PERFORMANCE IN THE 1970S

The explosion of performance art in Moscow in the 1970s should not be separated from the broad range of conceptualist tendencies then prevalent in many corners of that city’s unofficial art world. Scholarship on Moscow conceptualism has largely concentrated on the genres of albums, paintings, and objects and on the more open-ended categories of installations and projects to frame discussions of such common themes as artistic marginality, the mythological cast of Soviet ideological language, and the failure of utopian histories. These object-based and often deeply text-centered genres have played a central role in the historiographic foregrounding of the literary tone of Moscow conceptuelist practice, as, for example, in the use of invented characters.


Collective Actions (Kollektivnye deistviia) consisted, at various times, of Andrei Monastyrski, Nikita Alekseev, George Kiesewalter, Nikolai Panitkov, Igor Makarevich, Elena Elagina, Sergei Romashko, and Sabine Hänsgen. Lev Rubinstein took part in the first action, *Appearance*, but did not participate as an organizer thereafter. The name Collective Actions first appeared as azioni collettive in a section heading of the exhibition catalogue for the unofficial Soviet art section of the 1977 Venice Biennale. It was later applied to the group itself by Groys in the essay “Moscow Romantic Conceptualism.” For the sake of clarity, I will employ the name throughout, even though it postdates a number of the group’s early actions. For more on Collective Actions’ early history, see George Kiesewalter (pseud. Givi Kordiashvili), “Istoriiia ‘Kollektivnykh deistviia’: Povest’ v dvukh chastiakh s epilogom,” in Kollektivnye deistviia, *Poezdki za gorod*, vols. 2–3 (Vologda, Russia: BMK, 2011), 125–43.
that often consisted of material so minimal that viewers were not always sure that they had witnessed anything at all, or whether what they witnessed had concluded.5 By involving audiences directly in the realization of actions in a variety of ways, Collective Actions stretched the meaning of artistic spectatorship and participation at a time when the conditions under which unofficial Soviet artists could exhibit had undergone a number of challenges and contestations.6 Moreover, the group’s growing body of documentary materials—from textual descriptions to photographs, audio and video recordings, audience recollections, charts, maps, and various other means of capturing and conveying their “trips out of town”—soon became yet another site of the group’s unfolding practice.7 The actions, their documentation, the many post-action discussions that took place among the audiences and organizers, and the theoretical texts that sprang up in their wake all


became regular mainstays of artistic life within the Moscow conceptu-
alist circle, and formed a key locus for the articulation of Moscow con-
ceptualist discourse in the second half of the 1970s and 1980s.

Keeping this context in mind, the present essay will trace a provi-
sional history of Collective Actions’ first five years (1976–81), taking as
a guide the three critical terms action (aktsiia), documentation (doku-
mentatsiia), and factography (faktografiia), which came to figure promi-
nently in the group’s emerging understanding of its aesthetic project.
It was in these years that the investigation of spatiotemporal perception
in Collective Actions’ iconic early actions was at its most intense. The
simultaneous production of textual and photographic documentation
challenged the primacy of spatiotemporal experience as a necessary
condition of action. At issue in this dialectic, I will argue, was the very
definition of aesthetic experience and, by extension, Moscow conceptu-
alism’s relationship to its audience, the proper site of exhibition, and
the movement’s institutionalization in the form of a dispersed multi-
media archive and hermetic group discourse. Through a close reading
of several of Collective Actions’ performances and key theoretical writ-
ings from this period, a set of philosophical and artistic concerns can
be discerned that give insight into the specific stakes of performance as
an artistic practice within Moscow conceptualism.8

8 As I will explain in the following section, from 1977, Collective Actions used the term
action (aktsiia) to describe their activities in the field. Following this, I use “action” (or
“the action”) to refer to individual works in the group’s canon. However, I depart from
Collective Actions’ usage when I discuss their work in the context of “performance” or
“performance art” in order to indicate the group’s practice within broader discourses and
practices of performance in Moscow and around the world in the 1970s and 1980s. The
distinction between “action” and “performance” is an important and strategic one for
Collective Actions. As Amelia Jones has demonstrated in the case of the strategic use of
“body art” by American artists of the 1960s and 1970s, the distinction demonstrates a
desire to envision a practice that deviated from that indicated by the term performance at
the time. In Collective Actions’ case, the term action was meant to emphasize the con-
structed nature of the work as a text unfolding in time and space, and to de-emphasize
the theatrical or intersubjective aspects implied by performance. To consider actions
within the history of European and American performance art of the 1960s–80s, how-
ever, as I suggest here, is an attempt on my part to enlarge that history beyond the usual
borders of Western Europe and North America. This expanded history, in turn, stands to
open new avenues within prevailing theoretical discussions of performance, such as the
important discussion regarding the relationship of performance and documentation. To
suggest, as Monastyrski and Collective Actions eventually did, that certain types of facto-
graphic objects and photographs approach the status of action is to envision other possi-
bilities of performance, ones that do not rely on the artist’s or performer’s presence
expressed theatrically or intersubjectively and are instead located in the viewer’s engage-
ment with the performance as a text that unfolds not only in the dimensions of time and
space, but also in the manifold spaces of factographic discourse. (On which, see below.)
EARLY FIELD ACTIONS AND THE AESTHETICIZATION OF REALITY

The first action took place on the morning of March 13, 1976. Thirty viewers were invited to Izmailovsky Park (the site of the groundbreaking Second Fall Outdoor Exhibition of unofficial art eighteen months earlier) to witness something described only as Appearance. The viewers were met at the metro station by one of the action’s organizers and led to an empty, snow-covered field bordered on all sides by a forest. They assembled by the forest’s edge and waited. After several minutes, two figures appeared from the opposite side of the field and began to walk in the direction of the group. Upon reaching the audience, they began to distribute typewritten “Documentary Certificates,” attesting to each viewer’s presence as a witness to Appearance. Another action took place two weeks later, one more occurred in the fall, and, although a group practice had not been foreseen at the start, around twenty actions were carried out over the next five years.

The actions of the early period can be divided into two types: those with an audience and those with only the organizers present. When audiences were present, they received invitations or were invited by telephone to an unspecified event with only the time, place, and title of the action given ahead of time. They traveled alone or in groups to the determined meeting spot, which often required a ride on a commuter

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See also Amelia Jones, Body Art/Performing the Subject (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 13.

9 The Izmailovsky Park show took place on September 29, 1974, two weeks after the contentious Bulldozer show, and was the first uninterrupted public exhibition of unofficial Soviet art in Moscow. See materials in Hoptman and Pospiszyl, Primary Documents, 70.

10 For descriptions of actions, documentary photographs, and other documentary and theoretical texts, see the volumes of Poezdki za gorod and materials online. See also the English translations of audience recollections from this early period in Yelena Kalinsky, ed. and trans., Collective Actions: Audience Recollections from the First Five Years, 1976–1981 (Chicago: Soberscove Press, 2012).

11 My division here is practical and aims to sketch a great variety of actions in very general terms. In fact, different members of Collective Actions categorized actions in many different ways at various moments, as, for example, “paratheatrical actions” versus “meditative exercises” (“Obschchii kommentarii,” 1977; this and the following texts can be found in Poezdki za gorod, vol. 1); actions that use the principle of “empty action” versus actions for an anonymous audience that function outside the conventional boundaries of the action’s demonstrational time (“Kommentarii,” July 30, 1978); actions with audiences and without (Monastyriski, “Kratkii kommentarii k aktssiiam 1976–1979 gg.,” June 26, 1979; Alekseev, “Kommentarii k kratkomu kommentariiu A. Monastyriskogo,” July 11, 1979); actions consisting of movement toward or away from the viewer or a theatrical trick versus actions that make use of objects, the leaving of items in nature and, the stimulation of consciousness without theatrical tricks (Alekseev, “O kollektivnykh i individual’nykh aktssiakh 1976–1980 gg.”).


train followed by a walk or a bus ride from the station to the field. Once there, they witnessed or participated in some activity in the field, such as watching figures appear in the distance, listening to the sound of a ringing bell buried in the snow, pulling a rope out of the forest, blowing up balloons into a large fabric membrane to send down the river, or being photographed at various points along the field.¹² Actions where no audiences apart from the organizers themselves were present sometimes involved the installation of an item, such as a slogan or a tent constructed out of painted canvases, in nature and its abandonment for anonymous passersby to encounter.¹³ At other times, the organizers created particular phenomenological conditions that prompted them to meditate on their own perceptions.¹⁴ Actions with audiences usually concluded with the distribution of a Documentary Certificate or another souvenir object, or simply with no further instructions and the dispersal of the viewers on their own initiative. Many actions of both types segued into informal opportunities to socialize, group strolls in nature, or friendly gatherings at a nearby dacha.

As George Kiesewalter explains in his pseudonymous early history of the group, the term action (aktsiia) was not the only or exclusive term used to describe the group’s events in these years; rather, the actions were referred to as, among other things, stagings (postanovki), more rarely performances (performansy), or simply things (veshchi) or works (raboty).¹⁵ One of Collective Actions’ earliest programmatic texts discusses them as situations (situatsii).¹⁶ This terminological looseness reflects the initially unfixed, multivalent nature of Collective Actions’ undertakings. One of the first uses of the term action appears in 1976 in connection with Appearance and Lieblich, the group’s first two works. Here, the authors declare actions to be “a new form of public reading,” or “in some sense, seminars . . . whose main goal is the development of

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¹³ These might include Slogan-1977, January 26, 1977; Slogan-1978, April 9, 1978; For G. Kiesewalter (Slogan-1980), April 13, 1980; and The Tent, October 2, 1976.
¹⁴ This category might consist of The Lantern, November 15, 1977; For N. Panitkov (The Three Darknesses), February 17, 1980; and For A. Monastyrski, March 16, 1980.
¹⁵ In fact, Monastyrski, Rubinstein, and Alekseev had planned Appearance as a one-time event with no intention of carrying out any further actions. It was only with the third action, The Tent, which Alekseev had invented and proposed as a collective work, that a “group consciousness” began to emerge. Kiesewalter, “Istoriia,” 110.
potential forms of spiritual contact between us all.” As art historian Ekaterina Bobrinskaia points out, Moscow conceptualist performance was in many ways an outgrowth of existing practices of concrete poetry, conceptual poetry, and poetry readings. Instead of recited verbal texts, works like Appearance and Lieblich offered viewers situations that unfolded in both time and space in an attempt at what Rubinstein called an “aestheticization of reality” (estetizatsiia deistvitel’nosti). They thus became a form of poetic text or aesthetic object akin to those presented and discussed at the readings and seminars that took place in the circle’s apartments and studios in the 1960s and 1970s. The explicit association of actions, readings, and seminars with the “development of potential forms of spiritual contact” between organizers and viewers reminds us of the important role played by such regular gatherings in Moscow’s cultural life in the post-Stalinist period. It also reflects Collective Actions’ aspirations, at some level, that their “situations” occupy a similar place as a regular site of communitas within the Moscow conceptualist milieu.

Just as the terminology of action remained fluid in Collective Actions’ early years, so is there an accompanying ambiguity in the early texts about the exact nature of action itself. There is a nascent tension, already inherent in the association of actions with poetry, between the actions as aesthetic objects and actions as social practice, sites of communal feeling, or spiritual exercises. Were actions, like poems and artworks, subject to formal analysis? Or were they instead closer to social gatherings, “enthusiasms,” or “festivities that we sometimes organize

17 “Fragment 1976 goda” (1976), Poezdki za gorod, vol. 1, 147. This text was likely written sometime between April and October 1976 since it does not mention the third action, The Tent of October 2.
18 Bobrinskaia, “Moscow Conceptual Performance Art,” 155–57. Monastyrski and Rubinstein, who together invented the first action, Appearance, were poets.
19 Kiesewalter, “Istoriiia,” 128. Monastyrski had earlier developed a series of action objects called Elementary Poetry, which worked to direct the viewer’s attention to her or his own position through an engagement with the object. See, for example, The Pile or The Cannon (both 1975) in Poezdki za gorod, vol. 1, 97–98, 344–47.
20 Seminars in private studios and apartments often included poetry readings, lectures, musical performances, and presentations of new work by artists. See Kabakov’s description of his studio seminars in 60-e–70-e, 120; on the Chachko seminars, see Boris Groys and Antony Vidokle, “Art beyond the Art Market,” in East Art Map: Contemporary Art and Eastern Europe, ed. IRWIN (London: Afterall, 2006), 403–4; and Nikita Alekseev, Riady pamiati (Moscow: NLO, 2008), 106–7.
21 On the cultural significance of poetry readings and discussion groups for the postwar intelligentsia, see, for example, Vladislav Zubok, Zhivago’s Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
for ourselves”22. Certain passages in the texts reflect an interest in formalist or structuralist thinking, and were no doubt informed by such writers as Viktor Shklovsky and Ferdinand de Saussure, whose works were at this time either circulating in samizdat or beginning to be published.23 Such objectives as “breaking down the opposition of ‘reader-listener’” or “maintaining distance . . . by means of constantly new forms of action,” pronounced in Collective Actions’ earliest texts, envisioned actions as possessing both inherent aesthetic functions and art historical trajectories that unfold over time and must be maintained through deliberate aesthetic strategies from action to action.24

The crux of this ambivalence may be perceived in a statement from 1977, where the authors declare that “the true value of our work can be grasped only within the narrow circle of friends, whose dissolution will also bring about the end of this work’s reality, whereas that which appears meaningful in the annals of art carries for us a negative, even if formative, significance.”25 This statement concisely frames a major theoretical and practical problem that would soon arise in Collective Actions’ practice, and which can be seen to resonate through much postwar performance art: namely, the location of performance (ephemeral action experienced by a group of viewers) and the possibility of performance’s documentation and preservation in the annals of art history.26 Here, in 1977, Collective Actions seem to stand clearly on the side of ephemerality, denying any “reality” to actions outside the shared experience of those in the “narrow circle” who are present at the events. And yet, the final statement regarding art historical considerations at

22 In “Fragment 1976 goda,” the authors suggest that actions were “little subject to structural analysis” (147); and another early text, “Fragment 1977 goda,” makes use of “enthusiasms” and “festivities.” See “Fragment 1977 goda,” Poezdki za gorod, vol. 1, 148.
23 The roles of Russian formalism, structural linguistics, and semiotics in Collective Actions’ theoretical writings or in Moscow conceptualism more broadly are subjects that demand a fuller treatment than is possible in the present article. On discussions of structuralism and semiotics among the Collective Actions circle, see Alekseev, Riady pamiati, 104, 175. On the Tartu School of Semiotics in the Soviet Union, another source of structuralist thinking, see Maxim Waldstein, The Soviet Empire of Signs: A History of the Tartu School of Semiotics (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2008).
24 “Fragment 1976 goda.”
once forecloses such a narrow reading. For while they disavow art historical judgment (“that which appears meaningful in the annals of art”), the authors concede that established artistic categories have a formative (formoobrazuishchii, literally “form-determining”) significance, thereby implicitly placing actions in the category of artistic works with formal properties and histories.

**DOCUMENTATION AND THE FACTOGRAPHIC OBJECT**

With art historical framing envisioned as an inevitable and even, in a sense, formative cultural process, documentation, the main mechanism of that process, was at the same time assumed as being secondary with respect to action. In a 1977 “General Commentary,” for example, the group insists that the only “adequate reception” of an action is “unmediated participation.” The reader of documentary materials must “keep in mind the double distance between the objects [in the field] and the viewers [of the documentation].” The series of mediations—from spatiotemporal action to photograph or text to the viewer or reader of the document—“gives rise to an artificial contextualism that, unfortunately, cannot be avoided.”27 In the early years, the business of documenting actions was treated entirely pragmatically, and short descriptive texts, photographs, and occasionally videos were produced for the purposes of publicity and the dissemination of actions outside of Moscow and the Soviet Union.28 It should be noted, however, that the idea of purposely not documenting so as to avoid the distortion of distance and false contextualism does not seem to have been raised.

While documents served a secondary, practical function in the early years, the rhetoric of the document was present as an aesthetic strategy or formal device from the very first action in the form of the

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27 “Obshchii kommentarii” (1977), *Poezdki za gorod*, vol. 1, 151. The same skepticism regarding documentation’s ability to adequately convey the true experience of action recur again and again in the group’s texts from the first five years.

28 See, for example, some of the earliest documents (photographs and descriptive texts) published abroad in Ilaria Bignamini, “From the U.S.S.R...” *Flash Art: The International Arts Review* 76/77 (July–August 1977): 16–18. Letters and images sent to Victor and Margarita Tupitsyn served as primary sources in their writing on unofficial Soviet art, including Margarita Tupitsyn’s article on Russian performance. See the correspondence between the Tupitsyns and Monastyrski in Victor Tupitsyn and Margarita Tupitsyn, *Moskva–N’iu-Iork* (Moscow: WAM, 2006). The Dodge Archive at the Zimmerli Art Museum at Rutgers University contains typewritten action descriptions in folded booklets that likely predate the publication of the first volume of *Poezdki za gorod* and were probably mailed to Dodge or the Tupitsyns as a way to share information about the group’s activities.
Documentary Certificate.29 If Appearance was first envisioned as a new form of public reading, then the Documentary Certificate might be considered alongside recent moves in conceptual poetry. Its use of the wooden language of Soviet bureaucracy, for example, might associate it with the mid-1970s work of Lev Rubinstein and Dmitri Prigov, who introduced Soviet language as a ready-made element into simple poetic forms like serial index cards or texts affixed to tin cans.30 In his essay on Rubinstein’s index-card poems of the mid-1970s, Gerald Janecek suggests that they are “empty texts . . . devoid of concrete content.”31 In the process of being recited—an act that involved the author turning over the cards and reading them aloud one by one—such phrases as “nothing happens” become “events in themselves, illustrating the impossibility of talking about ‘nothing,’” and thus “provide models of the creative situation, the literary-reading situation, the role of the author,” and so on.32 A similar thing takes place with the Documentary Certificate. The evidentiary function purported by the text (“documentary certificate / that __________ / was a witness to / APPEARANCE, / which took place on March 13, 1976.”) directs viewers’ attention to their own participation in the action and competes with the experience of intensified looking that had been taking place up to that point. Before receiving the certificate, viewers positioned on the edge of an empty field found themselves engaged in an experience of spectatorship, wherein gazing at the appearance of two figures in the distance and their passage from far to near might have itself been taken as sufficient material to constitute an action. The certificate’s redirection of the viewers’ attention from pure spatiotemporal perception to the meta-level of linguistic and evidentiary representation (“so-and-so was a witness”) both challenges the primacy of action with respect to documentation and suggests a way in which the document, like Rubinstein’s “empty” text, might become an event in its own right.

29 The term device (priem) appears repeatedly in Collective Actions’ writings. It is likely that Collective Actions, a group of poets and artists familiar with the writings of the Russian formalists, borrowed the term from them.
32 Ibid., 114, 119. The quotation is from Rubinstein’s “Ocherednaia programma” (1975), reprinted in Domashnee muzitsirovanie (Moscow: NLO, 2000), 15–23.
The inclusion of artists Igor Makarevich and Elena Elagina as contributing members of Collective Actions with the action *Place of Action* (October 7, 1979) greatly expanded both the volume of documentation and its function within Collective Actions’ work. As Kiesewalter writes, *Place of Action* was in large part motivated by Makarevich’s ability to obtain photographic equipment (two additional Leica cameras) and materials, as well as his access to studio space.33 Makarevich describes his and Elagina’s participation in the group:

Lena and I became familiar with Collective Actions’ activities in 1979, and the first action in which we took part was *Place of Action*. I was wildly interested in everything that was taking place and, with all the energy of a neophyte, gave free rein to my photographer’s appetite. As a result, hundreds of photographs were produced, exceeding many times over the [group’s] existing norms of representing actions.34

The number of photographs created in the course of *Place of Action* did indeed exceed all of the group’s previous benchmarks, from several or several dozen to several hundred. But this excess of representation was not only a question of enthusiastic production. Many of the photographs created during *Place of Action* introduced a new function for documentary photography beyond the evidentiary. For the first time, photography itself, like the Documentary Certificate, participated in the realization of action as a constructive element of the action itself, competing with the viewers’ experience of pure spatiotemporal perception, and not as a parallel practice directed toward creating secondary materials for an absent reader.

*Place of Action* was the most structurally complex action that the group had put forward up to that point. In it, thirty people were invited to a large field and instructed, one by one, to move along an imaginary line along the field. They were asked to stop at each of fifteen numbered markers and turn to face the starting line, where an organizer with a camera would take a picture. Between the thirteenth and fourteenth stops, each viewer-participant encountered a curtain strung between two poles and, after moving behind the curtain, another viewer-participant lying in a ditch holding a second camera. The two

33 Kiesewalter, “Istoriiia,” 134.
34 Igor Makarevich, correspondence with the author, June 6, 2012.
Collective Actions, Place of Action, October 7, 1979. Documentary photographs. (Figure photographed at increasing intervals.) Images courtesy of Andrei Monastyrski. © Collective Actions.
traded places, and the person with the camera took a picture of the participant now lying in the ditch. Relinquishing the camera, the participant heretofore lying in the ditch now continued along the path to be photographed at the remaining two positions.\(^\text{35}\) At the conclusion of the action, viewers found themselves in a forested area at the far end of the field. There, a large signboard hanging on a tree illustrated the complex schema of the various camera and viewer positions during the action, and organizers waited with a tape recorder to capture the viewers’ impressions. As Makarevich recalls, the newly available technical means of documenting actions provided by his and Elagina’s positions

\(^{35}\) Makarevich’s enthusiastic account of his role as photographer might be seen to contradict the way photography actually functions in *Place of Action*. Two of the three cameras used in the action operated “mechanically,” one stationary, shooting the receding figures from the starting line; the other passed back and forth between viewer-participants at the curtain and capturing the arrival and departure of each person in the ditch. Only Makarevich with his roving camera was able to choose which shots to take of the overall scene and individual details. The coexistence of both photographic functions (the artist-photographer and the mechanical/automatic camera eye) suggests the group’s ability to sustain a number of different conceptions of artistic practice at this time. The use to which Makarevich’s “artistic” photographs were put in Monastyrski’s slide film complicates the picture further.
within the Soviet art bureaucracy were “handily put to use by Andrei [Monastyrski], and we acquired new ways of capturing the proceedings.”36 The resulting multimedia archive of *Place of Action* consisted of photographs taken by the two cameras directly involved in the action (in the field at the starting position and at the curtain), additional photographs of participants and organizers taken by a third camera, the audiotape recordings of responses in the forest, as well as a slide show and photographic display (what is referred in the action description as the “black-and-white exposition”) based on all of these materials presented at a separate gathering in Makarevich’s studio three weeks later.

It was around this time that the term *factographic* appeared in Collective Actions’ theoretical discourse. In his “Brief Commentary on the Actions of 1976–1979,” produced several months prior to *Place of Action*, Monastyrski lists what he considers to be the objects that function as “factographic documentation” in each of the actions up

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36 Makarevich, correspondence with the author, June 6, 2012.
to that point. Here he includes the Documentary Certificate from Appearance, a similar certificate attached to a piece of the rope pulled out in Time of Action, the colored paper constructions created and distributed in the course of Pictures, and a descriptive text that was to have been distributed in the unrealized action Twins. Distributed to viewers at the conclusion of actions, these items served as either souvenir-objects or evidence of actions having taken place (particularly the rope, which, like a contact relic, seems to promise direct access to the action through its materiality). However, the list does not end there; Monastyrski also includes “objects that have been left at the place of action,” such as the ringing bell in Lieblich, the banners hung in Slogan-1977 and Slogan-1978, the balloons sent down the river in The Sphere, and others. This second category of “factographic” objects, according to Monastyrski, “continued to act for some time after the participants’ contact with them during their creation.” Once again destabilizing the notion of action being located in direct audience experience (“public readings,” “festivities,” “stagings”), Monastyrski envisions a new location for action in the factographic object, as it might be encountered by an unnamed, anonymous viewer at an indeterminate time in the future.

In his response to Monastyrski, Nikita Alekseev proposed a more restrictive definition of factography, one in which the document or object plays a constructive role in the action’s realization (he includes the Documentary Certificate of Appearance and the colored paper constructions of Pictures in this conception). The passage of a document “from our hands into the viewers’ hands” did not, in Alekseev’s opinion, properly constitute the “semantics of factological documentation.” Rather, a factographic document becomes one by “directly

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38 Ibid. The others listed are the constructed painted-canvas tent in The Tent, the swinging violet lantern in The Lantern, and Nikita Alekseev’s rope-maze construction in his individual work The Spiral.
39 Ibid.
40 In Pictures, viewer-participants received 144 envelopes of various colors and sizes containing inscriptions referring to the conditions of the action (weather, time, place, etc.) and were then invited to lay out these envelopes in a line in the snow. As they inspected the inscriptions and reassembled the envelopes into twelve multicolored square constructions that were presented to twelve audience members to take home, three of the action’s organizers departed, unnoticed, from the field, completing the action.
participating in the construction of the text” and serving as one of its “integral parts”; otherwise, he contends, it remains “strictu senso documentation.”41 This definition categorically excludes objects left at the place of action after its conclusion, which Alekseev likens to “a painting created by an artist or a book written by an author.” Here Alekseev seems to offer a definition of actions as texts that unfold in the course of their realization by the participants and organizers in real time and space. Monastyrski’s attempt to expand the location of action from the viewers’ singular experience of this unfolding to the manifold possible sites and times of the factographic object and its potential encounters with anonymous viewers is here countered with a notion of action that can be neither separated from the viewers themselves nor contained in an artistic product, like a book or a painting. For Alekseev, action exists only in the process of being realized, and the factographic document or object acts as the instrument and later index of that realization.

In one sense, the significance of this disagreement should not be

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41 Nikita Alekseev, “Kommentarii k kratkomu kommentariiu A. Monastyrskogo” (July 11, 1979), in Poezdi z gorod, vol. 1, 162.
The first hand-bound volumes of *Poezdki za gorod* appeared in four copies in the fall of 1980 under the authorship of Alekseev, Kiesewalter, Monastyrski, and Panitkov. They contained documentary materials of collective and individual works from 1975 to 1980 as well as collectively and individually written interpretive texts.


The first hand-bound volumes of *Poezdki za gorod* appeared in four copies in the fall of 1980 under the authorship of Alekseev, Kiesewalter, Monastyrski, and Panitkov. They contained documentary materials of collective and individual works from 1975 to 1980 as well as collectively and individually written interpretive texts. Moreover, the question of the factographic document disappears from the texts after the summer of 1979, even while the amount and variety of documents produced in actions increased exponentially only months later (in *Place of Action*). Nevertheless, what is significant about this exchange is the way in which it frames questions about the nature of action through its relation to the document. Questions of temporality and materiality come to the fore, as Monastyrski suggests that the duration of an action may be extended and multiplied by means of the so-called factographic object, whose materiality acquires a symbolic significance (“the semantics of factographic documentation”) that is independent of the action’s structure (what Alekseev calls “the text”). Alekseev’s reticence to concede such significance to the materiality of documentation and his insistence on the primacy of the unfolding action’s structure point to a fundamentally different understanding of actions that would bear on the group’s practice in the coming years. In his own response to Alekseev, Monastyrski grants Alekseev’s point about materials left at the place of action, though this would not put the question to rest definitively.

**EMPTY ACTIONS AND EMPTY PHOTOGRAPHS**

The question of performance documentation in the Soviet context is haunted by the postrevolutionary history and theory of photography. The rapidly urbanizing and industrializing Soviet society of the 1920s saw an urgent need for new forms of collective production, address, and distribution. As Benjamin Buchloh has argued, this was a major impetus for left artists’ turn to “factographic” images, which he defines as “*iconic* representations for a new mass audience.” Artists and theorists of the left, especially those associated with the journal *Novyi*...
LEF, championed photography and film as the visual practices most suited to the postrevolutionary moment by virtue of their capacity for the precise inscription of fact and direct access to reality. This discourse of transparency and facticity associated with the photographic medium became, according to Leah Dickerman, the model for a mode of factographic writing championed by these left theorists (calling themselves faktoviki, or factists) in the late-1920s project of developing new forms of representation “grounded in the reality of contemporary Soviet life.”

Monastyrski has recently explained that his introduction of the term factography (faktografiia) into Collective Actions’ discourse was not consciously related to its use in the 1920s and 1930s. The project of building Soviet Communism was far from Monastyrski’s interests in the 1970s and 1980s. It is perhaps because of this association with the revolutionary avant-garde and with the postrevolutionary Soviet project that photography’s explicit consideration as a medium and as a documentary form did not initially figure in Collective Actions’ theoretical writings. When he finally addresses the group’s use of photography in his essay “Seven Photographs” (December 1980), Monastyrski sidesteps the language of photographic realism as it had been expounded by such theorists as Osip Brik, Aleksandr Rodchenko, and Dziga Vertov and turns his attention instead to the “entirely other aesthetic reality” that he sees as intrinsic to the different kinds of secondary documentary materials produced in the course of Collective Actions’ work. Here Monastyrski returns to some of the questions about the materiality and temporality of action raised the previous year in his exchange with Alekseev.

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47 In correspondence with the author (October 14, 2011), he writes, “I cannot say where the word factography came from, but I think that in a sense, I somehow ‘invented’ it (from the word ‘fact’), since I did not know the tradition of the 1920s–1930s. Or rather, I knew LEF and Novyi LEF and all of these names, but the theme of factography and this word . . . I did not know and was not interested in—these were, after all, Soviet problems, Communist problems, and I was absolutely uninterested in them.”
48 This issue is, of course, complicated by the different professional and artistic backgrounds of the group members. As was already seen in the case of Makarevich, these identities produced different attitudes toward photographic practice. A fuller examination of these positions and how they relate to the representational status of the photographic image within Collective Actions’ practice and discourse deserves a fuller examination than is possible here.
As was most clearly manifested in Appearance, actions staged in the field encapsulated a complex temporality of anticipation and retrospective sense making that raised simple spatiotemporal perception to the level of event by calling the viewers’ attention to their own looking. Factographic documents, as they were finally envisioned in the exchange of summer 1979, played a constructive role in this respect by directing viewer attention back in time precisely at the moment when it seemed that the action was just in the process of taking place (again, the Documentary Certificate is paradigmatic). Monastyrski describes this phenomenon in the preface to the first volume of Trips Out of Town:

We should say straightaway that the events of the action are undertaken in order to “distract the eye.”... [I]t is possible to “deceive” perception, ... but then to let the audience understand that “while everyone was looking in one direction, the main event was taking place in a completely different place”—in this case in the consciousness of the viewers themselves.50

What is implicit in this complex temporal structure is the separation of the position of “viewer-participant” engaged in the experience of action from the position of the “outside observer,” capable of making sense of that experience only after the fact. In essence, each action functions to prolong the period of anticipation and direct engagement in spatiotemporal perception and put off the formation of the position of the “outside observer,” who can only reflect on this experience in a mediated way.51 The term that Collective Actions use to describe this structure is empty action, which is thus called because “everything that the viewer sees at this time (the figures of participants’ movements, their clothing, the supplementary objects, etc.) is ‘empty’ of content, and is but a means by which consciousness is drawn into the event’s construction.”52

50 Andrei Monastyrski, “Predislovie” (June 1980), in Poezdki za gorod, vol. 1, 14. This preface was originally unsigned in the 1980 version of Poezdki za gorod, though it appears signed by Monastyrski in subsequent printings.
51 As Monastyrski explains in the preface, viewers make judgments of interpretation at every point in the action, but these judgments turn out to be false, as the primary experience (opyt) of action is located elsewhere, in consciousness (11).
In “Seven Photographs,” Monastyrski clarifies the relationship of photographic documentation to action and to the concept of empty action. Performing a semiotic analysis heavily tinged with the language of Heideggerian philosophy, Monastyrski posits the primary experience of actions as an “existential essence” (ekzistentsiial’naia sushchnost’ sobytiia) that is realized through the reception of some “real experience” (real’nyi opyt) that takes place in the field.\(^5\) The empty action, he continues, is what accompanies the existential essence on the level of “demonstrational relations”—that is, expressed externally in the action structure (the invitation, the journey to the field, the figures moving in the distance, etc.) and serving as a sign that points to the existential essence. The nature of the existential essence, and therefore the aim of the action itself, in Monastyrski’s formulation in this essay, is “to create [a] ‘non-arbitrary emptiness,’ to return the ‘non-arbitrariness’ of emptiness to the always arbitrarily empty space” of the field.\(^5\) Quoting from Heidegger’s 1929 lecture “What Is Metaphysics?,” Monastyrski likens this condition to the disclosure of the “whole of beings in their heretofore concealed strangeness” and the revelation of Dasein that takes place in nihilation.\(^5\) Without dwelling unnecessarily on the Heideggerian concept of nihilation, we may simply note that empty action functions in such a way that when it is revealed as such (when the Documentary Certificate is distributed, for example), the emptiness it contains, like Rubinstein’s empty text, becomes “nonarbitrary,” and in this way points to the existential essence of action, which Monastyrski sets beside such profound events as the momentary disclosure of Dasein.

Thus the relation of empty action to the existential essence is indexical: empty action is both the visible sign and the actual mechanism by which an action’s existential essence is experienced by the viewer. The fragment of time-space snatched out of everyday experi-

\(^5\) Monastyrski, “Sem’ fotografii,” 113. The connection between Collective Actions’ theories of action and Heideggerian philosophy is another subject of much interest that cannot be adequately addressed in the present essay, except to say that Heideggerian terms such as *unveiling*, *appearance*, *being-in-the-world*, *Stimmung*, *the nothing*, and many others form a critical reference for some of Collective Actions’ efforts to theorize their practice in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

\(^5\) Ibid., 114.

ence and framed by the action becomes “nonarbitrary” and is experienced as an event.56 Photography poses a potentially destabilizing challenge to this circuit, since photography’s indexical operation (the precise inscription of facts, what Rosalind Krauss calls, after Barthes, the “message without a code”)57 aspires to capture action and fix it in the static moment of the document. But as the empty action reminds us, an action’s existential essence, which takes place in consciousness, is inherently unrepresentable. Monastyrski addresses this problem from two directions, jettisoning most documentary photographs to a secondary position while raising certain kinds of photographs to the level of action. As in the distinction between the evidentiary document and the factographic object that prolongs action, Monastyrski posits that all documentary photographs fall into two categories: simple documents that capture the details of the visible world in which the action takes place and “empty photographs” that are taken at the moment of an essentially unrepresentable act when the viewer’s consciousness is engaged in action. Most photographs, according to this scheme, serve as secondary documents of all that is not the action, whereas empty photographs, by their very emptiness—their very lack of representation—allow the viewer to experience something like action.58 In this way, Monastyrski gives expression to a radically different vision of performance documentation that is no longer caught up in photography’s capacity for the precise and objective recording of fact. Rather, the category of empty photographs within the corpus of performance documents is metaphorical. Like Rubinstein’s empty text, the Documentary Certificate, or an action in the field, the empty photograph, in its non-representational emptiness, relinquishes its claims to indexicality and, doing so, becomes an event in itself.

56 Recall Rosalind Krauss’s discussion of the shifter as “a sign which is inherently ‘empty,’” its signification a function of only this one instance, guaranteed by the existential presence of just this object. It is the meaningless meaning that is instituted through the terms of the index.” See Rosalind Krauss, “Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America,” October 3 (Spring 1977): 78.
58 Monastyrski, “Sem’ fotografii,” 115. Monastyrski illustrates his argument with seven photographs of empty or nearly empty fields taken at the very moment of the viewers’ experience of “nonarbitrary emptiness,” as when they suddenly hear the ringing bell in Lieblich or when the two figures in Appearance have just appeared in the distance and may or may not yet be understood as part of the action.
CONCLUSION: ACTION, DOCUMENT, INSTITUTION

The theoretical formulation of another aesthetic reality outside the experience of spatiotemporal action structure in Monastyrski’s “Seven Photographs” recalls Alekseev and Monastyrski’s exchange regarding factographic documents of the previous summer. While “Seven Photographs” does not name the factographic document or factographic object, its affirmation of the independent aesthetic reality of the empty photograph *in its own right*, rather than as a secondary representation of a primary action, strays even further from Alekseev’s strict definition of action as the spatiotemporal structure unfolding before an audience. In a way, it also responds to Alekseev’s concerns about the growing excess of secondary documentation that he felt had begun to overshadow the actual experience of actions. This glut of documents, Alekseev felt, had begun to bog the actions down in endless discussions and secondary interpretations, creating an oppressive, hermetic atmosphere within the group. Monastyrski’s invention of the empty photograph may be seen as an attempt to rescue the group from drowning in documents through an expanded notion of action that might achieve the same existential function as the actions in the field (“the reception of some real experience,” akin to the disclosure of Dasein) without appealing to the indexical status of the document. In the years that followed, Monastyrski and Collective Actions, minus Alekseev, would go much further in this direction, exploring the aesthetic realms of multimedia archives assembled out of action photographs and videos, tape recordings of audience impressions, and audio tracks taken from radio broadcasts, in a series of outdoor and indoor actions based on what Monastyrski now called “factographic discourse.”

Meanwhile, Alekseev sought to inject the art world with the “dynamism, sharpness, and relevance” that he felt had been missing from Collective Actions since the early actions in the field. In the fall of 1982, he opened his apartment to the colorful, carnivalesque, all-over installations of fellow artists in a new venture called the AptArt Gallery that expressed his vision of an art world dramatically different from the kind of hermetic journeys instigated and eventually institutionalized


60 See Monastyrski, “Predislovie” (May 1983), in *Poezdki za gorod*, vols. 2–3, 8–16.
by Collective Actions. These journeys had served, for a period of about five years, as a site where certain concepts central to Moscow conceptualism were articulated through the performative aesthetics of spatio-temporal actions carried out in the field. As the production of documentation shifted from the purely practical to an aesthetic function, new artistic concepts and possibilities emerged, further expanding the scope of Moscow conceptualist concerns. In the process, this shift away from ephemeral, spatiotemporal actions toward an aesthetic of documentation and factographic discourse engendered a form of group institutionalization that struck some as excessively theoretical and virtually impenetrable. In exploring the aesthetic possibilities of performance through the concepts of action, documentation, and factography, Collective Actions located some of the deep fault lines hidden below the surface of Moscow conceptualism at the cusp of the 1980s.


62 See, for example, the dictionary of theoretical terms developed within the circle and compiled by Monastyrski, Slovar’ terminov moskovskoi kontseptual’nyi shkoly (Moscow: Ad Marginem, 1999), translated by Octavian Eșanu, accessed August 16, 2012, http://www.conceptualism-moscow.org/page?id=198&lang=en.