DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT

As for the more detailed division of our third Part, after these general indications of stylistic differences common to all the arts, it is especially the one-sided Understanding that has hunted around everywhere for the most varied kinds of bases for classifying the individual arts and sorts of art. But the genuine division can only be derived from the nature of the work of art; in the whole of the genres of art the nature of art unfolds the whole of the aspects and factors inherent in its own essence. In this connection the first thing that presents itself as important is the consideration that, since artistic productions now acquire the vocation of issuing into sensuous reality, art too is now there for apprehension by the senses, so that, in consequence, the specific characterization of the senses and of their corresponding material in which the work of art is objectified must provide the grounds for the division of the individual arts. Now the senses, because they are senses, i.e. related to the material world, to things outside one another and inherently diverse, are themselves different; touch, smell, taste, hearing, and sight. To prove the inner necessity of this ensemble and its articulation is not our business here: it is a matter for the philosophy of nature where I have discussed it [in §§ 358 ff.]. Our problem is restricted to examining whether all these senses—or if not all, then which of them—are capable by their nature of being organs for the apprehension of works of art. In this matter we have already [in Vol. I, Introduction, pp. 38–9] excluded touch, taste, and smell. Böttiger's1 fondling of the voluptuous parts of marble statues of female goddesses has nothing to do with the contemplation or enjoyment of art. For by the sense of touch the individual subject, as a sensuous individual, is simply related to what is sensuously individual and its weight, hardness, softness, and material resistance. The work of art, however, is not purely sensuous, but the spirit appearing in the sensuous. Neither can a work of art be tasted as such, because taste does not leave its object free and independent but deals with it in a really practical way, dissolves and consumes it. A cultivation and refinement of

1 K. A. Böttiger, 1760–1835: amongst his voluminous writings I have been unable to identify this quotation. Hegel met him and attended a lecture of his in Dresden in 1824.
taste is only possible and requisite in respect of foods and their
preparation or of the chemical qualities of objects. But the objet
d'art should be contemplated in its independent objectivity on its
own account; true, it is there for our apprehension but only in a
theoretical and intellectual way, not in a practical one, and it has
no relation to desire or the will. As for smell, it cannot be an organ
of artistic enjoyment either, because things are only available to
smell in so far as they are in process and [their aroma is] dissipated
through the air and its practical influence.

Sight, on the other hand, has a purely theoretical relation to
objects by means of light, this as it were non-material matter. This
for its part lets objects persist freely and independently; it makes
them shine and appear but, unlike air and fire, it does not consume
them in practice whether unnoticeably or openly. To vision, void
of desire, everything is presented which exists materially in space
as something outside everything else, but which, because it
remains undisturbed in its integrity, is manifest only in its shape
and colour.

The other theoretical sense is hearing. Here the opposite comes
into view. Instead of with shape, colour, etc., hearing has to do
with sound, with the vibration of a body; here there is no process
of dissolution, like that required by smell; there is merely a
trembling of the object which is left uninjured thereby. This ideal
movement in which simple subjectivity, as it were the soul of the
body, is expressed by its sound, is apprehended by the ear just as
theoretically as the eye apprehends colour or shape: and in this way
the inner side of objects is made apprehensible by the inner life
[of mind].

To these two senses there is added, as a third element, ideas,
sense-perceptions, the memory and preservation of images, which
enter consciousness singly by a separate act of perception, and,
now subsumed under universals, are put by imagination into
relation and unity with these. The result is that now on the one
hand external reality itself exists as inward and spiritual, while on
the other hand the spiritual assumes in our ideas the form of the
external and comes into consciousness as a series of things outside
and alongside one another.

This threefold mode of apprehension provides for art the
familiar division into (i) the visual arts which work out their
content for our sight into an objective external shape and colour,
(ii) the art of sound, i.e. music, and (iii) poetry which, as the art of speech, uses sound purely as a sign in order by its means to address our inner being, namely the contemplation, feelings, and ideas belonging to our spiritual life. Yet if we propose to go no further than this sensuous side of art as the final basis of division, we at once run into a perplexity in relation to principles in detail, since instead of being drawn from the concrete concept of the thing at issue the bases of division are drawn only from the thing's most abstract aspects. Therefore we must look around again for the mode of division which has deeper grounds, and which has already been indicated in the Introduction [pp. 82-3] as the true and systematic articulation of this Third Part. Art has no other mission but to bring before sensuous contemplation the truth as it is in the spirit, reconciled in its totality with objectivity and the sphere of sense. Now since this is to come about at this stage in the medium of the external reality of artistic productions, the totality which is the Absolute in its truth falls apart here into its different moments.

In the middle here, the really solid centre, is the presentation of the Absolute, of God himself as God in his independence, not yet developed to movement and difference, not yet proceeding to action and self-particularization, but self-enclosed in grand divine peace and tranquillity: the Ideal shaped in a way adequate to itself, remaining in its existence identical and correspondent with itself. In order to be able to appear in this infinite independence, the Absolute must be grasped as spirit, as subject, but as subject having in itself at the same time its adequate external appearance.

But as divine subject [or person], entering upon actual reality, it has confronting it an external surrounding world which must be built up, adequately to the Absolute, into an appearance harmonizing with the Absolute and penetrated by it. This surrounding world is in one aspect objectivity as such, the basis and enclosure of external nature which in itself has no spiritual absolute meaning, no subjective inner life, and therefore while it is to appear, transformed into beauty, as an enclosure for the spirit, it can express the spirit only allusively.

Contrasted with external nature there stands the subjective inner life, the human mind as the medium for the existence and appearance of the Absolute. With this subjective life there enters at once the multiplicity and variety of individuality, particularization,
difference, action, and development, in short the entire and var-
egated world of the reality of the spirit in which the Absolute is
known, willed, felt, and activated.

It is clear already from this hint that the differences, into which
the total content of art is broken up, correspond essentially, in
respect of artistic apprehension and portrayal, with what we con-
sidered in Part Two under the name of the symbolic, classical, and
romantic forms of art. For symbolic art does not reach the identity
of content and form but only a relationship of the two and a mere
indication of the inner meaning in an appearance external alike to
that indication and the content which it is supposed to express.
Thus it provides the fundamental type of the art which has the
task of working on the objective as such, on the natural surround-
ings, and making them a beautiful artistic enclosure for spirit, and
of picturing the inner meaning of spirit in an allusive way in this
external sphere. The classical Ideal, on the other hand, corre-
sponds to the portrayal of the Absolute as such, in its independ-
dently self-reposing external reality, while romantic art has for
both its content and form the subjectivity of emotion and feeling
in its infinity and its finite particularity.

On this basis of division the system of the individual arts is
articulated in the following way.

First, architecture confronts us as the beginning of art, a
beginning grounded in the essential nature of art itself. It is the
beginning of art because, in general terms, at its start art has not
found for the presentation of its spiritual content either the ade-
quate material or the corresponding forms. Therefore it has to be
content with merely *seeking* a true harmony between content and
mode of presentation and with an external relation between the
two. The material for this first art is the inherently non-spiritual,
i.e. heavy matter, shapeable only according to the laws of gravity;
its form is provided by productions of external nature bound
together regularly and symmetrically to be a purely external
reflection of spirit and\(^1\) to be the totality of a work of art.

The second art is sculpture. For its principle and content it has
spiritual individuality as the classical ideal so that the inner and
spiritual element finds its expression in the bodily appearance
immanent in the spirit; this appearance art has here to present in
an actually existent work of art. On this account, for its material it

\(^1\) With Hotho's first edition I retain *und*. 
III. INTRODUCTION

likewise still lays hold of heavy matter in its spatial entirety, yet without regard to its weight and natural conditions and without shaping it regularly in accordance with inorganic or organic forms; nor in respect of its visibility does it degrade it to being a mere show of an external appearance or particularize it within in an essential way. But the form, determined by the content itself, is here the real life of the spirit, the human form and its objective organism, pervaded by spirit, which has to shape into an adequate appearance the independence of the Divine in its lofty peace and tranquil greatness, untouched by the disunion and restriction of action, conflicts, and sufferings.

Thirdly we must group together into a final ensemble the arts whose mission it is to give shape to the inner side of personal life.

This final series begins with painting, which converts the external shape entirely into an expression of the inner life. Within the surrounding world, painting\(^1\) does not only [as sculpture does] present the ideal self-sufficiency of the Absolute but now brings the Absolute before our vision as also inherently subjective in its spiritual existence, willing, feeling, and acting, in its operation and relation to what is other than itself, and therefore too in suffering, grief, and death, in the whole range of passions and satisfactions. Its object, therefore, is no longer God as God, as the object of human consciousness, but this consciousness\(^2\) itself: God either in his actual life of subjectively living action and suffering, or as the spirit of the community, spirit with a sense of itself, mind in its privation, its sacrifice, or its blessedness and joy in life and activity in the midst of the existing world. As means for presenting this content painting must avail itself in general, so far as shape goes, of what appears externally, i.e. both of nature as such and of the human organism because that permits the spiritual to shine clearly through itself. For material, however, it cannot use heavy matter and its existence in the three dimensions of space, but instead must do with this material what it does with shapes [in nature], namely inwardize or spiritualize it. The first step whereby the sensuous is raised in this respect to approach the spirit consists (a) in cancelling the real sensuous appearance \([Erscheinung]\), the

\(^1\) In Hegel’s text the subject of this sentence is not ‘painting’ but ‘the inner life’. However, that Hegel means ‘painting’ seems clear from the fact that the first word in his following sentence is Ihr.

\(^2\) Bewusstsein (the genitive) in Hotho’s second edition must be a misprint.
visibility of which is transformed into the pure shining [Schein] of art, and (b) in colour, by the differences, shades, and blendings of which this transformation is effected. Therefore, for the expression of the inner soul painting draws together the trinity of spatial dimensions into a surface as the first inwardizing of the external, and presents spatial intervals and shapes by means of the sheen of colour. For painting is not concerned with making visible as such but with the visibility which is both self-particularizing and also inwardized. In sculpture and architecture the shapes are made visible by light from without. But, in painting, the material, in itself dark, has its own inner and ideal element, namely light. The material is lit up in itself and precisely on this account itself darkens the light. But the unity and mutual formation of light and darkness is colour.

Now secondly the opposite of painting in one and the same sphere is music. Its own proper element is the inner life as such, explicitly shapeless feeling which cannot manifest itself in the outer world and its reality but only through an external medium which quickly vanishes and is cancelled at the very moment of expression. Therefore music's content is constituted by spiritual subjectivity in its immediate subjective inherent unity, the human heart, feeling as such; its material is sound, while its configuration is counterpoint, the harmony, division, linkage, opposition, discord, and modulation of notes in accordance with their quantitative differences from one another and their artistically treated tempo.

Finally, the third art after painting and music is the art of speech, poetry in general, the absolute and true art of the spirit and its expression as spirit, since everything that consciousness conceives and shapes spiritually within its own inner being speech alone can adopt, express, and bring before our imagination. For this reason poetry in its content is the richest and most unrestricted of the arts. Yet what it wins in this way on the spiritual side it all the same loses again on the sensuous. That is to say, it works neither for contemplation by the senses, as the visual arts do, nor for purely ideal feeling, as music does, but on the contrary tries to present to spiritual imagination and contemplation the spiritual meanings which it has shaped within its own soul. For this reason the material through which it manifests itself retains for it only the value of a means (even if an artistically treated means) for the

1 Another allusion to Goethe's theory of colour.
expression of spirit to spirit, and it has not the value of being a
sensuous existent in which the spiritual content can find a corre-
sponding reality. Amongst the means hitherto considered, the
means here can only be sound as the sensuous material still rela-
tively the most adequate to spirit. Yet sound does not preserve
here, as it does in music, a value on its own account; if it did, then
the one essential aim of art could be exhausted in its manipulation.
On the contrary, sound in poetry is entirely filled with the spiritual
world and the specific objects of ideas and contemplation, and it
appears as the mere external designation of this content. As for
poetry's mode of configuration, poetry in this matter appears as
the total art because, what is only relatively the case in painting and
music, it repeats in its own field the modes of presentation charac-
teristic of the other arts.

What this means is that (i) as epic poetry, poetry gives to its
content the form of objectivity though here this form does not
attain an external existence, as it does in the visual arts; but still,
objectivity here is a world apprehended under the form of some-	hing objective by imagination and objectively presented to inner
imagination. This constitutes speech proper as speech, which is
satisfied in its own content and the expression of that content in
speech.

(ii) Yet conversely poetry is, all the same, subjective speech, the
inner life manifesting itself as inner, i.e. lyric which summons
music to its aid in order to penetrate more deeply into feeling and
the heart.

(iii) Finally, poetry also proceeds to speech within a compact
action which, when manifested objectively, then gives external
shape to the inner side of this objective actual occurrence and so
can be closely united with music and gestures, mimicry, dances,
etc. This is dramatic art in which the whole man presents, by
reproducing it, the work of art produced by man.

These five arts make up the inherently determinate and articulated
system of what art actually is in both essence and reality. It is
ture that outside them there are other imperfect arts, such as
gardening, dancing, etc., which however we can only mention in
passing. For a philosophical treatment has to keep to differences
determined by the essence of art and to develop and comprehend
the true configurations appropriate to them. Nature, and the real
world in general, does not abide by these fixed delimitations but has a wider freedom to deviate from them; and in this connection we often enough hear praise given to productions of genius precisely because they have to rise above such clear distinctions. But in nature the hybrids, amphibia, transitional stages, announce not the excellence and freedom of nature but only its impotence; it cannot hold fast to the essential differences grounded in the thing itself and they are blurred by external conditions and influences. Now the same is true of art with its intermediate kinds, although these may provide much that is enjoyable, graceful, and meritorious, even if not really perfect.

If, after these introductory remarks and summaries, we propose to proceed to a more detailed consideration of the individual arts, we are at once met in another way by a perplexity. This is because, after concerning ourselves up to this point with art as such, with the ideal and the general forms into which it was developed in accordance with its essential nature, we now have to approach the concrete existence of art, and this means treading on the ground of the empirical. Here it is much the same as it is in nature: its general departments are comprehensible in their necessity, but in what actually exists for our senses single productions and their species (both in their existent shape and in the aspects they offer for our consideration) have such a wealth of variety that (a) the most varied ways of treating them are possible and (b) if we want to apply the criterion of the simple differences entailed by the philosophical Concept of nature, this Concept cannot cover the ground, and thinking in terms of that Concept seems unable to get its breath amid all this fullness of detail. Yet if we content ourselves with mere description and reflections that only skim the surface, this again does not accord with our aim of developing the subject philosophically and systematically.

Then moreover there is added to all this the difficulty that each individual art now demands for itself a philosophical treatment of its own, because with the steadily growing taste for it the range of connoisseurship has become ever richer and more extended. The fondness that dilettanti have for connoisseurship has become an fashion under the influence of philosophy,¹ in our day, ever since the time when it was proposed to hold that in art the real religion,

¹ This may be an allusion to the closing passages of Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism, or to his lectures on the Philosophy of Art.
the truth, and the Absolute was to be found and that art towered above philosophy because it was not abstract but contained the Idea in the real world as well and presented it there to concrete contemplation and feeling. On the other hand it is a mark of superiority in art nowadays to equip oneself with a superfluity of the most minute details and everyone is expected to have noticed something new. Occupation with such connoisseurship is a sort of learned idleness which does not need to be all that hard. For it is in a way very agreeable to look at works of art, to adopt the thoughts and reflections which may occur in consequence, to make easily one's own the views that others have had about them, and so to become and to be a judge and connoisseur of art. Now the richer are the facts and reflections produced by the fact that everyone thinks he has discovered something original of his very own, the more now does every art—indeed every branch of it—demand a complete treatment of its own. Next, moreover, alongside this, history enters of necessity. In connection with the consideration and assessment of works of art it carries matters further and in a more scholarly way. Finally, in order to discuss the details of a branch of art a man must have seen a great deal, a very great deal, and seen it again. I have seen a considerable amount, but not all that would be necessary for treating this subject in full detail.

All these difficulties I will meet with the simple explanation that it does not fall within my aim at all to teach connoisseurship or to produce historical pedantries. On the contrary my aim is simply to explore philosophically the essential general views of the things at issue and their relation to the Idea of beauty in its realization in the sensuous field of art. In pursuit of our aim we should not be embarrassed by the multifariousness of artistic productions which has been indicated above. After all, despite this variety the guiding thread is the essence of the thing itself, the essence implied by the Concept. And even if, owing to the element of its realization, this is frequently lost in accident and chance, there are still points at which it emerges clearly all the same, and to grasp these and develop their philosophical implications is the task which philosophy has to fulfil.
AESTHETICS

LECTURES ON FINE ART

BY

G. W. F. HEGEL

Translated by T. M. Knox

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TRANSLATOR'S FOREWORD TO VOLUME TWO

In this volume Hegel is surveying five different arts from his philosophical point of view and supporting his argument by numerous examples. Therefore it may be helpful to recall what his attitude is to his own 'speculative' thinking and the empiricism adopted by the scientific intellect (or the Understanding). Nature, history, art, religion, and even philosophy may all be studied as it were on the surface. Scientists and historians may discern or try to discern laws in all these fields, but their first task is to accumulate a vast array of facts. This is something that must be done, but it would all add up to a tale told by an idiot if it were not possible to penetrate below the surface of fact, and even law, and discern the truth or the Reason lying at the heart. Hegel believes that this is the task of philosophy, but it must be given the facts first; it cannot work a priori. Consequently, although this volume provides facts in plenty, it really contains a philosophy rather than a history of art. See the closing paragraphs of the Division of the Subject which follows the Introduction here.

The lectures in this volume do depend here and there on the work of art historians and critics, but the bulk of them rest on Hegel's own direct acquaintance with works of art. In a few footnotes I have referred to his personal knowledge of buildings, pictures, and operas. His letters to his wife when he travelled to the Low Countries, Austria, and Paris testify to his devotion to works of visual art and his eagerness to see them; he looked at them with a fresh eye. Also he listened to opera with delight, and he read poetry with care and insight.

Not all of his judgements, still less his speculative reasoning, will command general assent. Novels seem to have little interest for him—Scott he regarded as a recorder of trivialities instead of great events, and the praise he lavishes on Hippel has amazed German critics. Moreover he seems to me to have had little understanding of what he calls 'independent' music. Nevertheless, a reader who is interested in art must find fascinating this survey of five arts, and he may even envy its comprehensiveness.
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