The book applies a novel interpretational framework in the philosophy of language to the study of Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer, emphasizing the fundamental opposition in Husserl's and Heidegger's views concerning the relations between language and the world. The author shows how Husserl's idea of language as a re-interpretable sign-system informs his whole philosophical project from the early work on the philosophy of mathematics to the late studies on the life-world.

The book also explains Heidegger's central reasons for rejecting Husserl's conception of language, the central tenets of Heidegger's early as well as his late "thought" being interpreted as so many corollaries of this rejection. The book concludes with a discussion of Gadamer's hermeneutics which is analyzed as an attempt to avoid the extremities of both Husserl and Heidegger. The study also elaborates on similarities and differences between these thinkers and classicists in the analytical tradition such as Frege and Wittgenstein.

Audience
The work will interest students and scholars working in the areas of the philosophy of language, intentionality, literary theory and the theory of interpretation.
LANGUAGE AS CALCULUS VS. LANGUAGE AS UNIVERSAL MEDIUM

A Study in Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer
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I first became interested in Husserl and Heidegger as long ago as 1980, when as an undergraduate at the Freie Universität Berlin I studied the books by Professor Ernst Tugendhat. Tugendhat's attempt to bring together analytical and continental philosophy has never ceased to fascinate me, and even though in more recent years other influences have perhaps been stronger, I should like to look upon the present study as still being indebted to Tugendhat's initial incentive.

It was my good fortune that for personal reasons I had to continue my academic training from 1981 onwards in Finland. Even though Finland is a stronghold of analytical philosophy, it also has a tradition of combining continental and Anglosaxon philosophical thought. Since I had already admired this line of work in Tugendhat, it is hardly surprising that once in Finland I soon became impressed by Professor Jaakko Hintikka's studies on Husserl and intentionality, and by Professor Georg Henrik von Wright's analytical hermeneutics. While the latter influence has—at least in part—led to a book on the history of hermeneutics, the former influence has led to the present work.

My indebtedness to Professor Hintikka is enormous. Not only is the research reported here based on his suggestions, but Hintikka has also commented extensively on different versions of the manuscript, helped me to make important contacts, found a publisher for me, and—last but not least—was a never failing source of encouragement.

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towards analytical philosophy. During my stay in Jerusalem, Professor Gabriel Motzkin of the Hebrew University was a kind host as well as an incredible and unfailing source of information concerning Heidegger's development. Without Motzkin's help my chapter on Heidegger would easily have been 20–30 pages shorter—and weaker.

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Most of this work was carried out while I held the position of a project researcher at the Academy of Finland. I am grateful to Professor Simo Knuuttila, the director of the project group, for allowing me to proceed with my research even though it soon turned out to carry me beyond the limits of the original research plan. I also gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the University of Oulu and the Academy of Finland in the form of travel grants.

Finally, I wish to thank Ian Morris-Wilson, Roxane Fletcher, and Professor Jaakko Hintikka for help with my English, Auli Kainpainen for excellent secretarial assistance, Heini-Eliisa Hakosalo for helping with the index, and Dr. Annie Kuipers of Kluwer Academic
Publishers for her friendly cooperation.

I dedicate this book to my mother, Erna Kusch. Among the million other things that she taught me there is one thing without which I never could have become interested in intellectual work: the love for books.

Oulu, February 1989

Martin Kusch
PART I

INTRODUCTION:
LANGUAGE AS CALCULUS VS.
LANGUAGE AS THE UNIVERSAL MEDIUM

Und was bedeuten diese Zwänge,
halb Bild, halb Wort und halb Kalkül
(G. Benn, "Gedicht")

1. CONTINENTAL AND ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY

It is customary to distinguish two traditions of contemporary philosophical thought, often referred to as 'continental thought' and 'analytical philosophy'. That these two traditions share several important problems and concerns has been suggested and defended in the last couple of decades in a number of influential studies. This essay is an attempt to vindicate further the thesis that there is a common ground shared by the two traditions. The differences and parallels between Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, Martin Heidegger's "thought of Being" and Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics will be interpreted here with the help of a conceptual framework that has so far been applied only to the classics of the analytical tradition, such as Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. By using this framework I shall in the first place try to track down the roots of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s crucial disagreements over such key issues as semantics, possible worlds, relativism, and truth. Insofar as the same interpretational tools that have proved useful in studying the classics of the analytical tradition thus also turn out to be useful in the case of continental thinkers, this success in itself constitutes indirect evidence for significant parallels between these two strands of modern philosophy. However, just because the same interpretational framework has earlier been used to explicate presuppositions of analytical philosophers, we can also go beyond this indirect proof of a common ground shared by both traditions. Indeed, the results already achieved by means of this framework in its original application provide us with a good opportunity for relating both traditions to one another more
directly. For instance, we shall have occasion to observe fundamental differences between Husserl’s and Frege’s respective conceptions of logic, and far-reaching parallels between Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s views of language.

2. THE INTERPRETATIONAL FRAMEWORK

The interpretational framework referred to above is Jaakko Hintikka’s distinction between two types of theories of language, namely, views of "language as the universal medium" vs. views of "language as calculus". This distinction is a generalization of a contrast between two ways of looking at logic suggested earlier by the late Jean van Heijenoort. In his paper "Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language"², van Heijenoort contrasts two strands in the recent history of logic. The first takes logic to be a universal language, the second conceives of logic as a calculus, in the sense of being re-interpretable in a large scale like a calculus. The universalist tradition is represented among others by Frege and Russell, the calculus tradition among others by Boole, Schröder and Löwenheim.

In defending himself against Schröder’s criticism of his Begriffsschrift, Frege stressed that he had not only developed a logic in the sense of a calculus ratiocinator, but also, and primarily, a logic in the sense of a lingua characteri(sti)ca.³ According to van Heijenoort, Frege’s emphasis on lingua as opposed to calculus is mainly based on two points. On the one hand, Frege goes beyond the propositional calculus in analyzing propositions into predicates, names, variables, and quantifiers. This allows, for the first time, an actual translation of mathematical and scientific propositions into the logical notation. On the other hand, Frege’s approach does not allow for any changes of the universe of discourse, as did Boole’s, De Morgan’s and Schröder’s. For Frege, the universe of discourse is fixed not only in the sense that "he restricts himself to one universe”, but also in the sense that "his universe is the universe".⁴ This second point has several important consequences, three of which van Heijenoort spells out. First, functions must be defined for all their possible arguments, i.e., for Frege, defined for all objects. Second,
metasystematic questions are ruled out on the ground that nothing can be said outside the system. Third, the language of logic must be learnt in an unsystematic way by means of hints and clues because it cannot be explained in that language itself.

While Frege's work can be regarded as the *locus classicus* of the conception of logic as language, Löwenheim's *oeuvre* is conceived of by van Heijenoort as the place where the modern idea of logic as calculus has found its first decisive formulation. From 1915 onwards, Löwenheim based his logic on set theory and replaced the notion of provability by that of validity. And the notion of validity of a well-formed formula is of course defined in effect in terms of its several interpretations in different domains. In other words, Löwenheim broke with the Frege-Russell approach of a fixed universe and reintroduced into contemporary logic the possibility of choosing the entire universe of discourse in different ways.

In several papers as well as in his book *Investigating Wittgenstein*, written jointly with Merrill B. Hintikka, Jaakko Hintikka has generalized van Heijenoort's distinction in order to conceptualize a fundamental opposition between two different ways of looking at one's language, regardless of whether this home language is formal or natural. Thus he speaks of a conception of "language as the universal medium" and of a conception of "language as calculus". As the Hintikkas put it in their book, according to the view of language as the universal medium ...

... one cannot as it were look at one's language from outside and describe it ... The reason for this alleged impossibility is that one can use language to talk about something only if one can rely on a given definite interpretation, a given network of meaning relations obtaining between language and the world. Hence one cannot meaningfully and significantly say in language what these meaning relations are, for in any attempt to do so one must already presuppose them.

Thus this conception naturally leads to the thesis of the "ineffability of semantics", i.e., to the claim that the relation between language and the world cannot be expressed. Needless to say, this thesis does not, however, imply that an advocate of the conception of the univer-
sality of language cannot have all sorts of unspoken ideas concerning semantics and semantical relations.

According to the opposite conception of language as calculus, we are not trapped in our language in this way. A proponent of the idea of language as calculus will conceive of language as a tool, to wit, as something that can be manipulated and re-interpreted, improved, changed and replaced, as a whole or at least in a large scale. For a defender of this conception we can disentangle ourselves from our home language and discuss in language its semantical relations to the world. In other words, according to the view of language as calculus, semantics is not ineffable.

What makes the distinction between language as the universal medium and language as calculus an interpretational device of considerable explanatory power is that each of these two views naturally leads one towards a number of opposite conclusions concerning such issues as truth, metalanguage, relativism and possible worlds. This allows us to treat them as two Idealtypen\(^9\) in the philosophy of language. These Idealtypen thus include the implications of the respective basic contentions concerning other key philosophical questions. In the following, I shall take my cue from the Hintikka's work on Wittgenstein, and spell out these implications only as far as they concern language as the universal medium; the main ingredients of language as calculus can then be easily derived via negationis. I shall confine myself at this point to a brief exposition, since we shall return to these implications in more detail and repeatedly in the main body of this study.

One of the central corollaries of the presumed ineffability of semantical relations between our home language and the world is that we cannot conceive of different systems of semantical relations or at least not express them in language and therefore not use them as an ingredient of a serious theoretical enterprise. Since the semantics of our language is inaccessible, we cannot express what it would mean for our language, or for that matter for any other language, to be related to the world differently. On a sufficiently radical view, such an alternative semantics is not even thinkable, i.e., if language and thinking are assumed to be inextricably intertwined.

This idea, in turn, is likely to lead the proponent of language as
the universal medium to reject model theory and to reject all talk of possible worlds. Since semantical relations are not accessible and since semantical relations which are different from the actual ones are neither expressible nor perhaps even conceivable, it is clear that a model theory cannot be developed, for it is based precisely on the idea of a systematical variation of semantical relations. Furthermore, since our language is thus interpreted, and interpretable, only with respect to one world, i.e., since our language inevitably has the one and only actual world as its "universe of discourse", our language cannot be used to speak meaningfully about other, merely possible worlds. To put the same point differently, an advocate of language as the universal medium is likely to search for a way to analyze modal notions in a way that avoids a full-blown ontology of possible worlds.

The belief in the ineffability of semantics and in the inconceivability of different semantical relations will also push a defender of language as the universal medium towards linguistic relativism and semantical Kantianism. Linguistic relativism might appear inevitable to universalists because—due to the ineffability of semantics—they have no way of comparing with each other the semantical relations of different languages to the world. Semantical Kantianism might seem inescapable because of the close conceptual link between not knowing the mechanisms and activities used by our faculty of knowledge and not knowing the things-in-themselves. That is to say, we must, according to the view in question, also accept the ineffability of things considered independently of the (possible) distorting influence of our language because we cannot reach a full knowledge of the relation between language and reality.10

Furthermore, a believer in language as the universal medium will also be strongly tempted to reject metalanguage and to distrust the idea of truth as correspondence. To the defender of this view, the development of a metalanguage presupposes that one can station oneself outside of one's home language. Since there is no way of stepping beyond this language, there cannot be a metalanguage, either. Furthermore, since language is tied to the world, speaking about language by means of language is a misuse of language. Precisely because we cannot step outside of our language, truth as correspondence must also be regarded as a highly questionable notion, for, ac-
According to this classical account, 'true' is a metalinguistic term that expresses a certain correspondence between a sentence and a state of affairs in the world. Now since according to the view of language as the universal medium there is no vantage point outside language from which this correspondence can be viewed and discussed, truth as correspondence must either be replaced by a different concept of truth or left undefined and inexplicable.\(^\text{11}\)

Finally, we come to a point where we have to compare the advocate of language as calculus with the advocate of language as the universal medium. With respect to formalism, i.e., to a purely syntactical treatment of language, the two Idealtypen do not simply adopt opposite stands. Instead, both are likely to be ambivalent about formalism: both have reasons to be attracted by formalism, but also have reasons for opposing it. A defender of the accessibility of semantics will be attracted by formalism when the latter is linked to the idea of re-interpretation. Yet the same thinker will be opposed to formalism insofar as formalism appears as the denial of (the possibility of) semantics. For a believer in language as the universal medium, the argument works the other way around: such a thinker will be repelled by formalism when it is conceived of as claiming that we can disentangle language from its one fixed interpretation. Yet the same linguist or philosopher will be attracted to formalism since a formal, syntactical study of language is all that remains for us to do in language theory in view of the ineffability of semantics.\(^\text{12}\)

Before turning to certain qualifications and to the main interpretational theses of this study, it will facilitate subsequent references if we summarize eight main ingredients of the universal medium conception \((UM-1-UM-8)\), and formulate the opposite theses that ensue from the conception of language as calculus \((C-1-C-8)\). This can be done as follows:

\((UM-1)\) Semantics is inaccessible; therefore
\((UM-2)\) we cannot conceive of a different system of semantical relations; therefore
\((UM-3)\) model theory and the conception of possible worlds are to be rejected;
and

(UM-4) linguistic relativism is to be accepted;
and (due to UM-1 and UM-2)

(UM-5) semantical Kantianism is to be adopted;
and (due to UM-1 and UM-2)

(UM-6) metalanguage is a misuse of language;
and (due to UM-1)

(UM-7) truth as correspondence is at best unexplainable and perhaps even unintelligible;
and (due to UM-1)

(UM-8) formalism is to be accepted when linked to the idea of the inaccessibility of semantics. It is to be opposed, however, insofar as it results from the assumption that language can somehow be disentangled from its one and only fixed interpretation.

The contrary theses might read as follows:

(C-1) Semantics is accessible;
therefore

(C-2) it is possible to conceive of a different system of semantical relations;
therefore

(C-3) model theory and the notion of possible worlds are intelligible;
and

(C-4) linguistic relativism can be opposed;
and (due to C-1 and C-2)

(C-5) semantical Kantianism can be avoided;
and (due to C-1 and C-2)

(C-6) metalanguage is possible and legitimate;
and (due to C-1)

(C-7) the idea of truth as correspondence is intelligible;
and (due to C-1)

(C-8) formalism can be accepted when linked to the idea of re-interpretation of a formal system, but it has to be opposed insofar as it results from the idea that semantics is inaccessible.
3. SOME QUALIFICATIONS AND
THE MAIN THESES OF THIS STUDY

In the preceding section, the main ingredients of the conception of language as the universal medium were presented, by and large, along the same lines as in Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka's work on Wittgenstein. The major qualification that this procedure calls for, that is to say, the major qualification that has to be made with respect to the two Idealtypen formulated above, concerns the relation of the two basic assumptions—the assumptions that language is a universal medium or that it is a calculus—and the subsequent eight theses formulated above. This relation is not to be understood as one of entailment in anything like a strict logical sense. In other words, a philosopher might well accept the thesis of the ineffability of semantics without thereby countenancing, for example, linguistic relativism or semantical Kantianism. For instance, even though Frege considers his logical language as a universal medium, he does not believe in anything like logical relativism. On the contrary, he argues that the universality of logic implies its uniqueness, i.e., its absoluteness. Other advocates of language as the universal medium might hold that language is not like a distorting and hiding medium between us and the world, but rather a crystal-clear glass—like a translucent window-pane—which does not add to the representation of reality nor distort it. On this view, there is no reason to regard reality an sich as being ineffable.

The fact that the interconnections between the different theses within each of the two Idealtypen are thus not necessarily tight and strict ones does not make these Idealtypen useless for the purposes of comparing different philosophical systems or for analyzing the deeper unity between the different facets of one and the same philosopher's oeuvre. This is so because the major function of an Idealtyp in interpretation is to work first and foremost as a question-raising device. An Idealtyp as understood here provides us with a catalogue of questions that can be raised with respect to different philosophies in order to arrive at their differences as well as their common tenets. Furthermore, deviations from the Idealtyp, far from invalidating it as a heuristic device, lead to new questions as to the deeper motivation for these deviations. They might thus lead us to
uncover presuppositions that otherwise would remain hidden. This, in any case, is the way I shall try to apply the dichotomy between language as the universal medium and language as calculus in this study.\textsuperscript{13}

The main results of this interpretative venture can perhaps be summarized as follows: I shall first show that Husserl's philosophy throughout its different stages and phases is informed by his belief in language as calculus. This brings Husserl in sharp contrast not only to Heidegger and Gadamer, but also to Frege. For instance, when the early Husserl argues in direct opposition to Frege that logic is not a \textit{lingua characteristica} but a \textit{calculus ratiocinator}, his main point is precisely that the former but not the latter has a fixed interpretation. Husserl initially opposes formalism in mathematics since he sees in it a neglect for semantics. Yet later he comes to adopt a formalist stance when formalism is connected to the idea of re-interpretation. In his transcendental phase, Husserl extends the idea of re-interpretation to natural language, too: the language that a transcendental phenomenologist uses after the phenomenological reduction is a natural language re-interpreted so as to refer to the domain of transcendental phenomena. As his belief in language as calculus leads us to expect, Husserl also offers an elaborate account of truth as correspondence, numerous highly interesting ideas concerning possible worlds, and explicit views on model theory and metalanguage. No wonder that Husserl also rejects relativism and Kantianism of various brands and origins.

Whereas Husserl thus turns out to presuppose the idea of language as calculus, Heidegger will be shown (in Part III of this study) to entertain the opposite conception of language as the universal medium in a radical form. As we shall see, Heidegger's adoption of this view is connected with his criticism of Husserl's theory of intentionality and of the numerous dichotomies linked to it. In criticizing the dichotomies of 'ego vs. world', and 'language vs. world', Heidegger rejects the idea that world and language can be treated as objects. Rather, world and language form one universal medium of meaning, a medium that cannot be studied objectively from a vantage point outside it. Language can only be studied in a circular fashion by already presupposing it. In spelling out the consequences
of this view, Heidegger comes to deny the possibility of any metalinguage, and replaces the conception of truth as correspondence with an idea of truth as "disclosedness". He accepts linguistic relativism, and rejects the idea of possible worlds as well as the idea of all formal study of language.

Whereas in the case of Husserl and Heidegger we are not confronted with major deviations from our respective Idealtypen, when we turn to Gadamer we shall encounter a position that is less clear-cut. I shall try to show that Gadamer's philosophy of language is decisively influenced by Heidegger's conception of an universal medium, but that his use of certain Husserlian ideas allows him to avoid linguistic relativism and semantical Kantianism.
PART II

HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY AND LANGUAGE AS CALCULUS

... aber eine gründliche Untersuchung des Zahlbegriffes wird immer etwas philosophisch ausfallen müssen.
(G. Frege)

Phänomenologe sein, das ist etwas, das nur der Phänomenologe erfahren und erkennen kann.
(E. Husserl)

1. INTRODUCTION

In this part of my study, I shall try to show that the idea of language as a re-interpretable sign-system, i.e., as a calculus, is central to Husserl's philosophy throughout its different stages. It is only later, in the third main part of this book, that we shall be able to see how radically this conception differs from that of Husserl's most gifted student, Martin Heidegger. Even in the present part, however, I shall not abstain from all comparisons between Husserl's conception of language as calculus and the notion of language or logic as a universal medium. Occasionally, Husserl's views will be compared with those of the "grandfather of analytical philosophy", Gottlob Frege. This procedure seems a natural one for two reasons. On the one hand, comparisons between Husserl and Frege have become common in Husserl research ever since Dagfinn Føllesdal published his little classic Husserl und Frege in 1958. On the other hand, recent Frege scholarship has provided a wealth of results to the effect that Frege's belief in the universality of language is one of the keys to his entire logical enterprise.

As to the structure of this part, I shall follow the received wisdom of Husserl research and divide his development into three phases. The first comprises Husserl's early work on the philosophical foundations of arithmetic and logic preceding his Logical
In this chapter I shall try to show how the central tenets of the conception of language as calculus emerge in those writings of Husserl's that precede the *Logical Investigations* which were published in 1900/01 and which he worked on since 1895 or so. We shall thus be dealing here with the period from the *Habilitationsschrift On the Concept of Number* (1887) to the manuscript "Intentional Objects" (1894/98).

The central challenge for any interpretation of this period is to explain, and to make intelligible, Husserl's development. This development led him from his early psychological investigations into the generation of the concepts of different cardinal numbers (*Anzahlen*), to his much broader subsequent interests in logic as an ideal science and in language, grammar, mereology, perception, intentionality and truth, interests that appear around the mid-nineties. How many stages can be distinguished between 1887 and 1895, which problems caused the transitions from one stage to the next, and why did specific new subjects and interests make an appearance at spe-
specific moments in this period?

The answer that will be outlined in this chapter can be put in the following way. Initially Husserl's central concern was with formalism in higher analysis, that is in (higher) mathematics, and in logic. Between 1887 and 1890 Husserl sought to undermine the meaning-neglecting formalist threat posed foremost by von Helmholtz and Kronecker. This Husserl did by applying the tools of descriptive psychology. These tools Husserl had come to appreciate when studying under Brentano in Vienna between 1884 and 1886. The project that Husserl undertook during the late 1880s was to find a partly philosophical, partly psychological foundation for higher analysis by explaining the psychological genesis of cardinal numbers. Husserl's ultimate hope was that such a foundation for elementary arithmetic could then be extended to the whole of analysis. Around 1890, however, Husserl came to realize that this hope was vain. He now saw that his earlier psychological theory concerning the origin of our concept of cardinal numbers could not be extended in a natural way to cover rational, irrational and imaginary numbers. In order to explain and justify operations with such numbers, psychology was of little use, and formal logic had to be evoked instead. Husserl was subsequently willing to accept formalism. This acceptance was, however, subject to important qualifications. In the manuscripts written in the early nineties, published recently under the fitting title "On the Philosophy of the Calculus"9, Husserl analyzed the structure and generation of algorithms, giving special emphasis to the observation that algorithms can be interpreted and re-interpreted over different domains. No surprise, therefore, that Husserl studied Boolean and Schröderian algebra during the same time. Yet from his encounter with Schröder's logical algebra10, Husserl took home much more than just an additional appreciation for the re-interpretability of formal systems. This additional lesson was a critical one: Husserl began to see that he could challenge formalism—something he himself had only recently been attracted by—in a new way. Schröder seemed to Husserl to neglect the important question as to the relations between his algebra of classes and what this algorithm was taken to represent: judgments, deductions, or, more generally, logical operations. In other words, Schröder's formalism neither answered nor
even posed the question as to the conditions of the possibility of logic as a formal algorithm. But this was precisely the question that Husserl now wanted to consider. The fact that he regarded this project as a sensible one shows that Husserl still believed firmly in logic as calculus and in the accessibility of meaning. It is this belief that allowed, and forced, him to go beyond the formal, syntactical laws of logic, to which Frege, for instance, was confined by his notion of logic as a universal medium. Husserl thought that the question concerning the possibility of a formal algorithm can be tackled by way of a thorough investigation into what it is that logic as a formal algorithm is a surrogate for. And in this new endeavour the 'old' tools of descriptive psychology once more came in handy. Also, and most importantly, it was only now that Husserl had the interest and the occasion to reflect systematically on the relation between logic and psychology. The need for reflection on this relationship was quite likely reinforced by Frege's writings, and especially by Frege's harsh criticism of the alleged psychologism of Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. But Frege was only one of many influences here, and Husserl was undoubtedly influenced more strongly by Bolzano, Lotze, and Natorp. The *Prolegomena of the Logical Investigations*, to which we shall turn in the next chapter (II.3.), were an outcome of these reflections.

2.1. The Semantics of Numbers and the Role of Psychology

From 1878 to 1881 Husserl studied mathematics under Karl Weierstraß in Berlin. Like Dedekind, Kronecker, and Cantor, Weierstraß was trying to provide a rigorous foundation for analysis (calculus) so as to dispense with the use of auxiliary geometrical notions altogether, to eliminate the need of appealing to spatial intuition in analysis. It is not easy to overestimate the influence that Weierstraß extended on Husserl's development. Not only are Husserl's first works on mathematics and its philosophy closely linked to Weierstraß's program, but the spirit of his teacher's search for absolute foundations also shaped Husserl's entire conception of philosophy. As late as 1929, on his seventieth birthday, Husserl stressed the central importance of Brentano and Weierstraß for his own thought, and added that he had wanted to do for philosophy what Weierstraß had
done for mathematics.\textsuperscript{13} This self-characterization can be appreciated in the light of Husserl's own description of Weierstraß's work. In Husserl's view, Weierstraß was trying to replace irrational instinct by rational thinking, searching for "radical groundings" and "original roots", and trying to formulate "a fully rigorous, thoroughly evident method". These are all leading ideas of the enterprise Husserl later came to term "phenomenology":

It was my great teacher Weierstraß who, through his lectures on the theory of functions, aroused in me during my years as a student an interest in a radical grounding of mathematics. I acquired an understanding for his attempts to transform analysis—which was to such a very great extent a mixture of rational thinking and irrational instinct and knack—into a rational theory. His goal was to set out its original roots, its elementary concepts and axioms, on the basis of which the whole system of analysis could be constructed and deduced by a fully rigorous, thoroughly evident method.\textsuperscript{14}

Weierstraß's great achievement had been the grounding of higher analysis in elementary arithmetic, and Husserl admired this achievement. But Husserl went beyond his teacher in seeking a foundation for elementary arithmetic itself. Not that Weierstraß had not tackled this problem; he had merely not seen it as an especially difficult one. From Husserl's own record of Weierstraß's lectures in 1878 and 1880 it appears that Weierstraß's solution was simple and straightforward. Weierstraß suggested that the concept of number should be studied via an investigation into counting. Confronted with some given aggregate of things, we run through them one by one, picking out those which have some given characteristic in common. Subsequently, we unite them in one presentation (Vorstellung). The result is a multiplicity of units, that is, a number.\textsuperscript{15} Husserl thought that he could improve on this account with the help of the descriptive psychology that he had been introduced to in Brentano's lectures in Vienna from 1884 until 1886.

Whereas Weierstraß and Brentano provided Husserl with the subject matter and the method for his own research, von Helmholtz and Kronecker held the view that Husserl sought to refute. This
fact is important from the standpoint of our study, since Husserl sees in von Helmholtz’s and Kronecker’s stance a purely formalistic position that seeks to exclude questions of meaning from the realm of mathematics. As Husserl sees it, for von Helmholtz and Kronecker, cardinal numbers are mere signs and arithmetic is a game with 'meaningless' signs.¹⁶

How crucial his opposition to formalism is for Husserl is clear from the fact that as early as in the "Introduction" to his Habilitationsschrift Husserl singles out formalism for special criticism. Husserl writes that "one will never succeed in charming away material difficulties by means of verbal or formalistic tricks"¹⁷ and he goes on to criticize the Riemann-Helmholtzian theory of space, claiming that analytical geometry is not really without reliance upon intuition (Anschauung): analytical geometry relies centrally on the idea that each point in space can be characterized by giving its distance from three "fixed 'coordinate axes". According to Husserl, this assumption is not intelligible without our intuition of space as three-dimensional.¹⁸

As is clear from the context in which he presents this criticism during the late 1880s, Husserl regards descriptive psychology as the most important weapon against meaning-denying formalism. It is true that he also speaks of the important achievements of "modern logic"¹⁹ and stresses the crucial role of "scientific psychology and logic"²⁰ in clarifying the foundations of mathematics. Yet in his actual treatment of the number concept Husserl relies on psychology alone and regards logical definitions of number (for instance, the one suggested by Frege) as insufficient. Husserl also states quite explicitly that psychology is not only involved in the clarification of the idea of number but is the only forum on which such a clarification can take place: "In truth, not only is psychology indispensable for the analysis of the concept of number, but rather this analysis even belongs within psychology."²¹ This smacks of psychologism, to be sure, even though it is quite certain that Husserl by no means held that mathematics was nothing but "'parts or branches' of psychology". In the Logical Investigations he explicitly states that "no one" could hold such a view, which makes it very unlikely that he should have done so himself only a decade earlier.²² That Husserl could write
sentences with such a strong psychologistic flavour at all must be understood against the background of the threat of formalism. For Husserl it is the accessibility of meaning as the central ingredient of the calculus conception that has to be defended first and foremost, and hence it is the meaning-neglecting formalism that has to be avoided at all costs. For the same reason, it is crucial to demonstrate to the mathematicians that they cannot avoid questions about meaning and that they cannot solve the philosophical problems of their own science by stipulation. Furthermore, it seems that Husserl thought that formalism and a "formal" logical definition of number both end up on the same wrong meaning-denying side of the fence:

Frege does not aim for a psychological analysis of the concept of number at all; he does not expect that such an analysis could clarify the foundations of arithmetic; ... Founding arithmetic upon a series of formal ![ definitions from which all theorems of that science can be purely syllogistically derived, that is Frege's ideal.23

Husserl's own account of (finite) cardinal numbers thus seeks to show that numbers have meaning, that we do have number concepts. But Husserl—unlike Frege—also holds that the concept of number cannot be defined, since we are dealing here with "ultimate, elementary concepts", where "[...] all defining comes to an end".24 The way to grasp the meanings of these kinds of concepts therefore has to proceed by laying bare the type of abstraction as whose result these meanings emerge.25

In his Foundations of Arithmetic (1884)26 Frege had made it clear that any attempt to base the concept of number on psychological considerations, that is, any attempt to let the concept of number emerge as an abstraction from concrete configurations of objects, runs into the problem of having to deal with different numbers in different ways. On the one hand, 0 and 1 are not multiplicities at all27; on the other hand, large numbers cannot be abstracted from concrete configurations of objects, since the respective multiplicities cannot be given as concrete configurations in intuition (Anschauung). Husserl accepts Frege's analysis but rejects its conclusion. For Husserl, the fact that a psychological investigation has to treat
different numbers differently does not speak against this type of investigation. First, in the case of 1 and 0 the treatment envisaged by Husserl does have a parallel in the exceptions which these numbers call for in arithmetical operations. Second, the meanings of large numbers are accessible even though they admittedly are not arrived at by abstraction from concrete configurations of objects.

Let us first look at Husserl's account of the genesis of genuine number concepts—that is the numbers from two to twelve. I shall confine myself to a brief outline only since several excellent detailed expositions can already be found in the literature and since the details of Husserl's argument lie outside of the scope of the overall interpretation aimed at in this study. It is more the fact that Husserl regards it as possible to speak about the meaning of the concept of number, rather than the details as to how he thinks he can go about doing this, that is crucial for my argument.

According to Husserl's analysis, numbers are answers to the question "how many" when asked with respect to multiplicities. To explain the genesis of the concept of number thus presupposes an explanation of the processes of abstraction that provide us with the concept of multiplicity. The concept of multiplicity is an abstraction from "totalities of some objects". These latter concrete sets can consist of any objects whatsoever, for instance, "a feeling, an angel, the moon and Italy" can make up one such set. What unites such disparate things into one set, Husserl calls "collective liaison". The first question is the nature of this relation.

In trying to arrive at a clarification of this relation Husserl first turns to earlier attempts to reduce this relation to other allegedly more simple (for instance, temporal) ones and rejects them. His own answer relies on the observation that it is only "a unifying interest" and not something in the elements themselves that establishes a collective liaison between them. A set is created by a unifying interest. In other words, what produces a unified concrete set is an act of unification. When we reflect subsequently on this act of unification, when we reflect on how the act unites and holds together different contents, we arrive at the concept of collective liaison, a concept that is expressed in a natural language simply by "and".

However, with the notion of collective liaison we have only ar-
The concept of number is thus arrived at by an interplay of acts of abstraction, collection, and reflection. First, an act of collection singles out a set of objects. Second, an act of abstraction reduces each element of this set to being a mere 'something'—this being a concept that itself is arrived at by acts of reflection on acts of thinking. Finally, an act of reflection is directed towards the two acts of collection and abstraction, producing the concept of definite multiplicity.

In the light of the much debated question as to Husserl's alleged psychologism in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* and in the light of his own later critique of psychologism, it is important to see precisely the point where the account given of the psychological generation of the number concepts from two to twelve veers towards psychologism. Looked at from the vantage point of Husserl's own later thoughts, the fact that he applied descriptive psychology in his analysis of numbers did not make him a psychologistic philosopher. The crucial points are rather the following two interrelated ingredients of his analysis: (a) the claim that the relation of collective liaison must be *either*
real (existing in the objects themselves) or psychological, and (b) the claim that a definite multiplicity is not the immediate correlate of the collecting act but rather arrived at by reflecting on the collecting act. The connection between these two assumptions comes out clearly in the following later, distinctly self-critical, passage:

According to the school model which I had been taught, which holds that everything must be grasped intuitively as either 'physical' or 'psychological', it [the collective liaison] could be nothing physical. Thus the concept had to arise ... from 'reflection' on the act of collecting ... But ... is the concept of a cardinal number not something essentially different from the concept of collecting, a concept yielded only by act-reflection? 38

If we are to trust this self-evaluation of the position of the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* by Husserl himself, then we must indeed say that in this work he had not yet arrived at a clear differentiation between ideal, categorical entities like numbers or concepts on the one hand, and physical and psychical entities and processes, on the other hand. What Husserl had not yet seen in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* is that reflection on an act of collection does not provide us with the category of a collection, but only with the concept of a collecting act. 39

However, as several interpreters 40 have stressed, this psychologistic tendency in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* is only one feature of this work. These interpreters are trying to argue that there are also some indications of Husserl's later, more platonistic conception of numbers in the very same book. In order to evaluate this claim, we have to turn to Husserl's account of the numbers 0 and 1 and of numbers larger than 12.

So far Husserl has only shown that the small numbers from two to twelve have a meaning that can be arrived at by studying acts of abstraction and reflection. The threat of formalism, however, is thus only banished in part, for the formalist might very well concede the Husserlian account for small numbers but stick to his position by arguing that the ground covered by Husserl's analysis is far too small.

Husserl's solution for the numbers 0 and 1 is surprising as well
as ad hoc. He accepts that these numbers do not denote multiplicities at all. Nevertheless, they too are answers to the question "how many" when asked with respect to multiplicities; yet they are negative answers: "One and none—those are the two possible negative answers to the question 'how many'. Linguistically they too function like numbers and thus grammaticians might regard them as numerical determinations. But looked upon logically they are not [numbers]." As mathematical evidence for this interpretation Husserl points to the special status 0 and 1 hold in elementary arithmetic: for instance, adding 0 does not add anything, deviding by 0 is senseless, and multiplication by 1 does not multiply.

Obviously, the solution for the large numbers has to proceed differently. The key here is provided by Brentano's distinction between "genuine" and "non-genuine" (symbolic) presentations or ideas (Vorstellungen). Whereas a genuine presentation of a certain content is independent of its symbolic representations, a non-genuine presentation of a given content relies upon symbols that characterize this content in an exact way. Using this distinction, Husserl holds that, whereas small numbers can be grasped by either genuine or non-genuine presentations, large numbers can be grasped only by non-genuine presentations. In other words, a large number, that is, the meaning of a large number, can be grasped only by means of some formal system, for instance our decadic one. What Husserl is attempting to do here is to beat the formalists using their own weapons. It is precisely the formal system of signs that makes the meanings of large numbers accessible to us.

Unfortunately, Husserl is not especially clear as to how this accessibility is to be understood. Some passages seem to suggest a constructivistic reading, while others have a strong platonistic flavour. Here is a rather straightforward constructivistic one:

And so the system of numbers arrived at (especially our generally used decadic system) is not only a method for signifying given concepts, but also [a method] for constructing new concepts and signifying them while constructing them.

Ever since Frege interpreters have paid much more attention to the more platonistic overtones of Husserl's statements. Husserl
speaks of number names and number signs as "symbolic constructions for the species of the number concept which are not genuinely accessible to us"\textsuperscript{46}, and writes:

A number system, like for instance our decadic one, can thus be regarded as a complete reflection of the realm of numbers as such, that is, of the real numbers which are generally inaccessible \ldots We are thus fully entitled to regard the indirect constructions of the system as symbolic surrogates for the numbers as such.\textsuperscript{47}

Several remarks are called for by these passages.

First of all, despite the strong platonistic flavour of the last two quotations, it must be remembered that in the very same book Husserl rejects the notion of the actual infinite as being of a "counterlogical character".\textsuperscript{48} This suggests that whereas we can perhaps attribute to Husserl some form of realism with respect to concepts on the basis of these sentences (the being of concepts is independent of their being thought), we should nevertheless distinguish this position from a fully-fledged Cantorian platonism.\textsuperscript{49}

Second, it is important to note, as has recently been persuasively argued by J. Ph. Miller\textsuperscript{50}, that the Philosophy of Arithmetic is not a homogeneous book. For instance, as Miller has pointed out, the book contains two different conceptions as to how the problem of extending the psychological analysis of cardinal numbers to rational, irrational and imaginary numbers is to be dealt with. Some parts of the Philosophy of Arithmetic, and especially those dealing with the psychological genesis of the number concepts, came from Husserl's Habilitationsschrift of 1887. Other parts were written three or four years later at a time when Husserl's position towards the problem of extension had undergone severe changes and when he had also begun to take a keen interest in Cantor's highly platonistic set theory.\textsuperscript{51} Thus the possibility cannot be ruled out that different, perhaps even conflicting, conceptions found their way into Husserl's book. Perhaps Husserl had held a more strongly psychologistic-constructivistic position in his Habilitationsschrift in 1887, but he had moved somewhat away from this position towards platonism by 1891, when the Philosophy of Arithmetic was published.

Third, it should be noted that the wording of the passages
quoted above does not by itself necessitate the suggestions I have made. At least one distinguished interpreter\textsuperscript{52} claims that, for Husserl, numbers in themselves just "are psychical acts of higher order that are actually carried out in contrast with acts that are only symbolically presented".\textsuperscript{53} According to this proposal one might perhaps explain the expression "realm of numbers" as shorthand for those number concepts that we could—starting from small numbers—successively construct if only our psychical apparatus lacked the limitations it in fact has. In other words, this realm consists of those number concepts that a hypothetically assumed limitless reason would have. Strong support for this view is to be found a still unpublished work from the year 1890 where Husserl still writes that it has to be admitted that "cardinal numbers are creations of the human mind ... They originate from certain psychic activities."\textsuperscript{54}

On whatever side one comes down on in this issue, from the perspective of our study it is far more important that on the psychologistic as well as on the constructivistic or the platonistic reading Husserl regards the meaning of numbers as accessible to us: numbers are not just signs, numbers have meaning. This meaning might not be accessible in the same way in each case, but for Husserl there is never any doubt of the fact that the meanings of numbers are indeed accessible to us, nor of the fact that an understanding of the meanings of numbers is essential to an understanding of elementary arithmetic.

2.2. The Interpretation and Re-interpretation of Algorithms
---From Psychology to Logic

As we have seen in our Introduction, a calculus conception of logic and language is likely to have a somewhat ambivalent position vis-à-vis formalism: formalism will be opposed where it is seen to result from a disregard for semantics, while it is likely to be accepted where it is connected to the idea of the re-interpretability of the formal calculus over different domains. Up to this point we have seen Husserl oppose formalism precisely for the predictable reasons. As we turn to the recently published manuscripts of the early 1890s, we shall encounter Husserl's acceptance of a qualified formalism.

In February 1890, three years after the publication of the Ha-
Habilitationsschrift On the Concept of Number and one year before the publication of the Philosophy of Arithmetic, Husserl wrote a letter to Carl Stumpf. This letter is of crucial significance for a proper understanding of the problematic character of the latter work and of Husserl's position in the early 1890s. The writer reveals to Stumpf that his project of grounding higher analysis in cardinal numbers had failed. His formerly entertained hope that cardinal numbers could provide the foundation for all of arithmetic had proven vain: it had proved impossible to capture negative and other complex numbers by means of non-genuine presentations.55 The project, of which the Habilitationsschrift formed the first part, had been to start from a psychological analysis of the cardinal numbers and to expand this approach successively to the more complex numbers employed in analysis by means of the same idea that had done the trick for large numbers.

What caused this project to fail was Husserl's increasing appreciation of the fact that the formal calculus of "general arithmetic" could equally be applied to different mathematical domains. And these domains had to be on one par, precisely because of their strictly parallel relation to the same formal calculus:

It is a fact that "general arithmetic" (including analysis, theory of functions, etc.) is applied to cardinal numbers ("number theory"), equally to ordinal numbers, continual quantities, n-fold expansions (time, space, colour, continuum of force etc.). But since these different applications of arithmetic are not based on a common notion out of which this science could be derived, what is its content . . . ?56

It is clear that this new insight was bound to cause trouble for Husserl's anti-formalistic program. If elementary arithmetic cannot provide a foundation for analysis, then the different domains and application seem to be held together merely by a common formalism. Does a formal approach then succeed after all? This is indeed what Husserl asks Stumpf: "... does arithmetic deal with mere signs? Such that it is a mere game with signs?"57

Now it is true that this whole turn in Husserl's approach did not as such invalidate his psychological analysis of the genesis of cardinal
number concepts. Therefore he could still include the *Habilitationsschrift* almost as such in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. Where this way of proceeding turned out to be doubtful, however, was where Husserl suggested that the study of cardinal numbers was to provide a basis for analysis as a whole. Admittedly, in the second part of the book, "Symbolic Number Concepts and the Logical Sources of the Arithmetic of Cardinal Numbers", Husserl pays attention to the re-interpretability of formal systems ("For the deeper understanding of mathematics it is a highly significant fact that one and the same system of symbols can serve several systems of concepts ..."), and in the "Introduction" he promises that the second volume of the book—that never appeared—will develop the same thesis of the independence of the different mathematical domains that he had mentioned to Stumpf. But despite all of this, the first—and the only—volume of the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* remained something of a bad compromise, a fact which Husserl admitted himself in his diary in 1908: "I did a good deal of reading of PA. How unripe, how naive and even childish this work seemed to me. Thus it was not for nothing that my conscience tormented me when I published it. At the time of publication, I had actually gone beyond it already. It stems essentially from the years 1886–87."

Since the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* is thus something of an interim work, Husserl's new position concerning formalism and, more specifically, concerning the problem of extension, that is, the problem of explaining and justifying higher mathematics starting from elementary arithmetic, can best be understood on the basis of lectures and manuscripts from the early 1890s. As early as in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* Husserl emphasizes that the arithmetician does not work with number concepts as such, but rather with signs that represent those numbers. Concerning mathematical operations, Husserl writes that these can be carried out either conceptually or "symbolically" (*sinnlich*). In the first case signs are of only minor importance, whereas in the second case the mathematician transforms given strings of 'meaningless' signs into new strings of signs by way of strict rules. However, rules governing these transformations are thought to correspond closely to the conceptual operations that they are a surrogate for.
Also in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, Husserl already touches upon a theme that will subsequently play a central role in all of his dealings with formal systems, viz., the question of the translation of conceptual content into signs and *vice versa*. In the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* it is stressed that the solution of any calculation contains two steps of translation or interpretation: "Every solving [of a mathematical problem] obviously consists of one calculating part and two conceptual parts: exchanging the initial thoughts with signs—calculating—exchanging the resulting signs with thoughts."\(^63\)

For Husserl, the question of the interpretation of a formal language is never just the problem of its re-interpretability over different domains. The problem is always equally the question concerning the adequacy and the conditions of the possibility of the translation of conceptual content into a formalism.

As was mentioned, in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* Husserl still assumes a strict parallelism between conceptual contents and their signitive correlates. This parallelism, however, had to go by the board with Husserl's new way of dealing with the extension (*Erweiterung*) problem. In a manuscript from 1889/90 published recently with the title "Concerning the Philosophy of the Calculus"\(^64\), Husserl gives an outline of his new approach. This approach merits attention not only because it reveals Husserl's changed attitude towards formalism but also because Husserl could have developed this program into an alternative to Hilbert's axiomatic program. Unfortunately by 1900 Husserl had re-interpreted his earlier theory in a Hilbert-style axiomatic way that like Hilbert's own theory subsequently fell prey to Gödel's ingenious discoveries.\(^65\)

Briefly put, the program of 1890 seeks to deal with the extension problem by dropping restrictions on operations within a given algorithm. Given an algorithm that is restricted by limiting conditions, a more general algorithm is constructed by dropping those restrictions. At the same time the conventions governing the old algorithm are preserved as far as possible. Husserl holds that the new algorithm then contains the old one as its part, and any sentence falling within the old algorithm but arrived at via the new one, is valid. In other words, the new algorithm is a "generalization" of the old one.\(^66\)

For Husserl this is exactly what has happened in arithmetic: ele-
mentary arithmetic is a limited algorithm whose extension is fully explained and justified by the general principles concerning the extension of any formal algorithm. Vis-à-vis the questions as to whether cardinal numbers are the basis of extension and as to whether there must always be a strict parallelism between sign and conceptual content, Husserl’s answer is now negative:

The concept of cardinal number does not allow for extensions; what is extended and what allows for extension is only the arithmetical technique. The latter knows of and constructs negative, imaginary, irrational and fractional numbers which serve the purpose of making the calculus more complete, and which in this respect have a great logical significance. But they lack all conceptual content that goes beyond the algorithmical.⁶⁷

In his letter to Stumpf Husserl uses the picture of concentric circles to explain his idea. The innermost circle consists of elementary arithmetic, the next circle contains fractions, and so on. As we go from the inside outwards, the numbers in each successive circle are formally derived by way of generalized operations from numbers in an earlier circle. The calculation rules are to be formulated in such a way that each equation is valid in the circle whose numbers the equation in question refers to, regardless of possible derivative transitions through more outer circles.⁶⁸

The lesson Husserl takes home from these considerations is that mathematics, more specifically, analysis or arithmetica universalis, is a part of formal logic where formal logic is understood as "the art of signs".⁶⁹ Husserl’s capitulation in the face of his own by now rather non-psychological and formalistic solution to the problem of extension is even so radical as to deny analysis the status of a science: "Based on all this I may say: The arithmetica universalis is no science, but a part of formal logic, which in turn I would define as the art of signs (etc. etc.) and [which I would] call one of the most important chapters of logic as the technology [Kunstlehre] of knowledge."⁷⁰ This remark is highly interesting since, for once, it reveals that in the early 1890s Husserl was holding a view of logic as Kunstlehre that in 1896, when he wrote the Prolegomena of the Logical Investigations, he would renounce as being insufficient and
as an easy prey to psychologism. The high appreciation for formal logic that speaks from the passage quoted also helps to understand why by 1891 Husserl was ready to withdraw his earlier criticism of Frege's logical definition of cardinal numbers:

In my chapter on definitions of numbers by equivalences [in Philosophy of Arithmetic] I ... erred decisively. To be sure, there I was dealing with genuine presentations of numbers, and in their case such a definition is not needed. But I overlooked the fact that ungenuine presentations of numbers demand a classificatory principle which is not given a priori, so that we cannot know a priori whether a classification is at all possible. Here the notion of equivalence serves in an excellent manner.\(^71\)

Most important of all, however, Husserl's construal of arithmetica universalis as a part of formal logic explains why he subsequently studied intensively Boole, Peirce, and especially Schröder's Lectures on the Algebra of Logic\(^72\). What Husserl took home from this study can be read from his extensive criticism, published in 1891, of the first volume of Schröder's work.\(^73\) A further article published during the same year was also directed against a logic based on classes, "The Deductive Calculus and Intensional Logic";\(^74\) it sheds additional light on Husserl's stand.

The first central theme of Husserl's review of Schröder's book is the distinction between logic and formal logic, the distinction between logic and a logical algorithm. Husserl is annoyed by Schröder's claim that his "deductive or formal logic concerns itself with the laws of valid thinking".\(^75\) For once, Husserl questions the assumption that logic coincides with the study of inferences. Within the deductive sciences, and the reviewer is thinking here foremost of arithmetic, we do not only draw inferences but also operate, construct and calculate. Especially the latter of these two operations is far removed from inference: "But is calculation deduction? Not at all. Calculation is a blind procedure with symbols ..."\(^76\) But Schröder's formal logic is not even to be regarded as a theory or a logic of inferences. What Schröder provides us with, according to Husserl, is rather—and only—a logical calculus of pure inference, not a logic of inference. This distinction between calculus and logic of inference is based on
two interconnected ideas. On the one hand, Husserl seems to imply that a logic proper does not deal with a formalism at all, but rather with deductive processes in the mind:

Thus this logical calculus is a calculus of pure deduction; but it is not its logic. The logical calculus is as little the logic of pure deduction as the arithmetica universalis (which spans the whole domain of numbers) is a logic of the domain of numbers. Of the deductive mental processes involved, we discover just as little in the one case as in the other.77

On the other hand, Husserl stresses that the rules of inference provided by Schröder have no necessary character. We are not forced to abide by Schröder’s formalism in order to draw correct inferences. We might want to draw inferences with its help, and in case we do we can be sure that the result will always be a correct one. But Schröder’s formalism does not tell us very much about what makes an inference or a deduction a correct one.78

This explicit distinction between logic and calculus is not only a new element in Husserl, it also foreshadows important later developments in his thought. It was the inability of psychology to handle the problem of extension that made Husserl change his mind about formalism and regard arithmetic as a part of formal logic. Yet once confronted with the most extensive formal logical system of his time, Husserl realized that the ability of formal logic to take care of itself was as poor as that of elementary arithmetic. In both cases philosophical, logical-semantic reflection was called for, reflection that explained and clarified what the algorithm was a surrogate for.

But it is not only the distinction between the logical algorithm and logic proper that is stressed by Husserl. A second distinction that he pays special attention to is the distinction between logic (qua algorithm) and language. As is well known, Frege as well as Schröder claimed that their logical notation is both a lingua characteristic and a calculus ratiocinat. In the case of Frege, this equation is an expression of his belief in logic as a universal medium.79 Husserl holds such a coincidence of language and algorithm to be, if not impossible in principle, then at least extremely hard to achieve. The whole subject is only briefly touched upon in the actually published
review, where Husserl stresses concerning language and algorithm only that "the two concepts are fundamentally different. A language is not a symbolic method for the systematic derivation of conclusions, and a calculus is not a symbolic method for the systematic expression of mental phenomena". In his notes for the published review, Husserl’s comments on the *lingua vs. calculus* distinction are a little more extensive. Here Husserl makes more explicit what his reasons actually are for denying the likelihood of there being a coincidence of *lingua* and *calculus*. In essence, Husserl’s point is that a formal calculus can be interpreted and re-interpreted, whereas a language can not. If arithmetic were to be a *lingua characteristic* and a *calculus ratiocinator* both at the same time, then it would not be possible to abstract from the meaning of the numbers and to carry out calculation with mechanical operations only: "But if the mentioned signs [the number signs and the signs of arithmetical operations] really were to be linguistic signs, then they would function always and everywhere as mere expressions of objects and relations meant. But this is not the case at all. During the calculation the signs do not serve to express the concepts." What this remark suggests is that Husserl holds (natural) language to be closely linked to its interpretation, and that he restricts the possibility of interpretation and re-interpretation to algorithms, to formal logic. This is interesting because Husserl thus seems to commit himself to a thesis concerning natural language that might lead to the conception of language as the universal medium. Of course doing this would not amount to a contradiction with Husserl’s calculus conception with respect to logic. A philosopher might very well hold the calculus conception with respect to logic while abiding to the universal medium conception with respect to natural language. As Jaakko Hintikka has argued, this is what happened in the case of Tarski. Unfortunately, in Husserl’s case, the textual basis is too small to determine whether Husserl in 1891 really held such a twofold position.

Interestingly enough, Husserl also stresses the *lingua vs. calculus* distinction in his correspondence with Frege. This happens in a letter addressed to Frege written in 1891 where Husserl comments on Frege’s "On the Scientific Justification of a Conceptual Notation". Husserl commends Frege for having stressed the es-
sential difference between language and calculus, and acknowledges that Frege had done this even prior to his, i.e., Husserl's, review of Schröder. However, after this reminder of their agreement, Husserl goes on: "To be sure, it appears to me that the *Begriffsschrift*, since it is meant to be a 'lingua characteristica,' should not be called 'a formal language constructed after the arithmetical.' For it should be certain that arithmetic is a 'calculus ratiocinatus' and not a 'lingua characteristica'."  

In the same letter to Frege Husserl also notes that he finds himself in agreement with Frege's opposition to formalism, or rather "formal arithmetic", once formalism proclaims itself to be a "theory" and not just a "technique" of arithmetic. And indeed, in an unpublished manuscript of approximately the same time, Husserl relies on Frege's arguments to refute one brand of formalism according to which arithmetic operates with empty signs. "Against this theory Frege was right in objecting ... that an empty sign does not solve a [mathematical] problem; without content it is mere ink and printing-ink on the paper having as such merely physiological attributes, ..."  

However, in the light of his other writings from this period, Husserl's agreement with Frege did not go very deep. Indeed, Husserl noticed this himself. Earlier in the letter he mentions that his own ideas with respect to the problem of extension are incompatible with Frege's views as presented in "On Formal Theories of Arithmetic".  

In this paper Frege in fact criticizes precisely the position that Husserl was developing in his unpublished writing. Whereas—as we have seen above—in 1890 Husserl accepts the view that only positive cardinal numbers are grounded in concepts, and that signs like $1/2, 1/3$, and $\pi$, are therefore empty of conceptual content, Frege explicitly rejects this view: "Despite the emphatic assertion that the signs are empty and that it is they themselves that are the numbers, in the background there always hovers the thought that they do signify something and that it is these contents of signs that really are the numbers."  

Actually Husserl did not quite hold the position that Frege describes and rejects. Husserl thought, not that the arithmetical signs within the calculating process are simply void of meaning, but that
the signs within the calculating process acquire a new meaning, i.e., the meaning that derives from their role within the 'game'. However, this too was a position that Frege was to criticize two years later in his Basic Laws of Arithmetic. The formalist under attack in that work, J. Thomae, did speak like Husserl of a game-meaning in analogy to the chess-game. Frege's counter-argument reveals his own standpoint, according to which logic and mathematics have a fixed interpretation:

Can one say that a content is assigned to chess pieces by their behaviour with respect to the rules of chess? I am aware that the chess pieces are given, likewise that rules for their manipulation have been established, but I know nothing of any content. It can surely not be said that the black king, in consequence of these rules, designates something, as, say, the name "Sirius" designates a certain star.

For Husserl, in his notes for the Schröder review, things look quite different: in his view, we start in calculation from mathematical signs that have conceptual meaning, that is, number signs that refer to number concepts. Subsequently, we drop this first conceptual content and start to operate with the algorithm as a sign-game. This amounts to a re-interpretation of the signs, which now acquire their game-meaning. In the third and final step we re-interpret the result of the game-calculation over number concepts.

Yet another issue over which Husserl and Frege ended up on different sides is the question 'logic of classes or logic of concepts or contents'. (Admittedly Frege's logic cannot be straightforwardly categorized as a logic of classes.) As we have already seen, Husserl takes Schröder to task for overlooking the difference between a natural language deduction and a formal deduction within a logical algebra. Fleshing out this criticism, Husserl points out that Schröder's class calculus demands a translation of judgments about concepts into judgments about classes. Husserl speaks of the transition from the "logical" to the "algorithmic content" of judgments. However, Husserl denies that constructing a calculus of deductions presupposes algorithmic meaning in terms of classes. A first—hardly convincing—argument to this effect is that every judgment about
classes is actually a judgment about concepts: "If we judge that class A is contained in class B, then it is affirmed that an object of the concept 'class A' is an object of the concept 'contained in class B'."\textsuperscript{92}

A second argument seeks to undermine Schröder's own main ground for rejecting a logic of contents. Schröder had held that we cannot base our logic on concepts since the "ideal contents" of concepts are inaccessible to us. By factual content Schröder understands those characteristics of a named thing that actually were the starting point for the forming of a concept. "Ideal content", however, refers to those characteristics that the named thing has in itself, characteristics that only an ideal knower could combine into the concept.\textsuperscript{93}

The way Husserl tackles this argument is noteworthy. He deals with it by relying on his—or rather Brentano's—old distinction between genuine and non-genuine presentations, a distinction that had come in handy in the explanation of large cardinal numbers four years earlier. Husserl writes now—in his article "The Deductive Calculus and Intensional Logic"—that we need not have an immediate grasp of a concept in order to use it as the basis of our logic; it is sufficient that we have a grasp of the concept "in the form of univocally determinate symbolic representations".\textsuperscript{94} Schröder's argument against a logic of contents seems to have appeared to Husserl as being part and parcel of that radical form of formalistic thinking that Husserl had sought to undermine at least for natural numbers. After all, Husserl's own moderate formalism had never extended so far as to question the accessibility of the meaning of natural numbers. No wonder that the tone of Husserl's review is occasionally harsh and even disrespectful. After he has unmasked Schröder as being a "formalist arithmetician"\textsuperscript{95} his tone had to be aggressive.

Yet what Husserl used as his main argument against Schröder was his demonstration that the whole algorithm of classes could as such be re-interpreted (in several ways) so as to be an algorithm of concepts. How dear this demonstration was to Husserl's heart can be seen from the fact that he engaged in a vigorous and polemical Prioritätsstreit with A. Voigt over whether he really had been the first to have suggested such a re-interpretation: "But Mr. Voigt is completely silent about the fact that the idea of the possibility of just such a translation, and the actual carrying through with it, is
"something novel and of fundamental importance for the logic of the calculus."\textsuperscript{96}

The details of Husserl's sketchy attempt to carry out this allegedly new logic of concepts are not of interest here. What is important, however, is the fact that he argued in favour of his logic of concepts by pointing out that this logic is closer to our natural thinking than Schröder's logic of classes: "Obviously the ideal would be to ground the deductive calculus from the outset upon the forms which are most primitive and the most at home in natural thinking."\textsuperscript{97} And here Husserl regards the form "provided something is an S, it is P" to be "most primitive" and to be favoured over Schröder's "all S's are P's".\textsuperscript{98} What this line of argument shows is that Husserl still draws on psychological considerations ('closeness to natural thinking') in his reflections upon formal logic. Psychology still serves as the stick with which to beat the formalist.

Our interpretation according to which Husserl and Frege take opposite sides on the issue 'language as calculus vs. language as the universal medium' is supported by Frege's showing more sympathy with Schröder's standpoint than with Husserl's. Even though Husserl and Frege discussed Schröder's book in their correspondence, and even though Frege wrote that it was Husserl's review that inspired him to write his own review of Schröder's book, the two men did not touch upon this issue directly. In his own review Frege writes that he agrees with the logician of content in that the content of a concept is logically prior to its extension. Yet he continues: "All the same, in many respects my position may be closer to the author than to those who could in contrast to him be termed logicians of content."\textsuperscript{99} Frege also takes a firm stand against Husserl in a manuscript that the editors of his \textit{Posthumous Writings} date as having been written between 1892 and 1895:

The intensionalist logicians are only too happy not to go beyond the sense; for what they call the intension, if it is not a presentation [\textit{Vorstellung}], is nothing other than the sense. They forget that logic is not concerned with how thoughts, regardless of truth-value, follow from thoughts, that the step from thought to truth-value—more generally, the step from sense to reference [\textit{Bedeutung}]}—has to be taken. They forget that the laws of logic
are first and foremost laws in the realm of references and only relate indirectly to sense.  

As is clear from the context of this remark, when writing this passage Frege had Husserl’s review in front of him. In the very next paragraph he quotes from Husserl’s review of Schröder concerning the latter’s definitions of equivocacy and univocacy. Frege’s allusion to the tendency of logicians of content to equate sense and presentation also points in Husserl’s direction, for in his review of Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic Frege accuses Husserl precisely of not appreciating the distinction between presentation and concept.

2.3. Spelling out the Language as Calculus Conception.

On the Road to the Logical Investigations

In sum, Husserl’s main lines of argument in his review of Schröder’s Lectures on the Algebra of Logic point towards a new research program. The problems to be tackled by this research include the relation between sign and meaning, the issue of interpretation and re-interpretation of signs, the question of layers of meaning in judgments (logical, algorithmical, and game meaning), the accessibility of concepts and meanings by way of genuine and symbolical presentations, an investigation into the extension/intension distinction, an inquiry into the key logical concepts like truth and conceivability, a clarification of whether the nature of (formal) logic is exhausted by its being a Kunstlehre, and—since Husserl regards descriptive psychology to be essential in this whole project—a reflection on the relation between psychology and logic. Needless to say, this list of problems reads like the agenda for the Logical Investigations published in 1900/01 and worked on since 1895/96. Of course, Husserl’s research program of 1891 that emerged from the Schröder review did not have to lead precisely to the specific doctrines of the Logical Investigations, for example, to platonism with respect to meanings, logics and mathematics. New external influences like those exerted by Cantor, Lotze, Bolzano, Natorp, Hilbert and Frege provided challenges to which Husserl responded, and also provided ideas that he incorporated into his own thinking. For this present study, the history of Husserl’s development towards a platonistic position is only a peripheral issue.
and will therefore not be discussed in detail here. What needs to be pointed out, however, is that Husserl’s adherence to a platonistic view in the *Logical Investigations* is not necessarily a radical breach with his earlier work. For instance, we have seen that some passages in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* have something of a platonistic ring. To this we can now add the observation that Husserl’s discussion of the logic of content also has platonistic tendencies, for example, where Husserl stresses in contradistinction to Schröder that ideal concepts are accessible to us by way of ungenuine presentations.\(^{105}\)

This is not to suggest that Frege’s criticism or the influence of Lotze, Brentano, and Natorp were not needed to make Husserl align himself with some sort of platonism. His own recognition of the importance of these influences easily disproves any such suggestion.\(^{106}\) What can be said, however, is that these influences were able to have their decisive impact on Husserl only because he had reached a point in his own work where an *explicit* and *clear* boarderline between logic and psychology, the empirical and the logical, had become a central issue due to reasons internal to his work itself.

Although a detailed examination of Husserl’s published and unpublished writings between the time of the Schröder review in 1891 and the *Prolegomena* in 1900 lies beyond the scope of this work, there is nevertheless one only recently published work that merits special attention. This work is entitled ”Intentional Objects” (1894/98).\(^{107}\) Compared with the ”Psychological Studies for Elementary Logic” (1894)\(^{108}\) ”Intentional Objects” is more than just a preliminary study of subjects that are taken up in more detail in the *Logical Investigations*. Rather the ”Intentional Objects” allows one to see clearly certain interconnections between different tenets of Husserl’s philosophy in the second half of the 1890s.

The question that ”Intentional Objects” sets out to resolve is the question as to whether each presentation (Vorstellung) has an (existing) object. Brentano had denied this on the ground that a description like ”the current king of France” is empty and thus does not refer.\(^{109}\) Husserl agrees with this solution only if ”object” is taken to be ”an existing, true, real, genuine object”\(^{110}\). However, the writer of ”Intentional Objects” does not want to speak of objects only in this sense. He also allows for ”merely intentional objects” that do
not "really" exist. "A round square" and "Zeus" are examples of intentional objects in this sense. How Husserl subsequently elaborates on these "merely intentional objects" is highly significant for in this treatment one easily recognizes the core idea of Husserl's much later notion of "epoché":

The presentations "Zeus" and "the highest of the Olympic gods" have the same intentional object, that is, Zeus is the highest of the olympic gods—according to Greek mythology. Usually we drop this qualification, and we do not miss it where it is lacking: it is obvious that when we make judgments about mythological objects, we judge them upon the basis of the myth, without, however, adopting it.

Husserl suggests that "merely intentional objects" are objects that are judged neither as existing nor as non-existing. They are treated by presentations as existing relative to some framework while the question as to their real, or absolute, existence remains "bracketed".

Even more important than to see that we do indeed have here a clear anticipation of the epoché is to point out that Husserl regards thinking within frameworks, that is, "under a fixed assumption", as being highly frequent in ordinary and scientific discourse. Husserl mentions especially "formal arithmetic" and geometrical systems as such kinds of frameworks. Here the "fixed assumption" consists of a manifold that is determined by a set of axioms. However, what distinguishes the framework of arithmetic from others is that the epoché is not upheld: "Here one does not only talk, but even judges as if the deduced truths, existences, relations, and incompatibilities were absolutely valid."

It also merits attention that Husserl stresses that there is only one logic, whether we move inside or outside of some given framework. From here it does not seem very far to one central ingredient of the conception of logic and language as calculus, namely the notion of logical laws as holding in all possible frameworks ("worlds") in contradistinction to empirical (for example, psychological!) laws holding in only some frameworks. It is no counterargument against this suggestion that Husserl rejects the idiom of "worlds" in the fol-
lowing passage:

We will thus not accept the unclear talk of different regions of existence, of different "worlds" (*universes of discourse*), that treat the existence or non-existence of the same object differently. The "world" of the myth, the world of poetry, the world of geometry, the real world, these are not equally "worlds". There is only one truth and one world ... ¹¹⁷

What this statement amounts to is not that Husserl withdraws his notion of "relative existence", but rather that he rejects transworld identity and that he is worried about the possibility that relative existence might be misunderstood as absolute existence. The fact that Husserl prefers to speak of a "comprehensive manifold of propositions under one and the same ... assumption"¹¹⁸ instead of "worlds" is perhaps best understood in the light of yet another central ingredient of the calculus conception: the denial of (onto)logical and linguistic relativism. In this early work Husserl has to express his position rather dogmatically, but in subsequent works, from the *Prolegomena* all the way to *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*¹²⁰, he will seek to put this tenet on a firm theoretical basis.

Yet soon, in an addition written in 1898 to the 1894 manuscript of "Intentional Objects", Husserl can be interpreted as providing an argument against one brand of relativism. This brand holds that some sentence S can be evident to some person P while non-S can be evident to another person Q. To see why Husserl can be interpreted as undermining this position, a brief look at his notion of truth in "Intentional Objects" is called for. This also seems useful because here we encounter, in a less complex form, Husserl's theory of truth as well as his idea of meanings as abstract entities, two central topics of the *Logical Investigations*.

The definition of truth given in "Intentional Objects" is based on the earlier idea that every presentation has an object. Truth is defined in relation to a presentation: the latter is "'valid', 'correct' or 'true', if there is an object that it relates to presentatively".¹²⁰ At first sight this seems to imply that simply all presentations are true, since as claimed earlier, all presentations have—at least—a "merely
intentional object’. This result is avoided by Husserl, however, who now limits objects of presentations to those objects that exist in the absolute sense ("an existing, true, real, genuine object”\textsuperscript{121}). Husserl remarks that this analysis of truth coincides with the classical correspondence theory. The difference between Husserl’s version and the classical one is supposed to lie merely in the fact that he calls the presentation "true" whereas the classical, traditional version speaks of the relation between presentation and object as true, "a case of this most general equivocation by transference that can hardly be avoided and which in any case does no harm".\textsuperscript{122}

To see what precisely is meant here by correspondence and coincidence ("Übereinstimmung"), Husserl tells us that we have to turn to cases of "self-evidence" (Evidenz), in which truth is immediately experienced. It is important for a proper understanding, not only of the passage at hand, but of Husserl’s whole later phenomenology to appreciate his claim that self-evidence is not a criterion of truth, or some feeling of regarding something as true, but the experience of truth. This can best be understood by means of a mathematical example that perhaps was the model for the entire treatment of truth and evidence in Husserl. One of Husserl’s examples suggests that he would call \( x^2 = 4 \) a presentation to which 2 corresponds as the true-making object.\textsuperscript{123} \( 2^2 = 4 \) is the truth that is experienced in self-evidence. Yet what is experienced here, is not something empirical but rather an ideal relation between an ideal meaning and an ideal object: \( x^2 = 4 \) and 2 are so related to each other that their correspondence is self-evident as something that holds independently of anything that pertains to the thinking subject as an empirical entity. What is experienced here is therefore the ideal relation between a meaning type and an object type, not between two tokens. This is so because one’s ability to come back over and over again to this self-same truth is part of the experienced self-evidence. It is the ideality of the relation between the relata and the ideality of both relata themselves that rules out the possibility of \( 1^2 = 4 \) being self-evident. To judge that \( 1 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 \) cannot be regarded as the perception or experience of a truth simply because it is false. Someone might, of course, think that the false equation is true, but that does not give one any reason for saying that he has perceived a
truth.

In order to appreciate Husserl's conception of truth and self-evidence it is useful to read it against the conception of the calculus view of meaning. The central ingredient of this view is the accessibility of meaning and truth. In Husserl this tenet takes the form of seeking to explain that meaning and truth are accessible to the individual in and through his acts or presentations, and to explain how they are so accessible. From this epistemological vantage point it is natural and plausible that Husserl sees self-evidence as prior to truth. Yet introducing the notion of self-evidence as prior to truth brings forth the danger of relativism; the contradictory opposite of what is self-evident to one person might be self-evident to another. Now what Husserl thinks allows him both to maintain his epistemological perspective and to oppose relativism, is his introduction of the notion of ideal species: what makes a presentation token $P$ true with respect to its object token $O$ is not one's evident feeling that $P$ corresponds to $O$. Rather, what makes $P$ true is the ideal relation between $P$ and $O$ as species or types. Put in a nutshell, it is the ideality of meaning that enables Husserl to stick simultaneously to the three central ingredients of the calculus conception already found in this early work: to the denial of relativism, to the accessibility of truth, and to truth as correspondence.

3. DEFENDING THE ACCESSIBILITY OF SEMANTICS AGAINST PSYCHOLOGISTIC RELATIVISM: THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS

In the last chapter we saw how the agenda for the Logical Investigations emerged from Husserl's treatment of formalism. In this chapter, I shall present an interpretation of this work from the vantage point of the conception of language as calculus. As is well known to every student of the Logical Investigations, Husserl's magnum opus gives rise to numerous difficult interpretational problems. Of these perhaps the most notorious problem concerns the question as to the relationship between the critique of psychologism, presented in the Prolegomena, and the descriptive psychology applied in the first,
second, fifth and sixth investigations. As I will try to show in this chapter, this problem can be successfully tackled by the interpretation suggested here. In brief, this interpretation can be put in the following way: even though the *Logical Investigations* are in more than one way a natural continuation of Husserl's earlier struggle against formalism, it is nevertheless important to see that the role of the central opponent in the *Logical Investigations* is reserved for psychologism and not for formalism. Moreover, it is equally important to understand *why* this is the case. Formalism ceases to be the main concern for Husserl because by the second half of the 1890s he has arrived at what he takes to be a satisfactory notion of the well-defined, albeit limited, role of formalistic elements in mathematics and logic. This new position, which is close to his definitive one, incorporates ideas from Riemann and Hilbert. According to it, systems of axioms define manifolds as the area of those objects that these axiomatic systems are *about*. Husserl's high regard for the axiomatic method also leaves a strong mark on his conception of a theory of formal theories. In this ultimate conception, theory *forms* are studied with a view on their logical-mathematical structure. If this new logical metascience is to function as a metatheory vis-à-vis all sciences, then naturally it cannot itself be reducible to one of them, for instance to psychology. Thus attempts to engage in such a reduction have to be undermined.

What makes psychologism an inevitable opponent for Husserl can also be appreciated by attending to our philosopher's conviction that the central result of psychologism is the *inaccessibility* of truth, reality, and meaning. Earlier, formalism had seemed to exclude questions of meaning as irrelevant or unanswerable, now psychologism is seen by Husserl to lead to the inaccessibility of meaning and thus to relativism by locating meaning in individual heads.

Husserl's answer to this challenge is twofold. On the one hand he argues for the ideality of laws of logic and meanings. On the other hand he employs the tools of descriptive psychology to provide a solution to the notorious difficulty platonism is traditionally faced with: how are abstract entities accessible to us? To understand the essential connection between these two elements of Husserl's answer to psychologistic relativism is to understand the mistake which
underlies interpretations that see a contradiction between the critique of psychologism in the *Prolegomena* and the employment of (descriptive) psychology in the remainder of the work. Most of the six investigations attempt to show that the assumption of abstract entities is inevitable once acts of meaning and perception are studied. The first and the second investigation present anew the case against relativism and defend the accessibility of meanings as abstract entities. While the *Prolegomena* attacks psychologism in logic, the second investigation attacks it in semantics. The conclusion arrived at is that abstract meanings are accessible to us because they are possible objects of acts. It is this object nature of meanings that explains why Husserl can attempt a systematization of meanings in the fourth investigation by using the tools and notions of his study of object relations developed in the third investigation. The research carried out in the fourth investigation provides a strong argument against linguistic relativism: it is shown that all natural languages share a common "ideal structure" that makes them intertranslatable and comparable. Furthermore, within the domain of meanings Husserl identifies a subset of meanings that refer to objects. To study the way meanings can do this, that is, to study the process of their doing it, is—for the phenomenologist—to study the philosophy of mind, to study the role of those meanings in intentionality, to study the types of acts in which objects come to be known in an interplay of acts of meaning (Akte des Bedeutens) and acts of perception. Of course, an inquiry into the meaning-object relation is an inquiry into knowledge and truth. These are the central topics of the fifth and the sixth investigation. It is strong support for our ascription of the calculus conception to Husserl that he attempts to show in these investigations that reality an sich is accessible to us, that meaning and object can be compared, and that the notion of correspondence provides the correct account of truth. Husserl's version of the correspondence theory is an especially strong one: he wants the correspondence theory to be an account of all truths, not just an account of the truth of immediate, direct empirical statements. This conception forces him to develop his theory of categorial perception and categorial objects with which the *Logical Investigations* conclude.
8.1. Formal Mathematics and the Theory of Science

In the last chapter, we saw that by 1890 Husserl came to accept a formalistic solution to the problem of extension. After that shift had occurred, the vigour with which formalism had formerly been opposed had gone by the board, even though Husserl stuck with his antiformalistic stand in his critique of Schröder. We also noted that in his manuscript "Intentional Objects", Husserl spoke of manifolds in arithmetics and geometry, manifolds that are determined by a "fixed assumption", that is, in the cases of arithmetic and geometry, they are determined by a system of axioms. In the *Prolegomena* to the *Logical Investigations* as well as in manuscripts from about the same time, Husserl pushes his thoughts on these topics even further in a way that reveals the influence of Hilbert and Riemann.

It is the notion of a manifold—as the region of objects defined by an axiomatic system—that Husserl adopts from Riemann's work on the foundations of geometry. Since it has occasionally been claimed that Husserl's use of this notion stems from his acquaintance with Cantor in Berlin, it is perhaps worth while pointing out that Riemann's and Cantor's notions of manifolds by no means coincide. In the case of a Cantorian manifold only external relations hold between the elements of the manifold ("set"), whereas Riemann allows also for internal relations of dependency between the elements of a manifold.

Husserl is also intrigued by Riemann's and von Helmholtz's idea of treating physical space as one of a variety of spacelike manifolds that are interconnected and derivable from each other by variation of curvature. Here Husserl finds an example of the idea of theory forms and their interconnections, an idea that is central to his conception of a pure logic.

However, there is an important further influence to be noted in this context, that of Hilbert. This influence can already be seen in the *Logical Investigations*, even though it becomes stronger still after Husserl comes into personal contact with Hilbert in Göttingen in 1901. The central lesson that Husserl learns from Hilbert is an appreciation of the "formalistic" axiomatic method. It is an interesting fact from the vantage point of our interpretation that this method was vigorously opposed by Frege. As Jaakko Hintikka has shown,
the debate between Frege and Hilbert had a fascinating "deeper dimension". Their exchange over the question of implicit definitions was very much a debate over which view of logic we have to adopt: logic as language or logic as calculus. For example, Hilbert allowed for the free interpretability of his axioms. Furthermore, metalogical proofs—not allowed according to Frege's view—form the heart of Hilbert's mathematical thinking. That Husserl was siding with Hilbert can both be seen from his adoption of Hilbert's ideas and also be read more directly from Husserl's notes on the correspondence between Hilbert and Frege. Having extracted Frege's main arguments, Husserl writes:

Frege does not understand the meaning of the Hilbertian "axiomatic" founding of geometry, namely that it is a purely formal system of conventions, whose theory form is equal to the Euclidean.

When can we be sure that we have not drawn the matter of some region of knowledge into the deductions and that we have inferred purely logically? ... only when we grasp the matter symbolically, when we rise to a formal system, to a theory form, which is defined by the sentence forms of the material principles of the region. ... The axiomatic foundations define the formal region.132

It was also under the influence of Hilbert that from 1901 onwards Husserl reformulated his earlier program for handling the extension problem.133 Now Husserl no longer suggested tackling this problem by dropping restrictions within a calculus (for instance, the restriction $a > b$ for the operation $a - b$), but rather by expanding an axiomatic system where one axiomatic system $A$ is an expansion of another axiomatic system $B$ if and only if all theorems of $B$ are also theorems of $A$ but not vice versa. Husserl did not work out this program in detail, but he did work intensively on the problem of defining the conditions under which a theorem of $B$ containing only expressions of $A$ is valid. The attention given by Husserl to this problem is noteworthy because in working out a solution to the problem Husserl shows an interest in metalogical questions and proofs that Frege—at least initially—was unable to consider in a systematic way because
of his belief in logic as language. In one manuscript, Husserl describes the problem in the following way:

Now all deducible theorems of the larger system must fall into two groups: 1) those theorems which contain solely the concepts of the narrow system and which are valid in terms of the narrower axioms, and which thus are not imaginary, and 2) those theorems which contain such imaginary concepts. ... when can we be sure that to each proof that leads through the imaginary sphere there corresponds a proof that leads only through the real [narrower] area ...?

Husserl's response to this problem is the notion of "definiteness", a notion that he himself regarded as close to Hilbert's notion of completeness:

The passage through the imaginary is allowed in every region of deduction that is definite. A region is called definite, if each sentence that is arbitrarily composed of only axiomatic concepts, that is, each sentence that has a grammatical meaning in this region is, on the basis of the system of axioms of this region, either true or false.

When speaking about formal systems of analysis, Husserl now stresses repeatedly that these are not mere empty games, but that they define manifolds, that is, areas of formal objects whose properties are determined precisely by the axioms in question. This solution—we will deal with it in more detail below when interpreting the Formal and Transcendental Logic—allows Husserl to accept some elements of the formalistic method without having to give up the idea that algorithms are ultimately more than mere games: their meaning—so to speak—lies in the axioms themselves, that is, in the objects that they implicitly define.

To return to the Prolegomena, we can first note that here Hilbert's, von Helmholtz's and Riemann's influence can best be seen in Husserl's claim that the study of theory forms is, at least to some by no means negligible extent a job of the mathematician. It is mathematics (and mathematical logic) that investigates and constructs formal systems, and insofar as theories of any science become axiomatized they are thus objects of mathematical study.
Husserl makes clear that the new theory of theories that he envisages is in part modelled on developments in mathematics. He even cites these mathematical developments as a proof of the feasibility of a theory of sciences that reduces scientific theories to their logical form, and that thus orders theories into different form classes (Formklassen):

These indications will perhaps seem somewhat obscure. That we are not here dealing with vague fantasies, but with conceptions definite in their content, is shown by "formal mathematics" in a most entirely general sense, or by the "theory of manifolds" [of Riemann and von Helmholtz], the fine flower of modern mathematics.¹⁴⁰

Husserl also calls his own theory of theories "the theory of manifolds" and defines it as an investigation into essential types of all possible theories in their lawful interconnections.¹⁴¹

However, Husserl's science of theories does not coincide with mathematics. The question concerning the "conditions of the possibility of science in general"¹⁴² is not yet answered by reducing given theories to their mathematical structure. Mathematical research is itself not a conceptual analysis of notions that are presupposed by all scientific inquiry. Notions like "'things', 'events', 'laws of nature'"¹⁴³ can only be studied by philosophy. In other words, Husserl envisaged a metascience which is not able to confine itself to a syntactical study of theories, but is forced to practice semantics as well. Semantical categories belong to the study of "the ideal 'essence' of theory as such".¹⁴⁴

Furthermore, it would be quite wrong to assume that under the influence of Hilbert, Husserl now takes back his criticism of Schröder. Despite his high appreciation for "formal mathematics", and despite the role he assigns to this venture within his theory of theories, Husserl still holds on to the distinction between logic and logical algebra, that is, between philosophy and mathematics: "Here we must note that the mathematician is not really the pure theoretician, but only the ingenious technician, the constructor, as it were, who, looking merely to formal interconnections, builds up his theory like a technical work of art."¹⁴⁵ To appreciate this claim, we have to note
that the theory of science that Husserl suggests starts from primitive concepts and concept-categories presupposed in all deductive theories, and goes on to study their interrelations and the systems they can form. Only after this venture is pushed to the highest level of abstraction will it coincide with mathematics. What this means is that logic still does not equal formal logic, and that the "logical meaning" of judgment forms and their "elementary connective forms" remains the domain of philosophy. Formalism has its place, but this place is well defined and restricted.

3.2. Frege's Hidden Psychologism and the Idea of Pure Logic

With formalism tamed and incorporated into an overall conception of logic and mathematics, Husserl can turn to a new front. The new enemy is psychologism. There are several routes along which this topic enters Husserl's reflections on the nature of logic. For one thing, it must be remembered that the issue of psychologism was a central one in the writings of Husserl's contemporaries, among them Frege. Frege had written his famous critique of Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* in 1894, the central charge being of course the notorious one of psychologism. But besides Frege, Husserl was also well acquainted with the works of Bolzano, Lotze, and Natorp, all of whom rejected the equation of logical and psychological laws. But there were certainly also reasons internal to Husserl's own work and development that made a demarcation of the relation between logic and psychology inevitable. Especially the project of a theory of science, influenced by Bolzano's monumental *Theory of Science*, naturally leads to—or rather presupposes—reflections on the boarderline between logic and the sciences. Clearly, if logic is envisaged as providing and identifying the ideal structure of all scientific theories, then its own reducibility to psychology would have devastating effects. All sciences, including mathematics, would turn out to be either branches of psychology or dependent upon psychology for their validity. ("... just like analytical investigations also all ontologies and, in the end, all sciences would have to dissolve into psychology ...") Thus it is essential to Husserl's project to demonstrate that laws of logic are not laws of psychology and that they do not presuppose psychological truths.
Especially since Dagfinn Føllesdal’s little classic *Husserl und Frege* (1958),\(^{151}\) it has been a much discussed question as to what extent Frege was responsible for Husserl’s turning against psychologism, and to what extent Husserl simply takes over Frege’s arguments. It is an undeniable fact that many of the arguments that Husserl employs can already be found in Frege’s *The Foundations of Arithmetic* (1884)\(^{152}\) and *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic* (1893).\(^{153}\) However, from the vantage point of this study this question concerning priority is only of marginal interest. What seems to me to be of considerably greater interest are the differences between Frege’s and Husserl’s respective treatments of the problem of psychologism and the differences between their respective solutions. As I shall argue, these differences reveal once again that these two most influential figures in modern philosophy stand on opposite sides of the contrast universal medium vs. calculus.

Føllesdal drew attention to the fact that even though Husserl and Frege employ similar arguments against psychologism Frege does not consider them as conclusive as Husserl does. Frege probably thought that only the completion of his entire project would provide a convincing argument.\(^{154}\) The reason why Frege thinks he cannot refute the psychologist by particular arguments is his conviction that all argumentation can only proceed by deduction: "The question why and with what right we acknowledge a law of logic to be true, logic can answer only by reducing it to another law of logic. Where that is not possible, logic can give no answer."\(^{155}\) In order to understand the true motivation behind this statement, it is essential to remember two interconnected implications of the logic as language (language as the universal medium) conception that we discussed in the Introduction of this study. An adherer to this view cannot step outside of language or outside of the logical system, and he cannot regard an analysis of the notion of truth (as correspondence) as feasible. Now as pointed out by van Heijenoort, this is exactly what happens in Frege’s case.\(^{156}\) Thus for Frege the relativistic psychologist that denies the binding nature of logic can no longer be refuted by means of explicit argument. Neither can it be demonstrated to him why an absolute notion of truth must be accepted. This would presuppose that the critic (Frege) would be able to demonstrate what truth is
all about. But this is precisely where Frege is bound to stop: "What true is, I hold to be indefinable."\(^{157}\) That Husserl is not bound by the same restrictive conception of meaning can explain why he is far more convinced of the conclusiveness of his arguments against a relativistic notion of truth. In the sixth investigation he will give a detailed exposition of the notions of truth and evidence in the light of which the relativist's position will turn out to be indefensible. (I shall return to the difference between Husserl's and Frege's notion of truth below.)

Even though Frege and Husserl are both fighting psychologism, their positive responses to its challenge differ in important ways. For Frege logic is to be marked off from psychology and other empirical sciences by the is–ought trench. Logic is for him a normative science like ethics, and "stipulate[s] the way in which one ought to think"\(^{158}\): "How must I think in order to reach the goal, truth?"\(^{159}\) Laws of logic are laws "which like the principles of morals or the laws of the state, prescribe how we are to act ..."\(^{160}\) In a famous passage of the *Basic Laws*, after having deplored "the corrupting incursion of psychology into logic",\(^{161}\) Frege draws a distinction between two meanings of the word "law": "... what is fatal is the double meaning of the word 'law'. In one sense a law asserts what is; in the other it prescribes what ought to be. Only in the latter sense can the laws of logic be called 'laws of thought': so far as they stipulate the way in which one ought to think."\(^{162}\)

Husserl's solution does not only differ from the one suggested by Frege. Husserl attacks the type of conception proposed by Frege as being an insufficient alternative to the challenge of psychologism, and even as being based on a hidden psychologism itself. To appreciate this point is to give a new and rather surprising reading to Husserl's own statement that "Frege's influence was decisive"\(^{163}\) in his, that is, Husserl's, overcoming of psychologism. To see how things might hang together here, we need to remember that Husserl himself had formerly held logic to be a *Kunstlehre* (technology, art) and that in the *Prolegomena* Husserl treats the normative conception of logic and the *Kunstlehre* view on equal terms. It is feasible, to say the least, that Husserl came to see the inadequacy of the *Kunstlehre* interpretation through his study of Frege. What makes this interpreta-
tion more than a wild guess—even though Husserl does not mention Frege by name—is the fact, that despite his interpretation of logic as a normative science, Frege holds a platonistic (non-normative) view of mathematics. Interestingly enough, Husserl's first argument against the normative view of logic turns exactly on this alleged inconsistency:

The mathematical disciplines also yield a basis for technologies. To arithmetic corresponds the practical art of calculation, to geometry the art of land-surveying. ... This readily suggests the view that it is the true sense of our supposed pure logic to be an abstract theoretical discipline providing a basis for a technology just as the previously mentioned disciplines do, its technology being logic in the ordinary, practical sense.\(^{164}\)

In other words, just as mathematical \textit{Kunstlehren} presuppose pure theoretical mathematics, logical \textit{Kunstlehren} presuppose pure theoretical logic.

However, Husserl has more arguments in his arsenal than just this "suggestion". To undermine the Fregean—and his own formerly held—position, he investigates the notions of norm and normativity. What this analysis boils down can be summarized by saying that systems of norms are held together by an absolute "basic norm", the other norms being what in recent discussion have been called "technical norms",\(^{165}\) that is, norms that are hypothetical, i.e., dependent on the norm subject's wish to obtain some end and, in this special case, upon the norm subject's wish to abide by the basic norm in question. This basic norm is also definitive of a "fundamental valuation" as a practical interest.\(^{166}\) Given this apparatus, the practical interest of a \textit{Kunstlehre} can then be brought by Husserl into opposition with the theoretical interest of pure logic:

A technology \textit{[Kunstlehre]} represents a particular case of a normative discipline which arises when the basic norm consists in achieving a universal practical aim.\(^{167}\)

\textit{Theoretical disciplines} do not have this central reference of all researches to a fundamental valuation as the source of a dominant normative interest. The unity of their researches, and the
coordination of what they know, is determined exclusively by a theoretical interest...\textsuperscript{168}

The implication here is clear: a normative conception of logic does not truly free logic from the empirical or practical sphere. Norms are norms for someone, and technical norms depend on our acceptance of the end in question. The Kunstlehre doctrine thus fails to separate logic from the psychological.

Husserl’s dislike of the Fregean solution is so strong that he is willing to side with the psychologistic logicians against it. If the antipsychologistic alternative merely relied on the normativity of logic, then the psychologist would be able to claim to have won the battle. That Husserl is likely to have Frege in mind here, even though he does not mention him by name, can be seen from the way he makes this point. He starts by letting the normativist present his case with the very notions that Frege himself uses. He speaks of two notions of law, of the is–ought distinction, and of logic as ethics: "He aims not at a physics, but at an ethics of thinking."\textsuperscript{169} But as uncompromising as Frege was in some of his remarks in his review of Husserl’s book, as uncompromisingly does Husserl let the antipsychologistic program get defeated by the psychologist’s rebuttal:

We cannot be content—such will be the psychologistic rejoinder—with such half-truths. The task of logic is of course quite different from that of psychology: who would deny it? It is a technology of knowledge, but how could such a technology ignore questions of causal connection, how could it look for ideal connections without studying natural ones?\textsuperscript{170}

Husserl’s charge of a hidden psychologism in the normative conception of logic hinges centrally on his interpretation of "technology": a technology is for him relative to the beings that use it. Thus Husserl is willing to concede to the psychologist that normative laws do indeed vary from species to species and that thus "mathematical angels may no doubt use other methods of calculation than ours..."\textsuperscript{171} To interpret logic as Kunstlehre is to give up the uniqueness of logic, which in turn—for both Frege and Husserl—means falling into total relativism.
The charge of a hidden psychologism in the Kunstlehre conception is, seen from a different angle, the charge of neglecting semantics. This is so, since for Husserl—as was mentioned in the last section—pure logic is the study of logical concepts, their meaning and content, just like numbers and their interrelations are the subject matter for the mathematician. Pure logic is centrally a semantical enterprise. Notions like "truth" thus cannot remain undefined and unanalyzed. Their usage in applied logic qua Kunstlehre is justified only in so far as they are clarified in the pure theoretical discipline. It is here that we can see clearly the connection between the guiding dichotomy of our study and the disagreement between Frege and Husserl over the nature of logic: Husserl’s overriding priority is the accessibility of meanings, be it in mathematics or in logic. Frege’s position must be different here since semantical considerations—at least systematic ones—are ruled out for him by his belief in logic as language.

Turning from Husserl’s critique of the conception of logic as a normative science to his arguments against psychologism, it seems especially important to point out that what Husserl attacks in psychologism is its implicit relativism. Thus Husserl stresses that if logical laws were to be psychological laws, then they could not have their apodictic necessary character. Laws of psychology are vague and based on induction. Induction itself, however, presupposes logic.

Husserl’s central charge against the psychologistic logician is that his position is self-refuting: he or she wants to present a theory about logic and/or the human mind, while the content of this theory violates "the self-evident conditions for the possibility of a theory in general": "The violation of logical conditions is at its grossest when the sense of the theoretical thesis involves a rejection of those laws on which the rational possibility of any thesis, and the proof of any thesis, depends." Husserl interprets the psychologist as holding that since logical laws are laws about the constitution of the human mind, logic is relative to species. But then, since the theory of the psychologist holding this position also relies on (human) logic, it too would be only relatively true. And this fact will invalidate the psychologist’s claim to giving us the truth about logic.

Even though this argument of Husserl’s is a forceful one, it seems that other arguments directed not at the psychologist logician but at
the relativist in general are committing a *petitio principii*. This much has been convincingly established by Føllesdal and need not be restated here in detail. Husserl takes it to be evident that "what is true is absolutely, intrinsically true: truth is one and the same, whether men or non-men, angels or gods apprehend and judge it".\(^{176}\) This is of course exactly what the relativist denies, but it is, unfortunately, what Husserl presupposes in his arguments.

Rather than following Husserl through the details of his criticism, I shall point out only some aspects of them that seem noteworthy from the vantage point of my interpretation of the *Logical Investigations* as presupposing and defending the accessibility of semantics, truth, and reality *an sich*.

First of all, Husserl claims that the relativity of logic and truth must imply that reality *an sich* becomes inaccessible. If logic, and therefore truth, too, is subjective we shall be unable to grasp reality as such:

The relativity of truth entails the relativity of cosmic existence. For the world is merely the unified objective totality corresponding to, and inseparable from, the ideal system of all factual truth. One cannot subjectivize truth, and allow its object (which only exists as long as truth subsists) to count as absolutely existent, or as existent "in itself". There would therefore be no world "in itself", but only a world for us, or for any other species of being.\(^{177}\)

That Husserl regards this observation as being an argument against psychologism reveals how central the accessibility of reality *an sich* to the knowing subject is to his epistemology.

A second point that merits attention is that Husserl, much more clearly than Frege, equates the limits of logical possibility with the limits of conceivability. In his *Basic Laws* Frege regards it as possible that we could encounter species that do not have our logical laws. To be sure, Frege comments on this possibility by saying that "we have here a hitherto unknown type of madness",\(^{178}\) but he does not seem to regard this case altogether inconceivable. Husserl, however, judges a similar case differently: talking of "centaurs and water-sprites"\(^{179}\) he mentions that we can conceive of them as having different psy-
chological states and different psychological laws of thought. Yet he makes it quite clear that we cannot imagine them having a different pure logic from our own.\textsuperscript{180} We cannot conceive of a different logic since there is only one logic, and whatever is conceived of, or imagined, must be logically possible in terms of this one and only logic. Equating logical possibility with conceivable is an interesting move for Husserl to make, since it sets him clearly apart from all possible extensional interpretations of modal notions, some of which Frege, for instance, occasionally fell prey to.\textsuperscript{181} As we shall see below, Husserl's intensional way of treating modal notions will lead him to an analysis of modal notions in terms of possible worlds.

Finally, it is worth noting that within the context of his criticism of psychologism, Husserl distinguishes his notion of self-evidence from all psychological concepts. To be sure, Husserl sees a connection between truth and self-evidence, but as he makes clear, this connection does not hold on the level of pure logic, since self-evidence does not belong to this level at all. The difference between pure logic and an application of this pure logic to a logic of self-evidence is spelled out as follows:

The pure laws of logic say absolutely nothing about inner evidence or its conditions. We can show, we hold, that they only achieve this relation through a process of application or transformation, ... The propositions about inner evidence which arise in this manner keep their a priori character ...\textsuperscript{182}

In itself, plainly, the proposition "A is true" does not state the same thing as the corresponding proposition "It is possible for anyone and everyone to judge that A is the case".\textsuperscript{183}

In other words, logic is concerned with self-evidence, but not with self-evidence as a psychological criterion of truth. Rather, less than pure logic formulates ideal laws concerning the possibility of self-evidence. These laws are built upon laws of truth, and in these laws the relation between the ideal self-evidence and truth is analytical. In the sixth investigation Husserl will develop these ideas into a fully-fledged theory to which we shall turn below.
3.3. Meanings as Abstract Entities

Several interpreters of Husserl have held that there is a break in the *Logical Investigations* between the anti-psychologistic program of the *Prolegomena* and the partly descriptive-psychological studies of the following six investigations. As was indicated above, I do not share this assessment. The main body of the *Logical Investigations* develops further the subject of logic as a pure science, provides further arguments against psychologistic tendencies in philosophical semantics, and offers precisely the conceptual analysis of central logical notions like 'truth' and 'entity' that the *Prolegomena* called for.

How closely the *Prolegomena* is connected with the rest of the work can be seen from the two studies that immediately follow it. In these studies Husserl tries to reach in a new way the central tenet upon which the idea of a pure logic is based, i.e., the idea that meanings are abstract entities. He separates meaning from individual natural languages, discusses the relation between sign and meaning, between meaning acts and meaning itself, and brings forth arguments against the allegedly relativistic tendencies in the psychologistic positions of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. To sketch briefly the main line of thought in these first two investigations can serve to throw more light on Husserl's views concerning the accessibility of semantics and logic as a semantical enterprise.

Even though Husserl's pure logic is a semantical enterprise, it is by no means concerned with the semantics of a particular natural (or formal) language. This point is stressed in the introduction to the second part of the *Logical Investigations* and subsequently argued for in the first investigation. In the introduction Husserl agrees that "linguistic discussions are certainly among the philosophically indispensable preparations for the building of pure logic" but adds that these linguistic considerations are only auxiliaries in an attempt to pass beyond the grammatical towards the logical form of judgments. By this he does not refer to any prelinguistic sphere, as it is clear to him that judgments "stemming from higher intellect regions, ... could barely arise without verbal expression". Husserl's striving beyond the grammar of particular languages is a striving for linguistic universals, not a search for speechless thought.

The first investigation, entitled "Expression and Meaning" is
meant to clarify this issue.\textsuperscript{187} The perspective here is one of general considerations as to the relation between signs and meaning. Husserl starts by distinguishing between two concepts of signs, "expressions" (\textit{Ausdrücke}) and "indications" (\textit{Anzeichen}). The difference between the two types of signs lies in the respective relation between \textit{significans} and \textit{significandum}. Whereas in the case of expressions the relation is an internal, ideal and immediate one, a relation constituted by meaning, in the case of indication the relation is external, empirically established, and based upon association. For instance, a gesture is an indication since the connection between meaning and gesture is an external, not directly motivated one. The paradigmatic case of expression is speech. "From indicative signs we distinguish \textit{meaningful} signs, i.e., \textit{expressions} ... Each instance or part of \textit{speech}, as also each sign that is essentially of the same sort, shall count as an expression, whether or not such speech is actually uttered, or addressed with communicative intent to any persons or not."\textsuperscript{188} Despite the close link between expressions and language, Husserl goes on to claim that in the communicative use of language, expressions function as indications. Expressions uttered serve the hearer as indications of the "sense-giving" inner experiences of the speaker. It is only in inner speech that expressions are free from all indicative function, since for the speaker the sense-giving act and the understanding of them coincide. As Jacques Derrida has pointed out\textsuperscript{189}, the special character of purity thus assigned to monologue is an anticipation of Husserl's later transcendental ego as the realm of absolute transparency. The correctness of this interpretation can be seen especially clearly from Husserl's claim that only indications need to be perceived as "existing", while expressions remain identical independent of whether they are real or merely imagined (as is the case with inner speech).\textsuperscript{190}

For Husserl, the appropriate starting point for studying the relation between sign and meaning is the experience (\textit{Erlebnis}) of meaning something by means of a linguistic sign. Within this experience he distinguishes three types of acts: the acts of perception that are directed towards the physical sign; the sense-giving acts that attach a meaning to the sign, i.e., the "\textit{meaning-conferring acts} or the \textit{meaning-intentions}"; and the acts of perception that present or
"give" the object referred to or meant, that is, "meaning-fulfilling acts". To study the relation between sign and meaning is thus to study the relation between the acts of the first and the second type, and the study of the relation between meaning and object is the study of the relation between the acts of the second and the third type. Husserl's main point vis-à-vis these distinctions in this context is that we have to distinguish strictly between sign, meaning and object. As obvious as this point might seem to the present-day reader, it is still worth stressing. In Heidegger (and in some way in Gadamer) we shall encounter a version of the universal medium conception in which the possibility of drawing this distinction is denied.

By drawing this threefold distinction, Husserl paves the way for introducing his thesis of the ideality of meaning. Experiences of meaning something can be classified according to their meaning-intentions. For example, different instances of meaning 'house' are instances of the same act of meaning-intending. However, what is intended in these meaning-intending acts goes beyond the psychological content of these acts. What is intended are ideal entities:

It would hardly occur to anyone, if asked as to the sense or the meaning of my assertion ['The three perpendiculars of a triangle intersect in a point'], to revert to my judgment as an inner experience. ... What this assertion asserts is the same whoever may assert it, and on whatever occasion or in whatever circumstances he may assert it ... In this selfsame meaning, of whose identity we are conscious whenever we repeat the statement, nothing at all about judging or about one who judges is discoverable. ... But what my assertion asserts, i.e., the content, ... neither arises nor passes away.

Husserl holds meanings to be ideal, abstract, non-temporal (and eo ipso non-spatial) entities that are independent of their being thought of. This does not make them inaccessible, however, for this would turn the cure of platonism into something more dangerous than the disease that this very platonism is meant to cure, that is, the disease of psychologistic relativism that makes meanings inaccessible by connecting them to fallible psychic faculties like memory or introspection. Abstract meanings are accessible to us, first,
because individual acts of meaning-intending are instantiations of the abstract meaning, second, because abstract meanings are possible objects of acts in an analogous way to concrete objects, and third—following from the second—because they can be picked out by definitions.

The idea of meaning-intentions as instantiations of ideal meanings is put straightforwardly in the following passage:

The manifold singulars for the ideal unity Meaning are naturally the corresponding act-moments of meaning, the meaning-intentions. Meaning is related to varied acts of meaning ... just as Redness in species is to the slips of paper which lie here, and which all "have" the same redness.\(^ {193} \)

Husserl presents his claim that abstract entities are genuine objects of acts, in the second investigation "The Ideal Unity of the Species and Modern Theories of Abstraction". He defends this claim against the allegedly psychologicist attempts of Locke, Berkeley and Hume to reduce, by means of reflection or abstraction, names of universals to names of concrete individuals. To follow Husserl into the details of his criticism of these British philosophers would take us too far afield from the main line of this study. Nevertheless, Husserl’s main argument in favour of his own stand is in every case the phenomenological fact that there are acts of meaning that are directed towards abstract entities, and that what is meant in these cases are these very entities themselves: "All that we maintain - the validity of the distinction between specific and individual objects, and the difference of the manner in which each type of object is present to us, is brought clearly before our consciousness—has the guarantee of self-evidence."\(^ {194} \)

Another—Fregean\(^ {195} \)—argument that Husserl employs to support his platonism is that we have to accept into our ontology everything that is presupposed by the propositions that we accept as true: "If I see the truth that 4 is an even number, that the predicate of my assertion actually pertains to the ideal object 4, then this object cannot be a mere fiction, a mere façon de parler, a mere nothing in reality."\(^ {196} \)

Husserl argues further that the status of ideal meanings as genu-
ine entities is also amply shown by the fact that with respect to them we can form judgments that are structurally identical with judgments about concrete objects. The abstract entity can be compared with other abstract or concrete entities, can be counted and can be picked out under different descriptions: "All these things are the same ... as in the case of other objects, e.g., horses, stones, mental acts etc., that are not meanings."¹⁹⁷ This idea, of course, is as good an indication as any for demonstrating how Husserl’s platonism is the condition of the possibility of his strong claim concerning the accessibility of meaning and semantics. Thus it is not surprising that the upshot of his critique of Hume and Cornelius—whom Husserl treats under the heading of "Modern Humeanism"—is that these theories lead into scepticism and the inaccessibility of semantics. If, as in the case of Cornelius, the formation of meaning hinges upon the memory of the individual subject, then strictly speaking not even one and the same person can be sure of using his meanings in a constant manner over a period of time.¹⁹⁸

3.4. The Structure and Classification of Meanings

With the program for the pure logic sketched out and the idea of the accessibility of meanings as abstract entities defended, Husserl can turn in the following four investigations towards filling out that program. Not that he would claim to give pure logic its final form. Rather, he carries out some preliminary studies within the field of pure logic. Furthermore, only the fourth investigation, "The Distinction Between Independent and Non-Independent Meanings and the Idea of Pure Grammar", and the sixth investigation, "Elements of a Phenomenological Elucidation of Knowledge", belong directly to pure logic as a theory of ideal meanings. The third investigation, "On the Theory of Wholes and Parts", and the fifth investigation, "On Intentional Experiences and their 'Contents'", provide conceptual frameworks of mereology (investigation number three) and descriptive psychology (investigation number five) for the subsequent semantical inquiries. Here, I shall deal with these topics only in so far as they illustrate Husserl’s semantical approach.

Concerning investigations three and four the first noteworthy fact relates to the historical role these studies have played in the
development of semantical approaches in formal logic. As is well known, the main gate through which these ideas entered modern logic was the work of Tarski and other Polish logicians. It was largely in virtue of their contributions that model theory began to emerge as the central notion in building a semantics for formal languages. Model theory, however, is a paradigmatical ingredient of the calculus conception of language, as van Heijenoort and Hintikka have argued.\textsuperscript{199} In the light of these facts it is remarkable that it was Husserl's \textit{Logical Investigations} and especially the third and fourth investigation that exerted a strong influence in Warsaw between the two world wars. This influence has been described as comparable to the influence of Wittgenstein's \textit{Tractatus} in the Vienna of the twenties and thirties.\textsuperscript{200} It can be considered as indirect evidence for attributing to Husserl the calculus conception that a precise formal semantical theory was developed where his influence was the strongest. And this influence did not only remain on an abstract, unspecific level. For instance, Ajdukiewicz's and Lesniewski's seminal work on categorial grammar had as its starting point Husserl's fourth investigation concerning the ideal logical grammar.\textsuperscript{201}

This ideal logical grammar aims at a classification of meanings and of the laws that govern their combination. Ultimately it aims at an identification of an ideal network of restrictions on combinations of meanings by which all languages have to abide. A brief closer look at some of the preliminary results suggested by Husserl in the fourth investigation can illustrate his idea.

One distinction in the realm of meanings is closely related to the scholastic distinction between categoriacal and syncategoriacal terms. The tools that Husserl uses in dealing with this problem are taken from his study of parts and wholes. In this study, the notions of part, whole, moment, abstract, concrete, dependence and foundation are analyzed, not directly as pertaining to meanings, but as pertaining to objects in general. Having earlier established that abstract meanings are entities, objects, Husserl can carry these tools over to the domain of meaning. Independent objects are objects that can exist without belonging to a larger whole. Converse, dependent objects can only exist as parts of a larger whole.\textsuperscript{202} A dependent content can thus be regarded as one that stands in need of comple-
tion by another content, or—to use Husserl's expression—as being "founded" in another:

A content of the species $A$ is founded upon a content of the species $B$, if an $A$ can by its essence (i.e., legally, in virtue of its specific nature) not exist, unless a $B$ also exists: this leaves open whether the coexistence of a $C$, a $D$ etc. is needed or not.\textsuperscript{203}

Husserl applies these notions to the distinction between \textit{categoremata} and \textit{syncategoremata}. He regards the former as being independent meanings and the latter as being dependent meanings. Dependent meanings stand in need of completion by independent meanings.

The same point can also be expressed by attending to meaning-intending acts instead of attending to meanings themselves. Just as a complex meaning is built up from several other meanings, so a corresponding act of meaning-intending consists of several subacts or partial acts. An independent meaning can then be defined as one that can be "the full, entire meaning of a concrete act of meaning"\textsuperscript{204}, whereas a dependent cannot. Husserl observes that these relations between meanings can be formulated as laws that govern the combination of given meanings into new ones: "To each case of non-independent meaning, a law of essence applies ... a law regulating the meaning's need of completion by further meanings ..."\textsuperscript{205}

Laws governing the combination of meanings pertain especially to the distinction between possible and impossible meanings. Laws excluding impossible meanings exclude "nonsense", they are laws that like Carnap's formation rules\textsuperscript{206} lie below strict logic laws that rule out "absurdity", i.e., formal contradiction. For example, the meaning combination "a round rectangle" is a well formed expression and thus a possible meaning; it is not "nonsense", but mere "absurdity". Cases of nonsense are expressions like "a man and is".\textsuperscript{207} In the first case, the case of the round rectangle, we have a logical contradiction, but the logical grammatical law, according to which the semantical categories of article meaning, adjective matter, and substantive matter can—in the given order—be combined into a new meaning, is not violated. In other words, the given combination is
syntactically possible. In the case of "a man and is" there is no law allowing for this combination. Husserl also expresses his idea of an inquiry into possible meaning combinations by speaking of his aim as "investigating the apriori system of the formal structures which leave open all material specificity of meaning, in a 'form-theory of meanings'".208

In its final form, this theory is supposed to start from the most basic, primitive semantical categories and to contain all laws governing the derivation of complications and modifications of these primitives into complex meaning forms. As part of this grammar Husserl also calls for the formulation of special transformations for handling the use-mention distinction (that is, special rules are needed for cases of suppositio materialis like 'and is a word'), for nominalization, the distinction between attributive and predicative position of adjectives, and much more.209

As for the motivation of this whole enterprise, Husserl mentions two reasons. First, what is provided by the ideal logical grammar is a recursive definition of all possible meanings in a strict mathematical way. Thus a foundation for logic and science is provided: "This lawfullness, through its a priori, purely categorial character, brings to scientific awareness a basic chapter in the constitution of 'theoretical reason'."210 Second, the logical grammar identifies an "absolutely fixed ideal framework" for all languages, thus providing a framework that is not only applicable to all languages, but also presupposed by all of them. Husserl claims that linguists have indeed been relying on something like this ideal framework all along, without however having been fully aware of the possibility of a science directed solely to these categories:

One must have this [ideal framework] in mind in order to be able to ask significantly: How does German, Latin, Chinese etc., express 'the' existential proposition, 'the' categorical proposition, 'the' antecedent of a hypothetical, 'the' plural, 'the' modalities of possibility and probability, 'the' negative, etc.?211

From the vantage point of our study it is interesting that Husserl puts a great deal of emphasis on the universal character of this ideal structure. Needless to say, its alleged existence provides in a natural
way a rather strong case against linguistic relativism. Languages are translatable among themselves, since we have the common ground or the *tertium comparationis* of our ideal grammar in terms of which languages can be compared.

Even though this last-mentioned feature of the logical grammar links up with the calculus conception in a natural way, one might perhaps be inclined to argue against a close link between this grammar and the calculus conception on two grounds. On the one hand, it seems that this grammar describes a *universal medium* of meaning relations that cannot be transgressed by any language. On the other hand, this grammar has been compared to Chomsky’s transformational grammar\(^{212}\) that, as is well known, leaves semantics in the state of a "poor relative".\(^{213}\) To start with the first point, it must be admitted that for Husserl logical grammar like logic in general is indeed unique. Yet it is important to see that the notion of the uniqueness of logic does not as such lead to the universal medium view of logic: uniqueness of logic equals the conception of logic as language only by adding the further assumptions of a fixed interpretation, the impossibility of metalogical perspectives, and the inaccessibility of meaning. However, none of these additional assumptions appear in the context of Husserl’s grammar. As for the second point, the comparison between Husserl and Chomsky, it is easy to agree with J. Katz who has recently argued that it is "completely wrong" to speak of a "unity of purpose ... behind the grammatical projects of Husserl and Chomsky"\(^{214}\): "it would be hard to find more disunity of purpose than one finds in the case of Husserl and Chomsky".\(^{215}\) Katz points out that Chomsky’s formal universals are taken by Chomsky to be biological impositions and that Chomsky’s aim is to develop the very psychologizing linguistic theory that Husserl so deeply abhors. And finally, Chomsky’s longstanding cooperator stresses that a parallelizing of Chomsky’s and Husserl’s projects "fails to appreciate Chomsky’s scepticism about just the semantic concerns that were central to Husserl’s project".\(^{216}\) To appreciate the fundamental correctness of Katz’s claims we only need to consider the facts that Husserl’s ideal grammar is part and parcel of a semantical enterprise, and that scepticism about semantical concerns is, as we saw in the preceding section, indeed very foreign to Husserl. As we turn
to investigations five and six, we will be able to encounter even more evidence to the same effect.

3.5. Truth, Realism, and Knowledge about Abstract Objects

Investigations five and six are by far the most difficult of the Logical Investigations. It would not be an exaggeration to say that they carry the burden of proof for several of the most central premisses of the whole work: they demonstrate that we do indeed have access to reality, that is to say, they refute idealism; they defend a non-relativistic notion of truth; and they present an answer to the question how we are able to acquire knowledge about abstract meaning entities in the way presupposed in investigation four. Thus investigation five and especially six give Husserl's conception of language as calculus its ultimate justification (as far as the Logical Investigations are concerned).

Before turning to these major topics, I want to draw attention to something of a minor theme of the fifth and the sixth investigations. This theme is not crucial for an understanding of what Husserl is doing here, but it will show its true significance once we have encountered Heidegger's and Gadamer's account of the same issue. What I have in mind is the distinction between picture and sign. As we shall see below, especially Gadamer stresses that language is misconstrued when looked at as a system of signs, and he conceives of language as a picture of reality. From this perspective it is interesting to note that Husserl in the last two investigations takes up the same problem but answers it in favour of the very sign conception that Gadamer opposes.

Husserl draws the distinction between sign and picture by saying that in the case of the picture there exists a relation of similarity between the picture itself and what is pictured. In the case of the sign this similarity is purely coincidental and generally absent. Now in the case of language there is no similarity between word and thing: Husserl holds that signitive act and perceived object have "nothing to do with one another". Were Husserl to stop here, the difference between him and Gadamer would have to be noted but would not as such be especially exciting. What makes the difference more dramatic is the way in which Husserl goes on to qualify his stand
somewhat. He acknowledges the fact that for members of a given language community there exists a close link between the word-sign and the object perceived or meant. To be sure, he again adds immediately that the relation between word-sign and thing is purely contingent, the reason now being that already the relation between word-sign and meaning is of a contingent nature. This can be seen, for example, from the fact that different languages use different signs (combinations of phonemes and graphemes) to designate different meanings.218 But despite the contingence in principle Husserl allows for an inner link in practice: natural language speakers experience something of an apparent picture relation between word and thing, their thinking being so intertwined with language that they cannot but project this language onto the objects that they encounter. And Husserl goes on: "This is confirmed if we recall the deep-set tendency to exaggerate the bond between word and thing, to invest it with objectivity, perhaps even to insinuate something of mystic unity into it."219 What merits attention here is that Husserl regards speaking of a "mystic unity" of word and thing as "exaggerated". However, three proponents of the language as the universal medium conception, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein, all speak literally of a "mystical" relation between language and the world.220 Albeit only a detail, this fact throws an interesting (confirming) light upon our claim that Husserl stands on the opposite side of the universal medium vs. calculus distinction as compared with these mentioned philosophers. This assessment can be further strengthened as we turn to a closer examination of Husserl's views on truth.

As mentioned in the Introduction of this study, the conceptions of language as the universal medium and of language as calculus can be distinguished vis-à-vis their respective stand on the correspondence theory of truth. Since language as calculus allows for the possibility of metalanguage, it also allows for a metalanguage expression, i.e., the word "true", that denotes a specific relation between a sentence of the objectlanguage and some state of affairs or event in some real or ideal world. The opposite view of language as the universal medium, since it does not regard any form of metalanguage as possible, must deny that truth as correspondence is ever expressible.

As an example of this last view we can turn to Frege, whose
criticism of the correspondence theory has been linked to his view of language as the universal medium. In his study "Thought. A Logical Investigation" (1918), Frege stresses that truth cannot be defined as correspondence. His main arguments seem to be that we cannot attach any clear meaning to the idea of a correspondence between a real thing and some meaning or presentation, and that we cannot step outside language to compare language and the world. It has been argued that only the first point is an altogether acceptable criticism, for the second mistakes the definition of truth with its criterion. Yet defenders of the view of language as the universal medium from Frege to Wittgenstein, from Heidegger to Gadamer, have so repeatedly used the second argument that—on grounds of the principle of charity—it cannot be simply rejected in this way. The position that we should attribute to those critics should rather be that they deny the intelligibility of any definition of truth that does not also give some indication as to how this truth can become known to us.

Frege's central argument is contained in the following passage, that is worth quoting at some length since—as we shall subsequently see—it marks an interesting difference as compared with Husserl's view:

It would only be possible to compare a presentation with a thing if the thing were a presentation too. And then, if the first did correspond perfectly with the second, they would coincide. But this is not at all what people intend . . . For in this case it is essential precisely that the reality shall be distinct from the presentation. But then there can be no complete correspondence, no complete truth. . . . Truth does not admit of more and less.—But could we not maintain that there is truth when there is correspondence in a certain respect? But which respect? . . . We should have to inquire whether it is true that an idea and a reality, say, correspond in the specified respect. And then we should be confronted by a question of the same kind . . . So the attempted explanation of truth as correspondence breaks down. And any other attempt to define truth also breaks down. As we already had occasion to see in earlier chapters, Husserl
does not agree with this "what true is, I hold to be indefinable" notation. The dangers of some repetition notwithstanding, it is crucial for a proper appreciation of Husserl's stand on the accessibility of knowledge concerning abstract entities, of his realism, and of his opposition to a relative notion of truth, to familiarize ourselves with the account of truth given in the sixth investigation.

The theory of truth presented in the *Logical Investigations* refines the one we encountered earlier in "Intentional Objects". In that earlier work it was claimed that a presentation is true if and only if it has an object. This account can be improved upon since Husserl now has a more elaborate framework of acts at his disposal, in particular the distinction between meaning-intending and meaning-fulfilling acts. Both of these acts are "objective" acts, acts that are outside the realm of the emotive and the voluntative (even though they are the basis upon which emotive and voluntative acts are built upon). Meaning-intending acts are acts that confer meaning upon a sign. Furthermore, by way of this meaning meaning-intending acts are directed towards an object if and only if the meaning in question is neither nonsensical ('and man but') nor absurd ('a round rectangle'). Meaning-fulfilling acts are acts of perception or imagination that—in changing degrees—fill out, make concrete, or make vivid, the intended meaning by presenting or "giving" the object meant. The meaning-intending act—by way of its meaning—is directed towards an intended object, but this object is not yet given in the meaning-intending act itself. Only an act of meaning-fulfillment, that fulfills the meaning delineated by the meaning-intention, can "give" the object referred to.

A meaning-intention and a meaning-fulfillment can each in turn consist of lower-level acts of both kinds. For instance, in an act of perception we are presented with one side or one perspective of an object while its other (unperceived) sides remain merely meant. Furthermore, as already alluded to above, meaning-fulfillment is a matter of degree. However, each merely partial meaning-fulfillment points beyond itself towards an ideal bordercase in which no aspect of the meaning-intention, and no partial intention of the intending whole, remains empty. This total fulfillment can occur only in perception, not in imagination. With this notion of a total, complete
fulfillment of a meaning intention we have reached the concept of truth:

Where a presentative intention has achieved its last fulfillment, the genuine *adaequatio rei et intellectus* has been brought about. *The object is actually 'present' or 'given', and present as just what we have intended it; no partial intention remains implicit and still lacking fulfillment.*

Even though with the introduction of the 'intention vs. fulfillment' distinction Husserl goes beyond the presentation-object distinction of "Intentional Objects", the two other central elements of the earlier theory are retained: the type-token distinction and the epistemological priority of self-evidence over truth. However, there are also some refinements here that are worth attending to briefly.

As in the earlier work self-evidence is still held to be the experience of truth. But now Husserl explains more clearly what is involved in this experience. First of all, experience of truth is as such not yet the explicit perception (as *Wahr-nehmung*) of truth. Self-evidence as experience of truth is not yet a reflective act directed at the correspondence between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment but rather the act in which the meaning and the corresponding object are identified. And to this identifying act belongs, as its result, or correlate, identity between meaning and object meant, i.e., correspondence, or truth. Thus Husserl can say that truth is the "objective correlate" of self-evidence. The reason why on this analysis self-evidence does not equal perception of truth is that the latter demands identity as well as difference: meaning and object need to be perceived as distinct and as identical. To avoid the suspicion that this account makes cases of truth both experienced and unobservable both at the same time, it must be added that Husserl always allows for acts of perception that observe the truth at hand: "Here we have always the a priori possibility of looking towards this agreement, and of laying it before our intentional consciousness in an adequate percept."

As in "Intentional Objects", the type-token distinction is also central in the account of truth given in the *Logical Investigations*. The relation between meaning and the true-making perception is
never principally unique and unrepeateable. Rather, each case of identity of a given meaning and the corresponding perception of the object meant is but a token of a type. For instance, the meaning-intention 'red' and the corresponding perception of something red are not merely coincidentally connected: a total fulfillment of the meaning in question can only be achieved by the perception in question. Thus there holds a necessary, abstract and ideal relation here that, albeit appearing in spatio-temporal settings, holds true independently of those settings. In order to make this distinction conceptually tight, Husserl speaks of two different notions of truth: truth-1 is the correlate of the empirical evidence-token, while truth-2 is the ideal type of identity holding between the respective intention and perception as types.

In order to demonstrate the completeness of his account, Husserl suggests that two further uses of the concept of truth can also be incorporated into his scheme. On the one hand, one often calls sentences true because they fit reality. This suggests speaking of the meaning-intention (both on the token and on the type-level) as true (truth-3). On the other hand, it is the perception—or rather the percept—that makes the meaning true; thus we can reserve another notion of truth for the fulfilling percept (truth-4). The following picture summarizes these distinctions:

Against the background of this analysis of truth, three issues can be addressed: In which sense can Husserl claim to have defended an absolute notion of truth? In which sense can his theory be regarded as avoiding the Fregean dilemma? And how can this analysis cover truths like conceptual truths and truths of logic that prima facie
seem independent of perception? As we shall see, this latter point is closely related to the further question as to how we have access to meanings as abstract entities, how are we to know anything about them. I shall try to tackle each of these questions in turn.

The question as to whether Husserl can claim to have undermined a relativistic notion of truth is not difficult to answer. In his terms, the refutation proceeds in the following way. Since truths are ideal they cannot be relative to singular acts of judging by singular, empirical persons. The point is that there is an ideal relation between a given type of meaning, its fulfillment, and the corresponding self-evidence; this relation holds independent of us as humans. Of course, it is always possible that someone thinks that he has self-evidence for what is later discovered to be a falsehood; Husserl cannot exclude this possibility. The only thing he needs to exclude, and he can exclude it by drawing on truth as grounded ultimately in ideal, abstract relations, is that someone who formerly took the meaning "red" to be fulfilled by a patch of green cannot uphold this fulfillment as "true-making" once he later comes to see that the meaning "red" can and must be fulfilled by a patch of red colour. It is not possible to say that we have two—relative—truths here, based on two different self-evidences. On the one hand, truths are ultimately independent of our judging, and on the other hand, the former self-evidence cannot be maintained, once the later self-evidence is experienced. The former self-evidence has to be given up.

As concerns the question how Husserl's analysis of truth stands up to the Fregean notion of truth as undefinable, the answer can also be straightforward: Husserl's theory shows all the marks of the correspondence theory of truth that only a defender of the calculus conception can fully abide by. He not only regards "\textit{adaequatio rei et intellectus}"\textsuperscript{234} as the meaning of truth, but he also claims that correspondence can be expressed and perceived from a metalevel act, and that correspondence can be explained. Furthermore, Husserl would also be likely to claim that his analysis undercuts the dilemma that Frege constructs for the correspondence theory. As we saw above, this dilemma confronts this notion with two equally unsatisfactory ways of accounting for correspondence or identity. If we say that the identity holds between a presentation and the real thing out there in
the world, then this makes no sense; there is no intelligible way of saying that these ontologically different entities coincide. If, in order to avoid this horn of the dilemma, we say that the identity really holds between two presentations, then, Frege claims, we run head-on against the other horn: if two presentations are identical, then they are one presentation, and what was supposed to be a two-placed relation ends up being a predicate of merely one presentation.

Husserl most certainly avoids the first horn of the Fregean dilemma, since he does not hold that the correspondence holds between presentation (meaning-intention) and real thing. The real thing enters into the relation as a percept, as the objective correlate of the perceptual act of meaning-fulfillment. Thus it seems that Husserl rather gets caught by the second horn. Yet it is not difficult to see how the complexity of his account also provides him with plenty of room to stay clear of this trap. Husserl holds that meaning-fulfillment is best regarded as a process that starts from an empty intention and only ends in a total fulfillment. This allows a distinction between the two presentations despite the fact that they will ultimately be identified. We also saw that Husserl assumes that we can always perceive truth as identity and difference: we can perceive the meaning and the fulfillment as distinct and as identical, we can perceive them as entering into identity. (It is Frege's opposition to metalanguage that precludes this solution for him.)

While the first two questions could be dealt with rather briefly, the remaining one will demand more extensive consideration. As will be remembered this third question pertained to the applicability of Husserl's theory of truth to logical truths and other complex meanings.

As it stands up to this point, the Husserlian theory is not yet even able to handle the truth of sentences like "This house is white". The basic model outlined above is merely designed to capture "truth" in cases of primitive, simple meanings like "red", or "house". Nothing has been said, however, as to which kinds of perceptions can serve to fulfill categorematic terms like "is" or "this", or sentence forms like "This S is P".

Since the correspondence theory of truth is one of the most important foundation stones of the calculus conception of language,
it is noteworthy that Husserl tries to give a unified account of all
truths, whether pertaining to simple meanings and sentences, or even
to logical analytical truths, in terms of (possible) correspondence and
(possible) perception. Furthermore, the starting point for dealing
with the different meaning structures to which truth is attributed is
in each case the corresponding self-evidence. Self-evidence, as the
epistemologically prior notion as compared with truth, is what is to
be explained; how truth is accessible to us, is what is to be clarified.

Explaining the conditions of the possibility of self-evidence with
respect to simple and complex meanings requires for Husserl an inves-
tigation into perception. Why this is so can be spelled out as follows:
self-evidence is by definition the experience of truth. To show that
a given type of self-evidence is possible is then not only to demon-
strate that the meaning intended in the type of meaning-intention
(to which the evidence at hand pertains) is fulfillable, but also to
demonstrate how it is fulfillable. Asking this question about the given
meaning inevitably treats this meaning—or so Husserl claims—as an
abstract, ideal entity. The reason for thus treating the meaning-type
can be seen from the fact that the questions that we are forced to
ask about this meaning are whether it can be intended in an act
of meaning-intention at all (remember that a nonsensical meaning
cannot) and whether it can, once intended, be fulfilled. That it can
be fulfilled is a property of the meaning itself, and this property is
independent of whether it is ever intended. However, this does not
make meanings inaccessible to us: we can study the properties of
meanings (as abstract entities) by studying whether there is a real
or possible (imaginable) fulfillment for these meanings. And we can
study the structure of meanings by studying the structure of acts
of fulfillment corresponding to the respective acts of intending those
very same meanings. This point is crucial for Husserl's whole en-
terprise, for only on its basis can Husserl make good his claim that
meanings are accessible to us, only on its basis can it be explained
how the distinctions drawn in the realm of meanings can be justified.
For instance, the question whether a meaning is merely possible (like
"round rectangle") or real (like "round circle") can be answered by
studying whether there can be acts that fulfill these meanings as
meaning-intentions.235
A first group of meanings that can be grouped together on the basis of a common structure of meaning-fulfillment are primitive meanings. Here the common type of fulfillment is based on simple, unstructured acts of perceptions that give us simple objects.

Things get more complicated as we turn to complex meanings. Some of them (the merely possible ones) cannot be fulfilled at all. Others can be fulfilled, but no longer by acts of simple perceptions. What is needed for an explanation of self-evidence with respect to the latter cases is thus a refinement of the structure of acts of perception. This is the point where Husserl introduces his notion of categorial perception, of higher acts of perception that are founded upon simple ones. A simple example might serve to illustrate this notion. If I perceive that on my desk the computer is to the left of my coffee cup, then the computer is the object (1) of one simple perception, and the coffee cup (2) is the object of another simple perception. These two simple acts then are the basis for a new act of perception that has the whole fact 'the computer is to the left of the coffee cup' as its object (3). This new act is founded on the two simple ones, but these do not themselves as acts figure as the new (founded) act's object; if this were the case, the resulting higher perception would be that my perception of the computer is to the left of my perception of the coffee cup. Rather, the new, founded, act is directed towards the objects of the simple acts and synthesizes these simple objects into a new, complex one:

Husserl calls objects of simple acts "sensuous or real objects" and objects of founded acts "categorial or ideal objects as objects of higher levels". To cite an example of the process of founding given by him, here is Husserl's description of the founded perception for the meaning "A is or has a":
An act of perception grasps $A$ as a whole, at one "blow" and in straightforward fashion. A second act of perception is trained upon $a$, the part or dependent moment that belongs constitutively to $A$. These two acts are not merely performed together, or after one another, in the manner of disjoined experiences; rather are they bound together in a single act in whose syntheses $A$ is first given as containing $a$ in itself.\textsuperscript{237}

Since there are numerous cases where we can have a perceptual fulfillment of the meaning "$A$ is or has $a$", this meaning must be regarded as real. Furthermore, varying the interpretation for $A$ and $a$ we can come to realize that this meaning is valid under some interpretations but not under just any. Husserl calls the process by which we come to grasp this meaning in its abstraction from a specific interpretation "purely categorial abstraction".\textsuperscript{238} "Categorial abstraction" provides us with form-meanings. The self-evidence we have for the reality (fulfillability) of these meanings is still based on perception: we only come to know this meaning as fulfillable (and thus as playing a role in knowledge and evidence) due to instances of self-evidence where this meaning is fulfilled. The complex nature of this meaning can only be read from the acts of perception needed to fulfill it.

The same also holds true, finally, for cases where different meaning-forms are combined into a new, complex meaning-form. Here we must distinguish two cases: on the one hand, we can arrive at complex meaning-forms that are again fulfillable by only some perception, and on the other hand, we can also identify complex meaning-forms that are fulfillable by any interpretation. An example of the first case is this: 'P is a part of Q, and Q is a part of S' can be experienced as self-evident if we place 'my computer' for $P$, 'my room' for $Q$ and 'my house' for $S$. A complex meaning form fulfillable under any interpretation is an analytical truth, for instance "If ... the statement 'w is a part of W' is valid, then a statement of the form 'W is a whole relative to w' is also valid."\textsuperscript{239} In this last case, the self-evidence we have for this sentence is again based ultimately on perception, on the correspondence of meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment. We only come to realize this sentence as analytically true by varying its interpretation and by study.
ing whether it is true/self-evident under all possible interpretations: "In such propositions, what is material is boundlessly variable; hence all material meanings are replaced by algebraical signs of indirect and wholly unfixed significance. For this reason such propositions are characterized as analytic."240

Since this whole analysis of truth is crucial for Husserl's *Logical Investigations* as well as for all of his subsequent work, let us restate the main point: to study truth and evidence is to study acts of fulfillment (perception). And the study of the latter is the key to an investigation into meanings as abstract entities and their interrelations. In other words, what allows us access to the realm of pure meanings is an investigation into types of perception. The fact that meaning-fulfillment correlates with meaning-intention is what gives us access to knowledge about meanings themselves. The following chart summarizes the distinctions within the realm of meaning and what motivates these distinctions in perceptive fulfillment241:
What we have dealt with in this section can be said to constitute the core of Husserl's conception of language as calculus as it appears in the *Logical Investigations*. In the *Prolegomena* he argued for logic as a theoretical science, and he opposed the idea of logic as a normative discipline or *Kunstlehre*. However, the central pillars of his argument (such as the possibility of logic as an ideal science, the accessibility of logical meanings, and a non-relativistic notion of truth) were presupposed rather than developed in the *Prolegomena*. The following four investigations argued for the accessibility of meanings and developed the notion of ideal grammar as the study of possible meanings in their interrelations. However, it was not spelled out how we can objectively have knowledge about meanings. All of these loose ends are taken up in the sixth investigation: a theory of truth is developed that explains why truth is absolute; a systematic way for studying abstract meanings is suggested; and the ideality of logical (analytical) laws is demonstrated by showing that they hold independent of their interpretation, that is, under any interpretation. It is additional support for our attributing the calculus conception to Husserl that he ends his sixth investigation by arguing for a realist stand: precisely because logical laws are ideal, they cannot stand between us and reality *an sich*: "Laws which refer to no fact cannot be confirmed or refuted by a fact."242 It is interesting that Husserl makes this same point even in terms of possible worlds: "Other beings may gaze upon other 'worlds', they may also be endowed with 'faculties' other than ours, but, if they are minded creatures at all, possessing some sort of intentional experiences, ...— then such creatures have both sensibility and understanding, and are 'subject' to the pertinent laws."243 As we turn to Husserl's transcendental philosophy, we shall see how this idea is developed further into a fully-fledged possible worlds idiom.

4. TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE CALCULUS CONCEPTION

In this chapter we shall turn to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, i.e., his philosophy from about 1905 up to his death in 1938. I
shall try to show that in Husserl's thinking of this period the conception of logic/language as calculus comes out even more clearly and is applied more generally than in the Logical Investigations. In transcendental phenomenology the central tenets of the calculus view, like the accessibility of meanings, the re-interpretability of languages, the feasibility of metalanguages, truth as correspondence, the opposition to relativism and the defence of realism, all turn out to be connected to one central methodological device: the methodology of the transcendental reduction and the eidetic variation. It is this connection that enables us to establish the calculus conception as the central premiss of the 'transcendental Husserl' without having to go through the enormous number of his studies on, for example, perception, temporal awareness, and imagination. Since these more concrete investigations are carried out from within the transcendental reductive attitude, they will be ipso facto covered by our interpretation.

However, treating Husserl's thought from 1905 to 1938 as one whole is not without problems, especially since on a superficial reading The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936) can be understood as a new and distinct phase, in which transcendental phenomenology is weakened into—or even replaced by—something like a phenomenology of the life-world. Nevertheless, recent Husserl scholarship has convincingly rejected this reading. Thus it has been shown that the term 'life-world' appears in Husserl's lectures as early as 1917 and that under different titles this subject matter is dealt with by Husserl as early as 1908. This is not to deny that the numerous works of the period under investigation here form anything but a homogeneous whole. For instance, Husserl's view of the relation between phenomenology and psychology underwent several changes: whereas in the early 1900s he dropped the name "descriptive psychology" in favour of "phenomenology"—a move that was undoubtedly motivated by critics that saw Husserl leap back into psychologism in the body of the Logical Investigations—he later came to regard psychology more and more as the central entry gate into phenomenological reflection. In the Crisis, Husserl even went so far as to equate a purified psychology with transcendental phenomenology proper. A further important
development is Husserl's changing view as to how to lead us into the transcendental stand; whereas he initially gave special prominence to a Cartesian approach, he later preferred a critique of the evidences of the life-world and a purified psychology as his starting point.\textsuperscript{250}

Since these developments have been treated repeatedly in the literature\textsuperscript{251}, I shall not deal with them here in any detail. Instead, I shall first try to spell out how Husserl motivates the transcendental reduction, and how he explicates eidetic variation or reduction. Special attention will be paid to the role of language in reduction and to possible worlds. As we shall see, one can extract the central premiss of the calculus conception from Husserl's few remarks on these topics: language is a re-interpretable sign-system, and a systematic study of "ways of worldmaking"\textsuperscript{252} is possible via a variation of world-creating meaning structures. Subsequently, we shall study Husserl's idiom of possible worlds. My aim here is not only to show that our philosopher spells out necessary/essential structures in terms of possible worlds, but furthermore to extract from his various pronouncements what kind of a conception of possible worlds he favours. I shall try to establish that the conception which Husserl's remarks suggest shows interesting parallels with Leibniz's and David Lewis's views.

In recent Husserl scholarship Dagfinn Føllesdal's interpretation of noematic Sinne as Fregean Sinne stands out as the most influential and most debated proposal. Most of the features of the noema that Føllesdal as well as his younger followers D. W. Smith and R. McIntyre have brought to light are such that they confirm and support the interpretation of the accessibility of meaning as the central semantical claim in Husserl. By and large, I shall therefore confine myself to a summary of these earlier results.

Subsequently, I turn to the equally controversial issue of Husserl's alleged 'idealism', suggesting a distinction between semantical and metaphysical realism. In brief, semantical realism holds that the meaning relations between language and its referents are accessible, no matter what the ontological status of the latter, that is to say, no matter whether they are independent of consciousness or not. It is easy to show that Husserl adopts semantical realism. However, we shall also see that Husserl furthermore provides at least a sketch
for an argument in favour of metaphysical realism, and that accusations of metaphysical idealism are based on misinterpretations of the notion of constitution.

In our two earlier chapters we saw Husserl oppose relativisms of various forms. In his transcendental phase our philosopher deepens these arguments and broadens their scope: especially in his writings of the thirties Husserl provides a sketchy account for 'trans-cultural' understanding, a move that precludes any possibility to interpret life-worlds as incompatible conceptual schemes.

Finally, I shall turn to Husserl's later logical writings, the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and *Experience and Judgment*. In these works there emerges—among other things—a clear distinction between logical syntax and semantics.

### 4.1. Transcendental Reduction and the Problem of a Transcendental Language

From 1905 onward Husserl thought of the ”reductions” (psychological, transcendental, eidetic) as the essential part of his whole phenomenological enterprise. Before turning to their exposition, I shall quote some of Husserl's more general pronouncements concerning the reductions, so as to illustrate his passionate belief that precisely through them he had brought about a philosophical revolution. Husserl called the reductions ”the most difficult task of philosophy in general” and claimed that these difficulties are by no means coincidental: "... the genuine phenomenological-psychological epoché is an attitude which is completely strange and artificial not only to the whole of natural life but also to the psychologist of the past." Husserl occasionally even compared the radically new stand arrived at via the reductions to a ”religious conversion” and he called them ”the greatest existential transformation which is assigned as a task to mankind as such”. No surprise that Husserl could also write that ”being a phenomenologist is something only a phenomenologist can experience and understand”. By way of the reduction phenomenologists were supposed to be able to free themselves from the bonds of history and tradition, they were to practice ”epoché concerning all traditions”. In the end, transcendental phenomenology—phenomenology using the reductions—was
to raise all sciences, and even mankind as a whole, to a new level of rationality and freedom:

...it is the function of phenomenology to provide all sciences with transcendental rationality, to give them a new and ultimate rationality of clearness and comprehensibility in all respects, and to transform them into branches of a single absolute science. (And that in itself must then be the means for turning the life of naive positivity into a life that is "absolute" in every respect, for building a life of freedom that is directed towards its absolute goals and that governs itself based on absolute self-comprehension, and on a comprehension of the ultimate meaning of the world and of every true being; this ultimate meaning lies within life itself and can be drawn only from it.)

Despite Husserl's numerous writings on the reduction and his often passionate way of propagating and defending them, only a few philosophers and scientists outside of his own school have become convinced of the advantages of this method—perhaps the most famous of the latter being Kurt Gödel. In part this might be due to the fact that regardless of the importance of the reductions to his enterprise, Husserl has not given us a final and definite explanation of what they are all about. That he failed in this respect is the contention of even distinguished interpreters like Spiegelberg and Fink. Herbert Spiegelberg, the distinguished historian of The Phenomenological Movement, has recently argued that the history of Husserl's many, often conflicting, efforts to clarify his notions of "reduction", "epoché", and "reflection", still has to be written. Spiegelberg also remarks that Husserl probably never found a completely satisfying solution himself. Spiegelberg's view is shared by H. L. Van Breda, the former director of the Husserl-Archiv in Louvain, who once noted that the ambiguity of the epoché is not only due to the inadequacy of interpretations suggested in the existing literature, but also due to the ambiguities in Husserl's notion itself. As early as in 1931, when still Husserl's assistant, Eugen Fink said that none of his teacher's manuscripts and writings contained a definitive "authoritative" presentation of the phenomenological reductions. In the late fifties, Fink went on to distinguish in Husserl's philosophy...
between "thematic" and "operative" concepts: thematic notions are those that a philosopher seeks to clarify whereas "operative" notions are those by way of which the thematic ones are studied. Operative notions remain somehow hidden, unseen, forming "a medium of concepts" that is not explicitly thought of, constituting "the shadow of a philosophy". Fink claims that besides the notion of epoché, the concepts of constitution, phenomenon, and transcendental logic make up the "shadow" in Husserl's case.

In this chapter, I shall not write the history of Husserl’s development with respect to the reductions. Nor can I hope to remove the shadows Fink refers to in anything less than another book-length study. Rather I shall here confine myself to pointing out the basic ingredients of Husserl’s reductions and—towards the end of this section as well as in the following ones—to suggesting the relation of the reductions to the conception of language as calculus.

In most explications of his phenomenological research, Husserl takes the "natural attitude", i.e., our usual everyday-life way of living and relating to the world, as his starting point. In this attitude we usually relate to physical, psychological, and cultural objects in the world in an immediate fashion, without reflecting on how we relate to them. Furthermore, subjects whose attitudes are "natural" regard themselves as being a part of the world. This world, however, is not as such the world of science. Rather the world in question is a pre-scientific and pre-theoretical world, the "life-world" (as Husserl was to call it eventually). This world we do not encounter from outside or objectively; we live within it. What we do encounter are objects and events that are already interpreted by the natural language that we use. Especially in the Crisis Husserl stresses this connection between the world we live in and the language we always already make use of: "... the life-world—the 'world for us all'—is identical with the world that can be commonly talked about". That what is "prescientifically pregiven" is what "can be named, asserted, described in common language". The life-world is the framework in terms of which we understand and interpret what goes on around us. Put differently, the life-world provides us with primitive "self-evidences". That is to say, being a member of a life-world is to adopt as unproblematic and unthematic certain ontological commitments, many of
which have—due to the influence of science—a naturalistic flavour. Since Husserl eventually brings the life-world and natural language into a relation of correlativity, we can attribute these ontological commitments directly to language: thus we can say that Husserl's "natural attitude" corresponds to a natural language with naturalistic ontological commitments.

However, the natural attitude is not confined to an immediate relating to objects in the world. Reflection upon how we experience some object is part of our natural life. Yet in reflecting on how, for example, we perceive something, we do not give up any of our ontological commitments. Reflecting on how I look at my computer screen, I do not drop the ontological commitment to the screen's existence, and I do not regard my psychological experience as anything but a worldly event.

In Ideas I, Husserl goes some way to arguing that reflection in general is possible. His central claims are that "it is the intrinsic nature of an experience [Erlebnis] to be perceivable through reflection"\(^\text{270}\), and that to deny the possibility of reflection is to state a contradiction\(^\text{271}\): to claim that reflection upon our experiences is impossible is to reflect upon our experiences. Husserl also holds that a clear distinction between object-experience and meta-experience is always possible, since each experience always carries with it something of a "level characteristic" or "index".\(^\text{272}\) Unfortunately, we are told almost nothing regarding the nature of this index.

The key to why Husserl—as early as 1903—came to draw a boarderline between psychology "in its normal sense"\(^\text{273}\) and phenomenology lies in the understanding that natural reflection does not give up any of the ontological commitments and self-evidences of the natural attitude. Furthermore, psychological reflection is nothing but a systematic natural reflection (within the natural attitude). In this dependence upon pre-theoretical self-evidences concerning the existence of the world, psychology does not differ from physics: "Both sciences start from the world in its usual sense . . . As explaining sciences they presuppose a given objectivization . . ."\(^\text{274}\) Thirty-three years later, in the Crisis, this dependence is stressed again in terms of language-use:
Psychology, like every objective science, is bound to the realm of what is prescientifically given, i.e., bound to what can be named, asserted, described in common language—in this case, bound to the psychic, as it can be expressed in the language of our linguistic community (construed most broadly, the European linguistic community).\textsuperscript{275}

These considerations clarify why Husserl in 1903 came to distinguish between descriptive psychology and phenomenology. As early as in \textit{Logical Investigations} he had not intended to speak about specific human acts and evidences but rather about acts and evidences \textit{in species}, that is, in relation to their essence. Subsequently he realized that this later research is also better marked off from psychology by terminology. In the 1903 review we thus read:

\begin{quote}
Phenomenology cannot be called "descriptive psychology" off-hand. In its strict and genuine sense phenomenology is not descriptive psychology. It does not describe experiences or classes of experiences of empirical persons \ldots\textsuperscript{276}
\end{quote}

Even though he does not use the notion of reduction in this context, Husserl does already write in the same early text that in phenomenology "all objectivations of natural sciences and metaphysics remain completely excluded"\textsuperscript{277}.

This brings us to the motivation for a stand that goes beyond psychological reflection with its natural ontological commitments. Already within psychology one can occasionally come across the observation that there are intentional experiences whose objects do not exist. The psychologist can even come to realize that the character of an act can exclusively be determined by attending to its inner structure—without any reference to something that transcends the mind. These kinds of observations suggest even to the non-phenomenological psychologist that we can for some special investigation leave aside our ontological commitments to mind-transcending entities. Now the central motivation for the transcendental reduction as the total neutralization of all ontological commitments stems from the consideration that any \textit{localized} dropping of ontological commitments is insufficient. Let us say that we drop ontological commitments with respect to some area of experience \textit{E-1}, while leaving
all other ontological commitments vis-à-vis areas of experience $E-2$ to $E-n$ in force. Husserl will then hold that our investigation of $E-1$ is still not ontologically neutral: since all areas of experience are interconnected in various ways, we are likely to rely on ontological commitments (that is, those vis-à-vis $E-2$ to $E-n$) even when neutralizing those with respect to $E-1$. Husserl’s central argument is thus that we cannot just drop ontological commitments with respect to one, or some, experience(s), since all experiences are interconnected: "Each singular experience 'reflects' the totality of experiences".278

In other words, in order to understand the self-evidences for one single transcendent object of some experience ($Erlebnis$), it is not enough to drop the ontological commitments with respect to only this object. Since each experience is connected to numerous other, further, experiences, dropping ontological commitments merely locally inevitably relies on similar commitments within neighbouring experiences. To avoid this kind of circularity, ontological commitments have thus to be dropped or neutralized at one fell swoop.

In lectures given in 1923/24 Husserl tries to make this move palatable by an interesting comparison with ethical criticism. Elaborating upon this account, the following argument seems to suggest itself. If I want to determine what is right or wrong to do in a given situation, I might search for an answer on the basis of my given general values and beliefs. However, instead of searching for the answer in this limited way, I may also move—leaving aside Alasdaire MacIntyre’s well-known counterarguments279—to a more radical reflective stance by asking myself which values I should accept and which interests I should develop in the first place. Asking this question, I can no longer make use of any of my earlier actually adopted values.280

Even though Husserl does not parallel phenomenology and ethics this explicitly in other places, it seems that his characterization of the transcendental standpoint as one where we drop at once all ontological commitments of the natural attitude is somehow modelled on moral ideas; especially Husserl’s repeated talk of becoming a "pure, disinterested onlooker"281, and his speaking of dropping "every interest in objective existence"282 is often reminiscent of the "moral point of view".

What we have above called the dropping or neutralization of
ontological commitments at one fell swoop, Husserl has described in various different ways, some of which he later recognized as being highly problematic. For instance, in Ideas I (1913) he spoke of the "suspension of the world-thesis"\textsuperscript{283}, a locution that in a manuscript written about 1924 he regarded as misleading, since it is not the world as such that is dropped, but naturalistic commitments vis-à-vis the world.\textsuperscript{284} Another misleading expression was to speak—as Husserl did in 1907—of an "index of questionability"\textsuperscript{285} that is attached to the world. This is potentially misleading since the existence of the world is not questioned in the reduction, rather the belief in the existence of the world is not used in the process of phenomenological analysis. This is already formulated clearly in the same early work: "Even if I could be wholly certain that there are transcendent worlds, even if I accept the whole content of the sciences of a natural sort, even then I cannot borrow from them."\textsuperscript{286} Other famous locutions are "not-having-as-theme"\textsuperscript{287}, "universal depriving of acceptance ('inhibiting', 'putting out of play')"\textsuperscript{288}, "index zero"\textsuperscript{289}, "index of indifference"\textsuperscript{290}, "bracketing"\textsuperscript{291}, and "neutrality-modification"\textsuperscript{292}. The problem of finding the right word here is the problem of finding an expression which makes clear that the reduction leaves something for us to study, and that it is not sceptical. That the reduction has nothing to do with scepticism is stressed, e.g., in the following passage:

Not as if we wished sceptically to deny or to surrender the facts of our experience and the existence of the world which is experienced in it. We do not alter our conviction at all; we have no motive for doing so, and therefore no possibility.\textsuperscript{293}

The question as to what remains after the transcendental reduction has been carried out demands somewhat more extensive consideration. Initially, when first employing the reduction in the "Seefeld Manuscripts" in 1905, Husserl seems to have held that what remains is nothing but "the pure sense-datum"\textsuperscript{294}, a position that Husserl himself saw as having close affinity with Mach's positivism.\textsuperscript{295} However, by the time of his Ideas I, after extensive studies on Kant\textsuperscript{296}, Husserl could define the "residuum" differently:
There remains the pure sphere of consciousness together with what is inseparable from it (for instance, "the pure ego") ... There remains ... the absolute region of Being, the region of absolute or "transcendental" subjectivity ...297

The transcendental ego is the subjective correlate of the (unbracketed) world: to each object in the world there corresponds an intentional structure in the transcendental ego, an intentional structure containing abstract meaning entities (noematic Sinne) as well as acts of positing objects as real. (This will become clearer in the following two sections.) Husserl argues that the reason why we have to commit ourselves to something like the pure ego is to be found in the Aristotelian principle that change presupposes something unchanging as the subiectum of change.298 Now in reflecting on consciousness we observe changing experiences. This presupposes something unchanging underlying this change. Since the body can be bracketed in the reduction, this subiectum cannot be the body. Hence it has to be something within the stream of consciousness itself, viz., the pure ego.299

Nevertheless, it should be stressed that it is somewhat misleading to ask—as Husserl himself often does—what 'is left' after the reduction, for this expression suggests that something has inevitably been lost.300 Husserl had become aware of this problem certainly by the time of the Crisis. Rather than asking what remains after the reduction, it seems more appropriate to ask what is gained by means of it. And indeed, what the reduction achieves, according to Husserl, is to open up a realm that simply cannot be seen as long as we remain in the natural attitude: the realm of meanings and self-evidences in their interconnections. Whereas in psychological reflection we do not reflect upon ontological commitments and self-evidences, but rather assume them in an uncritical fashion, transcendental-phenomenological reflection studies these very same commitments and self-evidences in their origin. Nothing is lost in the reflection, because the bracketed world is not denied and not fenced outside of our inquiry; rather the world is only now properly—epistemologically—turned into the object of inquiry, for it is only now that we study in which way the evidence for the existence of the world is itself possible.
Earlier we have already seen that Husserl at least occasionally connects the natural and the psychological stand with natural language with its naturalistic commitments. This raises the question as to how he conceives of language when used within the transcendental attitude: how can we be sure that this transcendental language—used after the reduction has been carried out—is free from the ontological commitments of the natural attitude, and how can we be sure that transcendental language is a true metalanguage with respect to our natural language, i.e., the language of the natural attitude? In the more recent literature on Husserl this problem has drawn only occasional attention.\(^{301}\) In the thirties, however, the question as to how natural language is affected by the transcendental reduction was critically discussed by Husserl’s assistant Eugen Fink.

Fink’s discussion is important for my interpretation for several reasons. First of all, Fink presented his objections in the early thirties, that is, at a time when he was already heavily influenced by Heidegger and when he was striving to mediate between Husserl and Heidegger (Fr.-W. von Herrmann in personal communication\(^{302}\)). In other words, Fink's arguments are such that one can easily imagine Heidegger having argued against the reductions along similar lines. No wonder, therefore, that Heidegger later referred to Fink as "the only one of my [!] students who was able to think speculatively" (von Herrmann, pers. comm.). Second, Fink’s analysis makes clear that "transcendental language", the language used after the reduction has been carried out, would have to be a completely re-interpreted language—this being precisely what Fink, following Heidegger, deems impossible. And third and finally, Fink’s objections are noteworthy since in answering them (in unpublished manuscripts), Husserl makes it quite clear that for him a re-interpretation of natural language in toto is indeed possible and presupposed by phenomenology. This pronouncement, of course, provides as good evidence as any for Husserl’s abiding to the conception of language as calculus.

Already in his doctoral thesis, published in 1930, Fink remarked that "the constant temptation of phenomenology is that the transcendental sentence falls back into mundane-ontic conceptuality, a temptation that is all the more dangerous since all available concepts
have by their nature a worldly meaning ...” Two years later, in his "Draft for a VI. Cartesian Meditation" Fink wrote a whole chapter on transcendental language. The main argument is worth quoting at some length:

All predication, as the articulating interpretation of knowledge by means of the "Logos", happens in the medium of some language. ... This language springs from the natural attitude. ... The fact that language is at home in the natural attitude shows itself in what all languages have in common: namely that all concepts are concepts of Being [Seinsbegriffe]. The natural human I, the carrier of language, speaks principally only concerning beings, ... Now through the phenomenological reduction the I ... does not lose its "language". ... language remains ... after the reduction, but it does not lose its expressive character of being solely directed towards beings. [This language] ... surely is a transcendental faculty, just like ultimately any other disposition and faculty of the Ego, but it is no transcendental language, that is, such [language] that can genuinely appropriately explicate and predicatively preserve transcendental Being.

Fink holds that language has a fixed interpretation and that this interpretation—over the domain 'actual world'—cannot be changed. What the transcendental phenomenologist attempts to do—according to Fink—is to re-interpret language over the domain of phenomena, an attempt that is doomed to fail, since language "somehow protests against the intended transcendental meaning". The transcendental phenomenologist "can never succeed in resolving the divergence of meaning that exists in every transcendental sentence between the natural word meaning and the intended transcendental meaning".

Husserl's published comments on transcendental language are scarce. In Ideas I he writes that everything that remains after the reduction, the "meant as such", is expressible in language. There he also tells us that as phenomenologists we can continue to use natural language, since even as phenomenologists we do not stop being human beings. However, what the transcendental attitude does demand is that we free natural language of its usual interpretation:
But as a method, and in respect of the set propositions which are to find their place in the fundamental work on phenomenology still to be brought out, we apply to ourselves the rule of phenomenological reduction which bears on our own empirical existence as well as on that of other beings, forbidding us to introduce a proposition which contains, implicitly or explicitly, such references to natural posittings [Setzungen].

In the Crisis Husserl holds that in moving to the transcendental stance we form a "new sort of language (new even if I use ordinary language, as is unavoidable, though its meanings are also unavoidably transformed)". This remark—that lies in line with Husserl's suggestions for 'noema quotation' to which we shall turn below—implies that transcendental language results from a re-interpretation of language over the domain of phenomena.

We can strengthen this interpretation by drawing on Husserl's annotations to Fink's "Draft for a VI. Cartesian Meditation" and on some of Husserl's unpublished manuscripts. Fink himself writes in a preliminary sketch for the preface to his study that Husserl "regards the difficulties concerning transcendental predication to be exaggerated". In his annotations, Husserl concedes that "the phenomenology of phenomenological language is a problem of phenomenology in its own right ([a problem] that carries with it its iteration)". But he regards "the miracle of transforming" natural into transcendental language, that is, the re-interpretation of language as a whole, to be a "really solvable problem". Fink's argument, that language after the reduction still refers to worldly objects, can convince only those philosophers "that do not really interpret phenomenologically", that is, for those critics that do not perform the "transformation of the natural meaning". In two unpublished manuscripts of the early thirties Husserl—perhaps in answer to Fink—goes into somewhat greater detail. Under the heading "The Original Language of the Radical Phenomenologist" he writes that in the transcendental stance natural language "is egologically reduced, and words and sentences become mere egological symbols that receive their meaning content from the freely acting Ego". Husserl calls this "a basic fact that is presupposed by phenomenology", and goes on to say:
I reduce myself to the transcendental. As transcendental Ego I can form symbols—transcendental symbols which are in my transcendental sphere, [symbols] which can then be intersubjectively "experienced" ... which symbolize transcendental facts as meanings.317

In another text of the same period, Husserl develops this idea further:

... I practice epoche and say "Ich bin" ... Of course, one cannot raise the objection against this that this utterance is carried out by using the words and the grammar of the German language and that it thus eo ipso has a meaning that refers back to the German people; as if I were to contradict the transcendental epoche by talking—even if it were only talking to myself. What suffices here is drawing attention to the possibility of reducing my language such that it repels all worldly meaning and becomes the pure expression of what I mean ...318

To be sure, this 'transcendental Humpty-Dumpty theory of meaning' can hardly be regarded as a sufficient answer to Fink's objections. Yet for my purposes Husserl's pronouncements are sufficient proof that he does regard a re-interpretation even of natural language as possible; indeed he regards this re-interpretation as a "basic fact" and as a precondition of his whole enterprise. Husserl's abiding to the conception of language as calculus is especially clear and obvious at this point.

Further indications of the link between Husserl's reductions and the central tenets of the calculus conception are to be found in his discussion of eidetic reduction. Eidetic reduction does not reduce facts to phenomena, but rather facts or phenomena to their essences, that is, it amounts to a reduction of inessential attributes. As with other components of the phenomenological method, here too we can note some developments in Husserl's writings. In Logical Investigations as well as in his writings preceding the Ideas I, Husserl spoke somewhat vaguely of "abstraction" as the process in which essences are arrived at. However, from the Ideas I (1913) onwards, and especially in the lectures on Phenomenological Psychology (1925)319 and then in Experience and Judgment320, Husserl developed and explicated eidetic reduction as a systematic tool. The basic idea of this method is
this: starting from some fact, thing, or phenomenon, we vary imag- 
inatively its attributes in an attempt to find that set of attributes 
that we cannot vary without the fact, thing or phenomenon in ques-

This: starting from some fact, thing, or phenomenon, we vary imag-
inatively its attributes in an attempt to find that set of attributes 
that we cannot vary without the fact, thing or phenomenon in ques-
tion losing its identity as this type of fact, thing or phenomenon. In 
Husserl's own words:

... by an act of volition we produce free variants ... It then 
becomes evident that a unity runs through this multiplicity of 
successive figures, that in such free variations of an original im-
age, e.g., of a thing, an invariant is necessarily retained as the 

necessary general form ... A general essence ... The essence 
proves to be that without which an object of a particular kind 
cannot be thought, i.e., that without which the object cannot 
be intuitively imagined as such.  

Husserl concedes that a study of all possible variations is usually 
impossible, but believes it sufficient that the choice of variants be 
arbitrary.  

From our vantage point, it seems especially relevant to note 
Husserl's application of the eidetic reduction after the transcendental 
reduction has been carried out. What is subjected to eidetic variation 
in this case is eventually the bracketed world as a whole, the aim 
being to find structures that are binding in every imaginable world, 
or, as, Husserl himself puts it, in every "possible world":

Once we conceive of the given world as a merely possible world, 

once we arbitrarily transform in our thinking this factual world 
(...), and once we run through, or rather, freely project in fan-
tasy, all free possibilities, then we arrive at the eidos "world" as 
the invariant essence that belongs to every possible world ...  

In Husserl's terms every possible world is related to one or sev-

eral possible transcendental ego(s) for which the respective world is 
given in experience, to possible transcendental ego(s) that intend the 
ontology of the respective world. From this it follows that varying 
a world, and thus moving from one possible world to another, also 
means varying the respective ego(s) and possibly moving from one 
(set of) possible transcendental ego(s) to another: "We can alter the 

world arbitrarily in imagination—the different imagined worlds will
be incompatible with respect to their existence—but then we also in our imagination alter the subject.”\textsuperscript{324}

Even though possible worlds and transcendental subjects are thus correlated one-to-many, the study of possible worlds, that is, the study of possible ontologies, starts for the phenomenologist with the subject, that is, with the world-constituting ego:

To each possible world that I freely imagine, there belongs a possible subject in whose consciousness or belief that world receives its possible status of Being \([\text{Sein}]\). As transcendental researcher I therefore reduce all possible worlds by means of the epoché to the respective possible consciousness that constitutes them. ... Yet since phenomenology includes all possible constitutive formations within any transcendental subjectivity, it also includes all real ontologies ... all ontologies for possible worlds in general.\textsuperscript{325}

It is not difficult to detect in these pronouncements further support for attributing the conception of language as calculus to Husserl. We only need to remember here that proponents of the universal medium conception are likely to be drawn towards the idea of the uniqueness of the world, language, and semantics: they claim that since language has a fixed unchangable interpretation, it cannot be used to speak about merely possible, alternative universes. Husserl is clearly very far away from any thought of this kind. He is only too willing to speak of worlds in the plural. Furthermore, language is—as we have seen earlier in this chapter—freely re-interpretable; a distinction between natural objectlanguage and transcendental metalinguage(s) is possible; and transcendental language is fit to express different semantical ”ways of worldmaking”. And finally, the way different possible worlds are studied is by attending to the different structures of meaning and ontological commitments within possible transcendental egos. Phenomenologists can vary these structures of meanings and ontological commitments systematically, they are not trapped within any one such system. Thus the systematic variation of meaning relations—yet another fundamental part of the calculus conception—also makes a clear appearance in Husserl.
4.2. Husserl, Leibniz, and Possible Worlds

Husserl’s use of the possible worlds idiom that we encountered above seems worth some closer attention, on the one hand, because the acceptance of the idea of different models/worlds is one of the central ingredients in the conception of language as calculus, and, on the other hand, because the relation between the conceptual tools of phenomenology and modern possible worlds semantics has loomed large in recent Anglosaxon Husserl scholarship. In their seminal book *Husserl and Intentionality* David Woodruff Smith and Ronald Mclntyre have presented a large-scale interpretation of Husserl’s investigations into intentionality in terms of possible worlds. In particular, they have reconstructed Husserl’s notion of horizon with the help of a possible worlds framework and—taking up suggestions made by Jaakko Hintikka—framed propositional attitudes within the same idiom. This has stimulated a new debate, started earlier between Hintikka and J. N. Mohanty, over the question whether the Husserlian notions can be thus reformulated, and whether this reformulation should supercede Husserl’s own way of speaking of intentionality in terms of directedness. Since my study is historical rather than systematical, I shall participate in this debate only indirectly: I shall not question whether Husserl’s analysis could be reconstructed in terms of possible worlds, but rather investigate Husserl’s own use of this idiom. As I shall try to argue, Husserl’s conception of possible worlds is in several ways reminiscent of Leibniz.

Before turning to this topic, it seems useful to mention briefly the importance of Leibniz for Husserl’s thought in general, since this influence has been much less attended to than, say, that of Kant or Brentano. However, Husserl himself, has stressed the significance of Leibniz for phenomenology in several places. Furthermore, he has commented on several of Leibniz’ most central ideas, like the *matheesis universalis*, the *calculus ratiocinator* vs. *characteristica universalis* distinction, the monads and possible worlds. For instance, sketching the main sources of his phenomenology in the lectures on *First Philosophy* in 1923/24, Husserl spoke of two main lines of influence, that of Descartes, Locke, and Brentano, and that of Leibniz. Leibniz is credited with having been the central source not only for the platonistic conception of logic appearing in the *Logi-
cal Investigations, but also for the notions of regional and formal ontologies, central in Ideas I. In his annotations to his copy of the Logical Investigations, Husserl also noted that his own idea of a philosophical grammar—that is envisaged to give us formation rules for judgements—was already anticipated by Leibniz in his Nouveaux Essais, and that Leibniz also knew the distinction between a meaning that cannot be fulfilled by perception and one that can be thus fulfilled. Husserl refers here to Leibniz’ example of ”the fastest movement” in the latter’s Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis.

As we already saw from Husserl’s review of Schröder’s Lectures on the Algebra of Logic, Husserl denied the possibility of there being in general a way of combining characteristica universalis and calculus ratiocinator. And at this point it is worth adding that Husserl makes this point in his preliminary notes for the Schröder review first and foremost against Leibniz. To be sure, Husserl regards each of the two projects, the idea of a sign language that mirrors a certain domain, that is the characteristica universalis, and the idea of a formal algorithm, that is the calculus ratiocinator, as promising and worth while—even though he did remark concerning the characteristica universalis that Leibniz was a victim of a prejudice when believing that all necessary judgments are analytical. But what was an even greater flaw, or rather naivety, according to Husserl, was the belief held by Leibniz and his modern followers that the construction of a calculus ratiocinator can ever be—at the same time—the construction of a characteristica universalis. To drive home this point, Husserl refers to natural numbers and their systematization in elementary arithmetic: what arithmetic provides us with is not a characteristica universalis as a characterization of the last attributes of numbers but rather an algorithm, a calculus ratiocinator that is ultimately independent of number concepts. Husserl adds that Leibniz should have come to the same conclusion, especially ”since he was after all about to invent the logical calculus . . . even though the characteristica universalis . . . did not yet exist”.

Yet another recurring Leibnizian theme in Husserl’s texts is the notion of monad. Husserl scholars have so far paid only limited attention to Husserl’s use of this term, a fact that is all the more unfortunate since the notorious charge of solipsism can perhaps best
be undermined by attending carefully to the role of this notion in Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity. Since this topic lies beyond the scope of this study, I shall only briefly indicate where Husserl saw the main differences between his own and the Leibnizian monadology. Two points seem to be central. The first concerns the question of whether monads have windows. Since Husserl uses the notion of monad in attempts to explicate the constitution of intersubjectivity, he feels he has to disagree with Leibniz over this issue:

Every ego is a "monad". But the monads have windows. Yet they do not have windows in the sense that no other subject can actually enter them. But through these windows (these windows are acts of empathy) another subject can just as easily be experienced as one's own former experiences are accessible through remembering.336

The second point is only alluded to briefly. Even though he acknowledges the "greatness" of Leibniz' "metaphysics of monads", Husserl adds that the central shortcoming in Leibniz' philosophy of monads is the lack of a systematic epistemology as the basis for this metaphysics. Husserl believed that in some sense his own philosophy did provide such an epistemological foundation for a Leibnizian monadology, albeit a revised one.337

The notion of monad also makes frequent appearances in texts in which Husserl spells out his conception of possible worlds. Concerning this latter notion it must first be noted that Husserl did not accept it in all his works. As we saw earlier, in "Intentional Objects" he criticized reference to 'worlds' in the plural, and preferred rather to talk of frameworks constructed by a constant assumption. However, as he moved on into his transcendental period, Husserl was more and more inclined to make use of this Leibnizian notion, especially in his manuscripts on fantasy338, in Cartesian Meditations, in the lectures on Phenomenological Psychology339, as well as in Experience and Judgment340, where the treatment is pushed far enough for us to see what kind of interpretation of possible worlds Husserl is willing to adopt.

A first peculiar element of Husserl's version—noted above—is that possible worlds are related to possible transcendental egos in and
through which the respective worlds are constituted, experienced, and posited as actual. This relation is a topic to which Husserl frequently returns, especially in his writings of the twenties and thirties. In the last section, I quoted Husserl's dictum that "to each possible world ... there belongs a possible transcendental subject ..." Here is a further pronouncement to the same effect from an unpublished manuscript ('O' stands for object, 'S' for subject):

To each compossible universe \( O(O_1, O_2, \ldots O_n) \) belongs, and belongs within that same universe, one \( S [O(O_1, O_2, \ldots O_n)] \); and if we think of another universe, then to it there belongs another \( S \). Two such universes have nothing in common, they are as universes incompatible with respect to existence, and that also holds for the \( S \)'s involved.\(^{341}\)

To put it in a nutshell: there is no possible world without its subject(s) that take(s) this world as actual, and no subject without its home world, possibly shared with other subjects. Different possible worlds are distinguished by what they contain and by how they are ordered, while different possible subjects are distinguished by what they take their respective worlds to contain, and by how they take these worlds to be ordered.

This correlation between worlds and egos has the immediate effect that Husserl speaks of (in-)compossibility not only confined to worlds, but also as applying to transcendental egos. With respect to the former case, he speaks of an "infinity of worlds, none of which is composable with any other"\(^{342}\), while with respect to transcendental egos he writes that they are "incompatible with respect to existence"\(^{343}\) and that "two subjects ... are compossible ... only if both are ... directed towards the same nature".\(^{344}\) Thus Husserl does allow that two subjects are related to the same world, an idea that is of course central for his notions of intersubjectivity and the constitution of an objective world.

This notion of a correlativity between egos and worlds seems to imply an interesting idea: Husserl seems to commit himself to a thesis, recently argued especially by David Lewis\(^{345}\), according to which actuality is expressed by an indexical like "I" or "here". That is to say, the predicate "actual" does not pick out one and the same sin-
gle world for all subjects, but it picks out for each subject (or group of subjects) 'its' (or 'their') world. This conception is implied by Husserl’s repeated pronouncements according to which the relation between a world and the correlative ego is one of "experience":

Composable [mit möglich] with a nature N that we imagine, are only subjects that experience N ... Assuming that N is [actual] ... does not preclude the possibility of other N's and— correspondingly—of subjects that experience them ...

That something possibly be, and that possibly be an ego-subject (...) which experiences that something, [these two] are essentially correlated.

Furthermore, in Experience and Judgment, Husserl explains that the predicate 'actual' means that "I do not imagine, I do not carry out an act of quasi-experience". In other words, 'actual' determines how I (as transcendental ego or subject) relate to my home world, while 'inactual' refers to my changing myself into a "fantasy-I", i.e., the subject of another world, into "the correlative subject of possible experience of precisely this [imagined] reality".

The idea that actuality and existence can be treated as indexicals appears in Leibniz, too, even though Leibniz employed also an absolute notion of existence. We can strengthen the parallel between Leibniz's and Husserl's views on modality, by touching briefly upon the temporal-statistical model of modalities, and subsequently by turning to the topic of transworld identity.

As is well known, the possible worlds idiom is only one of several models that Leibniz applied to the analysis of modal notions. A second model that is used by him to grasp physical or nomic necessity is the classical temporal-statistical one which claims that every true possibility will become actual sooner or later. Interestingly enough, in an unpublished manuscript of 1921, Husserl employs this model in order to argue that in any infinite world constituting subjects must appear sooner or later:

What is contained in a world which is infinite with respect to time and space is totally determined. The identity of an infinite world can only be thought via complete determinability.
is not within the world cannot even be within it, and everything which is possible within it is actual within it. ... if it is possible that within a world there are experiencing acts that come to know that world and that constitute that world phenomenologically, then these acts ... must really appear in that world.\textsuperscript{352}

More important than this argument, whose interest mainly lies in the fact that Husserl also shows himself to be acquainted with this further modal model in Leibniz, is the fact that both philosophers take almost the same stand concerning the issue of transworld identity, a topic also widely discussed in contemporary analytical philosophy. The debate here is over the question whether the same individual can be a member of several possible worlds or not. Saul Kripke\textsuperscript{353} and Alvin Plantinga\textsuperscript{354} are perhaps the best known advocates of the former stand, whereas Leibniz and Lewis\textsuperscript{355} argue for the view that individuals are bound to one world and that identity across possible worlds is a senseless notion. Leibniz held this position on account of his conviction that all attributes are essential; for him it makes no sense to ask "what would have happened if Peter had not denied Christ" since this question amounts to asking "what would have happened if Peter had not been Peter, for denying is contained in the complete notion of Peter".\textsuperscript{356} Leibniz also thought that in picking out one complete concept, say of Adam, we in fact pick out a whole world: since Adam mirrors all other concepts within his world, if anything—even thousands of years later—were different from what it is, Adam would not have been Adam.\textsuperscript{357}

In the following passage we can see that Husserl agrees with Leibniz on both of these ideas, the denial of transworld identity as well as the interconnection of all events and facts within one world:

The universe of free possibilities in general is a realm of disconnectedness; it lacks a unity of context. However, every possibility which is singled out of this realm signifies at the same time the idea of a whole of interconnected possibilities, and to this whole necessarily corresponds a unique time. Each such whole defines a world. But two worlds of this kind are not connected with each other; their "things", their places, their times, have nothing to do with one another; it makes no sense to ask
whether a thing in this world and one in that equally possible world are the same or not the same...\textsuperscript{358}

Husserl's reason for denying transworld identity is that for him individuation and identity make sense only within one and the same world, i.e., within one and the same time.\textsuperscript{359}

Although denying transworld identity, Husserl does allow for transworld \textit{likeness} and transworld \textit{similarity}: "We can speak here of the likeness and similarity of the components of such worlds but never of their identity, which would have absolutely no sense ..."\textsuperscript{360}

What this quotation suggests is that Husserl is committing himself to what has been dubbed by David Lewis as the counterpart theory, a notion that several scholars have also attributed to Leibniz.\textsuperscript{361} The basic idea is that even though all individuals are worldbound, counterfactual statements are nevertheless possible. Although I can only be a member of one world, say $w_1$, I can still have counterparts in other worlds, where a counterpart of mine is a member of some other world, say $w_2$, being more like me than any other member of $w_2$. In Lewis's opinion, this conception allows one to uphold the distinction between essential and inessential attributes while sticking to the worldboundness of individuals all the same: my essential attributes are those that I share with all of my counterparts, whereas my inessential attributes are those that I do not thus share.\textsuperscript{362}

To repeat, Husserl does commit himself to this kind of view on account of his acceptance of two theses: first, as seen in the quotation above, he explicitly denies transworld identity; and second, he cannot claim that all attributes are essential to individuals since this would render his eidetic reduction meaningless, for eidetic reduction is precisely a method for distinguishing between essential and inessential attributes.

In order to support this interpretation further, we can relate it to two earlier interpretations of Husserl's conception of possible worlds, one put forward by Mohanty, one by Smith and McIntyre.

Mohanty has suggested that between \textit{Ideas I} and \textit{Experience and Judgment} Husserl must have changed his mind over the issue of transworld identity: "As Plantinga rightly points out ... the theory of worldbound individuals does have an answer to the question which of Socrates' properties are essential to him. This answer is that all
of his properties are essential to him. ... I suspect that he [Husserl] moved away gradually from an essentialism that allows an individual to be in many possible worlds to one that does not." 363 Mohanty’s reasoning is that while in Ideas I Husserl seems to distinguish between essential and inessential attributes of individuals, in Experience and Judgment—in the passage we quoted above—transworld identity is explicitly denied. Mohanty thus equates the distinction between essential and unessential attributes with the acceptance of transworld identity, and conceives of the denial of transworld identity as being committed to the view that all attributes of an individual are essential. But if one accepts a third possibility, as the counterpart theory presents us with, then Mohanty’s conclusion is a non sequitur. Assuming that Husserl does indeed hold the counterpart theory, his distinction between essential and inessential attributes does not commit him to transworld identity; essential attributes are then those that an individual shares with all of his or her counterparts, while inessential attributes of a worldbound individual are those that he or she shares with only some, or none, of them.

Mohanty’s suggestion that Husserl changed his mind on the issue of transworld identity is also problematic because in Experience and Judgment we find Husserl continuously talking of the distinction between essential and inessential attributes. 364 Furthermore, in his studies on fantasy Husserl already quite early on denies the transworld identity thesis. 365 Additional support for continuity rather than discontinuity in Husserl’s thought about transworld identity can be obtained from the early manuscript ”Intentional Objects”, where, although talk of different ”worlds” is opposed, Husserl nevertheless speaks of different contexts or frameworks constituted by different assumptions. Here it does not seem to make sense to speak of transcontext identity, as Pietersma has pointed out in a recent detailed interpretation of this early text: ”... as a context-bound object there can be no question of its being identical with an object of another belief-context ...” 366

To turn to the second interpretation, Smith and McIntyre also note that Husserl denies transworld identity in the quotation given above, but they wish to go further by showing that in another passage Husserl again withdraws from this stand. However, as I shall try to
show, this other passage does not convincingly support Smith's and McIntyre's conclusions.

Their first argument can be disposed of rather quickly. Smith and McIntyre write that Husserl's notion of horizon commits him to identity across possible worlds. The weakness of this claim is that Husserl himself does not frame his analysis of horizon in terms of possible worlds at all, and the authors themselves concede that the notion of horizon can be analyzed without any reference to possible objects. All they can therefore claim is this: if one reconstructs Husserl's notion of horizon in the version of possible worlds that we (i.e., Smith and McIntyre) favour—a version that allows for transworld identity—then one commits oneself—and Husserl—to transworld identity.

However, this argument is not Smith's and McIntyre's main point. They draw their main evidence from §42c of *Experience and Judgment*, especially from the following remark:

We bring objects which belong to different fields of presence together by transposing them to one temporal field: we move the first objects to the intuitive temporal field of the others. In this way we bring them into an intuitive succession or into an intuitive coexistence ...

Smith and McIntyre interpret this passage as giving us a criterion for deciding when we can speak of transworld identity: this criterion is that the worlds in question must share a common time frame; that is, two objects in two different worlds are identical, if and only if we can trace them back to a common time frame, if and only if the two worlds in question have a common history.

However, it does not seem difficult to show that Smith's and McIntyre's interpretation goes far beyond what Husserl actually says in this passage. He neither speaks about transworld identity nor about the tracing back of an object in the history of a world. That Husserl is not dealing here with questions of identity at all is obscured in Smith's and McIntyre's translation, since they read "we bring together" for Husserl's "wir rücken Gegenstände ... aneinander". Here Husserl is concerned not with identity of objects but with the question whether objects of different fields can form one objectivity
(Gegenständlichkeit), that is one state of affairs.

Secondly, in the Appendix to §42, Husserl clarifies what he means when he says that "‘The same’ object which I just now imagine could also be given in experience": it does not mean that the same object can be the same in two different worlds, but rather that the same abstract meaning entity, the noematic Sinn, can be indexed as actuality and indexed as fantasy. In the light of Husserl’s general views concerning worlds and transcendental egos, this seems to imply that even though Husserl denies transworld identity, he allows for transego identity in that the same noematic Sinn (noema minus mode of givenness) can be intended by different transcendentale egos.

Thus it seems that the passage on which Smith and McIntyre rest their case does not in fact support any notion of transworld identity. Of course, these critical remarks do not even touch upon the topical issue as to whether Husserl’s denial of transworld identity is not best ignored so as to bring his theory in line with successful modern conceptions of possible worlds. Even after such an improvement, Husserl’s interesting historical debt to Leibniz could still be appreciated. However, what is most important from the vantage point of this study, is, in any case, that Husserl does not only adopt the possible worlds idiom—one of the central tenets that a proponent of the language as calculus conception is naturally drawn towards—but that he also presents detailed and sophisticated suggestions concerning the difficult problems caused by this model. A further perhaps even stronger indication of Husserl’s belief in language as calculus is his way of conceiving of possible worlds as correlated with world-constituting transcendental egos. Since the latter consist of meaning structures that are accessible to systematic research, the idea of the accessibility of semantics and the idiom of possible worlds turn out to be insolubly linked to each other.

4.3. Noemata, Metalanguage, and the Inexhaustibility of Semantics

One of the main issues in the debate over the relation between Husserl’s phenomenology and possible world semantics has been Hintikka’s suggestion that noemata should best be reframed as functions from possible worlds into objects. This idea has been taken up in Smith’s and McIntyre’s book, but it has been attacked on various
grounds by Mohanty. Again, I shall abstain from a discussion of this more topical rather than historical question. Instead I shall confine myself to an explication of Husserl's own use of the notion of noema, trying to explain its relation to the conception of language as calculus.

Of course, the question how noemata are understood by Husserl himself is itself a controversial issue. Follesdal has presented an interpretation of noema—or rather noematic Sinn—that brings Husserl's notion into close contact with Fregean Sinn. The main advocate of a different interpretation has been Aron Gurwitsch, for whom the perceptual noema is not an abstract meaning entity, but rather "the object as meant". I shall not continue this debate in this study. Here I shall adopt the Follesdalian approach—as developed further by Smith and McIntyre—without arguing in detail on its behalf, and without refuting actual and potential opponents. This way of proceeding seems acceptable to me since three different books have recently spelt out the overwhelming evidence for Follesdal's interpretation.

The notion of noema is the central concept in Husserl's analysis of intentionality as presented in Ideas I and subsequent works. Intentionality refers to the special 'aboutness' of our thoughts and experiences, namely that in most experiences the mind is directed towards something; for instance, perception is always perception of something, belief always believing something, and so on. Husserl's main tenet in his clarification of intentionality can be put in the following way: intentionality is a relation between the mind and objects. In order to clarify the nature of this relation it is misleading to look for special features in the object. Instead, the special character of this relation is to be brought out by attending to those meanings by way of which the mind picks out the objects. In other words, the study of intentionality is the study of those meaning-structures by means of which we relate to the world.

Husserl studies intentionality mainly in terms of one special case, i.e., perception. The basic tripartite distinction that provides the framework for his investigations is that between "hyle", "noesis", and "noema". "Hyle" here stands for those parts of a perceptive act that are purely sensory in character, that is for those parts
of perceptive acts that are "data of colour, touch, sound, and the like". It is important to point out that in Husserl's view, we are not intentionally directed towards "data of colour, touch, sound". In acts of perceptions we are directed rather towards paintings, speech, or music. Husserl claims that we find "concrete data of experience" only as "components in concrete experiences of a more comprehensive kind which as wholes are intentional, and indeed so that over those sensile phases lies as it were an 'animating', meaning-bestowing stratum".379

Now the concrete intentional experience of which the hyle forms merely a non-intentional base, Husserl calls "noesis". The noesis bestows a meaning on the hyle.380 Opposing noesis and hyle, Husserl speaks of the former as "immaterial form" and of the latter as "formless material".381 The noesis as concrete intentional experience is an event in time, and belongs to the inner life of a person. The noesis is the "real" (reell, proper) content of an experience, and it can be analysed by treating "the experience as an object like any other".383

In addition to this real content of experiences, Husserl also speaks of a "non real" content of experiences.384 This non-real content is the noema. It is not an entity in space and time, but rather an abstract, ideal, and complex meaning-entity.

The nature of this meaning can be brought into sharper focus by comparing this meaning with the abstract meanings of the Logical Investigations. In this earlier work, Husserl took ideal meanings to be species of acts, i.e., the abstract ideal meaning is what different acts of meaning (Akte des Bedeutens) have in common. Or, the other way round, particular acts are instantiations of abstract meanings as universals. However, by the time of Ideas I, Husserl had abandoned this view of ideal meanings as species in favour of ideal meanings as particulars. A first formulation of the new position can already be found in Lectures on the Theory of Meaning (1908), where Husserl speaks of two different notions of meaning: of "phenological (phän-sic)" and "phenomenological (ontic)" meaning.385 The first corresponds to the species conception presented in Logical Investigations, the second to the noema in Ideas I. In his subsequent works, Husserl stuck with the new position and stressed repeatedly that the ideality of meanings should not be mixed up with the ideality of species. For
instance, in *Experience and Judgment* Husserl argues that meanings qua noemata should not be regarded as species because meanings are not arrived at by way of eidetic reduction. This is not to say that eidetic reduction cannot be applied to meanings. Rather, eidetic reduction is not instrumental for arriving at meaning particulars, that is, noemata.

One of Husserl's central contentions concerning noesis and noema is that they are correlated with each other, such that each distinction on the ideal side corresponds to a distinction on the side of the real content of the experience: "... the law of the essence universally attested runs to this effect: *No noetic phase without a noematic phase that belongs specifically to it*. Thus one of the central pillars of the *Logical Investigations* is preserved despite the new conception of the ideality of meaning: ideal meanings can be studied by examining the structure of acts; and even though ideal meanings are neither spacial nor temporal, we can still acquire knowledge about them.

Next, let us look at the structure of the noema. As already mentioned, for Husserl the noema is not solid but structured. This structure can perhaps best be explained by considering an example like

*I see my computer screen.*

To the temporal experience of my seeing my computer screen (the noesis) there corresponds the noema "I see my computer screen." Within the noema Husserl distinguishes first between "noematic *Sinn*" and "mode of givenness" (*Gegebenheitsweise*): the noematic *Sinn* is that part of the noema that picks out an object or state of affairs (here "my computer screen"), whereas the mode of givenness is that part of the noema that characterizes how the noematic *Sinn* is given, whether it is given in perception, or in memory, in love, hate, or whatever. Both mode of givenness and noematic *Sinn* are again structured. Here it will suffice to mention the structure of the noematic *Sinn*.

The noematic *Sinn* consists of predicates on the one hand, and the common carrier of these predicates on the other hand:

In the *Sinn* lies the meant object *X*, that which one is aware of as the identical object meant as one passes from one *Sinn* to a
new Sinn ... Furthermore, in the Sinn lies the 'content' which explicates itself in predicates.\textsuperscript{390}

To return to our example, the noematic Sinn consists, on the one hand, of the predicates "my", and "computer screen" and, on the other hand, "that something" of which I say that it is mine and a computer screen. Husserl calls this "that something" "the determinable X in the noematic sense"\textsuperscript{391}, claiming that we have to assume the determinable-X in addition to the predicates in order to account for changing perceptions (which implies changing predicates) of the same object. For example, I might see "that" which a moment ago I saw as my computer screen, as "my TV screen". In this case the predicate has changed, but the determinable-X has not.

Husserl develops an elaborate account of changing perceptions, and further determinations, of one and the same object. From Ideas I onwards, Husserl suggests that every act, say, of perception, "predelineates" possible further perceptions of the same object ("internal horizon") as well as perceptions of further, other objects in the world ("external horizon").\textsuperscript{392} While the noematic Sinn of the original act is said to be "explicit", the noematic Sinn of these further, possible acts are called "implicit".\textsuperscript{393} Husserl points out that the possible further perceptions predelineated in the horizon of an act are not mere empty, or logical, possibilities but "motivated possibilities". They are motivated by the original act and by the background knowledge of the subject, as the following example aptly shows:

It is an empty possibility that this writing-desk has on its underside, which is presently invisible to me, ten legs instead of four, as is actually the case. This fourness, on the contrary, is a motivated possibility for the definite perception that I directly perform.\textsuperscript{394}

This brief characterization of the noema and its structure suffices for our purposes of highlighting some of its features from the calculus conception of language.

Now the first point which merits attention here is the relation between noema and language.\textsuperscript{395} Husserl tells us that his notion of Sinn is not immediately to be equated with meaning qua linguistic meaning:
Originally these words [viz., "meaning" and "meaning something] relate only to the sphere of speech, that of "expression". But it is almost inevitable, and at the same time an important step for knowledge, to extend the meaning of these words, and to modify them suitably so that they may be applied in a certain way to the whole noetico-noematic sphere, to all acts, therefore, whether these are interwoven with expressive acts or not. ... We propose in the interests of distinctness to favour the word *Bedeutung* ... when referring to the old concept, ... We use the word *Sinn* (...) in future, as before, in its more embracing breadth of application. 396

Continuing after this passage, Husserl goes on to explain that we can, for example, see something as white, without language being in any way involved. 397 Yet what is important is that he adds that whatever the nature of the act in question, that is to say, whatever the noema or noematic *Sinn* in question, it can always be expressed in language:

> Whatever is "meant as such", every meaning (*Meinung*) in the noematic sense (and indeed as noematic nucleus) of any act whatsoever can be expressed conceptually (*durch "Bedeutungen"*). 398

The *Sinn* is the sphere of the *logos* in the specific sense that it alone can be directly spoken out and expressed. 399

As Smith and McIntyre have shown in a detailed and balanced discussion of Husserl's stand on this question, Husserl does not mean to say that every noematic *Sinn* is in principle expressible in each and every language, nor that all of the noema is thus always expressible. For instance some features of the mode of givenness might be too idiosyncratic to be expressible. 400

From our perspective the interest of Husserl's stand on this point lies mainly in the fact that those parts of the noema which pick out an object, that is to say, the most prominently semantical parts, can always—or at least in principle—be couched in language and thus be made intersubjective and public. Semantics is not hidden in a solipsistic subjectivity.
A second point that can now be clarified is the question as to what remains when the transcendental reduction has been carried out: what remains, or rather comes to be seen, are the noemata: "The transcendental reduction practises epoché in respect of reality (Wirklichkeit); but to the residue thereby left over belong the noemata with the noematic unity which lies in them themselves..." 401 The reduction is thus the means by which we make meanings accessible.

A connected point pertains to what Smith and McIntyre have dubbed "noema quotation". 402 In two unpublished manuscripts (of 1925/26 and 1927 respectively), the idea is presented in the following way:

When I inhibit ... my taking of a stand with respect to the reality outside of consciousness (...) I still remain, in a certain way, with everything ... with the whole world, only now in quotation marks, as the respective Sinn ... 403

Judging about sentences: my perceptual sentence 'there is a black arm-chair over there' is placed in quotation marks. I do not take part in positing, which means that I still do have the perception (in this case); but I inhibit it. 404

In other words, Husserl suggests a special quotation convention, in order to mark noemata as distinct from the objects they pick out. In Ideas I we are told that "the quotation marks are clearly significant; they express that change of signature, the corresponding radical modification of the meaning of the words". 405 Witness especially the expression "the corresponding radical modification of the meaning of the words": language—or rather words—are re-interpreted; formerly they were interpreted over a domain of worldly objects, now they are interpreted over a domain of meanings.

What makes Husserl's idea that language can be re-interpreted over meanings (as a new level of objects) striking, is his further claim that this process can continue infinitely. In the important unpublished manuscript "Noema and Sinn", a text that Husserl himself marked "fundamental" (grundlegend) 406, he writes:

Every Sinn is an object. The Sinn corresponding to an object is in its turn an object [gegenständlich] ... As such it has a Sinn
of second order: the Sinn of a Sinn ... hence we end up with an infinite regress ... 

... Sinne of second order ... unthematic Sinne with respect to those [Sinne] that are thematic ... 

Obviously, for this "infinite regress" to be possible Husserl's quotation-device must be applicable iteratively, too. Thus we are led to the construction of ever new metalanguages and to ever new re-interpretations of language. That Husserl allows for an infinity of such re-interpretations also has a further implication concerning his overall semantical views. Even though he regards semantics to be accessible in principle, and even though he regards the semantics of any object level to be accessible for the next higher metalevel, the study of semantics is never completed: semantics is—to use Hintikka's expression—"inexhaustible". In so far as every noematic Sinn always points beyond itself towards some further noematic Sinn by which it is referred to, our semantics can never be complete.

4.4. Husserl's "Realism"

As we saw in the Introduction, the following brand of "realism" is a part of the Idealtyp of language as calculus: the world an sich does not inevitably remain behind the veil of our language; the semantical relations between our language and the world are accessible to systematical study, and we can attend to the way language structures our conception of the world. Since, as is repeatedly pointed out in the literature, the notion of realism is an ambiguous one, I shall refer to the brand of realism which is central for the Idealtyp of language as calculus as 'semantical realism' (semantical anti-Kantianism). As we shall see in this chapter, it is possible to argue that Husserl adopts semantical realism. Furthermore, he also accepts a 'perceptual' realism, according to which perception reaches the Dinge an sich.

Pointing out Husserl's commitment to semantical and perceptual realism suffices for our purposes of attending to the relation between language as calculus and his transcendental phenomenology. In other words, even if Husserl were to hold some non-realist or idealist view on some other level, i.e., the ontological or metaphysical, then this as such would not undermine our interpretation. Even
if Husserl were to claim that the world has no being outside of the ego, he could still believe in semantical and perceptual realism. Semantical and perceptual realism state only that the way I relate (by way of language and perception) to the world is principally open to reflection and—on the basis of reflection—transparent, whatever the ultimate ontological structure of the world might be. For instance, we can imagine a philosopher who claims that the world is totally of my mental (perhaps unconscious) making. On this basis there still remains room for both language as universal medium and language as calculus—at least as long as the purported referents of language and language itself do not coincide.

Even though the issue of semantical realism is the crucial form of realism from the standpoint of our interpretation, we cannot pass by the earlier debate as to Husserl’s alleged metaphysical idealism. Having dealt with the semantical issue first, I shall address the question concerning Husserl’s metaphysical stand. As we shall see, Husserl provides a justification for _metaphysical realism_ in addition to the semantical and perceptual one.41

Husserl attacks Kant’s notion of _Dinge an sich_, which are in principle unknowable, in detail in _Ideas I_ and in an earlier manuscript ”Against Kant’s Anthropological Theory” written about 1908.412 In a still earlier manuscript from 1903413, Husserl had applied his earlier argument against psychologistic scepticism against Kant:

Kant’s theory seems ... to imply an absurdity ... since the theory, according to which all human knowledge is merely phenomenal—because it is bound to human forms—claims not only phenomenal but absolute validity; yet this theory should, like any other theory, be valid only phenomenally.414

That is to say, Kant cannot relativize truth and knowledge to what is given in experience, since stating this relativization as a theory means stating an absolute truth, means stating more than what the content of this theory allows one to claim.

In ”Against Kant’s Anthropological Theory” Husserl speaks uncompromisingly of ”the absurdity of the Ding an sich in Kantian philosophy”.415 The target of Husserl’s attack here is especially the
Kantian assumption according to which God \textit{qua intellectus archetypus} and creator has immediate access to \textit{Dinge an sich}, whereas we as human beings have only knowledge of phenomena since our knowledge is based on sense perception.\textsuperscript{416} Husserl does not directly argue against this position by presenting a model as to how and why we have access to \textit{Dinge an sich}. Instead, he claims that if the assumption of unknowable things is based on our receptivity in perception, then not even God can grasp them: God too is dependent on receptivity. Husserl maintains that for all intellects the same structural essential rules are binding as to how knowledge is obtained, and as to what kinds of knowledge there are. For instance, the difference between empirical and non-empirical truths is as valid for God as it is valid for us.\textsuperscript{417} Furthermore, even though God creates things and worlds, these things and worlds are—once created—"facts"\textsuperscript{418} for God, too: "Even from an absolute perspective, objects as individual objects can be posited only on the basis of an experience as receptivity ..."\textsuperscript{419} Husserl concludes that if we argue with Kant that it is our receptivity which hinders us to reach \textit{Dinge an sich}, then, since knowledge of individual things is necessarily bound to receptivity. ...

\begin{quote}
... even God—who equally can, in knowledge and thought, posit individual things only on the basis of affections—would have to posit behind his things new things. And when God comes to know these new things, he will have to posit again new \textit{Dinge an sich} and so on \textit{ad infinitum}.\textsuperscript{420}
\end{quote}

In \textit{Ideas I} Husserl does not use this \textit{reductio ad absurdum} argument. Instead he makes use of the correlation between worlds and transcendental egos. His central premiss is that to be a thing, cause or state of affairs is to be an object of perception or knowledge for some ego, is to be an object with respect to which some (possible) transcendental ego would make a true existential statement ("A possible ego thus belongs to the possibility of truth, i.e., of a true being ..."\textsuperscript{421}) On this basis Husserl asks what it would mean if there were something which is inaccessible to us. His answer is not surprising: it would mean that this something is a part of some world correlated with another—and not one's own—transcendental
ego. We know already, however, that transcendental egos have their windows of empathy open to each other. Thus it is possible—in principle if not in practice—that one makes just any object accessible to oneself; by way of empathy one can adopt the viewpoint of any transcendental ego and look—with its eyes—into its world:

It can be easily shown that, if the assumed unknown cause [viz., the Ding an sich] exists [ist] at all, it must be in principle perceptible and experienceable, if not by me, at least for other Egos who see better and farther than I do. ... For me to be forced ... to admit the possibility of a cause of the kind in question, I must be able to conceive of the possibility of an ego that experiences this very cause. But thus there would also be the possibility of empathy ... 422

In these passages Husserl formulates his anti-Kantianism in terms of perception. To deal foremost with the case of perception was a natural move for Husserl, since semantical Kantianism was beyond his philosophical horizon. But this does not mean that the arguments Husserl employs against (perceptual) Kantianism do not carry over so as to apply against the semantical Kantianist: they will also work against the idea according to which reality an sich is principally inaccessible to us since our language shapes and distorts it.

Husserl's first argument against Kant—namely that stating a relativistic notion of truth implies the use of an absolute notion of truth—would also work against the semantical view: to formulate the semantical relativism would presuppose that language can after all grasp—without causing any distortion—the relation between language and the world. Leaving aside the question of God's use of language, on which the reductio argument would have to turn, it is easy to formulate a semantical parallel to the third argument as well: to say that one's language distorts reality implies the possibility that there is a language that does not distort reality but mirrors it faithfully. Put in transcendental-phenomenological terms, this would have to be the language (plus the corresponding semantics) of some other transcendental ego. But if we accept empathy in general, we are committed to allowing for the learning of new lan-
guages (and new semantics). Thus the correct language, that is, the non-distorting one, must in principle be accessible to any pure ego. Thus even so each transcendental ego has its home language, our pure ego, in so far as it is not bound to a specific transcendental ego, is not bound to a specific language either.\textsuperscript{423}

Whereas semantical realism seems to be a position that Husserl is likely to have adopted, the issue as to whether he is a metaphysical realist or not is more complicated. This question has been, and is still today, much debated. Three different positions have been taken by interpreters.

According to the first view, represented foremost by Roman Ingarden\textsuperscript{424}, Husserl as transcendental phenomenologist is a metaphysical idealist, more precisely a "creationistic idealist". This line of reasoning turns centrally on Husserl’s notion of constitution, and claims that "Husserl tended in his 'constitutive investigations to understand this dependence [i.e., the dependence of the object upon the perceiver] as a kind of 'creation of ... the noematic sense of the perceived thing"\textsuperscript{425} and that "the object ... is ... exclusively created by the cognitive (perceiving) subject".\textsuperscript{426}

According to the second view, Husserl is a metaphysical realist and his transcendental phenomenology is meant to be a defense of this position. For example, Karl Ameriks\textsuperscript{427} interprets Husserl as holding the view that we have for the existence of a consciousness-independent world precisely the non-apodictic evidence that transcendental phenomenology demonstrates to be the only possible, yet sufficient evidence, for such an existential claim. Certain idealistic pronouncements by Husserl are explained by Ameriks as being confined to the epistemological plane, i.e., as not being meant as ontological claims. Defenders of this interpretation also frequently point to Husserl’s notion of hyle as a realistic element.\textsuperscript{428}

The third viewpoint attributes to Husserl something of a neutral stand on ontological issues. Harrison Hall even goes so far as to claim that in transcendental phenomenology there is no way to raise ontological, metaphysical issues.\textsuperscript{429} According to Hall’s interpretation, Husserl’s realist pronouncements are pre-philosophical, that is, confined to his speaking in the natural attitude, whereas his idealism is non-metaphysical, that is, confined to meaning-analysis. Hall writes
that transcendental phenomenology is only meant to "understand" the natural attitude but not to justify existential claims raised by the former.\textsuperscript{430}

In order to evaluate these different interpretations and to provide an argument in favour of the second, it is important to understand what Husserl means by constitution. As Ernst Tugendhat has shown in his detailed study of Husserl's notions of truth and evidence, it is against the background of these notions that the concept of constitution is to be read.\textsuperscript{431} We saw in an earlier chapter how the \textit{Logical Investigations} treated (categorial) perception in order to explain how self-evidences concerning different meanings and their corresponding objects are possible. In other words, the study of self-evidences was the study of perceptive acts of different complexity, the study of acts that 'enable' different objects to "give" or "manifest" themselves to the perceiving subject. Now it is precisely this investigation into the conditions of the possibility of manifestation that the study of constitution is all about; the study of constitution is to clarify how meanings can be fulfilled, how objects of different complexity can be self-given in self-evidence. The adequacy of this interpretation can be seen, for example, from Husserl's statement that constitution studies the "manifestation" (= \textit{Selbstgegebenheit}) of objects\textsuperscript{432}:

The great subject matter of transcendental philosophy is consciousness in general, consciousness as an ordered structure of constitutive performances in which ever new steps or levels of ever new objectivities of ever new types constitute themselves, develop themselves in ever new manifestations [\textit{Selbstgebungen}]

\textsuperscript{433}

Three claims about constitution thus become immediately defensible. First, it is quite inappropriate to conceive of the manifestation of objects as a production of the objects. Second, the relation between a meaning and the corresponding fulfilling perception is an essential one (in specie); one that exists prior to and independent of any individual ego. And third, an object can manifest itself to a perceiver only as long as the perceptual acts last. Tugendhat explains these points in the following passage:
For instance, the "object" *Moonlight Sonata*—in specie—grows out of a specifically reglemented playing of the piano; and this object cannot even be thought of other than as a correlate (as what has been achieved) of this playing. The playing of the piano does not produce this object, rather the object has being only in the performance of the playing, the object constitutes itself in this playing. ... The theory of constitution results from the descriptive-analytical insight that—just as in the case of a piece of music the "object" "constitutes" itself only in the performance of a certain physical doing—the manifestation of every object in general constitutes itself only in a certain noetic performance. All of this must be understood as "in specie".434

Thus when Husserl writes that "nothing exists for me other than by virtue of the actual and potential performance of my own consciousness"435, he does not mean to say that everything that exists is produced by my transcendental ego. As already mentioned, Husserl stresses that constitution does not mean production of objects but rather the objects' own manifestation. What he means is that whatever is a purported object for me must be given to me in an act whose structure is such that this object can "manifest" itself; in other words the structure of the act is such that the object in question is "constituted" by this act.

Since constitution for Husserl thus is the enabling of the manifestation of an object rather than the producing of an object, Ingarden's argument for attributing idealism to Husserl seems to be without foundation.436

Proper attention to the essential connection (in specie) between a meaning, the fulfilling perception and the manifesting object also undermines Hall's contention that the transcendental phenomenologist can merely understand the realist's position without being able to justify it. Hall makes it sound as if the relation between the phenomenological and the natural attitude is parallel to the relation between psychiatrists and their patients: the former take no stand as to the truth of the latter's interpretations of their fellow men. They merely seek to understand that, given the pattern of interpretation of their neurotic worldview.
This turns out to be a mistaken model for transcendental phenomenology once we remember that the transcendental phenomenologist studies essential relations between meanings and the respective fulfillings and self-evidences. The phenomenologist investigates—among other things—why the assumption of a transcendent world is inevitable in the light of our experience; "increasingly complete ... perceptual continua harmoniously developed" support this assumption. Now whether or not these evidences are given or not is indeed a contingent matter. Furthermore, transcendental phenomenology is able to show that the evidences pertaining to the assumption of a transcendent world are not apodictic—unquestionable—as are evidences pertaining to a priori truths. However, given that these evidences pertaining to an existential claim concerning the world are instantiated, then this existential claim is not only understandable but also justified: "We ask now, presupposing all this, is it still conceivable, is it not on the contrary absurd, that the corresponding transcendent world should not be?" After all—as we heard earlier—these essential links would bind even a divine intellect.

In the light of these considerations there seems to be a strong case in favour of the thesis that Husserl adopts not only semantical and perceptual realism but also metaphysical realism.

4.5. Life-worlds and the Opposition to Relativism

As is to be expected from his general conception concerning the accessibility of meaning and reality, the transcendental Husserl can also be found to oppose cultural and—less explicitly—linguistic relativism. His stand on these issues is most clearly presented in his late work *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, in his paper "The Origin of Geometry" as well as in several shorter manuscripts published in the third volume of *The Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity*. Opposition to these forms of relativism is, to be sure, no new element in Husserl, for in *Logical Investigations* we already saw him attack psychologism precisely on the ground that it leads to relativism and scepticism; furthermore, we encountered in his ideal grammar an attempt to identify a common 'deep structure' for all languages. Earlier in this chapter we heard Husserl stress that the laws of constitution are essential, and not
relative to certain species. Now it is time to point out that Husserl does not withdraw a single remark from his outspoken opposition to relativism when giving more and more attention to the concept of life-world. As we mentioned above, recent Husserl scholarship has established that the *Crisis* and the other writings of the thirties do not mean any break with Husserl's earlier overall project of philosophy as a strict science. On the one hand, the life-world appears thematically since 1908 and terminologically since 1917. On the other hand, the central pillars of Husserl's methodology, the transcendental reduction and the eidetic variation, are fully preserved in his last works.

However, this is not to suggest that the *Crisis* and other late works do not introduce new ideas into phenomenology. For instance, David Carr has argued convincingly that history comes to hold a decisively new role in Husserl's *Crisis*. Whereas in Husserl's earlier works historical considerations concerning the origins of mathematics and phenomenology were more or less confined to serving as something of an introduction to philosophy proper, in the later works history becomes a genuine phenomenological concern, and historical reflections become indeed part of phenomenology. Furthermore, it is only in the *Crisis* that the relation between life-world and science is raised to being a central topic of phenomenological study, and that the correlativity between attitudes (natural, psychological, transcendental) and language receives attention.

To start from the last of these points, we saw in the context of section 4.1. that in the *Crisis* Husserl speaks of the life-world as identical with "the world that can be commonly talked about", that Husserl saw (prephenomenological) psychology as bound "to the psychic, as it can be expressed in the language of our linguistic community" and that he hinted at the possibility of a transcendental language being generated from a re-interpretation of language. More details can now be added by examining "The Origin of Geometry", one of Husserl's very last writings that probably was originally intended to be incorporated into the *Crisis*. Here Husserl strongly emphasizes the interconnections between civilization or culture, language and life-world. Thus it is claimed that "one is conscious of civilization from the start as an immediate and mediate
linguistic community". Concerning language Husserl writes that language is ... related correlatively to the world, the universe of objects which is linguistically expressible in its being and its being-such. Thus men as men, fellow men, world—the world of which men, of which we, always talk and can talk—and, on the other hand, language, are inseparably intertwined; and one is always certain of their inseparable relational unity, though usually only implicitly ...

In other passages of the same study Husserl makes clear that civilization and cultural world as life-world are, if not identical, at least "essentially corresponding" to each other. This suggests that for Husserl a specific life-world qua cultural world is correlated with a specific language, in other words, that a life-world is the world of a linguistic community.

However, Husserl's notion of life-world is not without its ambiguities. As has been pointed out by several scholars, the notion of life-world is not only applied to the cultural world, but also to the world of immediate—pre-linguistic—perceptual experience. In the Crisis, for example, after having criticized Galilei and Kant for having disregarded the life-world, and in turning to its explication, Husserl more or less repeats his earlier analyses of the perception of things and bodies; here the life-world does not seem to be treated as specifically cultural. More ambiguity stems from the fact that Husserl himself sometimes uses life-worlds in the plural while stating in other places that "the plural makes no sense when applied to it". Furthermore, Husserl calls the life-world a "world for us all" but also says that "each of us has his life-world, meant as the world for all". And finally, while in most places the life-world is opposed to the world of science, in other places the life-world is said to include science as a praxis.

These ambiguities somehow reflect the different elements in Husserl's thought that lead to the systematic treatment of the life-world: foremost the horizon analysis of perception, and the problems of intersubjectivity, objectivity, and science. It can perhaps also be suggested that the different ambiguities mentioned above can be seen
as interconnected and thus as hardly dramatic: if we take the life-world as the broadest horizon of pre-predicative experience, i.e., perception, then it is no surprise to see Husserl speak of it in the singular and as being one’s own; after all the direction of constitution starts from a sphere that is one’s own; intersubjectivity is only subsequently constituted via empathy. Only once the process of constitution proceeds beyond one’s own ("premordial") world, does the life-world cease to be one’s own: one perceives living bodies (Leiber) which one takes to be constituted by other transcendental egos in the same way as one (as transcendental ego) constitutes one’s own body. Taking this step—already of paramount importance in the fifth of the Cartesian Meditations—means ultimately to constitute an intersubjective world, a "world for us all". In Husserl’s numerous writings on intersubjectivity between 1929–1935, it is stressed that the intersubjectivity thus established is at first merely a local one—the term used by him is that of a "homeworld" (Heimwelt). Like the life-world, this homeworld is linked to language: "The homeworld of man ... is fundamentally determined by language." Only once this language community is constituted can I encounter other homeworlds as different life-worlds. It seems that in the Crisis Husserl has left aside the different distinctions between worlds, applying the notion of life-worlds to all stages of constitution. What probably encouraged this move was the fact that he wanted mostly to draw a conceptual wedge between science and everything relating to science as its object, its basis, medium, and condition, i.e., the life-world as a perceptual, cultural, and linguistically constituted world.

Another line of thought linking the singular as well as the plural uses of life-world to each other is Husserl’s opposition to cultural relativism. That Husserl regards this threat as a real one can be seen from the fact that he describes it over and over again in the published as well as in the unpublished texts of the thirties. For instance, an unpublished manuscript entitled "Paradoxes or Antinomies of Anthropological Relativism" reads:

At first it seems ... that we have to say the following: the world that has meaning for us and that is regarded by us as meaningful, and the ontology of this world, these all are related only to European people and culture—for other people, especially for a
primitive one, another world, and another ontology, and, in the end, ... another logic, is valid.\textsuperscript{464}

In the \textit{Crisis} the threat of relativism and its defeat is explained in the following passage:

... when we are thrown into an alien sphere, that of the Ne-groes in the Congo, Chinese peasants, etc., we discover that their truths, the facts that for them are fixed, generally verified and verifiable, are by no means the same as ours. ... But this embarrassment disappears as soon as we consider that the life-world does have, in all its relative features, a \textit{general structure}.\textsuperscript{465}

In other words, even though Africans and Chinese live in different life-worlds than we do, their life-worlds still share the same "general structure" as ours. It is one task of transcendental phenomenology to unearth this general structure in "a pure theory of essence of the life-world"\textsuperscript{466} or a "life-world ontology"\textsuperscript{467}. In this investigation the principal tools of transcendental phenomenology, transcendental and eidetic reduction, again loom large. Thus in "The Origin of Geometry" Husserl speaks of "the capacity of complete freedom to transform, in thought and fantasy, our human historical existence and what is there exposed as its life-world".\textsuperscript{468} In this variation, we are striving to find invariant, essential structures. By this procedure, we are told, we have dropped "every bond to the factually valid historical world and have regarded this world itself [merely] as one of the conceptual possibilities".\textsuperscript{469} Now since Husserl had earlier in the same text argued for a correlativity of specific cultural life-worlds and natural languages, it seems justified to go beyond his own wording and suggest that what holds for cultural life-worlds holds \textit{mutatis mutandis} for natural languages, too. Essential structures in all life-worlds are thus correlated with essential structures in all natural languages, and just as different cultural worlds are but variants of a general essence, so are natural languages.

However, the essential features of life-worlds are not confined to linguistic universals. In the \textit{Crisis} Husserl seems to hint that these invariant features are grounded in essential perceptive structures. In some earlier manuscripts these and other essential structures are
discussed somewhat more fully. For instance, in a Supplement to §44 of *Phenomenological Psychology* written in 1925, Husserl discusses "the problem of the natural notion of world as the identical structure that is valid for all people in their different environments (Umwelten)." The problem is how two tenets can be reconciled: the idea that different cultures live somehow in "different 'worlds'" and the idea that after all all cultures live in the same, one, world. This sameness, Husserl thinks, cannot be guaranteed by the (natural) sciences, since they do not belong to all life-worlds. Rather the sameness of the one physical world is to be explained via general structures in all different life-worlds. Members of different life-worlds frame the world according to different schemes only in so far as specifically cultural objects are concerned; yet their schemes necessarily overlap as far as physical objects are concerned:

We do not share the same life-world with all human beings. Not all human beings "in this world" share with us those objects that make up our life-world and that determine our personal doing and striving ... If we add to this [our] circle of human beings a Bantu negro, then it is clear that he will see our work of art as something or object but not as an object of our environment [Umwelt], as a work of art ... !

It is this common "space-time" framework of reference consisting of physical objects that constitutes the objective world for different life-worlds and that enables communication between different cultures:

Nevertheless, a single objective world runs through these different worlds. One is conscious of this fact in that everyone can communicate with any member of any life-world, and in that one finds oneself in agreement with this other person with respect to the same world ...

In another manuscript from 1931/32 "Experience and Practice—Surrounding World" the steps by which we can understand another life-world are explained in somewhat more detail. Beyond the jointly perceived world in space and time, Husserl now especially
stresses the role of certain actions and interests as universal features of all life-worlds. It is thus claimed that we understand others, that is, actions of others, in analogy to our own actions, and that we understand the products of these actions in the same way. In a footnote, Husserl suggests the following order to understanding:

1) Understanding of the body as organ, understanding by immediate appresentation and their immediate confirmations; 2) together with this and correlative: understanding of the immediate surrounding world as one that is common, normal, sensible for us; 3) understanding of immediate instinctive needs and of life in its common form of intimate every-day style; 4) analogy of spheres of interests that intervene in every-day life, but that go beyond the sensible every-day life, beyond the immediate. 478

However, Husserl adds that even with these four steps we are only able to open up the meaning of "the area of the craftsmanship" 479; for instance the art of another culture cannot be understood in this way. In subsequent manuscripts Husserl tries to tackle this remaining problem of understanding strange cultures mainly by historical and linguistic consideration, i.e., by studying the notion of tradition, by developing the idea of a historical a priori and by paying more and more attention to language. This development culminates in "The Origin of Geometry" where the notion of life-world gains a historical dimension—the notion of life-world is linked to the notion of tradition—and is connected to language. On this—final—analysis cultural objects (of our own as well as of another life-world) become accessible in their true—original—meaning only by historical analysis; that is, by an analysis that lays bare the layers or sedimentations of meaning in and through which cultural objects exist. This analysis reveals the origin of these cultural objects in basic and universal features shared by all life-worlds and studies the processes of how these objects are subsequently handed down in tradition by means of language. Since these processes themselves have essential features in specie, Husserl can speak of a historical a priori.

To be sure, in these investigations Husserl does not explicitly take up the question as to whether different languages are comparable with and translatable into one another. Nevertheless, the
Husserlian pronouncements on the relation between language and life-world, on the one hand, and on life-worlds, their common essence, and their understanding 'from outside', on the other hand, allow us to claim that Husserlian phenomenology opposes linguistic relativism even in its final stage. Since a life-world is essentially the world of a linguistic community (see above p. 118), since all life-worlds share in a common essence (p. 120), and since any one life-world is accessible to an interpreter from another life-world, it follows that no linguistic community lives within an incommensurable, untranslatable conceptual scheme.

4.6. Logic and Transcendental Phenomenology

In the two chapters on Husserl's pre-transcendental philosophy we saw how his fundamental premiss concerning semantics, that is, the conception of logic/language as calculus, emerged in the context of logical and mathematical investigations. In the present chapter we have studied how Husserl generalizes and applies this conception far beyond its original domain. Now it is time to review the effects which the adoption of the transcendental stand has for Husserl’s views concerning logic and mathematics. These views can be extracted fairly clearly from his Formal and Transcendental Logic as well as from Experience and Judgment, the latter work having been compiled and edited posthumously by Ludwig Landgrebe. In general, one can say that the central pillars of Husserl's conception of logic and mathematics as contained in the Logical Investigations are not affected by his transcendental turn. However, what is new in the later works is that Husserl now attempts to draw a clear line between logical syntax and semantics, formulates his position on formalism in mathematics more clearly, and attempts a phenomenological critique of logical truths and evidences.

In order to appreciate Husserl’s work concerning the syntax-semantics distinction, a brief summary of his ideas on "the structures and the sphere of objective formal logic" is called for. In Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl distinguishes between three strata within formal logic. The lowest level corresponds to what the Logical Investigations called "theory of the pure forms of meanings (or grammar of pure logic)". It is concerned with judgments in
their pure form, abstracting from questions concerning consequence, compatibility, truth and falsehood. Husserl suggests that we construct the variety of judgment-forms starting from the basic form ("primitive form", "fundamental form") "S is p". This construction is assumed to happen by means of a sharply delimited number of "operations" that can be applied in various orders. Such operations are, for instance, adjectivization (turning "S is p" into "Sp"), various forms of "modification" (producing, for example, "if S is p" or "then S is p"), operations concerning modalities of judgments, and conjunctive and hypothetical operations (producing "A and A'" or "if A, then A'"). Husserl suggests that even the basic "S is p" is already to be understood as the result of an operation, namely a result of "the operation of determining a determinable substrate, S".

It is the second, the middle level of formal logic, the "logic of consequence" or "logic of non-contradiction", and its separation from the third or highest level, the "logic of truth", which introduces a new element in Husserl's conception of logic. The distinction between the second and the third level also throws an interesting light on Husserl's semantical ideas. The logic of consequence studies sets of judgments from the vantage point of formal contradiction, consequence and compatibility, excluding, however, any concern with truth and falsity:

To seek out systematically the eidetic laws that govern just the analytic includedness and excludedness, just the internal and external analytic non-contradictoriness of judgments, singly or in combination, is a separate problem. ... It is an important insight that questions concerning consequence and inconsequence can be asked about judgments in forma, without involving the least inquiry into truth and falsity ... Husserl claims that the distinction between this second syntactical level and the third semantical level of the logic of truth is justified foremost by the observation that there is a special form of evidence, "distinctness", that pertains to the syntactical level. The fact that we can infer 'S is p' from '(Sp) is q' is evident or distinct without us interpreting S, p, and q.
Husserl makes some effort to show that the whole field of Logistik can be developed without semantical notions. For example, *modus ponens* and *tollens* .

If, at the same time, "If M, then N" and "M" are true (if they "hold good" at the same time), then "N" is true. If, at the same time, "If M, then N" and "Not N" are true, then "Not M" is true (or, equivalently, "M" is false).

can be reformulated in the logic of consequence as:

"N" follows analytically from two judgments of the form, "If M, then N" and "N". In the same manner, "Not M" follows from two judgments of the forms, "If M, then N" and "Not N".

In *Formal and Transcendental Logic* Husserl also includes a note by his former student, the mathematician Oskar Becker, who gives the following logic of consequence -reconstruction of Wittgenstein's definition of tautology:

"P is a tautology (or else a contradiction)" signifies: "P(p₁, p₂, ... pₙ) is compatible (or else incompatible) with either p₁ or non-p₁, with either p₂ or non-p₂, ... with either pₙ or non-pₙ."

As is the case with most of Husserl's projects, his distinction between logic of consequence and logic of truth also remains more on the level of a program for further research, rather than becoming a fully-fledged theory. Especially his remarks on the logic of truth are quite brief. What he does say, however, provides sufficient evidence for the claim that this level of logic is arrived at by interpreting judgments over different domains. Thus he says that the formal logic of truth is concerned with the search for essential insights into the possible truth of judgments, and that in this search we have to take "possible judgments as possibly undergoing verification, as possibly standing in a relationship of adequation to the corresponding judgments that give the supposed affairs themselves". He also writes that the logic of truth interprets judgements over a "world" or a "world-region" of individuals, individuals that are to be chosen "arbitrarily". This suggests that a judgment is true in Husserlian truth logic if and only if it is true in any (every) domain of
individuals. Despite the sketchiness of Husserl's remarks, these pronouncements are as good as any to provide evidence for the existence of model-theoretical ideas in his conception of logic: after all, what the pronouncements concerning truth logic and logic of consequence boil down to is the distinction between provability and validity. 497

The logic of consequence is the logic of an uninterpreted system, whereas the logic of truth is the logic of an interpreted one. What throws decisive light on this distinction from our vantage point is the observation how natural, on the one hand, this kind of distinction is for a follower of Hilbert (and thus for an adherer to the calculus conception), and how strange, on the other hand, it must seem to anyone abiding by Fregean principles. Frege takes logic to be tightly linked to the one and only actual world, but Husserl regards it as possible to study the meaning-system of logic without relating it to any world at all or—in truth logic—by relating it to alternative models, i.e., different worlds. Whereas Frege argues that "the laws of logic are first and foremost laws in the realm of references [Be- deutungen] and only relate indirectly to sense" 498, and whereas he holds that in formal logic we are to take reference to "the True" and "the False" as basic, Husserl's logic of consequence proceeds in the opposite direction: it concentrates on senses:

Analytics is a pure systematic theory of the region of what are strictly and properly senses [Sinne], only in its two lower strata: as the pure theory of forms of senses (or meanings) and as the pure analytics of non-contradiction. ... Its theme excludes all questions of truth; for precisely these, with the predicate "true" (and all its modifications), go beyond the Apriori that pertains purely to the proper essence of the sphere of senses ... 499

In passing it is worth noting that Husserl's views on logic were not developed in ignorance of Frege's work. In Husserl's library (preserved at the archive in Louvain) one finds all of Frege's major works. Most of them show marks of intensive study, a curious exception being Frege's review of Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic. Husserl also worked his way through the Begriffsschrift, making annotations and writing an extra page of comments. 500 Furthermore, Husserl's attitude towards formal, mathematical logic always remained a ba-
sically positive and interested one. For instance, in one manuscript dating from 1911, he writes that "all polemic directed against mathematical logic is based, I think, merely on a lack of insight into it".\(^5\)\(^0\)\(^1\), and in another manuscript of that year he praises the achievements of "mathematical logicians" in the following terms:

[They] have raised the logical [\textit{gattungslogischen}] disciplines in certain respects to a higher level of technical perfection. They have recognized the essential similarity of these disciplines with the formal-mathematical ones; thus they have transferred to them [viz., to the logical disciplines] the same algebraic method, a method that is indeed appropriate to them ...\(^5\)\(^0\)\(^2\)

However, continuing after this passage, Husserl makes clear what he regards as the limitation of mathematical logic as developed in his time:

Yet they [the mathematical logicians] are totally confused concerning the character and the meaning of these [logical] disciplines, concerning the content of the leading basic concepts ...\(^5\)\(^0\)\(^3\)

It was of course his own work on logic that Husserl regarded as doing away with this confusion and as thus in the end providing formal mathematical logic with a sound foundation.

An appreciation of Husserl's semantical ideas as revealed by his distinction between a logic of consequence and a logic of truth also highlights the significance of a further distinction put forward in \textit{Formal and Transcendental Logic}: the distinction between "formal apophansis" and "formal ontology".\(^5\)\(^0\)\(^4\) This distinction is meant as a generalization of Husserl's earlier notion of the correlation between a (syntactical) theory form and the corresponding manifold. Formal apophansis is nothing but the logic of consequence, i.e., mathematical logic confined to consequence and inconsequence. Formal ontology contains "the mathematics of sets, of combinations and permutations, of cardinal numbers (the modes of how-many), of ordinal numbers belonging to various levels of manifolds"\(^5\)\(^0\)\(^5\), all of which are nothing but "derivative formations of anything-whatever [\textit{des Etwas-überhaupt}]".\(^5\)\(^0\)\(^6\) Husserl suggests that numbers, sets and
manifolds are constructs, built up by mathematical operations from somethings-in-general: the number two, for instance, is 'something and something'; a set consists of somethings; and so on. Now Husserl's point is that just as a theory form correlates with a manifold, so also formal apophansis correlates with formal ontology. Judgments are always judgments about something, some object or objectivity, and all objects "have being for us—as truly existent or possibly existent modes—only as making their appearance in judgments. Accordingly, in all formal distinctions pertaining to judgments, differences among object-forms are included ..."507 For example, in formal apophansis we have the distinction between singular and plural, and in formal ontology the distinction between 'something' and 'somethings'.

What this distinction allows Husserl to do is to follow Hilbert's formalistic program without falling an easy prey to the charge of formalism: even though formal mathematics, that is, formal apophansis, operates 'merely' syntactically, its signs are not void of meaning: their meanings are given by the categories of formal ontology that are correlated with them. Husserl makes this point especially forcefully when discussing theory form and manifold, that respectively constitute the highest categories of formal apophansis and formal logic. He opposes tendencies, "to put in the place of the real theory of manifolds its symbolic analogue—that is, to define manifolds in terms of mere game rules".508 In the definition of a manifold, Husserl claims, we are not to speak of how we are allowed or supposed to manipulate signs, rather we are to speak of connecting forms holding among "the objects belonging to the manifold (conceived at first as only empty somethings, 'objects of thinking')".509 However, once we accept this façon de parler, we are free to ignore Frege's warning against formalism, and free to follow Hilbert:

... it is understandable that, for a consciously or unconsciously "pure" formal mathematics, there can be no cognitional consideration other than those of non-contradiction"; ... It is otherwise, to be sure, for the logician: ... he will not easily come upon the thought of making this reduction to an analytics of pure senses; and therefore he will acquire mathematics as only an amplified logic, which, as a logic, relates essentially to
possible object, regions and theories. ... One must see that a formal mathematics, reduced to the above-described purity, has its own legitimacy ... 

Husserl's distinction between three levels of logic and his distinction between apophansis and ontology are distinctions within "objective logic". In "objective logic" one takes judgments, meanings, and objects as given. In Husserlian jargon, both distinctions pertain only to the noematic side, without relating to the correlative noetic side of acts, to evidences, and to constitution:

Whereas formal [non-mathematical] logic as logic of meanings does not concern itself with questions of evidence and distinctness ... noetic logic proceeds the other way around. It concerns itself with the full experience, not in individuo but in the idea—and with the essential interrelations between all ideal components. 

This subjective side is studied foremost in *Experience and Judgment*. What this subjective or noetic approach to logic is all about is perhaps best explained by examining Husserl's criticism of Kant's position concerning logic. Husserl claims that Kant's transcendental philosophy remained half-hearted since Kant did not pose transcendental questions about logic. Husserl argues that these latter questions cannot be avoided, since questions concerning the conditions of the possibility of science must lead to questions concerning the possibility of logic. And questions concerning the possibility of logic can be sufficiently answered only by transcendental phenomenology.

So how is (formal) logic possible? The answer is to be found by studying those acts in which the self-evidences relating to logical truths are constituted. However, to study this constitution means going back to the most primitive, simple self-evidences, and explaining how logical self-evidences are founded (fundiert) on them. Now the basic form of judgment is "S is p". The task then is to understand which processes of constitution allow such a kind of predicative judgement to be evident. According to Husserl's analysis, the self-evidence pertaining to a judgement of the form "S is p" is not yet the most basic one. Since this judgment already has a specific structure, and since this judgment is already the result of an
"active synthesis", we must go back to acts in which the elements "S" and "p" are self-given. For Husserl this means that we have to study "passive synthesis", acts of perception in which something is perceived as something.

The details concerning these laboursome analyses are not of special interest for our purpose. However, what does deserve our attention concerning this transcendental justification of logic is the following: since Husserl grounds logic (and logical self-evidences) in perception (perceptual self-evidences), his project can be seen as an answer to the question 'What must be given in perceptual experience (in specie) to any intellect in perceptual experience for it to have logic (and logical self-evidences)?' This question does not only bring Husserl close to Russell's philosophy, as Jaakko Hintikka has already suggested\(^5\) (Russell's question was at one point precisely 'What must be given to me in experience for me to have the language I have?')\(^5\)), it also provides further evidence for the importance of two central tenets of the language/logic as calculus conception for Husserl: the one and only logic is binding in all possible worlds, i.e., in all possible intellects, and logical meanings are in principle accessible and open to systematic study. In every case of an ideal logical meaning we can study how it is known to us, that is, in the case of each and every logical meaning we can study how this meaning can be involved in acts of meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment.

5. SUMMARY OF HUSSERL'S NOTION OF LANGUAGE AS CALCULUS

In the three preceding chapters, I have interpreted Husserl's phenomenology as being based on the conception of language as calculus. Before turning to Heidegger, who eventually adopts the opposing conception of language as a universal medium, a brief summary of the main results of the first part of this study seems to be called for. Taking as the starting point the eight main tenets of the calculus conception that were distinguished in the Introduction, the following abstract of Husserl's calculus conception suggests itself:
Semantics is accessible. The defence of this thesis is of prime importance to Husserl throughout his philosophical career. His very starting point is to argue against the formalistic stand in arithmetic and to show that numbers have meaning. Initially Husserl believes that just any formal approach to numbers is meaning-denying, this being the reason for his lack of appreciation for Frege’s work. Husserl also thinks, by the early nineties, that he needs to oppose Schröder’s logic of classes because Schröder regards the content of concepts to be inaccessible. By the mid-nineties, Husserl comes to realize that even the psychology he has used as a stick to beat the formalist with could turn out to be a threat to the accessibility of meaning. Struggling with this problem, Husserl comes to adopt a platonistic stand in semantics, a move that demands extensive elaborations on how abstract, ideal meanings are accessible. These elaborations culminate in the sixth logical investigation, where it is shown that what allows us access to the realm of meanings is an investigation into types of perception qua meaning-fulfillments. In his transcendental phase, Husserl develops a new conception of meanings: noemata are no species of acts of meaning (the doctrine of the Logical Investigations) but rather ideal meanings as particulars. Yet noemata too are fully accessible: they can be isolated by way of transcendental reduction; the correlation between noema and noesis allows the study of meanings via a study of act-structures; and noemata are expressible in language. The only case in which Husserl is willing to weaken the thesis about the accessibility of semantics is the case of metalanguages: due to the possibility of ever new metalanguages being formed, semantics is inexhaustible.

It is possible to conceive of different systems of semantical relations. This tenet of the calculus conception appears clearly only in Husserl’s transcendental phase, although we are already told in the Logical Investigations that the relation between sign and thing referred to is arbitrary. In his debate with Fink, Husserl stresses that natural language does not have a fixed interpretation, and that a re-interpretation of language in toto is possible. The resulting transcendental language is then fit to express different semantical “ways of worldmaking”: the way different possible worlds are studied is by examining the different structures of meanings and ontological
commitments within different possible transcendental egos. Phenom- enologists can vary these structures systematically, for they are not trapped within any one such system.

\( C-3 \) Model theory and the notion of possible worlds are intelligible. In the early "Intentional Objects" Husserl opposes talk of possible worlds, even though he presents the idea behind this very idiom in the notion of frameworks that are constituted by fixed assumptions. While talk of possible worlds is scarce in Logical Investigations, the idiom is of crucial importance in the transcendental phase: eidetic structures hold in all possible worlds. Husserl formulates a sophisticated theory of possible worlds, showing interesting points of contact with Leibniz and Lewis: 'actual' is treated as an indexical, and transworld identity is denied. Furthermore, since possible worlds are correlated with possible transcendental egos—that are meaning-structures open to systematic study—the idea of the accessibility of semantics and the possible worlds idiom are interconnected. In his later work on logic, Husserl also shows appreciation for model-theoretical notions: his distinction between logic of consequence and logic of truth includes the distinction between provability and validity.

\( C-4 \) Linguistic relativism can be opposed. Critique of almost any form of relativism can be found in Husserl's oeuvre. It is precisely Husserl's opposition to relativism in logic and semantics that drives him towards platonism; not even a normative conception of logic (Frege) is strong enough to defeat this opponent. In the Prolegomena, psychologism is opposed on the ground that it leads to relativism, and that it has to treat world-views as relative to species. In the Logical Investigations, Husserl also presents his project of a universal grammar that as a tertium comparationis makes any two languages comparable and intertranslatable. It is Husserl's firm hope and belief that his method of reductions gives us a tool that allows us to free ourselves eventually from all perspectivity of tradition and culture. In his late work of the thirties, he also claims that linguistic communities do not live within incommensurable conceptual schemes: linguistic communities as life-worlds share a common eidos, and any life-world is open to outside empathetic understanding.
(C-5) **Semantical Kantianism can be avoided.** Husserl already argues against the idea of an ineffable world *an sich* in the *Logical Investigations*, claiming that it is psychologism that ultimately leads to the absurd result of Kantianism. In later writings this line of criticism is turned directly against Kant: any object (even the *Ding an sich*) must be an object for some ego, and each and every ego is in principle open to empathetic understanding. Since transcendental egos each have their home language, this argument has a semantical variant, too. Husserl is also a realist in the metaphysical sense: constitution does not mean creation. Study of constitution is the study of those acts in and through which objects are self-given.

(C-6) **Metalanguage is possible and legitimate.** Following Hilbert, Husserl accepts early on the idea of metalogical proof. Central to his whole enterprise is the notion of acts that relate to one another as object- and meta-acts. In his debate with Fink, Husserl argues for the possibility of a transcendental language as a true metalanguage with respect to natural ordinary language. To safeguard this distinction, he makes use of a special quotation convention, noema-quotation, and he speaks of Sinne of different order.

(C-7) **Truth as correspondence is intelligible.** Already in "Intentional Objects", Husserl develops a theory of truth that he himself sees as a re-formulation of the classical correspondence theory. A presentation is true if and only if it has an existing object. Husserl always takes his starting point from the notion of evidence as the epistemologically prior notion as compared with truth, since he wants to explain how truth is accessible to egos. The way to avoid relativism is to argue that the relation between types of meanings and types of fulfilling objects is an ideal one. The treatment of truth in *Logical Investigations*, the most extensive analysis of this topic in Husserl's œuvre, and one that remains binding throughout his later work, refines the phenomenological re-formulation of the notion of *adaequatio rei et intellectus*: truth is the total perceptual fulfillment of a meaning-intention. Husserl tries here to give a unified account of all truths, whether pertaining to simple meanings, sentences, and even logical analytical truths, in terms of correspondence and perception.
(C-8) Formalism can be accepted when linked to the idea of re-interpretation of a formal system, but it is opposed when seen as resulting from the idea that semantics is inaccessible. Against the formalists, the early Husserl holds that meanings of numbers are accessible. However, his opposition to formalism is weakened when his plan to extend the psychological-semantical analysis of cardinal numbers to rational, irrational, and imaginary numbers fails. The more positive attitude towards formalism that results is strengthened by an appreciation for the re-interpretability of "general arithmetic". Husserl's stress on re-interpretability also motivates his criticism of Leibniz's, Schröder's, and Frege's views concerning the relation between lingua characteristica and calculus ratiocinator: for Husserl the latter is re-interpretable, and thus not to be equated with the former. Husserl's somewhat ambivalent attitude towards formalism is resolved under the influence of Riemann and Hilbert. Formal systems are not void of content; they rather implicitly define manifolds as regions of formal objects. In his later work on logic, Husserl distinguishes clearly between logical syntax and semantics, and develops model-theoretical ideas.
PART III

HEIDEGGER’S ONTOLOGY AND LANGUAGE AS THE UNIVERSAL MEDIUM

Die Phänomenologie, das sind ich und Heidegger, sonst niemand.
(E. Husserl in the 1920s)

... das tautologische Denken. Das ist der ursprüngliche Sinn der Phänomenologie.
(M. Heidegger in 1973)

1. INTRODUCTION

In this part of my study, I turn to Heidegger’s philosophy.¹ I shall try to establish that, except for his very early writings, Heidegger’s ideas on language, truth, semantics, and logic are naturally interpreted as just so many corollaries of his belief in language as the universal medium. The position that Heidegger eventually developed thus shows a marked contrast to Husserl’s and to that of most of contemporary analytical philosophy. As we shall see below, however, even the Heidegger of the later writings does not stand completely isolated among his colleagues of this century. Several tenets of his later thought bear a remarkable resemblance to ideas proposed by Ludwig Wittgenstein. I shall point out some of these parallels, notwithstanding that comparisons between Heidegger and Wittgenstein have already been presented by other interpreters. A new examination of the parallels between Wittgenstein and Heidegger seems to be called for by recent advances in Wittgenstein scholarship. Notably, the book by Merrill B. and Jaakko Hintikka on Wittgenstein’s universal medium conception² provides a whole variety of new insights that have not yet been exploited in Heidegger research.

As concerns the structure of the following interpretation, I shall divide Heidegger’s development into three stages. The first phase comprises Heidegger’s publications between 1912 and 1916. In these early writings on logic, Heidegger remains closely aligned to Husserlian phenomenology. The second phase is, as I shall call it, 'the
period of *Being and Time*. Characteristic of this period, which lasts from about 1919 to 1930, is the project of an existential analysis of *Dasein* (Heidegger's term for 'human being'), i.e., an analysis of *Dasein*'s pre-theoretical and pre-predicative understanding of Being (*Sein*). Finally, the third phase begins about 1930 and ends with Heidegger's death in 1976. In this last phase, the project of existential analysis is "turned" into the "thought of Being". Here Heidegger exorcises the last Husserlian residues from his own philosophy, and comes to deny his earlier idea according to which us "mortals" can work out an adequate understanding of Being. As we shall see, this "turning" (*Kehre*) in Heidegger's thought leads to an even more radical universal medium conception than the one we shall encounter in Heidegger's middle period.

2. HEIDEGGER AS ADHERER TO THE CONCEPTION OF LANGUAGE AS CALCULUS IN HIS EARLY WRITINGS

The first phase of Heidegger's thought, which I take to be represented by his writings from 1912 to 1916, does not pose the same amount of interpretational problems that we shall meet when turning to his later views. This is due mainly to the fact that during his earliest period Heidegger's concerns as well as his ways of expressing himself are rather close to those of the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert, under whom Heidegger studied in Freiburg from 1911 to 1916, and to those of Husserl, who succeeded Rickert in 1916.

From the vantage point of this study, the earliest Heidegger is interesting for several reasons. First, we find Heidegger aligning himself to a considerable degree with many of those very ingredients of Husserl's conception of language/logic as calculus that he will later radically question. Second, we encounter an interesting deviation from Husserl, in that Heidegger, under the influence of Rickert, is more opposed to mathematical logic and formalism than Husserl. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Heidegger seems to be far more intrigued by Husserl's *Logical Investigations* than by the *Ideas*. Since the latter book was published in 1913, it could have left a clearer mark on Heidegger's *Habilitationsschrift* presented in 1915,
and published during the following year. The *Logical Investigations*, however, are much more central for the Scotus-interpretation of the *Habilitationsschrift*. This is of special interest in the light of Heidegger's later critique of Husserl's phenomenology, for in this critique Heidegger turns especially against *transcendental* phenomenology. What is at stake here is the question of whether Heidegger ever had any sympathy for Husserl's transcendental program. Even though the absence or the unavailability of manuscripts from these years still makes any final assessment impossible, it seems a highly plausible suggestion to say that even though Heidegger was initially intrigued by the phenomenology of the *Logical Investigations*, he never became, and never was, a transcendental phenomenologist in the sense of Husserl's writings from 1913 onwards. Evidence for this claim is provided by the concluding chapter of Heidegger's *Habilitationsschrift*, where we already find him taking some first steps in the direction that will eventually lead him to abandon the conception of language as calculus, and that thus will lead him to adopt the notion of language as the universal medium.

2.1. Realism and the Critique of Psychologism

In his first scientific publication, the article "The Reality Problem in Modern Philosophy" (1912), Heidegger opposes the phenomenalism of both the Machian and the Kantian brand. The arguments employed against these positions are influenced by Husserl's attack on psychologism, and they show Heidegger's commitment to the accessibility of the concepts by way of which we relate towards the world. This commitment is, of course, a central ingredient of the language as calculus conception.

In his paper, Heidegger claims that the contemporary philosophical scene is dominated by "conscientialism" (Konzentialismus) and "phenomenalism"5, both of which are said to deny the possibility of knowledge of an independent reality, and both of which are held to stand in opposition to the "healthy realism"6 of modern science. Heidegger takes Avenarius and Mach, among others, as representatives of conscientialism. As their main arguments, Heidegger distinguishes "aprioristic", "empirical", and "methodological" arguments. The first is built on the assumption that the very notion of
a mind-independent reality is a contradiction in terms, since "mind-independent reality" is a concept formed by—and thus dependent on—the mind. The empirical argument holds that what consciousness is presented with are mere mental facts or experiences (*Bewußtseinstatsachen*), and the methodological argument claims that only knowledge of our own mental experiences is knowledge of the utmost certainty.  

In order to refute these arguments, Heidegger draws in each case on Husserl's critique of psychologism, and especially on the notion of the irreducibility of the ideal concepts and the ideal laws of logic to psychological laws or facts. Thus, against the aprioristic argument Heidegger holds that the notion of "mind-independent reality" is not merely something in the mind. Rather, this notion, like all other notions, has an ideality that transcends the singular mind. For the same reason the claim that our consciousness is presented only with mental experiences is mistaken: in mental experiences we encounter logical principles as valid, principles that for this very reason cannot be regarded as purely psychological. To claim otherwise is to conflate the psychic act and its content: "It is here that once again the erroneous identification of the psychic act and the logical content comes to the surface." Finally, distinguishing between act and content also undermines the claim that knowledge of mental events has the highest degree of certainty: knowledge about our own mental states *qua* facts is less certain than knowledge about mind-independent meanings, concepts and logical laws.

Husserlian influences are also apparent in Heidegger's critique of Kantian phenomenalism. Heidegger calls the *Ding an sich* "mysterious" and a "purely dogmatic assumption", and he argues—like Husserl—that Kant's own thinking about pure concepts of understanding already disproves Kant's claim that only what is given intuitively (*anschaulich*) can be thought. Heidegger stresses that it is precisely the logical, systematic study of "concepts, judgments, and inferences" that ensures that eventually their effect upon our way of conceiving the world can be more and more limited. As far as the Kantian phenomenalism is concerned Heidegger suggests that understanding and reason, far from making objects given in perception 'subjective' by imposing concepts upon them, rather serve to elim-
Heidegger calls his brand of realism "critical", claiming it to be not only in accord with science but also important for the "Aristotelian-scholastic philosophy".

How deeply Heidegger was impressed by Husserl's attack on psychologism can be seen not only in the fact that he employed some elements of this attack in his brief and sketchy defence of critical realism, but still more clearly in his review of "New Researches on Logic" (1912) and in his doctoral thesis *The Theory on the Judgment in Psychologism. A Critical-Positive Contribution to Logic* (1913). Especially in this later work, Heidegger tries to push further Husserl's program of exorcising psychologism from logic and philosophy in general.

In the review, Heidegger sees the rise and fall of psychologism as the main issue in recent logic. However, he gives credit for the refutation of psychologism not only to Husserl but also to the neo-Kantians Cohen, Windelband, Rickert, and Natorp, as well as to Frege. While agreeing with Natorp, who once wrote that the neo-Kantians had little to learn from the *Prolegomena* of the *Logical Investigations*, Heidegger still writes that it was Husserl's work that has "in fact broken the psychological spell". Heidegger does not only mention Frege in this context *qua* critic of psychologism, but also praises his "On Sense and Reference" and "On Concept and Object", writing that Frege's "logical-mathematical investigations have, I think, not yet been appreciated for their true importance ..."

While the review remains more or less on a programmatic level, the doctoral thesis attempts to show that psychologism hides in places which had not been studied by Husserl, for instance and foremost in theories of judgment. Heidegger claims that even though psychologistic relativism has been discredited in general, it still raises its ugly head in specific doctrines.

Heidegger singles out the theories of Wundt, Maier, Brentano, and Lipps, and gives a short summary of their ideas before unmasking them each in turn as psychologists. The details of these theories and the adequacy or inadequacy of Heidegger's criticism are not of special interest from my vantage point. What deserves attention,
however, is that Heidegger, like Husserl, repeatedly capitalizes on the inner link between the conception of logic as a normative science or *Kunstlehre*, and psychologism. Heidegger suggests that if logic is conceived of as a normative science, logic depends on a volitive act, i.e., on "a desirous presentation, flowing from the nature of our Being". Heidegger argues against this conception, claiming that it leads into a fully-fledged relativistic anthropologism:

To anchor logic, as the theoretical science *per se*, in a desirous presentation, in an act of the will, an act whose appearing and existence is determined by the nature of our Being, [to anchor logic in this way] means *complete anthropologism*.23

More specifically Heidegger argues against the *Kunstlehre* notion in his review in a manner reminiscent of Husserl. He criticizes Meinong by saying that "logic as *Kunstlehre* presupposes the theoretical science, and cannot in itself be regarded as a science".24

### 2.2. Rickert's Influence, the Critique of Logistik, and Truth as Correspondence

As I have argued in my interpretation of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl's opposition to psychologism and the *Kunstlehre* doctrine is linked to his deeply rooted belief in the accessibility of semantics. In Husserl's opinion a psychologistic conception of logic and meaning makes meanings inaccessible to scientific study. Since Heidegger sides with Husserl in taking logic to be a systematic theoretical discipline that studies meanings, the same basic ingredient of the language as calculus conception also characterizes his stand. While there is hardly any difference between Husserl and the early Heidegger over this issue, Heidegger does, nevertheless, take a somewhat different position concerning the relation between logic as a semantical enterprise and formal, mathematical logic. Refuting Schröder, Husserl certainly stressed that logic proper should not be reduced to a formal algorithm, and in his later works Husserl does not show any special interest in formal logic. But Husserl hardly thought that mathematical logic poses as dangerous a threat to logic proper as psychologism does.
Yet this is precisely the position taken first by Rickert and now by Heidegger. In his paper "The One, the Unity and the Number 'One'. Remarks on the Logic of the Number Concept". Rickert had argued that logic needs to be clearly set apart from mathematics and that after the defeat of psychologism the greatest threat to "the independence of logic" comes from "a direction that one might call logical mathematism". In the review on "New Researches on Logic" Heidegger echoes this idea in the context of a brief comment on Russell’s and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica. What he says on this work is far too brief for us to determine how intensively Heidegger had studied this modern classic. In any case, his general assessment of the possibilities of formal logic as a tool for the analysis of logical notions and judgments is highly sceptical. Like Rickert, Heidegger proposes that the next main task for logical studies—after the venture of refuting psychologism has been completed—is to push Logistik and mathematics out of logic proper:

With this theory there arises for logic a new task of demarcation. In order to provide a solution to it, I think that the first thing that it is necessary to show is that Logistik does not at all pass beyond mathematics, and that it is unable to reach the truly logical problems. I see the weakness of Logistik in that it uses mathematical symbols and concepts (foremost the concept of a function), a use that conceals the meanings and meaning changes of judgments.27

This quotation shows that Heidegger's opposition to formal logic is based on the idea that the use of formalization makes semantical studies impossible. This not only makes it possible to understand why the early Heidegger, as a follower of Husserl’s semantical ideas, tended to view formal logic critically, it also makes it possible to understand why psychologism and formalism are opponents of equal danger: both hinder systematic semantical study.

In line with Rickert, Heidegger also suggests that logic and mathematics belong to different ontological categories: whereas mathematical idealities have Being, logical idealities "hold (valid)" (gelten).28 This is a notion that Heidegger takes up several times in his early work, especially in his doctoral thesis. Here Heideg-
ger first argues that meanings are ideal by pointing out that the same judgment-content "The bookcover is yellow" can be uttered under different circumstances, and with the involvement of different psychological processes. Different tokens of uttering "the bookcover is yellow" are tokens of a type that is non-physical and non-psychological. What remains identical in different tokens of utterances Heidegger calls "meaning" (Sinn), and he characterizes the "form of reality" (Wirklichkeitsform) of meaning as "Gelten": "The form of reality of meaning is Gelten; the form of reality of the event of judging [the event] in which the meaning can be found ... is temporally determinate existence." Logic is the study of ideally *geltend* meanings, the study of ideal contents of acts, rather than the study of these acts themselves.

Not only is Gelten the "form of reality" of meanings, it is also the essence of the copula, and the key for a reconstruction of the correspondence theory of truth. Thus Heidegger believes that the true meaning of the judgment "The bookcover is yellow" is "Being-yellow holds (gilt) for the bookcover", and that the essence of the judgment is "that one meaning content holds (gilt) of another". It is the copula that expresses this element of Gelten. The correspondence theoretical notion of truth, the "*adaequatio rei et intellectus*", can then be reformulated as follows:

A judgment is true or false in so far as a meaning content holds (gilt) determinatively for the object of the judgment. The old notion of truth, i.e., *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, can be raised to the purely logical sphere, once *res* is taken as object, and *intellectus* is taken as determining meaning content.

In the light of Heidegger's later criticism of the correspondence theory of truth, it is curious that in his early period he aligned himself this explicitly with this classical notion of truth. Thus in addition to the accessibility of semantics and realism, and the opposition to relativism and formalism (when understood as the exclusion of semantics), the early Heidegger also advocates that conception of truth that a defender of language as calculus is drawn towards, namely truth as correspondence.
2.3. Husserl, Scotus, and Thomas of Erfurt

The central tenets of the conception of language as calculus also appear in Heidegger’s Habilitationsschrift *The Theory of Categories and Meaning of Duns Scotus*.\(^{34}\) This work deserves some attention here, since it is as much a topical as it is a historical study. In a letter to Martin Grabmann (7.1.1917)—who later showed that the *Grammatica speculativa* on which Heidegger bases the second part of his thesis was actually written by Thomas of Erfurt\(^ {35}\)—Heidegger freely acknowledges the shortcomings of his study from the historical perspective but claims that these could not have been avoided “due to the deliberately new treatment of the subject matter with systematic aims in mind”.\(^ {36}\) Heidegger believes these aims have been accomplished: “Perhaps it is interesting for you to hear that the work has been illuminating for Husserl to such an extent that I can be satisfied. Also Rickert now looks upon the scholastic with different eyes.”\(^ {37}\) Grabmann himself later saw Heidegger’s achievements precisely in this respect: “Especially Heidegger has understood and managed to adapt the medieval author to the forms of Husserl’s philosophy, i.e., the terminology of phenomenology.”\(^ {38}\)

From our vantage point, Heidegger’s way of interpretation is a quite fortunate one, for it allows us to see to what extent he identified himself with Husserl’s philosophical program, especially with that of the *Logical Investigations*. I shall concentrate on these aspects here, leaving aside Heidegger’s attempt to vindicate Rickert’s ideas concerning the differences between the logical and the mathematical “one”.

Heidegger’s attempted historical vindication of Husserlian ideas starts in the context of a discussion of the notion of *verum*. The connection with Husserl is already alluded to in the headline of this part of the doctoral thesis: “The *Verum*: the Logical and the Psychological Reality”. First of all, Heidegger claims that the realm of the logical is characterized by intentionality, and that this realm is to be distinguished—according to Scotus—not only from the mathematical, but also from the psychological.\(^ {39}\) Second, even though Heidegger’s characterization of Scotus’s theory of truth is quite brief and rather unclear, Heidegger relates it to Husserl’s theory which says that truth is the fulfillment of a meaning intention.\(^ {40}\) Third, Heideg-
ger interprets Scotus’ *ens logicum* and *ens in anima* as Husserlian noematic *Sinn*, claiming that Scotus tried to make a distinction between the noetic, i.e., the *subjective in intellectu*, and the noematic, i.e., the *logicum*. Fourth, the distinction between *prima* and *secunda intentio* is identified with the distinction between the natural and the reflective stand in phenomenology.

In Heidegger’s treatment of the *Grammatica speculativa* and of some other Scotistic pronouncements in the domain of meaning, the Husserlian perspective goes even beyond occasional references and comparison, becoming the central framework of interpretation. For instance, Scotus’ ideas on the relation between word and meaning or, more generally, sign and meaning, are couched in the terminology of the first of the *Logical Investigations*. Heidegger points out—just like Scotus and Husserl—that the domain of meanings must be set apart from language as sign system, despite the fact that meanings can be expressed only with the help of words:

*The identity of the realm of meanings remains untouched in its *Geltung*, despite all differences in the sound-structure of particular languages, and despite the fact that the content [of this realm] may be ”grasped” and brought to an understanding in quite different forms of words and sentences.*

Heidegger also sees something of a parallel between Scotus’ idea according to which the domain of meanings is set apart from the domain of things, and the Husserlian epoché; thus he claims that for Scotus ”meaning presents itself . . . as detached from all realities” and that ”in the act-character of meaning-bestowing the specific accomplishment of position taking [concerning existence] is absent”. Furthermore, Heidegger goes to great pains to interpret the pseudo-Scotistic—that is Thomas of Erfurt’s—distinction between *modi significandi*, *modi intelligendi*, and *modi essendi* in terms of noema, noesis, and other phenomenological concepts. For instance, *modus significandus activus* is identified with the noesis, while *modus significandus passivus* is identified with the noema. In line with Husserl’s notion of constitution as manifestation, Heidegger also interprets Thomas’ demand to derive *modi significandi* and *intelligendi* from *modi essendi*. The Being of objects (*modi essendi*) is to be ar-
derived at by studying their manifestation in a knowing or perceiving subject (modi intelligendi), a study which in turn demands an investigation into the structure of the meanings through which these objects can be meant (modi significandi).47

Finally, Heidegger sees in the Grammatica speculativa a program for the very logical grammar that Husserl suggested in the fourth of the Logical Investigations. Heidegger shows that the Grammatica speculativa allows for a syntactical treatment of modi significandi in isolation, separated from questions of truth and falsehood: the modi significandi "are as it were the nerve of the process of forming complex meanings; they prescribe the combination of the latter, and they form an area of original lawfulness".48 Truth and falsehood enter the picture only as we turn to the domain of modi intelligendi. Not only is Thomas' theory of meaning composition conceived of by Heidegger in Husserlian terms, but he also deviates from his main historical subject matter in order to defend the Husserlian project against contemporary criticism.49 Criticizing one scholar's argument that grammar cannot be reduced to logical grammar, Heidegger claims, in accordance with Husserl, that even though the Sprachgeist is not completely logical, it still has "as Geist also a specific ... logical structure; it is only and precisely this structure that the logic of language seeks to identify".50

2.4. On the Way to Being and Time

Whereas in the central passages of the Habilitationsschrift we find Heidegger rather intensively occupied with a historical vindication of several of Husserl's main ideas (and thus occupied with at least a partial historical vindication of Husserl's conception of language as calculus), we encounter a somewhat different tone of voice as we turn to the concluding chapter of the work, a chapter that had not been a part of the actual Habilitationsschrift as presented to the faculty in 1915, but that was added for publication in 1916.51

As one contemporary reviewer of Heidegger's book was quick to complain, this final chapter is somewhat unclear or even obscure.52 Furthermore, in the light of our knowledge of Heidegger's subsequent development it is only too easy to overemphasize the importance of the pronouncements made there. Nevertheless, it does seem justified
to treat this chapter as giving us some indications as to how Heidegger’s subsequent work—that ultimately lead to *Being and Time*—got under way.

Heidegger formulates three basic demands for future investigations into categories, the Scotistic doctrine of which he had tried to interpret in the first part of his study. The first is described as "the characterizing demarcation between different areas of objects into categorial regions that cannot be reduced to one another". This demand does not yet amount to a step beyond Husserl, for Heidegger is probably thinking here merely of a clear distinction between the realms of the psychological, the logical, the physical, and the mathematical, a distinction that was also crucial in Husserl’s project.

Heidegger is more explicit as concerns the second demand, "the placing of the problem of the categories within the problem of the judgment and the subject". This does not as such sound like a new program, but as Heidegger spells out the implications of this "placing", he clearly goes beyond what Husserl had in mind. This is already indicated by Heidegger’s promise that in elaborating this point he will draw attention, "at least in a most general outline, to the necessity of a metaphysical settlement of the problem of knowledge". Heidegger claims that the central notions of logic and contemporary epistemology, like those of subject and object, immanence and transcendence—which in turn are but special versions of the general form/matter distinction—need to be reconsidered: "The 'form vs. matter' duplicity is today a decisive tool in working on epistemological problems. Therefore, a *principal* investigation into the value and the limitations of this duplicity has become inevitable." Logic alone is insufficient to deal with this problem, since logic is confined to forms and since logic presupposes the matter as given. Thus logic and its problems can be studied only from a "translogical", that is, metaphysical, perspective:

*In the long run, philosophy cannot do without its genuine optic, that is, metaphysics.* Concerning the theory of truth this means the task of an ultimate metaphysical-teleological interpretation of consciousness. The valuable already lives originally in the consciousness, because consciousness is meaningful and meaning-realizing living deed. This deed has not been under-
stood at all when being neutralized into the concept of a biological, blind factuality.\textsuperscript{58}

It is not difficult to read these sentences as anticipations of several fundamental views of Heidegger's subsequent thought: (i) metaphysics precedes logic, (ii) the notion of truth has to be clarified by studying the metaphysical-temporal structure of the "living deed" of consciousness, or of the "living spirit" as Heidegger says several times in the same context, and (iii) the mode of Being of this living spirit cannot be reduced to the biological. This list is easily extended by noting the sentence immediately following the quoted passage: "Within the wealth of the directions of the forming of the living spirit, the theoretical attitude is but one, ..."\textsuperscript{59} In his subsequent writings, Heidegger of course emphasizes the observation that the theoretical attitude is rooted in the practical doing.

Yet another important theme of the later writings is touched upon by Heidegger's third demand: "history and its cultural-philosophical-teleological interpretation must become the decisive element for the problem of the categories. Otherwise one cannot expect to work out the cosmos of categories, and thus to pass beyond a scanty, schematic table of categories."\textsuperscript{60} The justification for this claim also lies in the observation that "the living spirit is as such essentially historical spirit ..."\textsuperscript{61}

As already mentioned above, it is certainly an exaggeration to read Heidegger's subsequent writings as a mere elaboration upon the program sketched in these passages. Yet, as we shall see in the next chapter, Heidegger's development of a similar program in his writings between 1919 and 1930 amounts to a radical criticism of almost all of the crucial pillars of Husserl's phenomenology that, as we just saw, Heidegger was initially willing to abide by. This criticism eventually forced Heidegger to develop a rather different conception of knowledge, truth, meaning, and language, a conception that can naturally be characterized as a variant of the idea of language as the universal medium.
3. THE WORLD AS A "CLOSED WHOLE"
THE PERIOD OF BEING AND TIME

3.1. Introduction: Heidegger 1919–30

In this chapter I shall deal with Heidegger's philosophy, roughly from 1919 to 1930. This is the phase where the existential analysis of Dasein is Heidegger's main concern.

Dating the beginning of this period as 1919 is somewhat arbitrary, and based solely on no material being currently available on the courses that from 1916 to 1918 Heidegger taught on "Kant and 18th Century Philosophy" (1916), "Aristotle's Logical Writings" (1916), "Truth and Reality (Basic Problems of Epistemology)" (1916/17), "Hegel" (1917), "Plato" (1917/18), and "Lotze and the Development of Modern Logic" (1918/19). Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Heidegger's private assistant during the seventies, has informed me that Heidegger did not keep any of his notes for these courses. In fact, Heidegger told von Herrmann that during this early stage of his academic career he did not believe "that these notes would ever become 'manuscripts'". Interestingly enough, from 1919 onwards, Heidegger must have changed his mind on this issue, and indeed the preserved texts and lecture-notes from about 1919 onwards (like the lecture-series "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Weltanschauung" (1919), "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion" (1920/21), "Augustine and Neoplatonism" (1921), "Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle—Introduction to Phenomenological Research" (1921/22), as well as the critique of Jasper's Psychology of Worldviews (written between 1919 and 1921) show clearly that Heidegger had already by that time developed many of the most important tenets of Being and Time.

The dating of the end of "the period of Being and Time" as 1930, as I have done, is also open to questioning and debate. However, it is apparent that, starting with the lecture "On the Essence of Truth" (1930), Heidegger later abandoned his existential analysis of Dasein as the key to the question of Being. Heidegger gave up this approach because he came to realize that it had still been bound to Husserlian—and, more generally, traditional—presuppositions. Heidegger had wanted (in the period of Being and Time) to pass beyond...
the traditional notion of the subject. Yet the notion of Dasein as a being-in-the-world still retained elements of this traditional conception. For instance, the very idea of starting from Dasein's understanding of Being was but a continuation of the traditional, Cartesian, view according to which philosophy must take its lead from the ego-subject's understanding and doing. In giving up this premiss around 1930, Heidegger was later led to speak of Being (Sein), truth, meaning and language as primary with respect to us "mortals". As I shall argue in the next chapter, this new conception is deeply rooted in Heidegger's conception of language as a universal medium of meaning. However, in reviewing some of the major topics of the writings between 1919 and 1930, we shall see that much more than just the seeds of the later view are already present in the period under investigation here. Thus the "turn" (Kehre) from existential analysis of Dasein to the "thought of Being" is not a radical break, nor indeed a change from language as calculus to language as the universal medium. Rather it is a logical step in the following sense: the attempt to spell out explicitly the consequences of the universal medium conception of Being and Time naturally leads to the later position; the implications of the universal medium conception of Being and Time demand that the Husserlian residues still found in Being and Time be explicitly expelled.

It follows from the purpose of my study that I shall not engage in an analysis of the whole range of topics covered by Heidegger between 1919 and 1930. Rather I shall focus on those themes that enable us to see that Heidegger does indeed bend strongly towards accepting the most important tenets of the universal medium conception. Furthermore, it will be useful to examine Heidegger's criticism of Husserl, for here we find the motivation for Heidegger's own project. Not only shall I abstain from trying to treat the whole spectrum of themes in the middle Heidegger, I shall also largely ignore questions as to his development within this period. On the one hand, far too little material is as yet available to scholarly research for anyone to write a detailed history of Heidegger's thought. On the other hand, no important shifts seem to have occurred in those of Heidegger's fundamental beliefs that I shall investigate in this chapter.

Nevertheless, what does call for some brief comments are, re-
respectively, the role of the 1919 lectures on the "Idea of Philosophy", the question concerning the relation of *Being and Time* to Husserl's phenomenology, and the place of *Being and Time* among the other available material of the twenties.

The 1919 lectures need to be commented upon, since on a superficial reading they might be taken to constitute something of a separate phase in Heidegger's development. In this lecture-course, Heidegger turned vigorously against the epistemology of Rickert and that of other neo-Kantians like Windelband and Natorp. Besides identifying internal inconsistencies in their enterprises, Heidegger accused them of neglecting the primacy of the practical over the theoretical, of employing the obsolete subject vs. object distinction, and of relying above all on the unclear dichotomy between an ideal and a real realm of objects. While Heidegger was later to use all three arguments against Husserl, too, in 1919 he seems to suggest that it is Husserlian phenomenology that has overcome these mistaken views and false distinctions. Thus it looks as if in 1919 Heidegger aligned himself fully with Husserl's phenomenological program.

This reading is undermined, however, by the fact that it underestimates not only Heidegger's intelligence but also his opportunistic tendencies. On the one hand, it is highly unlikely that a thinker of Heidegger's eminence should not have noticed that his arguments against the neo-Kantians would also apply to Husserl's phenomenology. (This view is shared by H.-G. Gadamer and Fr.-W. von Herrmann; pers. comm.) On the other hand, in reading Heidegger, one should take into account that Heidegger tends to conceal his views wherever he thinks it favourable for him to do so. Heidegger's praise for Husserlian phenomenology in 1919 probably finds its explanation in this trait of his personality.

That this charge of a readiness on Heidegger's part to hide his true views is not unfounded or unfair can be seen clearly when we consider how Heidegger conceived of the relation of his existential analysis of *Dasein*, especially in *Being and Time*, to Husserl's phenomenology. Did Heidegger—at least at some point in the twenties—regard his project of *Being and Time* as an extension of the Husserlian framework, as somehow merely adding a study of the practical
life, or did he take his project to be a complete overthrow of phenomenology? That Heidegger called his own project in *Being and Time* a phenomenological one somehow suggests the former view, and led many readers (for instance Husserl's highly gifted student Oskar Becker⁷³) to adopt this interpretation. That this view is mistaken can be easily seen from Heidegger's pronouncements in his correspondence with Karl Löwith. On February 2, 1923, Heidegger wrote:

In the last seminar class I publicly burned and destroyed the *Ideas* to such an extent that I dare say that the essential foundations for the whole [of my work] are now clearly worked out. When I look back from this standpoint to the *Logical Investigations*, then I think this: Husserl was never a philosopher, not even for a second in his life. He becomes ever more ridiculous.⁷⁴

And on May 8, 1923, Heidegger added: ('my Aristotle' here refers to a book on Aristotle in which Heidegger was planning to develop his ideas on ontology as rooted in the existential analysis of *Dasein*)

... my "ontology" slips over and over again—but it obviously gets better.—It contains the main blows against phenomenology—I am standing now completely on my own feet. ... I am seriously considering whether it is not best to withdraw my "Aristotle".—There hardly will be any appointments [to a chair in philosophy]. And after I have published, there will no longer be any prospects. Probably the old man will then realize that I am wringing his neck—and then succession is out.⁷⁵

If we remember here that Heidegger wrote *Being and Time* precisely in order to be able to succeed Husserl in his chair, then we have a plausible explanation as to why this work left open—with the full intent of the author—the option of being interpreted as still moving within Husserl's phenomenological framework.

This curious character of *Being and Time* also affects the problem as to what position this modern classic is to be assigned among Heidegger's lecture courses of the twenties, published over the last decade as parts of the *Gesamtausgabe*. Since these lectures were not meant to be published, Heidegger dared to speak his mind much
more freely in them. Furthermore, some Heidegger scholars have drawn attention to Being and Time having been written in a great hurry—the only time in his life when Heidegger did not even manage to shave! (Gadamer, pers. comm.)—the book therefore having the character of a "patchwork"\textsuperscript{74}. Even though this assessment of Being and Time is contested by at least one distinguished expert (von Herrmann, pers. comm.), there seems, nevertheless, to be good reason not to overemphasize the importance of Being and Time as compared with the available lecture-courses of the same period.

With these more general comments concerning the "period of Being and Time" out of the way, we can turn to more substantial questions.

I shall start my interpretation of Heidegger's 'middle period' from what I take to be the \textit{Leitmotiv} not only of his criticism of Husserlian phenomenology but also of his own project. This \textit{Leitmotiv} is the opposition to the traditional distinction of 'subject vs. object'. This is the distinction between a knowing or perceiving ego-subject, encapsulated within a sphere of immanence and certainty, and the explicitly identified, transcendent object. According to Heidegger's analysis, this model is ill-fitted to treat properly such phenomena as Being-in-the-world, language, meaning, etc., all of which we are only unthematically aware of: we are acquainted with them, but we cannot—without distorting them—turn them as it were \textit{in toto} into objects of inquiry. Being-in-the-world or Being-in-the-language amounts to living within a universal medium of meaning, a "closed whole", that cannot be transgressed, that cannot be compared to a world \textit{an sich}, and that can be investigated only 'from within', that is, in a \textit{circular}, \textit{hermeneutical} fashion. Since the world as a universal medium cannot be transgressed, it follows, according to Heidegger, that the world-reducing phenomenological reduction needs to be given up, and that the issues of truth and modalities, among others, need to be addressed anew.

Having thus seen how Heidegger's rejection of the 'subject vs. object' distinction leads him to a position that naturally is characterized as a variant of the universal medium conception, I turn to Heidegger's \textit{ontological} concerns. These concerns cannot be separated from his criticism of the 'subject vs. object' distinction and
from his notion of world. I shall first try to explicate the importance of Aristotle’s philosophy for Heidegger. It was Heidegger’s admiration for Aristotle’s inquiry into the meanings of Being (Sein) that stimulated not only Heidegger’s ontological project but also his critical study of the Stagirite. What Heidegger gained from this study was above all two insights: first, in his ontological investigations, Aristotle falls prey to the same ‘mistake’ (favouring the theoretical attitude over the practical) that Heidegger—following the lead of Dilthey and Natorp—identified in Husserl and the neo-Kantians. Ultimately, Aristotle reads the meanings of Being from the declarative, theoretically-oriented sentence. Second, despite this ‘mistake’ Aristotle shows appreciation for the need to study practical life; in the *Rhetorics* he provides his reader with something of an existential analysis of the speaking *Dasein*, and in *De Anima* he studies the ontology of life.

In so far as Aristotle—at least potentially—had the conceptual tools for an unbiased investigation into Being qua Being, he was ahead of Husserl. Even though Heidegger owed to Husserl’s theory of categorial intuition the idea that an understanding of Being is already involved in prepredicative experience, he regarded the phenomenological reductions as an obstacle to ontological inquiry; what the reductions reduce, after all, is precisely Being qua existence. Thus Heidegger’s own ontological project does not take its lead from Husserl; rather, it is based on the idea that our pre-theoretical understanding of Being has already to be presupposed in its investigations, and that therefore, ontology can proceed only hermeneutically-circularly. As a result, the conception of philosophy as a strict, objective science has to go by the board.

Further support for attributing the conception of language as the universal medium to the middle Heidegger can be adduced as we turn to his pronouncements concerning language and truth. Although Heidegger’s remarks on language in the period under investigation here are scarce, they are nevertheless plain: we cannot grasp the world independent of our historical language; language and world cannot be abstractly separated; and language plays with us. Equally unequivocal are Heidegger’s pronouncements concerning truth. Every defender of the universal medium conception—in the
absence of special additional premisses—is faced with a choice, i.e.,
the choice between either declaring truth as correspondence to be
"indefinable", or developing an alternative new account. Heidegger
chose the second possibility. Insofar as Dasein lives within a universal
medium of meaning, Heidegger suggests, it lives in a "disclosed" world, or, "in the truth". Since truth is thus relative to a specific historical Dasein, claims to transhistorical, eternal truths turn out to be unfounded.

3.2. Being-in-the-world as Being within a Universal Medium of Meaning

In this section, I shall focus on Heidegger's critique of the subject-
object scheme, Heidegger's notion of world, and the implications of
this notion for my interpretation. We shall see that in his analysis of
Being-in-the-world, Heidegger moves away from his earlier advocacy
of the idea of language as calculus, taking a stand that makes a long
step towards the universal medium conception.

The main line of Heidegger's critique of the subject-object distinc-
tion as he takes it to be presupposed in Husserl's phenomenology
can be summarized in the following way. Phenomenology should not
and cannot take its starting point from the intentional relation be-
tween subject and object (qua thing or fact) since this relation and its relata are embedded in the world as a universal medium of mean-
ing. Insofar as Husserl (together with the whole tradition) neglects
this foundation—especially in Logical Investigations and Ideas I—he
is led to a false conception of actual life, of the theoretical attitude,
and of the world in general. Husserl studies the perception of some
isolated object, and extends his results to cover intentionality in
general, ultimately the relation between the subject and the world.
Thus Husserl, according to Heidegger, is forced to conceive of the
world as object-like, as something transcendent, and as inessential
to the Being of the subject. Criticizing this view, Heidegger argues
that we must start not from some particular object and the way it
is perceived, but from an appreciation of the world as the universal
medium of meaning. Proceeding in this way undercuts the tradi-
tional dichotomies between the subject and the object, the subject-
sphere and the object-sphere, immanence and transcendence. These
dichotomies go by the board, since the world as universal medium of meaning is not an object but an unthematic whole in and by which the human being (*Dasein*) lives. The nature of the world as the universal medium of meaning implies that we cannot step outside of it, and that any understanding within it and of it is inevitably circular.

Heidegger clearly expresses his uneasiness with intentionality as the foundation of phenomenological research. In a lecture series from as early as 1921/22, "Phenomenological Interpretations on Aristotle—Introduction to Phenomenological Research", Heidegger claims that "what has always bothered me is this: has intentionality fallen from the sky? And if it is something ultimate: in which ultimacy does it have to be accepted?"\(^77\) In subsequent lectures, as well as in *Being and Time*, this uneasiness is expressed over and over again.

Heidegger criticizes Husserl and the philosophical tradition most openly in lecture-series given in 1925 ("Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time")\(^78\), 1927 ("Basic Problems of Phenomenology")\(^79\), and 1928 ("Metaphysical Foundations of Logic Starting from Leibniz")\(^80\). In 1927 Heidegger takes his starting point from what one would today call "folk-theoretical" conceptions of intentionality, arguing that these conceptions have had an unfortunate impact upon the philosophical debate.

One ordinary way of understanding intentionality is to take it as a relation between two independently existing things. For there to be a relation of intentionality a physical object and a psychic subject are needed; with either of the two missing, intentionality is impossible. Heidegger refutes this position by drawing on phenomenological insights: we can be intentionally related to something even if it does not exist; perception is intentional even if it is directed at something non-existing.\(^81\)

A second folk-theoretical misconception, also dominant in philosophical thought and informing even phenomenology to some degree, is the idea that intentionality is merely a feature of experiences (*Erlebnisse*). This leads to the pseudo-problem of explaining how a subject can reach an experience-transcending object. Heidegger mentions Descartes as the advocate of the philosophical version of
this view, even though some of the phrases used to characterize this position, like the distinction between the certainty of the immanent sphere as opposed to the uncertainty of the transcendent, had also been employed by Husserl. In order to refute this stand, Heidegger nevertheless relies on Husserl himself, especially on Husserl’s view that a perceptual act is not intentionally directed towards some picture or sign, but to the perceived thing itself.\(^\text{82}\)

However, Heidegger goes beyond Husserl by questioning the whole notion of the subject-object dichotomy which Husserl typically employs. Heidegger takes this dichotomy to be invariably linked to the "erroneous subjectivizing of intentionality".\(^\text{83}\) It is from the need to avoid this error that the motivation for the introduction of the notion of "Dasein" derives:

Because the usual separation between a subject with its immanent sphere and an object with its transcendent sphere—because, in general, the distinction between an inner and an outer is constructive and continually gives occasion for further constructions, we shall in the future no longer speak of a subject, of a subjective sphere, but shall understand the being to whom intentional comportments belong as Dasein ...\(^\text{84}\)

_Dasein_ is no sphere of immanence as opposed to the sphere of transcendence: "For Dasein there is no outside, for which reason it is also absurd to talk about an inside."\(^\text{85}\)

In the lectures given in 1925, Heidegger claims that the use of the traditional terminology in the analysis of intentionality (and here Heidegger seems to be referring precisely to the subject-object opposition) is "metaphysically dogmatic".\(^\text{86}\) Two years earlier, in his lectures on "Ontology", he had already made the reference to Husserl explicit by calling the use of the subject-object scheme one of the two main "misunderstandings" of phenomenology—the second being the belief in the freedom from all standpoints\(^\text{87}\):

_This scheme_ has to be kept away: There are _subjects and objects_, consciousness and Being; Being is the object of knowledge; the genuine Being is that of nature; consciousness is "I think", i.e., ego-like, ego-pole, centre of act, person ...\(^\text{88}\)
In the same context, Heidegger goes on to say that "no modification of this scheme can overcome its inadequacy"\textsuperscript{89}, and he deplores the "disastrous invasion of this scheme into phenomenological research".\textsuperscript{90} Finally, in 1928 Heidegger writes that Husserl failed, like Brentano before him, to draw the proper conclusions from their insights into intentionality, the first and most important conclusion being that the very notions of consciousness and human being have to be recast in non-traditional terms.\textsuperscript{91} Giving up the subject-object distinction is the key to an adequate conceptualization of intentionality and the original transcendence on which it is grounded: the "\textit{Being-in-the-world}".\textsuperscript{92}

Thus Heidegger does not only hold that Husserl sticks to a misleading terminology; he also claims that Husserl has fallen prey to the misleading implications and temptations of this terminology. As for the need to start both from a systematic analysis of Being-in-the-world as the foundation of intentionality and from an analysis of the original phenomenon of transcendence, Heidegger writes that "neither Bergson—and he least of all, along with Dilthey—nor Husserl sees the problem and the phenomenon".\textsuperscript{93} In fact, Heidegger claims that Husserl has not only neglected the problem, but has even distorted the whole issue of the original and most basic relation of the human being to the world.

As Heidegger points out in his most extensive criticism of Husserl's phenomenology, the "Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time" (1925), Husserlian phenomenology touches upon the problem of the world only in the context of a theoretically-oriented perception of some worldly object. That is to say, the central paradigm of intentionality for Husserl is what one might term \textit{explicit perceptual identification}—that is, the explicit 'picking out' of an object—or, more technically, the \textit{deliberate focussing of perceptual attention on an object}. What is lost right from the start, however, is the network of meaningful objects that are—always already—\textit{implicitly identified} by us in our dwelling and doing, objects that we are acquainted with without our needing to focus our attention on them. And what is worse, Husserl's paradigm of intentionality is ill-suited to capture \textit{Dasein's self-identification}, that is \textit{Dasein's way of determining who it (he, she) is}, and wants to be.
Heidegger believes, however, that Husserl's one-sided stress upon theoretically-oriented perception, i.e., explicit identification, has a natural explanation. Heidegger speaks of a "basic temptation for phenomenology", that phenomenology as theoretical science tends to pick out as its prime subject matter "a specifically theoretical comportment to the world ... Thus a specifically theoretical apprehension of the thing is put forward as an exemplary mode of Being-in-the-world ..." This narrowing down of the modes of intentionality then leads naturally to Husserl's claim that the basic character of intentionality consists of "assuming [Meinen] ... taken as an indifferent, neutral character of knowing ... [that] all other modes of relating towards beings are built upon".

This inclination to treat explicit (perceptual) identification as the primitive also distorts the relation of Dasein towards itself and towards others: Dasein's primordial intentional relation towards itself is not to be conceptualized as turning itself reflectively into an object of inquiry, for Dasein's primordial relation towards itself is not theoretically-oriented:

Intentional direction-toward is not simply an act-ray issuing from an ego-center, which would have to be related to the ego only afterwards, in such a way that in a second act this ego would turn back to the first one ... Rather, the co-disclosure of the self belongs to intentionality.

Equally, the Being of other Daseins is misunderstood when couched in terms of the subject-object distinction, i.e., as something that needs to be explicitly identified:

The I–You relation thus cannot ... be conceptualized as a personified subject-object relation.

The apparently presuppositionless approach which says, "First there is only a subject, and then a world is brought to it", is far from being critical and phenomenally adequate. And neither is the assumption which holds that first a subject is given only for itself, then leading to the question, how does the first subject reach another subject?

Dasein knows—implicitly—about his fellow man prior to any deliberate focussing of perceptual attention.
Heidegger argues against Husserl’s presupposition that explicit identification is basic, stating that explicit identification, as the 'picking out' of an object, is itself rooted in, and possible only against, the background of implicit identification as unthematic and unspecific acquaintance with the world. As Heidegger stressed in 1921/22, and as he had already demanded in the conclusion of his Scotus-book, approaching this phenomenon demands choosing pre-theoretical, practical dwelling or living as one's subject matter; approaching this phenomenon adequately demands starting from "factual life", taking "life" as a "phenomenologically basic category".

This practical life always deals with 'something'. In order to avoid the pitfalls of the traditional misconceptions, this 'something' cannot be called 'thing' or 'object'. According to Being and Time, and the "Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time", a better term would be the Greek "πράγματα", that is 'those that we are dealing with in everyday life'. Heidegger suggests "Zeug" (equipment) as a German translation. Equipment surrounds us as work-equipment, eating-equipment, etc. What is characteristic of equipment is that it is part of a totality, that it is unthematic, only implicitly identified, and interconnected. Heidegger conceptualizes this specific nature of equipment, namely to be unthematic, unobjectivized, unnoticed, as a specific mode of Being: he calls it "Zuhandenheit" (readiness-to-hand). Put yet another way, equipment is not an object for a perceiving subject, it is not meant or explicitly known, rather it surrounds Dasein in its ventures before the theoretical stand is ever taken. In order to make this difference between equipment and the (explicitly, theoretically) identified object terminologically clear, Heidegger calls the latter "vorhanden" (present-at-hand).

Heidegger firmly emphasizes the claim that readiness-to-hand precedes presence-at-hand, that is to say that implicit identification precedes, and is the basis of, explicit identification. It is only when the original intimacy and familiarity with the world is somehow disturbed that Dasein explicitly directs its attention to the 'object' as the source of the disturbance within Dasein's dwelling. Therefore, the theoretical attitude is secondary in relation to the practical one.
Heidegger characterizes more precisely the universal medium of meaning in which Dasein always moves as a "context of references" (Verweisungszusammenhang) and as a "closed whole". More specifically, he speaks of references as "meanings" that make up the world: "The references and the contexts of references are primarily meaning. The meanings are ... the structure of the being of the world. The whole of references of the world is a whole of interrelations between meanings." This world is not something that Dasein encounters when 'turning away from itself', but is always already in an immediate unity with Dasein insofar as Dasein cannot be but be-in-the-world. In order to make explicit the special sense in which he wishes to use the term "world", Heidegger distinguishes four senses of this notion: (1) world as physical nature; (2) world as an eidos of all possible physical natures; (3) world as a social category, le grand monde; and (4) "an ontological notion of world" which refers to "the metaphysical essence of Dasein in general, with respect to its metaphysically basic condition: transcendence". In this fourth sense, world is "worldlihood" and "Being-in-the-world", i.e., the central characteristic of Dasein. In this sense, Heidegger can say that there is no world without Dasein.

In order to show more clearly that Heidegger's 'world' is naturally conceptualized as a universal medium of meaning, let me spell out a few corollaries of his view. (Heidegger's conception of Being, and his notions of truth and language, I shall take up in subsequent sections.)

Let us note first of all that Heidegger calls the world of Dasein a "closed whole". This term suggests that there is no point outside of this whole, that it cannot be transcended. This teaching needs to be appreciated in order to understand correctly Heidegger's speaking of the world as a "project" (Entwurf) of Dasein. On a superficial reading it might appear as if Heidegger were claiming that the individual Dasein can freely determine in which world it wishes to live. For instance, Heidegger writes: "Only where there is freedom ... only here there is world. To put it briefly, Dasein's transcendence and freedom are identical!" However, it needs to be stressed that the freedom in question here is not the freedom of the individual to construct its world from some worldless point of view. To claim this would
contradict Heidegger's pronouncements, according to which *Dasein* "always already" lives in an interpreted world as a closed whole of meaning. Furthermore, Heidegger also points out that "thrownness" is central to the condition of *Dasein*: *Dasein* is thrown into a world that is a historical world with specific ways of understanding *Dasein* itself and the things in the world. The individual *Dasein* cannot transcend the "Geschick" (fate, destiny) of its community and its tradition. "The heritage which has come down" to *Dasein* does not determine completely how *Dasein* understands itself, but *Dasein* cannot bypass the world into which it is thrown. The individual *Dasein* has the choice between authentic and inauthentic existence, the possibility to determine how it wants to understand itself within the alternatives offered by its community and its tradition, but in choosing to live authentically it does not disentangle itself from the world into which it is thrown. It seems most natural, therefore, to understand the freedom Heidegger refers to as applying to a rather abstract, transcendental plane: since the meaning-whole in which *Dasein* finds itself can only have originated—in the absence of theological premisses—from there having been other *Dasein* before it, and since the interpretation of the world, the project, cannot be shown to be determined by what it interprets, this interpretation is determined only by a historical tradition of *Dasein*. *Dasein* is metaphysically-transcendently free in the sense that outside of *Dasein*'s own history nothing determines what the world is like, or how the world is "disclosed".

More interesting than the mere refutation of this possible misunderstanding of the nature of the project in Heidegger is to see how his further pronouncements concerning the nature of the project are connected to the thesis of the inexpressibility of semantics. What I have in mind is Heidegger's idea that the world (or the project, or the closed whole of meaning) is projected onto something:

World is only, if, and as long as *Dasein* exists. Nature can also be when no *Dasein* exists. The project of world, though it does not grasp what is projected explicitly, does *throw* the projected world over being [das Seiende]. This, in turn, allows being to manifest itself.
In other words, the project is our only access to the world *qua* nature, to nature as that *onto which* the project is projected. This claim naturally leads to the idea that the relation between the project and that *onto which* it is projected is inaccessible to us. As far as I can see, Heidegger does not explicitly draw this conclusion—which amounts to the inaccessibility of semantics—but his silence on the relation between the project and 'nature' is equally telling.

Furthermore, and here I come to the second corollary of Heidegger's treatment of the world of *Dasein* as a universal meaning, it should be noted that Heidegger regards "understanding" (*Verstehen*) as one of the fundamental attributes of *Dasein*. Not everything that is implied in this claim is of interest to us here, but it is worth-while to examine one ingredient. *Dasein* can relate to its world only by partly presupposing a pre-given interpretation of its world, and it can relate to meanings only by partly presupposing the whole or totality of meaning in which it lives. In *Being and Time* as well as in the lecture-series on "Rhetoric" given in 1924, Heidegger conceptualizes the circular character of *Dasein*'s understanding with the help of the notions of "*Vorhabe*" (fore-having), "*Vorsicht*" (fore-sight), and "*Vorgriff*" (pre-conception). *Vorhabe* is that totality of meaning—the universal medium of meaning—that cannot be transcended and that is the condition of the possibility of the whole process of interpretation; it includes the *interpretandum* as well as the *interpretans*. This totality of meaning cannot itself become an object of explicit interpretation. To use Neurath's famous metaphor, it is like a ship on which the interpreter travels, a ship that in the process of interpretation is repaired—while necessarily remaining in the water. *Vorsicht* is the interest that singles out the interpretandum out of the totality, and *Vorgriff* is the system of concepts used in the interpretation. *Vorhabe*, *Vorsicht*, and *Vorgriff* are connected in a circular fashion, since *Vorsicht* and *Vorgriff* are "always already" part and parcel of *Vorhabe* that must be presupposed and cannot be interpreted as a whole. Heidegger claims, accordingly, that moving in a circle is essential to any investigation of meaning:

*But if we see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just 'sense' it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of understanding has been misunderstood*
from the ground up. ... What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way. ... The 'circle' in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning. ...\textsuperscript{116}

Heidegger does not only bend towards the universal medium conception, however, by thus claiming that the "closed whole" of meaning cannot be transcended and must always already be presupposed. A third corollary of Heidegger's claim that \textit{Dasein} is inevitably linked to its world seems to be his denial to speak of worlds in the plural, a denial that cannot but also affect his analysis of modalities.

Heidegger did in fact speak of world in the plural when formulating his hermeneutics of \textit{Dasein} between 1920 and 1922, distinguishing between "self-world" (\textit{Selbstwelt}; the world of \textit{Dasein} itself), and "with-world" (\textit{Mitwelt}; the world of the others)\textsuperscript{117}. In 1925, however, he criticized his own earlier way of speaking as inadequate.\textsuperscript{118} This self-correction hardly comes as a surprise, since to speak of worlds in the plural would have to appear to Heidegger as just one more way of treating the world as something present-at-hand, as something that can be treated as an object. Accordingly, Heidegger had already written in 1920 that "'world' is something within which one can live (and one cannot live within an object)."\textsuperscript{119}

Looking at the few remarks Heidegger made on modal notions\textsuperscript{120}, one can easily see that this doctrine of the uniqueness of the world forestalls any way of treating modalities in terms of possible worlds. Explaining the specific character of \textit{Dasein} as understanding itself via its possibilities, Heidegger writes:

The Being-possible which \textit{Dasein} is existentially in every case is to be distinguished sharply both from empty logical possibility and from the contingency of something present-at-hand ... As a modal category of presence-at-hand, possibility signifies what is \textit{not yet} actual and what is \textit{not at any time} necessary. It characterizes the merely possible. Ontologically it is on a lower level than actuality and necessity. On the other hand, possibility as an \textit{existentiale} is the most primordial and ultimate positive way in which \textit{Dasein} is characterized ontologically.\textsuperscript{121}
First, note that Heidegger says of 'present-at-hand' -possibility that it signifies something 'what is not yet actual', thus suggesting that it will be actual sooner or later. This 'definition' of possibility has at least something of a temporal-statistical ring, and as we shall see below (p. 170), Heidegger does indeed couch 'presence-at-hand' possibility in terms of the Aristotelian δυνάμει.

Second, *Dasein* is possibility because it understands itself only via its possibilities, via those possibilities it has chosen or not chosen in the past, via those possibilities in which it lives now, i.e., those possibilities that have become actual, and via those it intends or does not intend to strive for. Heidegger expresses the idea that human beings cannot avoid understanding themselves in this way by saying that human beings are "thrown possibility". This expression is also meant to emphasize that *Dasein* does not choose its possibility out of nothingness. Rather, *Dasein*—"always already"—finds itself situated within actualized possibilities that *Dasein* has never at any point in its past either accepted or rejected. We should also note that the possibilities of the future do not consist of everything that is logically possible. Just as Husserl’s "motivated possibilities" as possibilities of further perceptions of an object are predelineated in the perceptual act, so existential possibilities are predelineated by *Dasein*’s "project" (*Entwurf*). Heidegger stresses that understanding has the structure of a "project", and that this overall conception of ourself as beings in the world—a conception that usually is again unthematic and implicit—determines what are possibilities for us.

What is striking about these remarks in *Being and Time* is that Heidegger does not engage in any detailed discussion of traditional modal theories. This is striking because *Being and Time* usually confronts its own solutions (for instance, solutions to the problems of space, world, and time) with those of the philosophical tradition, and goes on to show that the latter are either inauthentic or secondary. One would expect such an investigation especially in the case of modalities, for not only was Heidegger well aquainted with Aristotle, the medievals and Leibniz, but also Husserl’s possible worlds approach should have posed an additional challenge to him. We can conjecture that the reason why Heidegger did not take up this task is that he did not find a way of dispensing with Husserl’s possible
worlds model without returning to a temporal model with its snares of determinism. Some backing for this thesis is found in the fact that shortly after having written *Being and Time* Heidegger started to lecture on Aristotle's modal theory. When he deals in these lectures with the Megarian temporal-deterministic conception, he defends them against Aristotle's and Plato's attempted refutations: "One has reason to doubt whether Plato and Aristotle really understood or conquered the central objections of the Megarians." (This claim is also interesting in that it concurs with recent studies on Aristotle's modal theory by J. Hintikka, U. Remes and S. Knuuttila.) Heidegger's tendency in *Being and Time* to think of true possibilities as being more than just conceivable objects or states of affairs can also be seen from his remark that the subject matter of historical science is the "quiet force of the possible." In his "Letter on Humanism" written about twenty years after *Being and Time*, Heidegger explains this expression, stressing that possibility here is not to be opposed to actuality:

As the element, Being is the "quiet force" of the favoring-enabling, that is, of the possible. Of course, our words "possible" and "possibility", under the dominance of "logic" and "metaphysics", are thought solely in contrast to "actuality"; that is, they are thought on the basis of a definite—the metaphysical—interpretation of Being as *actus* and *potentia* ... When I speak of the "quiet force of the possible" I do not mean the *possibile* of a merely imagined *possibilitas*, nor *potentia* as the *essentia* of an *actus* of *existentia*: rather, I mean Being itself ...

Furthermore, even though *Being and Time* does not claim that all existential possibilities are actual sooner or later, it is interesting to note that Heidegger's premisses suggest that even those existential possibilities that remain unactualized have some sort of actuality. For Heidegger, true existential possibilities include only those possibilities in terms of which human beings understand themselves; these possibilities are the ones which are, as it were, constitutive of what human beings are. Using Aristotle's famous definition of movement, we might say that true existential possibilities are always actual in that they are *actual as possibilities*. This interpre-
tation is neatly confirmed by the basic existential order Heidegger gives his reader: "Become what you are".\textsuperscript{128}

One interesting corollary of this Heideggerian insistence upon the singularity or uniqueness of the world is that it explains, at least in part, why Heidegger employs the term \textit{Dasein} in place of the more conventional concepts 'man' or 'human being'. Note that the grammar of \textit{Dasein} does not allow for a plural form: \textit{Dasein} is a \textit{singulare tantum}. Now since the world is unique, and since \textit{Dasein} (\textit{qua} individual or \textit{qua} community) is correlated with the one world, uniqueness of the world implies uniqueness of \textit{Dasein}.

Finally, Heidegger's idea of \textit{Dasein}'s being bound to its world of meaning also allows him to take a stand beyond the dispute between realism and idealism over the existence of an external world. The main reason why Heidegger feels that he has a stand 'beyond' the dispute is that, on his analysis, both parties overlook that \textit{Dasein}, insofar as \textit{Dasein} cannot but be within a universal medium of meaning, has its own world, and thus has a world that cannot be questioned as to its existence. Even to pose the question of the existence of an 'external world', \textit{Dasein} must already be situated within and acquainted with a universal medium of meaning, in and through which it is in-the-world. Since both idealism and realism overlook this unity of world, meaning, and \textit{Dasein}, their debate is misconceived:

Idealism and realism both let the relationship of Being [\textit{Seinsverhältnis}] between subject and object first \textit{emerge}. Indeed, in idealism this leads to the assertion (...) that it is the subject which first of all \textit{creates} the relation of Being to the object. Realism, which goes along with the same absurdity, in contrary fashion says that it is the object which through causal relations first effects the relation of being to the subject.\textsuperscript{129} ... After the primordial phenomenon of Being-in-the-world has been shattered, the isolated subject is all that remains, and this becomes the basis on which it gets joined together with a 'world'.\textsuperscript{130}
3.3. From Phenomenology as an Absolute Science to Phenomenological Ontology as Hermeneutics

In the preceding section, I focussed on Heidegger's notion of Being-in-the-world as Being-in-a-universal-medium-of-meaning. Little has been said as yet, however, of why Heidegger takes his own project to be an ontological one. In this section I turn to this question. I shall try to show how Heidegger's critique of the transcendental reduction is rooted in his ontological concerns and how his rejection of the reduction leads him to a conception of phenomenology as hermeneutics. As we shall see, this move from transcendental phenomenology to hermeneutics is crucially motivated by the idea that the meaning of Being can only be clarified in a circular fashion. Being is the most fundamental category; Being is the meaning that is involved in all of Dasein's relating to itself, to others, and to the world. Thus Being cannot be investigated without making use of an antecedent understanding of Being. Therefore, the idea of absolute science cannot be maintained, and philosophy has to manage without any absolute truths.

It is not difficult to explain how Heidegger's criticism of Husserl's use of the 'subject vs. object' distinction is connected to the question concerning the meaning of Being. It suffices to recall the basic principle of phenomenology according to which

(i) to be is to be for a consciousness

or, more precisely,

(ii) to be is to be an object for a (constituting) subject.

In the preceding section, we have seen that according to Heidegger Husserl takes being-an-object as being present-at-hand, i.e., as being explicitly identified or identifiable. Thus instead of (ii) we must write:

(iii) To be is to be present-at-hand.

In questioning the subject-object distinction, Heidegger is thus naturally led to ask whether Being has been adequately understood, whether the meaning of Being is indeed exhausted by Being-present-at-hand.
That Heidegger was sensitive to the ontological issues involved in, and presupposed by, transcendental phenomenology, is not surprising in view of his earlier work on medieval philosophy and in view of his strong interest in Aristotle and the neoscholastics. Heidegger himself has reported that it was his reading of Brentano’s *On the Manifold Meanings of Being in Aristotle* (1862) that as early as during his high school years stirred his interest in questions of ontology and made him turn to Brentano’s student Husserl during his early academic years. However, in turning from Brentano’s Aristotle to Husserl, Aristotle was not left behind. Indeed, the importance of Aristotle for Heidegger’s development can hardly be exaggerated. This can be seen, for instance, from the fact that by 1922 Heidegger planned to work out his hermeneutics of *Dasein* in a book-size study on Aristotle, from the fact that he frequently devoted his lectures to Aristotle’s philosophy, and from some of his pronouncements on the Stagirite. For example, in a lecture course on "The Phenomenology of Religion" (1920/21), Heidegger said that "Aristotelian metaphysics is perhaps ahead of our metaphysics today". In 1926, in lectures on "The History of Philosophy from Thomas Aquinas to Kant", the same assessment is suggested.

Today it is difficult to see exactly in which way Heidegger arrived at some of the central tenets of his own project via a critical reading of Aristotle, for the book manuscript of 1922—if it ever existed—is not preserved. The long treatment of Aristotle’s ontology, however, in the 1926 lectures on "Ancient Philosophy", and the lectures given in 1924 on Aristotle’s rhetoric, provide some indications as to what the Todtnaubergian might have gained from his encounter with the Stagirite.

In the lectures of 1926 Heidegger praises Aristotle for having been the first philosopher who asked for the meaning of Being qua Being. This praise notwithstanding, Heidegger goes on to examine critically whether Aristotle’s analysis of the meanings of Being is free of undetected presuppositions. Heidegger thinks that there are mainly two such hidden presuppositions in Aristotle’s ontological enterprise. One is the tacit assumption that the genuine meaning of Being is something like "independent constancy" or "presence(-at-hand)", the other is the belief that the meaning of Being is to be
read from the theoretically-oriented declarative sentence.

From his reading of the Stagirite, where accidental Being (ὅν κατὰ συμβεβηκός) and true Being (ὅν ὥς ἀληθές) are excluded from Being qua Being, Heidegger realised that Aristotle assumes "independent constancy" to be the genuine meaning of Being:

This is how we obtain the character of genuine Being as independent constancy: the accidental lacks the character of constancy. It exists merely sometimes and is arbitrary. Being-true lacks the character of independence, in that as the revealing of something, it is essentially related to a being which it [the true sentence] detects.\textsuperscript{138}

In other words, the way by which Aristotle seeks to exclude accidental and true Being from the genuine meaning of Being provides—\textit{via negationis}—an indication as to what he takes that genuine meaning to be, viz., independent constancy.

Heidegger also examines the notion of \textit{ousia}, the first category, on which, according to Aristotle, all other meanings of Being depend.\textsuperscript{139} Heidegger suggests that \textit{ousia} is best rendered as "presence(-at-hand)" (\textit{Vorhandenheit}) for three reasons. First, in its pre-philosophical use, \textit{ousia} means something like 'yard' or 'farm', that is to say, things that surround the farmer, i.e., things that are literally present around him. Second, independent constancy is nothing but another expression for presence; that which is independent of changes occurring around it, and which is constant or unchanging in its attributes, is identically present in time. Finally, Aristotle's distinction between \textit{ōn δυνάμει} and \textit{ōn ἐνεργεῖα} is but a distinction between two modes of presence(-at-hand).

To elaborate on this last point, Heidegger tells us that \textit{ōn δυνάμει} should not be rendered as "possible being" since for Aristotle the \textit{ōn δυνάμει} is a special mode of an already existing, already present being. Suggesting "readiness" (\textit{Bereitschaft})\textsuperscript{140} as a better translation, Heidegger defends his interpretation, according to which the distinction \textit{ōn δυνάμει} and \textit{ōn ἐνεργεῖα} is but a distinction between two modes of presence in the following way:
Every practical object, tool, material has readiness for something. Readiness is a character that belongs to something present(-at-hand). This character characterizes it as something which is not yet explicitly used. Once it is used, it passes into an eminent present \([\text{Gegenwart]}\), i.e., into an eminent presence \([\text{Anwesenheit}]\). Before that happens, it \([\text{the practical object}]\) is merely disposable. When used, however, it moves, in a certain way, closer towards me. In being-used it becomes, so to say, actual \([\text{wirklich}]\). ... The difference between actuality and readiness is this: in both cases we are dealing with something present(-at-hand). ... But in the two cases it is present in a different mode of obtrusiveness.\(^{141}\)

Demonstrating that the genuine meaning of Being for Aristotle is presence(-at-hand), a notion that Aristotle presupposes rather than explicates, is, however, only one part of Heidegger's interpretation. The other part centres on the observation that Aristotle's investigation into the meanings of Being is conducted primarily as an investigation into language. The categories to which the other meanings of Being are ultimately related are read from "the declarative sentence, the sentence that says something about a being that is present-at-hand".\(^{142}\) With this move, Aristotle, according to Heidegger, errs in two ways. By regarding the genuine, most fundamental meaning of Being as linked to the theoretically-oriented sentence, he treats that meaning not only as linked to the sentence, but also as linked to the \textit{theoretical}.

It is important to note here that Heidegger arrived at this observation under the joint influence of both Aristotle and Husserl. According to Heidegger's own later report, he owed the idea that Being is not essentially linked to judgments to Husserl's theory of categorial intuition: "With these analyses on categorial intuition Husserl freed Being from its localization in the judgment."\(^{143}\) That is to say, Husserl showed that an understanding of Being is implied in all intentional relating to objects in the world. But from where Heidegger originally gained the further insight that the genuine meaning of Being has to be disentangled from the theoretical attitude cannot be equally easily determined. After all, the notion of the primacy of the practical was important in a good many of the authors that Heideg-
Yet it is likely that Heidegger's study of Aristotle, the very same Aristotle who is accused by Heidegger of falsely giving primacy to the theoretical sentence, also helped in getting Heidegger's own project of studying practical life off the ground. For instance, Heidegger stresses in 1926 that Aristotle's treatment of χίνησις had been developed first and foremost in the context of the Stagirite's investigation into life in general and human existence (βιός in particular: "... only the ontological investigation into these two regions of Being enabled Aristotle to get a grip on the problem of movement. It can be seen that ... the clarification of the ontologically basic concepts of δύναμις and ἑνεργεία is based upon an investigation of that being which lives, and [on an investigation] of βιός, viz., Dasein ..." Heidegger also credits Aristotle with conceiving of πορευχή as a mode of Being rather than as a substance, and of seeing the primary mode of the Being of man as consisting in acting. Furthermore, in his 1924 lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric, Heidegger claims that the Rhetoric "is nothing else but the interpretation of concrete Dasein, the hermeneutics of Dasein itself. That is what Aristotle intended as the meaning of rhetorics." Heidegger considers Aristotle's two claims that "the world is, most often and first of all, present in praxis", and that Being-in-the-world is determined by the λόγος as the two most important conclusions of the Rhetoric. Heidegger is also intrigued by Aristotle's notions of πάθη and δόξα, notions that are clearly the models for Heidegger's notions of "mood" (Gestimmtheit) and "idle talk" (Gerede).

In the light of these observations concerning Heidegger's encounter with Aristotle, the following conclusion strongly suggests itself. Heidegger's own project of a circular investigation into the primary meaning of Being—a meaning of Being as implied in Dasein's practical dwelling in the world—is an outgrowth not so much of his critical encounter with Husserl, but primarily of his study of Aristotle. Aristotle mistakenly reduced the understanding of Being to how Being is understood in the theoretical sentence, yet also provided some of the conceptual tools with which this shortcoming of his ontology could be corrected.

To return from Heidegger's relation to Aristotle to his evalu-
ation of Husserl's phenomenology, it should be noted first of all that Heidegger's appreciation of Husserl's theory of categorial intuition is still apparent in the lecture-series "Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time" (1925) which contains Heidegger's most extensive critical discussion of Husserl's philosophy. Here Heidegger claims that the theory of categorial intuition could have provided a new starting point for studying ontology. Since categories like "Being", "part and whole", etc., are involved in categorial intuition, and since these concepts mark the traditional area of ontology, the study of categorial perception is the study of ontological concept. Heidegger thus claims that "scientific ontology is nothing but phenomenology".\(^{151}\)

However, writing this sentence in 1925, Heidegger did not mean to say that Husserlian phenomenology is the key to ontology. To be sure, Husserl's categorial intuition cannot survive the rejection of the subject-object distinction to which it is inseparably linked. Instead, Heidegger can write this sentence only because he has reached a new conception of phenomenology itself. In "Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time" as well as in *Being and Time*, Heidegger explains his understanding of phenomenology by means of an analysis of the two components of the word. In both cases he goes back to what he takes to be the original Aristotelian meanings of the words. In the case of φαινόμενον, we are told that it had originally the meaning of 'something that shows itself'. λόγος is explained via the Aristotelian notion of ἄπωραίνεσθαι, that is translated by Heidegger as "letting something be seen in itself and indeed—ἄπω—from itself".\(^{152}\) Phenomenology as λέγειν τὰ φαινόμενα, or as ἄπωραίνεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα must then be rendered as "letting the manifest in itself be seen from itself"\(^{153}\) or as "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself".\(^{154}\) Heidegger himself remarks that this expression is tantamount to the old phenomenological battle cry of "Zu den Sachen selbst!"\(^{155}\)

The important point of this exercise is that the newly interpreted definition characterizes phenomenology with respect to its method as well as with respect to a specific subject matter. At the same time, however, it says nothing about consciousness and acts,
makes no reference to the subject-object distinction, and thus leaves open the possibility of adopting a starting point entirely different from Husserl's.

On the methodological level, Heidegger's notion of phenomenology demands descriptions that are given not on the basis of some traditional philosophical bias (like the subject-object distinction), but rather on direct and immediate unprejudiced contact with the subject matter. How the definition specifies a specific subject matter, namely Being (das Sein), is more difficult to appreciate upon first sight. Heidegger establishes this link by observing that a systematic "letting-something-see" makes sense only if this something cannot easily be seen in the first place. That is to say, phenomenology is needed only where the phenomena are still to be revealed, where they are still hidden. Furthermore, those phenomena that are most hidden, where the amount of work needed to reveal them is the greatest, are the most important, and even the defining phenomena of phenomenology. Being and Time claims that the Being of beings (das Sein des Seienden) is this most hidden phenomenon, and that phenomenology thus turns out to be ontology:

What is it that by its very essence is necessarily the theme whenever we exhibit something explicitly? Manifestly, it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground. Yet that which remains hidden in an egregious sense ... is not this entity or that, but rather the Being of entities ... 156

That Heidegger held this conception already in 1921 can be read from the following passage:

Philosophy is a knowing attitude towards beings, an attitude concerned with the principal matter. ... And what is as such the principle [das Prinziielle] for such beings? ... [It is] Being, it is, to be more exact, a taking into account the manner in which such "Being" can be grasped, i.e., the "meaning of Being". 157

In a lecture given in 1927, Heidegger even writes that Being is "the proper and sole theme of philosophy". 158 Here he explains
the importance of this notion by arguing that, just as some vague understanding of reality precedes and is presupposed by our ability to identify and experience realities, and just as some vague understanding of actuality precedes and is presupposed by our ability to encounter actual things, so also some vague and implicit understanding of Being (das Sein) precedes and is presupposed by our ability to encounter and understand beings (Seiende). Therefore philosophy has to start by asking "What does Being signify?" and "How is understanding of Being at all possible?"\(^{159}\)

With respect to these ontological questions, Heidegger’s most fundamental criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology consists of three interrelated claims. First, Husserl has neglected the question concerning Being. Second, Husserl’s neglect is a result of his falling prey to traditional unquestioned presuppositions concerning the meaning of Being. And third, Husserl’s methodology—especially the system of reductions—is in principle incapable of even posing the question concerning the meaning of Being.

As we have seen in the last section, in order to undermine the ‘folk-theoretical’ distinction between immanence and transcendence, Heidegger drew on Husserl’s claim that in perceiving something we are intentionally related to the thing itself. When turning to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, however, Heidegger accuses Husserl of relying precisely on this superficial distinction:

It is true that every transcendent perception apprehends what is perceived by it, the thing, in its bodily character, but there is always the possibility that what is perceived cannot be and is not. In immanent apprehension, however, lived experience is given in its absolute self.\(^{160}\)

Heidegger’s attack on this distinction between immanence and transcendence, which is but another version of the subject-object dichotomy, concentrates on the question how Husserl explains the Being of consciousness. Heidegger tries to show that the characteristics that Husserl enumerates are nothing but traditional notions—notions, in other words, that are not arrived at by an unprejudiced look at the phenomena. Thus Husserl speaks of consciousness as "immanent", "absolute", and "pure" Being, as well as "quod nulla
re indiget ad existendum”. Not only are these notions traditional, they are also insufficient to characterize that being (das Seiende) for which intentionality is essential. These notions turn consciousness into something like a closed box that has only contingent relations with the outside. This model is of course not Husserl’s invention, or the result of phenomenological investigations, but simply taken over from the Cartesian tradition. What Heidegger detects here in Husserl’s way of characterizing the Being of consciousness is just another case—and now even a worse case—of the "basic phenomenological temptation" that we encountered in the last section. There this temptation consisted in choosing as the subject matter of phenomenology the same type of intentionality that the phenomenologist himself relies on, that is, theoretical perception. Now this temptation consists in trying to guarantee the absoluteness and objectivity of phenomenology by anchoring it within a consciousness that is uncritically assumed to be absolute:

In point of fact, all of these [four Husserlian] determinations of Being are derived with a view to working out the context of lived experience as a region for absolute scientific consideration. ... The primary concern which guides him is the idea of an absolute science. This idea that consciousness is to be the region of an absolute science is not simply invented; it is the idea which has occupied modern philosophy since Descartes. The elaboration of pure consciousness as the thematic field of phenomenology is not derived phenomenologically by going back to the matters themselves but by going back to a traditional idea of philosophy.

Husserl’s methodological ideal calls for an objective science, a science that can clearly distinguish between subject and object. The natural attitude and its relation to the world, as well as the transcendental stand are constructed so as to fit this ideal. First of all, the natural attitude (as subject) is conceived of as having constituted, or—in Husserl’s Fichtean expression—as having "posited" (gesetzt), a detached world of real beings (as its object). Second, the natural attitude is taken to have posited itself as a part of this world. In this way it is guaranteed, third, that when the world has been "brack-
et.e”, the transcendental ego (as subject) is clearly set apart from everything empirical (as object), be it the world, or be it the natural attitude as part of the world.

The key to the whole enterprise is thus a certain interpretation of the natural attitude: only if its relation to the world is one of ’positing a world and oneself as real’, only if Being is reduced to ’being posited’, does Husserl’s project succeed. But, Heidegger asks, is the natural attitude thus adequately described? Does consciousness originally posit a world of physical and psychological entities, and does it posit itself as a part of this world?

Is this attitude a natural attitude or is it not?

It is an attitude which is totally unnatural. For it includes a well-defined theoretical position, in which every entity is taken a priori as a lawfully regulated flow of occurrences in the spatio-temporal exteriority of the world. ... Man’s natural manner of experience, by contrast, cannot be called an attitude.164

To make use of the interpretational framework of this study, we can perhaps put this point in the following way: an absolute science as envisaged by Husserl demands that we can take a stand outside of those meaning-relations that we usually live in. An absolute science does not allow for any hermeneutical circle that results from our having to make use of those very networks of meaning that we are trying to describe. In other words, Husserlian phenomenology adopts and presupposes, without further argument and defense, the calculus-conception concerning meaning. Yet the price of this adoption is high. The phenomenon of Dasein’s living within a universal medium of meaning is obscured in a subject-world distinction modelled upon the traditional subject-object split. Being is reduced to presence-at-hand (the Being of the explicitly identified object), while Being as readiness-to-hand (the Being of the implicitly identified equipment or world), and Being as existence (the self-identification of Dasein as its self-determination), are ignored and distorted.

The distortions caused by Husserl’s methodology reach a peak, according to Heidegger, when the eidetic reduction is implemented together with the transcendental one, for the eidetic reduction aims at the essence of objects, events, and worlds, and hence rules
out their Being, presence-at-hand, readiness-to-hand, and existence. Heidegger’s point is that Husserl’s eidetic reduction is based on the presupposition that Being is inessential, a presupposition that remains unjustified and ultimately unjustifiable:

From the what [das Was] I never learn anything about the sense and the manner of the that [das Daß] ... Merely looking at the what-content means seeing the what as apprehended, given, constituted. ... But above all, this conception of ideation as disregard of real individualization lives in the belief that the what of any entity is to be defined by disregarding its existence. But if there were an entity whose what is precisely to be and nothing but to be, then this ideative regard of such an entity would be the most fundamental of misunderstandings.\textsuperscript{165}

Heidegger claims here that Husserl’s lack of appreciation for existence (”that”) is due to Husserl’s implicit assumption according to which Being means nothing but presence-at-hand (being ”apprehended, given, constituted”). Husserl can treat Being as inessential, since for him Being means ”being-posited” by some subject or other, at some time or other. While meaning-structures and their interconnections are necessary, the existence of the transcendent world and the (empirical) subject are merely contingent for Husserl. Heidegger’s counterargument is this: if there were a being whose essence is not to be posited and positable by the subject, then this being and its essence would lie outside of the scope of Husserl’s methodological tools. For Heidegger this being is the subject itself, Dasein as Being-in-the-world. It is of the very essence of Dasein and its world not to be posited but rather to precede all position-taking. Therefore, in order to clarify the essence of Dasein and its worldlihood, the phenomenologist must analyze Dasein non-reductively and without losing sight of Dasein’s worldboundedness.

Now Heidegger’s main point concerning a non-reductive inquiry into Being is that such an investigation into Being must inevitably presuppose an antecedent understanding of Being. There is no possibility of placing oneself in a position in which one would not have to make (implicit) use of this category, for it is involved and presupposed in all acts of relating to beings, be they ideal, real, or
whatever. Here we have the reason why Heidegger characterizes his investigation into Being as hermeneutical.

Heidegger's awareness of the hermeneutical tradition enables him to adopt the view of Being (and of the world) as a universal medium of meaning, while still engaging in its investigation. Once logicians like Frege or Wittgenstein came to realize the circle implicated in doing semantics, they were forced to put the strictest ban on the explicit expression of semantical ideas. This is so, because for them a circle is per se a vicious one. Not so, however, for a philosopher who, like Heidegger, is familiar with the hermeneutical tradition. Heidegger acknowledges the circle involved in investigating the notion of Being, but to him this circle is not vicious but rather hermeneutical, a circle which is also involved in Dasein's very understanding of its world.

Heidegger claims that any attempt to philosophically clarify one's understanding of Being must necessarily presuppose a prephilosophical understanding of Being. This is brought out clearly in the following passage:

Inquiry, as a kind of seeking must be guided beforehand by what is sought. ... We do not know what "Being" means. But even if we ask, 'What is "Being"?', we stay within an understanding of the 'is' ...  

The circularity involved in an inquiry into the meaning of Being is discussed by Heidegger early on in Being and Time by conceptualizing research as a process of questioning. With respect to questioning, Heidegger tells us, we have to distinguish the following three aspects:

(i) that about which we ask something,
(ii) that which we are asking about (i), and
(iii) that by way of which we want to obtain an answer to (ii).

For instance, we find an answer to the question about the intelligence (ii) of some student (i), by comparing his testsheet to those of his classmates (iii). In the Heideggerian ontological inquiry—in his "fundamental ontology"—(i) is Being, (ii) is the meaning of Being, and (iii) is that singular being—Dasein—from which we are trying
to read the meaning of Being. The circularity results from the fact that in order to pick the right being (of which we want to read the meaning of Being), we already have to rely on some conception of what it is that Being means:

Is there not, however, a manifest circularity in such an undertaking? If we must first define an entity in its Being, and if we want to formulate the question of Being only on this basis, what is this but going in a circle? In working out our question, have we not 'presupposed' something which only the answer can bring?  

Occasionally, Heidegger rejects the charge of a circle, claiming that one can speak of a circle only within a proof or a deduction. His own work, Heidegger holds, is not to be conceived of as a proof or deduction. In other places, however, Heidegger explicitly acknowledges that any investigation of meaning is inevitably circular: "The 'circle' in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning ..."  

This *prima facie* contradiction is easily resolved by noting that when Heidegger is opposing the charge of circularity, he is mainly thinking of the (logically) 'vicious' circle ("We cannot ever 'avoid' a 'circular' proof in the existential analysis, because such an analysis does not do any proving *at all* by the rules of the 'logic of consequence'."), whereas when accepting the charge of circularity, he is referring to the hermeneutical circle. Of course, in both cases we are dealing with the kind of circularity that characterizes the conception of language and Being as the universal medium.

It is interesting to note that Heidegger also stresses that the investigation into the meaning of Being, the central starting point of which is *Dasein*'s inauthentic and authentic being towards death, cannot be neutral and value-free. The motivation to engage in the hermeneutical endeavour of interpreting and understanding our implicit understanding of Being is motivated and influenced by this implicit understanding itself:

In the question of the meaning of Being there is ... a remarkable 'relatedness backward and forward' which what we are asking about (Being) bears to the inquiry itself as a mode of Being of an entity [viz., *Dasein*]. Here what is asked about has an
essential pertinence to the inquiry itself, and this belongs to the outmost meaning of the question of Being.\(^\text{172}\)

Heidegger is willing to draw a radical conclusion from the fact that his investigation of a universal medium of meaning is circular, and that the investigation is itself motivated and influenced by practical interests: philosophy must give up the claim to absolute truth:

Has it been shown, and can it be shown, that philosophy must and can obtain absolute, valid truth in its field of knowledge? This is possible only when one prepares for oneself an object for doing philosophy, or when one ignores the genuine, fundamental one \(\ldots\).\(^\text{173}\)

In the same spirit, Heidegger writes as early as 1920 that we need to free ourselves from "the prejudice of philosophy as a science".\(^\text{174}\) Heidegger "advocates the following thesis: \(\ldots\) Philosophy is to be freed from being 'secularized into a science'."\(^\text{175}\)

### 3.4. Logic, Language, Truth

Heidegger's denial of absolute truth and his opposition to logic as the foundation of philosophy are subjects that call for some further elaborations. Heidegger's views on these matters are connected with his conceptions of truth and language, conceptions that provide additional support for my thesis that the main tenets of the universal medium conception can be found in *Being and Time* and other writings of the same period.

To start from logic, Heidegger claims that traditional philosophy—and here Husserl is included—has a false conception of logic, in so far as logic is taken as the basis and foundation of all sciences, including all philosophical disciplines. Heidegger advocates instead that metaphysics precedes logic. The kind of metaphysics that Heidegger has in mind here is nothing other than the existential analysis of *Dasein*, which he also refers to as the "metaphysics of *Dasein".\(^\text{176}\)

Heidegger regards the traditional argument for the primacy of logic over metaphysics, according to which the primacy of logic stems from the fact that metaphysical thought abides by (logical) rules of thought, as unsatisfactory. If abiding by rules of thought were to
presuppose logic as a science, then logic itself could never get off the
ground; it would have to wait for itself to be developed:

... the inescapability of rule usage does not in itself immediately
imply the inescapability of logic. ... For otherwise the thought-
ful justification of logic itself would be intrinsically impossible,
or superfluous. A fully developed logic would have to exist then
already insofar as there was thought.177

Furthermore, the inevitability of abiding by laws of thought can-
not be explained by logic, but can only be clarified by metaphysics
which studies the inner essence of science itself. Finally, even the
most basic laws of logic need metaphysical analysis, explications,
and justification.178

However, Heidegger does not simply oppose logic as the foun-
dation of philosophy. He believes that the traditional mistake of
treating logic as the foundation of philosophy has recently led to a
still worse distortion: since logic has been reduced to what Heideg-
ger calls Logistik, viz., mathematical logic, mathematics threatens to
become the model for philosophy.179 Indeed, as early as in 1923, Hei-
degger claims that this threat has already materialized—in Husserl's
phenomenology: "Husserl relied on a certain ideal of science, an
ideal predelineated by mathematics and mathematical science. ... This scientific ideal became effective in that one tried to raise de-
scription to the level of mathematical strictness. ... But all this is
quite mistaken."180 The opposition to mathematical logic had, as we
saw earlier (p. 141), been already important for Heidegger in 1912.
Back then he had largely followed Rickert's paper "The One, the
Unity, and the Number 'One'", which interestingly enough was the
only work by Rickert that Heidegger held in high esteem throughout
his life (Gadamer, pers. comm.). In the twenties, however, Heideg-
ger bases his rejection of mathematics and mathematical logic on
two further arguments. On the one hand, he claims that due to the
state of crisis that mathematics finds itself in, it is ill-suited as a
model for other sciences:

Mathematics, that seemingly bestfounded, is today in crisis with
respect to its foundations! What, after all, does it deal with?
Are its axioms empty? Or do the first principles mean something? Mathematics thus cannot be the ideal for all sciences.\textsuperscript{181}

On the other hand, mathematics cannot be a model for philosophy since mathematical knowledge is completely empty:

What does it mean to present philosophy with mathematical knowledge as a measure of knowledge and as an ideal of truth? It means nothing less than to make that knowledge which simply does not bind us and which is most empty in its content, a measure for the most binding and most complete knowledge, i.e., the knowledge that strives for the whole.\textsuperscript{182}

Is it surprising then that in a letter to Löwith in 1922, Heidegger offered to sell his copy of the first volume of the \textit{Principia Mathematica} for just "60% of the English price for a new copy"?\textsuperscript{183}

Heidegger's opposition to logic also emerges from his scarce remarks on language and from his more extensive comments on the notion of truth. I shall deal with each of these issues in turn.

In \textit{Being and Time}, as well as in the other writings and lectures from the twenties, Heidegger does not deal with language as explicitly and extensively as we shall find him doing in his later writings. For instance, of the four-hundred-odd pages of \textit{Being and Time}, the chapter on language comprises barely seven pages.\textsuperscript{184} As the main reason for dealing with language only briefly in \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger himself mentions that language as "speech" (\textit{Rede}) is not one of the most basic structures of \textit{Dasein}'s Being-in-the-world, but is rather rooted and founded in that implicit identification, acquaintance, or "disclosedness" of the world that precedes speaking about things within the world.\textsuperscript{185} Speech is the articulation of the way \textit{Dasein} understands the world, others and itself\textsuperscript{186}, that is to say, as Heidegger puts it on another occasion\textsuperscript{187}, speech (or language) "makes manifest" what is already disclosed and uncovered. For Heidegger this point seems so important that he includes in \textit{Being and Time} a whole paragraph ("§33. Assertion as a Derivative Mode of Interpretation"\textsuperscript{188}) that is specifically meant to show how speech, especially assertive speech, is rooted in the prepredicative doing and seeing. According to the argument, all doing and seeing is already interpretation. We use the hammer \textit{as} a tool, we see something \textit{as}
a hammer, and we put the hammer aside as inconvenient for some given task. Heidegger speaks of interpretation in these cases because in each one of them something is taken as something, despite the fact that no words have been used: "From the fact that words are absent, it may not be concluded that interpretation is absent." In order to delimit this prepredicative interpretation from the predicative one, Heidegger calls the 'as'-structure involved in the first case "hermeneutical 'as'", and the 'as'-structure involved in the second case "apophantic 'as'". The latter is a modification of the first, and grounded in it, since readiness-to-hand (implicit identification) precedes presence-to-hand (explicit identification). To assert that, say, the hammer is heavy is to change the mode of Being the hammer has for us; as ready-to-hand we would simply use it without attending to it explicitly, that is, without talking about it. Yet once we assert something about the hammer, it loses its unnoticeness, and turns into something present-at-hand:

 Something ready-to-hand with which we have to do or perform something, turns into something 'about which' the assertion that points it out is made. ... The as-structure of interpretation has undergone a modification. ... The 'as' gets pushed into the uniform plane of that which is merely present-at-hand. It dwindles to the structure of just letting one see what is present-at-hand, and letting one see it in a definite way.

Heidegger's point here is not only that the assertion changes readiness-to-hand into presence-at-hand. He also uses this observation as a criticism of the philosophical-logical tradition from Aristotle to Husserl. Since this tradition focuses its attention on the assertion as the central linguistic structure, it is confined to an understanding of Being as presence-at-hand, this being a limitation that ultimately leads to a misconstruction of language as consisting of word-objects and meaning-objects. The assertive sentence itself is split up into subject and predicate whose combination then needs to be explained via a third word-object, the copula. What is lost in this tradition is not only an appreciation for other forms of language use, but also the basic insight that the being of language is not the being of an object in the world. Therefore—and in radical opposition to his
own earlier defense of Husserl’s ideal grammar in the Habilitations-
schrift—Heidegger now thinks that grammar needs to be freed from
logic:

Grammar sought its foundations in the 'logic' of this logos [i.e.,
the assertion]. But this logic was based upon the ontology of
the present-at-hand. ... The task of liberating grammar from
logic requires beforehand a positive understanding of the basic
a priori structure of speech in general as an existential matter.
...193 In the last resort, philosophical research must resolve to
ask what kind of Being goes with language in general. Is it a kind
of equipment ready-to-hand within-the-world, or has it Dasein’s
kind of Being, or is it neither of these? ... Philosophical research
will have to dispense with the 'philosophy of language' if it is to
inquire into the 'things themselves' ...194

In other places Heidegger elaborates somewhat on this criticism
in a way that indicates more clearly why he opposes "philosophy of
language". Thus in the lectures on rhetoric we are told that Arist-
totelian rhetoric had a more adequate conception of language—as
compared with philosophy of language—since it studied how dif-
ferent forms of language use are rooted in Dasein's practice.195
On another occasion—in 1925—Heidegger brands as mistaken all
approaches—including phenomenology—that try to understand lan-
guage and meaning in terms of the question "how can a word mean
something?"196, claiming that language and meaning cannot be un-
derstood by looking at the word and its meaning in isolation but
only by placing both within the Being-in-the-world. To ask "how
can a word mean something?" is to treat both word and meaning
as present-at-hand objects.197 It fits well with this opposition to the
question concerning the relation between word and meaning, and
with the idea of the inaccessibility of semantics that seems to lurk
behind it, that Heidegger also opposes conceptualizing in terms of
signhood the relation between words, meaning, and thing referred to:
"Not even the relation between word-sound to word-meaning can be
understood as a sign-relation."198

To turn from Heidegger's criticism of the tradition to his own
positive—albeit sketchy—account of language, one point seems es-
especially worth emphasizing: Heidegger's claim that the prepredicative Being-in-the-world is the foundation of our ability to speak should not be taken to mean that Being-in-the-world is essentially prelinguistic. The opposition is not between the prelinguistic and the linguistic, but between the prepredicative and the predicative, between meanings and interpretations as involved in our dwelling and doing, and meanings and interpretations as uttered. This interpretation is supported by a comment that Heidegger makes in 1925 about Husserl's categorial perception. Heidegger claims that Husserl's theory shows that there is no pure perception, that perception is always interpretation. Heidegger stresses especially that the concepts involved in perception are categories of natural language:

It is also a matter of fact that our simplest perceptions and constitutive states are already expressed, even more, are interpreted in a certain way. What is primary and original here? It is not so much that we see the objects and things but rather that we first talk about them. To put it more precisely: we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what one says about the matter. This inherently determinate character of the world and its potential apprehension and comprehension through expressness, through already having been spoken and talked over, is basically what must now be brought out in the question of the structure of categorial intuition.¹⁹⁹

Heidegger also aligns himself in other places with the idea that the way Dasein understands itself and its world is determined by the language it speaks, and that Dasein cannot bypass this language to reach a world existing an sich. Thus he writes that the logos "determines the directions in which Dasein can pose questions concerning the world and itself"²⁰⁰ and that "within any prevailing language in which Dasein itself is with its history, every age and generation has its own language and its specific possibility of understanding".²⁰¹ By 1928/29, Heidegger even writes that "it is the metaphysical meaning of language that language plays with us rather than we with language".²⁰² In Being and Time he proposes that language determines what the world for Dasein is like and claims that "in no case is Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have
been interpreted, set before the open country of a 'world-in-itself', so that it just beholds what it encounters." This last quotation is from a paragraph where Heidegger deals not with language in general but rather with "idle talk" (Gerede), the shallow and superficial talk of "das Man" (they), which rather than revealing the world, conceals it. Yet Dasein's partial freeing itself from idle talk does not mean that it leaves language behind, but that it opens itself to the revealing of language to which idle talk has become deaf. To be sure, the Heidegger of Being and Time is not yet propagating language as "the house of Being" nor as that "which speaks for us", but the seeds for this later radical conception of language as the universal medium can clearly be seen in the pronouncements summarized above.

Even stronger evidence—perhaps even the strongest evidence—of Heidegger's abiding by the universal medium conception can be adduced as we turn to his notion of truth.

Probably the best index in deciding what a philosopher's stand is on the accessibility of semantics is to look for his pronouncements on truth as correspondence. This is so because truth in this classical sense is of course the most important semantical relation between parts of language and parts of the world. Belief in language as the universal medium leads naturally (in the absence of special additional assumptions; see Introduction) to the denial of the possibility of metalanguage. Hence truth as correspondence will, according to this conception, turn out to be indefinable or unintelligible. An adherer to the universal medium conception will thus be tempted either to declare that "what true is, I hold to be indefinable" (Frege), or to develop an alternative notion of truth. Heidegger chooses the second option. As we have seen, according to Heidegger Dasein lives within its world as a closed universal medium of meaning without there being any intelligible way of even posing the question as to the relationship between this world-as-projected and the world as independent of Dasein's project. Therefore truth cannot be defined in terms of correspondence between (parts of) the universal medium of meaning and (parts of) the independent world. In order to find a place for the notion of truth despite this difficulty, Heidegger redefines truth and lets it refer to the existence of the universal medium of meaning itself. This universal medium is true, Heidegger suggests,
since within it and through it _Dasein_ is acquainted with, and aware of, a world, this being precisely the world that _Dasein_ itself projects.

Heidegger's first main argument against the correspondence theory of truth turns on the ontological question as to the relation between an ideal content of judgment and the real thing or state of affairs that the judgment is about. Husserl agrees with other critics of psychologism, saying that what is judged has to be sharply distinguished from the act of judging. Furthermore, the relation of correspondence does not hold between the act of judging and some real state of affairs, but rather—or so Heidegger interprets Husserl—between the ideal content of judgment and that perceptively given real state of affairs. Heidegger's critical question concerns the nature of the relation of correspondence between the real and the ideal, as well as, more basically, the nature between the ideal content and the real act of judging. First, _Being and Time_ claims that the propagators of this version of the correspondence theory have done nothing in order to clarify just how there can be a relation of correspondence between the ideal and the real. And second, the distinction between ideal content and real act of judging is itself highly problematic:

And with regard to the 'actual' judging of what is judged, is the separation of the real act of judging from the ideal content altogether unjustified? Does not the actuality of knowing and judging get broken asunder into two ways of Being—two 'levels' which can never be pieced together in such a manner as to reach the kind of Being that belongs to knowing? Is not psychologism correct in holding out against this separation, even if it neither clarifies ontologically the kind of Being which belongs to the thinking of that which is thought, nor is even so much as acquainted with it as a problem?

In a lecture series given in the winter term 1925/26, "Logic. The Question Concerning Truth", Heidegger even goes so far as to call Husserl's distinction between the ideal and the real "the most absurd formulation of the problem", and to say that an understanding of living thought based on that formulation is "doomed to hopelessness". He also writes that the "naturalism" of Husserl as well as of other critics of psychologism is "still much more crude and
more fundamental" than that of the psychologists, since the former say nothing on the relation between the two domains that they so sharply oppose to one another. Husserl neglects to deal with the Being of that being, Dasein, that "makes possible these two modes of Being in precisely their original unity".

A second major line of criticism that Heidegger employs against the correspondence theory relies on the primacy of the practical over the theoretical. This argument is not very explicitly developed in *Being and Time*, but it is presented in the already mentioned lecture series from the winter term 1925/26. Here, Heidegger starts from the distinction between five traditional uses of truth: (1) truth as an attribute of a sentence when this sentence refers to a state of affairs, (2) truth as referring to the sentence itself ("2 × 2 = 4 is a truth"), (3) truth as the knowledge of a truth ("someone cannot stand the truth"), (4) truth as a set of sentences (the truth about some event), and (5) truth in the sense of the real ("true gold"). According to Heidegger this list more or less exhausts traditional uses of the notion of truth. All of these senses are but expressions of the same idea, namely that truth is to be thought of as *adaequatio*, and that truth is essentially connected to knowledge. Heidegger argues against this traditional conception, claiming that it is by no means clear why truth should be related to knowledge as the theoretical, and not be originally linked to the practical, as acting and living in the world:

It is not at all obvious that the truth of theoretical knowledge or even of an assertion should be the basic form of truth. ... In other words, it is not at all decided which truth—the theoretical or the practical—is the original and genuine one ...

As Heidegger puts his alternative in another lecture (1928): "... a statement about X is only true because our dealing with X has already a certain kind of truth."

To make this suggestion, i.e., the primacy of practical over theoretical truth, more palatable, we need to turn to Heidegger's own account of truth.

When starting to explain his own notion of truth in *Being and Time* by discussing the truth of sentences, Heidegger seems at first to give merely a somewhat unusual restatement of the classical corre-
spondence notion by writing that "To say that an assertion 'is true' signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself." And indeed, Ernst Tugendhat, who has written a critical and penetrating exposition of Heidegger's notion of truth, argues that with this statement Heidegger does not yet go beyond Husserl. This step is taken, however, as Heidegger without further argument drops the "as it is in itself", writing simply that "the being-true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as being-uncovering." Tugendhat claims that with this step Heidegger loses the notion of truth as usually understood: after dropping the qualification "as it is in itself" from his notion of truth, Heidegger will no longer be able to give a criterion by which to distinguish the sense in which all assertions—even false ones—uncover something from the way in which only true assertions uncover something.

Tugendhat's analysis is of course correct in the sense that Heidegger here indeed gives up the correspondence notion of truth. What is crucial here, however, is not so much that he does so, but rather why he is forced to do so. Heidegger's dissatisfaction with Tugendhat's book turned precisely on this point. (von Herrmann, pers. comm.) In order to appreciate this dissatisfaction, it is necessary to follow Heidegger into the heart of his notion of truth, a notion of truth that is no longer linked to assertions.

Heidegger claims that truth as uncovering is grounded in the phenomenon that he calls "Being-in-the-world", alias the phenomenon that "Dasein is 'in the truth'". On another occasion he writes that if we want to speak of truth as a relation, we should say that it is the relation "of Dasein as Dasein to its world". In Being and Time these notions are explained in four steps.

First of all, Heidegger reminds us that in so far as Dasein is Being-in-the-world, where world is the universal medium of meaning, the world is disclosed to Dasein. ("To Dasein's state of Being disclosedness in general essentially belongs." In so far as Dasein lives in its world, this world is an already interpreted world, a world already implicitly identified, a world that Dasein is aware of and aquainted with.

Second, Dasein is "thrown into" this world, in the sense that Dasein "always already" lives within some already interpreted world.
"To Dasein's state of Being belongs thrownness ..." Dasein cannot just step outside of this interpretation, nor can this interpreted world be compared with the 'real' world.

Third,—and here I reverse Heidegger's steps three and four—Dasein can misinterpret its own place in relation to the world. Even though the world is disclosed to Dasein, Dasein can disregard and misconstrue, or simply ignore, what is disclosed to it by living within an interpreted world. Instead of attending to the disclosed, Dasein can follow the conventional and trivializing interpretations of das Man, which, even though parasitic upon the original disclosedness, cover and conceal it. In so far as Dasein follows this path, Dasein lives not "in the truth", but "in the false":

Its [Dasein's] absorption in das Man signifies that it is dominated by the way things are publicly interpreted. ... Beings have thus not been completely hidden; they are precisely the sort of thing that has been uncovered, but at the same time they have been disguised. They show themselves, but in the mode of semblance. Likewise what has formerly been uncovered sinks back again, hidden and disguised. Because Dasein is essentially falling, its state of Being is such that it is in 'untruth'. ... But only in so far as Dasein has been disclosed has it also been closed off; and only in so far as beings within-the-world have been uncovered along with Dasein, have such beings, as possible encounterable within-the-world, been covered up (hidden) or disguised.

This brings us finally to the full sense of "Dasein is 'in the truth'", and to Heidegger's justification for linking his notion of truth to the Greek a-letheia. Dasein is in the truth in so far as it disentangles itself from the superficialities of das Man and in so far as it attends fully to the disclosedness that its Being-in-the-world implies. The covering ("lethe") has to be removed, torn aside ("a-"), for there to be truth ("a-letheia").

As Heidegger tries to show, understanding truth as correspondence is itself but one of those distortions that Dasein has to free itself from. The temptation to take truth as a relation between a sentence and a fact stems from treating the uncovering assertion as
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well as that which is already pre-predicatively disclosed—and which is true before ever being asserted—as two present-at-hand things whose relation needs to be explained. It is the traditional tendency to think of all beings in terms of presence-at-hand that causes this question of the relation between the two to arise, a tendency that hinders our appreciating truth as disclosedness: "The primordial phenomenon of truth has been covered up by Dasein's very understanding of Being—that understanding which is proximally the one that prevails, and which even today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle."224

Against this treatment of truth as presence-at-hand, Heidegger puts his own suggestion as to which mode of Being applies to truth: "Truth and Being-true ... have the mode of Being of Dasein. Truth ... exists."225 An implication of this claim is that truth is relative to the universal medium of meaning, to the Being-in-world, and to the Dasein in question. Heidegger does not make this relativism concerning truth very explicit as concerns different 'Daseins', but he stresses in several places that there are no absolute, eternally timeless truths, and that "there is truth ... only if and as long as Dasein exists".226 With respect to Newton's laws—Heidegger's favorite example—we are told that they only became true when Newton discovered them227 and that they will be true only as long as Dasein exists. In the same way, $2 \times 2 = 4$ will cease to be true when Dasein ceases to be. It seems that Heidegger should have gone further here by saying that Newton's laws are true only for those Daseins that share the same universal medium of meaning with Newton; yet the Heidegger of Being and Time does not seem to be ready to state the relativism of his notion of truth so bluntly. Perhaps this reluctance is still based on the conviction that "relativism ... by being explicitly pronounced has already lost its best", an idea that Heidegger put to Löwith in 1920.228 In the same correspondence, one year later, Heidegger calls himself a "dogmatic subjective relativist".229

Despite this caution in making his relativistic tendencies too public, what Heidegger is willing to do, nevertheless, if not in Being and Time, at least in lectures given in 1921/22 and 1929/30, is to react to what would have been Husserl's response to this type of relativism. As we saw in Part II of this study, Husserl's favourite
weapon against psychologistic and Kantian relativism is to argue that any denial of absolute truth is a contradiction in terms: to say 'there is no absolute truth' is to assert one. In the passage quoted at the end of the last section, Heidegger writes that it has never been shown that philosophy has or could ever reach an absolute truth. To believe that it can is to invent an artificial subject matter for philosophy, instead of attending to the fact that philosophy deals with life. Without mentioning Husserl's name, Heidegger turns to the contradiction-argument, and says:

No-one can seriously want to make us believe that this well-known joke about the law of contradiction (i.e., that he who denies absolute truth contradicts himself) tells us anything about the possibility of philosophical knowledge …

The whole argument is claimed to be unphilosophical and purely formal, indeed based on a certain "logic of order" (Ordnungslogik) that itself stands in need of clarification. In 1929/30, Heidegger writes that precisely because this argument can be used in all contexts, it does not have any essential bearing on any issue: "It is completely empty and without obligation." Presenting his own conception of philosophy as "its truth is essentially that of human Dasein", a relativization that naturally follows from the notion of truth summarized above, Heidegger adds that against this statement the Husserlian twist does not work:

In saying this we do not know it with absolute certainty. Nor do we know it with probability, which is merely the corresponding notion with respect to an assumed absolute certainty. All this we do know with a knowledge of its own kind, a knowledge that is marked by a floating between certainty and uncertainty—with a knowledge that we grow into by doing philosophy.

Despite these pronouncements, Heidegger's position as regards truth is by no means one of scepticism. If scepticism is understood as the position that there is no truth, this position is, according to Being and Time, mistaken, in so far as Dasein is always already in-the-truth. But this cannot be proven (any more) to the skeptic:
A sceptic can no more be refuted than the Being of truth can be 'proved'. And if any sceptic of the kind who denies the truth, factically is, he does not even need to be refuted. In so far as he is, and has understood himself in this Being, he has obliterated Dasein in the desperation of suicide . . .

Thus Heidegger's denial of absolute truth does not lead him to deny truth in general. Only absolute truth has no place in Heidegger's conception of meaning. However, truth relative to a historical Dasein is possible, and cannot even be questioned: to question this truth in a radical way amounts to destroying one's Being-in-the-world.

4. "LANGUAGE IS THE HOUSE OF BEING"
—LANGUAGE AS THE UNIVERSAL MEDIUM
IN HEIDEGGER'S LATER "THOUGHT"

La poésie ne s'impose plus,
elle s'expose.
(P. Celan)

In this chapter I shall turn to Heidegger's thought from the thirties onwards. In this period Heidegger does not only remain committed to the conception of language as the universal medium, he in fact develops and reformulates his earlier views in a way that brings out his belief in the universality of language and the ineffability of semantics much more radically and dramatically.

In Being and Time, as well as in the other writings of the twenties, Heidegger expresses his belief in language as a universal medium. But his roots in Husserl's phenomenology, and the need to engage in a critical debate with Husserl, forced him to formulate his alternative to Husserl in a manner that still shared certain central presuppositions with Husserl. Thus, for instance, Heidegger did not emphasize language as the universal medium—even though this idea appears in Being and Time—partly because Heidegger was foremost concerned with undermining Husserl's analysis of intentionality, whose paradigm case is perception rather than linguistic meaning. Again, Husserl's ego/subject-centered approach continues
in the *Dasein*-centered approach of *Being and Time*. However, Heidegger later comes to realize that *Dasein* is far too easily conceived of as yet a new subject, as the kind of notion *Dasein* was meant to exorcize from philosophy. Starting from *Dasein* leads to conceptual difficulties in other ways, too, for *Dasein*’s constituting activity is difficult to combine with the claim that *Dasein* always lives within a universal medium of meaning. Thus Heidegger had to resort to expressions like "thrown project". The Husserlian residue in this expression lies with the word "project", while the word "thrown" refers to the pre-givenness of the world as a universal medium and reflects Heidegger's new way of thinking.

During the period we are now considering Heidegger not only gives up existential analysis, but he also gives up the idea of hermeneutical phenomenology. His contention is no longer that we can arrive—albeit in a circular fashion—at the one true meaning of Being. Being as the transcendental condition of language and the world is in the main ineffable, equally ineffable for phenomenology, for an analytical philosophy of language, or for hermeneutics.

These indications of the differences between *Being and Time* and Heidegger’s later thought will have to suffice for the purposes of my interpretation, since a detailed study of Heidegger’s development lies far beyond the scope of this study. Nor shall I tackle the question as to Heidegger’s development during the period from 1930 to his death. In any case, such studies are possible only once much more of the still unpublished and inaccessible material can be used. We may also need more reliable and critical editions for that purpose than the current Gesamtausgabe.\(^{236}\)

I shall spell out in three steps Heidegger’s belief in language as the universal medium in his later thought on language and art. First, I shall introduce what I take to be the main theses of Heidegger’s conception of art as it is presented in "The Origin of the Work of Art".\(^{237}\) This article seems to be a natural starting point since it presents us with the later Heidegger’s views on art, truth, and language in a straightforward fashion. Subsequently, I shall broaden the scope of my discussion by summarizing and extensively quoting Heidegger’s main ideas on Being and language. Since these ideas are scattered throughout dozens of books and articles, they seem
almost inaccessible to systematic exposition. In order to overcome this difficulty, I shall organize Heidegger's pronouncements around seven theses that are formulated parallel to his central claims on art. It is only after these somewhat laboursome preliminaries that I shall turn to showing how important the belief in language as the universal medium is for Heidegger. To postpone this task until this late stage seems to me to be necessitated by the extreme difficulty of the task and by the wealth of Heidegger's text. These difficulties make it imperative to present first an account of what I take him to claim and propose, independently of the objectives of my interpretation.

4.1. Art and poetry

The most important tenets of Heidegger's main work on art can be summarized in seven theses. I shall present and explain them in turn, and number them for subsequent reference:

(A-1) We cannot analyze the work of art starting from the categories of "thing" or "equipment", since both of these categories become accessible only in and through the work of art itself.

Heidegger arrives at this claim by criticizing traditional notions of what a thing is, and by demonstrating how the essence of equipment 'must' be read from a work of art.

At first sight, the notion of thing seems like a natural starting point for an investigation into the notion of an artwork. An artwork, one might suggest, is but a thing with aesthetic value. But what then is a thing? Heidegger gives a brief rundown of three traditional answers, and expresses his dissatisfaction with all three of them. According to the first answer, the "thing" is the \( \text{φυσικός} \), the carrier of attributes (\( \tauὰ \text{ συμβεβηκότια} \)). Heidegger argues that this notion makes the thing itself inaccessible: we can only reach new and ever new attributes, but never the thing itself. What is worse, this result—the inaccessibility of the thing—contradicts our everyday experience: we believe that we have immediate contact with things themselves, not only with their various attributes.\textsuperscript{238}

According to the second answer, a thing is but a bundle of sense data: "The thing is the \( \alphaἰσθητόν \), that which is perceptible by sensations in the senses ..."\textsuperscript{239} This solution—the one proposed by Moore
and Russell among others—tries to correct the shortcomings of the first one by bringing us into immediate contact with the thing. However, Heidegger argues that the second notion goes too far in this direction; sight is lost of the fact that what we hear and see are not sense data but things. Furthermore, this solution does not account for the fact that the thing, despite our having immediate contact with it, retains its independence.  

It is only the third answer which posits that a thing is formed matter, μορφή and ὑλή, that Heidegger discusses in detail. The reason why Heidegger pays somewhat more attention to this idea is that he regards it as fundamental in aesthetics. His counter-argument is that this definition is based on what we might call—following Ryle—a "category mistake". The primary place of the notions of form and matter is not the thing in general, but rather equipment. It is first and foremost with respect to tools that we deliberate about the right form and the appropriate matter. Therefore, to apply these notions to the analysis of thing (or work of art) means interpreting them as some sort of "equipment": "The bare thing is a sort of equipment, yet an equipment stripped of its equipmental Being."  

But why is the concept of equipment an insufficient starting point for the analysis of a work of art? Heidegger answers this question in a way that can hardly be regarded as a 'tight' argument. He claims that in order to first understand equipment, the best we can do is to let a painting depicting a concrete example of equipment tell us what is essential for equipmental Being. Thus, looking at a painting by van Gogh depicting a pair of peasant shoes, Heidegger attempts to describe the essential features of equipment, i.e., reliability and unthematicity. From this way of proceeding—and the assumed lack of alternatives—Heidegger then argues that precisely because art is the basis of our understanding of equipment—and incidentally of thinghood, too—equipment cannot be used in an explication of art.  

This result teaches us something crucial about art itself. The fact that we could read the truth about equipment from the painting reveals the truth-opening character of art:  

The equipmental quality of equipment was discovered. But how? Not by a description and explanation of a pair of shoes
actually present ... but only by bringing ourselves before van Gogh's painting. The painting spoke. ... The art work let us know what shoes are in truth.\textsuperscript{243}

Thus we have arrived at the second thesis:

\((A\text{-}2)\) The work of art shows us what a being truly is. It reveals the being in its Being.

Heidegger's subsequent text is largely devoted to the further elaboration of this point. First of all, he concerns himself with the question as to whether the truth that art reveals is to be understood as adaequatio or correspondence. In the light of Heidegger's earlier critique of the correspondence theory, it is hardly surprising that he again opposes this conception. The truth of van Gogh's painting does not lie in its correspondence to a given real pair of peasant shoes, and neither does its truth reside in a correspondence to the essence of peasant shoes. However, in order to approach the truth of art more adequately, Heidegger again chooses an example, this time a Greek temple. Since a temple does not have a relation of correspondence to something in the world or to some essence, Heidegger believes that in this case we can most successfully determine what the truth of art consists in without being tempted to fall back on the obsolete notion of truth as correspondence.

The notions which Heidegger employs in order to try and grasp the "happening of truth" in the case of the temple are those of "strife", "earth", and "world":

\((A\text{-}3)\) The work of art is a happening, a strife between world and earth.

"World" here comes close to the world-notion of \textit{Being and Time}, whereas "earth" is a notion that Heidegger adopts from Hölderlin: whereas "world" refers to openness, meaning, homeland, "earth" refers to the material, the impenetrable, the closed, and the strange. Like in \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger puts special emphasis on the observation that world is not an object. From about this period on he in fact generally prefers to express this observation by using the tautology, "The world worlds". The expression "world is" tempts one
to think wrongly of world as a particular being, and—arising from the interpretation of Being as presence(-at-hand)—as an object:

World worlds and has more Being than the tangible and the perceptible realm in which we believe ourselves to be at home. World is never an object ... Wherever the essential decisions of our history are made ... there the world worlds.244

Now according to Heidegger, what we experience, when confronted with a Greek temple is the interplay or the "strife" between world and earth. The temple makes present a world with its religion, life, and politics, but it also makes us aware of the limits that our understanding encounters. The rock on which the temple is built, the nature that surrounds it, the material that was used to build it, all of these cannot be understood like human deeds and texts. The temple or, more generally, any work of art, instantiates the tension between these two aspects: the openness of meaning and the impenetrability of matter, i.e., the limitation of understanding:

The world is the self-opening openness of the broad paths of the simple and essential decisions in the destiny of a historical people. The earth is the unhurried emergence of that which is continuously self-closing and to that extent sheltering. World and earth are essentially different from one another and yet never separated. ... The confrontation of world and earth is a strife.245

Heidegger suggests that in this strife of world and earth we encounter a phenomenon that is of the essence of truth:

(A-4) Art is a happening of truth, truth is a strife between illumination and concealment.

The conception of truth that Heidegger subsequently presents shows similarities with, but also some deviations from, the notion of truth that he develops in Being and Time. What is retained from Being and Time is the characterization of truth as unconcealedness, as ἀλήθεια. However, the distinction between truth and falsehood—qua "untruth"—is no longer linked to the issue of Dasein's authenticity and inauthenticity. Falsehood as "untruth" is rather developed into a component of the "happening" of truth itself.
Again the starting point is a criticism of truth as correspondence, of the truth of a sentence in the sense of correspondence to some one fact. The claim that this notion is inadequate is now defended by drawing attention to the idea that for a sentence to correspond to a fact, for a sentence to be able to be *true to* a fact, the fact must itself already be unconcealed and disclosed:

The fact must show itself as a fact if knowledge and the proposition that forms and expresses knowledge are to be able to conform to the fact; otherwise the fact cannot become binding for the proposition. How can a fact show itself if it cannot itself stand forth out of the concealedness, if it does not itself stand in the unconcealed?246

However, not only must the fact be disclosed, but furthermore the world as a whole must be disclosed, too. Human beings must live in a world, in a universal medium of meaning, in order for them to be able to decide to be true to a given fact, a fact already disclosed by language.247

Instead of merely speaking of disclosedness, Heidegger begins in "The Origin of the Work of Art" to use a further term: "Lichtung" (clearing, illumination). This term serves to express truth as a happening that lies beyond human deliberation. For humans to be able to have a world of beings, these beings must be disclosed, or situated in "illumination":

Beings can be as beings only if they stand within and stand out within what is lighted in this illumination. Only this illumination grants and guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings that we ourselves are not, and access to the beings that we ourselves are.248

What stands out in the illumination as unconcealed is not in our control. Furthermore, "untruth" (*Unwahrheit*) does not stem from our inauthentic tendency to ignore what is revealed to us by the universal medium of meaning/language in which we live, but untruth is rather the twofold darkness suggested by the picture of illumination or clearing. Untruth is the area not reached by the light, and the shadow which one lighted object throws over another. Heidegger
speaks of the former as "concealment as denial" and of the latter as
"concealment as covering". Based on the metaphor of light and
darkness, that is to say, on their dependence upon each other, Hei-
degger claims that the essence of truth is the strife between light
(illumination) and darkness: "The essence of truth is, in itself, the
primal strife in which that open center is fought open and fought
over, that open center into which beings stand out . . ." 

One of the curious ingredients of Heidegger's conception of truth
is that truth is something given to us humans: "... this illumination
grants . . . to us humans a passage to those beings . . ." Remember-
ring that art is a happening of truth, it is not surprising to find
the following idea proposed in "The Origin of the Work of Art":

(A-5) The production of works of art corresponds structurally
to their preservation; both are matters of receiving rather than
of active doing.

Heidegger makes this point by elaborating upon what he takes to
be the original meaning of the Greek τέχνη, a word that is often
held to cover both art and handicraft. Heidegger claims that this
translation remains somewhat superficial: τέχνη basically means
a kind of knowledge in the sense of "receiving the present [thing,
fact] as such"; "τέχνη never means the activity of producing". The creation of an artwork is thus "rather a receiving and hearing
[Entnehmen] within the relation of unconcealedness". Artists are
those people who are open to the unconcealedness that is "granted"
to all of us insofar as we all live in a universal medium of meaning.
The preservation of a piece of art is in principle of the same nature,
"Preserving the work means standing within the openness of beings
that happens in the work".

Up to this point, Heidegger has not been especially explicit as
to 'who' or 'what' precisely it is that presents us humans with dis-
closedness, lighting, truth, and the possibility of art. We can gain a
clearer understanding of this issue as we unfold the implications of
the claim that . . .

(A-6) Poetry is the essence of art.

A-6 contains several claims and ideas. First, A-6 is motivated
by saying that poetry is the essence of art qua the letting-happen of
truth, \textit{qua} the receiving of truth: "All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of beings, is as such, in essence, poetry."\textsuperscript{256} This notion of poetry, Heidegger suggests, is broader than poetry in its usual meaning of a kind of linguistic artwork. Second, it nevertheless is not coincidental or arbitrary that the usual notion of poetry should thus be expanded. It is appropriate to extend the scope of the term because the linguistic artwork, precisely because it is linguistic, has an eminent ability to receive the truth. This is so because it is language that "brings beings as beings into the open for the first time".\textsuperscript{257} Third, because of this role of language as that medium through which truth is disclosed to us, even the non-linguistic artwork depends on language:

Building and plastic creation ... always happen already, and happen only, in the open region of saying and naming. It is the open region that pervades and guides them. But precisely for this very reason, they retain their own ways and modes in which truth directs itself in the work. They are an ever special poetizing within the illumination of beings, which has already happened unnoticed in language.\textsuperscript{258}

Finally, this overruling dominance of language also explains why Heidegger can make the following claim (\textit{A-7}):

\textit{(A-7) Art is bound to nations and determines their essence and their history.}

This claim is based on the conviction expressed in "The Origin of the Work of Art" that language determines what kind of world we live in: "Actually language at any given moment is the happening of this saying, in which a people’s world historically arises for it ..."\textsuperscript{259} Since art \textit{qua} poetry has an essential link to language, it does not come as a surprise that Heidegger writes:

Whenever art happens—that is, whenever there is a beginning—a thrust enters history, history either begins or starts over again. ... History is the transporting of a people into its appointed task as entrance into that people’s endowment.\textsuperscript{260}
4.2. Language and Being

As was mentioned above, I shall group Heidegger's numerous pronouncements concerning language and Being around seven theses that are roughly modelled on the seven theses on art presented in the preceding section. I shall quote Heidegger more extensively than elsewhere in this study in order to provide evidence to support my claim that Heidegger indeed advocates the theses I formulate and also in order to present the reader with sufficient material against which my subsequent interpretation can be checked. As counterparts for A-1 we thus get the following claims on Being and language:

(B-1) We cannot analyze Being with the help of any other category, since all categories pertain to beings, not to Being. In all categories Being is already understood.

(L-1) We cannot analyze language with the help of any other category, since all categories appear only in language.

Evidence for Heidegger's acceptance of B-1 and L-1 is easily forthcoming. Concerning Being, we are told that the central blindness of metaphysics from Plato and Aristotle to Nietzsche consists in its attempt to approach Being in terms of an analysis of beings, neglecting the question concerning Being itself:

... the "question concerning Being" [Seinsfrage] in the sense of the metaphysical question as to beings as such [das Seiende als solches] precisely does not ask thematically for Being [Sein]. The latter remains forgotten.261

... we begin with the following attempt: to think Being as Being. This means: Not to explain Being via some being.262

In order to avoid the temptation of thinking Being to be a being, a temptation that misled the tradition into interpreting Being as presence, Heidegger relies on tautology ("Yet Being—what is Being? It is It itself."263), as well as two other devices: sometimes he uses an old-fashioned spelling ("Seyn"), sometimes he crosses out the word:

... Die. The drawing of these crossed lines at first only repels, especially the almost ineradicable habit of conceiving "Being" as something standing by itself and only coming at times face to face with man.264
Being, according to Heidegger, is the most fundamental of all meanings, the meaning that determines our understanding of all beings. Only in so far as we understand Being are we able to understand beings. But precisely because Being is thus the transcendental condition of relating to beings, it cannot be itself a being. (Just like in the early Wittgenstein the logical form of language and the world cannot be expressed in language. I shall return to this comparison below.)

To turn from Being to language, Heidegger strongly emphasizes the notion that language cannot be understood through the traditional categories of expression, sign, and meaning:

In its essence language is not the utterance of an organism; nor is it the expression of a living thing. Nor can it be thought in an essentially correct way in terms of the character of signification. Perhaps not even in terms of the character of meaning.265

In order to avoid reducing language to something else which is foreign to its essence, Heidegger again contends, the analysis of language has to happen along the lines of tautologies, such as "Language is language", or "Language speaks" [Die Sprache spricht].266 This turn to tautologies in order to avoid false reductions is of course a characteristic feature of Heidegger's way of expressing himself. Above, we already encountered the famous "the world worlds", to which we can add from other sources, "time times" (die Zeit zeitigt), and "space spaces" (der Raum räumt).267 With respect to the worlding of the world, Heidegger justifies the use of the tautology in this way: "World has its essential mode of Being in that it worlds. [Welt west, indem sie weltet.] That is to say, the worlding of the world can neither be explained through something else, nor can it be led back to something else as its ground."268 In another place, Heidegger even calls tautological thinking the original sense of phenomenology. Commenting on Parmenides' εστι γαρ ειναι, Heidegger suggests that...

... this is an obvious tautology. Indeed! It is a genuine tautology. It names the same and the same itself.269

... tautological thinking. That is the original meaning of phenomenology.270
... tautology is the only way to think what dialectic can only conceal.\textsuperscript{271}

(Even though I shall return to this point below, it should already be noted here that this recourse to tautologies is of course both an unavoidable corollary to the conception of the ineffability of semantics, and one of its most characteristic symptoms.)

Heidegger does not only claim, however, that we cannot analyze language in terms of other notions. He goes even further by denying that we can grasp the essence of language by speaking about language. Language is a totality that we cannot speak of, we can only speak 'out of' it.\textsuperscript{272} Everything appears to us in and through language, but language as a whole does not so appear. Heidegger makes his opposition to metalanguage explicit in, for instance, "A Dialogue on Language"\textsuperscript{273}, a somewhat stylized talk between Heidegger (or "I(nquirer)") and a Japanese philosopher (or "J"):  

\begin{quote}
\textit{I} ... Something else is more weighty, and that is, whether there ever is such a thing as speaking about language.
\textit{J} But what we are doing now is evidence that there is such speaking.
\textit{I} All too much, I am afraid.
\textit{J} Then I do not understand why you hesitate.
\textit{I} Speaking about language turns language almost inevitably into an object.
\textit{J} And then its essence vanishes.\textsuperscript{274}
\end{quote}

Heidegger links the striving to speak about language to analytical philosophy on the one hand, and to metaphysics on the other hand:

\begin{quote}
Of late, the scientific and philosophical investigation of languages is aiming ever more resolutely at the production of what it calls 'metalanguage'. Analytical philosophy, which is set on producing this super-language, is thus quite consistent when it considers itself metalinguistics. That sounds like metaphysics—not only sounds like it, it is metaphysics.\textsuperscript{275}
\end{quote}

Heidegger expresses the idea that only in and through language we encounter worldly things in the context of an interpretation of the following lines by Stefan George:
So lernt ich traurig den verzicht:
Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht.
(So I renounced and sadly see:
Where word breaks off no thing may be.)

In fact, Heidegger derives two crucial tenets of his thought about language from these lines. The one that is of immediate importance for thesis L-1 is that the Being of the thing is dependent on the word: "Only where the word for the thing has been found is the thing a thing. Only thus is it. Accordingly we must stress as follows: no thing is where the word, that is, the name, is lacking. The word alone gives being to the thing." From the vantage point of this study, it is interesting that in all contexts where Heidegger interprets these lines, he goes further and adds another interpretation to the one given. This further interpretation holds that the subject matter of the poet's renunciation is the (semantical) relation between a word and a thing: "The poet's renunciation does not touch the word, but rather the relation of word to thing, more precisely, the mysteriousness of that relation ..."

The counterparts of A-2 to A-4 in the realm of the philosophy of language are clear:

(L-2) Language discloses to us what a being truly is.
(L-3) Language is a happening, strife.
(L-4) Language as happening of truth is a strife between illumination and concealment.

These theses can also be easily detected in Heidegger's oeuvre. Thesis L-2 obviously follows from L-1, since there is no other way towards beings than the disclosing which is accomplished by language. Some further passages to the same effect state that, "it is only in the word, in language, that things first come into Being and are," or that "... only through language man is confronted with something that is disclosed ..." The happening-character of language and its relation to the metaphors of light and strife are seen neatly in the following passage:

To say, related to the Old Norse "saga", means to show: to make appear, set free, that is, to offer and extend what we call
World, illumination and concealing it. This lighting and hiding proffer of the world is the essential being of Saying.\textsuperscript{281}

The tension that is essential for language is sometimes also described by Heidegger as one between the world and a thing. To understand this point we need to recall that language and world are as inseparable as are thing and word. From this it follows that just as language cannot be made accessible to us \textit{in toto}, neither can the world be made accessible in this way. Furthermore, in every word the whole of language is present since every word is a word only within one particular language. This leads then, finally, to the idea that equally in every thing the thing's own world is present. A thing too is possible only within a particular (linguistically interpreted) world. Heidegger can claim, accordingly, that rather than speaking of the world and a thing, we should speak of the "thing-world" and a "world-thing". Their relation is couched by Heidegger—notwithstanding his opposition to dialectic—in an almost Hegelian way as a unity of identity ("\textit{Innigkeit}", "intimacy") and difference ("\textit{Schied}", "separating"):

... The world and the thing do not subsist alongside one another. They penetrate each other. In doing so they cross a middle ground between them. ... In the middle ground between the two, in this in-between [\textit{das Zwischen} of world and thing, in their \textit{inter}, separation rules [\ldots \textit{im Zwischen von Welt und Ding, in ihrem inter, in diesem Unter-, waltet der Schied}]. ... The intimacy of world and thing has its essence [\textit{west}] in this separating of the in-between, has its essence in the intimate separating [\textit{Unter-Schied}].\textsuperscript{282}

What enables this relation of unity and difference is, again, language: "Language has its essence [\textit{west}] in being the happening of the intimate separation of world and things."\textsuperscript{283}

In order to approach further the connection between language and illumination, it is useful first to formulate theses \textit{B-2} to \textit{B-4} (some modifications to theses \textit{L-2-L-4} are necessary for reasons that will become clear as we proceed):

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{(B-2)} Being discloses to us what a being truly is.
  \item \textit{(B-3)} Being is a happening, (a "message").
\end{itemize}
(B-4) Being is illumination.

B-4 can almost directly be found in Heidegger's writings: "But illumination itself is Being". In the light of what we heard earlier of Being and illumination, this equation does not come as a surprise. In "The Origin of the Work of Art", we were told that beings are accessible to us, that they are beings for us only in so far as they are disclosed by standing out in illumination. In this section we summarized Heidegger's idea on the relation between Being and beings as one in which Being makes our understanding of beings possible. Putting these two theses together, we arrive at thesis B-4.

The late Heidegger also deals repeatedly with the happening of Being. This happening is the history of our partial and insufficient understanding of Being. Heidegger claims that the understanding of Being which in Being and Time he referred to as "presence-at-hand" (Vorhandenheit), and which in his later writings he calls "presence" (Anwesenheit), has been the predominant understanding of Being from Plato up until the present day. Within this history, Heidegger distinguishes further several phases, for instance, the Platonic interpretation of Being as idea, or the modern interpretation of Being as that which is controlled by us: Being as "framing" (Ge-stell). The details of this history are not our concern here. Yet what does deserve our attention is Heidegger's often repeated contention according to which our understanding of Being is a "Geschick". The word "Geschick" in German means "fate" or "destiny", yet taken literally, as "Ge-schick", it means 'that which has been sent'. When Heidegger speaks of our understanding of Being as a "Geschick", both meanings are alluded to. On the one hand, our understanding of Being is our fate because we cannot change or overcome it. On the other hand, our understanding of Being is sent to us by Being itself. However, by calling our understanding of Being a message (by Being), Heidegger does not mean to say that Being reveals itself to us totally. What he wishes to say is that Being in its message still withholding its essence:

When using the word "Geschick" with respect to Being, we mean to say that Being speaks to us, or illuminates itself, and that through this illumination Being concedes us the time-space-
domain [Zeit-Spiel-Raum] in which beings can appear. ... The essence of history is determined by the message of Being, by Being as fate, by Being as that which sends itself to us while withholding itself from us.\textsuperscript{286}

... What follows from this is that "Being" has different meanings in different epochs of its Geschick.\textsuperscript{287}

For instance, in the case of Plato, Heidegger claims that it was not Plato's doing that "reality has shown itself in the light of Ideas ... The thinker only responded to what addressed itself to him."\textsuperscript{288} Equally, the modern technical age with its striving for control, is "no merely human doing".\textsuperscript{289} Since Being rather than human beings plays the active part, neither can metaphysical "forgetfullness" concerning the question of Being be regarded as a human shortcoming: "The oblivion of Being which constitutes the essence of metaphysics and became the stimulus of Being and Time belongs to the essence of Being itself."\textsuperscript{290}

In these pronouncements Heidegger contends that Being qua illumination is that through and by which we live in a disclosed world. Earlier we saw that he makes rather similar claims about language. In view of these Heideggerian pronouncements, the question naturally arises as to how Heidegger conceives of the relation between Being and language. Answering this question also throws additional light on the relation between language and illumination.

Of course the best-known line by the later Heidegger on the relation between language and Being is the famous pair of sentences from the "Letter on Humanism": "Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells."\textsuperscript{291} Later in the same text the same claim is modified slightly to say that language is "the house of the truth of Being".\textsuperscript{292} Other, related pronouncements in this famous letter are that "language is the illuminating-concealing advent of Being itself"\textsuperscript{293}, and that ...

illuminating itself, Being reaches language. Being is always on the way to language. What arrives in this way is what brings in turn the ek-sisting thought in its saying to language. Language is thus itself raised into the illumination of Being. It is only in this way that language exists [ist] in that mysterious but
us-always-penetrating way.\textsuperscript{294}

In other writings of the same period, for instance in \textit{The Law of the Reason}, we read that "the message of Being—as the saying that speaks to us, encourages, and demands—is that saying out of which all human speaking speaks".\textsuperscript{295} Likewise in "What is Metaphysics?" Heidegger says that without the indefinite meaning of Being, we would not have any language:

If the vague meaning of Being were not to exist ... then there would be no language at all. That would not be the case that in words beings are disclosed as beings ...\textsuperscript{296}

These quotations, as well as the other passages on language and Being referred to earlier, suggest that for Heidegger language and Being are neither identical nor separate. They are not identical in that language is dependent upon Being, and in that language 'houses' Being. And neither can one be without the other, since language cannot be without Being, and since Being is only within the house provided by language. What the housing metaphor alludes to is Heidegger's view that language is the place, the medium, for the truth-revealing happening, the lighting, of Being. An understanding of Being is always linked to a specific historical language (or group of languages). The way in which Being reveals beings, the way in which Being as illumination makes beings accessible to us, is the transcendental condition of the possibility of that language (something like its 'logical form').

The quotations given above to support \textit{B-2-B-4} and \textit{L-2-L-4} suffice to provide good grounds for claiming that Heidegger also holds \textit{B-5} and \textit{L-5}:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{(B-5)} An understanding of Being is given to us rather than developed by us.
  \item \textbf{(L-5)} The speaking of a language is more a receiving than an active doing.
\end{itemize}

In the case of Being, Heidegger's faith in the principle \textit{B-5} is clear from the way he was seen above to speak of the understanding of Being as a "\textit{Geschick}". In the case of language, however, it is worth while referring to some additional passages. Thesis \textit{L-5} finds an
almost poetic expression in the following lines: "Der Mensch spricht nur, indem er der Sprache entspricht. Die Sprache spricht. Ihr Sprechen spricht für uns im Gesprochenen." [The human being only speaks by conforming to language. Language speaks. Its speaking speaks for us in what is spoken.] With less alliteration Heidegger makes the same point by stressing that speaking a language means first and foremost listening to that language: "Speaking is of itself a listening. Speaking is listening to the language which we speak. ... What do we hear there? We hear language speaking." Heidegger also refers to language as "the master" of man: "Man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man."

For Heidegger, only the poet and the thinker, i.e., Heidegger himself, abstain from trying to be the master of language; they accept instead language as their master. But the poet does not just have a special openness for what language discloses; Heidegger goes further and even claims that ...

(L-6) Poetry is the essence of language; and
(B-6) Poetry, poetic thinking is more open for the illumination of Being than any other mode of thought.

According to Heidegger, poetic language is primary as compared with ordinary or scientific language in that it is in poetic language that Being as lighting and disclosing happens first and foremost. ("Science is no original event of truth, science is rather the cultivation of an area of truth already open ...") The reason why Being as illumination happens rather in poetic language than in ordinary language is that the user of the latter has become deaf to that revealing which happens in and through language. Heidegger expresses this also by saying that poetry is "original language", and "the donation of Seyn". This "donation" is no "arbitrary invention", however, but rather—as Heidegger puts it in Hölderlin's language—"the placing of oneself under the thunder of the Gods, first, in order to receive in the word and its becoming, their signs, the lightning, and second, in order to place the word with its whole hiding power among the people". The Heideggerian poet thus does not freely invent his own language game. Instead, the Heideggerian poet listens to
what his language speaks: "The conforming-speaking [Entsprechen] wherein man genuinely listens to the speaking of language, is that saying which speaks in poetry."\(^{303}\)

Heidegger does not regard his own later writings as poetry, however, but as "thought" (Denken). Thought is nevertheless closely tied to poetry, in that it abstains from wanting to control language. Thought, too, adopts an attitude of "releasement" towards language\(^{304}\), in that it is like poetry the "guard" in the "house of Being"\(^{305}\), and in that it is aware of poetry as a "beneficial danger".\(^{306}\)

Heidegger frequently draws a sharp line between poetic and "thinking" language on the one hand, and ordinary and scientific language, grammar, and the modern philosophy of language, on the other hand. In the following passage, the modern view of language as a means of communication is contrasted with poetry:

In the current view, language is held to be a kind of communication. It serves for verbal exchange and agreement, and in general for communication. But language is not only and not primarily an audible and written expression of what is to be communicated. It not only puts forth in words and statements what is overtly or covertly intended to be communicated; language alone brings beings as beings into the open for the first time . . . Such saying is a projecting of illumination . . . Projective saying is poetry . . .\(^{307}\)

To turn to the critique of modern grammar and the philosophy of language, Heidegger claims that they have completely distorted the order of priority between ordinary language and poetry:

The purest essence [of language] unfolds itself originally in poetry. Poetry is the original language of a people. The poetic saying, however, declines to become first genuine prose and later bad 'prose'. The latter then again declines into idle talk. The philosophy of language then starts from this latter, ordinary, everyday use of words, that is, from the form of decay. It subsequently then looks upon "poetry" as an exception to the rule. Thus everything is turned upside down.\(^{308}\)
Heidegger sees a link between modern technology (Technik), which treats everything as controllable by a human subject, and the modern conception and treatment of language. That technology has an impact upon our relation towards language is illustrated by Heidegger, for instance in the following passage:

The typewriter [Schreib-maschine, writing-machine] means an invasion of the mechanism into the realm of words. ... The typewriter is a signless cloud, i.e., a denying concealment despite its intrusiveness, through which man's relation towards Being is changed.309

In another context, Heidegger suspects that "the language-machine will start using language, and will thus become the master of man's essence".310

The kind of conception of language that must emerge in the age of technology is spelled out by Heidegger as follows:

Speaking is challenged to correspond in every respect to framing [Ge-stell] in which all present beings can be commandeered. Within framing, speaking turns into information. ... framing... commandeers for its purposes a formalized language, the kind of communication which "informs" man uniformly, that is, gives him the form in which he is fitted into the technological-calcu-lative universe, and gradually abandons "natural language". ... The "natural" aspect of language, which the will to formalization still seems forced to concede for the time being, is not experienced and understood in the light of the original nature of language. ... Information theory conceives of the natural aspect of language as a lack of formalization.311

On another occasion Heidegger suggests that "Logistik has noth-ing to do with philosophy" and that it amounts to "the mathema-tizing of all thinking". Heidegger continues:

That one takes Logistik to be the philosophy, that one believes one can say the least about the essence of something by way of formulas, all this is connected to Europeanization. Logic has been developed to such a level that it plays an uncanny role in mathematical research (calculating and thinking machines). In
other words, what began with Descartes unfolds itself here in an uncanny way ... 312

Heidegger seems to be somewhat divided as to the question whether these and similar remarks are to be taken as genuine criticisms or as a description of something that cannot be changed. On the one hand, he clearly seems to call upon his readers to adopt a more poetic attitude towards language. On the other hand, according to the principles concerning language and Being that he himself advocates, this kind of criticism cannot lead to any changes in the way Being sends itself to us. The latter view can be read from the following passage:

Language still denies us its essence ... Instead, language surrenders itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an instrument of domination over beings. 313

Finally, we have to turn to the relativistic implications of Heidegger's views on language and Being:

(L-7) Language is relative with respect to different communities and determines their essence and history.
(B-7) An understanding of Being is relative to different languages, and is determinative of a people's essence and history.

In the preceding section, we found an early expression of thesis L-7, in "The Origin of the Work of Art". There Heidegger stresses that language opens up the world for a people, and that, in the speaking of language, "the concepts of a historical people's essence, i.e., of its belonging to world history, are preformed for that people". 314 The cultural and linguistic relativism that raises its head in these lines comes out more clearly in the following passage which also provides confirmation for our ascribing thesis B-7 to Heidegger:

Some time ago I called language, clumsily enough, the house of Being. If man by virtue of his language dwells within the claim and call of Being, then we Europeans presumably dwell in an entirely different house than Eastasian man. ... And so, a dialogue from house to house remains nearly impossible. 315
4.3. Language, Art, and the Universal Medium Conception

Most of Heidegger's ideas on language and art will appear foreign—to say the least—to anyone within the analytical tradition. Not only does Heidegger's language seem poetical rather than philosophical, but also some of his pronouncements concerning, for instance, the gifts of illumination or the messages of Being seem to fly in the face of what a philosopher within the analytical tradition will regard as meaningful. (Even Jacques Derrida is unable to refrain from ridiculing these ideas as "postal metaphysics"!\textsuperscript{316}) I shall try nevertheless to make Heidegger a little more palatable, not by justifying his pronouncements in an absolute sense, but by showing how several of his most central ideas flow naturally from his belief in language as a universal medium. Since Heidegger shares this belief with such eminent authors of the analytical tradition as Frege, Russell, and especially Wittgenstein\textsuperscript{317}, he should thus turn out to be of some interest even for the student of this trio.

Let us first approach Heidegger's belief in the universality of language \textit{via negationis} by studying the relation between the mainstream philosophy of language as Heidegger characterizes and abhors it, and the conception of language as calculus. At least the following tenets are explicitly regarded as part and parcel of that view of language which Heidegger regards as insufficient:

(i) Language can be treated as a system of signs (see p. 203 above).
(ii) Language can and should be formalized (see p. 212 above).
(iii) Language is used to express prelinguistic intentions (see p. 211 above).
(iv) Any language can be turned into an object and talked about with the help of a metalanguage (see p. 205 above).
(v) Truth can be defined and is to be defined as correspondence (see p. 199 above).

The first obvious question with respect to this list is this: Who does Heidegger take to hold these views? Even though one does find occasional references to Husserl in the writings of the later Heidegger, Husserl no longer has the place that he had in the period of \textit{Being and Time}; Husserl is no longer the most important opponent. Instead, Heidegger seems to suggest that this list is characteristic of
modern analytical philosophy, to which we saw him referring above. Unfortunately, specific doctrines and names are almost never mentioned. The following reference to Wittgenstein is—as far as I can determine—one of the two only exceptions:

The being as a whole \([\text{das Seiende im Ganzen}]—\tau \alpha \delta \nu \tau \alpha—\) is for us merely an empty word. We no longer have that experience of being that the Greeks had. On the contrary, in Wittgenstein we read: "Wirklich ist, was der Fall ist". (i.e., that what falls under a determination, that what can be determined, the determinable.) Actually, this is a disturbing sentence.\(^{318}\)

It is interesting to note that Heidegger in these lines regards Wittgenstein as something like the culmination point of the tradition which takes everything—every being—to be determinable and controllable, to be present-at-hand, or present (as the later Heidegger puts it). And indeed, Heidegger always thought of Wittgenstein precisely as yet another ingredient of the metaphysical tradition. (von Herrmann, pers. comm.) As is well known, Wittgenstein had more sympathy for Heidegger than vice versa. Wittgenstein wrote that he appreciates Heidegger’s concern with Being and care, and Heidegger’s running up against the limits of language.\(^{319}\) However, in Heidegger we also find one positive remark about Wittgenstein. Having been asked in a seminar on Heracleitos for his opinion on the role of the hermeneutical circle in text interpretation, Heidegger is reported as having answered:

Wittgenstein says the following. The difficulty in which thinking stands is like a man in a room which he wants to get out of. At first, he attempts to get out through the window, but it is too high for him. Then he attempts to get out through the chimney, which is too narrow for him. If he simply turned around, he would see that the door was open all along.\(^{320}\)

These passages are noteworthy because the commonness of concern between Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s projects has—starting with Karl-Otto Apel’s articles\(^{321}\)—been pointed out repeatedly in the literature. What the first quotation suggests is that Heidegger himself did not find the \textit{Tractatus} congenial to his work. The second
quotation alludes to the possibility that Heidegger read some writings of the later Wittgenstein—Heidegger owned a copy of the *Philosophical Investigations* (von Herrmann)—and that he found himself, at least in some places and despite his overall critical assessment, in sympathy with what he encountered. Below I hope to show that actually there were quite a few ideas in the early as well as in the later Wittgenstein that Heidegger could have appreciated. This is not to deny, as Heidegger himself pointed out to his student Otto Pöggeler, that there are indeed "unbridgeable differences in the respective questions" of his and Wittgenstein's. Heidegger might also have been right in saying that Apel's interpretation has resulted in a "new kind of Chinese", even though such an accusation coming from Heidegger sounds very curious. But all this does not rule out the possibility that even quite different philosophical projects can lead to insights that are highly reminiscent of one another.

To return to Heidegger's characterization of the position he seeks to overcome, i.e., the theses (i)–(v), the question as to how well Heidegger was acquainted with the analytical philosophy of language cannot be sufficiently answered at the present time, that is as long as Heidegger's library is not made accessible to scholarly research. Let us therefore turn to more systematic concerns and remind ourselves how naturally theses (i)–(v) apply to the view of language as calculus. What is characteristic of the opponents that Heidegger envisages are two fundamental tenets: that we can take a stand outside of our language, and that language can be manipulated. Each of these tenets leads to further consequences: the former belief first raises its head in the contention that language is used as a *means* of communication, as something speakers use to convey to each other their pre-linguistic intentions (above p. 211 first quotation). Second, the belief in our ability to take a stand outside of our home language also informs the idea that we can talk about language, that a metalanguage is possible in which we can speak about our home language. Third, this belief leads to the assumption that language can be formalized, that language can be as it were disconnected from its world-disclosing function, in order to be treated purely syntactically. And fourth semantical relations between language and the world are accessible. Heidegger does not state this implication of
his opponents' position explicitly, but he lets his opponents abide by truth as correspondence, lets them believe that the nature of language can be investigated via the study of meaning (see p. 203 first quotation), and states—in developing his alternative account—that the poet, that champion of a true relation to language, relinquishes an explicit semantics (see above p. 205).

The second fundamental tenet that Heidegger attributes to his opponents, namely, the idea that we can manipulate language, links up his imaginary opponents' conception with modern technology. Here it is instructive to note that Heidegger comes close to adopting the notion of calculus as a characterization of the stand he regards as insufficient (albeit perhaps inevitable):

In 1677 (when 31 years old) Leibniz wrote a dialogue on the lingua rationalis, i.e., the calculus, the calculation, that was supposed to be able to calculate with respect to everything the relations between word, sign, and fact or thing. In this dialogue as well as in other treatises, Leibniz thought and anticipated what today is not only used as the thinking machine, but what rather even determines the way of thinking.\[325\]

The question naturally arises as to why Heidegger did not choose to characterize technology (and the conception of language that goes with it) in so many words in terms of the notion of calculus. For this notion seems to bring out the central ingredients of technology—calculation, rationalization, manipulation, control—at least as well as Heidegger's awkward term "Gestell". To this question, a likely answer is offered by Heidegger's own writings. What prevents our thinker from using the same term as us is his knowledge of Hölderlin. Two pages after the cited passage Heidegger explains that Hölderlin used the notion of "Kalkül" as meaning "balance and equipoise of the work of art".\[326\] Thus what is happening is that Heidegger yields the word "calculus" (Kalkul) to his admired Hölderlin who employed it for a different purpose.\[327\]

Of course Heidegger's picking as his antipode a position that is founded on the belief in language as calculus, already provides a good indication of his own abiding by the opposite conception, that is by language as the universal medium. However, more support for
this attribution is easily forthcoming as we review some of the main tenets of the two preceding sections.

Heidegger’s pronouncement that language is the house of Being clearly expresses his belief in the universality of language and the inaccessibility of semantics. Being is the transcendental condition of the possibility of there being beings for us; more precisely, Being is the transcendental condition of the possibility of the disclosedness of beings in and through language. This transcendental condition cannot be turned into a being itself, it cannot be expressed in language. As Karl-Otto Apel has aptly shown, in this sense Heidegger’s Being is similar to the logical form of language and world in Wittgenstein.\textsuperscript{328} Just as Wittgenstein thought that logical form cannot be expressed in language, so also Heidegger claims that Being qua Being cannot be treated as something we can talk about. However, the difference between Wittgenstein and Heidegger lies in the fact that whereas the early Wittgenstein believes that all speaking about logical form—and thus the *Tractatus* itself—is strictly nonsense, Heidegger believes that there are linguistic means to allude to Being: these are poetic pictures and tautologies, oblique uses of language that can at least point towards, or allude to, the inexpressible. Wittgenstein’s practice is nevertheless closer to Heidegger than his theory. He wrote in the *Tractatus* a carefully structured work of philosophy, using various literary and linguistic tools, even though in the penultimate proposition of his work Wittgenstein had to ask his reader to consider the entire presentation as so much nonsense. Interestingly enough, Heidegger was very intrigued with Wittgenstein’s way of making this last-mentioned point, i.e., the metaphor of the ladder that one has to throw away after having climbed up (von Herrmann, pers. comm.).\textsuperscript{329}

For the early Wittgenstein as well as for Heidegger, the inaccessibility of that transcendental condition is of course nothing but the ineffability of semantical relations between language and the world. That we cannot sidestep this transcendental condition means that we cannot clarify the relation between language and its referent. Wittgenstein puts this as follows:

In order to be able to represent the logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere
outside logic, that is to say, outside the world.  

Replacing 'Being' for 'logical form', and 'language' for 'logic', we obtain a Heideggerian equivalent to Wittgenstein's pronouncement. We should also remember that one consequence of the inexpressibility of logical form in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is the ineffability of the relation between names and their objects. Heidegger praises the poet precisely as the person who renounces the relation between word and object: "The poet's renunciation ... touch[es] ... the relation of word to thing ..."  

It is important to stress here that Heidegger's vindication of the poet also flows from his belief in language as the universal medium. From the way Heidegger characterizes poetry (and his "thinking") it is obvious that the poet is the human being who adopts the stand that "language is a bad servant, but a good master"—to use Jaakko Hintikka's happy phrase. The poet is the one who listens to language, who by his very profession cannot even want to take a stand beyond language, whose products are untranslatable, who does not raise claims to correspondence with an independent reality, and who does not make metalinguistic theoretical claims. At least in this last respect the Heideggerian thinker-poet closely resembles the writer of the *Philosophical Investigations* who equally believes that philosophy cannot take a stand in which metastatements about language are possible. For both Wittgenstein and Heidegger metalanguage is an abuse of language.

However, Wittgenstein does not go so far as to say, like Heidegger, that philosophical thinking should be thinking in terms of tautologies. Yet this idea in Heidegger is naturally seen as yet another consequence of his belief in language as a universal medium. The reason why the world worlds, the time times, the space spaces, and the language speaks (*die Sprache spricht*), is that predicating anything else of the world, time, space, or language would lead us to the temptation of turning them into something in toto accessible, to the temptation of turning them into something we can—without circularity—speak about. Precisely because the world, time, space, and language, are universal media, all we can say about them are tautologies. Since tautological sentences of the kind provided by Heidegger are attempts to allude to the idea that we cannot say
anything about them, we re-establish the parallel with Wittgenstein: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent".334 One is also reminded here of Wittgenstein's doctrine that all logical (conceptual) truths are so many tautologies.

Furthermore, in the case of both Heidegger and Wittgenstein a tendency towards linguistic relativism follows from their belief in language as the universal medium. Wittgenstein thinks that forms of life cannot be compared335 since the semantics of different language games cannot be compared. Heidegger stresses that there are "different houses of Being" between which communication is hardly possible. Different languages—or language-families336—are informed by different messages of Being, by different transcendental conditions of language, hence they cannot be easily related to each other. However, Heidegger does not elaborate on this point very much. In one place we are told that "there is no translation in the sense that the word of one language could ever be, or could be allowed to be, brought to coincidence with the word of another language".337 Unfortunately, Heidegger does not tell us in this context why he holds this view. The claim could naturally be justified by Heidegger's further idea—mentioned above—according to which the semantical relation between a word and the thing it names is ineffable.

The different messages of Being, which inform different languages, are, when looked at with Heidegger's notion of truth, nothing but different "illuminations". Since language is a universal medium in and through which we live in a disclosed world, truth as correspondence with a non-linguistic referent has to be rejected. Instead, truth is the process of the disclosing of the world. And precisely because world-disclosing is a process, it cannot be thought of without an ever changing area of the undisclosed—parts of which might be disclosed for another language.

Up to this point I have centered attention on the relation between Heidegger's thought on language and his belief in language as the universal medium. In what follows I shall suggest that this belief also throws an interesting light on some peculiarities of his views on art. To be sure, this hardly comes as a surprise. After all, for Heidegger the linguistic work of art has a special status among the different arts, in that the other forms of art are dependent upon the world-
opening character of language. What is less obvious, however, is that by relating Heidegger's belief in language as the universal medium to his conception of art, we can begin to understand some peculiarities of his views on pictorial representation, and come to understand—at least in part—some of his pronouncements concerning Picasso's cubism.

Perhaps the natural way to approach this issue is by returning briefly to Husserl. As is well known, Husserl does not provide us with a theory of art. His occasional asides that do touch upon the subject do not add up to even a sketch of an aesthetics. What these asides do show, nevertheless, is that Husserl conceived of art and its production in quite different terms than Heidegger. For instance, in a manuscript of 1924 Husserl writes that the poetic work of art consists of "the grammatical systems of words and sentences", of "presentations that are to count as part of the aesthetic content", and of "thoughts ... that the poet ... perhaps wanted to awaken". Furthermore, Husserl adds, "we have to distinguish here between contents of fact and contents of value".338 Husserl also tells us that language is "the general material [Stoff] that the language-artist shapes" and that the latter "shapes it in such a way that a linguistic work emerges as a unity of artistic ... meaning".339 The idea that the linguistic or nonlinguistic artwork can be approached by means of such kind of distinctions, is of course precisely what Heidegger never tired of denying. Heidegger also opposes in so many words the idea of language as "material" in human hands.

However, what makes it crucial to draw Husserl into our attempt to understand Heidegger's views on pictorial representation are not the above-mentioned pronouncements. Put differently, it is not Husserl's badly rudimentary 'surface' aesthetics that is of interest to us, but his hidden aesthetic dimension. This hidden dimension lies in the parallels that can be drawn between Husserlian phenomenology and cubism. This idea was first introduced by Jaakko Hintikka in his paper "Concept as Vision: On the Problems of Representation in Modern Art and in Modern Philosophy"340, and recently, independently of Hintikka's work, rediscovered by Hans Rainer Sepp.341 In his paper Hintikka calls upon philosophers to relate modern art and its theory on the one hand, and modern theories of language
and meaning, on the other hand, to each other. In order to defend this suggestion, Hintikka points out an exciting parallel between the cubist revolution, Husserl's phenomenology, and possible world semantics. For instance, just like "a noema may contain at one and the same time expectations as to what an object or a person would look like from many different perspectives, in the same way cubists often depict the same subject from several different angles at one and the same time". Thus, Hintikka claims, cubists represent noemata rather than objects, and cubism is "the art of noemata" where phenomenology is their philosophy. Most important of all, however, is the rejection by both the cubists and Husserl of the idea of a tight, inaccessible, relation between significans and significatum, or representans and representatum. As Hintikka puts it: "... the most important feature of the cubist revolution consisted precisely in the giving up of one preferred method of pictorial representation, i.e., the naturalistic and the illusionistic one". What this amounts to is clear: this step is immediately analogous to the step from 'language as the universal medium' to 'language as calculus'. In other words, where the cubist insists on being free to choose his own system of signs and the ways they represent, Husserl's phenomenology—as well as possible worlds semantics—is built upon, or includes, model theoretical ideas, i.e., ideas allowing for the systematic variation of meaning relations.

It is precisely this idea, to wit, that both cubism and Husserlian phenomenology take highly similar stands with respect to reference and representation, that leads to the crucial question about Heidegger's philosophy of art. Since Heidegger holds language to be a universal medium, and since he models art on language, how does his conception of language influence his pronouncements concerning art in general, and pictorial representation in particular?

Perhaps the easiest way to go about answering this question is to ask ourselves what a conception of art that is analogous to language as the universal medium would look like. The following formulation naturally suggests itself:

(1) Ways of representation cannot be expressed.
(2) We cannot speak of different ways of representation.
(3) A systematic variation of modes of representation is impossible.
HEIDEGGER’S ONTOLOGY AND LANGUAGE AS THE UNIVERSAL MEDIUM

ible.
(4) Art is bound to communities, nations.
(5) We cannot grasp reality without art. / Language is the condition of the possibility of art.
(6) Art cannot be self-reflective. / Metalanguage with respect to art is impossible.
(7) The truth of art does not reside in its correspondence with reality.

I shall not bother to prove that Heidegger accepts (4)–(7) since equivalent theses can be read almost literally from some of the theses we formulated in the first section. Much more interesting are theses (1) to (3), however. It deserves our attention that the conception of 'art as the universal medium' cannot speak about different ways of representing reality, that it cannot speak about what Nelson Goodman calls "languages of art". In the case of Heidegger, it is just as we were led to expect. A discussion of different sign-systems of art is not only missing from "The Origin of the Work of Art" but—as far as I can determine—it is also missing from all of his treatments of art. Thus, even though art is regarded as essentially linguistic—pictorial art is modelled on linguistic art—art is language only in the singular. For Heidegger there is just one mode of representation. Even though this mode might evolve and change historically, it cannot be systematically understood, studied or invented. It fits neatly into this thesis that Heidegger's most central example in "The Origin of the Work of Art" is a Greek temple, that is a case of classical art for which alternative modes of representation did not pose a problem.

Further evidence can be adduced as we turn to Heidegger's scarce remarks on modern art, and especially on Picasso. From a letter to the poet Erhart Kästner one gets the impression that Heidegger did not concern himself a great deal with modern art. In a letter from 1973, Heidegger writes that he is unable to comment on Kästner's interpretations of modern art, "since I am lacking the necessary experiences for that". The art-historian Heinrich W. Petzet, however, has told of several discussions with Heidegger on modern art during the sixties. These discussions show that the latter did have "experiences" with modern art after all. Especially interesting
from our vantage point are Heidegger’s comments on Picasso. Petzet reports that whereas he himself "was often only too quickly excited" about Picasso, "Heidegger sometimes expressed doubts". Petzet also relates the incident of a student saying to Heidegger "that what he does when speaking of the necessary 'destruction' in philosophy is nothing but Picasso’s decomposition of the object". Heidegger "answered with silence and smiled ambiguously". Petzet also reproduces a letter by Heidegger in which Picasso is discussed: "Picasso and 'the artistic power'—that is beyond doubt. But I still do not see how this artistic power is able to point out even the essential place for the art of the future". And on yet another occasion Heidegger noted that "the whole of modern art . . . is of a metaphysical nature".

To understand these comments we only need to remember here that the later Heidegger in fact calls the way of thinking that begins with Plato and Aristotle, and that in our day and age has led to Logistik, the typewriter and other technology, 'metaphysical'. This is the way of thinking that includes above all the idea that language is at our disposal, and that language can be manipulated, and re-interpreted. Since cubism is precisely the aesthetic variant of this latter idea, Heidegger—from his standpoint—cannot but regard modern art as "metaphysical". Small wonder that he "smiled ambiguously" when his philosophical work was regarded as analogous to the artistic work of Picasso. He probably would have smiled the same way when asked whether his "thought of Being" was parallel to the ontology of Aquinas, to the phenomenology of Husserl, or the possible worlds semantics of Hintikka or Montague.

It is no counterevidence against this interpretation that, as Petzet reports, Heidegger was willing to exclude one modern artist from the verdict 'metaphysical': Paul Klee. Heidegger writes that with respect to Klee he has to admit "not to understand what happens, namely that art changes". And Petzet relates Heidegger's worry that "he would now have to write a second part of 'The Origin of the Work of Art'". First of all, Heidegger's difficulties in coming to grips with fundamental changes in the language of art should not come as a surprise to us. Indeed, some of these difficulties were exactly what we above were led to assume for the art as the uni-
versal medium conception. Second, Heidegger's worry of having to write a new piece on "The Origin of the Work of Art" is also to be expected on the interpretation suggested above. Since "The Origin of the Work of Art" relies on the conception of art as the universal medium, it is ill-fitted to conceptualize a form of art for which variations in representation are important. But what is most significant, finally, is that Heidegger never wrote the second part of the "Origin". If the overall argument of this chapter is correct, then this abstention is anything but coincidental. Rather, this abstention is caused by Heidegger's most deep-rooted views concerning the relation between language and the world. Writing this new piece on modern art, either Heidegger would have had to give up his conception of language, or he would have had to allow for a gap to open up between his views on language and his ideas on pictorial art.

5. SUMMARY OF HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPTION OF LANGUAGE AS THE UNIVERSAL MEDIUM

In the two preceding chapters I have tried to make a case for interpreting Heidegger's pronouncements with respect to the world, Being, language, truth and art as so many expressions of his belief in language as the universal medium. To round up my interpretation, I shall summarize Heidegger's views by grouping them around the eight fundamental tenets of the universal medium conception.

(UM-1) Semantics is inaccessible. This thesis is contested by the early Heidegger, but is eventually adopted in the writings of his middle and late period. The young Heidegger argues against Kant, saying that we do have access to the concepts in terms of which we relate to the world. Furthermore, in his work on Scotus (and Thomas of Erfurt) Heidegger undertakes a historical vindication of Husserl's phenomenology. However, in his middle period, Heidegger abandons his earlier view on this matter. His criticism of the subject vs. object distinction leads him to deny the idea that meanings can be separated from the world. Dasein's project is its (his, her, our) only access to the world qua nature, as that onto which the project is projected. Hence Heidegger takes the relation between the
project and nature to be ineffable. In his later period, Heidegger goes even further by denying that Being, that is, the most fundamental semantical category, is accessible even to a hermeneutical, circular investigation. Statements about semantics can only be so many tautologies. Heidegger now believes that the unity of word and thing, of language and world, cannot be broken up. He also champions the poet's relation to language, i.e., an attitude that relinquishes an explicit semantics. Being as the logical form of language is a "fate", and the inaccessibility of this transcendental condition of language is nothing but the ineffability of semantical relations between language and the world. In his philosophy of art, these views on language lead Heidegger to the tacit assumption that ways of pictorial representation cannot be expressed.

(UM-2) We cannot conceive of different systems of semantical relations. Since this thesis is implied by the preceding one, it is natural for Heidegger to endorse it. The unity of the thing and its name is inseparable, hence it cannot be either broken up, or conceived of differently. Heidegger also believes in some sort of linguistic relativism which is a direct consequence of his adoption of UM-2. (See below, UM-4). Finally, Heidegger's views on modern art suggest that he regards modes of pictorial representation as fixed, and that to conceive of fundamental changes in these modes of representation is, for him, if not an altogether impossible undertaking, then at least an extremely difficult one.

(UM-3) Model theory and talk of possible worlds are to be rejected. While it is not clear what the young Heidegger thinks about this issue, there is plenty of evidence showing that Heidegger endorses UM-3 in his middle and later period. He declines to speak of worlds in the plural, and he assumed the uniqueness of the world. We cannot speak of worlds in the plural since the world cannot be explicitly identified, i.e., since the world is not an object. In Being and Time modal notions are spelled out in Aristotelian terms, suggesting that Heidegger favours a temporal-statistical analysis of modal notions. Especially in his later writings, Heidegger also clearly rejects the idea that language can be manipulated. As a proper attitude towards language, Heidegger proposes the poetic attitude, an attitude of listening to language and of accepting language as one's "master".
These views reflect themselves in Heidegger’s opposition to cubist art, especially to the idea of a play with modes of representation.

(UM-4) *Linguistic relativism is accepted.* While the young Heidegger rejects this idea, the middle and later Heidegger adopts it. In his early writings Heidegger argues—following Husserl—that psychologism is to be rejected precisely on the grounds that it leads to relativism. Furthermore, in his work on the medievals, Heidegger defends Husserl’s ideal grammar that, as we saw in the first part of this study, provides something of a safeguard against linguistic relativism. Subsequently, however, this early opposition to relativism gives way to an endorsing of relativism. Heidegger holds that truth is relative to *Dasein’s* project, and he argues that philosophy cannot disentangle itself from its subject matter. Thus claims to absolute truth in philosophy turn out to be unacceptable. Heidegger also proclaims that he is "a *dogmatic* subjective relativist". In his later thought, Heidegger regards the untranslatable poem as the original mode of language, and suggests that the words of different languages cannot ever match. Different languages—including languages of art—are informed by different messages of Being, and different languages are but different "houses of Being".

(UM-5) *Semantical Kantianism is adopted.* Initially, Heidegger supports Husserl’s (semantical) anti-Kantianism. He criticizes phenomenalism of different brands, relying on Husserl’s arguments against the psychologists. He claims to be in support of the "healthy realism" of science, and suggests that by way of logical studies we can reduce the influence of our concepts upon how we conceive of the world. In his middle and later period, however, Heidegger abides—at least tacitly—by the idea that we do not have access to the world *qua* nature. We are trapped in our project, or, as the later Heidegger would have it, we are trapped in our language and art.

(UM-6) *Metalanguage is a misuse of language.* Again, this view is absent from the early works although being an important ingredient in the later ones. In the period of *Being and Time* Heidegger claims that we cannot take a neutral and detached stand with respect to our Being-in-the-world. Later Heidegger argues that in speaking about language we inevitably lose its essence.
(UM-7) *Truth as correspondence is unintelligible.* The early Heidegger favours the notion of truth as *adaequatio rei et intellectus* when reformulated as the relation of *Geltung* between an object and a determining meaning content. Already in the "Conclusion" of the *Habilitationsschrift*, however, Heidegger distances himself from this conception. In *Being and Time* the correspondence theory is regarded as a secondary notion of truth, secondary to truth as disclosedness. *Dasein* is said to be "in the truth" insofar as it lives authentically within a universal medium of meaning, viz., the world. In the later writings, finally, even this reference to *Dasein* is dropped. Truth is now the strife between illumination and concealment, a strife that is assumed to take place in language and in art.

(UM-8) *Formalism is accepted when linked to the idea of the inaccessibility of semantics.* It is opposed, however, when seen as resulting from the assumption that language can be disentangled from its one and only fixed interpretation. Heidegger never concerns himself with the first part of *UM-8*. Under the influence of Rickert rather than Husserl, the young Heidegger already opposes *Logistik*. His main reason for this opposition is not yet informed by his later belief in language as the universal medium, however, but by his early belief in language as calculus. In other words, Heidegger regards formal mathematical logic as an obstacle to semantical investigations. In the two later phases, *Logistik* is rejected for different reasons. Now Heidegger argues, in accordance with *UM-8*, that language cannot be formalized, i.e., that language cannot be emptied of its semantical content. To formalize language is, for Heidegger, to conceive of language as a mere system of signs, is to overlook the essence of language as the universal medium in and through which we "mortals" are illuminated by Being.
PART IV

EPILOGUE:
BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS
—GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS

Zwischen Husserl und Heidegger—und Hegel . . .
(self-characterization by H.-G. Gadamer)

Das ist nicht mehr Heidegger!
(M. Heidegger about *Truth and Method*)

1. INTRODUCTION

In the main body of this study we have seen that Husserl and Heidegger take radically different stands on such key philosophical issues as the accessibility of semantics, the possibility of a re-interpretation of language, the intelligibility of speaking of worlds in the plural, the possibility of avoiding (linguistic) relativism and (semantical) Kantianism, the correct account of truth, and the justifiability of metalanguage and formalism. However, the main objective of the interpretation in parts II and III above was not (only) to draw attention to this list of differences but also to explain them as resulting from two fundamentally opposed ways of conceiving of language; to wit, to conceive of language as either being something like a re-interpretable calculus, or being as it were a universal medium of meaning. While Husserl and Heidegger were shown to stand on opposite sides of this divide, each of them turned out to be in respectable company: Husserl in that of modern semantical theory, Heidegger in that of Frege and Wittgenstein. Indeed it was an important by-product of our interpretation that the differences between Husserl and Frege over such questions as, for example, truth, the feasibility of metalogic, semantics, and the *calculus ratiocinator* vs. *characteristica universalis* distinction, could be led back to the same fundamental opposition between two ways of looking at language that also divides Husserl and Heidegger.
In this epilogue, I shall go one—moderate—step further by suggesting that not only the interpretational framework employed in this study, but also the specific results that we arrived at with respect to Husserl and Heidegger, can be brought to bear in attempts to illuminate a good deal of more recent continental philosophy. This suggestion can hardly seem surprising, for a considerable number of eminent continental thinkers in Germany and France, thinkers like, for instance, Derrida, Fink, Gadamer, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, either start out explicitly from Husserl and Heidegger, or return to them as the touchstones against which to check their own philosophy that perhaps was more directly informed by Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud or Saussure. Especially those continental philosophers who take their starting point fairly directly from both Husserl and Heidegger are faced with a set of rather uncomfortable choices. Since Husserl and Heidegger differ radically over almost every philosophical issue, the student and admirer of both is drawn in two radically different directions at the same time. The main choices available are the following: either one uses Husserl and Heidegger as two reservoirs of ideas from which one collects what one needs for one’s own enterprise; or one oscillates back and forth between the Husserlian and the Heideggerian line; or one re-interprets both projects in a way that makes them compatible. A good example of the dangers of this last line is Sartre’s *L’Être et le Néant*: Heidegger himself was so disenchanted by Sartre’s attempt to assimilate Husserl and Heidegger to each other that he stopped reading after some 40-odd pages; he gave his copy—which had been sent to him by Sartre himself with a personal dedication—to Hans-Georg Gadamer. (Gadamer, pers. comm.)

Since I cannot interpret the philosophy of language of the main figures of post-Heideggerian continental philosophy in anything less than another book-size study, I shall here confine myself to a brief discussion of just one example, Gadamer’s hermeneutics. To concentrate on Gadamer can be motivated in two ways. On the one hand, Gadamer is undoubtedly the most eminent of German philosophers that take their lead from Husserl and Heidegger. Gadamer also attended both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s lectures and seminars. On the other hand, more important than these so to speak ‘external’ reasons
is that in Gadamer’s treatment of tradition the unresolved conflict between Husserlian and Heideggerian influences can be studied especially clearly, and that in his theory of language Gadamer "paves the way" to the later Heidegger by drawing on Husserlian ideas.

I shall first discuss Gadamer’s notions of tradition and "effective-historical consciousness". Even though this topic is not directly connected to the issue of language, it is noteworthy because it allows us to see how Gadamer oscillates between a conception of tradition as an inescapable universal medium of meaning and the employment of a Husserlian subject-object scheme that cannot but turn tradition into something that consciousness can disentangle itself from. Subsequently, I shall turn to Gadamer’s philosophy of language. We shall see that here Gadamer ‘overcomes’ some of the radical implications of Heidegger’s conception of language by relying on Husserl’s notion of adumbration and by separating philosophy of language from ”the thought of Being”. I shall concentrate mainly on Gadamer’s classic Truth and Method and shall only occasionally draw on his earlier or his more recent works.

2. TRADITION AND THE RETURN OF THE SUBJECT —WHY HEIDEGGER HAD REASON TO DISLIKE THE "EFFECTIVE-HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS"

No reader of Gadamer’s Truth and Method can fail to notice a curious ambiguity in Gadamer’s pronouncements concerning such key concepts as "tradition", "prejudice", or "method". On the one hand, one often encounters ideas that suggest a conception of tradition as an inescapable universal medium of meaning. These passages seem to echo ideas of the later Heidegger, such as the view that our understanding of Being, of others and ourselves, is much more an inevitable fate than our doing. Yet, on the other hand, an attentive reader will also identify a quite different tendency in Gadamer’s book. According to this line of thought, human beings can disentangle themselves from the tutelage of tradition, in fact they can even destroy tradition. Gadamer suggests that the interpreter of texts can suspend his prejudices based on tradition by engaging in a hermeneutical
dialogue with classical texts.

That these somewhat conflicting tendencies do indeed exist in Gadamer's text, can—even apart from my subsequent interpretation—be seen from two facts. The existence of the first, Heideggerian, line is easily confirmed by reading critics of Gadamer, like Karl-Otto Apel or Jürgen Habermas, since these critics take Gadamer to task precisely for what they regard as conservative or even traditionalistic elements in his work. The existence of the second somewhat anti-Heideggerian tendency has been noted by no-one less than Heidegger himself. Heidegger regarded Gadamer's notion of "effective-historical consciousness, as "no longer Heideggerian" (Gadamer and von Herrmann, pers. comm.). In the following, I shall attend to both currents in Gadamer's treatment of tradition so as to identify his position as one between Husserl and Heidegger.

Let us first turn to the Heideggerian line in Gadamer's text. In several places, Gadamer seems to suggest that the "historicity" of human beings consists in their being nothing but a powerless element in the necessary course of history. That is to say, analogous to the Heideggerian notion of Being as the determinant of the human condition, human beings are occasionally depicted by Gadamer as under the tutelage of history. Thus Gadamer writes that "in fact history does not belong to us, but we belong to it", adding that "the focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror" and concluding that "the self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the close circuits of historical life." This tutelage acquires a more concrete form once an interpreter understands a text handed down by tradition. The outcome of this encounter seems to be a Heideggerian Geschick, seems to be the doing of tradition rather than the result of the interpreter's own efforts: "Understanding is not to be thought of so much as an action of one's subjectivity, but as the placing of oneself within a process of tradition, in which past and present are constantly fused."

The same idea also seems to follow from some remarks by Gadamer on another important notion of Truth and Method, to wit, the "fusion of horizons" (Horizontverschmelzung). According to Truth and Method, historical human beings are always situated within a particular situation, a particular time and place. Since this
situation is limited, it has a horizon of things and ideas within its reach: "Horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point." Now since Gadamer speaks of a fusion of such horizons, more precisely, of the fusion of the horizon of the interpreter with the horizon of the text, the question arises as to who is the agent or subject performing the action of fusing. In some contexts, Gadamer's answer, in accordance with the earlier passages, seems to be that the fusion of horizons, far from being the doing of the interpreter, is the work of tradition, or, more specifically, language: "The guiding idea ... is that the fusion of the horizons that takes place in understanding is the proper achievement of language." Here one is naturally reminded of Heidegger's claims that language speaks for us and that we thus should accept language as our master.

Gadamer also seems to be saying that the interpreters' horizon is never of their own making. The dependency of interpreters upon tradition rests on the fact that all their interests towards certain questions and answers with respect to a given text are prede-lineated by "effective-history" (Wirkungsgeschichte) as the sum of former interpretations and/or the general impact of tradition. Truth and Method seems to call on interpreters to accept this dependency. Accordingly, Gadamer demands that one accepts the status quo and that one refrains from striving for abstract ideals: "In other words, I take it to be scientific to accept what is the case rather than to start from what could be or should be the case ..." The late Heidegger would not have called this attitude "scientific", he would have termed it "poetic" or a "thinking" attitude, but otherwise he would have certainly agreed.

Gadamer's attack on "enlightenment" also seems to be well in line with Heidegger. From Heideggerian premisses, enlightenment cannot but be regarded as a mistaken conception of the human being's place in history. After all, enlightenment stressed the role of the subject-agent and its task of freeing itself from tradition and prejudice, i.e., its task of determining its own history. In full agreement with Heideggerian views on enlightenment, Gadamer suggests in some places that the aim of his philosophical hermeneutics is a "rehabilitation" of prejudice and authority, and he accuses enlighten-
ment of a "prejudice against prejudice itself"\textsuperscript{10}. Gadamer also rejects the attack of enlightenment on authority and draws on the "romantic criticism of the enlightenment", suggesting that "that which has been sanctified by tradition and custom has an authority that is nameless ..."\textsuperscript{11} However, authority, for Gadamer, is not inevitably linked to suppression. The authority that he seeks to vindicate is foremost an authority of knowledge. It is authority in this sense that Gadamer regards as central in the \textit{Geisteswissenschaften}:

To be obedient to authority means to realize that the other is able to see better than oneself—and this holds also of that voice that can be heard from tradition and the past ... To belong to tradition and to live within tradition obviously is the way of truth that has to be found in the \textit{Geisteswissenschaften}.\textsuperscript{12}

Since earlier knowledge thus seems to be placed automatically beyond later knowledge, it is understandable why Gadamer can regard judicial and theological interpretation of texts as paradigmatic for hermeneutics as a whole, for what seems to be the heart of interpretation is that the authoritative text, i.e., the "classic", is \textit{applied} to the present, not that its truth is systematically questioned. \textit{Application} is thus what interpretation is all about. The "classic" texts of Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel\textsuperscript{13} are to be listened to—almost as if they were major dispatches from Being.

Little surprise then that Gadamer also ends up with some kind of opposition between "truth" and "method". Indeed some interpreters have wondered why he did not prefer to entitle his book "Truth or Method".\textsuperscript{14} Highly reminiscent of Heidegger's opposition between thought/poetry and scientific method, Gadamer seems to draw a sharp line between methodically obtained knowledge on the one hand, and hermeneutical experience on the other hand. He seems to reject the need for rules of understanding, i.e., he appears to renounce the need for a distinction between "context of discovery" and "context of justification". He even seems to suggest that the context of justification is of no interest in the case of the \textit{Geisteswissenschaften} at all. For Gadamer, it seems to be sufficient that "all understanding means understanding differently".\textsuperscript{15} Gadamer writes that "the hermeneutic phenomenon is basically not a problem of
method at all" and that with respect to this phenomenon the ob-
jective is not "the amassing of ratified knowledge which satisfies the
methodological ideal of science". Gadamer thus concludes:

Hence the Geisteswissenschaften are joined with modes of ex-
perience which lie outside science; with the experiences of phil-
osophy, of art, and of history itself. These are all modes of
experience in which a truth is communicated that cannot be
verified by the methodological means proper to science.

It is in line with this notion of truth, that is, a notion of truth not
bound to method, that Gadamer also echoes Heidegger's relativistic
pronouncements. Husserl's favourite weapon against relativism, i.e.,
claiming that relativism is true is a contradiction in terms, is rejected
by Gadamer by relying on Heidegger's arguments. Gadamer calls
the Husserlian argument "irrefutable" but doubts that it can ever
have any effect. He suggests that the argument "falls back on the
arguer, in that it renders the truthfulness of all reflection suspect":
"It is not the reality of scepticism ... but the claim to truth of all
formal argument that is affected." In other words, the success of
this logical argument speaks against the logician and the employment
of logical reasoning, not against the sceptic or the relativist.

Interpreters like Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas, who
focus almost exclusively on passages like the ones quoted above, re-
gard Gadamer's project as, by and large, a direct continuation of
Heidegger's thought. At best, they categorize Gadamer's hermeneu-
tics as an "urbanizing of the Heideggerian province" (Habermas),
since Gadamer, after all, reformulates Heidegger's awkward "postal
metaphysics" in more familiar terms. Paying attention only to pas-
sages where tradition is depicted as an inescapable universal medium,
however, suppresses the presence of Husserl in Truth and Method.
Reading Gadamer in this way, one is left without a reasonable ex-
planation for the fact that Heidegger himself was dissatisfied not
only with Gadamer's notion of "effective-historical consciousness",
but even with the book as a whole. Heidegger's 'verdict' is simple:
"Das ist nicht mehr Heidegger!" [That is no longer Heidegger!] In
order to vindicate this judgment, we have to take a closer look at
some other passages of Truth and Method, passages that are equally
concerned with the notions of tradition, prejudice, horizon and truth.

That Gadamer gives the notion of "horizon" a central position in his hermeneutics is of course already a clear sign of Husserl's influence. We can appreciate Heidegger's disapproval particularly by examining some further Gadamerian pronouncements with respect to this notion. Gadamer does not only speak of the "fusion of horizons" as an event controlled by language or tradition. He also speaks of "the conscious act [kontrollierter Vollzug] of this fusion as the task of the effective-historical consciousness". He stresses interpretation as a process of learning in which we come to realize the perspectival character of our knowledge. This process has the nature of a question-answer dialogue between the interpreter and the text. The very existence of the text poses a question for the interpreter, to wit, a challenge to check his prejudices with respect to the text's topic. To answer this challenge, the interpreter must, in turn, pose a question to the text in order to be able to assimilate its content. Taking up Collingwood's famous insight, Gadamer stresses that "to understand an opinion is to understand it as the answer to a question". Yet Gadamer parts company with Collingwood in that he emphasizes the fact that the reconstructed question that the text is assumed to have been intended to answer is always more than the original question. This is because it is posed by an interpreter who reconstructs the original question only to answer himself the challenge that the text poses for his prejudices.

Now the careful interpreter will put such types of questions to the text that bring out his or her own prejudices and indeed endangers them. The careful interpreter strengthens the views of the text as much as possible in order to allow for a test of truth with respect to his or her own views. A direct fusion of the text's horizon with the horizon of the interpreter, an assimilation of the text on the terms of the interpreter's knowledge must be avoided. And what the interpreter must try to do in order to slow down the process of assimilation is to distinguish carefully between his or her own horizon and the horizon of the text:

Every encounter with tradition that takes place within historical consciousness involves the experience of the tension between the text and the present. The hermeneutic task consists in not
covering up this tension by attempting a naive assimilation but in consciously causing this tension. This is why it is part of the hermeneutical approach to project a historical horizon that is different from the horizon of the present. Historical consciousness is aware of its own otherness and hence distinguishes the horizon of tradition from its own.\footnote{23}

Already this brief characterization of Gadamer's idea of a dialogic fusion of horizons suffices to pinpoint what Heidegger is likely to have regarded as a crucial deviation from his own philosophy. First of all, Gadamer's re-employment of the notion of consciousness, after Heidegger had shown that this notion is inevitably linked to the subject-object scheme, must, in Heidegger's eyes, already seem disappointing. Yet what is more, Gadamer seems to adopt not only the notion, but also the obsolete scheme itself. To be sure, Gadamer writes that "as little as 'world' is made objective in language so little is effective-history the object of the hermeneutical consciousness".\footnote{24} But this pronouncement seems to be contradicted by the quotation above where Gadamer claims that historical or effective-historical consciousness "distinguishes" between its own horizon and that of tradition or effective history. For Heidegger this passage reads like a new Husserlian dichotomy between consciousness (\textit{qua} subject) and tradition (\textit{qua} object), it reads like a withdrawal from the Heideggerian conception of world, language and tradition as one universal medium. Thus it is not without irony that Gadamer writes in 1986 that "my own motivation for introducing the notion of effective-historical consciousness was precisely to pave a way to the later Heidegger".\footnote{25} Heidegger is likely to have thought that Gadamer was rather paving a way from Heidegger back to Husserl.

Heidegger's doubts about Gadamer's book were probably reinforced by several further ideas in \textit{Truth and Method}. For instance, Heidegger can hardly have been enchanted by Gadamer's argument—implicitly directed against Heidegger himself—that Husserl's subject-object scheme is more speculative than it appears. Gadamer suggests that Husserl's concept of "life" bears interesting resemblances to that of German idealism, and writes that for Husserl subject and object are not strictly opposed:
[Husserl's] transcendental phenomenology seeks to be "correlation research". But this means that the relation is the primary thing, and the "poles" into which it forms itself are contained within it...\(^26\)

We only need to recall Heidegger's views that "no modification of this [subject-object] scheme can overcome its inadequacy"\(^27\) and that "dialectic can only conceal"\(^28\) to understand why Heidegger would hardly have agreed with his most gifted student.

Second, it should be noted that it is not artificial to argue that Gadamer's description of the hermeneutical dialogue is in fact a description of a method for obtaining the truth. That Gadamer himself is not willing to speak of a method here is based on his idea that "there is no such thing as a method of learning to ask questions".\(^29\) He seems to think that the abiding by a given method can often be an obstacle to the development of new ideas, i.e., that every method is like a limited perspective. Gadamer's reluctance to employ the notion of method is also occasionally informed by the doubt as to whether political-practical questions can be decided on the basis of methods that are modelled on the methodology of the natural sciences.\(^30\) This doubt is probably influenced by Husserl's *Crisis*, a work that precisely describes how the development of the mathematical-idealizing method leads to an ever increasing disregard for the life-world, the world of culture and practice.

Third, Gadamer suggests in some places that far from being inevitably bound by tradition, human subjects can even dissolve tradition(s): "However much it is the nature of tradition to exist only through being appropriated, it still is part of the nature of man to be able to break with tradition, to criticize and dissolve it ..."\(^31\) What this breaking with tradition might add up to, and why Heidegger was justified in detecting a return to Husserl here, becomes clear as we turn to some further passages dealing with the notion of "prejudice". Here it needs to be mentioned that Gadamer's "rehabilitation of prejudice" is not really a defense of prejudices *per se*, but merely a rehabilitation of the idea that sometimes even prejudices qua pre-judgments (*Vor-urteil*) can turn out to be true: "Actually 'prejudice' means a judgment that is given before all the elements that determine a situation have been finally examined ..."\(^32\) There-
fore prejudices are not necessarily false, but can have "a positive and a negative value". Gadamer also writes that the task of interpretation is "to distinguish the true prejudices ... from the false ones", and goes on to claim:

... so long as our mind is influenced by a prejudice, we do not know and consider it as a judgment. How then are we able to isolate it? It is impossible to make ourselves aware of the prejudice while it is constantly operating unnoticed, but only when it is, so to speak, stimulated. The encounter with a text from the past can provide this stimulus ... We now know what is required, namely the fundamental suspension of our prejudices ...

Especially this last quotation must have sounded far too Husserlian in Heidegger's ears. The wording already brings to mind Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, for does not Husserl speak precisely of "the suspension of the world thesis"? What is more, however, the idea of suspending prejudices also appears of course repeatedly in Husserl. For instance, Husserl calls for the "epoché with respect to all traditions", suggesting that in this way we rise above the "prejudiced ... prescientific life". To be sure, Gadamer's 'hermeneutical-dialogic epoché' is far less ambitious than Husserl's transcendental one. Gadamer hardly means that we can free ourselves from all prejudices. Indeed, Gadamer criticizes the Husserlian transcendental project as paradoxical:

Transcendental reflection, which is supposed to remove all the validity of the world and all the pre-givenness of anything else, must also regard itself as included in the life-world. The reflective 'I' sees itself as living in purposive determinations for which the life-world is the basis. Thus the constituting of the life-world (...) is a paradoxical task. But Husserl regards all these as only apparent paradoxes.

But even this criticism does not alter the fact that Gadamer's own wording, and the idea behind it, has something of an undeniable Husserlian ring to it that can hardly have made Heidegger enthusiastic about Gadamer's book. Even though Gadamer adheres in
general to Heidegger's talk of *Vorhabe* and the hermeneutical circle involved in *Dasein*’s Being-in-the-world, the notion of suspension of prejudices can easily appear to betray Heidegger’s conception of thrownness, and the conception of language as the universal medium to which the notion of thrownness is closely linked.

Finally, it needs to be mentioned that Gadamer seeks suspension of philosophical prejudices with the help of texts by Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel. Now this is a list of names that Heidegger would have regarded as insufficient, for the most fundamental prejudice or presupposition in Heidegger’s eyes is the interpretation of Being as presence, an interpretation predominant in philosophical thought from Plato to Hegel. The idea of Being as presence is certainly not something one can suspend, but at least in the pre-Socratic thinkers, and in Hölderlin, Trakl and George, we receive hints ("Winke") that prepare us for a new revelation of Being. Gadamer’s attempt to overcome philosophical traditional prejudices with the help of these metaphysical thinkers must thus, for Heidegger, seem like a cure that is at least as bad as the disease. To seek help from Leibniz, for example, might easily lead to adopting a position that Heidegger—had it not been for Hölderlin—might well have called literally 'the calculus conception'.

To conclude, there seems to be good evidence for the suggestion that Gadamer’s conception of tradition is indeed not only influenced by Heidegger but also informed by Husserl. That Gadamer re-introduces—at least to some degree—the notion of consciousness as well as the subject-object distinction, that he speaks of the suspension of prejudices, and that he is concerned with the intruding of technical rationality into the practical life-world, finds a natural explanation by pointing to Husserl as an important source.

Of course, pointing out these two currents in Gadamer is one thing, answering the question as to how well he has succeeded in 'fusing' these two 'horizons' into one is quite another. To give a sufficient and balanced answer to this latter question would certainly demand much more detailed investigations than are possible in this study, whose objective is to point out Gadamer’s position as one between Scylla and Charybdis, i.e., Husserl and Heidegger, not to evaluate its coherence. Nevertheless it does not seem unduly precipitate to
doubt whether the somewhat conflicting pronouncements concerning tradition can be taken as expressions of one single homogeneous theoretical position. Tradition cannot be both an inescapable universal medium of meaning and an object for the human subject—both at the same time.

3. LANGUAGE AS UNIVERSAL ADUMBRATION

3.1. Introduction

The theory of language that Gadamer develops in the third part of *Truth and Method* is interesting from our vantage point not only because it turns out to be influenced by both Husserl and Heidegger, but also because Gadamer explicitly calls language "the universal medium of understanding". The fact that thus both labels of the dichotomy 'language as calculus' vs. 'language as the universal medium' appear in our *interpretanda* can perhaps be taken as indirect proof for the adequacy of the interpretational framework employed in this study. Recall that Husserl's conception of language is an outcome of his early work on the "calculus", and that Heidegger nearly adopts the notion of *Kalkul* for the view of language that he rejects.

The crucial question, however, is of course not whether Gadamer employs the same term that we use, but whether he turns out to abide by the central tenets of the conception of language that we have labeled 'language as the universal medium'. It is the task of this chapter to show that Gadamer subscribes to most of these tenets. By and large, in his philosophy of language, Gadamer follows Heidegger, but he does not adopt the latter's radical position wholesale.

Gadamer's version of the language as the universal medium conception can be characterized as resulting from two decisive steps. On the one hand, Gadamer disentangles Heidegger's ideas on language from the latter's "thought of Being". On the other hand, Gadamer uses Husserl's notion of "adumbration" (*Abschattung*) in order to avoid linguistic relativism and semantical Kantianism. In what follows I shall spell out these two steps and their implications.
Subsequently, I shall summarize Gadamer's own formulation of the conception of language as the universal medium.\textsuperscript{41}

\subsection*{3.2. Heidegger without Geschick}

In suggesting that the ontological concerns of the later Heidegger are absent from Gadamer's philosophy of language, I do not mean to claim that Gadamer is not at all interested in the larger project of the later Heidegger. After all, Gadamer has written extensively on this topic.\textsuperscript{42} The reason why Heidegger's ontology seems to have little bearing upon the third part of \textit{Truth and Method} therefore must lie rather in Gadamer's belief that the issue of Being (in the Heideggerian sense) and the issue of language can be dealt with separately.

Now the important question to be asked here is what happens to the Heideggerian conception of language as the universal medium when being disentangled from what Derrida calls "postal metaphysics". In spelling out these consequences we do in fact arrive at an outline of Gadamer's philosophy of language.

A first topic that has to be redefined is the notion of truth. Recall that for the later Heidegger truth as the strife between illumination and concealment is determined by the different messages that Being sends to language. Gadamer indeed gives up this notion of truth, even though he occasionally refers to the idea that language reveals truth to us. This latter idea obviously remains natural for a proponent of language as the universal medium, even when this conception is freed from Heidegger's \textit{Geschick}. Gadamer has also mentioned (in pers. comm.) that he has always remained committed to the notion of truth as correspondence, even though he has not dealt with this notion explicitly. Here Gadamer's position reminds one of Frege, who believed equally in both the universality of (logical) language, and in truth as correspondence. Gadamer's silence with respect to the classical notion of truth would thus have its parallel in Frege's "what true is, I hold to be indefinable".\textsuperscript{43}

A second issue that changes when language is no longer primarily conceived of as "the house of Being" is the idea of Being as the transcendental condition of language, i.e., of Being as the transcendental and therefore inexpressible condition of the possibility of
there being beings for us. Gadamer still believes in the ineffability of semantics; for instance, together with Heidegger and Wittgenstein, he calls the relation between word and thing "mysterious". Yet allusions to (an understanding of) Being as something of the logical form of language and world are missing in his writings.

A third question that has to be addressed anew is the question of linguistic relativism. We saw above that for Heidegger conversations between different houses of Being are nearly impossible, since different languages (or language-families) are informed by different messages or dispatches from Being. Being "sends" different understandings of Being to different languages, thus causing different linguistic cultures to conceive of the world in different ways. Since in each case the understanding of Being is a transcendental condition of language, these different languages cannot be compared. In making his philosophy of language independent from Being's messages, Gadamer enables himself to take a different stand on linguistic relativism. He suggests that different languages can be compared, that they are all but Husserlian "adumbrations" of the same world, and that each language potentially comprises all other linguistic worldviews.

Due to the absence of Heidegger's *Geschick* in his philosophy, Gadamer can also take a different stand with respect to ordinary and metaphysical language. Heidegger thought that ordinary language today as well as the language of the metaphysical tradition is limited in its expressive power by an understanding of Being as presence (*Anwesenheit*). Because of this understanding of Being, metaphysical as well as natural language is unable to conceive of Being (*Sein*) as anything but yet another object or being (*Seiendes*). While Heidegger claimed that in principle there is no way we can free ourselves from this understanding, he still hoped that poetic language provides us with *Winke* which prepare us for the arrival of a new understanding of, and thus a new dispatch from, Being. All of this is again missing in *Truth and Method*. Since Gadamer does not make the history of Being part and parcel of his philosophy of language, he has no reason to advocate the idea that poetic language is closer to truth than natural or metaphysical language is. Free from the constraints of Being's messages, language for Gadamer can thus be infinite in
its expressive power. 'Ordinary as well as metaphysical language is O.K.', is thus Gadamer's position that differs from both Heidegger's and Wittgenstein's views. What is more, however, with this result Gadamer then even turns the tables on Heidegger by asking why Heidegger's insights into Being should only be expressible by means of Heidegger's (half-)poetic (private) language. Since language is infinite, it follows that every idea that is sufficiently thought through can also be expressed clearly.

As we shall see below, Gadamer already criticizes Heidegger on this point in *Truth and Method*. He reformulates what he takes to be the important ingredients of the Heideggerian conception of language as the universal medium in terms of notions like speculation, notions that are drawn from the metaphysical tradition. In this way Gadamer attempts to show that no poetic language is needed for stating Heidegger's philosophy.

Whereas in *Truth and Method* Gadamer does not criticize Heidegger's poetic language directly, he does so explicitly in some writings of the sixties and seventies. The following passages contain Gadamer's main argument:

Heidegger uses violence to help himself. ... Is that really necessary? Does not natural language in its universal pliantness always offer a way to say what one has to say? And isn't that which cannot be said actually insufficiently thought through? But can a language—or a family of languages—ever properly be called the language of metaphysical thinking, just because metaphysics was thought, or what would be more, anticipated in it? Is not language always the language of the homeland and the process of becoming-at-home in the world? And does this fact not mean that language knows no restrictions and never breaks down, because it holds infinite possibilities of utterance in readiness?

As much as these pronouncements seem plausible to common sense, as much do they have to seem implausible to Heidegger. In Heidegger's ears, Gadamer's arguments must sound deficient precisely because the question of Being has been ignored. This expectation is confirmed by the following passage from a letter that
Heidegger sent to Gadamer:

Why does thinking necessarily remain in the language-despair of finding words? Probably because thought must say Being [Sein] (or rather say the difference between Being and singular beings), while the language that is sent to us, and that is our fate [die geschickliche Sprache], speaks towards and about beings—thus forgetting itself. The word is tuned to the saying of beings. But this saying is able to speak in this way only because it speaks out of the illumination of Being ...47

In other words, Heidegger's point is that his own way of writing is necessitated precisely by natural and metaphysical language having something of an inherent limitation to its universality, a limitation that is due to the Geschick of Being. It is only because Gadamer separates language from this Geschick that he can regard language as an infinite universal medium.

3.3. Husserl's Entry

In regarding language as an infinite universal medium, Gadamer may well be influenced by Husserl: while Husserl believed in language as calculus, he certainly thought of language as a universal medium in the sense that everything can ultimately be expressed in language. After all, we are the masters of our language, and thus there is no reason why we should not make language say everything we want it to say.

However, Husserl's influence upon Gadamer's version of the universal medium conception can be seen even more directly. In particular, the notion of "adumbration" is important for Gadamer's attempt to avoid linguistic relativism and semantical Kantianism.

Gadamer's rejection of linguistic relativism is contained in the following pronouncement:

It is true that those who are brought up in a particular linguistic and cultural tradition see the world in a different way from those who belong to other traditions ... [But] every such world, as linguistically constituted, is always open, of itself, to every possible insight and hence for every expansion of its own world-picture, and accordingly available to others.48
Gadamer argues that different worldviews are not relative with respect to the world an sich. Rather, "in every worldview the world an sich is meant"\(^49\), and the world an sich is nothing but the sum of the different world-views. To explicate this idea Gadamer draws on phenomenological insights concerning perception. Husserl had argued that the Ding an sich cannot be conceived of as the inaccessible cause of our perceptions and presentations. Rather, it is the sum of the different ways in which the thing appears to differently situated perceivers. In other words, the Ding an sich is the continuum of different perspectival adumbrations. Gadamer suggests that we should conceive of the relation between different languages and their worldviews along similar lines. Thus he speaks of different linguistic worldviews as of different "linguistic adumbrations" and suggests that the world an sich is nothing but the sum of these linguistic adumbrations.

With this suggestion, though, Gadamer has not yet exorcized linguistic relativism but merely defended himself against the possible charge of semantical Kantianism. It might even seem that linguistic relativism follows from the application of the notion of adumbration to language, since in Husserl different (perceptual) adumbrations exclude each other. Gadamer overcomes this difficulty by modifying Husserl's notion of adumbration: every linguistic adumbration is universal in that it can enlarge itself to include all other possible adumbrations:

But it remains a characteristic difference that every "adumbration" of the object of perception is exclusively different from every other one ... whereas, with the adumbrations of the linguistic worldviews, each one potentially contains within it every other one, i.e., every one is able to extend itself into every other one. It is able to understand, from within itself, the "view" of the world that is presented in another language.\(^50\)

Despite the crucial significance of the Husserlian notion of adumbration for Gadamer, however, and despite the possibility that Gadamer's conception of language as infinite might derive from Husserl, Gadamer does not return to Husserl's language as calculus conception. Earlier we already saw Gadamer reject the project of a
constitution of the life-world as paradoxical. Now we can add that Gadamer also employs Fink's central argument against Husserl's transcendental stand, namely that the transcendental ego cannot free itself from natural language and its ontological commitments:

Husserl's attempt . . . obviously is faced with the difficulty that the pure transcendental subjectivity of the ego is not really given as such, but always in the idealisation of language, which is already present in any acquisition of experience and which is a result of the individual I's membership in a particular linguistic community.51

That Gadamer relies on this argument shows that he does not believe in the idea that language can be re-interpreted in the way presupposed by Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. As we turn to Gadamer's exposition of his conception of language, we shall see that Gadamer also holds that language cannot be turned into an object, that the relation between word and thing is mysterious, and that language cannot be disentangled from the world. All of these ideas bring Gadamer close to Heidegger and Wittgenstein, who as we saw earlier conceive of language as a universal medium.

3.4. The Centre of Language, the Speculative Sentence, Spiel and Picture

Gadamer's view that language is an infinite universal medium implies that there is no point beyond language, i.e., that language is the medium in and through which we live in the world. Gadamer thus writes that "we cannot observe a language-world from without . . . for there is no point of view outside the experience of the world in language from which it could itself become an object".52 He claims also that "in language the world itself presents itself" and that "the linguistic quality of our experience of the world is prior, as contrasted with everything that is recognized and addressed as being".53 Gadamer claims that even though the world appears to us through language, the world does not appear as an object that can be picked out by language.54 This idea is of course in line with Heidegger, who suggested that precisely because the world is never an object, talk of worlds in the plural is strictly without sense. Gadamer abides
thus by the view of the uniqueness of the world, a view that naturally flows from the universal medium conception: since semantical relations between language and the world are fixed, we can speak meaningfully only about the one world.

Gadamer not only denies that the world can be turned into an object, but he also rejects the idea that language as a whole can be conceived of as object-like. This latter belief is one motive behind Gadamer's expression "we speak from the centre of language". We always speak from the centre of language in that we are never able to take a standpoint outside of its limits. However, this is not the only meaning of Gadamer's "centre of language" notion. The further idea of the speculative nature of language is also involved, to wit, the idea that in every word—spoken out of the centre of language—the whole worldview of the respective language is present:

... every word breaks forth as if from a centre and is related to a whole, through which alone it is a word. Every word causes the whole of the language to which it belongs to resonate and the whole of the view of the world which lies behind it to appear.

Language is a tight network of meaning relations, it is a net in which each word-knot presupposes the whole net. That we always speak from the centre of language also implies for Gadamer that in speaking a language we are part of a process that we do not control: the speaking of a language, and the change and development of language is less our doing than the doing of language. To spell out this idea, Gadamer thinks we can draw on Hegel's notion of speculation. In doing so, Gadamer argues implicitly against Heidegger, saying that the metaphysical tradition after all provides us with conceptual tools to express ingredients and corollaries of the conception of language as the universal medium.

For Hegel the speculative sentence, for instance 'God is everything', is a sentence whose subject-predicate form is refuted by its content. If God is everything, nothing can be outside of God. Yet in the sentence 'God is everything' 'God' and 'everything' are set apart. Thus the speculative sentence "destroys itself": it tries to express an infinity within a sentence-structure fit to express only finite contents. The speculative sentence forces understanding to give up its natural
tendencies to proceed from one idea to the next ("an Vorstellungen fortzulaufen", Hegel). The experience that the speculative sentence forces upon the speaker/reader thus is similar to the experience of natural consciousness in Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, where consciousness over and over again suffers from a surprising shift and turn in its conception of truth.

Gadamer suggests that language in general is speculative, first because we are never the masters of our language but only the recipients of the truth it reveals, and second because an infinity of relations, that is, the whole network of semantical relations, is present in a finite structure, in one sentence or one word. Third, and this is the main point, language is speculative because the relation between language and the world is a Hegelian unity of identity and difference. On the one hand, language is not identical with the world, while on the other hand, world does not appear outside of language, does not appear—metaphorically speaking—as anything but language:

*Being that can be understood is language ...* Thus we speak not only of a language of art, but also of a language of nature, in short, of any language that things have ... That which can be understood is language. ... Here too is confirmed the speculative structure of language. To be expressed in language does not mean that a second Being is being acquired. The way in which a thing presents itself is, rather, part of its own Being. Thus everything that is language has a speculative unity. It contains a distinction, that between its Being and the way in which it presents itself, but this is a distinction that is really not a distinction at all.

In other words, language and world cannot be disentangled from one another. Semantical relations as relations between language and the world are as it were "aufgehoben": they do exist, they are "preserved", but they also are "destroyed" for us, since we do not have any access to them.

Two of the three ideas that motivate Gadamer’s notion of the speculative nature of language, namely the idea that we are not the masters of our language, and that language and world form a "speculative unity", are also developed by Gadamer in less Hegelian
terms. The former idea is approached with the notion of "Spiel" (game, play), while the latter is analyzed with the help of the concept of "Bild" (picture). To turn to Gadamer's discussion of these notions is important for us, not only because they show certain parallels and differences between Gadamer and Wittgenstein but also because they throw additional light upon Gadamer's conception of language as the universal medium.

Gadamer employs the concept of Spiel in order to vindicate Heidegger's idea that language speaks for us. Interestingly enough, Heidegger himself had earlier used the notion of Spiel for precisely the same purpose. In fact Gadamer's analysis of Spiel was anticipated by Heidegger as early as 1928/29 in unpublished lectures entitled "Introduction to Philosophy". Taking his starting point from Kant's notion of the "Spiel des Lebens" (play of life, game of life), Heidegger suggested that Dasein's Being-in-the-world be conceptualized as a Spiel. Spiel undercuts the subject vs. object distinction; playing is an "inseparable happening in itself", and the subject of the Spiel is the Spiel itself rather than the player: "Das Spielen spielt sich" (The playing plays itself). Heidegger put forward the idea that playing is "in its basic character ... being in a certain mood", and he endorsed the view that the essence of the Spiel is more than just the mere execution of, and adherence to, rules. Heidegger remarked that something essential is missing in the equation "Spielen = following of Spiel rules". Heidegger also suggested applying his analysis of the Spiel to language by writing that "it is the metaphysical meaning of language that language plays with us rather than we with language".

Even though Gadamer had no knowledge of these lectures (pers. comm.), his own analysis of the notion of Spiel leads to the same results. Thus Gadamer holds that "alles Spielen ist ein Gespieltwerden" (all playing is a being-played), that we have to accept the "primacy of the Spiel over the player's consciousness" and that "... the most original sense of Spielen is the medial one". In other words, a Spiel is more than what the players plan and strive for. The Spiel's own 'logic', its own dynamic, has primacy over the players, who give up or delegate some of their conscious control over what is happening.
Precisely the same also holds in the case of speakers and listeners of a language. Just as in a Spiel the real subject is not the player but the Spiel itself, so also in the Spiel of language the subject is language itself:

Games [Spiele] of language are where we, as learners ... rise to the understanding of the Spiel, namely that the attitude of the player should not be seen as an attitude of subjectivity, since it is, rather, the Spiel itself that plays, in that it draws the player into itself and thus itself becomes the actual subject of the playing. What corresponds to this in the present case is neither play with language nor with the contents of the experience of the world or of tradition that speaks to us, but the Spiel of language itself, which addresses us, proposes and withdraws, asks and fulfils itself in the answer.69

To appreciate that the idea of language as playing with us, is an indication of the belief in language as the universal medium, we only need to remember how crucial an ingredient in Heidegger's conception of language as the universal medium is the notion of language as the master of man. The idea that we cannot master language means that we cannot manipulate or re-interpret language, that we have no access to the world over and above what language discloses to us, and that we therefore have no access to the language-world relation.

That Gadamer indeed accepts these Heideggerian tenets can also be seen from his treatment of language as a picture, a notion that is meant precisely to capture the inseparable unity of language and world. To explain this notion, Gadamer distinguishes the picture from "copy" (Abbild), "sign" (Zeichen) and "symbol". The paradigmatic case of the copy is a passport-photo. Its purpose is to be as similar as possible to the original (picture), the "Urbild". Thus it fulfils its purpose ultimately by way of a "self-cancellation".70 The picture is not an instrument in this way, however. Its relation to what it depicts is so close that any distinction between the original and itself, i.e., the picture, is merely secondary. What is primary is the unity of "representation and what is represented".71 Sign and symbol mark the opposite ends of a continuum in which the picture holds the centre, partaking of the characteristics of both sign and
symbol, while, at the same time, being distinct from both. The central characteristic of the sign is "pure indication", the referring to something else through pointing away from itself. At the other end of the scale, the symbol's doing is dubbed "pure representation"; the symbol represents the symbolized in such a way that the symbolized is present in the symbol, so that one does not have to go beyond the symbol in order to get, as it were, to the symbolized. The picture shares with the sign the attribute of referring beyond itself, but it differs from the sign in not pointing away from itself. Yet it is more than a symbol, too, for it produces an increase of meaning that is not apparent in the pictured: "But that means that what is represented—the 'original'—in the picture is more fully there, more properly just as it truly is."  

As we turn to Gadamer's arguments to the effect that language is neither sign nor copy but rather a picture of the world, note that Gadamer could have developed this idea in direct criticism of Husserl. For as we saw earlier (p. 64), Husserl had distinguished in the sixth of his Logical Investigations between sign and picture (Bild) by saying that in the case of the picture there exists a relation of similarity between the picture and what is pictured. (Thus the Husserlian picture is the Gadamerian copy.) Husserl had claimed that since in the case of words similarity between words and things is purely coincidental, words must be treated as arbitrary signs. Husserl had been ready, nevertheless, to concede that natural language speakers experience something of an apparent picture relation between word and thing since their thinking is so intertwined with language that they cannot but project their language onto the objects. Finally, Husserl had gone on to speak of "the deep-set tendency to exaggerate the bond between word and thing", and he had warned against the temptation to treat word and thing as a "mystic unity".  

Even though Gadamer rejects Husserl's alternative of sign relation vs. similarity relation, and even though he is ready to speak of a "mysterious" relation between word and thing, he does not turn against Husserl but rather against Plato. The reason for this way of proceeding is that Gadamer tries to show that the roots of the sign conception are to be found in Plato. It is not difficult to see that this claim is informed by Heidegger, for Heidegger held that modern tech-
nology, one of whose features is the sign conception of language, has its roots in Plato's and Aristotle's interpretation of Being as presence. By proving that the sign conception derives from Plato, Gadamer—even though he leaves aside the Geschick issue—vindicates an idea that is part and parcel of Heidegger's later philosophy.

Now in Plato's Cratylos two conceptions of language are discussed: on the one hand, the view that the relation between word and object is based only on conventions, on the other hand, the idea that there is a natural correspondence or similarity between word and object. According to Gadamer, both conceptions are insufficient, since by asking for the relation between word and thing, both conceptions break up the initial unity of word and thing. The very question as to the relation between word and thing tears apart what on the primordial level of Heideggerian presence-at-hand (Zuhandenheit) is experienced as one. Gadamer reproaches Plato for not having taken this line; Plato instead lets Socrates refute the idea of the word as a similar copy, thus leaving the sign conception as the only alternative. What is mistaken about this move, according to Gadamer, is that a third possibility, namely the notion of word as picture, is disregarded from the start:

The legitimate question whether the word is nothing but a "pure sign" or has something about it of the "picture" is thoroughly discredited by the Cratylos. Since the argument that the word is a copy is worked out there ad absurdum, the only alternative seems to be that the word is a sign.

Gadamer agrees with Plato that the relation between word and object cannot be one of similarity. To speak of a copy makes sense only in cases where we have an original that a copy resembles to some degree. The copy relation is thus characterized by some degree of distance between copy and original (Urbild). However, the case of the relation between word and object is different. In the case of the latter, we cannot speak of a degree of similarity, but only of an immediate unity.

Here it is of course inviting to ask in passing whether Gadamer's rejection of the similarity idea would also forces him to reproach Wittgenstein's famous picture theory. To be sure, Wittgenstein
does not believe that names are copies (Abbilders) of their objects.\textsuperscript{77} Wittgenstein does refer, however, to propositions as "portraits" or "genre pictures"\textsuperscript{78}, and he also speaks of "likeness"\textsuperscript{79} as well as of "similarity"—although "not in the ordinary sense"\textsuperscript{80}—between propositions and states of affairs. \textit{Prima facie} it thus seems that Gadamer would have to categorize Wittgenstein's picture theory as yet another example of the copy idea. However, as Merrill B. and Jaakko Hintikka have argued, Wittgenstein does not conceive of the picture relation as a relation of similarity. Instead, what Wittgenstein has in mind is what mathematicians call "isomorphic representation" or "isomorphic mapping".\textsuperscript{81} While thus perhaps escaping Gadamer's criticism on this score, Wittgenstein would nevertheless have been reproached by Gadamer for other reasons. This is so because Wittgenstein proposes ideas like "objects have signs as their representations"\textsuperscript{82}, or "thinking is the same as, or similar to, making a picture for oneself".\textsuperscript{83} To see why Gadamer would be dissatisfied with pronouncements such as these, we have to turn to his arguments against the sign conception.

While Gadamer joins sides with Plato in rejecting the copy theory, he is unhappy with Plato's leaving the sign conception unquestioned. Plato ends up regarding the word as "a mere tool of communication".\textsuperscript{84} Gadamer suggests that this view can only led inevitably to Leibniz's \textit{characteristica universalis}:

[The word is understood as] a mere tool of communication ... It follows that an ideal system of signs, the sole purpose of which is the unambiguous reference of all signs, makes the power of words ... appear as a mere obscuring of their usefulness. ... Here originates the idea of a \textit{characteristica universalis}.\textsuperscript{85}

Words are not regarded as providing in and by themselves genuine knowledge; instead they are regarded as instruments for the thinking subject that uses and manipulates them. Furthermore, the words of natural languages are conceived of as misleading and as misrepresenting the world. Thus, the best one can do is to develop a new sign language as a more adequate tool.

Gadamer emphasizes that the sign conception is linked to the notion of the subject-agent; on the sign conception language is merely
"an instrument of subjectivity". Whereas the copy "does not gain its function of referring or representing from the sign-introducing subject but from its own content", "the sign acquires its meaning only in relation to the sign-introducing subject". In other words, because the relation between signum and signatum is arbitrary, it must be stipulated by a sign-introducing subject. This can indeed be seen clearly in Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein writes that the sense of the picture he is employing is precisely that of "something which is intended to be a picture of another ... That it is a picture consists in intention".

Following Heidegger's lead, Gadamer also proposes that the sign conception of language is connected to the idea that the human subject-agent can control the world around it. For instance, Leibniz hoped that the system of exactly defined signs would correspond to "the totality of beings understood as the totality of controlled objects", to wit, that his "analysis notiorum" would ultimately reflect "the universe of beings ... The creation of the world, as the calculation of God, who calculates which is the best among all the possibilities of Being, would be calculated again by human reason." Even though modern philosophy has given up the theological ingredient in this conception, the idea of a perfect sign language has not, according to Gadamer, been given up. Gadamer does not discuss modern analytical philosophy anywhere in any detail, but he tells us that he takes, for instance, modern semantics to be linked to the sign conception. He also claims that the philosophy of language, especially starting with von Humboldt, has gone astray in regarding language as a pure form, in separating form from content.

Turning from Gadamer's critical discussion of the copy and the sign conception to his own positive account, it seems surprising at first that Gadamer does not give us very much to go by. His own conception is not even explicitly termed "picture theory"; what suggests this label is rather, on the one hand, that Gadamer places, in the quotation above (p. 253), the picture between sign and copy as the forgotten alternative, and, on the other hand, his pronouncements with respect to the language-world relation being strongly reminiscent of the characterization of the picture as a unity of representans and representatum. The following two passages can serve to illumi-
nate this point:

The word is not just a sign. In a sense that is hard to grasp it is also something almost like a copy ... The word has a mysterious connection with what it represents, a quality of belonging to its Being. This is meant in a fundamental way; it is not just that mimesis has a certain share in the creation of words.\(^94\)

... we speak of a language of nature, in short, of any language that things have ... To be expressed in language does not mean that a second Being is being acquired. The way in which a thing presents itself is, rather, part of its own Being.\(^95\)

The word is neither sign nor copy, since in both cases there exists a distance between representans and representatum. Neither does the sign belong to the Being of what is copied (das Abgebildete). The word, however, is so intimately related to the thing that it almost is impossible to even assume that we are dealing here with a genuine relation at all. Thus it is inevitable to speak in fact of 'a language that things have' and to believe that being-expressible in language is part of the things' own mode of Being. It is this immediate unity of word and thing, language and world, that justifies the conception of language as a picture of the world.

This idea of the inseparability of language and world already suggests the ineffability of semantics, since the alleged inadequacy of even speaking of a relation between language and world rules out any systematic study of semantical relations. Furthermore, Gadamer's opposition to the sign/form conception also reflects his belief that language cannot be disentangled from its interpretation. Finally, it should be noted that Gadamer speaks of a "mysterious" relation between word and thing. Gadamer's use of this expression explains not only why his own account of the word-thing 'relation' is so sketchy (how can we say much about a mystery?) but also brings Gadamer closer to Heidegger and Wittgenstein, two rather unequivocal proponents of language as the universal medium. Whereas Heidegger speaks of "the mysteriousness of that relation"\(^96\) between word and thing, Wittgenstein in the *Brown Book* notes that the relation of a name to what is named is a "mysterious relation"\(^97\), or even a "magic relation".\(^98\) It seems fair to say that Husserl's warning, in-
formed by his belief in language as calculus, not "to exaggerate the bond between word and thing" and not to fall prey to regarding their relation as a "mystic unity", finds deaf ears among philosophers who hold semantics to be inaccessible.

### 3.5. Gadamer's Universal Medium Conception

As we have seen above, Gadamer's philosophy of language remains close enough to Heidegger to be still regarded as a version of the language as the universal medium conception. The Husserlian influences, as well as the leaving aside of Heidegger's *Geschick* story, soften Gadamer's conception of language in that they lead to a rejection of linguistic relativism and semantical Kantianism, as well as to a denial of the need for poetic language in philosophy, but they do not amount to a departure from the thesis of the ineffability of semantics.

Since in Gadamer's case we dealt with mainly just one book, disregarding questions of development, we can conclude with a summarizing graphic representation of the different ingredients in his philosophy of language as the universal medium:
Husserl's notion of adumbration

Heidegger's conception of language with the Geschick

no linguistic relativism or semantical Kantianism

Being is no transcendental form of language

uniqueness of the world

truth is no message from Being

no world without language and no language without the world

no suspicion against metaphysical or ordinary language

LANGUAGE AS INFINITE UNIVERSAL MEDIUM

language as picture

language reveals truth

ordinary language and metaphysical language are O.K.

mystical relation between word and thing

language as Spiel

silence about truth as correspondence

no special need for poetic language

semantical relations are fixed and ineffable

language is no object, form, sign or copy

no need for Heidegger's poetic language

opposition to Husserl's transcendental project
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1 I can abstain from giving a long list at this point, since most of this literature will be mentioned below over and over again.


3 Frege speaks of *lingua characterica* rather than *lingua characteristica*. For a brief and concise exposition of the original Leibnizian meaning of this notion, see Heinrich Scholz, *Abriss der Geschichte der Logik*, Alber, Freiburg–München, 1959, pp. 52–55.

4 van Heijenoort, "Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus", p. 325.


10 See Hintikka, "Is Truth Ineffable?".


12 The Hintikkas have spoken of a "paradox of formalization", *Investigating Wittgenstein*, p. 10.

13 The interpretational method employed in this book calls for fairly extensive quoting. There is no better way of proving that a philosopher fits a certain model or *Idealtyp* than actually quoting him or her. I have also quoted more than is usual, since I base my interpretation partly on unpublished material, and partly on material not available in English.
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2This characterization is of course Michael Dummett's. See e.g. *Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1988, p. 167.


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6Elmar Holenstein, "Einleitung des Herausgebers", in LU I, pp. XI–LIV, here p. XXIV.


8"Intentionale Gegenstände", (hereafter IG), in Edmund Husserl, Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890–1910), mit ergänzenden Texten, edited by Bernhard Rang, Husserliana XXII, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1979, pp. 303–348. The major part of this essay was written in 1894, a smaller part on truth in 1898.


15Lothar Eley, "Einleitung des Herausgebers", in Husserliana XII, pp. XIII–XXVIX, here p. XXIV.
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17 BZ, p. 292; CN, p. 94.

18 BZ, pp. 293–294; CN, pp. 94–95.

19 BZ, p. 291; CN, p. 93.

20 BZ, p. 292; CN, p. 94.

21 BZ, p. 295; CN, p. 95.


24 PhA, p. 119.

25 PhA, p. 119.


27 G. Frege, Grundlagen, p. 38; Foundations, p. 38.


30 PhA, p. 15.

31 Ibid.

32 PhA, p. 16.

33 PhA, p. 17.

34 PhA, p. 74.

35 BZ, p. 335; CN, p. 116.

36 BZ, p. 336; CN, p. 116, translation changed.

37 Ibid.


41 *PhA*, p. 131.

42 *PhA*, p. 133.

43 *PhA*, p. 193.

44 *PhA*, p. 234.

45 See note 41.

46 *PhA*, p. 234.

47 *PhA*, p. 260.

48 *PhA*, p. 221.


52 De Boer, *The Development of Husserl's Thought*, p. 27.

53 *Ibid*.

54 K I 36/36 (1890), p. 1: "Daß die Anzahlen Schöpfungen des menschlichen Geistes sind, haben wir in gewisser Weise schon früher zugestanden. Sie entstehen eben aus gewissen psychischen Tätigkeiten."

55 Husserliana XXI, p. 245.


58 *PhA*, p. 259.

59 *PhA*, p. 7.


61 *PhA*, p. 182.

62 *PhA*, p. 257.

63 *PhA*, p. 259.
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64 See note 9.
66 "Philosophie des Kalküls", p. 32.
67 Ibid., pp. 42–43.
68 Ibid., p. 247.
69 Ibid., p. 248.
70 Ibid.
71 "Zur Lehre vom Inbegriff", p. 403.
72 See note 10.


75 Schröder, Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik, p. 4; Besprechung, p. 4; Review, p. 116.
76 Besprechung, p. 7; Review, p. 117.
77 Besprechung, p. 8; Review, p. 118.
78 Ibid.
79 See van Heijenoort, "Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus".
82 Jaakko Hintikka, "On the Development of the Model-Theoretical Tradition in Logical Theory".


84*Briefwechsel*, p. 100; *Correspondence*, p. 121.

85K I 36/39b (1890), p. 4: "Gegen diese Theorie hat Frege mit Recht eingewendet: Es hindert uns allerdings etwas c–b ohne weiteres als Zeichen anzusehen ... denn ein leeres Zeichen löst eben die Aufgabe nicht; ohne einen Inhalt ist es nur Tinte und Druckerschwärze auf dem Papier, hat als solches bloß physiologische Eigenschaften ..."


89Frege, *Grundgesetze I*, 103, ”Frege Against the Formalists”, p. 190.


91*Besprechung*, p. 25; *Review*, p. 129.

92*Besprechung*, p. 19; *Review*, p. 126.

93*Folgerungskalkül*, p. 47; *Deductive*, pp. 8–9.

94*Folgerungskalkül*, p. 48; *Deductive*, p. 9.

95*Besprechung*, p. 31; *Review*, p. 133.

96"A. Voigts 'Elementare Logik' und meine Darlegungen zur Logik des Logischen Kalküls", in Husserliana XXII, pp. 73–82, here p. 79. English translation by Dallas Willard, ”Remarks on A. Voigt’s 'Elementary Logic'”, *The Personalist*, vol. 60 (1979), pp. 26–35, here p. 29, translation slightly changed. The idea that the same formal algorithm can be interpreted either intensionally or extensionally was also central for Leibniz. See William and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 339. I owe this reference to Leila Haaparanta.

97*Folgerungskalkül*, p. 54; *Deductive*, p. 13.

98*Folgerungskalkül*, p. 55; *Deductive*, p. 13.

99G. Frege, ”Kritische Beleuchtung einiger Punkte in E. Schröders


See note 6.


105 See page 33 of this study.

106 Besprechung von M. Palagyi ...”, p. 156; ”A Reply ...”, p. 154.

107 See note 8.


109 *IG*, p. 303.


111 Bernhard Rang, ”Einleitung des Herausgebers”, in *Husserliana* XXV, pp. IX–LVI, here p. XXX.

112 *IG*, p. 317.


114 *IG*, p. 323.

115 *Ibid.*.


118 *Ibid.*.


120 *IG*, p. 342.


123 This is how I understand Husserl’s example at the bottom of page 343. In what follows I try to give an interpretative summary of Husserl’s argument on pp. 345-46 in terms of the mathematical case, even though Husserl does not proceed in this way. I take it, however, that the mathematical example provides an especially clear case from which one can appreciate Husserl’s point.

124 *IG*, p. 344.

125 See the authors and passages cited in DeBoer, *The Development of Husserl’s Thought*, p. 287. See also Charles Sanders Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul
Weiss, Vol. IV: *The Simplest Mathematics*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1933, p. 10: "How many writers of our generation (if I must call names, in order to direct the reader to further acquaintance with a generally described character—let it be in this case the distinguished Husserl) after underscored protestations that their discourse shall be of logic exclusively and not by any means of psychology (almost all logicians protest that on file), forthwith become intent upon those elements of the process of thinking which seem to be special to a mind like that of the human race, as we find it, to too great neglect of those elements which must belong, as much to any one as to any other mode of embodying the same thought."


127 Picker, "Die Bedeutung der Mathematik ...", p. 272.


130 For an early but still highly illuminating study on the relation between Husserl and Hilbert, see Dietrich Mahnke, "Von Hilbert zu Husserl. Erste Einführung in die Phänomenologie, besonders der formalen Mathematik", *Unterrichtsblätter für Mathematik und Naturwissenschaften*, vol. XXIX (1923), pp. 34–37. English translation by David L. Boyer, "From Hilbert to Husserl: First Introduction to Phenomenology, especially that of Formal Mathematics", *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, vol. 8 (1977), pp. 71–84. Mahnke is also interesting for the further reason that he wrote a dissertation on Leibniz, a work that influenced Husserl's own view of Leibniz. See Dietrich Mahnke, "Leibnizens Synthese von Univer-

131 See his paper mentioned in note 82. On the controversy between Hilbert and Frege, see also Friedrich Kambartel, "Frege und die axiomatische Methode", in Christian Thiel (ed.), *Frege und die moderne Grund-
lagenforschung*, Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Glan, 1975, pp. 77–89.

See especially "Das Imaginäre in der Mathematik" (1901), in Husserliana XII, pp. 430-444.

See van Heijenoort, "Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus".

F I 12 (1902-11), IV I 3, 19b, pp. 50-51: "Nun müssen aber alle deduzierbaren Lehrsätze des weiteren Systems in solche zerfallen, welche 1) ausschließlich die Begriffe des engeren enthalten und die im Sinn der engeren Axiome gültig, also nicht imaginär sind, 2) in Lehrsätze, welche solche Imaginaritäten enthalten. ... wann kann man sicher sein, daß jedem durch das Imaginäre hindurchleitenden Beweis sich muß ein ausschließlich durch das reelle Gebiet leitender Beweis ... an die Seite stellen lassen?"

Das Imaginäre in der Mathematik", p. 440.


Picker, "Die Bedeutung der Mathematik ...", p. 309. LU I, p. 254; LI, p. 244.


LU I, p. 239; LI, p. 232.


LU I, pp. 254-255; LI, p. 244.

LU I, p. 245; LI, p. 237.

See note 11.

See note 104.


F I 12 (1902-11), 66a, p. 150: "... so wie die Analytik so alle Ontologien sich in empirische Psychologie auflösen müßten und schließlich alle Wissenschaften überhaupt ..."

See note 3.
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152 See note 26.
153 See note 88.
154 This was suggested to me by Tuomo Aho and Jaakko Hintikka.
156 See his paper mentioned in note 4.
158 Frege, Grundgesetze, p. XV; Basic Laws, p. 12.
159 Frege, "Logik", in Frege, Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 137-63, here p. 139. English translation by Peter Long and Roger Hargreaves with the assistance of Raymond Hargreaves, "Logic", in Posthumous Writings, pp. 126-51, here p. 128.
161 Frege, Grundgesetze, p. XIV; Basic Laws, p. 12.
162 Frege, Grundgesetze, p. XV; Basic Laws, p. 12.
166 LU I, pp. 57-58; LI, p. 85.
167 LU I, p. 59; LI, p. 87.
169 LU I, p. 68; LI, p. 94.
170 LU I, p. 68; LI, p. 94.
171 LU I, p. 153; LI, p. 163.
172 LU I, p. 73; LI, pp. 98-99.
173 LU I, p. 73; LI, p. 99.
175 LU I, p. 120; LI, p. 136.
176 LU I, p. 125; LI, p. 140.
177 LU I, p. 128; LI, p. 143.
178 Frege, Grundgesetze, p. XVI; Basic Laws, p. 14. Frege's position differs from Husserl's only if we understand his pronouncement literally.
It might also be just a somewhat awkward expression for the idea that a

different logic is inconceivable.

181 Haaparanta, *Frege's Doctrine of Being*, p. 39; L. Haaparanta,
"Frege and his German Contemporaries on Alethic Modalities", in Simo
Knuuttila (ed.), *Modern Modalities. Studies of the History of Modal The-
ories from Medieval Nominalism to Logical Positivism*, Kluwer, Dordrecht,
182 LU I, p. 186; LI, p. 189.
183 LU I, p. 187; LI, p. 190.
184 See note 125 above.
185 LU II, p. 6; LI, p. 249.
186 LU II, p. 8; LI, p. 250.
187 For a more detailed investigation into, and an exposition of, this
investigation, see J.N. Mohanty, *Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning*,
188 LU II, p. 30; LI, p. 275.
189 Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, translated by David Al-
190 LU II, p. 42; LI, p. 279.
191 LU II, p. 44; LI, p. 281.
194 LU II, p. 113; LI, p. 339.
195 For a detailed exposition and defence of this argument in Frege, see
Hale, *Abstract Objects*.
196 LU II, p. 130; LI, pp. 352–353.
197 LU II, p. 117; LI, p. 342.
198 LU II, p. 212; LI, p. 421. This argument is of course reminiscent
of Wittgenstein's private language argument.
199 LU II, p. 96; LI, p. 322.
200 See George Berger, "Review of Barry Smith, editor, Parts and Mo-
201 See Barry Smith and Kevin Mulligan, "Pieces of a Theory", in
Barry Smith (ed.), *Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and Formal On-
tology*, Philosophy Verlag, München, 1982, pp. 15–109, here pp. 55–65;
Guillermo Ernesto Rosado Haddock, *Edmund Husserls Philosophie der
Logik und Mathematik im Lichte der gegenwärtigen Logik und Grundlagen-

203 LU II, p. 282; LI, p. 475.

204 LU II, p. 320; LI, p. 506.

205 LU II, p. 325; LI, p. 510.


207 LU II, p. 334; LI, p. 517.

208 LU II, p. 329; LI, p. 513.


210 LU II, p. 341; LI, p. 521; translation changed.

211 LU II, p. 348; LI, p. 526.


215 Ibid.

216 Ibid.

217 LU II, p. 588; LI, p 712.

218 LU II, p. 563; LI, p. 691.

219 LU II, p. 422; LI, p. 584; stress added.

220 See page 256 below.

221 Hintikka, ”Is Truth Ineffable?”.


223 Haaparanta, Frege’s Doctrine of Being, pp. 41–42.
224 Frege, "Der Gedanke", p. 343; "Thoughts", p. 353, translation changed.

225 See note 157.


227 LU II, p. 647; LI, p. 762.


229 LU II, p. 652; LI, p. 766.


231 LU II, p. 652; LI, p. 766.

232 Ibid.


234 LU II, p. 647; LI, p. 762.


236 LU II, p. 674; LI, p. 787.

237 LU II, p. 681; LI, p. 793.

238 LU II, p. 712; LI, p. 818.

239 LU II, p. 724; LI, p. 826.

240 Ibid.

241 This graph is but a modification of that given by Mohanty, Edmund Husserl’s Theory of Meaning, p. 116.

242 LU II, p. 728; LI, p. 830.


246 See note 119.

247 David Carr, Phenomenology and the Problem of History: A Study of Husserl’s Transcendental Philosophy, Northwestern University Press,
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252 This expression is of course not Husserl’s but Nelson Goodman’s. See Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking, The Harvester Press, Sussex, 1978.


254 Krisis, p. 251; Crisis, p. 248.

255 Krisis, p. 140; Crisis, p. 137.

256 Ibid.

257 B I 5 XIII, (1931), p. 3: "Phänomenologe sein, das ist etwas, das nur der Phänomenologe erfahren und erkennen kann."


259 B I 7 IV (about 1925), p. 1: "... es ist die Funktion der Phänome-
nologie, allen Wissenschaften transzendental Rationalität zu verschaffen, ihnen eine neuartige und letzte Rationalität, die ganz andersartige Rationalität alleitiger Klarheit und Verständigkeit zu geben, und sie dadurch in Zweige einer einzigsten absoluten Wissenschaft zu verwandeln. (Und das selbst muß dann Mittel sein, um aus dem Leben in der naiven Positivität in jeder Hinsicht ein 'absolutes' Leben, ein aus absoluter Selbstverständigung, aus einem Verstehen des letzten Sinnes der Welt und alles in Wahrheit Seienden überhaupt, der im Leben selbst liegt und aus ihm allein zu schöpfen ist, sich regierendes, auf seine absoluten Ziele gerichtetes Leben in Freiheit zu gestalten.)

260 See Hao Wang, Reflections on Kurt Gödel, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1987. Wang believes that Gödel valued Husserl's work "because 'bracketing' promise[d] for him a method of finding the right perspective to perceive concepts more clearly." (p. 193) Yet Wang also reports that "I have not been able to detect Husserl's influences in G[ödel]'s available philosophical work." (p. 221)


263 Quoted from Spiegelberg's "Epoche und Reduktion . . .", p. 26.


266 Ibid., p. 336.

267 Krisis, p. 213; Crisis, p. 209.

268 Krisis, p. 213; Crisis, p. 209.

269 Krisis, p. 130; Crisis, p. 127.


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272 Ideen I, p. 253; Ideas I, p. 294, with translation changed.
274 Ibid.
275 Krisis, p. 213; Crisis, p. 209, with translation changed.
276 "Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik", p. 206.
277 Ibid.
280 Erste Philosophie II, p. 155.
283 Ideen I, p. 136; Ideas I, p. 171, with translation changed.
286 Idee, p. 38; Idea, p. 31.
287 Psychologie, p. 189; Psychology, p. 145.
288 Cartesianische Meditationen, p. 60; Cartesian Meditations, p. 20.
289 Idee, p. 6; Idea, p. 4.
290 Ibid., with translation changed.
291 Ideen I, p. 65; Ideas I, p. 108.
293 Psychologie, p. 71; Psychology, pp. 52-53.


Ideen I, p. 72; Ideas I, p. 113, with translation changed.


Ideen I, p. 137; Ideas I, p. 172.

In B III 12 V (1927), p. 28, Husserl is also anxious to stress that forbearing (Enthalten) is no privation: "Forbearing does not mean a privation but a variation of the act, ..." (Enthalten besagt nicht eine Privation, sondern eine Abwandlung des Aktes, ...)

One question with respect to phenomenological language that has drawn attention is whether the language of the transcendental stand is a private one. See Suzanne Cunningham, Language and the Phenomenological Reductions of Edmund Husserl, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1976; and the debate between her and Hutcheson: Peter Hutcheson, "Husserl and Private Language", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. XLII (1981), pp. 118-128; S. Cunningham, "Husserl and Private Language: A Response to Hutcheson", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. XLIV (1983), pp. 103-111. It seems to me that in the light of the Husserl-Fink discussion this issue has to be addressed anew. However, I shall take up this task on another occasion. Closer to my concerns with respect to phenomenological language are the studies of Reeder and Lazaro. Lazaro confines himself to a summary of Fink’s argument, and Reeder’s comments are too brief to give an indication as to his stand on this issue. Ramon Castilla Lazaro, Zu Husserls Sprachphilosophie und ihren Kritikern, Doctoral Thesis, Free University Berlin, 1967, pp. 620-626; Harry P. Reeder, Language and Experience. Descriptions of Living Language in Husserl and...

302 Professor von Herrmann was Fink's assistant during the sixties, and Heidegger's private assistant during the first half of the seventies.


309 *Ideen I*, p. 305; *Ideas I*, p. 347.

310 *Ideen I*, p. 152; *Ideas I*, p. 189.


317 BI 5 (1930 or 1931), pp. 1–2: ”Ich reduziere mich auf das Transzendentale. Als transzendentales Ego kann ich Symbole bilden—transzendentale Symbole, selbst seidend in meiner transzendentalen Sphäre, die dann intersubjektiv 'erfahrbar' sind ... symbolisierend transzendentale Tatsachen als Bedeutungen.”

318 BI 5, V 19, pp. 19–20: ”... Epoché übend und aussagend 'ich bin' ... Natürlich das wäre kein Einwand, daß die Aussage, in den Worten, in der Grammatik der deutschen Sprache vollzogen eo ipso einen auf das deutsche Volk zurückbezogenen Sinn hat, daß ich also schon durch mein Reden und sei es auch Fürmich-reden der transzendentalen Epoché widerspräche. Denn hier genügt der Hinweis auf die Möglichkeit auch meine Sprache so zu reduzieren, daß sie allen weltlichen Sinn abstößt und reiner Ausdruck dessen ist, was ich meine, d.h. also daß ich nichts in Geltung
setze als eben den von mir selbst ursprünglich konzipierten Sinn meiner Rede.”

319 See note 282.


321 Erfahrung, p. 411; Experience, p. 341.

322 Erfahrung, p. 412; Experience, p. 342.

323 B I 5, V 27, p. 7: ”Wenn wir nun die gegebene Welt als eine bloß mögliche Welt ansehen, wenn wir das Faktum dieser Welt (...) willkürlich umdenken und alle freien Möglichkeiten durchlaufen, oder vielmehr frei phantasierend entwerfen, so gewinnen wir das Eidos 'Welt' als das invariante Wesen, das jeder möglichen Welt zugehört ...”

324 B IV 6 (about 1918), p. 91: ”Wir können die Welt beliebig umfingieren, wobei die umfingierten miteinander unverträglich wären in der Existenz, dann fingieren wir auch das Subjekt um.”

325 Psychologie, pp. 474–475; passage not in the English translation.


330 LU II, p. 856; passage not in the English translation.

331 LU II, p. 808–809; passage not in the English translation.
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332 See note 10.
333 "Aus Entwürfen ...", p. 390.
334 Ibid., p. 391.
335 Ibid., p. 392.


337 Erste Philosophie I, p. 366.
338 See note 245.
339 See note 282.
340 See note 320.

341 B IV 6 IV (1928), p. 275: "Zu jedem kompossiblen All G(G1, G2, ... Gn) gehört ein und gehört in dieses All selbst mit hinein ein S[G(G1, G2, ... Gn)] und denken wir ein anderes All, so gehört zu ihm ein anderes S. Zwei solche Alls haben nichts gemein, sie sind als Alls unverträglich im Dasein und das betrifft auch die in ihnen beschlossenen S." It is interesting that Husserl here explicitly treats of universes (All) as objects or Gegenstände.

342 Ibid., p. 269: "... Unendlichkeit von Welten, von denen keine mit keiner anderen kompossibel ist ..."
343 Ibid., p. 275: "... unverträglich im Dasein ..."

344 B IV 6 I a (1921), p. 53: "Zwei Subjekte ... sind nur kompossibel, ... wenn sie beide ... sind bezogen auf dieselbe Natur."


346 B IV 6 I a (1921), p. 45: "Denken wir eine Natur N so sind mit ihr nur sie erfahrende Subjekte möglich. ... Angenommen, es sei N, so kann dieses Sein unmöglich ausschließen die Möglichkeit anderer N und entsprechend sie erfahrende Subjekte."

347 Ibid., p. 79: "Daß irgend etwas möglicherweise sei, und daß möglicherweise ein es erfahrendes (...) Ichsubjekt sei, sind Wesenskorrelate."

348 Erfahrung, p. 364; Experience, p. 301.


350 B IV 6 I a (1921), pp. 64-65: "... Phantasie-Ich ... dieses zugehörige Subjekt möglicher Erfahrung von gerade dieser Realität."

351 On this model and its history in general, see Simo Knuuttila (ed.), Reforging the Great Chain of Being, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981. On Leibniz's use and discussion of this model, see Jaakko Hintikka, "Was Leibniz's Deity

352 B IV 6 I a (1921), pp. 8-9: ”Alles was in einer nach Zeit und Raum unendlichen Welt enthalten ist, ist völlig bestimmt. Nur durch völlige Bestimmbarkeit kann die Identität einer unendlichen Welt gedacht werden. Was in ihr nicht ist, das kann in ihr auch nicht sein, und alles, was in ihr möglich ist, ist in ihr auch wirklich. ... wenn in einer Welt sollen welterkennende, die Welt phänomenologisch konstituierende (erfahrende) Akte auftreten können, sie in ihr ... wirklich auftreten müssen.”


355 For Lewis’s view see his recent book mentioned in note 345, as well as his early paper ”Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 65 (1968), pp. 113-126.


357 Ibid., p. 141.

358 Erfahrung, pp. 431–432; Experience, p. 356.

359 Erfahrung, p. 203; Experience, p. 173.


362 See Lewis ”Counterpart Theory . . ., p. 122.


364 §§86–93.

365 Husserliana XXII pp. 528–529.


367 Husserl and Intentionality, p. 387.

368 Ibid., pp. 304–305.

369 Erfahrung, p. 213; Experience, p. 181.

370 Husserl and Intentionality, p. 337.
371 The English can perhaps be understood in the sense of identity, not so with the German, however.

372 Erfahrung, p. 461; Experience, p. 381.

373 See especially Hintikka's paper "The Intentions of Intentionality", in Hintikka, The Intentions of Intentionality, pp. 192-222.

374 See Mohanty, "Husserl and Hintikka".


382 Ideen I, p. 218; Ideas I, p. 257, with translation changed.

383 Ibid.

384 Ideen I, p. 219; Ideas I, p. 258.


386 Erfahrung, pp. 314-317; Experience, pp. 261-263.

Husserl and Intentionality, p. 124.


390 B III 12 III (1921), p. 22: "Im Sinn liegt der vermeinte Gegenstand X, das, was im Übergang von Sinn zu neuem Sinn als der identisch vermeinte Gegenstand bewußt ist. ... Ferner liegt im Sinn der 'Inhalt', der sich expliziert in Prädikaten."


392 Erfahrung, pp. 26-28; Experience, pp. 34-37.

393 Cartesianische Meditationen, p. 85; Cartesian Meditations, p. 42.

394 Ideen I, p. 345; Ideas I, p. 391.

395 See on this whole issue Smith and McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality, pp. 182-187.


397 Ibid. For a systematic discussion of this idea, see Dummett, Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie, pp. 93-110.

398 Ideen I, p. 305; Ideas I, p. 347.

399 B III 12 III (1921), p. 23: "Der Sinn ist die Sphäre des Logos im spezifischen Sinn, er ist das allein direkt Aussprechbare, Ausdrückbare."

400 Smith and McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality, p. 184.


402 Husserl and Intentionality, p. 190.

403 F I 38 (1920/21 & 1925/26), pp. 304-305: "Vollziehe ich ... die Ausschaltung jeder Stellungnahme zu einer außerbewußten Wirklichkeit (...) so bleibt mir in gewisser Weise doch alles: ... die ganze Welt aber in Anführungszeichen als der jeweilige Sinn ..."

404 B III 12 V (1927), p. 28: "Über Sätze urteilen: Mein Wahrnehmungssatz 'Dort steht der schwarze Sessel' kommt in Anführungszeichen. Ich mache nicht die Setzung mit, das sagt, ich habe noch (in diesem Fall) die Wahrnehmung; ich inhibiere sie."

405 Ideen I, p. 222; Ideas I, p. 260, with translation changed.

406 B III 12 "Noema und Sinn", "Grundlegend", written by Husserl on the cover of this collection of papers.

407 B III 12 VI (1917/18), p. 9: "Jeder Sinn ist ein Gegenstand. Der einem Gegenstand entsprechende Sinn ist ein 'gegenständlicher' ... [er] hat
als Sinn einen Sinn zweiter Stufe, den Sinnes-Sinn nämlich ... also ... wir kommen auf einen unendlichen Regreß."

408 B III 12 V (1927), p. 31: "... Sinne zweiter Stufe ... unthematische Sinne gegenüber den thematischen ..."

409 Hintikka, "Is Truth Ineffable?".

410 For a recent extensive treatment, see Susan Haack, "Realism", *Synthese*, vol. 73 (1987), pp. 275–299.


414 *Erste Philosophie I*, p. 355.
415 *Erste Philosophie I*, p. 361.
416 For a criticism of this interpretation of Kant, see Kern, *Husserl und Kant*, pp. 124–128.

418 *Erste Philosophie I*, p. 364.
419 *Erste Philosophie I*, p. 363.
420 *Erste Philosophie I*, p. 364.
422 *Ideen I*, pp. 123–124; *Ideas I*, p. 159; only part of this passage is in the English translation.

423 See Heinsen, "Husserl's Theory of the Pure Ego".


426 Ibid., p. 98.
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429 Harrison Hall, "Was Husserl a Realist or an Idealist?", in Dreyfus (ed.), *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, pp. 169-190.


432 See also the passage quoted by Ameriks, "Husserl’s Realism", p. 504.

433 F I 38, pp. 208-209: "Das große Thema der Transzendentalphilosophie ist das Bewußtsein überhaupt als ein Stufenbau konstitutiver Leistungen, in denen sich in immer neuen Stufen oder Schichten immer neue Objektivitäten, Objektivitäten immer neuen Types konstituieren, sich immer neuartige Selbstgebungen entwickeln . . ."


435 *Logik*, p. 207; *Logic*, p. 234.

436 For more criticism see Ingrid M. Wallner, "In Defence of Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism: Roman Ingarden’s Critique Re-examined", *Husserl Studies*, vol. 4 (1987), pp. 3-43.

437 *Ideen I*, p. 116; *Ideas I*, p. 152, with translation changed.


439 A collection of illuminating articles on this work is Elisabeth Ströker (ed.), *Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls*, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1979.


441 E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus*


444 Krisis, p. 213; Crisis, p. 209.

445 Ibid.


447 As is especially clear from the first paragraph.

448 Krisis, p. 369; Crisis, p. 358.

449 Krisis, p. 370; Crisis, p. 359.

450 See especially Krisis, p. 378; Crisis, p. 368.

451 Krisis, p. 378; Crisis, p. 369.


453 §40ff.

454 Krisis, p. 150; Crisis, p. 147.

455 Krisis, p. 146; Crisis, p. 143.

456 Krisis, p. 213; Crisis, p. 209.

457 Krisis, p. 258; Crisis, p. 254.

458 Krisis, p. 133; Crisis, pp. 130-31.

459 See note 281.

460 Krisis, p. 213; Crisis, p. 209.

461 See note 441.

462 Intersubjektivität III, p. 224.

463 Intersubjektivität III, pp. 224-225.
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464 B I 14 VIII (1933), p. 6: "Zunächst scheint es wohl . . . daß wir . . . sagen müssen: die Welt, die für uns Sinn hat und als die sie uns gilt, und die Ontologie dieser Welt ist speziell bezogen auf die europäische Menschheit und Kultur—für andere Menschheiten, insbesondere für eine primitive Menschheit gilt eine andere Welt und eine andere Ontologie, schließlich, ins Formalsste gewendet, eine andere Logik." See also A I 13 II (1930), p. 7: "Es gilt ja heute vielen es sogar schon für ausgemacht, daß unsere Ontologie keine Geltung habe für die Primitiven, für ihre Welt nicht die Wesensformzeichnet."

465 Krises, p. 142; Crisis, p. 139.
466 Krises, p. 144; Crisis, p. 141.
467 Krises, p. 145; Crisis, p. 142.
468 Krises, p. 383; Crisis, pp. 374–75.
469 Krises, p. 383; Crisis, p. 375.
471 Psychologie, p. 496.
472 Psychologie, p. 497.
473 Psychologie, p. 496.
474 Psychologie, p. 497.
475 Psychologie, p. 498.
476 Ibid.
478 Ibid., p. 442.
479 Ibid.
480 See note 138.
481 See note 320.
482 Logik, p. 51; Logic, p. 48.
483 Logik, p. 55; Logic, p. 50.
484 Logik; pp. 55–56; Logic, p. 51.
485 Logik; p. 58; Logic, p. 52.
486 Logik, p. 57; Logic, p. 51.
487 Logik, p. 58; Logic, p. 52.
488 Logik, p. 59; Logic, p. 53.
489 Logik, p. 59; Logic, p. 54.
490 Logik, p. 73; Logic, p. 68.
491 Logik, p. 72; Logic, p. 67.
492 Becker is in many ways an interesting figure within the phenomenological movement. For instance, Becker was one of the pioneers of modern modal logic, and stood interestingly between Husserl and Heidegger. See his "Mathematische Existenz. Untersuchungen zur Logik, und

494 Logik, p. 70; Logic, p. 65.
495 Ibid.
496 Logik, pp. 212-13; Logic, pp. 204-5, with translation changed.
497See Haddock, Edmund Husserls Philosophie der Logik, ..., p. 82.
499See page 34.
500 All of these writings are preserved in the Husserl-Archives in Louvain.


504Logik, p. 110; Logic, p. 105.
505Logik, p. 81; Logic, p. 77.
506Logik, p. 82; Logic, p. 77.
507Logik, p. 83; Logic, p. 79.
508Logik, p. 104; Logic, p. 100.
509Logik, p. 105; Logic, p. 100.
510Logik, pp. 145-46; Logic, p. 140.
511F I 15 (1910-11), pp. 156-157: "Während die formale Logik, als Logik der Bedeutungen sich um die Fragen der Evidenz und Anschaulichkeit nicht kümmert . . . verhält es sich umgekehrt mit der noetischen Logik. Ihr Augenmerk geht auf das volle Erlebnis nicht in individuo, sondern in der Idee—und auf die Wesenszusammenhänge, die alle idealen Komponenten miteinander verbinden."

512Logik, p. 265; Logic, p. 258.
513Logik, p. 272; Logic, p. 266. Cf. Leila Haaparanta, "Analysis as the Method of Logical Discovery: Some Remarks on Frege and Husserl",

514 See Hintikka’s paper "Wittgenstein as Philosopher of Immediate Experience", forthcoming.

NOTES TO PART III


2 Hintikka and Hintikka, *Investigating Wittgenstein*.


5 *Realität*, p. 3; *Reality*, p. 65.
6 *Realität*, p. 9; *Reality*, p. 68.
7 *Realität*, pp. 5–9; *Reality*, pp. 66–67.
8 *Realität*, p. 7; *Reality*, p. 67.
9 *Realität*, p. 8; *Reality*, p. 67.
10 *Realität*, pp. 9–10; *Reality*, p. 67.
11 *Realität*, p. 2; *Reality*, p. 64.
12 *Realität*, p. 9; *Reality*, p. 68.
13 *Realität*, p. 9; *Reality*, p. 68.
14 *Realität*, p. 10; *Reality*, p. 68, with translation changed.
15 *Realität*, p. 10; *Reality*, p. 68, with translation changed.
16 *Realität*, p. 15; *Reality*, p. 70.
17 *Realität*, p. 15; *Reality*, p. 70.

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20Forschungen, p. 19.
21Forschungen, p. 20.
22Urteil, p. 109.
23Urteil, p. 110.
24Forschungen, p. 29.
26Ibid., p. 27.
27Forschungen, p. 42.
29Urteil, pp. 167-169.
30Urteil, p. 172.
31Urteil, p. 175.
32Urteil, p. 178.
33Urteil, p. 176.
34See note 3 above.
37Ibid., p. 104.
38Ibid., p. 107. Two passages from Rickert’s ”Gutachten über die Habilitationsschrift des Herrn Dr. Heidegger, Freiburg i.B. den 19. Juli 1915”, (Philosophische Fakultät der Universität) are also worth quoting: ”The subject-matter has not been treated historically. To do this would have caused great difficulties and would probably still have exceeded the strength of the author.” (p. 1)
”His scientific development is still in its early stages, but he is already capable of understanding quite difficult thoughts from earlier centuries, and he also has enough knowledge of modern philosophy to see connections between the past and the present. Since he also has mathematical training and real talent for abstract thinking, and since he proceeds with industry
and carefulness, one may expect delightful results from his later scientific works.” (pp. 3-4)

39 Scotus, pp. 281-282.
40 Scotus, p. 274.
41 Scotus, p. 278.
42 Scotus, p. 279.
43 Scotus, p. 293.
44 Scotus, p. 301.
45 Ibid.
47 Scotus, p. 321.
48 Scotus, p. 327.
50 Scotus, p. 339.
51 Scotus, p. 191.


53 Scotus, p. 400.
54 Scotus, p. 401.
55 Scotus, p. 403.
56 Scotus, p. 405.
57 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Scotus, p. 408.
61 Scotus, p. 407.

62 Vorlesungsverzeichnisse der Albert Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg im Breisgau 1916-1919.


Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus”, unpublished.


Vom Wesen der Wahrheit”, in M. Heidegger, Wegmarken, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1967, pp. 73–97. I here follow the received view that recently has been developed in detail in Ekkehard Fräntzki, Die Kehre. Heideggers Schrift "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit”, Cantaurus-Verlagsgesellschaft, Pfaffenweiler, 1985.

Weltanschauungsproblem, §12.
Weltanschauungsproblem, p. 64, p. 100.
Weltanschauungsproblem, p. 54.
Oskar Becker, "Von der Hinfälligkeit des Schönen und der Abenteuerlichkeit des Künstlers”, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. Ergänzungsband. Festschrift. Edmund Husserl zum 70. Geburtstag gewidmet, Niemeyer, Halle, 1929, pp. 27–52. Among more recent authors, Dagfinn Follesdal seems to hold a similar position. See his "Husserl and Heidegger on the Role of Actions in the Constitution of the World”.

Die 'Ideen' habe ich in der letzten Seminarstunde öffentlich verbrannt u. so destruiert, daß ich sagen kann—die für das ganze wesentlichen


That Heidegger already by 1920 believed that his own project could not be integrated into any already existing system can be seen from the following remark made on November 5, 1920 in the lecture-series "Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion": "One does not ask how the factual Dasein is to be originally explicited, i.e., is to be philosophically explicited.—It appears as if there is a gap in the present system of philosophical categories that needs to be filled. But it will turn out that the expliciation of factual Dasein destroys the whole traditional system of categories ..." (Man fragt nicht, wie das faktische Dasein ursprünglich zu explizieren ist, d.h. philosophisch zu explizieren.—Es ist hier also scheinbar eine Lücke im heutigen philosophischen Kategoriensystem auszufüllen. Es wird sich aber zeigen, dass durch die Explikation des faktischen Daseins das gesamte traditionelle Kategoriensystem gesprengt wird ...) (Nachschrift Becker.)

75 Bast, Der Wissenschaftsbegriff Martin Heideggers, p. XIV.
77 Aristoteles, p. 131.

81 Grundprobleme, p. 85; Basic Problems, p. 61.

82 Grundprobleme, p. 88; Basic Problems, p. 63.

83 Grundprobleme, p. 90; Basic Problems, p. 64.

84 Grundprobleme, p. 90; Basic Problems, p. 64.

85 Grundprobleme, p. 93; Basic Problems, p. 66.


88 Ontologie, p. 81.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 Anfangsgründe, p. 167; Foundations, p. 133.

92 Anfangsgründe, p. 170; Foundations, p. 135.


95 Anfangsgründe, p. 169; Foundations, p. 134, with translation changed. Without mentioning Husserl's name, Heidegger argued already in 1919 (Weltanschauungsproblem, p. 89) that asking how something is "given" means changing the original experience into a theoretical one.

96 Grundprobleme, p. 225; Basic Problems, p. 158.

97 Heidegger in his "Gutachten über die Habilitationsschrift des Herrn Dr. Karl Löwith", Marburg, 16.2.1928, p. 2: "Das Ich-Du-Verhältnis läßt sich daher auch nicht als eine personifizierte Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung fassen."

98 Zeit, p. 334; Time, pp. 242-243, with translation changed.

99 Aristoteles, p. 80.

100 SZ, p. 68; BT, p. 97.
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101 SZ, p. 73; BT, p. 103.
102 Ibid.
103 For extensive discussion on this topic, see Gerold Prauss, Erkennen und Handeln in Heideggers "Sein und Zeit", Alber, Freiburg—München, 1977.

104 Zeit, p. 252; Time, p. 186.
105 Ibid., with translation changed.
108 Grundprobleme, p. 242; Basic Problems, p. 170.
109 See note 102.
110 Anfangsgründe, p. 238; Foundations, p. 185.
111 SZ, p. 135; BT, p. 174.
112 SZ, p. 386; BT, p. 438.
113 Grundprobleme, p. 242; Basic Problems, p. 170.


117 In "Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion" (1920/21), Heidegger distinguishes between Umwelt, Mitwelt, Selbstwelt, and furthermore calls art and science "genuine life-worlds" (genuine Lebenswelten). (2.11.1920). (Nachschrift Becker) The same distinction is made in "Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus" (Vorlesung, Freiburg 1921). (Nachschrift Becker.)
118 Zeit, p. 333; Time, p. 242.

119m Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion", "'Welt ist etwas, worin man leben kann (in einem Objekt kann man nicht leben)." (2.11.1920) In order to do justice to Husserl, it must be mentioned here that in Crisis §37 he stresses that the world is not an object. Even though Heidegger's argument thus does not immediately apply to Husserl, it does seem to apply to Lewis, however. Calvin Normore, independently of Heidegger, has suggested to me (in pers. comm.) that Lewis’s concrete worlds cannot but be thought of as concrete objects. However, to conceive of worlds as concrete objects amounts to using the notion of 'object' in a highly unusual and obscure way. It certainly is part of our usual notion of concrete objects that we can point to them. But in the case of a world, e.g., our world, we can only "wave our arms about in a vague way"; A.N. Prior and Kit Fine, Worlds, Times and Selves, University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst,
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1977, p. 92.

Different uses of modal notions in Sein und Zeit are summarized without interpretation in Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit bei Martin Heidegger, de Gruyter, Berlin, 1960.

121 SZ, pp. 143–144; BT, p. 183.

122 SZ, p. 144; BT, p. 183.


125 SZ, p. 394; BT, p. 446.


127 Phys. III, 1, 201a10–11.

128 SZ, p. 145; BT, p. 186.

129 Zeit, p. 225; Time, p. 166.

130 SZ, p. 206; BT, p. 250.


133 See the letter to Löwith, page 151.

134 ”Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles” (1921/22), ”Aristoteles, Physik” (Freiburg 1922/23), ”Rhetorik” (Marburg 1924), ”Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie” (Marburg 1926), ”Aristoteles Metaphysik Θ 1–3” (1931).

135 ”Die aristotelische Metaphysik ist vielleicht weiter als die heutige.” (5.11.1920, Nachschrift Becker)

136 ”Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas von Aquino bis Kant” (1926). (2.11.1926, Nachschrift Seidemann.)
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137 "Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie" (Marburg 1926); "Rhetorik" (Marburg 1924).


139 Met. Γ 2 1003b 16.

140 26.7.1926.


142 29.7.26: "... an der Aussage, am Satz der aussagt über das vorhandene Seiende..."


27.7.1926: "... die ontologische Durchforschung dieser beiden Bezirke des Seins brachte A. allererst dazu, das Phänomen der Bewegung in den Griff zu bekommen. Es zeigt sich, daß ... [die] Herausarbeitung der ontologischen Grundbegriffe δυναμίς and ενεργεία in der Untersuchung von demjenigen Seienden liegt, das lebt und des βιος, des Daseins ..."

Ibid.

29.7.1926.

"Rhetorik": "Die 'Rhetorik' ist nichts anderes als die Auslegung des konkreten Daseins, die Hermeneutik des Daseins selbst." (Heideggers manuscript.)


Ibid: "Der λόγος durchherrscht das In-Sein."

Zeit, p. 98; Time, p. 72.

Zeit, p. 115; Time, p. 84.

Zeit, p. 117; Time, p. 85.

SZ, p. 34; BT, p. 58.

Ibid. On Husserl's and Heidegger's conception of phenomenology, see Fr.-W. von Herrmann, Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1981.

SZ, p. 35; BT, p. 59.

Aristoteles, p. 58.

Grundprobleme, p. 15; Basic Problems, p. 11.

Grundprobleme, p. 19; Basic Problems, p. 15.

Zeit, p. 138; Time, p. 100.

Zeit, p. 143; Time, p. 103.

Zeit, p. 144; Time, pp. 104-105.

Zeit, p. 147; Time, p. 107.

Zeit, pp. 155-156; Time, p. 113.

Zeit, pp. 151-152; Time, p. 110, with translation changed.

See the Introduction to this study.

SZ, p. 5; BT, p. 25.

SZ, p. 7; BT, p. 27.


SZ, p. 315; BT, p. 363, with translation changed.


SZ, p. 9; BT, p. 28.

Aristoteles, p. 163.

"Wir vertreten die These: ... Die Philosophie ist von der Säkularisierung zur Wissenschaft zu befreien." (2.11.1920)


*Anfangsgründe*, p. 129; *Foundations*, p. 104.

*Anfangsgründe*, p. 130; *Foundations*, p. 105.

*Anfangsgründe*, p. 131; *Foundations*, p. 106.

*Ontologie*, p. 71.

Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas von Aquino bis Kant* (Marburg 1926), 8.11.1926: "Die Mathematik, die scheinbar festgegründete, in Krisis ihrer Fundamente heute! Wovon sie eigentlich handelt, ob ihre Axiome leer sind oder ob schon in den ersten Grundsätzen etwas gemeint ist. Die Mathematik kann also nicht das Ideal aller Wissenschaft sein." (Nachschrift Seidemann.)


*SZ*, p. 160; *BT*, p. 203.

*SZ*, p. 161; *BT*, p. 204.

*Zeit*, p. 361; *Time*, p. 263.


*SZ*, p. 157; *BT*, p. 200.


*SZ*, p. 158; *BT*, pp. 200–201.


*SZ*, p. 165; *BT*, p. 209, with translation changed.

195 "Rhetorik" (1924): "Das wir die Aristotelische Rhetorik haben, ist besser, als wenn wir eine Sprachphilosophie hätten. In der Rhetorik haben wir etwas vor uns, was vom Sprechen handelt als von einer Grundweise des Seins als Miteinandersein des Menschen selbst."

196 Zeit, p. 289; Time, p. 211.

197 Ibid.

198 Grundprobleme, p. 293; Basic Problems, p. 206.

199 Zeit, p. 75; Time, p. 56.

200 "Rhetorik": "... gibt die Richtungen vor, in denen das Dasein die Welt und sich selbst befragen kann."

201 Zeit, p. 375; Time, p. 271.

202 "Einführung in die Philosophie" (Freiburg 1928/29): "... es der metaphysische Sinn der Sprache ist, daß nicht wir mit der Sprache, sondern die Sprache mit uns spielt." (Nachschrift Moser.)

203 SZ, p. 169; BT, p. 213.

204 SZ, p. 217; BT, p. 259.

205 SZ, p. 217; BT, pp. 259–260. Heidegger already makes this point against the neokantians in Weltanschauung (p. 55): "... [they] are somehow fascinated with the radical distinction between Being and value and [they] fail to realize that they have in their theories destroyed the bridge between the two spheres, and that they are now standing helpless on one river bank."


207 Ibid.

208 Ibid., p. 92.

209 Ibid., p. 93.

210 Ibid., pp. 9–10.

211 Ibid., p. 11.

212 Logik, p. 159; Logic, p. 127.

213 SZ, p. 218; BT, p. 260.

214 Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff ..., pp. 331–32.


216 Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff ..., pp. 332–33.

217 SZ, p. 219; BT, p. 261.

218 SZ, p. 221; BT, p. 263.


220 SZ, p. 221; BT, p. 264.
NOTES TO PART III

221 SZ, p. 221; BT, p. 264.
222 SZ, p. 222; BT, pp. 264–265.
223 SZ, p. 222; BT, p. 265.
224 SZ, p. 225; BT, p. 268.
225 Zeit, p. 310; Time, p. 226.
226 Zeit, p. 313; Time, p. 228, with translation changed.
227 Zeit, p. 313; Time, p. 228; SZ, p. 227; BT, p. 269.
228 13.9.1920: "... durch die explizite Verkündigung hat er sein Bestes eingebüßt."
229 19.8.1921: "... ich dagegen [bin] dogmatischer subjektiver Relativist ...

230 Aristoteles, pp. 163–164.
231 Ibid.
232 Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, p. 27.
233 Ibid., p. 28.
234 Ibid.
235 SZ, p. 229; BT, p. 271.
238 Ursprung, p. 14; Origin, p. 25.
239 Ursprung, p. 15; Origin, p. 25.
241 Ursprung, p. 19; Origin, p. 30, with translation changed.
243 Ursprung, pp. 24–25; Origin, p. 35.
244 Ursprung, p. 33; Origin, pp. 44–45, with translation changed.
245 Ursprung, p. 37; Origin, pp. 45–49, with translation changed.
246 Ursprung, p. 40; Origin, p. 51.
247 Ursprung, p. 41; Origin, p. 52.
248 Ursprung, pp. 41–42; Origin, p. 53, translation changed. For a detailed investigation into the notion of Lichtung and its historical sources

249 Ursprung, p. 42; Origin, pp. 53-54, translation changed.
250 Ursprung, p. 43; Origin, p. 54, with translation changed.
251 Ursprung, pp. 41-42; Origin, p. 53.
252 Ursprung, p. 47; Origin, p. 59, with translation changed.
253 Ursprung, p. 48; Origin, p. 59, with translation changed.
254 Ursprung, p. 51; Origin, p. 62, with translation changed.
255 Ursprung, p. 55; Origin, p. 67.
256 Ursprung, p. 59; Origin, p. 72.
257 Ursprung, p. 60; Origin, p. 73.
258 Ursprung, p. 61; Origin, p. 74, with translation changed.
259 Ursprung, p. 61; Origin, p. 74.
260 Ursprung, p. 64; Origin, p. 77.
262 M. Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund, Neske, Pfullingen, 1957, p. 119.
265 Brief, p. 158; Letter, p. 206, translation changed.
NOTES TO PART III

270/ibid., p. 137.
271/Ibid., p. 138. Thus it seems quite adequate to characterize the philosophy or thought of the later Heidegger as "tautological". This is done in Tze-wan Kwan, Die hermeneutische Phänomenologie und das tautologische Denken Heideggers, Bouvier, Bonn, 1982, especially pp. 129–37, 168–72.
274/"Aus einem Gespräch ...", p. 149; "A Dialogue", p. 50.
276/From George's poem "Das Wort" (1919).
278/"Das Wesen der Sprache", p. 183; "The Essence of Language", pp. 78–79.
281/"Das Wesen der Sprache", p. 200; "The Essence of Language", p. 93.
283/"Die Sprache", p. 30; "Language", p. 207, with translation changed.
284/Brief, p. 163; Letter, p. 211, translation changed.
287/Ibid., p. 110.
288/"Die Frage nach der Technik" (1954), in Die Technik und die Kehre,
NOTES TO PART III


292 Brief, p. 150; Letter, p. 199.
293 Brief, p. 158; Letter, p. 206, translation changed.
294 Brief, p. 192; Letter, p. 239, translation changed.
295 *Der Satz vom Grund*, p. 158.
296 *Einführung*, p. 62; *Introduction*, p. 82, translation changed.


300 *Ursprung*, p. 50; *Origin*, p. 62, with translation changed.

302 Richard Rorty presents the Heideggerian poets as if they were to

303"... dichterisch wohnet der Mensch ...", p. 190; "Poetically Man Dwells ...", p. 216, with translation changed.


305 Brief, p. 145; Letter, p. 193.


307 Ursprung, pp. 60–61; Origin, p. 73.

308 Hölderlins Hymnen ..., p. 64.


313 Brief, p. 150; Letter, p. 199.

314 Ursprung, p. 61; Origin, p. 185.

NOTES TO PART III


317 See the studies by Hintikka and Haaparanta mentioned in my Introduction.


323 Ibid. Heidegger used the same expression in conversations with Fr.-W. von Herrmann (pers. comm.).

324 Heidegger owned copies of the *Tractatus* as well as the *Philosophical Investigations*. (von Herrmann, pers. comm.)

325 *Satz vom Grund*, p. 170.


333 This point was first made by Eugen Kaelin (J. Hintikka, pers. comm.). Heidegger’s language and especially his tautologies are investigated by Erasmus Schöfer, *Die Sprache Heideggers*, Neske, Pfullingen, 1962; see especially the chapter on Heideggerian tautologies as *figurae etymologicae*, pp. 202–217. This chapter has been translated by Joseph J. Kockelmans, ”Heidegger’s Language: Metalogical Forms of Thought and Grammatical Specialties”, in Joseph J. Kockelmans (ed.), *On Heidegger and Language*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1972, pp. 281–301, here pp. 287–301.

334 *Tractatus* 7.

335 See *Investigating Wittgenstein*, p. 21.

336 See page 214 above.


338 B III 12 V (1927), p. 41: ”Zum poetischen Sprachkunstwerk gehören nicht nur die grammatischen Worte und Satzsysteme, sondern auch die Anschauungen, die zum ästhetischen Gehalt rechnen, und eventuell die leer anklingenden Gedanken, die als leer anklingende der Dichter vielleicht nur eben wecken wollte. ... Und zudem ist hier zu scheiden zwischen Sachgehalten und Wertgehalten.”

339 *Ibid.*, p. 45: ”... der allgemeine Stoff, den der Sprachkünstler gestaltet und so gestaltet, daß ein Sprachwerk als Einheit eines künstlerischen ... Sinnes wird ...”

NOTES TO PART III

343 Ibid., p. 229.
344 Ibid., p. 239.
345 Ibid.


It seems that this important result, namely that the discussion of modes of representation is missing from Heidegger’s writings on purpose, has not yet been paid proper attention to in Heidegger scholarship. For instance the commentaries by Hans-Georg Gadamer (Heidegger's Wege, Mohr, Tübingen, 1983), Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1980) and Joseph J. Kockelmans (Heidegger on Art and Art Works, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1985) are all surprisingly silent on this point. The point is also missed by Gerhard Faden, Der Schein der Kunst. Zu Heideggers Kritik der Ästhetik, Neumann, Königshausen, 1986. The isomorphism between Heidegger’s philosophy of art in "Der Ursprung" and his later pronouncements on language also makes me doubt Otto Pöggeler’s claim according to which "Der Ursprung" belongs to a mere "romantic" phase that Heidegger subsequently overcame. See Otto Pöggeler, Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger, Alber, Freiburg und München, 1972, p. 122.

349 M. Heidegger und Erhart Kästner, Briefwechsel, herausgegeben von Heinrich W. Petzet, Insel Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1986, p. 121.
351 Ibid.
352 Ibid.
353 Ibid., p. 157.
NOTES TO PART IV


5 WM, pp. 274–75; TM, p. 258.

6 WM, p. 286; TM, p. 269.

7 WM, p. 359; TM, p. 340.


9 WM, p. 225; TM, p. 240.

10 Ibid.

11 WM, p. 265; TM, p. 249.


13 WM, p. XXVIII; TM, p. XII.

NOTES TO PART IV

15 WM, p. 280; TM, p. 264.


17 WM, p. XXVII; TM, p. XII.

18 WM, p. 327; TM, p. 309.

19 See note 2.


22 WM, p. 357; TM, p. 338. Marja-Liisa Kakku-Knuuttila and I have tried to develop this idea further in a joint publication. See M.-L. Kakkuri-Knuuttila and M. Kusch, "LSP-research, Philosophy of Science and the Question-theoretical Approach", forthcoming in Hartmut Schröder (ed.), Subject-oriented Textlinguistics, de Gruyter, Berlin, 1989.


24 WM, p. 432; TM, p. 414.


26 WM, p. 235; TM, p. 220.

27 See page 157 above.

28 See page 204 above.

29 WM, p. 348; TM, p. 329.


31 WM, p. XXV; TM, p. XXV.

32 WM, p. 255; TM, p. 240.

33 Ibid.

34 WM, p. 283; TM, p. 266, with translation changed.

35 See page 85 above. Husserl uses the German word "Ausschaltung".

NOTES TO PART IV

37 WM, p. 234; TM, p. 219.
38 WM, p. XXVIII; TM, p. XII.
41 It is a curious fact about the recent Anglo-Saxon interest in Gadamer that Anglo-Saxon philosophers have not shown much interest in Gadamer’s treatment of language and ontology. Of the two best-known expositions of Gadamer’s views in the English-speaking world, neither Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton University Press, 1979), nor Richard J. Bernstein’s Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983) attempts a detailed analysis of this part of Gadamer’s thought. This fact is all the more astonishing in the light of both authors’ keen awareness of developments in the philosophy of language in general.
42 See his Heideggers Wege, Mohr, Tübingen, 1983.
47 In H.-G. Gadamer, ”Nachwort”, in Gadamer and Habermas, Das Erbe Hegels, pp. 65–84, here p. 91.
48 WM, p. 422; TM, p. 404.
51 WM, p. 330; TM, pp. 311–12, translation changed.
52 WM, p. 429; TM, pp. 410–11.
53 WM, p. 423; TM, p. 405.
54 Ibid.
55 WM, p. 381; TM, p. 364.
56 WM, p. 434; TM, pp. 415–16.


"Einleitung in die Philosophie" (1928/29).

"... ein sich sich unzertrennliches Geschehen ..."

"Das Spielen ist seinen Grundcharakter nach ... ein In-Stimmung-sein, Gestimmtsein."

"Spielen = Befolgen von Spielregeln."

"... weil es der metaphysische Sinn der Sprache ist, daß nicht wir mit der Sprache, sondern die Sprache mit uns spielt."

*WM*, pp. 97–105; *TM*, pp. 91–99. That we have here an important parallel to Wittgenstein has been noted by Jörg Zimmermann, *Wittgensteins sprachphilosophische Hermeneutik*, pp. 252–259.

*WM*, pp. 101–2; *TM*, p. 95.

*WM*, pp. 99–100; *TM*, pp. 93 & 95, translation changed.

*WM*, p. 464; *TM*, p. 446.

*WM*, p. 132; *TM* p. 123.

*Ibid*.

*WM*, p. 147; *TM*, p. 137.

See page above.

*WM*, p. 384; *TM*, pp. 367–68.

*WM*, p. 391; *TM*, p. 374, translation changed.


Quoted from *Investigating Wittgenstein*, p. 229.

Quoted from *Investigating Wittgenstein*, p. 94.

Quoted from *Investigating Wittgenstein*, p. 239.

*Investigating Wittgenstein*, p. 93.

Stress added. Quoted from *Investigating Wittgenstein*, p. 100.

Quoted from *Investigating Wittgenstein*, p. 227.

*WM*, p. 391; *TM*, p. 375.

*WM*, p. 391; *TM*, p. 375, translation changed.

*WM*, p. 394; *TM*, p. 377.

*WM*, p. 391; *TM*, p. 374, translation changed.
NOTES TO PART IV

88 WM, p. 390; TM, p. 374, translation changed.
89 Quoted from Investigating Wittgenstein, p. 239.
90 WM, p. 392; TM, p. 375, translation changed.
91 WM, p. 392; TM, p. 376, translation changed.
95 WM, p. 450; TM, p. 432.
96 See page 204 above.
98 Ibid., p. 172.
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Taking a part-scholarly, part-systematic approach, this book studies the philosophical problems of intentionality and meaning and their roles in both Husserl's phenomenology and the semantics of intentional modalities (especially Fregean and possible-worlds semantics). With careful attention to Husserl's texts, it develops in detail the new interpretation of his theory of intentionality via meaning or content, as initiated by Dagfinn Føllesdal. The historical roots of Husserl's theory, its connections with the work of his contemporaries, and its place at the foundation of his phenomenology, are examined. Ten years in the writing, it is hoped that this book will help bridge the gap between Continental, phenomenological philosophy, and Anglo-American analytic philosophy.
The aim of Synthese Library is to provide a forum for the best current work in the methodology and philosophy of science and in epistemology. A wide variety of different approaches have traditionally been represented in the Library, and every effort will be made to maintain this variety, not for its own sake, but because we believe that there are many fruitful and illuminating approaches to the philosophy of science and related disciplines. Special attention is paid to methodological studies which illustrate the interplay of empirical and philosophical viewpoints and to contributions to the formal (logical, set-theoretical, mathematical, information-theoretical, decision-theoretical, etc.) methodology of empirical sciences. Likewise, the applications of logical methods to epistemology as well as philosophically and methodologically relevant studies in logic are strongly encouraged. The emphasis on logic will be tempered by interest in the psychological, historical, and sociological aspects of science.