepted medicines, and we said no to opening still wider our gates for immense European and multinational firms.

3. Green politics supports the elimination of class differences locally, regionally, nationally, and globally. The global aspect makes it clear that practically everyone in the rich industrial states belongs to the global up-

per class. This is easily forgotten by trade unions and by some Marxist/Leninists who still unilaterally focus on the liberation of the workers of their own country.

The core of class suppression may be seen basically as a cross-generational suppression of life-fulfillment potentials in relation to fellow beings, or in my terminology, possibilities for Self-realization.

The politically significant *green-red alliances* in Scandinavia use this name because green political issues are mostly conceived rather narrowly as comprising only issues I.A to III.B. Using such a narrow concept, a great many political problems seem to fall outside the green framework. But all political issues can be considered in a green way.

In order to finance ecologically important projects, supporters are dependent on private and public funding. This means that one has largely to give priority to projects that people with power or people with money think should have priority, and then hope that some of the money and equipment can be quietly put to work on projects that should have priority according to deep ecology. In short, politically accepted tactics must be taken seriously, however distasteful this may seem. Talk more about cancer, and dollar bills may come flying through your open window! The same is true for the fight against *easily seen* effects of pollution. Acid rain is now taken seriously in West Germany because an important pressure group, the owners of forests, discovered that they could *calculate* losses in terms of money, and because of the fact that more and more people could *see the trees dying* all around them.

The political function of science deserves to be mentioned. The belief is widespread that because of the scientists now working for governments, politics has become more scientific than in the days of Louis XIV. But there is little evidence to support this. In ecopolitics three main factors operate against scientific influence. First, politicians ask ecologically relevant questions that scientists find it impossible to answer except perhaps after long periods of large-scale research. So politicians conclude, "Science has *not* found it dangerous or detrimental to do so and so, therefore, why not do it?" Or, as in Britain today, the government says that the theory of acid rain destructiveness has not been scientifically *proven*, so let us postpone costly methods of control for at least five years.

The cautious language of some scientists (or philosophers) may always be used to postpone. Furthermore, the government knows that scientists do not always agree with each other. One can always find one or more scientists who do not publicly condemn unecological policies, and these

are then given power. For reasons already mentioned, saving spectacular animals gets better financing than saving more modest creatures that are more important for their ecosystems. Giant pandas and California condors are showpieces. It is estimated that recovery efforts to help the condor will cost twenty-five million U.S. dollars over the next forty years. Tactically, propaganda in favor of the spectacular may pay off, but tactics may go too far.

The recent effort in Australia to save toads crossing highways on their way to breeding sites by use of road signs shows the way to a more "democratic" and "egalitarian" ecopolitics. Philosophically the trend is remarkable.

Malthusianism

It is of crucial importance for the political Left's efforts to limit human populations to eliminate certain misconceptions about Malthusianism. It has two parts, one of which is acceptable and important from a green point of view, and one that is completely unacceptable.

The first part concerns food increases versus population increases. Let us say that there are one million people in a territory and let us suppose that they get food by cultivating one square kilometer—by truly fantastically "advanced" technology. Let us further assume that the population doubles very slowly, say every hundred years. Even then it is clear that the geometric (exponential) ratio of increase makes our planet overcrowded even after a small number of centuries. The number of square kilometers on Earth is finite! Malthus makes this important point considering the likely effects of "unchecked" population growth. Today human population is largely unchecked, and it would be a Herculean task to check it.

From theoretical demography Malthus jumps to social philosophy and politics. In order to understand Marx's hatred of Malthusianism, one must read Malthus's most extreme views: everyone must delay the establishment of his own happiness until, through his labor and savings, he has put himself in a situation where he can provide for the needs of his family. The man responsible for disobeying this injunction should rightly be punished even if this causes wife and children extreme suffering:

> To the punishment therefore of nature he should be left, the punishment of want. He has erred in the face of a most clear precise warning, and can have no just reason to complain of any person but himself when he feels the consequences of his error. All parish assistance should be

> denied him; and he should be left to the uncertain support of private charity.[13]

What also infuriated Marx was Malthus's talk about laws of nature and laws of God. Nothing could possibly eliminate poverty; misery was a scientific necessity!

The hatred of Malthusianism is worth mentioning because it may have indirectly led politically left parties everywhere to shun any talk of human population control by political means. In order to rationalize this negligence, which is so dangerous from a green point of view, the most improbable views about salvation through industrialization have been current in the Third World since the 1920s. In India, for example, it has until recently been common to point to the population density of England or Holland: population control was said to be unnecessary because "industrialization in these European countries shows that Malthus is wrong! The greater the population, the higher the standard of living for all!"

In Scandinavia and perhaps in all other rich industrial countries it would today be politically suicidal to propose plans for population reduction. From a green point of view there are, however, only two options: either a complete restructuring of economy and technology or population reduction. It is to be deplored that groups near the red poles in politics tend to neglect (human) population problems and that those near the blue pole forget that one more baby in the overdeveloped countries is a much graver ecological threat than one hundred more in the slums of Calcutta.

A person active in politics should try to make it clear to the public that he or she as a private person may entertain some views that are politically completely unrealistic to try to realize within election terms, but that nevertheless are important for his personal political motivation. The impact of continued population growth on conditions of life and on the ecosphere in general is intolerable and is still increasing geometrically. Even if it is *politically* suicidal to plan changes of this dimension as part of a political platform, it is irresponsible on the part of the politically active not to admit that they as private persons entertain these green views. If these views are hidden, the many people who do not play an active part in politics, but entertain radical green views, feel even more powerless than they are. They get the feeling that taking part in the struggle for power is incompatible with having green views.

The Rights of Living Beings

"Human rights" terminology has had a significant impact on politics that has been largely beneficial. Since 1945 minority groups in many countries have fought against discrimination and cruelty using rights terminology. As long as this has political impact it is advisable not to give up the expression "*animal* rights." The confusion about the term "rights" in philosophical and legal academic milieus does not constitute a decisive counterargument. At least in some countries the talk of rights of animals does not confuse people and is endorsed by the majority.

In a vast number of texts, the substitution "human and animal rights" or "ecosystemic rights" for just "human rights" improves the text significantly from the point of view of green politics. As an example, consider such a substitution in the last lines of the following quotation: "In this work, it is proposed to use *overpopulation* to refer to population sizes that exceed a country's or the world's capacity to provide adequately for the enjoyment of the basic human rights of all who are born into that country or the world."[14] In discussions this means that questions like the following are often relevant: You mean *exclusively* human rights? Why do you refer only to *human* rights? What about the rights of nonliving beings? The question is to some extent spurious if one adopts an expanded notion of the term "life," including the physical life of an ecosystem, the interaction of ecosystems, and the inherent life of the Earth as a whole. The highly successful slogan "Let the river live!" attests to the power of broad ideas of living that can cover landscapes, including mountains, lakes, and oceans.

But the use of the term "rights" may in some contexts be confusing. If so, it may be appropriate to eliminate it both in reference to animals and to humans.

The Deep Ecology Movement, the Peace Movement, and Their Campaigns

Fifteen years ago close cooperation between supporters of deep ecology and activists in the peace movement was out of reach. Rather suddenly this situation is totally changed. Nuclear war would be an ecological catastrophe, and no life forms except one are vitally interested in different political ideologies or big power rivalries. Even the present level of armaments with its exponential growth is a heavy burden ecologically. One

factor often overlooked is the mishandling, even torture of millions of animals in experiments involving nuclear radiation. These animals live through a nuclear war today. (This reasoning may sound ridiculous at present in the face of the other horrors of the modern world, but in ten years such thinking should be commonplace.)

Some of us, like myself, favor unilateral disarmament and establishment of unheroic nonviolent defense. Today it is politically unrealistic in northern NATO nations to work for getting out of NATO. This is not necessary, however. The basic documents of NATO establish it as a defense organization with no clauses against nonviolent defense. So, by promoting that sort of defense, we may probably be *pushed out* of NATO. Politically realistic is a gradual introduction of antinuclear and pro-nonviolent proposals within NATO.

At this point it is important for activists to stress the distinction between action, campaign, and movement. The first comprises the direct *actions* within a campaign, for instance a demonstration at a particular place and time against the building of a dam, or the nonviolent obstruction of the transport of the machinery on the way to the dam site. This may be part of a ten-year-old *campaign* to save a river (including of course its watershed) from development of some sort. Ten direct actions may be failures, but nevertheless their impact may contribute to the victory of the campaign (or may polarize the conflict, contributing to the failure of the campaign? That is what many antiactivists claim). The river campaign together with other analogous campaigns may be seen as part of a *movement* of greater or lesser generality. A movement to save rivers, or more generally a conservation movement. Many campaigns may be failures, but the movement goes on.

Politically it has been important to clarify that the highly successful antinuclear campaign (as part of the peace movement) is after all only a definite, limited campaign. Supporters of a more radical disarmament, or of nonnuclear politics of various kinds, should not try to force the campaign to widen or change its identity. One may take part in several campaigns, but the frequent attempts to change the antinuclear campaign to cover other goals are politically dangerous, leading to ruinous struggles among campaigners.

Ecology as Ideology?

Which are the political traditions or systems most likely to color green

politics—using the customary vague and ambiguous terms? Let me immediately admit that I feel uncomfortable when having to use those terms.

1. Reform or revolution? I envisage a change of revolutionary depth and size by means of many smaller steps in a radically new direction. This essentially makes me belong to the political reformists, I suppose? Scarcely. *The direction is revolutionary, the steps are reformatory.*

Of course what I as an individual think has not much weight, and I can only say that I do not feel at home with the thought that something resembling the revolutions we read about in history textbooks, or that we may wish would take place in South America, would be of help in the industrial countries.

2. Capitalism or socialism? While there may be said to be economic policies conveniently called capitalistic, there is hardly any capitalistic political doctrine. Socialism has such a doctrine, but is it sufficiently concerned with nature rather than its own bureaucracy?

3. Relation to communism and anarchism? Roughly speaking, supporters of the deep ecology movement seem to move more in the direction of nonviolent anarchism than toward communism. Contemporary nonviolent anarchists are clearly close to the green direction of the political triangle. But with the enormous and exponentially increasing human population pressure and war or warlike conditions in many places, it seems inevitable to maintain some *fairly* strong central political institutions. Recommendations such as that contained in the World Conservation Strategy are steps in the right direction, but there are no authorities strong enough to implement them.

Experience suggests that the higher the level of local self-determination, the stronger the central authority must be in order to override local sabotage of fundamental green policies. Or is this too pessimistic? Anyhow, the green utopias, such as those of Sigmund Kvaløy, Johan Galtung, The Future in Our Hands, Blueprint for Survival, much as the *panchayat* utopia of Gandhi, rarely provide for significant variation in occupation and social structure in general, nor do they seriously consider the need for centralized power as long as human mentality remains similar to what it is now. Local initiatives must be encouraged! There is a great difference between units of administration and self-motivated small groups of people.

Green Political Programs from Day to Day

My conclusion here is to remind us that we need not agree upon any definite utopia, but to thrash out limited programs of political priorities within the framework of present political conflicts. Our questions are of the form "What would be a *greener* line in politics at the moment within issue *x* and how could it be realized?" rather than of the form "What would be the deep green line of politics within issue *x*?" *Green is dynamic and comparative, never absolute or idealistic.*

The term "political voluntarism" is a term that may be helpful in this connection, as something to be wary of. It is a term characterizing political activity in which you think that you can rapidly force a deep change of society by sheer willpower through direct action. It was used, for instance, by Marxist criticisms of students engaged in the so-called student revolutions of the late 1960s. Some Marxists said that universities are peripheral institutions: "Power inside universities does not count." The *will* to change society by means of student power is nonsensical. You must have a much broader and more realistic basis of activity. In this sense, political voluntarism is a kind of romantic delusion.

Back to the problem of combining basic ideals of ecopolitics and day-to-day political fights for very, very limited green gains. An example may make the complicated situation clearer:

An energy problem exists in Norway and Sweden, but it is primarily the problem of how to reduce the fantastic *waste* of energy. It is a problem of how to essentially limit the use of energy to vital needs. From the green point of view the present level of yearly consumption is more than sufficient for any needs. Nevertheless some supporters of green policies take part, and should take part, in discussions concerning which sources of increased energy supply have the least detrimental consequences socially and for life conditions in general. The situation is rather awkward: the greens are led to promote decisions they detest. As long as we constantly make clear that any increase of energy production is unnecessary and detrimental, the participation in how to increase it is justified and important. At the moment policies of stabilization or decrease of energy production should be vigorously propagated, but politically they are dead or hibernating. Or proposals for such policies have no chance of being adopted at the moment. Presently politically powerful plans call for exponential increase of energy production until 2020. So if all available

alternatives are bad, this should be said, and the worst consequences should be fought strongly.

"Everything hangs together." This is still a good slogan. One consequence of the interrelatedness is that we all have the capacity to do something of relevance within a framework of our own interests and inclinations. The ecopolitical frontier is immensely long but we can only work effectively at one place at a time. It is more than long, it is multidimensional, and the pull of the pole of green-ness can be felt in all our political positions and actions.

Everything Really Important Is Dangerous[15]

A Discussion with Arne Naess

Q: *A frequent response to your whole approach is "Why is nature so important? How can an ecosophy address the real problems of the real people of the world? Is not environmentalism just an interest of the privileged?" How do you answer such skepticism?*

It cannot cover all problems, it cannot lead to all main global or local problems. But ecosophy T is more than an attempt to solve the basic ecological questions; it is a total view whose wording and terminology show inspiration *from* the science of ecology.

Q: *What is the content of this inspiration, other than "all things hang together"?*

For instance, you have basic terms such as symbiosis, complexity, and diversity, but otherwise . . . not much. Ecosophy T has moved away from this initial inspiration to become a total view, and, as such, it is much wider than any conception of ecology or the ecological crisis that could ever be commonly acknowledged.

Q: *If ecosophy T is so wide how do you expect people to believe in it or use it in a concrete way?*

I expect people to be inspired by it, and then they will find out that it is, of course, much wider than the ecological movement. And there Johan Galtung is one of my critics. He says, "Marvelous, your concept of ecosophy, but that will never be the usual concept." And I say, "OK, never mind." In the next century I may not talk about ecosophy T but have another terminology that has grown out of it, but is no longer inspired by the science of ecology.

Q: *But what are people supposed to do with this ecosophy T?*

They will change to some extent their way of thinking, and, I hope, their behavior, as well. Certain people already have ways of acting and attitudes such that they will feel at home in ecosophy T, but they might not be able to articulate them.

Q: *Should they?*

No, not all, that is a professional affair. But they will read it and find that it may confirm their existing attitudes and behavior and come to understand more about themselves, confirming all their existing attitudes and behavior; which may be much more consistent than my attitudes and behavior, so I would say, "Ah, you are an ecosopher of a higher standard than I!" But I have my professional training and the desire to articulate such things.

Q: *But one thing in ecosophy T that is different from similar systems is that you keep saying, "This is ecosophy T. Do not take it at face value, but use it as a guide for formulating your own, say ecosophies X, Y, or Z." What does that mean exactly? What do you really expect people to do?*

If they have philosophical training, to sit down and try to diagram their norm and hypotheses structures. Some have tried to formulate ecosophies with a Christian basis. I pushed Sigmund Kvaløy to work out something that resembled the diagram of ecosophy T.

Q: *But was it useful to him? Has it helped him?*

No. Not much . . . maybe. Ask him. Maybe yes, to some extent. Yes! Anyhow, I had, ten years ago, the optimism to think there would be other ecosophies, that is to say, other total views also inspired by the science of ecology.

Q: *And using your method of articulation and derivation?*

No, but to which I would say, "Oh sure, this is an ecosophy; it's a total view, it's all there, but it's so totally different from mine, and I am so glad."

Q: *And you found these?*

No. On the other hand, looking back, say in 2001, I might say, if I live: "Aha! There was ecosophy T, and now there are many others!"

Q: *What would make them distinct?*

Well, I, for example, start with Self-realization, and I use a deductive method, and a lot of techniques borrowed so to say from the analytical streams in philosophy, *plus* my approach to semantics and my use of model thinking. It is natural for some people with similar total views not to use these methods, and on the whole people who, according to me,

would *belong* in ecosophy may have a background quite dissimilar to mine.

Q: *What about all the people who start with religious beliefs, or ideological beliefs—do you dissociate them from this type of thinking? Are these not total views as well?*

Of course not, but very few even attempt to *articulate* verbally these views. In principle, an articulated total system includes ontology, methodology, semantics, epistemology, and ethics.

Q: *Well, in spite of such requirements, you use the term "ecosopher" quite frequently, calling people ecosophers all the time. Does this mean that they all have such a philosophy?*

Yes, that is an ambiguity which I have tried to straighten out. I distinguish between a philosophy and a philosopher, so I distinguish between an ecosophy and an ecosopher. For instance, here in rural Norway you might find some very wise people, and if you talk to them you see that they have been considering all aspects of life and have a clear total view, but the verbal articulations are scarce and often more poetic than systematic. Some of these people I would certainly call philosophers, and if they have an ecosophic view in mind they will be ecosophers, without having an articulated ecosophy. There are many ecosophers, but few have made an ecosophy.

Q: *Should more people be making them?*

First of all there should be *even more* ecosophers. And I truly hope there will be more ecosophies, because many people do not feel at home in my traditional analyticity and method of logical derivation, so they read into my book and find it strange that they do not feel at home. There's one Czech-American philosopher named Kohák.[16] He could easily, I think, write a book which would lead me to say, "This is an ecosophy!" and it would look very different from mine.

Q: *So what exactly makes something an ecosophy?*

It would have to be a kind of philosophical or religious background which could lead to the Eight Points.

Q: *All of them? Some of them? Just them and nothing else?*

Perhaps not exactly as they are presently written, but all of them. This is the simplest answer. But that would be too narrow, probably. It would have to have as a central theme the relation between man and nature and consider man/nature to be an integrated whole.

Q: *It would have to have that as a conclusion?*

Perhaps, but I do not easily see ecosophies as having conclusions. There might be philosophies inspired by ecology that would not in any way imply the Eight Points, which I might not call ecosophies. *There should be wisdom, but it must be related to action.* That holds for "conclusions" also. The term "ecosophy" is a term very much alive, for me, and therefore the nuances of its meaning will not be completely constant. Saying that it is a "total view inspired by the science of ecology" is only the least precise way of saying it.

Q: *But didn't you say earlier that it is not really that anymore?*

Yes. Since I have been strongly engaged in the ecological movement, it is now more inspired by that movement than by the science. What I am driving at now would more loosely connect the term with the syllable "eco." Ecosophy would then include the maxim "all things hang together," the notion of household covering man's relation to the rest of living beings, but in a more vague fashion. If I continue to say that it should be inspired by ecology then there may be ecosophies which I dislike extremely—total views inspired by the science but with aspects that I would have to *fight*: say the idea of "lifeboat ethic" offered by Garrett Hardin and others. They still retain Cartesian dualism, man separate from nature.

Q: *What of those who advocate the phenomenological approach? Some have pointed out that this leads to a nature structured entirely by humanity through our free will. They see the notion of "organic systems" as something entirely structured by man. Might such a criticism be applied to your method as well?*

Well, this is closer to my way of thinking than Hardin, but I see classical phenomenology as a kind of idealism, that is to say: you take the perceptual world with man doing the structuring in a Kantian or Husserlian sense. Through my notions of "concrete contents" I have tried to get the best out of phenomenology *plus* the best in realism, thus saying that basically reality is tremendously wider than any possible conception by God or Man, avoiding this Berkelian or Cartesian phenomenology.

As regards to organic systems, I am wary of the fact that through all the nineteenth century this was related to *totalitarianism*, to Hegel, and also to some uncritical vitalism of a very crude kind. So "organic" is to me underestimating on the whole the extreme importance of the concept of the individual, of living beings. Consider the decisive moment in the trial of Gandhi, when the prosecution asked, "But would there not be anarchy if the individual ultimately always had to say what was right?" To

which he replied, "No. The individual is the supreme consideration." Perhaps this is too extreme, but I am at least afraid of the organic systems approach because of history. There are two sorts of mysticism: in one of them you get completely absorbed in something much bigger than you, an organic whole or God, but on the other hand there is the mysticism you find in Spinoza, which tries to retain, after all has passed, the individual.

Q: *And that is why you use the term "Self-realization"?*

Yes.

Q: *People are likely to say that this logic of identification is so self-centered: "Is Naess not preaching self-centeredness?" How do you react to that?*

Well, I do want to sound provocative. I try to appeal to something that is today in practice extremely dominating, that is the ego—the ego trip, the atomization of humankind, each for him- or herself.

Q: *But you want to move beyond that?*

Sure, but it is not a direct motion. I never go from egoism to altruism. I change the concept of the Self. You never need any kind of altruism as opposed to egoism, you merely need to develop your self. Your self is a structure that is in continuing development and change. You may start in a sense very egoistic as a child, but later you get sorrowful because of others, your self becomes a social self and from there you move to the metaphysical Self, with a capital *S*, the Atman, with which you really identify.

Q: *And you see this as a clear progression?*

Well, in a sense, children may be closer to identification with nature in an immediate way than most adults, but there is a progression of understanding and unfolding that one can follow.

Q: *Is the path so linear? Is being a social self always on the way to this other Self, or does one simply go off in another direction?*

Many digress, I am sure. You saw many officers, on the German side of the Second World War, saying, "Through my oath I must *identify* with the Führer, so I cannot do anything unethical if I follow him." You had a self widened in the direction of the state.

Q: *So some might say, "this is a very dangerous sort of philosophy you have here!"*

Yes. Everything really important is dangerous, so that's OK.

Q: *What about those who say, "Yes, I agree with what Professor Naess is*

saying, but before I solve the world's problems I must solve my own problems?"

Well, that kind of conception has been a big problem for me because Erik Dammann, from the start of The Future in Our Hands, has used this phrase "start with yourself" as if it was a start *in time*. But when I talk with him he agrees with me—that it is not really a start in time but a kind of eternal starting point, that this idea of change must be *your* thought, not someone else's. But he never thought that by introspection or meditation alone you could get to widen yourself in this Western society of ours. You widen yourself through getting into trouble, no, rather by cooperating with others in a social and political context, where the actions themselves require identification, where it is advantageous to have a large self.

I think, then, that you have to go through social and political action to widen yourself in a satisfactory way and thus change society. Look at the bodhisattvas of Mahayana Buddhism: they meditate a lot but they end up back in society, selfless. That means egoless action. As Gandhi became a leader of India he lost his own ego: when he was asked for his political opinion, he answered from the point of view of India, and not only the current India but the India of all eternity. He was not hindered by any partisan religion or ego. This is a selflessness that realizes the Self with a capital *S*.

Q: *Some have said that all that you are saying is so vague that it can be interpreted any way. What have you to say about this "purposeful vagueness"?*

If something is vague and open to many interpretations and precisations, it leads to discussion and gradual elimination of uninteresting interpretations. And that is the most we can hope for any honest philosophy in today's world. It can become well known, and may have an influence. Within existentialism, Zapffe is not so well known because he is too precise. His ideas are so disturbing, humorous, and tough, but they are clear. But Sartre is so vague and provocative in his rhetoric that he commands much more attention. There is a lot of this in science, too. We see it more and more.

The vagueness in my ecosophy is due in part to the difficulty of articulating intuitions about the universe. It is continuously creating. Self-realization has been chosen as a rhetorical way to get people to say where they stand. I needed nothing more than intuition to choose it. I held to it. After twenty years, it is clear that it was worthwhile. Intuitions need not

be precise. They are the basis of visions. And we do not criticize visions. They excite people. They are what stimulates people.

Q: *So how do you move from vagueness through precisation?*

Let me give an example of what I mean by precisation, since the concept so often causes misunderstandings. At the vaguest level, T_0, we have the sentence, "I was born in the twentieth century." The next more precise level, T_1, would have to *clarify* this information, clear up possible misunderstanding. For instance, T_1 might be, "I was born in the twentieth century after the death of Christ." On the other hand, to say, "I was born in 1912" is not a precisation. It is an elaboration: more information is given on the situation, not the utterance itself. The process of precisation contributes to an increase in the richness and diversity of meanings of single utterances. This is the essence of my approach to semantics.

Now Self-realization, like nonviolence, is a vague, and T_0, term. People are frustrated that I can write an entire book upon an intuition that is nowhere defined or explained. It is tantalizing for our culture, this seeming lack of explanation. We do not accept the mode of the seer in academic circles. But if you hear a phrase like "all life is fundamentally one," you must be open to *tasting* this, before asking immediately, "what does this mean?" Being more precise does not necessarily create something that is more inspiring.

For example, Pascal jumped up from his sleep and shouted, "Feu!" Then "Dieu!" Then "Dieu d'Abraham et Isaac!" . . . narrowing successively. Precisizing? At the beginning we share in the inspiration. Pascal, though, becomes a bad example in the sense that he got *caught in a specialism*, moving from the fire to a very particular notion of a God, excluding all others. But Self-realization is certainly not *that* kind of vision. There is at the outset something essential: for life, by life. But there must be an arrow. A direction, starting from the self. It is a direction I can say yes to ethically. We may call it a vector, or a tensor—in tremendous but determinate dimensions.

Q: *But why not just start your system with a norm of "Life!"?*

Because I don't think I could derive any ethics from "Life!" Aldo Leopold believed that "what is good is what is good for the manifold of life." I could not agree with that. There are things in life that I cannot say yes to. Some types of parasites, for example. A successful parasite is one that lives in a symbiotic relationship with its host. They both benefit in some way. An unsuccessful one is one that destroys the host.

Q: *Unsuccessful from the host's point of view, at least. Or the human ethical view in general? Can we say there is objective cruelty in nature?*

Nature is not brutal [contrast to Galtung article—ED.], but from a human point of view (and that's my point of view), we do see brutality. As we see yellow in the sun. As we see these fantastically blue mountains outside this window.

There is a kind of deep yes to nature that is central to my philosophy. What do we say yes to? Very difficult to find out—there is a deep unconditionality, but at the same time there is a kind of regret, sorrow, or displeasure.

Through Self-realization I have the freedom to combine life fulfillment with ethics. I see an unconditional "cult of life" as being unethical. It is that strand that led in part to Nazism: You read nature in a certain way. You see the lions and their prey. You analogize to humans. A hierarchy emerges, with systems, totems, of power. You begin to say yes to brutality. Yes to exploitation. And among the humans, yes to sadism. One must be very careful, then, if one is to use "Life!" as the center of an ethic. It would have to be a conception of life broad in some areas but narrow in others.

Q: *Is it wise to define Self-realization as well, to avoid such misconceptions?*

Well, we can attempt to formulate a *conjunction definition*, like the list of norms characterizing nonviolence that appears at the end of my book *Gandhi and Group Conflict* (1974). This is a list of norms that the action must satisfy if it is to be considered nonviolent. "X is nonviolent if it satisfies norms Nl, N2, N3, N4, etc." To make any progress we must use the concept of *potential*. Let us first consider the idea of potential in evolution. How can we predict what comes next? How do we know which potential route is worth following? We cannot know, but all opportunities must be kept open. From the original concept of Atman, one's realization requires the realization of others.

I speak of Self-realization potentials. It must be clear that an individual has many potentials of this type. Perhaps it is better if I say potentialities; or simpler, possibilities; or simplest maybe, paths. You can do many things, there are many paths you can take. And there is no need to choose only one. Choices. Opportunities. Many of these possibilities are not realizable in our current world, which in some ways makes a business out of reducing the number of potentials.

Now with this in mind, let us attempt a conjunction definition of Self-realization: "X fulfills one of an individual's Self-realization paths if

1. it is realizing a capacity of that person,
2. it is nonviolent, and
3. it is an instance of activeness as defined by Spinoza.[17]

Q: *Should it also further symbiosis?*

No. No, much too strong to be part of a definition. We see that there are good and bad types of symbiosis—remember the parasites. Also, an individual can become strung out, too dependent on others. It leads to idealistic socialism.

Q: *How about furthering a particular kind of symbiosis?*

Yes, furthering the successful kind of symbiosis is a consequence of wider identification: you may lose your immediate peace of mind, but you learn. It is a tricky conceptual wilderness you enter into, moving from (1) me, to (2) Atman, to (3) God, or, better, Deva, the notion of certain powers greater than human beings. But fear not: *you still keep your individuality*, because of the diversity norm.

At the same time as we accept this vector of Self-realization moving through "Life!," there is an inherent goodness in the *mangfold*, in diversity, which is absolutely "unreasonable" in a sense. Parmenides would say to hell with this diversity!

Here the intuition somehow declines—this traditional intuition of God, losing yourself—you see, however far you get you are still you! Here I must acknowledge diversity: others are still there. But yet it is more than necessary, it is somehow a fantastically good thing! But I don't know how I can justify that.

Q: *Some have pointed out that it is easier to justify a norm of* complexity *(Kvaløy) that explains the meaningful interactions of nature in a single word. How do you react to this?*

Yes, we can use the word "complexity" in two ways: (1) as a term that to some extent covers richness and diversity, (2) as a normative idea: the more interdependence, the more interrelationship. I favor the second. For instance, we have the following six activities that are part of a healthy existence (in no particular order, and by no means comprehensive):

1. meaningful work
2. making love

3. entertainment
4. life in nature
5. religion
6. friends

In our present society such things are usually kept separate. But if we could integrate them, that would be complexity. But, however defined, "complexity" cannot do what "Self-realization" does.

Q: *So there seems to be a quality of interdependence involved in complexity. Could one make an analogy to the concept of a strong gestalt, where a gestalt is stronger the more its parts are dependent upon one another for the realization of the gestalt form? Could you then use the notion of symbiosis as a name for this interdependence?*

No. Again there must be a sense of positive mutuality in this dependence. Look at the relationship between cancer cells and our health. Symbiosis must be seen as interdependence with mutual benefit or enhancement. Mere interdependence may be satanic—as in a "monolithic" state!

But the gestalt analogy is helpful in the sense that meaninglessness can be expressed as a lack of gestalts in which we are participating. You cannot say structures themselves are meaningful or meaningless. It has to do with us, as both observers, participants, and perhaps creators of the structures.

Q: *This discussion seems to show that there is a danger in making use of such terms as "complexity," "diversity," and "symbiosis," which people think they understand. Readers quickly abstract from your usage of the terms to their own ideas, or own precisations, of what the meanings are. Is this "plausible interpretation," or misinterpretation?*

Yes, the danger exists, but there is also a danger in using completely new terms. What it really shows is that people are so enshrouded in their own thinking that they do not give others the care that they should. I am of course no exception! For instance, in my article on concrete contents,[18] I discuss the notions of object, subject, and media, and it is clear that no actual qualities of reality correspond to any of them separately. We have to look elsewhere, in our own perceptions and apprehendings.

Q: *So can there not then be complexity in our present society?*

Yes, "a city" as an object does not exclude complexity, or the possibility of a lifestyle that would fit my criteria for complexity. Kvaløy has in-

troduced complication as a negative term, complexity as a positive. For me, a "complexity" is neutral if separated from symbiosis and diversity.
Q: *Then why is diversity so clearly a plus?*

Ah . . . it is a special kind of diversity. The potentials of Self-realization are diverse, so the increase of potentials requires qualitative increase, a diversity characterized by qualitative difference. Not quantitative. Being one single planet, our structures are limited. We need intimate interactions of a noncoercive kind. Let us use the example of Robinson Crusoe: if there are two people stranded on a desert island, it is hoped and is so much better that they find each other and work together.
Q: *And two philosophers both living alone in huts on the same mountain? Should they be sharing a hut?*

That would be a very difficult way of living. Ha, ha. Well, let us say that these philosophers, Robinson Crusoe and Friday, should at least acknowledge each other, and benefit from each other's existence.
Q: *OK—but if I now say "maximize diversity!" according to the system of Professor Naess, this means I should ask for more and more different kinds of trees on that mountainside over there, while it is clear that according to nature only three or four species are appropriate.*

Well, you don't start from scratch. Realizing diversity requires first a description of the universe, and in that description you see there are important natural limitations. My notion of maximization of diversity does not exist in isolation from the other parameters. A natural balance develops between those qualities we wish to maximize.
Q: *So there are limitations to complexity and symbiosis as well?*

Of course. There should not be more interactions for their own sake. And I cannot say maximize symbiosis—that's too socialistic. In many cases it is better for A to help himself rather than be helped by another.
Q: *Are there limitations for the Self?*

I don't know. I haven't felt the need to establish them.
Q: *You have provided only the outlines of an ecosophy. Where is the substance, or the details?*

Yes, what I publish is very thin. What do you expect?
Q: *Are you not after depth?*

Well, yes, but it's painful to think deeply. It is painful to be a philosopher. *If it is good, it has to hurt.* I cannot see how there can be any pleasure in philosophy, when compared with music, zoology, etcetera.

With these Eight Points I may be inviting others toward this pain, or I may be lessening it a bit by making it unnecessary for them to start from

scratch. It is really a social and political goal I have in mind, namely that it should be possible for those who have their own points of view to find that they are, after all, thinking in very *similar* ways to certain others: not to force difference, not to show that they are better than the others. They can come together on certain actions, campaigns, and movements. They may not need a special political party but at least a more integrated movement than today.

Q: *What do you think today about your distinctions "shallow" and "deep" that have been so publicized?*

Well, difficulties continue to crop up there. Sometimes I join Warwick Fox, who uses the terms deep ecology versus reform ecology.[19]

Q: *But clearly in so many of your writings you advocate reform rather than revolution?*

No, no. Revolution I advocate in the Gandhian sense, that is, nonviolent revolution.

Q: *But do you expect nonviolent revolutions to occur in the developed nations?*

No. I don't expect it. So I am, I suppose, on the side of that which is mostly called reform.

Q: *Doesn't that make you shallow?*

No, because by reform I mean . . . ha ha, you are right. But one thing is the goals, the other is the means. In the sense of the means, I am a reformist; in the sense of the goals, I am a revolutionary. The goals are revolutionary in the sense that deep changes are demanded. The means are reformist in the sense that they are not proclaiming sudden change but a change in stages.

Q: *You have said that revolutionary goals cannot be accomplished by "shallow reforms in our current system, a total change is necessary."*[20] *What kind of change is it and how are we going to get it?*

Well, it has happened in world history that there has been very deep change within a short time without violent revolution. Look at what has been happening recently in Eastern Europe—of course its end is still not known. I am driving at something that should happen fairly rapidly.

Q: *But how?*

By the means I have pointed out. I say "the frontier is long." I have specified different organizations: Friends of the Earth, The Future in Our Hands, the academic philosophers, the direct action people, and some within the establishment.

Q: *But isn't there a danger of those on the frontier just communicating along the frontier, and losing track of all the rest of us? "Preaching to the converted" is a commonly heard criticism of the deep ecological movement.*

All movements start as minority movements. But those who preach to the converted, who write in sectarian newsletters, also contribute, in their daily lives, outside the converted milieus. One cannot ignore the fact that in our modern world information spreads at a tremendously rapid rate. More is known than ever before about the unsatisfactory condition of our planet. People are realizing the great importance of continually asking the question, Why?

Q: *But why ask questions this way? Why continue to ask people "why?" and bring them to the roots of their beliefs? Are you then not just confronted with the common paradox of a contradiction between ideals and action? Is that not what the harsh realities of our world demand?*

Well, people too often act only upon third- or fourth-level norms. It is useful to reveal the contradictions that this brings. Look at the attention caused by Gunnar Myrdal's *The American Dilemma*[21] when it came out in the middle of this century. He pointed out clauses in the American Bill of Rights and compared them to the actualities of life in the United States, such as the way black people were treated, and suggested that the Constitution should be revised if it were really to serve as an accurate source of norms. People took notice! We can get people to quote ideals in practice, and then the public will realize that all decisions come from people, and these people have values and beliefs like anyone else, and if they feel trapped by the system or driven to work in ways contrary to their basic norms, the public should know this and will come to understand more and more that the system must be changed.

Self-portrait (the ecophilosopher) (*Sigmund Kvaløy*)

Chapter 4

Sigmund Kvaløy

Sigmund Kvaløy has been called, with no exaggeration, Norway's leading environmentalist.[1] For the past twenty-five years there have been few ecological maelstroms he was not somehow mixed up in, and the ideas, protests, and organizations he initiated have permanently changed the face of Norwegian ecopolitics. Determined to integrate philosophical thought and political action, Kvaløy confounds those who would make a neat distinction between the theory and practice of ecophilosophy.

Kvaløy's involvement with ecophilosophy and ecopolitics began shortly after taking his philosophy degree with a dissertation on communication theory and electronic music. Shortly thereafter, encounters with the concrete canyons of New York City (where he had been offered a fellowship in the philosophy of music) and the parasol-ridden, pollution-strewn beaches of the Mediterranean (where he was vacationing) woke him up to the ecosocial crisis that was bred and revealed in such environments. He returned to Norway and took a position as a researcher first at the University of Oslo's Institute of Philosophy and later at the Zoological Institute. There he began working on the philosophical and ecological ideas that were to form a basis of his ecophilosophy.

Despite this academic coloring, Kvaløy's philosophical style, liberally sprinkled with personal anecdotes, reveals a more piebald background. His childhood on a rural farm gave him glimpses of the satisfying cultural

life that could be built around nature's rhythms. But more than the peaks of the surrounding mountains, Kvaløy's heart was in the rivers that flowed between them. And saving them from imprisonment by hydroprojects has been the focus of his ecoactivism. "What I have been convinced of," he writes, "is that running water in the landscape seizes human society and the minds of its individual members in a more decisive, creative manner than is generally recognized . . . down there, on the river, our existence begins."[2]

On the opposite extreme, Kvaløy's military service as an aircraft mechanic gave him firsthand experience of hierarchical organizations trying to render man and nature static and controllable. The difference between those two environments was for Kvaløy a good example of the distinction between "complexity" and "complication." While complexity is a characteristic of organic, qualitatively changing systems, complication is a result of mechanistic systems that try to stop time. A society in harmony with nature would be complex, while our modern Western society is dangerously complicated. This distinction is found in all his thought.

Kvaløy's colleague Nils Faarlund has called Sigmund a "Buddho-Marxist," and it is not hard to see why. Kvaløy has traveled many times to a particular valley in the central Himalaya, and his experience living with the villagers comes out in the priority he places on a Buddhist sense of time and of the self. His (and E. F. Schumacher's) concept of "meaningful work," on the other hand, has obvious roots in Marxist thought. Moreover, Kvaløy resembles his dialectical forerunner in his conviction that the modern West's social and political patterns are recipes for ecocatastrophe—a self-contradiction that will not resolve itself except through conflict. There is no use trying to hide this; compromises only too often serve the very social structures one is trying to replace. And like Marx, Kvaløy believes that academic descriptions of the problem are useless unless translated into action.

Action itself, in fact, can be the best teacher of what society is really all about. The kind of experience gained through just trying something, Kvaløy believes, is worth a month of Sundays in a seminar. Thoughtful analyses and careful planning are still prerequisites for successful actions. But his suggestion that we "jump into the stream" of things to see where it leads is a healthy antidote to an academic reluctance to move until one is sure one has all the answers.

Kvaløy takes an admitted delight in throwing himself into the fray—a vestige, perhaps of the Viking berserker. During his "fireside chats" on

Norwegian radio he will unabashedly say things that are certain to provoke representatives of opposing worldviews. The resulting discussion, he believes, can prove fruitful. He has not, however, stopped at discussion. He took the initiative in 1969 to form the activist group (snm), which was one of the most active and influential environmental organizations over the next decade. He was central in planning the Mardøla demonstration, which was of deciding significance for the course of Norwegian ecopolitics.

But the Mardøla waterfall was lost to hydropower. And the picture of policemen bearing Kvaløy away from the protest shows a man much more disgruntled than the cheerful snapshot of Arne Naess. Although he is an adherent of Gandhian nonviolence, Kvaløy does get frustrated. He has gone so far as to advocate the use of dynamite against construction machinery, something in the spirit of the American Earth First! movement:

> People's will to defend themselves doesn't concern only their country, but also their living environment. . . . One has to defend what one feels close to. . . . We must get away from the idea that the dividing line between violence and nonviolence lies at the use of dynamite. *Yet no living thing should be harmed*—not even a blade of grass. If dynamite helps life to flow again where it has been stopped, this would be a truly nonviolent use of explosives, really a peace-promoting use of Alfred Nobel![3]

In fact, it was partly in solidarity with an Icelandic group who blew up a dam (and saved their river) that Kvaløy and several others sailed two small Viking-style fishing boats from Norway to Iceland in 1974. The close communication required among the crew to handle these boats also inspired Kvaløy to model the individual as a bundle of diversely talented personalities, separated from themselves and from other individuals only by a "semipermeable membrane."

Encouraging not only others to cultivate their inner diversity, Kvaløy himself lives in two worlds: in 1981 he took up residence on his mother's family farm in mid-Norway, close to a river and close, in spirit, to his childhood. He took the last name "Sætereng" (meadow home) after the farm, and tries his best to shift between the life of a farmer concerned about his potatoes ("a fantastic plant!") and the life of an ecophilosopher concerned with the world. "To be able to do this," he says,

> I have to build a bridge between the farmer and the urban-educated activist. I have hit upon some tricks to facilitate this, like turning on the radio and listening to London or Moscow or New York, pouring myself a dram of imported bourbon instead of the local beer—these are pleasant things, so they move me softly onto the bridge. Piece by piece, my other personality falls into place.[4]

The ability to swim in very different currents, he maintains, is proof against being drowned by the opposition. To have ready to hand a wealth of talents, to be a "super-amateur," is the best method to win against a standardized, specialized society that seems bound willy-nilly toward collapse.

Kvaløy emphasizes the *conflicts* involved in staying this course more than other deep ecologists do. But in spite of his occasional frustration, Kvaløy describes the environmental struggle in Norway as a qualified success. Because, while actions are the best way to "learn environmentalism," the success of an action is not measured only by its short-term results. Rather, "it is the direction in which the action sets out, and pulls other actions along with it, the power to create such actions, and this direction stands in clear contrast to the destructive processes in the world we want to overcome."[5]

Complexity and Time: Breaking the Pyramid's Reign

Ecophilosophy Reflecting Ecopolitics: Time for a New Effort

Modern ecophilosophy started some twenty-five years ago. For a brief spell, some bright ideas were launched in various countries. Since then, there has been a lot of action, but very little philosophical movement. But we have reaped a good deal of experience through ecopolitical activity. We need now, after all that experience, to sit down and do ecophilosophy again, to philosophize under direct influence of the reaped experience. Otherwise, we'll keep on making unnecessary, sometimes very serious mistakes—even moving in the wrong direction.

Of course green philosophers have been at work during this period, but they have generally not been the people of concrete political action; that is why—in my view—so few viable ideas have appeared. The socio-ecological crisis of our time is throwing us through something completely unprecedented: it is global, and it is deeper and more uprooting than most people—even among the greens—have imagination to grasp. A few

The One and the Many (Sigmund Kvaløy)

generalist studies give us hints to that effect (specialists, of whom there is an overabundance in the world, are misleading instead of enlightening here).

We need very much to develop a viable new paradigm, a new world picture, or rather a new mode of perceiving, thinking, and living, maybe a new myth. The need is for something we can base our action on, something that will give us a collective strength at least equal to the security with which our opponent, an Industrial Growth Society, operates.

In relation to the kind of crisis we face, most of the ideas I have seen during the last decade are too conventional, meek, and conservative, more suited to hide than to expose and therefore sometimes dangerous. I don't know if I have made any beginnings toward a new breakthrough, but it is up to all of us to make a try and to have faith in the attempt. In any case, I have seen how some of the thoughts I and several others expressed in the sixties have been invalidated by what we have run up against ecopolitically in the intervening years.

Through all of our political actions in Norway we worked on a new philosophy of society and man-in-nature. Actually, the organization we developed (which I describe later) required that the participants do both. From 1969 we called our way of thinking *ecophilosophy*: "Love for the Wisdom of the World House." We produced many definitions of ecophilosophy. But since the stress in ecophilosophy is on activity and the persons involved in ecophilosophy, I will here reproduce the version that is in keeping with that, which means that rather than defining ecophilosophy, we define "ecophilosopher."

An ecophilosopher is one who occupies her- or himself with the following kinds of pursuits, never forgetting their interrelatedness:

1. Studies of the global ecosocial system and local subsystems and of humans and human groups as dynamic entities at various depths of complex integration with that system, with the latter conceived of as a self-regulating macro-organism in interplay with matter and energy; awareness focused particularly upon relationships of process, communication, and structural shifts.

2. In this study, trying to use all human faculties—intellect, sensitivity, feeling, intuition, and practical experience—to grasp and integrate consciously as much as possible the total network of interdependencies and the dynamisms of the life process, so that these insights and sensibilities may be, among other things, directed toward

3. a critical evaluation of the relevant scientific, technological, and economic/political views and regimes, their basic assumptions and their

impact on human attitudes and activities, as well as on their relation to nature and to human society, and toward

4. the formulation of values, norms, and strategies pertinent to the strengthening of the dynamic steady state or "homeorhesis" (I prefer the latter concept, which is the British geneticist C. H. Waddington's, since it is more in keeping with our process perspective; more on that later) and the continuing growth of the "organic complexity" of the total ecosocial system, and the formulation of criticism of values, norms, and procedures that tend to weaken homeorhesis and to stunt that growth.

Ecophilosophy is here conceived of as something more than an academic discipline in the traditional sense. It is thought of as a total engagement. It should strive to be as wide in scope as the attack on the life strength of the ecosystem and human society is today. Ecophilosophy is a form of activity and a direction of thought that appears as something not freely chosen but as a necessity—a response required by the total system crisis we are experiencing in the world, challenging us to attempt a deep-level revision of the basic notions of our Euro-American civilization. In such an extraordinary situation, the limits of the academic tradition—value-neutral and strictly intellectual—must, at least for the present, be broken out of.

The definition was more or less thought of as a program, something that we subsequently tried to follow as a gradually expanding string of groups. On the Norwegian scene we later got another concept, Arne Naess's "ecosophy," and the two terms tend to get mixed up in the media. The ecophilosophy group, which began while Naess was occupied elsewhere, has wanted to keep the term it started with, for several reasons: We wanted at an early stage to "occupy" the term that would most likely later on be chosen by academic institutions as a designation for a value-neutral, purely descriptive concept—like "the philosophy of ecology." We didn't want that to happen. It should not be possible to walk into a university and take up a philosophical discipline related to the ecocrisis that leaves one inactive. Any combination of "ecology" and "philosophy" should signal the necessity of involvement. In the United States the term "deep ecology" has been used to describe what we were driving at. But I am not ready to lose the "philo" part of the term. We wanted to keep a clear signal of involvement with *love*. We would seek understanding and work politically continuously inspired by love of nature and love of the

human partaker in nature. We associate "ecosophy" more with a purely intellectual pursuit.

Naess, on the other hand, wanted an academically neutral, descriptive field as well, and thought that "ecophilosophy" should be reserved for that. And before we got around to discussing this somewhat awkward situation with him, he had published the first edition of his *Økologi, samfunn, og livsstil* (now in English as *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle*) and several widely read articles. Since then we have been stuck with two terms.

This may serve some purpose, since the concepts covered by the terms are actually different, and there is also a difference of approach. One of Naess's definitions of "ecosophy" runs as follows: a "philosophical system (synthesis) that treats nature as diversity-in-unity, views human beings as parts of nature, and enlarges the field of validity of the norms of natural rights to encompass all of nature." In keeping with this, Naess has put a lot of effort into proposing and discussing theories of animal rights and "humanity as a part," while the ecophilosophy group might be said to be more anthropocentric, spending most of their time on the organization of human societies and how human cultures develop and change.

Perhaps this reflects two different ontologies—one of systems and system relationships (in Naess's case with Spinoza as a source of inspiration); the other of *process* as basic to everything. In any case I feel that the two projects complement each other nicely. Both engage people in work that badly needs to be done, probably people with different backgrounds and temperaments that would not find inspiration in both approaches. The differences and similarities between these two approaches could certainly be discussed at length; Naess's own writings in this volume should supplement my hasty treatment.

Part I: Two Kinds of Society in Basic Antagonism

I want to begin by outlining some general ideas about and ways of analyzing our eco-social crisis, and then move on to a discussion of how they have played a role in the Norwegian environmental movement. But I must make it clear that these ideas were not fully formed before we began to act; they were also formed in "midstream," so to speak, and even if they come first in this paper, that doesn't mean they came first in actual

fact. This is an important idea, and one that will become clearer as my discussion proceeds.

I will contrast here two basically different sorts of social organization; much of the thinking of the Norwegian ecophilosophy group has been formed through posing these two against each other. We have called them *Industrial Growth Society* (IGS) and *Life Necessities Society* (LNS). The first one is based on steady or accelerating growth in the production of industrial articles and the use of industrial methods. The second one is based on producing life necessities and always tending to give priority to that.

IGS is a subclass of what I will call pyramidal societies. As it progresses historically, its administrative and political networks tend toward perfecting the pyramidal shape. This development is propelled through four dynamic agents:

1. It is aiming for—and its success is measured against—*linear or accelerating expansion of the production of industrial commodities and services and the use of industrial method*—standardized mass production, concentration in a few, urbanized centers, carried out by specialists on all levels.

2. The main propellant is *individual competition*, not only in the economic sphere, but in every field of human endeavor, including leisure activities and art.

3. The main resource for expansion and for out-competing competitors is not the control of minerals, energy, and the like, but *applied science.*

4. The main method of governing everything and seeing what's wrong and what should be done is *quantification*, presupposing a world of spatial-mechanical constitution. These four characteristics should be regarded as one dynamic block, all of them effective in conjunction at any time.

There is only one historical example of this kind of society, our own, which is tending to become global. Most other human societies have been of the LNS type. Many of the latter have not been good societies to live in for the majority, but among them a few have belonged to a subvariety that we have named *Life Growth Societies*—societies that are furthering continued complex ecological and cultural growth and human creativity for all. The society we are aiming for is of this kind. In our thinking, such a society can only come about on the basis of prioritized life necessities

production, that is, it will keep its place as a subspecies of the LNSes. An IGS will never afford that basis. So any attempt to rewire that sociopolitical organization is futile.

IGS is an abnormal kind of society that exists for only a brief historical second. Judging from various indications spanning twelve million years, the LNS is the human kind of society, and we think it will remain so.

That means among other things that we have no faith in the saving capacity of the computer. Rather the opposite: the computer and its data collecting networks, its educational systems, and so on, will have as its most conspicuous function a treatment of symptoms and a hiding of real causes, and so will permit a buildup of crisis tendencies longer than they otherwise could.

I will go into more depth on these themes later, but just now I will assert that the computerized society model furthers isolated individualism (the talk of an electronic "global village" is a completely nonempirical fancy), mechanical schemes to replace organic processes, and alienation to nature. It offers an abstract world in replacement of a concrete, a complicated for a complex, employment instead of work. It represents the last stage of a civilization that for centuries regarded work purely as a means to an end—survival, and, if possible, affluence.

The end result of that will be a more devastating crash than a computer-free development would have lead to—that is, if the green movement, together with fresh Third and Fourth World activity, does not manage to build a global, radical break with IGS in parallel with the IGS's running itself down. And our hope is that the latter does happen as a soft crash and not as a sudden, violent one accelerated by positive feedback.

Complexity, Pseudocomplexity, and Complication

I want now to describe three other concepts that have been useful in our analysis of modern Western society. I label these concepts complexity, complication, and pseudocomplexity—in the latter case I also use the expressions "Amusement Park Diversity" or "Disneyland Effect." This handful of concepts has also been useful in clarifying how computers and living entities differ, nay, belong to two different worlds. By "complexity" (CX) I mean the dynamic, irreversible, self-steering, goal-directed, conflict-fertilized manifoldness of nature and—as a particularly refined and intricate version of that—the human body/mind. By "complication" (CC) I mean the static, reversible, externally steered, standardizing struc-



LNS versus IGS (Sigmund Kvaløy)

ture-intricacy of the machine. The computer is a particularly refined and intricate version of that.

"Pseudocomplexity" (PCX) *mimics* CX; it is the human invention of various arrangements and activities designed to keep people occupied in a diverse manner, through mass media, hobbies, tourism, schools, and so

on, but on the kind of shallow level that is exemplified by the amusement park—without offering training or development that equips them better for creative interaction with nature or with human society. Environmental PCX gives a "safety-valve" outlet for the inner urge toward complex development that any human is born with; it offers, however, only the sort of interaction that leaves the personality unchanged after the event.

CX can be described only by references to *qualities* (where, however, quantitative perception and assessment is included as *one* segment of the spectrum of the mediations between man and environment)—kinds and sorts and differentiations and crossings, shades and hues without definite boundaries, as well as dialectical leaps.

CC can, in any situation, be completely described by reference to the five mechanical parameters: height, breadth, depth, mass, and velocity, modeled through spatial diagrams, mathematics and logic, and quantified according to fixed numerical scales.

The propaganda of IGS tells us that LNS is a simple, primitive, and even standardized sort of society, while IGS is complex. One of my main points here is to show that it is actually the other way around. And there are many examples that most people will recognize that clarify the opposite view: that the complexity of IGS is just an appearance. A closer look reveals something else beneath the surface, if you are looking for what has really happened, psychologically and socially, to the lives of the majority of individuals when their society passed from LNS to IGS.

The main reason for the common misunderstanding—on which the propaganda thrives—is that in IGS *division of labor* is confused with spiritual, social, and cultural complexity. These are, of course, entirely different parameters. The different jobs that had to be done in the older society could, in principle, be taken care of by any individual. Each person came near to complete self-sufficiency and self-reliance, given a minimum of natural resources. To be so fit required of her or him the development of a broad spectrum of talents both intellectual, intuitional, emotional, and practical.

Modern women and men have been robbed of the kind of work that brought this out, of work as the everyday catalyst to the unfolding of human complexity. The potential of each individual's complexity has instead been administratively cut up and handed out to a thousand different career specialists. Life becomes complicated instead of complex.

Meaningful Work

This complication-encouraging pattern of work is a topic E. F. Schumacher stresses and treats lucidly in the chapter "Buddhist Economics" in *Small is Beautiful.* In Buddhist thinking, *man needs work as much as he needs food.* Again, we have an idea that sounds crazy in Western ears, since for us, work is a pure means, never an end in itself. This is very much so because in the IGS economy the ideal worker is an appendage to the machine, be it the physical or the organizational one. In other words, in IGS work loses its human meaning by necessity.

I want to go into the concept "meaningful (or human) work" as it has been developed in Norwegian ecopolitics. We define the concept through five characteristics:

1. It is an activity necessary for the human being's material life, giving it a direction and practical seriousness not shared by any other human activity.

2. Its fruits or products (material objects and services) do not damage but rather enhance life (dynamic complexity both in the ecosystem and in human culture), with no time limits.

3. It poses such challenges that the potential complexity of talents and capabilities in the human individual and her/his group are brought to bloom.

4. It demands of its partakers the building of loyalty, as well as practical techniques for cooperation.

5. In general it engages children (and any other social group), not as play only, but in a way needed by our society.

What is really remarkable about IGS is that it—unlike most types of societies we humans have tried out so far—deprives us of work in the defined sense. That might be its most damaging aspect. And what has appeared to us as a wonderful aspect of work in the stated sense is that a society built upon that foundation will thrive on meager energy resources, and that energy affluence blocks its path. And not only that: a society with an economy structured through work in this sense is one where all the green movement's other concerns are taken care of. Meaningful work presupposes a specific kind of social economy, which again requires the enhancement of sensitivity toward fellow human beings and nature. This is our contention, having compared information on a wide

range of different cultures and societies, historically and throughout the world.

One example of what I mean here, though, can be fetched from Norwegian sagas. Snorri Sturluson wrote of the building of the largest and most beautiful Viking ship for the famous king Olaf Tryggvesson, around the end of the first millennium A.D. One of the foremen of the boat builders was a man called Torberg Skavhogg, who, like most of his contemporaries, was a farmer, hunter, fisherman, blacksmith, carpenter, local parliamentarian, and cattle man—a super amateur.

One day Torberg asked to get leave from his job because of pressing matters at his farm. King Olaf realized that the farms of the day were a kind of holistic production unit on which all of society—and consequently the king's power—was based. So Torberg, despite his importance to the crew, was allowed to go home.

He was gone quite a while, and when he got back, the great ship was nearly finished, even to the rim planks forming the gunwales. But Torberg, in contrast to everyone else, did not seem pleased. And when the next day the king came to inspect the ship, there was great consternation among the builders; someone had hacked great gashes along one of the rims. In a rage, the king declared that he would give a bag of gold to whoever could deliver the vandal for execution. Torberg stepped forward and admitted his guilt.

King Olaf gave the renowned shipwright one last chance to redeem himself. Torberg sprang to the ship, and with smooth strokes of his axe, leveled both rim planks down, eliminating the notches he had cut into the one. The difference wasn't more than a few inches, but the saga reports that "everyone saw that the ship was even more beautiful." Torberg was honored for his modification.

Two points are worth emphasizing: First, Torberg, in contrast to our modern society, was willing to stake his life on his aesthetic sense, something that IGS has made hardly likely in our time. Second, it shows the close integration of value and work of Torberg's day, an association built on the sort of economy where everyday challenges are complex and where tasks call for the adaptability, ingenuity, and participation of every member of society.

Time

What can make it especially difficult for us to develop this manifoldness



The Long Serpent (Sigmund Kvaløy)

in our own society is that we in the West are particularly handicapped because our minds have such a weak sense of time. I mean "human" or "natural" time, as distinguished from clock time, the time of physics, which is time reduced to space, to projections on paper or to the computer screen. Our perception and our personalities are static.

We need to regain time, we need training in the sense of progress. We ask the question, What does the future hold?—but that's a meaningful question only if the future is a storehouse, a spatial affair. But it is not. *We* are building the future, on the basis of—or often in spite of—what's buried in our history. Right now some of us are trying to build a society that even in its roots is qualitatively different from the past and present one, a complex instead of a complicated society.

But, of course, we *have to* take our ideas from earlier experience, and in doing that, our best bet is to compare the widest possible range of different societies that together constitute humankind's experiments up to now. And in attempting that, we seem to discern a few very general elements that are probably indispensable strands for weaving a future that will avoid the kind of self-propelling dynamism that leads to IGSes.

One bundle of such elements is what I have defined as meaningful work. That's my main reason for claiming that we have a useful and even vital working guideline, even in a period when the future seems so uncertain.

A thinker who has been an inspiration both to me and to all ecoactivists in Norway is Gandhi, who says that man's most important source of insight and wisdom is located in social conflict where central human values are at stake. And that is exactly where Gandhi devises for us a training course for the *regaining* of time! Gandhi says, "The way is the goal," and the way is one of swimming in the stream, nonviolently, but gaining ability through action and conflict.

The Ineffectiveness of Revolutionizing Yourself Separately

It's something typically Western when some of the greens say that we can and should start by changing *ourselves* first, and through *that* get ready to change the sociopolitical system. That's still building on the view of man as a soul separated from his body and from his environment. In our world of passivity that's the worst kind of recommendation, and ensures that nothing will happen.

Instead of that, we should learn the karma-yoga message of Gandhi: You have to step into the stream to be grabbed by something outside your private soul, *something you do not control.* It's then that you have a chance of being shaken so that you're changed, and through that already contributing to changing the system. Instead of observing the river "scientifically," from a safe distance, you step into the river, are—surprisingly—grabbed by the current, and are *forced* to learn how to swim. That's when you learn to accept that nothing is permanent, that everything is time and that time is creativity. Only then will you have the initiative and ability to escape control by the powers above you in the pyramid.

Spatial West versus Temporal East

I began by contrasting two kinds of societies, one dominated by Western, spatial thinking, and an alternative, characterized by Eastern, temporal thinking. Let me here illustrate this difference by referring to a contrast between house-building traditions in the two cultures.

In the "Plow Furrow" valley in the Himalaya, tourists and mountaineers often pass through and say: "Look at these poor people. They try to build houses with regular right angles, striving for geometrical perfection, but they cannot! These primitives lack the simplest knowledge of mechanics, and the necessary technology besides! They are always short of time, and never manage to build a proper house!"

Through my long personal association with the people of this valley, I have come to think these Westerners are wrong. These Himalayan seminomads and farmers do not share this Western aim of geometrico-Platonic perfection, which has to do with perceiving the world as pure, immobile space overlaid with illusionary movement—even with detesting movement and time. In my perspective it is misleading to even use the word "architecture" to talk about Himalayan houses.

We should instead talk about "life with one's house." The house is a part of one's personality, something that is always accepted to be changing. The Sherpa and Tibetan houses are living beings that the builders take responsibility for on a day-to-day, never-let-up basis. If the roof blows off, you put it back on. It's no greater a tragedy than having your hat blow off; it doesn't threaten your life.

This is the strategy—formed by necessity in a nonaffluent society—of humoring nature, which is actually yourself, instead of forcing nature to remain unchanged. Forcing nature easily gets you into trouble. That's where we in the West are.

Western architecture, on the other hand, is an example of "stop-time aesthetics." If one day a crack appears in the wall of a house—that smooth, pure face—the owners can't bear it. The house is supposed to be a structure where the cracks of time are not supposed to have any relevance. And if the truth of its nature—a being in time—is revealed, it shows up something terribly wrong with this society and its economy. Western architecture, like Western society, is built to make you believe time is finally stopped, that withering and death are no more.

To keep that illusion going, however, requires a global robber economy, a systematic plundering of the earth's last resources at an exponential rate, trying desperately to preserve structures that are contradicting time, the process of life. Man here is living on a self-contradiction of his essential roots.

In contrast to this I propose what I call the philosophy of positive decay, a paradigm accepting decay because that means accepting life. It's another word for ecophilosophy. And this is where I find realism in the East, especially in the Buddhist tradition.

Buddhism plus Organic Systems Theory

The key element in the Buddhist tradition is that when the Buddhists say the world is suffering they mean *we are time but we think we are space.* It

is the element that unlocks Buddhist philosophy, especially in light of what I have said earlier. We think we are space and act accordingly, which means we are continuously colliding with ourselves and everybody else.

Buddhism—mainly classical Buddhism, but also Mahayana, Northern, and Far Eastern Buddhism—says instead that we are part of a time flow, of a stream, of chains of events with no beginning and no ending. In this stream our individuality disappears, although it is almost impossible for us to accept this. By natural inclination enormously fortified by pyramidal societies we seek individual permanency. We are inclined to do that, but we are also born with a freedom to rid ourselves of that inclination.

Buddhism is in this way basically at variance with IGS, with a socio-economic system that demands that people fight each other. And if that demand suddenly found no effect anymore, it would mean economic chaos and social catastrophe. Not only the individuals of the West, but also society itself, is forced to try to stop time. Half consciously we sense that we are living with an impossible project and sense how vulnerable we are. Deep down we are scared, and that leads to the opposite of Buddhism. We build protective walls around ourselves, we seek economic security, or social status, honor, a pyramid on top of our grave. But everything has to come down, because we are but eddies in the time stream.

There is no substance that things happen to, not even a substance of form. Everything is just movement, events that are linked together causally and ordered rhythmically. Even our language is a screen hiding reality. It uses words like "that," "everything"; it's a language of spaces and permanent substances, it's a screen that's hiding reality. IGS has inherited the Greek tradition of a geometric world, and mechano-spatial industrialism evolved from that.

There are, however, ideas that have been spawned in the context of IGS which—after millennia—might fruitfully come together. One is Western organic systems thinking. Gautama Buddha's theory of the individual being an eddy in the stream of time posits only the individual and the great system (Samsara and Nirvana); there is nothing in between those two levels. In organic systems theory the in-between is full: there are many intermediate and mediating layers, hierarchical in function. All entities of life tend very strongly to form and be part of organic systems, where smaller are parts of larger. Semipermeable membranes constitute the boundaries, keeping the larger and the smaller entities as part-systems, but interdependent and contributing symbiotically to each other.

Gautama, of course, could have none of this hierarchical idea. But in a somewhat analogous way he dismembers the individual, leaving us only with *skandas*—loosely connected "existence groups" whose unity in the form of a permanent, self-centered being is illusory.

With this in mind, I think our psychologists, psychiatrists, social psychologists, and the like, have been wrong in one of their basic presuppositions. When these thinkers and researchers talk about a human being whose mental life is chaos, they always stress the importance of getting back into the self; their aim is to build an individual identity where one was previously lacking. And success here is based on the possibility of defining one and only one personality structure as a skeleton for the healthy and sane individual.

Instead of this notion, we can conceive of a human being as a being who at birth is like a very complex root system that is trying not to fix a permanent personality structure, but to grow in a multiplicity of personalities and never to fix any of these either. I have in mind a dynamic and multidirectional but organically ordered pattern. Contrasting this, we "civilized" peoples live today as we did five thousand years ago under pyramidal systems that demand from us that when we are born we must be one, single, rigidly identifiable person. That's the only way we can function as controllable "elementary particles" in a pyramidally ordered universe.

Oddly enough, the novelist H. G. Wells wrote toward the end of his life a doctoral dissertation with the same theme and the fantastic title of *A Thesis on the Quality of Illusion in the Continuity of the Individual Life in the Higher Metazoa, with Particular Reference to the Species Homo Sapiens*. He has this idea that maybe we've had it all wrong, this one individual center that we turn back to all the time. Maybe the human personality structure is like a stage instead of a center, a stage where a series of actors are performing. We recognize only one of them at a time, and the rest are suppressed. The Finnish psychiatrist Reimo Kampman has related ideas in the book *You Are Not Alone* (*Du är inte ensam* [Stockholm, 1975]). He describes how, using hypnosis, he was able to call forth "side personalities" in a surprisingly high number of tested individuals.

I want to illustrate the idea that we are eddies in the stream of time, a decentralized, diverse group of personalities, with a few examples from Western cultures. Suppose, for example, I were to draw a pyramid. You could fix your eyes on my pen as I move it back and forth; you're able to reverse the locomotion of the pen. This ability to reverse and repeat, to



Picture of Pyramid (Sigmund Kvaløy)

control a movement in space, is a specific ability of our organ of visualization. Because of its offering of this control, of seeming security, we think that eyesight is the most important. According to Buddhism, controlled space is illusory, but the illusion is fortified if you are a part of IGS and have at your disposal the science and technology of that socioeconomic system. The eyes are suited to private study of books and things, you can be attentive or not, as you choose, because you have "control." In this way, you become abstracted from the world, from the life stream.

Hearing, in contrast, senses a time flow, irreversible novelty, creations in time. If I were talking to you, you could not stop my flow of words and reverse that to hear once more what I had said a while ago. And, because of that, with hearing you have to raise your awareness to a higher level, to be really present, in conscious and active synchronization with what is happening. Otherwise, you'll slide out of participation, you'll be individualized.

A comparison parallel with that between sight and sound can be made between a symphony orchestra and a jazz band. You can play orchestra music by yourself, look at the scores, follow the metronome alone, but secure in a controlled environment. If you play in an orchestra, you are governed from without, there is one and only one control center—the

conductor—that you must follow as best you can. If you don't, chaos threatens.

In contrast, jazz offers us real creativity or organic existence. Jazz means the opportunity of genuine personal creativity, but through a tightly woven *collectivity*: the jazz band is something greater than the individual, nevertheless it is nothing without him. The small, well-integrated jazz band is a flow where every member has the same importance, where there's no conductor, and where creativity happens all the time as a common effort.

Their communicative network happens through semipermeable membranes surrounding each individual, but at the same time including her or him in the total organism. Organic life teaches us this principle. But even the membrane is changing. This is in contrast with the method of the machine, and it is my symbol of the process structure of the kind of society that we are deprived of today but that should be our aim as an alternative.

Another example, this one from my own country, can help make these ideas clearer. Up until about seventy years ago, Norwegian communities along the western and northern coasts were seminomadic. Part of the year they were stationary in one place with their farms and families. But every winter for three or four months they left home on a sailing vessel, normally owned collectively by five or six neighbors, to go fishing at the Lofoten Islands far away in the north.

They often had very rough weather, and handling these little open, square-rigged boats was not easy. But they were masters at it. The only way they managed this was through total, mutual cooperation—the six of them, and the boat and its rigging, became like one organism. The theory of semipermeable membranes is very helpful in understanding how this happened.

These men had to be members of two extremely different societies with two different ways of social integration. They were also meeting nature in two different ways. In my view they did it because they developed *two different personalities*. The theory of permanent ego centering does not cover this phenomena. These two personalities go deeper than mere role playing, because in role playing, you keep the same center and merely *act* differently. At the same time, the varied personalities of these boatmen were dynamic, always shifting, adjusting, and growing. These men in their tiny nutshell of a boat had actually lost their egos. Not, however, into the disintegration into the *skandas* of Buddhism. *One* of the person-

alities of each man, his "Lofoten personality," combined with the similar personalities in each of the others, producing—with the boat, the waves, and the wind—an over-individual. The over-individual was an organically functioning form, one that was flexible in time. The personalities at work here were constituents of a world other than the one these men had put to sea from, the "geometrical" farm community of "secure separateness."

The behavior of seminomadic people of the central Himalaya can also be explained by assuming they have three different, annually operative personalities, repeated sequentially. This utilization of their complexity potential is brought forth by the very diverse demands posed by their environment and resources. Their existences are the following three: (1) as village-based farmers part of the year, (2) as high-altitude cattle herders another part, and finally (3) as caravan traders across the Himalaya once or twice annually.

A reincarnate lama head of a monastery in the valley I am most familiar with has five personalities, a product of his training to be deeply knowledgeable in all fields of human interest. That makes him an unusually stable and courageous person: he includes a little *society* within his mental and physical range. His community expects him to be many, and feels safer knowing that he spans that range.

What I am talking about is different from "split personality." I am speaking about a really radical utilization of an enormous potential for complex, deep "permeation" or interpenetration—an urge we all have from our childhood but which we are not permitted to follow in our society. I am using a *social* model for the psychic world of the human individual, starting with that internal society and then explaining the individual, rather than the usual method of beginning with the human individual and then going out to society. In the perspective I'm outlining, any person has a lot of different personality tendencies that are always budding, or trying to bloom or actually evolving, and some of these are supporting or complementing each other, and some are in conflict.

That conflict may not be damaging; it can be very fruitful. And if a person develops this complexity potential, he or she can with extraordinary courage and confidence meet challenges from new social or natural process structures. We in the West have come some distance in building democratic institutions in society; I think now we could entertain the possibility of developing a democracy in the individual's inner world.

IGS is a society demanding that we close up our membranes, so that we may be used as bricks in the pyramid. But the ecopolitical struggle needs people with soft, semipermeable membranes. Not only that, it needs people who are trained to be two, who are utilizing that potential. People who can't make that transition are victimized by the established powers—bulldozed into the ground by academic formality and legalistic pyramidisms!

If you are aware of this ability you have of utilizing your personality complex and building bridges to the right part of resources to use in the right place, your courage to act will be up to the challenge. You will discover that you are psychologically invulnerable because you no longer have just one single personality with its specific vulnerability.

If we could cultivate our inner complexity, the hard shell between us and the world would be broken, and we could become true cooperative partners with any human being in the endlessly creative life stream. And you'll accept all kinds of people because you find them all in your inner society. Recognizing that and permitting your inner democratic revolution furthers the democracy of your environment.

Part II: Hydropower and Ecopolitics

I want to turn now to the Norwegian experience in green thinking and acting, and try to illustrate some of the ways we developed and used the ideas I have outlined above.

After having traveled very much during the last thirty years to various corners of the world, I feel it is safe to say that the ecopolitical debate and some sort of a green movement started very early in my country. Its first beginnings were actually in the 1930s. One reason for the early start is the fact that Norway was industrialized very late compared with the rest of Europe. Iceland is in the same situation, I guess, and we have seen a comparable green awakening there.

At the same time, Norwegians have always been very curious, they have traveled a lot, and our authors started very early to describe and analyze the effects of industrialization in different countries. It was as if we were sitting there on our mountains, looking southward toward Europe (we didn't think of Scandinavia as part of Europe), watching the new order of things both with fear and expectant excitement.

I myself grew up with that double sentiment. Like so many of my own generation in Norway, I have experienced a complete transformation of

society in one lifetime—from an almost medieval, agricultural self-reliant society to a modern super industrialism, replete with computers, holidays at Mallorca, and complete dependency on world market forces.

One reason for our very late industrialization was our lack of tempting resources for industry. The only thing we had in any abundance was a combination of steep mountains and a lot of rain—in other words, hydroelectricity. The whole industrialization of Norway has been based on using our rivers this way.

But this has meant a direct collision with the Norwegian folk-soul, so to speak. The people of Norway once settled along the rivers; they utilized them in many ways and became dependent on them for their material existence. The rivers also decided their organization as a nation consisting of small, almost independent subnations along our long and rocky land. Finally, the rivers of Norway contributed to Norwegians' mental constitution. Their soul was a soul of rivers, waterfalls, and deep fjords.

Necessary Conflict

The industrial transformation was slow at first, and throughout the first half of this century people largely went along with the hydroprojects, feeling that electricity and industrialization would compensate for the river losses. But after World War II all that changed: the schemes grew out of all reasonable proportions and far beyond the needs of the people. That's when Norwegian electricity finally became the bridgehead for modern international big industry. This is the period when cultural collision became apparent.

That conflict has hardened tremendously during the last few years, and I as a member of a growing group have come to see it as my duty to highlight that conflict. I feel that it is impossible to reach a future that is creative and not destructive without social, economic, and political conflict. And I would even say that it's not possible to keep appealing to everybody, for instance the whole of the Norwegian population, because by now a number of people are so drawn into the industrial growth way of life that it has become a part of their personality. It is a waste of energy to try to pull them back to the green side of the new cultural dividing line.

We are reaching a future through conflict—and this is not coincidental, but rather what has always happened at major shifts in the various events building futures in history. So we have to accept that, and that's one spot where we feel we were too naive fifteen years ago, and the in-

dustrial powers caught us up on it. Our philosophizing was done too much in a harmony model. Our actions taught us a lot, and we now need to think in a model of conflict, to be prepared at every turn for strife. And what I have been saying here is, all of it, a product of conflict thinking.

Memories of bedtime in my childhood farmhouse can illustrate how some of these ideas I've been talking about developed, and how they led to ecopolitical engagement. We didn't have electricity, and we were not to use candles or oil lamps unnecessarily, so in my room I just had natural twilight, which was different every night, and my experiences and impressions of the day of play and work were also continually new. Every night there would always be something new with me to give life to all those fantastic visual patterns that surrounded me on the walls and ceiling, the natural pattern in the wood, always impressing on the mind the patterns of living growth. They inspired adventure stories that grew incessantly in my mind, bridging waking existence and dreams, shaping and giving momentum to my daily self-becoming.

The situation today is different. I look at my son's "bed and media chamber," where every item in the room is expressive of the total standardization and commercialization of the world of this growing child. Through its brightness and impressive crispness it functions as propaganda for the mass production of IGS.

What became clear to me here was that it is a blockage of our understanding of a human being's personality to draw limits around it as something trapped within the skin of one body. It is more fruitful to look upon the person's full environment—all the things and events that are near to him—as elements that are being *integrated into his personality* as it matures and unfolds. "Humanity and the Environment," a designation we see often these days, is misleading, too analytical and too static. As he lies there in bed, the child's person structure is being integrated with the people of the society that shaped his surroundings.

This realization, and a number of other unpleasant encounters with IGS's world of complication and competition, led me to join the Norwegian ecopolitical tradition on an all-day/all-night basis. It was a sort of therapeutic business, primarily: if you vividly feel that the roof may cave in any moment, it's just not possible to sit still at an Institute of Philosophy, analyzing some Greek concepts that presuppose that the world stands still.

So in 1969 a group of us met at that philosophy institute and founded what we later called the Ecopolitical Ring of Cooperation (snm). That



Fathers' and Sons' Rooms (Sigmund Kvaløy)

first autumn we lacked practice and training, so we spent the first half year calling on top experts in the Norwegian IGS to come every week to

our meetings and be informative. What they did not know was that their primary function was to act as our training objects. That autumn was our laboratory.

This deserves emphasis, because it proved very successful. At each "laboratory session" they were one and we were many, which meant that we dared to confront them and make mistakes without losing our nerve. Not only did we pick up courage this way, we discovered their one vulnerable spot: they were specialists, meaning they could be beaten by generalists. They were extremely good within their own narrow field, but they knew next to nothing outside that field. The present world is full of such people; that is why we are governed by people who don't know where we are headed. So we built our own training program to become *super amateurs*, like Torberg the shipwright and his contemporaries—meaning people who both know a little within all relevant social fields and love their work and put all their efforts and talents into training for that. The main trick of super amateurship is the training to combine specialized fields with the main theme that interests people: the future for their community.

This is the sort of program that one can hardly live up to, but we have seen through the years that it is possible to go part of the way and that it makes a great difference. It was later to become our main weapon in the fight to stop atomic energy in Norway, a fight that we won.

Then, during our first training term, we happened on a case that at first stopped us in our tracks: our laboratory object was the head of the Landscape Protection Division of the Norwegian Electricity Directorate, and he came out with the argument that the people of Norway lacked any aesthetic taste! He had been around Norway in his car and had taken a lot of photos of farms and houses and courtyards and fences, and he tried to draw from them his surprising conclusion. And if Norwegians lacked any aesthetic sense, then our arguments against dams and hydropower generally—which were mainly aesthetic—were politically doomed.

"You are just a tiny, exclusive elite," his argument ran. "And most people, in any society, are primarily concerned with material security and growth. If they are economically compensated for ugliness, then ugliness is OK." And to prove this he trotted out pictures of old, well-built log houses where the walls had been broken through and enormous panorama windows put in, even around the corners. The entrance to one courtyard looked like a gas station, only the gas pumps were actually old,

monumental stone posts that had recently been painted red, yellow, and blue in stripes.

Right then we were at a loss to counter his allegations. The next week's meeting we had to be alone to discuss his argument. Our conclusion was twofold: For one, his selection of pictures was clearly biased. The situation wasn't that bad. Second, there are an abundance of such illustrations to be found in traditional Norwegian society, going back just half a generation. Even so, recently we find a high-level artistic folk culture in our land. And at our following meeting we were able to defend the view that the deterioration of taste in half a generation coincides strikingly with the industrialization of the country. The state of aesthetic taste must somehow be the fruit of the transition to an IGS society. His documentation of a low ebb in aesthetic sensibility testified to a deterioration that he himself, as a designer of nicer power stations, had contributed to. He was making the quick super-industrialization of Norway more acceptable. He was an IGS cosmetologist.

In short, we decided that if in a certain society you find very few people who have an urge to fight for aesthetic values, that is a society with an economy and a social structure that *stops* people from developing a concern for such values. Most directly, it is the outcome of the kind of work available to most people for their living. And as an example of this, we thought of the difference between our own society and that of the Viking shipwright Torberg Skavhogg. Who in our society would risk his life to move a window in the city hall an inch to the right?

Anyway, the experience of the expert and his aesthetic slide show contributed decisively to our analysis of IGS, and as time passed and our work progressed we found ourselves aiming for a certain kind of alternative society with increasing clarity.

But actually realizing that society is formidably difficult from our present starting point, because it means *replacing* the basic economic and social structure of today with something different and molding our mental life according to a new world paradigm. And this we cannot do through available political means such as are easily acceptable to the establishment.

And at this point growing numbers of the Norwegian ecopolitical activists have ceased training for that harmonious kind of transition where IGS leadership is steered into the sort of economy that supports life and creativity, because that would be tantamount to going against natural law.

Instead of that, we are following the more modest program of contributing to a new social, economic, and mental basis that will come into function gradually as the IGS system breaks—and it must, since its self-destruction is a characteristic of its mode of behavior. Quite briefly, I will mention a few of the campaigns and direct actions we went into, which taught us a lot.

Direct Confrontations as "Experiments with Truth"

The start was actually made around 1967-68 when we planned to chain ourselves to the rocks while the water was rising in a hydropower dam in Trondelag (mid-Norway); we wanted to show that we were willing to risk our lives, to show that we experienced the onslaught on our rivers as a lethal threat even to our personal human existence. (Torberg's spirit was with us here, too!) That plan was never realized because that hydropower scheme had gone too far, and it was actually speeded up due to popular pressure to stop it, something that we've seen many times since. And besides, our kind of action cannot be done as a rush project.

Our second plan progressed much further toward realization. The idea was to build on a small scale the kind of alternative society we were aiming for—I mean the kind of society where people of all ages are cooperating in meaningful work in exactly the spot where a power station was to be built. That was in the middle of the well-known Aurland Valley in southwest Norway. Our aim was to create a "positive, constructive action" in the Gandhian sense.

Some of us in the late 1950s, inspired by Arne Naess, had started reading Gandhi, trying to learn from his various nonviolent direct actions in South Africa and India. So *that* had been brewing for a considerable period already, and all the later actions were actually "Experiments with Truth" in the Gandhian mode. A positive action does not only protest, but first and foremost it is a demonstration of what we want as an alternative to what is happening by living out that society as if the future were already here.

But again, we couldn't go through with it. This time not because we were short of time, but because we found out that the Aurland farmers had been talked into believing that it would be to their benefit to have the river taken, since their compensation in money would be so great. Today, over twenty years later, they know that those were empty promises, but

they didn't at the time, and you can't do such an action without being a part of the struggle of the local people.

Our first realized action came in 1970 in Eikesdal, further to the north. Here local cooperation came easily and naturally, because there had already been two hydropower schemes implemented in the valley. The emptiness of the economic promises had become clear to everyone. The action had been under preparation for one year. Our aim was to stop the "electrocution" of the Mardøla waterfall, the third highest in the world. In the springtime, when the snow thaws in the mountains, this fall makes its plunge two thousand feet in one leap into an extremely lush, forested valley, the Eikesdal. The picture of that waterfall later became the symbol of the whole ecopolitical movement of Norway.

One element of the Mardøla action may have been an abridgment of Gandhi: we used steel chains, forged by a local farmer, to anchor ourselves to the rocks so that the police could not move us. No one could cut the chains without hurting our bodies. Norwegian policemen are very hesitant to hurt anyone, so that tactic was successful.

The action and the larger campaign around it became very involved—more than we'd been able to envision beforehand—and we learned from it more about Norwegian society than we would have through ten years at a university seminar. Equally important, we learned vital things about ourselves and our potential for change. We came out as different people, and that's what the future demands of us.

The Mardøla action became a sensation. It was reported in the *New York Times* and *Der Spiegel*, there was a film made of it, and it came out on television. It lasted for about five weeks in late summer 1970. About five hundred people joined it, including some from France, Holland, and America. It is now regarded as the start of the modern ecopolitical movement in Norway.

We lost the waterfall in the end, but we had started a movement. Right after that, and inspired by it, we and others went into a series of actions—to save a beautiful forest near Oslo, to stop a new international airport on good farming land, to stop a road through a day care center and another through a suburban settlement, to stop several new military target ranges, and so on. But the large rivers had priority all along.

In connection with the action, we held ecophilosophical seminars in the mountains when it wasn't raining or blowing too hard. And when Mardøla was taken away from us, we still knew that we had progressed (not "achieved"), as well; the movement was much broader, and all of

Norway was to some extent aware of the new thinking that was coming in. As things developed in Norway, Mardøla was only the first of a series of nonviolent and unconventional campaigns to save these rivers. Two of the most notable later actions were at Innerdalen and Alta. Both of them lasted several years, and were on a much greater scale than Mardøla.

Innerdalen, "the innermost valley," is (was, I now regret to say) a beautiful, extremely fertile mountain valley in mid-Norway that was to be completely inundated by a hydropower reservoir. In this valley we were finally able to stage a pure, positive, constructive Gandhian action. We plowed and harvested crops from large fields, we kept cattle, produced milk, butter, and cheese. We organized a "Green University" there, and finally a "Green Factory Workers Occupation," proclaiming the dam workers as "strike breakers." The latter was partly done to provoke a discussion with the labor movement. It was at a meeting at Innerdalen that we first conceived of a Green Workers International, an organization that was finally founded in cooperation with the European Ecological Action group (ECOROPA) in 1979. That was right after we'd finally been arrested, with participants from Sweden and Finland, and forcibly transported out of the valley.

The Alta campaign—a lengthy series of direct actions, repeated arrests, and a morass of court cases—aimed at protecting the river Alta and the last unspoiled large territory of the Samé (Lapp) reindeer herders of northern Scandinavia. That campaign culminated during the winter of 1980-81, with the world's first large-scale direct action under purely arctic conditions. The temperatures outside went down to forty degrees below zero, and the activists chained to the rocks had to be housed in large, permanently heated tents. The international participation this time was much larger; about a thousand demonstrators—Scandinavians, West Germans, French, Dutch, and Belgians—all took part. The resistance, sometimes called the "nonviolent guerrillas," was finally broken when the authorities sent a ship with six hundred policemen to Alta. Specially trained technicians used flywheel cutters to break the extremely heavy chains, and asbestos sheets and riot shields to protect the demonstrators.

The campaign included a one-month hunger strike by five young Samé men, a Samé women's occupation of the Norwegian capitol building, and a Samé women's delegation to seek support from American Indian and Eskimo organizations, the Canadian labor unions, and other organizations as well—a support that was wholeheartedly given. One of the very positive results of the Alta campaign was that it contributed to coopera-

tion among various aboriginal groups—a strengthening of the Fourth World.

I was part of that action, and it was amazing to see how easy it was to find organizations and even radio and TV networks in America that were willing to help. That was another sign that an international green movement is underway. You find people everywhere who are hurt by the same forces, which gives us a global potential for mutual identification. In spite of cultural differences, IGS unites us!

One direct, local result of the decade-long campaign at Alta has been a substantial reduction of that hydropower scheme. Another, nonlocalized result has been the transformation of the lives or outlooks on life of many of the participants. I have talked to many young participants afterward who have told me that "for the first time I experienced meaning in my life." For the first time they were part of a process where it came naturally to forget their egos, to identify completely with other human beings, even those of generations unborn.

Through experiments like these we proved to ourselves that Gandhi is right when he says, "The goal is the way and the way is the goal." It doesn't help to concentrate your effort on some preconceived future achievement. That's why Gandhi says that you *should not hanker after the fruits of your action*. We in the West are always pitched on some concrete goal in the future. That means we think we always know what the future is before it's part of our own life. Instead, living the future right here and now makes you invulnerable—what happens tomorrow can't hurt what you are doing right now.

For us, the guiding star of Gandhi was the *norm of selfless action*. Gandhi tells us that the most important source of human knowledge is not to be found at some university or in meditation, but at the center of social and political conflict, the fight for Life and for Truth.

But this "Life-Truth"—what is that? Above all, these are experiments; you yourself have to help the definition along, through your own fight. It's not laid out beforehand, on a map, not in the real world, which is a creative stream. We in the Norwegian environmental movement had to learn that we are not chess pieces on a board, but part of a complex process. This means, in fact, that as we go on, the aim of our action is bound to be transitory. If you get very close to the fruit, say, saving the Mardøla cascade, and then lose the river, your coactivists are likely to be shocked into inactivity because "everything is lost." And that's where the Government and Big Industry will sit back and let out a sigh of relief and say,

"That takes care of those demonstrators! Now we can continue as always!"

After Mardøla we were liberated from the chess-board prison of win or lose. In the lifestream, obstacles are just inspirations to experimentation. So we continued experimenting, campaigning even more fiercely for the next river, doing our best to put the brakes on North Sea drilling, and the like. We saw the creation of the activist-oriented movement The Future in Our Hands, and parallel movements sprang up in the other Scandinavian countries and in England as well.

In Context: Liberation of the Self through Ecoactivism

Basing my judgment on the Norwegian experience I would venture the claim that an effective modern Buddhism is realized through ecopolitical action, with ecology, Marx, and Gandhi as important catalysts. In addition I could mention Thoreau, Bergson, Black Elk, the Laxa river protectors in Iceland, the Japanese Narita airport fighters, the Greenpeace "Rainbow Warriors," the women of Greenham Common, some of the Greens' actions in Germany, the Indian Chipko Andolan forest defenders, and many more as well.

The main thrust of the theory of radical human process complexity is its value as a pointer to a new way of liberation from the pyramid, from oppression by a sociopolitical and economic system that not only deprives us of meaningful work, but hustles us all into a global holocaust. If, however, the members of IGS should refuse to act any longer as part-pyramids, then the large pyramid would crumble.

If you want to contribute, "the way is the goal"—selfless, nonviolent action, found at centers of social and political conflict, and meaningful work. Those are the ways of getting started on the path to liberation, to breaking the walls of the pyramid.

It's not an easy process to rid oneself of an all-pervasive world paradigm. It is always easier to start training, to pick up the original courage to get started, if we join hands with people in the same situation, for example with the peace movement. But there are countless opportunities to get involved in "training programs" everywhere in our societies, right here in the West. This is another reason why I have stressed the hydropower actions so much. In Norwegian ecopolitics, those functioned as training courses for recapturing the human process-sense, and that, in my view, is a requirement for the building of a green growth future.



Living in the Earth (Sigmund Kvaløy)

Getting Our Feet Wet

A Conversation with Sigmund Kvaløy Sætereng

Q: *You have equated complex systems with diverse systems. Do you feel that diversity is some sort of intrinsic good? Is there a limit to the diversity that we should try to encourage?*

A limit to diversity? It is very difficult to know what that limit should be, because we are very much a part of the total diversity. I prefer the term "complexity," because diversity is used within information theory to express calculable quantity, while my complexity concept is dialectical. It's easier to put it negatively, saying that to us limited human beings it is very dangerous to destroy the complexity that has taken millions and millions of years for nature to build up by very many small steps and an enormous amount of experimentation in different directions.

But it is impossible for us not to break down this natural complexity, because we are too many people with too many monocultures and we have become dependent on a certain way of utilizing nature as outside manipulators, which has a certain economic and political imprint that is very difficult to change.

Q: *You also talk about how a person can be internally complex, and have a number of different sorts of personalities. Can conflicts between the value systems of these personalities arise? Since there is no center of the personality, how are these conflicts resolved?*

Well, they are not resolved, they are ameliorated by stages. I go into, I move, from one personality position to another one. Of course, when I talk about the different personalities in the human being I am not talking about finished entities. They are always on the move, not having velocity, but changing and shifting, qualitatively speaking. It's as if I have a discussion going within myself—I've experienced this many times.

Q: *So not only should we develop diversity in our personalities, but also develop ways of switching from one to another?*

That's right, I'm not talking at all about split personalities, but about utilizing the various potentialities within the human being. Developing a personality means to become part of a large environment, which is a field of activity. My advice to environmentalists is then to become even more complex. It is needed in our situation, both to be closely acquainted with the green world and our own nature, and at the same time to have an urban personality that can fight back. The Indians in Brazil can't fight

back, because they have no access to the channels of communication in our modern society. But we can.

Q: *In many of your works you emphasize time over space. Is there something that is intrinsically good about time, or is it that people have begun to emphasize space more than they should?*

Yes, but I prefer not to use the words good and bad. I prefer to talk about what is happening to the human being, to human society—where is it moving? What has happened in Western civilization is that we have replaced our sense of time with locomotion, mechanical time, clock time, which is necessary in a large, complicated society, because power centers have coordinated so many people, finally objectifying them as little machines that start and stop according to a fixed plan.

On the other hand, TIME, as I talk about it, is related to Henri Bergson's duration: it is a qualitative, subjective concept that leads directly into the lives of human beings, not abstract, like clock time, measurable only by machines. Qualitative time is the way to define a human being: he or she *is* movement.

Q: *So if we have spatialized time, as you say, we have eliminated a very important way that human beings interact with the world and themselves. But you are saying that the direction modern society is taking is hindering the development of humanity. When Arne says that real deep ecology has to be concerned with* nature's *intrinsic value, what do you say?*

Yes, I am more anthropocentric than Arne, and of course we have talked about it. He feels closer to animals that are far away from the human universe; it fascinates him very much, and one of my many personalities does feel the same way. But although it is important to have strong feelings about nature, we *have* to concentrate on the human society and the human being, otherwise everything we cherish will be destroyed. We have so little time.

Q: *Do you think your work is in the interests of people, or in the interests of nature?*

Both. I don't like to differentiate very much. The way I define a human being is not limited at the skin. At this farm the cows and sheep are part of our personality. But I feel less for an ant, for example, because it's so difficult to communicate with an ant. It's not so difficult to communicate with a cow.

Q: *Naess has his platform of deep ecology, and he says that though we borrow from many traditions, at some level there is a common*

agreement—these principles of deep ecology. Do you agree? Do we borrow from different traditions and then bring them down to a synthesis of ecological thinking?

Yes. But I would say that we are doing it from the perspective of creeping into those traditions, trying to utilize the potentiality we find in ourselves to become more than one. So in a way it's not a synthesis, but rather some sort of multipointed vantage base.

For example, when I was reading Buddhism, I was thinking in a sense as a dialectical materialist, so maybe what I have tried to do with Buddha is something of the same nature as Marx did with Hegel—turning him upside down to a materialist position. You know, I have to use materialism here with great care, because it's not mechanistic materialism, it's something very soft and swampy. My kind of materialism has very much to do with continuous interchange between mind and matter. So it's not Marxist materialism. Many people feel this is an impossible combination. They don't understand how it's done.

To describe the way I'm looking and doing as synthesis is misleading. And it is difficult to put it into a framework of Western logic. I have been critical for many years of Arne's tendency to formalize systems. It's not wrong, but it's not my position, and I think that it does not open up possibilities enough. It limits our view, because it is a static way of describing the world. It doesn't help us to see, at least, how our subject matter is fleeting, and that there are no certain limits; we can get stuck with these systems and just keep repeating them over and over again.

Q: *Do you see your own work reflected in public policy today?*

Oh yes, absolutely, but of course it's not only mine, but the efforts of a group of people that I've been with all the time. Some of the big clashes that came out of the nonviolent actions were very fruitful, because the discussions that followed the actions lit up new corners in Norwegian society that had previously been dark and hidden.

But one has to argue one's case in an appropriate manner—relevant, to the point, without attacking people personally, sticking to the subject, and without using devious means.

Q: *But were you not, in the beginning of the seventies, using quite a lot of devious means: an unheard of type of civil disobedience that served to focus much more attention on the environmental movement than before?*

I didn't think of these as devious means. We were very specific and open about what we were doing, and the actions were very clear and well planned. Each of them was widely announced beforehand.

Q: *Some people think that the environmental issue has become very polarized, and that this has made environmental decision making much more difficult. What do you think about this development?*

I think it's very good. I'm all for polarization. That's the only way we get deeper discussions. This brings up the role of conflict. In agreement with Gandhi, I say that the most important experience for gaining deeper understanding is to be had in the middle of a conflict situation, where you are fighting for truth or life values—in the Gandhian sense, nonviolently. You won't change the world and you won't change yourself, either, by just sitting in a seminar room, sitting on the fence, or walking up and down the street in a disconnected demonstration. Our own inside universe is very limited, and in order to enlarge that we have to become more a part of the world, and the first way to do that is to engage in conflict, and the short history of Norwegian ecopolitics proves that I'm right.

There is only one way to become courageous, and that is to be courageous. *Step into the river instead of just looking at it, and be grabbed by the current*, then something really begins shaking you so that something happens to you—you are changed and changing the world at the same time. You can't just change yourself first and then change the world. That is very typically Western, you know, talking from the viewpoint that there are two such worlds: your own little world and the world at large, soul and the body, and so forth. It's just one great big process.

Q: *Do you have a concrete picture of the sort of society you want to achieve?*

No, I don't have, and it would be irresponsible to think that one could have that. There's only a little set of principles that I have learned from comparing many different societies in different countries, and those are the principles of meaningful work, which would not produce any one definite sort of society, but a range of very different possibilities. But meaningful work is very basic.

Q: *If somebody in the environmental movement, anywhere, came and asked you, "Sigmund, what should we do? What future directions do you think environmentalism should take?," how would you answer?*

First I would ask them about their own situations. Local situations are very different. Yet the unity of the opposition against IGS helps us to understand each other. We should seek cooperation with people all over the world who are threatened by the same kind of developments. But watch out! Take care of your own local roots.

Q: *Are you optimistic about the efforts to transform us into an ecologically sensitive society?*

Not terribly optimistic, but I just think it will make a difference, the more we are able to unite ourselves, to spread ideas like India's Chipko Andolan movement to hug the trees, the better chances we will have in the future. Our main chance has to do with the downfall of the competitive industrial society.

In this sense the so-called new age movement is dangerous. Though it answers many people's need for some wave of optimism and offers something to believe in, it does so blindly, trying to blur the meaningful work found in the world's spiritual traditions with the rush of industrial and information technology, leading to a superficial synthesis that really has no legs to stand on.

Q: *What lessons does the Norwegian experience with environmentalism have for the United States?*

Well, I can mainly talk from my own experience in meeting activists in Wisconsin. They were not city dwellers, they were farmers, and they had been awakened to eco-awareness through the threat of a gigantic highway that had been built through some of the finest farmland in the world. These farmers went out and sat down in front of the bulldozers, and to their great shock they were immediately arrested and handcuffed, and suddenly they saw that underneath the smooth surface of their society there were some sharp claws. They thought that as soon as people got to know what was at stake here, they would realize the insanity of this highway construction. But this arrest was instead the first stage in *their own* awakening, and I think it is a good example of the dialectical development in individual human beings.

After this, they did something quite unprecedented, which shows they had become different persons. They took a lot of big milking cows on a truck and went to Madison, the capital of Wisconsin, and at night they put up a fence around the lawn outside the capitol building, and they tried to get the cows out onto this lawn. A policeman came up, and of course he had a gun, and he said, "What are you doing here?" and a farmer said, "Well, we had some cows here, and they were hungry, and this spot looked so good." And the policeman said, "What, in the middle of the night in front of the capitol? The first cow that comes out I'll shoot," and at that moment not one but all the cows came storming out of the trailer and nearly ran the policeman down, and of course he couldn't start shooting all of them. They were able to keep the cows there

for a month, and a lot of people became aware of the situation, and the construction of a second highway was actually stopped!

Q: *So the lesson is that ecopolitical activism of the Norwegian type can be used in America?*

Yes, these farmers and I were able to understand each other very, very well. But my students at the university were very far removed from doing a thing like that. The farmers were willing to do it because they were pushed into it as it had to do directly with their local environment, economy, and daily work. So I brought one of the farmers up to lecture to my ecophilosophy class. And he made quite an impression. My students had some difficulty understanding him, but they would have to become farmers themselves to really understand.

In olden times, philosophers were generalists and were strongly engaged in their own society. All questions were relevant to their work, which was the mother discipline that laid the grounds for all else. Modern academic philosophy is not that at all. That is why I left it—none of my colleagues were interested in process philosophy, not one! I think they could do far better by engaging in the world around them, stepping into the river, rather than looking back into the past without ever getting their feet wet.

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

The Crofter (Theodor Kittelsen)

Chapter 5

Nils Faarlund

An important strain in deep ecological thinking is Self-realization: a "strong identification with the whole of nature in its diversity and interdependence of parts."[1] The notion of Self-realization is closely linked to the idea of a "sense of place";[2] both imply an empathetic identification with our home environment and a desire to protect it.

But there is a step missing here. Fine principles like "love thy place as thyself" are easy to agree with, but often have about as much existential impact as a Wiffle ball. It is not enough to agree that we should love our place; we have to really love it if our declarations are to have any practical consequences. This, of course, means knowing our place, and that means getting out into it.

The point is not trivial. We don't really know what we're talking about in deep ecology unless we have some real, live experience with the *ecos* itself, and in this sense it is silly to write a book about how fine it is to be out in nature. One does not learn ecophilosophy from books alone.

This is perhaps the main message of Nils Faarlund's essay "A Way Home." There is a deep philosophy in woods, mountains, and water, a philosophy we can better dream of than describe, a philosophy only first-hand meetings with nature can intimate. Faarlund, deep ecologist and mountaineer, calls for a nonaggressive, environmentally sensitive ap-

proach to being in nature—*friluftsliv*: a way of tuning our lifestyles and society so that they are in harmony with nature.

To some, the word *friluftsliv* translates as "outdoor recreation," but to Nils, it is something more: it is nothing less than an agent of paradigm shift, the clearest way toward resolution of our ecological crises. In the article and interview we present here, his understanding of the word should become clear.

In addition to his work on this concept, Faarlund has taken a degree in microbiology and biochemistry, and was for several years a researcher in those fields. But a love for the mountains and a worry that even they would crumble before the onslaught of progress led him to take up outdoor guiding full time in 1966. Since then he has also held positions as lecturer and researcher at the Norwegian College of Sport (Norges idrettshøgskole), as well as advised the Ministry of the Environment in developing a national outdoor recreation policy.

Much of the rest of Faarlund's time, though, has been spent in the mountains, and although he has traveled in the Atlas, Himalaya, Rockies, and Hindu Kush, his heart has remained in his native land. Faarlund's attitude has always been that the journey is more important than the destination. He tries (with mixed success) to avoid the massive equipment purchases and corporation sponsorship that make modern mountaineering seem like a business enterprise. More important than reaching the top of the mountain is to learn from the people in the region and to respect their customs, even when this means *not* climbing to a "sacred" summit.

In 1971 Faarlund, Sigmund Kvaløy, and Arne Naess participated in an "antiexpedition" to Gauri Shankar in the Himalaya, one of Nepal's most revered holy peaks. Climbing only on the slopes of the mountain, they observed the traditional edict against treading on its summit, and appealed to the Nepali government in an (unsuccessful) attempt to have the mountain removed from the list of permitted peaks.

For most mountaineers, of course, reaching the summit is the key part of the whole enterprise. Faarlund is sharply critical of this trend in mountaineering, a position that has sparked a lively debate in the Norwegian climbing community. For Faarlund, outdoor life is not competitive, but a reintroduction to an old friend—free nature. *Friluftsliv* is thus a descendant of the Romantic attitudes to nature in nineteenth-century urbanized Norway. And naturally, Romantic attitudes are seen as archaic in our fast-paced, technological world. Nils is not alone, though, in calling for their rehabilitation. Gunnar Breivik, the only philosopher employed full

time at the *idrettshøgskole*, sees *friluftsliv* as belonging to the traditions of rural Norway, not only a practice of city folk seeking release from urban pressures. Small farmers and fishermen, though living much closer to free nature, also found joy in wandering about in the mountains; activities that, though connected to their "jobs," also had an element of pure lark.[3]

Faarlund prefers to see this not as *friluftsliv*, but as its absence: such cultures had achieved a harmony with nature and did not need a reintroduction to it. The point of living outdoors should be to help us understand the bankruptcy of our city-dependent lifestyle, and lead us back to the kind of intimate contact with nature enjoyed by these people.

The main point is clear: *friluftsliv* is a shift in perspective. It is a rejection of a paradigm that sees man as a vacationer, in favor of one that presents free nature as man's true *home*.

What Faarlund points out, then, is that we often underestimate the influence that being in free nature has on our minds and our lifestyles. And it is never, never enough to talk about being in nature. We need to step out into it. And after the first step can come another, and another . . .

A Way Home

Contemporary Norwegian culture—European culture, Western culture—has become estranged from the home of humankind. We belong to cultures that have failed to recreate a sense of free nature as our true home—archetypical nature, recognized by its rhythms and tides. Because our cultures have failed to pass on this precious understanding, free nature has lost standing.

Where humans are left without a home, made fugitives in our world, we feel lost, alone. Modern culture, instead of reintroducing us to nature, encourages our solitude by insisting that it is a virtue to be outstanding, a "separate individual," a true, objective observer. Alone, we are prey to anxiety, we feel afraid. Afraid, some turn aggressive toward the foreign—other humans, or nature. Some reject a confrontation, becoming followers. Either they follow the aggressive or, feeling hopeless and powerless, they turn cynical, or even mad.

In cultures where free nature has lost standing, people release aggression through their work, but also through their leisure, especially in outdoor recreation. Where nature has lost standing, it usually becomes the victim of this aggression; humans think of themselves as Descartes's

maître et possesseur de la nature. Coupled with the technological prowess made possible by Newtonian natural science, it is no surprise that the world today is in the throes of an ecological crisis.

If you are one of those who feel at home in free nature, there is no need to persuade you of the consequences of this crisis; you have probably been feeling them for some time. If you are an objective but attentive "observer" of nature, you might be persuaded of the gravity of the situation by "crisis literature."

If you see nature only as a resource, then nothing less than a crisis that breaks into your daily life—massive fish kills, a dying forest—will suffice to wake you up.

But the future is not uniformly black. There are still ways out of the crisis, ways opened by a sense of joy with nature. In Norway, the tradition of *friluftsliv* is a way of recreating understanding for nature, of rediscovering the true home of mankind. Pronounced "free-loofs-leaf," and meaning literally "open air life," it is similar to, but not exhausted by, the English term "outdoor recreation." It has resonances in the french *la vie en plein air*, in the English "nature life," or in the archaic English term "nature *faerd*." However translated, it draws on traditional crafts, tools, and lore from a Norwegian culture that was still consonant with the rhythms of free nature. Its roots and values are in harmony with the *poesophy* (poetry/philosophy) of the European Deep Romantic movement of the last century.

In this essay I want to to expand and make more concrete the ideas behind *friluftsliv*. It can be a guide toward the future, a way home. A joyous encounter with free nature can be a turning point for both the individual and society. No force is stronger than joy. Thus there is hope!

Background in the Backwater

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Norway was a "developing country." A backwater even in Scandinavia, where it was dominated by Sweden and Denmark, it was a fitting expression of the Romantic imagination in contemporary Europe.

It was still a developing country when Hitler invaded in the spring of 1940. It was largely the technological might of the Allies that evicted his armies five years later, and the lesson was not lost on a liberated Norway faced with the task of reconstruction. Norway threw itself into an all-out effort to train the necessary personnel and to expand the existing ma-

chine of technology, supported by U.S. Marshall Plan aid. River after river was sapped of its life-giving water, mountains were left as worm-eaten husks, fields were converted into airports, highways, and suburbs. An expanding national economy became the symbol of Norway's well-being.

This development—which completed the translation of Norway from an agricultural to an industrial nation—was coupled with an immense feeling of patriotism. To oppose it, to suggest that too much was being lost in the translation, was tantamount to treason. "Sentimental" objections to the building of a new Norway were set upon and shredded by implacable, utilitarian, "cost/benefit" arguments. And the experts who wielded these arguments had policymakers firmly by the ear.

To be sure, a few farmers complained when their fields were flooded by a hydropower project. But a geography-forced tradition of isolated farmsteads hamstrung any efforts to form a united front against developing Norway's "white coal." And though farmers had stood behind the writing of Norway's first constitution in 1814, their voice carried less and less weight as the population of industrial workers grew.

Farewell, Norway?

A nature-consonant Norway seemed on the brink of extinction. But even in this bleak postwar environment, a few hopeful buds began pushing their heads up through the packed earth and asphalt. The seedbed for these brave sprouts was a fertile blend of ideas from a variety of lands and times: On the Continent, Heidegger contrasted "*Oikos* and *Techne*," and Niels Bohr and the Copenhagen school laid the ground for the shift from "Newtonian" to the "new" physics. The Frankfurt school of sociology produced new ammunition for those critical of the "objectivity" of natural science. A tradition begun in the United States with Thoreau's *Walden* and "Civil Disobedience" blossomed later in the work of Buckminster Fuller, René Dubos, Lewis Mumford, and Anne and Paul Ehrlich.

In Norway itself the work of Peter Wessel Zapffe was a powerful and highly original voice for the preservation of nature's diversity. Arne Naess was studying Spinoza's ethics in high mountain camps, and together with his student Sigmund Kvaløy was propagating Gandhian nonviolent protest against the violence that was being done to the Norwegian landscape.

The growth in green ideas, though, was far from problem free in Norway. One of the first difficulties we in the green movement met came from

an over-reliance on *ecological* arguments for changing development policies. During the Mardøla/EEC years the hard data of this systems-oriented science served us well. But it wasn't long before the universities had laid claim to that territory, weeded out its normative aspects, and turned it into a descriptive academic discipline. Established "experts" closed ranks behind the politicians, disallowing any normative arguments from ecological thinking. Our protests in this vein were beaten back or ignored.

The motto among the green movement during the seventies had been "let a hundred flowers blossom." But instead of lending strength to the movement, this diversity often had the opposite effect: a "New Left" blended extraneous political philosophies with environmental work, and groups found it easier to go their own way than to iron out their differences and to cooperate. The diverse flora of green alternatives led to a fragmentation of the movement, a loss of enthusiasm, and eventually to "burnout."

A Native Alternative

As early as the mid-sixties, the search had begun for a new way of recreating a sensitivity to nature inspired by Norway's own cultural background. If we had become estranged from our home, we needed to find the way back. The reasons I and some others concentrated our search in our own neighborhood, so to speak, were twofold: the rich background from which we had culled our "new natural philosophy" was leading to a riotous diversity in approaches. Though all in their own way legitimate, ideas fetched from as far away as Eastern philosophy overlooked the fertile tradition of *friluftsliv* we had in our own land. Second, it seemed clear that intricate intellectual arguments could never substitute for a firsthand experience of free nature. As Konrad Lorenz put it, "Nature is immediately understandable": the most effective way to reintroduce Norwegians to the values of free nature was probably to arrange a face-to-face meeting.

Its Roots and Growth

The first overtures toward this reintroduction were made when we organized the Norsk Tindeklubben (Norwegian Mountain Club) at the Technical University of Trondheim. Until 1960 there had been only one moun-

taineering club in Norway, the Norwegian Alpine Club—a highly elitist group built on the model of the British Alpine Club with a membership limited to climbers whose achievements and character met the strict requirements of the club's founders. In contrast, the university club at Trondheim was open to any interested student.

Throwing membership open like this put a great deal of responsibility on those who lead club trips, since the hazards inherent to mountaineering had to be kept to an acceptable level. But this element of risk also turned our attention to the rationale behind mountaineering: why was this a good form of communicating with nature, and how could it best be practiced? These questions led us to investigate what might be called the "cultural history of mountaineering."

One of the first places we looked was naturally enough the impressive history of British and Continental mountaineering. That tradition is diverse, and occasionally contained expressions of a deeper sentiment for the mountains. What struck us about it, however, was its strongly *aggressive* strain: climbers seemed more interested in *conquering* the mountain with technical devices than they were in *touching* the mountain. Competition had priority over communication. In addition, both British and German mountaineers (there were exceptions; the Englishman Leslie Stephen was one) seemed very hesitant to speak of climbing except as physical battle, described in dramatic understatements.

On the other hand, there was a lively Norwegian tradition of exploration and mountaineering to draw on, with a markedly different tone. Fridtjof Nansen, polar explorer and humanitarian, was an especially strong inspiration. In 1888 this national hero had skied across Greenland, and in 1895 he set out on an (unsuccessful) attempt to reach the North Pole on skis. As Norway's ambassador to the League of Nations, he worked tirelessly to bring peace to a war-torn Continent—and in the meantime inspired many Europeans to take up skiing!

Nansen urged that an alternative rearing of youth should avoid the tendency toward "tourism"—superficial acquaintance—in all aspects of life. In addition, he contended that the use of technology in outdoor life had to be "appropriate," and that only an ample opportunity for life in free nature would foster responsible and mature people. Nansen's writing revealed a sense of cooperation with nature's awesome power, and equally important, a sense of joy in being in nature. And his belief that free nature was our true home was explicit:

> That which could revive us and lead us back to a more human existence is to take up a simple life in nature; in the forest, plains or mountains, on the high plateaus, in the great, lonely emptiness, where new and greater thoughts stream into us and leave a mark that cannot be easily erased . . . one feels something basic, something that feels like one's real self, and one comes back with a fresher and healthier view of life than we have in the city. In the wilderness, in the loneliness of the forest, with a view toward the mountains and a distance from clamor and confusion—this is where personalities are formed.

Mountaineer/poet Carl Rubenson (1814-1905) was also an inspiration. "There is much in a person," he wrote after returning from a long pilgrimage through the Himalaya,

> that present-day life, especially in the cities, does not call to use; half-forgotten abilities and instincts from a time when man lived together with nature, and had to struggle with nature's power to maintain his existence—we don't have to do that today. But there is still something left in us from those times. In every healthy human being there is a deep need to feel at home in nature, to show himself that his mind has roots, roots that haven't yet lost their grip in the earth. It is that need that drives us city folk out to the sea, into the forest, and up onto the mountains.

Even if this experience cannot, in the final analysis, be translated into words, it has been so important in our recent history that many Norwegians have tried. A sense for the Norwegian mountains "soaring out of the sea" is expressed in our national anthem written by Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson. Henrik Ibsen's poem "Paa Vidderne" (discussed in the Introduction) introduced the word *friluftsliv* to Norwegian literature in a paean to the rough purities of nature life.

Besides words, other mediums have also been used to convey a feeling for natural values. The music of Kierluk, Nordraak, and Grieg gave diversity and fullness to the expressions of a folk tradition with roots firmly in the land. Artists J. C. H. Dahl and H. Gude tried to portray nature's magnificence on canvas.

Something all of these artists, composers, and writers have in common is that they were all part of the Deep Romantic tradition of the nineteenth century. At a time when the industrial revolution was threatening to do its utmost to tear us *away* from our natural surroundings, the Romantic movement celebrated the possibility of our *identity* with nature. It hear-

kened to the joys found in unadorned nature, and claimed that we could find fulfillment of our deepest urges immediately there.

The Uniqueness of Norway

The message of Nansen, Rubenson, and the Romantics was not to be mistaken: they were pointing to a *re*discovery of free nature. The Romantic movement struck a deep chord in the soul of Norwegians, and led to a revival of a national identity: *this* is Norway, this is free nature, and we are unique as Norwegians to have it. The German philosopher Schelling's "Nature is visible Spirit, Spirit is invisible Nature" epitomized this reawakened sensitivity to the land. The implication, of course, was that contemporary Norwegians and Europeans in general had *already* lost that identity with nature. And this irony is reflected out by the beginnings of *friluftsliv* as a social phenomenon. Like the Romantic artists who traveled around Norway in search of subjects to paint, those who streamed out of the city in their wake were *urbanized* men and women. The natives of the countryside had, in a sense, never left the land, and so felt no need to be reunited with it. Instead, rural people played "interpreter," squiring city folk around so that the latter could "find their roots."

This sometimes presented an amusing spectacle, but the sincerity of these city dwellers should not be doubted. Even in those early days, the "civilized" inhabitants of Norway were realizing the heavy toll of being excluded from the "real" Norway—the Norway that was sung by the poets of the continent and of their own land.

This urge to regain citizenship in the "real" Norway still touches Norwegians deeply. Swedes and Danes use the term *friluftsliv*, too, but apply it to races on groomed ski tracks, painstakingly marked trails through rural farmland, or cabin-cruising through crowded holiday archipelagos. On the other hand, most Norwegian outdoorspeople react quite strongly if told they are *not* engaged in "genuine" *friluftsliv*. In Norway the word has a more limited usage, applying to activities in relatively untouched nature.

Rather than laying down fast rules for what these activities include, we can say that they show a respect for natural processes and for the realization of all life. They take place in relatively free nature, without the use of highly technical means of transport (e.g., motor vehicles). They present a diverse range of challenges to the total person, and are an opportunity for emotional, physical, and intellectual engagement.

We might also get a feel for what *friluftsliv* is by naming a few things it is *not.*

It is not sport, in the sense of physical activity in a selfish, competitive way, staying fit to compensate for an otherwise unnatural and unhealthy lifestyle. It does not take place in carefully prepared arenas designed to smooth out the "vagaries" of nature and ensure "fair competition" and exciting action.

It is not tourism, in the sense of the business and practice of rapid transit through different places. Such journeys are inspired by and produce a sense of alienation from our environment and the people around us.

It is not a scientific excursion, teaching us about the physical processes in nature, collecting specimens of objective interest. This approach to nature eliminates an emotive sense for nature, an essential poetry of the encounter.

It is not a "trade-show" style of grand Himalayan mountaineering expedition, featuring equipment, wealth, tourism, competitive adventures, display windows for sponsors, and use of nature as a "sparring partner."

It is not outdoor activity, in the sense of a safety valve for a fundamentally antinatural aggressive lifestyle. It is not meant to shore up our modern way of life, but to help us—as individuals and as a society—*out* of it.

Friluftsliv evokes such strong responses in Norwegian society because it evokes a *national* identity, a sense of really "belonging" to the land, a sense that predominated in Norway as recently as the Second World War. It conveys *social* identity in a similarly two-edged way, both as a "real" Norwegian and as a member of the upper class who must go *back* to nature. Finally, it conveys an *individual* identity in the same way that Nansen described, by paring a person built in the city down to some sort of "essential self."

In the Norwegian context, *friluftsliv* is a living tradition for recreating nature-consonant lifestyles. It implies making friends with nature and passionately recreating free nature's standing in our culture. It is an unselfish "I-Thou" relationship that tries to come away from the anthropocentrism of a nature-dissonant society.

A Friluftsliv *Seminar*

Both the "rationalism" and the "counterculture" that came to dominate Norwegian society in the postwar years dismissed cultural heroes like Nansen or the Romantic sentiments dripping from Dahl's canvases with

sniggers of skepticism. A modern world saw the Earth as a store of resources that had to be competed for and efficiently handled; "love" of nature lost standing. But however one might fault the Romantics' "inaccuracy" or "sentimentality," they legitimated a *feeling* for the wilderness, a feeling that was completely absent from the biological sciences that claimed to study nature "objectively."

And in the seventies, if our ecological arguments were routed by the scientific establishment, we could still point to "subjective" reasons to rescue nature—reasons that had been expressed a century before by the Romantics! The newborn Norsk Tindeklubben we had established at the Technical University of Trondheim aimed to put this emotive power to work. At an early stage we introduced engineers at the university to a different way of feeling the mountains—by climbing them instead of drilling them full of hydropower tunnels. The effect on many of them was remarkable. Though some of them went on to become dam builders with the government, their exposure to mountaineering colored (some have admitted) their designs and dampened their enthusiasm for these symbols of Norwegian national strength. This inspired us to continue to promote *friluftsliv* as part of a green movement.

A small organization, the *alpincenter* nevertheless survived (by never living beyond its means) and evolved into its present form as Norges høgfjellsskole (The Norwegian Seminar of Nature-Life and Mountaineering) nestled in the mountains of Hemsedal, Norway.

As mountaineering was little known to Norwegians, the curriculum was broadened to a more holistic "*friluftsliv* seminar" with backcountry Nordic skiing as a vehicle for communicating the values of free nature. Through a "values clarification" process, the negative trends of the modern way of life were unveiled, and alternative ways of life—or of "muddling toward frugality"—were worked out. At first the teaching method was fairly traditional—fixed, "military" pedagogy tried to implant the discipline needed to live with nature on its own terms.

Naturally, in the social climate of the seventies such methods were poorly received. It was clear that something was lacking in this introduction to nature, and the missing piece was discovered after an exposure to the ways of teaching in the more traditional communities of central Nepal. There, children are taught to live with the "serious" sides of nature through play. Not just a frivolous pastime, play is combined with useful tasks and with nature wisdom. But it remains play—a joyful activity, one that avoids breaking life up into tasks to be accomplished by efficient

thinking. Adults were "facilitators" and guides more than teachers in the common Western sense. This role was taken as a model for instructing in the seminars. The element of joy and "playlearning" in nature was realized, and the teaching method became a form of mentoring, or guiding. And since a person's own experience is of such importance here, often the art of guiding is the art of shutting up.

Friluftsliv has been sketched above as an attempt to break, even temporarily, from the traces of a highly technological society separating us from free nature. When we participate in it, then, we should attend closely to means that work against this separation. Current equipment catalogues are a poor guide for the perplexed. Tradition is much better. On a practical level, this implies a de-emphasis on clothing and equipment that are designed to *isolate* one as much as possible from the surroundings.

But the most important "how" is a process of "guided discovery": a participant is introduced to challenges that he or she can solve without serious risk to life. A "guide" starts with what is known and expected by the participant, and then "pulls" him or her into a stream of experiences toward the remote and unknown. To be "pulled into the stream" means to be pulled out of the position of spectator into the process of participation. The seminar, of course, should take place as much as possible in nature itself.

Without the possibility of making friends with free nature, we remain homeless in a world of technology. For a culture that has made the division of labor and big business a way of life, *friluftsliv* is a door into fresher air. *Friluftsliv* has a value of its own as a joyful "aha!" experience.

The original and "unabridged" nature—the archetypical—becomes a basic value. Manipulation of archetypical nature is therefore a way of degrading quality. The arts and sentiments are thus taken as superb ways of understanding life; positivist thinking is only of instrumental, and not intrinsic, value.

Today, the *friluftsliv* seminar initiated at Hemsedal has branched out to include joint seminars with other colleges and universities around the country, and participants in these seminars have the same standing as students in more traditional disciplines.

Relevance to Public Policy

The attempt to reintroduce Norwegians to the values of free nature at the

University of Trondheim has been going on in one way or another for over twenty years. What has happened in the public sphere during that time, and to what extent can the efforts initiated by the Norsk alpincenter take credit?

While current national policies can differ in their definitions of *friluftsliv* from the one I propose above, they are in agreement on perhaps a more important level: the White Paper on environmental policy in 1981 declared that "*friluftsliv* is of great importance in stimulating an environmental concern." The government is at present designing a comprehensive new policy, and as part of the process a committee, of which I am a member, is working on the plan. It is likely that Parliament will confirm the committee's goal to promote "harmony with nature," for a maximum of participants and with a minimum of necessary equipment, as the guiding rubric for recreation policy in the years to come.

It is almost always impossible to say with certainty who is responsible for which policy directions in a complex political process. Still, the workers and educators associated with the school in Hemsedal were key in turning official scrutiny on what until the sixties had been a blind faith in the benefits of economic growth. And having established themselves as legitimate voices on the political scene, long years of dialogue with public authorities seems to be having its effect.

A Political Tool?

Friluftsliv has had an effect on Norwegian politics, and this is due largely to a high public interest in it. Its ability to inspire people to new ways of thinking about themselves and about nature has been demonstrated again and again in our seminars. But is it well suited for a political strategy?

I think an interesting analogy here can be drawn with mountain rescue techniques, since what we are about here is a cultural rescue attempt, rescuing free nature from an avalanche of aggressive or hopeless human beings.

The most important element of both mountain rescue and cultural rescue is "preventive medicine." *Friluftsliv* can help prevent a catastrophe by showing how its own values avoid the global collapse our modern society is heading for. Centrally organized rescue expeditions are fairly ineffective when it comes to avalanche rescue. In the same way, mass environmental demonstrations can have some effect, but they can also conflict

with the sentiments in the community where they take place. And the groups that organize them can become top-heavy, clumsy, and too concerned about their public reputation to take effective action. Most of these actions are aimed at changing political institutions, and they can be useful; still, *activ*ism instead of *re*-activism, policy design instead of policy protest, is better. Avalanche victims don't live for long.

In any mountain accident, though, one's chances for survival are highest if competent comrades are nearby. And it is the same for cultural rescue attempts. Personal, grassroots contact is the way. Recreating the feeling of being *home* in free nature is the best prevention, and "*friluftsliv*-activists" can introduce others to a joyous encounter with free nature.

Personal friendships with nature are going to form the backbone in the efforts needed to rescue a nature in distress. Friendship with nature needs the same conditions for growth as human friendships: nearness (not objectivity), caution (without fear), intimacy (without pressure), and persistence (not endurance).

Conclusions

Carl Gustav Jung argues throughout his work in psychology that fundamental to all humans is a recollection of archetypes. Having lived for more than a hundred thousand generations in an environment where the nonhuman, rather than the human, was dominant, it should hardly be surprising that many of our archetypes involve free nature. To understand ourselves, then, to realize our potential for being a human being, we must communicate intimately with that which is—in some sense—the most *in*human: wild, undeveloped nature. *Friluftsliv*, in challenging us to respond in body, mind, and spirit with the rhythms of the natural environment, is our best opportunity for that development.

It is a paradigm shift: away from a dominant, "objective" view of nature and toward an emotive identity with it characteristic of Romanticism. By using the Romantic tradition as an example I do not mean we should become "romantic about the past." Rather, I mean that the search for a more multisided relationship with nature need not occur exclusively in Eastern traditions or in the "new physics." We have the roots for such a relationship in our traditional cultures, and we have not completely lost them!

More than just an individual pastime, this is a tradition inspiring an active response to an ecological crisis. It points toward a new way of living with other people and with our planet. Deemphasizing interhuman competition in outdoor activities weakens one of the driving forces behind our ecologically destructive social and political systems. *Friluftsliv*, then, is a poor "media event" in the eyes of the networks. In its proper perspective, though, it is more significant than an event at the Olympics—as much social movement as body movement. It is a step toward replacing the barriers keeping us from our true home by a lifestyle in which there is no need to seek this home. In this sense, the goal of *friluftsliv* is to make itself unnecessary.

"There is no way leading to peace," wrote Gandhi, "Peace is the way." *Friluftsliv* is not an armed battle, not a sports event, not an academic discipline, but a move toward lasting cultural change. It is a process.

Perhaps a slow process, though the growing disaffection with a "'normally" polluted environment could make the green wave crest sooner than we think. If it is slow, we must persevere; the motto for mountain climbing in Hemsedal seminars is "Don't let go the hold!" But *friluftsliv* is in many senses its own reward. Not a solemn attempt to go out and be miserable in nature, it is a lifestyle that nourishes hope and emanates strength.

The Way Is the Goal
Encountering free nature is an experience of joy.
There is no force stronger than joy.
Joy is the way Home.

Touch the Earth

A Conversation with Nils Faarlund

Q: *How did you become involved in* friluftsliv *guiding? What sorts of ideas were behind your involvement?*

Well, I was born on a farm before the Second World War, in Toten, near Olso, a region that was a kind of symbol for Norwegian agriculture, because it was quite an untechnological place; we used horses instead of tractors, et cetera. During the war we were closed off from the rest of the world, and we had to be quite self-reliant, using as much of the old lore as we could to get by. My parents also were fans of hiking, and I remember

that when I was fifteen years old I saved up and bought a copy of *Walden* and joined the Boy Scouts.

But the war was won by technology, and my father thought that was where the future was. So he wanted me to study in those fields, and I did. So I was influenced by a technological vocabulary and technical ideas. Throughout school I was really prodded to be smart, but still I began to feel a nagging doubt that this was the right way to experience the world. I didn't want to be in a technical field that separated human beings from nature, or was even hostile toward nature.

So I began to read Peter Wessel Zapffe, became interested in mountaineering, and in 1958 I and two others came together to establish the Mountain Club at the Technical University of Trondheim. Around 1960 Arne Naess came into contact with the club, and taught us a little about climbing and a lot about philosophy—mostly Spinoza. Arne was trying to get together an expedition to the west face of Tirich Mir in the Himalaya, which was conceived under the motto "The summit is not worth losing our toes"—it was the experience in the mountains that was important. The way was the goal. Unfortunately, out of consideration for my career as a biochemist, I didn't take the time to go on the expedition.

At the time I thought that biochemistry was going to be the answer for all of life's problems. Anyway, one of the things we discovered was that people who liked the mountains—even hydropower engineers—became furious when these mountains were desecrated by hydropower. So it was *that* which inspired us to think that *friluftsliv* could become a sort of movement for change.

When the green movement really got started, with Mardøla, we used ecology as an argument. But as I say, that wind was taken out of our sails by counterexperts who wouldn't accept normative arguments in ecology. So we moved into ethology, an attempt to get hard data for why people couldn't live without free nature. Desmond Morris's *The Human Zoo* was important, his thesis being that the city is about as good for humans as a zoo is for animals. And Konrad Lorenz's work was also important, and he got a Nobel prize, which carries a lot of credibility, so that came in very handy in terms of PR. Unfortunately, Lorenz's association with fascism made him rather suspect, so his work was no longer as credible as we had hoped, and that was the end of ethology as one of our arguments.

By that time some of us had been to Nepal, and anthropology became important as a tool against the Cartesian and Newtonian worldview. Looking at how other lands relate with nature continues to be an impor-

tant source of inspiration for us. Admittedly, we used these disciplines mostly as methods of persuasion; we felt the knife at our throats, that the crisis was acute. We felt as though we had to do something to change the situation, to protect our friend, nature. But in the end it became clear to us that only *friluftsliv* itself could convince people—living in the open air, and getting other people to come with us. These other disciplines were useful mostly as a way of verbalizing what must remain an experience. Communicating in this way is very important. But you have to be careful that you aren't using arguments that can be interpreted in ways that serve the kind of social trends you want to replace.

Q: *Your arguments are often for "nature-worth"* (naturverd), *and you prefer not to use the term "nature" or "environmental protection"* (naturvern). *Why?*

Because nature "protection" implies that we treat nature like an object, something to be set apart, preserved. The goal of nature protection is not ambitious enough. We say that people have a value in themselves. In a similar way we should say that nature has a value in itself, an intrinsic value. So if we live as though nature had an intrinsic value, we tend to touch it lightly. It becomes good to be in nature. Nature wouldn't be threatened. We wouldn't need to be ascetics in order to protect nature—quite the opposite: what is good for nature is good for us.

Q: *Still, "nature-worth" is a pretty unconventional expression. Do you think that most people have gotten so far away from thinking about nature in this way that they won't understand what you are saying?*

Possibly. But as Konrad Lorenz says, "Nature is immediately understandable." That's one reason why the best method for guiding people into the open air is to shut up. It's only after we have gone through a modern education that we lose this understanding. We become attached to a modern Newtonian worldview. *Friluftsliv* recommends that we jump over that education, forget it, listen to what nature tells us, let nature get into us, and use new expressions, if necessary, to describe what we have heard. We find especially good vocabularies for this with the North American Indians, the Sherpa people, the Samé—the old words are useful, while the new ones are often inappropriate. They call to mind the wrong images.

Q: *Still, even your description of* friluftsliv *seems quite different from what most Norwegians mean by the term. If they use it at all, they seem use it in as wide a sense as what you argue the Danes and Swedes use.*

True. But the people who *do* use the term in my sense happen to sit in the Ministry of the Environment, among other places. Most Norwegians think of *friluftsliv* a little differently than I do because most Norwegians have been influenced by the big business of outdoor recreation; they have gotten their idea of it from mass media, sports, et cetera. This common concept is much more oriented toward tourism and sport; one achieves social status by using high-tech, modern equipment, and so on.

Q: *So what you try to do is to lead people in Norway back to their own traditional roots?*

Right. *Friluftsliv* is one of the warmest words in Norwegian—even warmer than "love." So if you, as an industrialist, manage to connect the word to your product, you can become a millionaire. But there's hope, especially in some of the recent White Papers that have come from the government. I like to think that it is our activity, at our seminars and the like, that has gotten politicians to the stage of considering the thematic sides of *friluftsliv*.

Q: *Do you think that the only reason people with fancy modern equipment go out in nature is to show off their gear? Do you think they also have a sense for the values of free nature?*

Well, I think that everyone has a need to feel identity with nature. And the social, personal, national identity that *friluftsliv* provides in Norway is rather unique. That is why I think Norwegians react so strongly against accusations that they don't practice "real" *friluftsliv*. It is an assault on our entire national identity.

Q: *You speak of "touching the earth" and "touching the mountain." How can you tell when someone is "touching the mountain"?*

One criterion might be, for example, that you choose a good route—that is, so you can climb the mountain by fair means, with the least possible technical gear. We must try to use equipment common in Norway as recently as, oh, fifteen years ago. We need to make sure we don't lose the ability to obtain equipment that enables us to touch the mountain, or *friluftsliv* will become impossible.

The equipment used shouldn't be dependent on production by machines of the Newtonian paradigm; that in itself isolates us, distances us from nature. Buying this equipment just encourages the production processes that are driving nature to hell in a handcart. I don't mean you must not use *any* such gear, only as little as possible of it. The more we can become independent of this gear, the better. And we find that often the

traditional materials, cotton, wool, leather, are as serviceable as modern fabrics, or better.

Q: *Mountaineering, though, requires fairly sophisticated equipment just to keep the climber alive. So why should people climb in the first place?*

Well, if you never spend time with your friend, the friendship won't grow. So we have to get to *know* mountains, to know frozen waterfalls, even when they're vertical. Sometimes we have to stand a little bit on the shoulders of the Newtonian paradigm to get the equipment that enables us to know these places and at the same time makes our survival reasonably certain.

Q: *You are a mountaineer. Do you think that mountains are more valuable than other kinds of nature?*

No, not at all. I would say, in a modification of Arne's Tirich Mir motto, "The summit is not worth more than any other place." Being out in free nature anywhere has intrinsic value; it's not better to be out in the mountains than it is to be out on the plains. That is why I like to use the expression, "Nature is classless, open to all."

Q: *You say that we should seek an identity with nature, yet at the same time we have been parted from nature. So what do you mean by "nature"?*

Well, I prefer not to speak of humanity and nature, but instead, culture and nature. We have to live with the fact that nature can't be any more than a home, we can't just go in and disappear into nature, we're always going to be to some degree obvious. But we can behave in a whole variety of ways in our home, and this behavior is what we call culture. And our present culture is on a collision course with nature. *Friluftsliv* is one of a number of ways that could help us avoid this collision. It's a way of bringing us back to a contact with what we have already lost.

Q: *What do you think the prognosis is for finding our way home?*

It's ironic—after some really hopeful signs in the Mardøla era, we were hit by massive oil activities; "the black death," you might call it. Today I think Norway is one of the worst countries when it comes to culture's collision course with nature. People try to hide from this with alcohol, videos, windsurfing, mass media, and so forth. But when it's so black, it can only get better, and when the change comes, it will come quickly. And since it seems so black in Norway, I would say the change is going to come here before a lot of other places.

I think what happened in Alaska, the protection of 40 million acres, that was an inspiring bit of legislation. The dying forests in Europe have

really had an impact on the people and the governments there, especially in Switzerland. A huge protest against a hydroproject in Austria was responsible for changing the whole environmental policy of that country. In 1983, the West German Social Democrats wooed voters with the slogan "Peace with Nature: Vote Social Democrat!" In Denmark, a new municipal government rode in on a platform of "Nature protection is more important than full employment." In a sense, all countries in Europe have "green parties"—except for Norway.

Q: *Does Norway need a green party?*

It would be good to have one, but that's only one of the ways to eliminate our alienation from nature. There are other ways, and we shouldn't devote all our energy to just this one.

Q: *You say that* friluftsliv *is more than just city folks going out on hikes; you imply that it is an agent of paradigm shift. What kind of alternative society do you believe it can lead to?*

The kind of society it can lead us to is a way of life in which there is close daily contact with nature—"nature life." For example, if you live by the coast, you get some of your food from the sea, you have sheep and use their wool, and so on. This kind of life isn't *friluftsliv*; *friluftsliv* is for those who are barred from that life. It is to make people feel that they *can* be at home in nature again.

But I'll admit, I don't like to talk about how utopia is going to be, because that takes away the joy of creating it. Nature has to speak to the individual. Guides should point in general directions, say, "Look, here's a cultural star to follow, and we should keep our eyes on it." But people have to find their own routes toward those stars. Or stumble on the way. But stumbling's OK; we learn by stumbling; Norway's history is *full* of lucky stumbles. We are like the fairly tale figure Askeladden [literally; "Cinderlad"], who always finds himself in the most hopeless situations, but still manages to luck his way out of them. A string of "aha!" experiences, that's what all this stumbling is. Still, it would be nice to manage to be creative and avoid stumbling into crises.

Q: *Will a new "nature-life" mean the end of cities?*

I hope that people will come to see that big cities stand in the way of getting to know nature. A professor in thermodynamics I once met proposed that we build thirty-foot walls around all cities. Let people who like cities live there, and see how long they can hold out! In this sense, tourism is an evil—it gives people a taste of what they're missing, while letting them continue in their usual, nature-alienated lifestyles. Why not

stop tourism, don't let people breathe for a while, force people to see what they're missing!

Q: *That sounds pretty inhuman.*

Right! But who are *you* to think you are more important than nature?



Cascade with Snow Bridge (Finn Alnæs)

Chapter 6

Finn Alnæs

> Walking along the beach. Watching the sun go down. Is not what God has done well done?
>
> This is the planet we are born on, lie on, crawl on, stand on, walk on, freeze on, sweat on, kill on, love on—and finally are laid within. Is it all so wisely ordered?
>
> The Earth gives a day, a night, and a year with its movements around its axis and the sun. This is wisely ordered. The world has the materials you need, and you are given the ability to make good use of them. This is wisely ordered. Inside you there is both light and dark, as in space, and you are given the possibilities of good and evil.
>
> Take your world and do with it what you will. You may choose the game but you are among the rules.[1]

Finn Alnæs is one of Norway's foremost contemporary novelists. And he is the one literary figure to be explicitly involved in the country's ecological movement of the 1970s. From his practical efforts in the Mardøla action to his more artistic presentations of ecological questions in his novels, he has shown how literature in particular and the arts in general can be closely allied with the issues of deep ecology. In two sentences he sums up a creative philosophy that directs his artistic treatment of nature:

> Our old spectator attitude to nature is now unthinkable, because we now know that everything "hangs together" and we experience it as

such. I am for a fresh intensity in our conception of nature, because nature itself is threatened.[2]

We have chosen to concentrate on Alnæs's application of this intensity as a writer of fiction, rather than as an essayist or propagandist of the eco-movement. He himself gives the reason:

There is a marked difference between me and the ecophilosophers. As an artist I have an opportunity that they lack, namely to put persons in situations that urge them to act with their entire minds, even bodies. It's an outbreak from the human heart, expressed with, I hope, some intelligence and knowledge of our century.[3]

In explaining his own creative philosophy, he applies many of the terms used in deep ecology:

Diversity is the key. There are so many ways to say it. I am a *mangfoldist*, yes, of course. Art is the perfect place for diversity, where it must be considered as paramount.

But diversity can be dangerous as an all-powerful slogan. That is why the eco-movement failed. Everyone crying out in their own way in their own worlds. Lots of stars, but no real leaders, no unity, no agreement. Yes, there were a lot of strong individual personalities in this Movement, but what was there to hang it together?

We could never unify. And the authorities took our words. And no one would accept the new ones.

As an author, Alnæs is quite concerned with words and their precise meaning. He coined a word *samvern* to express a notion of conservation (*vern*) that would embrace all things (*sam-*), rather than narrower, more exclusionary concepts such as "nature" and "environment," which were co-opted by official bodies and institutions so that they no longer belonged to the protest of the people. But his new word did not catch on.

Some have said that the very individuality of Alnæs's approach to everything prevents his ideas from being widely accepted. This highlights a possible conflict between art and social action, again the basic question of unity within diversity and individual expression:

We must be clear, and embracing, but not shut out any of the many meanings of our position.

But, oh, there are conditions, consequences. When a man climbs up toward a summit alone, by a new route on a difficult wall, a hairline crack, one never knows exactly what he is doing. So it is with art.

> Now some climbers make a point of documenting all their climbs and letting everyone know it is they and not any other who has made the first ascent . . . but is that so important? Climbers must trust each other if they are to climb together. They must collectively see their goal. So it is with ecoactivists. But artists . . . with us we must encourage diversity above all.

Alnæs is skeptical of the influence artists can have in the current world, where mass media is the primary means of reaching most people, and people are more interested in hearing about famous people and "stars" than in the substance of what they say:

> But what shall we do? Knock on the door of the network and shout, "I want to speak to the people!" And then face the TV camera with rehearsed lines? No; just ten years ago one could write an article in any one of the major newspapers and it would be read by thousands. But no more. Our brains are numb. *No wonder the real artists are going into the catacombs.*
>
> No . . . the media has focused on our nonviolent actions, the protest against the damming of waterfalls. But the most important part of an action is the dialogue with the people through public debate. Yet that is not sensational. The media tried to create stars—and this is not hard in a movement with such strong personalities as Naess, Kvaløy, and Faarlund.
>
> But what about all those who have been forgotten!
>
> Those who really did the work. Even in my mind now they sink into oblivion. . . . Yes, this has been a Movement with a lack of human warmth . . . all this protest-camp romanticism, sad; . . . still, there is something essentially human about this lack.
>
> There is much to write about here: The coldness of silence; yes, silence can be disdain.
>
> What I am trying to say is this: we have all been false leaders. In my art, in my work, in my life, people come into focus and then fade. Something can happen now, something might happen, something must happen, but we need LEADERS!
>
> How shall we explain it this next time, how shall we make it clear? We must help the people, not try to convince them of anything. From among THEM shall the leaders sprout! We need more time! It is the only possibility.

Clearly Alnæs is somewhat bitter at the way things have turned out, or not turned out, for the Norwegian eco-movement, which once showed

such promise. He has written an entire novel about it, called *Dynamis*, which recounts the lives of several very different characters caught in the struggle of *samvern* in different ways. The philosopher Fartein Glitra struggles with his inability to connect his lofty ideals with practice and even to connect himself to other people. It is no secret that this character is largely based on Arne Naess, if turned into a caricature for emphasis.

The blacksmith Elias Brender struggles to come to terms with the memory of lost love, his own work, and the ecoactivism that is all the rage. But all is confused: in the excerpt we have selected here, Brender begins by leafing through stacks of Glitra's manuscripts, searching for some practical answers, and is later disturbed by the man himself.

It is in some senses a pointed fictional critique of the whole *idea* of an ecophilosophy with practical worth. The excerpts from Glitra's writings are somehow a bit more extreme than the works of the ecophilosophers of reality. *Or are they?* In another sense Alnæs presents a literary encounter between friends and ideals. Does too much abstract thinking prevent one from enjoying real contact with people and the world? This story pits ideology and dream against the hard, real need for friendship.

The Way of Two-ness

But nothing is everlasting. All is in dynamic change, and one death can be another's life. So it will be with the sun, when its hydrogen has been used up and transformed to other elements, its structure changed as it erupts into a supergiant. And after all possible fuel is used up, it will collapse into a white dwarf and in the end become merely a dark, cold, invisible heavenly body. Yet this does not mean that its final matter cannot end up in another area where the force of gravitation draws material together to form stars anew.

In this case, all life on Earth will have long ago evaporated, or perhaps the whole globe will be scourged, or boiled into a gaseous mass. Yet its material would then last on as a part of the dying sun.

Interesting, some will say. Others: discomforting.

But here, time is the deciding factor. The dimensions here are so inconceivably great that there are no grounds for fear. The sun has enough fuel to continue as it is for several billion years. This heals our earthly angst, and worries us only theoretically. A billion seems like an eternity to us, indistinguishable from 10 or 100 billion.

It is ourselves that we have to fear. We have found the means to destroy all that is here, and we have also accepted the possibility that we

may use these abilities. The Earth has stood and still stands at our disposal. But we must not take the right to prevail over all, and must declare our respect for that which is greater than ourselves.

Yet respect is not to be found! We, who were once fresh cells in the organism, have become a malignant tumor whose stifling tendrils have spread so thoroughly through everything that they cannot be severed without the death of the organism itself.

And when the cancer is complete we will have reshaped the entire Earth in our own dreadful image.

Elias Brender closes the book *Bombs and Stars* and slowly looks up. It has made the blacksmith dizzy, sitting at this desk, leafing through the books and manuscripts of his friend, the philosopher Fartein Glitra, coming from the cosmopolitan realms. Supernovas exploding. Catastrophes of the mind.

Is there really no hope for this man, this professor? Is there not a single glimmer of hope in his entire work? Was his lecture on "Astromia" last Monday in Oslo only an act, a farce for his fellowmen? Hmm . . . how was it that he began?

Astromia is more than all, and greater than the greatest. For it has no beginning and no end. Astromia was, is, and will be the uncountable universes. But stars arise and perish in the unending.

Yes, many had listened, with awe, confusion, and some with contempt. The lecture hall had been full of his followers, some well dressed, some unkempt: intellectuals, religious believers, anarchists, conservatives, nihilists, the ecopolitically concerned from all walks of life. Fartein's new interests in the stars and in human fellowship had disturbed some of his old fans. There had been many questions: "Are we to understand that the socialist and eco-struggler Fartein Glitra has become soft and spiritual in his old days?" Others were excited: "Don't you see! He will revitalize socialism!" Others put it point-blank and simply asked him, "Do you believe in God?"

Brender picks another of his friend's manuscripts from the vast collection on the shelves: "The Way of Two-ness. Guidelines for a teaching of friendship suited to the last half of the twentieth century." Still only preliminary. But something resounds so purely and singly with this "suited." A note on the binding: "Elias. Read the enclosed if you find time. Fartein." Brender chooses a page at random:

Every morning we turn toward the light of our sun, every evening we

turn out of it. Every year we make one more turn around this star. What can then make life worth turning further, into the fantastic life-dance of a star in the Milky Way?

My first and last answer is: friendship. Friendship is the basis for everything that can constitute human growth. When all else tumbles in ruins, you can find steady new grounds to live if you have a friend.

If you have a friend, you should simply be able to lift the globe on your shoulders. But one friend among billions of people does not shape the destiny of the world. If friendship shall shape history, we must go down into the ideological cauldron of our time, to emerge again with a standpoint tailored to all of society. To attempt this in a time when the chances for real friendship have fallen so low is an extremely tangled business, which, if a new solidarity is to be shaped, must . . .

Brender ceases reading, trembling, recalling how Glitra had ended his lecture. What did he mean with that final citation, " '*Eli, Eli! lama sabaktani.*' 'He shouts for Elias' "? What is this with the name Elias? What is it Fartein wants, beyond friendship? Has the smith done wrong?

Of course he is much more concerned with what his friend has written on the "Machine." Eagerly he grips a ringbound sheaf. On the cover stand only the words "The Machine," but on the title page there is more:

THE MACHINE
and
ECODYNAMISM

Foundation for an ecosocialistic dialectic

(an attempt to build up a philosophy and political platform for how humanity can become master over the Machine)

A little nervously he focuses attention. Might there be a link here to the cryptic lecture on Astromia? A powerful battery of words. There:

It is unbelievable just how conservative people of all political camps have become, both radical and socialistic. Each holds steadfast to the same old truths.

Yes, this is all fine and good, but what else? The Machine! Where? "We do not want an astromantic escape . . . " Yes, there! The smith holds the binder at a distance to get a better look at the whole page:

We do not want an astromantic escape to green paradises. We know that

humanity today cannot maintain itself without the Machine and the city. So we must introduce the term "natural city."

The natural city is as much a part of the ecosystem as an anthill. It does not consume the surrounding countryside. It never becomes a megalopolis, with slums and industrial wastelands, home to rootless urban man who is lured from the country by the promises of the Machine and Capital, which have themselves taken away his job.

The natural town arises and is attained only rarely in a society driven by a "free" economy and high technology, because Capital follows the Machine. The more effective the Machine becomes, the more compatible is its voice with the profit system. Capital pursues the Machine and soon leads the whole of humanity into an abyss. Neither the Machine nor Capital are dialectic. They are pragmatic from prognosis to prognosis, even from day to day.

The natural city, and all of humanity, is in our time dependent on a strong ideology that controls the Machine, and thus Capital. But such an ideology is nowhere to be found. We find only an "ism" would like to crush Capital, but Capital cannot be crushed in the foreseeable future. It can only endure.

Cease or control the Machine, and you cease or control Capital *in our own time*. Science follows Capital and the Machine about the whole world. And the Machine can do no less than use up the soil and earth as itself decides. I repeat: *The Machine itself is a deciding being.*

The smith turns the pages hectically. What more, what more on humankind? There:

Before we try something as difficult as new socialistic thinking, we must take a standpoint on the odd question of why the cultural blossoming of the working class has failed to appear.

Many excuses have been given. But who can we excuse? The small intellectual portion of the working class? This is hardly sufficient. The rest of the working class, the majority, shall they be excused?

But first we must tackle a second question: How can the cultural roots of the working class be defined through the industrial working class?

Where did the industrial workers come from? The cities were once relatively small, especially before the industrial revolution.

They came from "the land," as we have seen.

It was not the great farmers or their oldest sons who came. It was the underprivileged, the maligned, the ill-treated men and women from the lower ranks of rural society.

Fishermen had their cultural tradition, foresters had theirs. But first and foremost were the smallholders, with their craft and folk life, who were the culture-bearing class.

I believe the majority of those who went to the cities carried this humble background as they began to identify themselves with the city proletariat to whom they soon belonged as a new oppressed class. They pulled up the roots from their own culture-soil and the industrial working class had no such roots. So the newcomers set theirs down anew.

But if we shall today search for a new blossoming, toward what trade group can the modern industrial worker look for inspiration?

Again we must turn our eyes to smallholders and householders, for it is just these folk who constitute the prototype. In addition to the culture-root prototype they had themselves initiated, they found new value in the power of their expert and applied artistic capability. The prime example was the *blacksmith.*

The smith is the predecessor of both the industrial worker and the engineer. From the moment man took metals unto his possession, the prototype appeared, and it wove itself through fishing and farming culture and came out again in the culture that was the next-to-last decisive prototype, the old smith who could make and replace anything; this man who stands close enough to our time that many alive can still remember him well.

The tragedy of the working class is that, in the race of techno-specialization, they have lost contact with their own means of creation. The versatile smith has become alienated, thing-oriented. And the work is no longer a means for expression. The connection to the culture-bearing prototype has been broken. There has been a natural tendency to forget old humilities in the capitalistic system, which is the reason that the cultural blossoming does not exist.

What we therefore must do is to shape a concrete picture of the many functions the smith had in rural society before it was swallowed up. And since a few of these smiths are left, we have the possibility to shape a correct picture!

Every parish that has such a smith is a better and more self-reliant parish than one that does not.

Brender smiles just a bit at his friend's somewhat flattering, if idealistic words. The intentions seem good, but where in all this can one find something with relevance to concrete action here and now? Another manu-

script: "The Misery of Science." He turns and looks for the concrete message. Working folk want messages, and keep chatter to a minimum. Words that don't evoke a message here and now do not meet the workers in their hearts, and are then regarded as chatter. There?

> We natural scientists stand to become speechless animals in an abstract data-landscape that manifests itself concretely in new bombs and rockets, new industrial products, new computer terminals. In every single field each of us has become specialized within tiny, bounded areas, and we can talk only with difficulty to colleagues within another specialty.
>
> The more there is a shortage of interaction between unlike fields, the less interaction there is between us and the people. This is an even greater catastrophe, and it is upon *this* that we shall be judged. We do not serve humanity from a common ground, but haphazardly introduce one dangerous implement after another, without giving the people any opportunity to keep tabs on us.
>
> How can they hope to reach us when we cannot even reach each other? Our muteness, our own pitiful verbal closure, which has led to our misery, leads on to the misery of man. So few of the world's politicians realize that while they talk of arranging the world, we researchers and observers are busy reworking its very foundations.

Yes, yes, well said, but the same can be said for the Devil: No instructions. One can become impatient with the likes of Fartein. Yet in his lecture he had said, "I say to you: The needs of our time reasonably require *desperate actions*." But what sort of desperate actions? Reading on:

> . . . a philosophy that can gather, animate, and express all the most essential traits of everything we know today, that lives and can live, and that does this in the rich language of the people, full of concrete examples. A thinking that takes up corrective work, finding the old place of philosophy once again, uniting life, science, and political ideology with itself in powerful interpretation of the world. A philosophy that does not ask natural science or any other partisan discipline for laws, but takes its own right to do that which must be done *if the whole world of today shall step forth from a single place.* It is possible that this exercise cannot be solved philosophically. But we can at least try.

My God! My God, not a single concrete message! And so perhaps this cannot even be "solved philosophically"!

One last paper: "Astromia." Yes, what does this contain? It looks to be only a rough draft, with the subscript, "an attempt to solve the big question posed in *The Misery of Science*," but . . . but in this book . . . *only blank pages!*

Come now, Elias, you must not be unjust with your friend. The word "Astromia" was explained last Monday:

Astromia is real and infinite, and not only do we see parts of Astromia around us, but we ourselves are in Astromia. We live in Astromia.

Yes, I know you shall reject any word that gives false conceptions of space and the bounded, and this goes for all the names humanity has heretofore come up with for Astromia: all, everything, the world, the whole world, worldspace, lifeworld, cosmos, and the universe: these words each have too many meanings. Why is this so? Scientists wish to stake out a bordered area in which to rule over matter. . . .

A creak of the door. Fartein has entered, come in from the cold. Brender would like to stir up the coals in the fireplace, but his friend turns to him and will come straight to the point.

"I have a weight on my heart," begins Glitra slowly, "if I have a heart, and this is the question: Do I have a heart? I have my doubts."

The smith laughs and assumes the good Glitra has dipped his nose too long in the beer barrel.

"I am serious, Elias. And I ascertain that this ought to disturb me."

"I don't know what you mean," comes out a little grimly from the smith.

"Understandably. And I shall clarify. I have known for a long time that I treat you like a bastard."

No, now the smith must laugh quite heartily, and he does this approaching tears. The philosopher shakes his head, and when Brender eventually ceases to laugh, Glitra nods, meaning that this is enough, and proceeds:

"I come to be a friend, and now listen to me: I talk of friendship, and the Way of Two-ness, and I reason that I do not have the right to do this. The fact is: I stand, and have always stood, in a calculating relation to life, and I feel little of what friendship really is. But I ascertain what it is: that I must execute certain programs to be a friend. So I do this, neither zealously nor with hesitation. And can you forgive me this?"

Brender regards him slowly. Glitra continues:

"What I mean is: I cannot feel joy, or sadness. I have nearly no emotions at all. I am bound in, ice cold. And my question is now whether you

can forgive me this, and if you hereafter can forego the feeling of disgrace on my behalf when you hear me speak of the Way of Friendship. To my defense I can cite the following: My thoughts on friendship and culture are as much a charge against myself as against the crises of our time. I have the working hypothesis that if I, through these little philosophical writings, can take the way of thought down to my little petrified heart, and wake it from the dead, then the writings can be a seed for change in our society. This awakening will then mark itself, and light a possible path to the many others who have also lost the shape of their hearts."

The smith gapes wider. So moved is he that he only whimpers the words with trembling jaws:

"You treat *me* like a bastard?"

"Yes. I harbor an egoistic reasoning art of an almost professional nature. And you represent all that is lacking in me. I calculate, purely logically, that you must be the most *living* person I have ever encountered. And I warm myself with you. Or, better: I *try* to. And not only this. I learn from you also as a philosopher. You possess a wisdom that is near to the Earth, which I myself am missing. An entrance to your unconscious, a being-in-nature. So, as a philosopher, I steal from you, and set *your* thoughts in a system that can command rational respect. Hmph."

"What is all this nonsense? Aren't you a friend? No, knock it off, Fartein, these are my words: One can get twisted in the head from too much philosophizing."

But the other does not give in:

"This is just what I'm saying. My heart is not with me. It's all an intellectual computation that yields a categorical imperative: this or that *shall* you do. Can't you see this? I figure that I lack something, and I am not in doubt that my sanity depends on it. So I manage accordingly, but without deeper feelings."

Pause. The smith's head is starting to swim.

"Have you no joy when helping me in the forge?"

"Joy? . . . I calculate what that must be, but I know little of it."

"Do you find no joy in discovery, insight?"

"Yes, that is surely the single deep joy I have had. And the sinister pleasure of cynicism."

"So are you then compelled to seek me out here in the countryside out of your 'misery' back in Oslo?"

"Just so. Misery. That is the word."

Pause. Stillness so close to them.

"Elias. I sit here and tell you that I am simply not your friend. I have no component of emotion for such things. I am no one's friend. Not even my own. I am a brain that seeks after its lost heart. And I have the egoistic belief that you can help me. Merely by being here. Near. Permitting me to act as a friend. Perhaps, Elias, I will even awake one day and become a person."

Now the smith rises abruptly and paces around the room.

"What you see is one thing. What I see, Fartein, must also be taken into account. And I see you as someone I could be stranded together with on an iceberg."

"Doubtless. And I entrust to you an iceberg that could bear only one of us, because I would commit suicide."

The smith stops, his eyes glaring at the other, who merely continues:

"Yes, it is such, Elias. I can commit that which is cold-blooded as long as my clear thoughts lead me to it. For inside me I find the dearth of emotions that is the plague of our time. I have said too much, learned too much. I have taken in this whole century. Most others are glad that this century has imposed itself on them, and stifled them. But regardless of how one sees it, the result is the same. We have been cut short, truncated. I *know* my heart is cold. The masses do not know their hearts are cold. They eat frozen dinners in front of their TV sets, and suspect nothing of their own inhumanity. Because I can demonstrate my own inhumanity, I am especially suited to deliver some timely words, if I can only manage to express myself in the language of ordinary people."

"And so you see me as some sort of link between you and 'ordinary people'?"

"Yes. But I see you not only as a link, but also as a . . . "

The smith spills some glowing slag on the floor.

"You flatter me. And here is something that hasn't been voiced: You insist that you are without emotion. But then how could you be speaking to me as you are?"

"This is antiseptic philosophical reasoning without heart. I have, as I have said, believed in a cultural blossoming before the material collapse. I know where I have failed."

The smith paces faster, and stops.

"Then you have changed nothing. I accept you as you are."

"You must judge me upon my actions to you."

"If you insist."

Short silence. Glitra:

"But a person like me is not to be depended on. There is clearly something demonic about me, and there can be moments in our friendship I fail to see because my heart is so cold."

"Are you saying that you could be an unhealthy influence on me?"

"I calculate that I lack the inner radar to sense through your consciousness."

"You think I'm an enemy vessel, or what?"

"Are you? That is what I calculate for my own self-defense. But to and fro I see you also as a child who never grew up, and I recall Iago and Othello."

"Then you are my Iago?'

"In a way. Unproven. Another sort of Iago, with a certain seductive element, a poison which whispers in the other's ear . . . "

"Oh, Fartein, you Fartein!" Brender laughs heartily once again. "Rest your poor brain! You look worn out. Now you shall either eat or sleep. Choose!"

"Then we'll eat a little. I'm sick of company."

And Glitra sinks down into the sofa. Brender goes off to the kitchen. Amid the preparations he calls back:

"Fartein. You call yourself a socialist, and have been quite active. But if I hear correctly that socialism is a matter of the heart, then you have never been a socialist. You may have read much, from Marx to all those other ideologues. But there is no intellectual road to socialism. You must first have your heart in the right place before you can take those ideological drills. Have you thought of this, that perhaps you have *never* been a socialist?"

The philosopher is taken aback:

"No, I haven't. But you may be right. I have only acted as a pure intellectual, without the right heart, as I have acted as a friend without being a friend."

He grumbles a little, and decides that this is a good question, or at least an adequate question. He shall have to look into it, but now he is too tired. He sinks more comfortably into the couch, and closes his eyes to invoke the higher powers in the swirling mist. Now he has given his whole self over to rest, and he begins to murmur pleasant dreams.

Elias Brender chuckles from the kitchen, as he hears the snores. Yes, this philosopher has his passion; Brender even knows now what he called it. For now he remembers more clearly how that lecture had ended, when someone asked Glitra what he thought about God:

. . . Astram, derived from Astromia. Astram can be the name of the possibility of a higher law of nature that stands over all the laws of nature we know. But we cannot mark Astram with anything more than a question mark. Pay attention to that: Astram is a word, only a sigh in the silence. Matched with watchful candor—this is my scientific attitude. But you may consider me only as a dust speck in Astromia, and scarcely even that, as I feel enough that the distances between *particles in the macrocosmos and microcosmos are the dominating features of Astromia. The distances between particles in an atom are proportional to the distances between the sun and the earth,* or *between the sun and the neighboring stars. Astromia consists primarily of enormous between-spaces. I believe, therefore, as a human speck of dust, that Astromia must be considered to be predominantly dark and cold, a hell's hood at the visible points: Stars, et cetera. Yes, seen hostile with the eyes of Man. And when I listen for Astram, I hear the electric current from my own brain, which calculates that a natural law must exist that stands over and embraces all the natural laws we know. Coldly and mathematically I can say with all probability that some great influence and unknown, which we may call Astram, must exist. I am a* religious heathen. . . . *I underscore this, as a religious heathen, who has been moved by these, the words of a crucified man: "My God, My God, why have you forsaken me?* Eli, Eli! lama sabaktani." *"He shouts for Elias."*

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

Nunatak (Anna-Eva Bergman)

Chapter 7

Johan Galtung

Johan Galtung has been called many things: "the most prominent social scientist Norway has produced in the modern age," "the worldwide intellectual advocate of the suffering and the oppressed," or "the kind of professor who is constantly moving from one university to another, and when he does, both institutions gain in status."

Most of Galtung's extensive work is stamped with his penchant for symmetric systems and clever models that make everything look far too simple and straightforward. These elaborate world models and systematizations of concepts as broad as "peace" and "development" are never meant to be taken as doctrine or description, but more as tools to help one shape one's own view of the world and its problems. They are meant to encourage readers to reflect for themselves.

Galtung is probably best known for his founding role in the discipline of *peace research*—the academic study of worldwide ways to reduce violence.

One might say that PEACE! is the top norm of any of Galtung's systems. So like Naess's Self-realization, this concept must be wide ranging and flexible. His early definitions of peace began with a distinction of two types of violence: Structural (vertical) violence is inherent in the system, in the society itself, including poverty and legalized repression. Direct (horizontal) violence is the more familiar kind, where disorder occurs be-

tween two individuals or groups—as in wars, fights, and revolts. Peace is defined as the absence of violence, more specifically "the absence of classical violence and the absence of poverty, repression, and alienation."[1]

Galtung's concern with reducing structural violence has brought his attention to structures that cover the whole world and particularly to the wide question of strategies for "development." Considering the inevitable ecological impact of any large-scale development strategy, Galtung's work in this area has taken up many of the questions central to deep ecology.

As a student at the University of Oslo in the early 1950s, Galtung naturally came under the influence of Arne Naess. With the latter he studied logic and the philosophy of nonviolence according to Gandhi, and they collaborated on two books: *Gandhi's Political Ethic* (1955) and the textbook *Introduction to Logic and Methodology* (1960). In a sense, Galtung has carried Naess's interest in modeling and symbolic logic farther and more rigorously than his teacher ever could. Arne himself notes, "When Johan gives a lecture and presents one of his models, he might say 'we have five categories here . . . ' and will proceed to name all five. I, on the other hand, will most likely forget numbers four and five before I am finished with two and three."[2]

And there are some basic differences in the approaches of the two researchers. While Naess argues for a change in our personal values and way of perceiving the world, Galtung believes that these can best be effected by change in the organization of society itself:

> To rethink and refeel our nature and destiny is to ask for more than a change in attitude. It asks for a total reorientation of the purpose and destiny of the whole Western exercise. The conclusion more easily arrived at would be that structures should be changed, for [they] are far more flexible than human needs or the laws of nature.[3]

With such a view in mind, it is not surprising that Galtung has been highly critical of an approach to environmental problems that emphasizes technological solutions without deep structural change. He responded in the following way to the publication of the MIT computer modeling study *The Limits to Growth*:

> What is almost incredible is that it has not struck the authors that the three components of their coming apocalypse—overpopulation, overpollution, and overdepletion—are exactly the three conditions under which perhaps the majority of the population of the world are already living, and have been living for a long time.

> When the evils are placed at the foot of the weak they are not resisted, not even pointed out, because the weak are too weak to do so . . . [as their] life is a struggle to obtain very primary, essential goods. No cry of WOLF printed out by a computer in the very center part of the Center part of the world can change these priorities.[4]

His alternative, which consists of the theoretical bases for a restructuring of society, has been closely tied to an understanding that comes from nature. In his influential work on method in the social sciences, *Methodology and Ideology* (1977), he writes:

> I would be inclined to say that the best we can do with nature is to know her laws, which I understand as absolute invariances, and align our activities with them. But the best we can do with society is something else: to only accept the invariances so long as they serve us, and then look for ways of breaking them. I see man as small relative to nature and essentially riding on nature's waves, but, as mentioned, I see man equal to society, sometimes riding on the waves, sometimes creating them.[5]

It is this vision that is elaborated in the following essay. As with much of Galtung's work, a model is presented in the form of a diagram, and then elaborated in the text. The essay explains the diagram, not the other way around, and should be read in this way. It is an attempt to utilize the term "development" to imply positive change in four simultaneous "spaces" of existence: nature, human, social, world. Galtung suggests that the other three spaces have the most to learn from the nature space and that our growing understanding of that space aims to show how fruitful diversity/symbiosis thinking is. These are the ingredients of ecological balance, and he remarks that "there is something absolute about that balance, which we cannot deny when we talk about the other spaces."[6]

It is important here to remember that the whole thing is a model, only a device. It is a communicative tool, and Galtung often trades in one of these devices for another when he thinks it may help us to understand the problem better. The model is always moving—"history is a process, not a structure," says Galtung.[7] These metaphors and analytical devices we choose are always revisable, merely fleeting attempts to pin down the swirling, changing dynamic of life. Because one's position is never constant, we must accept flexibility if we are to respond to the challenge that the tackling of global problems presents.

Development Theory: Notes on an Alternative Approach

Development theory is a holistic approach to human society, in principle, and dynamic, as the word indicates. However, in practice, it has become sadly different. Instead of holism there has been a focus on the economic aspects of the social space of human existence; instead of dynamism there has been a focus on the capacity to emulate certain societies held to be "developed."

This type of approach, which has shown a remarkable ability to survive the presumably mortal attacks directed against it, has left out *nature* space, the setting for ecological balance, on which the human condition is absolutely predicated; it has left out the (inner) *human* space of mental and spiritual development; it has left out other aspects of the *social* space (although there is now, largely thanks to Reaganism, a renewed interest in political development and the theory of democracy), and it has left out the whole space of regions and countries in conflict and cooperation.

The word "space" has been chosen to acknowledge that these four approaches are simultaneous and coexistent, and that we must avoid thinking of them in terms of levels, with nature at the bottom. This essay will show that all four spaces can learn from each other, but that *nature has the most to teach us.*

At present we are given a theory of development so miserable that it is incapable of foreseeing ecological imbalances, incapable of taking into account diseases of the human body *caused* by "civilization" (heart diseases and cancer, mental diseases and the general sense of meaninglessness), incapable of handling problems of gross social maldevelopment (e.g., bureaucratization, militarization, and other forms of top-heaviness; lack of participation in general; flagrant inequalities) and incapable of handling the world system and facing the consequences of this maldevelopment. The point here is not that the practice is unable to solve these problems, but that the problems are not accommodated in the original theory, and thus not even foreseeable—though they are so readily observable by all of us today.

Four Spaces and the Assumption of Isomorphism, Departing from Nature Space

The following, then, are some intuitions for an alternative theory, based on the primacy of nature space, to show how thinking in terms of diver-

sity and symbiosis is quite fruitful for all the spaces concerned. There are three good reasons to try to learn from nature space:

1. Nature has been around much longer than we have. As a whole it has changed and differentiated, evolved what are usually referred to as higher forms—we humans usually appropriating for ourselves the title of the highest. Consequently, there must be some inherent "wisdom of nature," whatever its roots, something from which we can learn.

2. Nature space is basic; all the others depend on it. Whereas nature can very well survive without human beings around, without our social and global spaces, we depend on nature, not nature on us; we even destroy nature as evidenced by the ecological crisis today, and more so than nature has been destroying us through its natural calamities. When considering the old ecological chain, the homosphere is but a small, and highly expendable, part.

3. Perhaps our insight into nature is better than our insight into ourselves. This may be due to several reasons, of which two stand out. There is a distance between ourselves and the rest of nature that perhaps facilitates objectivity, or knowledge. Of course, a priori we might assume even more insight into the other three spaces because we are in them and of them and by them. But precisely for that reason it may be more difficult to achieve the distance necessary to arrive at some fruitful general conceptualizations. *We are too close to see ourselves*; there is too much at stake in our subjective values and interests.

Imagine that we now, at the point of departure, assume that there must be some basic similarity in the logic of balance of the four spaces, and that balance is a major component for self-generated reproduction. The point of departure is the general theory of ecological balance in *nature space.* By this we mean a nature space that includes abiota as well as biota. For the present purpose it is sufficient to state a basic insight into ecological balance: it is based on *diversity and symbiosis.* If a given part of nature space has sufficient diversity in abiota and biota (including access to energy from the cosmosphere, in particular solar energy) and its diversity is made use of by the system for symbiosis so that its parts interact with each other and generate new abiota and biota in repeated or changing exchange cycles, then after some time a *form of reliable balance* should be the result.

This is plausible because it is so easily seen how a system in nature space might collapse: through *lack* of diversity or through a malfunctioning of the symbiotic mechanism. The former is seen in monocultural agriculture, which was to be maintained artificially by supplying diversity through manures and pesticides at the expense of pollution. The latter is seen in the nuclear winter, where the basic assumption of the scenario is that due to clouding of the atmosphere the interaction with the cosmosphere is reduced so that the major form of symbiosis in the nature space—photosynthesis—no longer functions.

We shall refer to the joint function of diversity and symbiosis as "system maturity," and a general outline of our thought, in all four spaces, is indicated in Table 1. The reader will find on the left the four spaces and along the top nine headings, where the first two are simply the spaces and subspaces. There are the obvious divisions of nature space. Then comes the human body, *soma*, that can be seen as a part of the *human space*. A distinction has been made between *mind* and *soul*. The former is seen as the seat of emotions and cognitions, the latter as the seat of *self-reflections* on many things. It is this complexity that constitutes the *personality*, while no clear lines can really be drawn. The human space keeps it all together.

In *social space* a distinction has been made between micro, meso, and macro levels. The former is the small group surrounding any individual, based on kinship and friendship. The second would be the local level of social organization in a territorial sense and secondary associations based on values and interests. The third could be seen as the national or state level.

Finally there is the *world space*, of interacting social spaces of all kinds. Regardless of what kind of actors one can find in this space, a distinction between global and regional systems must be made.

The Code of Systems

Looking at the second column, what one finds is a very conventional hierarchy of increasing complexity, starting with cosmic energy and solar rays, and ending with world systems. It is a hierarchy of Chinese boxes—open one and inside you will find the next level, open that one and you find the next one, and so on. But each space is steered by its own logic; each space has what in the third column is referred to as a *code*, or a pro-

gram. The programs are rules of transformations, defining the processes of that space as goal-seeking entities with complex feedback relations.

Thus each organism in the nature space is the carrier of a genetic code that can be transmitted through acts of reproduction. The genetic code gives us the upper and lower limits of that entity, in terms of differentiation, complexity, and so on. The same is true of the somatic aspects of human beings. In addition humans have personalities that we define as the code for their nonsomatic aspects. These are the propensities of mind and soul, the characteristics that make it easy to continually recognize one person from one day to the next. A dramatic aspect of the spiritual capacity of a human being is the capacity to reflect on one's own personality, and possibly change it.

Then there is the social space. The code is here seen as being built into the structure and the culture in an implicit form, and into the ideology in an explicit form—explicit meaning "spelled out."

In world space this becomes more complex, since we are dealing with so many larger systems. In this space it makes sense to talk about "deep structure" and "deep culture," meaning by that the structural and cultural elements that different societies or systems in a region have in common. One might even identify a "cosmology," the personality of a civilization. And that raises the question of whether there is such a thing as a code for a true world space, encompassing everything, a deep human ideology beyond the genetic code.

The Maintenance of Systems

Let us now go on to the next column of "system maintenance." The two key concepts in this column are "needs" and "interests." We shall define them as the essential conditions for system maintenance. If the needs of an organism are not satisfied then that organism disintegrates. This of course applies as well to human beings. And our needs can probably be best understood by studying the human being as a biological organism, paying particular attention to sensory impressions and mental reactions. There is a need for rest, a need for activity.

Maybe it can be argued that biological needs of humans fall into two categories: simple *survival*, which at the individual level means not succumbing to violence—direct or structural. In addition it means procreation, so that the human species will continue. But on the other hand

Table 1. Development Goals: A System Approach

Space (1)	Subspace (2)	Code (3)	System maintenance (by definition) (4)	System maturity (diversity and symbiosis) (5)	Reproduction (using maturity) (6)	Resilience to violence		Maintenance goal (9)
						Direct (7)	Indirect (exploitation) (8)	
Nature	Cosmosphere Atmosphere Hydrosphere Lithosphere Biosphere	Genetic code	**Bio-needs**	Several biotopes and exchange cycles	Renewal	Injury to needs	Injury to renewal capacity	**Ecobalance**
Human	Body—soma Mind—psyche Soul—spirit	Genetic code Personality	**Bio-needs** other human **needs**	Several homotopes and exchange cycles	Reproduction Recovery	Injury to needs	Injury to reproduction and recovery capacities	**Health**
Social	Micro—primary Meso—local secondary Macro—tertiary national	Structure Culture Ideology	Social **interests**	Several sociotopes and exchange cycles	Reconstruction	Injury to **interests**	Injury to reconstruction capacity	**Development**
World	Regional	Cosmology	Regional **interests**	Different systems in active and peaceful coexistence	Reconstruction	Injury to interests	Injury to reconstruction capacity	**Peace**
	Global	Global Cosmology/ human cosmology as a whole	Global **interests**					

there is the need for something more than that—let us simply call it the human *well-being*.

It is readily seen how dependent all of this is on *nature*. Nature is the space in which we act and rest. It supplies our most indispensable inputs and receives and transforms some of our outputs. For nature to be able to accommodate human beings, it has to be strong, particularly if human beings act like parasites. And since human beings are biological organisms with personalities, they have other needs that may not be compatible with the stability of the nature space in which we are embedded. In short, we can be *bad guests*.

How, then, does one approach the problems of nonbiological human needs? Elsewhere I have tried to classify them in two groups: *identity* needs and *freedom* needs.[8] They are dialectically related. Identity needs demand some fixed point, some nucleus around which the individual can build and extend unions over and above its organismic self. Freedom needs are the needs for space, for somatic, psychological, and spiritual movement, in search of union or away from union. And perhaps freedom needs also include the need to be able to escape from oneself, in other words, to change, from time to time, the codes embedded in one's personality.

Let me proceed from these remarks to the complex subject of *interests*, in social space and world space. What would be the interest of a social system? How, for instance, could one today conceive of "national interests"? Cutting through a long debate, could one not simply say that *a social system has but one legitimate interest: that of satisfying the basic needs of its members?* And then one can discuss who the members are; are they only human beings, or could they also include other organisms? In that case would they include all animals or only some of them? I do not claim to have an answer, only pointing out that these questions should *never* be eliminated from the agenda of a good society.

I would say that the same applies to more complex groupings, all the way up to the world space. The world interest is to satisfy the needs of its members. And since the latter still depend on nature space, and as the needs of organisms also depend on abiota, there is a limit to the extent to which one can destroy them. So, ultimately, we depend on ecological balance in a superspace comprising all four spaces.

The Maturity of Systems

And that leads us to the fifth column, "system maturity." This is where

the bald assumption enters: system maturity is by definition based on the level of diversity combined with the level of symbiosis between the components that constitute the diversity. The assumption, then, is that the higher the level of system maturity, the more resilient is the system, the more able to maintain itself and create new generations, to withstand various injuries, and to set realistic goals for itself within the conditions of its maturity.

In all spaces this calls for many possibilities that work together. Let us refer to these types as *biotopes* in nature space, *homotopes* in human space, and *sociotopes* in the social and world spaces. Let us further assume a Chinese boxes logic again: the world space is an extremely rich sociotope, in interaction so far with no other sociotope, and all the others are nested within.

Thus, on the one hand one could imagine a world space consisting of a number of societies of exactly the same type, based on exactly the same low numbers of components, populated by human beings of a uniform kind, who inside themselves have cultivated exactly the same inclinations. Then, on the other hand, there could be a world with greatly differing societies that inside themselves would have diverse components, in very complex cycles of interaction, populated by diverse human beings who inside themselves would cultivate a high number of diverse inclinations in many directions. Worlds of very low and very high entropy, respectively. These are the kinds of images I hope to evoke, and I shall certainly refer to the first image as that of a highly underdeveloped system. *Obviously, development then means complexity and balance rather than single-mindedness and growth.*

For nature space this is just another way of evoking again the conditions for ecological stability. *But nature is a brutal place.* There are certainly exchange cycles, starting with water, carbon dioxide, and solar energy and ending with water and carbon dioxide (solar energy just going on and on as a bountiful endless input). Some of these cycles, when translated in a *normative manner* into rules of behavior in the human, social, and world spaces, would not fare well as models: I am thinking in particular of cycles such as the food chain, with the "higher" levels consuming the "lower" ones: microorganisms feeding on abiota, plants also on microorganisms, animals feeding on one another, human beings feeding on everything but not appreciating the idea that anybody should feed on us.

Obviously we need another principle here in addition to the idea of symbiosis as it is generally conceived: we need a principle of *respect for the needs of the other*. Exchange cycles, yes, but with some basic form of *tolerance*. In some religious systems this tolerance norm is formulated as *ahimsa*, nonviolence—extended not only to human beings, but to animals, or even plants. This was Gandhi's way.

Similarly, at the level of human space in a less biological sense, this means respect and tolerance for other personalities, and at the level of social space, respect and tolerance for other types of social organization. So there we are, in the midst of a philosophical and political wilderness: we are unable to arrive at any formula without some kind of moral injunction, some kind of norm. And this is not the norm of social justice, equality, or even equity. As a matter of fact, the norm may even be anti-egalitarian, since equality may have the tendency to lead to uniformity, homogeneity—and here the goal is just the opposite: heterogeneity. Moreover, the concept is not *distributive* between more or less endowed entities; social justice and equality are such concepts. Equity is a more *relational* concept, referring to the interaction between entities that should benefit equally from it.

But this does not mean that we get into a vicious circle! Are we not interested in systems that are developed and peaceful, while at the same time stating that a condition for a system to be developed is that it is already peaceful, replete with tolerance? Yes, there is an element of circularity in the reasoning, but that is not so problematic. The hypothesis is that once the system has attained a certain level of diversity, assuming some level of tolerance as a sufficient condition, then diversity will generate more diversity. It will feed on itself, so to speak. The result will be a system increasingly resilient, able to withstand injury from within and without.

So, one reaches the conclusion that the strong human being is one who permits inside himself or herself several tendencies to develop and mature. Take Gandhi again as an example: the saint and the politician rolled into one, the two interacting with each other in a highly symbiotic way, with neither driving the other out. And contrast this with the tendencies in so many societies, perhaps particularly in modern occidental civilization, to filter human beings into one particular channel where a limited set of propensities are developed as a "career," teaching its members to suppress other inclinations. Of course, a person also has what might pass as a way out: being one person at work, a different person in the family,

and still a different person in his or her leisure/peer group life. There is something schizophrenic in this, easily traceable to the formula of missing exchange cycles, of no interaction between the homotopes within that human being.

From here to social space there is but a short step: a strong society according to this type of thinking would mix sociotopes and put them creatively together in exchange cycles. It would not be based on market mechanisms only or on planning only, but on both. It would not be based on centralism only or decentralism only, but on both. The net result should be a society with a much stronger level of economic/political activity than found in most "developed" countries today, combining a capitalistic and socialistic sector, both at the local level and the macro level of organization. *The green, the blue, and the red together*, but only to the extent that they tolerate each other, in relatively soft forms, in other words, *light* green, *light* blue, and *light* red!—political and economic articulations both at the local and national levels, allowing everyone to participate but also selecting leaders, the output of which should be not only social but also human development.

But what about world space? Where do we have a theory of this type at the global level? Curiously enough, the closest we come to that is probably the Soviet theory of the 1930s of "active and peaceful coexistence between the two systems." The idea is that socialism and capitalism can "coexist" at the global level, and that the coexistence should be "active," meaning symbiotic, and "peaceful," meaning tolerant. In other words, the two components from ecological thinking and the moral injunction, the three in all, are found in the Soviet formula! But having said that, three critical remarks should immediately be put forward:

1. If this is such a good theory for the world, why not also use it *inside* society? Why not have, in the Soviet Union, some capitalist and some socialist republics?

2. Why should there be coexistence between only *two* systems? Capitalism/socialism surely does not exhaust the spectrum of human imagination!

3. Is this a theory for a goal state of the world or only for the transition to a world with only one sociotope? Is it simply a formula of convergence because capitalism is still too strong and not yet sufficiently in crisis to dig its own grave?

In spite of the validity of these three objections, the formula points to something very important. And the formula shows that there may indeed be a basis for convergence not only between the four spaces as here indicated, but also between ideological camps in the world today.

Reproduction of Systems

Let us then proceed to column 6, "reproduction," making use of system maturity. It is here pointed out that if in nature space the two conditions are satisfied, then there is a natural renewal capability that is threatened when diversity and/or symbiotic capacity diminish. Similarly, it is pointed out that the same applies in human space. It obviously applies to reproduction based on the two homotopes of man and woman and their symbiotic interaction, intercourse. *Precisely because this is so trivial, it bestows some validity on the scheme.* The theory touches ground in a very basic sense, so to speak. And this also applies to recovery from states of ill health. The thesis would simply be that the human being who has grown in diversity, letting the various homotopes in himself or herself play together, has a much higher resistance capacity to disease—an immune system far beyond that attributed to the white corpuscles. The highly one-sided sportsman dies from overexertion of the heart in middle age; the intellectual who never takes care of his body does the same. Balance is the key to health, but that is merely another word for letting more than one human flower grow and interact inside yourself.

When we then move on to social space, the logic is the same. A society playing on both market and planning forces is stronger, provided the balance is symbiotic rather than merely quantitative. It is stronger because of the synergy coming out of that interaction, with planning undoing some of the damages wreaked by the market's social Darwinism, at the same time as the market energizes the planning, even if by simply giving it something to plan! But there is a second factor: if one of these should fail, for instance if the foreign market collapses or the planning becomes too rigid, there is always the other to turn to—walking on two legs being far better than walking on one, walking on three legs being still far better when one includes the local basis of the economy as an additional limb. And the polity? Actually, the whole approach yields a theoretical basis for democracy, for *what is democracy if not exactly the symbiotic interaction between diverse parties?*

These conditions are all among the pillars upon which democracy is based. If there is no diversity, but only uniformity, then what is the use of interaction, either among attitudes/beliefs or actions/structures? And if there is pluralism only in attitudes and in the sociotopes, but no interaction between them, then one does not get the full richness of democracy based on give and take; learning and teaching; rubbing attitudes, actions, and structures against each other; developing dialectically together. In short, not only sexual reproduction and love, but also the whole basis for democratic thinking are already embedded in this simple little approach. And that is taken as a confirmation of its validity.

Given these characteristics of a society, reconstruction should in principle come easy. The whole system is vibrant, organic. Hit at some point, there may be injury, but there is plenty of material around, even abounding, for reconstruction. And in principle the same applies to the world space: the more uniform and devoid of action, the more vulnerable; the more diverse *and* symbiotic, the more capable of reconstructing itself.

Resilience of Systems

This is where columns 7 and 8 enter the picture: the heading they have in common is "resilience," to direct violence and structural violence respectively. Direct violence is injury to needs and injury to the interests of the more complex systems in social and world spaces, meaning their "capacity to satisfy the needs of their members." I have defined needs in a very broad sense, including both somatic and nonsomatic needs, and these can all be easily hurt by direct violence or by slow operations, usually unintended, by the structures themselves.

At the most basic level, this gives us the four major types of injury in the world today: the negation of survival known as "holocaust"; the negation of well-being known as "silent holocaust" or "structural holocaust"—the dying out of people and the cutting off of young human flowers in the Third World; the negation of freedom known as the concentration camp and the Gulag; and the withering away of feelings of identity to the point where the only focus is one's own ego, one's own needs, and one's own greed—in other words the "spiritual death" of materialist individualism. Systems with a high level of maturity would have the resilience to resist such injuries, surviving intact.

Column 8, "Exploitation," takes up the same theme but in a more basic way. It goes deeper. The injury is no longer only to one particular need

or complex interest but to the very capacity for reproduction. My definition of "exploitation" is then as follows: any utilization of a resource, in nature, human, social, or world spaces, to the point where that entity is no longer capable of reproducing itself.

In nature space it is well known what this means: resources have been made use of beyond their renewal capacity. The result is known as depletion. In human space it is also known what this means: a human resource is made use of beyond its production capacity as an individual: it is simply "exhausted." A good night's sleep after sufficient food constitutes a basic condition for recovery even from serious strain, even from injury. However, the human reproduction capacity from one generation to the next is extremely resilient, so exploitation in human space is ontogenetic rather than phylogenetic. Biogenetic transmission is robust, at least as far as we know.

A society no longer able to reconstruct itself is a society deprived of its capacity for autonomous reproduction. There is injury to the interests, there is insufficient capacity to undo the injury. In world space this also occurs; civilizations are known to be born, to mature, expand, and then contract, becoming senile before they eventually die. The metaphor chosen by Naipaul for India—"a wounded civilization"—becomes apt. However, it may not apply to India, given the extreme resilience of that particular civilization, as is attested by its survival for about 3,500 years, more than can be said about most civilizations.

But injury to reproduction capacity does not necessarily mean death. Reproduction is self-generated and autonomous, but input may also come from the outside if the system is not closed. Nature space may be artificially kept alive through manure and pesticides; human space, through biochemical and other types of engineering; social space, through development "assistance." World space? A condition of such support would be that there are other entities in the four spaces capable of extending this assistance. The "wounded system" becomes incorporated into a supersystem in which the donor is part. So the autonomy disappears—so what remains of the living? And what could help world space from the outside?

Maintenance as a Goal of Systems

And that brings us to the last column. What is the goal of the entire main-

tenance exercise? The goal is not system maturity as such; this is rather a condition upon which to build.

For nature space the goal is ecological stability, meaning a system on which human beings can also draw as a resource without hurting its reproduction capacity. Maturity is a condition for this stability. But it must be nurtured and developed further to reach stability.

In human space one might stipulate a similar goal: health in the broader sense of that word, a sense of somatic, mental, and social well-being as it is quite well expressed by the World Health Organization. Again, system maturity is a condition upon which health can be built—somatic health, mental health, spiritual health—the latter usually known as "human development" in a more narrow sense, or "salvation" in a religious sense.

And the same applies to social space. System maturity only indicates conditions for development to take place. It is like a solid foundation, the rock bottom upon which taller structures can be erected. At the same time it gives ideas on how the construction should take place, in a spirit of pluralism. If there are more ideas around, why not practice several of them, not merely one; why not let them interact with each other? The history of civilizations seems to indicate more than clearly that it is the moment when the rulers think they have developed *the* one single correct idea and try to put it alone into practice—creating a social order with only one sociotope—that the end of that civilization is in sight.

Some Concluding Words

Let me point out again what many might look at as a weak building block in this construction: "the moral injunction." I see no way of escaping from it; I see no engineering that can guarantee a built-in respect for that which is different. It is something that has to be cultivated, which means that the culture containing this type of tolerance already as a tenet of belief is one that may survive for a long time. So suddenly India stands out, for instance, as being more developed in many basic ways than Norway, despite the latter's being much richer per capita in economic terms. Hinduism shows almost incredible resilience at the level of social and world spaces, while in the other two spaces, health and ecological balance may be doing better in singular Norway.

In conclusion, let me again point out that the development concept proposed here, system maturity, is less growth-oriented and more resil-

ience-oriented. The goal is strength, but not at the expense of others, in all four spaces. The approach is holistic. In growth-oriented approaches, the goal may also be strength, but if necessary at the expense of others, and based on a very narrow one-sided band of factors—locating both cause and effect in economic aspects of social space. The result is spectacular until one-sidedness and growth lead to ruptures, decline, and fall.

On the other hand, there is more than enough to do within the present approach, especially because it is more qualitative and less quantitative. *Ecological balance, health, development, and peace are four aspects of development in a broader sense.* They are not modest goals to set for oneself, even if there appears to be some similarity in the underlying logic. And that similarity is, to me, the essence of "development."



Responsibility (Peter Reed)

Chapter 8

Erik Dammann and The Future in Our Hands

Over the past fifteen years, an alternative movement has developed in Norway called The Future in Our Hands (FIOH). It is relevant to our book for several reasons: unlike some of the more theoretical or analytical work discussed here, it seeks directly to reach a wide range of people at all levels in society, those interested and involved in the process of changing toward a more self-reliant, Earth-touching way of life. Many of its goals are similar to those of the deep ecologists, but some of its premises and methods of argumentation are different. But because of the direct desire to reach as many people as possible, its methods and history are quite instructive to those interested in doing something practical with the type of ideas we present in this book.

The movement was launched after enthusiastic response to the publication, in 1973, of a book by Erik Dammann, a former advertising executive who had just returned from a stay in the Pacific islands with his family. This experience of a more balanced society, along with a growing frustration with the problems of our own civilization in connection to the Third World, led Dammann to write a book entitled *The Future in Our Hands*. He listed three reasons as the basis for his effort:

> We are constantly hearing that we live in a mad world. . . . Why don't we do something to alter all the things that are wrong?

> One of the reasons is that we are unwilling to admit that this is something which concerns each and every one of us. We are all involved in creating the very development we criticize. If we desire a change, we must also accept that this presupposes a change in our daily lives.
>
> Another reason is the feeling of helplessness which has enveloped us. We don't really believe that anything is of any use, because wise men have been telling us for far too long that the development cannot be halted.
>
> A third reason why nothing happens is that we are building upon false conceptions of reality. In order to be able to accomplish anything, we must have a true, overall picture of the situation in which we find ourselves.[1]

Building upon this foundation, Dammann's first book provided an outline of what is wrong with the current system, how these problems are connected to all of us, and how we all then should participate in any change that is to have lasting effect.

The public response was considerable. There was enough interest on the part of readers to start a "people's movement for change." The particulars of this movement after nearly ten years of evolution are described in the article included here, based on a speech given by Dammann to an audience in Britain interested in forming a similar movement there in 1982.

Central to Dammann's work is the belief that, in democracies, we cannot create any change without support of the majority. So, given any vision of a future society, we must ask, "Will it motivate the majority? The majority may have a lack of imagination. But we must stimulate their creativity. The aims must be unfinished; we must concentrate on the process."

This remark highlights what Dammann feels to be an area of disagreement between him and some of the ecophilosophers. "I share the same dreams as Sigmund Kvaløy, but I disagree with his manner of presenting them." Dammann believes that some green utopias are presented as being too certain, too fixed, and too much of a return to an idealized version of the past—in a word, closed. "And closedness is elitism." A movement that hopes to reach the majority must avoid elitism. Goals must be unfinished, so people will be interested in participating actively in the process of shaping them.

There are other aspects of Dammann's approach that may be said to differ from some of the basic premises of the kind of ecophilosophical thinking that posits human beings at an equal level of importance with all

other species and ecosystems themselves. These quotes from *The Future in Our Hands* are indicative of this difference:

> None of us would talk in terms of *future* catastrophe if our present family income amounted to less than one dollar a day. . . . For the majority of people, there are problems far greater than those of pollution of nature and the environment and the threat of ecological collapse.[2]
>
> [There is a] danger in a growing interest in the environment, if it is based on narrow self-interests instead of upon the interest of the individual everywhere on Earth. The problem of environmental protection/aid to developing countries is not a question of either/or, but of both. . . . The real danger lies in the fact that, while worrying about nature, we shall forget the most important part of nature: the majority of people who are alive today.[3]

At the time of his writing, Dammann was reacting mainly against the "lifeboat ethics" of Garrett Hardin, as well as the method of the *Limits to Growth* researchers, which tried to reduce all the world's difficulties to problems of resource shortage. Dammann says that he "would still stand for these statements today," and thus he is far from the value premises of certain people within the ecology movement. But, as his article shows, his practical ideas on change and the spread of information are not so different. Perhaps one would not call The Future in Our Hands an ecological movement in the narrow sense, but it is an exemplary instance of the expansion of the tenets of deep ecology in an attempt to reach more people.

It should be stressed that Dammann has always believed that we should argue from a *value standpoint*, rather than with a list of definite answers to the problems. But in contrast to the somewhat radical and unfamiliar "intrinsic values" of nature used by some deep ecologists, Dammann has tried to argue from values *already familiar to the majority*. With the help of Arne Naess, he formulated in 1976 a list of basic value priorities in chapter 1 of his book *New Lifestyle—So What?* (*Ny Livsstil—og Hva Så?*)

> Value 1: Empathy and fellowship with all humanity [*medmenneskelighet*]!
> Value 2: All have equal rights!
> Value 3: Responsibility for the future!
>
> Supposition 1: The belief that humanity can control its own development: we have the future in our hands.

> Supposition 2: Trust in the common person's ability to value, and conviction of everyone's responsibility for our own development through our own actions.[4]

This book, Dammann's third, which sought to argue from these premises in a systematic way, was taken by many to be the expression of an ideology (which Marxists began to call "Dammannism"). So it was withdrawn from active use by the movement. Like Naess's ecosophy T, Dammann's system was meant to introduce a way of thinking, from accepted value premises, to stimulate the reader to elaborate the insights in her or his own way. But not everyone found this clear:

> My first idea was to ask the question: "Are your ideals in conflict with real life?" I thought this kind of pressure on politicians would cause them to change their orientation from concern with money to concern with systemic change. But it didn't. It proved that existing society has a stronger pressure on individual people than I believed.
>
> The elite criticized it: we did not have a sufficiently specific ideology. What people didn't take seriously was that we meant to present an example to start discussion. Nothing more. We can move from values! There should be room for people with different views!

Since then, The Future in Our Hands has concentrated on spreading information on alternatives, running a development fund to aid local projects, and administering a government-sponsored project on the feasibility of alternative futures. They have twenty-seven thousand members, and "will never be more than one hundred thousand. But that's not the movement we're talking about. We hope to reach many more people with our activities and publications. I wouldn't say we have succeeded, but we're trying all the time."[5]

An essential question remains: what is the reason to have a single "alternative" organization that seeks to embrace many different facets of a change in a particular direction? It should be clear that one *can* identify a general direction, characterized by self-reliance, equality between Center and Periphery (according to Galtung), complexity (according to Kvaløy), diversity, symbiosis, and "green politics" (according to Naess).

A unified movement? What would that mean? Dammann answers: "It would show that the *majority* is on our side. And that remains as one of the most powerful arguments in any democracy." A Future in Our Hands in America? Dammann is doubtful that the organization as it stands is exportable to the United States. "The capitalist system is in fundamental

opposition to *medmenneskelighet.*" He has found strong support for his ideas in elite environments connected to universities, but "the U.S. must be the most difficult country to correct in the world. Americans are always open to discussing values at a *personal* level, but when you mention opposition to the *system*, they think you are a communist."

The Future in Our Hands: Its Conceptions, Aims, and Strategies

Dear friends, I have come here on behalf of and with warm greetings from the Scandinavian popular movement "The Future in Our Hands." We hope that you will find our aims, and our methods of work, important enough to warrant the establishment of sister movements in other countries right now.

We feel that what we are working for is not only important—we feel that something *must* be done if mankind is to survive the threats we are facing toward the end of this century. But at the same time, we are optimists. We are convinced that a change pointing toward a better, safer world is both possible and realistic; we really believe that the future lies in our own hands.

In order to give you a basis for considering the need for international FIOH movements, I shall try to give you an impression of how we are working for change, how we have built up the movement in Scandinavia, and what we have achieved.

But let me first present the background for all this: our conception of the global development today, its consequences and origins, and how we feel the necessary process of change can begin. Before doing this, however, I would like to depict an overall picture of the human situation today as we see it.

It is a fact that the conditions under which the vast majority of the world's population is living would be regarded as a catastrophe if experienced by ourselves. I would just like to mention a few facts to illustrate my point. Let's take nutrition first.

The main source of nourishment for most people is cereals. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reckons about 500 pounds of cereals per person per year as a necessary minimum. But over half of our fellow human beings never get more than an average of 350 pounds. And while a person needs about 3 ounces of protein daily, the average Indian gets less than 2 ounces.

In addition to these problems, most of the people in the world lack access to clean water. The result is that deficiencies and diseases affect the majority of the world's population in a way we cannot even imagine. And when faced with these problems they are helpless: while we have a doctor for every eight hundred inhabitants, most of the world's people have to make do with one for every five to ten thousand.

This, my friends, is the background for the terrible fact that eighty thousand children in the world die of starvation or deficiency diseases every day.

Now the education necessary to give the poor political power to bring about change is just not available. Over 50 percent of all inhabitants in developing countries over fifteen years of age are still illiterate.

All this is *our* historical responsibility, as a result of centuries of exploitation of the many resources of the Third World—an exploitation that lay the foundations for the economic world order we have today, and that our standard of living depends on, and that we are just as unwilling as ever to change.

We love talking about justice, but seem to accept almost as a matter of course that we, the richest quarter of the world, use two-thirds of the total resources and income at the cost of the poor. And still we keep talking about *our* crises, *because* we are unable to create more growth in our own economy and prosperity.

Let's face it: there must be something fundamentally wrong with our economic system when even in such a situation we have to keep looking for more growth so as not to break down.

Well, what is then the impression of the situation in our own wealthy part of the world? Has our economic system created justice, satisfaction, and a good life for our inhabitants?

Of course, we all have to agree that the abolition of mass poverty was an undisputed blessing in previous generations. But it's a long time since the economic growth of industrialized countries reached a level of reasonable prosperity for all.

Our problem is not, in fact, economic needs, but a distorted distribution within our country of what we have:

an unequal distribution of the work that's available,

an unequal distribution of incomes, and

an unequal distribution of property, power, and privileges.

All this is the result of the economic system that we have developed and that cannot exist without *competition*. Built as it is on the rights of the strongest, our system replaces solidarity, cooperation, and brotherly love with everybody's fight against everybody else.

Instead of distributing work and income, all groups in our society have to fight for social survival. The result is that millions have to do without work and more and more of our youngsters feel like losers and give vent to their feelings through violence, criminality, and drug addiction.

More and more of our citizens are experiencing loneliness and insecurity. Symptoms of stress and nervous disorders have become epidemic, and even those who have all worldly goods are pressed in our competitive system to feel dissatisfied compared with those who have even more.

These problems are just getting bigger in all of the industrialized countries. As competition with other countries forces us to use an increasingly inhuman technology to build a system that only experts can manage, the problems of alienation and helplessness are on a steady increase.

Because of the want of deeper, human values, we are all becoming more dependent on material substitutes and artificial entertainment. This in turn brings about the need for more growth and creates new problems, increased social payments, and thus again the need for even more growth.

This development is not only harmful for our own humanity, it is also the cause of a steady increase in the destruction of free nature, eradication of vital forests, pressure on other natural resources, and pollution of air, sea, and Earth.

This destructive rat race, of course, makes us dependent on increased amounts of resources from other parts of the world. We have already become helplessly dependent on oil from the Middle East, on the vast plantations of South America, and on the natural wealth of Africa, just to name a few examples. And as long as this dependence exists, we cannot afford to let the poor inhabitants exploit their own resources themselves. We have to keep supporting the dictatorships, the multinational corporations, and the trade agreements that ensure raw materials for our industries.

So, as long as we accept our economic system, with all its needs for continual growth, we also have to accept the necessity of exploitation of the world's poor. That's why all negotiations for a more just economic world order have come to nothing.

Just before I conclude this description, let me say a few words about why *this cannot continue in the long run*: there are reasons why our de-

velopment is creating threats to our very existence that we have to face pretty soon. I'll just mention four of them:

1. Our dependence on the resources of the world's poor has made the influence on producer countries the number one aim of industrialized states. NATO just cannot afford to let these countries choose other trade partners. That would in fact mean a breakdown of our economic system.

That's why the increasing demand and fight for raw material sources is probably the greatest threat to peace today. And, let me tell you, this is no empty claim: both the United States and other NATO countries have special troops on guard to step into the Middle East if the flow of oil should cease. The Vietnam War, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the conflicts in South America must be seen in the light of this—even if this is not the only explanation. And while the oil is being tapped, our consumption of energy has been doubling every fifteen years. It is indeed difficult to see how a large-scale war can be avoided if we don't change our course of action.

2. At the same time, the Third World's people are gradually getting more and more impatient as they discover that our economic system is making global justice impossible. In fact it is surprising that their feeling of helplessness hasn't already exploded in a wave of terror aimed at our vulnerable centers. But the danger is increasing in line with their discovery of the injustice they are confronted with. And let us remember, that for parents who see their children die of starvation because of our demand for increased wealth, terrorism and bomb attacks could seem both necessary and morally defensible.

We would indeed be completely helpless if faced with that sort of terrorism, from representatives of 2 billion poor people, and the dangers of subsequent reactions, spurred by panic; and an uncontrolled development of conflict and war are evident as long as we are still unwilling to remove the causes.

3. The threats to the environment are another time bomb. The commission appointed by former President Carter that produced *The Global 2000 Report* was asked to consider the effects of development up to the end of the century, and concluded that humankind would be facing unsolvable ecological and human problems if our course of action wasn't changed. And as the world's population increases, we keep reducing, year by year, the ability of Mother Earth to give us more nourishment. The

erosion of the soil and expanding of deserts will steadily increase, and the want for food will reach catastrophic proportions, according to the American scientists.

In addition to this we are in the process of changing the climate of the Earth with as yet unknown consequences for ourselves and our fellow coexisters on the planet. And by our crazy destruction of the tropical forests and the threatening pollution of the seas, we are gradually reducing the main source of all life—the production of oxygen on which we are all dependent. And at the same time we are burning up more and more of that very oxygen. This is all because of one thing: our society is geared toward competition for growth, quite *independent* of all human needs.

4. At the same time, however, the internal problems in the wealthy countries causing this development are on the increase. Competition with other industrialized countries will force upon us a technological revolution that, it is said, will bring about the biggest social change in history. Educational and competitive demands will inevitably increase—exactly the type of pressure that has already created a wave of violence and criminality that all industrialized societies are facing helplessly.

I am very sorry for painting such a bleak picture of the present situation. However, I believe it is necessary to show that our work for fundamental change doesn't spring from some or another political ideology, but from the logical conclusion that a change of course is absolutely necessary, and in addition the only morally acceptable choice, in today's world situation.

What does give us hope, indeed, what makes this necessary change a realistic goal, is that we, in the deepest sense of the word, have the majority of our own people behind us. And this is important, because if we have an arrogant view of the silent majority in our own country—as many intellectual and politically conscious people tend to have—if we don't understand them, believe in their deepest values, and have a willingness to understand why they act as they do, then we cannot communicate with them, and thus we will be unable to bring about the democratic change we want. And in this respect, opinion polls on people's values tell important and interesting things.

Comparable opinion polls in a series of industrialized countries clearly point in the same direction: what people want most of all is not more material prosperity, not more competition, larger companies, or more efficiency. An analysis of a series of European and American opinion polls

shows that the majority of people yearn for the contrary of what modern industrial society offers them: they want greater simplicity; more time to be with their families, children and friends; a greater preservation of nature; and safer and more meaningful jobs.

Usually as many as 75 percent reply that at least if the income level is equalized, they are willing to do *without* material growth in exchange for greater simplicity and more fundamental values.

Of course we all know the arguments against this: why then is everybody fighting for higher wages, why does everybody go out and buy new things as soon as they have the chance? Actually, we all know the answer: we are living in a system that is influencing us to compete whether we like it or not. Those who don't compete are regarded as losers. Those who don't keep up with the race will lose respect and maybe even their jobs.

You have to be pretty strong to be satisfied with what you've got, when everyone else is climbing ahead of you up the social scale. Advertising plays its part, too, and sees to it that the rat race becomes tangible through property and consumption.

Comparative studies have been done in countries of different economic levels that show how the fight for greater incomes in itself decides what one feels is necessary: the decisive element is not the actual level of income, but what place one has on the income ladder of one's particular country. In this way the difference of incomes in our countries is one of the main obstacles for the change we need, because it makes economic competition and growth a necessity, independent of wishes and needs.

If we don't manage to substitute a more conscious attitude and policy for this inequality and competition, we will hardly be able to bring about a development that makes justice for the poorest in other countries possible.

Regardless of how obvious and simple this may sound and regardless of whether we like it or not, it seems clear that the fundamental change we need depends on this simple principle: we have to cultivate the will to share with each other—both on an international and national level. Our problems are due to a system that puts competition before sharing and cooperating. A solution has to be based on the opposite. But such ideas are not of much use if we cannot translate them into alternative solutions for the present problems:

When a society lacks jobs for everybody, we can start debating shorter

working hours for everybody, that is to say sharing the work that is available.

When some become losers because others have privileges, we can show that this is why we must develop less competition and more income equality.

When a small group has meaningful work and responsibility at the cost of a majority, we can point out that sharing also means the distribution of responsibility at work, in politics, between sexes, at home, and in the community.

When our products are aimed at those with the greatest spending power at the cost of those who are in greatest need, we can start demanding that production be geared to distribution of wealth, by producing for real needs where these exist.

As long as our foreign trade is based on a competition exploiting the poorest of the poor, we can work for more self-sufficiency in our own countries.

What we really have to do is bring about a debate on the social *consequences* of the values we all claim to represent. We have to make politics into a question of what we want and not, as today, a question of what our competitive system demands. And if we are serious about our belief in democracy, there is only one way to bring about change: we need the support of the majority. We have to show ordinary people that their longing for deeper values is strong enough to cause this change if it is translated into action and views in politics and daily life. We have to make it clear that these political issues that determine our future are plain and understandable to everybody.

It is just here, we believe, that a transpolitical movement like The Future in Our Hands has a mission: by spreading information we can meet the people on the level, we can show that those who feel politically helpless can in fact contribute to bringing about a change. We can point out that a conscious change of their own lifestyle is a decisive contribution for a more human development and a more just distribution of the world's resources.

That is why we inspire people to get together and support each other, in an emancipation from the pressures of competition and consumerism, which are driving us all in the wrong direction. And we must prove that this doesn't mean to do without real pleasures, but on the contrary leads to a freer and richer life. And we are seeing how what at first seems to be

nothing more than a conscious attempt to change one's lifestyle gradually develops into a new awareness of social issues and politics.

The reason is easy to understand. Whoever wants to free him- or herself from egotistic economic competition to search for a deeper meaning will soon discover how society is geared toward the opposite. There is a clear connection between increased consciousness in everyday life and a conscious role in society.

Let it be said, though, that we do not look upon ourselves as a movement geared to changing our lifestyles alone. A simpler lifestyle is just one of the means we support in the achievement of our real goal: a fundamental change of development pointing toward a society that makes a truly human life possible for all inhabitants of the world. That is why we spread information about real and actual alternatives that illustrate what we stand for:

alternative living and cooperating conditions in the community

solidarity funds in the trade unions, to be used for national and global equalizing projects

alternative production and educational systems

cooperative economic systems

alternative defense systems

Third World projects that promote freedom and independent development

energy production and farming that respect nature and ecology

In all countries, there are other movements working in one or more of these fields. Our aim is to promote understanding of the total picture. Therefore, we work for cooperation between the alternative movements, by proving that none of their single aims can be reached if we don't cooperate to change the system that enforces competition at the expense of both human and environmental values.

Thus we consider ourselves to be a movement for social and political change, yet independent from political parties. In our view this must be based on the conscious participation of the majority and on a consistent and imperative set of values: sharing and caring, solidarity, equality, and responsibility for nature and the future.

To wind this up, let me say a few words about the way we have built up the movement in Scandinavia, and what we're actually doing.

There are now 25,000 paying members in Norway, and about 4,000 in our Scandinavian sister movements. I shall concentrate on the Norwegian part of the movement, which has developed to a more advanced stage because it has been around since 1974.

Twenty-five thousand is a rather good membership for a country with a population of only 4 million. A proportional figure in the United Kingdom would be 375,000, and in the United States, 1,250,000. Still, we consider the actual number of members as decisive only in that it represents the main funding for our information and contact center in Oslo, which is trying to communicate to a far broader public than just the members.

We therefore spend the bulk of membership fees on mass media information, and on our own monthly magazine, which is not only for members, but is also sold at newsstands to reach the broadest possible public. This is an important point, because it gives us the possibility to have more influence on society than would normally be expected from a pressure group of this limited size.

But it is also important to demonstrate what we want and what we mean in action and through examples. This part of the job is taken care of by our local groups (about fifty active out of one hundred) and about ten national groups working in special fields, which I will come back to later. These groups have a common point of contact in the Information Center, but are completely independent and without hierarchic leadership, bound only to the rest of the movement by a common set of values. Groups are invited to participate on a voluntary basis when the Information Center launches national campaigns.

Since we stress so strongly the importance of reaching a large public, we are constantly rephrasing our message by organizing one or two nationwide campaigns per year, consisting of press conferences, press releases, and rallies; by cooperating with local groups, other popular movements, unions, the church, and other organizations; and also by inviting interested politicians and other key persons.

Maybe the easiest way for me to give you an impression of our work at the center would be to mention some of the issues that we have focused on in our campaigns so far:

In connection with the general elections for the Norwegian Parliament in 1981, we launched a campaign designed to force the political parties in Norway to take a stand on the really important issues of our time—the choice of future. We did this through rallies confronting leading politi-

cians with these issues and by printing pamphlets informing the public about the questions asked, along with the politicians' answers.

We worked with teachers toward introducing FIOH ideas in schools and classrooms.

One information campaign was based on an opinion poll showing that three out of four Norwegians would prefer a higher life quality to a higher standard of living.

We also did a campaign on intermediate technology, in connection with our efforts to launch a Norwegian edition of E. F. Schumacher's *Small Is Beautiful.*

One campaign was against racism and for greater understanding of other cultures.

Another campaign was aimed at healthier and less resource-demanding foods and farming techniques.

And a recent campaign has lead to a research project looking into the possibility of an *alternative future* for the Nordic countries in cooperation with one or more developing countries. The starting point of this campaign was a manifesto that was supported by quite an impressive number of church and trade union leaders and by a majority of members of parliament in five out of seven parties.

Apart from this, we send out press releases on all important issues dealt with in our magazine *Folkevett* (Common Sense) and spread information to special target groups by sending them posters and pamphlets and by training lecturers, who in turn address meetings and rallies. Another important job done at the center is permanent contact with opinion leaders. We have one person almost exclusively dedicated to this task, which aims at filtering our views and challenges into the most important organizations, through maintaining personal contact with key persons in these institutions. As already mentioned, about ten national FIOH groups have arisen, each of them concentrating on one particular issue within the movement. Let me mention a few examples:

The FIOH Development Fund

The work of this organization is funded by supporters regularly giving a portion of their income to the fund. In addition to this, the fund channels

public development aid into its development schemes. These government grants are proportionate to the funding raised through our membership.

Until now the overall amount channeled to development schemes in about twenty different countries represents about one million dollars. The board of the fund sees to it that the projects receiving aid are model examples of self-help schemes, working along lines drawn up by the local population itself. Other important criteria include the largest possible use of local resources, local humanpower, and locally adopted technology.

The Fund for Alternative Development Projects in Norway

This fund is based on the idea that a more human world supposes a different development within the industrialized countries. The financial basis for this fund is also regular fixed contributions from institutional supporters. This money goes to projects built on ecologically responsible appropriate technology that promotes cooperation instead of competition and profit.

The School Forum is made up of teachers and other people interested in educational issues. Its aim is to further education in global solidarity, development, and respect for nature. The School Forum gave rise to a vocational school on the island of Selvær in northern Norway, teaching the importance of conserving local culture and jobs through participation in agriculture and fishing in the local community.

The Traveling Folk High School is giving firsthand development education through travels to developing countries.

The Group for Alternative Housing is a forum for architects and others who are interested in housing projects that promote solidarity and cooperation—among other things, having communally owned equipment and common rooms for an active interplay between children and adults.

The Norwegian "Ekoteket" is an information group at the disposal of people who want to use alternative energy sources and technology that furthers human values and environmental responsibility.

The FIOH Disarmament Group spreads information and conducts actions for nonviolent defense systems and conflict-preventing defense alternatives that are not dependent on the exploitation of the Third World, cooperating with other Norwegian peace organizations.

The FIOH Organization for Adult Education is a center for a national

network of study circles concerned with FIOH issues. They arrange courses and lectures, and develop manuals and materials for study in adult education classes.

The Institute for Alternative Production has made a catalog containing more than five hundred contacts in fifteen countries. These are persons and groups working for the conversion of military and profit-greedy industry into peaceful and socially useful production, built on sharing of responsibilities and meaningful jobs.

The Repair Shop for Bicycles encourages cycling and does voluntary work for collecting and repairing secondhand bikes for export to developing countries.

The FIOH Hostel Organization is a network of people who can offer lodging at one another's homes when traveling, thus avoiding expensive hotel accommodations and promoting contact and friendship.

These are the national FIOH groups. In addition, more than fifty local groups have sprung up in various places in Norway. These groups run a wide range of activities of their own choosing, all furthering the aims of FIOH. Examples follow:

renting land that is offered to local people for their own food production, to increase self-sufficiency and meaningful activities

secondhand and recycling shops for such things as clothes and sports gear, as an alternative to fashion craze and throwaway consumerism

collecting waste firewood for heating

selling Third World products and supporting local production in developing countries

arranging information booths that sell the FIOH magazine and spreading information to local newspapers, expositions, and classes

Both national and local groups have come about as a result of information spread by the center, but are not really Information Center *initiatives*. It is important to note that the groups are completely independent and do their own funding through their own activities or by local membership fees. It has thus been possible to avoid a top-heavy bureaucratic and expensive organization, permitting membership fees to go almost exclusively into information to help the public.

I hope I've been able to give you an impression of what FIOH is, what we do, and why we do it. We believe that humanity has come to a turning point in history—a turning point at which accepting the existing development trends may mean the end of all life. At this point the only sane alternative is to awaken our responsibility for the future of humankind—as individuals, groups, and nations.

The present development has become our enemy. Our task is to make people understand that these trends are nothing less than the sum of our own deeds. As soon as people start *believing* that the future is in their hands, it will become fact.

But we must also rekindle trust in the values that we stand for. Human dignity cannot be restored by people who are locked in the chains of competition. The change we need must be directed by conscious human values. But these values must not be separated from practical obligation, as they often are when we read or hear party platforms. Our task must be to show what it means to take these values seriously in practical work at all levels of society.

Our problem until now has been that we are working in very small countries, counting less than twenty million people altogether and representing very small language groups, a fact that also confines us.

On behalf of all participants in our Scandinavian movement I bring you greetings, and a hope: a hope that I have managed to give you a feeling of the urgency of the situation, and a strong enough belief that we can make a difference, if you decide to join forces with us and carry on this work in your own countries. If you decide to start, it would be a great inspiration—to us. We have a heavy task and a long way to go, but if we become numerous enough and strong enough in the belief that *we can make a difference*, we will change the world.

Sailing through the Surge of Life (Sigmund Kvaløy)

Chapter 9

Conclusion: Deep Ecology as a Force for Change

From Zapffe to Dammann, it seems we have traversed a rocky path from pessimistic realization to hope that something can be done. Ideas have been presented in poem, story, argument, and discussion, and all aim to serve as an impetus toward change. We have seen in the Introduction how the achievements of Norwegian environmental activists have been impressive—both in terms of single-issue victories and in broader systemic changes that flowed out of waterpower controversies. But the question after the course of ideas is, How deep has Norwegian ecology really been?

Tracing the influence of a system of thought is an intricate task. But if deep ecological ideas seem to be reflected in the political system, they must have come from somewhere. "Somewhere" could be as diffuse as a slow osmosis of philosophies that have been floating around for a while and that come from a number of sources hard to pin down. This is probably the most significant way that abstract concepts have trickled into public policy, and in this case the fact of that influence is perhaps of greater interest than detecting the exact origin of these ideas.

Alternatively, one could look at how recognized eco-thinkers have had a hand in making policy—not through sensational demonstrations, but in the calmer deliberations of public policy. We will consider how they have fared from Norway to the United Nations, and return to glimpse

new roads of ecoactivism as radical as what old Jørgen might have wished for were he still alive.

Environmental Bureaucracy and Official Policy

Take, as a beginning, national environmental legislation. When it comes to statements of political intent, one finds in Norwegian environmental law discussions of "a moral responsibility for nature and other living beings. This is usually expressed in a recognition that nature, plant, and animal life have an intrinsic worth over and above our common conception of them as merely useful."[1]

This sentence parallels Naess's principle of nature's intrinsic value, though such sentiments are admittedly only one of the many motives publicly declared to be at the root of Norway's environmental laws. And looking at the declared intent behind other legislation, one gets a mixed feeling about their philosophic content. The purpose of the Wildlife Act of 1981, for example, runs as follows:

> Wildlife and the habitats of wildlife shall be managed in such a way that the productivity of nature and the diversity of species are preserved. Within this framework, wildlife may be harvested for the benefit of agriculture and recreation.[2]

The language of the act emphasizes the integrity of animal populations and habitats, but portrays these as resources that should be managed for humans. The Pollution Control Act of 1981 is slightly less anthropocentric:

> The purpose of this Act is to protect the external environment from pollution and to reduce existing pollution. . . . The Act is aimed at ensuring an adequate environmental quality, so that pollution and waste do not cause damage to health, adversely affect human well-being, or damage nature's capacity for production and self-renewal.[3]

Here the health of the natural environment seems to be on almost equal footing with the health of humans. But as any lawyer will attest, the acid test of a law is how it is interpreted in practice. How have environmental issues fared in the courts?

Odd as it may seem to an American observer, they almost never do at all. It is uncommon for Norwegian environmental disputes to end in a lawsuit, Alta being a peculiar exception. Environmental disputes are

meant to be handled through a dialogue with the concerned ministries rather than through the legal system. The most relevant laws, then, are procedural—those that stipulate the rules of the dialogue. Some jurists believe these rules could stand improvement, though they doubt that demonstrators or environmental philosophers can have much direct impact here.[4]

Since most environmental disputes are handled at the administrative level, the ideology holding sway in the concerned ministries can be of deciding importance. Is the ideology operative in the Ministry of the Environment especially sympathetic to ecophilosophical principles?

Not explicitly. The rationale employed by the state in setting up this new ministry was predominantly of the "economic growth and environmental protection" variety. No radically new mission to protect nature for its own sake or to take a hard position against "development" was envisioned.[5] Though philosophy is a required part of any Norwegian university education, there are few people in the Ministry of the Environment who specialize in the theory behind environmental thought. The ministry did, however, absorb a good many environmental activists when it was first established.

Internal discussion about the goals of the department do occasionally produce memos of a deeper sort, but the reigning ideology in the Ministry of the Environment seems to be to support conventional "management" of the environment.[6] Moreover, the ministry is a relatively poorly funded administration surrounded by gnarled old departments that brush off any moral arguments for environmental protection. Such tools are accordingly not heavily stocked in the ministry's arsenal.

It is, however, a trait of Norwegian decision making that official arms are spread wide to include everybody in policy discussions—even those who are likely to oppose the government's line. Nils Faarlund, for example, sits on the committee in charge of developing a new *friluftslivspolitikk*. In addition, almost any organization can receive money from the government to carry out educational functions, a largess that has included some of the more threadbare environmental groups.

A peculiarity of the Norwegian civil service worth noting, though, is that (in contrast to the U.S. system) very few of the positions in any ministry are political appointments. The mass of civil servants are unmoved by shake-ups in the political leadership, so any ideological content of the ministry is less fluid than in the United States, for example. Professionals, not politicians, make most of the policy decisions.

The resulting continuity is, of course, a two-edged sword: though "good" policies cannot easily be scuttled by a change in the admiralty, the Ministry of the Environment *is* a bureaucracy, with all the attendant inertia. Environmentalists can find it as hard to move the state to action with the ministry as it was without it. In fact, the impact of the environmental movement in the early seventies was partly due to the fact that the state had no apparatus in place to handle and routinize their demands.

The ruling government in Norway's Parliament, though, does set the priorities among competing concerns. But despite grand conferences on environmental protection sponsored by some political parties, the dominant players on the political stage seem to be firmly entrenched in an ideology of economic growth and only secondarily interested in environmental protection.

This non-green picture of Norwegian politics is brightened by a few considerations: First, while political historian Knut Arne Tvedt admits that "no Norwegian party has set as a goal the realization of the ideas of Naess, the ecological debate was an important impulse in the demands for a new environmental policy in the political parties."[7] Second, recent research by Naess suggests that deep ecological ideas may have infiltrated deeper into political circles than one would first suspect, as discussed above in "Will the Defenders of Nature Please Rise." Asked to respond to his Eight Points of deep ecology, both political appointees and civil servants expressed general agreement with such theses as "the richness and diversity of life forms has value in itself and contributes to the flourishing of life on earth." Naess concludes that the problem is not that political leaders are ideologically opposed to ecophilosophical principles and quite consciously choose not to act on them. Rather, they are trapped by a political system that does not permit them to make broad decisions in the interest of the environment. Pressure groups presently succeed only if they can work within the establishment, most often on very specific issues like the refinement of existing policy or the introduction of new controls. Holistic, deeper issues are much harder to implement at the governmental level.

Thus it is very hard to point to a definite result of conceptual deep ecology. It is difficult to come up with criteria for what a result of the intellectual activity could be. It won't do, for example, to reel off how much acid rain is produced in Norway, because environmental quality depends on more than political principles. It also depends on geographical, meteorological, and demographic conditions. But tearing deep ecol-

ogy apart into "theory" and "practice" seems to go against its very grain in Norway. Kvaløy's definition of ecophilosophy, presented in his article, lays special emphasis on this fact: it needs to be lived as much as it needs to be thought.

If we are concerned about what actually happens to the Earth (and in the end we all are), what part does abstract thinking play? Importantly, the answers are both "a positive role" and "a negative role," depending on the lengths to which it is taken. Good illustrations of the profits and pitfalls of philosophizing are the recent developments in the environmental movement and the environmental movement's debate on whether to forge a green political party.

Green Politics from the Grass Roots

With Alta as a good example, the trend in the current Norwegian environmental movement is away from mass demonstrations and toward a more diverse modus operandi. Activists in Norway are commonly involved in a number of "alternative" movements: for peace, Third World development, and the like.

This is partly the result of thinking carefully about principles and connections. Activists today seem to see ecological problems as manifestations of larger systematic problems, whose ramifications sprout up in many contexts. This is perhaps an incarnation of what Naess encourages as developing a "total view." *How* one works is not as important as *that* one works, since the complexity of the problems requires a diversity of approaches.

The ecological uproar of the seventies dissipated in the eighties, only to return at the beginning of the nineties in a renovated, more widespread, and international form. Norwegian sociologist Thomas Mathiesen writes that "more people seem to be involved (or at least concerned) than ten years ago, the ideological content seems to be more distinct, . . . and a great number of local interests stand together in the struggle."[8]

The "expansive political development" mentioned by Mathiesen raises eyebrows when one considers that *no* environmental organization has managed to found a green political party on the West German model. Ironically, this ecopolitical somnolence may be due to paying *too much* attention to ideological principles.

Ecopolitical thinking is not foreign to Norway, having blossomed simultaneously with the breakthrough at Mardøla. In 1972 Ivar Mysterud

and Magnar Norderhaug published "Ecopolitics: Environmentalism's New Dimension," in which they called for politics "consistently oriented toward the values in ecological information—where we as a matter of course base ourselves on a lifestyle that is in harmony with the resources of the biosphere."[9] The article touched off a flurry of similar articles and sent political theorists of every color scrambling to develop an ecopolitical position.

It was thinkers on the political Left who were quickest to pick up the glove thrown down by Norderhaug and Mysterud, and socialist Hartvig Sætra is perhaps the best known of these ecopolitical thinkers. Sætra scathingly criticizes socialists who bemoan the condition of the Norwegian worker, because these workers are very well off by global standards. In fact, they are so well off because Norway, along with the other developed nations, exploits the workers in the Third World. The North staves off environmental collapse by accelerating it in the South.

Here Sætra echoes the themes Erik Dammann takes up in his article, but Sætra's conclusion is a little stronger: "The central theme in ecopolitics," he writes, "is neither hydropower, energy conservation, nor biodynamic vegetables. It is *imperialism*."[10] "The impotence of socialism," he concludes, "is the impotence of ecopolitics."[11] What is needed is an "evolution" in the socialist states and a "revolution" in the capitalist world. Both must be aimed at reducing material consumption and living within a nation's own means.

The political Left was not only eager to jump on the ecological bandwagon, they were also determined to paint it red. This caused a good deal of dissent within environmental groups. The Left's support was often interpreted as a sly attempt to win converts to their dubious social visions instead of as genuine agreement with ecological issues. Groups became bogged down in ideological squabbles that diverted energy from the ecological crusade. Eventually, the "red death" strangled a number of organizations, including (snm). Only a few managed to regroup after some thorough housecleaning.

The debate on whether to set up a Norwegian green party is fading, as it is the world over. The established parties are taking up green rhetoric with a vengeance. Only a massive crisis in mindset could plant the single issue of greenness as a seed that could motivate significant numbers of voters to unify and take a stand. Single-issue parties rarely go too far, but when they do, they can go all the way. (Remember, the U.S. Republican

party was founded as a single-issue campaign against slavery 150 years ago. And now look how it has taken off.)

In recent years, Norway and the rest of the world have witnessed a fading of the Left on many fronts. Although this may be helpful in that it directs the contributions of free-thinking intellectuals more constructively into currently available options for change, it also brings a dwindling of respect for consideration of what politics *could* be. As Jørn Siljeholm, former director of the Norwegian Conservation Society, puts it, we are left with a "vacuum for values."[12] Realism tends to forego the time spent wondering what is right.

On the other hand, some Norwegian groups have become leery of abstract arguments over principles that do not seem to lead to concrete results. Nature and Youth, a branch of the Norwegian Conservation Society for people up to twenty-five years of age, expresses a typical dubiousness:

> One should not put too much pressure on people to live after precisely defined ideals. This usually leads to nitpicking, and one loses sight of the common goal. . . . Organizations within the [environmental] movement have been cross-political because they have brought people together from different parties to work on single issues. Is it possible to derive a holistic view of society out of such issue-directed work?[13]

Nature and Youth, called by some "Norway's most exciting environmental group," bases its effective activity on the volunteer work of teenagers. Not insisting on rigid ideological conformity is of practical benefit here, as leader Tom Christian Axelsen explains: "We have no objections to ideology as such. But try talking ecophilosophy to a fifteen-year-old who wanders into your office and wants to work on traffic pollution."[14]

Or start even earlier: Prosjekt blekkulf is the Conservation Society's latest arm for reaching even younger environmentalists. Its series of picture books for children features a curious octopus as ecological detective hero, and thousands of kids throughout the country have joined eco-detective clubs to participate in the investigation. The project is currently being readied for export across the globe. Parents don't quite know what to do with a new generation of radical children. (In the Pacific Northwest of the United States, we have even heard of kids admonishing their elders thus: "But Dad, you're not really a *deep* ecologist.")

So green politics means much more today than the championing of single-issue parties. Though the issue is still a live one, the risk of distract-

ing ideological debate over issues that have no direct connection with ecology is one reason most environmental groups like to keep the idea of a green party at arm's length. Although this makes a "total view" of social and environmental phenomena difficult, it may be a reasonable price to pay for avoiding a stifling ideological orthodoxy.

The Green Goddess and Worldwide Sustenance

Meanwhile, Norway's international environmental reputation has gained political clout in recent years. Gro Harlem Brundtland, former minister for the environment, several-time prime minister, and Norwegian delegate to the United Nations, has been dubbed "the green goddess" for her strong presence in worldwide environmental policy debate.

In 1982, she was asked to head the newly established World Commission on Environment and Development, at the request of the U.N. secretary general. Five years later this international panel of experts produced a document, *Our Common Future*, also known as "the Brundtland Report." This book has been widely hailed as the informal blueprint for a new international environmental attitude emphasizing *sustainable* development, in which conservation and growth are no longer pitted against each other as irreconcilable opponents, but instead emerge as necessary partners in a future that will make the whole world happy.

Though many of the recommendations put forth by the authors in our book have generally been brushed off by Norwegian authorities as being far too radical for policy implementation, the attitudes pioneered by deep ecology do find a place in the commission's work. Nature is to be valued not just as a human resource, but for many other reasons as well:

> The diversity of species is necessary for the normal functioning of ecosystems and the biosphere as a whole. The genetic material in wild species contributes billions of dollars yearly to the world economy in the form of improved crop species, new drugs and medicines, and raw materials for industry. But utility aside, there are also moral, ethical, cultural, aesthetic, and purely scientific reasons for conserving wild beings.[15]

Do these reasons include the saving of nature *for its own sake*? They certainly do not exclude it. Before deep ecology, the search for morality and ethics in nature was much harder to specify and recognize. The commis-

sion's intention is to satisfy all the diverse strands of the environmental community, and the words of the radicals have in this case been noticed.

Annex 1, a set of general principles put forth by the subgroup on international law, is even more specific. Here are the first three of eight items:

> 1. *Fundamental Human Right*
> All human beings have the fundamental right to an environment adequate for their health and well-being.
> 2. *Inter-Generational Equity*
> States shall conserve and use the environment and natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations.
> 3. *Conservation and Sustainable Use*
> States shall maintain ecosystems and ecological processes essential for the functioning of the biosphere, shall preserve biological diversity, and shall observe the principle of optimum sustainable yield in the use of living natural resources and ecosystems.[16]

Here we have nature accessible to all people as fundamental right, care in the long term, and the maintenance of natural systems *because they are necessary for the Earth* itself, not just helpful for humans. The law, at least in its idealized worldwide form, is moving in the right direction.

Of course, a contrary view might caution that the United Nations has co-opted the insights of deep ecology and watered them down to make them palatable to all without any adjustment to overconsumptive lifestyles. "Sustainable development" is touted as a term that might placate all factions, while specific constraints are often kept in the background. Another catchy phrase is foisted upon the populace, and definitions are reluctant in coming.

There is reason to be optimistic, but caution and criticism should continue. As environmental problems get more serious, survival may demand more upheaval than the makers of policy would like to admit. On this front there are others who have made deep ecology part of their battle cry.

Earth First?

In the United States, the past decade has seen the phenomenal growth of an environmental organization called Earth First!, who advocate "no compromise in defense of Mother Earth." Founded by former Washing-

ton lobbyist Dave Foreman and his buddies about ten years ago, this is a loose affiliation of people from across the United States who are fed up with the ineffectuality of mainstream eco-bureaucracy. The exclamation point is to emphasize the imperative nature of their name, insisting there is no wisdom without action, as Sigmund Kvaløy has already reminded us.

Taking matters into their own hands, they have staged elaborate theatrical protests (one recent event included the occupation of New York governor Mario Cuomo's front lawn, dressed up as dead, bloated caribou displaced by Canada's impending James Bay development scheme), spiked trees so that they will be useless to logging operations, drafted conservation schemes to preserve vast areas of wilderness with minimal access by humans, and conducted research on the insuring of biodiversity.

Throughout their tumultuous existence, Earth First! has maintained strong ties to the philosophy of deep ecology, using the ideas of Naess, Kvaløy, and their American counterparts to ground their often raucous actions in a stated ideology. They have at times advocated the destruction of property in the fight to respect nature, but never harm to other people. The aim is to call public attention to the need for an alternative kind of society that respects nature for its own sake, even if this means valuing the wild *before* the civilized.

The group has been particularly successful in the Pacific Northwest, where rampant clearcutting is destroying the largest North American rainforest in the service of a lumber industry that cannot sustain its present practices. The injustice is shocking, and Earth First! has by and large told the truth about it in ways that the media can handle.

In the late eighties the group was infiltrated by the FBI in an attempt to publicly discredit their actions. An agent posing as an activist lured the unsuspecting victims into a SWAT team capture at the moment they clipped the power cables leading to a nuclear facility. Legal documents that have come to light suggest that the defendants are fundamentally innocent, but they accepted a plea bargain at the close of the summer of 1991. Some have been sentenced to as much as six years in prison, and the whole group has, as the feds no doubt wished, been gravely demoralized. But Mark Davis, a first offender who received the maximum sentence, had this to say about why he participated in a willful act of property damage:

> I am not a terrorist, anarchist, or revolutionary, but a father concerned

> for the future of my children. I see a world committing suicide. [What I did] was an attempt to wake people up to this awful bargain we've made. My prison term is the price I have to pay. I am sorry for acting carelessly, but if this helps our species survive I can't be sorry.[17]

Here is someone, echoing the sentiments of Peter Wessel Zapffe voiced half a century before, who was not afraid to face willful persecution by the government because of his ideals. This is an American tradition at least as old as the Boston Tea Party.

Since the trial, Earth First! has had to calm down its public outcry, decentralize, and tone down its violence toward corporate property. In its place have come serious attempts to research radical solutions to environmental quandaries, rather than simply calling attention to them through humorous public spectacle.[18]

This is a group that has specifically named deep ecology as its guiding philosophy and has formed out of this a definite if somewhat extreme form of activism. It wakes the public up, and makes the more moderate reformers seem more acceptable in the eyes of skeptics. As Arne Naess likes to repeat again and again, at the cutting edge of the ecology movement, "the frontier is long."

The Open Air

Deep ecology has found adherents from the homeless halls of international law to the sagebrush desert of the American West. Is it in the end a movement of opposing extremes? Many of the writers within Norwegian deep ecology draw a picture of what is wrong with our present society, and what a better world might be like, thus pitting technological wasteland against ideal "Life Society." But most of us live somewhere between these poles. So it becomes important to ask, What relevance do these visions have for *us*, here and now? What are we able to understand, and what do we have the power to change?

Part of the answer to that question must have something to do with where we think nature stops and humanity begins. Why is it that we think some human activities natural and others unnatural? If humankind is a part of it all, how can we assume that some of our works are separate from nature, with others in line with the rise and fall of the tides?

For all the long time philosophy has been wrestling with this question, it has not come up with any definite answer. And the meanings of nature and technology are continuously changing, much too fast for our defini-

tions to keep pace with.[19] But it is the articulation of firm criteria that spans the gap between theory and practice. Agreement in principle is easy enough, but we also need to know how that assent fares in the sweaty realm of action.

Here we steer between Scylla and Charybdis: in view of our ignorance and the open-endedness of natural processes, we cannot define the means we use or the ends we are supposed to pursue too closely; on the other hand, we should not just mumble something vague about "loving the Earth." This means taking a hard look at how we deal with human interests. However wide our conception of these interests may be, we should not forget that they do conflict with the nonhuman world, at least in the short run. The long run should not become a succession of short sprints into ecocatastrophe.

Deep ecology as thought experiment must also reach those who hold different views about the direction our society is taking, making these differences clear and making sure they can be accommodated in workable solutions instead of protracted conflict. Nothing kills communication more quickly than an unwillingness to consider the views of the other side.

Constant attention must be paid to the connection between the rigors of ethical foundation and the unpredictability of the down-to-earth and day-to-day. There has been a great interest and activity on these issues in Norway, as well as in the rest of the world. One should not give up because no simple answers seem to have turned up. Deep ecology is not dogma, but suggestion: here is the beginning, it is up to the next generation to complete it. The work will be continued, expanded, and brought into the open air.

Notes

1. Introduction

1. The term "deep ecology" first appeared in a short article entitled "The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology Movement: A Summary," *Inquiry* 16 (1973): 95-100. See the Naess sections below for some details.

2. This alienating approach is taken by Bill Devall and George Sessions, in *Deep Ecology: Living As If Nature Mattered* (Salt Lake City, Utah: Peregrine Smith Books, 1985), which was the first book to introduce the term to a wider American public. The work is really a sourcebook of disconnected ideas, which are quickly categorized as either deep or shallow, i.e., good or bad, with little space in between for reality—the radical is opposed to all else with distance and disdain.

A second book, also entitled *Deep Ecology*, ed. Michael Tobias (San Diego, Calif.: Avant Books, 1985), came out at about the same time. Rather than pit the deep against the shallow, Tobias's approach was to present a hodgepodge of neatly unclassifiable ideas on the emerging sensitivity between humanity and nature. Though the quality of submissions is uneven and there is little to tie them together, the open-ended vision is closer to what we are after in this book: naming a tendency called deep ecology, and trying to see just what we can include within it.

3. This is the view put forth by Warwick Fox in *Toward a Transpersonal Ecology* (Boston: Shambhala, 1990), which tries to make a meticulous case for deep ecology as an academic discipline practiced by a small but dedicated few. Unfortunately, this narrows the term to near ineffectuality. In the end, even Fox must distance himself by coining his own terminology, "transpersonal ecology," leaving one less member in the academically "deep" ranks. This kind of analysis makes a good dissertation, but it stops the influence of the idea on the general public right in its tracks.

Fox's book, however, does contain the best bibliographic compendium on all sources explicitly using the name "deep ecology." Other places to look are in the pages of the jour-

nal *Environmental Ethics*, edited by Eugene Hargrove at the University of North Texas, and in the *Trumpeter*, edited by Alan Drengson at the University of Victoria, British Columbia.

4. Anarchist Murray Bookchin's attacks on deep ecology are legendary. He has called it everything from "Eco-la la" to "the depths of an ideological toxic dump" ("Social Ecology vs. Deep Ecology," *Green Perspectives*, Summer 1987, pp. 13-14). His basic point is that it tends to cloak social realities in pseudomythic pronouncements. He is right that deep ecologists are at times politically naive in the social hopes they see in renewed attention to nature, though his rhetoric is usually excessively foul-mouthed.

But now that some avowed protest-oriented deep ecologists in the American Earth First! movement have been persecuted and put on trial by the FBI (see our concluding chapter), Bookchin has come to view the deep ecological movement with more sympathy, even to the point of contributing some cash to their defense.

5. See, for example, the Council for All Beings ritual created by John Seed and Joanna Macy. Their book *Thinking Like a Mountain* (Santa Cruz, Calif.: New Society Publishers, 1988) is a good introduction to the experiential religious side of deep ecology. Also, see the writings of Dolores LaChapelle, *Sacred Land, Sacred Sex: Rapture of the Deep* (Silverton, Colo.: Finn Hill Arts, 1989), for an expansive, personal compendium of what deep ecology can entail in practice.

6. The story of Ernst Haeckel is alluded to in Donald Worster's *Nature's Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 202-4. Many of Haeckel's own works appear in English, such as *Riddle of the Universe* and *The Wonders of Life* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1900).

7. Demographic, energy, and recreation statistics used in the Introduction are, unless otherwise noted, cited from standard (bilingual) reports of the Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo. Especially relevant publications are *Statistical Yearbook* (1985); *Resource Budget* (1984); *Electricity Statistics* (1985); *Environmental Statistics* (1985); *Holiday Trips by Norwegians* (1979); and *Outdoor Recreation, Sport, and Exercise* (1975).

8. See Christen T. Jonassen, *Value Systems and Personality in a Western Civilization: Norwegians in Europe and America* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1983), esp. chap. 1. Also useful is Brian S. John, *Scandinavia: A New Geography* (New York: Longman, 1984).

9. Gunnar Skirbekk, "Nasjon og natur, eit essay om den norske veremåten" (Nation and nature: An essay on the Norwegian way of being), in *Ord og bilde: En essaysamling*, ed. Asbjorn Aarnes (Oslo: Stenersen, 1981), p. 23.

10. Yi-Fu Tuan, "Literature, Experience, and Environmental Knowing," in *Environmental Knowing*, ed. Gary Moore and Reginald Golledge (Stroudsburg, Pa.: Dowden, Hutchinson, and Ross, 1976), p. 271.

11. Cited in Arthur Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), p. 17.

12. In Harald Beyer, *A History of Norwegian Literature* (New York: NYU Press, 1956), p. 126.

13. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

14. Translated by the editors from the original, "Snø og granskog," Tarjei Vesaas, in *Dikt i samling* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1969), p. 11.

15. Translated by the editors from the original, "Det ror og ror," Tarjei Vesaas, in *Dikt i samling* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1969), p. 112.

16. Quoted in Beyer, *History of Norwegian Literature*, p. 251.

17. Knut Hamsun, *Pan* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1956), p. 39.

18. Knut Hamsun, *Growth of the Soil* (London: Picador, 1980), p. 275.

19. Henrik Ibsen, *In the Mountain Wilderness and Other Works*, trans. Theodore Jorgenson (Northfield, Minn.: St. Olaf College, 1957). The translation here varies somewhat.

20. Henrik Ibsen, *John Gabriel Borkman* (New York: Modern Library, 1961), pp. 38–39.

21. Errol Durbach, *Ibsen the Romantic: Analogies of Paradise in the Later Plays* (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 66 (Durbach's original translation).

22. Ibsen, *An Enemy of the People*, in *Ghosts and Two Other Plays*, trans. R. Farquharson Sharp (New York: Dutton, 1911), p. 183.

23. Ibid., p. 247.

24. From Olav Duun, *Floodtide of Fate* (*Menneske og Maktene*) (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1960), quoted in Beyer, *History of Norwegian Literature*, p. 313.

25. Arne Naess, "Self-realization in Mixed Communities of Humans, Bears, Sheep and Wolves," *Inquiry* 22 (1979): 231-41.

26. Gunnar Skirbekk, "Nasjon og natur," p. 20.

27. The earliest codification of this tradition, however, was made as far back as 1687.

28. "samarbeidsgruppene for natur- og miljøvern" (cooperative groups for nature and environment conservation). The group chose the lowercase, parenthesized initials to emphasize that the organization was in itself less important than what its members were actually doing.

29. For a treatment of the environmental impacts of hydropower, see Edward Goldsmith and Nicholas Hildyard, *The Social and Environmental Effects of Large Dams* (Bodmin: Wadebridge Ecological Center, 1984).

30. Kjell Haagensen and Atle Midttun, introduction to *Energi og samfunn: Kraftutbygging, konflikt, og aksjoner* (Energy and society: Hydropower, conflict, and actions), ed. Haagensen and Midttun (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1984), p. 3.

31. Hjalmar Hegge, "Miljøbevegelse og demokrati: et etisk, politisk og historisk perspektiv pa miljøvernsaksjoner" (Environmentalism and democracy: An ethical, political, and historical perspective on environmental protests), *Populist*, nr. 3-4 (1979): 15.

32. Sigmund Kvaløy, "Blocking 'Progress' in the Mountains—The Fight for Mardøla," *Outlook*, nr. 3 (1971): 4.

33. Ibid., p. 5.

34. Tom R. Burns and Atle Midttun, "Alta-konflikten og beslutningssystemet" (The Alta conflict and the decision-making system), in *Energi og samfunn*, ed. Haagensen and Midttun, p. 38.

35. Ron Eyerman, "Intellectuals and Popular Movements: The Alta Confrontation in Norway," *Praxis International* 3, no. 2 (July 1983): 186.

36. Atle Midttun and Svein S. Andersen, "Alta-konflikten, lokale holdninger og strategier" (The Alta-conflict, local attitudes and strategies), in *Energi og samfunn*, p. 58.

37. Arne Naess, "Hvorfor vi bør stå untenfor EEC" (Why we should stay out of the EEC), reprinted in *10 innlegg om EEC*, ed. Susan Høivik (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971), p. 138.

38. (snm), *Økopolitik eller EF?* (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 1972), pp. 91, 93.

39. Reported in Norwegian newspapers in the fall of 1991.

40. Økofeministene, "Økofeministene's hefte om mat" (The Ecofeminist's pamphlet on food), mimeograph, 1979, p. 1.

41. Siri Naess, "Self-Realization," in *In Sceptical Wonder: Inquiries into the Philosophy of Arne Naess on the Occasion of his 70th Birthday*, ed. Ingemund Gullvåg and Jon Wetlesen (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1982), pp. 280-81.

42. Kvaløy, "Blocking 'Progress' in the Mountains—The Fight for Mardøla," p. 4.

43. Per Arild Garnåsjordet and Kjell Haagensen, "Kraftutbygging og lokalsamfunn, aksjoner og folkelig deltakelse" (Hydroprojects and local communities: Demonstrations and public participation), in *Demokrati og folkeaksjoner: Tre studier og to artikler* (Democracy and popular movements: Three studies and two articles) (Oslo: Hovedkomitéen for norsk forskning, 1980), p. 76.

44. Ibid., p. 72.

45. According to Gunnar Germeten, central in the ministry's founding. Interview with the editors, March 24, 1986.

46. Thomas Christian Wyller, "Litt om aksjoners virkninger" (A little about the effects of demonstrations), in *Energi og samfunn*, ed. Haagensen and Midttun, pp. 95, 97, 98, 101.

2. Peter Wessel Zapffe

1. Peter Wessel Zapffe, interview by Viktor Roddvik, "Møte med norsk filosof" (A meeting with a Norwegian philosopher), *Dyade*, no. 1 (1975): 5.

2. Zapffe, cited in *Essays og epistler* (Essays and epistles), ed. Sigmund Hoftun and Bernt Vestre (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1967), p. 7.

3. Zapffe, "Mysterium," in *Essays og epistler*, p. 165.

4. Zapffe, "Møte med norsk filosof," p. 10.

5. Zapffe, "The Wisdom That Is Woe; or, The Curse of Being Mad without Being Muddled," trans. Herman Tønnessen, unpublished manuscript, 1967, p. 1.

6. Zapffe, "Hvad er tindesport?" (What is mountaineering?), in *Essays og epistler*, p. 55.

7. Zapffe, *Jeg velger sannheten* (I choose truth), a dialogue between Peter Wessel Zapffe and Herman Tønnessen (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1983), p. 60.

8. Zapffe, "Avskjed med Gausta" (Parting with Gausta), in *Barske glæder og andre temær fra et liv under åpen himmel* (Rough pleasures and other essays from a life under the open sky), ed. Sigmund Kvaløy (Olso: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1969), pp. 127-28.

9. Sigmund Kvaløy, obituary for Peter Wessel Zapffe, *Dagbladet*, October 23, 1990.

10. Zapffe wrote in an archaic style of Norwegian that is meant to have a strangely antiquated ring to it. Among other things, he utilizes the word "man" to refer to "humanity" throughout. Though this may seem exclusive and sexist to some readers today, it seems inappropriate to try to "retrofit" this particular text according to current mores. I hope this is not offensive to too many.

3. Arne Naess

Some of this material, written in 1986, has been incorporated into the introduction to the English edition of *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle*, translated and edited by David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

1. Ingemund Gullvåg, "Depth of Intention," *Inquiry* 26 (1984): 31-84.

2. Arne Naess, "How My Philosophy Seemed to Develop," *Philosophers on Their Own Work*, vol. 10 (New York: Peter Lang, 1982), p. 223.

3. Assembled from Arne Naess, "How My Philosophy Seemed to Develop," pp. 210-13, and "Modesty and the Conquest of Mountains," in *The Mountain Spirit*, ed. Michael Tobias and Harold Drasdo (New York: Overlook Press, 1979), pp. 13-16.

4. Naess, "How My Philosophy Seemed to Develop," p. 225.

5. Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements: A Summary," *Inquiry* 16 (1973): 95-96.

6. For details see Arne Naess, "Identification as a Source of Deep Ecological Attitudes," in *Deep Ecology*, ed. Michael Tobias (San Diego, Calif.: Avant Books 1985), pp. 256-70.

7. Various forms of Hegelianism conceive of humanity as "spiritualizing" nature, and allow that only through the agency of humankind can nature partake in the realm of intrinsic values. Such views are today still a step removed from representing an articulated, antagonistic philosophy; for instance, they don't negate any of the Eight Points. Another potentially antagonistic philosophy is the Marxist "labor theory of value," which has been interpreted to negate the intrinsic value of life forms. Only things transformed through labor acquire value, is one interpretation. But today, Marxists who work for the protection of wilderness propose a much wider concept of "labor" than that of gross material transformation.

8. Richard D. Alexander, *Natural Selection and Social Behavior* (New York: Clarion Press, 1981), p. 276.

9. For example, listen to the work of American jazz musician Paul Winter, Canadian composer R. Murray Schafer, or Norwegian composer Egil Kapstad.

10. See Arne Naess and Ivar Mysterud, "Philosophy of Wolf Policies," *Conservation Biology* 1, nos. 1 and 2 (1987): 396-409.

11. Portions of "The Politics of Deep Ecology," written in 1985, have been incorporated into the English edition of *Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle*, edited by David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

12. Jonathan Porritt, *Seeing Green* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 36. Note that the Ecology party in Britain has since changed its name to the Green party.

13. Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, 7th ed. (London: Dent, 1872).

14. H. J. McKloskey, *Ecological Ethics and Politics* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983), p. 19.

15. The original title of "Everything Really Important Is Dangerous" was "Is It Painful to Think?," now the title of an entire book of interviews: *Is It Painful to Think? Conversations with Arne Naess*, David Rothenberg (University of Minnesota Press, 1992).

16. Kohák, Erazim, *The Embers and the Stars* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

17. Arne Naess, *Freedom, Emotion, and Self-Subsistence* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1975).

18. Arne Naess, "The World of Concrete Contents," *Inquiry* 28 (1985): 417-28.

19. Warwick Fox, "Deep Ecology: A New Philosophy for Our Time?" *Ecologist*, September 1984, p. 194, or Warwick Fox, *Toward a Transpersonal Ecology* (Boston: Shambhala, 1990).

20. See George Sessions and Bill Devall, *Deep Ecology: Living As If Nature Mattered* (Salt Lake City, Utah: Peregrine Smith Books, 1984), pp. 70-73.

21. Gunnar Myrdal, *The American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Pantheon, 1972).

4. Sigmund Kvaløy

1. *Ecologist*, September-October 1978, p. 146.

2. Sigmund Kvaløy, "Kraftrom mot elvetid: To kulturer på norsk jord" (Power-space versus river-time: Two cultures on Norwegian soil), in *Energi og samfunn: Kraftutbygging, konflikt, og aksjoner*, ed. Kjell Haagensen and Atle Midttun (Olso: Universitetsforlaget, 1984), pp. 150-51.

3. Sigmund Kvaløy, interviewed with Oddmund Hollas by Jan Borring, "På tide med aksjoner mot demninger og maskiner" (Time for action against dams and machines), *Miljømagasinet*, no. 4 (1981): 5.

4. Personal communication with the editors.

5. Sigmund Kvaløy, "En 'karmabuddhisme' for Vesten og vår tid" (A "Karma-Buddhism" for the West and for our time), unpublished manuscript, 1986, p. 23.

5. Nils Faarlund

1. Arne Naess, "Identification as a Source of Deep Ecological Attitudes," in *Deep Ecology*, ed. Michael Tobias (San Diego, Calif.: Avant Books, 1985), p. 259.

2. See, for example, Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979).

3. Gunnar Breivik, *Friluftsliv: Noen filosofiske og pedagogiske aspekter* (*Friluftsliv:* Some philosophical and pedagogical aspects) (Oslo: Norges idrettshøgskole Komp. nr. 50, August 1979).

6. Finn Alnæs

1. Finn Alnæs, *Gemini* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1969), p. 157.

2. Finn Alnæs, preface to *Musica* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1978).

3. This and all remaining quotes are from communication with the editors.

7. Johan Galtung

1. Johan Galtung, *The Specific Contribution of Peace Research to the Study of the Causes of Violence* (Oslo: University of Oslo, Chair in Conflict and Peace Studies, 1975), p. 13.

2. Personal communication with the editors.

3. Johan Galtung, *Social Outer Limits* (Olso: University of Oslo, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, 1977), p. 28.

4. Johan Galtung, "Limits to Growth and Class Politics," in *Essays in Peace Research*, vol. 5 (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers Forlag, 1980), p. 332.

5. Johan Galtung, *Methodology and Ideology* (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers Forlag, 1977), p. 96.

6. Johan Galtung, plenary speech, conference of the International Peace Research Association, University of Sussex, 1986.

7. Johan Galtung, *The True Worlds* (New York: Free Press, 1980), p. 456.

8. See Galtung, *True Worlds*.

8. Erik Dammann

1. Erik Dammann, *The Future in Our Hands* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. xvii.

2. Ibid., pp. 46-47.

3. Ibid., pp. 108-9.

4. Erik Dammann, Ny livsstil—og hva så? (New lifestyle—so what?) (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1976), pp. 21-26.

5. This and the following quotes are from communication with the editors.

9. Conclusion

1. *Naturvern i Norge* (Environmental Protection in Norway), Royal Commission on Environmental Protection, NOU document 1980:23 (Oslo: Ministry of the Environment, 1980), p. 12.

2. The Wildlife Act of 29 May 1981, no. 38, with amendments, section 1, Ministry of the Environment Publication T-560.

3. The Pollution Control Act of 13 March 1981, no. 6, with amendments, section 1, Ministry of the Environment publication T-557.

4. See Inge Lorange Backer, "Alta: Et utgangspunkt for lovendringer" (Alta: A basis for legal changes), in *Energi og samfunn*, ed. Haagensen and Midttun, pp. 165-83; interview with the editors, April 1, 1986.

5. See Karen Havdal, "Om oppretinga av miljøvern departementet: En studie av vedtaksprocessen ved ei offentlig institusjonsetablering" (On the founding of the Ministry of the Environment: A study of the decision-making process in the establishment of a public institution), unpublished dissertation, Institutt for offentlig administrasjon og organisasjonskunnskap, Universitetet i Bergen, 1982. See also Alf Inge Jansen, "Organisasjon og offentlig politikk: En studie av natur-og miljøvernet som politisk sektor" (Organization and public policy: A study of environmental protection as a political institution), unpublished manuscript, Institutt for offentlig administrasjon og organisasjonskunnskap, Universitetet i Bergen, 1985.

6. See Hans A. Støen, "Hvorfor har vi egentlig et miljøverndepartement?" (Why do we actually have a Ministry of the Environment?), internal memo, Ministry of the Environment, February 19, 1986.

7. Knut Arne Tvedt, "Utviklingen av Høyres natur- og miljøvernpolitikk 1965-78" (The development of the Conservative party's environmental platform), unpublished dissertation in history, University of Oslo, 1983, p. 1.

8. Thomas Mathiesen, "Civil Disobedience at 70 Degrees North," *Contemporary Crises* 7 (1983): 5.

9. Ivar Mysterud and Magnar Norderhaug, "Økopolitikk—naturvernets nye dimensjon," reprinted from *Norsk Natur*, in *Norsk Økopolitikk*, ed. Bredo Berntsen (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1979), p. 9.

10. Hartvig Sætra, "Jamvekstsamfunnet er ikkje noko urteteselskap" (The balanced society ain't no herb-tea party), *Ny Tid*, nr. 30 (August 1, 1979): 10.

11. Hartvig Sætra, correspondence with the editors, January 4, 1986.

12. Jørn Siljeholm, personal communication, September 22, 1991.

13. Erik Gøtes and Gunnar Sætra, "Natur og ungdom, liv og røre i 17 år" (Nature and youth, making waves for over seventeen years).

14. Tom C. Axelsen, interview with editors, March 12, 1986.

15. World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future* (written but unsigned by Lloyd Timberlake) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 13.

16. "Annex 1: Summary of proposed legal principles for environmental protection and sustainable development adopted by the WCED experts on environmental law," *Our Common Future*, p. 348.

17. Defendent Mark Davis's testimony, paraphrased by Karen Pickett in "Arizona Conspiracy Trial Ends in Plea Bargain," *Earth First!* 11, no. 8 (1991): 24.

18. For more on the Earth First! movement and attitude, see Christopher Manes, *Green Rage* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990); and Rick Scarce, *Eco-Warriors* (Chicago: Noble Press, 1989).

19. This is the subject of David Rothenberg's *Hand's End: Technology and the Limits of Nature* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

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Obviously there is much more material available on Norwegian deep ecology in the Norwegian language. Listed below are just a few anthologies and historical volumes that may be useful.

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