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## **Vom Krieg zum Terrorismus?**

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### **Mosse-Lectures**

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Klaus R. Scherpe

**Öffentlichkeit von Kultur**  
**Die *Mosse-Lectures* an der**  
**Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin**

Die Veranstaltungsreihe der *Mosse-Lectures* ehrt den großen amerikanischen Historiker und Theoretiker des deutschen Faschismus George L. Mosse, der 1997 noch selber die erste Rede im neu erstellten Mosse-Zentrum hielt. Zugleich erinnert die Humboldt-Universität an die Geschichte eines ihrer Standorte in Berlins Mitte, den *genius loci* des liberalen, jüdischen Verlagshauses Mosse, in dem u. a. das legendäre Berliner Tageblatt erschien, redigiert vom demokratischen Geist des einflussreichen Publizisten Theodor Wolff und geprägt von den Beiträgen der namhaften Journalisten, Schriftsteller und Künstler der Weimarer Republik.

An der Geschichte dieses Hauses und seiner Nachfahren, die heute im *Jüdischen Museum* in Berlin dokumentiert ist, ist abzulesen, was sich angesichts des jüngsten geopolitischen und medientechnologischen Wandels besonders deutlich abzeichnet: dass *Kultur* keineswegs selbstverständlich eine Öffentlichkeit hat, dass *Öffentlichkeit* keineswegs kulturell etabliert ist. Auch in den westlichen Demokratien fördert die zulässige und gewünschte Vielfalt der Meinungen nicht selbstverständlich das Unterscheidungsvermögen und die Urteilsfähigkeit mündiger Bürger.

Welche Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten von Kultur kann Öffentlichkeit heute haben? Was sind die Vorstellungen und eingreifenden Beiträge der Literaturen, Künste und Wissenschaften? Welche Chancen bieten der Austausch und die Zusammenarbeit von Politikern, Medienpraktikern, Künstlern und Wissenschaftlern? Die Fachdisziplinen der Universität und die auf ihre (relative) Autonomie pochenden Künste sind stets zur *Interdisziplinarität* aufgefordert. Es ist dies aber nicht nur eine organisatorische Auf-

gabe und eine methodische Verpflichtung. Darüber hinaus gilt die verantwortliche Selbstbeteiligung an den öffentlichen Angelegenheiten: eine *condition humaine* und ein Menschenrecht eigener Art. Es herrscht ein „schreiender Mangel an Zusammenhang“, sagt der Schriftsteller und Medienproduzent Alexander Kluge und spricht eine Warnung aus: „Es gibt keine Identität in der Isolation!“

In der von der Hilde-Mosse-Foundation, New York, und Hans K. Röder, dem Eigner des Mosse-Zentrums, finanziell unterstützten Vorlesungsreihe haben seit 1997 vierundvierzig prominente Wissenschaftler, Schriftsteller, Künstler und Politiker gesprochen. Im Wintersemester 2002/2003 hieß das Rahmenthema *Vom Krieg zum Terrorismus? Militärische, geopolitische und kulturelle Optionen nach dem 11. September*. Die terroristischen Anschläge von New York und Washington haben militärische Strategien, machtpolitische Konstellationen und interkulturelle Muster der Verständigung grundlegend verändert. Der Terror wird zum *akzidentellen* Krieg. Er entwickelt sich im Verhältnis zur staatlichen Verfassung, zum Völkerrecht und zur avancierten Technik der Netzserver und Programme: der digitalen Proliferation des militärischen, politischen und kulturellen Wissens. Versagen in der wünschbaren „Zivilgesellschaft“ die gewollten Unterscheidungen zwischen kommunikativer und technischer Vernunft? Erzeugt die unheilige Allianz von Angst (Terrorismus) und Sekurität (Überwachung) in der so genannten zivilisierten Welt des Westens den Rückfall in atavistisches Handeln und apokalyptisches Denken? Wie ist die Rolle eines wie auch immer zu einigenden Europa im Verhältnis zur Vormachtstellung des „neuen Imperiums“ der USA zu bestimmen? Erzeugen die globale Infrastruktur der Wirtschaftsmächtigen und die sich neu ordnende staatliche Machtpolitik auch ihr „Anderes“: den hochtechnischen Terrorismus ehemaliger und heute angeblich undefinierbarer „Nomadenvölker“? Wie ist – im Unterschied zum Visionarismus einer asymmetrischen Anordnung des Militärischen und Zivilen im 21. Jahrhundert – die konstruktive, aber auch destruktive Kraft der militärstrategischen, machtpolitischen und kulturellen Optionen nach dem 11. September zu begreifen?

Die Vorträge von Étienne Balibar aus Paris, Martin van Crefeld aus Jerusalem und Friedrich Kittler aus Berlin versuchen, im Zeichen einer öffentlichen Verantwortung von Wissenschaft eigene Antworten zu geben.

Étienne Balibar

## **Europe: Vanishing Mediator?<sup>1</sup>**

Being invited by the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin to give this year's first public George L. Mosse Lecture is one of the greatest honors that I have received.<sup>2</sup> It is also for me a moving opportunity to return to Berlin and meet dear friends and excellent colleagues. Finally, it gives me the possibility to present before you some hypotheses on the function that European intellectuals can perform and the ideas that they should advocate in the current international situation, where the very project of a European community of nations and citizens is challenged. For all these generous gifts I want to thank you very sincerely.

I am especially pleased to speak under the auspices of George Mosse. I became aware of the importance of his work rather late in my life. Since reading *Nationalism and Sexuality* and his other books dealing with the relationships between nationalism, race, gender, and sexuality in the building of modern communities, I have always considered him a master of historical and political anthropology. I have also realized the extent to which his life and career, marked by the consequences of the European catastrophe of the twentieth century, and shared among the universities of three continents, form an epitome of our cosmopolitan background and a key to the intelligence of our present. I draw a permanent inspiration from them.

### **I. Voices from America**

Since September 11, many calls are directed toward Europeans. This is flattering for us, but also embarrassing. We understand that we really exist, but we fear some misunderstanding. I shall concentrate on the calls coming from the United States. Leaving



aside for the moment the *official* (or quasi-official) ones which express the view of the current Administration, I will examine in more detail those coming from the *liberal* intellectuals of America. This call is indeed self-critical; it is voiced by a „minority“ that wants to distinguish itself from the „majority“, criticizing the choices that are imposed by the majority and their elected representatives. The underlying idea is that in a globalized world no power can „save“ itself *alone*, but that it could very well „doom“ itself and the others. I shall recall some of the voices from America.

*My first example is Bruce Ackerman.* In February 2002, the prominent jurist and political philosopher from Yale published an article in *The London Review of Books* with the title „Don't Panic“. Ackerman begins with the idea that „the attack of 11 September is the prototype of similar events that will litter the 21st century“, and that „if American reaction is any guide, we urgently require new constitutional concepts to deal with the protection of civil liberties“. Otherwise, he prophecies, „a downward cycle threatens [...]. Even if the next half-century sees only four or five attacks on the scale of 11 September, this destructive cycle will prove devastating to civil liberties by 2050“. However, he does not see „an absolutist defense of traditional freedom“ as the right response on the part of liberals. Declaring his concern to „prevent politicians from exploiting momentary panic to impose long-lasting limitations on liberty“, Ackerman is especially critical of the notion of „war on terrorism“, which can and will be used both to cancel civil liberties and to destroy the democratic balance of powers between the administration, Congress, and the judiciary. What he advocates is a carefully controlled „state of emergency“ with legal and temporal limits, where as many „normal“ institutions as possible keep working under internal and external scrutiny of the „defenders of freedom“. And he concludes: „In the future, it will not be enough to defeat proposals that threaten permanent damage to civil liberties. A framework law emerging from any major European state would have worldwide influence. It would help us see the ‚war on terrorism‘ for what it is: an extravagant metaphor blocking responsible thought about

a serious problem.“<sup>3</sup> Even if you take into account that this was written for a European journal, it remains surprising and striking. The appeal seems to imply that certain traditions rooted in European politics form a legal pole of resistance against the tendencies towards the *militarization of politics*, inside and outside America, that threatens the very values in whose name the „war on terrorism“ is declared and fought.

I want to take my *second example* from a very different author and context. In a public lecture delivered in December 2002, the Marxist historian and social scientist Immanuel Wallerstein, Director of the Fernand Braudel Center at the State University of New York at Binghamton, explained how he saw the prospects of relationships between the United States and the world after the revelation of a completely new situation that the destruction of the twin towers had represented for Americans.<sup>4</sup> In the first part of his talk, he reminds us that the United States „had always defined itself by the yardstick of the world“, which seemed to prove its continuous superiority. He goes on quoting from Osama bin Laden’s presentation of America as a „depraved“ country, showing that bin Laden was the first person in history to become able to translate very widespread anti-American feelings into a physical attack initiated on American soil that left it momentarily helpless. As a consequence, a „war on terrorism“ was declared, with „no reservations“, that is, including measures against internal enemies. Wallerstein discusses the vulnerabilities of American hegemony, by comparing it with previous examples in history. Wallerstein’s thesis is that the hegemony of the United States is no longer based on unchallenged economic superiority, but only on military capacity. He describes the successive strategies that were implemented after World War II to eliminate forces and powers considered adversary to American interests in the world: containment, neutralization, interventions, subversion, selective „anti-proliferation“ military policies.

In the end, Wallerstein distinguishes between the belief that „America and Americans are the cause of all the world’s miseries and injustices“, which he denies, and the belief that „they are

their prime beneficiaries“, which he endorses. He expresses his fear that America, while trying to „rebuild“ the power that the Twin Towers symbolized, might sacrifice the ideals of freedom and universality that went along with the traditional privileges. This is where a reference to Europe (among others) surfaces again:

„What the United States needs now to do is to learn how to live with the new reality – that it no longer has the power to decide unilaterally what is good for everyone. [...] It has to come to terms with the world. It is not Osama bin Laden with whom we must conduct a dialogue. We must start with our near friends and allies – with Canada and Mexico, with Europe, with Japan. And once we have trained ourselves to hear them and to believe that they too have ideals and interests, that they too have hopes and aspirations, then and only then perhaps shall we be ready to dialogue with the rest of the world, that is, with the majority of the world.“

I understand Wallerstein’s position as expressing a neo-universalist perspective. It takes the form of a defense of *multilateralism* against the attempt to recreate the conditions of a past economic hegemony through the implementation of a military superiority that remains unchallenged at its own level, but is entirely vulnerable to the new kind of threat that develops *within the limits* of the dominant system. It should be a permanent concern, therefore, to resist the polarization of the world into the mimetic figures of *Leviathan* (the world-monopoly of „legitimate“ violence) and *Behemoth* (the ubiquitous power of subversion based on „fundamentalist“ religious creeds).

I borrow my *third example* from the article published in *The New York Times* April 2002 by the British historian and expert on Eastern European Affairs, Timothy Garton Ash (who teaches in Oxford but also works at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University), with the unambiguous title: „The Peril of Too Much Power.“<sup>55</sup> This is also a voice „from America“. Professor Ash be-

gins by stating that „for most of the 20th century, the defining political question was: What do you think of Russia? At the beginning of the 21st century, it is: What do you think of America?“ He recalls how „America is part of everyone’s imaginative life, through movies, music, television and the Web, whether you grow up in Bilbao, Beijing or Bombay. Everyone has a New York in their heads, even if they have never been there.“ In a sense it is not the existence of an American culture that is doubtful, but rather that of a European one. But then comes the problem of the use of America’s power and the effects of the enormous imbalance of power in the world.: „When a nation has so much power, what it doesn’t do is as fateful as what it does.“ Professor Ash especially fears the consequences of a possible American war in Iraq, without any simultaneous initiative to negotiate a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which would unite the Islamic world against the West while dividing Europe from America, „with disastrous consequences for years to come.“ Finally he explains that, since „contrary to what many Europeans think, the problem with American power is not that it is *American*“, but that it is *unchecked*. The internal democratic controls are no longer sufficient or working. „International agencies, starting with the United Nations, and transnational nongovernmental organizations are a place to start. My answer is Europe – Europe as an economic equal to the United States and Europe as a close-knit group of states with a long diplomatic and military experience.“ A difficulty remains, however: „the gulf between its military capacity and that of the U.S. grows ever wider“. Europeans therefore face a „complicated double task“: „to strengthen [their] capacity to act outside [their] own borders while disentangling the idea of a stronger Europe from its sticky anti-American integument“.

Finally, I want to quote from a recent article by Edward Said: „Europe versus America.“<sup>6</sup> Reporting from England, where he is currently teaching, Said emphasizes cultural differences between the U.S. and Europe, especially the disproportionate power of religious fundamentalism: „religion and ideology play a far greater role in the former than in the latter. [...] The vast number of

Christian fanatics in the US [...] form the core of George Bush's support and at 60 million strong represent the single most powerful voting block in US history". This American fundamentalism has merged with the conservative ideology of „American Values“ developed during the Cold War and has become „a menace to the world“. It produces the „unilateralist“ external policy, the belief that the U.S. as an „elect nation“ has a divine mission to be fulfilled by all means. Said embarks then on a synthetic comparison of the ideologies and the political systems on both sides of the Atlantic: „There is no trace of this sort of thing in Europe that I can detect. Nor is there that lethal combination of money and power on a vast scale that controls elections and national policy at will.“ For Said, Europe remains more democratic in practice, the citizens have more effective control over the politicians, are less exposed to ideological blackmail when they dissent from the official policy, and have a less Manichean view of the world. „No wonder then that America has never had an organized Left or real opposition party as has been the case in every European country.“

## **II. Contradictions and Illusions**

We certainly cannot ignore this call coming from the intellectuals of America. It really touches our common interests. We may observe that all these texts have a certain „family resemblance“. But we suspect that they include deep contradictions, and we fear that they have substituted an imaginary Europe for the real one.

Obviously, some American liberals share the view that America is the model democracy, they are especially concerned with the future of democracy in America, which they think should be an interest of the whole world, while others – from a more „global“ or „systemic“ point of view – believe that the democratic character of the U.S. will itself entirely depend on the way America behaves towards the rest of the world. Even more striking are the diverse ways in which these voices refer to the great divides of the world after the Cold War. But what I find even more striking

is the latent tension between two opposite ways of formulating the call to Europe: either as a demand for a *check and balance*, in order to countervail the American (super)power, or a demand for *mediation* within the „war of civilizations“ that America is now apparently waging. If you choose the first formulation, you are in a „strategic“ logic, where the relationships of forces ultimately resolve into military terms, quantitatively and qualitatively. Why address Europe in this case rather than, say, Russia, Japan, or China? Perhaps because the authors of these texts more or less transfer onto Europe the ideal model of „force merged with right“ that they fear America has now betrayed. If you choose the second formulation, you are in a logic of „moral“ and „social“ influences, which certainly does not ignore relationships of forces, but sees them as only one aspect of a more comprehensive process of cultural transformation. In that case, the apparently irreversible gap in military power between the United States and Europe is not necessarily a handicap for Europe. But the question whether it really displays an *alternative* to American policy becomes more embarrassing. Clearly, „multilateralism“ does not mean exactly the same thing from these two points of view. The first is compatible with a confrontation between rival „isolationisms“. Whereas the second implies that political isolation today, among allies or even adversaries, has become obsolete and impossible to achieve. Rather than a „right of intervention“, what we are confronted with would be a „fact of intervention“, that is, interdependence: we cannot ignore it, only perhaps organize it and modify its consequences.

One may wonder, whence the European rejection of the use of force as a means to solve international conflicts originates? This is not, according to Robert Kagan’s analysis, which has received considerable attention on both sides of the Atlantic, because Europeans possess a special character or moral nature: in past centuries, when they dominated the world, they never tired of using force to increase or keep their power, and quite simply they no longer have the capacities for power politics. Europe and America have „exchanged“ their political cultures, as it were: it is now Europe that has adopted the Wilsonian discourse, dreaming of

„civilizing the world“ by putting an end to the wars and doing away with *Machtpolitik*, whose terrible effects Europeans have lived on their own soil. A nice project indeed ... with one proviso: what makes European pacifism and moral consciousness materially possible is American military power itself! The irony is that this transatlantic disagreement is the fruit of successful transatlantic policies. As Joschka Fischer and other Europeans admit, the United States made the new Europe possible by leading the democracies to victory in World War II and the Cold War and by providing the solution to the age-old ‚German problem‘. Even today, Europe’s rejection of power politics ultimately depends on America’s willingness to use force around the world against those who still do believe in power politics. Europe’s Kantian order depends on the United States using power according to the old Hobbesian rules. Most Europeans do not realize that they can project themselves into „post-history“ or „post-modern history“ only because the U.S. did not follow this path. But as a result „this has put Europeans and Americans on a collision course.“ Formally speaking, they remain allies, but the former see the latter as a „rogue colossus“, and the latter see the former as a virtual obstacle, if not a potential traitor. Perhaps it would be better to acknowledge this contradiction, rather than desperately trying to fill the cultural gap.

I don’t believe that I distort the meaning of Robert Kagan’s analysis<sup>7</sup> if I say in a nutshell: the „European“ position, expressing something like a religion of law, is at the same time *powerless* („Europe? how many divisions?“, we might ask, echoing a famous question raised by Stalin), and *illegitimate* (since it disguises a historical regression as moral progress, misrepresenting its real weakness as an imaginary strength). Finally it is *self-destructive*: it undermines the defensive capacities of the Western democracies, everywhere under attack in the world, which remain its only safety. It is decidedly not America that has „too much power“, it is Europe that has too little. A double question is at stake here. *There is a first question concerning the „power“ of Europe.* In a sense, Europe as a sum is even *less* powerful than some of its constitutive nation-states, or its power is less effec-

tive, more difficult to implement. *There is also a second question concerning the „political capacity“ of Europe in today’s world, in particular its capacity to help resolve conflicts and hence the concept of the political by which this capacity can be measured.*

Here is the position that I want now to develop: undoubtedly, from a certain point of view, *Europe does not exist, it is not a political „subject“*. And in this sense to ask Europe to disturb the ongoing processes and plans, to „check and balance“ other powers, is a pure illusion. But on the other hand you cannot reduce the idea of „mediation“ to *the alternative of power politics (ultimately relying upon military force) and „moral“ powerlessness*, even if you admit that a diplomatic and institutional expression has to be found for such a mediation at some moment. The question then becomes: how to imagine a change in the relationship between „politics“ and „power“, *or perhaps better, in the very notion of „power“*.

I agree that European political capacity, which is a necessary condition of its autonomy, in a sense simply does not exist. „Economic weight“ is a weak argument, especially in a globalized economy. Even if you crown it with a common currency, it represents only a variable statistical aggregate, precisely so long as no corresponding „strategy“ or „economic policy“ exists. If you reflect further on the recent confrontation at the United Nations Security Council about the right of the United States to launch what it called a „preventive war“ against Iraq, you see clearly that it is not „Europe“ that, to some extent, has checked American power. It is a conjunctural convergence of middle-range powers who refused to become completely „marginalized“ in international relations. They are not all of Europe, and not all of them are European. In addition, they wouldn’t have achieved anything without certain internal divisions within American strategy itself.

Above all, there is a strong case to be made for Europe’s incapacity to *solve its own problems without American „help“*. When I say its „own“ problems, I am also thinking of neighboring prob-



lems where Europe is necessarily involved. This is exactly the opposite of the liberal dream, but there are numerous dramatic and recent examples, of which we can list but a few. Europe remains unable to solve the Irish problem, where two of its old nations are involved, each with its own „diaspora.“ It proved unable to prevent the civil war in Yugoslavia, which produced the worst crimes against humanity since Nazism, whether by offering a framework for development and coexistence to the various Balkan communities, or by launching a military intervention to neutralize the aggressors and protect the populations with some chance of success. The U.S. then has good reasons to explain that, beginning with the two World Wars, it has been American intervention that has stopped bloodshed and opposed savagery on European soil. What seems to be a characteristic of the twentieth century, and could characterize the twenty-first as well, is not a „European mediation“ in conflicts involving America, but rather an „American mediation“ in conflicts that rend Europe and prove that it is unable to provide an effective political expression for the historical and moral identity it claims to represent.

This is equally true concerning the way Europe deals with violent situations that have developed at its „borders“. Algeria, Palestine-Israel, Chechnya: these are the names of a long series of shameful collective resignations of Europe. Each time in different ways, tracing back to colonial history, to its own ethnic and religious divisions, its wars and genocides, Europe was involved as a cause or a mirror of these „impossible to solve“ conflicts, whose continuous degradation threatens its own civility and moral identity. History seems to show that any political entity, in order to exist, needs an „idea“ or a universal project to unify its human and material forces. But Europe’s project can no longer be to subjugate the world, as in the colonial era. Nor can it be a messianic project of announcing the birth of the „new man“. Europe can indeed try to exercise a „civilizing“ influence in the world, as well as to build the moral conditions of its own construction, but in order to do so it has to be more active. By abandoning the Chechens to the total war waged against them by post-soviet Russia, Europe keeps in the traditional line of blindness before

genocidal processes, and it practically denies the „European“ character of Russia, destroying the possibilities of finally lifting the „iron curtain“. By practically endorsing the plans of the U.S.-Israel alliance in the Middle East, the Europeans help the development of a new „generalized“ anti-Semitism in the world, where judeophobia and arabophobia paradoxically merge. By keeping silent on the crimes of the Algerian army (which seem to match the crimes of the Islamic terrorist groups) and backing the repression of democratic movements by other authoritarian regimes in Northern Africa, while at the same time racially and culturally discriminating against their own „immigrant“ populations from the Maghreb, they provoke a disastrous collapse of the „Euro-Mediterranean“ project.

But, we may ask, is this the only way to analyze the situation? I would suggest that the new „global“ conjuncture offers other alternatives. Undoubtedly the cultural divisions and conflicting interests of the world also affect us in Europe and could become acute. There is to date no strong symbol of a common identity that could help neutralize or suppress them. Undoubtedly Europe and America are not separated spaces, any more than Europe and Eurasia, or Europe and the Middle East. In this respect some countries owe to their history or their geography or their demographic composition the virtual capacity to „open gates“ and „build bridges“. Whether you think of Britain, the Ukraine, Turkey, or the Balkans, it would be absurd to try and forcefully locate them on a single side of an external „European border“. Undoubtedly Europe does not have the capacity to impose a kind of European „Monroe Doctrine“. But you can read all this in the opposite sense. No European „identity“ can be *opposed* to others in the world because there exist no absolute *borderlines* between the historical and cultural territory of Europe and the surrounding spaces. There exist no absolute borderlines *because Europe as such is a „borderline“*. More precisely it is a superposition of borderlines, hence a superposition of heterogeneous relations to the other histories and cultures of the world, which are reproduced within its own history and culture established rules.

We must draw all the consequences from the fact that *Europe is a borderland* rather than an entity that „has“ *borders* (or „will have“ them in the future). This quite naturally leads us to completely reexamine the relationships between „strategy“, „power“, and „subjectivity“ . In order to overcome the dilemma of a strategy that presupposes the autonomy of the subject that conceives and implements it, *agency* must have a privilege over *identity*. What is at stake is indeed a complete change in the way *relations of power* are calculated, imputed, and recognized on the world scale.

### III. Toward a European „Anti-Strategic“ Policy?

I am convinced that only a transformation in the way we understand the concept of politics in relation with the idea of „power“ will allow us to begin to escape the aporias affecting the notion of a „European policy“, and to give a realistic content to the notion of a „European mediation“, which combines such opposite demands as increasing Europe’s specific role in world affairs, and deconstructing the myths of European closure and exclusive identity. How then both to *individualize and de-substantialize Europe*? Is that really possible?

It will become possible only if, reacting to the calls addressed to us and drawing lessons from historical experience, we criticize to the roots the proposition presupposed by most of the arguments concerning politics and power: that an efficient action can take place only when the agent has an exclusive control over some resources, and is able to use them as a unified „sovereign subject“, at the very least enjoying a stable and recognized identity. This was typically the objective of the classical nation-states, and the European Union seems to be in permanent search of similar constitutional and administrative tools to achieve the same result. What I suggest is that we need to explore a completely different path, where *power does not predate action, but is rather its result*, in a sense that depends upon the goals that one wants to achieve. It is action, or agency, that produces the degree and dis-

tribution of power, not the reverse. As Michel Foucault used to explain, agency is „power acting upon power“, therefore it is the (efficient) use of *the other's power*, also resulting from its own orientation.<sup>9</sup> For the same reason, a „collective identity“ is not a given, a metaphysical prerequisite of agency, and it is certainly not a mythical image that could be forcefully imposed upon reality by inventing this or that historical criterion (for example, „Christian Europe“). It is a *quality* of collective agency, which changes form and content in time, as new agents come into play and new solidarities are built among those who, not long ago, were ignoring or fighting each other.

It will be useful to remind ourselves, in a schematic manner, of historical experiences that contributed to shaping contemporary Europe, especially in the past century. The lessons that we can draw from them are clearly not beyond dispute; they can be interpreted diversely in different places on the Continent and according to the social and political affiliations of each of us. But they have become to a large extent part of our collective memory, which is active in our intellectual elaborations and the institutional realities of Europe.

A first lesson – let us call it *the lesson of tragedy*, because it concerns the „civil wars“ that devastated the European community of peoples – seems initially to be purely negative. However, it gives its deep roots to what I would call, following Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, a „transnational public order“ that contradicts the „Clausewitzian“ equivalence of the „means“ of war and the „means“ of politics.<sup>10</sup> Retrospectively, the interstate national wars that periodically broke into the history of the „peoples“ and modified their respective powers, leading in the end to the mass exterminations during the World Wars and even after, are only one aspect of a more general system of violent conflicts, which includes also „wars“ between classes, religious communities, ideologies. And it is far from easy to always clearly distinguish what mainly depends on ethnic or religious, as opposed to social and ideological determinations. Whenever you believe to be able to reach a „final“ solution, you create the conditions for more de-

struction and self-destruction. Mutual extermination as such does not have an „end“ – or better said, it can reach an end only when it is radically deprived of its legitimacy, and if collective institutionalized counter-powers emerge.

But this is an incomplete lesson, and in some sense a blind one. It takes the problem of violence *within a „metropolitan“ framework* that cannot really be isolated. Only recently, and with considerable difficulties, have we become conscious of the fact that „barbarity“ indeed circulated for centuries between the dominant center and the dominated periphery. The critical labor of memory concerning the violence of European conquest and rule did not immediately start with decolonization, but long after the event, as in the case of the French War in Algeria. Much remains to be uncovered and acknowledged, but this growing consciousness of the realities of colonial history, a history that has made Europe what it is, has now profoundly disturbed Eurocentric visions that used to contrast „our“ civilization with „their“ barbarity: the greatest barbarity certainly. The *positive* counterpart of all this is a powerful, irreversible phenomenon of hybridization and multiculturalism now transforming Europe in a way that considerably differs from the American „melting pot“, even if you consider such „cosmopolitan“ cities as New York and Los Angeles. It started with specific, reciprocal ties between former metropolises and their former empires, but is now quite generalized as a pattern of interaction between Europe as such and its „exterior“. If the first lesson to be drawn from recent European history could be called a tragic lesson of public order, we might call this other one a lesson of *otherness*. It leads Europe to recognize, albeit with considerable hesitations and drawbacks, that the Other is a necessary component of its „identity“, therefore its future vitality, its „power“.

I would like to add a third lesson. It cannot be isolated from the other aspects of European history, but has its own specific implications. It concerns the possibility of a gradual transformation of the violence of social antagonisms into collective political capacities by combining the different resources of *institutionalizing*

*conflicts*, setting up *public and private* instances of social regulation, and progressively introducing *new basic rights*, which add new positive „liberties“ or, as Amartya Sen calls them, „capabilities“,<sup>11</sup> to the existing rights of the individual, thus becoming an essential component of citizenship. We might call this lesson „Machiavelli’s Theorem“, referring to the political model that can be found in famous pages in his *Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio*.<sup>12</sup>

I would admit that globalization has weakened this lesson, or confronts it with a dilemma, since it places nation-states in a defensive position, restricting their possibilities to mediate social conflicts and leaving without solution the urgent problem of the constitution of a new „citizenship“ in Europe. But the fact remains that Europe, in this respect, has a singular, if not privileged, position in the world. Europe certainly has no monopoly of pluralist representative democracy. But its own history of social movements has produced a level of institutional recognition of basic social rights that is still unrivaled in today’s world.

It would seem that this last lesson has to do with an original elaboration of *conflictual democracy*, where different heterogeneous constitutional principles are combined. This combination includes a development of *legal or formal democracy*, making sure that the individuals who vindicate them are recognized, ultimately, as the true bearers of rights. It also includes a development of *social or substantial democracy*, making sure that inequalities are addressed and conflictual interests taken into account, so that individual freedom is not pure and simply equivalent with competition, and competition with an elimination of the weakest within the „city“. Finally, it refers to an idea of *expansive democracy* (in the language of Antonio Gramsci) or *democratic invention* (in the language of Claude Lefort), which means that politics remains open to the integration of new elements into the „common part“ of mankind, and there can be no „end of history“. <sup>13</sup>

I would not be misunderstood: none of these „lessons“ seems to me irreversible, valid for ever, or unquestionable. All of them re-

main clearly fragile and ambiguous. After experiencing extermination processes on its own soil, Europe believed that it had become the natural champion of international law, which in many cases it does not obey itself. It has become conscious of the positive value of the other as such, but it keeps excluding people by systematically combining criteria of culture (practically equivalent to race) and economic discrimination. The „European“ conception of conflictual democracy that I have described is more a past ideal than a living reality today: it has a tendency to return to purely corporatist forms, since economic deregulation and globalization deprive it of its material possibilities to protect citizens from the brutal variations in the labor market and the continuous decrease in the level of welfare. However, these deep contradictions are part of a dynamic whose consequences should and could be to continue and broaden the European experience of politics by mobilizing all our forces, be they economic, cultural, intellectual, social, or legal, but also „external“ forces, to transform international relations. Such a project is not an exercise of power politics; it does not aim at constituting a new (great) power, but rather at constituting a *new type of power*, one that nobody can appropriate. This type of power is essentially a *new correlation among the existing forces*; it becomes effective inasmuch as structures and relations of forces are evolving, and resistances and alternatives to the dominant tendencies become more consistent. This explains why I preferred the expression „anti-strategic politics“. But it is not to say that we can do without initiatives, orientations, and even mottoes. I have no intention to define a „program“, but I will try to list some priorities, being aware that they concern long term evolutions, where obstacles and setbacks and rectifications will inevitably take place.

### *Collective security: for protection, against fortifications*

In order to transform international relations, we need a *model of collective security* that can open the possibility of escaping the confrontation between „terrorist“ and „counter-terrorist“ forces. But the notion of „collective security“, which is constitutive of

the texts on which international institutions are based (in particular the Charter of the United Nations),<sup>14</sup> can not remain purely formal. It cannot simply demand that the use of military force be subjected to the conditions registered in international law. It must become (again) a *political goal*, therefore involve *decisions* on certain crucial issues. In my view the demarcation line clearly passes between a *necessity* and an *impossibility*. It is necessary to take into account the real complexity and deep social roots of the *causes* that feed violence and encourage the recourse to terrorist practices and ideologies everywhere in the world: not only in the „peripheries“ ridden with poverty, humiliation and corruption, but also in the „centers“ where inequalities and discriminations are growing, with probably no less corruption. But it is impossible to blindly accept violence and terrorism as real answers to exploitation and domination. This answer is neither legitimate nor effective; it destroys the very cause in the name of which it is exercised. Collective security therefore requires us to reject the projective illusion of transforming the main victims of insecurity into its ultimate authors, but also to leave aside prophetic discourses picturing „the capitalist system“ as the hidden cause of every violence and all conflicts, including those which are obstacles to its own development.

What are then the complementary requisites of a viable model of collective security? It must allow the possibility for both actively fighting against injustice *and* having intelligence and police services combine their actions under legal control against terrorist networks, if their existence is proved (which seems to be the case of Al Qaeda, although the various powers involved clearly don't want all its dimensions to be clarified). If we agree that, for various reasons, there currently is a special threat of „Islamic terrorism“, there is no doubt in my mind that the ultimate condition for an effective „counter-terrorist“ policy is an active commitment to promoting the emergence of democratic regimes within the Islamic world. Only the ensemble of societies and states where Islam is the essential cultural reference, with the assistance of the international community, will prove able to „uproot“ Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. A model of collective security



therefore rules out the substitution for joint operations that prove either too difficult or too embarrassing for the hegemonic power and its clients, of potentially exterminist and imperialist wars that serve mainly objectives of regional domination and prestige.

### *General Disarmament: Who is in Charge?*

It is meaningless to talk about collective security if the global level of armaments is not reduced. International institutions are not only in charge of negotiating and settling conflicts; they have been created with a goal of generalizing and controlling the process of disarmament. This is the true basis of the idea of „multilateralism“, and it cannot be left aside from the moment when it becomes officially a question of obtaining the „disarmament“ of one or several states whose weapons, quantitatively and qualitatively, are dangerous „for the whole of mankind“. By definition no state („rogue“ or not) can be excepted from this rule, since precisely the populations of the whole world are likely to become victims of aggressions or, conversely, of retaliations and preventive wars against particular aggressors. It has been repeatedly proven that the origin of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and more generally the constant elevation of the level of military equipment in the world, has to be traced back to the great powers themselves, which produce them or develop most of the corresponding research programs.

The practical consequence is that Europe should not accept the comparison currently drawn between the „war on terrorism“ and the war against Nazism, raising once again the specter of „Munich“ when the idea of disarmament is suggested. It should refuse NATO plans to start a new cycle of development of its military capacities. On the contrary it should immediately raise the question of a long-term reduction in the level of armaments in the world, concerning both the „new“ and the „old“ concentrations of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, which include the European concentrations and exportations, under international control and inspections.

There are obvious difficulties with such a perspective, which are only too likely to lead to its abandonment. It contradicts powerful private and public interests in the production and consumption of arms, which continuously increase the level of insecurity throughout the world, producing a general phenomenon of militarization of social life, and transforming large regions of the world into zones of endemic violence and death. This is true enough; it proves that any serious program of disarmament involves a number of material conditions, including social and political changes all over the world. This is also the reason why we should not simply identify disarmament with pacifism. Controlled disarmament should be compatible with modernized national or supra-national defense policies, provided only that negotiations take place to replace offensive programs by defensive ones. Consequently and above all it means that „the world“ agrees to offer *guarantees and means of security to the American people* which, in the long run, would appear better than the prospects of isolation, fortification, and counter-terror on a world scale. This may indeed require the experience of tragic events, such as the attacks on September 11.

*Local and Global Processes:  
Who Is Accountable, Who Can Mediate?*

I am not trying to introduce a new brand of pacifism. I speak of collective security and advocate, against the current, a new cycle of general disarmament, but I don't speak against *any intervention* in the violent conflicts and civil wars that tend to shape world politics today: not only *humanitarian* interventions, but *coercive* interventions, making use of the means that derive from the contemporary intersections of economic, technological, and cultural processes. Not even military „forces of interposition“ should be excluded as a matter of principle, if the conditions exist for their introduction. However, Europe might draw another lesson from its own experience: military conflicts where ethnic, religious, and cultural communities confront each other, which are at the same time extremely unequal and mixed with one another,

can be resolved only *locally*. Better said, *the local and global determinations should invert their roles*. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is exemplary here. Everybody understands now that the roots of further hostilities were present in the very terms of the Oslo Accords and the „peace process“ based on them. But the Oslo Accords had one important positive aspect: they implied that, with the help of external mediating forces, the solution should be found *by the conflicting groups themselves*. You frequently hear just the opposite nowadays, both in America and in Europe: that „the Israelis and Palestinians have proved incapable of discussion.“ The result is a merging of the causes of the conflict into elements of a global conflict, producing destructions and hatreds that become more irreversible every day.

What I tentatively call an „anti-strategy“ therefore also implies giving a systematic primacy to local determinations over the „global“ ones, because they refer to the specific historical and geographical roots of the conflict. But to emphasize the importance of the local level is not to isolate it: we should neither deny globalization nor fetishize it as a „destiny“, but rather explore all the possibilities that it provides in order to set up „multilateral“ interventions which provide the conflicting subjects with observers, mediators, and witnesses who are *themselves accountable*, in order to build a space for coexistence. On the stage of globalized violence, there are today many actors more or less powerful and dangerous, but apparently only one „judge“, who is or seems to be as powerful (and therefore also as dangerous) as all the others combined. But seen from another angle, this stage also offers many potential „mediators“: Europe is one of them, albeit not the only one. It is perhaps no chance if many of them, as Europe itself, are trans-national orders, which can be found or will emerge in a near future in East Asia, in the *Cono Sur* of Latin America, in Southern Africa, perhaps even in the Middle East, where a renovated „Arab League“, both democratized and liberated from the dream of the „Arab Nation“ could play a decisive role. Maybe we could say that these potential „mediators“ are the true „anti-systemic forces“ of today and tomorrow, to borrow one of Immanuel Wallerstein’s favorite categories.<sup>15</sup>

*The „Fault Line“ Reduced, or the Euro-Mediterranean Ensemble*

In order to be more precise, I will now make a critical use of the great debate raised by the publication of Samuel Huntington's book *The Clash of Civilizations*, with its strategic proposal of a new „world order“ based on the simultaneous acceptance of a „multicultural world“ and rejection of „multiculturalism“ within the West, more specifically within America.<sup>16</sup> My „anti-strategic“ idea that we ought to push in the direction of the primacy of local determinations over global determinations within the relation constitutive of both, in order to promote the „mediated“ resolution of conflicts, will remain meaningless unless it proves possible to define an *open, non-exclusive* framework that would nevertheless be *sufficiently binding* in geographical and historical terms. In such a framework conflicts would ultimately appear as „civil wars“, that is, as wars whose very violence and „irreconcilable“ character force the community to assert itself, offering simultaneous recognition to the conflicting camps, and thus paving the way for mutual recognition or the building of „civil peace“. There seems to be an enigma, if not a logical flaw in such a formulation: *which community* is able to play such a role. No *preexisting community*, based on traditional membership and „roots“, can play this historic role, but only a community of alliances that is instituted *with a view toward favoring this kind of recognition*. Let us note in passing that, to a large extent, this was precisely the way in which modern nation-states were „invented“, as a *non-existing* solution for the problem of religious, feudal, and regional conflicts, but at a different scale and following procedures that are now obsolete.

I believe that the „Euro-Mediterranean ensemble“, whose development is both advocated and constantly hindered by multiple obstacles, including phobias profoundly buried in the collective unconscious which trace back to centuries of religious and colonial conflicts, is nevertheless exactly such a framework. Its progressive construction, through negotiations, common projects, and simultaneous mediations in the common interest, is itself a

way to affirm the originality of Europe's position in international relations, where the assertion of a specific identity goes hand in hand with its (seeming) opposite: the inclusion of the Other within itself. This is where Huntington's conceptualization can give us a precious *inverted* indication, since the central notion in his book is not only the concept of „borderline“ separating heterogeneous populations and territories, but more precisely the concept of a *global borderline*, which appears as a real „fault line“. It is along such „fault lines“ that the new (coming) type of wars would develop. According to Huntington, *it is impossible to reduce fault lines*: you can only „freeze“ the violence they tend to unleash, and organize the world order around the fragile equilibrium of competing, ultimately incompatible civilizations, which are essentially external to one another. This idea clearly derives from the geopolitical notions that were theorized around World War II by the German (pro-Nazi) jurist and philosopher Carl Schmitt, who explained that every political institution was based on the absolute primacy of the „friend versus foe“ divide, and sought to transfer this notion to the new „spatial distribution of power“ (*Nomos der Erde*) emerging after the second World War.<sup>17</sup> Clearly, the idea of a „Euro-Mediterranean“ ensemble (or alliance) expresses the exactly opposite axiom: it does not say that there are no „fault lines“, no vested hostilities around them, but it does say that political institutions precisely arise when hostility becomes a focal point for the elaboration of common interests and historic compromises. Such common interests express the „complementarity of the enemies“, to borrow an expression from the French anthropologist Germaine Tillion that I have commented elsewhere, and this is what makes them politically significant.<sup>18</sup> The whole of the southern shore of the Mediterranean will become progressively involved in the construction of a common space of interdependence, a laboratory for new relationships between „developed“ and „developing“ countries, and between cultures that have their religious roots in antithetical versions of the same monotheistic theology. Provided, of course, that the political conditions are consciously and tenaciously forged. If such an ensemble were to gain consistency, it would become at the same time an instrument to correct inequalities in

the rates of development, an intermediary structure making it easier for Europeans to effectively influence world affairs, and a powerful force for democratizing Arab-Islamic regimes in the Middle-East. This is the real way to overcome the old patterns of opposition between „Occidental“ and „Oriental“ cultures. It seems to me obvious that, in conjunction with other, similar processes, it could play a very effective role in promoting collective security and activating the working of international institutions. The alternative is quite gloomy: that the „global“ logic keeps igniting „fault lines“ for decades ...

These propositions are thrown into current debates as a contribution coming from an „intellectual“, whose instruments are the history of ideas and the analysis of discourse. What in a broad sense could be called „translations“. The intellectual is often perceived as someone who comes always „after the battle“. Let him take some risks to try and be a little ahead of the events, therefore also probably off balance. What is certain, however, is if the intellectuals need to keep deserving their name, they should not plug their ears, and close their lips. As a consequence, as Althusser used to say, they will fall in the trap... Indeed, but this is the condition for keeping a social function about which many of our contemporaries now have their doubts.

# Notes

- 1 I borrow this formulation from Fredric Jameson's brilliant essay: „The Vanishing Mediator; or Max Weber as Storyteller“, originally published in 1973 in *German Critique*, later included in *The Ideologies of Theory*, vol. 2, University of Minnesota Press, 1988, p. 3–34.
- 2 An enlarged version of this Mosse-Lecture will appear as conclusion in my forthcoming volume: *We, the people of Europe? Reflections on Trans-national Citizenship*, Princeton University Press, 2003.
- 3 Bruce Ackerman, „Don't Panic!“ *London Review of Books*, February 7, 2002, pp. 15–16.
- 4 Immanuel Wallerstein, „America and the World: The Twin Towers as Metaphor“ (delivered as the Charles R. Lawrence II Memorial Lecture, Brooklyn College, December 5, 2001), *Transeuropéennes* 22 (Spring–Summer 2002): pp. 9–29.
- 5 Timothy Garton Ash, „The Peril of Too Much Power“, *New York Times*, April 9, 2002, p. A25 (op-ed).
- 6 Edward W. Said, „Europe Against America“, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, November 14–20, 2002.
- 7 Robert Kagan, „Power and Weakness“, *Policy Review* 113 (June–July 2002): 3–28.
- 8 Be they „old“ or „new“ in Mary Kaldor's terms: See Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
- 9 Michel Foucault, „The Subject and Power“, *Essential Works of Foucault*, vol. 3, pp. 326–48.
- 10 Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, „Contre l'ordre impérial, un ordre public démocratique et universel“, *Le Monde diplomatique*, December 2002, pp. 22–23.
- 11 Amartya Sen, *Inequality Reexamined* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).
- 12 Machiavelli's basic idea is that the strength of the Roman Republic came from the fact that the antagonism between the two great social classes found an institutional solution with the creation, after violent revolts and repressions, of the „Tribunate of the Plebs“. See Niccolò Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), book I, chapter 4 („That the Disunion of the Plebs and the Roman Senate Made That Republic Free and Powerful“), pp. 16–17.
- 13 „Expansive democracy“ is a synonym for what Gramsci more often

calls „hegemony“, that is, a strategy of „permanent revolution“ transposed within the state itself. See Antonio Gramsci, *Quaderni del carcere*, Edizione critica dell’Istituto Gramsci, ed. Valentino Gerratana, 4 vols. (Turin: Einaudi, 1975), pp. 972–973, 1565–1567 and passim. See also Claude Lefort, *L’Invention démocratique: Les limites de la domination totalitaire* (Paris: Fayard, 1981).

- 14 See Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, Article 1: „The Purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removals of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.“
- 15 Giovanni Arrighi, Terence K. Hopkins, and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Antisystemic Movements* (London: Verso, 1989).
- 16 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
- 17 Carl Schmitt, *Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europäum* (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1988).
- 18 See Germaine Tillion, *France and Algeria: Complementary Enemies*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961).



Friedrich A. Kittler

## Von Staaten und ihren Terroristen

*Alles Leben ist abgewandert in Baukästen.*

Ingeborg Bachmann, Große Landschaft bei Wien

Meine Damen und Herren, sehr geehrte Dienste,

wir dienen alle einem höheren Zweck, ich zum Beispiel einem Griechenland, in dem es Dienste gar nicht gibt und freie Rede schlicht verstatet wird. Sie dagegen rechnen sicherheitshalber, hoffe ich zumindest, auch in Zukunft mit klassischen Kriegen. Alles andere würde angesichts der beiden Weltmächte, die die beiden Gegenküsten des Pazifik säumen, derart tiefblaue Augen vertragen, dass Sie diese Vorlesungsreihe kaum je besucht hätten. Nur will meines Wissens fast niemand wissen, was klassische Kriege heutzutage wären. Ihr Grauen überstiege alles je Gedachte.

Stattdessen starren wir hier in Europa, gebannt wie das Kaninchen vor der Schlange, das scheinbar ferne Schauspiel zweier absoluter Feinde an, dessen eine Seite gar kein Völkerrechtssubjekt ist und zudem die Menschenrechte von Zivilbevölkerungen systematisch übertritt, während die andere klassische Unterscheidungen etwa zwischen Strafverfolgung und Kriegsrecht, Polizei und Heeresmacht klüglich unterlässt.

In einer langen Forschungsgeschichte, die von Carl Schmitt bis Michael Jeismann reicht, ist die noch längere Vorgeschichte des absoluten Feindes, den es wie etwa Schweinesysteme oder Schurkenstaaten schlichtweg auszurotten gilt, mittlerweile gut erforscht. Heut bleibt eher daran zu erinnern, was relative Feinde einmal waren, als la chevalerie, das Rittertum, Kriege in Europa noch umhegte. Von Franz dem Ersten, allerchristlichstem König

von Frankreich, wird über Karl den Fünften, römischer Kaiser und deutscher König, ein ebenso schönes wie denkwürdiges Bonmot überliefert: „Mein Bruder Karl und ich doch sind ein Herz und eine Seele: beide wollen wir Mailand“. Das hinderte Karls siegreiche Landsknechte in der Schlacht von Pavia, 1525 um Mailand geschlagen, nicht am blutigen Geschäft der Spieße; das hinderte den Kaiser weder, seinen geschlagenen Gegner in Ehrenhaft zu nehmen, noch ihn nach einem Jahr beim Friedensschluss von Madrid schon wieder freizulassen. Keiner von beiden hieß den andern Unmensch. Denn wie das Bonmot und mit ihm Lacan erklären: das Begehren von Brüdern – seien sie auch nur nominell wie Europas einst gekrönte Häupter – ist immer reziprok, schließt jedoch eben darum die Anerkennung des Rivalen als meinesgleichen ein.<sup>1</sup> Soviel oder sowenig zur Erinnerung an klassische Kriege, in denen der Feind nur ebenbürtiger zeitweiliger Gegner war.

Es ist nun aber Sache der Gerechtigkeit, die da auf Anerkennung und Gleichgewicht beruht, an unterschiedliche Kriege, relative und absolute, nicht auch noch unterschiedliche Maße anzulegen. Ich fürchte daher: Jedes Machtsystem hat die Feinde, die es auswirft.

Bevor ich dieser Vermutung an den großen Machtsystemen, die uns auf den Nägeln brennen, nachzugehen suche, mag sie an einem kleinen Beispiel aus der sogenannten Zeitgeschichte wieder gegenwärtig werden.

## I.

Als die gute alte Bundesrepublik von ihrem Nachkriegsidyll Abschied zu nehmen gedachte, schritt sie zur Modernisierung oder – wie andere das nennen – zur Kolonialisierung ihrer Lebenswelt. Das traute Einfamilienhaus für heimgekehrte Kriegsgefangene und ihre fremd gewordene Ehefrauen, wie Adenauer es reihenweise am Stadtrand hatte errichten lassen, wich fast auf einen Schlag endlosen Hochhaussiedlungen, denen Holzfällerkom-

mandos unter Kreissägeneinsatz erst einmal Raum verschaffen mussten. Ortsteile mit so schönen Namen wie Freiburg-Binzengrün oder Erftstadt-Liblar schossen in die Höhe. Was Wunder, dass die mittels Fahrstühlen und Müllschluckern gestapelten Mieter solcher Satellitenstädte, wie sie im technigmachten Anblick neuer Nachtgestirne damals hießen, ein statistisch monotones Konsum- und Freizeitverhalten entwickelten. Das hätte allerdings üble Staus im Pkw-Verkehr bedeutet, wären die bedachten Planer nicht gleichzeitig zur Verkehrsentflechtung geschritten. Nach längst gemachten Projekten, deren Ausführung ein Weltkrieg nur verzögert hatte, verwandelte sich die Bundesrepublik in den damals autobahndichtesten Flächenstaat auf Erden. Bald konnten sich zumal obige Satellitenstädte nicht nur eines Großkaufhauses rühmen, sondern auch eines eigenen Autobahnzubringers. In Westdeutschland begann eine neue Epoche – und wir können sagen, wir sind dabei gewesen.

Es geschahen nämlich Parties, Kaufhausbrände und Banküberfälle, deren Täter merkwürdig unauffindbar blieben. Erst als die Kriminellen, wie sie hießen, Bekennerbriefen unter einem recht östlichen Logo versandten, wusste die Kriminalpolizei wenigstens, mit wem sie es zu tun hatte, und gab die ungelösten Fälle an das damals noch winzige Bundeskriminalamt ab. Besagte Behörde versagte anfangs zwar auch, besann sich aber eines mittelstädtischen SPD-Mitglieds und Polizeipräsidenten, dessen Traum (zeitgleich mit Oskar Wiener) immer schon die Verbesserung Mitteleuropas gewesen war. Dieser Herold der Modernisierung und das hieß Computerisierung aller Fahndungsmethoden fasste den einfachen, aber tiefliegenden Gedanken, von dem ich ausgegangen bin: Jedes Machtsystem hat die Feinde, die es auswirft.

Nur darum konnten die Terroristen (denn so hießen sie fortan) wie Maos Fische im Wasser des Partisanenkriegs perfekte Tarnung finden, weil sie ihre Lebenswelt dem damaligen Modernisierungsschub, den Satellitenstädten in Autobahnnähe also angepasst hatten. Sie fuhren dieselben schnellen BMWs, um immer auf der Überholspur bleiben zu können; sie mieteten weißgekalkte Neubauwohnungen in Hochhaustürmen, wo niemand seine

Nachbarn kannte, um dortselbst die unverdächtigen Teile ihrer Bombenbastelreste im Müllschlucker anonym verschwinden zu lassen; ganz zu schweigen davon, dass verbliebene Stadtwaldreste ringsum das ideale Terrain zum Pistolentüben abgaben. Als das BKA hinter dieses Tätermuster oder (aus der Sicht der Betroffenen) diese triste Lebenswelt gekommen war, hatte es sie auch schon beinah hinter Gittern, die, wie Sie sich erinnern werden, selbstredend nach demselben Modernisierungsmuster ganz neu erdacht und errichtet wurden. Denn nicht in allen Punkten konnten mehrfache Bankräuber, Bombenleger und Mörder computertechnisch der Lebensform von damals folgen: Auch unter falschem Namen war es zum Beispiel zu gefährlich, die Mieten wie üblich zu überweisen. Also ersann Dr. Horst Herold, der kongeniale Geist an der Spitze des BKA, höchstselbst die negative Rasterfahndung: eine bundesweite Datensuche nach bürokratischen Alltagsvorgängen, die gewisse Mieter jedoch ganz untypisch unterließen. Das Ende ist bekannt, darum aber noch nicht notwendig erkannt. Erst in den Altbauwohnungen von heute dämmert uns langsam, was es hieß, in eine Bundesrepublik hineinzuwachsen, die den Erdenrest ihrer selbst unter Beton und Asphalt versiegelte.

Kommen wir also vom kleinen Beispiel zum weltweiten. Anstelle von Autobahnen der Luftverkehr, anstelle des BKA-Computers die Internet-Überwachung; anstelle jener seltsam baren Mietenzahlungen die bank- und zinslose Geldüberweisung allein auf Treu und Glauben, wie sie den Islam ziert; anstelle von Stuttgart-Stammheim schließlich Guantánamo. Nur an den Hochhaustürmen hat sich außer ihrer Höhe in drei Jahrzehnten nichts geändert. Die Frage lautet mit anderen Worten: wie ist die Weltmacht von heute zu den Feinden gekommen, die sie hat?

## II.

Um das zu begreifen, tut zunächst ein Rückblick auf ältere Imperien not. Das British Empire, wie die USA es im Zweiten Weltkrieg endgültig abgelöst haben, beruhte auf zwei Säulen, einer

seinerzeit schlechthin modernen und einer ganz und gar traditionellen. Die Neuigkeit, mit der Britannien in den Ersten Weltkrieg zog, war ein einzigartiges Telegraphenkabelnetz, das alle Überseehäfen, die die Royal Navy zur Aufrechterhaltung ihrer Seeherrschaft brauchte, abfangsicher umspannte. Dies „all red“, also rein britische „cable“ meldete der „fleet in being“, der Flotte also im Sein und nicht bloß Werden, jede Feindbewegung und jedes nachgefüllte Kohlemagazin. Kein anderer Staat, geschweige denn die Mittelmächte, verfügte über derlei globale Fernsteuerungsmöglichkeiten des Krieges, sowohl für seine Logistik wie für seine Strategie. Mit anderen Worten: die Mittelmächte gerieten schon am zweiten Tag des Ersten Weltkriegs in eine doppelte Blockade: von Nachrichten abgeschnitten dank dem britischen Kabelmonopol, von Nachschubgütern wie zumal chilenischem Salpeter dank der Royal Navy.

Auch die zweite Säule, auf der das British Empire ruhte, sicherte Nachschub, nur nicht von Gütern, sondern von Kanonenfutter. Andere Kolonialmächte der Gründerzeit wie zumal Frankreich oder Belgien hielten ihre schwarzen und gelben Untertanen nach spartanischem Modell im Stande bloßer Arbeitssklaven; Britannien dagegen hatte die bitteren Lektionen erlernt, die ihm vom Sepoy-Aufstand 1857 bis zum Burenkrieg 1899 erteilt worden waren. Gegen die Rebellion der zahlenmäßig hoch überlegenen indischen Hilfsregimenter half nur die telegraphische Verkabelung des Vizekönigtums und seiner weithin zerstreuten Garnisonen; gegen den Partisanenkrieg südafrikanischer Buren, die ihre eigenen farbigen Sklaven zu halten gedachten, half nur der Einsatz von Farbigen. Ganze Regimenter aus Sikhs, Gurkhas und anderen Kolonialstämmen, die der Ostindienkompanie einst blutigste Gefechte geliefert hatten, töteten und starben plötzlich im Namen Kaiserin Victorias. Schon daher endete „A Sahib’s War“, jener Krieg zwischen Herren, wie Kipling seine einschlägige Kurzgeschichte überschrieb, für viele Buren in stacheldrahtumsäumten concentration camps.

Der Literatur-Nobelpreisträger von 1907 hat auch verraten, wie poetisch der farbige Weiße, dieses hölzerne Eisen, lange vor Af-

ghanistans CIA-finanzierter Nordallianz in die Welt gesetzt wurde. Kipling, der Dichter von Mowgly und Kim, kam im Kaiserreich Indien zur Welt, sog also Hindi eher als Englisch ein. Ammen sind älter als Mütter. Kiplings lyrische Bürde, als weißer Mann allen anderen Rassen Kultur bringen zu sollen, hat ihm vermutlich erst jener Mahdi auferlegt, dem es 1881, also lange vor saudischen Königen und ihren Bin Ladins, schon einmal gelang, ein ganzes Land – das ägyptisch-britische Kondominium namens Sudan – der reinen Lehre Mohammed ibn Abd el-Wahhabs zu unterwerfen. Ein erster Schurkenstaat war auf der Welt, seitdem das abgeschlagene Haupt von Gordon Pascha (wie um Bataille recht zu geben) auf der Festungsmauer von Khartum zum leeren blauen Himmel starrte und dem Empire nur noch seine Maschinengewehre und Dichter halfen. „We have the machine gun and they have not“, reimte Hillary Bellock schon damals treffend über Hautfarbenunterschiede, denn das Maschinengewehr wurde ganz wie nachmals die Atombombe nur gegen Farbige entwickelt und auch eingesetzt. Unerträglich aber, wie gesagt, lastete Kiplings Bürde erst, als eben diese waffentechnisch saubere Trennung zuschanden ward: Ab Oktober 1899 legten Weiße ihre Maschinengewehre auf andere Weiße an, Buren mähten Briten nieder und umgekehrt. Daraus zog Kipling einen messerscharfen Schluss: Erst wenn das Empire nicht mehr mit unzuverlässigen Blutsverwandten auf Europas Thronen, die Burenpräsidenten zum Beispiel im Berliner Schloss empfangen, faule Kompromisse eingehen müsste, sondern von seinen schwarzen, braunen oder gelben Eingeborenen selbst getragen und verfochten würde, ginge ihm – wie einst bei Karl dem Fünften – die Sonne niemals unter.

Also erfand Kipling (lange vor der CIA) einen neuen Romanheldentyp: Als blutjunges halbweises Halbblut schaukelt Kim auf Zam-Zammah, der alten Bronzekanone von Lahore<sup>2</sup>, tanzt zwischen Moguln und Vizekaisern, indischer Mutter und verschollenem Kolonialtruppenvater, nomadisiert durch halb Indien, kennt als einziger beide Seiten der Front und kann daher im entscheidenden Augenblick beim Great Game, das Queen Victoria und Zar Nikolaus ausgerechnet um Afghanistan führen, einen

Gewinnzug tun. So zaubert ein Halbblut, wo hundert Beamte und zwanzig Regimenter kläglich versagt hätten; so rettet der Nomade unser aller feste Häuser. Zehntausende messerbewehrte Gurkhas und Sikhs, Englands koloniale Weltkriegseliten also, sollten Kims schönem Beispiel folgen, vor allem jedoch jener eine Lawrence of Arabia, der Kiplings kolonialromantischen Roman militärhistorisch beim Wort nahm, um aus jungen unbedarften saudischen Fürstensöhnen, die nur Kamele, Falkenjagden und Mohammed ibn Abd el-Wahhab im Sinn gehabt hatten, siegreiche Türkenfeinde zu züchten. Keine dreißig Jahre nach Kitcheners blutigem Sieg über den Mahdi erhob Lawrence also absolute Feinde zu Königen. Die MGs ihrer Kamelreiter hatten schließlich das Sultanat selber zur Strecke gebracht, die alte Ordnung des Morgenlandes zerstört und seine Weiten nomadisch geöffnet. Nur welchen Ölreichtum die befreite Wüste barg und birgt, konnte Londons Geheimagent, im Unterschied zu seinen Fernlenkern, noch schwerlich ahnen. Also starb Lawrence of Arabia eines unbewachten Morgens seinen Motorradtod. Die Bürde des weißen Mannes fiel von seinen Schultern, unser Mann in Riad oder Mossul nahm sie ihm ja ab.

### III.

Nach diesem Vorspiel namens Erster Weltkrieg erst scheint mir verstatet, von Gegenwart und Zukunft überhaupt zu handeln; alles andere wäre vorzensiert wie dpa-Meldungen. Es gibt bis heute keine Weltmacht, die sich ohne *translatio imperii* hätte errichten lassen; man muss es nur bedenken. So rührt denn, recht bekanntlich, Amerikas einsame Größe aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, als Britannien in einem Meer aus Blut Schweiß Tränen versank, um sein entwundenes Imperium den USA zu überschreiben. Das geschah aber nicht im Pacht- und Mietvertrag von 1941, der bloß den Nebenkriegsschauplatz Atlantik ausverkaufte, sondern (weniger bekanntlich) in den Weiten von Indik und Pazifik. Japans Überfall auf ein den frühen Sonntagmorgen verschlafendes Hawaii, obwohl er immer wieder als Vorspiel zum 11. September 2001 bemüht wird, hatte einen traurig guten

Grund: die Weigerung der USA, das rohstofflose Kaiserreich an der ebenso industriellen wie militärischen Umstellung von Kohlen- auf Erdölversorgung teilhaben zu lassen. Zudem wechselte Japan im April 1943 nicht bloß den Außenminister aus, sondern die gesamte Strategie, was „auch und gerade für die Nachkriegsentwicklung in Südostasien von größter Bedeutung werden sollte“<sup>3</sup>. Denn anstelle lauter unterworfenen Sklavenvölker, wie sie die Militärs erträumt hatten, trat nun eine „Großostasiatische Wohlstandssphäre“, deren Blüte wesentlich darauf beruhen sollte, neben Japan selber allen besetzten Ex-Kolonien von Vietnam bis zu den Inselstaaten Indonesiens und der Philippinen dasselbe Recht auf Selbstbestimmung und Erdölquellen einzuräumen. Wenn die Studentenrevolutionäre meines Alters ihr „Hoh Chi Minh“ skandierten, um sich als kommende Außenminister zu empfehlen, wussten sie wohl nicht so recht, in welchen Tennos Namen sie brüllten. Und wenn Al-Qaida heutzutage auf Bali oder Mindanao operiert, geht die Geschichte weiter.

In dieser ernsten Lage, als die Herrschaft über Ostasien und den Pazifik auf dem Spiel stand, vollzogen die USA eine militärtechnische Revolution. Ihre logistische Kriegsanstrengung ging wesentlich darauf, beide Hemisphären und alle Ozeanküsten dieser Erde mit Rollbahnen und Flugzeughangars zu überziehen. Die USA überboten eine Weltmacht, die auf der vertraglich garantierten Maximalgröße ihrer Flotte beruht hatte, also schlichtweg dadurch, dass sie das Imperium von Flottenmacht zum erstenmal in aller Weltgeschichte auf Luftmacht umstellten. Schon der Zweite Weltkrieg schuf der US Air Force Flugplätze in Westeuropa, Südamerika, Afrika und Hinterindien, was weltweite Operationen gegen alle drei Achsenmächte überhaupt erst möglich machte; der Nachkrieg hat dies logistische Netz noch engmaschiger vernetzt und zudem über die einstigen Verlierer verbreitet. Womit nebenbei erklärt wäre, welches Pentagonogramm oder Pentagon mit seinen Überflugrechten der Bundesregierung solche Pein machen kann.

Weit mehr allerdings zählen im Great Game von heute jene exotischen Orte und Inseln, die der Luftweltmacht – um es mit Sal-



vador Dalí zu sagen – Reisen in die Innere Mongolei erlauben, Eurasiens verborgene Herzlande also. Als Ende 2001 die B2-Bomber voll beladen in Richtung Kandahar oder Kabul abhoben, lagen ihre Munitionsdepots und Rollfelder immer noch auf Diego García, einer von Großbritannien überlassenen einsamen Insel tief im Indischen Ozean, deren gesamte Bevölkerung bis 1973 auf die schönen Seychellen umgesiedelt worden war. Wie Malta einst im Zweiten Weltkrieg, um die Nachschublinien des deutschen Afrikakorps zu bombardieren, den Ruhm eines unsinkbaren Flugzeugträgers erwarb, ganz so prangen Inseln und Küstenstädte von heute im Glanz strategischer Waffensysteme.

Damit aber rückt die Weltmacht ihrem ganzen Gegenteil immer näher auf den Leib. Das Gegenteil des Meeres heißt die Wüste, das Gegenteil der Stadt die Steppe. Der zivilisatorische Prozess oder, besser gesagt, die militärische Infrastruktur der USA schiebt sich Schritt um Schritt in Regionen vor, denen the western civilisation (dieser denkwürdige Unbegriff) bislang verschlossen blieb. So entstehen zunächst Blechhütten oder Cargokulte, die ja abstürzende Trümmer eines militärisch-industriellen Komplexes auch noch zu Göttern erheben, bis schließlich die Weltordnung selber wankt: Stadt stößt auf Steppe, Haus auf Zelt, die Nomaden sind verstört. Das scheint heute der Fall. Als Usama Bin Ladin der Weltpresse noch freigiebige Communiqués gewährte, ging seine Kriegspropaganda jedenfalls immer auch darum, dass das heilige Wüstenland der Kamelzüchternomaden amerikanischen Garnisonen Kasernen, Hangars und Gastrechte gewährt.

Wir tun daher gut daran, einen kurzen Ausflug in die Philosophiegeschichte zu unternehmen, bevor es mit der Kriegsgeschichte und ihrer Zukunft weitergehen kann. Ob der Feind, der absolute, Reich des Bösen wie bei Ronald Reagan heißt oder Schurkenstaaten wie bei Bush jr., ändert an der Logik dieses Gegensatzes nichts: Auf der einen Seite wir, die Guten, auf der anderen das Böse selber. Die Unterscheidung scheint so geläufig oder selbstredend, dass vor Nietzsche niemand sie auch nur befragt hat. Die zweite Abhandlung zur „Genealogie der Moral“,

der Michel Foucault zudem eine meisterhafte, wenn schon nicht militärhistorische Analyse nachschickte, versucht jedoch den Nachweis anzutreten, wie wenig Allgemeinheit sie beanspruchen darf. Denn Adelskulturen nicht nur im Griechenland vor Sokrates unterschieden zwar das Gute und das Schlechte wie den Adel und die Untertanen, rühmten also, wenn sie „gut“ nur in den Mund nahmen, ihre eigene Tugend, die ja Mut und nicht Moral besagte. Dagegen gehen Kulturen, deren Grundunterscheidung Gut und Böse heißt, nach Nietzsches informierter Analyse allesamt auf jene fromme Lehre zurück, die Zarathustra, der historische, einst im Grenzland zwischen Persien und Afghanistan verbreitete. Ormuzd und Ahriman, ein guter und ein böser Gott, ringen um die Weltherrschaft in solcher Härte, dass es der Seele als heilige Pflicht obliegt, den bösen Ahriman aus dieser Welt zu schaffen helfen.<sup>4</sup> Als hätte Zeus in Kronos nicht bloß den schlechten Vater entmannen sollen, sondern das radikal Böse vernichten.

Über diese fromme oder unfromme Neuigkeit aus Zarathustras Mund staunten Nietzsches Griechenohren daher so sehr, dass er eine andere, nämlich geopolitische Lesart von Gut und Böse vorschlug. Böse hießen in Zarathustras Predigten an seine persischen Ackerbauern dann jene Nomadenstämme weiter im Osten, die schon als Züchter großer Viehherden jede Sesshaftigkeit vermieden, um statt dessen die Dörfer der Ackerbauern in regelmäßigen Abständen zu überfallen. Dabei nahmen sie, wie Tschingis Aitmatow das in aller gebotenen Grausamkeit beschrieben hat, die Haustiere als Beute und die Bauernkinder als Sklaven oder Kriegsmaschinen mit in die Steppe zurück. Gut hießen umgekehrt die sesshaften Bauern, sofern und soweit sie (nach dem Vorbild ihrer braven Haustiere) auch selber dem Wort des höchsten Guten, nämlich Zarathustra selbst Gehorsam leisteten. Und schon aus Dank für seine Worte folgten die Bauern fortan ihrem Hirten, der zwar nur so hieß, dafür bis heut ein guter Hirt. Dass Ackerbauern mit besonderer Vorliebe gerade die jungfräuliche Erde unter Steppengräsern mit dem Pflug bezwingen und den Nomaden dauerhaft entwinden, vermied der Hirte allerdings zu sagen; das tat nur Sophokles („Antigone“, V. 337–340). So sprach Zarathustra als „Ansiedlungsminister“<sup>55</sup> des altpersischen Iran.

Die Unterscheidung von Gut und Böse ist demnach keine moralische, sondern eine von Lebensformen oder Kulturen, die sich allerdings, um noch durchsetzungsfähiger zu werden, unterm Schleier einer Moral für Untertanen verhüllt. Auf der einen Seite der Krieg um des Krieges willen, die Nomadologie im Wortsinn von Deleuze und Guattari also, auf der anderen der Friede um des Ackerbaus willen, dessen Mehrwert schließlich in der Stadt als Ikone der Sesshaftigkeit zu steinerner Anschauung gerinnt. Beide Lebensformen gibt es nebeneinander; beide sind sie wählbar. Um diese frohe Botschaft zu Gehör zu bringen, erkannte Nietzsche mit allem Recht und Grund, musste er die Widerrufung der Sklavenmoral eben jenem Priester in den Mund legen, der einst das Unheil in die Welt gesetzt hatte. So und nicht anders kam es 1883 – nach dem Zeugnis von „Ecce homo“ – zu einem Buch des Titels „Also sprach Zarathustra“. „Zarathustra *schuf* diesen verhängnissvollsten Irrthum, die Moral; folglich muss er auch der Erste sein, der ihn *erkennt*“<sup>6</sup>.

Nietzsches Analyse wirkt aktueller denn je. Als Bin Ladin noch volle Bewegungsfreiheit genoss, statt zur Sesshaftigkeit unbekannter Höhlensysteme gezwungen zu sein, trat er den Fernsehkameras am liebsten hoch zu Ross entgegen, in Bild und Haltung also des Nomaden selber; nur die Wahrheit dieser Gewissheit seiner steht wie stets auf einem anderen Blatt. Wenn arabische Fürstensöhne ihrer mittelalterlichen Leidenschaft zur Falkenjagd nachgeben, ersetzen sie zwar erstens die schönen arabischen Pferde, wie man hört, durch zeitgemäßere Jeeps, suchen aber zweitens bei der Falkenjagd ausgerechnet jene Stammesgebiete oder Steppen im staatsfreien Norden Pakistans heim, die seit einem Jahr auch Taliban zur letzten Zuflucht dienen. Und wie um selbst noch jene Jeeps zu deuten, schrieb Carl Schmitts „Theorie des Partisanen“ an exponierter Stelle den Satz „Die Toten reiten schnell, und wenn sie motorisiert sind, reiten sie noch schneller.“<sup>7</sup>

Das Paradoxon liegt nur in der Tatsache, dass Motorisierung und waffentechnische Modernisierung der heutigen Nomaden nicht – wie im kleinen Beispiel der Bundesrepublik – eine Sache gefälschter Nummernschilder und nächtlicher Einbrüche gewesen

ist, sondern eines der Werke, die die Weltmacht selber vollbracht hat. Denn wie Sie alle wissen, galten Nomaden solange – nämlich ein gutes Jahrzehnt – als nützliche Helfer, wie der Feind meines Feindes mir Freund heißen darf. Auch die Weltherrschaft aus Stratosphäre und Ionosphäre, Bombengeschwadern und Aufklärungssatelliten braucht bei Gelegenheit ein scharfes Schwert hier auf Erden, zumal wenn – wie seit dem Trauma des Vietnamkriegs – das Einlaufen von Zinksärgen in den Häfen Kaliforniens tunlichst vermieden werden muss. Also hat die CIA einmal mehr dem Vorbild Britanniens nachgeeeifert und anstelle jener Gurkhas oder Sikhs, die Kipling so teuer waren, Paschtunen, Tadschiken und andere Stämme Afghanistans gegen die Rote Armee mobilisiert. Mit tragbaren Stinger-Raketen auf den Schultern erhielten sie Auftrag, die Lufthoheit der weiland anderen Weltmacht wo nicht zu brechen, so doch zu stören. Wenn die Grundunterscheidung nicht zwischen gut und böse verläuft, sondern zwischen gut und schlecht, heißen gut all jene, die zu töten und zu sterben wissen. Was das mindeste ist, das über Mudschaheddin oder untere Ränge von Al-Quaida wird gesagt werden dürfen.

Es ist aber gleichermaßen das mindeste, das über die neuen Eliten der US Army gesagt werden muss. Seit Abschaffung der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht, die den Krieg ja mehr und mehr in die Grenzen seiner demoskopischen Erklärbarkeit einzugrenzen drohte, scheinen diese Einsatzkräfte dabei, ihrerseits Mimikry ans Nomadentum zu treiben. Seitdem René Descartes der unvor-denklich alten Mensch-Tier-Symbiose, dem ungeschiedenem Zusammenleben von Sippen und Haustieren also, jeden Boden entzog, indem er Tiere zu konstruierbaren Maschinen erklärte und Menschen zu schon im Wortsinn unterworfenen Subjekten, haben militärisch-industrielle Komplexe – von der École militaire Ludwigs XV. bis Los Alamos und Livermore – diese Philosophie immer wörtlicher genommen. An die Stelle guter alter Reitpferde sind folglich Kampfhubschrauber getreten, an die der berittenen Späher Satellitenfunkkontakte für jeden einzelnen dieser einsamen computergestützten Kriegsspezialisten, so dass im letzten Afghanistanfeldzug nur der Grad waffentechnischer

Hochrüstung Nordallianzkämpfer und GIs noch unterschied. Die Nomaden alten Stils zogen bloß Hunderte von Kilometern von ihren Dörfern oder Herden entfernt ins mörderische Gefecht; die neuen Stils sind von der Luftweltmacht in beliebigen Flugzeitentfernungen zu dislozieren, gestern bei Masar-i-Scharif oder morgen nördlich von Basra. Rapid Deployment Forces, wie einst die Wikinger, tauchen auf, wo niemand sie erwartet, und sind verschwunden, eh jemand es versieht. Damit löst sich die Nordatlantische Verteidigungsorganisation, diese Schale aus lauter Zwiebschalen östlich von Washington, vor unser aller Augen auf. Und nicht ohne symbolischen Witz zieht das Oberkommando dieser Weltblitzkriege ausgerechnet nach Florida um, die touristische Parodie moderner Völkerwanderungen. Nur welche kulturellen und politischen Langzeitfolgen es zeitigen wird, dass Armeen – mit bezeichnender Ausnahme eines Großteils der deutschen – von neuzeitlichen Leitbegriffen wie Vaterland oder Muttererde entbunden – sich wieder in Nomaden verwandeln, allerdings hochtechnisch globale, bleibt offenen Auges abzuwarten, schon weil Mantik und Prophetie kommender Kriege ein Vorrecht Delphis waren und sind.

#### IV.

Soviel zur Vorgeschichte, nun zur dunklen Gegenwart. Denn erst seit September 2001 liegt ganz offenbar zutage, wie heikel die Unterscheidung nicht zwischen Gut und Böse, sondern eben zwischen viehzüchtenden und maschinenhaltenden Nomaden auf einen Schlag geworden ist. Als die beiden Welthandelshochhäuser wie Kartentürme einstürzten, mochte zwar immer noch jene uralte nomadische Wut auf Städte und Sesshaftigkeit überhaupt am Werk sein, die zum Beispiel heute noch die Beduinen in der Negev-Wüste dazu führt, ihre von Israels Regierung finanzierten neuen Steinhäuser dem Herdenvieh zu überlassen, nur um selber die freien Wanderzelte nicht opfern zu müssen. Schließlich hat sogar Goethe, Hausbesitzer am geräumigen Frauenplan in Weimars Mitte, Zeltern gegenüber angemerkt, in Zelten stünde sich's am besten. Neu und unerhört an jenem Septembermorgen war

dagegen die nachgerade perfekte Mimikry, mit der eine exotische Luftherrschaft über Manhattan sich in Szene setzte. Die Mörder wussten nicht bloß – wie einst die Flugzeugpiraten im Auftrag Jassir Arafats oder eben beim planlos langen Irrflug nach Mogadischu – mit Handfeuerwaffen und Sprengstoff umzugehen, sondern weit darüber hinaus mit Cockpits, Bordcomputern, Kerosinreserven und so fort. Ein ganzes vielfach rückgekoppeltes System, das mindestens ebenso vielfach vor unser aller Neugier abgeschirmt gediehen war, lag enttarnt vor ihnen. Nur den Landeanflug hatten die Piloten – wie dereinst Japans Kamikazeflieger – gar nicht erst geübt. Zudem stand hinter den willigen Vollstreckern, deren Todesmut ewige Rätsel aufgeben wird, eine strategische Planung, die fast genauso global operiert haben musste wie sonst nur die Weltmacht selber. Andernfalls wären für einmal der anderen Seite alle sprichwörtlichen Vorteile der Überraschung und des Angriffs zugefallen. Jürgen Kaube hat als einziger, soweit ich weiß, an Schmitts Orakel erinnert, die Partisanen von dereinst könnten sich von ihrer Erdung im Heimatboden eines Tages lösen und technisch-astronautische Nomaden werden. Diese Gefahr scheint aufzuziehen. Sie spricht, fürchte ich, aus der wütenden Angst, wie sie von vielfliegenden business class-Nomaden über letzte Handy-Anrufe bis ins innerste Fünfeck eines brennenden Pentagon durchkam. Kurz und knapp im WK II-Stil: Feind lernt mit.

Freunde aber auch. George Bush junior – in schroffem Gegensatz zu seinen trägen Statthaltern hier in Europas Mitte, die unbeirrt und unbelehrt von Wirtschaftswachstum reden – vermag die klaren Worte. „Wir sind in einer Rezession. Wir sind in einem Krieg“, begann zu Jahresanfang 2002 sehr genau die feierlich umrahmte Lagebeschreibung der USA. Sechs Monate später folgten Sätze nach, die bei wörtlichem Zitieren fast im Halse stecken bleiben. Das neue Jerusalem überm Atlantik stünde für Freiheit, Demokratie und freies Unternehmertum schlechthin. Wer auch immer, Nationalstaat oder Nomade, Professor oder Partisan, einen dieser drei Werte je bestreiten sollte, sei antiamerikanischen Gedankenguts schon immer überführt und habe ab sofort vor präventiven Gegenschlägen zu erzittern. Es eignet der

Rede, im Guten wie im Unguten, nun aber die Kraft, das, was sie beruft, fast schon herbeizureden. Bushs klare Worte, bleibt zu fürchten, könnten wie eine selbsterfüllende Prophezeiung eben jene Feinde zu den Waffen rufen oder allererst erregen, auf deren bloßes Nichtdasein sie doch gezielt sind.

Denn bei aller Trauer über Todesopfer, die wie die meisten von uns heute Abend keinen (mehr oder minder gut getarnten) Kombattantenstatus innehatten: In der aktuellen US-Wertetafel, wie Nietzsches Zarathustra derlei große Worte nannte, auch nur bis drei zu zählen, ist mir zum Beispiel nicht gegeben. Freiheit versteht sich seit den Helden des Homer von selbst, Demokratie seit Perikles, freiheitlich-demokratische Grundordnung seit Horst Herold; aber warum oder wozu kippt schon beim dritten Wert der Tafel, falls er nicht rhetorisch redundant sein sollte, Politik abrupt in Wirtschaftsordnung um? Ist freies Unternehmertum ein Tarnname hochtechnischer Nomaden, die lieber namenlos im Trüben unserer Begierden fischen würden? Sind freie Unternehmer nicht eben solche, denen eine Marktdurchdringung auch ohne den Nachdruck staatlicher Präventivkriegsandrohungen gelingt? Moskau und Peking hängen, frei nach Andy Warhols dummem seriellen Witz, jedenfalls schon längst an McDonalds langer Kette. Um uns Endverbraucher kann es also gar nicht gehen.

Technologien und Kriege träumen seit mehr als hundert Jahren davon, auf dem Stand von übermorgen zu sein. In Wahrheit sind sie auf dem Stand einer Rekursion, die immer tiefere Vorgesichten aufbohren muss, um überhaupt noch zu gelingen. Am Salpeterminschub kaiserlich-deutscher Geschütze scheiterte Schlieffens genialer Angriffsplan. Ganz wie aktuelles Computer-Design immer näher an den Urknall rührt, so verschlingt die Logistik des Krieges – frommer grüner Wünsche unbeschadet – immer ältere Rohstoffe. Mit der Umstellung von Kohle und Eisenbahn auf Panzeröl und Flugzeugbenzin begann der Zweite Weltkrieg, mit Exploration von Uranvorkommen, dem Weltkriegssonderauftrag auch an Hans-Martin Schleyer, die Pax america. Als schließlich US-Präsident Nixon 1972 den Dollar von seiner alten Goldbindung löste, schien es zunächst, er wolle

nur Goldfinger alias Gerd Fröbe in Fort Knox das räuberische Handwerk legen. Viel wahrscheinlicher aber rückte anstelle der Goldbindung eine ungesagte Ölpreisbindung. Andernfalls wäre schwer zu deuten, warum der verschuldetsten Nationalwirtschaft auf Erden immer noch zureichendes Fremdkapital zufließt. Nun kann jedoch keine Rekursion, außer in der reinen Mathematik, bis ins Unendliche weiterlaufen. Nach jüngsten Expertisen der DASA, die schon als Fortsetzung der Heeresversuchsanstalt Peenemünde denn doch Bescheid wissen sollte, sind die Erdölquellen dieser Erde – und das heißt zumal ihrer Steppen und Wüsten – ebenso berechenbar wie endlich. Allen Explorationen und Bohrungen zum Trotz sprudeln einfach (etwa unterm wüsten Schelfmeer vor Namibien) keine neuen Quellen mehr, die auch nur annähernd so milliarden schwer flößen wie Saudi-Arabien oder der Irak. (Nicht umsonst hat die deutsche Luftwaffe 1941 mit ein paar Messerschmitts den kurzlebigen Aufstand von Saddams Onkeln gegen die Briten unterstützt.) Um 2070 also, nicht früher und nicht später, wird der letzte Tropfen Erdöl im Wüstensand verronnen sein. DASA inquit.

Ich kann deshalb Herfried Münkler, der jeden Zusammenhang zwischen Kriegszielen und Ölquellen in Abrede stellt, schlecht folgen. Nicht nur Ackerbauern sind jungfräuliche Steppen feind; auch moderne Luftweltmächte schieben ihre Ölkonzerne immer tiefer ins Herz Eurasiens vor, Dalís Innere Mongolei der Drogenträume. Andernfalls müssten die Jeeps eines schönen baldigen Tages in der Garage stehen bleiben, die Bomber in Hangars oder auf ihren urangetriebenen Flugzeugträgern. Eine riesige, seit Pearl Harbour mühsam erkämpfte Infrastruktur, die mit der Weltmacht nachgerade zusammenfällt, wäre plötzlich Schrott. Und seitdem auch der hoffnungsvolle Zukunftsstrom reiner Software-Kriege im Kerosin zerstoßen ist, gerade weil die vielfach gespiegelten Server des World Trade Center wundersam überlebt haben und der Anschlag computer-technisch wohl ein Schlag ins Wasser war, geht es erneut um Hardware, Rohstoffe, Energiequellen.



## V.

Ich bin am Ende dieser verworrenen Momentaufnahme. Das kleine Beispiel Bundesrepublik war überschaubarer. Wir alle kennen und nutzen die Infrastruktur, in der sich selbsternannte Rotarmeeformationen eine Zeitlang als BMW-Nomaden über oder unter Wasser halten konnten. Niemand bis in höchste Stellen, scheint mir, hat dagegen einen Begriff, welche Netze aus Öl-Pipelines und Slums, Global Positioning System und Datenbanken, Rapid Deployment Forces und Handy-Missbrauch gegenwärtig den Planeten überziehen, in welchen Labyrinthen also die Nomaden zuschlagen und wieder verschwinden können. Als die Taliban – Koranschüler mithin, die den Koran hocharabisch hersagen müssen können, ohne nur ein Wort Arabisch zu verstehen – der CIA ersten Ärger machten, verstand umgekehrt fast kein Agent in Langley/Virginia sie und ihre Sprachen. Jungfräulichkeit ist nicht immer Tugend. Jemand wie Horst Herold müsste wohl erst einmal das Muster oder Raster ausmachen, das die globale Infrastruktur von heute, diese mehr oder minder gelungene Extension der USA (um Marshall McLuhan rasch noch vom Kopf auf die Füße zu stellen), Wölfen statt Haushunden zukehrt.

Aber Dr. Herold wohnt mit Frau und Ausgehverbot auf dem Gelände einer Bundeswehrkaserne, darf nicht schreiben oder auftreten, als hätte ihn sein Wissen selber mit der schwarzen Pest befleckt – und wäre dennoch der Berufenste, für uns im Dunkel und an meiner Statt die Lage zu erkennen.

# Anmerkungen

- 1 Vgl. Jacques Lacan, *Écrits*. Paris 1996, S. 784.
- 2 Einer der schönsten Romananfänge lautet: „He sat, in defiance of municipal orders, astride the gun Zam-Zammahmiß on her brick platform opposite the old Ajaib-Gher – the Wonder House, as the natives call the Lahore Museum. Who hold Zam-Zammah, that ‚fire-breathing dragon‘, hold the Punjab; for the great green-bronze piece is always first of the conqueror’s loot.“ (Rudyard Kipling, *Kim* [1901]. Harmondsworth/Middlesex 1994, S. 7). In nur zwei Sätzen gelingt es Kipling also, von einem frechen, aber namenlos belassenen Halbblut ins welthistorische Fünfstromland zu springen.
- 3 Andreas Hillgruber, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg 1939–1945*. Stuttgart 1996, S. 118.
- 4 Zur Einwirkung dieser Religion auf den Gott des „Alten Testaments“ und damit das Christentum vgl. Matthias Schulz, *Der leere Thron. „Der Spiegel“*, 52/2002, S. 146.
- 5 Johannes A. H. Potratz, *Die Skythen in Südrussland. Ein untergegangenes Volk in Südosteuropa*. Basel 1963, S. 87. Mit Dank an Peter Berz/Berlin.
- 6 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*. In: Giorgio Colli, Mazzino Montinari u. a. (Hg.): *Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, Berlin/New York 1967 ff., Bd. VI/3, S. 465.
- 7 Carl Schmitt, *Theorie des Partisanen. Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen*. Berlin 1992, S. 79.

Martin van Creveld

## Where 9–11 Fits in

Over the last year the events of 9–11 have been discussed from every possible point of view, beginning with the psychological effects on people around the world and ending with the impact on the way they dance in discotheques.<sup>1</sup> This paper will not follow the participants in the debate into such esoteric places: instead it will seek to keep our feet on the ground by focusing on some of the military and political aspects. First we shall ask what 9–11 actually represents. Second, we shall ask how we got there. Third, it is necessary to say something about what can be done. Fourth, we shall try to understand where it is taking us.

### I.

To put it as briefly as I can, the events of 9–11 have been the culmination – so far – of a fundamental change in the way wars are fought.<sup>2</sup> Such shifts have not been uncommon in the past. Think, for example, of the transition from the infantry-based forces of the Roman Empire to the much smaller, cavalry-centered, ones fielded by medieval principalities; or, *mutatis mutandis*, of the military revolution that was triggered by the introduction of firearms from about 1400 on. Each of those, and many others, were accompanied by far-reaching political, economic, and social changes. Though it took time, each helped create, and was in part created by, an entirely new world.

In marked contrast to the recent past, the new kind of war is not fought by states against each other. Al Qaeda, which stood behind the events of 9–11, neither claims to be a sovereign entity nor is recognized as such by the remaining states of the world. Unlike them, it does not have a solid piece of territory over which

to exercise its sovereignty; nor is its flag among the 190 or so that decorate the square in front of the United Nations in New York. Rather it is a loosely organized group of people whose members, instead of being recognized as citizens by the I.D cards they carry, operate in cells that are isolated from each other out of security considerations.<sup>3</sup> Communication inside the cells is carried out on the basis of personal acquaintance and trust. Communication among the cells is carried out by means of intermediaries who are only aware of the missions with which they are charged and are deliberately denied insight into everything else. Much reliance is placed on mobile telephones (which are discarded every week or two), personal computers, Internet cafes, and coded messages that only the initiated understand. The organization is said to have cells in no fewer than fifty different countries; many of its members, including the leaders, are not tied to a single country but keep moving from one to another. Now they form links with similar organizations, now they break them in search of new alliances; too often, the difference between insiders and outsiders only exists in the imaginations of those who try to trace them or write about them. Compared to traditional war-making entities, i.e. states, they are like gnats buzzing around an elephant.

Second, in the new kind of war symbolized by 9–11 the traditional division of labor between a government that directs, armed forces that fight and die, and a civilian population that pays and suffers does not exist in the same form; instead, all three are mixed together. As the famous videotape of Bin Laden playing with an assault rifle showed and was undoubtedly meant to show, to a large extent political leadership, military command, and fighting overlap. For the same reason, many other leaders of non-state fighting organizations like to strut about in uniform; it is as if they deliberately try to show that, not taking the orders of any state, they are neither civilian nor military but some hard to define mixture of both. Similarly their followers may put on uniform when it suits them, especially when posing for propaganda purposes as members of Latin American guerrilla organizations like to do. Most of the time, though, they do what they can not to be

conspicuous and merge with the surrounding population. As indeed they have to if they are not to be wiped out by the various state-owned agencies, from the police to the military, that are arrayed against them.

Third, since the organizations that wage them do not have regular, uniformed, bureaucratically-managed armed forces, the wars in question do not see the use of large numbers of heavy, advanced, weapons. Not making use of large numbers of heavy, advanced weapons, they do not rely on extensive lines of communication. What is needed are not huge numbers of ships, trains and lorries moving to the front and away from it but money and small amounts of other equipment, much of which can be had almost anywhere. As a result, the wars in question tend to be everywhere and nowhere; as the Americans in Vietnam used to say, they were waging a war „without fronts“. This proposition has a reverse side that is equally important. The absence of fronts to attack, and of lines of communication to cut, means that both heavy weapons and strategy as traditionally understood are largely useless against them.

Fourth, the wars in question tend to take place not along some „front“ but in the midst of the civilian population which, indeed, is often deliberately subjected to attack in order to intimidate, provoke, or simply inflict as much damage as possible. For this reason the new wars, for all that they do not usually involve large numbers of heavy, sophisticated weapons, tend to be at least as bloody and destructive as the ones whose place they took. 9–11, of course, is a perfect point in case. The number of casualties was roughly equal to that which the Japanese inflicted in their attack on Pearl Harbor; though the U.S Government, in the form of the White House, and its military, in the form of the Pentagon, were both targeted, the vast majority of them were civilians. The same is even more true of other struggles of the same kind. Take the number of people who died during the Algerian Civil War – which, contrary to what we thought, appears to be ongoing still – the Tamil struggle in Sri Lanka, the Uprising in East Timor, and many similar conflicts around to world. All of them failed to dis-

tinguish between combatants and noncombatants. With the result that, by comparison, it would almost be true to say that the 1991 Gulf War was little but a picnic.

During the first few decades after 1945, the new kind of war was limited almost entirely to what, at the time, was known as „The Third World“. Being very strongly governed and not having colonies, states belonging to the „Second World“ (also known as the „East Block“) escaped them almost completely. By contrast, so-called „developed“ or „First World“ states had a certain freedom of choice; in so far as outbreaks were limited almost entirely to their colonies, they were in a position to either defend those colonies or to withdraw from them. What set the period since 1990 or so apart is that the geography has been changing. From its original abode in the Third World new kind of war has been spreading into the Second World, playing havoc with the former Yugoslavia as well as parts of the former USSR. Now, as the events of 9–11 have so dramatically proved, it has reached the First World as well. Even that part of it which considers itself to be the most progressive, most disinterested, and most righteous on earth; is separated from the rest by the two largest oceans on earth; and had long considered itself invulnerable. Nor is there any chance that our children and grandchildren will ever again be free from the terrorist threat.

## II.

How did we get to this point, and what factors are responsible for the rise of the new kinds of war over the old? While historical processes of the kind we are dealing with here are never simple, one could start the discussion by considering the progressive delegitimization of conventional interstate war. The process, which can be traced to the years immediately following World War I, operated roughly as follows. First, there was a growing feeling that modern war was too deadly and too destructive to be left to the whims of sovereign states. This led to the establishment of the League of Nations; the latter's Covenant was the first formal

document that recognized territorial integrity and political independence as a fundamental international norm. Second, 1928 witnessed the signature of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in which the U.S and France renounced the right to use war as a national instrument against each other. To be sure, neither the Covenant nor the Pact made any difference when it came to preventing the outbreak World War II. Nevertheless their significance as indicators of the way public opinion was going was considerable, which explains why the latter was ultimately signed by almost all of then-existing states. As it gathered signatures, the Pact acquired legal force much greater than its originators had ever hoped for. Which, in turn, enabled it to be used as a basis for prosecuting Nazi War Criminals at Nuremberg.

After the end of World War II, the movement towards de-legitimizing interstate war accelerated. First came the establishment of the United Nations whose Charter, signed by every member state, prohibited „aggressive“ war and permitted it for self defense only. The same Charter also prohibited the annexation of territory by force, a prohibition that was later repeated several times by Security Council Resolutions. As a result, terms such as „subjugation“ and the „right of conquest“ disappeared from international law; by now they sound as if they were taken from some ante-deluvian language more suitable to the state of nature than to today’s civilization. As if all this were not enough, in 1950 for the first time the United Nations for the first time formally declared war. For forty years thereafter there was no repetition; in 1990, however, the next step was taken when the Security Council voted in favor of War against Iraq. Since then, in theory at any rate, *any* use of force by one state or another requires the prior approval of that body. States which chose to ignore that fact stood in danger of being regarded as international pariahs and paying a corresponding political price. Even, some would say particularly, if they were strong.

As Thomas Hobbes once wrote<sup>4</sup>, covenants without swords are but words. In this case, the damocles’ sword that backed up the evolution of international law was the proliferation of nuclear

weapons. The first, and most awesome, introduction to what nuclear weapons could do came in August 1945 when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were wiped out, leaving approximately 200,000 people dead. The devices in question represented the culmination of a centuries-old quest by states towards more and more powerful weapons; however, once they had been tested and proven it soon turned out that the results were very different from what had been intended. In the words of the greatest post-1945 strategist, Thomas Schelling<sup>5</sup>, what nuclear weapons really did was to cut the link between victory and survival. Instead, they created a situation whereby a state could win a very great „victory“ and *still* be turned into a smoking, radioactive desert. Worse, even; the more decisive the defeat suffered by the losing side, the more likely that side was to bring down the Temple on himself and his enemy as Samson did.

At first nuclear weapons were only available to one country, the United States, which once or twice threatened their use in order to advance its interests in Iran and Berlin. After the Soviet Union also tested its bomb in 1949, though, stalemate ensued. This was not for want of trying. Between 1949 and the end of the Cold War, and on both sides of the Iron Curtain, immense fortunes were spent in an effort to make nuclear weapons usable. Countless technologies were developed, scenarios written, and war-games held. All had as their ultimate objective finding ways in which one might use nuclear weapons against an opponent without necessarily blowing up the world.<sup>6</sup> As far as we know, none was ever able to produce convincing ways of doing so.

In time, what was true of the superpowers turned out to be even truer of other states. First, fear of escalation meant that the superpowers' close allies in NATO and the Warsaw Pact became almost as secure against major conventional warfare as were the superpowers themselves. Next, the Soviet Union and China found themselves with their horns locked; in fact, one of the very last things Michael Gorbachev did before surrendering power was ratify a border-treaty with China. From the nineteen seventies on the process reached China and India, causing relations



between them to stabilize if not to become cordial. It prevented anything larger but skirmishes from taking place between India and Pakistan, and even brought some relief from interstate war to that most strife-ridden region in the world, the Middle East.<sup>7</sup> To be sure, nuclear proliferation did not go so far as abolishing interstate war completely. However, already now it has brought the world to the point where such war is only possible between, or against, rather weak states; of which Iraq, a third world country of twenty million, anxiously waiting for an American attack, provides an excellent example.

While interstate war was being made less acceptable in theory as well as much more dangerous in practice, other developments facilitated the emergence of the forms of non-state war discussed above. Of those developments, the most important by far was globalization. As with every major historical process, deciding on the exact date when globalization got under way is difficult and indeed some would argue that the world has always constituted a single global system in which every actor interacted more or less closely with many of the rest.<sup>8</sup> Be this as it may, for our purposes globalization may have started in the nineteen sixties with the advent of wide-bodied passenger jets. Other technological advances such as the containerization of maritime transport, cheap (later, portable as well) electronic communications, computers, data-links, the Internet, and of course videotape satellite TV accelerated the process. All provided unprecedented opportunities for moving people, merchandise, money and ideas at a speed, and with a facility, never before achieved. All were also backed up by an economic theory that emphasized the need to avoid being tied to a single location in order to use opportunities wherever and whenever they might occur.

Locked-in as they were within their traditional borders, which they jealously guard, states by definition were only able to exploit these advances to a limited extent. Other organizations, being non-territorial by nature, did much better. The nature of the organizations in question differed greatly. Perhaps the most important ones were known as corporations, engaged in industry,

and had as their objective the maximization of profit. Others were ideological, others humanitarian, others criminal, and others still criminal serving some political or religious cause, which qualifies them as terrorists. Terrorists, in other words, were in some ways better positioned to make use of some of the most important technological developments of our time than were traditional war-making entities, i.e. sovereign states. If only in the sense that, in order to fly over a country or set up bases in it, they did not have to ask for permission first.

Once again, the events of 9–11 provide a perfect illustration of what is happening. As far as we know, the attacks on the Twin Towers, the Pentagon, and the White House were planned by a very small number of people who, at the time, were hunkering in some remote Afghan cave. The enterprise – the term itself is ironic – was financed by money coming from several Gulf States. It was prepared by a small group of dedicated fanatics who, while they resided in Hamburg, went to Afghanistan in order to obtain training; at other times they did their best not to stand out too much from their fellow students. Not content with what they learnt in Afghanistan, some training was procured – on a purely commercial basis, and without breaking any law – in Florida where a few of those involved attended flight school. The final effort at coordination took place among the casinos and whorehouses of Las Vegas, after which the terrorists, having consulted with Afghanistan for the last time, left for their designated airports. The operation was sophisticated in some ways, but very simple in others; at the point of impact all it took was readiness for sacrifice, very strong nerves, and a few box cutters. None of it would have been conceivable if Bin Laden and his organization had not been able to make use of the ordinary communications- and transportation technologies freely available to any citizen in the developed countries and to many in the less developed ones as well. Simple or sophisticated, the terrorists' modus operandi stands in sharp contrast to the hopeless inefficiency of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Which, three months after the event, was still busy issuing visas to terrorists who were long since servicing virgins in heaven.

The final factor behind the shift from conventional interstate war to terrorism is the evolution of military technology itself. By and large, the ability of states to monopolize violence in their own hands was closely associated with the introduction of heavy, crew-operated weapons, first cannon and then, after a long interval, aircraft and tanks. Technological advances that have taken place in recent decades have begun to reverse that trend, permitting small parties of suitably trained men to wield vast destructive power. Some forms of the power in question may be had off the shelf, as it were, in the form of simple chemicals and electronic components. Some may be deployed by way of a telephone link located thousands of miles away, as in the case of hackers waging information warfare aimed at disrupting computer networks and the countless facilities that depend on them.<sup>9</sup> Some take the form of chemical and biological weapons. Such weapons can be manufactured almost anywhere and are easily be transported from one country to the next; although, fortunately and as experience in Tokyo and other places suggests, spreading them in such a way as to lead to many casualties is not as simple as it sounds. The most frightening possibility is that terrorists will lay their hands on one or more of the thousands of nuclear weapons now in the hands of several countries. And use them, say, to blow up New York harbor after transporting them in one of the countless containers that arrive there every day.

### III.

Given what is happening, what is to be done? One thing seems abundantly clear: in fighting the new kinds of war, the armed forces, doctrines, training methods and weapons that have been developed for waging conventional war by one state against another are only of limited use. New forces and methods will have to be adopted, and the sooner the better. Naturally their exact nature will vary from one country to another and also according to the precise nature of the perceived threat. Even more than before, many of the specific measures taken will have to remain classi-

fied in order to minimize vulnerabilities. Still, by and large they may be classified as follows.

First, a list of the most sensitive targets should be drawn up and the targets in question hardened, as is already being done in the case of airports, nuclear power plants, computing centers, and the like. Such protection may be provided either by the military, the police, or, which is most likely, some new organization that will combine elements of both. In so far as protecting everything at the same time is impossible, such a force cannot guarantee against major attacks of the kind launched against the Moscow theatre where thirty or so terrorists reached the building and took it over. On the other hand, it can and should deal with many other threats. For example, the hijackings of 9–11 could easily have been prevented if there had been one or two sky marshals on each aircraft. Crew members could have been made to carry weapons and trained in their use; the doors between cockpit and passenger cabin could have been reinforced and kept locked at all times, as I myself suggested at the time I was working for Federal Aviation Authority/Security. While the possibilities are infinite, the essential point to keep in mind is that terrorists can only carry out their operations by concealing their preparations. Accordingly, even the deadliest attacks tend to be made by small parties of more or less determined persons using weapons light enough to be carried by hand or, at most, a single vehicle. This, of course, is just what makes them so hard to detect; but it also means that, quite often, simple measures can save many lives at trivial cost.

Second, specialized intelligence organizations should be set up to detect terrorist attacks ahead of time and prevent them from taking place. As configured at present, neither military intelligence nor the police are exactly suitable for the purpose. The former date back to the late unlamented Cold War and tends to focus on the regular forces of foreign countries, counting tanks, locating bases, and stealing plans. The latter are geared to dealing with crime and normally come into action only after it has been committed and reported. Either those services will have to mend their ways, or new ones will have to be established, organized and trai-

ned in such a way that they can take pro-active action. Once this is done, it will also be necessary to make sure that they coordinate with the existing organizations rather than obstruct them or duplicate their work; as always, problems of command and control will be critical.

Third, dealing with terrorist incidents is not a job that any soldier or policeman can do. Instead, it demands specially trained and equipped units. Most countries, Germany included, already have such units, but much more could and should be done. Once again, careful thought should be given to the question of command and control, i.e. the kind of authority that will run and activate the units in question. Equally important, it is vital to have them at hand where and when needed; in other words, the necessary vehicles, helicopters, and communications should be considered and made available.

Like any other special craft, waging the kind of war that terrorism represents requires specialized tools. Buildings may be altered to make them harder to enter, aircraft modified so as to provide better protection against hijackings or anti-aircraft missiles, and medical facilities prepared to receive and treat injured people. For example, the gas used by the Russian forces to neutralize the terrorists may have been too powerful for the purpose at hand. However, the idea of using an anesthetic in order to deal with hostage taking situations is sound. If 100 hostages died, this was less because of the means used than because the rescue forces were apparently not prepared to deal with so many incapacitated people; neither having ambulances ready, nor informing doctors what measures they should take, nor preparing sufficient quantities of antidotes.<sup>10</sup> Other measures might do their work by subjecting terrorists to noise, blinding light, and the like.<sup>11</sup> At a minimum, the knowledge that the security forces possess such means will make the work of terrorists more complicated; it will force them to prepare countermeasures and thus reduce both their effectiveness and their endurance. Accordingly, such weapons should be made the object of a well-funded, well-organized, sustained, and secret program of research and development.

To enable the various anti-terrorist units to do their work, the existing legal framework of democratic countries in particular may have to be modified. Governments and the intelligence services they employ may have to be given greater powers to monitor communications, search for evidence, and arrest suspects not after they have acted but before they can do so; attempts to modify the law in this direction are already under way in many countries.<sup>12</sup> However, there is a catch. The obvious dangers to democracy and freedom apart, experience shows that laws which ride roughshod over human rights will only alienate people. In extreme cases they may even drive them into the terrorists' arms; as in all things, it is a question of striking a balance.

Finally, all of the above measures depend on very close international cooperation. As already noted, in today's globalized world one of the main advantages terrorists enjoy is the fact that they are not tied to any specific location or country but are able to move from one to another as their safety and operational needs require. If they want to succeed, the forces deployed against them will have to be equally mobile and equally cooperative; operating across borders, resolving disputes over sovereignty, setting up common communications and command systems, and so on. All of this requires considerable preparation, and little of it can be improvised in a hurry. One might, indeed, argue that of all obstacles facing counter-terrorism this one is the most difficult one to overcome.

As the newly established American Department of Home Security with its \$ 38 billion budget shows, combating terrorism will not be cheap. On the other hand, doing so will hardly be more expensive than maintaining today's conventional armed forces, the Bundeswehr included, with all their highly paid generals, large units, heavy weapons, enormous logistic infrastructure, exercise grounds, and the like. States should therefore ask whether those armed forces are still relevant and which parts of them can be dissolved; whether, for example, it is the Eurofighter or a new generation of machines capable of detecting explosives, chemical agents, and radioactive materials that is needed most. As they

manage the shift from one kind of force to the other, it is important that governments look after the people they discharge. Or else, driven to penury, some of those people may well become terrorists themselves.

#### IV.

To end on a slightly more optimistic note, none of the above is meant to say that civilization will be washed away in mighty waves of anarchy. Throughout human history, for reasons that are rooted deep in our nature and almost certainly cannot be eradicated, armed struggles have broken out now here, now there. Some of the struggles in question lasted for a long time and were extremely deadly to participants and bystanders alike. Think of the Hundred Years War or, in the German speaking part of Europe, of the Thirty Years War. The former caused entire districts to be laid waste; the latter is supposed to have killed off as many as one third of the population. While the fate of the people involved was often almost too terrible to contemplate, few if any geographical regions have been permanently in a state of war, let alone reduced to the point where they could no longer sustain human life. After all, after the Romans had strewn its soil with salt even Carthage ended up by being rebuilt. As has been said<sup>13</sup>, not the least surprising thing about 9–11 is the fact that, 24 hours after it took place, 99.5 percent of all Americans were going about their business, more or less.

As things gradually change, compared to the period 1945–2000 life in the most advanced countries will almost certainly become less pleasant. It will also become less secure, and more preoccupied with security. Much of that security will take the form of petty harassment. Immigration procedures will be, indeed already are being, tightened up as form is piled on form, check on check, and bureaucrat on bureaucrat. People will be asked to produce documents and punished if, in the ones they do produce, the name of their grandmother is mistakenly spelt in the wrong way. They will be searched upon entering movie houses and super-

markets, made to take off their shoes and deprived of their nail-cutters as they try to board an aircraft, and so on. Much of this will be both time-consuming and pointless; after all, every queue formed by people waiting to have their persons and belongings checked is also a target. From time to time, they will watch a terrorist act taking place somewhere else. Some who happened to be in the neighborhood will call their relatives to assure them that they are OK, an experience I actually had as I was working on this paper. Others will stop for a moment, tell themselves how sorry they feel for the victims, offer silent thanks for the fact that they and theirs were not involved, and get back to their business as usual. As our children grow up they will take all of this very much for granted. For good or ill, they will be used, not to say injured, to the suffering around them; told about a time when people could enter restaurants, banks, and other public places without being searched first, they will shake their heads in disbelief. Most of the time, and barring terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, compared to what most of those same countries went through in 1914–45 it will probably not be too bad. If it is true that 3,000 people died in 9–11, it is also true that during the six years of World War II 20,000 people died *every day*; what can be worse than Hiroshima, or Hamburg, or Dresden?

While many people have much to lose from the brave new world now emerging, it is important to emphasize that many others have equally much to gain. For example, anyone who can provide security against terrorism, or looks as if he can do so, will see demand for his products and/or services skyrocketing; military men who fear unemployment owing to ongoing budget cuts, take note. Even at present, people who can talk well about terrorism are certain to attract listeners both inside universities and outside them. There are millions, perhaps more, to be made out a kit that is able to identify anthrax and perhaps other biological agents quickly and at a cost most people can afford. Already now, several companies are racing one another to see which of them will put the first devices on the market; the same is true of automatic face-recognition systems, foolproof I.D cards, and much more. There are more millions to be made, and any number of jobs to



be created, by protecting everything from skyscrapers to water-reservoirs and from private residences to entire neighborhoods.

As is always the case during times of profound upheaval everything will change, yet at another level everything will remain much the same. It therefore seems appropriate to end this essay by quoting a verse by Mao Tze Dong, referring to what would happen in the aftermath of nuclear war:

*The sun will keep rising  
Trees will keep growing  
And women will continue to have children.*

# Notes

- 1 See Th. L. Friedman, *Longitudes and Attitudes: Exploring the World After September 11*, New York, N.Y., Anchor Books, 2003.
- 2 See among many others M. van Creveld, *Die Zukunft des Krieges*, Munich, Gerling Akademie Verlag, 1998; M. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars; Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999; H. Münkler, *Die Neuen Kriege*, Reinbeck, Rowohlt, 2002.
- 3 On Al Qaeda see P. L. Williams, *Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror*, Pasippany, N.J., Alpha, 2002.
- 4 Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, M. Oakeshott ed., Oxford, Blackwell, 1946, p.109.
- 5 Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, New Haven, CT., Yale University Press, 1965, chapter 1.
- 6 See e.g. H. A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy: the Need for Choice* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957) pp. 174–83; R. van Cleave and R. W. Barnett, „Strategic Adaptability“, *Orbis*, XVIII, 3, autumn 1974, pp. 655–76; and L. Etheridge-Davis, *Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the new American Doctrine* (Adelphi paper No. 121, winter 1975–76; London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976); C. S. Gray, „War Fighting for Deterrence“, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 7, March 1984, pp. 5–28.
- 7 For a short summary of these processes see M. van Creveld, *Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict* (New York, N. Y., Free Press, 1993).
- 8 E.g. I.M. Wallerstein, *Processes of the World System*, Beverly Hills, CA, 1980.
- 9 An excellent, and chilling, account of the principles of information warfare is R. G. Molander and others, *Strategic Information Warfare*, Santa Monica, Ca., RAND, 1996, pp. XIII, 6–9; Gregory J. Rattray, „The Cyberterrorism Threat“, in James E. Smith and William C. Thomas, eds., *The Terrorism Threat and U.S Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors*, Colorado Springs, Co., USAF Academy, 2001, pp. 98–99.
- 10 For international criticisms of the operation see Department of State, „Moscow Hostage Crisis: 30.10.2002“, available on <http://www.cdi.org/russia/229-10.cfm>.
- 11 For some of the weapons now being considered or developed see J. B. Alexander and C. H. Heal, „Non Lethal and Hyper-Lethal Weaponry“, in R. J. Bunker, ed., *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, vol. 13, 2, summer

2002, pp.121–32.

- 12 See, for some of the possible implications of the so-called „Patriot Act“ signed by President Bush on 26.10.20, [http://www.village voice.co/specials/civil\\_liberties](http://www.villagevoice.co/specials/civil_liberties); also T. Brockaw, NBC, on <http://www.msnbc.com/news>.
- 13 R. Peters, „The New Warrior Class Revisited“, in Bunker, ed., *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, p. 17; Th. L. Friedman, „After the Storm“, *New York Times*, 9. 1.03.

## Étienne Balibar

Geb. 1942, Professeur de philosophie (émérite) an der Universität Paris X-Nanterre, als Professor of Critical Theory an der University of California, Irvine. Mit Louis Althusser zusammen verfasste er die berühmt gewordene Analyse *Lire le Capital* (1965), dt.: *Das Kapital lesen* (1971). Weitere Buchpublikationen u. a.: *Spinoza et la politique* (Paris 1985); mit Immanuel Wallerstein *Race, Nation, Classe* (1988), dt.: *Rasse, Klasse, Nation. Ambivalente Identitäten* (Hamburg 1990); *La crainte des masses* (Paris 1997); *Nous, citoyens d'Europe? Les frontières, l'Etat, le peuple* (2001), dt.: *Sind wir Bürger Europas?* (Hamburg 2003); *Politics and the Other Scene* (London 2002). Politische und philosophische Beiträge in *Lettre International*.

## Friedrich A. Kittler

Geb. 1943, nimmt seit 1993 an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin den Lehrstuhl für Ästhetik und Geschichte der Medien ein. 1985/86 erschienen seine grundlegenden Bücher zur Medien- und Kulturgeschichte: *Aufschreibesysteme 1800/1900* und *Grammophon Film Typewriter*. Weitere Buchpublikationen sind u. a.: *Dichter Mutter Kind* (München 1991); *Draculas Vermächtnis. Technische Schriften* (Leipzig 1993). 1993 erhielt er den Preis für Medienkunst, Abteilung Theorie, des Zentrums für Kunst- und Medientechnologie, Karlsruhe. Wichtige Titel der letzten Jahre sind *Eine Kulturgeschichte der Kulturwissenschaft* (München 2000), zusammen mit Cornelia Vismann *Vom Griechenland* (Berlin 2001) und *Optische Medien* (Berlin 2002).

## Martin van Creveld

Geb. 1946 in Rotterdam, lebt seit 1950 in Israel. Studium an der London School of Economics und an der Hebrew University in Jerusalem, wo er seit 1971 als Professor für Geschichte lehrt. Darüber hinaus ist er als militärischer Berater und Referent westlicher Regierungen tätig. Zu seinen zahlreichen Buchveröffentlichungen gehören u.a.: *Command in War* (Cambridge 1985); *Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict* (New York 1993); *The Transformation of War* (1991), dt.: *Die Zukunft des Krieges* (München 1998); *The Rise and Decline of State*, dt.: *Aufstieg und Untergang des Staates* (München 1999); *The Art of War* (London 2000); *Men, Women and War*, dt.: *Frauen und Krieg* (München 2001).

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- 44 *Martin van Creveld*: Where 9–11 Fits in (30. Januar 2003). In: Vom Krieg zum Terrorismus? Berlin: Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2003. Öffentliche Vorlesungen 120. S. 51–67.



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