



Sorry, a system terror occurred.



Karl Marx.



ISBN 953-6542-84-6

You gentlemen who think you have a mission
To purge us of the seven deadly sins
Should first sort out the basic food position
Then start your preaching, that's where it begins

You lot, who preach restraint and watch your waist as well
Should learn for all time **how the world is run**
However much you twist, whatever lies you tell
Food is the first thing, morals follow on

So first make sure that those, who now are starving
Get proper helpings, when we all start carving

What keeps mankind alive, the fact that millions
Are daily tortured, stifled, punished, silenced, oppressed
Mankind can keep alive, thanks to its brilliance
At keeping its humanity repressed
For once, you must not try to shirk the facts:
Mankind is kept alive by bestial acts.

You say the girls may strip with your permission [whoa!]
You draw the line dividing ART from SIN
So first sort out the basic food position
Then start your preaching, that's where it begins

You lot, who bank on your desires and our disgust
Should learn for all time how the world is run
Whatever lies you tell, however much you twist
Food is the first thing, morals follow on

So first make sure that those, who now are starving
Get proper helpings, when we all start carving

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Karl Marx's
predictions
have outlived
his
prescriptions.

...the history of the
World is nothing but
the development of the
Idea of Freedom

G.F. HEGEL

THE SPECTRE IS STILL
ROAMING AROUND

SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK

➤ The first, automatic reaction of today's enlightened liberal reader to **The Communist Manifesto** is: isn't the text simply WRONG on so many empirical accounts, with regard to the picture it gives of the social situation, as well as with regard to the revolutionary perspective it sustains and propagates? Was there ever a political manifesto that was more clearly falsified by the subsequent historical reality? Isn't **The Communist Manifesto**, at its best, the exaggerated extrapolation of certain tendencies discernible in the 19th century?

So let us approach **The Communist Manifesto** from the opposite end: where do we live TODAY, in our global "post..." [postmodern, postindustrial] society? The slogan that is imposing itself more and more is that of "globalization": the brutal imposition of the unified world market that threatens all local ethnic traditions, inclusive of the very form of Nation-State. And is, with regard to this situation, the description of the social impact of the bourgeoisie found in **The Manifesto** not more actual than ever? -

"The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the

national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones: industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.”⁰¹

So is this not, more than ever, our reality today? Think about Ericsson phones which are no longer Swedish, about Toyota cars manufactured 60% in the USA, about Hollywood culture that pervades the remotest parts of the globe... Yes, this is our reality - on condition that we do not forget to supplement this image from **The Manifesto** with its inherent dialectical opposite, the “spiritualization” of the very material process of production. That is to say, on the one hand, capitalism entails the radical secularization of the social life - it mercilessly tears apart all aura of authentic nobility, sacredness, honour, etc.:

“It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom - Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.”

However, the fundamental lesson of the “critique of political economy” elaborated by the mature Marx’s in the years after **The Manifesto** is that this reduction of all heavenly chimeras to the brutal economic reality generates a spectrality of its own. When Marx describes the mad self-enhancing circulation

of the capital, whose solipsistic path of self-fecundation reaches its apogee in today’s meta-reflexive speculations on futures, it is far too simplistic to claim that the spectre of this self-engendering monster that pursues its path disregarding any human or environmental concern is an ideological abstraction, and that one should never forget that, behind this abstraction, there are real people and

natural objects on whose productive capacities and resources the capital's circulation is based and on which it feeds itself like a gigantic parasite. The problem is that this "abstraction" is not only in our [financial speculator's] misperception of social reality, but that it is "real" in the precise sense of determining the structure of the very material social processes: the fate of whole strata of population and sometimes of whole countries can be decided by the "solipsistic" speculative dance of the Capital, which pursues its goal of profitability in a blessed indifference with regard to how its movement will affect social reality. Therein resides the fundamental systemic violence of capitalism, much more uncanny than the direct pre-capitalist socio-ideological violence: this violence is no longer attributable to concrete individuals and their "evil" intentions, but purely "objective", systemic, anonymous. Here we should recall Etienne Balibar who distinguishes two opposite but complementary modes of excessive violence in today's world: the "ultra-objective" ["structural"] violence that is inherent in the social conditions of global capitalism [the "automatic" creation of excluded and dispensable individuals, from the homeless to the unemployed], and the "ultra-subjective" violence of newly emerging ethnic and/or religious [in short: racist] "fundamentalisms" - this second "excessive" and "groundless" violence is just a counterpart to the first violence. The fact of this "anonymous" violence also allows us to make a more general point about anti-Communism: the pleasure provided by anti-Communist reasoning was that, with Communism, it was so easy to play the game of finding the culprit, blaming the Party, Stalin, Lenin, ultimately Marx himself, for the millions of dead, for terror and gulag, while in capitalism, there is nobody on whom one can pin guilt or responsibility, things just happened that way, through anonymous mechanisms, although capitalism has been no less destructive in terms of human and environmental costs, destroying aboriginal cultures... In short, the difference between capitalism and Communism is that Communism was perceived as an Idea which then failed in its realization, while capitalism functioned "spontaneously": there is no Capitalist Manifesto...



Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, *Manifest Komunističke Partije* [1848], trans. Moša Pijade, ZAGREB: ARKZIN, BASTARD BIBLIOTEKA 1998



What's next?™
SON

www.arkzin.com/munist

ALL THAT IS SOLID
ENDS UP ON THE WEB
MAREK KOHN

➤ If you want to know which bits of Marx's thought continue to haunt us, the digital industries will tell you. Of all Marx's writings, one passage leaps into electric relief:

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing of productions, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.

That's from the *Communist Manifesto*, which Marx and Engels wrote in 1848. At the time of the final great upsurge of Marxist faith, in 1968, these words



would perhaps have seemed anachronistic to many of the great unconverted. Television was going into colour and men were going to the Moon, but for millions of people in the West, the phrase "*everlasting uncertainty and agitation*" would not have spoken to their own experience of daily life. People thought that they could enjoy both progress and security. If they were lucky, they might stay in a job for life; their times of sickness and old age underwritten by social contracts that would not be rewritten or torn up. By now they have become much richer, but everlasting uncertainty and agitation is the normal condition. The digital industries are the vanguard of the constant production revolution, in which technology is stable for weeks rather than months, let alone years. Last spring, wanting to check the quote, I downloaded a copy of **The Communist Manifesto** from the **Marx/Engels Internet Archive**. When I came back to it in the summer, it wouldn't open, because the copy I had saved using Internet Explorer 4.0 was incompatible with Explorer 4.01, to which I had upgraded in the meantime.

Meanwhile, over in Zagreb, the wired dissidents at **Arkzin** were working on a new interface for the **Manifesto** itself, which they have published in print and as a multimedia Web production, with an opening title sequence and images that drift around the text. A old communist logo bearing the faces of **Marx and Engels** is followed by those of *Microsoft* and *Sony*. The **Manifesto** can be launched by clicking on a Windows 'Start' icon. It's Pop Art in reverse: instead of taking the ideology out of an icon of, say, Chairman **Mao**, it pastes the ideology into the pages of popular culture. And it re-brands communism as a dynamic force for the coming century, complete with Dynamic HTML. As the **Arkzin** crew say, the spectacle is worth a look even if you can't read Croatian, in which the text appears.

It would be unwise to assume that just because the pages look cool, the exercise is merely a fashion venture. Whatever the reasons for the minor vogue that **Marx** and the **Communist Manifesto** enjoyed in this country earlier in this 150th anniversary year, the motives in an ex-communist region are different. "Perhaps the answers offered by **The Communist Manifesto** are no longer pertinent," admits the Slovenian philosopher **Slavoj Žižek** in his introductory essay, sections of which appear in English on the **Arkzin** site. But the post-communists know better than anyone why answers are needed, **Žižek** observes. Forced as they are to live out the contradiction between globalised capitalism and reasserted national identity, most of them get the worst of both worlds.

On the Web page, the IBM logo hovers above these remarks, together with the corporate slogan: *Solutions for a small planet*. It can only be a matter of time before some Internet enterprise enhances its brand with '*All that is solid melts into air*'. ●



...today, as Fredric JAMESON perspicaciously remarked, nobody seriously considers possible alternatives to capitalism any longer, whereas popular imagination is persecuted by the visions of the forthcoming “breakdown of nature,” of the stoppage of all life on earth - it seems easier to imagine the “end of the world” than a far more modest change in the mode of production, as if liberal capitalism is the “real” that will somehow survive even under conditions of a global ecological catastrophe...

[Slavoj ŽIŽEK, *Spectre is Still Roaming Around*]

Handle With Care

COVER VERSIONS:
THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO
GEOFF COX

➤ *Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei* was first printed as pamphlet in February 1848, in the office of the Workers' Educational Association [*Communistischer Arbeiter-bildungsverein*], 46 Liverpool Street, Bishopsgate, in the City of London. Since that date it has been reproduced in countless contexts and editions - making it not only one of the most widely read texts ever, but one whose various covers speak of the way the *Manifesto* has been received, perceived, used, and abused across different contexts and locations. How would one begin to approach the design and packaging of *The Communist Manifesto* - to conceive of it in terms of the book's form and function, its use- and exchange-value?

The cover images include the metonymic uses of plain red and hammer and sickle; images of chains and sticks; more figurative depictions of workers stoking the fires of industry, trudging or uprising; paintings such as *May Day*, 1929 by V. V. Kuptsov; a photograph of Marx [interestingly, without Engels]; and a young woman threatening the reader with a machine gun. Given that the relationship of appearance and reality is fundamental to an understanding of the *Manifesto*, its packaging doubly invites close reading.

The sheer volume of publishing activity on the *Manifesto*'s 150th anniversary in 1998 subjected it on unprecedented level to the rules and mechanisms of contemporary marketing. One example is Verso's *The Communist Manifesto: A Modern Edition* with its high production values and silky red bookmark ribbon. Verso knowingly described it as the "Prada handbag" edition and it was received enthusiastically with an edition of 32,000. By June 1999, it had sold 21,000 in North America and 3,400 in the UK and other exports. Clearly, this indicates something about the edition's commodity status and the market forces in which capital appears to have successfully commodified radical politics as something reducible to both nostalgia and fashion, which is why an engagement with the text itself seems all the more urgent. ●



This work draws upon
an earlier project,
"Manifest", produced
in collaboration with
Tim Brennan and
Adrian Ward.



Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifest*, eds.
Tim Brennan and Geoff Cox, LONDON: WORKING PRESS 1999
vidi str/see pages 15-19, 21-25



Cristian Alexa:
*Autoportret za Zagreb/
Self-portrait for Zagreb,
2000*

**“Nema revolucionarnih filmova,
ima samo revolucionarnih ideja!”**


‘Maoist’ Branko, u dokumentarnom filmu ‘Svaki je čovjek
dobar čovjek u rđavom svijetu’, Rajko Grlić, 1968.

Što, kako i za koga


povodom 152 obljetnice Komunističkog manifesta

Odgovori na tri osnovna pitanja svake ekonomski organizacije - **što, kako i za koga** - višestruko su primjenjivni na gotovo sve životne segmente. **Što**, problem koliko će se proizvesti svakog mogućeg dobra i usluge s ograničenim resursima ili inputima društva, **kako**, izbor određene tehnologije prema kojoj će se svako dobro, odabranu rješavanjem pitanja **što**, proizvesti, i pitanje **za koga**, koje se odnosi na raspodjelu potrošnih dobara među pripadnicima tog društva, određuju i problematiku planiranja, koncepcije i realizacije izložbenih projekta, jednako kao i produkciju i distribuciju umjetničkih djela i položaj umjetnika na tržištu rada. Okolnosti nastanka i razvoja ovog projekta, čiji se koncept i obim mijenjao u razdoblju od njegova začetka koncem 1998. godine, kada je objavljivanje Marxovog **Komunističkog manifesta** povodom 150 godišnjice knjige poslužilo kao povod za organizaciju izložbe, namentele su koncept čija se unutrašnja logika razvijala usporedo s rastom apetita i želja organizatora. Odgovor na pitanje kako izložbom obilježiti godišnjicu knjige tako jakog političkog naboja u društvu koje čitavo desetljeće sustavno zaboravu i kolektivnim mistifikacijama prepusta arhiv politike, ekonomije i stila propalog projekta socijalističkog društva, oblikovao se u području zahvaćenom koliko razmatranjima o mogućnostima političkog i oblicima umjetničkog onogažmana, toliko i dnevnom politikom.


Izložba posvećena 150. [ili točnije 152.] obljetnici izdavanja **Komunističkog manifesta** za svoje ishodište uzima ekonomiju. Kao tema izložbe on može djelovati kao poticaj za stvaranje svojevrsne taksonomije imaginarija komunističkog režima, pokušaj tra-




Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, THE COMMUNIST PARTY, LONDON: CENTENARY EDITION, 1948




Karl Marx / Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, PEKING: FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS 1977



The Communist
Manifesto,
trans. Samuel Moore,
HARMONDSWORTH:
PENGUIN 1974



MALAYALAM EDITION,
MOSCOW, PROGRESS
PUBLISHERS 1999



Manifesto Comunista,
SAO PAULO: CHED 1982


siranja cinizma komunističke svakodnevice koji tako sjajno opisuju disidenti, a koji na podlozi sprege države i kapitala tvori jedinstvenu enciklopediju iskustva u svakoj svojoj pojedinačnoj realizaciji ili pak kao metafora revolucionarnih - avangardnih - modernističkih utopijskih manifesta u izmijenjenim uvjetima unificiranog spektakla. Istodobno *Komunistički manifest* djeluje kao snažan memorijski trigger djeleotvoran u oba smjera: kao tekst čije su posljedice uzrokovale najveći pomor u 20. stoljeću, *biblija* jednog strahotnog režima, ali i kao *modelaine*, podsjetnik na užitak revolucionarne djelatnosti koji uvijek nadmašuje njezinu instrumentalnost, a koji podrazumijeva ono čvrsto uvjerenje o znanju pozicija koje nam danas izmiče. Iz naše osobne perspektive može se odnositi na specifično generacijsko, pop-političko iskustvo rasapa jednog društvenog sustava nastalog kao degenerični plod borbe protiv kapitalističkih odnosa, koja u drugim svojim realizacijama završava kao retorika određenog životnog stila, kao terorizam i njegovi brojni mutanti, kao liberalno nastojanje ka usavršavanju administracije vladanja. Prigodničarski rečeno, nakon 150 godina borbe protiv kapitala kapital iz iscrpljujuće bitke izlazi kao pobjednik koji je tu da traje i manifest mu ne treba ni sada, kao što mu nije trebao ni prije 150 godina.

Ekonomija određuje dominantne trendove današnjice, od globalizacije, geo-politike i odnosa prema okolišu, do odabira životnog stila. Termin *ekonomija* pronalazimo i unutar različitih teoretskih diskursa, ali i u gotovo svim segmentima svakodnevice: govorimo tako o emotivnoj, jezičnoj i spolnoj ekonomiji, ili pak raspravljamo o državnom i "kućnom" budžetu ili budžetu nekog projekta. Ekonomija neprijepono određuje našu svakodnevnicu pokrivajući izuzetno širok tematski raspon. Istodobno, ekonomija jest politika, bez obzira na dominantnu sliku kapitala kao nezainteresiranog i objektivnog stanja stvari vođenog nepokolebljivom tržišnom logikom. Iz perspektive današnjice čini se da su upravo ekonomske analize *Komunističkog manifesta* još uvijek relevantne. Buržoaska epoha se razlikuje od svih ranijih epoha po stalnom revolucionariziranju proizvodnje, po ne-


prekidnom potresanju svih društvenih slojeva, po vječnoj nesigurnosti i stalnom kretanju. Ono rastače sve čvrste, zahrdale odnose sa svim drevnim predstavama i shvaćanjima koja je prote; svi novi odnosi zastrijevaju prije no što očvrsnu. Sve što je čvrsto i ustaljeno pretvara se u dim; sve što je sveto skrnavi se; ljudi najzad bivaju prisiljeni da na svoj životni položaj, na svoje međusobne odnose pogledaju trezvenim očima.

Jedna od definicija ekonomiju opisuje kao **znanost izbora** koja proučava načine kako se za upotrebu biraju oskudni ili ograničeni proizvodni resursi [rad, oprema, tehničko znanje] da bi se proizvele različite robe [kao što su, kako nabroja **Samuelson**, pšenica, ogrtači, koncerti i projektili] i raspodijelile za potrošnju. Ekonomija je proučavanje kako društva koriste oskudne resurse da bi proizvela vrijedne robe i raspodijelila ih među različitim ljudima. Tako u samoj biti pojma ekonomije leži i činjenica oskudnosti. "Zakon oskudnosti" kaže: resursi i dobra su ograničeni, dok se želje čine neograničenima. Ekonomičnost kao vodeća težnja suvremenog života podrazumijeva optimalizaciju kao način poslovanja, kada se uz najmanje troškove postižu najveći privredni efekti. Stoga povucimo još jednu paralelu: kako se organizacija ove izložbe odvija unutar izuzetno skučenih prostora "proizvodnih resursa", načelo optimalizacije postalo je lajtmotiv koncepta i organizacije izložbe. Drugim riječima, "ono" temeljno što i kako projekta sve su se više zbližavali i napokon preklopili. Politički sadržaj **Manifesta** izražava se kao fundamentalna političnost ekonomije, a naš se interes fokusirao na radove koji se bave funkcionalnjem ekonomije u globalnim sustavima, svakodnevnom životu, privatnom iskustvu, umjetničkoj praksi i artworldu, globalnoj ekologiji...


Unutar tako ocrtanog konteksta zanimaju nas reakcije ne samo uvjetno rečeno "socijalno usmjerene umjetničke struje" već umjetnosti koja direktno ili indirektno zaposjeda određene segmente socijalne infrastrukture bilo da preuzima, simulira ili korišti njene zamršene sustave kao prostore djelovanja ili direktno prisvaja njene sadržaje i znakove. Princip




LONDON: LAWRENCE &
WISHART 1983




Det Kommunistiske
Manifestet, trans. Frans
Masareel, OSLO: FALKEN
FORLAG 1984




trans. Samuel Moore,
HARMONDSWORTH:
PENGUIN CLASSICS 1985



ed. Samuel H. Beer,
NEW YORK: APPLETON-
CENTURY-CROFTS 1987



ed. Frederic L. Bender,
NEW YORK: W.W. NORTON &
CO. 1988



LONDON: PHOENIX, A
DIVISION OF ORION BOOKS,
1996

01 | M. Stilinović

optimalizacije izražava se i kao princip prisvajanja. Vjerujemo da će ekonomski principi optimalizacije i štendre kao ishodište izložbe potaknuti umjetnike i usmjeriti ih u različite pravcima. Tržišni mehanizmi, globalna međuovisnost, problem konkurenčije i tehnološki razvoj samo su neke od mogućih niti vodilja.


Jednako kako se u određenom smislu i koncept izložbe poklapa i bavi vlastitom realizacijom, tako očekujemo da će poneki umjetnici implicitno propitivati načine produkcije vlastitog umjetničkog djela te time pokrenuti i čitav niz pitanja vezanih uz rad, produktivnost, optimalizaciju i ekonomičnost i unutar sistema muzejsko—galerijskih institucija. Ekonomski termini kao što su inflacija, devalvacija ili deprivacija primjenjivi su i na širi sustav vrijednosti. Fokusiramo ih s obzirom na osobito interesantan razvoj u kontekstu umjetničke produkcije sedamdesetih i osamdesetih godina, kada su umjetnici obilato prisvajali ikoniku socijalnog pejzaža dekonstruirajući i kritizirajući centralizam socijalističkih državnih uređenja s rastućim trendom inflacije. Na neki način inzistiranje na tako osmišljenim radovima dovedeno je u pitanje društvenim promjenama u Istočnoj Evropi. Pod time mislimo da je devalvacija znakova i simbola danas još očitija, ne samo činjenicom da su se znakovi od pretjerane upotrebe izlizali i istrošili, već oni sa današnje točke gledišta nužno postaju etnografija.⁰¹ Unutar kolektivne memorije ili amnezije takvi se znakovi danas mogu očitovati dvojako: kao ispraznjeni fetiši ili kao devalvirani i pomalo nostalgični suveniri.

I za kraj, ekonomskim rječnikom rečeno, kao kustosice u našem radu sklone smo odabiru i primjени mikroekonomiske metode. Dok se makroekonomija bavi izučavanjem privrede u cijelosti u odnosu na niz agregatnih varijabli, mikroekonomija promatra ponašanje pojedinačnih varijabli. Drugim riječima, ne težimo stvaranju nekog definitivnog i taksioškog pogleda na složenu problematiku odnosa ekonomije i umjetnosti, ali vjerujemo u iskaz pojedinačnog i njegovu relevantnost u odnosu na opće.

Unutar suvremenih ekonomskih tokova mikroekonomija u centar pažnje dospijeva ponovljenim otkrićem novog tržišta nastalog slomom socijalizma

u zemljama Istočne Evrope. Baršunasta revolucija, raspjevana revolucija, revolucija svijeća, jogurt revolucija završava svojevrsnim trijumfom kapitala, ponovnim otkrivanjem tržišne privrede kao oruđa pre raspolođene resursa. Premda je marksizam kao ekonom-ska teorija [krivo] predviđao da će kapitalizam propasti zbog svojih unutrašnjih proturječja, osobito zbog eks-ploatacije radničke klase koja se s rastom kapitala ne smanjuje, ta je teorija i danas relevantna za razumijevanje složenih ekonomsko-političkih odno-sa. Jeli recentna "odluka socijalističkih zemalja da post-anu kapitalističke" obrtanje kotača povijesti za puni krug, krajnji manifest kapitalizma kao doista jedinog mogućeg modela opstanka ili tek karika u nizu koji se nastavlja, izgubljena runda preciznih pregovora oko iznaloženja najboljeg modela vladanja i raspolođene resur-sa?

Ova izložba posvećena je 152. obljetnici tiskanja *Komunističkog manifesta*, a želi istražiti načine na koje umjetnost reflektira kako pojedinac i društvo alociraju svoje oskudne i ograničene resurse, a namije-njena je svim pripadnicima društva. ●



The Communist
Manifesto, trans. Samuel
Moore, LONDON: PLUTO
PRESS 1996

**The history
of all
hitherto
existing
societies is
the history
of class
struggles**


**Sloboda
Jednosti!**

What, how and for whom


on the occasion of the 152nd anniversary of the Communist manifesto

The three basic questions of every economic organization - *what, how and for whom* - are operative in almost all segments of life. *VWhat*, the problem of how many of all possible goods and services will be produced with limited resources and social input; *how*, the choice of certain technology according to which each good, chosen by answering the question *what*, will be produced; and the question *for whom*, that concerns the distribution of goods among members of society - these are the questions that also concern the planning, concept and realization of an exhibition, as well as the production and distribution of artworks or the artist's position on the labour market. The circumstances surrounding the development of the *VWhat how and for whom* project, which has been progressing since 1998 with the republishing of Marx's *Communist Manifesto* on the occasion of the book's 150th anniversary serving as the impetus, have imposed the concept whose logic developed together with the increased ambition and wishes of the organizers. The answer to the question of how to deal with the anniversary of a book of such powerful ideological and political potential in a society that has imposed collective mystification and oblivion to the archive of politics, economy and style of the failed project of socialist society, took its shape in the area in which considerations about the possibilities of political and artistic engagement were interlocked with issues of local daily politics.


As an exhibition subject, the *Manifesto* could serve as an impetus for creating certain taxonomy of the communist regime *imaginari*, as an effort




Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels, *Manifeste du Parti Communiste*, trans. Corinne Lyotard, PARIS: LIBRAIRIE GÉNÉRALE FRANÇAISE 1973



Manifiesto Comunista,
MADRID: BÁSICA DE
BOLSILLO AKAL 1997



OXFORD: OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS



trans. Paul M. Sweezy,
NEW YORK: MONTHLY
REVIEW PRESS 1998



Kommunistiska
Manifestet, trans.
Per-Olof Mattsson,
STOCKHOLM/MÄLÖ:
VERTIGO FÖRLAG 1998

toward tracing the cynicism of the communist regime's daily life as described by dissidents, or as the metaphor for all revolutionary/avant-garde/modernist utopian manifestos in the present day state of unified spectacle. At the same time, the *Communist Manifesto* is a strong memory trigger active in two directions: as a text with grave consequences, as the bible of a terrible regime, but also as the reminder of a certain enjoyment in revolutionary activity, an enjoyment that always exceeds its instrumentality, and that implicates firm knowledge about one's position, knowledge that we can no longer have today. From our personal perspective, the *Manifesto* also concerns a specific generation, the pop-political experience of dissolution of the social system that turned out to be the degenerative fruit of an anti-capitalistic project that in its other realizations ended up as a lifestyle rhetoric, as terrorism and its mutants, as a liberal endeavour toward the better administration of life. In the anniversary spirit, we might say that after 150 years of anti-capitalistic struggle, capital has emerged as the winner that's here to stay, one that does not need a manifesto now just as it didn't need one yesterday.

The necessity for rethinking and coming to terms with our "communist" past is a consequence of the cultural policy dominant in Croatia during the last decade, characterized by insufficient intellectual contextualization that has incapacitated any serious reflection of both the immediate past and the present "transitional" moment. In a country in which the transition to a free-market economy has been marked by a robbed economy, a high unemployment rate, an intensified economic uncertainty, a pauperized population and an increase in crime rate, Marx's analysis of capital, on which the agitated elan of the *Manifesto* has been based, seems to be extremely relevant. The oblivion and repression of radical political theory, as well as of political and ideological history in the countries of Eastern Europe, intensifies their need for defining the fundamental political content of


economy, although the dominant picture of capital claims that capitalism is disinterested in the objective state of things, governed only by firm market logic.

One of the definitions describes economics as the science of choice that studies ways in which scarce or limited production resources [work, equipment, technical knowledge] are chosen in order to produce goods [such as wheat, coats, concerts or missiles] and ways in which goods are distributed for consumption. Economics study how societies utilize scarce resources in order to produce valuable commodities and distribute these among people. Therefore, scarcity lies within the very essence of the economy. Scarcity law says: resources and goods are limited, while wishes seem to be unlimited. Economizing as the leading motto of contemporary life implicates optimization as a way of doing business - how with the smallest input the greatest economic results are achieved.


Let us use another parallel: as the what, how & for whom project has been planed within extremely limited production resources, the optimization principle has become the leitmotif of the exhibition's concept and method. In other words, the basic "what" and "how" of the project were getting closer and closer to each other, and have finally overlapped. The political content of the *Manifesto* is expressed also in the fundamental political basis of economy, and our interest has focused on the art works that deal with the functioning of the economy within global systems, everyday life, private experience, the art world, global ecology...

Within such a context we are not interested solely in the reactions of "socially engaged" art, but also in art that directly or indirectly appropriates certain segments of the social infrastructure by taking over, simulating or parasiting its intricate system as its area of activity, or by directly appropriating the system's contents and signs. The optimization principle appears as the appropriation principle.

Just as the exhibition concept overlaps with and questions its own realization, artists keep



*The Communist
Manifesto: A Modern
Edition* [1848],
LONDON: VERSO 1998



trans. and ed. Frederick
Engels, NEW YORK:
INTERNATIONAL
PUBLISHERS 1998



*Manifest der
Kommunistischen Partei*,
STUTTGART: RECLAM 1998

K.Marx F.Engels

Komünist Manifesto ve Komünizmin İlkeleri




*Komünist Manifesto ve
Komünizmin İlkeleri,*
trans. Muzaffer Erdost,
ANKARA: SOL YAYINLARI
1998

THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO

KARL MARX AND FRIEDRICH ENGELS

Including *Principles of Communism*
by Friedrich Engels and an essay by
Paul M. Sweezy and Leo Huberman
The Communist Manifesto
After 100 Years

ed. Christopher Phelps,
NEW YORK: MONTHLY
REVIEW PRESS 1998




MOSCOW 1999

01 | M. Stilinović,
interview

questioning the conditions of artwork production, triggering broader issues concerning work, productivity, optimization within the system of gallery and museum institutions. Economic terms such as inflation, devaluation or depreciation are operative within a broader system of values. We center them in relation to very interesting developments in the context of local art production in the 70s and 80s, when artists used to appropriate socialscape, de-constructing and criticizing the centralism of the socialist state system with the increased trend of inflation. Social changes in the former Eastern block and the devaluation of signs and symbols has become more apparent, not only because the signs have become exhausted due to their over-usage, but from today's perspective they inevitably become ethnography. Within a collective memory or amnesia such signs today can function twofold: as emptied fetishes, or as devalued and slightly nostalgic souvenirs.

While macro-economy deals with economy as a whole in relation to a series of variables, micro-economy that investigates individual variables seems to be more interesting. Within contemporary economic trends micro-economy came into focus with the rediscovery of new markets in the countries of Eastern Europe. The Velvet revolution, the Singing revolution, the Candle revolution, the Yogurt revolution, they all ended up in certain triumph of capital, with the rediscovery of market economy as the best tool for resource distribution. Although Marxism as an economic theory predicted that capitalism would fail because of its inner contradictions, especially because of the exploitation of the working class that does not diminish with capital growth, Marxist theory is still relevant for the understanding of complex sociopolitical relations. Is the recent "decision of socialist countries to become capitalistic" turning the history wheel backwards, the ultimate manifesto of capitalism as the only possible modus of doing things, or just another link in the chain that continues infinitely, just a round lost in the process of precise negotiations about finding the best model of government and resource distribution?

The exhibition is dedicated to the 152nd anniversary of the Communist Manifesto. It aims to investigate the ways in which art reflects how individuals and societies allocate its scarce and limited resources. It is for all members of society. ●



Komunistički manifest.
AUGUST CESAREC, ZAGREB



Manifest komunistickej
strany, OBZOR, NOVI SAD
[whw, Zagreb 2000]

Subject: [alt.usenet.manifestoes] Manifesto Mini-FAQ [v1.31]

Date: 09 Dec 1996 11:38:00 GMT

Organization: Alt.usenet.manifestoes

Archive-name: usenet/manifesto/faq

Posting-Frequency: monthly [every 16th]


Last-modified: 1996/12/08

Version: 1.31

URL: URL: <http://www.emf.net/~estephen/manifesto.html>

=====

A Manifesto- Mini-FAQ [12/16/96]



*Manifest komunističke
partije, KULTURA,
BEOGRAD 1963.*



*Manifest komunističke
partije, KONFERENCIJA
ORGANIZACIJE SK U JNA,
1972.*

01 | "VWhat is this group all about?"

The purpose of **alt.usenet.manifestoes** is to present and discuss manifestoes on USENET. Manifestoes can be for individuals, organizations, groups, companies, governments, nations or political parties.

02 | "VWhy?"

Because it is interesting. It can be amusing. It appears to be worthwhile. Posterity matters. Some have found it useful. VWhy not?

Manifestoes are an important part of any undertaking. A manifesto answers the question, "VWHY?". Every group, individual, company, organization, project or government should have a mission statement; without stated goals, success can be elusive.

In the long-run, **alt.usenet.manifestoes** and its archive can serve to be the official repository for the manifestoes of a wide range of organizations. It is sometimes difficult to find a mainstream outlet for the presentation of views or goals; alt.usenet.manifestoes is a viable outlet.

In the tragic extreme, consider that **FC** [the Unabomber's organization] considered "Industrial Society and Its Future" [the **Unabomber manifesto**] to be so important that a bombing campaign was started in order to ensure the manifesto's publication.

03 | "VWhat is a manifesto?"

1. man.i. fes.to \. man-*. fes.-[]to-\ n pl.: manifestos or manifestoes [It, denunciation, manifest, fr. manifestare to manifest, fr. L] a public declaration of intentions, motives, or views A manifesto is your mission statement, your purpose: VWhy you do what you do, exactly what it is that you believe and intend to accomplish. Some well-known manifestoes include the **Communist Manifesto**, **Richard Stallman's GNU Manifesto**, and Kibo's HappyNet Manifesto [all of which have been posted to [alt.usenet.manifestoes](#) in the past and are available from the archive].



Manifest komunističke partije, konferencija organizacije sk u jna, Beograd 1975.

04 | "VWhere do these manifestoes come from?"

People and organizations write them and make them available, sometimes in other newsgroups, WWW pages or FTP archives. They are submitted to [alt.usenet.manifestoes](#) for approval [see below]. Sometimes the moderation team stumbles across them and posts them [we always try to get permission first]. All are welcome to submit a manifesto for themselves or for an organization.



Komunistički manifest u stripu, Rodolfo Mancenaro, TRIBUNA I STUDENTSKI LIST, LJUBLJANA/ZAGREB 1979.

05 | "VWhy is the plural of manifesto 'manifestoes' and not 'manifestos'? VWhy is the name of this newsgroup plural, anyway?"

Dictionaries in the U.S. say either is acceptable. The moderator happens to prefer 'manifestoes.' [~~Long story about why deleted.~~]

In the debate on [alt.config](#) [the place where new alt groups are discussed], **Melissa Anne Algeo** recommended that the name be plural so that people don't think the purpose of this newsgroup is to come up with some unifying manifesto for all of USENET [which although a worthwhile project, is not the sole goal of this newsgroup].



Manifesti i partisë komuniste, RILINDJA, PRISHTINE 1985.

06 | "VWhat e-mail addresses are relevant?"

Contributions: manifesto@emf.net

Requests: manifesto-request@emf.net

Human Being: estephen@emf.net

manifesto/s as meme spreading device?

A **meme**
[rhymes with
“dream”] is a
unit of
information -
an idea, a song,
a notion of
fashion,
philosophy or
politics - that
leaps from
mind to mind,
changing
opinions,
altering
behaviors,
catalyzing
collective
mindshifts and
transforming
cultures.

MANIFESTOS DESTINIES [list]
<http://www.altx.com/manifestos/>

ALT.USENET.MANIFESTOES ARCHIVE
<http://www.emf.net/~estephen/manifesto.html>

FUTURISM MANIFESTOS [list]
<http://www.unknownn.nu/futurism/>

DADA MANIFESTOS [list]
<http://www.tc.umn.edu/~whit0580/igloo/dada/manifestos.html>

THE FOUNDING AND MANIFESTO OF FUTURISM
<http://www.unknownn.nu/futurism/manifesto.html>

NEOFUTURISTS MANIFESTO
<http://neofuturists.org/manifest.htm>

CYBERSPACE INDEPENDENCE DECLARATION
<http://www.ultra.net.au/~visby/declindp.htm>

UNABOMBER'S MANIFESTO
<http://www.emf.net/~estephen/manifesto/unabe2.html>
<http://www.emf.net/~estephen/manifesto/aum00058.html>

S.C.U.M. MANIFESTO
<http://www.emf.net/~estephen/manifesto/aum00110.html>
<http://www.enviroweb.org/coe/e-sermons/scum.html>

VNS MATRIX: BITCH MUTANT MANIFESTO
<http://www.aec.at/meme/symp/contrib/vns.html>
<http://web.ukonline.co.uk/n.paradoxa/bitch.htm>

VNS MATRIX: A CYBERFEMINIST MANIFESTO FOR THE 21st CENTURY
<http://sysx.apana.org.au/artists/vns/manifesto.html>

MANIFESTO OF NEGATIVITY
<http://www.emf.net/~estephen/manifesto/aum00009.html>

MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
<http://www.emf.net/~estephen/manifesto/aum00014.html>

VIRTUAL SURREALIST MANIFESTO
<http://www.emf.net/~estephen/manifesto/aum00040.html>

MANIFESTO OF THE FUTURIST PROGRAMMERS
<http://www.sgi.com/grafico/future/futman.html>

MANIFESTO FOR CYBERSPACE
<http://www.emf.net/~estephen/manifesto/aum00025.html>

GNU MANIFESTO
<http://www.emf.net/~estephen/manifesto/aum00023.html>
<http://www.gnu.org/gnu/manifesto.html>

HACKER'S MANIFESTO
<http://members.tripod.com/~coldfirez/hacker.htm>

MANIFESTO OF NEGATIVITY
<http://www.altx.com/manifestos/negativity.html>

AVANT-POP MANIFESTO
<http://www.altx.com/manifestos/avant.pop.manifesto.html>

DADA MANIFESTO

<http://www.smalltime.com/novhere/dada/tristan.html>

NEUMERZ MANIFESTO

<http://www.smalltime.com/novhere/neumerz/manifesto.html>

DADA IS ALIVE

<http://www.smalltime.com/novhere/neumerz/wwords.html>

DADA IS ALIVE [hrvatski]

<http://members.xoom.com/FrankoBasic/>

THEROADTONOVVHERE

<http://www.smalltime.com/novhere/manifesto.html>

MANIFESTE CANNIBALE DADA

<http://www.tc.umn.edu/~vwhit0580/igloo/dada/picabia.html>

S.C.U.M. MANIFESTO

<http://www.bcn.net/~pjiazzo/scum.htm>

<http://www.generationterrorists.com/quotes/smvs.html>

<http://www.flash.net/~7Etwwinkle/psycho/DARK/links/scum-mon.htm>

HYPERMANIFESTO: MAJOR TENETS AND MINOR INDISCRETIONS

<http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rmutt/Manifesto.html>

MANIFESTO OF SURREALISM, SECOND MANIFESTO OF SURREALISM

<http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rmutt/dictionary/breton.html>

DADAISM

<http://dept.english.upenn.edu/~jenglish/English104/tzara.html>

LOVVTECH MANIFESTO

<http://www.lovvtech.org/projects/n5m3/>

<http://www.labinary.org/manifesto.htm>

THE PIRAN NETTIME MANIFESTO

<http://www.nettime.org/nettime.w3archive/199705/msg00147.html>

FIRST MANIFESTO OF NEOIST PERFORMANCE

AND THE PERFORMANCE OF NEOISM

http://www.neoism.org/squares/neoist_performance_manif.html

PRAXIS MANIFESTO

http://www.neoism.org/squares/praxis_manifesto.html

PLAGIARISM

http://www.neoism.org/squares/plagiarism_index.html

DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF CYBERSPACE

<http://www.cs.princeton.edu/fac/appel/barlov.html>

THE FIRST VIRTUAL COUNTRY IN CYBERSPACE

<http://www.globalideasbank.org/diyfut/DIY-205.HTML>

LINUX MANIFESTO [intervievv with Linus Torvalds]


http://www.bootnet.com/youaskedforit/lip_linux_manifesto.html


FIRST THINGS FIRST 2000

<http://www.xs4all.nl/~maxb/ftf2000.htm>

THE MAGNIFICENT UNION OF DIGITALLY DOVNLOADING ARTISTS

<http://www.muddo.org>





ALEKSANDR KOSOLAPOV
THE MANIFESTO, 1983

I certainly feel a glow of pride when I tell people my new address. Karl-Marx-Allee just rings with radical chic, doesn't it? Is there a Karl Marx Street in London? Well, they should have renamed Greek Street Karl Marx Street, since he lived there with his whole family stuffed into two tiny, unhygienic rooms while he was writing 'Das Kapital' [if only he'd lived long enough to sign up for the fruits of his philosophy, a luxurious workers' showcase apartment with good plumbing and a balcony in Berlin!] But of course they didn't. Neither are any streets in Highgate, where Marx lies buried, named after him. And, although Paris has its streets of communards and a subway station called Stalingrad, you certainly won't find any Karl Marx Streets in American cities. Marxism remains taboo in the land where tax breaks for the rich and the endless erosion of state support for the old and the poor pass for sound economic and social policy...

[MOMUS:
KARL MARX ALLEE,
WWW.IMOMUS.COM]

The Last Communist

'Would the last communist out
Switch off the lights?'
They shout as they go
Into the night

They think that it's over
Maybe it is
But I'm staying here
Alone with this promise

In my mind
It still exists
I'm the last communist
Alone in the Soviet Union

In the Soviet Union / There's a lightswitch on the wall
In the Soviet Union / And a canteen down the hall
In the Soviet Union / I make faces with a torch
In the Soviet Union / In the mirror on the back of the bathroom door
In the Soviet Union / Shining up the lino on the corridor floor
In the Soviet Union / Eating dead pigeons cold and raw
In the Soviet Union / Drinking vodka through a straw
In the Soviet Union / Weeping for the visions Lenin saw

I like it here, I like it fine
The radiator's warm
The bus is on time

And healthcare is free
A job is for life
The caretaker is me
I'm switching on the lights


In my mind
It will exist
I'm the first communist
Alive in the Soviet Union

[In the world of freedom]
You lived a long time ago
You filled your shoes with six black toes
You rode to work on a big skateboard
And swiped your celery barcode
Exploding filippino washing machines
Your sinister servants watch TV
You shake our palm trees violently
Until the coconuts fill your plastic tray
You're writing up the budget and you're purchasing supplies
It's always someone else's turn to die
You're launching major missile strikes
To prove you'll never drink Zamzam cola
The car protecting your child is killing mine
You're blinded by the headlights on the autobahn
A chimp made off with your sports jacket, boy
Your king is a monkey and a mongoloid

Today I'm alone
The war hasn't even begun
But your king hasn't won
One day you'll come

It's so clear
Our future's here
I am just the caretaker
All is forgiven!
Come back communism!

[Momus, Oskar Tennis Champion]



This is the initial statement for the process of developing **WHAT, WHY, FOR WHOM** project through the dialogue and discussion. It is also an invitation to everyone interested to respond to it in any way.

A selection of these responses will be published in a publication which will be a part of the **WHAT, HOW & FOR WHOM** project.

We believe that actual event in Zagreb will be real start and not the end of the discussion.

Here are some of the preliminary [but not limited to] topics:



Slavoj Žižek, *The Spectre is Still Roaming Around!*, JAPANESE EDITION 2000

01 | MANIFESTOS

- ★ role of political/artistic manifesto/s
- ★ manifesto/s as performative
- ★ manifesto/s as "nodal point"
- ★ manifesto/s as interpellation
- ★ manifesto/s as meme spreading device
- ★ manifesto/s as artwork
- ★ utopian concepts in arts & politics/connection of social [revolutionary] and aesthetic movements today?
- ★ theory as working basis of artistic practice

02 | COMMUNISM

- ★ actuality of the *The Communist Manifesto* today
- ★ ruling ideas are/are not ideas of the ruling class?
- ★ utopia as a symptom, critique of really existing social/artistic order
- ★ "transition" as a weapon within ideological, that is, hegemonic struggle
- ★ virtual and the return of the repressed utopia?
- ★ cybercommunism?

03 | UTOPIA vs ECONOMY

- ★ notion of economy in the arts
- ★ creation of value on art-market [Saatchi & Saatchi, big international exhibitions...]
- ★ art/s/artistic practice as a cultural machinery, as cultural factory, as ideological state apparatus
- ★ artist as a proletarian, part of alienated society/mass created by capitalist order
- ★ [ideology of] "art/s for all" [available? mass produced? understandable?]
- ★ social responsibility of artists/designers/media workers
- ★ art/istic practice against capitalist ideology of consumption/exploitation vs. art/istic practice as a part of exploitation/colonisation
- ★ free media? /free of what, free for whom, free for what?
- ★ open source /free as free beer or free as free speech?
- ★ art in opposition between dictate of art market and will/wish for free/spontaneous development, between tendency towards inertia and creation of relevant/political/cultural messages
- ★ public access, but who is/constitutes public?

- ★ new [digital] media - colonising us globally, empowering us locally - "wound can be healed only by the spear that smoothes you"?

04 | RE/POLITIZATION

- ★ politicization of culture vs. culturalisation of politics
- ★ art as model/experiment/test lab for new political/social practices
- ★ question/possibility of avantgarde in post post-modern/late capitalism
- ★ possibilities of radical [leftist, critical] art/culture/cultural action/art and media practice in late capitalist society
- ★ horizons of capital, possibility of subversion
- ★ possibility/place/strategy of disruptive gesture
- ★ is body radicalism only masking avoidance of radical political issues in contemporary art? Are we allowed to be radical with our bodies/identities just to keep the body of the capital intact?
- ★ interpassivity and political question: how to affect/influence others with art/work, and not /work/for/ instead of somebody else ["passive" audience]
- ★ role of the media
- ★ what are independent media worth for? Professional vs. partisan media?
- ★ myth of pure art and myth of objective information



Prvi prevod Manifesta na s/h, PANČEVO 1871.



Das Kommunistische Manifest, WIENER VOLKSBUCHHANDLUNG IGNAZ BRAND & CO., BEČ 1919.



prev. Milorad Popović,
SOCIJALISTIČKA IZDAVAČKA
KNJIŽARA TUČOVIĆ,
BEOGRAD 1920.

05 | REAL/ITIES OF [EASTERN] EUROPE

- ★ re/turn from real socialism to real capitalism
- ★ mutual disappointment of East [in new capitalism] and West [reality of new states]
- ★ eastern artists - western market
- ★ european cultural cooperation - beyond market?
- ★ role of contemporary [East] European art/art practice/creative work/new media in regional integration, post-war reconciliation, promotion of democracy, across national boundaries and ethnic, religious and other divides
- ★ how to keep non-profit/not-for-profit work/media/institutions going
- ★ foreign foundations vs. state funding vs. sponsorship
- ★ networking? Is it working?
- ★ selfmanagement and sustainability of cultural institutions/networks

much about guys working, which was a very 19th century preoccupation, defining what that meant. I think the two key books of that period were *The Communist Manifesto* and Melville's *Bartleby The Scrivener* — you can read it in about ten minutes, and it's the polar opposite. I just got *The Communist Manifesto* 150th anniversary edition.

What a book! "A spectre is haunting Europe..." What a great story, ending with "Workers of the world unite" . . .

There is nothing in our century that's like that; nothing that has that grandeur. The other book is this little short story about Bartleby, the scrivener, which was a 19th century nerd: he copies legal documents by hand, he would never leave the office and was always there working. One day the boss comes in and goes, "Hey, Bartleby, I want you to do this thing . . ." And Bartleby says, "I would prefer not to." And with those words rang in a whole new era of what work is. □

O DRUŠTVU KOJE JE ZAMIJENILO KULTURU S POLITIKOM

BORIS BUDEN

➤ Prije mnogo godina, u nekom sasvim drugom vremenu, *Komunistički manifest* je važio za veoma opasnu knjigu. Svet je u to doba bio podijeljen na one koji su vjerovali riječima te knjige i slijedili njezin revolucionarni duh i na one koji su je, jednako fascinirani njome, mrzili i bojali se njezina buntovnog zova. Nitko se međutim nije usudivao ignorirati važnost *Komunističkog manifesta*. Njegov povjesni utjecaj bio je očigledan; njegovi su praktično - politički učinci mijenjali svijet. Na trenutak se čak činilo da bi ta knjiga mogla odlučiti sudbinu čitavog čovječanstva.

Bilo je to vrijeme kad je svijet bio još mlad, što će reći zaokupljen poviješću koja se odvijala i budućnošću koja je još bila otvorena.

Otada se, međutim, sve promijenilo. Danas je *Manifest* tek mala knjižica među brojnim slavnim knjigama svjetske kulturne baštine koja nikoga više ne provočira na političku akciju i koje se više nitko ne boji.

Manifest, taj nekoć divlji politički pamflet, danas je, kako se čini, konačno udomačen i pretvoren u bezopasni kulturni artefakt. Kultura, a ne revolucionarna politika, danas je, gotovo sigurno, jedina poruka tog medija.

Komunistički manifest je izgubio svoje političko značenje u slijedu takozvanih demokratskih revolucija iz 1989. Pao je zajedno s komunizmom u Istočnoj Evropi, što se danas slavi kao konačna pobjeda moderne demokracije nad njenim totalističkim neprijateljima.

U skladu s razumijevanjem komunističkog totalitarizma, koje je postalo dominantno unutar političkog uma liberalnog demokratskog Zapada, komunistički politički pokret predstavljao je prije svega neku vrstu konzervativne reakcije protiv moderne, posebice protiv zapadne demokratske kulture kao kulture ljudskih prava i sloboda, dakle, bio je u svojoj osnovi intrinzično antimoderan politički fenomen.⁰¹ Komunisti su, prema tom shvaćanju, mobilizirali totalitarnu državu protiv civilnog društva i pokušali razviti proizvodne snage odbijajući pritom prihvati vrijednosti i institucije moderne kulture.

Moderna je, dakako, nešto mnogo više od procesa

01 | Luciano
Pellicani, *Modernity
& Totalitarianism,*
Telos No. 112,
Summer 1998,
str. 3-23

industrijalizacije, od neograničenog razvjeta proizvodnih snaga i znanstveno-tehničkog ovladavanja prirodom, onoga, dakle, što uobičajeno nazivamo civilizacijom. Modernaje, kako tvrde zastupnici spomenutog shvaćanja, i kultura - kultura ljudskih prava, vladavine zakona, sloboda, ukratko, esencijalnih vrijednosti Zapada. Ta prava i vrijednosti - a na prvom mjestu pravo privatnog vlasništva - ono je što garantira autonomiju civilnog društva.

U skladu s tim konceptom totalitarizma boljševička revolucija nije bila ništa drugo nego panični pokušaj da se zaustavi invazija zapadne kulture. Tako se i borba zapadnih demokracija protiv komunističkog totalitarizma može shvatiti kao oblik borbe u kulturi, kao neki divovski *Kulturkampf*. Politički proces tranzicije od komunizma ka demokraciji, koji je otpočeо 1989. u istočnoevropskim postkomunističkim zemljama, predstavlja u tom smislu neku vrstu kulturne *reconquiste*, rewesternizacije Istočne Evrope.

To je razlog zašto se u zapadnim strategijama tranzicije koje se primjenjuju u današnjoj istočnoj Evropi, odnosno u procesu takozvanog proširenja Evropske zajednice na istok, kultura i civilno društvo tretiraju kao da je riječ o nekom političkom jedinstvu, o dvjema tako nerazdvojnim sfarama društvenog života da ih čak više nismo u stanju ni razlikovati. Tako je kultura, kao sam sadržaj civilnog društva, postala glavni motor demokratizacije na postkomunističkom istoku.

Taj razvitak valja razumjeti i kao moment jednog daleko šireg povijesnog fenomena - radikalne kulturalizacije čitave sfere društva koji je u bitnome obilježio epohu postmoderne. Kultura danas ne predstavlja više jednu odvojenu, potpuno autonomnu sferu društva. To nestajanje autonomnog carstva kulture, kako je pisao **Fredric Jameson**, moramo predočiti sebi kao neku eksploziju:

"... silna ekspanzija kulture kroz čitavo područje društva do točke u kojoj se može reći da je sve u našem društvenom životu - od ekonomskе vrijednosti i državne moći do prakse odnosno same strukture psihe - postalo 'kulturom', u nekom originalnom i do sada još nereflektiranom smislu".⁰²

Ono što se promijenilo u našem postmodernom svijetu nije, dakle, sadržaj kulture, nego njen status. Sama kultura nije se povećala. Ono što je tako enormno poraslo je njen transformativni utjecaj na druge razine društva. Kultura je, kako ističe **Terry Eagleton**, "... čini se postala nova socijalna dominanta, nešto poput religije u srednjem vijeku, filozofije u Njemačkoj ranog 19. stoljeća ili prirodne znanosti u viktorijanskoj Britaniji".⁰³ S druge strane, posljedica tog razvjeta - gubitka autonomije - je da je kultura izgubila kritičku distancu koju je svojedobno imala u odnosu spram društvene stvarnosti. Ono, naime, što je također nestalo, je utopiskska perspektiva koja je bila immanentna carstvu kulture, koja se oduvijek zamišljala kao

02 | **Fredric Jameson**, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* [VERSO, LONDON/NEW YORK 1991], str. 48-49.

03 | **Terry Eagleton**, *The Idea of Culture* [BLACKWELL, OXFORD/MALDEN 2000], str. 126.

nešto uzvišeno nad praktičnim svijetom. Kultura danas nije više automatski sinonim za negaciju, opoziciju, subverziju, refleksiju, ukratko za dimenziju socijalne, ideoološke i političke kritike kao što je to nekoć bio slučaj.

Slična sudbina pogodila je i *Komunistički manifest*. Postavši naposljetku obični kulturni artefakt, ta je knjiga ostala bez svog kritičkog naboja i bez svakog političkog značenja i važnosti - bez obzira na to u kojoj mjeri izricala političku i povjesnu istinu suvremenog svijeta, bez obzira, dakle, na to koliko je u svojim idejama još uvijek aktualna.

Tako se čini da je *Manifest*, nekoć izraz najdubljih povijesnih proturječja zapadnog industrijskog društva, na koncu postao kulturni simbol Istoka. Onaj tko bi još pokušao dohvatiti njegovo političko, revolucionarno značenje neće, kako se danas vjeruje, naći u toj knjizi ništa drugo osim nekog opskurnog, u svojoj biti neevropskog kulturnog sadržaja.

Manifest je danas kulturno Drugo Zapada i upravo kao takav, istodobno predmet kulturnog uživanja i političkog isključivanja.

Da bismo bolje shvatili što se dogodilo, poslužit ćemo se u deskriptivne svrhe usporedbom s jednim poznatim psihiatrijskim slučajem.⁰⁴ Riječ je o slučaju dr. P., slavnog pacijenta **Olivera Sacksa**, koji je razvio neobičan simptom - zamjenio je svoju ženu sa šeširom. On je, doslovno, htijući staviti šešir na glavu, posegnuo za svojom suprugom. Dr. P. je naime zbog bolesti mozga izgubio moć vizualnog zamišljanja ili, preciznije, izgubio je sposobnost da vidi stvari određene vrste. Dok je primjerice previdao lica i scene, vizualizacija različitih apstraktnih shema je ostala intaktna, štoviše, još se izoštrela. Usprkos svojoj bolesti **Sacksov** pacijent - bio je učitelj u muzičkoj školi - mogao je na svome poslu funkcioniратi gotovo sasvim normalno. S druge strane, u svakidašnjem životu, kod kuće, nije mogao učiniti ništa sve dok svoje radnje ne bi pretvorio u neku pjesmu. Pjevao je cijelo vrijeme - pjesme jedenja, pjesme oblačenja i svlačenja, pjesme pranja, pjesme svega zamislivoga. U njega je mjesto na kojem su bile slike doslovno zauzela muzika. Pritom se dr. P. uopće nije osjećao loše, dapače, tvrdio je kako se nikada nije osjećao bolje.

Ono što je muzika bila za dr. P. - univerzalna struktura njegova života - to je danas za visoko razvijena društva Zapada postala kultura. Ondje ljudi u svom svakidašnjem životu gotovo više ništa ne mogu učiniti dok to ne pretvore u kulturu. Tako oni nemaju samo svoju kulturu ishrane, kulturu spavanja, kulturu oblačenja, kulturu kupovanja, nego na prvom mjestu svoju, kako vjeruju, sve napredniju političku kulturu koja obećaje eliminirati jednom zauvijek sve opasnosti društvenih sukoba, odričući se ne samo

MARXS - ENGELS

MANIFEST KOMUNISTIČKE PARTIJE



Manifest komunističke
partije, BICZ, BEOGRAD
1979.

04 | Oliver Sacks,
*The Man Who
Mistook His Wife for
a Hat* [PICADOR,
LONDON 1985]

povijesno produktivnih snaga tih sukoba, nego i politike kao takve. Kultura je postala univerzalno ime za bolju budućnost. Naše postindustrijsko društvo, kao što nam proriču futurolozi, uskoro bi trebalo biti zamijenjeno novim društvom, društvom kulture, u kome bi upravo ta kultura postala najdinamičnijom industrijom, u kojoj bi se korporacije razvile u neku vrstu *Gesamtkunstwerka*, a život pojedinca naponsljeku pretvorio u estetski projekt.

Siroti dr. P. je imao jedan *hobby*. Bio je, naime, nadaren ne samo kao pjevač nego i kao slikar. Njegova platna, koja su isprva bila naturalistička i realistička, s vremenom su postajala sve apstraktnija, čak čisto geometrijska odnosno kubiistička. **Sacks** je taj fenomen prokomentirao pacijentovoj supruzi upozoravajući je na sve dublji besmisao posljednjih slikarija njegina muža koje, prema njegovu mišljenju, nisu više predstavljale ništa drugo do spleta kaotičnih linija i nasumce nabacanih mrlja boje.

"Ah, vi liječnici, kakvi ste vi filistri!" uskliknula je, "zar ne zamjećujete njegov umjetnički napredak?"

Naravno, "... to što je napreduvalo nije bio umjetnik, nego patologija", napisao je **Sacks**.

To je, dakle, ono što trebamo imati na umu kad se danas, na nekoj izložbi na primjer, susretнемo s *Komunističkim manifestom* kao s nekim kulturnim artefaktom. Činjenicu da pritom gotovo sigurno nećemo prepoznati njegovu revolucionarnu poruku ne trebamo shvatiti kao ultimativni dokaz našeg kulturnog napretka. Lako, naime, može biti da u stvari svjedočimo napretku naše političke patologije.

Naposljeku, ima još jedna kurioznost u vezi s bolešću nesretnog dr. P. - on je općenito imao problema sa svojom lijevom stranom. To će reći, upravo je lijeva strana njegova vizualnog polja bila ono što on više nije mogao vidjeti. ●

it won't be better!



Krištof Kintera: *Neće biti bolje/It won't be better*, 2001

IT IS ABOUT A SOCIETY WHICH MISTOOK CULTURE FOR POLITICS

BORIS BUDEN

Many years ago, in another time, the **Communist Manifesto** used to be a very dangerous book. The world was at that time divided into those who trusted the words of this book and followed its revolutionary spirit, and those who, equally fascinated by the book, hated it and feared its rebellious cry. But nobody dared to ignore the significance of the **Communist Manifesto**. Its historical impact was obvious; its practical political effects were changing the world. It seemed for the moment that this book could even decide the destiny of humankind.

These were the times when the world was still young and had not only its history going on but also an open future.

Everything has changed since that time. Today the **Manifesto** is nothing more than a small booklet among other books of the world's cultural heritage, one that provokes no political action and one that nobody is afraid of any more. Once a wild political pamphlet, the **Manifesto** finally seems to have been domesticated and turned into a harmless cultural artefact. Today, it is culture and not revolutionary politics that is the only message of this medium.

The **Manifesto** has lost its political meaning as a consequence of the so-called democratic revolutions of 1989. It fell down together with the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe which was celebrated as the final victory of modern democracy over its totalitarian enemies.

According to the understanding of the communist totalitarianism which became dominant within the political mind of the liberal democratic West, the communist political movement was, in the first place, a conservative reaction against modernity, particularly against the modern Western culture as a culture of human rights and freedoms, i.e., an intrinsically anti-modern political phenomenon.⁰¹ Communists mobilized the totalitarian state against civil society by trying to develop productive forces without accepting the values and institutions of modern culture.

Modernity, however, means much more than the process of industrialization, an unlimited development of productive forces and the scientific-technological mastering of nature - or what we usually call civilization. Modernity is also a culture - the culture of human rights, rule of law, freedoms, in short, the essential values of the West. These rights and values - first and foremost property rights are what guarantee the autonomy of civil society.

01 | Luciano
Pellicani, *Modernity
& Totalitarianism,*
Telos No. 112,
Summer 1998,
pages 3-23

According to this concept of totalitarianism, the Bolshevik revolution was nothing more than a panicked effort to stop the invasion of Western culture. And consequently, the struggle of Western democracies against this communist totalitarianism was essentially a kind of cultural struggle, a gigantic **Kulturmampf**. The political process of transition from communism to democracy, which started after 1989 in East European postcommunist countries, is in that sense nothing more than some sort of a cultural reconquest, the re-westernization of Eastern Europe.

This is the reason why culture and civil society are so closely allied in the strategies of transition in today's Eastern Europe, or in the ongoing process of the so-called enlargement of the European Union. It is mainly culture, as the true content of civil society - and not politics! - which has to do the job of democratization.

This development has to be understood only as a moment of a much broader historical phenomenon - a radical culturalisation of the whole social sphere, a process which has so fatefully characterized the epoch of postmodernity. Culture today does not represent a separate, completely autonomous sphere of society any more. This dissolution of an autonomous realm of culture, as **Fredric Jameson** suggested, should be imagined in terms of an explosion:

“... a prodigious expansion of culture throughout the social realm, to the point at which everything in our social life - from economic values and state power to practices and the very structure of the psyche itself - can be said to have become ‘cultural’ in some original and as yet untheorised sense.”⁰²

What has changed in our postmodern world is not just the content of culture, but its status. Culture hasn't simply become larger. Rather, it is its transformative influence on other levels of society that has grown up enormously. Culture, as **Terry Eagleton** stressed, seems “... to have become a new social dominant, something like religion in the Middle Ages, philosophy in early nineteenth-century Germany or the natural sciences in Victorian Britain.”⁰³ On the other hand, as a consequence of this development - of losing its autonomy - culture has lost its critical distance towards the social reality. What has also disappeared is a utopian perspective which had been immanent to the realm of culture, placed above the

practical world. Culture today does not automatically mean negativity, opposition, subversion, reflection, in short, the dimension of social, ideological and political critique, as it used to mean before.

The **Communist Manifesto** has met a similar fate. By ultimately becoming a cultural artefact, this book has been deprived of its last critical capacity and of all its political meaning and importance.

Once an expression of the deepest historical contradictions of the western industrial society, the book has finally become a cultural symbol of the East. Anyone who still tries to grasp its political meaning will find nothing but an obscure, intrinsically non-European cultural content

02 | **Fredric Jameson**, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* [LONDON/NEW YORK: VERSO 1991], pages 48-49.

03 | **Terry Eagleton**, *The Idea of Culture* [OXFORD/MALDEN: BLACKWELL 2000], page 126.

in his or her hands. The **Manifesto** today is the cultural Other of the West.

To better understand what has happened, one might easily draw a parallel here to the case of Dr P., the famous patient of **Oliver Sacks**, who developed a curious symptom - he mistook his wife for a hat.⁹⁴ As a consequence of brain disease, Dr P. lost the power of visual imagery, or more exactly, he lost his capacity to see some things. Whereas he failed to see faces and scenes, the visualization of schemata was preserved and perhaps even enhanced. In spite of his illness, Sacks' patient - he was a teacher at a music school - was able to function almost normally at his work. On the other hand, in his everyday life at home, he could not do anything unless he made it a song. He sang all the time - eating songs, dressing songs, bathing songs, everything. It was music, which for him took the place of the image. And Dr P. did not feel ill - he had never felt better.

What music was for Dr P. - a universal code structure of his life - is what culture is today for the highly developed societies of the West. They cannot do anything unless they make it a culture. Thus, they have not only their eating, sleeping, dressing, and shopping culture, but first and foremost, their continuously improving political culture which promises to eliminate once for all the danger of social conflicts renouncing not only the historically productive force of these conflicts, but even politics as such. Culture has become the universal name for a better future. Our postindustrial society, as todays futurologists foretell, will soon be replaced by a new cultural one in which culture becomes the most dynamic industry, corporations develop into a **Gesamtkunstwerk** and life turns into an esthetic project.

Poor Dr P. had a hobby. He was a gifted painter as well as a singer. Whereas his first paintings were naturalistic and realistic, his last ones became far more abstract, even geometrical and cubist. **Sacks** commented on this to the wife of Dr P., pointing at the profound nonsense of her husband's last canvasses which had become mere chaotic lines and blotches of paint.

"Ach, you doctors, you're such philistines!" she exclaimed. "Can you not see artistic development...?"

However, "... this was not the artist, but the pathology, advancing," wrote **Sacks**.

This is what we should have in mind when we, at an exhibition for instance, face **The Communist Manifesto** as a cultural artefact today. The fact that we obviously won't see its revolutionary message should not necessarily be taken for the ultimate proof of our cultural development. It could easily be that we are actually witnessing an advancing political pathology.

Finally, there is one more curiosity about Dr P.'s illness we might also look back on. He had difficulties with his leftness. That is to say, it was precisely the left side of his visual field which was no longer "able to see". ●

04 | **Oliver Sacks,**
*The Man Who
Mistook His Wife for
a Hat* [LONDON:
PICADOR 1985]



Dom likovnih umjetnosti, 1938-1941.



Džamija, 1941-45.





Muzej revolucije, 1949–1990



Dom HDLU, 1990–



transnacionalni politički pokret
i institucije dovoljno jake da ozbiljno
ograniče neobuzdanu vladavinu kapitala

što, kako i za koga / 16.06 - 10.07.2000.

medunarodna izložba suvremene umjetnosti periodom 152. godišnjice konzumističkog manifesta
dom hiba, trg žrtava fašizma bb / net.kulturni klub mema, preradovićeva 18 / zagreb, hrvatska

ključne pitanje
transnac
i instit
o pre
četvrt
što, kako i za koga
medunarodna izložba suvremene umjetnosti
dom hiba, trg žrtava fašizma bb / net.kulturni klub mema, preradovićeva 18 / zagreb, hrvatska

east... je kako izgraditi
nani politički pokret
dovo jake da ozbiljno
uzdanu vladavinu kapitala

Nema dokumenta
kulture koji ne bi
istodobno bio
dokument
barbarstva.

[Walter Benjamin, Teza VII]

22^H

akše zmislići
šku katastrofu,
izvo je,
o temu

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o temu

ART IS NOT A MIRROR, IT IS A HAMMER!

DEJAN KRŠIĆ

➤ Talking about the anniversary of the *Communist Manifesto*, the dominant type of criticism says that today, after the failure of the socialist revolutions and collapse of so called "real socialism", the *Manifesto* is nothing but a small booklet among all the other books in the large library of the world, just part of the world's cultural heritage. In the opinion of such critics the reduction of the *Manifesto* to a literary phenomenon is the worst thing that could happen to it, as if even total oblivion, some kind of *damnatio memoriae*, would be better, or at least a more appropriate fate!

So, today, who is afraid of that little book?

Our curators could easily provide one answer - when, during the preparation of the exhibition they approached a rather famous East European curator, their presentation of the project and call for cooperation was met with shock! How could they even dare to think about an exhibition on the *Communist Manifesto*? Don't they know that communism, inspired by that book, was responsible for millions of deaths, Gulags, decades of totalitarianism...?

Oh, well, yes, of course, we all know that rhetorics very well.

After some recent anti-war rallies, Italian Prime-Minister **Silvio Berlusconi** denounced the Communist participation in the marches for peace:

"Those flags are red because they are stained by the blood of 100 million innocent victims. I think that putting them together with the flags of peace is a real blasphemy against peace".

But, we must ask, wouldn't those lost lives, all those dead, be killed once again, really lost, really dead, only if we accept that the whole *Communist Manifesto* was nothing, worthless, a piece of shit, even if most of its pragmatic demands now represent the commonplace settlement of the liberal-democratic order itself?

Not only do those liberal critics wrongly equate the so called real existing socialism of the Eastern European countries with the communist idea [**Marx** is not **Lenin**, and **Lenin** is not **Stalin**], but, answering to such criticisms, we also have to remember that manifestos as such, as "genre", are literary phenomena!

The idea of writing artistic, and for that matter political manifestos, is

characteristic of the modern/istic period, especially when related to "historical avant-gardes". Artists, as well as those critics and theoreticians that talk about manifestos, conceived of them in two ways: as a part of literary history [for example, avantguardist manifestos about painting that are in no way normative for the production of their paintings]; and as direct explications of "set of rules" for artistic creation [such is the recent case of *Dogma 95*], and in that case the understanding of the manifesto enables us to "correctly" understand, explain and talk about certain artworks. But such division is bit academic. Even if we accept the idea that, for instance, Futurist manifestos about painting, pastasuta or music... are "just pieces of writing" and that they are not normative for Futurist painting, cooking or composing and performing music, they stand in some relation towards other painting, cooking or music practices, they have influence on new generations that have somehow to count them in [or out, for that matter] of their work.

It could be seen as a kind of mystery how it was possible for "such a small book" [as *Com. Manifesto*], to have such large impact on the lives of so many people, but only if we forget that the "mystery" of an art-work lies not in creating some formal aspects of the object/text itself, but in the act of communication, in opening up a field of possibilities. Those possibilities lie not in the effect of sublime enthusiasm created in some distanced, passive reader/viewer [as if there are any "distanced", "passive", "disinterested" viewers in the first place], but in its Truth for an engaged, passionate, revolutionary subject.

It is precisely as text, as literature, as cultural artefact, as a piece of political *writing*, that the *Manifesto* had revolutionary agency. Especially today, we should be ready to go beyond the old distinctions between arts, high literature, journalism, theory, political writing and agitation towards the celebrated Marxist thesis of the unity of theory and practice. If **Freud** and **Marx** have taught us something, it is exactly the idea that there are no strictly separated spheres of economy, culture and politics, where one realm simply "determines" another.*

Political economy and cultural revolution are not oxymorons and the tension between aesthetisation of

★ "...if, for **Lacan**, there is no sexual relationship, then, for Marxism proper, there is no relationship between economy and politics, no "meta-language" enabling us to grasp from the same neutral standpoint the two levels, although - or, rather, BECAUSE - these two levels are inextricably intertwined. The "political" class struggle takes place in the very midst of economy [recall that the very last paragraph of *Capital III*, where the texts abruptly stops, tackles the class struggle], while, at the same time, the domain of economy serves as the key enabling us to decode political struggles. No wonder that the structure of this impossible relationship is that of the Moebius band: first, we have to progress from the political spectacle to its economic infrastructure; then, in the second step, we have to confront the irreducible dimension of the political struggle in the very heart of the economy." [Slavoj Žižek, *Repeating Lenin*]

politics and politisation of aesthetics is today raised to even higher level than in the age of **Walter Benjamin**, because the means of "technical reproduction" - new electronic, digital and old "mechanical" media - have developed and acquired new and even more power in our "society of spectacle".




So, today the real question is not why at certain times manifestos manage to produce "effects in reality", but what has happened to our understanding of arts, our idea of culture, our idea of politics, our "horizon of possibilities", that all cultural artefacts fail to aspire to such effects all the time? What has happened to us as subjects, as active political agents?

As **Slavoj Žižek** says, if today *the Communist Manifesto* appears as "just another book" that seems to belong to a different epoch to which we can no longer properly relate, instead of reading this fact as the proof that *the Communist Manifesto* is outdated, one should, perhaps, risk the opposite conjecture: what if that is a sign that there is something wrong with OUR epoch? What if the fact that we experience *Communist Manifesto* as irrelevant, "out of sync" with our postmodern times, imparts the much more unsettling message that our time itself is "out of sync," that a certain historical [and certainly utopian] dimension is disappearing from it?

Now, *the Communist Manifesto* is not relevant today because we should dogmatically stick to its word [about proletarian revolution etc.], but because there is a utopian spark in it worth saving. In the same manner as more meaning lies in

subsequent readings of *Antigone* than in what **Sophocles** "really wanted to say", the true meaning of *the Communist Manifesto* is in what generations have read and written into the text, and what they have managed to take out of it for themselves, their visions, hopes, plans, ideas and ideals...



So today, the true meaning of *Communist Manifesto* for us lies not in its heroic past, nor in its past failure to actually produce a new, better society and a more just, more human social system, but in what can we make out of it today, and tomorrow. It can be judged in the capability it offers to our cultural-social-political imagination and practice to go beyond the current debilitating limitations of liberal-democracy and the capitalist order. ●

**Ukoliko manje jedeš, piješ, kupuješ knjige
ukoliko manje ideš u kazalište, na ples, u gostionicu
ukoliko manje misliš, voliš, teoretiziraš, pjevaš, slikaš, pišeš itd.
utoliko više štediš,
utoliko veće postaje tvoje bogatstvo koje ne žderu ni moljevi ni prašina,
utoliko veći postaje tvoj kapital.**

**Utoliko si neznatniji,
ukoliko manje ispoljavaš svoj život,
utoliko više imаш,
utoliko je veći tvoj otuđeni život,
utoliko više nagomilavaš svome otuđenom biću.**

**Sve ono što ti nacionalni ekonomist oduzme od života i ljudskosti,
to ti nadomješta u novcu i bogatstvu.**

**A sve ono što ne možeš ti,
može tvoj novac:
On može jesti, pitи, idti na ples i u kazalište,
on može putovati,
on zna sebi pribaviti umjetnost i učenost,
historijske rijetkosti i političku moć,
on ti može sve pribaviti,
on može sve kupiti,
on je istinska moć.**

**Ali on koji je sve to,
ne može ništa drugo nego da stvori sebe sama,
da kupi sebe sama,
jer je sve drugo njegov sluga, i kad posjedujem gospodara,
posjedujem i slugu
i ne trebam njegovog slugu.**

Sve strasti i djelatnosti moraju, dakle, propasti u pohlepi.

[Karl MARX,
Ekonomsko-
filozofski rukopisi
iz 1844,
poglavlje
“Potreba,
proizvodnja i
podjela rada”]

GLOBALIZACIJA I POLITIČKA STRATEGIJA

FREDRIC JAMESON

➤ Diskurzivna borba vodi se oko jednog spornog koncepta: pokušaji definiranja globalizacije uvijek izgledaju malo bolje od tolikih mnogih ideologičkih posezanja. Moglo bi biti produktivnije iskombinirati sve deskripcije i poduzeti inventuru njihovih višezačja, učiniti nešto što bi predstavljalo govor o fantazijama i zabrinutostima koliko i o stvari samoj. Zapravo, mislim da se o globalizaciji najčešće raspravlja ne radi onoga što je ona sama, već prije u terminima njezinih posljedica, bilo dobrih ili loših. Ovo možda neće biti filozofiski ili konceptualno najtemeljniji put kroz globalizaciju, ali pružit će nam hvatište za njezine različite karakterizacije i omogućiti nam da ih posložimo prije no podemo dalje. Smatram da se one pojavljuju u nekim pet odvojenih oblika: tehnološkom, političkom, kulturnom, ekonomskom i društvenom.

1] O globalizaciji se može govoriti, na primjer, u čisto tehnološkim terminima: u tom slučaju imamo na umu novu komunikacijsku tehnologiju i informacijsku revoluciju, inovacije koje dakako ne ostaju naprosto na razini komunikacije u uskom smislu već također daju svoj biljež industrijskoj proizvodnji i organizaciji, kao i trženju dobara. Većina komentatora izgleda da osjeća kako je barem ta dimenzija globalizacije ireverzibilna; ludistička politika ovdje se ne čini baš osobitim izborom [a ona to dakako nikada i nije bila, ni u starijim oblicima industrije]. Ali naša nas tema podsjeća da je jedna od najurgentnijih konsideracija u bilo kakvoj diskusiji o globalizaciji - pitanje je li ona doista neizbjegiva: može li ona biti zaustavljena ili unatrag obrнутa? mogu li se dijelovi globusa isključiti ili odvojiti, iskopčati se iz nje? i tome slično. Dosta je jasno da će odgovor na ovo pitanje o neizbjegivosti utjecati na sudove koje ćemo prebacivati na globalizaciju kao takvu - ako je ona doista neizbjegiva, tada se moralni sudovi o njezinim zlima i njezinim lošim posljedicama čine ispraznim i beskorisnim, pa će se u najboljem slučaju odkolebatи u razmišljanja o tome kako bismo mogli preuređiti te loše posljedice i pridati im najbolji mogući izgled, kad su već tako i tako neizbjegni. Na to ćemo se vratiti kasnije.

2] Tu su onda politički sudovi o globalizaciji. Ovdje pozornost najviše plijeni

pitanje države - nacije: je li ona nešto prošlo i obavljeno, ima li još odigrati kakvu vitalnu ulogu, ima li ispuniti još kakvu vitalnu funkciju, ili su pak izvještaji o njezinom abdiciranju naivni i smiješni; ali u tom slučaju kako shvatiti samu globalizaciju? Je li ona onda tek jedan od mnogih pritisaka na nacionalne državne vlasti? Itd, itd. Ja zapravo vjerujem da iza tih rasprava vreba jedan dublji strah, vreba jedna temeljnija narativna misao ili fantazija koja mora imati veze sa Sjedinjenim Državama kao takvим. Vjerujem da je ovdje u pitanju bojazan da kada govorimo o širećoj moći i utjecaju globalizacije, zapravo imamo na umu moć i utjecaj Sjedinjenih Država. Kada govorimo o slabljenju nacionalne države, zapravo imamo na umu slabljenje drugih država nacija. Te vjerojatno njihovo oslabljivanje po američkoj moći, bilo uz suglasnost - kolaboraciju, svjesno podređivanje - bilo grubom silom i pritiskom svih vrsta. To što se ovdje odjelovljuje iza zabrinutosti jest jedna nova verzija onoga što se običavalo nazivati imperijalizmom, koji je i sam poznavao raznovrsne inkarnacije. Prva je verzija bila stare kolonijalne vrste od prije prvog svjetskog rata, i uključivala je stanoviti broj europskih zemalja te SAD i Japan; ta je kasnije, nakon drugog svjetskog rata i dekolonijalizacije bila zamijenjena manje očitim ali ništa manje podmuklim oblicima općeg ekonomskog pritiska i ucjene, uključujući savjetnike, prikrivene pučeve poput onih u Guatemali i Iranu, koji su i dalje uključivali nekolicinu zapadno-evropskih zemalja i SAD. Sada imamo posla s možda trećim varijetetom, u kojem Sjedinjene Države slijede trostruku vanjsku politiku, kako ju je definirao **Samuel Huntington**: nikakvoga nuklearnog oružja za bilo koga drugoga, ljudska prava i izborna demokracija u američkom stilu, te [manje očito] ograničavanje imigracije i slobodnoga tijeka rada [karakteristično, on ispušta četvrti i ključnu politiku posvudašnjeg propagiranja slobodnoga tržišta]. Ova će /inačica/ uključivati samo Sjedinjene Države [i njihove satelite, poput Britanije], te će joj sastavnim dijelom biti uloga svjetskog policajca, uz selektirane intervencije [većinom bombardiranja] u raznovrsnim zonama navodne opasnosti. Treba li to i dalje nazivati imperijalizmom, ili je to postalo tek hipokritskom i zakrinkanom formom poznate nam *Realpolitik*? U ovom potonjem slučaju, kakvu vrstu nacionalne autonomije raznovrsne nacije gube kada pokleknu pred ovim težnjama? Je li to doista ista vrsta gubitka kao u kolonizaciji ili prisilnom regrutiranju u hladni rat? Kakvu vlast suverena nacija doista gubi pod tim okolnostima [osim nuklearne moći, nepostojanja ljudskih prava i izbora, te mogućnosti emigriranja]?

Ima uvjerljivih i snažnih odgovora na ovo pitanje, ali oni više nisu baš usko politički. Oni spadaju u naše naredne dvije grupe /karakterizacija globalizacije/, kulturnalnu i ekonomsku, koje ćemo zasad i dalje nastojati držati odvojeno. Što dakle suverena nacija uistinu gubi u globalizaciji ako je ova i dalje definirana tradicionalnim jezikom kao, na neki način, američki imperijalizam? Dostojanstvo i samopoštovanje, možda: ali moja je poanta da to spada u kulturno područje a ne više baš u političko. Autonomna politička vlast može pružiti zadovoljstvo nacionalnog samopoštovanja, ali to je po svoj prilici tek neki dodatak i nuzgredna korist.

Ili možda, nakon države-nacije i imperijalizma, upravo dolazimo do treće šakaljive teme, naime do nacionalizma. Je li onda nacionalizam kulturno pitanje? No uvjek je postojala jedna varijanta u diskusijama o imperijalizmu u kojoj je ovaj bio prekrštavan u kulturni imperijalizam. Dakako da nacionalizam, kao politički program koji je u cijelini unutarnji, notorno apelira na ono što društveni znanstvenici općenito nazivaju kulturom, prije nego na, na primjer, vlastiti ekonomski interes, ili žudnju za moći, ili pak tehnologički i znanstveni ponos: tu može biti nuzgrednih dobitaka, ali nacionalizam kao takav, kao cjeloviti navlastiti politički program, čini se apelira na nešto što nije tehnologičko, niti je doista političko ili ekonomijsko, pa to dakle u potrazi za nekom boljom riječi po tendenciji nazivamo kulturnim.

No je li uvjek nacionalistički opirati se američkoj globalizaciji? SAD misle tako i žele da i vi tako mislite, dapače da mislite kako su američki interesi univerzalni. Je li to naprosto bitka između različitih nacionalizama, s američkim globalnim interesima kao naprosto još jednim nacionalizmom, naime s nacionalizmom američke vrste? Neki od komentatora željeli bi dati i takav odgovor, što ćemo u više detalja ispitati kasnije.

3] Ali jesu li pitanja o nacionalizmu, ili nacionalnom ponosu i dostojanstvu, doista jedina po srijedi kada govorimo o kulturi? Ne, očito ovdje ima mnogo drugih spornih stvari, gdje su kultura i nacionalitet [ili etno-nacionalitet] identificirani s oblicima popularne ili tradicionalne kulture i drugim njima sličnim, koji su kako izgleda pometeni sa scene i nadomješteni američkim masovnim kulturnim modelima - američkim televizijskim emisijama, modom, glazbom, filmovima i tome sličnim. Za mnoge među nama [osobito za ljude koji djeluju na području literature i kulture], ovo je sama bit definicije globalizacije: standardiziranje svjetske kulture, način kojim američka televizija, američka glazba i Hollywood nadomeštaju sve druge širom svijeta. Riječ je o strahu koji se sada preljeva u dvije preostale od naših kategorija: ponajprije, ovo je očito rezultat ekonomskog dominacije i zamjenjivanja lokalnih kulturnih djelatnosti američkim. Istdobro, dublji aspekt ovog straha počiva u onom društvenom za koje je ovdje kulturno uzeto tek kao simptom: drugim riječima, riječ je o strahu da će sami specifični etno-nacionalni načini života biti razoreni u ovom procesu standardizacije kulture.

Ali ne možemo prijeći na ta ekonomska i društvena razmatranja a da prije ne pogledamo neke od odgovora na kulturna strahovanja: oni se najčešće daju tako da na neki način podcjenjuju moć kulture i osobito kulturnog imperijalizma, dominacije i standardizacije. U tome smislu, čini se da ti odgovori spadaju u igru za američke interese, uvjeravajući nas da globalni uspjeh američke masovne kulture i nije tako loš kao sve ostalo što uz to ide. Oni tako imaju potrebu insistirati na duboko ukorijenenoj žilavoj moći svake kulture. Tako bi postojao indijski [ili hinduistički?] identitet koji bi se tvrdoglavno opirao moći uvezene

anglo-saske kulture čiji bi utjecaj onda ostajao površinski. Mogla bi postojati izvorna europska kultura koja nikada ne bi mogla biti doista amerikanizirana. I tako dalje. Pritom nikada nije jasno bi li taj "prirodni" otpor trebao i otvoreno oporbeno djelovanje, politiku otpora, političku borbu radi kulturnog opiranja i očuvanja kulture. Je li implicirano da poricanjem prirodne moći raznovrsnih kultura tim kulturama činimo krivo i vrijeđamo ih? Da time govorimo kako je na primjer indijska kultura preslabu da bi se oduprla snazi Zapada? Je li onda stvar političke korektnosti podcijeniti moć imperijalizma, jer, preuveličavati je, značilo bi umanjivati snagu nacija, društava i kultura kojima on prijeti? Rekao bih kako mi se čini da je ovo smiješan prigovor, ali bih dodao i da se najsnažniji odgovori na taj prigovor pokazuju kao društveni a ne kulturni, kako ćemo odmah i vidjeti.

U svakom slučaju, pitanje političke korektnosti nikada ne može biti razriješeno u ovom obliku. Svaka kulturna politička borba nužno se sučeljuje s tim retoričkim alterniranjem između umišljenog ponosa zbog snage kulturne grupe i njegova strategijskog umanjivanja: iz političkih razloga. Tako kulturna politička borba može isticati heroizam, sveudilj utjelovljivati uzbudljive slike heroizma podređenih - snažne žene, crne junake, fanonski otpor koloniziranih - da bi ohrabrilu publiku kojoj se obraća; ili pak može insistirati na njezinim jadima, na represiji nad ženama, crncima, koloniziranim. Ovo potonje prikazivanje nužno je također da bi dovelo do indignacije, da bi se situacija u kojoj se nalaze potlačeni učinila poznatom na dostupnije načine, pa čak i da bi se za njihovu stvar pridobilo dio vladajuće klase. Ali postoji rizik da, što više insistirate na toj bijedi i bespomoćnosti, to više oni o kojima se radi izgledaju kao slabe i pasivne žrtve kojima se lako vlada, pa se time tako šteti grupama o kojima je riječ i vrijeđa ih se. Obje ove strategije predstavljanja nužne su u političkoj literaturi, a nisu međusobno pomirljive. Možda one odgovaraju različitim historijskim trenutcima borbe, te političkim prilikama i potrebama prikazivanja koje se razvijaju. Ali ako o njima ne razmišljamo na takav politički i strategijski način, ne možemo se riješiti ove osebujne antinomije političke korektnosti.

4] Uostalom, sugerirao sam da kulturne teme imaju tendenciju da se preliju u ekonomski i društvene. Pogledajmo najprije prve. Zapravo, ono ekonomsko konstantno riskira grananje na razne druge razine ili dimenzije globalizacije. Nije li ekonomski moći danas barem dijelom tehnologiska ili vezana uz kontrolu novih tehnologija? Istodobno, politička moć zaizvjesno služi ekonomskim interesima, ali u takozvanim zemljama u razvoju ekonomski moći može također pojačati ili stvoriti geopolitičku važnost. Kao i kod kulture, da i do nje dođemo na koncu, postmoderna je bila karakterizirana kolapsom kulturnog u ekonomsko, te ekonomskog u kulturno. Tako je, u jednu ruku, robna proizvodnja sada kulturni fenomen u kojem kupujete proizvod baš isto toliko zbog njegova imidža koliko i zbog njegove neposredne upotrebe i funkcije. Cijela jedna industrija - jedna ekonomski institucija - nastala je da bi dizajnirala imidže roba i njihov marketing

učinila strategijskim: oglašavanje je tako fundamentalno posredovanje između kulture i ekonomije pa ga svakako treba ubrojiti u mirijade oblika estetičke producije kao takve, koliko god njegovo postojanje mogla problematizirati tradicionalna estetika. Erotizacija je također značajan dio toga procesa: stratezi oglašavanja su pravi frojdo-marksisti koji razumiju nužnost libidinalnog investiranja koje mora pratiti njihove robe i činiti ih privlačnim. Serijalnost također igra svoju ulogu, tako da imidž drugih ljudi s automobilima i vrtnim strojevima imaju udjela u mojoj odluci da kupujem takve stvari [usto nam omogućuje sagledavanje preklapanja kulturnog i ekonomskog natrag u samo društveno]. Ekonomski znanost je tako u ovome smislu robne proizvodnje i marketinga postala kulturnom stvari; a možda bismo mogli spekulirati da na velikim financijskim tržištima kulturnu dimenziju ima također imidž tvrtke čijih se dionica rješavamo ili ih nabavljamo. Već je tome davno kako je **Guy Debord** opisao naše društvo kao društvo imidža, društvo spektakla koji se estetski konzumiraju. On je tada ocrtao onaj šav koji odvaja kulturu od ekonomije i u isto vrijeme ih povezuje, otvarajući mogućnost usmjeravanja tokova jedne u drugu. Mnogo govorimo - nevezano - o robnom oblikovanju politike, ili ideja, ili čak emocija i aspekata privatnog života; ono što sada moramo dodati jest da je robno oblikovanje danas estetizacija, roba se danas estetski konzumira.

Takvo je kretanje iz ekonomije u kulturu: ali tu je također i kretanje iz kulture u ekonomiju koje nije manje signifikantno. Tu je ponajprije sam zabavljački biznis: on čini jedan od najprofitabilnijih dijelova izvoza Sjedinjenih Država, uz hranu i oružje. Od krucijalnog je značenja, vraćamo se na jednu od naših ranijih tema, izbjegći razmišljanje o kulturnom imperijalizmu samo u terminima kulturnih ukusa, u terminima, na primjer, otpor indijske ili arapske publike nekim vrstama holivudskih formi i stvari. Zapravo, vrlo je lako razviti kod neameričke publike ukus za stilove nasilja i temporalne te tjelesne neposrednosti karakterističan za današnji proizvod Hollywooda, čiji je prestiž samo pojačan stanovitim imidžom američkog moderniteta i postmoderniteta. Je li to onda argument za univerzalnost Zapada ili barem Sjedinjenih Država i njihove "civilizacije"? To je zasigurno vrlo vrlo rašireno, ako i nesvesno, zauzimani stav, pa zaslužuje ozbiljno i filozofjsko sučeljavanje, čak i ako se misli da je ridikulozan.

Zapravo, substantivna ekonomija zaizvjesno ima primat nad takvim neuhvatljivim kulturnim pitanjima kakvo je javni ukus. Sjedinjene Države učinile su znatan napor od kraja drugog svjetskog rata da bi osigurale nadmoćnu distribuciju svojih filmova na inozemnim tržištima: to je općenito postizavano klauzulama uglavljenim raznovrsnim sporazumima i paketima pomoći. U većini



Guy Debord, *Društvo spektakla*, BASTARD BIBLIOTEKA, ARKZIN, ZAGREB 1999.

europskih zemalja, osim Francuske, koja se ističe svojim otporom protiv ovog posebnog oblika američkog kulturnog imperijalizma, nacionalne filmske industrije bile su uništene nakon rata baš takvim obvezujućim dogovorima, koji su dopustili Hollywoodu da istisne nacionalne filmske produkcije ili da ih svede na specijalizirana područja. Ovo sustavno nastojanje da se uništi navodni kulturni protekcionizam drugih zemalja samo je dio one općenitije i sve globalnije korporacijske strategije, sada obogaćene u WTO i njezinim naporima - poput abortivnog MAI projekta - da podredi lokalne zakone međunarodnim propisima koji favoriziraju američke korporacije, bilo kroz kopirajte intelektualnog vlasništva bilo kroz patente [na primjer vezane uz eksploraciju šuma i lokalne izume], da ne spominjemo namjerno podrivanje samodostatnosti u proizvodnji hrane. Ovdje je kultura postala nedvojbeno ekonomskom, a ova posebna ekonomija također je jasno postavila političku agendu i diktira političku strategiju. U današnjem svijetu još razgovijetno postoje borbe za resurse relativno staromodnog tipa - za naftu i druge sirovine, na primjer: neka se netko samo usudi izazvati ove modernističke forme imperijalizma, uz još starije i više čisto političke i diplomatske ili vojne napore da se vlade koje se opiru zamijene prijateljskim [to jest, podložnim]. Ali izgleda kako je danas izrazitiji postsvremen i postmoderni oblik imperijalizma - pa čak i kulturnog imperijalizma - onaj koji sam opisivao u vezi inicijativa projekata kao što su NAFTA, CATT, MAI i WTO; ne na koncu zato što ovaj oblik imperijalizma predstavlja udžbenički primjer [iz novog udžbenika!] one diferencijacije, onoga stjecišta raznovrsnih i distinkтивnih razina ekonomskog, kulturnog i političkog, koje karakteriziraju postmodernost i posuduju fundamentalnu strukturu globalizaciji.

Ali ekomska dimenzija globalizacije može biti formulirana na nekoliko drugih načina koje sada moramo uzeti u razmatranje. Promotrili smo način na koji se o ekonomskoj globalizaciji često razmišlja u terminima novih tehnologija, takoreč u terminima tehnologiskog izvoza i uvoza, monopolizacije i ekskluzivne kontrole važnijih informacijskih tehnologija i tome slično [doista, bilo je rečeno da Sjedinjene Države već imaju virtualni monopol na informaciju kao takvu, i da je to bila utrka koju su drugi mogući pretendentni izgubili još u 1980-tima]. Vidjeli smo također da prodor globalizacije može biti opisan u terminima pravnih struktura koje štite i omogućuju prodiranje američkih roba u inozemstvo.

Sada svakako moramo dotaknuti s tim povezane probleme tvrtki i financija, te same kulture potrošnje. Transnacionalne tvrtke - jednoć, u 1970-tim, nazivane jednostavno multinacionalnim kompanijama - bile su prvi znak i simptom nove globalizacije, i periodično su izazivale političke strahove zbog mogućnosti nove vrste dualne vlasti i prevlasti tih supranacionalnih entiteta nad nacionalnim državnim vlastima. Paranoidna strana takvih strahova i fantazija nedvojbeno je povezana s učešćem nacionalnih državnih vlasti poput američkih u njihovim poslovnim operacijama [i kadrovskim razmjenama između jednih i drugih] - što je bio fenomen koji je svojom pojmom morao izazivati različite vrste zabrinutosti.

Osobito su zagovornici slobodnoga tržišta uvijek denuncirali model japanskog stila vladine intervencije u nacionalni biznis i industriju, te njegove nacionalne zaštite. U međuvremenu, kao još ozbiljnija crta nove globalne korporativne strukture pokazala se njezina sposobnost devastiranja nacionalnih tržišta rada prebacivanjem svoga djelovanja preko mora, na jeftinija tržišta. Još se nije pojavila nikakva usporediva globalizacija radničkoga pokreta koja bi odgovorila ovoj novorazvijenoj pokretljivosti kapitala i korporacija [pokret *Gastarbeiter-a* je društveni i kulturni po značajkama i još nema političku mobilnost].

Financijski kapitalizam je specijalni slučaj takve nove ekonomiske globalizacije [i još jednom, sama njegova mogućnost vezana je uz simultanost otvorene novim tehnologijama]. Ovdje se moramo baviti ne više samo radnom ili industrijskom pokretljivošću, već ponajprije pokretljivošću samoga kapitala i investiranja. Špekuliranje stranim valutama je samo jedan znakovit simptom nove međunarodne situacije, a on upozorava na još ozbiljniji razvoj događaja, naime na ovisnost većine zemalja svijeta o vanjskim ulaganjima kapitala [drugim riječima, na novo međunarodno tržište vrijednosnica]. Kada se kaže da je globalizacija ireverzibilna, općenito se misli upravo na to: na apsolutnu ovisnost država nacija, izvan jezgre Prvoga svijeta, o inozemnom kapitalu u obliku zajmova, podrški i ulaganja [čak su i zemlje Prvoga svijeta ranjive, kako svjedoči sudbina francuskih prvih socijalističkih politika u početnim godinama Mitterandove vlade]. Većina zemalja je već davno prestala biti samodostatna u poljoprivredi [što barem dijelom duguju američkim ekonomskim strategijama]: ali to se može shvatiti također i kao svjetska podjela rada, koja se, kao u **Adama Smitha**, može smatrati rezultatom podizanja produktivnosti a ne tek slabošću. Ovisnost na novim globalnim financijskim tržištima ne može više biti objašnjavana i opravdavana u tim terminima. Veliki broj najnovijih financijskih kriza, te javni istupi političkih voda poput **Mahathira**, ili iznošenja ekonomskih pokazatelja o kakvima govori **George Soros**, učinili su nešto vidljivijom ovu destruktivnu stranu novog svjetskog ekonomskog poretku, čiji trenutačni transferi kapitala preko cijelog svijeta mogu zaprijetiti uništenjem akumulirane vrijednosti proizvedene godinama nacionalnoga rada i bacanjem na prosjački štap cijelih regija Zemljine kugle.

Sjedinjene države su se oduprele strategiji uvođenja kontroliranja međunarodnih transfera kapitala, metodi kojom bi neke od ovih financijalnih i špekulativnih šteta mogle biti spriječene ili umanjene; uz to, one su uvijek bile skoro identificirane sa samim MMF-om, već odavno uočenim kao samo središte neoliberalnih nastojanja da se tržišni uvjeti u drugim zemljama stvore prijetnjama povlačenja kapitalskih ulaganja. Ali u ovom posebnom slučaju nije tako jasno da Sjedinjene Države i financijska tržišta treba tako apsolutno identificirati jedne s drugim: ovdje treba biti zabrinut nad mogućnosti da se ta nova globalna finansijska tržišta - poput inteligentne mašinerije najnovije znanstvene fantastike - još mogu pretvoriti u autonomne mehanizme koji proizvode katastrofe kakve nitko ne želi i koje prema tome mogu izmicati mogućnostima kontrole čak i

najmoćnije nacionalne državne vlasti. I neverzibilnost je dakako bila cijelo vrijeme dio ove priče: najprije shvaćana kao tehnologiska neverzibilnost [nema povratka jednostavnijem životu ili jednostavnoj proizvodnji], mogla bi sada također biti formulirana politički, čak i ako ovdje nestalnost povijesti sugerira barem načelno da niti jedno carstvo ne traje zauvijek; a mogla bi se formulirati i kulturno, kao definitivna destrukcija lokalne kulture koja ne može biti spašena nikako drugačije nego diznifikacijom, što će reći konstruiranjem artificijelnih simulakra i pukom slikom maštovitih tradicija i vjerovanja. Ali u slučaju finansijske globalizacije, aura strašnog usuda koja čini se visi nad njezinom navodnom neverzibilnosti dolazi barem dijelom od nesposobnosti da se zamisli bilo kakva alternativa ili da se pojmi nadasve kako bi "isključivanje" iz nje uopće moglo biti izvediv politički i ekonomski projekt, iako su relativno puno "isključeniji" oblici nacionalne egzistencije cvjetali prije samo par decenija [najizrazitije u obliku socijalističkoga bloka].

5] Drugi oblik koji uzima ekomska dimenzija globalizacije sada nas preusmjeruje na našu konačnu razinu analize, na ono društveno: jer ona uspostavlja nešto poput "kulture potrošnje", što je, općenito razvijeno u prvim zemljama svijeta ali nadasve opet u Sjedinjenim Državama, sada sistematski prošireno i prisrbljeno diljem cijelog svijeta. Škotski sociolog **Leslie Sklair** je najistaknutiji među onima koji su razvili ovu ideju, među ostalim i zato da bi projicirao i modelski izolirao specifični način života kakav je razvijen kasnom kapitalističkom robnom proizvodnjom i kakav predstavlja prijetnju drugim oblicima dnevnoga života u drugim zemljama ili kulturama, te koji bi tako mogao biti ciljan u specifičnim vrstama otpora. U svakom slučaju, čini mi se prikladnim postaviti ovaj koncept efekata globalizacije ne u kulturnu rubriku *per se*, već prije u točku u kojoj ono ekonomsko prelazi u društveno, pošto je takozvana kultura potrošnje zapravo specifični način svakodnevnog života, dio i komad društvenoga tkiva koji iz njega teško može biti izdvojen. Radi se očito o onome što se u drugim dijelovima svijeta ponekad naziva zapadnim materijalizmom ili čak američkim materijalizmom; i u tom slučaju također smatram da se, usprkos jeziku karakteriziranja, ovdje radi o nečemu što je specifičnije društveno nego kulturno, osim [opet] u onom vrlo širokome smislu u kojem društveni znanstvenici rabe riječ "kultura" obuhvaćajući njome sve što nije tradicionalno društveno-znanstveno.

Ali ne radi se toliko o tome je li takozvana "kultura potrošnje" dio društvenoga, koliko o tome nema li ona tendenciju da vrlo precizno razori društveno u svim tradicionalnim značenjima toga pojma. Ovdje se radi o argumentu koji dijeli podrijetlo s tradicionalnijim denuncijacijama individualizma i atomizacije društva, koji nagrizaju i rastvaraju šire tradicionalne društvene grupacije. *Gesellschaft versus Gemeinschaft*: moderno bezlično društvo razara starije porodice i klanove, sela, "organske" oblike. Argument bi onda smjerao na

to da potrošnja kao takva individualizira i atomizira, da njezina logika daje ono što se često metaforizira kao tkanje dnevnoga života. [A slučaj je takav da se dnevni život, svakodnevni ili quotidianalni, nije počeo teorijski, filozofski i sociološki konceptualizirati sve dok ga se na ovaj način nije počelo razarati.]

★★★

Sada bih želio promotriti ne bili sustav analize koji smo upravo izveli – razuđivanje razdvojivih razina tehnološkog, političkog, kulturnog, ekonomskog i društvenog [upravo u tom poretku] – mogao biti od pomoći također i u određivanju oblikovanja politike sposobne da pruži neki otpor globalizaciji kakvu smo upravo artikulirali. Jer, kako mi se čini, ako bismo klasificirali političke strategije na isti način kako smo to učinili s ovim razinama, to bi nam moglo pokazati kakve aspekte globalizacije one izoliraju i na njih ciljaju, kao i to kakve aspekte mimoilaze.

Tehnologiska razina, na primjer, sugerira politiku tradicionalno znanu kao ludizam – lomljenje novih strojeva, nastojanja da se zaustavi i možda čak unatrag obrne uspostavljanje novoga tehnološkoga doba. To je politika koja je najčešće bila historijski karikirana, i koja kao program nipošto nije tako nepromišljena i "spontana" kako joj se pripisivalo. A spominjanju takve strategije može se pripisati barem zasluga razbuđivanja svih najdublje ukorijenjenih uvjerenja o irreverzibilnosti razvoja tehnologije, ili, da to kažemo na drugi način, i čisto sistemska logika proliferacije tehnologije, koja ne ovisi o ljudskom odlučivanju čak niti kolektivne ili nacionalne vrste [kako syjedoče raznovrsni neuspjesi zaštite i pridržavanja korištenja tehnoloških inovacija]. Danas bi se moglo činiti da bi ovdje mogla naći prostora jedna ekološka politika [iako se već također sugeriralo da bi nastojanja za uspostavljanje kontrole industrijskih zloporaba i ekscesa mogla ponuditi i neki stimulans za tehnologiske inovacije], kako to već čine raznovrsni prijedlozi – poput Tobinova plana – o kontroli bijega kapitala i investiranja preko nacionalnih granica. Ali evidentnim se čini da je naše najdublje ukorijenjeno uvjerenje kako su tehnologiske inovacije irreverzibilne i neodoljive, pa je ono i samo po sebi [bilo istinito ili krivo] najveća barijera bilo kakvoj politici tehnološke kontrole. Potonja može figurirati kao vrsta alegorije "iskopčavanja" na političkoj razini: zamisliti zajednicu bez kompjutera [ili bez automobila i drugih oblika suvremenog transporta] isto je što i zamisliti provedivost odcepljenja od svega globalnog. Svakako nije nikakva slučajnost da kada netko pokuša zamisliti iskopčavanje na ovakav način, uvijek se tehnologija medija pojavljuje kao ono što je tu u pitanju – obnavljajući vrlo staro gledanje po kojem riječ medij označuje ne samo komunikaciju već također i transportiranje.



Prema tome, s ovom koncepcijom odcepljenja od prepostojećeg globalnog sustava, mi smo već skliznuli u političko. To je onda točka u kojoj nacionalistička politika počinje eskivirati. Smatram u ovom pitanju poznati argument **Partha Chatterjeea** etabliranim i uvjerljivim [kada zahtijeva automatsko odbacivanje

podržavanja nacionalističke politike kao takve, bez modifikacija]. On pokazuje da je nacionalizam neodvojiv od politike modernizacije, a njegovo demonstriranje da prvo uključuje sve programatske inkoherentnosti drugoga ima svoj korolar da svaki nacionalistički impuls uvijek mora biti dijelom neke šire politike koja transcendira nacionalizam. Inače bi ga postizanje njegova formalnoga cilja [nacionalne neovisnosti] ostavilo bez sadržaja: čime nije nužno rečeno da i svaka šira politika može postojati bez nekog nacionalističkog impulsa. Kuba i Kina su ovdje najbogatiji primjeri načina na koji je neki konkretni nacionalizam kompletiran socijalističkim projektom; a usprkos svim govorkanjima o neuspjehu socijalizma, čini se očitim da je danas sam cilj nacionalnog oslobođenja pokazao vlastitu neuspješnost načinom svoje realizacije. Sve zemlje koje su postale neovisne, postale su to samo da bi smjesta upale u polje sila kapitalističke globalizacije i moći novčarskih tržišta, te inozemnih ulaganja. Slučajevi otpora u Jugoslaviji i Iraku baš i ne inspiriraju na preveliko povjerenje u bilo kakav čisto nacionalistički put: svaki od njih, čini se, na svoj način potvrđuje **Chatterjeevu** dijagnozu. Ako je **Miloševićev** otpor na bilo koji način i povezan s obranom socijalizma, mi to nismo uspjeli zapaziti; dok Saddamovo zazivanje Islama u zadnji čas teško da je moglo biti uvjernljivo bilo kome.

Možda je nužno napraviti razlikovanje između nacionalizma kao takvog i onoga anti-amerikanizma - možda bi ga bolje bilo nazivati gaullizmom - koji danas mora biti dijelom svakoga nacionalizma koji drži do sebe, i koji ne želi degenrirati u ovakav ili onakav "etnički konflikt" [kako se to počelo nazivati]. To su nacionalistički ratovi oko granica; a otpor Sjedinjenim Državama utežjuje otpor samom sustavu globalizacije. Ali područja koja imaju najviše svega što je potrebno za ovu vrstu globalnoga otpora - Japan ili Evropska Unija - i sama su dio i parcella globalizacije, pa moraju s njom u vezi imati uobičajene "pomiješane osjećaje", koji izbijaju na vidjelo uglavnom u raspravama o tarifama, zaštiti, patentima i drugim vrstama trgovачkih sporova. Iz njih dolaze najnovije demonstracije protiv WTO, koje čini se označuju obećavajuće novo polazište politike otpora globalizaciji. Pa ipak mi se čini da kušnja da o njima raspravljamo u terminima nacionalizma, to jest, u terminima s političke razine, uže shvaćene - olakšavajuća i time znakovita. Jer zasad je teško vidjeti kako takve borbe mogu biti procjenjivane na bilo koji drugi način osim nacionalističkog. Riječi nacionalizam i nationalist uvijek su višežnačne, opasne i zavodeće. Pozitivan ili "dobar" nacionalizam kakav imam u vidu jest kolektivni projekt koji uzima oblik nastojanja konstruiranja nacije. Ali uspješni nacionalizmi koji su došli na vlast ipak su bili oni "loši". Osim toga, rekao bih da smatram pogrešnim mijesati nacionalizam s pojivama poput komunalizma koji mi više izgleda kao vrsta identitetske politike, premda na širokoj i doista "nacionalnoj" skali. Na koncu, mora se dodati da država-nacija danas ostaje jedini konkretni teren i okvir za političku borbu. Kao, na primjer, za zaštitu nacionalnog radnog prava od nešto represivnijeg slobodno-tržišnog američkog univerzalizma; ili za zaštitu nacionalnog kulturnog "protekcionizma"

ili nacionalnog patentnog prava protiv univerzalizma slobodnog tržišta na kojem bi nacionalna kultura i nacionalna farmaceutska industrija bili zbrisani, skupa s onoliko nacionalne mreže osiguranja i socijalističke zdravstvene zaštite koliko je od njih još uopće preostalo. Ovdje iznenada obrana nacionalnog postaje obrana same države blagostanja, uz sve njezine dobro poznate dvojbenosti [za početnike, je li to obrana nacionalne radne snage ili obrana nacionalne privrede?]. U međuvremenu ovaj veoma važni teren borbe sučeljuje se s vrlo pametnim političkim odgovorom kao protupotезом, kada Sjedinjene Države usvajaju jezik nacionalne samozaštite da bi obranile naše vlastite zakone o dječjem radu i zaštiti okoliša protiv "međunarodnog" miješanja i veta. Tako se nacionalni otpor protiv američke univerzalističke filozofije slobodnoga tržišta preobraća u američku obranu svoga univerzalizma ljudskih prava i isti čas isprážnjuje ovu posebnu političku borbu od njezina nacionalnoga sadržaja. Ili se pak ove borbe za nacionalnu suverenost stapaju s otporom u iračkom stilu, koji se tumači kao borba za pridržavanje prava na proizvodnju atomskog oružja [oblik otpora spram još jednog načela američkog univerzalizma koji sada ostavlja to pravo "velikim silama"]. U svim ovim situacijama svjedoci smo diskurzivne borbe između pretenzija partikularnog i pretenzija univerzalnog, potvrđujući **Chatterjeejevo** identificiranje fundamentalnog proturječja nacionalističke pozicije kao pokušaja da se univerzalizira partikularnost. Ne bi trebalo shvatiti da ova kritika znači podupiranje bilo kakvoga univerzalizma: jer kritika ovoga potonjega uvodi zabunu u suprotnome smislu, pošto Sjedinjene Države pretendiraju na univerzalnost onoga što je zapravo njihov vlastiti specifični nacionalni interes. Ali nijedna od ovih kontradikcija ne diskreditira niti ukida apstraktnu suprotnost između univerzalnog i partikularnog, koja je učvršćena kao proturječje unutar postojeće historijske situacije države nacije unutar globalnoga sustava. To je možda dublji filozofijski razlog zbog kojega borba protiv globalizacije ne može biti uspješno vođena u potpuno nacionalnim ili nacionalističkim terminima [iako nacionalistička strast, u mome gaullističkome smislu, može biti pokretačka sila koja je neophodna u sveobuhvatnijim oblicima *praxisa*].

Tako prelazimo na ono što je najčešće bilo identificirano kao "kulturna politika", danas trivijalizirani izraz, koji, kada i nije zazvan naprsto radi samopravdavanja ove ili one "novije" vrste umjetnosti, u najboljem slučaju zamata i




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uključuje drugi jedan cliché, "obranu našega načina života". To je moćni negativni program, jer on osigurava artikuliranje i utemeljenje svih oblika takozvanog kulturnalnog imperijalizma: on omogućuje identificiranje neprijatelja, te izoliranje i uočavanje sila razaranja. Doista, upravo u negativnim i destruktivnim efektima koje globalizacija polučuje u kulturi shvaćenoj u specijaliziranim smislu - uklanjanje nacionalne literature internacionarnom, ili bestselerima američke vrste, holivudska dezintegracija nacionalne filmske industrije i njezinih karakterističnih žanrova - najprije i najdramatičnije se mogu uočiti dublje i neopipljivije posljedice koje će se kasnije pojavit u dnevnom životu.

Ali problem i jest točno u tome, da je "dnevni život" mnogo teže predstaviti: pa tako, dok se njegova dezintegracija može učiniti vidljivom i opipljivom, pozitivna supstanca onoga što se željelo obraniti već se reducira na antropologische tikove i bizarnosti raznih vrsta, tabue i turističke migove [ne pokazujte donove svoje obuće! ne jedite lijevom rukom!], od kojih se većina može svesti na ovu ili onu religijsku "tradiciju" [a upravo je to onaj pojam tradicije koji ovdje želim dovesti u pitanje]. To nas vraća nečemu sličnom Huntingtonovoj svjetskoj politici, uz ogragu da je, sasvim očekivano, Islam jedina "religija" ili "religijska tradicija" koja izgleda da pokazuje energiju za otpor globalizaciji i vesternizaciji ["vesttoksifikaciji", kako je nazivaju Iranci]. Čini se dosta jasnim da je, nakon nestanka međunarodnog komunističkog pokreta [i prije njega fašizama, koji su



Edi Muka: *Poboljšati život ljudi/Improving people's lives*, HDLU, ZAGREB 2000

većinom na jedan ili drugi način bili također "protu-zapadni"] samo stanovita vrsta Islam-a, općenito karakterizirana kao "fundamentalistička", programatski postavljena kao otpor zapadnoj kulturi ili barem zapadnom "kulturnom imperijalizmu". [Ako se desničarski religijski fundamentalizam unutar Sjedinjenih Država također odupire stanovitim crtama zapadne tradicije, osobito onima povezanim s Prosvjetiteljstvom, svakako ga nitko ne bi opisivao kao antiamerički.]

Čak i ako stanovite islamske ideologije mogu pretendirati na zaslugu opiranja zapadnom kulturnom imperijalizmu, ipak je svejednako očito da one više ne mogu uspostaviti jednu izvorno univerzalističku oporbu zapadnom univerzalizmu - iako je to Islam mogao činiti u svojim najranijim danima. Taj povrat postaje još jasnijim ako prijeđemo iz domene kulture u samu ekonomiju. Ako je u stvarnosti sam kapitalizam ta motorna snaga iza loše i destruktivne globalizacije, onda se raznovrsne forme otpora "Zapadu" mogu testirati u terminima njihova kapaciteta da neutraliziraju i transformiraju kapitalizam. Kritika lihve očito neće biti od velike pomoći ako se ne ekstrapolira, na način **Ali Shariati-a**, u potpuno odbacivanje finansijskog kapitalizma kao takvog; dok nas starije denuncijacije eksplotacije lokalnog mineralnog bogatstva i lokalne radne

snage po multinacionalnim [čitaj: zapadnim] korporacijama i dalje ostavljaju unutar granica jednog starijeg antiimperijalističkog nacionalizma, uz podcjenjivanje silne invazivne snage globaliziranog kapitala i biznisa koji je danas transformiran do neprepoznatljivosti u odnosu na onaj od prije četrdeset ili pedeset godina.

Važno je, međutim, shvatiti da konkretna moć bilo kojeg religijskog oblika političkog otpora proizlazi ne iz sustava vjerovanja kao takvog, i koliko god tematiziranog, već iz njegove ukorijenjenosti u zbiljski postojecu zajednicu. U tome je i razlog zbog kojega bilo koji čisto ekonomski prijedlog otpora mora biti praćen pomakom pozornosti [koja u sebi zadržava sve prethodne razine] s ekonomskog na socijalno. Na koncu, prethodno postojeci oblici društvene kohezije, iako sami sobom nisu dostatni, nužno čine preduvjet bez kojega se ne može u bilo kakvu stvarnu i dugotrajnu političku borbu. U isto vrijeme ti oblici kohezije i sami predstavljaju sadržaj borbe, predstavljaju uloge koji su u pitanju u svakom političkom pokretu, čine program vlastitoga projekta. Takav program - očuvanje kolektivnog nasuprot atomiziranom i individualističkom - ne mora se shvaćati kao natražnjački ili doslovce konzervativan po tipu. Takva se kolektivna kohezija može i sama iskovati u borbi, kao na Kubi ili u Iranu, gdje ju sada razvoj događaja po svemu sudeći ugrozuje. Zapravo ona stara riječ za organiziranje radništva, *udruživanje* [*combination*], također nudi izvrsno simboličko određenje onoga što je u pitanju na toj konačnoj društvenoj razini; a povijest radničkoga pokreta posvuda pruža nebrojene primjere kovanja novih kolektiviteta u kolektivnom političkom djelovanju. Takvi kolektiviteti baš i nisu uvijek prepušteni na milost i nemilost "novim tehnologijama": naprotiv, elektronska razmjena informacija čini se središnjom u bilo kojem obliku novog političkog otpora globalizaciji koji se počinje pojavljivati - kao na primjer u demonstracijama protiv WTO. Zasad možemo koristiti izraz Utopijsko kao određenje svakog onog programa i nastupa koji, na ma koliko iskrivljen ili nesvjestan način, izražavaju zahtjeve kolektivnog života koji ima doći, i identificirati društveni kolektivitet kao krucijalno središte svakog doista naprednog i inovativnog političkog odgovora na globalizaciju. ●


[TEKST PREDAVANJA FREDRICA JAMESONA ODRŽANOG U ZAGREBU SKRAĆENA JE VERZIJA TEKSTA 'GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL STRATEGY'; S ENGLESKOGA PREVEO DAG STRPIĆ]

Lenin's stance against economism as well as against pure polities is crucial today, apropos of the split attitude towards economy in [what remains of] the radical circles: on the one hand, the above-mentioned pure "politicians" who abandon economy as the site of struggle and intervention; on the other hand, the economists, fascinated by the functioning of today's global economy, who preclude any possibility of a political intervention proper. Today, more than ever, we should here return to Lenin: yes, economy is the key domain, the battle will be decided there, one has to break the spell of the global capitalism – BUT the intervention should be properly POLITICAL, not economic. The battle to be fought is thus a twofold one: first, yes, anticapitalism. However, anticapitalism without problematizing the capitalism's POLITICAL form [liberal parliamentary democracy] is not sufficient, no matter how "radical" it is. Perhaps THE lure today is the belief that one can undermine capitalism without effectively problematizing the liberal-democratic legacy which – as some Leftists claim – although engendered by capitalism, acquired autonomy and can serve to criticize capitalism. This lure is strictly correlative to its apparent opposite, to the pseudo-Deleuzian love-hate fascinating/fascinated poetic depiction of Capital as a rhizomatic monstre/vampire which deterritorializes and swallows all, indomitable, dynamic, ever raising from the dead, each crisis making it stronger, Dionysos-Phoenix reborn... It is in this poetic [anti]capitalist reference to Marx that Marx is really dead: appropriated when deprived of his political sting.

[Slavoj Žižek, Repeating Lenin]

This apolitical turn in the arts is very much linked to the logic of today's capitalism. With the globalization of the capital, it becomes less and less possible for the national political powers to exert control over capital... the capital also marked the trend of today's obsession with everyday life in contemporary art. The ideology of the turn towards oneself is deeply ideologically connected to the logic of developed capitalist society. One should never forget that Foucault's call to make out of oneself a work of art goes hand in hand with the consumerist ideology, which constantly demand of us to change our appearances and which also makes us realize that there is no point in caring about politics, etc., since in the end we can only change oneself and have very little influence on society as a whole.

[Renata Salecl, Art of War and the War of Arts]



RASSIM®

Rassim Krastev: Autoportret s GSM-om/Self-portrait with GSM, 1998

WHY ARE WE AFRAID OF HYPER-CAPITALISM

RENATA SALECL

When we speak of living in the new age of anxiety, at first this looks like it is related to the proliferation of possible catastrophes like terrorist attacks, the collapse of the financial market, strange illnesses such as mad cow disease, ecological changes, possibilities of new wars and new developments in science. However, it is arrogant to say that our civilization actually experiences more anxieties than our predecessors do. They too had to deal with wars and other conflicts, poverty, and many more illnesses that radically shortened people's lives. If anxieties therefore, with regard to possible catastrophes, are not so different today than in the past, then anxieties that very much pertain to contemporary society are linked to the new feelings of insecurity on which contemporary capitalism capitalizes itself. These anxieties are not only linked to the uncertainties that have always been the vehicle of the capitalist labour market, but are also dependant on the changes that happened in the subject's self perception that have been affected by the transformations of the social symbolic order in today's society.

Consumerist society seems to be thriving on a particular feeling of inadequacy that people today experience. To grasp the power of this feeling one needs only to look at any women's magazine or even the simple *Style* section of daily journals. What do we find in such publications? On top of advertising for the latest fashions, cosmetics and reports on celebrities, the main part of the magazine is advice. Since we live in times of survival, in one randomly picked magazine one thus finds texts such as: "The single girl's guide to survival"; a secret mother's diary on how to survive childbirth [since "*Having babies does terrible damage, especially to the fashionably fortyish mother.*"], advice on how to survive being in or out of relationships, advice on diet and exercise, etc. Of course, this advice radically changes over time, so that as one health advice column claims, until recently: "*We have become neurotic about getting enough sleep, but new research now suggests that the less we have, the longer we'll live*".⁰¹

In summing up, such magazines offer a cocktail of advice and prohibitions that finally taste like guilt. If the nineties ideology followed the commands 'Just do it!' and 'Be yourself!' today it seems that the new motto promoted

01 | *The Sunday Times, Style magazine,*
15/09/2002

by the media is: "No matter what you do, you will do it wrong, but it is better that you follow our advice and try again." The '*Just do it!*' ideology relied on the idea that the subject is "free" in the meaning of being a non-believer in authority and someone who can be fully in charge of changing his or her identity as he or she pleases, while today it seems as if we are living in times when people wake up one day and realize their limitations in such pursuits. However, it is not that we have finally realized that we are not self-creators who can reject old authorities [like religion, state] and make a work of art out of ourselves which is not limited by any cultural or even biological restraints, it is rather that the very ideology of '*Just do it!*' instead of offering unlimited optimism opened the doors for a particular anxiety concerning the freedom to create an image in which we will appear likable to ourselves that we supposedly have today.

Today's consumerist culture very much plays on the power of the perfect image. While media on the one hand offer us images with which one is supposed to identify, on the other hand they point out the underside of this identification. It looks as if this search for the perfect image is linked to all kinds of traumas that people experience today. And self-destructiveness is very much part of this attempt to form an ideal body: anorexia, bulimia, excessive exercising, obsession with plastic surgery, shopping addictions all seem to be connected to the search for the perfect image. And people who feel particularly inadequate with regard to their own bodies often find a solution to their anxieties in self-mutilation like excessive piercing and cutting.

Why is it that today when we are supposed to be so free in creating our lives the way we want to [up to the point of changing our sexual identity], people seem more than ever to experience anxiety with regards to their image and their place in the world? What is so horrifying in the very possibility of making a work of art out of oneself and building a life that one supposedly wants to live?

ANXIETY BETWEEN DESIRE AND JOUSSANCE ★

Freud's speculations on anxiety were that in adulthood, the subject's anxiety is very much linked to guilt, which is why anxiety has an important connection with the super ego. Lacan also stressed this connection and pointed out that the super ego functions as the voice that commands the subject to enjoy while at the same time mockingly reminding the subject that he or she will fail in this pursuit of enjoyment. While it is easy to conclude that anxiety relates to this feeling of guilt linked to the super ego's command, one should nonetheless make a reversal here: the paradoxical in anxiety production is not the possibility of failure but rather the possibility of success. Here we need to remember two well-known Lacanian points about anxiety. First, that anxiety is not incited by the lack of the object but rather by the lack of the lack. And second, that anxiety is a median between desire and *jouissance*. Desire is always linked to dissatisfaction [to the lack of the object], while *jouissance* brings the subject close to the object often in most painful

ways. When we say that desire is linked to the lack, we should not make too quick a conclusion that there is never a proper object that can satisfy desire and that success in failure is a particular strategy of the desiring subject always complaining that whatever they have attained is just not "it". The paradoxical feature of desire is that it is not some kind of an insatiable mouth that goes from one object to another and is never satisfied: desire itself is put in motion only when the subject encounters the object of desire, i.e. the Lacanian *object a* which is another name for the lack itself. However, the lack does not start lacking when we come to an object of desire but rather when desire is replaced with *jouissance* - that is when we come close to an object that is not the elusive object of desire anymore but rather the object that incites a particular enjoyment that is often coupled with pain and thus horrifying for the subject.

In love relationships this might happen when a hysteric who has been longing and desiring a particular partner finally has a successful sexual encounter with this partner. At that moment it might happen that a woman will be totally horrified by the experience and might immediately abandon the partner. However, the woman's problem will not be simply that she wants to keep her desire unsatisfied [i.e. wants to keep longing for the inaccessible object], her horror might be linked to coming too close to the object of *jouissance*. In this context, **Lacan** makes a comment that orgasm is a state of anxiety that the subject usually tolerates quite well, however, it can also be a point that the subject very much tries to avoid.

How is anxiety therefore linked to failure? And why does the subject often desperately try to prevent success? Anxiety is often perceived as a state of dissatisfaction, an excitation that the subject feels when he or she is not content with their life, but in light of psychoanalytic theory, this might not be the case, since anxiety is primarily an affect that warns us of the painful encounter with *jouissance*. And if we take success not as a blissful state of harmony but rather as an encounter with *jouissance*, anxiety can be perceived as a protective shield from *jouissance* which also allows desire to keep being alive.

How is this logic of success in failure linked to the aforementioned feeling of inadequacy, i.e. why do people today seem to be so anxious regarding their image? And how does today's capitalist ideology play on this anxiety? Of course, one can easily observe that the whole marketing campaign on which capitalism relies constantly plays with the logic of desire and introduces the feeling that no matter which material goods we attain they are just not "it". However, if we complicate this understanding of the logic of desire with the logic of *jouissance*, the way capitalism plays with anxiety obtains a new meaning.

When **Kierkegaard** analysed anxiety, he took it as something that is linked to possibility in existence. Here anxiety became linked to freedom in a particular way, or, as **Keirkegaard** says, it is linked to freedom's actuality as the possibility of possibility. The subject who is free is therefore anxious precisely because of

the indeterminacy, i.e. "the possibility of possibility" that freedom entails. That is why **Kierkegaard** concludes that in the end anxiety is anxiety before myself, which means that I am the sole arbiter and what I do is entirely up to me. Anxiety is thus linked to the possibility of being able. However, anxiety as such often appears as a feeling aroused by looking down into a yawning abyss.

Kierkegaard's speculations on anxiety might appear far from the analysis of today's capitalism, however, one can show that the popular debate about anxiety with regards to too much choice that supposedly pertains to consumerist culture very much follows the logic **Kierkegaard** was already talking about.

How is this so-called abundance of choice operative today? The last 20 years were dominated by the ideology that people would be happier and better off if they were constantly shopping for the best deals. On the one hand, we had a massive emergence of new products, manufacturers and providers to choose from, but on the other hand, the idea of choice also became an end in itself. Some social scientists started to talk about the "tyranny of freedom" in today's world since consumers are forced to make choices even on things they never envisioned they could have any power over [and did not even want to have] - an example here choosing an electricity provider. This choice has incited quite the anxiety on the part of consumers, as a *New York Times* article explained: "the anxiety over energy is exposing something even deeper in human wiring".⁰² It is not only that people do not want to constantly be perceived as autonomous, rational consumers, "when it comes to electricity, a mysterious and dangerous thing that is also the foundation of modern living, Americans are just a little afraid to be alone." People are supposedly anxious for two reasons, first, it seems that no one is in charge in society anymore, and, second, the freedom of choice actually does not give more power to the consumers, but to corporations. A person shopping around on the Internet for the best price of a product, for example, gives corporations a chance to collect valuable data about consumer's desires and spending habits. The provoking of Anxiety in people therefore seems to be both that no one is in control, and that someone [the corporations] is in charge in a hidden way.

When people speak about anxiety today, they also invoke the idea that they are now asked to make choices about their sexuality, marriage, childbirth... things that were not regarded as choices in the past. But the more choices there are, the more it can seem possible to achieve an ideal result in every case. This seems to be the case not only for people who continually change their long-distance telephone service in hopes that they will find a better deal, but also for those that are searching for a love partner. That is why some claim that love especially provokes anxiety today.

While on the one hand the subject is perceived to be a self-creator, i.e. a subject who can make out of him or herself what he or she pleases and who does not rely anymore on old authorities like family, religion and the state, on the other hand the

subject has lost the "security" that the struggle with old authorities brought about. When we speak about the new age of insecurity we should not thus simply focus on the external dangers like wars and ecological catastrophes, but focus especially on the shift that has happened in the subject's perception of him or herself and his or her place in the social symbolic network.

While these new anxieties that subjects have regarding their body image and their role in society at large are very much linked to the way capitalism functions today, this same ideology that paradoxically offers "solutions" on how the subject should deal with his or her anxiety. It even seems that anxiety is the very motor of the marketing politics that dominates today's consumerist society.

ANXIETY AND THE NEW IMAGINARY ★

Psychoanalysis and marketing share the same knowledge that desire is always linked to prohibition. **Freud** was quite cynical about this fact and pointed out that where cultural prohibitions did not exist people invented them in order to keep desire alive. And **Lacan** was quick to follow that the subject would never want to have a sublime Thing unless the symbolic law was to prohibit access to it. With regards to consumer goods it is well known that we desire and cherish them more if they are expensive and difficult to obtain.

[I will never forget the enjoyment in the eyes of the Serbian student whom I met in Belgrade who had been telling me how he obsessively cleans his one pair of *Nike* sneakers since he hopes to have them for a number of years.]

The new philosophy of the brand makers is that they do not try to prevent their logos from being stolen and copied in the Third world. If a Turkish manufacturer makes copies of *Nike* sneakers, *Nike* will not try to persecute him for copyright violation. Since *Nike* is primarily concerned with the dissemination of their logo, they take the fact that someone copied their product as an advertising campaign. Another well-known strategy in creating "addiction" to consumer goods is that *Nike* and similar brands like to throw the excess of their products into the poorest neighbourhoods, like the Bronx in NY, and thus keep young consumers attracted to their goods.⁰³

If I said before that desire is linked to prohibition, does the fact that some companies give away their products for free nowadays kill that desire? The paradoxical answer here is no, since hyper-capitalism today very much relies on another type of identification which is not linked simply to selling goods, but on a certain imaginary which is linked to how people perceive their identities. In this context, the aforementioned feeling of inadequacy plays a strong role in the way marketing operates today. However, the problem is not that media offers some images of success and beauty to people with which they would want to identify, and since they cannot come close to this ideal, they feel inadequate. For some time now, fashion ideology has been convincing consumers that they should not follow

**03 | Naomi Klein,
No Logo**

fashion advice trying to make themselves into someone else, but rather find what is unique in them and with the help of fashion just accentuate it. This ideology of '*Be yourself!*', however, did not bring liberation to the subject, but rather opened up a space for new anxieties which marketing plays with in a paradoxical way. That is why provoking anxiety for the subject is not the failure that he or she cannot be someone else, but rather that he or she cannot be him or herself.

Before looking at how anxiety is present in today's ideology of consumerism, let us first recount how the market functions in contemporary society. Numerous studies have recently analysed the change in capitalist production where instead of material manufacturing the selling of the image has become the most important. In this new culture of hyper-capitalism, it is crucial that suppliers and users have replaced buyers and sellers; markets are managing ways for networks and ownership is being replaced by access. Economy depends less on the individual market exchange of goods and more on establishing long-term commercial relationships. Since the production costs of goods are minimal today and the market is saturated with so many goods, companies often decide to give away products for free in hopes of entering into long-term relationship with their customers.

The most important thing is to establish such a relation with a customer in becoming a supplier for a lifetime. The manufacturers thus invest most of their energy in developing trusting relations with their customers and trying to figure out what the future desires of the customers might be without the customers knowing that they might actually want or need these things. An example here can be the manufacturer of baby diapers who provides home delivery of their product and soon after the parents receive their first delivery of diapers, they start buying all other baby goods from this provider. And when the baby grows up, the provider will then offer goods for toddlers, adolescents etc. [OK, one can then imagine that the manufacturer will at some point also offer free psychoanalytic advice on how to raise children].

On top of establishing a trusting relationship, manufacturers today more than anything try to sell an image or a better lifestyle. Let us take the example of the so-called designer coffees sold at *Starbucks* or *Coffee Republic*. In these places, what is sold is not simply coffee, but a particular type of experience: nicely designed places, which offer a cosy, homey atmosphere with politically correct intellectual touches. One thus receives ecologically informed messages on how their coffee is produced and even an explanation on how by buying their [expensive] coffee one helps the poor people in Columbia. On the one hand, the consumers of such expensive coffees are offered a symbolic space in which they appear likable to themselves, while on the other hand they get protection from the outside world - especially the poor people.⁴

Today's hyper capitalist society is making a long-term shift from industrial production to cultural production, in which cultural experiences are more

important than goods and services. **Jeremy Rifkin** in his book "*The Age of Access*" points out that we are entering the so-called world of "experience" economy in which each person's life becomes a commercial market:

"Global travel and tourism, theme cities and parks, destination entertainment centres, wellness, fashion and cuisine, professional sports and games, gambling, music, film, television, the virtual world of cyberspace, and electronically mediated entertainment of every kind are fast becoming the centre of a new hyper-capitalism that trades in access to cultural experience".⁰⁵

In this context, businesses guess about the "lifetime value" of their customers, when they try to assess how much a subject is worth for every moment of his or her life. Also, economists speak about the change that has happened from the commodification of space and material into the commodification of human time and duration. The prediction is that in the future almost everything will be a paid-for experience in which traditional reciprocal obligations and expectations - mediated by feelings of faith, empathy, and solidarity - will be replaced by contractual relations in the form of paid memberships, subscriptions, admission charges, retainers, and fees. The guess is that in the new era, people will purchase their very existence in small commercial segments, since their lives will be modelled on movies so that "*each consumer's life experience will be commodified and transformed into an unending series of theatrical moments, dramatic events, and personal transformations*". [p. 29]

Rifkin summarizes these new trends by pointing out that: *"In the new network economy what is really being bought and sold are ideas and images. The physical embodiment of these ideas and images becomes increasingly secondary to the economic process. If the industrial marketplace was characterized by the exchange of things, the network economy is characterized by access to concepts, carried inside physical forms".⁰⁶* An example here can be Nike - a company that truly only sells image. Nike has no factories, machines or equipment, only an extensive network of suppliers, and so-called production partners. Nike is only a research and design studio with a sophisticated marketing formula and distribution system.

Another important point is that if in industrial society what mattered was the quantity of goods, in the post-industrial society this is replaced by the quality of life. That is why we do not so much buy goods anymore, but access in time to them [leasing, franchising, etc.]. It looks as if capitalism is losing its material origins and is becoming a temporal affair which is linked to the fact that customers do not so much need things, but just their

04 | Recently, such places experienced a flourishing in Japan. Their visitors explain that in the past they would often go to bars and tearooms after work to avoid going home, but that today they go to Starbucks because they feel at home there. Of course, this false home is a tranquil oasis without children screaming in one ear and the wife complaining in the other.

05 | Jeremy Rifkin, *The Age of Access*, p.7

06 | Ibid., p. 29

function. In this context, the customer becomes a client and partner who needs attention, expertise and, most of all, experience. [It is interesting how psychoanalysis is also replacing the name patient with client. And one wonders if some clients are doing analysis as a kind of new experience they wish to buy.]

Still another crucial element in our new society is the new take on community. Companies are thus desperate in creating communities with their clients. In the company manuals one can thus read about the four stages of how one deal with clients: first comes the so-called "awareness bonding", which makes the consumer aware of the new product or service; second is identity bonding when the consumer starts to identify with the brand in a particular way; third is the relationship bonding when the consumer establishes a particular attachment to the brand, and fourth is community bonding when the brand maker keeps consumers satisfied by organizing specific events and gatherings, or at least sends a birthday card to the consumer.

A particular marketing strategy that some brands of casual clothing use also presents an illusion of equality which helps in masking the class divides in today's world. In shops like *Gap*, poor people shop in order to appear middle class and rich in order not to show off with their clothes. Such brands also seem to ease gender differences in clothing, which changes the old divides in how men and women tend to choose their clothing. As **Darian Leader** points out, women usually search for what no one else has, while men want to buy clothes that everyone else is wearing.

In sum, we are witnessing a transformation in the nature of commerce from the selling of things to the selling of images and the creating of communities. And the idea behind this change is that people more than anything want to appear likable to others and themselves and also very much want to "belong". As a result, since old types of communities [families, cultural groups] are in steady decline, people acquire access to a new type of community by becoming subscribers, members, and clients. However, behind this attempt in creating new communities is the perception that the totality of people's lived experience needs to be transformed into a commercial fare. It looks as if human life itself becomes the ultimate commercial product. And some warn that when every aspect of our being becomes a paid-for activity then the commercial sphere becomes the final arbiter of our personal and collective existence.

If we introduce the Lacanian concept of the Big Other here, we can say that this search for community can be understood as a search for a new Big Other and that the companies are precisely playing on this subject's need to have a perception of a coherent social symbolic order. But what provokes anxiety in this new play with images and new takes on community? Anxiety can be perceived as a signal in the Ego, i.e. as a phenomenon that appears on the limit of the imaginary field that the Ego is comprised of. **Freud** took Ego as a projection of the surface, as a temporary perception that the subject has that he or she is coherent and has

an identity. Anxiety often appears when the Ego is threatened in its perception of coherence, i.e. when the subject comes close, for example, to some horror object of *jouissance*. This might happen as an uncanny phenomenon when one suddenly encounters one's double in the mirror or when one has the feeling that it is not the subject that is gazing at the images in the mirror, but that the image is actually gazing at the subject. Such moments are often perceived as depersonalisations. Lacan's point is that the subject feels depersonalised because something in the mirror becomes anxiety provoking and cannot therefore be proposed to be recognized by the Other, i.e. by the symbolic order. This moment of anxiety might incite the subject to express aggression towards the specular image or towards him or herself. Here again we see that anxiety provoking is not lack, but rather a presence of an object at the place where there should have been lack, like the emergence of the double in the mirror.

What is the basis of this horror? First, we need to note that the subject's engagement with the Other can be traumatic for three different reasons: the subject might have problems with the Other's demand, desire or *jouissance*. While the question of the Other's desire often comes formulated in the question: "Who am I for the Other?", and the trauma of the Other's *jouissance* becomes perceived as the theft of our own *jouissance*, the problem that the subject has in regard to the Other's demand engages another logic. The subject often wants to get a demand from the Other and the horror emerges precisely when this demand is lacking. This happens, for example, in a psychoanalytic situation, where the analysand is perturbed by the lack of the demand coming from the analyst. The problem with a society of "too much choice" is that there seems to be less and less demand. We might have a perception that we are now free from the constraints in creating an image in which we want to see ourselves and thus come close to a *jouissance* that we feel will bring us satisfaction, however, we necessarily fail in this attempt. *Jouissance* is something very much alien to ourselves [i.e. we do not "choose" it in a rational way], which is why it is often when we try to be ourselves that we encounter something that is most traumatic and horrifying.

THE ANXIETY OF POVERTY ★

The problem with the theories which claim that we live in a form of cultural capitalism today is that they seem to neglect the fact that material production nonetheless still goes on, but is often hidden in the countries of the Third world. Thus, Americans might have the perception that all they are doing nowadays is connecting to the virtual reality and leasing instead of buying, while most of the everyday products they use are made in China or by the invisible immigrant workers in the sweatshops in New York. But sometimes the workers actually become visible and are included into the imaginary presented by the new type of capitalism as some kind of decorative art objects, which gives proof of authenticity. This for example happens in expensive restaurants which usually have open kitchens so

that their low paid workers are exposed to the public. We might take this decoration as proof that cooking is really happening in the restaurant, which counters conspiracy theories that, for example, evolved around Chinese restaurants in Paris: the idea there was that cooking was being done in giant underground kitchens and when we order a meal in a small, supposedly authentic restaurant, their chef just warms up the pre-packaged meal or runs to the underground kitchen to fetch it. However, one can also read this need to expose workers as decorative art objects as a particular way of dealing with class anxieties today.

There seems to be a general need in our society to create a perception that life is good no matter how anxious people might be about their lives and especially to counter the insecurities that they have at their workplace. One way to tackle these insecurities is to depict the horror of poverty in a way that appears much less threatening for the middle classes. Recently, there have been a number of books published in which middle-class writers decided to live as poor workers for a period of time and then depict the lives of the lower classes in their books.

Ben Cheever, in his memoir of a writer who becomes a low paid salesman, remembers a training course in the electronics store in which the instructor asked the future salesmen: "*What do people fear more than death?*" "*Public speaking*", was **Cheever's** answer. This was definitely wrong, since the instructor reminded him that the greatest fear felt by American voters is that they will lose their job.

If in the past we tried to calm our fears regarding death by trying to figure out what death and dying looked like [here we only need to remember artists who either video-taped the dying or used actual cadavers in their art work], today the same approach is used regarding fears of poverty. With regards to death, nowadays we imagine that we will be able to postpone it with the help of new technologies, and with regards to poverty, the remedy is to depict it as something distant and non-threatening to the middle class.

If a decade ago, the lower classes were primarily afraid for their jobs [or were permanently unemployed], now the same kind of insecurity is touching the middle class. The latter is not only afraid daily of losing their jobs, with the growing uncertainty about their pension funds, they have also lost the belief in the possible security that will come with old age. For the middle class one way to tackle this insecurity is to observe the life of the poor in order to be able to make a conclusion: "This is not me! I am far better off than they are." It is common knowledge that when one is disadvantaged one is happy to learn that others might be worse off than they are. **Fran Abrams**, the author of "*Below the breadline*" begins her book with the calming reassurance: "*Let me tell you about the nearly poor. They are, to misquote F. Scott Fitzgerald, different from you and me. They are soft where we are hard, cynical where we are trustful, in a way that unless you were born poor, it is very difficult to understand. They think, deep in their hearts, that they are less than we are. Even when they enter far into our world, they still think they are less than we are. They are different*".⁰⁷ But are they really so different or do the middle classes want

to believe that they are in order to retain their own sense of being protected from the horror of the underclass's lifestyle? Adams herself concludes that many of the underclass actually want to: *"swim in the middle of the stream, to live the same lives, maintain the same standards, as their better-paid neighbours. Sadly, many of them found themselves pushed off towards the mudflats of society, unable indefinitely to continue to stay afloat. ... If they chose not to make a fuss, to shut their mouths tightly and just plough on, they usually had their reasons. Reasons born out of lifetimes of experience which told them that rocking the boat could only lead to capsise."*⁰⁸ While it is certainly true that the underclasses are not rocking the boat of capitalism so far, it is strange that a book about their lives finds the fact that the underclass continues to express determination, sheer grit and *"almost unbelievable optimism and joie de vivre"*. In times when optimism is so highly praised, it seems to be necessary that the middle classes retain their optimism that they will not be more pauperised in the future [although the movements on the market show no increase in security] while it is also important to keep the illusion alive that the lower classes remain optimistic in spite of their increasing marginalization.

While all these books about the poor clearly state that they did not wish to make a revolution, they also insist that their research wanted to show the dignity of the lives of the poor. They wanted to make visible not only their poverty, but also the way they cope with it in a dignified manner. But is dignified here not synonymous with silenced? Ben Cheever openly admits that in the book he is not really talking about the other poor people he encountered on his voyage to the world of the underclass. So he claims: *"This book's greatest failure is that it's turned out such a personal story. I am the character I talk about most. So it seems as if I'm the only character who matters. Please know that this is not what I think. I am seeing Ben Cheever. Not because he's the best product. I'm selling Ben Cheever because he's all I've got. It wouldn't have been fair - or legally advisable - to reveal everybody else's life as if it were my own. Instead I've had to reveal my own life as if it were everybody else's".*⁰⁹

What is therefore the logic of this search for the secret about how people really live? At first it looks like today's virtual world demands a search for some kind of real. My own theory in *[Per]versions of Love and Hate* has been that people today are searching for what is behind the imaginary simulacra that dominates

07 | **Fran Abrams,**
Below the
Breadline: Living on
the Minimum Wage,
LONDON: PROFILE
BOOKS 2002, p.1.

08 | Ibid., p.7

09 | P. xviii-xix

our perception of the world. But now, I think we need to take into account that the answer to this over-virtualization of the world has been actually more virtuality. Let us look at the so-called reality shows on TV. The first explanation might be that people who are tired of the virtual want to see something "real" and that the TV market has simply been playing on this desire by producing reality shows like *Big Brother*, *Survivor* and so on. However, on these shows it is not that we receive some kind of raw eve-

ryday reality exposed to the public. Yes, it is true that in these shows we do not have paid actors, but the lay persons featured in these show nonetheless very much play their part. While they do not try to adapt to some prescribed role, they actually play themselves: they create a certain image, persona that they perceive will be of interest to the public and which they might have seen before on TV.

What happens when one virtuality is supplemented by another virtuality? A paradoxical answer might be that it is precisely this supplementation that gives rise to anxiety. Let us go back to **Lacan**'s famous saying that "anxiety is not a signal of a lack, but the absence of the support of lack". **Lacan** exemplifies this by pointing out that what provokes anxiety for the child is not the absence of the mother, but rather her being constantly at their back. In this context, the loss of the object is not horrifying, but the presence of the fact that objects are not lacking. If we go back to the example of "reality TV", we can say that while the overpresence of the camera tries to capture the failures, contingency and spontaneity of everyday life, it does nothing more but create another spectacle. "Reality TV" tries to reveal the secret of daily life interactions, but in reality it actually covers this secret up. One might say that the secret of everyday life is its very boredom, its non-eventfulness or the unpredictability and contingency of events. While "reality TV" tries to come close to this secret, it has done nothing but eradicate it. Instead of boredom, we have the participants excessively trying to be interesting and thus engaging in strenuous exercise, self-help talks, a culture of fake tribal customs, etc. Thus, in this supplementation of one virtuality with another one, which presents itself as something real, what provokes anxiety is not that the idea of the Big Brother [the controlling agency from **Orwell**'s novel] has become materialized, but rather that the lack is lacking - i.e. that there is no place for inconsistency, for non-wholeness. It is wrong to conclude that shows like *Big Brother* simply show how our today's world is totally controlled, how there is no privacy anymore, since someone is watching all the time. The problem is not this overvisibility, but rather that the contingency is lacking. Thus, when in our virtual world we search for the secret behind the virtuality by filming reality, we are doing nothing than negating the very inconsistency that pertains to reality - i.e. we are trying to get rid of precisely the lack that marks the social. Contingency might appear as horrifying, but, in the end, what really produces anxiety is the attempt to get rid of it.

But how does one get rid of anxiety? The ideology of '*Just do it!*', in our advice culture incited a production of manuals '*How to do it.*' The most absurd example here includes recent discussions on how to simplify our lives. In the States a growing number of people have decided to quit the race for more money and consumer products and start living a frugal, simple and quieter life. But in order to simplify one's life, one first needs to buy numerous guidebooks which teach you how to do this. There is thus a growing industry which teaches consumers how not to be consumers and, of course, makes a lot of profit out of this new life-trend.

On another level, one finds the refusal of dealing with contingency in today's child-rearing. From psychoanalysis we know that no matter which guidelines we try to follow we cannot predict what kind of effect our parenting will have on our children, since we can never control the way our unconscious slips out in our planned behaviour. Even if we follow some culturally prescribed action in dealing with children, we cannot annihilate the contingency of what kind of an effect this action will have on the child. In today's advice-ridden society, where we do not have any more old relationships with authorities, we also do not have the previous type of advice on how to raise children that grandparents used to pass onto their children. The book *Paranoid Parenting*, makes a lucid observation that today's parents in seeking advice do not obtain answers on how to deal with a troubled child anymore. When they look into books or on the web, they usually just get advice where to get more advice - links to more books, more web pages, more therapists, etc.

The continuous talk about the new age of anxiety has incited an impression that anxiety is something that one should get rid of or at least try to control. The way anxiety is presented within popular media gives the impression that anxiety is the ultimate obstacle to the subject's well-being. Anxiety is perceived as something that prevents the subject in achieving full satisfaction in his or her life and should thus be minimised as much as possible. In the last years, the media have especially focused on overcoming so-called social anxiety that the subject experiences within public space. Manufacturers of the anti-anxiety drug *Paxil* have launched, for example, a big media campaign on how social anxiety is what prevents people from succeeding at their work and in their personal lives. The TV and newspaper ads for *Paxil* showed two images of a man sitting at a table surrounded by people. In the first image, the man is in a straight jacket, over him is an interrogation light and the people around him have grim, threatening faces. But the second image shows this same scene in a different light - people are friendly-looking, there is no interrogation light, and the man is just calmly sitting at the table. Over the first image, one reads: "This is how it seems", and over the second: "This is how it is." The text above the images explains that numerous people today suffer from social anxiety disorder, which prevents them in succeeding in life, but now it is easy to overcome this disorder with the help of *Paxil*. [In small print there are, of course, listed the numerous side effects of the drug, however the message at the end is that even if some side effects occur, they are well worth the risk, since social anxiety is a far worse impediment.] The message of this advertising is that the subject's perception of reality is radically changed because of anxiety, and that under the influence of anxiety the subject creates a fantasy, which turns the reality into something dangerous for the subject.

This perception that the subject under the influence of anxiety radically distorts the reality and perceives it as more threatening than it actually is was radically shattered with the September 11 attack. At the time of this attack, it seems

that the common perception of reality and fantasy became twisted in many ways. As a result of this twisting, the manufacturers of anti-anxiety drugs decided to adopt a new strategy of advertising. *Paxil* thus launched a new TV advertisement made by well-known documentary filmmaker **Barbara Koppel**, in which real people, users of *Paxil*, talk about their struggle with generalized anxiety disorder and how the drug has helped them. Now, the clip does not make the impression anymore that the subject who suffers from anxiety has a distorted sense of reality. On the contrary, their perception of reality is real, however, this reality looks grim and depressing, while after taking *Paxil* their perception of the same reality is cheerful and happy. The message of this advertising campaign is that the problem is not that the subject constructs a reality that is not true [i.e. our reality is depressive, difficult, scary], but with the help of *Paxil* one can experience this harsh reality with new eyes - the grim black and white picture suddenly becomes colour, the annoying buzz from the streets turns into soothing music and the subject who has been distressed suddenly becomes calm and relaxed.

This perception that life is grim, but that one can nonetheless find enjoyment in it, is also part of the new *Coca Cola* advertisement entitled '*Life tastes good!*' which in a particular way celebrates success in failure. In the TV clip, we see a grandson visiting his grandfather who asks him how his studies are going. The young man responds that he is taking a year off. Then the grandfather enquires about the last girlfriend and the grandson admits that he already has a new one. The grandson then asks how the grandmother is doing and the grandfather informs him that she has moved in with their friend from the bridge-club. At this point, both men salute themselves with *Coca Cola* and we are reminded that life tastes good.

This ad very much depicts the reality of today's family life where the stability of relationships is a thing of the past. Things have changed for both the young and the old. But now advertising depicts what used to be perceived as failure [not studying at school, the break-up of a relationship] just as change and continues to remind us that life is good anyhow.

Contemporary consumer ideology is constantly convincing us that the subject is just a work of art, that "being" gave way to "becoming", and that the new self is just an unfolding story continually being updated and re-edited. Similarly, corporations today struggle for continuity and thus wish to create an image about themselves that will pass into the future. Both individuals and corporations thus very much desire to achieve some kind of immortality. For **Freud**, anxiety in the final analysis always touches the horror of death. In this context, anxiety of too much choice and the "tyranny of freedom" has to do with the fact that amidst all the choices we are supposedly free to make today, we have no freedom from death. However, here we need to remember **Kierkegaard**'s famous saying that what is more horrible for people than death is actually the possibility of immortality. ●

What kind of 'individuality' is conjured up in a culture in which advertising and the media constantly stress that you can decide for yourself, that you decide what you like, that you will say who and what you want to be? Express yourself - but don't forget to do it by using products X, Y and Z.

I[®] has become a brand name, and the individual a consumer composed of branded emotions and activities.

DO[®] is NikeTM

Be[®] is Calvin KleinTM



Every design is a criticism of the context for which it has been produced.

[Max Bruinsma, An ideal design is not yet]

ZAŠTO SE BOJIMO HIPERKAPITALIZMA

RENATA SALECL

 Kada kažemo da živimo u novom dobu strepnje, to na prvi pogled izgleda neodvojivo povezano s umnažanjem mogućih katastrofa kao što su teroristički napadi, slom finansijskog tržišta, čudne bolesti poput 'kravljeg ludila', ekološke promjene, mogućnosti novih ratova i novih znanstvenih postignuća. Ipak, bilo bi arogantno kazati da strepnja našu civilizaciju pritiše više nego je pritiskala naše prethodnike. I oni su se morali nositi s ratovima i ostalim sukobima, siromaštvo, a još i više s bolestima koje su radikalno skraćivale ljudske živote. Ako se, dakle, današnje strepnje o mogućim katastrofama ne razlikuju mnogo od onih u prošlosti, strepnje koje odlikuju suvremeno društvo povezane su s novim osjećajima nesigurnosti na kojima suvremenii kapitalizam kapitalizira samog sebe. Te strepnje nisu samo povezane s neizvjesnostima na kojima se kapitalističko tržište rada oduvijek temeljilo, nego ovise i o promjenama koje su se zbile u načinu na koji se subjekt doživljava pod utjecajem transformacija simboličkog poretka u današnjem društvu.

Potrošačko društvo kao da cvjeta na posebnom osjećaju neadekvatnosti koji danas odlikuje ljude. Kako bismo shvatili moć tog osjećaja, dosta je zaviriti u bilo koji ženski magazin ili čak rubriku "Život" u dnevnim novinama. Što tu nalazimo? Pored reklama za najnoviju modu i kozmetiku te izvještaja iz 'svijeta slavnih', glavni element magazina su savjeti. Kako živimo u vremenu preživljavanja, u jednom nasumce izabranom magazinu, nalazimo tekstove poput: "Vodič za preživljavanje za mlade žene koje su same"; tajni majčin dnevnik o preživljavanju porodaca [jer "Rađanje nanosi štetu, posebno pomodnim majkama u četrdesetima"]; savjete kako preživjeti u vezi ili izvan nje; savjete o dijeti i fitnessu itd. Naravno, savjeti se vremenom radikalno mijenjaju, tako da, kako doznajemo iz jedne rubrike sa savjetima o zdravlju, "Pitanje da li dovoljno spavamo činilo nas je neurotičnima, ali najnovija istraživanja ukazuju da što manje spavamo, to čemo duže živjeti."⁰¹

Ukratko, takvi magazini nude koktel savjeta i zabrana od kojeg nam na koncu u ustima ostane tek okus krivnje. Ako je ideologija devedesetih zapovijedala **Just do it! i Be yourself!**, mediji danas kao da promiču novi moto: "Što god radili, sigurno

ćete pogriješiti, pa vam je bolje poslušati naš savjet i pokušati iznova." **Just do it!** ideologija temeljila se na ideji da je subjekt 'sloboden' u smislu da ne vjeruje u autoritete i da može posve kontrolirati promjene svog identiteta po vlastitom nahođenju, dok ljudi danas kao da su se probu-

dili i shvatili svoja ograničenja u takvim potragama za novim identitetom. Ipak, nije na stvari to da smo konačno uvidjeli kako nismo kreatori sebe samih koji mogu odbacivati stare autoritete [poput religije, države] i od sebe raditi umjetnička djela nesputana bilo kakvim kulturnim ili čak biološkim stegama: prije izgleda kao da je sama **Just do it!** ideologija, umjesto da nas nastavi klukati neograničenim optimizmom, otvorila vrata posebnoj strepnji glede slobode koju danas navodno imamo, slobode da stvaramo slike u kojima ćemo sami sebi djelovati dopadljivo.

Današnja potrošačka kultura igra na kartu moći savršene slike. Dok nam mediji na jednoj strani nude slike s kojima bismo se trebali poistovjetiti, na drugoj nas upozoravaju na naličje takvih identifikacija. Kao da je potraga za savršenom slikom povezana sa svim traumama od kojih ljudi danas pate. Autodestruktivnost je bitan dio tih pokušaja da se stvori idealno tijelo: anoreksija, bulimija, prekomjerno vježbanje, opsjednutost plastičnom kirurgijom, šoping-ovisnost - sve to kao da je povezano s potragom za savršenom slikom. Ljudi koji se smatraju posebno nezadovoljnima vlastitim tijelom rješenje za svoje strepne često nalaze u samounakazivanjima poput prekomjernog *piercinga* i rezanja tijela.

Zašto upravo danas, kada bismo trebali biti slobodni oblikovati naše živote po vlastitoj želji [do točke promjene našeg spolnog identiteta], ljudi kao da sve više strepe u pogledu vlastite slike i mjesta u svijetu? Što je to tako užasavajuće u samoj mogućnosti da se od sebe napravi umjetničko djelo i ustroji život kakav navodno želimo živjeti?

STREPNA IZMEDU ŽELJE I UŽITKA ★

Freud je prepostavljao da je kod odraslih subjektova strepnja umnogome povezana s krivnjom, zbog čega strepnju važna spona veže s Nad-ja. **Lacan** je također naglasio tu vezu i istaknuo kako Nad-ja funkcionira kao glas koji subjektu zapovijeda da uživa, dok ga istodobno podsmješljivo podsjeća da taj užitak neminovno ne može postignuti. Dok je lako zaključiti da je strepnja povezana s osjećajem krivnje povezanim sa zapovješću Nad-ja, tu bismo ipak trebali načiniti obrat: ono što proizvodi strepnju, paradoksalno, nije mogućnost neuspjeha, nego prije mogućnost uspjeha. Tu se trebamo prisjetiti dvije dobro znane lakanovske poante o strepnji. Prvo, da strepnju ne izaziva manjak objekta koliko prije manjak manjka. I drugo, da je strepnja veza između želje i užitka.

Želja je uvijek povezana s nezadovoljenjem [s manjkom objekta], dok *jouissance* približava subjekt objektu na često najboljniji način. Kada kažemo da je želja povezana s manjkom, ne smijemo prebrzo zaključiti da odgovarajući objekt koji može zadovoljiti želju uopće ne postoji, te da je ostvarivanje neuspjeha posebna strategija subjekta koji neprestano jamra da štogod on postigao, to ipak nije 'to'. Paradoksalna je odlika želje da nju ne možemo predstaviti nezasitnim ustima koja idu od jednog objekta do drugog i nikad se ne mogu zadovoljiti: sama želja biva pokrenuta tek kada subjekt nađe na objekt želje, tj. lakanovski *objet a* [objekt malo a], što je tek drugo ime za sam manjak. Ipak, manjak ne počinje manjkati kada se primaknemo objektu želje, nego prije kada je objekt želje zamijenjen objektom užitka - tj. kada se odveć približimo objektu koji više nije izmičući objekt

želje, nego prije objekt koji izaziva posebni užitak kakav često ide pod ruku s boljim i otud užasava subjekta.

U ljubavnim odnosima to se može dogoditi kada histerika, koja je čeznula i priželjkivala nekog posebnog partnera, konačno ostvari uspješan seksualni odnos s njim. U tom trenutku žena može biti potpuno užasnuta tim iskustvom i smješta napustiti partnera. Ipak, njezin problem nije naprosto da ona želi svoju želu sačuvati nezadovoljenom [tj. da želi nastaviti čeznuti za nedostupnim objektom], njezin užas može biti povezan s prekomernim približavanjem objektu užitka. U tom kontekstu, **Lacan** komentira da je orgazam stanje strepnje koje subjekt obično dobro tolerira, ali, ipak, to može biti i točka koju subjekt silno pokušava izbjegći.

Kako je, dakle, strepnja povezana s neuspjehom? I zašto subjekt često očajnički pokušava izbjegći uspjeh? Strepnju se često vidi kao stanje nezadovoljstva, pobuđenosti što ga subjekt osjeća kada nije zadovoljan sa svojim životom, no u svjetlu psihanalitičke teorije to ne mora biti slučaj jer je strepnja prvenstveno afekt koji nas upozorava na bolni susret s užitkom. Ako uspjeh shvatimo ne kao blaženo stanje harmonije nego prije kao susret s užitkom, strepnju možemo vidjeti kao zaštitnu branu od užitka, koja također i želi dozvoljava da ostane živa.

U kakvoj je vezi ova logika uspjeha u neuspjehu sa spomenutim osjećajem neadekvatnosti, tj. zašto ljudi danas toliko strepe zbog svog imagea? I kako današnja kapitalistička ideologija igra na tu strepnju? Naravno, lako je uočiti kako se sveukupna marketinška kampanja, na koju se kapitalizam oslanja, neprestano poigrava s logikom želje i uvodi osjećaj da koju god robu nabavimo, to ipak nije 'to.' Ipak, usložnimo li to poimanje logike želje s logikom užitka, poigravanje kapitalizma sa strepnjom dobiva novo značenje.

Kada je **Kierkegaard** analizirao strepnju, uzeo ju je za nešto povezano s mogućnošću egzistencije. Strepnja je na poseban način dovedena u vezu sa slobodom, ili kako je to rekao **Kierkegaard**, s aktualnošću slobode kao mogućnošću mogućnosti. Subjekt koji je slobodan tako stredično upravo zbog te nedeterminiranosti, tj. "mogućnosti mogućnosti" koju sloboda iziskuje. Zato **Kierkegaard** i zaključuje da je strepnja u konačnici strepnja pred sobom, odnosno pred činjenicom da sam ja jedini arbitar i da ono što radim posve ovisi o meni. Strepnja je tako povezana s mogućnošću da se bude sposoban uraditi nešto. Ipak, kao takva strepnja se često doima kao osjećaj pobuđen zurenjem u zjapeći bezdan.

Ove **Kierkegaardove** spekulacije o strepnji mogu se doimati dalekim od analize današnjeg kapitalizma, no moguće je demonstrirati da popularna debata o strepnji, povezana s pretjeranom mogućnošću izbora koja navodno odlikuje potrošačku kulturu, umnogome slijedi logiku o kojoj je govorio već **Kierkegaard**.

Kako to takozvano obilje izbora funkcioniра danas? Posljednjih dvadeset godina proteklo je u znaku ideologije da bi ljudi bili sretniji, i da bi im bilo bolje, ako bi neprestano kupovali po najpovoljnijim uvjetima. S jedne strane tako dobili pojavljivanje velikog broja novih proizvoda, proizvođača i opskrbljivača između kojih se može birati, no s druge strane, ideja izbora je postala ciljem po sebi. Neki su sociolozi počeli govoriti o 'tiraniji slobode' u današnjem svijetu, jer su potrošači prisiljeni birati čak i stvari za koje nisu niti mogli prepostavljati da će ih jednom

morati birati [i uopće željeti] - dobar primjer za to je izbor opskrbe električnom energijom. Ta je mogućnost izbora izazvala dosta strepnje među potrošačima, jer kako je objasnio članak u **New York Timesu**: "strepnja zbog energije ukazuje na nešto dublje u ljudskim vezama".⁰² Ne samo da ljudi ne žele da ih se neprestano smatra za autonomne, racionalne potrošače, "kada je u pitanju električna energija, zagonetna i opasna stvar koja je također u temelju modernog života, Amerikanci se ipak boje da budu prepušteni samima sebi". Ljudi strepe, pretpostavlja se, iz dva razloga, prvo, izgleda kao da više nitko nije zadužen da se brine za društvo, i drugo, sloboda izbora zapravo ne daje više moći potrošačima nego korporacijama. Osoba koja, na primjer, na Internetu traži proizvod po najboljoj cijeni, daje korporacijama priliku da prikupe dragocjene podatke o njenim željama i kupovnim navikama. Strepnju kod ljudi prema tome izaziva i to da nitko nema kontrolu, ali i to da netko [korporacije] ipak vlada situacijom na prikriven način.

U današnjem govoru o strepnji također se evocira ideja da se pred ljudi stavljaju izbori o pitanjima njihove seksualnosti, braka, roditeljstva, dakle stvari oko kojih se u prošlosti nije postavljalo pitanje izbora. No što je više izbora, to se više čini da je moguće postići idealni rezultat. Čini se da je to slučaj ne samo s ljudima koji neprestano mijenjaju telefonsku kompaniju u nadi da će naći najpovoljnije uvjete, nego i s onima koji tragaju za ljubavnim partnerom. Otud tvrdnja da ljubav danas posebno izaziva strepnju.

Dok je s jedne strane subjekt shvaćen kao stvoritelj samoga sebe, tj. koji od sebe može uraditi što god želi neovisno o starim autoritetima poput obitelji, religije i države, subjekt je s druge strane izgubio 'sigurnost' koju je borba s tim starim autoritetima donosila. Kada govorimo o novom dobu nesigurnosti, ne smijemo se, dakle, naprsto usredotočiti na izvanske opasnosti poput ratova ili ekoloških katastrofa, nego posebno na pomak koji se dogodio u subjektovu samodoživljavanju, kao i mesta što ga subjekt zauzima u društvenoj simboličkoj mreži.

Dok su nove strepnje koje subjekt ima glede slike svoga tijela kao i svoje društvene uloge umnogome povezane s načinom na koji kapitalizam danas funkcioniра, ista ta ideologija, paradoksalno, subjektu nudi 'rješenja' za njegove probleme sa strepnjom. Čak se čini da je strepnja sam motor marketinške politike koja dominira današnjim potrošačkim društвom.

STREPNJA I NOVO IMAGINARNO ★

Psihoanaliza i marketing dijele istu spoznaju da je želja uvijek povezana sa zabranom. **Freud** je o tome bio veoma ciničan, i istaknuo da kad kulturalne zabrane ne bi postojale, ljudi bi ih izmislili kako bi želju održali živom. **Lacan** je dodao da subjekt nikad ne bi poželio imati sublimnu Stvar ukoliko mu simbolički zakon ne bi priješao pristup k njoj. Kad je riječ o potrošačkim dobrima, dobro je poznato da ih želimo i čuvamo to više što su skuplja i teže nabavljiva.

[Nikad neću zaboraviti užitak u očima jednog srpskog studenta kojeg sam upoznala u Beogradu, kad mi je govorio kako opsesivno glanca svoj par **Nike** tenisica, nadajući se da će mu tako potrajati nekoliko godina.]

02 | The New York
Times, 27/08/2000.
[REDAKCIJSKI ZAŠTITNI Štampani na 100% recikliranom papiru]

Nova filozofija brand makera je da oni više i ne pokušavaju zakonski sprečavati kradu i kopiranje njihovih logoa u Trećem svijetu. Ako turski proizvođač napravi kopiju njihovih tenisica, **Nike** ga neće tužiti za kršenje *copyrighta*. Kako je **Nike** prvenstveno zainteresiran za diseminaciju svog logoa, kopiranje proizvoda doživljava kao još jednu marketinšku kampanju. Još jedna dobro poznata strategija u stvaranju 'ovisnosti' o robi jest da **Nike** i slične etikete vole višak svojih proizvoda ubacivati u najsiročije četvrti, poput njutorškog Bronx-a, i tako održavati privlačnost svojih proizvoda za mlade potrošače.⁰³

Ako sam prethodno rekla da je želja povezana sa zabranom, da li činjenica da neke kompanije danas besplatno dijele svoje proizvode ubija želju? Paradoksalan odgovor je ne, jer se današnji hiperkapitalizam umnogome oslanja na drugi tip identifikacije koji nije u vezi samo s prodajom roba, nego s posebnim imaginarnim koje je povezano s načinom na koji ljudi doživljavaju svoj identitet.

U tom kontekstu, maloprije spomenut osjećaj neadekvatnosti igra važnu ulogu u načinu na koji marketing danas djeluje. No, problem nije u tome da mediji nude ljudima neke slike uspjeha i ljepote s kojima bi se trebalo poistovjetiti ali kako se ovi ne mogu primaknuti tim idealima, to se osjećaju neadekvatnima. Već neko vrijeme modna ideologija uvjerava potrošače da ne bi trebali slušati moderne savjete i pokušavati od sebe napraviti nekoga drugog, nego da prije trebaju u sebi potražiti i pronaći ono što je jedinstveno, te uz pomoć mode to samo naglasiti. Ta **Be your-self!** ideologija ipak subjektu nije donijela oslobođenje, nego je prije otvorila vrata novim stregnjama s kojima se marketing poigrava na paradoksalne načine. Zbog tog razloga stregnju kod subjekta ne izaziva neuspjeh u postajanju nekim drugim, nego prije činjenica da subjekt ne može biti niti samim sobom.

Prije nego pogledamo kako je stregnja prisutna u današnjoj potrošačkoj ideologiji, podsjetimo se prvo kako tržište funkcioniра u suvremenom društvu. Brojne studije nedavno su analizirale promjene u kapitalističkoj proizvodnji gdje umjesto materijalne proizvodnje najvažnije postaje prodavanje imidža [predstave, predodžbe, slike]. U toj novoj kulturi hiperkapitalizma ključno je da su opskrbljivači i korisnici zamijenili kupce i trgovce, tržišta ustupaju mjesto načinima umrežavanja, a posjedovanje je zamijenjeno pravom pristupa. Ekonomija manje ovisi o pojedinačnoj tržišnoj razmjeni roba, a više o uspostavljanju dugoročnih komercijalnih odnosa. Kako su troškovi proizvodnje danas minimalni a tržište prezasićeno robama, kompanije često odlučuju besplatno dijeliti proizvode nadajući se da će tako uspostaviti dugoročni odnos sa svojim klijentima.

Najvažnije je uspostaviti takav odnos s mušterijom u kojem će se postati njezinim doživotnim opskrbljivačem. Proizvođači stoga najviše energije ulažu u razvijanje odnosa povjerenja sa svojim strankama i pokušavaju dokučiti kakve bi njihove buduće želje mogle biti, a da potrošači i ne znaju da im te željene stvari uopće trebaju. Primjer za to može biti proizvođač pelena koji pruža uslugu kućne dostave svojih proizvoda te uskoro nakon što roditelji dobiju prvu isporuku pele-

[U redu, možemo zamisliti da će proizvođač u jednom trenutku također ponuditi i besplatne psihoanalitičke savjete o odgoju djece.]

Pored izgradnje povjerenja, proizvođači danas više nego bilo što pokušavaju prodati imidž ili još bolje *lifestyle*. Uzmimo primjer takozvanih dizajnerskih kava [designer coffees] kakve se prodaju u **Starbucks** ili **Coffee Republic**. Na tim mjestima ne prodaje se naprosto kava nego posebna vrst ikustva: lijepo dizajnirana mjesta koja nude ugodnu domaću atmosferu s politički korektnim intelektualnim štihom. Tu dobivamo ekološke informacije o tome kako se njihove kave proizvode, pa čak i objašnjenja kako kupujući te njihove [skupe] kave pomažemo siromašne ljude u Kolumbiji. S jedne strane potrošačima takvih skupih kava nudi se simbolički prostor u kojem sami sebi izgledaju dopadljivima, dok s druge strane dobivaju zaštitu od izvanjskog svijeta - posebno od siromašnih ljudi.⁰⁴

Današnje hiperkapitalističko društvo pravi dugoročan prijelaz iz industrijske u kulturnalnu proizvodnju, u kojoj su od roba i usluga važnija kulturna ikustva.

Jeremy Rifkin u svojoj knjizi **The Age of Access** ističe da ulazimo u tzv. svijet "ekonomije ikustava" u kojoj život svake osobe postaje komercijalnim tržištem: "globalna putovanja i turizam, tematski gradovi i zabavni parkovi, zabavni centri, zdrav život, moda i kuhinja, profesionalni sportovi i igre, kocka, muzika, film, televizija, virtualni svijet cyberspacea i elektronički posredovana zabava svake vrste brzo postaju središtem novog hiperkapitalizma koji trguje pristupom kulturnom ikustvu."⁰⁵

U tom kontekstu biznismeni nagadaju o "životnoj vrijednosti svojih klijenata, pokušavajući procijeniti koliko subjekt vrijedi u bilo kojem trenutku svog života. I ekonomisti govore o promjeni koja se zbila od komodifikacije prostora i materijala u komodifikaciju ljudskog vremena i trajanja. Predviđa se da će u budućnosti skoro sve biti ikustvo za koje će se plaćati i u kojem će tradicionalne uzajamne obaveze i očekivanja - nekoć posredovani osjećajima vjere, suošjećanja i solidarnosti - biti zamijenjeni ugovornim odnosima u obliku plaćenog članstva, preplate, ulaznina i trošarina, naknada i honorara. Hipoteza je da će u novoj eri i samo ljudsko postojanje biti podijeljeno u male komercijalne segmente, jer će životi ljudi biti modelirani prema filmovima tako da će "životno ikustvo svakog potrošača biti komodificirano i transformirano u beskonačnu seriju teatarskih trenutaka, dramatičnih događaja i osobnih preobražaja." [str. 29]

Rifkin sumira te nove trendove ističući: "U novoj mrežnoj ekonomiji zapravo će se prodavati ideje i slike. Fizičko utjelovljenje tih ideja i slika sve više postaje od drugorazredne važnosti za ekonomski proces. Ako se industrijsko tržište odlikovalo razmjenom stvari, mrežna ekonomija se odlikuje pristupom pojmovima koji se pojavljuju u fizičkim oblicima."⁰⁶

04 | Nedavno su takva mesta doživjela pravi prorvat u Japanu. Njihovi posjetitelji objašnjavaju da su u prošlosti nakon posla često odlazili u barove i čajane kako bi izbjegli odlazak doma, ali danas odlaze u **Starbucks** jer se tamo osjećaju doma. Naravno, taj lažni dom je spokojna oaza bez djece koja vršite na jedno uho i žene koja zvoca na drugo.

05 | **Jeremy Rifkin**,
The Age of Access,
str.7

06 | Ibid., str. 29

Primjer toga može biti **Nike** - kompanija koja istinski prodaje samo imidž. **Nike** nema tvornice, strojeve ili opremu, samo široku mrežu dobavljača, takozvanih proizvodnih partnera. **Nike** je samo istraživački i dizajnerski studio sa sofisticiranim marketinškom formulom i sistemom distribucije.

Druga važna stvar je da ako je u industrijskom društvu važna bila kvantiteta roba, u postindustrijskom društvu je to zamjenila kvaliteta života. Zato više ne moramo toliko kupovati robe, koliko im imati pristup [putem iznajmljivanja, franšiza itd.]. Kao da kapitalizam gubi svoje materijalne korijene i postaje temporalnom stvari koja je povezana s činjenicom da klijenti više i ne trebaju predmete koliko samo njihove funkcije. U tom kontekstu, stranka postaje klijentom i partnerom koji traži pozornost, ekspertizu i ponajviše iskustvo. [Zanimljivo je da i psihoanaliza sve više riječ 'pacijent' zamjenjuje s 'klijent'. Možemo se zapitati i da li neki klijenti vide psihoanalizu kao neko novo iskustvo koje žele kupiti.]

Još jedan ključan element u našem novom društvu je novo poimanje zajednice. Kompanije otud očajnički pokušavaju oformiti zajednice sa svojim klijentima. U priručnicima kompanija tako se može pročitati o četiri stadija odnosa s klijentima: prvo je takozvano "**awareness bonding**", koje potrošača čini svjesnim novog proizvoda ili usluge; drugo je "**identity bonding**" kada se potrošač počinje na poseban način poistovjećivati s nekom etiketom; treće je "**relationship bonding**" kada potrošač uspostavlja posebnu privrženost toj etiketi, i četvrto je "**community bonding**" kada proizvođač održava potrošače zadovoljnima, organizirajući posebne događaje ili okupljanja ili barem šaljući potrošačima rođendanske čestitke.

Posebna je marketinška strategija, koju također upotrebljavaju neke marke casual odjeće, iluzija jednakosti koja pomaže u maskiranju klasne podjele u današnjem svijetu. U trgovinama kao što je **Gap** siromašni ljudi kupuju kako bi izgledali poput pripadnika srednje klase, a bogati kako se ne bi razmetali svojom odjećom. Takve etikete također ublažavaju rodnu razliku u odijevanju, što mijenja stare podjele u tome što muškarci i žene preferiraju pri odabiru svoje odjeće. Kako ističe **Darian Leader**, žene obično traže odjeću kakvu nema nitko drugi, dok muškarci kupuju ono što nose svi.

Ukratko, svjedočimo preobrazbi u prirodi trgovine od prodaje stvari do prodaje slike i stvaranja zajednica. Ideja koja stoji iza te promjene jest da ljudi više od svega žele izgledati dopadljivi drugima i sebi te da veoma snažno žele 'pripadati'. A kako su stare vrste zajednica [obitelji, kulturne skupine] u stalnom padu, ljudi kroz postajanje pretplatnicima, članovima i klijentima dobivaju pristup novim vrstama zajednice. Ipak, iza ovog pokušaja da se stvore nove zajednice stoji doživljaj da sveukupnost životnog iskustva treba biti preobražena u komercijalnu vrijednost. Kao da je sam ljudski život postao ultimativnim komercijalnim proizvodom. Stižu i upozorenja da kada svaki aspekt naših bića postane djelatnošću za koju ćemo morati plaćati, tada će komercijalna sfera postati konačnim arbitrom naše osobne i kolektivne egzistencije.

Uvedemo li ovdje lakanovski koncept velikog Drugog, možemo reći da ova potraga za zajednicom može biti shvaćena kao potraga za novim velikim Drugim i da kompanije igraju upravo na tu subjektovu potrebu za doživljajem koherent-

nog simboličkog poretka. No što u toj novoj igri sa slikama i poimanjima zajednice zapravo izaziva strepnju? Strepnju se može shvatiti kao signal u Ja, tj. kao feno-men koji se pojavljuje na rubu imaginarnog polja koje čini Ja. **Freud** je smatrao Ja za projekciju površine, za trenutačni doživljaj posredstvom kojeg subjekt zna da je koherentan i da ima identitet. Strepnja se često pojavljuje kada je Ja ugrožen u svome doživljaju koherencnosti, tj. kada se subjekt odveć približi, primjerice, ne-kom užasnom objektu užitka [*jouissance*]. To može biti *unheimlich* fenomen, kao kada u zrcalu nenađano sretнемo svog dvojnika ili kada osjetimo da ne gleda subjekt sliku u zrcalu, nego da zapravo odraz iz zrcala promatra subjekt. Takvi trenuci su često doživljeni kao depersonalizacije. **Lacanova** poanta je da se subjekt osjeća depersonaliziran jer nešto u zrcalu izaziva strepnju te ne može biti ponuđeno prepoznavanju od strane Drugog, tj. simboličkog poretka. Taj trenutak strepnje može potaknuti subjekt da izrazi agresivnost spram zrcalne slike ili spram samog sebe. Tu opet vidimo da strepnju ne izaziva manjak, nego prije prisustvo objekta na mjestu gdje ničega ne bi trebalo biti, poput pojavljivanja dvojnika u zrcalu.

Što je u temelju tog užasa? Prvo trebamo primijetiti da subjektov suodnos s Drugim može biti traumatičan iz tri razloga: subjekt može imati probleme sa zahtjevom, željom ili užitkom Drugoga. Dok se pitanje želje Drugoga često formulira u pitanju "Što sam ja za Drugoga?", a trauma užitka Drugoga biva doživljena kao krađa našega vlastitog užitka, problem što ga subjekt ima prema zahtjevu Drugoga počiva na drukčkoj logici. Kako subjekt često želi da mu Drugi uputi zahtjev, užas nastupa upravo kada do toga ne dode, kada zahtjev izostane. To se događa, recimo, u psihoanalitičkoj situaciji kada subjekt biva uzneniren izostankom analitičarevih zahtjeva. Problem s društvom 's previše izbora' jest što zahtjeva kao da je sve manje i manje. Imamo dojam da smo sada slobodni od svih stega u stvaranju slika u kojima se želimo vidjeti i tako približiti užitku za koji osjećamo da će nam pružiti zadovoljenje, pa ipak svejedno neminovno ne uspijevamo u ovom pokušaju. *Jouissance* je nešto što nam je fundamentalno tuđe [tj. mi ga ne izabiremo na 'racionalan' način], zbog čega kada pokušavamo biti nama samima često nailazimo na ono što je najtraumatičnije i najužasnije.

STREPNJA MOĆI ★

Problem je s teorijama koje tvrde da danas živimo u jednom obliku kulturnalnog kapitalizma to što one kao da previđaju kako se materijalna proizvodnja i dalje odvija, često skrivena u zemljama Trećeg svijeta. Dakle, Amerikanci mogu smatrati da je sve što danas rade umrežavanje u virtualnoj realnosti i iznajmljivanje umjesto kupovanja, dok je većina proizvoda koje svakodnevno koriste proizvedena u Kini ili rukama nevidljivih useljenika-radnika po njujorškim *sweatshopovima*. No radnici ponekad postanu vidljivima uključujući se u imaginarno: novi tip kapitalizma ih predstavlja kao neku vrstu dekorativnih umjetnina koje jamče autentičnost. To se primjerice događa u skupim restoranima koji obično imaju otvorene kuhinje kako bi njihovi slabo plaćeni radnici bili izloženi pogledu gostiju. Tu dekoraciju mogli bismo uzeti za dokaz da se jela uistinu pripremaju u restoranu, nasuprot teorijama



zavjere kakve, primjerice, kruže oko kineskih restorana u Parizu, prema kojima se jela pripremaju u džinovskim podzemnim kuhinjama i kada naručimo jelo u malenom, navodno autentičnom restoranu, njihov kuhar samo podgrije prethodno pripremljeno jelo ili ga donosi iz zajedničke podzemne kuhinje. Ipak, tu potrebu da se radnike izloži kao dekorativne predmete možemo protumačiti i kao poseban način izlaženja na kraj s klasnim strepnjama danas.

U suvremenom društvu kao da je na djelu općenita potreba za stvaranjem predstave da je život dobar bez obzira što se ljudi mogu brinuti zbog svog življenja, posebno zbog nesigurnosti kojima su izloženi na poslu. Jedan od načina da se uhvatimo s tom nesigurnošću jest pokazivanje užasa siromaštva na način koji se doima mnogo manje prijetećim po srednju klasu. Nedavno je objavljen znakovit broj knjiga u kojima pisci iz srednje klase odlučuju neko vrijeme živjeti kao siromašni radnici kako bi potom u svojim knjigama opisali život radničke klase.

Ben Cheever se u svojim memoarima pisca koji je postao slabo plaćenim prodavačem sjeća obuke u trgovini elektronske opreme, prilikom koje je nastavnik upitao budućeg trgovca: "Čega se ljudi boje više nego smrti?" "Govoriti u javnosti", odgovorio je **Cheever**. To je bilo posve krivo, jer kako ga je učitelj podsjetio, Amerikanci najviše strahuju od mogućnosti da izgube posao.

Ako smo u prošlosti pokušavali uspokojiti naše strahove od smrti nastojeći dokučiti kako izgledaju smrt i umiranje [ovdje će dostajati da se prisjetimo umjetnika koji snimaju umiranje ili u svojim djelima koriste prave mrtvace], danas se isti



pristup koristi glede straha od siromaštva. Kad je riječ o smrti, danas zamišljamo da ćemo uz pomoć novih tehnologija moći odgoditi umiranje, a glede siromaštva lijek se sastoji u prikazivanju siromaštva kao nečega dalekog i bezopasnog po srednju klasu.

Još u prošlom desetljeću prvenstveno se niža klasa bojala za svoje poslove [ili je bila stalno nezaposlena], a danas ista vrst nesigurnosti dotiče srednju klasu. Njezini pripadnici ne samo da svakodnevno strahuju da će ostati bez posla, sa sve većom neizvjesnošću mirovine, nego više ne vjeruju niti u moguću sigurnost u staroj dobi. Za srednju je klasu tako jedan od načina da se uhvate te nesigurnosti promatranje života siromašnih kako bi se došlo do zaključka: "To nisam ja! Meni je daleko bolje nego njima!" Opće je poznato da kada je netko loše, sretan je što iz primjera drugih vidi kako mu može biti i gore. Spisateljica **Fran Abrams** tako svoju knjigu **Below the Breadline** počinje umirujućim uvjerenjem: "Reći ću vam nešto o onima koji su gotovo pa siromašni. Oni se, da izvrnem citat **F. Scotta Fitzgeralda**, razlikuju od vas i mene. Blagi su gdje smo mi kruti, cinični gdje smo mi puni povjerenja, na način koji će vam, ako niste rođeni siromašni, biti teško shvatiti. Oni, duboko u svojim srcima, misle da su manji u odnosu na nas. Čak i kada dopru duboko u naš svijet, oni još uvijek misle da su nešto manje u odnosu na nas. Oni su različiti."⁰⁷

No jesu li oni uistinu toliko različiti ili to samo srednja

07 | **Fran Abrams**,
*Below the
Breadline: Living on
the Minimum Wage*,
LONDON, PROFILE
BOOKS, 2002, str.1.

klasa želi nastaviti vjerovati u to kako bi sačuvala vlastiti osjećaj sigurnosti spram užasa življenja siromašnih? Sama **Abramsova** zaključuje da mnogi iz niže klase zapravo žele "plivati glavnom strujom, živjeti iste živote, imati iste standarde poput svojih bolje plaćenih susjeda. Nažalost, mnogi od njih su se našli gurnuti prema moćvarnim obalama društva, nesposobni da do u beskraj nastave ploviti. ... Odluče li se da ne prosvjetedu zbog toga, da čvrsto stegnu zube i samo nastave veslati, obično imaju svoje razloge. Razloge rodene iz životnog iskustva koje im govori da će ljuljanje čamca samo dovesti do prevrtanja."⁰⁸

Dok je nedvojbeno istina da niža klasa dosad nije ljljala čamac kapitalizma, čudno je da knjiga o njihovom životu tvrdi kako niža klasa nastavlja izražavati riješenost, čvrstu postojanost i "bezmalо nevjerljatan optimizam i *joie de vivre*". U doba kada je optimizam visoko na cijeni, čini se da je neophodno da srednja klasa sačuva svoj optimizam da neće biti pauperizirana [premda kretanja na tržištu ne daju razloga za tu sigurnost], dok je također važno održati iluziju da i niža klasa ostaje optimistična usprkos sve većoj marginalizaciji.

Dok sve knjige o siromaštvu jasno tvrde da ne žele izazvati revoluciju, one također ustrajavaju da su njihova istraživanja htjela pokazati dostojanstvenost života siromašnih. One žele prikazati ne samo njihovo siromaštv, nego i način kako se ti ljudi s njim dostojanstveno nose. No, nije li dostojanstveno ovdje istoznačno s nijemo, bezglasno? **Ben Cheever** otvoreno priznaje da u svojoj knjizi on zapravo i ne priča o siromašnima koje je sreo na svom putu u svijet niže klase. Njegovim riječima: "Najveći je neuspjeh ove knjige da se prometnula u tako osobnu priču. Ja sam lik o kojemu najviše pričam. Tako ispada da sam ja jedini lik koji je bitan. Molim vas, znajte da ne mislim tako. Ja prodajem **Bena Cheevera**. Ne zato jer je on najbolji proizvod. Prodajem **Bena Cheevera** zato jer je on sve što imam. Ne bi bilo pošteno - ili zakonski preporučljivo - razotkrivati tudi život kao svoj vlastiti. Umjesto toga, morao sam razotkriti sam svoj život, kao da je svačiji."⁰⁹

Kakva je, dakle, logika te potrage za tajnom kako ljudi stvarno žive? Na prvi pogled, današnji virtualni svijet kao da zahtijeva neku vrstu zbilje. Moja teorija u knjizi **[Per]versions of Love and Hate** bila je da ljudi danas tragaju za nečim što je s onu stranu imaginarnih simulacija koje dominiraju našim doživljajem svijeta. No, danas mislim da trebamo uzeti u obzir da je odgovor na tu prekomjeru virtualizaciju svijeta bila još veća virtualizacija. Pogledajmo takozvane *reality shows* na televiziji. Prvo objašnjenje bi moglo biti da ljudi kojima je virtualno dojedilo žele vidjeti nešto 'stvarno' i da je televizijsko tržište naprosto igralo na kartu te želje proizvodeći *reality shows* poput **Big Brother**, **Survivor** itd. Ipak, ti programi nam ne daju nekakvu sirovu realnost svakodnevnog življjenja. Da, istina je da u tim programima nemamo plaćene glumice, ali amateri koji se pojavljuju u njima svejedno glume. Ne pokušavajući se prilagoditi nekoj propisanoj ulozi, oni zapravo glume sami sebe: stvaraju stanovitu sliku, osobu za koju smatraju da će biti zanimljiva

publici i kakvu su možda prethodno vidjeli na televiziji.

Što se dogodi kada jednu virtualnost nadopunimo drugom? Paradoksalni bi odgovor bio da upravo ta nadopuna potiče strepnju. Vratimo se čuvenoj **Lacanovoj** tvrd-

08 | Ibid., str.7

09 | Str. xviii-xix

nji da "strepnja nije signal manjka, nego odsustvo potpore koju taj manjak pruža." **Lacan** to demonstrira na primjeru djeteta kod kojeg strepnju ne izaziva odsustvo majke, nego prije to što mu je ona stalno za vratom. U tom kontekstu, ono što užasava nije gubitak objekata, nego to da objekata ne manjka. Vratimo li se primjeru "reality televizije", možemo reći da premda prekomjerno prisustvo kamere pokušava uhvatiti neuspjehe, slučajnosti i spontanost svakodnevnog života, ono zapravo rezultira stvaranjem još jednog spektakla. "Reality televizija" pokušala je otkriti tajnu svakodnevnih odnosa među ljudima, ali je zapravo tajnu tih odnosa samo prikrlila. Mogli bismo reći da je tajna svakodnevnog života sama njegova dosada, njegova nedogađajnost ili nepredvidljivost i slučajnost događanja. Premda se "reality televizija" pokušava približiti toj tajni, ona je zapravo zatire. Umjesto dosade, dobili smo sudionike koji se prekomjerno upinju biti zanimljivi te se zato upuštaju u naporne vježbe, priče o samopomoći, kulturu lažnih plemenskih običaja itd.

Dakle u ovom nadopunjavanju jedne virtualnosti drugom, koja se predstavlja kao nešto stvarno, ono što izaziva strepnju nije ideja da se Veliki Brat [kontrolirajuća instanca iz **Orwellova** romana] materijalizira, nego prije manjak manjka - tj. to da nema mjesta za nekonzistentnost, necjelovitost. Pogrešno je zaključiti da programi poput **Big Brother** napravio pokazuju kako je naš današnji svijet bezostatno kontroliran, kako više nemamo privatnosti jer nas sve vrijeme netko promatra itd. Problem, dakle, nije ova prekomjerna vidljivost, nego prije pomanjkanje kontingencije. Zato kada u našem virtualnom svijetu tragamo za tajnom iza virtualnosti tako što snimamo realnost, mi negiramo samu nekonzistentnost koja odlikuje realnost - tj. pokušavamo se riješiti upravo onog manjka koji obilježava društveno. Kontingencija se može doimati užasnom, ali ono što na koncu proizvodi strepnju jest nastojanje da se te kontingencije riješimo.

Ali kako se riješiti strepnje? Ideologija **Just do it!** u našoj kulturi savjetovanja potakla je proizvodnju priručnika **How to do it.** Najapsurdniji primjer toga su recentne rasprave o tome kako pojednostaviti naše živote. U Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama sve veći broj ljudi odlučuje prekinuti utrku za novcem i potrošačkim dobrima i počinje živjeti štedljivo, jednostavno i povućeno. No kako bismo pojednostavili naše živote, prvo trebamo kupiti bezbrojne priručnike koji će nas naučiti kako da to učinimo. Stoga se razvija čitava industrija koja uči potrošače kako da ne budu potrošači i naravno mnogo zarađuje iz tih novih trendova.

Na drugom nivou nailazimo na odbijanje da se suočimo s kontingenjom u današnjem odgoju djece. Iz psihanalize znamo da bez obzira koje smjernice pokušavali pratiti, ne možemo predvidjeti kakav će učinak naše roditeljstvo imati na našu djecu, jer nikad ne možemo kontrolirati način kako nesvesno ulazi u igru, intervenirajući u naše planirano ponašanje. Čak i ako slijedimo neki kulturno propisani tip ponašanja u odnosu prema djeci, ne možemo poništiti kontingentnost njegova učinka na dijete. U današnjem društvu prepunom savjeta, gdje više nemamo starih odnosa s autoritetima, također nemamo stari tip savjeta o odgoju djece kakav se prije prenosio s jedne generacije na sljedeću. Knjiga **Paranoid parenting** lucidno primjećuje da današnji roditelji pri traženju savjeta više ne dobivaju odgovore što raditi s djetetom. Kada pogledaju u knjige ili na Internet, obično dobiju samo savjet gdje mogu naći još više savjeta: linkove na više knjiga, više web stranica, više terapeuta itd.

Neprestana priča o novom dobu strepnje izazvala je dojam da je strepnja nešto čega se moramo riješiti ili što barem trebamo držati pod kontrolom. Predstava strepnje u popularnim medijima ostavlja dojam da je strepnja ultimativna prepreka za boljšetak subjekta. Strepnju se vidi kao nešto što subjektu ne dozvoljava da postigne puno zadovoljenje u svom životu te zato treba biti minimizirano u najvećoj mogućoj mjeri. Posljednjih godina mediji su se posebno usredotočili na prevladavanje takozvane društvene strepnje koju subjekt osjeća na javnim mjestima. Proizvođači lijeka za strepnju *Paxil*, primjerice, pokrenuli su veliku medijsku kampanju o tome kako je upravo društvena strepnja ono što ljudi sprečava da postignu uspjeh na poslu i u privatnom životu. Televizijske i novinske reklame za *Paxil* prikazivale su dvije slike čovjeka koji sjedi za stolom, okružen ljudima. Na prvoj slici čovjek je u ludačkoj košulji, u njega je uperenovo svjetlo kao na policijskom ispitivanju, a ljudi oko njega imaju ozbiljna, prijeteća lica. No, druga slika isti prizor prikazuje u drukčijem svjetlu: ljudi izgledaju prijateljski, nema policijske rasvjete i čovjek spokojno sjedi za stolom. Iznad prve slike stoji natpis "Ovako izgleda", a iznad druge "Ovako jest." Tekst iznad slika objašnjava da mnogobrojni ljudi danas pate od društvene strepnje, što ih sprečava da uspiju u životu, no, evo, sad je lako riješiti se tog poremećaja uz pomoć *Paxila*. [Sitnim slovima su, naravno, pobrojane mnogobrojne nuspojave izazvane uporabom lijeka, no konačna poruka je da čak i po cijenu neke od tih neželjenih popratnih pojava vrijedi riskirati, jer je društvena strepnja daleko veća nevolja.] Reklama, dakle, poručuje da strepnja radikalno mijenja subjektov doživljaj realnosti, te da pod utjecajem strepnje subjekt stvara fantazmu koja realnost mijenja u nešto opasno po subjekt.

Doživljaj da subjekt pod utjecajem strepnje radikalno izobličava realnost i vidi je više prijetećom no što ona uistinu jest, iz temelja je uzdrman napadom 11. rujna. U vrijeme napada činilo se da se zajednički doživljaj realnosti i fantazme iskrivilo na mnogo načina. Kao rezultat tog iskriviljenja proizvodači lijekova protiv strepnje odlučili su u reklamiranju primijeniti novu strategiju.

Paxil je tako lansirao novu televizijsku reklamu koju je snimila poznata autorica dokumentarnih filmova **Barbara Koppel**, u kojoj stvarni ljudi, korisnici *Paxila*, govore o svojoj borbi s općim poremećajem strepnje te o tome kako im je lijek pomogao. Sada reklama više ne ostavlja dojam kako subjekti koji pate od strepnje imaju izobličen osjećaj realnosti. Posve suprotno, njihov osjećaj za realnost je zbiljski, no ipak ta realnost izgleda turobna i depresivna, dok nakon uzimanja *Paxila* njihov doživljaj realnosti postaje ushićenim i sretnim. Poruka je reklamne kampanje da problem nije u tome što subjekt konstruira neistinitu sliku realnosti [tj. da je naša realnost depresivna, okrutna, prijeteća] - ona sada i može biti zbiljski depresivna i gruba, ali će je uz pomoć *Paxila* subjekt vidjeti novim očima - turobne crno-bijele slike iznenada dobivaju boju, uznemirujuća buka ulice promeće se u umirujuću glazbu, a subjekt koji je bio uznemiren iznenada postaje smiren i opušten.

Dojam da je život neveseo, ali da se u njemu svejedno može naći užitak, također je dio nove reklame za *Coca-Cola* nazvane **Life tastes good!**, koja na poseban način slavi uspjeh u neuspjehu. U TV spotu vidimo unuka koji dolazi u posjet djedu koji ga pita kako stoji sa školom. Mladić odgovara da je uzeo godinu dana slobodno od studija. Tada ga djed pita za zadnju djevojku, na što ovaj odgovara da već ima novu. Unuk tada pita djeda kako je baka, na što mu ovaj odgovara da se preselila kod prijatelja iz bridž-kluba. Tada si dvojica muškaraca nazdravljaju s *Coca-Colom*, a nas se podsjeća da je 'život dobrog okusa'.

Ova reklama umnogome oslikava realnost današnjeg obiteljskog života gdje je stabilnost odnosa stvar prošlosti. Stvari su se promijenile kako za mlade, tako i za stare. No, ono što se nekoć smatralo za neuspjeh [izostanak iz škole, raskid međuljudskih odnosa], sada reklama prikazuje naprsto kao promjenu i podsjeća nas kako je bez obzira na sve život ipak dobar.

Suvremena potrošačka ideologija neprestano nas uvjerava da je subjekt umjetničko djelo, da 'bivanje' otvara put za 'postajanje' i da je novo sebstvo jedna beskrajna priča koja se stalno nadopunjuje i mijenja. Na sličan način, korporacije se danas bore za kontinuitet i otud snažno žele stvoriti odredene slike o sebi koje će ostati za budućnost. I pojedinci i korporacije tako snažno žele postići neku vrstu besmrtnosti. Za **Freuda**, strepna se u konačnici uvijek dotiče užasa od smrti. U tom kontekstu, strepna od previše izbora i 'tiraniye slobode' povezana je s činjenicom da između svih izbora koje navodno pravimo danas, nemamo slobode birati kada je u pitanju smrt. Ipak, prisjetimo se na ovom mjestu čuvene **Kierkegaard-dove** izreke da je za ljude od smrti daleko užasnija mogućnost besmrtnosti. ●

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More than ever, one should bear in mind Walter Benjamin's reminder that it is not enough to ask how a certain **theory** [or art] declares itself to stay with regard to **social struggles** - one should also ask how it effectively functions IN these very struggles. In sex, the effectively hegemonic attitude is not patriarchal repression, but free promiscuity; in art, provocations in the style of the notorious 'Sensation' exhibitions ARE the norm, the example of the art fully integrated into the establishment.

[Slavoj ŽIŽEK: Repeating Lenin]

This is indeed the very meaning of the **commodity as a form**, to obliterate the signs of work on the product in order to make it easier for us to forget the **class structure** which is its organizational framework. It would indeed be surprising if such an occultation of work did not leave its mark upon artistic production as well, both in the form and in the content...

[Fredric JAMESON,
Marxism & Form]

**they say the working class is dead,
we're all consumers now...**

[Robert Wyatt, The Age of Self]



INSIDE THE CAPITALIST FRAME -
- POSSIBILITY, ART AND DEMOCRATIC DEVIANCE
CHARLES ESCHE

➤ If we want to talk about capitalism, especially its current global variety, we need to be precise. It is necessary to distinguish variations and gaps in global capitalism, just as we have to distinguish different levels within the capitalist system in general. Without such distinctions, even the suggestion of using art to probe its internal workings becomes overwhelming and ultimately affirmative. However, once we see that not all capitalism is global nor is it always the version we have presented to us as the current salvation of poor and rich states alike, we can start to find gaps and exceptions that permit other forms of exchange, both human and capital, to emerge.


Defenders of global capitalism would claim that the 'creative destruction' inherent in the economic model is necessary for the material benefits it eventually delivers. Thus, everything in the global version of capitalism that might seem negative or anti-emancipatory - from the slaughter in Bhopal to the deceit of ENRON - is simply a necessary if unfortunate bump on the no alternative one-way street of growth. It is this appearance of inevitability that is so disabling of the individual critical imagination to think the future differently. The current version of capitalism presents itself to us as more akin to an eternal force of nature than as a product of particular social and individual choices, or as a moment of human history amongst so many others. The powerless and sense of inertia this produces extends to current political parties with their competitive battles reduced largely to their relative economic managerial competence of the given system. In the cultural field, where we might fondly expect imagination to still hold some sway, it also seemed that much of the nineties was spent trying to make the system work for the individual artist rather than questioning the system itself.

Žižek has labelled this condition a '*Denkverbot*', denying us the possibility even to think beyond the paradigm of parliamentary free market democracy. The question for him, probably for all of us who are not seduced by the limited offer of endless conspicuous consumption, is how to induce thoughts and actions that are currently forbidden. To propose that small-scale, local engaged, independent cultural initiatives and artists projects as a part of the way out might seem to privilege an activity that is marginalised by capitalism and is anyway a part of the

system. Yet that status is, I want to suggest, the very reason that the micro-cultures of art and the exchanges between them, maybe its very sites for possibility to emerge. Critical projects of this kind have been emerging broadly since the mid-1990s and have sought ways to question current conditions neither through overt oppositional critique like the anti-globalist protestors, nor through the exploration of visual metaphor in the tradition of classical art. Instead, these projects are interested in working through the tangible 'play' with the mechanisms of capitalist production and social exchange. In this short text it is difficult to name more than a few, but at least let's remember **Dan Peterman**'s now lost building in Chicago; **Rick Lowe**'s *Project Row Houses*; **Oda Projesi** in Istanbul; **Superflex** and their local network of web TV Superchannels; **Mulyono**'s projects in small kampungs in Java or **Aleksandar Battista Ilić** and **Ivana Keser**'s *Community Art* in Zagreb amongst others. All these projects are engaged with the specifics of their locality and with individual social actors within them, they propose changes in social and economic relations through actual intervention and open exchange, they are 'modest proposals' for thinking things otherwise. Crucially, they are not carried out in the theatrical spirit of 'relational aesthetics' but in the messy, always already complicit territory of long term cultural action.

As a result, the practice of art in this way starts to create the potential for the art field in general to become the questioning, open, permissive and imaginative space for social and economic experimentation that we lack elsewhere. Of course, the artists, the public institutions and the self-made artists spaces that produce and promote this work are all necessarily located within the economic hegemony of capitalism. They are always already compromised but that compromised position is precisely their advantage. The projects can act as 'engaged autonomous' elements within capitalism, totally inside the system and yet, through their association with the tolerated cultural enclosure called 'art', able to act according to different rules. Afterall, to many 'hard headed' entrepreneurs, art projects are meant to lose money, to be profligate or to behave without economic rationality. Through these projects and through changes to institutional ambition, art can be enabled to discuss the gaps between real existing global capitalism and desires for things other than consumption. Tests and experiments within the field of capitalist exchange can be fenced off from its more rapacious financial demands and such projects can become, in **Superflex**'s terms, tools for other ways of thinking and relating to each other. This position of 'a foot in both camps' is probably only possible now, in a situation of totalising end-of-history capitalism, when there is no outside and no absolute autonomy from economic conditions. I intend these terms 'modest proposal' and 'engaged autonomy' also to be antidotes to the utopian tendency of art. Utopias are dangerous in many ways, not only if they are made real but even their proposal seems too often to lead to a kind of lazy disinvestments in the existing situation. For a utopian, hope is always elsewhere and much can therefore be excused in

THE ILLUSTRATED CAPITAL



Jean-Baptiste Ganne: *Ilustrirani Kapital* [skica]/*The Illustrated Capital* [The Sketch], 2000

the present. The modesty of the proposal saves it from too grandiose a claim either to universality or large scale application. Art as a 'modest proposal' remains on the scale of the individual or small group both in terms of production and presentation. Possibility is made manifest and these modest proposals for collective action suggest ways to be different than we currently are. At least that, as I said, is the optimistic picture that I would like to see.

This term possibility seems a vital one to use in relation to such thoughts. The challenge it represents is much more to the art institution than to the individual artist. It is the concept of creating possibility for the artist, for the audience and perhaps also for the city and citizens where we are based that drives my ideas. Possibility is, in these terms, simply a condition of thinking differently or imagining things otherwise than they are. Within the totalizing structure of global capitalism, such thinking, as well as project making, has to be done from within the existing structures, there being no outside from which to gain an overview. We have to use the material, the tools and the language at hand in ways that are both meaningful and resistant to instant comprehension. Therefore creating possibility is not a fixed point of view but a slippery and changeable condition made of spatial, temporal and relational elements. In other words, for possibility to emerge there needs to be a site, a moment and a group of people - material that is obligingly in the hands of public art institutions as much as any other gathering place.

I'd like to suggest then that the space for the generation of such possibility is now more than ever in the hands of cultural institutions. The vacuum created by the increasing inflexibility or marginalisation familiar sites for such rethinking such as politics, religion or the nation-state itself, leave the field open. The fact that no effective global institutions in the political field are even on the table as appalling, but that fact provides an necessary opportunity, probably a responsibility, on art institutions to think beyond national cultural politics and set out their own 'cosmopolitan' stall. Let us imagine [and therefore partly create] that the space for synthesis is visual art and its institutions as oases of 'engaged autonomous' generalism in a world of increasing affirmation and specialism. Even if this situation may be temporary and might simply be a way in which capitalism can fix its internal contradictions, it is not a reason to refuse to make use of it for investigative ends. The question then is how far can the field of art be a test site for economic and social alternatives? How far can we press the protective shield that has accrued around art in free market capitalism? Can we sneak possibility in through the back door if, like **Ernst Bloch** says: 'there is a very clear interest that has prevented the world from being changed into the possible'.

The creation of possibility has also little in the way of precedents in the current climate. There are no obvious formulas to follow, although the frequent talk these days of laboratories and factories gives us the beginnings of certain kinds of models from science and industry. I am however, rather uncertain about these terms as they seem to exclude a position for a visiting public - both labs and factories being by definition private productive sites. To use the institution at its best, we need to balance the need for private experimentation with public discussion, especially as the forums for a generalised intervention are becoming less and less in the face of privatisation of space. Art and its institutions need to move in an opposite direction if they are to play an effective social role. So, I prefer then [at least provisionally] the centre of possibility or the possibility forum as a term for this institutional proposal.

In order to find some co-ordinates with which to figure how to determine the activities within such a site, we need to think in terms of shifting vectors of possibility around these spatial, temporary and relational [or where, why and for whom?] co-ordinates. As a start, I always return to an old quotation by **Vito Acconci** that I have used on many previous occasions. Asked by *Art Forum* in January 1980 to describe the developments of the coming decade he talked specifically about the art gallery:

'A gallery could [then] be thought of as a meeting place, a place where a community could be called to order, called to a particular purpose'

This statement reveals tellingly that the 'community' is created in the 'gallery' rather than the gallery addressing existing fixed groups. Here, the art institution becomes the reason for community and describes the process of its

coming-into-being as the responsibility of the gallery itself. What topics will be on the table when the call 'to order' is issued? What 'particular purpose' would bring people together? Its authoritarian ring is also mildly revolutionary, without the delivery of a concrete manifesto.

In opposition to such a statement, **Derrida** has recently been working on the concepts behind friendship and hospitality in relation to **Klossowski**'s earlier ideas. In his conversational book '*Of Hospitality*' he says simply of the subject itself:

'Let us say Yes to who or what turns up, before any determination, before any anticipation, before any identification, whether or not it has to do with a foreigner, an immigrant, an invited guest or an unexpected visitor; whether or not the new arrival is the citizen of another country, a human, animal or divine creature, a living or dead thing, male or female.'

Such radical openness to the other challenges the role of gatekeeper and judge so much part of art institutional practice. What would it be to be a 'hospitable institution' or to have 'curators of hospitality' in the museum? It may mean handing over decision-making, simply allowing the use of the space for 'who or what turns up'. It could even be liberating of the uptight notion of art world success or of 'art itself'. The institution has the potential to become a place defined by its constituent social actors rather than its management, a space, I would like to argue, of 'democratic deviance', where ideas that are indeed beyond Žižek's *Denkverbot* are publicly expressed. This is an undoubtedly extremely demanding agenda for a small and relatively weak institutional frame.

Yet, it might only be as such a space that an institution might even begin to imagine justifying new or continued public funding. Within the various forms of European socialism and social democracy, exhausted by years of unrelenting attack from the free market fundamentalists, there is little desire to continue to prop up the bastions of what are called 'elitist' cultural institutions. The withdrawal of funding may happen suddenly or gradually, but it is more than likely. In response, those committed to culture as a testing ground for the future are required to refashion our tools. The economic contribution argument will not work in the long term, because the social democratic state will simply privatisate culture and let it battle with other forms of consumer entertainment. It may be then, that only as identified and acknowledged spaces of 'democratic deviance' can cultural palaces be justified at all in the twenty first century, not least to the culturally active themselves. ●

UNUTAR KAPITALISTIČKOG OKVIRA -
- MOGUĆNOSTI, UMJETNOST & DEMOKRATSKE DEVIJACIJE
CHARLES ESCHE

➤ Govorimo li o kapitalizmu, osobito o njegovoj aktualnoj globalnoj inačici, i o umjetnosti, moramo biti precizni. Nužno je razlučivati varijante i nejednakosti globalnoga kapitalizma, jednako kao što moramo razlučivati različite razine u kapitalističkome sustavu općenito. Bez takvog razlučivanja nije moguće ni pomišljati na to da je pomoću umjetnosti moguće ispitati njegov unutrašnji ustroj. No kad shvatimo da sav kapitalizam nije globalan, te da nije uvjek nalik na verziju koju su nam predstavili, prema kojoj, naime, on predstavlja spas kako za siromašne, tako i za bogate države, možemo početi pronalaziti nejednakosti i iznimke koje omogućuju pojavu drugih oblika.

Branitelji globalnoga kapitalizma tvrde da je "kreativno razaranje", koje je sastavni dio toga gospodarskog modela, nužno za materijalni boljšitak koji će nakon njega uslijediti. Tako je sve što je u globalnoj verziji kapitalizma naizgled loše ili se protivi emancamaciji - od pomora u Bhopalu do **Enronove** prijevare - samo žalosno, ali nužno spoticanje u jedinoj mogućoj jednosmjernoj ulici napretka. Kulturnu kritiku koči baš taj dojam neizbjještosti, jer aktualnu inačicu kapitalizma prikazuje više kao prirodnu silu ili trenutak u ljudskoj povijesti, jedan od tolikih, nego kao proizvod konkret-

nih društvenih i pojedinačnih odluka. Osjećaj nemoći i inercije koji se zbog toga javlja proširio se i na današnje političke stranke, čija se međusobna borba uvelike svodi na odmjeravanje gospodarskih menadžerskih sposobnosti. Na području likovne umjetnosti velik dio devedesetih proveden je u pokušaju da se sustav prilagodi individualnom umjetniku, a ne da se preispita sam sustav.

Žižek je takvo stanje nazvao **Denkverbot** - uskraćena nam je mogućnost i da razmišljamo onkraj paradigme parlamentarne demokracije slobodnoga tržišta. Postavlja pitanje, kao vjerojatno i svi mi koje ne zanose ograničene mogućnosti koje pruža beskonačna napadna potrošnja, kako razmišljati i činiti ono što je trenutačno zabranjeno. Možda bi prijedlog o lokalnoj kulturnoj inicijativi malih razmjera naizgled bio prijedlog koji se ionako uklapa u sustav, no možda je baš to uvjet da se mogućnost ostvari. Takve inicijative veoma su se raširile već od sredine devedesetih, a sadašnje stanje ne žele preispitivati ni otvorenom opozicijskom kritikom poput antiglobalizacijskih prosvjeda ni istraživanjem vizualne metafore u tradiciji klasične umjetnosti. Umjesto toga projekte zanima opipljiva "igra" s mehanizmima kapitalističke proizvodnje i društvene razmjene. U ovako kratkom tekstu možemo

spomenuti samo nekoliko njih, no prisjetimo se bar sad već nestale zgrade **Dana Petermana** u Chicagu, projekta kuća u nizu **Ricka Lowea [Project Row Houses]**, **Ode Projesi** u Istanbulu, **Superflexa** i njegove lokalne televizijske mreže **Superchannel** na Internetu, te **Community Art Aleksandra Battiste Ilića i Ivane Keser**. Svi projekti ostvareni su u izvornom okruženju s individualnim društvenim sudionicima unutar njih, te predlažu društvene i gospodarske promjene putem stvarnog djelovanja i otvorene razmjene. Što je najvažnije, ne izvode se u kazališnom duhu "relacijske estetike", nego u neurednome okolišu dugoročnog društvenog djelovanja koji je uvijek spremjan na sudioništvo.

Tako umjetnost može postati ljubotljiv, otvoren, nesputan i maštovit prostor društvenog i gospodarskog eksperimenta koji nam drugdje nedostaje. Dakako, umjetnici, javne ustanove i umjetnički prostori koji stvaraju i promiču takvu djelatnost nužno su smješteni unutar gospodarske hegemonije kapitalizma. Njihov položaj samim je tim već narušen, ali upravo je to njihova prednost. Projekti mogu djelovati kao "angažirani neovisni" elementi unutar kapitalizma koji se potpuno uklapaju u sustav, no budući da se smatraju toleriranom kulturnom cjelinom zvanom "umjetnost", dopušteno im je slijediti drugačija pravila. Napokon, mnogi "zatucani" poduzetnici smatraju da u umjetničkim projektima novac nužno propada, da je ulagati u njih rasipno i bez ikakva gospodarskoga zdravog razuma. Ti projekti i promjene u težnjama ustanova umjetnosti će omogućiti da se upozori na razlike u postojećim globalnim inačicama kapitalizma i na želje koje nisu isključivo potrošnja. Ispitivanja i pokuse na području kapitalis-

tičke razmjene treba razdvojiti od građežljivijih finansijskih zahtjeva, te takvi projekti mogu postati, da se poslužimo **Superflexovim** izrazom, sredstvo za drugačiji način razmišljanja i odnosa prema drugima. Danas, u doba totalitarnoga kapitalizma do kraja svijeta i vječka, vjerojatno je jedino moguće "sjediti na dvije stolice", jer ne postoji alternativa ni apsolutna neovisnost o gospodarskim uvjetima. Želim da termini "skroman prijedlog" i "angažirana autonomija" budu protutrov utopijskim težnjama u umjetnosti. Utopije u mnogočemu predstavljaju opasnost, i to ne samo od toga da se ostvare. Naime, prečesto vode lijepom povlačenju u postojeću situaciju. Utopist se uvijek nuda nečemu drugom, tako da u sadašnjosti štošta tolerira. Skromnost prijedloga štiti od pregrandioznih težnji univerzalnosti ili široke primjene. Umjetnost kao skroman prijedlog ostaje na razini pojedinaca ili malih skupina kad je riječ i o proizvodnji i o prezentaciji. Naglasak je na mogućnosti, a skromni prijedlozi za zajedničko djelovanje predlažu nam kako da budemo više drugačiji no što jesmo. To je bar, kao što rekoh, optimistična slika kakvu bih volio vidjeti.

"Mogućnost" je očito ključni izraz koji treba koristiti kad razmišljamo o tim stvarima. Moje zamisli, kao direktora umjetničke ustanove, pokreće koncept [i izazov] stvaranja mogućnosti za umjetnika, publiku, ali možda i za grad u kojem živimo i za njegove građane. Mogućnost je jednostavno stanje u kojem drugačije razmišljamo ili zamišljamo stvari drugačijima no što jesu. U sveobuhvatnoj strukturi globalnog kapitalizma takvo razmišljanje, kao i ostvarivanje projekata, mora poći iz postojećih struktura, jer ne postoji vanjska pozicija s koje

bismo mogli dobiti drugačije gledište. Moramo se poslužiti materijalom, alatima i jezikom koje imamo, na način koji ujedno ima smisla i opire se trenutačnom razumijevanju. Stvaranje mogućnosti zato nije čvrsto stajalište, nego sklisko i promjenjivo stanje koje se sastoji od prostornih, vremenskih i odnosnih elemenata. Drugim riječima, kako bi se stvorila mogućnost, mora postojati mjesto, trenutak i skupina ljudi - zgodno je što je taj materijal na raspolaganju javnim umjetničkim ustanovama kao i bilo kojem drugom prostoru za okupljanje.

Želim, dakle, reći da je prostor za stvaranje takve mogućnosti više nego ikada u rukama kulturnih ustanova. Zra-koprazni prostor koji su stvorile sve veća nefleksibilnost ili marginalizacija poznatih prostora za takvo promišljanje, kao što su politika, vjera ili sama država-nacija, ostavlja ih bez konkurenkcije. Činjenica je da nijednu postojeću globalnu političku ustanovu ne smatraju grozomornom, no ta činjenica je prilika, a vjerojatno i dužnost, da umjetničke ustanove razmišljaju dalje od nacionalnih kulturnih politika i uspostave vlastito "kozmopolitsko" gledište. Zamislimo [i tako djelomice stvorimo] da su likovna umjetnost i njezine ustanove prostor za sintezu, nešto poput oaza "angažiranog i neovisnog" uopćavanja u trendu sve veće afirmacije i partikularizacije. Čak i da je ovakvo stanje privremeno i da služi samo kako bi kapitalizam razriješio svoja unutarnja protuslovlja, ne bismo trebali oklijevati da ga iskoristimo u svrhu ispitivanja. Tako se postavlja pitanje kako područje umjetnosti može biti laboratorij za gospodarske i društvene alternative. Koliko smijemo naprezati zaštitno polje koje se stvorilo oko umjetnosti u kapi-

talizmu slobodnoga tržišta? Možemo li uvesti mogućnost na sporedni ulaz ako, kao što kaže **Ernst Bloch**, "postoji vrlo jasan interes koji je sprječio da se ostvari mogući svijet."

Treba spomenuti da je stvaranje mogućnosti bez presedana u današnjoj klimi. Nema jasnih formula koje bismo mogli slijediti, iako se danas mnogo govori o laboratorijsima i tvornicama, što su začeci svojevrsnih modela preuzetih iz znanosti i industrije. No tim modelima ne vjerujem previše, jer očito isključuju prisutnost publike - i laboratorijski tvornice po definiciji su zatvoreni prostori proizvodnje. Kako bismo na najbolji način iskoristili institucije, moramo uskladiti potrebu za zatvorenim pokusom i javnom raspravom, osobito zato što se forumi za opću intervenciju sve manje suprotstavljaju privatizaciji prostora. Umjetnost i ustanove moraju se kretati u suprotnim smjerovima žele li preuzeti učinkovitu društvenu ulogu. Zato sam, barem provizorno, više pobornik naziva "središte mogućnosti" ili "forum mogućnosti" kojim bismo označavali tu vrstu prijedloga ustanovama.

Kako bismo pronašli koordinate kojima bismo mogli odrediti aktivnosti unutar takvoga prostora, moramo razmisljati s obzirom na vektore mogućnosti koji se pomiču oko prostornih, vremenskih i odnosnih koordinata [koje odgovaraju na pitanja gdje, zašto i za koga]. Za početak se uvijek vraćam starom citatu **Vita Accconcija** koji sam već mnogo puta upotrijebio. Kad ga je **Art Forum** u siječnju 1980. zamolio da opiše kako se će umjetnost razvijati u nadolazećem desetljeću, u odgovoru se posebno osvrnuo na umjetničku galeriju:

"Galeriju bismo mogli shvatiti kao mjesto okupljanja, kao mjesto na

kojem bi zajednicu mogli pozvati na red, gdje bi ona imala određenu svrhu.”

Ta tvrdnja znakovito kaže da se "zajednica" stvara u "galeriji", a ne da se galerija obraća postojećim ustaljenim skupinama. Ovdje umjetnička ustanova postaje razlogom za zajednicu, te proces njezina nastajanja opisuje kao odgovornost same galerije. Koje će teme biti na dnevnome redu kad je "pozove na red"? Koja "određena svrha" može okupiti ljudе? Autorativni prizvuk pomalo je revolucionaran, no iz njega ne proizlazi konkretni manifest.

Za razliku od takve tvrdnje, **Derrida** se nedavno bavio konceptima iz kojih proizlaze prijateljstvo i gostoljubivost u odnosu na prijašnje ideje **Klossowskoga**. U svojoj knjizi "**O gostoljubivosti**" o toj temi kaže:

“Recimo DA kome god ili čemu god se pojavi, prije ikakve odluke, prije ikakva predosjećaja, prije ikakva prepoznavanja, bilo da je riječ o strancu, useljeniku, pozvanu gostu, neočekivanu posjetitelju; bilo da je pridošlica građanin druge zemlje, čovjek, životinja ili božanstvo, živ ili neživa stvar, muško ili žensko.”

Takva radikalna otvorenost prema drugome dovodi u pitanje ulogu vratara i suca koja je nezaobilazni dio institucionalne umjetničke prakse. Kako bi izgledala "gostoljubiva ustanova" ili kako bi bilo imati "gostoljubive kustose" u muzeju? Možda bi to značilo da treba prebaciti donošenje odluka i jednostavno dopustiti da prostor koristi "tko se god ili što se god pojavi". Time bi se čak bilo moguće oslobođiti uštogljenog pojma uspjeha u svijetu umjetnosti ili

same umjetnosti. Ustanova može postati mjesto koje definiraju njegovi sastavni društveni elementi, a ne njegova uprava. Bio bi to prostor, usudio bih se reći, "demokratske devijacije" gdje biste doista mogli javno izraziti ideje onkraj **Žižekova Denkverbota**. To je nesumnjivo izrazito zahtjevan plan za mali i relativno slab institucionalni okvir.

No neka institucija izdaleka bi mogla razmišljati o opravdanom novom i neprekidnom javnom financiranju jedino takvoga prostora. Unutar različitih oblika europskih socijalizama i socijalnih demokracija koje su iscrpile godine žestokog napada fundamentalista slobodnog tržista više nitko ne želi i dalje podupirati utvrde takozvanih "elitis-tičkih" kulturnih ustanova. Povlačenje sredstava dogodit će se ili odjednom ili postupno, no sigurno će se dogoditi. Kao odgovor na to mi, koji kulturu vidimo kao laboratorij budućnosti, morat ćemo prilagoditi svoje alate. Argument gospodarskog doprinosa dugoročno se neće održati, jer će socijalno-demokratske države jednostavno privatizirati kulturu i pustiti je da se bori s ostalim oblicima potrošačke zabave. Zato se može dogoditi da se postojanje palača kulture u 21. stoljeću opravdava jedino kao poznati i priznati prostori "demokratske devijacije", pa i u očima samih kulturnih radnika. ●

POHVALA
LIJENOSTI
MLADEN
STILINOVIC

Kao umjetnik učio sam i od Istoka [socijalizma] i od Zapada [kapitalizma]. Naravno, sada kada su se granice i politički sistemi promijenili, takvo iskustvo više neće biti moguće. Ali ono što sam ja naučio iz tog dijaloga ostaje mi. Gledanje i poznavanje umjetnosti Zapada navelo me je ovih dana na misao da na Zapadu više ne može biti umjetnosti. Ne tvrdim da je nema. Zašto ne može biti umjetnosti na Zapadu? Odgovor je vrlo jednostavan. Umjetnici Zapada nisu lijeni. Umjetnici s Istoka su lijeni, a hoće li oni sada kada više nisu umjetnici Istoka ostati lijeni, to ćemo vidjeti.

Lijenost je odsustvo pokreta i misli, samo tupo vrijeme - potpuna amnezija. Ona je također ravnodušnost, buljenje niušta, neaktivnost, nemoć. Ona je čista glupost, vrijeme bola, uzaludne koncentracije. Sve te vrline lijenosti važni su činioci umjetnosti. Nije dovoljno znati o lijenosti, ona se mora prakticirati i usavršavati.

Umjetnici Zapada nisu lijeni i zato više nisu umjetnici, već proizvođači nečega... Potpuna zaokupljenost umjetnika Zapada nevažnim stvarima, kao što su proizvodnja, promocija, sistem galerija, sistem muzeja, sistem natječaja [tko je prvi], zaigranost predmetima, sve to udaljilo ih je od lijenosti, od umjetnosti. Kao što je novac papir, tako je i galerija soba.

Umjetnici s Istoka bili su lijeni i siromašni, jer cijeli sistem nevažnih činilaca nije postojao. Zato su imali vremena koncentrirati se i baviti umjetnošću i lijenošću. Ali kada su i proizvodili umjetnost, znali su da je to uzaludno, da je to ništa.

Pouku o lijenosti umjetnici Zapada imali su od koga naučiti, ali nisu. Dva najvažnija umjetnika 20. stoljeća bavila su se pitanjem lijenosti, praktički i teoretski: **Duchamp** i **Malevič**.

Duchamp nikad nije govorio o lijenosti, već o ravnodušnosti i ne-radu. Na pitanje **Pierre Cabannea** - što mu je donijelo najviše zadovoljstva u životu, **Marcel Duchamp** je odgovorio:

"Kao prvo imao sam sreće. Jer nikada nisam morao raditi za život. Smatram da je raditi

*za život pomalo imbecilno s ekonomiske
točke gledišta. Nadam se da ćemo jednog
dana moći živjeti bez obaveze da radimo.
Zahvaljujući svojoj sreći, mogao sam se
provući kroz život bez posla".*

Malevič je napisao tekst pod naslovom
"Lijenost - prava istina čovječanstva" [1921.]. U
tom tekstu on je kritizirao kapitalizam zato što
omogućuje samo malom broju kapitalista lijenoš,
ali i socijalizam, jer je cijeli svoj pokret bazirao na
radu. Citiram:

*"Narodi se plaše lijenošti i progone one koji
je prihvataju, sve se događa na taj način,
jer nitko je nije shvatio kao istinu, budući
da su je žigosali kao 'majku svih poroka', a
ona je majka života. Socijalizam nosi
oslobađenje u nesvjesnom, on žigoše
lijenoš ne znajući da ga je ona rodila i njen
sin je u svojoj ludosti žigoše kao majku
poroka, ali on još nije sin koji će skinuti žig, i
stoga u ovoj kratkoj bilješci, ja želim skinuti
žig srama s njenog čela i da je učinim ne
majkom svih poroka, već majkom
savršenstva".*

I da budem lijen i da zaključim. Nema
umjetnosti bez lijenošti.

Pohvala lijenošti, 1993.
prvi put pročitano u
galeriji Opus Operandi,
Gent, 02/05/1993.

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ARBEIT IST KRANKHEIT
Mladen Stilinović K. MARX

RAD JE SRAMOTA
Vlado Martek

THE PRAISE OF LAZINESS

MLADEN
STILINOVIC

As an artist, I learned from both East [socialism] and VWest [capitalism]. Of course, now when the borders and political systems have changed, such an experience will be no longer possible. But what I have learned from that dialogue, stays with me. My observation and knowledge of VWestern art has lately led me to a conclusion that art cannot exist... any more in the VWest. This is not to say that there isn't any. Why cannot art exist any more in the VWest? The answer is simple. Artists in the VWest are not lazy. Artists from the East are lazy; whether they will stay lazy nowv when they are no longer Eastern artists, remains to be seen.

Laziness is the absence of movement and thought, dumb time - total amnesia. It is also indifference, staring at nothing, non-activity, impotence. It is sheer stupidity, a time of pain, futile concentration. Those virtues of laziness are important factors in art. Knowing about laziness is not enough, it must be practised and perfected.

Artists in the VWest are not lazy and therefore not artists but rather producers of something... Their involvement with matters of no importance, such as production, promotion, gallery system, museum system, competition system [vwho is first], their preoccupation with objects, all that drives them away form laziness, from art. Just as money is paper, so a gallery is a room.

Artists from the East were lazy and poor because the entire system of insignificant factors did not exist. Therefore they had time enough to concentrate on art and laziness. Even when they did produce art, they knew it was in vain, it was nothing. Artists from the VWest could learn about laziness, but they didn't. Two major 20th century artists treated the question of laziness, in both practical and theoretical terms: **Duchamp** and **Malevich**. **Duchamp** never really discussed laziness, but rather indifference and non-work. When asked by **Pierre Cabanne** what had brought him most pleasure in life, **Duchamp** said:

"First, having been lucky. Because basically I've never worked for a living. I consider working for a living slightly imbecilic from an economic point of view. I hope that some day we'll be able to live without being obliged to work. Thanks to my luck, I was able to manage without getting wet".

Malevich wrote a text entitled "*Laziness - the real truth of mankind*" [1921]. In it he criticized capitalism because it enabled only a small number of capitalists to be lazy, but also socialism because the entire movement was based on work instead of laziness. To quote:

"People are scared of laziness and persecute those who accept it, and it always happens because no one realizes laziness is the truth; it has been branded as the mother of all vices, but it is in fact the mother of life. Socialism brings liberation in the unconscious, it scorns laziness without realizing it was laziness that gave birth to it; in his folly, the son scorns his mother as a mother of all vices and would not remove the brand; in this brief note I want to remove the brand of shame from laziness and to pronounce it not the mother of all vices, but the mother of perfection".

Finally, to be lazy and conclude: there is no art without laziness.

ARBEIT IST KRANKHEIT

Mladen Stilinović

K. MARX

The praise of Laziness,
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WORK IS A SHAME
Vlado Martek



For the problem of abstraction – of which this one of finance capital is a part – must also be grasped in its cultural expressions. Real abstractions in an older period – the effects of money and number in the big cities of nineteenth-century industrial

capitalism – had as one significant offshoot the emergence of what we call modernism in all the arts. In this sense, modernism faithfully – even “realistically” – reproduced and represented the increasing abstraction and deterritorialization of Lenin’s “imperialist stage.” Today, what is called postmodernity articulates the symptomatology of yet another stage of abstraction, qualitatively and structurally distinct from the previous one, which I have drawn on Arrighi to characterize as our own moment of finance capitalism: the finance capital moment of globalized society the abstractions brought with it by cybernetic technology [which it is a misnomer to call postindustrial except as a way of distinguishing its dynamic from the older, “productive” moment]. Thus any comprehensive new theory of finance capitalism will need to reach out into the expanded realm of cultural production to map its effects; indeed mass cultural production and consumption itself – at one with globalization and the new information technology – are as profoundly economic as the other productive areas of late capitalism and as fully a part of the latter’s generalized commodity system.

[Fredric Jameson, Culture and Finance Capitalism]

FACE VALUE
or, CURRENCIES OF THE SIGNATURE IN CONTEMPORARY ART
BRIAN HOLMES

Even when it appears to have crystallized in an object—let's say an artwork, or a commodity—value is always a term in a relationship, a term of measurement to overcome the uncertainties of an exchange. Value arises as a disputed measure when something is to be given, or more acutely, when something is to be taken away. It is a discourse, an emotion, a memory, a desire, or all of these at once, when they come into play around an impending division or change in the state of things. The question of value presses upon us with the force of a disquieting, disruptive gaze. Whereas money, in its classical forms, is largely an attempt to neutralize or eliminate the anxiety of value-relations, i.e. the face-to-face relations of society. It claims to achieve absolute equivalence between objects, and above all between people, with no remainder. As Lacan once put it, money is "*le signifiant le plus annihilant qui soit*," the most annihilating signifier of all.⁰¹ And yet everywhere, the mathematical fluidity of money is haloed with very personal questions, incessantly debated between the takers, the givers, even the spectators of monetary exchange. Money gives rise to a necessarily incarnate anxiety, seemingly conjured up by the very system designed to conjure it away.

One observes, for example, that the moneys of Europe at the outset of the twenty-first century are insistently adorned with the ciphers of art. The apples of Cézanne's doubt, once explored by the phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty,⁰² now dapple the 100 franc note whereby global economics comes to bear on my life. The "signature" of the painter, inherent to a uniquely configured image, rivals with the more prosaic signatures of the various functionaries who make this currency legitimate. But does the artwork of Cézanne cover up the problems raised by the abstract processes of exchange—or exacerbate them? Does its authority [the authority of the "father of abstraction"] guarantee our own signatures when we fill out something like a check—a promise of money to come, as money can be a promise of paintings, of apples, of everything under the sun? Or does the meeting of money and artwork

01 | Jacques Lacan, from the conclusion to "Séminaire sur 'La lettre volée,'" *Écrits* [PARIS: SEUIL, 1966].

02 | Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Le doute de Cézanne," *Sens et non-sens* [PARIS: GALLIMARD, 1996/1966].

reopen a society's doubt about the legitimacy of all its currencies?

In a debate, the kind of debate that is essential to art today, it is well to be clear where one stands. I ask these questions with the franc note in my hand, from within the sphere of Europe's converging moneys. Yet I ask them with respect to a place on the geographic and political fringes of that convergence, the city of Ljubljana; and I ask them in the context of an exhibition where the emotions, desires, and speculative excesses of several generations of artists have been convoked around the issue of value and its signifiers. In such a dialogue of places, and before such a span of generations, it may be best to approach the artworks historically, through the political and economic frames that they constantly seek to shatter, to undermine, or to overflow. Only in this way can one begin to measure the ambition of artists when they come to face the enigmas of value, of the worthless and the invaluable.

KEYNES AND THE KULA RING ★

Let us begin with an historical allegory. In the fourth chapter of *The Great Transformation*, **Karl Polanyi** interrupts his genealogy of nineteenth-century capitalism to consider the very different economic systems revealed by social anthropology. Turning to **Malinowski**'s studies of the Pacific islanders, he focuses on a few curious details, like the existence of central granaries for storage, and the responsibility of the village headmen in coordinating feast days. His aim in these digressions only becomes clear at the end of the book. Insisting on the function of *redistribution* in precapitalist economies, with the moment of *centricity* it implies, he foreshadows one of his major conclusions: the necessary role of the state in any escape from the chaos wrought by 150 years of faith in self-regulating markets. Writing at the close of the Second World War, **Polanyi** sought to prove not only the inherent destructiveness of the market-driven economy, but also its unnecessary character, its historical exceptionalism, against the theorists of a truck-and-bartering human nature in the tradition of **Adam Smith**. Yet he proposed nothing so simple as "primitive communism." The political function of monetary exchange, coordinating all human relations through the abstract mathematics of general equivalency, was not to be replaced by the hierarchical order of a potentially totalitarian society, subsuming individual freedom beneath the dictates of a central plan. The relations of the island peoples were also characterized by practices of *reciprocity*, a mutual gift-giving regulated by principles of relational *symmetry* that instituted horizontal, non-hierarchical ties among individuals, both within and between the different clans. Thus **Polanyi** recounts the extraordinary system of the Kula trade that circulates shell armbands and necklaces around the ring-shaped archipelago of the Trobriand Islands, bringing individuals and generations together in a process of exchange founded on an aesthetics of the unique object and its history. Here was a market outside any consideration of profit; a form of "money," the shells, which were anything

but an abstract equivalent; a pattern of circulation which manifested the cosmopolitan openness that liberal theorists claimed as the cultural value of international commerce, yet without locking its participants into the destructive competition and exploitation of "accumulation for accumulation's sake":

*An intricate time-space-person system covering hundreds of miles and several decades, linking many hundreds of people in respect to thousands of strictly individual objects, is being handled here without any records or administration, but also without any motive of gain or truck. Not the propensity to barter, but reciprocity in social behavior dominates. Nevertheless, the result is a stupendous organizational achievement in the economic field. Indeed, it would be most interesting to consider whether even the most advanced modern market organization, based on exact accountancy, would be able to cope with such a task, should it care to undertake it. It is to be feared that the unfortunate dealers, faced with innumerable monopolists buying and selling individual objects with extravagant restrictions attached to each transaction, would fail to make a standard profit and might prefer to go out of business.*⁰³

03 | Karl Polanyi,
The Great Transformation
[BOSTON: BEACON,
1957/1944], p. 50;
cf. also the last
chapter, "Freedom
in a Complex
Society."

The delectation of the style betrays the aesthetic ideal gathering behind these lines, before the final phrase makes it explicit, with the notion that profit-seeking merchants would *prefer* to close out their books, in favor of an exchange of singularities irreducible to any general equivalent. The Kula traders are portrayed as a society of art-lovers, deeply attached to their singular tastes and histories but at the same time culturally enriched by the relational symmetries of clan identity, which help them to recognize an appropriate trading partner, even in a distant land. Their exchanges are taken as the allegorical sign of what could emerge from the war-shattered industrial civilization of 1944: a new balance between a redistributive state apparatus and a civil society elaborating different values, aestheticized, quality-oriented relations which could not and need not fit into the centralized systems of administrative accountancy. Freedom in a complex society would entail the maintenance of a paradoxical balance, founded on mobile, incommensurable measures. The single standard, which nineteenth-century society had sought to naturalize in the purity of gold, would have to give way to a multiplicity of economies, or to the economy and its others. And thus the basis of freedom could no longer be sought only in the fact of possession, expressed in that cornerstone of English law which is *habeas corpus*, the possession of one's

physical body. The relational form of the contract, struck between self-possessed individuals, must open to the mingling of bodies, to the larger reproduction of society, and to the changing configurations of a body politic discovering and abandoning its measures in the evolving dimension of historical time. Thus the living metaphor of the Kula ring leads to the heart of a debate over value, at one of those rare moments when such debates are possible on a civilizational scale.

We know that the value-relation which emerged as a norm in the so-called "Western" countries during the postwar period did not take the socialist form that **Polanyi** and so many others had desired. The Keynesian state with its welfare safety-nets and strategic government spending programs was at once a buffer against the violence of capitalism and an incitement to its expansion. To be sure, it succeeded in regulating the currency, whose volatility under the liberal economy had been so destructive, by instituting strictly national moneys whose value was guaranteed not by the displaceability of quantities of gold, but on the contrary, by the solidity of each country's industrial organization. But the centralized administrations and vertical hierarchies required to achieve this stabilization, and to effect the redistributive programs, were principally "balanced" by the growing strength of the private corporations, which would finally break the national bounds of the Keynesian regulation and spell its demise. The horizontal ties imagined by **Polanyi**, with the complex symmetries of identity that were supposed to underlie them, could not be formalized in the powerful and enduring ways that would have been needed to check the powers of the centralized administrations, which ultimately foundered under their own weight and were replaced by the stripped-down states of contemporary neoliberalism.

The Great Transformation describes the tumultuous events of the mid-century as a crisis of value, then attempts to conceive an ideal response. How did individual artists respond to the real political-economic forms that emerged from this crisis? And where did they succeed in placing their utopian hopes, as those forms gradually solidified in the postwar period, then shifted dramatically once again in the 1970s? Each visitor to the exhibition will develop their own answers, based on their history, experience, and desires. For my part I will focus initially on a single figure, **Marcel Broodthaers**, and on the themes of centrality and reciprocity, played out in gestures and fictions where the artist deals with economies of the collectivity and of the self. By concentrating on the work of **Broodthaers**, I hope to sketch out a problematic field within which artists of an earlier generation could approach the questions of value. The crux of the argument will then involve the transition between that time and our own.

SIGNATURE IN THE RAIN ★

In one of his films, perhaps the funniest of all, **Marcel Broodthaers** sits down to write in a garden. The year is 1969, but he writes with an old-fashioned fountain pen, dipped in the ink of the nineteenth-century poets [**Baudelaire, Mallarmé**].

And as he writes, a torrential rain poured from a watering can dissolves the letters, washes away the words, until finally he abandons the pen and the title of the film appears: *La Pluie [Projet pour un texte]*. The work reveals a dissolution, an impossibility [the inclement weather]; and yet at the same time it signals a latency, a space of reserve [the inkwell, the mind of the poet]. As he made clear in 1970: "If you still want to come somewhere close to a revolutionary position in art, there is only one position left to take, which is this: from a bourgeois platform, you declare yourself secret and hermetic. In other words you don't communicate, except to a few, just what you need to survive."⁰⁴ Another film displays this economy, this restraint: twenty-four frames in a loop, a single second of art, *Une Seconde d'Eternité*, 1970. The film recounts the signing of the initials M. B., gradually sketched to completion in twenty-four strokes, only to disappear and reappear once again. "I believe that the fundament of artistic creation rests on a narcissistic ground," said **Broodthaers** with respect to this film. "The very signature of the author, whether of an artist or a filmmaker or a poet, little matter, seems to me to be the beginning of the system of lies that all the poets, all the artists, attempt to establish to defend themselves, I don't quite know against what."⁰⁵

Broodthaers' art took the form of an elaborate system of defense. He was like the monopolists that **Polanyi** described in his reflections on the Kula trade, attaching the most "extravagant restrictions" to each transaction. The essence of his practice lay in its hermeticism, the difficulty of its communication. He had been a poet and a communist in his youth, during and immediately after the war, and had sought the juncture of art and politics in revolutionary surrealism. The problem of his relation to the public, which had been impossible to establish through poetry, was in no way resolved by his transition to the object: he felt an indomitable mistrust for everything that took the form of the commodity. Yet he knew that was what he produced in a consumer society. "*With plastic art, my only possible engagement has been on the side of my adversaries.*"⁰⁶ And so he built up his art as an elaborate set of ruses, even of lies, initially in order to survive and then gradually as a critical stratagem, ironically exposing the contradictions between the vanguard tradition of contemporary art and

04 | Marcel Broodthaers,
"Meusissen ou n'importe qui," in:
MTL Magazine, November 1970,
quoted in **Jean-Christophe Royoux**,
"*Projet pour un texte: The Cinematographic Model in the Work of Marcel Broodthaers*," in:
Marcel Broodthaers: Cinéma, exhib. cat., **FUNDACIÓ ANTONÍ TÀPIES**, BARCELONA, APRIL 17-JUNE 29, 1997, p. 304.

05 | Marcel Broodthaers,
excerpt from an interview with
Freddy De Vree, Düsseldorf, 1971,
in: **Marcel Broodthaers: Cinéma**, op. cit., p. 127.

06 | Marcel Broodthaers,
"Dix mille francs de récompense" [reworked interview with **Irmeline Lebeer**], in: **Marcel Broodthaers**, exhib. cat., **JEU DE PAUME**, PARIS, DEC. 17, 1991-MARCH 1, 1992, p. 250.

the economy on which it depended. This critique is one of the keys to his art, constantly informing its wit, its playfulness, even its gestures toward the spatial realization of a poetic ideal.⁰⁷

Like Marx, he made a distinction between an immeasurable fundament of value and the distorted expression this could take under historical conditions of unequal exchange. Marx identified this fundament of value as labor, the creative capacity to appropriate nature and make it useful for human desires; hence his notion of use values.⁰⁸ Broodthaers, in accord with his own desire, identified the fundamental value as the self-creative capacity of the poetic word; hence his reference to the essential narcissism of the artist. At this level value cannot be measured, it can only be experienced in its qualities: it is the self-evidence and self-satisfaction of the creative act. Yet no one can be an absolute monopolist. Insofar as we are social beings, the fundamental value must become an object of discourse, of reckoning, so that positions can be established in relations of exchange. Value must then be torn away from its unique attachment to qualities and given some kind of measure, which under capitalism takes the form of a general equivalent. It is at this point that value becomes the object of a dispute, couched in the specific terms established by a given society at a distinct historical moment. For example, the dispute over the wage to be accorded for a working day. Or the dispute over the price of a particular commodity, such as an artwork.

Now, what Marx contested was not the rate of a given wage, but the very terms of the value-relation between proletariat and capitalist, wage-labor itself. Similarly, in his specialized realm [or from what he called his "bourgeois platform"], Broodthaers contested the very frame within which the value of his work as an artist could be measured: the *Beaux-Arts* tradition and its central institution, the museum. Yet he did not simply criticize this tradition from the outside, as though possessed of a neutral, unassailable, unsaleable position. Rather, he created a critical museum as an artwork, and therefore of course as a commodity in itself. And he signed this commodity-work with his proper name.

I refer of course to the *Musée d'Art Moderne, Département des Aigles*, founded

07 | For a reading of Broodthaers' spatialized poetics, see J.-C. Rououx, op. cit. note 4 above.

08 | Cf. the discussion of Marx's value theory in David Harvey, *Limits to Capital* [LONDON: VERSO, 1999/1982], chap. 1.

Fair in 1971 under the title, "Museum of Modern Art for Sale, Due to Bankruptcy." He had devised an ironic project to restore the museum's ailing finances: the proposal to resell, at double its market value on any given day, an ingot of fine gold stamped with the museum's eagle emblem and accompanied by a handwritten certificate of authenticity from the curator [**Broodthaers** himself], as well as a formal contract between the buyers, the intermediaries [art galleries] and the seller [the museum]. This transaction, imagined by **Broodthaers** as one of his many small *plaquette*-type publications, and in fact realized only after his death, exemplifies the structure of the entire museum project and situates it perfectly within its political-economic context.

It would be false to suppose that the proposal is merely a variation on **Duchamp**'s *Monte Carlo Bond*, or other dadaist subversions of the surplus value attached to the artist's signature; and equally false to imagine that it merely registers a second demise of the gold standard, and a consequent loss of the secure ties that supposedly once bound signifier to referent in an ontology of realism.¹⁰ For the economic measures of value had changed vastly since the 1910s–1920s, when the dadaists elaborated their paradoxes. To be sure, the work was proposed shortly after the suspension of the dollar's automatic convertibility into gold, by the **Nixon** government in August 1971. Thus it takes its place in the period of monetary crisis before the final collapse, in March 1973, of the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates between the gold-backed dollar and the currencies of the other signatory nations. Under this system, the metallic "substance" of monetary value functioned as a guarantee only because it was held by the United States, whose imperial power "backed" the gold itself. The value of the metal was therefore explicitly dependent on the economic organization and military strength of the country that had imposed the Bretton Woods agreement; this was the framework within which its guarantee function could be unilaterally maintained or abrogated. And it was this imperial power of economic governance, overshadowing the stabilized national economies, that **Broodthaers** signified with the stamp of the eagle—equally dominant over the values of the artworks in his Museum of Modern Art.

The role of the signature is not exactly subversive in this proposal, it does not introduce a floating signifier into a balanced equation of values. Instead it binds the artist to an institutionalized power structure through the legal form of the signed contract that was to accompany

09 | **Marcel Broodthaers,**
interview with
Jürgen Harman and
Katharina Schmidt
in: *Marcel Broodthaers*, op. cit., p. 222; the following references to "Section financière" are from pp. 212–13.

10 | Arguments of this sort could be applied to an earlier and less elaborate gesture, the 100 Belgian franc note marked on one side, "Bon pour 1000 francs / M. Broodthaers," and on the other, "MARCEL BROODTHAERS / Bon pour 100 moules"; see *Marcel Broodthaers*, op. cit., pp. 28–29.

the ingot. In an fictive interview, **Broodthaers** describes this as a "natural contract," or again as a "logical contract" [just as his museum is a "logical fiction"]. The contract stipulates the precise conditions for "the sale of a kilo of gold according to the particular mode of the Beaux-Arts," and thereby reveals the imbrication of the fine-arts tradition in a far larger system for the extortion of surplus value, the system of state capitalism, identified at the very moment when its protective national barriers had begun to crumble, unleashing the destructive energies of exploitation and competition that Keynesian economics had sought

11 | This was the situation faced by the members of the Frankfurt School, after the emergence of the various forms of state capitalism in the 1930s; hence the resemblance between **Broodthaers'** practice and the aesthetic theory of **Adorno**. For early articulations of the problem, see **Friedrich Pollock**, "State Capitalism" [1941] and **Max Horkheimer**, "The Authoritarian State" [1940], in: *The Frankfurt School Reader*, eds. A. Arato and E. Gebhardt [NEW YORK: CONTINUUM, 1988].

12 | For a reading of the critical force of dispersal in **Broodthaers**, and of the relation between art and politics in his work in general, see the concluding pages of **Jean-François Chevrier**, *The Year 1967* [BARCELONA: FUNDACIÓ TÀPIES, 1997].

to contain. Thus the contract, whose legal function is to limit the individual's engagement, instead makes clear the total failure of the defensive rampart which the artist's signature could hope to erect against an abusive integration of personal value to an imperial hierarchy. The substantive autonomy of the artwork is an illusion. It is in this sense that **Broodthaers** could write, at the close of his reworked interview with **Irmeline Lebeer**: "*It remains indeed to be discovered whether art can exist anywhere but on the plane of the negative.*" Bourgeois autonomy, which emerged during the period of liberalism, cannot subsist before the all-embracing reign of state-administered capitalism.¹¹ Lucid, self-critical subjectivity—the progressive, enlightened version of capitalistic self-possession—becomes a disjointed, spectral conscience, increasingly unable to come to grips with the actual forms of political economy.

Beneath the shadow of the eagle, the artist's only escape would be dissolution, like letters of a text washing away in the rain. These moments of dissolution, of ungoverned dispersal, are the grace of **Broodthaers'** art, the boundless resource of its humor and also of its critique.¹² But still objects are made, circulated, and sold, as elements of a hermetic strategy that must foreclose any communication. Under these conditions the artist cannot face his public, but only profit from a misunderstanding. For any substantive debate over the measures of value has proven impossible, at least from the "bourgeois platform" of the fine arts, as **Broodthaers** confirmed shortly before his death in a text which is in many ways his testament: "In reality, it is certain that the commentary on Art follows the movement of the economy. We think it uncertain that this commentary can be political."¹³ Still the public, the distant other whom he could not reach and to whom he

could offer no fundamentally valuable sign, remained present to the very end, in the internalized form of a perverse remorse: "Urged on by an ignoble inspiration, I will not conceal that if the wrongs are on my account, they will give me a kind of pleasure. A guilty pleasure, because it would depend on the victims—those who believed me right." This failure of the face-to-face relation, and its retreat to a brooding interiority, is the enigma that the signature of an artist's contract gives us to ponder.

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The art of **Marcel Broodthaers**, in its sovereign reserve as poetry and its negative deployment as commodity, illuminates almost the entire field of the dispute over value as it could be joined by an artist of the postwar period. With sufficient attention to detail, one could situate the other artists of this generation within approximately the same field. It would not be impossible, for instance, to describe **Yves Klein**'s signature appropriation of "zones of stabilized pictorial sensibility" as a megalomaniacal equivalent of the operations involved in creating and stabilizing a currency regime.¹⁴ **Beuys'** unlimited editions and proposals for free art, extending the artist's creative privilege to everyone, would then appear as redistributive responses, convoking the mass autonomies of a democratic socialism. In contrast to **Broodthaers'** work, both gestures assume that the fundamental capacity of human subjectivity to appropriate nature can be expressed positively. Much to the opposite, **Oscar Bony**'s live piece, *La Familia Obrera* [Worker's Family], 1968, insists on the alienation that wage labor brings even to the intimate realm where the promise of money is supposed to be realized as direct use value [the family is paid double minimum wage for being reified as display objects in a museum]. This kind of action could still have critical force in the seventies. But as the possibility of a socialist alternative receded, the fact of reification simply became a norm, reiterated by the unceasing transfer of every imaginable mass-produced object into the museum. Fortunately the organizers of this exhibition have largely spared us the anti-poetic commodity art of the eighties, where the dispute over

13 | **Marcel Broodthaers**, "Etre bien pensant ou ne pas être. Etre aveugle," in the catalogue of the exhibition "Le privilège de l'art," Museum of Modern Art, Oxford, April 26–June 1, 1975. French text in: *Marcel Broodthaers, op. cit.*, p. 268.

14 | **Klein's gesture of throwing gold into the Seine after the sale of a zone of sensibility is better understood as a rivalry with the monetary value system than a refusal of it. He conceived pictorial abstraction as the painter's power of "radiance" into space: thus he believed himself capable of "specializing" all of France, turning the entire nation into one vast blue monochrome. Also see his 1958 letter to an international atomic energy committee proposing to color atomic explosions with IKB monochrome pigment. Quotes and references in **Sidra Stich, Yves Klein [OSTFILDERN: CANTZ, 1994]**, pp. 145–48.**

value freezes up in a one-sided, opportunistic reading of Duchamp's ready-mades.

More interesting in terms of their unrealized potential are Öyvind Fahlström's Monopoly-type board games on various geopolitical themes [*World Bank*, *Indochina*, etc.]. Conceived in the late sixties and early seventies as "variable paintings," these works map the farflung strategies of American imperialism, both military and economic, and the resistance to it, principally from the leftist nationalisms of what was then called the Third World. Complex rules based on extensive research into actual conditions govern the possible movements of figurative game pieces, which mythically condense the energies and emotions of the real actors in the world game. As Fahlström wrote: "Without manipulating works of art one can hardly realize the fantastic range of the astronomical freedom of choice and the immense rigidity in the external appearance of the parts—and in the material they are made of: the combination of metal and plastic makes shapes

as strong as axes. Then after that fundamental fact comes the fragile rigidity of the other rules—like our conventions and agreements: the border between the Congo and Angola, the numbers in the telephone book, the buttoning of jackets. The tension lies in the fact that it is possible to oppose the rigidity—just as it is in my models."¹⁵ The board games were meant to provoke a confrontation between the political-economic structures of the real world and their subjective transcription within the individual psyche; it is in this sense that "rules oppose and derail subjectivity, loosen the imprinted circuits of the individual."

Fahlström insisted that his Monopoly games "will only be meaningful when they have been made into mass multiple editions." They were not, of course; but the confrontations they figured had already been provoked on a mass scale by the brutal facts of the war in Vietnam. If the dispute over value then subsided, after the Vietnam war and the final throes of decolonization, it was also because the rules of the world economic game had become murky, the players ungraspable, their locations unknown. By 1984 the critic Fredric Jameson was already calling for "*an aesthetics of cognitive mapping*" to resolve "*the incapacity of our minds, at least at present, to map the great global multinational and decentered communicational network in which we find ourselves caught as individual subjects.*"¹⁶ What had happened in the interim, to make the cartography of the sixties and early seventies obsolete?

15 | Öyvind Fahlström, "Games—from 'Sausages and Tweezers'—A Running Commentary," in: Öyvind Fahlström, exhib. cat., Valencia, IVAM, June 10–August 23, 1992, p. 143. The following quotes are from "Take Care of the World," p. 143, and "Monopoly Games," p. 145. ■■■■■

16 | On the crisis of Fordism, see Michel Aglietta, *Régulation et crises du capitalisme* [PARIS: ODILE JACOB, 1997/1976]; cf. the more accessible but no less interesting account in David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* [OXFORD: BLACKWELL, 1990], pp. 141–88. ■■■■■

World Bank dates from 1971, like the "Section financière" of Broodthaers' fictive modern art museum. We know that it was in these years, roughly from 1967 to 1973, that the Keynesian or "Fordist" economy entered into a crisis, leading to a temporary weakening of American hegemony and a general reorganization of the capitalist regime of accumulation.¹⁷ The most obvious result of this crisis in monetary terms was the liberalization of currency exchanges, such that all moneys would now be expressed as variables of each other's shifting value, in an erratic dance led by the movements of the three regionally dominant currencies, the dollar, the deutschmark, and the yen. But a more subtle result, initially invisible or inconceivable for the general public, was the creation of new forms of financial investment, as capital fled its nationally bound industrial bases, where it was plagued by so-called "stagflation," and found unimpeded opportunities for valorization in international loans, in currency markets, in stock markets, and in newly volatilized government bonds [made freely exchangeable by the US Federal Reserve in 1979, and by most other countries thereafter]. This development of finance capital [or "fictional capital," as Marx termed it] may be usefully understood as a multiplication of the forms of *credit money*, i.e. the variously calculated contractual promises of future reimbursement on an investment, and the further promises which can then be obtained by trading in these promissory notes themselves, swapping one form of credit for the other.¹⁸ As the general public has now begun to realize, the ever-increasing swiftness and calculating power of computers and the world-girdling extension of networked communications has opened a seemingly infinite field for the diversification of the new forms of privately controlled credit money, themselves derivatives of the fiduciary currencies of the nation-states.

The conventional explanation for this explosion of financial instruments and opportunities is "deregulation." But it would be naive to think that the enormous quantity of abstract money transiting through the computer networks accomplishes its trajectories in an utterly chaotic way. The eagle's gaze has only sharpened,

17 | **Fredric Jameson**, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Capitalism* [LONDON: VERSO, 1991/ORIGINAL ARTICLE 1984], p. 44.

18 | For credit money, see Robert Guttman, "Les mutations du capital financier," in: *La mondialisation financière*, ed. François Chesnais [PARIS: SYROS, 1996]. For an introduction to derivatives, cf. Doug Henwood, *Wall Street* [LONDON: VERSO, 1997], pp. 28–41. At the close of his chapter on "Instruments," Henwood quotes the economist Joseph Schumpeter: "It is one of the most characteristic features of the financial side of capitalist evolution so to 'mobilize' all, even the longest, maturities as to make any commitment to a promise of future balances amenable to being in turn financed by any sort of funds and especially by funds available for a short time, even overnight, only. This is not mere technique. This is part of the core of the capitalist process."

from a new vantage point in the communications satellites of outer space. What we have seen on the ground is a partial *re-regulation* of the national economies in favor of finance capital, extending the scope of its rule-governed game to increasingly larger surfaces of the planet, and intensifying its penetration into increasingly numerous fields of human interaction—to the point where **Dan Graham**'s ironic gesture of incorporating himself, putting his own name up for sale on the stock market in 1969, now looks like the anticipation of a trend toward monetary abstraction that would ultimately affect everyone and everything. Indeed, the model of informational exchange has now overtaken production, volatilizing the object as conceptual art did, and transforming the nature of the supports whereby the consumer economy is articulated. Thus, if the notion of the simulacrum has gained such prominence in intellectual debates since the early eighties, it is precisely because of the huge increase in the numbers of people earning a living from the production-consumption of immaterial products, pure informational constructs which can increasingly be beamed about the planet through circuits like those taken by finance capital. Now, the peculiarity of these circuits, consisting essentially of interlinked computers, is to permit both the inexpensive transmission and the essentially costless *duplication* of the new products. And it is this latter function—made possible by what is called “memory”—that in recent years has begun to reawaken the public consciousness of the contradictions of capitalism. When the group **Ideal Copy** offers to exchange our leftover foreign coins on the basis of an equivalence in weight, we participate in a questioning of the very significance of money, its value in a transnational realm where it seems capable of infinitely and weightlessly replicating itself.

What are immaterial products like computer programs or photodigital images really worth? The new role of copyright, and of intellectual property laws in general, is to enforce the commodity value of such goods; this is why copyright has become one of the essential rules of the globalized economy. But the flick of a *save* button or the effortless dial-up of an Internet connection suggests that these immaterial goods are worth nothing, in monetary terms that is. Indeed, much of the informational “products” available over the Internet result from university research or amateur interest, outside the profit motive. But at the same time, because the new products flow through communications media, there is an increasing recognition of the role that each individual plays in the transformation of the initial information. The assertion of the individual’s specific contribution to a collective product has become possible in a way it never has been before, leading to the free software movement, a new proliferation of theories about the “gift economy,” perhaps even to what **Richard Barbrook** has dubbed “cybercommunism.”¹⁹ And the growing awareness of the preponderance that immaterial calculations and exchanges have taken over everyday material life has led to a perception of what **Fahlström** might have called the “fragile rigidity” of the new economic rules.

The contractual form of so-called "copyleft" is the free software makers' attempt to change those rules by legally inscribing the activity of collective invention: the GNU General Public License guarantees that the source code of free software must remain available and open to modification, on the condition that the user indicates each change and "signs" it with his or her name.²⁰ The signature functions here to encourage participation, not to exclude it. Other forms of resistance to copyright have been more radical. The **Luther Blisset Project**, evolving between London and Bologna, revolves around the ungoverned proliferation and use of a proper name. Anyone can sign "Luther Blisset," and everyone is encouraged to do so, in order to spark the formation of new urban media myths and to provide cover for the political activities of the core group working under this open signature, or "multiple name." There is a deliberate strategy here: "Luther Blisset represents the power of communication and collective intelligence—no copyright can fight him back," reads a sentence from an early text in 1995.²¹ The phrase was prophetic: when an Italian prosecutor called for the seizure and destruction of a particularly scandalous publication, the text was simply posted on 50 Internet sites. Haphazardly proliferating through the networks, the **Blisset** signature mirrors the embodied practice of the *dérive*, resurgent in cities like Bologna and London. And yet far from insisting on any sovereign freedom of the vanguard individual, **Luther Blisset** seeks an entirely new subjective formation: "Any single body-mind [any -dividuum] is endlessly invested by vertical fluxes of communications which supersede the boundaries of the individual body and create an unsettled, ready-made community of singularities. Con-dividuality... a multiple singularity whose unfolding entails new definitions of 'responsibility' and 'will.'"

The collective antics of the London or Bolognese psychogeographical societies may seem inconsequential, like some improbable Situationist revival. But their ideas recently became harder to ignore when the eco-anarchist group *Reclaim the Streets*, using a networked invitation to share a strategy and a proper name, was able to spark politically oriented street parties to demonstrate against

19 | Richard Barbrook,
"Cybercommunism,"
1999, at <<http://tao.ca/fire/nettime/0140.html>>.
Barbrook's
references to the
gift-economy are
usefully
complemented by
Saul Albert, "Open
Source Tactics for
Collective Art
Practices,"
1999, at
<www.nettime.org/nettime.w3archive/199903/msg00137.html>.

**20 | See "GNU
General Public
License," Free
Software
Foundation, at
<wwwipd.ira.uka.de/~ToolMan/jcvs/License.html>.**

**21 | All my
references to the
Luther Blisset
Project have been
culled from "The
Ultimate Luther
Blisset Website,"
<www.syntac.net/lutherblissett/index.html>; the
final quotes are
translated from the
book, *Mind
Invaders: Come
fottere i media. Manuale di
guerriglia e
sabotaggio
culturale* [ROME:
CASTELVECCHI,
1995].**

finance capitalism in over 40 countries on June 18, 1999, with a ten-thousand-strong "Carnival Against Capital" in the City of London, and an equally large "Carnival of the Oppressed" in Port Harcourt, Nigeria.²² Behind these events lay the insurgency of the Zapatistas, with their international "Encuentros" in Mexico in 1996 and Spain in 1997. And the recent protests in Seattle, for the opening of

22 | See the *Reclaim the Streets* archive
at
[www.gn.opc.org/
rts/archive.htm](http://www.gn.opc.org/rts/archive.htm).

23 | For a theoretical text on political activism in the wake of Zapatista practice, see Harry Cleaver, "Computer-linked Social Movements and the Global Threat to Capitalism," at [www.eco.utexas.edu:80/
Homepages/
Faculty/Cleaver/
hmchtmppapers.html](http://www.eco.utexas.edu:80/Homepages/Faculty/Cleaver/hmchtmppapers.html).

24 | Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. M. Nicolaus [LONDON: PENGUIN, 1973/1857-58], pp. 705-6 for this and the following quote.

25 | André Gorz, *Misères du présent, richesses du possible* [PARIS: GALIËE, 1997], p. 72; Gorz critiques the excessive optimism of the group around Toni Negri, who theorize the emancipatory potential of what they call "mass intellectuality," in reference to Marx's notion of general intellect.

the "millennium round" WTO meetings, revealed to the public the extent to which the world's political subjects were at last finding their place in what Jameson had called the "global multinational and decentered communicational network" of contemporary capitalism.²³ After a long, extremely diverse period of mental mapping, a new dispute over value has finally arisen on the global stage, and within the intimate, subjective realms of experience where art is made.

WHO GETS THE CREDIT? ★

If the finance economy has begun to raise such opposition, it is because capital itself, at the outset of the twentieth-first century, has become a fiction. And this is surely its destiny: in a few astonishing pages of the *Grundrisse* on the productive power of "general intellect," Marx observes that with the progress of science and technology, "the creation of real wealth comes to depend less on labor time and on the amount of labor employed than on the power of the agencies set into motion... the human being comes to relate more as watchman and regulator to the production process."²⁴ The tremendous advance in automation over the last half-century has effectively led to the worker's increasing autonomy from the mechanics of production. In Marx's vision, the ultimate result would be the creation of entirely new standards of value: "As soon as labor in the direct form has ceased to be the great well-spring of wealth, labor time ceases and must cease to be its measure, and hence exchange value [must cease to be the measure] of use value." An entirely different distribution of wealth is now possible, on the basis of new measures. But as André Gorz reminds us: "Autonomy in labor matters little in the absence of the cultural, moral, and political autonomy that completes it; and this does not emerge from productive cooperation in itself but from militant activity and from a culture of insubmission, rebellion, fraternity, free debate, and radical questioning

[the kind that goes to the root of things], with the dissidence that such questioning produces.”²⁵ An exhibition like *Worthless [Invaluable]* can be used by its publics in exactly this way, to gain the cultural and imaginary freedoms that technology alone cannot supply. Art can become the locus of a fundamentally political use value, inherent in [and not prior to] the processes of cultural and intellectual exchange.

Everyone will have their own ideas about the profusion of practices, the satires, the symbolic inventions and alternative uses that accompany the apogee of capitalist development in the precarious and dangerous phase called “globalization.” I would simply like to close with three brief examples, two from within the choices of the show and one more from the indistinct world of urban myth and rumor. The first concerns the *Banques de questions* invented by **François Deck**. These “question-banks” take the initial form of a checkbook, stamped with the name of the “branch,” devoted to a given group or particular theme, and accompanied by a statement sketching out the contours of a problematic field of inquiry. Each contributor fills in one of the checks, not with an answer, but with a question, signing and dating it as is the custom when dealing with banks, but adding two keywords to confront the contemporary problem of data. As **François Deck** writes: “There is a certain condensed knowledge in the question that can allow one to navigate rapidly through information. This condensation and speed encourage transitions between different fields, permitting new proximities.”²⁶ The questions are effectively “banked” in computer files, where they can be recombined by links between the keywords; but their real worth emerges most powerfully in the face-to-face sessions where questions are created, validated, and recirculated according to protocols favoring open, egalitarian speech.

What are these questions, if not a search for the kind of relational symmetries that the Kula shell-traders found in their clan identities, which allowed them to recognize the fitting partners for an exchange? In our more complex and open societies, a thousand procedures of reciprocity must still be invented to allow distant individuals to meet, to trade information, to share ideas and enthusiasms. Much of the best contemporary art is about the invention and expansion of exactly such procedures, which help to constitute what is called “civil society.” But by adopting the external form of semi-privatized money [the bank check], **Deck**’s work also signifies the political stakes of an expansion of free interchange: the possibility to pool forces and research to regain some democratic control over the transnational corporations and investment funds, with their highly sophisticated yet often anti-social mechanisms of exchange. I think it is fitting that this metaphorical significance of the question-banks should have been revealed, to me at least, by one of **Deck**’s correspondents, **Evelyne Massoutre**, who in the midst of an extended debate about authorship sent him the apparently simple question: “Who gets the credit?”

26 | “Banques de questions,” checkbook by **François Deck**, 1995.

Perhaps no other single question points more precisely to a possible transformation of today's speculative economy—on the condition that the position of the author/signatory is itself transformed.

The example of **Marcel Broodthaers** sufficiently underscored the impasse of a sovereign artistic consciousness, conceiving the artistic work as the projection of a preexistent personal integrity, a centrality of the self. This is undoubtedly an historical limit of the bourgeois culture which grew up in the age of nineteenth-century liberal individualism. **Deck**'s process, like the work of so many artists today, seeks to be immediately dialogical, engaged in the experience of questioning before producing any positive "expression." It calls less for commentary than for active participation, which can go so far as to change the very rules of the game. Again it is a matter of discovering "new definitions of responsibility and will," new intersubjective formations. Perhaps it is through

27 | To grasp these ambiguities and potential manipulations, one has only to think of the great defender of "open society" in the former Eastern bloc, **George Soros**, the speculative financier who reaped enormous profits from the international stock-market meltdown of 1997-98, even while pleading for a regulation of the world economy in his book *The Crisis of Global Capitalism* [LONDON: LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY, 1998]. Cf. my own essay on "Transnational Civil Society," in *ReadMe, Filtered by nettime* [BROOKLYN: AUTONOMEDIA, 1999], republished in **B. Holmes**: *Hieroglyphs of the Future* [ARKZIN/whw, ZAGREB 2002]

this kind of open engagement, accepting the premise of "condividuality," that the cultural alternatives of civil society can be developed across national frontiers, to enter the transnational realm where power inheres today—the realm of Europe's converging currencies, for example, which this exhibition questions from outside the purview of the monetary union's sovereign institutions, but from within the single world economy that binds us all together.

Still there will always be difficulties, objections. The question-banks, for instance, could easily be conceived as too intellectualist, too close to **Habermas**'s ideal [and unrealizable] model of the public sphere. And the highly ambiguous model of civil society must itself be constantly reexamined, given the manipulations to which it is prey.²⁷ No doubt the reality is that reciprocities are many, and there is no need to look for a single, all-embracing form. This is where the "museum of the street" project becomes so intriguing. The initial idea was apparently to go into a decaying quarter of Bogotá and document its existence, before the speculators' bulldozers arrived to start the process of "revalorizing" the potentially expensive urban ground. But how to get in contact with the people, justifiably suspicious of anyone setting foot in their neighborhood? The best answer that the "*Cambalache*" collective found was to load up an old rag-picker's cart with whatever odds and ends they could find lying around, and then go out for a little bartering. Sure enough, soon the cart was filled with other things, tokens of broken-

down use values from far-off corners of everyday life. Rather than preserving them as pathetic relics, the collective proposes to trade them again, in other similarly decaying quarters of Bogotá or of each new city where the piece is shown. So that instead of an objective fact we have a living allegory of face-to-face exchange. It is a real and symbolic proposal which asks a question in its own way: how to enlarge civil society, not extensively but emotionally, qualitatively? How to carry the critique of abstract exchange across the intangible boundaries of class and culture? How to embody the doubt that art paints on the monetary sign, and make it an active, affective force in the world as it exists, with all its borders, its quarters, its crossings? A text borrowed from **Hakim Bey** puts the question differently: "Is it possible to create a SECRET THEATER in which both artist & audience have completely disappeared—only to re-appear on another plane, where life & art have become the same thing, the pure giving of gifts?"²⁸

The centerless, costless distribution of informational products, the fictional aspect of credit money, the glaring inequalities of capitalist globalization, the sense of promise and danger unleashed by technological change: all these realities have offered artists a fresh chance to intervene directly on the measures of value, and to confront them with their opposites or others. The interventions can be subtle, relational, symbolic, secret; but they can also be spectacular, with ambitions on the scale of the forces at play. Here is where avant-garde artists might learn something from urban mythology: after writing a book on how to make a number one single [*The Manual*], then successfully applying the recipe, the British pop group **KLF—Kopyright Liberation Front**—invested the proceeds of their success in the most satirical action known to capitalist man, the 1994 documentary *Watch the K Foundation Burn A Million Quid*.²⁹ £1,000,000 worth of ashes in exchange for a few reels of commercially worthless film: the absurd fiction of pop-star wealth in a decaying, top-heavy society became the pretext for screenings all over Britain, to meet the motley public face to face again. And in the debates that followed the projection, the burning question was for the others, not for them: "ALL THEY ASK OF YOU IS TO TELL THEM WHY" read the poster for the film... ●

[text for the exhibition *Worthless [Invaluable]*,
at the Moderna Galerija, LJUBLJANA, FEBRUARY 2000]

28 | See the
Cambalache website
at
<[www.geocities.com/
Soho/Exhibit/7490/
secret.html](http://www.geocities.com/Soho/Exhibit/7490/secret.html)> and
Hakim Bey, T.A.Z.
[BROOKLYN:
AUTONOMEDIA,
"ANTICOPYRIGHT"
1991], p. 40.

29 | The true web-
crawler goes
straight to:
<[www.geocities.com/
SunsetStrip/Alley/
2399/
KLFAQ.html#toc](http://www.geocities.com/SunsetStrip/Alley/2399/KLFAQ.html#toc)>
to find all the
trenchant tales of
the million quid,
along with the
maybe-true story of
KLF's first artwork,
Nailed to a Board,
as well as savory
details on the
infamous "Worst
Artist of the Year"
prize, awarded to
Turner Prize-winner
Rachel Whiteread in
1993...

**I look from my window | down
to the square | at workers still
queuing | patiently there | for
market forces to provide |
what history's so far denied |
for a different kind of
fate | than to labour
long and always wait...**

Pet Shop Boys: To Step Aside

[words & music Neil Tennant & Chris Lowe]

ABOUT A CRITIC WHO MISTOOK A TITLE FOR THE CONTENT

[AFTER SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK]

➤ One of the common reactions of visual arts critics in mainstream Croatian media apropos the *What, How & for Whom* exhibition in Zagreb was a kind of confusion, as if they were wandering through the exhibition hall in certain disbelief, disappointedly asking - so, where is that bloody **Marx** and *Manifesto* at all? One of them even wrote that in "*the monumental building on the Square of the Victims of Fascism he could not even see a trace of him*".

His confusion reminds us of an old **Slavoj Žižek** story about one other, equally bedazzled visitor of another art exhibition in old socialist Moscow, where, among the other works, a painting showing **Lenin**'s wife **Nadezhda Krupskaya** in bed with a young member of the Komsomol, is exhibited. The title of the painting is: "*Lenin in Warsaw*". The bewildered visitor asks a guide: "But where is **Lenin**?", and the guide calmly and solemnly replies: "**Lenin** is in Warsaw".

In the same way, when critics ask: "But where is **Marx** in the *What, How and for Whom* exhibition?", we can calmly respond: "**Marx** is in Warsaw". That is, in exactly those "what, how and for whom" of the process of so-called "transition" from "real-existing socialism" to "real-existing capitalism"!

Marx and the *Communist Manifesto* are not the subject directly illustrated by this exhibition - although for every true nostalgic of Stalinist-type of communism it must be comforting to know that the old rigid Soc-Realist understanding of arts is still very much alive in the culture department of one main Croatian daily newspaper - but the object of this exhibition.

In a strict Lacanian sense, the title names the object that is lacking in the field of what is being depicted. The mistake of the Croatian daily paper's art critic was that he establishes the same relation between the exhibition [art-work] and its title as between a sign and its denoted object, as if the title speaks about the exhibition/art-work from some safe 'objective distance', and he then searches for its positive correspondence in the exhibited works.

And so he poses the question: "But where is that bloody **Marx** here - that is, where is the object indicated by the subtitle of the exhibition - depicted?". But the whole point is, of course, that in this case the relation between the gallery show/artwork and its title is not the usual one in which a title simply corresponds

to what is depicted ['*Landscape*', '*self-portrait*', or '*retrospective*', '*group show*'...]. Here, the title is, so to say, on the same level. It is a part of the same continuity as the exhibition itself. Its distance from the exhibition is strictly internal, it cuts, making an incision into it. Therefore, something has to be omitted, has to fall out from the show: not the [sub]title of the exhibition, but the object which is replaced by the title.

In other words, the title of the exhibition "*What, How and for Whom - on the occasion of the 152nd anniversary of the Communist Manifesto*", functions as the signifying element filling out the vacant place of the missing representation [of the depiction, that is, of Marx himself, of the *Communist Manifesto*]. The field of representation is the field of what is positively depicted, but the problem is that everything cannot be shown. Something must necessarily fall out; 'Lenin must be in Warsaw', and the title takes the place of this void, of this missing, 'originally repressed' representation: its exclusion functions as a positive condition for the



Boris Cvjetanović: *Radnici/Workers*, 1982–99

emergence of what is being depicted. Because, to put it bluntly, if **Lenin** were not in Warsaw, **Nadezhda Krupskaya** could not fool around with the young Komsomolac; if **Marx** & the *Communist Manifesto* were really alive and well in Eastern European countries we would not live/go through/the process of so-called "transition" from Real Socialism to the harsh reality of Real Capitalism, that is, the process of recapitalisation that often takes the form of brutal primitive capitalist accumulation.





If we take the word 'subject' in the sense of 'content', we can say that what we have here is precisely the difference subject/object. 'Nadezhda Krupskaya in bed with a young Komsomol member' is the subject of the picture; 'Lenin in Warsaw' is its object. **Marx** and the *Communist Manifesto* are the object of the "*What, How and for Whom*" exhibition, and the contemporary relations of global capitalism that every day more and more take hold of our lives are its subject.

At Lacan's teaching, the signifier is no longer the simple **Saussurean** material representative of the signified, of the mental representation - idea, but the substitute filling out the void of some originally missing representation; it does not bring to mind any representation, it represents its lack. So, the misunderstanding in the criticism of the Croatian paper is ultimately a misunderstanding about the nature of the representative. The critique misses the fact that the *Communist Manifesto* in the title of the exhibition is a pure reflexive signifier incarnating the lack itself that fills out the void of the lost object.

At the same time, the "real", "true Marx" in the exhibition, not as a private person, individual, historical figure, "womaniser and pornofile", but as a critical, theoretical and ideological position, that place where we actively reactualise Marxist thought, is the analysis of the functioning of global capitalism in the moment of so-called "transition" [or "normalisation"] - or, the object created by the signifying texture itself, that came to exist as the final result of all the fuss around it - curatorial investigation, search for artists, contacts, organisational infrastructure, all texts, articles, discussions, comments and critics... Only through our active search for the actuality of Marxist thought today, of its relevance to contemporary relations of global capitalism, through our repeated failures, can we create what we are searching for.


The paradox that bedazzles critics is that the process of the search itself creates the object which causes it. They overlook the way that they themselves are already part of the play of 'mad' curators and organizers of the exhibition that believe that **Marx** really speaks something to us today. Critics believe that they analyze the exhibition from an objective, metalanguage distance, in the same manner as the confused spectator of the picture "*Lenin in Warsaw*" mistook the title of the painting for a metalanguage description of its content. ●




шоу-арт в (тереза стюард) скап.
шоу-артът е имп (кориана, ет-
киртиен, енрико иако макко)
шоу-артът е од шакира ик-
тарин.




*ready-made adj (15c) 1: made beforehand esp. for general sale <-- sult> 2: lacking originality or individuality 3: readily available -her illness provided a -- excuse -- ready-made n (1882) 1: something (as a garment) that is readily-made 2: an item made in a mass-produced manner 3: connoisseur artist as a comic or a poet of a tongue twisted and displayed as a work of art





o1 | Ivana Keser:
Private Copy, 2000



o2 | Vlado Martek:
Osvijetljeni tekstovi/
Lighted texts, 2000


o3 | Attila Csörgő: Bez
naslova/Untitled, 1999

o4 | Sandro Đukić: o4-
P BIBLIOTEKA 2000/
o4-P LIBRARY 2000,
1998-2000

o5 | Igor Toševski:
Dossier, 1996/7

Martin Margiela
Kris Van Assche

Leading the world.



THE GLOBAL 500

OLIVER RESSLER

➤ The deregulation of the financial and working spheres, which has been progressing since the 1980s, the systematic reduction of barriers to trade and the associated global penetration of the capitalistic world market are being discussed in the media under the term "globalization". Since more and more businesses are taking advantage of this regime to transfer even sophisticated work, such as electronic services to "low wage countries", globalization of the economy in industrial states is equivalent to a loss of jobs. In countries where wages are [too] high, jobs are being lost which are only partly won back in other countries. The balance of jobs is negative, since the transfer is executed in the direction of those locations where productivity is comparatively higher and, thus, the labor cost per product unit is less.⁰¹

The concept of globalization proves itself a very effective enterprise strategy which pits the employees in the north and the south against each other and brings the wages and labor legislation in both hemispheres to the lowest possible level. Through the radical deregulation of the labor markets, production is sub-contracted to suppliers, and thus more and more people are dropping out of regular working relations and ending-up in totally unprotected working conditions. More and more workers are becoming completely "superfluous". Others have to sell their labor power below its value, and work illegally or without social security.

In many industries this means that as the companies'

01 | see: Elmar
Altwater / Birgit
Mahnkopf, *Grenzen
der Globalisierung*,
MÜNSTER 1996

profits rise, the number of jobs are substantially reduced. The globalization of companies therefore means a long-term social rearrangement in favor of capital at the expense of the workers and employees. "Globalization" is therefore not about mandatory necessities. It is a political strategy with which adjustment performances are being claimed and legitimized.

This process of the "liberalization" and "deregulation" of economies is pushed through and enforced by transnational companies through efficient lobbying in governments and in international trade-organizations. Parliaments and citizens are being evaded and not informed. As the MAI negotiations [*Multilateral Agreement on Investment*] could be stopped in 1998 after two years of secret negotiations within the OECD, at the moment negotiations with similar aims are taking place with the exclusion of the public again within the WTO [**World Trade Organization**.⁰² The attempt is undertaken to set companies' rights above the right of states. Companies should get a direct right to go to court with governments, as soon as they fear negative effects on their investments and profits, even for national environmental or social laws. The aim of the negotiations is to enforce the influence of the corporations and to limit drastically the adjustment possibilities of governments at the same time.

This political development directed against the interests of the majority of humanity is also therefore possible because deregulation, flexibility, privatization and structural adjustment programs are given a positive connotation in most media. Yet the failure of neoliberal economic models is completely obvious: the crises in Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, etc. were so dreadful because these countries have been forced to open their markets to goods and capital, and therefore also to currency speculation by the conditions of the international

02 | the "Millenium Round" with negotiations on the "General Agreement on Tariffs in Services" [GATS] or the "Transatlantic Economic Partnership"

03 | see: Iván Saldías, Proteste gegen neoliberalen Kurs - In Chile wächst der Widerstand, ak-analyse und kritik NO. 428, 8. JULY 1999

finance institutions - the World Bank and IMF [**International Monetary Fund**] which are dominated by western governments. "Structural adjustment" for the people living in these countries means the cutting of social services, the loss of state supported basic nutritional means, massive unemployment through the closing of industries rated as unprofitable, and as a result, impoverishment of the population, lowering of life expectancy rates and often homelessness. Since the formerly state owned energy companies were privatized in Chile, the compliant prototype of a neoliberal development, the lights actually turn off three hours a day as the current private company is not able to fulfill its delivery requirements.⁰³ The effects of capitalism on Russian society are so disastrous that they easily place in their shadow the decade long anti-capitalism propaganda of the socialist state regime.

Resistance, however, is slowly forming and not only in the Lacandonian rain forest in Chiapas. In Peru, a nation wide strike against neoliberalism and its effects took place on April 28, 1999 in which a repeal of the agreement with the **World Bank** and the IMF was demanded. Although 80% of the entire economy of Peru was in a standstill on this day, the general strike was ignored by the international media. *The New York Times*, as one of few media, reported the event in a text of altogether sixty words!⁰⁴ Yet in spite of increased critique, the IMF, **World Bank** and WTO denied their guilt in the collapse of entire economies and the resulting social effects.

After all, for at least a few of those involved the neoliberal politics of economic globalization is actually a huge success. While the salaries and wages of the majority of workers and employees have stagnated [and in some states even sunk] the profits of most of the large, globally active companies have grown to unimaginable sums. Presently, of the world's one hundred largest economic actors, there are only forty-nine nations and already fifty-one companies. This ratio will shift even more in favor of transnational companies in the next few years as the world economy in the nineties grows yearly by about 2-3% while the economic power of transnational companies increases by 8-10% per year. Parallel to that, the paradoxical situation exists that in spite of steadily increasing profits, the taxable income of these companies continuously sinks.

It is therefore not surprising that the head of the *Nestlé* company, **Helmut Maucher**, who is also the president of the corporate-lobby-group ICC [*International Chamber of Commerce*] and chairman of the ERT [*European Round Table of Industrialists*], emphatically states at the Geneva Business Dialogue in 1998: "Globalization is already a success. There will always be losers, like everywhere in life, but globalization is almost win-win."

The project, "The global 500" focuses on the transnationally acting "global players", who can be seen as the main protagonists of economic globalization. The 500 largest companies in the world, which are published yearly in a ranking from the financial magazine *Fortune*, form the starting point for several weeks of research which I carried out at the end of 1998 based on annual reports and websites of the companies. The various related lines of argumentation relating to economic globalization chosen from this, form the starting point of the project. The hegemonic globalization thesis was commented on and criticized by employees from unions and NGOs, theorists and an economist in a seventy-six minute video. The dialogue partners were the media theorist, **Charles R. Acland**, the globalization theorist, **Arjun Appadurai**, the US trade unionist, **Andy Banks**, the Mexican trade union chairman, **Aquiles Magana**, a coworker in the NGO "Corporate Europe Observatory", **Olivier Hoedeman**, and the economist **Birgit Mahnkopf**.

This video is the central element of the international exhibition series of the project *The global 500*, which

04 | Earl Gilman,
"El Nuevo Topo"
magazine, 1999

has solo exhibitions in the Galerie Stadtpark in Krems [Austria] and the artist-run centre Truck in Calgary [Canada], and is in the exhibitions *The global 500 and other stories* in W139 in Amsterdam [Holland] and *Social Machine Money* in the O.K - Center for Contemporary Art in Linz [Austria].

Chosen pages from the annual reports of the transnational companies, which address and visualize the important parameters of economic globalization can be seen in a manipulated photographic version in the exhibitions.

Here, "Leading the world" - is advertised by the world's largest airplane manufacturer *Boeing* with little restraint. The decisive question, to where transnational companies are leading this world, remains unanswered. The US trade unionist **Andy Banks**, in the dialogue carried out for *The global 500* regarding this page said: "*Companies are 'Leading the world' in taking high-tech manufacturing to developing countries that don't have the freedom to use it like we have.*"

Companies set the standard for the development of products ["*Quality in product and process*"], but also for labor conditions. With the slogan "Setting the Pace", in an image from *Pfizer*, the manufacturer of the potency pill *Viagra*, workers march in a multi-cultural idyll, in loyal tempo to the welfare of the company. Because everything is subordinated to the welfare of the company it is also not a contradiction when *Boeing* proudly announces in its annual report "Our strength is our people" while in the course of rationalization measures after the merger with the airplane manufacturer *McDonnell Douglas* they lay off 48.000 employees. At the same time [1998] *Boeing*'s net profit climbed to a billion dollars.⁰⁵ Countless further examples of the relationship of mass layoffs and an increase in the company's profits can be found in the "global 500". In addition to economic strengths, also military ones belong to "Leading the world", a condition, which finds its correspondence in the open praise of death bringing weapons systems in the photo with the slogan "Commitments honored".

These pages from the annual reports of the companies were crumpled up for the photo series and photographed in black and white. Through the contextual shift of the pages in the exhibition of "The global 500" the graphics refer to transnational companies generally and their vision of globalization ["*Sharing a vision*"].⁰⁶

05 | see: i.e. *Der Standard*,

02.12.1998

06 | This description
of the nine photos
from "The global
500" was printed in
an insert for the
magazine EIKON NO.
29, 1999.

In many popular analyses, "globalization" is presented as a project which can't be stopped. With concepts such as "turbo capitalism", "casino capitalism" or the "brutal market", the current form of capitalism is described as a type of exception without fundamentally placing capitalist accumulation principles in question. It is suggested that only the most extreme formulations of capitalist trade must be limited or regulated and then the economic system can again be in balance.

In contrast, the project *The global 500* makes room for the assessment that capitalism has never known a "normal" balanced state because its only chance for existence lies in expansion. A relative social security for most citizens in western Europe [i.e. in the eighties] is related to a historically specific situation which was only made possible by a transfer of capital and welfare from exploited regions of the world. A capitalism with a human face seems to have existed in Europe only as long as communism with its inhuman face. The "globalization" of capitalism is therefore not only an economic but also a political process. The decisions to privatize a company, lower import duties, make foreign investment possible, and destroy social states are political decisions.


Resistance to these neoliberal government and company driven policies can, however, be thoroughly successful as the international activities against the MAI negotiations have made clear in an exemplary way. ●



Oliver Ressler,
The global 500,
WIEN: EDITION SELENE,
1999



Oliver Ressler,
The global 500,
HDLU, ZAGREB 2000.



FINANCIRANI
OD SORO SA
SE NAVIGO "KAKO SKUPLJATI NOVAC"

DECENTRALIZACIJA KULTURE — LAZARETI

ZAGREB
NIMA GALERIJE
ZA SODOBEN ART

REKA
BIENALE
MLADIH, NE
DELA VEC

PUBROVNIK
TOLV
GALERIJA

LABIN

SPLIT
IMA NOVO AKADEMIO
TV DELA VERNAN

MODERNA GALERIJA JE ZAPRTA
DANEŠ DELNE PALAT - SVEN STILINOVIC

Mlađi verani
na medju
bow kot starejši

DANEŠ = SANJA IVEKOVIC — BEN XX
— BAKUNICA [fotografija
po Edi Engri]

JUVENTUD
SLIKALO

AMIREJA
EMBRIJO

GECAN TOMO → spominja pravijo govorji

KESER → Šampis (ILIC, GOTOVAC)
idem WEEKEND ART

KRISTINA
LEKO FRITZ

Š V KNJIŽNICI MODERNE GALERIJE UNUBLJANA IN ALV NI LITERATUZE, KATALOGOV O HRV. SCENI

Maja Licul & Jože Barši: *Suvremena umjetnost u Hrvatskoj/ Contemporary art in Croatia* [skica], 2001
Matthieu Laurette: *Pojavljivanja: refundirani proizvodi/Apparitions: Reimbursed Products*, 1997



I. TEZA ★ POLITIKA JE RETKA

Ako je XX vek počeo **Lenjinovim** pitanjem: "Šta da se radi?", pitanjem koje je izumelo politiku kao politiku, kojim se pitanjem završio ovaj vek? Sam Bog zna da se XX vek završio pitanjem: "Da li postoji istorija?" na koje je onaj koji ga je postavio dao jasan odgovor sa kojim se očigledno i sam Bog slaže: "Istorija više ne postoji".

Međutim iza odgovora: "Istorija više ne postoji!" krije se nikad izgovoreni ali podrazumevani kategorički imperativ epohe: "Ne bavi se politikom!". Bavljenje politikom je za doktrinu koja je proglašila kraj istorije, besmislen posao, zaludni gubitak vremena i energije.

Međutim, paradoks stava: "Istorija ne postoji" odnosno kategoričkog imperativa: "Ne bavi se politikom!" je da je istovremeno istinit i lažan, odnosno staljinističkim žargonom rečeno: objektivno je istinit - subjektivno lažan. Istina je da smo ušli u epohu u kojoj politika ne postoji, međutim objektivna laž ove objektivne istine je njena neizgovorena prepostavka da je politika uvek postojala i da je prvi put u istoriji došlo do njenog odsustva.

Dakle, epohalno odsustvo politike kao politike je zapravo odsustvo samo jednog oblika politike. Time smo stigli i do subjektivne laži doktrine o kraju istorije, jer je odsutna samo jedna politika i to ona koja je jedina dostoјna tog imena - emancipatorska politika.

Istorija emancipatorske politike startovala je briljantnom pobedom trećeg staleža u francuskoj revoluciji, nastavljena je kroz čitav devetdeset vek pod imenom proletarijat i klasna borba, zatim Oktobrom 1917. i **Maovim** revolucionarnim ratom četrdesetih, da bi se završila krajam šezdesetih, poslednjom sekvencom emancipatorske politike - kulturnom revolucijom. Dakle, krajam šezdesetih emancipatorska politika je nestala sa istorijske pozornice.

Kada govorimo o lokalnoj situaciji južnoslovenskih naroda važno je naglasiti da su se i oni jednom našli u situaciji da izumeju emancipatorsku politiku. Naime čitav dvadeseti vek južnoslovenskih naroda skupio se samo u pet godina 1941-1945. u emancipatorsku političku sekvencu NOB-a, u pet godina revolucionarnog rata, pet godina u kojima je



izumljen univerzalizam, univerzalizam onih koji su isključeni iz univerzalizma.

II. TEZA ★ ISTINA JE VERNOST DOGAĐAJU

Za nas koji mislimo politiku emancipacije NOB je događaj kome smo verni i sa kojim zadržavamo apsolutni kontinuitet. Naime, u NOB-u su poražena dva tada dominantna i suprostavljena univerzalizma: evrocentrični i staljinistički. Evropa je od 1941-1945. poražena naci-ekspanzionizmom, koji je ništa drugo do prenošenje imperijalnog rata na tlo Evrope: Evropa, neprikosnoveni kolonizator dovedena je u situaciju da bude kolonizovana. To nije samo vojnički poraz već i poraz evropskog duha, poraz njegove inkarnacije u telo evropske kulture devetnestog veka.



Na periferiji Evrope, među narodima bez istorije, grupa jugoslovenskih komunista, odsečena od "majke" SSSR-a, druge dominantne univerzalističke ideologije, odsečena od svog prirodnog tela, tela staljinističke Partije, uz sav rizik odluke, izumeva politiku antikolonijalnog i antistaljinističkog univerzalizma. Univerzalizam isključenih iz univerzalizma je univerzalizam zasnovan na onima koji su iz perspektive dominantnih univerzalističkih diskursa bili otpad - dislocirano seljaštvo i dislocirana staljinistička partija.

III. TEZA ★ DISLOKACIJA JE EMANCIPACIJA

Dakle, dve dislokacije su proizvele dva emancipatorska subjekta - zbeg i proletersku brigadu koji su subjektivacijom u konceptu narodno oslobođilačke borbe uspeli da poraze tri dominantne humanističke ideologije: rasističku, kolonijalno-evrocentričnu i staljinističku. Doslovce ne-ljudi, ljudski otpad, neuspeh interpelacije u tela u kojim su inkarnirani dominantni univerzalizmi su subjekti koji su za nas izumeli politiku emancipacije i proizveli događaj kome smo verni i sa kojim zadržavamo apsolutni kontinuitet. ●



**Arbeit, das allerwichtigste ist die Arbeit
Arbeit, das allerwichtigste ist die Arbeit
»Du mußt die Sachen aufblasen
Denn so wollen es die Leute haben
Und die Lieder mit den schmutzigen Texten, nimm sie ganz so auf
Andy liebte es, Arger anzuzetteln, da war er ganz eigen
Er sagte: »Arbeit, das einzige, was zählt, ist die Arbeit.«**



ARBEIT

CRISTIAN ALEXA r/b. 1968 | živi i radi u New Yorku/lives and works in New York

Autoportret za

Zagreb/Self-portrait

for Zagreb

kutija/81 kg

Komunističkog

manifesta /

box/81 kg of

Communist

Manifesto /

2000



vidi str/see pages 144/5

Velika zapečaćena kartonska kutija ispunjena je izdanjima *Komunističkog manifesta* u tjelesnoj težini umjetnika. **Cristian Alexa** posredno propituje političke i ekonomski odrednice *Komunističkog manifesta*, razmatrajući različite razine prisutnosti. Mjeriti utjecaj politički angažiranog teksta njegovom stvarnom težinom svjesno je absurdna gesta koja upozorava na mnogobrojne paradokse "kraja ideologija". *Autoportret za Zagreb* svojevrsni je autoironični "manifest bez manifesta", prazno mjesto koje prisvaja formu industrijskog proizvoda o čijem sadržaju možemo nagađati, čiji se ideološki naboј odražava težinom neprisutnog tijela.

★ A sealed cardboard box is filled with various editions of the *Communist Manifesto* altogether weighing 81 kg, the actual weight of the artist himself. The work indirectly questions the different political and economical determinants of the *Communist Manifesto* dealing with different levels of presence. To judge the political influence of the text by the actual weight of the copies is a consciously absurd act that points towards the different paradoxes of the "end of ideologies". *Self-portrait for Zagreb* is an auto-ironical "manifesto without the manifesto", an empty site that appropriates the form of an industrial product whose content is for viewers to guess, and whose ideology is expressed by the weight of a non-present body.

DAMIR BABIĆ

Pozor/Attention

prostorno instalacija/

installation

2000



r/b. 1962 | živi i radi u Zagrebu/lives and works in

Zagreb

Prostorna instalacija *Pozor* sastavljena je od vertikalno postavljenih štapova kojima je na oba kraja pričvršćena guma za odštopavanje kakvu nalazimo u gotovo svakom kućanstvu. Konstrukcija se proteže punom visinom galerijskog prostora u prostornoj kompoziciji koja se može zaobići, ali u koju se može i ući, premda takva cirkulacija ne djeluje na zatvorenost vakuumski začepljene sustava. Na pokušaj uspostavljanja protoka i uklanjanja začepljenja ukazuje naprava čije je djelovanje posve nefunkcionalno i dekorativno, kao što se i otvorenost različitih društvenih sustava pokušava uspostaviti sredstvima koja ih dodatno opterećuju i zatvaraju.


★ The installation *Attention* is composed of vertically placed poles, on both ends of which a plunger [common household

device with a rubber suction cup used to clear the plumbing system] is attached. The construction stretches across the whole height of the gallery space, forming a space composition that can be entered into but also easily avoided, since such circulation does not affect the vacuum-closed, clogged system. The device attached to the poles indicates an attempt to re-establish circulation, but its function is solely decorative, just as the openness of various social systems is often attempted to establish by means that just additionally burden and close them.

**MAJA LICUL
& JOŽE BARŠI**

Zagreb

video, 2000



**Suvremena
umjetnost u
Hrvatskoj/
Contemporary art in
Croatia, 2001**

vidi str/see page 140

**ML r/b. 1970; JB r/b. 1955 | žive i rade u Ljubljani/live
and work in Ljubljana**

Video snimljen u Zagrebu bilježi razgovor o lokalnoj likovnoj sceni između Maje Licul i Jože Baršija te kustosica izložbe **Ana Dević**, Nataše Ilić i Sabine Sabolović. Na temelju tog razgovora i literature dostupne u Ljubljani umjetnici su konstruirali sinkronijski i dijakronijski pregled situacije suvremene likovne scene u Zagrebu kao pokušaj komunikacije na osobnoj razini, te nastavak komunikacije prekinute početkom devedesetih u širem kontekstu likovnih zbijanja. Propitivanje i prakticiranje metoda historizacije i povijesti umjetnosti kao simbolnog kapitala koji treba osvajati u dalnjoj se razradi pretvara u svojevrsni dokument, plakat koji se poput letka nudi bećkoj publici.

★ A video shot in Zagreb documents a conversation about the local art scene between **Maja Licul** and **Jože Barši**, and the curators of the exhibition "*What, How and for Whom*", **Ana Dević**, **Nataša Ilić** and **Sabina Sabolović**. Based on that conversation and the literature available in Ljubljana, the artists constructed synchronic and diachronic views of the contemporary art scene in Zagreb, as an attempt to communicate on a personal level and to continue the communication between artistic circles, interrupted at the beginning of the nineties. In Zagreb, the video was shown accompanied by the sketch of the most important artists and artistic happenings. The questioning and practicing of the methods of hystorization and the history of art as the symbolic capital that has to be won, in the further elaboration turn into a document, a poster to be offered to the audience in KUNSTHALLE EXNERGASSE in Vienna as a leaflet.

ELDINA BEGIĆ r/b. 1976 | živi i radi u Londonu i Sarajevu/lives and works in London and Sarajevo

Liječenje/Healing

odjeća, medicinski
zavoj/clothes,
medical bandages

2000



Eldina Begić izlaže svoju omiljenu odjeću zakrpanu medicinskom gazom, preispitujući njezinu trajnost, kao i općenito trajnost predmeta koji su nam dragi. Dopušta li nam potrošačko društvo u kojem živimo sentimentalnu vezanost uz predmete koji su istrošeni od upotrebe i čija funkcija, barem na prvi pogled, više ne postoji? Moraju li biti zamijenjeni "novim i boljim" ili mogu biti izliječeni, baš kao i uobičajene, često nametnute, potrošačke navike?

★ The work is composed of the artist's favorite clothes, patched together by medical bandages. It examines the general issue of permanence of things we care about. Is it still possible in contemporary consumer society to maintain emotional relations towards things that are used up and whose function is not visible at first sight? Do they have to be replaced by "new and better" things or can they be healed, just like common and often not necessary consumer habits?

EMESE BENCZÚR r/b. 1969 | živi i radi u Budimpešti/lives and works in Budapest

Tjedna potrošnja i

proizvodnja. Plod
moga rada/ The
consumption and
production of a
week. The fruit of
my labour

vez na limunovoj kori
/ embroidery on
lemon peel

1996

Limunova kora doima se kao bezvrijedni i banalni ostatak svakodnevice koji umjetničinom intervencijom - strpljivim procesom vezenja rečenice *Plod moga rada* - zadobiva novu vrijednost. Upućujući na sveprisutnu uvjetovanost tržištem, taj rad propituje nestabilan i kontradiktoran status umjetničkog rada u ekonomskom kontekstu. Istodobno, to fragilno dokumentiranje razmjene i potrošnje dobara bilježi i neumitnost ponavljanja istovjetnih matrica u vremenskim intervalima.

★ A lemon peel, a worthless and banal discard of everyday life, acquires a new value via artistic intervention - through the embroidery of the text *The fruit of my labour* onto the lemon peel. By pointing toward the omnipresence of market relations, it questions the unstable and contradictory status of artistic work in the context of economy. At the same time, this fragile documentation of goods production and exchange also reflects the inevitable repetition of identical matrices of time intervals.



ATTILA CSÖRGÖ r/b. 1965 | živi i radi u Budimpešti/lives and works in Budapest

Bez naslova/Untitled


drveni štapovi,
konopac, utezi,
električni motor/
wooden sticks,
string, pulley wheel,
electric motor
1999

Drawing Machine

magnet,
gramophone, glass,
iron dust
1992

Neobični objekti-mašine Attila Csörga propituju gibanje materije i transformacije solidnih formi u nestabilnim stanjima kontinuirane mijene. *Bez naslova* dio je serije što varira forme pet osnovnih geometrijskih tijela koja se mogu upisati unutar sfere. **Platonova** interpretacija tih geometrijskih tijela kao simbola elementa na kojima je utemeljen čitav univerzum izravno je utjecala na konstrukciju serije. Sustav se sastoji od mreže drvenih štapića, niti, utega, elektromotora, a različiti, uobičajeni alati i vijci poslužili su kao utezi koji uravnotežuju korespondencije geometrijskih tijela koja se u polaganom gibanju pretapaju jedna u drugo. Nastali objekt je mobilna skulptura, pulsirajuće tijelo koje logici stroja pridaje kvalitete duhovnosti i ljepote. Jedinstveni objekti manufakturne izrade Attila Csörga plijene hipnotičkim iluzionizmom i neprekidnim traženjem ravnoteža unutar nestabilnih uvjeta.

★Atilla Csorgo's unusual objects-machines deal with movements and transformations of solid forms in unstable states of continual changes. *Drawing Machine* is a simple structure composed of a gramophone whose movement helped by a magnet draws a drawing on a glass plane covered with iron dust. *Untitled* is part of a series that varies the forms of five basic geometric bodies that could be inscribed into a sphere. Plato's interpretation of these geometric forms as symbols of elements on which the universe is based upon directly influenced this series. The system is composed of a net of wooden sticks, strings, weights and motors, and various common tools serving as weights that balance the correlations of geometric bodies, transforming them from one form to another. The produced object is thus a mobile sculpture, a pulsating object that provides the logic of the machine with sublime qualities of beauty, hypnotic illusionism and a constant search for balance in unstable conditions.



vidi str/see page 133

MARIJAN CRTALIĆ

Ekonomizacija

frizure/Hairstyle

economizing

video, 8'

2000

r/b. 1968 | živi i radi u Zagrebu/lives and works in Zagreb

Minimalnim otklonima od uobičajenog Marijan Crtalić re-petitivne geste i monotone procese održavanja svakodnevnog životnog ritma pretvara u neobične i duhovite rituale na granici besmislice. Video dokumentacijom vlastitog svako-



dnevnog šišanja i brijanja autor nudi pogled u svoju privatnost i intimu, istodobno oneobičavajući monotone procese održavanja higijene i kreiranja *imagea*. Siže videa je jednostavne strukture: prateći jednolični irritantni zvuk brijanja aparata, Crtalić spontano pjeva, improvizirajući vlastitu "mantru" koja se nadrealno pretapa sa zvukom aparata.

★ Monotonous processes of everyday life have been transformed into unusual and amusing rituals on the verge of the nonsensical. The video-documentation of the artist's rituals of shaving himself offers an insight into the artist's privacy, at the same time estranging the regular processes of maintaining personal hygiene and actions of personal image production. The artist has turned the irritant and monotonous sound of the shaving machine into music combining the machine noise with his own personal "mantra" song.

**BORIS
CVJETANOVIĆ**

Radnici/VWorkers
14 c/b fotografija/
14 b/w photos
1982-99



vidi str/see page 130

r/b. 1953 | živi i radi u Zagrebu/lives and works in Zagreb

Serijska fotopovratak *Radnici*, snimana u autentičnom tvorničkom okružju, problematizira temu rada u društvenom kontekstu. Ogoljenim, elementarnim odnosima interijera i ljudskog lika unutar crno-bijele fotografiske slike, usredotočenošću na neposrednost i ekspresiju autentičnog radnog okružja, serija evocira atmosferu američke socijalne fotografije tridesetih godina. Unutar duljeg vremenskog perioda koji zahvaća i razdoblje političkih i ekonomskih promjena posljednjeg desetljeća serija bilježi zastrašujuću "istost" dehumanizirane radne atmosfere.

★ This series of photographic portraits shot in factories problematizes the issue of work in a social context. B/w photos evoke the atmosphere of American 1930s documentary photographs. Produced over a longer period of time, this series also includes recent political and economical changes; simple and basic relations between interiors and human faces render visible the "sameness" of de-humanized working conditions.

SANDRO BUKIĆ
04-P Biblioteka
2000/04-P Library
2000
video, alarm, stol,

r/b. 1964 | živi i radi u Zagrebu/lives and works in Zagreb

Mali kućni filmovi s putovanja i bivanja kod kuće, kompjutorski razbijeni na frejmove otisnute i pomno numerirane na stranicama knjige, transformiraju banalnost svakodnevnog

stolice, polica, knjige/ video, alarm system, table, chairs, shelves, books, 1998-2000 potencirajući jedinstvenost i kvalitetu - kako slike tako i realnog trenutka. Naličje procesa - umnožavanje, ponavljanje, teror arhiviranja, redundantnost podataka, proizvoljnost sistema - upisuje fragmente privatnosti u jednoliku mrežu koja dokida distinkciju privatno/javno.

**Biblioteka
[04P_005_04] 2001/
Library**

[04P_005_04] 2001

video, knjige, stol, stolice, polica, c/b fotografija/video, books, table, chairs, shelves, b/vv photo

2001 vidi str/see page 133

DARKO FRITZ r/b. 1966 | živi i radi u Zagrebu i Amsterdamu/lives and works in Zagreb and Amsterdam

**vrijeme=novac
=vrijeme=novac/
time=money=time=
money=**

2000 - akcija/tram action
16/06/2000, Zagreb
internet dokument/
internet document

[http://
members.ams.chello.nl/~fritzd/projects](http://members.ams.chello.nl/~fritzd/projects)

time

**mapa grafika/
portfolio of prints,
izdavač /published by
Atelier Horvat, tisk /
printed by Horetzky**

**kompjutorska
instalacija/computer**

installation


2001

vidi str/see page 59

Akcija Darka Fritza vrijeme=novac=vrijeme= unosi faktor nestabilnosti u cirkulaciju strukture prometa. Akcija se realizira kao kružna vožnja oko trga nabijenog povijesnim referencama. Umjesto da tramvaj obide trgi produži ulicama koje se račvaju, on kruži oko trga dok se na oglasnom displayu pojavljuje tekst vrijeme=novac=vrijeme=, a isti tekst dopire i sa zvučnika. Tramvaj, idealni ambijent rasterećen referenci, ne-mjesto koje se iscrpljuje vlastitom svrhovitošću, u diskontinuitetu je s trgom kao mjestom, relacijskim, historijskim mjestom bremenitim konfliktnim identitetima.

Znak za vrijeme, reducirani sat, i znak za novac, dolar, dodani su u font tramvajskog displaya. U jednom od procesa koje pokreće tramvajska akcija znakovi se umnažaju u kompjutorskoj animaciji na Internetu i u mapi grafika, otvarajući se ekonomskoj cirkulaciji robe i informacija.

★The action time=money=time= brings the factor of instability into traffic circulation. This action is realized as the circular driving around the city square loaded with historical references. Instead of going around the square and heading along the forking streets, the tram circles around and around the square, while the message time=money=time= appears on the advertising display, and the same text is broadcast over a loudspeaker. A tram, the ideal ambiance, free of all references, a non-place defined solely by its pur-



pose, is discontinued from the town square as a place, a relational, historical place pregnant with conflicting identities. A symbol of time, a reduced clock, and a currency symbol, the dollar sign, have been added into the existing font of the tram's advertising display. In one of the processes triggered by the tram action, the symbols get multiplied in computer animation and in a portfolio of prints, and enter the economic circulation of goods and information.

**JEAN-BAPTISTE
GANNE**

**Ilustrirani Kapital
[Skica]/The
Illustrated Capital
[The Sketch]**

kolož/collage
2000 8 2001

vidi str/see page 99

r/b. 1972 | živi i radi u Nici/lives and works in Nice

Ilustracija Marxovog *Kapitala*, sastavljena od fotografija nazvanih prema poglavljima *Kapitala*, koje umjetnik poput fotoreportera snima u najrazličitijim prilikama radeći na materijalu spektakularne pojavnosti suvremenog kapitala u stupnju akumulacije u kojem on postaje slika.

★ The illustration of Marx's *Capital* composed of photos entitled by chapters of the *Capital*, that the artist, acting like a photo-reporter, recorded in various situations, working on the material of spectacular appearance of contemporary capital at the level of accumulation when it turns into an image.

TOMISLAV GOTOVAC

Rezervoardoksapartaband

6 saobraćajnih znakova
/6 traffic signs

2000
supported by:

Continental Film

Zagreb, Croatia

Pismorad d.d.

**Performance
Rocks in My Bed**

20/06/2001

Kunsthalle Exnergasse

VVUK, Beč/Vienna

r/b. 1937 | živi i radi u Zagrebu/lives and works in Zagreb

Raznolike umjetničke aktivnosti Tomislava Gotovaca opisuju se terminom *Paranoia View Art*. Gotovčev rad uvijek je inkorporiran u širu kontekstualnu mrežu koja suodnosi film, svakodnevni život, umjetnost i politiku.

Rezervoardoksapartaband sastoji se od saobraćajnih znakova čija je forma preuzeta iz stvarnog sistema. Zamjenjujući kodificirane boje prometnih znakova Gotovac prisvaja formu znaka i kreira nove objekte. Upotreba boja nije slučajna - Gotovac njome evocira likove filma Quentin Tarantina "Reservoir Dogs" [Mr. Orange, Mr. White...]. Upućujući hommage Quentinu Tarantinu, a posredno i Jean Luc Godardu, Gotovac trasira vlastita ishodišta i pripadnost. Široka asocijativna kontekstualna mreža zahvaća: procese kodiranja značenja u zatvorenim i otvorenim sistemima, izražajne mogućnosti boje na filmu, ideoološke aspekte filma, popularnu američku kulturu, utjecaj filma na život, politički potencijal umjetnosti...

★ The different artistic activities of Tom Gotovac could be described by his term *Paranoia View Art*. His work is always





vidi str/see page 190

incorporated into a broader context that relates film, everyday life, art and politics. *Rezervoradoksapartaband* is composed of traffic signs whose form is appropriated from real traffic regulation. Changing the regular colors of traffic signs, Gotovac creates new objects, and the usage of color evokes characters from Quentin Tarantino's movie "Reservoir Dogs" [Mr. Orange, Mr. White...]. Gotovac's hommage to Tarantino, and indirectly to Jean Luc Godard, outlines its own origins and general context. The broad flow of association includes processes of meaning formation in open and closed systems, expressive possibilities of color in film, ideological aspects of the film, influences of popular American culture, influences of film in daily life, political potential of film...

IGOR GRUBIĆ

Bez naziva [Iza

zavjeselj/Untitled

[Behind the Curtain]

prostorno
intervencija/site-
specific work

2000.

Starren Sie Nicht So

Romantisch

natpis na platnu/

print

2001

r/b. 1969 | živi i radi u Zagrebu/lives and works in Zagreb



Po završetku 2. svjetskog rata do početka devedesetih u zgradi današnjeg izložbenog prostora HDLU-a nalazio se MUZEJ REVOLUCIJE. Istaknuti hrvatski slikar Edo Murtić pedesetih je godina jedan od zidova oslikao freskom socijalne tematike, ispred koje je početkom devedesetih izgrađen novi zid i freska je zatvorena. Probijajući malu okruglu rupu u zidu, Igor Grubić otvara pogled na fresku i na prošlost koju je vladajuća nomenklatura 90-ih nastojala zaboraviti.

€ U predstavama Bertolda Brechta pozornicom bi povremeno prošao glumac noseći natpis "Ne buljite tako romantično". Premještajući taj natpis u galerijski kontekst, Grubić izaziva gledatelje da umjetnost percipiraju ne kao ljudsku aktivnost izdvojenu iz "realnog života", već kao skup postupaka određenih konkretnim društvenim i političkim okolnostima, kao realnost koju umjetnost tvori, ali i mijenja.

★ The MUSEUM OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTION was located in the building of the GALLERY OF CROATIAN ASSOCIATION OF ARTISTS, up to the beginning of the 1990s. In the 1950s, painter Edo Murtić, an important figure of Croatian modernism, painted a fresco with social motifs, which was covered up by a new wall built in front of the fresco at the beginning of the 1990s. By making a small peephole in the wall, Igor Grubić has opened up a view to the fresco, but also to the history that the leading nomenclature of the 1990s tried to forget and erase.

€ In the plays by Bertolt Brecht, an actor would occasion-

vidi str/see page 190/191



ally pass across the stage carrying the caption *Do not stare so romantically*. By transferring the caption into a gallery context, **Grubić** challenges the viewer to perceive art not as a human activity and illusion excluded from "real life", but as a set of procedures defined by very concrete social and political circumstances, as a reality shaped but also changed by art.

**ALEKSANDAR
BATTISTA ILIĆ** r/b. 1965 | živi i radi u Zagrebu/lives and works in Zagreb
Gamma-Rays


Industrial Body Art

inkjet print

2000

Plakat umjetnika izloženog medicinskom tretmanu svojevrsna je demistifikacija žanrovske tradicije same umjetnosti, dok spektakularizacija ekstremne privatnosti upisuje bolest, segment socijalnog života obično izoliran iz sfere javnosti, u istu matriku koja regulira civilizacijski propisan tretman liječenja. Svjetlosni crtež na tijelu kao urođenički *tattoo* integrira bolest u svijet.

★The poster of the artist exposed to medical treatment is a certain de-mystification of the genre tradition of art, while spectacularization of extreme privacy inscribes an illness, a segment of social life usually isolated from the public sphere, into the same matrix that regulates culturally constructed medical treatments. Drawing by light onto the body, as a kind of native tattoo, integrates the illness into the world.



IRWIN

Dušan MANDIČ + Miran MOHAR + Andrej SAVSKI + Roman URANJEK + Borut VOGELNIK | umjetnička grupa osnovana u 1983. u Sloveniji. IRVWINI žive i rade u Ljubljani/artistic group founded in 1983, Slovenia. IRVWIN live and work in Ljubljana

Tijekom devedesetih grupa IRWIN zaokupljena je konceptom NSK države u vremenu, koja unutar različitih projekta privremeno prisvaja prostore svojih realizacija simularajući paralelni državni instrumentarij i njenu ikonografiju. Ovaj rad retrospektivno obuhvaća do sada realizirane projekte ambasada i konzulata NSK države u vremenu, realizirane u Moskvi, Gentu, Umagu i Firenci.

★ During the 1990s, IRWIN was developing the concept of NSK state in time, appropriating different spaces for its realization and simulating parallel state apparatus and its iconography. This set-up forms a certain retrospective of projects of embassies and consulates realized by 2000 in Moscow, Ghent, Umag and Florence.

€ Ursula Noordung's teddy bears utilizes the developed market strategy to distribute IRWIN toys in toyshops, museum and gallery shops etc.

"...Can a teddy bear be the object of mechanism that motivates shopping? Can something as fragile as childhood, safety and memories be a part of marketing strategy? Will a teddy bear prick up her ears when she hears the market formula /Action, Interest, Desire, Attention/? The answer is certain: YES. At the moment when Ursula Noordung is invited into the area of market and exchange, when the price tag is placed around her neck, when she becomes the object of prices and discounts, her mark - a black cross - becomes a trademark, a logo of market competition with the rest of the teddy bear world."

[excerpt from a text written by Marko Rogač,
art director of the advertising agency PRISTOP, 1994]

**Ursula Noordung**

medvjedice, police/
she-bears, shelves

1994-2000 vidi str/see page 190/191



Nada Dimić File
work in progress
Repetitio Est Mater
[Nada Dimić]
performans/
performance
HDLU, 16/06/2000

SOS Nada Dimić
intervencija na
fasadi tvornice Nada
Dimić/intervention
on the facade of the
factory Nada Dimić,
Zagreb, June 2000

Nada Dimić File
maketa/wooden
model
[model by Boro
Kovačević]

U galerijskom performansu umjetnica preko zidne projekcije pisma Nade Dimić pisanog u 2. svjetskom ratu prepisuje tekst pisma reinvestirajući u kolektivnu memoriju. Akcijom restauriranja neonskog natpisa *Nada Dimić* na zgradi tekstilne tvornice koja je devedesetih preimenovana u *Endi International*, a danas je u stečaju, kao i organizacijom besplatnog pravnog savjetovališta za radnice tvornice, mapiranjem kolektivne prošlosti i zastrašujućeg ekonomskog trenutka sadašnjosti, ostvaruje se komunikacija s publikom koja nije dio umjetničkog sustava, te se preispituju modeli alternativni trenutnom ekonomskom sustavu [a u koji je uključena i proizvodnja umjetničkih predmeta] kao što su: razmjena, darivanje i recikliranje [znanja, ideja, vještine, roba].

Godinu dana kasnije tvornica je napuštena i zapečaćena, a sudbina otpuštenih radnika, uglavnom žena koje tradicionalno rade u tekstilnoj industriji, još je neizvjesnija. Izrađujući maketu tvorničke zgrade, vrijednog primjera rane industrijske arhitekture, **Sanja Iveković** je "konzervira" za budućnost.

★ In the gallery performance, the artist writes over a letter - written during the WWII by national heroine **Nada Dimić** - projected onto a wall, thus reinvesting into collective memory. The artist restored the neon sign *Nada Dimić* on the facade of a textile factory that went bankrupt - named after **Nada Dimić** during the socialist decades and renamed in the 1990s to *Endi International* - and also organized free legal advice for women about to lose their jobs. **Sanja Iveković** traces the collective memory and the frightening present time, realizes communication with a public that is not a regular part of the notorious art world, and also questions the alternative models of economic systems [art objects not excluded] such as: exchange, gift-giving and recycling [of knowledge, ideas, skills, goods, etc.]

A year later, the factory is abandoned and closed, and the destinies of the women [traditional working force of the textile industry] are even more uncertain. By making an architectural model of the factory building, a valuable example of industry architecture in Zagreb, **Sanja Iveković** "conserves" it for the future.



KURT&PLASTO r/b. 1971/1970 | žive i rade u Sarajevu/live and work in Sarajevo

Dobar, loš, zao/

Good, Bad, Ugly

5 reklamnih plakata/

5 advertising posters

2000


set razglednica /set

of postcards

2001

Serija lažnih oglasa realizirana je kao serija reklamnih plakata ili razglednica. Rad se odnosi na ekonomski uvjeti i oglasno djelovanje u poslijeratnim uvjetima Bosne i Hercegovine, ali i na širi fenomen zaštitnih znakova i imena kao garantije kvalitete i zadovoljenja djetotvorne čak i u svojim lažnim verzijama.

★ This series of fake advertisements was realized as a set of posters or postcards. The work refers to the economical conditions and functioning of advertising strategies in the post-war conditions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also to the broader phenomena of brand names as the guarantee of quality and satisfaction valid even in their fake versions.



KRIŠTOF KINTERA

Talkmen

2 lutke, zvuk/2 dolls,

sound

1999

Neće biti bolje/

It won't be better

graffiti

2001



r/b. 1973 | živi i radi u Pragu/lives and works in Prague

Serija *Talkmen* neobična je postindustrijska, duhovita i govorljiva varijanta alienirane persone - bezličnih "manechina" - čestog modernističkog motiva.

Kintera svoje nadrealne statične figure bez lica zaodijeva u dječačku odjeću, a sporno pitanje njihova identiteta uslojava se različitim ubrzanim audio zapisima koji lutke povremeno emitiraju, lucidno komentirajući različita goruća socijalna pitanja i probleme. Sučeljavanjem nekoliko figura u prostoru stječe se dojam kakofonije i automatske reprodukcije govorenja "u prazno".

★ *Talkmen* are post-industrial, funny and talkative versions of alienated persona - faceless manechinos, motifs typical for modernism. Dressed in boy clothes, their identity is multiplied by the lucid comments they deliver on various pressing issues of contemporary life, making cacophonous and automatic sound reproductions of "empty talk".

€ The graffiti series *It won't be better* is realized through cardboard models hand-made by the artist, composed of stylized human figures and textual messages that shortly and humorously comment general conditions of contemporary life. The graffiti is realized along the stairway leading to the gallery located on the 1st floor of the former industrial factory, but also spread like a virus inside the gallery space.

vidi str/see page 38

ŽIGA KARIŽ r/b. 1973 | živi i radi u Ljubljani/lives and works in Ljubljana

Teror=Dekor/

Terror=Decor

akrilik,iverica/
acrylic, formica

1999



Serijska slika TEROR=DEKOR za motiv uzima lijevi terorizam koji je harao Zapadnom Evropom 1970-ih godina. Karakteristični prizori RAF-a ili Crvenih brigada na motociklima i portret državnog neprijatelja br. 1 **Carlosa**, uz blagu ironiju nastavlja mit o posljednjem herojskom razdoblju klasne borbe u Evropi. Slike potiču nostalgična sjećanja na davno prošle sedamdesete godine jer su oslikane tada modernim kolorističkim kombinacijama namještaja, kao što su zelenonarančasto, purpurno-smede, te su uokvirene psihodeličnim okvirima koji također pripadaju sedamdesetim godinama. Svaka slika uključuje i fotografiju sretne kućanice u modernoj kuhinji.

★ The series of paintings titled TERROR=DECOR takes its motifs from the left-wing terrorism that rampaged across Western Europe in the 70s. The characteristic scenes of RAF or *Brigate Rosse* terrorists on motorbikes and a portrait of **Carlos**, public enemy N°. 1, with a touch of irony, foster the myth of the last heroic era of class struggle in Europe. The images stir nostalgic memories of the long gone 70s, as they are painted in the then fashionable "furniture" color combinations, e. g. orange-green, purple-brown, and additionally framed in decorative psychedelic frames also belonging to the 70s. Every painting also includes a photograph of a happy housewife in a modern kitchen.

IVANA KESER r/b. 1967 | živi i radi u Zagrebu/lives and works in Zagreb

Private Copy

novine/newspapers

2000



U projektu *Izložba lokalnih novina*, koji **Ivana Keser** razvija od 1994. godine, umjetnica uzima ili lokalne novine za vlastite intervencije u galeriji ili u javnom prostoru, ili proizvodi vlastite privatne novine koje sama piše, ilustrira i izdaje. Ti projekti predstavljaju njezin osobni pogled na odnose između lokalnog i globalnog, prikazujući ono globalno kao rezultat lokalnog djelovanja. Novine kao simbol konstrukcije službene realnosti podložne su različitim manipulacijama, kao i korekcijama temeljenim na subjektivnom iskustvu, što je pozicija koju **Ivana Keser** radikalizira izdajući vlastite novine u kojima upotrebljava fotografije i tekstove kojima komentira različite aspekte suvremenog života.

★ In the project *Exhibition of local newspapers* that **Ivana**

Keser has been carrying out in different cities since 1994, she either uses locally published newspapers for her own interventions in a gallery or in a public space, or she produces her own private newspaper that she writes, illustrates and publishes herself. These projects represent her personal view of the relations between the local and the global, showing the global as being the result of local actions. The newspapers as a symbol of construction of official reality are susceptible to various manipulations, as well as to corrections based on subjective experience, which is a position that **Ivana Keser** radicalizes by publishing her private newspaper, where she uses her photos and texts, making her own comments about life and contemporary society.

IVAN MARUŠIĆ KLIF
8 Ostali/8 Others

**DJ's Guide to
Communist
Manifesto/Zvučni
vodič kroz Manifest
komunističke partije**
s/together with
Vjeran Šalamon
[mama],
17-18/06/2000.
15 - satni zvučni
performans /
15 hours sound
performance

r/b. 1969 | živi i radi u Zagrebu/lives and works in

Zagreb

Dvodnevni, višesatni zvučni performans odvijao se 16. i 17. lipnja 2000. u prostorijama *net.kulturnog kluba mama* usporedno sa simpozijem. **Ivan Marušić Klif** u obraćanju suradnicima rekao je otprilike sljedeće: "Naš je zadatak: u najrazličitijem zvučnom materijalu detektirati tragove ideja vezanih uz KM [povijest, revolucija, novac, roba, rad, kapital, proleter, komunist]. Svi su izvori i nosači zvuka dopušteni i dobrodošli. Svi su statusi zvučnog materijala ravnopravni i zadržavaju svoje ničim otudivo pravo biti eksplotirani na sve zamislive načine, digitalno obrađeni, promijenjeni do neprepoznatljivosti, uništeni... Svaki od suradnika odabire i prikuplja materijale po vlastitom nahođenju. Tako je finalna zvučna slika rezultat prožimanja nekoliko nezavisnih i osobnih interpretacija teksta, te svih slučajnosti u trenutku izvođenja. Opseg sirovine je širok: pop, rock i klasična glazba, dokumentarno-povijesni tonski zapisi, izbor tekstova različitog podrijetla, tekst KM-a, dijelovi nekih razgovora, zvukovi simpozija koji se odvija u susjednoj prostoriji..."

U KUNSTHALLE EXNERGASSE performans se odvija 20.06.2001. za vrijeme otvorenja izložbe, a zvučni se zapis emitira na Internetu i lokalnoj bečkoj radijskoj postaji.

★ The sound performance by **Ivan Marušić Klif** was performed for 15 hours at the opening weekend of the exhibition "What, How & for Whom" in Zagreb on June 16 and 17, 2000 in Zagreb. **Klif** aimed to detect traces of ideas related to the *Communist Manifesto* [history, revolution, money,

vidi str/see pages 43, 132





DJ's Guide to the Communist Manifesto, If I had a Hammer
Kunsthalle
Exnergasse VVUK,
Vienna, 20/06/2001,
radio broadcast

RASSIM KRASTEV
Korekcije/Corrections
15 fotografija/
15 photos,
1996-1998
Autoportret s GSM-om/Self-portrait with GSM
inkjet print, 1998
vidi str/see page 64



Autoportret s cigaretom/Self-portrait with cigarette
video, 9', 1995

commodity, work, capital, workers, communists...] by using various sound materials. All sources of sounds were welcome. All statuses of sound material were treated equally, and they held on to their right to be exploited in various ways, digitally edited, changed to become non-recognizable or even destroyed... All participants were invited to choose and input sound material as they saw fit. Thus, the final sound image is the result of the interrelations of several independent and individual interpretations of the text, as well as of accidental events during the performance. The scope of materials is wide: pop, rock and classical music, documentary sound recordings, different texts, the *Communist Manifesto* text, and also the sounds coming from the conference held in Zagreb on June 16 and 17, 2000. This performance was also realized during the opening of the exhibition *What, How & for Whom* in KUNSTHALLE EXNERGASSE in Vienna on June 20, 2001, and was broadcasted through Internet and local Vienna radio station.

r/b. 1972 | živi i radi u Sofiji/lives and works in Sofia

Projekt Korekcije dokumentacija je procesa preoblikovanja umjetnikova tijela. Redizajn tijela postignut je specifičnim *life-styleom*: prakticiranjem body-buildingu uz konzumiranje proteina i vitamina, te zdravom prehranom bez alkohola, cigareta i opijata. Umjetnik svoje tijelo tretira kao instrument, a identitet se radikalno mijenja.

S druge strane, umjetnikovi autoportreti svjesno upućuju na narcističku prirodu potrošačkih imperativa po principu "prije - poslije". Upotrebom mobitela, zlatnog lanca i cigarete kao statusnih atributa vidljiv je i specifičan utjecaj tranzicijske svakodnevice.

★ The project *Corrections* is a documentation of the process of re-designing the artist's body. Body re-design is achieved by a specific life-style: practicing bodybuilding, vitamin and protein consumption, healthy food without alcohol, cigarettes and drugs. The body is treated as an instrument, and its identity is changed radically. In contrast, **Rassim**'s self-portraits point toward the narcissistic nature of the consumption imperatives of "before" and "after" miracles. The status symbols of the mobile phone, gold chain and cigarettes relate it to specific influences of life in "transitional" circumstances.

IGOR KUDUZ r/b. 1967 | živi i radi u Zagrebu/lives and works in Zagreb

Spavaća soba/ Bedroom

2 c/b fotografije/ 2 b/w photos

2000

Bez naslova/ Untitled

fotografije kaširane

na konzolama /

photos mounted on


wooden construction

1999

Par c/b fotografija u masivnim okvirima, presnimaka iz maketarskih časopisa, s motivom zaustavljene lokomotive, dio je serije medijskih manipulacija slika složenih u parove naslovljene prema tipičnim prostorijama stambenih prostora. Kao što par ne mora biti cjelina već početak serije, tako i ono što je jednako nije nužno jednako. Istovjetna digitalna obrada slike realizira se u vremenu ispisa koje ih diferencira, a i sami digitalni podaci trpe minimalne izmjene ovisne o promjenama strujnog napona.

★ This pair of b/w photos in massive frames, showing re-takes from model makers' magazines, with the motif of the locomotive stopped in motion, is part of a series of media manipulations of paired images and entitled by typical rooms in apartments. That which seems to be a pair is not necessarily a pair, but perhaps the beginning of a series. Identical digital manipulation of the images that differentiates them is realized at the time of printing, while the digital data also suffers from minimal changes due to changes in electricity voltage.

€ Photo re-takes from model makers' magazines, with images from construction sites, are mounted on light consoles that simulate real architectural elements. Eight consoles are set up in the gallery space, in relation to the industrial architecture of the gallery and to other works whose self-sufficiency has been threatened, describing the exhibition space as a permanent construction site.



ANDREJA KULUNČIĆ

Nama: 1908

zaposlenika, 15

robnih kuća / Nama:

1908 employees, 15

department stores

city-light plakati/city-

light outdoor display

posters/urban

intervencija/urban

intervention


Zagreb, June 2000

r/b. 1968 | živi i radi u Zagrebu/lives and works in

Zagreb

Realizaciju plakata potpomogli su: fotografkinja **Mare Milin**, stilist **Robert Sever**, šminker **Saša Joković**, tiskara **M-Ros, Arkzin** pre-press, **Rutta, Europaplakat proreklam, Futura DDB i HDLU**.

Projekt **Andreje Kulunčić** svojevrsna je reklamna simulacija koja, primjenjujući strategiju reklamnih oglasa, problematizira aktualnu ekonomsku situaciju izravno zaposjedajući prostore zagrebačkih *city lightsa*. Nakon dužeg razdoblja komunikacije sa sindikatom nekad najjačeg lanca robnih kuća koji je završio u stečaju, umjetnica je realizirala plakat s jednom od radnica *Name*, koji je, postavljen na ulice



plakat, fotografije,
dokumentacija/
poster, photographs,
documentation
2001

vidi str/see pages
88-89, 91

nekoliko tjedana prije otvorenja izložbe, podsjećao na radnike brojnih poduzeća koja su u burnim tranzicijskim godinama završila u stečaju.

★ The realization of this work was made possible by: photographer **Mare Milin**, stylist **Rober Sever**, make up artist **Saša Joković**, M-Ros printing, **Arkin pre-press**, **Rutta**, **Europaplakat proreklam**, **Futura DDB** and **Croatian Association of Artists**.

Andreja Kulunčić's work simulates commercial advertisements and directly occupies the public space of Zagreb's outdoor backlit displays, utilizing the strategy of commercial advertisements in order to deal with the current economical situation. In cooperation with the workers' union of *Nama*, once a successful chain of department stores that was facing bankruptcy at the time of this realization, **Andreja** produced a poster depicting one worker and placed it in the backlit displays a few weeks before the exhibition opening, reminding the public of the workers from many factories that went bankrupt during the 1990s.

**MATTHIEU
LAURETTE**

Pojavljivanja:
**refundirani
proizvodi/**
Apparitions:
**Reimbursed
Products**

video instalacija/
video installation,
cca/app 30', 1997

r/b. 1970 | živi i radi u Parizu/lives and works in Paris

Apparitions: Produits Remboursés je video i novinska dokumentacija koja je u periodu od 1996. do 1997. bilježila reakcije medija na konceptualnu i dosljednu odluku umjetnika da proizvode i sve za život neophodne potrepštine ne kupuje već da ih nabavlja na alternativne načine. Umjetnik je razvio različite legalne strategije unutar zadalog sistema a svojom je radikalnom praksom **Laurette** privukao i medijsku pažnju publike i postao svojevrsnom "zvjezdom". Ovaj rad bilježi različita umjetnikova pojavljivanja u medijima koja su otpočela njegovim nastupom i "triumfalnim" osvajanjem medalje u poznatom francuskom TV showu *Je passe à la télé / I'm on TV*.

★ **Apparitions: Produits Remboursés** is a video and magazine documentation that records media reaction to the artist's decision not to buy products necessary for living but to supply them in alternative ways between 1996 and 1997. He developed various legal strategies within the system, which also attracted media attention, turning the artist into a "star". The work documents his various media records starting with his triumphant winning a medal in the French TV show *Je passe à la télé / I'm on TV*.



vidi str/see page 141

YURI LEIDERMAN r/b. 1963 | živi i radi u Moskvi/lives and works in Moscow

Pregača radnika iz

19. stoljeća, raketa s

**1,2,3,4 prozorića i
mali Kidanj / 19**

century vworkman's

apron, rockets with

1,2,3,4 portholes

and small Kidan

instalacija/

installation

2000

Jukstaponiranjem nekoliko neobičnih objekata: radničke pregače, mitskog stvorenja medvjedića, ručno izrađene imitacije svemirskih raket **Leiderman** slaže enigmatičnu cjelinu koja je posredno inspirirana likovima njegovog fikcionalnog prozognog teksta. Izvorni autorov tekst oslanja se na poetiku "zauma", te na neobičan i sofisticiran način polemizira odnos Istoka i Zapada, ne oslanjajući se pritom na historijske, folklorne i ostale "realne" entitete, nego pokušavajući primijeniti autorov moto "konverzije geopolitike u geologiju i poetiku".



€ Kad sam bio dječak imao sam, naravno, svoju izmišljenu zemlju, koja se zvala Crnomorija. Ina vlasti je tamo, naravno, bila Komunistička partija Crnomorije. Kasnije, kad sam odlučio da je komunizam kod nas u Crnomoriji već izgrađen, pojavilo se pitanje promjene naziva vladajuće partije i, u skladu s tim, pitanje što može biti "bolje od komunizma". Tražeći inspiraciju, prelistavao sam tada priručnik "Zemlje i narodi svijeta", gdje su se navodili nazivi najvažnijih političkih stranaka

prema stanju 1970. godine. Jednoznačan odgovor nisam našao, ali je Komunistička partija Crnomorije na kraju krajeva bila preimenovana u Partiju sveopće sreće.

Prije nekoliko godina sam u antikvarijatu nabavio isti sovjetski priručnik "Zemlje i narodi svijeta" iz 1970., i on je poslužio kao osnova za moju knjigu [Liječnici-ribiči i Partije sveopće sreće]. Iz polaznog priručnika ispisao sam nazive svih navedenih političkih partija [272 naziva] i preveo ih na francuski jezik. Dalje sam izdvojio sve "atribute" ili, jednostavno rečeno, one "dobre" riječi od kojih se formiraju nazivi partija - "demokratski", "socijalistički", "narodni", "progresivni", itd. itd. - takvih "ciglica" ispaljeno je oko 80. Složio sam ih po abecedi i svakome od njih dodijelio neki znak koji ima veze s ribolovom. Na toj osnovi za svaku sam partiju sastavio ornament, koji se sastojao od označitelja riječi koje se nalaze u njenom nazivu. Mnoge partije - kao npr. "demokratska" pojavljuju se u nekoliko zemalja istodobno. U tom slučaju ispred naziva takve partije stoji odgovarajući broj ornamentalnih traka. [YURI LEIDERMAN]


★ By juxtaposing several unusual objects - a worker's apron, a mythical teddy bear creature, a hand-made space rocket model - **Leiderman** composes an enigmatic whole that is indirectly inspired by characters from his fictional text. The author's original text is based on the poetics of "zaum" and, in an unusual and poetic way, it questions the relations between an East and West not grounded in historical, ethnic or other "real" factors, but tries to apply the author's motto of "converting geo-politics into geology and poetics".

€ When I was a boy, of course, I had my imaginary land called Crnomorija. Naturally, the power was in the hands of the Communist Party of Crnomorija. Later, when I decided that communism in Crnomorija was already established, the issue of changing the party's name took place, and consequently, the question of what might be "better than communism". In my search for inspiration, I looked through the manual "Countries and peoples of the world", where they listed the names of the most important political parties in 1970. I did not find a single answer, but in the end the Communist Party of Crnomorija was renamed into the Party of General Happiness.

A few years ago in a second-hand bookstore, I bought the same Soviet manual "Countries and peoples of the world" from 1970, and used it as the basis for my book [Doctors-fishermen and Parties of General Happiness]. From this manual I took all the titles of political parties [272 titles] and translated them into French. Later I extracted all the attributes, all those "good" words that form the titles of political parties - democratic, socialistic, people's, progressive etc. - there were some 80 attributes. I arranged them in alphabetical order and assigned one sign connected to fishing to each of them. On that basis I constructed an ornament for each party, composed of signifiers in the title of the party. Many attributes - for example, "democratic" - appear in several countries at the same time. In those cases, I placed a corresponding number of ornamental rows in front of the title of such a party. [YURI LEIDERMAN]

PROJECT MADE WITH THE SUPPORT OF ART3, VALENCE, FRANCE

Liječnici-ribiči i
Partije sveopće
sreće/Doctors-
Fishermen and
Parties of Common
Happiness
2001



KRISTINA LEKO	r/b. 1966 živi i radi u Zagrebu/lives and works in Zagreb
Zg proza i vijesti/Zg prose and news	ZG proza i vijesti je narativni video kolaž koji pokriva period od kolovoza 1999. do ožujka 2000. godine, s jednim karakterističnim danom za svaki mjesec. "Odabirući dijelove iz kolektivnog [HRT] i osobnog dnevnika [KL], držala sam se jednostavnog zahtjeva: podastrijeti sve osnovne informacije o sebi i zemlji iz koje dolazim. Video rad ovom prilikom izlažem u ambijentu svoje dnevne sobe." [KRISTINA LEKO]
Her 25802ND Day	
video, 11'	
2000	

montaža/edited by

Bruno Gvozdanović

€ *Jedan po jedan, 10 portreta cvjećarica na maloj tržnici u gradiću u sjevernoj Hrvatskoj. Dob svake žene precizno je izračunata u danima.*

Osim tog podatka uvijek se nudi i cijena cvijeća prikazanog na ekranu, u lokalnoj valutu i u američkim dolarima. Na kraju svake sekvence kupujem cvijeće. To je moja podrška lokalnoj tržnici cvijeća.

Zatim sam uzela svo cvijeće koje sam kupila i kameru te sam ušla u najbližu žensku krojačku trgovinu. Poklonila sam im cvijeće. Iznenada sam osjetila inspiraciju i kupila si top i suknju.

Video je zapis spontane komunikacije u području preciznog izvodačkog čina. Kamera je ili na stalku pokraj ili u mojim rukama. S kamerom u ruci nema prave kontrole nad time što se i kako snima - kamera je tek alat dokumentacije.

Video se na vrlo izravan način bavi položajem lokalne ekonomije, ženskim položajem i veseljem života.

KRISTINA LEKO



★ *Zagreb prose and news* is a narrative video about the period of the artist's life from August 1999 to March 2000, in which one particular day is chosen for each month. "By choosing segments of the collective [Croatian TV] and the personal [KL's diary], I was trying to perform a simple task: to give all the basic information about myself and the country I come from. At this exhibition I show the video in the surroundings of my living room." [KRISTINA LEKO]

€ *One after another, 10 portraits of women selling flowers at a small town market in northern Croatia. The age of each woman is precisely counted in days.*

Next to this information, there is always the information




about the price of the flowers displayed on the screen, in local currency and in US dollars. At the end of each small sequence I buy the flowers. That was my support to the local flower market.

Then I took all the flowers I bought and my camera and I entered the closest dressmaker's shop. I gave them all the flowers as a present. And suddenly, I was so inspired that I bough myself a top and a skirt.

The video is a recording of the spontaneous communication within the realm of a precise performance act. The camera is either on a tripod nearby or in my hands. With the camera in my hands there is no real control of what & how the recording goes - the camera here is a tool of documentation only.

The video, in a quite direct way, deals with the position of local economics, women's position and joy of life.

KRISTINA LEKO



ZBIGNIEW LIBERA r/b. 1959 | živi i radi u Varšavi/lives and works in Varsavv

Placebo

suppositorji/
suppositories

1995

Ljubožnošću/

Courtesy **Zacheta**

Gallery Varsavv



Rječnička definicija za placebo je "naziv za tobožnji lijek, tj. za potpuno nedjelotvornu supstancu koja se katkada daje bolesnicima [umjesto pravog lijeka] da bi se izazvalo autosugestivno djelovanje". Placebo učinak ukazuje na interpasivnost, frenetičnu aktivnost koja služi kako bi se relocirala fundamentalna pasivnost, a koja otvara mogućnost izazivanja stvarnih učinaka u njihovom društveno kodificiranom obliku.

★The dictionary definition for placebo is "false medicine, completely non-efficient substance that is sometimes given to ill persons [instead of real medicine] in order to induce an auto-suggestive effect". The placebo effect is also about inter-passivity, the frenetic activity that serves just to relocate fundamental passivity that at the same time opens the possibilities of real effects in their socially codified form.

VLADO MARTEK r/b. 1951 | živi i radi u Zagrebu/lives and works in Zagreb

Ciklus Džepovi/

Pockets series

tekst/texts,
ready made,
2000

**Polagani radovi/Slow
works**

tekst, grijezdo,
olvake/texts, nests,
pencils, ready made
2000

**Osvijetljeni
tekstovi/Lighted
texts**

tekst, žarulje/
texts, light-bulbs
2000

**Dučan kolonijalnom
robom/Colonial
Goods Store**

akcija/action, 2000

Martekovi duboko u jezik ukorijenjeni radovi istražuju složene odnose re-označavanja, sučeljavanja i pretapanja verbalnih i vizualnih znakova. Autorovo poimanje jezika kompleksan je amalgam filozofskih i poetičnih elemenata koji uključuju različite slikovne, tekstualne znakove i *ready made* objekte u organsku nedjeljivu cjelinu. Martek prisvaja i rekombinira postojeće sadržaje i materijale, a svojom progresivnom praksom združivanja različitih nespojivih elemenata uz mnogobrojna, kompleksna i socijalno angažirana značenja proizvodi i snažne vizualne i poetične efekte: absurd i humor.

★**Vlado Martek's** textual works deal with the complex issues of re-signifying, facing and merging of verbal and visual signs. The author's understanding of language is a complex amalgam of philosophic and poetic elements that compose the organic unity of different visual and textual materials and ready-made objects. Martek appropriates and re-combines various contents producing complex and socially relevant meanings, as well as strong visual and poetic effects, both absurd and humorous.

vidi str/see pages 132/3

KOBE MATTHYS r/b. 1970 | živi i radi u Bruxellesu/lives and works in Brussels

Agencija

[Kompjuter]/Agency

[Computer]

Baza podataka o

upotrebljavanju

vlasništva/

Uses of property

database

1999 —



Vrtovi/Gardening,
Zagreb, 2000

Agencijina online baza podataka razmjenjuje informacije o načinima na koje upotrebljavamo vlasništvo u svakodnevnom životu. Bilo koji koncept vlasništva ovisi o društvu u cijelokupnoj njegovoj složenosti. Vlasništvo se opisuje kao kompleks pravnih odnosa između i unutar subjekata [osoba] prema objektima [stvarima]. Subjekti mogu biti pojedinačne osobe ili zajednice, poput gradova ili nacija. Objekti mogu biti konkretni, poput pokretnih i nepokretnih dobara, ili apstraktни, poput dionica i vrijednosnica, patena ili autorskih prava. Iako je osobno vlasništvo norma u kapitalističkim društvima, a društveno vlasništvo je bilo norma u nekadašnjim komunističkim, zajedničko je evropskom sustavu vlasništva da generalizira o vlasništvu i široko regulira njegovu upotrebu. Ali načini na koje ljudi koriste jedno te isto vlasništvo [svojinu] su bezbrojni. Oni su nepredvidivi i slijede svoju vlastitu logiku. Na prvi pogled čini se da se različiti načini upotrebe na istom mjestu i / ili u isto vrijeme međusobno previše ne razlikuju, ali ako ih se bolje pogleda, otkrivaju se različite namjere.

Ovu bazu podataka tvore podaci koje šalju njeni korisnici. Podatke zatim obrađuju i prevode njeni administratori. Bazu podataka možete naći na www.agency-computer.com

★ The Agency's online database exchanges information about the ways we use property in our everyday life. Any concept of property is dependent on society in its entire complexity. Property is described as the complex of juridical relationships between and among subjects [persons] with respect to objects [things]. The subjects may be single persons or communities, such as cities or nations. The objects may be tangible, such as immovable land or movable goods, or intangible, such as stocks and bonds, a patent, or a copyright. Although private property is a norm in capitalistic societies, while community property was a norm in former communist societies, what distinguishes the European property system is that it generalizes about property and it regulates extensively the use of property. But the ways in which different human beings use one and the same property gives way to innumerable practices. These practices are unforeseeable and obey their own logic. On the face of it,



different uses that happen in the same space and/or at the same time do not seem to differ very much from each other, but upon a closer look, one can discover different underlying intentions.

This database constitutes its data through the participation of its users. Information is posted by database users and is then edited and translated by a group of database administrators. You can access the database through <http://www.agency-computer.com>.

Zajedničko vlasništvo

Naše ponašanje u tehnokratski uređenom i kontroliranom prostoru i vremenu - u gradskom i prigradskom zajedničkom vlasništvu u kojem se krećemo kao korisnici, ne može se predvidjeti. Čak i kad se slijede propisane norme, uočava se upotreba u osobne svrhe koje uopće nisu predviđene za to zajedničko vlasništvo. Tim ponašanjem mijenjaju se prostor i vrijeme neke zajednice. Čim te promjene postanu sastavni dio okoline [događaju se na istom mjestu i u isto vrijeme], takve "radnje" počinju potiskivati plan. *Agencija* sakuplja podatke o takvim tragovima iskorištanja vaše zajedničke okoline. Na koji je način koristite? Kojim se trikovima služite kad se u njoj krećete? Kako je koristite u vlastite svrhe?

Agenciju je pokrenuo **Kobe Matthys** 1992. u Frankfurtu na Majni kao projekt za mrežu suradnje. U međuvremenu se mreža proširila i na druge gradove kao što su Aachen, Amsterdam, Antwerpen, Bruxelles, Fribourg, Graz, Lisbon, Toronto, Zagreb... Suradnici *agencije* su **Andreas Behr, Lieven Deboeck, Alexandra Dementieva, Romana Perećinec, Wilfried Prantner, Mafalda Ribeiro dos Anjos, Rebecca Verreth, Tristan Wibault, Elke Zimmermann, Guy Zurkinden...**

Pravnim terminima agencija se opisuje kao uzajamni odnos povjerenja između nekoliko ljudi. Prva strana [agent] pristaje djelovati za drugu stranu [principal] naspram treće strane [javnost]. Agent je posrednik; agencije mogu djelovati u ime svih i nikoga. Poput svih agencija, *agencija* aktivno sudjeluje u stvarnosti identitetom ne-identiteta, stoga je i realna i fiktivna. Nudi sredstva ne praveći razliku između proizvoda i usluge.

Communal property

Our behavior in technocratic and controlled space and time - urban and suburban communal property, in which we move as users, cannot be predicted. Even when the norms are followed, one can see different uses not predicted for that particular communal property. These behaviors change the space and time of the community. As soon as these changes become a regular part of the environment [they occur at the same place and at the same time], these "actions" start to

suppress the plan. The agency gathers data on such traces of uses of communal environment. How do you use it? Which tricks do you use when you move around? How do you use communal property for your own purposes?

The agency was established in Frankfurt a. M. in 1992 by **Kobe Matthys** as a set-up for a network of collaborations. In the meantime, this network has developed in other places, like Aachen, Amsterdam, Antwerp, Brussels, Fribourg, Graz, Lisbon, Toronto, Zagreb ... Collaborators of the agency are **Andreas Behr, Lieven Deboeck, Alexandra Dementieva, Romana Perećinec, Wilfried Prantner, Mafalda Ribeiro dos Anjos, Rebecca Verreth, Tristan Wibault, Elke Zimmermann, Guy Zurkinden...**

In legal terms an agency is described as a mutual relationship of trust between several people. The first party [an agent] agrees to act for the second [a principal] *vis-à-vis* the third [a public]. The agent is the person in between; agencies can act on behalf of everyone and nobody. As with all agencies, the *agency* takes an active part in reality with an identity of non-identity. Therefore it is both real and fictitious.

The *Agency* offers facilities without making any difference between products and services.

IVO MOUDOV r/b. 1975 | živi i radi u Sofiji/lives and works in Sofia

Jedan sat prednosti/

1 hour priority

video, 60'

2000



Jedan sat prednosti dokumentacija je akcije umjetnikove vožnje automobilom u jednom od prometnih čvorova u središtu Sofije. Dok se umjetnik jedan sat vozio uokrug putanjom koja ima pravo prvenstva, ostali vozači su ga "legalno" propuštali. Preuzimajući povlašten položaj unutar prometnog sistema, vozač se u biti besciljno vozio uokrug. Prisutni su i elementi pop-kulture koji vožnju automobilom definiraju kao životni stil i zabavu.

Prometni sustav prikazuje se kao napet suodnos mnogo-brojnih učesnika, kao prostor svakodnevne borbe i sukoba u kojem je osnovno pravilo - što brže, uz što veću uštedu vremena doći na željenu lokaciju.

★ *1-hour priority* documents the artist's action of driving a car along one of the roundabouts with heavy traffic in the center of Sofia. By driving for an hour round and around this roundabout with a "legal" priority, the artist takes over the privileged position within the traffic system and uses it for an aimless drive. The elements of pop-culture that define car driving as a part of life-style and fun are also present. The traffic system is perceived as an inter-relation between many participants, as a space of everyday conflicts where the main rule is how to reach one's destination as fast as possible and with maximum time utilization.

EDI MUKA	r/b. 1969 živi i radi u Tirani/lives and works in Tirana
Poboljšati život ljudi/Improving people's lives	Nekoć poznati a danas gotovo zaboravljeni sloganji komunističkog albanskog vođe Envera Hoxhe i jugoslavenskog predsjednika Josipa Broza Tita transparentnošću svoje potrošenosti, baš kao i sloganji kompjutorskog mogula Billa Gatesa, ukazuju na njihovu međusobnu zamjenjivost kao jedinu konstantu u vremenu.
notpsi/captions styrofoam letters	
2000	★ The once well-known but today almost forgotten slogans of Albania's communist leader Enver Hoxha, and ex-Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito, as well as the slogans of computer mogul Bill Gates, are so transparently exhausted that they point toward their mutual interchange as the only constant in time.
Precious tips for the [Western [Austrian] investors [taken from the in-flight magazine of Tyrolean Airways]	★ Enlarged prints of the texts with instructions for the efficient business behavior of Western investors in Eastern European countries directly and highly pragmatically describes the power relations between the economically set apart worlds of the East and West.
digital print	
2001	
vidi str/see pages 60-61	
OLA PEHRSON	r/b. 1964 živi i radi u Stockholmu/lives and works in Stockholm
Yucca Invest Trading	
Plant	Svi živi organizmi, biljke jednako kao i životinje i ljudi, ne-prestano emitiraju odredene električne impulse čije amplitudo variraju ovisno o vanjskom i unutrašnjem okružju organizma. Yucca Invest Trading Plant kombinira te informacije s poznavanjem funkciranja burze. Kao primjer tipične kućne biljke urbanog samca karijerista, biljka je korištena u pokušaju stimuliranja tržišno prilagođenog habitusa sličnog onome kakav iskusni burzovni mešetar akumulira u svom živčanom sustavu tijekom godina financijskih transakcija.
Marksističko odijelo/Marxist suit	Tijekom razdoblja od šest mjeseci intenzivnog proučavanja tržišta biljka je hranjena burzovnim podacima kodiranim u električnu struju, u kombinaciji s indeksom koji određuju obilnu ili siromašnu količinu vode i sunčevog svjetla. Nakon proučavanja struja koju biljka proizvodi transformira je u valutu, te putem kompjutora interpretira kao investicijska strategija burze. Dobrobit biljke ostvaruje se samostalno, u skladu s tržišnim pravilima prema kojima se rezultati transakcija konvertiraju u esencijalnu valutu biljke - vodu, svjetlost i zrak.
1997	★ All living organisms, plants as well as animals and human beings, constantly emit certain electric impulses of
Ljuboznošću/	
Courtesy Gallery Axel Mörner	



amplitude that vary depending on the interior and exterior milieu of the organism. *The Yucca Invest Trading Plant* combines this information with stock market know-how. An example of a typical plant for the single urban careerist, the Yucca palm tree has been used in an attempt to stimulate a market adapted habitat similar to that which an experienced stock broker has accumulated in his/her nervous system during years of financial transactions. During six months of intensive market education, the plant has been fed with stock market rates encoded into electrical currents, combined with an index related to the conditioning diet of either generous or poor rations of water and sunlight. After examination the currents of the plant are transformed into currency, as they are interpreted via a computer to investment strategies for the stock market. The welfare of *Yucca Invest* is generated by itself according to market rules when the result of the transactions is converted into the plant's essential currency - water, light and air.

€Pomniji pogled na tipično muško poslovno odijelo pokazuje da je uzorak uobičajenih pruga sastavljen od rečenica Marxovog "Kapitala".

★ A closer look at a typical male business suit discovers that the usual pinstripe pattern is composed of sentences taken from Marx's "Capital".





MARKO PELJHAN r/b. 1968 | živi i radi u Ljubljani/lives and works in

System 7 Ljubljana

light-box

1998. "Progresivna aktivnost u vremenu" Marka Peljhana

kombinacija je tehnoloških logističkih sustava, sredstava i

znanja usredotočena na probleme globalne komunikacije i

interakcije u prostoru i vremenu. Osnovni motiv rada *System*

Microlab II [System 176] je problematiziranje strateških i taktičnih odnosa u društvu,

akvarij, 176 neonskih

ribica/aquarium,

176 neon fish

1999

rad nastao u

kontekstu izložbe

INCOMMENSURABILIS

/work created in the

context of the


INCOMMENSURABILIS

exhibition

★ "Progressive activity in time" by **Marko Peljhan** combines technological logistics systems, means and knowledge, focusing on problems of global communication and interaction in space and time. The basic motif of *System 7* is problematizing the strategic and tactical relations in society, sys-

tems of social changes and communication codes. The artist and his collaborators [from project *Atol*, realized at DOCUMENTA X in Kassel 1998], dressed in "terrorist" costumes, compose frozen "situations" that turns the question "Would you believe these people?" into an unnecessary warning, daring threat or advertising message whose charm we resist just to fall under its spell.

€ The context of *Microlab II [System 176]* is the project of experimental station *Atol*. The installation composed of an aquarium with 176 neon fish repeats the isolated situation of controlled input and output. Living creatures under the care of gallery professionals, in the context of an exhibition that questions the functioning of the economy, appear as a commentary to our everyday survival, and also to the experimental progress of dubious quality.



TADEJ POGAČAR
P.A.R.A.S.I.T.E.
MUSEUM OF
CONTEMPORARY
ART

Pure Beauty

c/b fotografija,

sapuni, light-box/

b/vv photo, soaps,

light box

adresa/address: IRIS

Ilica 19, Zagreb,

June 2000



**Kuhinjska ikona/The
Kitchen Icon**

fotografija/photo

1999

Pure Beauty

c/b fotografija,

sapuni / b/vv photo,

soaps

2000

Osnovan 1990, osnivač Tadej Pogačar živi i radi u Ljubljani/founded in 1990 by Tadej Pogačar, Slovenia.
Tadej Pogačar lives and works in Ljubljana

Složeni projekt P.A.R.A.S.I.T.E. Museum po načelu "parazitizma" seli se u različite muzejske institucije i socijalne strukture koristeći njihove prostorne, materijalne, kadrovske, strukturne i simboličke mogućnosti.

P.A.R.A.S.I.T.E. Museum je "fiktivna", paralelna, umjetnička institucija, mobilna duhovna tvorba koja uspostavlja odnose sa različitim subjektima, muzejskim institucijama, socijalnim grupacijama i simboličnim mrežama. Koncept **P.A.R.A.S.I.T.E. muzeja** ne podrazumijeva specifičan prostor i stalnu zbirku artefakata, već povremeno "prisvanjanje" određenog teritorija i muzejskih predmeta drugih muzejskih institucija.

U inventaru bivšeg ljubljanskog MUZEJA REVOLUCIJE Pogačar je zatekao i fotografiju **Che Guevere** snimljenu za vrijeme njegova posjeta Ljubljani. Primjenjujući korporacijske i medijske strategije, **Tadej** dokumentarni materijal prezentira u novom kontekstu; kao reklamni *appeal* koji prisvaja sadržaje i manipulira političkom karizmom.


★ According to the principles of "parasitism", the project of the **P.A.R.A.S.I.T.E. Museum** moves into different museum institutions and social structures and uses as its material - human, structural and symbolic resources. **P.A.R.A.S.I.T.E. Museum** is a "fictive", parallel art institution that establishes relations to different subjects, museum institutions, social groups and symbolic networks. The concept of the **P.A.R.A.S.I.T.E. Museum** does not have a permanent specific space and collection of artifacts, but temporarily appropriates the territory and museum objects of other museum institutions. In the inventory of the former Ljubljana MUSEUM OF THE REVOLUTION **Tadej Pogačar** had found the photograph of **Che Guevara**, taken on the occasion of his visit to Ljubljana. By utilizing corporative and media strategies, the artist presents documentary material in a new context, as advertising appeal that appropriates contents and manipulates political charisma.

RENATA POLJAK r/b. 1974 | živi i radi u Splitu i Nici/lives and works in Split and Nice
Sjećanja/Memories

video
7'30"
1999

Zvučna i vizualna sličnost riječi *Tito* i *tata* ponovljenim ispisivanjem prazni se od smisla, zadobivajući gestualni potencijal. Zvučna i vizualna ritmičnost potvrđuju repeticiju kao oblik promjene, kulminirajući u techno glazbi oblikovanoj oko zvučnosti riječi. Intimno iskustvo jakih simbola rastače se u ekstrakt pop-politike.

★ The sound and visual proximity of the words *Tito* and *tata* [dad] gets emptied of meaning by repetitive writing, acquiring gestural potential. Sound and visual rhythm confirm repetition as a form of change, culminating in techno-music formed around the sound of words. The intimate experience of strong symbols melts away into an extract of pop politics.



p.RT p.RT [Vladimir RADIŠIĆ i Jovan TRKULJA], umjetnička grupa osnovana 1996 u Jugoslaviji, žive i rade u Novom Sadu/artistic group founded in 1996 in Yugoslavia. Vladimir RADIŠIĆ and Jovan TRKULJA live and work in Novi Sad

Intermedijalni Flash [privatni časopis za savremenu umjetnost]/

Intermedial Flash [private magazine for contemporary art] 1999

Intermedijalni Flash je projekt realiziran kao časopis za suvremenu umjetnost, te kao serija plakata uvećanih stranica časopisa koja u galerijskom zidnom postavu oblikuje environment, totalno okruženje koje ponavlja medijsku prenapučenost koja tvori jedinu realnost koju pozajmimo.

Art Gloves kartonska kutija, sitotisk, papir, guma / cardboard box, silk-screen print, paper, latex 1997

★ *Intermedial Flash* is a project realized as the limited edition of a magazine for contemporary art, and also as a series of posters of the magazine's enlarged pages, that in a gallery set-up becomes an environment that repeats media over-load, the only reality we know.



OLIVER RESSLER r/b. 1970 | živi i radi u Beču/lives and works in Vienna

Global 500

c/b fotografije, video

76' b/vv photos,

video

76'

1999/2000

Boom!

with **David THORNE**

plakati/light-box,

poster

2001

Projekt *Global 500* usredotočuje se na transnacionalno djelovanje "globalnih igrača" koje možemo smatrati glavnim protagonistima ekonomskog globalizacije. 500 najvećih svjetskih tvrtki koje se godišnje ocjenjuju u finansijskom časopisu *Fortune* tvore polazište nekoliko tijedana dugog istraživanja koje sam proveo krajem 1998. na temelju godišnjih izvješća i web-stranica tvrtki. Različiti pravci argumentacije o ekonomskoj globalizaciji tvore ishodište projekta. U 76 minuta dugom video hegemonijsku tezu globalizacije komentiraju i kritiziraju djelatnici u sindikatima i nevladnim udruženjima, teoretičari i ekonomisti. Partneri u dijalogu su medijski teoretičar **Charles R. Acland**, teoretičar globalizacije **Arjun Appadurai**, američki sindikalist **Andy Banks**, meksički predsjednik sindikata **Aquiles Magana**, suradnik u ne-vladinoj udruzi "Corporate Europe Observatory" **Olivier Hoedeman** i ekonomistica **Birgit Mahnkopf**. [OLIVER RESSLER]

★ "The project, *The global 500* focuses on trans-nationally acting "global players" who can be seen as the main protagonists of economic globalization. The 500 largest companies in the world, which are published yearly in a ranking from the financial magazine *Fortune*, form the starting point for several weeks of research which I carried out at the end of 1998 based on annual reports and web-sites of the companies. The various related lines of argumentation relating to economic globalization chosen from this form the starting point of the project. The hegemonic globalization thesis was commented on and criticized by employees of unions and NGOs, theorists and an economist, in a seventy-six minute video. The dialogue partners were media theorist, **Charles R. Acland**, globalization theorist, **Arjun Appadurai**, US trade unionist, **Andy Banks**, Mexican trade union chairman, **Aquiles Magana**, a coworker in the NGO "Corporate Europe Observatory", **Olivier Hoedeman**, and economist **Birgit Mahnkopf**." [OLIVER RESSLER]

€ *Boom!* is a collaborative project of **Oliver Ressler** [Vienna, Austria] and **David Thorne** [Brooklyn, USA]. The project consists of photo-text works in various media designed for flexible production and application in a range of display contexts. The works inject lengthy statements into the traditionally short linguistic structure of the "url" to generate dys-



functional web addresses which examine some of the central myths of globalized capitalism. These urls are combined with additional texts and photographs in order to suggest that the current [or is it "over" now?] economic boom is a manifestation of the deepening crises of capitalism, and that "boom" must be understood not only as "expansion" [capital in search of return] but also as potential collapse or explosion. The piece included in the exhibition "*What, How and for Whom*" in KUNSTHALLE EXNERGASSE in Vienna is one of a range combinations which will be realized as public works in New York and Los Angeles in 2001/2002.

The text "opposition nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere" is a modified quotation from *The Communist Manifesto*. In reference to the expansive, globalizing tendencies of capital, Marx and Engels write "it must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere". [OLIVER RESSLER]

vidi str/see pages
134-139

MLADEN STILINOVIĆ r/b. 1947 | živi i radi u Zagrebu/lives and works in Zagreb

Autocenzura 1980 - 2000/
Self-censorship 1980-2000

kolaž, novinski izvaci,
zavjesa/collage,
press cut-ups, curtain

Potrošena umjetnost /Used art

majice s otiskom/
printed T-shirts
2000, 2001

Vlast, jaja, novci/
Povver, eggs, money
novac, plastična
vrećica, jaje/money,
plastic bags, eggs
2001

Interakcija verbalnih i vizualnih znakova stalna je Stilinovićeva preokupacija. On istražuje agresivnost jezika, njegovu primjenu unutar politike i svakodnevnog života, te načine na koje se jezikom može manipulirati. Spajanjem oprečnosti zagovara ironiju i paradoks, te dekonstruira mehanizme moći. Autocenzura 1980-2000 estetikom gusto postavljenih slika predstavlja političke novinske članke i fotografije koje u duljem periodu bilježe aktualna društvena zbivanja sučeljena s pornografskim novinskim materijalima. Stilinović montažom dekontekstualizira dokumentarni materijal, intervenirajući u njega dvojako - bojom poništava ozbiljnost, važnost i identitet ljudskih lica, a necenzurirani ispis grubih psovki koje prate medijske slike istinska su reakcija ogorčenosti i apsurda.

Serijska Potrošena umjetnost poruke su na majicama koje ponavljaju motive autorovih poznatih tekstualnih konceptualnih radova. Tekstovi se u maniri parola ili poslovica duhovito pojigravaju značenjima i referencama. Originalni rad prenesen na odjeću postaje motiv koji je zadobio novi status. Predstavljen u formi privlačnog odjevnog predmeta umjetnički koncept istodobno zadobiva i gubi - objekt odražava specifični stav ali se njegova radikalnost umanjuje devalvacijom znaka.



★ The interaction of verbal and visual signs is a constant preoccupation with **Mladen Stilinović**. He investigates the aggression of language, its utilization within politics and everyday life, as well as ways of language manipulation. By connecting opposites, the artist opposes irony and paradox, and deconstructs power mechanisms. *Self-censorship 1980-2000* utilizes the aesthetic of densely set images and juxtaposes political articles on daily social events from newspapers taken over an extended period of time with pornographic materials from magazines. Through editing, **Stilinović** de-contextualizes documentary materials intervening into it in two ways - with coloristic interventions he nullifies the seriousness, importance and identity of human faces, while the placing of non-censored rude sentences together with media images act as a true reaction of absurdity and disillusionment.

The series *Used Art* is realized as messages on T-shirts that

**vidi str 106-107/
see pages 108-109**

repeat the motifs of previous conceptual works by **Mladen Stilinović**. Texts treated as slogans play with meanings and references. Original work transferred to clothing items becomes a motif with new status. In the form of a nice clothing item, the artistic concept loses and gains at the same time - the object reflects specific attitude, but its radical impact is diminished by the devaluation of the sign.

TOMO SAVIĆ GECAN

Bez naziva/Untitled



tel: 0800 200 012

2000

Bez naziva/Untitled

tel: 401 2176

2001



r/b. 1967 | živi i radi u Zagrebu i Amsterdamu/lives and works in Zagreb and Amsterdam

Rad **Tome Savića Gecana** ne postoji u fizičkoj formi no on se realizira pozivima na besplatan telefonski broj. Kustosice ove izložbe govornim porukama interpretiraju umjetnikov "rad". Prisutnost ovog rada na izložbi sastoji se isključivo u činu interpretacije - koja je diskutabilna, jer umjetnik ne izlaze ništa s čime bi posjetilac mogao uspostaviti odnos. I ovaj se put umjetnik poigrat mimikrijom, paradoksom, vidljivošću i jasnoćom svog rada koji svoju realizaciju zadobiva jednostavnim preslušavanjem gorovne poruke kojom se bez obzira na prostoru udaljenost i doba dana može iznova inicirati umjetničko djelo.

★ The work of **Tome Savić Gecan** does not exist in physical form but is realized as free calls to a telephone number. Curators of the show interpret the artist's "work" in telephone messages. The presence of the work is realized exclusively as an interpretive act, which is also questionable because the artist does not exhibit anything that the viewer might relate to. As with many times before, the artist plays with mimicry, paradox, and the visibility of his work that is actually realized by the process of listening to the message that can initiate the artwork regardless of space, distance or time of the day.

ANELA ŠABIĆ

Što, kako i za koga/

**What, how and for
whom**

2 majice s otiskom/

2 printed T-shirts

2000

r/b. 1970 | živi i radi u Sarajevu/lives and works in Sarajevo

Dvije *Benetton* majice s otisnutim biografijama umjetnice na prednjoj strani, te nazivom izložbe na stražnjoj strani. Uobičajena retorika žrtve *Benettonovih* reklama u **Anelinom** se radu transformira u umjetnicu kao žrtvu neizbjegnog procesa komercijalizacije.

★ Two *Benetton* T-shirts with a printed biography of the artists on the front, and logo of the exhibition on the back.

The usual *Benetton* advertising rhetoric of victims, in **Anela**'s piece has been changed into the artist herself as the victim caught in the inevitable commercialization processes.




NEBOJŠA ŠERIĆ- ŠOBA r/b. 1968 | živi i radi u Sarajevu i New Yorku/lives and works in Sarajevo and New Yorku

Heroji/Heroes

proizvodi [konjak, rublje, bombonijera], fotokopije/products [brandy, underwear, candies], photocopies
1998

Sučeljavanje fotokopija fotografija narodnih heroja i industrijskih proizvoda koji su njihova imena učinila poznatima ukazuje na stvarnu sudbinu heroja i njezinu medijsku konstrukciju. Masovna potrošnja i proizvodnja istaknutih osobnosti regulirana je socijalnim procedurama koje oblikuju i modus sadašnjosti i dominantnu verziju povijesti.



**Battle Fields/Bojna
polja**
[Gettysburg,
Guernica, Sarajevo]
digital print
2001

€ Proizvodeći fotografije lokacija velikih bitki koje su odredile tijek povijesti, a koje danas ničim ne odaju ratnu prošlost, **Nebojša Šerić Šoba** stvara rad koji se bavi povijesnom memorijom i amnezijom, ali i zacjeljivanjem.

★ By facing photocopied photos of WWII People's Heroes and industry products that had made their names famous, the artist points toward the true destinies of the heroes and their media constructions. Mass production and consumption of famous personalities is regulated by social procedures that shape the modus of present time as well as dominant version of the history.

€ By producing photos of locations of great historic battles that determined the course of history, and that today no longer betray signs of a glorious past, **Nebojša Šerić Šoba** produces work that deals with historic memory and amnesia, but also with healing.



SLAVEN TOLJ
Amnezija/Amnesia
slika/painting
2000



r/b. 1964 | živi i radi u Dubrovniku/lives and works in Dubrovnik

€ Grad Dubrovnik sastavni je dio i kontekstualno ishodište mnogih **Toljevih** projekata. Performans *Hrana za preživljavanje* Tolj je izveo 1993. godine sa svojom suprugom, **Marijom Grazio**. Performans upućuje na ratna zbivanja prve polovice devedesetih kada je Dubrovnik bio u opsadnom stanju. Za vrijeme izolacije u Dubrovnik je slana humanitarna pomoć u obliku konzervirane hrane za preživljavanje - neidentificirane praškaste mase koja se miješa s vodom. Jedući kašastu smjesu na svojih tijela, **Slaven Tolj** i **Marija Grazio** isprepleću eros i thanatos, izvodeći ritual međusobnog hranjenja u drastičnom spoju nagona za smrću i preživljavanjem.

★ The artist intervenes on the cheap portrait of WWII People's Hero **Ivo Lola Ribar** by placing a black cover over the figure's eyes, thus turning the former hero into a person

Hrana za preživljavanje/Food for Survival
performance, 1993,
MUU-ry, Tover of
Babel, Helsinki
documentation/
dokumentacija
photo by **Sakari Viika**
1993

without an identity, a prohibited figure convicted to death. **The city of Dubrovnik forms an important part and context of many projects by Slaven Tolj.** **Slaven Tolj** and his wife realized the performance *Food for survival* in 1993, during the time of heavy war actions when Dubrovnik was under siege. During the isolation humanitarian packages with food had been sent to the city - unidentifiable powdered masses to be mixed with water. By eating this from each other's bodies **Slaven Tolj** and **Marija Grazio** invoked eros and thanatos by performing the ritual of mutual feeding in the drastic mixture of death drive and instinct to survive.

MILICA TOMIĆ r/b. 1960 | živi i radi u Beogradu/lives and works in Belgrade
Zagreb se sjeća/ Zagreb Remembering Ovaj rad dio je serije *Remembering* [Sećanje], započete radom na grupnoj izložbi u javnom prostoru grada Erlaufa, *Erlauf erinnert sich...* [svibanj 2000, *Art in Public Space*]. Izložba je otvorena 8. svibnja, na 55-godišnjicu susreta američkih i sovjetskih oficira. Taj susret je za Austriju ujedno označio završetak rata, a i pobjedu nad fašizmom.
paralelna slide projekcija parallel slide projection Moj rad se odnosi na spomenik miru koji je na 50-godišnjicu tog događaja izveo ruski kipar **Oleg Komov**, u socrealističkoj tradiciji. Spomenik čine dva predstavnika oslobođilačke vojske - američke i sovjetske, i između njih, kao metafora austrijskog naroda, djevojčica u narodnoj austrijskoj nošnji, koja ih spaja. Deset Austrijanaca/Austrijanki zamoljeno je da pojedinačno stupi na mjesto austrijske djevojčice, u prostor "između dvije bivše vojske". Taj je čin foto-dokumentiran i u obliku oglasnih *billboarda* izložen duž glavne ulice, odnosno ceste koja prolazi kroz mjesto.
photo: Aleksandra Dabanović
Erlauf se sjeća.../ Erlauf erinnert sich... Akteri tog spomenika više ne postoje. Sovjetska armija nestala je raspadom SSSR-a i Varšavskog pakta. Američka vojska prisutna je u Evropi samo preko NATO-a. A austrijska djevojčica, je li ikada postojala, ili je ona tek nužni izraz žanra socrealističke memorijalne skulpture?
Courtesy of Charim Gallery Što danas znači zauzeti mjesto djevojčice, stati u prostor "između dvije bivše vojske"? Svaki Austrijanac/Austrijanka danas, već se nalazi na tom mjestu. Onaj tko zakorači u taj simbolički prostor stoji pred odlukom je li to prostor poraza i okupacije ili prostor pobjede nad fašizmom.
Danas je to prostor politike *par excellence*, a ne prazne ceremonije, ritualnog čina, sjećanja države na pobjedu.
vidi str/see pages 142/3

Navodim kao primjer svoju zemlju, koja je 1945. bila jedna od zemalja pobjednica nad fašizmom. Ta zemlja više ne postoji, a ostatak zemlje, u kojoj ja živim, usprkos činjenici da je već deset godina povezana s tragičnim događajima etno-rasističkog rata, slavi pobjedu nad fašizmom 1945., i to kao ritualni čin koji ne producira politiku koja se protivi etno-rasističkom ratu, već preuzima simbolički kapital povijesne pobjede nad fašizmom.

U radu *Zagreb se sjeća...*, drugom u seriji radova *Remembering* [Sjećanje], nalazim se ja, autorica rada odjevena u partizansku uniformu, predstavljajući sudionicu NOB-a, foto-dokumentirana između dvije "bijše vojske" u prostoru politike *par excellence*. NOB - jedini pokret na tlu tadašnje Evrope, pokret onih isključenih iz tadašnjih postojećih univerzalizama, pokret koji je izumio politiku emancipacije, politiku univerzalizma i kao takav izvojevaо pobjedu nad fašizmom.

MILICA TOMIĆ

★This work is part of the series *Remembering*, started at the group exhibition in a public space of the city of Erlauf, *Erlauf erinnert sich...* [May 2000, Art in Public Space]. The exhibition was opened on May 8, on the 55th anniversary of the American and Soviet officer's meeting. That meeting for Austria also meant the end of the war, as well as victory over fascism. My work is connected to the monument devoted to peace, realized by Russian sculptor Oleg Komov in the tradition of soc-realism, on the 50th anniversary of that event. The monument is composed of two representatives of the liberating armies - American and Soviet - and between them stands a girl connecting them, as the metaphor of Austrian people.

Ten Austrians were asked to step into the place of the Austrian girl, in the space "between two former armies". This act was photo-documented and displayed as billboards along the main road passing through the city.

The figures of the monument do not exist any longer. The Soviet army vanished with the disappearance of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact. The American army is present in Europe only through NATO. And the Austrian girl, did she ever exist, or was she just a necessary part of the genre of the soc-realistic memorial sculpture?





What does it mean to take the place of the girl nowadays, to step into the space of "two former armies"? Every Austrian today is already in that space. The one who steps into that symbolic space faces the decision of deciding whether it is the space of defeat and occupation, or the space of victory over fascism.

Today it is the space of politics *par excellence*, and not an empty ceremony, ritual acts and a state remembering the victory. As an example, I state here that in 1945 my country was among the countries celebrating victory over fascism. Today this country no longer exists. Its remnants, where I live, celebrate the victory over fascism in 1945 as a ritual act that does not produce politics that opposes ethnical and racial war, taking over the symbol capital of historic victory over fascism, disregarding the fact that for 10 years the country has been involved in tragic events of ethnical and racial war.

MILICA TOMIĆ



In the work *Zagreb Remembering* the photo of the artist dressed in a partisan uniform stands between two photos taken from eye-level of two busts of the Heroines of the People, sisters **Baković**, whose busts are placed in the center of Zagreb.

IGOR TOŠEVSKI r/b. 1963 | živi i radi u Skopju/lives and works in Skopje

Dossier

print

1996/7



Dossier je jednogodišnji projekt sasvim konceptualne naravi.

Nastao je u središtu reformi poznatih ovdje, a i drugdje u istočnoj Evropi, kao *privatizacija*, transformacija državnih tvornica. Simptomatični podatak je da je privatizacija bila zloupotreba istih tih tvornica kako bi došlo do gomilanja kapitala u posjedu nekolicine "privilegiranih". No činjenica je da je većina tvornica u Makedoniji [uglavnom 'dinosauri' koji su postojali za tržište bivše SFRJ] došla u paradoksalnu situaciju da proizvodi više škarta nego upotrebljive robe, pod izgovorom da su još uvijek rentabilne.

Dvosmislenost konteksta [ono što je *ready-made* u kontekstu umjetnosti visoko razvijenih zemalja Zapada vs. *feler* ili *škart* u zemlji niskog ili nikakvog ekonomskog razvoja - tretiran opet kao *ready-made* ili: *not yet ready-made*], potakla me je da u nekoliko [5] navrata napravim izložbe/ instalacije sastavljene isključivo od *ready-made* predmeta ili škart proizvoda. Svaka instalacija je organizirana u gradu u kojem je većina stanovništva [danas - stečajci] bila zaposlena u tamošnjoj tvornici [sada - pod stečajem]. Lokalne galerije [domovi kulture gotovo isto - pod stečajem] bile su otvorene za svakog tko je htio doći u kontakt s umjetničkim radom - uglavnom su to bili isti ti radnici čije su ruke proizvele gomile i gomile tanjura, boca, tekstila, ploča, plastike, itd.

U toku te godine [1996.] obišao sam više od 20 tvornica, ali sam bio u mogućnosti završiti samo nekoliko instalacija u Velesu, Prilepu, Kumanovu, Bitolju i Skopju. Finalna postavka u Skoplju je uključivala [pored uzorka *ready-made* predmeta] i potpunu dokumentaciju prepiske s bivšim i aktualnim direktorima, markice za transport i čitavu foto-dokumentaciju procesa u obliku kolaža.

Kao pozadinu sam upotrijebio blow-up slajdove fragmenata uzetih iz *Makedonskog Rečnika* i *Webstera*, gole definicije riječi *filament*, *stečaj* *privatizacija*, *škart* i dr.

Rad u Zagrebu je dio [*remake*] originalne instalacije u Skopju. [IGOR TOŠEVSKI]

Dossier is a conceptual project that lasted for one year. It developed in the midst of the economical reforms known in Macedonia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe as *privatization*, the transformation of factories that used to be owned by the state. A lot is said by the fact that privatization was in fact a

vidi str/see page 132

misuse of those factories in order to accumulate as much capital/wealth as possible in the hands of the "privileged" few. It is also a fact that most of the factories in Macedonia [mostly huge "dinosaurs" which were meant for the market of former Yugoslavia] found themselves in the paradoxical situation of producing more artificial products than usable products, under the false pretenses that their production was still valid.

The double-meaning context [that what is considered ready-made in the art context of highly developed states of the West vs. discards or rejects in the countries of a low economical profile - treated again as a ready-made or: *not yet ready-made*] encouraged me to make several [5] exhibitions/installations consisting exclusively of ready-made objects or *discard* products. Each installation was set up in a town in which the majority of inhabitants [today - unemployed] worked at one time in the local factory [now - bankrupt].



Local galleries [former Houses of culture, practically also gone bankrupt] were opened for anyone who wanted to come in contact with the art work - mostly it was the same workers whose hands produced piles and piles of plates, bottles, textile, boards, plastic etc.

During that year [1996] I visited more than 20 factories but I was able to finish only several installations in Veles, Prilep, Kumanovo, Bitolje and Skopje. The final set up in Skopje included [together with the samples of ready-made objects] the complete documentation of the correspondence with former and present directories of the factories, the transport receipts and the whole photo-documentation of the process in collage form.

As the background I used the blow-up slides of fragments taken from the Macedonian and Webster dictionaries, basic definitions of the words *faliment*, bankruptcy, privatization, reject, etc.

The work in Zagreb and Vienna is a part [remake] of the original installation from Skopje. [IGOR TOŠEVSKI]

GORAN TRBULJAK	r/b. 1948 živi i radi u Zagrebu/lives and works in Zagreb
Art & Fortune	
2000	Projekt <i>Art & Fortune</i> dio je serije Trbuljakovih radova koja kontradiktornu prirodu sreće propituje na osobnoj i općoj razini u kontekstu poistovješenja svakodnevne životne i umjetničke prakse te institucionalnog okvira umjetnosti.
Exchange is no robbery	Trbuljak ironično upućuje da kontekst "sreće u umjetnosti" nije određen samo umjetnikovom kreativnošću već ponajprije njegovim položajem u institucionalnom [muzejsko-galerijskom] okviru i tržišnom sistemu. Projekt, koji za vrijeme izložbe zbog nedostatka sredstava nije mogao biti realiziran proizvodnjom posebne kovanice - reminiscirao bi praksu bacanja novčića u fontanu. Fontana DOMA HRVATSKIH
video, 11'	
2001	



LIKOVNIH UMJETNIKA u Zagrebu zbog svoje lokacije i povijesti mogla bi se smatrati i "fontanom umjetnika". Ovaj projekt, uz Trbuljakov autoironijski pristup i interes za efemerno, odražava i skrivenu utopističnu želju da možemo simbolično i veselo poželjeti jedni drugima sreću u umjetnosti.


€ Spontana narativna sekvenca videa *Razmjena / Exchange is no robbery* snimljena u urbanoj svakodnevici jednog indijskog grada, duhovito propituje principe paralelne ekonomije izmjene dobara. Na nekom prometnom raskrižju Trbuljak preuzima tipičnu ulogu turista umjetničkih sklonosti u drugoj kulturi te s blokom u ruci otpočinje skicirati motiv... Uskoro se umjetniku pridružuje sve više slučajnih prolaznika koji isprva distancirano ali sa sve većim interesom prate umjetnikov rad. Vidljivo je kako prolaznici ocjenjuju i komentiraju umjetnikov rad. Kamera unutar jednog kadra statično registrira zbijanja, a jezikom gesta pratimo kratku i živu licitaciju kao *klimaks* filma. Razaznajemo da je umjetnik netom uradenu sliku uspješno trampio s lokalnim vozačem *rikše* za "besplatnu" vožnju gradom.

★ The project *Art & Fortune* belongs to the body of works by Goran Trbuljak in which the artist questions the contradictory nature of happiness at personal and general levels in the context of everyday life, art praxis and institutional framework of art. The artist ironically points toward the fact that "fortune in art" is not determined solely by an artist's creativity, but first and foremost by his/her position within the art market system. His project was not realized due to financial and organizational limitations. If it had been realized, it would have involved the production of a special coin and it

Iz emisije Transfer / TV show Transfer, HRT 2000.

would have invoked the praxis of throwing the coins into a fountain and making a wish. The fountain in front of the gallery of the CROATIAN ASSOCIATION OF ARTISTS in Zagreb would then become an "artists' fountain". Apart from Goran Trbuljak's self-ironic approach and interest for the ephemeral, the project also reflects his utopian idea for us to symbolically wish each other good luck in art.

€ The spontaneous narrative sequence of the video *Exchange is No Robbery* was taken in the urban environment of an Indian city. It questions the principles of the parallel economy of goods exchange. Standing at an intersection, the artist takes over the typical role of a tourist with artistic aspirations caught in a different culture, drawing and sketching events around him... Several passersby, at first from a distance, but later with increased interest, approach him to comment and follow his work. During one long shot, the camera statically records events. By reading the gestural language, the viewer follows the short and vivid bidding as the climax of the film. The finished drawing has been exchanged for a "free" drive through the city.



VASILY TSAGOLOV






Karl Marx - Pere
Lachaise
fotodokumentacija
akcije/
photodocumentation
of action
1993


TV News/TV viesti

video
1998

Fotodokumentacija akcije izvedene u Kijevu 1993. izgleda poput fotografija sa snimanja nekog akcijskog filma, no u isti mah i kao dokumentacija pripremne faze nekog terorističkog čina ili njegova pomno inscenirana rekonstrukcija. Pona-vljanjem aktera i tipičnim settingom fotografije ukazuju na filmsku naraciju čiji najbitniji dijelovi nedostaju. Simulacija je u temelju video rada *TV News*, koji vjerno oponaša televizijsku formu dnevnika mijenjajući sadržaj, no ne narušavajući obrazac fluktuacije znakova na površini.

★The photo-documentation of the action performed in Kiev in 1993 look like shots taken during some action movie set, but at the same time also looks like the documentation of a terrorist act or its carefully set-up reconstruction. By repeating the protagonists and typical settings, the photographs point toward film narration whose vital elements are missing. Simulation is also at the core of the video work *TV News* that closely simulates the TV news form, but changes its content without disturbing the form of fluctuation of the signs on the surface.





STARREN SIE NICHT SO ROMANTISCH

"Access for all," "Bandwidth for all": these are legitimate demands if the net is to be more than an elitist playground of the middle classes. In the future, access to adequate means of communication may even become a vital necessity of everyday life. But information and communication are not ends in themselves; first of all, they constitute an increasingly important terrain of social, political and cultural struggle. Inside and outside the net, communication guerrillas seek to attack power relations inscribed into the structure of communication processes. In the dawn of informational capitalism, such attacks become more than just a method, more than merely a technology of political activism: When information becomes a commodity and cultural capital, a most important asset, the distortion and devaluation of both is a direct attack against the capitalist system. To say it in a swanky way: This is class war.

This is class war

CYBERKOMUNIZAM
KAKO AMERIKANCI NADILAZE KAPITALIZAM U CYBERSPACEU
RICHARD BARBROOK

"Nije li utjecaj takozvane informatičke revolucije na kapitalizam ultimativni primjer stare Marxove teze da 'na određenom stupnju svog razvoja materijalne proizvodne snage društva dolaze u sukob s postojećim proizvodnim odnosima'? ... zar perspektive informatičkog 'globalnog sela' ne signaliziraju kraj tržišnih odnosa... barem u sferi digitaliziranih informacija?"

[S. ŽIŽEK: PREDGOVOR KOMUNISTIČKOM MANIFESTU, STR. 34]

DUHOVI U STROJU ★

Bauk kruži Mrežom: bauk komunizma. Odražavajući ekstravaganciju novih medija, taj bauk poprima dva različita oblika: teorijsko prisvajanje staljinističkog komunizma i svakodnevnu praksu cyber komunizma. Bez obzira na svoja proglašena politička uvjerenja, svi korisnici Mreže zaneseno sudjeluju u tom ljevičarskom *revivalu*. Bilo u teoriji ili u praksi, svi oni žele digitalno prevladavanje kapitalizma. No u isti mah čak ni najposvećeniji ljevičar ne može više istinski vjerovati u komunizam. Nakon pada Berlinskog zida i implozije Sovjetskog Saveza ta je ideologija posve diskreditirana. Obećanja društvene emancipacije pretvorila su se u užase totalitarizma. Snovi o industrijskom modernizmu kulminirali su u ekonomskoj stagnaciji. Komunizam se doima kao fosil iz prošlosti i daleko je od toga da predstavlja budućnost. Osim svega, Sovjetski Savez bio je nesposoban predvoditi informatičku revoluciju. Političke i ekonomski strukture staljinističkog komunizma bile su previše nefleksibilne i zatvorene za pojavu nove tehnološke paradigme. Kako bi totalistička partija mogla dopustiti svakome da stvara medije bez njezina nadzora? Kako bi agencija za centralno planiranje mogla dopustiti da proizvođači formiraju suradničke mreže bez njezina odobrenja? Za razvijanje Mreže bilo je potrebno mnogo otvorenije i spontanije društvo. Uzbudeni libertrijanskim potencijalom daljnje digitalne konvergencije, zastupnici gotovo svih radikalnih ideologija nedavno su osvremenili svoja stajališta. Ipak, kod cyber feministica, komunikacijskih gerilaca, tehno nomada i digitalnih anarhistika nema nove verzije nekoć dominantne struje staljinističkog komunizma. Čak i njegovi bivši sljedbenici priznaju da je Sovjetski Savez bio utjelovljenje najgorih mana fordizma: autoritarne vladavine, konformizma i uništenja prirodnog okoliša [HALL I JACQUES, 1989].

Ideolozi američkog neoliberalizma iskoristili su tu priliku da polože pravo na budućnost. Već gotovo trideset godina oni predviđaju da će nove tehnologije stvoriti utopijsku civilizaciju: informacijsko društvo. Na primjer, razni *toffleri* su već dugo uvjereni da će spoj informatike, telekomunikacija i medija oslobođiti pojedince iz kandži velikih tvrtki i snažne vlade [TOFFLER, 1980]. Slično tome **Ithiel de Sola Pool** proriče da će interaktivna televizija omogućiti svima da stvaraju vlastite medije i sudjeluju u političkom donošenju odluka [DE SOLA POOL, 1983]. Usprkos njihovoj radikalnoj retorici, te je konzervativne mudrace ponajprije zanimalo dokazati da će informacijske tehnologije nametnuti privatizaciju i deregulaciju cjelokupne ekonomske aktivnosti. Njihova postfordistička budućnost bila je povratak u liberalnu prošlost. Kad je Mreža postala popularna, taj fundamentalizam slobodnog tržišta brzo se prilagodio novoj situaciji. U tom smislu najslavnija je *Wiredova* tvrdnja da "Nova paradigma" nereguliranog natjecanja između cyber poduzetnika proširuje slobodu pojedinca i potiče tehnološke inovacije u SAD-u [BARBROOK I CAMERON, 1996]. Kako se Mreža širi svijetom, materijalne i duhovne vrijednosti američkog neoliberalizma na kraju će se nametnuti cijelom čovječanstvu. **Louis Rossetto**, urednik i utemeljitelj *Wireda*, objašnjava to ovako:

"Taj novi svijet [Mreže] karakterizira globalna ekonomija koja je inherentno antihijerarhijska i decentralistička, te ne poštuje nacionalne granice ni kontrolu političara i birokrata... i globalna, umrežena svijest ... koja pretvara... propalu izbornu politiku... u sljepu ulicu." [HUDSON, 1996:30]

KULT DIGERATA ★

Narcizam kalifornijske ideologije odražava samopouzdanje pobjedničke nacije. Nakon pobjede u hladnom ratu SAD više nemaju nikakvih ozbiljnih vojnih ni ideooloških konkurenata. Nadmašile su čak i svoje ekonomske rivale u EU i Istočnoj Aziji. Prema većini komentatora, obnova američke hegemonije temelji se na vodećem položaju u informacijskim tehnologijama. Nijedna zemlja ne može se nositi s "pametnim oružjima" američke vojske. Malo se tvrtki može natjecati s "pametnim strojevima" kojima

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se služe američke korporacije. Iznad svega, Amerika dominira vrhuncem tehnoloških inovacija - Mrežom. Ostvarujući američki san, sretna manjina bogati se prenoсеći svoje visokotehnološke kompanije na Wall Street [GREENWALD, 1998]. Općinjeni komercijalnim potencijalom e-trgovine, ostali spekuliraju svojom ušteđevinom i ulazu je u dionice novih medija.

"*Dionice na Internetu... možda su najprodavanija roba još od pomame za nizozemskim tulipanima u 17. stoljeću.*" [KADLEC, 1999:1]

Unatoč svem bogatstvu koje stvaraju tehnološke inovacije, podjela na bogate i siromašne u SAD-u se i dalje proširuje [ELLIOTT, 1999]. Za razliku od evropske i istočno-azijiske vrste kapitalizma, američki neoliberalizam može uspješno kombinirati ekonomski napredak s društvenom imobilnošću. Još od Francuske revolucije 1789. konzervativci traže to jedinstvo suprotnosti: reakcionarni modernizam [HERF, 1984]. Premda nužne za opstanak kapitalizma, društvene implikacije ekonomskog rasta uvijek su plašile desnicu. Na duži rok neprekidna industrijalizacija polako erodira klasne privilegije. Kako im prihodi rastu, obični ljudi mogu sve više određivati političke teme i kulturne stavove društva. Posljedica toga je da se niz generacija konzervativaca suočio s dilemom pomirenja ekonomske ekspanzije sa usporavanjem društvenih promjena. Unatoč dubokim ideološkim razlikama uvijek su predlagali isto rješenje: formiranje hi-tech aristokracije [NIETZSCHE, 1961.; ORTEGA Y GASSET, 1932].

Najranije verzije te reakcionarne fantazije naglašavale su hijerarhijsku podjelu rada u fordizmu. Premda su industrijskim sistemom uništene mnoge radne vještine, istovremeno su stvorene mnoge nove specijalnosti. Unutar fordizma inženjeri, birokrati, učitelji i drugi profesionalci tvore posrednički sloj između uprave i pogona [ELGER, 1979]. Za razliku od većine zaposlenih, taj segment radničke klase prima velike plaće i izmiče podčinjenosti proizvodne trake. U strahu od gubitka svojih ograničenih privilegija, neki profesionalci postaju strasni zagovornici reakcionarnog modernizma. Umjesto da se bore za socijalnu pravdu, oni sanjaju o nastanku nove aristokracije: tehnikracije.

"Razum, znanost i tehnologija nisu inertni procesi kojima muškarci [i žene] nezainteresirano i bez strasti otkrivaju, razmjenjuju i primjenjuju činjenice, već predstavljaju sredstvo kojim, putem sistema, neki muškarci [i žene] organiziraju i kontroliraju živote drugih muškaraca [i žena] u skladu sa svojom zamisli o onome što je bolje" [ISRAEL, 1972: 2-3].

U godinama buma fordizma nova se vladajuća klasa navodno formirala od menadžera i drugih stručnjaka iz velikih korporacija i vladinih ureda [BURNHAM, 1945]. Međutim, kad je ranih 70-ih ekonomija zapala u krizu, desničarski intelektualci bili su prisiljeni potražiti podršku među drugim dijelovima posredničkog sloja. Inspirirani Marshalom McLuhanom, ubrzo su otkrili da sve veći broj ljudi radi na razvoju novih informatičkih tehnologija [MC LUHAN, 1964]. Konzervativni su gurui gotovo tri desetljeća predviđali kako će se nova vladajuća klasa sastojati od kapitalističkih poduzetnika, znanstvenika izumitelja, hakerskih genijalaca, medijskih zvijezda i neoliberalnih ideologa: to su *digerati* [BELL, 1973; TOFFLER, 1980; KELLY, 1994]. Težeći popularizaciji svojih proročanstava, uvijek su spremno tvrdili kako svaki hi-tech profesionalac ima priliku da postane pripadnikom te nove aristokracije. Unutar industrije koja konvergira jednoj točki stručni radnici su nužni za razvoj originalnih proizvoda kao što su kompjutorski software ili dizajn web stranica. Poput mnogih svojih kolega, većina digitalnih zanatlija pati od nesigurnosti rada na ugovor. No oni su daleko bolje plaćeni i imaju veću autonomiju u svom poslu. Kao i u prošlosti, ta ambivalentna društvena pozicija može potaći lakovjernost u odnosu na reakcionarni modernizam. Jureći za američkim snom, mnogi se hi-tech radnici nadaju da će zaraditi milijune kad osnuju svoju vlastitu kompaniju. Umjesto da se identificiraju sa svojim kolegama oni se žele priključiti *digeratima* - novoj tehnokraciji Mreže [KROKER I WEINSTEIN, 1994].

Za razliku od ranijih oblika konzervativizma ta želja za dominacijom nad drugima u kalifornijskoj ideologiji nije više otvoreno izražena. Umjesto toga njezini gurui tvrde kako će vladavina digerata donijeti korist svima. Jer oni izumljuju sofisticirane strojeve i unapređuju proiz-

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vodne metode. Oni su pioniri hi-tech usluga čije će blagodati u konačnici uživati čitavo stanovništvo. S vremenom će digerati ograničenja fordizma transformirati u slobode informatičkog društva. Kompromisi predstavnice demokracije bit će zamijenjeni osobnim sudjelovanjem putem "elektronske vjećnice". Ograničenja osobne kreativnosti u postojećim medijima bit će prevladana interaktivnim oblicima estetskog izražavanja. U cyberspaceu će čak i fizička ograničenja tijela biti nadidena. U kalifornijskoj ideologiji autokracija manjine je kratkoročno nužna da bi mase dugoročno bile oslobođene [TOFFLER, 1980; KELLY, 1994; HUDSON, 1996; DYSON, 1997].

"*Ne oni-koji-imaju i oni-koji-nemaju - [već oni-koji-imaju-sad i] oni-koji-će-imati-kasnije.*" [ROSSETTO, 1996]

OSLOBABAJUĆA MANJINA ★

Isto ono što se očekuje od digerata u ovo sadašnje doba Mreže nekad se predviđalo za herojske elite iz dobe čelika i električne energije. Još od kasnog 19. stoljeća romano-pisci naučne fantastike maštali su o maloj skupini znanstvenika i filozofa koji će izmislići tehnološko rješenje za društvene probleme [BELLAMY, 1982; WELLS, 1913]. Među političkim aktivistima ta vjera u vodeću ulogu prosvjećene manjine ima još i duži staž. Na vrhuncu Francuske revolucije 1790-ih godina jakobinci su odlučili da demokratsku republiku može stvoriti samo revolucionarna diktatura. Premda se režim borio za političku i kulturnu slobodu, brojni slojevi stanovništva žestoko su se opirali modernizaciji francuskog društva. Prema mišljenju jakobinaca um tih tradicionalista pokvarili su aristokraciju i svećenstvo. Revolucionarna diktatura bila je nužna ne samo kako bi se slomila oružana pobuna već i kako bi se popularizirali principi republikanske demokracije. Jer tek kad budu obrazovani, svi će stanovnici moći sudjelovati u političkom odlučivanju. Kratkotrajna tiranija manjine vodit će do dugoročne demokracije za većinu [BRINTON, 1961; BARBROOK, 1995: 19 - 37].

Iako su jakobinci držali vlast svega nekoliko godina, njihov je primjer generacijama inspirirao revolucionarne pokrete. U mnogim državama su se radikalne grupe suočavale sa identičnim problemima transformiranja

tradicionalnih zajednica u industrijska društva. Ma kakve bile njihove ideoološke razlike, svaka revolucionarna manjina imala je isti zadatak: povesti mase u modernizaciju. Do polovice 19. stoljeća evropska ljevica shvatila je da se taj cilj političke i kulturne emancipacije može postići samo putem ekonomskog progresa. **Henry de Saint-Simon** je objasnio kako je moć aristokracije i svecenstva utemeljena na poljoprivredi. Kad bi se ekonomija mogla modernizirati, bogatstvo i moć će se nužno prenijeti na pripadnike novih industrijskih zanimanja: poduzetnike, radnike, političare, umjetnike i znanstvenike. **Saint-Simon** je, poput jakobinaca, tvrdio kako ta nova elita ne smije gledati samo svoje uske interese. Jer ti modernizatori imaju i povijesni zadatak da oslobole svoje nesretnije sugrađane od siromaštva i neznanja. Stvaranjem ekonomskog obilja prosvijetljena manjina omogućit će svima da uživaju u sretnom i produktivnom životu.

"Politika sada ne bi trebala biti ništa više od znanosti kako ljudima osigurati što je više moguće materijalnih dobara i moralnog zadovoljstva." [SAINT-SIMON I HALÉVY, 1975: 280]

Nadahnuti **Saint-Simonom**, prvi socijalisti vjerovali su da će ekonomski rast neizbjegno dovesti do političke i kulturne emancipacije. U kapitalizmu su morala postajati stalna poboljšanja metoda i mašinerije kojima se proizvode roba i usluge: *proizvodne snage*. Protokom vremena taj razvoj polako potkopava privatno vlasništvo nad tvrtkama: *proizvodne odnose*. Prema toj verziji **Saint-Simona** sve veća međuvisnost moderne ekonomije će na kraju nužno dovesti do prihvaćanja kolektivnijih oblika društvene organizacije. Bez obzira na trenutne teškoće, parlamentarne stranke evropske ljevice bile su uvjerenе u konačnu pobjedu. Prije ili kasnije razvoj proizvodnih snaga demokratizirat će proizvodne odnose [MARX, 1970: 20-21; ENGELS, 1975:74-101].

Sredinom 20. stoljeća taj marksistički remiks **Saint-Simona** prihvatali su apologeti totalitarizma. Čak i prije no što je došao na vlast **V. I. Lenjin** je tvrdio da bi revolucionarni intelektualci trebali oblikovati prototip jakobinske diktature: avangardnu partiju [LENJIN, 1975]. U starom poretku je glava većine ljudi bila napunjena

Kelly, K. [1997] 'New Rules for the New Economy: twelve dependable principles for thriving in a turbulent world', *Wired*, SEPTEMBER, VOL. 5, NO.9, STR. 140-144, 186-197.

Kleinman, N. [1996] 'Don't Fence Me In: Copyright, Property and Technology' u Strate, L., Jacobson, R. & Gibson, S. [ur.], *Communications and Cyberspace: social interaction in an electronic environment*, NEW JERSEY: HAMPTON PRESS, STR. 59-82.

Kollock, P. [1999] 'The Economics of Online Cooperation: gifts and public goods in cyberspace' u Smith, M. & Kollock, P. [ur.], *Communities in Cyberspace*, LONDON: ROUTLEDGE, STR. 220-239.

Kohn, A. [1998] 'Studies Find Reward Often No Motivator', *Free Software Foundation*, <www.fsf.org/philosophy/motivation.html>.

Kojève, A. [1969] *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit*, ITHACA NY: CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS.

Kroker, A. & Weinstein, M. [1994] *Data Trash: the theory of the virtual class*, MONTREAL: NEW WORLD PERSPECTIVES.

Lang, B. [1998] 'Free Software For All: freeware and the issue of intellectual property', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, JANUARY, <www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1998/01/12freesoft.html>.

Leonard, A. [1998] 'Mutiny on the Net', *Salon*, <www.salonmagazine.com/21st/feature/1998/03/cov_2ofeature.html>.

- Leonard, A.** [1998a] 'Let My Software Go!', *Salon*, <www.salonmagazine.com/21st/feature/1998/o4/cov_14feature.html>.
- Leonard, A.** [1999] 'The Really New Economy: Red Hat's IPO', *Salon*, <www.salonmagazine.com/tech/log/1999/06/o9/red.hat/index.html>.
- Lenin, V.I.** [1932] *Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power?*, LONDON: MARTIN LAWRENCE.
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- Lenin, V.I.** [1975A] *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, BEIJING: FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS.
- Linux Online** [1999] F.A.Q., <www.linux.org>.
- Lipset, S.M.** [1996] *American Exceptionalism: a double-edged sword*, NEW YORK: W.W. NORTON.
- Marx, K.** [1959] *Capital: a critique of political economy, volume 3, the process of capitalist production as a whole*, LONDON: LAWRENCE & WISHART.
- Marx, K.** [1961] *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, MOSCOW: FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE.
- Marx, K.** [1970] *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, MOSCOW: PROGRESS PUBLISHERS.
- Marx, K.** [1973] *Grundrisse*, LONDON: PENGUIN.
- Marx, K.** [1976] *Capital: a critique of political economy, volume 1, the process of the production of capital*, LONDON: PENGUIN.
- lažnom ideologijom proisteklom iz desničarskih novina, crkvi i drugih kulturnih institucija. Prosvjetljena manjina imala je povijesnu dužnost da vodi te neuke mase prema utopijskoj budućnosti. Nakon Oktobarske revolucije 1917. **Lenjin** i njegovi sljedbenici uspjeli su stvoriti modernizatorsku diktaturu. Poput svog prethodnika u Francuskoj krajem 18. stoljeća, taj novi režim posvetio se borbi protiv reakcionarnih snaga i obrazovanju cjelokupnog stanovništva [LENJIN, 1975.A]. Osim toga, revolucionarna diktatura ostvarila je jedan još važniji cilj: industrijalizaciju ruske ekonomije. Prisvajajući analizu **Saint-Simona** i njegovih marksističkih interpretatora, **Lenjin** je tvrdio da će ekonomska modernizacija na kraju dovesti do političkog i kulturnog oslobođenja. Nametnuli su se da će na duži rok izgraditi participativnu demokraciju [LENJIN, 1932; BUHARIN, 1971].
- Ta odlučnost da se modernizira ekonomija ubrzo je dovela do ukidanja svih političkih i kulturnih sloboda. Obećanje o konačnom oslobođenju opravdalo je ubijanje i zatvaranje milijuna. Kreativnost umjetnika reducirana je na stvaranje propagande za totalitarnu partiju. Modernizatorska diktatura čak je izgubila i interes za poboljšavanje životnih uvjeta masa [CILIGA, 1979:161–291]. Umjesto toga sovjetsko vodstvo postalo je opsjednuto uvođenjem novih tehnologija: mehaničkih dokaza o povećanju proizvodnih snaga. Početkom tridesetih godina Staljin je mjerio napredak prema utopijskoj budućnosti povećanjem proizvodnje industrijske robe: čelika, automobila, traktora i alatnih strojeva [STALJIN, 1954:512–520]. Ekonomski razvoj postao je sam sebi cilj.
- "Rezultati Petogodišnjeg plana [industrijalizacije] pokazali su da je kapitalistički sistem... postao zastario i da mora ustupiti mjesto drugom, višem, sovjetskom socijalističkom sistemu..."* [STALJIN, 1954:541–542]
- U 19. stoljeću nije bilo jasne definicije komunizma. Dok je **Mihail Bakunjin** svoje prethodnike nalazio u seljačkim zajednicama, **Karl Marx** je vjerovao da su novi sistem anticipirala industrijska kooperativa [BAKUNJIN, 1973:182–194; MARX, 1959:435–441]. No nakon sovjetske pobjede nad nacističkom Njemačkom 1945. više nije

Mauss, M. [1990] *The Gift: the form and reason for exchange in archaic societies*, LONDON: ROUTLEDGE.

May, C. [1998] 'Thinking, Buying, Selling: Intellectual Property Rights in Political Economy', *New Political Economy*, VOL. 3, NO. 1, STR. 59-78.

May, C. [1998A] 'Capital, Knowledge and Ownership: the "information society" and intellectual property', *Information, Communication & Society*, AUTUMN, VOL. 3, NO. 1, STR. 246-249.

McKay, G. [ed.] [1998] *DiY Culture: party & protest in 1990s Britain*, LONDON: VERSO.

McLuhan, M. [1964] *Understanding Media: the extensions of man*, LONDON: ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL.

Midnight Notes Collective [1990] 'Introduction to the New Enclosures', *Midnight Notes*, NO.10, FALL, STR. 1-9.

Negri, T. [1979] 'Capitalist Domination and Working Class Sabotage' in Red Notes, *Working Class Autonomy and the Crisis: Italian Marxist Texts of the Theory and Practice of a Class Movement 1964-79*, LONDON: RED NOTES/CSE BOOKS.

Negri, T. [1988] *Revolution Retrieved: selected writings on Marx, Keynes, capitalist crisis & new social subjects 1967-83*, LONDON: RED NOTES.

Nietzsche, F. [1961] *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, LONDON: PENGUIN.

Perović, L. [1999] 'The Flight from Modernity', *Bosnia Report*, 28th May, <www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/archive.htm>.

moglo biti sumnje o ispravnom tumačenju komunizma. Diljem svijeta su gotovo svi revolucionarni pokreti prihvatali neku varijantu staljinističke vjere. Radikalni intelektualci moraju stvoriti avangardnu partiju da bi zbacili postojeći poredak. Kad dođe na vlast, ta revolucionarna manjina mora uspostaviti modernizatorsku diktaturu. Uz pružanje sigurnosti i obrazovanja, ta totalitarna država organizirala bi brz razvoj ekonomije [ŠILAS, 1966]. Gotovo svi radikali vjerovali su da se ta, staljinistička verzija komunizma dokazala i u tvornici i na bojnom polju. Kad je počeo hladni rat, sve ostale interpretacije postale su marginalne. Gotovo pedeset godina je imperijalno suparništvo između dviju supersila bilo izraženo žestokim ideološkim sukobom: ruski komunizam nasuprot američkom kapitalizmu.

STALJIN U SILICIJSKOJ DOLINI ★

U hladnom ratu obje su strane tvrdile da upravo njihove društveno-ekonomske strukture predstavljaju budućnost cjelokupnog čovječanstva. Usprkos svom zalaganju apologeti obju supersila ipak su imali zajednički - i nepriznati - teorijski izvor: **Saint-Simona**. Još od revolucije 1917. godine ruska država služila se njegovim futurističkim predviđanjima kako bi opravdala svoje postupke. Učeći od svog protivnika u hladnom ratu, američka vlada počela je na sličan način veličati svoju politiku. Iako su se zalagali za liberalni kapitalizam, američki propagandisti zaneseno su oponašali teorijsku retoriku staljinističkog komunizma. Snaga kapitalističke manjine bila je u dugoročnim interesima većine stanovništva. Sve mane američkog društva ubrzo bi razriješio daljnji ekonomski rast. Utopijski potencijal SAD-a se prije svega dokazivao stalnim uvođenjem novih tehnologija kao simbola sve jačih proizvodnih snaga [ROSTOW, 1971]. Uz vojno-politički sukob o "sfarama utjecaja", dvije supersile natjecale su se i u tome tko će predstavljati budućnost.

Raspad Sovjetskog Saveza nije bio kraj teorijskog utjecaja staljinističkog komunizma na američke desničarske intelektualce. Naprotiv, globalna misija SAD-a bila je potvrđena pobjedom nad njegovim totalitarnim suparnikom. Prema jednom apologetu američki neolibe-

ralizam danas je ostvarenje hegelovskog "kraja povijesti". Premda se ratovi i sukobi i dalje nastavljaju, više nema nikakvog alternativnog oblika društveno-ekonomskog sistema [FUKUYAMA, 1992]. Za zastupnike kalifornijske ideologije tu narcističku pretpostavku dokazuje američka prevlast nad vrhuncem ekonomskog moderniteta: Mrežom. Ako i druge zemlje žele ući u informacijsku dobu, morat će oponašati osobit društveni sistem SAD-a. Poput svojih hladnoratovskih prethodnika, to suvremeno veličanje američkog neoliberalizma prisvaja mnoge teorijske pretpostavke staljinističkog komunizma. Opet prosvijetljena manjina vodi mase prema utopijskoj civilizaciji. Svaku patnju koju nanese uvodenje informacijskih tehnologija opravdava obećanje o budućem oslobođenju [HUDSON, 1996:33]. Kao odjek ruskog tiranina, digerati napredak prema utopiji mijere po sve rasprostranjenijem vlasništvu modernih artefakata: kućnih kompjutera, pagera, mobilnih telefona i laptopa [KATZ, 1997:71-72]. Premda je Sovjetski Savez odavno nestao, zastupnici kalifornijske ideologije i dalje prisvajaju teorijsko nasljeđe staljinističkog komunizma.

<i>avangardna partija</i>	digerati
Petoljetka	<i>Nova paradigma</i>
dječak na traktoru	štuber na Mreži
Treća Internacionala	Treći val
Moskva	Silicijska Dolina
<i>Pravda</i>	<i>Wired</i>
partijska linija	jedinstvena misao
sovjetska demokracija	elektroničke vijećnice
lisenkoizom	memetika
društvo-kao-tvornica	društvo-kao-košnica
novi sovjetski čovjek	post-čovjek
stahanovsko prebacivanje norme	iscppljujući rad na ugovor
čistke	smanjenja [radnih mjesta]
ruski nacionalizam	kalifornijski šovinizam

SAINT-SIMONOVA OSVETA ★

Diljem industrijaliziranog svijeta to konzervativističko prisvajanje staljinizma danas prevladava u raspravama o Mreži. Svaki guru veliča pojavu nove tehnokracije - *digerata*. Svaki mudrac tvrdi da ti pioniri Mreže grade novu utopiju - informatičko društvo. No ipak, poput svojih sovjetskih prethodnika, suvremeni desničarski intelektualci mogu stvoriti samo iskvarene verzije **Saint-Simonova** proročanstva. Dok je taj socijalistički filozof želio da ekonomski napredak doneše oslobođenje svima, ti zastupnici reakcionarnog modernizma isključuju većinu stanovništva iz svoje hi-tech kulture. Jer povlastice digerata ovise o podvrgavanju potlačenih masa. U kalifornijskoj ideologiji permanentna tehnološka revolucija uvijek se poistovjećuje s nezadiranjem u društvenu hijerarhiju. No bez obećanja konačnog iskupljenja ekonomska modernizacija postaje cilj sama sebi. Kon-

zervativni ideolozi opet obećavaju imaginarnu budućnost kako bi obeshrabrili ljude da poboljšaju svoj život u sadašnjosti.

Premda uvijek predstoji, dolazak informacijskog društva mora se neprekidno odgadati. Kao ni u bivšem Sovjetskom Savezu, ni u SAD-u nije zapravo zamišljeno da se Saint-Simonovo proročanstvo realizira. Naprotiv, razvoj proizvodnih snaga trebao bi pojačati postojeće proizvodne odnose. Jer i javne i privatne institucije uvođe nove informatičke tehnologije samo radi svojih vlastitih interesa. Još šezdesetih godina američka je vojska financirala stvaranje Mreže da bi vodila nuklearni rat. Od sedamdesetih godina finansijska tržišta služe se kompjutorskim mrežama da bi nametnula svoju hegemoniju cijelom svijetu. Posljednjih nekoliko godina kapitalističke tvrtke i vlade prihvatile su Mrežu kako bi poboljšale međusobnu komunikaciju svojih zaposlenika, suradnika i klijenata. U ovom trenutku svaki spekulant na Wall Streetu traži cyber-poduzetnika koji stvara neki novi Microsoft. Usprkos utopijskim predviđanjima digerata, čini se da nema ničega emancipatorskog u povezivanju kompjutatora, telekomunikacija i medija. Poput starijih oblika kapitalizma, informatičkim društvom vladaju hijerarhije tržišta i države [SCHILLER, 1995.; WINSTON, 1998:321-336].

Na početku novog tisućljeća čini se da je američki neoliberalizam postigao proturječne ciljeve reakcionarnog modernizma - ekonomski napredak i društvenu imobilnost. Budući da se dugoročni cilj oslobođenja svih neće ostvariti, kratkoročna vladavina digerata može trajati vječno. Ipak, kao i u bivšem Sovjetskom Savezu, dialektika razvoja i ostajanja na starom inherentno je nestabilna. Modernizirajući agrikulturalna društva, vladajuće stranke staljinističkog komunizma polako su uništavale temelje vlastite moći. Proizvodni odnosi koje je stvorio totalitarizam postali su neuskladivi sa stalnim širenjem proizvodnih snaga. U sadašnjem povjesnom trenutku Saint-Simon se napokon osvetio svojim lažnim učenicima.

"[Staljinistička] komunistička revolucija... donijela je određenu dozu industrijske civilizacije na velika područja Evrope i Azije. Tako je zapravo stvorena

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Rheingold, H. [1994] *The Virtual Community: finding connection in a computerised world*, LONDON: SECKER & WARBURG.

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Rossetto, L. [1996] '19th Century Nostrums Are Not Solutions to 21st Century Problems: a trans-atlantic jet steamer on European ideology and political eternal returns', *Mute*, WINTER/SPRING, NO. 4, STR. 17.

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Schiller, H. [1995] 'The Global Information Highway' u Brook, J. & Boal, I. [ur.], *Resisting the Virtual Life: the culture and politics of information*, SAN FRANCISCO: CITY LIGHTS, STR. 17-33.

de Sola Pool, I. [1983] *Technologies of Freedom: on free speech in the electronic age*, CAMBRIDGE MASS: BELKNAP PRESS.

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Stalin, J. [1954] 'The Results of the First Five-Year Plan: report delivered to the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U. [B.], January 7, 1933' u *Problems of Leninism*, MOSCOW: FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE, STR. 489-542.

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Wells, H.G. [1913] *A Modern Utopia*, LEIPZIG: BERNARD TAUCHNITZ.

Wice, N. [1999] 'Sony Tries to Put MP3 Genie Back in Bottle', *Time Digital*, <cgi.pathfinder.com/time/digital/daily/0,2822,24585,00.html>.

Winston, B. [1998] *Media, Technology and Society*, LONDON: ROUTLEDGE.

Wolf, G. [1995] 'The Curse of Xanadu', *Wired UK*, JUNE, STR. 70-85, 112-113.

Žizek, S. [1998] *The Spectre is Still Roaming Around: an anniversary edition of the 150th Communist Manifesto*, ZAGREB: ARKZIN

materijalna baza za buduće slobodnije društvo. Dakle, iako je nametnula najpotpuniji despotizam, [staljinistička] komunistička revolucija stvorila je i temelj za ukidanje despotizma." [ĐILAS, 1966:41-42]

Kao i njegovi prijašnji oponenti, američki neoliberalizam je sada potkopavan razvojem proizvodnih snaga. Kao što je **Saint-Simon** predviđao, puni potencijal recentnog tehnološkog i društvenog napretka ne može biti ostvaren unutar tradicionalne kapitalističke hijerarhije. Prema zagovornicima kalifornijske ideologije, Mreža je utemeljena na kupovanju i prodaji informatičkih dobara i usluga. Samo tržišna konkurenca može zadovoljiti individualne želje. Pa ipak, kad su *on-line*, korisnici Mreže prvenstveno su angažirani u davanju i primanju informacija kao darova. Radeći zajednički u cyberspaceu ljudi sasvim spontano prihvataju demokratske metode.

Ispunjavajući **Saint-Simonovo** proročanstvo, ti novi proizvodni odnosi pojavljuju se na rubu ekonomskog progresa - na Mreži. Nimalo iznenadujuće, njih je inauguirala privilegirana manjina svjetskog stanovništva - ljudi s pristupom kompjutorski posredovanim komunikacijskim tehnologijama. Kao rezultat toga, ti novi načini rada nagrašireniji su unutar vodeće kapitalističke nacije - Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Tehnološki i društveni preduvjeti za ostvarenje **Saint-Simonovog** proročanstva sada postoje. Dok konzervativni ideolozi ostaju začarani teorijskom ostavštinom staljinističkog komunizma, njihovi američki sugrađani otkrivaju praktične koristi nove verzije tog koncepta - cyber-komunizma.

"Kulture darivanja ne predstavljaju preoblikovanje oskudice već obilja. One se javljaju u grupama koje nemaju ozbiljnijih problema s materijalnom oskudicom sredstava za preživljavanje." [RAYMOND, 1998: 9]

Ekonomija darivanja na Mreži javlja se zbog tehnološkog i društvenog razvoja potaknutog kapitalističkom modernizacijom. Kroz posljednjih tri stotine godina reprodukcija, distribucija i manipulacija informacijama postupno je dugotrajnim procesom mehanizacije postajala sve lakšom. Novine koje su se proizvodile na ručnoj preši bile su relativno skupe, ograničenog broja primje-

raka i bilo ih je nemoguće umnožavati bez ponovnog tiskanja. Nakon generacija i generacija tehnoloških poboljšanja ista se količina teksta na Mreži može jednostavno prenijeti drugima, kopirati ili izmijeniti. No, dakako, pojedinac treba raspolagati i vremenom i novcem da bi ušao u taj napredni komunikacijski sistem. Dok većina svjetskog stanovništva živi u siromaštvu, stanovnici industrijski razvijenih zemalja su u posljednjih dvjesto godina ekonomskog rasta smanjili radne sate i povećali svoje bogatstvo. Sve tamo od izuma fordizma masovna proizvodnja je ovisila o tome da radnici imaju dovoljno sredstava i vremena za masovnu konzumaciju [NEGRI, 1998]. Tako imajući na raspolaganju prihod i slobodno vrijeme, mnogi radnici u razvijenim zemljama sad mogu raditi na vlastitim projektima [GORZ, 1989]. Upravo su se u ovom povijesnom trenutku tehnološki i društveni uvjeti dovoljno razvili da bi omogućili cyber komunizam.

"Kapital tako radi na vlastitom nestanku kao na obliku dominantne proizvodnje."

[MARX, 1973:700]

AKADEMSKA EKONOMIJA DARIVANJA ★

Izum Mreže najveća je ironija hladnog rata. Na vrhuncu borbe protiv staljinističkog komunizma američka vojska nenamjerno je financirala stvaranje cyber-komunizma. Zbog prijetnje nuklearnim napadom na zapovjedne i kontrolne strukture financirala su se istraživanja i pokusi s kompjutorski posredovanim komunikacijama. Premda je na početku razvijena za vojsku, izumitelji Mreže ubrzo su je počeli upotrebljavati za vlastite svrhe. U biti, znanstvenici su jednostavno prepostavili da bi se sve informacije trebale besplatno distribuirati njihovim novim komunikacijskim sistemom. Za razliku od većine ostalih proizvodnih sektora, ekonomija darivanja je već dugo glavna metoda podruštvljenja rada na sveučilištima. Budući da ih financira država ili donacije, znanstvenici ne moraju svoj rad izravno pretvarati u robu za tržiste. Umjesto toga rezultate istraživanja objavljuju na stručnim konferencijama i u akademskim časopisima. Kad budu citirani, postižu osobna priznanja, što povećava njihove izglede za uspješnu karijeru unutar sveučilišnog sistema. Usprkos sve većoj komercijalizaciji darivanje rezultata istraživanja ostaje najdjelotvornija metoda za rješavanje uobičajenih problema određene znanstvene struke.

"Racionalnost profesionalnih servisa nije ista kao racionalnost tržišta... U profesionalnom životu, a posebice u znanosti, odricanje od moralne kontrole poremetilo bi sistem. Davalac profesionalnih usluga mora biti... odgovoran za svoje proizvode i prikladno je da ne bude otuđen od njih." [HAGSTROM, 1982:29]

Zbog tih se pionira ekonomija darivanja čvrsto ukorijenila u društvenim običajima na Mreži. S vremenom se začarani krug njezinih korisnika polako proširivao sa znanstvenika, preko hobista, na široku publiku. Svaki novi član ne samo da mora poštovati tehnička pravila sistema nego pristaje i na određene društvene konvencije. Ljudi neprekidno besplatno šalju informacije jedni drugima

a da o tome i ne misle. Iako se Mreža proširila daleko izvan sveučilišnih granica, njezini korisnici i dalje više vole surađivati bez izravnog posredovanja novca.

Postoje čak i sebični razlozi za prihvatanje cyber-komunizma. Dodajući vlastitu prisutnost, svaki korisnik nečim pridonosi kolektivnom znanju dostupnom onima koji su već *on-line*. Zauzvrat svatko dobiva potencijalan pristup svim informacijama koje drugi nude na Mreži. U tržišnoj ekonomiji se kupci i prodavači trude razmjenjivati robu jednake vrijednosti. No u hi-tech ekonomiji darivanja svatko prima od svojih kolega korisnika mnogo više nego što bi bilo koji pojedinac ikad mogao dati [CHOSH, 1998: 10]. Ne iznenaduje što na Mreži nema općeg zahtjeva za tržišnom razmjenom. U cyber-komunizmu sretno sudjeluju čak i najdogmatičniji neoliberali.

Ti darovni proizvodni odnosi ugrađeni su u tehnološku strukturu Mreže. Iako ih je financirala vojska, znanstvenici su razvili kompjutorski posredovane komunikacije kako bi olakšali distribuciju i manipulaciju vlastitih istraživačkih podataka. Radeći na sveučilištima, nikada nisu te informacije shvaćali kao robu. Naprotiv, ti akademci su unapređivali svoje karijere poklanjajući rezultate svoga rada. Stvarajući komunikacijski sistem za vlastitu upotrebu, uključili su te radne metode u tehnologije Mreže [GEISE, 1996: 126–132]. Njihov izum iznad svega ovisi o neprekidnoj i neometanoj reprodukciji informacija. Svaka *on-line* veza uključuje kopiranje materijala s jednog kompjutora na drugi. Jednom kad je neka informacija stavljena na Mrežu, cijena svake sljedeće kopije postaje gotovo nula. Arhitektura sistema prepostavlja da se mnoštvo kopija svakog dokumenta može lako pronaći. Iako su korisnici Mreže danas većinom izvan akademske zajednice, njezin tehnički oblik i dalje prepostavlja da je informacija dar.

★ ★ ★

"U informatičkom prostoru, možemo govoriti o autorstvu... ali... postoji potreba za temelnjicom infrastrukturom koja omogućuje pravljenje kopija naprsto zbog efikasnosti i pouzdanosti. Koncept 'copyrighta' shvaćen u smislu napravljenih kopija nema više puno smisla..." [BERNERS-LEE 1996: 11]

SUMRAK COPYRIGHTA ★

Unatoč golemoj popularnosti ekonomija darivanja Mreže čini se poput zastranjenja. Općinjeni kalifornijskom ideologijom, gotovo svi političari, poslovni ljudi i mudraci uvjereni su kako se kompjutorski-posredovane komunikacije mogu razviti samo putem tržišne utakmice privatnih poduzeća. Informacija mora biti kupovana i prodavana kao roba poput drugih proizvoda. Ta vjera u sile tržišta dolazi od povjesnog iskustva. Kroz tri protekla stoljeća posredovanje robne razmjene dramatično je povećala produktivnost rada. Odgovarajući na promjene u cijeni, radnici i finansijska sredstva usmjeravani su prema najefikasnijim sektorima ekonomije. Natječući se s rivalskim tvrtkama,

poduzetnici moraju stalno poboljšavati načine i sredstva proizvodnje. Kad su disciplinirani tržištem, osobni interesi pojedinaca mogu biti usmjereni prema povećanju bogatstva čitave nacije [SMITH, 1970.; RICARDO, 1973].

U temeljitelji liberalne ekonomije otkrili su središnji paradox kapitalizma: individualno vlasništvo je preduvjet kolektivnog rada. U predmodernim društvima je kontrola koju su aristokracija i svećenstvo imali nad zemljom bila definirana feudalnim pravima i dužnostima. Rad seljaštva bio je organiziran kroz određeni skup običaja u svakom području. Nasuprot tome, pioniri kapitalizma preobrazili su zemlju u robu kojom se može trgovati - u parcele. Jednom kad su feudalne veze bile ukinute, rad različitih vrsta i na različitim lokacijama može biti reguliran jednim mehanizmom - tržištem [MARX, 1976: 873-930]. U proteklih nekoliko stoljeća taj moderni oblik kolektivnog rada proširio se posvuda. Jer disciplina tržišnog natjecanja nije samo podigla produktivnost unutar tradicionalnih zanata, već je potakla i razvoj novih industrija. Unutar razvijenih zemalja obični ljudi sada koriste dobra i usluge koje su bile nedostupne čak i kraljevima i papama ranijih vremena. Međutim, svako od tih tehnoloških čudesa bilo je oblikovano osebujnim kapitalističkim proizvodnim odnosima. Osim što zadowoljava ljudsku želju, svaki novi proizvod mora biti i prodavan kao roba. Unutar tržišne ekonomije ograde kolektivnog rada su trajne [MIDNIGHT NOTES COLLECTIVE, 1990].

U kapitalizmu je većina dobara i usluga proizvedena kao roba. Ako je riječ o opipljivim predmetima ili privremenim akcijama, ta društvena preobrazba obično nije problematična. Međutim, pretvaranje intelektualnog rada u robu uvek je bilo daleko teže. Dok su podučavanje i zabavljanje isto što i druge usluge, objavljivanje se veoma razlikuje od drugih dobara. Najviše rada u stvaranju informatičkog proizvoda je uloženo u pravljenje prve kopije. Čak su i na najjednostavnijim tiskarskim strojevima troškovi svake sljedeće kopije uvek mnogo niži. Na otvorenom tržištu izdavači su bili potaknuti da plagiraju postojeće radove umjesto da plaćaju nov materijal. Prve kapitalističke nacije ubrzo su otkrile pragmatično rješenje tog ekonomskog problema - *copyright*. Premda je svatko mogao kupiti kulturni artefakt, pravo na umnožavanje ograničeno je zakonom. Kao i svaki drugi oblik rada, sad je i intelektualni rad bilo moguće pretvoriti u robu [MAY, 1998: 68-73].

"Milton je stvorio 'Izgubljeni raj' kao što svilena buba proizvodi svilu, kao izraz svoje vlastite prirode. Kasnije je prodao svoj proizvod za pet funti i tako postao trgovac." [MARX, 1976:1044]

Konvergencija mnogih različitih tehnologija oko digitalnih formata također pojačava ekonomiju darivanja koju možemo sresti i na drugim područjima kulturne proizvodnje. Prema multimedijskim multinacionalnim kompanijama, Mreža će ubrzo morati prihvatići tržišne metode. Zaštićene šifriranjem i lozinkama, digitalne informacije prodavat će se kao roba. No ti nadobudni ograničavatelji

Mreže već su suočeni s djelomičnom dekomodizacijom vlastite kulturne industrije. Na primjer, kućno presnimavanje glazbe postoji već decenijima. Stalan napredak digitalne reprodukcije i brzo širenje Mreže još više olakšava to piratiziranje *copyrightom* zaštićenog materijala [CHESTERMAN I LIPPMAN, 1988: 36-45; LEONARD, 1998]. U biti najnovativniji oblici popularne glazbe danas nastaju kreativnim prisvajanjem intelektualnog vlasništva - house, hip-hop, drum&bass. Umjesto da ostanu zamrznute u jednom zvučnom zapisu, melodije i ritmovi neprekidno se sampliraju, miksaјu i remiksaju. Ako netko ima dobru ideju, mnogi drugi glazbenici pokušat će je "profiniti". I suvremena DJ kultura je, poput Mreže, također "interaktivna kreativnost" [GARRATT, 1998.; JAMES, 1997].

Godinama je najpopularnija riječ u pretraživačima bila prilično predvidljiva - seks. No 1999. godine je najčešće tražen postao glazbeni format Mreže - MP3 [WICE, 1999]. Za komercijalnu industriju glazbe je minoran problem kućnog presnimavanja prerastao u ozbiljnu krizu. Budući da je kopiranje i distribuiranje danas tako lako, mnogi ljudi daju digitalne snimke ne samo prijateljima nego i potpunim strancima. Kako se glazba integrira u Mrežu, oskudica robe spontano se pretvara u obilje darova [LEONARD, 1998]. Kao što omogućuje piratizaciju već postojećih zapisa, tehnološko približavanje produbljuje i muzičku "interaktivnu kreativnost". Poput mnogih drugih, glazbenici rade zajedno, sprijateljuju se i nadahnjuju jedni druge u mrežnim zajednicama. Objavljujući vlastiti materijal, oni svoju glazbu mogu ponuditi kao dar korisnicima Mreže širom svijeta. Polazeći od jednostavne *on-line* suradnje, oni stvaraju nove forme ritmičnog izražavanja - midi-jamming, interaktivnu glazbu, cyber-trance.

Kako se u Mreži stapaju i druge medijske tehnologije, svi se oblici kulturne proizvodnje polako integriraju u hi-tech ekonomiju darivanja. Čak će i televizija i film ubrzo biti preobraženi mogućnostima "interaktivne kreativnosti". Usprkos svojoj moći i bogatstvu, multimedijalne multinacionalne tvrtke mogu samo ometati tu ekonomsku transformaciju. Korisnici Mreže posve spontano prihvataju djelotvornije i ugodnije načine zajedničkog rada. U praskozorje novog tisućljeća mnogi Amerikanci danas uživaju praktične koristi cyber-komunizma.

roba	dar
zatvorenost	otvorenost
copyright	piratstvo
fiksno	fluidno
proizvod	proces
vlasnička prava	besplatni izvori
digitalno šifriranje	slobodno "skidanje"
originalne snimke	najnoviji remixes
oskudica	obilje
otuđenost	prijateljstvo
tržišno natjecanje	mrežne zajednice
e-trgovina	cyber komunizam

TRŽIŠTE OPĆEG DOBRA ★

U usporedbi s ostatkom čovječanstva stanovnici SAD-a su već privilegirani. Premda je još uvjek uskraćena za adekvatnu socijalnu zaštitu, većina Amerikanaca ne samo da konzumira više dobara i roba već uživa i veće demokratske slobode od većine svjetskog stanovništva. U proteklih dvije stotine godina kontinuirana ekspanzija i intenzifikacija robne razmjene masovno je podigla produktivnost kolektivnog rada u SAD-u. Uz pomoć uredbi federalne vlade i lokalnih državnih vlasti konkurencki poduzetnici su se natjecali u stvaranju sve kompleksnijeg i međuvisnijeg ekonomskog sistema. Prema mišljenju gotovo svih američkih političara, direktora i misilaca, sljedeći stupanj marketizacije društva započeo je na rubu najnovije tehnologije - na Mreži. Kao i u prošlosti, uključivanje novih tipova kolektivnog rada nužno će podići životni standard i proširiti osobne slobode u SAD-u. Nema alternative organizacijskom principu postojećih proizvodnih odnosa: rad-kao-roba.

Ironično, osveta **Saint-Simona** sad se obrušava na njegove lažne američke učenike. Kao i u bivšem Sovjetskom Savezu, stalni rast proizvodnih snaga i u SAD-u prijeti prevladavajućim proizvodnim odnosima. Daleko od toga da budu apoteoza robne razmjene, društvene i tehničke strukture kompjutorski posredovane komunikacije utjelovljuju alternativni oblik kolektivnog rada - ekonomiju darivanja. Kad bi se pojedince prisiljavalo da surađuju ponajprije putem e-trgovine, njihove mogućnosti za sudjelovanje u "interaktivnoj kreativnosti" bile bi vrlo ograničene. Puni potencijal proizvodnih snaga na Mreži može se ostvariti samo prihvaćanjem najnaprednijih proizvodnih odnosa - cyber-komunizma.

U tim povijesnim trenucima zastupnici reakcionarnog modernizma pali su u egzistencijalnu krizu. Usprkos svojim dubokim ideološkim razlikama gotovo svi desničarski intelektualci imaju isti cilj - ekonomski razvoj bez društvenog napretka. Vladajuće elite katkad i desetljećima uspijevaju kombinirati te proturječne ciljeve reakcionarnog modernizma. No stalni rast proizvodnih snaga na kraju će potkopati postojeće proizvodne odnose. Prije ili kasnije će zastupnici reakcionarnog modernizma biti prisiljeni na tešku odluku - ekonomski rast ili društvena stagnacija. Sljedbenici staljinističkog komunizma bili su, na primjer, s tom dilemom suočeni krajem osamdesetih godina. Želeći dostići svoje zapadne susjede, većina istočnoevropskih političara, menadžera i intelektualaca prihvatala je pad totalitarne države od koje su živjeli.

Nasuprot tome, srbijanska vladajuća elita odlučila se za drugu mogućnost - za uništenje proizvodnih sredstava. U strahu od gubitka bogatstva i moći pokrenula je ratove i "etnička čišćenja" kako bi spriječila svaki daljnji društveni i ekonomski napredak. Umjesto da se kreće prema utopiskoj budućnosti, njihova totalitarna država krenula je drugim smjerom - "bijegom od modernosti" [PEROVIĆ, 1999].

U SAD-u postoje jake grupe koje se zalažu za reakcionarni antimodernizam: vjerski fundamentalisti, bijeli suprematisti i lobby proizvođača oružja. Neki

utjecajni ljudi spremni su žrtvovati ekonomski rast kako bi održali postojeći društveni poredak. Ali većina onih koji imaju moć i bogatstvo htjela bi izbjegići tu odluku. Oni umjesto toga žele osuvremeniti reakcionarni modernizam za doba Mreže. U desničarskoj američkoj politici je hi-tech neoliberalizam već dugo optimistička alternativa tradicionalnom konzervativizmu. Daleko od toga da se boje budućnosti, ti proroci samopouzdano predviđaju da će ekonomski napredak na kraju oslobođiti čovječanstvo. Nesposobni izgovoriti prostu riječ na "I", američki neoliberali čak sami sebe nazivaju "libertarijancima" - oznakom koju su preuzeли od revolucionarnih ljevičarskih anarchista.

Taj optimistički oblik konzervativizma lako se prilagođava desničarskim analizama Mreže. Na primjer, zastupnici kalifornijske ideologije još vjeruju da se stalna tehnološka promjena može pomiriti s očuvanjem društvene hijerarhije [BARBROOK I CAMERON, 1996]. Poput svojih konzervativnih prethodnika, ti gurui često tvrde da se njihovi konzervativni ciljevi mogu postići mističnim sredstvima - umom Gaia, postljudima i memetikom. Što je još važnije, oni se zalažu za praktičnu metodu održavanja reakcionarnog modernizma - hibridizaciju robe i dara.

Poput pionira Divlje Zapada cyber-poduzetnici hvataju svaku priliku kako bi zatvorili novootvorenu elektroničku granicu. Na samom vrhu prožimanja medija profiti komercijalnih poduzeća ovise o ubrzanim širenju hi-tech ekonomije darivanja [KELLY, 1997]. Hardware i software za pristup Mreži mogu kao robu prodavati velika poduzeća kao što su IBM, Sun, Microsoft. Kruženje besplatnih informacija među korisnicima može biti zatvoreno unutar komercijalnih web stranica: AOL, Yahoo!, GeoCities.

Umjesto da se odupiru svim društvenim promjenama, digerati moraju prihvati određeni društveni napredak kako bi ubrali materijalnu korist od tehnološkog napretka. Sretna manjina otkrila je način za ostvarenje američkog sna - zatvaranje cyber komunističkog rada u digitalno kapitalističko vlasništvo [LEONARD, 1999]. Ako se postigne prikladan hibrid dara i robe, kolektivni rad će se odmah pretvoriti u bogatstvo pojedinca. Uzbudeni bogatstvom nekih cyber-poduzetnika, mnogi Amerikanci danas spekuliraju o istoj pretpostavci o Mreži: "... komunizam je poopcenje i konzumacija... privatnog vlasništva" [MARX, 1961:99].

Već gotovo trideset godina proroci hi-tech neoliberalizma izjednačuju ekonomski rast sa društvenom stagnacijom. U mnogim sektorima zalažu se za staromodne metode za povećanje profita: produženje radnog vremena, smanjivanje nadnica, ubrzavanje proizvodnje, smanjivanje socijalne skrbi i povećanje zagađivanja. No unutar Mreže zalažu se za sintezu tehnoloških inovacija i društvenog napretka. Jer je pretvaranje cyberspacea u robu nemoguće bez određenog prilagođavanja ekonomiji darivanja. Čak i sve veća važnost e-trgovine temelji se na nekomercijalnoj strukturi Mreže. "Cijena ulaska" na digitalno tržište tako je niska zbog nepostojanja vlasničkih barijera. Malene tvrtke danas imaju pristup kompjutorski posredovanim komunikacijama koje su nekoć bile dostupne samo vladinim agencijama, finansijskim institucijama i multinacionalnim

korporacijama. Izostavljajući posrednike, mnogi dobavljači roba i usluga povećavaju svoju dobit tako što na Mreži izravno posluju s nabavljačima i kupcima. Uzbudeni tim razvojem zastupnici kalifornijske ideologije vjeruju da se najslobodnije od svih tržišta odvija u općem dobru cyber prostora [KELLY, 1994; DYSON, 1997].

ČISTOĆA DARA ★

Protiveći se toj invaziji komercijalnih interesa, neki ljevičarski aktivisti oživljavaju purističku viziju dara. Zatvaranje Mreže sprječiti će se odbijanjem svakog kompromisa s robom [CRITICAL ART ENSEMBLE, 1996]. To revolucionarno stajalište nadahnjuje se hipijevskim radikalizmom iz šezdesetih. Prije više od trideset godina mnogi mladi ljudi pobunili su se protiv društveno-ekonomskog sistema i u SAD-u i u Sovjetskom Savezu. Materijalne dobrobiti moderniteti više nisu mogle nadoknaditi političku autoritarnost i kulturni konformizam koji je nametao industrijalizam. Razočarani hi-tech budućnošću ti su hipiji tražili nadahnuće u plemenskoj prošlosti. Neki ljevičarski intelektualci vjerovali su da se ta utopija može naći u ekonomiji darivanja polinezijских plemena - *potlatchu* [MAUSS, 1990].

Za radikalne hipije je ekonomija darivanja bila potpuna antiteze kapitalizmu. Umjesto nagomilavanja viška pojedinci u tim primitivnim društvima postizali su ugled darujući svoje bogatstvo na javnim proslavama. Dok je tržišno natjecanje zahtijevalo otuđeni rad da bi se proizvelo što više robe i usluga, *potlatch* je uključivao ugodno uništavanje viška. Dok moderna roba nameće hijerarhiju i utilitarizam, primitivno darivanje potiče jednakost i hedonizam. Odbijajući rad-kao-robu, ljevičarski hipiji proglašili su nov organizirajući princip za svoje utopijsko društvo - bacanje-kao-dar [SITUACIONISTIČKA INTERNACIONALA, 1981; BAUDRILLARD, 1975; NEGRI, 1979].

I nakon mnoga godina taj revolucionarni antimodernizam još uvijek utječe na ljevičarske analize kompjutorski posredovanih komunikacija. Premda se pojavljuje na samom vrhu tehnologije, ekonomija darivanja na Mreži može lako biti pomiješana s potlatchom plemenskih zajednica. Ti plemenski običaji mogu se naći i u plesnoj glazbi, besplatnim partyjima, protestnom pokretu i drugim oblicima kulture "uradi-sam" [BRASS, KOZIELL I SEARLE, 1997, MCKAY, 1998]. Imitirajući svoje hipni roditelje, ljevičarski mrežni aktivisti naglašavaju da su ti darovni odnosi slobodni od pokvarenosti robne razmjene. Odbijajući svaku hibridizaciju, zalažu se za uništavanje privatnog vlasništva putem piratiziranja materijala na koji postoji *copyright*: bacanje-kao-dar. Umjesto da se kupuje i prodaje, informacija će postati besplatna za svakoga tko sudjeluje u *on-line potlatchu*.

Nažalost, taj revival revolucionarnog antimodernizma ima i reakcionarne implikacije. Kao u stara vremena, ljevičarski intelektualci skloni su vidjeti sebe kao avanguardu koja predvodi neprosvjetljene mase. Budući iz srednjeg sloja, oni

slave "odbijanje rada" kako bi simbolički izrazili svoju superiornost nad ostatkom radničke klase. Iako su ostali bez Sovjetskog Saveza, neki pripadnici revolucionarne manjine još će se ispričavati zbog stranih diktatura koje se opiru američkoj hegemoniji. Teško je odbaciti stare političke navike unatoč nastupu novih informatičkih tehnologija. Revolucionarnu retoriku hipijevskog komunizma progoni reakcionarna praksa staljinističkog komunizma [BARBROOK, 1998].

AMERIČKI PUT U KOMUNIZAM ★

U SAD-u ta ljevičarska vizija čistoga dara ostaje na margini. Još od stjecanja neovisnosti američku "izuzetnost" definira gorljiva vjera u privatno poduzetništvo. U doba hladnog rata nijedan domoljub nije mogao podržavati revolucionarnu ideologiju nacionalnog neprijatelja. Neki ljudi se čak i danas oštro protive socijalnoj skrbi koja se smatra nužnom u drugim razvijenim zemljama [LIPSET, 1996]. No isti ti desničarski Amerikanci rado sudjeluju u uspostavljanju cyber komunizma. Sasvim spontano prihváćaju radne metode koje najviše koriste njihovim interesima. Katkad se bave e-trgovinom. Katkad više vole surađivati u hi-tech ekonomiji darivanja. Kao i svi drugi, i konzervativni Amerikanci odabiru cyber komunizam iz pragmatičnih razloga.

Usprkos svojoj ovisnosti o nadrlijekovima slobodnog tržišta, Amerikanci su dugo više voljeli praktična rješenja od ideološke korektnosti. Skeptično gledajući na evropsku opsjednutost teorijom, uvijek su bili ponosni na "jenkijevski pragmatizam" [DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1975: 3-20]. Osuvremenjujući tu tradiciju u odnosu na Mrežu, većina Amerikanaca jednostavno ignorira sve veću diskrepanciju između svojih političkih uvjerenja i svakodnevnih aktivnosti. Iako su prisiljeni govoriti kao neoliberali, u cyber prostoru se često odlučuju ponašati kao komunisti. Jer bi doslovna primjena kalifornijske ideologije odmah uklonila mnoge blagodati Mreže. Nije čudo što danas malo Amerikanaca otvoreno priznaje da uživa u grijehu suprotnom nacionalnom mitu. Dok reformistički zahtjev za javnim zdravstvenim sustavom ostaje očito ljevičarski, subverzivne implikacije koljanja informacija kao darova doslovno su nezamislive.

Bez trunka dvojbe **Eric Raymond** može istodobno biti strasni zagovornik dekomodifikacije softwarea i "...samozvani neopaganski [desničarski] libertarianac koji uživa u pucanju iz poluautomatskog oružja..." [LEONARD, 1998A: 2].

Među Amerikancima je cyber komunizam ljubav koju se ne usuđuju javno priznati. Nitko ne govori o onome što svatko čini. Nadasve se ne može diskutirati o povijesnom značenje njihovog kolektivnog ponašanja na Mreži. U svakodnevnom životu ljudi su uvijek darovali jedni druge. Mnoge društvene aktivnosti već su organizirane dobrotljnim radom i uz pomoć doniranih sredstava. DIY [Uradi sam] kultura predstavlja slavljenje pravljenja stvari za samoga sebe u svim aspektima života, od politike do glazbe [HYDE, 1999; BRASS, KOZIELLI I SEARLE, 1997]. Sada, s usponom Mreže, ta ekonomija darivanja dovodi u pitanje tržišno natjecanje na samom krajnjem rubu modernosti. Jer samo ti novi proizvodni

odnosi mogu u potpunosti ostvariti društvene i tehničke potencijale uznapredovalih proizvodnih snaga. Kad digitalni darovi slobodno cirkuliraju, ljudi mogu sudjelovati u "interaktivnoj kreativnosti". Kako se informacija beskrajno umnožava, količina kolektivnog rada sadržanog u svakoj kopiji ubrzo se svodi na gotovo ništa. U tim društvenim i tehnološkim uvjetima kruženje informacija kao darova može biti ne samo ugodnije već i efikasnije od robne razmjene. Iako cijene pogodnosti e-trgovine, Amerikanci s entuzijazmom sudjeluju u alternativnom obliku kolektivnog rada - cyber komunizmu.

U prijašnja vremena se ukidanje kapitalizma zamišljalo apokaliptično: revolucionarni ustanci, masovne mobilizacije i modernizatorske diktature. Korisnici Mreže spontano prihvataju ugodnije i djelotvornije načine zajedničkog rada. Umjesto da unište tržišnu ekonomiju, Amerikanci provode spor proces nadilaženja kapitalizma [HEGEL, 1873: 141–142; MARX, 1961: 98–114]. U tom dijalektičkom kretanju hi-tech neoliberali usavršavaju postojeće proizvodne odnose razvijajući e-trgovinu: rad-kao-roba. Reagirajući na to zatvaranje cyberspacea, ljevičarski aktivisti uništavaju informacijsko vlasništvo putem *online potlatcha*: bacanje-kao-dar. Za one koji osjećaju nostalgiju za ideološkom sigurnošću ne može biti kompromisa između tih proturječnih vizija Mreže.

Ipak, sinteza tih dijalektičkih suprotnosti mora se dogoditi iz pragmatičnih razloga. Korisnici Mreže često imaju više koristi od zajedničkog rada putem kolanja darova nego od sudjelovanja u e-trgovini. Živeći u bogatom društvu, mnogi Amerikanci više nisu motivirani samo novčanom dobiti nego rade i da bi zaslužili poštovanje svojih kolega. Sve veći broj ljudi zadovoljava svoju potrebu za priznanjem unutar mrežnih zajednica. Unutar Mreže porast proizvodnih snaga potiče napredniji oblik kolektivnog rada: rad-kao-dar [KOHN, 1998; LEONARD, 1998.A].

"...Rad se radi iz želje za priznanjem... i održava se i razvija u odnosu na tu istu želju." [KOJEVE, 1969:230]

Dijalektički proces nadilaženja kapitalizma obilježen je razvojem sinteze dara i robe na Mreži. U toj tranziciji ne smije se pretpostavljati ni otvaranje ni zatvaranje kolektivnog rada. Ako se ne pronađe prikladan hibrid, pojedinci koji rade na kolektivnom projektu mogu se brzo preseliti na ugodnije lokacije u cyberspaceu. Ponekad će tražiti novčane nagrade. U mnogim prilikama će više voljeti slobodu autonomnog rada. Ovisno o okolnostima, obje te želje djelomično će ostvariti u uspješnom hibridu dara i robe. Posljednjih dvjesto godina su bliske veze srodstva i prijateljstva u isti mah ometale i poticale impersonalne odnose potrebne za brz ekonomski rast. Moderno je uvjek postojalo istodobno s tradicionalnim. Sada, u doba Mreže, razmjena robe se kolanjem darova u isti mah pojačava i sprečava. Moderno se mora sintetizirati s hipermodernim.

Gurui kalifornijske ideologije ističu opstanak društvene hijerarhije unutar tih hibridnih proizvodnih odnosa na Mreži. Uspješni cyber poduzetnici već

počinju karijeru darujući svoje najpoželjnije proizvode. Ako se njihov proizvod prihvati, nadaju se zaraditi novac nudeći servis i dopunske proizvode korisnicima. Sretna manjina digeratija može se obogatiti prodajući dionice spekulantima na Wall Streetu [CUSUMANO I YOFFIE, 1998; LEONARD, 1999]. No čak i u toj konzervativnoj sintezi dara i robe *copyright* je prestao biti preduvjetom za proizvodnju informacija. Danas se svakoga kupca pridobiva reklamnim primjercima. Nesposobni oduprijeti se tehničkim mogućnostima digitalne konvergencije, neki neoliberalni ideolozi prihvaćaju konačan nestanak *copyrighta* [BARLOW, 1994]. Budući da će plagiranje uskoro postati opće, cyber poduzetnici moraju prihvati druge načine komodifikacije Mreže: usluge u realnom vremenu, oglašavanje, trgovinu. Hi-tech aristokracija može zaštитiti svoje povlastice samo tako da neprekidno dariva mase.

Ta hibridizacija proizvodnih odnosa prevladava u hi-tech proizvodnim granama. Na primjer, mnogi ljudi dobivaju zaposlenje tek nakon što odsluže "šegrtovanje" u mrežnoj zajednici. Ako kolege cijene njihov rad, mogu se pridružiti nastajućem posredničkom sloju koji zapošljavaju e-trgovačke tvrtke: digitalnim obrtnicima. Iako djeluje izvan akademske zajednice, darovanje informacija i dalje omogućuje prodaju radne snage. U skladu sa **Saint-Simonovim** proročanstvima, inovativni radnici u naprednim proizvodnim granama trebali bi predvoditi stvaranje ekonomskih i kulturnih okolnosti za društvenu emancipaciju. Posrednički sloj je avangarda moderniteta. Vjerni toj ulozi, digitalni obrtnici čine mnoge tehnološke i estetske napretke. Usprkos tome što moraju prodavati kreativnost za novac njihovi su načini rada često egalistički i kolaborativni. Opet se događa da posrednički sloj stvara budućnost.

No čak se i ta sinteza već nadilazi na vrhuncu moderniteta. Herojska manjina više nije sama. Nakon dva stoljeća ekonomskog rasta obični ljudi također mogu prihvati napredne proizvodne odnose. Rad na Mreži putem kolanja darova danas je svakodnevno iskustvo za milijune ljudi. Kao i na poslu, pojedinci u slobodno vrijeme surađuju na kolektivnim projektima. Oslobođen od neposredne stege tržišta, rad sve više može postajati darom. Prosvijećena manjina više nije potrebna da bi vodila mase u budućnost. Jer većina korisnika Mreže već sudjeluje u proizvodnim odnosima cyber komunizma. Oni danas šalju e-poštu, sudjeluju u raspravama, prave web stranice, sudjeluju u radu raznih grupa i održavaju *online* konferencije. Nemajući potrebu prodavati informaciju kao robu, spontano rade zajedno razmjenjujući darove. Političari, menadžeri i mudraci diljem svijeta nadahnuti su brzom ekspanzijom e-trgovine u SAD-u. Općinjeni neoliberalnom ideologijom ne primjećuju da većina informacija već kola kao darovi na Mreži. Zabavljeni nadilažnjem kapitalizma Amerikanci uspješno grade utopijsku budućnost u sadašnjosti: cyber komunizam.

"Društveni poredak ne biva uništen prije no što se razviju sve proizvodne snage za koje je on dovoljan, a novi, viši proizvodni odnosi ne zamjenjuju stare prije no što materijalni uvjeti njihova postojanja ne sazru u okviru staroga društva... Buržoaski način proizvodnje posljednji je antagonistički oblik procesa društvene

proizvodnje ... - antagonizam koji proistječe iz društvenih uvjeta egzistencije pojedinca - ali proizvodne snage koje se razvijaju unutar buržoaskog društva stvaraju i materijalne uvjete za razrješenje tog antagonizma. Prehistorija čovječanstva stoga se završava s tom društvenom formacijom.” [MARX. 1970:21-22]

DIJALEKTIKA CYBER-KOMUNIZMA ★

TEZA:

rad kao roba
e-trgovina
reakcionarni modernizam

SHOPPING

NEGACIJA:

rasipanje kao dar
potlatch
revolucionarni antimodernizam

NEGACIJA NEGACIJE:

rad kao dar
mrežne zajednice
revolucionarni modernizam

Where do you want t

Has Your Life Changed

English version
of this and similar
texts: [http://
www.hrc.wmin.ac.uk/
theory-author.html](http://www.hrc.wmin.ac.uk/theory-author.html)

[S ENGLEŠKOGA PREVEO GORAN VUJASINOVIĆ]

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
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OVER

Yet?

In Touch



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what does it mean when a whole culture dreams the same dream?

What's next?™

MIME-Version: 1.0
Date: Wed, 7 May
2003 19:25:20 -0400
Subject: Re: Reprint-
ing the dotCommunist
Manifesto

From: Eben Moglen
<moglen@columbia.edu>
Content-Type: text/
plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Description:
message body text
Content-Transfer-
Encoding: 7bit

Hi,
Sorry about that. It
completely slipped my
mind. The LaTeX
version is attached.

Best.
Eben

\DEF\MYTITLE{ DOTCOMMUNIST MANIFESTO }
{EBEN MOGLEN}

A specter is haunting multinational capitalism—the specter of free information. All the powers of “globalism” have entered into an unholy alliance to exorcize this specter: *Microsoft* and *Disney*, the World Trade Organization, the United States Congress and the European Commission.

Where are the advocates of freedom in the new digital society who have not been decried as pirates, anarchists, communists? Have we not seen that many of those hurling the epithets were merely thieves in power, whose talk of “intellectual property” was nothing more than an attempt to retain unjustifiable privileges in a society irrevocably changing? But it is acknowledged by all the Powers of Globalism that the movement for freedom is itself a Power, and it is high time that we should publish our views in the face of the whole world, to meet this nursery tale of the Specter of Free Information with a *Manifesto* of our own.

OWNERS AND CREATORS ★

Throughout the world the movement for free information announces the arrival of a new social structure, born of the transformation of bourgeois industrial society by the digital technology of its own invention.

The history of all hitherto existing societies reveals a history of class struggles.

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, bourgeois and proletarian, imperialist and subaltern, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that has often ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.

The industrial society that sprouted from the worldwide expansion of European power ushering in modernity did not do away with class antagonisms. It but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones. But the epoch of the bourgeoisie simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole seemed divided into two great hostile camps, into two great classes, directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.

But revolution did not by and large occur, and the "dictatorship of the proletariat," where it arose or claimed to arise, proved incapable of instituting freedom. Instead, capitalism was enabled by technology to secure for itself a measure of consent. The modern laborer in the advanced societies rose with the progress of industry, rather than sinking deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. Pauperism did not develop more rapidly than population and wealth. Rationalized industry in the Fordist style turned industrial workers not into a pauperized proletariat, but rather into mass consumers of mass production. Civilizing the proletariat became part of the self-protective program of the bourgeoisie.

In this way, universal education and an end to the industrial exploitation of children became no longer the despised program of the proletarian revolutionary, but the standard of bourgeois social morality. With universal education, workers became literate in the media that could stimulate them to additional consumption. The development of sound recording, telephony, moving pictures, and radio and television broadcasting changed the workers' relationship to bourgeois culture, even as it profoundly altered the culture itself.

Music, for example, throughout previous human history was an acutely perishable non-commodity, a social process, occurring in a place and at a time, consumed where it was made, by people who were indistinctly differentiated as consumers and as makers. After the adoption of recording, music was a non-perishable commodity that could be moved long distances and was necessarily alienated from those who made it. Music became, as an article of consumption, an opportunity for its new "owners" to direct additional consumption, to create wants on the part of the new mass consuming class, and to drive its demand in directions profitable to ownership. So too with the entirely new medium of the moving picture, which within decades reoriented the nature of human cognition, capturing a substantial fraction of every worker's day for the reception of messages ordering additional consumption. Tens of thousands of such advertisements passed before the eyes of each child every year, reducing to a new form of servitude the children liberated from tending a productive machine: they were now compulsorily enlisted in tending the machinery of consumption.

Thus the conditions of bourgeois society were made less narrow, better able to comprise the wealth created by them. Thus was cured the absurd epidemic of recurrent over-production. No longer was there too much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce.

But the bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and

opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air.

With the adoption of digital technology, the system of mass consumer production supported by mass consumer culture gave birth to new social conditions out of which a new structure of class antagonism precipitates.

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt its culture and its principles of intellectual ownership; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image. But the very instruments of its communication and acculturation establish the modes of resistance that are turned against itself.

Digital technology transforms the bourgeois economy. The dominant goods in the system of production—the articles of cultural consumption that are both commodities sold and instructions to the worker on what and how to buy—along with all other forms of culture and knowledge now have zero marginal cost. Anyone and everyone may have the benefit of all works of culture: music, art, literature, technical information, science, and every other form of knowledge. Barriers of social inequality and geographic isolation dissolve. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction—universal inter-dependence of people. And as in material production, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual people become common property. Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer's apprentice, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells.

With this change, man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind. Society confronts the simple fact that when everyone can possess every intellectual work of beauty and utility—reaping all the human value of every increase of knowledge—at the same cost that any one person can possess them, it is no longer moral to exclude. If Rome possessed the power to feed everyone amply at no greater cost than that of **Caesar**'s own table, the people would sweep **Caesar** violently away if anyone were left to starve. But the bourgeois system of ownership demands that knowledge and culture be rationed by the ability to pay. Alternative traditional forms, made newly viable by the technology of interconnection, comprising voluntary associations of those who create and those who support, must be forced into unequal competition with ownership's overwhelmingly powerful systems of mass

communication. Those systems of mass communication are in turn based on the appropriation of the people's common rights in the electromagnetic spectrum. Throughout the digital society the classes of knowledge workers—artists, musicians, writers, students, technologists, and others trying to gain in their conditions of life by copying and modifying information—are radicalized by the conflict between what they know is possible and what the ideology of the bourgeois compels them to accept. Out of that discordance arises the consciousness of a new class, and with its rise to self-consciousness the fall of ownership begins.

The advance of digital society, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the creators, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. Creators of knowledge, technology, and culture discover that they no longer require the structure of production based on ownership and the structure of distribution based on coercion of payment. Association, and its anarchist model of propertyless production, makes possible the creation of free software, through which creators gain control of the technology of further production.* The network itself, freed of the control of broadcasters and other bandwidth owners, becomes the locus of a new system of distribution, based on association among peers without hierarchical control, which replaces the coercive system of distribution for all music, video, and other soft goods. Universities, libraries, and related institutions become allies of the new class, interpreting their historic role as distributors of knowledge to require them to offer increasingly complete access to the knowledge in their stewardship to all people, freely. The liberation of information from the control of ownership liberates the worker from his imposed role as custodian of the machine. Free information allows the worker to invest her time not in the consumption of bourgeois culture, with its increasingly urgent invitations to sterile consumption, but in the cultivation of her mind and her skills. Increasingly aware of her powers of creation, she ceases to be a passive participant in the systems of production and consumption in which bourgeois society entrapped her.

★ *The free software movement has used programmers throughout the world—paid and unpaid—since the early 1980s to create the GNU/Linux operating system and related software that can be copied, modified and redistributed by all its users. This technical environment, now ubiquitous and competitively superior to the proprietary software industry's products, frees computer users from the monopolistic form of technological control that was to have dominated the personal computer revolution as capitalism envisioned it. By displacing the proprietary production of the most powerful monopoly on earth, the free software movement shows that associations of digital workers are capable of producing better goods, for distribution at nominal cost, than capitalist production can achieve despite the vaunted "incentives" created by ownership and exclusionary "intellectual property" law.}*

But the bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment." It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value. And in place of the numberless and feasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.

Against the forthcoming profound liberation of the working classes, whose access to knowledge and information power now transcends their previous narrow role as consumers of mass culture, the system of bourgeois ownership therefore necessarily contends to its very last. With its preferred instrument of Free Trade, ownership attempts to bring about the very crisis of over-production it once feared. Desperate to entrap the creators in their role as waged consumers, bourgeois ownership attempts to turn material deprivation in some parts of the globe into a source of cheap goods with which to bribe back into cultural passivity not the barbarians, but its own most prized possession—the educated technological laborers of the most advanced societies.

At this stage the workers and creators still form an incoherent mass scattered over the whole globe, and remain broken up by their mutual competition. Now and then the creators are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever-expanding union. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry and that place the workers and creators of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralize the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes. But every class struggle is a political struggle. And that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages, with their miserable highways, required centuries, the modern knowledge workers, thanks to the network, achieve in a few years.

FREEDOM AND CREATION ★

Not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons—the digital working class—the creators. Possessed of skills and knowledges that create both social and exchange value, resisting reduction to the status of commodity, capable collectively of producing all the technologies of freedom, such workmen cannot be reduced to appendages of the machine. Where once bonds of ignorance and geographical isolation tied the proletarian to the industrial army in which he formed an indistinguishable and disposable component, creators collectively

wielding control over the network of human communications retain their individuality, and offer the value of their intellectual labor through a variety of arrangements more favorable to their welfare, and to their freedom, than the system of bourgeois ownership ever conceded them.

But in precise proportion to the success of the creators in establishing the genuinely free economy, the bourgeoisie must reinforce the structure of coercive production and distribution concealed within its supposed preference for "free markets" and "free trade." Though ultimately prepared to defend by force arrangements that depend on force, however masked, the bourgeoisie at first attempts the reimposition of coercion through its preferred instrument of compulsion, the institutions of its law. Like the *ancien régime* in France, which believed that feudal property could be maintained by conservative force of law despite the modernization of society, the owners of bourgeois culture expect their law of property to provide a magic bulwark against the forces they have themselves released.

At a certain stage in the development of the means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal organization of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.

Into their place stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted to it, and by the economic and political sway of the bourgeois class. But "free competition" was never more than an aspiration of bourgeois society, which constantly experienced the capitalists' intrinsic preference for monopoly. Bourgeois property exemplified the concept of monopoly, denying at the level of practical arrangements the dogma of freedom bourgeois law inconsistently proclaimed. As, in the new digital society, creators establish genuinely free forms of economic activity, the dogma of bourgeois property comes into active conflict with the dogma of bourgeois freedom. Protecting the ownership of ideas requires the suppression of free technology, which means the suppression of free speech. The power of the State is employed to prohibit free creation. Scientists, artists, engineers, and students are prevented from creating or sharing knowledge, on the ground that their ideas imperil the owners' property in the system of cultural production and distribution. It is in the courts of the owners that the creators find their class identity most clearly, and it is there, accordingly, that the conflict begins.

But the law of bourgeois property is not a magic amulet against the consequences of bourgeois technology: the broom of the sorcerer's apprentice will keep sweeping, and the water continues to rise. It is in the domain of technology that the defeat of ownership finally occurs, as the new modes of production and distribution burst the fetters of the outmoded law.

All the preceding classes that got the upper hand, sought to fortify their already acquired status by subjecting society at large to their conditions of appropriation. Knowledge workers cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation. Theirs is the revolutionary dedication to freedom: to the abolition of the ownership of ideas, to the free circulation of knowledge, and the restoration of culture as the symbolic commons that all human beings share.

To the owners of culture, we say: You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property in ideas. But in your existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population. What they create is immediately appropriated by their employers, who claim the fruit of their intellect through the law of patent, copyright, trade secret and other forms of "intellectual property." Their birthright in the electromagnetic spectrum, which can allow all people to communicate with and learn from one another, freely, at almost inexhaustible capacity for nominal cost, has been taken from them by the bourgeoisie, and is returned to them as articles of consumption—broadcast culture, and telecommunications services—for which they pay dearly. Their creativity finds no outlet: their music, their art, their storytelling is drowned out by the commodities of capitalist culture, amplified by all the power of the oligopoly of "broadcasting," before which they are supposed to remain passive, consuming rather than creating. In short, the property you lament is the proceeds of theft: its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of everyone else. You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is the non-existence of any such property for the immense majority of society.

It has been objected that upon the abolition of private property in ideas and culture all creative work will cease, for lack of "incentive," and universal laziness will overtake us.

According to this, there ought to have been no music, art, technology, or learning before the advent of the bourgeoisie, which alone conceived of subjecting the entirety of knowledge and culture to the cash nexus. Faced with the advent of free production and free technology, with free software, and with the resulting development of free distribution technology, this argument simply denies the visible and unanswerable facts. Fact is subordinated to dogma, in which the arrangements that briefly characterized intellectual production and cultural distribution during the short heyday of the bourgeoisie are said, despite the evidence of both past and present, to be the only structures possible.

Thus we say to the owners: The misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and reason the social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property—historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production—this misconception you share with

every ruling class that has preceded you. What you see clearly in the case of ancient property, what you admit in the case of feudal property, you are of course forbidden to admit in the case of your own bourgeois form of property.

Our theoretical conclusions are in no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be universal reformer. They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes.

When people speak of ideas that revolutionize society, they do but express the fact, that within the old society, the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence.

We, the creators of the free information society, mean to wrest from the bourgeoisie, by degrees, the shared patrimony of humankind. We intend the resumption of the cultural inheritance stolen from us under the guise of "intellectual property," as well as the medium of electromagnetic transportation. We are committed to the struggle for free speech, free knowledge, and free technology. The measures by which we advance that struggle will of course be different in different countries, but the following will be generally applicable:

- ★ **Abolition of all forms of private property in ideas.**
- ★ **Withdrawal of all exclusive licenses, privileges and rights to use of electromagnetic spectrum. Nullification of all conveyances of permanent title to electromagnetic frequencies.**
- ★ **Development of electromagnetic spectrum infrastructure that implements every person's equal right to communicate.**
- ★ **Common social development of computer programs and all other forms of software, including genetic information, as public goods.**
- ★ **Full respect for freedom of speech, including all forms of technical speech.**
- ★ **Protection for the integrity of creative works.**
- ★ **Free and equal access to all publicly produced information and all educational material used in all branches of the public education system.**

By these and other means, we commit ourselves to the revolution that liberates the human mind. In overthrowing the system of private property in ideas, we bring into existence a truly just society, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. ●

Perhaps, there is a grain of truth in its detractor's claims; perhaps, the answers offered by The Communist Manifesto are no longer pertinent. However, in its very deficiency, The Communist Manifesto continues to address us, imposing us the task of reinventing the way out of the vicious cycle of capitalism. And why are we, from the "post-Communist" Eastern European countries, the ones to assume this task? Because we are compelled to live and sustain the contradiction of the global capitalist New World Order at its most radical. The ideological dream of the unified Europe aims at achieving the [impossible] balance between the two components: full integration into the global market; retaining the specific national and ethnic identities. What we are getting in the post-Communist Eastern Europe is a kind of negative, distopian realization of this dream - in short, the worst of both worlds, unconstrained market combined with ideological fundamentalism. [Slavoj Žižek, Spectre is Still Roaming Around]



Bauk kruži multinacionalnim kapitalizmom - bauk slobodnih informacija. Sve "globalizacijske" snage udružile su se u kleti savez da je istjeraju: Microsoft i Disney, Svjetska trgovinska organizacija, Kongres Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Evropska komisija.

Koje pobornike slobode u novom digitalnom društvu nisu osuđivali kao pirate, anarhiste ili komuniste? Zar se nismo osvijedočili da su oni koji upućuju takve epitete zapravo lopovi na vlasti čije je razglasanje o "intelektualnom vlasništvu" samo pokušaj da zadrže neopravdane povlastice u društvu koje se nepovratno mijenja? Ali Globalističke sile priznale su da je pokret za slobodu također Sila, te je krajnje vrijeme da svoja stajališta otvoreno izložimo cijelome svijetu kako bismo bajci o bauku slobodne informacije suprotstavili svoj vlastiti Manifest.

VLASNICI I TVORCI ★

U cijelome svijetu pokret za slobodne informacije najavljuje dolazak novoga društvenoga poretku, nastalog preobrazbom buržoaskog industrijskoga društva digitalnom tehnologijom, koju je samo stvorilo.

Povijest svih društava do danas zapravo je povijest klasnih borbi.

Slobodnjak i rob, patricij i plebejac, gospodar i kmet, zemljoposjednik i na-

jamni radnik, buržuj i proleter, imperijalist i potčinjeni, jednom riječju tlačitelj i potlačeni, uvijek su bili u sukobu i vodili neprekidnu, čas prikrivenu, čas otvorenu borbu, koja je često završavala ili revolucionarnom preobrazbom cijelog društva ili propašću sukobljenih klasa.

Industrijsko društvo izniklo je iz širenja evropske moći po cijelome svijetu, te je otvorilo vrata modernome dobu, ali nije se riješilo klasnih antagonizama. Uspostavilo je jedino nove klase, nove uvjete tlačenja i nove oblike borbe umjesto starih. No buržoasko doba pojednostavilo je klasne antagonizme. Društvo u cjelini naizgled se podijelilo u dva neprijateljska logora, na dvije velike, međusobno izravno suprotstavljene klase: na Buržoaziju i Proletarijat.

No revolucija se uglavnom nije dogodila, a ondje gdje se "vladavina proletarijata" nametnula [ili je bar tako tvrdila], nije se pokazala sposobnom uvesti slobodu. Umjesto toga tehnologija je kapitalizmu omogućila da dobije potporu za uspostavu svojega poretku. Životni uvjeti modernoga radnika u naprednim su se društвima poboljšavali s naprekom industrije umjesto da budu sve lošiji i padnu ispod klasnog standarda. Siromaštvo nije raslo brže od broja stanovnika i količine bogatstva. Poboljšana industrijska proizvod-

nja u fordovskome stilu od radnika nije stvarala osiromašeni proletarijat, nego masovne potrošače masovne proizvodnje. Buržoazija se štitila djelomično i tako što je uljudivala proletarijat.

Tako opće obrazovanje i kraj iskorištavanja djece u industriji više nije bio prezreni program proleterskih revolucionara, nego mjerilo buržoaskoga društvenog morala. Opće obrazovanje radnike je opismenoilo za praćenje medija koji su ih poticali na dodatnu potrošnju. Razvoj snimanja zvuka, telefonijske, filmova, radijskog i televizijskog emitiranja ne samo da je stubokom promijenio buržoasku kulturu nego je promijenio i odnos radnika prema njoj.

Glagzba je, na primjer, tijekom cijele prethodne ljudske povijesti bila proizvod koji se nije mogao očuvati, društveni proces koji se odvijao na određenom mjestu i u određenom vremenu, a kog su na licu mjesta konzumirali ljudi koji su bili nejasno podijeljeni na potrošače i proizvođače. Nakon pojave snimanja glazbu kao proizvod možemo sačuvati i prenijeti na velike udaljenosti, te se ona nužno otuduje od izvođača. Tako je postala potrošački proizvod, zbog čega su njezini novi "vlasnici" dobili priliku potaknuti dodatnu potrošnju, te stvoriti potražnju u novoj klasi masovnih potrošača i usmjeravati je tako da im bude unosna. Isto se dogodilo i s potpuno novim medijem, pokretnom slikom, koji je u roku od nekoliko desetljeća promijenio ljudski način shvaćanja zauzimajući znatan dio svakog radnikova dana porukama koje ga navode na dodatnu potrošnju. Deseci tisuća takvih reklama svake godine prođu pred očima svakoga djeteta, te djecu koja više ne moraju raditi za strojem sputavaju u novi oblik

ropstva — nehotično ropstvo potrošačkoga stroja.

Tako su se uvjeti buržoaskoga društva razvili da bolje upiju bogatstvo koje ono stvara. Otkriven je lijek za apsurdnu epidemiju prekomjerne proizvodnje koja se javlja svako taliko. Više ne može biti previše uljudbe, previše sredstava za život, previše industrije, previše trgovine.

Ali buržoazija ne može postojati ako stalno ne razvija instrumente proizvodnje, a s njima i proizvodne odnose koje prati razvoj sveukupnih društvenih odnosa. Buržoasko doba se od svih prethodnih razlikuje po stalnim revolucionarnim promjenama u proizvodnji, neprekidnim potresima svih društvenih prilika, vječnoj nesigurnosti i promjenama. Svi ustaljeni i čvrsto uvriježeni odnosi koji podrazumijevaju vjekovne i časne predrasude i stajališta pometeni su; svi novonastali zastarjevaju prije nego što stignu uhvatiti korijen. Sve što je čvrsto nestaje, pretvara se u dim.

Pojavom digitalne tehnologije sustav masovne potrošačke proizvodnje, koji podupire masovna potrošačka kultura, iznjedrio je nove društvene prilike iz kojih je ubrzo izrasla i nova struktura klasnih antagonizama.

Buržoazija je naglo usavršila instrumente proizvodnje i neizmjerno olakšala mogućnosti komunikacije, te tako u civilizaciju povukla sve, pa i najbarbarske narode. Niske cijene robe još uvijek su teška artillerija kojom ruši sve kineske zidove i prisiljava na pređaju i najtvrdokorniju mržnju barbaru prema strancima. Pod prijetnjom istrebljenja buržoazija prisiljava sve narode da usvoje njezinu kulturu, uključujući i načela intelektualnoga vlasništva;

prisiljava ih da u svoju sredinu uvedu ono što zove civilizacijom, to jest da i sami postanu buržoazija. Ukratko, stvara svijet na vlastitu sliku. No njezina sredstva komunikacije i prilagodbe omogućuju stvaranje otpora protiv nje same.

Digitalna tehnologija preobražava buržoasko gospodarstvo. Dominantnoj robi u sustavu proizvodnje, tj. predmetima kulturne potrošnje koji su ujedno i roba za prodaju i upute radniku što i kako da kupi, uključujući i sve ostale oblike kulture i znanja, granični je trošak jednak nuli. Bilo tko i svatko može slobodno koristiti sve oblike kulture: glazbu, likovnu umjetnost, književnost, tehničke informacije, znanost i bilo koju drugu vrstu znanja. Nestaju barijere društvene nejednakosti i zemljopisne izolacije. Umjesto stare lokalne i nacionalne zatvorenosti i samodostatnosti svjedoci smo komunikacije u svim smjerovima, opće međuovisnosti naroda, kako u proizvodnji materijalnih, tako i u proizvodnji intelektualnih dobara. Umotvorine pojedinaca postaju vlasništvo svijeta. Uzmemo li u obzir proizvodne, razmjenske i vlasničke odnose, moderno buržoasko društvo, koje je stvorilo preglede sredstva proizvodnje i razmjene nalikuje čarobnjaku pomoćniku koji više ne može obuzdati sile onoga svijeta koji je prizvao svojim čarolijama.

Zbog te promjene čovjek napokon mora trijezno razmisli o stvarnim životnim prilikama i svojemu odnosu prema vlastitoj vrsti. Društvo se suočilo s jednostavnom činjenicom da kad svatko može posjedovati svaku lijepu i korisnu umotvorinu, tj. požnjeti sve ljudske vrijednosti proistekle iz povećanja znanja po istoj cijeni po kojoj ih

može posjedovati jedna osoba, više nije moralno ikoga izopćiti. Da je Rim svakoga mogao obilno hraniti uz trošak ne veći od troška opskrbe Cezarova stola, narod bi silovito svrgnuo Cezara da je ikoga ostavio da gladuje. Ali buržoaski sustav vlasništva zahtijeva da se znanje i kultura doziraju prema platežnoj moći. Alternativni tradicionalni oblici koje je nedavno omogućila tehnologija međupovezanosti, a sastoje se od dobrovoljnih udruženja onih koji stvaraju i onih koji podržavaju, prisiljeni su ući u neravnopravnu borbu sa mnogo premoćnijim sustavima masovne komunikacije kojima raspolaže vlasnički sustav. Takvi sustavi masovne komunikacije temelje se na prisvajanju zajedničkoga prava svih ljudi na elektromagnetski spektar. U cijelome digitalnome društvu klasi ljudi koji se bave znanjem, tj. umjetnike, glazbenike, pisce, studente, tehnologe i ostale koji svoje životne prilike nastoje poboljšati kopirajući i modificirajući informacije, osvijestila je spoznaja da postoji sukob između onoga što znaju da je moguće i onoga što ih buržoaska ideologija sili da prihvate. Iz tog nesrazmjera izrasla je svijest o novoj klasi, a s rastom njezine samosvesti počinje pad vlasništva.

Razvoj digitalnog društva, čiji je nehotični promicatelj buržoazija, umjesto izolacije stvaratelja, što je posljedica konkurenčije, dovodi do njihova revolucionarnog organiziranja, što je posljedica udruživanja. Oni koji stvaraju znanje, tehnologiju i kulturu otkrivaju da im više ne treba struktura proizvodnje koja se temelji na vlasništvu i struktura distribucije koja se temelji na platežnoj moći. Udruživanje, kao i anarchistični oblik bezvlasničke

proizvodnje, omogućuje stvaranje slobodnog softvera pomoću kojega njegovi tvorci dobivaju nadzor nad tehnologijom daljnje proizvodnje.* Sama mreža, oslobođena nadzora vlasnika radijskih i televizijskih mreža, postaje mjesto novog sustava distribucije koji se temelji na udruživanju ravnopravnih osoba bez hijerarhijske kontrole, te tako zamjenjuje prisilni sustav distribucije glazbe, videomaterijala i ostale potrošne robe. Sveučilišta, knjižnice i srodne ustanove postale su saveznikom nove klase protumačivši njezinu povijesnu ulogu prnositeljice znanja, te zahtijevaju da svima dâ sve potpuniji sloboden pristup znanju pod njihovom paskom. Oslobođenje informacije od nadzora vlasnika oslobođa i radnika od nametnute mu uloge nadglednika stroja. Slobodna informacija omogućuje radniku da svoje vrijeme ne ispunjava konzumiranjem buržoaske kulture, koja sve upornije poziva na sterilnu potrošnju, nego da kultivira svoj um i vještine. Radnik je sve svjesniji svojih kreativnih mogućnosti, te prestaje biti pasivnim sudionikom sustava proizvodnje i potrošnje u koje ga je buržoasko društvo zarobilo.

No kad god je mogla, buržoazija je razorila sve feudalne, patrijarhalne, idilične odnose. Nemilosrdno je razdiralo svakojake feudalne spone koje su povezivale čovjeka s njegovim "prirodnim nadređenima", te je između čovjeka i čovjeka ostavljala jedino vezu golog interesa, beščutnog "gotovinskog plaćanja". Utopila je najuzvišenije ekstaze vjerskog zanosa, plemenitog oduševljenja i malograđanske sentimentalnosti u ledenoj vodi egoistične kalkulacije. Osobne kvalitete prozvala je razmjenskim vrijednostima. Umjesto bezbrojnih mogućih sloboda uspostavila je jednu jedinu, beskrupuloznu slobodu - Slobodnu trgovinu. Jednom riječju, umjesto izrabljivanja pod kriptom vjerskog i političkog cilja uvela je golo, besramno, izravno, surovo izrabljivanje.

Suočen sa skorašnjim velikim oslobođenjem radničke klase, koja pristupom znanju i informacijama uvelike nadilazi svoju prethodnu ulogu potrošača masovne kulture, sustav se buržoaskoga vlasništva nužno mora boriti svim snagama. Svojim omiljenim sredstvom Slobodne trgovine vlasništvo pokušava izazvati baš krizu prekomjerne proizvodnje koje se nekoć bojalo. U očajničkoj želji da one koje stvaraju zarobi u ulogu potrošača s plaćom, buržoasko vlasništvo pokušava pretvoriti ma-

★ {Pokret za slobodni softver od početka 1980-tih upošljava plaćene i neplaćene programere iz cijelog svijeta kako bi stvorio operativni sustav GNU/Linux i srodne softvere koje svaki korisnik može kopirati, mijenjati i dalje plasirati. Takvo tehničko okruženje, koje je sada rasprostranjeno i konkurentnije od proizvoda vlasničke softverske industrije, oslobođilo je korisnike računala monopolističkoga oblika tehnološkog nadzora koji je trebao dominirati revolucijom osobnih računala kakvom ju je zamislio kapitalizam. Oduzevši vlasničkoj proizvodnji najmoćniji monopol na zemlji, pokret za slobodni softver pokazao je da je udruženje digitalnih radnika sposobno proizvesti bolju robu od kapitalističkog sustava proizvodnje i plasirati je po nominalnoj cijeni, unatoč veoma hvaljenim "poticajima" vlasništva i isključivosti zakona o "intelektualnome vlasništvu".}

terijalnu neimaštinu nekih dijelova svijeta u izvor jeftine robe kojom u kulturnu pasivnost ne bi namamilo barebare, nego ono što mu je najvrednije – obrazovane tehnološke radnike najnaprednijih društava.

Trenutačno su radnici i stvaratelji još nepovezana masa raštrkana po cijelome svijetu, a razdire je to što si međusobno konkuriraju. I nekad i sad stvaratelji su pobijedivali, ali samo privremeno. Pravi plod njihove borbe nisu trenutačni rezultati, nego sve širo ujedinjenost. Ujedinjavanju idu na ruku poboljšana sredstva komunikacije moderne industrije koja moderne radnike i stvaratelje iz raznih krajeva povezuju jedne s drugima. Brojna lokalna nastojanja, koja su sva težila istom, trebala su upravo takvu povezanost kako bi se ujedinila u jednu narodnu međuklasnu borbu. No svaka je klasna borba politička. A jedinstvo, za koje su građanima u srednjem vijeku, koji su imali jedino loše putove trebala stoljeća, moderni kulturni radnici postigli su, zahvaljujući mreži, u nekoliko godina.

SLOBODA I STVARANJE ★

Buržoazija ne samo da je sâma iskovala oružje koje će joj zadati smrt nego je i stvorila ljudе koje će to oružje nositi - digitalnu radničku klasu, stvaratelje. Budući da posjeduju znanje i vještine koje predstavljaju i društvenu i razmjensku vrijednost, odbijaju da budu svedeni na status robe i sposobni su zajednički stvoriti svu tehnologiju slobode; takve radnike jednostavno nije moguće smatrati dodacima stroju. Nekoć su spone neznanja i geografske izolacije vezale proletera za industrijsku vojsku u kojoj je pojedinac bio

nerazlikovan i zamjenjiv dio, no danasni tvorci koji su zajednički preuzeли nadzor nad mrežom ljudskih komunikacija zadržali su svoju individualnost i nude proizvode svog intelektualnoga rada u raznolikim oblicima koji njihovu blagostanju i slobodi pridonose mnogo više nego što im je sustav buržoaskoga vlasništva ikada dopuštao.

No u točno onoj mjeri u kojoj su tvorci uspjeli stvoriti doista slobodno gospodarstvo, buržoazija mora ojačati strukturu prisilne proizvodnje i distribucije pod krinkom navodne sklonosti prema "slobodnim tržištima" i "slobodnoj trgovini". Iako je na kraju spremna silom braniti poredak koji ovisi o sili, ma kako ona maskirana bila, buržoazija prvo pokušava ponovo nametnuti prisilu svojim omiljenim sredstvom prinude - zakonodavnim ustanovama. Kao i ancien régime u Francuskoj koji je vjerovao da se feudalni posjed može očuvati konzervativnom silom zakona unatoč modernizaciji društva, vlasnici buržoaske kulture očekuju da njihov zakon o vlasništvu stvoriti čarobnu branu protiv sila koje su sami oslobodili.

Na određenom stupnju razvoja sredstava proizvodnje i razmjene, tj. uvjeta u kojima je feudalno društvo proizvodilo i razmjenjivalo, feudalna organizacija poljoprivrede i manufaktурне proizvodnje, jednom riječju feudalni odnosi, više nisu bili u skladu s novim proizvodnim snagama. Postali su poput robijaške kugle. Trebalo je raskinuti lanac – to se i dogodilo.

Na njihovo mjesto došla je slobodna konkurenca koju su popratila društvena i politička uređenja s njom u skladu, te gospodarska i politička dominacija građanske klase. Na "slo-

bodna konkurenčija" za buržoasko je društvo uvijek bila tek težnja, a kapitalisti su uvijek bili skloniji monopolu. Građanski posjed primjer je ideje monopolija koji na razini praktičnog poretku nijeće dogmu slobode, koju je buržoaski zakon nedosljedno proglašio. Budući da u novome digitalnom društvu stvaratelji uspostavljaju istinski slobodne oblike gospodarske aktivnosti, dogma građanskoga posjeda u izravnom je sukobu s dogmom građanske slobode. Zaštita vlasništva ideja zahtijeva ukidanje slobodne tehnologije, a to znači ukidanje slobode govora. Moć države koristi se kako bi se zabranilo slobodno stvaranje. Znanstvenike, umjetnike, inženjere i studente sprečavaju da proizvedu ili podijele znanje pod izlikom da njihove ideje dovode u opasnost imetak vlasnika u sustavu kulturne proizvodnje i distribucije. Na sudovima vlasnika stvaratelji najjasnije uočavaju svoju klasnu pripadnost, a ondje u skladu s tim sukob i počinje.

Ali zakon o građanskom vlasništvu nije čarobna amajlija protiv posljedica građanske tehnologije: metla čarobnjakova učenika i dalje će mesti, a vode će biti sve više. Poraz vlasništva napoljan se odigrava na području tehnologije kako novi načini proizvodnje i distribucije raskidaju lance zastarjela zakona.

Sve prethodne klase koje su izvojivale pobjedu nastojale su utvrditi status koji su postigle podvrgavajući cijelokupno društvo svojim uvjetima prisvojanja. Kulturni radnici ne mogu postati gospodari proizvodnih snaga nekoga društva ako ne ukinu svoje vlastite, a time i sve prethodne, načine prisvojanja. Njihov je način to što su revolucionarno odani slobodi: ukidanju

vlasništva ideja, slobodnom protoku znanja i ponovnoj uspostavi kulture kao simboličnog zajedničkog tla koje pripada svima.

Vlasnicima kulture kažemo: Užasava vas pomisao na to da namjeravamo ukinuti privatno vlasništvo ideja. Ali u vašem sadašnjem društvu privatno vlasništvo ionako je već izopćilo devet desetina stanovnika. Ono što stvaratelji stvore odmah prisvajaju njihovi poslodavci, koji polažu pravo na plod njihova uma na temelju zakona o patentu, copyrightu, poslovnoj tajni i ostalim oblicima "intelektualnog vlasništva". Pravo na elektromagnetski spektar koje su stekli rođenjem i koje svima omogućava da slobodno komuniciraju i uče jedni od drugih, neograničeno i uz zanemariv trošak, oduzela im je buržoazija i vratile im ga kao potrošnu robu, tj. kao emitirana dobra i telekomunikacijske usluge koje plaćaju suhim zlatom. Nemaju se mogućnosti kreativno izraziti: njihovu glazbu, umjetnost i priopovijedanje preplavila je roba kapitalističke kulture koju je rasprostranio svemoćni oligopol medija i koje bi trebali pasivno upijati - trošiti, a ne stvarati. Ukratko, vlasništvo za kojim kukate zapravo je proces krađe: rijetki ga imaju nauštrb toga što ga svi ostali nemaju. Spočitavate nam, dakle, što kanimo ukinuti oblik vlasništva čiji je nužan uvjet postojanja to što golema većina društva takvo vlasništvo ne posjeduje.

Jedna je od primjedbi da će, kad se ukinje privatno vlasništvo ideja i kulture, svaki kreativni rad prestati zbog nedostatka "poticaja", te da će nas preplaviti sveopća lijenosť.

To znači da prije uspostave buržoaskoga društva nije trebalo biti ni glaz-

be, ni likovne umjetnosti, ni tehnologije, ni znanja budući da se ono prvo dosjetilo da cijelokupno znanje i kulturu veže uz gotovinu. Uzveši u obzir pojavu slobodne proizvodnje i tehnologije, slobodnog softvera i, kao posljedicu toga, razvoj slobodne distribucijske tehnologije, ovoj argument negira vidljive i nepobitne činjenice. Činjenica se podvrgava dogmi da su odnosi koji su kratko karakterizirali intelektualnu proizvodnju i kulturnu distribuciju tijekom procvata buržoazije jedini mogući, usprkos dokazima i iz prošlosti i budućnosti.

Zato vlasnicima kažemo: Svaka vlađajuća klasa prije vas imala je pogrešno uvjerenje zbog kojega i vi želite društvene oblike nastale iz vašeg sadašnjeg načina proizvodnje i oblika vlasništva, tj. povjesnih odnosa koji nastaju i nestaju napretkom proizvodnje, preobraziti u vječne zakonitosti prirode i razuma. Dakako, u slučaju vlastitoga buržoaskoga vlasništva ne smijete priznati ono što vam je jasno u slučaju drevnoga ili feudalnoga oblika vlasništva.

Naši se teoretski zaključili ni u kom slučaju ne temelje na zamislima ili načelima koje je izmislio ili otkrio neki misilac koji teži ka univerzalnoj reformi. Oni jednostavno općenito izražavaju trenutačne odnose nastale iz postojeće klasne borbe, iz povjesnog kretanja koje se događa pred našim očima.

Kad ljudi govore o idejama koje stubokom mijenjaju društvo, žeze samo izraziti činjenicu da su unutar staroga društva nastali elementi novoga, te da raspadanje ideja ide ukorak s raspadanjem starih životnih prilika.

Mi, tvrđi slobodnog informacijskog društva, namjeravamo postupno oteti

buržoaziji zajedničku baštinu ljudskoga roda. Kanimo vratiti kulturno nasljeđe koje su nam ukrali pod kriškom "intelektualnoga vlasništva", kao i medij elektromagnetskog prijenosa. Predani smo borbi za slobodu govora, slobodu znanja i slobodu tehnologije. Mjere koje ćemo rabiti u toj borbi bit će, dakako, različite u različitim zemljama, no sljedeće stvari primijenit ćemo općenito:

- ★ **Ukipanje svakog oblika privatnog vlasništva ideja.**
 - ★ **Ukipanje svih ekskluzivnih dozvola, privilegija i prava na uporabu elektromagnetskog spektra. Poništenje trajnih koncesija na elektromagnetske frekvencije.**
 - ★ **Razvoj infrastrukture elektromagnetskog spektra kako bi svaka osoba mogla iskoristiti svoje jednako pravo na komunikaciju.**
 - ★ **Zajednički društveni razvoj kao javnog dobra računalnih programa i ostalih oblika softvera, uključujući i genetičke informacije.**
 - ★ **Puno poštivanje slobode govora, uključujući sve oblike tehničkoga jezika.**
 - ★ **Zaštita nepovredivosti umotvorina.**
 - ★ **Slobodan i ravnopravan pristup svim informacijama koje su javno proizvedene i svim obrazovnim materijalima koji se koriste u svim granama javnog obrazovnog sustava.**
- Ovim i drugim sredstvima započinjemo revoluciju za oslobođenje ljudskoga uma. Rušeći sustav privatnog vlasništva ideja, stvaramo istinski pravedno društvo u kojem je slobodan razvoj pojedinca uvjet za slobodan razvoj sviju. ●

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We must be very brave

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Shall I rewrite or revise

My October symphony?

Or as an indication THE SPEED OF LIFE™

Change the dedication

From revolution to revelation?

In Touch with Tomorrow

Pet Shop Boys, My October Symphony
[words & music Neil Tennant & Chris Lowe]

THE NETWORK IS THE COMPUTER™

The Communist Manifesto is still alive, perhaps more than ever, since the predicament it describes is heightened today to a new level of unbearable tension. The lesson of The Communist Manifesto for us today is that the dilemma “global market-liberalism or fundamentalism” is a false one. On the one hand, any hope that social antagonisms will be resolved through the further development of capitalist economy and its political counterpart, multiculturalist liberal democracy, is misleading: the antagonistic tension is inscribed into the very notion of capitalism and thus cannot be attenuated through “more consequent” multicultural tolerance, struggle against ethnic or sexist fundamentalism and other “remainders of the past”, etc. On the other hand, any return to traditional values [from the Catholic or Islamic fundamentalism to the Oriental New Age wisdom] is doomed to fail - not only because it is impotent in face of the thrust of the Capital, but because the attempts to reassert the old ways in their very form already reinforce the New [is today’s televangelist who preaches the return to authentic traditional values, as to the very form of his activity not already a mediatic show-man?].

[Slavoj Žižek, Spectre is Still Roaming Around]

PROLETARË TË TË GJITHA VENDEVE,
PROGRAM OTVORENJA / OPENING PROGRAM BASHKOHUNI!
HDLU, Zagreb | 15-18/06/2000

Proletarier aller Länder,

- ★ Hito STEYERL: *Die leere Mitte/The Empty Center*
film, 16mm, 63' & razgovor s autoricom/discussion with author

Performansi / performances:

- ★ Darko FRITZ: vrijeme=novac=vrijeme / time=money=time= .
★ Vlado MARTEK: *Dućan kolonijalnom robom / Colonial Goods Store*
★ Sanja IVEKOVIĆ: *Repetitio est mater [Nada Dumić]*
★ Ivan MARUŠIĆ Klif & others: *DJ's Guide to Communist Manifesto*
15 hours sound performance

- ★ "Nada Dumić", Besplatno pravno savjetovalište za žene / Legal advices
for women [organised by Sanja IVEKOVIĆ]

predavanja, radionice, prezentacije / lectures, workshops, presentations

- ★ Richard BARBROOK [Hypermedia Research Centre, UK]
★ Hito STEYERL [Berlin/München, D]
★ Mark TERKESSIDIS [Köln, D]
★ Fredric JAMESON [Duke University, USA]
★ Gregor PODNAR, Galerija ŠKUC, Ljubljana [Slo]
★ Saša GLAVAN, SCCA Ljubljana [Slo]
★ Lejla HODŽIĆ, SCCA Sarajevo [BiH]
★ Dejan SRETOVIĆ, SCCA Beograd [SRJ]
★ Larisa BLAŽIĆ, VideoMedeja, Novi Sad [SRJ]
★ Edi MUKA, International Arts Center, Tirana [AL]
★ Kobe MATTHYS, Agency [Computer], Bruxelles [B]

Пролетарији од сите земји, соедините се! Proletarë të

PROGRAM OTVORENJA / OPENING PROGRAM

Kunsthalle Exnergasse - WUK | Beč/Vienna | 20/06/2001

- ★ Ivan MARUŠIĆ KLIF: *DJ's Guide to Communist Manifesto, If I had a*

Hammer, live performance & radio broadcast

- ★ Tomislav GOTOVAC: *Rocks in My Bed, performance*

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
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PROLETARI DI TUTTI I PAESI UNITEVI!



povodom 152. godišnjice Komunističkog manifesta

how & for whom

on the occasion of 152nd anniversary of the *Communist Manifesto*

Kad bi samo Marks još stajao pored mene da
to gleda svojim očima!

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Što, kako i za koga, povodom 152. godišnjice Komunističkog manifesta
What, How and for Whom, on the occasion of 152nd anniversary of the Communist Manifesto
Dom Hrvatskog društva likovnih umjetnika, Zagreb
Home of Croatian Association of Artists, Zagreb
Trg žrtava fašizma bb | Zagreb | Hrvatska / Croatia
15/06–10/07/2000

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Što, kako i za koga / VVHVV — Ana DEVIĆ | Nataša ILIĆ | Sabina SABOLOVIĆ

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Što, kako i za koga / VVhat, Hovv and for VVhom/VVHVV 8 Arkzin

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Što, kako i za koga, povodom 153. godišnjice Komunističkog manifesta
Was, wie und für wen, anlässlich des 153sten Jahrestags des Kommunistischen Manifesto
What, How and for Whom, on the occasion of 153rd anniversary of the Communist Manifesto
VVUK | Kunsthalle Exnergasse
Währinger Strasse 59 | A - 1090 Vienna | Austria / Austria
20/06–28/07/2001

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VVUK | Kunsthalle Exnergasse, Vienna

Što, kako i za koga / VVhat, Hovv and for VVhom/VVHVV 8 Arkzin

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povodom 152. godišnjice Komunističkog manifesta
What, How and for Whom
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