

**ARISTOTLE**  
**Poetics**

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**D. W. LUCAS**

**CLARENDON**



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# ARISTOTLE

## POETICS

INTRODUCTION, COMMENTARY AND  
APPENDIXES BY

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## PREFACE

THE great edition of Bywater, on whose labours, together with those of Vahlen, nearly all subsequent work on the *Poetics* has depended, remains after half a century far from obsolete. But the text of many important passages has been improved in the light of new evidence, and knowledge of tragedy has advanced appreciably since Bywater wrote; further, those who use his work today may feel that his main interest was in Aristotle rather than in the theory and history of poetry. Since Bywater's several major editions have appeared, each more voluminous than the last. Accordingly it seemed that the ordinary student with limited time at his disposal might find useful a briefer Commentary, with literary emphasis, containing the new knowledge and what seem to me the more important of the new ideas which have emerged in recent years. Since the majority of those who take a serious interest in the *Poetics* in this country today are teachers or students of English Literature, I have tried to make the Introduction and Appendixes available to them by practically eliminating Greek type except from the footnotes.

It has been my good fortune to be able to use Professor R. Kassel's Oxford Text. To use another's text as a basis for a commentary is often embarrassing, but, as the pages which follow show, the number of places where I should have been inclined to prefer a different reading is negligible.

I have a number of debts which it is a pleasure to acknowledge. Mr. D. A. Russell read a draft of the whole at a time when he was under great pressure, and made many valuable corrections and suggestions. I have had useful discussions

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on parts of the work and received advice from Mr. G. H. W. Rylands, Mr. L. P. Wilkinson, Professor M. I. Finley, Professor Winnington-Ingram, Dr. G. E. R. Lloyd, and my daughter, and also from Mr. J. M. Bremer of the University of Amsterdam when he was working in Cambridge on the subject of 'hamartia'. I have received help with the proofs from my wife and from Mr. Wilkinson, who subjected them all to a careful scrutiny and saved me from myself on many occasions.

D. W. L.

*Cambridge, 1967*

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# INTRODUCTION

## I. ARISTOTLE'S WORKS

CICERO was acquainted with two types of Aristotelian writing: 'De summo autem bono quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum quod ἐξωτερικόν appellabant, alterum limatius quod in commentariis reliquerunt . . .' (*De Finibus* 5. 12). 'Commentarii', which translates ὑπομνήματα, can stand for anything from rough notes to such sophisticated works as Caesar's records of his campaigns. The exoteric works, presumably the same as those referred to as ἐκδεδομένοι λόγοι in the *Poetics* 54<sup>b</sup>18, must be the class whose fluent style is elsewhere praised by Cicero.<sup>1</sup> These 'published' works are all lost, unless the *Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία* recovered from a papyrus is to be reckoned among them. Probably they were for the most part early works, many of them dialogues, though less dramatic than those of Plato.<sup>2</sup> Our *Corpus Aristotelicum* consists of works of the type called by the early commentators, though not by Aristotle himself,<sup>3</sup> ἀκροαματικά 'works for listening to'. It is not known for certain how these often jerky and discontinuous discourses were actually used. They have been thought of as lecture notes, either used by the lecturer or taken down by the pupil, as sketches for proposed works, or as summaries of works already completed, but it is pretty generally agreed that they formed part of a course of oral instruction and were not intended for wide circulation outside the school.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 'Flumen orationis aureum fundens' (*Acad.* 2. 119); 'dicendi incredibili quadam cum copia tum etiam suavitate' (*Top.* 1. 3).

<sup>2</sup> *Ad Att.* 13. 19.

<sup>3</sup> The Letter to Alexander in which the word occurs (fr. 662) is not authentic.

<sup>4</sup> See de Montmollin, p. 343; W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*<sup>5</sup> (London, 1949), pp. 16 and 316; H. Jackson, *JPhil.* 35 (1920), 191-200; Bonitz 104<sup>b</sup>44.



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They vary much in degree of finish, and the *Poetics* is among the least finished, being in parts little more than a series of jottings.

It is something of a mystery why the more elaborate works were driven out of circulation by the less finished during the early centuries of the Roman Empire, and thereafter lost. A story is told in Strabo (608-9) and in Plutarch (*Sulla* 26) that the works used in Aristotle's school passed through Theophrastus into the possession of Neleus, who hid them in a cave to keep them out of the hands of the book-collecting kings of Pergamum. They were recovered early in the first century B.C. and taken to Rome by Sulla, where they eventually received scholarly publication from Andronicus of Rhodes; it is suggested that the effect of this was to turn attention away from the philosophically inferior exoteric works. This would imply that these were the only copies of the esoteric works and that the essential Aristotle was lost to the world for two centuries. Scholars vary in their ability to believe this.<sup>1</sup>

The characteristics of the surviving works have an important consequence. The *Poetics*, more than most, is disjointed, full of interruptions, of digressions, and of failures in connexion. It is in the nature of notes to be disjointed. It is also in their nature that they should be revised, supplemented, and supplied with alternatives, and if they are the property of a school, they may be worked over by different hands.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly the interpreter of the *Poetics*

<sup>1</sup> There is no agreement whether or not the influence of the supposedly lost works is to be found in the scanty philosophic remains of the period. Zeller, *Phil. der Griech.*<sup>3</sup> (1879), ii. 2, ch. 3, maintained that the *Physics* was known to Poseidonius and that traces of most of the major works can be found. K. von Fritz in *Entretiens Fond. Hardt*, iv, p. 86, asserts that Polybius did not know the *Politics* nor Euclid the *Analytics*, which implies that they were not available. For the history of the Peripatetics between Theophrastus and Andronicus see C. O. Brink in *RE Suppl.* B. vii, especially 923 ff.

<sup>2</sup> The extreme position is taken by F. Grayeff (*Phronesis* i. 105 ff.),

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is perpetually confronted with an awkward choice. He can explain an apparent failure of cohesion by saying that the writer put down enough to indicate for his own use a certain sequence of ideas, and that the connexion would be made clear in a spoken version embodying the necessary transitional passages. On the other hand, by removing a phrase or a sentence it is often possible to make a confused passage logical and coherent, and the assumption that a marginal addition has got into the text, or that alternative versions have been combined is not, given the apparent nature of the work, implausible. Again, Aristotle appears at times blatantly to contradict what he has said elsewhere. Should we go to all lengths to resolve such inconsistencies, or allow that two views may appear in notes which, not being intended for posterity, were never finally adjusted? There is no lack of sentences which can be made to appear intrusive, and editors have made the discovery that, if much of the book is left out, the rest becomes easier to explain. But attempts to recover an original *Poetics* by stripping off later additions rest on the assumption, which may not be true, that the original *Poetics* is still there. If what we have was assembled from a larger collection of notes, parts of the original can have been lost when alternative drafts were combined.

The right course would seem to be to warn the reader of the suspicions which may reasonably be entertained as to the continuity of the existing text, and then to make every endeavour to find a meaning for it, resorting only as a final expedient to excisions or to the assumption that there is a lacuna.

who says that all we have is ἡ βιβλιοθήκη Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου καὶ τῶν μετ' αὐτούς 'in which as it stands there may not be a single chapter of purely Aristotelian origin'.

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### II. THE LITERARY WORKS AND THE SECOND BOOK OF THE *POETICS*

Aristotle, unlike his master Plato, did not regard the material world and ordinary, unphilosophic activities as trivial. He tried to give a rational account not only of rhetoric, but of poetry and music; quotations in ancient writers and other testimony show that he wrote a number of works on these subjects, though he mentioned painting and sculpture only incidentally, while architecture was not counted among the fine arts in the ancient world. Among the exoteric works was the dialogue named *Gryllus* after Xenophon's son who fell at the battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C. In this Aristotle raised the question, in opposition to Isocrates, whether rhetoric was an art at all.<sup>1</sup> Here the influence of Plato was still strong. More important was the dialogue in three books *On Poets*.<sup>2</sup> It is impossible to reconstruct the work, but fragments show that it touched on some of the same topics as the *Poetics*, no doubt in a more leisurely manner, and it is likely that it is one of the sources from which Aristotelian ideas on literature passed to a wider audience.

The remaining literary works seem to have been intended for use within the school. In addition to the *Rhetoric* in three books, which is extant, there was a *Τεχνῶν Συναγωγή*, a summary of rhetorical theories in two books, and a summary of the *Techne*, the Handbook, of Theodectes. Nothing is known of the *Περὶ Μουσικῆς*, *On Music*, which may have

<sup>1</sup> Quint. 2. 17. 14. 'The young A. scorned judicial oratory, the old A. analyzed it'; see G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (London, 1963), pp. 83-87.

<sup>2</sup> See Rostagni, 'Il dialogo a. *Περὶ Ποιητῶν*', *Riv. Fil.* N.S. iv. 433 and v. 145 (1926, 7), = *Scritti Minori* I. 263. He assumes a closer resemblance to the *Poetics* than there is warrant for.

It is noteworthy that the dialogue form was used also by the Peripatetic Satyrus for his work on the lives of the tragic poets, *POxy.* ix. 1176, ed. G. Arrighetti (Pisa, 1964).

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dealt with the mathematical aspects of the subject. There were six books of *Ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικά*, *Homeric Problems*, of which the *Poetics* provides a sample in Ch. 25; it may have developed from the edition of the *Iliad* which Aristotle is said to have made for the young Alexander. The single book of *Ποιητικά* appears from its position in the list<sup>1</sup> of Aristotle's works to have been concerned with similar 'problems' in other poets. Finally there is a group of works based on researches in records and archives. A few years before 331 B.C. Aristotle compiled, with the help of his nephew Callisthenes, a list of victors at the Pythian festivals which is the subject of an existing inscription (Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, i. 275). He compiled similar lists of the victors at the Dionysiac festivals at Athens and of the plays which were produced on each occasion (*Didascaliae*). It is usually supposed that they were earlier than the *Poetics*, and that the knowledge of tragedy there displayed was based in part on researches carried out in connexion with these lists (see Pickard-Cambridge, *Festivals*, pp. 103-26).

Our *Poetics* is almost certainly the work listed as *Πραγματεία Τέχνης Ποιητικῆς*, *Treatment of the Art of Poetry*, 2 books.<sup>2</sup> It follows directly after works on rhetoric in the

<sup>1</sup> The lists of A.'s works, of which the most important is that given by Diogenes Laertius (5. 22-27), are printed at the beginning of Rose's ed. of the *Fragments*, and they are discussed by P. Moraux, *Les Listes anciennes des ouvrages d'A.* (Louvain, 1951): see the same author's *A. et son école* (Paris, 1962), pp. 279-80. The source of Diogenes' list, which begins with the exoteric works and groups the rest by subjects, is generally believed to be the Peripatetic Hermippus of Smyrna, who was associated with the Alexandrian Library, and presumably composed his list before the disappearance, if they did disappear, of Aristotle's esoteric works. Moraux himself attributes it to a later Peripatetic, Ariston of Chios.

<sup>2</sup> This is the only work in the list described as a *πραγματεία*, a word which A. often used with reference to his inquiries, e.g. *Soph. El.* 183<sup>b</sup>4.

Gudeman and de Montmollin consider our *Poetics* too unfinished for even such limited circulation as was intended for the esoteric works. The existence of a second book was denied by A. P. McMahon, *HSCP* 28 (1917), 1-46.

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ancient lists. Even without this external evidence there would be reason to believe that the *Poetics* consisted of two books or, since the division into books need not be Aristotle's, that a substantial portion of the work is missing. The scheme clearly implies a section on comedy to balance that on tragedy, and it is specifically promised at 49<sup>b</sup>21. Further, it is promised at *Politics* 1341<sup>b</sup>38 that a full account of *katharsis* will be given ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς 'in the work on poetry', and this could appropriately be part of the comedy section.<sup>1</sup>

The existence of a second book is supported also by the *subscriptio* of William of Moerbeke's Latin version completed in 1278 'Primus Aristotelis de arte poetica liber explicit'.<sup>2</sup> Similarly the reference to the *Margites* at 48<sup>b</sup>30 is cited by Eustratius (c. A.D. 1100) on *Ethics* 1141<sup>a</sup>14 as occurring in τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ποιητικῆς, the first book. Even if those are right who think our *Poetics* too rough and incoherent to be the finished version of Aristotle's work, what we have must still be the draft of a part only of the original (see p. xiii, n. 2).

### III. ARISTOTLE AND HIS PREDECESSORS

When Aristotle wrote the *Rhetoric* he was only doing more comprehensively and scientifically what others had done before him, but in writing the *Poetics* it can be said with fair

<sup>1</sup> Vahlen argued that the words of Proclus on *Pl. Rep.* (1, p. 49 Kroll, see p. 52) refer to a discussion of *katharsis* applying both to tragedy and comedy, and that it is to be assumed that this was part of the missing book, *Gesammelte philolog. Schriften*, i. 233.

Other refs. to the *Poetics*, τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, in A. are all from the *Rhetoric*, 1372<sup>a</sup>1, 1404<sup>a</sup>38, 1404<sup>b</sup>7, 1405<sup>a</sup>5, 1419<sup>b</sup>5; the first and last of these refer to a definition of the laughable and its various kinds (εἶδη), which must have been more extensive than our 49<sup>a</sup>32-37, and some of the other passages referred to are suspiciously brief. *Rhet.* 1404<sup>b</sup>28 cites τοῖς περὶ ποιήσεως. The tenses used imply an order *Politics*, *Poetics*, *Rhetoric*, but such evidence is not conclusive.

<sup>2</sup> *Aristoteles Latinus* xxxiii (Bruges/Paris, 1953).

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confidence that he broke new ground even though there was some overlap with his more popular dialogue *On Poets*.<sup>1</sup> There is no trace of any previous attempt to lay down the principles and to guide the practice of poetic composition in the way that rhetorical handbooks indicated the principles of that art.<sup>2</sup> Yet given the immense importance of poetry in Greek life, both in education and in public festivals, it must inevitably have been the subject of frequent discussion. This the *Poetics* would show even if there were not other evidence.<sup>3</sup> References to arguments about the place where tragedy and comedy originated (48<sup>a</sup>30), to conflicting views on the primacy of plot or character (50<sup>a</sup>15-38), on the merits of single and double plots (53<sup>a</sup>13), on the proper way of ending a tragedy (53<sup>a</sup>24), and the mention of the severity shown by contemporary critics (56<sup>a</sup>5) suggest a plentiful expression of opinion on literary subjects, though we have no means of telling how much was spoken and how

<sup>1</sup> *Soph. El.* 184<sup>a</sup>9: *περὶ μὲν τῶν ῥητορικῶν ὑπῆρχε πολλὰ καὶ παλαιὰ τὰ λεγόμενα*, 'On rhetoric (as opposed to logic) much had been said, some of it long ago'.

On the *Περὶ Ποιητῶν* see p. xii.

<sup>2</sup> Poetry had long been recognized as a *technē*; cf. Aristoph., *Ran.* 939 (of tragedy): *ἀλλ' ὡς παρέλαβον τὴν τέχνην παρὰ σοῦ*. But as with *ὑπόκρισις*, the art of delivery, though it was recognized, *οὐπω δὲ σύγκειται τέχνη περὶ αὐτῶν* (*R.* 1403<sup>b</sup>35).

<sup>3</sup> Gudeman, in an attempt to correct what he conceives to be the over-emphasis on Plato as a source for the *Poetics*, gives on p. 10 of his Introduction (and in English in *Class. Studies in Honour of J. C. Rolfe*, pp. 75-100) a long list of works with literary titles, not all of which need have existed when A. wrote. W. Kranz, *Stasimon* (Berlin, 1933), pp. 4-7, lays emphasis on Hellanicus among his predecessors, but there is nothing to suggest that there was a serious critical literature before A. Cf. L. G. Breitholtz, *Die dorische Farce* (Göteborg, 1960), pp. 35-40.

On the critical notions that can be extracted from earlier Greek literature see E. E. Sikes, *The Greek View of Poetry* (London, 1931), chs. 1 and 2; J. W. H. Atkins, *Literary Criticism in Antiquity* (Cambridge, 1934, ch. 2; G. M. A. Grube, *The Greek and Roman Critics* (London, 1965), chs. 1-3. The chief texts are collected in G. Lanata, *Poetica Preplatonica* (Florence, 1963).

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much written. The sections on style and grammar (Chs. 19–22) must owe something to the handbooks on rhetoric and to the linguistic speculations of the sophists, among whom Protagoras is mentioned by name at 56<sup>b</sup>15. Chapter 25, on the solution of the problems presented by poetry, clearly has a long ancestry in the difficulties, both literary and ethical, presented above all by Homer's works. And in the discussion whether epic or tragedy is superior Aristotle obviously has in mind the expression of a view the opposite of his own, perhaps Plato's. Plato indeed may have provided him with the starting point for his treatment of several important topics.

In any society where poetry and the arts are important some ideas about their nature and function begin sooner or later to circulate. In the world which Homer describes the subject-matter of the poet is heroic deeds and tales of the gods; by telling them he casts upon his listeners a spell of delight.<sup>1</sup> His poetic gift is divine and comes to him from the Muses, but it is a craft that he possesses, not a fitful inspiration.<sup>2</sup> Hesiod too received his powers from the Muses, the daughters of Memory;<sup>3</sup> and he was the first to raise the question of the truth and falsehood in the poet's message.<sup>4</sup> Archilochus knew of the fierce inspiration of those in the grip of a power outside themselves, and Pindar proclaimed the inferiority of acquired skill to native genius.<sup>5</sup> The spread of education and the ability to read, which is presupposed by the demand for written laws, caused men to reflect on the educational value of what they read—mainly Homer. Though his tone was pure, and the aristocratic ideal continued to be based on the heroic standards which he enshrined, there was room for much offence in his gods.

<sup>1</sup> κληθμός, *Od.* II. 334; θέλξις, *Od.* I7. 518–21.

<sup>2</sup> δίδου δ' ἠδείαν ἀοιδῆν, *Od.* 8. 64; θεὸς δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν οἶμας παντοίας ἐνέφυσεν, *Od.* 22. 347.

<sup>3</sup> *Theog.* 29–32.

<sup>4</sup> *Theog.* 27.

<sup>5</sup> Archil. fr. 77, see p. 80; Pindar, *Ol.* 2. 86, 9. 100. See Sir Maurice Bowra, *Pindar* (Oxford, 1964), ch. 1.

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Some—Xenophanes, Pythagoras, Heracleitus—denounced the poet who so portrayed the divine, others took refuge in explanations which assumed a hidden and deeper meaning. The first was probably Theagenes of Rhegium about the end of the sixth century.<sup>1</sup>

A no less lively stimulus to discussion must have come from the institution of literary contests at Greek festivals, especially the tragic contests at Athens. Contests are decided by comparison of one work with another, and such comparisons lead naturally to the development of a critical vocabulary and to the establishment, even if unconscious, of critical standards. As the verdicts of the judges were of interest to all, the growth of a critical attitude was rapid, as is clearly shown by the frequency and quality of literary allusions in comedy.<sup>2</sup> The contest of Aeschylus and Euripides in the *Frogs* of Aristophanes is a remarkable piece of impressionistic criticism which achieves all that is possible in a medium which forbids sustained seriousness. But in treating a question of principle, the poet's purpose in writing, Aristophanes is less happy. In a sense it is true that any poet who takes his own work seriously hopes that he will 'make men better citizens'.<sup>3</sup> If he believes that he has something to say, he believes that men will be the better for hearing it, even if he does not aim at inculcating specific virtues. Probably Sophocles, for instance, was conscious of working within a framework of values which many, to the

<sup>1</sup> In Pl. *Ion* 530 c, d Metrodorus of Lampsacus and Stesimbrotus of Thasos are mentioned as the leading expounders of Homer. Gods might be identified with the elements or with human faculties, the method by which Theagenes explained away the battle of the gods in *Il.* 20, or a hidden meaning might be found in a frivolous story, as Socrates jestingly interprets the story of Circe (Xenophon, *Memorab.* 1: 3. 7). Plato did not approve of such interpretation by *ὑπόνοια* (*Rep.* 378 d).

<sup>2</sup> In addition to *Acharnians*, *Thesmophoriazusae*, and *Frogs* there were many comedies, now lost, in which literary themes were prominent.

<sup>3</sup> *Ran.* 1009.



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detriment of the city, did not, accept. But when Aristophanes makes Aeschylus justify the poets on the ground that they convey useful information on curing diseases or drawing up an army, he puts him in the same ridiculous position as the Ion of Plato's dialogue who claimed to have acquired from his familiarity with Homer a knowledge of generalship.<sup>1</sup> Whether or not Aristophanes is wholly serious here, Plato's *reductio ad absurdum* would lack point unless such claims were actually made on behalf of poets. Those who use poets for education may easily come to assume that poets write to educate, and centuries later Plutarch, in his *De Audiendis Poetis* (M. 14 E ff.), often argues as though this were the case.

Some have believed that the literary contest in the *Frogs* presupposes a society in which literary criticism was widely practised. It is clear that there was lively interest and debate, but there is no evidence that it did more than touch the fringe of the subject.<sup>2</sup> The growth of rhetoric as a conscious art in the second half of the fifth century directed attention to words and to the formal structure of sentences. The sophists Prodicus, Protagoras, and Hippias, and, among philosophers, Democritus are known to have been interested in this kind of investigation. An awareness of the importance in rhetoric of arrangement and transitions might well awaken interest in the way poets handled similar problems.<sup>3</sup> Above all Gorgias, who defined rhetoric as 'the art of

<sup>1</sup> *Ran.* 1030-6, *Ion* 541 A.

<sup>2</sup> M. Pohlenz in an influential article on 'The Beginnings of Greek Poetic', *Nach. Gött. G.* (1920), 142 ff. asserted the need to assume the existence of a body of critical theory behind the *Frogs*. The founder of this he discovered, following Süss, *Ethos* (Leipzig, 1910), pp. 49 ff., in Gorgias. His reconstruction is of what could have happened rather than of what there is reason to suppose did happen; cf. O. Immisch ed. of Gorgias' *Helen* (Kleine Texte, Berlin, 1927), pp. 28-30. Refs. to further criticisms of the article in Radermacher, *Aristoph. Frösche*<sup>2</sup> (Vienna, 1954), p. 368.

<sup>3</sup> Protagoras seems to have suggested that the battle between Achilles and the river Xanthus, *Il.* 21. 211-384, provided a transition

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persuasion', asserted the power of words, with or without metre, to stir the emotions and control the mind, producing *apate*, deceit. It could be that Paris' eloquence deceived Helen, in which case she deserves no blame for not resisting him. Tragedy too is a source of *apate*, but this is a justifiable deceit and those who succumb to it are wiser than those who do not, meaning, perhaps, that the audience must co-operate by accepting the conventions of drama if it is to enjoy it.<sup>1</sup> There is no necessity to link this *apate* through word and persuasion with the *apate* in the sense of 'illusion' produced by the artist with his pigments, which amounts to deceit only in quite exceptional cases when a viewer is tempted to take a picture for the reality. But *apate* was used in connexion with the visual arts as early as Empedocles, fr. 23. 9, and the two were brought together round about 400 B.C. in the sophistic treatise on *The Two Arguments*<sup>2</sup> where it is said that the best poet and the best artist is the one who most deceives by producing things like the truth. Here, as in the epigram of Gorgias, the word is used with a conscious aim at paradox. The idea that poet and artist or sculptor are doing essentially the same thing was perhaps first expressed by Simonides in his celebrated comparison (see p. 269). The idea could be developed with reference to the process in terms of *mimesis*, or with reference to the effects in terms of *apate*,<sup>3</sup> but it is impossible to trace this development, as the few relevant statements cannot be dated with any precision.

between the battle of mortals, Greeks and Trojans, and the battle of gods, 385-513, see fr. of schol. on 21. 240, *POxy.* ii. 68 = Protag. fr. A 30.

<sup>1</sup> Gorgias, *Hel.* 8: εἰ δὲ λόγος ὁ πείσας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπατήσας. . . . Fr. B. 23 (Plut. *M.* 348 C): ἀπάτην, ὡς Γ. φησὶν, ἣν ὁ τε ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατηθέντος.

<sup>2</sup> *Δισσοὶ Λόγοι* I. 3. 10: ἐν γὰρ τραγωδοποιίᾳ καὶ ζωγραφίᾳ ὅστις <καὶ> πλείστα ἐξαπατᾷ ὁμοία τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς ποιῶν, οὗτος ἄριστος.

<sup>3</sup> This term, common in Plato, is conspicuously absent from the *Poetics*. There is some approach to it at 60<sup>a</sup>13, 61<sup>b</sup>11.

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It would be more possible to decide whether Gorgias was productive only of epigrams or of a serious theory if we knew more of two works, both probably of the late fifth century, the 'On Poetry' of Hippias and of Democritus. We know from Plato (*Hippias Ma.* 285 B-E, *Hippias Mi.* 368 B-D) that Hippias concerned himself with words and rhythms, but we are told nothing more. Titles of works by Democritus preserved in Diogenes Laertius (9. 48) show similar interests, but he is famous principally for his insistence that poetry is the result of inspiration, 'excludit sanos Helicone poetas' (Hor. *Ars Poet.* 295), a surprising belief to be held by a materialist (but see commentary on 55<sup>a</sup>32). This, however, tells us nothing about Democritus' view on the nature of poetry as *mimesis* or *apate*, though one would suppose that a work of this period on poetry would deal with the problem.

Finally there was one author of the late fifth century who seems to have been an historian of literature in something like the modern sense of the term, Glaucus of Rhegium, whom Aristotle may well have used. Fragments of his work *On the Ancient Poets*—the title need not be his own—deal with the early development of Greek lyric and include a valuable scrap of information about Aeschylus' *Persae*.<sup>1</sup>

Whatever Aristotle may have owed to fifth-century speculations, there can be no doubt about the influence exercised on him by Plato, whose pupil and follower he was from the time when he came to Athens at the age of seventeen until Plato's death twenty years later. Plato has much to say about poetry. In the *Ion* and, more eloquently, in the *Phaedrus*<sup>2</sup> he describes poetry as divinely inspired, 'the madness of the Muses'; but the compliment is two-edged,

<sup>1</sup> Περὶ τῶν Ἀρχαίων Ποιητῶν καὶ Μουσικῶν. Fragments in *F.Hist.G.* ii. 23. Damastes of Sigeum, pupil of Hellanicus, wrote Περὶ Ποιητῶν καὶ Σοφιστῶν.

<sup>2</sup> *Ion* 534 B; *Phaedr.* 245 A.

## INTRODUCTION

since the theory of inspiration is used to explain the inability of poets to give a rational account of what they have said. Only in the *Symposium* (209 A-D) is there a faint hint that poets may have a glimpse of ideal truth. In the early part of the *Republic* (376 C-402 A) he examines the value of the poets, especially Homer, for primary education, and finds the moral standards expressed and implied generally unacceptable. He had already in the *Protagoras* (347 C) rejected the use, popular with the sophists, of poems as the starting-point for discussions on moral questions among adults. It is in the last book of the *Republic* that Plato delivers his main attack on the arts,<sup>1</sup> using his Theory of Ideas to show that artists and poets are guilty of the most dangerous of all deceptions, representing appearance as reality. For if ideas alone are real and the world known to the senses is only a shadow of the ideas, then the arts yield the shadow of a shadow at the third remove from truth. A subsidiary argument (605 B-607 A) shows that the emotions aroused by poetry are as deleterious as its moral standards, and encourage weakness rather than self-control. Accordingly poetry is rejected as neither revealing truth nor helping the temperance of the emotions. To the second-best state described in the *Laws*, the work of Plato's old age, poets are indeed admitted, though only under the supervision of those who have knowledge of good and evil (658 E-661 D). Almost all existing poetry is condemned, and it is unlikely that any of the poets banished from the Republic would have cared to accept the terms offered for admission to the city of the *Laws*.

In private life Plato's attitude to literature seems to have been more genial; he knew the poems of Homer practically by heart, and in his works never tired of quoting them; he admired Sophron to whose art he probably owed much,<sup>2</sup> and if it is true that he sent a disciple to Colophon to

<sup>1</sup> 595 A-601 B. See Appendix I.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. Laert. 3. 18. See commentary on 47<sup>b</sup>10.

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collect the poems of Antimachus,<sup>1</sup> his interest in poetry was not unduly narrow.

Aristotle, in the *Poetics*, has little to say of genius or inspiration,<sup>2</sup> nor is he concerned about the religious or moral implications of the myths,<sup>3</sup> since he clearly does not expect them much to affect educated adults. As he did not accept the Theory of Ideas and the status attributed in it to the material world, he was under no necessity to controvert Plato's account of the artist as a mere imitator; but in showing how the poet can reveal significance by generalizing and universalizing he may have meant to show up the inadequacy of Plato's view. It is more certain that the theory of emotional purgation is an answer to Plato's complaint that drama encouraged the dominance of the emotions.<sup>4</sup> Finally, though Aristotle was not interested in the educational effects of drama, he may have been influenced by Plato's strictures on myths which show virtue defeated and vice triumphant when he laid down his requirement that the tragic sufferer should not be a character of unblemished excellence.

### IV. THE TEXT AND ITS TRANSMISSION<sup>5</sup>

Neither before nor after the alleged loss of Aristotle's esoteric writings does the *Poetics* seem to have been widely read. Throughout the last three centuries B.C. there was a considerable output of critical literature from the Peripatetic

<sup>1</sup> Proclus, *In Timaeum* i. 90.

<sup>2</sup> Mentioned only in Ch. 17, where it is probably to be understood in terms of the physiology of the four humours. See commentary and Appendix II.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. 60<sup>b</sup>36 where Xenophanes' objections are dismissed with a shrug of the shoulders.

<sup>4</sup> See the passage of Proclus' Commentary on the *Republic* printed on p. 52.

<sup>5</sup> For a fuller account of the sources of the text see the Latin Introduction to R. Kassel's Oxford Classical Text.

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school based on the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus. Quotations which we meet as examples first in *Poetics* or *Rhetoric* frequently recur in later literature,<sup>1</sup> but there is no passage earlier than the fourth century A.D. of which it can be asserted with confidence that it is derived directly from the *Poetics*.<sup>2</sup>

The *Poetics* seems never to have been the subject of a Commentary. But it was certainly known in Byzantium, and it was translated into Syriac probably at the end of the ninth century A.D. The Syriac version is lost except for part of Ch. 6, but a few years later the Syriac was done into Arabic by Abu Bišr (d. 940), and this translation, which has survived almost entire, is the earliest witness to the Greek text, though a halting one. For not only is it at two removes from the Greek, but it is accessible to most of us only in a Latin translation. Further, both Syriac and Arabic translators were at the disadvantage of scarcely knowing what a tragedy was.<sup>3</sup> The first complete Latin rendering of the Arabic was given by D. S. Margoliouth, Professor of Arabic at Oxford, in his edition of the *Poetics* (Oxford, 1911); but this has been superseded by the version of J. Tkatsch published posthumously at Vienna, vol. i, 1928, vol. ii, 1932; the translation is accompanied by a rambling commentary usable only with the aid of the index.

Probably within a generation or two of the translation

<sup>1</sup> See G. Else, *The Origin and Early Form of Gk. Trag.* (Harvard and London, 1966), p. 113, n. 52; F. Solmsen in *Hermes*, 66 (1931), 241-67. A striking example is the passage from the Rainer Papyrus given on p. 159.

<sup>2</sup> The earliest are: Themistius *Or.* 27, 337 B from 49<sup>b</sup>6, which is in part a later insertion; the story of Mityls (52<sup>a</sup>8) appears in *De Mirab. Auscultat.* 846<sup>a</sup>; sentences from ch. 20 on grammar are quoted in the Commentaries of Ammonius and of Boethius on the *De Interpretatione* (see Bywater on 56<sup>b</sup>20).

<sup>3</sup> Else gives as an example of the errors to which such a work is prone the Latin version of 51<sup>b</sup>21 *qui ponit*, where the Syriac translator read *Ἀγάθωνος Ἀνθεῖ* as *Ἀγάθων ὁς ἀν θῆ*, which the Arabic necessarily followed.

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into Arabic was copied the best and oldest surviving Greek manuscript, Parisinus 1741, called A or A<sup>c</sup> by editors. This manuscript was still in Constantinople in 1427, but reached Florence before the end of the century and found a final home in Paris. Its outstanding value was not recognized till the nineteenth century. J. Vahlen, who gave a full account of its readings in his editions of 1874 and 1885, regarded it as the sole authority from which the text of the *Poetics* is derived.

It was from a closely related manuscript that William de Moerbeke, who translated much of Aristotle, made his Latin version in 1278; this survives in two manuscripts, but they lay unrecognized until 1930. The Latin is occasionally of service in establishing the reading of A.<sup>1</sup>

Since Vahlen's day it has been recognized that there is one manuscript which preserves a tradition independent of A; this is Riccardianus 46 (B or R to editors), which, though of the fourteenth century, is the second oldest manuscript. Attention was first called to it by F. Susemihl in 1878, and some of its readings were published by G. Vitelli in *Stud. ital. di fil.* in 1894 and by C. Landi in the following year. They were given more fully in the apparatus to the edition of Margoliouth, who used the evidence of Ch. 16, where Riccardianus alone has the words that fill a previously unrecognized lacuna, to prove that it is independent of A, (see commentary on 55<sup>a</sup>14). Though Riccardianus has no descendants, a few of its readings found their way into Renaissance manuscripts (see apparatus, p. 3).

The numerous manuscripts of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are all dependent on A, and their readings, though occasionally of interest, have the authority only of anonymous emendations. See E. Lobel, 'The Greek Manuscripts of Aristotle's *Poetics*', *Supplement to the Bibliographical Society Transactions*, no. 9, 1933.

<sup>1</sup> See *Aristoteles Latinus* xxxiii, ed. Minio-Paluello (Bruges/Paris, 1953).

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The *Poetics* became available to the western world for the first time when Giorgio Valla published a Latin translation made from a copy of A, Estensis 100 gr., in 1498; the older translation was unknown, and a Latin version of Averroes' Arabic commentary printed at Venice in 1481 cast but a fitful light on the subject. The first printed text appeared in the Aldine edition not of Aristotle, but of the *Rhetores Graeci*, in 1508. The *Poetics* was edited probably by John Lascaris, who used an inferior copy of A, Par. 2038, or a closely allied manuscript. This remained the basis of the text for over three centuries until the superiority of A was recognized by Vahlen. And it is only, comparatively speaking, within the last few years that the other evidence for the constitution of a text, the medieval Latin version, the readings of Riccardianus, and the Arabic translation have been made available in a form as complete as is likely to be achieved.

The most recent development, based on the study of the growth of Aristotle's doctrines and on fresh consideration of the nature and function of Aristotle's esoteric works, is a growing suspicion of the homogeneity of the *Poetics*. Such suspicions are not new, and early editors transposed passages freely; but since F. Solmsen published his article on 'The Origins and Method of Aristotle's *Poetics*' in *C.Q.* 29 (1935), 192-201, more systematic attempts have been made to remove incoherencies and inconsistencies by distinguishing different layers of composition.<sup>1</sup> The scope for disagreement here is certainly not less than in more usual forms of textual criticism.

<sup>1</sup> See Introduction I.



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*P.* = *Poetics*, *R.* = *Rhetoric*, *Ar.* = *Arabic*.

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ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ

## SIGLA

A = cod. Parisinus 1741, saec. x/xi

A<sup>rec</sup> = m(anus) rec(entior) quae hunc codicem correxit

B = cod. Riccardianus 46, saec. xiv

Lat = translatio latina a Guilelmo de Moerbeke a. 1278 confecta

Lat O = translationis latinae cod. Etonensis, ca. a. 1300

Lat T = translationis latinae cod. Toletanus, ca. a. 1280

Ar = translatio arabica ab Abū Bišr saec. x ad syriacum exemplar  
(saec. ix?) confecta, e versione latina Jaroslai Tkatsch

fr Syr = fragmentum translationis syriacae, apud Tkatsch I 155

rec = codices graeci saec. xv-xvi, quorum lectiones propriae  
coniectarum loco habentur

Φ = Guilelmi codex graecus deperditus

Σ = Syri codex graecus deperditus

$$\Pi = \begin{cases} A \\ \Phi \end{cases}$$
$$\mathcal{E} = \begin{cases} \Pi \\ B \end{cases}$$
$$\Lambda = \begin{cases} \mathcal{E} \\ \Sigma \end{cases}$$

## ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ

Περὶ ποιητικῆς αὐτῆς τε καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς, ἦν τινα **1447<sup>a</sup>**  
 δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἔχει, καὶ πῶς δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοὺς μύθους  
 εἰ μέλλει καλῶς ἔξειν ἢ ποιήσιν, ἔτι δὲ ἐκ πόσων καὶ **10**  
 ποίων ἐστὶ μορίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τῆς  
 αὐτῆς ἐστὶ μεθόδου, λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν πρῶ-  
 τον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων. ἐποποιία δὴ καὶ ἡ τῆς τραγωδίας  
 ποιήσιν ἔτι δὲ κωμωδία καὶ ἡ διθυραμβοποιητικὴ καὶ τῆς  
 αὐλητικῆς ἢ πλείστη καὶ κιθαριστικῆς πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν **15**  
 οὔσαι μιμήσεις τὸ σύνολον· διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τρισίν,  
 ἢ γὰρ τῷ ἐν ἑτέροις μιμείσθαι ἢ τῷ ἕτερα ἢ τῷ ἑτέ-  
 ρως καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώμασι  
 καὶ σχήμασι πολλὰ μιμοῦνται τινες ἀπεικάζοντες (οἱ μὲν  
 διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείας), ἕτεροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς, **20**  
 οὕτω καὶ ταῖς εἰρημέναις τέχναις ἅπασαι μὲν ποιοῦνται  
 τὴν μίμησιν ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἀρμονίᾳ, τούτοις δ'  
 ἢ χωρὶς ἢ μεμιγμένοις· οἷον ἀρμονία μὲν καὶ ῥυθμῷ χρώ-  
 μεναι μόνον ἢ τε αὐλητικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστικὴ καὶ εἴ τινες  
 ἕτεραι τυγχάνωσιν οὔσαι τοιαῦται τὴν δύναμιν, οἷον ἢ τῶν **25**  
 συρίγγων, αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ῥυθμῷ [μιμοῦνται] χωρὶς ἀρμονίας ἢ  
 τῶν ὄρχηστῶν (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν  
 μιμοῦνται καὶ ἦθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις)· ἢ δὲ [ἐποποιία]  
 μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς <καὶ> ἢ τοῖς μέτροις καὶ τούτοις εἴτε  
 Usque ad 1448<sup>a</sup>29 deest B, ex quo codice nondum mutilo fortasse  
 una alteraque bonarum lectionum quas in hac parte praebet Parisinus  
 2038 (saec. xv/xvi) fluxit, cf. Lobel, *The Greek MSS.* pp. 27-31  
**1447<sup>a</sup>12** λέγωμεν Φ: λέγομεν A 17 ἐν Forchhammer: γένει Π, quod  
 non vertit Ar (cf. 1451<sup>a</sup>17) 21 καὶ Paris. 2038: καὶ Π 25 τυ-  
 χάνωσιν A: -ουσιν rec (prob. Vahlen) οὔσαι τοιαῦται Paris. 2038 (Ar):  
*habentes talent* Lat: οὔσαι A 26 μιμοῦνται Π (μιμείται Paris. 2038):  
 del. Spengel (non habuisse videtur Σ) ἢ Paris. 2038 (Ar): οἱ Π 28 ἐπο-  
 ποιία Π: del. Ueberweg (non vertit Ar) 29 καὶ ἢ Lobel: ἢ Π (Ar).  
 idem mendum in codd. Metaph. 992<sup>b</sup>32

17<sup>b</sup> μιγνύσα μετ' ἀλλήλων εἶθ' ἐνὶ τινὶ γένει χρωμένῃ τῶν μέ-  
 τρων ἀνώνυμοι τυγχάνουσι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν  
 10 ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι κοινὸν τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μί-  
 μους καὶ τοὺς Σωκρατικούς λόγους οὐδὲ εἴ τις διὰ τριμέτρων  
 ἢ ἐλεγείων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινῶν τῶν τοιούτων ποιοῖτο τὴν  
 μίμησιν. πλὴν οἱ ἄνθρωποι γε συνάπτοντες τῷ μέτρῳ τὸ  
 ποιεῖν ἐλεγειοποιούς τοὺς δὲ ἐποποιούς ὀνομάζουσιν, οὐχ ὡς  
 15 κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν ποιητὰς ἀλλὰ κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσα-  
 αγορεύοντες· καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἱατρικὸν ἢ φυσικὸν τι διὰ τῶν  
 μέτρων ἐκφέρωσιν, οὕτω καλεῖν εἰώθασιν· οὐδὲν δὲ κοινὸν  
 ἔστιν Ὀμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπειδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον, διὸ τὸν μὲν  
 ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιη-  
 20 τὴν· ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν εἴ τις ἅπαντα τὰ μέτρα μιγνύων  
 ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν καθάπερ Χαιρήμων ἐποίησε Κένταυ-  
 ρον μικτὴν ῥαψῶδιαν ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν μέτρων, καὶ ποιη-  
 τὴν προσαγορευτέον. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων διωρίσθω  
 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες αἱ πᾶσι χρῶνται τοῖς εἰρη-  
 25 μένοις, λέγω δὲ οἷον ῥυθμῶ καὶ μέλει καὶ μέτρῳ, ὥσπερ  
 ἢ τε τῶν διθυραμβικῶν ποιήσις καὶ ἢ τῶν νόμων καὶ ἢ  
 τε τραγωδία καὶ ἢ κωμῶδία· διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι αἱ μὲν  
 ἅμα πᾶσιν αἱ δὲ κατὰ μέρος. ταύτας μὲν οὖν λέγω τὰς  
 διαφορὰς τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν οἷς ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν.

18<sup>a</sup> Ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη 2  
 δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ ἦθη σχεδὸν  
 αἰεὶ τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖ μόνους, κακία γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ τὰ ἦθη  
 διαφέρουσι πάντες), ἦτοι βελτίονας ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἢ χείρονας

1447<sup>b</sup>9 ἀνώνυμοι τυγχάνουσι οὔσαι Lobel (sed participio nil opus, cf. De  
 cael. 294<sup>a</sup> 11, Lobeck, *Phryn.* p. 277): τυγχάνουσα II: (ἀνώνυμος) τυγχάνουσα  
 Bernays, cum nondum innotuisset Arabis 'quae est (sive sunt, Tkatsch, ii.  
 155. 1) sine appellatione'; cf. Tzetz. *De diff. poet.* vv. 11 et 167 (pp. 35 et 39  
 Kaibel) 14 οὐχ ὡς II: fort. οὐ χωρὶς, οἱπ. ἀλλὰ κοινῇ 15, cf. οὐδὲν δὲ  
 κοινὸν 17 15 κατὰ τὴν rec: τὴν κατὰ A 16 φυσικὸν Σ (Heinsius):  
 μουσικὸν Π 22 καὶ Π: nil mutandum, vid. Denniston, *Greek Part.*<sup>2</sup>,  
 p. 585 24 αἱ rec: οἱ Π (Ar) 28 οὖν Φ (Ar): οὐ A 29 οἷς Vic-  
 torius: αἷς Π (Ar) 1448<sup>a</sup>3-4 κακία . . . πάντες II (Ar): secl. Gudeman

ἢ καὶ τοιούτους, ὡσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς· Πολύγνωτος μὲν γὰρ 5  
κρείττους, Παύσων δὲ χείρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἵκαζεν.  
δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐκάστη μιμήσεων ἔξει  
ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ ἔσται ἕτερα τῷ ἕτερα μιμῆσθαι  
τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀρχήσει καὶ αὐλήσει καὶ  
κιθαρίσει ἔστι γενέσθαι ταύτας τὰς ἀνομοιότητας, καὶ [τὸ] 10  
περὶ τοὺς λόγους δὲ καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν, οἷον Ὅμηρος μὲν  
βελτίους, Κλεοφῶν δὲ ὁμοίους, Ἡγήμων δὲ ὁ Θάσιος <ὁ> τὰς  
παρωδίας ποιήσας πρῶτος καὶ Νικοχάρης ὁ τὴν Δειλιάδα  
χείρους· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς διθυράμβους καὶ περὶ τοὺς  
νόμους, ὡσπερ †γᾶς† Κύκλωπας Τιμόθεος καὶ Φιλόξενος 15  
μιμήσαιτο ἂν τις. ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ ἡ τραγω-  
δία πρὸς τὴν κωμωδίαν διέστηκεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ χείρους ἢ δὲ  
βελτίους μιμῆσθαι βούλεται τῶν νῦν.

3 Ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτη διαφορὰ τὸ ὡς ἕκαστα τούτων  
μιμήσαιτο ἂν τις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ 20  
μιμῆσθαι ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα, ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνό-  
μενον ὡσπερ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μετα-  
βάλλοντα, ἢ πάντας ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργούντας †τοὺς  
μιμουμένους†. ἐν τρισὶ δὲ ταύταις διαφοραῖς ἡ μίμησις ἔστιν,  
ὡς εἶπομεν κατ' ἀρχάς, ἐν οἷς τε <καὶ ᾠ> καὶ ὡς. ὥστε τῇ 25  
μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη μιμητῆς Ὅμηρῳ Σοφοκλῆς, μιμοῦνται  
γὰρ ἄμφω σπουδαίους, τῇ δὲ Ἀριστοφάνει, πράττοντας γὰρ  
μιμοῦνται καὶ δρῶντας ἄμφω. ὅθεν καὶ δράματα καλεῖ-  
σθαί τινες αὐτὰ φασιν, ὅτι μιμοῦνται δρῶντας. διὸ καὶ  
ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τε τραγωδίας καὶ τῆς κωμωδίας οἱ Δω- 30

8 τῷ rec (Lat): τὸ A 10 καὶ Paris. 2038: καὶ τὸ A 12 ὁ τὰς  
Paris. 2038: τὰς A 13 δειλιάδα A, η super ei scr. m. rec. 15 ὡσπερ |  
γᾶς κύκλωπᾶς A: sicut kyklopas Lat: ὡσπερ γὰρ Κύκλωπας Vahlen: γᾶς esse  
fragmentum nominis Οἰνώπας sive Οἰωνᾶς susp. Holland (cf. Athen. 19 f et  
638 b) τιμόθεος A (Lat O): et timotheus Lat T 16 αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ Π: τῇ  
αὐτῇ δὲ Victorius: ταύτῃ δὲ τῇ Casaubonus: fort. αὐτῇ δὲ <ταύτῃ> τῇ (non  
obstat Ar) 23 πάντας Π: πάντα Casaubonus 25 καὶ ᾠ Paris. 2038:  
om. Π 27-28 πράττοντας . . . δρῶντας A: -ες . . . -ες Casaubonus  
29 a voce τινες incipit B δρῶντας AB: -ες Casaubonus



ριείς (τῆς μὲν γὰρ κωμωδίας οἱ Μεγαρεῖς οἳ τε ἐνταῦθα ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς παρ' αὐτοῖς δημοκρατίας γενομένης καὶ οἱ ἐκ Σικελίας, ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἦν Ἐπίχαρμος ὁ ποιητῆς πολλῶ πρότερος ὢν Χιωνίδου καὶ Μάγνητος· καὶ τῆς τραγωδίας ἔνιοι  
 35 τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ) ποιούμενοι τὰ ὀνόματα σημείον· αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ κώμας τὰς περιοικίδας καλεῖν φασιν, Ἀθηναίους δὲ δῆμους, ὡς κωμωδοὺς οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ κωμάζειν λεχθέντας ἀλλὰ τῇ κατὰ κώμας πλάνῃ ἀτιμαζομένους ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως·  
 8<sup>b</sup> καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτοὶ μὲν δρᾶν, Ἀθηναίους δὲ πράττειν προσαγορεύειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν διαφορῶν καὶ πόσαι καὶ τίνες τῆς μιμήσεως εἰρήσθω ταῦτα.

Ἐοίκασι δὲ γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτία 4  
 5 δύο τινές καὶ αὗται φυσικαί. τό τε γὰρ μιμῆσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. σημείον δὲ τούτου τὸ συμβαῖνον  
 10 ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων· ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὀρῶμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων τε μορφᾶς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἡδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦ-  
 15 σιν αὐτοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὀρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος· ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τύχη προεωρακῶς,

31 γὰρ Π: om. B      33-34 ἐκεῖθεν . . . μάγνητος Ε (Ar): secl. Else: ὁ ποιητῆς del. Gudeman      34 Χιωνίδου Robortellus (Ar): χωνίδου Ε  
 35 αὐτοὶ Spengel: οὗτοι Ε      36 Ἀθηναίους anon. in ed. Oxon. a. 1760, Spengel: ἀθηναῖοι Ε      1448<sup>b</sup> 1-2 καὶ . . . προσαγορεύειν AB (ei . . . *appellanti* Lat): del. Gudeman (1888), om. Ar; sunt sane inepta, sed ad rationem concludendam necessaria, cf. διὸ 1448<sup>a</sup> 29      4 γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως A: ὅλως γενῆσαι μὲν B      5 αὗται rec: αὐταὶ Ε      6 διαφέρουσι Π: διαφέρει B      7 ἐστὶ Π: om. B      10 αὐτὰ Π: αὐτῶν B      13 καὶ τούτου Φ: καὶ τοῦτο A: τούτων B      ὅτι AB: ὅτι τὸ Else      17 οὗτος ἐκεῖνος A: τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο Gudeman

οὐχ ἢ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν ἢ τὴν χροιάν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν. κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ὄντος ἡμῖν τοῦ μιμείσθαι καὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας 20 καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ (τὰ γὰρ μέτρα ὅτι μόρια τῶν ῥυθμῶν ἐστι φανερόν) ἐξ ἀρχῆς οἱ πεφυκότες πρὸς αὐτὰ μάλιστα κατὰ μικρὸν προάγοντες ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποίησιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων. διεσπάσθη δὲ κατὰ τὰ οἰκεία ἦθη ἢ ποίησις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σεμνότεροι τὰς καλὰς ἐμιμοῦντο πράξεις καὶ 25 τὰς τῶν τοιούτων, οἱ δὲ εὐτελέστεροι τὰς τῶν φαύλων, πρῶτον ψόγους ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ ἕτεροι ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρὸ Ὀμήρου οὐδενὸς ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν τοιοῦτον ποίημα, εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι πολλούς, ἀπὸ δὲ Ὀμήρου ἀρξαμένοις ἔστιν, οἷον ἐκείνου ὁ Μαργίτης καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἐν οἷς κατὰ 30 τὸ ἀρμόττον καὶ τὸ ἱαμβεῖον ἦλθε μέτρον—διὸ καὶ ἱαμβεῖον καλεῖται νῦν, ὅτι ἐν τῷ μέτρῳ τούτῳ ἱάμβιζον ἀλλήλους. καὶ ἐγένοντο τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἥρωικῶν οἱ δὲ ἱάμβων ποιηταί. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα μάλιστα ποιητῆς Ὀμηρος ἦν (μόνος γὰρ οὐχ ὅτι εὖ ἀλλὰ καὶ μιμήσεις δραμα- 35 τικὰς ἐποίησεν), οὕτως καὶ τὸ τῆς κωμωδίας σχῆμα πρῶτος ὑπέδειξεν, οὐ ψόγον ἀλλὰ τὸ γελοῖον δραματοποιήσας· ὁ γὰρ Μαργίτης ἀνάλογον ἔχει, ὥσπερ Ἰλιάς καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια πρὸς τὰς τραγωδίας, οὕτω καὶ οὗτος πρὸς 1449 τὰς κωμωδίας. παραφανείσης δὲ τῆς τραγωδίας καὶ κωμωδίας οἱ ἐφ' ἑκατέραν τὴν ποίησιν ὀρμῶντες κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν οἱ μὲν ἀντὶ τῶν ἱάμβων κωμωδοποιοὶ ἐγένοντο, οἱ δὲ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τραγωδοδιδάσκαλοι, διὰ τὸ 5

18 οὐχ ἢ Ellebodus, Hermann: οὐχὶ E 20 δὲ E: δὴ Vahlen  
 22 οἱ B: om. A πρὸς B (Ar): καὶ Π 25 σεμνότεροι Π: -ον B  
 26 τῶν<sup>1</sup> A: om. B εὐτελέστεροι Π: -ον B 27 ποιοῦντες Π:  
 ποιοῦνται B ἕτεροι AB: ἄτεροι Sophianus, alii 29 εἶναι Π: εἰδέναι  
 B ἀρξαμένοις A: ἀρξάμενος B (*incipiens* Lat) 30 ἐν οἷς Π: ἐνὸς B  
 31 καὶ τὸ B: om. Π 35 ἀλλὰ B: ἀλλ' ὅτι Π 36 τὸ . . . σχῆμα  
 B: τὰ . . . σχήματα Π 37 ὑπέδειξεν A: ἀπ- B 38 ὁ B: τὸ A  
 1449<sup>a</sup>1 πρὸς τὰς τραγωδίας Π (Ar): om. B in fine paginae

μείζω καὶ ἐντιμότερα τὰ σχήματα εἶναι ταῦτα ἐκείνων.  
 τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰ ἄρα ἔχει ἤδη ἢ τραγωδία τοῖς  
 εἶδεσιν ἰκανῶς ἢ οὐ, αὐτὸ τε καθ' αὐτὸ κρίναι καὶ πρὸς  
 τὰ θέατρα, ἄλλος λόγος. γενομένη δ' οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτο-  
 10 σχεδιαστικῆς—καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ ἡ κωμωδία, καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ  
 τῶν ἐξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον, ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ φαλ-  
 λικά ἃ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐν πολλαῖς τῶν πόλεων διαμένει νομι-  
 ζόμενα—κατὰ μικρὸν ηὐξήθη προαγόντων ὅσον ἐγίνετο  
 φανερόν αὐτῆς· καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα ἢ  
 15 τραγωδία ἐπαύσατο, ἐπεὶ ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν. καὶ τό-  
 τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλῆθος ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς δύο πρῶτος Αἰσχύ-  
 λος ἤγαγε καὶ τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἠλάττωσε καὶ τὸν λόγον  
 πρωταγωνιστεῖν παρεσκεύασεν· τρεῖς δὲ καὶ σκηνογραφίαν  
 Σοφοκλῆς. ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων καὶ λέ-  
 20 ξεως γελοίας διὰ τὸ ἐκ σατυρικοῦ μεταβαλεῖν ὁπὲ ἀπ-  
 εσεμνύνθη, τό τε μέτρον ἐκ τετραμέτρου ἰαμβεῖον ἐγένετο.  
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τετραμέτρῳ ἐχρῶντο διὰ τὸ σατυρικήν  
 καὶ ὄρχηστικωτέραν εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν, λέξεως δὲ γενομένης  
 αὐτῆ ἢ φύσιν τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον εὔρε· μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτι-  
 25 κὸν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἰαμβεῖόν ἐστιν· σημεῖον δὲ τούτου,  
 πλεῖστα γὰρ ἰαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς  
 ἀλλήλους, ἐξάμετρα δὲ ὀλιγάκις καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λεκτι-  
 28 κῆς ἀρμονίας. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεισοδίων πλήθη. καὶ τὰ ἄλλ' ὡς

6 *maiora et honorabilia* Lat: μείζον καὶ ἐντιμότερα A: μείζω καὶ ἐντιμότε-  
 ρον B εἶναι ταῦτα ἐκείνων A: ταῦτα ἐκείνων εἶναι B 7 εἰ ἄρα ἔχει  
 rec: *si habet* Lat: ἄρα ἔχει B: παρέχει A 8 εἶδεσιν Π (Ar): ἠδέσι  
 B κρίναι Forchhammer: κρίνεται ἢ ναί A: κρίνεται εἶναι B (Lat)  
 9 γενομένης AB: corr. *recentiores quidam* (qui et αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆ pro -ῆς,  
 falso) δ' οὖν B: οὖν Π 10 καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ Π: καὶ αὐτὴ B καὶ ἢ  
 μὲν Π: ἢ μὲν B 11 φαλλικά rec: φαυλ(λ)ικά Σ 12 διαμένει rec  
 (Lat, Ar): -ειν AB 15 αὐτῆς AB 18 πρωταγωνιστεῖν Sophianus  
 (ct. *Rhein. Mus.* 1962, 117 sq.): πρωταγωνιστήν Σ: πρῶτος ἀγωνιστικόν ex  
 Ar eliciebat Immisch 19–20 *decurtata*; *plura videtur habuisse* Σ, sed  
 omnia turbata in Ar: μέγεθος ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων, καὶ (ἢ λέξις ἐκ) λέξεως  
 Christ 20 σατυρικοῦ B: σατυριακοῦ Π 23 δὲ γενομένης Σ:  
 fort. δ' ἐγγενομένης 28 ἄλλα ὡς rec: ἄλλως AB: *alia* Lat

ἕκαστα κοσμηθῆναι λέγεται ἔστω ἡμῖν εἰρημένα· πολὺ γὰρ 30  
 ἂν ἴσως ἔργον εἶη διεξιέναι καθ' ἕκαστον.

5 Ἡ δὲ κωμωδία ἐστὶν ὥσπερ εἵπομεν μίμησις φαυλο-  
 τέρων μὲν, οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ  
 αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοῖον μόριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖόν ἐστὶν ἀμάρ-  
 τημά τι καὶ αἰσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἷον 35  
 εὐθύς τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον  
 ἄνευ ὀδύνης. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς τραγωδίας μεταβάσεις καὶ  
 δι' ὧν ἐγένοντο οὐ λελήθασιν, ἡ δὲ κωμωδία διὰ τὸ μὴ  
 σπουδάζεσθαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλαθεν· καὶ γὰρ χορὸν κωμωδῶν 1449  
 ὀψέ ποτε ὁ ἄρχων ἔδωκεν, ἀλλ' ἐθέλονται ἦσαν. ἤδη δὲ  
 σχήματά τινα αὐτῆς ἐχούσης οἱ λεγόμενοι αὐτῆς ποιηταὶ  
 μνημονεύονται. τίς δὲ πρόσωπα ἀπέδωκεν ἢ προλόγους ἢ  
 πλήθη ὑποκριτῶν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἠγνόηται. τὸ δὲ μύ- 5  
 θους ποιεῖν [Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις] τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ  
 Σικελίας ἦλθε, τῶν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν Κράτης πρῶτος ἤρξεν  
 ἀφέμενος τῆς ἰαμβικῆς ιδέας καθόλου ποιεῖν λόγους καὶ  
 μύθους. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐποποιία τῇ τραγωδίᾳ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ  
 μετὰ μέτρον λόγῳ μίμησις εἶναι σπουδαίων ἠκολούθησεν 10  
 τῷ δὲ τὸ μέτρον ἀπλοῦν ἔχει καὶ ἀπαγγελίαν εἶναι, ταύτη  
 διαφέρουσιν· ἔτι δὲ τῷ μήκει· ἡ μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα πειράται  
 ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου εἶναι ἢ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν, ἡ δὲ  
 ἐποποιία ἀόριστος τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει, καίτοι  
 τὸ πρῶτον ὁμοίως ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις τοῦτο ἐποίουν καὶ ἐν 15  
 τοῖς ἔπεσιν. μέρη δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ταῦτά, τὰ δὲ ἴδια ἢς  
 τραγωδίας· διόπερ ὅστις περὶ τραγωδίας οἶδε σπουδαίας

31 διεξιέναι Π: διέναι B 33 ἀλλὰ Σ: ἀλλ' ἢ Friedrich 34 τὸ  
 Π: om. B 36 διεστραμμένον] δι' ἔστρ- A: ἔστρ- B 1449<sup>b</sup> ἐλαθεν Π  
 (Ar): ἔλαχε B χορὸν Π (Ar): χρόνον B 3 λεγόμενοι Σ: fort. γενόμενοι  
 6 ἐπίχαρμος καὶ φόρμις Σ: secl. Susemihl (om. Ar, cuius obscura verba 'ut  
 relinquatur omnis sermo qui est per compendium' ad notam criticam quae  
 fuerit in Σ incertissima coniectura refert Else) 9 μὲν τοῦ Tygwhitt:  
 μόνου Σ 10 μετὰ μέτρον λόγῳ scripsi (non obstat Ar): μέτρον  
 μετὰ λόγου B: μέτρον μεγάλου A: excidit in Lat 11 τῷ B: τὸ A  
 16 ταῦτα rec: ταῦτα Σ

καὶ φαύλης, οἶδε καὶ περὶ ἐπῶν· ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἐποποιία ἔχει, ὑπάρχει τῇ τραγωδίᾳ, ἃ δὲ αὐτῇ, οὐ πάντα ἐν τῇ 20 ἐποποιίᾳ.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐν ἐξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς καὶ περὶ 6  
κωμωδίας ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν· περὶ δὲ τραγωδίας λέγωμεν  
ἀναλαμβάνοντες αὐτῆς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὸν γινόμενον ὄρον  
τῆς οὐσίας. ἔστιν οὖν τραγωδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας  
25 καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἐκά-  
στω τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγ-  
γελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων  
παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. λέγω δὲ ἡδυσμένον μὲν λόγον τὸν  
ἔχοντα ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν [καὶ μέλος], τὸ δὲ χωρὶς τοῖς  
30 εἶδεσι τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἔνια μόνον περαίνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα  
διὰ μέλους. ἐπεὶ δὲ πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν, πρῶ-  
τον μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τι μόριον τραγωδίας ὃ τῆς  
ὄψεως κόσμος· εἶτα μελοποιία καὶ λέξις, ἐν τούτοις γὰρ  
ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν. λέγω δὲ λέξιν μὲν αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν  
35 μέτρων σύνθεσιν, μελοποιίαν δὲ ὃ τὴν δύναμιν φανερὰν  
ἔχει πᾶσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι μίμησις, πράττεται δὲ  
ὑπὸ τινῶν πραττόντων, οὓς ἀνάγκη ποιούς τινας εἶναι κατὰ  
τε τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν (διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τὰς  
50<sup>a</sup> πράξεις εἶναί φαμεν ποιάς τινας [πέφυκεν αἷτια δύο τῶν  
πράξεων εἶναι, διάνοια καὶ ἦθος] καὶ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ  
τυγχάνουσι καὶ ἀποτυγχάνουσι πάντες), ἔστιν δὲ τῆς μὲν  
πράξεως ὃ μῦθος ἢ μίμησις, λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον τὴν

19 πάντα Π: πάντως Β 21 μὲν Β: om. Π 23 ἀναλαμβάνοντες Bernays:  
ἀπο- Σ 24 σπουδαίας Π (Αγ): om. Β 25 ἐκάστω Reiz: -ου Σ, tractatus  
Coislinianus in defn. comoediae 26 ἀπαγγελίας Α: ἐπ- Β 28 πα-  
θημάτων Β, Σ ('dolores' fr Syr, 'passiones et impressiones' Αγ), tract.  
Coisl. in def. com.: μαθημάτων Π 29 καὶ μέλος Σ: del. Tyrwhitt  
31 post μέλους lacuna haustam esse καθάρσεως explicationem censent multi  
34 αὐτὴν Σ: ταύτην Bywater (cf. 1450<sup>a</sup>4) 35 μέτρων Α: ὀνομάτων  
Hermann 36 πᾶσαν Α: πᾶσιν Madius 1450<sup>a</sup>1-2 πέφυκεν...  
ἦθος Σ (Αγ): secl. Else, transposuerant alii alio 2 διάνοια Β (Lat):  
-αν Α ταύτας καὶ Π: ταῦτα Β 4 ἢ Α: om. Β

σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ ἦθη, καθ' ὃ ποιούς τινας 5  
εἶναι φαμέν τοὺς πράττοντας, διάνοιαν δέ, ἐν ὅσοις λέγον-  
τες ἀποδεικνύασιν τι ἢ καὶ ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην—ἀνάγκη  
οὖν πάσης τῆς τραγωδίας μέρη εἶναι ἕξ, καθ' ὃ ποιά τις ἐστὶν  
ἡ τραγωδία· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μῦθος καὶ ἦθη καὶ λέξεις καὶ  
διάνοια καὶ ὄψις καὶ μελοποιία. οἷς μὲν γὰρ μιμοῦνται, 10  
δύο μέρη ἐστὶν, ὡς δὲ μιμοῦνται, ἓν, ἃ δὲ μιμοῦνται, τρία,  
καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν. τούτοις μὲν οὖν †οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν† ὡς  
εἰπεῖν κέχρηται τοῖς εἶδεσιν· καὶ γὰρ †ὄψις ἔχει πᾶν† καὶ  
ἦθος καὶ μῦθον καὶ λέξιν καὶ μέλος καὶ διάνοιαν ὡσαύτως.  
μέγιστον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις. 15  
ἡ γὰρ τραγωδία μίμησις ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ πρά-  
ξεων καὶ βίου [καὶ εὐδαιμονία καὶ κακοδαιμονία ἐν  
πράξει ἐστὶν, καὶ τὸ τέλος πράξις τις ἐστὶν, οὐ ποιό-  
της· εἰσὶν δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ ἦθη ποιοί τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς  
πράξεις εὐδαίμονες ἢ τούναντίον]· οὐκ οὖν ὅπως τὰ ἦθη μι- 20  
μήσονται πράττουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἦθη συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν  
διὰ τὰς πράξεις· ὥστε τὰ πράγματα καὶ ὁ μῦθος τέλος  
τῆς τραγωδίας, τὸ δὲ τέλος μέγιστον ἀπάντων. ἔτι ἄνευ  
μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τραγωδία, ἄνευ δὲ ἠθῶν γέ-  
νοιτ' ἂν· αἱ γὰρ τῶν νέων τῶν πλείστων ἀήθεις τραγωδίαί 25  
εἰσὶν, καὶ ὅλως ποιηταὶ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι, οἷον καὶ τῶν γρα-  
φέων Ζεῦξις πρὸς Πολύγνωτον πέπονθεν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ  
Πολύγνωτος ἀγαθὸς ἠθογράφος, ἡ δὲ Ζεύξιδος γραφή οὐδὲν  
ἔχει ἦθος. ἔτι ἕαν τις ἐφεξῆς θῆ ῥήσεις ἠθικὰς καὶ λέξει

5 ὃ AB: ἃ rec (Lat)      6 διάνοιαν S: -a Reiz      7 ἀπο-  
δεικνύασιν A: -ύουσι B      τι ἢ Π: τινα B      8 τῆς B: om.  
A      13 τοῖς AB: ὡς Vahlen (cf. 1452<sup>b</sup>14)      γὰρ Π: om. B  
16 πράξεων B: πράξεως Π      17-20 καὶ εὐδαιμονία . . . τούναντίον secluserat Ritter      17 εὐδαιμονία καὶ  
κακοδαιμονία B: εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἡ κακοδαιμονία Π: non exstant in Ar  
19 εἰσὶν Π: ἐστὶν B      21 συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν S: συμπαρα-  
27 πολύγνωτον B (Ar): -στον Π      28 πολύγνωστος Π: om. B (et Ar,  
sed cf. Tkatsch, i. 178)      29-30 λέξεις καὶ διανοίας S (Ar): corr.  
Vahlen

30 καὶ διανοία εὖ πεποιημένας, οὐ ποιήσει ὁ ἦν τῆς τραγω-  
 δίας ἔργον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ καταδεεστέροις τούτοις  
 κεκρημένη τραγωδία, ἔχουσα δὲ μῦθον καὶ σύστασιν πραγ-  
 μάτων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὰ μέγιστα οἷς ψυχαγωγεῖ ἡ  
 τραγωδία τοῦ μύθου μέρος ἐστίν, αἷ τε περιπέτεια καὶ ἀνα-  
 35 γνωρίσεις. ἔτι σημεῖον ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἐγχειροῦντες ποιεῖν πρό-  
 τερον δύνανται τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἡθεσιν ἀκριβοῦν ἢ τὰ  
 πράγματα συνίστασθαι, οἷον καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι ποιηταὶ σχεδὸν  
 ἅπαντες. ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ οἷον ψυχὴ ὁ μῦθος τῆς τρα-  
 γωδίας, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἡθη (παραπλήσιον γάρ ἐστιν καὶ  
 50<sup>b</sup> ἐπὶ τῆς γραφικῆς· εἰ γὰρ τις ἐναλείψειε τοῖς καλλίστοις  
 φαρμάκοις χύδην, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειεν καὶ λευκο-  
 γραφήσας εἰκόνα). ἔστιν τε μίμησις πράξεως καὶ διὰ ταύτην  
 μάλιστα τῶν πραττόντων. τρίτον δὲ ἡ διάνοια· τοῦτο δὲ  
 5 ἔστιν τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι τὰ ἐνόητα καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα,  
 ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον  
 ἐστίν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι πολιτικῶς ἐποίουν λέγοντας, οἱ  
 δὲ νῦν ῥητορικῶς. ἔστιν δὲ ἡθος μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὃ δηλοῖ  
 τὴν προαίρεσιν, ὅποια τις [ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δηλόν ἢ προ-  
 10 αἰρεῖται ἢ φεύγει]—διόπερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἡθος τῶν λόγων ἐν  
 10<sup>1</sup> οἷς μὴδ' ὅλως ἔστιν ὃ τι προαἰρεῖται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων—  
 διάνοια δὲ ἐν οἷς ἀποδεικνύουσί τι ὡς ἔστιν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν  
 ἢ καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται. τέταρτον δὲ τῶν μὲν λόγων† ἢ  
 λέξις· λέγω δέ, ὡσπερ πρότερον εἴρηται, λέξιν εἶναι τὴν  
 διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἐρμηνείαν, ὃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμμέτρων καὶ

30 οὐ B (Ar): om. Π 31 ἢ rec (que Lat): ἢ AB 34 ἐστίν A: εἰσίν  
 B 35 ὅτι καὶ Π: ὅτι B 39-1450<sup>b</sup>3 παραπλήσιον... εἰκόνα  
 hic A: post πραγμάτων (1450<sup>a</sup>33) transp. Castelvetro I τις ἐναλεί-  
 ψειε Π: τι ἐναλείψει B 5 καὶ τὰ Π: καὶ B 8 τὸ A: om. B  
 9 ὅποια τις Φ (cf. 1462<sup>a</sup>12): ὅποια τις AB 9-10 ἐν οἷς... φεύγει Σ: del.  
 Bekker (om. Ar) 10-10<sup>1</sup> διόπερ... φεύγει Π (Ar): om. B 10<sup>1</sup> οἷς  
 A: quibus quidem Lat μὴδ' ὅλως Π: μὴ δηλός ex Ar eliciebat Lobel τι  
 rec: τις Π 12 τῶν μὲν λόγων Σ: om. Ar ('videntur fuisse interpolata'  
 calamo notavit nescio quis in editionis Oxon. a. 1760 exemplari  
 Bodleiano)

ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν 15  
ἢ μελοποιία μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων, ἢ δὲ ὄψις ψυχαγω-  
γικὸν μὲν, ἀτεχνότατον δὲ καὶ ἥκιστα οἰκείον τῆς ποιη-  
τικῆς· ἢ γὰρ τῆς τραγωδίας δύναμις καὶ ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ  
ὑποκριτῶν ἔστιν, ἔτι δὲ κυριώτερα περὶ τῆν ἀπεργασίαν  
τῶν ὄψεων ἢ τοῦ σκευοποιοῦ τέχνη τῆς τῶν ποιητῶν ἔστιν. 20

7 Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, λέγωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα ποίαν  
τινὰ δεῖ τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο  
καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον τῆς τραγωδίας ἔστιν. κείται δὴ  
ἡμῖν τὴν τραγωδίαν τελείας καὶ ὄλης πράξεως εἶναι μί-  
μησιν ἐχούσης τι μέγεθος· ἔστιν γὰρ ὅλον καὶ μηδὲν ἔχον 25  
μέγεθος. ὅλον δὲ ἔστιν τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τε-  
λευτήν. ἀρχὴ δὲ ἔστιν ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετ'  
ἄλλο ἔστιν, μετ' ἐκείνο δ' ἕτερον πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι  
τελευτῇ δὲ τούναντίον ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν μετ' ἄλλο πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ  
ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄλλο οὐδέν· 30  
μέσον δὲ ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο καὶ μετ' ἐκείνο ἕτερον.  
δεῖ ἄρα τοὺς συνεστῶτας εἶ μύθους μὴθ' ὀπόθεν ἔτυχεν  
ἄρχεσθαι μὴθ' ὅπου ἔτυχε τελευτᾶν, ἀλλὰ κεχρησθαι ταῖς  
εἰρημέναις ιδέαις. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζῶον καὶ ἅπαν  
πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα 35  
δεῖ ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν· τὸ  
γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἔστιν, διὸ οὔτε πᾶμμικρον  
ἂν τι γένοιτο καλὸν ζῶον (συγχεῖται γὰρ ἢ θεωρία ἐγγὺς  
τοῦ ἀναισθήτου χρόνου γινομένη) οὔτε παμμέγεθες (οὐ γὰρ  
ἅμα ἢ θεωρία γίνεται ἀλλ' οἴχεται τοῖς θεωροῦσι τὸ ἐν 145  
καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῆς θεωρίας) οἷον εἰ μυρίων σταδίων εἴη

15 λοιπῶν B (Ar): λοιπῶν πέντε Π: λοιπῶν πέμπτον rec (et v.l. in Φ)  
16 ἢ... ὄψις A: αἰ... ὄψεις B 18 ἢ B: ὡς Π 22 τὴν A: om. B  
23 δὴ Bywater: δὲ Σ 28 γίνεσθαι Π: γενέσθαι B 29 αὐτὸ  
μὲν B: et ipsum Lat: αὐτὸ A 31 καὶ αὐτὸ Π: καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ (prius  
καὶ supra αὐτὸ) B 33 ὅπου Π: ὅποι B 37 et 39 πᾶν  
μικρὸν... πᾶν μέγεθος AB: corr. rec (omnino parvum... omnino  
magnum Lat) 39 ἀναισθήτου Π (Ar): αἰσθητοῦ B χρόνου A: decl. Bonitz



ζῶον ὥστε δεῖ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν  
ζῶων ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι, οὕτω  
5 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων ἔχειν μὲν μῆκος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐμνημόνευ-  
τον εἶναι. τοῦ δὲ μήκουσ ὄρος <ὁ> μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ  
τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐ τῆς τέχνης ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ ἔδει ἑκατὸν  
τραγωδίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι, πρὸς κλεψύδρας ἂν ἠγωνίζοντο,  
† ὥσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτέ φασιν†. ὁ δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν  
10 φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὄρος, αἰεὶ μὲν ὁ μείζων μέχρι τοῦ σύν-  
δηλος εἶναι καλλίων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος· ὡς δὲ ἀπλῶς  
διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν, ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ἢ τὸ  
ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων συμβαίνει εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυσ-  
τυχίας ἢ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν, ἱκανὸς  
15 ὄρος ἐστὶν τοῦ μεγέθους.

Μῦθος δ' ἐστὶν εἰς οὐχ ὥσπερ τινὲς οἴονται εἶναι 8  
περὶ ἓνα ἢ πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄπειρα τῷ ἐνὶ συμβαίνει, ἐξ ὧν  
ἐνίων οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἓν· οὕτως δὲ καὶ πράξεις ἐνὸς πολλαί εἰσιν,  
ἐξ ὧν μία οὐδεμία γίνεται πράξις. διὸ πάντες εἰκόασιν  
20 ἁμαρτάνειν ὅσοι τῶν ποιητῶν Ἑρακλῆίδα Θησηίδα καὶ  
τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήματα πεποιήκασιν· οἴονται γὰρ, ἐπεὶ εἰς  
ἦν ὁ Ἑρακλῆς, ἓνα καὶ τὸν μῦθον εἶναι προσήκειν. ὁ δ'  
Ὅμηρος ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διαφέρει καὶ τοῦτ' εἰσικεν  
καλῶς ἰδεῖν, ἤτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν· Ὀδύσειαν  
25 γὰρ ποιῶν οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη, οἶον  
πληγῆναι μὲν ἐν τῷ Παρνασσῷ, μανῆναι δὲ προσποιησασθαι  
ἐν τῷ ἀγερμῷ, ὧν οὐδὲν θατέρου γενομένου ἀναγκαῖον ἦν  
ἢ εἶκος θάτερον γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μίαν πράξιν οἶαν

1451<sup>a</sup>3-4 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῶων Σ (Ar): fort. delenda (καὶ ἐπὶ abesse voluit  
Christ) 5 εὐμνημόνευτον Π (Ar): ἀμν- B 6 δὲ B: om. Π ὁ μὲν  
Ellebodius, Bursian: μὲν AB 8 κλεψύδρας Σ: -αν rec 9 φασιν Σ:  
'est consuetudo nostra ut dicamus' Ar τὴν A: om. B 10 φύσιν τοῦ  
πράγματος Π: τοῦ πράγματος φύσιν B 12 διορίσαντας Π: -α B 14 ἐξ  
εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν Π: ἐξ εὐτύχων εἰς δυστυχήματαβάλλειν (sic)  
B 17 ἐνὶ B: γένει Π (cf. 1447<sup>a</sup>17) 18 ἐνίων Π: ἐνι B: fort.  
<ἔξω> ἐνίων 20 θησηίδα Π: καὶ θησηίδα B 27 οὐδὲν Σ: οὐδὲ  
Bywater 27-28 ἦν ἢ B: ἦν A: aut Lat 28 μίαν Π: μὲν μίαν B

λέγομεν τὴν Ὀδύσειαν συνέστησεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἰλιά-  
 da. χρῆ οὖν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις μιμητικαῖς ἢ μία 30  
 μίμησις ἐνός ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν μῦθον, ἐπεὶ πράξεως μίμησίς  
 ἐστίν, μᾶς τε εἶναι καὶ ταύτης ὅλης, καὶ τὰ μέρη συνεστά-  
 ναι τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως ὥστε μετατιθεμένου τινὸς μέρους ἢ  
 ἀφαιρουμένου διαφέρεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ὅλον· ὁ γὰρ προσὸν  
 ἢ μὴ προσὸν μηδὲν ποιεῖ ἐπίδηλον, οὐδὲν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου ἐστίν. 35

9 Φανερόν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενό-  
 μενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἷα ἂν γένοιτο  
 καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. ὁ γὰρ  
 ἱστορικὸς καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς οὐ τῷ ἢ ἔμμετρα λέγειν ἢ ἄμετρα 14<sup>ε</sup>  
 διαφέρουσιν (εἴη γὰρ ἂν τὰ Ἡροδότου εἰς μέτρα τεθῆναι  
 καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἂν εἴη ἱστορία τις μετὰ μέτρου ἢ ἄνευ μέ-  
 τρων)· ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γινόμενα λέ-  
 γειν, τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο· διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ 5  
 σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις  
 μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἢ δ' ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει.  
 ἔστιν δὲ καθόλου μὲν, τῷ ποίω τὰ ποῖα ἅττα συμβαίνει  
 λέγειν ἢ πράττειν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὐ στο-  
 χάζεται ἢ ποίησις ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη· τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκα- 10  
 στον, τί Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔπραξεν ἢ τί ἔπαθεν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς  
 κωμωδίας ἤδη τοῦτο δῆλον γέγονεν· συστήσαντες γὰρ τὸν  
 μῦθον διὰ τῶν εἰκότων οὕτω τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα ὑπο-  
 τιθέασιν, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ἱαμβοποιοὶ περὶ τὸν καθ' ἕκαστον  
 ποιοῦσιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς τραγωδίας τῶν γενομένων ὀνομάτων 15  
 ἀντέχονται. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστὶ τὸ δυνατόν· τὰ μὲν

29 λέγομεν B (Lat): λέγομεν A 32 καὶ ταύτης Σ: ταύτης καὶ Susemihl  
 olim 34 διαφέρεσθαι Σ: διαφθείρεσθαι Laur. 60. 21 in marg. (Ar?): δια-  
 φορεῖσθαι Butcher 36 οὐ τὸ B (Lat, Ar): οὕτω A γενόμενα rec:  
 γιν- AB 1451<sup>b</sup>1 λέγειν ἢ ἄμετρα Π: ἢ ἄμετρα λέγειν B 2 γὰρ Π:  
 om. B 3 καὶ Π: om. B 4 τούτῳ B: τοῦτο A 8 καθόλου  
 A: τὰ καθόλου (ex 7) B 9 οὐ Π: οὐ B 10 τὸ B (Lat): τὸν A  
 13 οὕτω Σ: οὕτω videtur vertere Ar τυχόντα Π (Ar): τιθέντα B  
 ὑποτιθέασιν Π: τιθέασιν B 14 τὸν A: τὸ Φ(?): τῶν B

οὐν μὴ γενόμενα οὐπω πιστεύομεν εἶναι δυνατά, τὰ δὲ γε-  
 νόμενα φανερόν ὅτι δυνατά· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο, εἰ ἦν ἀδύ-  
 νατα. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἐν ἐνίαις μὲν ἐν  
 20 ἢ δύο τῶν γνωρίμων ἐστὶν ὀνομάτων, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πεποιοη-  
 μένα, ἐν ἐνίαις δὲ οὐθέν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ἀγάθωνος Ἀνθεί· ὁμοίως  
 γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ τὰ τε πράγματα καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πεποιήται,  
 καὶ οὐδὲν ἤττον εὐφραίνει. ὥστ' οὐ πάντως εἶναι ζητητέον  
 τῶν παραδεδομένων μύθων, περὶ οὓς αἱ τραγωδαὶ εἰσὶν, ἀντ-  
 25 ἔχεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ γελοῖον τοῦτο ζητεῖν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ γνώ-  
 ριμα ὀλίγοις γνώριμά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅμως εὐφραίνει πάντας.  
 δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν μᾶλλον τῶν μύθων  
 εἶναι δεῖ ποιητὴν ἢ τῶν μέτρων, ὅσω ποιητὴς κατὰ τὴν μί-  
 μησίαν ἐστίν, μιμνῆται δὲ τὰς πράξεις. κἄν ἄρα συμβῆ γενό-  
 30 μενα ποιεῖν, οὐθέν ἤττον ποιητὴς ἐστὶ τῶν γὰρ γενομένων  
 ἔνια οὐδὲν κωλύει τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷα ἂν εἰκὸς γενέσθαι  
 [καὶ δυνατὰ γενέσθαι], καθ' ὃ ἐκεῖνος αὐτῶν ποιητὴς ἐστίν.

τῶν δὲ ἀπλῶν μύθων καὶ πράξεων αἱ ἐπεισοδιώδεις  
 εἰσὶν χεῖρισται· λέγω δ' ἐπεισοδιώδη μῦθον ἐν ᾧ τὰ ἐπεισο-  
 35 ὅδια μετ' ἄλληλα οὐτ' εἰκὸς οὐτ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι. τοιαῦται  
 δὲ ποιοῦνται ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν φαύλων ποιητῶν δι' αὐτούς, ὑπὸ  
 δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν διὰ τοὺς ὑποκριτάς· ἀγωνίσματα γὰρ  
 ποιοῦντες καὶ παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείνοντες τὸν μῦθον πολ-  
 40 λάκις διαστρέφειν ἀναγκάζονται τὸ ἐφεξῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ  
 μόνον τελείας ἐστὶ πράξεως ἢ μίμησις ἀλλὰ καὶ φοβερῶν  
 καὶ ἐλεεινῶν, ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται καὶ μάλιστα [καὶ μᾶλλον]  
 ὅταν γένηται παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα· τὸ γὰρ θαυ-

19 ἐν ἐνίαις B: ἐνίαις Π 21 Ἀνθεί Welcker: ἄνθει AB: *ant he* Lat: Ἄνθη  
 Gudeman (Ar?) 26 ὅμως E: ὁμοίως Else 28 τὴν A: om. B  
 32 καὶ δυνατὰ γενέσθαι E: secl. Vorlaender (om. Ar): γενέσθαι del.  
 Hatzfeld-Dufour 33 ἀπλῶν E: ἀτελῶν Essen: om. Ar, sed in sen-  
 tentia turbata 34 τὰ Π:  
 ἐπεισοδιώδεις Π: ἐπιδόσεις B  
 καὶ B 38 παρατείνοντες B: -αντες A τὸν B: om. A 1452<sup>a</sup> 3 δὲ  
 Π: om. B καὶ μάλιστα Π: καὶ om. B καὶ μᾶλλον E: del. Ellebodus,  
 Spengel

μαστὸν οὕτως ἔξει μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου καὶ 5  
τῆς τύχης, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης ταῦτα θαυμασιώτατα  
δοκεῖ ὅσα ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες φαίνεται γεγονέναι, οἷον ὡς ὁ  
ἄνδριάς ὁ τοῦ Μίτυος ἐν Ἄργει ἀπέκτεινεν τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ  
θανάτου τῷ Μίτυι, θεωροῦντι ἐμπεσῶν· ἔοικε γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα  
οὐκ εἰκῆ γίνεσθαι· ὥστε ἀνάγκη τοὺς τοιούτους εἶναι καλλίους 10  
μύθους.

ΙΟ Εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν μύθων οἱ μὲν ἀπλοὶ οἱ δὲ πεπλεγμένοι·  
καὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις ὧν μμήσεις οἱ μῦθοί εἰσιν ὑπάρχου-  
σιν εὐθὺς οὖσαι τοιαῦται. λέγω δὲ ἀπλῆν μὲν πρᾶξιν ἣς  
γυνομένης ὥσπερ ὤρισται συνεχοῦς καὶ μιᾶς ἄνευ περι- 15  
πετείας ἢ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἢ μετάβασις γίνεται, πεπλεγμένην  
δὲ ἐξ ἣς μετὰ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἢ περιπετείας ἢ ἀμφοῖν ἢ  
μετάβασις ἐστίν. ταῦτα δὲ δεῖ γίνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συ-  
στάσεως τοῦ μύθου, ὥστε ἐκ τῶν προγεγενημένων συμβαίνειν  
ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι ταῦτα· διαφέρει 20  
γὰρ πολὺ τὸ γίνεσθαι τάδε διὰ τάδε ἢ μετὰ τάδε.

ΙΙ Ἔστι δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πρατ-  
τομένων μεταβολὴ καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ὥσπερ  
λέγομεν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον ἐν τῷ Οἰδί-  
ποδι ἐλθῶν ὡς εὐφρανῶν τὸν Οἰδίπουν καὶ ἀπαλλάξων τοῦ 25  
πρὸς τὴν μητέρα φόβου, δηλώσας ὅς ἦν, τούναντίον ἐποίησεν  
καὶ ἐν τῷ Λυγκεῖ ὁ μὲν ἀγόμενος ὡς ἀποθανούμενος, ὁ δὲ  
Δαναὸς ἀκολουθῶν ὡς ἀποκτενῶν, τὸν μὲν συνέβη ἐκ τῶν  
πεπραγμένων ἀποθανεῖν, τὸν δὲ σωθῆναι. ἀναγνώρισις  
δέ, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῦνομα σημαίνει, ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν 30  
μεταβολή, ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν, τῶν πρὸς εὐτυχίαν ἢ

5 οὕτως Π (Αγ): οὔτε Β 6 τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης Α: ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης Β 7 ὡς  
ὁ Α: ὥσπερ ὁ Β 10 γίνεσθαι Β: γενέσθαι Π 12 πεπλεγμένοι Π:  
πεπλασμένοι Β 16 πεπλεγμένην Β: -ἡ Π 17 ἐξ ἣς Β ('in qua'  
Αγ): λέξις Π: (ἣς) ἐξ ἣς Else ἢ ἀμφοῖν Π (Αγ): ἡ om. Β 20 ταῦτα Σ:  
τάναντία Bonitz 22 πραττομένων Π: πραττόντων Β 24 οἷον Β:  
ὥσπερ (ex 23) Π 25 ἀπαλλάξων Π: -άσσων Β 27 λυγκεῖ Π:  
γλυκεῖ Β 28-29 τὸν... τὸν Π: τῷ... τῷ Β 31 ἢ εἰς φιλίαν Π: ἡ om. Β

δυστυχίαν ὠρισμένων· καλλίστη δὲ ἀναγνώρισις, ὅταν ἄμα  
 περιπετεία γένηται, οἷον ἔχει ἢ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι. εἰσὶν  
 μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλαι ἀναγνωρίσεις· καὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἄψυχα καὶ  
 15 τὰ τυχόντα ἔστιν ὡσπερ εἶρηται συμβαίνει† καὶ εἰ πέ-  
 πραγέ τις ἢ μὴ πέπραγεν ἔστιν ἀναγνωρίσαι. ἀλλ' ἢ μά-  
 λιστα τοῦ μύθου καὶ ἢ μάλιστα τῆς πράξεως ἢ εἰρημένη  
 ἐστίν· ἢ γὰρ τοιαύτη ἀναγνώρισις καὶ περιπέτεια ἢ ἔλεον  
 1<sup>b</sup> ἔξει ἢ φόβον (οἷων πράξεων ἢ τραγωδία μίμησις ὑπόκειται),  
 ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων  
 συμβήσεται. ἐπεὶ δὴ ἢ ἀναγνώρισις τινῶν ἐστὶν ἀναγνώρισις,  
 αἱ μὲν εἰσι θατέρου πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον μόνον, ὅταν ἢ δῆλος ἄτερος  
 5 τίς ἐστίν, ὅτε δὲ ἀμφοτέρους δεῖ ἀναγνωρίσαι, οἷον ἢ  
 μὲν Ἰφιγένεια τῷ Ὀρέστη ἀνεγνωρίσθη ἐκ τῆς πέμψεως  
 τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ἐκείνου δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰφιγένειαν ἄλλης ἔδει  
 ἀναγνωρίσεως.

δύο μὲν οὖν τοῦ μύθου μέρη ταῦτ' ἐστί, περιπέτεια  
 10 καὶ ἀναγνώρισις· τρίτον δὲ πάθος. τούτων δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν  
 καὶ ἀναγνώρισις εἶρηται, πάθος δὲ ἐστὶ πράξις φθαρτικὴ ἢ  
 ὀδυνηρά, οἷον οἷ τε ἐν τῷ φανερωῦ θάνατοι καὶ αἱ περι-  
 ωδυνία καὶ τρώσεις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.

Μέρη δὲ τραγωδίας οἷς μὲν ὡς εἶδεσι δεῖ χρῆσθαι 12  
 15 πρότερον εἵπομεν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ εἰς ἅ διαιρεῖται  
 κευχωρισμένα τάδε ἐστίν, πρόλογος ἐπεισόδιον ἔξοδος χορι-

33 περιπετεία Gompertz: περιπέτεια Π: -α Β γένηται Β: γίνονται Α (aut  
 hoc aut γίνονται Φ) οἷον Σ: οἷαν Bywater ἢ Π: om. Β 34-36 καὶ  
 γὰρ . . . ἀναγνωρίσαι Π: om. Β: καὶ τὰ τυχόντα . . . συμβαίνει om. Αr  
 34-35 καὶ τὰ τυχόντα ἐστίν (hoc accentu) Α: et ad quaecumque adhuc et (=   
 καὶ πρὸς τὰ τυχόντα, ἔτι δὲ καί?) Lat 36 ἢ rec: εἰ Α: et si Lat  
 1452<sup>b</sup>1 οἷων ΒΦ: οἷον Α 2 ἐπειδὴ Vahlens duce Susemihl: ἔτι δὲ Σ  
 3 ἐπειδὴ (ἐπεὶ δὴ rec) ἢ ἀναγνώρισις Π: ἔτι δὲ ἀναγνωρίσεις Β τινῶν ἐστίν  
 ἀναγνώρισις Π (Αr): om. Β 4 εἰσι Β: om. Π ἄτερος (sic) Β: ἕτερος Α  
 7 ἐκείνῳ Σ: corr. Bywater ἔδει Π (Αr): ἔφη Β 9 ταῦτα Β (Lat,  
 Αr): περὶ ταῦτ' Α 10 καὶ Π: μὲν καὶ Β 10-11 τούτων . . .  
 εἶρηται Σ: exciderunt in Αr 12 οἷ τε Β: que Lat: ὅτε Α 13 τρώσεις  
 Α: αἱ τρώσεις Β 14-27 proscrispsit Ritter

κόν, καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν πάροδος τὸ δὲ στάσιμον, κοινὰ μὲν ἀπάντων ταῦτα, ἴδια δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνηῆς καὶ κομμοί. ἔστιν δὲ πρόλογος μὲν μέρος ὅλον τραγωδίας τὸ πρὸ χοροῦ παρόδου, ἐπεισόδιον δὲ μέρος ὅλον τραγωδίας τὸ μεταξὺ 20 ὄλων χορικῶν μελῶν, ἔξοδος δὲ μέρος ὅλον τραγωδίας μεθ' ὃ οὐκ ἔστι χοροῦ μέλος· χορικοῦ δὲ πάροδος μὲν ἢ πρώτη λέξις ὅλη χοροῦ, στάσιμον δὲ μέλος χοροῦ τὸ ἄνευ ἀναπαίστου καὶ τροχαίου, κομμὸς δὲ θρήνος κοινὸς χοροῦ καὶ ἀπὸ σκηνηῆς. μέρη δὲ τραγωδίας οἷς μὲν <ὡς εἶδεσι> δεῖ 25 χρῆσθαι πρότερον εἶπαμεν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται κεχωρισμένα ταῦτ' ἔστιν.

- 13 Ὡν δὲ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι καὶ ἃ δεῖ εὐλαβεῖσθαι συνιστάντας τοὺς μύθους καὶ πόθειν ἔσται τὸ τῆς τραγωδίας ἔργον, ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἶη λεκτέον τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις. ἐπειδὴ οὖν 30 δεῖ τὴν σύνθεσιν εἶναι τῆς καλλίστης τραγωδίας μὴ ἀπλήν ἀλλὰ πεπλεγμένην καὶ ταύτην φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλεεινῶν εἶναι μιμητικὴν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον τῆς τοιαύτης μιμήσεώς ἐστιν), πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε τοὺς ἐπικεικίς ἄνδρας δεῖ μεταβάλλοντας φαίνεσθαι ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν, οὐ γὰρ 35 φοβερὸν οὐδὲ ἐλεεινὸν τοῦτο ἀλλὰ μιαιρόν ἐστιν· οὔτε τοὺς μοχθηροὺς ἐξ ἀτυχίας εἰς εὐτυχίαν, ἀτραγωδέστατον γὰρ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πάντων, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει ὦν δεῖ, οὔτε γὰρ φιλόανθρωπον οὔτε ἐλεεινὸν οὔτε φοβερὸν ἐστίν· οὐδ' αὖ τὸν σφόδρα πονηρὸν 14 ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταπίπτειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλάν-

17 τούτου Π (Αγ): τοῦτο Β 18 ἀπὸ Α: ὑπὸ Β κόμμοι ΑΒ 20 παρ-  
 ὄδου Π: γὰρ ὁδοῦ Β 21 μέρος Π (Αγ): μέλος Β 22 μεθ' ὃ Π: καθ'  
 ὃ Β μέλος Π (Αγ): μέρος Β χορικοῦ Π: -ὸς Β 23 ὅλη Susemihl (ὅλη  
 τοῦ Westphal): ὅλον Α, in ἄλλου corruptum apud Tzetz. *De trag. poesi* v.  
 38 (p. 44 Kaibel) στάσιμον Π: -ος Β 24 κόμμος ΑΒ 25 ὡς εἶδεσι  
 rec (cf. 14): om. Α 26 εἶπαμεν Α: εἶπομεν Β 27 κεχωρισμένα  
 ταῦτα Π: ταῦτα κεχωρισμένα Β 28 ὦν rec (Αγ): que Lat: ὡς ΑΒ  
 32 πεπλεγμένην Π: πεπλασμένην Β 35-37 οὐ γὰρ... εὐτυχίαν Π (Αγ):  
 om. Β, irrepit in vicem τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀρετῇ, glossema ad τοὺς ἐπικεικίς  
 ἄνδρας (34) 37 ἀτραγωδέστατον Α: -δητότατον Β 1453<sup>a</sup> αὖ τὸν  
 rec: αὐτὸν Β: αὐτὸ Α

θρωπον ἔχοι ἂν ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσασις ἀλλ' οὔτε ἔλεον οὔτε  
 φόβον, ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιόν ἐστιν δυστυχοῦντα, ὁ δὲ  
 5 περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, ἔλεος μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον, φόβος δὲ  
 περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, ὥστε οὔτε ἔλεινόν οὔτε φοβερόν ἐσται τὸ  
 συμβαῖνον. ὁ μεταξὺ ἄρα τούτων λοιπός. ἐστι δὲ τοιοῦτος  
 ὁ μήτε ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνη μήτε διὰ κακίαν  
 καὶ μοχθηρίαν μεταβάλλων εἰς τὴν δυστυχίαν ἀλλὰ δι'  
 10 ἀμαρτίαν τινά, τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων καὶ εὐτυχία,  
 οἶον Οἰδίπους καὶ Θυέστης καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων γενῶν  
 ἐπιφανεῖς ἄνδρες. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν καλῶς ἔχοντα μῦθον  
 ἀπλοῦν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ διπλοῦν, ὥσπερ τινές φασι, καὶ μετα-  
 βάλλειν οὐκ εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἀλλὰ τούναντίον  
 15 ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μὴ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλλὰ δι'  
 ἀμαρτίαν μεγάλην ἢ οἴου εἶρηται ἢ βελτίονος μᾶλλον ἢ  
 χείρονος. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ  
 οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς τυχόντας μύθους ἀπηρίθμουν, νῦν δὲ περὶ  
 ὀλίγας οἰκίας αἱ κάλλιστα τραγωδίαί συντίθενται, οἶον  
 20 περὶ Ἀλκμέωνα καὶ Οἰδίπου καὶ Ὀρέστην καὶ Μελέαγρον  
 καὶ Θυέστην καὶ Τήλεφον καὶ ὅσοις ἄλλοις συμβέβηκεν  
 ἢ παθεῖν δεινὰ ἢ ποιῆσαι. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην  
 καλλίστη τραγωδία ἐκ ταύτης τῆς συστάσεώς ἐστι. διὸ καὶ  
 οἱ Εὐριπίδῃ ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸ αὐτὸ ἀμαρτάνουσι ὅτι τοῦτο  
 25 δρᾶ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις καὶ αἱ πολλαὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς δυστυχίαν  
 τελευτῶσιν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ὥσπερ εἶρηται ὀρθόν· σημεῖον  
 δὲ μέγιστον ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων τραγι-  
 κώταται αἱ τοιαῦται φαίνονται, ἂν κατορθωθῶσιν, καὶ ὁ  
 Εὐριπίδης, εἰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μὴ εὖ οἰκονομεῖ, ἀλλὰ τραγι-

4 περὶ Π: παρὰ Β      5-6 ἔλεος . . . ὅμοιον Π (Ar): om. Β      11 οἰδί-  
 πους Β (Ar): δίπους Π      13 τινές φασι Π: φασὶ τινές Β      15 μοχθηρίαν  
 Α: -ας Β      16 οἴου Π: οἴου ὡς Β      17 πρῶτον Π: πρὸ τοῦ Β  
 19 κάλλιστα Σ: del. Christ (om. Ar; cf. Tkatsch, i. 194)      20 ἀλ-  
 κμαίωνα ΑΒ      22 τὴν Α: om. Β      24 τὸ αὐτὸ Σ (excidit, ut  
 saepius, in Ar): αὐτοὶ Reiz      25 ταῖς Α: αἷς Β      καὶ αἱ Knebel:  
 καὶ Π: αἱ Β

κώτατος γε τῶν ποιητῶν φαίνεται. δευτέρα δ' ἡ πρώτη 30  
 λεγομένη ὑπὸ τινῶν ἐστὶν σύστασις, ἡ διπλὴν τε τὴν σύστα-  
 σιν ἔχουσα καθάπερ ἡ Ὀδύσεια καὶ τελευτῶσα ἐξ ἐναντί-  
 ας τοῖς βελτίοσι καὶ χείροσιν. δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι πρώτη διὰ  
 τὴν τῶν θεάτρων ἀσθένειαν· ἀκολουθοῦσι γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ κατ'  
 εὐχὴν ποιοῦντες τοῖς θεαταῖς. ἔστιν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἀπὸ τραγω- 35  
 δίας ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς κωμωδίας οἰκεία· ἐκεῖ γὰρ  
 οἱ ἂν ἔχθιστοι ᾧσιν ἐν τῷ μύθῳ, οἷον Ὀρέστης καὶ Αἴγι-  
 σθος, φίλοι γενόμενοι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἐξέρχονται, καὶ ἀπο-  
 θνήσκει οὐδείς ὑπ' οὐδενός.

4 Ἔστιν μὲν οὖν τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἔλεεινὸν ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως 1452  
 γίνεσθαι, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῶν πραγ-  
 μάτων, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρότερον καὶ ποιητοῦ ἀμείνονος. δεῖ γὰρ  
 καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὄραν οὕτω συνεστάναι τὸν μῦθον ὥστε τὸν  
 ἀκούοντα τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα καὶ φρίττειν καὶ ἐλεεῖν 5  
 ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων ἅπερ ἂν πάθοι τις ἀκούων τὸν τοῦ  
 Οιδίπου μῦθον. τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦτο παρασκευά-  
 ζειν ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενόν ἐστιν. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ  
 φοβερὸν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἀλλὰ τὸ τερατῶδες μόνον παρα-  
 σκευάζοντες οὐδὲν τραγωδία κοινωνοῦσιν οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν δεῖ 10  
 ζητεῖν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τραγωδίας ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ  
 τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως δεῖ ἡδονὴν παρα-  
 σκευάζει τὸν ποιητὴν, φανερόν ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πράγμα-  
 σιν ἐμποιητέον. ποῖα οὖν δεινὰ ἢ ποῖα οἰκτρὰ φαίνεται  
 τῶν συμπιπτόντων, λάβωμεν. ἀνάγκη δὲ ἢ φίλων εἶναι 15

31 σύστασις  $\mathcal{E}$ : del. Twining ἡ] ἡ B: que Lat: ἡ A τετὴν A: τὴν B  
 σύστασιν  $\mathcal{E}$ : μετάβασις Ueberweg 32 καὶ Π: om. B ἐξ ἐναντίας Π:  
 εἰς τὸναντίον B 34 τῶν A: om. B 35 αὕτη AB: αὕτη ἢ Vahlen  
 36-39 ἐκεῖ... οὐδενός A: ineptum sane exemplum secl. Else 37 οἱ ἂν  
 Bonitz: ἂν οἱ  $\mathcal{E}$  1453<sup>b</sup>3 πρότερον Π: καὶ πρότερον B 4 οὕτω συν-  
 εστάναι Π: τοῦ συνιστάναι B 6 ἅπερ ἂν πάθοι τις Π: post ἅπερ ἂν in  
 B καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενον ἐστὶ (ex 8), tum post unius vel duarum litt. spa-  
 tium πάθοι τις 6-7 ἀκούων τὸν τοῦ οιδίπου μῦθον A: τὸν οιδίπου  
 μῦθον ἀκούων B 7 δὲ Π: om. B 10 πᾶσαν A: ἅπασαν B  
 15 δὲ Spengel: δὲ  $\mathcal{E}$



πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις ἢ ἐχθρῶν ἢ μηδετέ-  
 ρων. ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐχθρὸς ἐχθρόν, οὐδὲν ἔλεινον οὔτε  
 ποιῶν οὔτε μέλλον, πλὴν κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος· οὐδ' ἂν  
 μηδετέρως ἔχοντες· ὅταν δ' ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις ἐγγένηται τὰ  
 20 πάθη, οἷον ἢ ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφὸν ἢ υἱὸς πατέρα ἢ μήτηρ  
 υἱὸν ἢ υἱὸς μητέρα ἀποκτείνῃ ἢ μέλλῃ ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον  
 δράῃ, ταῦτα ζητητέον. τοὺς μὲν οὖν παρελιημένους μύθους  
 λύειν οὐκ ἔστιν, λέγω δὲ οἷον τὴν Κλυταιμῆστραν ἀπο-  
 θανοῦσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀρέστου καὶ τὴν Ἐριφύλην ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκμέ-  
 25 ωνος, αὐτὸν δὲ εὐρίσκειν δεῖ καὶ τοῖς παραδεδομένοις χρῆ-  
 σθαι καλῶς. τὸ δὲ καλῶς τί λέγομεν, εἵπωμεν σαφέστερον.  
 ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὕτω γίνεσθαι τὴν πράξιν, ὥσπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ  
 ἐποιοῦν εἰδότας καὶ γινώσκοντας, καθάπερ καὶ Εὐριπίδης  
 ἐποίησεν ἀποκτείνουσαν τοὺς παῖδας τὴν Μήδειαν· ἔστιν δὲ  
 30 πράξαι μὲν, ἀγνοοῦντας δὲ πράξαι τὸ δεινόν, εἴθ' ὕστερον  
 ἀναγνωρίσαι τὴν φιλίαν, ὥσπερ ὁ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίπους· τοῦ-  
 το μὲν οὖν ἔξω τοῦ δράματος, ἐν δ' αὐτῇ τῇ τραγωδίᾳ  
 οἷον ὁ Ἀλκμέων ὁ Ἀστυδάμαντος ἢ ὁ Τηλέγονος ὁ ἐν τῷ  
 τραυματίᾳ Ὀδυσσεῖ. ἔτι δὲ τρίτον παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ μέλλον-  
 35 τα ποιεῖν τι τῶν ἀνηκέστων δι' ἀγνοίαν ἀναγνωρίσαι πρὶν  
 ποιῆσαι. καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως. ἢ γὰρ πράξαι  
 ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ καὶ εἰδότας ἢ μὴ εἰδότας. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν  
 γινώσκοντα μελλῆσαι καὶ μὴ πράξαι χεῖριστον· τό τε γὰρ  
 μιαρὸν ἔχει, καὶ οὐ τραγικόν· ἀπαθὲς γάρ. διόπερ οὐδεὶς  
 54<sup>a</sup> ποιεῖ ὁμοίως, εἰ μὴ ὀλιγάκις, οἷον ἐν Ἀντιγόῃ τὸν Κρέοντα

17 οὐδὲν ἔλεινον Π: ἔλεινον οὐδὲν Β 19 ἐγγένηται Α: ἐγγίγνεται Β  
 21 ἀποκτείνῃ . . . μέλλῃ Β: -εἰ . . . -εἰ Α 22 δράῃ rec (Lat): δράν ΑΒ  
 23 λύειν Π: λύειν δὲ Β κλυταιμῆστραν Σ 24 ἀλκμαίωνος ΑΒ  
 26 εἵπωμεν Φ: εἵπομεν Α: Β arrosus 29 post Μήδειαν lac. stat.  
 Gudeman ex Arabis 'quod non faciat . . . ubi cognoscunt' explendam (cf.  
 38) 33 Ἀλκμαίων ὁ Victoriū: ἀλκμαίωνος Σ 34 τρίτον Α: τὸ  
 τρίτον Β; numerum ternarium habuerunt Φ et Σ: del. Gudeman post  
 ταῦτα vel post ποιῆσαι (36) lac, stat. Vahlen τὸ Theod. Rentius, Bonitz:  
 τὸν ΑΒ 35 ποιεῖν τι τῶν ἀνηκέστων δι' Π: τι ποιεῖν δι' ἀνήκεστον δι' Β  
 (τι incertum, prius δι' inductum)

ὁ Αἴμων. τὸ δὲ πρᾶξαι δεύτερον. βέλτιον δὲ τὸ ἀγνοοῦντα  
 μὲν πρᾶξαι, πράξαντα δὲ ἀναγνωρίσαι· τὸ τε γὰρ μιαρὸν  
 οὐ πρόσεστιν καὶ ἡ ἀναγνώρισις ἐκπληκτικόν. κράτιστον δὲ  
 τὸ τελευταῖον, λέγω δὲ οἶον ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ ἢ Μερόπῃ 5  
 μέλλει τὸν υἱὸν ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνει δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἀν-  
 εγνώρισε, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ ἢ ἀδελφῇ τὸν ἀδελφόν, καὶ  
 ἐν τῇ Ἑλλῃ ὁ υἱὸς τὴν μητέρα ἐκδιδόναι μέλλων ἀνεγνώ-  
 ρισεν. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο, ὅπερ πάλαι εἴρηται, οὐ περὶ πολλὰ  
 γένη αἱ τραγωδίαί εἰσίν. ζητοῦντες γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ τέχνης 10  
 ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τύχης εὖρον τὸ τοιοῦτον παρασκευάζειν ἐν τοῖς  
 μύθοις· ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐπὶ ταύτας τὰς οἰκίας ἀπαντᾶν  
 ὅσαις τὰ τοιαῦτα συμβέβηκε πάθη. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τῶν  
 πραγμάτων συστάσεως καὶ ποίους τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μύ-  
 θους εἴρηται ἰκανῶς.

15

15 Περὶ δὲ τὰ ἦθη τέτταρά ἐστιν ὧν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, ἐν  
 μὲν καὶ πρῶτον, ὅπως χρηστὰ ἦ. ἕξει δὲ ἦθος μὲν ἔαν  
 ὡσπερ ἐλέχθη ποιῆ φανερόν ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ πρᾶξις προ-  
 αἰρεσίην τινα (<ἦ τις ἂν> ἦ, χρηστὸν δὲ ἔαν χρηστήν. ἔστιν δὲ  
 ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένει· καὶ γὰρ γυνή ἐστὶν χρηστὴ καὶ δοῦλος, 20  
 καίτοι γε ἴσως τούτων τὸ μὲν χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ ὄλως φαῦ-  
 λόν ἐστιν. δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἀρμόττοντα· ἔστιν γὰρ ἀνδρείαν  
 μὲν τὸ ἦθος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀρμόττον γυναικὶ οὕτως ἀνδρείαν ἢ  
 δεινήν εἶναι. τρίτον δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον τοῦ  
 χρηστοῦ τὸ ἦθος καὶ ἀρμόττον ποιῆσαι ὡς προεῖρηται. 25  
 τέταρτον δὲ τὸ ὁμαλόν. κἂν γὰρ ἀνώμαλός τις ἦ ὁ τὴν  
 μίμησιν παρέχων καὶ τοιοῦτον ἦθος ὑποτεθῆ, ὅμως ὁμα-

1454<sup>a</sup>2-3 βέλτιον... πρᾶξαι Π (Αγ): om. B 6 μέλλει... ἀποκτείνει  
 AB: *debebat*... *interfecit* Lat ἀνεγνώρισε Π: ἐγνώρισε B 9 ὅπερ  
 Π: ὁ B 14 συστάσεως Π (Αγ): στάσεως B 16 ἐστὶν A: εἰσίν B  
 17 καὶ Π: om. B 18 προαἰρεσίην Π: πρὸς αἰρεσίην B 19 τινα  
 ἦ τις ἂν ἦ Vahlen: τινα ἦ AB: *que sit* (... *bona*, pro *χρηστήν* AB) Lat  
 22 τὸ B: τὰ A ἀνδρείαν (sc. εἶναι γυναῖκα) scripsi: ἀνδρείον E 23 οὕτως  
 Vahlen: οὐ τῷ B: \*\*τῷ A: *aut* Lat 25 ὡς προεῖρηται (προ ex per  
 corr.) B (Αγ): ὡσπερ εἴρηται Π 27 ὑποτεθῆ B: ὑποτιθεῖς Π

λῶς ἀνώμαλον δεῖ εἶναι. ἔστιν δὲ παράδειγμα πονηρίας μὲν  
 ἦθους μὴ ἀναγκαίας οἷον ὁ Μενέλαος ὁ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστη, τοῦ  
 30 δὲ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ μὴ ἀρμόττοντος ὃ τε θρῆνος Ὀδυσσεύς  
 ἐν τῇ Σκύλλῃ καὶ ἡ τῆς Μελαλίππης ῥῆσις, τοῦ δὲ ἀνωμάλου  
 ἡ ἐν Αὐλίδι Ἰφιγένεια· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ ἱκετεύουσα τῇ  
 ὑστέρα. χρή δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἠθεσιν ὁμοίως ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν  
 πραγμάτων συστάσει αἰεὶ ζητεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός,  
 35 ὥστε τὸν τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἢ ἀναγκαῖον  
 ἢ εἰκός καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός.  
 φανερόν οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰς λύσεις τῶν μύθων ἐξ αὐτοῦ δεῖ τοῦ  
 54<sup>b</sup> μύθου συμβαίνειν, καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ Μηδείᾳ ἀπὸ μη-  
 χανῆς καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι τὰ περὶ τὸν ἀπόπλου. ἀλλὰ μη-  
 χανῆ χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ δράματος, ἢ ὅσα πρὸ τοῦ  
 γέγονεν ἂ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀνθρωπον εἰδέναί, ἢ ὅσα ὕστερον, ἂ  
 5 δεῖται προαγορεύσεως καὶ ἀγγελίας· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἀπο-  
 δίδομεν τοῖς θεοῖς ὄραν. ἄλογον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πράγ-  
 μασιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τῆς τραγωδίας, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ  
 Οἰδίποδι τῷ Σοφοκλέους. ἐπεὶ δὲ μίμησις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγω-  
 δία βελτιόνων ἢ ἡμεῖς, δεῖ μιμῆσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἰκονο-  
 10 γράφους· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ἀποδιδόντες τὴν ἰδίαν μορφήν ὁμοίους  
 ποιοῦντες καλλίους γράφουσιν· οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν μιμού-  
 μενον καὶ ὀργίλους καὶ ραθύμους καὶ τἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα  
 ἔχοντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθῶν τοιούτους ὄντας ἐπιεικεῖς ποιεῖν

29 ἀναγκαίας Thurot: ἀναγκαῖον Σ (Ar) ὁ ἐν Π: ἐν Β 31 τοῦ δὲ  
 ἀνομοίου cum exemplo ante τοῦ δὲ ἀνωμάλου perisse suspicatus est Victorius  
 33 ὁμοίως Β (cf. Phys. 208<sup>a</sup>27): om. Π 34 αἰεὶ Π (Ar): om. Β  
 35 ὥστε . . . ἀναγκαῖον Σ: om. Ar ἢ ἀναγκαῖον AB: sit (ἦ) necessarium Lat:  
 ἢ ἀναγκαῖον (et hic et 36) Hermann 36 καὶ . . . εἰκός Π (Ar): om. Β  
 1454<sup>b</sup> 1 μύθου Σ (cf. Porphyrius ap. schol. B Hom. Il. 2. 73): ἦθους Σ  
 (Ueberweg) 2 Ἰλιάδι Α: Ἰφιγενεία (sc. Taurica) Hermann: Αὐλίδι  
 (debuit Ἰφιγενεία τῇ ἐν Αὐλίδι) Sykutris ἀπόπλου rec: 'inversionem (?)  
 navium' Ar: ἀπλοῦν Σ 3 ἐπὶ τὰ Β (Ar): ἔπειτα Π 4 ἂ οὐχ  
 Π: ἢ ὅσα οὐχ Β 5 ἅπαντα Α: πάντα Β 7 τὸ Π: τὸν Β 9 ἢ  
 ἡμεῖς Β (ἢ habuit Σ): ἡμᾶς Π (def. Vahlen): ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς Stahr 10 ἰδίαν  
 Α: οἰκείαν Β (cf. 1456<sup>a</sup>6) 12 τοιαῦτα Π: τοιαῦτα ἦθη Β

† παράδειγμα σκληρότητος οἶον τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ἀγαθὸν καὶ Ὅμηροσ†. ταῦτα δὴ διατηρεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰ παρὰ 15 τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθούσας αἰσθήσεις τῇ ποιητικῇ· καὶ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὰς ἔστιν ἀμαρτάνειν πολλάκις· εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις ἰκανῶς.

6 Ἀναγνώρισις δὲ τί μὲν ἔστιν, εἴρηται πρότερον· εἶδη δὲ ἀναγνωρίσεως, πρώτη μὲν ἡ ἀτεχνοτάτη καὶ ἡ πλείστη 20 χρῶνται δι' ἀπορίαν, ἢ διὰ τῶν σημείων. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν σύμφυτα, οἶον “λόγχην ἣν φοροῦσι Γηγενεῖς” ἢ ἀστέρας οἶους ἐν τῷ Θυέστη Καρκίνος, τὰ δὲ ἐπίκτητα, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι, οἶον οὐλαί, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός, οἶον τὰ περιδέραια καὶ οἶον ἐν τῇ Τυροῖ διὰ τῆς σκάφης. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ 25 τούτοις χρῆσθαι ἢ βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον, οἶον Ὀδυσσεὺς διὰ τῆς οὐλῆς ἄλλως ἀνεγνωρίσθη ὑπὸ τῆς τροφοῦ καὶ ἄλλως ὑπὸ τῶν συβοτῶν· εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ μὲν πίστεως ἔνεκα ἀτεχνότεραι, καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται πᾶσαι, αἱ δὲ ἐκ περιπετείας, ὡσπερ ἢ ἐν τοῖς Νίπτροις, βελτίους. δεύτεραι δὲ αἱ πεποιη- 30 μέναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, διὸ ἀτεχνοί. οἶον Ὁρέστης ἐν τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι Ὁρέστης· ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ἐκείνος δὲ αὐτὸς λέγει ἃ βούλεται ὁ ποιητῆς ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ μῦθος· διὸ ἐγγύς τι τῆς εἰρημένης ἀμαρτίας ἔστιν, ἐξῆν 35 γὰρ ἂν ἔνια καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν. καὶ ἐν τῷ Σοφοκλέους Τηρεῖ ἢ τῆς κερκίδος φωνή. ἢ τρίτη διὰ μνήμης, τῷ αἰσθέσθαι

14 παράδειγμα σκληρότητος A: post ἀγαθὸν καὶ transp. Lobel: secl. Ritter, prob. Else qui post καὶ add. ὁμοιον· ἀχιλλέα Π: ἀχιλλέα μὲν B ἀγαθὸν B (Ar): -ῶν A: *agathon* Lat 15 δὴ διατηρεῖν Π: δὲ δεῖ τηρεῖν B 15-16 τὰ παρὰ τὰς rec: τὰς παρὰ τὰς Π: τὰς πάντας B 17 κατ' αὐτὰς Π: κατὰ ταῦτα B 20 ἡ πλείστη B (Lat): ἡ -η A 21 ἡ Π: ἡ B 24 οἶον<sup>2</sup> BΦ: om. A περιδέραια B: περιδέρρα A 25 οἶον rec (Ar): οἶ A: *que* Lat: οἶα B: οἶα Rostagni 27 ἀνεγνωρίσθη Π: ἐγνωρίσθη B 29 καὶ αἱ Π: καὶ B 30 ἡ A: οἶ B: *qui* Lat 31 διὸ ἀτεχνοί A: secl. Christ Ὁρέστης Π: om. B (Ar?) 35 διὸ ἐγγύς τι Vahlen: δι' ὅτι ἐγγύς A: διὸ τι ἐγγύς B 36 ἂν Π: om. B 37 ἢ τρίτη Spengel, (numerus ternarium habuit Σ): ἦτοι τῇ Σ αἰσθεσθαι AB (Ar): *fore* (ἔσεσθαι) Lat: ἄχθεσθαι Gomperz

155<sup>a</sup> τι ιδόντα, ὡσπερ ἡ ἐν Κυπρίοις τοῖς Δικαιογένουσ, ἰδὼν γὰρ  
 τὴν γραφὴν ἔκλαυσεν, καὶ ἡ ἐν Ἀλκίνου ἀπολόγῳ, ἀκούων  
 γὰρ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ μνησθεῖς ἐδάκρυσεν, ὅθεν ἀνεγνω-  
 ρίσθησαν. τετάρτη δὲ ἡ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ, οἷον ἐν Χοηφόροις,  
 5 ὅτι ὁμοίός τις ἐλήλυθεν, ὁμοῖος δὲ οὐθεὶς ἄλλ' ἢ Ὀρέστης,  
 οὗτος ἄρα ἐλήλυθεν. καὶ ἡ Πολυίδου τοῦ σοφιστοῦ περὶ τῆς  
 Ἰφιγενείας· εἰκὸς γὰρ ἔφη τὸν Ὀρέστην συλλογίσασθαι ὅτι  
 ἡ τ' ἀδελφὴ ἐτύθη καὶ αὐτῷ συμβαίνει θύεσθαι. καὶ ἐν τῷ  
 Θεοδέκτου Τυδεῖ, ὅτι ἐλθὼν ὡς εὐρήσων τὸν υἱὸν αὐτὸς ἀπόλ-  
 10 λυται. καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς Φινεΐδαις· ἰδοῦσαι γὰρ τὸν τόπον συν-  
 ελογίσαντο τὴν εἰμαρμένην ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ εἴμαρτο ἀποθανεῖν  
 αὐταῖς, καὶ γὰρ ἐξετέθησαν ἐνταῦθα. ἔστιν δέ τις καὶ συν-  
 θετὴ ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ τοῦ θεάτρου, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ τῷ  
 14 ψευδαγγέλῳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τόξον ἐντείνειν, ἄλλον δὲ  
 14<sup>1</sup> μηδένα, πεπονημένον ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ καὶ ὑπόθεσις,  
 14<sup>2</sup> καὶ εἴ γε τὸ τόξον ἔφη γνώσεσθαι ὁ οὐχ ἐωράκει·  
 15 τὸ δὲ ὡς δι' ἐκείνου ἀναγνωριούντος διὰ τούτου ποιῆσαι  
 παραλογισμὸς. πασῶν δὲ βελτίστη ἀναγνώρισις ἡ ἐξ αὐτῶν  
 τῶν πραγμάτων, τῆς ἐκπλήξεως γιγνομένης δι' εἰκότων,  
 οἷον ἐν τῷ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίποδι καὶ τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ· εἰκὸς  
 γὰρ βούλεσθαι ἐπιθεῖναι γράμματα· αἱ γὰρ τοιαῦται μόναι

1455<sup>a</sup>1 τι ιδόντα A ('ubi videt' Ar): *aliquid scientem* Lat: ἡ εἰδόντα B  
 ὡσπερ Π (Ar): om. B ἡ A: ἡ B: *qui* Lat τοῖς rec: τῆς AB: *ipsius* Lat  
 2 ἡ ἐν Π: ἐν B ἀπολόγῳ B: ἀπὸ λόγων A (*apologon* Lat) 4 χοηφόροις  
 B: χλοη- Π 5 ὀρέστης B: ὁ ὀρέστης A 6 οὗτος Π (Ar): οὕτω B  
 ἡ Σ: τὸ dubitanter Else πολυείδους Σ (-ου rec): corr. Tyrwhitt 7 ἔφη  
 B (Ar): om. Π 9 τὸν B: om. A 10 φινεΐδαις AB: corr.  
 Reiz 13 θεάτρου A: θατέρου Hermann 14-14<sup>2</sup> ἐντείνειν . . .  
 τόξον B (*similia nec minus obscura in Ar*): om. Π 14 ἄλλον [δὲ]  
 vel (ἐκείνον), ἄλλον δὲ Sykutris: fort. (αὐτόν), ἄλλον δὲ 14<sup>2</sup> γνώσεσθαι  
 Π (Ar): ἐντείνειν B 15 δι' Σ: δὴ Tyrwhitt 16 παραλογισμὸς  
 B (Ar): -όν Π πασῶν A: πάντων B δὲ Π: om. B 17 τῆς . . .  
 εἰκότων Σ: om. Ar ἐκπλήξεως rec (Lat): πλήξεως AB εἰκότων  
 BΦ: εἰκόντων A 18 ἐν B: ὁ ἐν A: τὸ ἐν Bywater (Lat, nisi  
*quod* = ὁ)

ἄνευ τῶν πεποιημένων σημείων καὶ περιδεραίων. δεύτεραι δὲ 20  
αἱ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ.

17 Δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους) συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπ-  
εργάζεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον· οὕτω γὰρ  
ἂν ἐναργέστατα [ὁ] ὄρων ὡσπερ παρ' αὐτοῖς γιννόμενος τοῖς  
πραττομένοις εὐρίσκοι τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἥκιστα ἂν λανθάνοι 25  
[τὸ] τὰ ὑπεναντία. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου ὁ ἐπετιμᾶτο Καρκίνω.  
ὁ γὰρ Ἀμφιάραος ἐξ ἱεροῦ ἀνῆει, ὁ μὴ ὄρωντα [τὸν θεατὴν]  
ἐλάνθανεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς σκηνῆς ἐξέπεσεν δυσχερανάντων  
τοῦτο τῶν θεατῶν. ὅσα δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ τοῖς σχήμασι  
συναπεργαζόμενον· πιθανώτατοι γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως 30  
οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἰσιν, καὶ χειμαίνει ὁ χειμαζόμενος  
καὶ χαλεπαίνει ὁ ὀργιζόμενος ἀληθινώτατα. διὸ εὐφροῦς ἢ  
ποιητικὴ ἐστὶν ἢ μανικὸν· τούτων γὰρ οἱ μὲν εὐπλαστοὶ οἱ δὲ  
ἐκστατικοὶ εἰσιν. τοὺς τε λόγους καὶ τοὺς πεποιημένους  
δεῖ καὶ αὐτὸν ποιοῦντα ἐκτίθεσθαι καθόλου, εἰθ' οὕτως ἐπεισ- 145  
οδιοῦν καὶ παρατείνειν. λέγω δὲ οὕτως ἂν θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ καθ-  
όλου, οἷον τῆς Ἰφιγενείας τυθείσης τινὸς κόρης καὶ ἀφανι-  
σθείσης ἀδήλως τοῖς θύσασιν, ἰδρυνθείσης δὲ εἰς ἄλλην  
χώραν, ἐν ἣ νόμος ἦν τοὺς ξένους θύειν τῇ θεῷ, ταύτην ἔσχε 5  
τὴν ἱερωσύνην χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον τῷ ἀδελφῷ συνέβη ἐλθεῖν  
τῆς ἱερείας, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἀνείλεν ὁ θεὸς [διὰ τινὰ αἰτίαν ἔξω τοῦ  
καθόλου] ἐλθεῖν ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐφ' ὃ τι δὲ ἔξω τοῦ μύθου ἐλθὼν

20 σημείων  $\Sigma$ : καὶ σημείων Spengel (qui secl. καὶ περιδεραιών): fort.  
delendum (non vertit Ar) περιδεραιών B: δέρεων A 22 συναπεργάζεσθαι  
 $\Sigma$ : [συν]ἀπ- olim Vahlen 24 ἂν Π: οπι. B ἐναργέστατα B: ἐνεργ- Π:  
om. Ar ὄρων rec: ὁ ὄρων AB παρ' Π: γὰρ B 25-26 λανθάνοι  
rec: -οιο B: -οι τὸ A 26 ἐπετιμᾶτο rec (Ar): ἐπιτιμᾶ τῷ  $\Sigma$  27 ἀν-  
ῆει B (Ar): ἂν εἶη A: utique erat (erit Lobel) Lat 27 ὄρωντα (sc. τὸν  
ποιητὴν) Butcher: ὄρωντα τὸν θεατὴν A 30 τῆς αὐτῆς  $\Sigma$ : αὐτῆς  
τῆς Tyrwhitt (in versione) 34 ἐκστατικοὶ B (Ar?): ἐξεταστικοὶ Π  
τοὺς τε B: τούτους τε Π πεποιημένους A: παρελημμένους Vahlen: an  
προπεποιημένους? 1455<sup>b1</sup> ἐπεισοδιοῦν B: ἐπεισοδίου A 2 παρα-  
τείνειν B: περι- A 4 ἰδρυνθείσης A: ἰδρυθ- B 7-8 διὰ ... καθόλου  
 $\Sigma$ : secl. Christ (ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου secluserat Duentzer)

δὲ καὶ ληφθεὶς θύεσθαι μέλλων ἀνεγνώρισεν, εἴθ' ὡς Εὐρι-  
 10 πίδης εἴθ' ὡς Πολύιδος ἐποίησεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς εἰπὼν ὅτι  
 οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὴν ἀδελφὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ἔδει τυθῆναι,  
 καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἡ σωτηρία. μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἤδη ὑποθέντα τὰ  
 ὀνόματα ἐπεισοδιῶν ὅπως δὲ ἔσται οἰκεία τὰ ἐπεισόδια,  
 οἷον ἐν τῷ Ὁρέστη ἡ μανία δι' ἧς ἐλήφθη καὶ ἡ σω-  
 15 τηρία διὰ τῆς καθάρσεως. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς δράμασι τὰ  
 ἐπεισόδια σύντομα, ἡ δ' ἐποποιία τούτοις μηκύνεται. τῆς γὰρ  
 Ὀδυσσεΐας οὐ μακρὸς ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ἀποδημούντος τινος  
 ἔτη πολλὰ καὶ παραφυλαττομένου ὑπὸ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος καὶ  
 20 μόνου ὄντος, ἔτι δὲ τῶν οἴκοι οὕτως ἐχόντων ὥστε τὰ χρή-  
 ματα ὑπὸ μνηστήρων ἀναλίσκεσθαι καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἐπιβου-  
 λεύεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀφικνεῖται χειμασθεὶς, καὶ ἀναγνωρίσας  
 τινὰς ἐπιθέμενος αὐτὸς μὲν ἐσώθη τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς δι-  
 ἐέφθειρε. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἴδιον τοῦτο, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἐπεισόδια.

Ἔστ δὲ πάσης τραγωδίας τὸ μὲν δέσις τὸ δὲ λύσις, τὰ 18  
 25 μὲν ἔξωθεν καὶ ἔνια τῶν ἔσωθεν πολλάκις ἢ δέσις, τὸ δὲ  
 λοιπὸν ἢ λύσις· λέγω δὲ δέσιν μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς  
 μέχρι τούτου τοῦ μέρους ὃ ἔσχατόν ἐστιν ἐξ οὗ μεταβαίνει  
 εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἢ εἰς ἀτυχίαν, λύσιν δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς  
 μεταβάσεως μέχρι τέλους ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Λυγκεῖ τῷ Θεοδέκτου  
 30 δέσις μὲν τὰ τε προπεπραγμένα καὶ ἡ τοῦ παιδίου λήψις καὶ  
 πάλιν ἡ αὐτῶν \* \* λύσις δ' ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτιάσεως τοῦ θανάτου

9 ἀνεγνώρισεν Σ: τὴν ἀδελφὴν ex Ar add. Tkatsch et Gudeman, glossemate  
 abusi 10 πολύιδος Σ 11 μόνον Π: μόνην Β 14 ἐν τῷ Σ:  
 τῷ Victorius (Ar?) 15 δράμασι Β (Ar): ἄρμασι Π 17 οὐ Σ: om.  
 Σ ἐστὶν Π: om. Β 18 ὑπὸ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος Α: ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ olim  
 Vahlen, malim ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ cum Ellebodio 19 ἔτι rec: ἐπὶ (ἐπι?) Lat:  
 ἐπεὶ Α: πολλὰ (ex 18) Β 21 δὲ Π: τε Β 21-22 ἀναγνωρίσας τινὰς  
 Π: ἀναγνωρισθεὶς Β 22 ἐπιθέμενος αὐτὸς Β: αὐτὸς ἐπιθέμενος αὐτὸς Π  
 27 μεταβαίνει rec (Lat, Ar): -ειν ΑΒ 28 ἢ εἰς ἀτυχίαν Β (Ar): om.  
 Π 29 λυγκεῖ rec: λυκεῖ Π: γλυκεῖ Β 31 λύσις δ' ἢ rec (Ar): δὴ  
 (om. λύσις) Σ: δῆλωσις, λύσις δ' ἢ Gomperz (Arabi fisis, cuius testimonium  
 nisi quod λύσις δ' ἢ confirmat incertissimum est): δὴ ἀπαγωγῆ, λύσις δ' ἢ  
 Vahlen αἰτιάσεως Π: αἰτήσεως Β θανάτου Σ (Ar): Δαναοῦ Vahlen

μέχρι τοῦ τέλους. τραγωδίας δὲ εἶδη εἰσι τέσσαρα (τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη), ἢ μὲν πεπλεγμένη, ἣς τὸ ὄλον ἐστὶν περιπέτεια καὶ ἀναγνώρισις, ἢ δὲ παθητικὴ, οἷον οἱ τε Αἴαντες καὶ οἱ Ἰξίονες, ἢ δὲ ἠθικὴ, οἷον αἱ Φθιώτιδες καὶ ὁ 145<sup>c</sup> Πηλεύς· τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ἴσως†, οἷον αἱ τε Φορκίδες καὶ ὁ Προμηθεὺς καὶ ὅσα ἐν ἄδου. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα δεῖ πειρᾶσθαι ἔχειν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὰ μέγιστα καὶ πλείστα, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὡς νῦν συκοφαντοῦσιν τοὺς ποιητάς· γεγονότων γὰρ καθ' 5 ἕκαστον μέρος ἀγαθῶν ποιητῶν, ἐκάστου τοῦ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ἀξιούσι τὸν ἕνα ὑπερβάλλειν. δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τραγωδίαν ἄλλην καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγειν οὐδενὶ ὡς τῷ μύθῳ τοῦτο δέ, ὣν ἢ αὐτὴ πλοκὴ καὶ λύσις. πολλοὶ δὲ πλέξαντες εὐλύουσι κακῶς· δεῖ δὲ ἀμφοτέρα ἀρτικροτεῖσθαι. χρῆ δὲ ὁ- 10 περ εἶρηται πολλάκις μεμνηῆσθαι καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν ἐποποικὸν σύστημα τραγωδίαν—ἐποποικὸν δὲ λέγω τὸ πολὺμυθον—οἷον εἴ τις τὸν τῆς Ἰλιάδος ὄλον ποιῶι μῦθον. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸ μῆκος λαμβάνει τὰ μέρη τὸ πρέπον μέγεθος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δράμασι πολὺν παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἀποβαίνει. ση- 15 μείον δέ, ὅσοι πέρσιν Ἰλίου ὄλην ἐποίησαν καὶ μὴ κατὰ μέρος ὡσπερ Εὐριπίδης, <ἦ> Νιόβην καὶ μὴ ὡσπερ Αἰσχύλος, ἢ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἢ κακῶς ἀγωνίζονται, ἐπεὶ καὶ Ἀγάθων ἐξέπεσεν ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς περιπετείαις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς πράγμασι στοχάζονται ὡν βούλονται θαυμαστῶς 20

32-33 τοσαῦτα . . . ἐλέχθη (A) obscura 1456<sup>a2</sup> σης B: ὄης A: spat. vac. in Lat: ὄψις Bywater coll. 1458<sup>a5</sup>, sed obstat 1459<sup>b8-9</sup> ὁ B: om. A  
 4 ἄλλως τε Φ: ἄλλως γε B: ἀλλ' ὡσγε A 6 ἐκάστου τοῦ γεσ: ἕκαστον τοῦ Σ ἰδίου A: οἰκείου B (cf. 1454<sup>b10</sup>) 7 καὶ τραγωδίαν Σ: τραγωδίαν καὶ Else 8 οὐδενὶ ὡς Zeller: οὐδὲν ἴσως AB: nihil minus (ἦσσον) Lat: ἴσως non vertit Ar τοῦτο Π: τοῦτων B 10 ἀμφοτέρα ἀρτικροτεῖσθαι Immisch: ἀμφοτέρα ἀντικροτεῖσθαι B: ἄμφω αἰεὶ κροτεῖσθαι A: ambo semper coadiuvare (coadiuvare Lobel) Lat 12 δὲ λέγω B (Lat): δὲ λέγω δὲ A  
 15-16 σημείον δὲ Π (Ar): om. B 16 ἰλίου ὄλην Π (Ar): ἰλιούπολην B  
 17 ἦ Vahlen: om. A νιόβην Σ: Θηβαίδα M. Schmidt: Ἐκάβην vertit G. Valla 19 ταῖς A: τοῖς B 19-20 καὶ . . . πράγμασι A: secl. Susemihl  
 20 στοχάζονται . . . βούλονται A: -εται . . . -εται Heinsius: -εται . . . -ονται Christ θαυμαστῶς A: -ῶν Tyrwhitt: τῷ θαυμαστῷ Castelvetro



τραγικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ φιλόφρων. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν  
 ὁ σοφὸς μὲν μετὰ πονηρίας <δ'> ἐξαπατηθῆ, ὡς περ Σίσυ-  
 φος, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος μὲν ἄδικος δὲ ἠττηθῆ. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ  
 εἰκὸς ὡς περ Ἀγάθων λέγει, εἰκὸς γὰρ γίνεσθαι πολλὰ  
 25 καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός. καὶ τὸν χορὸν δὲ ἕνα δεῖ ὑπολαμ-  
 βάνειν τῶν ὑποκριτῶν, καὶ μῦθον εἶναι τοῦ ὄλου καὶ συναγω-  
 νίζεσθαι μὴ ὡς περ Εὐριπίδῃ ἀλλ' ὡς περ Σοφοκλεῖ. τοῖς  
 δὲ λοιποῖς τὰ ἀδόμητα οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦ μύθου ἢ ἄλλης  
 τραγωδίας ἐστίν· διὸ ἐμβόλιμα ἄδουσιν πρώτου ἄρξαντος  
 30 Ἀγάθωνος τοῦ τοιούτου. καίτοι τί διαφέρει ἢ ἐμβόλιμα  
 ἄδειν ἢ εἰ ῥῆσιν ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο ἀρμόττοι ἢ ἐπεισόδιον  
 ὄλον;

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων εἰδῶν εἴρηται, λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ 19  
 λέξεως καὶ διανοίας εἰπεῖν. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν  
 35 τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κείσθω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον ἐκείνης  
 τῆς μεθόδου. ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ  
 τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι. μέρη δὲ τούτων τό τε ἀπο-  
 δεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν (οἶον  
 56<sup>b</sup> ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργὴν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα) καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος  
 καὶ μικρότητας. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀπὸ  
 τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι ὅταν ἢ ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινὰ ἢ  
 μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα δέη παρασκευάζειν· πλὴν τοσοῦτον δια-  
 5 φέρει, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἄνευ διδασκαλίας, τὰ δὲ

21 τραγικὸν . . . φιλόφρων A: post ἠττηθῆ (23) transp. Susemihl, secl.  
 Gudeman 22 ὁ σοφὸς Π (Ar): σαφές B δὲ rec: om. Σ ὡς περ  
 Π: ὡς περ γὰρ B 23 τοῦτο καὶ B (Ar?): καὶ om. Π 25 χορὸν Π  
 (Ar): χρόνον B ὑπολαμβάνειν B: ὑπολαβεῖν A 28 λοιποῖς Σ:  
 πολλοῖς ex Ar Gomperz ἀδόμητα Σ (Madius): διδόμητα Σ οὐδὲν  
 Vahlen (Ar; οὐ Madius): om. Σ 28-29 ἄλλης τραγωδίας Π:  
 ἄλλως τραγωδία B 30 τοῦ τοιούτου A, ante ἀγάθωνος B: huius  
 Lat O, aut huius Lat T: τοῦ ποιητοῦ vertit Ar (?): del. Gudeman, Hardy  
 31 εἰ Π: εἰς B ἀρμόττοι B: -ει A 33 εἰδῶν B (Ar): ἡδ' A: iam Lat  
 34 καὶ Hermann: ἢ Σ 37 τούτων Π: τούτου B 1456<sup>b2</sup> μικρό-  
 τητας AB: -a rec (Lat) 4 δέη rec: δεῖ B: (quando) oportet Lat:  
 δ' ἢ A

ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ παρὰ τὸν λόγον γίνεσθαι. τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον, εἰ φαίνοιτο ἢ δέοι καὶ μὴ διὰ τὸν λόγον; τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν εἶδος θεωρίας τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως, ἃ ἐστὶν εἰδέναί τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς καὶ τοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχον- 10 τος ἀρχιτεκτονικῆν, οἷον τί ἐντολὴ καὶ τί εὐχὴ καὶ διήγησις καὶ ἀπειλή καὶ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν ἢ ἄγνοιαν οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται ὃ τι καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς. τί γὰρ ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι ἡμαρτησθαι ἃ Πρωταγόρας 15 ἐπιτιμᾷ, ὅτι εὐχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν “μῆνιν αἰε δε θεά”; τὸ γὰρ κελεύσαι, φησὶν, ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπίταξις ἐστίν. διὸ παρείσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὃν θεώρημα.

- 20 Τῆς δὲ λέξεως ἀπάσης τάδ' ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη, στοιχείον 20 συλλαβὴ σύνδεσμος ὄνομα ῥῆμα ἄρθρον πτώσις λόγος. στοιχείον μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν φωνὴ ἀδιαίρετος, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἧς πέφυκε συνθετὴ γίνεσθαι φωνή· καὶ γὰρ τῶν θηρίων εἰσὶν ἀδιαίρετοι φωναί, ὧν οὐδεμίαν λέγω στοιχείον. ταύτης δὲ μέρη τό τε φωνῆεν καὶ τὸ ἡμίφωνον καὶ 25 ἄφωνον. ἐστὶν δὲ ταῦτα φωνῆεν μὲν <τὸ> ἄνευ προσβολῆς ἔχον φωνὴν ἀκουστήν, ἡμίφωνον δὲ τὸ μετὰ προσβολῆς ἔχον φωνὴν ἀκουστήν, οἷον τὸ Σ καὶ τὸ Ρ, ἄφωνον δὲ τὸ μετὰ προσβολῆς καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχον φωνήν, μετὰ δὲ τῶν ἐχόντων τινὰ φωνήν γινόμενον ἀκουστόν, οἷον τὸ Γ καὶ 30 τὸ Δ. ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει σχήμασιν τε τοῦ στόματος καὶ τόποις καὶ δασύτητι καὶ ψιλότητι καὶ μήκει καὶ βραχύ-

8 φαίνοιτο B: φανοῖτο A ἢ δέοι Vahlen: ἡδέα AB (Ar): ἡ ἰδέα Madius (idea Lat) 21 ἄρθρον B: ante ὄνομα transp. Spengel (Ar), del. Hartung 23 συνθετὴ Σ: συνετὴ E 24 θηρίων Π (Ar): θεωριῶν B 25 ταύτης Π (Ar): ταύταις B 26 ἄφωνον Π: ἄφωνα B ταῦτα B: om. Π τὸ Reiz: om. AB προσβολῆς Π: προβολῆς B (item 29) 27-28 ἡμίφωνον . . . ἀκουστήν Π (Ar): om. B 28 τὸ ρ A (Ar): τὸ β B (Lat) 32 ψιλότητι A: -σι B μήκει Π: μεγέθει μήκει B

τῆτι ἔτι δὲ ὀξύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι καὶ τῷ μέσῳ περὶ ὧν  
 καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν τοῖς μετρικοῖς προσήκει θεωρεῖν. συλλαβὴ  
 35 δὲ ἐστὶν φωνὴ ἄσημος συνθετὴ ἐξ ἀφώνου καὶ φωνῆν ἔχον-  
 τος· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ΓΡ ἄνευ τοῦ Α ἴσυλλαβὴ καὶ ἴμετὰ τοῦ  
 Α, οἷον τὸ ΓΡΑ. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων θεωρῆσαι τὰς διαφορὰς  
 τῆς μετρικῆς ἐστίν. σύνδεσμος δὲ ἐστὶν φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ οὐ-  
 17<sup>a</sup> τε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνῆν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων  
 φωνῶν πεφυκυῖα συντίθεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ  
 μέσου ἢν μὴ ἀρμόττει ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγου τιθέναι καθ' αὐτήν,  
 οἷον μὲν ἦτοι δέ. ἢ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν  
 5 μίας σημαντικῶν δὲ ποιεῖν πέφυκεν μίαν σημαντικὴν  
 φωνῆν. ἄρθρον δ' ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ λόγου ἀρχὴν ἢ  
 τέλος ἢ διορισμὸν δηλοῖ. οἷον τὸ ἀμφί καὶ τὸ περί καὶ  
 τὰ ἄλλα. ἢ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνῆν  
 μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν πεφυκυῖα τίθεσθαι καὶ  
 10 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου. ὄνομα δὲ ἐστὶ φωνὴ  
 συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ ἄνευ χρόνου ἢς μέρος οὐδέν ἐστι καθ'  
 αὐτὸ σημαντικόν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς διπλοῖς οὐ χρώμεθα ὡς καὶ  
 αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ σημαῖνον, οἷον ἐν τῷ Θεόδωρος τὸ δωρος  
 οὐ σημαίνει. ῥῆμα δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ μετὰ χρό-  
 15 νου ἢς οὐδέν μέρος σημαίνει καθ' αὐτό, ὡς περ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν  
 ὀνομάτων τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἢ λευκόν οὐ σημαίνει τὸ

34 ἐν Ξ (Ar?): del. Bernhardy 35 ἀφώνου Α: καὶ (debutit ἢ) ἡμφώνου  
 add. Gudeman 36 συλλαβὴ καὶ Ξ: ex Ar sic fere emendaveris οὐ  
 συλλαβὴ, συλλαβὴ δὲ 37 τὸ Α: om. B 38-1457<sup>a</sup> 10 corrupta et  
 confusa; 38-3 ἢ . . . αὐτήν om. Ar, 3-10 ἢν . . . μέσου om. B; 2-3 πεφυ-  
 κυῖα . . . μέσου secl. Montmollin, 6-7 ἄρθρον . . . δηλοῖ duce Hartung secl.  
 Rostagni, 8-10 ἢ . . . μέσου secl. Ellebodius, alii 2 πεφυκυῖα B: -αν  
 Π συντίθεσθαι Ξ: τίθεσθαι Winstanley 3 τιθέναι Α: ροπί Lat  
 αὐτήν Tyrwhitt (Lat): αὐτόν Α 4 ἦτοι Α (vel Lat): δὴ τοί Bywater  
 ἢ Α: om. Lat ἢ] ἢ Α: aut Lat 5 σημαντικῶν Robortellus: -όν  
 Α: -ῆν Φ δὲ Α: om. Lat 6 ἢ Α: aut Lat 7 ἀμφί Hartung:  
 φ.μ.ι. Π περι] π.ε.ρ.ι. Π 9 πεφυκυῖα Α: -αν Φ 11 συνθετὴ  
 σημαντικὴ Π: σημαντικὴ σημαντικὴ Β 13 Θεόδωρος τὸ δωρος  
 Ritter (Ar), cf. De interpr. 16<sup>a</sup>21, pap. Theophr. 8: θεοδώρω τὸ δῶρον Ξ

πότε, τὸ δὲ βαδίζει ἢ βεβάδικεν προσσημαίνει τὸ μὲν τὸν παρόντα χρόνον τὸ δὲ τὸν παρεληλυθότα. πτώσις δ' ἐστὶν ὀνόματος ἢ ῥήματος ἢ μὲν κατὰ τὸ τούτου ἢ τούτῳ σημαῖνον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐνὶ ἢ πολλοῖς, οἷον 20 ἄνθρωποι ἢ ἄνθρωπος, ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ὑποκριτικά, οἷον κατ' ἐρώτησιν ἐπίταξιν τὸ γὰρ ἐβάδισεν; ἢ βάδιζε πτώσις ῥήματος κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ εἶδη ἐστίν. λόγος δὲ φωνῆ συνθετῆ σημαντικῆ ἧς ἕνια μέρη καθ' αὐτὰ σημαίνει τι (οὐ γὰρ ἅπας λόγος ἐκ ῥημάτων καὶ ὀνομάτων σύγκειται, οἷον ὁ 25 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὄρισμός, ἀλλ' ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ ῥημάτων εἶναι λόγον, μέρος μέντοι ἀεί τι σημαῖνον ἔξει) οἷον ἐν τῷ βαδίζει Κλέων ὁ Κλέων. εἰς δὲ ἐστὶ λόγος διχῶς, ἢ γὰρ ὁ ἐν σημαίνων, ἢ ὁ ἐκ πλειόνων συνδέσμῳ, οἷον ἢ Ἰλιάς μὲν συνδέσμῳ εἰς, ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῷ ἐν σημαίνειν. 30

I Ὀνόματος δὲ εἶδη τὸ μὲν ἀπλοῦν, ἀπλοῦν δὲ λέγω ὁ μὴ ἐκ σημαίνοντων σύγκειται, οἷον γῆ, τὸ δὲ διπλοῦν τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐκ σημαίνοντος καὶ ἀσήμου, πλὴν οὐκ ἐν τῷ 33 ὀνόματι σημαίνοντος καὶ ἀσήμου, τὸ δὲ ἐκ σημαίνοντων 33<sup>1</sup> σύγκειται. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ τριπλοῦν καὶ τετραπλοῦν ὄνομα καὶ πολλαπλοῦν, οἷον τὰ πολλὰ τῶν Μασσαλιωτῶν, Ἐρμοκαῖ- 35 κόξανθος \* \*. ἅπαν δὲ ὄνομά ἐστὶν ἢ κύριον ἢ γλῶττα ἢ 1457

17 πότε AB: ποτέ Spengel βαδίζει Φ (Ar): -ειν AB προσσημαίνει Φ: προσσημαίνει AB 18 ἐστὶν Π: om. B 19 κατὰ τὸ Reiz: τὸ κατὰ AB 21 ἢ δὲ Π: ἢ B 22 ἐπίταξιν Π: ἢ ἐπίταξιν B ἐβάδισεν S, interrogative Cooke: <ἄρ'> ἐβάδισεν Vahlen βάδιζε rec: ἐβάδιζεν S 23 δὲ A (Lat T): δὲ ἐστὶν B (Lat O) 27 τι Π: om. B βαδίζει Φ (Ar): -ειν AB 28 ὁ κλέων AB: τὸ Κλέων Bigg εἰς Π: ἐξῆς B 29 σημαίνων Π: σημαῖνον B συνδέσμῳ rec: -ων S (Ar) 30 ἀνθρώπου (sc. λόγος) AB (de Arabis 'homo incedit' cf. Tkatsch, i. 193): ἀνθρώπου ὄρισμός (ex 26) Φ τῷ Φ (Ar): τὸ AB 32 σημαίνοντων Π (Ar): συμβαινόντων B 33 καὶ ἀσήμου A: del. Ussing 33<sup>1</sup> ὀνόματι Vahlen (Ar?): -ος AB καὶ ἀσήμου AB: om. Ar 34-35 ὄνομα καὶ πολλαπλοῦν Π: καὶ πολλαπλοῦν ὄνομα B 35 τὰ AB: del. Hardy Μασσαλιωτῶν Diels ex Ar: μεγαλιωτῶν S 1457<sup>b</sup> lac. explenda ex Arabis 'surplicans domino caelorum', unde ἐπευζάμενος Διὶ πατρὶ restituit Diels, εὐζάμενος Διὶ Wilamowitz; nomen quadruplex latere videtur Bywatero

μεταφορὰ ἢ κόσμος ἢ πεποιημένον ἢ ἐπεκτεταμένον ἢ ὑφ-  
 ηρημένον ἢ ἐξηλλαγμένον. λέγω δὲ κύριον μὲν ᾧ χρῶνται  
 ἕκαστοι, γλῶτταν δὲ ᾧ ἕτεροι ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι καὶ γλῶτ-  
 5 ταν καὶ κύριον εἶναι δυνατόν τὸ αὐτό, μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς δέ-  
 τὸ γὰρ σίγγνον Κυπρίοις μὲν κύριον, ἡμῖν δὲ γλῶττα. μετα-  
 φορὰ δὲ ἐστὶν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ  
 γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶ-  
 δους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. λέγω δὲ ἀπὸ γένους μὲν  
 10 ἐπὶ εἶδος οἶον “νηὺς δέ μοι ἦδ’ ἔστηκεν”. τὸ γὰρ ὀρμεῖν ἐστὶν  
 ἐστάναι τι. ἀπ’ εἶδους δὲ ἐπὶ γένος “ἦ δὴ μυρί’ Ὀδυσ-  
 σεὺς ἐσθλὰ ἔοργεν”. τὸ γὰρ μυρίον πολὺ ἐστὶν, ᾧ νῦν ἀντὶ  
 τοῦ πολλοῦ κέχρηται. ἀπ’ εἶδους δὲ ἐπὶ εἶδος οἶον “χαλκῶ  
 ἀπὸ ψυχῆν ἀρύσας” καὶ “τεμῶν ταναήκει χαλκῶ”. ἐνταῦθα  
 15 γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἀρύσαι ταμεῖν, τὸ δὲ ταμεῖν ἀρύσαι εἴρηκεν·  
 ἀμφω γὰρ ἀφελεῖν τί ἐστὶν. τὸ δὲ ἀνάλογον λέγω, ὅταν  
 ὁμοίως ἔχη τὸ δεύτερον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον  
 πρὸς τὸ τρίτον· ἐρεῖ γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ δευτέρου τὸ τέταρτον ἢ  
 ἀντὶ τοῦ τετάρτου τὸ δεύτερον. καὶ ἐνίοτε προστιθέασιν ἀνθ’  
 20 οὗ λέγει πρὸς ὃ ἐστὶ. λέγω δὲ οἶον ὁμοίως ἔχει φιάλη πρὸς  
 Διόνυσον καὶ ἀσπίς πρὸς Ἄρη· ἐρεῖ τοίνυν τὴν φιάλην ἀσπίδα  
 Διονύσου καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλην Ἄρεως. ἢ ὁ γῆρας πρὸς  
 βίον, καὶ ἐσπέρα πρὸς ἡμέραν· ἐρεῖ τοίνυν τὴν ἐσπέραν γῆ-  
 ρας ἡμέρας ἢ ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τὸ γῆρας ἐσπέραν βίου

2 ὑφρημένον Σ: ἀφ- ex 1458<sup>a</sup>1-4 Spengel (cf. pap. Theophr. 79)  
 3 ἐξηλλαγμένον Π (Αγ): ἐξεληλαγμένον Β 6 σίγγνον Π (Αγ): σίγγυλλον  
 Β γλῶττα Π: -αν Β; in Αγ sequuntur ‘dory autem est nobis proprium,  
 porulo (?) autem glossa’ 7 ἀπὸ Π: κατὰ Β 8 ἀπὸ Π: κατὰ Β  
 τὸ Α: om. Β 9 ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ Α: ἐπὶ τὸ εἶδος Β 10-13 οἶον . . . εἶδος  
 Π: om. Β 10 δέ μοι Α: autem mea (δ’ ἐμῆ) Lat 12 ἐσθλὰ Α  
 (Αγ): premia (ἀθλα?) Lat τὸ γὰρ Α: τὸ μὲν γὰρ Φ 14 ἀρύσας καὶ τεμῶν  
 Tyrwhitt (ἀρύσας iam rec, καὶ rec al.): ἐρύσασκε τεμῶν Β: ἀερύσασκετεμῶν  
 Α: exsecuit secans Lat ταμῶν Bekker ταναήκει] τανακεί Β (‘acuto’  
 Αγ): ατηρει Α: duro (= ἀτειρέι) Lat 17 καὶ Π: om. Β 18 δευ-  
 τέρου Π: δεύτερον Β 19 προστιθέασιν Π (Αγ): προτ- Β 21 ἄρη  
 Α: ἄρη Β 24 ἦ Σ: del. M. Schmidt (non vertit Αγ)

ἢ δυσμὰς βίου. ἐνίοις δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὄνομα κείμενον τῶν ἀνά- 25  
 λογον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἦττον ὁμοίως λεχθήσεται· οἶον τὸ τὸν  
 καρπὸν μὲν ἀφιέναι σπείρειν, τὸ δὲ τὴν φλόγα ἀπὸ τοῦ  
 ἡλίου ἀνώνυμον· ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἔχει τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν ἡλιον καὶ  
 τὸ σπείρειν πρὸς τὸν καρπὸν, διὸ εἴρηται “σπείρων θεοκτίσταν  
 φλόγα”. ἔστι δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ τῆς μεταφορᾶς χρῆσθαι 30  
 καὶ ἄλλως, προσαγορεύσαντα τὸ ἀλλότριον ἀποφῆσαι τῶν  
 οἰκείων τι, οἶον εἰ τὴν ἀσπίδα εἴποι φιάλην μὴ Ἄρεως ἀλλ'  
 ἄοιον. \* \* πεπονημένον δ' ἔστιν ὁ ὅλως μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ  
 τινῶν αὐτὸς τίθεται ὁ ποιητής, δοκεῖ γὰρ ἔνια εἶναι τοιαῦτα,  
 οἶον τὰ κέρατα ἔρηνυγας καὶ τὸν ἱερέα ἀρητῆρα. ἐπεκτεταμένον 35  
 δὲ ἔστιν ἢ ἀφηρημένον τὸ μὲν ἐὰν φωνήεντι μακροτέρῳ 145<sup>ε</sup>  
 κεχρημένον ἢ τοῦ οἰκείου ἢ συλλαβῆ ἐμβεβλημένη, τὸ δὲ ἂν  
 ἀφηρημένον τι ἢ αὐτοῦ, ἐπεκτεταμένον μὲν οἶον τὸ πόλεως  
 πόληος καὶ τὸ Πηλείδου Πηληιάδew, ἀφηρημένον δὲ οἶον τὸ  
 κρῖ καὶ τὸ δῶ καὶ “μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ”. ἐξηλ- 5  
 λαγμένον δ' ἔστιν ὅταν τοῦ ὀνομαζομένου τὸ μὲν καταλείπη  
 τὸ δὲ ποιῆ, οἶον τὸ “δεξιτερόν κατὰ μαζόν” ἀντὶ τοῦ δεξιόν.

αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα τὰ δὲ θήλεα τὰ  
 δὲ μεταξύ, ἄρρενα μὲν ὅσα τελευτᾷ εἰς τὸ Ν καὶ Ρ καὶ Σ καὶ  
 ὅσα ἐκ τούτου σύγκειται (ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν δύο, Ψ καὶ Ξ), θήλεα 10  
 δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τῶν φωνηέντων εἰς τε τὰ ἀεὶ μακρά, οἶον εἰς Η  
 καὶ Ω, καὶ τῶν ἐπεκτεινομένων εἰς Α· ὥστε ἴσα συμβαίνει  
 πλήθει εἰς ὅσα τὰ ἄρρενα καὶ τὰ θήλεα· τὸ γὰρ Ψ καὶ τὸ Ξ

25 ἐνίοις Π: ἐνίων Β κείμενον Π (Αγ): om. Β 27 ἀπὸ Ξ: ἐπὶ  
 Μ. Schmidt 29 τὸν καρπὸν Α: (τὸν ἀφιέντα) τὸν καρπὸν Castelvetro  
 32-33 ἀλλ' ἄοιον Victorius: ἀλλὰ οἴνου Α 33 κόσμου explicationem  
 deesse vidit Madius 35 ἔρηνυγας Victorius: ἐρνύγας Α: ἐρινύγας Β  
 1458<sup>a</sup> 1-3 τὸ μὲν . . . ἀφηρημένον Π (Αγ): om. Β 2 ἢ Φ: ἢ Α συλλαβῆ  
 ἐμβεβλημένη rec: -ἢ -ἢ Α 3 ἀφηρημένον τι ἢ Φ: ἀφήρη μὲν ὄντι ἢ Α:  
 τί ἢ Β πόλεως Β: πόλεος Π 4 πηλείδου rec: πηλέος Α: πηλέως Β:  
 Πηλέος (Πηλῆος καὶ τὸ Πηλείδου) Μ. Schmidt 5 ὄψ Victorius: ὄης  
 Α: ὄης Β: spat. vac. in Lat 6 ὀνομαζομένου Α: νομιζομένου Snell ex pap.  
 Theophr. 93 8-17 damnavit Ritter 9 καὶ ὄ rec (Αγ): om. Ξ  
 13 πλήθει Β (Αγ): πλήθει Π

σύνθετά ἐστιν. εἰς δὲ ἄφωνον οὐδὲν ὄνομα τελευτᾶ,  
 15 οὐδὲ εἰς φωνῆεν βραχύ. εἰς δὲ τὸ I τρία μόνον, μέλι κόμμι  
 πέπερι. εἰς δὲ τὸ Y πέντε \* \*. τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ εἰς ταῦτα καὶ  
 N καὶ Σ.

Λέξεως δὲ ἀρετὴ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι. σα- 22  
 φεστάτη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἢ ἐκ τῶν κυρίων ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ  
 20 ταπεινῆ· παράδειγμα δὲ ἡ Κλεοφῶντος ποιήσις καὶ ἡ  
 Σθενέλου. σεμνὴ δὲ καὶ ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἰδιωτικὸν ἢ τοῖς  
 ξενικοῖς κεχρημένη· ξενικὸν δὲ λέγω γλῶτταν καὶ μετα-  
 φορὰν καὶ ἐπέκτασιν καὶ πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον. ἀλλ' ἄν  
 25 ρισμός· ἄν μὲν οὖν ἐκ μεταφορῶν, αἰνιγμα, εἰάν δὲ ἐκ  
 γλωττῶν, βαρβαρισμός. αἰνιγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα αὕτη ἐστί,  
 τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι· κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν τῶν  
 <ἄλλων> ὀνομάτων σύνθεσιν οὐχ οἶόν τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, κατὰ  
 δὲ τὴν μεταφορῶν ἐνδέχεται, οἶον “ἄνδρ' εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν  
 30 ἐπ' ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα”, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. τὰ δὲ ἐκ τῶν γλωττῶν  
 βαρβαρισμός. δεῖ ἄρα κεκρᾶσθαί πως τούτοις· τὸ μὲν  
 γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ποιήσει μὴδὲ ταπεινόν, οἶον ἢ γλῶττα  
 καὶ ἡ μεταφορὰ καὶ ὁ κόσμος καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ εἰρημένα  
 εἶδη, τὸ δὲ κύριον τὴν σαφήνειαν. οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ μέρος  
 58<sup>b</sup> συμβάλλεται εἰς τὸ σαφές τῆς λέξεως καὶ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν  
 αἰ ἐπεκτάσεις καὶ ἀποκοπαὶ καὶ ἐξαλλαγαὶ τῶν ὀνομά-

14 σύνθετα Σ: ταῦτα AB: *cadem* Lat 16 πέντε Σ: τὸ πῶν τὸ νᾶπυ τὸ  
 γόνυ τὸ δόρυ τὸ ἄστν in marg. cod. Estensis 100 adnotavit G. Valla, unde in  
 rec quosdam devenerunt; diverso ordine Ar exhibet 'dory roy(?) nary  
 gony', quintum vocabulum corruptum 19 οὖν Π: om. B 21 τὸ  
 ἰδιωτικὸν ἢ τοῖς Π: τῶ ἰδιωτικῶ ἢ τῶ B 24 ἅπαντα B: ἄν ἅπαντα Π  
 ποιήσῃ rec (*faciat* Lat): ποιήσαι AB ἔσται Π: ἔστιν B 25 εἰάν A: ἄν B  
 27 ὑπάρχοντα A: τὰ ὑπάρχοντα B 28 ἄλλων Twining ex Piccolomini  
 versione (Ar): om. Σ 29 δὲ Π: om. B μεταφορῶν Bywater:  
 -ἄν A ἄνδρ' ἶδον A: *virilem* Lat: ἄνδρες εἶδον B πυρὶ χαλκὸν Σ: corr.  
 Robortellus 30 τὰ δὲ B: om. Π 31 βαρβαρισμός Π (Ar): βαρ-  
 βαρός B κεκρᾶσθαι B (Ar): κεκρίσθαι Π τὸ A: τό γε (lectio incerta;  
 vix τότε) B: τὰ Sykutris 32 τὸ μὴ B: μὴ A 1458<sup>b</sup> συμβάλλεται  
 Σ: -ονται rec 2 καὶ Π: αἰ B

των· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄλλως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς τὸ κύριον παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς γιγνόμενον τὸ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ποιήσει, διὰ δὲ τὸ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ εἰωθότος τὸ σαφὲς ἔσται. ὥστε οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψέγου- 5 σιν οἱ ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τρόπῳ τῆς διαλέκτου καὶ διακωμωδοῦντες τὸν ποιητὴν, οἷον Εὐκλείδης ὁ ἀρχαῖος, ὡς ῥάδιον ὄν ποιεῖν εἴ τις δώσει ἐκτείνειν ἐφ' ὅποσον βούλεται, ἰαμβοποιήσας ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει “Ἐπιχάρην εἶδον Μαραθῶ- νάδε βαδίζοντα”, καὶ “οὐκ ἴαν γεράμενος† τὸν ἐκείνου ἐλ- 10 λέβορον”. τὸ μὲν οὖν φαίνεσθαί πως χρώμενον τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ γελοῖον· τὸ δὲ μέτρον κοινὸν πάντων ἐστὶ τῶν μερῶν· καὶ γὰρ μεταφοραῖς καὶ γλώτταις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἶδεσι χρώμενος ἀπρεπῶς καὶ ἐπίτηδες ἐπὶ τὰ γελοῖα τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν ἀπεργάσαιο. τὸ δὲ ἀρμόττον ὅσον διαφέρει ἐπὶ 15 τῶν ἐπῶν θεωρεῖσθω ἐντιθεμένων τῶν ὀνομάτων εἰς τὸ μέτρον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεταφορῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν μετατιθεῖς ἂν τις τὰ κύρια ὀνόματα κατίδοι ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγομεν· οἷον τὸ αὐτὸ ποιήσαντος ἰαμβεῖον Αἰσχύλου καὶ Εὐριπίδου, ἐν δὲ μόνον ὄνομα μεταθέν- 20 τος, ἀντὶ κυρίου εἰωθότος γλώτταν, τὸ μὲν φαίνεται καλὸν τὸ δ' εὐτελές. Αἰσχύλος μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ ἐποίησε φαγέδαιναν ἢ μου σάρκας ἐσθίει ποδός,

ὁ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐσθίει τὸ θοινᾶται μετέθηκεν. καὶ

νῦν δέ μ' ἐὼν ὀλίγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καὶ ἀεικῆς,

25

6-7 διακωμωδοῦντες Π: -ος B 8 ὄν B: om. Π 9 ἢ ἐπιχάρην B ('Ἐπιχάρην Tytwhitt, 'Ἐπιχάρην Bursian), 'per laetitian' Ar: ἦτοι χάριν Π εἶδον B: ἰδον A: ἰδῶν Gomperz (Lat?) 10 ἂν γεράμενος A: ἂν γε ἀρά- μενος B: utique (= ἂν), tum spat. vac. in Lat: ἐγκεράμενος? 11 πως Σ (Ar): πάντως Hermann: ἀπρεπῶς Twining 12 μέτρον A: μέτριον Spengel 14 ἐπὶ τὰ B (Lat): ἔπειτα A 15 ἀρμόττον rec (Lat): ἀρμόττοντος A: ἀρμόττον πως B: ἀρμοττόντως Tucker 16 ὀνομάτων A: <κυρίων> ὀνομάτων Vahlen (cf. 18) 17 καὶ Π: om. B 20 Αἰσχύ- λου καὶ Σ: Αἰσχύλω Essen μεταθέντος B: μετατιθέντος A 21 κυ- ρίου εἰωθότος Σ: alterutrum (potius κυρίου) delendum censuit olim Vahlen, καὶ interposuit Heinsius 23 φαγέδαιναν Hermann (-a rec): φαγάδαινα B (post ultimam litt. foramen, quo n perisse potest): φαγάδαινα A 25 ὀλίγος Π: ὀλιγοστός B ἀεικῆς B: ἀειδῆς Π



εἶ τις λέγοι τὰ κύρια μετατιθεῖς  
 νῦν δέ μ' ἐὼν μικρός τε καὶ ἀσθενικός καὶ ἀειδής·  
 καὶ

δίφρον ἀεικέλιον καταθεῖς ὀλίγην τε τράπεζαν,  
 30 δίφρον μοχθηρὸν καταθεῖς μικράν τε τράπεζαν  
 καὶ τὸ “ἡόνες βοόωσιν”, ἡόνες κράζουσιν. ἔτι δὲ Ἀριφράδης  
 τοὺς τραγωδοὺς ἐκωμῶδει ὅτι ἂ οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν ἐν τῇ δια-  
 λέκτῳ τούτοις χρῶνται, οἷον τὸ δωμαίων ἀπο ἀλλὰ μὴ  
 ἀπὸ δωμαίων, καὶ τὸ σέθεν καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ δέ νιν καὶ τὸ  
 59<sup>a</sup> Ἀχιλλέως περὶ ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα  
 τοιαῦτα. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις ποιεῖ τὸ μὴ  
 ἰδιωτικὸν ἐν τῇ λέξει ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐκεῖνος δὲ τοῦτο  
 ἡγνόμεν. ἔστιν δὲ μέγα μὲν τὸ ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰρημένων πρεπόν-  
 5 τως χρῆσθαι, καὶ διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ γλώτταις, πολὺ δὲ  
 μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι. μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε παρ'  
 ἄλλου ἔστι λαβεῖν εὐφυῆς τε σημειῶν ἔστι τὸ γὰρ εὐ  
 μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἔστιν. τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τὰ  
 μὲν διπλᾶ μάλιστα ἀρμόττει τοῖς διθυράμβοις, αἱ δὲ γλῶτ-  
 10 ται τοῖς ἥρωικοῖς, αἱ δὲ μεταφοραὶ τοῖς ἰαμβείοις. καὶ ἐν  
 μὲν τοῖς ἥρωικοῖς ἅπαντα χρήσιμα τὰ εἰρημένα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς  
 ἰαμβείοις διὰ τὸ ὅτι μάλιστα λέξιν μιμῆσθαι ταῦτα ἀρ-  
 μόττει τῶν ὀνομάτων ὅσοις κἂν ἐν λόγοις τις χρῆσαιτο·  
 ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὸ κύριον καὶ μεταφορὰ καὶ κόσμος.  
 15 περὶ μὲν οὖν τραγωδίας καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ πράττειν μιμήσεως  
 ἔστω ἡμῖν ἱκανὰ τὰ εἰρημένα.

Περὶ δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικῆς, 23

26 λέγοι A: λέγει B    μετατιθεῖς A: μεταθεῖς B    27 τε B (Lat): δὲ A  
 29 δίφρον B (Lat): δίφρον τε A    31 ἡόνες... ἡόνες B: ἰώνες... ἡ ἰώνες Π  
 32 εἴπειεν ἐν] εἴπη ἐν A: εἴπειεν B    1459<sup>a</sup>4 τὸ B: τῷ A    πρεπόντως  
 Π (Ar): -ων B    5 διπλοῖς Π (Ar): δι' ἀπλοῖς B    11 ἅπαντα A:  
 ἅπαντα τὰ B    13 ὅσοις κἂν ἐν λόγοις] ὅσοις κἂν εὐλόγως B: ὅσοις καὶ ἐν  
 ὅσοις λόγοις Π    τις B: τι vel τί Π    14 τὸ κύριον καὶ μεταφορὰ Π:  
 κύρια καὶ μεταφοραὶ B    17 καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ Π: καὶ ἐμμέτρου B: κἂν ἐν  
 μέτρῳ Butcher

ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς μύθους καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις συνιστάνα  
 δραματικούς καὶ περὶ μίαν πράξιν ὅλην καὶ τελείαν ἔχου-  
 σαν ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλος, ἵν' ὡσπερ ζῶον ἐν ὄλον 20  
 ποιῇ τὴν οἰκείαν ἡδονήν, δῆλον, καὶ μὴ ὁμοίας ἱστορίαις τὰς  
 συνθέσεις εἶναι, ἐν αἷς ἀνάγκη οὐχὶ μιᾶς πράξεως ποιεῖσθαι  
 δήλωσιν ἀλλ' ἐνὸς χρόνου, ὅσα ἐν τούτῳ συνέβη περὶ ἓνα  
 ἢ πλείους, ὧν ἕκαστον ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχει πρὸς ἀλληλα. ὡσπερ  
 γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ἢ τ' ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ἐγένετο 25  
 ναυμαχία καὶ ἡ ἐν Σικελίᾳ Καρχηδονίων μάχη οὐδὲν  
 πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ συντείνουσαι τέλος, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς  
 χρόνοις ἐνίοτε γίνεται θάτερον μετὰ θάτερον, ἐξ ὧν ἐν  
 οὐδὲν γίνεται τέλος. σχεδὸν δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τοῦτο  
 δρῶσι. διὸ ὡσπερ εἶπομεν ἤδη καὶ ταύτῃ θεσπέσιος ἂν 30  
 φανείη "Ὀμηρος παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους, τῷ μὴδὲ τὸν πόλεμον καί-  
 περ ἔχοντα ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος ἐπιχειρήσαι ποιεῖν ὄλον λίαν  
 γὰρ ἂν μέγας καὶ οὐκ εὐσύνοπτος ἔμελλεν ἔσσεσθαι ὁ μῦθος,  
 ἢ τῷ μεγέθει μετριάζοντα καταπεπλεγμένον τῇ ποικιλίᾳ.  
 νῦν δ' ἐν μέρος ἀπολαβῶν ἐπεισοδίοις κέχρηται αὐτῶν 35  
 πολλοῖς, οἷον νεῶν καταλόγῳ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπεισοδίοις [δῖς]  
 διαλαμβάνει τὴν ποιήσιν. οἱ δ' ἄλλοι περὶ ἓνα ποιοῦσι  
 καὶ περὶ ἓνα χρόνον καὶ μίαν πράξιν πολυμερῆ, οἷον ὁ τὰ 1459  
 Κύπρια ποιήσας καὶ τὴν μικρὰν Ἰλιάδα. τοιγαροῦν ἐκ μὲν  
 Ἰλιάδος καὶ Ὀδυσσεΐας μία τραγωδία ποιεῖται ἑκατέρας  
 ἢ δύο μόναι, ἐκ δὲ Κυπρίων πολλαὶ καὶ τῆς μικρᾶς

20-21 ἵνα... ποιῇ B: ἵν'... ποιεῖ A: que... facit Lat 21-22 ἱστο-  
 ρίαις τὰς συνθέσεις Sophianus, Dacier ('compositiones' = συνθέσεις habet Ar):  
 ἱστορίαις τὰς συνθήσεις B: ἱστορίας τὰς συνήσεις Π 23 περὶ Π: ἢ περὶ B  
 26 ναυμαχία B (Lat): ναύμαχος A 27 οὕτω Π (Ar): οὕτε B 28 μετὰ  
 θάτερον rec: μετὰ θατέρου Σ 31 τῷ rec (Lat): τὸ AB 33 ἂν Φ: αὖ  
 AB μέγας B, A<sup>rec</sup>: μέγα A 33-34 ὁ μῦθος ἢ B: ἢ A: spat. vac. in Lat  
 34 μετριάζοντα καταπεπλεγμένον Σ: -άζων -μένος Schoemann 35-  
 36 κέχρηται... ἐπεισοδίοις Σ: om. Ar, quod ad homoeot. referre dubito  
 35 αὐτῶν AB: ἰpsi Lat O, ἰpsis Lat T 36 ἄλλοις Π: ἄλλως B δῖς (sed  
 ephasum) A: bis bis Lat: om. B: οἷς rec 1459<sup>b</sup>1 καὶ μίαν Σ: non habet  
 Ar, vide ut fortuito 2 Κύπρια Castelvetro: κυπρικὰ Σ 4 μόναι  
 A<sup>rec</sup>: μόνας AB

5 Ἰλιάδος [[πλέον] ὀκτώ, οἶον ὄπλων κρίσις, Φιλοκτῆτης, Νεοπτόλεμος, Εὐρύπυλος, πτωχεία, Λάκαιναι, Ἰλίου πέρσις  
καὶ ἀπόπλους [καὶ Σίνων καὶ Τρωάδες]]. ἔτι δὲ 24  
τὰ εἶδη ταῦτα δεῖ ἔχειν τὴν ἐποποιίαν τῇ τραγωδίᾳ, ἣ  
γὰρ ἀπλὴν ἢ πεπλεγμένην ἢ ἠθικὴν ἢ παθητικὴν καὶ τὰ  
10 μέρη ἔξω μελοποιίας καὶ ὄψεως ταῦτα· καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν  
δεῖ καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεων καὶ παθημάτων· ἔτι τὰς διανοίας καὶ  
τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς. οἷς ἅπασιν Ὀμηρος κέχρηται καὶ  
πρῶτος καὶ ἰκανῶς. καὶ γὰρ τῶν ποιημάτων ἐκάτερον  
συνέστηκεν ἢ μὲν Ἰλιάς ἀπλοῦν καὶ παθητικόν, ἣ δὲ  
15 Ὀδύσεια πεπλεγμένον (ἀναγνώρισις γὰρ διόλου) καὶ ἠθικὴ  
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις λέξει καὶ διανοία πάντα ὑπερβέβληκεν.

Διαφέρει δὲ κατὰ τε τῆς συστάσεως τὸ μῆκος ἢ  
ἐποποιία καὶ τὸ μέτρον. τοῦ μὲν οὖν μήκους ὄρος ἰκανὸς ὁ  
εἰρημένος· δύνασθαι γὰρ δεῖ συνορᾶσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ  
20 τέλος. εἴη δ' ἂν τοῦτο, εἰ τῶν μὲν ἀρχαίων ἐλάττους  
αἱ συστάσεις εἶεν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τραγωδιῶν τῶν  
εἰς μίαν ἀκρόασιν τιθεμένων παρήκοιεν. ἔχει δὲ πρὸς τὸ  
ἐπεκτείνεσθαι τὸ μέγεθος πολὺ τι ἢ ἐποποιία ἴδιον διὰ  
τὸ ἐν μὲν τῇ τραγωδίᾳ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἅμα πραττόμενα  
25 πολλὰ μέρη μιμῆσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνηῆς καὶ τῶν  
ὑποκριτῶν μέρος μόνον· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ διὰ τὸ διήγησιν

5-7 πλέον . . . Τρωάδες  $\Sigma$  (Ar om. Εὐρύπυλος et Λάκαιναι): interpolatori  
tribuit Else, alteri interpolatori πλέον (5) et καὶ Σίνων καὶ Τρωάδες (7),  
quae verba iam Hermann postea adiecta esse censuerat, sed ab ipso Ari-  
stotele; 2-7 τοιγαροῦν . . . Τρωάδες secluserat Ritter 5 πλέον A:  
πλέον ἢ B ὄπλων Π (Ar): ἀπλῶς B 6 λάκαιναι A: -α B (Lat)  
8 τὰ εἶδη ταῦτα Π: ταῦτα τὰ εἶδη B δεῖ BΦ (ἀεὶ vertit Ar): δὴ A 10 ταῦτα  
Π: ταῦτα B: ταῦτα (καὶ τὰ τοῦ μύθου μέρη ταῦτα) Vahlen 13 πρῶτος  
καὶ Π: καὶ om. B ἰκανῶς BΦ (Ar): ἰκανός A καὶ γὰρ B (Lat):  
καὶ γὰρ καὶ A ποιημάτων B (Ar): πονημάτων Π ἐκάτερον Π: ἐκά-  
τερον σῶτερ B, unde ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρως Gudeman 15 ἀναγνώρισις  $\Sigma$ :  
ἀναγνωρίσεις Christ γὰρ Π: om. B ἠθικὴ  $\Sigma$ : ἠθικόν A<sup>rec</sup> 16 δὲ  
rec: γὰρ  $\Sigma$  πάντα Π: πάντας B 17 κατὰ τε τῆς συστάσεως τὸ  
μῆκος A: κατὰ τὸ μῆκος τῆς συστάσεως B 21 πρὸς δὲ B (Ar): πρόσθε Π  
24 πραττόμενα Π: πραττομένοις B

εἶναι ἔστι πολλὰ μέρη ἅμα ποιεῖν περαινώμενα, ὕφ' ὧν οἰκείων ὄντων αὖξεται ὁ τοῦ ποιήματος ὄγκος. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλειν τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἀνομοίοις ἐπεισοδίοις· τὸ γὰρ 30 ὅμοιον ταχὺ πληροῦν ἐκπίπτειν ποιεῖ τὰς τραγωδίας. τὸ δὲ μέτρον τὸ ἥρωικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πείρας ἤρμοκεν. εἰ γὰρ τις ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ μέτρῳ διηγηματικὴν μίμησιν ποιοῖτο ἢ ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀπρεπὲς ἂν φαίνοιτο· τὸ γὰρ ἥρωικὸν στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστίν (διὸ καὶ γλώττας καὶ με- 35 ταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα· περιττὴ γὰρ καὶ ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων), τὸ δὲ ἱαμβεῖον καὶ τετράμετρον κινητικὰ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικὸν τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν. ἔτι δὲ ἀτο- 1460 πώτερον εἰ μιγνύοι τις αὐτά, ὥσπερ Χαιρήμων. διὸ οὐδεὶς μακρὰν σύστασιν ἐν ἄλλῳ πεποίηκεν ἢ τῷ ἥρωϊ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴπομεν αὐτῇ ἡ φύσις διδάσκει τὸ ἀρμόττον αὐτῇ αἰρεῖσθαι. Ὅμηρος δὲ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἄξιός ἐπαινείσθαι καὶ 5 δὴ καὶ ὅτι μόνος τῶν ποιητῶν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ ὁ δεῖ ποιεῖν αὐτόν. αὐτὸν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν ποιητὴν ἐλάχιστα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστι κατὰ ταῦτα μιμητής. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν δι' ὅλου ἀγωνίζονται, μιμοῦνται δὲ ὀλίγα καὶ ὀλιγάκις· ὁ δὲ ὀλίγα φροίμασάμενος εὐθύς εἰσάγει ἄνδρα ἢ γυναῖκα ἢ ἄλλο τι 10 ἦθος, καὶ οὐδέν' ἀήθη ἀλλ' ἔχοντα ἦθος. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστόν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ τὸ ἄλογον, δι' ὃ συμβαίνει μάλιστα τὸ θαυ-

29-30 εἰς μεγαλοπρέπειαν et τὸν ἀκούοντα A: secl. Else 30 καὶ A: fort. τῷ 31 τὰς τραγωδίας Π: τὴν -αν B 33 διηγηματικὴν B: διηγη-  
 τικὴν A 34 στασιμώτατον A: -τερον B 36 γὰρ καὶ E: δὲ καὶ  
 Else: γὰρ καὶ (ταύτῃ) Twining, fort. recte 37 μίμησις BΣ: κίνη-  
 σις Π καὶ A: καὶ τὸ B 1460<sup>a1</sup> κινητικὰ καὶ B: κινητικαὶ A: -ἀ  
 Φ 2 μιγνύοι rec: μιγνοῖ B: μιγνύη A (fuit μὴ γνύη, η fin. in lit.)  
 3 τῷ B: τὸ A 5 αἰρεῖσθαι Bonitz (*eligere* Lat): διαιρεῖσθαι AB 6 δὴ  
 A: δεῖ B 7 αὐτὸν γὰρ δεῖ Π: δεῖ γὰρ αὐτόν B 8 μὲν δι' Π:  
 μὲν οὖν δι' B 11 ἦθος<sup>1</sup> A: del. Castelvetro οὐδένα ἀήθη B: οὐδένα  
 ἦθη A: *nullum morem* Lat ἦθος<sup>2</sup> B: ἦθη Π ἐν' E: κὰν Gomperz  
 13 ἄλογον Victorius: ἀνάλογον A

μαστόν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄρᾶν εἰς τὸν πράττοντα· ἐπεὶ τὰ περὶ  
 15 τὴν Ἔκτορος δίωξιν ἐπὶ σκηνῆς ὄντα γελοῖα ἂν φανείη, οἱ  
 μὲν ἐστῶτες καὶ οὐ διώκοντες, ὁ δὲ ἀνανεύων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς  
 ἔπεσιν λανθάνει. τὸ δὲ θαυμαστόν ἡδύ· σημεῖον δέ, πάντες  
 γὰρ προστιθέντες ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὡς χαριζόμενοι. δεδίδαχεν  
 δὲ μάλιστα Ὀμηρος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ.  
 20 ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμός. οἴονται γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὅταν  
 τουδὶ ὄντος τοδὶ ἢ ἢ γινομένου γίνηται, εἰ τὸ ὕστερον ἔστιν,  
 καὶ τὸ πρότερον εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι· τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι ψεῦδος. διὸ  
 δεῖ, ἂν τὸ πρῶτον ψεῦδος, ἄλλο δὲ τούτου ὄντος ἀνάγκη εἶναι  
 ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ, προσθεῖναι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῦτο εἰδέναί· ἀληθὲς  
 25 ὃν παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῆ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὡς ὄν. παρά-  
 δεῖγμα δὲ τούτου τὸ ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων. προαιρεῖσθαι τε δεῖ  
 ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα· τοὺς τε λόγους  
 μὴ συνίστασθαι ἐκ μερῶν ἀλόγων, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν μη-  
 δὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος, ὥσπερ  
 30 Οἰδίπους τὸ μὴ εἰδέναί· πῶς ὁ Λαῖος ἀπέθανεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν  
 τῷ δράματι, ὥσπερ ἐν Ἡλέκτρα οἱ τὰ Πύθια ἀπαγγέλλον-  
 τες ἢ ἐν Μυσοῖς ὁ ἄφωνος ἐκ Τεγέας εἰς τὴν Μυσίαν ἦκων.  
 ὥστε τὸ λέγειν ὅτι ἀνήρητο ἂν ὁ μῦθος γελοῖον· ἐξ ἀρχῆς  
 γὰρ οὐ δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοιούτους. † ἂν δὲ θῆ καὶ φαίνηται  
 35 εὐλογωτέρως ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ ἄτοπον† ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσ-  
 σείᾳ ἄλογα τὰ περὶ τὴν ἔκθεσιν ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἀνεκτὰ δῆλον

14 ἐπεὶ τὰ B: ἔπειτα τὰ Π 16 μὲν Π: μὲν οὖν B οὐ Π (Ag): οἱ B  
 17 post ἡδύ **deest** Ag usque ad 1461<sup>a7</sup> 20 οἱ B: om. A 21 το δι  
 η ἢ B: τὸ δι' ἦν A: τὸ δι' ἢ A<sup>rec</sup>: aut .. hoc Lat εἰ BΦ: ἢ A (εἰ in marg.  
 m. rec.) 22 εἶναι Π: ἢ εἶναι B 23 δεῖ B: δὴ Π ψεῦδος Π:  
 ψεῦδος εἰ τὸ ὕστερον ἔστι (ex 21) B ἄλλο δὲ codices(?) Robortelli: ἄλλου δὲ  
 A: ἀλλ' οὐδὲ B, A<sup>rec</sup> (Lat) 24 ἢ Jortin, Vahlen: ἢ Σ: del. Ellebodius,  
 Bonitz τὸ A: om. B 25 ὄν<sup>1</sup> B, m. rec. in lit. A: *quibus* Lat  
 26 τούτου τὸ B: τοῦτο A: *huius* Lat 27 ἀδύνατα εἰκότα Π: εἰκότα  
 ἀδύνατα B τε Π: δὲ B 30 οἰδίπους Σ: ὁ Οἰδίπους Bywater: del. Else  
 λαῖος rec: ἰόλαος Σ 33 τὸ A: τῷ B ἀνήρητο B: ἀνήρειτο A  
 34 δὲ θῆ B, A<sup>rec</sup>: δεθῆ A: *autem ponatur* Lat (δὲ τεθῆ codex Robortelli)  
 35 ἐνδέχεσθαι Σ: ἀποδέχεσθαι rec καὶ ἄτοπον Π: spat. vac. in B τὰ ἐν  
 Π: ἐν, tum in charta lacerata fort. τῆ(?) B

ἂν γένοιτο, /εἰ αὐτὰ φαῦλος ποιητῆς ποιήσειε· νῦν δὲ τοῖς 14  
 ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς ὁ ποιητῆς ἀφανίζει ἠδύνων τὸ ἄτοπον. τῇ δὲ  
 λέξει δεῖ διαπονεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἀργοῖς μέρεσιν καὶ μήτε ἠθικοῖς  
 μήτε διανοητικοῖς· ἀποκρύπτει γὰρ πάλιν ἢ λίαν λαμπρὰ  
 λέξεις τά τε ἦθη καὶ τὰς διανοίας. 5

25 Περὶ δὲ προβλημάτων καὶ λύσεων, ἐκ πόσων τε καὶ  
 ποίων εἰδῶν ἔστιν, ὧδ' ἂν θεωροῦσιν γένοιτ' ἂν φανερόν.  
 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔστι μιμητῆς ὁ ποιητῆς ὡσπερανεὶ ζωγράφος ἢ τις  
 ἄλλος εἰκονοποιός, ἀνάγκη μιμῆσθαι τριῶν ὄντων τὸν ἀριθ-  
 μὸν ἐν τι αἰεὶ, ἢ γὰρ οἶα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν, ἢ οἶα φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ, 10  
 ἢ οἶα εἶναι δεῖ. ταῦτα δ' ἐξαγγέλλεται λέξει ἐν ἧ καὶ  
 γλῶτται καὶ μεταφοραὶ καὶ πολλὰ πάθη τῆς λέξεώς ἔστι  
 δίδομεν γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ποιηταῖς. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐχ ἢ αὐτῇ  
 ὀρθότης ἔστιν τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς οὐδὲ ἄλλης  
 τέχνης καὶ ποιητικῆς. αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς διττὴ ἁμαρτία, 15  
 ἢ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὐτήν, ἢ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ  
 προείλετο μιμῆσασθαι \* \* ἀδυναμίαν, αὐτῆς ἢ ἁμαρτία· εἰ  
 δὲ τὸ προελέσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον <ἄμ'> ἄμφω τὰ  
 δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα, ἢ τὸ καθ' ἐκάστην τέχνην ἁμαρτήμα,  
 οἷον τὸ κατ' ἰατρικὴν ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην [ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποιήται] 20  
 ὅποιαν οὖν, οὐ καθ' ἑαυτήν. ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα ἐν τοῖς

1460<sup>b</sup>1 αὐτὰ Π: ταῦτα B ποιήσειε B: ποιήσει A 5 τε BΦ: δὲ A  
 7 ποίων B: ποίων ἂν Π ὧδ' ἂν AB: ἂν non vertit Lat γένοιτ' ἂν  
 φανερόν Π: φανερόν γένοιτο B 8 ζωγράφος Π: τις ζωγράφος B ἢ BΦ,  
 A<sup>rec</sup>: εἴ A 9 τὸν ἀριθμὸν B: numero Lat: τῶν ἀριθμῶν A 10 ἢ  
 γὰρ Π: ἢ γὰρ B καὶ Π: ἢ καὶ B 11 ἢ B: om. Π ἐν ἧ B: ἢ Π  
 12 γλῶτται . . . μεταφοραὶ Menardos: -a . . . -à B: γλώτταις . . . -aίς A  
 14-15 τῆς πολιτικῆς . . . δὲ Π: om. B 15 διττὴ ἁμαρτία Π: om. B  
 16 εἰ Φ, A<sup>rec</sup>: ἢ A: ἢ εἰ B 17 lac. stat. et sic explet Vahlen <ὀρθῶς,  
 ἡμαρτε δ' ἐν τῷ μιμῆσασθαι (sive ἀπεργάσασθαι) δι'> ἀδυναμίαν Π: -a B  
 ἢ A: om. B εἰ Φ: ἢ AB 18 τὸ προελέσθαι A: τὸ om. B: preeligerat  
 Lat ἄμ' ἄμφω Vahlen: ἄμφω Σ 20 ἄλλην Π: κατ' ἄλλην B ἢ  
 ἀδύνατα πεποιήται AB: secl. Duentzer: ἢ ἀδύνατα non vertit Lat, ὅποιαν-  
 οὖν (21) et ante et post πεποιήται videtur habuisse Φ 21-23 ὅποιαν-  
 οὖν . . . πεποιήται Π: om. B

προβλήμασιν ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκοποῦντα λύειν. πρῶτον μὲν τὰ  
 πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην ἀδύνατα πεποιήται, ἡμάρτηται  
 ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει, εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς (τὸ γὰρ  
 25 τέλος εἴρηται), εἰ οὕτως ἐκπληκτικώτερον ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλο ποιεῖ  
 μέρος. παράδειγμα ἢ τοῦ Ἐκτορος δίωξις. εἰ μέντοι τὸ  
 τέλος ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ <μῆ> ἦττον ἐνεδέχέτο ὑπάρχειν καὶ κατὰ  
 τὴν περὶ τούτων τέχνην, [ἡμαρτησθαι] οὐκ ὀρθῶς· δεῖ γὰρ εἰ  
 ἐνδέχεται ὅλως μηδαμῆ ἡμαρτησθαι. ἔτι ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ  
 30 ἀμάρτημα, τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἢ κατ' ἄλλο συμβεβη-  
 κός; ἔλαττον γὰρ εἰ μὴ ἦδει ὅτι ἔλαφος θήλεια κέρατα  
 οὐκ ἔχει ἢ εἰ ἀμμητῶς ἔγραψεν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐὰν  
 ἐπιτιμᾶται ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ' ἴσως <ὡς> δεῖ, οἶον καὶ Σοφοκλῆς  
 ἔφη αὐτὸς μὲν οἶους δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδην δὲ οἶοι εἰσὶν, ταύτ  
 35 λυτέον. εἰ δὲ μηδετέρως, ὅτι οὕτω φασίν, οἶον τὰ περὶ θεῶν  
 ἴσως γὰρ οὔτε βέλτιον οὕτω λέγειν οὔτ' ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ' εἰ ἔτυχεν  
 61<sup>a</sup> ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνει· ἀλλ' οὖν φασι. τὰ δὲ ἴσως οὐ βέλτιον  
 μὲν, ἀλλ' οὕτως εἶχεν, οἶον τὰ περὶ τῶν ὄπλων, “ἔγχεα  
 δέ σφιν ὄρθ' ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρος”. οὕτω γὰρ τότ' ἐνόμιζον,  
 ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν Ἰλλυριοί. περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς  
 5 εἰ εἴρηται τι ἢ πέπρακται, οὐ μόνον σκεπτέον εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ  
 πεπραγμένον ἢ εἰρημένον βλέποντα εἰ σπουδαῖον ἢ φαυ-  
 λον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸν πράττοντα ἢ λέγοντα πρὸς ὃν ἢ  
 ὅτε ἢ ὅτω ἢ οὐ ἔνεκεν, οἶον εἰ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ, ἵνα γέ-

22 μὲν A: μὲν οὖν Φ τὰ A (que Lat): εἰ superscr. m. rec. 24 εἰ A:  
 ἢ B: que Lat γὰρ Π: δὲ B 25 εἰ οὕτως Π: ἢ οὐ κατὰ B 27 μάλ-  
 λον ἢ μὴ ἦττον Ueberweg: μᾶλλον ἂν ἢ ἦττον B: μᾶλλον ἦττον A (ἢ in-  
 seruit m. rec.): nihil Lat 28 μαρτησθαι (ἢ super μ scr. m. rec.) A:  
 τῆμαρτησθαι B: del. Ussing 29 ποτέρων AB: πότερον Hermann  
 (Lat) 30 τῶν Π: πότερον τῶν B 31 μῆ Π: spat. vac. in B  
 32 ἢ εἰ BΦ, A<sup>rec</sup>: ἢ η A 33 ὡς Vahlen: om. E 34 εὐριπίδης E:  
 corr. Heinsius 35 μηδετέρως Π: μὴ ἐτέρως B 36 οὕτω rec:  
 οὔτε E: del. rec. al. 36-1461<sup>a</sup>1 εἰ ἔτυχεν ὥσπερ ξενοφάνει B (Vah-  
 len): ἔτυχεν ὥσπερ ξενοφάνη Π 1 οὖν Tyrwhitt: οὐ E: οὕτω Spengel  
 φασι. τὰ δὲ B: φασι τάδε Π 5 εἰ Spengel: ἢ Π: om. B εἰς A: ἐπ'  
 B 6 εἰ BΦ: ἢ A 7 πρὸς ὃν A: ἢ πρὸς ὃν B. post haec verba rursus  
 praesto est Ar 8 εἰ Φ: ἢ AB

νηται, ἢ μείζονος κακοῦ, ἵνα ἀπογένηται. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὀρώντα δεῖ διαλύειν, οἷον γλώττη τὸ “οὐρήας μὲν πρῶ- 10 τον”. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοὺς ἡμιόνους λέγει ἀλλὰ τοὺς φύλακας· καὶ τὸν Δόλωνα, “ὅς ῥ’ ἦ τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός”, οὐ τὸ σῶμα ἀσύμμετρον ἀλλὰ τὸ πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν, τὸ γὰρ εὐεϊδὲς οἱ Κρήτες τὸ εὐπρόσωπον καλοῦσι καὶ τὸ “ζωρό- 15 τερον δὲ κέραιε” οὐ τὸ ἄκρατον ὡς οἰνόφλυξιν ἀλλὰ τὸ 15 θᾶπτον. τὸ δὲ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἶρηται, οἷον “πάντες μὲν ῥά θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες εὐδον παννύχιοι”. ἅμα δὲ φησιν “ἦ τοι ὄτ’ ἐς πεδίον τὸ Τρωικὸν ἀθρήσειεν, αὐλῶν συρίγγων τε ὄμαδον”. τὸ γὰρ πάντες ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοί κατὰ μετα- 20 φορὰν εἶρηται, τὸ γὰρ πᾶν πολὺ τι. καὶ τὸ “οἶη δ’ ἄμμο- 20 ρος” κατὰ μεταφορὰν, τὸ γὰρ γνωριμώτατον μόνον. κατὰ δὲ προσωδίαν, ὡσπερ Ἰππίας ἔλυσεν ὁ Θάσιος, τὸ “δίδομεν δὲ οἱ εὐχος ἀρέσθαι” καὶ “τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρω”. τὰ δὲ διαιρέσει, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς “αἶψα δὲ θνήτ’ ἐφύοντο τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ’ εἶναι ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκρητο”. τὰ δὲ ἀμφιβολία, 25 “παρώχηκεν δὲ πλέω νύξ”. τὸ γὰρ πλείω ἀμφίβολόν ἐστιν. τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως. τὸν κεκραμένον οἶνόν φασιν εἶναι, ὅθεν πεποιήται “κνημὶς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέριοι”· καὶ χαλκέας τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους, ὅθεν εἶρηται ὁ Γανυμήδης Διὶ οἰνοχοεῦεν, οὐ πινόντων οἶνον. εἶη δ’ ἂν 30

9 ἢ ΒΦ, A<sup>rec</sup>: om. A 10 τὸ Β: om. A 12 ὅς ῥ’ ἦτοι Β: ὡς ῥῆτοι (ῥ’ m. rec.) A: post ut (ὡς) spat. vac. in Lat ἔην Β: εἶ ἦν Π 14 τὸ<sup>1</sup> Β: om. A 16 τὸ δὲ Σ: τὰ δὲ Spengel κατὰ μεταφορὰν Π: καταφορὰν Β (item 19, ubi corr. m. rec.) πάντες Graefenhan: ἄλλοι Λ 17 ἀνέρες AB: ἰπποκορυσταὶ add. ΣΦ 18 ἀθρήσειεν Π: ἀθροίσειε Β (Ar) 19 τὸ Α: τό τε Β τοῦ Β: om. A 21 γνωριμώτατον Π: -τερον Β 22 δίδομεν Π: διδόμενον (on induxit m. rec.) Β 23 εὐχος ἀρέσθαι Β (Ar), cf. Soph. elench. 166<sup>b</sup>8: om. Π οὐ Α: οὐ Β (Lat, Ar) 25 εἶναι Β: om. Π ζωρά Victoriuss: ζῶα Λ τε Σ: τε ἂ Comperz κέκρητο Α: κέκριτο Β, A<sup>rec</sup> (Lat): ἔκρητο Diels (et τε <τὰ> πρὶν) 27 τὰ δὲ Π: τὸ δὲ Β τὸ ἔθος Α: τὸ om. Β τὸν κεκραμένον Β: τῶν -ων Π φασιν Π: φησιν (? lectio incerta) Β 30 ὁ Α: om. Β οἰνοχοεῦεν Β: -ει Π



τοῦτό γε <καί> κατὰ μεταφοράν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὅταν ὄνομά  
 τι ὑπεναντίωμά τι δοκῆ σημαίνειν, ἐπισκοπεῖν ποσαχῶς ἂν  
 σημήνῃε τοῦτο ἐν τῷ εἰρημένῳ, οἷον τῷ “τῆ ρ” ἔσχετο χάλ-  
 κεον ἔγχος” τὸ ταύτη κωλυθῆναι ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται, ὡδὶ ἢ  
 35 ὡδί, ὡς μάλιστ’ ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι· κατὰ τὴν καταντικρὺ ἢ  
 1<sup>b</sup> ὡς Γλαύκων λέγει, ὅτι ἔνιοι ἀλόγως προῦπολαμβάνουσι τι καὶ  
 αὐτοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι συλλογίζονται, καὶ ὡς εἰρηκότος ὁ  
 τι δοκεῖ ἐπιτιμῶσιν, ἂν ὑπεναντίον ἢ τῆ αὐτῶν οἴησει. τοῦ-  
 το δὲ πέπονθε τὰ περὶ Ἰκάριον. οἴονται γὰρ αὐτὸν Λάκωνα  
 5 εἶναι· ἄτοπον οὖν τὸ μὴ ἐντυχεῖν τὸν Τηλέμαχον αὐτῷ εἰς  
 Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθόντα. τὸ δ’ ἴσως ἔχει ὥσπερ οἱ Κεφαλλῆ-  
 νές φασι· παρ’ αὐτῶν γὰρ γῆμαι λέγουσι τὸν Ὀδυσσεά  
 καὶ εἶναι Ἰκάδιον ἀλλ’ οὐκ Ἰκάριον· δι’ ἀμάρτημα δὲ τὸ  
 πρόβλημα †εἰκὸς ἐστίν†. ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἀδύνατον μὲν πρὸς τὴν  
 10 ποίησιν ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν δεῖ ἀνάγειν.  
 πρὸς τε γὰρ τὴν ποίησιν αἰρετώτερον πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον ἢ  
 ἀπίθανον καὶ δυνατόν· \* \* τοιούτους εἶναι οἷον Ζεῦξις  
 ἔγραφεν, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν.  
 πρὸς ἃ φασιν τάλογα· οὕτω τε καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἀλογόν  
 15 ἐστὶν εἰκὸς γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι. τὰ δ’ ὑπεν-  
 αντίως εἰρημένα οὕτω σκοπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις  
 ἔλεγχαι εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως, ὥστε

31 γε κατὰ A: κατὰ γε B: καὶ add. Heinsius (Ar) 31-32 ὄνοματι  
 ὑπεναντιώματι (accentus super ω in ras.) A: ὄνομα ὑπερεναντιώματι B:  
*nomem aliquid* Lat 32 δοκῆ B: δοκεῖ A σημαίνειν ἐπισκοπεῖν Π:  
 ἐπισκοπεῖν σημαίνειν B 33 σημήνῃε B: σημαίνοιε A οἷον τῷ Bywater:  
 οἷον τὸ AB 34-35 ὡδί ἢ ὡδί ὡς B (Vahlen): ὡδί ἢ ὡς A: *sic aut sic*  
 Lat 1461<sup>b1</sup> ὅτι rec: τι vel τί E ἔνιοι codex(?) Victorii (Ar):  
 ἔνια E τι B: om. Π 2 εἰρηκότος B: -ες Π 3 post δοκεῖ *deest* B  
 usque ad 1462<sup>b1</sup> ἐπιτιμῶσιν Φ (Ar): ἐπειτιμῶσι A (εἰ in lit., ἐπει m. rec.)  
 3 et 7 αὐτῶν A 8-9 δι’ ἀμάρτημα . . . πρόβλημα om. Ar 8 δι’  
 ἀμάρτημα Madius (Lat): διαμάρτημα A δὲ Π: δὴ Gomperz 9 εἰκὸς  
 Π (Ar): εἰ Ἰκάδιός? 12 <καὶ εἰ ἀδύνατον> suppl. Vahlen qui lac.  
 detexit, <καὶ ἴσως ἀδύνατον> ex Ar Gomperz οἷον Π: οἷους rec  
 13 ὑπερέχειν A (Ar): *existere* (ὑπάρχειν) Lat 15-16 ὑπεναντίως  
 Twining (Ar?): ὑπεναντία ὡς Π 16 οὕτω A (Ar): om. Lat

καὶ ταῦτόν τ' ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ ὁ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται. ὀρθῇ δ' ἐπιτιμήσις καὶ ἀλογία καὶ μοχθηρία, ὅταν μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης μὴθὲν χρήσηται τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὡσπερ Εὐριπίδης τῷ 20 Αἰγεί, ἢ τῇ πονηρία, ὡσπερ ἐν Ὁρέστη <τῇ> τοῦ Μενελάου. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμήματα ἐκ πέντε εἰδῶν φέρουσιν· ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἀδύνατα ἢ ὡς ἄλογα ἢ ὡς βλαβερὰ ἢ ὡς ὑπεναντία ἢ ὡς παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην. αἱ δὲ λύσεις ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν σκεπτέαι. εἰσὶν δὲ δώδεκα. 25

26 Πότερον δὲ βελτίων ἢ ἐποποιικὴ μίμησις ἢ ἡ τραγικὴ, διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἥττον φορτικὴ βελτίων, τοιαύτη δ' ἢ πρὸς βελτίους θεατὰς ἐστιν αἰεὶ, λίαν δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἅπαντα μιμουμένη φορτικὴ ὡς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθανομένων ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς προσθῆ, πολλὴν κίνησιν κινουῦνται, οἷον οἱ φαῦλοι 30 αὐληταὶ κυλιόμενοι ἂν δίσκον δέη μιμεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔλκοντες τὸν κορυφαῖον ἂν Σκύλλαν αὐλῶσιν. ἢ μὲν οὖν τραγωδία τοιαύτη ἐστίν, ὡς καὶ οἱ πρότερον τοὺς ὑστέρους αὐτῶν ᾤοντο ὑποκριτὰς ὡς λίαν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα πίθηκον ὁ Μυνησκόσ τὸν Καλλιπίδην ἐκάλει, τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα καὶ περὶ Πιν- 35 δάρου ἦν· ὡς δ' οὗτοι ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτούς, ἢ ὅλη τέχνη 14 πρὸς τὴν ἐποποιίαν ἔχει. τὴν μὲν οὖν πρὸς θεατὰς ἐπιεικεῖς φασιν εἶναι <οἱ> οὐδὲν δέονται τῶν σχημάτων, τὴν δὲ τραγικὴν πρὸς φαύλους· εἰ οὖν φορτικὴ, χείρων δῆλον ὅτι ἂν εἶη. πρῶτον μὲν οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἢ κατηγορία ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς, 5 κῆς, ἐπεὶ ἔστι περιεργάζεσθαι τοῖς σημείοις καὶ ραψωδοῦντα,

18 αὐτόν Π: λυτέον Μ. Schmidt: fort. ἐναντίον, cf. De gen. et corr. 315<sup>a3</sup>  
 φρόνιμος rec (Ar): -ον A<sup>rec</sup>: φρόνημον A 19 ἀλογία . . . μοχθηρία Π:  
 corr. Vahlen 21 Αἰγεί ἢ τῇ Victoriis: αἰγειήτη A: egieti Lat τῇ  
 τοῦ Vahlen (Ar): τοῦ A 25 εἰσὶν δὲ δώδεκα Π (Ar): secl. Tucker  
 26 βελτίων Φ: βελτίον A 28 δ' ἢ rec (autem Lat T, om. Lat O): δὴ A  
 αἰεὶ, λίαν Vahlen: δεῖ | λίαν A: spat. vac. in Lat 30 κινουῦνται rec (Ar):  
 -α Π 34 πίθηκον Π: Καλλίαν Gudeman (qui hoc nomen in Ar latere  
 putat) 1462<sup>a1</sup> δ' οὗτοι rec (Lat): δ' οὗτοι δ' A αὐτούς A:  
 αὐτούς multi 3 οἱ Victoriis (Ar): om. Π σχημάτων τὴν rec (Lat,  
 Ar): σχημά(τα αὐ)τὴν A (τα αὐ scr. m. rec. in loco macula deformato)  
 δὲ A: om. Lat 4 εἰ rec: ἢ Π

ὅπερ [ἐστὶ] Σωσίστρατος, καὶ διάδοντα, ὅπερ ἐποίει Μνασί-  
 θεος ὁ Ὀπούντιος. εἶτα οὐδὲ κίνησις ἅπαντα ἀποδοκιμαστέα,  
 εἴπερ μηδ' ὄρχησις, ἀλλ' ἡ φαύλων, ὅπερ καὶ Καλλιππίδη  
 ο ἐπιτιμᾶτο καὶ νῦν ἄλλοις ὡς οὐκ ἐλευθέρας γυναῖκας μιμου-  
 μένων. ἔτι ἡ τραγωδία καὶ ἄνευ κινήσεως ποιεῖ τὸ αὐτῆς,  
 ὡσπερ ἡ ἐποποιία· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀναγινώσκειν φανερὰ ὅποια  
 τίς ἐστίν· εἰ οὖν ἐστὶ τὰ γ' ἄλλα κρείττων, τοῦτό γε οὐκ ἀναγ-  
 καῖον αὐτῇ ὑπάρχειν. ἔπειτα διότι πάντ' ἔχει ὅσαπερ ἡ ἐπο-  
 5 ποιία (καὶ γὰρ τῷ μέτρῳ ἔξεστι χρῆσθαι), καὶ ἔτι οὐ μικρὸν  
 μέρος τὴν μουσικὴν [καὶ τὰς ὄψεις], δι' ἧς αἱ ἡδοναὶ συνίσταν-  
 ται ἐναργέστατα· εἶτα καὶ τὸ ἐναργὲς ἔχει καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀναγνώ-  
 σει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων· ἔτι τῷ ἐν ἐλάττονι μήκει τὸ τέλος  
 ὁ τῆς μιμήσεως εἶναι (τὸ γὰρ ἀθρούτερον ἡδίων ἢ πολλῶ κεκρα-  
 μένον τῷ χρόνῳ, λέγω δ' οἶον εἴ τις τὸν Οἰδίπουν θεῖη  
 τὸν Σοφοκλέους ἐν ἔπεσιν ὅσοις ἡ Ἰλιάς· ἔτι ἦττον μία ἢ  
 μίμησις ἢ τῶν ἐποποιῶν (σημεῖον δέ, ἐκ γὰρ ὅποιασούν  
 ; μιμήσεως πλείους τραγωδίαί γίνονται), ὥστε ἐὰν μὲν ἕνα  
 μῦθον ποιῶσιν, ἢ βραχέως δεικνύμενον μύουρον φαίνεσθαι, ἢ  
 ἀκολουθοῦντα τῷ τοῦ μέτρου μήκει ὑδαρῆ· λέγω δὲ οἶον  
 ἐὰν ἐκ πλείονων πράξεων ἢ συγκειμένη, ὡσπερ ἡ Ἰλιάς  
 ἔχει πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσεια <ᾶ> καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ  
 ἔχει μέγεθος· καίτοι ταῦτα τὰ ποιήματα συνέστηκεν ὡς ἐν-

7 ἐστὶ Π: del. Duentzer καὶ διάδοντα rec: καὶ διαδόντα A: et etiam can-  
 tantem Lat: καὶ ᾄδοντα Spengel, fort. recte 8 ὁ Ὀπούντιος rec (Ar): ὁ  
 πούντιος A (pronitius Lat) 10 ἐπιτιμᾶτο A: corr. m. rec. (increpabant Lat)  
 11 αὐτῆς A 13 τοῦτό γε A: hocque Lat 14 ἔπειτα διότι Π (Ar):  
 ἐστὶ δέ, ὅτι Usener: lac. ante ἔπειτα stat. Thurot 16 καὶ τὰς ὄψεις Π  
 (Ar): secl. Spengel 17 ἐναργέστατα Π: ἐνεργ- rec (Ar?) ἀναγνώσει  
 Madius e codicibus(?) quibusdam: ἀναγνωρίσει Π (Ar) 18 τῷ Π: τὸ  
 Jortin, Winstanley 1462<sup>b</sup> rursus praesto est B τῆς μιμήσεως Π  
 (Ar): ἐκ μιμήσεως B ἡδίων ἢ Madius: ἴδιον ἢ B: ἡδονῆ Π 2 οἰδίπουν θεῖη  
 B (Lat, Ar): δίπουν θεῖη θεῖη A 3 τὸν Φ, A<sup>rec</sup>: τὸ AB ἡ ἰλιάς rec: ἡ  
 ιδίας A (δ in λ corr. m. rec.), B: aut propriis Lat μία ἢ Spengel: ἡ μία AB  
 5 post γίνονται deficit Ar 6 μύουρον A: μείουρον B: gratiosum Lat  
 7 τοῦ μέτρου E: συμμέτρῳ Bernays ante λέγω lac. stat. multi, post οἶον alii  
 8 ἡ A: om. B 9 ᾶ rec: om. E 10 καίτοι ταῦτα τὰ rec: καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα E

δέχεται ἄριστα καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα μιᾶς πράξεως μίμησις. εἰ οὖν τούτοις τε διαφέρει πᾶσιν καὶ ἔτι τῷ τῆς τέχνης ἔργῳ (δεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν αὐτὰς ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημένην), φανερόν ὅτι κρείττων ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον τοῦ τέλους τυγχάνουσα τῆς ἐποποιίας. 15

περὶ μὲν οὖν τραγωδίας καὶ ἐποποιίας, καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν μερῶν, καὶ πόσα καὶ τί διαφέρει, καὶ τοῦ εὖ ἢ μὴ τίνες αἰτίαι, καὶ περὶ ἐπιτιμήσεων καὶ λύσεων, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα. \* \* \*

11 μίμησις Σ: μμήσεις Spengel 14 κρείττων Π: κρείττον Β  
16-17 καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ Α: *ipsisque et* (αὐτῶν τε καὶ?) Lat: καὶ αὐτῶν Β  
18 ἢ Φ: εἰ ΑΒ 19 τοσαῦτα Π: ταῦτα Β; sequuntur in hoc codice περὶ  
δὲ, tum lectu difficillima: . . . ω μ ω | [ . . ] ουγρ . . ω, unde *ιάμβων*(?) καὶ  
*κωμωδίας* (ων et καὶ et *δίας* per compendia) restituitur; ultima si re vera  
fuerunt οὐ γράψω, non loquitur ipse Aristoteles.

Notanda subscriptio in Lat O *primus aristotilis de arte poetica liber explicit*,  
cf. Eustratius in Eth. Nic. p. 320. 38 Heylbut: *Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ*  
*περὶ ποιητικῆς* (spectat ad Margitae mentionem, 1448<sup>b</sup> 30 et 38). Index  
librorum Aristotelis apud Diog. Laert. 5. 24 (83) *πραγματεία τέχνης*  
*ποιητικῆς* ᾱβ, in vita Hesychiana (75) *τέχνης ποιητικῆς* β.

## FRAGMENTA

### I

Aristoteles Poet. 6, 1449<sup>b</sup>21: *περὶ κωμωδίας ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν.*

Conf. adnot. crit. ad 26, 1462<sup>b</sup>19.

### II

Aristoteles Rhet. 1. 11, 1371<sup>b</sup>33: *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ παιδιὰ τῶν ἠδέων καὶ πᾶσα ἄνεσις καὶ ὁ γέλως τῶν ἠδέων, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ γελοῖα ἠδέα εἶναι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους καὶ ἔργα· διώριστα δὲ περὶ γελοίων χωρὶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.*

Idem Rhet. 3. 18, 1419<sup>b</sup>2: *περὶ δὲ τῶν γελοίων, ἐπειδὴ τινα δοκεῖ χρῆσιν ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι, καὶ δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν διαφθεῖρειν τῶν ἐναντίων γέλῳ τὸν δὲ γέλῳτα σπουδῆ ὀρθῶς λέγων, εἴρηται πόσα εἶδη γελοίων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἀρμόττει ἐλευθέρῳ τὸ δ' οὐ ὅπως οὖν τὸ ἀρμόττον αὐτῷ λήψεται. ἔστι δ' ἡ εἰρωνεία τῆς βωμολοχίας ἐλευθεριώτερον ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ γελοῖον, ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἑτέρου.*

### III

Aristoteles Rhet. 3. 2, 1404<sup>b</sup>37: *τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῇ ὁμωνυμῖαι χρήσιμοι (παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακουργεῖ), τῷ ποιητῇ δὲ συνωνυμῖαι. λέγω δὲ κύρια τε καὶ συνώνυμα οἷον τὸ πορεύεσθαι καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφοτέρω καὶ κύρια καὶ συνώνυμα ἀλλήλοις. τί μὲν οὖν τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ πόσα εἶδη μεταφορᾶς καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο πλείστον δύναται καὶ ἐν ποιήσει καὶ ἐν λόγοις, αἱ μεταφοραί, εἴρηται καθάπερ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.*

Simplicius in Categ. 36. 13 Kalbfleisch: *καὶ γὰρ καὶ*

## FRAGMENTA

ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ περὶ ποιητικῆς συνώνυμα εἶπεν εἶναι ὧν πλείω μὲν τὰ ὀνόματα λόγος δὲ ὁ αὐτός, οἷα δὴ ἐστὶ τὰ πολυώνυμα, τό τε λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον καὶ τὸ φᾶρος.

### IV

Antiatticista in Anecdosis Bekkeri. 101. 32: κυντότατον: Ἀριστοτέλης περὶ ποιητικῆς τὸ δὲ πάντων κυντότατον.

### V

Aristoteles Pol. 8. 7, 1341<sup>b</sup>32: ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδεχόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιρούσι τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὰ μὲν ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δ' ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τιθέντες, καὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν τὴν φύσιν πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων οἰκείαν ἄλλην πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος τιθέασι, φαμὲν δ' οὐ μιᾶς ἕνεκα ὠφελείας τῇ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι δεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ πλειόνων χάριν (καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἕνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐροῦμεν σαφέστερον—τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν, πρὸς ἄνεσιν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν), φανερόν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἀρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἠθικωτάταις, πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἐτέρων χειρουργούντων καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχᾶς ἰσχυρῶς τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἥττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον, οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἔτι δ' ἐνθουσιασμός· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατοκώχιμοί τινές εἰσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἱερῶν μελῶν ὀρώμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ἐξοργιάζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὥσπερ ἰατρειᾶς τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. ταῦτό δὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν καὶ τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικούς καὶ τοὺς ὄλως παθητικούς, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἐκάστω, καὶ πᾶσι γίγνεσθαι τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κουφίζεσθαι

## FRAGMENTA

μεθ' ἡδονῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ καθαρτικὰ παρέχει  
χαρὰν ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Conf. Aristoteles Pol. 8. 6, 1341<sup>a</sup>21: ἔτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἡθικὸν  
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιροὺς χρηστέον  
ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἢ μάθησιν.

Proclus in Plat. Remp. 1 p. 42 Kroll: εἰπεῖν χρῆ . . . δεύτερον, τί δήποτε  
μάλιστα τὴν τραγωδίαν καὶ τὴν κωμικὴν οὐ παραδέχεται [scil. Plato] καὶ  
ταῦτα συντελοῦσας πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν, ἃ μῆτε παντάπασι ἀποκλείειν  
δυνατὸν μῆτε ἐμπιμπλάναι πάλιν ἀσφαλές, δεόμενα δέ τινος ἐν καιρῷ κινήσεως,  
ἣν ἐν ταῖς τούτων ἀκροάσειν ἐκπληρουμένην ἀνενοχλήτους ἡμᾶς ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐν  
τῷ λοιπῷ χρόνῳ ποιεῖν . . . p. 49: τὸ δὲ δεύτερον [scil. πρόβλημα]—τοῦτο δ' ἦν  
τὸ τὴν τραγωδίαν ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ κωμωδίαν ἀτόπως, εἴπερ διὰ τούτων  
δυνατὸν ἐμμέτρως ἀποπιμπλάναι τὰ πάθη καὶ ἀποπλήσαντας εὐεργὰ πρὸς τὴν  
παιδείαν ἔχειν τὸ πεπονηκὸς αὐτῶν θεραπεύσαντας—τοῦτο δ' οὖν πολλὴν καὶ  
τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει παρασχὸν αἰτιάσεως ἀφορμὴν καὶ τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιήσεων  
τούτων ἀγωνισταῖς τῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα λόγων οὕτωςί πως ἡμεῖς ἐπομένως τοῖς  
ἐμπροσθεν διαλύσομεν . . . p. 50: δεῖν μὲν οὖν τὸν πολιτικὸν διαμηχανᾶσθαι τινὰς  
τῶν παθῶν τούτων ἀπεράσεις καὶ ἡμεῖς φήσομεν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥστε τὰς περὶ αὐτὰ  
προσπαθείας συντείνειν, τὸναντίον μὲν οὖν ὥστε χαλινοῦν καὶ τὰς κινήσεις  
αὐτῶν ἐμμελῶς ἀναστέλλειν ἐκείνας δὲ ἄρα τὰς ποιήσεις πρὸς τῇ ποικιλίᾳ  
καὶ τὸ ἄμετρον ἐχούσας ἐν ταῖς τῶν παθῶν τούτων προκλήσει πολλοῦ δεῖν εἰς  
ἀφοσίωσιν εἶναι χρησίμους. αἱ γὰρ ἀφοσιώσεις οὐκ ἐν ὑπερβολαῖς εἰσιν ἀλλ'  
ἐν συνεσταλμέναις ἐνεργείαις, σμικρὰν ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἐκείνα ἐχούσαις ὧν  
εἰσιν ἀφοσιώσεις.

Iamblichus de Myst. 1. 11: αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων παθημάτων  
τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πάντῃ μὲν εἰργόμεναι καθίστανται σφοδρότεραι, εἰς ἐνέργειαν  
δὲ βραχείαν [ita Bernays; βραχεῖς vulg.] καὶ ἄχρι τοῦ συμμετρου προαγόμεναι  
χαίρουσι μετρίως καὶ ἀποπληροῦνται, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀποκαθαιρόμεναι πειθοῖ  
καὶ οὐ πρὸς βίαν ἀποπαύονται. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐν τε κωμωδίᾳ καὶ τραγωδίᾳ  
ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦντες ἴσταμεν τὰ οἰκεία πάθη καὶ μετριώτερα ἀπεργαζό-  
μεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν.

### [VI]

Philoponus in Aristot. de Anima p. 269. 28 ed.  
Hayduck: διὰ τοῦτό φησιν ὅτι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, τουτέστι τὸ  
τέλος, διττόν ἐστι, τὸ μὲν οὐ ἔνεκα, τὸ δὲ ᾧ, ὅπερ καὶ  
†ἐν τῇ Ποιητικῇ† καὶ ἐν τῇ Περὶ γενέσεως εἶπεν.

## COMMENTARY

For abbreviations see p. xxvi.

### CHAPTERS 1-5

IN this introductory section A. distinguishes the forms of poetry, which is assumed to be a *mimesis* of human actions, according to the medium employed (Ch. 1), to the objects imitated (Ch. 2), and to the manner of imitation (Ch. 3). In Chs. 4 and 5 he discusses the origins of *mimesis* and shows how different forms were developed by men of different dispositions, giving in the process brief histories of the two basic forms, tragedy and comedy. He is then ready to proceed in Ch. 6 to his main subject, tragedy, together with epic, which is viewed as a rudimentary form of tragedy. The corresponding treatment of comedy (promised at 49<sup>b</sup>21) is missing.

### CHAPTER 1

47<sup>a</sup>8-13. *The subject.*

47<sup>a</sup>8. ποιητικῆς: sc. τέχνης as in Pl. *Gorg.* 502 c, though the word was perhaps felt by now to be a subst. in its own right. As the subject of a book it would recall the τέχνη ῥητορική, the *Handbook of Rhetoric*; the purpose of these books, which had been in existence for a century or more (see Introduction III), was to teach the art of speaking, but in the *P. A.*'s object is mainly to define the nature and function of poetry, though instructions for the poet are included.

αὐτῆς: emphasizing the contrast with τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς, the particular kinds of poetry.

εἰδῶν: the species of the genus poetry. Used also of the various types of tragedy (cf. 55<sup>b</sup>32), and at 56<sup>a</sup>33 apparently for the parts, μέρη, or μόρια. For A. the first step towards the comprehension of a subject is to divide it according to its natural categories. Cf. Pl. *Phaedr.* 265 E: κατ' εἶδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν κατ' ἄρθρα ἢ πέφυκεν. . . . The popular division by metre is rejected (47<sup>b</sup>13).

47<sup>a</sup>9. δύναμιν: here no more than 'effect', ἔργον; frequently in A. it means 'potentiality' as opposed to 'actuality'. Related to the δύναμις is the τέλος which each εἶδος achieves.

πῶς δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοὺς μύθους: 'how plots should be constructed'; μῦθος normally means in the *P.* the story as organized into the plot, the πραγμάτων σύστασις; συνιστάναι (sometimes συνίστασθαι) represents the activity of the poet which results in the πραγμάτων σύστασις or σύνθεσις. B. cites 50<sup>b</sup>32 and 53<sup>b</sup>4 as evidence that the



verb is pass. here. Sometimes, e.g. at 51<sup>b</sup>24, 53<sup>a</sup>18, 37, *μῦθος* retains its older meaning of legendary story or myth, on which tragic plots were normally based. By a natural extension it is used of the invented plot of comedy (51<sup>b</sup>13).

A. has singled out plot for emphatic mention right at the beginning of his work, in which it is the dominating theme. It is by the construction of plots more than by any other single means that the poet achieves his purpose.

47<sup>a</sup>10. *καλῶς ἔξιν*: to be good of its sort: cf. *τὸν καλῶς ἔχοντα μῦθον* 53<sup>a</sup>12.

*ποίησις*: lit. the 'making', 'composition' of poetry. It sometimes preserves this literal sense, as possibly at l. 14 below and, E. thinks, here. However, it early became a general word for poetry (first in Herod. 2. 23, 82), and must be so used here if it is the subject of *ἔστι* in the next clause; if it is to mean 'composition', the subject of *ἔστι* must be supplied from *ποιητικῆς* or *εἰδῶν*, which seems less natural. *ποίησις* and *ποίημα* later acquired narrower technical meanings, first perhaps in Theophrastus; see N. A. Greenberg, *HSCP* 65 (1961), 263 ff., and C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry*, pp. 62 ff.

It is important to remember that in the words *ποίησις*, *ποίημα*, *ποιητής* the idea of making is completely dissociated from the idea of 'creating' with which it is frequently combined in English. *ἡ τῆς τραγωδίας ποίησις* means the fashioning of tragedies by a poet in a sense similar to *ἡ τῶν τραπέζων ποίησις*, the fashioning of tables by a carpenter. A. began the elevation of the poet through revealing that poets gave significance to poems by organizing their structure, by making stories into plots. 'The very word *ποιεῖν* . . . means "to create"' (Gomme, *Greek Attitude to Poetry and History*, p. 54), is misleading: *λογοποιός* means, among other things, 'writer of prose'.

*πόσων καὶ ποίων*: cf. the closing lines of *P.* 62<sup>b</sup>17.

47<sup>a</sup>11. *μορίων*: *μόριον* and *μέρος* are used indifferently by A.

47<sup>a</sup>12. *μεθόδου*: 'inquiry'; cf. *Pol.* 1317<sup>b</sup>34: *ἐν τῇ μεθόδῳ τῇ πρὸ ταύτης*.

*κατὰ φύσιν*: cf. *Ph.* 189<sup>b</sup>31: *ἔστι γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν τὰ κοινὰ πρῶτον εἰπόντας οὕτω τὰ περὶ ἕκαστον ἴδια θεωρεῖν*.

47<sup>a</sup>13–47<sup>b</sup>29. *The forms of poetry distinguished in terms of medium.*

47<sup>a</sup>13. *ἐποποιία*: as *μίμησις* is an activity, A. may be stressing the process of making, *ποίησις*, rather than the thing made; but *ἐποποιία* can mean 'epic' just as *ἀνδριαντοποιία* can mean 'statuary', and since *κωμῳδία* is used here without *ποίησις* it is simpler to take all as referring to product rather than process (cf. 47<sup>b</sup>26). The four kinds of poetry mentioned were the most important at this date. Though Antimachus was the only recent epic poet of note, the dominance of Homer ensured that epic should not be neglected; works in the other

three forms were still being produced in large numbers. Under dithyramb, the choral song of Dionysus, is included the *nomos*, the song of Apollo, mentioned separately at 47<sup>b</sup>26. Dithyramb itself, originally narrative, had become highly dramatic by A.'s time (cf. 61<sup>b</sup>29). Non-choral lyric, such as was written by Sappho and Alcaeus, was now nearly extinct.

**47<sup>a</sup>15.** αὐλητικῆς . . . κιθαριστικῆς: the *aulos*, something akin to the clarinet, was used to accompany the dithyramb and was regarded as highly emotional; the more restrained *cithara* or lyre was associated with the *nomos*, which was originally choral, but in A.'s time an astrophic monody; both were used in dramatic performances. The problem is the meaning of the qualification 'most'. The only natural distinction is that between music unaccompanied by words, *ψιλή μουσική*—'bare music' the Greeks called it—and the use of these instruments to accompany lyric poetry. The former was not much practised (unless accompanied by the dance, in which case it was not strictly *ψιλή*), though a competition with the unaccompanied *aulos* was part of the Pythian Games from 582 B.C. Plato in a famous passage, *Laws* 669 D–670 B, denied that such music had any clear meaning and condemned it. A. seems to have held that rhythm by itself was meaningful. But ἡ πλείστη probably carries an admission that not all 'bare music' was mimetic.

In the rest of the *P.* A. has little to say about music in general, and nothing about instrumental music. The subject can be introduced here quite naturally because A. takes *ποιητική* to cover *μουσική* as a whole, in which music and dancing (47<sup>a</sup>27) were mostly subordinate to poetry. The scheme of the *media* is made as comprehensive as possible, though A. will have little to say about some of them. The term *μουσική* occurs only at 62<sup>a</sup>16, referring to the musical element in tragedy.

For the use of music in education and the rejection of the *aulos* see *Pol.* 1341<sup>a</sup>17 ff.

τυγχάνουσιν: see 47<sup>b</sup>9 n.

**47<sup>a</sup>16.** μιμήσεις: that poetry, music, painting, sculpture, and dance are all forms of *mimesis* A. takes for granted. *μιμῆσθαι* means to make or do something which has a resemblance to something else. No one English word is adequate in all contexts, but basically the idea of imitation will be present. See Appendix I.

τὸ σύνολον: not 'in general' but 'viewed collectively'.

διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τρισίν: the mimetic arts can be distinguished in three ways, according to the medium used (colour, words, etc.), the subject of this chapter; according to the object imitated (men, good or bad), the subject of Ch. 2; and according to the manner of imitation (by narrative or direct speech), the subject

of Ch. 3. *μουσική* is included here as part of *ποιητική* (cf. 62<sup>a</sup>16), but the *P.* deals only with imitations in which words are used.

**47<sup>a</sup>17.** *ἐν*: the regular word to indicate medium (cf. 47<sup>b</sup>29).

**47<sup>a</sup>18.** *ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώμασι . . .*: the first of seven passages in which the activities of the poet are illustrated from the visual arts, which presumably represent for A., as for Plato, the simplest form of *mimesis*; see G.'s note ad loc. In Plut. *M.* 17 F poetry is still a mimetic art and *ἀντίστροφος τῇ ζωγραφίᾳ*.

*χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι*: the media used by painters and sculptors; the latter normally applied pigment to their statues. *σχήματα* can mean, in addition to the static shapes of painter or sculptor, the shapes into which men put themselves, the postures, e.g. of dancers as in *σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν* l. 27, below, and of actors at 62<sup>a</sup>3; cf. Plut. *M.* 747 C-E. It means also the form or structure of a play (cf. 49<sup>a</sup>6).

**47<sup>a</sup>19.** *ἀπεικάζοντες*: 'making likenesses'. Words derived from *εἰκών*, 'an image', were used primarily for visual representation, but they contain the same basic idea as *mimesis*. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3. 10. 1: *σώματα διὰ τῶν χρωμάτων ἀπεικάζοντες ἐκμμεῖσθε*; Pl. *Laws* 668 A: *μουσικὴν γε πᾶσάν φαμεν εἰκαστικὴν τε εἶναι καὶ μιμητικὴν*;

*οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης . . .*: this parenthesis contains an idea here quite irrelevant but dear both to Plato and to A. To do a thing *διὰ τέχνης* requires knowledge of the basic principles of what you are doing: cf. *ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ ὃ ἂν ἦ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα*, Pl. *Gorg.* 465 A with Dodds' note; you may do it very successfully in the light of long experience *ἐμπειρία* (*συνήθεια* and *ἐμπειρία* are coupled by A. at *EN* 1158<sup>a</sup>15), but you will not be able to give a rational account of your procedure. According to Plato's *Gorgias* rhetorical skill is all of this empirical sort; A. tried to make a real science of it in his *Rhetoric*, in which he treats not only of tricks of style but of the arguments to be employed and of the psychology of audiences. Similarly poets learnt which myths provided good plots by working their way through the available myths, so that they discovered by trial and error which were really suitable (see 53<sup>a</sup>17). A., in the light of his *τέχνη*, could have directed them immediately to the best plots; so (51<sup>a</sup>24) Homer did the right thing *ἦτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν*. He could hardly have possessed a complete theory of epic, but he followed his genius. There is a similar contrast between *τέχνη* and *τύχη* at 54<sup>a</sup>10. A. converts a chance discovery into a part of *τέχνη* by giving a rational explanation of it. For a general account of the difference between *τέχνη* and *ἐμπειρία* see *Met.* 980<sup>b</sup>28 ff., though common usage made little of the distinction.

**47<sup>a</sup>20.** *φωνῆς*: it is a problem who the 'others' are who use the *φωνή* as their medium. The first thought of the modern reader, for whom

poetry consists primarily of printed words, will be that sound, the medium of music, should supply the second analogy. *φωνή*, 'the (human) voice', can be used metaphorically for the sounds of musical instruments, and it is conceivable that it could here refer to sound in general as the medium of the musician (it was so understood by S. and by Tkatsch), especially as the more general word *ψόφος* includes mere noise as well. But this will not do, since the Greeks included virtually all music in poetry, and A. would be illustrating the media of the *εἰρημέναι τέχναι* l. 21 from themselves. (It is true that rhythm and harmony, the media of poetry l. 22, are not the *same* as sound, but they are inseparable from sound in this sense). The same objection applies, though rather less strongly, to the rendering 'voice'. Most music was sung, and accordingly the voice is one of the media to be illustrated, not itself a proper illustration. But A. did call the voice 'the most imitative of human faculties', *μιμητικώτατον τῶν μορίων* (R. 1404<sup>a</sup>21), presumably because of its emotional suggestiveness, and he might have used it, though illogically, as being a helpful illustration here. Another and less vulnerable suggestion is that the reference is to those who supplied entertainment of a somewhat vulgar kind by giving imitations of sounds difficult to render with the human voice, such as cries of animals and the squeaking of pulley wheels (cf. Pl. *Rep.* 397 A, *Laws* 669 D). Plutarch tells of a Parmenon whose performance of the part of a squealing pig was agreed to be better than the real thing (*M.* 18 C, 674 B). An objection is that these performances are hardly on a level such that they can suitably be compared to painting and poetry. An art is here explained by the analogy of a parlour-trick. But this is the view of V., G., and R., and it remains the most likely. E. supposes the voice to be that of the rhapsode reciting epics.

For a technical sense of *φωνή* see 56<sup>b</sup>38.

**47<sup>a</sup>22.** *ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ*: we thus have rhythm, words, and music as the media of the *εἰρημέναι τέχναι*, those listed in ll. 13–15, above. The artist represents material or personal objects by colours on a two-dimensional surface, in fact patches of colour, as they appear on the retina, by patches of colour; the entertainer represents sounds by sounds; the poet represents human action by words, rhythm, and music. From one point of view words differ from the other media in that, unlike colours and sounds, they are conventional symbols. But *λόγος* also means speech, and A. probably thought in terms of the performance of a play in which the spoken word represents the spoken word accompanying the original action.

*ῥυθμός* is essentially a pattern of recurrence imposed on speech or on other sounds giving rise to expectations which are more or less fulfilled, so that even in over-rhythmic prose 'one waits for the

recurrence', *πότε πάλιν ἤξει* (R. 1408<sup>b</sup>24). It is defined by Pl. *Laws* 665 A as *ἡ τῆς κινήσεως τάξις*, the application of order to movement; the ethical effects of rhythms are due to a correspondence between this ordered movement and the movements of the soul; see Appendix I. Aristoxenus, a pupil of A., says (*Rhythmica* p. 411 Mar.) *ἔστι τὰ ῥυθμιζόμενα τρία, λέξις, μέλος, κίνησις σωματική*. On the history and many senses of *ῥυθμός* see E. Wolf, *Wiener St.* 68 (1955), 99 ff.

*λόγος* is a meaningful combination of words; an individual word is *ὄνομα*, used in later grammar to mean a noun as opposed to *ῥῆμα* a verb. (We find *ἔπος* in the *P.* only in the plural, meaning hexameter verses or epic.)

*ἄρμονία* 'fitting together', as a musical term is a satisfying relation between notes. I translate it by 'melody', though this does not exclude the notion of rhythm. The only English word referring to pitch alone is the highly technical 'melos'. At 47<sup>b</sup>25 *ἄρμονία* is replaced by *μέλει* and *λόγοις* by *μέτρῳ* without significant change of meaning. The combination *λόγος-ἄρμονία-ῥυθμός* occurs at *Rep.* 398 D, but A.'s classification of the arts in terms of the media employed is probably new. Gorgias' definition of poetry as *λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον*, *Hel.* 9, was intended to minimize the difference between poetry and rhetoric in the interests of the latter.

**47<sup>a</sup>26. *συρίγγων*:** the *syrinx* was a less sophisticated instrument than the *aulos*. The latter was played mainly by professionals (cf. *Pol.* 1341<sup>a</sup>17 f.). Alcibiades is said to have rejected the *aulos* when it was still fashionable (Plut. *Alc.* 2. 5).

**47<sup>a</sup>27. *ὀρχηστῶν*:** dancing has not been mentioned among the *τέχναι*, though the choral dance was part of both drama and dithyramb. But A. must here refer to unaccompanied solo dancing which can hardly have been common. Solo dancing was highly developed and very mimetic; as the pantomime it became a favourite form of entertainment under the early Roman Empire. Even so, whether for entertainment or for ritual, it was normally accompanied by music. The main sources of information are Athenaeus, 1. 25-27, 37-40, and Lucian, *De Saltatione*, especially ch. 60.

**47<sup>a</sup>28. *καὶ ἦθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις*:** curiously emphatic. A single medium can cover the whole field of *μίμησις*. *ἦθος*, not quite the same as character: see on 50<sup>b</sup>8. *πάθη καὶ πράξεις*, here a related pair, the things that are done to a man, i.e. the things that happen to him, and the things that a man does (cf. 51<sup>b</sup>11); for different senses see on 49<sup>b</sup>24, 52<sup>b</sup>10, 55<sup>b</sup>34. For the general effect of the dance cf. Pl. *Laws* 655 D: *μιμήματα τρόπων ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς χορείας*.

**47<sup>a</sup>28-47<sup>b</sup>24.** *A digression on the deficiencies of nomenclature.*

**47<sup>a</sup>28-47<sup>b</sup>2.** *ἡ δὲ . . . ἀνώνυμοι:* after *mimesis* using rhythm and

rhythm with harmony (instrumental music) we have the medium of words and of words with rhythm, here called *μέτροις* as at 47<sup>b</sup>25, and equivalent to *λόγω* with *ῥυθμῶ*. *λόγος* or *λόγος ψιλός* is an adequate expression for prose, but it does not distinguish mimetic prose, like mime and Socratic dialogue, from history or a speech in the courts. As A. points out in the course of the digression which follows this complaint, the nomenclature of poetry too is unsatisfactory in a similar way in that mimetic and non-mimetic verse are not distinguished. Homer and Empedocles are both *ἐποποιοί* because both wrote *ἔπη*, hexameters, though Empedocles' poems have nothing in common with Homer's except the metre. (The Greeks had no category of didactic poetry.) With the traditional text *ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις* and *ἀνώνυμοι* it is not clear whether A. is lamenting a double deficiency, the lack of a word for the class of mimetic prose writing, and of another word for mimetic verse writing regardless of the particular metre used, or whether he wants a word which should cover mimetic writing both in prose and in verse. The run of the sentence rather suggests the latter, the natural sense and the evidence of the examples, the former, which is the interpretation of M., following Gallavotti, *Riv. di fil.* 58 (1930), 74, and of E. Lobel's emendation *καὶ ἦ* for *ἢ* with *ἀνώνυμοι* (*CQ* 23 (1929), 76) puts it beyond doubt that there were two forms of mimetic writing which lacked a name. *ψιλοῖς*, which is in the predicative position, is probably to be taken both with *λόγοις* and with *μέτροις*, i.e. *λόγοι* that are not in verse and verses that are not accompanied by music; cf. *τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν* (48<sup>a</sup>11, but see note ad loc.). *μόνον* in l. 29 stresses the absence of rhythm and harmony. Good prose would, in a sense, possess rhythm, but it is not necessary to the form.

The recognition that what we should call 'imaginative' writing is possible in prose is remarkable, and was a stumbling-block to Renaissance critics.

**47<sup>a</sup>29. καὶ τούτοις . . . :** a superfluous complication introduced by A. either for the sake of completeness or because he wanted to mention Chairemon's *Centaur* (l. <sup>b</sup>21, below). A mixture of metres would usually be a mixture of spoken and sung verses, involving *μέλος*. Iambics, trochaics, and anapaests could be mixed in drama.

**47<sup>b</sup>9–24.** The explanation of the 'nameless' forms leads on to a digression on the naming of forms in terms of metre, a practice which conceals the difference between mimetic and non-mimetic writing. The return to the main theme of media is marked by *περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων . . .* at 47<sup>b</sup>23.

**47<sup>b</sup>9. ἀνώνυμοι:** A. often remarks that there is no available word, e.g. *EN* 1107<sup>b</sup>2, *Pol.* 1275<sup>a</sup>30.

**τυγχάνουσι:** they might have been given names but, as it happens,

they have not. For this slightly emphatic use see G. Thomson on Aes. *Ag.* 125-9 and W. S. Barrett on Eur. *Hipp.* 388. At 47<sup>a</sup>25 it is a synonym for εἶσιν.

**47<sup>b</sup>10. Σώφρονος:** Sophron of Syracuse (late fifth century) and his son Xenarchus wrote mimes, realistic sketches from everyday life, developed, perhaps, from the comedies of Epicharmus. Some idea of their nature may be got from the urban mimes of Theocritus (2, 14, and 15) and from Herodas. But these are in verse, while those of Sophron, though he was sometimes referred to as a poet, were generally considered to be in rhythmic prose. There is a strong tradition that Plato greatly admired Sophron; Athen. 504 B, Diog. Laert. 3. 18. For the only considerable fragment see Page, *Gk. Lit. Pap.*, p. 328, and A. S. F. Gow, *Theocr.* ii. 34. A. himself said that Plato's *Dialogues* were half-way between prose and verse (fr. 73).

**47<sup>b</sup>11. Σωκρατικούς λόγους:** the conversational philosophy of Socrates gave rise to a new literary genre. Plato's dialogues, some in dramatic form, some told by a narrator, were the most famous example. Alexamenus of Teos, whose works are lost, was the first to write in this form. Xenophon wrote a number of conversation pieces in most of which Socrates is the chief speaker. An important fragment of the dialogue *Περὶ Ποιητῶν* seems to be making the same point, οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἐμμέτρους τοὺς καλουμένους Σώφρονος μίμους μὴ φῶμεν εἶναι λόγους καὶ μιμήσεις, ἢ τοὺς Ἀλεξαμενοῦ τοῦ Τηίου τοὺς πρώτους γραφθέντας τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων (Athen. 505 C = A. fr. 72). The text is uncertain, and probably to be printed as a question. Rostagni suggested (see Introduction II, p. xiii) that the *Περὶ Ποιητῶν* was roughly parallel in structure to the *P.* and contained a full exposition of the theory of *mimesis*. There is no evidence that the reference to Empedocles fr. 70 (cf. l. 18, below) came from the same part of the dialogue. R. suggested also that A. may have pointed out the ironic implications of the mimetic activities of Plato who was so resolute in condemning *mimesis*: cf. Athen. 505 B: αὐτὸς (sc. Plato) τοὺς διαλόγους μιμητικῶς γράψας.

**47<sup>b</sup>13. πλὴν . . . :** if the mimes and Socratic dialogues were put, for example, into iambs they would have a common name, but it would be in virtue of their metre, not their content, and so irrelevant *qua mimesis*.

**47<sup>b</sup>14. -ποιός:** as *τριμετροποιός* is not found, Lobel proposed the excision of *τριμέτρων* in l. 11 (*CQ* 23 (1929), 76).

**47<sup>b</sup>16. φυσικόν τι:** i.e. a poem *περὶ φύσεως* as of Xenophanes or Empedocles.

**47<sup>b</sup>18. Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ:** poet, philosopher, and mystery-monger of Acragas in Sicily, c. 493-433. Considerable fragments survive of his poem *On Nature* and of his *Katharmoi*; they bear out the opinion of A.,

quoted by Diog. Laert. (8. 57) from the *Περὶ Ποιητῶν* (= A. fr. 70), that he was a master of poetic diction. This opinion is in no way inconsistent with what is said here, as diction by itself does not make a poet. On differences between E.'s similes and Homer's see B. Snell, *Discovery of the Mind*, pp. 214-16.

**47<sup>b</sup>20.** ὁμοίως δὲ . . . : this takes up 47<sup>b</sup>1: *μιγνύσα μετ' ἀλλήλων*.

**τὰ μέτρα:** E., p. 57, seems right in restricting *μέτρα* to non-lyric metres. It is true, though he does not mention it, that at R. 1406<sup>b</sup>36 A. uses *μέτρα* in reference to Pl. *Rep.* 601 A, B where both verse and music are in question, but the lyric element is not essential to Plato's argument, and A. is notably careless about references. So *μέτρα* here need mean no more than dactylic, iambic, and trochaic (cf. 59<sup>b</sup>34-37); otherwise the exaggeration would be considerable.

**47<sup>b</sup>21.** *Χαιρήμων*: a contemporary of A. who seems to have aroused his interest or to have been a topic of the moment. He is mentioned again at 60<sup>a</sup>2 for his use of metres in combination and at R. 1413<sup>b</sup>13 as author of tragedies meant for reading rather than acting. Five iambic lines of the *Centaur* are cited by Athenaeus (608 E) as from a *δρᾶμα πολύμετρον*. What A. means by *μικτὴν ῥαψωδίαν* is unknown. A rhapsody is normally a portion of epic of a length to be given at one performance.

**47<sup>b</sup>22.** *καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον*: if there were any evidence that the *Centaur* was non-mimetic, the point would be that Chairemon, like Einpedocles, has to be called a poet for lack of any other word. As it is, we must suppose that *προσαγορευτέον* picks up *προσαγορεύοντες* in l. 15. C. cannot be called a *παμμετροποιός* (Tyrtwhitt) 'writer in all metres', so he is called *ποιητής*.

**47<sup>b</sup>24-29.** *We return to the main subject, poetic media.*

**47<sup>b</sup>25.** *ῥυθμῷ καὶ μέλει καὶ μέτρῳ*: cf. 47<sup>a</sup>22. Both *μέλος* and *μέτρον* imply the presence of words, so *λόγος* is omitted. Pl. *Gorg.* 502 C says that if these two elements are removed from a poem only *λόγοι* are left.

*μέλος* denotes words sung and therefore includes *ἄρμονία*. But the words themselves are nowhere treated as a significant part of the *μέλος*, which appears to depend for its effect on *ῥυθμός* and *ἄρμονία*. Equally *μέτρον* is never used by A. of lyric metres. *ῥυθμός* contributes to the effect of the words but *μέτρον* is metrical *λόγος* and *λόγος* is predominant. Cf. *Probl.* 920<sup>a</sup>12, in the time of Phrynichus *πολλὰ πλάσια εἶναι τότε τὰ μέλη ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις τῶν μέτρων*.

**47<sup>b</sup>27.** *διαφέρουσι*: in the dithyramb and in the *nomos* (here mentioned specifically for the first time: see 47<sup>a</sup>13 n.) all three media are used continuously throughout—words are sung by a choir that dances; in tragedy and comedy the dialogue generally uses only words and



rhythm, music and dancing being confined to the chorus, though actors sometimes sing (cf. 52<sup>b</sup>18).

There is nothing particularly striking about this classification by media except A.'s perception that it ought to be made to include the mime and Socratic dialogue. The arrangement is somewhat confusing, partly because two out of the possible combinations of three things, taken three, two, and one at a time, are left blank. Harmony cannot stand by itself, since all music is associated, if not with words, with rhythm, and for the same reason words plus harmony cannot exist without rhythm. A. begins for no obvious reason with rhythm plus harmony and rhythm alone, then passes to words alone and words plus rhythm. The digression on nomenclature divides this from the final sentence on the two ways of combining all three media. Except for a reference in the next chapter pure music and dance have no further place in the *P.*, and song, *μέλος*; though a part of drama, is discussed not at all.

## CHAPTER 2

*The second differentia: the forms distinguished according to the objects of imitation. Men are superior or inferior; the writer, like the artist, can represent either sort. Sometimes, as with the dithyramb, both types can be represented in a single form, but in general each form is concerned with only one type, hence the importance of type as a differentia. As is emphasized in the last sentence of the Ch., this is the difference between tragedy (along with epic) and comedy (along with iambic or lampoon, 48<sup>b</sup>24 n.). Our *P.*, the first book, is mainly about the poetry of superior characters; the lost second book dealt with comedy and the inferior. The same distinction is important also in the account of the differentiation and development of literary forms given in Ch. 4; the main division is between those who by temperament were attracted to superior or to inferior human beings as their subject.*

**48<sup>a</sup>1. οἱ μιμούμενοι:** the poets, who are ultimately responsible for the play or epic, as at 48<sup>a</sup>26 where Homer and Sophocles are specified. But the same word can be used for the performers impersonating characters, as the dancers at 47<sup>a</sup>28 or the actors at 62<sup>a</sup>10. This ambiguous use is the less unnatural since down to the time of Sophocles the poet was himself the principal actor as well as being producer and inventor of the dances for the chorus; he was *μιμητής* on several different levels.

**πράττοντας:** the idea that men in action are the subject of epic and drama was already familiar. Cf. *Rep.* 603 c: *πράττοντας, φασί, ἀνθρώπους μιμείται ἢ μιμητικῆ βιαίους ἢ ἑκούσας πράξεις*, and similarly 396 c. Since A. is working up to his definition of tragedy as the

μίμησις of a πράξις 49<sup>b</sup>24, it is likely that πράττοντας contains the implication of acting purposefully, not merely doing something: see note ad loc. Though πράττειν, unlike the English 'act', never of itself means to perform on the stage, A. uses the verb indifferently of men acting (pursuing a course of action) who are the object of the poets' imitation as here, and the men acting (performing on the stage) who are the medium of his imitation as at 60<sup>a</sup>14, and it is not always clear which meaning is uppermost in his mind—apparently men in action (48<sup>a</sup>1, 23, 27; 50<sup>a</sup>6; 50<sup>b</sup>4), men performing (49<sup>b</sup>31; 50<sup>a</sup>21; 60<sup>a</sup>14).

ἀνάγκη δέ: the δέ here is connective, carrying on the force of ἐπεί, rather than apodotic, and the apodosis begins after some parentheses at δῆλον δέ in l. 7: so G. and S.

48<sup>a</sup>2. σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους: cf. *Laws* 798 D: μουσικῆ τρόπων μιμήματα βελτιόνων καὶ χειρόνων ἀνθρώπων.

σ. and φ. indicate the two ends of the ordinary, aristocratically based, Greek scale of values. ἀρετή, 'excellence', forms no positive adjective of its own and σπουδαῖος could be used to fill the gap. Cf. *A. Categ.* 10<sup>b</sup>7: ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁ σπουδαῖος. τῷ γὰρ ἀρετὴν ἔχειν σπουδαῖος λέγεται, and *Pol.* 1324<sup>a</sup>13. ἀρείων and ἄριστος are in fact related to ἀρετή. σ. and φ. form a regular pair of opposites, e.g. *EN* 1113<sup>a</sup>25, *EE* 1221<sup>b</sup>33, expanded at *EN* 1145<sup>b</sup>9 to σ. καὶ ἐπαινετός . . . φ. καὶ ψεκτός. It is the mark of the σ. to concern himself with the pursuit of ἀρετή, which from Homer onwards is centred on honour. The φαῦλος is an inferior being, not because he is actually wicked but because his capabilities and ambitions are mean. Cf. *R.* 1387<sup>b</sup>12: οἱ ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ φαῦλοι καὶ ἀφιλότιμοι. The word can be used without any suggestion of reproach as at *Thuc.* 7. 77. 2, when Nicias, in catastrophic plight before Syracuse, says he is in the same position as ὁ φαυλότατος 'the humblest' of his soldiers. But they are people not worth serious attention and no subject for tragedy, which is about οἱ ἐπιφανεῖς (53<sup>a</sup>12), heroes and 'persons of quality'. Near synonyms of σ. are χρηστός and ἐπιεικής, both words applied by A. to the characters of tragedy and both by him contrasted with φ. For further discussion of σ. and kindred words see Vahlen, pp. 267–8.

These connotations of the word σπουδαῖος are relevant to a deficiency which has been seen in A.'s account of tragedy, notably by Wilamowitz, *Herakles*<sup>1</sup>, p. 107, that he disregards the heroic element, the status of human and divine implicit in the myth, which was its all but universal subject. In fact the conception of the σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ covers many of the same values. None the less it is probably true that for A. and his age the myth had worn a little thin and they were disinclined to discover in it the primitive profundities revealed by twentieth-century critics and psychologists. It is on a more superficial level that he speaks with approval of the story of Athena's

rejection of the flute as *εὐλόγως μεμυθολογημένος* (*Pol.* 1341<sup>b</sup>3). Theophrastus added something when he defined tragedy as *ἡρωικῆς τύχης περίστασις*. Cf. also the later definition by Poseidonius *ποίησις δ' ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν ποίημα μίμησιν περιέχον θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπέων*; see Diog. Laert. 7. 60; Brink, *Horace on Poetry*, p. 65.

The superiority of the *σ. ἀνὴρ* is relevant also to the educational effects of tragedy. The activities of admirable people must reflect admirable standards of conduct. Whether we call this 'didactic' is a question of words.

**ἦθη**: 'disposition' is closer than 'character' to the meaning of *ἦθος*, but it is a disposition acquired chiefly by training, not implanted at birth. A. derives *ἦθος* from *ἔθος*, 'habit'. We become just through acting justly, though the degree of justness we can achieve depends on our natural endowment (cf. *EN* 1144<sup>b</sup>4-10). Once our *ἦθος* is formed, the decisions we take with a view to action will be largely determined by it (see *EN* 1103<sup>a</sup>15). Common usage was rather wider. Cf. Aes. *Ag.* 727: *ἦθος τὸ πρὸς τοκέων* (of a lion-cub), Pindar, *Ol.* 11. 19, and A. himself on the *ἦθη* of the aristocrat, *R.* 1390<sup>b</sup>15.

**48<sup>a</sup>3. τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖ μόνοις**: 'follow, as effect from cause', 'go with' (cf. *EE* 1232<sup>a</sup>31). *τούτοις*: in spite of *τούτους* in the line above, this refers to *σπουδαίους ἢ φ.* not to *πράττοντας* as E. argues. It is true that *ἦθος* is revealed by action (50<sup>b</sup>8), but it is not the point here, which is that all *ἦθη* are comprehended in the terms *σπουδαῖος* and *φαῦλος*. As A. is going to base a vital distinction on these two categories he emphasizes that they are all-inclusive.

**48<sup>a</sup>4. ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς**: equivalent to *τῶν νῦν* (l. 18), which is perhaps an echo of Homer's *οἶοι νῦν βροτοὶ εἰσιν*.

**48<sup>a</sup>5. ἢ καὶ τοιοῦτους**: this third term, 'those like ourselves', in addition to those who are better or worse, corresponds to nothing outside this chapter in the literary forms which it is supposed to illustrate, and is wholly superfluous. Possibly the comparison with the three painters was originally made elsewhere in a different connexion. The contrast between Polygnotus and Pauson appears again at *Pol.* 1340<sup>a</sup>36. The requirement that the characters of tragedy should be *ὅμοιοι*, which is put forward in Ch. 15, has nothing to do with this tripartite division. If tragedy is to arouse the proper emotions, the characters must be like ourselves to the extent that we can feel sympathy for them (cf. 53<sup>a</sup>5).

**ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς**: sc. *μιμοῦνται*.

**Πολύγνωτος**: the celebrated fifth-century painter (cf. 50<sup>a</sup>27).

**48<sup>a</sup>6. Παύσων**: perhaps the person mentioned by Aristoph. *Ach.* 854 and elsewhere in Old Comedy, who is said by the schol. to have been a painter; as he corresponds to Hegemon the parodist, it is possible that he painted caricatures.

- Διονύσιος**: probably the fifth-century painter mentioned by Pliny, *NH* 35. 113.
- 48<sup>a</sup>7. λεχθεισῶν**: i.e. in Ch. 1.
- 48<sup>a</sup>9. ὀρχήσει**: dances representing those worse than the average man, among whom satyrs are no doubt included, are commonly shown on vase-paintings. Cf. also *Laws* 814 E.
- 48<sup>a</sup>11. τοὺς λόγους . . . φιλομετρίαν**: prose, or verse but without music; this is more likely than G.'s view that *καὶ* is explanatory, 'λόγους that is to say *φιλομετρία*'. Presumably *λόγοι* here are mimes on various levels of seriousness.
- Ὅμηρος**: though as author of the *Margites* (48<sup>b</sup>30) he wrote also about *φᾶνλοι*.
- 48<sup>a</sup>12. Κλεοφῶν**: a tragic poet of this name is mentioned in the *Suda*. The inappropriate diction of a Cleophon is referred to in *R.* 1408<sup>a</sup>15.
- Ἡγήμων**: he lived at Athens in the second half of the fifth century.
- 48<sup>a</sup>13. παρωδίας**: perhaps a play on *ραψωδία*, burlesque epic. The *Batrachomyomachia* of uncertain date is a surviving specimen, and the *Hymn to Hermes* is not far removed in spirit. Burlesque of myth was a feature both of satyric drama and of comedy. It is not known what innovations H. made. He is said by Athenaeus (406 E, 699 A), to have produced parodies in the theatre—possibly there was a parody contest at the Panathenaea—among them a *Gigantomachia*. He used the ludicrous tag *καὶ τὸ πέρδικος σκέλος* in the same sort of way as Aristophanes his *ληκύθιον ἀπώλεσεν*.
- Νικοχάρης . . . Δειλιάδα**: may be the comic poet contemporary with Aristophanes. The title, if *Deiliad*, would mean a tale of Delos, if *Deiliad*, an epic of cowardice.
- 48<sup>a</sup>14. διθυράμβους . . . νόμους**: it is hard to believe that many poems in these classes were of other than exalted type. But a new and more flexible kind of dithyramb was introduced early in the fourth century (see Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb*, p. 38). Timotheus, the innovator in musical technique and friend of Euripides, and Philoxenus of Cythera were both writers in the new style. Philoxenus, when in love with the concubine of Dionysius of Syracuse, is said to have relieved his feelings by representing his rival in the guise of a grotesque and love-lorn Polyphemus. Something of his spirit is probably reproduced in the two Cyclops poems of Theocritus, 6 and 11. Timotheus can suitably represent the more serious type of dithyramb. Those who believe that there existed dithyrambs on three different levels can get a third name by taking *as* as the last letters of a poet's name, *Ἀργᾶς* (Castelvetro) or *Οινώπας* (Holland). What little is known of Argas (see *Athen.* 131 B, 638 C) suggests that he was a bad poet rather than a writer of dithyrambs on low characters.

**48<sup>a</sup>16.** αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ διαφορῇ: the difference of objects presented is common to several kinds of poetry, but in tragedy and comedy especially the class of object is the distinguishing feature of the poetic form. The account of the central character of a tragedy given later in the *P.* (Ch. 13) is not altogether easy to reconcile with the basic requirement that it should be σπουδαῖος. It is worth observing that, although in Ch. 6 tragedy is defined as μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας, it is the characters that are here the differentia. Presumably a πρᾶξις σπουδαία is to be defined as a πρᾶξις σπουδαίων. Cf. 48<sup>b</sup>25: τὰς καλὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοιούτων.

As διαφορά has not been mentioned since l. 8 Casaubon's ταύτη or Kassel's αὐτῇ δὲ ταύτη is an improvement.

### CHAPTER 3

*The third differentia, the manner of mimesis (narrative, dramatic, or mixed) 48<sup>a</sup>19-28; followed by a digression on the Dorian claim to the invention of tragedy and comedy, 48<sup>a</sup>28-b3*

**48<sup>a</sup>19.** τούτων: sc. μιμήσεων; in view of 47<sup>a</sup>16 this is more likely than διαφορῶν (Vahlen), in spite of l. 24, below. In fact division by manner applies only to those forms which use λόγος.

ἕκαστα: the objects of imitation (cf. Ch. 2).

**48<sup>a</sup>20-24.** This is one of the most difficult passages in the *P.*, though the general drift of the meaning is clear. Plato (*Rep.* 392 D-394 D) draws a distinction between those forms in which the poet speaks in his own person (διήγησις, δι' ἀπαγγελίας) and those in which he speaks through his characters, i.e. between narrative and dramatic; but the dramatic form can be introduced into narrative, as it often was and is, giving the 'mixed' manner. In this part of the *Republic*, though not elsewhere, Plato adopts a particular meaning for the word μίμησις, the activity of the dramatic poet or of the narrative poet speaking through his characters, 'impersonation', a usage which seems to have affected A., though he did not generally adopt it (but see 60<sup>a</sup>9). As Plato explains himself with great care, actually putting part of *Iliad* i. 17-42 into narrative by way of illustration, it would seem that this distinction was unfamiliar. There is no reason to think that Plato denied that narrative was imitative in the wider sense of the word.

The first problem is the grouping of the clauses. As the text has come down to us we have a ὅτε μὲν followed not by ὅτε δέ but by ἢ three times. If we take the first ἢ as equivalent to ὅτε δέ (a usage not exactly paralleled, though we have ὅτε δέ following αἱ μὲν at 52<sup>b</sup>5), then we have three 'manners' of *mimesis* as follows:

(1) The mixed, the poet at one time narrating at another 'becoming something else', i.e. assuming the role of a character, as Homer does. (Apparently Homer used direct speech more, and narrative less, than other epic poets (cf. 60<sup>a</sup>7), which A. regards as one of the reasons for his manifest superiority.)

(2) With the poet maintaining unchanged the part of narrator. According to Plato this was characteristic of the dithyramb, but direct speech was certainly not excluded. Probably A. has no one form in mind.

(3) With the imitators acting and taking part throughout. (The syntax of this sentence will be considered later.) This is clearly the dramatic form, in which the poet never speaks in his own person.

On this interpretation, which is B.'s, we have three possible manners: mixed, narrative, dramatic. Commas are required after *ποιεῖ* and *μεταβάλλοντα*. This is very close to the passage of the *Republic* which is generally supposed to have inspired these distinctions.

Or it is possible to take the third *ἢ*, the one after *μεταβάλλοντα*, as equivalent to *ὅτε δέ*. Then we have two main divisions, the first of which, narrative, has two subdivisions. Thus:

- (1) with the poet narrating : either (a) becoming (at times) someone else, like Homer, or (b) maintaining the part of narrator unchanged ;
- (2) the dramatic manner as above.

Commas or dashes are placed after *ἀπαγγέλλοντα* and *μεταβάλλοντα*.

Most editors prefer the second interpretation. *ὅτε μὲν* suggests a single main alternative to follow. Given A.'s manner of writing it is not a serious objection that with *ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον* we have to understand that the poet sometimes speaks in his own person as well. Apparently A. does not distinguish between passages in which poets narrate and those in which they speak personally as in invoking the Muse or commenting on their story, e.g. *Il.* 23. 176.

**48<sup>a</sup>21.** *ἕτερόν τι*: the neuter is curious, but the objects of imitation were referred to in the neut. *τὰ αὐτά* in l. 20. 60<sup>a</sup>10 *εἰσάγει ἄνδρα ἢ γυναῖκα ἢ ἄλλο τι ἦθος* is perhaps relevant. Vahlen compares *Phys.* 247<sup>b</sup>18.

**48<sup>a</sup>22.** *ποιεῖ*: probably 'composes'. Cf. 58<sup>b</sup>8.

**48<sup>a</sup>23.** *ἢ πάντας . . . μιμουμένους†*: the construction of the whole sentence is complicated by its being acc. and infin. depending on *ἔστιν*. If we rewrite it with finite verbs, it runs *καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖται (ὁ μιμούμενος) ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλων, ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενος . . . ἢ ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλων, ἢ πάντες ὡς πράττοντες καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες (μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι).*

The change from sing. to plur. is noticeably awkward; behind it, as B. suggests, is probably the thought that, whereas a single poet or rhapsode recites, a number of actors perform. We have here the same ambiguity as was noted in the discussion of 48<sup>a</sup>1. Far-reaching implications are discovered by J. Jones in his *Aristotle and Greek Tragedy*, p. 59. It is all but inevitable that *ὡς τὸν αὐτόν* should be parallel to *ὡς πράττοντας* both from the build of the sentence and from the fact that the chapter is about *τὸ ὡς μιμῆσαι ἄν τις*. But so far as A.'s usage is concerned *ὡς πράττοντας* could well be the object of *μιμείσθαι* equivalent to *διὰ τῶν πραττόντων*, the medium of the dramatic poet. This would then be picked up by the *πράττοντας* of l. 27, below (where A could have written *ὡς πράττοντας*). If with most editors we retain *τοὺς μιμουμένους*, the obscurity is somewhat increased. Vahlen at one time proposed its excision and Butcher brackets it in his text. If it agrees with *πάντας πράττοντας* it is worse than superfluous. If it is the object of *μιμείσθαι* it has to be taken as an almost unique pass. = *ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων* 54<sup>a</sup>26: so Tyrwhitt, and cf. V. ad loc. The most acceptable expedient, if we wish to keep *τοὺς μ.* is to take it as subj. of *μιμείσθαι*, and *ὡς πράττοντας* as obj., with Casaubon's *πάντα* for *πάντας*.

48<sup>a</sup>25-28. *ὥστε τῇ μὲν . . . ἄμφω*: we have here two illustrious pairs, Homer and Sophocles, whose subjects are heroic characters, Sophocles and Aristophanes, whose medium is drama. Aristophanes is scarcely mentioned by A., who was no enthusiast for the Old Comedy with its *αἰσχρολογία*, 'obscene abuse' (EN 1128<sup>a</sup>22). He probably felt more admiration for Epicharmus, but the two Athenians make a better pair.

With this illustration of the *τριῶν διαφοραῖς* at l. 24 the first section of the work is rounded off (cf. 47<sup>a</sup>16). Our own way of dividing the arts is different, and the interest of A.'s system is largely historical. For us music has a separate existence in its own right, and the arts which combine music with words and dance, opera and ballet, belong to music. The distinction between grand and low personages as objects of representation has had little relevance to literary forms since Milton and the French Classical drama. The third distinction, between narrative and dramatic presentation, owes its significance to the conditions prevailing in the ancient world, where literature was something heard rather than read. Plato's *Ion* 535 C leaves no room for doubt about the dramatic quality of a recitation from Homer, and of the difference between Homer and an epic poet who provided no speeches in which the rhapsode could show his powers of impersonation. Comments in the scholia, such as that on Eur. *Alc.* 163: *μετέβη δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐξηγητικοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ μιμητικόν*, show that later

scholarship continued, whether or not out of mere pedantry, to recognize this distinction; cf. also *Vit. Aesch.* 19, and Dion. Hal., *Thuc.* 37 on the Melian Dialogue: καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου προσώπου δηλοῖ τὰ λεχθέντα ὑφ' ἑκατέρων. ἐπὶ μιᾶς δ' ἀποκρίσεως τοῦτο τὸ σχῆμα διατηρήσας, τὸ διηγηματικόν, προσωποποιεῖ τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα διάλογον καὶ δραματικόν; cf. also [Longinus] 27. 1 with D. A. Russell's note.

Today a not wholly dissimilar distinction arises in the study of the novelist's technique. 'Dickens's impulse is always to *present*, in dialogue and pantomime; instead of telling us *about*, he *shows* us': see Wellek and Warren, *Theory of Literature* (London, 1949), ch. xvi 'The Nature and Modes of Narrative Fiction'.

There is a certain artificiality in A.'s structure of forms; we have a number of media in each of which, and in certain combinations of which, three kinds of object can be imitated in two (or three) different manners. But of some of these possibilities there are no instances at all, for example, of manner in those media which lack λόγος, and others are represented by freak instances such as a dithyramb about a Cyclops.

**48<sup>a</sup>26 ὁ αὐτός:** a compressed expression for 'the same sort of'.

**48<sup>a</sup>28-b2.** A digression introduced, or suggested, by the Dorian associations of the word δρᾶν used synonymously with πράττειν and from the same root as δρᾶμα, 'drama'; this was the basis of a Dorian claim to have originated tragedy and comedy. A. expresses no opinion on this claim, but presumably thought it of some importance. On the original meaning of δρᾶν see B. Snell in *Philol. Supp.* 20. 1 (1928) and H. Schreckenberg, *Δρᾶμα* (Würzburg, 1960). The word was freely used in fifth-century Attic by both poets and prose writers, but some fourth-century orators avoided it.

Themistius, who cites A. as his authority on Thespis, states that tragedy was invented at Sicyon, *Or.* 27. 337 B. This too may come from A., but it is hardly proof that A. accepted the Dorian claim.

**48<sup>a</sup>29. αὐτά:** tragedy and comedy, as suggested by Sophocles and Aristophanes, who, rather than the neut. pl. αὐτά, are probably the subject of μιμῶνται; possibly οἱ μιμούμενοι is to be understood, as the names of the forms are older than the poets.

**48<sup>a</sup>31. ἐνταῦθα:** Megara next to Attica as opposed to M. Hyblaea north of Syracuse. The word suggests that the passage was written at Athens, and so before 348 B.C. or, more likely, after 335.

**48<sup>a</sup>32. δημοκρατίας:** following the overthrow of the tyrant Theagenes at a date which is very uncertain, usually taken to be early in the sixth century. While Attic Old Comedy could have existed only under a full democracy, there is no evidence whether Megarian comedy was of the kind which only a democracy would find



congenial: and it is questionable whether there could have been such a democracy in the period of Theagenes. Susarion, whom a dubious tradition made inventor of comedy and also claimed as Megarian, is not mentioned here. Megarian comedy of a later date is referred to in Aristoph. *Vesp.* 57 and in *EN* 1123<sup>a</sup>24.

**48<sup>a</sup>33.** Ἐπίχαρμος . . . Χιωνίδου καὶ Μάγνητος: the *Suda* gives the *flor.* of Chionides as eight years before the Persian War, i.e. 488 B.C., and Magnes is known to have won his first victory at the Dionysia in 473/2. Both may have competed at the first official comic contest in 486 B.C. For the official list of comic poets see Pickard-Cambridge, *Festivals*, p. 114. Epicharmus is thought to have begun producing comedies (mainly non-choral) at Syracuse towards the end of the sixth century and to have died at a great age about 467 B.C. Accordingly 'much earlier' is a stronger expression than would seem justified.

It is extraordinary that Epicharmus, one of the most famous of ancient poets, should be described as ὁ ποιητής. These words at least are suspect. L. G. Breitholtz, *Die dorische Farce im gr. Mutterland* (Göteborg, 1960), is sceptical about the whole tradition of early Dorian comedy.

**48<sup>a</sup>35.** ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ: probably connected with Sicyon where, according to Herod. 5. 67, 'tragic choruses' performed in honour of the hero Adrastus early in the sixth century. These choruses would be pre-dramatic. Epigenes of Sicyon is mentioned in the *Suda* as a tragic poet after whom Thespis was either the second or the sixteenth in the list of tragic poets. Corinth, where Arion developed the dithyramb, was Dorian but doubtfully within the Peloponnese.

ὀνόματα: i.e. the words κώμη-δῆμος and δρᾶν-πράττειν.

**48<sup>a</sup>36.** κῶμας: the Dorian equivalent of the Attic demes, country districts. (The urban demes may have been an invention of Cleisthenes.) A. shows himself aware of the other (and true) derivation of comedy from κῶμος, the procession of revellers.

Various stories appear in late commentators connecting comedy with κῶμαι: see Kaibel, *Com. Gr. Frag.*, pp. 6, 11, 16. The version which A. has in mind is not extant.

A. reverts to the early history of tragedy and comedy in the course of his sketch of the development of poetry in the two following chapters: see especially 49<sup>a</sup>9-<sup>b</sup>9, where there is no mention of a Dorian contribution except for comedy. τὰ φαλλικά would be more easily associated with a κῶμος than with a κώμη.

**48<sup>b</sup>2.** περὶ μὲν οὖν . . .: the subject of classification is now finally dismissed. But before the main discussion begins it is necessary to trace the development of poetry in time and to show how the different forms emerged. How far this account is to be regarded as

a mainly logical scheme of development, and how far it is intended as a record of historical fact, is a difficult question.

A.'s scheme of mimetic arts is given in diagrammatic form by G., p. 108, and with some modification by Solmsen in *CQ* 29 (1935), 196.

#### CHAPTER 4

*The origins of poetry, the division into forms, and the development of tragedy.*

**48<sup>b</sup>4–24.** *The two causes of poetry.*

**48<sup>b</sup>4.** **εἰκασί:** B.'s rendering 'it is clear that . . .' is rather strong for a hypothesis; the word is used to avoid dogmatism. Cf. *EN* 1096<sup>b</sup>5: *πιθανώτερον δ' εἰκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ*, where 'seem' is the natural English.

**γενῆσαι:** 'produce', used of the invention of dancing (*Pl. Laws* 673 D).

**ὅλως:** either 'in general', allowing for other incidental or subordinate causes such as, G. suggests, divine inspiration, or, more likely, 'as a whole', contrasted with the particular causes leading to the growth of the various species; so E.

**αἰτίαι δύο:** the pleasure in imitating and the pleasure in imitations performed by others; or pleasure in imitation and the instinct for melody and rhythm (see on l. 22, below).

**48<sup>b</sup>5.** **φυσικαί:** as an integral part of human nature, repeated in *σύμφυτον* (*ἔστιν*). S. sees here a denial of theories of divine inspiration. Anyway the traditional *πρῶτος εὐρετής* is conspicuously absent from this account, as is any attempt to enlarge on the relationship between the artist's *mimesis* and the poet's.

**48<sup>b</sup>7.** **μιμητικώτατον:** the neighbouring *ζῶων* has suggested *ζῶον* with which *μιμητικώτατον* is made to agree instead of with *ἄνθρωποι*. Cf. *Prob.* 956<sup>a</sup>14: *ἢ ὅτι μιμητικώτατον* (sc. *ἄνθρωπος*); *μανθάνει γὰρ δύναται διὰ τοῦτο*.

**48<sup>b</sup>8.** **καί:** this carries on the const. of *σύμφυτον*.

It is characteristic of man not only to imitate but to take pleasure in the imitations performed by others. Were it not so, we might have poets but no readers of poetry.

**48<sup>b</sup>10.** **ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων:** 'in practice', cf. *EN* 1131<sup>b</sup>18, rather than 'in the case of works of art'. But at 62<sup>a</sup>18 it means 'when plays are performed'. G. seeks to save consistency by reading *ἐκ τῶν ἔργων* there.

**48<sup>b</sup>11.** **μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας:** in the extreme case of *ἀκρίβεια* viewers are persuaded that they see not a representation but the reality, as with Plato's carpenter (*Rep.* 598 C). In A. *ἀπάτη* with reference to the arts is conspicuously absent: cf. Appendix I.

**48<sup>b</sup>12.** ἀτιμοτάτων: cf. ζώοις καὶ μεγάλοις καὶ μικροῖς καὶ τιμίους καὶ ἀτιμοτέροις *De An.* 404<sup>b</sup>4, and *Part. An.* 645<sup>a</sup>15

On the other hand, if we enjoy a representation because the *μορφή* of the object as represented is pleasing we shall be pleased by the object itself (*Pol.* 1340<sup>a</sup>25).

Most ancient painting and sculpture (*εἰκόνας* covers both) was of mythical subjects, among which corpses would appear from time to time, e.g. the children of Heracles or Niobe; the lowest animals, one would have thought, less often, as Circe's swine or a hydra.

The difficulty of recognition in the case of τῶν ἀρχαίων γραφῶν is mentioned at *Top.* 140<sup>a</sup>21.

**48<sup>b</sup>13.** καὶ τούτου: we have had the proof that it is so, σημείον τούτου l. 9; we now have the reason for it.

A. nowhere attempts to analyse the difference between the reactions of a man viewing a representation and of the same man viewing the original, and so ignores a basic problem of criticism—unless, which is not very likely, it formed part of his explanation of *katharsis*. According to *De An.* 427<sup>b</sup>21–24 a representation arouses a feebler emotion than the original.

μανθάνειν . . . ἡδιστον: cf. *Pl. Rep.* 475 D, *A. Met.* 980<sup>a</sup>22. The same explanation of the same paradoxical fact, that we enjoy looking at representations of things in themselves unpleasing, is given at *R.* 1371<sup>b</sup>4: ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι οἷον τὸ τε μιμητικόν, ὥσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιητικὴ, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημένον ᾖ, κἂν ᾗ μὴ ἡδὺ αὐτὸ τὸ μεμιμημένον οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμὸς ἐστὶν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μανθάνειν τι συμβαίνει. The explanation is inadequate. When we have learnt what already familiar thing a picture represents we have not learnt much. συλλογίζεσθαι l. 16 is somewhat nearer the mark. We have the intellectual pleasure of solving a puzzle, as in the simple delight of the Chorus in the *parodos* of *Eur. Ion* when they recognize the subjects of the (?)reliefs at Delphi. Plutarch has a highly confused discussion of this problem in his *De Aud. Poet.*, *M.* 18 A–D. This same idea is introduced far more plausibly at *R.* 1410<sup>b</sup>10 in connexion with metaphor and simile, where the moment of illumination which comes from recognition of a not wholly obvious resemblance is well observed. It has no relevance to the aesthetic enjoyment of a picture.

*M.* states (pp. 35 and 204) that συλλογίζεσθαι here and at 55<sup>a</sup>7, 10 means 'infer by syllogistic reasoning', at 61<sup>b</sup>2 no more than 'consider', and that the last occurrence is earlier than the invention of the syllogism. While it is true that we have two meanings 'consider' and 'infer', there is nothing in the latter which goes beyond the common significance of the word in Plato.

The principle *μανθάνειν ἡδύ* has a bearing on the enjoyment of literature. One of the many elements present in the impulse to undergo the painful experience of seeing a tragedy is probably the desire for knowledge, knowledge of the behaviour of human beings in extreme conditions. But there is nowhere any indication that A. means this. In prose fiction this element, though not of the first importance, is more pervasive. It has commonly been regarded as a merit, however aesthetically irrelevant, if a novel gives us a vivid picture of life in other times or places or in an unfamiliar milieu. Further, if poetry has the universal quality ascribed to it in Ch. 9, it should reveal to us the significance of particular experiences, so that we should learn from literature a fuller comprehension of the nature of life itself. But there is nowhere any hint that A. intends by the pleasure of learning anything of this sort.

**48<sup>b</sup>17. οὗτος ἐκεῖνος:** the masc. is strange after *τί ἕκαστον*; cf. 48<sup>a</sup>21 for the opposite switch. Both the passages from the *R.* cited on l. 13 above have *τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο* (which is G.'s reading here) in the corresponding place, and so Aristoph. *Ran.* 1342, 'so that is what the dream meant'. As portraiture had little place in A.'s world, the figure recognized must in most cases have been a mythological one, but Alexander, for instance, might be picked out in a battle piece. The *εἰκονόγραφος* of 54<sup>b</sup>9 is a portrait-painter.

E. has a suggestion which would give a more real meaning to *μανθάνειν*. The spectator is at a zoology lecture and learns from a picture or diagram to what genus an animal belongs, 'that is a so-and-so'. But the mention of philosophers in l. 13 is not enough to conjure up a lecture-room, and it does not suit the passages from the *R.* R. G. C. Levens objected, *JHS* 81 (1961), 190, that *τοιούτος* would be needed.

*ἐπεὶ ἂν μὴ τύχη* . . . : this reads like an afterthought; if the subject of a picture is not at least partly familiar, there can be no recognition, and pleasure in the workmanship seems a lame alternative, but the same pleasure in craftsmanship is recognized at *Part. An.* 645<sup>a</sup>10 (cf. Plut. *M.* 673 D-4 D), which is as near as A. gets to admitting an aesthetic pleasure. It should be remembered that the visual arts are not A.'s prime concern; they are brought in merely to illustrate a basic impulse, which led gradually to the development of poetry as we know it. Pl. *Laws* 668 D, E speaks of the impossibility of judging a picture of a kind of animal one has not seen.

**48<sup>b</sup>20. κατὰ φύσιν:** cf. *φυσικαί, σύμφυτον* above. It has already been implied by the examples of the distribution of media among the arts that harmony cannot exist without rhythm, so they form a natural pair. The possession of these instincts for rhythm and harmony distinguishes men from animals according to Pl. *Laws* 653 E. They are manifest in children from birth (*Probl.* 920<sup>b</sup>30).

48<sup>b</sup>21. **μόρια**: 'sections'. Lines of dactyls, iambs, or trochees are thought of as pieces cut off from a continuous rhythmic strip; cf. *R.* 1408<sup>b</sup>29: *ῥυθμός, οὐδὲ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τμητὰ (τμήματα, B.). μέτρον* often means 'metre' in the abstract, and we have had it as *λόγος μετὰ μέτρου*; either will do here.

48<sup>b</sup>22. **κατὰ μικρόν . . .**: the *αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων*, 'improvisations', came first; men gradually developed them (*προάγοντες*) until they reached a stage when they became fit to be described as belonging to an art. Though there is no reference to it, this is not incompatible with the view attributed to Democritus that *μουσική* is the product of superfluity (Philodemus, *De Mus.* 31; see Koller, *Mimesis* (Berne, 1954), pp. 146, 151). The slowness of development might well be due to lack of leisure in a struggling community.

A major problem of the *P.* is whether (*a*) the two causes are the natural tendency to imitate and the natural pleasure in imitations, or (*b*) the tendency to imitation is one cause with two subdivisions, and the other cause is the instinct for rhythm and melody. (*a*) is favoured by the phrasing of the passage into which rhythm and melody are introduced late and unemphatically as though of subordinate importance. It can also be argued that *A.* treats the plastic arts and poetry as similar forms of imitation, and that rhythm and melody have no connexion with the plastic arts and are therefore excluded as a main cause. (It is true that *ῥυθμός* was sometimes applied to objects devoid of motion or repetition, e.g. a shield (*Xen. Mem.* 3. 10. 10) which is *εὐρυθμος* if it fits. As Wolf says (see 47<sup>a</sup>22 n.), *ῥυθμός* is here equivalent to *σχῆμα*, as it is at *Met.* 985<sup>b</sup>15. Later the critical use of the term seems to have been extended; Aristides Quintilianus (? third century A.D.) 1. 13, says that *ῥυθμός* is used in three connexions, one of which is *ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκινήτων σωμαμάτων, ὡς περ φάμεν εὐρυθμον ἀνδριάντα.*) Again, the essentials of imitation can be effected through the medium of prose to which rhythm is not indispensable. Alternative (*a*) is accepted by B., R., and S.

In favour of (*b*), the more likely, it can be argued that it is in accord with common sense; that *ἐγέννησαν* in l. 23 resumes the *γεννήσαι* of l. 4, giving *A.*'s final statement of his view, and that *αὐτά* in l. 22, whether we read *πρὸς αὐτά* (cf. *τῷ εὐφυῆς εἶναι πρὸς αὐτήν* sc. *ιατρικὴν Met.* 1003<sup>b</sup>3), or make it the object of *προάγοντες*, must refer to *τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ* of ll. 20, 21, and that all three must therefore be concerned with the origin of poetry, the tendency to imitation being one cause and the instinct for melody and rhythm the second. This is the view of G., M., and E., and of Tyrwhitt and Vahlen among the older critics. The delayed mention of *ῥυθμός* becomes easier if we regard 48<sup>b</sup>12-19 as a parenthesis; M. and E. agree that it is.

It is possible to make a guess about the way in which A. reached his conclusions on this subject. Literature in its most highly developed form, tragedy, is the imitation of an action in a form using rhythm and melody. Both these elements can plausibly be traced back to very simple beginnings. Man has perhaps had some sort of song and dance as long as he has been man. A. did not know how long ago men had begun to paint animals on the sides of their caves (not that this practice is to be accounted for by purely mimetic tendencies) but he rightly inferred from the habits of children that the instinct is fundamental. However, he was not altogether happy in combining the two ideas. It is far from clear that the urge to expression present in the primitive dance has anything to do with the visual arts, though both may have roots in magic. One may suspect that both Plato and A. were ill served by a theory of *mimesis* which could be applied indifferently to painting and poetry. As used in the discussion of music in the *Politics* the conception of *mimesis* is much less inadequate; it means there something very close to 'expression'. But references to accurate (*ἡκριβωμένως*) drawings of animals serve only to darken counsel.

**48<sup>b</sup>24–49<sup>a</sup>6.** *The poetry of σπουδαῖοι and φαῦλοι, hymn-epic-tragedy and lampoon-comedy.*

**48<sup>b</sup>24.** *διεσπάσθη δέ:* δέ corresponds to μὲν ὅλως at 48<sup>b</sup>4. This is the first stage after the *γένεσις* of poetry out of improvisations; poetry was split into two streams according to the characters of the poets. In spite of Finsler, *Platon und die A. Poetik* (Leipzig, 1900), p. 198, and E., it is hard to believe that the ἦθος is that of the poetry rather than of its writers (and at 49<sup>a</sup>4), though it is quite true that we here revert to the idea explained in Ch. 2, the classification of poetry according to the objects of *mimesis*, and this is, strictly speaking, a classification of poems not of poets; cf. *κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν* 49<sup>a</sup>3.

**48<sup>b</sup>25–26.** *καλῶς:* clearly indistinguishable from *σπουδαίους* 48<sup>a</sup>2.

*σεμνός* and *εὐτελής* also mean the same in this context as *σπουδαίος* and *φαῦλος* respectively. *σεμνός* may have particularly appropriate associations. Cf. *τὸ σεμνὸν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν* (R. 1406<sup>b</sup>7), *μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς (λέγειν)* (R. 1408<sup>a</sup>13), and ironic *ἢ σεμνή αὐτὴ καὶ θαυμαστή, ἢ τῆς τραγωδίας ποίησις* (Pl. *Gorg.* 502 B).

*πράξεις* see note on 49<sup>b</sup>24.

**48<sup>b</sup>27.** *ψόγους:* songs or poems of abuse balancing ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια, poems in praise of gods and men respectively. A. has nothing to say of the mature forms of hymn and encomium as written, for instance, by Pindar. (The only Pindar mentioned in the *P.* is an actor.)

**48<sup>b</sup>28.** *πρὸ Ὁμήρου:* a number of poems of a religious and ritual nature were attributed to poets supposed to be older than Homer,

e.g. Orpheus, Musaeus, Olen. A. was, at the least, doubtful of their authenticity (*Hist. An.* 563<sup>a</sup>18, *Gen. An.* 734<sup>a</sup>19).

**τοιούτων**: this should refer to the several kinds of poem mentioned in the previous sentence, but it is clear from what follows that A. is thinking only of *ψόγοι*; there is no further mention of the serious sort of poetry until l. 33. It is astonishing that in a passage of this sort Homer should first be mentioned in connexion with the *Margites* and comedy. It is possible that *ψόγοι* are mentioned here because A. did not wish to exclude the possibility that the supposedly pre-Homeric *ὑμνοι* were authentic.

**48<sup>b</sup>30. ὁ Μαργίτης**: this was a burlesque epic about the ludicrous adventures of a 'dumb' hero who *πολλ' ἠπίστατο ἔργα κακῶς δ' ἠπίστατο πάντα*. It is again cited by A. as Homer's at *EN* 1141<sup>a</sup>14, on which the commentator Eustratius (c. A.D. 1050-1120) observes: *πράγει . . . καὶ τινα ποιήσιν Μαργίτην ὀνομαζομένην Ὀμήρου. μνημονεύει δ' αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς Α. ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ Ποιητικῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος καὶ Κρατῖνος καὶ Καλλίμαχος . . . καὶ μαρτυροῦσιν εἶναι Ὀμήρου τὸ ποίημα.*

As the *floruit* of Archilochus was about 650 B.C., which is earlier than the generally received date of the *Margites*, the reference should probably be to the *Ἀρχίλοχοι* of Cratinus: see Radermacher in *RE* 14. 1707. The metre was hexameter irregularly interspersed with iambics, as exemplified by *POxy.* xxii (1959), 2309.

**καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα**: there were other burlesque epics, one of which, the *Batrachomyomachia*, survives in a late form. It has no resemblance to a *ψόγος*.

**ἐν οἷς**: in spite of the nearness of *τὰ τοιαῦτα* the reference is to the *ψόγοι*: cf. 59<sup>b</sup>12 for the position of the relative. It is to lampoons that the iambic metre was appropriate, while the *Margites* was not a true *ψόγος*, being akin to comedy (48<sup>b</sup>38). R., however, disagrees; as no *ψόγοι* survived, their metre was unknown. Probably A. assumed that the metre developed during the period of indefinite duration when *ψόγοι* were being composed. The oldest surviving iambics would be for A. those in the *Margites*, but it is not suggested that Homer invented the metre. Though not all *ψόγοι* need have been in iambics, *ἰαμβοὶ* and *ψόγοι* in this passage are not to be distinguished.

**48<sup>b</sup>31. ἤλθε**: 'turned up': cf. *παραφανείσης* at 49<sup>a</sup>2.

**μέτρον**: A. derived 'iambic' from *ἰαμβίζω* = *λοιδορῶ*; it should be the other way round. As the natural metre for abuse it came *κατὰ τὸ ἀρμόττον* and, though it had long ceased to be restricted to this use, the name remained. (The metre is always *ἰαμβεῖον*; *ἰαμβικός* means 'abusive', and *ἰαμβος* can include abusive lines in trochaic tetrameters (*R.* 1418<sup>b</sup>28); see K. J. Dover, *Entretiens Fondation Hardt*, 10 (1963), p. 186.)

**48<sup>b</sup>32. ἰάμβιζον ἀλλήλους**: this implies abusive exchanges of a ritual

nature such as we know to have been common in many societies: cf. Herod. 5. 83. 3, and LSJ s.v. *γεφυρίζω*. This piece of information does not seem much at home in its context. For another derivation, from Iambe, see Hom., *H. Dem.* 195–204.

**48<sup>b</sup>33. τῶν παλαιῶν:** at 53<sup>b</sup>27 *οἱ παλαιοί* are extant poets; here logical sequence rather than chronology is the subject. There was a long period when these were the two forms of poetry practised, epic and iambic. Archilochus is not mentioned as *the* iambic poet, but his name is to be supplied mentally. Transitions from an earlier to a later form, e.g. from hymn to epic, are not under consideration.

**48<sup>b</sup>34–38. ὥσπερ . . . δραματοποιήσας:** the genius of Homer transcends ordinary limitations, and he embraces both *σπουδαίους* and *φαύλους*. Actually tragic poets also wrote satyr-plays, though never comedies; cf. Pl. *Symp.* 223 D.

*τὰ σπουδαῖα . . . ποιητής:* cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 3. 3. 39: *ἐπιστήμονες τὰ προσήκοντα.*

**48<sup>b</sup>35. δραματικός:** the distinction between narrative and impersonation was made in Ch. 3, and Homer was praised for his use of impersonation, but in view of *δραματοποιήσας* below it must mean more than this, as at 59<sup>a</sup>19, both more unified in structure and more generalized in significance. Thus Homer developed the forms in the direction of tragedy and comedy, but epic and iambic long continued to be the main forms. That *ᾠμοὶ* and other lyric poetry continued to be composed in the post-Homeric period is probably implied by 49<sup>a</sup>10–14.

**48<sup>b</sup>36. σχῆμα . . . ὑπέδειξεν:** Homer indicated the outlines of the emerging form of comedy. *σχῆμα* (cf. 49<sup>a</sup>6 and 49<sup>b</sup>3) implies the structure, the 'set-up', of comedy, hardly to be distinguished from *εἶδος*. But it is excessively difficult to believe that the *Margites* approached comic form in any respect other than the use of direct speech. Conceivably the episodes in which the hero was involved may have had something in common with incidents in the Dorian comedy of Epicharmus, who is no doubt the next in the line of development. In the terms of Ch. 9 *Margites* would mark an advance as being a more universal, i.e. typical, figure than the object of lampoon.

**48<sup>b</sup>37. ψόγον . . . γελοῖον:** the difference is more fully indicated at 49<sup>a</sup>34–37. Whereas *ψόγος* is essentially vituperative, comedy displays the ridiculous without malevolence, though this is not always true of the Attic Old Comedy.

**48<sup>b</sup>38. ὁ γὰρ Μαργίτης . . .:** the kinship between Homer's epics and tragedy was widely recognized. Cf. Pl. *Theaet.* 152 E: *οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμωδίας μὲν Ἐπῆαρμος, τραγωδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος* and the passages cited by G., p. 109. The suggestion of a similar



relationship between the *Margites* and comedy was probably novel. Homer must have marked out the σχῆμα of tragedy too, but in this case the subject remained unchanged, τὸ σπουδαῖον.

49<sup>a</sup>2. παραφανείσης δὲ τῆς τραγωδίας: at one level the realization of the potential already present in poetry from the beginning is spoken of as a natural process, at another (49<sup>a</sup>15 ff.) innovations made on the initiative of individuals are regarded as an important part of this process.

49<sup>a</sup>4. οἰκείαν: see on 48<sup>b</sup>24.

κωμωδοποιόι . . . τραγωδοδιδάσκαλοι: there seems no reason for this elegant variation. διδάσκειν means to produce a play, and A. uses κωμωδοδιδάσκαλοι (EE 1230<sup>b</sup>19), without any difference in meaning. The transition ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τραγωδοδιδάσκαλοι is consistent with 49<sup>a</sup>19–25 only if epic poets took over tragedy ready-made.

49<sup>a</sup>6. μείζω καὶ ἐντιμότερα: 'grander and more estimable'. The superiority of tragedy to epic as a form is explained in Ch. 26. But it was only at 'a late stage', l. 20, that tragedy became σεμνός and οἱ σπουδαῖοι then abandoned epic for tragedy.

*This concludes the scheme of the development of the various poetic forms, which is followed by a fuller discussion of tragedy and comedy.*

The confused impression which is left by this middle section of Ch. 4 is due partly to compression, partly to the introduction of Homer, an historical figure, into what seems to be an account of logical rather than of historical development, and to the attempt to connect him with comedy as well as tragedy. Arising out of improvisations we have the two sequences, hymns and encomia—epic—tragedy, and lampoons—comedy; symmetry could be improved by inserting iambic poetry between lampoons and comedy, making three of each; but though the original lampoons may not have been in iambs, ψόγοι and ἰαμβοὶ are essentially the same. The effect of Homer's genius was to bring both existing forms nearer to the ultimate goal. This is easily understood as regards epic, but it is hard to believe that the *Margites* had much in common with a ψόγος. No doubt, as being more humane than a ψόγος and less concerned with the foibles of a particular individual, it bore some resemblance to later comedy. After Homer, epic (which would include Hesiod) and iambic poetry continued to be written much as before, but meantime new forms were developing to the point where Epicharmus could turn to comedy and Thespis followed by Aeschylus to tragedy. It is not suggested that tragedy developed from epic, only that it was its spiritual successor. According to what follows tragedy in fact developed from performances which were mainly ludicrous, 49<sup>a</sup>19.

We now turn to tragedy and comedy, which are considered together in their most rudimentary stage, 49<sup>a</sup>9–14; thereafter tragedy

is the subject for the remainder of Ch. 4, 49<sup>a</sup>14-31, and comedy for the first half of Ch. 5, 49<sup>a</sup>32-<sup>b</sup>9.

**49<sup>a</sup>7-9.** A. first asks whether the development is complete. ἄλλος λόγος implies that he will return to the subject, but we do not know that he ever did. He appears in fact to answer his question in the affirmative a few lines later, 49<sup>a</sup>15, but see note ad loc.

**49<sup>a</sup>8.** εἶδεσιν: usually taken as 'constituent elements' = μέρη (cf. 50<sup>a</sup>13 and 56<sup>a</sup>33), but in neither case is the text beyond doubt. B. declares this use unexampled except in Plato. G. says that it means the same as σχήματα. It could also refer to 'types' of tragedy (cf. 55<sup>b</sup>32, 59<sup>b</sup>8). The question is whether further development is possible. Further development of the μέρη seems excluded by 49<sup>a</sup>15. E. makes εἶδεσιν depend on ἰκανῶς; cf. *Pol.* 1318<sup>b</sup>25: ἰκανῶς ἔχει τοῖς πολλοῖς, meaning 'is adequate to the basic form'.

πρὸς τὰ θεάτρα: the natural realization by tragedy of its potentialities might be impeded by accidental factors like the requirements of dramatic festivals—as it might be by dinner and licensing hours; cf. 51<sup>a</sup>6, the length of plays is governed by festival arrangements. The quality of the audience too might be relevant; cf. Plato on their θεατροκρατία (*Laws* 659 B, 701 A).

**49<sup>a</sup>9-31.** *Origin and development of tragedy.* Every phrase in this passage has been the subject of controversy. For a general account of the subject the reader is referred to A. W. Pickard-Cambridge's *Dithyramb, Tragedy, and Comedy*. Recent work on the subject is summarized in *Fifty years of Classical Scholarship*, ed. Platnauer (Oxford, 1955), (that on tragedy by Professor Webster, on comedy by Professor Dover), and more recently by Professor A. Lesky, *Die Trag. Dichtung der Hellenen*<sup>2</sup> (Göttingen, 1964). A full historical survey of the controversy is given by C. del Grande in *ΤΡΑΓΩΔΙΑ*<sup>2</sup> (Naples, 1962). The latest studies are *Die Anfänge der gr. Trag.* by H. Patzer (Wiesbaden, 1962), and *The Origin and Early Form of Gk. Trag.* by G. F. Else (Harvard and London, 1966).

The main point at issue is whether A. is writing from knowledge of a genuine tradition or propounding a scheme based on his own guesses and inferences. A. lived some two centuries after the establishment of the tragic contests. The official records, which he used for his *Didascaliae*, began about 501 B.C., and it is unlikely that any earlier evidence of comparable quality was available. No doubt some information based on tradition was preserved by fifth-century writers, information like that given by Herodotus about the 'tragic' choruses at Sicyon in the early sixth century. A Glaucus of Rhegium, who is quoted in the Argument to the *Persae*, wrote *Περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων Ποιητῶν καὶ Μουσικῶν* probably about 415 B.C., and some facts of literary history were preserved by the Atthidographers, of whom the

earliest was Hellanicus of about the same date. It is extremely doubtful whether A. possessed any detailed information about the development of tragedy before its introduction at the Dionysia in or around 534 B.C.

On the other hand, and this is sometimes forgotten, A. had access to an immense amount of literature which is lost to us; he knew virtually all Aeschylus and some of Phrynichus, though probably nothing of Thespis; also he was doubtless much better supplied than we are with early satyr-plays. Thus he was in a good position to extrapolate backwards from mature through early tragedy to whatever preceded tragedy; and if it appeared to him that the answer was some form of choral lyric, this must carry great weight. It is uncertain how much of early dithyramb survived; Arion was the key figure here, but as no quotation from his works remains, it is likely that they were early lost.

Finally, it is worth observing that A.'s account of the origin of tragedy from a basically ludicrous form fits so badly with the scheme of development presented in the first part of the chapter that he would not have been likely to offer it unless he had been reasonably confident that it was true. Here again it is important that he knew more than we do about the early satyr-play. But that he was ready to state inferences as facts is proved by 59<sup>b</sup>31 on the metre of epic.

49<sup>a</sup>9. ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς: this resumes from αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων 48<sup>b</sup>23, the stage of ὕμνοι and ψόγοι. Whether A. thought the primitive dithyramb was pre-Homeric we cannot tell.

49<sup>a</sup>11. τῶν ἐξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον: one would suppose that the dithyramb is a form of ὕμνος and belongs, in contrast to the phallic songs, to the poetry of the σπουδαῖοι; but there are difficulties. The dithyramb is the original song of Dionysus, for its development see below. Originally, or at an early stage in its development, the dithyrambic singers would be led by an *exarchon*; cf. the chorus of mourners in *Il.* 24. 720. Archilochus (primarily an iambic poet) claims (fr. 77) 'I know how to lead off the fair song of the lord Dionysus, the dithyramb, when my wits are blasted with wine'.

ὡς Διωνύσοι' ἀνακτος καλὸν ἐξάρξαι μέλος  
οἶδα διθύραμβον, οἴνω ξυγκεραυνωθεῖς φρένας.

This must mean more than that he knew the words, rather that he knew how to improvise, or to sing new words which appeared to be improvised on the spot, while the chorus answered with a traditional refrain. There is no doubt that this is how the word was used by A.'s contemporary, Heracleides of Cumae, (ap. Athen. 145D): καὶ ψάλλουσιν αἱ παλλακαὶ αὐτῷ (sc. βασιλεῖ) καὶ μία μὲν ἐξάρχει, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ἀθρόως ᾄδουσι. The *exarchon* is separate from the chorus, though still

attached to it; thus he is the first stage in the development towards an independent actor.

**ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ φαλλικά (ἐξάρχοντων):** the phallus was conspicuous in the cult of Dionysus. At the *komos* (48<sup>a</sup>37), which was part of the Dionysia, *phalloi* were contributed by Athenian settlers overseas, *IG* i<sup>2</sup> 46, cf. *Plut. M.* 527 D. The accompanying songs were full of the *αἰσχρολογία* appropriate to a fertility ritual. In *Aristoph. Ach.* 241–79 Dicaeopolis celebrates his own Dionysia including a phallic procession and song. Sicyon had its *φαλλοφόροι* and other towns had similar bodies; cf. *Athen.* 621 D–622 D, and 445 A where he speaks of an Antheus of Lindos who composed songs ἃ ἐξῆρχε τοῖς μεθ' αὐτοῦ φαλλοφοροῦσιν. The word *ψόγος* would cover a good deal of the operations of such bodies, but A. does not seem to have been aware of the connexion of cult and ritual with early art. It is to be remembered that the chorus of Attic comedy, unlike the actors, did not wear the phallus.

**ὁ ἐξάρχων** is properly a pr. part. and was so used in the ancient world. The noun *ἐξάρχος* is attested in *Homer, Il.* 24. 721, for the leader of a chorus of mourners, and in *Eur. Bacc.* 140 and *Demos.* 18. 260 for one of 'enthusiastic' celebrants not far removed from the early singers of the dithyramb.

**49<sup>a</sup>12. ἔτι καὶ νῦν:** as opposed to the dithyramb which was completely changed from its original form; cf. *Prob.* 918<sup>b</sup>19.

**49<sup>a</sup>14. φανερόν:** cf. *παραφανείσης* 49<sup>a</sup>2. The development of rhetoric is described almost in the same terms, *Soph. El.* 183<sup>b</sup>17–32.

**μεταβολάς:** the only hint as to the nature of the changes which filled the long gap between primitive dithyramb and the invention by Aeschylus of the second actor, l. 16 below, is given in ll. 19–28. To this we can add Thespis' introduction of the first actor, see l. 16 n. Between Archilochus and Thespis a real contribution was made at Corinth c. 600 by Arion, who gave the dithyramb its literary form. This is implied by *Herod.* 1. 23, and A. appears to accept this (*fr.* 677). The further statement in the *Suda* that Arion invented the *τραγικὸς τρόπος* and introduced speaking satyrs may be derived ultimately from A. himself, in the latter case from a misunderstanding of his words, since speech cannot be earlier than Thespis on A.'s hypothesis. The *τραγικὸς τρόπος* probably refers to the style of music. At all events the important and perplexing passage, *Herod.* 5. 67, which tells of the *τραγικοί χοροί* at Sicyon, originally in honour of Adrastus and transferred by Cleisthenes to Dionysus in the early sixth century, shows that a form described as *τραγικός* had long been in existence. For this reason the reference to tragedy as the invention of Arion, said to have been contained in Solon's elegies (*Ioannes Diaconus, Comm. in Hermogenem*, Rabe in *Rh. Mus.* 63

(1908), 150), need not refer to anything dramatic. The whole problem is complicated by the uncertain relation of satyrs to dithyramb: see below.

**49<sup>a</sup>15.** ἐπαύσατο, . . . φύσιν: the tragic form, like an organic growth, develops until it reaches its τέλος, when its potentiality is fully realized; cf. *Ph.* 193<sup>a</sup>36. This seems to imply that there was no important change later than the early plays of Sophocles, and that no further development is to be looked for. Vahlen and G. argue that 49<sup>a</sup>7 εἰ ἄρα ἔχει ἤδη ἡ τραγωδία τοῖς εἶδεσιν ἰκανῶς is sufficient to prove the contrary. On the other side, and more convincingly, S. cites *Pol.* 1252<sup>b</sup>32-34: οἶον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου.

**49<sup>a</sup>16.** ὑποκριτῶν: 'actors'; it has long been disputed whether the actor was called a ὑποκριτής because he answered, or because he interpreted and expounded. The first is plausible because it may have been an original function of the actor to answer the questions of the chorus-leader about what was happening off-stage. But one of the actor's main tasks was to speak the prologue (see next note), and then he was answering no one. Hence G. renders ὑποκριτής 'speaker', a meaning for which there is no warrant elsewhere. E. keeps the sense of answerer, but denies the title to the first actor, who was originally the poet himself. The second actor might reasonably be called the answerer of the first, but then we encounter difficulties about the number of actors. B. adopts the meaning 'interpreter' in the sense that the actor is the poet's spokesman, but the poet needed no spokesman so long as he was himself the actor, and the word probably goes back to this period; cf. Pindar fr. 140<sup>b</sup> (Snell), 125 (Bowra), and Page in *CR* N.S. 6 (1956), 191. While certainty is impossible the most satisfactory suggestion is that the actor expounds the situation to chorus and audience, especially in the prologue, the speaking of which was one of his earliest functions; see A. Lesky in *Studi in onore U.E. Paoli* (Florence, 1955), p. 469.

πλήθος: as at 28 below it means no more than ἀριθμός. It is strange that the invention of the first actor, or the transformation of the *exarchon* into an actor, is not mentioned. It appears that A. accepted the tradition that this was due to Thespis; cf. Themistius, *Or.* 26, 316 D: οὐ προσέχομεν Α. ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὁ χορὸς εἰσιὼν ἦδεν εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς, Θέσπις δὲ πρόλογόν τε καὶ ῥῆσιν ἐξεύρεν, Αἰσχύλος δὲ τρίτον ὑποκριτὴν . . . (this frag. is rejected, without much reason, by Rose, *A. Pseudepigraphus*, p. 79). A. may well have thought the introduction of the second actor even more important. The chorus is only rarely so far a corporate person that it can engage in genuine conflict, as does the Chorus of the *Supplices* with Pelasgus and the Egyptian Herald. For the confrontation of Clytemnestra by

Agamemnon or Orestes actors are essential. It was the introduction of the second actor that opened the way for true drama.

**49<sup>a</sup>17.** τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἡλάττωσε: no example of a single-actor play has survived, but the chorus would obviously be dominant, as it is in the *Supplikes*, the play in which it comes nearest to being an actor, even more than in the *Eumenides*.

τὸν λόγον: the part spoken and not sung.

Did Aeschylus, in addition to making the chorus less important, reduce its size? The dithyrambic chorus numbered 50, and according to Pollux, 4. 110 the tragic chorus was composed of the same number down to the *Eumenides* (458 B.C.). That Aeschylus used a chorus of 50, at least in his early period, was believed by many when it was still accepted that the *Supplikes*, with its two sets of 50 cousins, was an early play; but with the dating of the *Supplikes* about 463 B.C. the theory has lost favour, though still maintained by A. Fitton Brown, (*CRN.S.* 7 (1957), 1). The statement in the 'Life' of Sophocles, 4, that he raised the number of *choreutae* from 12 to 15 receives some support from the twelve couplets spoken by the Chorus at *Ag.* 1348-71. There is no external evidence, apart from Pollux's assertion, that the tragic chorus originally consisted of more than 12.

**49<sup>a</sup>18.** πρωταγωνιστεῖν: the leading actor is called an ἀγωνιστής as taking part in the ἀγών. Pickard-Cambridge, *Festivals*, pp. 133-6, is probably right in taking it as a general term for 'playing first fiddle' sometimes applied metaphorically to an actor; this is not a normal use until late (cf. *Pol.* 1338<sup>b</sup>30). With the reading πρωταγωνιστήν the metaphor becomes more violent and the constr. dubious: see R. Kassel in *Rh. Mus.* 105 (1962), 117-19.

τρεῖς δὲ . . . : these are jottings rather than continuous prose; there is no suitable verb to supply from the previous sentence.

The introduction of the third actor was attributed by some to Aeschylus. The ancient 'Life' claims it for him but adds that Dicaearchus of Messene (a 'pupil' of A.) made Sophocles responsible. Aeschylus used three actors in the *Oresteia* of 458 B.C.; Sophocles first competed in 468. The confusion probably arose because the innovation took place during the period when both poets were active. Did A. mention both versions? Cf. Themistius quoted on l. 16, above.

σκηνογραφίαν: 'scene-painting', which made use of the newly discovered knowledge of perspective. According to Vitruvius 7, *praef.* 11, this was due to the painter Agatharchus, and the initiative came from Aeschylus. The 'Life' speaks of his attention to stage décor. On the whole the Greeks, like the Elizabethans, seem to have achieved their spectacular effects by splendid costumes rather than by elaborate scenery: cf. Webster, *Greek Theatre Production*, pp. 13 ff. See, on ὄψις, 49<sup>b</sup>33 n.

**49<sup>a</sup>19-31.** This passage contains some of the most indigestible matter in the *P.* The general intention seems to be as follows: *tragedy as it first developed from the dithyramb was rather trivial and in the style of the satyr-play. Only at a late stage did it acquire dignity, and one of the accompanying changes was that of metre from trochaic tetrameter to iambic trimeter; also the number of episodes, and so the length of the plays, was increased.* There are a number of incidental obscurities in this account and there are grave difficulties in reconciling the account with the few known facts. So long as it was widely accepted that τραγωδία meant 'song of goats' and that satyr-plays had goat-choruses the theory seemed to receive some confirmation, but it is now generally believed that the satyrs of the theatre were horse-rather than goat-men.

**49<sup>a</sup>19. μέγεθος:** like 'greatness' in English this can refer both to physical length and to grandeur of content; the same ambiguity extends to μικρῶν μύθων, 'short', or 'trivial'. γελοίας and σατυρικοῦ (l. 20) imply lack of dignity, ἐπεισοδίων πλήθη (l. 28), that the original plays were short.

**λέξεις:** covers both choice and use of words.

**49<sup>a</sup>20. ἐκ σατυρικοῦ:** this may mean that tragedy, in A.'s view, developed from the satyr-play. A connexion between the two forms is suggested by the fact that satyr-plays were produced in conjunction with tragedies. This is the only reference to the form by A., if reference it is. But in view of σατυρικὴν . . . ποίησιν at l. 22 it is more likely that a form akin to the satyr-play is intended, which could well use a 'ludicrous diction' and be associated with lively dancing, ὀρχηστικωτέραν (l. 23). The addition of satyrs to the dance is easily illustrated from vase-paintings (see end of next note).

The major difficulty is in combining this satyric stage of tragedy with its origin in the dithyramb and its subsequent development. The account here given implies that the dithyramb was a ludicrous form with a chorus of satyrs. The contrast with the phallic komos at 49<sup>a</sup>10 implies the opposite, and there is no evidence of anything satyric in what we know of the early dithyramb—which is not much. However, Webster thinks he has found evidence for a dithyramb danced by satyrs at the Panathenaea in a fragmentary vase-painting: see his revision of Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb*, pp. 34 and 96, and Plate 1 (a).

**ὀψέ:** 'late', with reference to what? Presumably to the beginning of tragedy, which cannot be placed much before the middle of the sixth century, if it was Thespis who introduced the first actor. The form must have been established some time before Peisistratus gave it official recognition at the Dionysia within a few years of 534 B.C. At *R.* 1403<sup>b</sup>23 ὀψέ means early in the career of Sophocles (when

the poet ceased to act in his own plays), at 1403<sup>b</sup>36, not long before the time of writing; at 49<sup>b</sup>2 *ὅμῃ ποτε* means 486 B.C., when comedy was officially recognized some fifty years later than tragedy. Tragedy appears to have received an access of grandeur, *ἀπασεμνύθη* (cf. *οἱ σεμνότεροι* 48<sup>b</sup>25), when, or soon after, Aeschylus began to compete. He is hailed in the *Frogs* 1004 as the creator of tragedy:

ἀλλ' ὦ πρῶτος τῶν Ἑλλήνων πυργώσας ῥήματα σεμνά  
καὶ κοσμήσας τραγικὸν λῆρον.

and the lines are quoted at the beginning of the 'Life', which implies that they had become part of the raw material for the history of tragedy. Cf. also Philostratus *Vit. Soph.* 9. No one suggested that he was literally the inventor, but he could be regarded by those with better evidence than we have as its second founder. Tragedy must have ceased to be satyric at latest by 492 B.C. (?) when Phrynichus' play on the capture of Miletus reduced the theatre to tears, seven or eight years after the first production of Aeschylus. This, if not obviously 'late', does not seem entirely out of scale with A.'s other uses of the word, but the time allowed for the changes is short.

According to a widely believed tradition the satyr-play proper with its chorus of men with horses' tails was introduced from Phlius near Corinth by Pratinas about 490 B.C. If A. accepted this, his use of *σατυρικός* would distinguish the primitive drama from the imported satyr-play. On the other hand, the abundance of satyrs on vases of the late sixth century suggests a date nearer to 515 B.C. for the establishment of satyric drama in Attica, whether due to Pratinas or not. On satyrs see F. Brommer, *Satyroi* (Würzburg, 1937), *Satyrspiele* (Berlin, 1959), E. Buschor, 'Satyrtänze und frühes Drama', *Sitzb. Münch. Phil.-hist.* 1943/5.

**49<sup>a</sup>21. τετραμέτρον:** that is to say the trochaic tetrameter, a metre which is prominent in the *Persae* and used at the close of the *Agamemnon* (later it was increasingly employed by Euripides in the *HF* and subsequent plays). The use in the *Persae* may be connected with the employment of the metre by Phrynichus, described in the *Suda* as *εὐρετῆς τοῦ τετραμέτρου*, with whose *Phoenissae* the *Persae* was said to stand in a close relationship; cf. Argument to *Persae*. For the transition from tetrameter to iambic see *R.* 1404<sup>a</sup>31. Iambic tetrameters occur in *Soph. Ichn.*, a satyr-play.

**49<sup>a</sup>23. ὀρχηστικώτερον:** we should expect this to mean 'suggestive of the dance', as at *R.* 1408<sup>b</sup>36, where in a discussion of prose rhythms the trochaic is called *κορδακικώτερος*; it can hardly mean 'suitable for dancing to', since tetrameters were normally spoken or intoned, and were not used in the strophic systems to which the chorus sang and danced both dithyramb and tragedy. The general meaning



must be that, when spoken verse first came in with Thespis, they used the trochaic metre because it was in keeping with the tone of the old tragedy, which was light and close to the satyr-play. But we hear of dancing to tetrameters in comedy (schol. Aristoph. *Nub.* 1352) and of recitation to the flute (Xen. *Symp.* 6. 3). See P. Maas, *Greek Metre*, trans. Lloyd-Jones (Oxford, 1962), 73-77.

**λέξεως δὲ γενομένης:** 'When dialogue had come in', (Kassel's ἐγ-γενομένης would be even clearer); λέξεως, speaking as opposed to singing, is hardly distinguishable from λόγον in l. 17, above. The beginning of the change described in γενομένης is not subsequent to τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον. There were no (tragic) tetrameters till there was λέξις, but as λέξις became more important the natural tendency to use iambic rhythm in speech ensured that the trochaic tetrameter was gradually ousted by the iambic trimeter.

**49<sup>a</sup>24. τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον:** cf. 59<sup>a</sup>11, R. 1408<sup>b</sup>32.

**εὔρε:** one may agree that this is not historical, see A. M. Dale *CQ N.S.* 13 (1963), 48, n. 2, without allowing that εὔρε must mean 'invent'. If A. believed that the *Margiles* was by Homer, it is unlikely that he was so careless as to suggest that the iambic was invented in the sixth cent.

**49<sup>a</sup>28. ἁρμονίας:** is said to refer to the pitch of the voice used by the Greeks in conversation (cf. R. 1403<sup>b</sup>31). We should have expected rather a reference to rhythm.

**ἐπεισοδίων:** probably in the sense defined at 52<sup>b</sup>20, equivalent to an act. If plays grew longer, the acts would tend to be more numerous. In fact, in extant tragedy the tendency is for the *episodia* to become not more numerous but longer. The word appears elsewhere in a different sense, 'incident' (see 55<sup>b</sup>1 n.). This would give the same meaning here; a longer play would use more incidents. It is convenient to keep the Greek form *epeisodion* for the technical sense, a section of a play.

**πλήθει:** sc. ἐγένετο V., or perhaps a general sense of augmentation from ηὐξήθη . . . ἀπεσεμνύθη.

**τὰ ἄλλ':** A. could have given fuller information on the use of trilogies, on the development of the theatre and stage equipment, and on the features mentioned in connexion with comedy at 49<sup>b</sup>4.

## CHAPTER 5

*Comedy, and the relation of epic to tragedy.*

**49<sup>a</sup>32-49<sup>b</sup>9. Comedy.**

**49<sup>a</sup>32. ὡς περ εἴπομεν:** this has not been said in so many words. References back may be to particular statements or to the gist of

a longer passage with no precise point of reference. An example of the former is 48<sup>a</sup>25, where *ὡς εἶπομεν* refers to the three media *τρισὶν* of 47<sup>a</sup>16. Here the reference is to the general distinction between *φαῦλοι* and *σπουδαῖοι* as objects of imitation. That comedy is *μίμησις φαύλων* is indicated by Ch. 2, especially 48<sup>a</sup>16, and the mention of Aristophanes (48<sup>a</sup>27), and by 48<sup>b</sup>26. E. discusses the references in the *P.* in his note on 60<sup>a</sup>3, p. 615; cf. Vahlen, p. 259. His distinction between *ὡς* referring back to a particular statement and *ὥσπερ*, *ὅπερ*, etc. meaning *κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον* is too clear-cut; *ὅπερ* 54<sup>a</sup>9 is a precise reference to 53<sup>a</sup>19; *ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη* 54<sup>a</sup>18 to 50<sup>b</sup>8, 9; cf. *EN* 1104<sup>a</sup>2 with reference to 1094<sup>b</sup>13. The important point is that many references are of the second type and it is vain to search for an exactly equivalent statement.

Objection has been taken to the occurrence here of a premature definition of comedy. The definition of tragedy comes after the history of its development and at the beginning of the section of which it is the subject; there must have been a further definition of comedy in the corresponding position. The reason for the presence of the five lines 32–37 is perhaps that A., referring to the classification by objects in Ch. 2, felt it desirable to point out that, while tragedy imitated actions of *σπουδαῖοι* in general, comedy was concerned only with a particular group of *φαῦλοι*. At the same time he added an explanation of the difference between *ψόγος* and *τὸ γελοῖον* with reference to 48<sup>b</sup>37, unnecessary perhaps, but not unnatural, since his subject is still the development of poetry from improvisations, not of one form alone. Vahlen, who suggested that 49<sup>a</sup>32–37 should be moved to after 49<sup>b</sup>20, thought that A. was indicating why he chose to treat as a pair tragedy and epic, which are both serious, rather than tragedy and comedy, which are both dramatic—an interesting point, but there is nothing to suggest that A. had it in mind here.

**49<sup>a</sup>33. *κακίαν*:** the condition of the *φαῦλος*, who has not been bred to aspire to *ἀρετή*, but it covers wickedness as well as insensitivity or tastelessness. In *R.* 1383<sup>b</sup>19–84<sup>a</sup>4 subheadings of *κακία* are *δειλία*, *ἀδικία*, *ἀκολασία*, *αἰσχροκέρδεια*, *ἀνελευθερία*, *κολακεία*, and *μαλακία*.

**ἀλλά:** the sequence *μέν . . . οὐ μέντοι . . . ἀλλά* is very elliptical; the *ἀλλά* clause should explain the emphasis on *πᾶσαν*, not all *κακία* but one sort. Friedrich's *ἀλλ' ἢ* or the *τοῦ αἰσχροῦ οὐδ* of one of the *re-centiores* would make things easier.

**τοῦ αἰσχροῦ:** like *καλός* in both moral and aesthetic senses; it means 'ugly' at 61<sup>a</sup>13. *κακός* too can have the aesthetic reference, but not, apparently, *κακία*. Ugliness is as incompatible with conventional *ἀρετή* as is baseness.

**49<sup>a</sup>34. *τὸ γελοῖον*:** the *τέλος* of comedy, as pity and fear are of tragedy.

**ἀμάρτημα**: the ludicrous error might be anything from confusion between identical twins to falling into a well, and in particular unawareness of one's own weaknesses. For the distinction between ἀμάρτημα and ἀμαρτία see Appendix IV, p. 300. It is natural to assume some correspondence between comic *hamartema* and tragic *hamartia*, though it should be remembered that there is no sign that A. regarded *hamartia* as, what we have made it, a sort of technical term. But the explanation is to be found rather in the Platonic theory put forward in the *Philebus* 47 B-50 A. Plato, in discussing mixed pleasures and pains, accepts tragic pleasure as an obvious fact *ὅταν ἅμα χαίροντες κλάωσι* 48 A; comedy offers malicious enjoyment through the spectacle of those deficient in self-knowledge (*ἄγνοια* 48 C) and the ridiculous consequences which follow from exaggerated self-esteem *πλείστοί γε περὶ . . . τὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς διημαρτήκασιν, ἀρετῇ δοξάζοντες βελτίους ἑαυτοῦς, οὐκ ὄντες*.

**49<sup>a</sup>35. καὶ αἰσχος**: καὶ is explanatory, i.e. it is not the sort of *hamartema* in which a superior character would find himself involved.

**ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν**: *ὀδύνη* and *φθαρτικός* are strong words which imply violent suffering and danger to life; cf. tragic *πάθος* (52<sup>b</sup>11), *πράξις φθαρτικῆ ἢ ὀδυνηρά* which contains deaths, woundings, and scenes of physical agony. Plato required (*Phileb.* 49 E) that the comic *ἄγνοια* should be *ἀβλαβής*. That which in tragedy makes a direct appeal to the emotions is the opposite of what is appropriate in comedy. Further examples of the *ὀδυνηρὰ καὶ φθαρτικά* are to be found in *R.* 1386<sup>a</sup>7. There is a limit to the amount of suffering that can be portrayed if a comedy is not to leave a bad taste in the mouth. A play in which no one suffers at all is unlikely to be dramatic. The amount of suffering which an audience will take depends on the degree of realism or fantasy with which misfortune is presented and on the strength of its stomach. Some today find the humiliation of a Malvolio offensive, though it does not seem to have troubled the Elizabethans. It is hard to say what degree of affliction for unsympathetic characters was acceptable to the Greeks, but we have it from A. himself that it was in accord with the spirit of comedy when *ἀποθνήσκει οὐδείς ὑπ' οὐδενός* 53<sup>a</sup>38.

**49<sup>a</sup>36. εὐθύς**: 'immediately', in the sense that the example is instantly available and does not have to be searched for. With a slightly different application at 52<sup>a</sup>14; cf. the Attic use of *αὐτίκα* 'for example'.

**πρόσωπον**: 'mask'. Many comic masks were grotesque, but though the face was twisted out of the normal to give the desired grimace, it did not suggest pain. The masks themselves have perished but numerous specimens in clay and representations in works of art have survived; see T. B. L. Webster, *Greek Theatre Production*, and

M. Bieber, *History of the Greek and Roman Theatre* (Princeton, 1961). A large number of types of mask are listed in Pollux's *Lexicon*, 4, 143-54.

**49<sup>a37</sup>.** μεταβάσεις: 'changes' undergone by tragedy = μεταβολαί 49<sup>a14</sup>. This sense of the word is to be distinguished from the changes of fortune experienced by the characters of a play, the meaning elsewhere in the *P.*, 52<sup>a16</sup>, 18, 55<sup>b27</sup>, 29.

**49<sup>a38</sup>.** οὐ λεληθασιν: the sort of developments of tragedy which have not been forgotten are the first use of masks, prologue, etc. mentioned at 49<sup>b4</sup>, below. Prologues at least were not earlier than Thespis, and these words should not be quoted to show that A. claimed to possess fuller knowledge about the *origins* of tragedy than of comedy.

**49<sup>b1</sup>.** σπουδάζεσθαι: in act. the opposite of παίζειν. Here 'to be taken seriously' as at *R.* 1380<sup>a26</sup>: σπουδάζεσθαι ἀλλ' οὐ καταφρονεῖσθαι, obviously in contrast to tragedy, which was taken seriously from the beginning. Comedy too was taken seriously and the facts about it recorded after it was recognized, but it was recognized at a later stage of its development than tragedy.

καὶ γὰρ . . . ἐθελονταὶ ἦσαν: the poet who wished to compete at a dramatic festival asked the competent archon for a chorus, which would be trained and equipped at the expense of the officially appointed *choregus*. How the archon decided between poets when there were more poets than places we are not told. The earliest mention of the practice, Cratinus, fr. 15: ὅς οὐδ' ἔδωκ' αἰτοῦντι Σοφοκλέει χορόν, shows that the problem could be real. Until comedy was recognized and competition invited, it was no good asking the archon for a comic chorus, and performances of comedy must have been organized by private, not necessarily individual, initiative. Such is the force of ἐθελονταί, 'volunteers', which was also the name of those who gave comic performances at Thebes, corresponding to the φαλλοφόροι at Sicyon, etc.; see note on 49<sup>a11</sup>.

According to the most natural use of words, which is not always that of the *P.*, the ἐθελονταί should be the same persons as the κωμῳδῶν. So far as usage goes, it seems that κωμῳδός can mean a comic poet, a comic actor, or a singer in a comic chorus or κῶμος, the primary meaning of the word. Thus the κωμῳδῶν of the MSS., 'a chorus of comic singers', gives adequate sense, though G. objects to it as being a tautology. Some support for the view that it was the poet or poets (reading κωμῳδῶ B., or κωμῳδοῖς Bernhardt) who volunteered the requisite effort and expenditure may be found in Eustathius on *Il.* 10. 230: ἐκαλοῦντο δὲ καὶ ἐθελονταὶ διδάσκαλοι, δραμάτων δηλαδή, ὅτε τις μὴ λαβῶν χορόν μηδὲ χορηγέτην ἔχων ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντα παρείχε. At any early date the producer (διδάσκαλος) would be the poet. But we do

not know, and cannot expect to know, how the unofficial production of plays was managed.

**49<sup>b2</sup>. ὀψέ ποτε:** see note on 49<sup>a20</sup>. The date of the introduction of comedy at the Dionysia, which was unknown when B.'s edition was published, was 486 B.C.; see Capps, *The Introduction of Comedy into the City Dionysia* (Chicago, 1903), and *Hesperia*, 12 (1943), 10.

**49<sup>b3</sup>. σχήματα:** cf. 48<sup>b36</sup> and n.

It is curious that A. here writes as if comedy had begun at Athens, whereas he has already emphasized the earlier development of comedy at Syracuse. One can only guess that he had Athens in mind as the home of the dramatic records and perhaps of literary history. The archon has no place outside Athens.

**λεγόμενοι:** the meaning 'the so-called comic poets' is in accord with A.'s usage (cf. Bonitz 424<sup>b28-45</sup>), but signifies little; those comic poets 'who are spoken of', i.e. whose names have survived, implying that many had been forgotten because the records began so late, is preferred by G. and S. Kassel's *γεγόμενοι* avoids the difficulty.

**49<sup>b4</sup>. πρόσωπα:** in place of the wine-lees which were originally part of the comic disguise, whence *τρυγῳδία*? Tragic masks were said to be the invention of Thespis, but if we believe the anthropologists that masks are an original feature of all quasi-dramatic mummeries, the role of Thespis must be limited to improving them. Later, when *πρόσωπον* was used for a character in a drama, a mask was called *προσωπεῖον*.

**49<sup>b5</sup>. πλήθῃ ὑποκριτῶν:** this A. himself records for tragedy at 49<sup>a16</sup>. Most Attic comedy can be performed by three actors, but four or five are required in parts of the *Lysistrata* and of the *Frogs*; see Pickard-Cambridge, *Festivals*, pp. 148-52. According to the Byzantine Anonymous writer on comedy (Kaibel, *CGF*, p. 18) it was Cratinus who introduced regularity by fixing the number at three, at a time when there was no accepted limitation; but since actors were provided by the state one would have supposed that the number would be fixed as soon as comedy became a part of the Dionysia, unless state provision was introduced later. Epicharmus used three actors (*POxy.* 2427. 1 = vol. 25, p. 2).

**τὸ δὲ μύθους ποιεῖν** marks the change from a mere collection of *ψόγοι*, invectives against individuals.

The priority of Epicharmus has already been asserted at 48<sup>a33</sup>. About Phormis, or more probably Phormos, the only information we have is that he shared with Epicharmus the credit for inventing comedy. The alleged titles of his plays are all mythological, see *Suda* s.v. and Themistius, *Or.* 27. 337 B, which seems to be based on this passage or on a similar one from the *Περὶ Ποιητῶν*. The names, which have no construction, must have been a marginal note.

**49<sup>b</sup>6.** ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθε: this implies direct influence of Syracusan on Attic comedy. Cf. Themistius, loc. cit.: κωμῳδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἤρξατο μὲν ἐκ Σικελίας, ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἦσθην Ἐπίχαρμος τε καὶ Φόρμος, κάλλιον δὲ Ἀθήναζε συνηυξήθη. . . .

**49<sup>b</sup>7.** Κράτης: Crates was producing from about 450 to 430 B.C., when Cratinus was the most prominent comic poet. That he was younger than Cratinus does not mean that he could not have made the innovation credited to him.

πρῶτος ἦρξεν: for the tautology cf. πρῶτος ἐνίκα from the Didascalical inscriptions.

**49<sup>b</sup>8.** καθόλου ποιεῖν λόγους καὶ μύθους: this repeats the μύθους of l. 5 with additional points. καθόλου: the ἰαμβικὴ ἰδέα was concerned with individuals. A properly constructed μῦθος generalizes. This is an idea by which A. set great store, and it forms a large part of the subject of Ch. 9, where καθόλου is explained. λόγους καὶ μύθους: the καί is explanatory, λόγος being rather more general than μῦθος. This, one out of the many senses of λόγος, suggests a reasonably coherent story as at 55<sup>a</sup>34, the raw material or argument for a plot; at 55<sup>b</sup>17 the λόγος, the essential story of the Odyssey, is hardly distinguishable from the plot: cf. λόγοι Αἰσώπειοι (R. 1393<sup>a</sup>30), Αἰσώπου μῦθοι (*Meteor.* 356<sup>b</sup>11).

Without this passage (but cf. Kaibel, *CGF*, pp. 7, 8) no one would have guessed that Crates had made a particular contribution to Attic comedy. There is no hint of it in the sketch of comedy before his own time given by Aristoph. *Eq.* 507-40, the last lines of which are about Crates. Nor is it clear how A.'s standards are to be applied to extant comedy. Aristophanes is full of invective in his earlier plays. Is the *Clouds* still within the province of ἰαμβικὴ ἰδέα? S. thinks so. It is directed against an individual, but it could be argued that Socrates is a highly generalized sophist as Cleon is a generalized demagogue, or that both *Clouds* and *Knights* have sufficient plot to remove them from the category of simple invective. But one may suspect that A. preferred the *Plutus* to either of them. It is not clear how he placed the development of Epicharmus and Crates in relation to the Homeric *Margites*. Both were movements away from the ψόγος.

Hereafter in the extant portion of the *P.* there are only a few incidental references to comedy. There is ample scope for speculation as to the way in which A. could have developed a doctrine of comedy, especially with reference to *katharsis*. Attempts have been made to achieve this, particularly on the basis of the definition given in the *Tractatus Coislinianus* (Kaibel, *CGF*, p. 50), see Lane Cooper, *An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy* (New York, 1922, Oxford: Weimer Press, 1924). The discussion of the ludicrous in Cic. *De Orat.*

2. 235-47 may be based on A. But it is to be remembered that virtually the whole development of the New Comedy was subsequent to A., and that Peripatetic writers are likely to have modified A.'s opinions on comedy more freely than those on tragedy, which changed little after his death.

**49<sup>b</sup>9-20.** There follows a brief statement of the relation between tragedy and epic with the emphasis rather on the resemblances than on the differences. Its practical justification is that A. regards epic as largely contained within tragedy, which is the more fully developed form. In the section on tragedy, which forms the main section of the book, he draws his examples freely from epic, a thing he could hardly have done had he not clarified the relationship between epic and tragedy in this transitional passage, of which the conclusion is 'the man who understands good and bad in tragedy understands it in epic too' 49<sup>b</sup>17. Vahlen suggests that A. is giving his justification for not treating both forms of drama together.

**49<sup>b</sup>9.** ἡ μὲν οὖν . . . ἠκολούθησεν: this sentence, of which the text is highly disturbed, must give the points of agreement between epic and tragedy in terms of the distinctions drawn in the first three chapters. ἠκολούθησεν is the opposite of διαφέρουσιν. There is no compelling reason why ἠκολούθησεν should be aor. Probably it is historical; epic and tragedy long ago reached their final forms. The most obvious resemblance is that both imitate σπουδαῖοι (cf. 48<sup>a</sup>26). So far as medium is concerned both use λόγος and ῥυθμός, elsewhere called μέτρον, and, whatever his exact words may have been, it is unlikely that A. said much more than this. Cf. περὶ τῆς διηγηματικῆς καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικῆς 59<sup>a</sup>17, with which the section on epic begins. The μεγάλου of A does not make sense with μέτρον and gives no contrast with μέτρον ἀπλοῦν in the next line; it is best dropped. It does not appear in Arabic and Latin versions.

**49<sup>b</sup>11.** τῷ δὲ . . . διαφέρουσιν: the difference between narrative and drama is fundamental, even though Homer is the most dramatic of narrators. The precise metrical distinction is less obvious. Epic uses only hexameters, tragedy as we have it uses iambs, tetrameters, and anapaests (if the last count as μέτρον). We know nothing of metrical practice in A.'s time. A more notable distinction is that tragedy has music and song which epic lacks, but that is referred to in the comment on the μέρη at l. 16, below, and anyway μέχρι μὲν . . . implicitly excludes μέλος. Probably μέτρον itself denotes speaking verse which could not be set to music (cf. 47<sup>b</sup>20 n.), but μέτρον ἀπλοῦν could conceivably imply that epic has the adornment of metre without melody = μέτρον ψιλόν, which is the differentia specified in Ch. 1; this is E.'s view. But the most natural meaning is that epic uses only one metre. Conversely, in the comparison of tragedy

and epic, 62<sup>a</sup>15, tragedy *can* use the metre of epic, epic cannot use that of tragedy.

For μέχρι τοῦ . . . εἶναι cf. 51<sup>a</sup>10 μέχρι τοῦ σύνδηλος εἶναι.

49<sup>b</sup>12. διαφέρουσιν: we should expect the sing.

49<sup>b</sup>12-16. *A further distinction between epic and tragedy is in their μήκος.*

The meaning of μήκος here is one of the major problems of the *P.*, though its importance is mainly historical. It has three possible meanings: (1) physical length of the written work, the number of feet of papyrus or the number of lines in the epic or tragedy; (2) which is closely allied to (1), the time required for the performance of a play or epic. As readers we think naturally of the first, but for the Greeks, who usually listened, the second is more obvious, and χρόνος in l. 14 shows that time in some sense is the meaning here. But it is manifest nonsense to say that tragedy was ever 'unlimited in time' and took as long to perform as epic, or that an epic could continue indefinitely. The oldest tragedies are comparatively short, and 49<sup>a</sup>19 may mean that originally, in A.'s view, they were shorter still. Accordingly we have to accept (3) the length of time of the action. This is not to us such an obvious distinction as the physical length, but it is a perfectly valid one. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* both extend over several weeks, and the latter is much compressed by the device of making one of the characters, as part of the action, tell a story embracing the events of years. An epic on Heracles or Theseus, unless a similar device was used, must have extended over a lifetime. It is true also that in older tragedies the time of action was unrestricted. The events of the *Agamemnon* could not take place in a single day, and in the *Eumenides* the passage of a considerable period is definitely indicated. As tragedy became more realistic the continuous presence of the chorus, who in general neither sleep nor eat on the stage, tended to restrict the action to the period between dawn and dusk. But pedantry about time, which the audience was not encouraged to calculate, was not allowed to impede an otherwise desirable plot. The duration of the journeys required in, for instance, *Trachiniae* and *Andromache* is ignored. Euripides' *Stheneboea* seems to have used even freer licence; cf. Page, *Gk. Lit. Papyri*, p. 126; and even if the reconstruction of Zühlke (*Philol.* 105 (1961), 1-15, 198-227) is right, the extension in time remains considerable.

Scholars have been reluctant to accept this explanation. It is true that elsewhere, 55<sup>b</sup>16, 59<sup>b</sup>17, 62<sup>a</sup>18, μήκος means length in the physical sense. It has been argued, as by B. and R., that the longer the duration of the action the longer will be the work containing it, so that the two meanings are combined. This is not obviously true and, as E.



points out, the longest periods of time in the *Iliad* are accounted for in the fewest words, e.g. *Il.* 24. 784. The above interpretation alone is true to the simple facts about epic and tragedy.

I suggest that the reasons why A. expresses length not in the more obvious way, in terms of the number of lines or number of yards of papyrus, but in terms of the duration of the action, is that this brings out an essential difference between epic and tragedy. Tragedy is superior to epic in unity because the events are less dispersed in time. The necessary or probable connexion between events, on which A. insists, is likely to be closer if one follows directly after another, and it is remarked that this superiority is due to a development within tragedy. Tragedies were always shorter than epics, but only later did they acquire the cohesion which comes with a shorter time of action. This idea of superiority is implicit in the conclusion reached in the final comparison of epic and tragedy, τὸ γὰρ ἀβρούτερον ἤδιον ἢ πολλῶ κεκραμένον τῷ χρόνῳ, λέγω δ' οἶον εἶ τις τὸν Οἰδίπουν θείη τὸν Σοφοκλέους ἐν ἔπεσιν ὅσοις ἡ *Ιλιάς* (62<sup>b</sup>1, where, however, χρόνῳ is time of performance). If this is correct, the statement of the principle of the unity of time, which is based entirely on this passage, is not so purely a generalization from practice as has usually been supposed (see below).

‡9<sup>b</sup>13. ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου: this suggests twenty-four hours rather than twelve, but twelve, the time the sun is above the horizon, is not impossible and suits the sense better. The Greek play, like the Greek day's work, began at dawn, as is occasionally emphasized, e.g. in Soph. *Electra*, Eur. *Ion* and *Phaethon*, and the action can plausibly be regarded as filling a day. Twelve hours suffice for the action in virtually all Sophocles' and Euripides' plays.

μικρὸν ἐξάλλαττειν implies neither much exceeding nor falling short of. Indications of time are rare, much rarer than in Elizabethan plays; the *Choephoroi* ends after dusk (660-2), the *Agamemnon* and *IA* begin before daybreak, the *Rhesus* takes place at night.

This is the passage, the only passage, on which was based the law of the unity of time which was taken with immense seriousness by the neo-classic writers and critics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The critics were more interested in claiming the support of the infallible A. for their own views than in finding out what he said. 'A. was valid in their eyes only to the extent to which he sanctioned a literature already in existence' (Vinaver, *Racine* (Eng. trans. Manchester, 1955), 11 ff.). Lessing, who was one of the first critics to consider what A. really said rather than what the legislator of the arts ought to have meant, observed (*Hamb. Dram.* 46, ed. R. Rieman, Leipzig, 3. 197) that unity of place and time, in so far as they were observed, were merely a consequence of unity of action,

and that in any case the chorus made it natural that playwrights should tend to observe both. But A. makes it clear that he disapproved of the episodic play, 51<sup>b</sup>33, and no doubt he would have found fault with the dispersion involved in the plot of *A Winter's Tale*, which extends into the second generation, because it must detract from the unity of the action. And this was no extreme case. George Whitstone in his *Epistle Dedicatory to Promas and Cassandra* speaks of the English dramatist who 'in three houres ronnes throwe the worlde: marriges, gets children, makes children men, men to conquer kingdomes, murder monsters, and bringeth Gods from Heaven and fetcheth Divels from Hel'. (Quoted by L. Hotson, *The Wooden O* (London, 1959), p. 188.)

**49<sup>b</sup>16. μέρη:** the constituent elements, six of them, as will be shown in Ch. 6. μέλος and ὄψις are the two which are lacking in epic: see 59<sup>b</sup>10.

**49<sup>b</sup>18. ἄ μὲν γάρ . . .:** repeated in the final comparison of epic and tragedy 62<sup>a</sup>14.

## CHAPTERS 6–22. *Tragedy.*

### CHAPTER 6

#### *Definition of tragedy, and its six parts.*

Ch. 6 begins with the definition of tragedy in the light of which the necessary parts are distinguished and proceeds to a discussion of their relative importance. The whole is closely knit and is not easily divided into sections. For convenience it can be separated into (1) Definition 49<sup>b</sup>21–31; (2) List of Parts 49<sup>b</sup>31–50<sup>a</sup>14; (3) Importance of Parts 50<sup>a</sup>15–<sup>b</sup>20, of which the section on Plot extending from the beginning to 50<sup>a</sup>38 forms the first half.

**49<sup>b</sup>21–31.** The definition is derived largely from the conclusions of the previous five chapters, but some supplementary explanations are required where new ideas are introduced.

**49<sup>b</sup>21. περὶ . . . ἐροῦμεν:** not concerning all hexameter verse but only that which is mimetic. Epic is in fact mentioned frequently in the present section, but it is not till Chs. 23 and 24 that it is discussed in its own right. Comedy was presumably treated in the lost Second Book. Cf. *R.* 1419<sup>b</sup>5: εἴρηται πόσα εἶδη γελοίων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, about which there is nothing in the *P.* as we have it. Iambic verse, the poetry of abuse, may have been subsidiary, like epic in Bk. I.

- 49<sup>b</sup>23.** ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων . . . ὄρον: the expected order of the words would be τὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γινομένον: see V. on 55<sup>a</sup>24. E. explains γινόμενον as imperf., repeating the ἐγίγνετο of 49<sup>a</sup>13 and referring to the way in which tragedy realized its own nature while developing in time, τῶν εἰρημένων being taken as the historical sketch in Ch. 4. This is not readily intelligible.
- 49<sup>b</sup>24.** οὐσίας: οὐσία is frequently used as a technical term in A.'s philosophy meaning 'essence', that in virtue of which a thing is what it is; see *Met. Z*, Ch. 4.
- 49<sup>b</sup>24-28.** That tragedy is a μίμησις has been stated in Ch. 1, that it imitates πράττοντες in Ch. 2, and the main point of that chapter is that they are σπουδαῖοι. No one English word for σπουδαῖος fits both men and action (cf. 51<sup>b</sup>6 n.). μέγεθος was mentioned in connexion with historical development in Ch. 4, and μήκος at 49<sup>b</sup>12, though the real significance of μέγεθος will not emerge until Ch. 7. B. was probably wrong in taking τελείας with μέγεθος ἐχούσης, 'complete as having magnitude' (cf. 50<sup>b</sup>25). ἡδυσμένω λόγω refers to the media of poetry defined in Ch. 1, as is explained in the next sentence; the force of δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας has been fully elucidated in Ch. 3, but δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου is new, and the assertion that κάθαρσις is the end of tragedy is not only new but remains unexplained.
- 49<sup>b</sup>24.** πράξεως: cf. 48<sup>a</sup>1; we have had πράξις as the complement of πάθος at 47<sup>a</sup>28 and in a more general sense, similar to this passage, at 48<sup>b</sup>25. It is necessary to be aware of the connotations which this word frequently possesses in A.'s literary and ethical works, because much of what is said in Chs. 7 and 8 about unity of action is implicit in the word πράξις. It means, not any random act like opening one's mouth or crossing the street, but an action initiated with a view to an end and carried on in pursuit of it; it can thus include a whole complex of subordinate actions (cf. 51<sup>a</sup>18, 19); it is associated with προαίρεσις as *EN* 1139<sup>a</sup>31: πράξεως ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις; cf. *EE* 1222<sup>b</sup>19; man alone, as opposed to animals, can initiate action, is ἀρχὴ πράξεων (and similarly with the verb *EE* 1224<sup>a</sup>28: οὐ φάμεν τὸ παιδίον πράττειν). Since πράξις refers to an action begun for a purpose and carried on until it is realized or until the activity thus initiated terminates, it is implied that it is a complete whole τελείας, the word here added; that it is an entity with beginning, middle, and end as explained in Ch. 7. Cf. E., p. 256, 'The word has the twin implications of completeness and seriousness'. For a different view, see Solmsen, *CQ* 29 (1935), 197. This conception of action has interested modern writers on tragedy: cf. F. Fergusson, *The Idea of a Theatre* (Princeton, 1949), p. 36, 'Thus by action (of the OT) I do not mean the events of the story but the focus or aim of psychic life from

which the events in that situation result'. In the Appendix on Plot and Action, p. 229, almost ineffable mysteries are propounded. Cf. also J. Jones, *On A. and Greek Tragedy*, pp. 24-29.

**49<sup>b</sup>25.** ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ: a ἡδυσμα is something added to food to give it a pleasant flavour; the metaphor is maintained at R. 1406<sup>a</sup>19 where Alcidas is said to have used epithets οὐχ ἡδύσματι ἀλλ' ὡς ἐδέσματι, 'not as seasoning but as food'. It is used contemptuously by Pl. *Rep.* 607 A: ἡδυσμένη Μοῦσα. Here the tone seems neutral, as at *Pol.* 1340<sup>b</sup>16: ἡ μουσικὴ φύσει τῶν ἡδυσμένων, but A., like Plato, was capable of regarding style as an extraneous addition to matter: cf. R. 1404<sup>a</sup>24 ff., and Pl. *Gorg.* 502 C. A ἡδυσμα was not normally sweet, though sugar would count as one but only as making foods more agreeable.

χωρὶς ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν: τῶν ἡδυσμάτων is to be supplied after εἰδῶν. ἐκάστῳ, though only two kinds of ἡδυσμα are mentioned, note ἕτερα in l. 30, below. This is a complicated way of saying that rhythm alone is used to make more alluring the language of the dialogue, rhythm with melody is used in the sung parts; cf. Ch. 1, especially χωρὶς ἢ μεμιγμένοις (47<sup>a</sup>23). Since we do not regard style as a separable ornament of the subject-matter, no translation of this can sound natural.

**49<sup>b</sup>26.** τοῖς μορίοις: various parts, of what kind is not specified; at l. 32 μόριον is equivalent to one of the six μέρη. Here something more like the quantitative parts of Ch. 12 must be intended, *epeisodion* and *stasimon*.

δρώντων: subj. gen., 'an imitation performed by men acting', not 'of men acting', or it may be gen. abs. with τῶν μιμουμένων understood. This follows from Ch. 3, 48<sup>a</sup>19-28.

**49<sup>b</sup>27.** δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου: see Appendix II on κάθαρσις.

τὴν . . . κάθαρσιν: different from κάθαρσιν τινα; there are various sorts of κάθαρσις; this is the one appropriate to pity and fear. κάθαρσις appears in a different sense at 55<sup>b</sup>15. On the general interpretation see Appendix II.

The vulgate reading on which early commentators worked was χωρὶς ἐκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις δρώντων, καὶ οὐ δι' ἐπαγγελίας ἀλλὰ δι' ἐλέου . . . The first to punctuate correctly was Giacomini (1573): see Weinberg p. 524. The old punctuation has been perversely revived by R. Stark, *Aristot. Stud.*, Zetemata 8, pp. 39-46, who separates δρώντων from what follows and takes καὶ with περαινουσα.

τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων: attempts have been made, and still are, to distinguish between πάθημα and πάθος. But Bonitz, *Aristot. Stud.* v. has convinced most scholars that they are indistinguishable, the form παθημάτων being preferred to παθῶν, which does, however, occur.

*τῶν τοιούτων* raises a much-discussed problem. It was held by many of the older commentators and by R. among the moderns that *τοιούτων* is here equivalent to *τούτων*. It is a question of some substance because if *τοιούτων* = such, then pity and fear are not the only tragic emotions, and it is the difficulty of finding other emotions which may be purged by tragedy that has led to the attempt to equate *τοιούτων* with *τούτων*. A.'s use of *τοιούτος* has been examined by Beare in *Hermathena* 18 (1914-19), 116-35 and more recently by C. W. van Boekel, *Katharsis* (Utrecht, 1957), pp. 146 ff. The fact is that there seems to be an ambiguity which is common to Greek *τοιούτος* and to English 'such'. Both words can mean similar to the referent as falling under the same definition but not separately specified—often virtually synonymous with *οὗτος*—and similar to the referent but falling under a somewhat enlarged definition. In the first case the point of *τῶν τοιούτων* here would be to include, for example, *οἶκτος*, *ἔκπληξις*, pity and fear in a slightly different form; in the second, to include different but kindred emotions such as *ὄργη*. Cf. 56<sup>b</sup>1: *οἶον ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὄργην καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα*, R. 1378<sup>a</sup>22: *ὄργη, ἔλεος, φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα*, where A. is thinking primarily of rhetoric, and *Pol.* 1342<sup>a</sup>12: *τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικούς καὶ τοὺς ὄλως παθητικούς*. Since we are so much in the dark as to what A. meant by *κάθαρσις*, it is difficult to choose with confidence, but the first meaning is the more likely. In any case there is no justification for introducing under *τοιούτων* such emotions as ambition; cf. Johnson in Appendix II, p. 277.

A meaning which, it has been suggested (*Pol.*, ed. Susemihl-Hicks (London, 1894), p. 652, also by Butcher, p. 240, n. 3) might be intended by *τῶν τοιούτων* is that the emotions aroused by tragedy are not identical with the corresponding emotions aroused by events in real life; they are *ἔλεος καὶ φόβος* as aroused by imitations; cf. 53<sup>b</sup>12: *τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως ἠδόνην*; see note on 48<sup>b</sup>13. They are transformed by 'aesthetic distance'. If this distinction were a basic assumption of the *P.*, it might well be referred to in this summary fashion, but as A. never clearly makes the distinction it is going far to find it in *τῶν τοιούτων*.

**49<sup>b</sup>29.** *ἁρμονίαν* [καὶ μέλος]: the difference between *ἁρμονίαν* and *μέλος* is that *μέλος* implies the presence of words. If *καὶ μέλος* is in place here at all, *καὶ* must be explanatory, but as *λόγος* + *ῥυθμός* and *λόγος* + *ῥυθμός* + *ἁρμονία* cover all the media used by tragedy, *μέλος* is best explained as a gloss based on 47<sup>b</sup>25.

**49<sup>b</sup>31.** After *διὰ μέλους* would be a possible place for a similar brief explanation of the meaning of *κάθαρσις*.

**49<sup>b</sup>31-50<sup>a</sup>14.** The six parts or elements of tragedy are now deduced from the definition. This passage was discussed at length by Vahlen,

'A. über die Teile der Tragödie', *Gesammelte philologische Schriften* (Leipzig, 1911) i. 235-74, reprinted from *Symb. phil. Bonn. in hon. Friderici Ritschelii* (Leipzig, 1864), pp. 158-84.

**49<sup>b</sup>31.** **πράττοντες:** the visible actors. More precisely, the poet makes the imitation *διὰ πραττόντων*. The play can achieve its *τέλος* without being performed (62<sup>a</sup>11).

**49<sup>b</sup>33.** **ὄψεως κόσμος:** the actors are visible, and the spectacle they present is necessarily to some extent an element in the total effect. *κόσμος* implies that things are so arranged as to be worth looking at. The question is whether *ὄψις* refers only to the appearance of the actors, who were richly attired, or includes all that we mean by 'spectacle'. There is no doubt that on the Greek stage, as on the Elizabethan, the main spectacle was the appearance of the actors, magnificent or horrific as the occasion might require. At 50<sup>b</sup>20 *ὄψις* is associated with the *σκευοποιός* who is said to have been concerned mainly with masks and costumes (Pollux 4. 115; cf. schol. Aristoph. *Eg.* 230). The few spectacular effects of which we hear seem to depend mainly on his efforts: the Erinyes in the *Eumenides* who caused a panic, perhaps the winged steed of Oceanus in the *PV*; cf. Bellerophon's steed in Euripides' play; Ion's act with the birds at Delphi would depend mainly on his own grace, [Demetrius] *Eloc.* 195. But at 53<sup>b</sup>1-4 *ὄψις* seems to refer to the whole content of *τοῦ ὄραν*. Presumably it was not for nothing that Sophocles introduced scene-painting, and the *mechane* as a spectacle must have lent excitement to divine epiphanies. From a later date *ταῖς σκηναϊαῖς ὄψεσι καλόν* (Argument to Eur. *Phoen.*), e.g. Antigone on the walls, refers to more than clothes.

**ἐν τούτοις:** actors speak and sing, using words, rhythm, and melody; these are the *media* (*ἐν*); cf. 47<sup>b</sup>29.

**49<sup>b</sup>34.** **τὴν τῶν μέτρων σύνθεσιν:** *μέτρα* are non-lyric metres, 47<sup>b</sup>20 n. The whole is short for *τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐν μέτρῳ σύνθεσιν*.

**49<sup>b</sup>36.** **πᾶσαν:** predicative 'in its entirety'.

**49<sup>b</sup>36-50<sup>a</sup>10.** **ἐπεὶ δὲ . . . μελοποιία:** this rather cumbrous sentence is best taken as depending on *ἐπεὶ* down to *γνώμην* at 50<sup>a</sup>7, with the apodosis beginning *ἀνάγκη οὖν*. The const. is obscured by the change from nom. *μῦθος* at 50<sup>a</sup>4 to the acc. in *ἦθη . . . διάνοιαν* which are governed by *λέγω*.

**49<sup>b</sup>37.** **πραττόντων:** the performers, who have the same *ἦθη* as the original characters of the story.

**ποιούς:** speakers in the courts argue *ὅπως τὸν κριτὴν ποιόν τινα ποιήσωσιν* (*R.* 1354<sup>b</sup>20).

**49<sup>b</sup>38.** **ἦθος:** see on 48<sup>a</sup>2 and 50<sup>b</sup>8.

**διάνοιαν:** further explained below and at 50<sup>b</sup>4. We differ from the Greeks in attributing *διάνοια* to the author rather than to his

characters, in whom we do not so sharply separate intellectual power from the remaining characteristics. A. divides ἀρετή into ἠθικὴ and διανοητικὴ (EN II03<sup>a</sup>5). On a man's διάνοια depends his power to assess a situation, on his ἦθος his reactions to it. In drama διάνοια is manifested mainly in the characters' arguments.

**50<sup>a</sup>1.** ποιὰς τινὰς: many actions can be judged only in the light of what we know of the character of the doer and of what he says in explanation of his actions.

[πέφυκεν αἷτια . . .]: probably a marginal explanation of the previous clause.

**50<sup>a</sup>2.** ταύτας i.e. πράξεις: the end of an action is a further activity and not a static condition; this is good Aristotelian doctrine. but not self-evident, and depends on a particular conception of activity. Cf. EN I, Chs. 7 and 8.

**50<sup>a</sup>3.** ἔστιν . . .: μῦθος has scarcely appeared since it was numbered among the main subjects of the P. at the beginning of Ch. I. Now it is introduced with great emphasis; we know that tragedy is a μίμησις πράξεως, but it is the μῦθος, the ψυχὴ of tragedy as it is called at l. 38 below, which is more particularly the imitation of the action.

**50<sup>a</sup>4.** λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον: 'for I use the word μῦθος in this sense', not the most obvious sense, which was simply 'story'. Similarly B. wrote ταύτην for αὐτήν at 49<sup>b</sup>34.

The poet takes the story, μῦθος in the non-technical sense (see 47<sup>a</sup>9 n.), and reorganizes it in such a way as to bring the parts into a more logical and significant relation to one another. The story is a preliminary selection from the stream of events; in the plot the story is organized.

**50<sup>a</sup>5.** σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων: 'structure', developing the hint given by the word συνίστασθαι 47<sup>a</sup>9: cf. σύστασις in l. 15. συντιθέναι is used of putting together an essentially true story in Eur. Bacc. 297, Aristoph. Ran. 1052. Cf. Pl. Phaedr. 268 D, τὴν τούτων (sc. ῥήσεων) σύστασιν πρόπουσαν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τῷ ὄλῳ συνισταμένην.

**50<sup>a</sup>7.** γνώμη: not 'purpose', though it would make sense here, but as at 50<sup>b</sup>12, καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται, 'make some general statement'. γνώμαι were 'practical maxims' (R. 1394<sup>a</sup>21), but they naturally tended to be pithy and epigrammatic. The γνωμοδικτῆς of Cratinus, fr. 307, being a Εὐριπιδαριστοφανίζων, no doubt appreciated τὸ στρογγύλον; cf. Aristoph. fr. 471. Eur. Phoen. is described in the Argument as γνωμῶν μεστόν πολλῶν τε καὶ καλῶν.

ἀνάγκη οὖν: cf. 49<sup>b</sup>37: οὗς ἀνάγκη ποιούς τινὰς εἶναι. It is a logical consequence of its nature as developed from its definition.

**50<sup>a</sup>8.** ποιὰ τις: this refers not to the quality of an individual tragedy as good or bad, but to the nature of tragedy in general. B., who like most edd. omits τῆς after πάσης, is misleading here.

**50<sup>a</sup>9.** ταῦτα δ' . . . : the order in which the six parts are given bears no relation to the division which follows, but with the transposition of λέξις and διάνοια the order would be that in which the parts are discussed, which is more or less the order of importance; ὄψις and μελοποιία, which come last, are not really a part of the art and are not discussed. The order λέξις-διάνοια is common elsewhere.

**50<sup>a</sup>10, 11.** οἷς μὲν . . . τρία: δύο = λέξις, μελοποιία; ἓν = ὄψις (διὰ πραττόντων); τρία = μῦθος, ἦθος, διάνοια. λέξις applies to the λόγος of non-lyric parts. Words of lyrics are included in μέλος. The *P.* is almost entirely concerned with the group of τρία. Robortello (1548) and Maggi (1546, 1550) explained τρία as λέξις, ἦθος, διάνοια. The passage was correctly explained by Vettori (1560): see Weinberg, p. 462.

**50<sup>a</sup>12-14.** τούτοις μὲν . . . ὡσαύτως: a passage much discussed, but never adequately explained. The apparent meaning is unsatisfactory; after saying that every tragedy *must* have all six parts, why add that 'not a few' poets use them all? It is vain to cite ἀήθεις τραγωδίαι (50<sup>a</sup>25), because it means deficient in, not devoid of, ἦθος. Further, the separation of τούτοις and εἶδεσιν is needlessly emphatic, and ὡς εἰπεῖν, though not restricted by A. to use with such expressions as 'all' or 'none', has no application here. πᾶν sc. δρᾶμα is an odd expression. Some of these difficulties can be avoided by rearrangement or emendation, but as a summing up it is defective, even apart from the gratuitous change from μέρος to εἶδη (see 56<sup>a</sup>33 n.). The only serious alternative is Vahlen's ὡς εἶδεσιν, abandoned in his edn. The meaning of this would be that not a few poets concentrate on a single μέρος (cf. 56<sup>a</sup>3-7) using it, or regarding it (cf. 52<sup>b</sup>14, *Met.* 998<sup>b</sup>10 χρῆσθαι ὡς γένεσιν) as a special type of tragedy. In the next sentence he read ὄψεις ἔχειν πᾶν (cf. 62<sup>a</sup>14), indirect statement of the poet's thought, that spectacle, or whatever μέρος it might be, contained all the essentials of drama. This seems an extreme view, but it makes sense of a sort. It is a difficulty that of the εἶδη mentioned in Ch. 18, though they are connected with the μέρη, only the ἠθικόν is common to both (see 55<sup>b</sup>32 n.). But 53<sup>b</sup>1 gives some support to the existence of an εἶδος connected with ὄψις; anyway the εἶδη are themselves a mystery.

†ὄψις: ὄψεις is an easy emendation, but why is this μέρος alone in the plur.? ὄψιν gives the required sense, but the corruption is harder to explain.

**50<sup>a</sup>15-38.** *Five reasons why μῦθος is pre-eminent among the parts. First reason 50<sup>a</sup>15-23. Drama is concerned with actions, to which character is incidental.*

**50<sup>a</sup>15.** πραγμάτων σύστασις: not distinguishable from πραγμάτων σύνθεσιν in l. 5, above.



**50<sup>a</sup>16.** μίμησις . . . πράξεων: this follows from the definition and was assumed at 48<sup>a</sup>1, at least in so far as *πράττοντες* are engaged on a *πρᾶξις*, and by Plato before; it is regarded as self-evident and no reasons are given. The fact that tragedies are about actions shows nothing, for even if the main purpose was to reveal character, character would have to be revealed largely through action; cf. what is said about *προαίρεσις* at 50<sup>b</sup>10. A. does no more here than repeat what is implicit in the definition.

**50<sup>a</sup>17.** βίου: a surprising statement, but apparently it means what it says, not the lives of individuals ('careers' E.), of which only a minute proportion can be represented in a play, but the whole complex of events of which a generalized picture is given, a more philosophic picture than that given by history. Alcidamas had called the *Odyssey* *καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον* (R. 1406<sup>b</sup>11), and there are other examples of this wide use: see B., ad loc., and Pl. *Laws* 858 D. A. associates βίος or ζωή with ἔργα and πράξεις (EN 1179<sup>b</sup>19, EE 1219<sup>b</sup>2). In later writers imitation of βίος is associated more particularly with comedy.

**50<sup>a</sup>17-20.** [καὶ εὐδαιμονία . . .]: these words can be attached to the text only by supposing that some words, e.g. καὶ εὐδαιμονίας, have fallen out by haplography. But (a) *κακοδαίμων, -ονία* do not occur elsewhere in A.; (b) τέλος in l. 18 is awkward with τέλος in l. 22, especially as the first refers to the end of the action which is the subject of the tragedy, the second to the action itself which is the end of the tragedy; (c) A.'s particular views on the end of action are not very relevant to the importance of action in drama, but they are the sort of thing that a commentator might be tempted to explain. The desire for happiness might well be the cause which led to the initiation of the action which was the subject of a play, but this action is just as much an action whether the happiness which is its end is regarded as an action or a state. In fact A. was emphatic that it was an action: cf. EN 1101<sup>a</sup>15, 1176<sup>b</sup>7, Pol. 1325<sup>a</sup>32. Even the βίος θεωρητικός, which we might regard as the opposite of action, is an ἐνέργεια (EN 1177<sup>a</sup>18).

**50<sup>a</sup>21.** πράττουσιν . . . συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν: the subject is οἱ μιμούμενοι. They do not act, i.e. conduct their imitation of the action, in order to present character, but they present character as an element in the action which is the main end. On A.'s habit of identifying the poet with the actors who are his medium see 48<sup>a</sup>1 n.

**50<sup>a</sup>22.** ὥστε . . .: accordingly it follows that the plot is the end. It had not been suggested that any other part but ἦθος could claim the primacy. In a different, and more ultimate, sense the τέλος of tragedy is the emotional effect it produces (and the *katharsis*):

cf. 60<sup>b</sup>24, 62<sup>a</sup>18, 62<sup>b</sup>15; here it is the end in the sense that the poet subordinates all other parts to it.

**καί:** explanatory of *πράγματα*: *πραγμάτων σύστασις* which is the same as *μῦθος*. *Οἱ πράγματα* could stand for the materials and *μῦθος* for their form when embodied in structure.

*Second Reason 50<sup>a</sup>23–29. Tragedy can exist without character, not without action.*

**50<sup>a</sup>23.** ἄνευ . . . τραγωδία: many contemporary plays and some of Maeterlinck in an earlier generation come nearer to achieving this than A. would have thought possible.

**50<sup>a</sup>24.** ἄνευ δὲ ἡθῶν: B. is right in taking *ἀήθεις*, l. 25, below, as 'deficient in character'; cf. *ἀμιμῆτως ἔγραψεν*, 'drew inadequately' (60<sup>b</sup>32). A play may be devoid of 'character interest', but it is inconceivable that all the participants of a play could be such that the audience have no expectation as to the kind of decision they will make. Those who act must be *ποιοί τινες* (49<sup>b</sup>37).

**50<sup>a</sup>25.** τῶν νέων: see on 53<sup>b</sup>28. Euripides is less a master of *ἦθος* than Sophocles, but to call him *ἀήθης* would imply a severe standard indeed. *οἱ πρῶτοι* (l. 37, below) who are contrasted with the *νέοι* are presumably the earliest of the *παλαιοί*. S. is alone in taking *νέων* as 'young' rather than 'recent', which contradicts ll. 35–38, below.

**50<sup>a</sup>27.** Polygnotus was introduced at 48<sup>a</sup>5 as an example of a painter who idealized his figures, see n. ad loc. Zeuxis of Heraclea in southern Italy worked in the late fifth and early fourth centuries. He is mentioned at 61<sup>b</sup>12 as painting figures more faultlessly beautiful than any in real life. At *Pol.* 1340<sup>a</sup>28–40 it is said that *αἰσθητά* except for *μουσική* have little ethical effect, though there Polygnotus is again mentioned as *ἠθικός*.

*Third Reason 50<sup>a</sup>29–33. Tragedies which are rich in character but poor in plot do not fulfil the function of tragedy.*

**50<sup>a</sup>29.** ἐφεξῆς: suggests a mere sequence, 'one after another', as at 59<sup>a</sup>27. Sometimes, however, it is a rational or natural order, 52<sup>a</sup>1.

**ἠθικός:** 'expressive of character' B., in this case the true character of the speaker. *λόγοι ἠθικοί* (*R.* 1391<sup>b</sup>22) are speeches which suggest the speaker has a certain character, not speeches on ethics.

**50<sup>a</sup>30.** ἦν: 'was agreed to be'. A. uses the imperf. to refer to conclusions previously reached; cf. *R.* 1363<sup>a</sup>9: *οὗ γὰρ πάντες ἐφίενται, τοῦτ' ἀγαθὸν ἦν. τραγωδίας ἔργον* recurs at 52<sup>b</sup>29 with reference to emotional effects; these have not so far been discussed, only mentioned in the definition 49<sup>b</sup>27, 28. The majority of commentators, R., S., E., refer it to that passage, E. with emphasis on *κάθαρσις*. B. following Vahlen

understands the *ἔργον* to be the production of a *πράξεως μίμησις* (cf. 49<sup>b</sup>36), which a mere sequence of speeches could not achieve.

The difference between a play and a series of rhetorical speeches is put, with a different purpose, by Pl. *Phaedr.* 268 c.

**50<sup>a</sup>32.** *καί*: is undoubtedly explanatory: cf. l. 22, above.

**50<sup>a</sup>33.** Castelvetro transposed the comparison of the painter and the choice between pleasing colours without form and form without colours, 50<sup>a</sup>39–<sup>b</sup>3, to follow directly after *πραγμάτων*. This was accepted by most editors until Vahlen, who defended the change (*Gesammelte*, pp. 250–2), altered his mind in favour of the MSS. order in his edn.; only E. among recent editors transposes. Against the change we may argue that there is no easy explanation to account for it; that the comparison between a more and a less essential element stands well at the end of the discussion about plot and character; that *ἔστιν τε μίμησις . . .* at 50<sup>b</sup>3 follows a little awkwardly on *ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν . . . ἦθη* at 50<sup>a</sup>38, 39, since both sentences round off the stage of the argument. On the other hand, while there is an obvious correspondence between an outline drawing and the plot of a play, a random spread of colours has little connexion with the characters. But the comparison would gain immensely in significance if attractive colours placed at random *χύδην* corresponded with eloquent speeches following one after another *ἐφεξῆς*. Indeed G. goes so far as to make *χύδην* refer back to *ἐφεξῆς* though he leaves them 12 lines apart. That the words do correspond is strongly suggested by the relevant passage of the *Phaedrus*. Socrates, criticizing Lysias' speech, says 'do not the parts seem to have been thrown down *χύδην* at random?' and a few lines later 'can you suggest any reason why Lysias put the parts in this order *οὕτως ἐφεξῆς*?' and the meaning is illustrated by the famous Midas epitaph of Cleobulus of Lindus, four hexameters which can be read in any order, 264 B–D. *ἐφεξῆς* suggests, not disorder, but absence of any ordering principle.

*Fourth Reason 50<sup>a</sup>33–35. The most attractive elements in a play belong to the plot.*

**50<sup>a</sup>33.** *ψυχαγωγεί*: cf. 50<sup>b</sup>16 and Timocles, fr. 6. 6; first in Xen. *Mem.* 3. 10. 6, and Pl. *Phaedr.* 261 A. This originally striking expression drawn from necromancy (cf. Aes. *Pers.* 687) loses a good deal of its force when it becomes part of the language of criticism, and implies little more than 'attract': see G.'s note. It is surprisingly absent from Gorg. *Helen* (he uses *ἐκγοητεύω*). Eratosthenes stated that the aim of poetry was *ψυχαγωγία* not *διδασκαλία* (Strabo 16).

**50<sup>a</sup>34.** *περιπέτεια καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεις*: the first mention of these terms, which are explained in Ch. 11. Probably they were already recognized technical terms.

*Fifth Reason and summing up 50<sup>a</sup>35–39. The plot is the most difficult part of a play to manage.*

**50<sup>a</sup>36.** ἀκριβοῦν: cf. 48<sup>b</sup>11 εἰκόνας μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας, to produce something finished and precise. No extant tragedy is a youthful work, unless possibly the *Rhesus*, which, if it is by Euripides, was written early in his career: see Ritchiè, *The Authenticity of the Rhesus of Eur.* (Cambridge, 1964). The evidence of other periods certainly suggests that skill in dramatic art comes only with practice, whereas a youthful rhetorician might be expert at apt speeches.

**50<sup>a</sup>37.** συνίστασθαι: act. and mid. form seem to be used indifferently. οἱ πρόωτοι: are these pre-Aeschylean? See on νέων l. 25, above. If this generalization does not strike us, so far as our evidence goes, as obviously true, it is perhaps a measure of the difference between character and ἦθος. However, Sophocles is said to have considered his latest and most mature style to have been ἠθικώτατον (Plut. *M.* 79 B); see Sir Maurice Bowra, *Problems in Gk. Poetry* (Oxford, 1953), pp. 108 ff.

**50<sup>a</sup>38.** ἀρχή . . . καὶ οἶον ψυχή: in the light of A.'s philosophy these words carry even more weight than they might seem to. E. quotes *De An.* 402<sup>a</sup>6: ἔστι γὰρ (ἡ ψυχὴ) οἶον ἀρχὴ τῶν ζώων. Soul is the 'form' of man, and plot is of equivalent importance in tragedy.

**50<sup>a</sup>39–50<sup>b</sup>4.** *The Second Part ἦθος.*

**50<sup>a</sup>39.** δεύτερον: in order of importance. A difficulty of the following passage is that ἦθος has already been examined in connexion with μῦθος, as being the only rival for primacy, without having been introduced formally as the second part. It has been defined only incidentally (49<sup>b</sup>37) as that in virtue of which men are ποιοί, of one sort and not another. It is further defined in contrast to διάνοια 50<sup>b</sup>8, below.

**50<sup>b</sup>1.** ἐναλείψειε: trans., the object being πίνακα understood.

**50<sup>b</sup>2.** χύδην: 'at random'. τὰ χύδην means prose as opposed to verse (*R.* 1409<sup>b</sup>7). At *Phaedr.* 264 B (see 50<sup>a</sup>32 n.) the parts of Lysias' speech are said χύδην βεβλήσθαι 'to be thrown down at random'.

εὐφράνειεν: give the ἡδονή which is the τέλος of the arts.

λευκογραφήσας: for the formation cf. σκιαγραφεῖν. There seems no evidence whether this means to draw in white on a dark ground or to draw in black on a white ground. That Philostratus mentions drawing λευκῇ τῇ γραμμῇ (*Vit. Ap.* 2. 22) shows little. The comparison, if it stands here—cf. 50<sup>a</sup>33 n.—is between an outline drawing, which corresponds to the plot, and beautiful colours grouped without meaning, corresponding to the characters. While the first pair have significance in common, the correspondence between characters and patches of pigment seems incomplete. Gomme, p. 63, following V.

suggests 'not give so much pleasure as if he draws the outline in black and white first'. For a similar comparison between *περιγραφή*, 'outline', and *φάρμακα*, 'colours' see Pl. *Polit.* 277 c.

**50<sup>b</sup>3. διὰ ταύτην:** i.e. indirectly, secondarily, repeating the point which was made at 50<sup>a</sup>16; tragedy is not an imitation of men, but it imitates men in the course of presenting human action. The repetition rounds off the paragraph.

**50<sup>b</sup>4. πραττόντων** here must refer to the original agents, not the performers, as at 48<sup>a</sup>1.

**50<sup>b</sup>4-12. The Third Part** *διάνοια*.

This is discussed further in Ch. 19, but it is quickly dismissed as being in the province of rhetoric.

**50<sup>b</sup>4. τοῦτο . . . δύνασθαι:** as *ἦθος* is revealed mainly by action, so *διάνοια* is revealed in *λόγοι* spoken or written, in demonstrations and in generalizations; the point is repeated (ll. 11, 12) at the end of the section. *ἦθος* καὶ *διάνοια* are the two aspects of the whole man, corresponding, though rather superficially, to character and intellect. Then as now it was a subject of debate with which of the two the educator ought to be more concerned (cf. *Pol.* 1337<sup>a</sup>38). In the last resort they are not completely separable.

**50<sup>b</sup>5. τὰ ἐνόητα:** the man with good *διάνοια* can see what there is in a subject and what there is to be said about it. Cf. Isocr. 5. 110: *κατιδὼν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνόητων εἰπεῖν*, Dion. Hal. *Lysias*, 15: *εὐρετικός γὰρ ἔστιν τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐνόητων λόγων*.

**τὰ ἀρμόττοντα:** cf. 54<sup>a</sup>22. The two together are much the same as *τὰ δεόντα*, what Thucydides claims to put into the mouths of the speakers in his *History* (1. 22. 1).

**50<sup>b</sup>6. τῶν λόγων:** taken by B. and G. to refer to speeches in plays, by Vahlen, Butcher, R., and S. to speeches in general. M. and E. bracket the words. At l. 15, below, it has the latter meaning (or just 'prose'), and it is natural to illustrate *διάνοια* from rhetoric in general: cf. 56<sup>a</sup>34. On the other hand, with *οἱ ἀρχαῖοι* l. 7 we are back again with the speeches of drama. It is not necessary to specify *λόγοι* as the part of drama where *διάνοια* is in place, but A. does sometimes state the obvious.

**τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς:** *διάνοια* is associated with both of them. The *πολιτικός* is as old as the *πόλις*; the *ῥητορικός* depends on his new art. The meaning of *ῥητορικῆς* is plain, but *πολιτικός* is used in many senses. With this passage may be compared *Pol.* 1274<sup>b</sup>36: *τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου πᾶσαν ὀρώμεν τὴν πραγματείαν οὖσαν περὶ πόλιν. πολιτικὴ* is concerned with the good of the whole *πόλις* (*EN* 1094<sup>b</sup>11). As ethics were conceived as existing within the framework of the city, the connexion between *ἦθη* and *πολιτικὴ* was close.

Cf. *Pol.* 1288<sup>b</sup>1: παιδεία καὶ ἔθῃ ταῦτὰ σχεδὸν τὰ ποιῶντα σπουδαῖον ἄνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιῶντα πολιτικόν; *R.* 1356<sup>a</sup>26: τῆς περὶ τὰ ἦθη πραγματείας, ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικὴν; *Satyr. Vit. Eur.* 39. iv. 5 (Arrighetti): πολλὰ καὶ παρὰ τῶν κωμικῶν ποιητῶν ἅμα αὐστηρῶς λέγεται καὶ πολιτικῶς . . . Εὐριπίδης πρὸς ἀλκὴν καὶ εὐψυχίαν παρακαλεῖ τοὺς νέους. There is a touch of irresponsibility about ῥητορικὴ: cf. ῥητορικὸν γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον μᾶλλον ἢ τιμῶντος ἀλήθειαν ἀνδρός (*Galen, Protrept.* 10).

50<sup>b</sup>7. οἱ . . . ἀρχαῖοι: see note on 53<sup>b</sup>28.

50<sup>b</sup>8. ῥητορικῶς: the rhetorical characteristics of Euripides are obvious. In the set debates he seems at times more eager to make his characters say τὰ ἐνόητα καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα than to maintain their consistency. No doubt fourth-century tragedy developed further along the same lines; Theodectes was both dramatist and rhetorician. We need not go so far as to take πολιτικῶς as equivalent to ἠθικῶς, but it implies a less exclusive interest in persuasiveness and point scoring: cf. *R.* 1417<sup>a</sup>23: μὴ ὡς ἀπὸ διανοίας λέγειν ὥσπερ οἱ νῦν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως (for προαίρεσις see below) and 1366<sup>a</sup>10. But there is some overlap between them. G. quotes Dio Chrys. *Or.* 52 (vol. ii, p. 160 Dind.): ἡ τε τοῦ Εὐριπίδου σύνεσις . . . πολιτικωτάτη καὶ ῥητορικωτάτη οὖσα. As an example of a play that was conspicuously πολιτικός E. suggests the *Antig.* Eur. *Supp.*, like Thucydides, is both πολιτικός and ῥητορικός. For an extreme of rhetoric we might instance the *agon* of the *Troades* (914–1032).

ἦθος μὲν: answered by διάνοια δέ l. 11. ἦθος is introduced here in order to explain διάνοια by contrast. According to our ἦθος we are ποιοί τινες, and naturally prefer certain courses of action and make certain decisions προαιρέσεις. The notion of προαίρεσις makes clear the connexion between ἦθος and action, whereas διάνοια is revealed mainly in speech. A προαίρεσις is a considered decision made by a person of mature judgement after due deliberation. Such a choice cannot be made on the spur of the moment (*EE* 1224<sup>a</sup>4), or by a child (*ibid.* 28), or under the influence of violent passion, since π. is μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας (*EN* 1112<sup>a</sup>15; cf. schol. Eur. *Med.* 899); Medea does not kill her children κατὰ προαίρεσιν. (A. could hardly have denied that the tempestuous disposition which gave rise to such violent passions was part of her ἦθος.) Hence we are told here ἦθος δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν, and only those λόγοι which contain a προαίρεσις can reveal ἦθος (cf. *EN* 1417<sup>a</sup>19: οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ ἦθη ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν), though διάνοια can be shown without one. The connexion between προαίρεσις and ἦθος is a commonplace in A. (cf. *EN* 1111<sup>b</sup>4 ff., 1139<sup>a</sup>31, *R.* 1395<sup>b</sup>14). One would not expect to find ἦθος in a Messenger's speech; messengers decide nothing. But it is obvious that decisions require also the ability to foresee

consequences, and sometimes A. makes a place for *διάνοια* too, e.g. *Met.* 1065<sup>a</sup>32: *προαίρεσις οὐ χωρὶς διανοίας*, and *Ph.* 196<sup>b</sup>18 and 22 where the two words are synonymous: see Ross's note.

In the 'drama of ideas', Shaw or Pirandello, *διάνοια* assumes pre-eminence. Whether A. admitted the existence of such a type depends on the interpretation of 50<sup>a</sup>12-14.

50<sup>b</sup>9. [ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον . . .]: either the *προαίρεσις* would be inexplicable but for the *ἦθος* in the speech, or *τί ποιητέον* may be supplied after *δῆλον*. But the clause is absent in Ar. and can be dispensed with.

There is another sense of *ἦθος* which Vahlen, *Gesammelte*, pp. 257 ff., would introduce here. A speaker's persuasiveness depends partly on the personal confidence which he inspires; he may set out to convey an impression of a particular sort of personality according to the nature of his audience and his subject. In rhetorical writings this is the sense of *ἦθος* most commonly referred to, the character which the speaker projects. Dion. Hal. *Lysias* 8, says of Lysias that he never made a *πρόσωπον ἀνηθοποίητον*. A. discusses this in Bk. 2 of his *R.* This *ἦθος* could be independent of *προαίρεσις*.

The characters in a play are usually represented as expressing themselves sincerely, revealing themselves as they are. No doubt the playwright in representing them uses some of the same skills as the speech-writer putting across a personality which will make a favourable impression. Occasionally he will go a stage further and represent a wolf representing himself in sheep's clothing, as Creon in *OC* 728-60. A.'s tendency to identify the dramatist with his characters makes it difficult to give a precise meaning to *ἦθος* here. So long as we regard a dramatic character as an independently existing entity, this sense of *ἦθος* is largely irrelevant, but it becomes relevant when we think of the dramatist using his art to present characters.

For *ἠθικὴ τραγωδία* see 56<sup>a</sup>1.

50<sup>b</sup>12. *καθόλου*: such generalizations or *γνώμαι* would not express ultimate truths; they would be general statements such as are concocted with a view to the particular conclusions that the speaker wishes to justify.

It is worth noting that there is little room for impassioned speech within these categories. In later tragedy the expression of emotion was left increasingly to the musical parts. A speech like Medea's (*Med.* 1019-80), which A. probably did not admire (cf. 53<sup>b</sup>28), contains by these standards little *ἦθος* and less *διάνοια*, though it does end with a resounding *γνώμη*, the generalization *ὄσπερ μέγιστων αἰτίος κακῶν βροτοῖς* 1080. To many moderns this rather spoils the effect.

**50<sup>b</sup>12–15.** *Fourth Part λέξις.*

[τῶν μὲν λόγων]: B.'s emendation τῶν ἐν λόγῳ would mean 'of the parts in the medium of words': cf. 47<sup>a</sup>22.

**50<sup>b</sup>13.** λέξις can often be rendered 'style', but it covers the whole process of combining words into an intelligible sequence. Cf. 49<sup>b</sup>34, where the phrase τὴν τῶν μέτρων σύνθεσιν covers only metrical language, but in the widest sense the process is the same.

τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἐρμηνείαν: 'communication by means of words'; ὀνομασία = ὀνόματα. From ἐρμηνεύς, an interpreter of riddling or foreign language, ἐρμηνεία comes to mean communication and also, like λέξις, style. See the entry s.v. in the Glossary to Rhys Roberts's *Demetrius of Phalerum περὶ Ἑρμηνείας*.

**50<sup>b</sup>15.** ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν: 'has the same effect' and so 'does the same thing' (cf. 47<sup>a</sup>9). Both in verse (ἐμμέτρων) and in prose (λόγων), or in this context perhaps in speeches (in real life), λέξις is concerned with communication, with putting the best words in the best place, but not, of course, the same words in the same places in verse and in prose. The language of lyric poetry is probably covered by μέλος, and neither ἔμμετρα nor λέξις are relevant to it.

**50<sup>b</sup>15–20.** *The two remaining Parts, μέλος and ὄψις.*

**50<sup>b</sup>16.** ἡδυσμάτων: cf. 49<sup>b</sup>28. At EN 1170<sup>b</sup>29 the point of ἡδυσμα is that one does not need much of it.

**50<sup>b</sup>17.** ἀτεχνότατον . . . ἥκιστα οἰκείον: the qualities required by the successful producer of visual effects are different from those required by a poet, and though the wardrobe-master is allowed to have a τέχνη (l. 20, below), his skill is mainly empirical.

**50<sup>b</sup>18.** δύναμις: A. is emphatic (cf. 53<sup>b</sup>4, 62<sup>a</sup>12) that the 'effect' of tragedy does not depend on its being performed. Indeed it appears that at this date plays were written which were intended only for reading, ἀναγνωστικοί (R. 1413<sup>b</sup>12). The earliest ref. to the reading of stage plays is Aristoph. *Ran.* 52: Dionysus read the *Andromeda* to himself.

ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν: '(performance at) a public contest and actors'. Cf. 53<sup>a</sup>27 σκηνῶν καὶ ἀγῶνων, which is a hendiadys 'scenic contests'. ἀγ. καὶ ὑπ. so constructed should mean 'actors' contests'. There was in fact a prize for acting at Dionysia and Lenaea, but it would be pointless to mention it here.

**50<sup>b</sup>20.** σκευοποιῶ: schol. to Aristoph. *Eq.* 230 tells us that none of the σκευοποιοί dared to make a portrait mask of Cleon for Paphlagon to wear. Pollux 4. 115 suggests that masks and costumes were the main, if not the only, concern of the σκευοποιός.

A.'s preference for plot as opposed to character has won little



approval from most of the critics from the late nineteenth century onwards. To the generations which were profoundly influenced by Bradley's *Shakespearian Studies* it was common doctrine that, as Granville Barker once put it, the purpose of drama was to portray character. Interest in the inner life of the individual, which had been developed by the great novelists of late Victorian times in England, France, and Russia, caused exaggerated attention to traits of personality which could be perceived in Shakespeare and contributed to the spread of the belief that they must be contained, could one but find them, in all great drama. In fact few Greeks were interested in the analysis of states of consciousness and the study of psychological developments, and the scale of Greek drama allowed few opportunities for revealing the uniqueness of individuals. The character who appeared in a mask was naturally generalized spiritually in the same way as he was physically and as the style of masked acting must require. The difference becomes obvious if one compares the number and variety of the situations in which Hamlet, for instance, is presented with the restrictions and simplicity of the Greek stage, from which the background of ordinary life is almost totally excluded. It is impossible to deny that A. was right in his priorities so far as concerns Greek tragedy, and it is surprising that there should have been critics in his own time, as the tone of the chapter implies there were, who thought character more important than plot.

More recent critics are less out of sympathy with A. 'In drama characterization depends on function; what a character is depends on what he has to do in the play. Dramatic function in its turn depends on the structure of the play; the character has certain things to do because the play has such and such a shape.' Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton, 1957), p. 171.

## CHAPTERS 7-14

Chapters 7-14, with the intrusive Ch. 12, deal with plot, its structure, and its emotional effects. They contain a large proportion of the meat of the *P*. Chs. 7-9 form the first part of this section, and in them the general nature of the plot is discussed. Ch. 7 deals with plot in the light of the previously agreed definitions, while Ch. 8 throws further light by showing what it is not and the misapprehensions which have caused plots to be badly constructed. In Ch. 9 it is shown that a well-constructed plot represents a more general truth than history can usually reveal.

CHAPTER 7. 50<sup>b</sup>21–34. *Unity.*

**50<sup>b</sup>21.** διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων: this refers to the definitions given in Chs. 1–5 and more particularly to the examination of the six parts in Ch. 6.

λέγωμεν: a fresh start: cf. the beginning of the *P.*, 47<sup>a</sup>8.

**50<sup>b</sup>22.** τὴν σύστασιν. . . τῶν πραγμάτων: A.'s favourite expression for *mũthos*, with *σύνθεσις* as an alternative to *σύστασις*. The neutral word *πράγματα* applied to the contents can fairly be translated 'incidents' or 'subject matter'; cf. 53<sup>b</sup>5: τὸν ἀκούοντα τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα καὶ φρίττειν καὶ ἐλεεῖν. They are already present as relevant parts of the *πρᾶξις* but not yet built into the structure; see on 51<sup>a</sup>33.

**50<sup>b</sup>23.** κείται: 'it is accepted' between A. and his reader on the basis of the definitions in Ch. 6.

**50<sup>b</sup>24.** τελείας καὶ ὄλης: *τελείας* was added to *πρᾶξεως* in the definition of tragedy, apparently as being implicit in the notion of *πρᾶξις*; now *ὄλης*, which means much the same as *τελείας*, is added for emphasis. Nothing is absent which is necessary, nothing is present which is superfluous.

**50<sup>b</sup>25.** τι μέγεθος: again repeated from the definition 49<sup>b</sup>25.

μηδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος: an entity so small that it has no meaningful dimensions; cf. *Ph.* 266<sup>a</sup>10: ἀμερὲς εἶναι . . . καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν μέγεθος. The importance of parts in A.'s conception of a whole emerges in what follows.

**50<sup>b</sup>27.** μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης: no event can be completely isolated from all other events. But some events have no essential causal connexion with what has gone before. Where the action of a play begins there should be a natural seam in the continuum. The opposite of *ἐξ ἀνάγκης* is *ὡς ἔτυχεν* at 59<sup>a</sup>24.

**50<sup>b</sup>31.** μέσον: it is noteworthy that when the idea is repeated in connexion with epic at 59<sup>a</sup>20 we find the plur. *μέσα* (cf. *Pl. Phaedr.* 264 C). This is more exact, as there are usually a number of separable parts between beginning and end.

Dion. Hal. *de Thuc.* 10 is reminiscent of this passage, though there is no reason to suppose direct influence: αἰτιῶνται δὲ καὶ τὴν τάξιν αὐτοῦ τινὲς ὡς οὐτ' ἀρχὴν τῆς ἱστορίας εἰληφότος, ἣν ἐχρῆν, οὔτε τέλος ἐφηρημηκότος αὐτῇ τὸ πρέπον· οὐκ ἐλάχιστον μέρος εἶναι λέγοντες οικονομίας ἀγαθῆς, ἀρχὴν τε λαβεῖν, ἣς οὐκ ἂν εἶη τι πρότερον, καὶ τέλει περιλαβεῖν τὴν πραγματείαν, ᾧ δόξη μηδὲν ἐνδεῖν.

**50<sup>b</sup>34.** ιδέαις: probably 'principles', i.e. of right connexion (cf. 56<sup>b</sup>3), or equivalent to *εἶδος*, the form that has been described with beginning, middle, and end.

In this sentence A. formulates one of his most fruitful ideas, that there must be close internal cohesion binding the parts of a play together, if not logical necessity at least probability. We must not

find ourselves in doubt whether the consequences follow naturally. Plato makes the same demand in the more obvious context of a speech at *Phaedr.* 264 B. Dramas still undreamed of at the date of the *P.* on the whole bear out the validity of A.'s principles, though there are other unities than that of logic. But, as G. points out, A.'s principle does not apply without a good deal of modification to the beginning and the end. Here the test is that the audience should not feel something lacking from the beginning or that the action is cut short at the end. To Greek dramatists it was of great practical importance that their plots were mainly derived from stories already familiar. For instance the action of the *Ajax* at its beginning results immediately from what has been happening before. A modern audience, unless provided with a programme note, would be a good deal mystified. Moreover there is a whole class of plays from Aeschylus to Ibsen in which the distant past suddenly rears its ugly head. It may be outside the action, but it is one of the conditions of the play. In fact the plot is larger than the action, as is brought out by *δέσεις-λύσεις* in Ch. 18. Again, the end of the *OT* is anything but clear cut. Euripides solved the problem after a fashion with his prologue and *deus ex machina*, whatever his motives may have been for introducing them. It is noteworthy that the obvious end, the death of the hero as in *Hipp.* and *OC*, is exceptional in Greek tragedy, a fact which may be relevant to the absence of the conception 'hero' from Greek criticism (see p. 140).

'Really, universally, relations stop nowhere, and the exquisite problem of the artist is eternally but to draw, by a geometry of his own, the circle within which they shall happily appear to do so.' Henry James, *Preface to Roderick Hudson*.

50<sup>b</sup>34-51<sup>a</sup>15. *The right μέγεθος and its relation to τὸ καλόν.*

50<sup>b</sup>34. ἐπεὶ . . . : ὥστε δεῖ . . . 51<sup>a</sup>3 performs the function of the main clause. Cf. Bonitz 873<sup>a</sup>31.

τὸ καλόν: the idea that tragedy possesses formal beauty—that the attractiveness of style and of music are connected with beauty may perhaps be assumed—is here introduced without warning or explanation: cf. 59<sup>a</sup>21. See note on l. 36, below.

ζῶον: not a 'picture', though this is a meaning the word can bear, e.g. Herod. 3. 88 (cf. also Butcher, p. 188, n. 1), but a living being as opposed to the inorganic πρᾶγμα. The comparison of a work of literature to a ζῶον has been made by Plato *Phaedr.* 264 C, with reference to the discourse of Lysias (see on 50<sup>a</sup>33) which had been read earlier in the dialogue; this had been shown to lack the organization of its parts in harmony and proportion to each other and to the whole which is common to living beings and properly constructed

works of art. But the factor of beauty is not specifically mentioned. The notion of organic unity implicit in *σῶμα* (cf. 51<sup>a</sup>3) reappears in *R. ad Alex.* 1436<sup>a</sup>29, 1438<sup>b</sup>24, where *σωματοειδής* is a technical term for 'structurally coherent'. Polybius i. 3..4 uses the word to describe a history which combines events in separate areas forming a unity by reason of their interaction. It is likely that the idea was transmitted from A. through Peripatetic channels.

**50<sup>b</sup>37.** τὸ γὰρ καλόν: καλόν is A.'s word for describing something good to look at, but it suggests equally approval on other grounds; he has no term to denote aesthetic satisfaction, though there are a few passages where the context suggests such a meaning, e.g. 54<sup>b</sup>11, or *Pol.* 1338<sup>b</sup>1, where it is asserted that the young are taught to draw not for any practical end but in order that they may become perceptive of corporeal beauty, *θεωρητικὸν τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους*. But it is not clear that A. ever completely separates aesthetic satisfaction from the perception of functionally harmonious development in which the realization of the form consists. *τοῦ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἶδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὀρισμένον*, *Met.* 1078<sup>a</sup>36, refers to the proper relation of parts to whole, proper for a particular purpose. Even if an object is superficially repulsive it may yet be καλόν to the philosopher who understands that the relation of its parts is determined *μὴ τυχόντως ἀλλ' ἔνεκά τινος* (*HA* 645<sup>a</sup>23). Again, *ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι* (*Pol.* 1326<sup>a</sup>33) refers to the size of population which allows the most efficient functioning of a community. Accordingly, although beauty is mentioned as a quality of a good play or poem, we need not regard the achievement of beauty as a separate end of the poet; both in a picture and in a play τὸ καλόν includes intelligibility. It is a necessary result of constructing a plot which will arouse pity and terror that it constitutes a pleasing whole. If the parts were not *σύμμετροι* and in the proper relation to each other as explained at 50<sup>b</sup>27 ff. (cf. *Pol.* 1284<sup>b</sup>8), that is to say every part except the first must be a necessary or likely consequence of the part that precedes it, the τέλος or ἔνεκά τινος of the poet's activity would not be achieved. For a different view see Else, *HSCP* 49 (1938), 179–204.

*ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει*: clearly there is variety of unity and different degrees of it; a rhinoceros has a compacter unity than a giraffe.

**50<sup>b</sup>38.** ἔγγυς τοῦ ἀναισθήτου χρόνου: at first sight Tkatsch's χρόνου, adopted by G., is attractive. As an object becomes progressively smaller it is harder to see, and if the diminution is continued indefinitely, χρόνω 'in course of time' it will be invisible. However, not only is word-order against it, but there is no doubt that A. believed that there is a connexion between the size of an object and the time taken to look at it (*Ph.* 222<sup>b</sup>15). Once an object is too small for its

parts to be distinguishable, so that their relations cannot be seen, it cannot be beautiful.

**50<sup>b</sup>39.** οὐ γὰρ ἅμα: similarly, if an object is too large to be within the field of vision from a single view-point, it is impossible to appreciate its proportions.

**51<sup>a</sup>1.** ἡ θεωρία: for the viewing of works of art A. always uses θεωρεῖν and its derivatives; of words derived from θεᾶσθαι only θεατής and θέατρον.

τὸ ἓν: the idea of unity has been present throughout this chapter, but this is the first mention of 'oneness'; cf. Gorgias, *Helen* 5: ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ γραφεῖς, ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν σωμάτων καὶ χρωμάτων ἐν σώμα καὶ σχῆμα τελείως ἀπεργάσωνται, τέρπουσι τὴν ὄψιν.

**51<sup>a</sup>3.** σωμάτων: i.e. ἀψύχων σωμάτων corresponding to ἅπαν πρᾶγμα at 50<sup>b</sup>34.

**51<sup>a</sup>4.** εὐσύνοπτον: this is the opposite of the situation described in 50<sup>b</sup>39: οὐ γὰρ ἅμα ἡ θεωρία γίνεται. The word is used at 59<sup>a</sup>33 with reference to the plot of the *Iliad*, and at *R.* 1409<sup>b</sup>1 of the prose period which because of its form is more intelligible than a long sentence in the λέξις εἰρομένη the 'running-on style', and also εὐμνημόνευτον 'easily retained in the memory': see below.

**51<sup>a</sup>5.** μῆκος in plots corresponds to μέγεθος in objects; cf. 49<sup>b</sup>12-16.

εὐμνημόνευτον: a plot should be such that it can be retained in the mind as a whole. Cf. the complaint of the Spartans after listening to a long speech from the Samian envoys, Herod. 3. 46: τὰ μὲν πρῶτα λεχθέντα ἐπιλεληθέναι, τὰ δὲ ὕστερα οὐ συνιέναι.

In practice the limits of the duration of drama are fixed by external arrangements depending on custom and on the convenience of the various parties concerned. It may not be the same as the duration which would be fixed if nothing were to be considered but the drama itself; this would be a matter of τέχνη. B. suggests that αἴσθησιν refers to the power of an audience to watch without loss of concentration. The ideal play might be too long, or not long enough, for the normal audience.

**51<sup>a</sup>9.** †ὥσπερ ποτέ . . .: that plays were ever timed by the water-clock like speeches in the courts is inconceivable.

**51<sup>a</sup>10.** ὁ μείζων: the Greeks associated bigness very closely with beauty; cf. *EN* 1123<sup>b</sup>7: τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ. In particular they admired women large, perhaps as suggesting goddesses, like Phye in Herod. 1. 60. 4; cf. also *R.* 1361<sup>a</sup>6, though there seems to have been a tradition that Andromache was too big (Ovid, *AA* 2. 645).

σύνδηλος: that the συν- is emphatic and repeats the notion of εὐσύνοπτος is shown by συνορᾶσθαι at 59<sup>b</sup>19. The word to be understood with μείζων and σύνδηλος is μῦθος.

**51<sup>a</sup>12.** *κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον*: in this much-used phrase *κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς* is hardly to be distinguished from *ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ* at 50<sup>b</sup>30.

**51<sup>a</sup>13.** *ἐφεξῆς*: 'in natural sequence', sometimes, though not here, with stress on continuity. Cf. *R.* 1416<sup>b</sup>16.

*εἰς εὐτυχίαν . . . μεταβάλλειν*: the first appearance of another basic idea of the *P.* The content of the *πρᾶξις* of a tragedy is a change from good to bad, or from bad to good, fortune. The character who experiences this change is today commonly called the 'hero', but A. lacks such a term. However, it appears from the discussion in Ch. 13 that he has in mind one dominating character on whose fortunes the play mainly turns, though in Ch. 14 we have rather a conflict between equally important parties (see 52<sup>b</sup>34–53<sup>a</sup>5 n.). The transition from one state to its opposite requires a number of stages, some plots requiring more, others fewer, but the crucial point is that these stages (often corresponding to *episodes*) must be sufficient, and not more than sufficient, to make the transition comprehensible. The words used to express this transition are *μεταβάλλειν*, *μεταβολή*, *μεταβαίνειν*, *μετάβασις*, *μεταπίπτειν* all of which, except *μεταβαίνειν* and *μεταπίπτειν*, are used elsewhere in the *P.* for other sorts of change. *περιπέτεια*, as we shall see, is a particular type of *μετάβασις*. It appears from 55<sup>b</sup>28 that the *ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβάσεως* can be quite late in a play. Although A. states elsewhere that the change from good to bad fortune is superior in realizing the specific effects of tragedy, there is no suggestion that it is the necessary end to a tragedy, as modern usage requires. A tragedy was the sort of play performed at the tragic festivals. It dealt with life at more or less heroic level, but there was no suggestion that it need end in catastrophe. *μεταβάλλειν* as at 53<sup>a</sup>13 = *μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι*.

The statements in this chapter about the *μῆκος/μέγεθος* of tragedy do not seem to have any reference to the comparison of tragedy to epic in respect of *μῆκος* in Ch. 5. 49<sup>b</sup>12–16. That the action tends to extend over less than a day puts little practical limitation on its length. Nor does A. show whether he thinks the limits imposed by conditions of performance conflict with what is desirable.

## CHAPTER 8

This follows closely on Ch. 7 and reveals certain common misconceptions about the nature of unity. All the references are to epic; this is justified by the section at the end of Ch. 5 stressing the similarity of epic and tragedy.

**51<sup>a</sup>17.** *περὶ ἓνα*: there is no unity of hero.

*συμβαίνει*: repeated from l. 13, above. The word suggests events

happening to a man, *πάθη*, which may be the reason for the separate mention of *πράξεις* in the next sentence.

**51<sup>a</sup>18.** *πράξεις*: not complex *πράξεις*. Cf. what is said about paradigmatic history at *R.* 1360<sup>a</sup>36, quoted on 51<sup>b</sup>2.

**51<sup>a</sup>19.** *ἐξ ὧν*: of these many things which can happen to a man some, to put it mildly, do not combine to form part of any unified whole: cf. Horace, *AP* 23: *simplex et unum*.

Probably those who suffer from this illusion, that singleness of hero gives unity, are not critics who have enunciated a theory but poets who reveal their assumptions in their choice of subject. No Greek play could cover the whole life of a hero, and the example is taken from epic as affording the best example of a failure in unity. Eur.'s *Hecuba* is an example of a play with two episodes connected mainly by the fact that they affect one person. Here the failure in unity is not total.

**51<sup>a</sup>20.** *Ἡρακλῆϊδα*: epics on Heracles were composed by Peisander c. 600 B.C. and by Panyasis (?uncle of Herodotus) who perished in the *stasis* at Halicarnassus c. 460.

*Θησιῖδα*: little is known of early epics on Theseus except that they existed; see *Epic. Gr. Frag.*, ed. Kinkel, p. 217.

Epics on either of these heroes would be likely conspicuously to lack cohesion, since three separate cycles of legend were connected with Heracles, and Attic patriotism tended to assimilate to Theseus myths which belonged elsewhere.

**51<sup>a</sup>22.** *μῦθον*: since such a plot must contain the imitation of many actions it will be unintegrated.

**51<sup>a</sup>23.** *τὰ ἄλλα διαφέρει*: cf. 59<sup>b</sup>12-16. The convention of the picaresque novel allows a sequence of episodes with no connexion other than that they are centred on the same person.

**51<sup>a</sup>24.** *ἦτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν*: A. holds Homer in such admiration that he will not deny him *τέχνη*, though it is unlikely that anyone before himself had discovered the scientific basis of poetic practice; cf. 54<sup>a</sup>10 for the empirical processes of tragic poets. He is less certain of the absence of *τέχνη* from the visual arts (47<sup>a</sup>19).

*Ὀδύσειαν*: there may, as E. suggests, be a point in the omission of the article here, though the omission is not unique (cf. 54<sup>a</sup>1). Homer, confronted with the problem of composing an epic on Odysseus (cf. *Ἡρακλῆϊδα* *Θησιῖδα*, above) avoided the obvious mistake and 'composed', *συνέστησεν*, emphasizing structure, *τὴν Ὀδύσειαν*, l. 29, below.

**51<sup>a</sup>26.** *πληγῆναι μὲν ἐν τῷ Παρνασσῷ*: it is odd that the wounding of Odysseus on Parnassus, when as a boy he visited Autolycus, is described at length at *Od.* 19. 392-466 in connexion with the scar by which Eurycleia recognizes him. Like the second episode mentioned—

Odysseus' attempt by feigning madness to evade his obligation of following Agamemnon to Troy (told in the *Cypria*, see *Soph. Frag.*, Pearson 2. 115)—it has no logical relevance to the structure of events in the poem. The most probable explanation is, not that A. forgot that the wounding was told in the *Odyssey*, still less that he had a text which omitted the incident—the scar is mentioned independently at 54<sup>b</sup>27—but that he did not consider it part of the structure as defined in Ch. 17, rather a mere episode. Moreover, what A. says is not that these incidents are irrelevant to the *Odyssey*, but that they have no relation to each other, except that both concerned the same man. An ordinary epic poet with Odysseus for his subject would have brought both of them into his poem. None the less there is undeniable clumsiness here, and if the *Odyssey* were lost no one would guess that the wounding on Parnassus was there related.

51<sup>a</sup>27. οὐδέν: must be adverbial with ἀναγκαῖον ἦν. B.'s οὐδέ would be easier.

51<sup>a</sup>29. ὁμοίως δέ καὶ τὴν Ἰλιάδα: the unity of the *Iliad* is extolled at 59<sup>a</sup>30 ff.

51<sup>a</sup>30. ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις μιμητικαῖς: this appears to claim that the principle of unity is valid in all the arts, not only in other categories of poetry, though for A. music and dancing were both subordinate to poetry, and architecture was not a mimetic art at all. This leaves us with the assertion that the representational arts, painting and sculpture, must show unity. The problem must have arisen most obviously over the representation of groups, as in pedimental sculptures and in friezes, though paintings too sometimes contained large numbers of figures. No attempt to work out common principles, like that of Lessing in the *Laocoon*, has survived from the ancient world. Both Plato and A. assume that poetry and painting are strictly comparable, and this is the nearest thing we have to a plain statement of the fact; see also the passage of Gorgias cited with reference to 51<sup>a</sup>1.

51<sup>a</sup>32. καὶ ταύτης ὅλης: an action could be one and yet not be complete. 'Wholeness guarantees that no part is missing which should be there; unity, that nothing is there which belongs somewhere else', E. A's remarks on the chorus (56<sup>a</sup>25–32) follow from this.

51<sup>a</sup>33. πραγμάτων: here used collectively for the *πρᾶξις* as a whole; but a single *πρᾶγμα* cannot be equated with a *μέρος*.

51<sup>a</sup>34. διαφέρεσθαι: 'is dislocated', probably a medical term. At *Probl.* 917<sup>b</sup>8 it is said that stories about a single episode *περὶ ἐν συνεστηκυῶν* give greater pleasure because they are more easily intelligible, τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν ὠρίσται τὰ δὲ πολλὰ τοῦ ἀπείρου μετέχει.



## CHAPTER 9

This is a chapter of the greatest importance; here the conclusion is reached as to the nature of the poet's activity.

**51<sup>a</sup>36–51<sup>b</sup>32.** *The universality of poetry.*

**51<sup>a</sup>36.** ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων: it follows from Chs. 7 and 8, especially from 51<sup>a</sup>12, that γενόμενα 'particular events' are not the poet's proper theme because they do not normally unite to form the sort of organic whole defined in Ch. 7, and because many events even in the life of a central figure have no necessary connexion with the rest. They must form part of a πράξις as defined in Ch. 6. It is allowed at the end of this section 51<sup>b</sup>29–32 that γενόμενα may, exceptionally, form part of such a πράξις.

**51<sup>a</sup>37.** οἷα ἂν γένοιτο: 'the sort of thing that might be expected to happen', more fully expressed at 51<sup>b</sup>8–10, below. Renderings like 'might happen' or 'can happen' are misleading because they suggest something unusual: cf. fr. 137 = schol. *Il.* 2. 73: ποιητικὸν τὸ μιμείσθαι τὰ εἰωθότα γίνεσθαι.

**51<sup>a</sup>38.** καί: explanatory; events are a natural or necessary consequence of previous events, including human decisions, but their complexity and obscurity is such that this is often concealed.

δυνατά: sc. γενέσθαι.

κατὰ τὸ εἶκος: by no means all δυνατά are of this kind: see 61<sup>b</sup>15.

**51<sup>b</sup>1.** ἱστορικός: here relates to history, not to the older sense of the word 'inquiry', as in *περὶ τῶν ζώων ἱστορίαι* (*Gen. An.* 716<sup>b</sup>31) and our 'natural history'.

ἔμμετρα . . . ἄμμετρα: the idea that metre is a superficial addition has already appeared at 47<sup>b</sup>18; Empedocles, though he wrote in verse, remained essentially a physiologist. The subject of Herodotus was γενόμενα, not πράξεις, with which alone mimetic art is concerned.

**51<sup>b</sup>2.** Herodotus is mentioned several times by A. and it must be his *History* that is referred to at 59<sup>a</sup>24–29; his opening sentence is actually quoted at *R.* 1409<sup>a</sup>27, though with *Θουρίου* in place of *Ἀλικαρνησσοῦ*. Thucydides, strangely, is never mentioned by name, though it is generally agreed that *Ath. Pol.* 33. 2 refers to Thuc. 8. 97. 2. A. has extraordinarily little to say about history in general. At *R.* 1360<sup>a</sup>36 αἱ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἱστορίαι are said to be useful πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς συμβουλὰς (πράξεις must be used here in the limited sense of 'individual acts': cf. 51<sup>a</sup>18).

**51<sup>b</sup>4.** διαφέρει: the plur. would be more natural after διαφέρουσιν in l. 2, above.

**51<sup>b</sup>5.** φιλοσοφώτερον: see note to l. 8, below.

**51<sup>b</sup>6. σπουδαιότερον:** A. took a low view of history, as emerges clearly from the fuller statement at 59<sup>a</sup>22-29: see M. I. Finley in *History and Theory*, 4 (1965), 281 ff. It contains a mere congeries of events, either those of a short period, which will belong to numerous different πράξεις, or those of a longer period, which again will tend to no one τέλος. As A. nowhere censures the historian he must have thought that the complexity of events combined with deficiency of information made it impossible to disentangle the underlying relationships. There is no reason to object to the introduction here of a non-mimetic art, if art it should be called. The point is that history, not being concerned with πράξεις, is not intelligible in the same way as the μῦθος of a play.

Herod. 3. 39 and 4. 145 are examples of purely temporal linkage between events.

σπουδαῖος applied to things means what ὁ σπουδαῖος would do or approve. A σπουδαῖον ὑπόδημα is the work of a σ. σκυτεὺς (εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ σκυτικῆ) *EE* 1219<sup>a</sup>21. Close to the sense here is Isocr. 15. 267: τὰ μείζω καὶ σπουδαιότερα τῶν μαθημάτων.

Note that the subject of this chapter is not tragedy alone. Comedy, though less σπουδαία than tragedy, is still superior to history. Cf. *EN* 1177<sup>a</sup>3.

**51<sup>b</sup>7. μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου:** cf. 50<sup>b</sup>12: καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται, 'state a general truth'. For the relation of καθόλου here to Ch. 17 see 55<sup>b</sup>2 n.

**51<sup>b</sup>8. ἔστιν δὲ . . . :** this sentence with its explanation of καθόλου supplies a large part of the evidence for A.'s meaning when he claims that poetry is philosophical. τῷ ποίῳ τὰ ποῖα shows that we have to deal with both characters and events: cf. 54<sup>a</sup>33-36 where character is the starting-point. To take characters first, it is clear that, in contrast to Alcibiades, they are to be generalized. Possibly Alcibiades is chosen here, rather than the habitual Coriscus or Callias, because he was so strikingly individual; as he was unlike most men in most respects his experiences, if he were represented in a play, would be unlike those of most men, and so lacking in significance. Also his life was treated by historians. The requirement in Ch. 15 that characters shall be ὁμοῖος is based on the same idea; they must be like us to the extent that we feel that their experiences have meaning for us. It is less easy to determine in what way characters are universalized, apart from the removal of individual eccentricities. Obviously a number of different sorts of character are involved, all of them to some extent 'typical' human beings. Cf. the characteristics of different ages described at *R.* 2. 12-14. But it is a question whether τὸ καθόλου is achieved simply by the absence of peculiarity, as in a composite photograph, or whether the poet reveals qualities not generally recognized which none the less show essential realities of

man; there may be a hint of the latter idea in 54<sup>b</sup>10–14. Incidentally it is not nowadays high praise to say of a dramatist's characters that they are good *types*. It has not always been so: 'His persons act and speak by the influence of those general passions and principles by which all minds are agitated. . . . In the writings of other poets a character is too often an individual, in those of Shakespeare it is commonly a species.' So Johnson in the Preface to his *Shakespeare*. See also 54<sup>a</sup>36 n. The title *Death of a Salesman* suggests an individual who is typical of his species.

It is the statement that the things which happen are universals that arouses the attention of a modern reader. Surely the things which happen in tragedy raise all the great questions about pain and suffering and justice and the nature of the world in which the tragic event is allowed to happen. Are we victims of powers like wanton boys? Do just gods make of our pleasant vices instruments to plague us? Does any divinity shape our ends or send upon us a *χάρις βίαιος* in loving chastisement? It is remarkable that a work on tragedy should pass by such problems in silence—except for an aside to the effect that the misfortunes of a good man, if shown on the stage, would be too painful to contemplate. But A. of course knows no powers that can be thus questioned; god is inside the process, eternally actualizing potentiality. Events happen in the way they must in the light of what has happened before and of human decisions superimposed on the logic of events. When the universal regularities are revealed, events are intelligible: *τίμιον τὸ καθόλου ὅτι δηλοῖ τὴν αἰτίαν* (*An. Post.* 88<sup>a</sup>5), 'the universal is precious because it reveals the cause'.

Accordingly E. 306, 7 seems to go too far in asserting that 'the poetic universal has nothing to do with what happens to man but only with how he reacts to it'. Things happen as they must and the consequences of the past press hard. The victim finds himself in the fell clutch of circumstance not only because of his own decisions, but because of the way in which the law of the universe requires one thing to follow on another. What is true is that the question why god allows iniquities is not answered, or even asked, by tragedy as A. understands it. Accordingly many may think his claim that tragedy is philosophic does not amount to much. None the less, he does find a serious achievement with which to credit the poet, a thing not easily to be managed within the framework of ideas commonly accepted among the Greeks. Whether or not in conscious contradiction Polybius (2. 56. 11) puts forward the view that the *τέλος* of tragedy is the opposite of that of history, to produce *ἐκπληξίς* and *ψυχαγωγία* through *ἀπάτη*, while history benefits the *φιλομαθοῦντες* by showing them the truth.

**51<sup>b</sup>10.** *ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη*: names belong to individuals, not to classes, hence B. translates 'though it affixes proper names to characters'. It is more likely that the connexion is given by the emphasis on *ἐπι-* in *ἐπιτιθεμένη*; tragedy aims at achieving this generalized statement, but *afterwards*, when the structure of plot is complete, it gives individual names. This is in accord with the procedure recommended in Ch. 17: the poet first constructs his plot, then adds the names, Orestes and Iphigeneia. The contrast here is between *τὰ καθόλου* and *τὰ γενόμενα*; below it is between *τὰ πεποιημένα* and *τὰ γενόμενα*.

**51<sup>b</sup>11.** *ἔπραξεν . . . ἔπαθεν*: why not the same pair of words as in l. 9? Probably *λέγειν* is used above because it is appropriate to characters in plays, while *πράττειν* covers *πάσχειν* because every *πάθος* can be regarded as the consequence of some *πράξις*; in the second sentence the redundant *ἔπαθεν* is added for the sake of balance, not *λέγειν*, because few of Alcibiades' words were recorded.

**51<sup>b</sup>12.** *ἤδη*: it has become obvious 'in course of time': cf. *EN* 1154<sup>b</sup>9, so B. 'Logical' *ἤδη* (LSJ s.v. 4, cf. *εὐθύς* 52<sup>a</sup>14), 'without more ado', is less natural.

The point of the comparison is not the obvious one, that comic poets, unlike tragic poets, construct their own plots, since *συστήσαντες . . . εἰκότων* would be just as appropriate for tragic poets, but that after constructing their plots comic poets apply to their characters any chance names, while tragic poets use existing names, i.e. names of characters known from legend. It is paradoxical that tragic poets should be like iambic poets in using names of real persons, a practice which belongs to a primitive stage of development. To this extent comedy should be more universal than tragedy. The reason, *αἴτιον δέ*, is given at l. 16, below.

**51<sup>b</sup>13.** *μῦθον*: the comic plot is so described though usually unconnected with myth.

*οὔτω*: 'then only' when they have achieved the action described in the part., a common idiom in A. (cf. *EN* 1145<sup>b</sup>4). G. disregarding this made *οὔτω* refer back to *οὐ στοχάζεται . . .* in l. 9, meaning that comic poets name their characters in a significant way which continues the generalizing power of poetry, much the same force as is obtained by reading *οὐ τυχόντα* (see below). *τυχόντα* then has to mean something like 'suitable', which is unexampled.

*ὑποτιθέασιν*: B. renders 'give it a basis of proper names' both here and at 55<sup>b</sup>12. *ἦθος ὑποτεθῆ* (54<sup>a</sup>27) means 'is supplied' or 'suggested'.

The reading *οὐ* or *οὔπω τὰ τυχόντα*, which is said to be supported by the Arabic though rejected by Tkatsch, was suggested by Butcher, and accepted by Grube. This would refer to the practice of choosing names to indicate the type to which a character belongs, who would thus be more generalized. This has been usual in many kinds of

comedy, e.g. Euelpides, Pyrgopolinices, Volpone, and has been continued with subtler suggestiveness by novelists. But οὐ τὰ τυχόντα gives a feebler antithesis than τυχόντα to γενομένων, and significant names do not seem to have been a conspicuous feature in the comedy of A.'s time.

**51<sup>b</sup>15.** τῶν γενομένων ὀνομάτων: taken by itself this phrase need mean no more than that the names occurred in well-known stories, without prejudice to the historical reality of the characters. But in view of the statement in the next sentence that things which have actually happened are obviously possible, and so credible, it is better to take γενομένων in the sense of belonging to real people, thus maintaining the same sense for γενομένων as for γενόμενα at 51<sup>a</sup>36 and 51<sup>b</sup>29. H. C. Baldry, in an article in *CQ* N.S. 4 (1954), 151-7, argued that ὀνόματα was to be supplied with γενόμενα 51<sup>b</sup>17, thus evading the contradiction between this passage, which implies that the subjects of tragedy were normally historical, and 51<sup>b</sup>29-32, where it appears that historical themes were exceptional. But the ὀνόματα γενόμενα will not be very persuasive unless the actions attributed to them are consistent with tradition. The licence allowed for modifying existing stories at 53<sup>b</sup>22-26 is in any case restricted. The easiest solution is to suppose that A., like Thucydides, believed that Greek myth, or much of it, was basically historical, or at least that names like Heracles or Achilles belonged to the class of γενόμενοι, real people, but that he distinguished between legends such as those of Troy or Thebes, and history of recent events like the Persian Wars.

The passage has been much discussed in connexion with the supposed Peripatetic theory of tragic history: see K. von Fritz in *Entretiens Fondation Hardt*, 4 (1956), 83 ff., F. W. Walbank in *Historia*, 9 (1960), 217 ff., C. O. Brink, *Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc.* (1960), 14 ff.

**51<sup>b</sup>16.** πιθανόν: K. von Fritz, in 'Entstehung u. Inhalt des 9 Kap. von A.'s Poet.', *Antike und Moderne Trag.* (Berlin, 1962), pp. 430-57, suggests that the need for τὸ πιθανόν is restricted to improbable legends full of ἄλογα, like that of Oedipus, while invented plots can be prima facie more plausible, and so dispense with the support from γενόμενα. But the wording of the passage implies that A. has in mind the general practice of tragic poets. Anyway, plots which were entirely or largely invented seem to have been too uncommon to merit so much attention (cf. 51<sup>b</sup>24).

**51<sup>b</sup>17.** οὐπω: i.e. while they still have not happened.

**51<sup>b</sup>20.** γνωρίμων: 'well-known' as legendary characters and so equivalent to γενομένων.

τὰ δὲ ἄλλα: tragedy at all periods contained Messengers and Servants who were invented, but they had no ὀνόματα, and hardly count as characters. A. refers rather to such figures as the Autourgos

in Eur. *El.*, who is of sufficient weight to be included in the final settlement announced by the Dioskouroi 1286, 7. Thoas, Theonoe, and Theoclymenus hardly existed before Euripides brought them into his plays, and even Xuthus, who was a genealogical lynchpin, was probably devoid of characteristics until Euripides assigned him some.

**πεποιημένα:** cf. Hor. *AP* 119: *aut famam sequere aut sibi convenientia finge.* (*fingere* = *ποιεῖν*).

**51<sup>b</sup>21. Ἄνθεϊ:** the nom. is probably *Ἀνθεύς* rather than *Ἄνθος*. But for this sentence it would not be known that Agathon, a younger contemporary of Euripides, or anyone else had written a play with a wholly invented plot. It was suggested by C. Corbato, *Dioniso*, 11 (1948), 163–72, that the story is to be found in Alexander Aetolus (fr. 3 Powell) and Parthenius, *Erot. Path.*, 14; but the evidence is far from conclusive.

**51<sup>b</sup>23. εὐφραίνει:** pleasure is assumed to be the end of drama: see 53<sup>b</sup>11 n.

**51<sup>b</sup>26. ὀλίγοις γνῶριμα:** this statement can hardly be taken at its face value. In view of the familiarity with poetry which resulted from ordinary Greek education, and the familiarity with tragedy which must have been general if the Theatre of Dionysus was normally full at the Dionysia and Lenaea, it is incredible that the great stories should not still have been well known. It may be that knowledge of the myths was more restricted than it had been formerly, but the famous fragment of the *Poiesis* of Antiphanes (191), in which the tasks of tragic and comic poets are compared, turns on the point that tragic plots were generally known to the audience. The *Poiesis* was not so much earlier than the *P.* that the situation could have changed completely in the meantime. A. himself says that everyone knows the deeds of Achilles (*R.* 1416<sup>b</sup>27).

**51<sup>b</sup>27. δῆλον οὖν . . .:** a reaffirmation, based on new reasons, of the primacy of the plot asserted in Ch. 6. *ἐκ τούτων* refers to the argument of the chapter as a whole. The poet might appear to be more completely a maker of plots if they were his own invention, *τὰ πράγματα πεποιήται*, but A. does not distinguish specifically between inventing a plot and organizing the dramatic structure of a given story. It is only incidentally that he encourages the poet to depart from traditional subject-matter, and it is clear from *περὶ οὗς αἱ τραγωδίαί εἰσίν* (51<sup>b</sup>24) that few poets did so. Agathon's *Antheus* was obviously exceptional. That the poet was a *ποιητῆς μέτρων* not *μύθων* was the usual assumption, as is shown by the conventional nomenclature which A. rejected in Ch. 1.

**51<sup>b</sup>29. γενόμενα ποιεῖν:** 'to take historical events as his subject'. The meaning of *γενόμενα* here is the same as in the first line of the chapter,

51<sup>a</sup>36, whereas *γενόμενα* at 51<sup>b</sup>17 includes the events of legend: see on 51<sup>b</sup>15. Walbank, loc. cit., takes *γενόμενα* as mythical events, to which A. allows historical status, as opposed to invented plots. But *καὶ ἄρα* implies that the possibility is mentioned as an afterthought, as being something of infrequent occurrence; cf. Denniston, *Gk. Part.*, p. 37, A. *Pol.* 1315<sup>a</sup>10. This gives a natural reference to *οὐ τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν* in 51<sup>a</sup>36.

There is some evidence for a revival of historical drama in A.'s time, and he is probably thinking of this rather than of the historical plays of Phrynichus and Aeschylus.

While *πράγματα πεποιήται* (l. 22) means the subject-matter is invented by the poet, *γενόμενα ποιεῖν* refers to the use of historical matter by the poet for his plots, an ambiguity in the use of *ποιεῖν* which illustrates the immense importance which A. attaches to the organization of story into plot. If we ask what sort of *γενόμενα* are proper material for drama, the answer must lie in the nature of a *πράξις*. In a narrative of events, especially if they are divided according to years, many will lack the completeness and wholeness which is the mark of a true action, sometimes because the full story is not recorded, sometimes because it is difficult to isolate it from contingent events. But when the *γενόμενα* are suitable the poet will see them as a single *πράξις*, 'a brief, shapely series of related deeds such as sometimes emerges from the chaos of events in daily life or historical record' (Una Leigh-Fermor, *The Frontiers of Drama* (London, 1954), p. 2). Then by manipulating his material in the same way as he would organize purely mythical data, he will form them into a *μῦθος* with beginning, middle, and end, and due logical cohesion.

**51<sup>b</sup>31.** *οἷα ἄν εἰκὸς . . .*: we return to the idea from which the chapter started, 51<sup>a</sup>37, 38; its influence may account for the presence of the unmeaning [*καὶ δυνατὰ γενέσθαι*] which is missing in Ar.

**51<sup>b</sup>33–52<sup>a</sup>11.** This isolated paragraph forms a kind of transition between Chs. 9 and 10. So far as 52<sup>a</sup>1 the idea of logical connexion is still foremost, with respect to its deficiency in the episodic plot. With *ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ* (52<sup>a</sup>1) are introduced the specific emotions of tragedy mentioned previously only in the definition 49<sup>b</sup>27, and these are central through the chapters which follow, though the idea of causation remains vital. It is doubtful if the paragraph was originally intended for this position.

**51<sup>b</sup>33.** *ἀπλῶν μύθων*: *ἀπλῶν* is a technical term which, ideally, should be explained before it is used. The explanation is delayed till 52<sup>a</sup>12, where plots are divided into 'simple' and 'complex'. At 53<sup>a</sup>13 the same word *ἀπλοῦς* is used without explanation in a wholly different sense, 'single' as opposed to 'double'; the *Odyssey* is 'double' because it ends happily for the virtuous, unhappily for the wicked.

**ἐπεισοδιώδεις**: cf. 49<sup>a</sup>28. An 'episodic' play, as A. here explains, is either one in which the causal connexion between *episodes*, as they are defined in Ch. 12, is weak or lacking (as he says at 52<sup>a</sup>21, it makes a great difference whether things happen *διὰ τὰδε* or *μετὰ τὰδε*), or one which is full of detached incidents: cf. 59<sup>a</sup>35. In the *PV* there is no causal connexion between the episodes of Oceanus and of Io, which could well occur in reverse order, in the *Medea* between the Aegeus episode and what goes before. The *Troades* can be regarded as an episodic play, though the effect of unity does not depend so exclusively on *logical* coherence as A. affirms. The *Phoenissae*, described in the Argument as *παραπληρωματικόν*, would be an example of the second type. No doubt 'simple' plays are particularly liable to this weakness, but it does not seem that only 'simple' plays can have detachable episodes. For the meaning of *ἐπεισόδιον* see 55<sup>b</sup>1 n.

The train of thought is here resumed from the end of Ch. 8. 51<sup>b</sup>33 refers to the principle laid down at 51<sup>a</sup>34, that each part must belong in its place.

**51<sup>b</sup>37. ἀγωνίσματα . . .**: it was no doubt self-evident to A.'s contemporaries how the actors (or the judges, if we accept from some late MSS. the emendation *κριτάς*, printed by G.) influenced the dramatists, but in the absence of the plays we can only guess at the meaning. *διαστρέφειν τὸ ἐφεξῆς* must mean that the dramatist interrupts or distorts the natural sequence of events (cf. 51<sup>a</sup>13), thus making his work episodic (*τοιαῦται* 51<sup>b</sup>35); similarly *παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείνοντες* (cf. 55<sup>b</sup>2) suggests extending the play to include matter which would be better omitted. There is most doubt about *ἀγωνίσματα*; it could mean 'writing in a competitive spirit' and thus sacrificing the artistic conscience for the sake of success. This would better suit the reading *κριτάς*, if it can be supposed that the judges would prefer this sort of play. They were said in a famous passage, Pl. *Laws* 659 A, to defer to the taste of the audience. As poets are the subject, it is difficult to see a reference to the contest for the prize for acting. R. takes *ἀγωνίσματα* to mean 'epideictic speeches'. This would give satisfactory sense, but there is no example of this use of the word, though it is not far from the *ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα* of Thuc. 1. 22. 4. B. finds the point of the passage in the contrast between a play for reading and one marred by the compromises necessary in order to put it on the stage (*διὰ τοὺς ὑποκριτάς* = *διὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν*). He quotes the schol. to Eur. *Phoen.* 88 (after the 88 lines of Jocasta's prologue): *ἡ τοῦ δράματος διάθεσις ἀγωνιστικωτέρα γίνεται τὰ γὰρ τῆς Ἰοκάστης παρελκόμενά εἰσι καὶ ἔνεκα τοῦ θεάτρον ἐκτέταται*, though this is not relevant only to his interpretation. A. says (R. 1403<sup>b</sup>33) that in his day the actors were more important than the poets. Still more to the point is 1413<sup>b</sup>8: *ἔστι δὲ λέξις . . . ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ ἡ*



ὑποκριτικωτάτη. ταύτης δὲ δύο εἶδη ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικὴ ἢ δὲ παθητικὴ. διὸ καὶ οἱ ὑποκριταὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν δραμάτων διώκουσι, καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς τοιούτους. The most likely meaning is that poets were forced to insert speeches and debates of the kind that gave scope to the actors but spoil the structure of the plays. G. cites the inclusion of a love interest in Voltaire's *Oedipus* to satisfy the demands of the actors.

**52<sup>a</sup>2.** καὶ φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλεεινῶν: this marks the beginning of a new theme, but still with reference to causality. Pity and fear were part of the definition of tragedy, but since the end of Ch. 6 attention has been directed to the problem of structure. The tragic emotions now replace dramatic structure as the central theme and form a large part of the subject of the next five chapters.

**52<sup>a</sup>3.** ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν γένηται παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα: as E. says, one of the key phrases in the *P.* That events should be shown as happening δι' ἄλληλα is a main requirement of coherent structure; that they should also be 'unexpected' is a refinement which involves the change from simple to complex form, as will be shown in the two following chapters. For the question whose δόξα, see 52<sup>b</sup>7 n.

The δέ is apodotic, unless we take ὥστε . . . 52<sup>a</sup>10 as the apodosis separated by a parenthesis.

**52<sup>a</sup>4.** τὸ θαυμαστόν: perhaps 'exciting' is the nearest equivalent. People improve their stories in the telling because τὸ δὲ θαυμαστόν ἡδύ (60<sup>a</sup>17). Tales of narrow escapes give pleasure because they are θαυμαστά (*R.* 1371<sup>b</sup>11). ἐκπληκτικός is used in much the same sense at 54<sup>a</sup>4, but according to *Top.* 126<sup>b</sup>14 it is a stronger word.

**52<sup>a</sup>5.** οὕτως: i.e. if they are δι' ἄλληλα.

αὐτομάτου . . . τύχης: the two are similar in that they are applied to events for which there is no obvious natural cause. A.'s ideas on the subject are given in *Ph.* B, Chs. 4-6. In the example which follows the fall of the statue, an inanimate object, would be ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, whereas the fate of Mityes, who went with one object and achieved κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός something quite different, would be ἀπὸ τύχης.

**52<sup>a</sup>7.** Sometimes things happen by chance so appropriately that we feel there must be a controlling purpose behind them. An example of this is the story of Mityes, whose statue fell upon his murderer and killed him, either when he was looking at it θεωροῦντι, or when he was visiting a festival, as is implied by Plutarch's θέας οὔσης, see below. Mityes is perhaps the man mentioned in [Demos.] 59. 33 as present in Argos in 374 B.C. Plutarch (*M.* 553 D) mentions that he met his end in a *stasis*; the story is repeated verbatim in the *De Mirabilibus Auscultationibus* 846 A 22 of the fourth-fifth centuries A.D., almost the only clear reference to the *P.* in ancient literature.

The point of the reference is to stress the importance of δι' ἄλλα; even if events are not δι' ἄλλα they are more striking when they have the kind of chance connexion which is so appropriate that they seem to be directed by a higher purpose. A. does not suggest that the hand of Providence is visible in the story of Mitys, though E. thinks that this is what εἰκε (52<sup>a</sup>9) ought to imply in A., nor that the story of Mitys would make a good play; he would probably have agreed that it would make a better play than a version in which the murderer was killed, e.g. by a falling tree. For a similar 'providential' coincidence cf. the story of Bulis and Sperthias in Herod. 7. 134-7.

**52<sup>a</sup>10.** τοὺς τοιοῦτους rather awkwardly refers back to 52<sup>a</sup>4 ὅταν γένηται . . . when things really happen οὐκ εἰκῆ, not when they merely seem to.

For later developments in the conception of Τύχη see F. W. Walbank, *Commentary on Polybius*, i. 16-26.

## CHAPTER 10

### *Simple and complex plots*

**52<sup>a</sup>12.** ἀπλοῖ: see on 51<sup>b</sup>33.

πεπλεγμένοι: 'complex'. A similar metaphor of complication, followed by disentangling, is present in the pair of words used in Ch. 18, δέσις, λύσις. πλοκή from πλέκω occurs as an alternative to δέσις at 56<sup>a</sup>9.

**52<sup>a</sup>14.** εὐθύς: 'by their own nature', a fairly common use. The basic idea seems to be 'right from the start'; cf. 51<sup>b</sup>12 n.

The nature of the πράξις determines the μῦθος. A complex action cannot be represented by a simple plot and vice versa. But the action does not give a precise form of plot. It is for turning action into plot that the greater part of the poet's skill is required.

**52<sup>a</sup>15.** γινομένης: E. seems to be right in taking this in a dynamic sense 'as it develops'.

ὥσπερ ὄρισται: the explanation of unity of action in Ch. 7.

συνεχοῦς: the word has not previously been used, but seems to replace ὅλης, 'continuous' in the sense that it admits no extraneous matter, i.e. the episodic: cf. 59<sup>a</sup>37 n. It figures in the discussion of τὸ ἐν (*Met.* 1014<sup>b</sup>25), especially μάλλον ἐν τὰ φύσει συνεχῆ ἢ τέχνη (1016<sup>a</sup>4).

περιπετείαι ἢ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ: used without explanation, perhaps as being familiar terms, at 50<sup>a</sup>34. ἀναγνωρισμός (in A. only in this passage), is not to be distinguished from ἀναγνώρισις.

**52<sup>a</sup>16.** πεπλεγμένην: in a complex play the action is more involved

owing to the illusions and misapprehensions under which it is conducted, and the actual *μετάβασις* is more compressed and dramatic because the change of fortune, or the realization of it, is concentrated into a short space of time.

**52<sup>a</sup>17.** ἐξ ἧς: the ἐκ is probably modal; see 54<sup>b</sup>29 n.

**52<sup>a</sup>18.** ταῦτα: i.e. *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis*. It is not enough that they should be exciting scenes: they must arise naturally from their antecedents (δι' ἄλληλα), unlike the recognitions at the end of *Measure for Measure*.

**52<sup>a</sup>21.** διὰ τὰδε ἢ μετὰ τὰδε: the fault of the episodic plot is that one episode follows another without being caused by it. Cf. *R.* 1401<sup>b</sup>31: τὸ γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὡς διὰ τοῦτο λαμβάνουσι.

The only really effective division into classes which A. is able to make is into simple and complex. Accordingly he proceeds at once to consider their differentiae (Chs. 10 and 11). Otherwise there would be a case for his considering first the more general problem of the tragic *μετάβασις*, which is postponed to Chs. 13 and 14.

## CHAPTER 11

*Peripeteia* and *anagnorisis*, the differentiae of simple and complex plots, **52<sup>a</sup>22–52<sup>b</sup>8**; definition of πάθος, **52<sup>b</sup>9–13**. On *anagnorisis* see further Chs. 14 and 16.

**52<sup>a</sup>22–29.** The ambiguity of the Greek in this passage has given rise to much discussion of the meaning which A. intends for *peripeteia*, though there is fair agreement as to which plays have one: see Appendix III. It is probably implied at 55<sup>b</sup>34 that a play may have a minor *peripeteia* yet not be complex. See in general F. L. Lucas, *Tragedy*, pp. 110–13, H. House, *A.'s Poetics*, pp. 96–99.

**52<sup>a</sup>22.** ἔστι . . . μεταβολή: the first ambiguity lies in τῶν πραττομένων. Is the change (μεταβολή) cannot be distinguished from *μετάβασις*, cf. 52<sup>a</sup>16) a change in the action, in the course of events, τῶν πραττομένων being equivalent to τῶν γινομένων as at 55<sup>a</sup>25, or is it a change in what the characters are trying to achieve, *πραττομένων* being the pass. of πράττω (ὅπως) in the sense of 'work for an end' = ὧν διενοήθησαν? We may compare fr. 142 (from the schol. to *Il.* 2. 73): οὕτως ἔπραξε (sc. Agamemnon) ὥστε ὀλίγου τὰ ἐναντία συμβῆναι ἢ ἐβούλετο. With the second interpretation it is more forceful to make ἐναντίον govern τῶν πραττομένων. At l. 29, below, τῶν πεπραγμένων probably stands for τῶν γεγενημένων (cf. 52<sup>a</sup>19), though Vahlen in the interest of his own theory took it to mean 'what had been done by Danaus'; even if this is so, it is not conclusive for the sense here. Before attempting to choose it is necessary to consider the examples of *peripeteia* in actual plays given below.

52<sup>a</sup>23. *καθάπερ εἴρηται*: it has not in any obvious sense been said already: see 49<sup>a</sup>32 n. The most likely reference is to 52<sup>a</sup>4: *ὄταν γένηται παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα*; see I. M. Glanville, 'Peripeteia', *CQ* 41 (1947), 73. B. followed V. in referring it to previous expressions of the general notion of change to or from happiness such as 51<sup>a</sup>13, though Vahlen took *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν* as referring to *peripeteia*.

*καὶ τοῦτο . . . ἀναγκαῖον*: the effect of this clause is to show A.'s approval of the two examples of *peripeteia* which follow; cf. l. 20, above.

52<sup>a</sup>24–26. *οἶον ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι . . . ἐποίησεν*: the first difficulty here is that A.'s summary does not fit the text of the *OT*. The Messenger came from Corinth hoping, or expecting, to please Oedipus with the news that the Corinthians had made him king in succession to his supposed father Polybus. It was only in consequence of Oedipus' unexpected reception of the news that the Messenger went on to give him the information about his birth which was intended to reassure him but led to the discovery of his true parentage. This discrepancy is not in fact relevant to the point A. wants to illustrate. It would be possible to put a comma after *Οἰδίπου* and so to separate *καὶ ἀπαλλάξων* from *ἐλθών*, thus making *ἀπαλλάξων* refer to the situation in which the Messenger found himself at Thebes, but the sentence would be very obscure; and seeing that in *R.* 1415<sup>a</sup>19 A. quotes *OT* 774 as coming from the prologue, there is little reason to try to save his accuracy by straining the text. A second difficulty arises out of the ambiguity implicit in the construction *ὡς* with fut. part. This covers both expectation and intention. At l. 27, below, the context makes it clear that *ἀποθανούμενος* must mean 'expecting to be put to death', (cf. *Arg. Aes. Ag.* 10, 11), but in the other cases it can mean equally well 'expecting' or 'intending'. This difficulty would be to some extent eased if the expectation were not of the character concerned but of the audience, and this would suit those who think that the surprise felt by the audience at a dramatic development is here in the forefront of A.'s mind. It is so taken by P. Turner, 'The Reverse of Vahlen', *CQ* n.s. 9 (1959), 208: 'The messenger who appeared to be going to please O. and free him from fear. . . .' But the normal Greek usage is that the expectation referred to is that of the subject of the clause, though it can be that of some other party emphatically mentioned in the sentence: cf. Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 864, Kühner–Gerth 488a (a). It is perhaps not inconceivable that the audience, though mentioned nowhere in the chapter, may be supposed to be in A.'s mind throughout; but it remains excessively unlikely that the expectation here belongs to anyone but the Messenger, the subject of *ἐλθών*. But again it may seem odd that the expectations or intentions of a mere messenger

should be treated as important. What strikes us is that Oedipus is cheated by an illusory hope which leads to the discovery of a truth even worse than he had dreaded. The disappointment of the Messenger is trivial, though his crestfallen figure is not a negligible part of the moment of frozen horror which follows the storming exit of Oedipus. Still, the *μετάβασις* is of Oedipus, not of the Messenger, and it is with the *μετάβασις* that *περιπέτεια* is associated (52<sup>a</sup>17).

The second illustration is from a play of which little is known, the *Lynceus* of Theodectes (cf. 55<sup>b</sup>29). Theodectes, rhetorician and dramatist, was a friend of A. This dealt with the story of the daughters of Danaus, who were ordered by their father to murder their bridegrooms. Hypermnestra alone disobeyed and spared Lynceus. She concealed her disobedience, which was not discovered till she had borne Lynceus a son, Abas. It appears that Danaus, as king of Argos, commanded the execution of Lynceus, but in consequence of wholly unknown events was executed himself. The deaths of Aegisthus at the end of Soph. *El.* and of Lycus in the *HF* are part of similar situations. S. suggests that A. chose as his examples one play with a change to misfortune, the other with a change to good fortune.

To return to the main question, whether it is the situation or the intention which is reversed, it will be seen that the evidence of the two illustrations works in opposite directions. The wording of the Oedipus example would suggest that intention is primary; the Messenger intended one thing and *τοῦναντίον ἐποίησεν*, 'he achieved the opposite'. And it is the Messenger's intention that is in the centre of the picture. In the second example Danaus and Lynceus are put on equal terms; both experience the opposite of what they expected. Danaus alone can have had intentions, while Lynceus had only unpleasant expectations. The most likely explanation is that so far as concerns *peripeteia* the distinction between intention and expectation is irrelevant. Certainly if A. did mean to confine it to cases of reversed intention, his language is inept.

Outside the *P.* there is one instance in A. of a *peripeteia*, but unfortunately it fits either explanation. In describing the ways of certain species of fish which prey on each other, A. says at *Hist. An.* 590<sup>b</sup>12-19: *καί τις συμβαίνει περιπέτεια τούτων ἐνίοις*. There is a *peripeteia* when congers (*γόγγροι*) eat octopuses (*πολύποδες*). For octopuses eat crabs (*κάραβοι*), and crabs eat congers. So when an octopus encounters a conger the apparently stronger octopus becomes the victim of the apparently weaker conger, a reversal of the situation. Or seen from the point of view of the octopus, who knows that crabs eat congers and he can eat crabs, his reasonable intention to eat a conger leads to a result the opposite of what he intended and expected.

The best answer is to take *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα* (52<sup>a</sup>4) at its face value as an anticipation of what is more fully discussed in Ch. 11. When there is a *peripeteia*, things turn out in a way the opposite of what one, or more, of the characters (not unreasonably) expects. The effect is to reverse the direction of what is going on. This definition has the advantage of applying equally to *πρᾶξις* and to *πάθος*. It is still strange that the expectations of the Messenger in the *OT* are given such emphasis, especially as the expectations of Oedipus are equally falsified by the event.

**52<sup>a</sup>29–b8.** *The second differentia of the complex play, Anagnorisis.* This presents no major difficulty, but it causes confusion that the word means both recognition of people and realization of circumstances. In fact A. uses it almost entirely with reference to people. See H. Phillipart, 'La théorie a. de l'anagnorisis', *REG* 38 (1925), 171–204.

**52<sup>a</sup>30.** *ἐξ ἀγνοίας . . . μεταβολή:* E. rightly stresses that this sentence is parallel to the previous one defining *peripeteia*; each is a *μεταβολή* (and one involving *ἄγνοια*).

**52<sup>a</sup>31.** *εἰς φιλίαν:* the effect of a personal recognition is generally towards friendship or enmity. The character who has been ignorant of someone else's identity discovers that a supposed enemy is a friend (or more often a kinsman) or the supposed friend an enemy. Ion finds that the woman who has tried to murder him is his mother; Aegisthus, that the bringer, as it seems, of good news is Orestes; cf. 53<sup>b</sup>15 ff.

*φιλίαν:* 'kinship', in all the cases here discussed; we find the more general (and more usual) sense at 53<sup>a</sup>38.

**52<sup>a</sup>32.** *ὠρισμένων:* this clearly refers to the idea of the tragic *μετάβασις*. It is usually understood in the sense of 'destined, marked out' for good or bad fortune, by the poet, as Butcher adds, not by fate; but *ὀρίζω* does not appear to bear this sense elsewhere in A., and E. may be right in taking it of the first state *from* which they move to good or bad fortune: 'those who are in a state defined with reference to good or bad fortune'. For *ὀρίζειν πρὸς* cf. *Met.* 382<sup>a</sup>19, Eur. fr. 218. They remain in this state (the force of the perf.) up to the time when the *anagnorisis* shows friends as enemies or enemies as kinsmen, thus changing the state. E. suggested alternatively that *ὠρισμένων* could be obj. gen., which would be good sense but tortuous Greek.

**ἅμα περιπετεία:** how long does a *peripeteia* last? In the *OT* the Messenger from Corinth arrives at 924, and l. 25, above, suggests that this is the beginning of the *peripeteia*; there is no *anagnorisis* until Jocasta realizes that Oedipus is her son between 1026 and 1056; Oedipus does not realize his own identity until around 1167.

A. manifestly held the *OT* in high esteem. A. E. Taylor once remarked, 'It is clear from repeated allusions that the play he admired above all others was the *King Oedipus* of Soph., but it is equally clear that he admired it not for the profound insight into human life and destiny or the deep sense of the mystery of things which some modern critics have found in it, but because its plot is the best and most startling detective story ever devised and its finale a triumph of melodramatic horror' (*Aristotle* (London, 1919), p. 124). It might be argued that this does less injustice to A. than to Sophocles.

**52<sup>a</sup>34.** καὶ ἄλλαι: different as not being of persons, not as lacking a *peripeteia*.

πρὸς ἄψυχα: the things recognized are usually tokens like the *δραῖα* in the *Ion*. These are subordinate to the recognition of persons. Or the truth of an oracle can be recognized, as *Trach.* 1143.

καὶ τὰ τυχόντα: qualifying ἄψυχα; otherwise we should expect τὰ ἄψυχα.

**52<sup>a</sup>35.** †ἐστὶν . . . συμβαίνει†: a translatable text is easily achieved by reading ἐστὶν ὡς ὥσπερ (ἐστὶν ὡς = 'in a way') or by ἐστὶν ὥσπερ εἶρηται συμβαίνειν. But ὥσπερ εἶρηται is hard to justify.

εἰπέπραγε: e.g. the realization by Oedipus that he has killed his father or by Philoctetes that Neoptolemus has stolen his bow. There is a sense in which every *peripeteia* has such a moment of realization, for if there is no realization there is little dramatic effect, as in the *Phoen.* where the effect on Creon of Menoeceus' death, which he has unintentionally caused, is crowded out. That *peripeteia* involves realization was assumed by Sir John Harington, *Briefve Apologie of Poetry* (1591), 'Peripeteia, which I interpret as an agnition of some unlooked-for fortune'. This is perhaps why A. in practice reserves the term *anagnorisis* for recognition of personal identity. An undoubted instance of *anagnorisis* which is hardly covered by A.'s formula is the discovery by Iphigeneia and Clytaemnestra in the *IA* that the bride is to be offered as a victim.

**52<sup>a</sup>36.** ἡ μάλιστα . . . : i.e. it arises ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως (52<sup>a</sup>18).

**52<sup>a</sup>37.** καί: probably explanatory.

ἡ εἰρημένη: recognition of persons as opposed to αἱ ἄλλαι.

**52<sup>a</sup>38.** ἢ ἔλεον ἔξει ἢ φόβον: the only passage in which ἔλεος and φόβος are alternatives, except negatively (e.g. 53<sup>a</sup>1), and not a pair. E. suggests that fear is associated with recognition εἰς ἔχθραν, pity is felt when it is εἰς φιλίαν. It is doubtful whether a distinction is intended.

**52<sup>b</sup>2.** τὸ ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν: representing the new stage of disaster or happiness which follows the *μετάβασις* and in which the play ends: cf. 50<sup>a</sup>2. The drastic change of situation represented by such a combination of *anagnorisis* with *peripeteia ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων* will adequately account for the transition.

52<sup>b</sup>3. *τινῶν*: masc., as is shown by what follows. A. has tacitly dropped the other kinds of recognition mentioned at 52<sup>a</sup>34, 35.

52<sup>b</sup>4. αἱ μὲν εἰσι θατέρου . . . : of a pair of people one may know the identity of the other, as in Soph. *El.* Orestes knows Electra, while Electra does not know Orestes; or neither may know the other, which is the position between Electra and Orestes in the *IT*.

52<sup>b</sup>6. ἐκ τῆς πέμψεως: cf. 55<sup>a</sup>18 n.

52<sup>b</sup>7. ἄλλης: cf. 54<sup>b</sup>33.

If those are right who explain *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis* in the light of *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν* (52<sup>a</sup>4), the question arises, whose *δόξα*? E. is emphatic that it is the expectation of the audience, and he is supported by the context of 52<sup>a</sup>4 where *τὸ θαυμαστόν* is more easily applicable to the audience than to the characters. Yet this cannot be right. There are, for the audience, few major surprises in Greek tragedy. The only startling instance is the beginning of a new action in Eur. *HF* at 815, but it is a surprise because, so far as can be seen, there is no reason for it; events here are anything but *δι' ἄλληλα*. Less violent are Creusa's outburst at *Ion* 859, which is not a necessary, or even a very likely, consequence of what has gone before, and Neoptolemus' return with the bow (*Phil.* 1222), where the audience know the bow must be restored but are unlikely to have anticipated this move. Since in general the audience know the end of the story and the characters do not, the surprise must belong to the latter. This is clinched by the facts of *anagnorisis*. *Peripeteia* and *anagnorisis* are parallel forms of *μεταβολή* as is emphasized by the *μὲν* and *δέ* at 52<sup>a</sup>22 and 30. Now it is invariably the case that the true identity of characters is known to the audience from their first appearance. Even with regard to Oedipus the audience is clearly assumed to know from the start all that in the course of the play Oedipus discovers about himself. Accordingly nothing that happens can be literally unexpected for the audience apart from minor details. Indeed without this knowledge of the future course of events there would be no room for those ironic effects which are so much more impressive than simple surprise. On the other hand, the audience in some measure shares the emotions, including surprise, of the characters, because it identifies itself with them. Though few go so far as to forget that they are in a theatre, we do in a sense suspend our knowledge when we put ourselves sympathetically in the position of those who do not possess that knowledge. Otherwise we should rarely want to see a play, or to read a novel, twice. The question of communication is not discussed by A. or by any other ancient critic, but it seems that it was assumed to be pretty complete; see my article 'Pity, Terror, and Peripeteia', *CQ* N.S. 12 (1962), 52-60. None the less, it would be a misuse of language to apply *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν*



equally to the state of mind of an audience which watches Aegisthus lift the covering from Clytemnestra's body, when he alone is unaware what lies beneath, and of one which learns in the last act that it was the policeman who committed the murder.

As an example of an audience's self-identification with those it is watching L. A. Post (*Homer to Menander*, p. 251) cites the fact that spectators at football matches experience, like the players, an increase in the sugar-content of the blood, as if they too were about to make violent physical exertions.

**52<sup>b9</sup>-13.** *The third element of plot, πάθος.*

**52<sup>b9</sup>.** μέρη: cf. 50<sup>a34</sup> of which this is verbatim repetition. They both come as we might say 'under the heading' of plot, though they are not a part of all plots, simple plots for instance.

**52<sup>b10</sup>.** πάθος: this too is an element in plot, and one that may, or must, be present in simple plots. The formula *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα* does not apply to πάθος.

πάθος has here the appearance of a technical term describing a special sort of dramatic incident in the same category as *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis*. But this technical sense is very close to one of the normal senses of the word, and elsewhere in the *P.* it seems unlikely that this special meaning is to be understood. πάθος means first something experienced, the complement of a *πρᾶξις*, then an unpleasant experience viewed either subjectively as an emotion, as at 56<sup>a38</sup>, or objectively as a misfortune. It is defined as a 'destructive or painful act', but there is a difficulty because it is illustrated entirely by examples of physical horror, death, or bodily pain (cf. *R.* 1386<sup>a5</sup>), experienced on the stage. This is a special case of the normal sense of the word as used at 54<sup>a13</sup>, probably at 53<sup>b18</sup> and 39, and as it is defined at *Mel.* 1022<sup>b20</sup>: *ἐπι τὰ μεγέθη τῶν συμφορῶν καὶ λυπηρῶν πάθη λέγεται*. Although such horrors are rarely shown on the Greek stage, they are not so rare that we are justified in trying, like E., to evade the obvious meaning of *ἐν τῷ φανερῷ*. Alcestis and Hippolytus expire before the audience, Evadne and Ajax only just out of sight; Heracles and Philoctetes are represented in agony, Oedipus, Polymestor, and the Cyclops with their eyes put out; Prometheus has a spike driven through his chest, Rhesus' charioteer lies wounded on the stage, and in the *Τραυματίας Ὀδυσσεύς* (53<sup>b34</sup>) the hero was shown after receiving his fatal wound (*Cic. Tusc.* 2. 48). This use of *ἐν τῷ φανερῷ* appears in the scholia; see G. ad loc.

Accordingly A. would be justified in using πάθος in a restricted sense to indicate a recognizable category of scene with a direct emotional appeal, comparable to *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis*. But elsewhere there is no sign of such a category; the *εἶδος παθητικόν*

(55<sup>b</sup>34) cannot be restricted to plays with scenes of *physical* suffering; the *πάθος*, 'the disaster', which is discussed in Ch. 14 is not of this kind; cf. 54<sup>a</sup>12: *οίκίας . . . ὄσαις τὰ τοιαῦτα συμβέβηκε πάθη*, and 53<sup>b</sup>30 where τὸ δεινόν is synonymous with τὸ πάθος; we are told of epic (59<sup>b</sup>11) *περιπετειῶν δεῖ καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεων καὶ παθημάτων* (*παθημάτων* is the usual form in the gen. plur., see 49<sup>b</sup>27 n.). But nothing in epic can be ἐν τῷ φανερῷ and vivid narrative is no more vivid than the Messengers' speeches of tragedy. Accordingly we must conclude that the *πάθος* is a disastrous occurrence, and that the examples, being all of visible suffering, are ill chosen.

At first sight the expression *πάθος ἐστὶ πράξις* is odd, but see note at beginning of Ch. 14. *πράξις* here is an act, something done, rather than the whole action of which a tragedy is the imitation. *πάθος* has of course only the most tenuous connexion with what we call 'pathos'.

No other *μέρος* of plot is anywhere mentioned, and at 59<sup>b</sup>10, quoted above, the same three parts appear as the distinctive features of plot. It can hardly be maintained that plot consists of nothing but *peripeteia*, *anagnorisis*, and *pathos*, but it might be said that every tragedy must contain one or more of them. Lessing asserted that every tragedy had a *pathos*, and it would seem to be a necessary condition for the arousing of pity and fear. What we cannot tell is whether any distinction was made in applying the terms *πάθος*, *παθητικός* between plays which contained scenes of conspicuous *πάθος* like *Medea* or *Ajax* (cf. 56<sup>a</sup>1), and plays like the *PV* or *Persae*.

#### CHAPTER 12 *The parts (quantitative) of tragedy.*

This chapter makes a break in an otherwise continuous whole, Chs. 7–14, of which the subject is the *σύστασις τῶν πραγμάτων*. But the distinction between parts considered qualitatively and quantitatively is made at the beginning and end of the *P.*, 47<sup>a</sup>10, 62<sup>b</sup>17, and is probably alluded to in Ch. 6, 49<sup>b</sup>26, *τοῖς μορίοις*. Accordingly a chapter in which an account is given of the parts of a tragedy divided into lengths, *prologos*, *episodesion*, etc., seems to be required. The logical place for it would be with or after the division into parts by quality, Ch. 6, and Heinsius in the seventeenth century suggested transposing it to that position; in fact it would be more obviously an intrusion there than it is here, where it is introduced, through association rather than logic, by the words *τοῦ μύθου μέρη* (l. 9, above). The only alternative position would be at the end of Ch. 9 (or after 51<sup>b</sup>32). Partly because it cannot be fitted into the *P.*, partly because some details cannot easily be reconciled with extant tragedy, the authenticity of the chapter has been denied by many. Most of the nineteenth-century editors took

this line, but in the present century there has been a reaction against the often frivolous rejections of earlier scholars, and of recent editors only Butcher and E. do not accept the chapter as genuine. Objections based on ignorance of the actual practice of tragedy would, of course, apply as strongly to a near contemporary of A. as to A. himself, and E. attributes the chapter to a late period, even Byzantine. But it should be remembered that we are ourselves ill informed on the practice of tragedy contemporary with A., as the most recent of extant tragedies are some two generations earlier.

**52<sup>b</sup>14. μέρη:** these are the six elements of tragedy analysed *κατὰ τὸ ποιόν*, plot, character, etc.

**οἷς μὲν ὡς εἶδεσι δεῖ χρῆσθαι:** the six *μέρη* can be 'regarded as' (the most likely meaning of *χρῆσθαι ὡς*: cf. *ὡς γένεσιν αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι Met.* 998<sup>b</sup>10) constituent elements as having each a single property, whereas the quantitative units, *μόρια* at 49<sup>b</sup>26, are composite; an *episodion*, for instance, could contain something of all six of the qualitative units. *εἶδη* recurs as a synonym for *μέρη* at 56<sup>a</sup>33 (unless the reading of Parisinus is preferred). It is awkward that *εἶδη τραγωδίας* is found in a completely different sense at 55<sup>b</sup>32, the various classes to which a tragedy can belong. It is perfectly in place here to point out the difference between the two types of subdivision of tragedy; one type consists of elements, the other does not. But if we render *χρῆσθαι ὡς* as 'use' with H. and E., it is no longer in place, since every tragic poet necessarily uses all six parts. But one *μέρος* might be pre-eminent in one type (*εἶδος*) of play: cf. 55<sup>b</sup>32 n. This passage probably has a bearing on the corrupt 50<sup>a</sup>13; see n. ad loc.

**52<sup>b</sup>15. πρότερον:** in Ch. 6, 49<sup>b</sup>31-50<sup>a</sup>14.

**εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται:** these parts, not being of an abstract nature like the 'elements', can be divided up into actual lengths.

**52<sup>b</sup>16. πρόλογος . . . ἔξοδος:** the non-musical parts come first.

**52<sup>b</sup>18. ἴδια:** peculiar to certain plays.

**τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς:** 'songs sung from the *skene*', i.e. by the actors (whether *kommos* or monody, see below) as opposed to the chorus, whose place was in the *orchestra*. The corresponding phrase *τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀρχήστρας* is found in the late (tenth century) *Μουσικὴ Ἱστορία*. The words *ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς* throw no light on the question whether there was a separate stage, since they could as well describe the building at the back of the acting-area. *ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς* is found at 55<sup>a</sup>28; see note ad loc.

**52<sup>b</sup>19. πρόλογος:** this term for the first part of a play goes back at least to Aristoph. *Ran.* 1119, where it is clearly a word in common use. If Thespis invented it (cf. 49<sup>a</sup>16 n.), it must have been a feature of the earliest tragedy, but a few plays open with the *parodos* of the

chorus, *Aes. Pers.* and *Supp.*, while the *Supp.* of Euripides begins with the Chorus already in place around the altar.

**ὄλον:** possibly added in order to distinguish the prologue from the opening monologue characteristic of Euripides; sometimes the chorus enters directly after it, as in the *Bacc.*, but usually the whole prologue is an introductory scene of some length.

**52<sup>b</sup>20. ἐπεισόδιον:** roughly equivalent to a modern act or scene as conventionally bounded by the operation of the curtain. This use of the word overlaps, but is not identical with, the other use in the *P.*, e.g. 55<sup>b</sup>13. This second type of episode is a part also of epic (55<sup>b</sup>16, etc.). The original sense must have been with reference to drama, as the word means the coming on to the scene of a character (to join the chorus) with which an *epeisodion* normally begins; cf. *OC* 730, schol. *Phil.* 1218. This term did not become standard but was replaced by *μέρος* or *μόριον*. Nowhere in the *P.* outside this chapter does the word necessarily bear the sense it has here, but it probably does at 49<sup>a</sup>28.

**ὄλον:** added because a brief choral song is sometimes found within an episode, e.g. Eur. *Hipp.* 362–72, 669–79, Soph. *Phil.* 391–402, 507–18. This definition does not always apply to *Aes.*; *Supp.* 625–709 is a *χοροῦ μέλος* which is essentially a part of the *epeisodion* 600–735, and similarly the *stasimon* in which Darius is evoked, *Pers.* 623–80, is a part of 598–851.

**52<sup>b</sup>21. ἔξοδος:** not a very useful division, as the last *χοροῦ μέλος* may be a long way from the end of the play. Thus the *exodos* of the *HF* extends from 1038 to 1428. The original meaning of the word was probably the song sung by the chorus as it left the *orchestra* corresponding to the *parodos* sung at entrance.

**52<sup>b</sup>22. παράδοδος:** occurs in the technical sense (with reference to comedy) also at *EN* 1123<sup>a</sup>23. For the form cf. *παράβασις*, the address of the comic chorus to the audience. The chorus advances *παρα-* before the audience, the actors *ἐπι-* to join the performers already present.

**52<sup>b</sup>23. λέξις:** elsewhere *λέξις* is contrasted with *μέλος*. It is the language of dialogue and is not applied to the utterances of the chorus. Possibly *λέξις* is used here because the *parodos* might contain anapaests, which were intoned rather than sung. But this was an archaic practice of Aeschylus, and of Sophocles only in *Ajax* and *Antigone*, and A. is not here concerned with the history of drama. However, the use of anapaests in the *parodos* may have been revived in the fourth century. A late example, *μέλος δέ ἐστι τέλειον μὲν, τὸ ἔκ τε ἀρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ καὶ λέξεως συνεστηκός* (*Arist. Quint.* 1. 12), shows *λέξις* applied to lyrics.

In the later fifth century the *parodos* was often replaced by a *κόμμος*.

δλη seems to have no point here unless to emphasize that each of these parts is an entity. In the *Hippolytus* of Euripides there is a short song by the secondary Chorus of Huntsmen before the *parodos* of the Troezenian Women, but A. can hardly be thinking of this sort of minor exception.

**στάσιμον**: the technical term, not found earlier, for the choral song which separated *epeisodia* from each other and from the *exodos*. It has been explained as a 'stationary' song, one without much movement, or as the song sung after the chorus had reached its station in the *orchestra*, and so contrasted with the *parodos*. The second is the more likely, as some choral songs in extant plays suggest lively movement, e.g. *Trach.* 205–24 called, wrongly, a *hyporcheme*. But it may be that by A.'s time the dance of the chorus had become unimportant.

**ἄνευ ἀναπαιστού καὶ τροχαίου**: a mysterious statement, since trochaic passages are common and anapaestic not unknown in *stasima*, e.g. *Medea* 1081 ff., if these astrophic anapaests really count as a *stasimon*. Miss A. M. Dale, *Eranos* (1950), 14–19, explains it as the distinction between μέλος, which was sung, and troch. tetr., and anap. dim. given in recitative; this is not very naturally expressed by τὸ ἄνευ.

**52<sup>b</sup>24. κομμός**: the technical term for a lyric dialogue between chorus and one, or sometimes two, actors. There seems to have been no specific ancient term for a lyric dialogue between actors. The term *κομμός*, unlike most of those which appear in this chapter, is not found in the scholia, which sometimes use *θρήνος* (*dirge*), a word with much the same meaning. *κομμός* is from *κόπτω* 'beat the breast in mourning': cf. Aes. *Choe.* 306 ff., especially 423, which is part of the great lamentation of Orestes, Electra, and Chorus. A large number of lyric dialogues are lamentations over the dead, and the name is extended to cover all examples of the form. Included among τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς are monodies, *μονωδίαι*, a form developed particularly by Euripides (cf. Aristoph. *Ran.* 849, etc.). Again we do not know if they were a feature in the tragedy of A.'s own times.

**52<sup>b</sup>25. μέρη δὲ . . .**: the virtual repetition of 52<sup>b</sup>14, 15 after so short an interval is strange. D. A. Russell suggests it may be a sign that the chapter is a later insertion.

Ch. 12 is intruded into the section on plot extending from 7–14, and Ch. 13 can follow on from the end of 11, to which τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις (52<sup>b</sup>30) would naturally refer. There is, however, a minor break here. Chs. 7–11 deal with plot as structure; 13 and 14 are concerned with plot in terms of function, the arousing of pity and fear, Ch. 13 with the *metabasis*, the kind of change and the kind of persons who experience it, Ch. 14 with the crucial conflict considered

with reference to the relationship of the parties to the conflict and to whether the action contemplated is, or is not, performed.

CHAPTER 13. *The content of the plot: ἡ καλλίστη τραγωδία.*

**52<sup>b</sup>28.** στοχάζεσθαι . . . εὐλαβεῖσθαι: things 'to aim at', things 'to guard against'; the same categories are tacitly adopted in discussing plot in Chs. 7 and 8 respectively. In this chapter the two are intermingled. Ch. 17, which mentions some common errors, is not closely associated with 13 and 14.

**52<sup>b</sup>29.** ἔργον: 'function', by performing which tragedy achieves its τέλος, the awakening of the appropriate pity and fear (and the accompanying κάθαρσις).

**52<sup>b</sup>31.** σύνθεσιν: indistinguishable from σύστασις.

τῆς καλλίστης τραγωδίας: cf. 53<sup>a</sup>19. It is not always remembered that a play which does not conform to the prescription is not thereby condemned. Partly empirically, partly *a priori*, A. determines the form of the ideal tragedy, but no one would want all tragedies to have the same form. Note that the passage ends with the parallel phrase ἡ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγωδία (53<sup>a</sup>23).

Ὁν ἀπλήν see 51<sup>b</sup>33 n.

It has not been stated that simple plots are inferior to complex, though it is possibly implied at 51<sup>b</sup>33, but A.'s general picture of forms developing until all their potentialities are realized (cf. 49<sup>a</sup>15) implies that the most complex and most highly developed form will be the best. Also *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis*, the most attractive parts of tragedy (50<sup>a</sup>34), are confined to complex plays.

**52<sup>b</sup>32.** φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλεεινῶν . . . μιμητικῆν: i.e. the πράγματα 'the matter' of the play must be such as to arouse these feelings.

**52<sup>b</sup>33.** ἴδιον: cf. 53<sup>a</sup>36: ἡδονὴ . . . οἰκεία; the pleasure 'peculiar' to tragedy is derived from these two emotions, but it is implied, particularly at 62<sup>b</sup>13, that epic is similar in effect. Why these emotions should be enjoyable, and what relation the enjoyment may have to κάθαρσις is not explained here or elsewhere, but the notion that tears and lamentation are in part enjoyable appears from time to time in Greek literature (see Appendix II) and imitations are enjoyable in and for themselves.

**52<sup>b</sup>34–53<sup>a</sup>5.** *It has already been stated that the content of a tragedy is a change of fortune (51<sup>a</sup>13). It now remains to consider what sort of person, for what reason, is to experience which of the two possible changes, bad to good or good to bad. The answer will be that a man neither bad nor of outstanding goodness, by reason of a ἁμαρτία 'a misapprehension' should pass from good to bad fortune. In the following*

chapter it is asked not what sort of man *ποιός*, but what sort of events *ποιά*, what sort of conflict, will produce the most effective *πάθος*.

It is a point of importance that A. does without the word which modern writers find indispensable in discussing the subject, namely 'hero'. In fact no such term existed until the sixteenth century when the Italian commentators on the *P.* made the transition from heroes, i.e. figures from the heroic age (*ἡρωικοὶ χρόνοι*, *Pol.* 1285<sup>b</sup>4) who are the normal subject of tragedy, to the most conspicuous of them in any one play, the 'hero'. He was taken over from them in France by Boileau, and first appears in English in Dryden's *Defence of the Epilogue* in 1673 (*Of Dramatic Poesy*, etc., Everyman i. 172). Without going as far as J. Jones, *On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy*, pp. 12-18, who finds in the instinct to foist this idea on A. the clue to a basic misunderstanding, we may admit that there is a real difference in emphasis here. But it remains true that the *hamartia* is someone's *hamartia* and that many Greek tragedies took their name from their most prominent character. The Elizabethans had indubitable heroes, though they had no word for them.

52<sup>b</sup>34-36. *δῆλον . . . μῆλον ἔστιν*: nothing could be less 'manifest' than the truth of this extraordinary statement. If we attach to words their normal meanings we might do worse than define tragedy as the passage of *ἐπιεικῆς ἄνδρας*, admirable men, from prosperity to adversity. It appears from 53<sup>a</sup>7-9 that *τοὺς ἐπιεικῆς ἄνδρας* is here to be understood as *ἀρετῇ διαφέροντας καὶ δικαιοσύνην*, 'outstanding in goodness and righteousness'. This is not the normal meaning of the word, nor indeed one easily paralleled. H. Richards in *Aristotelica* (London, 1915), p. 118, is one of the few who have done justice to the strangeness of *ἐπιεικῆς* here. The difficulty was first pointed out by Paoli Beni in his *Commentary* (Venice, 1624) 'mihi certe apertior videtur repugnantia quam ut dissimulari posse sperem'. For *ἐπιεικῆς*, apart from a particular sense of 'fair' or 'equitable' (cf. Herod. 3. 53. 4, *EN* 1137<sup>a</sup>31 ff.), is a word of general, not very enthusiastic, approbation and often indistinguishable from *σπουδαῖος* or *χρηστός*, and implying like them some social standing, in fact the kind of man who is described in Chs. 2 and 15 as the proper subject for tragedy; cf. *Pl. Rep.* 397 D. He appears at *EN* 1169<sup>a</sup>16 as the lover of honour, who will sacrifice his life for country or friends, actions not beyond the scope of normal tragic heroes; he is summed up *εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ σπουδαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων προαιρούμενός τὸ καλόν*. The word is used with more limited reference in the *P.* at 54<sup>b</sup>13 of tragic characters, and at 62<sup>a</sup>2 of those spectators who are men of taste and intelligence. If there is a Greek word which can be generally applied to the leading characters of tragedy it is *ἐπιεικῆς*.

The commentators have little to offer; B. accepts the fact of some inconsistency in the use of words, G. takes it as referring to social standing *τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων καὶ εὐτυχία*. (53<sup>a</sup>10) and so = *ἐπιφανείς*, R. understands it in a purely moral sense, and S. as a heightened form of *σπουδαῖος* with a connotation, due to the context, of faultlessness. M. Kommerell, *Lessing und A.* (Frankfurt, 1940), pp. 126 ff., suggests that the tragic hero is a man with good *ἦθη*, who is deficient in practical insight and so liable to error. This cannot be supported from Greek usage, but it suggests the only means by which A.'s consistency could be saved. We may suspect that what he really objects to is the fall of the *ἐπιεικής* without due cause, i.e. without a *ἀμαρτία*. This escape is ruled out by *ὁ μεταξὺ τούτων* (53<sup>a</sup>7), and one can only guess that there is some distortion here due to A.'s sensitivity to Plato's strictures on poets who show good men as unhappy, e.g. *Rep.* 392 A. Recently A. W. H. Adkins, *CQ* N.S. 16 (1966), 78 ff., has sought an explanation in the change of values which he observes in the fourth century. *ἐπιείκεια* includes the 'co-operative virtues' which in the fifth century were only on the fringe of *ἀρετή*. It is suggested that A.'s moral sense was violently affronted by the idea of the undeserved fall of one who possessed not only the aggressive, heroic virtues—that such can come to grief is a notorious fact of life—but also the co-operative virtues which he associated with deserved prosperity. But one would have thought that the friend of Hermeias knew that such things happen.

*τοὺς ἐπιεικείς*: the plur. indicates one character in each of a number of plays, and is no different from the sing. *τὸν πονηρόν*.

52<sup>b</sup>35. *εὐτυχίας . . . δυστυχίαν*: as at 51<sup>a</sup>13, 14. The variation *ἀτυχίας* (again at 55<sup>b</sup>28), two lines below, is without significance.

*οὐ γὰρ φοβερὸν . . . μισρόν ἐστιν*: it is explained at 53<sup>a</sup>4, 5, below, that fear is felt for those like ourselves, pity for those who suffer undeservedly. The *ἐπιεικής* (as the word is here used) is presumably so unlike us that we cannot enter into his feelings, as might be the case in a play about Socrates, who was superior to ordinary human weakness.

52<sup>b</sup>36. *οὐδὲ ἐλεινόν*: since the sufferings are undeserved it is not clear why they should not awaken pity. *ἐπιεικείς* appear to arouse pity at *R.* 1385<sup>b</sup>35, where the word *ἐπιεικής* is no doubt used in a more normal sense. It must be that the whole situation is found so *μισρόν*, 'repellent', that pity is lost in revulsion. For *μισρόν* cf. 53<sup>b</sup>39, 54<sup>a</sup>3. The thought that the truly good can suffer is too hideous to be tolerated! Euripides' Heracles is a possible example of suffering so undeserved as to be revolting. Some of Thomas Hardy's novels gave rise to similar objections.

*μοχθηρός*: the opposite of the *ἐπιεικείς*, whereas the opposite of



the *ἐπιεικής* in the usual sense is *φάυλος* (*EN* 1113<sup>b</sup>14). *μοχθηρούς* are indistinguishable from *τὸν σφόδρα πονηρόν* in 53<sup>a</sup>1.

52<sup>b</sup>38. *φιλόανθρωπον*: not previously mentioned and never defined. We are told merely that this emotion is a desirable element, *ὣν δεῖ*, clearly less important than pity and fear, and not requiring purgation. The word is of common occurrence from the early fourth century onwards, and comprises kindness, benevolence, mercifulness: cf. Lat. *humanus*. To the *φιλόανθρωπος* the thought of human suffering is painful, and his sympathy is not reserved for undeserved suffering, as *ἔλεος* is supposed to be. The attitude was expressed by Democritus, fr. 107a: *ἄξιον ἀνθρώπους ὄντας ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων συμφοραῖς μὴ γελᾶν ἀλλ' ὀλοφύρεσθαι*. See in general R. Stark, *A. Studien*, Ch. 5 and B. Snell, *Discovery of the Mind*, pp. 246-53.

The problem here is whether *φιλόανθρωπία* includes satisfaction at the sight of deserved suffering, as is probably implied at 53<sup>a</sup>2, where a play ending in disaster for a wicked character is said to be *φιλόανθρωπον*. This is unlikely to be due to sympathy with a positive villain: see M. Pohlenz, 'Furcht und Mitleid', *Hermes*, 84 (1956), 58. Even general sympathy with suffering may involve indignation with those who are responsible for wanton injury, and consequent satisfaction at their punishment. This is not an aspect of *φιλόανθρωπία* which is emphasized elsewhere, but it need cause no surprise, especially in view of *R.* 1386<sup>b</sup>28, where pain at undeserved misfortune accompanies pleasure in deserved misfortunes of others. The subject of pleasure or pain felt at the good or bad fortune of others is discussed at *EE* 3. 7. Desire for 'poetic justice' arises naturally from human sympathy.

53<sup>a</sup>4. *φόβον*: the nature of this fear is not self-evident; for a discussion of fear and of pity see Appendix II.

*ἀνάξιον*: the same restriction of pity to undeserved suffering is found at *R.* 1385<sup>b</sup>13. This affords a plain hint of the direction in which A. is working; the tragic misfortune must be to a great extent undeserved; but it must not be due to mere bad luck, for so the chain of causality would be weakened or broken; it must therefore be due to a mistake.

53<sup>a</sup>5 *ὅμοιον*: this is not to be taken as a reference to the triple division *σπουδαῖος-ὅμοιος-φάυλος* of Ch. 2. We can enter into the emotions felt by characters in drama only if they are so far like ourselves that we assume their feelings in a given situation to be similar to our own.

53<sup>a</sup>7. It will be observed that one of the four possibilities is not mentioned; nothing is said of the good man who passes from adversity to prosperity. G. argues that the *ἐπιεικής* cannot be *ἐπιεικής* without *εὐτυχία* (e.g. Ion at the beginning of Euripides' play or Orestes in the *IT* are in too lowly a state), E. that this plot is so obviously untragic

that there is no need to mention it; S. suggests more reasonably that in plays of this type the pity and fear depend on the *πάθη* endured in the course of the action, while the outcome itself is untragic. But in fact the situation most highly approved in Ch. 14 involves a dramatic climax with just such an untragic outcome, yet it is considered pre-eminent for pity and fear. Either there is an omission, or no account is taken of a type of play which includes some of which A. speaks most favourably, especially the *IT*. It is hard to believe that A.'s alternatives are not intended to cover all types of play.

**53<sup>a</sup>7-12.** *ὁ μεταξύ . . . ἄνδρες*: to what does *τούτων* refer? It can only be to the two types of character so far mentioned; *ὁ μεταξύ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς καὶ τοῦ πονηροῦ* is a common type of expression in A. E. wishes to take *ἀνάξιον . . . ὁμοιον* (ll. 4, 5) as the reference, but though this would give sense, the clause to which they belong is too obviously parenthetical.

**53<sup>a</sup>8-10.** *ὁ μήτε . . . ἁμαρτίαν τινά*: at first sight the meaning seems obvious; the required character is neither faultless nor wicked but he has a flaw, which brings him out between the two extremes. *ἁμαρτία* lies between *ἐπιείκεια* and *μοχθηρία*. This flaw or frailty is a popular starting-point for the discussion not only of Greek plays. But though *ἁμαρτία* can mean many things, there are few, if any, passages where 'flaw' is a justifiable rendering (see Appendix IV), and there can be little doubt that what A. recommends is a character neither very good nor very bad who makes a mistake; the mistake may, or may not, be reprehensible, but it is not by reason of the *ἁμαρτία* that the character is less than *ἐπιεικής*. A., for reasons which can be guessed, has expressed himself with misleading asymmetry.

It is to be noted that the form in which A. gives his description changes; so far good or bad men have experienced a change of fortune; now *μήτε διὰ κακίαν* implies that the bad man fell because of his badness. Why did the fortune of the good man change? Hardly because of his goodness; and so it must have been *δι' ἀτύχημα*, and this would introduce a random element destroying the chain of causality. At all events, in order to stress that the cause of the misfortune is not *κακία* (or *ἀρετή*) but a mistake of judgement, *ἁμαρτία*, he adopts a form of expression which has proved deceptive. It is easily read in the sense that the tragic character falls into adversity not through badness, but through something less deserving of moral censure, namely a flaw or weakness. Had A. written, as he might have, *ὁ μήτε ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνη μήτε κακία καὶ μοχθηρία ἀλλὰ δι' ἁμαρτίαν τινὰ μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν δυστυχίαν . . .* he would have made it easier to perceive his meaning. He chose the present form to bring out a contrast between a moral and a non-moral cause of tragic

action; he has been commonly misread as contrasting a serious and a venial moral fault.

The reasons for believing that the *hamartia* is the error of a man intermediate in moral stature, not the fault which reduces the man's moral stature to a middle level, are as follows:

(1) There are few passages in which *ἀμαρτία* means anything like 'flaw' or 'defect' of character. A. is fairly consistent in using it in the sense of 'mistake', either unavoidable and so entirely innocent, or involving at most a moderately culpable negligence, see Appendix IV.

(2) The subject of this section of the *P.* is plot, not character, and Ch. 15, which deals with character, says nothing about a flaw or defect; cf. especially 54<sup>b</sup>8-15.

(3) The only extant play among the examples which A. uses to illustrate his meaning, the *OT*, turns on a mistake. The cause of Oedipus' disaster, in so far as it was not determined before he was born, was that he was mistaken as to the identity of his parents. It must be admitted that other interpretations of the play allowing a different view of *ἀμαρτία* have been found acceptable by some; see Appendix IV.

(4) The most highly commended situation discussed in Ch. 14 as proper for tragedy depends on mistakes like that of Oedipus, though the word *ἀμαρτία* does not occur in that chapter. But the statement (54<sup>a</sup>9) that only a few legends provide the sort of plot which A. approves, one turning on ignorance of identity, refers back, *ὅπερ πάλαι εἴρηται*, τὸ 53<sup>a</sup>18, where it is said that the finest tragedies are about only few families because they alone fit the formula just expounded of the tragic *ἀμαρτία* (but see note ad loc. and 54<sup>a</sup>9-13 n.). It is manifest that *ἀμαρτία* is closely connected with the kind of ignorance of identity which is conspicuous in the plots considered in Ch. 14. Moreover, it would be absurd to suggest that only a few families offered characters of the right degree of mediocrity to fit the theory of the moral flaw; the poet, as maker of the plot, can impose what mediocrity he likes. See also note to l. 16.

**53<sup>a</sup>10.** τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων καὶ εὐτυχία: the heroes of myth are necessarily of high station and degree, and their passage from good to bad fortune is correspondingly spectacular. The tragic convention long continued to require heroes of a similar type even when drama had become entirely secular; so long as power is confined to the aristocracy this is natural. A few Elizabethan tragedies, *Arden of Feversham*, *A Yorkshire Tragedy*, descended to bourgeois themes, but it was not until the eighteenth century that the convention was formally challenged with plays such as Lessing's *Sarah Sampson*. It could be argued that the heroes and heroines of such plays were *ἄμοιοι* in a more meaningful sense than A.'s 'imperfect' demi-gods and kings.

**53<sup>a</sup>11. Οἰδίπους καὶ Θυέστης:** as A. frequently refers to the *OT*, it is clear that he has that play in mind here and the importance in the play of *ἀμαρτία*. The hero's ignorance of his own identity gives a satisfactory meaning. But Thyestes is a surprise in this context. He is best known for his crime against his brother Atreus, the seduction of his wife, and the theft of the golden lamb, for which Atreus revenged himself by pretending to forgive Thyestes and then serving him up his children's flesh at a banquet. The only *ἀμαρτία* here is that Thyestes did not know what he was eating. But Sophocles seems to have written a play about a recognition between Thyestes and his daughter Pelopiá, by whom he had had unawares a son, Aegisthus, ending with the suicide of Pelopia and the murder of Atreus; see *Soph. Frag.* (Pearson) 1. 185. This would give a more satisfactory *ἀμαρτία*.

**53<sup>a</sup>12. ἐπιφανείς:** repeats τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ. . . .

ἀνάγκη ἄρα . . . : a recapitulation of the important conclusions reached.  
καλῶς ἔχοντα: cf. 47<sup>a</sup>10.

**53<sup>a</sup>13. ἀπλοῦν . . . διπλοῦν:** it is a sign of the rough state of the work that the pair *ἀπλοῦς*–*διπλοῦς* is here introduced without explanation in spite of *ἀπλήν–πεπλεγμένην* (52<sup>b</sup>31) only a few lines before. *διπλοῦς* is explained at 53<sup>a</sup>31, below.

ὥσπερ τινές: there is no clue who they may have been.

**53<sup>a</sup>14. οὐκ εἰς εὐτυχίαν:** the change of a bad man's fortunes for the better was rejected as untragic at 52<sup>b</sup>37, but nothing has been said of the many plays which showed an indifferent or good hero enjoying an improvement in his fortunes.

**53<sup>a</sup>15. δι' ἀμαρτίαν μεγάλην:** 'a momentous mistake' suits better here than 'a great flaw' with *ἢ βελτίονος μᾶλλον ἢ χείρονος*; this last phrase may well indicate that A. was uneasy about the crudely ethical differentia employed above. Anyway, it would be absurd to say in one breath that the man was better and the flaw was greater.

**53<sup>a</sup>18. τοὺς τυχόντας μύθους ἀπηρίθμουν:** 'used to work their way through the stories at random'. In the absence of a *τέχνη* poets did not know which myth (the probable meaning of *μῦθος* here) would make a good play, so they just took from the store of myths which ever came first; more recently they learnt empirically that the stories of certain houses made the best plays; now A. tells them why.

**53<sup>a</sup>20. Ἀλκμέωνα . . . :** of the six heroes here mentioned Oedipus and Thyestes were used as examples at l. 11, above (see n.).

Alcmeon, like Orestes, killed his mother, Eriphyle, to avenge a father, Amphiaraus. His story was the theme of plays by Sophocles, Euripides, Agathon, Theodectes, and Astydamas. We learn in the next chapter (53<sup>b</sup>33) that in the play of Astydamas Alcmeon killed his mother in ignorance; in the ordinary version there cannot have

been much room for a *ἀμαρτία*: Euripides' *Alcmeon in Corinth* had a characteristic plot turning on recognitions; see [Apollodorus] 3. 7. 7. Orestes was the central figure of one of the most popular cycles of myth. Since he returned unrecognized to his own country, he was certainly a cause of *ἀμαρτία* in others, and it is present also in the Iphigeneia story. Meleager was killed by his mother after he had accidentally slain his uncles in the hunting of the Calydonian boar; plays by Phrynichus, Sophocles, and Euripides. Telephus, son of Heracles and Auge, is best known as the ragged suppliant who sought the cure of his wound by means of Achilles' spear which had also caused it. But he grew up in ignorance of one or both of his parents, with whom he was reunited after a dramatic recognition; also he unintentionally killed his uncles (Soph. *Aleadae*). Sophocles wrote a *Telephus Trilogy*, Aeschylus a *Telephus* and a *Mysians* (cf. 60<sup>a</sup>32). For a fuller account of what is known of tragedy relating to these six heroes see E., pp. 391-8. The chief difficulty is Meleager. Perhaps he failed to recognize his uncles; or his mother, Althaea, did not know he had killed them in error.

53<sup>a</sup>22. *παθεῖν δεινὰ ἢ ποιῆσαι*: this refers back to *φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλειωῶν* at the beginning of the chapter. Such plots would inevitably present characters who were *ἐπιφανείς*. A. is no doubt thinking of the sort of *δεινόν* specified at 53<sup>b</sup>30, the killing, or near killing, in ignorance, of a kinsman.

53<sup>a</sup>23. *ταύτης τῆς συστάσεως*: i.e. the structure prescribed in the sentence beginning *ἀνάγκη ἄρα*, l. 12, above.

This ends the section on *ἀμαρτία* and the tragic character. Taken in its narrowest sense, the theory of *ἀμαρτία* provides a formula for the numerous intrigue plays composed in the late fifth century and after. It has a wider relevance in connexion with unity of action. If the hero himself sets going the train of events which leads to his undoing, a causal connexion is secured between the beginning and the catastrophe; as the hero does not desire his own destruction he will hardly take the fatal step except under a misapprehension (or in a fit of passion). E. thinks the *ἀμαρτία* is confined to the complex play, belonging to the type *ἡ καλλίστη τραγωδία*, which A. is here considering. One may suspect that throughout this passage on the tragic situation A. has been influenced by Plato's denunciation of epic and tragic poets who presented a world in which the good were often miserable and the wicked successful, e.g. *Rep.* 392 A, B, *Laws* 660 E. Elsewhere in the *P.*, as in the demand that characters should be *σπουδαῖοι* and *χρηστοί*, the emphasis seems differently placed.

*διό*: though what follows is in the nature of an appendage to the main part of the chapter, it is closely linked. *δευτέρα* (53<sup>a</sup>30) refers back to *καλλίστη* in this line.

On καλλίστη see 50<sup>b</sup>36 n.

**53<sup>a</sup>24.** τὸ αὐτὸ ἁμαρτάνουσιν: 'make the same mistake' i.e. as the *τινες* of l. 13 who prefer the double ending, which implies that the critics of Euripides are a different set of people from those mentioned above. B. read αὐτό, acc. after ἐγκαλοῦντες picked up by ὅτι, which in any case is to be taken with ἐγκαλοῦντες, not as 'because'.

τοῦτο δρᾶ: cf. 59<sup>a</sup>29; τοῦτο has no clear antecedent. ταύτης τῆς συστάσεως (l. 23) involves three points: that it is single, ending in misfortune, caused by ἁμαρτία. E. makes τοῦτο refer to these three things and removes a major difficulty by bracketing καὶ αἱ πολλαὶ . . . τελευτῶσιν. But the τὸ αὐτό of l. 24 refers to the particular error of preferring a double to a single plot and ending, and in view of this it is impossible not to relate τοῦτο to the ending as explained by καὶ αἱ πολλαὶ . . . Further, the ending, double/or single, remains the chief topic for the rest of the chapter. It is, however, true that Euripides' work abounds more strikingly with plays based on mistaken identity and ἁμαρτία than with unhappy endings (see next n.). But the identity plays usually end happily.

**53<sup>a</sup>25.** αἱ πολλαί: editors are divided between αἱ πολλαί and πολλαί. Against πολλαί it is so obvious that many plays based on the body of Greek legend must end unhappily that it is not worth saying; on the other hand, it is not clear that Euripides was addicted specially to the unhappy ending. G.'s computation is: unhappy Soph. 43, Eur. 46; happy Soph. 16, Eur. 24. The endings are known of a larger proportion of Euripides' plays. But the point probably is that Euripides wrote a number of plays with spectacularly unhappy endings.

**53<sup>a</sup>27.** τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων: hendiadys for 'dramatic contests'.

**53<sup>a</sup>28.** ἂν κατορθωθῶσιν: 'if they are successfully executed'. It has sometimes been taken to refer to success in production, but every play needs proper production for success. κατορθοῦσθαι will be the consequence of εὖ οἰκονομεῖν, which Euripides does not always achieve.

**53<sup>a</sup>29.** εἰ καί: with the usual nuance, 'even if, as is in fact the case,'. Cf. *De Caelo* 298<sup>b</sup>17: οἷον οἱ περὶ Μέλισσόν τε καὶ Παρμενίδην, οὓς, εἰ καὶ τᾶλλα λέγουσι καλῶς, ἀλλ' οὐ φυσικῶς γε δεῖ νομίσαι λέγειν.

τὰ ἄλλα μὴ εὖ οἰκονομεῖ: οἰκονομεῖν is the regular word in the scholia for management of plot, etc. On the interpretation here given this will mean that Euripides was more correct with his endings than with the rest of his construction.

τραγικώτατός γε: taken in its context this famous aphorism must mean that Euripides excels in arousing pity and fear. On the evidence of the surviving plays it might be said that Euripides is most tragic in the sense that he is the most heart-rending of the poets.

A play such as the *Troades* is more pathetic, not to say more sentimental, than anything written by Aeschylus or Sophocles; his characters and his situations are nearer the level of ordinary life. Jebb, who was no great admirer of Euripides, attributed to *τραγικώτατος* here the meaning 'most sensational' (*Attic Orators* i. ci) but it is unexampled at this date.

**53<sup>a</sup>30. φαίνεται:** sc. to audiences.

ἡ πρώτη: equivalent to *καλλίστη*, l. 23.

**53<sup>a</sup>31. ὑπὸ τινῶν:** the same unknown critics as at l. 13, above.

**53<sup>a</sup>32. ἡ Ὀδύσσεια:** epic provides a better example than any tragedy because, owing to the larger scale of the work, the two parties, Odysseus and the suitors, are kept apart during the first half of the poem. The *Electra* of Sophocles might supply an example from tragedy; it ends badly for the wicked Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, well, at least in the short term, for the more sympathetic Electra and Orestes. But many plays with happy endings contain no overwhelming misfortune for anyone, e.g. *Helen*, *IT*, *Philoctetes*.

**53<sup>a</sup>34. θεάτρων ἀσθένειαν:** 'the weakness of theatre audiences'. Though tragedy gives pleasure, it is a more austere and more exacting pleasure than that of comedy.

ἀκολουθοῦσι γάρ: the importance attached to the applause of the, inevitably, uninstructed audience was a ground of complaint for Plato, who implied that in practice the judges awarded the prize in accordance with the verdict of the applause (*Laws* 659 A, 701 A).

**53<sup>a</sup>37. μῦθῳ:** here the traditional story as opposed to the plot shaped by the poet.

**53<sup>a</sup>38. φίλοι γενόμενοι:** we know of no such play, nor of any parallel in extant comedy, though titles of lost plays imply burlesque of tragic plots. E. rejects the whole sentence as lacking connexion with what has gone before—he objects also to the use of *μῦθῳ* meaning 'story' and not 'plot'. Presumably the sequence of thought is that it is natural human frailty to be disturbed by the sight of suffering and that the extreme case of the artificial avoidance of it is the turning upside down of a famous story with a tragic ending, as though Hamlet should be reconciled to his uncle. Nahum Tate's happy ending to *King Lear*, which was habitually acted for over a century, was a comparable concession to weakness.

## CHAPTER 14

The break at the end of Ch. 13 is a light one. The subject is still how to construct a plot in such a way as to achieve the due (emotional) effect, 52<sup>b</sup>28–30. It has been laid down that the construction of ἡ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγωδία will involve the *μετάβασις*, due to *ἀμαρτία*,

from good to bad fortune of a man neither faultless nor wicked. The main subject of Ch. 14, though it is not introduced until 53<sup>b</sup>14, is the relationship between the parties to the conflict. (A. has no single word for conflict in this sense any more than he has for the tragic hero; *ἀγών* is the conflict of competitors at a public performance.) Or, in other words, it is an enumeration of tragic *πάθη*: cf. 53<sup>b</sup>19. When a man gravely injures a *φίλος*, one of his kin, or comes near to doing so, the whole situation is a *πάθος* in which *ὁ πρᾶττων* and *ὁ πάσχων* are jointly involved. Oedipus in killing Laius was involved in a *πάθος* no less than his victim. *Hamartia* is not specifically mentioned in this chapter, but it is implied by *ἄγνοια* and *ἀναγνώρισις*. *ἄγνοια* is lack of knowledge. *ἀμαρτία* is the defective knowledge of one who thinks he knows. Of the four possible situations the two best involve *hamartia*.

**53<sup>b</sup>1–14.** *The less desirable way of arousing emotion.* This may be the explanation of *ἀ δεῖ εὐλαβεῖσθαι* at the beginning of the previous chapter, or it may have been suggested by 'the weakness of the audience' mentioned just above.

**53<sup>b</sup>1.** *τῆς ὄψεως*: see 49<sup>b</sup>33 n. For terror provoked by costume (or spectacle) see note on *τερατῶδες* at l. 9, below; that pity was aroused by the mere trappings of woe was a complaint made constantly by Aristophanes against Euripides, especially *Ach.* 407–89 and *Ran.* 1063:

*πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς βασιλεύοντας ῥάκι' ἀμπίσχων, ἔν' ἔλεινοι  
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις φαίνονται εἶναι.*

with emphasis on appearance as against reality. It is impossible to tell whether Aristophanes was genuinely outraged by the debasement of tragedy or exploiting an easy line in humour. Sophocles seems to have adopted Euripides' innovation in his later plays, *El.*, *Phil.*, *OC* (especially 1258–61). Webster, *Greek Theatre Production*, p. 39, denies, for no apparent reason, that rags were actually used. But it was Aeschylus who was traditionally the exploiter of *ἐκπληξίς* through *ὄψις*, e.g. in *PV* and *Eumen.*; see on l. 9, below. There may even have been a class of play which derived its effect from spectacle; cf. 56<sup>a</sup>2 n.

**53<sup>b</sup>3.** *πρότερον*: 'superior', not uncommon: cf. Aristoph. *Ran.* 76: *Σοφοκλέα πρότερον ὄντι Εὐριπίδου*; *A. Met.* 997<sup>a</sup>12.

**53<sup>b</sup>5.** *τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα*: 'the sequence of events': see on l. 6, below.

*φρίττειν*: 'shudder', used as a synonym for *φοβεῖσθαι* only here in *P.*; cf. *De Mol. An.* 701<sup>b</sup>22: *φρίττουσι καὶ φοβοῦνται νοήσαντες μόνον*. The word may be in A.'s mind as appropriate to the gruesome thrills presented through the medium of *ὄψις*. Cf. *Pl. Rep.* 387 c and *φρίκη*



*περίφοβος* of the terror aroused by poets (Gorgias, *Hel.* 9). It is used in the biological works of a purely physical *frisson*.

**53<sup>b</sup>6.** τὸν τοῦ Οἰδίπου μῦθον: there is no agreement about the meaning of *μῦθος*, whether it is the story of Oedipus (R. and S.), the plot of the *Oedipus* (B. and E.), or the play itself, read, not acted (G., Butcher). In favour of the last it can be argued that this is what is left when *ὄψις* is eliminated, and the point that plays can be read is made at 50<sup>b</sup>18 and 62<sup>a</sup>11; the great effect of Racine's reading aloud of the *OT* is recorded in Pellisson et d'Olivet, *Hist. Acad. franç.* (Paris, 1858), ii. 335. In favour of plot, slightly the most probable, we have the emphasis on τῆς συστάσεως and πράγματα, above; it is the organization by the poet of his material which is the decisive element, and it fits the argument equally well whether a summary of the plot or the plot as embodied in the play is here referred to. The pres. γινόμενα suggests that the hearing takes an appreciable time. What it cannot mean is the story. A poet with a proper grasp of his art can tell which stories are potentially good plots, but until the poet has put the parts or incidents, *πράγματα*, into a significant relation, the emotional impact is slight. So the story is essentially predramatic, *πράγματα* with only rudimentary *σύστασις*. Anyone telling the story of Oedipus today would in fact summarize the *plot* of Sophocles' play, because his version is dominant. The *λόγος* of Euripides' *IT* which A. outlines in Ch. 17, 55<sup>b</sup>2-15, seems to be more than story but less than plot. The main structural feature, the recognition, is given, though only allusively; but much detail would have to be filled in before it could arouse emotion.

**53<sup>b</sup>8.** χορηγίας: at Athens a *choregus* was a wealthy citizen who financed the training and equipment of a tragic, comic, or dithyrambic chorus and originally, no doubt, led it in the theatre: cf. Lysias 21. 1-4. There is no evidence that he was responsible for anything except the chorus, and so he would have little to do with the spectacular effects here referred to. By a natural extension *χορηγία* was used for expenditure in general, often with a suggestion of lavishness, and it is best taken in this sense here. Cf. *Pol.* 1331<sup>b</sup>41: δέεται καὶ χορηγίας τινὸς τὸ ζῆν καλῶς. E. keeps the technical sense but extends it to cover the dressing of actors.

**53<sup>b</sup>9.** τὸ τερατῶδες: 'the portentous'. To produce fear by spectacle rather than plot is inferior; to use spectacle to produce thrills for their own sake is incompatible with tragedy. The pleasure is different in kind, though *ἔκπληξις*, the pleasurable effect of seeing τὸ θαυμαστόν, is used in both connexions (cf. 55<sup>a</sup>17). It is not known to what A. is referring unless it be Aeschylus. The dreadful appearance of the Erinyes in his *Eumen.* is said to have caused women to miscarry; his *PV* contained not only the cow-headed Io but the winged

stead of Oceanus. The observation in the *Vit. Aes.* 7, ταῖς τε ὄψεσι καὶ τοῖς μύθοις πρὸς ἑκπληξίν τερατώδη κέχρηται, may go back to a Peripatetic source. While it is incredible that Aeschylus made so frivolous a use of spectacle, it is conceivable that A. thought he did. But the reference may be to something of which we know nothing.

**53<sup>b</sup>11.** ἡδονήν: one of the few clear statements in the *P.* of the function of tragedy: cf. 51<sup>b</sup>23, 53<sup>a</sup>36, 59<sup>a</sup>21, 62<sup>a</sup>16, 62<sup>b</sup>13.

**53<sup>b</sup>12.** τήν . . . διὰ μιμήσεως . . . ἡδονήν: it is not clear whether διὰ μιμήσεως is purely descriptive, or whether A. is emphasizing that pity and fear are enjoyable only when caused διὰ μιμήσεως, not in real life (cf. 48<sup>b</sup>10).

**53<sup>b</sup>13.** τοῦτο: it, not ἡδονή but τὸ ἡδονήν παρασκευάζειν, must be embodied in the action and not be a superficial effect of production. The effect of the πράγματα is of course dependent on their σύστασις.

**53<sup>b</sup>14–54<sup>a</sup>15.** In this, the concluding section on the organization of the plot, certain types of situation are arranged in order of effectiveness. It is to be noted that they turn not on a 'hero' but on a relation between two parties: cf. M. Kommerell, p. 189. These are εἶδη πάθους: cf. 52<sup>b</sup>9–13 and n.

**53<sup>b</sup>14.** δεινά . . . οἰκτρά: we might have expected φοβερὰ ἐλεεινά, but δεινά is appropriate to terrible events, οἰκτρά to the victims' πάθη, such as A. is about to classify (cf. l. 30, below). οἰκτρά, rare in A., is a synonym for ἐλεεινά, which occurs with δεινά at 56<sup>b</sup>3.

**53<sup>b</sup>15.** φίλων: in all the examples given the parties are closely connected by blood or marriage, though the sense is not normally so limited.

**53<sup>b</sup>18.** μέλλων: the intention without performance can produce the emotional impact.

κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος: the sight of a fellow creature in agony, physical or mental, rouses feelings of sympathy; strictly this should be called φιλανθρωπία, as pity is reserved for undeserved suffering and fear for those like ourselves, but the inconsistency, such as it is, is not objectionable. πάθος must have the sense of 'disaster' as in 54<sup>a</sup>13, which includes the sense of 52<sup>b</sup>10 (see note ad loc.), but is not confined to physical suffering.

**53<sup>b</sup>22.** ταῦτα ζητητέον: G., ad loc., gives lists of plots involving these relationships.

**53<sup>b</sup>22–26.** This is a parenthesis in which A. observes that *the poet has not complete freedom to arrange his plot on the most advantageous lines, since he uses traditional stories which prescribe the main events.*

**53<sup>b</sup>23.** Clytemnestra and Eriphyle, two examples of mothers killed by their sons. Alcmeon's murder of Eriphyle was the subject of Sophocles' *Erigoni* and of the *Alcmeon* of Astydamas. A. observes (*EN* 1110<sup>a</sup>28) that it is ridiculous that Alcmeon is *compelled* to kill his mother.

**53<sup>b</sup>25.** αὐτὸν δὲ . . . καλῶς: this can be taken in two ways: (1) εὐρίσκειν, meaning 'invent', and χρῆσθαι both depend on δεῖ, καί is copulative (2) χρῆσθαι depends on εὐρίσκειν = 'discover how to', καί is emphatic. The first being slightly the more natural has been generally preferred, though not by B. But the possibility that the poet may invent his own plots (εὐρίσκειν) has not been mentioned since 51<sup>b</sup>23 and what follows appears to refer exclusively to the handling of existing stories. (εὐρίσκειν governing an infin. is rare, but occurs at 54<sup>a</sup>11). There is no reason to take καλῶς with εὐρίσκειν as well as with χρῆσθαι. The interpretation to be adopted of 54<sup>a</sup>9-13 is not irrelevant to the final choice here. Since the invention might take the form not of shaping new plots but of ingeniously varying old ones, the effect of (2) can be got by making εὐρίσκειν depend on δεῖ and taking καί as explanatory.

παραδεδομένοις: as at 51<sup>b</sup>24, indistinguishable from παρελημμένους.

**53<sup>b</sup>26.** τὸ δὲ καλῶς . . .: *it has been agreed that a characteristic tragic plot would deal with the killing or projected killing of a near relative. The killing can either take place or not take place (this would generally be a datum of the myth), and the killer can be either aware or unaware of the identity of his proposed victim (here the dramatist is generally free to choose).* The symmetry of these four possibilities is not as complete as might appear, because not-killing covers both failing to kill and changing the intention to kill. It is to be noticed that A. lists only three possibilities (53<sup>b</sup>26-36), omitting the case of the aware killer who does not kill. This case is considered in the following passage, 53<sup>b</sup>36-54<sup>a</sup>9, where the four possibilities are put in order of merit beginning with the worst, but dismissed because it hardly occurs. It would be easy to insert with G. ἔστιν δὲ μὴ πράξαι εἰδότας after Μήδειαν in l. 29. This gets support from the Arabic version, but it involves the omission of τρίτον in l. 34.

**53<sup>b</sup>27.** ἔστι μὲν γὰρ . . .: *case I, action with knowledge, as Medea killed her children with full knowledge of what she was doing.* It is interesting that A. takes a low view of this type of play (54<sup>a</sup>2), although it is the one which gives the most scope for the study of a mind divided against itself and the psychology of decision.

ὡσπερ οἱ παλαιοί: as simple plays naturally precede complex, the older poets tended to write works which lacked the *anagnorisis* associated with action in ignorance. It is uncertain whether Euripides is reckoned as one of the ancient poets or not, just as it is uncertain whether he is among the νέοι at 50<sup>a</sup>25. In view of the large number of complex plays which Euripides wrote it would seem inappropriate to consign him to the category of the ancients, and this is the view of most commentators. On the other hand, no play is more complex than Sophocles' *OT* or *Philoctetes*, and the deaths of Sophocles and

Euripides would afford a natural dividing line between old and new. Cf. Denniston in *CR* 43 (1939), 60, who argues convincingly that Euripides is among the *παλαιοί*, and shows that *καί* can easily mean 'E, too among the ancients'.

**53<sup>b</sup>29.** *ἔστιν δέ . . .*: *case II*; as in *case III* they form their intention *ἀγνοοῦντες*, under the influence of *ἁμαρτία*. All *ἁμαρτήματα* arise from *ἄγνοια*, though not all *ἄγνοια* leads to a *ἁμάρτημα*.

**53<sup>b</sup>30.** *τὸ δεινόν*: every story suitable for a tragic plot contains a disastrous act (*πάθος*), actual or potential.

**53<sup>b</sup>31.** *τὴν φιλίαν*: 'the relationship', in the case of Oedipus that Laius was the father and Jocasta the mother.

**53<sup>b</sup>32.** *ἔξω τοῦ δράματος*: *τὸ δεινόν* occurred many years before the action of the play begins with the plague at Thebes. At 54<sup>b</sup>7 and 60<sup>a</sup>30 the same fact is mentioned in a different connexion. It is contrary to reason (*ἄλογον*) that inquiry into the disappearance of Laius should not have been made at the time and Oedipus been aware of the facts about his predecessor. And how should Jocasta not have noticed the scarred ankles of Oedipus? If there must be an *ἄλογον* it is better outside the action of the play.

**53<sup>b</sup>33.** *Ἀλκμέων*: in the play of Astydamos, one of the most productive tragic poets of the fourth century, Alcmeon killed his mother without knowing who she was.

*Τηλέγονος*: the play must be the *Ὀδυσσεὺς Ἀκανθοπλήξ* of Sophocles. Telegonus, the son of Odysseus by Circe, was sent by his mother to search for his father; landing on Ithaca by night he was mistaken by Odysseus for a marauder, and in the fight that followed Telegonus fatally wounded his father with his spear which was tipped with fish-bone (hence *ἀκανθοπλήξ*). Telegonus does not appear to have realized what he had done until after his father's death; cf. *Soph. Frag.* (Pearson) 2. 105 ff.

**53<sup>b</sup>34.** *μέλλοντα*: *case III*; *μέλλειν* means 'intend' or 'be on the point of'.

**53<sup>b</sup>35.** *ἀναγνωρίσαι*: sc. *τὴν φιλίαν*; cf. l. 31, and similarly at 54<sup>a</sup>3.

**53<sup>b</sup>37.** *τούτων*: the four possibilities implied in the preceding sentence; see note on l. 26.

*τὸ μὲν γινώσκοντα . . .*: the one possibility not so far mentioned.

Had Medea, for instance, changed her mind about her children, it would have been hard to maintain the tension of the play.

**53<sup>b</sup>39.** *μιαρόν*: 'morally repulsive', as at 52<sup>b</sup>36. The desire to kill one who should be dear, a husband or a son, is repellent. When the deed is done, or planned, in ignorance of the victim's true identity, it ceases to be *μιαρόν*, however painful it may remain. Presumably the next worse type, that of action with knowledge, is also *μιαρόν*, but the effect of the *πάθος* may afford some compensation.

**ἀπαθής:** there is no πάθος, disastrous occurrence, rather than no event which arouses appreciable pity or fear. Thus in the instance given Haemon, having failed in his attempt to kill Creon, desists and kills himself. This would not make a sufficient climax for a tragic action. In fact, of course, it is only an incident narrated by a messenger (*Antig.* 1206-43).

**54<sup>a</sup>1. ὀλιγάκις:** there are no examples in extant tragedy. Orestes' intended slaughter of Helen is incidental. The sparing of Lycus (*Antiope*) is a better case, but here too a god intervenes and Lycus is not a φίλος. G. suggests the intention of Nephele to kill Athamas in Soph. *Athamas B.*: cf. *Soph. Frag.* (Pearson), 1. 1-4. Hamlet's failure to kill his uncle at prayer would be irrelevant, as part only of a larger movement. Had Medea spared her children it would have been an example.

**54<sup>a</sup>2. δεύτερον:** 'next in order from the worst'. The same arrangement is used in the case of recognitions at 54<sup>b</sup>30; elsewhere we have a descending order of merit or importance, as 50<sup>a</sup>39. This second type is not criticized. Like the worst it must be μαρόν because the characters act γιγνώσκοντες, but it is superior because it contains a πάθος or arouses πάθος.

**βέλτιον:** the class of the *OT*, *Alcmeon*, and *Odysseus Akanthoplex*.

As there is no wicked intention, τὸ μαρόν is absent.

**54<sup>a</sup>4. ἐκπληκτικόν:** ἐκπληξίς is defined in *Top.* 126<sup>b</sup>14 as ὑπερβολὴ θαυμασιότητος. The word occurs mainly in *P.* and *Rhetoric*, again in connexion with *OT* at 55<sup>a</sup>17: see n.; and D. A. Russell on [Longinus] 15. 2. A characteristic use is for the amazement of Rhampsinitus in Herod. 2. 121γ.

**54<sup>a</sup>5. τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ:** a play by Euripides produced earlier than 426 B.C. The story was dramatized by Voltaire, and by M. Arnold in his *Merope*. Cresphontes, the son of Merope and the king of Messenia, was smuggled out of the country as a child when the usurper Polyphontes killed the king and forcibly married his queen. A price was set on his head, and this he made use of to exact his revenge. He returned to his country in disguise and claimed the reward offered to the slayer of Cresphontes. He deceived not only Polyphontes but Merope as well, and she planned to murder the supposed murderer of her son. She stood with axe raised to strike her sleeping son when the *Paidagogos* entered in time to save the boy and bring about the *anagnorisis*. Plutarch, *M.* 998 E, tells of the suspense created in the theatre when this scene was performed: ὅσον ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ κίνημα ποιεῖ συνεξορθιάζουσα φόβῳ καὶ δέος μὴ φθάσῃ τὸν . . . γέροντα. If Plutarch saw the play himself, this must be one of the last recorded performances of Euripides in the ancient world. A. Pertusi in *Dioniso* 19 (1956), 111-14, has collected references to performances;

they are numerous down to the end of the second century A.D., but it is impossible to tell which are merely recitations of selected speeches.

54<sup>a</sup>7. τῆ Ἰφιγενεία: the *anagnorisis* of the *IT* is praised at 55<sup>a</sup>18.

54<sup>a</sup>8. τῆ Ἑλλη: Helle was daughter of Athamas and sister of Phrixus. Nothing is known of the play, nor does the story obviously suit this context. ἐκδιδόναι would mean 'hand over to her enemies'. Some have proposed to substitute Antiope for Helle. In the *Antiope* of Euripides Antiope was on the point of being handed over by her sons to her enemy Dirce; this would be ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον (53<sup>b</sup>21), τι τῶν ἀνηκέστων (53<sup>b</sup>35).

This preference for this class of action, which involves recognition before execution, appears to be in flat contradiction to the prescription of ἡ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγωδία in Ch. 13, 53<sup>a</sup>13-15, where it is laid down that the change shall be not to good fortune from bad, but in the opposite direction, to bad from good. There is a partial solution which was suggested by Lessing, whom most later edd. have followed (see M. 338-9): in Ch. 13 A. is discussing the movement of the play as a whole turning on its *μετάβασις*, in Ch. 14 the best management of a single scene and the way to secure the maximum *πάθος*; in theory this might be subordinate to the plot. But it should be clearly stated that within the restricted compass of a Greek play there is rarely, if ever, room for a single scene to be developed to this point, unless it is the essential turning-point of the whole plot. The scene of realization before action in the *Cresphontes* might possibly have been combined with the final destruction of the innocent parties, Cresphontes and Merope, though there would probably have been difficulties, and we know no instance of such a plot, unless possibly Euripides' *HF*, a play of quite exceptional construction. So we are left on this view with the curious fact that the best kind of scene cannot be got into the best kind of play, a fact on which A. might have been expected to comment. B. supposes a change of view subsequent to the writing of Ch. 13 due to a feeling that τὸ *μιαρόν* must be avoided at all costs, and that there must be an element of τὸ *μιαρόν* in a play like *OT* even though the intention is pure. Yet, apart from this contradiction, the two chapters with their common focus in the tragic emotions give a strong impression of coherence, and if we are to believe that different drafts are combined here, the case for treating the *P.* as anything approaching an integrated work is weak indeed. The least awkward solution is to suppose that A. thought the *OT* the best type of play, but that *Cresphontes* and *IT* contained each a finer scene.

54<sup>a</sup>9-13. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο . . .: the problem here is whether A. is merely repeating what he said at 53<sup>a</sup>18 (νῦν δὲ περὶ ὀλίγας . . .) about the scarcity of legends which can be made to yield a first-class plot, or

whether he is blaming the poets for not increasing the supply by inventing new ones. The first question is the reference of *τοῦτο*. B. took it to be the statement about plots which ends *ταῦτα ζητητέον* at 53<sup>b22</sup>. Better perhaps is to refer it to the whole discussion on situations and emotions, particularly to *κράτιστον* (l. 4). Alternatively it can refer forward to the next sentence *ζητοῦντες γάρ . . .* ‘the reason why tragedies are about few families is . . .’; cf. 51<sup>b4</sup>. In any case, *ὅπερ εἴρηται* depends not on *τοῦτο* but on *οὐ περὶ πολλὰ . . .*. If *ζητοῦντες γάρ* explains *τοῦτο*, then the force of this sentence is that the poets sought the best emotional effects but, having no adequate theory, they merely found empirically (cf. 47<sup>a20</sup> *οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείας*) that certain sorts of plot worked. Accordingly they were compelled, *ἀναγκάζονται οὖν*, to ring the changes on the stories of the few houses which had suffered the right sort of disasters. Whereas if they had worked out the *τέχνη*, they would have been able to invent all the plots they wanted for themselves. This satisfies logic, and most edd. explain along these lines. But the emphasis and the indirectness of this demand for invented plots are surprising, and R. may be right in allowing less to the claims of logic. The implication of A.’s words need not be that, if they had worked *ἀπὸ τέχνης*, they would have found more plots, but that they would have reached the present position sooner. Further, *τέχνη* could not have increased the number of *οικίαι*. The best solution is to take *διὰ τοῦτο* as referring to the earlier part of the chapter, and the *γάρ* clause as parenthetic, making the same favourite contrast as at 47<sup>a19</sup>, 51<sup>a24</sup>; *ἀναγκάζονται οὖν* is the consequence of *οὐ περὶ πολλὰ . . .*. There is a basic scarcity of stories which make first-class tragedies.

It may be noted that no sort of ‘flaw’ appears as part of the theoretically correct plot, but *ἄγνοια* does.

**54<sup>a9</sup>.** *πάλαι* of something stated a page or two back is not found elsewhere in the *P.*, but is not infrequent in *A.*

**54<sup>a10</sup>.** *αἱ τραγωδίαι εἰσὶν*: cf. 53<sup>a18</sup>: *νῦν δὲ περὶ ὀλίγας οἰκίας αἱ κάλλισται τραγωδίαι συντίθενται*. It does not appear that all contemporary tragedy was confined to these few plots, so *κάλλισται* must be supplied, textually or mentally, from the earlier passage.

When was the process of working through the myths to find the suitable ones completed? *ἀπηρίθμουν* (53<sup>a18</sup>) shows it was in the past. Perhaps Euripides came near to exhausting the supply of good recognition plots in his last years.

*τέχνης . . . τύχης*: cf. Agathon, fr. 6: *τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τέχνην τύχην*, from *EN* 1140<sup>a19</sup>.

What they sought *ζητοῦντες* must have been satisfying plots; if they had already identified *τὸ τοιοῦτον* they would not have sought *ἀπὸ τύχης*.

- 54<sup>a12</sup>.** ἀπαντᾶν: sometimes to 'face' or 'cope with' a threat or difficulty, e.g. πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν *Pol.* 1283<sup>b35</sup>, more generally to 'have dealings with', 'concern oneself with' as here. Vahlen took it 'many poets coincide over a few plots': cf. Bonitz 73a 4-9.
- 54<sup>a13</sup>.** περὶ μὲν οὖν . . .: this appears to mark with finality the conclusion of the section which began with the examination of τὴν σύστασιν τῶν πραγμάτων in the first sentence of Ch. 7. 'I do not think A. could state in a clearer way . . . that he had finished with the μῦθος' (Solmsen, *CQ* 29 (1935), 193). But we soon return to topics which belong primarily to the province of plot.

## CHAPTER 15

- 54<sup>a16-36</sup> and 54<sup>b8-15</sup> ἦθος.** **54<sup>a37-b8</sup>** seems to be concerned with μῦθος: **54<sup>b15-18</sup>** belongs doubtfully.

*After plot the element second in importance is character, in the somewhat limited form of ἦθος, the disposition induced by habit and training. Knowledge of a person's ἦθος creates an expectation as to the way he will behave in given circumstances.* The word appears to mean both 'character', one of the *dramatis personae*, as at 60<sup>a11</sup> (but see note), and also 'the character of a character'; the ambiguity is the same in English. τρόποι 'a man's ways' is not found in the *P.*—οἱ λόγοι τῶν ἡθῶν καὶ τῶν τρόπων εἰσὶν εἰκόνες (*R. ad Alex.* 1441<sup>b19</sup>).

- 54<sup>a16</sup>.** ὧν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι: parallel to the beginning of the previous section, 52<sup>b28</sup>.

**54<sup>a17</sup>.** χρηστά: χρηστός like χρήσιμος 'useful' and so 'good of its sort' and, more generally, 'good'. There is considerable overlap between this word and σπουδαῖος and ἐπιεικής, all three being opposed to φαῦλος. χρηστός is equated with ἐπιεικής (*R.* 1418<sup>b1</sup>). It occurs in the *P.* only in this chapter. It is appropriate here because of its relative sense. It would have been paradoxical to say at l. 20, below, that a slave could be σπουδαῖος or ἐπιεικής. On the other hand, the general statement that characters should be χρηστά at least does not contradict the definitions of Ch. 2. Cf. Eur. fr. 329 φεῦ, τοῖσι γενναίοισιν ὡς ἀπανταχοῦ πρέπει χαρακτήρ χρηστός εἰς εὐψυχίαν.

Note that characters are required to be χρηστός in order that tragedy may achieve its proper effect. A. is untroubled by Plato's feeling that it is blasphemous to represent heroes, often the children of gods, as wicked (*Rep.* 391 C); cf. 60<sup>b35</sup>.

- 54<sup>a18</sup>.** ὡσπερ ἐλέχθη: 50<sup>b8</sup>.

προαίρεσιν: cf. 50<sup>b8</sup> n. and *R.* 1395<sup>b13</sup>.

- 54<sup>a19</sup>.** ἔστιν: the subj. is ἦθος χρηστόν.

- 54<sup>a20</sup>.** καὶ . . . καί: 'both . . . and', so S. and E. (cf. Denniston,



*Particles*, p. 109), not 'even' as B. and Butcher render; see A. W. Gomme, *CQ* N.S. 4 (1954), 46-9. The natural inferiority of women and slaves was a commonplace: cf. A. *Pol.* 1, Chs. 12 and 13; but even A. admitted that the wrong men were sometimes slaves. The superior slave is often to be met in tragedy, though sometimes, like Eumaeus in the *Odyssey*, he is not of slave birth.

54<sup>a</sup>21. φαῦλον: see 48<sup>a</sup>2 n.

The first of the four requirements, that characters should be *χρηστός*, arises naturally from the definition and from the discussion of plot in the two previous chapters. The second, that they should be *ἀρμόττων*, a synonym for *πρέπων*, means no more than that they should be free from inappropriate or incongruous characteristics. For τὸ πρέπων, conformity to a norm, see M. Pohlenz, *N. Gött. G.* (1933), pp. 53 ff.

54<sup>a</sup>22. ἔστιν γὰρ . . . ἦθος: γυναῖκα is to be supplied from the next clause, 'it is possible for a woman to be brave'. With the vulgate ἀνδρείον we have to translate 'it is possible for a man to be brave', or 'there exists the dramatic character who is brave'. οὕτως, l. 23 (Vahlen's emendation) then means 'brave in the way that a man is brave'; this is less easy to supply with ἀνδρείαν.

ἀνδρείαν: lit. 'manly'. What would be brave for a woman would be cowardly for a man (*Pol.* 1277<sup>b</sup>21). Antigone is brave, but it is appropriate that she should not face death with the same unbending resolution as Ajax. Iphigeneia in the *IA* shows her womanliness and, in a different passage, her bravery. If the Electra of Sophocles is something of a virago, there are special reasons, and she herself is troubled by her own behaviour. What A. made of the ἀνδρόβουλον κέαρ of Aeschylus' Clytemnestra it is idle to speculate; he perhaps allowed the spirited Merope of the *Cresphontes*, ἡ δὲ λόγους ἀνδρώδεις προσφερομένη κινεῖ τὰ θέατρα (Plut. *M.* 110 D, Eur. fr. 454).

54<sup>a</sup>24. δεινήν: 'clever' as illustrated by the case of Melanippe at l. 31, below. Plato's *Ion* (540 B) knows ἃ πρέπει ἀνδρὶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ὅποια γυναικί.

ὅμοιον: there can be little doubt that the third requirement is that the characters should be like ordinary human beings, in the sense that they should not be so remote that they fail to arouse sympathy; the σφόδρα πονηρός is untragic because he is too unlike us, and so, at the other extreme, would be Plato's Socrates, who lacks human weakness. It must be allowed that this requirement leaves room for a considerable measure of unlikeness.

There is, however, another kind of likeness which could be intended in this passage, likeness of dramatic character to mythical prototype, as in Hor. *AP* 123. 4:

sit Medea ferox invictaque, flebilis Ino,  
perfidus Ixion, Io vaga, tristis Orestes.

The schol. contain many criticisms of this sort of failure to achieve likeness, as on Eur. *Med.* 922: ἔδει δὲ αὐτὴν μηδὲ κλαίουσαν εἰσάγεσθαι οὐ γὰρ οἰκείον τῷ προσώπῳ. G. collects a number of examples of criticisms παρὰ τὸ πρόσωπον in his note on 54<sup>a</sup>29, though it is not always possible to distinguish between criticisms of failure to follow the traditional model and those of mere inconsistency within the play. Much closer to this chapter is a fragment of papyrus from an unknown work (M. believes it to be the Aristotelian *Poetic* of which our *P.* is a shortened version) in the *Rainer Pap.* published by H. Oellacher, *Soc. roy. égypt. de papyrologie, Études* iv (1938), 133–96. Part of one column is continuously legible, and in the two adjacent columns some form of ὁμοιος appears three times, of ἀρμόττων twice, leaving no doubt as to the subject under discussion. καὶ ὁ μάλ[ι]στα δυνάμεν[ος] αὐτὴν (sc. λέξιν Oel.) ἀκρειβῶς ἀποδιδόμει (cf. 54<sup>b</sup>10) μάλιστα ἀγαθὸς ποιητῆς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Ὅμηρος ἀγαθὸς καὶ Σοφοκλ[ῆ]ς· οἷα γὰρ ἂν εἶποι καὶ ὡς ἡ Ἀνδρομάχη ἰδοῦσα τὸν ἄνδρα ἐλκόμενον δύναται εὐρεῖν καὶ λέξει κα[ὶ] ἤθει καὶ διανοίᾳ. εἰσιν δὲ τινες, οἳ ὄν μὲν προτίθενται οὐ μειμούνται, ἄλλον δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καλῶς, ο[ὗ τ]υγχάνομεν (εἰ τυγχάνοιεν Gomp.) ἔχοντες ἔννοιαν καὶ παράδειγμα παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς· ὥσπερ καὶ Τειμόθεος ἐν τῷ θρήνῳ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεύς, εἰ μὲν τινα μειμείται [κ]αὶ τὸ ὁμοίον τι οἶδεν, ἀλλ[ὰ] τῷ Ὀδυσσε[ῖ]. . . . (ἀλλ' οὐ Gomp.) (ἄλλο τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ περιτίθησιν ἦθος Wil.). Gomperz, *Mitteilungen aus der Sammlung Pap. Erz. Rainer*, I (1887), 82, Wilamowitz, *Timotheus* (1903), p. III.

The interpretation is not beyond doubt; this could mean that the Odysseus of Timotheus possesses τὸ ὁμοιον but, as at 54<sup>a</sup>30, not τὸ ἀρμόττων, in the sense not only that it is inappropriate for O. *qua* man to weep, but that it is inappropriate for the O. whom we know from myth (while for Melanippe, as a woman having no clear-cut mythical character, it is inappropriate to be philosophical). This sense has usually been attributed not to ἀρμόττων but to ὁμοιος, so B., G., and H. But it could be that, while the other characters of T. are 'like', O. conforms to a recognizable type οὐ τυγχάνομεν ἔχοντες ἔννοιαν, but is not like O. In any case it does appear that in what is probably an early Peripatetic work likeness to the prototype is a requirement of ἦθος.

It is to be noted that there is no reference to ἀμαρτία as a moral quality being part of ἦθος. Nor is the triple division of Ch. 2, where ὁμοιος is intermediate between κρείττων and χείρων, relevant to anything here.

**54<sup>a</sup>25.** ὡς προεῖρηται: not 'as has been said', but 'as they have been defined', i.e. in ll. 20–24.

**54<sup>a</sup>26.** ὁμαλόν: 'even' and so 'all of a piece'. Cf. *EN* 1159<sup>b</sup>8: οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς διαμένουσιν ὁμοιοὶ ὄντες, and *Hor. AP* 119: 'aut famam sequere aut sibi convenientia finge'.

**κᾶν γὰρ ἀνώματος:** people in real life are sometimes wayward; their *ἦθος* is such that they do not on all occasions react as their general behaviour would lead a reasonable person to expect. If such a character is presented on the stage there is an obvious danger that in different scenes he will give the impression of being different people; nor is it easy within the restricted compass of a Greek play to reveal that a character is normally inconsistent. The *ἀνομοιότητες* in the *ἦθος* of Alcibiades are mentioned at Plut. *Alcib.* 2.

**ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων:** i.e. the original character in the myth. *ὁ μιμούμενος*, being usually mid., would be ambiguous.

**54<sup>a</sup>27. ὑποτεθῆ:** 'supplied' (by the myth): cf. 51<sup>b</sup>13.

**54<sup>a</sup>29. ἀναγκαίαις:** what is unnecessary, i.e. not demanded by the plot, is the wickedness. *ἀναγκαῖον*, agreeing with *παράδειγμα*, should mean that the example itself is superfluous, and if, as E. thinks, it is what A. wrote, he was writing carelessly. B.'s *ἀναγκαῖον* from one of the *recentiores* would violate A.'s practice of treating the word as of three terminations.

**ὁ Μενέλαος:** E. is probably right in taking this to mean that the plot of the *Orestes* does not require that Menelaus should be as base as he is. In the *Andromache*, where he is even baser, the *πονηρία* is more necessary to the plot. The *Orestes* is censured again for the same reason at 61<sup>b</sup>21 and in the schol. The same idea may underlie the comment at the end of the First Argument to the play: *πλήν Πυλάδου πάντες φαῦλοί εἰσιν.*

**54<sup>a</sup>30. ὁ τε θρῆνος Ὀδυσσεύς:** this appears to be an example of the fault opposite to the manly woman (see note on l. 24); it is curious that the work from which it is drawn was a dithyramb (cf. 61<sup>b</sup>32) by Timotheus, in which Odysseus lamented the members of his crew whom Scylla devoured.

**54<sup>a</sup>31. ἡ τῆς Μελανίππης ῥῆσις:** fortunately we know enough of this very curious speech to understand the reference. The plot of the *Melanippe* of Euripides (called *Μελανίππη ἡ Σοφή* to distinguish it from *Μ. Δεσμώτις*) was as follows: Melanippe in her father's absence gave birth to twins by Poseidon; she exposed them, but after her father's return a cow was found to be suckling them. It was over-hastily inferred that the cow had given them birth—a portent. Melanippe's father decided to dispose of them by burning, and gave them to his daughter to prepare for the sacrifice. She attempted to save them by arguing that cows do not give birth to human babies and that they must have had a human mother. The opening lines of her speech have been preserved, and they suggest that she went back to the beginning of things and expounded a scientific cosmogony, perhaps on Anaxagorean lines, asserting the uniformity of nature. The first line (fr. 484)

κούκ ἐμός ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα.

became a proverbial disclaimer. As her mother was Hippe, the daughter of the wise Chiron, this does a little, though not much, to extenuate τὸ ἀπρεπές. In fact the speech carried no conviction and Melanippe was reduced to confessing the truth, and only the intervention of Poseidon saved mother and twins.

**54<sup>a</sup>32.** ἡ ἐν Αὐλίδι Ἰφιγένεια: Iphigeneia in the extant play is horrified when first she hears that she is to be sacrificed so that the Greeks may have a fair wind for Troy; later, in an upsurge of Pan-Hellenic enthusiasm and in order that Achilles may not endanger himself on her behalf, she gladly offers to die for Greece. It is true enough that Iphigeneia as suppliant is quite unlike her later self. In view of what passes between Clytemnestra and Achilles in her presence the transformation is by no means inexplicable, but Euripides does nothing to explain it, and A.'s criticism is not so insensitive as is sometimes suggested. In fact the economy of the play allows no scope for the development of Iphigeneia's character. It is not till after 1035 that Iphigeneia learns that she is to be victim and not bride; Agamemnon rejects her appeal 1255-75, Achilles enters at 1345, and the transformation of Iphigeneia is revealed at 1368; this is the method of melodrama. Such changes are rare in Greek tragedy; that of Neoptoleimus in the *Phil.* is one with which neither A. nor anyone else could find fault. In fact A. appears to accept it (*EN* 1151<sup>b</sup>18). The use of masks must have worked against variations of character within the play.

Elsewhere A. seems to have censured the ἀνωμαλία of Achilles in his treatment of Priam in the last book of the *Iliad*: cf. Eustathius on *Il.* 24. 569 = A. fr. 168. This is probably connected with the melancholic temperament; see 55<sup>a</sup>32-34 n. and E., p. 462.

No example is given (or has survived) of a failure in τὸ ὅμοιον.

**54<sup>a</sup>33-36.** This demand for probable and coherent behaviour certainly does not support, though it is perhaps too vague to dismiss, the suspicions that have been raised, for example, by Tycho von Wilamowitz, *Die dramatische Technik des Soph.* and E. Howald, *Die gr. Trag.*, that the Greeks lacked the notion of continuity and consistency of dramatic character.

In effect this repeats the requirement of 51<sup>b</sup>8, τῷ ποίῳ τὰ ποῖα ἅττα συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ πράττειν. The form of expression resembles 52<sup>a</sup>18-21 and suggests that here too we have the termination of a completed section.

**54<sup>a</sup>36.** καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο . . . : either 'one thing after another' (cf. τὰδε μετὰ τὰδε 52<sup>a</sup>21), or it refers to τὰ τοιαῦτα, what is said or done, for which ταῦτα would be more natural.

In spite of the search for individuality of character as a result of the influence of the novel, echoes of the Aristotelian view are still to be heard. 'It is clear that we demand from tragic action the sense that the actors represent us all, humanity in general. . . . The plot must depict the agents as working within, and worked upon by, forces which we feel to circumscribe human actions generally.' A. M. Quinton and R. Meager, *Symp. Proc. Aristot. Soc.*, supp. vol. 34 (1960), 145. Yeats's comparison of tragic and comic character goes beyond anything in A., though he might have found in it much to agree with. 'Suddenly it strikes us that character is continuously present in comedy alone, and that there is much tragedy, that of Corneille, that of Racine, that of Greece and Rome, where its place is taken by passions and motives, one person being jealous, another full of love or remorse or pride or anger. . . . Congreve defined humour itself—the foundation of comedy—as a singular and peculiar way of doing anything peculiar to one man only, by which his speech and actions are distinguished from all other men.' Yeats's *Essays* (London, 1924), pp. 297–8. Yeats evaded some obvious objections by asserting that Shakespeare was essentially a writer of tragi-comedies. On the typical quality of the tragic character see also Wilamowitz, *Herakles*<sup>1</sup>, pp. 112–13.

54<sup>a</sup>37–54<sup>b</sup>8. The connexion of this section with the rest of the chapter is obscure. Plot seems to replace character as the subject, character being resumed at 54<sup>b</sup>8, ἐπεὶ δὲ . . ., which could easily follow directly after 54<sup>a</sup>36. If the text is sound, the explanation must be something like this: the notion of πραγμάτων σύστασις is introduced at 54<sup>a</sup>34 in order to illustrate from the plot the requirements of τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός as applied to character. μῦθος now having replaced ἦθος in the forefront of A.'s mind, he mentions a point which should have been made in Chs. 8–11 but is now inserted as an afterthought, that bad use of the *deus ex machina* at the end of a play can weaken its unity. Thereafter the thought develops naturally down to 54<sup>b</sup>8. B. in his translation makes A. apologize for the digression. But even so καὶ τὰς λύσεις gives the impression that the whole sentence is part of a discussion of structure. It is not unlike A. to mention λύσεις before he has defined it, but there is no doubt that the section would stand better in Ch. 18, which is concerned with δέσις and λύσις. Hermann in fact transposed it to 55<sup>b</sup>32, where he marked a lacuna. But verbally the fit is poor.

Many edd., G., S., E., and R. in his first ed., attempt to solve the problem by reading in place of μύθου at 54<sup>b</sup>1 ἦθους or ἦθῶν, which is said to be supported by the Arabic. The presence of μύθων five words earlier might explain the corruption. This is at first sight attractive. It has been objected to ἦθους, the easier reading in view

of ἐξ αὐτοῦ, that A. normally uses the plur., but as there is often only one character in a play whose ἦθος is in question, this carries little weight. More importance attaches to the phrase in the schol. to *Il.* 2. 73: ἔστι δὲ ἀποίητον τὸ μηχανήμα λύειν εἰ μὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ μύθου. Since this relates to the episode of the ἀπόπλους cited immediately below, it is very possibly an echo of our text, or more probably of something in A.'s Homeric criticism, and evidence that μύθου stood here at a date earlier than the translation into Syriac. Further, it would be surprising if A. suddenly placed such emphasis on the importance of ἦθος. It is of course true that the inevitability shown in the development of a good plot is unattainable if the behaviour of the characters is felt to be unnatural; but it is late in the day to be saying this. The real test is whether ἦθος works better than μύθου in the context, and it does not. The end of the *Medea* is unsatisfactory, not because there is anything inconsistent or illogical in the ἦθος of Medea, but because her status and powers are different from what they were represented to be in the rest of the play. Her implacability towards Jason remains constant. If Thoas or Theoclymenus had been given as the example, a stronger case could have been made for ἦθος. Both in the *Hel.* and in the *IT* the finale requires a change of attitude in a character which is motivated purely by outside intervention and is not ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἦθους in either sense of the word. But it must be added that the λύσις of both these plays, as the word is defined in Ch. 18, begins much earlier than the introduction of the god who in the last resort is dispensable. See A. Spira, *Untersuchungen zum Deus ex machina bei Soph. und Eur.* Frankfurt Dissert. (1960).

The problem is well discussed by Solmsen, *CQ* 29 (1935), 192 ff.

**54<sup>b1</sup>.** καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ . . . ἀπόπλους: the μηχανή was a kind of crane used to suggest the miraculous appearance of gods out of the sky: see Pickard-Cambridge, *Theatre of Dionysus*, pp. 127–8. Since it was sometimes convenient to use this device to rescue a plot which had reached an impasse, it soon got a bad name. Cf. Pl., *Crat.* 425 D: οἱ τραγωδοποιοί, ἐπειδάν τι ἀπορώσιν, ἐπὶ τὰς μηχανὰς καταφεύγουσι θεοὺς αἶροντες; Antiphanes, *Poiesis*, fr. 191, contrasts the comic poet who has to contrive his own plots with the tragic poet who has his work done for him, and who, if in difficulty, 'can raise the crane as easily as his little finger'; in Demos. 40. 59, a convenient witness appears ὥσπερ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς. From this a metaphorical sense easily developed, e.g. A. *Met.* 985<sup>a</sup>18: Ἀναξαγόρας μηχανῆ χρῆται τῶ νῶ.

The use was extended also to cover all divine interventions even if the *mechane* was not actually employed, as in epic. The second example in the present passage relates to the intervention of Athena in *Il.* 2. 166 ff. and the reference in ὅσα πρὸ τοῦ γέγονεν .l. 3, below,

must be to prologues, which were often spoken by gods but not, it is generally believed, from the *mechane*. So far as extant plays are concerned the *deus* is introduced to announce the future rather than to cut the knot. The *Philoctetes* and the *Orestes* are the only ones in which, as they are usually interpreted, the *deus* can be said to constitute an *ἄλογον* (cf. l. 6, below). The *Medea* is a less clear case. A.'s objection would have been met if Medea, her vengeance achieved, had departed under her own power for Athens and safety, and if a divinity, who would naturally have been Hera, had appeared to announce the future of Medea and Jason, and the establishment of the children's cult in her temple. This would have made impossible the third and final encounter between Medea and Jason, and the play would have been the poorer. Yet the present end is undeniably awkward; whereas it is easy to accept the convention of gods appearing at beginning and end when they are a technical convenience for supplying information and mainly outside the action, we are bound to be disturbed by a Medea who remains herself in her relations with Jason but suddenly assumes miraculous powers of prophecy and a means of transport which are incompatible with her position in the play as a whole. It is noteworthy that Polymestor at the end of the *Hecuba* is similarly endowed with prophetic gifts in order to obviate the introduction of a god. It is uncertain whether the *mechane* was actually used at the end of the *Medea*. Possibly she appeared on the roof of the stage building on, or together with, the chariot of the Sun; the notion that this was drawn by winged serpents comes only from the Argument.

54<sup>b</sup>2. *περὶ τὸν ἀπόπλου*: *Il.* 2. 110-206. Agamemnon made trial of his army with the suggestion that they should abandon the siege; he hoped for an enthusiastic refusal, but the army took him at his word, and Troy would have survived 'contrary to fate' had not Athena, prompted by Hera, inspired Odysseus to rally the Greeks. This is not a strikingly suitable example of a divine intervention; it is not the *λύσις* of a play but, if *λύσις* it can be called at all, of a superfluous episode in an epic. Also, it is not A.'s way to find fault with Homer. In his *Homeric Problems*, fr. 142, A. had rationalized the divine intervention as the explanation of a thought occurring spontaneously to Odysseus, whose *ἦθος* is in any case unaffected. Hermann avoided the difficulty, reading *Ἰφιγενεία* for *Ἰλιάδι* and S., followed (unawares) by E., improved this to *Αὐλίδι*. The reference would then be to the lost end of the *IA*, in which it seems that Artemis appeared and announced that she had saved Iphigeneia from sacrifice. It is improbable, however, that *ἀπόπλους* would suit the sailing of the Greeks to Troy from Aulis, or that the play would be cited as *ἐν Αὐλίδι*. *ἀπόπλους* occurs at 59<sup>b</sup>7 as the title, or possible

title, of a play about the sailing of the Greeks for home *after* the fall of Troy.

54<sup>b</sup>3. τὰ ἔξω τοῦ δράματος: this would seem to approve the typical use of epiphanies by Euripides in prologues and final scenes.

54<sup>b</sup>4. ἃ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνθρωπον εἰδέναι: for example, both Hermes at the beginning and Athena at the end of the *Ion* reveal things unknowable to mortals, as does Athena at the beginning of the *Ajax*.

54<sup>b</sup>5. ἀποδίδομεν: cf. *R.* 1386<sup>b</sup>16: τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν τὸ νεμεσᾶν.

54<sup>b</sup>6. ἄλογον: a word of frequent occurrence hereafter. It means contrary to τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, 'irrational'. The use of the *mechane* is one instance of the class of ἄλογα. At 61<sup>b</sup>20 the unmotivated entry of Aegeus in the *Medea* is called an ἄλογον.

54<sup>b</sup>7. οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι: a particular ἄλογον was the failure of Oedipus to inquire into the death of Laius. This is specifically mentioned at 60<sup>a</sup>30. One might suppose also that Jocasta would have asked how Oedipus came by the deformity of his feet. In the older version of the story the truth was revealed on, or soon after, the wedding night (*Od.* II. 274), perhaps through his deformity. Note that this is included in the πράγματα of the play, though Laius perished long before the beginning of the action. His murder is described, but the ἄλογον, the situation at Thebes after his death, is only lightly touched on. In the terminology of Ch. 18 such πράγματα are part of the προπεπραγμένα and belong to that portion of the δέσις which is prior to the beginning of the action. These events make less emotional impression than those actually represented, a fact which is used as the basis of a curious illustration in *EN* 1101<sup>a</sup>31: διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ τελευτήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι. A. of course allows that misfortunes after our death, i.e. those which befall our families, are not without emotional effect on those beyond the grave.

54<sup>b</sup>8-15. The subject is again ἦθος. Connexion with <sup>a</sup>36 is not close.

54<sup>b</sup>9. μιμῆσθαι: 'do the same as', 'follow the example of', a little curious after μίμησις in the previous line.

εἰκονογράφους: 'portrait-painters'.

54<sup>b</sup>11. καλλίους γράφουσιν: a sort of idealization is implied, and one less crude than the combination of the best points of beautiful models; cf. Appendix I, p. 264.

54<sup>b</sup>12. ὀργίλους καὶ ῥαθύμους: 'irascible and sluggish'. Neither of these characteristics is sufficient to mar an otherwise admirable character, but a character will not be admirable if he is all irascibility like a 'humourous' character in one of Ben Jonson's comedies. Such qualities may be present, but they should not be dominant, any more than the warts on the nose in a good portrait. The ὀργίλος is described



at *EN* 1108<sup>a</sup>7, 1126<sup>a</sup>13. The *ράθυμοι* are contrasted with the *όξεις* at *EE* 1240<sup>a</sup>2.

54<sup>b</sup>13. *έπιεικείς*: an instance of the normal use of the word, hardly to be reconciled with 52<sup>b</sup>34.

54<sup>b</sup>14. †*παράδειγμα*: possibly an explanatory note which has got into the text from the margin.

*Άχιλλέα*: he was conspicuously *όργίλος*. If *Άγάθων* is read here, the only play of his known that is likely to have contained Achilles was the *Teléphus*. Lobel's *οίον τόν Α. άγαθόν και παράδειγμα σκληρότητος* "O. (*CQ* 23 (1929), 76) gives good sense.

54<sup>b</sup>15. *ταύτα δή . . .*: *ταύτα* has no obvious reference and *διατηρεϊν* better suits the subject mentioned next, points which might escape notice in performance. Something may be lost here.

*παρά*: = *διά*: cf. *παρά τόν λόγον* 56<sup>b</sup>6, and Bonitz 562<sup>a</sup>9. R. alone among modern edd. takes it to mean 'inconsistent with'; cf. 55<sup>a</sup>26 *ύπεναντία*.

54<sup>b</sup>16. *αισθήσεις*: such things as movements of the actors implied by the text, not *όψις* in general, as is made plain by *τῆ ποιητικῆ*. This in fact is the subject of the next chapter (Ch. 16 is intrusive), but *είρηται . . . ικανώς* gives anything but a smooth transition.

54<sup>b</sup>18. *τοις έκδεδομένοις λόγοις*: 'the published works': see Introduction, p. ix. The reference is very possibly to the dialogue in three Books *Περί Ποιητών*.

## CHAPTER 16

After *ήθος* the next subject should be *διάνοια* followed by *λέξις*. Instead we return without warning to an investigation of the kinds (*είδη*) of *anagnorisis*, which is a department of plot. Not till Ch. 19 do we reach *διάνοια*, and *λέξις* in Ch. 20. The logical place for this discussion would be either before Ch. 12, where it would naturally be accompanied by further remarks on *peripeteia*, or after Ch. 14, where, as Vahlen suggested, the analysis of *anagnorisis* into its *είδη* would follow the analysis of *pathos*. It is out of the question to transfer the chapter to either of these positions in view of the dislocation which would be caused, especially as it is announced in the last lines of Ch. 14 that plot is now finished with.

54<sup>b</sup>19. *είρηται πρότερον*: in Ch. 11, 52<sup>a</sup>29.

*είδη*: the serious investigation of a subject requires that it should be analysed into its proper categories, cf. the opening words of the *P.*: *περί ποιητικῆς αὐτῆς τε και τῶν ειδῶν αὐτῆς*.

54<sup>b</sup>20. *πρώτη*: *A. distinguishes five main είδη*, the first four being numbered, the fifth *πασῶν δέ βελτίστη* (55<sup>a</sup>16). They are arranged, like the situations in Ch. 14, 53<sup>b</sup>38 ff., in ascending order.

(1) ἡ διὰ τῶν σημείων, 'signs and tokens'. In view of the use made of this type of recognition by poets of the highest distinction it is, as G. points out, rather sweeping to attribute the choice to ἀπορίαν, lack of resources intellectual or technical.

54<sup>b</sup>21. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν . . . : the subdivisions of this class reveal more of A.'s passion for classification than of the nature of ἀναγνώρισις. It makes little practical difference whether a man is recognized by a scar or by a birth-mark. Signs are divided into natural and acquired, acquired signs into those on the person and those detached from the person, 'tokens' as we should call them.

54<sup>b</sup>22. λόγῃν . . . Γηγενεῖς: presumably a quotation from a tragic poet. The 'Earthborn' sprang from the dragon's teeth sowed by Cadmus. It was by the birthmark of the spear that Creon recognized the child of Haemon and Antigone in the *Antigone* of Euripides.

ἀστέρας: probably governed by ἐποίησε understood. The stars which were the birthmark of the descendants of Pelops commemorated the ivory shoulder given him in place of his own, which was eaten by Demeter when Tantalus served up Pelops at the banquet of the gods.

54<sup>b</sup>23. Καρκίνος: probably the younger of the two tragic poets of this name, who lived in the fourth century. Thyestes, also a 'Pelopid', recognized the body of his son by the stars on his shoulder.

τούτων: i.e. of the ἐπίκτητα.

54<sup>b</sup>24. τὰ περιδέραια: the article implies that A. knew many instances. Necklaces were commonly left in the cradles of exposed children in the hope of subsequent recognition, if someone reared them. The only recognition of this type in extant plays is that of Ion by his mother Creusa in the *Ion*. But it is implied that there were others by Satyrus in his *Life of Euripides* 39. vii. 7 (Arrighetti) when he says that the stock features of New Comedy, ἀναγνωρισμοὺς διὰ τε δακτυλίων καὶ διὰ δεραίων, were developed by Euripides. Menander's *Epitrepontes* shows the use in New Comedy.

54<sup>b</sup>25. ἐν τῇ Τυροῖ διὰ τῆς σκάφης: *Soph. Frag.* (Pearson) 2. 270. Neleus and Pelias, whom Tyro bore to Poseidon, were set adrift in a boat, like Romulus and Remus; the boat was preserved and brought about the recognition by their mother in the play of Sophocles. Ion's cradle in a similar way gave Creusa the first hint of his identity.

54<sup>b</sup>26. Ὀδυσσεύς: for the recognition of Odysseus by Eurycleia see on l. 29, below. When Odysseus revealed himself to Eumaeus, his swineherd, and to Philoetius, who was actually his neatherd, before the battle with the suitors, he proved his identity by showing the scar (*Od.* 21. 217).

54<sup>b</sup>29. ἐκ περιπερείας: some commentators take this as an instance of

the word in its non-technical sense, 'exciting' or 'dramatic', so B., G., and apparently R. E. does not comment on this chapter. The relevant passage of the *Od.* begins at 19. 317. Penelope, pleased with the Stranger who has brought news of her husband, orders that he shall be washed and his bed made. The Stranger, of course Odysseus, who is incensed that the handmaidens have shown disloyalty by consorting with the suitors, replies that he has learnt to do without such luxuries and that he will not be washed unless by some old, discreet servant. Penelope thereupon calls for Eurycleia, Odysseus's old nurse. He realizes that Eurycleia will recognize his scar where the boar wounded him and retires into the shadows away from Penelope, so that he is able to check Eurycleia's cry of joy as she feels the scar and so to keep his secret from his wife. The episode would have been still more dramatic if Odysseus had been taken completely by surprise, but the man of wiles cannot be allowed to lack foresight; only once is he tricked, and that is by Penelope herself at the climax of their reunion at 23. 177. But even though the effect is somewhat blunted, there seems no reason why it should not count as a *peripeteia* in the sense of Ch. 11. The upshot is the natural consequence of what has gone before and it is *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν*. Or, if the other account of *peripeteia* is preferred, Odysseus by his own action brings about the recognition which he wished to avoid. It is true that this is not a major turning-point in the action, since he escapes recognition by Penelope, but in the looser structure of epic there is room for minor climaxes. Possibly there was once a version of the story in which the recognition of Odysseus by Penelope was effected through the scar (cf. D. L. Page, *The Homeric Odyssey*, p. 122). That A. found several *peripeteiai* in the *Od.* appears from 59<sup>b</sup>10-16.

The use of *ἐκ* in *ἐκ περιπετείας* presents no real difficulty. It does not suggest that it is the result of a *peripeteia* which has already occurred; there is a well-marked modal use of *ἐκ* in A.: cf. R. 1420<sup>a</sup>1-4 *ἐξ εἰρωνείας . . . ἐξ ἐρωτήσεως . . . ἐκ παραβολῆς*, and Bonitz 225<sup>b</sup>36-47. The point is that an inferior type of recognition (by a sign) becomes more effective through the manner of its introduction.

**54<sup>b</sup>30. τοῖς Νίπτροις:** 'The episode of the Washing', i.e. most of *Od.* 19. The division of Homer's poems into books was subsequent to A. *τὰ Νίπτρα* seems also to have been an alternative title of Soph. *Odysseus Akanthoplex*: see *Soph. Frag.* (Pearson) 2. 105. On pre-Alexandrian names for parts of Homer see Aelian, *Var. Hist.* 13. 14.

**βελτίους:** see on l. 35, below.

**(2) πεποιημένοι:** 'contrived by the poet': cf. 55<sup>a</sup>34.

**54<sup>b</sup>31. ἄτεχνοι:** cf. *ἀτεχνοτάτη* at l. 20, above.

**54<sup>b</sup>32. ἀνεγνώρισεν:** if this passage is taken in isolation, the best treat-

ment is to remove 'Ορέστης in l. 31 with Riccardianus and ?Ar., supplying Iphigeneia as subject out of the title of the play (cf. 55<sup>a</sup>1). But ἀναγνωρίζω is a problem in two other places, 55<sup>b</sup>9 and 21, where sense requires the meaning 'make known', as it does here if we keep the first 'Ορέστης. Vahlen argued that ἀναγνωρίζω can mean either 'make known' or 'know', it is reasonable to extend this to ἀναγνωρίζω, though even if we do this there is difficulty with the construction at 55<sup>b</sup>21, q.v., and it is surprising if a word which looks like a technical term has so wide a range of meaning. A possible solution is to suppose that the word means to 'have an *anagnorisis*', leaving it unspecified who recognizes whom. An objection is that it is improbable that a need should have been felt for so specialized a word. But Gomperz, 'Zu A.'s P.' (2), p. 17, cites passages from later authors, e.g. [Apollod.] 1. 9. 8 where ἀναγνωρίζω is used compendiously for a mutual recognition. The three passages were discussed by Vahlen, *Sitzb. K. Preuss. Ak. Berlin* (1898), 258-69, = *Ges. phil. Schr.* ii. 498 ff. See also *Beiträge*, p. 275.

54<sup>b</sup>34. ἐπιστολῆς: an example of the best type; see 55<sup>a</sup>16-19.

λέγει ἃ βούλεται . . . : when Orestes greets Iphigeneia as his sister she naturally asks for some evidence τεκμήριον (*IT* 808) that he is her brother. The evidence he gives is wholly natural in the situation; he shows knowledge of things in their old home which only one who had lived there could possess. There is no conflict with the μῦθος, only it is not a necessary consequence of anything.

54<sup>b</sup>35. ἀμαρτίας: i.e. he might as well have produced a token, which would have been an example of the most inartistic class of recognition. A.'s criticism of both *Od.* and *IT* is extraordinarily rigid and unaccommodating. It is assumed that in all contexts a higher grade *anagnorisis* is to be preferred to one of a lower grade. In fact Orestes' method of showing his identity is the natural one in the circumstances, and anything more elaborate would probably have seemed out of place. Similarly in the *Od.* not every recognition has to be a big scene. Between Odysseus' recognition by Philoetius and Eumaeus and the beginning of the battle with the suitors there are only 200 lines. A full-dress recognition here would have held up the action intolerably.

54<sup>b</sup>37. ἡ τῆς κερκίδος φωνή: probably a quotation from the play, 'the voice' being not the sound made by the shuttle in operation, but the web by means of which Philomela revealed her story. Tereus, king of the Thracians, married Pandion's daughter Procne. Later he ravished Procne's sister, Philomela, and tore out her tongue to prevent her revealing his crime, but Philomela made Procne aware of what had happened by weaving the scene on her loom (see *Soph. Frag.* (Pearson) 2. 221 ff.). In the version of [Apollodorus] 3. 14. 8,

Philomela seems not to have woven a picture but to have spelt out words of woven letters.

(3) *Memory.*

A character being reminded of the past spontaneously gives a sign which leads to recognition. Orestes' τεκμήριον (l. 34, above) depended on memory, but it did not arise spontaneously ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων. Had he seen something, a ring of Iphigeneia's, for instance, which reminded him of Argos and caused him to comment, this would have been a recognition of a higher class.

55<sup>a</sup>1. Δικαιογένους: a tragic poet of the late fifth century. Nothing is known of his *Cyprians*; it has been guessed that it dealt with the secret return of Teucer to his old home at Salamis after founding Salamis in Cyprus, and his self-betrayal by an emotional outburst.

55<sup>a</sup>2. Ἀλκίνου ἀπολόγῳ: 'the story told to Alcinous': cf. *R.* 1417<sup>a</sup>13 and see on τὰ Νίπτρα 54<sup>b</sup>30. The actual narrative of Odysseus occupies Books 9–12 of the *Od.* but the passage here referred to is 8. 521 ff., where Odysseus, having asked Demodocus to sing the lay of the Wooden Horse, is moved to tears by the memories it arouses, as he had been at l. 85 of the same Book, when Demodocus sang of his quarrel with Achilles. This time Alcinous asks him to reveal who he is and to tell his story, as Odysseus presumably had intended that he should. Thus it leads somewhat indirectly to an *anagnorisis*.

(4) *Inference.*

55<sup>a</sup>4. Χοηφόροις: the scene from the *Choephoroi* 166–234 was famous (cf. Aristoph. *Nub.* 534), perhaps because it was the earliest example of its kind, though there could well have been an ἀναγνώρισις in the *Oed.* of Aeschylus.

55<sup>a</sup>5. ὁμοίως τις . . . ἐλήλυθεν: A.'s account of the inference is over-compressed. Electra finds the lock of hair on her father's tomb (*Ch.* 166). The first point is that it must be the hair of a φίλος, for no one else would affront Clytemnestra and Aegisthus by putting it there. It is only within the narrow circle of the φίλοι that the source of a lock of hair like her own must be sought. In fact, when Orestes shows himself, Electra is not satisfied with her inference but demands tokens as well. Yet it is the moment of the discovery of the lock and the guess what it imports that convey the greatest emotional force.

55<sup>a</sup>6. ἡ Πολυίδου τοῦ σοφιστοῦ: presumably P. made a comment (ἐφη) on the *IT* in which he suggested an alternative mode of recognition; it was natural that Orestes on the point of being sacrificed should say in Iphigeneia's hearing that he was meeting the same end as his sister (see 55<sup>b</sup>10). This could lead I. to discover that the unknown Greek was her brother, but it would be her inference, not his. So in spite of ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that συλλογίσασθαι bears the less specific sense of 'reflect', applying to O.'s

meditations about his family's misfortunes; he brought the two sacrifices together in his thoughts. Most edd. here omit *ἔφη*, which is only in Riccardianus and ?Ar. In that case it could be that P. was author of a tragedy or dithyramb on the Iphigeneia story, as is suggested by the word *ἐποίησεν* at 55<sup>b</sup>10. A Polyeidus of Selymbria won the prize for dithyramb between 399 and 380; cf. Diod. Sic. 14. 46. He may have been sophist as well as poet, but there is no positive reason to think he was.

**55<sup>a</sup>9. Θεοδέκτου:** rhetorician and tragic poet, friend of A.

**Τυδεΐ:** Tydeus was the father of Diomedes, but no known version of his legend fits the situation here.

**55<sup>a</sup>10. Φινείδαις:** the daughters of Phineus were the Harpies. Nothing is known of the legend or of the play to which A. alludes. The inference sounds comparable to that made by Oedipus on reaching Colonus (*OC* 44).

**(4a) False Inference.** It is not clear whether this is a separate type of Inference, or merely a special case. Almost everything here is obscure.

**55<sup>a</sup>12. συνθετή:** means 'compound' as opposed to 'simple'. The only likely compound here is one of *συλλογισμός* and *παραλογισμός*, inference and false inference.

**55<sup>a</sup>13. παραλογισμοῦ:** this is discussed again in connexion with epic at 60<sup>a</sup>19 ff. *παραλογισμός* is due to the natural human tendency to assume that if A is always followed by B, then if B occurs it must have been preceded by A. An example given in *Soph. El.* 167<sup>b</sup>7 is: after it has rained the earth is always wet, but if the earth is wet it need not be a just inference that it has rained.

**θεάτρου:** if a false inference is drawn, it is drawn by someone who is thereby led astray. If we accept the *θεάτρου* of the MSS., it is the audience who are deceived; and this appears to be the case in the subsequent discussion of *παραλογισμός* in epic, where A. asserts that Homer knows how *ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ*, which means that he persuades his audience by his poetic skill to accept things which will not bear looking into. But the audience have so far had no place in the discussion of *anagnorisis* for the sufficient reason that they always know from the start who everyone is. But A. may be saying that the audience is deceived into accepting a recognition between two characters which is based on a logical fallacy, just as the audience of the epic poet can be charmed into accepting an absurdity like the landing of Odysseus on Ithaca in his sleep (60<sup>a</sup>36). Unfortunately the example given of *παραλογισμός* in epic at 60<sup>a</sup>26 is obscure (though less obscure than the example from drama given below), *παράδειγμα δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων*. Assuming that *τὰ Νίπτρα* includes the whole scene of the meeting of Odysseus and Penelope beginning at *Od.* 19.

96 and extending to the climax of the foot-washing, then the reference must be Penelope's testing of her visitor. If the Stranger had really entertained Odysseus on his way to Troy twenty years before, he ought to have some idea of his appearance. When the Stranger gives a precise account of his dress, she accepts this as proof that the whole story is true, whereas the Stranger might know what Odysseus had been wearing because, for instance, he had been a slave waiting at table. This looks like a criticism of the gullibility of Penelope, but it could refer to the audience who accept the test as showing sufficient reason why Penelope should believe the Stranger.

On the other hand, if we read Hermann's *θατέρου*, the reference is restricted to the two parties to the recognition, or in the case of the *Νίπτρα* to deceiver and deceived. The first interpretation is supported by the use of *παραλογίζεται* at *R.* 1408<sup>a</sup>20.

**Ὀδυσσεὶ τῷ ψευδαγγέλω:** nothing is known of this play or its author. The title suggests that Odysseus returns with news of his own death; in view of the appearance of a bow it is natural to connect it with the events described in *Od.* 21, but there the object is to string the bow and shoot with it, not to recognize it. No clear meaning can be attached to the corrupt lines in which A. explains his example, and in the absence of other information it is idle to attempt to reconstruct the plot. For an example of such an attempt see J. A. Smith, *CQ* 16 (1924), 165.

It is this passage which proves conclusively that Riccardianus represents an independent MS. tradition; it alone contains fourteen words after *τὸ μὲν γὰρ τόξον* (l. 14) which fell out of the archetype from which the other MSS. derive, because the eye of the scribe travelled from the first *τόξον* to the second (*parablepsy*). The Arabic version confirms that the passage belongs here, though it too is unintelligible and probably translated from a text already corrupt.

(5) *That which arises ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων, the best.*

**55<sup>a</sup>16. ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων:** the structure of the plot is such that as it develops the true identity is necessarily revealed.

**55<sup>a</sup>17. τῆς ἐκπλήξεως:** the article suggests that *ἐκπλήξις* is the emotion that an *anagnorisis* naturally evokes; cf. 54<sup>a</sup>4, where the *anagnorisis* of the *OT* is described as *ἐκπληκτικόν*. The only other appearance of the word in the *P.* is at 60<sup>b</sup>25, where it is applied to Achilles' pursuit of Hector in *Il.* 22. Usage suggests that *ἐκπλήξις* is more akin to fear than to pity (cf. Aristoph. *Ran.* 962); at *R.* 1385<sup>b</sup>33 οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι are said to be incapable of pity because absorbed in their own troubles. But the verb can be used of the onset of any strong emotion (cf. Eur. *Med.* 8 ἔρωτι θυμὸν ἐκπλαγείσ' Ἰάσονος) and the emotion implied here is perhaps wonder, amazement; cf. the passage of the *Topics* cited 54<sup>a</sup>4 n.

**55<sup>a</sup>18.** ἐν τῷ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίποδι: when the Messenger from Corinth, who knows that Oedipus was not the son of Polybus but was to have been exposed on Cithaeron, and the Servant, who knows that Oedipus was the son of Laius and was to have been exposed on Cithaeron, are brought together, the *anagnorisis* is a natural consequence. It is, of course, unlikely that the Messenger should have arrived on the day he did, but this does not affect the logic of events.

**εἰκὸς γὰρ . . .**: cf. l. 7, above. Iphigeneia, presented with two Greeks for sacrifice, decided that she could beg off one of them and send him back to Greece to ask for her rescue. For this purpose she gave him a letter for Argos. ἐπιθεῖναι means 'charge with', not 'give in addition'; she gave a verbal message in addition to the letter, in case the latter should be lost at sea, and it was because the message was for Orestes that the recognition naturally followed at once. It is perhaps something of an ἀλογον that the priestess should be on such terms with the king that she could reckon on the reprieve at her request of one of the goddess's proper victims. The scene in question is *IT* 725-803.

**55<sup>a</sup>19.** αἱ γὰρ τοιαῦται μόναι . . .: the emphasis must be on πεποιημένων since it is not true that σημεῖα of the kind described in the first εἶδος (54<sup>b</sup>20-30) are present in all but the last εἶδος. It might, however, be said that they all contain something contrived, not a necessary consequence of previous events (for instance, the words of Orestes) and these might be called a πεποιημένον σημεῖον. περιδεραιῶν stands as an example of the crudest type of all.

## CHAPTER 17

With Ch. 17 we are back on the subject of plot, and how the poet should work on it. There is no link at all with the previous chapter, but a fairly close connexion with the end of Ch. 15, since the need for watchfulness and the ἀκολουθοῦσαι αἰσθήσεις are the theme, though in relation to plot rather than character. But the last sentence of Ch. 15, saying that the subject has been treated elsewhere, can hardly be intended as an introduction. Δεῖ δέ (55<sup>a</sup>22) carries on the pattern of instruction; in general this part of the *P.* is more admonitory than earlier sections and closer in tone to Horace's *Ars Poetica*.

**55<sup>a</sup>22-34.** *How the poet should set to work.*

**55<sup>a</sup>22-26.** συναπεργάζεσθαι . . .: συν- is emphatic; the poet first constructs his plot then finishes his work by supplying words (and music). Menander was almost ready when his play was planned and not yet written (Plut. *M.* 347F). It is essential that, at the same time



as he conducts both these processes, he should keep the scene vividly before his eyes as though he were himself present and watching *ὡσπερ παρ' αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς πραττομένοις* (l. 24). If it be asked whether it is the original situation, as it existed at Thebes during the plague for instance, or the situation as it was to be represented in the theatre of Dionysus, the answer is that it makes little difference, since the one is an imitation of the other. The example which follows rather suggests that A. has the theatre mainly in mind; on the other hand, the epic poet, who did much the same as the dramatic poet, though under far less rigorous conditions, had no theatre to think of; cf. Demodocus, who sang of the Trojan War *ὡς τέ που ἦ αὐτὸς παρεῶν ἢ ἄλλον ἀκούσας* (*Od.* 8. 491). What we can exclude is Vahlen's idea that the poet visualizes as though he were a member of the audience; but he retained *τὸν θεατὴν* at l. 27.

**55<sup>a</sup>23.** *πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον*: frequent in the *R.* for vivid or dramatic expression (1386<sup>a</sup>34, 1411<sup>b</sup>24); of Phylarchus' melodramatic history *περιώμενος ἐκάστοις αἰεὶ πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τιθέναι τὰ δεινά* (Polyb. 2. 56. 8); and cf. [Longinus] 15. 1.

**55<sup>a</sup>25.** *τὸ πρέπον*: probably movements and stage business which are appropriate, contrasted with the 'contradictions'.

**55<sup>a</sup>26.** *ὑπεναντία*: the *ὑπο* seems to contain no suggestion of 'latent' or, as in its English equivalent 'subcontrary', of partial contradiction.

**55<sup>a</sup>27.** *Ἀμφιάραος*: his wife, Eriphyle, was bribed by the gift of a necklace to persuade him to join the expedition against Thebes in which, as he knew, being a seer, he was doomed to perish. He charged Alcmeon, his son, to avenge him by killing his mother: cf. 53<sup>a</sup>20, etc. Nothing is known of Carcinus' play (see 54<sup>b</sup>23 n.), but it must have involved Amphiaraus in a movement which was preposterous when seen on stage.

*ὀρῶντα*: picks up the sense of *ὀρῶν*, l. 24, 'as he (Carcinus) failed to visualize the scene'. This, the text also of E., gives admirable meaning, but there is no justification for the neg. *μή*, which should give a conditional or generic force. This must refer not to the poet but 'to anyone who did not see it', i.e. to those who read it. But in the theatre (*δέ* is now adversative) the result was calamitous. It would have been the same with the pursuit of Hector in *Il.* 22; see 60<sup>a</sup>15. B. and V. inserted an *ἄν*, which avoids the awkward implication that many people would read the play and never see it performed.

**55<sup>a</sup>28.** *ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς σκηνῆς*: cf. *ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς* 52<sup>b</sup>18. This can mean 'in front of the *σκηνή* = stage-building', or simply 'in a performance' (see Pickard-Cambridge, *Theatre of Dionysus*, p. 73). But if there was a raised stage called a *σκηνή* at this date—the earliest clear instance of this meaning for *σκηνή* is in Polybius (Pickard-Cambridge,

op. cit., p. 216)—then the phrase could bear the meaning we naturally assume, 'on the stage'. It is coming to be accepted once again that there was a low stage in the pre-Lycurgan theatre of Dionysus. K. Schneider in *RE Supp.* Bd. 8 (1956), s.v. ὑποκριτής, actually uses ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς in the *P.* as an argument in its favour.

ἐξέπεσεν: probably in its literal sense 'was hissed off the stage'. Cf. Dem. 18. 265, Demosthenes to Aeschines, the sometime actor, ἐτριταγωνίστηκες, ἐγὼ δ' ἐθεώρουν. ἐξέπιπτες, ἐγὼ δ' ἐσύριττον. It can mean simply 'to fail', as at *R.* 1413<sup>a</sup>10, where it is opposed to εὐδοκίμεῖν, and perhaps at 59<sup>b</sup>31, below. At 56<sup>a</sup>18 ἐκπίπτειν is contrasted with κακῶς ἀγωνίζεσθαι, the less drastic form of failure. G. in his note on our passage draws the bold conclusion that more than three poets competed at the Dionysia, so that κακῶς ἀγωνίζεσθαι means 'to get third place', ἐκπίπτειν 'not to be classed at all'. Cf. also Dem. 19. 337 and Eur. *Med.* 1346 with schol. and Page's note ad loc. It was a technical term also in athletics: see Macan on Her. 5. 22.

55<sup>a</sup>29–32. καὶ τοῖς σχήμασιν συναπεργαζόμενον is obviously parallel to τῇ λέξει συναπεργάζεσθαι, and δεῖ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι has to be supplied from l. 22. Accordingly we should expect σχήμασι to balance λέξει as something necessary to the completion of the work. The only meaning that could meet this requirement would be 'gestures', i.e. of the actors, or of the characters, which comes to much the same thing; this could cover an important part of the production. It was so understood by Vahlen and G. But there seems no urgent need for the poet to consider production at this stage, though no doubt the poet's memories of his creative moments would be important for the production. Nor is this stress on the poet's functions as producer to be paralleled in the *P.* Indeed we should expect the actors to have taken such things into their own hands at this date. Yet it must be admitted that the parallel passage *R.* 1386<sup>a</sup>31, ἀνάγκη τοὺς συναπεργαζομένους σχήμασι καὶ φωναῖς καὶ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ὄλως τῇ ὑποκρίσει ἐλεινοτέρους εἶναι, does give some support to the view that actors are meant. But this fails to lead on to the following sentence. The other view is, at first sight, somewhat bizarre. The poet gesticulates and grimaces as he composes because by so doing he can induce in himself the state of mind of which the gestures are the natural expression. Lions when angry are said to lash themselves with their tails; if a lion were writing an angry speech, he would first lash himself with his tail to induce anger. At all events Aristophanes made Euripides dress himself in rags to write about his lame and ragged heroes, and Agathon as a woman likewise (*Ach.* 412, *Thesm.* 148–52). Burke in his essay *On the Sublime and Beautiful*, pt. 4, sect. 4, records that the physiognomist Campanella obtained insight into various states of mind by examining

the emotions he experienced when he imitated the facial expressions which he observed to be associated with them. T. B. L. Webster in 'The Poet and the Mask' contributed to *Classical Drama and its Influence* (London, 1965) argues from the evidence of works of art that dramatists helped their composition by writing with the appropriate masks before their eyes. Equally the poet might help himself by changing the expression on his own face.

E. offers a third explanation; the *σχήμασι* in question are the *σχήματα τῆς λέξεως* (56<sup>b</sup>9), which are associated with *ὑποκριτική* and relevant therefore to communication between the actors and the audience. But since they are a part of the province of *λέξις*, this gives an unsatisfactory balance to *τῇ λέξει* at 55<sup>a</sup>22, and *λέξεως* would hardly be omitted.

**55<sup>a</sup>30. πιθανώτατοι:** possibly men in general, who afford an illustration of the superior effect given by genuine feeling; more likely the poets, who write better when they put themselves into a passion. E.'s theory requires it to be the actors.

**ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως:** B. translates 'given the same qualifications'. Two poets with the same talents, one in an emotional state (*ἐν πάθει* or *πάθει* frequently so used by A.), the other not, will not render the emotion into words with the same degree of convincingness. *τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως* has been taken, by Butcher, H., E., to refer to the emotional identity or natural sympathy of poet and audience, which is less relevant to the train of thought. For the use of *ἀπὸ* cf. R. 1386<sup>b</sup>11: *ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους*.

**55<sup>a</sup>31. χεῖμαινει:** 'storms', a curiously picturesque word. It must, like *χαλεπαίνει*, be intransitive. To be angry with someone is *χαλεπαίνειν τινι* or *πρὸς τινά*. E.'s translation, emphasizing production rather than the artistry of the play, 'it is the character who rages or expresses dejection in the most natural way who stirs us to anger or dejection', is hardly possible. Presumably anger and despair awaken fear and pity in response. The history of the interpretation of this passage is given by H. Sanborn, *Class. Journ.* 33 (1937), 322 ff.

**55<sup>a</sup>32. ἀληθινώτατα:** here equivalent to *πιθανώτατα*.

The idea that the most powerful expressions of emotion come from those who are powerfully moved is natural and widespread, though not invariably justified. Horace's 'si vis me flere, dolendum est primum ipsi tibi' and the rest of the passage *Ars Poetica* 101 ff. may be derived, indirectly, from this part of the *P.* G. quotes examples of the idea from the writers on rhetoric, Cicero, *De Orat.* 2. 188-97, *Orat.* 132, Quintilian 6. 2. 25-31, and, more interesting, from [Longinus] ch. 15, where the author speaks of visualization so vivid that the poet seems to have seen what he describes; the examples given

are from Euripides, *Or.* 255-7, *IT* 291, *Phaethon*, fr. 779, and there is no doubt that this is a particular quality of Euripides. There is, of course, no evidence that Euripides achieved his effects by working up his own emotions.

There is abundant testimony to the peculiar condition in which creative writers frequently find themselves:

Ibsen said, 'I have to visualize his whole exterior too, down to the last button, how he stands and walks, how he carries himself, what his voice sounds like' (F. L. Lucas, *Ibsen and Strindberg* (London, 1962), p. 43). Again Dickens 'himself virtually assumed the character of which he was writing. His daughter Mamie described how she saw him grimacing in a glass, talking aloud the speeches of a character, completely unaware of his actual surroundings' (Humphrey House, *All in Due Time* (London, 1955), p. 188). Trollope himself recorded experiences of similar intensity in his *Autobiography* (Oxford, 1950), p. 176.

55<sup>a</sup>32-34. διὸ εὐφροῦς . . . , ἔκστατικοί εἰσιν: the sense of εὐφροῦς is further defined by εὐπλαστοί, of μανικοῦ by ἔκστατικοί. The problem is whether it makes sufficient sense to say that both these types are adapted to the pursuit of poetry, or whether μᾶλλον should be inserted before ἡ μανικοῦ, thus giving the preference to the εὐφροῦς. The εὐφροῦς is a man well endowed by nature either generally or for a particular end, such as distinguishing between right and wrong (*EN* 1114<sup>b</sup>8), for lighting on metaphors (*R.* 1410<sup>b</sup>8), or, as here, for fitting himself in imagination to various roles, for which he needs in particular to be εὐπλαστος, 'versatile'. The μανικός is a man so possessed; he may be in a frenzy, but the word need imply no more than a passionate nature, as at *R.* 1367<sup>a</sup>37: τὸν ὀργίλον καὶ τὸν μανικὸν ἀπλοῦν, 'the choleric and the passionate man can be called frank'. ἔκστατικός means 'deviating from the norm', often as here from a normal state of mind, usually under pressure of emotion; but the associations of 'ecstasy' are misleading. Yet the εὐφροῦς and the μανικός are not, as might be expected, strongly contrasted types; rather one merges into the other as genius approaches insanity. Excess of εὐφροῦς tends in the next generation in the direction of instability ἐξίσταται δὲ τὰ μὲν εὐφροῦς γένη εἰς μανικώτερα ἤθη, οἷον οἱ ἀπ' Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Διονυσίου τοῦ προτέρου (*R.* 1390<sup>b</sup>28). As E. says, the connexion between the two types is consistent with the physiological theory of the humours; an excess of hot, black bile produces μανικοὶ καὶ εὐφροεῖς καὶ ἐρωτικοί (*Probl.* 30. 954<sup>a</sup>32). See Appendix II.

Corresponding to these two types two accounts of the poetic activity existed side by side in Greece. The εὐφροῦς is the poet of genius; his power is doubtless of divine origin, but once given it is more or less permanently under his control; so Phemius claimed that

he was *αὐτοδίδακτος*, i.e. he had not learnt from other men, but a god had caused all manner of lays to grow within him (*Od.* 22. 347). The *μανικός* is the poet who is divinely possessed, the mouthpiece through which the god speaks, as Apollo spoke through his priestess at Delphi. *μαντεύεο, Μοῖσα, προφατεύσω δ' ἐγώ*, said Pindar, fr. 150 (Snell)—not that he would have admitted to any lack of art, only that art was not enough. Maracus wrote best *ὅτε ἑκοταίη* (*Prob.* 954<sup>a</sup>38), and Tynnichus, since he achieved fame only in a single poem, was presumably inspired by something outside himself on this one occasion. Connected with this belief is the traditional association of wine and inspiration as in Archilochus' claim in the case of the dithyramb (fr. 77, see p. 80), and Chamaeleon's assertion that Aeschylus wrote his plays when drunk (*Athen.* 22 A). It is no accident that the normal condition of those with an excess of black bile was said to have been like that of ordinary men heated by wine (*Prob.* 953<sup>b</sup>9). For further examples of wine as an inspiration to poets see G. ad loc., p. 308. The inspiration of Aeschylus, contrasted with the coldly intellectual Euripides, was described in terms of *μανία* by Aristophanes, *τότε δὴ μανίας ὑπὸ δεινῆς ὄμματα στροβήσεται* (*Ran.* 816), and Plato paid to the poets the equivocal compliment of explaining their inability to give a rational account of their own writings by suggesting that they composed under the influence of divinely inspired madness (*Ion* 534 B, *Apol.* 22 B, *Phaedr.* 245 A). A. has nothing to say on this aspect of the poet's activities. There was no room in his philosophy for powers which expressed themselves through the mouths of poets. He recognized *ἐνθουσιασμός*, a word which can cover the condition of the inspired poet, but only as a nervous condition. In literary contexts 'enthusiasm' means little more than a state of excitement: *φθέγγονται γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνθουσιάζοντες. . . διὸ καὶ τῆ ποιήσει ἤρμοσε ἐνθεον γὰρ ἡ ποιήσις.* (*R.* 1408<sup>b</sup>17) A few lines earlier *ποιεῖν ἐνθουσιάζσαι* applied to the effect produced by an orator, e.g. Isocrates in his *Panegyricus*, precludes a literal meaning. When he calls poetry *ἐνθεος* and Homer *θεσπέσιος* one would suppose that he is using language hyperbolically. Yet A. was reluctant to dismiss widely held opinions and there are a few passages, perhaps reflecting beliefs of his Platonic period, where less restricted possibilities seem to be contemplated, as in the allowance of prophetic dreams to the 'melancholy', *De Div. per Somn.* 463<sup>b</sup>13, and *EE* 1214<sup>a</sup>24, 1248<sup>a</sup>30. Divine interventions are not ruled out at *EN* 1179<sup>a</sup>25; cf. Verdenius on A.'s religion, *Phronesis*, 5 (1960), 56, Mlle Croissant, *A. et les mystères*, pp. 21 ff.

It is not easy to decide the force of the present passage. To mention the two related classes of men who, according to ordinary Greek opinion, were the most successful at writing poetry is quite in place

here. But the introduction by the word *διό* is rather more natural if A. is giving the preference, in view of the largely intellectual nature of the process just described, to the more mentally normal of the two poetic types. *ἡ ποιητικὴ* here must be principally drama, and the facility of the more inspired poet for composing lyrics is beside the point. It is the *εὐπλαστος* who is required. Accordingly Tyrwhitt suggested that *μᾶλλον* should be understood before *ἢ* as at Soph. *Ajax* 966, but this is not normal prose usage, and it is better to insert *μᾶλλον*, which G. and E. print on the authority of Ar. Castelvetro replaced *ἢ* by *οὐ*, which Dryden, *Preface to Troilus and Cressida*, accepted as necessary to the sense.

**55<sup>a</sup>34–55<sup>b</sup>23.** *Recommended procedure for the writer of tragedy.*

**55<sup>a</sup>34.** *τούς τε λόγους:* *τε* continues the main subject, how to set about writing a play.

*λόγους* is hardly to be distinguished from *μῦθος* in the sense of plot; the passage should be read in connexion with Ch. 9, 51<sup>b</sup>11–32. *λόγος* is used by Aristophanes for the argument of a play (*Vesp.* 54, *Pax* 50).

*καὶ τοὺς πεποιημένους . . . ποιοῦντα:* common sense suggests that we should find here a reference to the familiar distinction between traditional plots and those invented by the poet. So B. 'his story whether already made or of his own making'; *πεποιημένους* is equivalent to *παραδεδομένους*. But elsewhere in the *P.* *πεποιημένος* means 'fabricated' or 'contrived' as opposed to traditional and natural, e.g. names at 51<sup>b</sup>20, recognitions at 54<sup>b</sup>30, coined words at 57<sup>b</sup>2. Accordingly, serious consideration must be given to the solution proposed by Gomperz, 'Zu A.'s P.' (3), p. 10; *ποιεῖν* keeps its usual sense when applied to a poet of 'composing'; 'plots, whether already composed (as existing plays) or whether he is in process of composing, he should set out in general terms.' A. does not elsewhere suggest such analysis of plays as a profitable occupation for a poet, but it would fit in with the otherwise obscure passage 56<sup>a</sup>7–9. A. himself shows the way in the remainder of this chapter. G. and S. try to avoid the difficulties by understanding *λόγους* as traditional plots so that *πεποιημένους* can keep its natural meaning of 'invented'. This involves taking the first *καὶ* as connective, the second as emphatic, which is awkward Greek.

**55<sup>b</sup>1.** *ἐκτίθεσθαι καθόλου:* that is to give a general account of the plot without assigning names to the characters (cf. 51<sup>b</sup>10). Butcher is right in saying (p. 194) that *καθόλου* here means 'generalized', whereas in Ch. 9 it means 'universal' as possessing wider significance. For the least significant of plots, a mere congeries of particular incidents, can be set out in generalized form without names of the

characters. But the purpose is clearly to help the poet escape from the particularities of myth.

**οὕτως:** 'in the way described' or, more likely, 'then and only then'; cf. 51<sup>b</sup>13 n.

**ἐπεισοδιοῦν καὶ παρατείνειν:** A.'s use of ἐπεισόδιον and its derivatives is not free from difficulty. ἐπεισόδιον has two well-defined meanings: (1) the part of a play between choral odes, a scene as explained in Ch. 12, which I render *epeisodion*; (2) a more or less coherent section of a play or epic which is inessential and may be entirely superfluous. So far there has been no indication of the second meaning, and we might be tempted to translate 'divide the plot as outlined into *epeisodia* and fill it out' (*παρατείνειν* as at 51<sup>b</sup>38); but it is clear from what follows that episodes are not part of the plot, but contrasted with it, as additions which may be appropriate but which in some cases are superfluous: cf. *R.* 1418<sup>a</sup>33: *δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἐπαίνοισ,* 'introduce encomia to give variety'.

Given the skeleton of the *IT* as here constituted, certain things must happen. Orestes, having reached the Tauri, must be captured and handed over to his sister for sacrifice. However, the particular manner of his capture is extraneous. Orestes could have been handed over as a captured Greek sailor without further explanation. Accordingly 260-339, in which his fit of madness and ensuing capture are described, are an episode. Yet it is natural that an explanation of his capture should be given, and his madness has a wider relevance, so the episode is allowed to be *οἰκεῖον*, 'germane'. It is less obvious that the escape through the purification of the statue (55<sup>b</sup>14) is an episode. In the situation a *μηχάνημα* of some sort is indispensable; Orestes and his sister cannot simply sail away. A. might have argued that, since the escape is due in the last resort to the intervention of Athena, the trick with the statue is superfluous; to which the answer would be that the play could better dispense with Athena than with the stratagem. It is clear that on this definition no play, however tight its construction, can be altogether without episodes; the requirement that plots should be shapely and the parts of the right proportions (Ch. 7) must affect the presence and scale of episodes.

The position is no more satisfactory in epic. The part which is the indispensable nucleus of the *Odyssey* is small and 'all the rest is episode' (55<sup>b</sup>17, 23). That the suitors riot in Ithaca and Odysseus returns battered by his wanderings are parts of the plot, but each single offence of the suitors and each adventure of Odysseus is an episode, since no particular one is essential; the blinding of the Cyclops is possibly an exception as motivating Poseidon's wrath, yet no reader of the poem feels that the story of Polyphemus is on a level of relevance different from the story of Circe. A more real distinction

would be between things which no one would miss if they were lacking, the Catalogue in *Il.* 2 or Antigone on the walls of Thebes in the *Phoen.* 88–201, and those which contribute obviously to the effect of the whole. A.'s distinction is useful to him in developing his theory of dramatic composition but of little relevance to critics in general.

Twining (i. 315–20) has done fuller justice to the difficulties inherent in the idea than have more recent critics, but see also House, *A.'s Poetics*, pp. 53–7 and A. H. Gilbert in *AJP* 70 (1949), 56.

There is some trace of a technical use of episode, with a connotation of irrelevance, in relation to comedy: see Radermacher's note on Aristoph. *Ran.* 416–30, p. 202.

**55<sup>b8</sup>.** ἐφ' ὃ τι: in Euripides' play, to get hold of the statue of Artemis.

ἔξω τοῦ μύθου: i.e. not an integral part of the plot, in the sense that Orestes might equally well have had a different mission. ἔξω τῆς τραγωδίας at 54<sup>b7</sup>, τοῦ μυθεύματος at 60<sup>a29</sup> mean that the incident in question is one of the antecedents of the play and not part of the action. This is part of the plot as belonging to the δέσις as defined in Ch. 18.

**55<sup>b9</sup>.** ἀνεγνώρισεν: cf. 54<sup>b32</sup> n. The ordinary meaning 'recognized' does well enough, but as applied to the alternative κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς . . . it must be Electra who recognizes O., so it is simplest to take it 'O. made himself known'.

**55<sup>b10</sup>.** Πολύιδος: previous mention of P. in the misplaced Ch. 16 is ignored.

**55<sup>b12</sup>.** ὑποθέντα: as at 51<sup>b13</sup>, the poet superimposes individual characteristics on τὸ καθόλου.

**55<sup>b13</sup>.** οἰκεία: sc. τῶ μύθῳ: those who drop the ἐν in l. 14 supply 'to the characters'.

**55<sup>b14</sup>.** ἡ μανία: *IT* 260–335.

**55<sup>b15</sup>.** διὰ τῆς καθάρσεως: the pretence that the goddess's statue had been contaminated by the presence of a parricide and so must be purified by washing in the sea.

**55<sup>b16</sup>.** μηκύνεται: in A.'s view an epic should be longer than a tragedy, not because its plot is of greater compass, but because it has more and longer episodes; cf. 59<sup>b2–7</sup>.

**55<sup>b18</sup>.** τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος: it is odd that he is not generalized θεοῦ τινός.

**55<sup>b19</sup>.** μόνου ὄντος: loss of ship and comrades is part of the plot.

τῶν οἴκοι: the epic poet would have considerable discretion as to the number of incidents he described by way of illustrating the state of affairs in Odysseus' home.

**55<sup>b21</sup>.** ἀναγνωρίσας: again, we should expect the meaning 'made himself known' in this context, as would be given by ἀναγνωρισθεῖς τισιν. Odysseus himself was disguised. Those he recognized were changed



only by time. Whether or not it is Aristotelian, the problem raised in the schol. to *Od.* 14 (p. 789 Dind.) gives the essence of the situation: why did O. reveal himself to Telemachus and others and not to the loving Penelope? See Rose, *A. Pseudepigraphus*, p. 175. V. did not exclude the possibility that ἀναγνωρίζω in the sense 'made himself known' might take an acc. τινάς of those concerned in the recognition, but most scholars would. It would be less impossible if the meaning 'be concerned in an *anagnorisis*' were allowed to ἀναγνωρίζω: see 54<sup>b</sup>32 n.

55<sup>b</sup>22. αὐτὸς μὲν . . . διέφθειρε: this is the 'double ending' of 53<sup>a</sup>31.

55<sup>b</sup>23. ἴδιον: 'peculiar to the poem'; anyone writing an epic with the plot of the *Odyssey* would necessarily cover the incidents mentioned, but there would be considerable variety in the choice and scope of episodes.

## CHAPTER 18

This chapter, like 17, is a collection of odds and ends concerned mainly with plot. It has no particular connexion with what precedes or follows. Indeed, there is clearly a fresh start with Ch. 19.

55<sup>b</sup>24-32 (to which should perhaps be added 56<sup>a</sup>7-10) δέσις and λύσις, 'complication' and 'resolution'. πλοκή is used at 56<sup>a</sup>9 as a synonym for δέσις, which does not appear elsewhere in a technical sense. The use of λύσις, as at 54<sup>a</sup>37, is akin to that in 60<sup>b</sup>6 and many passages in other works, the 'solution' of a problem. 'Denouement' is unsatisfactory as a rendering, since on one view a play can consist entirely of λύσις, while it cannot be all denouement, which is rather the climax of the λύσις.

55<sup>b</sup>24. τὰ μὲν ἔξωθεν . . . : events which happen between the beginning of the story and the beginning of the action of the play, the προπεπραγμένα of l. 30. They are the antecedents, which are described as outside the play at 53<sup>b</sup>32, etc. If we press the definition of ἀρχή at 50<sup>b</sup>27, it would appear that the beginning of a play should coincide with the beginning of the δέσις, but in practice the brief stretch of action represented invariably has roots in the past. τὰ πολλὰ δὲ πάλαι προκόψασα says Aphrodite of her preparations (*Hipp.* 22), and in one form or another the antecedents are always numerous.

As the death of Laius is given as an example of something outside the plot (60<sup>a</sup>30) and the incident is in fact described in the course of the play, 798-813, A. must mean by τὰ ἔξωθεν anything which occurred before the time at which the play begins, whether or not it is described in retrospect. The contest for the arms of Achilles is an intrinsic part of the δέσις of the *Ajax*, but is alluded to only briefly.

**55<sup>b</sup>25. καὶ ἓνια . . . πολλάκις:** if we take these words closely together the meaning is that the *δέσις* consists always of τὰ *ἔσωθεν* and often of part of the play as well; thus a play may consist entirely of *λύσις*, a view which might well be taken of the *OT*; B. and S. understand the passage so. But the complete absence of *δέσις* contradicts *πάσης* in l. 24, and it is better to take *πολλάκις* with the whole expression; this is the interpretation of G., who also regards *ἓνια τῶν ἔσωθεν* as equivalent to τὰ δὲ *ἔσωθεν*. We are then left with the possibility that the *δέσις* can be entirely outside or entirely inside the play.

**55<sup>b</sup>27. τοῦ μέρους . . . ἀτυχίαν:** here again there is room for more than one interpretation. The *Ajax* or *OT* can be regarded as dramatizations of the inevitable consequences of previous actions. Oedipus and Ajax have already acted, and it only remains for the consequences to be realized; the *δέσις* being entirely outside the play, the *μετάβασις* begins right away. In these cases the drama depends on the recognition by those concerned of the significance of what has passed. But in another sense the *ἔσχατον* in the *Ajax*, the point of no return where hope is lost, is the warning of Calchas (753 ff.) that Ajax must not leave his quarters that day; in the *OT* it is Jocasta's attempt to reassure Oedipus by showing that the oracle about Laius' death was false. To regard these as the turning-points which mark the end of the *δέσις* makes dramatic sense, even though the *μετάβασις* began long before. Failing this we must put the *δέσις* wholly outside the play. But in most cases the end of the *δέσις* is obvious, in the *Trachiniae*, for instance, the moment when Deianeira decides to use Nessus' love-potion, in the *Hippolytus* when Phaedra gives way to her Nurse.

On the whole the division between *δέσις* and *λύσις* is even less clear in Greek than in subsequent drama, because plots which are familiar in outline require less exposition. As Dryden put it: 'The Ancients . . . set the audience, as it were, at the post where the race is to be concluded; and, saving them the tedious expectation of seeing the poet set out and ride the beginning of the course, you behold him not till he is in sight of the goal, and just upon you.'

**τοῦ μέρους:** probably not in a technical sense but equivalent to 'the point in the play'. It could be an early example of the use of *μέρος* for 'scene' = *epeisodion* as defined in Ch. 12; cf. *POxy.* 2257. 1, probably a fr. from the *hypothesis* of Aesch. *Αἰτναῖαι*; see Lloyd-Jones in App. to *Aes.* (Loeb), ii. 593.

**μεταβαίνει:** indistinguishable from *μεταβάλλει* (cf. 51<sup>a</sup>13 n.).

**55<sup>b</sup>28. λύσιν . . . τέλους:** the *λύσις* must always fall entirely within the play, but where the plot is determined by the intervention of a god at the last minute, it is confined to the last few lines. Thus in the *Orestes* the movement towards *δυστυχία* continues until the

appearance of Apollo at 1625; but it could be argued that the plot to use Hermione as a hostage (1184), though it does not in fact succeed, marks a change in the movement; at least it introduces the possibility of thwarting Menelaus. Similarly in the *Philoctetes* the impasse is resolved only by the appearance of Heracles at 1409, but the defeat of Odysseus is assured much earlier, when Neoptolemus restores the bow. Both of these are more extreme cases than the *Medea*, which A. censures (54<sup>b</sup>1) because the λύσις is achieved ἀπὸ μηχανῆς. G. hazards the generalization that in Euripides, apart from *Alc.* and *Troad.*, the μετάβασις always begins in the fourth *episodesion*.

This method of dividing plays had no lasting influence and does not reappear in the scholia. καταστροφή, which is similar to λύσις in meaning, appears in Antiphanes, fr. 191. 19, which may be older than the *P.*, and has continued in use.

**55<sup>b</sup>29.** τῷ Λυγκεῖ: see 52<sup>a</sup>24-26 n.; the name of the παιδίον was Abas.

**55<sup>b</sup>30.** προπεπραγμένα: the πράγματα which are ἔξω τοῦ δράματος in the sense that they occurred before the beginning of the play, though they may be mentioned retrospectively in the prologue or elsewhere.

**55<sup>b</sup>31.** ἡ αὐτῶν \* \*: Lynceus and Hypermnestra, or possibly Lynceus and Abas. ἀπαγωγή and δήλωσις have been suggested as the word missing after αὐτῶν.

**55<sup>b</sup>32-56<sup>a</sup>3.** *The Four Kinds of Tragedy*: this appears to be a new subject unrelated to δέσις and λύσις. Vahlen found a tenuous connexion in μετάβασις, the feature which in his view determines to which kind (εἶδος) a play belongs, and also forms the division between δέσις and λύσις in each play.

No satisfactory explanation of the four kinds has yet been given. Apart from the textual corruption in 56<sup>a</sup>2, the categories here defined do not coincide with any set of μέρη so far mentioned. Twining's verdict (vol. 2, p. 230) may be accepted: 'When we have made the best we can of this passage I believe it is more to the credit of A. to suppose it faulty', that is to say, a combination of drafts based on different sets of categories; cf. *M.*, pp. 156-8.

**55<sup>b</sup>32.** εἶδη: 'types' or 'categories' as at 59<sup>b</sup>8 and 62<sup>b</sup>17; at 56<sup>a</sup>33, if εἰδῶν is read there, it is equivalent to μέρη, internal divisions of a play.

τέσσαρα: the description of the fourth is missing from 56<sup>a</sup>2, but the evidence of 59<sup>b</sup>7-9 is all but decisive in favour of ἀπλοῦν (Morel), or ἀπλή (Bursian). It is hard to evade the positive statement that the εἶδη of epic are the same as of tragedy, and that they are ἀπλή, πεπλεγμένη, ἡθικὴ, παθητικὴ. But it is strange that in our list the simple type should be put fourth, separated from the complex, and there seems no compelling reason why plays set in Hades should be simple (56<sup>a</sup>3). Other, and not smaller, difficulties are that it has

never been stated that the *μέρη* of tragedy are four in number, and that *γάρ* indicates a correspondence between *εἶδη* and *μέρη*, though no set of four *μέρη* has been found which can reasonably be said to correspond.

I give in tabular form all *μέρη* or *εἶδη* mentioned in the *P.*, apart from the *μέρη κατὰ τὸ ποσόν* of Ch. 12, which are plainly irrelevant.

Ch. 6	Ch. 11	Ch. 18.	Ch. 24.
<i>μέρη κατὰ τὸ ποιόν,</i> ? = <i>εἶδη</i> 50 <sup>a</sup> 13	<i>μέρη τοῦ μύθου</i>	<i>εἶδη τραγωδίας</i>	<i>εἶδη ἐποποιίας</i>
<i>μῦθος</i>	<i>περιπέτεια</i>	<i>πεπλεγμένη</i>	<i>ἀπλῆ</i>
<i>ῥῆθος</i>	<i>ἀναγνώρισις</i>	<i>παθητικὴ</i>	<i>πεπλεγμένη</i>
<i>διάνοια</i>	<i>πάθος</i>	<i>ἠθικὴ</i>	<i>ἠθικὴ</i>
<i>λέξις</i>		(?)	<i>παθητικὴ</i>
<i>μέλος</i>	Ch. 18.		<i>μέρη ἐποποιίας</i>
<i>ὄψις</i>	<i>δέσις</i>		<i>μῦθος</i>
	<i>λύσις</i>		<i>ῥῆθος</i>
			<i>διάνοια</i>
			<i>λέξις</i>

Though the word *εἶδος* is not used there, it is stated in Ch. 10, 52<sup>a</sup>12, that tragedies are either *ἀπλαῖ* or *πεπλεγμένοι*, and at 51<sup>b</sup>33 that the *ἐπεισοδιώδεις* are the worst of the *ἀπλαῖ*; this is not a separate type, but a defect of an existing type. It will be seen that there is no set of four *μέρη* except those of epic, which are four because they lack two of the six *μέρη* of tragedy (59<sup>b</sup>10), though as *μέλος* and *ὄψις* are not treated as part of the *τέχνη* of poetry the remainder could well be taken as being 'the four parts' if only they fitted the *εἶδη*.

And what of the correspondence between *μέρος* and *εἶδος*? That A. is thinking of such a thing and not merely remarking on the not very striking fact that there are four of each (so M., p. 149), is shown pretty conclusively by R. 1358<sup>a</sup>36: *ἔστι δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἶδη τρία τὸν ἀριθμόν· τοσοῦτοι γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τῶν λόγων ὑπάρχουσιν ὄντες* (cf. EN 1156<sup>a</sup>7). There are three kinds of oratory because there are three kinds of audience; there should be four kinds of tragedy because there are four parts, though the relation of part to kind is less than obvious in some cases. There is no difficulty about the *ἠθικὴ* in which the *μέρος ῥῆθος* predominates, nor about the *παθητικὴ*, except that *πάθος* is a *μέρος* of the *μῦθος*, and not in the same group as *ῥῆθος*. The partner to *πεπλεγμένη*, the complex type, is found in *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis*, again in the wrong group. Then, if we are right in seeing *τραγωδία ἀπλῆ* as the missing *εἶδος*, what is the corresponding *μέρος*? If we suggest *πάθος* as a *μέρος* corresponding to the simple

type, we deprive the *εἶδος παθητικόν* of its natural partner. It is indeed an argument of some weight against using the statement on the *εἶδη* and *μέρη* of epic and tragedy in Ch. 24 to supplement the list in Ch. 18 that of the *μέρη* given in Ch. 24 only *ἦθος* chimes with an *εἶδος*.

If we start the search from the side of the *μέρη*, for which there is a warrant in Ch. 6, 50<sup>a</sup>13, supposing we accept Vahlen's emendation *τούτοις κέχρηται ὡς εἶδεσιν*, we encounter other difficulties. Why do we hear nothing of an *εἶδος διανοητικόν*, a perfectly possible type? A play in which *λέξις* was dominant would be an oddity, one with *μέλος* pre-Aeschylean; but the plausibility of a tragedy depending on *ᾄψις* is strongly suggested by the opening sentences of Ch. 14.

The only possibilities seem to be that something irrecoverable is missing from our text, or that A. has used his categories in a manner so arbitrary that, even if we guessed it, the guess would appear implausible. Yet we may console ourselves with the thought that the classification, whatever it was, must have been singularly ineffectual. Categories which overlap are of little help to anyone, and once we go beyond the mutually exclusive pair simple/complex the types are based on characteristics which are present to some degree in many plays. *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are each attributed to two *εἶδη* at 59<sup>b</sup>13-15, and many complex plays must have ethical or pathetic qualities, or both. An awareness of this difficulty may be the reason for the definition of the complex play (55<sup>b</sup>33) as one *ἧς τὸ ὅλον* depends on *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis* (cf. 59<sup>b</sup>15). The interest centres *entirely* on plot, while other plays of undeniable complexity are more justly distinguished by some other characteristic. Again, *πάθος* is an indispensable feature of the plots adumbrated in Ch. 14, but since they depend on an *anagnorisis*, they are also complex.

**55<sup>b</sup>34. παθητική:** a somewhat limited class if the *πάθος* were *ἐν τῷ φανέρῳ*, as apparently defined at 52<sup>b</sup>11 (see 52<sup>b</sup>10 n.); of the examples given our *Ajax*, it is true, contains an at least partly visible suicide, but in Aeschylus' *Θρήσσαι* it was narrated, and so probably in some other versions; there were plays by Carcinus, Theodectes, and Astydamas. Ixion, king of the Lapiths, offered violence to Hera and was punished in Hades by being attached to a revolving wheel of fire. To show this *ἐν τῷ φανερώ* would surely have been beyond the resources of an Athenian stage-manager. He was the subject of plays by Aeschylus and Euripides.

**56<sup>a</sup>1. ἠθική:** the *Odyssey* is ascribed to this class (59<sup>b</sup>15). As a *ῥῆσις ἠθική* (50<sup>a</sup>29) is one which gives an impression of the speaker's character, so a *τραγωδία ἠθική* is a play concerned with the expression of character, in the rather limited sense which we meet in Ch. 15; so B., R., S., and Verdenius, *Mnemos.* 12 (1945), 241. R. 1413<sup>b</sup>8 is really

decisive here: ἔστι δὲ λέξις γραφικὴ (written) μὲν ἢ ἀκριβεστιάτη. ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ ἢ ὑποκριτικωτάτη. ταύτης δὲ δύο εἶδη· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικὴ ἢ δὲ παθητικὴ. διὸ καὶ οἱ ὑποκριταὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν δραμάτων διώκουσι, καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς τοιούτους. Unless we suppose that A. is using the pair ἠθικός / παθητικός in a wholly different sense here and in the *P.*, it is plain that an 'ethical' tragedy is one which allows the actor scope for presenting character, the 'pathetic', scope for representing passion. It is plain, too, that there must be much overlap between the two types. An interesting extension of the meaning of ἠθικός, which may be relevant here, is mentioned a little later in *R.* (1417<sup>a</sup>21) where, after stressing the familiar connexion between ἦθος and προαίρεσις, A. continues: ἀλλὰ ἠθικὰ τὰ ἐπόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἦθει, οἷον ὅτι ἅμα λέγων ἐβάδιζεν. δηλοῖ γὰρ θρασύτητα καὶ ἀγροικίαν ἦθους. Cf. Cicero, *Orat.* 128: 'alterum est, quod Graeci ἠθικόν vocant, ad naturas et ad mores et ad omnem vitae consuetudinem accommodatum.' If this can be applied to the stage, it suggests that acting, at least in comedy, may have been less stylized than is generally supposed.

*E.*, however, supports a wholly different interpretation, arguing from the classification of the *Odyssey* as ἠθικὴ (59<sup>b</sup>15) that it refers to the ending, which is ethical in the sense that the good are rewarded and the bad punished; this was the view of *G.* also. In later Greek there is evidence for a different but related sense 'relaxed' or 'tranquil' in contrast to the emotional turmoil implied by πάθος, e.g. Plut. *M.* 20 E: ἐν ἦθει καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾶς λεγομένοις. The word ἠθικὴ is applied to the *Odyssey* also in a famous passage in [Longinus] 9. 15. D. A. Russell in his note ad loc. attaches this same meaning to ἠθικὴ in *A.* also, as does Grube, but there seems to be no clear instance of this use earlier than the first century B.C. It is common in Dion. Hal., e.g. *Dem.* 2, 'relaxation' as opposed to πάθος. On this and other meanings see Lockwood, *CQ* 23 (1929), 180 ff.

**Φθιωτίδες:** of the play with this name by Sophocles nothing is known; the title suggests the home of Achilles in Phthia.

**56<sup>a</sup>2. Πηλεὺς:** both Sophocles and Euripides wrote a *Peleus*: see *Soph. Frag.* (Pearson) 2. 140. The little evidence is rather against a happy ending. We can discover nothing about the meaning of ἠθικὴ either from *Phthiotides* or *Peleus*.

†**της†:** at 58<sup>a</sup>5 the same letters are a corruption of ὄψ, for which reason *B.* read ὄψις here, a suggestion which has been widely received. Though we should expect an adj., the asymmetry is not impossible, and the examples which follow are not, so far as we can tell, inappropriate. The other popular suggestion is Schrader's *τερατώδες* for τέταρτον. Again this fits the examples, and both it and ὄψις derive some support from 53<sup>b</sup>1-11. *E.* suggests ἐπεισοδιώδης from 51<sup>b</sup>33, which fits the *PV* instanced below, but not much else.

One would expect the *τραγωδία ἐπεισοδιώδης* to be not an *εἶδος* but a deviation from the *ἀπλή*, though E. defends it as being the characteristic form of the *τραγωδία ἀπλή*. H., following V., who did not, however, print it in his text, inserted *ἡ δὲ ἀπλή . . .* in 55<sup>b</sup>34 between *ἀναγνώρισις* and *ἡ δὲ παθητική*, treating τὸ *τερατώδες* as a supplementary class; *τέταρτον* could have been inserted after *ἡ ἀπλή . . .* dropped out, to make no. 5 into no. 4. Post, *TAPA* 78 (1947), 247, suggested *ὄγκος*, which has Aeschylean associations.

**Φορκίδες**: three old women, who lived by Lake Tritonis as sentinels for the Gorgons; they had only one eye between them. They were outwitted by Perseus. If this was a satyr-play, it cannot have belonged to the Perseus Tetralogy, of which the satyr-play was the *Δικτυουλκοί*. Like Prometheus and the denizens of Hades they are remote and mysterious.

**ὁ Προμηθεύς**: the Prometheus TrilogY consisted of *Π. Δεσμώτης*, *Π. Λυόμενος*, and probably *Π. Πυρφόρος*, while *Π. Πυρκαεύς* was the satyr-play produced at the same time as the *Persae*; some suppose it to be the same as the *Πυρφόρος* of which hardly anything is known. *Δεσμώτης* and *Λυόμενος* with their remote setting and tortured hero are doubtless the ones referred to here.

56<sup>a</sup>3. **ὅσα ἐν ᾗδου**: examples are the *Psychagogoi* and *Sisyphus* of Aeschylus and the *Peirithous* of Euripides and perhaps that of Achaeus. What quality would be common to plays set in Hades is not obvious; the *Sisyphus* was a satyr-play, the *Peirithous*, ascribed by some to Critias, contained a number of references to contemporary philosophical theory. It is hard to believe that on a stage without artificial lighting any very horrific effects could be achieved. The denizens of the lower world could wear alarming masks and costumes like the Erinyes in the *Eumenides*, whose proper home was below; some representation of the tortures of the damned would be possible. The plots might well tend to be simple, but there is no compelling reason why the rescue of Peirithous and Theseus should not contain a *peripeteia*, if not an *anagnorisis*. Lucian recognizes as a group *τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου ἅπασαν τραγωδίαν*. *De Salt.* 60.

56<sup>a</sup>3-7. **μάλιστα μὲν . . .**: the general sense, especially in view of *μέρος* in l. 6, seems to be that the dramatist, whatever *εἶδος* his play may belong to, should try to show mastery of all the *μέρη*, if he hopes to satisfy the exigence of contemporary critics. Naturally, *ἅπαντα* would refer to *εἶδη*, the subject of the previous sentence, but no play could be expected to comprise all the *εἶδη* within itself, while every play must contain something of all the *μέρη*. The tone of the sentence, with its censure of the unreasonableness of critics, suggests that they find fault with every play because in respect of some of its *μέρη* it is inferior to plays which excel in those particular *μέρη*.

B. cites Polyb. 16. 20. 2: διὸ δεῖ μάλιστα μὲν πάντων κρατεῖν τῶν τῆς ἱστορίας μερῶν. If ἅπαντα referred to εἶδη, the point would have to be that every poet was expected by the critic to write some plays of the highest quality in each εἶδος, a requirement less wholly unreasonable; and though it is not impossible that A. may have obscured his meaning by writing μέρος in l. 6 where εἶδος was required by the sense, there is no reason to assume that he did so. Further, τὰ μέγιστα suits μέρη not εἶδη, which have not been given an order of merit. M. Kommerell, p. 190, takes this sentence as evidence that plays could belong to more than one εἶδος. V. took ἅπαντα as 'all the things a play ought to have', which fits better with μέγιστα καὶ πλείστα.

**56<sup>a</sup>4. μέγιστα:** in the light of Ch. 6 these would be μῦθος, ἦθος, διάνοια.

**πλείστα:** by definition all tragedies have all six parts; we must understand that they are not only present but executed with distinction.

**56<sup>a</sup>5. συκοφαντοῦσιν:** the meaning is weakened from the original sense of 'blackmail', but it remains hostile. It is used several times by A. of quibbling arguments, e.g. *EE* 1221<sup>b</sup>7. The suggestion is of critics more professional than comic poets.

**56<sup>a</sup>7. ὑπερβάλλειν:** can govern gen. or acc. If we read ἕκαστον, ἀγαθοῦ will be gen. of reference 'surpass each poet in his own speciality'; if ἐκάστου, 'surpass the speciality of each poet'. There is no need to supply μέρους with ἀγαθοῦ.

**56<sup>a</sup>7-10. δίκαιον . . . ἀρτικροτεῖσθαι:** transferred by B. to 55<sup>b</sup>32, before the account of the four εἶδη; but the train of thought is not impossibly obscure.

**δίκαιον:** 'fair' in contrast to the unfairness implied by συκοφαντοῦσιν. At 47<sup>b</sup>19, the only other occurrence in the *P.*, the sense of δίκαιον is closer to 'reasonable' than to 'just'; it is δίκαιον to regard Empedocles as a physiologist rather than as a poet.

**56<sup>a</sup>8. ἄλλην καὶ τὴν αὐτήν:** 'different or the same'; for the form of expression cf. *Pol.* 1276<sup>a</sup>18, *De An.* 416<sup>a</sup>5. As E. says, the point is comparability, already implicit in ὑπερβάλλειν, above. It is unfair to compare plays of different sorts, because different μέρη are prominent in each, and a less essential μέρος in one play may be set against a more essential μέρος of another. As μέρος is related to εἶδος, this approaches the position that only plays within the same εἶδος (if plays belong only to one εἶδος) ought to be measured against each other.

**οὐδενὶ ὡς:** 'in virtue of nothing so much as of the μῦθος'. Here the μῦθος is conceived in terms of δέσις and λύσις. It is by no means obvious that plays of the same εἶδος would often be similar in respect of δέσις and λύσις. There is, however, a meaning which could be



attached to this sentence if *μῦθος* is considered in the same terms as in Ch. 17. Many plays, if stripped of their 'episodes' in the way in which the *IT* is there treated and reduced to a bare skeleton, would show strong resemblances. Among extant plays the *Helen* and *IT* have much in common both in *δέσις* and *λύσις*; among lost dramas the plays of Euripides like the *Ion*, which turned on the recognition between a mother and the child, or children, who had been born to a divine father and parted from the mother since birth, must have had almost indistinguishable skeletons; the *Tyro* of Sophocles belonged to the same type. But though such plays fit the words of A. in this sentence, criticism could hardly be restricted to the comparison of works in this usually close relation to each other. Plays should be compared in the handling of their plots: for this it is helpful to break down the plot into *δέσις* and *λύσις*.

**56<sup>a</sup>9.** *πλοκή*: not to be distinguished from *δέσις* (55<sup>b</sup>25).

*πολλοί* . . . *κακῶς*: no doubt a legitimate field for comparison, but the sentence seems rather an afterthought.

*ἀρτικοροτεῖσθαι*, Immisch's emendation, accepted by E. and R., who supposed it to be a nautical metaphor from oarsmen keeping in time: see Hesych. s.v. The word occurs in Menander, fr. 904.

**56<sup>a</sup>10-20.** *A tragedy should not contain the subject-matter of an epic.*

This topic has only a loose connexion with what goes before, types of tragedy considered as wholes. Among extant tragedies the *Phoenissae* is the only one obviously open to criticism as containing an excess of matter (it is called *παραπληρωματικόν* in the ancient Argument), but it is not certain that this is the kind of play which A. has in mind.

**56<sup>a</sup>10.** *ἄπερ εἴρηται*: the point has not been made before just in this form, but length and the relation of parts to whole were discussed in Chs. 5 and 7, episodes in tragedy and epic in Ch. 17.

**56<sup>a</sup>11.** *μεινῆσθαι καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν*: *ποιεῖν* probably carries on *χρῆ*: cf. *EN* 1098<sup>a</sup>26: *μεινῆσθαι καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρῆ, καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ . . . ἐπιζητεῖν*. Or *ἄπερ εἴρηται* can be parenthetical; older edd. so taking it omitted *καί*.

**56<sup>a</sup>12.** *σύστημα*: need mean no more than *σύστασις*. S. and E. find in the word a suggestion of mass or accumulation.

*πολύμυθον*: an odd word to apply to an epic such as the *Iliad*, which is declared to have unity; *πολυμερῆ*, 59<sup>b</sup>1, would have been less surprising. *μῦθοι* here must be the episodes which swell a basically short and simple plot (55<sup>b</sup>16). Epics which are *πολύμυθοι*, in the sense that they contain matter for a number of plays each with its own plot, are contrasted with Homer's epics (59<sup>b</sup>2-4). 'Having a big plot' would make sense, but is hardly Greek. A. does not avoid the suspicion of contradicting himself on this subject. See 62<sup>b</sup>7 and n.

**56<sup>a</sup>13. ὅλον:** 'in its entirety'. It is not suggested that anyone made the *Iliad* into a play. Aeschylus' Achilles Trilogy, *Myrmidons*, *Nereids*, and *Phrygians* or *Ransoming of Hector*, covered much of the story of the last third of the *Iliad*; the ?Euripidean *Rhesus* was a dramatization of Book 10. E. takes *μῦθος* here to be the story from which the *Iliad* was made, not the plot of our *Iliad*.

**ἐκεῖ . . . μέγεθος:** in a poem several thousand lines in length the *μέρη*, which must be both episodes and sections of the plot as defined in Ch. 17, can be of the dimensions required by the subject-matter and at the same time harmonize in their proportions with the poem as a whole. The same or a comparable number of *μέρη* put into a play would have to be unduly abbreviated and the whole would contain a disproportionate number of parts.

**56<sup>a</sup>15. ὑπόληψιν:** equivalent to *δόξαν*. E. refers it to the particular (mistaken) opinion which poets hold about the relation of parts to whole.

**56<sup>a</sup>16. κατὰ μέρος:** *μέρος*, usually a section of a play, is here a part of a story. The *Troades* is an example of a play which deals with a part only of the story of the sack of Troy. The epic poem on the subject ascribed to Arctinus was in two books; it covered also subsequent events like the sacrifice of Polyxena, which is only alluded to in the *Troad*. It is in this sense that an epic is *πολυμερής* (59<sup>b</sup>1).

**πέρσιν Ἰλίου:** the title of a poem in the epic cycle and of several lost tragedies. After the mention of the *Iliad* it is likely that the reference is to the other epic poem. The noun *πέρσις* appears to be used only as part of the title of epic or play. This has some relevance to the problem of *Niobe* which follows.

**56<sup>a</sup>17. Νιόβην:** A. has mentioned two themes suitable for treatment on epic rather than dramatic scale; if he gives a third example (the *ἦ* is V.'s emendation) Niobe is unsatisfactory. There is no evidence that the subject was one to support an epic (it might perhaps include the story of Tantalus) or that there was any epic treatment of it. Of Aeschylus' play we do not know whether it was part of a trilogy, and there is nothing to suggest that it was particularly selective in its treatment of the subject. G. Valla's Latin version has Hecuba here, and the Arabic is said to suggest *Θηβαΐδα*. This is unsatisfactory in that the Oedipus trilogy of Aeschylus seems to have as close a connexion with the *Oedipodea* as with the *Thebais*. E. suggests that A. recommends, not that the poet should confine himself to one part of the story, but that he should construct his plot around one part and bring in the rest in 'episodes'; the lyric narrative of the sacking of Troy *Hec.* 905-52 would afford an example of this, but it would be impossible in any real sense to cover the whole story in this way.

56<sup>a</sup>18. ἐκπίπτουσιν: the tense, between ἐποίησαν and ἐξέπεσεν, is strange. Probably it is a generalizing present: 'all who have done or do this fail.'

Ἀγάθων: Nauck, the editor of the *Frag. Trag. Graec.*, was hardly justified in concluding from this passage that Agathon wrote an *Iliou Persis*. See next note.

ἐξέπεσεν . . . μόνω: (cf. 55<sup>a</sup>28 n.) usually taken to mean 'failed in this respect alone'; only E. translates 'in this play (δράματι) alone'. But unless we assume that ἐξέπεσεν has lost its strict sense of 'being driven from the stage', E.'s is the natural rendering. The objection to his view is that ἐν δὲ ταῖς περιπετείαις at the beginning of the next sentence implies a contrast between τούτῳ and περιπετείαις; so τούτῳ should refer to a characteristic of plays, i.e. σύστημα ἐποποικόν, not to a particular play. Possibly there should be a lacuna after μόνω.

56<sup>a</sup>19. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς πράγμασι: this should be equivalent to ἀπλοῖς πραγμάτων συστάσει; but if we read θαυμαστῶν or θαυμαστῶ at the end of the line, it can be objected that 52<sup>a</sup>4 shows only complex plots arousing this emotion = ἐκπληξίς. Possibly the meaning is 'single incidents'.

56<sup>a</sup>20. The subj. of στοχάζονται should be the ὅσοι of l. 16. θαυμαστῶς 'to a surprising degree' is unparalleled. θαυμαστῶν, associated with *peripeteia* also at *R.* 1371<sup>b</sup>10 (cf. 60<sup>a</sup>12), is more likely.

56<sup>a</sup>21. τραγικόν: cf. 53<sup>b</sup>39; τραγικόν equals φοβερόν καὶ ἔλεινόν, which are a trio with φιλόνηρον at 52<sup>b</sup>38, but τὸ φιλόνηρον is no part of the preferred type of tragedy (53<sup>a</sup>12), and ὧν βούλονται may imply a different purpose.

τούτο: the desired effect which they achieve.

56<sup>a</sup>22. σοφὸς . . . πονηρίας . . . ἀνδρείος . . . ἄδικος: this appears to conflict with the principle laid down in Ch. 13 requiring that the character who experiences the change of fortune should be predominantly good. But the 'hero', in so far as the term is allowable, may be the character who deceives Sisyphus or vanquishes the brave rogue. Possibly the first case is complex, the second simple. φιλόνηρον is appropriate here, not τραγικόν. One may suspect that a lacuna conceals a change in the type of play being discussed.

Sisyphus, celebrated for his cunning, was sometimes said to be the father of Odysseus. The stories about him are collected in *Soph. Frag.* (Pearson) 2. 184, but it is nowhere related that the deceiver was himself deceived. Aeschylus wrote a *S. Petrokulistes* on Sisyphus' punishment in Hades and a *S. Drapetes* on the story that Sisyphus ordered his wife not to give him due burial; in Hades he complained of this denial and was given leave to return to the world in order to punish her, but having returned he stayed until he died of old age. These were probably satyr-plays, as was the *Sisyphus* of

Euripides. Sisyphus was a character also in his satyric *Autolycus*. A play of this name by Sophocles is attested only by a single reference. This unexplained batch of satyr-plays gives reason to suspect the continuity of the text.

**56<sup>a</sup>23.** ἀνδρείος . . . ἡττηθῆ: Eteocles in the *Phoenissae* is a possible example, but there are few in extant tragedy.

καὶ εἰκός: in addition to being τραγικὸν καὶ φιλόανθρωπον.

**56<sup>a</sup>24.** Ἀγάθων: fr. 9, a couplet quoted by A. at *R.* 1402<sup>a</sup>10:

τάχ' ἂν τις εἰκός αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι λέγοι,  
βροτοῖσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα.

This is not the same sort of εἰκός as is associated with τὸ ἀναγκαῖον (51<sup>a</sup>12, etc.), but related rather to 61<sup>b</sup>15 and its special pleading. This εἰκός is 'likely' to be unusual, certainly not οἷα ἂν γένοιτο.

One thing leading to another by a series of barely possible connexions, we pass from the epic structure in tragedy to plots such as that of the *Sisyphus*. It is not credible that this is a single coherent passage. Sisyphus has little to do with epic and his story is not excessively rich in material. At the least we must suppose a lacuna, and the suspicion remains that we have here some unconnected fragments, and it is strengthened by the ensuing passage on the Chorus.

**56<sup>a</sup>25–32.** *The Chorus.*

**56<sup>a</sup>25.** ἔνα . . . ὑποκριτῶν: while the lyric element is no more than a ἦδυσμα, the chorus is in some degree one of the actors, and should have a function in the structure of the play, as in Sophocles. This really is all that A. has to say on the subject, and it may be noticed that Aeschylus, whose plays were chorus-centred, is ignored.

**56<sup>a</sup>26.** συναγωνίζεσθαι: Aristoph. *Thesm.* 1060: Euripides disguised as Echo says:

ἐν τῷδε ταύτῳ χωρίῳ  
Εὐριπίδῃ καὶ τῇ ξυνηγωνιζόμενῃ.

alluding to the part of Echo in the *Andromeda*. There the verb has its full literal meaning 'helped him in the contest'. Here the sense must be 'make a positive contribution to the play'. In the light of the Aristophanes passage the dat. Εὐριπίδῃ . . . Σοφοκλεῖ is quite natural.

In the earlier extant plays of Euripides the role of the chorus is not conspicuously different from what it is in Sophocles. But in the plays of his last ten years the chorus is often composed of persons who have little direct concern with the action, like the maidens of Aulis in the *IA*, who are present in the Greek camp purely out of

curiosity; the increasing use of monody, solos given by actors, diminishes the importance of the lyrics to which the chorus would contribute, and, further, the chorus and the comments of its leader are ignored by the other characters as never happens in Sophocles. Even in the *Bacchae*, where the Chorus is of vital importance in presenting the Dionysiac faith, the actors ignore their presence and their comments except in two short passages in which a single actor is alone on the stage with the chorus.

**56<sup>a</sup>27.** τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς: this implies that from the late fifth century onwards poets used the chorus to sing odes which had no connexion with the subjects of the plays. *IT* 1234-83 and *Hel.* 1301-68 are, as commonly understood, the only surviving odes in this class.

**56<sup>a</sup>29.** ἐμβόλιμα: Agathon took the final step and used songs not written for a particular play in the same way as incidental music played between acts. Presumably the text of the play would contain merely the indication χοροῦ, which appears also in extant fourth-century comedy. Agathon won his first victory in 416 B.C. and had died, or gone to Macedonia, by 405. The chorus may have been obsolete by A.'s own time, which would explain to some extent his lack of interest in it. Cf. *Probl.* 922<sup>b</sup>26: ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ χορὸς κηδευτῆς ἀπρακτος· εὐνοίαν γὰρ μόνον παρέχεται οἷς πάρεστιν.

It is possible that the play with epic structure and superabundance of incident was common in the fourth century, and that A. associated it with the decline of the chorus. If this connexion does exist it is masked by the interposition of ll. 19-25.

**56<sup>a</sup>31.** ἐπεισόδιον: very likely in the sense defined in Ch. 12, the part of a play between two choral songs.

## CHAPTER 19

*Final remarks on διάνοια and introduction to section on λέξις.*

**56<sup>a</sup>33-56<sup>b</sup>8.** διάνοια.

**56<sup>a</sup>33.** περὶ . . . εἴρηται: at the end of Ch. 14 A. marked the conclusion of his treatment of μῦθος. Strictly this should mark the end of the second main section, that on ἦθος, which is never properly rounded off. But apart from the detachable Ch. 16 on Recognition a number of more or less disconnected subjects have been dealt with in Chs. 15-18, of which ἦθος had little more than half a chapter. This is in keeping with the unorganized state of the latter part of the *P.*

λοιπόν: since ὄψις and μέλος are not regarded as part of the τέχνη, of the six μέρη mentioned in Ch. 6 only λέξις and διάνοια are left. It is noteworthy that, if εἰδῶν (Riccardianus and Ar.) is right, the term is interchangeable with μέρος.

**56<sup>a</sup>34. λέξεως:** cf. 50<sup>b</sup>12; *διανοίας* cf. 50<sup>a</sup>6 and <sup>b</sup>11: *λέξις* is the main subject of the following chapters while *διάνοια* will first be dismissed in a few lines, but this is the usual order of the two words. They are a common pair because *διάνοια* is intimately involved with the *λέξις* = *λόγος* in which it is expressed. The close association of *διάνοια* with *ἦθος*, which we have in Ch. 6, is exceptional.

**56<sup>a</sup>35. τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς:** usually referred to the work on rhetoric which consisted of the first two books of our *R.* (cf. Diog. Laert. 5. 24). This implies that the *R.* was an earlier work, yet the *R.* contains no less than six probable references to the *P.*; see Introduction p. xiv. n. 1 and Bonitz 103<sup>b</sup>59; but the value of such cross references as evidence is questionable. Anyway, the *R.* itself is suspected to contain strata of different periods: see F. Solmsen, *Die Entwicklung der A. Logik und Rhetorik* (Berlin, 1929). S. takes it as a statement that the inquiry belongs to the province of rhetoric; one might compare *ἐν τοῖς μετρικοῖς* (56<sup>b</sup>34).

*κείσθω:* 'let the exposition be available in', perhaps in the future.

**56<sup>a</sup>37. τοῦ λόγου:** the def. art. suggests that *λόγος* is a recognized part of tragedy, and so, as equivalent to *λέξις* (cf. 49<sup>a</sup>23), it may be. It is all that part of tragedy which is not *μέλος*, as at 54<sup>a</sup>18; the next sentence suggests a narrower reference for *λόγος*, the product of rhetorical art as it occurs in tragedy; cf. 56<sup>b</sup>6 and 8.

E. understands everything down to *μικρότητας* at 56<sup>b</sup>2 as referring to the place of *διάνοια* in rhetoric. There is no justification for such a statement here, and one would expect *λόγων* rather than *τοῦ λόγου*.

*τό τε ἀποδεικνύειν καὶ τὸ λύειν:* 'prove and disprove': cf. 50<sup>b</sup>11; *ἀποδεικνύουσί τι ὡς ἔστιν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν*. In Ch. 25 *λύειν* has the slightly different sense of dismissing objections or solving difficulties in *προβλήματα*.

**56<sup>a</sup>38. πάθη:** here 'emotions' not 'catastrophes'.

**56<sup>b</sup>1. ὀργήν:** this does not justify the inclusion of anger under *τῶν τοιούτων* at 49<sup>b</sup>27, because the anger is that produced in one character in the play by the words of another. The audience too may feel anger in so far as they identify themselves with an angry character, but the pity and fear which are the means of *κάθαρσις* are, to some extent at any rate, emotions felt by the audience as spectators external to the action. See Appendix II.

*ὅσα τοιαῦτα:* the list of *πάθη* given at *EN* 1105<sup>b</sup>21 is: *ἐπιθυμία, ὀργή, φόβος, θράσος, φθόνος, χαρά, φιλία, μῖσος, πόθος, ζῆλος, ἔλεος*.

*μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητας:* a speaker in a play uses *διάνοια* to accentuate or to minimize the importance of something, *αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν* (*R.* 1403<sup>a</sup>17, cf. 1359<sup>a</sup>19), associated with *ψόγος* and *ἔπαινος* (1368<sup>a</sup>33-37). An example of the first would be Teiresias on Dionysus (*Bacc.* 272-327), of the second, Creon on tyranny (*OT* 583-615), or Ion

on social eminence (*Ion* 585-647). The plur. is strange, but cf. *Physiog.* 813<sup>b</sup>28: *μεγέθεσιν ὑπερβάλλοντα ἢ σμικρότησιν ἐλλείποντα.*

**56<sup>b</sup>2.** *δῆλον . . . πράγμασιν:* it is common ground that *διάνοια* is needed for *λόγος*, 'rhetoric'; the point which A. now makes is that *πράγματα* too have an emotional impact, and that *διάνοια* as used in the ordering of the *πράγματα* is required to produce it. Cf. 53<sup>b</sup>13, the impulse to pity and fear *τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμποιητέον*, 54<sup>a</sup>18 *ἐὰν ποιῆ φανερόν ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ πράξις προαίρεσίν τινα*, and 53<sup>b</sup>7 the *μῦθος* = *πράγματα* of the *OT* can by itself produce horror and pity. E. takes *πράγμασιν* as *πραγμάτων συστάσει*, i.e. in plays as opposed to the *διάνοια* in speeches in real life, see below.

Normally *διάνοια* and the *λέξις* or *λόγος* in which it is expressed are inseparable. *γνώμαι* (50<sup>a</sup>7) cannot exist without words. But there are dramatic situations which make their impression without any verbal exposition of intentions or motives, e.g. Phaedra's calumny on Hippolytus or Neoptolemus' decision to return the bow.

It should be noted that of the functions of *διάνοια* listed in 56<sup>a</sup>37 *ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ λύειν* are omitted in 56<sup>b</sup>3, 4, no doubt as being impossible without verbal argument.

*ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν:* the principles proper to rhetoric (cf. 50<sup>b</sup>34).

*ἀπό,* as often, of cause or source, Bonitz 77<sup>b</sup>52.

**56<sup>b</sup>3.** *χρησθαι:* understand *διανοία* rather than *μέρεσιν*. G. and H. follow some older edd. in omitting *ἐν*, so that *πράγμασιν*, 'incidents', is governed by *χρησθαι*.

**56<sup>b</sup>5.** *τὰ μέν:* i.e. *τὰ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων*. E. refers it to *ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινὰ*, but without a modern system of punctuation A. could not have separated this pair from *μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα*, though it is true that of the four terms the two former are the more likely to be conveyed *ἄνευ διδασκαλίας*.

*διδασκαλίας:* here nothing to do with production but equivalent to *ἀπόδειξις*, which is associated with *διάνοια* at 50<sup>a</sup>7, <sup>b</sup>11. Probably *ἄνευ διδασκαλίας* does not exclude altogether the use of words but only set speeches in which *διάνοια* would normally be conspicuous.

**56<sup>b</sup>6.** *παρά:* equivalent to *διὰ* as at 54<sup>b</sup>15 and often in A.

**56<sup>b</sup>8.** *ἢ δέοι:* the text is far from certain. Either A. is asking what would be the function of speech in drama if the necessary emotions could be aroused by pantomime, or, more likely, what would be the role of rhetoric in drama if the emotions could be aroused by the action. This is neatly given by Spengel's *ἢδη τῇ θέα*, which was accepted by Gomperz.

It cannot be claimed that this section on *διάνοια* is satisfactory. It remains obscure how *διάνοια* is expressed if not in speech. E. makes the contrast as between rhetoric and drama, and sees the whole as a censure of the tendency of rhetoric to transgress the proper limits

in the tragedy of A.'s own day. Grube, p. 40, also finds a contrast between rhetoric and drama, the difference being that in tragedy the events are enacted before the audience *ἀνευ διδασκαλίας*, i.e. they do not have to be explained, whereas the orator has to describe the situation in his speech. This is no doubt true, but there seems no occasion for A. to say it here.

**56<sup>b</sup>8–19.** Before addressing himself to the more important aspects of the last *μέρος*, i.e. *λέξις*, A. mentions, only to dismiss as irrelevant, the *σχήματα τῆς λέξεως*. The normal meaning of this phrase in later authors is figures of speech; for this and the related *τρόπος* see Russell, *Longinus*, pp. 126–8. A. uses it in the sense of 'manner of speaking' or 'delivery'; the meaning of a phrase may be determined by the speaker's intonation. As the ancients were virtually without punctuation, this was a subject of some importance, but A. considers that it is part of the art of elocution rather than of poetry.

**56<sup>b</sup>10. ὑποκριτικῆς:** on *ὑποκριτής* see 49<sup>a</sup>16 n. The word was naturally applied to the elocution of the orator as well as of the poet. The subject is dealt with at the beginning of Bk. 3 of the *Rhetoric*, where it is stated that it has not yet been scientifically studied, though Glaucon of Teos among others had written on it. It was developed both as regards tone and gesture by Theophrastus; cf. Diog. Laert. 5. 48, Cicero *De Or.* iii. 221, Kroll in *RE Suppl.* B. vii. 1075. For an example of practical *ὑποκριτική* see Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 53.

**56<sup>b</sup>11. ἀρχιτεκτονικήν:** at *Pol.* 1282<sup>a</sup>3 the *ἀρχιτέκτων* is contrasted with the *δημιουργός*. The word suggests mastery and true understanding of a subject (cf. Pl. *Pol.* 259 E). At *EN* 1094<sup>a</sup>14 it is a *τέχνη* to which other *τέχναι* are subordinate. *ἡ ὑποκριτική* is a master art in this sense, or would be if it existed (cf. *R.* 1403<sup>b</sup>35). It would include mastery of tone and gesture as well as knowledge of their effects on an audience.

*ἐντολή* . . . : the expression of all these would require different intonations. As B. points out, they are arranged in pairs distinguishable by intonation; *διήγησις* 'statement' rather than 'narrative'; cf. *R.* 1416<sup>b</sup>29. These intonations recur as *πτώσεις* 57<sup>a</sup>18.

**56<sup>b</sup>13. παρά:** cf. l. 11, above.

**56<sup>b</sup>14. ἐπιτίμημα:** 'censure'; cf. 61<sup>b</sup>22.

**56<sup>b</sup>15. τί γὰρ ἄν τις . . . :** A. is right that this comment is not serious as literary criticism, but it is of great interest for the history of linguistic study. It is to the sophists, especially to Protagoras, that the credit belongs for inventing 'grammar'. They were probably moved to do so in consequence of the *φύσις–νόμος* controversy, which raised the question of the relation between words and things. Diog. Laert. 9. 52–54 states that Protagoras examined the genders of nouns and the tenses of verbs; he distinguished also four, or perhaps seven,



modes of speech, prayer, command, question, etc., possibly stimulated by an incipient awareness of moods. The point raised here probably arose from his perception that what we call the imperative mood was associated with the tone of command, which led him to object that a commanding tone of voice in a prayer was anomalous, though one would have thought that the fault would be in the bard rather than in the poet. Those who discover new principles often try to apply them too rigidly, but Protagoras had taken an important step in thus analysing linguistic usage. *ἐπιτιμᾶ* may imply that he collected a number of examples of what he regarded as incorrect use of language by Homer, but this is the only one mentioned in the Homeric scholia, see schol. Ven. A, *Il.* 1. 1, and Eustathius ad loc., which may be derived from A.'s *Homeric Problems*.

**56<sup>b</sup>16.** *οἰόμενος*: he thought he was offering a prayer, not knowing the implications involved in the *σχῆμα* of *ἄειδε*.

**56<sup>b</sup>17.** *ἐπίταξις*: according to G. the word used by Protagoras; it is a synonym for *ἐντολή* at l. 11, above.

## CHAPTERS 20-22

*λέξις*, the last of the four parts of tragedy to be dealt with, *μέλος* and *ὄψις* being outside the scope of the *P.* A. begins at the beginning with the elements of grammar, which was not yet a subject in its own right (cf. *Int.* 17<sup>a</sup>5). In consequence Chs. 20 and, to some extent, 21 contain matter which is of interest rather to the historian of philology than to the ordinary reader. As Gomperz says, it has no more to do with tragedy than with prose. The commentary is reduced to a minimum. E. omits Chs. 20-22 altogether.

The investigation of language began with the sophists; Protagoras distinguished genders, tenses, and to some extent moods; Prodicus attempted to define the meanings of apparent synonyms, and Hippias especially gave his attention to language and metre; cf. *Hipp. Ma.* 285 D, *Hipp. Mi.* 368 D, *Xen. Mem.* 4. 4. 7. Titles of Democritus' works suggest that he wrote on these subjects, and Plato's *Cratylus* shows a few technical terms already in existence; his views on vowels and consonants may be derived from the Pythagoreans. A. had previously dealt briefly with some of the questions mentioned here at the beginning of the *De Interpretatione*, but he was not greatly interested in grammar apart from its bearing on logic, and little advance was made until it was taken up by the Stoics. Zeno's views as summarized in *Diog. Laert.* 7. 56-9 show obvious progress and Chrysippus developed the subject further. The foundation of traditional European grammar was laid by Dionysius Thrax, the pupil of Aristarchus, in the second century B.C. His little book with extensive scholia is still extant.

On the subject in general see Sandys, *Hist. of Class. Scholarship*, i, pp. 88–97, 144–6; Gudeman in *RE* vii. 1780 s.v. 'Grammatik'; P. B. R. Forbes, 'Greek Pioneers in Philology and Grammar', *CR* 47 (1933), 105; M. Hammarström, 'Die antiken Buchstabennamen', *Arctos*, i (1930), 3–40. For the overlap between grammar and logic in A.'s treatment, D. J. Allen *The Philosophy of A.* (Oxford, 1952), ch. 10. *A.'s Categories and De Interpretatione*, trans. J. L. Ackrill (Oxford, 1963), throws light on a number of questions, though our chapters are not drawn on in his commentary. Accents and breathings were examined by B. Laum, *Das Alexandrinische Akzentuations-system* (Paderborn, 1928).

CHAPTER 20. *Phonetics, parts of speech and their functions.*

**56<sup>b</sup>20. λέξεως ἀπάσης:** language in general, not only of tragedy.

**μέρη . . .:** these 'elements' are far from homogeneous; they are the subjects with which grammar deals ranged from the simplest to the most complex (cf. *Pl. Crat.* 424 B–425 A). ἄρθρον is out of place; as a non-significant word it should come after σύνδεσμος, as does the treatment of ἄρθρον at 57<sup>a</sup>6; we pass from letters to syllables to non-significant words to words to the word-group. For the reason why ἄρθρον is suspect see on 57<sup>a</sup>6.

**στοιχείον:** 'element'. Speech is built on sounds which can be represented by single letters; cf. *Aes. PV* 460 γραμμάτων τε συνθέσεις of the invention of writing; *Probl.* 895<sup>a</sup>7: οἱ μὲν ἄνθρωποι γράμματα πολλὰ φθέγγονται, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τὰ μὲν οὐδέν, ἓνια δὲ δύο ἢ τρία τῶν ἀφώνων.

**56<sup>b</sup>23. συνθετή:** i.e. it is a component of syllables and words (cf. l. 35, below). *συνετή* would mean an element of an intelligible sound, which, though widely preferred, is less appropriate to the context.

**φωνή:** distinguished from φόφος (*Hist. An.* 535<sup>a</sup>27). See on l. 38, below.

**56<sup>b</sup>23–25. καὶ γὰρ . . . στοιχείον:** the same would doubtless be true of many basic sounds of other languages, but A. concerns himself only with Greek. On the φωναί of animals see *Probl.* 895<sup>a</sup>4, as expressing pleasure and pain, *Pol.* 1253<sup>a</sup>10.

**56<sup>b</sup>25 μέρη:** the different classes of letter are μέρη of στοιχεῖα, which are themselves a μέρος of λέξις. εἶδη would have done as well here, or better in view of ἀδιαίρετος.

**τὸ φωνῆεν . . . ἡμίφωνον . . . ἄφωνον:** vowels, semi-vowels, and mutes. These terms must go back at least to the sophists, οἱ δεινοὶ περὶ τούτων (*Pl. Cra.* 424 c). In *Eur. Palamedes* (415 B.C.) the great inventor is made to say

ἄφωνα καὶ φωνοῦντα συλλαβὰς τε θεῖς  
ἐξεῦρον ἄνθρωποισι γράμματ' εἰδέναί. (fr. 578)

'I taught men knowledge of writing, putting vowels and consonants together to make syllables.' *ἄφωνα* here includes *ἡμίφωνα*. Usually the *ἄφωνα* are κ γ τ δ π β and χ θ φ.

**56<sup>b</sup>26. προσβολῆς:** of the application of the tongue to various parts of the mouth. Cf. l. 31, below, and *Part. An.* 660<sup>a</sup>5: τὰ μὲν γὰρ (sc. γράμματα) τῆς γλώττης εἰσι προσβολαί, τὰ δὲ συμβολαὶ τῶν χειλῶν, and *H. An.* 535<sup>a</sup>31. Vowel sounds are made with the tongue stationary. B. took *προσβολῆς* as the addition of another letter, but this is tied up with the interpretation of l. 28 and l. 36, below. If it is not allowed that *Γ* plus *P* forms a syllable there is no case at all for this interpretation.

**56<sup>b</sup>27. ἡμίφωνον:** a category of letters pronounceable (more or less), in contrast to the other consonants, without the obvious addition of a vowel; it contained at least *P* and *Σ*, and usually *Λ* *Μ* *Ν* possibly the compound letters with *Σ*, i.e. *Z*, *Ξ*, *Ψ*. These are the *ἄφωνα οὐ μέντοι γε ἄφθογγα* of *Crat.* 424 c; cf. *Phileb.* 18 B, *Theaet.* 203 B. A similar account was given by A.'s pupil Aristoxenus (see *Dion. Hal. Comp.* 14). The use of the term with reference to consonantal I and U is modern.

**56<sup>b</sup>32. δασύτητι καὶ ψιλότητι:** the presence or absence of the aspirate, not yet indicated by breathings in A.'s time.

**56<sup>b</sup>33. ὀξύτητι . . . τῷ μέσῳ:** refers to the pitch accent, acute, grave, or circumflex: see on *προσωδία* 61<sup>a</sup>21 n. The first two are mentioned in *Pl. Crat.* 399 A, but this is the earliest reference to the circumflex (unless *R.* 1403<sup>b</sup>30). Written accents were introduced, or perhaps first systematized, by Aristophanes of Byzantium. B. and R. wish to make of τῷ μέσῳ a third term common to all three pairs. Then we should have first the triple division of the mutes given by Dionysius Thrax, p. 12: θ φ χ δασέα; κ π τ, ψιλά; β γ δ, μέσα; second the triple division of vowels into η ω long, ε ο short, α ι υ dichronous (long or short).

**56<sup>b</sup>34. τοῖς μετρικοῖς:** metre is not a subject that A. treated, unless in the lost *De Musica*. οἱ μετρικοί are similarly referred to, *Part. An.* 660<sup>a</sup>8.

**56<sup>b</sup>35. ἄσημος:** A. would treat a word of one syllable as an *ὄνομα*. As compared with *σύνδεσμος* (l. 38) *συλλαβή* is essentially part of a larger whole.

**56<sup>b</sup>36. ΓΡ:** it is hardly credible that A. considered *ΓΡ* as a syllable, which he defined, according to schol. *Dion. Thrax* 1. 344 (Hilgard), as a combination of a vowel and a mute. Sense can be made by inserting a 'not', or by making him say *ΓΑ* is a syllable, also with *P*, *ΓΡΑ*. The Arabic is said to suggest the former. The traditional text is accepted by Hammarström.

**56<sup>a</sup>38–57<sup>a</sup>10.** Edd. are agreed in despairing of this passage. The text with its repetitions and alternative definitions is suspect, the illustrations are inadequate, and the meaning of the terms, especially of ἄρθρον, is not the same as in later writers.

**56<sup>b</sup>38. σύνδεσμος:** a connective, a word joining other words, phrases, or clauses, i.e. certain particles and conjunctions. The point emphasized both in *R.* 3. 5, in fr. 10 of Isocrates (from his lost *Τέχνη*), and in the *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1435<sup>a</sup>38 is that when a σύνδεσμος gives an expectation that another σύνδεσμος is to follow, e.g. μέν . . . δέ, καί . . . καί, or that there will be an 'apodosis', lucidity requires that the interval should not be too long; and it is undesirable to insert other σύνδεσμοι in the intervening space. The λέξις εἰρομένη is dependent on σύνδεσμοι as the 'periodic' style is not (*R.* 1409<sup>a</sup>24; cf. *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1434<sup>b</sup>13). At *Prob.* 919<sup>a</sup>22 a distinction is made between necessary σύνδεσμοι like τε and καί, whose absence destroys the sense, and others which are not necessary but presumably affect only emphasis, e.g. δή, (cf. [Demetr.] *Eloc.* 54–8). Prepositions are classed as σύνδεσμοι by Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 22, and so they must be in any system which recognizes only one part of speech in addition to ὄνομα and ῥήμα; see below 57<sup>a</sup>6 n.

**φωνή:** an articulate sound or series of sounds; it covers anything from a syllable to a sentence, and in the latter case is indistinguishable from λόγος, which means a significant group of words of any extent.

**57<sup>a</sup>4–6. ἡ φωνή . . . φωνήν:** this definition at least is consistent with what we are told elsewhere about σύνδεσμοι; cf. ll. 28–30 and n.

**57<sup>a</sup>6. ἄρθρον:** lit. 'joint', is the term used by later writers for the article, first perhaps in *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1435<sup>b</sup>13. This is not the meaning here, and the prepositions which are offered as an example do not conform to the definition. It is impossible to say what kinds of non-significant word A. here intends.

R. following Susemihl and some earlier edd. rejects the definition of ἄρθρον here and removes the word at 56<sup>b</sup>21 because, according to Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 2 and *Dem.* 48, A. and Theodectes recognized only three parts of speech ὄνομα, ῥήμα, σύνδεσμος, and the distinction between σύνδεσμος and ἄρθρον in the sense of article was due to the Stoics. Dionysius probably refers to A.'s *συναγωγή τέχνης Θεοδέκτου*. To which it may be replied that D. or his source, like many ancient scholars, may have had no knowledge of the *P.*, which could have contained a more developed view than the *Theodectea*. In any case D. seems to be inaccurate in that this sense of ἄρθρον is found in the *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1435<sup>b</sup>13 and perhaps in Theophrastus (Simplicius on A.'s *Categories*, p. 10, 24 Kalbfleisch) which are earlier than Stoic grammar. If the passage were a later interpolation one would expect

the account of ἄρθρον to be that current in the interpolator's own time.

**57<sup>a</sup>10. ὄνομα:** in later Greek 'noun', here includes adjectives, pronouns, and probably adverbs; the main distinction between them and ῥήμα, 'verb', is that the terminations of the former give no indication of time. The definition is nearly the same in *Int.* 16<sup>a</sup>19; Ackrill renders 'name' (see p. 115). In Pl. *Soph.* 261 D ff. ὄνομα is primarily a word which can be subject of a predicate.

**57<sup>a</sup>12. διπλοῖς:** in compound nouns the component parts do not retain the meaning they have in isolation. In the name Theodoros 'god' and 'gift' are not present to the sense. Similarly with Callippus, *Int.* 16<sup>a</sup>21; cf. Ackrill, p. 118.

It is irrelevant that δωρος is not a real word. In the parallel example *Κάλλιππος, ἵππος* is. Nor does it mean that such words cannot be analysed into their component parts. Such combinations are considered further at l. 32, below. Pl. *Crat.* 422 A naturally allows meaning to parts of words.

The name Theodoros or Doros is given as an example in a source which is of interest in relation to several passages in this chapter, a frag. probably of Theophrastus' *Περὶ Λέξεως*, published in *Griech. Pap. der Hamburger Staats- und Universitäts-Bibliothek* (1954), p. 36, ed. B. Snell. After what appears to be a discussion on similar lines of the elements, significant and non-significant, of speech the example δωρος is given, of which the syllable ρος is non-significant if the δω is removed. It is suggested that Theophrastus was troubled by A.'s statement that δωρος was itself non-significant and modified the example.

**57<sup>a</sup>14. ῥήμα:** at Pl. *Soph.* 262 A, B, a predicate. The point that it signifies time is not there made.

**57<sup>a</sup>18. πτώσις:** from πίπτω, whence Lat. *casus* and our 'case'. A. uses the word of formal modifications generally, not only of the terminations associated with declensions and conjugations, but also of those which give adverbial forms and comparatives and superlatives. It appears to cover not only the termination but the whole word as modified by its ending or by the tone in which it is spoken, the σχῆμα λέξεως. A change of sense without a change of form is thus a πτώσις. This μέρος λέξεως relates entirely to the forms of other μέρη.

**57<sup>a</sup>21. τὰ ὑποκριτικά:** see on 56<sup>b</sup>10. The use of the same form in two senses, e.g. of a verb as statement or a question (the Greeks had no mark of interrogation) would involve different πτώσεις, but a wish (not an example given by A.) would require a πτώσις in the optative, and so a different form, though the moods as such were not recognized until much later. There was as yet no word for case endings or verb terminations.

**57<sup>a</sup>23.** λόγος: a meaningful group of words which can be extended indefinitely. For a discussion see Ackrill, p. 126.

**57<sup>a</sup>24.** καθ' αὐτὰ σημαίνει τι: both ὀνόματα and ῥήματα do this.

οὐ γὰρ . . . σύγκεται: probably with reference to Pl. *Soph.* 262 A ff., who treated all λόγοι as predications formed from ὀνόματα and ῥήματα. To these A. gave the name λόγος ἀποφαντικός (*Inl.* 17<sup>a</sup>8). For A. λόγος is a meaningful group of words which may be composed entirely of ὀνόματα; the example given is the definition of man ζῶν δίπουν. At *R.* 1407<sup>b</sup>27 the use of a λόγος in place of an ὄνομα is said to add dignity τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ἀντ' ὀνόματος, οἷον μὴ κύκλον, ἀλλ' ἐπίπεδον τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον. The λόγος is a significant group of words, not a sentence with the predicate understood.

**57<sup>a</sup>27.** βαδίζει Κλέων: this appears to refer to the definition of ll. 23-4, but it is not clear that Κλέων has any more independent significance than βαδίζει.

**57<sup>a</sup>28.** ἢ γὰρ ὁ ἐν . . . : a λόγος may be single because it expresses a single idea, or because a number of λόγοι are united by σύνδεσμοι; cf. *An. Post.* 93<sup>b</sup>35, *Met.* 1045<sup>a</sup>12: ὁ δ' ὀρισμός (definition) ἐστὶν εἰς οὐ συνδέσμῳ καθάπερ ἡ Ἰλίας, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνὸς εἶναι. συνδέσμῳ = συνδέσει, by the use of σύνδεσμοι.

γὰρ: not connective, rather 'that is to say', see Denniston, *Greek Particles*, p. 67.

CHAPTER 21 deals with the individual word, the various types and formations, considered as an element of λέξις. The probable frag. of Theophrastus' *Περὶ Λέξεως* deals with some of the topics of this chapter. See n. l. 12, above.

**57<sup>a</sup>31-57<sup>b</sup>1.** *Single and double, or compound, words.* The double word 'Theodorus' has already been adduced at 57<sup>a</sup>13 as being composed of parts not in themselves significant, but in the cases now to be considered one part at least does by itself possess significance.

**57<sup>a</sup>31.** ὀνόματος: now used not with reference to a part of speech but meaning word in general including ῥήμα, as at 61<sup>a</sup>31.

**57<sup>a</sup>33.** ἀσήμου: e.g. a preposition compounded with a noun or verb. Though a preposition has a meaning, it is not, in isolation, significant in the same way as a noun or verb, and A. classifies prepositions as ἄσημα like other σύνδεσμοι and ἄρθρα.

ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι: this maintains consistency with what was said about Θεόδωρος at 57<sup>a</sup>13.

**57<sup>a</sup>34.** τριπλοῦν, τετραπλοῦν: S. gives as examples παρακλαυσίθυρον, συμπαρεισέρχομαι. The longer formations owe their complexity in most cases to the accumulation of prepositions. Combinations of

significant words belong mainly to comedy, e.g. *σαλπιγγολογχυπηνάδαι*, *σαρκασμοπιτυοκάμπται* (Arist. *Ran.* 966).

57<sup>a</sup>35. *τὰ πολλά*: 'the majority'; this is not credible unless it is restricted to a special type of word.

*Μασσαλιωτῶν*: this reading, based on the Arabic text, is generally accepted.

*Ἐρμολοκόςανθος*: Phocaea, from which Massilia was founded, was situated near the mouth of the Hermus; Caicus and Xanthus are the two major rivers to the northward, though the Xanthus is a considerable distance away in the Troad.

57<sup>b</sup>1. A lacuna after *Ἐρμολοκόςανθος* is implied by Ar., which continues with a mention of prayer to Zeus. Presumably the Massiliots brought the cult-title from their old home.

57<sup>b</sup>1–58<sup>a</sup>7. *Eight varieties of form or type of ὄνομα, which are of stylistic importance.* They might in each case be either simple or complex, so they are introduced collectively after the definition of the *ἀπλοῦν* and *διπλοῦν ὄνομα*; the section on *κόσμος* is missing at 57<sup>b</sup>33.

57<sup>b</sup>3. *κύριον–γλῶτταν*: in any one context a mutually exclusive pair. *κύριον* is current in normal usage, a *γλῶττα* is current elsewhere or has been current at other times. *γλῶττα* first appears in this sense in Aristoph. *Daitaleis*, fr. 222, of 427 B.C.; it is applied to hard words in Homer such as *κόρυμβα*, the explanation of which was part of traditional education. Further examples are given at R. 1406<sup>a</sup>7. At 58<sup>a</sup>22 *γλῶττα* is included in the category *ξενικόν*.

57<sup>b</sup>6. *σίγυνον*: see Herod. 5. 9. 3, 'a spear'.

*μεταφορά*: the term is used in a wider sense than English 'metaphor', which is mainly confined to the third and fourth of A.'s types.

57<sup>b</sup>6–35. The same classification is assumed in R. 1405<sup>a</sup>3 ff., where there is a reference back to the P. *μεταφορά* means both the transference of a word from its usual reference and the word so transferred.

57<sup>b</sup>9. (1) *γένος* to *εἶδος*: a more general term in place of one of more limited application; 'stand' is more general than 'lie at anchor' (*Od.* 1. 185).

57<sup>b</sup>11. (2) *εἶδος* to *γένος*: the converse of (1), a definite number in place of the more general 'many'. Grammarians distinguished *μυρία*, 'countless', and *μύρια* = 10,000. A., of course, did not write accents. (*Il.* 2. 272).

57<sup>b</sup>13. (3) *εἶδος* to *εἶδος*: the use of a term from a different class. Both quotations are probably from the *καθαρμοί* of Empedocles, whose gift for metaphor was praised in the *Περὶ Ποιητῶν* (fr. 70). In the first (fr. 138) *ἀρύσας* suggests drawing off a liquid, i.e. blood (cf. Ap. R. 3.

1015), in the second (fr. 143) *τεμών* suggests *prima facie* cutting a vein and so drawing blood, but in fact it appears to describe cutting off a stream of water with a bronze vessel, so 'drawing off' means 'cutting' and 'cutting' means 'drawing off'. The passages were discussed by Wilamowitz, *Sitzb. Berl. Ak.* 1929, 649.

**57<sup>b</sup>16.** ἀφελεῖν τι: probably the infin. is treated as a noun and τι has the force 'a sort of', as with ἐστάναι τι at l. 11 above; but B. agreed with the older commentators in taking τι as obj. here, as subj. at l. 11.

In the Theophrastus papyrus (1) and (2) are classed as *μετουσία*, (3) does not appear, and *μεταφορά* is confined to (4) τὸ ἀνάλογον, see below.

**τὸ δὲ ἀνάλογον:** (4) the most important type; this depends on the resemblances of the relations between pairs of things. In the first example the resemblance is between the relation of the cup to Dionysus, the god of wine, and the relation of the shield to Ares, the god of war. Each god is commonly represented as holding the appropriate emblem. Thus the cup can be called the shield of Dionysus, or the shield the cup of Ares, as Timotheus, *Persae*, fr. 22. In 'as that fell sergeant Death Is strict in his arrest' the analogy is between the official who executes the commands of earthly authorities and Death the minister of the divine powers. Numerous examples of this class of metaphor are given in *R.* 1406<sup>b</sup>4 ff. and 1411<sup>a</sup>1 ff.

**57<sup>b</sup>24.** Ἐμπεδοκλῆς: his words have not survived. Some edd. transfer ὡσπερ Ἐ. to after ἐσπέραν βίου or δυσμὰς βίου. The latter occurs in Pl. *Laws* 770 A, and in various forms the metaphor is common.

**57<sup>b</sup>25.** κείμενον: as at *Top.* 140<sup>a</sup>3 = κύριον.

**57<sup>b</sup>28.** ἀνώνυμον: there is no word to describe the sun scattering his rays which corresponds to sowing, the proper term for scattering seed; none the less sunlight could be said to be 'sown'. The source of the quotation is unknown.

**57<sup>b</sup>33.** ἄοινον: for further examples of the negative type see *R.* 1408<sup>a</sup>5.

In the list at 57<sup>b</sup>2 *μεταφορά* is followed by *κόσμος*, which should be explained here. It must refer to some sort of ornament. At *R.* 1404<sup>a</sup>34, <sup>b</sup>7, and *Isocr.* 9. 9 *κόσμος* and *κεκοσμημένη λέξις* include all poetical and abnormal use of language; similarly *κοσμεῖν* of metaphor (*R.* 1405<sup>a</sup>14). *πότνια συκῆ* (*R.* 1408<sup>a</sup>16) has been thought to imply that *κόσμος* is an ornamental adj., but probably this is an example only of one kind of *κόσμος*. In the Theophrastus pap. 46–59, after the quotation *δυσμὰς βίου* (cf. l. 25), we have compound and other epithets, *σίδηρος αἶθων*, *χρυσὸς αἰγλήεις*. Something similar may be missing here.

**πεποιημένον:** 'coined' by the poet; cf. the invented names of Ch. 9.



57<sup>b</sup>34. ὁ ποιητής: see 58<sup>b</sup>7 n.

57<sup>b</sup>35. ἔρνυγας: explained by Hesychius as derived from ἔρνη branches, as in a deer's 'branching' horns.

ἀρητήρα: from ἀράομαι, a praying, or cursing, man, hence priest. It is found three times in Homer.

57<sup>b</sup>35–58<sup>a</sup>7. The three remaining types are of a different kind, consisting of words whose form is changed by some sort of poetic licence.

57<sup>b</sup>35. ἐπεκτεταμένον: 'lengthened', whether by prolonging a short vowel, or by adding a syllable; ἀφηρημένον is the opposite.

58<sup>a</sup>4. πόλῆος: this, being an epic form, is akin to a γλώττα. In Πηληϊάδεω the inserted α counts as a syllable despite the definition at 56<sup>b</sup>34.

ἀφηρημένον: in all three examples the final syllable is lost by apocope; cf. 58<sup>b</sup>2, κρι for κριθή, δῶ for δῶμα, ὄψ for ὄψις: the hexameter ending is from Empedocles, fr. 88. Strabo 364 includes these three examples in a longer list.

58<sup>a</sup>7. δεξιτερόν: a positive with the formation, apart from accent, of a comparative (*Il.* 5. 393).

58<sup>a</sup>8–17. Nouns considered according to gender, based, whether or not directly, on Protagoras; cf. Arist. *Nub.* 659. Certain terminations are masc., others fem., while neuters τὰ μεταξύ (σκέυη in Protagoras' scheme: cf. *R.* 1407<sup>b</sup>8, used also by A. at *Soph. El.* 173<sup>b</sup>40) have both terminations and in addition a few peculiar to themselves. There are many exceptions to the rules here adumbrated, which in any case have little to do with poetic forms.

58<sup>a</sup>9. ἄρρενα: the starting-point for speculation on this subject was probably proper names, e.g. Πλάτων, Κράντωρ, Περικλῆς, and the assumption that grammatical gender should conform to natural gender.

58<sup>a</sup>10. ὄσα . . . σύγκειται: i.e. ψ, ξ (= κς) as in Πέλοψ, Ἄστυάναξ. It is not, of course, true that all nouns ending with these letters are masc.

58<sup>a</sup>12. ἐπεκτεινομένων: vowels that can be lengthened, α, ι, υ as opposed to ε, ο; of the dichronous vowels (long or short) ι and υ are said below to be neuter terminations.

ἴσα: masc. and fem. terminations each number three. A. writes as though this were the work of some unknown planner. Protagoras' assertion that μῆνις and πῆληξ, as ending in sigma, were really masc. (*Soph. El.* 173<sup>b</sup>19) seems based on a similar idea of a rational system to which usage should conform. In fact, if we disregard neuters, masc. words end in the three consonants, the three vowels are confined to feminines, of which a number end also with the same three consonants, so that it is really six to three.

58<sup>a</sup>14. ἄφωνον: 'mute' (β γ δ κ π τ) (cf. 56<sup>b</sup>28). This is true, as it is that no nouns end with ε or ο.

58<sup>a</sup>15. τὸ Ι: Herodian gives some twenty examples, mostly rare or foreign.

Neuters are regarded as an intermediate class, not as a separate gender, and no doubt endings in the vowels ι and υ are viewed as akin to the fem.

58<sup>a</sup>16. πέντε: δόρυ, πῶν, νᾶπυ, γόνυ, ἄστυ supplied from Ar. μέθυ and δάκρυ, the least uncommon of the others which are given by Herodian, are both archaic.

ταῦτα: it is questionable whether this can refer back beyond ι and υ to include α, the ending of a large class of neuters, e.g. πρᾶγμα.

58<sup>a</sup>17. Ν καὶ Σ: τέκνον, τείχος. P, which neut. would be expected to share with masc. (as ὕδωρ), must have dropped out.

## CHAPTER 22

In this chapter we have the application of the ideas about words expressed in Ch. 21 (Ch. 20 on basic ideas of grammar is not directly used elsewhere), metaphor being considered primarily as the use of single words. Thus the chapter is practically restricted to the stylistic effect of word usage with reference to the ὀνόματος εἶδη distinguished in Ch. 21, though λέξις means very much more than this; it was defined at 49<sup>b</sup>34 as composition in verse (excluding lyric), and in R., where the subject receives much fuller treatment, as 'the right use of language', οὐ γὰρ ἀπόρη τὸ ἔχειν ἂ δεῖ λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν (1403<sup>b</sup>16), the whole of the manner, as opposed to the matter, of rhetoric. The Third Book of the R., as we have it, is probably to be identified with the Περὶ Λέξεως in the ancient list of A.'s works; see P. Moraux, *Les Listes anciennes des Ouwrages d'A.* (Louvain, 1951), p. 103. The first twelve chapters are well worth reading in connexion with the section on λέξις in the P. Although the subject is there treated with reference to prose, many illustrations are taken from poets and the discussion and definitions given ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, whether or not this is identical with the P. as we have it, are referred to several times. It is stated that in speeches intended for reading λέξις is more important than διάνοια (1404<sup>a</sup>19), and that its importance was realized because 'the poets, though what they said was simple, seemed to have won their fame through their style', οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐήθη διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδόκουν πορίσασθαι τὴν δόξαν (1404<sup>a</sup>24). (The word 'simple' perhaps lacks the note of contempt which is present in εὐήθη.) That is why the style of the early rhetoricians like Gorgias was unduly poetical.

58<sup>a</sup>18. ἀρετὴ σαφῆ . . . εἶναι: the primary purpose of words is to convey meaning, so clarity is the indispensable quality of style. This is

stated more fully at the corresponding point in *R.* Bk. 3, the beginning of the second chapter, following on the Introduction, 1404<sup>b</sup>1: *ὠρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφὴ εἶναι· σημεῖον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ λόγος, εἰ μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον.*

**ταπεινήν:** 'low'. A style which aims only at clarity is in danger of being commonplace and undistinguished. This too is put more fully in the corresponding passage in *R.* 1404<sup>b</sup>3: *μήτε ταπεινήν μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν* (cf. 1414<sup>a</sup>23). The conception of *τὸ πρέπον* 'the appropriate', which was immensely important in later theory of style, occurs in our chapter only at 59<sup>a</sup>4.

**58<sup>a</sup>19. κυρίων:** as defined in 57<sup>b</sup>3.

**ὀνομάτων:** 'words' in the most general sense. The corresponding passage, *R.* 1404<sup>b</sup>5, has *ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων.*

**58<sup>a</sup>20. Κλεοφῶντος:** see 48<sup>a</sup>12 n., where *K.* is given as an instance of a poet whose characters were neither better nor worse than the human average.

**58<sup>a</sup>21. Σθενέλου:** probably the tragic poet whose flavourless style was referred to in Aristophanes' *Gerylades*, fr. 151, whose poverty, in *Vesp.* 1313.

**ἐξαλλάττουσα:** cf. 49<sup>b</sup>13. Of style almost a technical term, 'avoiding'. Cf. *R.* 1406<sup>a</sup>15.

**τὸ ἰδιωτικόν:** from *ἴδιος* in the sense of 'ordinary' as opposed to 'expert' or 'professional'. Cf. *R.* 1413<sup>b</sup>15: *οἱ δὲ τῶν ῥητόρων εὖ λεχθέντες ἰδιωτικοὶ ἐν ταῖς χερσίν*, successful speeches may seem jejune when read. It is almost synonymous with *ταπεινόν*, and is a regular term in later criticism, e.g. [Longinus] 31. 2.

**58<sup>a</sup>22. ξενικοῖς:** this term was not explained in Ch. 21, presumably as not being technical. It was used by Plato, *Crat.* 401 c, and by Isocrates in the sense of 'non-Attic' (cf. *γλώττα*), but by A. here and in a number of passages in *R.* meaning 'out of the ordinary'; cf. *τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον* in the next line. A word which is itself *ξενικός* is a *γλώττα*, but an ordinary word acquires *τὸ ξενικόν* by an unusual formation, e.g. *ο'ερ* for *over*, or by its application, *καὶ τὸ ξενικόν ἔχει μάλιστα ἢ μεταφορὰ* (*R.* 1405<sup>a</sup>8); cf. Diod. Sic. 12. 53: *τῷ ξενίζοντι τῆς λέξεως ἐξέπληξε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους* of Gorgias' famous embassy. It would cover, though not coincide with, our category 'archaic language'. Probably *κόσμος* too could contribute to it.

**58<sup>a</sup>23. ἐπέκτασιν:** defined along with other poetical formations at 57<sup>b</sup>35 ff.

**58<sup>a</sup>24. ἅπαντα τοιαῦτα ποιήση:** 'makes everything of this kind', i.e. if the whole composition is *ξενικόν*.

**αἰνίγμα:** 'a puzzle', because it is in the nature of metaphors that their meaning is not always obvious at first sight, and this enigmatic quality is one of the causes of the effectiveness of metaphors, only

it must not be overdone. Cf. *R.* 1405<sup>b4</sup>: ἐκ τῶν εὐήνιγμένων ἔστι μεταφορὰς λαβεῖν ἐπιεικέως, and the *mot* of Stesichorus to the Locrians, *R.* 1412<sup>a22</sup>: ὅτι οἱ τέττιγες ἑαυτοῖς χαμόθεν ἔσσονται, together with A.'s explanation of the reason for the effectiveness of such pregnant sayings. According to [Longinus] 32. 3 A. somewhere recommended the use of ὡσπερὶ or οἶονεῖ to soften violent metaphors.

**βαρβαρισμός**: Greek as it might be used by a foreigner not brought up to speak it. *σολοικίζειν* occurs in the same sense at *R.* 1407<sup>b18</sup>. The opposite is ἐλληνίζειν explained at *R.* 1407<sup>a19</sup>.

**58<sup>a26</sup>. γλωττῶν**: misplaced use of these is said to be a source of τὸ ψυχρόν 'frigidity' (*R.* 1405<sup>b34</sup>); metaphors too can be frigid (1406<sup>b4</sup>)

**58<sup>a27</sup>. τὸ λέγοντα . . . συνάψαι**: 'while speaking of what is actually the case, to use words which (in their literal sense) are not a meaningful combination'.

**58<sup>a28</sup>. ὀνομάτων**: most modern editors insert ἄλλων before it, 'other than metaphorical'; B., followed by R., thought that ὀνόματα could stand in a restricted sense for κύρια ὀνόματα.

**58<sup>a29</sup>. ἄνδρ' . . . κολλήσαντα**: an example of words which taken literally are ἀδύνατα συνάψαι. The χαλκόν is a metal 'cupping-glass' which is heated before application to the body's surface so that it may produce a partial vacuum as it cools, and thus exert suction. The line is quoted again at *R.* 1405<sup>b1</sup>: οἶον ἐν τῷ αἰνίγματι τῷ εὐδοκιμούντι, by [Demetrius] 102, and by others. On the later use of A.'s material derived from Peripatetics see Solmsen in *Hermes*, 66 (1931), 241. The line is usually attributed to Cleobulina who, according to the *Suda*, composed riddles in hexameters. G. objects to the attribution because as quoted by Athenaeus (452 B) the line is part of an elegiac couplet.

**58<sup>a31</sup>. δεῖ . . . τούτοις**: with this shorthand style it is perhaps idle to inquire closely to what τούτοις refers. The sense must be, as G. says, δεῖ τὴν λέξιν κεκρᾶσθαι τούτοις τοῖς εἶδεσι.

**58<sup>a34</sup>. οὐκ ἐλάχιστον . . .**: we can get the best of both worlds by using common words in uncommon forms such as are defined in the previous chapter, 57<sup>b35</sup>–58<sup>a7</sup>, since we can thus avoid both flatness and obscurity—convincing in logic but doubtful in practice; similarly *R.* 1414<sup>a26</sup>: ἂν εὐμυθῆ, τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ τὸ ξενικόν. Possibly relevant here is the interesting judgement on the style of Euripides at *R.* 1404<sup>b24</sup>: κλέπτεται δ' εὐ, ἂν τις ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας διαλέκτου ἐκλέγων συντιθῆ ὅπερ Εὐριπίδης ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπέδειξε πρῶτος. διάλεκτος is used in *R.* in the same sense as λέξις (cf. 58<sup>b6</sup>) but at 58<sup>b32</sup> it refers as usual to speech.

**58<sup>b1</sup>. συμβάλλεται**: the sing. verb is peculiar, perhaps to be accounted for by its distance from its subjects.

58<sup>b</sup>5. ὥστε οὐκ ὀρθῶς . . . : the passage extending to 59<sup>a</sup>4 is a digression, in which certain objections to the use of poetical forms are answered.

58<sup>b</sup>6. οἱ ἐπιτιμῶντες: who these were, and whether they were critics, or comic or satirical poets, is unknown.

58<sup>b</sup>7. τὸν ποιητήν: probably Homer, who used licences freely. ὁ π. is certainly so used at 60<sup>b</sup>2, possibly at 57<sup>b</sup>34, but see J. A. Scott, *CJ* 17 (1921), 330.

Εὐκλείδης: the two best known among the earlier bearers of this name were the Archon of 403 B.C. under whom the Ionic alphabet was officially recognized at Athens, and a Socratic philosopher from Megara. Neither was of an antiquity suitable to the curious title ἀρχαῖος, which S. takes to be the corruption of an ethnic adjective. Wilamowitz preferred the Euclides of Athen. 3 A and perhaps 242 B.

58<sup>b</sup>9. ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει: 'ridiculing him in his diction', i.e. by parodying as well as by criticizing—the most likely meaning of a strange phrase. V. following Tyrwhitt took λέξει as 'prose', but αὐτῇ would lack point.

Ἐπιχάρην . . . βαδίζοντα: to make this pass as a hexameter we have to lengthen the *E* of Ἐπιχάρην, (cf. ἐπίτονος, *Od.* 12. 423) and also the *a* of the prosaic word βαδίζοντα. In the next line ἐλλέβορον could be the end of a spondaic hexameter. See G.'s note for a large collection of metrical irregularities.

58<sup>b</sup>11. τὸ μὲν οὖν . . . γελοῖον: best taken with the emphasis on φαίνεσθαι. χρώμενον probably governs ἐπεκτάσει understood, τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ being adverbial. G. disagrees. For the importance of concealing such artifice cf. *R.* 1404<sup>b</sup>18, 36.

58<sup>b</sup>12. τὸ δὲ μέτρον: = τὸ μέτριον, which some edd. print; the application to style of the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean may have led on to the important position of τὸ πρόπον in later literary theory.

μερῶν: i.e. μερῶν λέξεως.

58<sup>b</sup>13. καὶ γὰρ . . . : Euclides could have made any of the main stylistic elements ridiculous by using the same unfair method as that which he used to discredit the lengthening of vowels. H. interprets: lack of measure gives results as ridiculous as does intentional exaggeration.

58<sup>b</sup>15. τὸ δὲ ἀρμόττον: A. now proposes to illustrate the efficacy of the proper (ἀρμόττον), as opposed to the blatant (φαίνεσθαι), use of distinctive words and forms in epic, by showing how much is lost if commonplace (κύρια) words are substituted. But something has gone wrong here; examples from epic are delayed until l. 25, and instead we have an example from tragedy. M. regards ll. 17–24 as a classic instance of an intrusive marginal note. It may be noted that no example is given of the right use of the poetic forms which the critics attacked.

**58<sup>b</sup>18. ἰδεῶν:** in the same sense, V. observes, as *μέρων* at l. 12 and *εἶδεσι* at l. 14.

**58<sup>b</sup>20. ὄνομα:** see 57<sup>a</sup>31 n.

**58<sup>b</sup>21. κυρίου εἰωθότος:** since *ἐσθίει* is used metaphorically, though the metaphor is a dead one, it is not strictly a *κύριον ὄνομα*, hence A. uses the expression *κυρίου εἰωθότος*.

**58<sup>b</sup>22. εὐτελής:** opposed to *σεμνός* (48<sup>b</sup>26); cf. *εὐτελισμός*, 'disparagement' [Longinus] II. 2.

**58<sup>b</sup>24. ὁ δέ:** Euripides. It may be a surprise to find Aeschylus using the less opulent language, as Twining observed, but Euripides' style is sometimes highly ornamental: see Earp, *The Style of Aeschylus* (Cambridge, 1948), pp. 72-83.

**θoinάται:** though not particularly *recherché*, has strong epic flavour.

**καί:** an unsatisfactory introduction of the examples from epic which we expected after *τὸ μέτρον* at l. 17.

**58<sup>b</sup>25. νῦν δ' μ' . . .:** *Od.* 9. 515. The traditional text of Homer has *ἄκιυς*, but *ἀεικής* is noted as a variant. *ἀεικής* must have been read (or remembered) by A., since he gives *ἀειδής* as equivalent, whereas *ἄκιυς* means 'feeble'.

**58<sup>b</sup>29. δίφρον . . .:** *Od.* 20. 259.

**58<sup>b</sup>31. ἡμόνες βοόωσιν:** *Il.* 17. 265, cf. 14. 394. In these examples we have *ὀλίγος* (twice), *οὐτιδανός*, *ἀεικής*, *ἀεικέλιον* as the *γλῶτται*, *μικρός*, *ἀσθενικός*, *ἀειδής*, *μοχθηρός* as the *κύρια ὀνόματα*. Of these the most interesting pair is *ὀλίγος* / *μικρός*. Both are *κύρια* but *ὀλίγος* becomes a *γλῶττα* when applied to something which is not to be described numerically. Cf. Antimachus *ἡνεμόεις ὀλίγος λόφος* (*R.* 1408<sup>a</sup>3). The pair is discussed by A. C. Moorhouse, *CQ* 41 (1947), 31.

**κράζουσι:** primarily the croaking of birds, seems an unsuitable word for the sound of waves. S. points out that both *ἡμόνες* and *βοόωσιν* are examples of *ἐπεκτεταμένα ὀνόματα* (57<sup>b</sup>35).

**Ἀριφράδης:** no more is known of Aripgrades than of his companion Eucleides. There are no grounds for identifying him with the A. pilloried by Aristophanes, *Eq.* 1281, *Vesp.* 1280, nor does *ἐκωμῶδει* at l. 32 imply that he was a comic poet (cf. 58<sup>b</sup>6, above), though his apparently foolish observations might be more in place in comedy than elsewhere.

**58<sup>b</sup>32. τραγῳδοῦς:** G. seems right against B. and Richards in *CR* 14 (1900), 201, that the word must here mean tragic poets, though the meaning has been declared late. For the parallel problem of *κωμῳδοί* see 49<sup>b</sup>1 n.

**58<sup>b</sup>33. δωμάτων ἄπο:** G. in a useful note states that this anastrophe use of the preposition is infrequent in Homer, common in tragic iambs especially in Euripides, where the preposition is almost

invariably the last word in the line, rare in lyrics, and not unknown in Plato and even in A.

It is hardly credible that *Ἀχιλλέως πέρι* in 59<sup>a</sup>1 should not have been intended to follow immediately after *δωμάτων ἄπο*.

**58<sup>b</sup>34** *σέθεν*: the convenient alternative to *σοῦ*.

*ἐγὼ δέ νιν*: occurs at Soph. *OC* 986. *νιν* can stand for all genders, sing. or plur., of the 3rd pers. pron.

**59<sup>a</sup>1**. *ἄσα ἄλλα*: the list could have been a long one.

**59<sup>a</sup>4**. *ἔστιν δέ . . .*: we now return to the main subject of the chapter.

*πρεπόντως*: cf. *τὸ μέτρον* (58<sup>b</sup>12). A number of practical recommendations relating to *τὸ πρέπον* are given in *R.* 3 Ch. 7, 1408<sup>a</sup>10 ff.

**59<sup>a</sup>5**. *καὶ διπλοῖς . . .*: *R.* takes *καὶ* in the sense of 'especially' but as *διπλᾶ ὀνόματα* are suitable mainly for dithyrambic poets, it seems that B. is right in saying that *καὶ* introduces some afterthoughts.

*διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι*: not all would be *παρὰ τὸ κύριον* (cf. 57<sup>a</sup>32 ff.), but many would be so and some would be *πεποιημένα*, coined by the poet.

*πολὺ δέ μέγιστον . . .*: A.'s insistence on the importance of metaphor is generally approved, cf. *R.* 1405<sup>a</sup>8, from the introduction to a long discussion of the subject, *καὶ τὸ σαφές καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ξενικὸν ἔχει μάλιστα ἢ μεταφορά*. But it is not obvious that A. was aware of the emotional effects which may be introduced by metaphors drawn from themes which carry powerful associations. Indeed Greek poetry in general is less rich than one might expect in emotionally charged metaphor. On the whole subject see W. B. Stanford, *Greek Metaphor* (Oxford, 1936). The emphasis throughout is on intellectually satisfying resemblances.

**59<sup>a</sup>7**. *εὐφυΐας*: one must be endowed with the faculty from birth; see 55<sup>a</sup>32-34 n. The same point about metaphor is made at *R.* 1405<sup>a</sup>8. See also 1394<sup>a</sup>5, 1412<sup>a</sup>10.

**59<sup>a</sup>9**. *διθυράμβοις*: the reason why compound words suit the dithyramb is given at *R.* 1406<sup>b</sup>2: *οὔτοι γὰρ ψοφώδεις*: The passage repeats what is said here about the use of *γλῶτται* and *μεταφοραί*.

**59<sup>a</sup>12**. *ιαμβείοις*: the word covers all verse in iambic metre, originally the metre of abuse (48<sup>b</sup>32), but the reference here must be to the dialogue of tragedy.

*λέξιν*: equivalent to *διάλεκτος*, the speech of everyday life. In A.'s view, and he had all the evidence before him, as tragedy developed, the language of dialogue approached ever more closely to common speech; cf. 49<sup>a</sup>23 ff. That Euripides made an important contribution to this development is shown by the passage quoted in the note to 58<sup>a</sup>34. A similar growth in the use of colloquial language can be seen in Elizabethan and Jacobean drama.

**59<sup>a</sup>13**. *λόγοις*: as often, this word of many meanings causes difficulty.

'Common speech', 'speeches', 'prose' are all possible meanings, of which the first seems to fit the context best.

**59<sup>a</sup>14.** ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα . . . : without a certain amount of τὸ κύριον any writing is intolerably obscure; μεταφορά introduces an element of τὸ ξενικόν, but being also natural in conversation it need not conflict with τὸ κύριον. The account of κόσμος is missing from 57<sup>b</sup>33 (see note ad loc.).

**59<sup>a</sup>15.** καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ πράττειν: καὶ must be explanatory, or else comedy would be included. The medium of drama is men performing on the stage; ἐν indicates the medium as at 47<sup>a</sup>22 and frequently in the opening chapters. But though performance is the differentia of drama, it remains essentially itself when read; cf. 53<sup>b</sup>6 and more especially 62<sup>a</sup>17. That the imitation is of σπουδαῖοι must be understood in this and the next chapter.

**59<sup>a</sup>16.** ἱκανὰ τὰ εἰρημένα: cf. εἴρηται ἱκανῶς at the end of Ch. 14 terminating the section on plot. Here we have the indication that the main subject of Bk. 1 of the *P.* is finished with.

## CHAPTERS 23–26

In the last four chapters the promise made at the beginning of Ch. 6, 49<sup>b</sup>21, is fulfilled by a discussion of epic. Since epic and tragedy are alike as being representations of superior men, the discussion can be founded largely on what has already been said about tragedy, and although this common feature is not in fact referred to in the course of these chapters, it accounts for their brevity. In Ch. 23 and in 24 as far as 59<sup>b</sup>16, which would be a better place for the chapter division, the subject is the resemblances between the two forms, in the remainder of Ch. 24 the differences. Ch. 26 compares the two forms and ends with the assertion that tragedy is superior. Ch. 25 is an insertion, wholly independent of its surroundings, on the ways of answering criticisms of the poets, especially Homer. It could reasonably have been given as an Appendix.

The treatment is not closely parallel to that of tragedy, in part at least because A. finds in Homer the model of what epic should be, and perpetually turns to comparison with Homer in order to illustrate the deficiencies of other poets, while in the case of tragedy no such model is recognized, not even the *OT*.

### CHAPTER 23. *Epic and its resemblance to tragedy.*

Epic has already been defined in relation to tragedy at 49<sup>b</sup>9–17.

**59<sup>a</sup>17.** περὶ . . . μμητικῆς: διηγηματικῆς causes no difficulty. Though the word has not previously been used, it is clearly equivalent to



δι' ἀπαγγελίας in the definition of tragedy (49<sup>b</sup>26) and contrasted with ἐν τῷ πράττειν at l. 15, above. The sense of ἐν μέτρῳ is less apparent; it may be the same as τὸ μέτρον ἀπλοῦν (49<sup>b</sup>11), interpreted as 'in metre alone and without harmony'. The whole phrase might stand for 'metrical narrative'; metre as opposed to prose does not require mention in a work on poetry (the only *mimetic* prose recognized by A. is the mime, particularly Socratic dialogues) but it is not inapposite in a definition. E.'s notion that it refers to history as being διηγηματικὴ *par excellence* is far-fetched. Butcher's ἐνί, approved by G., is superfluous if we suppose μέτρον to exclude lyric metres; tragedy, apart from lyrics, is almost as completely restricted to the iambic as epic is to the hexameter. Anyway, use of μέτρῳ and not μέτροις implies one metre. But the emphatic repetition of μέτρον at 59<sup>b</sup>18, defined as heroic verse at 59<sup>b</sup>32, gives some warrant for Heinsius' ἐξαμέτρῳ here; cf. also 49<sup>b</sup>21 τῆς ἐν ἑξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς. Epic and hexameter are inseparable.

**59<sup>a</sup>19. δραματικούς:** there are two ways in which a narrative can be dramatic: (a) in virtue of a unified plot: cf. καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν δεῖ . . . (the μέρη μύθου), 59<sup>b</sup>10, (b) by having the characters speak rather than the author narrate, the τρίτη διαφορά of Ch. 3. In conjunction with συνιστάναι it is clear that (a) is intended and the καί before περὶ μίαν πράξιν must be explanatory; (b) is not mentioned, except for διηγηματικῆς (l. 17), until 60<sup>a</sup>7. Homer's μιμήσεις δραματικάς (48<sup>b</sup>35) probably belong to type (a), though dramatic quality has not yet been discussed; see note ad loc.

περὶ μίαν . . . τέλος: cf. 50<sup>b</sup>26. The repetition is sufficient to recall the important argument about unity of action in Ch. 7, which applies equally to epic; note μέσα in place of μέσον (l. 20), as at Pl. *Phileb.* 31 A.

**59<sup>a</sup>20. ὡσπερ ζῶον:** the comparison of an epic to an animal with its implication of organic unity is repeated from 50<sup>b</sup>34 ff., but here A. concerns himself with unity alone, while in Ch. 7 he proceeded to draw conclusions about the proper length of a play and the beauty of its form.

**59<sup>a</sup>21. τὴν οἰκείαν ἡδονήν:** in this same passage of Ch. 7 the ζῶον is described as καλόν, and it was implied that a well-constructed plot is a thing of beauty which would give pleasure. On the other hand, the οἰκεία ἡδονή of tragedy was dependent on the emotions roused and perhaps on their κάθαρσις. Nothing is said about the emotions aroused by epic, though τὸ θαυμαστόν is declared appropriate to epic and would arouse emotion. It is not clear whether this is a fortuitous difference of emphasis or an indication that the two forms have each a different οἰκεία ἡδονή and so a different τέλος. It seems likely that, as both forms have the same subject-matter and as tragedy can achieve its end even when read and not performed, they have similar

ends, and this is strongly supported by the concluding words of Ch. 26: *δεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν αὐτὰς ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημένην*, where *αὐτὰς* are the tragic and epic *μιμήσεις*. This is, on the whole, the view of G.; E. is dubious.

*καὶ μὴ . . . εἶναι*: this must be a repetition of the point made in Ch. 9 about the relation of poetry to history, but the text is uncertain. The reading of the Paris MS. is *ὁμοίας ἱστορίας τὰς συνήθεις εἶναι*, which B. keeps with the change of *εἶναι* to *θεῖναι*. This gives the required sense, though in a topsy-turvy fashion, if *θεῖναι* means 'to regard as'. Anyway, *ἱστορίας τὰς συνήθεις*, 'ordinary histories', is a dubious expression. A better solution found by Dacier is accepted by modern editors other than B., and by Gomme, *Greek Attitudes*, p. 2, *καὶ μὴ ὁμοίας ἱστορίας τὰς συνθέσεις εἶναι*, 'their structures should not be like those of histories'. The point here, however, is not that history is less universal than poetry, but that it does not take 'actions' for its subject, rather the events of a single period or a sequence of unconnected events. This in effect repeats the important point made in Ch. 8 that a series of events grouped round an individual need lead to no single *τέλος*. Of course, in the last resort it is on the unity of action and the necessary relation between its parts that the philosophic quality of poetry depends, but it is the unity which is in point here. It is noteworthy that this defect in history is regarded as part of its nature; it is due to *ἀνάγκη*, not to the fault of historians.

**59<sup>a</sup>24.** *ἢ πλείους*: in Ch. 8 only the epic on a Theseus or a Heracles was considered. In an historical subject there may or may not be a single dominant character in the narrative, hence the addition. The same was true of some Cyclic epics (cf. 59<sup>b</sup>1, below).

*ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα*: they have a purely random association; this is the positive statement of what is purely put negatively at 51<sup>a</sup>27.

**59<sup>a</sup>24–30.** *ὥσπερ . . . δρῶσι*: in this sentence A. gives an illustration of historical events *κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους*, and then mentions the further possibility that a history may deal with a sequence of events extending over a longer period, which would show a similar lack of causal connexion.

**59<sup>a</sup>25.** *ἢ τ' ἐν Σαλαμῖνι . . . μάχη*: for A., as for us, Herodotus was the principal authority for the Persian Wars. According to Her. 7. 166 the two battles were fought on the same day. Himera has only slight relevance to Salamis in that Herodotus mentions the Syracusan claim that Gelon would have come to the help of the Greeks in spite of the dispute about the supreme command, had it not been for the Carthaginian threat. E. suggests that A. is here contradicting Ephorus, who alleged (see Diodorus II. 1. 4) that the Carthaginians

co-operated with the Persians in the timing of their invasion. To establish the interest of A. in Ephorus E. quotes interesting verbal parallels between this passage and the Introductions to Diodorus 16 and 17, though there is the possibility that Diodorus is himself using Peripatetic doctrine. The priority of Ephorus' history to the P. is uncertain. Ideas occurring in the later part of this chapter make their appearance in Horace's *Ars Poetica*, transmitted probably through Theophrastus.

**59<sup>a</sup>27.** ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις: A. gives no example of history covering a longer period; he might have used as an instance Herodotus on the Lydian kings, 1. 6-94. The absence of a τέλος is common to both groups of events, contemporary and successive. It could be argued in favour of history that the issue of the conflict between Europe and Asia is the τέλος of the Persian Wars, and that many of Herodotus' digressions are no more irrelevant than many of Homer's episodes, but it must be granted that the cohesion is less close and the pace more leisurely.

**59<sup>a</sup>29.** σχεδὸν δὲ οἱ πολλοί: if A. allowed that any epic poets apart from Homer achieved dramatic unity, there is certainly no sign of it in the P.

τοῦτο δρῶσι: i.e. make the structure like that of history, l. 21, above.

**59<sup>a</sup>30.** ὥσπερ εἶπομεν: A. has not so far said precisely this. In Ch. 8, 51<sup>a</sup>23, Homer was praised for the unity of action in the *Odyssey*, which does not tell of all that Odysseus did but is restricted to a part of his life which is a real whole, and at 56<sup>a</sup>13 it is implied that the *Iliad* possesses unity, though not of a kind that could be reproduced in the medium of drama.

θεσπέσιος: 'divine', an expression of enthusiasm unusual for A., who does not appear to have used the word elsewhere.

**59<sup>a</sup>31.** τοὺς ἄλλους: implies all other epic poets.

μηδέ: 'nor . . . either': a previous negative must be supplied; the force of the whole is something like 'he did not make the mistake of choosing a subject without unity, and having chosen a subject with natural unity, but one which was too vast, he did not make the whole war his subject either, but took a single part of it with a unity of its own'.

**59<sup>a</sup>33.** μέγας: of actual dimensions, as μέγεθος at 51<sup>a</sup>4.

εὐσύνοπτος: cf. εὐσύνοπτον . . . εὐμνημόνευτον (51<sup>a</sup>4 and 5).

**59<sup>a</sup>34.** μετριάζοντα: intrans. as usually in A.

καταπεπλεγμένον τῇ ποικιλίᾳ: 'over-complex by reason of its variety'. The whole story of the Trojan War told in the compass of the *Iliad* would have been as excessively compressed as the whole story of the *Iliad* put into the length of a play (56<sup>a</sup>13). There is

a change of construction here. Logic can be satisfied by supplying ἔδει εἶναι mentally.

**59<sup>a35</sup>.** ἐν μέρος: i.e. the wrath of Achilles, which by itself would have made a much shorter poem, an *Achilleid* as postulated in the earlier days of the Homeric controversy.

αὐτῶν: τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πραγμάτων (B., S.), τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν (R., E.). The latter is slightly to be preferred. Homer chose one part for his subject, but he took episodes from the other parts to add variety to his poem. This justifies the title of the *Iliad*, even though the poem does not include the natural end, the fall of Troy.

**59<sup>a36</sup>.** πολλοῖς: for instance most things between the end of Bk. 1 and the fulfilment of Zeus' promise to Thetis, which begins in Bk. 8.

νεῶν καταλόγῳ: a conspicuous example because it is appropriate to the beginning of the war, not to its tenth year. The same is true of the episode in which Helen on the walls of Troy points out the Greek heroes (3. 160-244).

**59<sup>a37</sup>.** διαλαμβάνει: the plot, the essential minimum, of the poem is divided by the insertion of episodes; cf. *Ph.* 213<sup>a33</sup>: διάστημα, ὃ διαλαμβάνει τὸ πᾶν σῶμα ὥστε εἶναι μὴ συνεχές. As E. objects, such translations as Butcher's 'diversifies' fail to bring out the alternation of plot and episode: cf. Dion. Hal. *Isocr.* 4: τὸ διαλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν ὁμοειδίαν . . . καὶ ξένοις ἐπεισοδίοις.

**59<sup>b1</sup>.** καὶ . . . καὶ . . .: the first καὶ (κ. περὶ ἓνα χρόνον) must be rendered 'or', the second could as well be explanatory.

πολυμερῆ: cf. 56<sup>a12</sup>: ἐποποικόν δὲ λέγω τὸ πολύμυθον, and note, where it was suggested that πολύμυθον could well be exchanged with πολυμερῆ in this passage. πολυμερῆ is preferred here to contrast with the μέρος which Homer selected (59<sup>a35</sup>).

ὁ τὰ Κύπρια . . . μικρὰν Ἰλιάδα: it is by no means clear that either the *Cypria* or the *Little Iliad* could fairly be described as being about a single action. If Photius' summary is to be trusted, the former extended from the Judgement of Paris to the arrival of the Greeks before Troy and had no obvious end, the latter from the contest for Achilles' arms to the departure of the Greeks and had no obvious beginning. The extreme example of lack of unity is afforded by the *Nostoi*, dealing with the misfortunes of various heroes on the way home from Troy and after their return. The best account in English of the Epic Cycle and its problems is still Monro's appendix to his edition of *Od.* 13-24. The fragments and Photius' Epitome of Proclus' summary of the Cycle are given in T. W. Allen's O.C.T. (revised ed. 1946) and in the Loeb *Hesiod and Homeric Hymns*, the Trojan Cycle in E. Bethe, *Homer*, 2. 149-293. Traditionally the *Cypria* was attributed to Stasinus, the *Little Iliad* to Arctinus. For the omission of ὁ before καὶ τὴν μικρὰν cf. Herod. 2. 57. 3, *De Caelo* 316<sup>a10</sup>.

**59<sup>b2</sup>-4.** τοιγαροῦν . . . μόναι: ποιεῖται as applied to *Iliad* and *Odyssey* must mean 'can be made' (cf. 62<sup>b5</sup> γίνονται). The idea is probably that the wrath of Achilles would make a single play, while the *Odyssey* would make two plays, one concerned with the hero's wanderings, the other with the situation in Ithaca. It is not relevant that other plays could be made out of individual episodes, e.g. *Rhesus*, as this throws no light on the unity of the basic plot. In this respect there is no inconsistency with the statements 56<sup>a12</sup>, that the *Iliad* is πολύμυθος, and 62<sup>b4</sup>, that a number of tragedies can be made out of any epic. But the *Little Iliad* is particularly πολύμυθος.

**59<sup>b4</sup>.** πολλαί: e.g. Judgement of Paris, Rape of Helen, Gathering of the Greek Host, Achilles on Scyros, Telephus, Quarrel of Achilles and Agamemnon, Iphigeneia at Aulis, and Protesilaus; these are all μέρη, not mere episodes.

**59<sup>b4</sup>-7.** καὶ τῆς μικρᾶς . . . [Τρωάδες]: 'more than eight' is a most unlikely expression, and there can be no doubt that the original list of eight ended with καὶ ἀπόπλους, and that the addition of πλέον took place when καὶ Σίνων καὶ Τρωάδες were introduced, whether or not from the margin. The superfluous conjunctions confirm this, and further Σίνων is out of chronological order; see M., pp. 91-3.

Problems arise from the list of titles. First, are they titles of plays or subjects for possible plays? In view of the meaning of ποιεῖται at l. 3 the second view would be preferable, but Λάκαινα must be the title of a play derived from its Chorus (Spartan women attendant on Helen), not the subject of a potential play. There is no evidence for the existence of plays on some of the subjects mentioned, but it is not difficult to believe that there were such plays.

Further difficulties arise from the plays themselves. The subjects agree pretty well with the account of the subject-matter in eight books given by Proclus, though the last two of the eight plays belong, according to him, to the 'Ιλίου πέρις'. This probably indicates an overlap between the two epics, which was eliminated in the 'Cycle' for the sake of continuity. E.'s suggestion that the whole list is a Byzantine insertion based on Photius' summary of Proclus does not compel agreement.

**59<sup>b5</sup>.** οἶον: in the sense *exempli gratia* not *scilicet*.

δπλων κρίσις: title of the first play of Aeschylus' Ajax Trilogy.

Φιλοκτήτης: possibly Soph. Φ. ἐν Τροίᾳ. The surviving play deals with an earlier part of the story, P. on Lemnos.

**59<sup>b6</sup>.** Νεοπτόλεμος: N. was fetched from Scyros and given his father's arms. According to the version of the story used in Soph. *Phil.* N.'s return preceded the bringing of Philoctetes to Troy, but there is no need for N. to take part in this action. Nicomachus is said to have written a *Neoptolemus*.

**Εὐρύπυλος:** E., son of Telephus, came to fight on the Trojan side and was killed by Neoptolemus. No play with this title is recorded.

**πτωχεία:** Odysseus entered Troy as a spy disguised as a beggar (cf. *Od.* 4. 247 ff.). No play with this title is known.

**Λάκαιναι:** Odysseus and Diomedes entered Troy in secret and with Helen's help stole the Palladium. Sophocles wrote a play of this name.

**Ιλίου πέρις:** title of a play by Iophon.

**59<sup>b</sup>7. ἀπόπλους:** not a known title, but a play on Polyxena might have been so described, since her sacrifice was the condition of the Greek departure, and the *Troades* actually ends with the sailing of the fleet. Vahlen takes it to be about the pretended departure of the Greeks when they went no further than Tenedos, making with *Sinon* and *Troades* a group of plays, the *Iliou persis*. G. suggests the flight of Aeneas.

[**Σίνων**]: title of a play by Sophocles. It must have dealt with the Wooden Horse: cf. Virgil, *Aen.* 2. 57-198.

[**Τρωάδες**]: no doubt the play of Euripides.

The point is that they are independent entities not subordinated, as they should be, to the whole epic.

## CHAPTER 24

Down to 59<sup>b</sup>16 the subject continues to be the ground common to tragedy and epic. The remainder of the chapter is concerned with the differences, especially the admissibility of the marvellous and irrational.

**59<sup>b</sup>8. τὰ εἶδη:** this refers to 55<sup>b</sup>32, where three of the εἶδη here specified are mentioned, and there is a mystery about the fourth; see note ad loc.

**δεῖ:** see below, l. 9 n.

**59<sup>b</sup>9. τὰ μέρη:** these obviously suggest the *μέρη* defined in Ch. 6, on which, ostensibly, the εἶδη were based. Apart from *μελοποιία* and *ᾄψις* they were *μῦθος*, *ἦθος*, *διάνοια*, *λέξις*. The two last are mentioned in l. 11. Before them we should expect to find *μῦθος* and *ἦθος*. Instead we find *περιπέτειαι*, *ἀναγνωρίσεις*, and *πάθη*, which were given in Ch. 11 as the *parts* of *μῦθος*. *ἦθος* is perhaps omitted because we have already had the *ἠθικὸν εἶδος*. Solmsen argued, *CQ* 29 (1935), 195, followed by M., p. 146, that we have here a series of clauses relating to *μέρη* superimposed on a passage about εἶδη. The double reference to *λέξις* καὶ *διάνοια* in ll. 11 and 16 supports this.

The sense of the passage is affected by our translation of *δεῖ ἔχειν* l. 8. It can mean either 'must have' as a consequence of its own nature (so B. and S. and apparently others who do not comment), or 'ought to have' though it does not always (cf. *δεῖ συνιστάται* 59<sup>a</sup>18).

E. alone takes the latter view, and carries on the constr. to the clause *καὶ τὰ . . . ταῦτά* in ll. 9 and 10 instead of supplying *ἐστὶ*. This view is supported by *ἔτι δέ* (l. 7) carrying on the statement of what epic ought to be in contrast to what most poets make of it. But E. has to accept the drastic conclusion that epic poets other than Homer are so null that their poems defy classification. Being a mere accumulation of episodes, they are not ethical, or pathetic, or anything else. But as *εἶδος* is normally used, all members of a class belong to one *εἶδος* of it or another. This is implied of tragedy at 55<sup>b</sup>32 and the *γάρ* of *ἢ γὰρ ἀπλήν* (l. 9) is best understood as showing a similar necessary consequence. On the whole *δεῖ* should be understood in the sense *ἐξ ἀνάγκης*. That some epics belong to two *εἶδη* at once (ll. 13-15, below) makes it no more likely that an epic can belong to no *εἶδος*.

**59<sup>b</sup>11. παθημάτων:** it is natural to refer this to the definition of *πάθη* given at 52<sup>b</sup>11 in association with *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis*, though *ἐν τῷ φανέρῳ* 'on the stage' has no application to narrative poetry. There is no lack in epic of horrors vividly described, like the death of Hector or the Cyclops' cannibalism, but except for the metre they cannot be distinguished from similar descriptions in the Messengers' speeches of tragedy. A. might be thinking of scenes of physical distress such as would produce *πάθη ἐν τῷ φανέρῳ* in a tragedy; more likely he is using *πάθη* in its generally accepted sense.

*ἔτι . . . ἔχειν καλῶς:* this is a desideratum, not a logical necessity. The *δεῖ*, in this case with no suggestion of necessity, is carried forward from the previous clause as if A. had written *δεῖ τῶν διανοιῶν καὶ τῆς λέξεως καλῶν*.

**59<sup>b</sup>13. καὶ πρῶτος καὶ ἰκανῶς:** probably an expression of approbation without temporal reference. *ικανός* in A. often carries a notion of completeness (cf. 49<sup>a</sup>8), and it is not unenthusiastic by comparison with *πάντα ὑπερβέβληκεν* (l. 16, below), as might appear.

*καὶ γάρ:* if an epic is complex, it is complex for the same reason as a tragedy. It is possible that the application to epic poetry of these technical terms from tragedy was a novelty.

G.'s addition of *ἐκατέρως* after *ἐκάτερον* (Riccardianus has *ἐκάτερον σῶτερ*) improves the run of the sentence but is not indispensable.

**59<sup>b</sup>14. συνέστηκεν . . . ἠθική:** it is one of the difficulties of A.'s classification that *εἶδη* are by nature mutually exclusive, as the use of *ἢ* suggests in ll. 8 and 9, above, yet pathetic and ethical plays must also be either simple or complex. Only here, in relation to epic, do we find one work explicitly assigned to two categories; see notes on 55<sup>b</sup>32 ff.

That the *Iliad* should be accounted simple is not unreasonable, at least in comparison with the *Odyssey*. Yet it is typical of the narrow

and technical approach of A. that he ignores the inner irony of the *Iliad*, when Achilles in his passion to avenge the injury done him by Agamemnon inflicts upon himself the ultimate disaster of Patroclus' death, a sequence of events *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα* if ever there was one. But it is not brought to a fine point in the kind of compressed scene which A. approved. There is an *anagnorisis* of a sort in the meeting of Glaucus and Diomedes, and a *peripeteia* in the *ἀπόπλους* in Bk. 2.

**59<sup>b</sup>15. ἀναγνώρισις γὰρ διόλου:** a natural result of the situation when Odysseus reaches Ithaca; he knows who everyone is, no one knows who he is. There is also the 'realization', as when Polyphemus realizes that by his blinding the prophecy has come true in an unexpected way.

**ἠθικὴ:** see 56<sup>a</sup>1 and n. If *ἠθικός* means that the characters of the persons in the epic are differentiated, the *Iliad* too is *ἠθικός* according to 60<sup>a</sup>11, though the *Odyssey* shows character on more levels. If it means morally edifying, it is true that the *Odyssey* ends with the more virtuous characters on top, but it has not an obviously profounder moral lesson than the *Iliad*. For the association of the *Odyssey* with τὸ ἠθικόν cf. [Longinus] 9. 15.

**59<sup>b</sup>16. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις:** the reference of *τούτοις* is obscure, and the reference to the supremacy of Homer in diction and thought (cf. Strabo I. 1. 2) after *οἷς . . . ἰκανῶς* at ll. 12, 13, is superfluous: see note on l. 9, above. Edd. except B. and S. prefer to read *πάντας* and to make Homer the subject of *ὑπερβέβληκεν*. R. considers *πάντας ὑπερβέβληται* in Strabo, loc. cit., to be evidence in its favour.

**59<sup>b</sup>17–60<sup>a</sup>5.** *The subject now changes from the resemblances to differences between epic and drama already adumbrated at 49<sup>b</sup>11.* The change would provide a better place for the beginning of Ch. 24. The two formal differences, length and metre, are discussed first, length to l. 31, metre thereafter to 60<sup>a</sup>5.

**59<sup>b</sup>17. τῆς συστάσεως:** here 'the thing composed', equivalent to *ποίησις*, as at 60<sup>a</sup>3. In most of the previous occurrences the emphasis was on the organization required for the composition of a work.

**59<sup>b</sup>18. τοῦ μὲν οὖν μήκου . . . εἰρημένους:** the general considerations governing the length of a poem, or the dimensions of a structure, if it is to be satisfying and intelligible, were given in Ch. 7; these are now applied to the case of epic. The ideal length of tragedy was determined by its basic structure which contains the passage of a dominant character from good to bad fortune or the reverse. The length of epic might have been determined in the same way, but (1) in many epics there was no one dominant character, (2) more important, it is in the nature of the epic tradition to tolerate more and longer episodes than tragedy.



**59<sup>b</sup>19.** *συνορᾶσθαι*: cf. *εὐσύνοπτος* (51<sup>a</sup>4). Though the satisfaction given by harmonious proportions is not here mentioned, there is no need to doubt that epic too may supply it; but as construction of epic is less tight, so it will be less marked.

**59<sup>b</sup>20.** *τῶν μὲν ἀρχαίων*: probably 'poems' are to be supplied, rather than 'poets' as E. would have it. The reference must be mainly to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, since we are told that the cyclic epics were much shorter; the *Cypria* in eleven Books, the longest of them, was less than half the length of the *Iliad*. The *Thebaid* of Antimachus was of inordinate length, but it could not be reckoned among *τὰ ἀρχαία*.

**59<sup>b</sup>21.** *τὸ πλῆθος*: 'the quantity'. A. must be referring to the conditions of his own day when three tragedies were given at a single sitting. At this time only one satyr-play was performed at the Dionysia, and though A., as historian of drama, must have been well aware that in the fifth century each poet competed at the Dionysia with three tragedies and a satyr-play, he could not have supposed that his readers would interpret *τὸ πλῆθος* in that sense.

Assuming that the average length of a tragedy did not change between the late fifth century and A.'s time, three tragedies would amount to 4,000–5,000 lines which would take a long half-day in performance; an epic with longer lines but less business would need about the same. An audience cannot be expected to give its attention for longer than this at a stretch, but in view of the statement at 51<sup>a</sup>6, 7 that the limits of length set by the physical conditions of the contests have nothing to do with the *τέχνη*, A. seems to be thinking here, not of the longest poem which can be given in a single performance, but of the whole to be constructed out of sufficient parts of the right size. The *Argonautica* of Apollonius Rhodius is of about the length that A. prescribes.

**59<sup>b</sup>23.** *ἐπεκτείνεσθαι*: cf. 55<sup>b</sup>15, 16: *ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς δράμασιν τὰ ἐπεισόδια σύντομα, ἢ δ' ἐποποιία τούτοις μηκύνεται*, more and longer episodes can be introduced.

**59<sup>b</sup>24–26.** *μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι . . . μόνον*: one would expect this to mean 'give as representations many parts (of the action) at the same time as they happen (lit. are done)', a feat which could be performed only by batteries of television cameras. Accordingly *ἅμα* must be taken only with *πραττόμενα* 'which happen at the same time', i.e. in the mythical action which is the subject of play or poem, and similarly at l. 27, below, *ἅμα* must be taken with *περαινόμενα* not with *ποιεῖν*. Two events which happened, or are supposed to have happened, at the same time cannot be represented as so happening on the stage (though by rapid switching from one scene to the other it can be achieved, more or less, in the cinema). The point which A. makes here is that in epic, which is narrative, it is possible to describe in

rapid succession a number of different events which happened at the same time; hence the complexity of some of the battle-scenes in the *Iliad*. It is worth pointing out that in fact Homer very rarely describes events as simultaneous. In the interests of clarity he avoids doubling back in time, and prefers to make events which would naturally have occurred simultaneously follow one after the other. The most striking examples of this are to be found in the *Odyssey*. When Telemachus has reached Sparta, the narrative switches to the departure of Odysseus from Calypso's island and his journey by way of Scheria to Ithaca. As Telemachus has now finished his business at Sparta, it would be natural for him to go home. Yet he is delayed at Sparta for a fortnight in order that we may not return to his story until Odysseus has reached Eumaeus' hut, where he can conveniently be detained while Telemachus is making his way home. The subject of time in Homer was fully discussed by Zielinski, *Philol. Suppl.* 8 (1889), 405-49, see also P. Mazon, *Introd. à l'Iliade* (Paris, 1942), p. 29. Virgil, writing for a more sophisticated public, does allow simultaneous actions and thereby increases the dramatic concentration of his narrative.

It is sometimes said, e.g. by B. ad loc., that we have here an indirect recognition of the unity of place. In strict logic, at least, this is not so. A. does not say that different places cannot be staged successively. Had frequent changes of scene been customary, Greek drama would no doubt have gained in flexibility, but it would not have led to the representation of events as simultaneous. In the *Ajax*, for instance, where there is a change of scene, the suicide of Ajax is represented as taking place after the arrival of the Messenger, though in the conditions obtaining the two events might well have been simultaneous. There is a very real sense in which drama is better placed than epic for handling two *μέρη* at once. In the Messenger's speech two situations are amalgamated as they never can be in epic. The action conjured up before the eyes by the Messenger's vivid narrative is itself part of a situation where emotionally charged information is being imparted to a character and usually to the Chorus which, though less immediately concerned, responds *en masse*. The death of Neoptolemus is combined with the sorrow of Peleus, the passing of Oedipus with the conflicting emotions of his daughters, the triumph of Salamis with the dismay of the Persian Queen.

59<sup>b</sup>25. ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς: 'on the stage', or 'by the stage building'; see 55<sup>a</sup>28 n.

59<sup>b</sup>28. οἰκείων ὄντων: 'provided they have a real connexion with the subject' referring to episodes, which can be included in *μέρη*. Cf. 55<sup>b</sup>13: ὅπως δὲ ἔσται οἰκεία τὰ ἐπεισόδια.

**ὄγκος**: 'volume' and so 'dignity'. In later criticism the word is associated with the grandeur or pomposity of Aeschylus; cf. Plut. *M.* 79 A and the *Vit. Aesch.*, 5, 14. Epic owes some of its quality to being on the grand scale.

**59<sup>b</sup>29. μεγαλοπρέπειαν**: like *ὄγκος* only here in the *P.* (but *ὀγκώδης* at l. 35, below). Elsewhere A. uses it in a personal sense, *μεγαλοπρεπῆ καὶ σεμνόν* (*R.* 1367<sup>b</sup>1). Later it became almost a technical term for the qualities of the grand style.

**τὸ μεταβάλλειν τὸν ἀκούοντα**: the nearest thing to a parallel is *Pol.* 1340<sup>a</sup>22: *μεταβάλλομεν τὴν ψυχὴν* when listening to certain kinds of music. Here it must mean 'procurer à l'auditeur le plaisir du changement', as H. puts it, which is shorthand rather than Greek; but if we make *μεταβάλλειν* intrans. the structure is even more awkward.

**59<sup>b</sup>30. ἐπεισοδιῶν ἀνομοίοις ἐπεισοδίοις**: the emphasis is on *ἀνομοίοις*. There is plenty of room in epic, so the poet can use not only a number of episodes (cf. *ἐπεισοδίοις κέχρηται αὐτῶν πολλοῖς* 59<sup>a</sup>35), but ones which are unlike each other, as the Catalogue and the story of Bellerophon, thus attaining a variety which is beyond the range of tragedy. The absence of the article has led some commentators to take the expression as explanatory. This rather unsatisfactory sentence would be improved if we had *τὸ ἐπεισοδιῶν* followed by explanatory *μεταβάλλειν*. For the importance of variety see *R.* 1371<sup>a</sup>25.

**59<sup>b</sup>31. πληροῦν**: 'satiating', usually followed by an acc. as *θύμον*, or a gen. as *δαίτος*.

**59<sup>b</sup>31-60<sup>a</sup>5. The metre of epic.**

**59<sup>b</sup>32. ἥρωικόν**: used by A. as the adj. of *ἥρωος* in all senses, *ἥρωος* (60<sup>a</sup>3) only of the metre of heroic verse, i.e. the hexameter.

**ἀπὸ τῆς πείρας**: 'as a result of trial'. This is an inference on the part of A., who did not know of the unsuccessful trial of any other metre for epic poetry. For A. metres like genres are there ready to be used; they are not invented by poets or improvisers, who merely realize their potentialities; cf. 48<sup>b</sup>30: *κατὰ τὸ ἀρμόττον καὶ τὸ ἱαμβεῖον ἦλθε μέτρον*. The 'technical' reasons why it is appropriate are given below at ll. 34, 35, but it was on empirical grounds, not from knowledge, that the metre was used. There is no inconsistency with *φύσις* 60<sup>a</sup>4, because *φύσις* and *πείρα* share the opposite pole to *τέχνη* (cf. 47<sup>a</sup>19).

**59<sup>b</sup>34. ἀπρεπές**: the opposite of *ἀρμόττον*.

**στασιμώτατον**: *στάσιμος* means 'stately', like the speech of the great-souled man in *EN* 1125<sup>a</sup>14. Similarly among harmonies the Dorian is *στασιμωτάτη* (*Pol.* 1342<sup>b</sup>13). Its opposite is *κινητικός*.

**59<sup>b</sup>35. γλώττας:** see on 57<sup>b</sup>3. It is clear from 61<sup>a</sup>10 that A. was conscious that what was to him a γλώττα could have been a κύριον ὄνομα to Homer. At 59<sup>a</sup>10 it was said that, while γλώτται were suitable to epic, metaphors were proper rather to iambic verse (similarly *R.* 1406<sup>b</sup>3). It is possible that A. has similes in mind here. The εἰκῶν, not mentioned in *P.*, is regarded as a kind of metaphor at *R.* 1406<sup>b</sup>20, but one more suited to poetry.

**59<sup>b</sup>36. περιττή γὰρ . . . :** as an argument this would be circular; it is an emphatic restatement of what is already implied. Because narrative poetry is on a greater scale the hexameter is the only appropriate metre; the hexameter being exceptionally weighty can take rare words and similes (see previous note). Now we are told in explanation that narrative poetry surpasses other forms (τῶν ἄλλων is gen. of comparison), presumably in being receptive of γλώτται and μεταφοραί. Twining's ταύτη makes the sense clearer.

**59<sup>b</sup>37. τὸ δὲ ἰαμβεῖον . . . :** we return to the qualities of metres, διὸ . . . ἄλλων being in the nature of a digression. These statements about iambic and trochaic verse stress by contrast what has been said about the hexameter. A.'s views on rhythms as given here, in *R.*, and in the last Book of the *Politics*, where they are considered in some detail, probably reflect the speculations of Damon; cf. *Pol.* 1341<sup>b</sup>32: τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδεχόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιροῦσιν τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὰ μὲν ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικά . . . τιθέντες. The opposition στασιμώτερον / κινητικόν appears at *Pol.* 1340<sup>b</sup>9. For the (trochaic) tetrameter see 49<sup>a</sup>21 n., 23 n. Our own impression of Greek metres does not accord very closely with what A. says, except that the iambic is obviously nearest to the rhythm of ordinary speech. The hexameter in Greek, if not in Latin, might seem rapid rather than stately. In English the trochaic is lighter than the iambic, though we are perhaps not justified in using for accentual verse a nomenclature invented for quantitative verse. But the *ethos* of trochaic tetrameters used by Archilochus and Solon and by the tragic poets is not obviously related to the spirit of the dance. See the reference to Maas's *Greek Metre* (49<sup>a</sup>23 n.).

**60<sup>a</sup>1. πρακτικόν:** as B. says in his note on 49<sup>a</sup>23, πρακτικός should mean πράξεως μιμητικός as ἠθικός means ἤθους μιμητικός. In support of the same view Twining, ii. 6, cited *Probl.* 922<sup>b</sup>24: κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὑποδωριστι καὶ ὑποφρυγιστι πρᾶττομεν, ὃ οὐκ οἰκεῖόν ἐστι χορῶν, which supports a corresponding parallel between the action of dialogue and the reflections of a chorus. On the same principle at *Pol.* 1341<sup>b</sup>34, where μέλη are divided into ἠθικά, πρακτικά, ἐνθουσιαστικά, it should mean 'encouraging activity in those who hear them'. πρακτικός is contrasted with θεωρητικός (*EN* 1139<sup>a</sup>28); cf. Horace, *AP* 82 *natum rebus agendis*.

ἀτοπώτερον: the comparative is in relation to ἀπρεπές (59<sup>b</sup>34).

**60<sup>a</sup>2.** εἰ μὴ γνῶσι τις αὐτά, ὥσπερ Χαιρήμων: should refer to the types of metre already mentioned, hexameter, trochaic, and iambic; it might be used loosely of μέτρα in general. However, if μέτρον excludes lyric metres, the only other type that Chairemon is likely to have used is the anapaest. At 47<sup>b</sup>20-23 Chaereon's poem was described as a μικτὴ ῥαψωδία which mixed together ἅπαντα τὰ μέτρα. See notes ad loc.

**60<sup>a</sup>3.** ὥσπερ εἴπομεν: usually referred to 49<sup>a</sup>24, where we are told in connexion with the development of tragedy that, as here, φύσις found the appropriate metre, in that case the iambic, though only after a false start with the tetrameter. It may refer only to the beginning of the passage ἀπὸ τῆς πείρας; see 59<sup>b</sup>32 n.

**60<sup>a</sup>4.** φύσις: as in the passage just cited, and also at 49<sup>a</sup>4, it is a question whether the φύσις is that of the genre or of poets, since both undeniably possess a φύσις. It is slightly more likely that human φύσις was in A.'s mind, since αὐτῇ at the end of the line, which is the μακρὰ σύστασις, would be superfluous if the σύστασις was also the subject of the clause.

**60<sup>a</sup>5-11.** Homer's dramatic quality. This has nothing to do with likenesses or differences between epic and tragedy; the passage stands in isolation.

**60<sup>a</sup>5.** Ὅμηρος δὲ . . . : when A. had to speak earlier of the excessive length of some ancient epic, Homer was not mentioned by name. A. now returns to the more agreeable duty of extolling him.

**60<sup>a</sup>6.** μόνος: it is surprising if all the poets of the cycle, to say nothing of later epic poets, denied themselves the pleasure of putting speeches into their characters' mouths, even though their work may have lacked structural unity. In fact passages of direct speech occur in the scanty fragments. Further, Nestor spoke throughout a monstrous digression in the *Cypria*, and Thetis sang a dirge in the *Aethiopis*. But no doubt Homer did impersonate more than others.

**60<sup>a</sup>7.** οὐ . . . μιμητής: the distinction between the poet who narrates and the one who makes his work 'dramatic' by putting part of his matter into the mouths of his characters in the form of speeches was made in Ch. 3.

**60<sup>a</sup>8.** μιμητής: this is a restricted sense of μίμησις as in Pl. *Rep.* 392 D ff. According to A.'s normal usage the epic poet is a μιμητής σπουδαίων regardless of whether he uses direct speech. Cf. the end of note on 48<sup>a</sup>20-24.

οἱ . . . ἄλλοι: mainly the cyclic poets, but there is no need to exclude A.'s contemporary, Antimachus, though one may wonder how he expended twenty-four Books in the process of bringing his heroes before Thebes if he did not give them a generous allowance of speeches.

**60<sup>a</sup>9.** ἀγωνίζονται: in place of λέγουσι (cf. l. 7, above). ἀγωνίζεσθαι is

used of any sort of public appearance in a competitive situation whether of actor, rhapsode, or orator in the courts. It makes a poor contrast to *μιμούνται*, since actors can equally well be said *ἀγωνίζεσθαι*. *εἰσάγει* (l. 10) suggests that the metaphor is from the stage, though G. quotes *Rep.* 381 D to show that the word could be used of 'bringing in' characters in other forms of poetry. Anyway the distinction is between narration and impersonation, the meaning of *μιμούνται* here.

**60<sup>a</sup>10. ἄλλο τι ἦθος:** edd. from the days of Castelvetro were inclined to treat *ἦθος* as superfluous in the light of what follows. For *τι* without a subs. cf. *ἕτερόν τι* at 48<sup>a</sup>21. But it has generally been retained since Vahlen (p. 316) set out the arguments for *ἦθος* = *πρόσωπον*. Gomperz, however, (3), p. 40, argued with some force that the two passages from the *R.* on which Vahlen mainly relied, 1388<sup>b</sup>31 and 1408<sup>a</sup>27, showed nothing; as in many other cases either meaning gives perfectly good sense. Only here in all A. is the sense 'dramatis persona' unavoidable, and so general is the natural ambiguity that clear examples are hard to find elsewhere. At *Rep.* 496 B, which is sometimes cited, both *ἦθος* and *ψυχή* are used rather self-consciously. But the extension of meaning from *ἦθος* to *πρόσωπον* is very natural. If we reject it, certain consequences follow for the interpretation of Ch. 15.

The other characters would be gods, ghosts, children, etc.

**60<sup>a</sup>11. ἔχοντα ἦθος:** supply *ἕκαστον*. The alternative *ἦθη* would mean 'characteristics'.

**60<sup>a</sup>11–b5.** *The section on epic ends with further differences between it and tragedy; τὸ θαυμαστόν and τὸ ἄλογον are more suitable to epic.* It has been noted, especially by G., that A. writes here with direct reference to what the poet ought to do rather than to the nature of the forms; there is a similar change of angle in the latter part of the section on tragedy. Possibly we have here an anticipation of the arrangement in terms of *ars-artifex* which is supposed to have been a feature of Hellenistic treatises. See C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry*, pp. 20 ff.

**60<sup>a</sup>11–14. δεῖ . . . τὸν πράττοντα:** since the epic poet does not produce his action before the eyes of spectators, he can slur over the improbabilities.

**60<sup>a</sup>12. τὸ θαυμαστόν:** this was associated at 52<sup>a</sup>4 with *τὰ παρὰ τὴν δόξαν*, and so with *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis*, the vital parts of the complex plot. The thrill it produces is called *ἐκπληξίς*. This suggests that the emotional *τέλος* of epic is very close to that of tragedy, whether or not both might be accompanied by *katharsis*.

**60<sup>a</sup>13. τὸ ἄλογον:** mentioned as a fault in tragedy at 54<sup>b</sup>6, and again later in this chapter. The natural connexion between *θαυμαστά* and

ἄλογα is close. Beyond a certain point the marvellous becomes incredible and loses its effect, but it is more possible μάλλον ἐνδέχεται to get away with it in narrative than in drama. But not all ἄλογα rouse emotion; all θαυμαστά do. As compared with Ch. 9 there is a considerable shift of emphasis here from universal significance to the merely exciting.

**60<sup>a</sup>15.** τὴν Ἑκτορος δίωξιν: *Il.* 22. 131 ff. Hector lost heart as he saw Achilles approach. He turned to flee, and Achilles pursued him round the walls of Troy; it was in the course of this pursuit that Achilles shook his head to warn the Greeks not to intervene and so rob him of his glory. The same passage is discussed in the next chapter, 60<sup>b</sup>24-26, where it is called not an ἄλογον but an ἀδύνατον; see note ad loc.

**60<sup>a</sup>17.** λανθάνει: sc. ὄντα γελοῖα.

τὸ δὲ θαυμαστόν ἡδύ: at *R.* 1371<sup>a</sup>31 the pleasure of τὸ θαυμαστόν is explained by the desire to learn. τὰ θαυμαστά awaken curiosity; the satisfaction of this desire involves the relaxation of tension in the soul as it returns to its normal state with curiosity satisfied. This has no application here. There is a simple, unanalysable pleasure in hearing surprising things.

**60<sup>a</sup>18-26.** Closely connected with τὸ ἄλογον as an element in τὸ θαυμαστόν is τὸ ψεῦδος. For an ἄλογον is something which will not stand up to examination. Homer is praised for a particularly effective expedient which veils τὸ ψεῦδος. Here A.'s ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ is in direct conflict with *Rep.* 377 D, where Homer is condemned because μὴ καλῶς ψεύδεται.

**60<sup>a</sup>19.** τοὺς ἄλλους: this should refer to other *epic* poets, though one would have thought that, if they made frequent use of such devices, A. would have been less unenthusiastic about them.

**60<sup>a</sup>20.** παραλογισμός: this has already occurred in connexion with *anagnorisis* as a subdivision of ἀ. ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ (55<sup>a</sup>13).

**60<sup>a</sup>22-24.** διὸ δεῖ . . .: if A is not true, but if A is such that if it were true B would follow (even though B can happen otherwise than as a consequence of A), the poet should add B (προσθεῖναι) to his false statement A; then his audience, seeing that B is true, will infer falsely that A, of which it is a natural, though not a necessary, consequence, is true too.

**60<sup>a</sup>25.** ψυχῆ: i.e. as the organ of reason: cf. παραλογίζεται ἡ διάνοια *Pol.* 1307<sup>b</sup>35.

παράδειγμα . . . Νίπτρων: this is a perfectly good example of a false inference, but it is an inference made by a character in the story, and its effect depends on the awareness of the audience that it is false. It would have been more helpful if A. had given an example of some impossibility in Homer's narrative which Homer made plausible

by showing it as the antecedent of something real, e.g. Odysseus' fabulous swim followed by his natural exhaustion.

**60<sup>a</sup>26. τῶν Νίπτρων:** see notes to 54<sup>b</sup>29, 55<sup>a</sup>13. The passage here referred to must be *Od.* 19. 220-48, which precedes the foot-washing. In the absence of numbered books for reference the named episodes must have been given a wide extension. The false inference made by Penelope was that, since the stranger gave a correct account of the clothes Odysseus was wearing when he visited Crete on his way to Troy, the stranger must have met Odysseus (he could have described his clothes from hearsay) and that the rest of his story must be true.

A different possibility is suggested by the Porphyry schol. to *Od.* 19. 467, which would refer the *paralogismos* to the actual recognition arising from the *Niitra*: *Α., φασίν, ἐπιλαμβάνεται τοῦ τοιούτου ἀναγνωρισμοῦ λέγων ὡς ἄρα κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ πᾶς οὐλὴν ἔχων Ὀδυσσεύς ἐστιν.* Odysseus was wounded as a boy, and if alive must still have a scar; the Stranger has a scar, therefore the Stranger is Odysseus. This ignores the fact that not all scars are the same or on the same part of the body. A. cannot have been guilty of such simplicity, and *φασίν* suggests that the account is garbled. Other quotations from the *Homeric Problems* do not admit to any doubt as to what A. said. But probably A. did say something in that work criticizing the recognition, and the same point may be alluded to here. In any case it is not the audience which is deceived; it is only Penelope or Eurycleia who is allowed to be convinced on inadequate evidence.

What the deception of the audience by *παρalogισμός* comes down to is that, the more realistic details are inserted in an account of an improbable event, the more probable it is made to seem. To take the instance of an *ἄλογον* given in another connexion at l. 36, below, the landing of Odysseus in his sleep by the Phaeacian mariners, the vivid account of Odysseus' feelings when he awoke, his sense of grievance that he had been deceived, his relief that his tripods and cauldrons were still with him, his apprehension that he might be discovered sitting among his treasures, all these help to 'add verisimilitude' to the fabulous narrative of the night-voyage. A. himself considers charm of style the justification for this absurdity.

**60<sup>a</sup>26-60<sup>b</sup>1.** *Further recommendations regarding ἄλογα.*

**60<sup>a</sup>26. προαιρεῖσθαι . . . ἀπίθανα:** sc. *μμήσασθαι* as at 60<sup>b</sup>17, 18. The exact bearing on the discussion of this famous principle, which is introduced again at 61<sup>b</sup>11, is not quite clear. It would appear from *τε . . . τε* that it is to be taken closely with what follows, but *ἀδύνατα* are not mentioned again, and the examples are examples of *ἄλογα*.



What is the relation of ἀδύνατα to ἄλογα? The two are distinguished at 61<sup>b</sup>23, but it would seem natural that an ἄλογον in the structure would give rise to individual incidents which were ἀδύνατα. A likely reason for the introduction here of the similar, but not identical, class of ἀδύνατα is that with ἄλογα the epigram would not work. ἄλογα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ εὐλογα ἀπίθανα would be a contradiction in terms. The significance of the saying lies in the undoubted truth that a series of events containing no impossibility may strike an audience as much less convincing than one which maintains the sequence of cause and effect but requires suspension of disbelief on some incidental impossibility. Few coincidences are impossible; but a plot which turns on unlikely coincidences violates the feeling for logical coherence. It does not trouble a sophisticated audience that Medea murders her rival with a poison unknown to science, but the unmotivated arrival of Aegeus at a convenient moment causes dissatisfaction. Although A. condemns it, the anachronism (if that is the point) of the introduction of the Pythian Games into the story of Electra could be taken as an instance of an inoffensive ἀδύνατον (cf. 60<sup>b</sup>30).

60<sup>a</sup>27. λόγους: = μύθους; see note on 55<sup>a</sup>34.

60<sup>a</sup>28. μερῶν ἀλόγων: a μέρος is a substantial part; A. passes over the odd incident. Though in epic it is possible to get away with ἄλογα (60<sup>a</sup>12), they are undesirable.

60<sup>a</sup>29. μυθεύματος: only here, not to be distinguished from μύθου. The same stipulation, that the ἄλογον should be in the antecedents rather than in the action, was made (54<sup>b</sup>7) with the same instance of the OT and it is more appropriate to drama than to epic.

60<sup>a</sup>30. τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι: the acc. is governed by ἔχει understood from ἔχειν, above.

60<sup>a</sup>31. τῷ δράματι: the ostensible subject is epic, but A. is always ready to use the one form to illustrate the other.

Ἡλέκτρα: in Soph. *El.* 680-763 the *Paidagogos* gives a brilliant but fictitious account of the death of Orestes in the chariot-race at the Pythian Games. The objection that the games, except for the musical contests, were not founded until much later (582 B.C.) is raised in the scholia and is probably the point here. It has also been suggested that it is incredible that such news should have been brought by so lowly a character.

60<sup>a</sup>31. οἱ . . . ἀπαγγέλλοντες: the announcement is made by one man only; the pl. can be justified if Orestes and his old slave are regarded collectively as conspirators.

60<sup>a</sup>32. ὁ ἄφωνος . . . ἦκων: Telephus in the *Mysians*, of Aeschylus or Sophocles. Telephus, having killed his uncle at Tegea, made the journey to Mysia in Asia Minor without speaking; being con-

taminated with kindred blood, he was precluded from intercourse with all men: cf. Orestes and his separate table at the Choes in the Attic tradition. As this was ἐν τῷ δράματι and the journey itself cannot have been dramatized, presumably the play began with his arrival in Mysia, still silent. The silence of Telephus is the subject of comic allusion in Middle Comedy (Amphis, fr. 30. 6, Alexis fr. 178. 3). Aeschylus was addicted to the presentation of silent actors, but Telephus with his special reasons for silence is hardly a typical case.

**60<sup>a</sup>34. θῆ†**: the text is uncertain: a measure of sense can be extracted. The subj. is ποιητής, the obj. either τοιοῦτόν τινα λόγον or ἄλογα. There are two possible interpretations of this highly compressed sentence. (1) 'if a poet does use such a plot and it appears that he could have done so (sc. θεῖναι) less irrationally, it is ἄτοπον as well (as γελοῖον); (2) with a comma after εὐλογωτέρως, and ἐνδέχασθαι = *admittere* depending on δεῖ, 'but if a poet does use such a plot and makes it appear fairly plausible, even the absurd should be allowed'. It is an argument, though not a conclusive one, in favour of the second version that ἄτοπον has the same sense here as in 60<sup>b</sup>2, below, though we should expect ἄτοπα. Further, the next sentence follows more easily after a statement that τὸ ἄτοπον can be acceptable than after a demand for its rejection.

**60<sup>a</sup>36. τὴν ἔκθεσιν**: see note on l. 26, above. The episode may include the voyage from Scheria and Poseidon's petrification of the Phaeacian ship in addition to the actual disembarkation of the sleeping Odysseus.

**60<sup>b</sup>1. τοῖς . . . ἀγαθοῖς**: 'good features', pre-eminently the charm of style. ἀγαθόν has a similar sense at 59<sup>b</sup>29.

**60<sup>b</sup>2. ἀφανίζει ἡδύνων**: the flavour of absurdity is concealed by the strength of the sauce: cf. 49<sup>b</sup>25, 50<sup>b</sup>16. The notion that style is applied to matter like a coat of paint was persistent in antiquity: cf. Pl. *Gorg.* 502 c. Here the beautiful surface is sufficiently opaque to conceal the underlying absurdity.

**60<sup>b</sup>2-5.** The last remark leads on naturally to the general statement on *the right use of λέξεις in epic.*

**60<sup>b</sup>3. τοῖς ἀργοῖς μέρεσιν**: 'unexacting passages', explained by what follows. The fine style which diverts attention from ἄλογα will divert it too from things which deserve attention. A similar idea in R. 1418<sup>a</sup>12, where the speaker is warned not to combine πάθος and ἐνθύμημα, as the hearer cannot attend to both at once. In tragedy stylistic elaboration can be justified in Messengers' speeches.

**60<sup>b</sup>4. ἡ λίαν λαμπρά**: 'dazzling'; the metaphor is very much alive.

CHAPTER 25. *Problems and their Solutions*

The great authority of the Homeric poems and their general use in education gave rise from an early date to numerous perplexities. These were partly due to the difficulties of interpreting works which were archaic and preserved traces of a society different in many ways from that of Greece in the sixth century and afterwards, partly to what were felt to be moral, religious, and ethical inadequacies. Xenophanes and Heracleitus denounced Homer's theology, and not much later Theagenes of Rhegium is said to have defended Homer by explaining offensive passages as allegorical (cf. Lehrs, *Aristarchus*<sup>3</sup> (1882), pp. 197 ff.). In the fifth and fourth centuries ingenious minds found ever more numerous difficulties, some real, many, as it seems today, frivolous. We do not know when it was first asked what song the Sirens sang.

By A.'s time there were in existence works devoted to the denunciation of Homer, that of Zoilus of Amphipolis, for example. Often argument was in the form of 'Problems'. A Problem (*πρόβλημα*) was a question 'put forward' as deserving discussion. If the Problem was concerned with a difficulty in the interpretation of Homer, the Solution (*λύσις*) might be found in historical or philological learning; it might on the other hand be found in censuring Homer. Thus in the literary Problem there often lurks an *ἐπίμημα* (60<sup>b</sup>21), 'a censure', and the solution, if it can be found, involves the acquittal of the poet. The treatment of the Problem in general can be illustrated from the surviving *Problems*, some of which are literary, though most, if not all, of the work is not by A. himself. Closer to this chapter was the *Ἀπορήματα, Προβλήματα, or Ζητήματα Ὀμηρικά*, in six Books according to Diog. Laert. 5. 26, from which the instances of Homeric interpretation are no doubt derived. Echoes of this work are numerous in the scholia and commentaries to Homer: see especially Porphyry's *Ζητήματα Ὀμηρικά*, ed. H. Schrader, *Porph. Quaestiones Homericae ad Il. pertinentes* (Leipzig, 1880), and *Od.* (1890). It is noteworthy that A. agrees with Pl. *Rep.* 378 D in rejecting the method of the *ὑπόνοια*, the allegorical or concealed meaning, in literary interpretation.

Elucidation of obscure passages is obviously a part of the *τέχνη ποιητική*, and as literary Problems were concerned principally with Homeric difficulties there was a case for treating the subject under the heading of epic. There is a further superficial connexion in that *ἄλογα* and *ἀδύνατα*, which were discussed in Ch. 24 with reference to the difference between epic and tragedy, frequently provide the text for a Problem. Had ancient book-production supplied the useful device of the Appendix, A. would no doubt have employed it here. As it is, the chapter is as much an insertion in its present context as is Ch. 12.

And although A. implies interesting general principles, it is not always safe to press such hints very far, because the atmosphere of debate was traditionally contentious and the level of discussion is more that of the law-courts than of the philosopher's school. Tyrwhitt indeed cites *Soph. El.* 175<sup>a</sup>31 'sophistries are fitly answered by sophistries'.

Parallels from the scholia are collected by M. Carroll, *A.'s Poetics Ch. XXV in the Light of the Homeric Scholia* (Baltimore, 1885): see further Gudeman, *RE* 13. 2511 s.v. λύσεις.

There is great difficulty about the structure and connexion of thought in this long chapter, which provided M. with the test-case for his theory of a double redaction in the *P.* The list of five ἐπιτιμήματα at the end does not correspond with the treatment of the subject in the body of the chapter, and there is no agreement about the twelve λύσεις, or indeed about the analysis of the chapter as a whole.

The chapter appears to fall into three main sections:

1. 60<sup>b</sup>6–22: the nature of the poet's activity suggests the classes of problem which arise and of the answers to criticisms of the poets. These are under three heads: what the poet says may be justified (a) as true, given the objects of imitation, i.e. (i) things as they are, (ii) as they are said to be, (iii) as they ought to be, (b) by a purely linguistic explanation, (c) as being a fault but an incidental one irrelevant to the poetic art.

2. 60<sup>b</sup>22–61<sup>b</sup>9: instances of solutions to problems in which these defences are used. But these are not taken in the order in which they are given in Section 1, and a new type of problem *περὶ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς* is inserted at 61<sup>a</sup>4–9. Section 2 (a) 60<sup>b</sup>22–32 deals with the solution proposed in 1 (c) and there seems to be some confusion in the statement of it (see note ad loc.). 2 (b) 60<sup>b</sup>32–61<sup>a</sup>4 deals with solutions of the type described in 1 (a). There follows the insertion on *τοῦ καλῶς* already mentioned (61<sup>a</sup>4–9), which I refer to as 2B. 2 (c) 61<sup>a</sup>9–31, the longest section, deals with the numerous solutions based on language and usage; this answers to 1 (b). Finally 2C 61<sup>a</sup>31–61<sup>b</sup>9 discusses the solution to problems in which contradiction (*ὑπεναντίωμα*) is alleged; this is not clearly marked off from 2 (c) as it carries on from the same starting point, the individual *ὄνομα* (61<sup>a</sup>31), but it is essentially a new section, and, like 2B, it is in no way prepared for in Section 1.

3. 61<sup>b</sup>9–25 is in the nature of a summary of the solutions given in the previous section, concluding with the five ἐπιτιμήματα and the twelve λύσεις, but the summary restates what has been given under the heads of various types of λύσις in terms of the various ἐπιτιμήματα—or some of them. This is particularly confusing, because in the previous sections some λύσεις have been associated with a particular ἐπιτίμημα, others have not. The change of classification here is pointed out by R., but it has

not been sufficiently stressed as a principal reason for the confused impression given by this chapter. Within the section the *ἐπιτιμήματα* do not correspond with the list of five given at 61<sup>b</sup>22.

*Section 1*

**60<sup>b</sup>6.** *λύσεων*: in the context the meaning is not ambiguous, though it has no connexion with *λύσις* as expounded in Ch. 18.

*πόσων τε καὶ ποίων εἰδῶν*: a characteristic way of setting out on a new subject; cf. the beginning of Ch. 1.

**60<sup>b</sup>8.** *ὡσπερ ἀνεὶ ζωγράφος . . . εἰκονοποιός*: the painter is again introduced as the simplest case of the imitator, with the addition for the sake of completeness of the sculptor. *εἰκόνες*, always visual representations, even, in a sense, in the special meaning 'simile'; and the word for writing poetry is *ποιῶ* not *γράφω*.

(a)

**60<sup>b</sup>10.** *ἐν τι ἀεὶ*: i.e. all possible imitations are contained in the three types that follow. The general law of Ch. 9, that the artist should represent things *οἷα ἂν γένοιτο*, applies to actions, which are complex wholes composed of parts. Problems normally deal with individual things or persons and their representations.

*οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν*: for representation of men and things *οἷα ἔστιν* cf. the paintings of Dionysius (48<sup>a</sup>6) and *εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας* (48<sup>b</sup>11). The distinction between things as they are and as they were has not so far arisen, but when the subject is taken up again at 61<sup>a</sup>1, the *λύσις* depends on the difference between past and present usage. No doubt there are *προβλήματα* to which the correct *λύσις* would be *οὕτως ἔχει*. *οἷα φασὶν καὶ δοκεῖ*: again only one of the pair is taken up *οὕτω φασὶν* 60<sup>b</sup>35, not that there is much difference between the two.

**60<sup>b</sup>11.** *οἷα εἶναι δεῖ*: the idea of an idealized representation is present at 48<sup>a</sup>4 and more fully at 54<sup>b</sup>8-14. For the application to a problem see ll. 32-34, below.

(b)

*λέξει*: *λέξις*, so long as it was *λ. κυρία*, would give rise to no difficulties; but *γλώττα* and *μεταφορά*, the two most important of the stylistic expedients considered in Ch. 22, could both cause misunderstanding; see 61<sup>a</sup>10 ff.

**60<sup>b</sup>12.** *πάθη τῆς λέξεως*: these are the things that are done to *κύρια ὀνόματα*, such as lengthening or contraction (see Ch. 21). An example of their use in a problem is to be found at 61<sup>a</sup>22, though it is there classed as *προσωδία*. *πάθος* in this sense became a technical term among grammarians.

60<sup>b</sup>13. **δίδομεν**: cf. ἀποδίδομεν τοῖς θεοῖς 54<sup>b</sup>5.

(c)

60<sup>b</sup>14. **τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς**: this is similar to 'life and art'; *πολιτικῆ* includes both public and private morality. The independence of poetic ὀρθότης suggests the existence of a set of purely aesthetic values, but they are recognized, if at all, only by implication.

60<sup>b</sup>16. **κατὰ συμβεβηκός**: as an accidental accompaniment, not as an intrinsic part. The second type of failing is not caused by any deficiency in the artist *qua* artist, but by ignorance of some other matter. The mimetic arts are unique in being concerned with many other arts.

60<sup>b</sup>16–21. **εἰ μὲν γὰρ . . . ἑαυτήν**: some words have fallen out in l. 17 e.g. *τι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐμιμήσατο δι'.*

60<sup>b</sup>17. **προεἴλετο**: he set himself to imitate a certain object: cf. *Soph. El.* 183<sup>a</sup>37 *προειλόμεθα εὐρεῖν δυνάμιν τινα συλλογιστικὴν*. But the artist must first form his conception of the object, and this he may do incorrectly: see next line.

**ἀδυναμίαν**: technical incompetence in representing his conception. The old view (Tyrwhitt) that ἀδυναμία = τὰ ἀδύνατα cannot be supported by any parallel. While it is clear what is meant by a failure of an artist in representing his subject, it is less than obvious what is the failure of a tragic poet. In the light of earlier chapters one would suppose it would be a failure in construction, a highly episodic plot for instance. But the examples do not bear this out, and Problems do not normally deal with criticisms of so general a nature. ἀμιμήτως ἔγραψεν (60<sup>b</sup>32), being also a reference to the analogy of the artist, gives no help. It appears from 60<sup>b</sup>23 that ἀδύνατα are an offence against 'the art itself'. There may be others in the same category: see below.

60<sup>b</sup>18. **τὸ προελεσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς**: supply ἔχει. Some prefer to read τῷ from one of the *recentiores*. The artist acted incorrectly in proposing for himself the model of a horse galloping with both right legs thrown forward. The contrast is between δύναμις and προαίρεσις (cf. *R.* 135<sup>b</sup>18). For the interpretation if μὲν is read for μή, see 60<sup>b</sup>32 n. Apparently a horse does, on occasion, move both right legs forward at the same time, and according to G. a camel does so habitually. See Sir James Gray, *How Animals Move* (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 59–61. A. discussed the subject in his *De Incessu Animalium* 712<sup>a</sup>24.

A., in suggesting that precise knowledge of all the things he imitates is not to be required of the artist, is in direct contradiction to Plato. A subsidiary argument against poetry in *Rep.* 600 E–602 B

is based on the contrast between the horseman who understands the use of a bridle and the artist who is interested only in its appearance and has no knowledge of it. Later in this chapter A. suggests a certain indifference to even more important kinds of truth.

**60<sup>b</sup>21.** ὥστε δεῖ . . . λύειν: we began with προβλημάτων καὶ λύσεων at l. 6, but the main point of the sort of problem that A. is considering is an attack on the poet, so that λύσις is equivalent to clearing him from the charge, and we find the contents of this chapter referred to as *περὶ ἐπιτιμήσεων καὶ λύσεων* (62<sup>b</sup>18).

**60<sup>b</sup>22.** ἐκ τούτων: this probably refers to the whole of the earlier part of the chapter, but some refer it to ll. 13–22 only.

*Section 2 (a). Cf. I (c)*

*πρῶτον μὲν τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην:* *πρῶτον μὲν* can introduce the passage extending as far as l. 32, with *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις* marking the transition to the next subject. But it is possible that *πρῶτον μὲν* is picked up by *τὰ δέ* (61<sup>a</sup>9), and that Section 2 (a) and (b) are both comprehended under the general heading *πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην*.

**60<sup>b</sup>23.** ἀδύνατα: as *αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην* seems to return to *αὐτῆς τῆς ποιητικῆς* (l. 15), we expect an immediate reference to the distinction between the two kinds of *ἀμαρτία*. This does not come till l. 29. In the meantime the representation of impossibilities is given as the first example of offences against the art. This is awkward: (1) *ἀδύνατα μιμῆσθαι* is not obviously the same as *ἀμιμήτως μιμῆσθαι* (cf. 60<sup>b</sup>32). (2) If *ἀδύνατα*, why not *ἄλογα* and *ὑπεναντία*, and even *βλαβερά* (cf. 61<sup>b</sup>22–23), particularly as the instance given here of an *ἀδύνατον*, the pursuit of Hector in *Il.* 22, appeared at 60<sup>a</sup>15 as an *ἄλογον*? No doubt the two classes are closely connected. All *ἀδύνατα*, even those that are *πιθανά* (61<sup>b</sup>11), must be *ἄλογα*; not all *ἄλογα* are *ἀδύνατα* (cf. 61<sup>b</sup>15). If one is an offence against 'the art itself', the other must be too, but as the *λύσις* will be the same, A. may not have thought it necessary to mention separately the *ἐπιτιμήματα* to which it can be applied. We may guess that of the five listed at 61<sup>b</sup>23 all but the last are directed against the art of poetry.

**60<sup>b</sup>24.** τοῦ τέλους: to produce emotion, particularly the *ἐκπληξίς* which is aroused by *τὸ θαυμαστόν*. Cf. 60<sup>a</sup>17.

**60<sup>b</sup>25.** ἄλλο ποιεῖ μέρος: in the absence of an example it is not clear how an impossibility in one part of a poem would enhance the effect of another part.

**60<sup>b</sup>26.** ἢ τοῦ Ἑκτορος δίωξις: cf. 60<sup>a</sup>15 and n.

**60<sup>b</sup>28.** τὴν περὶ τούτων τέχνην: the last *τέχνη* mentioned was that of poetry *αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην* in l. 23, above. Despite Vahlen, the addition of *περὶ τούτων* should indicate a different art, that of war, which is

relevant to Hector's pursuit, and R. and S. so understand it. But Achilles' restraint of the Greek army by a nod of the head is a violation of common probability; cf. schol. *Il.* 22. 205: πῶς τοσαύτας μυριάδας νεύματι ἀπέστρεψεν; Anyway, a λύσις to the effect that the impossibility was κατὰ συμβεβηκός would anticipate the next sentence.

**60<sup>b</sup>29. μηδαμῆ ἡμαρτήσθαι:** repeating 60<sup>a</sup>28.

**ποτέρων:** to which of the two classes of ἀμαρτία defined at 60<sup>b</sup>15 does the fault belong?

**60<sup>b</sup>31. ἔλαττον:** the fault is less; it is not dismissed as, strictly speaking, it should be by a λύσις. It is an effective plea in mitigation. What is represented is still an ἀδύνατον.

**ἔλαφος θήλεια κέρατα:** this almost universal error was exposed by A. in his zoological works, *Hist. An.* 538<sup>b</sup>18, *Parit. An.* 664<sup>a</sup>3. Pindar *Ol.* 3. 29 spoke of χρυσοκέρων ἔλαφον θήλειαν and the schol. has a comment on the frequent occurrence of the error among artists and poets, notably in the case of the hind that suckled Telephus; further examples in Aelian *NA* 7. 39. This reinforces the example of the galloping horse l. 18, above. Presumably the distinction was unfamiliar and needed explanation.

**60<sup>b</sup>32. ἀμιμήτως ἔγραψεν:** again the painter has taken over from the poet, though G. denies it. In ἀμιμήτως the privative does not denote the opposite of the positive adj., only a deficiency of the quality in question; so probably in ἀήθεις (50<sup>a</sup>25).

The usual interpretation of ll. 13–32 gives an unsatisfactory sequence of thought: ll. 23–29 on ἀδύνατα are intruded into a passage on the two kinds of ἀμαρτίαι κατὰ τὴν τέχνην. There is another interpretation which involves a different treatment of the lacuna in l. 17 and the reading προελέσθαι μὲν ὀρθῶς, with μὲν in place of μή, with the lost cod: Lampridii. This is accepted by S. and M. The contrast is no longer between δύναμις τοῦ μιμῆσθαι and προαίρεσις τοῦ μιμῆσθαι, but between wrong and right προαίρεσις. If an artist through incompetence set himself (προείλετο) to represent an impossible subject, this would be an error in 'the art itself'; if he made a correct choice, but owing to ignorance of the technicalities of some other art, e.g. horsemanship, made a mistake which only an expert in that art would perceive, then the error would be κατὰ συμβεβηκός. S. reads ἦ μὲν γὰρ προείλετο μιμῆσθαι <δι> ἀδυναμίαν, αὐτῆς ἢ ἀμαρτία· ἦ δὲ τὸ προελέσθαι μὲν ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ. . . (If ἀδυναμίαν could be taken as ἀδύνατα, δι' would not be needed.) The advantage of this is that in ll. 23–32 the alternatives are considered in the same order. Homer made a wrong choice of subject when he wrote of Achilles' pursuit of Hector (even though in fact it came off), but to show a hind with horns is a trivial error because it is a mistake not in poetry but in



zoology. But it remains surprising that inadequate *μίμησις* should be so closely identified with *μίμησις* of *ἀδύνατα*.

Section 2 (b). Cf. 1 (a)

**60<sup>b</sup>32-61<sup>a</sup>4.** We now come back to the application of the ideas introduced at the beginning of the chapter at 60<sup>b</sup>8-11. They are taken in the reverse order, which seems unnatural, unless the two passages are juxtaposed. It is possible that this Section is regarded as still under the head *πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις* (cf. 60<sup>b</sup>13) would support this. Anyway, we have now finished with the distinction between *κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην* and *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*.

**60<sup>b</sup>33.** *ἐπιτιμᾶται*: pass., cf. 55<sup>a</sup>26.

*ἀλλ'*: introduces the answer, picked up by *ταύτη λυτέον*.

**60<sup>b</sup>34.** *δεῖ*: whether we supply *εἶναι* or *ποιεῖν* makes little difference to the sense, but the antithesis in *οἶοι εἰσὶν* is lost if we supply *ποιεῖν*: and cf. *οἶα εἶναι δεῖ* l. 11, above. This memorable *mot* of Sophocles, which is recorded only here, is more likely to be traditional than derived from the work on the tragic chorus ascribed to him. Remarks on the same pattern were credited to Philoxenus and to Lysippus. The difference is not so much that the characters of Sophocles are morally superior to those of Euripides, though the 'unnecessary' badness of some among the latter was censured, nor that Sophocles was an idealist and Euripides a realist, though this is not irrelevant, but that Sophocles achieved the effect commended at 54<sup>b</sup>10-15. Though not concealing their faults, he makes his characters finer than those of real life; they are worthy of the heroic world in which they move. Alcestis and Hippolytus can both be called idealized characters, but they do not breathe the same air as Antigone or Neoptolemus.

It is useless to distinguish between a moral and an aesthetic sense of *δεῖ*.

**60<sup>b</sup>35.** *μηδετέρως*: sc. *λυτέον*. If the charge that things are not *ἀληθῆ* cannot be contradicted, and it cannot be claimed that things are *οἶα δεῖ*, it is open to reply that it is the received opinion or tradition. The *καὶ δοκεῖ* of 60<sup>b</sup>10 is merged with the *οἶα φασιν*. This is the argument with which Euripides defends his Phaedras and Stheneboeas at *Ran.* 1052: *πότερον δ' οὐκ ὄντα λόγον . . .*;

*τὰ περὶ θεῶν*: the traditional stories about the gods. For *οὐ βέλτιον* equivalent to *οὐκ ἀγαθόν* cf. *Soph. El.* 180<sup>b</sup>12.

**60<sup>b</sup>36.** *εἰ ἔτυχεν*: Vahlen cites *Part. An.* 649<sup>a</sup>20, *Ph.* 217<sup>a</sup>25 and other passages for *εἰ ἔτυχε* = *fortasse*. Cf. Bonitz 778<sup>b</sup>29.

**61<sup>a</sup>1.** *ὡσπερ Ξενοφάνει*: 'as in the view of Xenophanes'; for the use of the dat. cf. *De Caelo* 307<sup>a</sup>16, perhaps equivalent to 'in Xenophanes', see Kühner-Gert, §423 Anmerk. 21 This is taken by R., G., and S.

as a reference to Xenoph. fr. 30 (34), which states the impossibility of knowledge about the gods:

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφές οὐ τις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται  
εἰδώς ἀμφὶ θεῶν . . .

δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

But Xenophanes was celebrated not so much for his scepticism as for his denunciation of the traditional stories about the gods told by Homer and Hesiod as being morally inadequate:

πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὀμηρός θ' Ἡσίοδος τε  
ὅσα παρ' ἀνθρώποις ὀνειδέα καὶ ψόγος ἔστιν,  
κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν. fr. 10 (11).

lines which were clearly in the mind of Euripides when he wrote *HF* 1341 ff. It is stories of this kind that are likely to have given rise to ἐπιτιμήματα; so Tyrwhitt. *G.* quotes schol. *Il.* 18. 489: ἀπρεπές δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ τῶν παρὰ θεοῦ τὰ πλείστα παρ' Ὀμήρῳ λελέχθαι. ὦν ἢ λύσις κατὰ τὸ πλείστον ἀπὸ ἔθους λαμβάνεται. ἐξ ἔθους γὰρ τινος τοῖς ποιηταῖς παρακεχώρηται . . . διαμυθολογεῖν.

ἀλλ' οὖν φασι . . . (the answer can be given) 'anyway that is the story'. An answer less likely to satisfy Plato would be hard to imagine. Where Plato is indignant, A. is indifferent. Here we have, perhaps, the obverse of A.'s insensitivity to the positive values of the myth. He was not disposed to take it very seriously either way. Living, by ancient standards, detached in his philosophic circle, he could afford to ignore the delusion of ordinary men because, unlike Plato, he was not dominated by the purpose of reforming them. Regarding the arts mainly as a means of entertainment, he was content that poets should take as the basis for their activity the world of experience; the myths were a part of this world, stories commonly told and widely believed, so the poet might use them. This is not to say that A. approved their use for the purpose of propagating unworthy beliefs about the gods, or that he was enthusiastic about their use in general. Indeed so much of this chapter seems composed with a view to supplying sufficient answers to sometimes frivolous objections, that it is unsafe to interpret the answers as expressions of A.'s profound convictions.

τὰ δὲ: corresponding to the οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν of 60<sup>b</sup>10.

βέλτιον: i.e. than things as they actually are; they are not οἷα δεῖ, none the less that is how they were then.

61<sup>a</sup>2. τὰ περὶ τῶν ὄπλων: alluded to as a well-known problem. Actually we know that A. dealt with this one in his *Ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικά*. The passage is *Il.* 10. 152, where Odysseus, going to wake Diomedes, found him asleep among his companions, their spears planted upright

with their spikes driven into the ground. It is suggested in the Porphyrius schol. ad loc. that this was a bad arrangement or a bad piece of writing, because the spears would be likely to fall down in the night and make a noise. The obvious λύσις would seem to be that, if the spikes were sunk deep enough, there would be no likelihood of the spears falling over. But we are told λύει δε Α. λέγων ὅτι τοιαῦτα αἰεὶ ποιεῖ Ὅμηρος οἷα ἦν τότε (fr. 160), adding that it was still common practice among barbarians. It is likely that A. has used material from his *Ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικά* elsewhere in this chapter, as only a small proportion of the many passages on which he must have commented carry a specific reference to his work in the Homeric schol. Schol. *Il.* 24. 15 = fr. 158 shows that A. used the same λύσις from τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἔθῃ to account for Achilles' treatment of Hector's corpse.

2B (*new subject*)

**61<sup>a4</sup>–9.** *περὶ δὲ . . . ἀπογένηται:* objection was often raised against the moral standards of behaviour among the characters of a work. Without giving instances A. offers as a general precept that it is important to consider an action in its full context. This may give reason for modifying a first conclusion on the moral quality of an action. The introduction of this topic is not prepared for, and like the general statement on ὑπεναντίωμα (61<sup>a31</sup>, cf. 61<sup>b15</sup>–18) it would apply to a wide variety of ἐπιτιμήματα, e.g. the βλαβερά (so Vahlen) and the ὑπεναντία. The notion of value in βέλτιον (60<sup>b36</sup>, 61<sup>a1</sup>) eases the transition to καλῶς at l. 4.

**61<sup>a4</sup>.** *περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς . . .:* the subject seems to be the ethical standards employed. This is implied by σπουδαῖον–φαῦλον–ἀγαθόν in the following lines, and τὰ μὴ καλῶς εἰρημένα may be the things which are open to the criticism that they are βλαβερά (61<sup>b23</sup>). But καλῶς in itself would be equally applicable in criticisms of aesthetic or moral quality. When Euripides said ἐγὼ δὲ τοὺς προλόγους καλοῦς ποιῶ (*Ran.* 1197), he was claiming that his prologues were technically proficient.

**61<sup>a6</sup>.** *σπουδαῖον ἢ φαῦλον:* see note on 48<sup>a2</sup>.

**61<sup>a7</sup>.** *εἰς τὸν πράττοντα . . .:* G. and S. have tried to relate these qualifications to possible problems. τὸν πράττοντα, Homer is not to be blamed if he makes Thersites or the Cyclops guilty of bad actions, since they are necessarily presented as bad characters. πρὸς δν, A. explained Odysseus' statement that Calypso offered him immortality as made to the Phaeacians in order to impress them with his eagerness to get home (schol. *Od.* 7. 258, A. fr. 178). *ὅτε*, the particular occasion; when Hippolytus made his casuistical assertion ἢ γλώσσ' ὀμώμοχ' ἢ δὲ φρήν ἀνώμοτος, which Aristophanes made a stock

ἐπιτίμημα, he was moved by a justifiable horror at the deception practised on him by the Nurse, and in fact he kept his oath to the end. ὄτω, the means employed; to use craft was less creditable than to act openly by force, but Odysseus could not be blamed for using deceit against Polyphemus considering the odds by which he was faced. οὐ ἔνεκεν, the motive; Antigone was condemned to death ὄσια πανουργήσασα.

2 (c). Cf. 1 (b)

61<sup>a</sup>9–31. *Solutions depending on λέξις*, the commonest type in the scholia. This Section was prepared for at the beginning of the chapter, 60<sup>b</sup>11–13. The heads are (1) γλῶττα (2) μεταφορά (3) προσωδία (4) διαίρεσις (5) ἀμφιβολία (6) ἔθος. 61<sup>a</sup>31–61<sup>b</sup>9, ὑπεναντίωμα, forms a sort of appendix. All these λύσεις depend on the removal of a failure to communicate, the remainder on showing that the thing communicated has been wrongly appreciated.

61<sup>a</sup>10–16. Three instances are given of lines which become unobjectionable if it is assumed that a word is used in a sense that has since become obsolete: (a) οὐρήας . . ., *Il.* 1. 50, when Apollo punished the Greeks for affronting his priest, he laid low first 'mules and dogs'. That mules should be attacked first offended Zoilus, the original Homeromastix, and A. suggested that οὐρήας here stands for οὐρους guards (cf. *Od.* 15. 89), but Aristarchus pointed out that it would still leave κύνας unaccounted for and make nonsense of αὐτοῖσι in the next line. The only λύσις is that the question should never have been asked. The schol. suggest it was a warning to men or refers to the greater liability of animals to disease. (b) Δόλωνα, *Il.* 10. 316, where our texts read ὅς δὴ τοι; the continuation of the line ἀλλὰ ποδώκης, which makes the point of the problem clearer, has perhaps fallen out. εἶδος κακός could mean 'misshapen', which would be, or might be, incompatible with fleetness of foot. The solution is that this is an ancient use of εἶδος, still surviving in Crete, applying only to the face, not to the whole person, and thus irrelevant to his speed. (c) ζωρότερον . . ., *Il.* 9. 203. Achilles, entertaining the embassy in his quarters, directed Patroclus to take a bigger mixing bowl and to mix the wine stronger. As we know from Plutarch, who devoted to this problem Ch. 4 of the Fifth Book of *Quaest. Conviv.* (M., 677 c), Zoilus found fault with this because wine unmixed, or mixed with little water, was associated with debauchery. The observation of the Porphyry schol. is: ἀπρεπὲς δὲ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ κῶμον ἤκουσιν ἀκρατότερον δίδοναι παρακελεύεσθαι καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως λύουσι· τὸ γὰρ ζωρότερον τάχιον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ, ὅτι νύξ. . . . Athen. 423 E says that some explain ζωρότερον as meaning θερμόν, a solution mentioned by Plut. loc. cit. There appears no justification for any sense other than 'stronger'.

- 61<sup>a</sup>16-21.** *κατὰ μεταφορὰν*: in the restricted sense given in Ch. 22. *πάντες μὲν . . .*: the MSS. have *ἄλλοι μὲν*, which, with *ἱπποκορυσταί* after *ἀνέρες*, is the opening of *Il.* 2, but as A. continues *ἅμα*, 'in the same passage', it is generally supposed that he has confused it with the beginning of *Il.* 10: *ἄλλοι μὲν παρὰ νηυσὶν ἀριστῆες Παναχαιῶν/ εὐδον παννύχιοι. . .* In l. 19 he refers to *πάντες* as part of his quotation, which may indeed have been corrected later to conform with the accepted text of Homer, so it is best to assume that he read *πάντες* as the first word of the line.
- 61<sup>a</sup>18.** *ἦ τοι ὄτ' ἐς πεδίον . . .* is *Il.* 10. 11; l. 12 is missing, and l. 13 begins *αὐλῶν συρίγγων τ' . . .* A. may have been quoting from memory, or he may have given only so much of the text as was needed for his purpose. The problem is supposed to be, if all men were asleep (except Agamemnon) how came there to be any bustle among the Trojans for Agamemnon to observe. With the standard text, which makes only the Greeks sleep, the problem does not of course arise. The *πάντες*, which is 'metaphorical' for *πολλοί*, is close to the example given at 57<sup>b</sup>12, *τὸ γὰρ μυρίον πολὺ ἐστίν*. Carroll cites schol. *Il.* 2. 649, 13. 189, 14. 304, *Od.* 12. 374 for similar *λύσεις*.
- 61<sup>a</sup>20.** *οἷη δ' ἄμμορος . . .*: *Il.* 18. 489, *Od.* 5. 275. The statement that the Bear alone of all the constellations never sets gave much trouble to ancient critics, since many of them wished to treat Homer as an authority on astronomy. Strabo 3 declares that by *ἄρκτος* Homer meant all the northern constellations, pointing out that the Little Bear was first distinguished by the Phoenicians at a later date. Crates of Pergamum changed *οἷη* to *οἶος*, and the Porphyry schol. suggests dividing *οἷ, ἦ δ'* . . ., *οἷ* being construed with *δοκεύει* in the previous line. A. more sensibly suggests that the Bear is called the 'only' constellation because it is by far the most important of those that do not set. Cf. *EN* 1153<sup>b</sup>35.
- 61<sup>a</sup>21-23.** *κατὰ δὲ προσῳδίαν*: see *Soph. El.* 166<sup>b</sup>1. At Rep. 399A *φθόγγους καὶ προσῳδίας* refers to the pitch of the voice in singing and speaking. A. uses it of the pitch accent (cf. 56<sup>b</sup>33); later it was extended to cover quantity, which is closely related to accent, and to breathings (cf. 56<sup>b</sup>32). Though breathings are relevant to some of the cases discussed below, they were not written in A.'s time and there is no reason to think they are included under *προσῳδία*; cf. B. Laum, op. cit. (p. 199), pp. 21-32. A possible exception is *Soph. El.* 177<sup>b</sup>3, *ῥπος* and *ῥρος*, but see G., p. 343.
- 61<sup>a</sup>22.** *Ἰππίας . . . ὁ Θάσιος*: possibly the victim of the Thirty mentioned by Lysias 13. 54, but otherwise unknown. The emphasis on *ὁ Θάσιος* marked by the unusual separation from the name may be intended to distinguish him from the better-known Hippias of Elis.
- δίδομεν . . .*: *δίδομεν δέ τοι εὐχος ἀρεσθαι* occurs at *Il.* 21. 297 where

Athena and Poseidon promise victory to Achilles, but the fuller treatment of the same problem at *Soph. El.* 166<sup>b</sup>1, where the same solution is attributed to *ἔνιοι*, makes it clear that A. had these words, with *οἱ* for *τοί*, in his text of *Il.* 2. 15, the story of the deceitful Dream sent by Zeus to Agamemnon, where our text has *Τρώεσσι δὲ κήδε' ἐφήπται*. In either case the burden of the message is that the gods, at Hera's instance, have agreed to give final victory to the Greeks, whereas Zeus is really carrying out his promise to Thetis that the Greeks shall be defeated and so need Achilles. *δίδομεν* pres. indic. would be Zeus' own promise, *διδόμεν* would be infin. for imper. and so the onus of the deception would be transferred, it is suggested, from Zeus to the Dream. This poverty-stricken casuistry becomes even more pathetic when it is remembered that the Dream's verbatim report to Agamemnon is governed by the phrase *Διὸς δέ τοι ἄγγελός εἰμι*, 2. 26, and Agamemnon would inevitably understand it as Zeus' own promise. *διδόμεν* for *διδόμεναι* might count as an *ὄνομα ἀφηρημένον* (58<sup>a</sup>1).

This indefensible behaviour on the part of Zeus was censured by Plato, *Rep.* 383 A, and remained a major problem for interpreters of Homer. The best solution was that gods and kings were allowed to lie *ἐς τὸ πρόσφορον*.

61<sup>a</sup>23. τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρω: *Il.* 23. 328, from Nestor's advice to Antilochus before the chariot-race; he describes the wooden stump which is to be the turning-point, *ξύλον αὖτον . . . ἢ δρυὸς ἢ πεύκης*. The apparent meaning of this passage is that Homer was taken to have said τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται 'part of it is rotted by rain' and that Hippias made the simple improvement of changing *οὐ* to *οὐ* which everyone has read ever since. In the fuller explanation given in *Soph. El.* 166<sup>b</sup>1 (cited above) it is said: *λύουσι γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇ προσωδίᾳ λέγοντες τὸ οὐ ὀξύτερον*, and there is no doubt that *οὐ* the negative was once so regarded, in contrast with *οὐ* perispomenon. The breathing *δασύ / ψιλόν* is not mentioned (cf. *Soph. El.* 177<sup>b</sup>35). Michael Ephesius, whose commentary on this passage is quoted in full by B., said: *τινὲς οὖν ἐκάκιζον τὸν Ὅμηρον περισπωμένως τὸ οὐ ἀναγιγνώσκοντες*, which suggests that it was not the commonly received text that Hippias corrected, but the text as marred by others. There is no trace in the scholia of *οὐ*. It seems incredible that it could have been understood in the form τὸ μὲν οὐ during the long period when breathings and accents were not yet written. B. supposes that this was the traditional version, and that it was challenged because pine and oak are conspicuously rot-resisting, though rotten stumps of both kinds cannot have been outside Greek experience. G. rightly points out that this passage of the *P.* as originally written without breathings and accents must have been

uncommonly obscure, and uses it as evidence that what we have is in lecture-note form. Certainly the parallel passage in *Soph. El.* contains a far fuller explanation. B. Laum, *op. cit.* (p. 199), pp. 105-6, infers that A. and the sophists used marginal signs to indicate 'prosody' in disputed passages.

**61<sup>a</sup>24. διαιρέσει:** 'by division', which includes both word-division and punctuation. For marking the pause between word-groups not necessarily requiring a comma *διαστίζω* is used at *R.* 1407<sup>b</sup>13. Since word-groups could not be marked off within the sentence, there was room for much confusion here; cf. *Soph. El.* 166<sup>a</sup>35.

**αἴψα δὲ . . .:** Empedocles, fr. 35. 14-15. The text of these lines, which are quoted in whole or part by Athen. 424 A, Simplicius on A. *De Caelo*, p. 529. 15 (Heiberg), Plut. *M.* 677 D, is uncertain. MSS. are divided between *θνήτ' ἐφύοντο* and *θνητὰ φύοντο*, which, as it does not affect the sense, is unlikely to be part of the point of the quotation; it is that the second *πρίν* can be taken either with *ζωρά* or *κέκρητο*. Empedocles' subject here is the encroachment of *Φιλία* on *Νείκος*; this leads to the combination of the elements which had existed previously in isolation; accordingly the right sense must be 'the things, which had been unmixed *ζωρά* before, became mixed', though the Greek could mean 'the unmixed things were mixed before'. Athenaeus quotes a different version of the second line *ζωρά τε τὰ πρίν ἄκρητα, διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους*, accepted by Theophrastus who interpreted *ζωρά* as 'mixed', and in his treatise *περὶ μέθης* used this line as evidence for the sense to be given to *ζωρότερον* at *Il.* 9. 203. See note on l. 14 above.

**61<sup>a</sup>25, 26. ἀμφιβολία:** 'ambiguity'. *παρώχηκεν . . . Il.* 10. 251-3:

ἀλλ' ἴομεν μάλα γὰρ νύξ ἄνεται, ἐγγύθι δ' ἠώς.  
ἄστρα δὲ δὴ προβέβηκε, παρώχηκεν δὲ πλέων νύξ  
τῶν δύο μοιράων, τριτάτη δ' ἔτι μοῖρα λέλειπται.

How a third of the night could be left when more than two-thirds had passed was, according to the schol., a *πολυθρύλητον ζήτημα*. Porphyry devotes more than six pages to the problem. The true *λύσις* is probably that Homer wavered between 'more than half the night had passed' and 'a third of the night was left', which would be no great matter. A. dealt with the passage in his *Ἀπορήματα* as we know from Porphyry; *πλέων* means both 'more than' and the 'greater part of', and the alleged explanation is that the greater part of the two halves of night had passed, i.e. more than one half, so that a third could be left without doing violence to arithmetic, though this is a perfectly normal use of *πλέων*. A certain Metrodorus pointed out another ambiguity, that *πλέων* could stand for *πλήρης*,

and he presumably thought to save consistency here by taking the meaning as 'night to the full measure of two thirds'.

**61<sup>a</sup>27-31.** *κατὰ τὸ ἔθος*: 'verbal usage': cf. *Soph. El.* 166<sup>a</sup>17. Many solutions in the scholia depend on non-verbal *ἔθος* (cf. 61<sup>a</sup>2 and n.). Verbal usage excuses illogicalities of expression; we are offered two Homeric instances each exemplified by a parallel case from common speech. 'Just as they say wine mixed with water is wine, so the poet wrote "a greave of new-wrought tin" (*Il.* 21. 592). Greaves of tin would have been extravagant and ineffective; as wine and water is called wine, so tin and copper is called tin. Being customary it is not misleading. A. explained *Od.* 5. 93, fr. 170, *κέρασσε δὲ νέκταρ*, as meaning 'poured out' thus evading the objection to a god's drinking water with his nectar.

**61<sup>a</sup>29.** *χαλκῆας*: blacksmiths continued to be called 'bronze workers' because bronze had long taken the place among metals later held by iron.

**61<sup>a</sup>30.** *οἰνοχοεύειν*: cf. *Il.* 20. 234. A cupbearer was called in Greek a 'winepourer'. When he poured not wine but nectar he retained the analogous title. So motor-ships still steam and shooting with a rifle is called musketry.

**61<sup>a</sup>31.** *καὶ κατὰ μεταφορὰν*: this kind of transference could be explained just as well as being a metaphor.

2C (*new subject*)

**61<sup>a</sup>31-61<sup>b</sup>9.** A supposed inconsistency may be due to misunderstanding the force of a word in a particular context or to making unjustifiable assumptions. *ὑπεναντίωμα* means a thing which is opposed to, or contradicts, something else; one naturally takes it to mean an inconsistency within the work itself. This is the sense of *ὑπεναντία* at its previous occurrence 55<sup>a</sup>26, where Amphiarus' movements seem to have been incompatible with what was said or done earlier in the play. But this does not fit the two examples which follow. The trouble with Aeneas' spear is that its effect on Achilles' shield is inconsistent, not with what has been said earlier about the shield, but with common sense. According to Vahlen we must supply e.g. *οἰήσει* (cf. 61<sup>b</sup>3). Telemachus' failure to encounter Icarus is not inconsistent with anything in the *Odyssey* but with a widely believed legend about Icarus. In fact *ἀδύνατον*, *ἄλογον*, and *ὑπεναντίον* shade insensibly one into another; sometimes one of the three terms is obviously appropriate, but some *ἐπιτιμήματα*, for example that directed against the night of which more than two-thirds had passed and a third was left (61<sup>a</sup>26), can reasonably be assigned to any of the three categories. See B. on 61<sup>b</sup>15. *λύσεις* of problems *πρὸς τὸ ὑπεναντίον* are akin to those *πρὸς τὴν λέξιν* in that they depend on clearing up a difficulty in communication.



The examples from the Homeric scholia keep the categories reasonably distinct. An instance of *ἀδύνατον* is the appearance of Aphrodite as an old woman (*Il.* 3. 386), of an *ἄλογον* Helen's ignorance that her brothers are dead (*Il.* 3. 236), of a *ὑπεναντίον* the statement that Crete has 100 cities (*Il.* 2. 649 contradicting the 90 of *Od.* 19. 174), or the description of both Ganymede and Hebe as Zeus' cupbearer (*Il.* 20. 232, 4. 2). Here *ὑπεναντίον* keeps its natural sense of contradiction to something said elsewhere.

B. avoids the difficulty by making *ὅταν ὀνομά τι . . .* an interjected phrase referring back to the cases considered *πρὸς τὴν λέξιν* since 61<sup>a</sup>9. But (1) *τὰ ὑπεναντία* appear as a separate class at 61<sup>b</sup>23 (cf. 61<sup>b</sup>15), and (2) *τὰ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν* can hardly continue till 61<sup>b</sup>9, and there is no other place for a break.

One of the things which makes this chapter confusing is that down to 61<sup>b</sup>9 the discussion is based on *λύσεις* in their various classes, e.g. 61<sup>a</sup>9 *τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν*, but it is often convenient, as here, to introduce a class by reference to the particular *ἐπιτίμημα* which it may answer, though in fact most *λύσεις* can be relevant to several *ἐπιτιμήματα*.

61<sup>a</sup>32. *ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήναιε*: 'how many meanings the word could have.'

61<sup>a</sup>33. *ἐν τῷ εἰρημένῳ*: 'in the phrase in question'.

*τῆ ρ' ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος*: *Il.* 20. 272 where our text has *μείλινον*. Another celebrated Homeric problem; according to the schol. some of the 'sophists' rejected these lines, as did Aristarchus. In some texts they were missing.

The situation is that Aeneas has hurled his spear at Achilles' new shield fresh from the workshop of Hephaestus. The shield had five layers (*Il.* 18. 481), though it is not there stated what they were made of; Leaf, who rejects our passage, asserts that they were of hide. The spear pierced two layers of bronze leaving the two layers of tin untouched:

*χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύκακε, δῶρα θεοῖο  
ἀλλὰ δύο μὲν ἔλασσε διὰ πτύχας, αἱ δ' ἄρ' ἔτι τρεῖς  
ἦσαν, ἐπεὶ πέντε πτύχας ἤλασε Κυλλοποδίων,  
τὰς δύο χαλκείας δύο δ' ἔνδοθι κασσιτέριοι,  
τὴν δὲ μίαν χρυσέην, τῆ ρ' ἔσχετο μείλινον ἔγχος.*

*Il.* 20. 268-72.

It is natural to assume that the layer of gold was not put in the middle of the five where it would have been invisible. But if it was where one would expect, on the outside, how could it stop a spear which had already passed through the bronze? A. does not give the solution of the problem, but indicates that if *ἔσχετο* = *ἐκωλύθη* is understood rightly, the problem does not exist. His solution may

have been that of Aristarchus, that the gold effectively checked the impetus of the spear even though it went through two more layers. A further refinement would be that the dent made in the gold layer, itself unbroken, penetrated the bronze beneath. It is perhaps idle to speculate on the structure of the divine shield, which was rather surprisingly damaged by mortal assault; but as some of the figures upon it were of gold, the background, if of gold too, must have been concealed by a layer of colour, supposing the figures were to be visible (*Il.* 18. 517, 574, 598), and if the gold layer was concealed, it might as well have been inside, a view taken by some of the commentators. But who was the cobbler who stitched the bag of the winds? Note that this is not a problem arising out of two inconsistent accounts of the shield. It is rather an *ἄλογον*.

**61<sup>a</sup>35. κατά τὴν καταντικρὺ:** the course recommended will work in the way opposite to that which Glaucôn condemned.

**61<sup>b</sup>1. Γλαύκων:** to be distinguished from Glaucus of Rhegium, the early critic, author of *Περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων Ποιητῶν καὶ Μουσικῶν*. This may be the Glaucôn mentioned in *Pl. Ion* 530 D along with Metrodorus of Lampsacus and Stesimbrotus of Thasos, both characters on the fringe of the sophistic movement, as having *πολλὰς καὶ καλὰς διανοίας* on Homer. But the name is a common one.

**61<sup>b</sup>2. καταψηφισάμενοι:** probably not in the common sense of 'condemn' which would anticipate *ἐπιτιμῶσιν* and be awkward in tense, but referring back to *ἀλόγως προὔπολαμβάνουσιν*; they make an irrational supposition about a passage, accept it (*καταψηφισάμενοι*, cf. *Pol.* 1298<sup>b</sup>39), and, proceeding to argue on the basis of it, find fault with the poet as if he had really said it.

**61<sup>b</sup>3. οἰήσει:** their 'preconception', picked up by *οἴονται* in the next line.

**61<sup>b</sup>4. τὰ περὶ Ἰκάριον:** 'the case of Icarus'. This does not follow on well from *ὄνομά τι* at 61<sup>a</sup>31. A new type of fallacy is introduced by *προὔπολαμβάνουσί τι* in 61<sup>b</sup>1; the problem of Icarus does not turn on any one *ὄνομα*. The situation appears *ἄτοπον* because it contradicts a preconception.

Icarus was father of Penelope and brother of Tyndareus, the mortal father of Helen. If he lived at Sparta, we should expect Telemachus, who was his grandson, to have encountered him when he stayed with Menelaus as described in *Od.* 4. The question is raised several times in the *Od.* schol., 1. 285, 2. 52, 14. 68, 15. 16 and by Porphyry on 4. 1. Strabo 461 says he had left Sparta for Acarnania. It is obvious in the *Odyssey* that he is assumed to be resident in Ithaca or close by (cf. 2. 52, 15. 16), and the 'Problem' does not arise.

**61<sup>b</sup>6. οἱ Κεφαλλῆνες:** no doubt a local legend.

**61<sup>b</sup>8. ἀμάρτημα:** the baseless assumption that Icarus was a Spartan, though it seems as well founded as much mythological information.

Edd. variously supply *εἶναι, γενέσθαι, ποιείσθαι* with *πρόβλημα*. This is more likely than the alternative interpretation 'It is through an error that the problem has plausibility'. Anyway, the whole thing is based on the sort of false assumption against which Glaucon gave warning.

### Section 3.

**61<sup>b</sup>9. δλωσ:** not used by A. to introduce a summary of a previous discussion, rather to amplify or clarify a previous statement by giving it a fresh form, e.g. *EN 1111<sup>b</sup>29*; cf. Bonitz 505<sup>b</sup>46. Here it introduces a new and shorter treatment of matter already discussed by taking the *ἐπιτιμήματα*, which should number five, and listing the *λύσεις* appropriate to each.

**τὸ ἀδύνατον:** the most general cause for fault-finding, which overlaps several other categories: cf. 60<sup>b</sup>23: *ἀδύνατα πεποιήται*.

**πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν:** cf. 60<sup>b</sup>23-32.

Vahlen took *ἀδύνατον πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν* as a single phrase, but has found no followers.

**61<sup>b</sup>10. τὸ βέλτιον:** equivalent to *ὡς δεῖ* (60<sup>b</sup>33). There the *ἐπιτίμημα* was *ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ*.

**τὴν δόξαν:** *οὕτω φασίν* at 60<sup>b</sup>35-37: cf. *φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ* 60<sup>b</sup>10. This overlaps *τᾶλογα* (l. 14, below).

**ἀνάγειν:** only here in the *P.*, but common in A. for explaining a point by reference to a general principle.

**61<sup>b</sup>11. πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον:** repeated from 60<sup>a</sup>26-7 (see n.). *τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους* is the *λύσις* given at 60<sup>b</sup>24.

**61<sup>b</sup>12. τοιούτους . . . :** the *ἐπιτίμημα* must be that someone or something was too good to be true. Whether this is a *πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον*, or whether this is another answer to the *ἀδύνατον* of l. 9, i.e. the *λύσις πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον*, depends on the length of the lacuna. The latter would be the more logical, and it is no real objection that it transfers to *τὸ ἀδύνατον* what at 60<sup>b</sup>33 was the answer to the objection *οὐκ ἀληθῆ*. Zeuxis painted men more beautiful than they really are, though according to 50<sup>a</sup>28 they lacked *ἦθος*.

**61<sup>b</sup>13. ὑπερέχειν:** best taken as trans.

**61<sup>b</sup>14. πρὸς ᾧ φασιν τᾶλογα:** sc. *δεῖ ἀνάγειν*. *ᾧ φασιν* corresponds to *τὴν δόξαν* (l. 10, above), which again suggests that there is no rigid distinction between *ἀδύνατα* and *ἄλογα*. *ὅτι οὕτω φασίν* was a sufficient answer at 60<sup>b</sup>35. The alternative *λύσις* for *τᾶλογα*, that they may not really be unlikely, is introduced from 56<sup>a</sup>24. If the odds are a hundred to one against something happening, it is still likely that it will happen 'some time' in a hundred times.

The third *λύσις* based on *οὕτως εἶχεν* (61<sup>a</sup>2) is not mentioned.

**61<sup>b</sup>15–18.** τὰ ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα: according to the list of ἐπιτιμήματα at l. 23, below, τὰ βλαβερά should be mentioned next; the λύσις would presumably be a close attention to the context. Cf. 61<sup>a</sup>4 ff.: περὶ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς. A sentence may have fallen out. The ὑπεναντία have just been discussed (see 61<sup>a</sup>31–61<sup>b</sup>9 and n.).

**61<sup>b</sup>16.** σκοπεῖν: understand δεῖ.

λόγοις: not speeches but philosophical arguments, 'dialectic'.

**61<sup>b</sup>17.** ἔλεγχοι: 'refutations' which are based largely on the detection of contradictions: cf. *Soph. El.* 167<sup>a</sup>26. Some such word as σκεπτέοι is to be supplied after ἔλεγχοι to carry on the force of δεῖ, which is understood in the previous clause. Charges of inconsistency against poets must be examined with the same care as dialectical arguments; these often contain accusations of contradiction, which are found on examination to be unjustified.

εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ . . .: the sort of false argument against which it is necessary to guard turns on the use of the same term in different senses, or with a different reference, or in a different way; cf. 61<sup>a</sup>32: ἐπισκοπεῖν ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήνεια.

**61<sup>b</sup>18.** φρόνιμος: the contradiction may be, not with an actual statement, but with something that is taken to be implied. It is necessary that the assumption alleged to be contradicted should be one that a sensible man would make. Cf. *EN* 1107<sup>a</sup>1: ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν (here too it would be easier with the article). For instance the assumption that Dolon could not run fast if he were εἶδος κακός is not very intelligent.

**61<sup>b</sup>19–21.** ὀρθῇ δ' ἐπιτίμησις: the subject of justified censure comes in very abruptly. It has been observed that A. finds no justified censure of Homer.

ἀλογίᾳ: this must here include τὸ ἀδύνατον. Such faults may be justified if the effect could have been achieved in no other way (cf. 60<sup>a</sup>13 and 60<sup>b</sup>25–29). The same idea is expressed in the next clause μὴ ἀνάγκης οὐσης, 'if it is not essential for the poet's purpose'. For this use of ἀνάγκη cf. 54<sup>a</sup>28: παράδειγμα πονηρίας μὲν ἦθους μὴ ἀναγκαίας οἶον ὁ Μενέλαος.

μοχθηρίᾳ: no example of an ἐπιτίμημα based on the portrayal of wickedness has been given in this chapter (unless the use of strong wine at 61<sup>a</sup>14), and the only obvious reference to the subject was in Ch. 15, where it was required that ἦθη should be χρηστά, and the character of Menelaus was given as an instance of wickedness which was not essential to the plot (54<sup>a</sup>19–30). There is a possible allusion in 61<sup>a</sup>4 περὶ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς.

**61<sup>b</sup>21.** τῷ Αἰγεῖ: sc. ἐχρήσατο. Euripides wrote a play with this title, but the reference is almost certainly to the scene in the *Medea*, a far more celebrated play already mentioned by A. (54<sup>b</sup>1), otherwise ἐν

(τῷ) Αἰγεί would be required. The ἄλογον here is the coincidence of the arrival and perhaps the sanctuary at Athens, superfluous for a heroine with divine resources. Aegeus arrives at Corinth from Delphi on his way to Troezen just at the moment when Medea is at a loss for a refuge where she can be secure from her enemies after she has taken her revenge; without security her revenge cannot be complete. It is possible that it is Aegeus' childlessness which suggests to Medea the subtler vengeance of killing Jason's children instead of killing him, as at first intended.

The unmotivated arrival of Aegeus is certainly clumsy. Whether it is unnecessary in the sense that the same effects could have been produced in a different way is more doubtful. It is mistaken to argue that Medea, being a witch, did not need Aegeus' help. The effect of the play would be destroyed if the audience felt throughout that Medea was beyond the reach of her enemies. The supernatural aid she receives from her grandfather is confined to the epilogue which, as often in Euripides, is not completely assimilated to the rest of the play.

In the *Medea* of Neophron which, according to Dicaearchus, Euripides imitated—a statement not generally accepted—the arrival of Aegeus seems to have been better managed. On the whole question see *Medea*, ed. D. L. Page (Oxford, 1938), p. xxx.

τοῦ Μενελάου: see 54<sup>a</sup>29 n.

61<sup>b</sup>22. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμήματα: this sums up the section which began at δλωσ δέ (61<sup>b</sup>9), but there are discrepancies. ἀδύνατα and ἄλογα correspond to ll. 9–15, ὑπεναντία to ll. 15–18, but the other two ἐπιτιμήματα, ὡς βλαβερά and ὡς παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα cause difficulty. The class of βλαβερά inserted between the ἄλογα and the ὑπεναντία is not mentioned elsewhere, though the unnecessary πονηρία of Menelaus (l. 21) could be an instance; nor is any λύσις given for this defect. Some of the statements under the heading οὐκ ἀληθῆ at 60<sup>b</sup>33, such as untrue statements about the gods, could be 'hurtful', but the λύσις given at 61<sup>a</sup>1 is ἀλλ' οὖν φασι, and according to 61<sup>b</sup>14 it is to the ἄλογα not to the βλαβερά that this defence applies. Again the thing said or done μὴ καλῶς (61<sup>a</sup>4) could be βλαβερόν.

A more serious difficulty arises from the last εἶδος, that of things censured ὡς παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην. This clearly looks back to 60<sup>b</sup>15–32, the account of the διττὴ ἁμαρτία in the poetic art. Obviously, where there is a ἁμαρτία there are grounds for an ἐπιτίμημα. If offences against poetry αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην are covered by ἀδύνατα (cf. 60<sup>b</sup>23, 61<sup>b</sup>9), τέχνην here must refer to individual arts, so that the error is κατὰ συμβεβηκός. This is the usual view, though R. refers it to poetry itself, which really requires Hermann's κατὰ τὴν τέχνην. It is an objection to the usual view that, though A. allows

that an incidental inaccuracy is a *ἀμαρτία* and to be avoided if possible (60<sup>b</sup>31), it appears that the *ἐπιτίμημα* in these cases is thought of as being directed against the *ὀρθότης τῆς τέχνης* in general, while it is only in the *λύσις* that the distinction is made between the two kinds of *ἀμαρτία* (60<sup>b</sup>29).

**61<sup>b</sup>25. ἀριθμῶν:** we should expect *εἰδῶν* as in l. 22. *ἀριθμός*, like *numerus*, can mean 'part' or 'member', at Eur. *Ion* 1014 one of a list of numbered items (cf. Isocr. II. 16). B. compared *Gen. An.* 760<sup>a</sup>34. G. keeps the *ἀριθμῶν* of Parisinus at 60<sup>b</sup>9 but the following *ἐν τι* is awkward.

**δώδεκα:** presumably *ἀριθμοί*, the classes of *λύσις*, but R. is firm for *λύσεις*. There are clearly six *πρὸς τὴν λέξιν* (61<sup>a</sup>9–32) and three in 60<sup>b</sup>32–61<sup>a</sup>4. There are also two *πρὸς τὴν τέχνην* (60<sup>b</sup>22–32). This gives eleven; in addition 61<sup>a</sup>4–9 contains one expressed in general terms, 61<sup>a</sup>31–<sup>b</sup>9 gives two ways of replying to a charge of *ὑπεναντίωμα* and another is embedded in 61<sup>b</sup>15–18. Arbitrary methods are required to reduce these to twelve. M.'s examination of the attempts of numerous edd. (pp. 306–22) proves, if proof were necessary, that something is wrong with the tradition. Since A. was using basically the same material in his *Ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικά*, it is quite likely that the 5+12 categories were first distinguished there and used again in the *P.* But the outlines have been blurred by reworking and later additions.

## CHAPTER 26

*The superiority of Tragedy to Epic.*

**61<sup>b</sup>26–62<sup>a</sup>4.** *Arguments which can be advanced in favour of epic.*

**61<sup>b</sup>27. διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις:** only here in *P.*, but common in A. for 'the question might be raised', e.g. *EN* 1136<sup>a</sup>23. It is clear from what follows that A. was not the first to raise this question. Pl. *Laws* 658 D gives the preference to epic, the choice of the *γέροντες*, whereas tragedy is favoured by educated women and by boys.

**φορτική:** lit. 'burdensome', especially something which is wearisome to the man of taste, and so 'vulgar'. The *θεατῆς φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγκείμενος* is contrasted with the *ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος* at *Pol.* 1342<sup>a</sup>20. It is also opposed to *χαρίεις* and so not far removed from *ἀμαθής*, though this word is hardly used by A.

**61<sup>b</sup>28. ἢ ἅπαντα μιμουμένη:** a strange phrase, since it is the business of a mimetic art to imitate. Possibly *μίμησις* here is impersonation. Cf. 60<sup>a</sup>9, also 48<sup>a</sup>23 where some read *πάντα*. Tragedy, unlike epic, is all impersonation. In the light of what follows the meaning seems restricted to the over-playing of parts by actors. *ὄψις* is a *μέρος* of tragedy and not of epic, and this is a consequence. B.'s *πρὸς*

ἅπαντα (cf. *Top.* 164<sup>b</sup>8), modified by G. to πρὸς ἅπαντας contrasted with πρὸς βελτίους, is attractive and gives a less restricted meaning; the following γάρ clause then explains the kind of abuse which accompanies μίμησις 'addressed to all and sundry', but μιμουμένη becomes superfluous.

λίαν goes with φορτική, δῆλον ὅτι is parenthetical.

**61<sup>b</sup>29. αἰσθανομένων:** sc. θεατῶν. Being uneducated, they need every help.

**61<sup>b</sup>30. αὐτός:** the μιμούμενος *qua* actor.

οἱ φαῦλοι αὐληταί: the over-acting prevalent in tragedy is illustrated from dithyrambic performances, in which the flute-player who accompanied the singing emphasized the rhythm by bodily motion. Theophrastus, fr. 92, said: πρῶτον Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Καταναῖον αὐλητὴν κινήσεις καὶ ῥυθμούς ποιῆσαι τῷ σώματι αὐλοῦντα (ὄθεν σικελίζειν τὸ ὄρχεσθαι παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς). It is idle to speculate how a man could make movements suggestive of hurling the discus or of its movements while continuing to blow his flute. This seems to be an extreme example of what was now common practice. In *Probl.* 918<sup>b</sup>13-29 we read that dithyrambs had now become μιμητικοί, and that antistrophic systems had been abandoned as in τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς (not generally true of extant tragedy), which would give the performers more freedom of movement; see Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb*, p. 40, n. 3. Gomperz, *Mitteil. Samm. Pap. Erz. Rainer*, i (1887), 87, suggested that the aulete, Scylla, manhandled the coryphaeus, Odysseus.

**61<sup>b</sup>31. κυλιόμενοι:** a later form of κυλινδόμενοι. Used contemptuously of those who 'hang about' the Agora (*Pol.* 1319<sup>a</sup>29), but here closer to the literal sense.

δίσκον: usually understood as the 'throwing of the discus', but R. suggested and S. accepted that it refers to the spinning flight of the discus, which is less grotesque than might appear if we think of it as the discus which killed Hyacinthus or Acrisius.

καὶ ἔλκοντες . . .: for *Scylla* see note on 54<sup>a</sup>30; ἔλκοντες suggests violent manhandling (cf. *EN* 1149<sup>b</sup>12) and it is hard to imagine an αὐλητῆς having his hands free for the purpose, as Twining observed. He must have interrupted his playing in the interest of his mime. Schol. Aeschin. *Tim.* 10 implies that the αὐλητῆς was usually stationary. Such behaviour by the aulete later became customary to judge from Dio Chry. *Or.* 78 (2. 281 Dind.), who compares the gait of Alcmaeon (Herod. 6. 125.4) to one αὐλοῦντα τὴν τῆς Σεμέλης ὠδίνα.

**61<sup>b</sup>33. τοιαύτη:** i.e. has the same fault as old-fashioned actors saw in the performance of their successors, namely vulgarity. A. says that in his day the actors had become more important than the poets (*R.* 1403<sup>b</sup>33).

**61<sup>b</sup>34.** ὡς λίαν γὰρ . . . : The 'Life' of Aeschylus states that Mynniscus performed in his later plays; he was still acting in 422 B.C., when he appears in the 'Fasti' as winning the actors' prize. Callippides won the prize at the Lenaea of 418 B.C., no doubt as a young man, and was mentioned in Xenophon's *Symposium* 3. 11 as boasting of his ability to draw tears from the audience. M. called him an ape as being merely an exact imitator. A. says (*Top.* 117<sup>b</sup>17) that an ape is like a man but ἐπὶ τὸ γελοιότερον. Nothing is known about Pindarus.

**62<sup>a</sup>1.** αὐτούς: the older actors. Hermann's αὐτούς would refer to their fellow actors (of an older generation).

ὄλη as opposed to the single department of acting.

**62<sup>a</sup>2.** πρὸς θεατὰς ἐπιεικεῖς resumes πρὸς βελτίους (61<sup>b</sup>28) at the beginning of the paragraph. ἐπιεικεῖς bears its normal sense 'superior', the opposite of φαῦλοι.

**62<sup>a</sup>3.** φασιν: who said this is wholly unknown; the plur. might imply that it was the view of an appreciable number of people, but see 61<sup>a</sup>22 n.

τῶν σχημάτων: 'gestures and postures'; cf. τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν (47<sup>a</sup>27).

**62<sup>a</sup>4.** εἰ οὖν . . . : the major premiss of those who argued against tragedy was given at 61<sup>b</sup>28, 'the less vulgar the better'. The grounds on which tragedy could be regarded as vulgar have now been stated, but A. withholds agreement.

**62<sup>a</sup>5–62<sup>b</sup>15.** *Reasons for holding tragedy superior.*

**62<sup>a</sup>5.** οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς . . . : the poet had long ceased to act in his own plays, and the τέχνη ὑποκριτικὴ though associated with drama was not part of it, being associated also with rhetoric. Cf. *R.* 1403<sup>b</sup>22–36, where it is denied that ὑπόκρισις has yet acquired the status of a true τέχνη.

**62<sup>a</sup>6.** σημείοις: a variant for σχήμασιν.

ῥαψωδοῦντα: Plato calls Ion ῥαψωδὸς καὶ ὑποκριτής (*Ion* 536 A), and the dialogue makes it plain that Ion achieved his effects by means superior people might well think vulgar. But it is possible that in A.'s time epic was more often read than heard, while tragedy, though it could be read, was generally performed. The ordinary Athenian became familiar with Homer at school.

**62<sup>a</sup>7.** Σωσίστρατος: an unknown rhapsode.

διᾶδοντα: 'singing in a contest' (cf. *Theocr.* 5. 22), probably while accompanying himself on the cithara like Arion. The excesses of singers are presumably mentioned by way of illustration; they have no direct connexion with a comparison of tragedy and epic. G. thought that Mnasisheus too was a rhapsode, but it is unlikely that epic hexameters were sung to the cithara at this date.



- 62<sup>a</sup>9.** εἴπερ μηδ' ὄρχησις: all dancing is a form of κίνησις, but no Greek would suggest that all dancing was to be rejected.
- 62<sup>a</sup>10.** οὐκ ἐλευθέρας: cf. ἀνελεύθερος, *Pol.* 1337<sup>b</sup>16, 20. Callippides was a tragic actor, but he did not perform the parts of tragic heroines in a worthy fashion. There is no reason to suppose he acted the parts of low women, rather that his movements were undignified.
- 62<sup>a</sup>11.** τὸ αὐτῆς: sc. ἔργον or τέλος. That tragedies can achieve their proper effect when read and not acted has already been stated at 50<sup>b</sup>18, and 53<sup>b</sup>4.
- 62<sup>a</sup>12.** ὁποία τις: not the quality of a particular tragedy but the essential nature of the genre, as at 50<sup>a</sup>8.
- 62<sup>a</sup>13.** εἰ οὖν . . . : whatever this may mean it is obscurely expressed. The first clause implies what will later be proved, that tragedy is in other respects τὰ γ' ἄλλα superior to epic; what is it then that is not necessarily a part of tragedy? B., who makes no comment, translates 'this element of inferiority', E. 'this reproach', and G. taking a similar view explains τοῦτο as πολλή κίνησις. But no one could suppose it a necessary quality that it should be tastelessly performed, since in the old days it was free from the excess of κίνησις. This would be an illogical way of saying that if tragedy is otherwise superior, the faults of actors are not a fatal objection. It is less awkward to take τοῦτο to refer to ὑπόκρισις with R. and S., the μέρος of tragedy which ceases to be an integral part when it is read and not performed.
- 62<sup>a</sup>14.** ἔπειτα: corresponding to πρῶτον μὲν (62<sup>a</sup>5) introduces the second main group of arguments, which assert the positive superiority of tragedy.  
 διότι: has no construction; some emend the text, or κρείττων ἐστὶ ἡ τραγωδία may be supplied.  
 πάντ' ἔχει: the point already made at 49<sup>b</sup>15-20; four of the six μέρη are common to epic and tragedy, but tragedy alone has μέλη and ὄψις. A. has been criticized for claiming this as a mark of superiority so soon after stating that performance can be dispensed with. Had he written at greater length, he would doubtless have explained that tragedy is not to be ranked below epic because it may be handicapped by a bad style of performance, but that good performance gives advantages which epic cannot rival.
- 62<sup>a</sup>15.** τῷ μέτρῳ: that the hexameter can occur in tragedy seems a niggling point. In the surviving plays, apart from single lines in dactylic systems, it is found only in short passages, as *Trach.* 1010-22, *E. Supp.* 271-4, 282-5, (and in the elegiacs in the prologue to the *Androm.*): see A. M. Dale, *Lyric Metres of Gk. Drama* pp. 25 ff. S. tries to save his author's credit by understanding it to refer to metrical narrative, such as messengers' speeches, rather than to the hexameter.

καὶ ἔτι: as in the section beginning *πρῶτον μὲν* (62<sup>a5</sup>) the further points are introduced by *ἔτι* and *εἶτα*.

62<sup>a16</sup>. *μέρος*: sc. *ἔχει* carried on from l. 14. If we keep *τὰς ὄψεις*, we have *μέρος* in a non-technical sense applied to two *μέρη* of tragedy, and *δι' ἧς* agreeing only with *μουσική* is awkward. But since *ὄψις* is mentioned along with music as an attractive element in tragedy (50<sup>b16</sup>), V. proposed to keep *ὄψεις*, reading *αἷς* or *δι' αἷς*.

*τὴν μουσικὴν*: *μελοποιία* was described as the greatest of the *ἡδυσμάτων* (50<sup>b16</sup>). Cf. *Pol.* 1339<sup>b20</sup>. The word *μουσική* is used only here in the *P*.

*αἱ ἡδοναί*: are these the *οἰκείαι ἡδοναί* accentuated by performance, or incidental pleasures?

62<sup>a17</sup>. *τὸ ἐναργές*: even when read tragedy is more vivid than epic, because all the characters speak in the first person and narrative is virtually eliminated.

62<sup>a18</sup>. *ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων*: an extension of the normal use of the phrase meaning 'in practice', as 48<sup>b10</sup>, to mean 'in performance'; cf. *ἐν τῇ ἀναγνώσει*.

*ἔτι τῷ ἐν . . .*: the third and most important argument based on the concentration of tragedy is hardly separable from the fourth, beginning *ἔτι ἦττον μία* (62<sup>b3</sup>), which emphasizes the diffuseness of epic.

*ἐν ἐλάττονι μήκει τὸ τέλος*: E. is alone in taking this to mean 'the ending comes sooner', which would be odd Greek. The sense must be that it achieves its purpose in a shorter length (of time). Time of performance and number of lines in a poem are directly related, but *τῷ χρόνῳ* suggests that time is uppermost in A.'s mind. *μήκει* refers here to physical length as at 59<sup>b17</sup>, not to the duration of the action as, probably, at 49<sup>b12</sup>. The same principle is applied to metaphor at *R.* 1410<sup>b18</sup>: *ἦττον ἡδύ, ὅτι μακροτέρως*.

62<sup>b1</sup>. *κεκραμένον*: the metaphor of wine diluted with water is probably still live here (cf. *ἕδαρῆ* l. 7, below). Dryden in his *Dedication of the Aeneid* argued with more wit than force, 'he might prove as well that a mushroom is to be preferred before a peach, because it shoots up in the compass of a night'.

62<sup>b2</sup>. *λέγω δ' οἶον . . .*: if the content of Soph. *OT* was made to occupy an epic of the length of the *Iliad*, which was probably the longest ancient epic known to A., we should have an extreme example of dilution. The epic *Oedipodeia* consisted of 6,600 verses, the equivalent of the first ten books of the *Iliad*. Of its content nothing is definitely known except that it told the story of the Sphinx, but unless it overlapped the *Thebais* it ended with the death of Oedipus.

62<sup>b3</sup>. *ἔτι ἦττον μία*: this is the converse of the previous argument, but a new point is added. Not only does epic lack concentration, it

lacks basic unity; in order to make a long poem tolerable the poet is usually driven to include more than one action in his narrative.

**μία**: cf. ἡ μία μίμησις ἑνός ἐστίν (51<sup>a</sup>30). ὅλη καὶ τελεία might have been added as at 59<sup>a</sup>19.

**62<sup>b</sup>5. μιμήσεως**: sc. τῶν ἐποποιῶν.

**πλείους**: already illustrated from the case of the *Cypria* (59<sup>b</sup>2).

**ὥστε . . . φαίνεσθαι**: indicates a consequence not of epic being ἤττον μία, but of the nature of epic. What follows is that, if an epic has strict unity εἰάν ἕνα μῦθον ποιῶσιν, an hypothetical case, it will either be too short, or, if expanded to the customary length, too dilute.

**62<sup>b</sup>6. μούρον**: MSS. vary here and elsewhere between μούρον, 'mouse-tailed' i.e. 'tapering off', 'ending prematurely', and μείουρον, with μει- as in μειονεξία, 'with an inadequate tail'. The word occurs in a similar sense at *R.* 1409<sup>b</sup>18 of a period unexpectedly cut short, and in later Greek, Athen. 632 E, of 'teliambic' hexameters, which had a weak penultimate syllable. The word is discussed at length by T. F. Higham in *Greek Poetry and Life* (Oxford, 1936), pp. 209 ff. It has since turned up in a papyrus fragment of Aes. *Isthmiastai ὄρων μύουρα καὶ βραχέα τα φ[αλλί]α*. See the Loeb *Aes.* ii. 551 and Mette, *Aes. Fragmenta*, p. 8. As the papyrus (*POxy.* xviii. 2162) is dated A.D. 150-200, the form μούρος must have been current then, and μείουρος may be the result of a phonetic change.

**62<sup>b</sup>7. ἀκολουθοῦντα . . . μήκει**: the required meaning is that if it conforms to the normal scale of epic, it seems diffuse. The association of the μέτρον in question, the hexameter, with epic is extremely close (cf. 59<sup>b</sup>31-60<sup>a</sup>5), and it is not too difficult to understand τῷ μήκει as τῷ οἰκείῳ μήκει, the scale appropriate to the epic metre, and so to the epic form. E. understands τοῦ μέτρον as the due measure of epic length, conforming to the μήκους ὄρος without reference to metre. Butcher suggested μετρίου μ. to give a similar sense, but actually printed Bernays's συμμέτρω.

**ὑδαρῆ**: see note on κεκραμένον <sup>b</sup>1, above.

**λέγω δέ . . .**: at this point A. seems to have become aware that he had said things not easy to reconcile with his previous praise of Homer's unity (59<sup>b</sup>2), and he tries to escape from the inconsistency by claiming that, though the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* contain many πράξεις, they represent what is essentially a single πράξις. The root of the trouble is that it is impossible to draw a firm line between the μέρος which is a subordinate episode and the μέρος which is a potential πράξις. When A.'s theme was the flexibility of epic in Ch. 24, he put the emphasis on the variety arising from the abundant episodes. Now that he is giving the preference to tragedy because of its compact structure, he represents the episodes of epic as impairing its

unity. The suspicion that A. did feel Homer's episodes to be too many and too long is reinforced by the standard of length laid down for epic at 59<sup>b</sup>21, four to five thousand lines as against the 15,000 of the *Iliad*. See also 56<sup>a</sup>12 and note, where epic is described as *πολύμυθος*.

**62<sup>b</sup>9. τοιαῦτα:** makes the *μέρη* equivalent to *πράξεις*. They cannot be distinguished from episodes, which must be included under *μέρη* (59<sup>b</sup>27). B. and G. for no reason suppose the *μέρη* themselves to contain *πλείους πράξεις*.

**62<sup>b</sup>10. μέγεθος:** they have to be on a substantial scale if they are to carry the weight of separate *μέρη*.

*τὰ ποιήματα . . .*: cf. the assertions of Homer's superiority at 51<sup>a</sup>23, 60<sup>a</sup>5.

**62<sup>b</sup>12. τέχνης ἔργω:** in view of *αὐτάς* in the next line we must suppose that epic and tragedy are both part of a single *τέχνη*, which is quite in accord with A.'s usual approach in these chapters.

**62<sup>b</sup>13. δεῖ γάρ . . .**: *αὐτάς* as the subject of *ποιεῖν* clearly indicates that tragedy and epic are similar not only in being each a *μίμησις σπουδαίων*, but also in the kind of pleasure which it is their purpose to afford. It is not specified whether this pleasure arises from the stimulation of pity and fear and also, presumably, from their *κάθαρσις*, or whether it is the kind of pleasure mentioned more recently at 59<sup>a</sup>21 as being produced by formal unity. The emphatic position of this statement, which seems to imply a backward glance at the work as a whole, makes it likely that the aim of epic is virtually identical with the aim of tragedy, though neither pity nor fear is mentioned in the chapters which have epic as their theme.

**62<sup>b</sup>16. τραγῳδίας καὶ ἐποποιίας:** these are now finished with, but the general considerations contained in the first five chapters continue to be the basis of what is to be said on other departments of the *τέχνη ποιητική*, so they are not included in the dismissal.

**62<sup>b</sup>17. τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν μερῶν:** the *εἶδη* of tragedy are hardly mentioned save at 55<sup>b</sup>32 ff., the *μέρη κατὰ τὸ ποσόν* only in Ch. 12, but the *μέρη κατὰ τὸ ποιόν* are a large part of the subject.

**62<sup>b</sup>18. ἐπιτιμήσεων καὶ λύσεων:** these are practically confined to Ch. 25, described as concerning *προβλημάτων καὶ λύσεων* (60<sup>b</sup>6).

**62<sup>b</sup>19.** For an attempt to decipher more of the defective ending see Landi, *Riv. di Filol.* N.S. 3 (1925), 551. His *περὶ δὲ ἰάμβων καὶ κωμωδίας . . .* is accepted into the text, with more or less hesitation, by recent editors other than H. and M. The Latin version contained in the Cod. Etonensis ends 'primus Aristotilis de arte poetica liber explicit'.

If the whole work ended with a comparison between tragedy and comedy, we need not doubt that tragedy was again put first. Cf. EN 1177<sup>a</sup>3: *βελτίω λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων*.

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### MIMESIS<sup>1</sup>

IT is taken as self-evident in the first chapter of the *Poetics* that poetry, painting and sculpture, music, and dancing are all forms of *mimesis*; Plato makes the same assumption as Aristotle, and both write as though it was the accepted opinion. The stock translation of *mimesis* is 'imitation'. The first instinct of readers and commentators is to reassure themselves that imitation is not 'mere copying'. Copying is in fact prominent among the senses of *mimesis*, but the general inadequacy of Greek accounts of the arts is due not so much to the associations of this word as to the absence of any other which can express the idea of imaginative creation—until in the third century A.D. Philostratus used *phantasia*<sup>2</sup> to mark the distinction between copying and creating. In the classical period *phantasia* means a mental image, or the power of forming such, and belongs to the theory of knowledge rather than of art.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly the Greeks always found it hard to get away from the view of

<sup>1</sup> The discussion in Butcher, *A.'s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, Ch. 2, is rather unincisive, but the notes contain a valuable collection of passages. More recent are U. Galli, 'Mimesi secondo A.' *St. it. fil.* N.S. iv (1926), 281; Sections 3 and 4 of the Introduction to Rostagni's ed.; and the same writer's 'A. e l'aristotelismo', *St. it. fil.* N.S. ii (1921), 1-147 = *Scritti Minori*, i. 136 ff. There is a full-length study by H. Koller, *Mimesis in der Antike* (Bern, 1954); reviews by Lesky, *Gymnasium*, 63 (1956), 442, and by Else *CP* 53 (1958), 73.

<sup>2</sup> *Apoll. Ty.* 6. 19. Cicero, *Orator* 2. 8-9, distinguishes between the artist's physical model and the conception of a beautiful object in his mind, which suggests that Hellenistic speculation had made some progress towards the idea of creation.

<sup>3</sup> In Longinus, ch. 15, it is an important part of the poet's equipment, but still basically the power of visualizing vividly.

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the artist as craftsman, at times an inspired craftsman, whose task was to reproduce phenomena in words or colours. It was no negligible achievement of Aristotle to give a more adequate description of the poet's work.

The word *mimesis* has an extraordinary width of meaning,<sup>1</sup> which makes it difficult to discover just what the Greeks had in mind when they used the word to describe what it is that poet and artist do. To translate it we need in different contexts 'imitate', 'represent', 'indicate', 'suggest', 'express'. All of these can be referred to the single notion of making or doing something which resembles something else. It will be convenient to illustrate this range of meaning in fourth-century literature—there are not many earlier occurrences—and then to examine its application to poetry by Aristotle. Finally some attempt will be made to trace the origins of the idea that literature is *mimesis*.

No sooner has Aristotle given his list of the forms of *poietike* at the beginning of the *Poetics* (47<sup>a</sup>13–16) than he proceeds to illustrate the mimetic quality which is common to all of them from the visual arts, painting and sculpture, and to this illustration he returns<sup>2</sup> from time to time throughout the work. Clearly this is regarded as the simplest case of imitation; the artist makes the most accurate possible copy of his model, and the accuracy is itself a cause of pleasure to the viewer. This should cause no surprise; ancient descriptions of works of art show an unabashed delight in vivid and life-like renderings.<sup>3</sup> Today it is

<sup>1</sup> Illustrated, especially for Plato, by McKeon, *Modern Philology*, 34 (1936), 1–35 (reprinted in *Critics and Criticism*, ed. R. Crane, Chicago, 1952).

<sup>2</sup> 48<sup>a</sup>5, 48<sup>b</sup>11, 50<sup>a</sup>26, 39, 54<sup>b</sup>9, 60<sup>b</sup>8, 61<sup>b</sup>12. For examples of this comparison elsewhere see G.'s note on 47<sup>a</sup>18.

<sup>3</sup> *Il.* 18. 548–9, Achilles' shield; *Od.* 19. 229–31, Odysseus' brooch; *Aes. Isthmiastai*, *POxy.* xviii. 2162 = *Aes.* (Loeb), ii. 540, satyrs' masks; *Theocr.* 15. 80–86, embroideries at the Adonis-festival; *Herodas* 4. 27, statues in the Asclepieion at Cos; *App. Plan.* 162, the Aphrodite of Praxiteles.

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often forgotten that until the introduction of photography in the last century the artist alone was able to record visual impressions. The beginning of his task was to make recognizable pictures of real objects. He might do more than this, but that painting was basically an imitative art was beyond reasonable doubt. In so far as much art at all times is concerned with imaginary scenes, imitation in the most literal sense is impossible. None the less, the more life-like the people, the more solid-seeming the objects, the more highly esteemed was the work. Men might be nobler than in real life, and gods should look divine, but all this depends on an ability accurately to imitate appearances in the physical world.

Plato, in the fullest discussion of the nature of art that has come down to us from the ancient world (*Rep.* 10. 595 E ff.), shows the same readiness to identify art with the representation of appearances and to take the visual arts as the clearest and most typical case. The perfect imitator is the man who holds up a mirror and thereby produces a complete imitation of the natural world. Had Plato known that the photographer would one day give permanence to the image in the mirror, he would doubtless have used him as an even better instance of the triviality of the artist and his work. If the world is only a shadow of reality, who wants a shadow of a shadow—unless the representation of the shadow can reveal something of the reality behind the shadow? Plato alone among early philosophers had it in his power to exalt the artist and set him up as the hierophant through beauty of reality. But he chose to do nothing of the sort, though in the *Symposium* (209 A) he took a step along the path which could have led in that direction. So his verdict was a condemnation, however reluctant, of the arts,<sup>1</sup> which are allowed only to be of some slight use in

<sup>1</sup> There has been no less reluctance among Plato's commentators to accept his condemnation as comprehensive. His rejection of poetry *ὄση μιμητική* (*Rep.* 595 A) has been used as a pretext for supposing the

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elementary education and, in the *Laws*, for innocent relaxation. In the *Republic* the photographer-artist is equated, without explanation, with the tragic poet, and both are condemned in the light of the Theory of Ideas. The difference between Plato and Aristotle is not so much in their basic conceptions of *mimesis* as in their attitude to the world known through the senses, which it is the business of *mimesis* to reproduce.

The representation of an object or scene in space by a painter has an obvious correspondence with the representation of characters and events in time by a writer, one which was, perhaps, first observed by Simonides (see below, p. 269). The flexibility of Greek usage in this matter can be illustrated by such a passage as A., *Ethics* III 3<sup>a</sup>8, 'the ancient constitutions which Homer imitated'.<sup>1</sup> We might here say 'outlines' or 'depicts', but these words would be metaphorical as 'imitated' in Greek is not.

We encounter greater difficulties when we come to the use of the word in connexion with music and dancing. According to Aristotle (47<sup>a</sup>28), the dance by itself, rhythmic motion of body and limbs, can imitate, or as we should say 'express', character, emotion, and action. Little is known existence of a whole range of non-mimetic poetry which escaped condemnation. (The problem is complicated by the use in *Rep.* 3 of the word *mimesis* in a more restricted sense of 'impersonation'.) Despite this and despite the admittance (*Laws* 802 B) of some existing poetry in the interest of harmless relaxation, the fact remains that little poetry written before or since would pass his censors. A persistent attempt to tone down Plato's condemnation was made by Tate in the *CQ* 22 (1928), 16-23; 23 (1929), 142-54; 26 (1932), 161-9; see also W. J. Verdenius, *Mimesis, Plato's Doctrine of Imitation* (Leiden, 1949). A more realistic assessment in N. R. Murphy, *The Interpretation of Plato's Rep.* (Oxford, 1951), and T. Gould in *Arion*, 3 (1964), 70. The relevant passages in *Rep.* and *Laws* are considered by I. M. Crombie, *Examination of Plato's Doctrine* (London, 1964), pp. 143-50. He concludes that *mimeseis* are worthless as representations of reality, and that, though they might be defended as being beautiful, Plato does not attach much value to them.

<sup>1</sup> ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν ὡς Ὅμηρος ἐμμείτο.



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about Greek dancing and, worse still, the language of the dance has passed out of the European tradition, perhaps because the Church divorced it from the practice of religion. About dancing, except as a social amusement, we have to learn from ballet and from anthropologists. It seems likely that there is a fundamental connexion between rhythm and emotion; fast and gay, slow and sad seem as indissolubly connected as sorrow and tears. For the Greeks, who thought of emotional processes as movements *kineseis* occurring within the soul,<sup>1</sup> it was easy to explain the relationship on the basis of a correspondence between internal and external movements, though dances as full of meaning as those referred to in ancient sources (Pl. *Laws* 655 D, 814 D–16 A, A. *Pol.* 8. 9) must have depended largely on a conventional language of gesture; and since dances were normally accompanied by music, this too would have contributed its associations.

Nor does the description of music as *mimesis* accord with our own linguistic habits. We allow that music can suggest or induce a mood; it can be mournful or martial; it could make Boswell long to rush into battle. Anyone who can remember occasions when the incidental music failed during the showing of a silent film will recollect the emotional cold bath that followed. But we do not normally speak of music as suggesting moral qualities, though it may be no more than a linguistic convention which prevents our saying that martial music imitates courage or lascivious music wantonness; it would be objected that the relation is too vague and the emotions too undifferentiated.<sup>2</sup> But Greek

<sup>1</sup> *Probl.* 919<sup>b</sup>26, 920<sup>a</sup>3, Pl. *Rep.* 400 B, and Athen. 628 C, where *οἱ περὶ Δάμωνα* are cited for the opinion that *ὡδὰς καὶ ὀρχήσεις ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι κινουμένης τῆς ψυχῆς*; cf. Pl. *Tim.* 47 D: *ἡ δὲ ἁρμονία ξυγγενεῖς ἔχουσα τὰς φορὰς ταῖς ἐν ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς περιόδοις*.

<sup>2</sup> Music 'has a persuasively direct sensory medium but no controllable correspondence between the medium and any definite objects'. See Twining i. 66–93. His whole discussion is worth looking at. Cf. Theophrastus, fr. 91: *τὴν ἀκουστικὴν αἴσθησιν παθητικωτάτην εἶναι πασῶν*; A. *Pol.* 1340<sup>a</sup>18: *ῥυθμοὶ καὶ μέλη ὁμοιώματα ὀργῆς καὶ πραότητος*.

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music was mostly sung, and the human voice, even if the words are unintelligible, can convey a powerful suggestiveness; further, the musical modes had their own conventional associations which could easily be mistaken for intrinsic meaning. Hence both Plato and Aristotle assert unhesitatingly a direct connexion between music and character.<sup>1</sup> It was claimed, though less strenuously, that even unaccompanied music had meaning. It is worth adding that, though lyric, words plus music, was one of Aristotle's six parts of tragedy, the words are never alluded to in the *Poetics*.<sup>2</sup>

A further strange use of *mimesis*, not paralleled in the *Poetics*, is found in the discussion of the theory of language in Plato's *Cratylus*. A word is a vocal 'imitation' of the object which it indicates, and this applies as well when the word is regarded merely as a conventional symbol as when it is believed to have an intrinsic connexion with the object which it denotes.<sup>3</sup> Again, meaning can be indicated by the language of gesture, and the gesture too is a *mimesis* of that which it indicates. A vertical raising of the hand can mean 'upwards' or 'light', because light things are easily raised, so men raise their hands 'imitating the nature of the thing'.<sup>4</sup> Whether Plato used the word here, or even in Book 10 of the *Republic*, with a touch of conscious paradox it is hardly possible to say.

<sup>1</sup> *Pol.* 1340<sup>a</sup>28-39, especially ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ὁμοίωμα τοῖς ἡθεσιν. ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσι αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ μιμήματα τῶν ἡθῶν. Cf. Polyb. 4. 20. On modes see *Rep.* 398 C-402 A. The general view of the moral efficacy of music is contradicted in Hibeh Pap. 13 (? late fifth century) ascribed by Blass to Hippias of Elis, see J. F. Mountford in *New Chapters in Gk. Literature*, 2nd ser., pp. 181-2 Philodemus, *De Mus.* 4. 3. 23.

<sup>2</sup> On Greek music in general see the article in the *Oxford Class. Dict.*; on music in tragedy A. M. Dale, *Lyric Metres of Greek Drama*, 'Some Notes on Performance', pp. 194 ff.

<sup>3</sup> ὄνομ' ἄρ' ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικε, μίμημα φωνῆ ἐκείνου ὃ μιμείται (*Crat.* 423 B); cf. τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα μιμήματα ἐστίν (*A. Rhet.* 1404<sup>a</sup>20), without any suggestion that words have any but a conventional relation.

<sup>4</sup> μιμούμενοι αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος (*Crat.* 423 A).

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The connotation of *mimesis* and its derivatives is obviously very wide, but at the same time there is an unmistakable common element to the activities of the man who indicates 'upward' by a movement of his thumb and the painter who copies a human face. It is less obvious that the word covers the activities of the poet, the flute-player, and the dancer, but in the light of what is known of certain Greek attitudes it is understandable that the word should be so used. Yet it is anything but clear why men should practise this activity, or why its results should be regarded as valuable. Certain skills or techniques are required which Plato considers of a low order. Aristotle is a little more precise in that he stresses the fact that artists work in various media;<sup>1</sup> a painter making a picture of a clay pot works not with clay but with pigments. He goes rather further with the demand that the painter should depict character (50<sup>a</sup>28), though here he was to some extent anticipated by the instructions which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Socrates (*Memorabilia* 3. 10). Much more significant is the suggestion that the painter can make his subjects nobler and more beautiful than they are in real life: 'for they (good portrait-painters) when rendering an individual form, though making it like the original, depict it as more beautiful' (54<sup>b</sup>10); just as Sophocles claimed to represent men as they ought to be, whereas Euripides represented them as they are.<sup>2</sup> Here we have, at first sight, a break-through to a new order of ideas; the artist produces not a copy but an idealization of his original, and as a creator of new beauty he is surely entitled to the philosopher's esteem. In fact it amounts to less than this. By leaving out a wen from a portrait of a beautiful face the artist makes it more beautiful; or a number of existing beauties might be combined into a more beautiful whole, as Zeuxis was said to have amalgamated the five loveliest maidens of Croton to form his

<sup>1</sup> See R. P. Hardie, 'The *Poetics* of Aristotle', *Mind* N.S. 4 (1895), 350.

<sup>2</sup> 60<sup>b</sup>33. See Commentary.

## COMMENTARY

Helen.<sup>1</sup> There seems no sign of awareness that the artist is producing something quite different from a display of technical skill, nothing like the claim of [Longinus] that high poetry has 'the ring of a great soul', or Dion of Prusa's description of the Zeus of Pheidias, whose grandeur can bring tranquillity to an afflicted spirit.<sup>2</sup>

Poetry is similar to the visual arts in that both represent men. The poet who works by putting words into the mouths of his characters may show a greater intellectual comprehension of moral qualities than the painter who suggests them by the features and expressions of his figures, but this difference does not amount to much. Where Aristotle showed his originality was in stressing the element of structure.

Here it is important to observe how far Plato and Aristotle followed the same path, and where Aristotle went beyond Plato. Plato asserted in the *Phaedrus* (268 D) that a tragedy (a representation of men in action, *Rep.* 603 C) was not a mere sequence of speeches but a structure so ordered that the parts stood in the proper relation to each other and to the whole.<sup>3</sup> The meaning of this can be filled out from the criticism of Lysias' speech given shortly before (264 B-E), where in terms similar to those used by Aristotle in Chs. 7 and 8 it is laid down that the parts must be 'organically' connected as in an animal,<sup>4</sup> so forming a whole, single and complete. Where Aristotle goes beyond Plato is in extending to a mimetic form the conception of a causally united structure. Structure in a speech gives intellectual satisfaction because the parts are logically related and proportioned, and no doubt aesthetic satisfaction as well. But

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, *De Invent.* 2. 1.

<sup>2</sup> με ἀλης ψυχῆς ἀπήχημα, Longinus 9. 2; Dio, *Orat.* 12 (I. 229 Dindorf). Other passages which throw light on the relation of a painting to its models are *Rep.* 472 D, *A. Pol.* 1281<sup>b</sup>10, 1284<sup>b</sup>8.

<sup>3</sup> καὶ οὗτοι (Sophocles and Euripides) ἄν, ὦ Σώκράτες, οἶμαι καταγελῶεν εἴ τις οἶεται τραγωδίαν ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὴν τούτων (ῥήσεις) σύστασιν πρέπουσαν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ συνισταμένην.

<sup>4</sup> See Commentary on 50<sup>b</sup>22-51<sup>a</sup>13; also on 50<sup>a</sup>33.

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a play, the imitation of an action, if its parts are in a necessary causal relationship with each other and the whole, reveals something about the nature of an action under the conditions obtaining in our world. This is the point reached in the first climax of the *Poetics* in Ch. 9. It is because a properly constructed plot shows a general truth about the sort of thing that is done by certain sorts of men that poetry is, in the famous phrase (51<sup>b</sup>5), 'more important and more philosophical than history', 'a universally valid representation of life'.<sup>1</sup> J. H. Newman in his youthful *Essay on Poetry* put the essence of the matter in a way that has not been bettered: 'by confining the attention to one series of events and scene of action, it (tragedy) bounds and finishes off the confused luxuriance of real nature; while by a skilful adjustment of circumstances, it brings into sight the connexion of cause and effect, completes the dependence of the parts one on another, and harmonizes the proportions of the whole'.<sup>2</sup> Whether or not Plato was aware of the significance which could be claimed for structure in drama, it did not suit his purpose to allow universal significance to mimetic art.

Aristotle goes beyond Plato also in deducing from structural principles the limits of size (*megethos*) appropriate to tragedy. But as the dimensions proper for a speech are determined by a wholly different set of circumstances, this is of only incidental interest.

It must be admitted that Aristotle, having reached this position, appears to leave it undefended; it is as though he was interested only to show that there was an answer to Plato's rejection of the arts as trivial. If he believed that any tragedies possessed cosmic significance, he has nothing to say about it in the course of his detailed criticisms.

<sup>1</sup> A. M. Quinton and R. Meager, *Proc. of the Aristotelian Soc.* supp. vol. 34 (1960).

<sup>2</sup> Quoted by Tillotson, *Perspectives of Criticism*, Harv. Studies Comp. Lit., vol. 20, p. 177.

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Poetry might have philosophic implications, but it was not sufficiently philosophic to be of interest as a tool to a real philosopher. Yet the assertion of the value, actual or potential, of poetry may have seemed worth making for another reason; it served to establish the superiority of poetry to other arts. Music was in any case mainly a subsidiary of poetry. The visual arts are on a lower level because action develops in time, and they are virtually restricted to the representation of single events. No doubt a scene from a well-known myth could include a certain amount of interpretation,<sup>1</sup> but the intellectual perception of relations between events over a period of time is beyond the scope of the visual arts, and consequently for painter and sculptor 'philosophic' achievement is ruled out. The art of the dance is exempt from this particular restriction, since it can represent events in sequence, but in the absence of words it can hardly give an adequate account of the relationship between them. The same emphasis on causal relations may go some way to explain Aristotle's apparent indifference to non-choral lyric poetry which is largely concerned with the description of states of mind. But it was probably due also to the comparative unimportance of this type of poetry in this period.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, mention should be made of certain passages dealing with 'art' and imitation which have been brought into relation with Aristotle's 'aesthetics', though in fact they probably have little bearing on the 'fine arts'. 'Things are produced by *techne* whose form (*eidos*) is in the soul'; 'of things made the origin is in the maker, either mind or *techne* or some potentiality'; 'in general *techne* brings to

<sup>1</sup> See T. B. L. Webster, 'Greek Theories of Art and Lit.', *CQ* 33 (1939), 166, for the efforts of vase-painters to include a series of events in a single painting.

<sup>2</sup> It should not be forgotten that A. himself wrote a not negligible lyric to the memory of his friend Hermeias of Atarneus (*Anth. Lyr.* 1, p. 117, *Poetae Melici Gr.*, p. 444, no. 842). The poem is discussed by Bowra, *Problems in Greek Poetry* (Oxford, 1953), pp. 138-50.

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completion some things which nature (*physis*) is unable to finish off, other things it imitates'.<sup>1</sup> Butcher (p. 157), by applying such passages to the arts which produce not artefacts but imitations, reaches bold conclusions, which are highly questionable, about the artist's completion of nature's unrealized ideals.

Early references to *mimesis* and the nature of the arts are scarce, and it is not possible to reach a positive conclusion on the origin and development of the view that was generally accepted in the fourth century. A widely received opinion attributes the first use of *mimesis* with reference to the arts, especially music and the dance, to the Pythagoreans. We know from Aristotle (*Met.* 987<sup>b</sup>11) that the Pythagoreans described as *mimesis* the relation between things and the underlying reality which they believed to be number.<sup>2</sup> As their belief in the fundamental nature of number was founded on their discovery of the relation between musical notes and the length of the string which produced them, it is likely enough that they proceeded to argue that the effects of music were due to an imitation of the numerical aspect of the movements in the soul.<sup>3</sup> It appears to have been Damon, the teacher of Pericles, who developed this branch, perhaps emphasizing for the first time the significance of rhythm.<sup>4</sup> The word *mimesis* is appropriate to describe the relation between the soul and the harmony; they are not the same, but there is an unfailing correspondence. It is much less obviously suitable to describe the relation between a picture and its subject or a play and its action. Whether

<sup>1</sup> ἀπὸ τέχνης δὲ γίγνεται ὅσων τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (*Met.* 1032<sup>b</sup>1). τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ ποιῶντι ἢ ἀρχή, ἢ νοῦς ἢ τέχνη ἢ δύναμις τις (1025<sup>b</sup>23, cf. *EN* 1140<sup>a</sup>1-20). ὅλως δὲ ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμνῆται (*Phys.* 199<sup>a</sup>15).

<sup>2</sup> οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι μιμῆσει τὰ ὄντα φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μεθέξει. . . . See Kirk and Raven, *Presocratic Philosophers*, pp. 229-31, and Index s.v. 'number'.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 262, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Rep.* 400 B ff., 424 C; cf. Boyancé, *Culte des Muses*, p. 131.

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the Pythagorean account, if it was the oldest, was extended by analogy, or whether it arose independently in the case of painting and poetry, can hardly be determined.

The use by both Plato and Aristotle of the example of the painter to provide the simplest illustration of mimetic activity creates a presumption, though it falls far short of proof, that it was the original use and was extended later to the other arts. The germ of the idea may perhaps be seen in the compliment paid by Odysseus to Demodocus: 'very correctly do you sing of the fate of the Achaeans, all that they did and suffered, as though you had been there yourself, or heard it from one who was'.<sup>1</sup> The poet gives an exact description of the events which are his subject, which is very similar to a naive account of the painter's activity. The two were brought together for the first time, if the quotation is authentic, by Simonides (c. 556-468 B.C.); 'Simonides calls painting silent poetry and poetry speaking painting' Plutarch, *De Gloria Athen.*<sup>2</sup> 'This dazzling anti-thesis of the Greek Voltaire', as it was called by Lessing, who took it as the text for his *Laocoon*, may be the ancestor of the numerous comparisons between the poet's and the painter's arts which are found in the *Poetics* and elsewhere. Crude though it may seem to us, the suggestion that the work of poet and artist could be comprised within a single category may, when it was first made, have appeared

<sup>1</sup> *λίην γὰρ κατὰ κόσμον Ἀχαιῶν οἶτον αἰεῖδεις,  
ὄσσο' ἔρξαν τ' ἔπαθόν τε καὶ ὄσσο' ἐμόγησαν Ἀχαιοί,  
ὡς τέ που ἦ αὐτὸς παρεὼν ἢ ἄλλου ἀκούσας.* *Od.* 8. 489-91.

<sup>2</sup> *M.* 347 A: ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν μὲν ζωγραφίαν ποίησιν σιωπῶσαν προσ-  
αγορεύει τὴν δὲ ποίησιν ζωγραφίαν λαλοῦσαν. The saying is alluded to five  
times in Plutarch or Pseudo-Plutarch, *M.* 18 A, 58 C, 347 A, 748 A,  
*Vit. Hom.* 216. The earliest mention is in the *Ad Herennium* (first  
century B.C.). Its authenticity is widely accepted, as such an aphorism  
is quite in the manner of Simonides; (Hibeh Pap. 17 of about 250 B.C.  
seems to be an anthology of his sayings). But the words cannot be  
a verbatim quotation since *λαλεῖν* as a synonym for *λέγειν* is not earlier  
than the fourth century. *φθεγγομένην* given at *M.* 18 A could be the  
original word.



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something of a revelation. The sentence which follows in the *De Gloria Athen.* goes on to define an important difference between the two forms 'for the actions which painters portray as happening, these words relate and describe when they have happened'.<sup>1</sup> It is just this extension of the action in time which makes it possible for a poet to give it significance by revealing the logic of events, but it would be unsafe to assert that Simonides himself was aware of this distinction.

The only other thinker who, it may be guessed, followed this line of speculation was Gorgias. The theory of art as illusion with which he has been credited is insecurely founded,<sup>2</sup> but it is evident that he was struck by the way in which fictitious incidents happening to other people can be made to stimulate emotions very similar to those caused by real incidents happening to ourselves (*Helen* 9). Such *apate*, 'deceit' or 'illusion', is the result only of successful *mimesis*, just as Plato speaks of the possibility that a skilful painter might paint a carpenter so realistically that from a distance children or stupid adults might mistake if for a real carpenter.<sup>3</sup> Gorgias' illusionistic theory may throw new light on the way literature works, but it assumes the same basic process of copying.

H. Koller in his book, while allowing Pythagorean influence, derives the *mimesis* group of words from *mimos*, the ritual dancer who embodies, impersonates, and by his dancing expresses the influence of the god, 'the bull-voiced, terrible *mimoi*' of Aeschylus' *Edonoi*.<sup>4</sup> Thus the primary

<sup>1</sup> ἄς γὰρ οἱ ζωγράφοι πράξεις ὡς γιγνομένας δεικνύουσι, οἱ λόγοι γεγενημένας διηγούνται καὶ συγγράφουσιν. There is no trace of this in any of the other passages in which the aphorism is quoted, and as Plutarch is here passing from historical painting to historical writing, it is likely that the addition was made by him in order to fit his quotation to its context.

<sup>2</sup> See Introduction III, p. xviii, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Rep.* 598 C: πόρρωθεν ἐπιδεικνύς ἐξαπατῶ ἂν τῷ δοκεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς τέκτονα εἶναι. Cf. *Crit.* 107 D: σκιαγραφία ἀσαφεὶ καὶ ἀπατηλῷ.

<sup>4</sup> Fr. 57 (71 M.): ταυρόφθογγοι . . . φοβεροὶ μῖμοι.

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meaning of *mimeisthai* is not 'copy' or 'imitate' but 'give expression'. This sense is still dominant in the discussion of poets in education in Book 3 of the *Republic*, where the distinction is made between impersonation and narrative. The poet who puts unsuitable words into the mouth of Zeus does not so much make a bad representation as give a bad performance of Zeus, like an incompetent ritual dancer.<sup>1</sup> And this, it is suggested, is the meaning of *mimeisthai* at its first occurrence in the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo*, 'they know how to perform the songs and dances of all men; each would say that it was his own voice, so well-fitting is the fair song'.<sup>2</sup>

But it cannot be said that the conventional meaning 'imitate' is impossible here, nor indeed in the passage from the *Edonoi*, seeing that Plato uses the word *mimeisthai* for mimicking the roaring of bulls along with whinnying horses and other natural objects (*Rep.* 396 B). But it must be granted that there are passages where Koller's rendering is neater; 'I shall perform the new Helen' better describes what Mnesilochus does<sup>3</sup> than 'imitate': similarly 'performing the sacred rites' (which he was not entitled to do) better suits the situation in Lysias' *Andocides*<sup>4</sup> than 'imitating' the Mysteries.

But it is a serious objection to Koller's view that Plato explains with great care, as though introducing an unfamiliar idea, the use of *mimesis* to mean impersonation (*Rep.* 392D–394 A), while it is taken for granted elsewhere, especially in Book 10, that the primary meaning of the word is 'to copy'. Moreover, this sense is found quite indisputably among the not numerous examples of this group of words as early as the mid-fifth century, the satyr's mask in

<sup>1</sup> *Rep.* 388 C: οὕτως ἀνομοίως μιμήσασθαι. Cf. *P.* 60<sup>a</sup>8 and n.

<sup>2</sup> 162–4: πάντων δ' ἀνθρώπων φωνὰς καὶ κρεμβαλιαστὸν μιμείσθ' ἴσασιν· φαίη δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος φθέγγεσθ', οὕτω σφιν καλὴ συνάρησεν αἰοιδή.

<sup>3</sup> τὴν καινὴν Ἑλένην μιμήσομαι (*Aristoph. Thesm.* 850).

<sup>4</sup> μιμούμενος τὰ ἱερά (*Lys.* 6. 51).

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Aeschylus' *Isthmiastai* or the wooden dummy in Herodotus' *Egyptian Logos*.<sup>1</sup>

Whatever the origin of the belief that the activity of those who practised the fine arts could be described in terms of *mimesis*, it was Aristotle who first showed how, if this were true, poets could deserve serious consideration.

<sup>1</sup> Aes., see p. 259, n. 3, above; Herod. 2. 78: νεκρὸν ἐν σορῶ ξύλινον, μεμιμημένον ἐς τὰ μάλιστα καὶ γραφῇ καὶ ἔργῳ. Theognis 370 reveals nothing. Early occurrences of the word *mimesis* are discussed at length by Göran Sörbom in *Mimesis and Art* (Uppsala, 1966).

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### PITY, FEAR, AND *KATHARSIS*

WHEN tragedy is defined in Ch. 6, its end or purpose is affirmed to be the *katharsis* of the emotions, of *eleos*, pity, and *phobos*, fear. Elsewhere in the *Poetics* the stimulation of these emotions leading to the pleasure resulting from them is itself regarded as the end of tragedy. Before discussing the meaning of *katharsis* it is necessary to look further at the emotions in question. Emotions other than pity and fear are occasionally mentioned, wonder or surprise connected with *to thaumaston*, and amazement, *ekplexis*, but surprise is in any case a feature of the complex play, and these are to be regarded as accentuating pity and fear rather than as an independent end.

That the sufferings represented in tragedy should awaken pity needs no comment. The distinction between *eleos* and the milder *philanthropia* (52<sup>b</sup>38–53<sup>a</sup>2) suggests that pity is a powerful emotion, and its association with undeserved suffering. (53<sup>a</sup>4) implies perhaps some sense of outrage. Since pity, especially in tragedy, is often pity for the dead or the bereaved, it is akin to the shared or public lamentation which is part of life in small and closely knit communities.<sup>1</sup> Plato's strictures on the moral weakness caused by indulgence in epic and tragedy (*Rep.* 605 C–606 B) suggest that the audience luxuriated in community sorrow, 'surrendering itself' to lamentation and taking part in the mourning along with actors and chorus.

In all countries in which the Christian tradition has been

<sup>1</sup> τεταρπόμεθα γόοιο (*Il.* 23. 10 etc.). See Patrick Leigh Fermor, *The Mani* (London, 1958), p. 54 ff., for emotional mourning ritual in southern Greece today.

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dominant pity, as half-sister to forgiveness, is strongly approved, and those who experience it feel that they have acquired merit. In the ancient world it was less generally admired, since it came into conflict with the belief, all but universal, that it was meritorious to hate one's enemies; and to hate one's friends' enemies was a part of loyalty. But on balance pity was admired. Until Patroclus perished, Achilles used to take prisoner those who submitted, not kill them, as he said in answer to Lycaon's plea for mercy (*Il.* 21. 100). Deianeira pitied Iole, and Odysseus pitied Ajax; indeed pity was encouraged by that aspect of *sophrosyne* which taught men to see in others' misfortunes a warning of their own insecurity. Yet pity was a disturbing emotion (therefore excluded altogether by the Stoics) and accordingly to be allowed only in moderation; hence the need for *katharsis* among those liable to an excess of it.

It is far less obvious that fear or, as some prefer, terror, *phobos*, is present in the theatre to anything like the same extent as pity. Disaster on the grand scale, the fall of an Oedipus, can be awe-inspiring. Flesh may be made to creep by the portrayal of supernatural or infernal powers or by the suggestion of the uncanny, and the sensibility of ancient audiences may have compensated for the simplicity of their stage effects. But the majority of plays at all times make their impression by quite other means. A more universal effect of tragedy is, by revealing the precariousness of the human condition, to make men fear for themselves. This could be the point of the definition of fear (53<sup>a</sup>5) as being concerned with those like oneself, that is, endowed with similar capacities and exposed to similar dangers. Here we must distinguish two levels of emotional response; on the one hand, we may 'sit firmly in the dress circle admiring the hero's courage or deploring the unscrupulousness of the villain', and also perceiving the dramatic irony (which can be observed only from a position of some detachment), on the other, 'we live through their

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(the characters') situation with them and feel the action issuing directly from them'.<sup>1</sup> The fear that comes from reflections on the precariousness of life belongs to the dress-circle level and corresponds to the judgement that the suffering is undeserved and merits pity. The more strongly felt fear, above all the suspense caused by apprehended disaster, is what we experience when we sink ourselves in the characters and fear for them the things they fear for themselves.

Aristotle gives a sufficiently precise account of pity and fear on the remoter level in his *Rhetoric*, Bk. 2, Chs. 5 and 8. We pity others when they suffer undeserved misfortunes, the prospect of which causes fear when they threaten ourselves. But all this is from the point of view of an orator trying to persuade an assembly or a jury. It is one thing to work on the apprehensions of one's fellow citizens by arguing that danger will beset them if they follow a certain course of action, quite another to arouse sympathy in the theatre; consequently the evidence of the *Rhetoric* so far as concerns emotion has only limited relevance to the *Poetics*.<sup>2</sup>

It was generally accepted among the Greeks that such emotions, when aroused by mimetic performances, are enjoyable, and little attempt is made to explain why. *Katharsis*, though affording a pleasurable relief, seems to be the consequence and justification of tragic pleasure rather than the pleasure itself. But it is implied (53<sup>a</sup>34) that the pleasure is hard to take, which is the reason why happy endings are

<sup>1</sup> Miss R. Meager in *Proc. of the Aristot. Soc.* supp. vol. 34 (1960), 172-3. See also my article 'Pity, Terror, and *Peripeteia*', *CQ* N.S. 12 (1962), 52 ff.

<sup>2</sup> The fullest discussion is by W. Schadewaldt in *Hermes*, 83 (1955), 129 ff.; he is criticized by Pohlenz, *Hermes*, 84 (1956), 49 ff. Schadewaldt may be justified (p. 141) in seeing in *περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον* (53<sup>a</sup>5) a reference not only to moral deserts but to the shock caused by the humiliation of one outstanding in traditional ἀρετή. Cf. Achilles on Priam, *Il.* 24. 543, Talthybius on Hecuba, Eur. *Hec.* 488, Thucydides on Nicias, 7. 86. 5 ἥκιστα δὲ ἄξιος ὦν . . . ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι.

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often supplied; they are a concession to the weakness of the audience.<sup>1</sup>

Pity and fear are the emotions most concerned in the kathartic process. The verb *kathairo* means to 'cleanse' or 'remove/impurities'. The impurities may consist of visible dirt or of invisible sacral contaminations, like those which the statue of Artemis among the Tauri was supposed to have acquired from the presence of a matricide; for this pollution only washing in the sea could provide *katharsis* (55<sup>b</sup>15). With the growth of medical science in the fifth century the word came naturally to be applied to the removal or evacuation of morbid substances from the human system. Finally *kathairo* was used in a sense partly religious, partly medical, for the psycho-therapeutic treatment of emotional disorders by ritual and music.<sup>2</sup>

*Katharsis*, rendered 'purification', is a word with a strong suggestion of uplift, and the earlier commentators were content to take the sentence as meaning that tragedy was morally improving. Castelvetro thought that pity and fear experienced in the theatre hardened up these emotions so that they were less a source of weakness in real life, but the common view was that tragedy worked on the emotions in such a way as to make men more inclined to virtue by banishing undesirable passions. Thus Corneille adapted Aristotle to his own purposes, arguing that the audience observed the excessive passions of the characters and were filled with pity and dread at their misfortunes, both realized and impending, with the consequence that their own ten-

<sup>1</sup> Plato discussed mixed emotions in the *Philebus*; at 47 E he takes the case of dirges, *θρήνοι*, which give both pleasure and pain, and of the *τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις*, *ὅταν ἅμα χαίροντες κλάωσι*. The question may have been raised first by Aristippus; cf. Diog. Laert. 2. 90: *τῶν γοῦν μιμουμένων θρήνους ἠδέως ἀκούομεν, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀηδῶς*. At R. 1382<sup>a</sup>21 and 1385<sup>b</sup>13 both *φόβος* and *ἔλεος* are described as *λύπη τις*. Cf. also St. Augustine, *Conf.* 3. 1. 2.

<sup>2</sup> For a full classification of the meanings of *κάθαρσις* see F. Pfister in *RE Supp.* B. V, s.v.

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dencies to excessive passion were removed.<sup>1</sup> Dr. Johnson, questioned by Boswell, gave a similar account, though he probably construed the Greek better; 'The passions are the great movers of human actions; but they are mixed with such impurities that it is necessary they should be purged or refined by means of terrour and pity. For instance, ambition is a noble passion; but by seeing upon the stage that a man who is so excessively ambitious as to raise himself by injustice; is punished, we are terrified at the fatal consequences of such a passion. In the same manner a certain degree of resentment is necessary; but if we see that a man carries it too far, we pity the object of it, and are taught to moderate that passion.'<sup>2</sup> Though the upshot is much the same as with the first interpretation, this is a reasonable treatment of the Greek, except that resentment and ambition are passions too remote from pity and fear to be included under the term 'such passions'. But what is basically the same rendering can be made to yield a more satisfactory sense; the horror and crudity of pity and fear in real life are purified and transformed into something valuable but still true by the introduction of 'aesthetic distance'. An early example of this, which illustrates also the tendency to smuggle in other and illicit ideas, can be found in K. O. Müller's *Dissertations on the Eumenides*. 'In place of the eager wish we felt for the success of individuals, and

<sup>1</sup> Early explanations of *katharsis* are discussed by Max Kommerell, *Lessing und A.*, pp. 268 ff., by Döring, *Die Kunstlehre des A.*, pp. 263 ff., and by B. Hathaway, *The Age of Criticism* (Cornell, 1962), pp. 205-300.

Translation of the Greek is complicated by the gen. *παθημάτων* after *κάθαρσιν*, which can be attributive, objective, or separative. If we expand the phrase by substituting the verb *καθαίρει*, Corneille probably took the whole as *τὰ παθήματα (τῶν πραττόντων) καθαίρει (τοὺς θεατὰς) δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου*, the gen. being attributive. This is unlikely Greek.

<sup>2</sup> *Boswell's Life of Johnson*, ed. Hill, iv. 39. *παθημάτων* is here objective gen. after *κάθαρσιν*, the easiest, and for long the most widely accepted, explanation. This is equivalent to *(οἱ πράττοντες) καθαίρουσι τὰ παθήματα (τῶν θεατῶν) δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου*.



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distressing apprehension of the dangers which menaced this, there succeeds, mingled with wondering awe and sublime joy, the contemplation of an imperturbable, eternal order, which out of all the seeming turmoil and confusion emerges only more resplendent.<sup>1</sup> In less dithyrambic terms Butcher gave his support to the view that 'the painful element in the pity and fear of reality is purged away, the emotions themselves are purged' (p. 254). On this foundation might be raised a theory of tragedy which would be acceptable to many; pity and fear are cleansed of their pain because the tragic situation is made comprehensible (Aristotle's pleasure in learning: see Ch. 4), and the poet's philosophic insight leads to a calm and passionless, or acquiescent, contemplation of the human condition. But Aristotle gives no encouragement towards adopting such a conclusion, and it is hard to believe that, had he meant it, he would have said anything so clumsy as that pity and fear purify pity and fear.

It has been generally, though not universally, accepted since Bernays published his essay in 1857<sup>2</sup> that the idea of *katharsis* is derived from medicine. Milton had already implied this interpretation in his 'calm of mind, all passion spent', in *Samson Agonistes* and in the preface to that work. In fact Maggi in the first full-length commentary on the *Poetics* (1546 and 1550) had quoted in illustration the key passage on *katharsis* and 'enthusiasm' from *Poetics*, Bk. 8, and the view was familiar to the Italian commentators,<sup>3</sup> but was not widely accepted before the nineteenth century.

On this view the meaning is that tragedy purifies the spectators by freeing them from undesirable or excessive

<sup>1</sup> K. O. Müller, *Dissertation on the Eumenides*, Anon. English trans. (Cambridge, 1853), p. 200.

<sup>2</sup> *Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des A. über Wirkung der Tragödie* (Breslau), republished in *Zwei Abhandlungen über die A. Theorie des Dramas* (Berlin, 1880). Similar suggestions had been put forward by H. Weil at the Philological Congress at Bâle in 1847.

<sup>3</sup> See Bywater in *Journal of Phil.* 27 (1900), 267.

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emotions.<sup>1</sup> At first sight this is open to the same objection as applied to the previous theory, that purifying pity and fear by themselves makes little sense. This is not quite so; what is purified (or diminished) is the emotional capacity of the spectator over a considerable period of time after the performance, what purifies is the emotional experience given by the performance itself. As will be seen, this is more intelligible in the light of Greek physiological theories than of our own. Similarly it should not be argued that, because removal of impurity leaves a pure residue,<sup>2</sup> this view asserts, like the previous one, that the spectator at a tragedy experiences emotions purer than those roused by real events. The *katharsis* affects not the emotional quality of the experience but the subsequent emotional stability of the spectator.

The theory of *katharsis* put forward by Aristotle can be understood only in relation to a mysterious aspect of Greek life which is taken for granted by ancient authors and in consequence rarely alluded to, and also in relation to a view of the emotions and their physiological basis which is fundamentally alien to us, though traces of it, such as the words 'humour', 'melancholy', survive in modern thought and language.

A curious feature of ancient life was the ritual leading to *enthousiasmos*, a condition of trance or hysteria. We should be very much in the dark as to 'enthusiastic' music and its kathartic effects but for the references to it in the eighth book of the *Politics*, the most important of which are given on p. 51. The sense of the passage, with translation of key phrases, is that we accept the division of music (*mele*) into

<sup>1</sup> It is equivalent to (οἱ πράττοντες) καθαίρουσι (τοὺς θεατὰς) τῶν παθημάτων δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου. The gen. is one of separation; cf. ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς πᾶσαι, Thuc. 2. 49. 3. The construction is discussed by Dirlmeier, *Hermes* 75 (1940), 81 ff. He compares Theophrastus, *Περὶ Μουσικῆς* fr. 89: κατ' ἀπόλυσιν γιγνομένη τῶν διὰ τὰ πάθη κακῶν.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, *Soph.* 226 D, defines καθαρός as διάκρισις καταλείπουσα μὲν τὸ βέλτιον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον ἀποβάλλουσα. See Butcher, p. 254.

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the types ethical, practical, and enthusiastic. Music should be used not for one purpose only but for several, for education 'and for *katharsis*—what I mean by *katharsis* I will state simply now, but more clearly in my work on poetry—and third to entertain one's leisure', that is for rest and relaxation. In the case of practical and enthusiastic music one should listen while others play (because enthusiastic music was played on the *aulos*, an unsuitable instrument for citizens: see *Pol.* 1341<sup>a</sup>17). 'For a state of the soul, which is present in some measure in all, affects certain men strongly, though it varies in degree, for instance pity (*eleos*), and fear (*phobos*), and also *enthousiasmos*; for some are liable to this disturbance, and when they expose themselves to the music which puts the soul into an orgiastic state, we see them become composed (medical term) as though they had received medical treatment, that is to say *katharsis*. And those who are prone to pity and fear and in general those who are emotional, and the rest in so far as each is subject to such influences, must have the same experience, and all must have some sort of *katharsis* and a sense of alleviation (medical term) accompanied by pleasure.' Though this passage refers to music (which does not exclude words) it is folly to deny its relevance to tragic *katharsis* in view of the promise made at the beginning of the passage of a fuller explanation to be given in a work devoted primarily to poetry.

The first question is, on what sort of occasion did people listen to kathartic, which is to say, enthusiastic music? We may be sure there were no kathartic concerts.<sup>1</sup> Just as Athenians could go to the theatre only when there was a Dionysiac festival, so no elaborate musical performance would take place except in connexion with some cult, public or private. For us religious ecstasy, which is what ritual

<sup>1</sup> *Pol.* 1341<sup>a</sup>23: *καιρούς ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἢ μάθησιν* might suggest the contrary; the word 'concert' is actually used by Susemihl and Hicks (n. ad loc.). A. is conspicuously indifferent to the ritual element in poetry and drama.

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'enthusiasm' implies, is associated with Dionysus' Bacchanals; but though there was doubtless much holy drunkenness<sup>1</sup> at the Dionysia, there is no trace of Bacchic revels in Attica in historical times. But there are numerous references to other cults with not dissimilar rituals as that of Sabazius, the Thracian Dionysus, and above all the Corybantic worship originally connected with the Great Mother in Phrygia.<sup>2</sup> Plato takes for granted familiarity with the ritual among upper-class Athenians; 'as you will know, if you have been initiated', in a casual illustration (*Euthydemus* 277 D), and a wider familiarity is assumed by Aristophanes.

As to the organization of the ritual and the occasions on which it was performed the sources reveal nothing except that, as we should expect, it was associated with initiations. But while an individual would be initiated only once, or if there were a number of grades, on a limited number of occasions, it was clearly possible to obtain access to the ritual repeatedly. And although Aristotle mentions only the flute-music, it is a fair inference that the 'enthusiasm' would be produced also by the emotional infection communicating itself within a group of worshippers, an infection more violent than that generated in the theatre or at a rhapsodic performance, but not unlike it (cf. *Ion* 536 A, B).<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> According to Pl. *Laws* 637 B the whole of Taras was drunk at the Dionysia and 'the procession of wagons' at Athens was not much better. It is not suggested that drunkenness prevailed in the theatre itself, but see Athen. 464 F for drinking at the performances.

<sup>2</sup> Euripides probably draws on his own knowledge of it in his eclectic account of Bacchanalian ecstasy (*Bacc.* 64-169). On Dionysiac enthusiasm in general see Dodds, *Bacchae* (Oxford, 1960), pp. xi-xx, and 'Maenadism in the *Bacchae*', *Harv. Theolog. Rev.* 33 (1940), 155 ff., also, H. Jeanmaire, *Dionysos* (Paris, 1951), chs. 4 and 5. The available information on Corybantism is given by I. M. Linforth, 'Corybantic Rites in Plato', *Univ. of Calif. Publ. in Class. Phil.* 13 (1946), no. 5, 121 ff.

<sup>3</sup> If it is correctly inferred that kathartic enthusiasm is inseparable from mass emotion, an important consequence follows. We are told that the pleasure which is the end of tragedy can be obtained without stage performance by reading (62<sup>a</sup>12), which presumably means reading

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No doubt many took part in enthusiastic ritual for the sake of the harmless pleasure which Aristotle mentions (*Pol.* 1342<sup>a</sup>15, though the text has been doubted). But it had been observed that, apart from any religious efficacy the ritual might have, those who were hysterical and emotionally unstable were restored to a more normal condition by the violent excitement of the proceedings. This might be a *katharsis* in the religious sense; evil spirits would naturally leave when a god entered into possession of his worshipper. Educated Athenians might come to doubt the entry of the god under the guidance of Cybele's rather dubious priests, but the cure continued to work and might be attributed to the emotional potency of the music. This appears to be Aristotle's position in the *Politics*. At all events the effectiveness of this kathartic process, religious or secular, was generally accepted. When Philocleon in the *Wasps* was suffering from an obsessive passion for jury-service, his son tried among other remedies Corybantic initiation, but the only result was that he burst into the law-court still carrying his tambourine.<sup>1</sup> The verb *korubantiao* means not only to take part in the rites but also to be in need of them because of some psychological disturbance.<sup>2</sup>

The therapeutic use of music by the Greeks was no novelty. The Pythagoreans had long practised it.<sup>3</sup> But the

aloud either to oneself or to a small circle. Under such conditions *katharsis* could scarcely occur. This strengthens the suspicion aroused by failure to mention *katharsis*, except in the definition of tragedy, that the kathartic theory is not an original and integral part of Aristotle's thinking on poetry.

<sup>1</sup> *Vesp.* 119. The schol. on the passage says τὰ τῶν Κορυβαντίων ἐποίει αὐτῷ μυστήρια, ἐπὶ καθαρωῷ τῆς μανίας, 'he had him initiated into the Corybantic mysteries to purify him of his madness.'

<sup>2</sup> *Vesp.* 8: ἀλλ' ἢ παραφρονεῖς ἔτεδόν ἢ κορυβαντιᾶς; Pl. *Symp.* 215 C-E: the music of Olympus δηλοῖ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν δεομένους.

<sup>3</sup> Aristoxenus, fr. 26 (Wehrli): καθάρσει ἐχρῶντο τοῦ μὲν σώματος διὰ τῆς ἰατρικῆς, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς. Boyancé, *Culte des Muses*, p. 187, stresses the traditional element in A.'s theory; A. Busse, *Rh. Mus.* 77 (1928), 49, stresses, with better reason, A.'s originality.

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peculiarity of this kind of treatment was that, instead of correcting excitement by calming it, a further stimulus in the same direction was given; like was cured by like, whereas the normal way to remedy a deviation was, and is, to apply a force working in the opposite direction. As Aristotle himself said 'medicines work naturally by means of opposites' (*EN* 1104<sup>b</sup>18), and it was recognized as paradoxical that this form of *katharsis* worked homoeopathically. Thus Plato used it as an illustration when expounding his system of rearing children; their natural restlessness should be countered not by keeping them still, but by having their nurses rock the cradles perpetually, using the same principle 'as those who are concerned with the healing performed by the Corybantes'.<sup>1</sup>

We, unlike the Greeks, are not accustomed to thinking in terms of opposites, otherwise we might reflect with mild surprise that we treat a fever not with cold baths but by keeping the patient warm. As an answer to Plato's strictures the theory of *katharsis* is a triumphant success; so far are we from pandering to our emotional frailty when we visit the theatre that we actually strengthen our emotional resistance ready for the trials of real life. Its value for other purposes is more open to question. An obvious weakness of the theory in the form in which Aristotle proposed it is that it applies to all men and presumably women a treatment which is appropriate only to the unstable, as is hardly concealed in the statement quoted from the *Politics* on p. 280.

Weil and Bernays gave the basically correct answer to the question what Aristotle meant by *katharsis*, but the process should not be explained wholly in medical terms, because the pressure of infectious emotion which accompanies manifestations of 'enthusiasm' cannot be dissociated from the

<sup>1</sup> *Laws* 790D. For homoeopathy cf. Milton, *Preface to Samson Agonistes*, 'For so in physic things of melancholic hue and quality are us'd against melancholy, sour against sour, salt to remove salt humours.'

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ritual celebrations which provoked it. However little Aristotle may have believed in the religious efficacy of such ritual, the word *katharsis* used in this context must retain sacral associations.

Subsequent research has made the Bernaysian theory more intelligible by bringing it into relation with the physiological and medical theories of the time.<sup>1</sup> For it is far from obvious that emotions experienced in the theatre should affect our emotional capacity on other occasions, unless by the simple tendency of experience to harden, which would be ill described as *katharsis*.<sup>2</sup>

Aristotle, who had been trained as a physician, accepted the Hippocratean theory of the human constitution, namely that health depends on the proper balance of the four humours present in the body, blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile. Of these the last is, for the present purpose, the most significant. A gross excess of it leads to stark madness, but a moderate superfluity causes some degree of instability and sensuality such as are often associated with the artistic temperament. There is no doubt that those liable to an excess of pity and fear belonged to the class of the melancholic. Aristotle has many references to this widely recognized type; 'those whose nature is melancholic are in perpetual need of treatment'.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately the most detailed discussion occurs in the *Problems*,<sup>4</sup> and though it

<sup>1</sup> Recent work is conveniently summarized by H. Flashar in *Hermes* 84 (1956), 12-18. See also his *Melancholie und Melancholiker* (Berlin, 1966).

<sup>2</sup> H. Richards, *Aristotelica*, p. 131.

<sup>3</sup> *EN* 1154<sup>b</sup>11: οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν αἰεὶ δεόνται ἰατρείας. The earliest statement of the theory of humours is probably that in the Hippocratean *περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου*, ch. 4. On melancholy and inspiration see Commentary on 55<sup>a</sup>32-4.

<sup>4</sup> *Probl.* 4. 880<sup>a</sup>22 and especially *Probl.* 30. 953<sup>a</sup>10-955<sup>a</sup>40. The latter was attributed by Rose to Theophrastus, who wrote a *περὶ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ*. Mlle Croissant accepts it as A.'s on the ground that ideas which it contains are attributed to A. by later writers, but Svoboda, *L'esthétique d'A.* (Brno, 1927), p. 52, questions *νοερός τόπος* (954<sup>a</sup>35) as incompatible with A.'s unlocalized soul (cf. *De An.* 429<sup>a</sup>10 ff.).

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may well be that there is nothing in these passages to which A. would not have subscribed, they cannot be treated as his work. Much ingenious fancy is employed on the diverse effects of hot and cold bile, but the upshot is that those with an excess of warm black bile are in a state similar to that of ordinary men when drunk. The important thing from the point of view of tragic *katharsis* is that it gives real meaning to the purge of emotion. An excess of bile involves an increase of emotional pressure. An emotional orgy brings release in the same way as blood-letting relieves the over-sanguine. We naturally think of emotions as reactions to stimuli. If they are excessive or unbalanced, it may be because a man is sensitive, has 'a skin too few', or because he has suffered traumatic experiences, whether in the womb or later in life. The Greek doctrine of humours implies that each man has an emotional capacity directly related to his physical make-up, and an excess of one humour can cause an undue generation of emotional pressure, which will need an outlet. If the imbalance of humours is marked, the emotional congestion can become serious, and the pleasure, when it is relieved, proportionately greater.<sup>1</sup> So the release of accumulated pity and fear by pity and fear experienced in the theatre presents no problem.

Theoretically the *katharsis* might equally well be provoked by a dose of medicine, but Greek physicians seem to have lacked confidence in their power to control black bile, which is no wonder, since it is in fact dark blood discharged in certain morbid conditions and therefore altogether absent at most times from the majority of human beings. Indeed, of the four humours only blood is easily acted on, and there is naturally some lack of integration between Greek medical

<sup>1</sup> The medical term *κουφιζεσθαι*, used of *katharsis* by music (*Pol.* 1342<sup>a</sup>14) is applied at *Probl.* 955<sup>a</sup>25 to the relief experienced after intercourse by those whose 'melancholy' takes the form of a more than normal sexual urge. It appears that an actual release of bile was supposed to take place.



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theory and practice.<sup>1</sup> It is questionable whether it is strictly correct to describe *katharsis* of the emotions as a metaphorical expression, since the process actually worked on the humours through the emotions. Had Aristotle been asked, he would probably have allowed that both Corybantic music and tragic drama had an effect on the balance of the physical components in those who listened to them. As the changes could not be observed and the whole matter was obviously speculative in the highest degree, he may well have thought this aspect of the subject unimportant, but given the physiological beliefs then current, it does not seem possible to escape from the conclusion that the kathartic process was both physical and psychological. Whether Aristotle attached any meaning to the religious side of the performances at which these effects were produced is not known. Dionysus gets little attention in the *Poetics*, and it is doubtful if Cybele would have got more in a full-length account of *katharsis*.

There is no clear trace of the *katharsis* theory of tragedy before Aristotle,<sup>2</sup> nor is it mentioned elsewhere in his extant works; except for a possible trace in Theophrastus frs. 87-89, there is no sign of it among his successors or, more significant, in the literary works of Cicero or in the *Ars Poetica* of Horace,<sup>3</sup> all of which were influenced by Peripatetic writings.

<sup>1</sup> For an attempt to trace the process more precisely see Mlle Croissant, *A. et les Mystères*, also J. Tate, 'Tragedy and Black Bile', *Hermathena* 50 (1937), 1-25; W. Müri, 'Melancholie und schwarze Galle', *Mus. Helvet.* 19 (1953), 21 ff.; Boyancé, p. 190. On Greek medicine, Döring, pp. 251 ff.; H. E. Sigerist, *History of Greek Medicine* (Yale, 1951-6), ii. 317.

Hippocrates, i. 352 (Kühn), speaks of a *φάρμακον ὅτι τὴν χόλην μέλαιναν ἄγει*.

<sup>2</sup> Gorgias (*Helen* 14) compared the effect of words on the mind to the power exerted by drugs (*φάρμακα*) on the body, but Süss, *Ethos* (Leipzig, 1910), pp. 52 ff., was not justified in finding an anticipation of A. here.

<sup>3</sup> Horace's 'O ego laevus, qui purgor bilem sub verni temporis horam!' (*AP* 301) refers to the poet and his genius allied to madness.

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This silence suggests that Aristotle produced his theory *ad hoc* in answer to Plato's condemnation of drama and never developed it outside this context.<sup>1</sup> Interest in the aesthetic problems relating to tragedy vanished in the Graeco-Roman world, which was so besotted with rhetoric that a form supplying unlimited themes for exercises in the art seemed to stand in no need of justification. There are, however, unmistakable references to *katharsis* in Proclus and Iamblichus in the fourth century A.D. Though these writers were steeped in Pythagorean literature, Proclus' statement in his Commentary on the *Republic*, that Plato's attack on drama gave Aristotle the starting-point for his reply, is evidence that their knowledge of *katharsis* derives from Aristotle, perhaps from his Dialogue *On Poets*.<sup>2</sup>

But the main interest of these passages lies in the positive statement that the effects of comedy, as well as of tragedy, are to be explained in terms of *katharsis*. Speculation on how this worked is not perhaps very profitable (see p. 91). The emotions to be purged by comedy, which correspond to pity and fear, would be scorn and over-confidence; as the

Kemke in his ed. of Philodemus, *De Musica* (Leipzig, 1884), p. xiv, claimed to detect a reference to the musical *katharsis* of the *Politics*: *καὶ καθίστανται τινὲς ἐκ τῶν θεοφορίων καταυλούμενοί πως. καθίστανται* in a medical sense as *Pol.* 1342<sup>a</sup>10. This could be derived from Pythagorean and not Peripatetic sources.

<sup>1</sup> This was the view of Castelvetro in the sixteenth century and of Voltaire in the eighteenth. 'Nous penchons vers l'opinion de cet interprète de A., qui pense que ce philosophe n'imagina son galimatias de la purgation des passions que pour ruiner le galimatias de Platon' (*Sur le second discours* (de Corneille), ed. Firmin-Didot (Paris, 1876), p. 337).

<sup>2</sup> The view of Solmsen, *Gnomon* 5 (1929), 407. The main texts are given on p. 52. The term *ἀποκαθαίρομαι* remains, but *κάθαρσις* is replaced by *ἀφοσίωσις* and *ἀπέρασις*. Only a few metaphors survive from the old medical basis of the theory, which seems to be watered down to the suggestion that moderate exercise of the emotions may make them more controllable in real life. The contrast between homoeopathic and allopathic is lost; cf. Koller on Aristides Quintilianus, *Mimesis*, pp. 79-104.

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unstable man might be helped by tragedy to maintain his composure in time of trouble, so comedy might help him to maintain his dignity and refrain from contempt in prosperity. But there is a more interesting possibility. Some comedy, especially the Old Comedy of Athens, involves the imaginary suspension of many among those restraints and restrictions which make civilized life possible; especially there is more sexual licence in comedy than in most life. Many societies have allowed occasions when there was a communal kicking over of the traces, like the Roman Saturnalia and the medieval Feast of Misrule. No doubt they gave relief to the tensions caused by the restraint, internal and external, on which society depends; their partial violation on these particular occasions was a substitute for lawlessness in real life. A *katharsis* of the impulses which lead to defiance of convention and contempt of authority would make good sense in the light of modern ideas, and Aristotle might have reserved his full treatment of *katharsis* for the section on comedy, because it provided the more important illustration. It may be significant that the passage from Iamblichus, *De Mysteriis*, i. 11, quoted on p. 52, continues: 'and in some of the obscenities which we see and listen to in the sacred rites we find the means used to free ourselves from the harm we should incur from real experiences'.<sup>1</sup> But there is no evidence that this idea is taken from Aristotle. Difficulties about this explanation are, that the emotions purged by comedy are common to all men, not confined to a few like the emotions purged by enthusiastic music; and, more serious, that comedy and obscene ritual work, on this theory, by providing emotions roused by imitations as a substitute for emotions roused by actual experience. But while the substitute emotions afforded by comedy are ones that mankind in general considers desirable, those afforded

<sup>1</sup> After ἀποκαθαίρομεν the passage continues ἐν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς θεάμασι τῶν καὶ ἀκούσμασι τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἀπολυόμεθα τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων ἀπ' αὐτῶν συμπιπτούσης βλάβης. The whole passage is given in V., p. 83.

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by tragedy are the opposite, and one would have supposed that most people experienced in the course of their lives as much pity and fear as they wanted. Men may sometimes have daydreams of themselves as tragic heroes, but it is in the nature of daydreams that they should end happily. So long as emotions are considered on the level of common sense, *katharsis* seems intelligible in relation to comedy, but has a less satisfactory application to tragedy.

The reason why catharsis (it is convenient to keep the distinctive spelling) is a word that runs so easily from the pens of theatre critics and other writers on drama is that since Freud it has come to be used in a sense that has only a remote connexion with anything in Aristotle.<sup>1</sup> In 1880-2 J. Breuer developed what he called his 'cathartic method'. With it he claimed to have cured a hysterical patient whose traumatic experiences he recovered under hypnosis; the patient's disorders vanished when their cause was explained to her. Freud used the method for a short time before developing from it the method of free association, and published an account jointly with Breuer.<sup>2</sup> No doubt they were both aware of the Aristotelian usage of *katharsis*, especially as Freud was married to Martha, the niece of Jakob Bernays; but there appears to be no trace in Freud's works of any attempt to connect catharsis with tragedy.<sup>3</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> 'What A. may have meant, an exegetical problem of interest, need not be confused with the problems to which the term has come to be applied' (Wellek and Warren, *The Theory of Literature* (London, 1949), p. 27).

<sup>2</sup> Breuer-Freud, *Studien über Hysterie* (Leipzig-Wien, 1922). See *Freud: An Autobiographical Study*, trans. J. Strachey (London, 1950), p. 38. 'Breuer spoke of our method as cathartic; its therapeutic aim was explained as being to provide that the accumulated affect used for maintaining the symptoms, which had got on the wrong lines and had, as it were, stuck there, should be directed on to the normal path along which it could obtain discharge.'

<sup>3</sup> On the application of Freudian ideas to tragedy see Lionel Trilling 'Freud and Literature' in *Criticism*, ed. M. Schorer, etc. (New York, 1948), pp. 180-2.

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many today who appear to take it for granted, rightly or wrongly, that tragedy helps us to face and dismiss suppressed apprehensions should be aware that a theory based on the hypothesis of *id* and *ego* can have only superficial resemblances to one based on the balance of humours, and that the Greeks, interested though they were in dreams, knew nothing of the subconscious mind and defence mechanisms, or of the possibility that men may repress experiences.

## APPENDIX III

### SIMPLE AND COMPLEX TRAGEDY

PLAYS are not easily divided into firm and comprehensive categories. The four kinds of tragedy defined in Ch. 18 are so obscure, owing to the compression and corruption of the text, that little can usefully be said about them. The distinction between plays with happy and unhappy endings is recognized in Ch. 13 but not made the basis of a division into types. In the case of Greek tragedy this is doubtless correct; though some of the plays seem to us much less tragic than others, the *Philoctetes*, for instance, which ends happily, makes an impression not fundamentally different from the *Antigone*, which does not. The one really fruitful distinction is that between simple and complex plays made in Ch. 10.

The complex play is distinguished from the simple by the presence of a *peripeteia* or an *anagnorisis*, a reversal or a recognition; this means in effect that one or more of the characters is in ignorance on some vitally important matter, often the true identity of one of the other characters, perhaps of his own. Some measure of ignorance followed by realization is present in almost all plays. No tragedy is simpler than the *Persae*; even there the Persians in Susa are unaware that their fleet has been destroyed, until they learn it from the Messenger; they are unaware that further disasters await them, until they learn it from the Ghost of Darius. Accordingly there are moments of heightened tension distributed in fact with great art. But a play so constructed cannot contain changes from confidence to despair or from agony to joy taking place in a matter of moments. If we rule out arbitrary strokes of chance like someone falling dead from no foreseeable cause, the only process which can

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lead to these instants of intense drama is the passage from ignorance to knowledge. Both *anagnorisis*, which involves not knowing who somebody is, and *peripeteia*, which involves acting or suffering in ignorance of the outcome, imply the presence of illusion. It is because these two devices, as explained by Aristotle, necessarily carry with them misapprehension over vital matters on the part of some of the characters that they successfully distinguish a category of drama. Moreover, effects of dramatic irony, though Aristotle does not refer to this, depend on the presence of these illusions which the audience perceives but does not share, particularly in the Greek theatre, where the audience was acquainted in advance with the outlines of the plot or informed of them in the prologue.

Yet the distinction between simple and complex plays is less clear-cut than might be expected, and there is real doubt to which class a number of plays belong. Aristotle himself seems to have recognized that the presence of *peripeteia* or *anagnorisis* was not sufficient to make a play complex unless one or both formed a main turning-point of the action. That is why he defined the complex type (55<sup>b</sup>33) as that 'of which the whole is *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis*'. Employed incidentally, they do not suffice to determine the character of a play. For instance, in the *Phoenissae* Creon learns that he will be asked to yield up his son for sacrifice in order to save Thebes. He tries to save the boy's life by sending him secretly away from the besieged city, but the son, while pretending to fall in with Creon's plan, goes off to make a voluntary sacrifice of his own life. Here we have the raw material for a *peripeteia* of which the climax would have been the realization by Creon that he had sent his son not to safety but to destruction. As it is, this is a mere episode and the play is undeniably simple. Similarly, the trapping of Aegisthus at the end of Sophocles' *Electra*, though more fully worked out, would not of itself make the play complex, as it is not necessary to the plot.

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Since Aristotle asserted that the ideal tragedy is complex, he is felt to have cast something of a slur on simple plays, and editors and critics tend to call the climax of any play a *peripeteia* out of a desire, perhaps unconscious, to improve its status. Thus W. Ritchie, in *The Authenticity of the 'Rhesus' of Euripides*, p. 90, arguing that the *Rhesus* is worthy of Euripides, finds and admires its *peripeteia*; yet if the *Rhesus* is complex, few plays can be simple.

When we come to allot known tragedies to the two classes, the obvious starting-point is the examples actually given in the *Poetics*. We can be reasonably sure that Aristotle regarded as simple the *Prometheus*, presumably our play, *Ajax*, and *Medea*.<sup>1</sup> Plays stated or hinted to be complex are more numerous: Aeschylus' *Choephoroi* (55<sup>a</sup>4), Sophocles' *OT* (52<sup>a</sup>24), also *Tyro* (54<sup>b</sup>25) and *Wounded Odysseus* (53<sup>b</sup>34), of which the main incidents are known though the plays are lost, Euripides' *IT* (52<sup>b</sup>6) and *Cresphontes* (54<sup>a</sup>5), and in addition the *Alcmeon* of Astydamas (53<sup>b</sup>33), the *Lynceus* of Theodectes (52<sup>a</sup>28), and the *Helle* (54<sup>a</sup>8). Further, at 53<sup>a</sup>20; 21 we are given a list of myths from which many complex plays were derived, but of these only the *OT* can be identified.<sup>2</sup> What all these plays have in common is that one or more of the characters were unknown to the others, and that the identity was revealed in a dramatic scene which entirely transformed the situation. The only exception is the *Lynceus*; we know nothing of the mechanism of its *peripeteia*. Thus the complex plays about which we are best informed,

<sup>1</sup> Both *Prometheus* and *Ajax* are assigned at 56<sup>a</sup>1-3 to types other than the complex. Even if plays could, like the *Odyssey*, belong to more than one type, it is likely that A. chose as his examples plays which did not overlap his εἶδη. The evidence for the *Medea* is 53<sup>b</sup>29; *Medea's* action without ἀγνοία is contrasted with more complex plots involving *anagnorisis*.

<sup>2</sup> Not all these plays are actually referred to as complex, but all of them contained an *anagnorisis* or *peripeteia*, and though these features, if incidentally introduced, would not make a play complex, it is likely that those which A. thought worthy of special mention were far from incidental.



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*OT*, *IT*, and *Cresphontes* (Aeschylus is hardly in competition with the rest) are distinguished by a scene of great concentration marking the passage from ignorance to knowledge; on the other hand, the *Ajax*, though simple, has a marked change of direction, from fear through hope back to despair, and the realization that Ajax, so far from being reconciled with the Atridae, has killed himself is not sufficient to make the play complex. It is with this standard in mind that we should look at the doubtful plays.<sup>1</sup>

The plays of Aeschylus were normally simple; the only known exception is the *Choephoroi*, but it is likely that there was a recognition scene in his *Oedipus*; if there were others, no trace of them has remained. Yet it is a sign that Aristotle's categories are slightly artificial that the *Septem* should contain a moment of powerful dramatic impact which can hardly, without straining, be classed as an *anagnorisis*; this is when Eteocles, absorbed in arrangements for the defence of his city, finds that the champion whom he has left himself to face is his own brother, that the Erinys has stolen up behind him and has her hand on his throat (653).

Of the works of Sophocles, in addition to the *OT*, the *Electra* and *Trachiniae* are clearly complex; the last is of interest as one of the few plays whose complexity is wholly independent of mistaken identity. The *peripeteia* arises from Deianeira's using a poison as a love-philtre, and there is an *anagnorisis* when Heracles realizes the meaning of the oracle that no living being can destroy him (1160), though the effect is weakened because we hear of the oracle only in retrospect. Some difficulty arises over the *Antigone* and *Philoctetes*; the former is basically simple, but it might be argued that Antigone's entry under guard as the wanted criminal (376) is sufficient to give the play complexity. It is

<sup>1</sup> Gudeman, who is readier than most to commit himself, gives the following as simple (p. 221): *Agamemnon*, *Ajax*, *Medea*, *Hecuba*, *Troades*, *Phoenissae*, *Supplices*, *Rhesus*, and 'strictly speaking' *Philoctetes*, since the *peripeteia* follows the appearance of the *deus*.

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true also that Creon brings about the opposite of what he expected and intended, but so did Achilles in the *Iliad*, and the *Iliad* is classed as simple (59<sup>b</sup>14); Creon's *metabasis* is probably too protracted to constitute a *peripeteia*. The *Philoctetes* is, in the non-technical sense of the word, perhaps the most complex of all Greek tragedies, but its claim to rank as complex in the Aristotelian sense must depend on the scene in which Philoctetes realizes that Neoptolemus has stolen the bow and that he is taking him not to his home but to Troy (915 ff.).

The following plays of Euripides I take to be obviously simple: *Medea*, *Andromache*, *Heracleidae*, *Supplices*, *Troades*, *Phoenissae*, to which should be added the *Rhesus*, because, although the fortunes of the over-confident Rhesus suffer a swift *metabasis*, his death off-stage in his sleep makes little impact. There is no *ekplexis* when the victim is unaware of his own misfortune. Complex are the *Alcestis*, probably the *Hecuba*, the group of 'intrigue plays', *Ion*, *IT*, *Helen*, *Electra*, together with *Bacchae* and *IA*, though the former is eccentric in that the main *anagnorisis* is related in a Messenger's speech, and in the latter the discovery by Clytemnestra and Iphigeneia of the real reason why they have come from Argos extends over an unusual length of time and is not, so far as concerns the manner of its happening, a necessary consequence of what has gone before.

The apparent complexity of the *IA*, which, like that of the *Philoctetes*, is not warranted by a single scene of devastating revelation, suggests that Aristotle went too far in identifying complexity with the presence of one overriding illusion which is dispelled in a few moments of intense drama; the real difference is that the simple play moves in one direction with minor variations of pace and tension, while a play gives an impression of complexity if there are changes in the trend and direction of the action even without a sudden *volte-face*. A. Lesky (on the *Orestes*) speaks of 'the tendency towards animating the plot by repeated new twists'

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(*Hist. of Gk. Lit.*, Engl. trans., p. 393). Thus in the *IA* we begin with Agamemnon changing his mind about the sacrifice of his daughter; he is thwarted by Menelaus, who changes his mind in his turn when it is too late. The expected situation is then complicated by the unforeseen arrival of Clytemnestra along with Iphigeneia; owing to a chance meeting between Clytemnestra and Achilles the latter learns how his name has been made use of and a new force is introduced into the action working against Agamemnon's purpose; when the issue has reached the verge of violence, Iphigeneia's new willingness to die for Greece again reverses the direction of the action, though the change is not logically determined by previous events in the way which would produce a formal *peripeteia*.

This suggestion is important for two celebrated plays, the *Hippolytus* and *Orestes*. In the former there is a near *peripeteia* in the destruction of Hippolytus by his father in the belief that Phaedra's slander was true. But its effect is weakened by the manner of the realization. The truth does not emerge in consequence of the action but through an arbitrary intrusion on the part of Artemis, which would certainly be condemned in the terms of 54<sup>a</sup>37. The *Orestes* is remarkably free from the sort of action in ignorance on which the effects in question depend. Menelaus' unwillingness to assist disappoints Electra and Orestes, and their treatment of Helen and Hermione exceeds the worst fears of a not very far-sighted Menelaus, but even if Apollo had not intervened and Orestes had burnt the palace together with his friends, it would not have made much of a *peripeteia*. Yet to call either of these plays simple is to disregard normal use of language. It must be accepted that changes in the direction of the action accompanying changing attitudes among the characters can give complexity to a play even though these changes are not brought to a climax in single moments of great dramatic power.

One other play calls for consideration, the *HF* of Euri-

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pides. No reversal could be more complete than that which transforms the fortunes of Heracles, who in the hour of a triumphant return is struck with madness in the course of which he kills his wife and children; and the realization, when the madness passes, of what he has done is as much an *anagnorisis* as the recognition by Agave in the *Bacchae* of her child's head. But if we set any store by the requirement that a *peripeteia* should be not only unexpected but a natural or necessary consequence of the previous action, then the *HF* is ruled out. The disaster which Heracles suffers appears, and seems intended to appear, wholly inconsequent. Hence the unique second prologue (822-74) with which the second half of the play begins, and from which the *anagnorisis* cannot be wholly dissociated. The play can be seen as complex only by those who find some causal connexion between the madness of Heracles and the events which preceded it.

In fact, Aristotle's differentiae characterize well a certain type of play in which ignorance of a particular fact or identity is vital, and in which the climax coincides with the passage from ignorance to knowledge. His partiality for this type of play is well shown by the analysis of plot types in Ch. 14, and by Ch. 16 on modes of recognition. The earliest play of this type which is known is the *Cresphontes* of Euripides, probably between 429 and 425 B.C., unless the *OT* is older; a number of such plays were written by Euripides in the last decade of his life, and in many of them he exploited convenient myths which told of the loves of gods for mortal maidens, who bore children in secret, lost, or abandoned them, and were reunited with them in later years. Similar stories with the divine element eliminated passed into the stock of New Comedy. Whether or not this is the best kind, it is not the only kind of complexity.

These categories have not proved a very useful critical tool in either the ancient or the modern world. Few post-classical plays are short enough to be 'simple' in Aristotle's

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sense. Synge's *Riders to the Sea* is one of the few examples. And it is for the same reason, because they are much longer, that few post-classical dramas have their climax in a single *peripeteia*.<sup>1</sup> That the trial-scene of *The Merchant of Venice* is very close to an Aristotelian *peripeteia* was observed as long ago as 1792 by Pye in his *Commentary on the Poetics*. Recognition-scenes have remained part of the regular stock-in-trade of drama, but the general structure, though on a larger scale, more resembles that of those Greek plays which give an impression of complexity without, however, conforming to Aristotle's pattern.

<sup>1</sup> Dryden, clearly with A. in mind, describes the playwright's business in his own day: 'to conduct his imaginary persons through so many various intrigues and chances as the labouring audience shall think them lost under every billow; and then at length to work them so naturally out of their distresses that when the whole plot is laid open, the spectators may rest satisfied that every cause was powerful enough to produce the effect it had; and that the whole chain of them was with such due order linked together that the first accident would naturally beget the second till they all reached the conclusion necessary.' Dedication to *The Rival Ladies* (1664).

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### HAMARTIA<sup>1</sup>

It is widely supposed that *hamartia* is a flaw or frailty of character, a conception which gives scope for developing the always popular notion of poetic justice, and one which has found easy application to Shakespeare's tragedies. This is due largely to Butcher's influential essay *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art* (especially pp. 316-33). Butcher himself gave a balanced survey of the subject and 'flaw' was not the only meaning which he suggested, but it was the one that caught the fancy of the world; Hamlet was a good man ruined by irresolution, Macbeth by ambition, Othello by jealousy; so satisfactory a formula clearly deserved to be supported by the authority of Aristotle. Indeed it may be a more useful critical tool than *hamartia* in the sense that Aristotle probably intended. But in fact 'flaw', the favourite English rendering, is a barely legitimate translation, and those German writers who favour the same general interpretation use the more appropriate *Schuld* equivalent to 'fault'.<sup>2</sup>

It will be convenient first to consider the word in its general sense, then its usage in Aristotle, which leads to the celebrated passage in Ch. 13, where *hamartia* is shown as the hinge of tragedy; finally I shall say something about the application of this chapter to the interpretation of Greek Tragedy.

#### *The general meaning of hamartia*

The basic idea is to be found in the verb *hamartanein* 'to miss the mark, to err, to fail'. From it are formed two nouns

<sup>1</sup> Dr. R. D. Dawe's article, 'Some Reflections on *Ate* and *Hamartia*' *HSCP* 72 (1968), 89-123, appeared too late for me to use it

<sup>2</sup> See Kurt von Fritz, *Antike und moderne Tragödie* (Berlin, 1962), pp. 1-21 = *Studium Generale* 8 (1955), 195. Ignorance likely to lead to mistakes is a 'flaw' in a man's equipment, not in his character.

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*hamartia* and *hamartema* which in many senses are indistinguishable, but Aristotle prefers in general to give *hamartema* its natural meaning of a particular case of mistaken action (this is the normal force of the termination *-ema*), and to use *hamartia* for the erroneous belief likely to lead to particular mistaken actions.<sup>1</sup> Thus a man under a misapprehension as to the identity of his parents would suffer from a *hamartia* which might lead him to commit a *hamartema* whenever he took any action relating to his real or supposed parents. It is doubtless no accident that Aristotle uses *hamartema* in his brief definition of comedy (49<sup>a</sup>34) for the particular ludicrous mistake on which a comedy may turn, whereas the continuing illusion of the tragic character is a *hamartia*.

The significance of the word has often been examined<sup>2</sup> and the general development is clear. In early societies actions are judged in themselves and for their consequences without regard to intention.<sup>3</sup> *Hamartia* and *hamartema* could be used in relation to any action which failed to come off; it covered equally error and crime.<sup>4</sup> This intrinsic ambiguity lent itself in course of time to a euphemistic use whereby errors became 'slips'. Even Aristotle allowed himself to be so far contaminated by the practices of rhetoric that he permitted a speaker to call injustices errors and vice versa.<sup>5</sup> Although in neutral contexts *hamartia* remained the usual word for a mistake, the habitual use of the euphemistic sense caused its tone to deteriorate until in the New Testa-

<sup>1</sup> Martin Ostwald in *Festschrift für I. Kapp* (München, 1954), pp. 93-100.

<sup>2</sup> P. van Braam, *CQ* 6 (1912), 266-73; Hey, *Philol.* 83 (1928), 1-17, 137-63; Harsh, *TAPA* 76 (1945), 47-58.

<sup>3</sup> K. Latte, *ARW* (1920), 275.

<sup>4</sup> The flexibility of usage can be illustrated from *Aes. Ag.* 1194-7 where Cassandra asks: 'Am I "mistaken" (*ἡμαρτον*) in my account of the "crimes" (*ἁμαρτίαι*) of the House of Atreus?'

<sup>5</sup> *R.* 1405<sup>a</sup>26: ἐξέσσι λέγειν τὸν ἀδικήσαντα μὲν ἁμαρτάνειν, τὸν δ' ἁμαρτάνοντα ἀδικῆσαι.

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ment it appears as the regular word for sin. Even in Antiphon in the late fifth century we find the paradoxical expression 'premeditated crimes and *hamartemata*', showing that in suitable company the word already implied simple injustice, and in the orators it is frequently so used.<sup>1</sup>

##### *Hamartia in Aristotle*

As in other writers the normal meaning is 'mistake'. Within a few lines of the famous passage on *hamartia* in tragedy we read (53<sup>a</sup>24) 'those critics are mistaken (*hamartanousi*) who find fault with Euripides because of the way his plays are constructed'. Occasionally Aristotle uses the word in such a way that the natural English rendering is 'wrong-doing', but here it is necessary to remember a difference between ancient and modern ethical attitudes, that the ancients tended to emphasize the intellectual element in wrong decision where we tend to lay the blame on wrong desires and wrong behaviour, as can be illustrated from such a passage as *Ethics* 1109<sup>b</sup>12, 'if we put aside pleasure (which upsets our judgement) we shall be less likely to err'.

In three passages Aristotle discusses at length the nature of *hamartia*. Always it is rooted in ignorance; ignorance of ends amounts to moral obliquity; further, a man may be responsible for the ignorance which misleads him, as when it is due to drunkenness. Such acts are different from those performed with premeditation, since they are regretted afterwards, and in general they are pitied and forgiven.<sup>2</sup> Again he distinguishes actions done in ignorance that is unavoidable, which are defined as *atuchemata*, and actions done in consequence of ignorance which might have been avoided by care and forethought; these are called in the context *hamartemata*, though in a more general sense this

<sup>1</sup> Ant. 1. 27: ἐκ προνοίας ἀδικήμασιν καὶ ἀμαρτήμασιν. At R. 1374<sup>b</sup>5 the same two words are contrasted: τὰ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα μὴ τοῦ ἴσου ἀξιούν.

<sup>2</sup> EN 1111<sup>a</sup>2: ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη. See 1109<sup>b</sup>30–11<sup>a</sup>20.



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word covers both classes of unintentional act.<sup>1</sup> A similar distinction is drawn in the *Rhetoric* between unintentional acts whose consequences are, or are not, contrary to reasonable expectation.<sup>2</sup> But in these passages Aristotle is not laying it down that these are the intrinsic meanings of the words; he is giving them for his own purposes an unusually precise meaning. In the *Poetics* *hamartia* is not to be regarded as a technical term, and the distinction between *hamartia* proper and *atuchema* has no relevance. Usually the tragic *hamartia* leads to an *atuchema* caused by lack of essential knowledge; occasionally there may be some lack of caution as in Deianeira's rather improvident use of her supposed love-potion. The essence of *hamartia* is ignorance combined with the absence of wicked intent. Mere lack of knowledge is *agnoia*; *hamartia* is lack of the knowledge which is needed if right decisions are to be taken.

### Hamartia in Ch. 13 of the *Poetics*

It is important to remember that the subject of this chapter is plot—it is under plot, not character, that the subject is discussed. The question is how pity and fear are best aroused. It has already been laid down that the subject of a tragic action is a change of fortune, and that each event must be a likely or necessary consequence of what has gone before. The possibilities are put in terms of good or bad men changing to good or bad fortune. The solution is to be found in the misfortunes of a man who is neither very good nor very bad and who acts under the influence of *hamartia*, not frailty as opposed to badness, but error as opposed to evil intent. We now have a specific cause for the action leading to the change of fortune. Aristotle has required that

<sup>1</sup> *EN* 1135<sup>b</sup>16: ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἢ βλάβη γένηται, ἀτύχημα: ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ δὲ κακίας, ἀμάρτημα (ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ τῆς ἀγνοίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ' ὅταν ἐξῶθεν). Cf. *R. ad Alex.* 1427<sup>a</sup>31–43.

<sup>2</sup> *R.* 1374<sup>b</sup>6: ἔστι δ' ἀτυχήματα μὲν ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἀμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τ' ἐστίν.

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the logic of cause and effect should be rigidly observed; nothing could be more logical than that decisions made under a misapprehension should lead to disastrous consequences, and the train of events may well come to a climax in a *peripeteia*. Further, it is a true observation that the number of myths which contain such a *hamartia* is limited, with the result that dramatists returned again and again to the few families which were suitable for their purpose (53<sup>a</sup>17, 54<sup>a</sup>12).

The subject is continued in Ch. 14 dealing with the situations which best arouse pity and fear. The term *hamartia* is not there used, but the situations are defined with reference to the knowledge or ignorance of the participants,<sup>1</sup> and those situations in which action is taken or intended by those ignorant of the real position are preferred as being more productive of emotion. The best tragedy requires a sequence of events which are logically necessary, or at least plausible, leading to an unexpected result. An initial *hamartia* is admirably suited to bring this about.

### *Hamartia in Greek tragedy*

The only Greek tragedy of which we know beyond doubt that Aristotle considered it to contain a *hamartia* is the *OT*. If we allow that Ch. 14 is evidence, we may add the *Odysseus Traumatias* or *Akanthoplex* of Sophocles (53<sup>b</sup>34), the *Cresphontes* and *IT* of Euripides (54<sup>a</sup>5-7); from the *Alcmeon* of Astydamas and the otherwise unknown *Helle*, also mentioned in this chapter, nothing is to be learned. The search for a moral *hamartia* in Oedipus has been conducted with the utmost earnestness. The faults for which Oedipus suffers in Sophocles are his vain curiosity in consulting the oracle about his birth, his pride in refusing to yield the way

<sup>1</sup> The man who acts *ἀγνοῶν* or *μὴ εἰδώς* is conveniently contrasted with one who acts *εἰδώς*, and *ἀγνοῶ*/*ἀναγνωρίζω* are complementary terms, but *ἁμαρτών*/*ἁμαρτία* are less easy to use antithetically; *εἰδώς* answers better to *ἀγνοῶν* than to *ἁμαρτών*.

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on his return from that oracle, and his fury and violence in attacking four men on the road the very day he had been forewarned by the oracle that he should kill his father', Dennis, *The Impartial Critic* (1693). To this can be added his improvidence in marrying a woman old enough to be his mother. Of these charges only his violent retaliation for the violence offered him in the Phocian pass need be taken seriously. But Oedipus never reproached himself for this action and nobody in the play criticized it. Though it is not generally justified to use one play as evidence for another, it is surely relevant that in the *OC* Oedipus regularly asserts his moral innocence of his father's death, even to the extent of claiming (998-9) that Laius himself, if restored to life, would admit it.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly we must conclude that, like Telegonus and Iphigeneia and Merope, Oedipus labours under the disadvantage of not possessing vital information without which a right decision is impossible. He differs from them only in that his *hamartia* has also a positive side; not only is he unaware who his parents are, but he believes he knows who are his parents when he does not. The peculiar effectiveness of the play is not unconnected with this extra layer of error.<sup>2</sup>

Ignorance of identity is likely to have been a factor in all but one of the six plots given by Aristotle as examples of action originating in *hamartia*.<sup>3</sup> Several of these are revenge stories in which the avenger naturally conceals his identity and is thus a cause of *hamartia* in others. The other group of

<sup>1</sup> On the 'guilt' of Oedipus see J. T. Sheppard, *The Oedipus Tyrannus of S.*, Introduction, Ch. 2; Sir Maurice Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy*, pp. 166-76; A. J. A. Waldock, *Sophocles the Dramatist*, pp. 151-60; C. H. Whitman, *Sophocles*, pp. 32, 129-33; G. M. Kirkwood, *A Study of Sophoclean Drama*, pp. 172-6; D. W. Lucas, *The Greek Tragic Poets*, pp. 150-2.

<sup>2</sup> There is a similar *hamartia* in the *Helen*. Menelaus would have recognized Helen in Egypt if he had not supposed that the real Helen was the phantom whom he had recovered from Troy.

<sup>3</sup> See note on 53<sup>a</sup>20. The exception is the story of Meleager, where the ignorance seems to have related to the facts of the murder.

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legends suitable for the construction of such plots is the one which tells of the birth of semi-divine children. A god or hero has a child, often twins, by a mortal maiden who gives birth in secret and abandons her offspring in fear of parental anger. They are miraculously saved and appear years later to rescue the mother in a moment of danger. The *anagnorisis* in Sophocles' *Tyro*, a play of this type, is referred to in Ch. 16 (54<sup>b</sup>25), and the extant *Ion* of Euripides is similar. In his later years Euripides wrote a number of plays belonging to this type, which later, with a purely human setting, was transferred to New Comedy.

*Hamartia* is certainly not confined to illusions about personal identities. An abundant source of error is misinterpretation of oracles; Oedipus himself is involved in this, and so is Heracles in the *Trachiniae*. Of a different type is the *hamartia* of Deianeira in the same play. In some measure the seed of error is in herself:<sup>1</sup> ignorance about the nature of the poison which she used as a love-philtre was not imposed on her; she was deceived, but it need not have been beyond her to suspect the truth.

The difficult problem is to define the limits of *hamartia* in those plays in which the relevant character suffers through a fault which could indeed be called a *hamartia*, but which is much more than a misapprehension about particular facts. Thus Athenaeus said of Hippolytus that he possessed every excellence and the one fault, that he paid no honour to Aphrodite, which was the cause of his destruction.<sup>2</sup> He had beyond question a wrong attitude towards Aphrodite, but it was not based on lack of information; at the end of the play he remains the outraged victim and, matters of detail apart,

<sup>1</sup> EN 1135<sup>b</sup>18, quoted on p. 302, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> 600 C: νεανίσκῳ τὴν πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντι τοῦτο μόνον τὸ ἀμάρτημα προσόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐτίμα τὴν Ἀφροδίτην, αἴτιον ἐγένετο τοῦ ὀλέθρου. There is no reason to assume any reference to Peripatetic criticism, in which, so far as is known, *hamartia*-*hamartema* were not technical terms. J. C. Kamerbeek, *Entret. Fond. Hardt*, vi. 25, agrees that H. had no *hamartia* in the relevant sense.

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does not pass from ignorance to knowledge. It is Theseus who has a *hamartia* in believing, on no inadequate grounds, that his son is guilty, but he is not the character who experiences the change of fortune, nor is his discovery of the truth a natural consequence of the action since it is revealed to him by Artemis in the course of her epiphany. The conclusion seems to be that though Aristotle might well have alluded casually to the *hamartia* of Hippolytus, he would not have counted the *Hippolytus* among the plays which follow the principle laid down in Ch. 13. Incidentally, Hippolytus is a hero whose excellence is so nearly untarnished that his death might well seem repellent (*miarón*). Much the same would apply to another difficult case, the *Antigone*. There can of course be no question of a *hamartia* on the part of Antigone herself; what she did was right; her defiance may seem unfeminine, but had she been as patient as Griselda, the consequences of her choice would have been the same. Creon is in rather a similar position with reference to the 'unwritten laws' as is Hippolytus with reference to Aphrodite. He is mistaken about them, but his mistake is, in general, disinterested; yet to be unaware of the status of universal laws is to be ignorant of the right ends of conduct, which amounts to wickedness.<sup>1</sup> The defect of Ajax is more flagrant still; his pride forbids him to submit to the authority of either gods or men; such defiance may be magnificent but it is a fault on the grand scale, not an error but a refusal to live on the terms which the cosmos imposes on mankind.

Like many of the ideas in the *Poetics* the idea of *hamartia* can be extended and applied in various ways. Critics have been inclined to lose sight of the context in which it is expressed; it is a feature not of every play but of the best plays, and it seems that 'the best tragedies' in Aristotle's judgement belonged to a rather limited type. It may well be that for the critic of tragedy *hamartia* in its wider and

<sup>1</sup> *EN* 1110<sup>b</sup>28: ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ ὄλως κακοὶ γίνονται.

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perfectly normal sense of moral fault would be a more useful term, but it is not compatible with the examples which Aristotle offers.

The tragedy of error, of that blindness which is part of the human condition, was not the only kind of tragedy even in Greece; but it represents an experience and a vision of life peculiarly Greek. It is an intrinsic part of their myth and of history stated in terms of myth. It is no accident that long before Aristotle Herodotus the historian, friend of Sophocles the dramatist, translated the story of Cambyses into the very paradigm of Greek tragedy. When Cambyses was campaigning in Egypt, he was misled by a dream which seemed to reveal that Smerdis, his brother, was conspiring to seize the Persian throne. A secret emissary to Susa procured his death, and Cambyses thought himself secure; but a Mede, the pseudo-Smerdis, usurped the kingdom, and as Cambyses was hurrying home to suppress the revolt and stopped in an obscure Syrian village, he accidentally wounded himself. 'As it seemed to him that the injury was mortal he asked what was the name of the place where he was, and they said it was Agbatana. Now while he was in Egypt he had heard a prophecy that in Agbatana he would end his life. He had thought that he would die an old man in Median Agbatana where all his treasure was, but the oracle spoke, as it turned out, of Agbatana in Syria.' So Cambyses realized that he had been deceived and had killed an innocent brother to no purpose, and he said: 'Being mistaken in all that was to happen (*hamarton*), I became the slayer of my brother when I should not, and none the less am I robbed of my kingdom.'<sup>1</sup> 'Being mistaken in all that was to happen' is a phrase as pregnant as Aristotle's 'things happening unexpectedly one because of another'. Like Cambyses, Oedipus and Heracles, secure in illusion, walk into the jaws of destruction.

<sup>1</sup> Herod. 3. 65. 4: παντὸς δὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι ἀμαρτῶν.



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