The GREEKS and the IRRATIONAL

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PREFACE

This book is based on a course of lectures which I had the honour of giving at Berkeley in the autumn of 1949. They are reproduced here substantially as they were composed, though in a form slightly fuller than that in which they were delivered. Their original audience included many anthropologists and other scholars who had no specialist knowledge of ancient Greece, and it is my hope that in their present shape they may interest a similar audience of readers. I have therefore translated virtually all Greek quotations occurring in the text, and have transliterated the more important of those Greek terms which have no true English equivalent. I have also abstained as far as possible from encumbering the text with controversial arguments on points of detail, which could mean little to readers unfamiliar with the views controverted, and from complicating my main theme by pursuing the numerous side-issues which tempt the professional scholar. A selection of such matter will be found in the notes, in which I have tried to indicate briefly, where possible by reference to ancient sources or modern discussions, and where necessary by argument, the grounds for the opinions advanced in the text.

To the nonclassical reader I should like to offer a warning against treating the book as if it were a history of Greek religion, or even of Greek religious ideas or feelings. If he does, he will be gravely misled. It is a study of the successive interpretations which Greek minds placed on one particular type of human experience—a sort of experience in which nineteenth-century rationalism took little interest, but whose cultural significance is now widely recognised. The evidence which is here brought together
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illustrates an important, and relatively unfamiliar, aspect of the mental world of ancient Greece. But an aspect must not be mistaken for the whole.

To my fellow-professionals I perhaps owe some defence of the use which I have made in several places of recent anthropological and psychological observations and theories. In a world of specialists, such borrowings from unfamiliar disciplines are, I know, generally received by the learned with apprehension and often with active distaste. I expect to be reminded, in the first place, that “the Greeks were not savages,” and secondly, that in these relatively new studies the accepted truths of to-day are apt to become the discarded errors of to-morrow. Both statements are correct. But in reply to the first it is perhaps sufficient to quote the opinion of Lévy-Bruhl, that “dans tout esprit humain, quel qu’en soit le développement intellectuel, subsiste un fond indéracinable de mentalité primitive”; or, if nonclassical anthropologists are suspect, the opinion of Nilsson, that “primitive mentality is a fairly good description of the mental behaviour of most people to-day except in their technical or consciously intellectual activities.” Why should we attribute to the ancient Greeks an immunity from “primitive” modes of thought which we do not find in any society open to our direct observation?

As to the second point, many of the theories to which I have referred are admittedly provisional and uncertain. But if we are trying to reach some understanding of Greek minds, and are not content with describing external behaviour or drawing up a list of recorded “beliefs,” we must work by what light we can get, and an uncertain light is better than none. Tylor’s animism, Mannhardt’s vegetation-magic, Frazer’s year-spirits, Codrington’s mana, have all in their day helped to illuminate dark places in the ancient record. They have also encouraged many rash guesses. But time and the critics can be trusted
to deal with the guesses; the illumination remains. I see here good reason to be cautious in applying to the Greeks generalisations based on non-Greek evidence, but none for the withdrawal of Greek scholarship into a self-imposed isolation. Still less are classical scholars justified in continuing to operate—as many of them do—with obsolete anthropological concepts, ignoring the new directions which these studies have taken in the last thirty years, such as the promising recent alliance between social anthropology and social psychology. If the truth is beyond our grasp, the errors of to-morrow are still to be preferred to the errors of yesterday; for error in the sciences is only another name for the progressive approximation to truth.

It remains to express my gratitude to those who have helped in the production of this book: in the first place to the University of California, for causing me to write it; then to Ludwig Edelstein, W. K. C. Guthrie, I. M. Linforth, and A. D. Nock, all of whom read the whole or a part in typescript and made valuable suggestions; and finally to Harold A. Small, W. H. Alexander, and others at the University of California Press, who took great and uncomplaining trouble in preparing the text for the printer. I must also thank Professor Nock and the Council of the Roman Society for permission to reprint as appendices two articles which appeared respectively in the *Harvard Theological Review* and the *Journal of Roman Studies*; and the Council of the Hellenic Society for permission to reproduce some pages from an article published in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*.

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I

Agamemnon's Apology

The recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder strata of character, are the only places in the world in which we catch real fact in the making.

William James

Some years ago I was in the British Museum looking at the Parthenon sculptures when a young man came up to me and said with a worried air, "I know it's an awful thing to confess, but this Greek stuff doesn't move me one bit." I said that was very interesting: could he define at all the reasons for his lack of response? He reflected for a minute or two. Then he said, "Well, it's all so terribly rational, if you know what I mean." I thought I did know. The young man was only saying what has been said more articulately by Roger Fry and others. To a generation whose sensibilities have been trained on African and Aztec art, and on the work of such men as Modigliani and Henry Moore, the art of the Greeks, and Greek culture in general, is apt to appear lacking in the awareness of mystery and in the ability to penetrate to the deeper, less conscious levels of human experience.

This fragment of conversation stuck in my head and set me thinking. Were the Greeks in fact quite so blind to the importance of nonrational factors in man's experience and behaviour as is commonly assumed both by their apologists and by their critics? That is the question out of which this book grew. To answer it completely would evidently involve a survey of the whole cultural achievement of ancient Greece. But what I propose attempting is something much more modest: I shall

\footnote{For notes to chapter i see pages 18-27.}
merely try to throw some light on the problem by examining afresh certain relevant aspects of Greek religious experience. I hope that the result may have a certain interest not only for Greek scholars but for some anthropologists and social psychologists, indeed for anyone who is concerned to understand the springs of human behaviour. I shall therefore try as far as possible to present the evidence in terms intelligible to the non-specialist.

I shall begin by considering a particular aspect of Homeric religion. To some classical scholars the Homeric poems will seem a bad place to look for any sort of religious experience. "The truth is," says Professor Mazon in a recent book, "that there was never a poem less religious than the Iliad." This may be thought a little sweeping; but it reflects an opinion which seems to be widely accepted. Professor Murray thinks that the so-called Homeric religion "was not really religion at all"; for in his view "the real worship of Greece before the fourth century almost never attached itself to those luminous Olympian forms." Similarly Dr. Bowra observes that "this complete anthropomorphic system has of course no relation to real religion or to morality. These gods are a delightful, gay invention of poets."

Of course—if the expression "real religion" means the kind of thing that enlightened Europeans or Americans of to-day recognise as being religion. But if we restrict the meaning of the word in this way, are we not in danger of undervaluing, or even of overlooking altogether, certain types of experience which we no longer interpret in a religious sense, but which may nevertheless in their time have been quite heavily charged with religious significance? My purpose in the present chapter is not to quarrel with the distinguished scholars I have quoted over their use of terms, but to call attention to one kind of experience in Homer which is prima facie religious and to examine its psychology.

Let us start from that experience of divine temptation or infatuation (ate) which led Agamemnon to compensate himself
for the loss of his own mistress by robbing Achilles of his. "Not I," he declared afterwards, "not I was the cause of this act, but Zeus and my portion and the Erinys who walks in darkness: they it was who in the assembly put wild *ate* in my understanding, on that day when I arbitrarily took Achilles' prize from him. So what could I do? Deity will always have its way."

By impatient modern readers these words of Agamemnon's have sometimes been dismissed as a weak excuse or evasion of responsibility. But not, I think, by those who read carefully. An evasion of responsibility in the juridical sense the words certainly are not; for at the end of his speech Agamemnon offers compensation precisely on this ground—"But since I was blinded by *ate* and Zeus took away my understanding, I am willing to make my peace and give abundant compensation." Had he acted of his own volition, he could not so easily admit himself in the wrong; as it is, he will pay for his acts. Juridically, his position would be the same in either case; for early Greek justice cared nothing for intent—it was the act that mattered. Nor is he dishonestly inventing a moral alibi; for the victim of his action takes the same view of it as he does. "Father Zeus, great indeed are the *atalai* thou givest to men. Else the son of Atreus would never have persisted in rousing the *thūmos* in my chest, nor obstinately taken the girl against my will." You may think that Achilles is here politely accepting a fiction, in order to save the High King's face? But no: for already in Book 1, when Achilles is explaining the situation to Thetis, he speaks of Agamemnon's behaviour as his *ate*; and in Book 9 he exclaims, "Let the son of Atreus go to his doom and not disturb me, for Zeus the counsellor took away his understanding." It is Achilles' view of the matter as much as Agamemnon's; and in the famous words which introduce the story of the Wrath—"The plan of Zeus was fulfilled"—we have a strong hint that it is also the poet's view.

If this were the only incident which Homer's characters interpreted in this peculiar way, we might hesitate as to the poet's motive: we might guess, for example, that he wished
to avoid alienating the hearers' sympathy too completely from Agamemnon, or again that he was trying to impart a deeper significance to the rather undignified quarrel of the two chiefs by representing it as a step in the fulfilment of a divine plan. But these explanations do not apply to other passages where "the gods" or "some god" or Zeus are said to have momentarily "taken away" or "destroyed" or "ensorcelled" a human being's understanding. Either of them might indeed be applied to the case of Helen, who ends a deeply moving and evidently sincere speech by saying that Zeus has laid on her and Alexandros an evil doom, "that we may be hereafter a theme of song for men to come." But when we are simply told that Zeus "ensorcelled the mind of the Achaeans," so that they fought badly, no consideration of persons comes into play; still less in the general statement that "the gods can make the most sensible man senseless and bring the feeble-minded to good sense." And what, for example, of Glaucus, whose understanding Zeus took away, so that he did what Greeks almost never do—accepted a bad bargain, by swopping gold armour for bronze? Or what of Automedon, whose folly in attempting to double the parts of charioteer and spearman led a friend to ask him "which of the gods had put an unprofitable plan in his breast and taken away his excellent understanding?" These two cases clearly have no connection with any deeper divine purpose; nor can there be any question of retaining the hearers' sympathy, since no moral slur is involved.

At this point, however, the reader may naturally ask whether we are dealing with anything more than a façon de parler. Does the poet mean anything more than that Glaucus was a fool to make the bargain he did? Did Automedon's friend mean anything more than "What the dickens prompted you to behave like that?" Perhaps not. The hexameter formulae which were the stock-in-trade of the old poets lent themselves easily to the sort of semasiological degeneration which ends by creating a façon de parler. And we may note that neither the Glaucus episode nor the futile aristeia of Automedon is integral
to the plot even of an “expanded” Iliad: they may well be additions by a later hand. Our aim, however, is to understand the original experience which lies at the root of such stereotyped formulae—for even a façon de parler must have an origin. It may help us to do so if we look a little more closely at the nature of ate and of the agencies to which Agamemnon ascribes it, and then glance at some other sorts of statement which the epic poets make about the sources of human behaviour.

There are a number of passages in Homer in which unwise and unaccountable conduct is attributed to ate, or described by the cognate verb aasasthai, without explicit reference to divine intervention. But ate in Homer is not itself a personal agent: the two passages which speak of ate in personal terms, II. 9.505 ff. and 19.91 ff., are transparent pieces of allegory. Nor does the word ever, at any rate in the Iliad, mean objective disaster, as it so commonly does in tragedy. Always, or practically always, ate is a state of mind—a temporary clouding or bewildering of the normal consciousness. It is, in fact, a partial and temporary insanity; and, like all insanity, it is ascribed, not to physiological or psychological causes, but to an external “daemonic” agency. In the Odyssey, it is true, excessive consumption of wine is said to cause ate; the implication, however, is probably not that ate can be produced “naturally,” but rather that wine has something supernatural or daemonic about it. Apart from this special case, the agents productive of ate, where they are specified, seem always to be supernatural beings; so we may class all instances of nonalcoholic ate in Homer under the head of what I propose to call “psychic intervention.”

If we review them, we shall observe that ate is by no means necessarily either a synonym for, or a result of, wickedness. The assertion of Liddell and Scott that ate is “mostly sent as the punishment of guilty rashness” is quite untrue of Homer. The ate (here a sort of stunned bewilderment) which overtook Patroclus after Apollo had struck him might possibly be claimed as an instance, since Patroclus had rashly routed the
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Trojans ἔτη αἰσχρά; but earlier in the scene this rashness is itself ascribed to the will of Zeus and characterised by the verb ἀκατάστασις. Again, the ate of one Agastrophus in straying too far from his chariot, and so getting himself killed, is not a “punishment” for rashness; the rashness is itself the ate, or a result of the ate, and it involves no discernible moral guilt—it is just an unaccountable error, like the bad bargain which Glaucus made. Again, Odysseus was neither guilty nor rash when he took a nap at an unfortunate moment, thus giving his companions a chance to slaughter the tabooed oxen. It was what we should call an accident; but for Homer, as for early thought in general, there is no such thing as accident—Odysseus knows that his nap was sent by the gods εἰς ἀτε, “to fool him.” Such passages suggest that ate had originally no connection with guilt. The notion of ate as a punishment seems to be either a late development in Ionia or a late importation from outside: the only place in Homer where it is explicitly asserted is the unique Ἀτειά passage in Iliad 9, which suggests that it may possibly be a Mainland idea, taken over along with the Meleager story from an epic composed in the mother country.

A word next about the agencies to which ate is ascribed. Agamemnon cites, not one such agency, but three: Zeus and moira and the Erinys who walks in darkness (or, according to another and perhaps older reading, the Erinys who sucks blood). Of these, Zeus is the mythological agent whom the poet conceives as the prime mover in the affair: “the plan of Zeus was fulfilled.” It is perhaps significant that (unless we make Apollo responsible for the ate of Patroclus) Zeus is the only individual Olympian who is credited with causing ate in the Iliad (hence ate is allegorically described as his eldest daughter). Moira, I think, is brought in because people spoke of any unaccountable personal disaster as part of their “portion” or “lot,” meaning simply that they cannot understand why it happened, but since it has happened, evidently “it had to be.” People still speak in that way, more especially of death, for which μῆνα has in fact become a synonym in modern Greek, like μῆλος in classical Greek.
I am sure it is quite wrong to write Moira with a capital “M” here, as if it signified either a personal goddess who dictates to Zeus or a Cosmic Destiny like the Hellenistic Heimarmenē. As goddesses, Moirai are always plural, both in cult and in early literature, and with one doubtful exception they do not figure at all in the Iliad. The most we can say is that by treating his “portion” as an agent—by making it do something—Agamemnon is taking a first step towards personification. Again, by blaming his moira Agamemnon no more declares himself a systematic determinist than does the modern Greek peasant when he uses similar language. To ask whether Homer’s people are determinists or libertarians is a fantastic anachronism: the question has never occurred to them, and if it were put to them it would be very difficult to make them understand what it meant. What they do recognize is the distinction between normal actions and actions performed in a state of ate. Actions of the latter sort they can trace indifferently either to their moira or to the will of a god, according as they look at the matter from a subjective or an objective point of view. In the same way Patroclus attributes his death directly to the immediate agent, the man Euphorbus, and indirectly to the mythological agent, Apollo, but from a subjective standpoint to his bad moira. It is, as the psychologists say, “overdetermined.”

On this analogy, the Erinys should be the immediate agent in Agamemnon’s case. That she should figure at all in this context may well surprise those who think of an Erinys as essentially a spirit of vengeance, still more those who believe, with Rohde, that the Erinyes were originally the vengeful dead. But the passage does not stand alone. We read also in the Odyssey of “the heavy ate which the hard-hitting goddess Erinys laid on the understanding of Melampus.” In neither place is there any question of revenge or punishment. The explanation is perhaps that the Erinys is the personal agent who ensures the fulfilment of a moira. That is why the Erinyes cut short the speech of Achilles’ horses: it is not “according to moira” for horses to talk. That is why they would punish the
sun, according to Heraclitus, if the sun should "transgress his measures" by exceeding the task assigned to him. Most probably, I think, the moral function of the Erinyes as ministers of vengeance derives from this primitive task of enforcing a moira which was at first morally neutral, or rather, contained by implication both an "ought" and a "must" which early thought did not clearly distinguish. So in Homer we find them enforcing the claims to status which arise from family or social relationship and are felt to be part of a person's moira: a parent, an elder brother, even a beggar, has something due to him as such, and can invoke "his" Erinyes to protect it. So too they are called upon to witness oaths; for the oath creates an assignment, a moira. The connection of Erinys with moira is still attested by Aeschylus, though the moirai have now become quasi-personal; and the Erinyes are still for Aeschylus dispensers of ate, although both they and it have been moralised. It rather looks as if the complex moira-Erinys-ale had deep roots, and might well be older than the ascription of ate to the agency of Zeus. In that connection it is worth recalling that Erinys and aisa (which is synonymous with moira) go back to what is perhaps the oldest known form of Hellenic speech, the Arcado-Cypriot dialect.

Here, for the present, let us leave ate and its associates, and consider briefly another kind of "psychic intervention" which is no less frequent in Homer, namely, the communication of power from god to man. In the Iliad, the typical case is the communication of menos during a battle, as when Athena puts a triple portion of menos into the chest of her protégé Diomede, or Apollo puts menos into the thumos of the wounded Glaucus. This menos is not primarily physical strength; nor is it a permanent organ of mental life like thumos or nöös. Rather it is, like ate, a state of mind. When a man feels menos in his chest, or "thrusting up pungently into his nostrils," he is conscious of a mysterious access of energy; the life in him is strong, and he is filled with a new confidence and eagerness. The connection of menos with the sphere of volition comes out clearly in the re-
lated words μενομάν, "to be eager," and δυσμενής, "wishing ill." It is significant that often, though not always, a communication of menos comes as a response to prayer. But it is something much more spontaneous and instinctive than what we call "resolution"; animals can have it, and it is used by analogy to describe the devouring energy of fire. In man it is the vital energy, the "spunk," which is not always there at call, but comes and goes mysteriously and (as we should say) capriciously. But to Homer it is not caprice: it is the act of a god, who "increases or diminishes at will a man's artē (that is to say, his potency as a fighter)." Sometimes, indeed, the menos can be roused by verbal exhortation; at other times its onset can only be explained by saying that a god has "breathed it into" the hero, or "put it in his chest," or, as we read in one place, transmitted it by contact, through a staff.

I think we should not dismiss these statements as "poetic invention" or "divine machinery." No doubt the particular instances are often invented by the poet for the convenience of his plot; and certainly the psychic intervention is sometimes linked with a physical one, or with a scene on Olympus. But we can be pretty sure that the underlying idea was not invented by any poet, and that it is older than the conception of anthropomorphic gods physically and visibly taking part in a battle. The temporary possession of a heightened menos is, like ate, an abnormal state which demands a supernormal explanation. Homer's men can recognise its onset, which is marked by a peculiar sensation in the limbs. "My feet beneath and hands above feel eager (μαυμώσει)," says one recipient of the power: that is because, as the poet tells us, the god has made them nimble (δαφρά). This sensation, which is here shared by a second recipient, confirms for them the divine origin of the menos. It is an abnormal experience. And men in a condition of divinely heightened menos behave to some extent abnormally. They can perform the most difficult feats with ease (θλα) that is a traditional mark of divine power. They can even, like Diomede, fight with impunity against gods—an action which
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to men in their normal state is excessively dangerous. They
are in fact for the time being rather more, or perhaps rather
less, than human. Men who have received a communication of
menos are several times compared to ravening lions; but the
most striking description of the state is in Book 15, where
Hector goes berserk (μαίνεται), he foams at the mouth, and his
eyes glow. From such cases it is only a step to the idea of
actual possession (δαιμονία); but it is a step which Homer does
not take. He does say of Hector that after he had put on
Achilles’ armour “Ares entered into him and his limbs were
filled with courage and strength”; but Ares here is hardly
more than a synonym for the martial spirit, and the communi­
cation of power is produced by the will of Zeus, assisted per­
haps by the divine armour. Gods do of course for purposes
of disguise assume the shape and appearance of individual
human beings; but that is a different belief. Gods may appear
at times in human form, men may share at times in the divine
attribute of power, but in Homer there is nevertheless no real
blurring of the sharp line which separates humanity from deity.
In the Odyssey, which is less exclusively concerned with
fighting, the communication of power takes other forms. The
poet of the “Telemachy” imitates the Iliad by making Athena
put menos into Telemachus; but here the menos is the moral
courage which will enable the boy to face the overbearing
suitors. That is literary adaptation. Older and more authentic
is the repeated claim that minstrels derive their creative power
from God. “I am self-taught,” says Phemius; “it was a god who
implanted all sorts of lays in my mind.” The two parts of his
statement are not felt as contradictory: he means, I think,
that he has not memorised the lays of other minstrels, but is a
creative poet who relies on the hexameter phrases welling up
spontaneously as he needs them out of some unknown and un­
controllable depth; he sings “out of the gods,” as the best
minstrels always do. I shall come back to that in the latter
part of chapter iii, “The Blessings of Madness.”
But the most characteristic feature of the Odyssey is the way
in which its personages ascribe all sorts of mental (as well as physical) events to the intervention of a nameless and indeterminate daemon\textsuperscript{66} or “god” or “gods.”\textsuperscript{66} These vaguely conceived beings can inspire courage at a crisis\textsuperscript{67} or take away a man’s understanding,\textsuperscript{68} just as gods do in the \textit{Iliad}. But they are also credited with a wide range of what may be called loosely “monitions.” Whenever someone has a particularly brilliant\textsuperscript{69} or a particularly foolish\textsuperscript{70} idea; when he suddenly recognises another person’s identity\textsuperscript{71} or sees in a flash the meaning of an omen;\textsuperscript{72} when he remembers what he might well have forgotten\textsuperscript{73} or forgets what he should have remembered,\textsuperscript{74} he or someone else will see in it, if we are to take the words literally, a psychic intervention by one of these anonymous supernatural beings.\textsuperscript{75} Doubtless they do not always expect to be taken literally: Odysseus, for example, is hardly serious in ascribing to the machinations of a daemon the fact that he went out without his cloak on a cold night. But we are not dealing simply with an “epic convention.” For it is the poet’s characters who talk like this, and not the poet:\textsuperscript{76} his own convention is quite other—he operates, like the author of the \textit{Iliad}, with clear-cut anthropomorphic gods such as Athena and Poseidon, not with anonymous daemons. If he has made his characters employ a different convention, he has presumably done so because that is how people did in fact talk: he is being “realistic.”

And indeed that is how we should expect people to talk who believed (or whose ancestors had believed) in daily and hourly monitions. The recognition, the insight, the memory, the brilliant or perverse idea, have this in common, that they come suddenly, as we say, “into a man’s head.” Often he is conscious of no observation or reasoning which has led up to them. But in that case, how can he call them “his”? A moment ago they were not in his mind; now they are there. Something has put them there, and that something is other than himself. More than this he does not know. So he speaks of it noncommittally as “the gods” or “some god,” or more often (especially when
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...its prompting has turned out to be bad) as a daemon. And by analogy he applies the same explanation to the ideas and actions of other people when he finds them difficult to understand or out of character. A good example is Antinous’ speech in *Odyssey* 2, where, after praising Penelope’s exceptional intelligence and propriety, he goes on to say that her idea of refusing to remarry is not at all proper, and concludes that “the gods are putting it into her chest.” Similarly, when Telemachus for the first time speaks out boldly against the suitors, Antinous infers, not without irony, that “the gods are teaching him to talk big.” His teacher is in fact Athena, as the poet and the reader know; but Antinous is not to know that, so he says “the gods.”

A similar distinction between what the speaker knows and what the poet knows may be observed in some places in the *Iliad*. When Teucer’s bowstring breaks, he cries out with a shudder of fear that a daemon is thwarting him; but it was in fact Zeus who broke it, as the poet has just told us. It has been suggested that in such passages the poet’s point of view is the older: that he still makes use of the “Mycenaean” divine machinery, while his characters ignore it and use vaguer language like the poet’s Ionian contemporaries, who (it is asserted) were losing their faith in the old anthropomorphic gods. In my view, as we shall see in a moment, this is almost an exact reversal of the real relationship. And it is anyhow clear that Teucer’s vagueness has nothing to do with scepticism: it is the simple result of ignorance. By using the word *daemon* he “expresses the fact that a higher power has made something happen,” and this fact is all he knows. As Ehnmark has pointed out, similar vague language in reference to the supernatural was commonly used by Greeks at all periods, not out of scepticism, but simply because they could not identify the particular god concerned. It is also commonly used by primitive peoples, whether for the same reason or because they lack the idea of personal gods. That its use by the Greeks is very old is shown by the high antiquity of the adjective *daemónios*. That
word must originally have meant “acting at the monition of a daemon”; but already in the *Iliad* its primitive sense has so far faded that Zeus can apply it to Hera.\(^8^6\) A verbal coinage so defaced has clearly been in circulation for a long time.

We have now surveyed, in such a cursory manner as time permits, the commonest types of psychic intervention in Homer. We may sum up the result by saying that all departures from normal human behaviour whose causes are not immediately perceived,\(^8^7\) whether by the subjects’ own consciousness or by the observation of others, are ascribed to a supernatural agency, just as is any departure from the normal behaviour of the weather or the normal behaviour of a bowstring. This finding will not surprise the nonclassical anthropologist: he will at once produce copious parallels from Borneo or Central Africa. But it is surely odd to find this belief, this sense of constant daily dependence on the supernatural, firmly embedded in poems supposedly so “irreligious” as the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. And we may also ask ourselves why a people so civilised, clear-headed, and rational as the Ionians did not eliminate from their national epics these links with Borneo and the primitive past, just as they eliminated fear of the dead, fear of pollution, and other primitive terrors which must originally have played a part in the saga. I doubt if the early literature of any other European people—even my own superstitious countrymen, the Irish—postulates supernatural interference in human behaviour with such frequency or over so wide a field.\(^8^8\)

Nilsson is, I think, the first scholar who has seriously tried to find an explanation of all this in terms of psychology. In a paper published in 1924,\(^8^9\) which has now become classical, he contended that Homeric heroes are peculiarly subject to rapid and violent changes of mood: they suffer, he says, from mental instability (*psychische Labilität*). And he goes on to point out that even to-day a person of this temperament is apt, when his mood changes, to look back with horror on what he has just done, and exclaim, “I didn’t really mean to do that!”—from which it is a short step to saying, “It wasn’t really I who did
it.” “His own behaviour,” says Nilsson, “has become alien to him. He cannot understand it. It is for him no part of his Ego.” This is a perfectly true observation, and its relevance to some of the phenomena we have been considering cannot, I think, be doubted. Nilsson is also, I believe, right in holding that experiences of this sort played a part—along with other elements, such as the Minoan tradition of protecting goddesses—in building up that machinery of physical intervention to which Homer resorts so constantly and, to our thinking, often so superfluously. We find it superfluous because the divine machinery seems to us in many cases to do no more than duplicate a natural psychological causation. But ought we not perhaps to say rather that the divine machinery “duplicates” a psychic intervention—that is, presents it in a concrete pictorial form? This was not superfluous; for only in this way could it be made vivid to the imagination of the hearers. The Homeric poets were without the refinements of language which would have been needed to “put across” adequately a purely psychological miracle. What more natural than that they should first supplement, and later replace, an old unexciting threadbare formula like μένος ἐμβαλε θυμῷ by making the god appear as a physical presence and exhort his favourite with the spoken word? How much more vivid than a mere inward monition is the famous scene in *Iliad* 1 where Athena plucks Achilles by the hair and warns him not to strike Agamemnon! But she is visible to Achilles alone: “none of the others saw her.” That is a plain hint that she is the projection, the pictorial expression, of an inward monition—a monition which Achilles might have described by such a vague phrase as ἐνενευσε φρεοὶ δαιμον. And I suggest that in general the inward monition, or the sudden unaccountable feeling of power, or the sudden unaccountable loss of judgement, is the germ out of which the divine machinery developed.

One result of transposing the event from the interior to the external world is that the vagueness is eliminated: the indeterminate daemon has to be made concrete as some particular
personal god. In *Iliad* I he becomes Athena, the goddess of good counsel. But that was a matter for the poet's choice. And through a multitude of such choices the poets must gradually have built up the personalities of their gods, "distinguishing," as Herodotus says,94 "their offices and skills, and fixing their physical appearance." The poets did not, of course, invent the gods (nor does Herodotus say so): Athena, for example, had been, as we now have reason to believe, a Minoan house-goddess. But the poets bestowed upon them personality—and thereby, as Nilsson says, made it impossible for Greece to lapse into the magical type of religion which prevailed among her Oriental neighbours.

Some, however, may be disposed to challenge the assertion on which, for Nilsson, all this construction rests. Are Homer's people exceptionally unstable, as compared with the characters in other early epics? The evidence adduced by Nilsson is rather slight. They come to blows on small provocation; but so do Norse and Irish heroes. Hector on one occasion goes berserk; but Norse heroes do so much oftener. Homeric men weep in a more uninhibited manner than Swedes or Englishmen; but so do all the Mediterranean peoples to this day. We may grant that Agamemnon and Achilles are passionate, excitable men (the story requires that they should be). But are not Odysseus and Ajax in their several ways proverbial types of steady endurance, as is Penelope of female constancy? Yet these stable characters are not more exempt than others from psychic intervention. I should hesitate on the whole to press this point of Nilsson's, and should prefer instead to connect Homeric man's belief in psychic intervention with two other peculiarities which do unquestionably belong to the culture described by Homer.

The first is a negative peculiarity: Homeric man has no unified concept of what we call "soul" or "personality" (a fact to whose implications Bruno Snell has lately called particular attention). It is well known that Homer appears to credit man with a *psyche* only after death, or when he is in
the act of fainting or dying or is threatened with death: the only recorded function of the psyche in relation to the living man is to leave him. Nor has Homer any other word for the living personality. The thumos may once have been a primitive “breath-soul” or “life-soul”; but in Homer it is neither the soul nor (as in Plato) a “part of the soul.” It may be defined, roughly and generally, as the organ of feeling. But it enjoys an independence which the word “organ” does not suggest to us, influenced as we are by the later concepts of “organism” and “organic unity.” A man’s thumos tells him that he must now eat or drink or slay an enemy, it advises him on his course of action, it puts words into his mouth: θυμός ἀνώγει, he says, or κελεται δὲ με θυμός. He can converse with it, or with his “heart” or his “belly,” almost as man to man. Sometimes he scolds these detached entities (κραδιν ἡνίατε μόδω); often he takes their advice, but he may also reject it and act, as Zeus does on one occasion, “without the consent of his thumos.” 

In the latter case, we should say, like Plato, that the man was κρείττων ἐαυτῷ, he had controlled himself. But for Homeric man the thumos tends not to be felt as part of the self: it commonly appears as an independent inner voice. A man may even hear two such voices, as when Odysseus “plans in his thumos” to kill the Cyclops forthwith, but a second voice (ἔτερος θυμός) restrains him. This habit of (as we should say) “objectifying emotional drives,” treating them as not-self, must have opened the door wide to the religious idea of psychic intervention, which is often said to operate, not directly on the man himself, but on his thumos or on its physical seat, his chest or midriff. We see the connection very clearly in Diomede’s remark that Achilles will fight “when the thumos in his chest tells him to and a god rouses him” (overdetermination again).

A second peculiarity, which seems to be closely related to the first, must have worked in the same direction. This is the habit of explaining character or behaviour in terms of knowledge. The most familiar instance is the very wide use of the verb οἶδα, “I know,” with a neuter plural object to express
not only the possession of technical skill (οἶδεν πολεμικὰ ἔργα and the like) but also what we should call moral character or personal feelings: Achilles "knows wild things, like a lion," Polyphemus "knows lawless things," Nestor and Agamemnon "know friendly things to each other." This is not merely a Homeric "idiom": a similar transposition of feeling into intellectual terms is implied when we are told that Achilles has "a merciless understanding (νόος)," or that the Trojans "remembered flight and forgot resistance." This intellectualist approach to the explanation of behaviour set a lasting stamp on the Greek mind: the so-called Socratic paradoxes, that "virtue is knowledge," and that "no one does wrong on purpose," were no novelties, but an explicit generalised formulation of what had long been an ingrained habit of thought. Such a habit of thought must have encouraged the belief in psychic intervention. If character is knowledge, what is not knowledge is not part of the character, but comes to a man from outside. When he acts in a manner contrary to the system of conscious dispositions which he is said to "know," his action is not properly his own, but has been dictated to him. In other words, un-systematised, nonrational impulses, and the acts resulting from them, tend to be excluded from the self and ascribed to an alien origin.

Evidently this is especially likely to happen when the acts in question are such as to cause acute shame to their author. We know how in our own society unbearable feelings of guilt are got rid of by "projecting" them in phantasy on to someone else. And we may guess that the notion of ἀτε served a similar purpose for Homeric man by enabling him in all good faith to project on to an external power his unbearable feelings of shame. I say "shame" and not "guilt," for certain American anthropologists have lately taught us to distinguish "shame-cultures" from "guilt-cultures," and the society described by Homer clearly falls into the former class. Homeric man's highest good is not the enjoyment of a quiet conscience, but the enjoyment of τίμη, public esteem: "Why should I fight," asks Achilles, "if
the good fighter receives no more τιμή than the bad?" And the strongest moral force which Homeric man knows is not the fear of god, but respect for public opinion, ἀιδῶς: ἀιδούµαι ἁτός, says Hector at the crisis of his fate, and goes with open eyes to his death. The situation to which the notion of ἀτε is a response arose not merely from the impulsiveness of Homeric man, but from the tension between individual impulse and the pressure of social conformity characteristic of a shame-culture. In such a society, anything which exposes a man to the contempt or ridicule of his fellows, which causes him to "lose face," is felt as unbearable. That perhaps explains how not only cases of moral failure, like Agamemnon's loss of self-control, but such things as the bad bargain of Glaucus, or Automedon's disregard of proper tactics, came to be "projected" on to a divine agency. On the other hand, it was the gradually growing sense of guilt, characteristic of a later age, which transformed ἀτε into a punishment, the Erinyes into ministers of vengeance, and Zeus into an embodiment of cosmic justice. With that development I shall deal in my next chapter.

What I have thus far tried to do is to show, by examining one particular type of religious experience, that behind the term "Homeric religion" there lies something more than an artificial machinery of serio-comic gods and goddesses, and that we shall do it less than justice if we dismiss it as an agreeable interlude of lighthearted buffoonery between the presumed profundities of an Aegean Earth-religion about which we know little, and those of an "early Orphic movement" about which we know even less.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1 Last Lectures, 182 ff.
2 Introduction à l'Iliade, 294.
3 Rise of the Greek Epic, 265.
4 Tradition and Design in the Iliad, 222. The italics are mine. Similarly Wilhelm Schmid thinks that Homer's conception of the
gods "cannot be called religious." (Gr. Literaturgeschichte, L. i. 112 ff.)
5 Il. 19.86 ff.
6 137 ff. Cf. 9.119 f.
7 19.270 ff.
8 1.412.
9 9.376.
10 1.5.
11 Il. 6.357. Cf. 3.164, where Priam says that not Helen but the gods are to blame (átrw) for the war; and Od. 4.261, where she speaks of her árw.
12 Il. 12.254 f.; Od. 23.11 ff.
13 Il. 6.234 ff.
14 Il. 17.469 f.
15 Cf. Wilamowitz, Die Ilias und Homer, 304 ff., 145.
17 The transition to this sense may be seen at Od. 10.68, 12.372, and 21.302. Otherwise it seems to be post-Homeric. L.-S. still cites for it Il. 24.480, but I think wrongly: see Leaf and Ameis-Hentze ad loc.
18 The plural seems to be twice used of actions symptomatic of the state of mind, at Il. 9.115 and (if the view taken in n. 20 is right) at Il. 10.391. This is an easy and natural extension of the original sense.
19 11.61; 21.297 ff.
20 Il. 10.391 is commonly quoted as a solitary exception. The meaning, however, may be, not that Hector's unwise advice produced árw in Dolon, but that it was a symptom of Hector's own condition of (divinely inspired) árw. árav will then be used in the same sense as at 9.115, whereas the common view postulates not only a unique psychology but a unique use of árav as "acts productive of infatuation." At Od. 10.68 Odysseus' companions are named as subordinate agents along with ἄπος σχέτλιος.
21 Il. 16.805.
22 Ibid., 780.
23 Ibid., 684-691.
24 Il. 11.340.
25 Cf. L. Lévy-Bruhl, Primitive Mentality, 43 ff.; Primitives and the Supernatural, 57 f. (Eng. trans.).
26 Od. 12.371 f. Cf. 10.68.
27 Il. 9.512: τῷ ἄρν ἄμ᾽ ἐπεσθαί, ἦasename ἄποτε.
20 The Greeks and the Irrational

II. 19.91. At II. 18.311 Athena, in her capacity as Goddess of Counsel, takes away the understanding of the Trojans, so that they applaud Hector’s bad advice. This is not, however, called an ἀρνητικόν. But in the “Telemachy” Helen ascribes her ἀρνητικόν to Aphrodite (Od. 4.261).

II. 24.49, where the plural may refer merely to the “portions” of different individuals (Wilamowitz, Glaube, I.360). But the “mighty Spinners” of Od. 7.197 seem to be a kind of personal fates, akin to the Norns of Teutonic myth (cf. Chadwick, Growth of Literature, I.646).

Cf. Nilsson, History of Greek Religion, 169. Cornford’s view, that μοίρα “stands for the provincial ordering of the world,” and that “the notion of the individual lot or fate comes last, not first, in the order of development” (From Religion to Philosophy, 15 ff.), seems to me intrinsically unlikely, and is certainly not supported by the evidence of Homer, where μοίρα is still quite concretely used for, e.g., a “helping” of meat (Od. 20.260). Nor does George Thomson convince me that the Μοίραι originated “as symbols of the economic and social functions of primitive communism,” or that “they grew out of the neolithic mother-goddesses” (The Prehistoric Aegean, 339).

Snell, Philol. 85 (1929-1930) 141 ff., and (more elaborately) Chr. Voigt, Ueberlegung u. Entscheidung . . . bei Homer, have pointed out that Homer has no word for an act of choice or decision. But the conclusion that in Homer “man still possesses no consciousness of personal freedom and of deciding for himself” (Voigt, op. cit., 103) seems to me misleadingly expressed. I should rather say that Homeric man does not possess the concept of will (which developed curiously late in Greece), and therefore cannot possess the concept of “free will.” That does not prevent him from distinguishing in practice between actions originated by the ego and those which he attributes to psychic intervention: Agamemnon can say ἔγω δ’ οὐκ αἴτησιν εἰμί, ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς. And it seems a little artificial to deny that what is described in passages like II. 11.403 ff. or Od. 5.355 ff. is in effect a reasoned decision taken after consideration of possible alternatives.


In all cases but one (Od. 11.279 f.) the claims are those of living persons. This seems to tell heavily against the theory (invented in the confident heyday of animism) that the ἐρωβεῖς are the vengeful dead. So do (a) the fact that in Homer they never punish murder; (b) the fact that gods as well as men have “their” ἐρωβεῖς. The ἐρωβεῖς of Hera (Il. 21.412) have exactly the same function as those of Penelope (Od. 2.135)—to protect the status of a mother by punishing an unfilial son. We can say that they are the maternal anger projected as a personal being. The θεῶν ἐρωβεῖς who in the Thebais (fr. 2 Kinkel) heard the curse of the (living) Oedipus embodies in personal form the anger of the gods invoked in the curse: hence ἐρωβεῖς and curse can be equated (Aesch. Sept. 70, Eum. 417). On this view Sophocles was not innovating, but using the traditional language, when he made Teiresias threaten Creon with Λέον καὶ θεῶν ἐρωβεῖς (Ant. 1075); their function is to punish Creon’s violation of the μοῖρα, the natural apportionment, by which the dead Polynoeices belongs to Hades, the living Antigone to the ἥων θεῶ (1068–1073). For μοῖρα as status cf. Poseidon’s claim to be ἱσόμορος καὶ δυῖς πεπρωμένος αὐτῇ with Zeus, Il. 15.209. Since writing this, I find the intimate connection of ἐρωβεῖς with μοῖρα also stressed by George Thomson (The Prehistoric Aegean, 345) and by Eduard Fraenkel on Agam. 1535 f.


Demeter Ἐρωβεῖς and verb ἐρωβεῖν in Arcadia, Paus. 8.25.4 ff. ala in Arcadian, IG V.2.265, 269; in Cypriot, GD 1.73.

Cf. E. Ehnmark, The Idea of God in Homer, 6 ff.; and on the mean-
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Of the word μενός, J. Böhme, *Die Seele u. das Ich im Homerischen Epos*, 11 ff., 84 ff.


47 That kings were once thought of as possessing a special μενός which was communicated to them in virtue of their office seems to be implied by the usage of the phrase ἐπὸν μενός (cf. ἐπὶ is), although its application in Homer (to Alcinous, *Od*. 7.167 etc., to Antinous, *Od*. 18.34) is governed merely by metrical convenience. Cf. Pfister, P.-W., s.v. "Kultus," 2125 ff.; Snell, *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, 35 ff.

48 *Od*. 24.318.


50 *Il*. 6.182, 17.565. So the medical writers speak of the μενός of wine (Hipp. acut. 63), and even the μενός of famine (vet. med. 9), meaning the immanent power shown by their effects on the human organism.


52 *Il*. 13.59 ff. The physical transmission of power by contact is, however, rare in Homer, and in Greek belief generally, in contrast with the importance which has been attached in Christianity (and in many primitive cultures) to the "laying on of hands."

53 *Il*. 13.61, 75. γυνὰ δ' ἔθηκεν Ἐλαφρά is a recurrent formula in descriptions of communicated μενός (5.122, 23.772); cf. also 17.211 ff.

54 Cf. Leaf’s note on 13.73. At *Od*. 1.323 Telemachus recognises a communication of power, we are not told exactly how.


60 *Il*. 15.605'ff.


62 *Od*. 1.89, 320 f.; cf. 3.75 f.; 6.139 f.

63 *Od*. 22.347 f. Cf. Demodocus, 8.44, 498; and Pindar, *Nem*. 3.9, where the poet begs the Muse to grant him "an abundant flow of song welling from my own thought." As MacKay has put it, "The Muse is the source of the poet's originality, rather than his conventionality" (*The Wrath of Homer*, 50). Chadwick, *Growth of
Literature, III.182, quotes from Radloff a curiously exact primitive parallel, the Kirghiz minstrel who declared, “I can sing any song whatever, for God has implanted this gift of song in my heart. He gives the words on my tongue without my having to seek them. I have learned none of my songs. All springs from my inner self.”

On Homer’s use of the term ὀλυμπός and its relationship to θέας (which cannot be discussed here), see Nilsson in Arch. f. Rel. 22 (1924) 363 ff., and Gesch. d. Gr. Rel. I.201 ff.; Wilamowitz, Glaube, I.362 ff.; E. Leitzke, op. cit., 42 ff. According to Nilsson the ὀλυμπός was originally not only indeterminate but impersonal, a mere “manifestation of power (orenda)”; but about this I am inclined to share the doubts expressed by Rose, Harv. Theol. Rev. 28 (1935) 243 ff. Such evidence as we have suggests rather that while μοῖρα developed from an impersonal “portion” into a personal Fate, ὀλυμπός evolved in the opposite direction, from a personal “Apportioner” (cf. ὀλίῳ, ὀλυμπώνη) to an impersonal “luck.” There is a point where the two developments cross and the words are virtually synonymous.

Occasionally also to Zeus (14.273, etc.), who in such phrases is perhaps not so much an individual god as the representative of a generalised divine will (Nilsson, Greek Piety, 59).

If his intervention is harmful, he is usually called ὀλυμπός, not θέας.

This distinction was first pointed out by O. Jørgensen, Hermes, 39 (1904) 357 ff. On exceptions to Jørgensen’s rule see Calhoun, JJP 61 (1940) 270 ff.

Cf. the ὀλυμπός who brings unlucky or unwelcome visitors, 10.64, 24.149, 4.274 f., 17.446, and is called κακός in the first two of these places; and the στυγερός ὀλυμπός who causes sickness, 5.396. These passages at least are surely exceptions to Ehnmark’s generalisation (Anthropomorphism and Miracle, 64) that the ὀλυμπόνες of the Odyssey are simply unidentified Olympians.
2.122 ff.
1.384 ff.
1.320 ff.
Il. 15.461 ff.
E. Hedén, *Homerische Göttersstudien*.
Cf., e.g., the passages quoted by Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitives and the Supernatural*, 22 ff.
A particularly good, because particularly trivial, example of the significance attached to the unexplained is the fact that sneezing—that seemingly causeless and pointless convulsion—is taken as an omen by so many peoples, including the Homeric Greeks (Od. 17.541), as well as those of the Classical Age (Xen. *Anab.* 3.3.9) and of Roman times (Plut. *gen. Socr.* 581 ff.). Cf. Halliday, *Greek Divination*, 174 ff., and Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, 1.97 ff.
Something analogous to ἀγαθί is perhaps to be seen in the state called "fey" or "fairy-struck," which in Celtic belief comes on people suddenly and "makes them do somewhat verie unlike their former practice" (Robert Kirk, *The Secret Commonwealth*).
As Snell points out (*Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, 45), the "superfluous" character of so many divine interventions shows that they were not invented simply to get the poet out of a difficulty (since the course of events would be the same without them), but rest on some older foundation of belief. Cauer thought (*Grundfragen*, I.401) that the "naturalness" of many Homeric miracles was an unconscious refinement dating from an age when the poets were ceasing to believe in miracles. But the unnecessary miracle is in fact typically primitive. Cf., e.g., E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande*, 77, 508; and for a criticism of Cauer, Ehnmark, *Anthropomorphism and Miracle*, chap. iv.
E.g., Il. 16.712 ff., and often. At Il. 13.43 ff., the physical and (60) the psychic intervention stand side by side. No doubt epiphanies of gods in battle had also some basis in popular belief (the same belief which created the Angels at Mons), though, as Nilsson observes, in later times it is usually heroes, not gods, who appear in this way.
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11. 1.198.
Cf. Voigt, Ueberlegung u. Entscheidung . . . bei Homer, 54 ff. More often the warning is given by the god “disguised” as a human personage; this may derive from an older form in which the advice was given, at the monition of a god or διάμωσις, by the personage himself (Voigt, ibid., 63).

Hdt. 2.53. Lowie has observed that the primitive artist, following his aesthetic impulse, “may come to create a type that at once synthesises the essentials of current belief, without contravening them in any particular, and yet at the same time adds a series of strokes that may not merely shade but materially alter the pre-existing picture. So long as things go no further, the new image is no more than an individual version of the general norm. But as soon as that variant . . . is elevated to the position of a standard representation, it becomes itself thenceforward a determinant of the popular conception.” (Primitive Religion, 267 f.) This refers to the visual arts, but it affords an exact description of the manner in which I conceive the Greek epic to have influenced Greek religion.


Od. 22.17.

II. 4.43: ἐκὼν ἀδεκορτί γε θυμῷ. As Pfister has pointed out (P.-W. XI.2117 ff.), this relative independence of the affective element is common among primitive peoples (cf., e.g., Warneck, Religion der Bataik, 8). On the weakness of the “ego-consciousness” among primitives see also Hans Kelsen, Society and Nature (Chicago, 1943), 8 ff.

Od. 9.299 ff. Here the “ego” identifies itself originally with the first voice, but accepts the warning of the second. A similar plurality of voices, and a similar shift of self-identification, seems to be implicit in the curious passage II. 11.403–410 (cf. Voigt, op. cit., 87 ff.). One of Dostoievsky’s characters, in A Raw Youth, describes this fluctuating relation of self and not-self very nicely. “It’s just as though one’s second self were standing beside one; one is sensible and rational oneself, but the other self is impelled to do something perfectly senseless, and sometimes very funny; and suddenly you notice that you are longing to do that amusing thing, goodness knows why; that is, you want to, as it were, against your will; though you fight against it with all your might, you want to.”
"E.g., Il. 5.676: τράπε θυμόν Ἀθήνη; 16.691: (Zeus) θυμὸν ἐνι στήθεσιν ἀνήκε; Od. 15.172: ἐνι θυμῷ ἀδάνατοι βάλλοντι. Hence the θυμός is the organ of seership, Il. 7.44, 12.228. (Cf. Aesch. Pers. 10: κακόμαντις . . . θυμός; 224: θυμόμαντις. Also Eur. Andr. 1073: πρόμαντις θυμός, and Trag. Adesp. fr. 176: πηδών δ' ο θυμός ἐνδοθεν μαντεδεται.)

"E.g., Il. 16.805: ἀτη φρένας εἶλε; Il. 5.125: ἐν γάρ τοι στήθεσιν μένος . . . ἥκα.

Il. 9.702 f. Cf. Od. 8.44: "a god" has given Demodocus the gift of singing as his θυμός prompts him.


Il. 24.41; Od. 9.189; Od. 3.277.

Il. 16.35, 356 f.

The same point has been made by W. Nestle, Ἕββ 1922, 137 ff., who finds the Socratic paradoxes "echt griechisch," and remarks that they are already implicit in the naive psychology of Homer. But we should beware of regarding this habitual "intellectualism" as an attitude consciously adopted by the spokesmen of an "intellectual" people; it is merely the inevitable result of the absence of the concept of will (cf. L. Gernet, Pensée juridique et morale, 312).

A simple explanation of these terms will be found in Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, 222 ff. We are ourselves the heirs of an ancient and powerful (though now declining) guilt-culture, a fact which may perhaps explain why so many scholars have difficulty in recognising that Homeric religion is "religion" at all.

Il. 9.315 ff. On the importance of τιμή in Homer see W. Jaeger, Paideia, I.7 ff.

Cf. chap. ii, pp. 29 ff.

Il. 22.105. Cf. 6.442, 15.561 ff., 17.91 ff.; Od. 16.75, 21.323 ff.; Wilamowitz, Glaube, I.353 ff.; W. J. Verdenius, Mnem. 12 (1944) 47 ff. The sanction of αἵδως is νέμωσις, public disapproval: cf. Il. 6.351, 13.121 f.; and Od. 2.136 f. The application to conduct of the terms καλόν and αἰσχρόν seems also to be typical of a shame-culture. These words denote, not that the act is beneficial or hurtful to the agent, or that it is right or wrong in the eyes of a deity, but that it looks "handsome" or "ugly" in the eyes of public opinion.

Once the idea of psychic intervention had taken root, it would, of course, encourage impulsive behaviour. Just as recent anthropologists, instead of saying, with Frazer, that primitives believe in
magic because they reason faultily, are inclined to say that they reason faultily because they are socially conditioned to believe in magic, so, instead of saying with Nilsson that Homeric man believes in psychic intervention because he is impulsive, we should perhaps say rather that he gives way to his impulses because he is socially conditioned to believe in psychic intervention.

"On the importance of the fear of ridicule as a social motive see Paul Radin, *Primitive Man as Philosopher*, 50.
II
From Shame-Culture to Guilt-Culture

*It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God.*

Hebrews 10:31

In my first chapter I discussed Homer’s interpretation of the irrational elements in human behaviour as “psychic intervention”—an interference with human life by nonhuman agencies which put something into a man and thereby influence his thought and conduct. In this one I shall deal with some of the new forms which these Homeric ideas assumed in the course of the Archaic Age. But if what I have to say is to be intelligible to the nonspecialist, I must first attempt to make plain, at least in rough outline, certain of the general differences which separate the religious attitude of the Archaic Age from that presupposed in Homer. At the end of my first chapter I used the expressions “shame-culture” and “guilt-culture” as descriptive labels for the two attitudes in question. I am aware that these terms are not self-explanatory, that they are probably new to most classical scholars, and that they lend themselves easily to misconception. What I intend by them will, I hope, emerge as we proceed. But I should like to make two things clear at once. First, I use them only as descriptions, without assuming any particular theory of cultural change. And secondly, I recognise that the distinction is only relative, since in fact many modes of behaviour characteristic of shame-cultures persisted throughout the archaic and classical periods. There is a transition, but it is gradual and incomplete.
When we turn from Homer to the fragmentary literature of the Archaic Age, and to those writers of the Classical Age who still preserve the archaic outlook—as do Pindar and Sophocles, and to a great extent Herodotus—one of the first things that strikes us is the deepened awareness of human insecurity and human helplessness (ἀμηναξία), which has its religious correlate in the feeling of divine hostility—not in the sense that Deity is thought of as evil, but in the sense that an overmastering Power and Wisdom forever holds Man down, keeps him from rising above his station. It is the feeling which Herodotus expresses by saying that Deity is always φθονερήν τε καὶ ταραχῶδες. "Jealous and interfering," we translate it; but the translation is not very good—how should that overmastering Power be jealous of so poor a thing as Man? The thought is rather that the gods resent any success, any happiness, which might for a moment lift our mortality above its mortal status, and so encroach on their prerogative.

Such ideas were of course not entirely new. In Iliad Achilles, moved at last by the spectacle of his broken enemy Priam, pronounces the tragic moral of the whole poem: "For so the gods have spun the thread for pitiful humanity, that the life of Man should be sorrow, while themselves are exempt from care." And he goes on to the famous image of the two jars, from which Zeus draws forth his good and evil gifts. To some men he gives a mixed assortment, to others, unmixed evil, so that they wander tormented over the face of the earth, "unregarded by gods or men." As for unmixed good, that, we are to assume, is a portion reserved for gods. The jars have nothing to do with justice: else the moral would be false. For in the Iliad heroism does not bring happiness; its sole, and sufficient, reward is fame. Yet for all that, Homer's princes bestride their world boldly; they fear the gods only as they fear their human overlords; nor are they oppressed by the future even when, like Achilles, they know that it holds an approaching doom.

* For notes to chapter ii see pages 50–63.
So far, what we meet in the Archaic Age is not a different belief but a different emotional reaction to the old belief. Listen, for example, to Semonides of Amorgos: "Zeus controls the fulfilment of all that is, and disposes as he will. But insight does not belong to men: we live like beasts, always at the mercy of what the day may bring, knowing nothing of the outcome that God will impose upon our acts." Or listen to Theognis: "No man, Cynus, is responsible for his own ruin or his own success: of both these things the gods are the givers. No man can perform an action and know whether its outcome will be good or bad. . . . Humanity in utter blindness follows its futile usages; but the gods bring all to the fulfilment that they have planned." The doctrine of man's helpless dependence on an arbitrary Power is not new; but there is a new accent of despair, a new and bitter emphasis on the futility of human purposes. We are nearer to the world of the *Oedipus Rex* than to the world of the *Iliad*.

It is much the same with the idea of divine *phthonos* or jealousy. Aeschylus was right when he called it "a venerable doctrine uttered long ago." The notion that too much success incurs a supernatural danger, especially if one brags about it, has appeared independently in many different cultures and has deep roots in human nature (we subscribe to it ourselves when we "touch wood"). The *Iliad* ignores it, as it ignores other popular superstitions; but the poet of the *Odyssey*—always more tolerant of contemporary ways of thought—permits Calypso to exclaim in a temper that the gods are the most jealous beings in the world—they grudge one a little happiness. It is plain, however, from the uninhibited boasting in which Homeric man indulges that he does not take the dangers of *phthonos* very seriously: such scruples are foreign to a shame-culture. It is only in the Late Archaic and Early Classical time that the *phthonos* idea becomes an oppressive menace, a source—or expression—of religious anxiety. Such it is in Solon, in Aeschylus, above all in Herodotus. For Herodotus, history is overdetermined: while it is overtly the outcome of human
purposes, the penetrating eye can detect everywhere the covert working of *phthonos*. In the same spirit the Messenger in the *Persae* attributes Xerxes' unwise tactics at Salamis to the cunning Greek who deceived him, and simultaneously to the *phthonos* of the gods working through an *alastor* or evil daemon: the event is doubly determined, on the natural and on the supernatural plane.

By the writers of this age divine *phthonos* is sometimes, though not always, moralised as *nemesis*, "righteous indignation." Between the primitive offence of too much success and its punishment by jealous Deity, a moral link is inserted: success is said to produce *kōros*—the complacency of the man who has done too well—which in turn generates *hubris*, arrogance in word or deed or even thought. Thus interpreted, the old belief appeared more rational, but it was not the less oppressive on that account. We see from the carpet scene in the *Agamemnon* how every manifestation of triumph arouses anxious feelings of guilt: *hubris* has become the "primal evil," the sin whose wages is death, which is yet so universal that a Homeric hymn calls it the *thēmis* or established usage of mankind, and Archilochus attributes it even to animals. Men knew that it was dangerous to be happy. But the restraint had no doubt its wholesome side. It is significant that when Euripides, writing in the new age of scepticism, makes his chorus lament the collapse of all moral standards, they see the culminating proof of that collapse in the fact that "it is no longer the common aim of men to escape the *phthonos* of the gods."

The moralisation of *phthonos* introduces us to a second characteristic feature of archaic religious thought—the tendency to transform the supernatural in general, and Zeus in particular, into an agent of justice. I need hardly say that religion and morals were not initially interdependent, in Greece or elsewhere; they had their separate roots. I suppose that, broadly speaking, religion grows out of man's relationship to his total environment, morals out of his relation to his fellowmen. But sooner or later in most cultures there comes a time
of suffering when most people refuse to be content with Achilles' view, the view that "God's in his Heaven, all's wrong with the world." Man projects into the cosmos his own nascent demand for social justice; and when from the outer spaces the magnified echo of his own voice returns to him, promising punishment for the guilty, he draws from it courage and reassurance.

In the Greek epic this stage has not yet been reached, but we can observe increasing signs of its approach. The gods of the *Iliad* are primarily concerned with their own honour (*τιμή*). To speak lightly of a god, to neglect his cult, to maltreat his priest, all these understandably make him angry; in a shame-culture, gods, like men, are quick to resent a slight. Perjury comes under the same rubric: the gods have nothing against straightforward lying, but they do object to their names being taken in vain. Here and there, however, we get a hint of something more. Offences against parents constitute so monstrous a crime as to demand special treatment: the underworld Powers are constrained to take up the case.¹⁵ (I shall come back to that later on.) And once we are told that Zeus is angry with men who judge crooked judgements.¹⁶ But that I take to be a reflex of later conditions which, by an inadvertence common in Homer, has been allowed to slip into a simile.¹⁷ For I find no indication in the narrative of the *Iliad* that Zeus is concerned with justice as such.¹⁸

In the *Odyssey* his interests are distinctly wider: not only does he protect suppliants¹⁹ (who in the *Iliad* enjoy no such security), but "all strangers and beggars are from Zeus";²⁰ in fact, the Hesiodic avenger of the poor and oppressed begins to come in sight. The Zeus of the *Odyssey* is, moreover, becoming sensitive to moral criticism: men, he complains, are always finding fault with the gods, "for they say that their troubles come from us; whereas it is they who by their own wicked acts incur more trouble than they need."²¹ Placed where it is, at the very beginning of the poem, the remark sounds, as the Germans say, "programmatic." And the programme is carried out. The suitors by their own wicked acts incur destruction,²² while
Odysseus, heedful of divine monitions, triumphs against the odds: divine justice is vindicated.

The later stages of the moral education of Zeus may be studied in Hesiod, in Solon, in Aeschylus; but I cannot here follow this progress in detail. I must, however, mention one complication which had far-reaching historical consequences. The Greeks were not so unrealistic as to hide from themselves the plain fact that the wicked flourished like a green bay-tree. Hesiod, Solon, Pindar, are deeply troubled by it, and Theognis finds it necessary to give Zeus a straight talk on the subject.\textsuperscript{33} It was easy enough to vindicate divine justice in a work of fiction like the \textit{Odyssey}: as Aristotle observed, “poets tell this kind of story to gratify the desires of their audience.”\textsuperscript{34} It was not so easy in real life. In the Archaic Age the mills of God ground so slowly that their movement was practically imperceptible save to the eye of faith. In order to sustain the belief that they moved at all, it was necessary to get rid of the natural time-limit set by death. If you looked beyond that limit, you could say one (or both) of two things: you could say that the successful sinner would be punished in his descendants, or you could say that he would pay his debt personally in another life.

The second of these solutions emerged, as a doctrine of general application, only late in the Archaic Age, and was possibly confined to fairly limited circles; I shall postpone its consideration to a later chapter. The other is the characteristic archaic doctrine: it is the teaching of Hesiod, of Solon and Theognis, of Aeschylus and Herodotus. That it involved the suffering of the morally innocent was not overlooked: Solon speaks of the hereditary victims of \textit{nemesis} as \textit{avairon}, “not responsible”; Theognis complains of the unfairness of a system by which “the criminal gets away with it, while someone else takes the punishment later”; Aeschylus, if I understand him rightly, would mitigate the unfairness by recognising that an inherited curse may be broken.\textsuperscript{35} That these men nevertheless accepted the idea of inherited guilt and deferred punishment is due to that belief in family solidarity which Archaic Greece
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shared with other early societies and with many primitive cultures to-day. Unfair it might be, but to them it appeared as a law of nature, which must be accepted: for the family was a moral unit, the son's life was a prolongation of his father's, and he inherited his father's moral debts exactly as he inherited his commercial ones. Sooner or later, the debt exacted its own payment: as the Pythia told Croesus, the causal nexus of crime and punishment was moira, something that even a god could not break; Croesus had to complete or fulfil (ἐκπλησσεί) what was begun by the crime of an ancestor five generations back.

It was a misfortune for the Greeks that the idea of cosmic justice, which represented an advance on the old notion of purely arbitrary divine Powers, and provided a sanction for the new civic morality, should have been thus associated with a primitive conception of the family. For it meant that the weight of religious feeling and religious law was thrown against the emergence of a true view of the individual as a person, with personal rights and personal responsibilities. Such a view did eventually emerge in Attic secular law. As Glotz showed in his great book, La Solidarité de la famille en Grèce, the liberation of the individual from the bonds of clan and family is one of the major achievements of Greek rationalism, and one for which the credit must go to Athenian democracy. But long after that liberation was complete in law, religious minds were still haunted by the ghost of the old solidarity. It appears from Plato that in the fourth century fingers were still pointed at the man shadowed by hereditary guilt, and he would still pay a cathartes to be given ritual relief from it. And Plato himself, though he accepted the revolution in secular law, admits inherited religious guilt in certain cases. A century later, Bion of Borysthenes still found it necessary to point out that in punishing the son for the father's offence God behaved like a physician who should dose the child to cure the father; and the devout Plutarch, who quotes this witticism, tries nevertheless to find a defence for the old doctrine in an appeal to the observed facts of heredity.
To return to the Archaic Age, it was also a misfortune that the functions assigned to the moralised Supernatural were predominantly, if not exclusively, penal. We hear much about inherited guilt, little about inherited innocence; much about the sufferings of the sinner in Hell or Purgatory, relatively little about the deferred rewards of virtue; the stress is always on sanctions. That no doubt reflects the juridical ideas of the time; criminal law preceded civil law, and the primary function of the state was coercive. Moreover, divine law, like early human law, takes no account of motive and makes no allowance for human weakness; it is devoid of that humane quality which the Greeks called επιείκεια or φιλανθρωπία. The proverbial saying popular in that age, that “all virtue is comprehended in justice,”14 applies no less to gods than to men: there was little room for pity in either. That was not so in the Iliad: there Zeus pities the doomed Hector and the doomed Sarpedon; he pities Achilles mourning for his lost Patroclus, and even Achilles’ horses mourning for their charioteer.35 μελουσί μοι, δολιμενοί τερ, he says in Iliad 21: “I care about them, though they perish.” But in becoming the embodiment of cosmic justice Zeus lost his humanity. Hence Olympianism in its moralised form tended to become a religion of fear, a tendency which is reflected in the religious vocabulary. There is no word for “god-fearing” in the Iliad; but in the Odyssey to be θεοφός is already an important virtue, and the prose equivalent, δεισ-δαιμών, was used as a term of praise right down to Aristotle’s time.36 The love of god, on the other hand, is missing from the older Greek vocabulary:37 φιλόθεος appears first in Aristotle. And in fact, of the major Olympians, perhaps only Athena inspired an emotion that could reasonably be described as love. “It would be eccentric,” says the Magna Moralia, “for anyone to claim that he loved Zeus.”38

And that brings me to the last general trait which I want to stress—the universal fear of pollution (miasma), and its correlate, the universal craving for ritual purification (catharsis). Here once again the difference between Homer and the Archaic
Age is relative, not absolute; for it is a mistake to deny that a certain minimum of catharsis is practised in both epics. But from the simple Homerian purifications, performed by laymen, it is a long step to the professional *cathartai* of the Archaic Age with their elaborate and messy rituals. And it is a longer step still from Telemachus' casual acceptance of a self-confessed murderer as a shipmate to the assumptions which enabled the defendant in a late fifth-century murder trial to draw presumptive proof of his innocence from the fact that the ship on which he travelled had reached port in safety. We get a further measure of the gap if we compare Homer's version of the Oedipus saga with that familiar to us from Sophocles. In the latter, Oedipus becomes a polluted outcast, crushed under the burden of a guilt "which neither the earth nor the holy rain nor the sunlight can accept." But in the story Homer knew he continues to reign in Thebes after his guilt is discovered, and is eventually killed in battle and buried with royal honours. It was apparently a later Mainland epic, the *Thebais*, that created the Sophoclean "man of sorrows."

There is no trace in Homer of the belief that pollution was either infectious or hereditary. In the archaic view it was both, and therein lay its terror: for how could any man be sure that he had not contracted the evil thing from a chance contact, or else inherited it from the forgotten offence of some remote ancestor? Such anxieties were the more distressing for their very vagueness—the impossibility of attaching them to a cause which could be recognised and dealt with. To see in these beliefs the *origin* of the archaic sense of guilt is probably an oversimplification; but they certainly expressed it, as a Christian's sense of guilt may express itself in the haunting fear of falling into mortal sin. The distinction between the two situations is of course that sin is a condition of the will, a disease of man's inner consciousness, whereas pollution is the automatic consequence of an action, belongs to the world of external events, and operates with the same ruthless indifference to motive as a typhoid germ. Strictly speaking, the archaic sense of guilt
becomes a sense of sin only as a result of what Kardiner calls the "internalising" of conscience—a phenomenon which appears late and uncertainly in the Hellenic world, and does not become common until long after secular law had begun to recognise the importance of motive. The transference of the notion of purity from the magical to the moral sphere was a similarly late development: not until the closing years of the fifth century do we encounter explicit statements that clean hands are not enough—the heart must be clean also.

Nevertheless, we should, I think, be hesitant about drawing hard chronological lines: an idea is often obscurely at work in religious behaviour long before it reaches the point of explicit formulation. I think Pfister is probably right when he observes that in the old Greek word ἀγος (the term which describes the worst kind of miasma) the ideas of pollution, curse, and sin were already fused together at an early date. And while catharsis in the Archaic Age was doubtless often no more than the mechanical fulfilment of a ritual obligation, the notion of an automatic, quasi-physical cleansing could pass by imperceptible gradations into the deeper idea of atonement for sin. There are some recorded instances where it is hardly possible to doubt that this latter thought was involved, e.g., in the extraordinary case of the Locrian Tribute. The people who in compensation for the crime of a remote ancestor were willing year after year, century after century, to send two daughters of their noblest families to be murdered in a distant country, or at best to survive there as temple slaves—these people, one would suppose, must have laboured not only under the fear of a dangerous pollution, but under the profound sense of an inherited sin which must be thus horribly atoned.

I shall come back to the subject of catharsis in a later chapter. But it is time now to return to the notion of psychic intervention which we have already studied in Homer, and to ask what part it played in the very different religious context of the Archaic Age. The simplest way to answer this is to look at some post-Homeric usages of the word ate (or its prose equiva-
lent ἀθρόβατεν) and of the word daemon. If we do so, we shall find that in some respects the epic tradition is reproduced with remarkable fidelity. Ate still stands for irrational as distinct from rationally purposive behaviour: e.g., on hearing that Phaedra won’t eat, the Chorus enquires whether this is due to *ate* or to a suicidal purpose. Its seat is still the *thumos* or the *phrēnes,* and the agencies that cause it are much the same as in Homer: mostly an unidentified daemon or god or gods; much more rarely a specific Olympian; occasionally, as in Homer, Erinys or *moira;* once, as in the *Odyssey,* wine.

But there are also important developments. In the first place, *ate* is often, though not always, moralised, by being represented as a punishment; this appears once only in Homer—in *Iliad* 9—and next in Hesiod, who makes *ate* the penalty of *hubris* and observes with relish that “not even a nobleman” can escape it. Like other supernatural punishments, it will fall on the sinner’s descendants if the “evil debt” is not paid in his lifetime. Out of this conception of *ate* as punishment grows a wide extension of the word’s meaning. It is applied not only to the sinner’s state of mind, but to the objective disasters resulting from it: thus the Persians at Salamis experience “marine alai;” and the slaughtered sheep are the *ate* of Ajax. *Ate* thus acquires the general sense of “ruin,” in contrast with *kērδος* or *σωτηρία,* though in literature it always, I think, retains the implication that the ruin is supernaturally determined. And by a still further extension it is sometimes applied also to the instruments or embodiments of the divine anger: thus the Trojan Horse is an *ate,* and Antigone and Ismene are to Creon “a pair of *alai.*” Such usages are rooted in feeling rather than in logic: what is expressed in them is the consciousness of a mysterious dynamic nexus, the *μένος ἄτης,* as Aeschylus calls it, binding together crime and punishment; all the elements of that sinister unity are in a wide sense *ate.*

Distinct from this vaguer development is the precise theological interpretation which makes of *ate* not merely a punishment leading to physical disasters, but a deliberate deception
which draws the victim on to fresh error, intellectual or moral, whereby he hastens his own ruin—the grim doctrine that *quem deus vult perdere, prius dementat.* There is a hint of this in *Iliad* 9, where Agamemnon calls his *ate* an evil deception (*ἀπατη*) contrived by Zeus (l. 21); but there is no general statement of the doctrine in Homer or Hesiod. The orator Lycurgus attributes it to “certain old poets” unspecified and quotes from one of them a passage in iambics: “when the anger of the daemons is injuring a man, the first thing is that it takes the good understanding out of his mind and turns him to the worse judgement, so that he may not be aware of his own errors.” Similarly Theognis declares that many a man who is pursuing “virtue” and “profit” is deliberately misled by a daemon, who causes him to mistake evil for good and the profitable for the bad. Here the action of the daemon is not moralised in any way: he seems to be simply an evil spirit, tempting man to his damnation.

That such evil spirits were really feared in the Archaic Age is also attested by the words of the Messenger in the *Persae* which I have already quoted in another connection: Xerxes was tempted by an “*alastor* or evil daemon.” But Aeschylus himself knows better: as Darius’ ghost explains later, the temptation was the punishment of *hubris,* what to the partial vision of the living appears as the act of a fiend, is perceived by the wider insight of the dead to be an aspect of cosmic justice. In the *Agamemnon* we meet again the same interpretation on two levels. Where the poet, speaking through his Chorus, is able to detect the overmastering will of Zeus (*πανατιου, πανεργετα*) working itself out through an inexorable moral law, his characters see only a daemonic world, haunted by malignant forces. We are reminded of the distinction we observed in the epic between the poet’s point of view and that of his characters. Cassandra sees the Erinyes as a band of daemons, drunken with human blood; to Clytemnestra’s excited imagination, not only the Erinyes but *ate* itself are personal fiends to whom she has offered her husband as a human
sacrifice; there is even a moment when she feels her human personality lost and submerged in that of the alastor whose agent and instrument she was. This last I take to be an instance, not exactly of "possession" in the ordinary sense, but rather of what Lévy-Bruhl calls "participation," the feeling that in a certain situation a person or thing is not only itself but also something else: I should compare the "cunning Greek" of the Persae who was also an alastor, and the priestess Timo in Herodotus, the woman who tempted Miltiades to sacrilege, concerning whom Apollo declared that "not Timo was the cause of these things, but because Miltiades was destined to end ill, one appeared to him to lead him into evil"—she had acted, not as a human person, but as the agent of a supernatural purpose.

This haunted, oppressive atmosphere in which Aeschylus' characters move seems to us infinitely older than the clear air breathed by the men and gods of the Iliad. That is why Glotz called Aeschylus "ce revenant de Mycènes" (though he added that he was also a man of his own time); that is why a recent German writer asserts that he "revived the world of the daemons, and especially the evil daemons." But to speak thus is in my view completely to misapprehend both Aeschylus' purpose and the religious climate of the age in which he lived. Aeschylus did not have to revive the world of the daemons: it is the world into which he was born. And his purpose is not to lead his fellow-countrymen back into that world, but, on the contrary, to lead them through it and out of it. This he sought to do, not like Euripides by casting doubt on its reality through intellectual and moral argument, but by showing it to be capable of a higher interpretation, and, in the Eumenides, by showing it transformed through Athena's agency into the new world of rational justice.

The daemonic, as distinct from the divine, has at all periods played a large part in Greek popular belief (and still does). People in the Odyssey, as we saw in chapter i, attribute many events in their lives, both mental and physical, to the agency
of anonymous daemons; we get the impression, however, that they do not always mean it very seriously. But in the age that lies between the *Odyssey* and the *Oresteia*, the daemons seem to draw closer: they grow more persistent, more insidious, more sinister. Theognis and his contemporaries did take seriously the daemon who tempts man to *ate*, as appears from the passages I quoted just now. And the belief lived on in the popular mind long after Aeschylus’ day. The Nurse in the *Medea* knows that *ate* is the work of an angry daemon, and she links it up with the old idea of *phthonos*: the greater the household, the greater the *ate*; only the obscure are safe from it. And as late as the year 330 the orator Aeschines could suggest, though with a cautious “perhaps,” that a certain rude fellow who interrupted his speech at the Amphictyonic Council may have been led on to this unseemly behaviour by “something daemonic” (*δαιμονίου τινὸς παραγομένου*).

Closely akin to this agent of *ate* are those irrational impulses which arise in a man against his will to tempt him. When Theognis calls hope and fear “dangerous daemons,” or when Sophocles speaks of Eros as a power that “warps to wrong the righteous mind, for its destruction,” we should not dismiss this as “personification”: behind it lies the old Homeric feeling that these things are not truly part of the self, since they are not within man’s conscious control; they are endowed with a life and energy of their own, and so can force a man, as it were from the outside, into conduct foreign to him. We shall see in later chapters that strong traces of this way of interpreting the passions survive even in writers like Euripides and Plato.

To a different type belong the daemons projected by a particular human situation. As Professor Frankfort has said with reference to other ancient peoples, “evil spirits are often no more than the evil itself conceived as substantial and equipped with power.” It is thus that the Greeks spoke of famine and pestilence as “gods,” and that the modern Athenian believes a certain cleft in the Hill of the Nymphs to be inhabited by three demons whose names are Cholera, Smallpox, and
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Plague. These are powerful forces in whose grip mankind is helpless; and deity is power. It is thus that the persistent power and pressure of a hereditary pollution can take shape as the Aeschylean $\delta a\i$mw $\gamma e\nu n$s, and that, more specifically, the blood-guilt situation is projected as an Erinys.\(^{75}\) Such beings, as we have seen, are not wholly external to their human agents and victims: Sophocles can speak of “an Erinys in the brain.”\(^{76}\) Yet they are objective, since they stand for the objective rule that blood must be atoned; it is only Euripides\(^{77}\) and Mr. T. S. Eliot who psychologise them as the pangs of conscience.

A third type of daemon, who makes his first appearance in the Archaic Age, is attached to a particular individual, usually from birth, and determines, wholly or in part, his individual destiny. We meet him first in Hesiod and Phocylides.\(^{78}\) He represents the individual $m$oira or “portion” of which Homer speaks,\(^{79}\) but in the personal form which appealed to the imagination of the time. Often he seems to be no more than a man’s “luck” or fortune;\(^{80}\) but this luck is not conceived as an extraneous accident—it is as much part of a man’s natal endowment as beauty or talent. Theognis laments that more depends on one’s daemon than on one’s character: if your daemon is of poor quality, mere good judgement is of no avail—your enterprises come to nothing.\(^{81}\) In vain did Heraclitus protest that “character is destiny” ($\zeta h o s$ $\alpha n$\thor$\o t\i$ $\delta a i m o w$); he failed to kill the superstition. The words $k a k o \delta a i m o w$ and $d a i m o w$ seem in fact to be fifth-century coinages ($e d a i m o w$ is as old as Hesiod). In the fate which overtook great kings and generals—a Candaules or a Miltiades—Herodotus sees neither external accident nor the consequence of character, but “what had to be”—$x r o n \gamma a p$ $K a n d a i l h \gamma e n e \theta a i$ $k a k \o s$.\(^{82}\) Pindar piously reconciles this popular fatalism with the will of God: “the great purpose of Zeus directs the daemon of the men he loves.”\(^{83}\) Eventually Plato picked up and completely transformed the idea, as he did with so many elements of popular belief: the daemon becomes a sort of lofty spirit-guide, or Freudian Super-ego,\(^{84}\) who in the $T i m a e u s$ is identified with the element of pure
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reason in man. In that glorified dress, made morally and philosophically respectable, he enjoyed a renewed lease of life in the pages of Stoics and Neoplatonists, and even of medi­aeval Christian writers.

Such, then, were some of the daemons who formed part of the religious inheritance of the fifth century B.C. I have not attempted to draw anything like a complete picture of that inheritance. Certain other aspects of it will emerge in later chapters. But we cannot go further without pausing to ask ourselves a question, one which must already have formed itself in the mind of the reader. How are we to conceive the relationship between the “guilt-culture” I have been describing in these last pages and the “shame-culture” with which I dealt in the first chapter? What historical forces determined the differences between them? I have tried to indicate that the contrast is less absolute than some scholars have assumed. We have followed various threads that lead from Homer down into the imperfectly mapped jungle of the Archaic Age, and out beyond it into the fifth century. The discontinuity is not complete. Nevertheless, a real difference of religious outlook separates Homer’s world even from that of Sophocles, who has been called the most Homeric of poets. Is it possible to make any guess at the underlying causes of that difference?

To such a question we cannot hope to find any single, simple answer. For one thing, we are not dealing with a continuous historical evolution, by which one type of religious outlook was gradually transformed into another. We need not, indeed, adopt the extreme view that Homeric religion is nothing but a poetic invention, “as remote from reality and life as the artificial Homeric language.” But there is good reason to suppose that the epic poets ignored or minimised many beliefs and practices which existed in their day but did not commend themselves to their patrons. For example, the old cathartic scapegoat-magic was practised in Ionia in the sixth century, and had presumably been brought there by the first colonists, since the same ritual was observed in Attica. The poets of the
Iliad and the Odyssey must have seen it done often enough. But they excluded it from their poems, as they excluded much else that seemed barbarous to them and to their upper-class audience. They give us, not something completely unrelated to traditional belief, but a selection from traditional belief—the selection that suited an aristocratic military culture, as Hesiod gives us the selection proper to a peasant culture. Unless we allow for this, comparison of the two will produce an exaggerated impression of historical discontinuity.

Nevertheless, when all such allowances have been made, there is an important residue of differences which seem to represent, not different selections from a common culture, but genuine cultural changes. The development of some of these we can trace—scanty though our evidence is—within the limits of the Archaic Age itself. Even Pfister, for example, recognises "an undeniable growth of anxiety and dread in the evolution of Greek religion." 89 It is true that the notions of pollution, of purification, of divine phthonos, may well be part of the original Indo-European inheritance. But it was the Archaic Age that recast the tales of Oedipus and Orestes as horror-stories of bloodguilt; that made purification a main concern of its greatest religious institution, the Oracle of Delphi; that magnified the importance of phthonos until it became for Herodotus the underlying pattern of all history. This is the sort of fact that we have to explain.

I may as well confess at once that I have no complete explanation to give; I can only guess at some partial answers. No doubt general social conditions account for a good deal. 90 In Mainland Greece (and we are concerned here with Mainland tradition) the Archaic Age was a time of extreme personal insecurity. The tiny overpopulated states were just beginning to struggle up out of the misery and impoverishment left behind by the Dorian invasions, when fresh trouble arose: whole classes were ruined by the great economic crisis of the seventh century, and this in turn was followed by the great political conflicts of the sixth, which translated the economic crisis into
terms of murderous class warfare. It is very possible that the resulting upheaval of social strata, by bringing into prominence submerged elements of the mixed population, encouraged the reappearance of old culture-patterns which the common folk had never wholly forgotten. Moreover, insecure conditions of life might in themselves favour the development of a belief in daemons, based on the sense of man's helpless dependence upon capricious Power; and this in turn might encourage an increased resort to magical procedures, if Malinowski was right in holding that the biological function of magic is to relieve pent-up and frustrated feelings which can find no rational outlet. It is also likely, as I suggested earlier, that in minds of a different type prolonged experience of human injustice might give rise to the compensatory belief that there is justice in Heaven. It is doubtless no accident that the first Greek to preach divine justice was Hesiod—"the helots' poet," as King Cleomenes called him, and a man who had himself smarted under "crooked judgements." Nor is it accidental that in this age the doom overhanging the rich and powerful becomes so popular a theme with poets—in striking contrast to Homer, for whom, as Murray has observed, the rich men are apt to be specially virtuous.

With these safe generalities scholars more prudent than I am will rest content. So far as they go, I think they are valid. But as an explanation of the more specific developments in archaic religious feeling—particularly that growing sense of guilt—I cannot convince myself that they go the whole way. And I will risk the suggestion that they should be supplemented (but not replaced) by another sort of approach, which would start not from society at large but from the family. The family was the keystone of the archaic social structure, the first organised unit, the first domain of law. Its organisation, as in all Indo-European societies, was patriarchal; its law was patria potestas. The head of a household is its king, oikovos avat; and his position is still described by Aristotle as analogous to that of a king. Over his children his authority is in early times un-
limited: he is free to expose them in infancy; and in manhood to expel an erring or rebellious son from the community, as Theseus expelled Hippolytus, as Oeneus expelled Tydeus, as Strophios expelled Pylades, as Zeus himself cast out Hephaestos from Olympus for siding with his mother. In relation to his father, the son had duties but no rights; while his father lived, he was a perpetual minor—a state of affairs which lasted at Athens down to the sixth century, when Solon introduced certain safeguards. And indeed more than two centuries after Solon the tradition of family jurisdiction was still so strong that even Plato—who was certainly no admirer of the family—had to give it a place in his legislation.

So long as the old sense of family solidarity was unshaken, the system presumably worked. The son gave the father the same unquestioning obedience which in due course he would receive from his own children. But with the relaxation of the family bond, with the growing claim of the individual to personal rights and personal responsibility, we should expect those internal tensions to develop which have so long characterised family life in Western societies. That they had in fact begun to show themselves overtly in the sixth century, we may infer from Solon’s legislative intervention. But there is also a good deal of indirect testimony to their covert influence. The peculiar horror with which the Greeks viewed offences against a father, and the peculiar religious sanctions to which the offender was thought to be exposed, are in themselves suggestive of strong repressions. So are the many stories in which a father’s curse produces terrible consequences—stories like those of Phoenix, of Hippolytus, of Pelops and his sons, of Oedipus and his sons—all of them, it would seem, products of a relatively late period, when the position of the father was no longer entirely secure. Suggestive in a different way is the barbarous tale of Kronos and Ouranos, which Archaic Greece may have borrowed from a Hittite source. There the mythological projection of unconscious desires is surely transparent—as Plato perhaps felt when he declared that this story was fit to
be communicated only to a very few in some exceptional \( \mu \nu \sigma \tau \acute{\mu} \rho \iota \omicron \nu \) and should at all costs be kept from the young.\(^{103}\)

But to the eye of the psychologist the most significant evidence is that afforded by certain passages in writers of the Classical Age. The typical example by which Aristophanes illustrates the pleasures of life in Cloudcuckooland, that dream-country of wish-fulfilment, is that if you up and thrash your father, people will admire you for it: it is \( \kappa \alpha \lambda \nu \) instead of being \( \alpha \iota \sigma \chi \rho \omicron \nu \).\(^{104}\)

And when Plato wants to illustrate what happens when rational controls are not functioning, his typical example is the Oedipus dream. His testimony is confirmed by Sophocles, who makes Jocasta declare that such dreams are common; and by Herodotus, who quotes one.\(^{105}\) It seems not unreasonable to argue from identical symptoms to some similarity in the cause, and conclude that the family situation in ancient Greece, like the family situation to-day, gave rise to infantile conflicts whose echoes lingered in the unconscious mind of the adult. With the rise of the Sophistic Movement, the conflict became in many households a fully conscious one: young men began to claim that they had a "natural right" to disobey their fathers.\(^{106}\) But it is a fair guess that such conflicts already existed at the unconscious level from a very much earlier date—that in fact they go back to the earliest unconfessed stirrings of individualism in a society where family solidarity was still universally taken for granted.

You see perhaps where all this is tending. The psychologists have taught us how potent a source of guilt-feelings is the pressure of unacknowledged desires, desires which are excluded from consciousness save in dreams or daydreams, yet are able to produce in the self a deep sense of moral uneasiness. This uneasiness often takes a religious form to-day; and if a similar feeling existed in Archaic Greece, this would be the natural form for it to take. For, to begin with, the human father had from the earliest times his heavenly counterpart: Zeus \( \textit{pater} \) belongs to the Indo-European inheritance, as his Latin and Sanskrit equivalents indicate; and Calhoun has
shown how closely the status and conduct of the Homeric Zeus is modelled on that of the Homeric paterfamilias, the οἶκος αὐτης. In cult also Zeus appears as a supernatural Head of the Household: as Patroos he protects the family, as Herkeios its dwelling, as Ktesios its property. It was natural to project on to the heavenly Father those curious mixed feelings about the human one which the child dared not acknowledge even to himself. That would explain very nicely why in the Archaic Age Zeus appears by turns as the inscrutable source of good and evil gifts alike; as the jealous god who grudges his children their heart’s desire; and finally as the awful judge, just but stern, who punishes inexorably the capital sin of self-assertion, the sin of hubris. (This last aspect corresponds to that phase in the development of family relations when the authority of the father is felt to need the support of a moral sanction; when “You will do it because I say so” gives place to “You will do it because it is right.”) And secondly, the cultural inheritance which Archaic Greece shared with Italy and India included a set of ideas about ritual impurity which provided a natural explanation for guilt-feelings generated by repressed desires. An archaic Greek who suffered from such feelings was able to give them concrete form by telling himself that he must have been in contact with miasma, or that his burden was inherited from the religious offence of an ancestor. And, more important, he was able to relieve them by undergoing a cathartic ritual. Have we not here a possible clue to the part played in Greek culture by the idea of catharsis, and the gradual development from it, on the one hand of the notions of sin and atonement, on the other of Aristotle’s psychological purgation, which relieves us of unwanted feelings through contemplating their projection in a work of art?

I will not pursue these speculations further. They are clearly incapable of direct proof. At best, they may receive indirect confirmation if social psychology succeeds in establishing analogous developments in cultures more accessible to detailed study. Work on those lines is now being done, but it would be
premature to generalise its results. In the meantime, I shall not complain if classical scholars shake their heads over the foregoing remarks. And, to avoid misunderstanding, I would in conclusion emphasise two things. First, I do not expect this particular key, or any key, to open all the doors. The evolution of a culture is too complex a thing to be explained without residue in terms of any simple formula, whether economic or psychological, begotten of Marx or begotten of Freud. We must resist the temptation to simplify what is not simple. And secondly, to explain origins is not to explain away values. We should beware of underrating the religious significance of the ideas I have discussed to-day, even where, like the doctrine of divine temptation, they are repugnant to our moral sense. Nor should we forget that out of this archaic guilt-culture there arose some of the profoundest tragic poetry that man has produced. It was above all Sophocles, the last great exponent of the archaic world-view, who expressed the full tragic significance of the old religious themes in their unsoftened, unmoralised forms—the overwhelming sense of human helplessness in face of the divine mystery, and of the **āte** that waits on all human achievement—and who made these thoughts part of the cultural inheritance of Western Man. Let me end this chapter by quoting a lyric from the *Antigone* which conveys far better than I could convey it the beauty and terror of the old beliefs.

Blessed is he whose life has not tasted of evil.
When God has shaken a house, the winds of madness
Lash its breed till the breed is done:
  Even so the deep-sea swell
  Raked by wicked Thracian winds
Scours in its running the subaqueous darkness,
Churns the silt black from sea-bottom;
And the windy cliffs roar as they take its shock.

Here on the Labdacid house long we watched it piling,
Trouble on dead men’s trouble: no generation
Frees the next from the stroke of God:
  Deliverance does not come.
The final branch of Oedipus
Grew in his house, and a lightness hung above it:
To-day they reap it with Death's red sickle,
The unwise mouth and the tempter who sits in the brain.

The power of God man's arrogance shall not limit:
Sleep who takes all in his net takes not this,
Nor the unflagging months of Heaven—ageless the Master
Holds for ever the shimmering courts of Olympus.

For time approaching, and time hereafter,
And time forgotten, one rule stands:
That greatness never
Shall touch the life of man without destruction.

Hope goes fast and far: to many it carries comfort,
To many it is but the trick of light-witted desire—
Blind we walk, till the unseen flame has trapped our footsteps.

For old anonymous wisdom has left us a saying
"Of a mind that God leads to destruction
The sign is this—that in the end
Its good is evil."

Not long shall that mind evade destruction.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1 The Archaic Age is usually made to end with the Persian Wars, and for the purposes of political history this is the obvious dividing line. But for the history of thought the true cleavage falls later, with the rise of the Sophistic Movement. And even then the line of demarcation is chronologically ragged. In his thought, though not in his literary technique, Sophocles (save perhaps in his latest plays) still belongs entirely to the older world; so, in most respects, does his friend Herodotus (cf. Wilamowitz, Hermes, 34 [1899]; E. Meyer, Forschungen z. alt. Gesch. II.252 ff.; F. Jacoby, P.-W., Supp.-Band II, 479 ff.). Aeschylus, on the other hand, struggling as he does to interpret and rationalise the legacy of the Archaic Age, is in many ways prophetic of the new time.

2 The feeling of ἀνέγκαστι is well illustrated from the early lyric poets by Snell, Die Entdeckung des Geistes, 68 ff. In the following pages I am especially indebted to Latte's brilliant paper, "Schuld u. Sünde i. d. gr. Religion," Arch.f. Rel. 20 (1920-1921) 254 ff.
3 All Herodotus' wise men know this: Solon, 1.32; Amasis, 3.40; Artabanus, 7.106. On the meaning of the word ἕθος cf. Snell, Aischylos u. das Handeln im Drama, 72, n. 108; Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, 118; and for its association with ταραχή Pind. Isthm. 7.39: ὁ δ’ ἀθανάτων μὴ τραυστέων ἕθος. Ταραχή is regularly used of supernatural interference, e.g., Aesch. Cho. 289; Plato, Laws 865E.

5 Il. 24.525-533.

6 Semonides of Amorgos, 1.1 ff. Bergk. On the meaning of τετυμεροῦ see H. Fränkel, TAPA 77 (1946) 131 ff.; on that of τῆς F. Wehrli, Λάδε βιωσάς, 8, n. 4.

Theognis, 133-136, 141-142. For man's lack of insight into his own situation cf. also Heraclitus, fr. 78 Diels: ἔθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπων μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, θέου δὲ ἔχει, and for his lack of control over it, H. Apoll. 192 ff., Simonides, frs. 61, 62 Bergk; for both, Solon, 13.63 ff. This is also the teaching of Sophocles, for whom all men's generations are a nothingness—ὐσα καὶ τὸ μὴ δεῖν γοῦσα, O.T. 1186—when we see their life as time and the gods see it; viewed thus, men are but phantoms or shadows (Ajax 125).

7 Agam. 750.

8 The unmoralised belief is common among primitive peoples to-day (Lévy-Bruhl, Primitives and the Supernatural, 45). In its moralised form it appears in classical China: "If you are rich and of exalted station," says the Tao Te Ching (? fourth century B.C.), "you become proud, and thus abandon yourself to unavoidable ruin. When everything goes well, it is wise to put yourself in the background." It has left its mark also on the Old Testament: e.g., Isaiah 10: 12 ff., "I will punish . . . the glory of his high looks. For he saith, By the strength of my hand I have done it, and by my wisdom. . . . Shall the ax boast itself against him that heweth therewith?" For the notion of κόρος, cf. Proverbs 30: 8 f., "Give me neither poverty nor riches; feed me with food convenient for me: Lest I be full, and deny thee, and say, Who is the Lord?"

9 Od. 5.118 ff. Cf. 4.181 f.; 8.565 f. = 13.173 f.; 23.210 ff. All these are in speeches. The instances which some claim to find in the Iliad, e.g., 17.71, are of a different type, and hardly true cases of ἕθος.

10 Pers. 353 f., 362. This is not, strictly speaking, a new development. We have noticed a similar "overdetermination" in Homer (chap. i, pp. 7, 16). It is common among present-day primitives: e.g., Evans-Pritchard tells us that among the Azande "belief in death
from natural causes and belief in death from witchcraft are not mutually exclusive" (*Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic*, 73).


12 E.g., Hdt. 7.10. Sophocles seems nowhere to moralise the idea, which appears at *El.* 1466, *Phil.* 776, and is stated as a general doctrine (if πάμπολυ γ’ is right) at *Ant.* 613 ff. And cf. Aristophanes, *Plut.* 87–92, where it is argued that Zeus must have a special grudge against the χρηστὸι.

13 For ὕβρις as the πρῶτον κακόν see Theognis, 151 f.; for its universality, *H. Apoll.* 541: ὕβρις θ’, ἣ θέμας ἐκτι καταθνήτων ἀνθρώπων, and Archilochus, fr. 88: ὥ Ζεῦ . . . σοι δὲ θηρίων ὕβρις τε καὶ δίκη μέλει. Cf. also Heraclitus, fr. 43 D.: ὕβριν χρὴ σβεννύαι μᾶλλον ἥ πυρκαῖν. For the dangers of happiness cf. Murray’s remark that “It is a bad look-out for any one in Greek poetry when he is called ‘a happy man’” (*Aeschylus*, 193).

14 *I.A.* 1089–1097.

15 *Il.* 9.456 f., 571 f.; cf. *Od.* 2.134 f., 11.280. It is worth noticing that three of these passages occur in narratives which we may suppose to be borrowed from Mainland epics, while the fourth belongs to the “Telemachy.”


18 Those who argue otherwise seem to me to confuse the punishment of perjury as an offence against the divine τιμή (4.158 ff.), and the punishment of offences against hospitality by Zeus Xeinios (13.623 ff.), with a concern for justice as such.


20 *Od.* 6.207 f.

21 *Od.* 1.32 ff. On the significance of this much-discussed passage see most recently K. Deichgräber, *Göt. Nachr.* 1940, and W. Nestle, *Vom Mythos zum Logos*, 24. Even if the καὶ in 1.33 is to be taken as “also,” I cannot agree with Wilamowitz (Glaube, II.118) that “der Dichter des Α hat nichts neues gesagt.”

22 *Od.* 23.67: δ’ ἀτασθαλίας ἔπαθον κακόν, the same word that Zeus uses at 1.34. We must, of course, remember that the *Odyssey*, unlike the *Iliad*, has a large fairy-tale element, and that the hero of
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a fairy-tale is bound to win in the end. But the poet who gave the story its final shape seems to have taken the opportunity to emphasise the lesson of divine justice.


24 Poetics 1453a 34.

25 Solon, 13.31; Theognis, 731-742. Cf. also Sophocles, O.C. 964 ff. (where Webster, Introduction to Sophocles, 31, is surely mistaken in saying that Oedipus rejects the explanation by inherited guilt). For Aeschylus’ attitude, see later in the present chapter, pp. 39 ff. Herodotus sees such deferred punishment as peculiarly δίκαιον, and contrasts it with human justice (τὸ δίκαιον), 7.137.2.

26 Cf., e.g., the case of Achan, in which an entire household, including even the animals, is destroyed on account of a minor religious offence committed by one of its members (Joshua 7: 24 ff.). But such mass executions were later forbidden, and the doctrine of inherited guilt is explicitly condemned by Jeremiah (31: 29 f.) and by Ezekiel (18: 20, “The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father,” and the whole chapter). It appears nevertheless as a popular belief in John 9: 2, where the disciples ask, “Who did sin, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?”

27 Some examples will be found in Lévy-Bruhl, The “Soul” of the Primitive, chap. ii, and Primitives and the Supernatural, 212 ff.

28 Cf. Kaibel, Epigr. graec. 402; Antiphon, Tetral. II.2.10; Plutarch, ser. vind. 16, 559D.

29 Hdt. 1.91: cf. Gernet, Recherches sur le développement de la pensée juridique et morale en Grèce, 313, who coins the word “chosisme” to describe this conception of ἀμαρτία.


31 Theae. 173D, Rep. 364BC. Cf. also [Lys.] 6.20; Dem. 57.27; and the implied criticism in Isocrates, Busiris 25.

32 Laws 856c, πατρὸς ονείδη καὶ τιμωρίας παιδῶν μηδὲν συνέπεσθαί. This, however, is subject to exception (856D); and the heritability of religious guilt is recognised in connection with the appointment of priests (759c), and with sacrilege (854B, where I take the guilt to be that of the Titans, cf. infra, chap. v, n. 133).

33 Plut. ser. vind. 19, 561C ff. If we can believe Diog. Laertius (4.46), Bion had every reason to be bitter about the doctrine of inherited guilt: he and his whole family had been sold into slavery on account of an offence committed by his father. His redactio ad ab-
surdum of family solidarity has its parallels in actual practice: see Lévy-Bruhl, *The "Soul" of the Primitive*, 87, and *Primitive Mentality*, 417.

34 Theognis, 147; Phocyl. 17. Justice is the daughter of Zeus (Hesiod, *Erga* 256; Aesch. *Sept.* 662) or his παρεδρός (Pindar, *Ol.* 8.21; Soph. *O.C.* 1382). Cf. the Presocratic interpretation of natural law as δίκη, which has been studied by H. Kelsen, *Society and Nature*, chap. v, and by G. Vlastos in a penetrating paper, *CP* 42 (1947) 156 ff. This emphasis on justice, human, natural, or supernatural, seems to be a distinctive mark of guilt-cultures. The nature of the psychological connection was indicated by Margaret Mead in an address to the International Congress on Mental Health in 1948: "Criminal law which metes out due punishment for proved crimes is the governmental counterpart of the type of parental authority which develops the sort of internalised parent image conducive to a sense of guilt." It is probably significant that in the *Iliad* δίκαως occurs only thrice, and perhaps only once means "just."


37 L.-S. (and Campbell Bonner, *Harv. Theol. Rev.* 30 [1937] 122) are mistaken in attributing an active sense to θεοφιλῶς at Isocrates 4.29. The context shows that the reference is to Demeter's love of Athens, πρὸς τοὺς προγάνους ἡμῶν εὐμενῶς διατεθείης (28).

38 *M.M.* 1208 b 30: κρότων γὰρ ἄν ἐλη ἐλ τις φατην Φίλειν τῶν Δια. The possibility of φίλα between man and God was denied also by Aristotle, *E.N.* 1159 a 5 ff. But we can hardly doubt that the Athenians loved their goddess: cf. Aesch. *Eum.* 999: παρθένων φιλαί φιλοι καὶ Solon 4.3 f. The same relationship of absolute trust exists in the *Odyssey* between Athena and Odysseus (see esp. *Od.* 13.287 ff.). No doubt it derives ultimately from her original function as a protectress of Mycenaean kings (Nilsson, *Minoan-Mycenaean Religion*, 491 ff.).

39 That Homer knows anything of magical κάθαρτις is denied by Stengel (*Hermes*, 41.241) and others. But that the purifications described at *Il.* 1.314 and at *Od.* 22.480 ff. are thought of as cathartic in the magical sense seems fairly clear, in the one case from the disposal of the λύματα, in the other from the description of the brimstone as κακῶς δικός. Cf. Nilsson, *Gesch.* I.82 f.
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40 Od. 15.256 ff.; Antiphan, de caede Herodis 82 f. For the older attitude cf. also Hesiod, fr. 144.
43 The infectious character of μιασμα is first attested by Hesiod, Erga 240. The leges sacrae of Cyrene (Solmsen, Inscr. Gr. dial. No. 39) include detailed prescriptions about its extent in individual cases; for the Attic law cf. Dem. 20.158. That it was still commonly accepted in the Classical Age appears from such passages as Aesch. Sept. 597 ff., Soph. O.C. 1482 f., Eur. I.T. 1229, Antiph. Tetr. 1.1.3, Lys. 13.79. Euripides protested against it, Her. 1233 f., I.T. 380 ff.; but Plato would still debar from all religious or civic activities all individuals who have had voluntary contact, however slight, with a polluted person, until they have been purified (Laws 881 DE).
44 The distinction was first clearly stated by Rohde, Psyche (Eng. trans.), 294 ff. The mechanical nature of μιασμα is evident not only from its infectiousness but from the puerile devices by which it could be avoided: cf. Soph. Ant. 773 ff., with Jebb's note, and the Athenian practice of putting criminals to death by self-administered hemlock.
45 See F. Zucker's interesting lecture, Syneidesis-Conscientia (Jenaer Akademische Reden, Heft 6, 1928). It is, I think, significant that side by side with the old objective words for religious guilt (άγως, μιασμα) we meet for the first time in the later years of the fifth century a term for the consciousness of such guilt (whether as a scruple about incurring it or as remorse for guilt already incurred). This term is ἐνθυμομαι (or ἐνθυμία, Thuc. 5.16.1), a word long in use to describe anything "weighing on one's spirits," but used by Herodotus, Thucydides, Antiphan, Sophocles, and Euripides with specific reference to the sense of religious guilt (Wilamowitz on Heracles 722; Hatch, Harv. Stud. in Class. Phil. 19.172 ff.). Democritus has ἐγκαρδομαι in the same sense (fr. 262). The specific usage is practically confined to this particular period; it vanished, as Wilamowitz says, with the decline of the old beliefs, whose psychological correlate it was.
46 Eur. Or. 1602-1604, Ar. Ran. 355, and the well-known Epidaurian inscription (early fourth century?) quoted by Theophrastus, apud Porph. abst. 2.19, which defines ἄγνεια as φορεῖν δοσια. (I neglect Epicharmus, fr. 26 Diels, which I cannot believe to be genuine.)
As Rohde pointed out (Psyche, ix, n. 80), the shift of standpoint is well illustrated by Eur. Hipp. 316-318, where by μίασμα φρενός Phaedra means impure thoughts, but the Nurse understands the phrase as referring to magical attack (μίασμα can be imposed by cursing, e.g., Solmsen, Inscr. Gr. dial. 6.29). The antithesis between hand and heart may in fact have involved at first merely the contrast between an external and an internal physical organ, but since the latter was a vehicle of consciousness its physical pollution became also a moral pollution (Festugière, La Sainteté, 19 ff.).

40 Art. κόθαρσις, P.-W., Supp.-Band VI (this article provides the best analysis I have seen of the religious ideas associated with purification). On the original fusion of “objective” and “subjective” aspects, and the eventual distinction of the latter from the former, see also Gernet, Pensée juridique et morale, 323 ff.

49 Cf. for example the cathartic sacrifice to Zeus Meilichios at the Diasia, which we are told was offered μετὰ τινὸς στυγνότητος (Σ Lucian, Icaromen. 24)—not exactly “in a spirit of contrition,” but “in an atmosphere of gloom” created by the sense of divine hostility.

50 The evidence about the Locrian Tribute, and references to earlier discussions of it, will be found in Farnell, Hero Cults, 294 ff. Cf. also Parke, Hist. of the Delphic Oracle, 331 ff. To a similar context of ideas belongs the practice of “dedicating” (δεκαρεβευ) a guilty people to Apollo. This meant enslaving them and pastoralising their land; it was carried out in the case of Crisa in the sixth century, and was threatened against the Medizers in 479 and against Athens in 404. (Cf. Parke, Hermathena, 72 [1948] 82 ff.)


53 Aesch. Cho. 382 f. (Zeus); Soph. Aj. 363, 976 (the madness sent by Athena is called ἀνη).  


So perhaps Soph. Trach. 849 f. And cf. Herodotus’ conception of disastrous decisions as predetermined by the destiny of the person who takes them: θυμὸς δὲ κακῶς γὰρ ἔδει πανοκλῆ γενέσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα εἰπε Ξέρχετε κτλ.; 1.8.2, 2.161.3, 6.135.3.

55 Panyassis, fr. 13.8 Kinkel.

56 Erga 214 ff.
In Dorian law ἀτη seems to have become completely secularized as a term for any legal penalty: leg. Gortyn. 11.34 (GDJ 4991).

In Leocratem 92. Cf. the similar anonymous γνώμη quoted by Sophocles, Ant. 620 ff.

Aesch. Pers. 354 (cf. 472, 724 f.); contrast 808, 821 f. The divine ἀπάτη is thus for Aeschylus δικαία (fr. 301). In his condemnation of those who make gods the cause of evil Plato included Aeschylus, on the strength of Niobe’s words: θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φθεὶ βροτοῖς, δεν κακώσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θήλη (fr. 156, apud Pl. Rep. 380a). But he omitted to quote the δὲ clause, which contained—as we now know from the Niobe papyrus, D. L. Page, Greek Literary Papyri, I.1, p. 8—a warning against βῆθι, μὴ θρασυτομεῖν. Here, as elsewhere, Aeschylus carefully recognised man’s contribution to his own fate.

Aesch. Agam. 1486; cf. 160 ff., 1563 f.

Eur. Med. 122–130. Phaedra too ascribes her state to δαιμόνος ἀτη, Hipp. 241. And we know from a treatise in the Hippocratic corpus (Virg. 1, VIII.466 L.), that mental disturbance often showed itself in dreams or visions of angry daemons.

Aeschin. in Cleis. 117. Aeschines knew that he was living in a strange, revolutionary time, when the old centres of power were giving place to new ones (ibid., 132), and this inclined him, like Herodotus, to see the hand of God everywhere. Thus he speaks of the Thebans as τὴν γε θεοθήλατειν καὶ τὴν ἀφροτήτην οὐκ ἀνθρωπίως ἀλλὰ δαιμονίως κτησάμενοι (ibid., 133).

Theognis, 637 f.; Soph. Ant. 791 f. On Ἐλπίς see Wehrli, Δάθε βιώσας, 6 ff.
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75 For the view of the modern Athenian see Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion*, 21 ff. For bloodguilt projected as an Erinys cf. Aesch. Cho. 283: προσβολάς 'Ερυνών ἐκ τῶν πατρώων αλμάτων τελουμένας, with Verrall ad loc.; *ibid.*, 402; Antiphon, *Tetral. 3.1.4.*

76 Soph. *Ant.* 603. Cf. the verb δαίμων, used both of "haunted" places (Cho. 566) and of "possessed" persons (*Sept. 1001, Phoen. 888*).

77 Eur. *Or.* 395 ff. If letters VII and VIII are genuine, even Plato believed in objective beings who punish bloodguilt: VII.336β: ἡ ποῦ τις δαίμων ἡ τίς ἀληθήρας ἐμπεσὼν (cf. 326ε); VIII.357α: ἐννεκά ἔρυνες ἕκωλυσαν.


80 δαίμων (the religious interpretation) and τῆς (the profane or non-committal view) are not felt to be mutually exclusive, and are in fact often coupled: Ar. *Av.* 544: καὶ δαίμονα καὶ (τίνα) συντυχιαν ἀγαθὴν, Lys. 13.63: τῆς καὶ ὁ δαίμων, [Dem.] 48.24, Aeschin. in *Ctes.* 115, Aristotle, fr. 44. Eur., however, distinguishes them as alternatives (fr. 901.2). In the concept of θεᾶ τῆς (Soph. *Phil.* 1326, and often in Plato) chance regains the religious value which primitive thought assigns to it (chap. i, n. 25).

81 Theochnis, 161-166.

82 Hdt. 1.8.2. Cf. n. 55 above.

83 Pindar, *Pyth.* 5.122 f. But he does not always thus moralise the
popular belief. Cf. Ol. 13.105, where the "luck" of the γέως is projected as a δαλμων.

The Stoic δαλμων comes even closer to Freud's conception than the Platonic: he is, as Bonhöffer put it (Epiketet, 84), "the ideal as contrasted with the empirical personality"; and one of his principal functions is to punish the ego for its carnal sins (cf. Heinze, Xenokrates, 130 f.; Norden, Virgil's Aeneid VI, pp. 32 f.). Apuleius, d. Socr. 16, makes the daemon reside in ipsis penitissimis mentibus vice conscientiae.

Phaedo 107d; Rep. 617de, 620de (where Plato avoids the fatalism of the popular view by making the soul choose its own guide); Tim. 90a-c (discussed below, chap. vii, pp. 213 f.).

Cf. M. Ant. 2.13, with Farquharson's note; Plut. gen. Socr. 592bc; Plot. 2.4; Rohde, Psyche, XIV, n. 44; J. Kroll, Lehren des Hermes Trismegistos, 82 ff. Norden, loc. cit., shows how the idea was taken over by Christian writers.

The evidence about the φαρμακολ is conveniently assembled in Murray's Rise of the Greek Epic, App. A. In regarding the rite as primarily cathartic I follow Deubner, Attische Feste, 193 ff., and the Greeks themselves. For a summary of other opinions see Nilsson, Gesch. I.98 f.


Some scholars would attribute the peculiarities of archaic as compared with Homeric religion to the resurgence of pre-Greek "Minoan" ideas. This may well prove to be true in certain cases. But most of the traits which I have stressed in this chapter seem to have Indo-European roots, and we should therefore hesitate, I think, to invoke "Minoan religion" in this context.

As Malinowski puts it, when a man feels himself impotent in a practical situation, "whether he be savage or civilised, whether in possession of magic or entirely ignorant of its existence, passive inaction, the only thing dictated by reason, is the last thing in which he can acquiesce. His nervous system and his whole organism drive him to some substitute activity. . . . The substitute action in which the passion finds its vent, and which is due to impotence, has subjectively all the virtue of a real action, to which emotion would, if not impeded, naturally have led" (Magic, Science and Religion). There is some evidence that the same principle
holds good for societies: e.g., Linton (in A. Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society*, 287 ff.) reports that among the effects produced by a grave economic crisis among certain of the Tanala tribes in Madagascar were a great increase in superstitious fears and the emergence of a belief in evil spirits, which had previously been lacking.

93 Plut. *Apophth. Lac.* 223A.

94 E.g., Hesiod, *Erga* 5 f.; Archilochus, fr. 56; Solon, frs. 8, 13.75; Aesch. *Sept.* 769 ff., *Agam.* 462 ff.; etc.

95 Murray, *Rise of the Greek Epic*, 90; cf. *Il.* 5.9, 6.14, 13.664, and *Od.* 18.126 f. This is the attitude to be expected in a shame-culture; wealth brings πυθή (Od. 1.392, 14.205 f.). It was still so in Hesiod’s day, and (conscious though he was of the attendant dangers) he used the fact to reinforce his gospel of work: *Erga* 313: πλούσιος δ’ ἄρετῇ καὶ κόσμος ὀπηθεί.

96 For the evidence see Glotz, *Solidarité*, 31 ff.


98 Eur. *Hipp.* 971 ff., 1042 ff. (Hippolytus expects death rather than banishment); *Alcaeus*, fr. 4 Kinkel (apud [Apollo.] *Bibl.* 1.8.5); Eur. *Or.* 765 ff.; *Il.* 1.550 ff. The myths suggest that in early times banishment was the necessary consequence of ἀποκρυφεῖς, a rule which Plato proposed to restore (*Laws* 928E).


101 Honouring one’s parents comes next in the scale of duties after fearing the gods: Pind. *Pyth.* 6.23 ff. and *Σ ad loc.*; Eur. fr. 853; Isocr. 1.16; Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.19 f., etc. For the special supernatural sanctions attaching to offences against parents see *Il.* 9.456 f.; Aesch. *Eum.* 269 ff.; Eur. frs. 82, 852; Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.21; Plato, *Euthyphro* 15D; *Phaedo* 114A; *Rep.* 615C; *Laws* 872E and esp. 880E ff.; also Paus. 10.28.4; Orph. fr. 337 Kern. For the feelings of the involuntary parricide cf. the story of Althaimenes, Diod. 5.59 (but it should be noticed that, like Oedipus, he is eventually heroised).

102 The story of Phoenix, like the rest of his speech in *Il.* 9 (432–605), seems to reflect rather late Mainland conditions: cf. chap. i, p. 6. The other stories are post-Homeric (Oedipus’ curse first in the
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103 Plato, Rep. 377E-378B. The Kronos myth has, as we should expect, parallels of a sort in many cultures; but one parallel, with the Hurrian-Hittite Epic of Kumarbi, is so close and detailed as strongly to suggest borrowing (E. Forrer, Mil. Cumont, 690 ff.; R. D. Barnett, JHS 65 [1945] 100 ff.; H. G. Güterbock, Kumarbi [Zurich, 1946], 100 ff.). This does not diminish its significance: we have to ask in that case what feelings induced the Greeks to give this monstrous Oriental phantasy a central place in their divine mythology. It is often—and perhaps rightly—thought that the "separation" of Ouranos from Gaia mythologises an imagined physical separation of sky from earth which was originally one with it (cf. Nilsson, Hist. of Greek Religion, 73). But the father-castration motive is hardly a natural, and certainly not a necessary, element in such a myth. I find its presence in the Hittite and Greek theogonies difficult to explain otherwise than as a reflex of unconscious human desires. Confirmation of this view may perhaps be seen in the birth of Aphrodite from the severed member of the old god (Hesiod, Theog. 188 ff.), which can be read as symbolising the son's attainment of sexual freedom through removal of his father-rival. What is certain is that in the Classical Age the Kronos stories were frequently appealed to as a precedent for un­filial conduct: cf. Aesch. Eum. 640 ff.; Ar. Nub. 904 ff., Av. 755 ff.; Plato, Euthyphro 5E-6A.

104 The figure of the πατραλοίας seems to have fascinated the imagination of the Classical Age: Aristophanes brings him on the stage in person, Av. 1337 ff., and shows him arguing his case, Nub. 1399 ff.; for Plato he is the stock example of wickedness (Gorg. 456D, Phd. 113E fin., etc.). It is tempting to see in this something more than a reflex of sophistic controversies, or of a particular "conflict of generations" in the late fifth century, though these no doubt helped to throw the πατραλοίας into prominence.

105 Plato, Rep. 571C; Soph. O.T. 981 f.; Hdt. 6.107.1. That undisguised Oedipus dreams were likewise common in later antiquity, and that their significance was much debated by the ὅνειροκατέκολ, appears from the unpleasantly detailed discussion of them in Artemidorus, 1.79. It may be thought that this implies a less deep and rigorous repression of incestuous desires than is usual in our own society. Plato, however, specifically testifies, not only that incest was universally regarded as αἱρεχρῶν αἱρεχριδον, but that most people were completely unconscious of any impulse towards
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it (Laws 838b). It seems that we ought rather to say that the necessary disguising of the forbidden impulse was accomplished, not within the dream itself, but by a subsequent process of interpretation, which gave it an innocuous symbolic meaning. Ancient writers do, however, also mention what would now be called disguised Oedipus dreams, e.g., the dream of plunging into water (Hipp. περὶ διαίτης 4.90, VI.658 Littré).

Cf. S. Luria, "Väter und Söhne in den neuen literarischen Papyri," Aegyptus, 7 (1926) 243 ff., a paper which contains an interesting collection of evidence on family relations in the Classical Age, but seems to me to exaggerate the importance of intellectual influences, and in particular that of the sophist Antiphon.

G. M. Calhoun, "Zeus the Father in Homer," TAPA 66 (1935) 1 ff. Conversely, later Greeks thought it right to treat one's parent "like a god": θέσ μέγιστος τοῖς φρονοῦσιν οι γονεῖς (Dicaeogenes, fr. 5 Nauck); νόμος γονείσιν ισοθέοις τιμᾶς νέμειν (Menander, fr. 805 K.).

The doctrine of divine ὕθυμα has often been regarded as a simple projection of the resentment felt by the unsuccessful against the eminent (cf. the elaborate but monomaniac book of Ranulf). There is no doubt a measure of truth in this theory. Certainly divine and human ὕθυμα have much in common, e.g., both work through the Evil Eye. But passages like Hdt. 7.46.4: ὅ δὲ θέσ γλυκὸν γεῦσα τῶν ἄλων ὕθυμα ἡθνέρος ἐν αὐτῷ εὐρισκεται ἐὼν to my mind point in a different direction. They recall rather Piaget's observation that "children sometimes think the opposite from what they want, as if reality made a point of failing their desires" (quoted by A. R. Burn, The World of Hesiod, 93, who confirms the statement from his own experience). Such a state of mind is a typical by-product of a guilt-culture in which domestic discipline is severe and repressive. It may easily persist in adult life and find expression in quasi-religious terms.

Rohde called attention to the similarity between Greek ideas about pollution and purification and those of early India (Psyche, chap. ix, n. 78). Cf. Keith, Religion and Philosophy of Veda and Upanishads, 382 ff., 419 f.; and for Italy, H. J. Rose, Primitive Culture in Italy, 96 ff., 111 ff., and H. Wagenvoort, Roman Dynamism (Eng. trans., 1947), chap. v.

I am tempted also to suggest that Aristotle's preference among tragic subjects for deeds of horror committed ἐν ταῖς φιλαῖς (Poet. 1453b 19), and among these for stories where the criminal act is prevented at the last moment by an ἀναγνώρισις (1454a 4),
is unconsciously determined by their greater effectiveness as an abreaction of guilt-feelings—especially as the second of these preferences stands in flat contradiction to his general view of tragedy. On catharsis as abreaction see below, chap. iii, pp. 76, 78.


See Latte’s excellent remarks, Arch. f. Rel. 20.275 ff. As he points out, the religious consciousness is not only patient of moral paradoxes, but often perceives in them the deepest revelation of the tragic meaning of life. And we may remind ourselves that this particular paradox has played an important part in Christianity: Paul believed that “whom He will He hardeneth” (Rom. 9: 18), and the Lord’s Prayer includes the petition “Lead us not into temptation” (μη ἐλθέτω ὑμᾶς εἰς τεταγμόν). Cf. Rudolph Otto’s remark that “to the religious men of the Old Covenant the Wrath of God, so far from being a diminution of his Godhead, appears as a natural expression of it, an element of ‘holiness’ itself, and a quite indispensable one” (The Idea of the Holy, 18). I believe this to be equally true of men like Sophocles. And the same formidable “holiness” can be seen in the gods of archaic and early classical art. As Professor C. M. Robertson has said in his recent inaugural lecture (London, 1949), “they are conceived indeed in human form, but their divinity is humanity with a terrible difference. To these ageless, deathless creatures ordinary humans are as flies to wanton boys, and this quality is conveyed in their statues, at any rate far down into the fifth century.”

Soph. Ant. 583 ff. The version which follows attempts to reproduce the significant placing of the recurrent key word ἡτη, and also some of the metrical effects, but cannot reproduce the sombre magnificence of the original. For several turns of phrase I am indebted to a gifted pupil, Miss R. C. Collingwood.
III
The Blessings of Madness

In the creative state a man is taken out of himself. He lets down as it were a bucket into his subconscious, and draws up something which is normally beyond his reach.

E. M. Forster

“Our greatest blessings,” says Socrates in the Phaedrus, “come to us by way of madness”: τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν γίνεται διὰ μανίας.¹ That is, of course, a conscious paradox. No doubt it startled the fourth-century Athenian reader hardly less than it startles us; for it is implied a little further on that most people in Plato’s time regarded madness as something discreditable, an ὅνειδος.² But the father of Western rationalism is not represented as maintaining the general proposition that it is better to be mad than sane, sick than sound. He qualifies his paradox with the words θεία μέντοι δόσει διδομένης, “provided the madness is given us by divine gift.” And he proceeds to distinguish four types of this “divine madness,” which are produced, he says, “by a divinely wrought change in our customary social norms” (ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰσωθητῶν νόμων).³ The four types are:

1) Prophetic madness, whose patron god is Apollo.
2) Telestic or ritual madness, whose patron is Dionysus.
3) Poetic madness, inspired by the Muses.
4) Erotic madness, inspired by Aphrodite and Eros.⁴

About the last of these I shall have something to say in a later chapter;⁵ I do not propose to discuss it here. But it may be worth while to look afresh at the first three, not attempting

¹ For notes to chapter iii see pages 82-101.
any exhaustive survey of the evidence, but concentrating on what may help us to find answers to two specific questions. One is the historical question: how did the Greeks come by the beliefs which underlie Plato’s classification, and how far did they modify them under the influence of advancing rationalism? The other question is psychological: how far can the mental states denoted by Plato’s “prophetic” and “ritual” madness be recognised as identical with any states known to modern psychology and anthropology? Both questions are difficult, and on many points we may have to be content with a verdict of non liquet. But I think they are worth asking. In attempting to deal with them I shall of course be standing, as we all stand, on the shoulders of Rohde, who traversed most of this ground very thoroughly in his great book Psyche. Since that book is readily available, both in German and in English, I shall not recapitulate its arguments; I shall, however, indicate one or two points of disagreement.

Before approaching Plato’s four “divine” types, I must first say something about his general distinction between “divine” madness and the ordinary kind which is caused by disease. The distinction is of course older than Plato. From Herodotus we learn that the madness of Cleomenes, in which most people saw the godsent punishment of sacrilege, was put down by his own countrymen to the effects of heavy drinking. And although Herodotus refuses to accept this prosaic explanation in Cleomenes’ case, he is inclined to explain the madness of Cambyses as due to congenital epilepsy, and adds the very sensible remark that when the body is seriously deranged it is not surprising that the mind should be affected also. So that he recognises at least two types of madness, one which is supernatural in origin (though not beneficent) and another which is due to natural causes. Empedocles and his school are also said to have distinguished madness arising ex purgamento animae from the madness due to bodily ailments.

This, however, is relatively advanced thinking. We may doubt if any such distinction was drawn in earlier times. It is
the common belief of primitive peoples throughout the world that all types of mental disturbance are caused by supernatural interference. Nor is the universality of the belief very surprising. I suppose it to have originated in, and to be maintained by, the statements of the sufferers themselves. Among the commonest symptoms of delusional insanity to-day is the patient's belief that he is in contact with, or even identified with, supernatural beings or forces, and we may presume that it was not otherwise in antiquity; indeed, one such case, that of the fourth-century physician Menecrates, who thought he was Zeus, has been recorded in some detail, and forms the subject of a brilliant study by Otto Weinreich.9 Epileptics, again, often have the sensation of being beaten with a cudgel by some invisible being; and the startling phenomena of the epileptic fit, the sudden falling down, the muscular contortions, the gnashing teeth and projecting tongue, have certainly played a part in forming the popular idea of possession.10 It is not surprising that to the Greeks epilepsy was the "sacred disease" par excellence, or that they called it ἐπιληψις, which—like our words "stroke," "seizure," "attack"—suggests the intervention of a daemon.11 I should guess, however, that the idea of true possession, as distinct from mere psychic interference, derived ultimately from cases of secondary or alternating personality, like the famous Miss Beauchamp whom Morton Prince studied.12 For here a new personality, usually differing widely from the old one in character, in range of knowledge, and even in voice and facial expression, appears suddenly to take possession of the organism, speaking of itself in the first person and of the old personality in the third. Such cases, relatively rare in modern Europe and America, seem to be found more often among the less advanced peoples,13 and may well have been commoner in antiquity than they are to-day; I shall return to them later. From these cases the notion of possession would easily be extended to epileptics and paranoiacs; and eventually all types of mental disturbance, including such things as sleep-walking and the delirium of high fever,14 would be put down
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to daemonic agencies. And the belief, once accepted, naturally created fresh evidence in its own support by the operation of autosuggestion.15

It has long been observed that the idea of possession is absent from Homer, and the inference is sometimes drawn that it was foreign to the oldest Greek culture. We can, however, find in the Odyssey traces of the vaguer belief that mental disease is of supernatural origin. The poet himself makes no reference to it, but he once or twice allows his characters to use language which betrays its existence. When Melan-tho jeeringly calls the disguised Odysseus ἐκτεπαταγμένος,16 "knocked out of his senses," i.e., crazy, she is using a phrase which in origin probably implied daemonic intervention, though on her lips it may mean no more than we mean when we describe someone as "a bit touched." A little later, one of the suitors is jeering at Odysseus, and calls him ἐπιμαστόν ἀλήτην. ἐπιμαστός (from ἐπιμαίσαι) is not found elsewhere, and its meaning is disputed; but the sense "touched," i.e., crazy, given by some ancient scholars, is the most natural, and the one best suited to the context.17 Here again a supernatural "touch" is, I think, implied. And finally, when Polyphemus starts screaming, and the other Cyclopes, on asking what is the matter, are informed that "No-man is trying to kill him," they observe in response that "the sickness from great Zeus cannot be avoided," and piously recommend prayer.18 They have concluded, I think, that he is mad: that is why they abandon him to his fate. In the light of these passages it seems fairly safe to say that the supernatural origin of mental disease was a commonplace of popular thought in Homer's time, and probably long before, though the epic poets had no particular interest in it and did not choose to commit themselves to its correctness; and one may add that it has remained a commonplace of popular thought in Greece down to our own day.19 In the Classical Age, intellectuals might limit the range of "divine madness" to certain specific types. A few, like the author of the late-fifth-century treatise de morbo sacro, might even go the length
of denying that any sickness is more "divine" than any other, holding that every disease is "divine" as being part of the divine order, but every disease has also natural causes which human reason can discover—\( \pi\alpha\tau\alpha\ \theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\ k\alpha\ \pi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\ \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\nu\alpha.\) But it is unlikely that popular belief was much affected by all this, at any rate outside a few great cultural centres. Even at Athens, the mentally afflicted were still shunned by many, as being persons subject to a divine curse, contact with whom was dangerous: you threw stones at them to keep them away, or at least took the minimum precaution of spitting.

Yet if the insane were shunned, they were also regarded (as indeed they still are in Greece) with a respect amounting to awe; for they were in contact with the supernatural world, and could on occasion display powers denied to common men. Ajax in his madness talks a sinister language "which no mortal taught him, but a daemon"; Oedipus in a state of frenzy is guided by a daemon to the place where Jocasta's corpse awaits him. We see why Plato in the *Timaeus* mentions disease as one of the conditions which favour the emergence of supernatural powers. The dividing line between common insanity and prophetic madness is in fact hard to draw. And to prophetic madness we must now turn.

Plato (and Greek tradition in general) makes Apollo its patron; and out of the three examples which he gives, the inspiration of two—the Pythia and the Sibyl—was Apolline, the third instance being the priestesses of Zeus at Dodona. But if we are to believe Rohde in this matter—and many people still do—Plato was entirely mistaken: prophetic madness was unknown in Greece before the coming of Dionysus, who forced the Pythia on Delphi; until then, Apolline religion had been, according to Rohde, "hostile to anything in the nature of ecstasy." Rohde had two reasons for thus rejecting the Greek tradition. One was the absence from Homer of any reference to inspired prophecy; the other was the impressive antithesis which his friend Nietzsche had drawn between the "rational"
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religion of Apollo and the "irrational" religion of Dionysus. But I think Rohde was wrong.

In the first place, he confused two things that Plato carefully distinguished—the Apolline mediumship which aims at knowledge, whether of the future or of the hidden present, and the Dionysiac experience which is pursued either for its own sake or as a means of mental healing, the mantic or mediumistic element being absent or quite subordinate. Mediumship is the rare gift of chosen individuals; Dionysiac experience is essentially collective or congregational—θιασεθεται ψυχαν—and is so far from being a rare gift that it is highly infectious. And their methods are as different as their aims: the two great Dionysiac techniques—the use of wine and the use of the religious dance—have no part whatever in the induction of Apolline ecstasy. The two things are so distinct that the one seems most unlikely to be derived from the other.

Furthermore, we know that ecstatic prophecy was practised from an early date in western Asia. Its occurrence in Phoenicia is attested by an Egyptian document of the eleventh century; and three centuries earlier still we find the Hittite king Mursili II praying for a "divine man" to do what Delphi was so often asked to do—to reveal for what sins the people were afflicted with a plague. The latter example would become especially significant if we could accept, as Nilsson inclines to do, the guess of Hrozný that Apollo, the sender and the healer of plague, is none other than a Hittite god Apulunas. But in any case it seems to me reasonably certain, from the evidence afforded by the Iliad, that Apollo was originally an Asiatic of some sort. And in Asia, no less than in Mainland Greece, we find ecstatic prophecy associated with his cult. His oracles at Claros near Colophon and at Branchidae outside Miletus are said to have existed before the colonisation of Ionia, and at both ecstatic prophecy appears to have been practised. It is true that our evidence on the latter point comes from late authors; but at Patara in Lycia—which is thought by some to be Apollo's original homeland, and was
certainly an early centre of his cult—at Patara we know from Herodotus that the prophetess was locked into the temple at night, with a view to mystic union with the god. Apparently she was thought to be at once his medium and his bride, as Cassandra should have been, and as Cook and Latte conjecture the Pythia to have been originally.\(^3\) That points fairly plainly to ecstatic prophecy at Patara, and Delphic influence is here very unlikely.

I conclude that the prophetic madness is at least as old in Greece as the religion of Apollo. And it may well be older still. If the Greeks were right in connecting \(\mu\acute{a}v\acute{t}i\)s with \(\mu\acute{a}v\acute{v}\nu\acute{o}\)p\(\acute{a}\)l—and most philologists think they were\(^3\)—the association of prophecy and madness belongs to the Indo-European stock of ideas. Homer’s silence affords no sound argument to the contrary; we have seen before that Homer could keep his mouth shut when he chose. We may notice, moreover, that in this matter as in others the \(O\)d\(\acute{a}\)s\(s\)sey has a somewhat less exacting standard of seemliness, of epic dignity, than has the \(I\)li\(a\)d. The \(I\)li\(a\)d admits only inductive divination from omens, but the \(O\)d\(\acute{a}\)s\(s\)sey-poet cannot resist introducing something more sensational—an example of what the Scots call second-sight.\(^3\) The symbolic vision of the Apolline hereditary seer Theoclymenus in Book 20 belongs to the same psychological category as the symbolic visions of Cassandra in the \(A\)gam\(\acute{e}\)m\(n\)n\(o\)n, and the vision of that Argive prophetess of Apollo who, as Plutarch tells, rushed one day into the streets, crying out that she saw the city filled with corpses and blood.\(^3\) This is one ancient type of prophetic madness. But it is not the usual oracular type; for its occurrence is spontaneous and incalculable.\(^4\)

At Delphi, and apparently at most of his oracles, Apollo relied, not on visions like those of Theoclymenus, but on “enthusiasm” in its original and literal sense. The Pythia became \(e\)nte\(\acute{e}\)n\(e\)os, plena deo:\(^4\) the god entered into her and used her vocal organs as if they were his own, exactly as the so-called “control” does in modern spirit-mediumship; that is why Apollo’s Delphic utterances are always couched in the first person, never
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in the third. There were, indeed, in later times, those who held that it was beneath the dignity of a divine being to enter into a mortal body, and preferred to believe—like many psychical researchers in our own day—that all prophetic madness was due to an innate faculty of the soul itself, which it could exercise in certain conditions, when liberated by sleep, trance, or religious ritual both from bodily interference and from rational control. This opinion is found in Aristotle, Cicero, and Plutarch;43 and we shall see in the next chapter that it was used in the fifth century to account for prophetic dreams. Like the other, it has abundant savage parallels; we may call it the “shamanistic” view, in contrast with the doctrine of possession.43 But as an explanation of the Pythia’s powers it appears only as a learned theory, the product of philosophical or theological reflection; there can be little doubt that her gifts were originally attributed to possession, and that this remained the usual view throughout antiquity—it did not occur even to the Christian Fathers to question it.44

Nor was prophetic possession confined to official oracles. Not only were legendary figures like Cassandra, Bakis, and the Sibyl believed to have prophesied in a state of possession,45 but Plato refers frequently to inspired prophets as a familiar contemporary type.46 In particular, some sort of private mediumship was practised in the Classical Age, and for long afterwards, by the persons known as “belly-talkers,” and later as “pythons.”47 I should like to know more about these “belly-talkers,” one of whom, a certain Eurycles, was famous enough to be mentioned both by Aristophanes and by Plato.48 But our direct information amounts only to this, that they had a second voice inside them which carried on a dialogue with them,49 predicted the future, and was believed to belong to a daemon. They were certainly not ventriloquists in the modern sense of the term, as is often assumed.50 A reference in Plutarch seems to imply that the voice of the daemon—presumably a hoarse “belly-voice”—was heard speaking through their lips; on the other hand, a scholiast on Plato writes as if the voice were
merely an inward monition. Scholars have overlooked, however, one piece of evidence which not only excludes ventriloquist but strongly suggests trance: an old Hippocratic case-book, the *Epidemiae*, compares the noisy breathing of a heart patient to that of "the women called belly-talkers." Ventriloquists do not breathe stertorously; modern "trance mediums" often do.

Even on the psychological state of the Pythia our information is pretty scanty. One would like to be told how she was chosen in the first instance, and how prepared for her high office; but practically all we know with certainty is that the Pythia of Plutarch's day was the daughter of a poor farmer, a woman of honest upbringing and respectable life, but with little education or experience of the world. One would like, again, to know whether on coming out of trance she remembered what she had said in the trance state, in other words, whether her "possession" was of the somnambulistic or the lucid type. Of the priestesses of Zeus at Dodona it is definitely reported that they did not remember; but for the Pythia we have no decisive statement. We know, however, from Plutarch that she was not always affected in the same manner, and that occasionally things went badly wrong, as they have been known to do at modern seances. He reports the case of a recent Pythia who had gone into trance reluctantly and in a state of depression, the omens being unfavourable. From the outset she spoke in a hoarse voice, as if distressed, and appeared to be filled with "a dumb and evil spirit"; finally she rushed screaming towards the door and fell to the ground, whereupon all those present, and even the *Prophetes*, fled in terror. When they came back to pick her up, they found her senses restored; but she died within a few days. There is no reason to doubt the substantial truth of this story, which has parallels in other cultures. Plutarch probably had it at first hand from the *Prophetes* Nicander, a personal friend of his, who was actually present at the horrid scene. It is important as showing both that the trance was still genuine in Plutarch's day, and
that it could be witnessed not only by the *Prophetae* and some of
the *Hosioi*, but by the enquirers. Incidentally, the change of
voice is mentioned by Plutarch elsewhere as a common fea-
ture of "enthusiasm." It is no less common in later accounts
of possession, and in modern spirit mediums.

I take it as fairly certain that the Pythia's trance was auto-
suggestively induced, like mediumistic trance to-day. It was
preceded by a series of ritual acts: she bathed, probably in
Castalia, and perhaps drank from a sacred spring; she estab-
lished contact with the god through his sacred tree, the laurel,
either by holding a laurel branch, as her predecessor Themis
does in a fifth-century vase painting, or by fumigating her-
self with burnt laurel leaves, as Plutarch says she did, or
perhaps sometimes by chewing the leaves, as Lucian asserts;
and finally she seated herself on the tripod, thus creating a
further contact with the god by occupying his ritual seat.
All these are familiar magical procedures, and might well
assist the autosuggestion; but none of them could have any
physiological effect—Professor Oesterreich once chewed a
large quantity of laurel leaves in the interests of science, and
was disappointed to find himself no more inspired than usual.
The same applies to what is known of the procedure at other
Apolline oracles—drinking from a sacred spring at Claros and
possibly at Branchidae, drinking the blood of the victim at
Argos. As for the famous "vapours" to which the Pythia's
inspiration was once confidently ascribed, they are a Hellenistic
invention, as Wilamowitz was, I think, the first to point out.
Plutarch, who knew the facts, saw the difficulties of the vapour
theory, and seems finally to have rejected it altogether; but like
the Stoic philosophers, nineteenth-century scholars seized with
relief on a nice solid materialist explanation. Less has been
heard of this theory since the French excavations showed that
there are to-day no vapours, and no "chasm" from which
vapours could once have come. Explanations of this type are
really quite needless; if one or two living scholars still cling to
them, it is only because they ignore the evidence of anthropology and abnormal psychology.

Scholars who attributed the Pythia's trance to inhaling mephitic gases naturally concluded that her "ravings" bore little relation to the response eventually presented to the enquirer; the responses must on this view be products of conscious and deliberate fraud, and the reputation of the Oracle must have rested partly on an excellent intelligence service, partly on the wholesale forgery of oracles post eventum. There is one piece of evidence, however, which suggests, for what it is worth, that in early times the responses were really based on the Pythia's words: when Cleomenes suborned the Oracle to give the reply he wanted, the person whom his agent approached was, if we can trust Herodotus, not the Prophetes or one of the Hosioi, but the Pythia herself; and the desired result followed. And if in later days, as Plutarch implies, the enquirers were, on some occasions at least, able to hear the actual words of the entranced Pythia, her utterances could scarcely on such occasions be radically falsified by the Prophetes. Nevertheless, one cannot but agree with Professor Parke that "the history of Delphi shows sufficient traces of a consistent policy to convince one that human intelligence at some point could play a deciding part in the process." And the necessity of reducing the Pythia's words to order, relating them to the enquiry, and—sometimes, but not always—putting them into verse, clearly did offer considerable scope for the intervention of human intelligence. We cannot see into the minds of the Delphic priesthood, but to ascribe such manipulations in general to conscious and cynical fraud is, I suspect, to oversimplify the picture. Anyone familiar with the history of modern spiritualism will realise what an amazing amount of virtual cheating can be done in perfectly good faith by convinced believers.

Be that as it may, the rarity of open scepticism about Delphi before the Roman period is very striking. The prestige of the Oracle must have been pretty deeply rooted to survive its scandalous behaviour during the Persian Wars. Apollo on that
occasion showed neither prescience nor patriotism, yet his peo­
pel did not turn away from him in disgust; on the contrary, his clumsy attempts to cover his tracks and eat his words ap­
pear to have been accepted without question. The explanation
must, I think, be sought in the social and religious conditions
 described in the preceding chapter. In a guilt-culture, the need
for supernatural assurance, for an authority transcending
man's, appears to be overwhelmingly strong. But Greece had
neither a Bible nor a Church; that is why Apollo, vicar on
earth of the heavenly Father, came to fill the gap. Without
Delphi, Greek society could scarcely have endured the tensions
to which it was subjected in the Archaic Age. The crushing
sense of human ignorance and human insecurity, the dread of
divine phthonos, the dread of miasma—the accumulated burden
of these things would have been unendurable without the as­
surance which such an omniscient divine counsellor could give,
the assurance that behind the seeming chaos there was knowl­
edge and purpose. "I know the count of the sand grains and
the measures of the sea"; or, as another god said to another
people, "the very hairs of your head are all numbered." Out
of his divine knowledge, Apollo would tell you what to do when
you felt anxious or frightened; he knew the rules of the com­
plicated game that the gods play with humanity; he was the
supreme ἀλέξικακος, "Averter of Evil." The Greeks believed in
their Oracle, not because they were superstitious fools, but
because they could not do without believing in it. And when
the importance of Delphi declined, as it did in Hellenistic
times, the main reason was not, I suspect, that men had grown
(as Cicero thought) more sceptical, but rather that other
forms of religious reassurance were now available.

So much for prophetic madness. With Plato's other types I
can deal more briefly. On what Plato meant by "telestic"
or ritual madness, much light has recently been thrown in two
important papers by Professor Linforth; and I need not repeat
things which he has already said better than I could say them.
Nor shall I repeat here what I have myself said in print about
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what I take to be the prototype of ritual madness, the Dionysiac δρειβασία or mountain dancing. I should like, however, to make some remarks of a more general character.

If I understand early Dionysiac ritual aright, its social function was essentially cathartic, in the psychological sense: it purged the individual of those infectious irrational impulses which, when dammed up, had given rise, as they have done in other cultures, to outbreaks of dancing mania and similar manifestations of collective hysteria; it relieved them by providing them with a ritual outlet. If that is so, Dionysus was in the Archaic Age as much a social necessity as Apollo; each ministered in his own way to the anxieties characteristic of a guilt-culture. Apollo promised security: "Understand your station as man; do as the Father tells you; and you will be safe to-morrow." Dionysus offered freedom: "Forget the difference, and you will find the identity; join the θιασος, and you will be happy to-day." He was essentially a god of joy, πολυγηθής, as Hesiod calls him; χάραιμα βροτοίων, as Homer says. And his joys were accessible to all, including even slaves, as well as those freemen who were shut out from the old gentile cults. Apollo moved only in the best society, from the days when he was Hector's patron to the days when he canonised aristocratic athletes; but Dionysus was at all periods δημοτικός, a god of the people.

The joys of Dionysus had an extremely wide range, from the simple pleasures of the country bumpkin, dancing a jig on greased wineskins, to the ωμοφάγος χάρις of the ecstatic bacchanal. At both levels, and at all the levels between, he is Lusios, "the Liberator"—the god who by very simple means, or by other means not so simple, enables you for a short time to stop being yourself, and thereby sets you free. That was, I think, the main secret of his appeal to the Archaic Age: not only because life in that age was often a thing to escape from, but more specifically because the individual, as the modern world knows him, began in that age to emerge for the first time from the old solidarity of the family, and found the unfamiliar
burden of individual responsibility hard to bear. Dionysus could lift it from him. For Dionysus was the Master of Magical Illusions, who could make a vine grow out of a ship’s plank, and in general enable his votaries to see the world as the world’s not. As the Scythians in Herodotus put it, “Dionysus leads people on to behave madly”—which could mean anything from “letting yourself go” to becoming “possessed.” The aim of his cult was ecstatic—which again could mean anything from “taking you out of yourself” to a profound alteration of personality. And its psychological function was to satisfy and relieve the impulse to reject responsibility, an impulse which exists in all of us and can become under certain social conditions an irresistible craving. We may see the mythical prototype of this homoeopathic cure in the story of Melampus, who healed the Dionysiac madness of the Argive women “with the help of ritual cries and a sort of possessed dancing.”

With the incorporation of the Dionysiac cult in the civic religion, this function was gradually overlaid by others. The cathartic tradition seems to have been carried on to some extent by private Dionysiac associations. But in the main the cure of the afflicted had in the Classical Age passed into the hands of other cults. We have two lists of the Powers whom popular thought in the later fifth century associated with mental or psycho-physical disturbances, and it is significant that Dionysus does not figure in either. One occurs in the Hippolytus, the other in the de morbo sacro. Both lists include Hecate and the “Mother of the Gods” or “Mountain Mother” (Cybele); Euripides adds Pan and the Corybantes; Hippocrates adds Poseidon, Apollo Nomios, and Ares, as well as the “heroes,” who are here simply the unquiet dead associated with Hecate. All these are mentioned as deities who cause mental trouble. Presumably all could cure what they had caused, if their anger were suitably appeased. But by the fifth century the Corybantes at any rate had developed a special ritual for the treatment of madness. The Mother, it would appear, had done likewise (if indeed her cult was at that time distinct from that of
the Corybantes); and possibly Hecate also. But about these we have no detailed information. About the Corybantia treatment we do know something, and Linforth's patient examination has dissipated much of the fog that surrounded the subject. I shall content myself with stressing a few points which are relevant to the particular questions I have in mind.

1) We may note first the essential similarity of the Corybantic to the old Dionysiac cure: both claimed to operate a catharsis by means of an infectious "orgiastic" dance accompanied by the same kind of "orgiastic" music—tunes in the Phrygian mode played on the flute and the kettledrum. It seems safe to infer that the two cults appealed to similar psychological types and produced similar psychological reactions. Of these reactions we have, unluckily, no precise description, but they were evidently striking. On Plato's testimony, the physical symptoms of οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες included fits of weeping and violent beating of the heart, and these were accompanied by mental disturbance; the dancers were "out of their minds," like the dancers of Dionysus, and apparently fell into a kind of trance. In that connection we should remember Theophrastus' remark that hearing is the most emotive (παθητικότατον) of all the senses, as well as the singular moral effects which Plato attributes to music.

2) The malady which the Corybantes professed to cure is said by Plato to consist in "phobies or anxiety-feelings (δειματα) arising from some morbid mental condition." The description is fairly vague, and Linforth is doubtless right in saying that antiquity knew no specific disease of "Corybantism." If we can trust Aristides Quintilianus, or his Peripatetic source, the symptoms which found relief in Dionysiac ritual were of much the same nature. It is true that certain people did try to distinguish different types of "possession" by their outward manifestations, as appears from the passage in de morbo sacro. But the real test seems to have been the patient's response to a particular ritual: if the rites of a god X stimulated him and produced a catharsis, that showed that his trouble was due to
if he failed to react, the cause must lie elsewhere. Like the old gentleman in Aristophanes' parody, if he did not respond to the Corybantes, he might then perhaps try Hecate, or fall back on the general practitioner Asclepius. Plato tells us in the Ion that ό κορυβαντιώντες “have a sharp ear for one tune only, the one which belongs to the god by whom they are possessed, and to that tune they respond freely with gesture and speech, while they ignore all others.” I am not sure whether ό κορυβαντιώντες is here used loosely as a general term for “people in an anxiety-state,” who try one ritual after another, or whether it means “those who take part in the Corybantic ritual”; on the second view, the Corybantic performance must have included different types of religious music, introduced for a diagnostic purpose. But in any case the passage shows that the diagnosis was based on the patient’s response to music. And diagnosis was the essential problem, as it was in all cases of “possession”: once the patient knew what god was causing his trouble, he could appease him by the appropriate sacrifices.

3) The whole proceeding, and the presuppositions on which it rested, are highly primitive. But we cannot dismiss it—and this is the final point I want to stress—either as a piece of back-street atavism or as the morbid vagary of a few neurotics. A casual phrase of Plato’s appears to imply that Socrates had personally taken part in the Corybantic rites; it certainly shows, as Linforth has pointed out, that intelligent young men of good family might take part in them. Whether Plato himself accepted all the religious implications of such ritual is an open question, to be considered later; but both he and Aristotle evidently regard it as at least a useful organ of social hygiene—they believe that it works, and works for the good of the participants. And in fact analogous methods appear to have been used by laymen in Hellenistic and Roman times for the treatment of certain mental disorders. Some form of musical catharsis had been practised by Pythagoreans in the fourth century, and perhaps earlier; but the Peripatetic school seems to have been the first who studied it in the light of physiology.
and the psychology of the emotions. Theophrastus, like Plato, believed that music was good for anxiety-states. In the first century B.C. we find Asclepiades, a fashionable physician at Rome, treating mental patients by means of "symphonia"; and in the Antonine Age Soranus mentions flute music among the methods used in his day for the treatment either of depression or of what we should call hysteria. Thus the old magico-religious catharsis was eventually detached from its religious context and applied in the field of lay psychiatry, to supplement the purely physical treatment which the Hippocratic doctors had used.

There remains Plato's third type of "divine" madness, the type which he defines as "possession (κατοκωμή) by the Muses" and declares to be indispensable to the production of the best poetry. How old is this notion, and what was the original connection between poets and Muses?

A connection of some sort goes back, as we all know, to epic tradition. It was a Muse who took from Demodocus his bodily vision, and gave him something better, the gift of song, because she loved him. By grace of the Muses, says Hesiod, some men are poets, as others are kings by grace of Zeus. We may safely assume that this is not yet the empty language of formal compliment which it was later to become; it has religious meaning. And up to a point the meaning is plain enough: like all achievements which are not wholly dependent on the human will, poetic creation contains an element which is not "chosen," but "given"; and to old Greek piety "given" signifies "divinely given." It is not quite so clear in what this "given" element consists; but if we consider the occasions on which the Iliad-poet himself appeals to the Muses for help, we shall see that it falls on the side of content and not of form. Always he asks the Muses what he is to say, never how he is to say it; and the matter he asks for is always factual. Several times he requests information about important battles; once, in his most elaborate invocation, he begs to be inspired with an Army List—"for you are goddesses, watching all things, know-
ing all things; but we have only hearsay and not knowledge." These wistful words have the ring of sincerity; the man who first used them knew the fallibility of tradition and was troubled by it; he wanted first-hand evidence. But in an age which possessed no written documents, where should first-hand evidence be found? Just as the truth about the future would be attained only if man were in touch with a knowledge wider than his own, so the truth about the past could be preserved only on a like condition. Its human repositories, the poets, had (like the seers) their technical resources, their professional training; but vision of the past, like insight into the future, remained a mysterious faculty, only partially under its owner's control, and dependent in the last resort on divine grace. By that grace poet and seer alike enjoyed a knowledge denied to other men. In Homer the two professions are quite distinct; but we have good reason to believe that they had once been united, and the analogy between them was still felt.

The gift, then, of the Muses, or one of their gifts, is the power of true speech. And that is just what they told Hesiod when he heard their voice on Helicon, though they confessed that they could also on occasion tell a pack of lies that counterfeited truth. What particular lies they had in mind we do not know; possibly they meant to hint that the true inspiration of saga was petering out in mere invention, the sort of invention we can observe in the more recent portions of the Odyssey. Be that as it may, it was detailed factual truth that Hesiod sought from them, but facts of a new kind, which would enable him to piece together the traditions about the gods and fill the story out with all the necessary names and relationships. Hesiod had a passion for names, and when he thought of a new one, he did not regard it as something he had just invented; he heard it, I think, as something the Muse had given him, and he knew or hoped that it was "true." He in fact interpreted in terms of a traditional belief-pattern a feeling which has been shared by many later writers—the feeling that creative thinking is not the work of the ego.
It was truth, again, that Pindar asked of the Muse. "Give me an oracle," he says, "and I will be your spokesman (προφατεβ-σω)." The words he uses are the technical terms of Delphi; implicit in them is the old analogy between poetry and divination. But observe that it is the Muse, and not the poet, who plays the part of the Pythia; the poet does not ask to be himself "possessed," but only to act as interpreter for the entranced Muse. And that seems to be the original relationship. Epic tradition represented the poet as deriving supernormal knowledge from the Muses, but not as falling into ecstasy or being possessed by them.

The notion of the "frenzied" poet composing in a state of ecstasy appears not to be traceable further back than the fifth century. It may of course be older than that; Plato calls it an old story, παλαιὸς μῦθος. I should myself guess it to be a by-product of the Dionysiac movement with its emphasis on the value of abnormal mental states, not merely as avenues to knowledge, but for their own sake. But the first writer whom we know to have talked about poetic ecstasy is Democritus, who held that the finest poems were those composed μετ' ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ λεποῦ πνεύματος, "with inspiration and a holy breath," and denied that anyone could be a great poet sine furore. As recent scholars have emphasised, it is to Democritus, rather than to Plato, that we must assign the doubtful credit of having introduced into literary theory this conception of the poet as a man set apart from common humanity by an abnormal inner experience, and of poetry as a revelation apart from reason and above reason. Plato's attitude to these claims was in fact a decidedly critical one—but that is matter for a later chapter.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1 Plato, Phaedrus 244a.
2 Ibid., 244b: τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ τὰ ὄντων τεθέμενοι οὐκ αἰσχρῶν ἔγοντο οἷς ὅντες μανίαν, which implies that people nowadays do
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think it \(\alpha i\sigma \chi o\beta v\). Hippocrates, \textit{morb. sacr.} 12, speaks of the \(\alpha i\sigma \chi o\beta v\) felt by epileptics.

3 \textit{Ibid.}, 265A.

4 \textit{Ibid.}, 265B. Cf. the fuller description of the first three types, 244A–245A.

5 See below, chap. vii, p. 218.

6 Hdt. 6.84 (cf. 6.75–3).


9 O. Weinreich, \textit{Menekrates Zeus und Salmoneus} (Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, 18).

10 On the confusion of epilepsy with possession in popular thought at various periods see O. Temkin's comprehensive historical monograph, \textit{The Falling Sickness} (Baltimore, 1945), 15 ff., 84 ff., 138 ff. Many of the highly coloured mediaeval and Renaissance descriptions of "demoniacs" are garnished with symptoms characteristic of epilepsy, e.g., the tongue projecting "like an elephant's trunk," "prodigiously large, long, and hanging down out of her mouth"; the body "tense and rigid all over, with his feet touching his head," "bent backwards like a bow"; and the involuntary discharge of urine at the end of the fit (T. K. Oesterreich, \textit{Possession, Demoniacal and Other}, Eng. trans., 1930, pp. 18, 22, 179, 181, 183). All these were known to rationalist Greek physicians as symptoms of epilepsy: see Aretaeus, \textit{de causis et signis acutorum morborum}, p. 1 ff. Kühn (who also mentions the feeling of being beaten).

11 Cf. Hdt. 4.79.4: \(\mu e\lambda a s \delta \theta e\delta s \lambda \alpha \mu b\alpha\nu e\), and the adjs. \(\nu m\nu \phi\omicron \lambda\epsilon\omicron \eta\tau o\tau o\), \(\theta\epsilon\delta\lambda \eta\tau o\tau o\), etc.; Cumont, \textit{L'Égypte des astrologues}, 169, n. 2. But \(\epsilon\pi\iota\lambda\eta\tau o\tau o\) is already used in the \textit{de morbo sacro} without religious implication. Aretaeus, \textit{op. cit.}, 73 K., gives four reasons why epilepsy was called \(\iota e\rho\alpha \nu\omicron o\omicron\): (a) \(\delta o\kappa e i \gamma\alpha r \tau o\iota i \varepsilon t\iota \ \sigma e\lambda \iota\nu\eta\nu \ \alpha \lambda i\tau r\omicron\iota i \ \alpha \kappa \iota n t\varepsilon\sigma\tau a\iota i \ \iota \nu o\omicron o\tau o\) (a Hellenistic theory, cf. Temkin, \textit{op. cit.}, 9 ff., 90 ff.); (b) \(\iota \mu e\gamma\omicron \varepsilon\iota o\tau o\) \(\tau o\iota \ \kappa a\kappa o\iota \ \iota e\rho\omicron \ \gamma\alpha r \ \tau o \ \mu e\gamma\alpha\); (c) \(\iota \nu o\omicron o\ \omega \kappa \ \alpha \nu t\rho o\omicron \nu\nu\ \alpha \lambda \lambda \ \theta e\iota\omicron\) (cf. \textit{morb. sacr.} 1, VI.352.8 Littré); (d) \(\delta a\iota m\omicron o\nu o\ \delta \o\xi\omicron \iota \varepsilon \tau o\ \iota \nu o\ \alpha \nu t\rho o\omicron \nu \iota \o\omicron\). The last was probably the original reason; but popular thinking on such matters has always been vague and confused. Plato, who did not believe in the supernatural character of epilepsy, nevertheless defended the term \(\iota e\rho\alpha \nu\omicron o\omicron\), on the ground that it affects the head,
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which is the "holy" part of a man (*Tim. 85αβ*). It is still called the "heiliges Weh" in Alsace.


12 Cf. Seligman, *JRAI* 54 (1924) 261: "among the more primitive folk of whom I have personal knowledge . . . I have observed a more or less widespread tendency to ready dissociation of personality."

13 Sleepwalking is referred to in the *de morbo sacro* (c. 1, VI.354.7 Littré), and is said to be caused, in the opinion of the magical healers, by Hecate and the dead (*ibid.*, 362.3); the ghosts take possession of the living body which its owner leaves unoccupied during sleep. Cf. *trag. adesp.* 375: ἐνυπνον φάντασμα φοβηθεὶς θ' Ἐκάτης κώμον ἐδέω. For the supernatural origin of fever cf. the fever-daemons Ἡπιάλης, Τάφυς, Εὔπνας (Didymus *apud* Σ Ar. *Vesp.* 1037); the temple of Febris at Rome, Cic. *N.D.* 3.63, Pliny, *N.H.* 2.15; and *supra*, chap. ii, n. 74.


15 Od. 18.327. In the *Iliad*, on the other hand, such expressions as ἐκ δὲ οἱ ἱντοχοὶ πλήγη φρένας (13.394) imply nothing supernatural: the driver's temporary condition of stupefied terror has a normal human cause. At *Il.* 6.200 ff., Bellerophon is perhaps thought of as mentally afflicted by the gods, but the language used is very vague.


17 Od. 9.410 ff. Cf. 5.396: συγερός δὲ οἱ ἔχρας δαίμων (in a simile); there, however, the illness seems to be physical.

18 See B. Schmidt, *Volksleben der Neugriechen*, 97 f.

19 Hipp. *morb. sacr.* 18 (VI.394-9 ff. Litttré). Cf. *aer. aq. loc.* 22 (II.76.16 ff. L.), which is perhaps the work of the same author (Wilamowitz, *Berl. Sitzb.* 1901, i.16); and *Flat.* 14 (VI.110 L.). But even medical opinion was not unanimous on this question. The author of the Hippocratic *Prognostikon* seems to believe that certain diseases have "something divine" about them (c. 1, II.112.5 L.). Despite Nestle, *Griech. Studien*, 522 f., this seems to be a
different view from that of morb. sacr.: "divine" diseases are a special class which it is important for the physician to recognise (because they are incurable by human means). And the magical treatment of epilepsy never in fact died out: e.g. [Dem.] 25.80 refers to it; and in late antiquity Alexander of Tralles says that amulets and magical prescriptions are used by "some" in treating this malady, not without success (I.557 Puschmann).

21 The slave's question, Ar. Vesp. 8: ἀλλ' ἡ παραφρονεῖς ἔτευν ἡ κορυβαντίας; perhaps implies a distinction between "natural" and "divine" madness. But the difference between παραφρονεῖν and κορυβαντίαν may be merely one of degree, milder mental disturbance being attributed to the Corybantes (infra, pp. 77 ff.).

22 Ar. Aves 524 f. (cf. Plautus, Poenulus 527); Theophr. Char. 16 (28 J.) 14; Pliny, N.H. 28.4.35, "despuimus comitiales morbqs, hoc est, contagia regerimus"; and Plautus, Captivi 550 ff.

23 "Mental derangement, which appears to me to be exceedingly common among the Greek peasants, sets the sufferer not merely apart from his fellows but in a sense above them. His utterances are received with a certain awe, and so far as they are intelligible are taken as predictions" (Lawson, Mod. Greek Folklore and Anc. Greek Religion, 299). On the prophetic gifts attributed to epileptics see Temkin, op. cit., 149 ff.

24 Soph. Ajax 243 f. It is a widespread belief among primitives that persons in abnormal mental states speak a special "divine" language; cf., e.g., Oesterreich, op. cit., 232, 272; N. K. Chadwick, Poetry and Prophecy, 18 f., 37 f. Compare also the pseudo-languages spoken by certain automatists and religious enthusiasts, who are often said, like Ajax, to have learned them from "the spirits" (E. Lombard, De la glossolalie chez les premiers chrétiens et les phénomènes similaires, 25 ff.).

25 Soph. O.T. 1258: λισσωντι β' αὐτῶ δαιμόνων δείκνυσι τις. The Messenger goes on to say that Oedipus was "led" to the right place (1260, ὦς ὑφηγητῷ τινος); in other words, he is credited with a temporary clairvoyance of supernatural origin.


27 Heraclitus, fr. 92 D.: Σιβυλλα δὲ μανικάρω στόματι ἄγελαστα καὶ ἀκαλλωπιστα καὶ ἀμύριστα φθεγγομένη χιλίων ἔτων ἔξεινεται τῇ φωνῇ διὰ τῶν θεών. The context of the fragment in Plutarch (Pyth. or. 6, 397a) makes it practically certain that the words διὰ τῶν θεών are part of the citation, and that the god in question is Apollo (cf. Delatte, Conceptions de l'enshouiasme, 6, n. 1).
Psyche; Eng. trans., 260, 289 ff.

Rohde's view is still taken for granted, e.g., by Hopfner in P.-W., s.v. μαρτυρία; E. Fascher, Ἡρακλῆς, 66; W. Nestle, Von Mythos zum Logos, 60; Oesterreich, Possession, 311. Contra: Farnell, Cults, IV.190 ff.; Wilamowitz, Glaube der Hellenen, II.30; Nilsson, Geschichte, I.515 f.; Latte, "The Coming of Pythia," Harv. Theol. Rev. 33 (1940) 9 ff. Professor Parke, Hist. of the Delphic Oracle, 14, inclines to the opinion that Apollo took over the Pythia from the primitive Earth-oracle at Delphi, on the ground that this accounts for her sex (we should expect Apollo to have a male priest); but this argument is, I think, adequately met by Latte.

Euripides makes Teiresias claim that Dionysus is, among other things, a god of ecstatic prophecy (Ba. 298 ff.); and it appears from Hdt. 7.111 that female trance-mediumship was really practised at his Thracian oracle in the country of the Satrae (cf. Eur. Hec. 1267, where he is called Ὁρήζει μαντεία). But in Greece he found a mantic god already in possession, and seems accordingly to have resigned this function, or at any rate allowed it to fall into the background. In the Roman age he had a trance-oracle (with a male priest) at Amphikleia in Phocis (Paus. 10.33.11, IG IX.1.218); but this is not attested earlier, and the cult shows Orientalising traits (Latte, loc. cit., 11).

Phoenicia: Gressmann, Altorientalische Texte u. Bilder zum A.T. I.225 ff. Hittites: A. Görze, Kleinasiatische Forschungen, I.219; O. R. Gurney, "Hittite Prayers of Mursili II," Liverpool Annals, XXVII. Cf. C. J. Gadd, Ideas of Divine Rule in the Ancient East (Schweich Lectures, 1945), 20 ff. We also have a series of Assyrian oracles, dating from the reign of Esarhaddon, in which the goddess Ishtar professedly speaks through the mouth of an (entranced?) priestess whose name is given: see A. Guillaume, Prophecy and Divination among the Hebrews and Other Semites, 42 ff. Like the θεομάντεως in Plato, Apol. 22c, such prophets are said to "bring forth what they do not know" (A. Haldar, Associations of Cult Prophets among the Ancient Semites, 25). Gadd thinks ecstatic prophecy in general older than divination by art ("oracles and prophecy tend to harden into practices of formal divination"); and Halliday is of the same opinion (Greek Divination, 55 ff.).

Nilsson, Greek Popular Religion, 79, following B. Hrozný, Arch. Or. 8 (1936) 171 ff. Unfortunately, the reading "Apulunas," which Hrozný claims to have deciphered in a Hittite hieroglyphic inscription, is disputed by other competent Hittite scholars: see R. D. Barnett, JHS 70 (1950) 104.
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34 Claros, Paus. 7.3.1; Branchidae (Didyma), ibid., 7.2.4. Cf. C. Picard, Ephèse et Claros, 109 ff.

35 Cf. Farnell’s discussion, Cults, IV.224. The ancient evidence is collected ibid., 403 ff.


38 Od. 20.351 ff. I cannot agree with Nilsson, Gesch. I.154, that this scene is “dichterisches Schauen, nicht das sogenannte zweite Gesicht.” The parallel with the symbolism of Celtic vision, noticed by Monro ad loc., seems too close to be accidental. Cf. also Aesch. Eum. 378 ff.: τοίνυν ἐκι νέφας ἀνδρὶ μῦσον-πεξότασαι, καὶ δνοφεράν τίς ἀκλόν κατὰ δώματος αδώται πολύστονος φάτις, and for the symbolic vision of blood, Hdt. 7.140.3 and the Plutarch passage quoted in the next note, as well as Njals Saga, c. 126.

39 Plut. Pythh. 31: ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν Ἄργεων ἡ τοῦ Δικέλου προφήτης Ἀπόλλωνος ἐξέδραμε βοώσα νεκρῶν ὅραν καὶ φόνου κατάπλεω τὴν πόλιν.

40 It could be made available at set times and seasons only by the use of some device analogous to the mediaeval “crystal ball.” This was perhaps done at the minor Apolline oracle of Κυανέα in Lycia, where Pausanias says it was possible ἔσω ἐνυδώτα τινὰ ἐς τὴν πηγὴν ὁμολογόν πάντα ὑπὸ θελεῖ θέασασθαι (7.21.13).

41 ἐδθέος never means that the soul has left the body and is “in God,” as Rohde seems in places to imply, but always that the body has a god within it, as ἐμφυχος means that it has ψυχή within it (see Pfister in Pisciculi F. J. Doelger dargeboten [Münster, 1939], 183). Nor can I accept the view that the Pythia became ἐδθέος only in the sense of being “in a state of grace resulting from the accomplishment of rites” and that her “inspired ecstasy” is the invention of Plato, as P. Amandry has recently maintained in a careful and learned study which unfortunately appeared too late for me to use in preparing this chapter, La Mantique apollinienne à Delphes (Paris, 1950), 234 f. He rightly rejects the “frenzied” Pythia of Lucan and the vulgar tradition, but his argument is vitiated by the assumption, still common among people who have never seen a “medium” in trance, that “possession” is necessarily a state of hysterical excitement. He also seems to misunderstand Phaedrus 244B, which surely does not mean that besides her
trance utterances the Pythia also gave oracles (of inferior quality) in her normal state (σωφρονόστα), but only that apart from her mediumship she had no particular gifts (cf. n. 53 below).


44 Some writers (e.g., Farnell, Greece and Babylon, 303) use the terms "shamanism" and "possession" as if they were synonymous. But the characteristic feature of shamanism is not the entry of an alien spirit into the shaman; it is the liberation of the shaman's spirit, which leaves his body and sets off on a mantic journey or "psychic excursion." Supernatural beings may assist him, but his own personality is the decisive element. Cf. Oesterreich, op. cit., 305 ff., and Meuli, Hermes, 70 (1935) 144. Greek prophets of the shamanistic type are discussed below, chap. v.

45 "Deus inclusus corpore humano iam, non Cassandra, loquitur," says Cicero (de divin. 1.67) with reference to an old Latin tragedy, probably the Alexander of Ennius. Aeschylus presents Cassandra as a clairvoyante rather than a medium; but there is an approach to the idea of possession at Agam. 1269 ff., where she suddenly sees her own act in stripping off the symbols of seership (1266 f.) as the act of Apollo himself. For the possession of the Sibyl by Apollo, and of Bakis by the Nymphs, see Rohde, Psyche, ix, n. 63. (I doubt if Rohde was right in supposing Bakis to be originally a generic descriptive title, like σιβυλλα, ibid., n. 58. When Aristotle speaks of Σιβυλλαι και Βακίδες και οι ἐνθεοι πάντες [Probl. 954^4 36], and Plutarch of Σιβυλλαι αὖτα καὶ Βακίδες [Pyth. or. 10, 390A], they probably mean "people like the Sibyl and Bakis." The term Ἐφουκλεῖς was similarly used [Plut. def. orac. 9, 414E; Σ Plato Soph. 252C]; but Eurycles was certainly a historical person. And when Philetas, apud Σ Ar. Pax 1071, distinguishes three different Βακίδες, he is merely using a common expedient of Alexandrian scholars for reconciling inconsistent statements about the same person. Everywhere else Bakis appears as an individual prophet.)

46 Plato calls them θεομαντεῖς and χρησμῳδοί (Apol. 22C, Meno 99D), or χρησμῳδοί and μάντεις θείοι (Ion 534C). They fall into ἐνθοσυναισμός and utter (in a state of trance?) truths of which they know nothing, and are thus clearly distinguished both from those
μάντεις who “trust birds” (Phil. 678) and those χρησμολόγου who merely quote or expound old oracles. Plato says nothing to indicate that they have official status. See Fascher, Προφήτης, 66 ff.

47 Plut. def. orac. 9, 414E, τούς ἐγγαστριμύθους, Εὐρυκλέας πάλαι, νυν Πίθωνας προσαγορευμένους: Hesych., s.v. ἐγγαστριμύθους: τούτων τινες ἐγγαστριματων, οἱ δὲ στερνόματων λέγουσι ... τούτων ἡμείς Πίθωνα νῦν καλοῦμεν. The more dignified term στερνόματις comes from the Ἀλκμαλωτίδες of Sophocles, fr. 59 P. On private mediumship in late antiquity see App. II, pp. 295 ff.

48 Ar. Vesp. 1019, and schol.; Plato, Soph. 252c, and schol.

49 ἐντὸς ὑποθεγγύμενον, Plato, loc. cit. L.-S. takes ὑποθεγγύμενον to mean “speaking in an undertone”; but the other sense, which Cornford adopts, suits the context much better.

50 As Starkie points out ad loc., Ar. Vesp. 1019 need not imply ventrilouquism in our sense of the word, while some of the other notices definitely exclude it. Cf. Pearson on Soph. fr. 59.

51 Plut. def. orac., loc. cit., where their state of possession is compared to that commonly ascribed to the Pythia, though it is not clear just how far the comparison extends. Schol. Plato, loc. cit., δαίμονα ... τον ἐγκελευμένον αὐτῶ περὶ τῶν μελλόντων λέγειν. Suidas’ statement that they called up the souls of the dead is not to be trusted: he took it from 1 Sam. 28 (witch of Endor), and not, as Halliday asserts, from Philochorus.

52 Hipp. Epid. 5.63 (= 7.28), ἀνέπνεεν ὡς ἐκ τοῦ βεβαττίσας ἀνανεωμένοι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ στήθους ὑπενεβίμων, δώσπερ αἱ ἐγγαστριμυθοὶ λέγομεναι. A critical observer’s report on the famous “medium” Mrs. Piper states that in full trance “the breathing is slower by one half than normal, and very stertorous,” and goes on to suggest that “this profound variation in the breathing, with the lessened oxygenation of the blood ... is probably the agency by means of which the normal consciousness is put out of commission” (Amy Tanner, Studies in Spiritualism, 14, 18).

53 Plut. Pyth. orac. 22, 405C. Aelius Aristides, orat. 45.11 Dind., says that the Pythiae have in their normal condition no particular ἐνεργήμη, and when in trance make no use of such knowledge as they possess. Tacitus asserts that the inspired prophet at Claros was ignarus plurumque litterarum et carminum (Annals 2.54).

54 Both types occurred in theurgic possession (see App. II, p. 297). Both were known to John Cassian in the fourth century A.D.: “some demoniacs,” he observes, “are so excited that they take no account of what they do or say; but others know it and re-
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member it afterwards" (Collationes patrum, 7.12). And both appear in savage possession and in spirit mediumship.

About the priestesses at Dodona the testimony of Aelius Aristides is clear and unambiguous: ὑστερον οδηγὸν ὅν εἶπον ἵσσον (orat. 45.11). What he says about the Pythiae is less explicit: he asks regarding them τίνα ἐπιστανται δὴ ποιν τέχνην ὅτε (sc. ἐπειδὰν ἐκστάσεις δαιμόνων), αἰ γε οὕτω οἷοι τε ἐσοὶ φυλάττειν οδὴ μεμνημόθεα; (45.10). Strictly speaking, this need not imply more than that they cannot remember why they said what they did. The language used by other writers about the Pythiae is too vague to admit of any secure inference.

Plut. def. orac. 51, 438c: οὕτε γὰρ πάντας οὕτε τοὺς αὐτοὺς αἰὲ διετιθέμεν ὀσαυτῶς ἢ τοῦ πνεύματος δύναμις (the statement is general, but must include the Pythia, as the context shows).

Ibid., 438b: ἄλαλον καὶ κακοῦ πνεύματος ὁδός πλήρης. “Dumb” spirits are those which refuse to tell their names (Lagrange on Mark 9: 17; Campbell Bonner, “The Technique of Exorcism,” Harv. Theol. Rev. 36 [1943] 43 f.). “A dumb exhalation” (Flacelière) is hardly sense.

ἀνείλοντο... ἔμφρονα. This is the reading of all extant MSS, and makes reasonable sense. In quoting the passage formerly (Greek Poetry and Life: Essays Presented to Gilbert Murray, 377) I was careless enough to accept ἐκφρονα from Wyttenbach.

I have myself seen an amateur medium break down during trance in a similar way, though without the same fatal results. For cases of possession resulting in death, see Oesterreich, op. cit., 93, 118 ff., 222 ff., 238. It is quite unnecessary to assume with Flacelière that the Pythia’s death must have been due to inhaling mephitic “vapours” (which would probably kill on the spot if they killed at all, and must in any case have affected the other persons present). Lucan’s imaginary picture of the death of an earlier Pythia (Phars. 5.161 ff.) was perhaps suggested by the incident Plutarch records, which can be dated to the years 57–62 A.D. (J. Bayet, Mélanges Grat, I.53 ff.).

It may be said that, strictly, the text proves only that the priests and enquirers were within earshot (R. Flacelière, “Le Fonctionnement de l’Oracle de Delphes au temps de Plutarque,” Annales de l’École des Hautes Études à Gand [Études d’archéologie grecque], 2 [1938] 69 ff.). But it gives no positive support to Flacelière’s view that the Pythia was separated from them by a door or curtain. And the phrase δικαίως ἐπειγομένης rather suggests a visual impression; she shuddered like a ship in a storm. On the procedure
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at Delphi in earlier periods I can arrive at no confident judgement: the literary evidence is either maddeningly vague or impossible to reconcile with the archaeological findings. At Claros, Tacitus' account suggests (Ann. 2.54), and Iamblichus definitely states (de myst. 3.11), that the inspired prophet was not visible. But at Apollo's Ptoan oracle in Boeotia the enquirers themselves hear the inspired πρόμανται speaking and take down his words (Hdt. 8.135).

The pitch of the voice in which the "possessed" spoke was one of the symptoms from which the KaDathral drew inferences about the possessing spirit (Hipp. morb. sacr. 1, VI.360.15 L.). In all parts of the world the "possessed" are reported as speaking in a changed voice: see Oesterreich, op. cit., 10, 19-21, 133, 137, 208, 247 ff., 252, 254, 277. So too the famous Mrs. Piper, when "possessed" by a male "control," would speak "in an unmistakably male voice, but rather husky" (Proc. Society for Psychical Research, 8.127).

62 Cf. Parke, Hist. of the Delphic Oracle, 24 ff., and Amandry, op. cit., chaps. xi-xiii, where the ancient evidence on these points is discussed. Contact with a god's sacred tree as a means of procuring his epiphany may go back to Minoan times (B. Al, Mnemosyne, Ser. III, 12 [1944] 215). On the techniques employed to induce trance in late antiquity see App. II, pp. 296 ff.

63 Oesterreich, op. cit., 319, n. 3.

64 For Claros see Maximus Tyrius, 8.1c, Tac. Ann. 2.54, Pliny, N.H. 2.232. Pliny's remark that drinking the water shortened the life of the drinker is probably a mere rationalisation of the widespread belief that persons in contact with the supernatural die young. The procedure at Branchidae is uncertain, but the existence of a spring possessing prophetic properties is now confirmed by an inscription (Wiegand, Abh. Berl. Akad. 1924, Heft 1, p. 22). For other springs said to cause insanity cf. Halliday, Greek Divination, 124 f. For the highly primitive procedure at Argos see Paus. 2.24.1; it has good savage parallels (Oesterreich, op. cit., 137, 143 f.; Frazer, Magic Art, I.383).


66 Oppé, loc. cit.; Courby, Fouilles de Delphes, II.59 ff. But I suspect that the belief in the existence of some sort of chasm under the temple is much older than the theory of vapours, and probably suggested it to rationalists in search of an explanation. At Cho. 953, Aeschylus' Chorus address Apollo as μεγαν ἐξων μυχὸν χθόνος,
and the corresponding phrase at 807, ὁ μέγα ναὸς στῆμον, must also in my judgement refer to Apollo. This seems an unnatural way of speaking if the poet has in mind merely the Pleistos gorge; the temple is not in the gorge, but above it. It looks more like a traditional phraseology going back to the days of the Earth-oracle: for its implications cf. Hes. Theog. 119: Τάρταρα τ' ἥρθεντα μυχῷ χθόνος: Aesch. P.V. 433: "Αἴδος ... μυχὸς γᾶς, Pind. Pyth. 4.44: χθόνοις Ἀίδα στήμα. The στῆμον which was later interpreted as a channel for vapours (Strabo, 9.3.5, p. 419: ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ τὸν τοῦ ὕπνου τρίποδα ὑψηλὸν, ἐφ' ὑπ' ἐν τῷ Πυθίνῳ ἀναβαλόμενον δεχόμεναν τὸ πνεύμα ἀποθεστὶ) had originally, I take it, been conceived as an avenue for dreams.  


68 Hdt. 6.66; cf. Paus. 3.4.3. Similarly, it was the Pythia whom Pleistoanax was accused of bribing on a later occasion (Thuc. 5.16.2). Thucydides might be speaking loosely, but Herodotus was not, for he gives the Pythia's name. It is open, however, to the sceptic to say that he is reproducing an "edited" Delphic version of what happened. (Amandry neglects these passages, and is inclined to make the Pythia a mere accessory, op. cit., 120 ff.)

69 Parke, op. cit., 37. Fascher, contrasting Greek with Jewish prophecy, doubts if "real prophecy was possible within the framework of an institution" (op. cit., 59); and in regard to responses on matters of public concern the doubt seems justified. Replies to private enquirers—which must have formed the majority at all periods, though very few genuine examples are preserved—may have been less influenced by institutional policy.

70 The verse form of response, which had gone out of use in Plutarch's day, was pretty certainly the older; some even maintained that the hexameter was invented at Delphi (Plut. Pyth. orac. 17, 402D; Pliny, N.H. 7.205, etc.). Strabo asserts that the Pythia herself sometimes spoke ἐμετέρα (9.3.5, p. 419), and Tacitus says the same of the inspired prophet at Claros (Ann. 2.54). These statements of Strabo and Tacitus have been doubted (most recently by Amandry, op. cit., 168), but are by no means incredible. Lawson knew a modern Greek prophet, "unquestionably mad," who possessed "an extraordinary power of conducting his part of a conversation in metrical, if not highly poetical, form" (op. cit., 300). And the American missionary Nevius heard a "possessed" woman
in China extemporise verses by the hour together: "Everything she said was in measured verse, and was chanted to an unvarying tune. . . . The rapid, perfectly uniform, and long continued utterances seemed to us such as could not possibly be counterfeited or premeditated" (J. L. Nevius, *Demon Possession and Allied Themes*, 37 f.). Among the ancient Semitic peoples "recitation of verses and doggerel was the mark of one who had converse with the spirits" (A. Guillaume, *Prophecy and Divination among the Hebrews and Other Semites*, 245). In fact, automatic or inspirational speech tends everywhere to fall into metrical patterns (E. Lombard, *De la glossolalie*, 207 ff.). But usually, no doubt, the Pythia's utterances had to be versified by others; Strabo, *loc. cit.*, speaks of poets being retained for this purpose, and Plutarch, *Pyth. orac. 25, 407B*, mentions the suspicion that in old days they sometimes did more than their duty. At Branchidae the existence in the second century B.C. of a χρησμογράφου (office for drafting, or recording, responses?) is inscriptionally attested (*Rev. de Phil.* 44 [1920] 249, 251); and at Claros the functions of προφήτης (medium?) and θεσπισθῶν (versifier?) were distinct, at least in Roman times (Dittenberger, *OGI* II, no. 530). An interesting discussion of the whole problem by Edwyn Bevan will be found in the *Dublin Review*, 1931.

The Greeks were quite alive to the possibility of fraud in particular instances; the god's instruments were fallible. But this did not shake their faith in the existence of a divine inspiration. Even Heraclitus accepted it (fr. 93), contemptuous as he was of superstitious elements in contemporary religion; and Socrates is represented as a deeply sincere believer. On Plato's attitude see below, chap. vii, pp. 217 f., 222 f. Aristotle and his school, while rejecting inductive divination, upheld εὐθυναιασμὸς, as did the Stoics; the theory that it was ἐμφυτος, or provoked by vapours, did not invalidate its divine character.

This was so from the first; Delphi was promised its share of the fines to be paid by the collaborators (*Hdt. 7.132.2*), and also received a tithe of the booty after Plataea (*ibid., 9.81.1*); the hearths polluted by the presence of the invader were rekindled, at the Oracle's command, from Apollo's own (*Plut. Aristides* 20).

It is worth noting that the nearest approach to an ecclesiastical organisation transcending the individual city-state was the system of ἐκκητικαὶ πυθαγόριται who expounded Apolline sacral law at Athens and doubtless elsewhere (cf. Nilsson, *Gesch.* I.603 ff.).

Aesch. *Eum.* 616 ff.: οὐκέτωτεν' εἶπον μαντικόισιν ἐν θρόνοις . . . δ ὅμη κελεύσαι Ζέδις Ὠλυμπίων πατήρ.
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75 Cic. de divin. 2.117: "quando ista vis autem evanuit? an postquam homines minus creduli esse coeperunt?" On the social basis of changes in religious belief see Kardiner, Psychological Frontiers of Society, 426 f. It is significant that the growing social tensions and increased neurotic anxieties of the late Empire were accompanied by a revival of interest in oracles: see Eitrem, Orakel und Mysterien am Ausgang der Antike.


78 Cf. Eur. Ba. 77, and Varro apud Serv. ad Virg. Georg. 1.166: "Liberi patris sacra ad purgationem animae pertinebant." We should perhaps connect with this the cult of Αὐθνύντος λατρεία which is said to have been recommended to the Athenians by Delphi (Athen. 22E, cf. 36B).


80 Cf. Eur. Ba. 421 ff., and my note ad loc. Hence the support that the Dionysiac cult received from Periander and the Peisistratids; hence also, perhaps, the very slight interest that Homer takes in it (though he was acquainted with maenads, Il. 22.460), and the contempt with which Heraclitus viewed it (fr. 14 makes his attitude sufficiently clear, whatever may be the sense of fr. 15).


82 Cf. H. Hymn 7.34 ff. It was, I take it, as Master of Illusions that Dionysus came to be the patron of a new art, the art of the theatre. To put on a mask is the easiest way of ceasing to be oneself (cf. Lévy-Bruhl, Primitives and the Supernatural, 123 ff.). The theatrical use of the mask presumably grew out of its magical use: Dionysus became in the sixth century the god of the theatre because he had long been the god of the masquerade.

83 Herodotus, 4.79.3. For the meaning of μανεσθαι cf. Linforth, "Corybantic Rites," 127 f.

84 Pfister has shown grounds for thinking that ἐκστασις, ἐξιστασθαι, did not originally involve (as Rohde assumed) the idea of the
soul’s departure from the body; they are quite commonly used by
classical writers of any abrupt change of mind or mood (“Eksta-
sis,” Pisciculi F. J. Doelger dargeboten, 178 ff.). ὃ αὖ ἔλυς ἐλυμεν καὶ ὅμεν ἐξέστησαι, says Pericles to the Athenians (Thuc. 2.61.2); τὰ μὴν ἑρῶν προσδοκόμων ἐκτασθὲς φέρετ, says Menander (fr. 149); and in
Plutarch’s time a person could describe himself as ἐκτασθήσας ἔχων, meaning merely that he felt, as we say, “put out” or “not himself” (Plut. gen. Socr. 588 A). Cf. also Jeanne Croissant, Aristote et les mystères, 41 ff.

88 [Apollod.] Bibl. 2.2.2. Cf. Rohde, Psyche, 287; Boyancé, Le Culte des Muses chez les philosophes grecs, 64 ff. It has been the usual opinion of scholars since Rohde that at Phaedr. 244 D Plato had the Melampus story in mind; but see, contra, Linforth, “Telestic Madness,” 169.

89 Boyancé, op. cit., 66 ff., tries to find survivals of the god’s original cathartic function (whose importance he rightly stresses) even in his Attic festivals. But his arguments are highly speculative.

87 This appears from Plato, Laws 815cd, where he describes, and re-
jects as “uncivilised” (ὁ πολιτικόν), certain “Bacchic” mimetic
dances, imitating Nymphs, Pans, Sileni, and Satyrs, which were
performed περὶ καθαρμόν τε καὶ τελετάς τινας. Cf. also Aristides Quinquilianus, de musica 3.25, p. 93 Jahn: τὰς Βακχικὰς τελετάς καὶ δοκεῖ ταῦτας παραπληθήςιοι λύγου τινὸς ἑκέσθαι φασιν ὅπως ἐν τῷ ἀμαθεστήρων πτοιησὶς διὰ βίου ἡ τύχην υπὸ τῶν ἐν ταύταις μελῳκιῶν τε καὶ ὄρχησεων ἄμα παιδίας ἐκκαθαιρηται (quoted by Jeanne Croissant, Aristote et les mystères, 121). In other passages which are sometimes cited in this connection, the term βακχῖξα may be used metaphorically for any excited state: e.g., Plato, Laws 790 E (cf. Linforth, “Corybantic Rites,” 132); Aesch. Cho. 698, which I take as referring to the κῶμος of the Ἐρυνθές (Agam. 1186 ff., cf. Eum. 500).


89 Pan was believed to cause not only panic (Πανικὸν ἕπιμα), but also fainting and collapse (Eur. Med. 1172 and Σ). It is a likely enough guess that originally Arcadian shepherds put down the effects of sunstroke to the anger of the shepherd god; and that he was first credited with causing panic by reason of the sudden terror which sometimes infects a herd of beasts (Tambornino, op. cit., 66 f.). Cf. Suidas’ definition of panic as occurring ἡμικα αἱμίδων ὅ τε ἐπτοι καὶ ὅλ άνθρωποι ἐκταραξθῶσι, and the observation of Philodemus, π. θέων, col. 13 (Scott, Fragm. Herc. no. 26), that animals
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are subject to worse ταπαξαί than men. The association of Apollo Νόμους with μανία may have a similar origin.

90 Eur. Hipp. 143 f. speaks as if the two were distinct, as does Dion. Hal. Demosth. 22. But the Corybantes were originally Cybele’s attendants; she, like them, had a healing function (Pind. Pyth. 3.137 ff.; Diog. trag. 1.5, p. 776 N.; Diodorus, 3.58.2); and this function included the cure of μανία (Dionysus himself is “purged” of his madness by Rhea-Cybele, [Apollod.] Bibl. 3.5.1). And I think it a reasonable guess that in Pindar’s day the rites were similar, if not identical, since Pindar wrote ἐνθρωσὶμοι (Suidas, s.v. Ἐπιδαφος), which it is natural to connect on the one hand with the Corybantic rite of θρωσὶς or θρωσὶμος described by Plato, Euthyd. 277D, and Dio Chrys. Or. 12.33, 387 R., and on the other with the cult of the Mother which Pindar himself established (Σ Pind. Pyth. 3.137; Paus. 9.25.3). If this is so, we may suppose the Corybantic rite to be an offshoot from the Cybele-cult, which took over the goddess’s healing function and gradually developed an independent existence (cf. Linforth, “Corybantic Rites,” 157).

The annual τελετή of Hecate at Aegina, though attested for us only by late writers (testimonies in Farnell, Cults, II.597, n. 7), is doubtless old: it claimed to have been founded by Orpheus (Paus. 2.30.2). Its functions were presumably cathartic and apotropaic (Dio Chrys. Or. 4.90). But the view that they were specifically directed to the cure of μανία seems to rest only on Lobeck’s interpretation of Ar. Vesp. 122 διέπλευσεν εἰς Ἀλκυναν as referring to this τελετή (Aglaophamus, 242), which is hardly more than a plausible guess.

92 Ar. Vesp. 119; Plut. Amat. 16, 758r; Longinus, Subl. 39.2. Cf. Croissant, op. cit., 55 ff.; Linforth, “Corybantic Rites,” 125 f.; and below, App. I. The essential similarity of the two rites explains how Plato can use συγκορυφαστικά and συμβακχείεν as synonyms (Symp. 228B, 234D), and can speak of αἱ τῶν ἐκφρονῶν βακχείεν λάσεις in reference to what he has just described as τὰ τῶν Κορυφαστῶν λάματα (Laws 790DE).

93 Plato, Symp. 215E: πολὺ μοι μάλλον ἢ τῶν κορυφαστικῶν ἢ τε καρδία πηδᾶ καὶ δάκρων ἐκχείται. I agree with Linforth that the reference is to the effect of the rites, though similar effects could occur in spontaneous possession (cf. Menander, Theophrorumene 16–28 K.).

94 Plato, Ion 553E: οἱ κορυφαστικῶτες ὁμὶ ἐμφρονεῖς δίνεις ὄρχοντα τάς. Pliny, N.H. 11.147: “Quin et patentibus dormiunt (oculis) leporès multique hominum, quos κορυφαστικῶ Graeci dicunt.” The latter
passage can scarcely refer to ordinary sleep, as Linforth assumes ("Corybantic Rites," 128 f.), for (a) the statement would be false, as Pliny must have known, (b) it is hard to see why a habit of sleeping with the eyes open should be taken as evidence of possession. I agree with Rohde (Psyche, ix, n. 18) that what Pliny means is "a condition related to hypnosis"; the ecstatic ritual dance might well induce such a state in the susceptible. Lucian, Ἱππ. Τραγ. 30, mentions κῦνμα κορυβαντωδές among symptoms of incipient manic trance. For the effects of the comparable Dionysiac ritual see Plut. Mul. Virt. 13, 249ε (App. I, p. 271).

Theophrastus, fr. 91 W.; Plato, Rep. 398c-401a. Cf. Croissant, op. cit., chap. iii; Boyancé, op. cit., I, chap. vi. The emotional significance of flute-music is illustrated in a bizarre way by two curious pathological cases which have come down to us. In one of them, reported by Galen (VII.60 f. Kühn), an otherwise sane patient was haunted by hallucinatory flute-players, whom he saw and heard by day and night (cf. Aetius, Ιατρικά 6.8, and Plato, Crito 54D). In the other, the patient was seized with panic whenever he heard the flute played at a party (Hipp. Epid. 5.81, V.250 L.).

Laws 790ε: δελμάτα δ' ἐξίν φαύλην τῆς νυχτὸς τινα. Cf. H. Orph. 39.1 ff., where the Corybantic daemon is called φόβων ἀποκαθήγετα δεινών.

"Corybantic Rites," 148 ff.

See above, n. 87. Elsewhere Aristides tells us that ἐνθουσιασμοὶ in general are liable, in default of proper treatment, to produce δεισιδαιμονίας τε καὶ ἀλβυγός φόβους (de musica, p. 42 Jahn). Mlle Croissant has shown reason to think that these statements come from a good Peripatetic source, probably Theophrastus (op. cit., 117 ff.). It may be observed that "anxiety" (φροντίς) is recognised as a special type of pathological state in the Hippocratic treatise de morbis (2.72, VII.108 f. L.); and that religious anxieties, especially the fear of δαίμονες, appear in clinical descriptions, e.g., Hipp. virg. 1 (VIII.466 L.) and [Galen] XIX.702. Phantasies of exaggerated responsibility were also known, e.g., Galen (VIII.190) cites melancholics who identified themselves with Atlas, and Alexander of Tralles describes a patient of his own who feared that the world would collapse if she bent her middle finger (I.605 Puschmann). There is an interesting field of study here for a psychologist or psychotherapist with a knowledge of the ancient world and an understanding of the social implications of his subject.

Loc. cit. supra, n. 88.
As Linforth points out (op. cit., 151), it is nowhere expressly stated that the disorder which the Corybantes cured had been caused by them. But it is a general principle of magical medicine, in Greece and elsewhere, that only he who caused a disease knows how to cure it (ὅ τρόφος καὶ λάθες); hence the importance attached to discovering the identity of the possessing Power. For the cathartic effect, cf. Aretaeus’ interesting account of an ἐνθέος μανία (morb. chron. 1.6 fin.) in which the sufferers gash their own limbs, θεοῦ ἱδίως ὡς ἀπαίτοντι χαράζομενον εὑσθεὶς φαντασία. After this experience they are εὐθύμου, ἄγηδες, ὡς τελεσθέντες τῷ θεῷ.

101 Ar. Vesp. 118 ff. See above, n. 91.

Plato, Ion 536c. Of the two views given in the text, the first corresponds broadly to Linforth’s (op. cit., 139 f.), though he might not accept the term “anxiety-state,” while the second goes back to Jahn (NJbb Supp.-Band X [1844] 231). It is, as Linforth says, “difficult to accept the notion of a divided allegiance in a single religious ceremony.” Yet Jahn’s theory is supported, not only by the usage of κορυβαντὶῶν elsewhere in Plato, but also, I think, by Laws 791a, where in apparent reference to τὰ τῶν Κορυβαντῶν λάματα (790d) Plato speaks of the healed patients as δρόχωμένους τε καὶ αἰθλούμενους μετὰ θεῶν ὅσ τὰ καλλιεργοῦντες ἔκαστοι θώσοι. Linforth argues that there is a transition here “from the particular to the general, from Corybantic rites at the beginning to the whole class of rites involving madness” (op. cit., 133). But the more natural interpretation of the two passages, taken together, is that the Corybantic rite included (1) a musical diagnosis; (2) a sacrifice by each patient to the god to whose music he had responded, and an observation of omens; (3) a dance of those whose sacrifices were accepted, in which the appeased deities (perhaps impersonated by priests?) were believed to take part. Such an interpretation would also give a more precise sense to the curious phrase used at Symp. 215c, where we are told that the tunes attributed to Olympos or Marsyas “are able by themselves [i.e., without an accompanying dance, cf. Linforth, op. cit., 142] to cause possession and to reveal those who need the gods and rites (τοῖς τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν δεομένων, seemingly the same persons who are referred to as τῶν Κορυβαντίων τῶν 215ε).” On the view suggested, these would be the kind of persons who are called οἱ κορυβαντίωντες at Ion 536c, and the reference in both places would be to the first or diagnostic stage of the Corybantic rite.

103 In Hellenistic and Christian times diagnosis (by forcing the intrusive spirit to reveal his identity) was similarly a prerequisite to

104 Plato, *Euthyd.* 277D: καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ χορεῖ παῖς καὶ παιδία, τὸ ὄρα καὶ τετελεσθαι (discussed by Linforth, *op. cit.*, 124 f.). It seems to me that the appeal to the experience of the τετελεσμένος is hardly natural save on the lips of one who is τετελεσμένος himself.

105 See chap. vii, p. 217.


108 Theophrastus, fr. 88 Wimmer (= Aristoxyenus, fr. 6), seems to describe a musical cure (with the flute) performed by Aristoxyenus, though the sense is obscured by textual corruption. Cf. also Aristoxyenus, fr. 117, and Martianus Capella, 9, p. 493 Dick: “ad affectiones animi tibias Theophrastus adhibebat... Xenocrates organicis modulis lymphaticos liberabat.”

109 Theophrastus, *loc. cit.* He also claimed, if he is correctly reported, that music is good for faintness, prolonged loss of reason, sciatica (!), and epilepsy.

110 Censorinus, *de die natali* 12 (cf. Celsus, III.18); Caelius Aurelianus (i.e., Soranus), *de morbis chronicis* 1.5. Ancient medical theories of insanity and its treatment are usefully summarised in Heiberg’s pamphlet, *Geisteskrankheiten im klass. Altertum*.

111 *Od.* 8.63 f. The Muses also disabled Thamyris, *Il.* 2.594 ff. The danger of an encounter with them is intelligible if scholars are right in connecting μοῦσα with mons and regarding them as originally mountain nymphs, since it has always been thought perilous to meet a nymph.


113 *Il.* 3.65 f.: οὐ τοι ἀπόβλητθ’ ἐστὶ θεῶν ἐχιμδεὰ δῶρα / ὅσα κεν αὐτοὶ δῶςων ἐκὼν δ’ ὅπε καὶ τίς ἔλεπτο.


115 *Il.* 11.218, 16.112, 14.508. The last of these passages has been regarded as a late addition both by Alexandrine and by modern critics; and all of them employ a conventional formula. But even if the appeal itself is conventional, its timing remains a significant clue to the original meaning of “inspiration.” Similarly Phemius claimed to have received from the gods not merely his poetic talent, but his stories themselves (*Od.* 22.347 f., cf. chap. i, p. 10).
As Marg rightly says (op. cit., 63), "die Gabe der Gottheit bleibt noch auf das Geleistete, das dinghafte ἔργον ausgerichtet." It corresponds to what Bernard Berenson has called "the planchette element in the pen, which often knows more and better than the person who wields it."

I. 2.484 ff. The Muses were the daughters of Memory, and were themselves in some places called Μυεῖαι (Plut. Q. Conv. 743D). But I take it that what the poet here prays for is not just an accurate memory—for this, though highly necessary, would be memory only of an inaccurate κλέος—but an actual vision of the past to supplement the κλέος. Such visions, welling up from the unknown depths of the mind, must once have been felt as something immediately "given," and because of its immediacy more trustworthy than oral tradition. So when Odysseus observes that Demodocus can sing about the war of Troy "as if he had been there or heard about it from an eyewitness," he concludes that a Muse, or Apollo, must have "taught" it to him (Od. 8.487 ff.). There was a κλέος on this subject too (8.74), but it was evidently not enough to account for Demodocus' accurate mastery of detail. Cf. Latte, "Hesiods Dichterweihe," Antike u. Abendland, II (1946), 159; and on the factual inspiration of poets in other cultures, N. K. Chadwick, Poetry and Prophecy, 41 ff.

116 Special knowledge, no less than technical skill, is the distinctive mark of a poet in Homer: he is a man who "sings by grace of gods, knowing delightful epic tales" (Od. 17.518 f.). Cf. Solon's description of the poet, fr. 13.51 f. B., as ἱμερότης σοφίας μετρον ἐπιστάμενος.

117 Several Indo-European languages have a common term for "poet" and "seer" (Latin vates, Irish fili, Icelandic thulr). "It is clear that throughout the ancient languages of northern Europe the ideas of poetry, eloquence, information (especially antiquarian learning) and prophecy are intimately connected" (H. M. and N. K. Chadwick, The Growth of Literature, I.637). Hesiod seems to preserve a trace of this original unity when he ascribes to the Muses (Theog. 38), and claims for himself (ibid., 32), the same knowledge of "things present, future, and past" which Homer ascribes to Calchas (Il. 1.70); the formula is no doubt, as the Chadwicks say (ibid., 625), "a static description of a seer."


119 "The songs made me, not I them," said Goethe. "It is not I who think," said Lamartine; "it is my ideas that think for me." "The mind in creation," said Shelley, "is as a fading coal, which some
invisible influence, like an inconstant wind, awakens to transitory brightness."


ii The same relationship is implied at *Pyth*. 4.279: αὐξηται καὶ Μοίσα δι' ἀγγελίας ὅρθας: the poet is the Muses’ “messenger” (cf. *Theognis*, 769). We should not confuse this with the Platonic conception of poets ἐνθοσυμφώντες ὅσπερ οἱ θεομάντες καὶ οἱ χρησμώδοι (*Apol*. 22c). For Plato, the Muse is actually inside the poet: *Crat.* 428c: ἄλλη τις Μοίσα πάλαι σε ἐνύσα εἰληθεῖ.

i The inspirational theory of poetry is directly linked with Dionysus by the traditional view that the best poets have sought and found inspiration in drink. The classical statement of it is in the lines attributed to Cratinus: οἴνως τοι χαρίεντι πέλει ταχύς ἱππος ἀοιδώ, ὕδωρ δὲ πίνων οδὴν ἀν τέκοι σοφόν (fr. 199 K.). Thence it passed to Horace (*Epist*. 1.19.1 ff.), who has made it a commonplace of literary tradition.

iv Democritus, frs. 17, 18. He appears to have cited Homer as an instance (fr. 21).

v See the careful study by Delatte, *Les Conceptions de l’enthousiasme*, 28 ff., which makes an ingenious attempt to relate Democritus’ views on inspiration to the rest of his psychology; also F. Wehrli, "Der erhäbene und der schlichte Stil in der poetisch-rhetorischen Theorie der Antike," *Phyllobolia für Peter von der Mühl*, 9 ff.

vi For the airs which poets gave themselves on the strength of this theory see Horace, *Ars poetica*, 295 ff. The view that personal eccentricity is a more important qualification than technical competence is of course a distortion of Democritus’ theory (cf. Wehrli, *op. cit.*, 23); but it is a fatally easy distortion.
IV
Dream-Pattern and Culture-Pattern

S'il était donné à nos yeux de chair de voir dans la conscience d'autrui, on jugerait bien plus sûrement un homme d'après ce qu'il rêve que d'après ce qu'il pense.

Victor Hugo

Man shares with a few others of the higher mammals the curious privilege of citizenship in two worlds. He enjoys in daily alternation two distinct kinds of experience—\( \psi \nu \alpha \rho \) and \( \delta \nu \alpha \rho \), as the Greeks called them—each of which has its own logic and its own limitations; and he has no obvious reason for thinking one of them more significant than the other. If the waking world has certain advantages of solidity and continuity, its social opportunities are terribly restricted. In it we meet, as a rule, only the neighbours, whereas the dream world offers the chance of intercourse, however fugitive, with our distant friends, our dead, and our gods. For normal men it is the sole experience in which they escape the offensive and incomprehensible bondage of time and space. Hence it is not surprising that man was slow to confine the attribute of reality to one of his two worlds, and dismiss the other as pure illusion. This stage was reached in antiquity only by a small number of intellectuals; and there are still to-day many primitive peoples who attribute to certain types of dream experience a validity equal to that of waking life, though different in kind. Such simplicity drew pitying smiles from nineteenth-century missionaries; but our own age has discovered that the primitives were in principle nearer the truth than the missionaries. Dreams,

\[ \text{For notes to chapter iv see pages 121-134.} \]

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as it now appears, are highly significant after all; the ancient art of oneirocriticis once more provides clever men with a lucrative livelihood, and the most highly educated of our contemporaries hasten to report their dreams to the specialist with as grave an anxiety as the Superstitious Man of Theophrastus. 2

Against this historical background it seems worth while to look afresh at the attitude of the Greeks towards their dream-experience, and to this subject I propose to devote the present chapter. There are two ways of looking at the recorded dream-experience of a past culture: we may try to see it through the eyes of the dreamers themselves, and thus reconstruct as far as may be what it meant to their waking consciousness; or we may attempt, by applying principles derived from modern dream-analysis, to penetrate from its manifest to its latent content. The latter procedure is plainly hazardous: it rests on an unproved assumption about the universality of dream-symbols which we cannot control by obtaining the dreamer's associations. That in skilled and cautious hands it might nevertheless yield interesting results, I am willing to believe; but I must not be beguiled into essaying it. My main concern is not with the dream-experience of the Greeks, but with the Greek attitude to dream-experience. In so defining our subject we must, however, bear in mind the possibility that differences between the Greek and the modern attitude to dreams may reflect not only different ways of interpreting the same type of experience, but also variations in the character of the experience itself. For recent enquiries into the dreams of contemporary primitives suggest that, side by side with the familiar anxiety-dreams and wish-fulfilment dreams that are common to humanity, there are others whose manifest content, at any rate, is determined by a local culture-pattern. 3 And I do not mean merely that where, for example, a modern American might dream of travelling by 'plane, a primitive will dream that he is carried to Heaven by an eagle; I mean that in many primitive societies there are types of dream-structure which depend on a socially transmitted pattern of belief, and cease to occur when that belief
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There is only the choice of this or that symbol, but the nature of the dream itself, seems to conform to a rigid traditional pattern. It is evident that such dreams are closely related to myth, of which it has been well said that it is the dream-thinking of the people, as the dream is the myth of the individual.5

Keeping this observation in mind, let us consider what sort of dreams are described in Homer, and how the poet presents them. Professor H. J. Rose, in his excellent little book Primitive Culture in Greece, distinguishes three prescientific ways of regarding the dream, viz., (1) "to take the dream-vision as objective fact"; (2) "to suppose it . . . something seen by the soul, or one of the souls, while temporarily out of the body, a happening whose scene is in the spirit world, or the like"; (3) "to interpret it by a more or less complicated symbolism."6 Professor Rose considers these to be three successive "stages of progress," and logically no doubt they are. But in such matters the actual development of our notions seldom follows the logical course. If we look at Homer, we shall see that the first and third of Rose's "stages" coexist in both poems, with no apparent consciousness of incongruity, while Rose's second "stage" is entirely missing (and continues to be missing from extant Greek literature down to the fifth century, when it makes a sensational first appearance in a well-known fragment of Pindar).7

In most of their descriptions of dreams, the Homeric poets treat what is seen as if it were "objective fact."8 The dream usually takes the form of a visit paid to a sleeping man or woman by a single dream-figure (the very word oneiros in Homer nearly always means dream-figure, not dream-experience).9 This dream-figure can be a god, or a ghost, or a pre-existing dream-messenger, or an "image" (eidolon) created specially for the occasion;10 but whichever it is, it exists objectively in space, and is independent of the dreamer. It effects an entry by the keyhole (Homeric bedrooms having neither window nor chimney); it plants itself at the head of the bed to
deliver its message; and when that is done, it withdraws by the same route. The dreamer, meanwhile, is almost completely passive: he sees a figure, he hears a voice, and that is practically all. Sometimes, it is true, he will answer in his sleep; once he stretches out his arms to embrace the dream-figure. But these are objective physical acts, such as men are observed to perform in their sleep. The dreamer does not suppose himself to be anywhere else than in his bed, and in fact he knows himself to be asleep, since the dream-figure is at pains to point this out to him: "You are asleep, son of Atreus," says the wicked dream in *Iliad* 2; "You are asleep, Achilles," says the ghost of Patroclus; "You are asleep, Penelope," says the "shadowy image" in the *Odyssey*.

All this bears little resemblance to our own dream-experience, and scholars have been inclined to dismiss it, like so much else in Homer, as "poetic convention" or "epic machinery." It is at any rate highly stylised, as the recurrent formulae show. I shall come back to this point presently. Meanwhile we may notice that the language used by Greeks at all periods in describing dreams of all sorts appears to be suggested by a type of dream in which the dreamer is the passive recipient of an objective vision. The Greeks never spoke as we do of having a dream, but always of seeing a dream—θαυμάζειν, εὕπνοιον λάειν. The phrase is appropriate only to dreams of the passive type, but we find it used even when the dreamer is himself the central figure in the dream action. Again, the dream is said not only to "visit" the dreamer (φοιτάν, ἐπισκοπεῖν, προσελθεῖν, etc.) but also to "stand over" him (ἐνοπτήραν). The latter usage is particularly common in Herodotus, where it has been taken for a reminiscence of Homer’s στῆ δ' ἀρ' ὑπερ κεφαλῆς, "it stood at his head"; but its occurrence in the Epidaurian and Lindian Temple Records, and in countless later authors from Isocrates to the Acts of the Apostles, can hardly be explained in this manner. It looks as if the objective, visionary dream had struck deep roots not only in literary tradition but in the popular imagination. And that conclusion is to some extent fortified
by the occurrence in myth and pious legend of dreams which prove their objectivity by leaving a material token behind them, what our spiritualists like to call an “apport”; the best-known example is Bellerophon’s incubation dream in Pindar, in which the apport is a golden bridle."

But let us return to Homer. The stylised, objective dreams I have been describing are not the only dreams with which the epic poets are acquainted. That the common anxiety-dream was as familiar to the author of the Iliad as it is to us, we learn from a famous simile: “as in a dream one flees and another cannot pursue him—the one cannot stir to escape, nor the other to pursue him—so Achilles could not overtake Hector in running, nor Hector escape him.” The poet does not ascribe such nightmares to his heroes, but he knows well what they are like, and makes brilliant use of the experience to express frustration. Again, in Penelope’s dream of the eagle and the geese in Odyssey 19 we have a simple wish-fulfilment dream with symbolism and what Freud calls “condensation” and “displacement”: Penelope is crying over the murder of her beautiful geese when the eagle suddenly speaks with a human voice and explains that he is Odysseus. This is the only dream in Homer which is interpreted symbolically. Should we say that we have here the work of a late poet who has taken an intellectual leap from the primitiveness of Rose’s first stage to the sophistication of his third? I doubt it. On any reasonable theory of the composition of the Odyssey it is difficult to suppose that Book 19 is much later than Book 4, in which we meet a dream of the primitive “objective” type. Moreover, the practice of interpreting dreams symbolically was known to the author of Iliad 5, which is generally thought one of the oldest parts of the poem: we read there of an oneiropolas who failed to interpret his sons’ dreams when they went to the Trojan War.

I suggest that the true explanation does not lie in any juxtaposition of “early” and “late” attitudes to dream-experience as such, but rather in a distinction between different types of dream-experience. For the Greeks, as for other ancient peoples,
the fundamental distinction was that between significant and nonsignificant dreams; this appears in Homer, in the passage about the gates of ivory and horn, and is maintained throughout antiquity. But within the class of significant dreams several distinct types were recognised. In a classification which is transmitted by Artemidorus,Macrobius, and other late writers, but whose origin may lie much further back, three such types are distinguished. One is the symbolic dream, which "dresses up in metaphors, like a sort of riddles, a meaning which cannot be understood without interpretation." A second is the horama or "vision," which is a straightforward preenactment of a future event, like those dreams described in the book of the ingenious J. W. Dunne. The third is called a chrematismos or "oracle;" and is to be recognised "when in sleep the dreamer's parent, or some other respected or impressive personage, perhaps a priest or even a god, reveals without symbolism what will or will not happen, or should or should not be done."

This last type is not, I think, at all common in our own dream-experience. But there is considerable evidence that dreams of this sort were familiar in antiquity. They figure in other ancient classifications. Chalcidius, who follows a different scheme from the other systematisers, calls such a dream an "admonitio," "when we are directed and admonished by the counsels of angelic goodness," and quotes as examples Socrates' dreams in the Crito and the Phaedo. Again, the old medical writer Herophilus (early third century B.C.) probably had this type in mind when he distinguished "godsent" dreams from those which owe their origin either to the "natural" clairvoyance of the mind itself or to chance or to wish-fulfilment. Ancient literature is full of these "godsent" dreams in which a single dream-figure presents itself, as in Homer, to the sleeper and gives him prophecy, advice, or warning. Thus an oneiros "stood over" Croesus and warned him of coming disasters; Hipparchus saw "a tall and handsome man," who gave him a verse oracle, like the "fair and handsome woman" who revealed to Socrates the day of his death by quoting Homer;
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Alexander saw "a very grey man of reverend aspect" who likewise quoted Homer, and in Alexander's opinion was in fact Homer in person."

But we are not dependent on this sort of literary evidence, whose striking uniformity may naturally be put down to the conservatism of Greek literary tradition. A common type of "godsent" dream, in Greece and elsewhere, is the dream which prescribes a dedication or other religious act; and this has left concrete evidence of its actual occurrence in the form of numerous inscriptions stating that their author makes a dedication "in accordance with a dream" or "having seen a dream." Details are rarely given; but we have one inscription where a priest is told in a dream by Sarapis to build him a house of his own, as the deity is tired of living in lodgings; and another giving detailed rules for the conduct of a house of prayer which are stated to have been received in sleep from Zeus. Nearly all the inscriptions are of Hellenistic or Roman date; but this is probably fortuitous, for Plato speaks in the Laws of dedications which are made on the strength of dreams or waking visions, "especially by women of all types, and by men who are sick or in some danger or difficulty, or else have had a special stroke of luck," and we are told again in the Epinomis that "many cults of many gods have been founded, and will continue to be founded, because of dream-encounters with supernatural beings, omens, oracles, and deathbed visions." Plato's testimony to the frequency of such occurrences is all the more convincing since he himself has little faith in their supernatural character.

In the light of this evidence we must, I think, recognise that the stylisation of the "divine dream" or chrematismos is not purely literary; it is a "culture-pattern" dream in the sense I defined at the beginning of this chapter, and belongs to the religious experience of the people, though poets from Homer downwards have adapted it to their purposes by using it as a literary motif. Such dreams played an important part in the life of other ancient peoples, as they do in that of many races.
to-day. Most of the dreams recorded in Assyrian, Hittite, and ancient Egyptian literature are “divine dreams” in which a god appears and delivers a plain message to the sleeper, sometimes predicting the future, sometimes demanding cult. As we should expect in monarchical societies, the privileged dreamers are usually kings (an idea which appears also in the Iliad); commoners had to be content with the ordinary symbolic dream, which they interpreted with the help of dream-books. A type corresponding to the Greek chrematismos also appears among the dreams of contemporary primitives, who usually attach special importance to it. Whether the dream figure is identified as a god or as an ancestor naturally depends on the local culture-pattern. Sometimes he is just a voice, like the Lord speaking to Samuel; sometimes he is an anonymous “tall man,” such as we meet in Greek dreams. In some societies he is commonly recognised as the dreamer’s dead father; and in other cases the psychologist may be disposed to see in him a father-substitute, discharging the parental functions of admonition and guidance. If that view is right, we may perhaps find a special significance in Macrobius’ phrase, “a parent or some other respected or impressive personage.” And we may further suppose that so long as the old solidarity of the family persisted, such maintenance of contact in dreams with the father-image would have a deeper emotional significance, and a more unquestioned authority, than it possesses in our more individualised society.

However, the “divine” character of a Greek dream seems not to depend entirely on the ostensible identity of the dream-figure. The directness (enargeia) of its message was also important. In several Homeric dreams the god or eidolon appears to the dreamer in the guise of a living friend, and it is possible that in real life dreams about acquaintances were often interpreted in this manner. When Aelius Aristides was seeking treatment in Asclepius’ temple at Pergamum, his valet had a dream about another patient, the consul Salvius, who in the dream talked to the valet about his employer’s literary works.
This was good enough for Aristides; he is sure that the dream-figure was the god himself, “disguised as Salvius.” It made, of course, some difference that this was a “sought” dream, even though the person to whom it came was not the seeker: any dream experienced in Asclepius’ temple was presumed to come from the god.

Techniques for provoking the eagerly desired “divine” dream have been, and still are, employed in many societies. They include isolation, prayer, fasting, self-mutilation, sleeping on the skin of a sacrificed animal, or in contact with some other holy object, and finally incubation (i.e., sleeping in a holy place), or some combination of these. The ancient world relied mainly on incubation, as Greek peasants still do to-day; but traces of some of the other practices are not lacking. Thus fasting was required at certain dream-oracles, such as “Charon’s cave” in Asia Minor and the hero-shrine of Amphiaraus in Oropus; at the latter one also slept on the skin of a sacrificed ram. Withdrawal to a sacred cave in quest of visionary wisdom figures in the legends of Epimenides and Pythagoras. Even the Red Indian practice of chopping off a finger joint to procure a dream has an odd partial parallel, which I will mention presently. There were also in later antiquity less painful ways of obtaining an oracle-dream: the dreambooks recommended sleeping with a branch of laurel under your pillow; the magical papyri are full of spells and private rituals for the purpose; and there were Jews at Rome who would sell you any dream you fancied for a few pence.

None of these techniques is mentioned by Homer, nor is incubation itself. But as we have seen, arguments from silence are in his case peculiarly dangerous. Incubation had been practised in Egypt since the fifteenth century B.C. at least, and I doubt if the Minoans were ignorant of it. When we first meet it in Greece, it is usually associated with cults of Earth and of the dead which have all the air of being pre-Hellenic. Tradition said, probably with truth, that the original Earth oracle at Delphi had been a dream-oracle; in historical times, incubation
was practised at the shrines of heroes—whether dead men or chthonic daemons—and at certain chasms reputed to be entrances to the world of the dead (*necyomanteia*). The Olympians did not patronise it (which may sufficiently explain Homer's silence); Athena in the Bellerophon story is an exception, but with her it may be a vestige of her pre-Olympian past.

Whether or not incubation had once been more widely practised in Greece, we find it used in historical times mainly for two specialised ends—either to obtain mantic dreams from the dead, or else for medical purposes. The best-known example of the former is Periander's consultation of his dead wife Melissa on a business matter at a *necyomanteion*, when an "image" of the dead woman appeared to Periander's agent, established her identity, prescribed cult, and insisted on satisfaction of this demand before she would answer his question. There is nothing really incredible in this story, and whether true or false, it seems in any case to reflect an old culture-pattern, out of which in some societies a kind of spiritualism has been developed. But in Greece the Homeric Hades-belief, as well as the scepticism of classical times, must have worked to prevent such a development; and in fact mantic dreams from the dead seem to have played only a very minor part in the Classical Age. They may have acquired more importance in some Hellenistic circles, after Pythagoreans and Stoics had brought the dead into more convenient proximity to the living, by transferring the site of Hades to the air. At any rate we read in Alexander Polyhistor that "the whole air is full of souls, who are worshipped as the daemons and heroes, and it is these who send mankind dreams and omens"; and we find a like theory ascribed to Posidonius. But those who held this view had no reason to seek dreams in special places, since the dead were everywhere; there was no future for *necyomanteia* in the ancient world.

Medical incubation, on the other hand, enjoyed a brilliant revival when at the end of the fifth century the cult of Asclepius suddenly rose to Panhellenic importance—a position which it
retained down to the latest pagan times. About the wider implications of this I shall have something to say in a later chapter. For the moment we are concerned only with the dreams that the god sent to his patients. Ever since the publication in 1883 of the Epidaurian Temple Record, these have been much discussed; and the gradual change in our general attitude towards the nonrational factors in human experience has been reflected in the opinions of scholars. The earlier commentators were content to dismiss the Record as a deliberate priestly forgery, or else to suggest unconvincingly that the patients were drugged, or hypnotised, or somehow mistook waking for sleeping and a priest in fancy dress for the divine Healer. Few, perhaps, would now be satisfied with these crude explanations; and in the three major contributions to the debate which have been made in the present generation—those of Weinreich, Herzog, and Edelstein—we can observe a growing emphasis on the genuinely religious character of the experience. This seems to me entirely justified. But there are still differences of opinion about the origin of the Record. Herzog thinks it is based in part on genuine votive tablets dedicated by individual patients—which might, however, be elaborated and expanded in the process of incorporation—but also in part on a temple tradition which had attracted to itself miracle stories from many sources. Edelstein, on the other hand, accepts the inscriptions as in some sense a faithful reproduction of the patient’s experience.

Certainty in this matter is hardly attainable. But the concept of the culture-pattern dream or vision may perhaps bring us a little nearer to understanding the genesis of such documents as the Epidaurian Record. Experiences of this type reflect a pattern of belief which is accepted not only by the dreamer but usually by everyone in his environment; their form is determined by the belief, and in turn confirms it; hence they become increasingly stylised. As Tylor pointed out long ago, “it is a vicious circle: what the dreamer believes he therefore sees, and what he sees he therefore believes.” But what if he never-
neless fails to see? That must often have happened at Epidaurus: as Diogenes said of the votive tablets to another deity, "there would have been far more of them if those who were not rescued had made dedications."59 But the failures did not matter, save to the individual; for the will of a god is in-scrutable—"therefore hath He mercy on whom He will have mercy." "I am determined to leave the temple forthwith," says the sick pimp in Plautus; "for I realise the decision of As- clepius—he does not care for me or want to save me."60 Many a sick man must have said that. But the true believer was no doubt infinitely patient: we know how patiently primitives wait for the significant vision,61 and how people return again and again to Lourdes. Often in practice the sufferer had to be content with a revelation that was, to say the least, indirect: we have seen how somebody else's dream about a consul could be made to serve at a pinch. But Aristides had also experienced, as he believed, the god's personal presence, and described it in terms that are worth quoting.62 "It was like seeming to touch him," he says, "a kind of awareness that he was there in person; one was between sleep and waking, one wanted to open one's eyes, and yet was anxious lest he should withdraw too soon; one listened and heard things, sometimes as in a dream, sometimes as in waking life; one's hair stood on end; one cried, and felt happy; one's heart swelled, but not with vainglory.63 What human being could put that experience into words? But anyone who has been through it will share my knowledge and recognise the state of mind." What is described here is a condition of self-induced trance, in which the patient has a strong inward sense of the divine presence, and eventually hears the divine voice, only half externalised. It is possible that many of the god's more detailed prescriptions were received by patients in a state of this kind, rather than in actual dreams. 

Aristides' experience is plainly subjective; but occasionally an objective factor may have come into play. We read in the Epidaurian Record of a man who fell asleep in the daytime
outside the temple, when one of the god’s tame snakes came and licked his sore toe; he awoke “cured,” and said he had dreamed that a handsome young man put a dressing on his toe. This recalls the scene in Aristophanes’ *Plutus*, where it is the snakes who administer the curative treatment after the patients have seen a vision of the god. We also read of cures performed by the temple dogs who come and lick the affected part while the patient is wide awake. There is nothing incredible here, if we do not insist on the permanence of the “cures”; the habits of dogs and the therapeutic virtues of saliva are well known. Both dogs and snakes were quite real. A fourth-century Athenian inscription commands an offering of cakes to the holy dogs, and we have Plutarch’s story of the clever temple-dog who detected a thief stealing the votives and was rewarded with dinners at the public expense for the rest of his life. The temple snake figures in Herodas’ mime: the visiting ladies remember to pop a little porridge “respectfully” into his hole.

In the morning, those who had been favoured with the god’s nocturnal visitation told their experiences. And here we must make generous allowance for what Freud called “secondary elaboration,” whose effect is, in Freud’s words, “that the dream loses the appearance of absurdity and incoherence, and approaches the pattern of an intelligible experience.” In this case the secondary elaboration will have operated, without conscious deception, to bring the dream or vision into closer conformity with the traditional culture-pattern. For example, in the dream of the man with the sore toe, the godlike beauty of the dream-figure is the sort of traditional trait which would easily be added at this stage. And beyond this I think we must assume in many cases a tertiary elaboration contributed by the priests, or more often perhaps by fellow-patients. Every rumour of a cure, bringing as it did fresh hope to the desperate, will have been seized on and magnified in that expectant community of suffering, which was bound together, as Aristides tells us, by a stronger sense of fellow-
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ship than a school or a ship's company. Aristophanes gets the psychology right when he describes the other patients crowding round Plutus to congratulate him on recovering his eyesight, and too much excited to go to sleep again. To this sort of milieu we should probably refer the folktale elements in the Record, as well as the tall stories of surgical operations performed by the god on sleeping patients. It is significant that Aristides knows of no contemporary surgical cures, but believes that they were frequent "in the time of the present priest's grandfather." Even at Epidaurus or Pergamum one had to give a story time to grow.

A word, finally, about the medical aspect of the business. In the Record the cures are mostly represented as instantaneous, and possibly some of them were. It is irrelevant to ask how long the improvement lasted: it is enough that the patient "departed cured" (γυρής ἀπηλθε). Such cures need not have been numerous: as we see in the case of Lourdes, a healing shrine can maintain its reputation on a very low percentage of successes, provided a few of them are sensational. As for the dream-prescriptions, their quality naturally varied not only with the dreamer's medical knowledge, but with his unconscious attitude towards his own illness. In a few instances they are quite rational, though not exactly original, as when the Divine Wisdom prescribes gargling for a sore throat and vegetables for constipation. "Full of gratitude," says the recipient of this revelation, "I departed cured." More often the god's pharmacopoeia is purely magical; he makes his patients swallow snake-poison or ashes from the altar, or smear their eyes with the blood of a white cock. Edelstein has rightly pointed out that such remedies still played a biggish part in profane medicine too; but there remains the important difference that in the medical schools they were subject, in principle at least, to rational criticism, whereas in dreams, as Aristotle said, the element of judgement (τὸ ἔπικριτον) is absent.

The influence of the dreamer's unconscious attitude may be seen in Aristides' dream-prescriptions, many of which he has
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recorded. As he says himself, “They are the very opposite of what one would expect, and are indeed just the things which one would naturally most avoid.” Their common characteristic is their painfulness: they range from emetics, river-bathing in midwinter, and running barefoot in the frost, to voluntary shipwreck and a demand for the sacrifice of one of his fingers—a symbol whose significance Freud has explained. These dreams look like the expression of a deep-seated desire for self-punishment. Aristides always obeyed them (though in the matter of the finger his Unconscious so far relented as to let him dedicate a finger-ring as a surrogate). Nevertheless he somehow managed to survive the effects of his own prescriptions; as Professor Campbell Bonner has said, he must have had the iron constitution of the chronic invalid. Indeed, obedience to such dreams may well have procured a temporary abatement of neurotic symptoms. But plainly on a wider view there is little to be said for a system which placed the patient at the mercy of his own unconscious impulses, disguised as divine monitions. We may well accept the cool judgement of Cicero that “few patients owe their lives to Asclepius rather than Hippocrates”; and we should not allow the modern reaction against rationalism to obscure the real debt that mankind owes to those early Greek physicians who laid down the principles of a rational therapy in the face of age-old superstitions like the one we have been considering.

As I have mentioned self-induced visions in connection with the Asclepius cult, I may add a couple of general remarks on waking visions or hallucinations. It is likely that these were commoner in former times than they are to-day, since they seem to be relatively frequent among primitives; and even with us they are less rare than is often supposed. They have in general the same origin and psychological structure as dreams, and like dreams they tend to reflect traditional culture-patterns. Among the Greeks, by far the commonest type is the apparition of a god or the hearing of a divine voice which commands or forbids the performance of certain acts. This type figures,
under the name of "spectaculum," in Chalcidius' classification of dreams and visions; his example is the *daemonion* of Socrates. When all allowance has been made for the influence of literary tradition in creating a stereotyped form, we should probably conclude that experiences of this kind had once been fairly frequent, and still occurred occasionally in historical times.

I believe with Professor Latte that when Hesiod tells us how the Muses spoke to him on Helicon this is not allegory or poetic ornament, but an attempt to express a real experience in literary terms. Again, we may reasonably accept as historical Philippides' vision of Pan before Marathon, which resulted in the establishment of a cult of Pan at Athens; and perhaps also Pindar's vision of the Mother of the Gods in the form of a stone statue, which is likewise said to have occasioned the establishment of a cult, though the authority in this case is not contemporary. These three experiences have an interesting point in common: they all occurred in lonely mountainous places, Hesiod's on Helicon, Philippides' on the savage pass of Mount Parthenion, Pindar's during a thunderstorm in the mountains. That is possibly not accidental. Explorers, mountaineers, and airmen sometimes have odd experiences even today: a well-known example is the presence that haunted Shackleton and his companions in the Antarctic. And one of the old Greek doctors in fact describes a pathological state into which a man may fall "if he is travelling on a lonely route and terror seizes him as a result of an apparition." We need to remember in this connection that most of Greece was, and is, a country of small and scattered settlements separated by wide stretches of desolate mountain solitude that dwarf to insignificance the occasional farms, the "νησίων." The psychological influence of that solitude should not be underrated.

It remains to trace briefly the steps by which a handful of Greek intellectuals attained a more rational attitude to dream-experience. So far as our fragmentary knowledge goes, the first man who explicitly put the dream in its proper place was
Heraclitus, with his observation that in sleep each of us retreats to a world of his own. Not only does that rule out the "objective" dream, but it seems by implication to deny validity to dream-experience in general, since Heraclitus' rule is "to follow what we have in common." And it would appear that Xenophanes too denied its validity, since he is said to have rejected all forms of divination, which must include the veridical dream. But these early sceptics did not offer to explain, so far as we know, how or why dreams occurred, and their view was slow to win acceptance. Two examples will serve to show how old ways of thinking, or at any rate old ways of speaking, persisted in the late fifth century. The sceptical Artabanus in Herodotus points out to Xerxes that most dreams are suggested by our waking preoccupations, yet he still talks of them in the old "objective" manner as "wandering about among men." And Democritus' atomist theory of dreams as eidola which continually emanate from persons and objects, and affect the dreamer's consciousness by penetrating the pores of his body, is plainly an attempt to provide a mechanistic basis for the objective dream; it even preserves Homer's word for the objective dream-image. This theory makes explicit provision for telepathic dreams by declaring that eidola carry representations (ειδολασεις) of the mental activities of the beings from whom they originate.

We should expect, however, that by the end of the fifth century the traditional type of "divine dream," no longer nourished by a living faith in the traditional gods, would have declined in frequency and importance—the popular Asclepius cult being for good reasons an exception. And there are in fact indications that other ways of regarding the dream were becoming more fashionable about this time. Religious minds were now inclined to see in the significant dream evidence of the innate powers of the soul itself, which it could exercise when liberated by sleep from the gross importunities of the body. That development belongs to a context of ideas, commonly called "Orphic," which I shall consider in the next chap-
At the same time there is evidence of a lively interest in oneirocritice, the art of interpreting the private symbolic dream. A slave in Aristophanes talks of hiring a practitioner of this art for a couple of obols; a grandson of Aristides the Just is said to have made his living by it with the help of a πυάκια or table of correspondences. Out of these πυάκια developed the first Greek dreambooks, the earliest of which may belong to the late fifth century.

The Hippocratic treatise On Regimen (περὶ διαίτης), which Jaeger has dated to about the middle of the fourth century, makes an interesting attempt to rationalise oneirocritice by relating large classes of dreams to the physiological state of the dreamer and treating them as symptoms important to the physician. This author admits also precognitive "divine" dreams, and he likewise recognises that many dreams are undisguised wish-fulfilments. But the dreams which interest him as a doctor are those which express in symbolic form morbid physiological states. These he attributes to the medical clairvoyance exercised by the soul when in sleep it "becomes its own mistress" and is able to survey its bodily dwelling without distraction (here the influence of the "Orphic" view is evident). From this standpoint he proceeds to justify many of the traditional interpretations by a series of more or less fanciful analogies between the external world and the human body, macrocosm and microcosm. Thus earth stands for the dreamer's flesh, a river for his blood, a tree for his reproductive system; to dream of an earthquake is a symptom of physiological change, while dreams about the dead refer to the food one has eaten, "for from the dead come nourishment and growth and seed." He thus anticipates Freud's principle that the dream is always egocentric, though his application of it is too narrowly physiological. He claims no originality for his interpretations, some of which are known to be older; but he says that earlier interpreters lacked a rational basis for their views, and prescribed no treatment except prayer, which in his opinion is not enough.
Plato in the *Timaeus* offers a curious explanation of mantic dreams: they originate from the insight of the rational soul, but are perceived by the irrational soul as images reflected on the smooth surface of the liver; hence their obscure symbolic character, which makes interpretation necessary. He thus allows dream-experience an indirect relationship to reality, though it does not appear that he rated it very high. A much more important contribution was made by Aristotle in his two short essays *On Dreams* and *On Divination in Sleep*. His approach to the problem is coolly rational without being superficial, and he shows at times a brilliant insight, as in his recognition of a common origin for dreams, the hallucinations of the sick, and the illusions of the sane (e.g., when we mistake a stranger for the person we want to see). He denies that any dreams are godsent (θεοπεμπτα): if the gods wished to communicate knowledge to men, they would do so in the daytime, and they would choose the recipients more carefully. Yet dreams, though not divine, may be called daemonic, “for Nature is daemonic”—a remark which, as Freud said, contains deep meaning if it be correctly interpreted. On the subject of veridical dreams Aristotle in these essays is, like Freud, cautiously noncommittal. He no longer talks of the soul’s innate powers of divination, as he had done in his romantic youth; and he rejects Democritus’ theory of atomic *eidola*. Two kinds of dreams he accepts as intelligibly precognitive: dreams conveying foreknowledge of the dreamer’s state of health, which are reasonably explained by the penetration to consciousness of symptoms ignored in waking hours; and those which bring about their own fulfilment by suggesting a course of action to the dreamer. Where dreams outside these classes prove to be veridical, he thinks it is probably coincidence (συμπτωμα); alternatively, he suggests a theory of wave-borne stimuli, on the analogy of disturbances propagated in water or air. His whole approach to the problem is scientific, not religious; and one may in fact doubt whether in this matter modern science has advanced very far beyond him.
Certainly later antiquity did not. The religious view of dreams was revived by the Stoics, and eventually accepted even by Peripatetics like Cicero's friend Cratippus. In the considered opinion of Cicero, the philosophers by this "patronage of dreams" had done much to keep alive a superstition whose only effect was to increase the burden of men's fears and anxieties. But his protest went unheeded: the dreambooks continued to multiply; the Emperor Marcus Aurelius thanked the gods for medical advice vouchsafed to him in sleep; Plutarch abstained from eating eggs because of certain dreams; Dio Cassius was inspired by a dream to write history; and even so enlightened a surgeon as Galen was prepared to perform an operation at the bidding of a dream. Whether from an intuitive apprehension that dreams are after all related to man's inmost life, or for the simpler reasons I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, antiquity to the end refused to content itself with the Gate of Ivory, but insisted that there was also, sometimes and somehow, a Gate of Horn.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1 On the attitude of primitives to dream-experience see L. Lévy-Bruhl, Primitive Mentality (Eng. trans., 1923), chap. iii, and L'Expérience mystique, chap. iii.
2 Theophrastus, Char. 16 (28 J.).
4 C. G. Jung would regard such dreams as based on "archetypal images" transmitted through a supposed racial memory. But, as Lincoln points out (op. cit., 24), their disappearance upon the breakdown of a culture indicates that the images are culturally transmitted. Jung himself (Psychology and Religion, 20) reports the significant admission of a medicine-man, who "confessed to me that he no longer had any dreams, for they had the District Commissioner now instead. 'Since the English have been in the country
we have no dreams any more,’ he said. ‘The D. C. knows every­thing about war and diseases, and about where we have got to live.’”


6 *Primitive Culture in Greece*, 151.


8 The most recent and thorough study of dreams in Homer is Joachim Hundt’s *Der Traumgläube bei Homer* (Greifswald, 1935), from which I have learned a good deal. “Objective” dreams are in his terminology “Aussenträume,” in contrast with “Innenträume,” which are regarded as purely mental experiences, even though they may be provoked by an extraneous cause.

9 άνειπος as “dream-experience” seems to occur in Homer only in the phrase ἐν άνειπῳ (*Il.* 22.199, *Od.* 19.541, 581 = 21.79).

10 Ghost, *Il.* 23.65 ff.; god, *Od.* 6.20 ff.; dream-messenger, *Il.* 2.5 ff., where Zeus sends the άνειπος on an errand exactly as he elsewhere sends Iris; ἐδώρων created *ad hoc*, *Od.* 4.795 ff. In *Iliad* 2 and the two *Odyssey* dreams, the dream-figure is disguised as a living person (cf. *infra*, p. 109); but I see no reason to suppose with Hundt that it is really the “Bildseele” or shadow-soul of the person in question paying a visit to the “Bildseele” of the dreamer (cf. Böhme’s criticism, *Gnomon*, 11 [1935]).


17 Hdt. 1.34.1; 2.139.1, 141.3; 5.56; 7.12: cf. Hundt, *op. cit.*, 42 f.
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18 lāmara, nos. 4, 7, etc. (see n. 55); Lindian Chronicle, ed. Blinkenberg, D 14, 68, 98; Isocrates, 10.65; Acts 23: 11. Many other examples of this usage are collected by L. Deubner, de incubatione, pp. 11 and 71.

Pindar, Ol. 13.65 ff. Cf. also Paus. 10.38.13, where the dream-figure of Asclepius leaves a letter behind. Old Norse incubation-dreams prove their objectivity in a like manner; cf., e.g., Kelchner, op. cit., 138. The Epidaurian operation-dreams (n. 72 below) are a variation on the same theme. For “apports” in theurgy see App. II, n. 126.

20 Il. 22.199 ff. Aristarchus seems to have rejected the lines; but the grounds given in the scholia—that they are “cheap in style and thought” and “undo the impression of Achilles’ swiftness”—are plainly silly, and the objections of some moderns are not much stronger. Leaf, who thinks v. 200 “tautological and awkward,” has failed to notice the expressive value of the repeated words in conveying the sense of frustration. Cf. H. Fränkel, Die homerischen Gleichnisse, 78, and Hundt, op. cit., 81 ff. Wilamowitz found the simile admirable, but “unerträglich” in its present context (Die Ilias u. Homer, 100); his analysis seems to me hypercritical.

21 Od. 19.541 ff. Scholars have thought it a defect in this dream that Penelope is sorry for her geese whereas in waking life she is not sorry for the suitors whom they symbolise. But such “inversion of affect” is common in real dreams (Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, 2nd Eng. ed., 375).

22 Il. 5.148 ff. The ὄνειροστὸλος here can only be an interpreter (ἐκποιήσας ὄνειρος). But in the only other Homeric passage where the word occurs, Il. 1.63, it may mean a specially favoured dreamer (cf. Hundt, op. cit., 102 f.), which would attest the antiquity in Greece of the “sought” dream.

23 Cf. Sirach 31 (34): 1 ff.; Laxdaela Saga, 31.15; etc. As Björck points out (loc. cit. 307), without the distinction between significant and nonsignificant dreams the art of ἐνεποκριτῇ could never have maintained itself. If there was ever a period, before the advent of Freud, when men thought all dreams significant, it lies very far back. “Primitives do not accord belief to all dreams indiscriminately. Certain dreams are worthy of credence, others not” (Lévy-Bruhl, Primitive Mentality, 101).

24 Od. 19.560 ff.: cf. Hdt. 7.16; Galen, περὶ τῆς ἐνυπνίων διαγνώσεως (VI.832 ff. R.); etc. The distinction is implied at Aesch. Cho. 534, where I think we should punctuate, with Verrall, oντοι μῶλαυν· ἄνδρος δύναντον πέλει: “it is not a mere nightmare: it is a symbolic
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vision of a man." Artemidorus and Macrobius recognise the ἄνθρωπος ἀσθένειας and also another type of nonsignificant dream, called φάντασμα, which includes, according to Macrobius, (a) the nightmare (εφιάλτης), and (b) the hypnopompic visions which occur to some persons between waking and sleeping and were first described by Aristotle (Insomn. 462a 11).

25 Artemid. 1.2, p. 5 Hercher; Macrobius, in Somn. Scip. 1.3.2; [Aug.] de spiritu et anima, 25 (P.L. XL.798); Joann. Saresb. Polycrat. 2.15 (P.L. CXCIX.429a); Nicephorus Gregoras, in Synesium de insomn. (P.G. CXLIX.608a.). The passages have been collected, and their relationship discussed, by Deubner, de incubatione, 1 ff. The definitions quoted in the text are from Macrobius.

26 This has been shown by J. H. Waszink, Mnemosyne, 9 (1941) 65 ff. Chalcidius’ classification combines Platonist with Jewish ideas; Waszink conjectures that he may have derived it from Numenius via Porphyry. Direct converse with a god appears also in Posidonius’ classification, Cic. div. 1.64.

27 Chalcidius, in Tim. 256, quoting Crito 44B and Phaedo 60e.

28 Aetius, Placita 5.2.3: Ἡρόδιος τῶν ὀνειρῶν τοὺς μὲν θεοπέμπτοις καὶ ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι τοὺς δὲ φυσικοῖς ἀνευδολοποιομένης ψυχῆς τὸ συμφέρον αὐτῇ καὶ τὸ πάντως ἐσθέμον· τοὺς δὲ συγκραματικοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτομάτου κατ’ εἶδώλων πρόσπτωσιν . . . διὰν αἱ βουλόμεθα βλέπωμεν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν τὰς ἐρωμένας ἀρώτων ἐν ὑπνῷ γίνεται. The last part of this statement has caused much difficulty (see Diels ad loc., Dox Gr. 416). I think the “mixed” dreams (συγκραματικοῖς) are dreams of monsters (φάντασμα) which on Democritus’ theory arise from a fortuitous conjunction of ἐιδῶλα, ubi equi atque hominis casu convenit imago (Lucr. 5.741). But a dream of one’s beloved is not a “mixed” dream in this or any other sense. Galen has συγκραματικοῖς, which Wellmann explained as “organic” (Arch. f. Gesch. d. Med. 16 [1925] 70 ff.). But this does not square with κατ’ εἶδωλων πρόσπτωσιν. I suggest that διὰν αἱ βουλόμεθα καὶ illustrates a fourth type, the dream arising from ψυχῆς ἐνθυμία (cf. Hippocrates, ἐπὶ διαίτης, 4.93), mention of which has fallen out.

29 Hdt. 1.34.1, 5.56; Plato, Crito 44A; Plutarch, Alex. 26 (on the authority of Heraclides). The uniformity of the literary tradition has been noted by Deubner (de incubatione 13); he quotes many other examples. The type is as common in early Christian as in pagan literature (Festugière, L’Astrologie et les sciences occultes, 51).

30 E.g., Paus. 3.14.4, the wife of an early Spartan king builds a temple of Thetis κατὰ δύν ὀνειρῶτας. Dreams about cult statues,
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ibid., 3.16.1, 7.20.4, 8.42.7; Parrhasios apud Athen. 543r. Sophocles dedicates a shrine as a result of a dream, Vit. Soph. 12, Cic. div. 1.54.

Dittenberger, Sylloge 1, offers the following instances: kar' δναρ, 1147, 1148, 1149; κατά δνειρον, 1150; καθ’ ύπνους, 1152; δυν ἱδούσα άρετήν τῆς θεοῦ (Athene), 1151. Probably 1128 καθ’ ὄραμα and 1153 καν’ επιταγήν also refer to dreams; 557, an επιφάνεια of Artemis, may be a waking vision. Cf. also Edelstein, Asclepius, I, test. 432, 439-442, and for cults originating in waking visions, infra, p. 117, and Chron. Lind. A 3: τὸ λερόν τὰς Ἀθάνας τὰς Αἰνίδας . . . τολλοῖς κ[αὶ καλοῖς ἀναθέματι ε̇ς ἀρχαιότατων χρόνων κεκόμηται διὰ τὰν τὰς θεοὺς επιφάνειαν.

Syll. 1, 663; 985. Cf. also P. Cair. Zenon I.59034, the dreams of Zoilus (who appears to have been a building contractor, and had thus every motive for dreaming that Sarapis required a new temple). Many of Aristides’ dreams prescribe sacrifices or other acts of cult.

Plato, Laws 909E–910A, Epin. 985c. The inscriptions tend to confirm Plato’s judgement about the kind of person who made a dedication on the strength of a dream; the majority are either dedications to healing deities (Asclepius, Hygieia, Sarapis) or dedications by women.


I. 2.30 ff. seems to imply that the dream-experience of a High King is more trustworthy than that of an ordinary man (cf. Hundt, op. cit., 55 f.). A later Greek view was that the σπουδαῖος was privileged to receive only significant dreams (Artemidorus, 4 prae.; cf. Plutarch, gen. Socr. 20, 589B), which corresponds to the special status as dreamer accorded by primitives to the medicine-man, and may be based on Pythagorean ideas (cf. Cic. div. 2.119).

Gadd, op. cit., 73 ff.

Voice, e.g., Lincoln, op. cit., 198, cf. I Samuel 3: 4 ff.; tall man, e.g., Lincoln, op. cit., 24, cf. Deubner, op. cit., 12. Some of Jung’s patients also reported dreams in which an oracular voice was heard, either disembodied or proceeding “from an authoritative figure”; he calls it “a basic religious phenomenon” (Psychology and Religion, 45 f.).

Cf. Seligman, JRAI 54 (1924) 35 f.; Lincoln, op. cit., 94.

Lincoln, op. cit., 96 f.

Il. 2.20 ff. (Nestor, the ideal father-substitute!); Od. 4.796 ff.,
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6.22 f. (hardly mother-substitutes, for they are ὑμήλακες with the dreamer).

41 Aristides, orat. 48.9 (II.396.24 Keil); cf. Deubner, op. cit., 9, and Christian examples, ibid., 73, 84. Some primitives are less easily satisfied: see, e.g., Lincoln, op. cit., 255 f., 271 ff.

42 Strabo, 14.1.44; Philostratus, vit. Apoll. 2.37. Other examples in Deubner, op. cit., 14 f.

43 Paus. 1.34.5. Other examples in Deubner, op. cit., 27 f. Cf. also Halliday, Greek Divination, 131 f., who quotes the curious Gaelic incubation rite of "Taghairm," in which the enquirer was wrapped in a bull's hide.

44 See chap. v, pp. 142, 144.

45 See n. 79.


47 It has been thought that the Σελλός ἀνιπτότοδες χαμαίεθαυ at Dodona (II. 16.233 ff.) practised incubation; but if they did, did Homer know it?

48 Cf. Gadd, op. cit., 26 (temple incubation of Amenophis II and Thothmes IV to obtain the god's approval of their occupying the throne). For the Minoans we have no direct evidence; but the terra-cottas found at Petsofa in Crete (BSA 9.356 ff.), which represent human limbs and are pierced with holes for suspension, certainly look like votives dedicated at a healing shrine.—For a probable case of incubation in early Mesopotamia see Ztschr. f. Assyri. 29 (1915) 158 ff. and 30 (1916) 101 ff.

49 Eur. I.T. 1259 ff. (cf. Hec. 70 f.: ἡ πότνια χθὼν, μελανοπτερύγων μητρο πνευμων). The authority of this tradition has been doubted; but is any other oracular method so likely? Neither inspired prophecy nor divination by lots is appropriate, so far as our knowledge goes, to an Earth oracle; whereas the author of Od. 24.12 already seems to regard dreams as chthonic (cf. Hundt, op. cit., 74 ff.).

50 Pindar, Ol. 13.75 ff. Cf. an inscription from the Athenian Acropolis, Syll. 3 1151: Ἀθηνᾶ . . . ὑπὸ λύδους ἀρετήν τῆς θεοῦ (not necessarily a sought dream, but significant of the goddess' attitude); and the (probably fictitious) epiphany of Athena in a dream, Blinkenberg, Lindische Tempelchronik, 34 ff.

51 Hdt. 5.92. Melissa was a βιασθήναρος, which may have made her εἰδωλον more easily available for consultation. Her complaint
about the cold may be compared with the Norse story of a man who appeared in a dream to say that his feet were cold, the toes of his corpse having been left uncovered (Kelchner, op. cit., 70).

Pelias's (unsought) dream in which the soul of Phrixos asks to be brought home (Pindar, Pyth. 4.159 ff.) probably reflects the anxiety of the late Archaic Age about translation of relics, and may thus be classed as a "culture-pattern" dream. Other dreams in which the dead appear mostly illustrate the special cases of the Vengeful Dead (e.g., the Erinyes' dream, Aesch. Eum. 94 ff., or Pausanias' sought dream, Plutarch, Cimon 6, Paus. 3.17.8 f.), or the Grateful Dead (e.g., Simonides' dream, Cic. div. 1.56). Dream-apparitions of the recently dead to their surviving relatives are occasionally recorded in their epitaphs as evidence of their continued existence (see Rohde, Psyche, 576 f.; Cumont, After Life in Roman Paganism, 61 f.). Such dreams are of course natural in all societies; but (apart from Achilles' dream in Homer) the recorded examples of this type are, I think, chiefly postclassical.

Alexander Polyhistor apud Diog. Laert. 8.32 (= Diels, Vorsokr. 58 B 1a); Posidonius apud Cic. div. 1.64. Alexander's account was thought by Wellmann (Hermes, 54 [1919] 225 ff.) to go back to a fourth-century source which reflected old-Pythagorean views; but see Festugière, REG. 58 (1945) 1 ff., who shows reason for dating the source or sources to the third century, and relates the document to the views of the Old Academy and of Diocles of Carystus.

See chap. vi, p. 193.

There is a separate edition by R. Herzog, Die Wunderheilungen von Epidaurus (Philol. Suppl. III.3); and the less mutilated portions are reproduced and translated in Edelstein, Asclepius, I, test. 423.

The scene in Aristophanes' Plutus has been quoted as supporting the last view. But I doubt if the poet intended to hint that the priest of line 676 was identical with "the god" who appears later. Cario's narrative seems to represent, not what Aristophanes thought actually happened, but rather the average patient's imaginative picture of what went on while he slept.

O. Weinreich, Antike Heilungswunder (RGV VIII.i.), 1909; R. Herzog, op. cit., 1931; E. J. and L. Edelstein, Asclepius: A Collection and Interpretation of the Testimonies (2 vols., 1945). Mary Hamilton's Incubation (1906) provides a very readable general account for the nonspecialist.

E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture, II, 49. Cf. G. W. Morgan, "Navaho
Dreams,” *American Anthropologist*, 34 (1932) 400: “Myths influence dreams, and these dreams in turn help to maintain the efficacy of the ceremonies.”

Diog. Laert. 6.59.

Plautus, *Curc.* 216 ff. (= test. 430 Edelstein). Later piety represents failure as a sign of the god’s moral disapproval, as in the cases of Alexander Severus (Dio Cass. 78.15.6 f. = test. 395) and the drunken youth in Philostratus *(vit. Apoll. 1.9 = test. 397).* But there were also temple legends to hearten the disappointed *(lámara 25).* Edelstein thinks these must have been the minority *(op. cit., II.163)*; but the history of Lourdes and other healing shrines suggests that no such assumption is necessary. “If nothing happens,” says Lawson, speaking of incubation in Greek churches today, “they return home with hope lessened, but belief unshaken” *(Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion, 302).*

Cf., e.g., Lincoln, *op. cit.*, 271 ff.; and on delays at Epidaurus, Herzog, *op. cit.*, 67. In some narratives of mediaeval incubation the patient waits as much as a year (Deubner, *op. cit.*, 84), and Lawson speaks of peasants today waiting for weeks and months.

Aristides, *oral.* 48.31 ff. (= test. 417). Maximus of Tyre claims to have had a waking vision of Asclepius (9.7: ἐδῶν τὸν Ἀσκληπιόν, ἀλλ’ ὄψιν ὄραρον). And Iamblichus *(myst. 3.2, p. 104 P.)* regards the state between sleeping and waking as particularly favourable to the reception of divine visions.

*γνώμης ὄγκος ἀνεπαχθῆς.* ὄγκος was normally a sign of pride, and therefore offensive *(επαχθῆς)* to the gods.

*lámara 17; Ar. Plut.* 733 ff.; *lámara 20, 26.* On the virtue in the dog’s lick see H. Scholz, *Der Hund in der gr.-röm. Magie u. Religion,* 13. A fourth-century relief in the National Museum at Athens, no. 3369, has been interpreted by Herzog *(op. cit., 88 ff.)* as a parallel to *lámara 17.* Dedicated by a grateful incubant to the healing hero Amphiaraurus, it shows side by side (a) the healing of an injured shoulder by Amphiaraurus in person (the dream?), (b) a snake licking it (the objective event?).

*IG II², 4962 (= test. 515); Plutarch, soll. anim. 13, 969E; Aelian, N.A. 7.13 (= test. 731a, 731).* On the offering “to the dogs and their keepers *(κυνηγέταις)*” see Farnell, *Hero Cults,* 261 ff.; Scholz, *op. cit.,* 49; Edelstein, *op. cit.,* II.186, n. 9. Plato comicus adapts the phrase to an indecent *double entendre* (fr. 174.16 K.), which possibly indicates that some Athenians found the offering as funny as we do. Are the “keepers” or “dog-leaders” spirits who guide the dog to the appropriate patient? They are anyhow not, I think,
“huntsmen,” human or divine: Xen. Cyneg. 1.2 is no proof that Asclepius ever hunted.

66 Herodas, 4.90 f. (= test. 482). He is surely a live snake, not a bronze one. Bronze snakes do not live in holes, and τρώγλη does not mean “mouth” (as Edelstein, loc. cit. and II.188, reproducing a slip of Knox), nor does it seem likely that a money-box could be called a τρώγλη (as Herzog, Arch. f. Rel. 10 [1907] 205 ff.). The natural interpretation is confirmed by Paus. 2.11.8 (= test. 700a).

67 The Interpretation of Dreams, 391.

68 Cf. λάματα 31, and the many examples in Deubner, op. cit., 12.

69 λάματα 1 is a clear example, as Herzog has pointed out. Cf. also G. Vlastos, “Religion and Medicine in the Cult of Asclepius,” Review of Religion, 1949, 278 ff.

70 Aristides, orat. 23.16 (= test. 402): οὔτε χοροῦ σύλλογος πράγμα τοσοῦτον οὔτε πλούτος κοινωνία οὔτε διδασκάλων τῶν αὐτῶν τυχεῖν, διὸν χρήμα καὶ κέρδος εἰς Ἀσκληπιοῦ τε συμφοιτήσαι καὶ τελεσθῆναι τὰ πρῶτα τῶν λειῶν.

71 Ar. Plut. 742 ff.

72 Aristides, orat. 50.64 (= test. 412). Surgical operations on sleeping patients appear also in the fragment of a temple record from the Asclepieum at Lebena in Crete (Inscr. Cret. I.xvii.9 = test. 426), and are attributed to Sts. Cosmas and Damian (Deubner, op. cit., 74). For an old Norse operation-dream see Kelchner, op. cit., 110.

73 Instantaneous cures appear also in Christian incubation (Deubner, op. cit., 72, 82), and are characteristic of savage medicine generally (Lévy-Bruhl, Primitive Mentality, 419 f. [Eng. trans.]).

74 Edelstein rightly stresses the first point (op. cit., II.167, “men in their dreams made the god trust in everything on which they themselves relied”); he overlooks the second. The older view which attributed the cures to the medical skill of the priests, and attempted to rationalise the Asclepiea as sanatoriums (cf. Farnell, Hero Cults, 273 f., Herzog, op. cit., 154 ff.), is rightly abandoned by Edelstein. As he points out, there is not much real evidence that at Epidaurus and elsewhere physicians, or priests trained in medicine, played any part in the temple healings (op. cit., II.158). The Asclepieum at Cos has been claimed as an exception; but the medical instruments found there may well be votives dedicated by physicians. (See, however, Aristides, orat. 49.21 f., where Aristides dreams of an ointment and the νεκρός provides it; and an inscription in JHS 15 [1895] 121, where the patient thanks his doctor as well as the god).
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10 IG IV.1.126 (= test. 432). Cf. Aristides, orat. 49.30 (= test. 410): τὰ μὲν (τῶν φαρμάκων) αὐτός συντεθεὶς, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἐν μέσῳ καὶ κοινῶν ἔδιδον (ὁ θεὸς), and Zingerle's study of the prescriptions given to Granius Rufus, Comment. Vind. 3 (1937) 85 ff.


14 Cf. Edelstein, op. cit., II.171 ff.; and, contra, Vlastos, loc. cit. (n. 69 above), 282 ff. In their admiration for the rational principles of Greek medicine, philosophers and historians have been inclined to ignore or slur over the irrational character of many of the remedies employed by ancient physicians (and indeed by all physicians down to fairly recent times). On the difficulty of testing drugs before the development of chemical analysis see Temkin, The Falling Sickness, 23 f. Nevertheless, one must still agree with Vlastos that "Hippocratic medicine and Asclepius' cures are polar opposites in principle."


19 Aristides, orat. 36.124; 47.46–50, 65; 48.18 ff., 27, 74 ff. Aristides' obsessive sense of guilt betrays itself also in two curious passages (orat. 48.44 and 51.25) where he interprets the death of a friend as a surrogate for his own; such thoughts are symptomatic not so much of callous egotism as of a deep-seated neurosis. For the dream of sacrificing a finger (orat. 48.27 = test. 504) cf. Artemidorus, 1.42. Actual finger-sacrifice is practised by primitives for a variety of purposes (Frazer on Paus. 8.34.2). One object is to procure significant dreams or visions: see Lincoln, op. cit., 147, 256, where the practice is explained as an appeasement of the Father-figure, whose apparition is desired, by an act which symbolises self-castration.


21 Cic. N.D. 3.91 (= test. 416a). Cf. Cic. div. 2.123 (= test. 416). For the harm done by reliance on medical dreams cf. Soranus' requirement that a nurse shall not be superstitious, "lest dreams or omens or faith in traditional rituals lead her to neglect proper treatment" (1.2.4.4, Corp. Med. Graec. IV.5.28).

22 A "census of hallucinations" conducted by the English Society for Psychical Research (Proc. S.P.R. 10 [1894] 25 ff.) seemed to indicate that about one person in ten experiences at some time in his life a hallucination not due to physical or mental illness. A more
recent enquiry by the same society (Journ. S.P.R. 34 [1948]
187 ff.) has confirmed this finding.

83 Chalcidius, in Tim. 256: spectaculum, ut cum vigilantibus offer-
t se videndam caelestis potestas clare iubens aliquid aut prohibens
forma et voce mirabili. The question whether such epiphanies
really occurred was the subject of lively controversy in Hellenistic
times (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.68). For a detailed account of an
experience in which the same divine figure was simultaneously
perceived by one person in a dream and by another in a waking
vision, see P. Oxy. XI.1381.91 ff.

84 Cf. Wilamowitz, Glaube, I.23; Pfister in P.-W., Supp. IV, s.v.
"Epiphanie," 3.41. As Pfister says, we cannot doubt that the
mass of ancient epiphany-stories corresponds to something in an-
cient religious experience, even though we can seldom or never be
quite sure that any particular story has a historical basis.

154 ff.

86 Hesiod, Theog. 22 ff. (cf. chap. iii, p. 81). Hesiod does not claim
to have seen the Muses, but only to have heard their voices; they
were presumably κεκαλυμμέναι ἕρι πολλῇ (Theog. 9). Some MSS
and citations, reading δρέψασαι in line 31, make the Muses pluck
a branch of bay and give it to him, which would put the vision into
the class of “apport” stories (n. 19 above). But we should prob-
m ably prefer the less obvious reading δρέψασθαι, “they granted me
to pluck for myself” a branch of the holy tree—the symbolic act
expresses his acceptance of his “call.”

87 Hdt. 6.105. Here too the experience may have been purely audi-
tory, though φανήναι is used of it in c. 106.

88 Aristodemus, apud Schol. Pind. Pyth. 3.79 (137); cf. Paus. 9.25.3,
and chap. iii, n. 90.

89 Sir Ernest Shackleton, South, 209.

90 Hippocrates, Int. 48 (VII.286 L.): αὐτή ἦ νοῦσος προσπίπτει μά-
lιστα ἐν ἀληθημιᾷ, καὶ ἦν κοι ἐρήμην ὄδων διδήξι καὶ ὁ φόβος αὐτῶν
λάβη ἐκ φάσματος. λαμβάνει δὲ καὶ ἀλλως. The influence of the wild
environment on Greek religious ideas has been eloquently stressed
by Wilamowitz (Glaube, I.155, 177 f., and elsewhere), but this
passage seems to have escaped notice.

91 Heraclitus, fr. 89 D.; cf. fr. 73 and Sext. Emp. adv. dogm. 1.129 f.
(= Heraclitus, A 16). Fr. 26 also seems to refer to dream-experi-
ence, but is too corrupt and obscure to build anything on (cf.
O. Gigon, Untersuchungen zu Heraclit, 95 ff.). Nor can I place
much reliance on Chalcidius’ statement about the views of ‘Hera-
clitus and the Stoics” concerning prophecy (in Tim. 251 = Heraclitus, A 20).

92 Fr. 2.
93 Cic. div. 1.5; Aetius, 5.1.1 (= Xenophanes, A 52).
94 Hdt. 7.168, ἐνυπνια τὰ ἐσ ἀνθρώπους πεπλανμένα. Cf. Lucr. 5.724, “rerum simulacra vagari” (from Democritus?). For dreams reflecting daytime thoughts cf. also Empedocles, fr. 108.
95 This point has been made by Björck, who sees in Democritus’ theory an example of the systematising of popular ideas by intellectuals (Eranos, 44 [1946] 313). But it is also an attempt to naturalise the “supernatural” dream by giving a mechanistic explanation (Vlastos, loc. cit., 284).
97 In popular usage terms like θεότεμπτος came to be largely emptied of their religious content: Artemidorus says that in his day anything unexpected was colloquially called θεότεμπτον (1.6).
98 See chap. v, p. 135.
99 Ar. Vesp. 52 f.; Demetrius of Phaleron apud Plut. Aristides 27. Cf. also Xen. Anab. 7.8.1, where the reading τὰ ἐνυπνια ἐν Δυκέλω γεγεραφότος is probably sound (Wilamowitz, Hermes, 54 [1919] 65 f.). θεορομάντειες were referred to by the early comic poet Magnes (fr. 4 K.), and appear to have been satirised in the Telemessians of Aristophanes. S. Luria, “Studien zur Geschichte der antiken Traumdeutung,” Bull. Acad. des Sciences de l’U.R.S.S. 1927, 1041 ff., is perhaps right in distinguishing two schools of dream-interpretation in the Classical Age, one conservative and religious, the other pseudo-scientific, though I cannot follow him in all his detailed conclusions. Faith in the art was not confined to the masses; both Aeschylus and Sophocles recognise the interpretation of dreams as an important branch of μαντική (P.V. 485 f.; El. 497 ff.).
100 Antiphon ὁ τερατοπαθής, who is presumably the author of the dreambook quoted by Cicero and Artemidorus (cf. Hermogenes, de ideis, 2.11.7 = Vorsokr. 87 A 2, ὁ καὶ τερατοπαθῆς καὶ ὄνειροκρήτης λεγόμενος γενέθοι) was a contemporary of Socrates (Diog. Laert. 2.46 = Aristotle, fr. 75 R. = Vorsokr. 87 A 5). He is often identified, on the authority of Hermogenes, loc. cit., and Suidas, with the sophist Antiphon; but this is not easy to accept. (a) It is hard to attribute a deep respect for dreams and portents to the author of the περὶ ἀληθείας, who “disbelieved in providence”
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(Vorskr. 87 B 12; cf. Nestle, Vom Mythos zum Logos, 389); (b) Artemidorus and Suidas call the writer of the dreambook an Athenian (Vorskr. 80 B 78, A 1), while Socrates' use of ταρ’ ἥμιν at Xen. Mem. 1.6.13 seems to me to imply that the sophist was a foreigner (which would also forbid identification of the sophist with the orator).

Jaeger, Paideia, III.33 ff. Previous scholars had generally attributed the περὶ διαίρεσις to the late fifth century.

That dreams can be significant symptoms in illness is recognised elsewhere in the Hippocratic corpus (Epidem. 1.10, II.670 L.; Hum. 4, V.480; Heb. 45, IX.460). In particular, anxiety dreams are seen to be important symptoms of mental trouble, Morb. 2.72, VII.110; Int. 48, VII.286. Aristotle says the most accomplished physicians believe in taking serious account of dreams, div. p. somn. 463a 4. But the author of περὶ διαίρεσις carries this essentially sound principle to fantastic lengths.

περὶ διαίρεσις 4.87 (VI.640 L.): οὐκ ὁμοίως τῶν ἐνυπνιών θεία ἔστι καί προσημαίνει τινά συμβησθείμενα... εἰς τιντι κρίνοντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀκριβῆ τέχνην ἔχουτες, καὶ ιδί., 93: οὐκ ὁμοίως ὁ ἀνθρώπως θεωρεῖν τῶν συνθέων, ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίην σημαίνει. [Ibid., 86: περὶ τῶν τίμημα καὶ ἐπεξεργασμένων τῶν σύμπτωμα τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος διοικεῖ τὸν ἐνυπνί όλον κτλ. Cf. chap.v, p. 135, and Galen's observation that "in sleep the soul seems to sink into the depths of the body, withdrawing from external sense-objects, and so becomes aware of the bodily condition" (περὶ τῆς ἐνυπνίων διαγνώσεως, VI.834 Kühn). The influence of "Orphic" ideas on περὶ διαίρεσις 4.86 has been pointed out by A. Palm, Studien zur Hippokratischen Schrift π. διαίρεσις, 62 ff.]

105 Ibid., 90, 92. For the detailed correspondence of macrocosm and microcosm cf. Heb. 6 (IX.436 L.).

Freud, op. cit., 299: “every dream treats of one’s own person.”

For the tree as a symbol of reproduction cf. Hdt. 1.108 and Soph. El. 419 ff.; a like symbolism is found in some old Norse dreams (Kelchner, op. cit., 56). Similarities of interpretation between the π. διαίρεσις and ancient Indian dreambooks have led to the suggestion of Oriental influence on the Greek medical writer, or on the Greek dreambook which he used (Palm, Studien zur Hipp. Schrift π. διαίρεσις, 83 ff., followed by Jaeger, Paideia, III.39). Others on grounds of the same kind have postulated an early Greek dreambook as a common source of Artemidorus and the π. διαίρεσις (C. Fredrich, Hippokratische Untersuchungen, 213 f.). But such inferences are fragile. The art of ὀνειροκρητική was (and is) an art of
seeing analogies (Arist. div. p. somn. 464\* 5), and the more obvious analogies can hardly be missed. Professor Rose has pointed out detailed similarities between Artemidorus' system and that now in vogue in Central Africa (Man, 26 [1926] 211 ff.). Cf. also Latte, Gnomon, 5, 159.

Ibid., 87; cf. Palm, op. cit., 75 ff. Theophrastus' Superstitious Man asks the οὐνέροκρίται every time he has a dream τίνι θεῷ ἢ θεῷ προσεύχεσθαι δεί (Char. 16).

Plato, Tim. 71A–E.

Insonn. 458\* 25 ff., 460\* 3 ff.


Ibid., 463\* 14; cf. Freud, Interpretation of Dreams, 2. I cannot agree with Boyancé (Culte des Muses, 192) that when Aristotle calls dreams δαυμήνια he is thinking of the Pythagorean (? post-Aristotelian) doctrine that they are caused by δαυμονες in the air (see n. 53). And Boyancé is certainly wrong in claiming Aristotle as an unqualified believer in the manic dream.


Ibid., 463\* 4 ff., 27 ff.

Ibid., 464\* 6 ff. Aristotle further suggests that the mind responds best to such minute stimuli when it is empty and passive, as in some types of insanity (464\* 22 ff.); and that there must be a selective factor at work, since veridical dreams usually concern friends, not strangers (464\* 27 ff.)

Cf. Cic. div. 1.70 f. Cicero attributes the religious view even to Aristotle's pupil Dicaearchus (ibid., 1.113, 2.100); but this is not easy to reconcile with Dicaearchus' other recorded opinions, and may be due to a misapprehension (F. Wehrli, Dikaiarchos, 46).

Cic. div. 2.150. The civilised rationalism of de divinatione, Book 2, in this closing passage has hardly been sufficiently appreciated.

Cf. the formidable list of authorities on οὐνέροκρίτικη now lost, in Bouché-Leclercq, Hist. de la Divination, 1.277. Dreambooks are still much studied in Greece (Lawson, op. cit., 300 f.). Marcus Aurelius' enumeration of his personal debts to Providence includes τὸ δε' οὐνειράτων βοηθήματα δοθήναι ἄλλα τε καὶ ὡς μὴ πτέειν αἷμα καὶ μὴ λυγγαίν (1.17.9); cf. also Fronto, Epist. 3.9.1 f. For Plutarch's reliance on dream advice see Q. Conv. 2.3.1, 635E; for Galen's, see his commentary on Hipp. περὶ χυμῶν 2.2 (XVI.219 ff. K.). Dio Cassius is instructed by his δαυμύνων in a dream to write history, 72.23.
V
The Greek Shamans and the Origin of Puritanism

That man should be a thing for immortal souls to sieve through!

Herman Melville

In the preceding chapter we saw that, side by side with the old belief in objective divine messengers who communicate with man in dreams and visions, there appears in certain writers of the Classical Age a new belief which connects these experiences with an occult power innate in man himself. "Each man's body," says Pindar, "follows the call of overcoming death; yet still there is left alive an image of life (aiōnos eidoλov), for this alone is from the gods. It sleeps while the limbs are active; but while the man sleeps it often shows in dreams a decision of joy or adversity to come." Xenophon puts this doctrine into plain prose, and provides the logical links which poetry has the right to omit. "It is in sleep," says Xenophon, "that the soul (psyche) best shows its divine nature; it is in sleep that it enjoys a certain insight into the future; and this is, apparently, because it is freest in sleep." Then he goes on to argue that in death we may expect the psyche to be even freer; for sleep is the nearest approach to death in living experience. Similar statements appear in Plato, and in a fragment of an early work by Aristotle.

Opinions of this kind have long been recognised as elements in a new culture-pattern, expressions of a new outlook on man's nature and destiny which is foreign to the older Greek writers.

1 For notes to chapter v see pages 156–178.
Discussion of the origin and history of this pattern, and its influence on ancient culture, could easily occupy an entire course of lectures or fill a volume by itself alone. All that I can do here is to consider briefly some aspects of it which crucially affected the Greek interpretation of nonrational factors in human experience. But in attempting even this, I shall have to traverse ground which has been churned to deep and slippery mud by the heavy feet of contending scholars; ground, also, where those in a hurry are liable to trip over the partially decayed remains of dead theories that have not yet been decently interred. We shall be wise, then, to move slowly, and to pick our steps rather carefully among the litter.

Let us begin by asking exactly what it was that was new in the new pattern of beliefs. Certainly not the idea of survival. In Greece, as in most parts of the world, that idea was very old indeed. If we may judge by the furniture of their tombs, the inhabitants of the Aegean region had felt since Neolithic times that man's need for food, drink, and clothing, and his desire for service and entertainment, did not cease with death. I say advisedly "felt," rather than "believed"; for such acts as feeding the dead look like a direct response to emotional drives, not necessarily mediated by any theory. Man, I take it, feeds his dead for the same sort of reason as a little girl feeds her doll; and like the little girl, he abstains from killing his phantasy by applying reality-standards. When the archaic Greek poured liquids down a feeding-tube into the livid jaws of a mouldering corpse, all we can say is that he abstained, for good reasons, from knowing what he was doing; or, to put it more abstractly, that he ignored the distinction between corpse and ghost—he treated them as "consubstantial."

To have formulated that distinction with precision and clarity, to have disentangled the ghost from the corpse, is, of course, the achievement of the Homeric poets. There are passages in both poems which suggest that they were proud of the achievement, and fully conscious of its novelty and importance.
They had indeed a right to be proud; for there is no domain where clear thinking encounters stronger unconscious resistance than when we try to think about death. But we should not assume that once the distinction had been formulated it was universally or even generally accepted. As the archaeological evidence shows, the tendency of the dead, with its implication of identity between corpse and ghost, went quietly on, at any rate in Mainland Greece; it persisted through (some would say despite) the temporary vogue of cremation, and in Attica became so wastefully extravagant that legislation to control it had to be introduced by Solon, and again by Demetrius of Phaleron.

There was no question, then, of "establishing" the idea of survival; that was implicit in age-old custom for the thing in the tomb which is both ghost and corpse, and explicit in Homer for the shadow in Hades which is ghost alone. Nor, secondly, was the idea of rewards and punishments after death a new one. The post-mortem punishment of certain offences against the gods is in my opinion referred to in the Iliad, and is undoubtedly described in the Odyssey; while Eleusis was already promising its initiates favoured treatment in the afterlife as far back as we can trace its teaching, i.e., probably in the seventh century. No one, I suppose, now believes that the "great sinners" in the Odyssey are an "Orphic interpolation," or that the Eleusinian promises were the result of an "Orphic reform." In Aeschylus, again, the post-mortem punishment of certain offenders is so intimately tied up with the traditional "unwritten laws" and the traditional functions of Erinys and Alastor that I feel great hesitation about pulling the structure to pieces to label one element in it "Orphic." These are special cases, but the idea was there; it looks as if all that the new movement did was to generalise it. And in the new formulation we may sometimes recognise echoes of things that are very old. When Pindar, for example, consoles a bereaved client with a description of the happy afterlife, he assures him that there will be horses and draught-boards in Heaven. That is no new promise: there were
horses on Patroclus’ funeral pyre, and draught-boards in the tombs of Mycenaean kings. The furniture of Heaven has altered little with the centuries; it remains an idealised replica of the only world we know.

Nor, finally, did the contribution of the new movement consist in equating the psyche or "soul" with the personality of the living man. That had already been done, apparently first in Ionia. Homer, indeed, ascribes to the psyche no function in the living man, except to leave him; its "esse" appears to be "super-esse" and nothing more. But Anacreon can say to his beloved, "You are the master of my psyche"; Semonides can talk of "giving his psyche a good time"; a sixth-century epitaph from Eretria can complain that the sailor’s calling "gives few satisfactions to the psyche." Here the psyche is the living self, and, more specifically, the appetitive self; it has taken over the functions of Homeric thumos, not those of Homeric noos. Between psyche in this sense and soma (body) there is no fundamental antagonism; psyche is just the mental correlate of soma. In Attic Greek, both terms can mean "life": the Athenians said indifferently ἀγωνίζομαι περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς or περὶ τοῦ σῶματος. And in suitable contexts each can mean "person": thus Sophocles can make Oedipus refer to himself in one passage as "my psyche," in another as "my soma"; in both places he could have said "I." Even the Homeric distinction between corpse and ghost is blurred: not only does an early Attic inscription talk of the psyche dying, but Pindar, more surprisingly, can speak of Hades with his wand conducting to "the hollow city" the somata of those who die—the corpse and the ghost have reverted here to their old consubstantiality. I think we must admit that the psychological vocabulary of the ordinary man was in the fifth century in a state of great confusion, as indeed it usually is.

But from this confusion one fact emerges which is of importance for our enquiry. It was demonstrated by Burnet in his famous lecture on "The Soeratic Doctrine of the Soul," and for that reason need not detain us long. In fifth-century Attic
writers, as in their Ionian predecessors, the "self" which is denoted by the word *psyche* is normally the emotional rather than the rational self. The *psyche* is spoken of as the seat of courage, of passion, of pity, of anxiety, of animal appetite, but before Plato seldom if ever as the seat of reason; its range is broadly that of the Homeric *thumos*. When Sophocles speaks of testing *ψυχήν τε καὶ φρόνημα καὶ γνώμην*, he is arranging the elements of character on a scale that runs from the emotional (*psyche*) to the intellectual (*gnōmē*) through a middle term, *phrōnēma*, which by usage involves both. Burnet's further contention that the *psyche* "remains something mysterious and uncanny, quite apart from our normal consciousness," is, as a generalisation, much more open to dispute. We may notice, however, that the *psyche* appears on occasion as the organ of conscience, and is credited with a kind of nonrational intuition. A child can apprehend something in its *psyche* without knowing it intellectually. Helenus has a "divine *psyche*" not because he is cleverer or more virtuous than other men, but because he is a seer. The *psyche* is imagined as dwelling somewhere in the depths of the organism, and out of these depths it can speak to its owner with a voice of its own. In most of these respects it is again a successor to the Homeric *thumos*.

Whether it be true or not that on the lips of an ordinary fifth-century Athenian the word *psyche* had or might have a faint flavour of the uncanny, what it did not have was any flavour of puritanism or any suggestion of metaphysical status. The "soul" was no reluctant prisoner of the body; it was the life or spirit of the body, and perfectly at home there. It was here that the new religious pattern made its fateful contribution: by crediting man with an occult self of divine origin, and thus setting soul and body at odds, it introduced into European culture a new interpretation of human existence, the interpretation we call puritanical. Where did this notion come from? Ever since Rohde called it "a drop of alien blood in the veins of the Greeks," scholars have been scanning the horizon for the source of the alien drop. Most of them have
looked eastward, to Asia Minor or beyond. Personally, I should be inclined to begin my search in a different quarter.

The passages from Pindar and Xenophon with which we started suggest that one source of the puritan antithesis might be the observation that "psychic" and bodily activity vary inversely: the psyche is most active when the body is asleep or, as Aristotle added, when it lies at the point of death. This is what I mean by calling it an "occult" self. Now a belief of this kind is an essential element of the shamanistic culture which still exists in Siberia, and has left traces of its past existence over a very wide area, extending in a huge arc from Scandinavia across the Eurasian land-mass as far as Indonesia; the vast extent of its diffusion is evidence of its high antiquity. A shaman may be described as a psychically unstable person who has received a call to the religious life. As a result of his call he undergoes a period of rigorous training, which commonly involves solitude and fasting, and may involve a psychological change of sex. From this religious "retreat" he emerges with the power, real or assumed, of passing at will into a state of mental dissociation. In that condition he is not thought, like the Pythia or like a modern medium, to be possessed by an alien spirit; but his own soul is thought to leave its body and travel to distant parts, most often to the spirit world. A shaman may in fact be seen simultaneously in different places; he has the power of bilocation. From these experiences, narrated by him in extempore song, he derives the skill in divination, religious poetry, and magical medicine which makes him socially important. He becomes the repository of a supernormal wisdom.

Now in Scythia, and probably also in Thrace, the Greeks had come into contact with peoples who, as the Swiss scholar Meuli has shown, were influenced by this shamanistic culture. It will suffice to refer on this point to his important article in Hermes, 1935. Meuli has there further suggested that the fruits of this contact are to be seen in the appearance, late in the Archaic Age, of a series of ἑτεροπάντες, seers, magical healers, and religious teachers, some of whom are linked in Greek tradi-
tion with the North, and all of whom exhibit shamanistic traits. Out of the North came Abaris, riding, it was said, upon an arrow, as souls, it appears, still do in Siberia. So advanced was he in the art of fasting that he had learned to dispense altogether with human food. He banished pestilences, predicted earthquakes, composed religious poems, and taught the worship of his northern god, whom the Greeks called the Hyperborean Apollo. Into the North, at the bidding of the same Apollo, went Aristeas, a Greek from the Sea of Marmora, and returned to tell his strange experiences in a poem that may have been modelled on the psychic excursions of northern shamans. Whether Aristeas’ journey was made in the flesh or in the spirit is not altogether clear; but in any case, as Alfoldi has shown, his one-eyed Arimaspians and his treasure-guarding griffons are genuine creatures of Central Asiatic folklore. Tradition further credited him with the shamanistic powers of trance and bilocation. His soul, in the form of a bird, could leave his body at will; he died, or fell entranced, at home, yet was seen at Cyzicus; many years later he appeared again at Metapontum in the Far West. The same gift was possessed by another Asiatic Greek, Hermotimus of Clazomenae, whose soul travelled far and wide, observing events in distant places, while his body lay inanimate at home. Such tales of disappearing and reappearing shamans were sufficiently familiar at Athens for Sophocles to refer to them in the Electra without any need to mention names.

Of these men virtually nothing is left but a legend, though the pattern of the legend may be significant. The pattern is repeated in some of the tales about Epimenides, the Cretan seer, who purified Athens of the dangerous uncleanness caused by a violation of the right of sanctuary. But since Diels provided him with a fixed date and five pages of fragments, Epimenides has begun to look quite like a person—even though all his fragments were composed, in Diels’s opinion, by other people, including the one quoted in the Epistle to Titus. Epimenides came from Cnossos, and to that fact he may perhaps have
owed something of his great prestige: a man who had grown up in the shadow of the Palace of Minos might well lay claim to a more ancient wisdom, especially after he had slept for fifty-seven years in the cave of the Cretan mystery-god. Nevertheless, tradition assimilated him to the type of a northern shaman. He too was an expert in psychic excursion; and, like Abaris, he was a great faster, living exclusively on a vegetable preparation whose secret he had learned from the Nymphs and which he was accustomed to store, for reasons best known to himself, in an ox’s hoof. Another singular feature of his legend is that after his death his body was observed to be covered with tattoo-marks. Singular, because the Greeks used the tattoo-needle only to brand slaves. It may have been a sign of his dedication as servus dei; but in any case to an archaic Greek it would probably suggest Thrace, where all the best people were tattooed, and in particular the shamans. As for the Long Sleep, that is of course a widespread folktale; Rip Van Winkle was no shaman. But its place at the beginning of the Epe- menides-saga suggests that the Greeks had heard of the long “retreat” which is the shaman’s novitiate and is sometimes largely spent in a condition of sleep or trance.

From all this it seems reasonable to conclude that the opening of the Black Sea to Greek trade and colonisation in the seventh century, which introduced the Greeks for the first time to a culture based on shamanism, at any rate enriched with some remarkable new traits the traditional Greek picture of the Man of God, the θειός ἄνθρωπος. These new elements were, I think, acceptable to the Greek mind because they answered to the needs of the time, as Dionysiac religion had done earlier. Religious experience of the shamanistic type is individual, not collective; but it appealed to the growing individualism of an age for which the collective ecstasies of Dionysus were no longer wholly sufficient. And it is a reasonable further guess that these new traits had some influence on the new and revolutionary conception of the relation between body and soul which appears at the end of the Archaic Age.
One remembers that in Clearchus' dialogue *On Sleep* what convinced Aristotle "that the soul is detachable from the body" was precisely an experiment in psychic excursion. That, however, was a work of fiction, and relatively late at that. Whether any of the Men of God whom I have so far mentioned drew such general theoretical conclusions from his personal experiences, we are entitled to doubt. Aristotle, indeed, thought there were grounds for believing that Hermotimus anticipated his more famous townsman Anaxagoras in his doctrine of *nous*; but this may mean only, as Diels suggested, that for evidence of the separability of *nous* Anaxagoras appealed to the experiences of the old local shaman. Epimenides, again, is said to have claimed that he was a reincarnation of Aeacus and had lived many times on earth (which would explain Aristotle's statement that his divination was concerned not with the future but with the unknown past). Diels thought that this tradition must have an Orphic source; he attributed it to an Orphic poem forged in Epimenides' name by Onomacritus or one of his friends. For a reason which will appear presently, I am less certain about this than Diels was; but whatever view one takes, it would be unwise to build very much on it.

There is, however, another and a greater Greek shaman who undoubtedly drew theoretical consequences and undoubtedly believed in rebirth. I mean Pythagoras. We need not suppose him to have claimed precisely that series of previous incarnations which was attributed to him by Heracleides Ponticus; but there is no good reason to question the statements of our authorities that Pythagoras is the man to whom Empedocles attributed a wisdom gathered in ten or twenty human lives, and that he is also the man whom Xenophanes mocked for believing that a human soul could dwell in a dog. How did Pythagoras come by these opinions? The usual answer is "from Orphic teaching," which, if it is true, only pushes the question one step further back. But it is, I think, possible that he was not directly dependent on any "Orphic" source in this cardinal matter; that both he and Epimenides before him had heard of
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the northern belief that the “soul” or “guardian spirit” of a former shaman may enter into a living shaman to reinforce his power and knowledge.\(^5\) This need not involve any general doctrine of transmigration, and it is noteworthy that Epi­menides is credited with no such general doctrine; he merely claimed that he himself had lived before, and was identical with Aeacus, an ancient Man of God.\(^5\) Similarly Pythagoras is represented as claiming identity with the former shaman Hermotimus;\(^5\) but it would appear that Pythagoras extended the doctrine a good deal beyond these original narrow limits. Perhaps that was his personal contribution; in view of his enormous prestige we must surely credit him with some power of creative thinking.

We know at any rate that Pythagoras founded a kind of religious order, a community of men and women\(^5\) whose rule of life was determined by the expectation of lives to come. Possibly there were precedents of a sort even for that: we may remember the Thracian Zalmoxis in Herodotus, who assembled “the best of the citizens” and announced to them, not that the human soul is immortal, but that they and their descendants were going to live for ever—they were apparently chosen persons, a sort of spiritual elite.\(^6\) That there was some analogy between Zalmoxis and Pythagoras must have struck the Greek settlers in Thrace, from whom Herodotus heard the story, for they made Zalmoxis into Pythagoras’ slave. That was absurd, as Herodotus saw: the real Zalmoxis was a daemon, possibly a heroised shaman of the distant past.\(^6\) But the analogy was not so absurd: did not Pythagoras promise his followers that they should live again, and become at last daemons or even gods?\(^6\) Later tradition brought Pythagoras into contact with the other northerner, Abaris; credited him with the usual shamanistic powers of prophecy, bilocation, and magical healing; and told of his initiation in Pieria, his visit to the spirit world, and his mysterious identity with the “Hyperborean Apollo.”\(^6\) Some of that may be late, but the beginnings of the Pythagoras legend go back to the fifth century at least,\(^4\) and I
am willing to believe that Pythagoras himself did a good deal to set it going.

I am the more willing to believe it because we can see this actually happening in the case of Empedocles, whose legend is largely composed of embroideries upon claims which he himself makes in his poems. Little more than a century after his death, stories were already in circulation which told how he had stayed the winds by his magic, how he had restored to life a woman who no longer breathed, and how he then vanished bodily from this mortal world and became a god. And by good fortune we know the ultimate source of these stories: we have Empedocles' own words, in which he claims that he can teach his pupils to stay the winds and revive the dead, and that he is himself, or is thought to be, a god made flesh—ἐγὼ δ' ὄμιν θεὸς ἀμβρότος, οὐκέτι θνητός. Empedocles is thus in a sense the creator of his own legend; and if we can trust his description of the crowds who came to him in search of occult knowledge or magical healing, its beginnings date back to his lifetime. In face of that, it seems to me rash to assume that the legends of Pythagoras and Epimenides have no roots at all in genuine tradition, but were deliberately invented from first to last by the romancers of a later age.

Be that as it may, the fragments of Empedocles are the one first-hand source from which we can still form some notion of what a Greek shaman was really like; he is the last belated example of a species which with his death became extinct in the Greek world, though it still flourishes elsewhere. Scholars have been astonished that a man capable of the acute observation and constructive thought which appear in Empedocles' poem On Nature should also have written the Purifications and represented himself as a divine magician. Some of them have tried to explain it by saying that the two poems must belong to different periods of Empedocles' life: either he started as a magician, lost his nerve, and took to natural science; or else, as others maintain, he started as a scientist, was converted later to "Orphism'' or Pythagoreanism, and in the lonely exile of his
declining years comforted himself with delusions of grandeur—he was a god, and would return one day not to Acragas but to Heaven. The trouble about these explanations is that they do not really work. The fragment in which Empedocles claims the power to stay the winds, cause or prevent rain, and revive the dead, appears to belong, not to the Purifications, but to the poem On Nature. So does fragment 23, in which the poet bids his pupil listen to “the word of a god” (I find it hard to believe that this refers merely to the conventional inspiration of the Muse). So does fragment 15, which seems to contrast “what people call life” with a more real existence before birth and after death. All this is discouraging for any attempt to explain Empedocles’ inconsistencies on “genetic” lines. Nor is it easy to accept Jaeger’s recent description of him as “a new synthesising type of philosophical personality,” since any attempt to synthesise his religious and his scientific opinions is precisely what we miss in him. If I am right, Empedocles represents not a new but a very old type of personality, the shaman who combines the still undifferentiated functions of magician and naturalist, poet and philosopher, preacher, healer, and public counsellor. After him these functions fell apart; philosophers henceforth were to be neither poets nor magicians; indeed, such a man was already an anachronism in the fifth century. But men like Epimenides and Pythagoras may well have exercised all the functions I have named. It was not a question of “synthesising” these wide domains of practical and theoretical knowledge; in their quality as Men of God they practised with confidence in all of them; the “synthesis” was personal, not logical.

What I have thus far suggested is a tentative line of spiritual descent which starts in Scythia, crosses the Hellespont into Asiatic Greece, is perhaps combined with some remnants of Minoan tradition surviving in Crete, emigrates to the Far West with Pythagoras, and has its last outstanding representative in the Sicilian Empedocles. These men diffused the belief in a detachable soul or self, which by suitable tech-
niques can be withdrawn from the body even during life, a self which is older than the body and will outlast it. But at this point an inevitable question presents itself: how is this development related to the mythological person named Orpheus and to the theology known as Orphic? And I must attempt a short answer.

About Orpheus himself I can make a guess, at the risk of being called a panshamanist. Orpheus’ home is in Thrace, and in Thrace he is the worshipper or companion of a god whom the Greeks identified with Apollo. He combines the professions of poet, magician, religious teacher, and oracle-giver. Like certain legendary shamans in Siberia, he can by his music summon birds and beasts to listen to him. Like shamans everywhere, he pays a visit to the underworld, and his motive is one very common among shamans—to recover a stolen soul. Finally, his magical self lives on as a singing head, which continues to give oracles for many years after his death. That too suggests the North: such mantic heads appear in Norse mythology and in Irish tradition. I conclude that Orpheus is a Thracian figure of much the same kind as Zalmoxis—a mythical shaman or prototype of shamans.

Orpheus, however, is one thing, Orphism quite another. But I must confess that I know very little about early Orphism, and the more I read about it the more my knowledge diminishes. Twenty years ago, I could have said quite a lot about it (we all could at that time). Since then, I have lost a great deal of knowledge; for this loss I am indebted to Wilamowitz, Festugiére, Thomas, and not least to a distinguished member of the University of California, Professor Linforth. Let me illustrate my present ignorance by listing a few of the things I once knew.

There was a time when I knew:

That there was an Orphic sect or community in the Classical Age;

That an Orphic “Theogony” was read by Empedocles and Euripides, and parodied by Aristophanes in the Birds;

That the poem of which fragments are inscribed on the gold
plates found at Thurii and elsewhere is an Orphic apocalypse;\textsuperscript{84}
That Plato took the details of his myths about the Other World from such an Orphic apocalypse;\textsuperscript{85}
That the Hippolytus of Euripides is an Orphic figure;\textsuperscript{86}
That σώμα-σώμα ("Body equals tomb") is an Orphic doctrine.\textsuperscript{87}

When I say that I no longer possess these items of information, I do not intend to assert that all of them are false. The last two I feel pretty sure are false: we really must not turn a bloodstained huntsman into an Orphic figure, or call "Orphic" a doctrine that Plato plainly denies to be Orphic. But some of the others may very well happen to be true. All I mean is that I cannot at present convince myself of their truth; and that until I can, the edifice reared by an ingenious scholarship upon these foundations remains for me a house of dreams—I am tempted to call it the unconscious projection upon the screen of antiquity of certain unsatisfied religious longings characteristic of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.\textsuperscript{88}

If, then, I decide provisionally to dispense with these cornerstones, and to follow instead the cautious rules of architecture enunciated by Festugière and Linforth,\textsuperscript{89} how much of the fabric still stands? Not, I fear, very much, unless I am prepared to patch it with material derived from the fantastic theogonies that Proclus and Damascius read at a time when Pythagoras had been in his grave for nearly a millennium. And that I dare not do, save in the very rare instances where both the antiquity of the material and its Orphic origin are independently guaranteed.\textsuperscript{90} I shall quote later what I believe to be such an instance, though the question is a controversial one. But let me first muster such uncontroverted knowledge about Orphism as I still possess, and see what it includes that is germane to the subject of this chapter. I still know that in the fifth and fourth centuries there were in circulation a number of pseudonymous religious poems, which were conventionally ascribed to the mythical Orpheus, but which the critically minded knew or guessed to be of much more recent origin.\textsuperscript{91}
Their authorship may have been very diverse, and I have no reason to suppose that they preached any uniform or systematic doctrine; Plato's word for them, βιβλιον δουαδον, "a hubbub of books," rather suggests the contrary. Of their contents I know very little. But I do know on good authority that three things were taught in some at least of them, namely, that the body is the prisonhouse of the soul; that vegetarianism is an essential rule of life; and that the unpleasant consequences of sin, both in this world and in the next, can be washed away by ritual means. That they taught the most famous of so-called "Orphic" doctrines, the transmigration of souls, is not, as it happens, directly attested by anyone in the Classical Age; but it may, I think, be inferred without undue rashness from the conception of the body as a prison where the soul is punished for its past sins. Even with this addition, the sum total is not extensive. And it gives me no sure basis for distinguishing an "Orphic" from a "Pythagorean" psychology; for Pythagoreans too are said to have avoided meat, practised catharsis, and viewed the body as a prison, and Pythagoras himself, as we have seen, had experienced transmigration. There cannot in fact have been any very clear-cut distinction between the Orphic teaching, at any rate in some of its forms, and Pythagoreanism; for Ion of Chios, a good fifth-century authority, thought that Pythagoras had composed poems under the name of Orpheus, and Epigenes, who was a specialist on the subject, attributed four "Orphic" poems to individual Pythagoreans. Whether there were any Orphic poems in existence before the time of Pythagoras, and if there were, whether they taught transmigration, remains entirely uncertain. I shall accordingly use the term "Puritan psychology" to cover both early Orphic and early Pythagorean beliefs about the soul.

We have seen—or I hope we have seen—how contact with shamanistic beliefs and practices might suggest to a thoughtful people like the Greeks the rudiments of such a psychology: how the notion of psychic excursion in sleep or trance might sharpen the soul-body antithesis; how the shamanistic "retreat" might
provide the model for a deliberate *askēsis*, a conscious training of the psychic powers through abstinence and spiritual exercises; how tales of vanishing and reappearing shamans might encourage the belief in an indestructible magical or daemonic self; and how the migration of the magical power or spirit from dead shamans to living ones might be generalised as a doctrine of reincarnation.97 But I must emphasise that these are only "mights," logical or psychological possibilities. If they were actualised by certain Greeks, that must be because they were felt, in Rohde's phrase, "to meet Greek spiritual needs."98 And if we consider the situation at the end of the Archaic Age, as I described it in my second chapter, I think we shall see that they did meet certain needs, logical, moral, and psychological.

Professor Nilsson thinks that the doctrine of rebirth is a product of "pure logic," and that the Greeks invented it because they were "born logicians."99 And we may agree with him that once people accepted the notion that man has a "soul" distinct from his body, it was natural to ask where this "soul" came from, and natural to answer that it came from the great reservoir of souls in Hades. There are in fact indications of such a line of argument in Heraclitus as well as in the *Phaedo.*100 I doubt, however, if religious beliefs are often adopted, even by philosophers, on grounds of pure logic—logic is at best *ancilla fidei.* And this particular belief has found favour with many peoples who are by no means born logicians.101 I am inclined to attach more importance to considerations of a different type.

Morally, reincarnation offered a more satisfactory solution to the Late Archaic problem of divine justice than did inherited guilt or post-mortem punishment in another world. With the growing emancipation of the individual from the old family solidarity, his increasing rights as a judicial "person," the notion of a vicarious payment for another's fault began to be unacceptable. When once human law had recognised that a man is responsible for his own acts only, divine law must sooner or later do likewise. As for post-mortem punishment,
that explained well enough why the gods appeared to tolerate the worldly success of the wicked, and the new teaching in fact exploited it to the full, using the device of the “underworld journey” to make the horrors of Hell real and vivid to the imagination. But the post-mortem punishment did not explain why the gods tolerated so much human suffering, and in particular the unmerited suffering of the innocent. Reincarnation did. On that view, no human soul was innocent: all were paying, in various degrees, for crimes of varying atrocity committed in former lives. And all that squalid mass of suffering, whether in this world or in another, was but a part of the soul’s long education—an education that would culminate at last in its release from the cycle of birth and return to its divine origin. Only in this way, and on this cosmic time-scale, could justice in its full archaic sense—the justice of the law that “the Doer shall suffer”—be completely realised for every soul.

Plato knows this moral interpretation of rebirth as “a myth or doctrine or what you will” which was taught by “old-time priests.” It is certainly an old interpretation, but not, I think, the oldest. To the Siberian shaman, the experience of past lives is not a source of guilt, but an enhancement of power, and that I take to be the original Greek point of view; it was such an enhancement of power that Empedocles perceived in Pythagoras, and that Epimenides, it would seem, had claimed earlier. It was only when rebirth was attributed to all human souls that it became a burden instead of a privilege, and was used to explain the inequalities of our earthly portion and to show that, in the words of a Pythagorean poet, man’s sufferings are self-incurred (αὐθαλπέτα). Beneath this demand for a solution to what we call “the problem of evil” we may believe that there lay a deeper psychological need—the need to rationalise those unexplained feelings of guilt which, as we saw earlier, were prevalent in the Archaic Age. Men were, I suppose, dimly conscious—and on Freud’s view, rightly conscious—that such feelings had their roots in a submerged and long-forgotten past experience. What more nat-
ural than to interpret that intuition (which is in fact, according to Freud, a faint awareness of infantile traumata) as a faint awareness of sin committed in a former life? Here we have perhaps stumbled on the psychological source of the peculiar importance attached in the Pythagorean school to "recollec­tion"—not in the Platonic sense of recalling a world of dis­embodied Forms once seen by the disembodied soul, but in the more primitive sense of training the memory to recall the deeds and sufferings of a previous life on earth.¹⁰⁷

That, however, is speculation. What is certain is that these beliefs promoted in their adherents a horror of the body and a revulsion against the life of the senses which were quite new in Greece. Any guilt-culture will, I suppose, provide a soil favourable to the growth of puritanism, since it creates an unconscious need for self-punishment which puritanism gratifies. But in Greece it was, apparently, the impact of shamanistic beliefs which set the process going. By Greek minds these beliefs were reinterpreted in a moral sense; and when that was done, the world of bodily experience inevitably appeared as a place of darkness and penance, the flesh became an "alien tunic." "Pleasure," says the old Pythagorean catechism, "is in all circumstances bad; for we came here to be punished and we ought to be punished."¹⁰⁸ In that form of the doctrine which Plato attributes to the Orphic school, the body was pictured as the soul's prison, in which the gods keep it locked up until it has purged its guilt. In the other form mentioned by Plato, puritanism found an even more violent expression: the body was con­ceived as a tomb wherein the psyche lies dead, awaiting its resurrection into true life, which is life without the body. This form seems to be traceable as far back as Heraclitus, who per­haps used it to illustrate his eternal roundabout of opposites, the "Way Up and Down."¹⁰⁹

To people who equated the psyche with the empirical per­sonality, as the fifth century mostly did, such an assertion made no sense at all; it was a fantastic paradox, whose comic possi­bilities did not escape the eye of Aristophanes.¹¹⁰ Nor does it
make much better sense if we equate "soul" with reason. I should suppose that for people who took it seriously what lay "dead" within the body was neither the reason nor the empirical man, but an "occult" self, Pindar's "image of life," which is indestructible but can function only in the exceptional conditions of sleep or trance. That man has two "souls," one of divine, the other of earthly origin, was already taught (if our late authority can be trusted) by Pherecydes of Syros. And it is significant that Empedocles, on whom our knowledge of early Greek puritanism chiefly depends, avoids applying the term psyche to the indestructible self. He appears to have thought of the psyche as being the vital warmth which at death is re-absorbed in the fiery element from which it came (that was a fairly common fifth-century view). The occult self which persisted through successive incarnations he called, not "psyche," but "daemon." This daemon has, apparently, nothing to do with perception or thought, which Empedocles held to be mechanically determined; the function of the daemon is to be the carrier of man's potential divinity and actual guilt. It is nearer in some ways to the indwelling spirit which the shaman inherits from other shamans than it is to the rational "soul" in which Socrates believed; but it has been moralised as a guilt-carrier, and the world of the senses has become the Hades in which it suffers torment. That torment Empedocles has described in some of the strangest and most moving religious poetry which has come down to us from antiquity.

The complementary aspect of the doctrine was its teaching on the subject of catharsis—the means whereby the occult self might be advanced on the ladder of being, and its eventual liberation hastened. To judge from its title, this was the central theme of Empedocles' poem, though the parts which dealt with it are mostly lost. The notion of catharsis was no novelty; as we saw earlier, it was a major preoccupation of religious minds throughout the Archaic Age. But in the new pattern of belief it acquired a new content and a new urgency: man must be cleansed not only from specific pollutions, but, so far as
might be, from all taint of carnality—that was the condition of his redemption. "From the company of the pure I come, pure Queen of those below"—thus the soul speaks to Persephone in the poem of the gold plates."17 Purity, rather than justice, has become the cardinal means to salvation. And since it is a magical, not a rational self that has to be cleansed, the techniques of catharsis are not rational but magical. They might consist solely in ritual, as in the Orphic books that Plato denounced for their demoralising effect."18 Or they might use the incantatory power of music, as in the catharsis attributed to the Pythagoreans, which seems to have developed from primitive charms (ἐπιβολή)."19 Or they might also involve an "askesis," the practice of a special way of life.

We have seen that the need for some such askesis was implicit from the first in the shamanistic tradition. But the archaic guilt-culture gave it a peculiar direction. The vegetarianism which is the central feature of Orphic and of some Pythagorean askesis is usually treated simply as a corollary to transmigration: the beast you kill for food may be the dwelling-place of a human soul or self. That is how Empedocles explained it. But he is not quite logical: he ought to have felt the same revulsion against eating vegetables, since he believed that his own occult self had once inhabited a bush."10 Behind his imperfect rationalisation there lies, I suspect, something older—the ancient horror of spilt blood. In scrupulous minds the fear of that pollution may well have extended its domain, as such fears will, until it embraced all shedding of blood, animal as well as human. As Aristophanes tells us, the rule of Orpheus was φημών ἀπεχεσθαι, "shed no blood"; and Pythagoras is said to have avoided contact with butchers and huntsmen—presumably because they were not only wicked, but dangerously unclean, carriers of an infectious pollution."11 Besides food taboos, the Pythagorean Society seems to have imposed other austerities on its members, such as a rule of silence for novices, and certain sexual restrictions."12 But it was perhaps only Empedocles who took the final, logical step of the Manichee; I see no reason to dis-
believe the statement that he denounced marriage and all sex relations," though the verses in which he did so are not actually preserved. If the tradition is right on this point, puritanism not only originated in Greece, but was carried by a Greek mind to its extreme theoretical limit.

One question remains. What is the original root of all this wickedness? How comes it that a divine self sins and suffers in mortal bodies? As a Pythagorean poet phrased it, "Whence came mankind, and whence became so evil?" To this unescapable question Orphic poetry, at any rate later Orphic poetry, provided a mythological answer. It all began with the wicked Titans, who trapped the infant Dionysus, tore him to bits, boiled him, roasted him, ate him, and were themselves immediately burned up by a thunderbolt from Zeus; from the smoke of their remains sprang the human race, who thus inherit the horrid tendencies of the Titans, tempered by a tiny portion of divine soul-stuff, which is the substance of the god Dionysus still working in them as an occult self. Pausanias says that this story—or rather, the Titans' part in it—was invented by Onomacritus in the sixth century (he implies that the rending of Dionysus is older). And everyone believed Pausanias until Wilamowitz, finding no clear and certain allusion to the Titan myth in any writer earlier than the third century B.C., inferred it to be a Hellenistic invention. The inference has been accepted by one or two scholars whose judgement I respect, and it is with great hesitation that I differ from them and from Wilamowitz. There are indeed grounds for discounting Pausanias' statements about Onomacritus; yet several considerations combine to persuade me that the myth is nevertheless old. The first is its archaic character: it is founded on the ancient Dionysiac ritual of Sparagmos and Omophagia, and it implies the archaic belief in inherited guilt, which in the Hellenistic Age had begun to be a discredited superstition. The second is the Pindar quotation in Plato's Meno, where "the penalty of an ancient grief" is most naturally explained as referring to human responsibility
for the slaying of Dionysus. Thirdly, in one passage of the Laws Plato refers to people who "show off the old Titan nature," and in another to sacrilegious impulses which are "neither of man nor of god" but arise "from old misdeeds unpurgeable by man." And fourthly, we are told that Plato's pupil Xenocrates somehow connected the notion of the body as a "prison" with Dionysus and the Titans. Individually, these apparent references to the myth can at a pinch be explained away; but taking them together, I find it hard to resist the conclusion that the complete story was known to Plato and his public.

If that is so, ancient like modern puritanism had its doctrine of Original Sin, which explained the universality of guilt-feelings. True, the physical transmission of guilt by bodily inheritance was strictly inconsistent with the view which made the persistent occult self its carrier. But that need not greatly surprise us. The Indian Upanishads similarly managed to combine the old belief in hereditary pollution with the newer doctrine of reincarnation; and Christian theology finds it possible to reconcile the sinful inheritance of Adam with individual moral responsibility. The Titan myth neatly explained to the Greek puritan why he felt himself to be at once a god and a criminal; the "Apolline" sentiment of remoteness from the divine and the "Dionysiac" sentiment of identity with it were both of them accounted for and both of them justified. That was something that went deeper than any logic.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

1 Pindar, fr. 116 B. (131 S.). Rohde rightly emphasised the importance of this fragment (Psyche, 415), though he was wrong in reading back some of its ideas into Homer (ibid., 7); cf. Jaeger, Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers, 75 f.—The view that the experient subject in dreams is an unchanging "deeper" self is naturally suggested to the mind by the way in which a long dead
and even a forgotten past can be reinstated in sleep. As a modern writer puts it, "In dreams not only are we free of the usual limitations of time and space, not only do we return to our past and probably go forward to our future, but the self that apparently experiences these strange adventures is a more essential self, of no particular age" (J. B. Priestley, *Johnson over Jordan*).


Plato, *Rep.* 571D ff.; when the *logiastikos* in sleep is *αντι καθ* *αντι μόνον καθαρὸν* (which is not always the case), it can perceive something it did not know before, whether in the past, the present, or the future, and *τίς διηθέλας ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ μάλιστα ἀπτεται*. Aristotle, fr. 10 = Sext. Emp. *adv. Phys.* 1.21: *ὅταν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ὑπνῶν καθ’ αὐτήν γίγνεται ἡ φυσῆ, τότε τὴν ἑαυτὸν ἀπολαβοῦσα φύσιν προ­μαντεβεται τε καὶ προαγορευεί τὰ μέλλοντα. τοιαύτη δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὸν θάνατον χωρὶς τοῖς σωμάτωι, cf. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, 162 f. See also Hipp. *peri diainthi*, 4.86, quoted above, chap. iv, n. 104; and Aesch. *Eum.* 104 f., where the poet has combined the old "objective" dream with the idea that the mind itself is gifted with prescience in sleep, which seems to derive from a different pattern of belief. For the importance attached by the Pythagoreans to dreams cf. Cic. *div.* 1.62; Plut. *gen. Socr.* 585E; Diog. L. 8.24.

"The question whether one's conscious personality survives after death has been answered by almost all races of men in the affirmative. On this point sceptical or agnostic peoples are nearly, if not wholly, unknown." Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, I, 33.

The archaeological evidence is conveniently assembled and collated in Joseph Wiesner's *Grab und Jenseits* (1938), though doubt may be felt about the validity of some of the inferences he draws from it.


Il. 23.103 f.; *Od.* 11.216–224. The significance of these passages, with their implication of novelty, has been rightly stressed by Zielinski ("La Guerre à l'outretombe," in *Mélanges Bidez*, II. 1021 ff., 1934), though he went a little far in seeing the Homeric
poets as religious reformers comparable in earnestness with the Hebrew prophets.

8 Not only object-offerings but actual feeding-tubes are found even in cremation burials (Nock, *Harv. Theol. Rev.* 25 [1932] 332). At Olynthus, where nearly 600 interments of the sixth to the fourth century B.C. have been examined, object-offerings are, in fact, commonest in cremation burials (D. M. Robinson, *Excavations at Olynthus*, XI.176). This must mean one of two things: either that cremation was after all not intended, as Rohde thought, to divorce ghost from corpse by abolishing the latter; or else that the old unreasoning habits of tendance were too deeply rooted to be disturbed by any such measures. Meuli, *loc. cit.*, points out that in Tertullian’s time people continued to feed the cremated dead (*carn. resurr.*, 1, [vulgus] *defunctos atrocissime exurit, quos post modum gulosissime nutrit*); and that, despite the initial disapproval of the Church, the use of feeding-tubes has persisted in the Balkans almost down to our own day. Cf. also Lawson, *Mod. Gr. Folklore*, 528 ff., and on the whole question, Cumont, *Lux Perpetua*, 387 ff.


10 *Il.* 3.278 f., 19.259 f. It is extremely unwise to impose eschatological consistency on Homer (or anyone else) at the cost of emendation, excision, or distorting the plain meaning of words. These oath-formulae of the *Iliad* preserve a belief which was older than Homer’s neutral Hades (for such formulae archaise, they do not innovate) and had far greater vitality.


12 This was maintained by Wilamowitz in his rash youth (*Hom. Untersuchungen*, 199 ff.); but he recanted later (Glaube, II.200).

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17 Soph. O.T. 64 f., 643. But although each phrase could be replaced by the personal pronoun, they are not (as Hirzel suggested) interchangeable; σῶμα could not have been used at 64, nor ψυχή at 643.


19 The Hertz Lecture, 1916, Proc. Brit. Acad. VII. L.-S., s.v. ψυχή, has failed to profit by Burnet's investigation. For tragedy, the lexicographical material is collected by Martha Assmann, Mens et Animus, I (Amsterdam, 1917).


21 E.g., Antiphon, 5.93; Soph. El. 902 f.

22 I am inclined to agree with Burnet that this must be the meaning of Eur. Tro. 1171 f.; it is hardly natural to construe σῇ ψυχή other­wise than with γνωσ.

23 Eur. Hec. 87.


26 That the word ψυχή carried no puritanical associations is evident from phrases like ψυχή τῶν ἀγαθῶν χαριζομένως (Sem. Amorg. 29.14), ψυχή διδόντες ἡδονήν καθ' ἡμέραν (Aesch. Pers. 841), βορᾶς ψυχῆν ὑπλήρων (Eur. Ion 1169). And how remote it was in common speech from religious or metaphysical implications is nicely shown by a passage from the devout Xenophon (if it be his): when he sets out to provide the uninventive with a list of suitable names for dogs, the very first name that occurs to him is Ψυχή (Cyneg. 7.5).

27 Like θυμός in H. Apoll. 361 f., ψυχή is sometimes thought of as residing in the blood: Soph. El. 785 τοῦμον ἐκπίνουσα' ἀεί ψυχῆς ἁκρατον αἷμα, and Ar. Nub. 712 τήν ψυχήν ἐκπίνουσαν (οἱ κόρεις). This is popular usage, not philosophical speculation as in Empedo­cles, fr. 105. But the medical writers also tend, as we should natu-
rally expect, to stress the close interdependence of mind and body, and the importance of affective elements in the life of both. See W. Muri, "Bemerkungen zur hippokratischen Psychologie," Festschrift Tidche (Bern, 1947).


Gruppe's thesis of the origin of Orphism in Asia Minor has lately been reaffirmed by Ziegler, P.-W., s.v. "Orphische Dichtung," 1385. But the weakness of the case is that those divine figures of later Orphism which are certainly of Asiatic origin—Erikepaios, Misa, Hipta, the polymorphic winged Chronos—have no demonstrable existence in early Orphic literature and may easily be importations of a later age. Herodotus' derivation of the rebirth theory from Egypt is impossible, for the good reason that the Egyptians had no such theory (see Mercer, Religion of Ancient Egypt, 323, and the authorities cited by Rathmann, Quaest. Pyth. 48). A derivation from India is unproved and intrinsically improbable (Keith, Rel. and Phil. of Veda and Upanishads, 601 ff.). It seems possible, however, that the Indian and the Greek belief may have the same ultimate source; see below, n. 97.

On the character and diffusion of shamanistic culture see K. Meuli, "Scythica," Hermes, 70 (1935) 137 ff., a brilliant paper to which I owe the idea of this chapter; G. Nioradze, Der Schamanismus bei den Sibirischen Völkern (Stuttgart, 1925); and the interesting though speculative book of Mrs. Chadwick, Poetry and Prophecy (Cambridge, 1942). For detailed descriptions of shamans see W. Radloff, Aus Sibirien (1885); V. M. Mikhailovski, JRAI 24 (1895) 62 ff., 126 ff.; W. Sieroszewski, Rev. de l'hist. des rel. 46 (1902) 204 ff., 299 ff.; M. A. Czaplicka, Aboriginal Siberia (1914), who gives a full bibliography; I. M. Kasanovicz, Smithsonian Inst. Annual Report, 1924; U. Holmberg, Finno-Ugric and Siberian Mythology (1927). The connection of Scythian with Ural-Altaic religious ideas was noticed by the Hungarian scholar Nagy and is accepted by Minns (Scythians and Greeks, 85).

It would appear that in some modern forms of shamanism the dissociation is a mere fiction; in others there is evidence that it is quite real (cf. Nioradze, op. cit., 91 f., 100 f.; Chadwick, op. cit., 18 ff.). The latter is presumably the older type, which the former conventionally imitates. A. Ohlmarks, Arch. f. Rel. 36 (1939) 171 ff., asserts that genuine shamanistic trance is confined to the arctic region and is due to "arctic hysteria," but see the criticisms of M. Eliade, Rev. de l'hist. des rel. 131 (1946) 5 ff. The soul may also leave the body in illness (Nioradze, op. cit., 95; Mikhailovski,
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loc. cit., 128), and in ordinary sleep (Nioradze, op. cit., 21 ff.; Czaplicka, op. cit., 287; Holmberg, op. cit., 472 ff.).

On these “Greek shamans” see also Rohde, Psyche, 299 ff. and 327 ff., where most of the evidence about them is collected and discussed; H. Diels, Parmenides' Lehrgedicht, 14 ff.; and Nilsson, Gesch. I. 582 ff., who accepts Meuli's view of them. It may perhaps be argued that shamanistic behaviour is rooted in man's psycho-physical make-up, and that something of the kind may therefore have appeared among the Greeks independently of foreign influence. But against this there are three things to be said: (1) such behaviour begins to be attested among the Greeks as soon as the Black Sea is opened to Greek colonisation, and not before; (2) of the earliest recorded “shamans,” one is a Scythian (Abaris), another a Greek who had visited Scythia (Aristeas); (3) there is sufficient agreement in concrete detail between ancient Greco-Scythian and modern Siberian shamanism to make a hypothesis of simple “convergence” look rather improbable: examples are the shaman's change of sex in Scythia and Siberia (Meuli, loc. cit., 127 ff.), the religious importance of the arrow (n. 34 below), the religious retreat (n. 46), the status of women (n. 59), the power over beasts and birds (n. 75), the underworld journey to recover a soul (n. 76) the two souls (n. 111), and the resemblance in cathartic methods (nn. 118, 119). Some of these things are very likely coincidences; taken separately, none of them is decisive; but their collective weight seems to me considerable.

This tradition, though preserved only by later writers, looks older than Herodotus' rationalising version (4.36) in which Abaris carries the arrow (his motive for doing so is not explained). Cf. Corssen, Rh. Mus. 67 (1912) 40, and Meuli, loc. cit., 159 f.

This seems to me to be implicit in the Buryat shaman's use of arrows to summon back the souls of the sick, and also at funerals (Mikhailovski, loc. cit., 128, 135). Shamans also divine from the flight of arrows (ibid., 69, 99); and it is said that the Tatar shaman’s “external soul” is sometimes lodged in an arrow (N. K. Chadwick, JRAI 66 [1936] 311). Other shamans can ride the air on a “horse-staff” like witches on a broomstick (G. Sandschejew, Anthropos, 23 [1928] 980).

Hdt. 4.36.

For the “Hyperborean Apollo” cf. Alcaeus, fr. 72 Lobel (2 B.); Pindar, Pyth. 10.28 ff.; Bacchyl. 3.58 ff.; Soph. fr. 870 N.; A. B. Cook, Zeus, II. 459 ff. A. H. Krappe, CPh 37 (1942) 353 ff., has shown with great probability that the origins of this god are to be
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looked for in northern Europe: he is associated with a northern product, amber, and with a northern bird, the whooper swan; and his "ancient garden" lies at the back of the north wind (for the obvious etymology of "Hyperborean" is probably after all the right one). It would seem that the Greeks, hearing of him from missionaries like Abaris, identified him with their own Apollo (possibly from a similarity of name, if Krappe is right in supposing him to be the god of Abalus, "apple island," the mediaeval Avalon), and proved the identity by giving him a place in the temple legend of Delos (Hdt. 4.32 ff.).

Aristeas, frs. 4 and 7 Kinkel; Alföldi, Gnomon, 9 (1933) 567 f. I may add that Aeschylus' blind "swan-shaped maidens" who never see the sun (P.V. 794 ff., perhaps from Aristeas) have also a good parallel in the "swan-maidens" of Central Asiatic belief, who live in the dark and have eyes of lead (N. K. Chadwick, JRAI 66 [1936] 313, 316. As to Aristeas' journey, Herodotus' account (4.13 f.) is ambiguous, and may reflect an attempt to rationalise the story (Meuli, loc. cit., 157 f.). In Maximus of Tyre, 38.3, it is definitely the soul of Aristeas which visits the Hyperboreans in the shamanistic manner. The details given in Herodotus 4.16, however, suggest a real journey.

8 Hdt. 4.15.2; Pliny, N.H. 7.174. Compare the soul-birds of the Yakut and Tungus tribes (Holmberg, op. cit., 473, 481); also the bird-costumes worn by Siberian shamans when shamanising (Chadwick, Poetry and Prophecy, 58 and pl. 2); and the belief that the first shamans were birds (Nioradze, op. cit., 2). Soul-birds are widely distributed, but it is not certain that early Greece knew them (Nilsson, Gesch. 1.182 f.).

Soph. El. 62 ff. The tone is rationalistic, suggesting the influence of his friend Herodotus; he no doubt has in mind stories like the one Herodotus tells of Zalmoxis (4.95), which rationalises Thracian shamanism. The Lapps used to believe that their shamans "walked" after death (Mikhailovski, loc. cit., 150 f.); and in 1556 the English traveller Richard Johnson saw a Samoyed shaman "die" and then reappear alive (Hakluyt, I.317 f.).

40 H. Diels, "Ueber Epimenides von Kreta," Berl. Sitzb. 1891, 1.387 ff. The fragments are now Vorsokr. 3 B (formerly 68 B). Cf. also H. Demoulin, Épiménide de Crète (Bibl. de la Fac. de Phil. et Lettres Liège, fasc. 12). Wilamowitz' scepticism (Hippolytos, 224, 243 f.) appears excessive, though some of E.'s oracles were certainly forged.

41 The prestige of Cretan καθάραλ in the Archaic Age is attested by
the legend that Apollo was purified after the slaying of Python by Karmanor the Cretan (Paus. 2.30.3, etc.); cf. also the Cretan Thaletas who expelled a plague from Sparta in the seventh century (Pratinas, fr. 8 B.). On the Cretan cave-cult see Nilsson, Minoan-Myc. Religion, 458 ff. Epimenides was called νέος Κόβης (Plut. Sol. 12, Diog. L. 1.115).

42 The tradition of psychic excursion was possibly transferred to Epimenides from Aristeas; Suidas attributes the power to each of them in much the same terms. Similarly Epimenides’ post-mortem apparition (Proclus, in Remp. II.113 Kr.) may be imitated from that of Aristeas. But the tradition of the fairy food looks older, if only because of the unexplained ox’s hoof. It is traceable as far back as Herodorus (fr. 1 J.), whom Jacoby dates ca. 400 B.C., and seems to be referred to by Plato, Laws 677ε. It is tempting to connect it (a) with the tradition of Epimenides’ miraculously long life, and (b) with the Thracian “recipe for escaping death” (n. 60 below).

43 τὸ δέρμα εὐφησαὶ γράμματι κατάστικτον, Suid. s.v. (= Epimenides A 2). The source of this may be the Spartan historian Sosibius, ca. 300 B.C. (cf. Diog. Laert. 1.115). Suidas adds that τὸ Ἐπιμενίδιον δέρμα was proverbial for anything hidden (ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποθέτων). But I cannot accept the curious theory of Diels (op. cit., 399) and Demoulin (op. cit., 69) that this phrase originally referred to a vellum MS of E.’s works, and was later misunderstood as referring to his tattooed skin. Compare, perhaps, Σ Lucian, p. 124 Rabe, ἐλεγετο γὰρ ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἐντεναισθαί τὸ δέζω αὐτοῦ μηγά ὁ τῶν Φοί-βον. Is this a rationalisation of the mysterious “golden thigh”? Or was the historical kernel of that tale a sacral tattoo-mark or natural birthmark?

44 Hdt. 5.6.2: τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ χθαὶ εὐγενές κάκοταί, τὸ δὲ ἀστικτὸν ἀγεννές. The Thracian shaman “Zalmoxis” had a tattoo-mark on his forehead which Greek writers, unaware of its religious significance, explained by saying that he had been captured by pirates, who branded him for the slave-market (Dionysophanes apud Porph. vit. Pyth. 15, where Delatte, Politique pyth., 228, is surely wrong in identifying the fictitious ἀστικτος with local anti-Pythagorean insurgents). That the Thracians practised sacral tattooing was known to Greek vase-painters: Thracian maenads tattooed with a fawn appear on several vases (JHS 9 [1888] pl. VI; P. Wolters, Hermes, 38 [1903] 268; Furtwängler-Reichhold, III, Tafel 178, where some are also tattooed with a snake). For tattooing as a mark of dedication to a god cf. also Hdt. 2.113 (Egyptian), and the
examples from various sources discussed by Dölger, Sphragis, 41 ff. Tattooing was likewise practised by the Sarmatians and Da­
cians (Pliny, N.H. 22.2), the Illyrians (Strabo 7.3.4), the “picti
Agathyrsi” in Transylvania whom Virgil represents as worship­
ping (the Hyperborean) Apollo (Aen. 4.146), and other Balkan
and Danubian peoples (Cook, Zeus, II.123). But the Greeks
thought it ἀλθεῖν καὶ ἀτίμον (Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hyp.

45 Frazer, Pausanias, II, 121 ff.

46 Cf. Rohde, Psyche, chap. ix, n. 117; Halliday, Greek Divination,
91, n. 5; and for the long sleeps of shamans, Czaplicka, op. cit., 179.
Holmberg, op. cit., 496, quotes the case of a shaman who had lain
“motionless and unconscious” for over two months at the time of
his “call.” Compare the long underground retreat of Zalmôxis
(n. 60 below). Diels thought (loc. cit., 402) that the Long Sleep
was invented to reconcile chronological discrepancies in the vari­
ous tales of Epimenides. But if this were the only motive, Long
Sleeps should be very common in early Greek history.

47 I leave out of account here Meuli’s hazardous speculations about
shamanistic elements in the Greek epic (loc. cit., 164 ff.). On the
lateness of Greek access to the Black Sea, and the reason for it, see
Rhys Carpenter, AJA 52 (1948) 1 ff.

48 This was already clearly recognised by Rohde, Psyche, 301 ff.

49 Proclus, in Remp. II.122.22 ff. Kr. (= Clearchus, fr. 7 Wehrli).
The story cannot, unfortunately, be treated as historical (cf.
Wilamowitz, Glaube, II.256, and H. Lewy, Harv. Theol. Rev. 31
[1938] 205 ff.).

50 Ar. Met. 964b 19; cf. Diels on Anaxagoras A 58. Zeller-Nestle,
I.1269, n. 1, would dismiss Aristotle’s statement as entirely base­
less. But Iamb. Protrept. 48.16 (= Ar. fr. 61) supports the idea
that Anaxagoras did appeal to the authority of Hermotimus.

51 Diog. Laert. I.114 (Vorschr. 3 A 4): λέγεται δὲ ὃς καὶ πρῶτος (πρῶ­
tον Casaubon, aŭtós cf. Diels) αὐτὸν Αλακὸν λέγει ... προςποιηθήναι
tε πολλάκις ἀναβιβωκέανι. The words αὐτόν Ἀλακὸν λέγει show that
ἀναβιβωκέανι cannot refer merely to psychic excursion, as Rohde
suggested (Psyche, 331).

52 Ar. Rhet. 1418 24: ἕκεινος γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων οὐκ ἐμαντεῖτο,
ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων, ἀδῆλων δὲ. For a different explanation of
this statement see Bouché-Leclercq, Hist. de la divination, II.100.

53 H. Diels, loc. cit. (n. 40 above), 395.

54 Apud Diog. Laert. 8.4. Cf. Rohde, Psyche, App. X, and A. De-
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Empedocles, fr. 129 D. (cf. Bidez, *La Biographie d’Empédocle*, 122 f.; Wilamowitz, “Die *Katharroi* des Empedokles,” *Berl. Sitzb.* 1929, 651); Xenophanes, fr. 7 D. I find quite unconvincing Rathmann’s attempt to discredit both these traditions in his *Quaestiones Pythagoreae, Orphicae, Empedoclea* (Halle, 1933). Xenophanes seems to have made fun also of the tall stories about Epimenides (fr. 20). Burnet’s way of translating the Empedocles fragment, “though he lived ten, yea, twenty generations of men ago” (*EGPh* 4, 236)—which would exclude any reference to Pythagoras—is linguistically quite impossible.

Mikhailovski, *loc. cit.* (n. 30 above), 85, 133; Sieroszewski, *loc. cit.*, 314; Czaplicka, *op. cit.*, 213, 280. The last-named attributes a general belief in reincarnation to a number of Siberian peoples (130, 136, 287, 290).


Diog. Laert. 8.4. Another of Pythagoras’ avatars, Aethalide, was said by Pherecydes of Syros to have been given the power of rebirth as a special privilege (Σ *Apoll. Rhod.* 1.645 = Pherecydes fr. 8). I agree with Wilamowitz (*Platon*, I.251, n. 1) that such stories are not products of philosophical theorising, but that on the contrary the theory is a generalisation suggested (in part, at least) by the stories. On reincarnation as a privilege limited to shamans see P. Radin, *Primitive Religion*, 274 f.

The status allowed to women in the Pythagorean community is exceptional for Greek society in the Classical Age. But it is worth noticing that in many Siberian societies today women, as well as men, are eligible for the status of shaman.

Hdt. 4.95. Cf. 4.93: Γέται τούς ἄθανατιζοντας, 5.4: Γέται οἱ ἄθανατιζοντες, and Plato, *Charm.* 156D: τῶν θρήκων τῶν Ζαλμοξίδος ιατρῶν, οἵ λέγονται καὶ ἄθανατιζοντες. These phrases mean, not that the Getae “believe in the immortality of the soul,” but that they have a recipe for escaping death (Linforth, *CPh* 13 [1918] 23 ff.). The nature of the escape which “Zalmoxis” promised to his followers is, however, far from clear. It seems possible that Herodotus’ informants had fused into one story several distinct ideas, viz., (a) the earthly paradise of the “Hyperborean Apollo,” to which, as
to the Aegean Elysium, some men are translated bodily without dying (alel pepei作文, cf. Bacchyl. 3.58 ff. and Krappe, CPh 37 [1942] 353 ff.): hence the identification of Zalmoxis with Kronos (Mnaseas, FHG III, fr. 23); cf. Czaplicka, op. cit., 176: "There exist traditions about shamans who were carried away still living from the earth to the sky"; (δ) the disappearing shaman who vanishes for long periods into a sacred cave: Hdt.'s καταγαγων οληνμα and Strabo's αντράδες τι χωρίον αβατον τοίς ἀλλοις (7.3.5) look like rationalised versions of the case where an ανθρωποδαιμων dwells undying, Rhesus, 970 ff., cf. Rohde, Psyche, 279; (ε) perhaps also a belief in transmigration (Rohde, loc. cit.); cf. the explicit statement of Mela that some Thracians "redituras putant animas obeuntium" (2.18), and Phot., Suid., EM, s.v. Ζαλμοξίς; but there is nothing about "souls" in Herodotus' account.

Herodotus knows that Zalmoxis is a δαιμων (4.94.1), but leaves open the question whether he may once have been a man (96.2). Strabo's account (7.3.5) strongly suggests that he was either a heroised shaman—all shamans become Úör, heroes, after death (Sieroszewski, loc. cit., 228 f.)—or else a divine prototype of shamans (cf. Nock, CR 40 [1926] 185 f., and Meuli, loc. cit., 163). We may compare the status which, according to Aristotle (fr. 192 R. = Iamb. vit. Pyth. 31), the Pythagoreans claimed for their founder: τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου τὸ μὲν ἑστὶ θεῖος, τὸ δὲ ἀνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ οἷον Πυθαγόρας. The fact that Zalmoxis gave his name to a particular type of singing and dancing (Hesych. s.v.) seems to confirm his connection with shamanistic performances. The similarities between the Zalmoxis legend and those of Epimenides and Aristeas have been rightly emphasised by Professor Rhys Carpenter (Folktales, Fiction, and Saga in the Homeric Epics, Sather Classical Lectures, 1946, 132 f., 161 f.), though I cannot accept his ingenious identification of all three with hibernating bears (was Pythagoras a bear too?). Minar, who tries to elicit a historical kernel from the Zalmoxis stories, ignores their religious background.


Pythagoras and Abaris, Iamb. vit. Pyth. 90-93, 140, 147, who makes Abaris P.'s pupil (Suidas, s.v. Πυθαγόρας, reverses the relation); initiation, ibid., 146. Prophecy, bilocation, and identity with Hyperborean Apollo, Aristotle, fr. 191 R. (= Vorsokr., Pyth. A 7). Healing, Aelian, V.H. 4.17, Diog. Laert. 8.12, etc.; visits underworld, Hieronymus of Rhodes apud Diog. 8.21, cf. 41. Against the view that the whole Pythagoras-legend can be dismissed as the invention of late romancers see O. Weinreich,
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NJbb 1926, 638, and Gigon, Ursprung d. gr. Philosophie, 131; and on the irrational character of much early Pythagorean thinking, L. Robin, La Pensée hellénique, 31 ff. I do not, of course, suggest that Pythagoreanism can be explained entirely as a development from shamanism; other elements, like number-mysticism and the speculations about cosmic harmony, were also important from an early date.

As Reinhardt says, the earliest references to Pythagoras—in Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Ion (and one might add Herodotus)—all “presuppose the popular tradition which saw in him an Albertus Magnus” (Parmenides, 236). Cf. I. Lévy, Recherches sur les sources de la légende de Pythagore, 6 ff. and 19.

The wind-magic goes back to Timaeus (fr. 94 M. = Diog. L. 8.60); the other stories to Heraclides Ponticus (frs. 72, 75, 76 Voss = Diog. L. 8.60 f., 67 f.). Bidez, La Biographie d'Empédocle, 35 ff., argued convincingly that the legend of Empedocles' bodily translation is older than that of his death in the crater of Etna, and was not invented by Heraclides. Similarly, Siberian tradition tells how the great shamans of the past were translated bodily (Czaplicka, op. cit., 176), and how they raised the dead to life (Nioradze, op. cit., 102).

Frs. 111.3, 9; 112.4.


The first of these views was maintained by Bidez, op. cit., 159 ff., and Kranz, Hermes, 70 (1935) 115 ff.; the second by Wilamowitz (Berl. Sitzb. 1929, 655), after Diels (Berl. Sitzb. 1898, i.39 ff.) and others. Against both opinions, see W. Nestle, Philol. 65 (1906) 545 ff., A. Diès, Le Cycle mystique, 87 ff., Weinreich, NJbb 1926, 641, and Cornford, CAH IV. 568 f. The attempts of Burnet and others to distinguish in a later generation between “scientific” and “religious” Pythagoreans illustrate the same tendency to impose modern dichotomies on a world which had not yet felt the need to define either “science” or “religion.”

This explanation (Karsten's) was accepted by Burnet and Wilamowitz. But see, contra, Bidez, op. cit., 166, and Nestle, loc. cit., 549, n. 14.

In view of these passages, Wilamowitz' description of the poem On Nature as “durchaus materialistisch” (loc. cit., 651) is decidedly misleading, though no doubt Empedocles, like other men of his time, thought of mental forces in material terms.

Jaeger, Theology, 132.

Cf. Rohde, Psyche, 378. On the wide range of the shaman's func-
tions see Chadwick, *Growth of Literature*, I.637 ff., and *Poetry and Prophecy*, chaps. i and iii. Homeric society is more advanced: there the ἅδρισ, the ἄρτος, the ἀόδας, are members of distinct professions. The archaic Greek shamans were a throwback to an older type.

Later tradition, with its emphasis on the secrecy of Pythagoras' teaching, denied that he put anything in writing; cf., however, Gigon, *Unters. z. Heraklit*, 126. It would seem that there was no such established tradition in the fifth century, since Ion of Chios could attribute Orphic poems to Pythagoras (n. 96 below).


Chadwick, *JRAI* 66 (1936) 300. Modern shamans have lost this power, but they still surround themselves when they shamanise with wooden images of birds and beasts, or with their skins, in order to secure the help of the animal spirits (Meuli, *loc. cit.*, 147); they also imitate the cries of these helpers (Mikhailovski, *loc. cit.*, 74, 94). The same tradition appears in the legend of Pythagoras, who "is believed to have tamed an eagle, by certain cries checking it in its flight overhead and calling it down" (Plut. *Numa* 8); this may be compared with the Yenissean belief that "the eagles are the shaman's helpers" (Nioradze, *op. cit.*, 70). He also tames another animal very important to northern shamans, the bear (*Lamb. vit. Pyth.* 60).

Chadwick, *ibid.*, 305 (underworld journey of Kan Märgän to look for his sister), and *Poetry and Prophecy*, 93; Mikhailovski, *loc. cit.*, 63, 69 ff.; Czaplicka, *op. cit.*, 260, 269; Meuli, *loc. cit.*, 149.


E.g., the mantic head of Mímir, *Ynglinga saga*, chaps. iv and vii. In Ireland, "heads that speak have been a well-attested phenomenon for more than a thousand years" (G. L. Kittredge, *A Study of Gawain and the Green Knight*, 177, where numerous examples are quoted). Cf. also W. Déonna, *REG* 38 (1925) 44 ff.

Wilamowitz, *Glaube*, II.193 ff. (1932); Festugière, *Revue Biblique*, 44 (1935) 372 ff.; *REG* 49 (1936) 306 ff.; H. W. Thomas, *Ἑπίκεων* (1938); Ivan M. Linforth, *The Arts of Orpheus* (1941). A spirited counter-attack on this "reactionary" scepticism was delivered in 1942 by Ziegler, representing the Old Guard of pan-Orphists, in the guise of an article in a work of reference (P.-W., s.v. "Orphische Dichtung"). But while he has no difficulty in scoring some direct hits on his immediate adversary Thomas, I cannot feel that Ziegler has stilled my doubts about the foundations on which the traditional account of "Orphism" rests, even in the modified form in
which it is presented by such careful writers as Nilsson ("Early Orphism," *Harv. Theol. Rev.* 28 [1935]) and Guthrie (op. cit.).

See, contra, Wilamowitz, II.199. To his generalisation that no writer of the Classical Age speaks of Ὀρφικός, Herodotus 2.81, can be claimed as a possible exception only if we adopt the "short text" (the reading of ABC) in that disputed passage. But an accidental omission in an ancestor of ABC, caused by homoioteleuton and leading to a subsequent change in the number of the verb, appears to me much likelier than an interpolation in DRSV; and I cannot resist the conviction that the choice of the word ἄργιων in the next sentence was determined by the word Βαρμείος in the "long text" of this one (cf. Nock, *Studies Presented to F. Ll. Griffith*, 248, and Boyance, *Culte des Muses*, 94, n. 1).


That this hypothesis is both superfluous and intrinsically improbable is the central thesis of Thomas’s book.

See, contra, Linforth, 56 ff.; D. W. Lucas, "Hippolytus," *CQ* 40 (1946) 65 ff. It may be added that the Pythagorean tradition explicitly coupled hunters with butchers as unclean persons (Eudoxus, fr. 36 Gisinger = Porph. vit. Pyth. 7). The Orphic view of them can hardly have been very different.

This hoary error has in recent years been exposed again and again: see R. Harder, *Ueber Ciceros Somnium Scipionis*, 121, n. 4; Wilamowitz, II.199; Thomas, 51 f.; Linforth, 147 f. Since, however, it is still repeated by highly respected scholars, it seems worth while to say once more (a) that what is attributed by Plato, *Crat.* 400c, to οἶ ἄμφ’ Ὀρφέα is a derivation of σῶμα (τοῦτο τὸ
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δομα) from σώματος, ίνα σώζηται (ἡ ψυχή): this is placed beyond doubt by the words καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν παράγειν οὐδὲν γράμμα, which contrast σώμα-σώμα with σώμα-σήμα and σώμα-σήμαινος; (b) that σώμα-σήμα is attributed in the same passage to τινές, without further specification; (c) that when an author says, “Some persons connect σώμα with σήμα, but I think it was probably the Orphic poets who coined the word, deriving it from σώζω,” we cannot suppose “the Orphic poets” to be either identical with, or included among, “some persons” (I am inclined to think this remains true even if μάλιστα is understood as qualifying ὡς δίκαιον διδόσης κτλ).

As Mr. D. W. Lucas has put it (CQ 40.67), “the modern reader, baffled and dismayed by the apparent crudity of much of conventional Greek religion, is inclined to look everywhere for signs of Orphism, because he feels it gives more of what he has come to expect from religion, and he is loath to believe that the Greeks did not demand it too.” Cf. also Jaeger, Theology, 61. I cannot help suspecting that “the historic Orphic Church,” as it appears, e.g., in Toynbee’s Study of History, V.84 ff., will one day be quoted as a classic instance of the kind of historical mirage which arises when men unknowingly project their own preoccupations into the distant past.

Festugière, REG 49.307; Linforth, xiii f.

Parallels between Plato or Empedocles and these late compilations do not in my opinion constitute such a guarantee, unless in any particular case we can exclude the possibility that the compiler lifted the phrase or the idea from those accepted masters of mystical thought.

The sceptics appear to have included Herodotus, Ion of Chios, and Epigenes (n. 96 below), as well as Aristotle: see Linforth’s admirable discussion, 155 ff.

Rep. 364ε. The etymology and usage of the word διμαδος suggest that what Plato had in mind was not so much the confused noise of gabbling recitation as the confused noise of a lot of books each propounding its own nostrum; it takes more than one to make a διμαδος. Euripides’ phrase, πολλὰ γραμμάτων κατούσ (Hipp. 954), also stresses the multiplicity of Orphic authorities, as well as their futility. It is anachronistic, as Jaeger points out (Theology, 62), to postulate a uniform Orphic “dogma” in the Classical Age.


Ziegler, loc. cit., 1380, seems to me to be right on this point, against
the ultra-sceptical Thomas. Aristotle's words at *de anima* 410b 19 (= O.F. 27), far from excluding transmigration from the range of Orphic beliefs, go some way to confirm its inclusion by showing that some writers of Ὄρφικα believed at any rate in a pre-existent detachable soul.

Pythagoreans are portrayed in Middle Comedy as pretending to be strict vegetarians (Antiphanes, fr. 135 K., Aristophon, fr. 9, etc.) and even as living on bread and water (Alexis, fr. 221). But the Pythagorean rule had various forms; the oldest may have prohibited the eating only of certain "sacred" animals or parts of animals (Nilsson, "Early Orphism," 206 f.; Delatte, *Études sur la litt. pyth.*, 289 ff.). The σώμα-φρουρά idea was put by Clearchus (fr. 38 W.) into the mouth of a real or imaginary Pythagorean called Euxitheos. (Plato, *Phaedo* 628, does not in my opinion support the view that it was taught by Philolaus; and I have little faith in "Philolaus," fr. 15.) On Pythagorean κάθαρος see below, n. 119, and on the close general similarity of old-Pythagorean and old-Orphic ideas, E. Frank, *Platon u. d. sogenannten Pythagoreer*, 67 ff., 356 ff., and Guthrie, *op. cit.*, 216 ff. The most clearly recognisable differences are not doctrinal, but are concerned with cult (Apollo is central for Pythagoreanism, Dionysus apparently for the Ὄρφικα); with social status (Pythagoreanism is aristocratic, the Ὄρφικα probably were not); and, above all, with the fact that Orphic thought remained on the mythological level, while the Pythagoreans at an early date, if not from the first, attempted to translate this way of thinking into more or less rational terms.

Diog. Laert. 8.8 (= Kern, *Test.* 248); Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1.21, 131 (= *Test.* 222). I find it difficult to accept Linforth's identification of this Epigenes with an obscure member of the Socratic circle (*op. cit.*, 115 ff.); the sort of linguistic interests attributed to him by Clement (*ibid.*, 5.8, 49 = O.F. 33) and Athenaeus (468c) strongly suggest Alexandrian scholarship. But he was in any case a man who had made a special study of Orphic poetry, and in view of the poverty of our own information it seems unwise to dismiss his statements in the cavalier manner of Delatte (*Études sur la litt. pyth.*, 4 f.). We do not know on what his particular ascriptions were based; but for the general view that early Pythagoreans had had a hand in the manufacture of Ὄρφικα he could appeal to good fifth-century authority, not only to Ion of Chios but also, I think, to Herodotus, if I am right in understanding the famous sentence in 2.81 to mean "These Egyptian practices agree (διολογεῖει
RSV) with the practices called Orphic and Dionysiac, which really
originated in Egypt and (some of which) were brought thence by
Pythagoras” (on the text see n. 80 above). Since Hdt. elsewhere
(2.49) attributes the importation of the βαχύκα to Melampus,
the practices imported by Pythagoras are presumably limited to
the Ὀρφικά. Cf. 2.123, where he says he knows but will not name
the plagiarists who imported the doctrine of transmigration from
Egypt and claimed it as their own.

Something of the same sort may have happened in India, where
the belief in reincarnation also emerges relatively late and ap­
ppears to be neither indigenous nor part of the creed of the I.-E.
incomers. W. Ruben, Acta Orientalia, 17 (1939) 164 ff., finds its
starting-point in contacts with the shamanistic culture of Central
Asia. One interesting fact is that in India, as in Greece, the re­
incarnation theory and the interpretation of the dream as a psychic
excursion make their first appearance together (Br. Upanishad
3.3 and 4.3; cf. Ruben, loc. cit., 200). It looks as if they were ele­
ments of the same belief-pattern. If so, and if shamanism is the
source of the latter element, it is probably the source of both.


below, n. 109); Plato, Phaedo 70c-72d (the “argument from
ἀντανάκλοσις”).

101 “This doctrine of the transmigration or reincarnation of the soul
is found among many tribes of savages,” Frazer, The Belief in
Immortality, 1.29. “The belief in some form of reincarnation is
universally present in all the simple food-gathering and fishing­
hunting civilisations,” P. Radin, Primitive Religion, 270.

Cf. Plato, Phaedo 69c, Rep. 363d, etc., and for the Pythagorean
belief in Tartarus, Arist. Anal. Post. 94b 33 (= Vorschr. 58 C 1).
An Underworld Journey is among the poems ascribed by Epigi­
enes to the Pythagorean Cercops (n. 96). The specific fancy of a
hell of mud is usually called “Orphic” on the not very impressive
authority of Olympiodorus (in Phaed. 48.20 N.). Aristides, ora­
Plato, Rep. 363d and Phaedo 69c, is quite vague. I suspect it to
be an old popular notion derived from the consubstantiality of
ghost and corpse and the consequent confusion of Hades with the
grave: the stages of its growth may be traced in Homer’s Ἀτάνεως
δύναυν εὐρώπητα (Od. 10.512, cf. Soph. Aj. 1166, τάφων οἰρώπητα);
Aeschylus’ λάμπα or λάτα (Eum. 387, cf. Blass ad loc.); and
Aristophanes' \( \beta \rho \beta \rho \sigma \sigma \nu \pi o l \bar{o} \nu k a l \sigma k \omega \rho \ \delta \epsilon \nu \nu \) (Ran. 145). At some point in its development it was interpreted as the appropriate punishment of the uninitiated or "unclean" (\( \tau \omega \nu \ \delta \kappa \alpha \theta \delta \alpha \rho \tau \nu \)) this might be the contribution of Eleusis or of the 'O\( \alpha \mu \kappa \sigma \) or of both. To the question, \( \tau i \ \alpha \lambda \eta \theta \delta \sigma \tau a t o n \ \lambda \varepsilon \gamma e t a i \); the old Pythagorean catechism replied, \( \delta t i \ \pi o n \nu r o l \ o i \ \alpha \nu \theta r \bar{i} \omega \) (Iamb. vit. Pyth. 82 = Vorsokr. 45 C 4).

\[ \text{Laws 872DE. Cf. the Pythagorean view of justice, Arist. E.N. 1132b 21 ff.} \]

\[ \text{\gamma} \nu \omega \sigma \varepsilon \ \delta \ \\alpha \nu \theta r \bar{i} \omega \nu s \ \alpha \nu \theta \alpha \lambda \rho e \tau a \ \pi \mu \mu a i \ \xi \chi o n t a s, \text{ quoted as Pythagorean by Chrysippus apud Aul. Gell. 7.2.12. Cf. Delatte, Êtudes, 25.} \]

See above, chap. ii.

Against Burnet's ascription of Platonic \( \alpha \nu \alpha \mu \nu \nu \sigma \nu s \) to the Pythagoreans (Thales to Plato, 43) see L. Robin, "Sur la doctrine de la réminiscence," REG 32 (1919) 451 ff. (= La Pensée hellénique, 337 ff.), and Thomas, 78 ff. On Pythagorean memory-training, Diod. 10.5 and Iamb. vit. Pyth. 164 ff. These authors do not connect it with the attempt to recover memory of past lives, but it seems a reasonable guess that this was originally its ultimate purpose. \( \alpha \nu \alpha \mu \nu \nu \sigma \nu s \) in this sense is an exceptional feat, attainable only by special gifts or special training; it is a highly esteemed spiritual accomplishment in India today. The belief in it is probably assisted by the curious psychological illusion, to which some persons are subject, known as "déjà vu."

\[ \text{\text{Iamb. vit. Pyth. 85 (= Vorsokr. 58 C 4). Cf. Crantor apud [Plut.] cons. ad Apoll. 27, 115b, who attributes to "many wise men" the view that human life is a \( \tau \mu \omega \rho \alpha \), and Arist. fr. 60, where the same view is ascribed to \( \omega l \ \tau \alpha \s o \ \tau e \l e r \alpha s \ \lambda \gamma \nu o \nu \tau e s \) (Orphic poets?).} \]

\[ \text{\text{Heraclitus, frs. 62, 88; cf. Sext. Emp. Pyth. Hyr. 3.230: \( \delta \ \bar{\delta} \ \delta \ \bar{\delta} \ \alpha \rho \alpha \kappa \lambda e \iota \tau \sigma s \ \phi \nu \sigma o s \ \delta t i \ \kappa a l \ \tau o \ \zeta \eta\nu \ k a l \ \tau o \ \alpha \pi o \theta a \nu e i n \ k a l \ \epsilon n \ \tau \bar{o} \ \zeta \eta\nu \ \eta \mu \alpha s \ \bar{\eta} \sigma t i \ k a l \ \epsilon n \ \tau \bar{o} \ \tau e \nu \alpha \nu i a i: \delta t e \ \mu e n \ \gamma \alpha r \ \bar{\eta} \mu e i s \ \zeta \omega \mu e n, \ \tau \alpha s \ \psi \nu \chi \alpha s \ \eta \mu \omega n \ \tau e \nu \alpha \nu i a i \ k a l \ \epsilon n \ \eta \mu \mu n \ \tau e \nu \alpha \beta \bar{\delta} \bar{\delta} \bar{\delta}, \ \delta t e \ \bar{\delta} \ \bar{\delta} \ \bar{\delta} \ \eta \mu e i s \ \alpha \pi o \theta a \nu e i s \ \kappa o m e n, \ \tau \alpha s \ \psi \nu \chi \alpha s \ \alpha \nu \alpha \beta \bar{\delta} \bar{\delta} \bar{\delta} \ \kappa a l \ \zeta \eta\nu, \ \text{and Philo, Leg. alleg. 1.108. Sextus' quotation is doubtless not \text{\text{verba\text{\text{im; but it seems unsafe to dis-}}}count \text{\text{it completely, as some do, because of its "Pythagorean" language. For the similar view held by Empedocles, see below, n. 114; and for later developments of this line of thought, Cumont, Rev. de Phil. 44 (1920) 230 ff.} \}

\[ \text{\text{Ar. Ran. 420, \( \epsilon n \ \tau o i s \ \bar{\alpha} \nu o \ \nu e \kappa r \iota \sigma i, \) and the parody of Euripides, ibid., 1477 f. (Cf. 1082, \( \kappa a l \ \phi \alpha \kappa o \delta \sigma a s \ \bar{o} \nu \ \zeta \eta\nu \ \tau o \ \zeta \eta\nu, \text{ where the doctrine is presented as a climax of perversity.})}} \]

\[ \text{\text{Pherecydes, A 5 Diels. On the two souls in Empedocles see Gom-}} \]
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perz, Greek Thinkers, I.248 ff. (Eng. trans.); Rostagni, Il Verbo di Pitagora, chap. vi; Wilamowitz, Berl. Sitzb. 1929, 658 ff.; Delatte, Enthousiasme, 27. Failure to distinguish the ψυχή from the δαίμων has led various scholars to discover an imaginary contradiction between the Purifications and the poem On Nature in regard to immortality. Apparent contradictions on the same subject in the fragments of Alcmaeon are perhaps to be explained in a like manner (Rostagni, loc. cit.). Another view of the persistent "occult" self, attributed by Aristotle to "some Pythagoreans" (de anima 404a 17), represented it as a tiny material particle (ξοσμα), a notion which has plenty of primitive parallels. This again is quite distinct from the breath-soul which is the principle of life on the ordinary empirical level. The notion of a plurality of "souls" may have been taken over from shamanistic tradition: most of the Siberian peoples today believe in two or more souls (Czaplicka, op. cit., chap. xiii). But, as Nilsson has lately said, "pluralistic teaching about the soul is founded in the nature of things, and only our habits of thought make it surprising that man should have several 'souls' " (Harv. Theol. Rev. 42 [1949] 89).

112 Empedocles, A 85 (Aetius, 5.25.4), cf. frs. 9-12. Return of ψυχή or πνεύμα to the fiery aether: Eur. Supp. 533, fr. 971, and the Potidaea epitaph (Kaibel, Epigr. gr. 21). It seems to be based on the simple idea that ψυχή is breath or warm air (Anaximenes, fr. 2), which will tend to float upwards when released at death into the atmosphere (Empedocles, fr. 2.4, καπνὸν δίκην ἀρδέωτες).

113 A similar paradox is attributed by Clement to Heraclitus, Paedag. 3.2.1. But what is missing in the fragments of Heraclitus is the Empedoclean preoccupation with guilt. Like Homer, he is apparently more concerned about τιμὴ (fr. 24).

114 Rohde's view, that the "unfamiliar place" (fr. 118) and the "Meadow of Ate" (fr. 121) are simply the world of men, has the support of ancient authority, and seems to me almost certainly right. It was challenged by Maass and Wilamowitz, but is accepted by Bignone (Empedocle, 492), Kranz (Hermes, 70 [1935] 114, n. 1), and Jaeger (Theology, 148 f., 238).

115 The imaginative qualities of the Purifications have been well brought out by Jaeger, Theology, chap. viii, especially 147 f. Empedocles was a true poet, not a philosopher who happened to write in verse.

116 See above, pp. 35 ff. Certain cathartic functions are exercised by the primitive Siberian shaman (Radloff, op. cit., II.52 ff.); so that the role of καθαρτικις would come natural to his Greek imitators.
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117 O.F., 32 (c) and (d).

118 Rep. 364E: διὰ θυσίων καὶ παιδιῶς ἱδώνων. Empedocles, fr. 143, prescribes washing in water drawn in a bronze vessel from five springs—which recalls the "futile prescription" offered by a speaker in Menander (fr. 530.22 Κ.), ἀπὸ κρούων τριῶν ὀδανικῶν ἐρράναι, and the catharsis practised by Buryat shamans with water drawn from three springs (Mikhailovski, loc. cit., 87).

119 Aristoxenus, fr. 26, and Wehrli's note; Iamb. vit. Pyth. 64 ff., 110-114, 163 ff.; Porph. vit. Pyth. 33; Boyancé, Le Culte des Muses, 100 ff., 115 ff. Music is much used by modern shamans to summon or banish spirits—it is "the language of spirits" (Chadwick, ijRAI 66 [1936] 297). And it seems likely that the Pythagorean use of it derives in part at least from shamanistic tradition: cf. the ἐπῳδαῖ by which the Thracian followers of Zalmoxis are said to "heal the soul" (Plato, Charm. 156D-157A).

120 Empedocles, fr. 117.

121 Ar. Ran. 1032 (cf. Linforth, 70); Eudoxus apud Porph. vit. Pyth. 7. Vegetarianism is associated with Cretan mystery cults by Euripides (fr. 472) and by Theophrastus (apud Porph. de abst. 2.21), and it may well be that the Cretan vegetarian Epimenides played a part in its diffusion. But the other form of the Pythagorean rule, which forbade only the eating of certain "sacred" creatures, such as the white cock (n. 95 above), may possibly derive from shamanism, since to-day "animals, and especially birds, which play some part in shamanistic beliefs may not be killed or even molested" (Holmberg, op. cit., 500), though a general prohibition of flesh-eating is reported only of certain clans among the Buryats (ibid., 499).

122 The "Pythagorean silence" is proverbial from Isocrates (11.29) onwards. Iamblichus speaks of five years' complete silence for novices (vit. Pyth. 68, 72), but this may be a later exaggeration. Sexual restraint, Aristoxenus, fr. 39 W., Iamb. vit. Pyth. 132, 209 ff.; sex relations harmful, Diog. Laert. 8.9, Diod. 10.9.3 ff., Plut. Q. Conv. 3.6.3, 654B. Celibacy is not required of the modern Siberian shaman. But it is worth noticing that, according to Posidonius, celibacy was practised by certain holy men (shamans?) among the Thracian Getae (Strabo, 7.3.3 f.).

123 Hippolytus (Ref. haer. 7.30 = Empedocles B 110) accuses Marcion of emulating the καθαρμοῖ of Empedocles in trying to get rid of marriage: διαρρέει γάρ ὁ γάμος κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα τὸ ἐν καὶ ποιεῖ τολλά. This is explained by another statement which he attributes to E. (ibid., 7.29 = Emp. B 115), that sexual intercourse helps
the disruptive work of strife. It is not clear, however, whether E. went to the length of preaching race-suicide.

124 Hippodamas apud Iamb. vit. Pyth. 82.
125 Paus. 8.37.5 (= Kern, Test. 194).
126 Wilamowitz, Glaube, II.193, 378 ff.
127 Notably by Festugière, Rev. Bibl. 44 (1935) 372 ff. and REG 49 (1936) 308 ff. On the other hand the antiquity of the myth is maintained—not always on what seem to me the strongest grounds—by Guthrie (107 ff.), Nilsson (“Early Orphism,” 202), and Boyancé (“Remarques sur le salut selon l’Orphisme,” REA 43 [1941] 166). The fullest and most careful survey of the evidence is Linforth’s, op. cit., chap. v. He inclines on the whole to the earlier dating, though his conclusions are in some other respects negative.

128 For the probable meaning of the attribution to Onomacritus see Wilamowitz, Glaube, II.379, n. 1; Boyancé, Culte des Muses, 19 ff.; Linforth, 350 ff. I should also be hesitant about building much on the finds in the Theban Kabeiron (Guthrie, 123 ff.), which would be more impressive as evidence if there were anything to connect them directly with Titans or with σπαραγμός. Nor are we helped by S. Reinach’s ingenious discovery (Rev. Arch. 1919, i.162 ff.) of an allusion to the myth in one of the “additional” Aristotelian προβληματα (Didot Aristotle, IV.331.15), so long as the date of this πρόβλημα remains uncertain; the evidence of Athen. 656AB is not sufficient to show that the πρόβλημα was known to Philochorus.

129 See App. I, pp. 276 ff.; and on the connection between the rite and the myth, Nilsson, “Early Orphism,” 203 ff. Those who deny, like Wilamowitz, that the older Ὄρφικα had any connection with Dionysus have to explain away the evidence of Hdt. 2.81 (or eliminate it by adopting the transcriptionally less probable reading).

130 See above, pp. 33 ff.
131 Pindar, fr. 127 B. (133 S.) = Plato, Meno 811c. This interpretation was offered by Tannery, Rev. de Phil. 23, 126 ff. The case for it has been persuasively argued by Rose in Greek Poetry and Life: Essays Presented to Gilbert Murray, 79 ff. (cf. also his note in Harv. Theol. Rev. 36 [1943] 247 ff.).
132 Plato, Laws 701c. The thought is unfortunately as elliptical as the syntax is crabbed; but all explanations which assume that τὴν λέγομένην παλαιὰν Τιτανικήν φύσιν refers merely to the war of the Titans and the gods seem to me to suffer shipwreck on the phrase ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν ἔκεινα ἄφικομένους (or ἄφικομένους,
Schanz), which makes no known sense as applied to Titans, and not much sense (in view of πᾶλων) as applied to men unless the human race sprang from Titans. To Linforth's objection (op. cit., 344) that Plato is talking only of degenerates, whereas the myth made the Τίτανική φύσις a permanent part of all human nature, the answer surely is that while all men have the Titan nature in their breasts, only degenerates "show it off and emulate it." (ἔπιθεικον implies that they are proud to have it in them, while μιμομένοι means that they follow the example of their mythical ancestors.)

133 Ibid., 854B: to a person tormented by impulses to sacrilege we must say: ὃ θαυμάσει, οὖκ ἄνθρωπον σε κακὸν οὐδὲ θείον κυβεῖ τὸ νῦν ἐπὶ τὴν λεπτολαν προτέρουν λέγαι, οὐστρος δὲ σὲ τες ἐμφύλοιος ἐκ παλαιῶν καὶ ἀκαθαρτῶν τοῖς ἄνθρωποις ἀδικήματαν, περιφερόμενος ἀντιμιᾶς. The ἀδικήματα are usually thought to be crimes committed by the person's immediate ancestors (so England, etc.), or by the person himself in a previous incarnation (Wilamowitz, Platon, I.697). But (a) if the temptation arises in some way from past human acts, why is it called οὐκ ἄνθρωπον κακὸν? (b) Why is it specifically a temptation to sacrilege? (c) Why are the original acts ἀκάθαρτα τοῖς ἄνθρωποις (words which are naturally taken together, and must in fact be so taken, since they evidently lead up to the advice in the next sentence to seek purgation from the gods)? I cannot resist the conclusion (which I find has been reached on other grounds by Rathmann, Quaestt. Pyth., 67) that Plato is thinking of the Titans, whose incessant irrational promptings (οὐστρος) haunt the unhappy man wherever he goes (περιφερόμενος), tempting him to emulate their sacrilege. Cf. Plut. de esu carn. 1, 996C: τὸ γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν ἄλογον καὶ ἀτακτὸν καὶ βιαῖον, οὐ θείον ἀλλὰ δαιμονικὸν, οἱ παλαιοὶ Τίτανας ὄνομασαν (which seems to come from Xenocrates); and for οὐστρος resulting from man's evil inheritance, Olymp. in Phaed. 87.13 ff. N. (= O.F. 232).

134 Olymp. in Phaed. 84.22 ff.: ἤ φρουρά . . . ὡς Ζευκρατῆς, Τίτανική ἐστιν καὶ εἰς Δήμωνον ἀποκορυφώτας (= Xenocrates, fr. 20). Cf. Heinze ad loc.; E. Frank, Platon u. d. sog. Pythagoreer, 246; and the more cautious views of Linforth, 337 ff.

135 It must be conceded to Linforth that none of the older writers explicitly equates the divine in man with the Dionysiac. But it can, I think, be shown that this equation is not (as Linforth maintains, p. 330) the invention of Olympiodorus (in Phaed. 3.2 ff.), or (as might be suggested) of his source Porphyry (cf. Olymp. ibid., 85.3). (a) It appears in Olympiodorus, not merely "as a desperate
device to explain a puzzling passage in Plato" (Linforth, p. 359), but as an explanation in mythical terms of moral conflict and the redemption of man, in *Phaed.* 87.1 ff.: τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν Διόνυσον διαστῶμεν . . . οὕτω δ' ἔχοντες Τιτάνες ἔσμεν· διὰ τοῦτο έκεῖνο συμβῶμεν, Διόνυσον γυνήμεθα τετελεωμένοι ἄτεχνως. When Linforth says (p. 360) that the connection of these ideas with the Titan myth “is not suggested by Olympiodorus and is merely the gratuitous assertion of modern scholars,” he seems to have overlooked this passage. (6) Iamblichus says of the old Pythagoreans, *vit. Pyth.* 240, παρηγγέλλου γὰρ θαμά ἀλλήλοις μὴ διαστᾶν τὸν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς θεῖον. It has apparently escaped notice that he is alluding to the same doctrine as Olympiodorus (the use of the verb διαστᾶν makes this fairly certain). We do not know what his source was; but even Iamblichus would hardly represent as an old-Pythagorean σύμβολον something which had just been invented by Porphyry. Its real age cannot be exactly determined; but it is a reasonable guess that, like the Titan myth itself, Porphyry found it in Xenocrates. If so, Plato will hardly have been ignorant of it. But Plato had a good reason for not using this element of the myth: he could identify the irrational impulses with the Titans, but to equate the divine in man with the Dionysiac was repugnant to a rationalist philosophy.

Keith, *Rel. and Phil. of Veda and Upanishads*, 579.
VI
Rationalism and Reaction in the Classical Age

The major advances in civilisation are processes which all but wreck the societies in which they occur.

A. N. Whitehead

In the previous chapters of this book I have tried to illustrate within a particular field of belief the slow, age-long building up, out of the deposit left by successive religious movements, of what Gilbert Murray in a recently published lecture has called "the Inherited Conglomerate." The geological metaphor is apt, for religious growth is geological: its principle is, on the whole and with exceptions, agglomeration, not substitution. A new belief-pattern very seldom effaces completely the pattern that was there before: either the old lives on as an element in the new—sometimes an unconfessed and half-unconscious element—or else the two persist side by side, logically incompatible, but contemporaneously accepted by different individuals or even by the same individual. As an example of the first situation, we have seen how Homeric notions like 

* For notes to chapter vi see pages 195-206.
these pictures persisted in the background of fifth-century thinking; you could take some one of them seriously, or more than one, or even all, since there was no Established Church to assure you that this was true and the other false. On questions like that there was no "Greek view," but only a muddle of conflicting answers.

Such, then, was the Inherited Conglomerate at the end of the Archaic Age, historically intelligible as the reflex of changing human needs over many successive generations, but intellectually a mass of confusion. We saw in passing how Aeschylus attempted to master this confusion and to elicit from it something which made moral sense. But in the period between Aeschylus and Plato the attempt was not renewed. In that period the gap between the beliefs of the people and the beliefs of the intellectuals, which is already implicit in Homer, widens to a complete breach, and prepares the way for the gradual dissolution of the Conglomerate. With certain consequences of this process, and of the attempts that were made to check it, I shall be concerned in the remaining chapters.

The process itself does not, in its general aspect, form part of my subject. It belongs to the history of Greek rationalism, which has been written often enough. But certain things are perhaps worth saying about it. One is that the "Aufklärung" or Enlightenment was not initiated by the Sophists. It seems desirable to say this, because there are still people who talk as if "Enlightenment" and Sophistic Movement were the same thing, and proceed to envelope both in the same blanket of condemnation or (less often) approval. The Enlightenment is of course much older; its roots are in sixth-century Ionia; it is at work in Hecataeus, Xenophanes, and Heraclitus, and in a later generation is carried further by speculative scientists like Anaxagoras and Democritus. Hecataeus is the first Greek who admitted that he found Greek mythology "funny," and set to work to make it less funny by inventing rationalist explanations, while his contemporary Xenophanes attacked the Homeric and Hesiodic myths from the moral angle. More
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important for our purposes is the statement that Xenophanes denied the validity of divination ($\mu\alpha\nu\tau\iota\nu\chi$) : if this is true, it means that, almost alone among classical Greek thinkers, he swept aside not only the pseudo-science of reading omens but the whole deep-seated complex of ideas about inspiration which occupied us in an earlier chapter. But his decisive contribution was his discovery of the relativity of religious ideas. "If the ox could paint a picture, his god would look like an ox": once that had been said, it could only be a matter of time before the entire fabric of traditional belief began to loosen. Xenophanes was himself a deeply religious man; he had his private faith in a god "who is not like men in appearance or in mind." But he was conscious that it was faith, not knowledge. No man, he says, has ever had, or ever will have, sure knowledge about gods; even if he should chance to hit on the exact truth, he cannot know that he has done so, though we can all have our opinions. That honest distinction between what is knowable and what is not appears again and again in fifth-century thought, and is surely one of its chief glories; it is the foundation of scientific humility.

Again, if we turn to the fragments of Heraclitus, we find a whole series of direct assaults on the Conglomerate, some of which concern the types of belief we have considered in previous chapters. His denial of validity to dream-experience we have already noticed. He made fun of ritual catharsis, comparing those who purge blood with blood to a man who should try to wash off dirt by bathing in mud. That was a direct blow at the consolations of religion. So was his complaint that "the customary mysteries" were conducted in an unholy manner, though unluckily we do not know on what the criticism was based or exactly what mysteries he had in mind. Again, the saying ηεκίες κοπρίων ἐκθλητότερον, "dead is nastier than dung," might have been approved by Socrates, but it was a studied insult to ordinary Greek sentiment: it dismisses in three words all the pother about burial rites which figures so largely both in Attic tragedy and in Greek military history, and indeed the
whole tangle of feelings which centred round the ghost-corpse. Another three-word maxim, ἡθος ἀνθρώπων δαιμων, "character is destiny," similarly dismisses by implication the whole set of archaic beliefs about inborn luck and divine temptation. And finally, Heraclitus had the temerity to attack what to this day is still a leading feature of Greek popular religion, the cult of images, which he declared was like talking to a man’s house instead of talking to its owner. Had Heraclitus been an Athenian, he would pretty certainly have been had up for blasphemy, as Wilamowitz says.

However, we must not exaggerate the influence of these early pioneers. Xenophanes, and still more Heraclitus, give the impression of being isolated figures even in Ionia, and it was a long time before their ideas found any echo on the Mainland. Euripides is the first Athenian of whom we can say with confidence that he had read Xenophanes, and he is also represented as introducing the teaching of Heraclitus for the first time to the Athenian public. But by Euripides’ day the Enlightenment had been carried much further. It was probably Anaxagoras who taught him to call the divine sun "a golden clod," and it may have been the same philosopher who inspired his mockery of the professional seers; while it was certainly the Sophists who set him and his whole generation discussing fundamental moral questions in terms of Νόμος versus Φύσις, "Law" or "Custom" or "Convention" versus "Nature."

I do not propose to say much about this celebrated antithesis, whose origin and ramifications have been carefully examined in a recent book by a young Swiss scholar, Felix Heinimann. But it may not be superfluous to point out that thinking in these terms could lead to widely different conclusions according to the meaning you assigned to the terms themselves. Νόμος could stand for the Conglomerate, conceived as the inherited burden of irrational custom; or it could stand for an arbitrary rule consciously imposed by certain classes in their own interest; or it could stand for a rational system of State law,
the achievement which distinguished Greeks from barbarians. Similarly *Physis* could represent an unwritten, unconditionally valid "natural law," against the particularism of local custom; or it could represent the "natural rights" of the individual, against the arbitrary requirements of the State; and this in turn could pass—as always happens when rights are asserted without a corresponding recognition of duties—into a pure anarchic immoralism, the "natural right of the stronger" as expounded by the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue and by Callicles in the *Gorgias*. It is not surprising that an antithesis whose terms were so ambiguous led to a vast amount of argument at cross-purposes. But through the fog of confused and for us fragmentary controversy we can dimly perceive two great issues being fought out. One is the ethical question concerning the source and the validity of moral and political obligation. The other is the psychological question concerning the springs of human conduct—why do men behave as they do, and how can they be induced to behave better? It is only the second of these issues which concerns us here.

On that issue the first generation of Sophists, in particular Protagoras, seem to have held a view whose optimism is pathetic in retrospect, but historically intelligible. "Virtue or Efficiency (*arete*) could be taught": by criticising his traditions, by modernising the *Nomos* which his ancestors had created and eliminating from it the last vestiges of "barbarian silliness," man could acquire a new Art of Living, and human life could be raised to new levels hitherto undreamed of. Such a hope is understandable in men who had witnessed the swift growth of material prosperity after the Persian Wars, and the unexampled flowering of the spirit that accompanied it, culminating in the unique achievements of Periclean Athens. For that generation, the Golden Age was no lost paradise of the dim past, as Hesiod had believed; for them it lay not behind but ahead, and not so very far ahead either. In a civilised community, declared Protagoras robustly, the very worst citizen was already a better man than the supposedly noble savage. Better, in fact, fifty
years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay. But history has, alas, a short way with optimists. Had Tennyson experienced the latest fifty years of Europe he might, I fancy, have reconsidered his preference; and Protagoras before he died had ample ground for revising his. Faith in the inevitability of progress had an even shorter run in Athens than in England. 7

In what I take to be a quite early dialogue, Plato set this Protagorean view of human nature over against the Socratic. Superficially, the two have much in common. Both use the traditional utilitarian language: "good" means "good for the individual," and is not distinguished from the "profitable" or the "useful." And both have the traditional intellectualist approach: they agree, against the common opinion of their time, that if a man really knew what was good for him he would act on his knowledge. 8 Each, however, qualifies his intellectualism with a different sort of reservation. For Protagoras, arete can be taught, but not by an intellectual discipline: one "picks it up," as a child picks up his native language; 9 it is transmitted not by formal teaching, but by what the anthropologists call "social control." For Socrates, on the other hand, arete is or should be epistêmê, a branch of scientific knowledge: in this dialogue he is even made to talk as if its appropriate method were the nice calculation of future pains and pleasures, and I am willing to believe that he did at times so talk. 10 Yet he is also made to doubt whether arete can be taught at all, and this too I am willing to accept as historical. 11 For to Socrates arete was something which proceeded from within outward; it was not a set of behaviour-patterns to be acquired through habituation, but a consistent attitude of mind springing from a steady insight into the nature and meaning of human life. In its self-consistency it resembled a science; 12 but I think we should be wrong to interpret the insight as purely logical—it involved the whole man. 13 Socrates no doubt believed in "following the argument wherever it led"; but he found that too often it led only to fresh questions, and where it failed him he was prepared to follow other guides. We should not forget that he took
both dreams and oracles very seriously, and that he habitually heard and obeyed an inner voice which knew more than he did (if we can believe Xenophon, he called it, quite simply, "the voice of God").

Thus neither Protagoras nor Socrates quite fits the popular modern conception of a "Greek rationalist." But what seems to us odd is that both of them dismiss so easily the part played by emotion in determining ordinary human behavior. And we know from Plato that this seemed odd to their contemporaries also; on this matter there was a sharp cleavage between the intellectuals and the common man. "Most people," says Socrates, "do not think of knowledge as a force (lauxuphuv), much less a dominant or ruling force: they think a man may often have knowledge while he is ruled by something else, at one time anger, at another pleasure or pain, sometimes love, very often fear; they really picture knowledge as a slave which is kicked about by all these other things." Protagoras agrees that this is the common view, but considers it not worth discussing—"the common man will say anything." Socrates, who does discuss it, explains it away by translating it into intellectual terms: the nearness of an immediate pleasure or pain leads to false judgements analogous to errors of visual perspective; a scientific moral arithmetic would correct these.

It is unlikely that such reasoning impressed the common man. The Greek had always felt the experience of passion as something mysterious and frightening, the experience of a force that was in him, possessing him, rather than possessed by him. The very word pathos testifies to that: like its Latin equivalent passio, it means something that "happens to" a man, something of which he is the passive victim. Aristotle compares the man in a state of passion to men asleep, insane, or drunk: his reason, like theirs, is in suspense. We saw in earlier chapters how Homer's heroes and the men of the Archaic Age interpreted such experience in religious terms, as ate, as a communication of menos, or as the direct working of a daemon who uses the human mind and body as his instrument.
That is the usual view of simple people: "the primitive under the influence of strong passion considers himself as possessed, or ill, which for him is the same thing." That way of thinking was not dead even in the late fifth century. Jason at the end of the Medea can explain his wife's conduct only as the act of an alastor, the daemon created by unatoned bloodguilt; the Chorus of the Hippolytus think that Phaedra may be possessed, and she herself speaks at first of her condition as the ate of a daemon.

But for the poet, and for the educated part of his audience, this language has now only the force of a traditional symbolism. The daemonic world has withdrawn, leaving man alone with his passions. And this is what gives Euripides' studies of crime their peculiar poignancy: he shows us men and women nakedly confronting the mystery of evil, no longer as an alien thing assailing their reason from without, but as a part of their own being—\( \eta \delta \sigma \ \alpha \nu \theta \rho \alpha \omega \ \delta \alpha \iota \mu \omicron \omega \nu \). Yet, for ceasing to be supernatural, it is not the less mysterious and terrifying. Medea knows that she is at grips, not with an alastor, but with her own irrational self, her thumos. She entreats that self for mercy, as a slave begs mercy of a brutal master. But in vain: the springs of action are hidden in the thumos where neither reason nor pity can reach them. "I know what wickedness I am about to do; but the thumos is stronger than my purposes, thumos, the root of man's worst acts." On these words, she leaves the stage; when she returns, she has condemned her children to death and herself to a lifetime of foreseen unhappiness. For Medea has no Socratic "illusions of perspective"; she makes no mistake in her moral arithmetic, any more than she mistakes her passion for an evil spirit. Therein lies her supreme tragic quality.

Whether the poet had Socrates in mind when he wrote the Medea, I do not know. But a conscious rejection of the Socratic theory has been seen, I think rightly, in the famous words that he put into the mouth of Phaedra three years later. Misconduct, she says, does not depend on a failure of insight, "for plenty of people have a good understanding." No, we know and
recognise our good, but fail to act on the knowledge: either a kind of inertia obstructs us, or we are distracted from our purpose by "some pleasure." This does look as if it had a controversial point, for it goes beyond what the dramatic situation requires or even suggests. Nor do these passages stand alone; the moral impotence of the reason is asserted more than once in fragments from lost plays. But to judge from extant pieces, what chiefly preoccupied Euripides in his later work was not so much the impotence of reason in man as the wider doubt whether any rational purpose could be seen in the ordering of human life and the governance of the world. That trend culminates in the Bacchae, whose religious content is, as a recent critic has said, the recognition of a "Beyond" which is outside our moral categories and inaccessible to our reason. I do not maintain that a consistent philosophy of life can be extracted from the plays (nor should we demand this of a dramatist writing in an age of doubt). But if we must attach a label, I still think that the word "irrationalist," which I once suggested, fits Euripides better than any other.

This does not imply that Euripides followed the extreme Physis school, who provided human weakness with a fashionable excuse by declaring that the passions were "natural" and therefore right, morality a convention and therefore a shackle to be cast off. "Be natural," says the Unjust Cause in the Clouds; "kick up your heels, laugh at the world, take no shame for anything." Certain characters in Euripides follow this counsel, if in a less lighthearted manner. "Nature willed it," says an erring daughter, "and nature pays no heed to rules: we women were made for this." "I don't need your advice," says a homosexual; "I can see for myself, but nature constrains me." Even the most deeply rooted of man's taboos, the prohibition of incest, is dismissed with the remark, "There's nothing shameful but thinking makes it so." There must have been young people in Euripides' circle who talked like that (we are familiar with their modern counterparts). But I doubt if the poet shared their opinions. For his Choruses re-
peatedly go out of their way to denounce, without much dra-
matic relevance, certain persons who “slight the law, to gratify
lawless impulse,” whose aim is εἰ κακουργεῖν, “to do wrong and
get away with it,” whose theory and practice is “above the
laws,” for whom αίδος and αρετή are mere words. These un-
named persons are surely the Ψυχή men, or the pupils of the
Ψυχή men, the “realist” politicians whom we meet in Thucydi-
des.

Euripides, then, if I am right about him, reflects not only the
Enlightenment, but also the reaction against the Enlighten-
ment—at any rate he reacted against the rationalist psychology
of some of its exponents and the slick immoralism of others.
To the violence of the public reaction there is, of course, other
testimony. The audience that saw the Clouds was expected to
enjoy the burning down of the Thinking Shop, and to care
little if Socrates were burnt with it. But satirists are bad wit-
tesses, and with sufficient good will it is possible to believe that
the Clouds is just Aristophanes’ friendly fun. More secure
deductions can perhaps be drawn from a less familiar bit of
evidence. A fragment of Lysias makes us acquainted with a
certain dining-club. This club had a curious and shocking
name: its members called themselves Κακέωςαμοισταί, a profane
parody of the name 'Αγαθοδαμοισταί which respectable social
clubs sometimes adopted. Liddell and Scott translate it “devil-
worshippers,” and that would be the literal meaning; but Lysias
is no doubt right in saying that they chose the title “to make
fun of the gods and of Athenian custom.” He further tells us
that they made a point of dining on unlucky days (ἡμέραι
ἀποφράδες), which suggests that the club’s purpose was to
exhibit its scorn of superstition by deliberately tempting the
gods, deliberately doing as many unlucky things as possible,
including the adoption of an unlucky name. One might think
this pretty harmless. But according to Lysias the gods were
not amused: most of the members of the club died young, and
the sole survivor, the poet Kinesias, was afflicted with a
chronic disease so painful as to be worse than death. This un-
important story seems to me to illustrate two things rather well. It illustrates the sense of liberation—liberation from meaningless rules and irrational guilt-feelings—which the Sophists brought with them, and which made their teaching so attractive to the high-spirited and intelligent young. And it also shows how strong was the reaction against such rationalism in the breast of the average citizen: for Lysias evidently relies on the awful scandal of the dining-club to discredit Kinesias’ testimony in a lawsuit.

But the most striking evidence of the reaction against the Enlightenment is to be seen in the successful prosecutions of intellectuals on religious grounds which took place at Athens in the last third of the fifth century. About 432 B.C. or a year or two later, disbelief in the supernatural and the teaching of astronomy were made indictable offences. The next thirty-odd years witnessed a series of heresy trials which is unique in Athenian history. The victims included most of the leaders of progressive thought at Athens—Anaxagoras, Diagoras, Socrates, almost certainly Protagoras also, and possibly Euripides. In all these cases save the last the prosecution was successful: Anaxagoras may have been fined and banished; Diagoras escaped by flight; so, probably, did Protagoras; Socrates, who could have done the same, or could have asked for a sentence of banishment, chose to stay and drink the hemlock. All these were famous people. How many obscurer persons may have suffered for their opinions we do not know. But the evidence we have is more than enough to prove that the Great Age of Greek Enlightenment was also, like our own time, an Age of Persecution—banishment of scholars, blinkering of thought, and even (if we can believe the tradition about Protagoras) burning of books.

This distressed and puzzled nineteenth-century professors, who had not our advantage of familiarity with this kind of behaviour. It puzzled them the more because it happened at Athens, the “school of Hellas,” the “headquarters of philosophy,” and, so far as our information goes, nowhere else.
Hence a tendency to cast doubt on the evidence wherever possible; and where this was not possible, to explain that the real motive behind the prosecutions was political. Up to a point, this was doubtless true, at least in some of the cases: the accusers of Anaxagoras were presumably, as Plutarch says, striking at his patron Pericles; and Socrates might well have escaped condemnation had he not been associated with men like Critias and Alcibiades. But granting all this, we have still to explain why at this period a charge of irreligion was so often selected as the surest means of suppressing an unwelcome voice or damaging a political opponent. We seem driven to assume the existence among the masses of an exasperated religious bigotry on which politicians could play for their own purposes. And the exasperation must have had a cause.

Nilsson has suggested that it was whipped up by the professional diviners, who saw in the advance of rationalism a threat to their prestige, and even to their livelihood. That seems quite likely. The proposer of the decree which set off the series of prosecutions was the professional diviner Diopheithes; Anaxagoras had exposed the true nature of so-called “portents”; while Socrates had a private “oracle” of his own which may well have aroused jealousy. The influence of diviners, however, had its limits. To judge by the constant jokes at their expense in Aristophanes, they were not greatly loved or (save at moments of crisis) wholly trusted: like the politicians, they might exploit popular sentiment, but they were hardly in a position to create it.

More important, perhaps, was the influence of wartime hysteria. If we allow for the fact that wars cast their shadows before them and leave emotional disturbances behind them, the Age of Persecution coincides pretty closely with the longest and most disastrous war in Greek history. The coincidence is hardly accidental. It has been observed that “in times of danger to the community the whole tendency to conformity is greatly strengthened: the herd huddles together and becomes more intolerant than ever of ‘cranky’ opinion.” We have seen
this observation confirmed in two recent wars, and we may assume that it was not otherwise in antiquity. Antiquity had indeed a conscious reason for insisting on religious conformity in wartime, where we have only unconscious ones. To offend the gods by doubting their existence, or by calling the sun a stone, was risky enough in peacetime; but in war it was practically treason—it amounted to helping the enemy. For religion was a collective responsibility. The gods were not content to strike down the individual offender: did not Hesiod say that whole cities often suffered for one bad man? That these ideas were still very much alive in the minds of the Athenian populace is evident from the enormous hysterical fuss created by the mutilation of the Hermae.

That, I think, is part of the explanation—superstitious terror based on the solidarity of the city-state. I should like to believe that it was the whole explanation. But it would be dishonest not to recognise that the new rationalism carried with it real as well as imaginary dangers for the social order. In discarding the Inherited Conglomerate, many people discarded with it the religious restraints that had held human egotism on the leash. To men of strong moral principle—a Protagoras or a Democritus—that did not matter: their conscience was adult enough to stand up without props. It was otherwise with most of their pupils. To them, the liberation of the individual meant an unlimited freedom of self-assertion; it meant rights without duties, unless self-assertion is a duty; “what their fathers had called self-control they called an excuse for cowardice.” Thucydides put that down to war mentality, and no doubt this was the immediate cause; Wilamowitz rightly remarked that the authors of the Corcyraean massacres did not have to learn about the transvaluation of values from a course of lectures by Hippias. The new rationalism did not enable men to behave like beasts—men have always been able to do that. But it enabled them to justify their brutality to themselves, and that at a time when the external temptations to brutal conduct were particularly strong. As someone has said in reference to our own en-
lightened age, seldom have so many babies been poured out with so little bath-water.\textsuperscript{80} Therein lay the immediate danger, a danger which has always shown itself when an Inherited Conglomerate was in process of breaking down. In Professor Murray's words, "Anthropology seems to show that these Inherited Conglomerates have practically no chance of being true or even sensible; and, on the other hand, that no society can exist without them or even submit to any drastic correction of them without social danger."\textsuperscript{81} Of the latter truth there was, I take it, some confused inkling in the minds of the men who charged Socrates with corrupting the young. Their fears were not groundless; but as people do when they are frightened, they struck with the wrong weapon and they struck the wrong man.

The Enlightenment also affected the social fabric in another and more permanent way. What Jacob Burckhardt said of nineteenth-century religion, that it was "rationalism for the few and magic for the many," might on the whole be said of Greek religion from the late fifth century onwards. Thanks to the Enlightenment, and the absence of universal education, the divorce between the beliefs of the few and the beliefs of the many was made absolute, to the injury of both. Plato is almost the last Greek intellectual who seems to have real social roots; his successors, with very few exceptions, make the impression of existing beside society rather than in it. They are "sapientes" first, citizens afterwards or not at all, and their touch upon contemporary social realities is correspondingly uncertain. This fact is familiar. What is less often noticed is the regressiveness of popular religion in the Age of Enlightenment. The first signs of this regression appeared during the Peloponnesian War, and were doubtless in part due to the war. Under the stresses that it generated, people began to slip back from the too difficult achievement of the Periclean Age; cracks appeared in the fabric, and disagreeably primitive things poked up here and there through the cracks. When that happened, there was no longer any effective check on their growth. As the
intellectuals withdrew further into a world of their own, the popular mind was left increasingly defenceless, though it must be said that for several generations the comic poets continued to do their best. The loosening of the ties of civic religion began to set men free to choose their own gods, instead of simply worshipping as their fathers had done; and, left without guidance, a growing number relapsed with a sigh of relief into the pleasures and comforts of the primitive.

I shall conclude this chapter by giving some examples of what I call regression. One instance we have already had occasion to notice—the increased demand for magical healing which within a generation or two transformed Asclepius from a minor hero into a major god, and made his temple at Epidaurus a place of pilgrimage as famous as Lourdes is to-day. It is a reasonable guess that his fame at Athens (and perhaps elsewhere too) dated from the Great Plague of 430. That visitation, according to Thucydides, convinced some people that religion was useless, since piety proved no protection against bacilli; but it must have set others looking for a new and better magic. Nothing could be done at the time; but in 420, during the interval of peace, Asclepius was solemnly inducted into Athens, accompanied, or more probably represented, by his Holy Snake. Until a house could be built for him, he enjoyed the hospitality of no less a person than the poet Sophocles—a fact which has its bearing on the understanding of Sophocles' poetry. As Wilamowitz observed, one cannot think that either Aeschylus or Euripides would have cared to entertain a Holy Snake. But nothing illustrates better the polarisation of the Greek mind at this period than the fact that the generation which paid such honour to this medical reptile saw also the publication of some of the most austerely scientific of the Hippocratic treatises.

A second example of regression may be seen in the fashion for foreign cults, mostly of a highly emotional, "orgiastic" kind, which developed with surprising suddenness during the Peloponnesian War. Before it was over, there had appeared at
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Athens the worship of the Phrygian "Mountain Mother," Cybele, and that of her Thracian counterpart, Bendis; the mysteries of the Thraco-Phrygian Sabazius, a sort of savage un-Hellenised Dionysus; and the rites of the Asiatic "dying gods," Attis and Adonis. I have discussed this significant development elsewhere, so shall not say more about it here.

A generation or so later, we find the regression taking an even cruder form. That in the fourth century there was at Athens plenty of "magic for the many," and in the most literal sense of the term, we know from the first-hand evidence of the "defixiones." The practice of defixio or katadeus was a kind of magical attack. It was believed that you could bind a person's will, or cause his death, by invoking upon him the curse of the underworld Powers; you inscribed the curse on something durable, a leaden tablet or a potsherd, and you placed it for choice in a dead man's grave. Hundreds of such "defixiones" have been found by excavators in many parts of the Mediterranean world, and indeed similar practices are observed occasionally to-day, both in Greece and in other parts of Europe. But it seems significant that the oldest examples so far discovered come from Greece, most of them from Attica; and that while exceedingly few examples can be referred with certainty to the fifth century, in the fourth they are suddenly quite numerous. The persons cursed in them include well-known public figures like Phocion and Demosthenes, which suggests that the practice was not confined to slaves or aliens. Indeed, it was sufficiently common in Plato's day for him to think it worth while to legislate against it, as also against the kindred method of magical attack by maltreating a wax image of one's enemy. Plato makes it clear that people were really afraid of this magical aggression, and he would prescribe severe legal penalties for it (in the case of professional magicians the death penalty), not because he himself believes in black magic—as to that he professes to have an open mind—but because black magic expresses an evil will and has evil psychological effects. Nor was this merely the private fussiness of an
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elderly moralist. From a passage in the speech Against Aristogeiton\(^9\) we may infer that in the fourth century attempts were actually made to repress magic by drastic legal action. Taking all this evidence together, in contrast with the almost complete silence of our fifth-century sources,\(^9\) I am inclined to conclude that one effect of the Enlightenment was to provoke in the second generation\(^10\) a revival of magic. That is not so paradoxical as it sounds: has not the breakdown of another Inherited Conglomerate been followed by similar manifestations in our own age?

All the symptoms I have mentioned—the revival of incubation, the taste for orgiastic religion, the prevalence of magical attack—can be viewed as regressive; they were in a sense a return of the past. But they were, also, in another aspect, portents of things to come. As we shall see in the final chapter, they point forward to characteristic features of the Greco-Roman world. But before we come to that, we must consider Plato’s attempt to stabilise the situation.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1 Gilbert Murray, *Greek Studies*, 66 f.
2 Chap. ii, pp. 39 f.
3 This point is made most forcibly, if with some exaggeration, by Pfister, *Religion d. Griechen u. Römer*, Bursian’s Jahresbericht, 229 (1930) 219. Cf. chap. ii, pp. 43 f.
4 See, in particular, the recent book of Wilhelm Nestle, *Vom Mythos zum Logos*, the purpose of which is to exhibit “the progressive replacement of mythological by rational thinking among the Greeks.”
5 Hecataeus, fr. 1 Jacoby; cf. Nestle, *op. cit.*, 134 ff. Hecataeus rationalised mythological bogies like Cerberus (fr. 27), and possibly all the other horrors of ῥά ἐν Ἀθήναις. That he was personally ἀδειγματικός appears from his advice to his countrymen to appropriate to secular uses the treasures of Apollo’s oracle at Branchidae (Hdt. 5.36.3). Cf. Momigliano, *Atene e Roma*, 12 (1931) 139,
and the way in which Diodorus and Plutarch present the similar action of Sulla (Diod. 38/9, fr. 7; Plut. Sulla 12).

6 Xenophanes, frs. 11 and 12 Diels.

7 Cic. div. 1.5; Aetius, 5.1.1 (= Xenophanes, A 52). Cf. his naturalistic explanations of the rainbow (fr. 32) and of St. Elmo’s fire (A 39), both of which are traditional portents.

8 Xenophanes, fr. 15 (cf. 14 and 16).

9 Fr. 23. Cf. Jaeger, Theology, 42 ff. As Murray says (op. cit., 69), “That ‘or in mind’ gives food for thought. It reminds one of the mediaeval Arab mystic who said that to call God ‘just’ was as foolishly anthropomorphic as to say that he had a beard.” Cf. the God of Heraclitus, for whom human distinctions of “just” and “unjust” are meaningless, since he perceives everything as just (fr. 102 Diels).

10 Fr. 34.

11 Cf. Heraclitus, fr. 28; Alcmaeon, fr. 1; Hipp. vet. med. 1, with Festugière ad loc.; Gorgias, Hel. 13; Eur. fr. 795.

12 See chap. iv, p. 118.

13 Heraclitus, fr. 5. If fr. 69 is to be trusted, he did not dispense altogether with the concept of κάθαρσις; but he may have transposed it, like Plato, to the moral and intellectual plane.

14 Fr. 14. The antecedent reference to βάκχοι and λιήψει suggests that he had Dionysiac (not “Orphic”) mysteries especially in mind; but in the form in which it is transmitted, his condemnation appears not to be limited to these. Whether he intended to condemn mysteries as such, or only their methods, cannot, I think, be determined with certainty, though it is plain from the company in which he puts them that he had little sympathy with μυστήρια. Fr. 15 throws no light on the question, even if we could be sure of its meaning: the φαλλικά were not a μυστήρια. As to the much-discussed equation of Dionysus with Hades in that fragment, I take this to be a Heraclitean paradox, not an “Orphic mystery-doctrine,” and am inclined to agree with those who see in it a condemnation of the φαλλικά, not an excuse for them (the life of the senses is the death of the soul, cf. frs. 77, 117, and Diels, Herakleitos, 20).

15 Fr. 96. Cf. Plato, Phaedo 115c; and for the sentiments attacked, chap. v, pp. 136 f.

16 Fr. 119; cf. chap. ii, p. 42. Fr. 106 similarly attacks the superstition about “lucky” and “unlucky” days.

17 Fr. 5. On the modern cult of holy icons (statues being forbidden) see B. Schmidt, Volksleben, 49 ff.
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18 Glaube, II.209. Heraclitus' significance as an Aufklärer is rightly emphasised by Gigon, Untersuchungen zu Heraklit, 131 ff., and (despite what seems to me a questionable interpretation of fr. 15) by Nestle, op. cit., 98 ff. His doctrine has, of course, other and no less important aspects, but they do not concern the subject of this book.

19 Cf. Xenophanes, fr. 8; Heraclitus, frs. 1, 57, 104, etc.

The similarity between Eur. fr. 282 and Xenophanes, fr. 2 was noticed by Athenaeus, and seems too close to be accidental; cf. also Eur. Her. 1341–1346 with Xenophanes A 32 and B 11 and 12. On the other hand, the resemblance of Aesch. Supp. 100–104 to Xenophanes B 25–26, though interesting, is hardly specific enough to establish that Aeschylus had read or heard the Ionian.

20 Diog. Laert. 2.22. Heraclitus' critique of irrational ritual has in fact echoes in Euripides (Nestle, Euripides, 50, 118); though these need not be direct borrowings (Gigon, op. cit., 141). Euripides is described as a noted collector of books (Athen. 3a; cf. Eur. fr. 369 on the pleasures of reading, and Ar. Ran. 943).

21 Eur. fr. 783.


23 F. Heinimann, Nomos und Physis (Basel, 1945). For a bibliography of earlier studies see W. C. Greene, Moira, App. 1.

24 Cf. Hdt. 1.60.3: ἀπεκρίθη ἐκ παλαιότερον τοῦ βαρβάρου ἥθεος τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, ἓν καὶ δεξιώτερον καὶ εὐθείας ἡλιθίων ἀπηλλαγμένον μᾶλλον.

25 Plato, Prot. 327cd.

26 A measure of the swift decline in confidence is the changed tone of the Sophist known as "Anonymus Iamblichii" (Vorsokr. 5, 89), who shared Protagoras' belief in ἓθεος and was perhaps his pupil. Writing, we may guess, in the later years of the Peloponnesian War, he speaks in the despondent voice of one who has seen the whole social and moral order crumble about his head.

27 On the traditional character of the identification of the "good" with the useful, see Snell, Die Entdeckung des Geistes, 131 ff. For Socratic utilitarianism cf. Xen. Mem. 3.9.4, etc.

28 Cf. chap. i, p. 17. So long as ἀπερή was conceived in the positive way as efficiency, "being good at doing things," it was naturally thought of as dependent on knowing how to do them. But by the fifth century the masses (to judge from Prot. 352b and Gorg. 491d) were more impressed by the negative aspect of ἀπερή as control of passion, in which the intellectual factor is less obvious.
Plato, *Prot.* 352A–E.

Ibid., 327E. The comparison is a fifth-century one, and was probably used by the historical Protagoras, since it appears in the same context in Euripides, *Suppl.* 913 ff. In general, I incline to think with Taylor, Wilamowitz, and Nestle that Protagoras' discourse (320c–328d) can be taken as a broadly faithful reproduction of views which Protagoras actually held, though certainly not as an excerpt or précis from one of his works.


*Prot.* 319A–320C. This is often said to be "merely ironical," in order to eliminate the difference between the sceptical Socrates of this dialogue and the Socrates of the *Gorgias* who has discovered what true statesmanship is. But to take it so is to destroy the point of the paradox with which the dialogue ends (361a). Plato must have felt that there was in his master's teaching on this matter a real inconsistency, or at any rate obscurity, which needed clearing up. In the *Gorgias* he cleared it up, but in doing so stepped beyond the position of the historical Socrates.

The reciprocal implication of the virtues is among the few positive doctrines which we can attribute with confidence to the historical Socrates (cf. *Prot.* 329D ff., *Laches*, *Charmides*, Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.4 f., etc.).


Plato, *Apol.* 33C: *ευόλ δε τούτο, ως εγώ φημι, προστετακτάμεν επὶ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττεων καὶ εκ μαντέλων καὶ εξ ενυπνίων. For dreams cf. also *Crito* 44A, *Phaedo* 60E; for oracles, *Apol.* 21B, Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.15 (where Socrates believes in *τέρατα* too), *Anab.* 3.1.5. But Socrates also warned his hearers against treating *μαντή* as a substitute for "counting and measuring and weighing" (Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.9); it was a supplement and (as in the case of Chaerephon's oracle) a stimulus to rational thought, not a surrogate for it.


Plato, *Prot.* 352BC.

Ibid., 353A.

Ibid., 356C–357E.


Chap. i, pp. 5 ff.; chap. ii, pp. 38 ff.

108). Plato speaks of animals in the grip of sexual desire as νοσοῦτα (Symp. 207A); and of hunger, thirst, and sexual passion as τρια νοσημάτα (Laws 782E–783A).

Eur. Med. 1333; Hipp. 141 ff., 240. M. André Rivier, in his interesting and original Essai sur le tragique d’Euripide (Lausanne, 1944), thinks that we are meant to take these opinions seriously: Medea is literally possessed by a devil (p. 59), and a supernatural hand is pouring a poison into Phaedra’s soul. But I find this hard to accept, anyhow as regards Medea. She, who sees deeper into things than the conventional-minded Jason, uses none of this religious language (contrast Aeschylus’ Clytemnestra, Agam. 1433, 1475 ff., 1497 ff.). And Phaedra too, when once she has brought herself to face her situation, analyses it in purely human terms (on the significance of Aphrodite see “Euripides the Irrationalist,” CR 43 [1929] 102). Decisive for the poet’s attitude is the Troades, where Helen blames her misconduct on a divine agency (940 f., 948 ff.) only to be crushed by Hecuba’s retort, μὴ ἀμαθεῖς πολειθεοῦσι τὸ σῶν κακῶν κοσμοῦσα, μὴ οὐ πείσῃ σοφοῖς (981 f.).


Ibid., 1078–1080. Wilamowitz deleted 1080, which from the standpoint of a modern producer injures the effectiveness of the “curtain.” But it is in keeping with Euripides’ habit of mind that he should make Medea generalise her self-analysis, as Phaedra does hers. My case, she implies, is not unique: there is civil war in every human heart. And in fact these lines became a standard textbook example of inner conflict (see below, chap. viii, n. 16).

Wilamowitz, Einleitung i. d. gr. Tragoedie, 25, n. 44; Decharme, Euripide et l’esprit de son théâtre, 46 f.; and especially Snell, Philologus, 97 (1948) 125 ff. I feel much more doubt about the assumption of Wilamowitz (loc. cit.) and others that Prot. 352B ff. is Plato’s (or Socrates’) “reply” to Phaedra. Why should Plato think it necessary to reply to the incidental remarks of a character in a play written more than thirty years earlier? And if he did, or if he knew that Socrates had done so, why should he not cite Euripides by name as he does elsewhere (Phaedra cannot quote Socrates by name, but Socrates can quote Phaedra)? I see no difficulty in supposing that “the many” at Prot. 352B are just the many: the common man has never ignored the power of passion, in Greece or elsewhere, and in this place he is credited with no subtleties.

Hipp. 375 ff.

For an attempt to relate the passage as a whole to the dramatic

59 Cf. frs. 572, 840, 841, and Pasiphaë’s speech in her own defence (*Berl. Kl. Texte*, II.73 = Page, *Gk. Lit. Papyri*, I.74). In the two last the traditional religious language is used.

51 Cf. W. Schadewaldt, *Monolog u. Selbstgespräch*, 250 ff.: the “tragedy of endurance” replaces the “tragedy of πάθος.” I should suppose, however, that the *Chrysippus*, though a late play (produced along with the *Phoenissae*), was a tragedy of πάθος: it became, like the *Medea*, a stock example of the conflict between reason and passion (see Nauck on fr. 841), and it clearly re-emphasised the point about human irrationality.


53 *CR* 43 (1929) 97 ff.

54 Ar. *Nub.* 1078.

55 Quoted by Menander, *Epitrep.* 765 f. Koerte, from the *Auge* (part of it was previously known, fr. 920 Nauck).

56 *Chrysippus*, fr. 840.

57 *Aeolus*, fr. 19, τὸ δ’ ἀλαχρόν ἢν μὴ τοῖς χρωμάτωι δοκῇ; The Sophist Hippias argued that the incest prohibition was conventional, not “divinely implanted” or instinctive, since it was not universally observed (*Xen. Mem*. 4.4.20). But Euripides’ line understandably created a scandal: it showed where unlimited ethical relativism landed you. Cf. Aristophanes’ parody (*Ran*. 1475); the courtesan’s use of it against its author (Machon *apud* Athen. 582cd); and the later stories which make Antisthenes or Plato reply to it (Plut. *aud. poet.* 12, 33c, Serenus *apud* Stob. 3.5.36 H.).


60 Lysias, fr. 73 Th. (53 Scheibe), *apud* Athen. 551E.

61 Best known as a favourite butt of Aristophanes (*Aves* 1372–1409 and elsewhere). He was accused of insulting a shrine of Hecate (Σ Ar. *Ran.* 366), which would be exactly in keeping with the spirit of the club, the *Ekstrαα* being foci of popular superstition (cf. Nilsson, *Gesch.* I.685 f.). Plato cites him as a typical example of the kind of poet who plays to the gallery instead of trying to make his audience better men (*Gorg.* 501E).
This is the date indicated for the decree of Diopeithes by Diod. 12.38 f. and Plut. Per. 32. Adcock, CAH V.478, is inclined to put it in 430 and connect it with “the emotions evoked by the plague, the visible sign of the anger of heaven”; that may well be right.

τὰ θεία μὴ νομίζειν (Plut. Per. 32). On the meaning of this expression see R. Hackforth, Composition of Plato’s Apology, 60 ff., and J. Tate, CR 50 (1936) 3 ff., 51 (1937) 3 ff. δόξηθεία in the sense of sacrilege had no doubt always been an offence; what was new was the prohibition of neglect of cult or antireligious teaching. Nilsson, who clings to the old pretence that “freedom of thought and expression was absolute in Athens” (Greek Piety, 79), tries to restrict the scope of the prosecutions to offences against cult. But the tradition unanimously represents the prosecutions of Anaxagoras and Protagoras as based on their theoretical views; not their actions. And a society which forbade the one to describe the sun as a material object and the other to express uncertainty about the existence of gods surely did not allow “absolute freedom of thought.”

λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρρυθμίσεων διδασκόν (Plut. ibid.). This was doubtless aimed especially at Anaxagoras, but the disapproval of μεταρρυθμίσεις was widespread. It was thought to be not only foolish and presumptuous (Gorg. Hel. 13, Hipp. vet. med. 1, Plato, Rep. 488E, etc.), but also dangerous to religion (Eur. fr. 913, Plato, Apol. 19B, Plut. Nicias 23), and was in the popular mind associated especially with Sophists (Eupolis, fr. 146, Ar. Nub. 360, Plato, Pol. 299B). Cf. W. Capelle, Philol. 71 (1912) 414 ff.

Taylor’s dating of the trial of Anaxagoras to 450 (CQ 11 [1917] 81 ff.) would make the Enlightenment at Athens and the reaction against it start much earlier than the rest of the evidence suggests. His arguments seem to me to have been disposed of by E. Derenne, Les Procès d’impitié, 30 ff., and J. S. Morrison, CR 35 (1941) 5, n. 2.

Burnet (Thales to Plato, 112), and others after him, dismiss the widely attested tradition of Protagoras’ trial as unhistorical because of Plato, Meno 91E. But Plato is speaking there of Protagoras’ international reputation as a teacher, which would not be diminished by an Athenian heresy-hunt; he was not accused of corrupting the young, but of atheism. The trial cannot have taken place so late as 411, but the tradition does not say that it did (cf. Derenne, op. cit., 51 ff.).


It is rash to assume that there were no prosecutions but those we
happen to have heard of. Scholars have hardly paid enough attention to what Plato makes Protagoras say (Prot. 316c–317b) about the risks attendant on the Sophists' trade, which exposes them to "great jealousy, and other forms of ill-will and conspiracy, so that most of them find it necessary to work under cover." He himself has his private safeguards (the friendship of Pericles?) which have so far kept him from harm.

69 Diog. Laert. 9.52, Cic. nat. deor. 1.63, etc. For the dangers of the reading habit cf. Aristophanes, fr. 490: τοὺον τῶν ἄνδρ᾽ ἡ βυβλίον διέφθορον ἢ Πρόδικου ἢ τῶν ἄδολεσχῶν έλς γέ τις.

70 This may well be an accident of our defective information. If it is not, it seems to contradict the claim which Plato puts into Socrates' mouth (Gorg. 461e), that Athens allows greater freedom of speech than any other place in Greece (the dramatic date of this is after the decree of Diopeithes). It is worth noticing, however, that Lampsacus honoured Anaxagoras with a public funeral after Athens had cast him out (Alcidamas apud Ar. Rhet. 1398b 15).

71 Nilsson, Greek Popular Religion, 133 ff.


73 Plato, Apol. 40a: ἡ εἰσωθενά μον σαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαμονίου.

74 Xen. Apol. 14: οἱ δικασταὶ θορῶσιν, οἱ μὲν ἀπεσταύντες τοῖς λεγομένοις, οἵ δὲ καὶ φθονοῦντες, εἰ καὶ παρὰ θεῶν μειζόνων ἢ αὐτῶν τυγχάνοι. Despite Taylor's ingenious arguments to the contrary (Varia Socratica, 10 ff.), I think it impossible to separate the charge of introducing καὶ ἄνοιξια from the δαμονία with which both Plato and Xenophon connect it. Cf. A. S. Ferguson, CQ 7 (1913) 157 ff.; H. Gomperz, N Ybb 1924, 141 ff.; R. Hackforth, Composition of Plato's Apology, 68 ff.

75 Cf. Thuc. 5.103.2, when things are going badly the masses ἐπὶ τὰς ἀφανεῖς (ἐπιδίας) καθίστανται, μαντικὴν τε καὶ χρησμοῦς. Contrast Plato, Euthyphro 3c: διὰ τὴν λέγων ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θεῶν, προλέγων αὐτοῖς τὰ μέλλοντα, καταγελάσων ὡς μανομένου.

76 R. Crawshay-Williams, The Comforts of Unreason, 28.

77 Hesiod, Erga 240; cf. Plato, Laws 910b, and chap. ii, n. 43. Lysias' attitude is illuminating. "Our ancestors," he says, "by performing the prescribed sacrifices left us a city the greatest and most prosperous in Greece: surely we ought to offer the same sacrifices as they did, if only for the sake of the fortune which has resulted from those rites" (30.18). This pragmatist view of religion must have been pretty common.

78 Thuc. 6.27 f., 60. Thucydides naturally stresses the political aspects of the affair, and indeed it is impossible to read 6.60 without
being reminded of the political "purges" and "witch-hunts" of our own time. But the root cause of the popular excitement was δεισιδαιμονία: the act was an ολωνδ τοῦ ἐκτλου (6.27.3).

79 Thuc. 3.82.4.
80 Nigel Balchin, Lord, I was afraid, 295.
81 Gilbert Murray, Greek Studies, 67. Cf. Frazer's judgement that "society has been built and cemented to a great extent on a foundation of religion, and it is impossible to loosen the cement and shake the foundation without endangering the superstructure" (The Belief in Immortality, I.4). That there is a real causal connection between the breakdown of a religious tradition and the unrestricted growth of power politics seems to be confirmed by the experience of other ancient cultures, notably the Chinese, where the secularist positivism of the Fa Hia school had its practical counterpart in the ruthless militarism of the Ts' in Empire.

82 Chap. iv, pp. 111 ff.
83 So Kern, Rel. der Griechen, II.312, and W. S. Ferguson, "The Attic Orgeones," Harv. Theol. Rev. 37 (1944) 89, n. 26. It was for a like reason that the Asclepius cult was brought to Rome in 293 B.C. It was in fact, in Nock's words, "a religion of emergencies" (CPh 45 [1950] 48). The first extant reference to incubation in an Asclepius temple occurs in the Wasps, written within a few years of the cessation of the plague.

84 Thuc. 2.53.4: κρίνοντες εν δυνω καὶ σέβεται καὶ μη, εκ τοῦ πάντας δραν εν τω λαολαμένου.
85 IG II.2, 4960. On the details see Ferguson, loc. cit., 88 ff.
86 Glaube, II.233. The most probable interpretation of the evidence seems to be that Asclepius appeared in a dream or vision (Plutarch, non posse suaviter 22, 1103B) and said, "Fetch me from Epidaurus," whereupon they fetched him δρακοντε εικασμένου, just as the Sicyonians did on the occasion described by Pausanias (2.10.3; cf. 3.23.7).
87 E.g., de vetere medicina, which Festugière dates ca. 440-420; de aeribus, aquis, locis (thought by Wilamowitz and others to be earlier than 430); de morbo sacro (probably somewhat later, cf. Heinemann, Nomos u. Physis, 170 ff.). Similarly, the appearance of the first known "dreambooks" (chap. iv, p. 119) is contemporary with the first attempts to explain dreams on naturalistic lines: here too there is polarisation.

88 The Second Punic War was to produce very similar effects at Rome (cf. Livy, 25.1, and J. J. Tierney, Proc. R.I.A. 51 [1947] 94).
89 Harv. Theol. Rev. 33 (1940) 171 ff. Since then, see Nilsson, Gesch.
I.782 ff., and the important article of Ferguson (above, n. 83), which throws much light on the naturalisation of Thracian and Phrygian cults at Athens and their diffusion among Athenian citizens. The establishment of the public cult of Bendis can now be dated, as Ferguson has elsewhere shown (Hesperia, Suppl. 8 [1949] 131 ff.), to the plague year, 430–429.

Over 300 examples were collected and studied by A. Audollent, *Defixionum tabellae* (1904), and others have been found since. A supplementary list from central and northern Europe is given by Preisendanz, *Arch. f. Rel.* 11 (1933).

Lawson, *Mod. Greek Folklore*, 16 ff.

99 See Globus, 79 (1901) 109 ff. Audollent, op. cit., cxxv f., also quotes a number of instances, including the case of "a wealthy and cultivated gentleman" in Normandy who, when his offer of marriage was rejected, ran a needle through the forehead of a photograph of the lady and added the inscription, "God curse you!" This anecdote indicates the simple psychological roots of this kind of magic. Guthrie has cited an interesting example from nineteenth-century Wales (*The Greeks and Their Gods*, 273).

The Attic examples known before 1897 (over 200 in number) were separately edited by R. Wünsch, *IG* III.3, Appendix. Additional Attic *defixiones* have since been published by Ziebarth, *Gött. Nachr.* 1899, 105 ff., and *Berl. Sitzb.* 1934, 1022 ff., and others have been found in the Kerameikos (W. Peek, *Kerameikos*, III.89 ff.) and the Agora. Among all these there seem to be only two examples (Kerameikos 3 and 6) which can be assigned with confidence to the fifth century or earlier; on the other hand, a good many are shown by persons named to belong to the fourth, and there are many in which the spelling and style of the lettering suggest that period (R. Wilhelm, *Öst. Jahreshfte.*, 7 [1904] 105 ff.).


99 Plato, *Laws* 933a–e. He refers to *κατάδεσμος* also at *Rep.* 364c as performed for their clients by ἀγγορας καὶ μάντεις, and at *Laws* 909b to necromancy as practised by similar people. The witch Theoris (n. 98 below) claimed some kind of religious status: Harpocration s.v. calls her a μάντις, Plutarch, *Dem.*, 14, a ίχνια. There was thus no sharp line separating superstition from "religion." And in fact the gods invoked in the older Attic *κατάδεσμος* are the chthonic deities of ordinary Greek belief, most often Hermes and Persephone. It is noteworthy, however, that the meaningless formulae (*Εφέσια γράμματα*) characteristic of later magic were a-
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ready coming into use, as appears from Anaxilas, fr. 18 Kock, and with more certainty from Menander, fr. 371.

96 Laws 933b: κηρινα μυθματα πεπλασμενα, ειτ' εκ δε θεραις ειτ' επι τριδους ειτ' εκι μυθμαι γονεων. So far as I know, the earliest extant reference to this technique is in an inscription of the early fourth century from Cyrene, where κηρινα are said to have been publicly used as part of the sanction of an oath taken at the time of Cyrene's foundation (Nock, Arch. f. Rel. 24 [1926] 172). The wax images have naturally perished; but figurines in more durable materials with the hands bound behind the back (a literal καταδεσωs), or with other marks of magical attack, have been found fairly often, at least two of them in Attica: see Ch. Dugas's list, Bull. Corr. Hell. 39 (1915) 413.

97 Laws 933a: ταυτ' ουν και περι τοιαυτα συμπαγα ουτε θαδων δως ποτε τεφυκεν γεγωνον εουτ' ει τις γυναι, πεθαιν ευτετες ετερους. The second part of this sentence perhaps hints at a greater degree of scepticism than he chooses to express, since the tone of Rep. 364c (as well as Laws 909b) is definitely sceptical.

98 [Dem.] 25.79 f., the case of a φαρμακις from Lemnos named Theoris, who was put to death at Athens "with her entire family" on the information of her maid servant. That this φαρμακις was not merely a poisoner appears from the reference in the same sentence to her φαρμακα και επωδας (and cf. Ar. Nub. 749 ff.). According to Philochorus, apud Harpocratian, s.v. θεωρλς, the formal charge was one of δαεβεσα, and this is probably right: the savage destruction of the whole family implies a pollution of the community. Plutarch (who gives a different account of the charge) says, Dem. 14, that the accuser was Demosthenes—who was himself, as we have seen, more than once the object of magical attack.

99 Mythology apart, there are surprisingly few direct references in Attic fifth-century literature to aggressive magic, other than love-philtres (Eur. Hipp. 509 ff., Antiphon, 1.9, etc.) and the επωδη 'Ορφεως, Eur. Cycl. 646. The author of morb. sacr. speaks of persons allegedly πεφαρμακευμενους, "placed under a spell" (VI.362 L.), and the same thing may be meant at Ar. Thest. 534. Otherwise the nearest approach is perhaps to be seen in the word αναλυσης, an "undoer" of spells, said to have been used by the early comic poet Magnes (fr. 4). Protective or "white" magic was no doubt common: e.g., people wore magic rings as amulets (Eupolis, fr. 87, Ar. Plut. 883 f. and Ζ). But if you wanted a really potent witch you had to buy one from Thessaly (Ar. Nub. 749 ff.).

100 There was a comparable gap in the nineteenth century between the
breakdown of the belief in Christianity among intellectuals and the rise of spiritualism and similar movements in the semi-educated classes (from which some of them have spread to a section of the educated). But in the case of Athens one cannot exclude the possibility that the revival of aggressive magic dated from the despairing last years of the Peloponnesian War. For other possible reasons which may have contributed to its popularity in the fourth century see Nilsson, *Gesch.* I.759 f. I cannot think that the multiplication of "defixiones" at this time reflects merely an increase in literacy, as has been suggested; for they could be written, and probably often were written (Audollent, *op. cit.*, xlv), by professional magicians employed for the purpose (Plato speaks as if this were so, *Rep.* 364c).
VII
Plato, the Irrational Soul, and the Inherited Conglomerate

There is no hope in returning to a traditional faith after it has once been abandoned, since the essential condition in the holder of a traditional faith is that he should not know he is a traditionalist.

AL GHAZALI

The last chapter described the decay of the inherited fabric of beliefs which set in during the fifth century, and some of its earlier results. I propose here to consider Plato’s reaction to the situation thus created. The subject is important, not only because of Plato’s position in the history of European thought, but because Plato perceived more clearly than anyone else the dangers inherent in the decay of an Inherited Conglomerate, and because in his final testament to the world he put forward proposals of great interest for stabilising the position by means of a counter-reformation. I am well aware that to discuss this matter fully would involve an examination of Plato’s entire philosophy of life; but in order to keep the discussion within manageable limits I propose to concentrate on seeking answers to two questions:

First, what importance did Plato himself attach to non-rational factors in human behaviour, and how did he interpret them?

Secondly, what concessions was he prepared to make to the irrationalism of popular belief for the sake of stabilising the Conglomerate?

It is desirable to keep these two questions distinct as far as possible, though, as we shall see, it is not always easy to decide
where Plato is expressing a personal faith and where he is merely using a traditional language. In trying to answer the first question, I shall have to repeat one or two things which I have already said in print; 1 but I shall have something to add on matters which I did not previously consider.

One assumption I shall make. I shall assume that Plato's philosophy did not spring forth fully mature, either from his own head or from the head of Socrates; I shall treat it as an organic thing which grew and changed, partly in obedience to its inner law of growth, but partly also in response to external stimuli. And here it is relevant to remind you that Plato's life, like his thought, all but bridges the wide gulf between the death of Pericles and the acceptance of Macedonian hegemony. 2 Though it is probable that all his writings belong to the fourth century, his personality and outlook were moulded in the fifth, and his earlier dialogues are still bathed in the remembered light of a vanished social world. The best example is to my mind the Protagoras, whose action is set in the golden years before the Great War; in its optimism, its genial worldliness, its frank utilitarianism, and its Socrates who is still no more than life-size, it seems to be an essentially faithful reproduction of the past. 3

Plato's starting-point was thus historically conditioned. As the nephew of Charmides and kinsman of Critias, no less than as one of Socrates' young men, he was the child of the Enlightenment. He grew up in a social circle which not only took pride in settling all questions before the bar of reason, but had the habit of interpreting all human behaviour in terms of rational self-interest, and the belief that "virtue," arete, consisted essentially in a technique of rational living. That pride, that habit, and that belief remained with Plato to the end; the framework of his thought never ceased to be rationalist. But the contents of the framework came in time to be strangely transformed. There were good reasons for that. The transition from the fifth century to the fourth was marked (as our

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1 For notes to chapter vii see pages 224-235.
own time has been marked) by events which might well induce any rationalist to reconsider his faith. To what moral and material ruin the principle of rational self-interest might lead a society, appeared in the fate of imperial Athens; to what it might lead the individual, in the fate of Critias and Charmides and their fellow-tyrants. And on the other hand, the trial of Socrates afforded the strange spectacle of the wisest man in Greece at the supreme crisis of his life deliberately and gratuitously flouting that principle, at any rate as the world understood it.

It was these events, I think, which compelled Plato, not to abandon rationalism, but to transform its meaning by giving it a metaphysical extension. It took him a long time, perhaps a decade, to digest the new problems. In those years he no doubt turned over in his mind certain significant sayings of Socrates, for example, that "the human psyche has something divine about it" and that "one's first interest is to look after its health." But I agree with the opinion of the majority of scholars that what put Plato in the way of expanding these hints into a new transcendental psychology was his personal contact with the Pythagoreans of West Greece when he visited them about 390. If I am right in my tentative guess about the historical antecedents of the Pythagorean movement, Plato in effect cross-fertilised the tradition of Greek rationalism with magico-religious ideas whose remoter origins belong to the northern shamanistic culture. But in the form in which we meet them in Plato these ideas have been subjected to a double process of interpretation and transposition. A well-known passage of the Gorgias shows us in a concrete instance how certain philosophers—such men, perhaps, as Plato's friend Archytas—took over old mythical fancies about the fate of the soul and read into them new allegorical meanings which gave them moral and psychological significance. Such men prepared the way for Plato; but I should guess that it was Plato himself who by a truly creative act transposed these ideas definitively from the plane of revelation to the plane of rational argument.
The crucial step lay in the identification of the detachable "occult" self which is the carrier of guilt-feelings and potentially divine with the rational Socratic psyche whose virtue is a kind of knowledge. That step involved a complete reinterpretation of the old shamanistic culture-pattern. Nevertheless the pattern kept its vitality, and its main features are still recognisable in Plato. Reincarnation survives unchanged. The shaman’s trance, his deliberate detachment of the occult self from the body, has become that practice of mental withdrawal and concentration which purifies the rational soul—a practice for which Plato in fact claims the authority of a traditional logos. The occult knowledge which the shaman acquires in trance has become a vision of metaphysical truth; his "recollection" of past earthly lives has become a "recollection" of bodiless Forms which is made the basis of a new epistemology; while on the mythical level his "long sleep" and "underworld journey" provides a direct model for the experiences of Er the son of Armenius. Finally, we shall perhaps understand better Plato’s much-criticised "Guardians" if we think of them as a new kind of rationalised shamans who, like their primitive predecessors, are prepared for their high office by a special kind of discipline designed to modify the whole psychic structure; like them, must submit to a dedication that largely cuts them off from the normal satisfactions of humanity; like them, must renew their contact with the deep sources of wisdom by periodic "retreats"; and like them, will be rewarded after death by receiving a peculiar status in the spirit world. It is likely that an approximation to this highly specialised human type already existed in the Pythagorean societies; but Plato dreamed of carrying the experiment much further, putting it on a serious scientific basis, and using it as the instrument of his counter-reformation.

This visionary picture of a new sort of ruling class has often been cited as evidence that Plato’s estimate of human nature was grossly unrealistic. But shamanistic institutions are not built on ordinary human nature; their whole concern is to ex-
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ploit the possibilities of an exceptional type of personality. And the Republic is dominated by a similar concern. Plato admitted frankly that only a tiny fraction of the population (φάσει ὀλίγωστον γένος) possessed the natural endowment which would make it possible to transform them into Guardians. For the rest—that is to say, the overwhelming majority of mankind—he seems to have recognised at all stages of his thought that, so long as they are not exposed to the temptations of power, an intelligent hedonism provides the best practicable guide to a satisfactory life. But in the dialogues of his middle period, preoccupied as he then was with exceptional natures and their exceptional possibilities, he shows scant interest in the psychology of the ordinary man.

In his later work, however, after he had dismissed the philosopher-kings as an impossible dream, and had fallen back on the rule of Law as a second-best, he paid more attention to the motives which govern ordinary human conduct, and even the philosopher is seen not to be exempt from their influence. To the question whether any one of us would be content with a life in which he possessed wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and a complete memory of the whole of history, but experienced no pleasure or pain, great or small, the answer given in the Philebus is an emphatic "No": we are anchored in the life of feeling which is part of our humanity, and cannot surrender it even to become "spectators of all time and all existence" like the philosopher-kings. In the Laws we are told that the only practicable basis for public morals is the belief that honesty pays: "for no one," says Plato, "would consent, if he could help it, to a course of action which did not bring him more joy than sorrow." With that we seem to be back in the world of the Protagoras and of Jeremy Bentham. The legislator's position, however, is not identical with that of the common man. The common man wants to be happy; but Plato, who is legislating for him, wants him to be good. Plato therefore labours to persuade him that goodness and happiness go together. That this is true, Plato happens to believe; but did he not believe it, he
would still pretend it true, as being "the most salutary lie that
was ever told." It is not Plato's own position that has changed:
if anything has changed, it is his assessment of human capacity.
In the *Laws*, at any rate, the virtue of the common man is
evidently not based on knowledge, or even on true opinion as
such, but on a process of conditioning or habituation by
which he is induced to accept and act on certain "salutary"
beliefs. After all, says Plato, this is not too difficult: people
who can believe in Cadmus and the dragon's teeth will be­
lieve anything. Far from supposing, as his master had done,
that "the unexamined life is no life for a human being," Plato
now appears to hold that the majority of human beings
can be kept in tolerable moral health only by a carefully chosen
diet of "incantations" (ἐπόδαλ), that is to say, edifying
myths and bracing ethical slogans. We may say that in prin­
ciple he accepts Burckhardt's dichotomy—rationalism for
the few, magic for the many. We have seen, however, that his
rationalism is quickened with ideas that once were magical;
and on the other hand we shall see later how his "incanta­
tions" were to be made to serve rational ends.

In other ways too, Plato's growing recognition of the im­
portance of affective elements carried him beyond the limits
of fifth-century rationalism. This appears very clearly in the
development of his theory of Evil. It is true that to the end of
his life he went on repeating the Socratic dictum that "No
one commits an error if he can help it"; but he had long ceased
to be content with the simple Socratic opinion which saw
moral error as a kind of mistake in perspective. When Plato
took over the magico-religious view of the psyche, he at first
took over with it the puritan dualism which attributed all
the sins and sufferings of the psyche to the pollution arising
from contact with a mortal body. In the *Phaedo* he transposed
that doctrine into philosophical terms and gave it the formula­
tion that was to become classical: only when by death or by
self-discipline the rational self is purged of "the folly of the
body" can it resume its true nature which is divine and sin-
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less; the good life is the practice of that purgation, ἡμέτηριον. Both in antiquity and to-day, the general reader has been inclined to regard this as Plato's last word on the matter. But Plato was too penetrating and, at bottom, too realistic a thinker to be satisfied for long with the theory of the Phaedo. As soon as he turned from the occult self to the empirical man, he found himself driven to recognise an irrational factor within the mind itself, and thus to think of moral evil in terms of psychological conflict (συνάσια).

That is already so in the Republic: the same passage of Homer which in the Phaedo had illustrated the soul's dialogue with "the passions of the body" becomes in the Republic an internal dialogue between two "parts" of the soul; the passions are no longer seen as an infection of extraneous origin, but as a necessary part of the life of the mind as we know it, and even as a source of energy, like Freud's libido, which can be "canalised" either towards sensuous or towards intellectual activity. The theory of inner conflict, vividly illustrated in the Republic by the tale of Leontius, was precisely formulated in the Sophist, where it is defined as a psychological maladjustment resulting "from some sort of injury," a kind of disease of the soul, and is said to be the cause of cowardice, intemperance, injustice, and (it would seem) moral evil in general, as distinct from ignorance or intellectual failure. This is something quite different both from the rationalism of the earliest dialogues and from the puritanism of the Phaedo, and goes a good deal deeper than either; I take it to be Plato's personal contribution.

Yet Plato had not abandoned the transcendent rational self, whose perfect unity is the guarantee of its immortality. In the Timaeus, where he is trying to reformulate his earlier vision of man's destiny in terms compatible with his later psychology and cosmology, we meet again the unitary soul of the Phaedo; and it is significant that Plato here applies to it the old religious term that Empedocles had used for the occult self—he calls it the daemon. In the Timaeus, however, it has
another sort of soul or self "built on to it," "the mortal kind wherein are terrible and indispensable passions." Does not this mean that for Plato the human personality has virtually broken in two? Certainly it is not clear what bond unites or could unite an indestructible daemon resident in the human head with a set of irrational impulses housed in the chest or "tethered like a beast untamed" in the belly. We are reminded of the naive opinion of that Persian in Xenophon to whom it was quite obvious that he must have two souls: for, said he, the same soul could not be at once good and bad—it could not desire simultaneously noble actions and base ones, will and not will to perform a particular act at a particular moment.  

But Plato's fission of the empirical man into daemon and beast is perhaps not quite so inconsequent as it may appear to the modern reader. It reflects a similar fission in Plato's view of human nature: the gulf between the immortal and the mortal soul corresponds to the gulf between Plato's vision of man as he might be and his estimate of man as he is. What Plato had come to think of human life as it is actually lived, appears most clearly in the Laws. There he twice informs us that man is a puppet. Whether the gods made it simply as a plaything or for some serious purpose one cannot tell; all we know is that the creature is on a string, and its hopes and fears, pleasures and pains, jerk it about and make it dance. In a later passage the Athenian observes that it is a pity we have to take human affairs seriously, and remarks that man is God's plaything, "and that is really the best that can be said of him": men and women should accordingly make this play as charming as possible, sacrificing to the gods with music and dancing; "thus they will live out their lives in accordance with their nature, being puppets chiefly, and having in them only a small portion of reality." "You are making out our human race very mean," says the Spartan. And the Athenian apologises: "I thought of God, and I was moved to speak as I did just now. Well, if you will have it so, let us say that our race
Plato suggests here a religious origin for this way of thinking; and we often meet it in later religious thinkers, from Marcus Aurelius to Mr. T. S. Eliot—who has said in almost the same words, “Human nature is able to endure only a very little reality.” It agrees with the drift of much else in the Laws—with the view that men are as unfit to rule themselves as a flock of sheep,\textsuperscript{36} that God, not man, is the measure of things,\textsuperscript{37} that man is the gods’ property (κτήμα),\textsuperscript{38} and that if he wishes to be happy, he should be ταπεινός, “abject,” before God—a word which nearly all pagan writers, and Plato himself elsewhere, employ as a term of contempt.\textsuperscript{39} Ought we to discount all this as a senile aberration, the sour pessimism of a tired and irritable old man? It might seem so: for it contrasts oddly with the radiant picture of the soul’s divine nature and destiny which Plato painted in his middle dialogues and certainly never abjured. But we may recall the philosopher of the Republic, to whom, as to Aristotle’s megalopsych, human life cannot appear important (μέγα τι);\textsuperscript{40} we may remember that in the Meno the mass of men are likened to the shadows that flit in Homer’s Hades, and that the conception of human beings as the chattels of a god appears already in the Phaedo.\textsuperscript{41} We may think also of another passage in the Phaedo, where Plato predicts with undisguised relish the future of his fellow-men: in their next incarnation some of them will be donkeys, others wolves, while the μετριοι, the respectable bourgeoisie, may look forward to becoming bees or ants.\textsuperscript{42} No doubt this is partly Plato’s fun; but it is the sort of fun which would have appealed to Jonathan Swift. It carries the implication that everybody except the philosopher is on the verge of becoming subhuman, which is (as ancient Platonists saw)\textsuperscript{43} hard to reconcile with the view that every human soul is essentially rational.

In the light of these and other passages I think we have to recognise two strains or tendencies in Plato’s thinking about the status of man. There is the faith and pride in human reason
which he inherited from the fifth century, and for which he found religious sanction by equating the reason with the occult self of shamanistic tradition. And there is the bitter recognition of human worthlessness which was forced upon him by his experience of contemporary Athens and Syracuse. This too could be expressed in the language of religion, as a denial of all value to the activities and interests of this world in comparison with "the things Yonder." A psychologist might say that the relation between the two tendencies was not one of simple opposition, but that the first became a compensation—or overcompensation—for the second: the less Plato cared for actual humanity, the more nobly he thought of the soul. The tension between the two was resolved for a time in the dream of a new Rule of the Saints, an élite of purified men who should unite the incompatible virtues of (to use Mr. Koestler's terms) the Yogi and the Commissar, and thereby save not only themselves but society. But when that illusion faded, Plato's underlying despair came more and more to the surface, translating itself into religious terms, until it found its logical expression in his final proposals for a completely "closed" society, to be ruled not by the illuminated reason, but (under God) by custom and religious law. The "Yogi," with his faith in the possibility and necessity of intellectual conversion, did not wholly vanish even now, but he certainly retreated before the "Commissar," whose problem is the conditioning of human cattle. On this interpretation the pessimism of the Laws is not a senile aberration: it is the fruit of Plato's personal experience of life, which in turn carried in it the seed of much later thought.

It is in the light of this estimate of human nature that we must consider Plato's final proposals for stabilising the Conglomerate. But before turning to that, I must say a word about his opinions on another aspect of the irrational soul which has concerned us in this book, namely, the importance traditionally ascribed to it as the source or channel of an intuitive insight. In this matter, it seems to me, Plato remained throughout his life faithful to the principles of his master: Knowledge, as dis-
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tinct from true opinion, remained for him the affair of the intellect, which can justify its beliefs by rational argument. To the intuitions both of the seer and of the poet he consistently refused the title of knowledge, not because he thought them necessarily groundless, but because their grounds could not be produced. Hence Greek custom was right, he thought, in giving the last word in military matters to the commander-in-chief, as a trained expert, and not to the seers who accompanied him on campaign; in general, it was the task of σωφρόσυνη, rational judgement, to distinguish between the true seer and the charlatan. In much the same way, the products of poetic intuition must be subject to the rational and moral censorship of the trained legislator. All that was in keeping with Socratic rationalism. Nevertheless, as we have noticed, Socrates had taken irrational intuition quite seriously, whether it expressed itself in dreams, in the inner voice of the “daemonion,” or in the utterance of the Pythia. And Plato makes a great show of taking it seriously too. Of the pseudo-sciences of augury and hepatoscopy he permits himself to speak with thinly veiled contempt; but “the madness that comes by divine gift,” the madness that inspires the prophet or the poet, or purges men in the Corybantic rite—this, as we saw in an earlier chapter, is treated as if it were a real intrusion of the supernatural into human life.

How far did Plato intend this way of talking to be taken au pied de la lettre? In recent years the question has been often raised, and variously answered; but unanimity has not been reached, nor is it likely to be. I should be inclined myself to say three things about it:

a) That Plato perceived what he took to be a real and significant analogy between mediumship, poetic creation, and certain pathological manifestations of the religious consciousness, all three of which have the appearance of being “given” ab extra;

b) That the traditional religious explanations of these phenomena were, like much else in the Conglomerate, accepted
by him provisionally, not because he thought them finally adequate, but because no other language was available to express that mysterious "givenness"; 53

c) That while he thus accepted (with whatever ironical reservations) the poet, the prophet, and the "Corybantic" as being in some sense channels 54 of divine or daemonic 55 grace, he nevertheless rated their activities far below those of the rational self; 56 and held that they must be subject to the control and criticism of reason, since reason was for him no passive plaything of hidden forces, but an active manifestation of deity in man, a daemon in its own right. I suspect that, had Plato lived to-day, he would have been profoundly interested in the new depth-psychology, but appalled by the tendency to reduce the human reason to an instrument for rationalising unconscious impulses.

Much of what I have said applies also to Plato's fourth type of "divine madness," the madness of Eros. Here too was a "given," something which happens to a man without his choosing it or knowing why—the work, therefore, of a formidable daemon. 57 Here too—here, indeed, above all—Plato recognised the operation of divine grace, and used the old religious language 59 to express that recognition. But Eros has a special importance in Plato's thought as being the one mode of experience which brings together the two natures of man, the divine self and the tethered beast. 60 For Eros is frankly rooted in what man shares with the animals, 61 the physiological impulse of sex (a fact which is unfortunately obscured by the persistent modern misuse of the term "Platonic love"); yet Eros also supplies the dynamic impulse which drives the soul forward in its quest of a satisfaction transcending earthly experience. It thus spans the whole compass of human personality, and makes the one empirical bridge between man as he is and man as he might be. Plato in fact comes very close here to the Freudian concept of libido and sublimation. But he never, as it seems to me, fully integrated this line of thought with the rest of his philosophy; had he done so, the notion of the intellect as a self-
sufficient entity independent of the body might have been im-
perilled, and Plato was not going to risk that.62

I turn now to Plato's proposals for reforming and stabilising
the Inherited Conglomerate.63 They are set forth in his last
work, the Laws, and may be briefly summarised as follows.

1. He would provide religious faith with a logical foundation
by proving certain basic propositions.

2. He would give it a legal foundation by incorporating these
propositions in an unalterable legal code, and imposing legal
penalties on any person propagating disbelief in them.

3. He would give it an educational foundation by making
the basic propositions a compulsory subject of instruction for
all children.

4. He would give it a social foundation by promoting an
intimate union of religious and civic life at all levels—as we
should phrase it, a union of Church and State.

It may be said that most of these proposals were designed
merely to strengthen and generalise existing Athenian practice.
But when we take them together we see that they represent the
first attempt to deal systematically with the problem of con-
trolling religious belief. The problem itself was new: in an
age of faith no one thinks of proving that gods exist or inventing
techniques to induce belief in them. And some of the methods
proposed were apparently new: in particular, no one before
Plato seems to have realised the importance of early religious
training as a means of conditioning the future adult. Moreover,
when we look more closely at the proposals themselves, it be-
comes evident that Plato was trying not only to stabilise but
also to reform, not only to buttress the traditional structure
but also to discard so much of it as was plainly rotten and
replace it by something more durable.

Plato's basic propositions are:

a) That gods exist;
b) That they are concerned with the fate of mankind;
c) That they cannot be bribed.

The arguments by which he attempted to prove these state-
ments do not concern us here; they belong to the history of theology. But it is worth noticing some of the points on which he felt obliged to break with tradition, and some on which he compromised.

Who, in the first place, are the gods whose existence Plato sought to prove and whose worship he sought to enforce? The answer is not free from ambiguity. As regards worship, a passage in *Laws* iv provides a completely traditional list—gods of Olympus, gods of the city, gods of the underworld, local daemons and heroes. These are the conventional figures of public cult, the gods who, as he puts it elsewhere in the *Laws*, “exist according to customary usage.” But are they the gods whose existence Plato thought he could prove? We have ground for doubting it. In the *Cratylus* he makes Socrates say that we know nothing about these gods, not even their true names, and in the *Phaedrus*, that we imagine a god (\(\pi\lambda\alpha\tau\omega\mu\epsilon\nu\)) without having seen one or formed any adequate idea of what he is like. The reference in both passages is to mythological gods. And the implication seems to be that the cult of such gods has no rational basis, either empirical or metaphysical. Its level of validity is, at best, of the same order as that which Plato allows to the intuitions of the poet or the seer.

The supreme god of Plato’s personal faith was, I take it, a very different sort of being, one whom (in the words of the *Timaeus*) “it is hard to find and impossible to describe to the masses.” Presumably Plato felt that such a god could not be introduced into the Conglomerate without destroying it; at any rate he abstained from the attempt. But there was one kind of god whom everyone could see, whose divinity could be recognised by the masses, and about whom the philosopher could make, in Plato’s opinion, logically valid statements. These “visible gods” were the heavenly bodies—or, more exactly, the divine minds by which those bodies were animated or controlled. The great novelty in Plato’s project for religious reform was the emphasis he laid, not merely on the divinity of sun, moon, and stars (for that was nothing new), but on their
In the *Laws*, not only are the stars described as “the gods in heaven,” the sun and moon as “great gods,” but Plato insists that prayer and sacrifice shall be made to them by all; and the focal point of his new State Church is to be a joint cult of Apollo and the sun-god Helios, to which the High Priest will be attached and the highest political officers will be solemnly dedicated. This joint cult—in place of the expected cult of Zeus—expresses the union of old and new, Apollo standing for the traditionalism of the masses, and Helios for the new “natural religion” of the philosophers; it is Plato’s last desperate attempt to build a bridge between the intellectuals and the people, and thereby save the unity of Greek belief and of Greek culture.

A similar mixture of necessary reform with necessary compromise may be observed in Plato’s handling of his other basic propositions. In dealing with the traditional problem of divine justice, he firmly ignores not only the old belief in “jealous” gods, but (with certain exceptions in religious law) the old idea that the wicked man is punished in his descendants. That the doer shall suffer in person is for Plato a demonstrable law of the cosmos, which must be taught as an article of faith. The detailed working of the law is not, however, demonstrable: it belongs to the domain of “myth” or “incantation.” His own final belief in this matter is set forth in an impressive passage of *Laws* x: the law of cosmic justice is a law of spiritual gravitation; in this life and in the whole series of lives every soul gravitates naturally to the company of its own kind, and therein lies its punishment or its reward; Hades, it is hinted, is not a place but a state of mind. And to this Plato adds another warning, a warning which marks the transition from the classical to the Hellenistic outlook: if any man demands personal happiness from life, let him remember that the cosmos does not exist for his sake, but he for the sake of the cosmos. All this, however, was above the head of the common man, as Plato well knew; he does not, if I understand him rightly, propose to make it part of the compulsory official creed.
On the other hand, Plato’s third proposition—that the gods cannot be bribed—implied a more drastic interference with traditional belief and practice. It involved rejecting the ordinary interpretation of sacrifice as an expression of gratitude for favours to come, “do ut des” a view which he had long ago stigmatised in the *Euthyphro* as the application to religion of a commercial technique (*εμπορική τις τέχνη*). But it seems plain that the great emphasis he lays on this point both in the *Republic* and in the *Laws* is due not merely to theoretical considerations; he is attacking certain widespread practices which in his eyes constitute a threat to public morality. The “travelling priests and diviners” and purveyors of cathartic ritual who are denounced in a much-discussed passage of *Republic* ii, and again in the *Laws*, are not, I think, merely those minor charlatans who in all societies prey upon the ignorant and superstitious. For they are said in both places to mislead whole cities, an eminence that minor charlatans seldom achieve. The scope of Plato’s criticism is in my view wider than some scholars have been willing to admit: he is attacking, I believe, the entire tradition of ritual purification, so far as it was in the hands of private, “unlicensed” persons.

This does not mean that he proposed to abolish ritual purification altogether. For Plato himself, the only truly effective catharsis was no doubt the practice of mental withdrawal and concentration which is described in the *Phaedo*; the trained philosopher could cleanse his own soul without the help of ritual. But the common man could not, and the faith in ritual catharsis was far too deeply rooted in the popular mind for Plato to propose its complete elimination. He felt, however, the need for something like a Church, and a canon of authorised rituals, if religion was to be prevented from running off the rails and becoming a danger to public morality. In the field of religion, as in that of morals, the great enemy which had to be fought was antinomian individualism; and he looked to Delphi to organise the defence. We need not assume that Plato believed the Pythia to be verbally inspired. My own guess would
be that his attitude to Delphi was more like that of a modern "political Catholic" towards the Vatican: he saw in Delphi a
great conservative force which could be harnessed to the task
of stabilising the Greek religious tradition and checking both
the spread of materialism and the growth of aberrant tendencies
within the tradition itself. Hence his insistence, both in the
*Republic* and in the *Laws*, that the authority of Delphi is to
be absolute in all religious matters. Hence also the choice of
Apollo to share with Helios the supreme position in the hier­
archy of State cults: while Helios provides the few with a rela­
tively rational form of worship, Apollo will dispense to the
many, in regulated and harmless doses, the archaic ritual magic
which they demand.

Of such legalised magic the *Laws* provides many examples,
some of them startlingly primitive. For instance, an animal,
or even an inanimate object, which has caused the death of a
man, is to be tried, condemned, and banished beyond the fron­
tiers of the State, because it carries a "miasma" or pollution.
In this and many other matters Plato follows Athenian practice
and Delphic authority. We need not suppose that he himself
attached any value to proceedings of this kind; they were the
price to be paid for harnessing Delphi and keeping superstition
within bounds.

It remains to say a few words about the sanctions by which
Plato proposes to enforce acceptance of his reformed version of
the traditional beliefs. Those who offend against it by speech or
act are to be denounced to the courts, and, if found guilty, are
to be given not less than five years' solitary confinement in a
reformatory, where they will be subjected to intensive religious
propaganda, but denied all other human intercourse; if this
fails to cure them, they will be put to death. Plato in fact
wishes to revive the fifth-century heresy trials (he makes it
plain that he would condemn Anaxagoraras unless he mended
his opinions); all that is new is the proposed psychological
treatment of the guilty. That the fate of Socrates did not warn
Plato of the danger inherent in such measures may seem strange
indeed. But he apparently felt that freedom of thought in religious matters involved so grave a threat to society that the measures had to be taken. "Heresy" is perhaps a misleading word to use in this connection. Plato's proposed theocratic State does in certain respects foreshadow the mediaeval theocracy. But the mediaeval Inquisition was chiefly concerned lest people should suffer in the next world for having held false opinions in this one; overtly, at any rate, it was trying to save souls at the expense of bodies. Plato's concern was quite different. He was trying to save society from contamination by dangerous thoughts, which in his view were visibly destroying the springs of social conduct. Any teaching which weakens the conviction that honesty is the best policy he feels obliged to prohibit as antisocial. The motives behind his legislation are thus practical and secular; in this respect the nearest historical analogue is not the Inquisition, but those trials of "intellectual deviationists" with which our own generation has become so familiar.

Such, then, in brief, were Plato's proposals for reforming the Conglomerate. They were not carried out, and the Conglomerate was not reformed. But I hope that the next and final chapter will show why I have thought it worth while to spend time in describing them.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1 "Plato and the Irrational," JHS 65 (1945) 16 ff. This paper was written before the present book was planned; it leaves untouched some of the problems with which I am here concerned, and on the other hand deals with some aspects of Plato's rationalism and irrationalism which fall outside the scope of the present volume. Plato was born in the year of Pericles' death or the year following, and died in 347, a year before the Peace of Philocrates and nine years before the battle of Chaeronea.

3 Cf. chap. vi, nn. 31–33.

4 Xen. Mem. 4.3.14; Plato, Apol. 30ab, Laches 185e.
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5 Gorgias 493α–c. Frank's view of what is implied in this passage (Platon u. die sog. Pythagoreer, 291 ff.) seems to me right in the main, though I should question certain details. Plato distinguishes, as 493β 7 shows, (a) τοις μυθολογούν κομψός ἄνθρ. ἵως Σικελός τοις Ἰταλικὸς, whom I take to be the anonymous author of an old Underworld Journey (not necessarily “Orphic”) which was current in West Greece and may have been somewhat after the style of the poem quoted on the gold plates; (b) Socrates' informant, τοις τῶν σοφῶν, who read into the old poem an allegorical meaning (much as Theagenes of Rhegium had allegorised Homer). This σοφῶν I suppose to be a Pythagorean, since such formulae are regularly used by Plato when he has to put Pythagorean ideas into Socrates' mouth: 507ε, φασί δ' οί σοφοί that there is a moral world-order (cf. Thompson ad loc.); Meno 81α, ἀκήκου ἀνδρόν τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν about transmigration; Rep. 583β, δοκῶ μοι τῶν σοφῶν τινος ἀκροβατεῖ that physical pleasures are illusory (cf. Adam ad loc.). Moreover, the view that underworld myths are an allegory of this life appears in Empedocles (cf. chap. v, n. 114), and in later Pythagoreanism (Macrob. in Somn. Scip. I.10.7–17).

I cannot agree with Linforth (“Soul and Sieve in Plato's Gorgias,” Univ. Calif. Publ. Class. Philol. 12 [1944] 17 ff.) that “the whole of what Socrates professes to have heard from someone else ... was original with Plato himself”; if it were, he would hardly make Socrates describe it as ἔστιν τὸν ἤτοι αὐτοῦ (493c) or call it the product of a certain school (γυμνασίου, 493δ).

6 Phaedo 67c, cf. 80ε; 83α–c. For the meaning of λόγος (“religious doctrine”) cf. 63c, 70c, Epist. vii. 335α, etc. In thus reinterpreting the old tradition about the importance of dissociated states, Plato was no doubt influenced by Socrates' practice of prolonged mental withdrawal, as described in the Symposium, 174d–175c and 220cd, and (it would seem) parodied in the Clouds: cf. Festugière, Contemplation et vie contemplative chez Platon, 69 ff.

7 See chap. v, n. 107.

8 Proclus, in Remp. II.113.22, quotes as precedents Aristeas, Hermotimus (so Rohde for Hermodorus), and Epimenides.

9 As the Siberian shaman becomes an Úör after death (Sieroszewski, Rev. de l'hist. des rel. 46 [1902] 228 f.), so the men of Plato's “golden breed” will receive post-mortem cult not merely as heroes—which would have been within the range of contemporary usage—but (subject to Delphic approval) as δαιμόνες (Rep. 468ε–469β). Indeed, such men may already be called δαιμόνες in their lifetime (Crat. 398c). In both passages Plato appeals to the precedent of
Hesiod’s “golden race” (*Erga* 122 f.). But he is almost certainly influenced also by something less remotely mythical, the Pythagorean tradition which accorded a special status to the θεῖος or δαμόνιος ἄνήρ (see above, chap. v, n. 61). The Pythagoreans—like Siberian shamans today—had a special funeral ritual of their own, which secured for them a μακαριστὸν καὶ οξεῖον τέλος (Plut. *gen. Socr.* 16, 585ε, cf. Boyancé, *Culte des Muses*, 133 ff.; Nioradze, *Schamanismus*, 103 f.), and may well have provided the model for the elaborate and unusual regulations laid down in the *Laws* for the funerals of ἐθνοι (947β-ε, cf. O. Reverdin, *La Religion de la cité platonicienne*, 125 ff.). On the disputed question whether Plato himself received divine (or daemonic) honours after death, see Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles u. Athen*, II.413 ff.; Boyancé, *op. cit.*, 250 ff.; Reverdin, *op. cit.*, 139 ff.; and contra, Jaeger, *Aristote*, 108 f.; Festugière, *Le Dieu cosmique*, 219 f.

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11 *Phaedo* 82αβ, *Rep.* 500δ, and the passages quoted below from *Philebus* and *Laws*.
12 *Politicus* 297δε, 301δε; cf. *Laws* 739δε.
13 *Philebus* 21δε.
14 *Rep.* 486α.
15 *Laws* 663β; cf. 733α.
19 *Apol.* 38α. Professor Hackforth, *CR* 59 (1945) 1 ff., has sought to convince us that Plato remained loyal to this maxim throughout his life. But though he certainly paid lip service to it as late as the *Sophist* (230ε-ε), I see no escape from the conclusion that the educational policy of the *Republic*, and still more clearly that of the *Laws*, is in reality based on very different assumptions. Plato could never confess to himself that he had abandoned any Socratic principle; but that did not prevent him from doing it. Socrates’ ἑρμηνεία ψυχῆς surely implies respect for the human mind as such; the techniques of suggestion and other controls recommended in the *Laws* seem to me to imply just the opposite.

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20 In the *Laws*, ἐπιθώ and its cognates are continually used in this metaphorical sense (659ε, 664β, 665ε, 666ε, 670ε, 773δ, 812ε, 903β, 944β). Cf. Callicles’ contemptuous use of the word, *Gorg.* 484α. Its application in the *Charmides* (157α-ε) is significantly different: there the “incantation” turns out to be a Socratic cross-examination. But in the *Phaedo*, where the myth is an ἐπιθώ
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(114D, cf. 77E-78A), we already have a suggestion of the part which ἐπωδαί were to play in the Laws. Cf. Boyancé’s interesting discussion, Culte des Muses, 155 ff.

21 Tim. 86DE, Laws 731C, 860D.

22 See above, chap. vi, p. 185.

23 Phaedo 67A: καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης. Cf. 66C: τὸ σῶμα καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτον ἑπιθυμηματικὸν, 94E: ἀγεθοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων, Crat. 414A: καθαρά πάντων τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακῶν καὶ ἑπιθυμιμῶν. In the Phaedo, as Festugière has lately put it, “le corps, c’est le mal, et c’est tout le mal” (Rev. de Phil. 22 [1948] 101). Plato’s teaching here is the main historical link between the Greek “shamanistic” tradition and Gnosticism.

24 For a fuller account of the unitary and the tripartite soul in Plato see G. M. A. Grube, Plato’s Thought, 129-149, where the importance of the concept of στάσις, “one of the most startlingly modern things in Platonic philosophy,” is rightly stressed. Apart from the reason given in the text, the extension of the notion of ψυχή to embrace the whole of human activity is doubtless connected with Plato’s later view that ψυχή is the source of all motion, bad as well as good (cf. Tim. 89E: τελα τρικήν ψυχήν ἐν ἦμιν εἶδον κατώκισαι, τυγχάνει δὲ ἐκαστὸν κυητῆς ἔχον, Laws 896D: τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αὐτὰν εἶναι ψυχήν καὶ τῶν κακῶν). On the ascription in the Laws (896E) of an irrational, and potentially evil, secondary soul to the κόσμος see Wilamowitz, Platon, II.315 ff., and the very full and fair discussion of this passage by Simone Petrement, Le Dualisme chez Platon, les Gnostiques et les Manichéens (1947), 64 ff. I have stated my own view briefly in JHS 65 (1945) 21.

25 Phaedo 94DE; Rep. 441BC.

26 Rep. 485D: ὅστερ ἡμῖν ἐκείνη ἀπωχετευμένον. Grube, loc. cit., has called attention to the significance of this passage, and others in the Republic, as implying that “the aim is not repression but sublimation.” But Plato’s presuppositions are, of course, very different from Freud’s, as Cornford has pointed out in his fine essay on the Platonic Eros (The Unwritten Philosophy, 78 ff.).

27 Rep. 439E. Cf. 351E-352A, 554D, 486E, 603D.

28 Soph. 227D-228E. Cf. also Phdr. 237D-238B and Laws 863A-864B.

29 ἐκ τῶν διαβοθρῶν διαφοράν (so Burnet, from the indirect tradition in Galen).

30 The first hints of an approach to this view may be detected in the Gorgias (482BC, 493A). But I cannot believe that Socrates, or Plato, took it over from the Pythagoreans ready-made, as Burnet and Taylor supposed. The unitary soul of the Phaedo comes (with
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a changed significance) from Pythagorean tradition; the evidence that the tripartite one does is late and weak. Cf. Jaeger, *Nemesios von Emesa*, 63 ff.; Field, *Plato and His Contemporaries*, 183 f.; Grube, *op. cit.*, 133. Plato’s recognition of an irrational element in the soul was seen in the Peripatetic School to mark an important advance beyond the intellectualism of Socrates (*Magna Moralia* 1.1, 1182a 15 ff.); and his views on the training of the irrational soul, which will respond only to an irrational ὑμᾶς, were later invoked by Posidonius in his polemic against the intellectualist Chrysippus (Galen, *de placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, pp. 466 f. Kühn, cf. 424 f.). See below, chap. viii, p. 239.

**Tim.** 90a. Cf. *Crat.* 398c. Plato does not explain the implications of the term; on its probable meaning for him see L. Robin, *La Théorie platonicienne de l’amour*, 145 ff., and V. Goldschmidt, *La Religion de Platon*, 107 ff. The irrational soul, being mortal, is not a δαίμων; but the *Laws* seem to hint that the “heavenly” δαίμων has an evil daemonic counterpart in the “Titan nature” which is a hereditary root of wickedness in man (*701c, 854b*: cf. chap. v, nn. 132, 133).

**Tim.** 69c. In the *Politicus*, 309c, Plato had already referred to the two elements in man as τὸ δεινονετὸς δυν τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος and τὸ ζῷονετὸς, which implies that the latter is mortal. But there they are still “parts” of the same soul. In the *Timaeus* they are usually spoken of as distinct “kinds” of soul; they have a different origin; and the lower “kinds” are shut away from the divine element lest they pollute it “beyond the unavoidable minimum” (690). If we are meant to take this language literally, the unity of the personality is virtually abandoned. Cf., however, *Laws* 863b, where the question whether θυμὸς is a ἴματος or a μέρος of the soul is left open, and *Tim. 91e*, where the term μέρη is used.

**Xen. Cyrop.** 6.1.41. Xenophon’s imaginary Persian is no doubt a Mazdean dualist. But it is unnecessary to suppose that the psychology of the *Timaeus* (in which the irrational soul is conceived as educable, and therefore not incurably depraved) is borrowed from Mazdean sources. It has Greek antecedents in the archaic doctrine of the indwelling δαίμων (chap. ii, p. 42), and in Empedocles’ distinction between δαίμων and ψυχή (chap. v, p. 153); and Plato’s adoption of it can be explained in terms of the development of his own thought. On the general question of Oriental influence on Plato’s later thought I have said something in *JHS* 65 (1945). Since then, the problem has been fully discussed by Jula Kerschensteiner, *Plato u. d. Orient* (Diss. München, 1945);
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by Simone Pétremont, *Le Dualisme chez Platon*; and by Festugière in an important paper, “Platon et l'Orient,” *Rev. de Phil.* 21 (1947) 5 ff. So far as concerns the suggestion of a Mazdean origin for Plato’s dualism, the conclusions of all three writers are negative.

34 *Laws* 644de. The germ of this idea may be seen already in the *Ion*, where we are told that God, operating on the passions through the “inspired” poets, ἀλει τὴν ψυχὴν δοκεῖ ἀν δοληται τῶν ἄνθρωπον (536a), though the image there is that of the magnet. Cf. also *Laws* 903d, where God is “the gamester” (*πεττευθὺς*) and men are his pawns.

39 *Ibid.*, 716a. For the implications of τατεινός, cf., e.g., 774c, δου-λελα τατεινή καὶ ἄνελάθερος. To be τατεινός towards the gods was for Plutarch a mark of superstition (*non posse suaviter*, 1101e), as it was also for Maximus of Tyre (14.7 Hob.) and probably for most Greeks.
41 *Meno* 100a, *Phaedo* 62b.
42 *Phaedo* 81e–82b.
44 *Laws* 942ab: “The principal thing is that none, man or woman, should ever be without an officer set over him, and that none should get the mental habit of taking any step, whether in earnest or in jest, on his individual responsibility: in peace as in war he must live always with his eye on his superior officer, following his lead and guided by him in his smallest actions... in a word, we must train the mind not even to consider acting as an individual or know how to do it.”

45 On later developments of the theme of the unimportance of τὰ ἄνθρωπα see Festugière in *Eranos*, 44 (1946) 376 ff. For man as a puppet cf. M. Ant. 7.3 and Plot. *Enn.* 3.2.15 (I.244.26 Volk.).
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47 *Laches* 198e; *Charm.* 173c.

48 The attack on poetry in the *Republic* is usually taken to be Platonic rather than Socratic: but the view of poetry as irrational, on which the attack depends, appears already in the *Apology* (n. 46 above).

49 Chap. vi, p. 185.

50 *Phaedrus* 244cd; *Tim.* 72b.

51 Cf. R. G. Collingwood, "Plato's Philosophy of Art," *Mind* N.S. 34 (1925) 154 ff.; E. Fascher, Προφητης, 66 ff.; Jeanne Croissant, *Aristote et les mystères*, 14 ff.; A. Delatte, *Les Conceptions de de l'enthousiasme*, 57 ff.; P. Boyancé, *Le Culte des Muses*, 177 ff.; W. J. Verdenius, "L'Ion de Platon," *Mnem.* 1943, 233 ff., and "Platon et la poésie," *ibid.*, 1944, 118 ff.; I. M. Linforth, "The Corybantic Rites in Plato," *Univ. Calif. Publ. Class. Philol.* 13 (1946) 160 ff. Some of these critics would divorce Plato's religious language from any sort of religious feeling: it is "no more than a pretty dress in which he clothes his thought" (Croissant); "to call art a divine force or an inspiration is simply to call it a je ne sais quoi" (Collingwood). This seems to me to miss part of Plato's meaning. On the other hand, those who, like Boyancé, take his language quite literally seem to overlook the ironical undertone which is evident in passages like *Meno* 99cd and may be suspected elsewhere.

52 Phdr. 244a: μανίας θελεί δοσεῖ διδομένης.

53 Cf. chap. iii, p. 80.

54 *Laws* 719c, the poet ὀλον κρήνη τις τὸ ἐπιδὶν δεῖν ἐτοιμῶς ἔι.

55 *Symp.* 202e: διὰ τοῦτο (σκ. τοῦ δαμονίου) καὶ ἡ μαντικὴ πάσα χωρεῖ καὶ ἡ τῶν ιδρέων τέχνη τῶν τε περὶ τὸς θυσίας καὶ τελετάς καὶ τὸς ἐπιφάς καὶ τὴν μαντέλαν πάσαν καὶ γοντελάν.

56 In the "rating of lives," Phdr. 248d, the μάντεις or τελεσθῆς and the poet are placed in the fifth and sixth classes respectively, below even the businessman and the athlete. For Plato's opinion of μάντεις cf. also *Politicus* 290cd; *Laws* 908d. Nevertheless both μάντεις and poets are assigned a function, though a subordinate one, in his final project for a reformed society (*Laws* 660a, 828b); and we hear of a μάντεις who had studied under him in the Academy (Plut. *Dion.* 22).

57 Chap. ii, p. 41; chap. vi, pp. 185 f. Cf. Taylor, *Plato*, 65: "In the
Greek literature of the great period, Eros is a god to be dreaded for the havoc he makes of human life, not to be coveted for the blessings he bestows; a tiger, not a kitten to sport with."

This religious language does not, however, exclude for Plato an explanation of erotic attraction in mechanistic terms—suggested, perhaps, by Empedocles or Democritus—by postulating physical “emanations” from the eye of the beloved which are eventually reflected back upon their author (Phdr. 251B, 255C). Cf. the mechanistic explanation of the catharsis produced by Corybantic rites, Laws 791A (which is called Democritean by Delatte and Croissant, Pythagorean by Boyancé, but may quite possibly be Plato’s own).

Eros as a δαιμων has the general function of linking the human with the divine, ὅπερ τὸ πᾶν αὐτῷ αὑτῷ συνάδεσθαι (Symp. 202E). In conformity with that function, Plato sees the sexual and the nonsexual manifestations of Eros as expressions of the same basic impulse towards τόκος ἐν καλῷ—a phrase which is for him the statement of a deep-seated organic law. Cf. I. Bruns, “Attische Liebestheorien,” NZbb 1900, 17 ff., and Grube, op. cit., 115.

It is significant that the theme of immortality, in its usual Platonic sense, is completely missing from the Symposium; and that in the Phaedrus, where a sort of integration is attempted, this can be achieved only at the level of myth, and only at the cost of treating the irrational soul as persisting after death and retaining its carnal appetites in the discarnate state.

In the following pages I am especially indebted to the excellent monograph of O. Reverdin, La Religion de la cité platonicienne (Travaux de l’École Française d’Athènes, fasc. VI, 1945), which I have not found the less valuable because the writer’s religious standpoint is very different from my own.

Laws 717AB. Cf. 738D: every village is to have its local god, δαιμων, or hero, as every village in Attica probably in fact had (Ferguson, Harv. Theol. Rev. 37 [1944] 128 ff.).

Ibid., 904A, ὁ κατὰ νόμον δυνας θεος (cf. 885B and, if the text is sound, 891E).

Crat. 400D, Phdr. 246C. Cf. also Critias 107AB; Epin. 984D (which sounds definitely contemptuous). Those who, like Reverdin (op. cit., 53), credit Plato with a wholehearted personal belief in the traditional gods, because he prescribes their cult and nowhere explicitly denies their existence, seem to me to make insufficient
allowance for the compromises necessary to any practical scheme of religious reform. To detach the masses completely from their inherited beliefs, had it been possible, would in Plato’s view have been disastrous; and no reformer can openly reject for himself what he would prescribe for others. See further my remarks in JHS 65 (1945) 22 f.


68 The heavenly bodies are everywhere the natural representatives or symbols of what Christopher Dawson calls “the transcendent element in external reality” (Religion and Culture, 29). Cf. Apol. 26d, where we are told that “everybody,” including Socrates himself, believes the sun and the moon to be gods; and Crat. 397cd, where the heavenly bodies are represented as the primitive gods of Greece. But in the fourth century, as we learn from the Epinomis, 982d, this belief was beginning to fade before the popularising of mechanistic explanations (cf. Laws 967a; Epin. 983c). Its revival in the Hellenistic Age was in no small degree due to Plato himself.

69 On the question of animation versus external control see Laws 898e–899a, Epin. 983c. Animation was no doubt the popular theory, and was to prevail in the coming age; but Plato refuses to decide (the stars are either θεός or θεών ειδήσεις ὡς ἀγάλματα, θεῶν αὐτῶν θυγασμένων, Epin. 983e; for the latter view cf. Tim. 37c).

70 Laws 821b–d. In itself, prayer to the sun was not foreign to Greek tradition: Socrates prays to him at sunrise (Symp. 220d), and a speaker in a lost play of Sophocles prays: ἦλιος, ὀκτείρει με, ἡμῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἕως ὅταν πάντων (fr. 752 P.). Elsewhere in the Laws (887d) Plato speaks of προκολάσεις ἀμα καὶ προσκυνήσεις ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων at the rising and setting of the sun and moon. Festugière has accused him of misrepresenting the facts here: “ni l’objet de culte ni le geste d’adoration ne sont grecs: ils sont barbares. Il s’agit de l’astrologie chaldéenne et de la προσκυνήσεις en usage à Babylone et chez les Perses” (Rev. de Phil. 21 [1947] 23). But while we may allow that the προκολάσεις, and perhaps the moon-cult, are barbarian rather than Greek, Plato’s statement seems sufficiently justified by Hesiod’s rule of prayer and offerings at sunrise and sundown
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(Er̔a 338 f.) and by Ar. Plut. 771: καὶ προσκυνῶ ἵνα πρῶτα μὲν τῶν ἡλίων, κτλ. Nevertheless, the proposals of the Laws do seem to give the heavenly bodies a religious importance which they lacked in ordinary Greek cult, though there may have been partial precedents in Pythagorean thought and usage (cf. chap. viii, n. 68). And in the Epinomis—which I am now inclined to regard either as Plato's own work or as put together from his "Nachlass"—we meet with something that is certainly Oriental, and is frankly presented as such, the proposal for public worship of the planets.

Laws 946BC, 947A. The dedication is not merely formal; the ἐθνοῦθε are to be actually housed in the τέμενος of the joint temple (946CD). It should be added that the proposal to institute a High Priest (ἄρχιερεύς) appears to be an innovation; at any rate the title is nowhere attested before Hellenistic times (Reverdin, op. cit., 61 f.). Presumably it reflects Plato's sense of the need for a tighter organisation of the religious life of Greek communities. The High Priest will be, however, like other priests, a layman, and will hold office only for a year; Plato did not conceive the idea of a professional clergy, and would certainly, I think, have disapproved it, as tending to impair the unity of "Church" and State, religious and political life.

Laws 903B, 904D; cf. also 728BC, and Plotinus' development of this idea, Enn. 4.3.24.

904D: Λίθην τε καὶ τὰ τοῦτων ἐκάθεν τῶν ὄνομάτων ἐπονομάζοντες σφόδρα φοβοῦνται καὶ ὑπερτοπολούσιν ζῶντες διαλυθήσετε τε τῶν σωμάτων. Plato's language here (ὄνομάτων, ὑπερτοπολούσιν) suggests that popular beliefs about the Underworld have no more than symbolic value. But the last words of the sentence are puzzling: they can hardly mean "when in sleep or trance" (England), since they are antithetic to ζῶντες, but seem to assert that the fear of Hades continues after death. Does Plato intend to hint that to experience this fear—the fruit of a guilty conscience—is
already to be in Hades? That would accord with the general doctrine which he preached from the Gorgias onward, that wrongdoing is its own punishment.

903cd, 905b. On the significance of this point of view see Festugière, La Sainteté, 60 ff., and V. Goldschmidt, La Religion de Platon, 101 f. It became one of the commonplaces of Stoicism, e.g., Chrysippus apud Plut. Sto. rep. 44, 1054f, M. Ant. 6.45, and reappears in Plotinus, e.g., Enn. 3.2.14. Men live in the cosmos like mice in a great house, enjoying splendours not designed for them (Cic. nat. deor. 2.17).


Rep. 364b-365a; Laws 909b (cf. 908d). The verbal similarities of the two passages are, I think, sufficient to show that Plato has in view the same class of persons (Thomas, 'Épèkeiva, 30, Reverdin, op. cit., 226).

Rep. 364e: πειθοντες οι μονον ιδιωτας ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις (cf. 366ab, αἱ μέγισται πόλεις), Laws 909b: ιδιωτας τε και διας οικίας καὶ πόλεως χρημάτων χάρων ἑπιχειρῶν κατ' ἄκρας ἐξαιρεῖν. Plato may have in mind famous historical instances like the purification of Athens by Epimenides (mentioned at Laws 642d, where the respectful tone is in character for the Cretan speaker) or of Sparta by Thaletas: cf. Festugière, REG 51 (1938) 197. Boyancé, REG 55 (1942) 232, has objected that Epimenides was unconcerned with the Hereafter. But this is true only on Diels' assumption that the writings attributed to him were "Orphic" forgeries—an assumption which, whether it be correct or not, Plato is unlikely to have made.

I find it hard to believe—as many still do, on the strength of "Musaeus and his son" (Rep. 363c)—that Plato intended to condemn the official Mysteries of Eleusis: cf. Nilsson, Harv. Theol. Rev. 28 (1935) 208 f., and Festugière, loc. cit. Certainly he cannot have meant to suggest in the Laws that the Eleusinian priesthood should be brought to trial for an offence which he regards as worse than atheism (907b). On the other hand, the Republic passage does not justify restricting Plato's condemnation to "Orphic" books and practices, though these are certainly included. The parallel passage in the Laws does not mention Orpheus at all.

See above, n. 6.

Rep. 427bc; Laws 738bc, 759c.

I do not intend to imply that for Plato Apolline religion is simply a pious lie, a fiction maintained for its social usefulness. Rather it reflects or symbolises religious truth at the level of ἐκκασθία at
which it can be assimilated by the people. Plato’s universe was a graded one: as he believed in degrees of truth and reality, so he believed in degrees of religious insight. Cf. Reverdin, *op. cit.*, 243 ff.

16 *Laws* 873E. Pollution is incurred in all cases of homicide, even involuntary (865CD), or of suicide (873D), and requires a καθαρσία which will be prescribed by the Delphic ξηγγήσας. The infectiousness of μίασμα is recognised within certain limits (881DE, cf. 916C, and chap. ii, n. 43).

86 *Laws* 907D–909D. Those whose irreligious teaching is aggravated by antisocial conduct are to suffer solitary confinement for life (909Bc) in hideous surroundings (908A)—a fate which Plato rightly regards as worse than death (908E). Grave ritual offences, such as sacrificing to a god when in a state of impurity, are to be punishable by death (910CE), as they were at Athens: this is defended on the old ground that such acts bring the anger of the gods on the entire city (910B).

17 *Ibid.*, 967Bc, “certain persons” who formerly got themselves into trouble through falsely asserting that the heavenly bodies were “a pack of stones and earth” had only themselves to blame for it. But the view that astronomy is a dangerous science is, thanks to modern discoveries, now out of date (967A); some smattering of it is indeed a necessary part of religious education (967D–968A).

87 Cornford has drawn a striking parallel between Plato’s position and that of the Grand Inquisitor in the story told in *The Brothers Karamazov* (The Unwritten Philosophy, 66 f.).

90 Cf. *Laws*, 885D: οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ δρᾶν τὰ δίκαια τρεπόμεθα οἱ πλείστοι, δράσαντες δ’ ἐξακείσθαι πειρώμεθα, and 888B: μέγιστον δὲ ... τὸ περὶ τῶν θεῶν ὅρθως διανοηθέντα ἥν καλῶς ἢ μὴ. For the wide diffusion of materialism see 891B.
VIII
The Fear of Freedom

A man's worst difficulties begin when he is able to do as he likes.

T. H. Huxley

I must begin this final chapter by making a confession. When the general idea of the lectures on which this book is based first formed itself in my mind, my notion was to illustrate the Greek attitude to certain problems over the whole stretch of time that lies between Homer and the last pagan Neoplatonists, a stretch about as long as that which separates antiquity from ourselves. But as material accumulated and the lectures got themselves written, it became evident that this could not be done, save at the price of a hopeless superficiality. Thus far I have in fact covered about one-third of the period in question, and even there I have left many gaps. The greater part of the story remains untold. All that I can now do is to look down a perspective of some eight centuries and ask myself in very general terms what changes took place in certain human attitudes, and for what reasons. I cannot hope in so brief a survey to arrive at exact or confident answers. But it will be something if we can get a picture of what the problems are, and can formulate them in the right terms.

Our survey starts from an age when Greek rationalism appeared to be on the verge of final triumph, the great age of intellectual discovery that begins with the foundation of the Lyceum about 335 B.C. and continues down to the end of the third century. This period witnessed the transformation of Greek science from an untidy jumble of isolated observations mixed with a priori guesses into a system of methodical disciplines. In the more
abstract sciences, mathematics and astronomy, it reached a level that was not to be attained again before the sixteenth century; and it made the first organised attempt at research in many other fields, botany, zoology, geography, and the history of language, of literature, and of human institutions. Nor was it only in science that the time was adventurous and creative. It is as if the sudden widening of the spatial horizon that resulted from Alexander’s conquests had widened at the same time all the horizons of the mind. Despite its lack of political freedom, the society of the third century B.C. was in many ways the nearest approach to an “open” society that the world had yet seen, and nearer than any that would be seen again until very modern times. The traditions and institutions of the old “closed” society were of course still there and still influential: the incorporation of a city-state in one or other of the Hellenistic kingdoms did not cause it to lose its moral importance overnight. But though the city was there, its walls, as someone has put it, were down: its institutions stood exposed to rational criticism; its traditional ways of life were increasingly penetrated and modified by a cosmopolitan culture. For the first time in Greek history, it mattered little where a man had been born or what his ancestry was: of the men who dominated Athenian intellectual life in this age, Aristotle and Theophrastus, Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus were all of them foreigners; only Epicurus was of Athenian stock, though by birth a colonial.

And along with this levelling out of local determinants, this freedom of movement in space, there went an analogous levelling out of temporal determinants, a new freedom for the mind to travel backwards in time and choose at will from the past experience of men those elements which it could best assimilate and exploit. The individual began consciously to use the tradition, instead of being used by it. This is most obvious in the Hellenistic poets, whose position in this respect was like that of poets and artists to-day. “If we talk of tradition to-

1 For notes to chapter viii see pages 255–269.
day," says Mr. Auden, "we no longer mean what the eighteenth century meant, a way of working handed down from one generation to the next; we mean a consciousness of the whole of the past in the present. Originality no longer means a slight personal modification of one's immediate predecessors; it means the capacity to find in any other work of any date or locality clues for the treatment of one's own subject-matter." That this is true of most, if not all, Hellenistic poetry hardly needs proving: it explains both the strength and the weakness of works like the Argonautica of Apollonius or the Aetia of Callimachus. But we can apply it also to Hellenistic philosophy: Epicurus' use of Democritus and the Stoic use of Heraclitus are cases in point. As we shall find presently, it has likewise some bearing on the field of religious beliefs.

Certainly it is in this age that the Greek pride in human reason attains its most confident expression. We should reject, says Aristotle, the old rule of life that counselled humility, bidding man think in mortal terms (θυσία φρονεῖν τὸν θυγήτον); for man has within him a divine thing, the intellect, and so far as he can live on that level of experience, he can live as though he were not mortal. The founder of Stoicism went further still: for Zeno, man's intellect was not merely akin to God, it was God, a portion of the divine substance in its pure or active state. And although Epicurus made no such claim, he yet held that by constant meditation on the truths of philosophy one could live "like a god among men."

But ordinary human living, of course, is not like that. Aristotle knew that no man can sustain the life of pure reason for more than very brief periods; and he and his pupils appreciated, better perhaps than any other Greeks, the necessity of studying the irrational factors in behaviour if we are to reach a realistic understanding of human nature. I have briefly illustrated the sanity and subtlety of their approach to this kind of problem in dealing with the cathartic influence of music, and with the theory of dreams. Did circumstances permit, I should have liked to devote an entire chapter to Aristotle's treatment of the
Irrational; but the omission may perhaps be excused, since there exists an excellent short book, Mlle Croissant's *Aristote et les Mystères*, which deals in an interesting and thorough manner, not indeed with the whole subject, but with some of its most important aspects.

Aristotle's approach to an empirical psychology, and in particular to a psychology of the Irrational, was unhappily carried no further after the first generation of his pupils. When the natural sciences detached themselves from the study of philosophy proper, as they began to do early in the third century, psychology was left in the hands of the philosophers (where it remained—I think to its detriment—down to very recent times). And the dogmatic rationalists of the Hellenistic Age seem to have cared little for the objective study of man as he is; their attention was concentrated on the glorious picture of man as he might be, the ideal *sapiens* or sage. In order to make the picture seem possible, Zeno and Chrysippus deliberately went back, behind Aristotle and behind Plato, to the naïve intellectualism of the fifth century. The attainment of moral perfection, they said, was independent both of natural endowment and of habituation; it depended solely on the exercise of reason. And there was no "irrational soul" for reason to contend with: the so-called passions were merely errors of judgement, or morbid disturbances resulting from errors of judgement. Correct the error, and the disturbance will automatically cease, leaving a mind untouched by joy or sorrow, untroubled by hope or fear, "passionless, pitiless, and perfect."

This fantastic psychology was adopted and maintained for two centuries, not on its merits, but because it was thought necessary to a moral system which aimed at combining altruistic action with complete inward detachment. Posidonius, we know, rebelled against it and demanded a return to Plato, pointing out that Chrysippus' theory conflicted both with observation, which showed the elements of character to be innate, and with moral experience, which revealed irrationality and evil as ineradicably rooted in human nature and control-
lable only by some kind of "catharsis." But his protest did not avail to kill the theory; orthodox Stoics continued to talk in intellectualist terms, though perhaps with diminishing conviction. Nor was the attitude of Epicureans or of Sceptics very different in this matter. Both schools would have liked to banish the passions from human life; the ideal of both was \textit{ataraxia}, freedom from disturbing emotions; and this was to be achieved in the one case by holding the right opinions about man and God, in the other by holding no opinions at all. The Epicureans made the same arrogant claim as the Stoics, that without philosophy there can be no goodness—a claim which neither Aristotle nor Plato ever made.

This rationalist psychology and ethic was matched by a rationalised religion. For the philosopher, the essential part of religion lay no longer in acts of cult, but in a silent contemplation of the divine and in a realisation of man's kinship with it. The Stoic contemplated the starry heavens, and read there the expression of the same rational and moral purpose which he discovered in his own breast; the Epicurean, in some ways the more spiritual of the two, contemplated the unseen gods who dwell remote in the \textit{intermundia} and thereby found strength to approximate his life to theirs. For both schools, deity has ceased to be synonymous with arbitrary Power, and has become instead the embodiment of a rational ideal; the transformation was the work of the classical Greek thinkers, especially Plato. As Festugière has rightly insisted, the Stoic religion is a direct inheritance from the \textit{Timaeus} and the \textit{Laws}, and even Epicurus is at times closer in spirit to Plato than he would have cared to acknowledge.

At the same time, all the Hellenistic schools—even perhaps the Sceptics—were as anxious as Plato had been to avoid a clean break with traditional forms of cult. Zeno indeed declared that temples were superfluous—God's true temple was the human intellect. Nor did Chrysippus conceal his opinion that to represent gods in human shape was childish. Nevertheless, Stoicism found room for the anthropomorphistic gods by
treating them as allegorical figures or symbols; and when in the Hymn of Cleanthes we find the Stoic God decked out with the epithets and attributes of Homer's Zeus, this is more, I think, than a stylistic formality—it is a serious attempt to fill the old forms with a new meaning. Epicurus too sought to keep the forms and purify their content. He was scrupulous, we are told, in observing all the usages of cult, but insisted that they must be divorced from all fear of divine anger or hope of material benefit; to him, as to Plato, the "do ut des" view of religion is the worst blasphemy.

It would be unwise to assume that such attempts to purge the tradition had much effect on popular belief. As Epicurus said, "the things which I know, the multitude disapproves, and of what the multitude approves, I know nothing." Nor is it easy for us to know what the multitude approved in Epicurus' time. Then as now, the ordinary man became articulate about such things only, as a rule, upon his tombstone—and not always even there. Extant tombstones of the Hellenistic Age are less reticent than those of an earlier time, and suggest, for what they are worth, that the traditional belief in Hades is slowly fading, and begins to be replaced either by explicit denial of any Afterlife or else by vague hopes that the deceased has gone to some better world—"to the Isles of the Blessed," "to the gods," or even "to the eternal Kosmos." I should not care to build very much on the latter type of epitaph: we know that the sorrowing relatives are apt to order "a suitable inscription" which does not always correspond to any actively held belief. Still, taken as a whole, the tombstones do suggest that disintegration of the Conglomerate has gone a stage further.

As for public or civic religion, we should expect it to suffer from the loss of civic autonomy: in the city-state, religion and public life were too intimately interlocked for either to decline without injury to the other. And that public religion had in fact declined pretty steeply at Athens in the half-century after Chaeronea we know from Hermocles' hymn to Demetrius
Poliorcetes: at no earlier period could a hymn sung on a great public occasion have declared that the gods of the city were either indifferent or nonexistent, and that these useless stocks and stones were now replaced by a "real" god, Demetrius himself. The flattery may be insincere; the scepticism plainly is not, and it must have been generally shared, since we are told that the hymn was highly popular. That Hellenistic ruler-worship was always insincere—that it was a political stunt and nothing more—no one, I think, will believe who has observed in our own day the steadily growing mass adulation of dictators, kings, and, in default of either, athletes. When the old gods withdraw, the empty thrones cry out for a successor, and with good management, or even without management, almost any perishable bag of bones may be hoisted into the vacant seat. So far as they have religious meaning for the individual, ruler-cult and its analogues, ancient and modern, are primarily, I take it, expressions of helpless dependence; he who treats another human being as divine thereby assigns to himself the relative status of a child or an animal. It was, I think, a related sentiment that gave rise to another characteristic feature of the Early Hellenistic Age, the wide diffusion of the cult of Tyche, "Luck" or "Fortune." Such a cult is, as Nilsson has said, "the last stage in the secularising of religion"; in default of any positive object, the sentiment of dependence attaches itself to the purely negative idea of the unexplained and unpredictable, which is Tyche.

I do not want to give a false impression of a complex situation by oversimplifying it. Public worship of the city gods of course continued; it was an accepted part of public life, an accepted expression of civic patriotism. But it would, I think, be broadly true to say of it what has been said of Christianity in our own time, that it had become "more or less a social routine, without influence on goals of living." On the other hand, the progressive decay of tradition set the religious man free to choose his own gods, very much as it set the poet free to choose his own style; and the anonymity and loneliness of
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life in the great new cities, where the individual felt himself a cipher, may have enforced on many the sense of need for some divine friend and helper. The celebrated remark of Whitehead, that "religion is what the individual does with his own solitari­ness," whatever one may think of it as a general definition, describes fairly accurately the religious situation from Alexander's time onwards. And one thing that the individual did with his solitariness in this age was to form small private clubs devoted to the worship of individual gods, old or new. Inscriptions tell us something of the activities of such "Apolloniasts" or "Hermaists" or "Iobacchi" or "Sarapiasts," but we cannot see far into their minds. All we can really say is that these associations served both social and religious purposes, in unknown and probably varying proportions: some may have been little more than dining-clubs; others may have given their members a real sense of community with a divine patron or protector of their own choice, to replace the inherited local community of the old closed society.

Such, in the broadest outline, were the relations between religion and rationalism in the third century. Looking at the picture as a whole, an intelligent observer in or about the year 200 B.C. might well have predicted that within a few generations the disintegration of the inherited structure would be complete, and that the perfect Age of Reason would follow. He would, however, have been quite wrong on both points—as similar predictions made by nineteenth-century rationalists look like proving wrong. It would have surprised our imaginary Greek rationalist to learn that half a millennium after his death Athena would still be receiving the periodic gift of a new dress from her grateful people; that bulls would still be sacrificed in Megara to heroes killed in the Persian Wars eight hundred years earlier; that ancient taboos concerned with ritual purity would still be rigidly maintained in many places. For the vis ineratiae that keeps this sort of thing going—what Matthew Arnold once called "the extreme slowness of things"—no rationalist ever makes sufficient allowance. Gods withdraw,
but their rituals live on, and no one except a few intellectuals notices that they have ceased to mean anything. In a material sense the Inherited Conglomerate did not in the end perish by disintegration; large portions of it were left standing through the centuries, a familiar, shabby, rather lovable façade, until one day the Christians pushed the façade over and discovered that there was virtually nothing behind it—only a faded local patriotism and an antiquarian sentiment. So, at least, it happened in the cities; it appears that to the country folk, the pagani, certain of the old rites still did mean something, as indeed a few of them, in a dim half-comprehended manner, still do.

A prevision of this history would have surprised an observer in the third century B.C. But it would have surprised him far more painfully to learn that Greek civilisation was entering, not on the Age of Reason, but on a period of slow intellectual decline which was to last, with some deceptive rallies and some brilliant individual rear-guard actions, down to the capture of Byzantium by the Turks; that in all the sixteen centuries of existence still awaiting it the Hellenic world would produce no poet as good as Theocritus, no scientist as good as Eratosthenes, no mathematician as good as Archimedes, and that the one great name in philosophy would represent a point of view believed to be extinct—transcendental Platonism.

To understand the reasons for this long-drawn-out decline is one of the major problems of world history. We are concerned here with only one aspect of it, what may be called for convenience the Return of the Irrational. But even that is so big a subject that I can only illustrate what I have in mind by pointing briefly to a few typical developments.

We saw in an earlier chapter how the gap between the beliefs of the intellectuals and the beliefs of the people, already discernible in the oldest Greek literature, widened in the late fifth century to something approaching a complete divorce, and how the growing rationalism of the intellectuals was matched by regressive symptoms in popular belief. In the relatively
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“open” Hellenistic society, although the divorce was on the whole maintained, rapid changes in social stratification, and the opening of education to wider classes, created more opportunities of interaction between the two groups. We have noticed evidence that in third-century Athens a scepticism once confined to intellectuals had begun to infect the general population; and the same thing was to happen later at Rome.48 But after the third century a different kind of interaction shows itself, with the appearance of a pseudo-scientific literature, mostly pseudonymous and often claiming to be based on divine revelation, which took up the ancient superstitions of the East or the more recent phantasies of the Hellenistic masses, dressed them in trappings borrowed from Greek science or Greek philosophy, and won for them the acceptance of a large part of the educated class. Assimilation henceforth works both ways: while rationalism, of a limited and negative kind, continues to spread from above downwards, antirationalism spreads from below upwards, and eventually wins the day.

Astrology is the most familiar example.49 It has been said that it “fell upon the Hellenistic mind as a new disease falls upon some remote island people.”50 But the comparison does not quite fit the facts, so far as they are known. Invented in Babylonia, it spread to Egypt, where Herodotus appears to have met with it.51 In the fourth century, Eudoxus reported its existence in Babylonia, along with the achievements of Babylonian astronomy; but he viewed it with scepticism,52 and there is no evidence that it was taken up, although in the Phaedrus myth Plato amused himself by playing his own variation on an astrological theme.53 About 280 B.C. more detailed information was made available to Greek readers in the writings of the Babylonian priest Berossus, without (it would seem) causing any great excitement. The real vogue of astrology seems to start in the second century B.C., when a number of popular manuals—especially one composed in the name of an imaginary Pharaoh, the Revelations of Nechepso and Petosiris54—began to circulate widely, and practising
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astrologers appeared as far afield as Rome. Why did it occur then and not sooner? The idea was by then no novelty, and the intellectual ground for its reception had long been prepared in the astral theology which was taught alike by Platonists, Aristotelians, and Stoics, though Epicurus warned the world of its dangers. One may guess that its spread was favoured by political conditions: in the troubled half-century that preceded the Roman conquest of Greece it was particularly important to know what was going to happen. One may guess also that the Babylonian Greek who at this time occupied the Chair of Zeno encouraged a sort of "trahison des clercs" (the Stoa had already used its influence to kill the heliocentric hypothesis of Aristarchus which, if accepted, would have upset the foundations both of astrology and of Stoic religion). But behind such immediate causes we may perhaps suspect something deeper and less conscious: for a century or more the individual had been face to face with his own intellectual freedom, and now he turned tail and bolted from the horrid prospect—better the rigid determinism of the astrological Fate than that terrifying burden of daily responsibility. Rational men like Panaetius and Cicero tried to check the retreat by argument, as Plotinus was to do later, but without perceptible effect; certain motives are beyond the reach of argument.

Besides astrology, the second century B.C. saw the development of another irrational doctrine which deeply influenced the thought of later antiquity and the whole Middle Age—the theory of occult properties or forces immanent in certain animals, plants, and precious stones. Though its beginnings are probably much older, this was first systematically set forth by one Bolus of Mendes, called "the Democritean," who appears to have written about 200 B.C. His system was closely linked with magical medicine and with alchemy; it was also soon combined with astrology, to which it formed a convenient supplement. The awkward thing about the stars had always been their inaccessibility, alike to prayer and to magic. But if each planet had its representative in the animal, vegetable,
and mineral kingdoms, linked to it by an occult "sympathy," as was now asserted, one could get at them magically by manipulating these earthly counterparts.61 Resting as they did on the primitive conception of the world as a magical unity, Bolus' ideas were fatally attractive to the Stoics, who already conceived the cosmos as an organism whose parts had community of experience (συμπάθεια).63 From the first century B.C. onwards Bolus begins to be quoted as a scientific authority comparable in status with Aristotle and Theophrastus,64 and his doctrines become incorporated in the generally accepted world picture.

Many students of the subject have seen in the first century B.C. the decisive period of Weltwende, the period when the tide of rationalism, which for the past hundred years had flowed ever more sluggishly, has finally expended its force and begins to retreat. There is no doubt that all the philosophical schools save the Epicurean took a new direction at this time. The old religious dualism of mind and matter, God and Nature, the soul and the appetites, which rationalist thought had striven to overcome, reasserts itself in fresh forms and with a fresh vigour. In the new unorthodox Stoicism of Posidonius this dualism appears as a tension of opposites within the unified cosmos and unified human nature of the old Stoa.65 About the same time an internal revolution in the Academy puts an end to the purely critical phase in the development of Platonism, makes it once more a speculative philosophy, and sets it on the road that will lead eventually to Plotinus.66 Equally significant is the revival, after two centuries of apparent abeyance, of Pythagoreanism, not as a formal teaching school, but as a cult and as a way of life.67 It relied frankly on authority, not on logic: Pythagoras was presented as an inspired Sage, the Greek counterpart of Zoroaster or Ostanes, and numerous apocrypha were fathered on him or on his immediate disciples. What was taught in his name was the old belief in a detachable magic self, in the world as a place of darkness and penance, and in the necessity of catharsis; but this was now combined with ideas
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derived from astral religion (which had in fact certain links with old Pythagoreanism), from Plato (who was represented as a Pythagorean), from the occultism of Bolus, and from other forms of magical tradition.

All these developments are perhaps symptoms, rather than causes, of a general change in the intellectual climate of the Mediterranean world—something whose nearest historical analogue may be the romantic reaction against rationalist “natural theology” which set in at the beginning of the nineteenth century and is still a powerful influence to-day. The adoration of the visible cosmos, and the sense of unity with it which had found expression in early Stoicism, began to be replaced in many minds by a feeling that the physical world—at any rate the part of it below the moon—is under the sway of evil powers, and that what the soul needs is not unity with it but escape from it. The thoughts of men were increasingly preoccupied with techniques of individual salvation, some relying on holy books allegedly discovered in Eastern temples or dictated by the voice of God to some inspired prophet, others seeking a personal revelation by oracle, dream, or waking vision; others again looking for security in ritual, whether by initiation in one or more of the now numerous “mysteria” or by employing the services of a private magician. There was a growing demand for occultism, which is essentially an attempt to capture the Kingdom of Heaven by material means—it has been well described as “the vulgar form of transcendentalism.” And philosophy followed a parallel path on a higher level. Most of the schools had long since ceased to value the truth for its own sake, but in the Imperial Age they abandon, with certain exceptions, any pretence of disinterested curiosity and present themselves frankly as dealers in salvation. It is not only that the philosopher conceives his lecture-room as a dispensary for sick souls; in principle, that was nothing new. But the philosopher is not merely a psychotherapist; he is also, as Marcus Aurelius put it, “a kind of priest and minister of the gods,” and his teachings claim to have religious rather than
scientific worth. "The aim of Platonism," says a Christian observer in the second century A.D., "is to see God face to face." And profane knowledge was valued only so far as it contributed to such aims. Seneca, for example, quotes with approval the view that we should not trouble to investigate things that it is neither possible nor useful to know, such as the cause of the tides or the principle of perspective. In such sayings we already feel the intellectual climate of the Middle Ages. It is the climate in which Christianity grew up; it made the triumph of the new religion possible, and it left its mark on Christian teaching; but it was not created by Christians.

What, then, did create it? One difficulty in the way of attempting any answer at the present time is the lack of a comprehensive and balanced survey of all the relevant facts which might help us to grasp the relationship between the trees and the wood. We have brilliant studies of many individual trees, though not of all; but of the wood we have only impressionistic sketches. When the second volume of Nilsson's *Geschichte* appears, when Nock has published his long-awaited Gifford Lectures on Hellenistic Religion, and when Festugière has completed the important series of studies in the history of religious thought misleadingly entitled *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, the ordinary nonspecialist like myself may be in a better position to make up his mind; meanwhile he had better abstain from snap judgements. I should like, however, to conclude by saying a word about some suggested explanations of the failure of Greek rationalism.

Certain of these merely restate the problem which they claim to solve. It is not helpful to be told that the Greeks had become decadent, or that the Greek mind had succumbed to Oriental influences, unless we are also told why this happened. Both statements may be true in some sense, though I think the best scholars to-day would hesitate to accord to either the unqualified acceptance which was usual in the last century. But even if true, such sweeping assertions will not advance matters until the nature and causes of the alleged
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degeneration are made clear. Nor shall I be content to accept
the fact of racial interbreeding as a sufficient explanation until
it is established either that cultural attitudes are transmitted in
the germ-plasm or that cross-bred strains are necessarily in-
ferior to “pure” ones.

If we are to attempt more precise answers, we must try to
be sure that they really square with the facts and are not dic-
tated solely by our own prejudices. This is not always done.
When a well-known British scholar assures me that “there
can be little doubt that the over-specialisation of science and
the development of popular education in the Hellenistic Age
led to the decline of mental activity,” I fear he is merely pro-
jecting into the past his personal diagnosis of certain con-
temporary ills. The sort of specialisation we have to-day was
quite unknown to Greek science at any period, and some of the
greatest names at all periods are those of nonspecialists, as
may be seen if you look at a list of the works of Theophrastus
or Eratosthenes, Posidonius, Galen, or Ptolemy. And universal
education was equally unknown: there is a better case for the
view that Hellenistic thought suffered from too little popular
education rather than too much.

Again, some favourite sociological explanations have the
drawback of not quite fitting the historical facts. Thus the
loss of political freedom may have helped to discourage in-
tellectual enterprise, but it was hardly the determining factor;
for the great age of rationalism, from the late fourth to the
late third century, was certainly not an age of political freedom.
Nor is it quite easy to put the whole blame on war and eco-
nomic impoverishment. There is indeed some evidence that
such conditions do favour an increased resort to magic and
divination (very recent examples are the vogue of spiritualism
during and after the First World War, of astrology during and
after the Second); and I am willing to believe that the dis-
turbed conditions of the first century B.C. helped to start the
direct retreat from reason, while those of the third century
A.D. helped to make it final. But if this were the only force at
work, we should expect the two intervening centuries—an exceptionally long period of domestic peace, personal security, and, on the whole, decent government—to show a reversal of this tendency instead of its gradual accentuation.

Other scholars have emphasised the *internal* breakdown of Greek rationalism. It "wasted away;" says Nilsson, "as a fire burns itself out for lack of fuel. While science ended in fruitless logomachies and soulless compilations, the religious will to believe got fresh vitality." As Festugière puts it, "on avait trop discuté, on était las des mots. Il ne restait que la technique." To a modern ear the description has a familiar and disquieting ring, but there is much ancient evidence to support it. If we go on to ask why fresh fuel was lacking, the answer of both authors is the old one, that Greek science had failed to develop the experimental method. And if we ask further why it failed to do so, we are usually told that the Greek habit of mind was deductive—which I do not find very illuminating. Here Marxist analysis has hit on a cleverer answer: experiment failed to develop because there was no serious technology; there was no serious technology because human labour was cheap; human labour was cheap because slaves were abundant. Thus by a neat chain of inference the rise of the mediaeval world-view is shown to depend on the institution of slavery. Some of its links, I suspect, may need testing; but this is a task for which I am not qualified. I will, however, venture to make two rather obvious comments. One is that the economic argument explains better the stagnation of mechanics after Archimedes than it does the stagnation of medicine after Galen or of astronomy after Ptolemy. The other is that the paralysis of scientific thought in general may very well account for the boredom and restlessness of the intellectuals, but what it does not so well account for is the new attitude of the masses. The vast majority of those who turned to astrology or magic, the vast majority of the devotees of Mithraism or Christianity, were evidently not the sort of people to whom the stagnation of science was a *direct* and conscious concern; and I find it
hard to be certain that their religious outlook would have been fundamentally different even if some scientist had changed their economic lives by inventing the steam engine.

If future historians are to reach a more complete explanation of what happened, I think that, without ignoring either the intellectual or the economic factor, they will have to take account of another sort of motive, less conscious and less tidily rational. I have already suggested that behind the acceptance of astral determinism there lay, among other things, the fear of freedom—the unconscious flight from the heavy burden of individual choice which an open society lays upon its members. If such a motive is accepted as a *vera causa* (and there is pretty strong evidence that it is a *vera causa* to-day),\(^{96}\) we may suspect its operation in a good many places. We may suspect it in the hardening of philosophical speculation into quasi-religious dogma which provided the individual with an unchanging rule of life; in the dread of inconvenient research expressed even by a Cleanthes or an Epicurus; later, and on a more popular level, in the demand for a prophet or a scripture; and more generally, in the pathetic reverence for the written word characteristic of late Roman and mediaeval times—a readiness, as Nock puts it, “to accept statements because they were in books, or even because they were said to be in books.”\(^{97}\)

When a people has travelled as far towards the open society as the Greeks had by the third century B.C., such a retreat does not happen quickly or uniformly. Nor is it painless for the individual. For the refusal of responsibility in any sphere there is always a price to be paid, usually in the form of neurosis. And we may find collateral evidence that the fear of freedom is not a mere phrase in the increase of irrational anxieties and the striking manifestations of neurotic guilt-feeling observable in the later\(^{98}\) stages of the retreat. These things were not new in the religious experience of the Greeks: we encountered them in studying the Archaic Age. But the centuries of rationalism had weakened their social influence and thus, indirectly, their power over the individual. Now they show themselves in new
forms and with a new intensity. I cannot here go into the evidence; but we can get some measure of the change by comparing the “Superstitious Man” of Theophrastus, who is hardly more than an old-fashioned observer of traditional taboos, with Plutarch’s idea of a superstitious man as one who “sits in a public place clad in sackcloth or filthy rags, or wallows naked in the mire, proclaiming what he calls his sins.” Plutarch’s picture of religious neurosis can be amplified from a good many other sources: striking individual documents are Lucian’s portrait of Peregrinus, who turned from his sins first to Christianity, then to pagan philosophy, and after a spectacular suicide became a miracle-working pagan saint; and the self-portrait of another interesting neurotic, Aelius Aristides. Again, the presence of a diffused anxiety among the masses shows itself clearly, not only in the reviving dread of post-mortem punishments but in the more immediate terrors revealed by extant prayers and amulets. Pagan and Christian alike prayed in the later Imperial Age for protection against invisible perils—against the evil eye and daemonic possession, against “the deceiving demon” or “the headless dog.” One amulet promises protection “against every malice of a frightening dream or of beings in the air”; a second, “against enemies, accusers, robbers, terrors, and apparitions in dreams”; a third—a Christian one—against “unclean spirits” hiding under your bed or in the rafters or even in the rubbish-pit. The Return of the Irrational was, as may be seen from these few examples, pretty complete.

There I must leave the problem. But I will not end this book without making a further confession. I have purposely been sparing in the use of modern parallels, for I know that such parallels mislead quite as often as they illuminate. But as a man cannot escape from his own shadow, so no generation can pass judgement on the problems of history without reference, conscious or unconscious, to its own problems. And I will not pretend to hide from the reader that in writing these chapters, and especially this last one, I have had our own
situation constantly in mind. We too have witnessed the slow disintegration of an inherited conglomerate, starting among the educated class but now affecting the masses almost everywhere, yet still very far from complete. We too have experienced a great age of rationalism, marked by scientific advances beyond anything that earlier times had thought possible, and confronting mankind with the prospect of a society more open than any it has ever known. And in the last forty years we have also experienced something else—the unmistakable symptoms of a recoil from that prospect. It would appear that, in the words used recently by André Malraux, “Western civilisation has begun to doubt its own credentials.”

What is the meaning of this recoil, this doubt? Is it the hesitation before the jump, or the beginning of a panic flight? I do not know. On such a matter a simple professor of Greek is in no position to offer an opinion. But he can do one thing. He can remind his readers that once before a civilised people rode to this jump—rode to it and refused it. And he can beg them to examine all the circumstances of that refusal.

Was it the horse that refused, or the rider? That is really the crucial question. Personally, I believe it was the horse—in other words, those irrational elements in human nature which govern without our knowledge so much of our behaviour and so much of what we think is our thinking. And if I am right about this, I can see in it grounds for hope. As these chapters have, I trust, shown, the men who created the first European rationalism were never—until the Hellenistic Age—“mere” rationalists: that is to say, they were deeply and imaginatively aware of the power, the wonder, and the peril of the Irrational. But they could describe what went on below the threshold of consciousness only in mythological or symbolic language; they had no instrument for understanding it, still less for controlling it; and in the Hellenistic Age too many of them made the fatal mistake of thinking they could ignore it. Modern man, on the other hand, is beginning to acquire such an instrument. It is still very far from perfect, nor is it always skilfully handled; in
many fields, including that of history, its possibilities and its limitations have still to be tested. Yet it seems to offer the hope that if we use it wisely we shall eventually understand our horse better; that, understanding him better, we shall be able by better training to overcome his fears; and that through the overcoming of fear horse and rider will one day take that decisive jump, and take it successfully.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

1. A completely "open" society would be, as I understand the term, a society whose modes of behaviour were entirely determined by a rational choice between possible alternatives and whose adaptations were all of them conscious and deliberate (in contrast with the completely "closed" society in which all adaptation would be unconscious and no one would ever be aware of making a choice). Such a society has never existed and will never exist; but one can usefully speak of relatively closed and relatively open societies, and can think in broad terms of the history of civilisation as the history of a movement away from the former type and in the general direction of the latter. Cf. K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London, 1945), and the paper by Auden quoted below. On the novelty of the third-century situation see Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics, 23 ff.


5. Stoicorum Veterrum Fragmenta, ed. Arnim (cited henceforth as SVF), I.146: Ζήνων ὁ Κιτεῖος ὁ Στωικός ἔφη . . . δεῖν . . . ἔχειν τὸ θεῖον ἐν μόνῳ τῷ νῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ θεῶν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν νοῦν. God himself (or itself) is "the right reason which penetrates all things" (Diog. Laert. 7.88, cf. SVF I.160-162). For such a view there were precedents in earlier speculation (cf., e.g., Diogenes of Apollonia fr. 5); but it appeared now for the first time as the foundation of a systematic theory of human life.

6. Epicurus, Epist. 3.135: ζήσεις δὲ ὃς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις. Cf. also
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Sent. Vat. 33; Aelian, V.H. 4.13 (= fr. 602 Usener); and Lucr. 3.322.

Aristotle, Met. 1072b 14: διαγωγὴ δ' ἐστὶν οἷα ἡ ἀριστὴ μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν.

Chap. iii, pp. 79 f.; iv, p. 120.

Cf. also Jaeger, Aristotle, 159 ff., 240 f., 396 f.; Boyance, Culte des Muses, 185 ff.

Cic. Acad. post. 1.38 = SVF I.199.

Unity of the ψυχή, SVF II.823, etc. Zeno defined πάθος as "an irrational and unnatural disturbance of the mind" (SVF I.205). Chrysippus went further, actually identifying the πάθη with erroneous judgements: SVF III.456, 461, Χριστισίππος μὲν ... ἀποδεικνυαὶ περιταί, κράσεις τινὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὰ πάθη, Ζήτων δ' οὐ τὰς κράσεις αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιγιγνομένας αὐταῖς συστολὰς καὶ χύσεις, ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ πτώσεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνήμιζεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη.

SVF III.444: Stoici affectus omnes, quorum impulsu animus commovetur, ex homine tollunt, cupiditatem, laetitiam •••• Haec quattuor morbos vocant, non tam natura insitos quam prava opinione susceptos: et idcirco eos censent exstirpari posse radicitus, si bonorum malorumque opinio falsa tollatur. The characterisation of the Sage is Tarn's (Hellenistic Civilisation, 273).


In his ἐπὶ παθῶν, on which Galen drew in his treatise de placitis Hippocratis et Platonis. Cf. Pohlenz, NYbb Supp. 24 (1898) 537 ff., and Die Stoa, 1.89 ff.; Reinhardt, Posidonios, 263 ff.; Edelstein, ΑJP 47 (1936) 305 ff. It would seem that the false unity of the Zenonian psychology had already been modified by Panaitius (Cicero, Off. 1.101), but Posidonius carried the revision much further.

A newly recovered treatise by Galen, in which most of the material seems to be taken from Posidonius, develops this argument at some length, citing the differences of character observable in infants and animals: see R. Walzer, "New Light on Galen's Moral Philosophy," CQ 43 (1949) 82 ff.

Galen, διὰ ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κράσεων κτλ., p. 78.8 ff. Muller: οὐ τοῖνοι οὖν Ποσειδανίως δοκεῖ τὴν κακίαν ἔξωθεν ἐπεισώναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐδεμίαν ἔχουσαν ἰξαν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῖν, ὃθεν ὁρμωμένη βλαστάνει τε καὶ αὐξάνεται, ἀλλ' αὕτο τοῦντον καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ τῆς κακίας ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς σπέρμα, καὶ δεμεθα πάντες οὐχ οὖτω τοῦ φεύγειν τούς πονηροῖς ὃς τοῦ διόκειν τοὺς
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καθαριστήσε τε καὶ κωλύστησε ἡμῶν τὴν αβέβαιαν τῆς κακίας. Cf. plac. Hipp. et Plat., pp. 436.7 ff. Müller: in his treatment (θερατεία) of the passions Posidonius followed Plato, not Chrysippus. It is interesting that the inner conflict of Euripides' MEDEA, in which the fifth-century poet had expressed his protest against the crudities of rationalist psychology (chap. vi, p. 186), also played a part in this controversy, being quoted, oddly enough, by both sides (Galen, plac. Hipp. et Plat., p. 342 Müller; ibid., p. 382 = SVF III.473 ad fin.).

19 Cf. Philodemus, de dis III, fr. 84 Diels = Usener, Epicurea fr. 386: the wise man περάται οὕτως ἀνθέ (sc. the divine character) καὶ καθευδεῖ γλίταται θεγέν καὶ σωείναι.
20 Festugière, Le Dieu cosmique, xii f.; Épique et ses dieux, 95 ff. Against the view that early Stoicism represents an intrusion of "Oriental mysticism" into Greek thought see Le Dieu cosmique, 266, n. 1, and Bevan, op. cit., 20 ff. The general relation of philosophy to religion in this age is well stated by Wendland, Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur, 106 ff.
21 Pyrrho is said to have held a high-priesthood (Diog. Laert. 9.64).
22 AVF I.146, 264-267.
23 AVF II.1076.
24 Chrysippus, ibid. A like allegorisation is attributed to the Platonist XENOCRATES (Aetiós, 1.7.30 = Xen. fr. 15 Heinze).
27 ἀνυπερβλητον ἀνεβαλλαν, Philod., ibid., p. 112. For Plato, cf. chap. vii, p. 222. Epicurus accepted the first and third of the basic propositions of Laws x, but rejected the second, belief in which seemed to him a main source of human unhappiness.
29 Down to the end of the fifth century, Greek epitaphs rarely include any pronouncement on the fate of the dead; when they do,
they nearly always speak in terms of the Homeric Hades (on the most striking exception, the Potidaea epitaph, see chap. v, n. 112). Hopes of personal immortality begin to appear in the fourth century—when they are sometimes couched in language suggestive of Eleusinian influence—and become somewhat less rare in the Hellenistic Age, but show little trace of being based on specific religious doctrines. Reincarnation is never referred to (Cumont, _Lux Perpetua_, 206). Explicitly sceptical epitaphs seem to begin with Alexandrian intellectuals. But a man like Callimachus could exploit by turns the conventional view (Epigr. 4 Mein.), the optimistic (Epigr. 10), or the sceptical (Epigr. 13). On the whole, there is nothing in the evidence to contradict Aristotle’s statement that most people consider the mortality or immortality of the soul an open question (Soph. Elench. 176b 16). On the whole subject see Festugière, _L’Idéal rel. des grecs_, Pt. II, chap. v, and R. Lattimore, “Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs,” _Illinois Studies_, 28 (1942).

30 Cf. Schubart’s cautious verdict (loc. cit., 11): “wo in solchen Äusserungen wirklicher Glaube spricht und wo nur eine schöne Wendung klingt, das entzieht sich jedem sicherem Urteil.”

31 Athenaeus, 2530 = Powell, _Collectanea Alexandrina_, p. 173. The date is not quite certain, probably 290 B.C.

32 ἀλλοι μὲν ἄν μακρὰν γὰρ ἄπέχουσιν θεοῖ,
       ἢ οὐκ ἄπεχουσιν ἡτα,
       ἢ οὐκ εἰσίν, ἢ οὐ προσέχουσιν ἡμῖν οὐδὲ ἐν,
       σὲ δὲ παρόνθ᾽ ὀρώμεν,
       οὐ ἐξίλοιν οὐδὲ λίθον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀληθινόν.

I do not understand how Rostovtzeff can say in his Ingersoll Lecture (“The Mentality of the Hellenistic World and the After-Life,” Harvard Divinity School _Bulletin_, 1938–1939) that there is “no blasphemy and no ἀσέβεια” here, if he is using these terms in the traditional Greek sense. And how does he know that the hymn is “an outburst of sincere religious feeling”? That was not the view of the contemporary historian Demochares (apud Athen. 253a), and I can find nothing in the words to suggest it. The piece was presumably written to order (on Demetrius’ attitude see Tarn, _Antigonos Gonatas_, 90 f.), and could well have been composed in the spirit of Demosthenes advising the Assembly “to recognise Alexander as the son of Zeus—or Poseidon if he fancies it.” Demetrius is the son of Poseidon and Aphrodite? Certainly—why not?—provided he will prove it by bringing peace and dealing with those Aetolians.
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33 Athen. 253f (from Duris or Demochares?): ταύτις ἱδον οἱ Μαραθωνιακοὶ ὑμῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' οἷς ἢν.

34 We are not unique in this. The fifth century, with Delphic approval, "heroised" its great athletes, and occasionally its great men, presumably in response to popular demand: not, however, until they were dead. A tendency to this sort of thing has perhaps existed at all times and places, but a serious supernaturalism keeps it within bounds. The honours paid to a Brasidas pale before those of almost any Hellenistic king, and Hitler got nearer to being a god than any conqueror of the Christian period.

35 It would seem that once the habit had been established, divine honours were often offered spontaneously, even by Greeks; and in some cases to the genuine embarrassment of the recipients, e.g. Antigonos Gonatas, who on hearing himself described as a god retorted drily, "The man who empties my chamberpot has not noticed it" (Plut. Is. et Os. 24, 360cd).

36 Not kings only, but private benefactors were worshipped, sometimes even in their lifetime (Tarn, Hellenistic Age, 48 f.). And the Epicurean practice of referring to their founder as a god (Lucr. 5.8, deus ille fuit, Cic. Tusc. 1.48, eumque venerantur ut deum) was rooted in the same habit of mind—was not Epicurus a greater εὐεργέτης than any king? Plato again, if he did not actually receive divine honours after death (chap. vii, n. 9), was already believed in his nephew's day to have been a son of Apollo (Diog. Laert. 3.2). These facts seem to me to tell against W. S. Ferguson’s view (Amer. Hist. Rev. 18 [1912-1913] 29 ff.) that Hellenistic ruler-worship was essentially a political device and nothing more, the religious element being merely formal. In the case of rulers, reverence for the εὐεργέτης or σωτήρ was doubtless reinforced, consciously or unconsciously, by the ancient sense of a "royal mana" (cf. Weinreich, NH 1926, 648 f.), which in turn may be thought to rest upon unconscious identification of king with father.

37 Nilsson, Greek Piety (Eng. trans., 1948), 86. For the deep impression left on men’s minds in the late fourth century by the occurrence of unpredictable revolutionary events see the striking words of Demetrius of Phaleron apud Polyb. 29.21, and Epicurus’ remark that οἱ πολλοὶ believe τῆς γῆ to be a goddess (Epist. 3.134). An early example of actual cult is Timoleon’s dedication of an altar to Ἀμφαρία (Plut. Timol. 36, qua quis rat. 11, 542e). This sort of impersonal morally neutral Power—with which New Comedy made so much play, cf. Stob. Ecl. 1.6—is something different from the “luck” of an individual or a city, which has
older roots (cf. chap. ii, nn. 79, 80). The best study of the whole subject will be found in Wilamowitz, Glaube, II.298–309.


39 On the earlier phases of this development see Nilsson, Gesch. I.760 ff.; on its importance for the Hellenistic period, Festugière, Épicure et ses dieux, 19.


41 The standard book on the Hellenistic clubs is F. Poland’s Geschichte des griechischen Vereinswesens. For a short account in English see M. N. Tod, Sidelights on Greek History, lecture iii. The psychological function of such associations in a society where traditional bonds have broken down is well brought out by de Grazia, The Political Community, 144 ff.

42 In this brief sketch I have taken no account of the position in the newly Hellenised East, where the incoming Greeks found firmly established local cults of non-Greek gods, to whom they duly paid their respects, sometimes under Greek names. On the lands of old Greek culture, Oriental influence was still relatively slight; further east, Greek and Oriental forms of worship lived side by side, without hostility, but apparently as yet without much attempt at syncretism (cf. Schubart, loc. cit., 5 f.).

43 Dittenberger, Syll.1 894 (A.D., 262/3).

44 IG VII.53 (fourth century A.D.).

45 Cf. Festugière et Fabre, Monde gréco-romain, II.86.

46 Matthew Arnold to Grant Duff, August 22, 1879: "But I more and more learn the extreme slowness of things; and that, though we are all disposed to think that everything will change in our lifetime, it will not."

47 This is not to deny that there was an organised and bitter opposition to the Christianisation of the Empire. But it came from a small class of Hellenising intellectuals, supported by an active group of conservative-minded senators, rather than from the masses. On the whole subject see J. Geffcken, Der Ausgang des griechisch-römischen Heidentums (Heidelberg, 1920).

48 For the prevalence of scepticism among the Roman populace cf., e.g., Cic. Tusc. 1.48: quae est anus tam delira quae timeat ista?; Juv. 2.149 ff.: esse aliquid Manes, et subterranea regna . . . nec pueri credunt, nisi qui nondum aere lavantur; Sen. Epist. 24.18: nemo tam puer est ut Cerberum timeat, etc. Such rhetorical statements should not, however, be taken too literally (cf. W. Kroll,
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“Die Religiosität in der Zeit Ciceros,” Njbb 1928, 514 ff.). We have on the other side the express testimony of Lucian, de luctu.

In the following paragraphs I am especially indebted to Festugière’s L’Astrologie et les sciences occultes (=La Révélation d’Hermès Trismégiste, I [Paris, 1944]), which is much the best introduction to ancient occultism as a whole. For astrology see also Cumont’s Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romans, and the excellent short account in H. Gressmann’s Die Hellenistische Geistverreligion.

Murray, Five Stages of Greek Religion, chap. iv.

Hdt. 2.82.1. It is not quite certain that the reference is to astrology.

Cic. Div. 2.87: Eudoxus, . . . sic opinatur, id quod scriptum reliquit, Chaldaeis in praedictione et in notatione cuiusque vitae ex natali die minime esse credendum. Plato also rejects it, at least by implication, at Tim. 40cd; the passage was understood in later antiquity as referring specifically to astrology (see Taylor on 40d 1), but it is quite possible that Plato had in mind only the traditional Greek view of eclipses as portents. Of other fourth-century writers, it is probable that Ctesias knew something of astrology, and there is a slight indication that Democritus may have done so (W. Capelle, Hermes, 60 [1925] 373 ff.).

The souls of the unborn take on the characters of the gods whom they “follow” (252cd), and these twelve θεοὶ ἀπόχωρεις seem to be located in the twelve signs of the zodiac (247a) with which Eudoxus had associated them, though Plato does not say this in so many words. But Plato, unlike the astrologers, is careful to safeguard free will. Cf. Bidez, Eos, 60 ff., and Festugière, Rev. de Phil. 21 (1947) 24 ff. I agree with the latter that the “astrology” of this passage is no more than a piece of imaginative decoration. It is significant that Theophrastus (apud Proclus, in Tim. III. 151.1 ff.) still spoke of astrology as if it were a purely foreign art (whether he felt for it all the admiration that Proclus attributes him may reasonably be doubted).

Festugière, L’Astrologie, 76 ff. Some of the fragments of “Nechepso’s” work, which has been called “the astrologer’s Bible,” were collected by Riess, Philologus, Supp.-Band 6 (1892) 327 ff.

Cato includes “Chaldaei” among the riff-raff whom the farm steward should be warned not to consult (de agri cultura 5.4). A little later, in 139 B.C., they were expelled from Rome for the first but by no means the last time (Val. Max. 1.3.3). In the follow-
ing century they were back again, and by then senators as well as farm stewards were numbered among their clients.

56 Epicurus, Epist. 1.76 ff., 2.85 ff. (cf. Festugière, Épicure et ses dieux, 102 ff.). A sentence in 1.79 sounds like a specific warning against the astrologers (Bailey ad loc.).

57 Diogenes of Seleucia, called "the Babylonian," who died ca. 152 B.C. According to Cicero (div. 2.90), he admitted some but not all of the claims made for astrology. Earlier Stoics had perhaps not thought it necessary to express any view, since Cicero says definitely that Panaetius (Diogenes' immediate successor) was the only Stoic who rejected astrology (ibid., 2.88), while Diogenes is the only one he quotes in its favour. See, however, SVF II.954, which seems to imply that Chrysippus believed in horoscopes.

58 Cleanthes thought that Aristarchus ought to be had up (like Anaxagoras before him and Galileo after him) for δείσεω (Plut. de facie 6, 923A = SVF I.500). In the third century that was no longer possible; but it seems likely that theological prejudice played some part in securing the defeat of heliocentrism. Cf. the horror of it expressed by the Platonist Dercylides, apud Theon Smyrn., p. 200.7 Hiller.

59 Cicero, div. 2.87–99; Plot. Enn. 2.3 and 2.9.13. The astrologers were delighted by Plotinus' painful end, which they explained as the merited punishment of his blasphemous lack of respect for the stars.


61 Hence Epicurus thought it better even to follow popular religion than to be a slave to astral ἐλαιριμένη, since the latter ἀπαραίτητων ξει τῆν ἀνάγκην (Epist. 3.134). The futility of prayer was emphasised by orthodox astrologers: cf. Vettius Valens, 5.9; 6 proœm.; 6.1 Kroll.


63 SVF II.473 init., Chrysippus held that by virtue of the all-penetrating πνεύμα, συμπαθές λατων αὑτῷ τὸ πᾶν. Cf. also II.912. This is of course something different from the doctrine of specific occult "sympathies"; but it probably made it easier for educated men to accept the latter.

64 Festugière, op. cit., 199. Hence Nilsson's remark that "antiquity could not differentiate between natural and occult potencies" (Greek Piety, 105). But the aims and methods of Aristotle and his
pupils are as distinct from those of the occultists as science is from superstition (cf. Festugière, 189 ff.).

A generation ago there was a fashion, started by Schmekel in his *Philosophie der mittleren Stoa,* for attributing to Posidonius almost every “mystical” or “otherworldly” or “Orientalising” tendency which appeared in later Greco-Roman thought. These exaggerations were exposed by R. M. Jones in a valuable series of articles in *CP* (1918, 1923, 1926, 1932). For a more cautious account of Posidonius’ system see L. Edelstein, *AJP* 57 (1936) 286 ff. Edelstein finds no evidence in the *attested* fragments that he was either an Orientaliser or a man of deep religious feeling. But it remains true that his dualism suited the religious tendencies of the new age.


Cf. Diog. Laert. 8.27, and the first question in the Pythagorean catechism, \( \tau i \ \varepsilon \sigma \tau i \ \alpha l \ \mu a k\acute{a}r\omega n \nu\sigma\omega i ; \ \eta\lambda\iota\sigma\varsigma \ \kappa a l \ \sigma\acute{e}l\acute{i}n\eta \) (Lamb. *vit. Pyth.* 82 = Diels, *Vorskr. 58 C 4*), with Delatte’s commentary, *Études sur la litt. pyth.,* 274 ff.; also Boyancé, *REG* 54 (1941) 146 ff., and Gigon, *Ursprung,* 146, 149 f. I am not satisfied that these old Pythagorean beliefs are necessarily due to Iranian influence. Such fancies seem to have originated independently in many parts of the world.

This was especially stressed by Wellmann (*op. cit. supra,* n. 60). Wellmann regarded Bolus himself as a Neopythagorean (after Suidas), which seems to be wrong (cf. Kroll, *loc. cit.,* 231); but such men as Nigidius Figulus were evidently influenced by him.

Nigidius Figulus, a leading figure in the Pythagorean revival, not only wrote on dreams (fr. 82) and quoted the wisdom of the Magi (fr. 67), but was reputed to be a practising occultist who had discovered a hidden treasure by the use of boy mediums (Apul.
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Apol. 42). Vatinius, who "called himself a Pythagorean," and Appius Claudius Pulcher, who probably belonged to the same group, are said by Cicero to have engaged in necromancy (in Val. 14; Tusc. 1.37; div. 1.132). And Varro seems to have credited Pythagoras himself with necromancy or hydromancy, doubtless on the strength of Neopythagorean apocrypha (Aug. Civ. Dei 7.35). Professor Nock is inclined to attribute to Neopythagoreans a substantial share in the systematising of magical theory, as well as in its practice (J. Eg. Arch. 15 [1929] 227 ff.).

71 The romantic reaction against natural theology has been well characterised by Christopher Dawson, Religion and Culture, 10 ff. Its typical features are (a) the insistence on transcendence, against a theology which, in Blake's words, "calls the Prince of this World 'God'"; (b) the insistence on the reality of evil and "the tragic sense of life," against the insensitive optimism of the eighteenth century; (c) the insistence that religion is rooted in feeling and imagination, not in reason, which opened the way to a deeper understanding of religious experience, but also to a revival of occultism and a superstitious respect for "the Wisdom of the East." The new trend of religious thought which began in the first century B.C. can be described in exactly the same terms.

72 In the early centuries of the Empire, monism and dualism, "cosmic optimism" and "cosmic pessimism," persisted side by side—both are found, for example, in the Hermetica—and it was only gradually that the latter gained the upper hand. Plotinus, while sharply criticising both the extreme monism of the Stoics and the extreme dualism of Numenius and the Gnostics, endeavours to construct a system which shall do justice to both tendencies. The starry heavens are still for the Emperor Julian an object of deeply felt adoration: cf. orat. 5, 130 CD, where he tells how the experience of walking in starlight caused him in boyhood to fall into a state of entranced abstraction.


75 Theurgy was primarily a technique for attaining salvation by magical means; see App. II, p. 291. And the same may be said of some of the rituals preserved in the magical papyri, such as the famous "recipe for immortality" (PGM iv. 475 ff.). Cf. Nock, "Greek Magical Papyri," J. Eg. Arch. 15 (1929) 230 ff.; Festugière, L'Idéal religieux, 281 ff.; Nilsson, "Die Religion in den gr.
Nilsson, *Greek Piety*, 150. Occultism, I should add, is to be distinguished from the primitive magic described by anthropologists, which is prescientific, prephilosophical, and perhaps prereligious, whereas occultism is a pseudo-science or system of pseudosciences, often supported by an irrationalist philosophy, and always exploiting the disintegrated débris of preexisting religions. Occultism is also, of course, to be distinguished from the modern discipline of psychical research, which attempts to eliminate occultism by subjecting supposedly "occult" phenomena to rational scrutiny and thus either establishing their subjective character or integrating them with the general body of scientific knowledge.

Epicurus was particularly frank in expressing his contempt for culture (fr. 163 Us., παιδείαν πᾶσαν φευγε, cf. Cic. fin. 1.71 ff. = fr. 227), and also for science, so far as it does not promote ἀταραξία (Epist. 1.79, 2.85; Κύριας Δόξας, 11). Professor Farrington seems to me altogether mistaken in making him a representative of the scientific spirit, in contrast with the "reactionary" Stoics. But Stoicism too was generally indifferent to research save in so far as it confirmed Stoic dogmas, and was prepared to suppress it where it conflicted with them (n. 58).

Plotinus is the outstanding exception. He organised his teaching on the basis of a sort of seminar system, with free discussion (Porh. vit. Plot. 13); he recognised the value of music and mathematics as a preparation for philosophy (Enn. 1.3.1, 1.3.3), and is said to have been himself well versed in these subjects, as well as in mechanics and optics, though he did not lecture on them (vit. Plot. 14); above all, as Geffcken has put it (*Auszang*, 42), "he does not stand on top of a system and preach: he investigates."

Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.23.30: λατρείαν ἵστων, ἀνδρέας, το τοῦ φιλοσόφου σχολείον; Sen. *Epist.* 48.4: ad miserum advocatus es . . . perditae vitae periturasque auxilium aliquod implorant. This language is common to all the schools. The Epicureans held that their concern was περὶ τῆς ἡμῶν λατρείαν (*Sent. Vat.* 64, cf. Epicurus, *Epist.* 3.122, πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχῆν ὑγιαίνον). Philo of Larissa οὐκέταί φησι τὸν φιλοσόφον λατρῶ (Stob. Ecl. 2.7.2, pp. 39 f. W.), and Plato himself is described in the anonymous *vita*, 9.36 ff., as a physician of souls. The ultimate source of all this is, no doubt, the Socratic θεραπεύειν ψυχῆς, but the frequency of the medical metaphor is nevertheless significant: On the social function of philosophy in the Hellenistic Age and later see especially Nock, *Conversion*, chap. xi.
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80 M. Ant. 3.4.3: ἑρεῖς τὸς καὶ ὑπούργος θεῶν.

81 Justin Martyr, Dial. 2.6. Cf. Porphyry, ad Marcellam 16: ψυχὴ δὲ σοφοῦ ἀμφότεραι πρὸς θεῶν, ἀεὶ θεῶν ὅρα, σύνεται ἀεὶ θεῶ.

82 Demetrius Cynicus (saec. 1 A.D.) apud Seneca, de beneficiis 7.1.5. f.

83 As Wendland points out (Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur, 226 ff.), the attitude of pagans like Demetrius is matched by that of Christian writers like Arnobius who held all secular learning to be unnecessary. And there is not a vast difference between the view of the Shorter Catechism that “the whole duty of man is to glorify God and enjoy him for ever” and the view of the pagan Hermetist who wrote that “philosophy consists exclusively in seeking to know God by habitual contemplation and holy piety” (Asclepius 12).

84 Meanwhile, see his Greek Piety (Eng. trans., 1948), and his articles on “The New Conception of the Universe in Late Greek Paganism” (Eranos, 44 [1946] 20 ff.) and “The Psychological Background of Late Greek Paganism” (Review of Religion, 1947, 115 ff.).


86 Bury thought that no misuse of “that vague and facile word ‘decadent’” could be more flagrant than its application to the Greeks of the third and second centuries (The Hellenistic Age, 2); and Tarn “ventures to entertain considerable doubts whether the true Greek really degenerated” (Hellenistic Civilisation, 5). As to Oriental influence on later Greek thought, the present tendency is to diminish the importance assigned to it in comparison with that of earlier Greek thinkers, especially Plato (cf. Nilsson, Greek Piety, 136 ff.; Festugière, Le Dieu cosmique, xii ff.). Such men as Zeno of Citium, Posidonius, Plotinus, and even the authors of the philosophic Hermetica, are no longer considered as “Orientalisers” in any fundamental sense. There is also now a reaction against exaggerated estimates of the influence of Eastern mystery cults: cf. Nock, CAH XII, 436, 448 f.; Nilsson, op. cit., 161.

87 Cf. the remarks of N. H. Baynes, JRS 33 (1943) 33. It is worth remembering that the creators of Greek civilisation were themselves to all appearance the products of a cross between Indo-European and non-Indo-European stocks.
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W. R. Halliday, *The Pagan Background of Early Christianity*, 205. Others, with more reason, have blamed the thinness of the civilised upper crust and the total failure of higher education to reach or influence the masses (so, e.g., Eitrem, *Orakel und Mysterien am Ausgang der Antike*, 14 ff.).


See chap. ii, n. 92.

A book published in 1946 states that there are at present some 25,000 practising astrologers in the United States, and that about 100 American newspapers now provide their readers with daily divinations (Bergen Evans, *The Natural History of Nonsense*, 257). I regret that I have no comparable figures for Britain or Germany.

Nilsson, *Greek Piety*, 140.


There are important exceptions to this, particularly in the work of Strato in physics (cf. B. Farrington, *Greek Science*, II.27 ff.), and in the fields of anatomy and physiology. In optics Ptolemy devised a number of experiments, as A. Lejeune has shown in his *Euclide et Ptolemée*.

Cf. Farrington, *op. cit.*, II.163 ff., and Walbank, *Decline of the Roman Empire in the West*, 67 ff. I have simplified the argument, but I hope without doing it serious injustice.


That we have so little evidence from the Hellenistic Age may well be due to the almost total loss of the prose literature of that period. But its history does provide one very striking instance of a mass upsurge of irrationalist religion, the Dionysiac movement in Italy which was suppressed in 186 B.C. and the following years. It claimed to have a vast following, “almost a second people.” Cf. Nock, *op. cit.*, 71 ff.; E. Fraenkel, *Hermes*, 67 (1932) 369 ff.; and most recently J. J. Tierney, *Proc. R.I.A.* 51 (1947) 89 ff.


If we can trust Lucian, Peregrinus too used to smear his face with mud (*Peregr.* 17), though perhaps from other motives. Lucian explained everything in Peregrinus’ strange career as due to a craving for notoriety. And there may be an element of truth in his diagnosis: P.’s exhibitionism à la Diogenes (*ibid.*), if it is not simply
a trait conventionally ascribed to extreme Cynics, seems to con-
firm it better than Lucian could know. Yet it is difficult to read
Lucian's angry narrative without feeling that the man was a good
deal more than a vulgar charlatan. Neurotic he certainly was,
possibly to a point not far removed at times from actual insanity;
yet many, both Christian and pagan, had seen in him a θεῖος ἀνήρ,
even a second Socrates (ibid., 4 f., 11 f.), and he enjoyed a post-
mortem cult (Athenagoras, Leg. pro Christ. 26). A psychologist
might be disposed to find the leitmotiv of his life in an inner
need to defy authority (cf. K. v. Fritz in P.-W., s.v.). And he
might go on to conjecture that this need was rooted in a family
situation, remembering the sinister rumour that Peregrinus was a
parricide, and remembering also those unexpected last words
before he leapt upon the pyre—δαίμονες μητρῴοι καὶ πατρῴοι,
δέξασθη εἰς εὐμενείς (Peregr. 36).

Campbell Bonner, "Some Phases of Religious Feeling in Later
iv, p. 116.

103 Cf. Cumont, After Life, lecture vii. Plutarch's δεισιδαιμον πικ-
tures "the deep gates of Hell opening," rivers of fire, the shrieks
of the damned, etc. (de superst. 4, 167A)—quite in the style
of the Apocalypse of Peter, which may have been written in Plu-
tarch's lifetime.

104 On amulets, see the important paper by Campbell Bonner in
Harvard Theol. Rev. 39 (1946) 25 ff. He points out that from the
first century A.D. onwards there was apparently a great increase
in the magical use of engraved gems (with which his paper is
primarily concerned). The compilation known as Kyranides,
whose older parts may go back to that century, abounds in recipes
for amulets against demons, phantasms, night fears, etc. How
far the fear of demons had gone in late antiquity, even in the edu-
cated class, may be seen from Porphyry's opinion that every house
and every animal body was full of them (de philosophia ex oraculis
haurienda, pp. 147 f. Wolff), and from the assertion of Tertullian
nullum paene hominem carere daemonio (de anima 57). It is true
that as late as the third and fourth centuries A.D. there were
rational men who protested against these beliefs (cf. Plot. Enn.
2.9.14; Philostorgius, Hist. Eccl. 8. 10; and other examples quoted
by Edelstein, "Greek Medicine in Its Relation to Religion and
Magic," Bull. Hist. Med. 5 [1937] 216 ff.). But they were a dimin-
ishing band. For Christians, the view that the pagan gods were
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truly existent evil spirits greatly added to the burden of fear. Nock goes so far as to say that “for the Apologists as a group and for Tertullian in his apologetic work the redemptive operation of Christ lay in deliverance from demons rather than in deliverance from sin” (Conversion, 222).

104 PGM viii.33 ff. (cf. P. Christ. 3); ἀντίθεος πλανοδαίμων, vii.635; κύων ἀκέφαλος, P. Christ. 158.

105 PGM vii.311 ff.; x.26 ff.; P. Christ. 10. The fear of terrifying dreams is also prominent in Plutarch’s picture of the δεισιδαίμων (de superst. 3, 165E ff.).

I believe that there are elements in our situation to-day which make it essentially different from any earlier human situation, and thus invalidate such cyclic hypotheses as Spengler’s. The point has been well put by Lippmann, A Preface to Morals, 232 ff.

107 A. Malraux, Psychologie de l’art (Paris, 1949). Cf. Auden’s observation that “the failure of the human race to acquire the habits that an open society demands if it is to function properly, is leading an increasing number of people to the conclusion that an open society is impossible, and that, therefore, the only escape from economic and spiritual disaster is to return as quickly as possible to a closed type of society” (loc. cit. supra, n. 2). Yet it is less than thirty years since Edwyn Bevan could write that “the idea of some cause going forward is so bred in the bone of modern men that we can hardly imagine a world in which the hope of improvement and advance is absent” (The Hellenistic Age, 101).

108 The late R. G. Collingwood held that “irrational elements . . . the blind forces and activities in us, which are part of human life . . . are not parts of the historical process.” This agrees with the practice of nearly all historians, past and present. My own conviction, which these chapters attempt to illustrate, is that our chance of understanding the historical process depends very largely on removing this quite arbitrary restriction upon our notion of it. The same point was repeatedly stressed by Cornford in relation to the history of thought: see especially The Unwritten Philosophy, 32 ff. As to the general position, I should accept L. C. Knights’ conclusion in his Explorations: “what we need is not to abandon reason, but simply to recognise that reason in the last three centuries has worked within a field which is not the whole of experience, that it has mistaken the part for the whole, and imposed arbitrary limits on its own working” (p. 111).
Appendix I

Maenadism

"In Art, as well as in poetry, the representation of these wild states of enthusiasm was apparently due to the imagination alone, for in prose literature we have very little evidence, in historic times, of women actually holding revels in the open air. Such a practice would have been alien to the spirit of seclusion which pervaded the life of womankind in Greece. . . . The festivals of the Thyiads were mainly confined to Parnassus." Thus Sandys in the introduction to his justly admired edition of the Bacchae. Diodorus, on the other hand, tells us (4.3) that "in many Greek states congregations (βακχεῖα) of women assemble every second year, and the unmarried girls are allowed to carry the thyrsus and share the transports of the elders (συνεθουσίατευ)." And since Sandys's day inscriptional evidence from various parts of the Greek world has confirmed Diodorus' statement. We know now that such biennial festivals (τριετηρίδες) existed at Thebes, Opus, Melos, Pergamum, Priene, Rhodes; and they are attested for Alea in Arcadia by Pausanias, for Mitylene by Aelian, for Crete by Firmicus Maternus. Their character may have varied a good deal from place to place, but we can hardly doubt that they normally included women's ὅργια of the ecstatic or quasi-ecstatic type described by Diodorus, and that these often, if not always, involved nocturnal ὅρμασις or mountain dancing. This strange rite, described in the Bacchae and practised by women's societies at the Delphic τριετηρίς down to Plutarch's time, was certainly practised elsewhere also: at Miletus the priestess of Dionysus still "led the women to the mountain" in late Hellenistic times; at Erythrae the title Μυμαντοβάτης points to an ὅρμασις on Mount Mimas. Dionysus himself is ὅρεως (Festus, p. 182), ὅρειμα-

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1 For numbered notes to Appendix I see pages 278-280 below.
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νῆς (Tryph. 370), ὀπέσασας, οὐρευσοφόρης (Anth. Pal. 9.524); and Strabo in discussing Dionysiac and other related mystery-cults speaks quite generally of τὰς ὀπέσασις τῶν περὶ τὸ θεῖον σπουδαζόντων (10.3.23). The oldest literary allusion is in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter, 386: ἵες ἱότε μανάς δρος κατὰ δὰσκοιν ἄλις.

The ὀπέσασια took place at night in midwinter, and must have involved great discomfort and some risk: Pausanias says that at Delphi the women went to the very summit of Parnassus (which is over 8,000 feet high), and Plutarch describes an occasion, apparently in his own lifetime, when they were cut off by a snowstorm and a rescue party had to be sent out—when they returned, their clothes were frozen as stiff as boards. What was the object of this practice? Many people dance to make their crops grow, by sympathetic magic. But such dances elsewhere are annual like the crops, not biennial like the ὀπέσασια; their season is spring, not midwinter; and their scene is the cornland, not the barren mountaintops. Late Greek writers thought of the dances at Delphi as commemorative: they dance, says Diodorus (4.3), “in imitation of the maenads who are said to have been associated with the god in the old days.” Probably he is right, as regards his own time; but ritual is usually older than the myth by which people explain it, and has deeper psychological roots. There must have been a time when the maenads or thyiads or ἄκεα really became for a few hours or days what their name implies—wild women whose human personality has been temporarily replaced by another. Whether this might still be so in Euripides’ day we have no sure means of knowing; a Delphic tradition recorded by Plutarch suggests that the rite sometimes produced a true disturbance of personality as late as the fourth century, but the evidence is very slender, nor is the nature of the change at all clear. There are, however, parallel phenomena in other cultures which may help us to understand the πάροδος of the Bacchae and the punishment of Agave.

In many societies, perhaps in all societies, there are people for whom, as Mr. Aldous Huxley puts it, “ritual dances provide a religious experience that seems more satisfying and convincing than any other... It is with their muscles that they most easily obtain knowledge of the divine.” Mr. Huxley thinks that Christianity made a mistake when it allowed the dance to become completely secularised, since, in the words of a Mohammedan sage, “he that knows the Power of the Dance dwells in God.” But the Power of the Dance
is a dangerous power. Like other forms of self-surrender, it is easier to begin than to stop. In the extraordinary dancing madness which periodically invaded Europe from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, people danced until they dropped—like the dancer at *Bacchae* 136 or the dancer on a Berlin vase, no. 2471—^11—and lay unconscious, trodden underfoot by their fellows. Also the thing is highly infectious. As Pentheus observes at *Bacchae* 778, it spreads like wildfire. The will to dance takes possession of people without the consent of the conscious mind: e.g., at Liège in 1374, after certain possessed folk had come dancing half-naked into the town with garlands on their heads, dancing in the name of St. John, we are told that “many persons seemingly sound in mind and body were suddenly possessed by the devils and joined the dancers”; these persons left house and home, like the Theban women in the play; even young girls cut themselves off from their family and friends and wandered away with the dancers. Against a similar mania in seventeenth-century Italy “neither youth nor age,” it is said, “afforded any protection; so that even old men of ninety threw aside their crutches at the sound of the tarantella, and as if some magic potion, restorative of youth and vigour, flowed through their veins, they joined the most extravagant dancers.”

The Cadmus-Teiresias scene of the *Bacchae* was thus, it would appear, frequently reenacted, justifying the poet’s remark (206 ff.) that Dionysus imposes no age limit. Even sceptics were sometimes, like Agave, infected with the mania against their will, and contrary to their professed belief.” In Alsace it was held in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that the dancing madness could be imposed on a victim by cursing him with it. In some cases the compulsive obsession reappeared at regular intervals, growing in intensity until St. John’s or St. Vitus’ day, when an outbreak occurred and was followed by a return to normality; while in Italy the periodic “cure” of afflicted patients by music and ecstatic dancing seems to have developed into an annual festival.

This last fact suggests the way in which in Greece the ritual oreibasia at a fixed date may originally have developed out of spontaneous attacks of mass hysteria. By canalising such hysteria in an organised rite once in two years, the Dionysiac cult kept it within bounds and gave it a relatively harmless outlet. What the πάροδος of the *Bacchae* depicts is hysteria subdued to the service of religion; what happened on Mount Cithaeron was hysteria in the raw, the
dangerous Bacchism which descends as a punishment on the too respectable and sweeps them away against their will. Dionysus is present in both: like St. John or St. Vitus, he is the cause of madness and the liberator from madness, Bάκχος and Αἴουσ. We must keep this ambivalence in mind if we are rightly to understand the play. To resist Dionysus is to repress the elemental in one's own nature; the punishment is the sudden complete collapse of the inward dykes when the elemental breaks through perforce and civilisation vanishes.

There are, further, certain resemblances in points of detail between the orgiastic religion of the Bacchae and orgiastic religion elsewhere, which are worth noticing because they tend to establish that the "maenad" is a real, not a conventional figure, and one that has existed under different names at widely different times and places. The first concerns the flutes and tympana or kettledrums which accompany the maenad dance in the Bacchae and on Greek vases. To the Greeks these were the "orgiastic" instruments par excellence: they were used in all the great dancing cults, those of the Asiatic Cybele and the Cretan Rhea as well as that of Dionysus. They could cause madness, and in homoeopathic doses they could also cure it. And 2,000 years later, in the year 1518, when the crazy dancers of St. Vitus were dancing through Alsace, a similar music—the music of drum and pipe—was used again for the same ambiguous purpose, to provoke the madness and to cure it: we still have the minute of the Strassburg Town Council on the subject. That is certainly not tradition, probably not coincidence: it looks like the rediscovery of a real causal connection, of which to-day only the War Office and the Salvation Army retain some faint awareness.

A second point is the carriage of the head in Dionysiac ecstasy. This is repeatedly stressed in the Bacchae: 150, "flinging his long hair to the sky"; 241, "I will stop you tossing back your hair"; 930, "tossing my head forwards and backwards like a bacchanal"; similarly elsewhere the possessed Cassandra "flings her golden locks when there blows from God the compelling wind of second-sight" (I.A. 758). The same trait appears in Aristophanes, Lysist. 1312, ταὶ δὲ κόμαι σελευθ’ ἄπερ βακχὰν, and is constant, though less vividly described, in later writers: the maenads still "toss their heads" in Catullus, in Ovid, in Tacitus. And we see this back-flung head and upturned throat in ancient works of art, e.g., the gems figured by Sandys, pages 58 and 73, or the maenad on the bas-relief in the
British Museum (Marbles II, pl. xiii, Sandys, p. 85). But the gesture is not simply a convention of Greek poetry and art; at all times and everywhere it characterizes this particular type of religious hysteria. I take three independent modern descriptions: "the continual jerking their heads back, causing their long black hair to twist about, added much to their savage appearance"; "their long hair was tossed about by the rapid to-and-fro movements of the head"; "the head was tossed from side to side or thrown far back above a swollen and bulging throat." The first phrase is from a missionary's account of a cannibal dance in British Columbia which led up to the tearing asunder and eating of a human body; the second describes a sacral dance of goat-eaters in Morocco; the third is from a clinical description of possessive hysteria by a French doctor.

Nor is this the only analogy which links these scattered types. The ecstatic dancers in Euripides "carried fire on their heads and it did not burn them" (757). So does the ecstatic dancer elsewhere. In British Columbia he dances with glowing coals held in his hands, plays with them recklessly, and even puts them in his mouth; so he does in South Africa; and so also in Sumatra. In Siam he claims to be invulnerable so long as the god remains within him—just as the dancers on Cithaeron were invulnerable (Ba. 761). And our European doctors have found an explanation or half-explanation in their hospitals; during his attacks the hysterical patient is often in fact analgesic—all sensitiveness to pain is repressed.

An interesting account of the use, both spontaneous and curative, of ecstatic dancing and ecstatic music (trumpet, drum, and fife) in Abyssinia at the beginning of the nineteenth century is to be found in The Life and Adventures of Nathaniel Pearce, written by himself during a Residence in Abyssinia from the years 1810 to 1819, I.290 ff. It has several points in common with Euripides' description. At the culminating moment of the dance the patient "made a start with such swiftness that the fastest runner could not come up with her [cf. Bacch. 748, 1090], and when at a distance of about 200 yards she dropped on a sudden as if shot" (cf. Bacch. 136 and n. 11 below). Pearce's native wife, who caught the mania, danced and jumped "more like a deer than a human being" (cf. Bacch. 866 ff., 166 ff.). Again, "I have seen them in these fits dance with a bruly, or bottle of maize, upon their heads without spilling the liquor, or letting the
bottle fall, although they have put themselves into the most extravagant postures” (cf. *Bacch.* 775 f., Nonnus, 45.294 ff.).

The whole description of the maenads’ raid on the Theban villages (*Bacch.* 748–764) corresponds to the known behaviour of comparable groups elsewhere. Among many peoples persons in abnormal states, whether natural or induced, are privileged to plunder the community: to interfere with their acts would be dangerous, since they are for the time being in contact with the supernatural. Thus in Liberia the novices who are undergoing initiation in the forest are licensed to raid and plunder neighbouring villages, carrying off everything they want; so also the members of secret societies in Senegal, the Bismarck Archipelago, etc., during the period when their rites have set them apart from the community. This state of affairs belongs no doubt to a stage of social organisation which fifth-century Greece had long outgrown; but legend or ritual may have preserved the memory of it, and Euripides may have encountered the actuality in Macedonia. An attenuated ritual survival is perhaps to be seen even to-day in the behaviour of the Viza mummers: “in general,” says Dawkins, “anything lying about may be seized as a pledge to be redeemed, and the Koritzia [girls] especially carry off babies with this object.” Are these girls the direct descendants of the baby-stealing maenads of *Bacch.* 754 (who appear also in Nonnus and on vases)?

Another obviously primitive element is the snake-handling (*Bacch.* 101 ff., 698, 768). Euripides has not understood it, although he knows that Dionysus can appear as a snake (1017 f.). It is shown on vases, and after Euripides it becomes part of the conventional literary portrait of the maenad; but it would seem that only in the more primitive cult of Sabazius, and perhaps in Macedonian Bacchism, was the living snake, as vehicle of the god, actually handled in ritual in classical times. That such handling, even without any underlying belief in the snake’s divinity, may be a powerful factor in producing religious excitement is shown by a curious recent account, with photographs, of the rattlesnake ritual practised in the Holiness Church in remote mining villages in Leslie and Perry counties, Kentucky. According to this report the snake-handling (which is ostensibly based on Mark 16:18, “They shall take up serpents”) forms part of a religious service, and is preceded and accompanied by ecstatic dancing and followed by exhaustion. The snakes are taken from boxes and passed from hand to hand (apparently by both sexes); photographs show them held high
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above the worshipper's head (cf. Demos. de cor. 259 ὑπὲρ τῆς κεφαλῆς αἰωρᾶν) or close to the face. "One man thrust one inside his shirt and caught it as it wriggled out before it could fall to the floor"—an oddly exact parallel to the ritual act of the Sabaziasts described by Clement and Arnobius, and one which may lead us to hesitate before agreeing with Dieterich that the act in question "can signify absolutely nothing else than the sexual union of the god with the initiate!"

It remains to say something of the culminating act of the Dionysiac winter dance, which was also the culminating act of the Columbian and Moroccan dances mentioned above—the tearing to pieces, and swallowing raw, of an animal body, σπαραγμὸς and ὀμοφαγία. The gloating descriptions of this act in certain Christian Fathers may well be discounted, and it is hard to know how much weight to attach to the anonymous evidence of scholiasts and lexicographers on the subject; but that it still had some place in the Greek orgiastic ritual in classical times is attested not only by the respectable authority of Plutarch, but by the regulations of the Dionysiac cult at Miletus in 276 B.C., where we read μὴ ἔσείναι ὀμοφάγιον ἐμβαλέιν μηθεὶν πρῶτερον ἡ ή λέρεια ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἐμβάλη. The phrase ὀμοφάγιον ἐμβαλέιν has puzzled scholars. I do not think that it means "to throw a sacrificial animal into a pit" (Wiegand, ad loc.) or "to throw a joint of beef into a sacred place" (Haussoulier, R.E.G. 32.266). A bloodier but more convincing picture is suggested by Ernest Thesiger's account of an annual rite which he witnessed in Tangier in 1907: "A hill-tribe descends upon the town in a state of semi-starvation and drugged delirium. After the usual beating of tom-toms, screaming of the pipes and monotonous dancing, a sheep is thrown into the middle of the square, upon which all the devotees come to life and tear the animal limb from limb and eat it raw." The writer adds a story that "one year a Tangier Moor, who was watching the proceedings, got infected with the general frenzy of the crowd and threw his baby into the middle of them." Whether the last is true or not, the passage gives a clue to the meaning of ἐμβαλέιν, and also illustrates the possible dangers of unregulated ὀμοφαγία. The administration at Miletus was engaged in the ever-recurrent task of putting Dionysus in a strait waistcoat.

In the Bacchae, σπαραγμὸς is practised first on the Theban cattle and then on Pentheus; in both cases it is described with a gusto which
the modern reader has difficulty in sharing. A detailed description of the ὀμοφαγία would perhaps have been too much for the stomachs even of an Athenian audience; Euripides speaks of it twice, Bacchae 139 and Cretans fragm. 472, but in each place he passes over it swiftly and discreetly. It is hard to guess at the psychological state that he describes in the two words ὀμοφάγον χάριν; but it is noteworthy that the days appointed for ὀμοφαγία were “unlucky and black days,” and in fact those who practise such a rite in our time seem to experience in it a mixture of supreme exaltation and supreme repulsion: it is at once holy and horrible, fulfilment and uncleanness, a sacrament and a pollution—the same violent conflict of emotional attitudes that runs all through the Bacchae and lies at the root of all religion of the Dionysiac type.

Late Greek writers explained the ὀμοφαγία as they did the dancing, and as some would explain the Christian communion: it was merely a commemorative rite, in memory of the day when the infant Dionysus was himself torn to pieces and devoured. But the practice seems to rest in fact on a very simple piece of savage logic. The homeopathic effects of a flesh diet are known all over the world. If you want to be lion-hearted, you must eat lion; if you want to be subtle, you must eat snake; those who eat chickens and hares will be cowards, those who eat pork will get little piggy eyes. By parity of reasoning, if you want to be like god you must eat god (or at any rate something which is θείον). And you must eat him quick and raw, before the blood has oozed from him: only so can you add his life to yours, for “the blood is the life.” God is not always there to be eaten, nor indeed would it be safe to eat him at common times and without due preparation for the reception of the sacrament. But once in two years he is present among his mountain dancers: “the Boeotians,” says Diodorus (4.3), “and the other Greeks and Thracians believe that at this time he has his epiphany among men”—just as he has in the Bacchae. He may appear in many forms, vegetable, bestial, human; and he is eaten in many forms. In Plutarch’s day it was the ivy that was torn to pieces and chewed: that may be primitive, or it may be a surrogate for something bloodier. In Euripides bulls are torn, the goat torn and eaten; we hear elsewhere of ὀμοφαγία of fawns and rending of vipers. Since in all these we may with greater or less probability recognise embodiments of the god, I incline to accept Gruppe’s view that the ὀμοφαγία was a sacrament in which God was present in his beast-
vehicle and was torn and eaten in that shape by his people. And I have argued elsewhere that there once existed a more potent, because more dreadful, form of this sacrament, viz., the rending, and perhaps the eating, of God in the shape of man; and that the story of Pentheus is in part a reflection of that act—in opposition to the fashionable euhemerism which sees in it only the reflection of a historical conflict between Dionysiac missionaries and their opponents.

To sum up: I have tried to show that Euripides’ description of maenadism is not to be accounted for in terms of “the imagination alone”; that inscriptions evidence (incomplete as it is) reveals a closer relationship with actual cult than Victorian scholars realised; and that the maenad, however mythical certain of her acts, is not in essence a mythological character but an observed and still observable human type. Dionysus has still his votaries or victims, though we call them by other names; and Pentheus was confronted by a problem which other civil authorities have had to face in real life.

NOTES TO APPENDIX I

1 This traditional rendering of βακχειεων has unfortunate associations. βακχειεων is not to have a good time, but to share in a particular religious rite and (or) have a particular religious experience—the experience of communion with a god which transformed a human being into a βακχος or a βάκχη.

2 Fouilles de Delphes, III.i.195; IG IX.282, XII.iii.1089; Fraenkel, In. Perg. 248 (cf. Suidas, s.v. τραγηνης); Hiller v. Gärtringen, In. Priene 113, 1. 79; IG XII.i.155, 730; Paus. 8.23.1; Ael. Var. Hist. 13.2; Firm. Mat. Err. prof. rel. 6.5. Also τραγηνηδες among the half-Hellenised Budini in Thrace, Hdt. 4.108.

3 Wiegand, Milet, IV.547 els δρος ἂγε: cf. Bacch. 116, 165, 977, which suggest that els δρος may have been a ritual cry.

4 Waddington, Explic. des Inscr. d’Asie Mineur, p. 27, no. 57. That the title is Dionysiac is not certain. But there is literary evidence of Dionysiac δραματα on Tmolus, the eastern part of the same mountain range: Nonnus 40.273: εις σκοπίας Τμωλου θεόσων ηι Βάκχη, H. Orph. 49.6: Τμωλος ... καλὸν λυδοίσα θάσμα (hence ιερὸν Τμωλον, Eur. Bacch. 65).

5 10.32.5. The statement has naturally been doubted.

6 de primo frigido 18, 953D.
Dancing as a form of worship long survived in certain of the American sects. Ray Strachey, *Group Movements of the Past*, 93, quotes the exhortation of the Shaker elder a hundred years ago: “Go forth, old men, young men and maidens, and worship God with all your might in the dance.” And it appears that the sacramal dance is still practised by members of the Holiness Church in Kentucky (*Picture Post*, December 31, 1938), as it is by the Jewish Hasidim (L. H. Feldman, *Harv. Theol. Rev.* 42 [1949] 65 ff.).


Chronicle of Limburg (1374), quoted by A. Martin, “Gesch. der Tanzkrankheit in Deutschland,” *Zeitschrift d. Vereins f. Volkskunde*, 24 (1914). Similarly the Ghost Dance, for which North American Indians developed a passion in the 1890’s, went on “till the dancers, one after another, fell rigid, prostrate on the ground” (Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, 92).

Quoted by Martin, *loc. cit.*, from various contemporary documents. His account supplements, and in some points corrects, the classic work of J. F. K. Hecker, *Die Tanzwuth* (1832: I quote from the Eng. trans. by Babington, Cassell’s Library, 1888).

Hecker, *op. cit.*, 152 f. So Brunel says of certain Arab dances that “the contagious madness infects everybody” (*Essai sur la confrérie religieuse des Aissâoûa au Maroc*, 119). The dancing madness in Thuringia in 1921 was similarly infectious (see my edition of the *Bacchae*, p. xiii, n. 1).

Hecker, 156.

Martin, 120 ff.

Hecker, 128 ff.; Martin, 125 ff.

Hecker, 143 f., 150. Martin, 129 ff., finds a formal and regulated survival of the Rhenish compulsive-curative dances in the annual dancing procession of Esternach, which is still believed to be a cure for epilepsy and similar psychopathic complaints.

Perhaps expressed in Laconia by the term ἄσωτος (the title of a tragedy by Pratinas, Nauck, *TGF*, p. 726). Failure to distinguish the “black” maenadism described by the Messengers from the “white” maenadism described by the Chorus has been responsible for much misunderstanding of the *Bacchae*.

Cf. Rohde, *Psyche*, ix, n. 21; Farnell, *Cults*, V.120. Others explain ἄσωτος and Λαῦαῖος as the liberator from convention (Wilamowitz)
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or the liberator of the imprisoned (Weinreich, *Tübinger Beiträge*, V [1930] 285 f., comparing *Bacch. 498*).

20 In vase paintings of maenads Lawler, *loc. cit.*, 107 f., finds 38 occurrences of the flute and 26 of the tympanum, also 38 of crotala or castanets (cf. Eur. *Cycl. 204 f.*). She notes that "tranquil scenes never show the use of the tympanum."


22 See chap. iii, pp. 78–80.

23 Martin, 121 f. So too the Turkish drum and shepherd’s pipe were used in Italy (Hecker, 151).


25 Further examples may be seen in Furtwängler, *Die antike Gemmen*, pl. 10, no. 49; pl. 36, nos. 35–37; pl. 41, no. 29; pl. 66, no. 7. Lawler, *loc. cit.*, 101, finds a “strong backward bend” of the head in 28 figures of maenads on vases.

26 Quoted in Frazer, *Golden Bough*, V.i.19. Similarly in voodoo dances “their heads are thrown weirdly back as if their necks were broken” (W. B. Seabrook, *The Magic Island*, 47).

27 Frazer, *ibid.*, V.i.21.


29 For other ancient evidence on this point see Rohde, *Psyche*, viii, n. 43.

30 Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, 176.


33 A. Bastian, *Völker des Oestlichen Asiens*, III.282 f.: “When the Chao (demon lord) is obliged by the conjurations to descend into the body of the Khon Song (a person dressed as the demon lord), the latter remains invulnerable so long as he is there, and cannot be touched by any kind of weapon” (quoted *ibid.*, 353).

34 Czapliska, *Aboriginal Siberia*, 176.


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37 JHS 26 (1906) 197; cf. Wace, BSA 16 (1909–1910) 237.
38 Nonnus, 45.294 ff. Cf. the maenad on a British Museum pyxis by the Meidias Painter (Beazley, ARV 833.14; Curtius, Pentheus, fig. 15) which is closely contemporary with the Bacchae. The child she carries is hardly her own, since it is brutally slung by the leg over her shoulder.
40 Demos. de cor. 259.
41 Plut. Alex. 2; Lucian, Alex. 7.
42 Even Sabazius, if we may believe Arnobius, eventually spared his worshippers’ nerves by allowing them to use a metal snake (see n. 44). The snakes in the Dionysiac procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus at Alexandria (Athen. 5.28) were doubtless sham ones (like the imitation ivy and grapes described in the same passage) since the ladies were ἐστεφανωμέναι ὀψευ: a wreath of live snakes, however tame, would come undone and spoil the effect.
43 Picture Post, December 31, 1938. I am indebted to Professor R. P. Winnington-Ingram for calling my attention to this article. I am informed that the ritual has resulted in deaths from snakebite, and has therefore now been prohibited by law. Snake-handling is also practised at Cocullo in the Abruzzi as the central feature of a religious festival; see Marian C. Harrison, Folklore, 18 (1907) 187 ff., and T. Ashby, Some Italian Scenes and Festivals, 115 ff.
44 Protrept. 2.16: δράκων δὲ ἐκείνῳ οὖν (sc. Σαβάζιος) διεκλήμενος τοῦ κόλπου τῶν τελουμένων, Arnob. 5.21: aureus coluber in sinum demittitur consecratis et eximitur rursus ab inferioribus partibus atque imis. Cf. also Firmicus Maternus, Err. prof. rel. 10.
45 Mithrasliturgie, 124. The unconscious motive may of course be sexual in both cases.
46 Collected in Farnell, Cults, V. 302 f., nn. 80–84.
47 Def. orac. 14, 417c: ἡμέρας ἀποφράδας καὶ σκηνωπάς, ἐν αἷς ὠμοφαγοῖαι καὶ διαστασμοί.
48 Milet, VI.22.
49 Kindly communicated to me by Miss N. C. Jolliffe. The Arab rite is also described by Brunel, op. cit. (n. 13 above), 110 ff., 177 ff. He adds the significant points that the animal is thrown from a roof or platform, where it is kept until the proper moment, lest the crowd should tear it to pieces too soon; and that the fragments of the creatures (bull, calf, sheep, goat, or hen) are preserved for use as amulets.
50 See n. 47.
Cf. Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, 179: “The very repugnance which the Kwakiutl (Indians of Vancouver Island) felt towards the act of eating human flesh made it for them a fitting expression of the Dionysian virtue that lies in the terrible and the forbidden.”


Plut. *Q. Rom.* 112, 291A.


Photius, s.v. *vespîτευ*. Cf. the art type of the maenad *vespôfôνος* most recently discussed by H. Philippart, *Iconographie des “Bacchantes,”* 41 ff.

Galen, *de antidot.* 1.6.14 (in a spring festival, probably of Sabazius).


See my introduction to the *Bacchae*, xvi f., xxiii ff.

As argued by Rapp, *Rh. Mus.* 27.1 ff., 562 ff., and accepted, e.g., by Marbach in *P.-W.*, s.v., and Voigt in *Roscher*, s.v. “Dionysos.”
Appendix II
Theurgy

The last half-century has seen a remarkable advance in our knowledge of the magical beliefs and practices of later antiquity. But in comparison with this general progress the special branch of magic known as theurgy has been relatively neglected and is still imperfectly understood. The first step towards understanding it was taken more than fifty years ago by Wilhelm Kroll, when he collected and discussed the fragments of the Chaldaean Oracles. Since then the late Professor Joseph Bidez has disinterred and explained a number of interesting Byzantine texts, mainly from Psellus, which appear to derive from Proclus' lost commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles, perhaps through the work of Proclus' Christian opponent, Procopius of Gaza; and Hopfner and Eitrem have made valuable contributions, especially in calling attention to the many common features linking theurgy with the Greco-Egyptian magic of the papyri. But much is still obscure, and is likely to remain so until the scattered texts bearing on theurgy have been collected and studied as a whole (a task which Bidez seems to have contemplated, but left unaccomplished at his death). The present paper does not aim at completeness, still less at finality, but only at (i) clarifying the relationship between Neoplatonism and theurgy in their historical development, and (ii) examining the actual modus operandi in what seem to have been the two main branches of theurgy.

I. The Founder of Theurgy

So far as we know, the earliest person to be described as θεούργος was one Julianus, who lived under Marcus Aurelius. Probably, as Bidez suggested, he invented the designation, to distinguish himself from mere θεολόγοι: the θεολόγοι talked about the gods, he "acted..."
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upon" them, or even, perhaps, "created" them. Of this personage we
know regrettably little. Suidas tells us that he was the son of a
"Chaldaean philosopher" of the same name, author of a work on
daemons in four books, and that he himself wrote Θεουργικὰ, Τελεο-
τικὰ, Λόγια δι' εἰκών. That these "hexameter oracles" were (as
Lobeck conjectured) none other than the Oracula Chaldaica on which
Proclus wrote a vast commentary (Marinus, vii. Procli 26) is put
beyond reasonable doubt by the reference of a scholiast on Lucian to τὰ τελεστικὰ Ἰουλιανοῦ & Πρόκλου υπομνήματι μελέτης, οἷς ὁ Προκόπιος ἀντιφθέγγεται, and Psellus' statement that Proclus "fell in love with the ἐπὶ, called Λόγια by their admirers, in which Julianus set forth
the Chaldaean doctrines." By his own account, Julianus received
these oracles from the gods: they were θεοπαράδοσα. Where he in
fact got them we do not know. As Kroll pointed out, their manner
and content suit the age of the Antonines better than any earlier
period. Julianus may of course have forged them; but their diction
is so bizarre and bombastic, their thought so obscure and incoherent,
as to suggest rather the trance utterances of modern "spirit guides"
than the deliberate efforts of a forger. It seems indeed not impossible,
in view of what we know about later theurgy, that they had their
origin in the "revelations" of some visionary or trance medium, and
that Julianus' part consisted, as Psellus (or his source Proclus)
asserts, in putting them into verse. This would be in accordance with
the established practice of official oracles; and the transposition
into hexameters would give an opportunity of introducing some sem-
blance of philosophical meaning and system into the rigmarole. But
the pious reader would still stand badly in need of some prose ex-
planation or commentary, and this also Julianus seems to have sup-
plied; for it is certainly he whom Proclus quotes (in Tim. III.124.32)
as δ θεουργὸς ἐν τοῖς υφηγητικοῖς. Marinus is probably referring to
the same commentary when he speaks of τὰ Λόγια καὶ τὰ σύντοιχα τῶν
Χαλδαίων συγγράμματα (vii. Procli 26), and Damascius (II.203.27)
when he cites οἱ θεοὶ καὶ ἀκπὸς δ θεουργὸς. Whether it was identical with
the Θεουργικά mentioned by Suidas we do not know. Proclus once
(in Tim. III.27.10) quotes Julianus ἐν ἐβδομῇ τῶν Ζωνών, which sounds
like a section of the Θεουργικά dealing in seven chapters with the
seven planetary spheres through which the soul descends and reascends
(cf. in Remp. II.220.11 ff.). On the probable content of the Τελεστικά,
see below, section IV.
Theurgy

Be the origin of the *Chaldaean Oracles* what it may, they certainly included not only prescriptions for a fire and sun cult but prescriptions for the magical evocation of gods (see below, p. 298). And later tradition represents the Juliani as potent magicians. According to Psellus, the elder Julianus "introduced" (συνεστησε) his son to the ghost of Plato; and it seems that they claimed to possess a spell (ἀγωγή) for producing an apparition of the god Ξρήνος. They could also cause men’s souls to leave and reenter the body. Nor was their fame confined to Neoplatonic circles. The timely thunderstorm which saved the Roman army during Marcus’ campaign against the Quadi in 173 A.D. was attributed by some to the magic arts of the younger Julianus; in Psellus’ version of the story Julianus makes a human mask of clay which discharges "unendurable thunderbolts" at the enemy. Sozomen has heard of his splitting a stone by magic (*Hist. Eccl.* 1.18); and a picturesque Christian legend shows him competing in a display of magical powers with Apollonius and Apuleius: Rome being stricken with a plague, each magician is assigned the medical superintendence of one sector of the city; Apuleius undertakes to stop the plague in fifteen days, Apollonius in ten, but Julianus stops it instantly by a mere word of command.

II. Theurgy in the Neoplatonic School

The creator of theurgy was a magician, not a Neoplatonist. And the creator of Neoplatonism was neither a magician nor—pace certain modern writers—a theurgist. Plotinus is never described by his successors as a θεουργός, nor does he use the term θεουργία or its cognates in his writings. There is in fact no evidence that he had ever heard of Julianus and his *Chaldaean Oracles*. Had he known them he would presumably have subjected them to the same critical treatment as the revelations "of Zoroaster and Zostrianus and Nikotheos and Allogenes and Mesos and others of the sort," which were analysed and exposed in his seminar. For in his great defence of the Greek rationalist tradition, the essay Against the Gnostics (*Enn.* 2.9), he makes very clear both his distaste for all such megalomaniac "special revelations" and his contempt for τοῖς πολλοῖς, οί τὰς παρὰ τοῖς μάγοις δυνάμεις θαυμάζουσι (c. 14, I.203.32 Volkmann). Not that he denied the efficacy of magic (could any man of the third century deny it?). But it did not interest him. He saw in it merely an application to mean personal ends of "the true magic which is the sum of
love and hatred in the universe," the mysterious and truly admirable συμπάθεια which makes the cosmos one; men marvel at human γνώση more than at the magic of nature only because it is less familiar.29

Despite all this, the article "Theurgie" which appeared in a recent volume of Pauly-Wissowa calls Plotinus a theurgist, and Eitrem has lately spoken of "Plotin, dont sans doute dérive la théurgie."30 The main grounds for this opinion seem to be (1) his alleged28 Egyptian birth and the fact that he studied at Alexandria under Ammonius Saccas; (2) his allegedly profound32 knowledge of Egyptian religion; (3) his experience of unio mystica (Porph. vit. Plot. 23); and (4) the affair at the Iseum in Rome (ibid., 10, quoted and discussed in section III below, p. 289). Of these considerations only the last seems to me to be really relevant. On the first point it must suffice here to say that Plotinus' name is Roman, that his manner of thought and speech is characteristically Greek, and that in the little we know of Ammonius Saccas there is nothing which warrants calling him a theurgist. As to the acquaintance with Egyptian religion displayed in the Enneads, I cannot see that it amounts to more than a few casual references to matters of common knowledge: Porphyry learned as much or more by reading Chaeremon.33 And as to the Plotinian unio mystica, it must surely be clear to any careful reader of passages like Enn. 1.6.9 or 6.7.34, that it is attained, not by any ritual of evocation or performance of prescribed acts, but by an inward discipline of the mind which involves no compulsive element and has nothing whatever to do with magic.44 There remains the affair of the Iseum. That is theurgy, or something like it. It rests, however, only on school gossip (see below). And in any case one visit to a séance does not make a man a spiritualist, especially if, like Plotinus, he goes there on someone else's initiative.

Plotinus is a man who, as Wilhelm Kroll put it, "raised himself by a strong intellectual and moral effort above the fog-ridden atmosphere which surrounded him." While he lived, he lifted his pupils with him. But with his death the fog began to close in again, and later Neoplatonism is in many respects a retrogression to the spineless syncretism from which he had tried to escape. The conflict between Plotinus' personal influence and the superstitions of the time appears very plainly in the wavering attitude of his pupil Porphyry35—an honest, learned, and lovable man, but no consistent or creative
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thinker. Deeply religious by temperament, he had an incurable weakness for oracles. Before he met Plotinus he had already published a collection under the title Περὶ τῆς ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας. Some of these refer to mediums, and are themselves clearly what we should call “séance-room” products (see below, section v). But there is no trace of his having quoted the Chaldaean Oracles (or used the term theurgy) in this work; probably he was still unaware of their existence when he wrote it. Later, when Plotinus has taught him to ask questions, he addresses a series of decidedly searching and often ironsounding inquiries on demonology and occultism to the Egyptian Anebo and points out, among other things, the folly of attempting to put magical constraint on gods. It was probably later still, after the death of Plotinus, that he disinterred the Chaldaean Oracles from the obscurity in which they had survived (as such books do) for more than a century, wrote a commentary on them, and “made continual mention of them” in his de regressu animae. The latter work he held that theurgic τελεταί could purify the πνευματικὴ ψυχή and make it “aptam susceptioni spirituum et angelorum et ad videndos deos”; but he warned his readers that the practice was perilous and capable of evil as well as good uses, and denied that it could achieve, or was a necessary ancillary to, the soul’s return to god. But he had made a dangerous concession to the opposing school.

The answer of that school came in Iamblichus’ commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles and in the extant treatise de mysteriis. The de mysteriis is a manifesto of irrationalism, an assertion that the road to salvation is found not in reason but in ritual. “It is not thought that links the theurgists with the gods: else what should hinder theoretical philosophers from enjoying theurgic union with them? The case is not so. Theurgic union is attained only by the efficacy of the unspeakable acts performed in the appropriate manner, acts which are beyond all comprehension, and by the potency of the unutterable symbols which are comprehended only by the gods.... Without intellectual effort on our part the tokens (συνθήματα) by their own virtue accomplish their proper work” (de myst. 96.13 Parthey). To the discouraged minds of fourth-century pagans such a message offered a seductive comfort. The “theoretical philosophers” had now been arguing for some nine centuries, and what had come of it? Only a visibly declining culture, and the creeping growth of that Christian
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\( \delta \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \nu s \) which was too plainly sucking the lifeblood of Hellenism. As vulgar magic is commonly the last resort of the personally desperate, of those whom man and God have alike failed, so theurgy became the refuge of a despairing intelligentsia which already felt \textit{la fascination de l'abîme}.

Nevertheless it would seem that even in the generation after Iamblichus theurgy was not yet fully accepted in the Neoplatonic school. Eunapius in an instructive passage (\textit{vit. soph.} 474 f. Boissonade) shows us Eusebius of Myndus, a pupil of Iamblichus' pupil Aedesius, maintaining in his lectures that magic was an affair of "crazed persons who make a perverted study of certain powers derived from matter," and warning the future emperor Julian against "that stagy miracle-worker" the theurgist Maximus: he concludes, in words which recall Plotinus, \( \varepsilon \rho \varepsilon \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \nu s \) \( \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \phi \varepsilon \iota \alpha \) \( \varepsilon \varepsilon \o \varepsilon \nu s \) \( \iota \varepsilon \varepsilon \omega \varepsilon \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \nu s \) \( \varepsilon \varepsilon \o \varepsilon \nu s \) \( \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \phi \varepsilon \iota \alpha \). To which the prince replied: "You can stick to your books: I know now where to go"—and betook himself to Maximus. Shortly afterwards we find the young Julian asking his friend Priscus to get him a good copy of Iamblichus' commentary on his namesake theurgist (Julianus the theurgist); for, says he, "I am greedy for Iamblichus in philosophy and my namesake in theosophy [\textit{theosofía}, i.e. theurgy], and think nothing of the rest in comparison."\textsuperscript{47}

Julian's patronage made theurgy temporarily fashionable. When as emperor he set about reforming the pagan clergy, the theurgist Chrysanthius found himself \( \alpha \rho \chi i \beta e l s \) of Lydia; while Maximus as theurgic consultant to the imperial court became a wealthy and influential \textit{éménence grise}, since \( \upsilon \varepsilon \rho \tau \nu \nu \varepsilon \rho \nu \tau \tau \nu \varepsilon \pi \iota \tau \varepsilon s \) \( \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \phi \iota \alpha \tau \varepsilon \varepsilon \nu s \) \( \alpha \nu \varepsilon \varepsilon \rho \varepsilon \nu s \) (Eunap. p. 477 Boiss.; cf. Amm. Marc. 22.7.3 and 25.4.17). But Maximus paid for this in the subsequent Christian reaction, when he was fined, tortured, and eventually in 371 executed on a charge of conspiracy against the Emperors (Eunap. p. 478; Amm. Marc. 29.1.42; Zosimus 4.15). For some time after this event theurgists deemed it prudent to lie low;\textsuperscript{48} but the tradition of their art was quietly handed down in certain families.\textsuperscript{49} In the fifth century it was again openly taught and practised by the Athenian Neoplatonists: Proclus not only composed a \( \Pi er \ \alpha \gamma \omega \gamma \hat{n} \) and a further commentary on the \textit{Chaldaean Oracles}, but also enjoyed personal visions (\textit{α\beta\omicron\theta\omicron\omicron\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron\nu}) of luminous "Hecatic" phantasms and was, like the founder of the cult, great at rainmaking.\textsuperscript{50} After Justinian theurgy went under-
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ground again, but did not wholly die. Psellus has described a θεαγωγία conducted by an archbishop on the lines of pagan theurgy (τοῖς Χαλκαίων λόγοις ἐπίμενοι), which he asserts took place at Byzantium in the eleventh century; and Proclus’ commentary on the Oracles was still known, directly or indirectly, to Nicephoros Gregoras in the fourteenth.

III. A Séance in the Iseum

Porphyry, vita Plotini io (16.12 ff. Volk.): Αλγυπτιός γὰρ τις λεπές ἀνελθὼν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην καὶ διὰ τῶν φίλων αὐτῷ (sc. Πλωτίνῳ) γνωρισθέων θέλων τε τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας ἀπόδειξιν δοῦναι ἕξωσε τὸν Πλωτίνον ἕπι θέαν ἀφικέσθαι τοῦ σωφτοῦ αὐτῷ οἰκεῖον δαίμωνος καλομένου. τοῦ δὲ ἐπιμώς ὑπακούσαντος γίνεται μὲν ἐν τῷ Ἰσείῳ ἡ κλῆσις: μόνον γὰρ ἐκείνου τὸν τόπον καθαρόν φασίν εὑρεῖν ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ τὸν Αλγυπτιόν. κληθέντα δὲ εἰς αὐτοφίλα τὸν δαίμονα θεὶν ἔλθειν καὶ μὴ τοῦ δαίμονον εἶναι γένους· ἢς τὸν Αλγυπτιόν εἶπεῖν· μακάριος εἰ θεὶν ἔχων τὸν δαίμονα καὶ οὐ τὸν οφειμένον γένους τὸν σωφτα. μὴτε δὲ ἐρέσθαι τι ἐγκενέσθαι μὴτε ἐπιτλέον ἰδεῖν παρόντα, τοῦ συνεωροῦντος φίλων τὰς ὄρνες, ἀς κατείχε φυλακῆς ἕνεκα, πνείαντος εἴτε διὰ φόβουν εἴτε καὶ διὰ φόβον τινά.

This curious passage has been discussed by Hopfner, OZ II.125, and more fully by Eitrem, Symb. Oslo. 22.62 ff. We should not attach too high a historical value to it. Porphyry’s use of φασίν33 shows that his source was neither Plotinus himself nor any of the actual “sitters”; and since he says that the affair prompted the composition of Plotinus’ essay, Περὶ τῶν ἐλιχύτων ἡμᾶς δαίμονος (Enn. 3.4), it must have taken place, like the composition of that essay, before Porphyry’s own arrival in Rome, and at least thirty-five years before the publication of the vita. The testimony on which his story rests is thus neither first-hand nor (probably) close in time to the event. It cannot, as Eitrem rightly says, “avoir la valeur d’une attestation authentique.”34 Nevertheless, it affords an interesting if tantalizing glimpse of high-class magical procedure in the third century.

Neither the purpose nor the place of the séance need much surprise us. The belief in an indwelling δαίμων is very old and widespread, and was accepted and rationalised, in their respective fashions, by Plato and by the Stoics.35 That it may have played some part in Greco-Egyptian magic is suggested by PGM vii.505 ff., where a recipe, unfortunately incomplete, is headed Συντασσε ἱθὼν δαίμονος.36 (It should not, however, be confused with the much commoner evocation of a
πάρεδρος or "familiar," whose connection with the magician is created for the first time by the magical procedure.) For the δαιμον turning out to be a god, cf., besides Plot. Enn. 3.4.6 (I.265.4 Volk.) δαιμον τοις θείοι (quoted by Eitrem), Olympiodorus in Alc. p. 20 Cr., where, after distinguishing θείοι δαιμόνες from those of lower rank, he tells us that οἱ κατ' ουσίαν έαυτών βιώντες καὶ ὁ πεφύκας τῶν θείοι δαιμόνων ἔχουσιν εἰληξία. . . κατ' ουσίαν δὲ ἐστὶ ξῆν το πρόσ- φορον αἱρεῖσθαι βλον τῇ σειρᾷ υφ' ἤν ἀνάγεται, οἷον στρατιωτικάν μέν, ἐὰν ὑπὸ τὴν ἀρείκην, κτλ. As to the choice of place, it is sufficiently explained by the well-known requirement of a τόπος καθαρᾶς for magical operations,67 together with Chaeremon's statement that Egyptian temples were accessible at ordinary times only to those who had purified themselves and undergone severe fasts.68

But what puzzles Eitrem, as it has puzzled me, is the part played by the birds, ἃς κατέχει φυλακῆς ἕνεκα, i.e., to protect the operators from attack by evilly disposed spirits (not, surely, to keep the birds themselves from flying away, as MacKenna, Bréhier, and Harder unanimously mistranslate: for then their presence would be wholly unexplained). Protective measures are sometimes prescribed in the papyri.69 But how did the birds act as a φυλακῆ? And why did their death banish the apparition? Hopfner says that the impurity of death drove the god away: they were brought there so that their killing should act as an ἀπόλυσις in case of need,66 but it was done prematurely and needlessly. Eitrem, on the other hand, comparing PGM xii.15 ff., where the strangling of birds is part of the ritual for animating a wax figure of Eros, thinks that the real intention must have been sacrifice and that Porphyry or his informant misunderstood what happened: he finds the motives attributed to the φιλος "invirosenblables." In support of this view he might have quoted Porphyry's own statement in the Letter to Anebo67 that διὰ νεκρῶν ζώων τὰ πολλὰ ἁλ θεαγωγηλαι ἐπιείλοιτα, which seems to put Hopfner's explanation out of court. There is, however, another passage of Porphyry which appears to imply that in killing birds on this occasion the φιλος was breaking a rule of the theurgic μυστήριον: at de abst. 4.16 (255.7 N.) he says, δοτις δὲ φαιματων φύσιν λατήσοντε, οἴδεν καθ' ὁν νόμον ἀπέχεσθαι χρή πάντων ὄρνιθων, καὶ μάλιστα δυν ἀπέχεσθαι οἷον τῶν χθονίων ἀπαλλαγῆναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς υἱονιούς θεούς ἱδρυνθῆναι. This fits the occasion at the Iseum so aptly (for ἀπέχεσθαι can surely cover abstention from killing as well as from eating) that it is difficult not
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to feel that Porphyry had it in mind. We may perhaps compare also
the Pythagorean rule which specifically forbade the sacrifice of cocks
(Iamb. vit. Pyth. 147, Protrept. 21).

But if so, why were the birds there? Possibly because their presence
was in itself a φυλακή. δρυιδες without qualifying description are
usually domestic fowl, κατοικίδιοι δρυιδες (cf. L.-S. 9, s.v.). And the
domestic fowl, as Cumont has pointed out, 64 brought with it from its
original home in Persia the name of being a holy bird, a banisher of
darkness and therefore of demons: 65 Plutarch, for example, knows
that κύνες καὶ δρυιδες belong to Oromazes (Ormuzd). 66 Is it not likely
that in this matter, as in its fire-cult, the theurgic tradition pre­served traces of Iranian religious ideas, and that Porphyry at least,
if not the Egyptian priest, thought of the birds' function as apotropaic
and of their death as an outrage to the heavenly phantasm? There is,
in fact, later evidence to support the guess: for we learn from Proclus
not only that cocks are solar creatures, μετέχουτες καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῦ
θεοῦ κατὰ τὴν έαυτῶν τάξιν, but that ἤδη τινὰ τῶν ἧλιακῶν δαμάςδων
λευτροπρόσωπον φαινόμενον, ἀλκρόνος δείκθετος, ἀφανῆ γενέσθαι
φασίν ὑποστελλόμενον τὰ τῶν κρειττῶν χωνῆματα. 67

IV. The Modus Operandi: τελεστική

Proclus grandiloquently defines theurgy as “a power higher than
all human wisdom, embracing the blessings of divination, the purifying
powers of initiation, and in a word all the operations of divine pos­
session” (Theol. Plat. p. 63). It may be described more simply as
magic applied to a religious purpose and resting on a supposed revela­
tion of a religious character. Whereas vulgar magic used names and
formulae of religious origin to profane ends, theurgy used the pro­
cedures of vulgar magic primarily to a religious end: its τέλος was
ἡ πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν πῦρ ἄνοδος (de myst. 179.8), which enabled its votaries
to escape εἰμαρμένη (ὅ γάρ ἰδ' εἰμαρμην ἀγέλην πίπτουσι θεουργοὶ,
Or. chald. p. 59 Kr.; cf. de myst. 269.19 ff.), and ensured τῆς ψυχῆς
ἀπαθανατισμὸς (Procl. in Remp. I.152.10). 68 But it had also a more
immediate utility: Book III of the de mysteriis is devoted entirely
to techniques of divination, and Proclus claims to have received from
the δαίμονες many revelations about the past and future (in Remp.
I.86.13).

So far as we can judge, the procedures of theurgy were broadly
similar to those of vulgar magic. We can distinguish two main types:
(i) those which depended exclusively on the use of συμβολα or συνθήματα; and (ii) those which involved the employment of an entranced "medium."

Of these two branches of theurgy, the first appears to have been known as τελεστική, and ὃς have been concerned mainly with the consecrating (τελειά, Procl. in Tim. III.6.13) and animating of magic statues in order to obtain oracles from them: Proclus in Tim. III.155.18, τὴν τελεστικὴν καὶ χρηστήρια καὶ ἀγάλματα θεῶν ἱδρύονται ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ διὰ τῶν συμβολῶν ἐπιτηδείᾳ ποιεῖν τὰ ἐκ μερικῆς ἥλιος γενόμενα καὶ φθερῆς εἰς τὸ μετέχειν θεῶν καὶ κυνείον παρ’ αὐτῶν καὶ προλέγειν τὸ μέλλον: Theol. Plat. I.28, p. 70, ἡ τελεστικὴ διαρρασα καὶ τινὰς χαρακτήρας καὶ σύμβολα περιτιθείσα τῷ ἀγάλματι ἐμψύχον αὐτὸ ἐποίησε: to the same effect in Tim. I.51.25, III.6.12 ff.; in Crat. 19.12. We may suppose that a part at least of this lore goes back to the Τελεστικα of Julianus; certainly the σύμβολα go back to the Χαλδαίαν Οράλκες.

What were these σύμβολα, and how were they used? The clearest answer is given in a letter of Psellus: ἐκείνη γὰρ (sc. ἡ τελεστικὴ ἐπιστήμη) τὰ κοῖλα τῶν ἀγαλμάτων ἥλιος ἐμπιπλώντας οικείας ταῖς ἐφεστηκυλίαις δυνάμεις, ἱών, φυτῶν, λιθῶν, βοτανῶν, μιξῶν, σφραγίδων, ἐγγραμμάτων, ἑσωτε ἐκ καὶ ἀρωμάτων συμπαθῶν, συγκαθεύρουνα δὲ τούτοις καὶ κρατήρας καὶ σπονδεία καὶ θυμιστήρια, ἔμπνεόν ποιεῖ τὰ εἴδωλα καὶ τῇ ἀπορρήτῳ δυνάμει κυκεῖ. This is genuine theurgic doctrine, doubtless derived from Proclus' commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles. The animals, herbs, stones, and scents figure in the de myst. (233.10 ff., cf. Aug. Civ. D. 10.11), and Proclus gives a list of magical herbs, stones, etc., good for various purposes. Each god has his "sympathetic" representative in the animal, the vegetable, and the mineral world, which is, or contains, a σύμβολον of its divine cause and is thus en rapport with the latter. These σύμβολα were concealed inside the statue,12 so that they were known only to the τελεστής (Procl. in Tim. I.273.11). The σφραγίδες (engraved gems) and ἐγγράμματα (written formulae) correspond to the χαρακτήρες καὶ ὀνόματα ἵωτικα of Procl. in Tim. III.6.13. The χαρακτήρες (which include such things as the seven vowels symbolic of the seven planetary gods) might be either written down (θέσις) or uttered (ἐκφώνησις). The correct manner of uttering them was a professional secret orally transmitted.15 The god's attributes might also be named with magical effect in an oral invocation.16 The "life-giving names" further included certain
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secret appellations which the gods themselves revealed to the Juliani, thus enabling them to obtain answers to their prayers.77 These would be among the ὄνοματα βάρβαρα which according to the Chaldaean Oracles lose their efficacy if translated into Greek.78 Some of them have indeed been explained to us by the gods;79 as to the rest, if a χαρακτήρ is meaningless to us αὐτῷ τὸν ὄνομα αὑτοῦ τὸ σεμνότατον (de myst. 254.14 ff.).

In all this the theurgic τελεστική was far from original. The ancient herbals and lapidaries are full of the “astrological botany” and “astrological mineralogy” which assigned particular plants and gems to particular planetary gods, and whose beginnings go back at least to Bolus of Mendes (about 200 B.C.).80 These σύμβολα were already utilized in the invocations of Greco-Egyptian magic; thus Hermes is evoked by naming his plant and his tree, the moon-goddess by reciting a list of animals, etc., ending ἐιρήνη σου τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ σύμβολα τοῦ ὄνοματος.81 χαρακτήρες, lists of attributes, ὄνοματα βάρβαρα, belong to the standard Greco-Egyptian materia magica; the use of the last was familiar to Lucian (Menipp. 9 fin.), and Celsus, and the theory of their untranslatable efficacy was stoutly maintained by Origen against the latter (c. Cels. 1.24 f.). For a god revealing his true name in the course of a magical operation, cf. PGM i.161 ff.; for the importance of correct ἐκφώνησις, PGM v.24, etc.

Nor was the manufacture of magical statuettes of gods a new industry or a monopoly of the theurgists.82 It rested ultimately upon the primitive and widespread belief in a natural συμφάσει linking image with original,83 the same belief which underlies the magical use of images of human beings for purposes of envelopment. Its centre of diffusion was evidently Egypt, where it was rooted in native religious ideas.84 The late Hermetic dialogue Asclepius knows of “statuas animatas sensu et spiritu plenas” which foretell the future “sorte, vate, somniis, multisque aliis rebus,” and both cause and cure disease: the art of producing such statues, by imprisoning in consecrated images, with the help of herbs, gems, and odours, the souls of daemons or of angels, was discovered by the ancient Egyptians: “sic deorum fuctor est homo.”85 The magical papyri offer recipes for constructing such images and animating them (Ὑπαθεῖν, xii.318), e.g., iv.1841 ff., where the image is to be hollow, like Psellus’ statues, and is to enclose a magic name inscribed on gold leaf; 2360 ff., a hollow Hermes enclosing a magic formula, consecrated by a garland and the sacrifice
of a cock. From the first century A.D. onwards we begin to hear of the private manufacture and magical use of comparable images outside Egypt. Nero had one, the gift of "plebeius quidam et ignotus," which warned him of conspiracies (Suet. *Nero* 56); Apuleius was accused, probably with justice, of possessing one. Lucian in his *Philopseudes* satirized the belief in them; Philostratus mentions their use as amulets. In the third century Porphyry quoted a Hecate-oracle giving instructions for the confection of an image which will procure the worshipper a vision of the goddess in sleep. But the real vogue of the art came later, and appears to be due to Iamblichus, who doubtless saw in it the most effective defence of the traditional cult of images against the sneers of Christian critics. Whereas Porphyry's *Πεπλεγματων* seems to have advanced no claim that the gods were in any sense present in the images which symbolised them, Iamblichus in his like-named work set out to prove "that idols are divine and filled with the divine presence," and supported his case by narrating πολλά ἄπλθανα. His disciples habitually sought omens from the statues, and were not slow to contribute ἄπλθανα of their own: Maximus makes a statue of Hecate laugh and causes the torches in her hands to light up automatically; Heraiscus has so sensitive an intuition that he can at once distinguish the "animate" from the "inanimate" statue by the sensations it gives him.

The art of fabricating oracular images passed from the dying pagan world into the repertoire of mediaeval magicians, where it had a long life, though it was never so common as the use of images for envoûtement. Thus a bull of Pope John XXII, dated 1326 or 1327, denounces persons who by magic imprison demons in images or other objects, interrogate them, and obtain answers. And two further questions suggest themselves in connection with the theurgic τελεστυχ, though they cannot be pursued here. First, did it contribute something to the belief, familiar alike to mediaeval Italy and mediaeval Byzantium, in τελεσματα (talismans) or "statuae averruncae"—enchanted images whose presence, concealed or visible, had power to avert natural disaster or military defeat? Were some of these τελεσματα (usually attributed to anonymous or legendary magicians) in fact the work of theurgists? We are told by Zosimus (4.18) that the theurgist Nestorius saved Athens from an earthquake in 375 A.D. by dedicating such a τελεςμα (a statue of Achilles) in the Parthenon, in accordance with instructions received in a dream. Theurgic also, it would seem, was the
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statue of Zeus Philios dedicated μαγγανελαίς τινὶ καὶ γοητελαίς at Antioch by a contemporary of Iamblichus, the fanatical pagan Theoteknos, who practised τελεστί, μυήσεις, and καθαρομοί in connection with it (Eus. Hist. Eccl. 9.3; 9.11). A like origin may be guessed for that statue of Jupiter, armed with golden thunderbolts, which in 394 was “consecrated with certain rites” to assist the pagan pretender Eugenius against the troops of Theodosius (Aug. Civ. Dei 5.26): we may see here the hand of Flavianus, Eugenius’ leading supporter and a man known for his dabbling in pagan occultism. Again, the ἄγαλμα τετελεσμένον which protected Rhegium both from the fires of Etna and from invasion by sea seems to have been furnished with στοιχεία in a way that recalls the σύμβολα of theurgy and the papyri: ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐν ποι ἀκοιμητὸν ἐλεγχανε, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ ὕδωρ ἀδιάφθορον.99

Secondly, did the theurgic τελεστική suggest to mediaeval alchemists the attempt to create artificial human beings (“homunculi”) in which they were constantly engaged? Here the connection of ideas is less obvious, but curious evidence of some historical linkage has recently been brought forward by the Arabist Paul Kraus,100 whose premature death is a serious loss. He points out that the great corpus of alchemy attributed to Jābir b. Ḥayyan (Gebir) not only refers in this connection to a (spurious?) work of Porphyry entitled The Book of Generation,101 but makes use of Neoplatonic speculations about images in a way which suggests some knowledge of genuine works of Porphyry, including perhaps the letter to Anebo.102

V. THE MODUS OPERANDI: MEDIUMISTIC TRANCE

While τελεστική sought to induce the presence of a god in an inanimate “receptacle” (ὑποδοχή), another branch of theurgy aimed at incarnating him temporarily (εἰσκρίνεις) in a human being (κάτοχος or, a more specific technical term, δοχεῖς).103 As the former art rested on the wider notion of a natural and spontaneous συμπάθεια between image and original, so did the latter on the widespread belief that spontaneous alterations of personality were due to possession by a god, demon, or deceased human being.104 That a technique for producing such alterations goes back to the Juliani may be inferred from Proclus’ statement that the ability of the soul to leave the body and return to it is confirmed by διὰ τοῦ Ἔλι Μάρκου θεουργοῖς ἴκδεδο­ται· καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνοι διὰ δὴ τῶν τελετῶν τὸ αὐτὸ δρῶσιν ἐλι τὴν τελομένον.105 And that such techniques were practised also by others
is shown by the oracle quoted from Porphyry's collection by Firmicus Maternus (err. prof. rel. 14) which begins, "Serapis vocatus et intra corpus hominis collocatus talia respondit." A number of Porphyry's oracles appear to be founded, as Frederic Myers saw, on the utterances of mediums who had been thrown into trance for the purpose, not in official shrines but in private circles. To this class belong the directions for terminating the trance (ἀπόλυσις), professedly given by the god through the entranced medium, which have their analogues in the papyri but could hardly form part of an official oracular response. Of the same type is the "oracle" quoted (from Porphyry?) by Proclus in Remp. I. 111.28, "οὐ φέρει με τοῦ δοξῆς ἡ τάλαμα καρδία," θεῶν. Such private ἐλακρινεῖς differed from official oracles in that the god was thought to enter the medium's body not as a spontaneous act of grace but in response to the appeal, even the compulsion, of the operator (κλήτωρ).

This branch of theurgy is especially interesting because of the evident analogy with modern spiritualism: if we were better informed about it, we might hope by a comparison to throw light on the psychological and physiological basis of both superstitions. But our information is tantalisingly incomplete. We know from Proclus that before the "sitting" both operator and medium were purified with fire and water (in Crat. 100.21), and that they were dressed in special chitons with special girdles appropriate to the deity to be invoked (in Remp. II. 246.23); this seems to correspond to the Νειλαίη ὅθη or συνδών of the Porphyrian oracle (Præp. Ev. 5.9), whose removal was evidently an essential part of the ἀπόλυσις (cf. PGM iv. 85, συνδονίασα κατὰ κεφαλῆς μέχρι ποδῶν γυμνὸν . . . παίδα, the "lintea indumenta" of the magicians in Amm. Marc. 29.1.29, and the "purum pallium" of Apul. Apol. 44). The medium also wore a garland, which had magical efficacy, and carried, or wore on his dress, ἐκοινωνα τῶν κεκλημένων θεῶν or other appropriate σμίμολα. What else was done to induce trance is uncertain. Porphyry knows of persons who try to procure possession (ἐλακρινεῖς) by "standing upon χαρακτῆρας" (as mediëval magicians did), but Iamblichus thinks poorly of this procedure (de myst. 129.13; 131.3 ff.). Iamblichus recognises the use of ἀμοι and ἐπικλήσεις (ibid., 157.9 ff.), but denies that they have any effect on the medium's mind; Apuleius, on the other hand (Apol. 43), speaks of the medium being put to sleep "seu carminum avocamento sive odorum delenimento." Proclus knows of the practice of
smearing the eyes with strychnine and other drugs in order to procure visions,\(^a\) but does not attribute it to the theurgists. Probably the effective agencies in the theurgic operation, as in spiritualism, were in fact psychological, not physiological. Iamblichus says that not everybody is a potential medium; the most suitable are "young and rather simple persons."\(^b\) Herein he agrees with the general ancient opinion;\(^c\) and modern experience tends on the whole to support him, at least as regards the second part of his requirement.

The behaviour and psychological condition of the medium are described at some length, though obscurely, by Iamblichus (\textit{de myst.} 3.4–7), and in clearer terms by Psellus (\textit{oral.} 27, \textit{Scripta Minora} I.248. 1 ff., based on Proclus: cf. also \textit{CMAG} VI.209.15 ff., and \textit{Op. Daem.} xiv, \textit{PG} 122, 851). Psellus distinguishes cases where the medium's personality is completely in abeyance, so that it is absolutely necessary to have a normal person present to look after him, from those where consciousness (\textit{παρακολούθησις}) persists \textit{θαυμαστῶν \τινα \τρόπον}, so that the medium knows \textit{τίνα \τι \ἐνεργεῖ καὶ \τί \φθεγγεται} καὶ \πόθεν δεὶ \ἀπολλέων \το \κυνών. Both these types of trance occur today.\(^d\) The symptoms of trance are said by Iamblichus to vary widely with different "communicators" and on different occasions (111.3 ff.); there may be anaesthesia, including insensibility to fire (110.4 ff.); there may be bodily movement or complete immobility (111.17); there may be changes of voice (112.5 ff.). Psellus mentions the risk of \textit{καταξίωσα} causing convulsive movement (\textit{κνησα \μετά \τυν \βλας \γενομένην}) which weaker mediums are unable to bear;\(^e\) elsewhere he speaks of \textit{κάτοχος} biting their lips and muttering between their teeth (\textit{CMAG} VI.164.18). Most of these symptoms can be illustrated from the classic study of Mrs. Piper's trance phenomena by Mrs. Henry Sidgwick.\(^f\) It is, I think, reasonable to conclude that the states described by the ancient and the modern observers are, if not identical, at least analogous. (One may add the significant observation quoted by Porphyry, \textit{ap. Eus. Praep. Ev.} 5.8, from Pythagoras of Rhodes, that "the gods" come at first reluctantly, but more easily when they have formed a habit—i.e., when a trance personality has been established.)

We do not hear that these "gods" furnished any proofs of identity; and it would seem that their identity was often in fact disputed. Porphyry wished to know how the presence of a god was to be distinguished from that of an angel, archangel, \textit{δαίμων}, \textit{ἀρχών}, or
human soul (de myst. 70.9). Iamblichus admits that impure or in-
expert operators sometimes get the wrong god or, worse still, one
of those evil spirits who are called ἀντιθέους (ibid., 177.7 ff.). He
himself is said to have unmasked an alleged Apollo who was in reality
only the ghost of a gladiator (Eunap. vit. soph. 473). False answers are
attributed by Synesius, de insomn. 142A, to such intrusive spirits,
which "jump in and occupy the place prepared for a higher being"; his
commentator, Nicephoros Gregoras (PG 149, 540A), ascribes this
view to the Χαλδαῖοι (Julianus?), and quotes (from the Chaldaean
Oracles?) a prescription for dealing with such situations. Others
account for false answers by "bad conditions" (πονηρὰ καρδιωταῖς
τοῦ περικεχοντος, Porph. ap. Eus. Praep. Ev. 6.5 = Philop. de mundi
creat. 4.20), or lack of ἐπιτηδείων; others again, by the medium's
disturbed state of mind or the inopportune intervention of his normal
self (de myst. 115.10). All these ways of excusing failure recur in the
literature of spiritualism.

Besides revealing past or future through the medium's lips, the
gods vouchsafed visible (or occasionally audible) signs of their pres-
ence. The medium's person might be visibly elongated or dilated, or
even levitated (de myst. 112.3). But the manifestations usually
took the form of luminous apparitions: indeed, in the absence of
these "blessed visions," Iamblichus considers that the operators can-
not be sure what they are doing (de myst. 112.18). It seems that Pro-
clus distinguished two types of séance: the "autoptic," where the
θεατής witnessed the phenomena for himself; and the "epoptic," where
he had to be content with having them described to him by the
κλητορ (ὅ τιν τελεῖ τις διατιθέμενος). In the latter case the visions were,
of course, exposed to the suspicion of being purely subjective, and
Porphyry seems to have suggested as much; for Iamblichus ener-
getically repudiates the notion that ἐνθουσιασμὸς or μαντικὴ may be of
subjective origin (de myst. 114.16; 166.13), and apparently refers to
objective traces of their visit which the "gods" leave behind. Later
writers are at pains to explain why only certain persons, thanks to a
natural gift or to θεατικὴ δῶμαι, can enjoy such visions (Procl.
in Remp. II.167.12; Hermeias in Phaedr. 69.7 Couvreur).

The luminous apparitions go back to the Chaldaean Oracles, which
promised that by pronouncing certain spells the operator should see
"fire shaped like a boy," or "an unshaped (ἀμφωτικός) fire with a voice
proceeding from it," or various other things. Compare the πυραινῇ
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φάσματα which the "Chaldaeans" are said to have exhibited to the Emperor Julian;\(^{128}\) the φάσματα Εκατικά φωτεινά which Proclus claimed to have seen (Marin. \textit{vit. Procl.} 28); and Hippolytus’ recipe for simulating a fiery apparition of Hecate by natural if somewhat dangerous means (\textit{Ref. Haer.} 4.36). At \textit{de myst} 3.6 (112.10 ff.) these phenomena are clearly associated with mediumship: the spirit may be seen as a fiery or luminous form entering (ελεκτρομενόν) or leaving the medium’s body, by the operator (τῶ θεαγωγοῦντι), by the medium (τῶ δειχομένῳ), and sometimes by all present: the last (Proclus’ αὐτοψία) is, we are told, the most satisfactory. The apparent analogy with the so-called "ectoplasm" or "teleplasm," which modern observers claim to have seen emerge from and return to the bodies of certain mediums, has been noted by Hopfner\(^{29}\) and others. Like “ectoplasm,” the appearances might be shapeless (ἀτριβωτα, ἀμφρωτα) or formed (τετυπωμένα, μεμορφωμένα): one of Porphyry’s oracles (\textit{Praep. Ev.} 5.8) speaks of “the pure fire being compressed into sacred forms (τόσιοι)”; but according to Psellus (\textit{PG} 122, 1136c) the shapeless appearances are the most trustworthy, and Proclus (\textit{in Crat.} 34.28) gives the reason—καὶ χάρι ἀμφρωτος οὕσα διὰ τήν πρόσωπον ἐγένετο μεμορφωμένη. The luminous character which is regularly attributed to them is doubtless connected with the “Chaldaean” (Iranian) fire-cult; but it also recalls the θωταγωγύλα of the papyri\(^{20}\) as well as the “lights” of the modern séance-room. Proclus seems to have spoken of the shaping process as taking place “in a light”:\(^{31}\) this suggests a λυχνομαντεία, like that prescribed at \textit{PGM} vii.540 ff., where the magician says (561), ἐμβαθι αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ παιδὸς) ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἦν τυπώσθη καὶ τῷ ἄθανατον μορφήν ἐν φωτεινῷ χρωματικῷ καὶ ἀφθαρτῷ. Eitrem\(^{32}\) would translate τυπώσθηται here as “perceive” (a sense not elsewhere attested); but in view of the passages just referred to I think we should render “give shape to” (“abilden,” Preisendanz) and suppose that a materialization is in question. The “strong immortal light” replaces the mortal light of the lamp, just as at \textit{PGM} iv.1103 ff. the watcher sees the light of the lamp become “vault-shaped,” then finds it replaced by “a very great light within a void,” and beholds the god. But whether a lamp was ever used in theurgy we do not know. Certainly some types of φωταγωγύλα were conducted in darkness,\(^{33}\) others out of doors,\(^{14}\) while lychnomancy does not figure among the varieties of φωτός ἄγωγή listed at \textit{de myst.} 3.14. The similarity of language remains, however, striking.
NOTES TO APPENDIX II

1 W. Kroll, *de Oraculis Chaldaicis* (Breslauer Philologische Abhandlungen, VII.i, 1894).


3 Griechisch-Aegyptische Offenbarungszahuber (quoted as OZ); and in the introduction and commentary to his translation of the *de mysteriis*. Cf. also his articles “Mageia” and “Theurgie” in Pauly-Wissowa, and below, n. 115.

4 Especially “Die obseraen und der Lichtzauber in der Magie,” *Symb. Oslo.* 8 (1929) 49 ff.; and “La Théurgie chez les Néo-Platoniciens et dans les papyrus magiques,” *ibid.*, 22 (1942) 49 ff. W. Theiler’s essay, *Die chaldaischen Orakel und die Hymnen des Synesios* (Halle, 1942), deals learnedly with the doctrinal influence of the *Oracles* on later Neoplatonism, a topic which I have not attempted to discuss.


7 τοῦ κληθέντος θεουργοῦ Ἰουλιανοῦ, Suidas, s.v.

8 Suidas, s.v., cf. Proclus in *Crat.* 72.10 Pasq., *in Remp.* II.123.12, etc. Psellus in one place (confusing him with his father?) puts him in Trajan’s time (*Scripta Minora* I, p. 241.29 Kurtz-Drexl).

9 *Vie de Julien*, 369, n. 8.

10 See Eitrem, *Symb. Oslo.* 22.49. Psellus seems to have understood the word in the latter sense, *PG* 122, 721D: θεοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπος ἐργάζεται. Cf. also the Hermetic “deorum fctor est homo,” quoted on p. 293.

11 Proclus’ expression of Ἐπὶ Μάρκου θεουργοῖ (in *Crat.* 72.10, in *Remp.* II.123.12) perhaps refers to father and son jointly.

12 ad *Philops.* 12 (IV.224 Jacobitz). On this scholion see Westerink, *op. cit.*, 276.

13 *Script. Min.* I.241.25 ff., cf. *CMAG* VI.163.19 ff. As Westerink points out, the source of these statements seems to be Procopius.

14 Marinus, *vit. Procl.* 26; cf. Procl. in *Crat.* c. 122. On such claims of divine origin, which are frequent in Hellenistic occult literature, see Festugière, *L’Astrologie*, 309 ff.

15 Bousset, *Arch. f. Rel.* 18 (1915) 144, argued for an earlier date on
the ground of coincidences in doctrine with Cornelius Labeo. But
Labeo's own date is far from certain; and the coincidences may
mean merely that the Juliani moved in Neopythagorean circles,
which we know to have been interested in magic.
16 *Script. Min.* I.241.29; cf. *CMAG* VI.163.20. On doctrinal oracles
received in vision see Festugière, *op. cit.*, 59 f.
17 See chap. iii, n. 70.
18 Kroll, *op. cit.*, 53 ff. The passages about the divine fire recall the
"recipe for immortality" in *PGM* iv.475 ff., which is in many
ways the closest analogue to the *Chaldaean Oracles*. Julian, *Or. V*,
1720, attributes to ὁ Καλδαῖος (i.e., Julianus) a cult of τὸν ἐπτάκτων θεόν.
This solar title has been disguised by corruption in two passages of Psellus: *Script. Min.* I.262.19: Ἐρωτήχην ἡ Κασθίαν ἡ Ἐπτάκτις (read Ἐπτάκτις), ἢ εἰ τις ἄλλος δαιμόν ἀπατηλός,
*ibid.*, I.446.26: τὸν Ἐπακτὸν (Ἐπτάκτιν, Bidez) ὃ Ἀπολλόριος
also Procl. *in Tim.* I.34.20: Ἡλίῳ, παρ’ ἐμ’ ἐκ τῶν θεολόγων.
ἀγωγὴ are "terms of art," familiar to us from the magical papyri.
21 Proclus, *in Remp.* II.123.9 ff.
22 Suidas, s.v. Ἰουλιανὸς. The ascription of the credit to Julianus is
perhaps implied also in Claudian, *de VI cons. Honorii*, 348 f., who
speaks of "Chaldaean" magic. For other versions of the tale, and
a summary of the lengthy modern discussions, see A. B. Cook,
*Zeus*, III.324 ff. The attribution to Julianus may have been sug-
gested by a confusion with the Julianus who commanded against
the Dacians under Domitian (Dio Cass. 67.10).
23 *Script. Min.* I.446.28.
24 S. Anastasius of Sinai, *Quaestiones* (PG 89, col. 525A). For Juli-
anus' supposed rivalry with Apuleius see also Psellus quoted above,
n. 18.
25 Cf. Olympiodorus *in Phaed.* 123.3 Norvin: οἱ μὲν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν
προτιμῶσιν, ὡς Πορφύριος καὶ Πλούτινος καὶ ἄλλοι τοῦλοι φιλόσοφοι:
οἱ δὲ τὴν ἱερατικὴν (i.e., theurgy), ὡς Ἰάμβλικος καὶ Συριανὸς καὶ
Πρόκλος καὶ οἱ θεοπλάστες.
26 The prose injunction, μὴ ἔξαγγει ἵνα μὴ ἔχουσα τι, which he
quotes at *Enn.* I.9 *init.*, is called "Chaldaean" by Psellus (*Expos.*
or. Chald. 1125c ff.) and in a late scholion ad loc., but cannot come from a hexameter poem. The doctrine is Pythagorean.


Cf. esp. c. 9, I.197.8 ff. Volk.: τοὺς δ' ἄλλους (δεί) νομίζειν εἶναι χώραν παρὰ τῷ θεῷ καὶ μὴ αὐτὸν μόνον μετ' ἐκείνου τάξαντα ὄσπερ ὀνείρασι πέτεσθαι ... τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἡδὴ ἐστὶν ἔξω νοῦ κειεῖν.

Enn. 4.4-37, 40. Observe that throughout this discussion he uses the contemptuous word γοητεία and introduces none of the theurgic terms of art. On the Stoic and Neoplatonic conception of συμπαθεία see K. Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie, and my remarks in Greek Poetry and Life, 373 f. To theurgists such explanations appeared entirely inadequate (de myst. 164.5 ff. Parthey).

Symb. Oslo. 22.50. As Eitrem himself notes, Lobeck and Wilmowtz thought otherwise; and he might have added the names of Wilhelm Kroll (Rh. Mus. 71 [1916] 313) and Joseph Bidez (Vie de Julien, 67; CAH XII.635 ff.).

See on this CQ 22 (1928) 129, n. 2.


de abst. 4.6, cf. de myst. 265.16, 277.4. See further E. Peterson's convincing reply to Cumont, Theol. Literaturzeitung, 50 (1925) 485 ff. I would add that the allusion in Enn. 5.5.11 to people who are excluded from certain ἕρα because of their γαστριμαργία probably refers to Eleusis, not Egypt: παραγγέλλεται γὰρ καὶ Ἑλευσῖν ἀπέχεσθαι κατοικίαν ὅρην καὶ ἱχθυών καὶ κυάμων ῥοῖας τὲ καὶ μῆλων, Porph. de abst. 4.16.

Cf. CQ 22 (1928) 141 f., and E. Peterson, Philol. 88 (1933) 30 ff. Conversely, as Eitrem has rightly pointed out (Symb. Oslo. 8.50), the magical and theurgic term σῶτασις has nothing to do with unio mystica.

See Bidez's sympathetic, elegant, and scholarly study, La Vie du Neoplatonicien Porphyre. A like infection of mysticism by magic has occurred in other cultures. "Instead of the popular religion being spiritualised by the contemplative ideal, there is a tendency for the highest religion to be invaded and contaminated by the subrational forces of the pagan underworld, as in Tantric Buddhism and in some forms of sectarian Hinduism" (Christopher Dawson, Religion and Culture, 192 f.).

vedo δὲ ἃν ηῶς ταύτα ἐγραφεῖν, ὡς οὖν, Eun. vit. soph. 457 Boissonade; Bidez, op. cit., chap. iii.
The fragments were edited by W. Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia ex Oraculis Haurienda (1856). On the general character of this collection see A. D. Nock, "Oracles théologiques," REA 30 (1928) 280 ff.

The fragments as reconstructed (not very scientifically) by Gale are reprinted in Parthey's edition of the de mysteriis. On the date see Bidez, op. cit., 86.

It is probable that the letter to Anebo did not quote Julianus or the Chaldaean Oracles, since Iamblichus' reply is silent about them. Whether the "theurgy" of the de mysteriis is in fact independent of the Julianic tradition remains to be investigated. The writer certainly claims to be acquainted with the "Chaldaean" (p. 4.11) or "Assyrian" (p. 5.8) doctrines as well as the Egyptian, and says he will present both.

Marinus, vit. Procli 26; Lydus, mens. 4.53; Suidas, s.v. Πορφύριος.


Cf. Olympiodorus' judgement, above, n. 25.

Julian, Epist. 12 Bidez; Marinus, vit. Procli 26; Damasc. I.86.3 ff.

The de mysteriis, though issued under the name of "Abammon," was attributed to Iamblichus by Proclus and Damascius; and since the publication of Rasche's dissertation in 1911 most scholars have accepted the ascription. Cf. Bidez in Mélanges Desrousseaux, 11 ff.

Epist. 12 Bidez = 71 Hertlein = 2 Wright. The Loeb editor is clearly wrong in maintaining against Bidez that τὸν διώνυμον in this passage means Iamblichus the younger: τὰ Ἰαμβλίχων έλι τὸν διώνυμον cannot mean "the writings of Iamblichus to his name-sake"; nor was the younger Iamblichus Θέσσαρος.

Cf. what Eunapius says of one Antoninus, who died shortly before 391: ἐπεδείκτο οἱ δὲν τὸν θεοργόν καὶ παράλογον ἐν τῇ φανομένῃ αληθείᾳ, τὰς βασιλικὰς λόγους ὁμικ ùφορόμενος ἐτέρωσε φερόμενα (p. 471).

Thus Proclus learned from Asclepigenia the θεουργικὴ ἀγωγὴ of "the great Nestorius," of which she was, through her father Plutarchus, the sole inheritress (Marinus, vit. Procli 28). On this family transmission of magical secrets see Dieterich, Abraxas,
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160 ff.; Festugière, L’Astrologie, 332 ff. Diodorus calls it a Chaldaean practice, 2.29.4.

59 Marinus, *vit. Procli* 26, 28. The Περὶ ἀγωγῆς is listed by Suidas, s.v. Πρόκλος.


53 Nauck’s correction for φησιν, which has no possible subject.

54 Among later writers, Proclus (*in Alc.* p. 73.4 Creuzer) and Ammianus Marcellinus (21.14.5) refer to the incident. But Proclus, who says οἱ ἀργυρίῳ τῶν Πλατωνίων ἐθάμασεν ὡς θεῖον ἐχοντα τῶν δαίμων, is clearly dependent on Porphyry; and so, presumably, is Ammianus, whether directly or through a doxographic source.

55 See chap. ii, pp. 42 ff. Ammianus, *loc. cit.*, says that while each man has his "genius," such beings are "admodum paucissimis visa."

56 Since the surviving part of the recipe is an invocation to the sun, Preisendanz and Hopfner think that Ωλυν is a mistake for Ἡλίον. But loss of the remainder of the recipe (Eitrem) seems an equally possible explanation. On such losses see Nock, *J. Eg. Arch.* 15 (1929) 221. The θεῖος δαίμων seems to have played a part in alchemy also; cf. Zosimus, *Comm. in Ῥωσ*. 2 (Scott, *Hermetica*, IV.104).

57 E.g., *PGM* iv.1927. Similarly iv.28 requires a spot recently bared by the Nile flood and still untrodden, and ii.147, a τόπος ἀγνὸς ἀπὸ παντὸς µυσαροῦ. So Thessalus, *CCAG* 8(3).136.26 (οἶκος καθαρῶς).


60 Aspersion with blood of a dove occurs in an ἀπόλυσις, *PGM* ii.178.

61 Fr. 29 = *de myst.* 241.4 = Eus. *Praep. Ev.* 5.10, 198 A.

62 *CRAI* 1942, 284 ff. Doubt may be felt about the late date which Cumont assigns to the introduction of domestic fowl into Greece; but this does not affect the present argument.

63 “The cock has been created to combat demons and sorcerers along with the dog,” Darmesteter (quoted by Cumont, *loc. cit.*). The belief in its apotropaic virtues survives to this day in many countries. On this belief among the Greeks see Orth in *P.-W.*, s.v. “Huhn,” 2532 f.
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61 Is. et Os. 46, 369 ff.
63 Very similar ideas appear in the “recipe for immortality,” PGM iv.475 ff., e.g. 511: ὅποιον ἔρως τὸ ἐρῶν πῦρ, and 648: ἐκ τοσοῦτων μυριάδων ἀπαθανατισθῆναι εἰς ταύτη τῇ ἀρα. It, too, culminates in luminous visions (634 ff., 694 ff.). But the theurgic ἀπαθανατισμὸς may have been connected with a ritual of burial and rebirth, Procl. Theol. Plat. 4.9, p. 193: τῶν θεουργῶν θάπτειν τὸ σῶμα κελευντών πλὴν τῆς κεφαλῆς εἰς τῇ μοστικωτάτη τῶν τελευτῶν (cf. Dieterich, Eine Mithrasliturgie, 163).
64 Psellus, though he too connects τελευτή with statues, explains the term otherwise: τελευτή δὲ ἐκποτήμη ἔστων ἢ ἕνων τελοῦσα (so MSS) τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐντανθ' ὑλῶν δυνάμεως (Expos. or. Chald. 1129d, in PG, Vol. 122). Hierocles, who represents a different tradition, makes τελευτή the art of purifying the pneuma (in aur. carm. 482A Mullach).
65 Psellus says that “the Chaldaeans” διαφόρως διὰς ἄνδρεκελα πλάτ- τοντες ἀποτέφθαια νοομάτων ἐργάζονται (Scrip. Min. I.447.8). For σύμβολα cf. the line quoted by Proclus, in. Crat. 21.1: σύμβολα γὰρ πατρίδος νόος ἐστειρέν κατὰ κόσμον.
66 Epist. 187 Sathas (Bibliotheca Graeca Medii Aevi, V.474).
67 CMAG VI.151.6; cf. also in Tim. I.111.9 ff.
69 An identical practice is found in modern Tibet, where statues are consecrated by inserting in their hollow interiors written spells and other magically potent objects (Hastings, Encycl. of Religion and Ethics, VII.144,160).
70 Psellus, in CMAG VI.62.4, tells us that Proclus advised invoking
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Artemis (= Hecate) as ξυφήφρος, σπειροδρακοντόζων, λευντοῦχος, τρίμορφος τοῦ τοῖς γὰρ αὐτὴν φησὶ τοῖς ὅνωμα αἰκεσθαί καὶ ὅνων ἤξαπατᾶσθαι καὶ γοητευσθαι.

77 Proclus, in Crat. 72.8. Cf. the divine name which "the prophet Bitys" found carved in hieroglyphs in a temple at Sais and revealed to "King Ammon," de myst. 267.14.

78 Psellus, expos. or. chald. 1132c; Nicephoros Gregoras, in Synes. de insomn. 541a. Cf. Corp. Herm. xvi.2.

79 Cf. the Greek translations of such magical names given by Clem. Alex. Strom. 5.242, and Hesych. s.v. 'Εφέσα γράμματα.


83 Cf. Plot. Enn. 4.3.11 (II.23.21 Volk.): προσπαθὲς δὲ τὸ ὀψωσθν ὑμηθέν, ὁσπερ κατοπτρὸν ἀρτᾶσαι εἰδος τε δυνάμενον, where ὀψωσθν seems to involve denying any specific virtue to magical rites of consecration.

84 Erman, Die ägyptische Religion, 55; A. Moret, Ann. Musée Guime.; 14 (1902) 93 f.; Gadd, Divine Rule, 23. Eusebius seems to know this: he lists ξοανων ὅρθεσις among the religious and magical practices borrowed by the Greeks from Egypt (Praep. Ev. 10.4.4). A simple ritual of dedication by offering χοτραι was in use in classical Greece (texts in G. Hock, Griech. Weihebräuche, 59 ff.); but there is no suggestion that this was thought to induce magical animation.

85 Asclep. III.24*, 37*-38* (Corp. Herm. i.338, 358 Scott). Cf. also Preisigke, Sammelbuch, no. 4127, ξοανω (so Nock for ααιων) τε ση καὶ ναὶ ἵπτοιαν παρέχων καὶ δυναμω μεγάλην, of Mandulis-Helios; and Numenius apud Orig. c. Cels. 5.38.

86 This is also the period when gems incised with magical figures or formulae begin to appear in large numbers (C. Bonner, "Magical Amulets," Harv. Theol. Rev. 39 [1946] 30 ff.). The coincidence is not fortuitous: magic is becoming fashionable.

87 Legends about the miraculous behaviour of public cult-statues
were, of course, as common in the Hellenistic world as in the me-
diaeval: Pausanias and Dio Cassius are full of them; Plutarch, *Camillus 6*, is a *locus classicus*. But such behaviour was ordinarily
viewed as a spontaneous act of divine grace, not as the result of a
magical ἱδρυσις or κατάκλησις. On the classical Greek attitude see
Nilsson, *Gesch. der Griech. Rel.* I.71 ff.; down to Alexander's time,
rationalism seems to have been in general strong enough to hold in
check (at least in the educated class) the tendency to attribute
divine powers to images whether public or private. In later days
the belief in their animation may sometimes have been sustained
by the use of fraudulent contrivances; see F. Poulsen, "Talking,
Weeping and Bleeding Sculptures," *Acta Archaeologica*, 16 (1945)
178 ff.

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*Die Apologie des A. u. die antike Zauberei*, 302. Such statuettes,
which were permanent possessions, are, of course, somewhat dif­
ferent from the image constructed *ad hoc* for use in a particu­
lar πραξις.

89 Philops. 42: ἔκ πηλοῦ Ερώτινν τι ἀναπλάσας, Ἀπιθη, ἔφη, καὶ ἄγε

90 *viv. Apoll.* 5.20.

Animated statues may have played a part in the classical Greek
Hecate-magic; see the curious notices in Suidas, s.vv. Θεαγένης
and 'Ἐκάρτεων, and cf. Diodorus 4.51, where Medea makes a hol­
low statue of Artemis (Hecate) containing φάρμακα, quite in
the Egyptian manner.

maker of the image at *PGM* iv.1841 asks it to send him dreams.
This explains the reference to "somnia" in the *Asclepius* passage.

92 See the fragments in Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre*, App. I.

93 Photius, *Bibl.* 215. The report is second-hand, but may be ac­
cepted as showing the main drift of Iamblichus' argument. Cf.
Julian, *Epist.* 89b Bidez, 293ab.

94 Eunap. *vit. soph.* 475. Cf. *PGM* xii.12. The τὸ ρο ἀυτῶματον is an
old piece of Iranian magic (Paus. 5.27.5 f.), of which Julianus
may have preserved the tradition. But it was also known to profane
conjurers (Athen. 19E; Hipp. *Ref. Haer.* 4.33; Julius Africanus,
*Keīroî*, p. 62 Vieillefond). It reappears in mediaeval hagiology,
e.g., Caesarius of Heisterbach, *Dialogue on Miracles*, 7.46.

95 Suidas, s.v. His "psychic" gifts were further shown by the fact
that the mere physical neighbourhood of an impure woman al­
ways gave him a headache.
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97 Th. de Cauzons, *La Magie et la sorcellerie en France*, II.338 (cf. also 331, 408).


99 Olympiodorus of Thebes in Müller’s *FHG* IV.60.15 (= Photius, *Bibl.* 58.22 Bekker). The fire and water were doubtless symbolized by χαρακτήρες. It may be a coincidence that they are the two elements used in theurgic purifications (Proclus, *in Crat.* 100.21).

100 *Jâbir et la science grecque* (= *Mém. de l’Inst. d’Égypte*, 45, 1942). I am indebted to Dr. Richard Walzer for my knowledge of this interesting book.

101 Porphyry figures as an alchemist in Berthelot, *Alchim. grecs*, 25, as well as in the Arabic tradition (Kraus, *op. cit.*, 122, n. 3). But no genuine works of his on alchemy are known to have existed. Olympiodorus, however, and other late Neoplatonists dabbled in alchemy.

102 References to the *ad Aneb.* in Arabic literature are quoted by Kraus, *op. cit.*, 128, n. 5.

103 I do not know on what ground Hopfner (*OZ* II.70 ff.) excludes both these types of operation from his definition of “theurgic divination proper.” In defining a term like theurgy we should be guided, it seems to me, by the ancient evidence and not by *a priori* theory.

104 See chap. iii, p. 60. For secondary personalities professing to be pagan gods and accepted as such by Christian exorcists, cf. Min. Felix, *Oct.* 27.6 f.; Sulpicius Severus, *Dial.* 2.6 (*PL* 20, 215c), etc.

105 in *Remp.* II.123.8 ff. To judge from the context, the aim of this *telereî* was probably, like that of the imaginary experiment with the ψυχουλωας βάθος which Proclus quotes at 122.22 ff. from Clearchus, to procure a “psychic excursion” rather than possession; but it must in any case have involved the induction of some sort of trance.

106 “Greek Oracles,” in Abbott’s *Hellenica*, 478 ff.

107 Lines 216 ff. Wolff (= Eus. *Præp. Ev.* 5.9). G. Hock, *Griech. Weihegebräuche*, 68, takes the directions as referring to withdrawal of the divine presence from a statue. But such phrases as βροτὸν θεῶν ουκέτι χωρεῖ, βροτὸν αὐτίκειθεν, ἀνάπαυε δὲ φῶτα, λυόν τε δοξὴ, ἀρατε φῶτα γένθειν ἀναστήσαντες ἐταίροι, can refer only to
a human medium. ("Controls" at modern séances regularly speak of the medium in this way, in the third person.)

This is stated in several of Porphyry's oracles, e.g., I. 190, θεοδά-μονος Ἐκάτην με θηπ έκάλεσας ἀνάγκαις, and by Pythagoras of Rhodes whom Porph. quotes in this connection (Praep. Ev. 5.8). Compulsion is denied in the de myst. (3.18, 145-4 ff.), which also denies that "the Chaldaeans" use threats towards the gods, while admitting that the Egyptians do (6.5-7). On the whole subject cf. B. Olsson in ΑΡΑΓΜΑ Nilsson, 374 ff.


Cf. λπορτκ μοι στεφάνον in the Porphyrian oracle (Praep. Ev. 5.9), and the boy Aedesius who "had only to put on the garland and look at the sun, when he immediately produced reliable oracles in the best inspirational style" (Eun. φιμ. soph. 504).

Porphyry, loc. cit.

Proclus in CMAG VI.151.6: ἀποχρη γάρ πρός μεν αυτοφάνειαν το κυέων.


de myst. 157.14. Olympiodorus, in Alc. p. 8 Cr., says that children and country people are more prone to ἔθνουσιαμβς owing to their lack of imagination (!).

Cf. Hopfner's interesting paper, "Die Kindermedien in den Gr.-Aeg. Zauberpapyri," Festschrift N. P. Kondakov, 65 ff. The reason usually alleged for preferring children is their sexual purity, but the real cause of their superior effectiveness was doubtless their greater suggestibility (E. M. Butler, Ritual Magic, 126). The Pythia of Plutarch's day was a simple country girl (Plut. Pyth. Orac. 22, 405C).

Cf. Lord Balfour in Proc. Soc. for Psychical Research, 43 (1935) 60: "Mrs. Piper and Mrs. Leonard when in trance seem to lose all sense of their personal identity, whereas, so far as the observer can judge, this is never the case with Mrs. Willett. Her trance sittings abound with remarks describing her own experiences, and
occasionally she will make comments... on the messages she is asked to transmit." See also chap. iii. nn. 54, 55.

17 **οὐ φέρειν.** This explains the line **οὐ φέρει με τοῦ δοξήν ἡ τάλανα καρδία** quoted by Proclus in *Remp. I.111.28.*


20 *Porphyry, loc. cit.,* quotes a "god's" request in such circumstances that the sitting be closed: **ἀυὴ βιην κάρτος τε λγγων' ψευδήγορα λέξω.** Just so will a modern "communicator" close the sitting with "I must stop now or I shall say something silly" (*Proc. Soc. Psych. Research,* 38 [1928] 76).

21 According to Proclus in *Tim.* I.139.23, and in *Remp.* I.40.18, this involves, besides the presence of the appropriate *σύνθημα,* a favourable position of the heavenly bodies (cf. *de myst.* 173.8), a favourable time and place (as often in papyri), and favourable climatic conditions. Cf. Hopfner, P.-W., s.v. "Mageia," 353 ff.

22 Proclus in *Crat.* 36.20 ff. offers a theoretical explanation of what spiritualists would call "the direct voice"; it follows Posidonian lines (cf. *Greek Poetry and Life,* 372 f.). Hippolytus knows how to fake this phenomenon (*Ref. Haer.* 4.28).


24 This is a traditional mark of magicians or holy men. It is attributed to Simon Magus (ps.-Clem. *Hom.* 2.32); to Indian mystics (Philost. *vit. Apoll.* 3.15); to several Christian saints and Jewish rabbis; and to the medium Home. A magician in a romance lists it in his repertoire (*PGM* xxxiv.8), and Lucian satirizes such
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claims (Philops. 13, Asin. 4). Iamblichus' slaves bragged of their master's being levitated at his devotions (Eunap. vit. soph. 458).

See the passages from Psellus and Nicetas of Serrae collected by Bidez, Mélanges Cumont, 95 ff. Cf. also Eitrem, Symb. Oslo. 8 (1929) 49 ff.

116 de myst. 166.15, where τοῖς καλουμένους seems to be passive (sc. θεοῖς), not (as Parthey and Hopfner) middle (= τοῖς κλητοπασ): it is the "gods," not the operators, who improve the character of the mediums (166.18, cf. 176.3). If so, the "stones and herbs" will be σύμβολα carried by the "gods" and left behind by them, like the "apports" of the spiritualists. Cf. chap. iv, n. 19.

117 Procl. in Remp. I.111.1; cf. in Crat. 34.28, and Psellus, PG 122, 1136B.

118 Gregory of Nazianzus, orat. 4.55 (PG 35, 577c).

119 "Kindermedien," 73 f.

120 Cf. de myst. 3.14, on various types of φωτὸς ἀγώγη.

121 Simpl. in phys. 613.5, quoting Proclus, who spoke of a light τὰ αὐτοπτικὰ θεάματα ἐν ξανθῷ τοῖς άξίοις ἔκφαινον. ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ τὰ ἀτεχνάτα τυπούσθαι φησι κατὰ τὸ λόγιον. Simplicius, however, denies that the Oracles described the apparitions as arising ἐν τῷ φωτὶ (616.18).


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