ADDRESSING MEDIA*

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“You mean my whole fallacy is wrong.”

(Marshall McLuhan, in Annie Hall)

“I don’t know if I mean what I say. And if I knew, I would have to keep it to myself.”

(Niklas Luhmann¹)

In Annie Hall, there is a famous scene in which Woody Allen is stuck on a movie line next to an obnoxious media studies professor from Columbia University who insists on broadcasting his stupid opinions about cinema. When the professor starts to hold forth on Marshall McLuhan’s theories of media, Woody can stand it no longer. He steps out of the line and addresses the camera directly, complaining about being trapped next to this boor. The professor then steps towards the camera as well and responds: “Hey it’s a free country. Don’t I have a right to my opinions too?” When he goes on to defend his own credentials for explaining McLuhan, Woody has his moment of triumph. He says, “Oh yeah, well I have Marshall McLuhan right here.” McLuhan steps into view and squelches the obnoxious professor with the decisive putdown: “I heard what you were saying. You know nothing about my theories.” Woody smiles at the camera and sighs, “If only life were like that.”

The only problem with this moment of at least negative clarity and insight in the welter of media theories is that someone (Woody Allen? McLuhan himself?) has inserted a tiny glitch into the intervention of the authority figure, the media guru, the One Who Is Supposed To Know. Generally overlooked (or unheard) is a quiet little remark nested inside McLuhan’s assertion of authority over his own theories: “You know nothing about my theories. You mean my whole fallacy is wrong.”

One wants to play this scene over and over again to be sure one has heard the words correctly. What nonsense! There must be some mistake in the script, or in McLuhan’s delivery of his lines. Of course his fallacy is wrong. That is what it means to be fallacy. But why should McLuhan, as he steps forward to declare his authority as the oracle of media theory—a kind of meta-medium in his own right—subvert his authority by calling his theory a fallacy? At the very least it suggests that one had better approach the question of media somewhat cautiously. If even the inventor of media studies, the great avatar of media theory who became a media star in his own right, is capable of slipping

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This line does appear in the script as reproduced on the Annie Hall Website, http://www.unofficial.com/anniehall.txt (August 29, 2003). What Allen intended by it one can only guess.

[MediaTropes Editorial Note: “You mean my whole fallacy is wrong?” The following is reported by Michael Edmunds, in conversation with Corrine McLuhan and Mattie Molinaro, 2002, at the McLuhan Program in Culture and Technology, University of Toronto, on the topic of Annie Hall and the origin of the fallacy statement.

Marshall McLuhan was invited by Woody Allen to appear in Annie Hall. McLuhan arrived in New York with his wife, Corrine, and his agent, Mattie Molinaro. After checking into their hotel suites, McLuhan went to meet Allen and discuss the film. The two women remained behind, looking forward to their stay in New York. When McLuhan arrived back from his meeting with Allen, according to Corrine and Mattie he was quite perplexed. McLuhan told the women that he did not like what had been scripted for him to say and he felt that he couldn’t do it. He was, however, also very much disinclined to go against Allen. Both Corrine and Mattie encouraged McLuhan to follow his feelings and not to say Allen’s lines. They urged him to present his own dialogue to Allen. McLuhan did just this.

At some point the next day, McLuhan presented his text, including his “You mean my whole fallacy is wrong?” It was accepted without argument by Allen (perhaps he even liked it) and it became part of the McLuhan corpus—a part apparently still misunderstood.

A full study of the various script versions can be found at The Harry Ransom Center at The University of Texas at Austin, which houses the Woody Allen Archive. Box 1, Folders 4–7, of Series I. Works, 1963–2002, Subseries A. Films and Stage Plays contains the following 4 versions of the screenplay Annie Hall (United Artists, 1977): (1) Early draft, untitled, dated 4/15/76; (2) Revised draft with credits; production notes with an alternate title “Anxiety”; (3) Final draft, 1976; and (4) Combined continuity with corrected dialogue, dated 5/3/77. (See http://www.hrc.utexas.edu/research/fa/allen.woody.film.html).

The question posed by Mitchell as to what is meant by McLuhan’s line gains more urgency with the realization that the great avatar of media theory himself not only wrote it and said it, but, we believe, he meant it for the purposes of media ecology!]
on a figurative banana peel, what lies in wait for the rest of us who think we have a right to our opinions about media? How can we hope, as McLuhan promised, to “understand media,” much less become experts about them? Perhaps we need a less ambitious model than understanding. That is what I propose to explore by “addressing” media: not as if they were logical systems or structures but as if they were environments where images live, or personas and avatars that address us and can be addressed in turn.

The lives and loves of images, it seems clear, cannot be assessed without some reckoning with the media in which they appear. The difference between an image and a picture, for instance, is precisely a question of medium. An image only appears in some medium or other—in paint, stone, words, or numbers. But what about media? How do they appear, make themselves manifest and understandable? It is tempting to settle on a rigorously materialist answer to this question, and to identify the medium as simply the material support in or on which an image appears. But this answer seems unsatisfactory on the face of it. A medium is more than the materials of which it is composed. It is, as Raymond Williams wisely insisted, a material social practice, a set of skills, habits, techniques, tools, codes and conventions. Unfortunately, Williams wanted to push this insight to the point of jettisoning the whole idea of the medium as an unnecessary reification. The title of his essay on this subject, “From Medium to Social Practice,” suggests as much. The idea is to release the study of media from a misplaced emphasis on the material support (as when we call paint, or stone, or words, or numbers by the name of media) and move it toward a description of the social practices that constitute it. But perhaps this gesture of de-reification goes too far. Is every social practice a medium? This is not the same as asking whether every social practice is mediated. Is a tea party, a union walkout, an election, a bowling league, a playground game, a war, or a negotiated settlement a medium? Surely these are all social practices, but it would seem odd to call them media no matter how much they might depend on media of various sorts—on material supports, representation, representatives, codes, conventions, and even mediators. The concept of a medium, if it is worth preserving at all, seems (unsurprisingly) to occupy some sort of vague middle ground between materials and the things people do with them. Williams’s compromising phrase, “material social practice,” is clearly an attempt to sketch this middle ground, in contrast with his title, and the thrust of this argument, which wants to move us from one side (materials) to the other (social practice).

3 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 158–64.
Perhaps this is the fundamental paradox built into the concept of media as such. A medium just is a “middle,” an in-between or go-between, a space or pathway or messenger that connects two things—a sender to a receiver, a writer to a reader, an artist to a beholder, or (in the case of the spiritualist medium) this world to the next. The problem arises when we try to determine the boundaries of the medium. Defined narrowly, confined to the space or figure of mediation, we are returned to the reified picture of materials, tools, supports, and so forth. Defined more broadly, as a social practice, the medium of writing clearly includes the writer and the reader, the medium of painting includes the painter and beholder—and perhaps the gallery, the collector, and the museum as well. If media are middles, they are ever-elastic middles that expand to include what look at first like their outer boundaries. The medium does not lie between sender and receiver; it includes and constitutes them. Are we left with a version of the Derridean maxim about texts—that is, “there is nothing outside the medium”? What does it mean to go to the movies? When are we inside or outside the medium? When we are in the theater, or like Woody Allen in Annie Hall, standing on line in the lobby?

The vagueness built into the concept of media is one of the main stumbling blocks in the way of a systematic discipline of “media studies,” which seems today to occupy a rather peculiar position in the humanities. One of the youngest emergent disciplines in the study of culture and society, it exists in a parasitical relationship to departments of rhetoric and communication and to the film studies, cultural studies, literature, and the visual arts. The common rubrics these days are “cinema and media studies,” as if the general idea of media were merely a supplement to the centrally located medium of film; or “communication and media studies,” as if media were merely instrumental technologies in the master domain of communicating messages. In the field of art history, with its obsessive concern for the materiality and “specificity” of media, the supposedly “dematerialized” realm of virtual and digital media, as well as the whole sphere of mass media, are commonly seen either as beyond the pale or as a threatening invader, gathering at the gates of the aesthetic and artistic citadel.4 A symptom of history’s ambivalent relation to media is the way it marginalizes architecture as (at best) the third most important medium in

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4 The hostile reception to the emphasis on new media art at the 2002 Documenta exhibition in Kassel, Germany, is symptomatic of this continued resistance to moving, virtual, and dematerialized images in the art world. Of course, like everything else in the art world, the new media are contested zones, and there are many who regard them as the frontier of artistic experimentation and research. The other notable “invaders” of the media territory of art history are, of course, the verbal disciplines—literary theory and history, rhetoric, linguistics, and semiotics.
its purview, well down the standard hierarchy that places painting at the top, sculpture a distant second, while the oldest, most pervasive medium human beings have devised, the art of constructing spaces, languishes at the bottom. In the study of literature, the medium of language, and the specific technologies of writing, from the invention of the printing press to the typewriter to the computer, are relatively minor issues compared to question of genre, form, and style, which are generally studied independently of the specific material vehicle through which literary works are transmitted. Cultural studies, meanwhile, is such an amorphous formation that it may well be synonymous with media studies, or vice versa, with a bit of emphasis on technologies of communication and archiving.

Thirty years after the death of Marshall McLuhan, the great pioneer of media studies, the field still does not have its own identity. Symptomatic of this is the need to constantly overturn McLuhan, to recite all his mistakes and bemoan his naïve predictions of the end of labor, the emergence of a peaceful “global village,” and the development of new planetary consciousness, a kind of wired “world spirit.” Contemporary media theory, as if in reaction against McLuhan’s optimism, is driven by an obsession with war machines (Friedrich Kittler, Paul Virilio) and traces every technical innovation to the arts of coercion, aggression, destruction, surveillance, and propaganda spectacle. Or it is enveloped in a presentist rhetoric that takes the Internet and the age of digital information as the horizon of its interests (Peter Lunenfeld, Lev Manovich). Or it focuses exclusively on the so-called mass media (television and print journalism) as a uniquely modern invention that can be rigorously distinguished from more traditional media.

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5 This claim might seem counterintuitive, given the importance of structural linguistics in the study of poetry and literary narrative. But these studies (along with their poststructural and deconstructive descendants) tend to focus on tropes and structural elements that are quite independent of the technical media in which a “text” makes its appearance. Thus, Friedrich Kittler’s arguments about the importance of the typewriter to the gendering of literature in the late nineteenth century have fallen, so far as I can see, on deaf ears among students of literature.


Perhaps the most interesting symptom in the current discussion is the recurrent theme of the end of media and the death of media studies, a claim which, if true, would make this one of the shortest-lived concepts in the history of human thought. Just thirty years ago, in the wake of McLuhan’s meteoric career and burnout as a has-been media star in his own right, Jean Baudrillard penned a “Requiem for the Media,” in which he denounced Hans Magnus Enzensberger’s hopeful attempts to sketch out a socialist theory of media in terms of productive forces and a “consciousness industry.”9 “There is no theory of the media,” declared Baudrillard, except “empiricism and mysticism”; and the idea that socialism could somehow harness the productive forces of the intransitive, nonreciprocal structures of mass media were dismissed as a pipe dream harnessed to an illusion. Even Friedrich Kittler, who opens Gramophone, Film, Typewriter by declaring that “[m]edia determine our situation,” within a few pages is hinting that the age of media, the era of the great media inventions (cinema, sound recording, the keyboard interface), may now be over. The invention of the computer promises “a total media link on a digital base” that will “erase the very concept of medium. Instead of wiring people and technologies, absolute knowledge will run in an endless loop.” All that is left for the present, according to Kittler, is “entertainment” as we wait for the arrival of the endless loop that will not include any human component in its circuits.10

What does it mean to “address” media today, at the threshold of the twenty-first century? I want to raise the question this way in contrast with McLuhan’s notion of “understanding” media in order to foreground the way media address or “call out” to us and the ways in which we imagine ourselves talking back to or addressing media.11 The primal scene of this address might be the moment we find ourselves shouting at the television set, or putting our hands on the radio and sending in five dollars in response to an evangelical preacher. How are the media addressing us, who is the “us” they are addressing, and what is the “address” of media, in the sense of their location or place in social and mental life? How, in particular, can we address the totality of media—not just mass or technical media, not just television and print media, but obsolete and archaic media, and media in McLuhan’s expanded field—

10 Kittler, Gramophone, File, Typewriter, 1–2.
money, exchange, housing, clothing, the arts, communication systems, transportation, ideology, fantasy, and political institutions? One avenue is offered by systems theory, which provides models of media as autopoetic system-environment dialectics. Every entity in the world, from the single-celled organism to the multinational corporation to the global economy, turns out to be a system that inhabits an “environment” which is nothing more than the negative of the system—an “unmarked space” that contrasts with “marked space” of the system. Persons and minds are also systems, and they are “isolated monads” that can never communicate with one another.

Systems theory, especially as developed by its principal exponent, Niklas Luhmann, tends to be very abstract and paradoxical. It can be rendered concrete, if no less paradoxical, by picturing its logic with the aid of those ambiguous figure-ground diagrams that are icons of cognitive science. The system-environment relation turns out to be a nest of Chinese boxes in which systems (such as minds) never communicate with one another, but do manage to observe their own observing (Figure 1).

![Luhmann diagram: form is to medium as system is to environment as organism is to habit.](image)

The ultimate result of systems theory seems finally to be a rather dry mystical empiricism (in contrast with the messy, metaphorical, and associative logic of McLuhan’s dazzling puns and alliterations). Luhmann’s own system is worked

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out with impeccable and impersonal logic. It finds that systems are something like living organisms, while environments, seen from a high enough level, can begin to look like systems (that is, organisms) in their own right. Media can fit on both sides of the systems/environment divide: they are a system for transmitting messages through a material vehicle to a receiver; or they are a space in which forms can thrive, as Luhmann’s “form/medium” division recapitulates his foundational move of “drawing a distinction” (between inside and outside, object and space, observer and observed) in a rather graphic way. In vernacular reflections on media, we describe this as the difference between a medium through which messages are transmitted, and a medium in which forms and images appear. These two fundamental models of media (as transmitter and habitat) may be visualized with Umberto Eco’s familiar linear diagram of the sender-receiver circuit (Figure 2) and with my own diagram of Luhmann’s system/environment and form/medium distinctions (Figure 1, above).

If we are stuck with mystical empiricism, I would prefer mine to be as concrete as possible, and so I suggest that instead of using system/environment as the master terms, we think of media in terms of faces and places, figures and spaces. If we are going to “address” media, not just study or reflect on them, we need to transform them into something that can be addressed, that can be hailed, greeted, and challenged. If we are going to be “address media” in the other sense, that is locate them, give them an address, then the challenge is to place them, and to see them as landscapes or spaces. This may all correspond to the distinction between system (organism, body, face) and environment (place, space), but it will have the advantage of being more picturesque. The methodological strategy here is what I have called “picturing theory,” that is, treating theory as an embodied discourse, one that is constructed around critical metaphors, analogies, models, figures, cases, and scenes. A theory of media that follows this path has to ask not only what media are, what they do; it has to raise the question of what the medium of theory itself might be. We tend to assume, of course, that some form of critical or philosophical language, the metalanguage of systems theory or semiotics, for instance, might lift us out the welter of media and give us a neutral scientific perspective on the totality of
My approach is just the opposite. It assumes that no theory of media can rise above the media themselves, and that what is required are forms of vernacular theory, embedded in media practices. These will turn out to be what I have called “metapictures,” media objects that reflect their own constitution, or (to recall artist Robert Morris’s wonderful object of minimalist Dadaism), boxes with the sound of their own making.\(^\text{14}\)

A useful metapicture of media is provided by the classic multistable image of the one vase/two faces (Figure 3).\(^\text{15}\)

![Figure 3, One vase/two faces: figure-ground ambiguity. Digital Media Laboratory, University of Chicago.]

If we begin with the vase, we see a useful illustration of Luhmann’s distinction between the “marked” system (the vase), and the “unmarked” environment, or

\(^{13}\) Luhmann, for instance, imagines that systems theory can replace traditional “utopian” ethical/political concepts of social theory (e.g., democratization, dialectics, inequalities, and struggle) and traditional concepts of media aesthetics (e.g., mimesis, expression, representation) with an Olympian survey of “the emergence of comparable conditions in systems as diverse as religion or the monetary economy, science or art, intimate relationships or politics—despite extreme differences between the functions and the operational modes of these systems” (\textit{Art as a Social System}, 2; emphasis Luhmann’s). I disagree. See my essay, “Why Comparisons are Odious,” \textit{World Literature Today}, vol. 70, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 321–24, for a critique of comparatism in literature and the arts.

\(^{14}\) See my discussion of Morris in W. J. T Mitchell, \textit{Picture Theory} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), chapter 8. Metapictures are similar to Luhmann’s concept of the “‘playful’ doubling of reality” in works of art, but Luhmann assumes that this is a distinctive feature of the modernist “art system,” rather than an essential property representation and mimesis as such. My notion of the metapicture is not limited to works of art, modern or otherwise.

\(^{15}\) In a simpler, unornamented form, this figure is known as Rubin’s Vase, first presented by Danish psychologist Edgar Rubin in 1921. See J. Richard Block, \textit{Seeing Double} (New York: Routledge, 2002), 8.
empty space around it. It also illustrates the distinction between form (the
drawn outline that distinguishes the vase) and the medium (the blank paper on
which it is inscribed). But a second glance precisely reverses these readings: the
vase turns from a system into an environment between two systems that face
each other, and the empty space or environment around the vase turns into the
two facing systems. But the most stunning reversal in this image is the
transformation of the ornamental markings on the vase into the conduits of
communication between the eyes and mouths of the faces. The invisible media
of seeing and speaking are depicted here as channels of intersubjectivity, a kind
of emblem of the very process of “addressing media.” Not only do the two
faces address each other simultaneously in what Jacques Lacan would call the
“scopic” and “vocative” registers, the image as a whole addresses us, the
beholders, staging for us our own relation to the picture as something we speak
of and to at the same time we see it and find ourselves shown by it. As we
“face” this image, in other words, we face our own interpolation as
seeing/speaking subjects in face-to-face communication. This picture wants to
address us, to be addressed, and to differentiate sensory modes of address. The
unmarked ribbon of the oral medium is contrasted to the punctuated, subdivided
channel of the visual, perhaps to suggest a qualitative difference between the
scopic and vocative, the pulsations and nervous glances of the optical process
as contrasted with the fluidity of the smooth talker.

[...] It may be useful at this point to spell out some conclusions that
may be drawn from the preceding reflections on theories of media, and to make
explicit the assumptions about media that underlie this series of case studies.
The following “ten theses on media” provide a summary of these conclusions,
followed by a more leisurely elaboration.

1. Media are a modern invention that has been around since the beginning.
2. The shock of new media is as old as the hills.
3. A medium is both a system and an environment.
4. There is always something outside a medium.
5. All media are mixed media.
6. Minds are media, and vice versa.
7. Images are the principal currency of media.
8. Images reside within media the way organisms reside in a habitat.
9. The media have no address and cannot be addressed.
10. We address and are addressed by images of media.

1. *Media are a modern invention that has been around since the
beginning.* When I address the question of media, I do not confine myself
exclusively or even primarily to the modern sphere of “mass” media or technical, mechanical, or electronic media. I prefer to see modern and traditional and so-called primitive media as dialectically and historically linked. Ancient and archaic media such as painting, sculpture, and architecture provide a framework for the understanding of television, cinema, and the Internet, at the same time that our view of these early media (even our modern understanding of them as “media” in the first place) depends on the invention of new means of communication, simulation, and representation. Ancient practices such as body painting, scarification, and gesture language, archaic cultural formations like totemism, fetishism, and idolatry survive (albeit in new forms) in contemporary media, and many of the anxieties surrounding traditional media involved questions of technical innovation, from the proliferation of “graven images” to the invention of writing.

2. The shock of new media is as old as the hills. In so far as there is a history of media, it is not usefully bifurcated between modern and traditional forms. A dialectical account of media involves the recognition of uneven development, of the survival of traditional media in the modern world, and anticipations of new media in ancient practices. For instance, the “first” medium, architecture, has, as Walter Benjamin noted, always been a mass medium in the sense that is consumed in a state of distraction.16 Outdoor sculpture has addressed mass collectives since time immemorial. Television may be a mass medium, but its point of address is generally in the private, domestic space, not a mass gathering.17 And technology has always played a role in the production of works of art and the communication of messages over distance, from the invention of fire to the drum, to tools and metallurgy, to the printing press. The notion of “new media” (the Internet, the computer, video, virtual reality) must be tempered, then, by the recognition that media are always new, and have always been sites of technical innovation and technophobia. Plato regarded writing as a dangerous innovation that would destroy human memory and the dialectical resources of face-to-face conversation. Baudelaire thought the invention of photography would destroy painting. The printing press has been blamed for revolution, and youthful violence has been attributed to everything from video games to comic books to television. When it comes to media, then the “shock of the new” is as old as the hills, and needs to be kept in perspective. There has always been a shock of the new with media; they have

17 This is not, of course, a fixed condition of the television medium. In the South African shantytowns, for instance, a television set may provide mass entertainment for several hundred people at the same time.
always been associated with divine invention, with double-edged gifts from the god, and with legendary creators and messengers (Theuth, the inventor of writing; Moses, the bringer of the phonetic alphabet from Sinai; Edison and the phonograph; Prometheus and the fire; and McLuhan, the Promethean inventor of media studies as such). That doesn’t mean that these innovations are not really new, or make no difference; only that the difference they make cannot be settled by labeling them “new” and treating all of the past as “old.”

3. A medium is both a system and an environment. The notion of media is derivative of a more embracing concept of “mediation” that goes well beyond the materials and technologies of art and mass media to include such arenas as political mediations (representative institutions such as legislatures and sovereigns), logical media (the middle term in a syllogism), economic mediations (money, commodities), biological “media” (as in a biotic “culture” or habitat), and spiritual mediations (the medium as the go-between at a séance; the idol as symbol of an invisible god). A medium, in short, is not just a set of materials, an apparatus, or a code that “mediates” between individuals. It is a complex social institution that contains individuals within it, and is constituted by a history of practices, rituals and habits, skills and techniques, as well as by a set of material objects and spaces (stages, studios, easel paintings, television sets, laptop computers). A medium is as much a guild, a profession, a craft, a conglomerate, a corporate entity as it is a material means for communicating. This proposition leads us back, however, to the Pandora’s Box opened by Raymond Williams’s concept of “social practice,” threatening to unleash a boundless concept of the media. Therefore we need to supplement this concept with another maxim, in this case, illustrated by a cartoon by Alex Gregory. [The cartoon depicts two men standing in contemplation before what appears to be a picture hanging on a wall. The caption reads: “It’s not a high-definition anything. It’s a window.” From The New Yorker Collection, 2001]

4. There is always something outside a medium. Every medium constructs a corresponding zone of immediacy, of the unmediated and

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18 An instructive example is here is Lev Manovich’s tendency to equate “New Media” with computerization (numeric coding, modularity, automation, variability, transcoding), and to treat photography and cinema as “traditional media,” with “old media” identified as “manually assembled” (The Language of New Media, 36). The line between old and new, however, is continuously redrawn, and needs clearer specification.

19 As Luhmann argues, this is simply a formal condition of any system, including media: “the mass media, as observing systems, are forced to distinguish between self-reference and other-reference. They cannot do otherwise. They must construct reality—another reality, different from their own” (Niklas Luhmann, The Reality of Mass Media [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000], 5).
transparent, which stands in contrast with the medium itself. The window was, of course, a medium in its own right, dependent on the emergence of suitable technologies of glass rolling. Windows are perhaps one of the most important inventions in the history of visual culture, opening architecture to new relations of inner and outer, and remapping the human body by analogy into inner and outer spaces, so that the eyes are the windows of the soul, the ears are porches, and the mouth is adorned with pearly gates. From the grillwork of Islamic ornament to the stained glass windows of medieval Europe, to the show windows and arcades of modern shopping and flânerie, to the Windows of the Microsoft user interface, the window is anything but a transparent, self-evident, or unmediated entity. But this cartoon also reminds us that the new medium is, paradoxically, often associated with immediacy and the unmediated, so that high-definition, high-speed computing makes it possible to simulate the older medium of the window perfectly. In this sense, new media do not remap our senses so much as they analyze the operations of the senses as they are already constructed by nature and habit and previous media, and try to make them look just like the older media.  

5. All Media are mixed media. There are no “pure” media (for example, “pure” painting, sculpture, architecture, poetry, television), though the search for the essence of a medium, what critic Clement Greenberg saw as the task of the modernist avant-grade, is a utopian gesture that seems inseparable from the artistic deployment of any medium. The issue of media purity arises when a medium becomes self-referential and renounces its function as means of communication or representation. At this point, certain exemplary images of the medium become canonized (abstract painting, pure music) as embodying the inner essence of the medium as such.  

6. Minds are media, and vice versa. Mental life (memory, imagination, fantasy, dreaming, perception, and cognition) is mediated, and is embodied in the whole range of material media. Thinking does not, as Wittgenstein put it, reside in some “queer medium” inside the head. We think out loud, at the keyboard, with tools and images and sounds. This process is thoroughly reciprocal. Artist Saul Steinberg called drawing: thinking on paper. But

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20 This is one of Kittler’s major arguments in *Gramophone, Film, Typewriter*, and it needs to be kept in mind when we too easily fall into the notion that media reconfigure or reprogram the senses.

21 For more on the issue of purity in media, see my essay, “Ut pictura Theoria: Abstract Painting and language,” in *Picture Theory*.


23 See my discussion of Steinberg in my essay, “Metapictures,” in *Picture Theory*. 
thinking can also be a kind of drawing, a mental sketching, tracing, delineating, and (in own my case) aimless scribbling. We not only think about media, we think in them, which is why they give us the headache endemic to recursive thinking. There is no privileged metalanguage of media in semiotics, linguistics, or disclosure analysis. Our relation to media is one of mutual and reciprocal constitution: we create them, and they create us. That is why so many creation myths describe god as an artificer working in various media to make an ensemble of creations (the architecture of the universe, the sculpted forms of animals and human beings).

7. Images are the principal currency of media. If we wish to “address media” as such, we must recognize that images, not language, are their main currency. Speech and writing are of course crucial to articulating and deciphering the messages conveyed by media, but the medium itself is the embodied messenger, not the message. McLuhan had it half right: the medium is “the massage,” not in message. Speech and writing, moreover, are themselves simply two kinds of media, the one embodied in acoustic images, the other in graphic images.

8. Images reside within media the way organisms reside in a habitat. Like organisms, they can move from one media environment to another, so that a verbal image can be reborn in a painting or photograph, a sculpted image can be rendered in cinema or virtual reality. This is why one medium can seem to be “nested” inside another, and why a medium can seem to become visible in a canonical exemplar, as when a Rembrandt comes to stand for oil painting, or oil painting comes to stand for painting, or painting comes to stand for fine art. It is also why the notion of a “life of images” is so inevitable. Images need a place to live, and that is what a medium provides. McLuhan argued, famously, that “the content of a medium is always another medium.” Where he went wrong was in assuming that the “other” medium has to be an earlier medium (novels and plays as the content of film; film as the content of video). The fact is that a newer and even a nonexistent medium may be “nested” inside of an older medium, most notably in those science fiction films that predict technical breakthroughs in imaging and communication, in virtual reality environments, in teleportation devices, or in brain implants that have yet to be invented. New media inventions invariably produce a set of hypothetical futures, both utopian and dystopian, as Plato saw when he predicted that writing would destroy human memory.

24 See Debray, Media Manifestos, 5.
9. The media have no address and cannot be addressed. The notion of “addressing media” (all of them, as general field) is a thoroughly mythical and paradoxical concept. The media have no address and cannot be addressed. Like the god of monotheism, like the “Matrix” of modern sci-fi, the media are everywhere and nowhere, singular and plural. They are that in which “we live and move and have our being.” They are not located in a particular place or thing, but are themselves the spaces in which messages are representations thrive and circulate. Asking for the address of a medium is like asking for the address of the postal system. There may be specific post offices, but the medium known as the postal service does not have an address. It contains all addresses within itself; it is what makes address possible.25

10. We address and are addressed by images of media. Therefore, we cannot “address media” or be addressed by media as such. We address and are addressed by images of media, stereotypes of specific mediascapes, or personifying figures (media stars, moguls, gurus, spokespeople). When we speak of being “hailed” or “interpellated” by media, we are projecting a personification of the media, addressing it as speaker for whom we are the addressee. The “address of media” takes two distinct forms, one figural, the other spatial: (1) the “address” as that of speaking subject to an addressee, in which case the medium is given a face and body, represented in an avatar (as when the Matrix speaks through its “Agents” and the hackers respond, or when McLuhan or Baudrillard utter gnomic statements that speak “for” as well as “about” media, as if the media expert were a “medium” in his own right); or (2) the “address” as a location, a place, space, or site of enunciation, in which case the important thing is where the address is “coming from,” as we say.

Given that media address us with and as images of spaces or bodies, landscape or figures, they produce in us all the ambivalence we associate with images. They are the invisible Matrix or the hypervisible spectacle, the hidden God or his incarnate living Word. They are mere instruments of our will, increasingly perfect means of communicative action or out-of-control machines that are leading us to slavery or extinction. I conclude, therefore, that a reasonable place to start “addressing media” is by addressing images of media, the forms that they bring to life and that bring them to light. To illustrate this point, I want to end with mediation on a scene from David Cronenberg’s horror classic, Videodrome, in which a trio of “media avatars” are brought together in the same space, and the whole distinction between the medium as body and as space is deconstructed.

25 I believe Wolfgang Schnaffer made this observation at the Cologne Symposium, “Addressing Media.”
Max Wren (played by James Woods) is the first avatar, a television producer who has been searching for a new “tough” form of pornography to raise the ratings on his struggling Toronto channel. He has been given a videocassette of a lecture by a media expert, Dr. Brian O’Blivion (a clear reference to Marshall McLuhan), whom we have already met in this film as an enigmatic, oracular figure who declines all invitations to appear in person on live television, insisting that he “only appears on television on television,” in the form of prerecorded videotapes. The third avatar is gorgeous television personality named Nicki Brand, who has been having affair with Max Wren. Max has been having strange hallucinatory experiences, and is hoping that Dr. O’Blivion will be able to explain what is going on.

As the tapes begin to play, Brian O’Blivion recites what we know as his familiar McLuhanesque mantra about the new age of the video medium:

*The battle for the mind of North America will be fought in the video arena. The Videodrome. The television screen in the retina of the mind’s eye. Therefore, whatever is seen on television emerges as raw experience. Therefore, television is reality, and reality is less than television.*

Max, who has heard this all before and is watching in a state of distraction, scratching himself and fidgeting, snorts disdainfully as if to say, “Oh, sure.” At this point, the voice of Dr. O’Blivion then changes drastically and begins to address Max directly, as if in real time—no longer an archived recording:

*Max! I’m so glad you came to see me. I’ve been through it all myself you see. Your reality is already half video hallucination. If you’re not careful, it will become all hallucination.*

At this point, Brian O’Blivion has Max’s total attention, and continues thus:

*I had a brain tumor. I thought the visions caused the brain tumor, and not the reverse. But when they removed the tumor, it was called Videodrome.*

[YouTube video 1; YouTube video 2]

As O’Blivion tells his story, we see the figure of a hooded executioner in a chain-mail tunic entering the room behind him. As O’Blivion continues, the hooded figure straps his arms to the chair and takes out a length of rope. Just as O’Blivion reaches the end of his story, revealing that he was “Videodrome’s first victim,” the executioner strangles him in midsentence. Max Leaps from his chair and demands, “But who’s behind it? What do they want?” The executioner removes the hood, revealing herself to be Max’s lover,
Nicki Brand. She says, “I want you, Max,” and proceeds to insist in tones that are alternately commanding and pleading, “Come to Nicki. Come to me now. Don’t make me wait,” as her lips grow to fill the entire picture tube. Next, the tube bulges out from the television set while the set itself comes alive, panting and purring with desire, veins dilating under its plastic skin. The scene ends as Max obeys her demands, inserting his head into the mouth of Nicki Brand.

The three media avatars in this scene personify the four crucial components of all media systems: the sender or “producer” of messages, the code that makes it possible to understand messages, the receiver or “consumer” who takes in the message; and the embodied message in the form of an image. But these are immediately scrambled in the staging of this scene: Max, the producer, is put in the role of spectator; Dr. Brian O’Blivion, the master of the code, the media theorist who holds the key to all messages whatsoever, is portrayed as the “first victim” of the medium; and while Nicki Brand plays the role of cannibalistic receiver-consumer, prepared to devour the producer, she has also become the avatar of the medium as her mouth merges with the screen and the body of the television set merges with her physical, sexually excited body. All the supposedly stable components of the medium—sender, receiver, code, and embodied message—are rewired in this brilliant scene to make clear the radical instability of the very concept of the medium. The producer is consumed; the embodied image that should be the consumed object of visual pleasure turns out to be the consumer; and the media theorist, the oracle of the code who should stand outside the media in Olympian serenity, is its first victim.

We can read this, of course, as an allegory of the death of McLuhan himself, the great avatar of media theory brought down by the curse of his own media celebrity. As McLuhan became a bigger media star, appearing on the TV programs *The Dick Cavett Show* and *Laugh-In* and in the film *Annie Hall* and consulting with American corporations about new product lines, his academic reputation hit the skids. He was quickly supplanted by a new media oracle in the late eighties, the rising star of the more politically correct and safely posthumous Walter Benjamin.26

26 The fall of McLuhan and the rise of Benjamin is a story that remains to be told in the history of media studies. McLuhan’s cheery “global village” optimism and his mystical visions of a group mind did not play well in the era of poststructuralist suspicion and a predominately Left-oriented media studies. My confidence in the importance of this story has been bolstered by conversations with Horst Bredekamp. See his article, “Der simulierte Benjamin: Mittelalterliche Bemerkungen zu seiner Aktualität,” in *Frankfurter Schule und Kunstgeschichte*, eds. Andreas Berndt, Peter Kaiser, Angela Rosenberg, and Diana Trinkner (Berlin: Reimer Verlag, 1992),
But there is a more fundamental lesson to be learned from this scene, and that is the presence of media theory in the midst of media themselves. Of course these theories need to be greeted and transcoded with all the tools of semiotics, systems theory, phenomenology, and hermeneutics. But this cannot happen as long we imagine that the media are somehow an “object” for scrutiny by the master discourses of theory. Perhaps we need a new label for this pursuit, a “medium theory” that would acknowledge its middling, muddling location in the midst of media.  

This would be the location of theory as an immanent vernacular, closely tied to the practice while reflecting on it from within. It would ask the question of media, “Who’s behind it? What do they want?” without expecting the answer to be as simple as “Rupert Murdoch, dummy!” or as indeterminate as a mystical notion of the mass media system as a massive, living totality, the paranoid scenario of the Matrix, or the autopoietic system-environment shuffle of Niklas Luhmann. The answer to “Who’s behind it?” may also be “Ourselves,” and our obscure objects of desire, the fantasy of fatal pleasure promised by Nicki Brand. As for what the media want, that much is clear: they want you.

116–40, which argues that Benjamin’s article, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” was celebrated since the sixties as an antidote against McLuhan, at least in Germany.