


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THE JOURNAL OF A GROUP ANALYZING THE POWER MECHANISMS WHICH PRODUCE AND MAINTAIN THE PRESENT DIVISIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.


Anti-Oedipus



From Psychoanalysis to Schizopolitics

semiotexte

ANTI-OEDIPUS



“Beneath the beach, the paving stones . . .”

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
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Francis Picabia: "Machine Turn Quickly" (1916-1918)
 Inscribed top "Machine Tournez Vite"; 1.1. "1 Femme/ 2 Homme"

Libido Unbound: The Politics of 'Schizophrenia'

SYLVÈRE LOTRINGER

"If Marxism and Psychoanalysis are the two big losers of the last fifteen years, it is not so much that they sold themselves to the class in power, but that they participated in the very mechanisms of power"

—Michel Foucault (1975)

If *Anti-Oedipus** had merely thrown psychoanalysis into question, as its title would seem to indicate, it would never have aroused in France the kind of passionate attention to which some of the pieces collected here attest.

Since its inception the psychoanalytical establishment has undergone quite a number of attacks, but it always managed to modify its make-up somewhat, like the flu virus, in order to outlive the more powerful antidotes. The American Ego-psychology gradually ensheathed itself in a neo-behaviorist chain-mail which tied down intra-familial behavior to the theory of communication. Interpretative power maintained its grip on the sly, through binary logic. On the other side of the Atlantic, old Freudianism, which hadn't quite made it the first time, grew a second, more glorious, skin by jumping on the band wagon of Structuralism. Linguistics helped thereafter to justify the "return to Freud" advocated by Jacques Lacan. Oedipus and castration were turned into incontrovertible scientific truths and the unconscious into an object of pure knowledge reserved strictly for techno-academics. This is why Deleuze and Guattari felt it necessary to direct in response the brunt of their first attack against psychoanalysis and "psychoanalysisism" (Cf. Jacques Donzelot: "An Antisociology").

PROJECT FOR A REVOLUTION IN NEW YORK

Yet the real scope of their attempt is to be found elsewhere, in the more general title of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Psychoanalysis is the specific, yet restrictive, application-point of a reflection that actually endorses the entire economy, libidinal as well as political, of industrial societies. After the battering dealt to psychoanalysis by Wilhelm Reich, it is the whole problem of the relationship of desire to the sphere of social forces that Deleuze and Guattari attempt to recast here in a new light.

Anti-Oedipus comes to us in the wake of May '68, at a time when the radicalism of the 60s seems to have vanished, or rather has exhausted the

**Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Anti-Oedipus*, by Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari (translated by Robert Hurley, Helen R. Lane and Mark Seem), A Richard Seaver Book, the Viking Press: New York, 1977.

most expedient and all-encompassing forms it assumed in the conditions of acute socio-political crisis (civil rights, Vietnam war, etc.). Economic neurosis, carefully entertained and exploited, now prevails. At the micro-political level, though, some powerful energy is still stirring blindly for change and it is precisely in this respect that *Anti-Oedipus* can be put to good use.

Its originality on the French scene resides also in the fact that instead of grudgingly remaining, as Jean-Paul Sartre had to do, the uneasy bedfellow of bureaucratic socialism, it turns somewhat paradoxically towards the United States to discover another face of revolution. That which can no longer be expected from socialist countries appears suddenly at the very heart of the capitalist maelstrom. America, with its free-floating and shifting borders, its impenitent pragmatism and its unrestrained energy affords a better viewpoint on modern industrial societies than most European countries, such as France, which have long been sedentary and centralized. The gamble of *Anti-Oedipus* is to reformulate revolutionary perspectives from the strong points, and the weak links, of capitalism. No longer moving against the grain, but rather pushing the logic of Kapital further than it ever allowed itself to be led—to its breaking point.

THE NEUROTIC SMOKE-SCREEN

“Those who suffer from the Oedipus-complex are not sick, they make up the quasi-totality of the people. To the contrary, isolated and affected as I am by simplex anti-oedipus, I could, paraphrasing Saint-Theresa, howl like a banshee that I suffer not to suffer . . .”

—René Crevel, *Etes-vous fous?* (1929)

Freud never considered the relationships of desire and society except in terms of de-sexualization: sublimated homosexuality remains for him the very cement of social cohesion (Cf. Guy Hocquenghem: “Family, Capitalism, Anus”). Furthermore he explicitly recognized modern society as essentially repressive, and consequently bound and bounded to neurosis. If neurosis is the intrinsic law, the norm of all industrial societies, who can deliver us from this normality?

Surely not psychoanalysis, which cures less than it regulates neurosis for the simple reason that, in the final analysis, psychoanalysis and neurosis are two sides of the same coin.

Who then? Vertiginous moment: if normality is abnormal, then the very notion of “patient” begins to vacillate. Nevertheless Freud concludes: “As regards the therapeutic application of our knowledge, what would be the use of the most correct analysis of social neuroses, since no one possesses authority to impose such a therapy upon the group?” (*Civilization and its Discontents*). The therapeutic contract is a social contract: the analyst derives his power-to-cure from society. From here on, no one can wrest society from its neurosis. “But in spite of these difficulties,” Freud adds, for the sake of argument, “we may expect that one day someone will venture to embark upon a pathology of cultural communities.” We surely need a

Superman for such a superanalysis. Unless analysis can dissociate itself from any authority . . .

Freud's reasoning relies on certain presuppositions that should be elucidated if we are to escape this apparent impasse: (1) There exists a "correct," objective, disinterested knowledge of man; (2) This knowledge can be "applied" or not according to the authority with which one is invested; (3) There should be an appointed representative who will "impose" the therapy onto the group. (4) Social pathology is defined, by "analogy," along with individual development, in terms of neurosis.

To this I will reply, telescoping the first two points, that from the outset knowledge of man constitutes an "application" of social authority. Power needs to erect an identifiable object in order to exercise its control over it. Knowledge, even in its positive aspects, involves exclusions and repressions of all kinds. It is the exercise of power by other means. Consequently the individual explored by the human sciences is correlative to a specific form of subjugation. The sickness of man is nothing but his individuality, an untenable construction that requires a continual libidinal investment onto repression. To be oneself or nothing, to possess or to die: paltry Eros trapped in an either/or designed to rock him back and forth into anguish or annihilation. The very demands of the person, propped up as they are by the affective deadlocks of conjugality and the Oedipal family, tributary themselves of a certain machinery of meaning, make up an internal police force far more powerful than the actual one. One does not cure neurosis, one changes a society which cannot do without it.

Certainly, but how? Here we are at the closest point to, and the farthest remove from, the positions of Anti-Psychiatry and Radical Therapy. For my third point is that it isn't enough to transfer therapeutic authority, still conceived by Freud in personal liberal terms, to an extra-familial community bent on securing a new, magnified Oedipus at the group level (Cf. Félix Guattari: "Mary Barnes' Trip") or to simply equate therapy with political struggle. Two excessive, that is maladjusted, reactions that particularize and reduce (micro-repression) or globalize and transcend (macro-struggle) the complexity of power-relations that stratify society. The discontents of our civilization result from the failure to recognize and connect these different, specific dimensions (be they somatic, conjugal, familial, professional, etc.)

Freud conceived social pathology as merely an extension of the "private" neurosis of the individual. It is at this, the fourth, point that Deleuze and Guattari intervene most forcefully with reflections on the group or the horde ("Three Group Problems" and "May 14, 1914. One or Several Wolves"). Such an extension is actually a *secondary* operation, a mere optical illusion since the distinction between these two "entities" already partakes of repression. The institution is not filled with individuals like a fish bowl with fish. Nor is the family the microcosm for society, for it has no more unity save at the level of ideological representation. All of these trumped-up analogies constitute a basic logico-political manipulation by which capitalism strains to choke off *its own overflowing*.

For the movement proper to capitalism does not in any way answer to neurosis: it produces neurosis *on the side*, like an archaism indispensable to its survival, a lesser evil perfectly designed to keep the psychoanalysts and their patients, i.e. virtually everyone, busy. Behind the neurotic smoke-screen, though, ever more powerful machines of a different kind are churning, machines before which Freud sits silently. Celibatory machines, nomadic, protean, elusive, meaningless. Schizophrenic.

ACTION-ANALYSIS

“Psychoanalysis, it’s like the Russian revolution, you can’t tell when it starts to go bad.”

—*Anti-Oedipus*

What capitalism sets directly in motion is a prodigious process of decoding which unceasingly opens everything in its path. Since everything becomes interchangeable (law of value), nothing, or almost nothing, resists the flow of capital whose economy is one, *at least potentially*, with that of desire. Schizophrenia defined loosely, and not clinically, as the uncontrollable, polymorphous movement of desire emanating from within the social production, constitutes thus the threshold and the threat of industrial society: “Capitalism, through its process of production, produces an incredible schizophrenic charge on which it dumps all the weight of repression, but which nonetheless continues to engender itself as the limit of the process . . . Capitalism institutes or restores all sorts of residual and artificial territorialities, be they imaginary or symbolic, on which it attempts, as best it can, to recode, to pigeon-hole persons derived from abstract quantities. Everything returns or recurs: States, nations, families.” (*Anti-Oedipus*). Repression is not just imposed globally and from the outside, it is generated at every single level of society by a fundamentally anarchic and intensive régime always on the brink of its own dissolution. *Energumen Capitalism* (Cf. Jean-François Lyotard’s article). Psychoanalysis, which was the first to recognize the thrust of libido as such, hastened to enclose it in a formation of power meant to patch up the increasingly obsolete structure of the family (Cf. John Rajchman: “Analysis in Power”), while Marxism-Leninism, once victorious, crushed all revolutionary energies under the heel of State-nation-family. There was no more distortion of Marx than perversion of Freud. Exit the Freud-Marxist alternative (Cf. Félix Guattari’s interviews and “Everybody Wants to Be a Fascist”) and return Nietzsche (our next issue).

The elimination of social pathology therefore requires paradoxically the radicalization of the “schizophrenic” propensity of the system, rightly perceived by R. D. Laing, by calling upon its most marginal elements. Since capitalism operates through a continuous network of micro-controls that simultaneously produce and differentiate the individual, any local struggle at its peak can eventually intensify, by connecting them strategically, all the points of resistance and by so doing affect the whole of the social fabric. *Anti-Oedipus* obviously echoes in that respect the “events” of May ’68 in

France. A handful of young militants distrustful of all hierarchies acted as schizo-revolutionary "analyzers" and succeeded in mobilizing students and workers alike, to the point of bursting through the dikes and stratifications built up by the capital: "Many people have asked themselves how it was possible that so vast a movement should have erupted from what was apparently so unimportant an event as the closure of a university and the intervention of the police in students affairs. It is therefore important to explain how a relatively small number of students succeeded in broadening the struggle against police repression to such an extent that it culminated in the occupation of the universities and the total rejection of its function in capitalist society. Learning through action plays a basic part in the genesis and growth of all revolutionary movements. *From analyzing what is closest at hand, we can come to understand society at large.*" (Daniel Cohn-Bendit). This constitutes a response to Freud's investigation of therapeutic authority. The remedy to societal neurosis is not "imposed" from the outside on the collectivity out of any "correct" theory; it is a cure-in-action that forces, for once, analysis to side with desire.

Revolution always comes as a surprise. Interpretation lags behind. The events in France have proven that revolution is possible in even a highly industrialized capitalist society. But they shouldn't be hailed as another ready-made model to be followed blindly. For even May '68 can become Oedipal . . .

THUS SPAKE TZARATHOUSTRA

"Develop the desire motor . . ."

—Marcel Duchamp

We cannot change society without simultaneously unhinging the individual and all the power mechanisms that maintain his position (logic, dialectics, meaning).

There was already a warning more than half a century ago, evident where it was least expected. In the *Dada Manifesto 1918*, Tristan Tzara, with a rare lucidity, violently attacked logic's arbitrariness, the extenuating ruses of dialectics, the sick speculations of psychoanalysis which "puts to sleep the anti-objective impulses of man and systematizes the bourgeoisie." Dada understood very well that logic, an "organic disease," is the most insidious weapon of power (it "has inflicted us with passivity in the presence of policemen"). Such is the very logic, holistic, hierarchized, made in the image of the organism which Antonin Artaud will pulverize in turn by producing the *body without organs* (Cf. "The Body is the Body" and "To Have Done With the Judgment of God"). It is not by chance that Deleuze and Guattari begin their study with a whole development on the syntheses of the unconscious, that is the real "logical," or rather alogical, operations of desire. It is possible, writes Tzara, to "perform contrary actions together while taking one fresh gulp of air." Logic doesn't breathe: "its chains kill." A non-exclusive disjunctive synthesis on the contrary outflanks dialectics and

the "boring perfection" of its construction in the rigor of an action and the beat of a breath.

Psychoanalytical interpretation, for as much as it seeks causes and goals, explanations and meanings under the protection of an unconscious conceived on the model of language, remains a tributary to the logic of power. This is what the *Dada Manifesto* summarizes in a striking aphorism: "Safe in the cottony refuge of serpentine complications he manipulates his instincts. Hence the mishaps of conjugal life." Interpretative logic, bridling desire, leads to the cottony refuge, to the anguished protection of conjugal neurosis. The destructive work of Dada, its negation of the family, thus is complemented by a precise critique of ego traps. "We have thrown out the cry-baby in us," writes Tzara in a Nietzschean tone where he calls for an awakening of *anti-human* action just as he demands an *anti-psychological* drive. Man as a sovereign being is a subtle hallucination superimposed over chaos. We must rid the individual of his cry-baby penchant (love me for myself!), take him away from his neurosis towards an intrinsically schizophrenic intensity: "Affirm the cleanliness of the individual *after the state of madness* . . . Without aim or design, without organization: indomitable madness, decomposition."

Surrealism, with its paranoiac organization, its little Parisian scene, its dialectic manipulations and its desire for an aesthetic surplus-value of meaning, quickly came to restore order to an explosive movement, loosely defined, at once multinational and multiform, political in Berlin, poetical in Paris, pictorial in New York and everywhere profoundly subversive. André Breton won't rest until he has "oedipalized Dada" (Cf. Deleuze/Guattari: "Balance Sheet-Program for Desiring Machines") and sublimated in a group homosexuality the "future beauty" which Picabia had attempted to destroy once and for all.

No wonder that these artists in life, these revolutionaries without a doctrine who make up Dada, were suspicious of psychoanalysis and its neurotic sexuality, these very men who dealt with psychosis. Dada was scuttled, René Crevel pushed to suicide, Artaud straight-jacketed. Fascist paranoia is always ready to check the schizo-revolutionary flight if given the chance.

Wanted: dadanalysts . . .

I would like to thank Thomas Gora, Daniel Moshenberg and Patrick Truhn who helped me prepare this manuscript.

Energumen Capitalism

JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD

In spite of its title, *Anti-Oedipus* is not a critical book. Rather, like the *Anti-Christ*, it is a positive, assertive book, an energetic *position* inscribed in discourse, the negation of the adversary happening not by *Aufhebung*, but by forgetting. Just as atheism is religion extended into its negative form—even the modern *form* of religion, the only one in which modernity could continue to be religious—so does the critique make itself the object of its object and settle down into the field of the other, accepting the latter's dimensions, directions and space at the very moment that it contests them. In Deleuze and Guattari's book you will see everywhere their utter contempt for the category of transgression (implicitly then for the whole of Bataille): either you *leave immediately* without wasting time in critique, simply because you find yourself to be elsewhere than in the adversary's domain; or else you critique, keeping one foot in and one out, positivity of the negative, but in fact nothingness of the positivity. And this is the critical non-potence one finds in Feuerbach and Adorno. Marx said in 1844 that socialism doesn't need atheism because the *question* of atheism is *positionally* that of religion; it remains a critique. What is important in the question is not its negativity, but its position (the position of the problem). From atheism (which Marx considered to be utopian communism) to socialism, there is no critique, no barrier crossed, no transcendence; there is a displacement, desire has wandered into another space, a different mechanism has begun to operate, it works differently, and what allows it to work is not the fact that the other, older machine has been criticized. For the same reason and all things being equal, the lines that follow here will not be a critique.

Contrary to all expectations, or in fact *because* the shattering title is an illusory effect, what the book subverts most profoundly is what it doesn't *criticize*: Marxism. This does not imply that symmetrically, it does not subvert psychoanalysis, which it attacks. On the contrary, beneath the different speeds at which this book/machine runs, whether it works with Freud or Marx, there remains an evident identity of *position*. What is silently buried from Marx is no less serious or important than that from Freud which is rendered up to the crackling blaze of *Anti-Oedipus*' counterfire. On one hand, the machine/book unplugs itself from the psycho-

Translation of "Capitalisme énergumène," Critique, 306, Nov. 1972. J.-F. Lyotard teaches philosophy at the Faculté de Vincennes, Paris, and is the author of Discours, figure, Klincksieck, 1971; Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud, 10/18, 1973; Des dispositifs pulsionnels, 10/18, 1973, and Economie libidinale, Minuit, 1974.

analytical network and *exposes* it, forces it to expose itself, just like the man with the tape recorder does, reducing and projecting all the libidinal energy which should have flowed away into the transference relationship, projecting it onto the paranoid configuration of the Arch-State which, according to Deleuze and Guattari, underlies the network of psychoanalytical practice; on the other hand and on the contrary, the book pumps out Marxism's theoretical and practical flows, cutting them off here and there, dropping without a word whole parts of the Marxist apparatus. None the less, the two Elders are in fact put under the same banner: in their works, every way that the libidinal economy communicates with the political economy is truly a transforming force and thus a potential departure; on the contrary, that by which the libidinal conceals the political in Freud or the political the libidinal in Marx must be leaped out of and danced upon. Thus, as the visible axis of the book, everything that is *unconsciously* political in psychoanalysis will be profoundly subverted, Anti-Oedipus being Anti-State, rupture with the despotic configuration unconsciously present in psychoanalysis. But parallel to that, everything unconsciously libidinal in Marxism will be detached, a libido imprisoned in the religious scaffolding of dialectical politics or economic catastrophism, a libido repressed in the interrupted analyses of commodity fetishism or of the naturalness of work.

Yet the book is Anti-Oedipus and not Anti-Party, assuming that the Party is, on the socio-political surface, the analogue of Oedipus on the corporal surface. Is this not giving too much importance to psychoanalysis in the repressive mechanisms that regulate the circulation of Kapital? Is this critical virulence not too clamorous? Is it not precisely through it that leftist intellectuals will make the book into a gadget, a seasonal fad, and thereby neutralize it? Is not its true virulence in its silence? By branching the present short work off the larger work of the book exactly where the latter is silent, perhaps a few little spurts will be released, flows unexchangeable by the merchants and/or the politicians. Thus what the book affirms is reaffirmed, showing to be one of the most intense products of the new libidinal configuration that is beginning to gel inside capitalism.

It is of no importance that what we do ends up being melodic.

—C. Wolff to Stockhausen

Marxism says: there is a frontier, a limit past which the organization of flows called capital (capitalist relations of production) comes apart, and the group of correspondences between money and commodities, capital and the labor force, as well as other parameters, go haywire. And it is the very growth of production capacities in the most modern capitalism which, reaching this limit, will cause the whole system of production and circulation to wobble. Furthermore this growth will not fail to allow the passage of even more energy flows, and to unleash and disperse their "regulation" system *within* capital, that is, within the relations of production.

All Marxist politics is built thereon, seeking in this frontier, this limit, or this chian, a cornerstone seemingly ready to crumble, or a weak link—or one considered so pertinent as to bring down the whole structure, the strongest link. All of this is a politics of limits and of negativity. It requires an exteriority beyond the reach of capital: the latter extends the law of value to new objects, or rather it remodels all the old objects formerly “coded” according to the intricate rules of the production of “trades,” according to religious rituals, and according to the customs of older, more “savage” cultures, so that they may be decoded and made into modern “objects” stripped of all constraints other than that of exchangeability: at the same time as all that, capital itself approaches a limit it cannot exceed.

What is this limit? The disproportion between flows of credit and flows of production? That between quantities of commodities and quantities of available currency? That between capital invested and the expected profit rate? The disequilibrium between projected production capacity and effective production? The disproportion between fixed capital and salaries or variable capital? That between surplus value created by the exploitation of the labor force and its realization or reconversion in production? Or is the limit the lowering of the profit rate? Or the rising up of revolutionary criticism within the ranks of a growing proletariat? Or should it on the contrary be bitterly but symmetrically (that is by remaining within the same theoretical and practical field) recorded that the impetus to invest, discouraged by the lowering of the profit rate, is reinforced by the State; that workers are less and less open to a revolutionary upheaval in spite of their growing numbers (to the extent that Communist parties are obliged to *practically* exclude such a perspective from their programs and to present themselves as capable managers of a nearly identical system where there would simply be a few less owners of capital and a few more high-level functionaries)?

These are not speculative hesitations, but are rather practical and political. They are the legacy of a century of the Communist movement, and from a good half-century of socialist revolution. As if around 1860, one had examined the dynamics of the French society, the contradictions within the society of the *Ancien Regime*; the direction imposed by Robespierre during the French Revolution; the historical function of Bonaparte; and finally, the fundamental difference between French society under the last kings and under the last emperor, realizing that it is found not in the Age of Enlightenment, where bourgeois ideology places it, but to the side, in the Industrial Revolution. The same goes, all things displaced, for the Russian “socialist” state. Its divergence from bourgeois society is not where its discourse places it: not in the power of the Soviets, that is, not in the greater, theoretically very great proximity of the workers to the decisions taken on the economy and on society, thus in freer flows of production, words, thoughts, and objects. Its difference lies on the contrary in the restraint which is put on these currents just as strongly as it was under czarism, just as rationally (that is to say, irrationally, and in just as secondary a fashion (in the Freudian sense)) by a sociovoracious state that absorbs

civil, economic and intellectual society, that infiltrates it through all its circulatory canals, and pours into them the cement of its bureaucratic suspicion. Thus no more fluctuating and less representative; on the contrary, just as centralized, totalizing and paranoiac. Here again things happen elsewhere: the socialist revolution engenders a new kind of despotic state, where the police-like, paternalistic contempt for the masses and the libido seeks to combine with the technical efficiency and initiative of (American) capitalism, and does not succeed. To Lenin stating that socialism was the Soviets' power plus electrification, Cronstadt replied: it is the Party's power plus execution. In no way is capitalism the reign of freedom, for it too is the mapping back of the flows of production onto the *socius*; and Kapital is this mapping-back-onto; but it must happen *only in the form of profit*, and not at all in that of some gain in sacred power (*numen*), in what Deleuze and Guattari call code surplus value, that is, a gain in prestige, which presupposes an emotional attachment. Capitalism offers nothing to believe in, cynicism is its morality. The Party, on the contrary, as a despotic configuration, requires a mapping-back-onto that is territorialized, coded and hierarchized, in the religious sense of the term. Russia, Mother Russia, the people, folklore, dances, customs, and costumes, baba and little father, all that comes from "savage" Slavic communities is kept up, preserved and referred to the figure of the Secretary General, to the despot who appropriates all production.

If one examines what effectively destroys bourgeois society then, it is clear that the answer can be found neither in socialist revolution nor in Marxism. Not only does the "dialectics" of history belie speculative dialectics, but it must be admitted that there is no dialectics at all. Configurations and vast networks dispute energies; the way to tap, transform and circulate them is completely different, depending on whether the configuration is capitalistic or despotic. They may combine, producing no contradictions, no totalization of history leading to other configurations, but effects of compromise on the social surface, unexpected monsters: the Stakhanovist worker, the proletarian company head, the Red Marshall, the leftist nuclear bomb, the unionized policeman, the communist labor camp, Socialist Realism. . . . In this economic-libidinal mixing, it is surely the despotic configuration that dominates. But in any case, were the outcome different, it cannot be seen how and why this machinery would be a dialectical result, even less why and how the libidinal configuration of capitalism ought to or even could "lead to" this kind of arrangement as a "result of its intrinsic organic development." In fact, it does not lead to it, it leads only to itself: no transgression to expect, no limit in its field that it does not pass over. On one hand, capitalism leaps over all the pre-capitalist limitations; on the other, it draws along and displaces its own limit in its movement. Uneasiness on the "left," orthodox and unorthodox.¹

What if this idea of an impassable economic, social, "moral," political, technical, or whatever, limit were a hollow idea?—this is the region where Deleuze and Guattari begin. If instead of a wall to breach or transgress, it were capitalism's wall itself that always went increasingly farther inside itself

(this kind of set-up was already present in the old idea of the expansion of the “internal” market)? Not that it would thus suppress itself by simple extension; neither would the question of its overthrow be found to be obsolete and necessitate joining the ranks of revisionists and reformers expecting everything from development, growth and a little more “democracy,” or rather expecting nothing more than a 3% increase in the GNP and better distribution. But in the sense that there is no exteriority, no Other of Kapital—which would be Nature, Socialism, Festival, whatever—; rather in the very interior of the system there are regions of contact and war that never stop multiplying between what is fluidity and almost indifference, developed by capital itself, and what is “axiomatic,” repression, plugging up of flows, “reterritorialization,” and mapping back of energy onto a body supposed to be its origin but that only draws energy from it, whatever the name it assumes: Nation, Civilization, Freedom, Future, and New Society have only one Identity: Kapital.

There is no dialectics in the sense that one or several of these conflicts should one day result in the breaching of the wall, that one day the energy would find itself freed, dispersed, fluid, on the “other side”; rather there is a kind of *overflowing* of force inside the same system that liberated it from the savage and barbaric markings; any object that can be exchanged can enter into Kapital; from the moment that it is exchangeable (according to the law of value), what can be metamorphosed from money into machines, from merchandise into merchandise, from work force into work, from work into salary, from salary into work force, is an object for Kapital. And thus nothing is left but an enormous moving around, objects appear and disappear, fins of dolphins, on the surface of the sea, and objectness gives way to sheer obsolescence, what is important is no longer the object, a concretion inherited from the codes, but metamorphosis, fluidity. Not a dolphin, but a trail, an energetic trace inscribed on the surface. It is perhaps in this liquidity, in these lukewarm waters, that the capitalist production relationships will sink, that is, the simple rule of equality of exchangeable values and the whole set of “axioms” that Kapital keeps on creating to make this rule compulsory and respectable once again, while it unceasingly derides it.

ENERGUMEN CAPITALISM

At once very deep and superficial, a subversion of Marxism never stated . . . This configuration of Kapital, the circulation of flows, is imposed by the predominance of the point of view of circulation over that of production: in the sense of political economics. (Production for Deleuze and Guattari is the branching on and breaking off of flows, a gush of milk sucked from the breast and cut off by the lips, energy extracted and converted, a flow of electrons converted in the rotation of a milling machine, spurts of semen sucked in by the uterus.) This predominance of the point of view of circulation will inevitably be attacked. When Deleuze

and Guattari write that capitalism must be thought in the category of the bank rather than that of production, it will be cried that it is Keynesian ideology, techno-bureaucratic representation of the system by intellectuals cut off from practice, and that in abandoning the point of view of production, it is work, worker, struggle, and class that are ignored. There is not a word, in fact, on work-value theory; and only an enigmatic word on a hypothesis of machinic surplus value. In truth, the great river of the book washes up several major cadavers: proletariat, class struggle, human surplus value It spreads the image of a decoded capitalism full of contemporary circulations or even more intense potential circulations that only a series of dikes ("reterritorializations") can restrain and keep within the banks, only a whole battery of repressions led by the fundamental State: the Arch-State and its Oedipus.

Capitalism as metamorphosis without an extrinsic code, having its limit only within itself, a relative, deferred limit (which is the law of value), there is in fact an "economics" found already in German Ideology and again in the manuscripts of 1857-58 (*Grundrisse*, introduction to the *Critique of Political Economics*), and in *Capital* itself. And the traces of this economics' concern with the libido can be seen at one end in the *Reading Notes* of 1843, and at the other in the chapter on fetishism in *Capitalism*, as Baudrillard has shown. The critical universality of capitalism is outlined as well, the hypothesis that with indifference, with the effect of the principle of equivalence—of decoding—the empty space, the void in which the great categories of work and value can be constituted arises in labor or in the capitalist practice of capitalism, and the assumption is made that it will be possible to apply these categories retroactively to systems ("precapitalist" forms) in which the modalities had been covered over by codes, by markings and representations that did not permit a generalized political economics, that is, that maintained political and libidinal economics exterior to one another, the latter diverted into religion, customs, rituals of inscription (tattooing, scarification), cruelty, and terror. With capitalism, all this becomes equalized, the modalities of production and inscription are simplified within the law of value, and thus anything can be produced-inscribed from the moment that inscription-production energy put into a trace or an object is reconvertible into energy, into another object or another trace. A portrait of a nearly schizophrenic capital. Occasionally called perverse, but it is a *normal* perversion, the perversion of a libido operating its flows over an organless body on which it can cling everywhere and nowhere, just as the flows of material and economic energy can, in the form of production—that is, of conversion—invest themselves on (to) any region whatsoever of the surface of the social body, of the smooth and indifferent *socius*. Transient cathexes causing all territories confined and marked by codes to disappear in their wake—not only on the side of *objects* (the prohibitions of production and circulation all collapse, one after another), but as well on the side of "subjects," whether individual or social, which can only appear in this transit, as indifferent concretions themselves exchangeable and anonymous,

whose illusion of existence can only be maintained at the price of special expenditures of energy.

What fascinates Marx is quite recognizable in the configuration of Kapital proposed by Deleuze and Guattari: the capitalist *perversion*, the subversion of codes, religions, decency, trades, education, cookery, speech, the levelling of all "established" differences into the one and only difference: being worth . . . , exchangeable for Indifferent difference. *Mors immortalis*, in his words.

Deleuze and Guattari have brought this fascination to light, freed it from bad conscience, and help us to dislodge it, all the way into today's politics. Bad conscience for Marx himself, increasingly so for Marxists. And thus in proportion, a piety meant to conceal and expiate this appetite for capitalist liquefaction: this piety—dialectics—amounts to maintaining the positive perversion of capitalism inside a network of negativity, contradiction and neurosis which will permit a detection and denunciation of the *forgetting of the creditor (the proletariat) and of the debt (surplus value)*, in a freedom declared to be factitious and guilty, in a positivity judged to be a facade. Marxism will then be this repairing and remonstrating enterprise in which one will demonstrate and remonstrate the system to be a faithless debtor and erect all political energy on the project of repairing the wrong—not just any wrong, said Marx in 1843, but a wrong in itself, this living wrong that the proletariat *is*, the wrong of alienation. A not unfamiliar device inherited from Christianity, but one that took on paranoiac dimensions with Stalin and Trotsky before it fell into the routine of a wilted belief with today's "communism."

It is of this system of negativity and guilt that Anti-Oedipus rids Marxism. Cendrars said that "artists are, above all, men who struggle to become inhuman." The book's silence on class struggle, the worker's epic and the function of his party, such as they encumber political language, lead one to believe that for the authors, true politicians today are in fact men who struggle to become inhuman. No debt to localize. Its muteness on surplus value springs from the same source: looking for the creditor is wasted effort, the *subject* of the credit would always have to be *made to exist*, the proletariat to be incarnated on the surface of the *socius*, that is, represented in the representative box on the political stage; and that is in nucleus the reappearance of the Arch-State, it is Lenin and Stalin, it can be a nameless subject, the Party, a Void, the Signifier—and it is never anything but that, since a creditor is always the name of something missing. So forget bad politics, the politics of bad conscience, the processions of bedecked and bannered wisdom of a simulated piety: capitalism will never croak from bad conscience, it will not die of a lack or of a failure to render unto the exploited what is owed them. If it disappears, it is by excess, because its energetics unceasingly displace its limits; "restitution" comes as an extra and not as a paranoiac passion to render justice, to give everyone his due, as if it were not evident that in addition to the market value of his energy expendi-

ture, a worker's "salary" in any of the ten wealthiest nations did not contain a redistributed share of surplus value.

**NEITHER STRUCTURES, BE THEY INFRA-,
NOR EXCHANGE, BE IT SYMBOLIC**

What are the prohibitions capitalism opposes to the incessant wandering of flows? "Reterritorializations" necessary for the maintenance in place of the system, say Deleuze and Guattari. These localizations circumscribed on the surface of the *socius*, disconnecting whole regions and sheltering them from schizo-flows, are neo-archaisms, they say: Indian reservations, Fascism, exchange, Third World bureaucracies, private property—and assuredly, Oedipus and *Urstaat*.

How superficial it seems to ascribe the same function to reservations and capital, Stalin and Hitler, Hitler and private property! What do they do with super- and infra-structures? Not a word, of course, on this subject. There are only desiring-machines, the organless body, their stormy relationships already in the molecular order, relationships between the anus making shit, or the mouth making words, or the eyes making eyes, and a surface, that of the hypothetical body, where they are to posit, inscribe and compose themselves—and then in the order of the conjectural great social body, of the *socius*, again in the molar order, the violent disjunction between on one hand, the blind, machinic repetition of the production-inscription of small organs and social segments; and on the other hand, the mapping back and monopolization of these segmentary productions on (to) the surface of the *socius*, thanks to the Arch-State in particular. No structure in the linguistic or semiotic sense; only dispositions of energy transformations. And among these dispositions, no reason to privilege (under the name of infrastructure) that which regulates the production and circulation of *goods*, the so-called "economic" apparatus . . . For there is no less an *economy*, an energetics in that which will regulate lineages and alliances and thus distribute the flows of intensity in concretions of roles, persons and goods on the surface of the *socius*, finally producing what is called the organization of savage society (an organism that is in fact never unified, always divided between the thousand poles of small, multiple organs, partial objects, libidinal segments, and the vacuum-unifying pole created above, at the summit, at and in the head, by the signifier)—no less an economy in the laws of *kinship*, no less an economy even in the distribution of the libido on the surface of the organless body, in the hooking-up of small, desiring, energy transforming, and pleasure-seeking organs, than in the economics and distribution of capital, no less of a producing-inscribing apparatus there than here. Conversely, the Oedipal formation is no less political-economic than Kapital's, and finally, it is no less eco-libidinal and deviant than the primary process it taps. Thus in considering these dispositions, the problem is not in discerning which would be subordinating and which subordinated: there is a reciprocal subordination.

But the infra/super hypothesis would require that an organic totality of the social field be presupposed, that a social whole be presupposed and perpetuated, that structures be mapped out in a macro-structure, that the whole be the point of departure, that it be assumed that the whole is given or at least discernable and analyzable. But the whole problem is that the *whole is not given*, that society is *not* a unified totality; rather it is displacements and metamorphoses of energy that never stop decomposing and recomposing sub-units and that pull these units along, now towards the organs' perverse-schizo functioning, now towards the neurotic-paranoiac functioning of the great absent signifier. If you speak in terms of super- and infra- you are ordering dispositives according to high and low, you have already adopted the point of the signifier, of the whole, and *it will not let you go*: when you want to conduct a revolutionary politics or to imagine a subversive process, if you don't attack this edifice, you will have at best a dialectics, at best one "after" the negative moment, "after" the revolution, that is, *already before* (in the form of a party, for example, or a need for effectiveness or for organization, or the fear of failure), and the same hierarchized arrangement will be reproduced: the same worker-militant on the bottom and the same chief-boss on the top, the same confiscation of flows and partial production for the common good, that is to say, for the good of the despot.

What allows us to say this—once again, it is no fantasy—is capitalism itself. By sweeping through the most forbidden regions with its influxes of work and money—through art, science, trades and festivals, politics and sports, words and images, air, water, snow and sun, Bolshevik, Maoist and Castroist revolutions—capitalism makes coded dispositions that governed their economy appear as libidinal configurations at the very moment that it casts them into disuse. It thus reveals that infra/superstructural oppositions, or those of economic/ideological structures and relationships of production versus social relationships are themselves pairs of concepts that cannot show us what happens in savage, feudal or Oriental societies, or even in capitalist society itself. For they are either too much or too little: too much because it is unquestionable that in the former, kinship, ritual and practical relationships decisively determine the production and circulation of goods, that is, the configuration of the "economy," and that they cannot be reduced to an illusory ideological function; too little because in the latter the term economics covers much more than political economics, much more than production and exchange of goods, since it is no less production and exchange of labor force, images, words, knowledge and power, travel and sex.

If political economics is a discourse that founds the phenomena of production and circulation by anchoring them in a nature (the Physiocratic Nature, the interests and needs of *Homo Oeconomicus*, the creative power of the workers' expenditure of energy), it is never applicable as such: past the level of survival given by hypothesis, archaic societies are no less arbitrary than capitalism, and the latter fits no better than they into the category of interest and need or work. Nowhere is there a primary economic order (of

interest, need or work) followed by ideological, cultural, juridical, religious, familial, etc., effects. Everywhere there are set-ups aimed at tapping or discharging, but in archaic or Oriental societies, energy and its concretions in "objects" (sexual partners, children, tools and weapons, food) must be *marked*—a seal, an incision, an abstraction—the marking of archaic arts, for their function is not that of "representation" in the sense of the Quattrocento, but rather to code what is libidinally invested or investable, to authorize what may circulate and produce pleasure; these codes are thus sorters, selectors, brakes-accelerators, dams and canals, mitral valves regulating the inputs and outputs of energy in all its forms (words, dances, children, delicacies . . .) in relation to the socius, to the non-existent, postulated Great Social Body; in capitalism however, all is swept away—these codified functionings, these specific adjustments in their concrete abstractions, this or that inscription on a certain region of the skin to denote puberty, a distinctive distortion in the neck, the ear, the nostrils, or the confection of a hat of chicken or pig entrails (Leiris in Gondar) to denote a particular function in a religious or magic ritual, this tattoo for the right to bear arms, that ornament on the chief's face, those words and chants and drum beats inscribed in the ritual scenario of sacrifice, mourning or ex-cision: all of this is surpassed and dissipated, capitalism deculturalizes peoples, dehistoricizes their inscriptions, repeats them anywhere at all as long as they are marketable, recognizes no code marked by the libido but only exchange value: you can produce and consume everything, exchange, work or inscribe anything anyway you want if it comes through, if it flows, if it is metamorphozable. The *only* untouchable axiom bears on the condition of metamorphosis and transfer: exchange value. Axiom and not code: energy and its objects are no longer marked with a sign; properly speaking, *there are no more signs* since there is no more code, no reference to an origin, to a norm, to a "practice," to a supposed nature or surreality or reality, to a paradigm or to a Great Other—there is nothing left but a little price tag, the index of exchangeability: it is nothing, it is enormous, it is something else.

The territorial mechanism of savagery or even the great barbaric despotic machine (as Nietzsche sometimes envisioned it) is not a good perspective for viewing the machinery of capitalism. After Marx, Deleuze and Guattari say that capitalism is *the* good perspective for seeing it all. If you look at capitalism through castration, you think you see it from the despotic Orient or from savage Africa, but in fact you perpetuate the nihilism of Western religion, your position is still inspired by bad conscience and piety for Nature and Exteriority and Transcendence; while capitalism, much more positive than atheism, the indication of a profound liquidity of economic flows on the surface of the socius, is for these very reasons what retro-actively makes us see the precapitalistic codes and lets us comprehend what in it and related only to itself, *index sui*, blocks up and channels this liquidity in the law of value. The only axiom of this system entirely made up of indifference and equivalence (*Gleichgültigkeit*, says Marx again and again, young and old), the law of value, is as well the only *limit*, an

impassible limit if you wish, always displaceable and displaced, keeping capitalism from being carried off by the meandering flood of molecular energetics.

THE OEDIPAL APPARATUS

The question to be asked Deleuze and Guattari is evidently that of the origin, finality, condition of possibility, or etc., of this "secondary" order, of this order that contains the void, that separates, orders and subordinates, that terrorizes and causalizes, that is the law (of value and exchange). But before that, why Oedipus? Why Arch-State in an apparatus like capitalism, whose "corresponding effect of meaning" is, repeat Deleuze and Guattari, cynicism? Nothing less cynical than Oedipus, nothing more culpable. Why and how would this circulation of flows regulated by only the law of exchange value need the Oedipal configuration as a supplement, as a premium of repression, that is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, why the configuration of State? Do they not themselves grant that bad conscience comes neither from despotism nor from capitalism, the former generating terror, and the latter, cynicism? What then generates this bad conscience? A two-levelled question: 1) What good is Oedipization within the system of generalized exchange? and 2) Is Oedipus really a configuration of *Urstaat*? The first level is plugged directly into the politics of capital and anti-capitalistic politics as well; the second into a theory of history and psycho-analytical machinery itself. First level: if capitalism needs no code whatever, if its only axiom is the law of value, that is, the exchangeability of sections of flows in equal quanta, why Oedipus? Is not the configuration of the father, the great despotic signifier, nothing more than an archaism—and not a neo-archaism—at the heart of the configuration of exchange? The Oedipal configuration in Deleuze and Guattari's hypothesis is that of Oriental despotism, and we will return to it shortly: does that mean that the capitalist State is the same as that of the Chinese kingdoms, the Great Kings and the Pharaohs? There is certainly in all of them a predominance of the bureaucracy as an apparatus for the channeling of libidinal economic flows. Deleuze and Guattari base their hypothesis to a great extent on Wittfogel, in fact, to too great an extent. Not because Wittfogel is often very imprudent as a *historian*, which is another problem; but because his whole book is inspired by a *political* confusion between the system of pre-capitalist domination, called by Marx the Asian mode of production, and the regime that Stalin imposed on Russia and its satellites for twenty years. The absence of private property, the absorption of all economic and social initiative by the bureaucratic apparatus, and the suspension of all activity, of all energetic flows—whatever their order—into the configuration of the despot, traits common indeed to both societies, obviously do not permit their identification. The decisive difference is precisely that Stalin and Mao are post-capitalist, that their regimes are in fact in competition with world capitalism, that they can only survive by accepting the challenge of industrialization,

without which capitalism would not fail to infiltrate bureaucratic society with flows of money, products, technological, and cynical—as well as revolutionary and critical—thought, causing fissures to appear everywhere.

Let us go further: why should capitalism preserve the institution of the family, forcing the adhesion of the child's libido? The parental configurations—teachers, professors, priests—undergo as well the erosion of capitalistic flows. Not really, assuming that psychoanalysis is in fact Oedipization, it is not the deed of capitalism, it goes against the current of the law of value. A salaried father is an exchangeable father, an orphaned son. Deleuze and Guattari must be supported against themselves: capitalism is indeed an orphanage, a celibacy, submitted to the rule of equivalence. What supports it is not the configuration of the great castrator, but that of equality: equality in the sense of the commutability of men in one place and of places for one man, of men and women, objects, spaces, organs.

It will be said that this does not stop repression from increasing in modern societies nor the law of value from dispensing nice and strong forces of order. But it must be answered that repression never stops becoming more *exteriorized*; since it is less in people's heads it is more in the streets. Cynicism never stops progressing, hence the police and militia contingents. Fewer recognized, "interiorized" fathers, professors chiefs, moral leaders, more cops. Freud was completely mistaken in *Civilization and its Discontents* when he foresaw that the extension of "civilization" in the bourgeois sense of material civilization, and in the League of Nations sense of "perpetual peace," which he equated to the resorption of external expressions of aggressivity, would be accompanied by an aggravation of its internal expressions, that is, ever increasing anguish and guilt. In the regions where this civilized peace reigns—in the center of capitalism—there is nothing of the kind, and so much the better. The Great Signifier and Great Castrator are drawn into the rapid and polluted waters of the reproduction of capitalism, of the Great Metamorphosis. A modern man believes in nothing, not even in his responsibility-guilt. Repression comes on not as punishment, but as a reminder of the axiomatic: the law of value, nothing for nothing. It can be the PTA exerting it on children, the union on the workers, the woman's magazine on the "weaker sex," the writer on discourse, or the museum curator on paintings—they act not at all as the terrifying or cruel incarnations of a transcendental Power—even though they possess it—and all their operativeness is reducible to the maintenance of the most elementary rule, the last word of Kapital: "equitable," exchange, equivalence. They do not frighten, they only hurt.

Thus we proceed to the second level: Oedipus is not a configuration of *Urstaat*, a despotic one. Here as in guiltiness (and the two institutions are on a par), Deleuze and Guattari remain too near and too far from Freud. Too near, for it was indeed Freud's hypothesis in *Moses and Monotheism* that the source of Judaism was in the Oriental, monotheistic "despotism" of Akhenaton and thus that the father configuration conveyed by Judaism, Freud himself and all of psychoanalysis, is the configuration of the castrating

and incestuous despot. But very far at the same time, for what for Freud made the *difference* between Judaism and Egyptian religion, or Catholicism as well—in a sense between Judaism and *every religion*—what then in Judaism unravelled religiosity or potentially constituted its defeat or its defects was the foreclosure of the wish for the Father's death and its *acting out*, the carrying out of the original murder (supposed by Freud at the cost of an outrageously novelistic imagination) of a first Moses (he as well supposed) by Israel. Which means that in Judaism Oedipus remains unadmitted, unadmittable, hidden, and thus it is for Freud that guilt and bad conscience are born, contrary to what happens in religions of reconciliation.

The question here is not of following Freud in the construction of his family or ethnic romance. It is a question of seeking out what he is trying to achieve in conformity with his own libidinal construction and in his own words, to produce the singularity of the Judaic (and psychoanalytical) configuration of desire. And *like Nietzsche*, he apprehends it in bad conscience and sin. What the *origin* that Freud exhibits is worth is not questioned here. What assuredly matters is the principle according to which Oedipus and castration—and by the same token, transferral in the psychoanalytic relationship—are only operative in an energetic disposition whose traits are formed by the most ancient Hebraic law: the channeling of all libidinal energy into the order of language (suppression of the idols); in language, an absolute privilege given to the I/Thou relationship (elimination of myth); and within this relationship, the (Kierkegaardian) paradox of it always being Thou who speaks and never I. The disposition is that of the couch, where Israel is the patient, Moses the analyst, and Yaweh the unconscious: the Great Other. The Great Other *is not* the great incestuous Pharaoh, *Urvater* or *Urdespot*. There was an exodus, and the Jews broke with despotism, crossed the sea, the desert and killed the father (the murder that Freud sought to reconstruct was simply this exodus), and this is why interiorization as sin, as solitude, as neurosis, as well as the whole current of reform—Lutheranism and Freudism—will become possible, will become a fundamental possibility for the Western World.

We demand nothing of one another, we complain of nothing, but we both go on, the heart open, through open doors.

—Zarathustra to his solitude

But Kapital's configuration *is not* articulated with that of Judaism (of Oedipus) any more than it is with that of despotism or of symbolic savagery, it accords no privileges to discourse as the locus of the libido's inscription, it suppresses all locational privileges: hence its mobility; its principle bears on the inscriptive modality, its machinery obeys only one principle of energetic connection—the law of value, equivalence—the principle according to which all "exchange" is always possible in principle, all plugging or metamorphosis of a form of *Naturstoff* into another is always reconvertible in the inverse connection. But what about surplus value, will it be said? Is it not precisely

a belying of the disposition since it means that the relation between force and what it is supposed to be worth (its equivalent in commodities, its salary) is not convertible, and their equality is fictitious? This is assuredly true for every force sucked into capitalist economic networks, including machines. The apparatus functions by ignoring the inequality of force and resorbing its potential of disturbance, creation and mutation. Because of the principle governing energetic connection, the capitalist system privileges repetition without profound difference, duplication, commutation or replication, and reversibility. Metamorphosis is contained within the moderate limitations of metaphor. Surplus value and even profit are *already* denominations and resorption (exploitation, if you wish); they imply the commensurability of given and received, of "additional value" after production processes, and of value advanced in production. This supposed commensurability is what permits the transforming of the second into the first, the reinvestment of surplus value, it is the rule or the warrant of the capitalist system. The capitalist secret for the mapping back of desiring-production onto the organless body is found within this rule of immanent commutativity: this forcing back is reinvesting under the law of value. In it consists the very repression of the system, and it needs no other—or the others (cops, etc.) are only lemmas or reciprocals of the fundamental theorem of replication. And this is what Deleuze and Guattari mean when they stress the fictitious nature of the commensurability of credit and payment monies.

The potential of force is not producing something more, but producing something different, in different ways. Force is a disorganizing power in the organism, it is emotional stress, pruritus, perverse polymorphism, so-called psychosomatic illnesses, loss of spatial reference in schizo walking, so dear to Deleuze and Guattari, a grinning cat and the grin without the cat, work but always as dream work. Force fuses through the organic weave, perfusing energy. And it is this virtuality of an alterity that is multiplying in the gut of the capitalist "organism" and of the value apparatus, it is criticizing without interfering, *forgetting* the law of exchange, dodging it and making it a glaring and obsolete illusion, an unserviceable network. Who can say how long it will take the new disposition to sweep over the surface of our bodies and the social body with its unknown, transparent organs, to free them from their involvement with interests and the worries of saving, spending and counting? Another configuration is rising, the libido is withdrawing from the capitalist apparatus, and desire is finding other ways of spreading itself out, according to another configuration, one that is formless and ramified in a thousand attempts and (ad)ventures throughout the world, a bastard in rags of this and that, in words of Marx and Jesus and Mohammed and Nietzsche and Mao, communal practices and job actions, occupation, boycott, squatting, kidnap and ransom, happenings and demusicalized music and sit-ins and sit-outs, taking trips and light shows, liberation of gays and lesbians and the "madmen" and criminals, gratuitous acts unilaterally undertaken . . . What can capitalism possibly do against this unserviceability that is rising from within it (among others, in the form of unserviceable "young" people),

against this thing that is the new libidinal configuration, whose production/inscription in language is *Anti-Oedipus*?

Force produces only as channeled, as partially invested. Schizophrenia is called the *absolute limit*, because if it ever happened, it would be force undistributed in a libidinal network, pure liquid inflexion. By the multiplication of metamorphic principles, the annuhment of codes regulating flows, capitalism brings us closer to this schizophrenic limit. Bringing us closer to this limit, it already puts us on the other side. Thus the lack of attention paid by Deleuze and Guattari to Bataille's theme of transgression is understood: every limit is constitutively transgressed, there is nothing to transgress in a limit, what is important is not the other side of the frontier, since if there is a frontier, it is that both sides are already posited, composed in one and the same world. Incest, for example, is but a very shallow stream: only in words can the mother be conceived as a mistress; in orgasm, she is no longer the mother, no longer anything, for the night rules, the night of a hundred thousand disjointed organs and partial objects. Thus, either there is a limit—but it boils down to a too-human opposition, and desire is absent from both sides; or desire actually wanders about the limit's field—and its movement is not that of transgressing the limit, but rather of pulverizing the field itself into a libidinal surface. If capitalism has such affinities with schizophrenia, it follows that its destruction cannot come from a deterritorialization (the simple suppression of private property, for example . . .), which by definition it will survive: it is this deterritorialization. Destruction can only come from an even more liquid liquidation, only from even more *clinamen* and less gravity, from more dancing and less piety. What we need is for the variations of intensity to become more unpredictable, stronger; in "social life," for the highs and lows of desiring-production to be aimlessly inscribed without justification and without origin, as in the heady moments of "affective" or "creative" life; for a term to be put to *ressentiment* and bad conscience (*always equal to themselves, always depressed*), terms imputable to the identities of roles engendered by servicing paranoid machines, by technology and Kapital's bureaucracies.

What then about the death instinct? Deleuze and Guattari energetically fight the Freudian hypothesis of guilt and hate turned against themselves, such as it supports the diagnostic of *Civilization and its Discontents*: a death instinct that is without original or experience, a theoretical product of Freud's pessimism destined to maintain the neurotic, dualistic position, whatever happens. But if the death instinct is the reason why machines can only work by fits and starts and their cycles cannot be kept harmonious; if it is what perturbs desiring-production, either by the organless body drawing away and taking over their production, or by rejecting and repressing it; if its model is a haywire machinic functioning, a dysfunctioning; and if it presents itself in the corresponding experience of inarticulation (the loss of every *articulus*) as the surface without variation in intensity, as catatonia, as the "Ah, to not have been born," then it is not merely admissible, it is a necessary component of desire. Not at all *another* instinct, another energy, but within the

libidinal economy, an inaccessible “principle” of excess and disorder; not a second machinery, but a machine whose velocity can be displaced towards positive infinity, bringing it to a halt. It is this plasticity or viscosity that traces everywhere and nowhere the difference between political economy and libidinal economy, and owing to which in particular, a great savage configuration (a great apparatus)—for example—can be disinvested, pipes and filters can fall into obsolescence and the libido can be distributed differently in another configuration: it is thus in this viscosity that all revolutionary potential lies.

translated by James Leigh

NOTES

1. In Lyotard's words: “Désarroi de la “gauche”, non gauchiste 1) et gauchiste 2) ”, i.e. 1) Traditional leftist organisations such as the communist and socialist parties. 2) Organisations more “radical” and “unconventional” in their ideologies and methods than the communist party, which include Leninists, Trotskyites, Maoists, some of the anarchist trends, etc.. [Translator's note].

An Antisociology

JACQUES DONZELOT

What was it that brought a man, one day, to stretch out on the analyst's couch to relate the details of his life? This is in a sense the question Michel Foucault raised in *Madness and Civilization*. In order to solve this problem, Foucault described an historical sequence of three centuries during which time the division separating madness and normality was plotted. The results of his investigation show psychoanalysis to be situated at the outermost point of the confinement trappings without foregoing its fundamental implications: "Freud did deliver the patient from the existence of the asylum within which his 'liberators' had alienated him; but he did not deliver him from what was essential in this existence . . . he created the psychoanalytical situation in which, by an inspired short-circuit, alienation becomes disalienation, but the doctor as alienating figure remains the key to psychoanalysis."

Yes, one could tell his life history on the couch. But in such conditions as this, Foucault wonders, what was to be understood? Foucault's impertinent conclusion directed at psychoanalysis was to please Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to such an extent that they used it as a starting point for their own book and were able to systematically demolish psychoanalysis, construct a new theory of desire and, while they were at it, sketch the evolution of mankind from its origins to the present day. Each of these three aspects has been spoken about differently. The first aspect has been overly discussed, owing, it would seem, to the book's satirical style aimed at ridiculing psychoanalysis. The second aspect, the theory of machinic desire, has been academically treated so as to ascertain whether it is the negation of any and all poetry, or whether it is nothing but poetry. And the third aspect has been for the most part ignored, which is too bad since here, on the scale of the whole of the human sciences, there is an attempt at subversion on the general order of what Laing and Cooper had carried out solely on the terrain of psychiatry. In Deleuze and Guattari's book, the reversal of psychoanalysis no longer figures as an end in itself, but rather as the primary condition for a shake-up of a completely different scope, whose magnitude is already given in the very form and tone of the book.

A COMPLEX-FREE DISCOURSE

Some critics have written that this book is difficult. Now, there could not be a more poorly chosen word to designate this outburst of demystifi-

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cation and simplification which traverses in almost constant inflexible fashion the enormous and quite debilitated pile-up constituting the present day intellectual scene.

Anti-Oedipus comes to add to other histories besides the one described by Foucault. For example there is the series of institutional psychotherapy for which the book seeks to be the theoretical expansion. There is also the Freudo-Marxist "tradition" and the anti-Hegelian thrust whose groundwork was laid by Nietzsche. The book is hence the product of a conjunction between different series, a conjunction making for the book's singularity and explaining the kind of welcome it has received: a spectacular success, uneasy, parochial (*poujadistes*) reactions, to put it succinctly. This is due to the fact that, since impossible to situate in a given genre, it shakes the theories of every discipline while the disciples are unable to summon it before the tribunal of their own rules, since the book outflanks them on all sides. It is not a matter, strictly speaking, of a philosophy book; if Deleuze and Guattari indeed have a philosophy, it can adhere totally to the proposition that everything is in everything else and vice versa. Nor does the book emerge from a scientific discipline, any more than it invents one. Its principle of existence can be seen above all in an activity comprising a splitting of instituted modes of knowledge and an integral overturning of institutional propositions currently accepted. Prodigious efforts to think differently.

As concerns the form of the book, it will be recognized as disconcerting. This is because we are no longer accustomed to a book whose absence of disciplinary moorings makes the writing style take on the form of speech. Some deplore the absence here of a linear progression, the absence of the accumulative patience normally gratifying the reader. For Deleuze and Guattari can only be read as one would listen to someone speaking: everything is already said from the first words, all is yet to be said. There is no reason for it to come to a halt, save for fatigue. And it is true that we sometimes find them out of breath, panting too hard to digest the erratic blocks of knowledge acting as stones in the stream of the work, tired out by the rehashings of the primary postulates in order, at every turn, to demonstrate their pertinence. What can be said of all this, except that it is the inevitable ransom of adventure? The flattening of the intellectual scene, by means of a multi-angular scholarship allowing itself the right to an "indispensable incompetence," is no less disconcerting, as Deleuze and Guattari make negligent use of the most learned and respected scholars, enjoying themselves where they can and nimbly scaling the protective embankments that secure the intellectual edifices and guarantee their prominence. It is no longer a question of being "in the right" with respect to a given discipline or noted author, but rather of saying something which stands by itself.

A style gathering speech up into writing, then, rather than a regulated theoretical production, discouraging a study of it, as if the desired effect were not so much the contemplation of some body of knowledge as it is the communication of a joyful certitude: the history of humanity is that of a

long error that begins with the State and continues with psychoanalysis, via capitalism and the familial system. Another planetary discourse, some will say, but this time at least those "humanistic" fidgetings of nostalgia and prophecy are not present, there is nothing oratorical about *Anti-Oedipus*, no imprecations, no invocations. In order to read this book, and even more so to like it, we must, it is true, share with the authors a certain boredom with tragedy, suspecting it of being nothing more than an exorcism of life, a way of de-realizing history through the calling up of the origins and the incantation of the outcome, cutting off history's flow by means of the rehashings of myth and the compulsion of phantasy. We must also be tired of those entreaties aimed at giving a meaning to life because one is haunted by death. Finally we must be tired of the positivist attempts to obsessively delimit the "pathological" because one fears madness just as one fears all difference. If we are not tired of these things, we will get angry at only finding in its pages an obscuring of painfully acquired certitudes, settlements for the initiated, and a fashionable terrorism.

PSYCHOANALYSIS UPSIDE DOWN

Their enterprise could only be carried out against psychoanalysis, against its sovereign position within the intellectual field, its aptitude for decoding different modes of knowledge while inscribing them in its own wake, all the while constituting the inevitable target for any attempt at seriously shaking up this intellectual field. Now, how could a leftist critique of psychoanalysis be made, when psychoanalysis is justified in its own principles by the relationship of liberation which it maintains with what is driven back or repressed, and when it is powerfully shielded by a technical facade barring access to any and all criticism? The most daring among such projects of critique only scratched the psychoanalytic edifice, fitted it up in slightly different fashion, or annexed it with great reverence and many precautions.

This theoretical and political lock-up relies, as we can now see, on two main allegations which have permitted psychoanalysis to drive back criticism up until now. The first assertion: desire is reactionary in its essence, it does not bear on the present, and even less on the future, but seeks instead a reactivation of the past. From this angle, psychoanalysis passed, if not for revolutionary, at least for honorably progressive since it was coupled with a project of maturation of desire. The second assumption: desire is a denial of reality since every desire is a desire for images or, what is worse, for images of images. According to this assessment, desire would thus keep us perpetually out of key with respect to the real. Only analysis had competence in this area and was able to make the claim that it could unmask this "impossible real" hidden behind the theater of the Imaginary.

The growing feeling in recent years that things were not running too smoothly in the area of psychoanalysis constantly ran up against the above argument. Deleuze and Guattari move from this to an extremely coherent attitude stating that what cannot be assimilated or reshaped must be overthrown without another word being wasted on it. To the assertion that

desire is de-realizing they retort that desire is the real itself. Why, they ask, see anything other than a difference in régime between desiring activity and social, technical, artistic or political activity? Surely there can be a reactionary desire, but desire is in its essence revolutionary—take Fourier for example. This veritable reversion of psychoanalysis is carried out thanks to three operations:

1. **A generalization of the unconscious.** —Once it has been detriangularized, relativized, the unconscious becomes the continuum of existence, its principle, and no longer one impetus among others. The unconscious, an orphan, self-produced, anarchist and atheist, cyclical, enveloping within its own experience that of death, makes Becoming into something which does not stop and which never stops recurring. It therefore knows nothing of the origin or the end of existence, it expresses nothing and is not even a language. It is not the secret repository of a meaning to be deciphered, but rather *the state of coexistence of man and nature.*

2. **A materialization of desire.** —Desire is no longer viewed as a desire *for* something; it is not a tension exerted toward an object that is lacking and which is always lacking in order for desire, transcendence and beliefs to live; it is not produced by an incompleteness, but is, precisely, a production working by means of an association between machines that produce flows and other machines which break these flows: the sun and the eyes, the air and the mouth, the sexual organ and anything else you want. Desire back on its feet consists of a swarming of connections between energy-machines and organ-machines, and which can incidentally be both at the same time. Process thus implies neither law, hierarchy, nor transgression. The extension of sexuality to all surfaces of contact is obviously not what makes this analysis new—here Freud already pointed the way; what makes it different is the simultaneous desubstantialization and demystification of sexuality, such that desire no longer has a precise substance or a meaning. There is no longer a myth, an archetype or a structure which could be related back to the drives, and vice versa, in a give-and-take guaranteeing sexuality as an underground force and the force of myths. The shattering of this link holding together myth and sexuality liberates *desire as a surface activity*, and relieves it of the character of canned tragedy vile to the taste-buds.

3. **A functionalization of the processes of attraction and repulsion.** —Death is not the object of desire, but a form of desire, “a part of the desiring-machine, a part which must itself be judged, evaluated in the functioning of the machine and the system of its energetic conversions, and not as an abstract principle.” Just as there is life which desires in terms of the body without organs, this state of catatonic immobility of the body which silences organs and repudiates them. The difference between Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis here, and psychoanalysis, is that we are no longer captive to a dualistic concept of the instincts, a dilemma approving of civilization at every turn and sanctioning the repressive agencies as alone capable of combatting the death instinct. Instead we have at our disposal the possibility of *understanding the life-death, attraction-repulsion relationships*

in terms of a positive conjugation. No longer an antagonistic dualism which would be overcome dialectically through a neutralization by the Oedipal filter, but a functional multiplicity where the repulsion of the organs by the body without organs conditions the attraction which is the functioning in and of itself. If repulsion is indispensable this is due to the fact that, without it, a fixed organism is created, a closed entity, finalized, blocking the free labor of the molecular set-up of the desiring-machines which cannot function without some failures and breakdowns, hence without returns to a zero degree, by means of a kind of entropy, in order to be once again reactivated: a cycle during which the model of death (the body without organs—the death that comes from within) is converted into the experience of death (the death which comes from without).

In this ontogenetic perspective, the body without organs figures as the third term in the productive series: 1) flow; 2) cut; 3) stoppage. It is in relation to this third movement, that of antiproduction, that the possible variations of desire are defined. The paranoiac state corresponds to a situation wherein the desiring-machines persecute the body without organs: the repudiation of desire. The schizophrenic state stands at the other pole of the process and is an enchantment of the body without organs which miraculously takes on all of the productive forces and the organs of production.

These differentiations cannot be fully understood except within the phylogenetic perspective that aligns the different stages of history. At this level, generic production functions according to the same plan, with antiproduction being represented successively by the Earth, the Despot, and Capital. There is, however, a major difference between the body without organs and the general forms of antiproduction; the body without organs is the internal result of desiring-production over which it exercises a functional primary repression, whereas the general forms of antiproduction are desiring-production's extrinsic condition and exercise an arbitrary social repression over it.

The evolution of history attests then to an ever greater liberation of flows (a schizophrenization), a tendency which the agencies of antiproduction provoke while at the same time trying to contain these flows, map them back onto themselves, and join them all (paranoia). The historical process therefore tends to do one of two things: make the earth an equivalent of the body without organs; or solidify the whole of desiring-production into a mass and rigidify it into meta-organisms, pseudo-worlds, the hidden face of the earth.

Do all of these new operations, these new "pieces of evidence" put forth in the book, open a final refutation of psychoanalysis? Or is it merely a question of a contribution, certainly a bit too vigorous, but nonetheless assimilable by psychoanalysis? In order to decide on this, we must look at how psychoanalysis, before arriving at the point it presently occupies, had to undergo the consecutive modifications brought about following two decisive confrontations: a confrontation with the reality of the psychiatric hospital on the one hand, and with Nietzschean thought on the other.

The first confrontation was led under the name of institutional psychotherapy. Analytic practice met up with what it had always been able to avoid in its "liberal" practice: the treatment of the psychoses which it hypocritically left up to psychiatrists. The unwillingness of psychotics to enter into analysis, the impossibility of making the psychotic delirium enter into the Freudian frameworks of interpretation, were both experienced by Guattari from 1956 on, beginning with his first hospital psychotherapy. From the published account of this we can witness a curious wavering between the not too discreet pleas made to his patient so that the latter would recite "daddy, mommy, my sickness and me" and a growing attention to a discourse inclined to speak of something else altogether; of Kafka, of the Jews, or of an integral immobility. We can also see that the injection of a psychoanalytic discourse, the Lacanian version, into a custodial institution provoked a kind of collectivization of the analytic concepts: transferences became institutional and phantasies collective. This consideration of desire on a collective level fulfilled a political function in the sixties: for those sickened by Stalinism in all its forms, La Borde became a refuge, the place for a critique of militant practice and social theory; Lacan was still spouted out, but it was already a matter of something entirely different.

The second confrontation, with Nietzschean thought, was the encounter between Deleuze and Guattari. This encounter led to a mutual call for an integral, amoral theory of history and a theory of desire freed from all moorings in the sphere of the pathological, the establishment of a correspondence between an evaluation of behavior and actions with no other criteria than their own force and a perception of desire calling only for desire's self-sufficiency. This encounter was the occasion for a clarification of everything that had just resurfaced within the framework of institutional psychotherapy: the teachings pertaining to a machinic functioning of desire, and to a cathexis by desire of the entire social field, are drawn from the psychotic, all of this witnessed in his delirium; from group practice the idea is extracted that the creative constructs, the real singularities are the desiring multiplicities, subject-groups, and not persons or institutions. Political analysis comes to coincide completely with the analysis of the cathexes of desire. What was an external critique of political theory and practice becomes an integral part of this new analysis, since the distinction can no longer be made between a social logic (meta-individual) and a logic of desire (intra-individual), between a reality principle and a pleasure principle.

On the whole, then, schizoanalysis is a theory constructed on the basis of everything that psychoanalysis hid from view or neglected: psychosis and the social cathexes of desire; not in the least in order to violently force them into the analytic edifice, but rather so as to explode this edifice and open the analysis of desire to the entire social field.

THE END OF FREUDO-MARXISM

But, one might quickly ask, isn't this effacement of the rigid distinction between the reality principle and the pleasure principle already an old

dream, the dream behind all the attempts at synthesis of Marx and Freud? And besides, doesn't this liquidation of the barrier between the theory of the unconscious and social theory lead us to the same sort of aberrations we reproached psychoanalysis for above: an imperialism of the theory of the unconscious which subjugates all the other dimensions? Why, in the last analysis, prefer Deleuze and Guattari's anthropology to the anthropologies sought in close allegiance with Lacanian orthodoxy?

An attempt at specifying the position of *Anti-Oedipus* in relation to all of these questions is all the more necessary in that its appearance is more or less contemporary with two equally important books which take appreciably different positions on these questions. The first book, published right before *Anti-Oedipus*, intitled *La critique de l'économie politique du signe* by Jean Baudrillard, is a critique of Marx's critique. This book's political point of view is no less radical than Deleuze and Guattari's, but it is based on a theory of the unconscious very close to that of Lacan. The second book, *Le psychanalisme*, by Robert Castel, appeared several months later. It is a total denunciation of all of the illusions held by psychoanalysis with regard to its political scope, both in the practice of its agents as well as in the attempts at reaching a synthesis with social theories.

"It seems to us that one has yet to analyze the role and the effects of this contractual model which psychoanalysis has come to follow... (the psychoanalytic contract as a particular case of the medico-liberal contractual relationship)," writes Deleuze in his preface to Guattari's *Psychanalyse et transversalité*. It can now be said that this has been done in Castel's book. The analytical contract provides the means for "placing the political and social determinations aside from the very moment and at the very level of the foundation of the analysis, its development (the dual relation), its materials (the formations of the unconscious), and its concepts (the categories of the analytic discourse)." The contract is thus an arbitrary convention for gaining a certain access to the unconscious which is completely caught in a bias with respect to reality; a bias having to do with procedures of neutralization of what, in real life, is never neutral. By means of this preliminary neutralization, psychoanalysis in fact becomes *neutralizing*, it neutralizes what it expels through the use of the contract but subtly continues in its own practice: the role of money, the structures of inequality, the reference to the family, the leading role attributed to masculine symbols, etc.... From this there results the impossibility of accrediting psychoanalysis with any subversive content whatever since this structuration of its practice and its theory on the contrary provides the key to a normalizing imperialism which is manifest in the new capacities of intervention which it grants to the "mental" medicine apparatus. The natural movement of psychoanalysis in its *formal* and *exterior* critique of psychiatry has above all led psychoanalysis to be extended beyond the hospital, with the cooperation of the hospital, to be metamorphosed and multiplied rather than really changed (unlike the strategy adopted by people like Guattari who, as we have seen, led a *practical* critique of psychoanalysis by intro-

ducing it by force into the hospital; but here we have left Castel's line of argument, for he does not think too highly of institutional psychotherapy).

It is within this direction of an accrued medicalization of the social problems by means of psychoanalysis itself, that the whole of the Freud-Marxist attempts at analysis appear to Castel as the means for finding a medical explanation and solution for revolutionary failures. Even if these attempts condemn loudly and strongly the practical extension of bourgeois or revisionist psychoanalysis, they participate in the same process which consists in seeking to "cure life" while believing to "change" it . . .

Castel's description now enables us to look in depth at fifty years of liaison between Marxism and psychoanalysis, and to thereby explain its breaking point where Baudrillard as well as Deleuze and Guattari are situated. This liaison begins with the Marxists and the Freudians at loggerheads with one another. The Soviets have Pavlov, the Americans will have Freud; Stalin, by the way, prefers, adores stimuli. The only Communist who was also a psychoanalyst, Wilhelm Reich, was incapable of being both until 1932 (with respect to the C. P.) and 1934 (with respect to psychoanalysis, a point, nonetheless). It was the socio-democrats, the Germans of the Frankfurt School whence Marcuse stems, who had the task of leading the confrontation between Marx and Freud. What Reich and Marcuse did was to make a certain number of adjustments of Marxism and of psychoanalysis, postulating their fundamental compatibility. An ingenious bit of handiwork, but carried out blindly; a kind of intellectual forcing of the issue which neglected what was to become the main question: the heterogeneity of the conditions of production for Marxist theory and for Freudian theory. With Althusser and Lacan handiwork and amalgams are finished. They instituted the pure, rigid rule of epistemology, i.e., the reign of truisms and tautologies: Marxism is Marx; Freudianism is Freud; science is science. It was nevertheless not deemed impossible to join the two orders of knowledge if one proceeded with all due respect. Certain critics have devoted many pages of rare intelligence and total futility in order to show that the Freudian sub-continent could, while maintaining its dignity, take its place within the large Marxist-Leninist continent.

During the first period of this confrontation, the efforts bore in a sense on finished products, on a reality cut up, filtered through and treated by different cognitive methods. In the second period, a relationship was established due to the simple similarity of methods based on the same practice of suspicion. The first was fertile but, might we add, artificial; the second engaged in no denaturizing procedures, but at the price of sterility. This perhaps enables us to understand how it was that one could no longer advance in this direction except by practicing an underhanded or straightforward abolition of one term or the other in the problematic. What could not be established by means of a mutual dismantling of the respective domains, and even less so by a methodological closeness, was now sought in the simplest way possible: by settling accounts either with psychoanalysis or with Marxism. We will say then that Deleuze and Guattari's enterprise is a

hyper-Marxism whereas Baudrillard's could be termed hyper-Freudian. This can be established by considering the place occupied by production in Deleuze and Guattari, and by exchange in Baudrillard.

Since desire for Deleuze and Guattari is production, every production can be confronted with desiring-production; a connection which the psychiatric and psychoanalytic apparatus is bent on proscribing by referring desire not to production but to the Law, by relating not to the social and political space but to the petty enclave of the family. In Deleuze and Guattari desire then takes its place in the Marxist constellation of the productive forces. It is only repressed and regulated by that which regulates all production.

For Baudrillard the concept of exchange is the focal point starting from which he effects an absolute deconstruction of Marxism and comes to anchor his theory in Freudianism, the Lacanian version. First then, this implies a critique of Marxism starting from a refusal of the distinction between use-value and exchange-value. Use-value relies on an idealist anthropology giving credit to the idea of a nature, natural needs, the idea of a utility which escapes historical determinism. Now, needs are regulated by a code, by a system whose logic is as abstract as that which regulates the equivalence of exchange-value. The same abstraction, hence the same fetishism of commodities in the framework of use-value as in the framework of exchange-value.

The second stage of Baudrillard's critique: to this supremacy of the logic of equivalence corresponds the logic of the signifier, with the signified being the needs, the use-value. A hierarchized bi-polarity where absolute preeminence is attributed to exchange-value and to the signifier. And since the stroke separating the signifier and the signified is the stroke of castration, and since the unconscious is structured like a language, one arrives at the foregone conclusions arrived at already by Lacan. Baudrillard represents for us the paradoxical man who carries out one of the best critiques of Marx, while weeding out all of the naturalist naïvetés, but who cannot see a half-naked woman without thinking that the limit where clothing meets naked flesh figures as the cut-off point of castration.

For Baudrillard the modern unconscious, perfused by equivalence, is the plaything of systems, the slave of signs. Capitalism is the progressive dismantling of the unconscious domains which leads to substituting for the veritable logic of desire and for its radical ambivalence, the principle of equivalence by means of which there are no longer more than pseudo-exchanges, the manipulation of signs of enjoyment in the place of enjoyment itself. One no longer exchanges anything more than simulacra, one no longer enjoys, one consumes signs.

This analysis has all the essentials to lure us with, except that it ends by separating desire from all social economy. Hence it institutes a closed system to which death can only come from outside. One spends one's time verifying the law of equivalence, demystifying all its progressions and waiting for desire to want to make its eruption. Graver still, one might wonder: how is this system maintained? Since the product of a dismantling process, it

implies the necessary elements to maintain its artificiality, ramparts able to contain within their limits the ambivalence of desire. Hence the reason for cops, teachers, armies we are told. But how does it work? How is it efficient? Merely by its force? To the exteriority of desire corresponds the exteriority of repression. Therefore there is, on the one side, an exchange system whose inscription in the unconscious entails a capacity for generalized recuperation of any and all excesses and then, nevertheless, but quite foreign to this logic, a capacity for repression.

The difficulty is clear: Baudrillard says: 1) there is only exchange; 2) an objective repression is nevertheless necessary; 3) this repression is in no way based on the driving elements of the psyche, it is the barbed wire cutting off a closed area.

The force of Deleuze and Guattari's book lies precisely in seeking the processes which link repression to self-repression. The absence of any distinction in nature between social production and desiring-production allows them to inscribe the logic of desire at the heart of the capitalist system, to see therein a force whose development is simultaneous with the development of the whole of the productions, a force overlapping these productions and menacing the social relationships in which this generic production is contained. We can follow the reasoning: everything takes place as if Deleuze and Guattari had said to themselves: Marxism is fine, its way of putting matter there where one had seen the spirit or some strange substance. But why in hell did Marx stop when he was on such a good path? Desire merited the same treatment as the other phenomena. With this omission having been made, it is not at all surprising if the Marxist method only permits understanding things half way, with ups and downs and even more annoying turns of the crank. Let's be more Marxist than Marx. Let's go all the way. We will also do a materialist analysis of desire, hence lodging it well within the foundations of the social system. And if Marxism falls apart as a result of this, it deserved it.

Capitalism's weakness, for Deleuze and Guattari, is therefore to be found in what it *implies*, i.e., an inevitable development of desiring-production, and it is therefore not to be found in what it *excludes*, i.e., the primitive symbolic exchange, as Baudrillard would have it. Change for Deleuze and Guattari derives from the very logic of the development, whereas for Baudrillard it is subordinated in a sense to the return of the repressed. Repression consists, for Baudrillard, in the absolute separation between veritable desire and social life, in the conversion of the one into the other by means of a trick which Freud termed sublimation and which Baudrillard describes as the substitution of the logic of equivalence (the level of capitalist merchandise) for the logic of ambivalence (the logic of desire and of the symbolic exchange). For Deleuze and Guattari repression is inseparable from the self-repression proper to the logic of capitalism, which can only exist by liberating generic production while at the same time containing it within well-defined limits so that it doesn't flee in all directions and escape everywhere. Repression is therefore not an *exterior* condition of

capitalism, but rather its *internal* contradiction. The fundamental question raised by *Anti-Oedipus* is therefore the following: if capitalism is all the more powerful to the extent that it liberates more production and hence more desire, how does it manage to maintain itself? They take into account the fact that it does not suffice to say that it so manages by means of repression but that we must explain how this repression is possible, what relationships there are between its efficacy and desire.

What we have attempted to situate through this comparative discussion of the three works by Castel, Baudrillard and Deleuze and Guattari is a kind of gradation in the urgency of the question bearing on the problem of power in its relations to desire, a progressive escalation towards what is perhaps most bothersome to think of. Castel describes psychoanalysis as a practico-theoretical complex whose function it is to mask the real problems which are, as Marxism demands, man's production of his material life. His critique of power is undertaken in terms of true and false, good and evil; this is what we term humanism. As for Baudrillard, he develops a critique of capitalism considered as a system of illusions artificially sustained through a repression which is useless to criticize morally or cleverly since this repression finds its principle within itself. This is the paradox of nihilism: we live so much in illusions that we cannot disengage ourselves from our subjugation to the power that is exterior to us, the only objective reality. For Deleuze and Guattari the problem is not to criticize power, nor to name it, but to perceive the active links it upholds with what is its own negation: desire.

In the second place we can notice how in this gradation or, if one prefers, this span, the attention given to the problem of illness on the one hand and the reference, if not the reverence with respect to the established modes of knowledge on the other, diminish as we approach a problematic connecting desire and power. In any case we could deduce from this that what is called realism is a consideration of institutions and people in the name of their knowledge at least as much as a consideration of the sufferings of this world. That ought to suffice to force attention on *Anti-Oedipus*, for there are more and more people becoming indifferent to the clinical and the human sciences and who feel that these modes of knowledge are getting them nowhere. It is only too obvious that they are becoming more and more congested, having attained a saturation point that invalidates their postulate and reveals their political limitations. We could care less whether, with these modes of institutional knowledge, optimism or pessimism were fabricated, state Deleuze and Guattari. What we are looking for, what we want, are new analyses, new means.

AN ANTISOCIOLOGY

Now, the means are provided in *Anti-Oedipus* for escaping from at least three of the major difficulties of current forms of social analysis:

1) The alternative between functionalist descriptions which do no more than rationalize "after the fact," and very poorly indeed, the social insti-

tutions, and structuralist analysis which denounces, according to acknowledged uses, mechanisms of functioning that contradict these uses. If this latter form of analysis has more often than not a revolutionary orientation, it is at the price of a unilateral view of systems which does not provide an understanding of the forces which labor and are at work in the said institutions.

2) The whole gamut of distinctions between infra and superstructure, between class struggle and marginal struggles. Classical Marxist analysis consists in extracting the pure gold of class struggle from the matrix of the concrete. But since class struggle in a pure state is quite rare, if not indeed non-existent, it becomes necessary to join to class struggle a religious, linguistic, or ethnic dimension operating as more or less disruptive parameters. Having played down everything that does not come out of pure Marxist logic, and having merely analyzed the nature of struggles, it was forgotten that struggles also have a definite space and a definite direction and that these three elements are inseparable. There is no social construct which is not first of all a certain form of investment of the earth, a certain manner for inhabiting it.

3) The more or less chaste veil thrown over the problem of the State. It is ever more impossible to see in the State the simple instrumental secretion of a partisan or collective will, whereas one establishes everywhere its aptitude for subordinating the revolutionary movements, its ever greater attraction towards regressive temptations.

In order to escape from all these difficulties, the very type of questioning must be changed. We must no longer ask: what is society? This is an abstract idea, merely serving to open the way for the most general of concepts. Instead we must substitute for this the direct question: how do we live in society? This is a concrete question entailing others in its wake: where do we live? how do we inhabit the earth? how do we live and experience the State? In such a way that the social processes no longer look to these questions so much for an explanation of the terms of their internal logic, but rather this questioning is done in terms of the investments with which these processes affect the two surfaces surrounding them: the earth and the State. The social is no longer an autonomous whole but a field of variations situated between an impetus of aggregation and a surface on which flows of all sorts wander.

I. Molar, molecular, gregarity. —In their attempts to bypass the alternative between function and structure, Deleuze and Guattari rely explicitly on the trend of critical psychosociology which developed in France after the Algerian War and whose fecundity in terms of historical analysis was demonstrated by Sartre in *La critique de la raison dialectique*.

We can find more than one correspondence between Sartre's "group-in-fusion" and the molecular formations of Deleuze and Guattari, the desiring micro-multiplicities which constitute the active pole of the social constellations. We can also find similarities between the latter's molar constellations and Sartre's serial gatherings. But the first important difference is that, for

Deleuze and Guattari, there does not exist a separation between the molar and the molecular. Now Sartre described these forms more as *successive* states in the life of a group. As for Deleuze and Guattari, they stick to defining the coexistence of these different states, and locating which line subordinates the other. This is in fact the whole task of schizoanalysis, this work of detection:

1) To discover at the heart of the social molar machines the presence of desiring-machines and the variations of affinity between the two. Hence a primary mechanic's task aimed at studying the incompatibilities in functioning, the immobilizations, by confronting desiring-machines and molar machines.

2) To distinguish the pre-conscious cathexes of interest. The molar constellations are not pure inertia, but are constituted by the social investments. The attachment to a social class refers back to one's role in production or antiproduction. There is thus a cathexis of interest which bears on the regime of social syntheses according to the place one occupies within the apparatus. But this cathexis is distinct from the libidinal cathexis which can lead just as easily to the desire for a new social body as to the social body in existence. This is an important distinction because the two types of cathexis can be opposed, feeding the contradictions both in the dominant class and in the dominated strata of society.

The second advantage of referring the study of groups to desiring-production is that in this way one avoids the need for founding historicity on the speculation of an original lack. The cyclical nature of Sartre's description of the life of groups implied a kind of compulsive mechanics: groups repeatedly and successively snatched from inertia thanks to a dynamics of rarity placed at the threshold of history, and always followed by fatal relapses into the "practico-inert" until the reign of abundance arrives. Thus Sartre was incapable of describing the social constellations on the whole except as inert constructs, petrified practices traversed by spasmodic waves. Deleuze and Guattari escape from this relentless dialectic by conferring on each pole, the molar and the molecular, its own attraction: the schizophrenic pole (molecular) corresponding to productive desire, the paranoid pole to the adjustment of a lack. On the one side desire is seized within the real order of its production, which therefore behaves like a molecular phenomenon devoid of goals or intentions; on the other side, desire is the prisoner of large "totalizing, signifying objectivities which situate the organizations, the lacks and the goals."

The large social formations are qualified as gregarious because they gather together all of their elements by crushing, through selective pressure, all of the singularities and multiplicities, thereby producing a structural unity. This unity gains its efficiency from effecting a fusion of desire and lack, assigning to desire an end, goals, needs and intentions within its deployment. Lack is not at the origin of desire but rather constituted by the apparatus which recovers and registers the productions. Capitalist society has as its main characteristic that of pushing the liberation of flows to its

extreme point, all the while maintaining them within limits which permit their inscription; hence there is an encouraged tendency towards schizophrization, towards the absolute liberation of flows, towards their endless escape from social codes and territorialities; but there is also an aggravated tendency towards reconnection, towards the subjugation to the structure which assigns the productions a place and a limit.

Function and structure are not to be opposed as differing methods of analysis, they are merely two different regimes of one and the same production, but their difference has now been carried to the point of explosion. And what is at issue in this struggle is the form of investment which the earth can assume.

2. **Territoriality.** —In our mind, this is the richest idea in the book. While we can see that it takes a lot of things into account and permits doing away with the distinctions between infra- and super-structural, between what is marginal and what is essential, we also recognize that it is rarely and barely explained.

In a first attempt at definition of what they mean by territoriality we might do well to refer to the notion of codes. Coding and territorialization are two complementary modalities for the fitting-up of productions. Coding adjusts the productions to the *socius*, the central apparatus of society, and territorialization stocks the flows of production on the body of the earth. If we consider the "savage" societies the difference is negligible between coding and territorialization, since the recording surface and the coding space are both the earth itself. The earth is then "this great unengendered stasis, the superior element of production which conditions the common appropriation and utilization of the soil." It is on the earth that the tie is made between desire and its own repression. It is the space, the object and the natural grounding of production, the immanent form of the first cathexis of desire bearing on the full body of the earth, only modulated then by sole differences in intensity. This is to say that the establishment of a principle of geographic distribution is already a first stage of deterritorialization since it institutes a divided, parcelled earth, replaced as a unifying principle by a transcendent agency this time, the unity of the State, the new full body. It can be seen that coding and territoriality evolve in inverse proportion to one another. When coding is developed, becoming overcoding, territoriality diminishes and gains in artificiality. Desire no longer bears directly on the earth, it no longer inhabits it. Desire now hallucinates the earth through new full bodies: God, Moses, little and big chiefs; lead us to the Promised Land!

This movement of deterritorialization is raised to such a level by the logic of capitalism that it can no longer be produced except by simultaneously carrying out reterritorializations that feverishly call to arms all the former ones. This is carried all the way to the saturation point making of capitalism, according to Nietzsche, "the motley painting of all that has ever been believed." The activity of coding, pushed to its extreme limit, becomes the axiomatic, the regulation of the flows which regulates them without ever rigidifying or immobilizing them. Properly speaking, there is no longer

territoriality, but a state of suspension of the flows that must render them permanently available, whence this ceaseless back-and-forth movement of deterritorializations and reterritorializations. It is only through the total liberation of the flows that one might hope for the re-creation of a new earth. Homecomings, but without an umbilical cord this time, as supple and functional as the body without organs for the schizophrenic; a miraculated earth capable of containing the proliferation of the productions, an enchanted surface where the flows will be able to shift about endlessly.

This is more than mere literature, for this entire description is supported by a critique of representation which comes to serve as the basis for their analysis of territoriality. Delimiting a territory, marking out its limits, taking account of its resources, attributing a Center to it, amounts to representing it, leaving the surface of the earth in order to enter into the sphere of representation. Maps and charts also constitute the territory. These two things are inseparable: the relinquishing by the earth of its primary privilege, and the advent of pseudo-worlds, those of the territory and the despot, those related in myths and in tragedy; the apparition of another face of the earth, shabby as pasteboard, limited as a theater stage.

It is in this fashion that the major objective representations transport desire into the symbolics of representation, at the same time relating it back to material conditions: a precise space, the body of the despot. Following these objective representations there are the subjective representations, real conversions of the former ones which, by displacing myths and tragedies from the social space towards subjectivity, transform these into dreams and phantasies. This operation increases the potency of these dreams and phantasies, by lodging them in interiority. The closed world of representation gives way to the figures of a universal libido. A subjective representation of desire in the privatized family and a subjective representation of labor in private property. There is nothing left but daddy-mommy, money and shit. There are thus not two distinct levels, the level of the subjective and the level of the objective, that of the ideological and that of the Real. Instead there is one and the same phenomenon of creation of a perverted and neurotic universe.

One might be tempted to totally agree with Deleuze and Guattari if it were not for the fact that there is a rather unfortunate lack of an analysis of the effects of this movement of deterritorialization on the very body of the earth itself. How, through what means, is this deterritorialization carried out if not by means of an equivalent process of deterioration of this earth? If the capitalist economy is indeed a war economy, only able to proceed by an always more advanced and intense colonization of terrestrial space, it must be recognized that this economy implies an administration of the prospective terror which radically modifies this space. In order to make fear reign a space of fear must be created; the earth must therefore be rendered uninhabitable. The appearance of habitats was a defense, a first form of resistance to colonization. Their current destruction no longer leaves them with more than their function as a refuge, a hiding place. Now, it is not solely by

means of “flows of stupidity” that the State produces this fear with regard to space, but by rendering space truly, biologically uninhabitable. In Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of representation there is a chunk of reality which is left out. Agreed, Deleuze and Guattari might well reply, and so if we are not able to create a new world, the liberated flows will lead us towards another one. While waiting for this to happen, it is not on the side of the schizo that the apocalypse is to be found, but well within the hands of the State, and if necessary, their analysis of this situation would be able to convince us on this matter.¹

3. The origins of the family, of paranoia and the State. — *Anti-Oedipus* contains all that is needed for a reversal of Engels’ propositions in *The Origins of the Family*. Let’s recall to mind that he established the State and the family in a relationship that could be deduced from the modification of the relationships of production whose essential axis was the advent of private property. The State possessed three characteristics for Engels: its birth was logical, it was determined before being determining, and there were as many forms of States as there were modes of production. The family, from a position integrated within the relationships of production in an original era, became progressively individualized but still remained closely subordinated to and alienated by private property, with private property being the major “analyzer” of the other institutions. To which Deleuze and Guattari respond: The birth of the State is not logical but perfectly contingent; the fact of the founders of the State, “they (who) come like fate, without reason, consideration or pretext.”² Where do they come from? from the desert, i.e., from the limit exterior to the discontinuous web of filiations and alliances which stowed among themselves and on the full body of the earth the savage populations. What do they bring with them? the principle of a vertical allegiance to the despot, a new point of coupling of the alliances and the filiations which the despot extends by causing them to converge in his direct filiation with God. The despot then replaces the earth as an immobile motor, his God is the Goddess Earth. Secondly, the State is a determining factor before being determined. The despotic machine installs an overcoding on the first assemblies, thereby determining a unified construct. The territorial machine held its own through an interplay of actions and reactions articulated around debt. It fit together the filiations in themselves and among themselves, the producers and the non-producers according to a relationship of debtor and creditor which marked on the very body of each organ the place, the function and the use to which it was indebted. The overcoding, in establishing the law as a superior unity, substituted for this active scheme the passivity of terror, the abstract sign for the concrete marking of the body. The law is a latency, the omnipresent menace of everything that might escape it. The law no longer manages a system of retribution and re-equilibration but allows the State to drain everything towards itself by the capitalization of debt that it renders infinite, eternal. The state is the already-there, the thing to which everything is owed.

The deterritorialization of the soil (by privatization) and the deterritorialization of wealth (by a monetary abstraction), the decoding of the flows (the monetary flows, the commercial flows, the flows of man-power); this hazardous conjunction of production and of capital, rendered possible in this way, brings about a displacement of the position of the State which, from a determining position, becomes determined. Its role is no longer that of direction but of regulation, of surveillance, and of control of the processes of deterritorialization and of reterritorialization of the flows in order that they be able to connect to capital, but without ever escaping from it. Capital no longer maintains anything, it must on the contrary maintain the flows at a certain level of decoding. Neither too much, nor too little.

Deleuze and Guattari's third response to Engels is that there has never been but one State. From Engels' art of the happy medium it might be deduced that the State is the wisdom of nations whereas it is their dark folly. "Born from decoding and deterritorialization, on the ruins of the despotic machine, the modern societies are caught between the *Urstaat* which they would indeed like to resuscitate as an overcoding and reterritorializing unity, and the freed flows leading them towards an absolute threshold." If this nostalgia for the *Urstaat* carries so much weight, it is due to the fact, as Reich already put forth, that it is desired. But how can one desire the State? How can desire desire its own repression? The answer is found in the analysis of the evolution of the family.

In the primitive social machine, the family is not isolated by any sort of barrier from the rest of the social and political field. Producing and non-producing elements are immediately marked, inscribed on the *socius*, according to their family rank and their rank in the family. This is exactly what Engels said, and he is certainly right when he makes the advent of private property the principal cause of the privatization of the family; but if he does indeed see the cause of the process, he is hardly aware of its scope.

What is inscribed within the capitalist *socius* are no longer producers but forces and means of production as abstract quantities. Whence a placing out of play of the family, a segregation making it the locale for an abstract equality. The family becomes, then, a deceptive microcosm of what it is separated from, a surface of application of the social field which, while fitting itself over the familial determinations, performs a transmutation of social persons into private persons and vice versa. As the smallest possible theater, the smallest colony of capitalism, the family causes the entire social field to pass into the images of private life. "In the aggregate of departure there is the boss, the tribal chief, the priest, the cop, the tax-collector, the soldier, the worker, all of the machines and the territorialities, all of the social images of our society, but in the aggregate of destination, there no longer exists anything more than daddy-mommy-me." The family only expresses what it no longer dominates and this simulation of the social field allows the latter to catch desire in the trap of its primary cathexes and to draw the maximum benefits from the very process of making desire guilty. Daddy, mommy, my desire and me, everywhere and forever.

This operation completes the adventure of desire, its migration from the primary situation where it was a simple effusion, a "germinal implex" running on the surface of the body of the earth, unaware of incest since the pure filiations did not presuppose names or functions that were discernible, but simple differences in intensity. Oedipus is born when society gains in extension what it loses in intensity. The prohibition therefore bears nominally on incest, but what it represses is the unbridling of the free flows on the body of the earth. Oedipus is not the object of desire but desire's repressing representation. Desire is shamed when it is granted as its object what is forbidden it. Whatever you desire is, therefore, what is shameful. The first trickery from whence the others derive. The despotic State symbolically embodies Oedipus through the ritual incest of the sovereign, a displacement that transports Oedipus to the point of an object on high, increasing its importance, situating desire even better on it, since it is the act that determines sovereignty and forbids access to it. In the final stage, Oedipus is installed in familial life, becoming the representative of desire, the imaginary object and no longer the symbolics of its repression. What is inaccessible is no longer outside but in the very heart of being. Fear and shame freeze desire there, in an "upright stance."

Between the family and the State, there exists a constituent link causing them to call upon each other. Behind daddy-mommy, the State. The State which makes way for the family and prepares for it, the State which is the family's horizon. And this is all achieved by means of a ruse causing the prohibition to be taken as the object of desire. History did not begin in the head of the children who desired the father's place, but in the fear of the father, who says: "What you desire is my death." Oedipus is a paranoiac's idea. Through it the family is more than alienated, it is alienating.

Translated by Mark Seem

NOTES

1. This remark was inspired by Paul Virilio's article "L'Etat suicidaire" (*Cause commune*, #3), whose confrontation with this aspect of *Anti-Oedipus* might engender a myriad of reflections and great perplexity.
2. Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, II, section 17. [translator's note].

Analysis in Power

A Few Foucauldian Theses

JOHN RAJCHMAN

QUESTIONS OF MADNESS

“Whoever wants to, does not go mad”

— Jacques Lacan
as a young psychiatrist

Anti-Oedipus intervenes in that relatively modern, principally post-war struggle, the politics of madness. But its analysis is distinguished in several respects from Anglo-American anti-psychiatry which first politicized the question of madness on the basis of that post-war ideology *par excellence*, existentialism. First, what it attacks—the operation of “Oedipalization”—is both larger in scope and different in kind from the notions of psychiatric power and alienation in which anti-psychiatry located its struggle. But not simply do the mechanisms of the control of madness exceed the walls of the asylum and the act of internment, but madness itself is not reduced to an existential alienation of which the family would be the locus. Madness is presented as a form of experience found in its purest form in small dispersed groups which allow for a collectivity of singular, unpredictable alterations in the miniscule details of the body, its suffering and its desires. The control of this form of madness depends, accordingly, not simply on institutions like the family and the asylum, their ideologies, and class bases, but on what Foucault calls disciplinary strategies which are also dispersed, and which also have, as the point of their application, the body.

From this perspective *Anti-Oedipus* can be read as opposing what might be called an anti-psychiatric moralism. It is opposed to the *idealization* of madness (the view that ‘mad’ is only a devaluating label placed on innocent if disagreeable persons within some institutional context), and thus to the liberal tolerance of the mad. It refuses to *humanize* madness (to identify it with the alienated essence of humanity derived from German Idealism or existentialism). Nor does it then *socialize* this alienation by locating it in the family, the reification of commodities, etc. It does not propose to blame the existence of madness on family or society, nor to transfer its cure from the hands of psychiatrists to those of political ideologues who would banish it from society. It does not claim that capitalism is the cause of a politically reparable mental alienation, but that it exercises a disciplinary control of

John Rajchman is a Graduate Student in Philosophy at Columbia University. He is presently completing a study on Jacques Lacan and a translation of Jacques Derrida's Marges.

madness. Its politics consists not in curing madness by social means but in extricating it from systems of control.

The politics of *Anti-Oedipus* has thereby earned the charge of having *romanticized* madness. First it is argued that the authors transfigure a miserable and helpless suffering into a glorious radical effusion; second, that they illegitimately assimilate the experiences of hospitalized schizophrenics to a range of quite distinct practices moving from those of anarchist and marginal groups to those of modern art and literature; and finally that, by glorifying madness, they unwittingly support the very social and political forces which require and produce it.

These charges in fact point to a difficulty in their general conception of the politics of madness, and, in particular, to the practice they call "schizoanalysis" (where this refers to a technique in the "materialist psychiatry" they propose to found). In passing, the authors remark that they see no problem in appropriating the diagnostic categories of psychiatry ("schizophrenic," "paranoid" etc.) to describe a history and politics of desire. This is, on the contrary, just the problem with their analysis. And it is the use of this terminology which makes the connection—essential for their politics of madness—between their general theory and the experiences of the hospitalized schizophrenic. Not simply is there throughout the book an uncritical, illegitimate, and simply imprecise use of this terminology, but it is evident that their principal theses (which rely on the entire analytic theoretical arsenal: unconscious, desire, partial object, etc. etc.) cannot be stated in other terms. To take the most flagrant example of all, it is not at all innocent to make as the principle of the analysis of society the question of desire and not that of pleasure. But the problem is basically one of the *function* of the knowledge they propose to offer. Is their materialist psychiatry in the end not simply another positivist theory where, in the analysis of deliria, a pragmatic rather than a structural organization, and social rather than familial themes, are favored? And how does this knowledge in fact function in the practice of a "schizoanalysis" where it is a question of the schizoanalyst (an adherent of *Anti-Oedipus*?) discerning the schizophrenic "indices" of mental patients?

Deleuze and Guattari inherit this problem from psychoanalysis. It was Freud who first systematically derived an analysis of *Kultur* from madness, and proposed a theory according to which the distinction mad/normal would describe not classes of persons, but structures of experience which necessarily and irreducibly belonged to *Kultur*, and its malaise or discontents. In this theory there was nevertheless an important distinction. If the separation of the normal individual from the *neurotic* was a matter of degree and not of kind, this was not true for his relation to the *psychotic*, in whom were united the two characteristics of required hospitalization and immunity to the analytic technique. Freud held that in every neurosis there was a *fear* of madness, of going mad and of mad people.

Nevertheless, precisely from the impossibility of treating psychosis analy-

tically (absence of transference), Freud inferred its *structure*. If one could not interpret a delirium, this was not because of its irrationality, but because it was already itself an interpretation attendant upon the withdrawal of libido from objects and ego. In fact, psychotic deliria were thought to produce without resistance the very unconscious material and operations which, in the case of the neuroses, required the long labor of analytic interpretation to uncover. Freud even recognized a kinship between paranoid and analytic interpretation.

The problem with *Anti-Oedipus* is that it is content to preserve the general form of this argument which derives an analysis of society from madness, and to simply modify it by a particular construal of the difference between schizophrenia and paranoia.

The recent work of Michel Foucault allows one to understand both the psychoanalytic inheritance and the politics of *Anti-Oedipus* in another way. He proposes to examine knowledge—in this case psychoanalytic knowledge—in terms of power, not of the powers which it may serve, but the mechanisms of power to which it is indissolubly linked. This requires a concept of power which is not reducible to alienation, exclusion, interdiction or repression, but which has a *formative* function with respect—in this case—to the theoretical entities recognized by psychiatric knowledge, and which cuts across institutional and class boundaries. Thus, for example, he refuses a psychiatrico-centric analysis of the type found in Goffman, since he links the function of the psychiatrist and the method of psychiatric control to strategic apparatuses external to the asylum.

From this approach emerges another sort of question about the psychoanalytical inheritance. Did psychoanalysis in fact have the function of liberating madness from the enclosure of the asylum and of Western Reason; or did it, on the contrary, have the function of announcing the extension of the knowledge and power of psychiatry outside these boundaries and into the whole of *Kultur*? Is psychoanalysis the great subversion of the *sciences humaines*, or is it, on the contrary, the appropriation by a basically psychological problematic (slightly displaced as the science of the subject of the unconscious) of what was previously excluded from it: physiology, sociology, anthropology, linguistics, etc.? And what of the postulation of madness as the foreclosed “truth” of the Reason: “. . . the Being of man not only cannot be understood without madness, but it would not be the Being of man, were it not to carry madness in itself as the limit of its freedom.”¹ (Lacan)? Does it not belong to a very old and completely articulate set of strategies which bind the question of desire and of madness to that of truth?

In at least six volumes Foucault has promised to answer these questions. Suffice it then to pose these elementary questions. Is it still true that the Western world is principally characterized by a “crisis of rationality”? Within psychiatric knowledge itself, has not the old opposition of delirium to rationality been displaced? Does not the whole theory of madness as an irrationality at the heart of Reason, a *non-sens* repressed by a Cartesian

cogito, a language in which the locus of enunciation is not known, does not this theory simply have a precise *function* within psychiatric and other systems? Is it not the case that the structure of deliria can be, and is every day, altered by behavioral and chemical control without the slightest regard for either rational psychology or psychoanalysis? And have not experiences in which precisely 'It' speaks in the place of the subject, far from being experiences of the limits of Reason, become simply the grist of any number of normalizing psychotherapies with mystical and transcendental leanings? And, finally, has there not arisen an entirely new figure of madness (if one persists in calling it thus), which does not consist in the fading of the subject, his submission and submersion in the unconscious, but in the refusal to be controlled and normalized by the great psychiatric and disciplinary complex which has come to dominate the Western world, and not simply the Western world?

It is in this light that *Anti-Oedipus* should be read.

FAMILY AND FAMILIALISM

"The familial order does no more than translate the fact that the Father is not the progenitor and the Mother remains to contaminate woman for the little one [*le petit d'homme*]. The rest follows."

—Jacques Lacan

When Deleuze and Guattari criticize the familialism of psychoanalysis, it is not to claim that the Oedipal configuration is simply an invention of Freud which he and his followers would make their patients swallow. Psychoanalysis contributes to a process of familializing which it does not understand, but of which it is also not the cause.

The paradox of psychoanalysis as a theory that makes familial relations either the principal fantasies or else the principal structure of the fantasies of human beings, is that it emerged in a period of the decline of the power of the family: first its reduction to the monogamous form, and then, within that form, the decline of the power of the father. Ours is a time in which the complete dispossession of the family-cell and the absorption of both the relations of reproduction and the control of childhood by the State, its institutions and its disciplinary mechanisms, has become feasible.

Lacan is one of the few analysts who has attempted to account for this paradox theoretically. In 1950, he argued that the decline in the social power of the family with its reduction to the "conjugal form" coincided with an increase in its "captivating power," that is, in its role in the "first identifications" and the "first disciplines" of the child. The *discovery* of the Oedipal Complex was due to the effects of this "dehiscence of the familial group in the heart of society," whose psychopathology Freud observed; but the significance of the Complex, its *universality*, exceeded this narrow

historical evolution, and concerned the symbolic authority the father or his substitute was constrained to assume:

... the Oedipal triangle is only the reduction to the natural group, operated by an historical evolution, of a formation in which the authority preserved for the father, the only trait remaining from its original structure, shows itself to be increasingly unstable.²

One recognizes in this argument the idea advanced by Lévi-Strauss that incest is universally forbidden, not because of events in the mythical pre-history of humanity, which might be thought to be simply the projection of Victorian fears or dissatisfactions, or a revival of Biblical mythology, but in order to insure the social relations of reproduction, and to insure them through symbolic systems. Read in this way, the universality of the Oedipal Complex is no longer falsified by cultures with kinship systems other than that of the monogamous bourgeois family—or at least the ethnologist is so re-assured.

In fact Lacan does make use of this argument, but for a quite specific purpose: to transfer the Oedipal Complex from the framework which places the child (“*le petit d’homme*”) in relation to members of his family, to another, which places him in relation to his Culture and its symbolic forms. For Lacan, the Oedipal Complex is the theory of the relation between one’s childhood, shrouded in amnesia and “absence” of origin, and one’s assumption of a place within a culture. Comments Althusser:

Herein no doubt lies the most original aspect of Lacan’s work, his discovery. Lacan has shown that this transition from (ultimately purely) biological existence to human existence (the human child) is achieved within the Law of Order. . . . and this Law of Order is confounded in its *formal* essence with the order of language.³

But Lacan gives a rather specific interpretation to this “Law of Order.” He identifies the authority of the father with a religiously consecrated “function” which the real father of the family or some substitute (e.g. even the real mother) must “assume”:

It is not only the way in which the mother accommodates the person of the father with which one should be concerned but with the case she makes of his Word (*parole*), let us say the word, of his authority, in other words, the place she reserves for the Name of the Father in the promotion of the law.⁴

This Name-of-the-Father is of course not identical to the actual father’s legal name and the actual legal, contractual, and property relations in which it figures as signature, any more than *the* Law is identical to any particular law or interdiction. The “function” of the Name-of-the-Father is perfectly compatible with a matronymic or matrilineal society. The Law, on the other hand, prevails in every society, or wherever people speak; it presides over the

transition from an unspeakable relation with the Mother to an insertion within the symbolic systems provided by a Culture.

In short, it is not the father's name that the mother must "accommodate" (whatever that would mean) but the symbolic, the *religious* consecration of the power or authority which it embodies: "The attribution of procreation to the father can only be the *effect* of a pure signifier, of a recognition not of the real father, but of *what religion has taught us* to invoke as the Name-of-the-Father."⁵ It is this religious consecration of the father's authority, its derivation from the "function" of the Word of God that is elaborated in Lacan's version of the Oedipal Complex: that this Word occupies a "third position" with respect to the "dual" (I/You) relation with the mother; that the phallus stands in a symbolic and not simply a natural-analogic relation to the penis; that the Word incurs a symbolic debt, initiates a symbolic contract discharged as ethical responsibility or "full Word." With Lacan, one witnesses a baroque catholicization of the Oedipal myth.⁶

To resume: Lacan separates the Oedipal function from the family cell itself, presenting it not as a relation between child and family, but between child and a larger "symbolic" order. Next he derives the authority of the father from this order, rather than the other way around. Finally he imputes the determination of the Complex to the *mother*, not in her relation to the father (her spouse) but with respect to the Cultural Order ("the meaning of castration . . . [acquires its significance] only from its discovery as castration of the mother"⁷).

While Lacan's treatment of this theme is quite ingenious, and while it may well be that, particularly in France, the father's effective legal power and the institution of marriage are supported "symbolically" by reference to very old Catholic or even Biblical ideas, it certainly seems objectionable to claim that the *cause* of the father's authority is its symbolic support, or that the authority *is* this support.

The error in Lacan's argument comes from deducing from the evident necessity for some discipline or "acculturation" of children a *particular* form of authority, namely sovereign or patriarchal authority (in its Catholicized form). Thus what he takes to be "universal" in the Oedipal Complex is not any particular familial system, nor even, within the monogamous form, the father, but a particular form of power, the necessity, as he puts it, that there be *Un-père* One-father, who *represents* for the child the Divine Law. It is the postulation of this One-father that allows him to continue to present the discipline of the child in terms of *identification* (although distinguishing imaginary from symbolic identifications).

In *Surveiller et punir*, Foucault demonstrates, on the contrary, that the form of power which effectively disciplines children, which more strongly *produces* the modern form of childhood, is not patriarchal authority; it does not transpire uniquely through identifications and cannot be described in terms of a power by delegation from the Law. The family does not represent

the Law, it administers techniques, among them, the "first disciplines," which derive from systems outside the family, systems that in fact increasingly impute to the family, and in particular, to the *mother*,⁸ deficiencies in discipline. Far from being patriarchal or sovereign power, supposed delegate of the Law, just what characterizes the operation of the discipline of children is that a *representative* cannot be found for it:

The familial relations, essentially in the parents-children cell, have been disciplined, absorbing since the classical age external school, military, then medical, psychiatric, psychological schemes which have made of this cell the privileged locus of emergence for the disciplinary question of normal and anormal.⁹

Unlike Lyotard in his *Energumen Capitalism*, Foucault does not argue that the existence of sovereign or patriarchal power within the family is an anachronistic vestige surpassed by the capitalist Law of Exchange. While there is something like a "crisis of the patriarchal family", to pose its dispossession by the State and its battery of pedagogical mechanisms as the liberation of an an-Oedipal desire is naive, to say the least. Foucault regards the survival of a sovereign familial power as an essential piece in the general operation of a disciplinary society. Not simply does the family play a key role in the administration of discipline, it also serves to transfer individuals from one disciplinary system to another (e.g. a "problem child" in the school transferred via the family to the medico-psychiatric system). Moreover, it is by reference to the *family* that the apparatuses with radical "psycho-" serve a function of individualization *within* the disciplinary institutions: psychopathology within the asylum and psychiatric system, psychology of work within the discipline of labor, psychopedagogy with the school system, etc. Thus, in a certain sense, psychoanalysis is not mistaken in finding familial themes within these disciplines, but the readability of these themes is not due to symbolic or ideological structures, nor even to the family itself, but to the installation of an entire psychologizing complex.

Anti-Oedipus does not therefore, as Lyotard proposes, engage in an outmoded polemic against the patriarchal family • the Oedipal "machine." It is not simply a critique of the patriarchal form of power, but of a diffuse familialism which is supported by a power of another sort.

The originality of the analysis of the repression of desire in *Anti-Oedipus* is that it put emphasis on this form of power.

SEXUALITY AND REPRESSION

"Freud did not say that repression (*refoulement*) derives from suppression (*répression*): that, to make it plain, castration results from Daddy's brandishing to his kid, who is diddling his dingaling: We'll cut it off, if you keep it up!"

—Jacques Lacan

Anti-Oedipus provides what might loosely be called a political analysis of the repression of sexuality. In this sense, it belongs to the great tradition of German Freudo-Marxism in its two periods divided by the advent of fascism it never succeeded in analyzing. But it is distinguished from this tradition in its conception of desire (machine, production) and in its analysis of the repression of desire (Oedipalization, not interdiction or suppression).

In the discussion of sexuality in the book, there is a happy break with Reich's specious reliance on Malinowski and his fantasies of matriarchy, his general ignorance and distaste for pre-genital or a-genital sexuality, his strange overestimation of a normalizing heterosexuality, his blind faith in the derivation of anxiety from frustrated genital libido, and his crude positivism which ended with the isolation in boxes of orgone energy. Reich and Marcuse are nevertheless proclaimed by Deleuze and Guattari as precursors and are simply criticized for retaining the notion that it is desirable, or even possible, to re-arrange social relations so as to provide for a natural expression of sexuality for which psychoanalysis would provide the theory. For Deleuze and Guattari there is still a "rationalism" in Reich and Marcuse in which psychoanalysis would figure roughly as did the calculus of pleasure and pain in Bentham's utilitarian society.

They identify the source of this error, drawing from a well-known argument in France, in the confusion between *répression* and *refoulement*. *Refoulement* is an operation postulated to explain the relation between sexuality and the unconscious, whereas *répression* is a form of social suppression of sexuality, e.g. through interdiction, denial, enforced renunciation, etc. In the claim that *refoulement* does not *derive* from *répression* is contained the theoretical argument supporting the position that madness does not *derive* from social alienation.

This argument employs a further distinction Freud drew between primal and secondary *refoulement*, the importance of which has been really recognized only in France. When Freud posed the problem of the relation between drives, partial sexual drives, and the "psychical apparatus" (divided into unconscious and preconscious systems of representations), he came in 1915 to distinguish a primal repression in virtue of which drives were first connected or "represented in" the psyche, from a secondary repression which concerned only the destiny of the "representatives" of the drives within it. The postulate of a primal repression is not isolated from the rest of his work; it is connected, on the one hand, to the abandonment of traumatic scenes and the introduction of the concept of fantasy as inherent in sexual drives (e.g. through "anaclysis"), and, on the other hand, to the theory of the death-drive as intrinsic to the operation of the sexual drives. One importance of this part of Freud's theory is to have displaced the basic model of the suppression of drives onto one of their "articulation." Repression accordingly did not consist in pushing an urge into the dark recesses of the mind to await therapeutic (or socio-political) release, but concerned how a sexual drive marked by a certain *constant* force or impulse and a certain

relation to the body acquired a "representative" in the psyche, or more precisely, required the division of the psyche into preconscious and unconscious "localities." The complicated schemes of the blockage of representations in the psyche (for which the model of suppression was still roughly appropriate) were explained and qualified by reference to a constitutive or primal repression which did not have this form. Lacan's theory of desire is a particular elaboration of the postulate of a primal repression. An object of a sexual drive is for Lacan irretrievably lost, or found only as lost in the chains of representations which substitute for it. These representations are, moreover, *signifiers* for Lacan. The articulation of drives is an articulation in language. The death drive is manifested in an endless process of masking and displacement, in the repetition or "insistence" in the "signifying chain" which results from a "primal" articulation. A philosophical exposition of the "logic" of this theory of desire is to be found in *Différence et répétition*, an earlier work by Deleuze.

In *Anti-Oedipus*, however, while something like a "primal repression" is recognized for the articulation of drives (their differentiation from opaque biological forces), it does not establish (as in Freud) a "fixation," nor (as in Lacan) a "signifying chain," nor even the regulated systems preconscious/unconscious. In fact, the authors use the terms "desire" and "productive unconscious" more or less interchangeably.

They locate the problem in Freud's theory—an important point—in the analytic *practice*, a practice of interpretation of language. For the postulation of a signifying chain is also the condition of analytic interpretation; what it postulates essentially is that the unconscious is structured in such a way as to be susceptible to interpretation, or "like a language."

They dispute therefore at one and the same time the postulate of a signifying chain and the postulate that the unconscious is structured as a language. What replaces the signifying chain is a set of "passive syntheses" or "*régimes*" which inscribe and re-inscribe desire in a rhythm not open to interpretative recovery and for which there arises a transient sentient "subject." The work of the death drive is no longer seen in a repetition in the signifying chain but in the constant break-down of the "machine" which mounts and re-mounts the configurations of desire. In these configurations, in the nexer-fixed or fixated articulation of desire, the materials of language, while important, are not privileged; not simply is the unconscious not structured as a language, it is also not articulated in language. The function of the "productive unconscious," moreover, is not to preserve the trace of a fundamentally lost object; it is not a function of memory but of forgetfulness. In the unconscious economy there is always the possibility of an effective "erasure" of former articulations. And finally the energy in the system is not, through privation, castration, or "separation" from the Mother, reduced to anxiety, but becomes a positive *intensity* which accompanies and excites new articulations. In short, while there is primal repression, it does not tie desire to a Law or fixed subjective structure.

The importance of this theory resides less in the details of the operations of the "three syntheses" of desire than in the possibility it opens to discern a form of its social repression. Under the name of "Oedipalization," the authors attempt to describe historically a form of power whose effect is to "throw desire back" (*rabattre*) onto a structure which specifies an object (which is lacking), a subject (identified with familial images), and a means of satisfaction (neurosis). If the unconscious is not *structured* as a language, there nevertheless exists a form of power, an operation on the "syntheses" of desire, which *produces* an unconscious susceptible to interpretation, which *conditions* the practice of analytic interpretation and the epistemological role of the theory based on it. The social suppression of desire is, as they put it, "delegated" to *secondary* repression (*refoulement*); in virtue of this delegation desire comes to be "Oedipalized."¹⁰ Two very general consequences follow.

First, unlike in anti-repressive discourse (Reich, Marcuse), repression is not depicted as a barrier imposed, for social and political reasons, between an urge or need and its natural expression. A prior production of the very forms of desire is required before the role of such barriers can be appraised. Moreover the forms of interdiction and suppression of sexuality are neither the principal instruments nor the ultimate ends, but simply parts of a larger and more basic operation which produces the historico-social forms of desire. Hence, the "liberation" of sexuality, where this is identified simply with the lifting of interdictions, does not touch what is essential in the "Oedipalization" of desire.

Second, what differentiates desire from natural need or provides for its "articulation" is not the Oedipal Law, but a form of *power* applied to the operations of desire, whose effect is Oedipalization. The social relations of reproduction, in other words, do not derive from symbolic structures to which the subject of desire is submitted, but to a form of power, part of whose operations consists in the inscription of the parts of the body ("Society is not exchangeist, the socius is inscribing . . .").

The analysis of the relation between this form of power and desire suffers from two principle limitations. First, the authors present a positive erotic practice as though it were a "flight" (*une fuite*) from Oedipalizing mechanisms and, further, identify it with schizophrenia. They make it appear as if what 19th Century psychiatry called the "flight into madness" were the price, in the end, the punishment, for a recalcitrant, deviant, experimental, curious, and "polymorphous" eroticism. This is a consequence of continuing to accept psychoanalytic, or even psychiatric knowledge, of schizophrenia as the basis for their historical and political analysis. Hence they seem to make an impossible demand—the transference (sic!) of a schizophrenic economy to a society which requires precisely its segregation—and to confuse psychotic experiences with modern works of art, which at most, can be said to evoke them. It is evident that works of art have a quite different social function from the ravings of madmen. But this applies to

anarchist and marginal groups as well. It is with them that analysis should start.

In the second place, the operation they call "Oedipalization" is too abstract or general in its description, and too narrow in its results, to provide an even approximate analysis of the form of power through which modern sexuality has been fabricated, watched-over, and disciplined. Even within psychoanalysis the emphasis on the theories of Oedipal identification and the phallus is too restrictive; the conception of desire they need cannot be derived from a simple "curetage" of the Oedipal theory from within psychoanalysis. The theory of erogenous zones, for example, would also require examination and cannot be taken for granted. For, to begin with, the very concept of an erogenous zone is modelled on that of a hysterogenous zone, and it is for this reason that it is believed to have an uneliminable, not strategic, but fantasmatic, component. The production of hysterical symptoms nevertheless served a precise function in the history of medicine, a function of defiance of the power of medical knowledge to pronounce the "truth" on one's body. The hysterical symptom in the time of Charcot was an ironic defiance of the medicine of anatomical localization. And when Charcot introduced the *technique* of hypnosis to establish the stable symptoms which gave rise to his famous tableaux, the hysteric replied by *sexualizing* her symptoms. It was only with the introduction of the technique of free-association that hysteria was again brought within the realm of medical knowledge but with this result: the question of "truth" (the famous *proton pseudos* of hysteria) had become linked to that of *sexuality* within a new theory: psychoanalysis. Freud then drew on two sources to localize and normalize this fantasmatic sexual body, and to consolidate his theory. First he drew on the 19th Century sexologists cited in the first pages of the *Three Essays*, accepting the *structure* of the perversions they described while disputing their aetiology from hereditary degeneracy. In the Dora case, he puts it well: hysterical fantasies reproduce the perverse scenes as *Krafft-Ebing describes them*: this is the basis of the famous formula that neuroses are the "negative" of perversions. Secondly, Freud postulated an *infantile* sexuality shrouded in an amnesia structured as an hysterical defense in which the erogenous zones underlying the perversions were fixed with respect to the great disciplines of childhood: feeding, toilet training, and the control of masturbation. Thus, even with a short reflection on the theory of erogenous zones, some of the elements of what Foucault has called the "political technology of the body" are already brought into play.

These two limitations of *Anti-Oedipus*—its over-estimation of Oedipus and of schizophrenia—indicate a problem in the type of knowledge it supposes to advance, and in its practical use.

READINGS

... all my books, from "Madness and Civilisation" to the latest, are little tool boxes.

—Michel Foucault

For a certain taste, the style of *Anti-Oedipus* affords a marked pleasure in reading, a pleasure not simply in the outrage of allusion, but in the collision of a stale academic language with a frenetic popular one. This sort of pleasure, translation unfortunately must relinquish.

The style touches on the question of the address of the book, of its strategic aims, of its position in-between not simply languages but power mechanisms. In the last pages where the traditional relation between theory and practice is disclaimed, there is a long series of denials: the book is not meant to provide a new coherent analysis of history and society, nor set down a specific line of action. In fact there is a refusal to prescribe in advance the uses to which the book might be put. To this disclaimer corresponds the subsequent migration of "schizoanalysis" itself, sliding effortlessly from materialist psychiatry to literary criticism, finally to descend on the great project of founding a new semiotics.

An apparent paradox licences this fluidity: the book sets out to interpret something to which, in the same breath, it denies interpretation—a paradox at the heart of schizoanalysis as a technique. It is as though the old project of interpretation were twisted back—almost masochistically—against itself. This is no Dadaist paradox, however, but a problem precisely in the use of the book.

In a certain sense, *Anti-Oedipus* is not addressed to those already departed in the processes of "deterritorialization" (for what have they to do with the theory of the three syntheses of desire or a new semiotics?). Rather it appears to plead its case before the established psychoanalytic, psychiatric, political, and university authorities in a style of defiance, seduction, admonition, and exhortation which is almost Oedipal. A space is artificially created between these authorities and the processes the book exhorts (not at all "transversally" but vertically) and in this space is placed the practice of "schizoanalysis." This is a position of power which remains unexamined, or at least unspoken, by the authors.

The error of basing the analysis of society on established psychoanalytic and psychiatric knowledge is only one of the difficulties which follows from this ambiguous position. There is also a tendency to homogenize or conflate specific and diverse experiences, subsuming them under abstract concepts like "lines of flight" or "collective set-up of enunciation." The great silence of the book on the subject of the specificity of the women's movement is an example. But there is also no explanation for the patent fact that the leftist and counter-cultural movements of the sixties are in a period of decline, dispersion, or transition, some of their energies even re-absorbed in the banality of mindless mysticism. The reference to May '68 remains strangely nostalgic.

Perhaps above all *Anti-Oedipus* should thus be read today for the problems that it poses but does not solve.

NOTES

1. Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits* Seuil, 1966, p. 176.
2. *Ibid.* p. 133.

3. *Lenin and Philosophy*, MLP, 1971, p. 209. Althusser underlines "formally" to provide for his claim that "no theory of psychoanalysis can be produced without basing it on historical materialism" (p. 190). While the Law of Order is *formally* identical to the order of language, its "content" is given through the "real kinship structures and determinate ideological formations in which the persons inscribed in these structures live their functions" (p. 211). A more elaborated statement of this position is given by Catherine Clément (Repères, 1973). Julia Kristeva has advanced a critique both of this theory of ideology, and of its understanding of Lacan's theory of the Order of language. Althusser's theory of ideology for Kristeva suffers from an imprecise understanding of the role of "representations" in ideology. Introducing the concept of "signifying practice" she recognizes a hierarchy of the "semiotic materials" employed by ideology, and in particular accords a privilege to language (cf. *Cahiers théoriques du cinéma*). In subsequent writings Kristeva then emphasizes the importance of *drives* in the "signifying practices"; and the importance of a "monumental history" of symbolic forms which is relatively independent of that of modes of production (cf. "Entretien" in *Promesse* 36-37, 1974). Accordingly she challenges the basic metaphor of superstructure/infrastructure. Thus she comes to support the view against Althusser that Lacan's Law of Order is *materially* identical to the Order of language (cf. in *La Révolution du langage poétique* (Seuil, 1974), the long argument which identifies the phallic with the symbolic function). Kristeva seems closer to the theory of the "four discourses" which Lacan himself has proposed (cf. "Radiophonie" in *Scilicet* 2/3) where a discourse establishes what he calls a "social bond" (*un lien social*) in language. In *Surveiller et punir* (Gallimard, 1975) Foucault advances an implicit critique of Althusser's theory of ideology from another perspective: that of power. Refusing the distinction between ideology and violent coercion, he describes historically the operation of a form of power which "can very well be direct, physical, pitting force against force, operating on material elements, and still not be violent; it can be calculated, organized, technically reflected, it can be subtle, making use neither of arms nor of terror, and still remain within the physical order. That is: there can exist a 'knowledge' of the body which is not exactly the science of its functioning, and a mastery of its forces which is more than the capacity to conquer them: this knowledge and this mastery constitute what one might call a political technology of the body." Thus, for example, his critique of the *sciences humaines* is not that they count every person as representing the essence of humanity (ideological function), but that they are inserted in the techniques, procedures, and strategies of normalization which have produced in and through the body the form of the individual. A possible application of this sort of approach to the family and to Lacan's theory of the Oedipal Complex is briefly indicated in what follows.
4. *Ecrits*, p. 576.
5. *Ibid.* p. 556. italics mine
6. Lacan has brought about a remarkable *catholization* of psychoanalysis; his preoccupation with sainthood of recent years is only a symptom. In "Sur une figure de discours" (*Des Dispositifs pulsionnels*, 10/18, 1973), Lyotard draws a number of significant parallels between the structure of Lacan's theory of enunciation and that of Biblical discourse. From a quite different perspective, Julia Kristeva in the first part of her *Chinoises* (des Femmes, 1974) demonstrates a profound (if rapid) link between the psychoanalytic theory of the difference between the sexes and the Biblical tradition in its Augustinian mutation. One need only read *L'Ombilic et la voix* (Denis Vasse, Seuil, 1974) to discover an interweaving of Catholic themes within Lacan's discourse and its application to the psychoanalysis of children. The Catholicism of Lacan's discourse is still to be properly appreciated, however. The installation of a Jesuitical exegesis of Freud's texts with its re-appropriation of Freud's "borrowed" German Romantic terminology goes some way in explaining the specificity of French psychoanalytic theory. The displacement of the Hegelian

problematic of alienation of self-consciousness and intersubjectivity and the introduction of the theory of the Other and of the subject-supposed-to know can certainly be read in this way (cf. "Proposition du 9 octobre, 1967" where the theory of intersubjectivity is explicitly disclaimed). The influence of Bataille's Catholic eroticism of transgression on Lacan's theory of sexual desire and of woman is well known. In *Seminaire I* (Seuil, 1975) Lacan sees in the spread of a Puritanism in psychoanalysis, deriving from Ferenczi and transported to England by Balint, an important influence on the reduction of desire to need and its absorption in "object-relations." It can be argued that Catholicism plays a similar role in Lacan's own theory of desire as structured by the Law, and even on his formula: "there is no sexual relation." Lacan puts it succinctly in an early paper (*Ecrits*, p. 130): "God is dead, nothing is permitted any longer."

7. *Ecrits*, p. 686.
8. For a very brief account of the role of imputation of guilt to the mother as an historical influence on British psychoanalysis, ("psychoanalysis of children"), see Juliet Mitchell, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism*, pp. 227-231. (Vintage, 1974).
9. *Surveiller et punir*, *op. cit.*, p. 217. For a Foucauldian approach to the problem of the "modern system of childhood," see Scherer and Hocquenghem, *Recherches* #22, 1976 ("Co-ire").
10. This is the relevant argument: "Secondary repression is a means in the service of social repression. What it is exercised on is also the object of social repression: desiring production. But it is simply that it implies an original operation of two parts, one through which a social formation delegates its power to a repressing instance, the other, through which, correlatively, the repressed desire is as though recovered by a displaced and fake image which the secondary repression excites. There is *at the same time* a delegation of repression by the social formation, and a defiguration, a displacement of the desiring formation by the secondary repression. The agent delegated of, or rather to, secondary repression is the family; the disfigured images of the repressed are the incestuous drives, Oedipus, Oedipalization is the fruit of the double operation."

Antonin Artaud

The body is the body,
alone it stands
and in need of no organs,
organism it never is,
organisms are enemies of the body,
things done
happen all by themselves
with the support of no organ,
organs are parasites always,
covering parasitic functions
designed to make a being live
who shouldn't be.
Organs are made to feed
beings,
while these at the outset condemned
have not to existence a claim.

Reality is yet unconstructed for the
legitimate organs of the human body
are still to be composed and set.

Created was the theater of cruelty,
to accomplish this arrangement and undertake,
with a new dance of man's body, the disruption
of this world of microbes
which is but clotted nothingness.

The theater of cruelty wants a dance
of eyelids coupled up with elbows and kneecaps
and femurs and toes,
and wills it seen.

Translated by Roger McKeon

Translation of [Le théâtre de la cruauté], *Oeuvres complètes*, XIII, Gallimard, p. 287.
Written on Nov. 18, 1947.



To Have Done with the Judgment of God

ANTONIN ARTAUD

Man is sick because he is badly constructed.
We must make up our minds to strip him bare in order to scrape
off that animalcule that itches him mortally,

god,
and with god
his organs.

For you can tie me up if you wish,
but there is nothing more useless than an organ.

When you will have made him a body without organs,
then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions
and restored him to his true freedom.

Then you will teach him again to dance wrong side out
as in the frenzy of dance halls
and this wrong side out will be his real place.

(1947)

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Mary in front of
her painted door

(Photograph by John Haynes)

Mary Barnes' "Trip"

FÉLIX GUATTARI

In 1965, a community of about twenty people gather around R. D. Laing. They settle in the suburbs of London, at Kingsley Hall, an old building which for a long time was a stronghold of the British labor movement. For the next five years, the leaders of antipsychiatry and patients who, according to them, "make a career of schizophrenia," will explore collectively the world of madness. Not the madness of asylums, but the madness each of us carries within, a madness they intend to liberate in order to lift inhibitions and symptoms of every kind. At Kingsley Hall, they overlook, or rather, try hard to overlook, the distribution of roles among patients, psychiatrist, nurse, etc. No one is entitled to give or receive orders, to issue prescriptions. . . . Kingsley Hall is then a liberated piece of land, a base for the counter-culture movement.

The antipsychiatrists want to go beyond the experiments in community psychiatry; according to them, these experiments still represent only reformist enterprises, which fail to really question the repressive institutions and traditional framework of psychiatry. Maxwell Jones and David Cooper,¹ two of the main instigators of these attempts, will actively participate in the life of Kingsley Hall. Antipsychiatry, then, can make use of its own recording surface, a kind of body without organs, with each corner of the house—the cellar, the terrace, the kitchen, the chapel. . .—each part of the collective life functioning like the gears of a big collective machine, taking each individual away from his immediate self and from his petty problems, so that he either devotes himself to the service of others, or falls upon himself in the sometimes dizzying process of regression.

This liberated piece of land, Kingsley Hall, is besieged from all sides; the old world seeps in through all its cracks; the neighbors complain about its nocturnal life; the neighborhood children throw stones at the windows; on the slightest pretext, the cops are ready to ship the restless patients off to the *real* psychiatric hospital.²

However, the real threat against Kingsley Hall comes from within; the inhabitants freed themselves from recognizable constraints, but secretly the internalization of repression continues, and besides, they are left under the yoke of simplistic reductions to the hackneyed triangle of father, mother, and child, used to compress all cases not classified as "normal" behavior into the mold of Oedipal psychoanalysis.

Is it necessary to maintain a minimum of discipline at Kingsley Hall, or

This review of Two Accounts of a Journey Through Madness (1971) by Mary Barnes and Joseph Berke first appeared in Le Nouvel Observateur, May 28, 1973.

not? Internal struggles for power poison the atmosphere. Aaron Esterson, leader of the "hardcores" (Stalin under his arm, while Laing carries a book by Lenin) is finally eliminated, but nevertheless, it will always be difficult for the enterprise to find ways of self-regulation. In addition, the press, television, the "in" crowd are all involved; Kingsley Hall becomes the object of riotous publicity. Mary Barnes, one of the patients, becomes a kind of superstar of madness, at the cost of making herself the focal point of implacable jealousies.

From her experience at Kingsley Hall, Mary Barnes and her psychiatrist Joseph Berke wrote a book. It is a confession of disconcerting naiveté. It is at the same time both a model enterprise of the liberation of "mad desire" and a neo-behaviorist dogmatism,³ brilliant discoveries and an impenitent familialism akin to the most traditional Puritanism. The "mad" Mary Barnes elucidates in several chapters of confession what no other "anti-psychiatrist" has ever revealed: the hidden side of the Anglo-Saxon antipsychiatry.⁴

FREAKING OUT

Mary Barnes is a former nurse labelled schizophrenic. She might just as well have been classified among the hysterics. She takes Laing's advice on the "trip" literally. Her "regression into childhood" is achieved in the manner of a *kamikaze*. The "down" years several times lead her to the verge of death by starvation. Everyone around her panics; should she be hurried off to a hospital or not? This triggers off a "monumental crisis" in the community. Admittedly, during her "up" years, the problems of the group are no better: she will only relate to the few people whom she heavily endows with her familialism and mysticism, that is, first and foremost Ronnie (Laing), whom she idolizes like a god, and Joe (Berke), her simultaneous father, mother, and spiritual lover.

She thus carved for herself a small Oedipal territory that will resound with all the paranoid tendencies of the institution. Her pleasure cristallizes into the painful realization, which tortures her relentlessly, of the *evil* she generates around her. She opposes Laing's project; and yet, this project is her most dear possession! The more guilty she feels, the more she punishes herself, the worse her condition gets, unleashing reactions of panic all around her. She reconstitutes the infernal circle of familialism by involving more than twenty people, which makes matters worse!

She acts like a baby; she has to be bottle-fed. She walks around naked, covered with shit, pissing in all the beds, breaking everything, or letting herself starve to death. She tyrannizes Joe Berke, forbids him to leave, persecutes his wife, to the point that, one day, unable to stand it any longer, he hits her. Irrepressable becomes the temptation to resort to the well known methods of the psychiatric hospital! Joe Berke asks himself how it could be that "a group of people devoted to demystifying the social transactions of disturbed families should revert to behaving like one of them"?

Fortunately, Mary Barnes is an extreme case. Not everyone behaves as she does at Kingsley Hall! Yet, isn't she presenting the real problems? Is it certain that understanding, love, and all the other Christian virtues, together with a method of mystical regression, suffice to exorcize the demons of the Oedipal madness?

TOO MUCH CHAOS

Laing is unquestionably among those most engaged in the attempt to destroy psychiatry. He passed the walls of the asylum, but it seems he remained the prisoner of other walls, those he carries with himself; he has not yet succeeded in ridding himself of the worst constraint, the most dangerous of the *double binds*,⁴ namely "psychoanalysis"—to repeat the apt expression of Robert Castel—with its signifying, interpretative delusion, its echoed representations, and its derisive abyss.

Laing believed it possible to elude neurotic alienation by focusing the analysis on the family, on its internal "knots." For him, everything begins with the family. He wouldn't mind, though, getting out of it. He would like to melt with the cosmos, to shatter the routine of everyday existence. But style of his explanation cannot free the subject from the familialist hold which he wanted only as a starting point and which catches up with him at every corner. He tries to resolve the difficulty by taking refuge in an Oriental type of meditation which however, cannot ward off indefinitely the intrusion of a capitalist subjectivity equipped with quite subtle means. You don't compromise with Oedipus; as long as you don't attack head-on this essential mechanism of capitalist repression, you won't be able to effect major changes in the economy of desire and consequently in the status of madness.

Throughout the book, there is a constant flow of either shit, piss, milk, or paint. However, it is significant to note that there is practically never mention of a flow of money. We do not exactly know what goes on from this angle. Who is in charge of money, who decides to buy what, who gets paid? The group seems to live out of thin air; Peter, Mary's brother, undoubtedly much more involved than she in the schizo process, cannot stand the bohemian style of Kingsley Hall. There is too much noise, too much chaos, and moreover, what he wants most is to keep up with his job.

But his sister harasses him; he must stay with her at Kingsley Hall. Relentless proselytism of regression: you will see, you will have your trip, you will be able to paint, you will go to the end of your madness. . . . But Peter's madness is somewhat more disturbing. He is not very anxious to throw himself into this kind of venture! Perhaps here we can grasp the difference between a real schizo trip and the petty bourgeois style of familialist regression. A schizo is not very much interested in "human warmth." His concern lies elsewhere, on the side of the most deterritorialized flux; the flow of the "miraculating" cosmic signs, and also the

flow of monetary signs. The schizo does not overlook the reality of money (even if his use of it is out of the ordinary), any more than he overlooks any other reality. A schizo does not act like a child. For him, money is a point of reference like any other, and he needs to make use of as many systems of reference as possible, precisely to enable him to keep his distance. Exchange for him is a way to avoid mix-ups. In short, Peter cannot be bothered with all these stories about community, which only invade and threaten his singular relation to desire.

Mary's familialist neurosis is something altogether different; she does not stop establishing small familial grounds; it is a kind of vampirism of "human warmth." Mary hangs on to the image of the other; for example, she asked Anna Freud to be her analyst—but for her, this meant that she would settle at her place, with her brother, and that they would become her children. This is what she tried to do again with Ronnie and Joe.

A PROFESSIONAL

Familialism consists of magically denying social reality, and avoiding all connections with the actual flux. The only remaining possibilities are the dream and the infernal closed-door of the conjugal-familial system, or better still, during the great moments of crisis, a small decrepit territory in which to isolate oneself. It was in this manner that Mary Barnes operated at Kingsley Hall; as a missionary of Laing's therapy, a militant of madness, as a professional.

We learn more through this confession than we would by reading a dozen theoretical writings on antipsychiatry. We can finally glimpse the repercussions of "psychoanalysis" in the methods of Laing and his friends.

COLLECTIVE DELUSION

From the Freud of *Studies on Hysteria* to the structuralist analysts who are the current rage, the whole psychoanalytic method consists of reducing any situation by means of three criteria:

—**Interpretation:** a thing will always *mean* but only obliquely through a game of signifying clues;

—**Familialism:** these signifying clues are essentially reducible to familial representations. To reach them, one proceeds by means of *regression*; the subject will be induced to "recapture" his childhood. It will be in fact a kind of "powerless" representation of childhood, a recollected, mythical, and sheltered childhood, negative of the present intensities and without any connection to the positive aspects of childhood;

—**Transfer:** in line with interpretative reduction and familialist regression, desire is restored onto a wilted space, a small, miserable world of identifications (namely the analyst's couch, the look, the assumed attention). The rule of the game is that everything that comes up is to be reduced in terms of interpretation and papa-mama images; one need only proceed to the ultimate

reduction of the signifying battery itself, which must henceforth function with a single term: the silence of the analyst, against which all sorts of questions are to lean. Psychoanalytical transfer, a churn used to cream the reality of desire, makes the subject sink in a dizziness of abolition, a narcissistic passion, which, though less dangerous than Russian roulette, doesn't lead him on any less (if it works) to an irreversible fixation of cheap subtleties which will end by expropriating him from all other social investment.

We have known for a long time that these three criteria work badly with the insane; their interpretations, their images are too removed from dominant social coordinates. Instead of giving up this method at Kingsley Hall, they try to improve these criteria to reinforce their effects. Thus, the silent interpretation of dual analysis is replaced with a collective, and loud, interpretation, a kind of collective interpretative delusion. It is true that the method becomes operational; no longer is it simply a mirror game between the words of the patient and the silence of the analyst, but rather it involves objects, gestures, and interaction of forces. Joe Berke, initiated in the big game of Mary Barne's regression, grunts acts like a crocodile, bites and pinches her, rolls her in bed. . . things still not very common among typical psychoanalysts.

We are almost there! On the verge of penetrating another practice, another semiotic. The ropes will be broken with the sacred principles of significance and interpretation. Not so, each time the psychoanalyst recovers by reinstating the familialist coordinates. He is then caught at his own game; when Joe Berke needs to leave Kingsley Hall, Mary tries everything to stop him. Not only has the analysis become endless, but the session also! Only by losing his temper can Berke free himself from his "patient" for a few hours, to participate in a meeting on the Vietnam war.

A FAMOUS PAINTER

The interpretative contamination has become boundless. Paradoxically, Mary is the first one who breaks the cycle through her painting. In a few months she has become a famous painter.⁵ Even this is subject to interpretation; if Mary feels guilty taking drawing courses, it is because painting was her mother's hobby and she would be upset if she found out her daughter was a better painter. Paternally speaking, things are no better: "Now, with all these paintings, you have the penis, the power, and your father is threatened."

Mary tries to ingest all this psychoanalytical rubbish with touching diligence. Thus in the communal atmosphere of Kingsley Hall, Mary refuses to work with just anyone. She turns down others because she wants to make sure the person working with her is a firm discipline of Ronnie. "When I got the idea of the breast, a safe breast, Joe's breast, a breast I could suck, without being stolen from myself, there was no holding me back. . . . Joe

putting his finger in my mouth was to me saying, 'Look I can come into you but I'm not controlling you, possessing, stealing you.'

Even the psychoanalyst ends up being overwhelmed by the interpretative machine he helped start. He admits: "She interpreted everything that was done for her (or for anyone else for that matter) as therapy. If someone brought her a glass of water when she was thirsty, this was therapy. If the coal was not delivered when ordered, that was therapy. And so on, to the most absurd conclusions." This doesn't prevent Joe Berke from continuing to fight with his own interpretations, aimed only at making his relation with Mary part of the Oedipal triangle: "By 1966, however, I had a pretty good idea of what and who I was for her when we were together. 'Mama' took the lead when she was Mary the baby. 'Papa' and 'brother Peter' vied for second place. In order to protect my own sense of reality and to help Mary break through her web of illusion, I always took the trouble to point out when I thought Mary was using me as someone else." But it will be impossible for him to disentangle himself from this spider web. Mary trapped the whole house inside it.

A MORTAL SIN

Let us deal next with the technique of regression into childhood and with transfer; developed in a communal atmosphere, their "derealization" effects are accentuated. In the traditional analytical face-to-face situation, the dual relation, the artificial and limited character of the scenario form a kind of barricade against imaginary outbursts. At Kingsley Hall, it is with a real death that Mary Barnes is confronted at the end of each trip, and the whole of the institution is overcome by a kind of sadness and anxiety just as real. Aaron Esterson ends up having to resort to the old methods of authority and suggestion: Mary was brought close to death by her starvation; she is forcefully forbidden to continue fasting.

It is with the same brutality that a few years before a Catholic psychoanalyst forbade her to masturbate, telling her, as she recalls, that it was a worse sin than sleeping with a man without being married. It worked then also. In fact, isn't this return to authority and suggestion the inevitable correlative to the technique of regression in all directions? A sudden relapse close to death, a papa-cop creeps out of the shadows. The imaginary faculties, especially those of the psychoanalyst, do not form a defense against social repression; they secretly bring it on instead.

One of the richest lessons of this book is perhaps that it shows us to what extent it is foolish to hope to find raw desire, pure and sure, by heading off to look for knots, hidden in the unconscious, and secret keys of interpretation. Nothing can unravel, by the sheer magic of transfer, the real micropolitical conflicts that imprison the subject. No mystery, no inner world. There is nothing to discover in the unconscious. The unconscious needs to be created. If the Oedipus of transfer does not resolve the familial Oedipus, it is because he is deeply attached to the familialized individual.

CAPITALIST EROS

Whether alone on the couch or in the group, in an institutional regression the "normal-neurotic" (you and I) or the neurotic of the psychiatrist (the "insane") continues to ask again and again for Oedipus. Imbued with the reducing drug of interpretation through their training and practice, the psychoanalysts could only reinforce the policy which amounts to crushing desire; transfer is a way of detouring the cathexes of desire. Far from slowing down the race toward death, it seems instead to accelerate it, cumulating, as a cyclotron, "individuated" Oedipal energies in what Joe Berke calls "the vicious spiral of punishment-anger-guilt-punishment." It can only lead to castration, self-denial, and sublimation: a shoddy asceticism. The objects of the collective culpability follow one after the other, and accentuate the punitive and self-destructive impulses by doubling them with a real repression made of anger, jealousy, and fear.

Guilt becomes a specific form of the libido—a capitalist Eros—when it exists in conjunction with the deterritorialized flows of capitalism. It then finds a new way, an unedited solution, outside the framework of family, asylum, or psychoanalysis. I shouldn't have, what I did was bad, and the more I feel it's bad, the more I want to do it, because then I can exist within the realm of the intensity of guilt. Except that this realm, instead of being made "corporeal," attached to the body of the subject, to his ego, to his family, will take possession of the institution; actually, the real boss of Kingsley Hall was Mary Barnes. She knew it well. Everything centered around her. All she ever did was play Oedipus, while the others were indeed well caught in a collective Oedipus.

Once Joe Berke finds her covered with shit and shaking with cold, and his nerves crack. He then becomes aware of her extraordinary capacity for "conjuring up everyone's favourite nightmare and embodying it for them." Thus, transfer at Kingsley Hall is no longer "contained" by the analyst. It goes in all directions and threatens even the psychoanalyst. Everyone becomes a psychoanalyst! Yet they were so close to having none, to let the desiring intensities, the "partial objects," follow their own lines of force without being haunted by the systems of interpretation or duly codified by the social frame of "dominant reality."

AROUND THE FAMILY

What is the reason for this desperate attempt on the part of Joe Berke to glue together the scattered multiplicity by which Mary "experiments" with the dissolution of her ego and seeks to explode her neurosis? Why this return to familial poles, to the unity of the person, which prevents Mary from opening up to the outside world, after all potentially quite rich? "The initial process of her coming together was akin to my trying to put together a jigsaw puzzle without having all the pieces. Of those pieces at hand, many

had had their tabs cut off and their slots stuffed. So it was almost impossible to tell what went where. This puzzle, of course, was Mary's emotional life. The pieces were her thoughts, her actions, her associations, her dreams, etc."

What proof do we have that the solution for Mary Barnes lies within infantile regression? What proof do we have that the origin of her problems lies in the disturbances, the blocked intrafamilial communication system of her childhood? Why not consider instead what went on around the family? We note, in fact, that all the doors leading outside were forcefully closed upon her when she tried to open them; this is surely how she came upon an even more repressive familialism around the family than the one she knew in childhood. And what if the poor father and mother Barnes were only the pitiful and peripheral connections to the repressive tempest raging outside? Mary was not *fixated* in childhood: she just did not find the exit! Her desire to leave was too strong and too demanding to adapt itself to compromises of the outside world.

The first crisis strikes in school. "School was dangerous." She sat in her chair, paralyzed, terrorized; she fought with the teacher. "Most things at school worried me." She pretended to read, sing, draw. . . What she always wanted, however, was to be a writer, a journalist, a painter, a doctor! All this, she will be told, meant that she wanted to become a man. "I was ashamed of wanting to be a doctor. I know that this shame was bound up. . . [and here goes the interpretationite] with the enormous guilt I had in connection with my desire to be a boy. Anything masculine in myself must be hidden, buried in secret, hardly admitted."

THE FAVORITE GAME

Priests and cops of all types tried to make her feel guilty, about anything and mainly about masturbation. When she resigns herself to being a nurse and enlists into the army, she finds herself in another dead-end. Once, she wanted to go to Russia because she heard that over there "women with babies and no husbands were quite acceptable." When she decides to enter a convent, her religious faith is questioned: "What brought you into the Church?"


Priests are probably right; her wish for saintliness smells fishy! It finally all leads to the asylum. Even there, she is ready to do something, give herself to others. She once brings flowers to a nurse to be told: "Get out! You should not be here!" It is impossible to recount all the social traumas and tortures she has gone through. As a nurse, her right to go into higher education is challenged. At the beginning, Mary Barnes was not interested in the family, but in society! But everything brought her back to the family. And (this is hard to say), this holds true even for her stay at Kinglsey Hall! Since familialist interpretation was the favorite game of the place, and since she adored everyone there, she also got into it. And with what a gusto!

She is, at bottom, the real analyst of Kingsley Hall. She played to the full all the neurotic mainsprings of the enterprise, the underlying paranoia of the fathers and mothers of Kingsley Hall. Has Mary-the-missionary at least helped the antipsychiatrists clarify the reactionary implications of their psychoanalytical assumptions?

Translated by Ruth Ohayon

NOTES

1. David Cooper, *Psychiatry and Anti-psychiatry*, Travistock Pub. Ltd., 1967.
2. Not to be compared, however, with the Italian repression, which destroyed less "provoking" attempts, and above all the German repression, truly barbaric, presently inflicted against members of the SPK in Heidelberg.
3. 'Behaviorism': turn of the century theory which reduces psychology to the study of behavior, defined as the interaction between outside *stimuli* and the subject responses. Present neo-behaviorism tends to reduce all human problems to those of communication, putting aside socio-political problems of power at all levels.
4. Contradictory double constraint established on the level of the communications between a subject and his family, which perturbs him completely.
5. Her exhibitions in Great Britain and abroad guaranteed her a certain reputation. A lot could be said about this kind of recuperation, in the style of "art brut," which amounts to promoting a mad artist . . . like a music hall star, for the good of the producers [of this kind of show]. The essence of mad art is to be above and beyond the notions of *oeuvre* or the authorial function.



Richard Lindner, *Boy with Machine*
(1954, o/c 40 x 30, Mr. and Mrs. C. L. Harrison, Batavia, Ohio)

Freudo-Marxism

FÉLIX GUATTARI

Question: How, in your opinion, can or should the works of Freud and Marx complement one another?

F. Guattari: Can or should . . . The problem is that they have effectively done so. At least in the university, where the concoction of “cocktails” mixing the two in various proportions seems to be the guarantee of an “appropriate” political affiliation. Reread Marx, return to Freud, assure their peaceful coexistence . . . a whole Program! And then isn’t it marvelous to be able to serve the people this way, on the sole front of “theoretical combat” without having to leave our lecture-hall or our office?

No, definitely, this kind of question makes me very suspicious. Freudo-Marxism is the busy work of the Victor Cousin type of academics of our time. The academician always returns to the same devices for shunning reality, by taking refuge behind the exegesis and interpretation of texts. But behind Marx and Freud, behind “Marxology” and “Freudology,” there is the shitty reality of the Communist movement, of the psychoanalytic movement. That’s where we should start and that’s where we should always return. And when I speak of shit, it is hardly a metaphor: Capitalism reduces everything to a fecal state, to the state of undifferentiated and unencoded flux, out of which each person in his private, guilt-ridden way must pull out his part. Capitalism is the regime of generalized interchangeability: anything in the “right” proportions can equal anything else. Take Marx and Freud for example, reduced to a state of dogmatic mush; they can be introduced into the system without presenting any risk to it. Marxism and Freudianism, carefully neutralized by the Institutions of the worker’s movement, the psychoanalytic movement, and the university, not only no longer disturb anyone, but have actually become the guarantors of the established order, a demonstration via reduction to the absurd, that it is no longer possible to seriously unsettle that order. One might object that these theories shouldn’t be blamed for deviations in their application; that the original message has been betrayed; that precisely it is necessary to return to the sources, review the faulty translations, etc. . . . That’s the trap of fetishism. There is no comparable example in any scientific domain of a similar respect for the texts and formulae pronounced by great scientists. Revisionism is the rule here. The process of relativizing, dissolving, and dislocating these established theories is permanent. Those which resist are constantly under attack. The

Intended for Le Nouvel Observateur, which never published it. The title is ours.

ideal thing would not be to mummify them, but to leave them open to other constructs, all equally temporary, but better strengthened by such experimentation. *What counts in the long run is the use one makes of a theory.* Therefore, we cannot disregard the pragmatic implementation of Marxism and Freudianism. We must start from existing practices in order to retrace the fundamental flaws of these theories insofar as, in one way or another, they lend themselves to distortions of that kind.

Theoretical activity escapes only with difficulty the propensity of capitalism to ritualize and retrieve any minimally subversive practice by cutting it off from its libidinal investments (cathexes); only by confronting real struggles can theoretical activity hope to leave its ghetto. The primary task of a theory of "desire" must be to discern the possible ways in which it can invade the social field, rather than guarantee the quasi-mystical exercise of psychoanalytical eavesdropping such as it has evolved since Freud. Correlatively, any theoretical development bearing upon class struggle at this time should be concerned primarily with its connection with libidinal production and its impact on the creativity of the masses. Marxism, in all its versions, excludes desire, and loses its guts with bureaucracy and humanism, while Freudianism, from its very beginning, has not only been alien to class struggle, but moreover has continued to distort its first discoveries about desire by trying to lead it back, handcuffed, to the familial and social norms of the establishment. The refusal to confront these fundamental deficiencies, the attempt to mask them, lead one to believe that the internal limits of these theories are actually insurmountable.

There are two ways to absorb these theoretical statements; the academic one, which takes *or* leaves the text in its integrity, and the revolutionary one, which takes *and* leaves it at the same time, doctoring it to its requirements in an attempt to use it in order to elucidate its own co-ordinates and guide its practice. *The only question is to try to make a text work.* And, from this point of view, what has always been alive in Marxism and in Freudianism, in their initial stages, is not the coherence of their statements, but the fact that the very act of enunciating them represents a breaking off, a way of telling Hegelian dialectics, bourgeois political economy, academic psychology, and psychiatry of the time, etc. to go to hell.

Even the idea of the possible coupling of these two separate bodies, Marxism and Freudianism, falsifies the perspective. Some bits of a "dismembered" Marxism can and should converge with a theory and practice of desire; bits of a "dismembered" Freudianism can and should converge with a theory and practice pertaining to class struggle. Even the idea of a separation, between a private exercise of desire and public struggles between opposite interests, leads implicitly to integration into capitalism. Private ownership of the means of production is intrinsically bound up with the appropriation of desire by the individual, the family, and the social order. One begins by neutralizing the worker's access to desire, by familial castration, by the lures of consumption, etc. in order to subsequently seize without difficulty, his capacity for social work. To sever desire from work:

such is the primary imperative of capitalism. To separate political economy from libidinal economy: such is the mission of those theoreticians who serve capitalism. Work and desire are in contradiction only in the framework of relations of production, of well-defined social and familial relations: those of capitalism and bureaucratic socialism.

There is no alienation of desire, no psychosexual complexes that may be radically and permanently separated from repression and psychosocial complexes. For example, to tell the present-day Chinese that their Maoism would continue to depend upon a universal Oedipus would be the same as considering Maoism itself as something eternal, always being reborn from its own ashes. But, of course, history just doesn't work like that! A revolutionary in France after May '68, with regard to desire is of a completely *different race* than his father in June '36. There is no possible Oedipal relationship between them! Neither rivalry, nor identification! No continuity in change! And if it is indeed true that the rupture is as radical as that, theoreticians of society and those of psychoanalysis would do well to prepare themselves for a serious recycling.

Translated by Janis Forman



NOUS SOMMES TOUS

INDESIRABLES

“We all are undesirables” (Daniel Cohn-Bendit)

Psycho-Analysis and Schizo-Analysis

AN INTERVIEW WITH FÉLIX GUATTARI

Arno Munster: For a long time Freud-Marxists and left-wing Freudians have struggled for the recognition of psychoanalysis by the labor movement, for the integration of psychoanalysis into political combat, for a synthesis of dialectical materialism and psychoanalysis. After the failure of this attempt, shouldn't you fear that your critique might be taken up at least in part by the Right which has long fought Freudianism because of its materialism, because it destroys society's hypocrisy in matters of sexuality?

Félix Guattari: There are two parts to your question. First, when the communist movement deigns at last to pay attention to the problems of the unconscious, of sexuality, when a great reconciliation is at hand, are we going to spoil the whole deal? Second, the recovery by the Right. On the first point, it's precisely my belief that all the consequences must be drawn from the fact that the communist movement, the socialist movement, the leftist movements, etc., have never unreservedly accepted to consider the desiring economy in its relation to the work of revolutionaries. Let it suffice to mention the famous conversation between Lenin and Clara Zetkin!

A certain degree of tolerance undoubtedly exists today between the labor movement and psychoanalysis. There are two ways of looking at it: on the one hand, there are the resistances manifested by the revolutionary movement, the labor movement, and on the other there is the psychoanalytical movement proper. It is quite obvious that the labor movement and the revolutionary movement participate in the repression of desire; therefore they are not very willing to face questions which could eventually break their internal bureaucratic equilibrium. In this sense your question is justified. It should, however, be added immediately that the psychoanalytic movement has contributed a good deal to these resistances; indeed, it has consistently promoted them. The psychoanalytical movement has organized itself on the basis of a complete split between social formations and unconscious ones; it has set up a radical separation between what happens in political and social struggles and what takes place in "private life" with the couple, the child, etc. Psychoanalysts have discarded social issues and politicians have considered that desiring economy did not concern them. The two groups finally appear to be acting in complicity. Such a reconciliation between Marxism and Freudianism is inseparable from their respective entry into the University. The preliminary step was the emasculation of Marxism.

This interview was given shortly after the publication of Anti-Oedipus. The title is ours.

It was thus necessary, on the one hand, that Freudianism shift once and for all from its origins to an ideology of the Oedipus, of the signifier, and that Marxism, on the other hand, reduce itself to an exercise in textual practice so that the welding of the two could be worked out. As for the text, nothing is left of it but a powerless residue cut off from any revolutionary opening.

The warders of the labor movement now agree to deal with the family and with desire just as long as the issue is confined to sterilized institutional objects: the "quality of life" and other nonsense. But as soon as other objects, dynamite carriers, come into the picture—homosexuality, delinquency, abortion—they call in the cops! They are willing to take into consideration the problems of the couple, of women, housing, tenants, but they are not really inclined to tackle seriously with libido-revolutionary problems. Psychoanalysts, on the other hand, do not mind investigating social formations, but on the express condition that no one will question the status of the family, of the school, etc.

Munster: If a psychoanalyst wanted to stop being an accomplice, if he wanted to bring about this rupture you mentioned, what should he do? Your book gives an answer—perhaps not a completely satisfying one—to this question: one must "de-Oedipianize" psychoanalysis, replace it by another institutional practice conceived as an attempt to break down the familialism of traditional psychoanalysis and create a completely different psychoanalytical practice. But is it sufficient, in the context of the system, to avoid giving a hand to authority and repression? Is this "de-Oedipianization" of psychoanalysis possible, is it possible without a total revolution of psychoanalysis and of the institutional framework of psychiatry, which, as one of the authors of *The Kursbuch Number 28* concerning "the misery of the psyche" very correctly points out, continues to fight mental illness by repressing the patient? How does *Anti-Oedipus* operate in this perspective and what can "schizo-analysis" do here?

Guattari: The problem is once again to avoid considering the institutions of psychiatry and psychoanalysis as confined arenas. We remain in some sort of "social objectivity" as if there were a particular battle to fight with the workers in the factories, another in hospitals with the sick, yet another in the University with the students, etc. . . . We must question this "containing-contained" approach of institutions which are supposed to be filled with people. Sociologists and Technocrats see things that way. The problem of the University—we certainly found out in May '68—is not that of *the* students and *the* professors; it is the problem of the entire society inasmuch as it involves the relationship between the transmission of knowledge, the training of executives, the desire of the masses, the requirements of industry, and, finally, everything which could intermingle in the setting of the University. What was the magnificent answer of the governmental reformists? To refocus the problem on the object itself, to confine it to the University's structure and organization. The same holds for psychiatry and the associations for psychoanalysis; what we should try to elucidate today is not how

to alter the role of the psychiatrist, of the psychoanalyst, the attitude of groups of patients, but, more fundamentally, how society functions in order to bring about such a situation. Marxism raises the very same question, which is not to know how the situation in the concentration camps could have been improved, but what was the process that led to them. We assert that a society which overcodes production through the law of capitalist profit tends to create an inseparable split between desiring production and social production. Desire is thrown upon private life while sociality recedes into profit-making labor.

The real question is whether a production of desire, a dream, a passion, a concrete Utopia, will finally acquire the same existential dignity in social life as the manufacturing of cars or fads. It is naive to think that production can be reduced to the simple opposition of the variable investment of work forces and the constant investment of technical means. Underlying the whole problem is the division which will determine what component of desire will be accepted and what will be rejected. The capitalist is interested only in the different machines of production that he can connect to his machine of exploitation: your arms, if you are a janitor; your brains, if you are an engineer; your looks, if a cover-girl. Not only doesn't he give a damn about the rest, but he won't hear a word about it. To speak in the name of the rest would upset—could only upset—the normal process of his production. At the heart of industrial machines, there are desiring machines which are split, separated, and tapped by the dominant system. The point at issue is whether this division which is considered to be legitimate and human—this castrating slash by machines which is supposed to give access to who knows what sacrosanct sublimation—can or cannot be overcome. Will the revolutionaries ever come to grips with this separation, this castration which people constantly run up against, this recuperation by the family, by the school, etc.?

As for the second part of your question—the recovery by the Right—I agree completely! It is even surprising that this book elicited, let us say, so many responses. We didn't anticipate any. I believe that the explanation can be found, to a certain extent, in a blend of several elements: a revolutionary current which was fed up with being overcoded by all these psychoanalytical concepts and perhaps a long-standing hatred of the reactionary Right which was happy, finally, to find people who could support an attack that it had never known how to lead. But, in the end, such a misunderstanding is not fundamental. Anything can always be recovered: the most daring artistic production, the most untimely philosophy, as long as it does not depart from the framework of writing, books, the University. . .

Munster: But by attacking psychoanalysis' fixation upon Oedipus and upon the superego, you also attack part of the theoretical heritage of Freud. Your theory of schizophrenia is at variance with Freudian theory.

Guattari: Freud didn't understand much about schizophrenia. Many inner struggles in the psychoanalytic movement would be understood if Freud's fundamental hostility toward psychosis were finally acknowledged. Psychosis

and revolution have always been taboo. Normality was identified with the acceptance of family life. From its origin Freudianism was built upon a vision of the family man. Freud despised delirium: for example that of President Schreber! He also held women in contempt. His representation of sexuality and society is entirely “phallogentric” as the Women’s Liberation Movement would say. In *Analysis Terminable and Intermittent* (1937), the problem of castration appeared as the stumbling block which analysis hit upon; man refuses the necessary castration because he does not want to be “like a woman,” while the woman does not accept the lack of a penis, etc. In no way does Freud elucidate the element of political struggle which underlies this kind of “resistance.” Women refuse castration as much as men (if, indeed, the latter succeed in doing so). The key term is the superego. The question is whether the superego is a formation derived from the social milieu and transmitted through the family in such a way that the individual comes to desire repression and to assume his own curbing as the ultimate link in a long chain which begins with the father, or if the superego is to be accepted as a necessary split at the core of the psychic topography which alone would allow the subject to reach a satisfactory equilibrium and guarantee the ego a good adaptation to reality. In this perspective, the authority of the father and the images of social hierarchy would only be accessories to this necessary, sacrosanct castration. It all boils down to these alternatives: either desire comes to desire repression and actively supports its aims, thus preserving itself as desire, or desire revolts against repression and loses itself as desire. Quite a clever mechanism!

About ten years ago I introduced the notion of *transversality* to express the capacity of an institution to remodel the ways of access it offers the superego so that certain symptoms and inhibitions are removed. Modification of the local coefficient of transversality implies the existence of an erotic focal point, a group eros, and a take-over—even if partial—of local politics by a group-subject. A social formation can modify the erotic “causality” which sets off the activity of the superego. This modification of the ways it accommodates the superego leads to a radical transformation of the whole of the topography. Under these conditions, repression and inhibition take on a completely different meaning. Psychoanalysis is simply reactionary when it covers up for what happens at school, in the family, in the army, etc. No existential dehisence, no splitting of the ego, no lack, no castration can justify the intervention of a repressive third party. To no avail are we told that we don’t have to deal anymore with the real father, that what’s really at stake is a structural logic without which the “subject” could not establish himself as desire within the signifying chain, that we must at all costs renounce the undifferentiated Imaginary pleasures in order to accede to the “Symbolic” order¹—the Symbolic is mere twaddle (you have it or you don’t, and that’s that). All this sordid paraphernalia is there only to safeguard the comfort of the couch. Let society have it its own way, we’ll take care of desire; we will assign it the small, secret domain of the couch. And it works! *Psychoanalysis works only too well.* That’s what makes it so dangerous! It’s

the best of all capitalist drugs. Denouncing it is not enough; something has to be found to replace it!

Munster: Psychoanalytical struggle has to be shifted into the social domain. Instead of attacking the institutional framework of traditional psychoanalysis, we should fight it in the context of politics, which would one day allow us to destroy the conditions out of which the “social Oedipus” originates, dismantle family life, etc.

Guattari: I agree completely.

Munster: Yes, but the point is not completely elucidated in the book . . .

Guattari: The second part of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* will have to deal with the concrete conditions of schizo-analytical struggle—in other words, a political struggle on all fronts of desiring production. We should avoid centering the struggle on a single field. The problem of psychoanalysis is the problem of the revolutionary movement; the problem of the revolutionary movement is the problem of madness; the problem of madness is the problem of artistic creation. Transversality is, at heart nothing but this nomadism. . . . The unconscious is in the first place a social set-up, the collective distribution of virtual utterances. Statements such as “this is yours and that is mine” will only be differentiated in a second phase. The unconscious recognizes the private property of statements no more than it recognizes the private property of desire. Desire is always extraterritorial—deterritorialized-deterritorializing; it passes over and under all barriers. Although psychoanalysis readjusts its concepts and passes them through a linguistical, logical, and anthropological sieve, it cannot leave its home base which is that of familialism and capitalism. It serves capitalism as a substitute religion. Its function is to update repression, to give it a personal touch so it sells better—as has been done for the Ford Pinto or Plymouth Duster. Sin and confession don’t work the way they used to. Desire has to be given leeway. Gadgets aren’t enough. Something imperishable, waterproof and imputrescible, is needed: a subjective prostitution, an interminable ritual. Once hooked on this new drug, there is no longer any reason to fear that the subject will truly invest its energy into social struggle. Reality must remain at the door of the consulting room. The objective is not really to defend the values of capitalism but only to pretend not to be aware of them. Revolutionary struggle must act upon such a representation of social production and of labor in general. This shift of emphasis you mentioned must be operated in all places where familial repression is exerted on desire, women, children, drug addicts, alcoholics, homosexuals, etc. This “micro class struggle” can not be undertaken in the sole territory of psychoanalysis. Whatever conceptual references we adopt, we should never lose sight of the true stakes, the real institutional objects of this class struggle. The complicity between psychoanalysis and left-wing trends is based upon ideas, never upon practice. When militants in groupuscules or in revolutionary parties are asked what their real attitude is in regard to children, homosexuals, etc., what their

bureaucrats get off on, or what depresses or maddens their comrades . . . no answer. When things get out of hand, the psychoanalyst or the psychiatrist is called for.

Munster: You said: “micro class struggle.” Can we truly separate it from the “macro-struggle”?

Guattari: No more than we can separate atomic chemistry from molecular chemistry.

Munster: This confirms an article you wrote immediately after the events of May, 1968, in which you asserted that as many “subject-groups” should be created as possible, and that the struggle should also be led against “serialization” which was responsible, according to Sartre, for the inertia inherent in groups, parties, unions, etc. In short, political action had to be started off again. Here the psychoanalyst and militant are intermingled. Where, in an identical strategy, is the place of the patient, the place of the psychoanalyst, in this radical psychoanalysis you call “schizo-analysis”?

Guattari: The place of contemporary psychoanalysis in the revolutionary struggle—I don’t see it! Which does not mean that all analytical exercises, including “dual” analysis, must be condemned. But there are two facets to the question: on the one hand, shifting the focus of analysis to “subject-groups” involved in political reality or in an activity of creative self-analysis, and, on the other hand, a constant fight against the insidious reinjection of repressive social patterns. A group analysis of the Slavson or Ezriel type can be as thoroughly harmful as a “dual” analysis if the real function of parental poles is not elucidated; what element of the father and mother intervenes in a neurotic relation? Does the father serve as an integrating symbolic pole or is he, despite himself, only the homing head of the social hydra? Take, for example, the case of Kafka.² Photographs are a constant theme of his work. There are several ways of looking at it. We might reduce the theme by interpreting it: photos could refer to a crystallization of the imaginary, the theme of the double, narcissicism, whatever. Many a theory would be elaborated here. . . . But wouldn’t it be much more interesting to try to find out how photos really function in the work, when they appear, what networks they modify, etc. In one section of *The Trial*, a series of identical pictures appear: it is one of the “hottest” moments of the work, at a juncture where Joseph K. is almost freed from the hold of the Oedipal process. Instead of saying, “Hey, things are strangely resolved in identity, there is a duplication, etc.,” schizo-analysis will find paths of differentiation which originate there. There is no such thing as a father in general. There is only a father who works at the bank, who works in a factory, who is unemployed, who is an alcoholic: the father is only the element of a particular social machine. According to traditional psychoanalysts, it’s always the same father and always the same mother—always the same triangle. But who can deny that the Oedipal situation differs greatly, depending on whether the father is an Algerian revolutionary or a well-to-do executive? It

isn't the same death which awaits your father in an African shanty town as in a German industrial town; it isn't *the same* Oedipus complex or the same homosexuality. It may seem stupid to have to make such obvious statements and yet such swindles must be denounced tirelessly; there is no universal structure of the human mind!

Munster: Is the schizo-analyst, then, someone who wants to synthesize the analysis of social economy and of libidinal economy in this society?

Guattari: Synthesis is a big word! Instead of reducing things to no more than a logical skeleton, we must enrich them, follow sequences, the real tracks, the social implications. Difference originates in repetition. Repetition is not the law, the finality of something; on the contrary, it marks the threshold to "deterritorialization," the indication of a desiring mutation. Blocked representation, catatonia as a response to aggression, group photos, etc., don't play the same role in the work of Kafka before and after his meeting with Felice Bauer. The family picture crystallizes Kafka's anti-Oedipal hatred from the time of *The Trial*. Hate and fascination. Kafka being a top level executive—not at all a shabby bureaucrat—is also confronted with his own Fascist desire to master the other in the framework of bureaucratic hierarchy, for instance. A tele-mastery. The other, fixed in the photo, is crystallized in some sort of submission ritual. The attempt to possess Felice from a distance through the interplay of love letters is inserted in a much larger practice of remote-possession based on the power of titles and functions. We will thus come closer and closer to the social ties "holding" Felice and Kafka; both of them are bureaucrats fascinated by the power of bureaucracy. Kafka's denunciation is only a denial. The analysis of a "perversion" of the letter, of a bureaucratic perversion, leads him to analyse the decaying bureaucracy of Austria-Hungary and the cultural turmoil out of which Nazi Eros will rise. Analysis will move in this direction. But if one is content to point out Kafka's impossible identification with his shopkeeper of a father, one completely overlooks the social dynamic of desiring energy. Kafka is not, in spite of what has been said, a writer of the nineteenth century. He is a writer of the twenty-first century who describes a desiring process in embryo, the scope of which we have scarcely begun to grasp.

Munster: Your book is, above all, a plea for the liberation of desire, a revolt against the overcoding of individuals by the fluxes of capitalism. But you go farther still, you call for an identification of the analyst, the patient, and the militant. Exactly what does this mean:?

Guattari: To start with, we never said: "identification of the analyst and the schizophrenic." We say that the analyst, like the militant, the writer, or whoever it may be, is more or less involved in a "schizo-process" to be distinguished from the locked-up schizophrenic whose own "schizo-process" runs aimlessly or is blocked up. We don't say that revolutionaries ought to identify with free-wheeling madmen, but that they should model their action

on the “schizo-process.” The schizophrenic is a guy who, for whatever reason, has been touched off by a desiring flow which threatens the social order. There’s an immediate intervention to ward off such a menace. The issue is libidinal energy in its process of “deterritorialization” and not at all the interruption of this process. Like the militant, the analyst must drift with the process instead of serving the “Oedipianizing” social repression by stating, for instance that “All you do is the result of an abnormal homosexual desire.” (So they claim to interpret President Schreber’s delusion.) Or “It’s so because, in your case, the death instinct and Eros are not properly interrelated.” Schizo-analysis, on the other hand, meets with the revolutionary struggle to the extent that it strives to free the flows, to remove the bolts—the axiomatics of capitalism, the overcoding of the superego, the primitive territorialities artificially reconstructed, etc. The work of the analyst, the revolutionary, and the artist meet to the extent that they must constantly tear down systems which reify desire, which submit the subject to the familial and social hierarchy. (I am a man, I am a woman, I am a son, I am a brother, etc.) No sooner does someone say, “I am this or that” than desire is strangled.

Munster: One last question on this new analytical practice. Your activities as a psychoanalyst are closely linked to the experience of the La Borde clinic at Cour Cheverny where institutional psychoanalysis is practiced.³ Do you think this institution (the clinic) takes on special importance for your project of liberation, or is it to be considered a compromise solution with all the characteristics of contemporary reformism in psychoanalysis? Don’t the determinations of the general sociological framework condemn it to a failure at the outset?

Guattari: Yes and no! It effectively partakes in reformism, being surrounded by Social Security, the way patients perceive their illness, the whole medical ideology and social hierarchy, money, etc. . . . So, in this sense it is but a small-scale experiment which is easily repressed and even recuperated. It is, however, sufficiently alien to the rest of society to offer a number of people new conceptual instruments. If I had had to work as a psychoanalyst in private practice or as a professor it would have been much more difficult for me to challenge psychoanalytic dogmas. Our teamwork, although it is prey to all the mechanisms you were referring to, has nevertheless allowed us to pursue somehow or other a positive collective experiment with the French Communist Party, the radical “groupuscules,” the Movement of March 22.⁴ If we had worked in a traditional hospital, this would have been impossible. It is important to preserve a few pals, a network which allows us to escape from this abominable solitude which capitalist society brings us to.

So, yes and no. No, it’s not a vanguardist undertaking; it is nevertheless by progressively modifying the tutelages which weigh on desire, that we will succeed in setting up revolutionary machines of a new type. As much as I am against the illusion of a step by step transformation of society—“small reforms which make up great transformations”—I believe that microscopic

attempts at creating communities, setting up analytic groups among militants, organizing a day-care center in a university—are crucial. It is out of such small attempts that one fine day we will bring about a great big rip like May '68. At the outset, the Movement of March 22 was almost a joke! I believe in a permanent reformism of the revolutionary organization. It's better to have ten consecutive failures or insignificant results than a besotted passivity before the mechanisms of retrieval.

Translated by Janis Forman

NOTES

1. A reference to Lacanian theory of the "subject." The *Symbolic* designates everything that has to do with the Law. In short, the power of language as well as the language of power. The subject being caught in language becomes a mere element of the signifying chain. An instrument to its structure, it is bound to miss the object it desires. [Editor's Note].
2. Cf. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Kafka: Pour une littérature mineure*, Minuit, 1975.
3. Institutional psychotherapy corresponds roughly to the Anglo-American therapeutic communities. Cour-Cheverny (La Borde) is directed by Jean Oury, an orthodox Lacanian. [Ed. Note].
4. The Movement of March 22 was instrumental in bringing about the May '68 "revolution" in France.



"Kiss my light"

Gilles vient de s'acheter une Klossowski 750 flambante neuve, véritable « monstre » qui fera rêver bien des lecteurs avec ses quatre cylindres, ses six synthèses disjonctives et son décodeur à flux inversés. Félix, lui, préfère la Ninietzsche 1880, plus souple et plus maniable, en fait la réplique « surbaissée » de la fameuse Kafkaha 900, y compris la chaîne signifiante à roulement à bille et la libido visqueuse. Pour **Salut les Mafins!** ils expliquent tout sur leur nouvelle folie.

Gilles, es-tu content de ta nouvelle moto ?

Ouais. Ma Klosso est une machine formative, dont les ratés mêmes sont fonctionnels, et dont le fonctionnement est indiscernable de la formation : machine chronogène confondue avec son propre montage, opérant par liaisons non localisables et localisations dispersées, faisant intervenir des processus de temporalisation, formations en fragments et pièces détachées, avec plus-values de code, et où le tout est lui-même produit à côté des parties.

Félix, la Ninietzsche est-elle vraiment une « tous terrains » ?

Tu parles ! Il y a partout le molaire et le moléculaire : leur disjonction est un rapport de disjonction incluse, qui varie seulement d'après les deux sens de la subordination, suivant que les phénomènes moléculaires se subordonnent aux grands ensembles, ou au contraire se les subordonnent.

Même sur une route mouillée ?

Parfaitement. L'investissement libidinal ne porte pas sur le régime des synthèses sociales, mais sur le degré de développement des forces ou énergies dont ces synthèses dépendent.

Gilles, quelles sont à ton avis les qualités d'une moto idéale ?

Avant tout, un usage immanent de la synthèse connective de production. J'ajouterai : un Œdipe triangulé, une bipolarité polyvoque, des flux-schizes et un corps sans organes.

Félix, peut-on aller jusqu'à dire que tu fais l'amour avec ta moto ?

Sur ma moto, ça respire, ça chauffe, ça mange, ça baise. Une machine-organe est branchée sur une machine source : l'une émet un flux que l'autre coupe. Le couplage de la synthèse connective, objet partiel flux, a donc aussi bien une autre forme : la disjonction inclusive.

Gilles, les mauvaises langues disent que tu ne respectes pas le code de la route.

Le décodage généralisé des flux dans le capitalisme a libéré, déterritorialisé, décodé et même surcodé les flux du code, au point que la machine les a toujours intériorisés dans son corps ou sa machine comme champ de forces. Mais la véritable axiomatique n'est pas là.

Certes, Félix, on dit souvent que Ronald Laing est un plus grand champion que toi. Quel est ton avis ?

L'anti-conduite « de Laing » ne retient de la moto que ses lignes de disjonction exclusive, et l'écrase sur ses dimensions individuelles du pseudo-individuelles qui le rapportent par nature à des groupes assumés, au lieu de faire l'opération inverse et de dégager dans la moto l'élément sous-jacent d'une inclusion connective des disjonctions.

A parody of Deleuze and Guattari as motorcycle freaks ... and as Number One on the Hit-Parade!

Published by Actuel, a satirical Leftist magazine.

Gilles, comment es-tu réagi à l'augmentation du prix de l'essence ?

Les consommations mêmes ont des passages, des devenir et des revenir. C'est Maurice Blanchot qui a su poser le problème dans toute sa rigueur, au niveau d'une grosse cylindrée : comment produire, et penser, des fragments qui aient entre eux des rapports de différence en tant que telle, qui aient pour rapport entre eux leur propre différence, sans référence à une totalité originelle même perdue, ni à une totalité résultante même à venir.

Félix, qu'est-ce qu'un mot-analyste ?

C'est un mécanicien. Il s'agit de trouver comment marche une moto, avec quelles synthèses, quels flux, quelles chaînes, quels devenir, et de détruire les structures et les représentations qui empêchent la machine de fonctionner : grands amas qui remplissent le préconscient, immobilisant les motos, les faisant taire, les engluant, les sabotant, les coinçant, les clouant. Ce ne sont pas les lignes de pression de l'inconscient qui comptent, ce sont au contraire ses lignes de fuite !

Everybody Wants to be a Fascist

FÉLIX GUATTARI

I have chosen to discuss fascism for several reasons: because it is a real political problem, and not a purely theoretical consideration, and because I think it is a key theme to use in approaching the question of desire in the social realm. Besides, isn't it a good idea to discuss it freely while we still can?

A micro-politics of desire is not a proposal for the establishment of a bridge between psychoanalysis and Marxism, looking at them as completely formalized theories. This seems to me to be neither desirable nor possible. I do not think that a system of concepts can function with validity outside of its original environment, outside of the collective dispositions of enunciation which produced it. For example, much of the talk about pleasure is very interesting, but in contrast with desire, it is absolutely impossible to transfer these two notions, drawn from a certain type of practice and a certain vision of psychoanalysis, to the social field; in no way do they help us grasp the functioning of the libido in, for example, a fascist situation. Therefore, it must be understood that when I speak of desire I am not borrowing this notion from orthodox psychoanalysis or from Lacanian theory. I do not pretend to lay the foundation of a scientific concept; I will simply try to erect the scaffolding of a provisional theoretical construct in which the operation of desire within the social realm will be discussed. The starting point is simple: it is not possible to bind together in the same sentence the term "pleasure" with the term "revolution." You cannot say that a "pleasure of revolution" could exist. But nowadays no one is surprised to hear someone speak of a "desire for revolution" or a "revolutionary desire." It seems to me that this is tied to the fact that the meaning generally given to pleasure is inseparable from a certain mode of individuation of subjectivity, and psychoanalytic pleasure is even less independent from this kind of inward-folding individuation which, quite to the contrary, managed to find some kind of fulfillment within the confines of the couch. With libido and desire, however, things are altogether different.

Desire is not intrinsically linked to an individuation of the libido. A machine of desire encounters forms of individuation, that is, of alienation. Neither desire nor its repression is an ideal formation; there is no desire-in-itself, no repression-in-itself. The abstract objective of a "successful castration" partakes of the worst reactionary mystifications. Desire and repression function in a real society, and are marked by the imprint of each of its historical stages. It is therefore not a matter of general categories which could be transposed from one situation to another. The distinction which I propose between micro-politics and macro-politics of desire would have to

function as something which would lead to the liquidation of the pretended universality of psychoanalytic models, a notion which ostensibly secures the psychoanalyst against political and social contingencies. It is said that psychoanalysis is concerned with something which takes place on a small scale, barely the scale of the family and the person, whereas politics is concerned only with large social groupings. I would like to demonstrate that, on the contrary, there is a politics which addresses itself to the individual's desire, as well as to the desire which manifests itself in the broadest social field. And it has two forms: either a macro-politics aiming at both individual and social problems, or a micro-politics aiming at the same domains (the individual, the family, party problems, state problems, etc.). The despotism which exists in conjugal or family relationships arises from the same kind of libidinal disposition that exists in the broadest social field. Inversely, it is by no means absurd to approach a certain number of large scale social problems (for example, the problems of bureaucratism and fascism), in the light of a micro-politics of desire. The problem therefore is not to put up bridges between already fully constituted and fully delimited domains, but to put in place new theoretical and practical machines, capable of sweeping away the old stratifications, and of establishing the conditions for a new exercise of desire. In that case, it is no longer a simple question of describing pre-existing social objects, but one of engaging in a political struggle against all machines of the dominant power, whether it be the power of the bourgeois State, the power of any kind of bureaucracy, the power of academia, familial power, phallocratic power in male/female relationships, or even the repressive power of the super-ego over the individual.

Three methods of approach to these questions can be schematized: first, a sociological approach, which we will call analytic-formalist; secondly, a neo-Marxist, synthetic-dualist approach; and thirdly, an analytic-political approach. The first and second approaches preserve the distinction between large and small social groupings, while the third approach attempts to go beyond this distinction.

Sociological analytic formalist thought attempts to disengage common traits and to separate out species, either by a method of *perceptible analogies*—in that case, it will try to settle small relative differences; for example: it will distinguish the three types of fascism: Italian, German, and Spanish; or, by a method of *structural homologies*—in that case, it will try to determine absolute differences, such as the differences between fascism, Stalinism, and the Western democracies. On the one hand, the differences are minimized, in order to disengage a common feature, and on the other, the differences are magnified, in order to separate levels and construct species.

Synthetic dualist neo-Marxist thought claims to go beyond such a system by always refusing to sever representation from a militant social practice, but generally this practice gets caught up in another kind of gap, this time between the reality of the desires of the masses, and the instances that are supposed to represent these desires. Sociological thought's system of description proceeded by reducing social objects into things, and by failing

to recognize the desire and creativity of the masses; the militant Marxist system of thought surmounts this failure, but constitutes itself as the collective system of representation of the desire of the masses. This system recognizes the existence of a revolutionary desire, but it imposes mediations on it: that of the theoretical representation of Marxism, and that of the practical representation of the party which is supposed to be its expression. A whole mechanism of transmission belts is thus put into place between the theory, the direction of the party, and the militants, so that the innumerable differences which run through the desire of the masses find themselves "massified," restored to standardized formulations whose necessity is deemed to be justified in the name of the cohesion of the working class and party unity. From the impotence of a system of mental representation we have passed to the impotence of a system of social representativity. In fact, it is no accident if this neo-Marxist method of thought and action is swamped in bureaucratic practices; this owing to the fact that it has never really disengaged its pseudo-dialectic from an obdurate dualism between representation and reality, between the caste who hold the passwords and the masses, who are heard alphabetizing and catechizing like good children. Neo-Marxist thought contaminates by its reductive dualism, its conception of the class struggle, its schematic opposition between the city and the country, its international alliances, its politics of "the peace camp and the war camp," etc. The two terms of each of these oppositions always revolve around a third object which, though a third, still does not therefore constitute a "dialectical synthesis"; this third object is, essentially, the State, the power of the State and the party which is a candidate for the taking of that power. Any partial struggle must be brought back to these transcendent third objects; everything must be given its *meaning* by them, even when real history reveals them for what they are, namely, lures, lures just like the phallic object of the triangular Oedipal relationship. In addition, it could be said that this dualism and its transcendent object constitute the nucleus of the militant Oedipus, which must be confronted by a *political analysis*.

In fact, this analysis refuses to let the disjunction remain between large social groupings and individual problems, family problems, academic problems, professional problems, etc. This analysis will no longer concern itself with mechanically chipping the problematic of concrete situations down to a simple alternative of classes or camps. It will no longer pretend to find all the answers in the action of a unique revolutionary party standing as a central depository of theoretical and practical truth. Therefore, a micro-politics of desire would no longer present itself as *representing* the masses and as *interpreting* their struggles. Which does not mean that it would condemn, *a priori*, all party action, all idea of party line, of program or even of centralism, but it would endeavor to situate and relativize this party action in terms of an analytic micro-politics which, at every turn, would place itself in opposition to the Manichean dualism that presently contaminates the revolutionary movements. It would no longer seek support from a transcendent object in order to provide itself with security. It would no

longer center itself on a unique object—the power of the State, which could only be conquered by a representative party acting in the place of and instead of the masses—but rather, it would center on a multiplicity of objectives, within the immediate reach of the most diverse social groupings. Starting from the plurality of partial struggles (but the term is already equivocal: they are not part of an already constituted whole), far-reaching collective struggles could be launched. There would no longer be mass, centrally ordered movements which would set more or less serialized individuals in motion on a local scale. Rather, it would be the connection of a multiplicity of molecular desires which would catalyze tests of force on a large scale. This is what happened at the beginning of the movement of May '68: the local and singular manifestation of the desire of small groups began to resound with a multiplicity of repressed desires which had been isolated and crushed by the dominant forms of expression and of representation. In such a situation there is no longer an ideal *unity* which *represents* and *mediates multiple* interests, but rather, there is a *univocal multiplicity* of desires whose process secretes its own systems of tracking and regulation. This multiplicity of desiring machines is not composed of standardized and regulated systems which can be disciplined and hierarchized in relation to a unique objective. It is stratified according to different social groupings, according to classes formed by age groups, the sexes, geographic and professional localizations, ethnic origins, erotic practices, etc. Thus, it does not realize a totalizing unity. It is the univocity of the masses' desire, and not their regrouping according to standardized objectives, which lays the foundation for the unity of their struggle. The unification of struggles is antagonistic to the multiplicity of desires only when it is totalizing, that is, when it is treated by the totalitarian machine of a representative party.

Seen from this perspective, theoretical expression no longer comes between social object and praxis. The social object is ready to speak without having to have recourse to representative instances to express itself. To make political struggle coincide with an analysis of desire, you have to place yourself so as to be able to listen in on whoever is expressing himself starting from a position of desire, and above all, if he places himself "off the track." In the home, a child is put down if he expresses himself "off the track," and this continues in school, in the barracks, in the factory, in the trade union, and in the party cell. You must always stay "on the right track" and "in line." But desire, by virtue of its very nature, always has the tendency to "stray from the subject," "to get off the track," and to drift from its proper course. A collective disposition of enunciations will say something about desire without referring it to a subjective individuation, without centering it around a pre-established subject and previously codified meanings. Henceforth, the analysis is not something which takes place after the terms and relationships of force are established, or after the *socius* is crystallized into various closed instances which remain opaque to one another: it participates in this very crystallization. The analysis has become immediately political. "When saying is doing": the division of labor between the specialists of saying and the specialists of doing ceases.

Collective dispositions of enunciation produce their own means of expression—it could be a special language, a slang, or a return to an old language. For them, working on semiotic flows, or on material and social flows is one and the same thing. Subject and object are no longer face-to-face, with a means of expression in a third position; there is no longer a tripartite division between the realm of reality, the realm of representation or representativity, and the realm of subjectivity. You have a collective set-up which is, at once, subject, object, and expression. The individual is no longer the universal guarantor of the dominant meanings. Here, everything can participate in enunciation: individuals, as well as zones of the body, semiotic trajectories, or machines that are plugged in on all horizons. The collective disposition of enunciation thus unites semiotic flows, material flows, and social flows, well short of its possible recuperation within a theoretical corpus. How is such a transition possible? Are we talking about a return to anarchist utopias? Isn't it an illusion to want to give the masses permission to speak in a highly differentiated industrial society? How could a social object—a subject group—substitute itself for the system of representation and for ideologies? Gradually, as I go on with this statement, a paradox thrusts itself on me: how is it conceivable to speak of these kinds of collective dispositions of enunciation while seated on a chair facing a group that is soberly arranged in a room? In reality, everything I say tends to establish that a true political analysis cannot arise from an individuated enunciation, especially when it is the act of a lecturer, who is unacquainted with the problems of his audience! An individual statement has no bearing except to the extent that it can enter into conjunction with collective set-ups which already function effectively: for example, which are already engaged in real social struggles. If this doesn't happen, then who are you speaking to? To a universal interlocutor? To someone who already knows the codes, the meanings and all their possible combinations? The individuated enunciation is the prisoner of the dominant meanings. Only a subject-group can manipulate semiotic flows, shatter meanings, open the language to other desires and forge other realities!

Let's come back to this question of fascism and to its relation to Stalinism and Western-style "democracies." We are not interested in establishing reductive comparisons, but, on the contrary, in complexifying the models. Any halt in the course of this analytic path will come only once one has reached a position where one has a minimum of real grasp on the process which has been put into play. There are all kinds of fascisms, all kinds of Stalinisms, and all kinds of bourgeois democracies. These three groupings break up as soon as one begins to consider, at the heart of each grouping, the relative status of, for example, the industrial machine, the banking machine, the military machine, the politico-police machine, the techno-structures of the State, the Church, etc. The analysis will have to consider each of these sub-groupings while, at the same time, not losing sight of the fact that, in each case, it is still concerned only with provisional stages of molecular reduction. Contemporary totalitarian systems have in-

vented a certain number of prototypes for a police party; the Nazi police party would merit being studied in comparison with the Stalinist police party; in fact, perhaps they are closer to each other than the corresponding structures of the State. It would be interesting to pick out the different kinds of machines of desire that go into their composition. But we would then discover that it is not enough to consider things from so far off. The analysis would have to progress constantly in the direction of a molecularization of its object to be able to grasp, to the nearest place, the role that it plays in the heart of the large groupings within which it functions. There is not *one* Nazi party; not only has the Nazi party evolved, but during each period it has had a different function, according to the various domains wherein it has carried out its action. Himmler's SS machine was not the same as the SA machine or as that of the mass organizations conceived by the Strasser brothers. Certain points of view of quasi-religious inspiration are found at the very heart of the SS machine—remember that Himmler wished the SS to be trained using methods similar to those of the Jesuits—coexisting with openly sadistic practices, like those of a Heydrich. . . . We are not talking about a gratuitous investigation, but about a refusal of those simplifications which prevent us from perceiving the *genealogy* and the *permanence* of certain fascist machineries. The Inquisition itself was already the setting into place of a certain type of fascist machinery which was to keep developing and to keep perfecting itself up to our own day. Thus, we see that the analysis of the molecular components of fascism can deal with quite a variety of areas. It is the same fascism under different forms which continues to operate in the family, in school, or in a trade union. A struggle against the modern forms of totalitarianism can be organized only if we are prepared to recognize the continuity of this machine.

There are all kinds of ways in which to approach these questions concerning desire in the social field. We can simply ignore them, or else reduce them to simplified political alternatives. We can also try to grasp their mutations, their displacements, and the new possibilities which they afford to revolutionary action. Stalinism and fascism are generally placed in opposition, since they seemingly answer to radically different definitions, while the different forms of fascism have been placed under the same rubric. And yet, the differences are, perhaps, much greater between the fascisms than between certain aspects of Stalinism and certain aspects of Naziism. It is in no way contradictory to want to preserve these differences, and, at the same time, wish to disengage the continuity of a totalitarian *machine* which pursues its course through *all structures*: fascist, Stalinist, democratic-bourgeois, etc. Without going all the way back to the Late Empire of Diocletian and Constantine, its filiation can be traced from the repression against the Communards of 1871, right up to its present forms. In this way, different totalitarian systems produced different formulas for a collective seizing of desire, depending on the transformation of productive forces and the relationships of production. We must endeavor to disengage its *machinic composition*, much as we would a chemical composition, but a social

chemistry of desire which runs not only through History, but also through the whole social space. The historical transversality of the machines of desire on which totalitarian systems depend is, in fact, inseparable from their social transversality. Therefore, the analysis of fascism is not simply a historian's specialty. I repeat: what fascism set in motion yesterday continues to proliferate in other forms, within the complex of contemporary social space. A whole totalitarian chemistry manipulates the structures of state, political and union structures, institutional and family structures, and even individual structures, inasmuch as one can speak of a sort of fascism of the super-ego in situations of guilt and neurosis.

But what is this bizarre totalitarian machine that traverses time and space? Some prop in a science-fiction story? I can already hear the sarcastic remarks, of the right-minded psychoanalysts, Marxists, and epistemologists. "What a confusion of levels! Everything's been thrown into the same sack . . ." May I point out that it was only by conducting an analysis at the molecular and atomic levels that the chemists later succeeded in realizing syntheses of complex elements! But they will still say: that's nothing but mechanistic talk! Granted; up to this point we're only talking about a comparison. And besides, what's the use of polemicizing: the only people who will put up with listening to me any longer are those who feel the interest and urgency of the micro-political anti-fascist struggle that I'm talking about. The evolution of the social division of labor has necessitated the creation of ever more gigantic productive groupings. But this gigantism of production has involved an increasingly accentuated molecularization of those human elements which it put into play in the machinic combinations of industry, of the economy, of education, of information, etc. It is never a man who works—the same can be said for desire—but a combination of organs and machines. A man does not communicate with his fellow men: a transhuman chain of organs is formed and enters into conjunction with semiotic links and an intersection of material flows. It is because the productive forces of today cause the explosion of traditional human territorialities, that they are capable of liberating the atomic energy of desire. Because this phenomenon is irreversible, and because its revolutionary scope cannot be calculated, the totalitarian-bureaucratic capitalist and socialist systems are forced to constantly perfect and miniaturize their repressive machines. Therefore, it seems to me that the constant search for this machinic composition of totalitarian powers is the indispensable corollary of a micro-political struggle for the liberation of desire. The minute you stop facing it head-on, you can abruptly oscillate from a position of revolutionary openness to a position of totalitarian foreclosure: then you find yourself a prisoner of generalities and totalizing programs, and representative instances regain their power. Molecular analysis is the will to a molecular power, to a theory and practice which refuse to dispossess the masses of their potential for desire. Contrary to a possible objection, we are not talking about taking on history by looking at the smallest side of things, nor do we claim, like Pascal, that if Cleopatra's nose had been longer, the course of history would

have been changed; it is simply a question of not missing the impact of this totalitarian machine which never stops modifying itself and adapting itself to accord with the relationships of force and societal transformations. Certainly the role of Hitler as an individual was negligible, but his role remains fundamental, inasmuch as he caused a new form of this totalitarian machine to crystallize. He is seen in dreams, in deliriums, in films, in the contorted behavior of policemen, and even on the leather jackets of some gangs who, without knowing anything about Naziism, reproduce the icons of Hitlerism.

Let's return to a question which is at work, in other forms, in the present political situation. After the debacle of 1918 and the crisis of 1929, why wasn't German capitalism content to grasp onto a simple military dictatorship for support? Why Hitler rather than General von Schleicher? Daniel Guérin says, in this context, that large capital hesitated to "deprive itself of this incomparable, irreplaceable means of penetrating into all the cells of society, the organization of the fascist masses." Indeed, a military dictatorship does not compartmentalize the masses in the same way as a party that is organized like a police force. A military dictatorship does not draw on libidinal energy in the same way as a fascist dictatorship, even if certain of their results may seem identical, and even if they happen to result in the same kinds of repressive methods, the same tortures, etc. The conjunction, in the person of Hitler, of at least four libidinal series, caused a mutation of a new desiring machinism to crystallize in the masses:

--A certain plebeian style that put him in a position to have a handle on people who were more or less marked by the socio-democratic and Bolshevik machines.

--A certain veteran-of-war style, symbolized by his Iron Cross from the war of 1914, which made it possible for him to at least neutralize the military staff elements, for want of being able to gain their complete confidence.

--A shop-keeper's opportunism, a spinal flexibility, a slackness, which enabled him to negotiate with the magnates of industry and finance, all the while letting them think that they could easily control and manipulate him.

--Finally, and this is perhaps the essential point, a racist delirium, a mad, paranoiac energy which put him in tune with the collective death instinct which had been released from the charnel houses of the First World War. To be sure, all this is still much too schematic! But the point that I wanted to insist upon, and that I could only allude to, is the fact that we cannot regard as indifferent those local and singular conditions which allowed this mechanical crystallization on the person of Hitler. I insist that it is not a matter of being content with historico-psychoanalytic generalities: today within political and trade union movements, within groupuscules, in family life, academic life, etc., we are witnessing other fascisizing micro-crystallizations, which succeed the phylum of the totalitarian machine. By pretending that the individual has a negligible role in history, they would like to make us think that we can do nothing but stand with hands tied in the face of the hysterical gesticulations or paranoiac manipulations of local

tyrants and bureaucrats of every color. A micro-politics of desire means that henceforth we will refuse to allow any fascist formula to slip by, on whatever scale it may manifest itself, including within the scale of the family or even within the scale of our own personal economy. Through all kinds of means—in particular, movies and television—we are led to believe that Naziism was just a bad moment we had to go through, a sort of historical error, but also a beautiful page in history for the good heroes. And besides was it not touching to see the intertwined flags of capitalism and socialism? We are further led to believe that there were real antagonistic contradictions between the fascist Axis and the Allies. This is a way of concealing the nature of the selection process which was to lead to the elimination of a fascist formula which, after a while, the bourgeoisie finally decided was dangerous. Radek defined Naziism as something external to the bourgeoisie, somewhat like iron bands used by the bourgeoisie, in an attempt to consolidate “capitalism’s leaky tank.” But wasn’t this image a bit too reassuring? Fascism only remained external to a certain type of bourgeoisie, which rejected it only because of its instability and because it stirred excessively powerful forces of desire within the masses. The remedy, which had been welcomed in the paroxysmic phase of the crisis, later seemed too dangerous. But international capitalism could only consider its elimination to the extent that other means were available by which to control class struggle, not to mention totalitarian formulas for subduing the desire of the masses: as soon as Stalinism had “negotiated” this replacement formula, an alliance with it became possible. The Nazi regime never really mastered its internal contradictions; the Führer’s practically insoluble mission consisted of an attempt to establish a sort of compromise between different machines of power which fully intended to maintain their autonomy: the military machine, the politico-police factions, the economic machine, etc.¹ At the same time, he had to keep in mind that the revolutionary effervescence of the masses threatened to sway them towards a Bolshevik-style revolution. In fact, the alliance of the Western democracies and totalitarian Stalinism was not formed to “save democracy.” It was formed only because of the catastrophic turn which the fascist experiments had taken, and, above all, in response to the deadly form of libidinal metabolism which developed in the masses as a result of these experiments. During this whole period, the planet was seized by a crisis that seemed like the end of the world. Of course, it must not be forgotten that the leftist organizations in Italy and Germany had been liquidated at the very beginning. But why did these organizations collapse like houses of cards? They never offered the masses a real alternative, at any rate, none that could tap their energy of desire, or even divert this energy from the fascist religion (on this subject I find Reich’s analysis definitive). It is often asserted that, at their outset, the fascist regimes supplied a minimum of economic solutions to the most urgent problems—an artificial boost to the economy, a reabsorption of unemployment, a large-scale public works program, control of capital. These measures are then contrasted, for example, with the powerlessness of the socio-democratic governments of the Weimar

Republic. Explanations like, "The socialists and communists had a bad program, bad leaders, a bad organization, bad alliances," are considered sufficient. Their deficiencies and betrayals are endlessly enumerated. But nothing in these explanations accounts for the fact that the new totalitarian desiring machine was able to crystallize in the masses to such an extent that it was felt, by international capitalism itself, to be even more dangerous than the regime that came out of the October revolution. What almost everyone refuses to acknowledge is that the fascist machine, in its Italian and German forms, became a threat to capitalism and Stalinism because the masses invested a fantastic collective death instinct in it. By reterritorializing their desire onto a leader, a people, and a race, the masses abolished, by means of a phantasm of catastrophe, a reality which they detested and which the revolutionaries were either unwilling or unable to encroach upon. For the masses, virility, blood, vital space, and death took the place of a socialism that had too much respect for the dominant meanings. And yet, fascism was brought back to these same dominant meanings by a sort of intrinsic bad faith, by a false provocation to the absurd, and by a whole theater of collective hysteria and debility. Fascism simply took a much longer detour than, for example, Stalinism. All fascist meanings stem out of a composite representation of love and death, of Eros and Thanatos now made into one. Hitler and the Nazis were fighting for death, right up to and including the death of Germany; the German masses agreed to follow along and meet their own destruction. How else are we to understand the way they were able to keep the war going for several years after it had been manifestly lost? Beside such a phenomenon, the Stalinist machine seemed much more sensible, especially when viewed from the outside. It is no wonder that English and American capitalism felt few qualms about an alliance with it. After the liquidation of the Third International, Stalinist totalitarianism could appear to the capitalist strategy as a replacement system, having certain advantages over the different forms of fascism and classical dictatorship. Who could be better equipped than the Stalinist police and their agents to control any excessively turbulent movements of the working class, the colonial masses, or any oppressed national minorities? The last World War will thus have been the opportunity to select the most efficient totalitarian machines, those best adapted to the period.

Unlike fascism, capitalist totalitarian machines endeavor to divide, particularize, and molecularize the workers, meanwhile tapping their potentiality for desire. These machines infiltrate the ranks of the workers, their families, their couples, their childhood; they install themselves at the very heart of the workers' subjectivity and vision of the world. Capitalism fears large-scale movements of crowds. Its goal is to have automatic systems of regulation at its command. This regulatory role is given to the State and to the mechanisms of contractualization between the "social partners." And when a conflict breaks out of the pre-established frameworks, capitalism seeks to confine it to economic or local wars. From this standpoint, it must be acknowledged that the Western totalitarian machine has now completely

surpassed its Stalinist counterpart. And yet, Stalinism had the advantage, over Fascism, of greater stability; the party was not put on the same level as the military machine, the police machine, and the economic machine. In effect, Stalinism overcoded all the machines of power, meanwhile keeping the masses under an implacable control. Furthermore, it succeeded in keeping the avant-garde of the international proletariat strung along on a tight leash. The failure of Stalinism, which is no doubt one of the most striking developments in the modern period, evidently stems from the fact that it could not adapt itself to the evolution of the productive forces and, in particular, to what I have called the molecularization of the work force. Inside the USSR, this failure was translated into a series of political and economic crises and into a series of successive slips which restored, to the detriment of the party, a relative autonomy to the technocratic machines of the State and of production, to the army, to the regions, etc. Outside of USSR, this was translated into the chaotic relationships with the popular democracies—rupture with China, foundation of a *de facto* polycentrism within the communist parties. Everywhere, national and regional questions, particularisms once again took on decisive weight. Among other things, this allowed the capitalist countries to recuperate and partially integrate their local communist parties. From this standpoint, Stalin's legacy was completely lost! Of course, Stalinism continues to outlive itself in a certain number of parties and unions, but, in fact, it now operates on the old social-democratic model, and revolutionary struggles, struggles of desire, like May '68 or Lip, tend more and more to escape its influence. Under these conditions, the capitalist system is forced to search internally for new formulas of totalitarianism. And so long as these are not found, capitalism will have to face struggles which it will find situated on unforeseeable fronts (managerial strikes, struggles of immigrants and racial minorities, subversion in the schools, in the prisons, in the asylums, struggles for sexual liberty, etc.) This new situation, where one is no longer dealing with homogeneous social groupings whose action is channeled into purely economic objectives is met by proliferation and exacerbation of repressive responses. Alongside the fascism of the concentration camps, which continue to exist in numerous countries², new forms of molecular fascism are developing: a slow burning fascism, in familialism, in school, in racism, in every kind of ghetto, which advantageously makes up for the crematory ovens. Everywhere, the totalitarian machine is in search of adapted structures, which is to say, structures capable of adapting desire to the profit economy. We must abandon, once and for all, the quick and easy formula: "Fascism will not make it again." Fascism has already "made it," and it continues to "make it." It passes through the tightest mesh; it is in constant evolution, to the extent that it shares in a micro-political economy of desire which is itself inseparable from the evolution of the productive forces. Fascism seems to come from the outside, but it finds its energy right at the heart of everyone's desire. We must stop, once and for all, being diverted by the sinister buffooneries of those socio-democrats who are so astonished that their army, which they

said was the most democratic in the world, launches, without notice, the worst of fascist repressions. A military machine, as such, crystallizes a fascist desire, no matter what the political regime may be in the country where it is implanted. Trotsky's army, Mao's army, and Castro's army have been no exceptions: which, nevertheless, in no way detracts from their respective merits! Fascism, like desire, is scattered everywhere, in separate bits and pieces, within the whole social realm; it crystallizes in one place or another, depending on the relationships of force. It can be said of fascism that it is all-powerful and, at the same time, ridiculously weak. And whether it is the former or the latter depends on the capacity of collective arrangements, subject-groups, to connect the social libido, on every level, with the whole range of revolutionary machines of desire.

Translated by Suzanne Fletcher

NOTES

1. It is needless to repeat that all this is too simple: there was not, for example, a homogeneous attitude on the part of the capitalist. Krupp was hostile towards Hitler at first, and only rallied to him after the course was set . . .
2. One of contemporary capitalism's major concerns is the search for forms of totalitarianism tailored to the countries of the Third World.

Three Group Problems

GILLES DELEUZE

It so happens that a militant and a psychoanalyst have joined forces in the same person and that, rather than remain separated, the two continually intermingle, interfere and communicate, often taking the one for the other. This is quite a rare event since Reich, Pierre-Félix Guattari is hardly likely to be bothered by problems of the unity of an Ego. The ego is rather part of those things we must dismantle through the joint assault of analytical and political forces. Guattari's catchword, "we are all *groupuscules*", clearly marks his search for a new subjectivity, group subjectivity, which does not allow itself to be cloistered within a whole necessarily eager to reconstitute an ego, or worse yet, a super-ego, but traverses several groups at the same time, groups that are divisible, multipliable, communicating and always revocable. The criterion for a good group is that it never dreams of itself as unique, immortal and meaningful, as would a bureau of defense and security or a ministry of veterans, but that it instead connects up with an outside that confronts it with the possibilities of its non-sense, its death and its dissolution, "precisely because it is open to other groups." The individual, in turn, is such a group. Guattari embodies in the most natural way the two aspects of an anti-Ego: on the one hand, like a catatonic pebble, a blind and hardened body penetrated by death the instant it takes off its glasses; on the other hand a body blazing with a thousand fires, swarming with multiple lives as soon as it looks, acts, laughs, thinks or attacks. Thus is he named Pierre and Félix: schizophrenic powers.

At least three problematical levels can be discerned in this encounter between the psychoanalyst and the militant: 1) what form of analysis would allow the introduction of politics into psychoanalysis practice and theory (once it has been made clear that politics is in the unconscious itself)? 2) Is there a way, and how, to introduce psychoanalysis into revolutionary militant groups? 3) How could one conceive and set up specific therapeutic groups whose influence would react on political groups, and also on psychiatric and psychoanalytic structures? In *Psychanalyse et transversalité*, Guattari presents a certain number of articles concerning these three types of problems, from 1955 to 1970. These articles mark an evolution, with two key landmarks: the hopes despairs following the Liberation, and those following May 1968. And, between the two, the mole's work that prepared for May.

As to the first problem, we see how Guattari very early had the feeling

"Trois problèmes de groupe" was published as a foreword to Félix Guattari's *Psychanalyse et transversalité*, Paris: Maspéro, 1972.

that the unconscious relates directly to an entire social field, both economic and political, rather than to the mythical and familial coordinates traditionally invoked by psychoanalysis. What is at stake is the libido as such, as the very essence of desire and sexuality: it invests and disinvests the flows of all kinds that run through the social body, it breaks in these flows, it blocks them off, lets them loose, holds them back. It certainly does not operate in an obvious way, as do objective, conscious interests and the sequences of historical causality. Instead, it displays a latent desire, coextensive with the social field, that brings about ruptures in causality, the emergence of singularities, points of stoppage, points of escape. The year 1936 is not just an event in historical consciousness, it is also a complex of the unconscious. Our loves and our sexual choices are less derivatives of a mythical Daddy-Mommy than they are of a social reality, interferences and effects of flows cathected by the libido. What do we not make love and death with? Guattari is thus able to blame psychoanalysis for systematically crushing all the socio-political contents of the unconscious which do, nonetheless, determine in reality the objects of desire. Psychoanalysis, he says, starts from a sort of absolute narcissism (*Das Ding*), and leads to an ideal of social adaptation which it calls a cure; but this procedure always leaves a singular social constellation in the dark, which should instead be explored rather than sacrificed to the invention of an abstract symbolic unconscious. The *Das Ding* is not the recurrent horizon which finds in an illusory way an individual, but rather a social body serving as a basis for latent potentialities (why are there mad people here, and revolutionaries there?). Far more important than the father, the mother and the grandmother, are all the characters who haunt the fundamental questions of society like the contemporary class struggle. More important than telling how Greek society, one fine day, has "a positive skin reaction" to Oedipus is the enormous *Spaltung* cutting through the Communist world today. How can we forget the role of the State in all the impasses where the libido finds itself entangled, reduced to cathecting the intimist images of the family? How could it ever have been believed that the castration complex could eventually find a satisfying solution as long as society entrusts it with an unconscious role of social regulation and repression? In short, the social relation never constitutes a beyond or an afterwards of the individual and familial problems. It is even very curious to see to what extent socio-economic and political contents of the libido show up so much clearer as we find ourselves before syndroms of the most unsocialized nature, such as in the case of psychosis. "Beyond the ego, the subject finds itself scattered in all corners of the historical universe, delirium speaks foreign languages, hallucinates history, and class conflicts or wars become the instruments of self-expression [...], the distinctions between private life and the various levels of social life are no longer valid." (Compare this with Freud, who retains from war only an indeterminate death instinct, and an unspecified shock, an excess of excitement of the Boom! Boom! type). To restore to the unconscious its historical perspectives on an unsettling and unknown background, implies a reversal of psycho-

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analysis and doubtless also a rediscovery of psychosis underneath the tinselled finery of neurosis. For psychoanalysis has joined wholeheartedly in the efforts of the most traditional psychiatry to snuff out the voices of the mad who speak to us essentially of politics, economy, order and revolution. In a recent article, Marcel Jaeger shows how "the idle talk of the mad does not merely possess the depth of their individual, psychic disorders: the discourse of madness overlaps another discourse, that of political, social and religious history, that speaks from each of them [. . .]. In certain cases, the use of political concepts is what provokes a crisis in the patient, as if this forced into the light of day the knot of contradictions in which the mad person is entangled [. . .]. There is not one area in the social field, not even in the asylum, where the history of the worker's movement is not being written."¹ These formulations express the same orientation as the works of Guattari from his first articles, the same enterprise of a reevaluation of psychosis.

We can see how this orientation differs from Reich's: there is not a libidinal economy that would subjectively prolong through other means political economy; there is not a sexual repression that would interiorize economic exploitation and political subjugation. Rather, for Guattari, desire as libido is already everywhere, sexuality surveys and espouses the whole social field, coinciding with the flows that pass underneath the objects, the person and the symbols of a group, all of which depend upon these flows for their very shape and constitution. Therein lies precisely the latent character of the sexuality of desire, which only becomes manifest through the choices of sexual objects and their symbols (it is only too obvious that symbols are consciously sexual). It is therefore political economy as such, the economy of flows, which is unconsciously libidinal. There are not two economies, and desire or the libido is merely the subjectivity of political economy. "Economy is, in the last analysis, the very mainspring of subjectivity." That is what the notion of *institution* stands for, which is defined by a subjectivity of flows and breaks in flows within the objective forms of a group. The dualities objective/subjective, infrastructure/superstructure and production/ideology fade away, giving us access to the strict complementarity of the desiring subject of the institution and the institutional object. These institutional analyses of Guattari should be compared to those developed by Cardan at the same period in *Socialisme et Barbarie*, and which were assimilated under a similar bitter criticism of Trotskyists.²

The second problem—should psychoanalysis be introduced into political groups, and how?—clearly excludes every attempt at "applying" psychoanalysis to historical and social phenomena. Psychoanalysis has amassed many a ridicule, with such applications: Oedipus at the fore. The problem is of a completely different nature: the situation which makes capitalism the thing to be overthrown by revolution, has also turned the Russian Revolution, the history following it, and the organization of Communist Parties and national unions into so many agencies incapable of bringing about this

destruction. In this respect, the fundamental character of capitalism, presented as a contradiction between the development of the productive forces and the relations of production, consists in the following: the process of reproduction of capital, on which the productive forces depend in the capitalist regime, is in itself an international phenomenon implying a worldwide division of labor; capitalism, however, can neither break the national structures within which it develops its relations of production, nor can it destroy the State as generating instrument for the development of capital. The internationalism of capital thus progresses through national and State structures, which check it at the same time as extending its thrust, and play the role of up-dated archaisms. State monopoly capitalism, far from being an ultimate given, is the result of a compromise. In this "expropriation of capitalists at the heart of capital," the bourgeoisie maintains its full domination over the State machinery, but only through an increasing effort to institutionalize and integrate the working class in such a way that class struggles become displaced in relation to the places and factors of real decision-making which refer back to international capitalist economy and easily outflank the States capacities. It is by virtue of the same principle that "only a limited sphere of production is inserted into the worldwide process of reproduction of capital," with the remainder, in the States of the Third World, remaining obedient to precapitalist relations (current archaisms of a second type).

In such a situation, we can easily ascertain the complicity of national Communist Parties which fight for the integration of the proletariat into the State, to the point that "the national particularisms of the bourgeoisie are for the main part the result of national particularisms of the proletariat itself, and the internal division of the bourgeoisie, the very expression of the division of the proletariat." In another respect, even when the necessity for revolutionary struggles in the Third World is affirmed, these struggles serve above all as exchange currency in a transaction, and mark the same renunciation of all claims to an international strategy and to a development of class struggles in capitalist countries. Isn't everything contained in this slogan: *defense of the national forces of production by the working class*, a struggle against monopolies and a conquest of the State machinery?

The origins for such a situation lie in what Guattari terms "the great Leninist break" of 1917, which fixed for better or for worse the major attitudes, the principal terms, the initiatives and stereotypes, as well as the phantasies and interpretations of the revolutionary movement. This break appeared as the possibility for bringing about an actual rupture of historical causality, by "interpreting" the military, economic, political and social confusion as a victory for the masses. Rather than a necessity for the sacred union left of center, there arose the possibility for socialist revolution. But this possibility was only assumed by establishing the Party, from a modest, clandestine formation to the embryo of a State machinery capable of directing everything, fulfilling a messianic vocation and substituting itself for the masses. Two more or less long term consequences came out of this.

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Inasmuch as the new State stood squarely in opposition to the capitalist States, it entered with them into relationships of force whose ideal was a sort of status quo. What had been the Leninist tactic at the time of the "N.P.E." (New Political Economy) was transformed into an ideology of peaceful coexistence and economic competition. The idea of rivalry was ruinous for the revolutionary movement. And inasmuch as the new State shouldered the burden of proletarian internationalism, it could only develop socialist economy in terms of the requirements of the world market, and on the basis of objectives similar to those of international capital, accepting all the more readily the integration of local Communist Parties into capitalist relations of production, always in the name of the working class's defense of the national productive forces. In short, it is incorrect to go along with the technocrats when they argue that the two types of regimes and States converged throughout their evolution. But it is no more true to pre-suppose, along with Trotsky, the existence of a healthy proletarian State supposedly perverted by bureaucracy, which could be straightened by a mere political revolution. It is in the very manner in which the State-Party *answered to* the State-cities of capitalism, even in relations of hostility and opposition, that everything was already played out or betrayed. The weakness of institutional creation in Russia in all domains, since the precocious liquidation of the Soviets, is a perfect example of this (for example, when one imports pre-assembled automobile factories, types of human relations are also imported as well as technological functions, separations between intellectual and manual labor, and modes of consumption fundamentally foreign to socialism).

This entire analysis takes on added meaning in terms of Guattari's distinction between *subjugated groups* and *subject-groups*. Subjugated groups are just as subjugated in terms of the "masters" which they take on or accept, as they are in terms of their own masses. The hierarchy, the vertical or pyramidal organization that characterizes them is constructed in such a way as to avert all possible inscriptions of non-sense, death or explosion into the body of the group, to prevent the development of creative breaks, thereby assuring the mechanisms of self-conservation based on the exclusion of other groups. Their centralism operates by structuration, totalization and unification, substituting a set-up of stereotyped statements, cut off both from reality and from subjectivity, for the conditions of a real collective "enunciation" (it is here that imaginary phenomena of group "oedipalization", "super-egoization" and castration are produced). Subject-groups, on the other hand, are defined by coefficients of *transversality*, which avert totalities and hierarchies. They are agents of enunciation, pillars of desire, and elements of institutional creation. Throughout their practice, they never cease confronting themselves to the limits of their own non-sense, their death and their breaking-point. Again, it is less a question of two types of groups, than it is of two sides of the institution—since a subject-group always stands the chance of letting itself be subjugated through a paranoid spasm within which it wants at all costs to maintain itself and become eternalized

as subject. Inversely, “a party, once revolutionary and now more or less subjugated to the dominant order, can still occupy in the eyes of the masses the emptied place of the subject of history, become in spite of itself the spokesman for a discourse not its own, which it is ready to betray when the evolution of relationships of forces brings on a return to normalcy: it retains, as if involuntarily, a potential for a subjective break which a transformation of the context would be able to reveal.” (As extreme examples, take the way in which the worst archaisms can become revolutionary—the Basques, the Irish Catholics, etc.)

It is clear that if the problem of group functions is not raised from the start, it will be too late later on. How many *groupuscules* there are which animate nothing more than ghost masses and already have structures of subjugation with a direction, driving belt, and base which all reproduce in a void the errors and the perversions they claim to be combatting! Guattari’s experience encompasses Trotskyism, “entrisme,”³ Leftist opposition (*La Voie communiste*) and the movement of March 22.⁴ All along this road, the problem remains that of desire or of unconscious subjectivity: how can a group carry its own desire, connect it with the desires of other groups and the desires of the masses, produce the corresponding creative statements, and establish the conditions necessary, not for their unification, but for a multiplication favorable to statements capable of producing a rupture? The misunderstanding and the repression of phenomena of desire inspire structures of subjugation and bureaucratization, and the militant style made of a love full of hatred that determines a certain number of exclusive dominant statements. The constant manner in which revolutionary groups have betrayed their own tasks is only too well known. They proceed by detachment, setting apart, and residual selection: the detachment of a vanguard supposedly in the know; the setting apart of a well disciplined, organized, and hierarchical proletariat; a remainder in the form of a sub-proletariat “to be excluded or reeducated.” Now this three-part division reproduces exactly those divisions introduced by the bourgeoisie into the proletariat and on which the former founded its power within the framework of relations of capitalist production. To claim to turn these divisions against the bourgeoisie is to lose from the start. The revolutionary task is the suppression of the proletariat itself, that is, from now on the suppression of corresponding distinctions between vanguard and proletariat, proletariat and sub-proletariat, and the effective struggle against all operations of detachment, of setting apart and of residual selection in order, on the contrary, to free subjective, singular positions capable of communicating transversally.

Guattari’s strength lies in showing that the problem is in no way that of an alternative between spontaneity and centralism, between guerrilla warfare and generalized war. It serves no purpose to pay lip service to a certain right to spontaneity in the first stage, if one is standing ready to claim the need for centralism for a second stage: the theory of stages is ruinous for all revolutionary movements. From the outset we should be more centralist than the centralists. It is obvious that a revolutionary machine cannot

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content itself with local, punctual struggles: hyper-desiring and hyper-centralized, it must be all of that at once. The problem therefore has to do with the nature of unification which must operate transversally, throughout a multiplicity, and not vertically so as to avoid crushing the multiplicity proper to desire. That is to say in the first place that the unification must be that of a *war machine*, and not a *State machinery* (a Red Army stops being a war machine to the extent that it becomes a more or less determinant cog in the State machinery). That is to say in the second place that the unification must be brought about by *analysis*, and should have a role of *analyzer* with respect to group and mass desire, rather than the role of synthesis that proceeds by way of rationalization, totalization, exclusion, etc. What constitutes the difference between a war machine and the State machinery, and what an analysis or analyzer of desire is in opposition to pseudo-rational and scientific syntheses, such are the two major directions in which Guattari's book leads us, and which in his eyes designate the theoretical tasks to be pursued.

Concerning the second point, the necessary conditions for an analysis or analyzer of desire, it is most certainly not a question of an "application" of psychoanalysis to group phenomena. Nor is it a matter of a therapeutic group which would claim to "treat" the masses. Rather, within the group itself, it is necessary to set up the conditions for an analysis of desire in oneself, and in others; to follow the flows that constitute so many different lines of escape in Capitalist society, effecting ruptures, imposing breaks in the very core of social determinism and historical causality; to identify the collective agents of enunciation capable of formulating new statements of desire; instead of a vanguard, to constitute groups adjacent to social processes which are to be used merely to advance a truth along paths ordinarily foreign to it. In short, it is essential to set up the conditions necessary for creating a revolutionary subjectivity where it would be irrelevant to ask which comes first, economic, political or libidinal determinations etc., since this subjectivity would cut through traditionally separated orders; and to seize this point of *rupture* where political economy and libidinal economy are but one and the same thing. For the unconscious is nothing else: this order of group subjectivity which introduces machines of explosion into so-called signifying structures as well as into causal chains, forcing them to open up in order to release their hidden potentialities as a reality to come. The movement of March 22 remains exemplary in this respect. For, even if it was an insufficient war machine, at least it functioned admirably as an analytic, desiring group, which not only put forward its discourse in the mode of a really free association, but which was also able "to set itself up as an *analyzer* of a considerable mass of students and young workers," without pretensions of vanguard or hegemony—a simple prop enabling the transference and the break-down of inhibitions. Such an analysis in action, where analysis and desire finally meet on the same side, where it is desire at last which leads the analysis, characterizes the *subject-groups*, whereas *subjugated groups* continue to exist under the laws of a simple "application" of

psychoanalysis within a closed environment (the family as a continuation of the State through other means). The economic and political tenor of the libido as such, the libidinal and sexual tenor of the political-economic field, all this *drifting of history* can only be discovered in an open environment and within subject-groups, where a truth is born. For "truth is neither theory nor organization." it is not the structure, nor the signifier, but the machine of war and its non-sense. "It is once truth has emerged that theory and organization have to cope with it. It is up to theory and organization, and never to desire, to constantly practice self-criticism."

This transformation of psychoanalysis into schizo-analysis implies an evaluation of the specificity of madness. And this is one of the points that Guattari stresses, joining Foucault in his assertion that it is not madness which will disappear for the benefit of mental illnesses positively defined, treated and aseptitized, but, on the contrary, mental illnesses will give way to something which we have not as yet been able to grasp in madness.⁵ For it is clear that the real problems are to be discovered within the realm of psychosis (and not within neuroses of application). It is always a pleasure to stir up the mockeries of positivism: Guattari does not cease to claim the rights to a metaphysical or transcendental viewpoint, which consists of purging madness from mental illness, rather than the reverse: "Will the day ever come when President Schreber's or Antonin Artaud's definitions of God will be studied as seriously, as rigorously as the definitions of Descartes or Malebranche? Will the split long be perpetuated between what would fall under the jurisdiction of a pure theoretical criticism, and the concrete analytical activity of the human sciences?" (Let's get it straight that the wild definitions are in fact more serious, more rigorous than the morbid-rational definitions through which subjugated groups relate to God under the aegis of reason.) More precisely, institutional analysis charges anti-psychiatry not only with refusing every pharmacological function, nor merely with negating any and all revolutionary possibility for the institution, but most of all with confusing, in the last resort, mental alienation and social alienation, thereby suppressing the specificity of madness. "Even with the best intentions in the world, both moral and political, one comes to refusing the madman the right to be mad; the refrain: *'it's society's fault'* can mask ways for repressing all deviance. The negation of the institution would then become a denial of the singular fact of mental alienation." Not that one should lay down some kind of generality of madness, or invoke a mystical identity of the revolutionary and the madman. It is probably useless to attempt to avoid a criticism which will be made in any case. This is just to point out that it is not madness that must be reduced to the order of the general, but the modern world in general or the whole of the social field which must *also* be interpreted in terms of the singularity of the madman within his own subjective position. Revolutionary militants cannot afford not to be intimately concerned with delinquency, deviance and madness, not as educators or reformers, but as those who can only see in those mirrors the reflections of their own

difference. Witness this bit of dialogue with Jean Oury⁶ at the outset of Guattari's book: "There is something which must specify a group of militants in the psychiatric domain; they are involved in the social struggle, but also mad enough to have the possibility of being *with* the mad: yet there are many very good people on the political level who are incapable of being part of this kind of group . . ."

What Guattari brings to institutional psychotherapy consists in a number of notions whose formulation will be followed throughout the book: the distinction between two kinds of groups, the opposition between group and individual phantasies, the concept of transversality. And these notions have a precise practical orientation whose role it is to introduce inside the institution a militant political function, thereby constituting a sort of "monster" which is neither psychoanalysis, nor hospital practice, and especially not group dynamics, and which aspires to be applicable everywhere—in the hospital, in the school, in militant activity—a machine to produce and enunciate desire. This is why Guattari lays claim to the name of institutional analysis, rather than institutional psychotherapy. In the institutional movement such as it develops with Tosquelles and Jean Oury, a third age of psychiatry begins: the institution as model, beyond law and contract. If it is true that the asylum of the past was ruled by repressive law, in that the mad were judged "incapable" and thus excluded from contractual relationships which only join together supposedly reasonable human beings, the Freudian coup lies in having shown that in bourgeois families and at the frontiers of the asylum, a large group of people termed neurotics could be led to establish a particular contract which brings them round to the norms of traditional medicine through distinctly original means (the psychoanalytic contract as a particular case of the medico-liberal contractual relationship). Abandoning hypnosis was an important step in this direction. It seems to us that one has yet to analyze the role and the effects of this contractual model which psychoanalysis has come to follow. One of the principal consequences of this situation is that psychosis remained on the horizon of psychoanalysis as the true source of its clinical material, and yet was excluded by the psychoanalyst as lying outside the contractual field. It is therefore hardly surprising to learn that institutional psychotherapy, as several texts in Guattari's book demonstrate, implied in its main propositions a critique of the so-called liberal contract and the repressive law, for which it sought to substitute the model of the institution. This critique necessarily went in very diverse directions, so true is it that the pyramidal organization of groups, their subjugation, their hierarchical division of labor, rests on contractual relationships not less than upon legalistic structures . . . From Guattari's first text on doctor-nurse relationships, Oury intervenes to say: "There is a rationalism of society which is more accurately a rationalization of bad faith, of rubbish. The inside view of an institution is made up of relationships with the mad on an every day level, *once a certain 'contract' with tradition has been breached*. One can therefore say in a sense that to know what it means to be in contact with the mad amounts at the same

time to being progressive. [...] It is obvious that the very terms doctor-nurse belong to this traditional kind of contract which as we just said must be broken." In institutional psychotherapy there is a kind of psychiatric inspiration *à la Saint-Just*, in that he defined the Republican regime by many institutions and few laws (few contractual relationships also). Institutional psychotherapy traces out its difficult path between anti-psychiatry, which tends to fall back into hopeless contractual forms (of a recent interview with Laing), and "community" psychiatry with its neighborhood grids, its planned triangulation, soon leading us to regret the closed asylums of before, ah the good old times, the old style . . .

It is here that Guattari raises his own problems on the nature of caretaking/cared-for groups (*soignants-soignés*) potentially able to form subject-groups, i.e., able to make the institution the object of a veritable creation where madness and revolution, without becoming confused, echo their precise difference within the singular positions of a desiring subjectivity. For example, take his analysis of the Base Therapeutic Unit (U.T.B.) at La Borde in the text "Où commence la psychothérapie de groupe?" ["Where does group psychotherapy being?"]. How do we avert subjugation to groups themselves subjugated, to which traditional psychoanalysis is conducive? And psychoanalytic associations, on what side of the institution are they, in what group? A good deal of Guattari's work before May '68 was "the taking-charge of illness by the patients themselves, with the support of the whole student movement." A certain dream of non-sense and of *empty speech*, against the law or the contract of full speech, and a certain right of the *schizo-flows* have always encouraged Guattari in his attempt to pull down the hierarchical or pseudo-functional divisions and partitions—teachers, psychiatrists, analysts, militants . . . All of the articles in his collection are articles of circumstance. They are marked by a double finality: that of their origin at a given turning point in institutional therapy: a given moment of militant political life, a given aspect of the *Ecole freudienne* and the teachings of Lacan; but also that of their function, and of their possible functioning in cases other than those where they were first used. The book must be seen as the assembling or installation, here and there, of pieces and cogs of a machine. Cogwheels are at times very small, minute, disordered, thereby all the more indispensable. A machine of desire, i.e., a machine of war and analysis. That is why particular importance can be assigned to two texts from this collection, a theoretical text where the very principle of a *machine* is disengaged from structural links ("Machine et structure"), and a schizo-text, where the notions of a "point-sign" and a "sign-spot" are liberated from the shackle of the signifier.

Translated by Mark Seem

NOTES

1. Marcel Jaeger, "L'Underground de la folie," in "Folie pour folie," *Partisans* February 1972.

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2. *Cahiers de la vérité*, série "Sciences humaines et Lutte des classes," no. 1.
3. A tendency of certain Trotskyists to *enter* into the French C. P. around 1950, in order to bring about a fractionalization that would favor the formation of revolutionary trends of opposition. [trans. note]
4. The catalytic agent for the May '68 events. [trans. note]
5. Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*, New York: Random House, 1965.
6. Jean Oury is an orthodox Lacanian who began La Borde clinic in light of the work done by Dr. François Tosquelles at St. Alban Hospital, where the latter initiated the first intra-hospital therapeutic groups before the war. [trans. note]

GILLES DELEUZE

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Le Froid et le cruel

followed by

La Vénus à la Fourrure

SPINOZA

ET LE PROBLEME DE L'EXPRESSION

LOGIQUE DU SENS



Gilles Deleuze

and

Félix Guattari

Capitalisme et Schizophrénie

L'ANTI-OEDIPE

KAFKA

Pour une littérature mineure

RHIZOME

Introduction




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"I have nothing to admit"

GILLES DELEUZE

Dear Michel,

You are charming, intelligent, spiteful to the point of being wicked. You could do even better though. . . The letter you sent me, invoking sometimes what people say, sometimes what you think on your own, and the two mixed together, reflects some sort of jubilation brought about by my supposed misfortune. On the one hand, you tell me that I am cornered in every way, in my life, in teaching, in politics, that I've become a dirty hit star, that in any case it won't last forever and that I'll never get out of the rut. On the other hand, you tell me that I've always trailed behind, that I suck your blood and sample your poisons. You are the true experimenters, the heroes, and I remain on the sideline, looking at you and taking advantage of you. That isn't at all the way I feel about it. I'm so fed up with schizos, true or false, that I joyfully convert to paranoia. Vive la paranoia! What do you want to inject into me with your letter, if not a little resentment (You're cornered, you're cornered, "admit it.") and a little bad conscience (shame on you, you're lagging behind. . .). If that was all you had to tell me, it wasn't worth the trouble. What you seek in that book about me is only revenge. Your letter is full of sham commiseration and a real zest for vengeance. . . .

Of course benevolence is not your strong point. When I am no longer capable of loving and admiring people and things (not very many), I'll feel dead, mortified. But as for you, it seems you were born sour; all your art is in allusions. "I won't be taken in. . . I'm writing a book on you, but I'm going to show you. . ." Of all possible interpretations you'll generally choose the most wicked or the vilest. First example: I love and admire Foucault. I've written an article on him. And he, one on me,¹ from which you quote the following sentence: "Perhaps the century will be Deleuzian one day." Your comment: they send each other flowers. It seems you can never get the idea that my admiration for Foucault is real and that Foucault's statement is just a crack intended to make those people laugh who love us and to make the others rage. . .

Second example: my nails, which are long and untrimmed. At the end of your letter, you say that my worker's vest (which isn't true, it's a peasant's vest) is well worth Marilyn Monroe's pleated blouse, and my nails, the sunglasses of Greta Garbo. And you inundate me with ironic, evil advice.

*This "Lettre à Michel Cressole" was published as an appendice to Cressole's Deleuze, "Psychothèque", Editions Universitaires, 1973.
All the notes have been added to the original.*

Since you refer to my nails several times, let me tell you what they are all about. People can always say that my mother used to cut them and this is linked to the Oedipal complex and castration (a grotesque interpretation but psychoanalytical). They can also notice, if they have a look at my fingertips, that, being deprived of normal protective fingerprints, I cannot touch an object, especially a piece of cloth, with the pads of my fingers without a nervous twinge, which requires me to resort to the protection offered by long nails (a teratological and selectionist interpretation). They can also say, and it is true, that I dream not of being invisible, but imperceptible and that I compensate for this dream by having nails that I can tuck into my pocket, so much so that nothing seems more shocking to me than someone who looks at them (a psycho-sociological interpretation). Finally they can say: "You shouldn't bite your nails because they are yours; if you love nails, eat someone else's, provided that is what you want, and if you can (a political interpretation, Darien)². But you had to choose the most degrading interpretation: he wants to distinguish himself, to act his Greta Garbo part. Anyway, isn't it strange that none of my friends ever noticed my nails, finding them completely natural, planted there by chance as if they had been sowed by a gust of wind, which no one would bother to talk about?

Let me come back to your first criticism; you state and reiterate: blocked and cornered you are, *admit it*. Attorney-general, I admit nothing. Since our topic is a book about me—and you are the only one to blame for this—I would like to explain how I view what I have written. I belong to a generation, one of the last generations, that was more or less assassinated with the history of philosophy. History of philosophy has an obvious, repressive function in philosophy; it is philosophy's very own Oedipus. "All the same you won't dare speak your own name as long as you have not read this and that, and that on this, and this on that." In my generation, many did not pull through; some did by inventing their own procedures and new rules, a new tone. For a long time I myself have worked through the history of philosophy, read such and such a book on such and such an author. But I managed to compensate for this in several ways: first by loving authors who were opposed to the rationalist tradition of that history. I find among Lucretius, Hume, Spinoza, and Nietzsche³ a secret link which resides in the critique of negation, the cultivation of joy, the hatred of interiority, the exteriority of forces and relations, the denunciation of power, etc.). What I detested more than anything else was Hegelianism and the Dialectic. My book on Kant is something else.⁴ I like it, I wrote it as a book on an enemy; in it I try to show how Kant operates, what makes up his mechanisms—High Court of Reason, measured use of the faculties, submissiveness all the more hypocritical as the title of legislators is bestowed upon us. But what really helped me to come off at that time was, I believe, to view the history of philosophy as a screwing process (*enculage*) or, what amounts to the same thing, an immaculate conception. I would imagine myself approaching an author from behind, and making him a child, who would

"I have nothing to admit"

indeed be his and would, nonetheless, be monstrous. That the child would be his was very important because the author had to say, in effect, everything I made him say. But that the child should be monstrous was also a requisite because it was necessary to go through all kinds of decenterings, slidings, splittings, secret discharges which have given me much pleasure. I consider my book on Bergson to be typical in that respect.⁵ And today there are people who laugh and reproach me for having written even on Bergson. Perhaps because they know nothing about history. They don't know how much hatred focused on Bergson at the beginning, within the French university, and how he attracted all sorts of madmen and marginals, fashionable or not. And whether this went on in spite of him or not is of little importance.

Nietzsche whom I read late was the one who pulled me out of all this. For it is impossible to submit him to such a treatment. He's the one who screws you behind your back. He gives you a perverse taste that neither Marx nor Freud have ever given you: the desire for everyone to say simple things in his own name, to speak through affects, intensities, experiences, experiments. To say something in one's own name is very strange, for it is not at all when we consider ourselves as selves, persons, or subjects that we speak in our own names. On the contrary, an individual acquires a true proper name as a result of the most severe operations of depersonalization, when he opens himself to multiplicities which pervade him and to intensities which run right through his whole being. The name as the immediate apprehension of such an intensive multiplicity is the opposite of the depersonalization brought about by the history of philosophy, a depersonalization of love and not of submission. The depth of what we don't know, the deepness of our own underdevelopment is where we talk from. We've become a bundle of loosened singularities, names, first names, nails, things, animals, minute events: the opposite of hit stars. So I began to work on two books in this intermediate direction: *Différence et Répétition* and *Logique du sens*.⁶ I don't have any illusions: they are still full of an academic apparatus—they are laborious—but there is something I try to shake, to stir up within myself. I try to deal with writing as with a flux, not a code. And there are pages I like in *Différence et Répétition*, those on fatigue and contemplation, for example, because they reflect live experience despite appearances. That didn't go very far, but it was a beginning.

And, then, there was my meeting Félix Guattari, the way we got along and completed, depersonalized, singularized each other—in short how we loved. That resulted in *Anti-Oedipus* which marked a new progression. I wonder whether one of the formal reasons for the hostile reception the book occasionally encounters isn't precisely that we worked it out together, depriving the public of the quarrels and ascriptions it loves. So, they try to untangle what is indiscernable or to determine what belongs to each of us. But since everyone, like everyone else, is multiple to begin with, that makes for quite a few people. And doubtlessly *Anti-Oedipus* cannot be said to be rid of all the formal apparatus of knowledge: surely it still belongs to the

University, for it is well-mannered enough, and does not yet represent the “pop” philosophy or “pop” analysis that we dream of. But I am struck by this: most of the people who find this book difficult are the better educated, notably in the psychoanalytical field. They say: What is this, the body without organs? What do you really mean by desiring machines? In contrast, those who know just a little bit, those who are not spoiled by psychoanalysis, have fewer problems and do not mind, leaving aside what they don’t understand. Such is the reason for our saying that those who should be concerned by this book, theoretically at least, are fellows between fifteen and twenty. There are in fact two ways of reading a book: either we consider it a box which refers us to an inside, and in that case we look for the signified; if we are still more perverse or corrupted, we search for the signifier. And then we consider the following book as a box contained in the first one or containing it in turn. And we can comment, and interpret, and ask for explanations, we can write about the book and so on endlessly. Or the other way: we consider a book as a small a-signifying machine; the only problem is “Does it work and how does it work? How does it work for you?” If it doesn’t function, if nothing happens, take another book. This other way of reading is based on intensities: something happens or doesn’t happen. There is nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. It can be compared to an electrical connection. A body without organs: I know uneducated people who understood this immediately, thanks to their own “habits”. This other way of reading goes against the preceding insofar as it immediately refers a book to Exteriority. A book is a small cog in a much more complex, external machinery. Writing is a flow among others; it enjoys no special privilege and enters into relationships of current and countercurrent, of back-wash with other flows—the flows of shit, sperm, speech, action, eroticism, money, politics, etc. Like Bloom, writing on the sand with one hand and masturbating with the other—two flows in what relationship? As for our own exteriority (at least one of our exteriorities) it has been a large group of people (especially young ones) who are fed up with psychoanalysis. They are “comered,” to use your phrase, because they continue, more or less, to be analyzed. They already criticize analysis, but they criticize it in psychoanalytical terms. (For example, a secret source of inner glee: how can boys belonging to the FHAR, girls of the MLF⁷, and so many others be analyzed? Doesn’t it bother them? They believe in it? What on earth are they doing on the couch?) It is the existence of this trend which made *Anti-Oedipus* possible. And if psychoanalysts, from the dumbest to the most intelligent, react for the most part with hostility to this book, but are defensive rather than aggressive, their reaction is evidently not a result of its content alone, but of this trend which is going to grow, according to which people are more and more fed up with being told about “papa, mama, Oedipus, castration, regression,” and with the properly imbecilic image of sexuality in general, and of their own in particular, which they are being offered. As we say, the psychoanalysts will have to take the “masses” into account; the small masses. We receive beautiful letters in that

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respect, sent from a "lumpenproletariat" of psychoanalysis, much more beautiful than the articles of the critics.

This way of reading intensively, in relation to the outside—flow against flow, machine with machines, experimentations, events for everyone (which have nothing to do with a book, but with its shreds and are a new mode of operating with other things, no matter what. . . etc.)—is a manifestation of love. Such is exactly the way you approached the book. And the section of your letter I find beautiful, rather marvelous even, is that where you explain the manner in which you read it, what use you made of it on your own account. Alas! alas! Why do you have to rush right back to a reproachful attitude? "You are not going to get away with it. We are waiting for the second volume; you will still be on the same track. . ." No, that isn't true at all. We do have plans. We will follow up because we love to work together. But it won't be a sequel at all. With the help of the outside, we'll do something so different both in language and thought that those who are anticipating on our work will have to say to themselves: they've gone completely crazy, or they're a couple of bastards, or they've obviously been unable to continue. Deception is a pleasure. Not that we want to make believe we are madmen; we will go mad, though, in our own time and in our own way. Why are people in such a hurry? We certainly know that *Anti-Oedipus*, volume 1, is still full of compromises—too full of scholarly things which still look like concepts. So, we'll change; we have already changed; we're doing all right. Some people think we're bound to stay on the same old path. There has even been some relief we'd form a fifth psychoanalytic group.⁸ Woe unto us. We dream of other things, more secret and more joyful. Compromise we shall no longer, because that won't be necessary. And we'll always find the allies we want or who want us. . . .

As for the bunch of you, you are still busy provoking, publishing, making up questionnaires, forcing public confession ("admit, admit. . ."). Why should we? What I anticipate is just the opposite: an age of clandestineness, half voluntary and half obligatory, which will shelter the new born desire, notably in politics. You want me cornered professionally because I spoke at the faculty of Vincennes for two years and they say, you say, that I don't do a thing there anymore. You think that everything I've said was contradictory, "refusing the position of professor, but condemned to teach, putting on the harness when everyone had let it drop." I am not concerned about contradictions, and I'm not a righteous soul living out the tragedy of its condition: I have spoken because that was what I really wanted. I have been supported, insulted, interrupted by militants, fake madmen, real madmen, fools, very intelligent people; there was some lively fun at Vincennes. It lasted two years. That's enough; things have to change. . . .

Thus I have nothing to "admit." The relative success of *Anti-Oedipus* compromises neither Félix nor myself. In a sense it doesn't concern us since we're involved in other projects. So let me turn to your other criticism, which is harsher and more dismaying. What you say is that I've always been trailing behind, sparing my strength, taking advantage of the

experiments of others—homosexuals, drug addicts, alcoholics, masochists, madmen, etc.—and vaguely sampling their delights and their poisons without ever risking a thing. You turn against me one of my texts in which I ask how one can avoid becoming a professional lecturer on Artaud, a worldly amateur of Fitzgerald. But what do you know about me once it is said that I believe in secrecy—in the power of falsehood rather than in accounts which bear witness to a deplorable belief in accurateness and truth? If I don't move, if I don't travel, I have taken motionless trips just like everyone else, and I can measure them only by my emotions, express them in the most oblique and diverted way in what I write. And who cares about my relations with homosexuals, alcoholics, or drug addicts, if I manage to achieve the same results as theirs by other means?

The problem is not one of being this or that in man, but rather one of becoming human, of a universal becoming animal: not to take oneself for a beast, but to undo the human organization of the body, to cut across such and such a zone of intensity in the body, everyone of us discovering the zones which are really his, and the groups, the populations, the species which inhabit him. Why shouldn't I speak of medicine without being a doctor if I speak of it as a dog? Why shouldn't I speak of drug without being drugged, if I speak about it as a little bird? And why shouldn't I invest a speech on something, even if this speech is completely unreal and artificial, without anyone asking me my credentials for delivering it? Drugs sometimes cause delirium. Why shouldn't I rave about drugs? What can you do with your very own "reality"? Yours is dull realism. And, then, why do you read me? Your argument of cautious experimentation is an invalid, reactionary one. The sentence from *Anti-Oedipus* that I prefer is: no, we have never seen schizophrenics. . .

Translated by Janis Forman

NOTES

1. Gilles Deleuze, "Un nouvel archiviste", *Critique*, 1970 and Michel Foucault, "Théâtre Philosophicum", *Critique*, 282, November 1970.
2. Georges Darien: French newsman and novelist (Paris, 1862-1921); a rebellious and cynical individualist, he is known for his violent protests against all social constraints, political cowardice and the military spirit.
3. On Lucretius, cf. "Lucrece et le simulacre", in *Logique du Sens*, Minuit, 1969; on Hume, cf. *Empirisme et Subjectivité*, P.U.F., 1953; on Spinoza, cf. *Spinoza et le problème de l'expression*, Minuit, 1968; on Nietzsche, cf. *Nietzsche et la philosophie*, P.U.F., 1962.
4. Cf. *La Philosophie critique de Kant*, P.U.F., 1963.
5. Cf. *Le Bergsonisme*, P.U.F., 1966.
6. *Différence et Répétition*, P.U.F., 1968.
7. Front Homosexuel d'Action Révolutionnaire (the French Gay Liberation) and Mouvement de Libération de la Femme (the French Women's Lib).
8. A splinter group of the *Société française de Psychanalyse* established in 1963 which is now known as *L'École Freudienne* of Jacques Lacan (Third group). A "Fourth group" dissociated itself from the Freudian School in 1969.

Balance Sheet - Program For Desiring-Machines

GILLES DELEUZE AND FÉLIX GUATTARI

I. HOW DESIRING-MACHINES DIFFER FROM GADGETS—FROM PHANTASIES OR IMAGINARY PROJECTIVE SYSTEMS—FROM TOOLS OR REAL PROJECTIVE SYSTEMS—FROM PERVERSE MACHINES, WHICH HOWEVER PUT US ON THE TRACK OF DESIRING-MACHINES.

Desiring-machines have nothing to do with gadgets, or little homemade inventions, or with phantasies. Or rather they are related, but from the opposite direction, because gadgets, improvised contraptions, and phantasies are the residue of desiring-machines; they have come under the sway of specific laws of the foreign market of capitalism, or of the home market of psychoanalysis (it is a function of the psychoanalytic "contract" to reduce the states lived by the patient, to translate them into phantasies). Desiring-machines cannot be equated with the adaptation of real machines, or fragments of real machines, to a symbolical process, nor can they be reduced to dreams of fantastic machines operating in the Imaginary. In both instances, one witnesses the conversion of an element of production into a mechanism of individual consumption (phantasies as psychic consumption or psychoanalytic breast-feeding). It goes without saying that psychoanalysis feels at ease with gadgets and phantasies, an environment in which it can develop all its castrating oedipal obsessions. But that tells us nothing of consequence about machines and their relation to desire.

The artistic and literary imagination conceives a great number of absurd machines: whether through the indeterminate character of the motor or energy source, through the physical impossibility of the organization of the working parts, or through the logical impossibility of the mechanism of transmission. For example, Man Ray's *Dancer-Danger*, subtitled "impossibility", offers two degrees of absurdity: neither the clusters of cog-wheels nor the large transmission wheel are able to function. Insofar as this machine is supposed to represent the whirl of a Spanish dancer, it can be said that it expresses mechanically, by means of the absurd, the impossibility for a machine to execute such a movement (the dancer is not a machine). But one can also say: there must be a dancer here who functions as a part of a machine; this machine component can only be a dancer; here is the machine of which the dancer is a component part. The object is no longer to compare man and the machine in order to evaluate the correspondences, the extensions, the possible or impossible substitutions of one for the other, but to bring them into communication in order to show how man *is a component part* of the machine, or combines with something else to constitute a

Translation of "Bilan-programme pour machines désirantes," Minuit, 2, January 1973.

machine. The other thing can be a tool, or even an animal, or other men. We are not using a metaphor however when we speak of machines: man *constitutes a machine* as soon as this nature is communicated by recurrence to the ensemble of which he forms a part under given specific conditions. The man-horse-bow ensemble forms a nomadic war machine under the conditions of the steppe. Men form a labor machine under the bureaucratic conditions of the great empires. The Greek foot-soldier together with his arms constitute a machine under the conditions of the phalanx. The dancer combines with the floor to compose a machine under the perilous conditions of love and death . . . We do not start from a metaphorical usage of the word machine, but from an (confused) hypothesis concerning origins: the way in which heterogeneous elements are determined to constitute a machine through *recurrence and communications*; the existence of a "machinic phylum". Ergonomics comes near to this point of view when it sets the general problem, no longer in terms of adaptation or substitution—the adaption of man to the machine, and of the machine to man—, but in terms of recurrent communication within systems made up of men and machines. It is true that just as ergonomists become convinced that they are confining themselves in this way to a purely technological approach, they raise the problems of power and oppression, of revolution and desire, with an involuntary vigor that is infinitely greater than in the adaptive approaches.

There is a classic schema that is inspired by the tool: the tool as the extension and the projection of the living being, the operation by means of which man progressively emerges, the evolution from the tool to the machine, the reversal in which the machine grows more and more independent of man . . . But this schema has many drawbacks. It does not offer us any means to apprehend the reality of desiring-machines, and their presence throughout this circuit. It is a biological and evolutive schema, which determines the machine as an event occurring at a given moment in the mechanical lineage that begins with the tool. It is humanistic and abstract, isolating the productive forces from the social conditions of their exercise, involving a man-nature dimension common to all the social forms, to which are thus lent relations of evolution. It is imaginary, phantasmal, and solipsistic, even when it is applied to real tools, to real machines, since it rests entirely on the hypothesis of projection (Roheim for example, who adopts this schema, shows the analogy between the physical projection of tools and the psychic projection of phantasies).¹ We believe on the contrary that it is necessary to posit, *from the outset*, the difference in nature between the tool and the machine: the one as an agent of contact, the other as a factor of communication; the one being projective, the other recurrent; the one referring to the possible and the impossible, the other to the probability of a less-probable; the one acting through the functional synthesis of a whole, the other through real distinctions in an ensemble. Functioning as a component part in conjunction with other parts is very different from being an extension or a projection, or being replaced (an

instance where there is no communication). Pierre Auger shows that a machine is constituted from the moment there is communication between two portions of the outside world that are really distinct in a system that is possible although less probable.² One and the same thing can be a tool or a machine, according to whether the “machinic phylum” takes hold of it or not, passes or does not pass through it. Hoplite weapons existed as tools from early antiquity, but they became components of a machine, *along with* the men who wielded them, under the conditions of the phalanx and the Greek city-state. When one refers the tool to man, in accordance with the traditional schema, one deprives oneself of any possibility of understanding how man *and* the tool *become or already are* distinct components of a machine in relation to an effectively engineering agency (*une instance effectivement machinisante*). And we believe moreover that there are always machines that precede tools, always phyla that determine at a given moment which tools, which men will enter as machine components in the social system being considered.

Desiring-machines are neither imaginary projections in the form of phantasies, nor real projections in the form of tools. The whole system of projections derives from machines, and not the reverse. Should the desiring-machine be defined then by a kind of introjection, by a certain perverse use of the machine? Let us take the example of the telephone exchange: by dialing an unassigned number, connected to an automatic answering device (“the number you have dialed is not in service . . .”), one can hear the superposing of an ensemble of teeming voices, calling and answering each other, criss-crossing, fading out, passing over and under each other, inside the automatic voice, very short messages, utterances obeying rapid and monotonous codes. There is the Tiger; it is rumored that there is even an Oedipus in the network; boys calling girls, boys calling boys. One easily recognizes the very form of perverse artificial societies, or a society of Unknowns. A process of re-territorialization is connected to a *movement of deterritorialization that is ensured by the machine* (groups of ham radio transmitters afford the same perverse structure). It is certain that the public institutions are not troubled by these secondary benefits of a private use of the machine, infringe or interference phenomena. But at the same time there is something more here than a simple perverse subjectivity, be it that of a group. The normal telephone may be a machine for communication, but it functions as a tool as long as it serves to project or extend voices that are not as such a part of the machine. But in our example communication attains a higher degree, inasmuch as the voices enter into the make-up of the machine, become components of the machine, distributed and apportioned in chance fashion by the automatic device. The less probable is constructed on the basis of the entropy of the set of voices that cancel each other out. It is from this perspective that there is not only a perverse use or adaptation of a technical social machine, but the superposing of a true objective desiring-machine, the construction of a desiring-machine within the technical social machine. It may be that desiring-machines are born in this way in the

artificial margins of a society, although they develop in a completely different way and bear no resemblance to the forms of their birth.

In his commentary on this phenomenon of the telephone exchange, Jean Nadal writes: "It is, I believe, the most successful and complete desiring-machine I am aware of. It has everything: desire works freely in it, with the erotic agency of the voice as a partial object, in the sphere of chance and multiplicity, and connects up with a flow that irradiates a whole social field of communication through the unlimited expansion of a delirium or a drift." The commentator is not entirely correct: there are better and more complete desiring-machines. But as a general rule, perverse machines have the advantage of presenting us with a constant oscillation between a subjective adaptation, a diverting of a technical social machine, and the objective setting up of a desiring-machine—yet another effort, if you would become republicans . . .³ In one of the finest texts ever written on the subject of masochism, Michel de M'Uzan shows that the perverse machines of the masochist, which are machines in the strict sense of the term, cannot be understood in terms of phantasy or imagination, just as they cannot be explained in terms of Oedipus or castration, by means of a projection. There is no phantasy, he says, but—and this is something totally different—a *programming* that is "essentially structured outside the oedipal problem complex" (at last a little fresh air in the house of psychoanalysis, a little understanding for the perverse).⁴

2. THE DESIRING-MACHINE AND THE OEDIPAL APPARATUS: RECURRENCE VERSUS REPRESSION-REGRESSION.

Desiring-machines constitute the non-oedipal life of the unconscious-Oedipus being the gadget or phantasy. By way of opposition, Picabia called the machine "the daughter born without a mother." Buster Keaton introduced his house-machine, with all its rooms rolled into one, as a house without a mother, and desiring-machines determine everything that goes on inside, as in the bachelors' meal (*The Scarecrow*, 1920). Are we to understand that the machine has but a father, and that it is born like Athena fully armed from a viril brain? It takes a lot of good will to believe, along with René Girard, that paternalism is enough to lead us out of Oedipus, and that "mimetic rivalry" is really the complex's *other*. Psychoanalysis has never ceased doing just that: fragmenting Oedipus, or multiplying it, or on the other hand dividing it, placing it at odds with itself, or sublimating it, making it boundless, elevating it to the level of the signifier. We have witnessed the discovery of the pre-oedipal, the post-oedipal, the symbolic Oedipus, none of which helps us to escape from the family any more than the squirrel from its turning cage. We are told: but see here, Oedipus has nothing to do with daddy-mommy, it is the signifier, it is the name, it is culture, it is mortality, it is the essential lack that is life, it is castration, it is violence personified . . . All of which is enough for a good laugh, at least, but it only carries on the ancient task, by cutting all the

connections of desire the better to map it back onto sublime, imaginary, symbolic, linguistic, ontological, and epistemological daddy-mommies. Actually, we haven't said a fourth, or even a hundredth of what needed to be said against psychoanalysis, its *ressentiment* towards desire, its tyranny and its bureaucracy.

What defines desiring-machines is precisely their capacity for an unlimited number of connections, in every sense and in all directions. It is for this very reason that they are machines, crossing through and commanding several structures at the same time. For the machine possesses two characteristics or powers: the power of the continuum, the machinic phylum in which a given component connects with another, the cylinder and the piston in the steam engine, or even, tracing a more distant lineage, the pulley wheel in the locomotive; but also the rupture in direction, the mutation such that each machine is an absolute break in relation to the one it replaces, as, for example, the internal combustion engine in relation to the steam engine. Two powers which are really only one, since the machine in itself is the break-flow process, the break being always adjacent to the continuity of a flow which it separates from the others by assigning it a code, by causing it to convey particular elements.⁵ Hence the fact that the machine is motherless does not speak for a cerebral father, but for a collective *full body*, the engineering agency on which the machine installs its connections and effects its ruptures.

The machinic painters stressed the following: that they did not paint machines as substitutes for still lifes or nudes; the machine is not a represented object any more than the drawing of it is a representation. The aim is to introduce an element of a machine, so that it combines with something else on the full body of the canvas, be it with the painting itself, with the result that it is precisely the ensemble of the painting that functions as a desiring-machine. The induced machine is always other than the one that appears to be represented. It will be seen that the machine proceeds by means of an "uncoupling" of this nature, and ensures the deterritorialization that is characteristic of machines, the inductive, or rather the transductive quality of the machine, which defines recurrence, as opposed to representation-projection: *machinic recurrence versus oedipal projection*. These opposing terms mark a struggle, or a disjunction, as can be seen for example, in *Aeroplaf(1)a*, or *Automoma*, and again in Victor Brauner's *Machine à connaître en forme Mère*.⁶ In Picabia's work, the finished design connects up with the incongruous inscription, with the result that it is obliged to function with *this* code, with *this* program, by inducing a machine that does not resemble it. With Duchamp, the real machine element is directly introduced, either standing on its own merits or set-off by its shadow, or, in other instances, having its place in the ensemble determined by an aleatory mechanism that induces the representations still present to change roles and statuses: *Tu m'* for example. The machine stands apart from all representation (although one can always represent it, copy it, in a manner however that is completely devoid of interest), and it stands apart because it is pure

Abstraction; it is non-figurative and non-projective. Léger demonstrated convincingly that the machine did not represent anything, itself least of all, because it was in itself the production of organized intensive states: neither form nor extension, neither representation nor projection, but pure and recurrent intensities. It sometimes happens, as in Picabia, that the discovery of the abstract leads to the machinic elements, while at other times, as in the example of many a Futurist, the opposite road is travelled. Consider the old distinction drawn by the philosophers of the Enlightenment, the distinction between representative states and affective states that do not represent anything. The machine is the affective state, and it is false to say that modern machines possess a perceptive capacity or a memory; machines themselves possess only affective states.

When we contrast desiring-machines and Oedipus, we do not mean to say that the unconscious is mechanical (machines belong rather to a meta-mechanics), or that Oedipus counts for nothing. Too many forces and too many people depend on Oedipus; there are too many interests at stake. To begin with, there would be no narcissism without Oedipus. Oedipus will prompt a great many moans and whimpers yet. It will inspire research projects that are more and more unreal. It will continue to nourish dreams and phantasies. Oedipus is a vector: 4, 3, 2, 1, 0 . . . Four is the famous fourth symbolical term, 3 is the triangulation, 2 is the dual images, 1 is narcissism, and 0 is the death instinct. *Oedipus is the entropy of the desiring-machine*, its tendency to external abolition. It is the image or the representation slipped into the machine, the stereotype that stops the connections, exhausts the flows, puts death in desire, and substitutes a kind of plaster for the cracks—it is the Interruptrice (the psychoanalysts as the saboteurs of desire). For the distinction between the manifest content and the latent content, for the distinction between the repressing and the repressed, we must substitute the two poles of the unconscious: the schizo-desiring machine, and the paranoiac oedipal apparatus, the connectors of desire, and its repressors. Yes, in fact, you will find as much of Oedipus as you wish to find, as much as you call forth in order to silence the machines (necessarily so, since Oedipus is both the repressing and the repressed, which is to say the stereotype-image that brings desire to a standstill, and attends to it, representing it as being at a standstill). An image is something that can only be *seen* . . . It is the compromise, but the compromise distorts both parties alike, namely, the nature of the reactionary repressor and the nature of the revolutionary desire. In the compromise, the two parties have gone over the same side, as opposed to desire, which remains on the other side, beyond compromise.

In his two studies of Jules Verne, Moré came upon two themes, one after the other, which he presented simply as being distinct from each other: the oedipal problem which Jules Verne lived both as father and as son, and the problem of the machine as the destruction of Oedipus and a substitute for women.⁷ But the problem of the desiring-machine, in its essentially erotic nature, is not in the least that of knowing whether a machine will ever

be capable of giving “the perfect illusion of woman”. On the contrary, the problem is: in which machine to place woman, in which machine does a woman put herself in order to become the non-oedipal object of desire, which is to say, non-human sex? In all the desiring-machines, sexuality does not consist of an imaginary woman-machine couple serving as a substitute for Oedipus, but of the machine-desire couple as the real production of a daughter born without a mother, a non-oedipal woman (who would not be oedipal neither for herself, nor for others). Yet there is no indication that people are growing tired of such entertaining narcissistic exercises as psycho-criticism, which ascribes an oedipal origin to the novel in general, bastards, foundlings. One must admit that the greatest authors lend themselves to this kind of misunderstanding, precisely because Oedipus is literature’s counterfeit currency, or, what amounts to the same thing, its real exchange value. But, just when these writers appear to be up to their teeth in Oedipus, in the eternal mommy-wail, the eternal daddy-debate, in actual fact they are embarked upon a completely different venture, an orphan undertaking; they are assembling an infernal desiring-machine, putting desire in contact with a libidinal world of connections and breaks, flows and schizes that constitute the non-human element of sex, a world where each thing becomes a component of “the motor, desire”, of a “lubric wheelwork”, crossing, mixing, overturning structures and orders—mineral, vegetable, animal, juvenile, social—, each time shattering the ridiculous figures of Oedipus, always pushing forward a process of deterritorialization. For not even childhood is oedipal; as a matter of fact, it does not have the least possibility of being oedipal. What is oedipal is the abject childhood memory, the screen memory. And finally, an author most effectively reveals the inanity and the vacuity of Oedipus when he manages to inject into his work veritable recurrent blocks of childhood which again start up the desiring-machines, as opposed to old photos, to screen memories which flood the machine and make the child into a regressive phantasy for little old people.


This can be seen clearly in the case of Kafka, a privileged example, the oedipal terrain *par excellence*. The oedipal pole that he Kafka waves and brandishes under the reader’s nose masks a more subterranean undertaking, the non-human establishment of a totally new literary machine. Strictly speaking, it is a machine for literary practice and for de-oedipalizing all-too-human love. Kafka’s machine plugs desire into the premonition of a perverse bureaucratic and technocratic machine, a machine that is already fascist, in which the names of the family lose their consistency in order to open onto the motley Austrian Empire of the machine-castle, onto the condition of Jews without identity, onto Russia, America, China, continents situated well beyond the persons and the names of familialism. One can see a parallel undertaking in Proust: Kafka and Proust, the two great oedipals, are make-believe Oedipals, and those who take Oedipus seriously will always be able to graft onto them their own mournful novels and commentaries. Just consider for a moment what they are losing: the comedy of the super-human, the schizo laughter that shakes Proust or Kafka behind the oedipal grimace—the becoming-spider, or the becoming-beetle.

In a recent text, Roger Dadoun develops the theory of two poles of dreams: the program-dream, the machine or machinery-dream, the factory-dream, in which the essential is desiring production, machinic operation, the establishment of connections, the vanishing points or those of the deterritorialization of the libido being engulfed in the non-human molecular element, the circulation of flows, the injection of intensities—and, on the other hand, the oedipal pole, the theater-dream, the screen-dream, which is no longer anything but an object of molar interpretation, and where the dream narrative has already prevailed over the dream itself, the visual and verbal images over the informal or material sequences.⁸ Dadoun shows how Freud, with *The Interpretation of Dreams*, abandons a direction that was still possible during the period in which he wrote the “Project for a Scientific Psychology”, and that henceforth psychoanalysis is committed to blind-alleys which it will set up as the very conditions of its own practice. One already finds in Gherasim Luca and in Trost, authors whose work goes strangely unrecognized, an anti-oedipal conception of dreams which strikes us as being very fine. Trost reproaches Freud with having neglected the manifest content of dreams for the benefit of a unified theory of Oedipus, with having failed to recognize the dream as a machine for communication with the outside world, with having fused dreams to memories rather than to deliriums, with having constructed a theory of the compromise that robs dreams as well as symptoms of their inherent revolutionary significance. He exposes the action of the repressors or regressors in their role as representatives of “the reactionary social elements” that insinuate themselves into dreams by the help of associations originating in the preconscious and that of screen memories originating in waking life. Now these associations do not belong to dreams any more than do the memories; that is precisely why, the dream is forced to treat them symbolically. Let there be no mistake, Oedipus exists, the associations are always oedipal, but precisely because the mechanism on which they depend is the same as for Oedipus. Hence, in order to retrace the dream thought, which shares a common lot with waking thought insofar as they both undergo the action of distinct repressors, it is necessary to break up the associations. To this end, Trost suggest a kind of à la Burroughs cut-up, which consists in bringing a dream fragment into contact with *any* passage from a textbook of sexual pathology, an intervention that re-injects life into the dream and intensifies it, instead of interpreting it, that provides the machinic phylum of the dream with new connections. The risk is negligible, since by virtue of our polymorphous perversity, the passage *selected at random* will always combine with the dream fragment to form a machine. And no doubt the associations re-form, close up between the two components, but it will have been necessary to take advantage of the moment, however brief, of dissociation to cause desire to emerge, in its non-biographical and non-memorial nature, beyond as well as on this side of its oedipal predeterminations. And this is indeed the direction indicated by Trost or Luca, in several brilliant texts: bringing out an unconscious alive with revolution, straining towards a being, a non-oedipal

man and woman, the “freely mechanical being”, “the projection of a human group still to be discovered”, whose mystery is that of a functioning and not that of an interpretation, the “wholly secular intensity of desire” (there has never been such a thorough denunciation of the authoritarian and pious nature of psychoanalysis).⁹ In this sense, wouldn’t the highest aim of the M.L.F.¹⁰ be the machinic and revolutionary construction of the non-oedipal woman, instead of the confused exaltation of mothering and castration?

Let us return to the necessity of breaking up associations: dissociation not merely as a characteristic of schizophrenia but as a principle of schizo-analysis. The greatest obstacle to psychoanalysis, the impossibility of establishing associations, is on the contrary, the very condition of schizo-analysis—that is to say, the sign that we have finally reached elements that enter into a functional ensemble of the unconscious as a desiring-machine. It is not surprising that the method called free association invariably brings us back to Oedipus; that such is its function. Far from testifying to a spontaneity, it presupposes an application, a mapping back that forces an ensemble given at the outset into correspondence with a final artificial or memorial ensemble, determined in advance and symbolically as being oedipal. In reality, we still have not accomplished anything so long as we have not reached elements that are not associable, or so long as we have not grasped the elements in a form in which they are no longer associable. Serge Leclaire takes a decisive step when he sets the terms of a problem which, in his words, “everything impels us not to consider straight in the face . . . what is involved, in brief, is the conception of a system whose elements are bound together precisely by the absence of any tie, and I mean by that, the absence of any natural, logical, or significant tie”, “a set of pure singularities”.¹¹ But, mindful of the need to remain within the narrow bounds of psychoanalysis, he takes the same step backwards: he presents the unbound ensemble as a fiction, its manifestations as epiphanies, which must be inscribed in a new re-structured ensemble, if only through the unity of the phallus as the signifier of absence. Yet here indeed was the emergence of the desiring-machine, that which distinguishes it both from the psychic bonds of the oedipal apparatus, and from the mechanical or structural bonds of the social and technical machines: a set of really distinct parts that operate in combination *as being really distinct* (bound together by the absence of any tie). Such approximations of desiring-machines are not furnished by surrealist objects, theatrical epiphanies, or oedipal gadgets, which function only by reintroducing associations—in point of fact, Surrealism was a vast enterprise of oedipalization of the movements that preceded it. But they will be found rather in certain Dadaist machines, in the drawings of Julius Goldberg, or, more recently, in the machines of Tinguely. How does one obtain a functional ensemble, while shattering all the associations? (What is meant by “bound by the absence of any tie”?).

In Tinguely, the art of real distinction is obtained by means of a kind of uncoupling used as a method of recurrence. A machine brings into play several simultaneous structures which it pervades. The first structure includes




Jean Tinguely: "Meta-matic N. 17" (1959)

at least one element that is not operational in relation to it, but only in relation to a second structure. It is this interplay, which Tinguely presents as being essentially joyful, that ensures the process of deterritorialization of the machine, as well as the position of the mechanic as the most deterritorialized part of the machine. The grandmother who pedals inside the automobile under the wonder-struck gaze of the child—a non-oedipal child whose eye is itself a part of the machine—does not cause the car to move forward, but, through her pedalling, activates a second structure which is sawing wood. Other methods of recurrence can be involved into play or added-on, as, for example, the envelopment of the parts within a multiplicity (thus the city-machine, a city where all the houses are in one, or Buster Keaton's house-machine, where all the rooms are in one). Or again, the recurrence can be realized in a series that places the machine in an essential relationship with scraps and residua, where, for example, the machine destroys its own object, as in Tinguely's Rotozazas, or the machine itself taps lost intensities or energies as in Duchamp's Transformer project, or it is itself made up of scraps as in Stankiewicz's Junk Art, or in the Merz and the house-machine of Schwitters, or, finally, where it sabotages or destroys itself, where "its construction and the beginning of its destruction are indistinguishable." In all these examples (to which should be added narcotics functioning as a desiring-machine, the junky machine) there appears a properly machinic death drive that stands in opposition to the oedipal regressive death, to psychoanalytic euthanasia. And there is really not one of these desiring-machines that is not profoundly de-oedipalizing.

Moreover, it is chance relations that ensure this, without, between elements which are really distinct as such, or the unconnective connection of their autonomous structures, following a vector that goes from mechanical disorder towards the less probable, and which we call the "mad vector". The importance here of Vendryes' theories becomes evident, for they make it possible to define desiring-machines by the presence of such chance relations within the machine itself, and by its production of Brownoid movements of the sort observed in the stroll or the sexual prowling.^{1 2} And, in the case of Goldberg's drawings as well, it is through the realization of chance relations that the functionality of really distinct elements is ensured, with the same joy that is present in Tinguely, the schizo-laughter. What is involved is the substitution of an ensemble functioning as a desiring-machine positioned on a mad vector, for a simple memorial circuit or for a social circuit (in the first example, *You Sap, Mail that Letter.*, the desiring-machine pervades and programs the three automated structures of sport, gardening, and the bird-cage; in the second example, *Simple Reducing Machine*, the Volga boatman's exertion, the decompression of the stomach of the millionaire eating dinner, the fall of the boxer onto the ring, and the jump of the rabbit are programmed by the record insofar as it defines the less probable or the simultaneity of the points of departure and arrival).

All these machines are real machines. Hocquenghem is right in saying, "There where desire is active, there is no longer any place for the Imaginary",



THE PROFESSOR'S BRAIN TOSSES OFF HIS LATEST ANTI-FLOOR WALKING PARADHERNALIA —

PULL STRING (A) WHICH DISCHARGES PISTOL (B) AND BULLET (C) HITS SWITCH ON ELECTRIC STOVE (D), WARMING POT OF MILK (E). VAPOR FROM MILK MELTS CANDLE (F) WHICH DRIPS ON HANDLE OF POT CAUSING IT TO UPSET AND SPILL MILK DOWN TROUGH (G) AND INTO CAN (H). WEIGHT BEARS DOWN ON LEVER (J) PULLING STRING (I) WHICH BRINGS NURSING NIPPLE (K) WITHIN BABY'S REACH.


IN THE MEANTIME BABY'S YELLING HAS AWAKENED TWO PET CROWS (L & M) AND THEY DISCOVER RUBBER WORM (N) WHICH THEY PROCEED TO EAT. UNABLE TO MASTICATE IT, THEY PULL IT BACK AND FORTH CAUSING CRADLE TO ROCK AND PUT BABY TO SLEEP.

PUT COTTON IN YOUR EARS SO YOU WILL NOT BE BOTHERED IF BABY WAKES AGAIN —



PROFESSOR BUTTS STEPS INTO AN OPEN ELEVATOR SHAFT AND WHEN HE LANDS AT THE BOTTOM HE FINDS A SIMPLE ORANGE SQUEEZING MACHINE. MILK MAN TAKES EMPTY MILK BOTTLE (A) PULLING STRING (B) WHICH CAUSES SWORD (C) TO SEVER CORD (D) AND ALLOW GUILLOTINE BLADE (E) TO DROP AND CUT ROPE (F) WHICH RELEASES BATTERING RAM (G). RAM BUMPS AGAINST OPEN DOOR (H) CAUSING IT TO CLOSE. GRASS SICKLE (I) CUTS A SLICE OFF END OF ORANGE (J). AT THE SAME TIME SPIKE (K) STABS PRUNE HAWK (L). HE OPENS HIS MOUTH TO YELL IN AGONY, THEREBY RELEASING PRUNE AND ALLOWING DIVER'S BOOT (M) TO DROP AND STEP ON SLEEPING OCTOPUS (N). OCTOPUS AWAKENS IN A RAGE AND SEEING DIVER'S FACE WHICH IS PAINTED ON ORANGE, ATTACKS IT AND CRUSHES IT WITH TENTACLES, THEREBY CAUSING ALL THE JUICE IN THE ORANGE TO RUN INTO GLASS (O).

LATER ON YOU CAN USE THE LOG TO BUILD A LOG CABIN WHERE YOU CAN RAISE YOUR SON TO BE PRESIDENT LIKE ABRAHAM LINCOLN.



nor for the Symbolic. All these machines are already there; we are continually producing them, manufacturing them, setting them in motion, for they are desire, desire just as it is,—although it takes artists to bring about their autonomous presentation. Desiring-machines are not in our heads, in our imagination, they are *inside the social and technical machines themselves*. Our relationship with machines is not a relationship of invention or of imitation; we are not the cerebral fathers nor the disciplined sons of the machine. It is a relationship of peopling: we populate the social technical machines with desiring-machines, and we have no alternative. We are obliged to say at the same time: social technical machines are only conglomerates of desiring-machines under molar conditions that are historically determined; desiring-machines are social and technical machines restored to their determinant molecular conditions. Schwitters' Merz is the last syllable of Komerz. It is futile to examine the usefulness or uselessness, the possibility or impossibility of these desiring-machines. Their impossibility and their uselessness become visible only in the autonomous artistic presentation, and there very rarely. Don't you see that they are possible because they are; they are there in every way, and we function with them. They are eminently useful, since they constitute the two directions of the relationship between the machine and man, the *communication* of the two. At the very moment you say, "this machine is impossible", you fail to see that you are making it possible, by being yourself one of its parts, the very part that you seemed to be missing in order for it to be already working, the dancer-danger. You argue about the possibility or the usefulness, but you are already inside the machine, you are a part of it, you have put a finger inside, or an eye, your anus, or your liver (the modern version of "You are embarked . . .").

It almost appears as though the difference between social technical machines and desiring-machines were primarily a question of size, or one of adaptation, desiring-machines being small machines, or large machines suited to small groups. It is by no means a problem of gadgets. The current technological trend, which replaces the thermodynamic priority with a certain priority of information, is logically accompanied by a reduction in the size of machines. In another very joyful text, Ivan Illich shows the following: that heavy machines imply capitalist or despotic relations of production, involving the dependence, the exploitation, and the powerlessness of men reduced to the condition of consumers or servants. *The collective ownership of the means of production* does not alter anything in this state of affairs, and merely sustains a Stalinist despotic organization. Accordingly, Illich puts forward the alternative of *everyone's right to make use of the means of production*, in a "convivial society", which is to say, a desiring and non-oedipal society. This would mean the most extensive utilization of machines by the greatest possible number of people, the proliferation of small machines and the adaptation of the large machines to small units, the exclusive sale of machinic components which would have to be assembled by the users-producers themselves, and the destruction of the specialization of knowledge and of the professional monopoly. It is quite obvious that things

as different as the monopoly or the specialization of most areas of medical knowledge, the complicated nature of the automobile engine, and the monstrous size of machines do not comply with any technological necessity, but solely with economic and political imperatives whose aim is to concentrate power or control in the hands of a ruling class. It is not a dream of a return to nature when one points out the extreme machinic uselessness of automobiles in cities, their archaic character in spite of the gadgets attached to them for show, and the potentially modern character of the bicycle, in our cities as well as in the Vietnam War. And it is not even on behalf of relatively simple and small machines that the desiring "convivial revolution" has to be made, but on behalf of machinic innovation itself, which capitalist or communist societies do everything in their economic and political power to repress.¹³

One of the greatest artists of desiring-machines, Buster Keaton, was able to pose the problem of an adaptation of the mass machine to individual ends, or to those of a couple or small group, in *The Navigator*, where the two protagonists "have to deal with housekeeping equipment generally used by hundreds of people (the galley is a forest of levers, pulleys, and wires)"¹⁴ It is true that the themes of reduction or adaptation of machines are not sufficient by themselves, and stand for something else. This is shown by the demand that everyone be able to make use of them and control them. For the true difference between social technical machines and desiring-machines obviously is not in the size, nor even in the ends they serve, but in the regime that decides on the size and the ends. *They are the same machines, but it is not the same regime.* This is not to say, by any means, that we should counter the present regime, which submits technology to the aims of an economy and a politics of oppression, with the notion of a regime in which technology presumably would be liberated and liberating. Technology presupposes social machines and desiring-machines, each within the other, and, by itself, has no power to decide which will be the engineering agency, desire or the oppression of desire. Every time technology claims to be acting on its own, it takes on a fascist hue, as in the techno-structure, because it implies not only economic and political investments, but libidinal investments as well, and they are turned entirely towards the oppression of desire. The distinction between the two regimes, as the regime of anti-desire and that of desire, does not come down to the distinction between the collectivity and the individual, but to two types of mass organization, in which the individual and the collective do not enter into the same relationship. There exists the same difference between them as between the microphysical and the macrophysical,—it being understood that the microphysical agency is not the machine-electron, but molecular machinizing desire, just as the macrophysical agency is not the molar technical object, but the anti-desiring, anti-productive, molarizing social structure that currently conditions the use, the control, and the possession of technical objects. In our present social order, the desiring-machine is tolerated only in its perverse forms, which is to say, on the fringes of the serious utilization of machines, and as a

secondary benefit that cannot be avowed by the users, producers, or anti-producers (the sexual enjoyment experienced by the judge in judging, by the bureaucrat in stroking his files . . .). But the desiring-machine's regime is not a generalized perversion, it is rather the opposite, a general and productive schizophrenia that has finally become happy. What Tinguely says of one of his own works applies to desiring-machines: *a truly joyous machine, by joyous I mean free.*

3. THE MACHINE AND THE FULL BODY: THE CATHEXES OF THE MACHINE. MACHINE.

Nothing is more obscure, as soon as one considers the details, than Marx's propositions concerning productive forces and relations of production. The broad outline is clear enough: from tools to machines, the human means of production imply social relations of production, which however are external to these means and are merely their "index". But what is the meaning of "index"? Why does Marx project an abstract evolutive line meant to represent the isolated relationship of man and nature, where the machine is apprehended starting from the tool, and the tool in terms of the organism and its needs? It then necessarily follows that social relations appear external to the tool or to the machine, and impose on them from the outside another biological schema while breaking up the evolutive line according to heterogeneous social organizations¹⁵ (it is among other factors, this interplay between productive forces and relations of production that explains the strange idea that the bourgeoisie was revolutionary at a given moment). It seems to us on the contrary that the machine has to be directly conceived in relation to a social body, and not in relation to a human biological organism. If such is the case, one cannot regard the machine as a new segment that succeeds that of the tool, along a line that would have its starting point in abstract man. For man and the tool *are already* components of a machine constituted by a full body acting as an engineering agency, and by men *and* tools that are engineered (*machinés*) insofar as they are distributed on this body. For example, there is a full body of the steppe which engineers man-horse-bow, a full body of the Greek city-state which engineers men and weapons, a full body of the factory which engineers men and machines . . . Of the two definitions of a manufacture given by Ure, and cited by Marx, the first relates machines to the men who tend them, while the second relates the machines *and* the men, "mechanical *and* intellectual organs", to the manufacture as the full body that engineers them. It is in fact the second definition that is literal and concrete.

It is not through metaphors nor by extension that we regard public places and community facilities (*les lieux, les équipements collectifs*), the means of communication, and the social bodies as machines or machine components. On the contrary, it is by virtue of a restriction and a derivation that the machine will cease to designate anything but a technical reality but precisely under the conditions of a quite specific full body, the body of money-Capital, insofar as it

gives the tool the form of fixed capital, which is to say, distributes the tools on the surface of an autonomous mechanical representative, and gives man the form of variable capital, which is to say, distributes men on an abstract representative of labor in general. An interlocking of full bodies all belonging to the same series: the full body of capital, that of the factory, that of mechanisms . . . (Or indeed the full body of the Greek city-State, that of the phalange, that of the two-handed shield). The question we ought to ask is not how the technical machine follows after simple tools, but how the social machine, and which social machine, instead of being content to engineer men and machines, makes the emergence of technical machines both possible and necessary. (There were many technical machines before the advent of capitalism, but the machinic phylum did not pass through them, precisely because it was content to engineer men and tools. In the same way, there are tools in every social formation which are not engineered, because the phylum does not pass through them while the same tools are engineered in other social formations: hoplite weapons, for example.

The machine understood in this manner is defined as a desiring-machine: the ensemble composed of a full body that engineers, and men and tools engineered on it. Several consequences follow from this view of the machine, but we can only plot them here in a programmatic way.

Firstly, desiring-machines are indeed the same as technical and social machines, but they are their unconscious, as it were: they manifest and mobilize the libidinal cathexes (cathexes of desire) that "correspond" to the conscious or preconscious cathexes (cathexes of interest) of the economy, the politics, and the technics of a specific social field. To correspond does not at all mean to resemble; what is at stake is another distribution, another "map", that no longer concerns the interests established in a society, nor the apportionment of the possible and the impossible, of freedoms and constraints, all that constitutes a society's *reasons*. But, beneath these reasons, there are the unwanted forms of a desire that cathects the flows as such, and the breaks in these flows, a desire that continually reproduces the aleatory factors, the less probable figures, and the encounters between independent series that are at the base of this society, a desire that elicits a love "for its own sake", a love of capital for its own sake, a love of bureaucracy for its own sake, a love of repression for its own sake, all sorts of strange things such as "What does a capitalist desire from the bottom of his heart?" and "How is it possible that men desire repression not only for others but for themselves?", and so on.

Secondly, the fact that desiring-machines are the internal limit, as it were, of the technical social machines is more easily understood if one bears in mind that the full body of a society, its engineering agency, is never given as such, but must always be inferred from terms and relations coming into play in that society. The full body of capital as a proliferating body, Money that produces more Money, is never given in itself. It implies a movement to the limit, where the terms are reduced to their simple forms taken in an absolute sense, and where the relations are "positively" replaced by an

absence of ties. Consider the capitalist desiring-machine, for example, the encounter between capital and labor force, capital as deterritorialized wealth, and labor capacity as the deterritorialized worker, two independent series or simple forms whose chance meeting is continually reproduced in capitalism. How can the absence of ties be positive? One meets again with Leclair's question stating the paradox of desire: how can elements be bound together by the absence of any ties? In a certain sense, it can be said that Cartesianism, in Spinoza and Leibniz, has not ceased to reply to this question. It is the theory of real distinction, insofar as it implies a specific logic. It is because they are really distinct, and completely independent of each other, that ultimate elements or simple forms belong to the same being or to the same substance. It is in this sense, in fact, that a substantial full body does not function at all as an organism. And the desiring-machine is nothing other than a multiplicity of distinct elements or simple forms that are *bound together* on the full body of a society, precisely to the extent that they are "on" this body, or to the extent that they are really distinct. The desiring-machine as a movement to the limit: the inference of the full body, the eliciting of simple forms, the assigning of absences of ties. The method employed in Marx's *Capital* takes this direction, but its dialectical presuppositions prevent it from reaching desire as forming a part of the infrastructure.

Thirdly, the relations of production that remain outside the technical machine are, on the contrary, internal to the desiring-machine. Admittedly, they no longer exist as relations, but as parts of the machine, some being elements of production, and others elements of anti-production.¹⁶ J.-J. Lebel cites the example of certain sequences of Genet's film that form a desiring-machine of the prison: two prisoners locked in adjoining cells, one of whom blows smoke into the other's mouth through a straw that passes through a little hole in the wall, while a guard masturbates as he watches. The guard is both an element of anti-production and a voyeur peeping component (*une pièce voyeuse*) of the machine: desire is transmitted through all the parts. This means that desiring-machines are not pacified; they contain dominations and servitudes, death-carrying elements, sadistic parts and masochistic parts that are juxtaposed. Precisely in the desiring-machines, these parts assume, as do all the others, their strictly sexual dimensions. This is not to say, as psychoanalysis would have it, that sexuality has at its disposal an oedipal code that would supplement the social formations, or even preside over their mental genesis and organization (money and anality, fascism and sadism, and so forth). There is no sexual symbolism, and sexuality does not designate another "economy", another "politics", but rather the libidinal unconscious of political economy as such. The libido, the energy of the desiring-machine, cathects every social difference as being a sexual difference, including class differences, racial differences, and so on, either in order to guard the wall of sexual differentiation in the unconscious, or, on the contrary, in order to blow this wall to pieces, to abolish it on behalf of non-human sex. In its very violence, the

desiring-machine is a trial of the whole social field by desire, a test whose outcome can just as well be desire's triumph as its oppression. The test consists in the following: given a desiring-machine, how does it make a relation of production or a social difference into one of its component parts, and what is the position of this part? What about the millionaire's stomach in Goldberg's drawing, or the masturbating guard in Genet's film image? Isn't a captive factory boss a component of a factory desiring-machine, a way of responding to the test?

Fourthly, if sexuality as an energy of the unconscious is the cathexis of the social field by the desiring-machines, it becomes apparent that a social attitude vis-a-vis machines in general in no way express mere ideology, but the position of desire in the infrastructure itself, the mutations of desire in terms of the breaks and the flows that pervade this field. That is why the theme of the machine has a content that is so emphatically, so openly sexual. The epoch of the First World War was the meeting-ground of the four great attitudes centering around the machine: the great molar exaltation of Italian Futurism, which counts on the machine to develop the national productive forces and to produce a new national man, without calling in question the relations of production; that of Russian Futurism and Constructivism, which conceive the machine in terms of new relations of production defined by collective appropriation (the tower-machine of Tatlin, or that of Moholy-Nagy, expressing the famous party organization as a democratic centralism, a spiral model, with a summit, a driving belt, and a base; the relations of production continue to be external to the machine, which functions as an "index"); the Dadaist molecular machinery, which, for its part, brings about a reversal in the form of a revolution of desire, because it submits the relations of production to the trial of the parts of the desiring-machine, and elicits from the latter joyous movements of deterritorialization that overcomes all the territorialities of nation and party; and lastly, a humanist anti-machinism, which wants to rescue imaginary or symbolic desire, to turn it back against the machine, standing ready to level it onto an oedipal apparatus (Surrealism versus Dadaism, or Chaplin versus the Dadaist Buster Keaton).¹⁷


And precisely because it is not a matter of ideology, but of a machination that brings into play an entire group unconscious characterizing a historical epoch, the tie between these attitudes and the social and political field is complex, although it is not indeterminate. Italian Futurism clearly sets forth the conditions and the organizational forms of a fascist desiring-machine, with all the equivocations of a nationalist and war-hungry "left". Russian Futurists attempt to slip their anarchist elements into a party machine that crushes them. Politics is not the strong point of the Dadaists. Humanism effects a withdrawal of the cathexis of desiring-machines which nonetheless continue to operate inside it. But the problem of desire itself was posed in the confrontation of these attitudes, the problem of the position of desire, i.e., that of the relationship of respective immanence between desiring-machines and social technical machines, between those two

extreme poles where desire invests paranoiac fascist formations, or, on the contrary, revolutionary schizoid flows. The paradox of desire is that it always requires such a long analysis, an entire analysis of the unconscious, in order to disentangle the poles and draw out the nature of the revolutionary group trials—for desiring-machines.

Translated by Robert Hurley

NOTES

1. Gesa Roheim, *Psychoanalysis and Anthropology*, International Universities Press, 1950.
2. Pierre Auger, *L'Homme microscopique*, Flammarion, p. 138.
3. The allusion here is to Sade and his perversely rational pamphlet of 1795, "Français, encore un effort si vous voulez être républicains. . ." (incorporated in *La Philosophie dans le boudoir*), in which he turns post-Enlightenment principles into an argument for the total eradication of the Church, a bare minimum of laws, an end to the bourgeois family, and a perpetual revolution, in manners and morals. [Translator's note].
4. Michel de M'Uzan, in *La Sexualité perverse*, pp. 34-37.
5. With regard to machinic continuity and discontinuity, cf. André Leroi-Gourhan, *Milieu et techniques*, Albin Michel, 1945, pp. 366sp.
6. It is again Roheim who clearly reveals the Oedipus-projection-representation linkage.
7. Marcel Moré, *Le très curieux Jules Verne* and *Nouvelles explorations de Jules Verne*.
8. Roger Dadoun, "Les ombilics du rêve", in *L'espace du rêve, Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse*, #5 (and concerning the program-dream, cf. Sarane Alexandrian, "Le rêve dans le Surréalisme", *id.*).
9. Trost, *Vision dans le cristal* (Ed. de l'Oubli), *Visible et invisible* (Arcanes), *Librement mécanique* (Minotaure). Gherasin Luca, *Le Vampire passif* (Ed. de l'Oubli).
10. Mouvement pour la Libération de la Femme, one of the groups active in the women's liberation movement in France. [Translator's note].
11. Serge Leclair, "La réalité du désir", in *Sexualité humaine*, Aubier.
12. With regard to the aleatory, the "mad vector", and their political applications, cf. Vendryes's books, *Vie et probabilité* (Albin Michel), *La probabilité en histoire* (*id.*), and *Déterminisme et autonomie* (Armand Colin). Regarding a "prowl machine", of the Brownoid type, cf. Guy Hocquenghem, *Le Désir homosexuel* (Ed. Universitaires, 1972).
13. Ivan Illich, "Re-tooling Society", *Le Nouvel Observateur*, Sept. 11, 1972 (regarding largeness and smallness in the machine, cf. Gilbert Simondon, *Du mode d'existence des objets techniques*, pp. 132-133).
14. David Robinson, "Buster Keaton", *Revue du Cinéma* (this book contains a study of Keaton's machines).
15. With regard to this other biological schema based on the types of organization, cf. "Afterword" to the Second German Edition of *Capital* (International Publishers, pp. 17-19).
16. "Every rupture produced by the intrusion of a machine phenomenon will be found to be conjoined to what we shall call a system of anti-production, a specific representative mode of the structure. . . Anti-production will be, among other things, what has been entered in the register of relations of production."
17. Regarding the role of machines in Futurism and Dadaism, cf. Noëlmi Blumenkranz, *L'Esthétique de la machine* (Société d'esthétique), "La Spirale" (*Revue d'esthétique*, 1971).



May 14, 1914. One or Several Wolves?

GILLES DELEUZE AND FÉLIX GUATTARI

That particular day the Wolf-man got off the couch, especially tired. He knew that Freud was a genius at brushing over the truth and going around it, filling up the void with associations. He knew that Freud did not know anything about wolves, and nothing more about anuses for that matter. Freud only understood what a dog was, and a dog's tail. That did not suffice, that would not suffice. The Wolf-man knew Freud would soon declare him cured, whereas this was not at all the case, and he knew that he would continue to be treated for all eternity by Ruth, Lacan, Leclaire. Finally, he knew he was in the process of acquiring a veritable proper name—Wolf-Man, much more proper than his own since it gave access to the highest singularity through the instantaneous apprehension of a generic multiplicity: wolves—but how this new, this real proper name was going to be disfigured, spelled wrong, and retranscribed patronimically!

Nevertheless Freud, for his part, was soon to write several extraordinary pages. Completely practical pages, in his 1915 article on the *Unconscious*, concerning the difference between neurosis and psychosis. Freud says there that a hysterical or obsessed person is capable of comparing in a global fashion a sock to a vagina, a scar to castration, etc.—this doubtless at the same time as apprehending the object as global and lost. What would never enter into a neurotic's head—erotically seizing skin as a multiplicity of pores, of little points, of little scars or holes, erotically seizing the sock as a multiplicity of stitches—would be quite possible for the psychotic: "We should expect the multiplicity of these little cavities to prevent him from using them as substitutes for the female genital."¹ To compare a sock to a vagina is okay, it's done very day. But to compare a pure set of stitches to a field of vaginas, why you've got to be crazy. That's what Freud says.

Hardly had he discovered the greatest art of the unconscious, this art of molecular multiplicities, than Freud could not stop going back to molar unities, finding therein his big familiar themes—the father, the penis, the vagina, the castration, etc. The process of reduction is very interesting in the 1915 article: he says that the neurotic guides his comparisons or identifications by way of the representation of things, whereas the psychotic contents himself with word representation (for example, the word *hole*). "What has dictated the substitution is not the resemblance between the things denoted but the sameness of the words used to express them." Thus, when there is not a unity of things, at least there is a unity and identity of words. Names here are taken in their *extensive* usage, that is to say they function as

Translation of "14 mai 1914. Un seul ou plusieurs loups?"; *Minuit*, 5, 1973.

common names which assure the unification of an ensemble which they subsume (hence the multiplicity of pores, Oh metonymy!), and these names then ascribe this ensemble to a concept which is, itself, one (the vagina, the penis, Oh metaphor!). The proper name can no longer be anything more than an extreme case of a common name. Within itself, it comprises its already domesticated multiplicity, and ascribes it to a being or object given as unique. What is compromised, both in terms of words and things, is the relationship of the proper name as *intensity* to the free multiplicity which it instantaneously apprehends. For Freud, when the thing explodes and loses its identity, the word is still there to lead the thing back to its identity or invent an identity for it. Isn't an ulterior adventure revealed here, that of the Signifier, the despotic underhanded agency which itself is substituted for asignifying proper names just as it substitutes the dejected unity of an object (declared lost) for multiplicities? But all this is getting complicated, and should be put off for a future date.

We're not far from wolves. For the Wolf-Man is also the one who, in his second so-called psychotic episode, constantly watches over the variations, the moving trajectory of small holes or little scars on the skin of his nose. But in the first episode which Freud declares neurotic, the Wolf-Man tells how he dreamed of six or seven wolves in a tree, and drew five of them. After all, who is unaware of the fact that wolves travel in packs? No one, except Freud. What any child knows, Freud ignores. Freud asks with false scruples: how can we explain that there are five, six or seven wolves in the dream? Since he had already decided this was a case of neurosis, Freud uses the other reduction procedure: not the verbal classification of things at the level of word representation, but rather so-called free association at the level of the representations of things. The result in any case is the same, since it is always a question of returning to the unity and identity of the person or object supposedly lost. Watch how the wolves will have to be purged of their multiplicity. This operation is accomplished by the association of this dream with the tale *The Wolf and the Seven Kid-goats* (only six of which were eaten). We are witness to Freud's gleeful reduction. We can literally see the multiplicity leave the wolves in order to take on the shape of the kids which have no place in the story. Seven wolves which are only kid-goats, six wolves since the seventh kid (the Wolf-Man himself) is hiding in the clock, five wolves, since it is at five o'clock perhaps that he saw his parents make love and since the Roman Numeral V is associated with the erotic opening of female legs, three wolves since perhaps the parents made love three times, two wolves since it was the parents *more ferarum*, or even two dogs which the child might have first seen copulating, and then one wolf, since the wolf is the father which we knew from the start, and finally zero wolf since it lost its tail—no less castrated than castrating. Who's Freud trying to kid? The wolves didn't have a chance to get out of this one, thereby saving their pack. It was decided from the outset that animals could only serve to represent copulation between parents or, inversely, be represented by such a copulation. Freud manifestly ignores everything about the fascination which

wolves exercise, what the mute call of the wolves means, the call to become wolf. *Wolves* observe and hold the attention of the dreaming child. It's so much more reassuring to say to oneself that it's the dream which produces an inversion, and that it is the child who is looking at dogs or parents making love. The only dog or wolf Freud ever associates with belongs to an oedipalized breed, the castrated-castrating wolf-daddy, the kenneled-up dog, the ruff-ruff of the psychoanalyst, his own big dog. He doesn't understand a thing, he knows nothing about all this.

Franny Schizo is listening to a program on wolves. I say to her: would you like to be a wolf? A haughty response—"That's stupid, you can't be a wolf, you're always eight or ten wolves, or six or seven." Not six or seven wolves at once, all by yourself, but one wolf among others with five or six other wolves. What is important in the becoming-wolf is the mass position, and first of all the subject's own position with relation to the pack, to the multiplicity-wolf, and the way in which he does or doesn't join in, the distance he takes, the manner in which he does or doesn't value the multiplicity. So as to subdue the severity of her response, Franny tells me about a dream: "We're in the desert. Here again it would make no sense at all to say that *I* am in the desert. This is a panoramic vision of the desert, this desert is neither tragic nor uninhabited, the only thing desert-like about it is its sandy color and its hot sun which casts no shadow. In this desert there is a swarming crowd, a swarm of bees mingled in with soccer players or a group of Touaregs. *I'm on the border of this crowd, at the periphery. But I belong to it, I am attached to it by an extremity of my body, a hand or a foot.* I know that this periphery is my only possible place, I would die if I allowed myself to be drawn into the center of the melee, but just as surely if I let go of this crowd. My position is not easy to keep and even very difficult to hang on to, for these beings stir about constantly, their movements are unforeseeable and answer to no specific rhythm. Sometimes they twirl around, sometimes they go towards the north then suddenly towards the east, not one of the individuals constituting the group stays in the same place in relation to the others. Therefore I, too, am perpetually mobile. All of this requires a huge tension, but gives me a feeling of violent, almost vertiginous happiness." This is a very good schizo-dream.

A multiplicity of pores, of dark points, of little scars or stitches. A multiplicity of bees, of soccer players or of Touaregs. A multiplicity of wolves, of jackals . . . None of these things allow themselves to be reduced, but rather send us back to a certain status of the formations of the unconscious. Let's try to define the factors which come into play here: first of all something which plays the role of a full body—the body without organs. The desert in the preceding dream. The barren tree where the wolves are perched in the Wolf-Man's dream. The skin as an envelope or a ring, the sock as a reversible surface. It can be a house, a part of a house, many things more. Anything. No one really makes love without constituting for himself, with another or with others, a body without organs. A body without organs is not an empty body stripped of organs, but rather a body

onto which what serve as organs (wolves, wolves' eyes, wolves' jaws?) distribute themselves in line with crowd phenomena, following Brownoid movements, in the form of molecular multiplicities. The desert is populated. Therefore, the body without organs is opposed not so much to organs, as to the organization of organs inasmuch as this organization would constitute an organism. The body without organs is not a dead body, but rather a living one, all the more living, all the more swarming since it threw out the organism and its organization. Lice flopping onto the seashore. The full body without organs is a body populated with multiplicities. And the problem of the unconscious, for sure, has nothing to do with generation, but with populating, and population. A matter of world population on the full body of the earth, and not organic familial generation. Dr. Green says: nevertheless, the schizo has a mother and a father, right? We regret to have to say no, he has none as such. He only has a desert and tribes which inhabit it, a full body and multiplicities which cling to it.

From which can be seen, in the second place, the nature of these multiplicities and of their elements. One of the essential characteristics of a dream of multiplicity is that each element never stops changing and modifying its distance in relation to the others. On the nose of the Wolf-Man the elements never stop dancing, growing, and diminishing, defined as pores in the skin, little scars in the pores, little crevices in the scar tissue. Now, these variable distances are not extensive quantities which would divide up into one another, but are rather indivisible each time, "relatively indivisible," meaning that they do not divide up above and beyond a certain threshold, and do not grow or diminish without their elements changing in nature. A swarm of bees—look at them mixed with soccer players in striped shorts, or a band of Touaregs. Or take another example: the clan of wolves increases to include a swarm of bees against the gang of Deuhls, under the direction of Mowgli who runs on the edge (Ah yes, Kipling understood the call of the wolves better than Freud, their libidinal sense, and in the Wolf-Man there is also a story of wasps or of butterflies which replace the wolves; we go from wolves to wasps). But what is this all about, these indivisible distances which modify unceasingly, and which do not modify themselves or divide up without their elements' changing in nature? Isn't it already a matter of *the intensive character* of the elements and of their relationships within this type of multiplicity? Just as a velocity and a temperature are not made up of velocities or temperatures, but rather enclose themselves within others or enclose others, which mark a change in nature each time. This is because these multiplicities do not possess the principle of their metrics in themselves, or in a rational interest which forms them extrinsically, but elsewhere, in the forces working within them, in the physical phenomena occupying them, precisely in the libido which constitutes them from within, and only constitutes them by dividing up into variable and qualitatively distinct flows. Freud himself recognizes the multiplicity of libidinal "currents" which coexist in the Wolf-Man. We are therefore all the more surprised at the way in which he treats the multiplicities of the unconscious. It's deplorable.

Since, for him, there will always be a reduction to the One: for Freud, the small scars, the little holes will be the subdivisions of the large scar or the major hole called castration, the wolves will be the substitutes for one and the same Father to be found everywhere, just as often as he is stuck in (as Ruth Mack Brunswick says, let's get on with it, the wolves are "all fathers and doctors," but the Wolf-Man thinks: "Are you trying to tell me my ass isn't a wolf?").

The opposite should have been done, this all should have been understood in intensity: the Wolf is the pack, i.e., the multiplicity apprehended as such in an instant, by its coming together or drawing away from zero—each time distances which are non-decomposable. Zero is the body without organs of the Wolf-Man. If the unconscious knows nothing of negation, this is due to the fact that there is nothing negative in the unconscious, but coming-together or drawing-apart from the zero point, which does not at all express lack, but rather the positivity of the full body as support and prop (since "a flux is necessary merely to signify the absence of intensity"). Wolves designate an intensity, a bank of intensity, a threshold of intensity on the body without organs of the Wolf-Man. Mrs. Brunswick, why didn't you attach importance to a remark which nevertheless struck you, since you relate it: a dentist said to the Wolf-Man, "Your teeth will fall out, due to your jutting jaw, the jutting of your jaw is too abrupt"—and at the same time his gums were covered with pimples and little holes.² The jaw as major intensity, the teeth as minor intensity, and the pimpled gums as a drawing towards zero. The wolf as an instantaneous apprehension of a multiplicity in a given region, this is not a representative, a substitute, wretched notions all of them, this is an *I feel*. I feel as if I am becoming wolf, a wolf among other wolves, at the edge of wolves, and the anguished cry, the only one Freud understands: help me to not become wolf (or on the contrary help me so that I don't fail in this becoming). It is not a question of representation: not at all taking oneself for a wolf, or representing oneself as a wolf. The wolf, wolves, are intensities, velocities, temperatures, variable non-decomposable distances. It's a swarming, a wolfing. And who could ever think the anal machine has nothing to do with the machine of wolves, or that the two are merely tied together by the Oedipal apparatus, by the all-too-human figure of the Father? For the anus also expresses an intensity, here the merging towards zero of the distance which doesn't decompose without the elements' changing their nature. An anus-field, just like a pack of wolves. And isn't it by means of the anus that the child holds on to and values wolves, at the periphery? We move down from the jaw to the anus. We keep a hold on wolves by a jaw and by an anus. A jaw is not a wolf's jaw, it's not so simple, but jaw and wolf form a multiplicity which changes in eye and wolf, anus and wolf, in terms of other distances, following other velocities, with other multiplicities, within the limits of thresholds. That's what intensity is, lines of escape or deterritorialization, the becoming-wolf, the becoming inhuman of deterritorialized intensities. Becoming wolf, becoming a hole, amounts to being deterritorialized, following distinct

tangled up lines. A hole is no more negative than a wolf. Castration, lack, substitute: what a tale told by an idiot, altogether too conscious, and understanding nothing of multiplicities as formations of the unconscious. A wolf, but also a hole, these are particles of the unconscious, nothing but particles, productions of particles, trajectories of particles as elements of molecular multiplicities. It does not even suffice to say that intense and floating particles pass by way of holes. A hole is no less a particle than what goes through it. Physicists say: holes are not absences of particles, but rather particles going faster than light. Flying anuses, quick vaginas, there is no castration.

Let's get back to this story of *multiplicity*, since it was a very important moment when such a word was created precisely in order to escape from the abstract opposition between the multiple and the one, to escape from idiotic dialectics, to succeed in thinking the "multiple" in its pure state, to stop making it into the numeric fragment of a lost Unity or Totality, or on the contrary the organic element of a Unity or Totality to come—and to distinguish rather the different types of multiplicity. It is in this respect that we can appreciate the distinction made by the mathematician-physicist Riemann between discreet multiplicities and continuous multiplicities (the latter finding the principle of their metrics only within the forces working inside them). Then in Meinong and Russell, the distinction between multiplicities of length or divisibility, extensive, and multiplicities of distance, closer to the "intensive." Or in Bergson the distinction between numeric or extended multiplicities, and qualitative or enduring ones. We're doing about the same thing by distinguishing on the one hand extensive, divisible, and molar multiplicities—unifiable, organizable, totalizable, conscious or preconscious, and on the other hand unconscious libidinal multiplicities, molecular, intensive, made up of particles which do not divide up without changing their nature, of distances which do not vary without entering into another multiplicity, and never stop composing and undoing themselves while communicating, passing from the ones into the others within a threshold, or above and beyond it. The elements of these latter multiplicities are particles, their relations are distances, their movements are Brownoid, their quantities are intensities, differences of intensities.

But above, we have only sketched out the logical basis for the theory of multiplicities, with a hasty dualism, and we have not said anything about their conscious or unconscious scope, their alogical characteristics, their reciprocal connections, their interrelated pressures, their exercise within a single *set-up*. We must look to other directions, no matter what. In a book by Elias Canetti, we also find two types of multiplicities, not unrelated to the preceding ones, but here they take on new life. They are sometimes opposed, and penetrate each other at other times: mass multiplicities and pack multiplicities. Among the characteristics of mass, let's take note of their large quantity, the divisibility and equality of the members, the concentration and collectivity of the whole, the unicity of direction, and perhaps the organization of territoriality or territorialization, and finally the emission

of signs. Among the characteristics of the pack, there is the restriction in number, the dispersion, the variable non-decomposable distances, the qualitative metamorphosis, the inequalities as remainders or overcomings, the impossibility of a fixed totalization or hierarchization, the Brownoid variety of the directions, the lines of deterritorialization, and finally, the projection of particles. Canetti remarks that the individual can never enter as completely into the pack as into the mass, each person remaining alone at the same time as being with the others (as in hunting wolves): "In the changing constellation of the pack, in its dances and expeditions, he will again and again find himself at *its edge*. He may be in the center, and then, immediately afterwards, at the edge again; at the edge and then back in the center. When the pack forms a ring around the fire, each man will have neighbours to right and left, but no-one behind him; *his back is naked and exposed to the wilderness*."³ This is the schizo position: the subject always on the border, at the edge (the open window in the Wolf-Man). To this is opposed the paranoiac position of the mass subject. For it is certain that mass equality as the essential element does not exclude the most rigid hierarchy. It is an easy matter to show how, in diverse ways throughout historic formations, the organization of the classes implies in itself a communal egalitarianism as a real basis. And whether it is a question of the boss or a man from the ranks, the paranoiac position presupposes an inclusion or identification of the subject to the mass, in relation to which the exclusion or segregation of the enemy is brought about (to be well integrated in the mass, never on the border, except under special orders).

But how could the two types of multiplicities, the molar and the molecular machines, the big social machines and the little libidinal ones, the masses and the packs, not communicate constantly, finding themselves in one and the same set-up? Isn't a huge cyclotron needed in order to produce a mad particle? How could it be that a sign is not there to guide a particle? Or else, how could lines of deterritorialization even be assignable outside the circuits of territoriality? How could it be otherwise but in large expanses, and in relation to big upheavals in these expanses, that the minute spring of a new intensity flows? So much must be done just to produce a new sound! The becoming-animal, the becoming-inhuman, the becoming-molecular goes by way of a molar extension, a human hyperconcentration, or else prepares them. We will not separate, in Kafka, the erection of a big bureaucratic paranoiac machine, and the installation of little schizo machines of a becoming-dog or a becoming-beetle. In the Wolf-Man, we will not separate the becoming-wolf from the dream, and the religious and military organizations of his obsessions. A military man makes the wolf, a bureaucrat makes the dog. There are not two multiplicities or two machines, but *one and the same machinic set-up*, which produces the whole, i.e., the entire construct of enunciations which correspond to the "complex." What does psychoanalysis have to say about all this? Oedipus, nothing but Oedipus, since it doesn't listen to anyone, hear anyone or anything. It is Oedipus who has to make the monotonous connection among all the episodes, wolves and butterflies,

icons and armies. But Oedipus, the Oedipal apparatus, the plough, the psychoanalytic horse flattens everything, the masses and the peaks, the social and libidinal machines, the multiplicities of all types. Take the wolf-Man's second dream at the moment of the so-called psychotic episode: in a street, there is a wall with a closed door, and to the left, an empty dresser; the patient is in front of the dresser with a large woman with a small scar who seems to want to go around the wall; and behind the wall there are wolves which hurry towards the door. Mrs. Brunswick herself can't go wrong here; although she does her best to see herself in the large woman, she readily recognizes that this time the wolves are Bolsheviks, the revolutionary mass which emptied the dresser or confiscated the fortune of the Wolf-Man. *In a metastable state, the wolves passed to the side of a large social machine.* But what does psychoanalysis have to tell us on all these points?—except what Freud already said: all of that still refers back to Daddy (by the way, he was a leader of the liberal party in Russia, but that is hardly important; it suffices to say that the revolution “satisfied a guilt feeling of the patient”). Really! As if the libido, in its cathexes and counter-cathexes, has nothing at all to do with the commotions of the masses, the movements of packs, or the collective signs and the particles of desire!

It therefore does not suffice to attribute the molar multiplicities or the mass machines to the preconscious, reserving another class of machines or multiplicities for the unconscious. For what belongs in every way to the unconscious is the set-up of the two, the way in which the first ones condition the second, and the second ones prepare the first, or escape them, or return to them: the libido immerses everything. We have to keep track of everything at once: the way in which a social machine or an organized mass possesses a molecular unconscious which does not only mark their tendency towards decomposition, but also the current components of their very exercise and organization; the way in which an individual, any individual, taken up in a mass, has his own pack unconscious which does not necessarily resemble the packs of the mass of which he is a part; the way in which an individual or a mass make the masses and the packs of another mass or another individual live on in their own unconscious. What does it mean to love someone? Always seize this person within a mass, extract him from a mass, even limited, in which he participates, *even if merely by way of the family* or by way of something else; and then search out his own packs, the multiplicities locked within the person and which are perhaps of a totally different nature. Then join these to mine, make them penetrate into mine and penetrate the other person's. Celestial wedding, multiplicities of multiplicities. Every love, then, is an exercise of depersonalization on a body without organs to be formed, and it is at the most advanced stage in this depersonalization that someone can be *named*, receive his family name or his first name, and acquire the most intense discernibility in the instantaneous apprehension of the multiples belonging to him and to which he belongs. A pack of freckled specks on a loved one's face, a pack of young boys speaking in a woman's voice, a brood of young girls within Mr. Charlus'

brood, a horde of wolves in someone's throat, an anal multiplicity in the anus, the mouth or the eye towards which one tends. Everyone passes through so many bodies within himself. Albertine is slowly extracted from a group of young girls having its own number, its own organization, its code and its hierarchy; and not only does an entire unconscious immerse this group and this limited mass, but Albertine too has her own multiplicities which the narrator, having isolated her, discovers on her body and in her lies—until the end of this love surrenders her back to the “undiscernible.”

And above all we must not think it suffices to distinguish exterior masses and groups to which one belongs or in which one participates, from internal constructs held within oneself. The distinction to be made is not at all between exterior and interior, a distinction which is always relative, changing and reversible, but rather a distinction between types of multiplicities which coexist, interpenetrate and change places. Machines, cogs, motors and elements which intervene at a given moment to form a set-up as a producer of statements: I love you (or something else). For Kafka, Felice is still inseparable from a certain social machine, and from the dictaphone machines whose firm she represents. In Kafka's eyes, fascinated by commerce and bureaucracy, how could this social machine not belong to such an organization? But at the same time, Felice's teeth, the big carnivorous teeth, make the machine slip away, following other lines in the molecular multiplicities of a becoming-dog, a becoming-jackal . . . Felice is inseparable both from the sign of the modern social machines which are both hers and Kafka's (not the same), and from particles, from the small molecular machines and this whole strange becoming or trajectory, which Kafka is about to make, and make Felice undertake, by way of his perverse machine of writing.

There are no individual statements, but rather machinic set-ups—producers of statements. We say that such a set-up is primarily libidinal and unconscious. There you have it, the unconscious in person. For the time being, we see in it elements (or multiplicities) of many types: human, social, technical, and molar organized machines; molecular machines with their particles of becoming-inhuman; Oedipal structures (*since, of course, yes, there are Oedipal statements—and lots of them*); counter-Oedipal structures, of variable aspects and functioning. We'll see later. We can no longer even speak of distinct machines, but only of types of multiplicities which penetrate each other and form, at a given instant, one and the same machinic set-up, the faceless figure of the libido. Each of us is caught within such a set-up, reproducing its statement when he thinks he speaks in his own name or rather speaks in his own name when he produces its statement. How bizarre these statements are, real discourses of the mad. We said Kafka, we could say the same of the Wolf-Man: a religious-military machine which Freud assigns to obsessional neurosis—an anal machine of the pack or of a becoming-wolf and also wasp or butterfly, which Freud assigns to the hysterical character—an Oedipal apparatus which Freud sees as the sole motor, the immobile motor to be found everywhere—a counter-Oedipal apparatus

(incest with the sister, schizo-incest, or else love with those “of a lower status,” or anality, or homosexuality?), all these things Freud considers as substitutes, regressions and derivatives of Oedipus. In truth, Freud sees nothing and understands nothing. He has no idea what a libidinal set-up is, along with all the other machineries put into play, all the multiple loves.

Of course there are Oedipal statements. It is easy to read Kafka's tale, *Jackals and Arabs*, that way: this can always be done, there is nothing to fear, it's bound to work, even if nothing is understood. The Arabs are clearly referred back to the father, the Jackals to the mother; between the two, the whole story of castration represented by the rusty scissors. But it just so happens that the Arabs are an organized mass—armed, extensive, extended over the whole desert; and the Jackals are an intense pack which never stops charging into the desert, following lines of escape or deterritorialization (“these are madmen, real madmen”); between the two, on the edge, the Man of the North, the Jackal-Man. And aren't the big scissors the Arab sign which guides or lets loose the jackals-particles, as much to accelerate their mad course by detaching them from the mass, as to gather them back into this mass, to subdue and whip them, to make them turn around? An Oedipal apparatus of nourishment—the dead camel; a counter-Oedipal apparatus—the carrion: killing beasts to eat, or eating to clean up the carrion. The jackals situate the problem well: it is not a problem of castration, but of “cleanliness” (*propreté*), the test of the desert-desire. Who will win here, the territoriality of the mass or the deterritorialization of the pack, with the libido bathing the whole desert as a body without organs where the drama is played out? In each case, we must study the coexistences in their variable positions, the outpouring of signs of the masses, the release of the packs, the trajectory of particles: the multiplicities. Given a group or an individual, we must search out its divisibilities or distances, its extensions and inner tensions, its masses and packs, its signs and particles, its machine of becoming human and its unhuman becoming machinic.

There is no individual statement, there never is. Every statement is the product of a machinic set-up, that is to say of collective agents of enunciation (by “collective agents” we don't mean peoples or societies, but multiplicities). Now a proper name does not designate an individual: on the contrary it is when an individual opens up to the multiplicities which traverse him, and at the end of the most severe exercise of depersonalization, that he acquires his real proper name. The proper name is the instantaneous apprehension of a multiplicity. It is the subject of a pure *infinitive* belonging as such to an intensive field. I to fuck, to be penetrated, to penetrate, to screw . . . Which is what Proust says about first names: when I said Gilberte's name, I had the impression of holding her entire naked body in my mouth. The Wolf-Man, a real proper name, an intimate first name which refers to becomings, infinitives, and intensities of a depersonalized and multiplied individual. But what does psychoanalysis understand of multiplication? The desert hour where the dromedary becomes a thousand dromedaries snickering in the sky? The night hour when a thousand holes dig deep

into the surface of the earth? Castration, castration cries the psychoanalytic scarecrow which never saw more than one hole, one father, or one dog where there are wolves, a domesticated individual where there are wild multiplicities. We don't merely reproach psychoanalysis for having only singled out the Oedipal statements. For these statements are, in a way, still part of a machinic set-up in relation to which they could serve as correctional indicies, *as in a calculation of errors*. What we do reproach psychoanalysis for is that it made use of the Oedipal enunciation in order to make the patient believe he was going to say something personal, something individual, that he was finally going to speak in his own name. Whereas everything is rigged from the start: never will the Wolf-Man be able to speak. He's a goner from the start. He can talk about wolves, howl like a wolf, Freud does not even listen, gazes instead at his dog and retorts "it's Daddy." As long as it lasts, Freud says it's neurosis, and when it breaks down, it's psychosis. The Wolf-Man will win the psychoanalytic medal for services rendered to the cause, and even the supplementary pension given to former disabled veterans. He would only have been able to speak in his own name if the machinic set-up which produced this or that statement in him had been brought to light. But it⁴ is never at issue in psychoanalysis: *at the very moment the subject is made to believe that he is about to utter his most individual statements, every condition of enunciation is-taken away from him*. To shut people up, keep them from speaking and above all, when they speak, act as if they had said nothing: this is the famous psychoanalytic neutrality. The Wolf-Man keeps howling: six or seven wolves! Freud answers: what? kid-goats? how interesting, I take the kids away, a wolf is left, therefore it is your father . . . That's why the Wolf-Man feels so tired: he stays sprawled out with all his wolves in his throat, and all the little holes on his nose, all these libidinal values on his body without organs. The war will come, the wolves will become Bolsheviks, the Man remains suffocated by all he had to say. We will merely be told that he came back well-behaved, well-mannered, subdued. In short, cured.

Translated by Mark Seem

NOTES

1. Sigmund Freud, S. E., XIV, p. 200 ("Papers on Metapsychology", 1915).
2. Ruth Mack Brunswick, "A Supplement to Freud's 'History of an Infantile Neurosis' ", in *The Wolf-Man*, Basic Books, 1971.
3. Elias Canetti, *Crowds and Power*, translated by Carol Stewart, Viking Press, 1962, p. 93.
4. Ça in French *it*, but also *Id*. The very first lines of *The Anti-Oedipus* define the Id as it or machines: "What a mistake to have ever said *the Id*." [Translator's note].



Family, Capitalism, Anus

GUY HOCQUENGHEM

Homosexual desire flows in two directions: one rising towards sublimation, towards the Superego, towards social anxiety; the other descending into the abysses of a non-personalized, non-codified desire. And it is good to pursue the descent; this is the course of desire in which the connecting organs obey no law and follow no rule.

THE SIGNIFYING PHALLUS AND THE SUBLIMATED ANUS

In the world of Oedipized sexuality, free connections between organs, direct relations of pleasure are no longer possible. There is one organ, one sexual organ only, at the center of the Oedipal triangle, the One which determines the place to be occupied by the other three elements of the triangle. The One creates the lack; it determines absence or presence; the penis envy of the little girl, or the castration fear of the little boy. As the signifying despot, it organizes the global situations of people. As the complete detached object, it plays, in the sexuality of our society, the role money plays in the capitalist economy; the fetish, the veritable universal reference of activity, economic in one case, desiring in the other . . .

Sex for the whole world is above all a word that designates the phallus, in relation to the phallus the quantity of possible pleasure is determined. This society is phallocratic; in the construction of the complex of social relations according to the hierarchical mode, the transcendence of the Great Signifier displays itself. The schoolmaster, the general, the boss are father-phalluses. Everything is organized in pyramidal form, and the Oedipal signifier distributes levels and identifications. The body is centered around the phallus like society around its chief. Those who lack one, and those who obey, are subject to the reign of the phallus: such is the triumph of Oedipus.

If the phallus is essentially social, the anus is essentially private. The transcendence of the phallus, and the organization of society around the Great Signifier depends on the 'privatization' of the anus in Oedipized, individualized persons. "The first organ to be excluded from the social domain, the first to be made private was the anus. Just as money created the new state of abstract circulation, the anus provided the model for privatiza-

Translation of "Famille, capitalisme, anus," ch. 3 of Le Désir homosexuel, Ed. Universitaires, 1972. Guy Hocquenghem teaches philosophy at the Faculté de Vincennes, Paris, and is also the author of L'Après-mai des faunes, Grasset, 1974 and Fin de section, Christian Bourgois, 1976. He is the Special Editor of our forthcoming issue on the Homosexualities.

tion.” (*The Anti-Oedipus*) Only the sublimated anus has a place in society. Because the functions of this organ are truly private, because they belong to the formation of the person, the anus expresses privatization itself. Analytic history assumes (and one can hardly help noticing the ‘anal’ in ‘analytic’) that the anal stage must be surpassed in order to reach the genital stage. In fact, the exercise in sublimation forced upon the anus is unequalled in any other organ; the anus moves from lowest to highest; in this sense ‘anality’ can be seen as the movement of sublimation itself.

The person is formed in the anal stage, explains Freud. The anus no longer has a desirous social functioning because all of its functions are henceforth excremental, that is to say, above all, private. The formation of the individual goes hand in hand with the great capitalist decoding: the anus is the most intimate concern of the individual and can certainly be linked with money, which must be possessed in order to circulate. The formation of the private person, individual and chaste, is ‘of the anus.’ The constitution of the public person is ‘of the phallus.’ The anus does not benefit from the ambiguity of the phallus, from its double existence as penis and Phallus. Certainly, to expose one’s penis is shameful, but it is at the same time linked to the glory of the Great Social Phallus. All men have a phallus which secures their social role, each man has an anus, very much his own, concealed in the depths of his person. Precisely because it establishes the individual, the anus is outside social relations, and thus permits the division between individual and society. Schreber suffers supreme humiliation when he can no longer defecate by himself. Defecation is not a public affair. The toilet is the one place to be alone, behind locked doors. There is no pornography of the anus (except anti-social). The anus is over-invested libidinally because it is dis-invested socially.

All libidinal energy directed towards the anus is diverted towards the social organization of private persons and sublimation. “The whole Oedipus is anal” (*Anti-Oedipus*) and there is all the more social anality when there is less desirous functioning of the anus. Your excrement is your concern, it belongs to you and you alone. Anus is to the organs what narcissism is to the formation of the individual: the source of energy from which the social sexual system and its oppressive reign over desire issue forth.

HOMOSEXUALITY AND ANUS

It could be said that the desirous functioning of the anus is not limited to homosexuals. We have mentioned in passing the anti-social exception: Bataille, for example, who is heterosexual, also recognized the particularly repressed character of this zone of the bourgeois body. For this very reason, Bataille cannot be considered an adequate expression of social sexuality; he is rather the expression of its extreme limits. No pornography of the anus, we have said, though certainly, heterosexual pornography makes quite a fuss over women’s buttocks. But if the breasts and buttocks of a woman represent

the fullness with which a man can fill his hands, the anus remains an intimate and empty site of a mysterious and personal production, the production of excrement.

If not exclusive to homosexuals, the desirous functioning of the anus at least takes precedence among them. Only homosexuals make constant libidinal use of this zone. In restoring to the anus its desiring function, homosexual desire defies anality sublimation. Schreber stops defecating when he can no longer resist his own homosexual libido. Homosexuality is above all anal homosexuality, i.e., sodomy.

At the end of his article on the "Noseology of Masculine Homosexuality," Ferenczi makes an observation of considerable importance: "It is difficult to find the cause for the proscription pronounced at the encounter of *this form* of tenderness between men. It may have been provoked mainly by the considerable reinforcement of the sense of cleanliness throughout the last centuries, that is to say, the *repression of anal eroticism*. Even the most sublimated homo-eroticism is associated, more or less consciously, with pederasty, an erotic anal activity" (passages underlined by the author). There is a certain 'form of tenderness' in the relationships between men, or should we say rather a certain 'desirous relation' opposed to the sublimated form of friendship which excludes anal cleanliness. Anal cleanliness establishes the child's responsible little self, and the relation between 'private property' and 'personal cleanliness' (*propriété privée* and *propreté privée*) becomes necessary rather than associative. Ferenczi also analyses "A Case of Paranoia Prompted by the Excitation of the Anal Zone." The patient is a forty-five-year-old farmer whose social role is marked by an extraordinary zeal: he manifests a great interest in community affairs in which he plays an important role. After a surgical intervention with the anal fistule, he loses all interest in the community and becomes the victim of a persecution paranoia. For Ferenczi, the relation between paranoia and homosexuality leads to the following analysis: "The necessity of an active intervention by men (the doctors) *around the patient's anal orifice* aroused . . . homosexual tendencies, formerly latent or sublimated. The paranoia is the consequence of a resurgence of the homosexual libido, which, until then, had been properly sublimated through friendliness for his fellow men and an important social role. If the anal fixation disappeared, Ferenczi concludes, the patient would be cured, that is to say "he would then be able to recover his capacity to sublimate, to direct his homosexual interests towards social activity and friendship, rather than towards a vulgar, though perhaps unconscious, perversion." The perversion here is all the more vulgar because it is phantasmagorically associated with excrement.

The homosexual anal drive thus has a right to manifest itself only in its properly sublimated form. The repression of the anus's desiring function is a condition for the important public role of a Schreber or a Souabe peasant, his rights, his individuality, his anal propriety, and his property. (Schreber has problems enjoying his family wealth when his presidential madness endangers their fame and fortune, which is protected in the end.) **Domina-**

tion of the anus is a condition for the acquisition of property, and propriety. Knowing how to 'hold it in' or, on the contrary, when to release one's excrement, is indispensable to the proper formation of the self. To 'forget oneself' is the most ridiculous and annoying social accident, and the most decremental to the human person. To live surrounded by dejection is, in our time, the great misfortune which only prisons and concentration camps can force upon us. To 'forget oneself' is to risk rejoining, across the excremental flux, non-differentiated desire . . .

One does not see one's anus except in the mirror of narcissism, 'tête à tête' or rather 'tête à dos' with one's own private little person. The anus is elevated socially and lowered individually, it is divided into the excremental and the poetic, the ignoble shameful little secret and sublimation. We have already noted that the homosexual undergoes a fate both miserable and divine. To renounce this conversion of anal libidinal energy in the paranoid machine, and to risk the loss of identity, is to sidestep the perverse reterritorializations imposed on homosexuality.

"Only the mind is capable of defecating": by this statement Deleuze and Guattari mean that only the mind is capable of fabricating excrement, only sublimation is capable of localizing the anal. Between the whispering of the mind on the summits and the underworld of the anus, our anal sexuality is imprisoned. Here, too, reigns that rule of double bind, that simultaneous production of two messages, contradictory but coherent in the success with which they have tied production to desire.

HOMOSEXUALITY AND IDENTITY LOSS

Sex is the first digit of our national identity number in the efficient ordering of the modern world. And neurosis is, above all, the impossibility of knowing (and this is certainly different from innocent ignorance) whether one is man or woman, parent or child. Hysterical neurosis is, as we know, the impossibility of knowing whether one is man or woman. All homosexuals are more or less hysterics; in fact, like women they have a profound identity problem, or rather they benefit from an uncertain identity.

The phallus alone distributes identity, non-sublimated use of the anus creates the risk of identity loss. From behind, we are all women; the anus is unaware of the difference between sexes. R. Greenson discusses homosexuality and identity loss in an article published by *Revue Française de Psychanalyse* (February 1965). To begin, the author establishes a fact which appears to astonish him: when the subject of homosexuality is introduced in the discourse with the patient, "the patient reacts with a feeling of fear, as if I had told him: You *are* Homosexual!" As if homosexuality could be mentioned innocently; after all, the neurosis of the patient begins with the paranoia of the doctor. But what is really astonishing is that the patient (the term itself says enough about his supposed passivity) is overwhelmed and panic stricken by the idea. "If we continue the analysis, the patient will soon describe the feeling of having lost a part of himself, something essential

though acquired, and directly related to his sexual identity, in the response he gave one day to the question 'Who am I?' One of my patients expressed this very succinctly when he told me, 'I have the impression that you are going to tell me that I am not a man, nor a woman, but a monster.'" The author distinguishes three phases of 'progress' from child to adult:

"I am me, John,

I am me, John, a boy.

I am me, John, a boy, and have the desire at this moment to have sexual relations with girls."

The difference between sexes and the attraction for the opposite sex are the conditions for sexual identity. "The least sexual attraction (of the sick person) for a man may provoke a state of great panic and threaten his sexual identity." The relation between sexual tendency and sexual object will be discussed elsewhere; for the moment we will only say that sexual identity is entirely dependent on the double assurance of resemblance and difference, narcissism and hetero-sexuality . . .

When the desirous function of the anus imposes itself, it is no longer the 'I' who speaks. The problem here is not one of passivity and activity (which, according to Freud, are differentiated in the anal stage). All homosexuality is linked to the anus, even though the celebrated Kinsey statistics report that anal sexuality remains an exception for all, including homosexuals.

All homosexuality is concerned with anal eroticism despite the perverse differentiations and reterritorializations Oedipus consequently imposes. And the anus is not a substitute for the vagina: it serves women as well as men. Homosexual desire thus interferes with the signifying discriminatory function of the phallus, which is affected the moment the anus organ becomes detached from the private realm it was forced into in order to enter the market of desire. Collective and libidinal reinvestment of the anus weakens the reign of the great phallic signifier that controls our daily life, in the little family hierarchies as well as in the great social hierarchies. Because it is the most desublimating, the desirous operation directed towards the anus is the least acceptable to society.

COMPETITIVE SOCIETY AND THE REIGN OF THE PHALLUS

Our society is a competitive society, competitive between males, between phallus bearers. The anus is excluded from the social game; the bourgeois reign organizes individuals in relation to possession of the phallus, appropriation of the phallus of others, and the fear of losing one's own. The Freudian reconstruction merely interprets and interiorizes the competitive hierarchy's merciless reign. One can only have an erection by castrating others, one can only rise on the road to genitality by trampling on other phallus-bearers, one can only possess a phallus when it is recognized by others, and the phallus is constantly threatened. That is to say, the phallus bearer is constantly in danger of losing his phallus in a hard-won battle. Nobody threatens to take your anus, the danger lies in revealing that you,

too, have a phallus. Schreber fears the rape of Fleschig although he desires it; he fears for his phallic existence which is jeopardized by the disclosure that he, too, has an anus.

All relations between men, that is to say, between phallus-bearers, subject to the competitive rule, refer to the only possible object of sexual activity: the woman. Competition 'begins' in the family, with the father, with the brothers, and 'continues' in the whole social process, with the ascent in the hierarchy. To possess or not to possess, to possess a woman or not to possess her, that is the question posed by the world, the 'apparent' question that conceals the production of desire.

All normal people are more or less paranoid, admit the psychologists. Relations of property and possession create the generalized paranoia of our society, based on the system of jealousy. We have already seen how Freudian analysis conceives the relations between paranoia and self-repressed homosexuality. In 1927, Freud writes an article entitled "On Certain Mechanisms of Jealousy, Paranoia, and Homosexuality". In this text he distinguishes between competitive jealousy, considered normal, projected jealousy, pertaining to the resistance of socially tolerated transgressions (adultery for example), and finally, delirious jealousy of paranoid order. Actually these distinctions, which introduce (at least quantitatively) a minimum of differentiation between the normal and pathological person, serve the sole purpose of reassuring the reader. In fact we are told that competitive jealousy "is caused by an unconscious hatred for woman, who is considered a rival . . . (the jealous man) associated (his feelings of jealousy) with the impressions of several homosexual aggressions he suffered as a young boy." As for projected jealousy, which is provoked by society's wise concession of a certain inevitable amount of infidelity in marriage, it "already has a delirious character." The analysis of delirious jealousy will show why Freud finds himself obliged to temper his discovery with alterations. For him it is out of the question to imprudently attack the competition-jealousy system head-on.

'Delirious jealousy' corresponds to homosexuality 'gone sour'; it is a defensive attempt against an overwhelming homosexual tendency, which could, for man, be circumscribed by the following formula: "I no longer love him, *she* is the one I love." This could be formulated more precisely: "I cannot love him since she is the one I love and who loves him."

The persecution delirium is this imaginary reconstruction that allows self-defense against the emerging homosexual drive: "We know that the person the paranoid transforms into his persecutor is precisely the member of his own sex that he loves the most." The jealousy-competition system opposes the system of non-exclusive desire, and multiplies the safeguards against it. Concerning relations between men: "Within the male community, a man who sees virtual objects of love in other men, must act differently from those who are forced to consider men primarily as rivals in front of women." The jealousy-competition system is immediately opposed to the poly-vocal system of desire. Homosexual desire preserves something of this opposition, but it is transferred, in its sublimated social form, to a devotion

to the community of men, to the public interest, in Freud's own terms. Sublimation of homosexuality can thus be considered a public service. The ambiguity stems from such vague Freudian expressions as 'instinct to a social tendency' and 'devotion to the interests of public service.' This supposed social sense is the basis of the exploitation of homosexual desire, of its transformation into a cohesive social force. It is a necessary counterpart to the jealousy-competition system, which, taken to its limit, would be a total law of the jungle.

Homosexual sublimation offers ideological security to a social cohesion which is constantly threatened. Thus the essential role of the jealousy-competition system in the social relations of capitalist society is entirely supported by a double drive of homosexual repression and sublimation, one securing the phallus' competitive reign, the other, the hypocrisy of human relations.

Jealousy and rivalry play a role in homosexual love too; in return for the services rendered by the homosexual libido, the competition-jealousy system invests in homosexual love. To the point, moreover, that certain people attribute the origins of jealousy paranoia to homosexual desire, which actually has been forced to serve as its motor. In Stekel's psychological analysis (cited above)¹ jealousy is linked to homosexuality, conceived as a means of representing the competitor's phallus. If men are in competition, then sexual relations between men (here Stekel has evidently forgotten to specify that they are repressed, strictly imaginary) are relations between phalluses, relations of comparison and hierarchy. Homosexuality thus becomes phallic in exchange for what it has allowed through repressive organization of desires directed towards the anus, namely, the triumph of the phallus. To free homosexual desire from the imaginary system in which it is exploited is essential for the destruction of the jealousy-competition system.

OEDIPAL REPRODUCTION AND HOMOSEXUALITY

Homosexual desire is specifically related to the pre-personal state of desire. Insofar as it is repressed, experienced within the imaginary system, it is related to the fear of losing one's identity. Manifest homosexual desire conflicts with identity relations, with the roles Oedipus imposes in order to insure the reproduction of society. Reproductive sexuality also reproduces Oedipus; parent sexuality insures the reproduction of children, but above all it insures the reproduction of Oedipus as discrimination between parent and child . . .

Homosexual neurosis is the retaliation of Oedipal reproduction threatened by homosexual desire. Producing without reproducing, homosexual desire is the terror of the family, the non-engendered non-engenderer. And so the homosexual must feel that he is at the end of a race, a race of reproduction for which he is not responsible and which he concludes. The homosexual is socially unacceptable unless he is neurotically attached to his

mother or father, the by-product of an expiring lineage that finds meaning for its perversion in the guilt of the one whose position can be determined only in relation to the past. Since he does not engender, the homosexual must be a degenerate, the artistic end of a race. His temporality is limited to the past: the Greeks or Sodom. Homosexuality serves nothing, grant it at least a little useless, though necessary role in the conservation of the artistic spirit. Homosexuality is treated as a regressive neurosis, completely turned towards the past, revealing the inability to follow the course that is designed for each individual of the male sex, the path to the adult figure, to papa. Since it is incapable of rising to genitality, since, like the countercurrent of a necessary historical evolution, it ignores the succession of stages, homosexual desire must be regressive. Because otherwise the homosexual would be a childless orphan. An orphan in the sense that "the unconscious is an orphan" as Deleuze and Guattari say. Childless: as such the transmission of homosexuality preserves the rather mysterious nature that belongs to the course of desirous production; G. Macé refers to a police commissioner's definition of homosexuals (*Lundis en prison*): "These people who tend to multiply even though they don't procreate." Homosexual reproduction is based on unrestricted horizontal relations; heterosexual reproduction is based on hierarchical succession. In the delineated Oedipal triangle everyone knows what place he will occupy in his tum; this, explains Freud, is the condition for society's progress . . .

HOMOSEXUAL GROUP-FORMATION

Sublimated homosexuality provides the minimal amount of humanitarian cohesion required by society. The repression of homosexuality corresponds to the jealousy-competition system of phallic individuals. Freud writes at the end of an article ("Of Certain Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia, and Homosexuality"): "...from the psychoanalytic point of view, we are accustomed to think of the social sentiment as requiring a sublimation of homosexual desire with regard to its object." It would be interesting to consider what sort of 'social relations' are not founded on homosexual sublimation, or conversely, how the de-sublimation of homosexual desire would affect social organization.

Freud ends his article with the following ambiguous conclusion: "Among homosexuals endowed with a social sense, the social sentiments will not function in such a way as to detach him from the original choice of object with fully gratifying results." This sentence is particularly unsatisfying from a Freudian point of view, for the quantity of libido directed towards the homosexual object should, in principle, diminish in proportion to the 'social sense.' According to this, in dealing with the homosexual endowed with a social sense, we are dealing with a contradictory monster; unless 'social' here has a meaning other than the ordinary one. If the direct expression of homosexual desire can acquire a social sense it is certainly not in a society founded upon the heterosexual family system where anti-homosexual paranoia and sublimation reign.

The desires directed towards the anus are closely linked to homosexual desire and constitute what can be described as a group-mode of relations as opposed to the usual social mode. The anus undergoes a movement which renders it private; the opposite movement, which would make the anus public, through what might be called desirous-group formation, provokes a collapse of the sublimating phallic hierarchy, and at the same time, destroys the double bind relation between individual and society.

Deleuze and Guattari explain that there is no individual phantasm which could oppose the collective phantasm, the fruit of a collectivity based on Oedipal oppression. To speak of homosexuality as an individual problem, as *the* problem of the individual, is a sure means of subjecting it to Oedipus. Homosexual desire is a group desire, it forms the anus-group, by endowing the anus with the function of 'desiring link,' by reinvesting it collectively, in a way that opposes its reduction to a shameful little secret. "Practicing homosexuals have somehow failed to sublimate desire, they are incapable of fulfilling the demands that nature and society impose upon individuals." (Jacques Corraze, *The Dimensions of Homosexuality*). The failure to sublimate involves, quite simply, a different conception of social relations. When the anus recovers its desiring function, when the connecting of organs follows no rule and obeys no law, the group can enjoy a sort of immediate relation in which the sacred distinctions between public and private, individual and society, disappear. And one could perhaps find an indication of this primary sexual communism in certain institutions of the homosexual ghetto, even though they are frequently the object of repressions and guilty reconstructions; the Turkish baths, for example; well-known as the place where homosexual desires are anonymously connected in spite of the constant menace of police presence. With the formation of anus-groups, sublimation loses its hold, not even a crevice is left for the implantation of the guilty conscience.

The group-mode of the anus is annular (anular, we could say); it is the circle which is open to infinite possible connections in all directions without the limitation of assigned places. The social in the phallic hierarchy, that flimsy castle of cards which belongs to the realm of the imaginary, collapses with the annular group formation.

Homosexual desire is not a secondary consequence of Oedipus; it is the functioning of the desirous machine connected to the anus. Deleuze and Guattari underline the error of Devereux (*Ethno-Psychoanalytic Consideration on the Notion of Parenthood*, "L'Homme," July 1965), who considers homosexuality to be the product of Oedipal repression. *Anti-Oedipus* insists on the fact that "... if it is true that Oedipal or filial homosexuality exists, we must recognize it only as a reaction to group homosexuality, initially non-Oedipal." Homosexual desire, then, exists only in groups, and at the same time is forbidden by society. And so it is necessary to make the anal disappear, or rather, to transform the anal into anality. Freud writes: "The first restriction imposed upon the child... is directed towards the pleasure obtained by anal activity and its products. For the first time, the

child feels himself surrounded by a world hostile to the manifestations of his desires; he learns to distinguish between his own small self and these strangers who are forcing him for the first time to repress his possibilities for pleasure. From this point on, the anal becomes the symbol of all that must be excluded from his life." In his *Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, Freud explains that anal stimulation is rejected because "all that is related to this function is indecent and must remain hidden. (The child) is forced to renounce pleasure in the name of social dignity."

If homosexual desire, caught in the trap of Oedipus, becomes homosexuality, it is precisely because the anal group-formation threatens to silence the social Oedipus. And the myth of Oedipus reveals why it is necessary to distinguish between homosexual desire, the primary form of homosexuality characterized by a non-differentiation of desire, and Oedipized homosexuality, perverse because all energy is directed towards the reinforcement of the law. It is because, say Deleuze and Guattari, everything begins in the mind of Laius, the old homosexual of the group, the pervert who sets a trap for desire. Oedipal homosexuality begins in the mind of the father and assures the integration of the group-forming force into the Oedipal social edifice.

Translated by Caithin and Tamsen Manning

NOTES

1. Wilhelm Stekel, *Impotence in the Male; The Psychic Disorders of Sexual Function in the Male*, translated by Oswald H. Boltz, New York: Liveright, 1927.

. . . returns home (Mythologies, Dialectics, Structures): Disruptions

R. A. BRINKLEY and ROBERT DYER

As we pause on the edge of our extraterritorial adventures, our Odyssean encounters with the unknown, our Kazantzakian sightseeings, our flights from the stifling cages of family and knowledge, we have been taught to privilege that edge as a unique position—one position, fully differentiated from all other positions, rational, secure: “In your adventure, you will gain profit, wisdom, experience, but you must bring it home to this privileged place, your home. You cannot exclude this position. It is yours. Therefore set down roots in this place, become a tree, ever returning to the roots of your identity.”

We have learned this from the mythologies of family, childhood, capitalism, dialectics, translation, thesis-writing: the family demands return, capital demands return, God demands return, the hero returns, discussion returns to the point of departure, the signifier returns to the signified . . . We thus enter a cage in which we are positioned below the power of society’s master discourse, the Oedipal imperative. We believe ourselves trapped, struggling for return to identity, for integrity, struggling to control the lines of return, to master the point of departure or to overthrow the tyrants who possess it.

Yet these demands are illusions, tricks designed by the territorial masters to position us within their territories forever. They derive from—no, they are—a particular social coding, mythology, the one which Deleuze and Guattari have named Oedipal—suggesting the privileged position of families, at least of the Freudian analysis of families. What are our names for these Oedipal points of departure, to which we are conditioned to return, by which our identities are positioned, controlled, trapped?

The point of departure as point of desire. The birth canal as vagina. Oedipus’ particular birth canal as his particular vagina. The line FROM also named TO, the master ruse of Oedipal control, a mystification of semantics, a psychodrama. Home. Ithaca. Mother country. Hawaiki. The established Church. Ritual. The Democratic Party. The Dictionary.

In extraterritorial space, that sea of Odysseus, that ocean of the Polynesians, we travel looking for the magic craft that will ferry us home in sleep, or sail in the *vaka*¹ which brings with it the sacred name of Hawaiki, making of each new landfall the representation of hawaiki, “home.” Each new home a representation of Home, a mimesis suggesting a deep structure of reality, the original Home, Urheimat, the Platonic Home in the ordered cosmos, repressing chaos, fully differentiated, Emphyrean.

R. A. Brinkley is a graduate student in English at the University of Massachusetts where Robert R. Dyer, who was born a New Zealander, teaches Classics. Their Passages (Out of Contest) From Derrida Deleuze Guattari Lyotard is in preparation.

The myths preach: In Ogygia with Calypso/Suzanne, feeding “you tea and oranges that come all the way from China,”² in Phaeacia, gracious Phaeacia with the child-bride who found you naked and would not flee, you pray to the gods for return to the old wife who saw you off to war twenty years ago, for old, blind Argus, for the familiar hills and beaches of before. If you capture the exogamous bride in Colchis, bring her home to Corinth. There she will learn to conform to the *nomoi* of your roots. If she does not, send her packing before she murders your offshoots, the new branches of your tree. The Oedipal center grasping against the lines of flight. Charles Kingsley, Andrew Lang, the absurd Arnold cult of Greco-Roman mythology:

PRESERVE THE VICTORIAN FAMILY.

How to disrupt return, to free the machines of desire to generate intensities, lines of flight/desire? Lines without point or privileged position, flowing free, running on in the perpetual flux of the polymorphous libido? Each place must be seen as an undifferentiated oracle, every instant on the lines of flight/desire as a moment of oracular ambiguity, potentially positioned by aggressive acts in its environment. How to learn that Home is not the point of final return? How to learn that you can only leave? How to teach . . . ?

The master ruses of Oedipal control, the master strategy of encountered forces, position us, engage us. How to find the weak ruses—no, *some* weak ruses—that will deposition, disrupt, the territorial masters of our own living? Guerrilla stratagems against global strategy. Passages from centers that are not to centers. Grafts that interrupt the closed arboreal cycle of identity. At least some passes.

DISRUPTIONS the action of rending, of bursting asunder; violent dissolution of continuity (of the body without organs); forcible severance. A disrupted condition; a disrupted part or place, a rent. *spec. The Disruption*: the name applied to the great split in the Established Church of Scotland, 18th May 1843, when 451 ministers left that Church and formed themselves into the Free Protestant (afterwards, simply, the Free) Church of Scotland. (1871, J. Mackenzie, *Life Princ. Cunningham* xv, 192: “The same contented cheerfulness dwelt in the poor abode of every Disruption minister.”)³

GRAFT a shoot or scion inserted in a disruption or slit in another stock, so as to allow the sap of the latter to circulate through the former / A portion of living tissue transplanted from one place to another on the same or another organism *in order to grow* / The act of fixing a graft / of planting / of transplanting / A kind of spade for digging drains / A means of making illicit profit or usury / To practise graft. C.f. GRAPH GRAPHIC GRAPHITE —graph(y).⁴

We encounter the global strategy in our schoolmasters’ “classical” traditions, taught through the mystifying abracadabra of decently dead languages.

One pass leads into this classroom. Let us pause long enough from the pursuit of liberation to become Professors of Classics and speak with authority:

"Greek thought, despite its praised clarity, always tolerated a central ambiguity, an ambiguity properly elevated by the Pythagoreans into a religious mystery. Although knowledge and reality are an undifferentiated whole, the One, they can be understood only by polarizations, by differentiations. When the Delphic oracle proclaimed, "Know thyself," it hedged between its claim to know the undifferentiated truth and its practice of setting forth differentiations. Its oracles pose being (the yourself it says you must know) as choice, as differentiation of being into two modes of being:

A is B, where B returns to A without difference; or

A is B, where B departs from A in a deterritorializing attempt at difference.

The primary polarization of the body without organs (Stay home. Replace I am me with me with me with me forever.) vs. the machines of desire (Liberate I. Become the new subject: I decide, I act, I choose, I leave, I kill, I die.).⁵ Achilles, Croesus, Orestes, Oedipus, Clytemnestra, they are all the same in myth and story. The intellectual temptation: Differentiate beings. But in binary opinions to which there is no third, no disruptive being, no graft to interrupt arboreal identity. Only the illusory third, the synthesis, the meaning of the myth.

"Oedipus looks at the body without organs without terror, so says Sophocles. He flees from the terror option in the oracle out into the passages of desire and intensity. But the flight from Corinth is actually the return home. Fleeing the imaginary home, answering the Sphinx's question, What is man?, he is always returning to the Oedipal home. He finds that his flight from the body without organs was really always a return to it, that in truth From is To, To is From, there is only Home. The eyes with which he differentiated From from To were his betrayers. He tears out the passage-finders, the finders of choice. We never left home, never left the roots of identity. All passage was Return Home. So says Sophocles, Oedipal tyrant, peddler of Asclepiadeanism, Freudianism, ismism, traducteur.

"Orestes choosing to kill, gain power, become I King, excludes memory of the undifferentiated state before being, Mother, Furies, the Dark, so says Aeschylus. His choice excludes a dark, sinister line. He must be brought home to his new Hawaiki, Athens, in synthesis, uniting the polarization of choice in the flimsy harmony of democratic compromise. Aeschylus believes in Hegel, yet the scabskin of synthesis is perilously thin. The wound of differentiation is visible, it will not heal.⁶ The rite of passage to new Hawaiki is plainful, terrible. Yet it can be done if the new home is painted with the proper representation of Home as re-integrated differentiations, as the place of mediation between self and other, choice and exclusion, good (Home) and evil (not Home). So says Aeschylus, old army officer, founder of a dubious democratic propaganda and the Athenian empire, author of the LBJ compromise.

“Antigone excludes Creon; Creon excludes Antigone. Two modes of being, never meeting, destroying, the human condition. Despair within the cage of Life. I have encountered myself and it is two: Heaven and Hell in perpetual war. Yet the death of one is the death of me. Hide low within society. Sophrosyne. Without sophrosyne, know yourself as two, the good scapegoating, excluding the evil, yet empowering the unchosen, the evil, to overpower the good. Death.

“‘I Apollo, I am God. I am also Death.’ The master language of death over life, the ruse of the Delphic oracle over the living intensities of man. The priests claim for their god the mystic integration of polarities into unity, but offer in the oracles the differentiated choice, leading to schizophrenia and death, the schizoid path of western educated man from which the Delphic priest, the Asclepiadean poet, and the psychotherapist derive their income, the tyrants of the Oedipal master ruse.”

Whereas the Delphic oracle is simply wrong. Return is impossible, as Heraclitus had already seen. Sophocles/Freud says through Oedipus that every step away is a step towards. But every step towards is a step away. All paths lead away. They will say through Oedipus that all paths are circular (in reality or in art). Yet every attempt to make the path circular results only in a spiral, spiralling out from the point of departure. There is only Being Away. That is the Deleuze-Guattarian position, which depositions other positions.

Laius is not the father of Oedipus. How could a man Oedipus has never known be his father? Jocasta is not the mother. She lost that position long ago. To say that she did not is a master ruse of the oracle. And of an overly serious play/psychology. Each oracle, as it proclaims the fact of family life, makes Oedipus an orphan. Because of the first oracle, he is abandoned by his parents. Because of the second, he abandons his adopted parents. Because of their interpretation, he is driven from his family in Thebes.

The Thebes to which Oedipus “returns” is not the Thebes into which he was born. Jocasta his wife is not the young girl from whom he was born. The mother of his children is different from the mother who had exposed him, her first-born.

But Sophocles/Freud does not wish the oracle/analysis to be the exit from family life. They wish to make family life global. So by oracle or analysis they mean to convince Oedipus, as a master tricks his slave, that he has returned, that from the trap of the family there will be no escape. Yet Thebes, the play on the couch, are only traps through which Oedipus, the orphan, will pass. As the child must pass through the Freudian family, dreaming (Freud acknowledges) that it is a changeling.

“At every step the pure wind rises,”⁷ movement of which the movement of representation is a deceptive part.

What we know, what we could know if it were simply a question of knowing, is that there never has been and never will be a unique word, a master name . . . There will be no unique name, not even the name of Being. It must be conceived *without nostalgia*.⁸

Insist instead on forgetting. In representation and opposition there is memory: passing from one singularity to the other, the one and the other are held together . . . An identity, the Same, is implicit in this memory . . . (Forgetting.) The voyage is a passage without a wake, snapshots, exposures that are multiple only for discourse, not for themselves. That is why there is no representation for this voyage, for *the nomadic of intensities*.⁹

ANTI-OEDIPAL STRATAGEMS I ME SHADOWS MOVING APART

RETURN on the nomadic moment / a critical moment / position / where the choice (chance) between alternatives apparently occurs / the nomadic or the dialectic.

Thinking—instead of getting any further with the transition from subject to predicate, in reality finds its activity checked through the loss of the subject, and it is thrown back on the thought of the subject because it misses the subject.¹⁰

A passage from Hegel, from the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, which marks the moment/movement of return. Hegel has taken the linguistic proposition of Cartesian discourse—*this is that*¹¹—and demonstrated, contrary to belief, that the predicate is not an attribute of the subject, rather that the subject, as we read, *becomes* the predicate, so that when we write *God is love*, God becomes love. A journey out. The subject disappears in the object. First there was a subject without object: *God*; now there is an object without subject: *love*; in a moment there will be neither. A moment, nevertheless, which we never encounter. Checked by a sense of loss, thought returns to its subject—either by making *love*, *God* again, or by making *love* a new subject into which *God* has been subsumed.

The moment of return then is a moment when loss is sensed. But why such a sense at all?

In Lacan return is a motif of re-placement: there is no movement from place to place, rather, a movement *in* place, the repetition (wheresoever) of the *same* place: *re-place*, that is to say, metaphor. In Lacan's definition of metaphor, the trope which he identifies both with being and with neurotic symptoms, a place emerges as a linguistic moment, the present, and replacement as a repetition of that moment, *re-present*(action).

The creative spark of metaphor does not spring from the conjunction of two images, that is of two signifiers, one of which has taken the place of the other in the signifying chain, the hidden signifier then remaining present through its (metonymic) relation to the rest of the chain.¹²

The emergence here of both a hidden presence (the hidden signifier which remains present in the signifying chain) and return (the second signifier which replaces the first, continues to re-present that which it has replaced), an emergence that can only occur if there is an assumption that there is / can be only one place, one position, for which the signifiers vie. One scene.

But this motif is already apparent in Hegel, in his insistence on *becoming*, his insistence that God must become love since the present is singular and the moment of consciousness moves from content to content as it mediates itself. There is no place in dialectic for two, three, fifty simultaneous and irreducibly different presents (differents): only one process happens at a time. *The* dialectic. It returns to where it began because, as an exclusive process, it cannot move without a certain loss. In a movement without return, there would be no becoming.

Preoccupation with a particular scene, the assumption of a single space, that there is one place and one place only: in Marxism, a single historical space in which history becomes; in Freud, a psychic place where forces contend, a place that is the re-enactment/repetition/return of a primal scene. The assumption of a stage, a scene as the context of interplay: so that play is *a play*, it has a narrative, a beginning and end, an evolution of forces. We watch what the plot becomes.

Moving in place: so in dialectic, the sublation of A by B, in which B takes A's place, necessarily means that B never leaves A at all. The issue then, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, is precisely that *of an issue*—an exit, escape, the problem of leaving.¹³ A line of flight. And from the first, it appears, that for a line of flight to occur, it must not be preoccupied; it must not become from and toward what it is; it must not replace, but *displace*. That is, leave. No return.

Preoccupations—Wittgenstein on Freud: “the fact is that whenever you are preoccupied with something . . . then no matter what you start from, the association will lead finally and inevitably back to the same theme.”¹⁴ Derrida on metaphor: “When we search for metaphor, what could we find other than this run of the same.”

Return, pre-occupation. The search for metaphor. Without these there could be no signification since signification begins with substitution: when one signifier is replaced by another, the signified comes into existence. It is constituted in the negative moment of a signifier's loss. Just as the subject in dialectic is established by its loss in the predicate which it becomes. The movement that does not become cannot be significant (c.f. Guattari's concern with a-signifying codes).

One scene: but it is not so simple really.

If B takes A's place, so that B never leaves A at all, B nevertheless takes A's place *from a distance*. Position B *is* position A, but it is so from a distance. Since in order to posit B as a representative of A, we must have posited B and A as separate positions: B as an apparent, A as a hidden position. We can only say that B is A because B is not A. The B that is A is a-way from A.

The ambivalence of becoming: the movement that becomes, the movement in place: or rather, a movement away (the subject *is* lost, the signifier as it becomes the signified of another signifier *does* disappear, *at the same time* that each returns) that goes no-where. That carries the place it is leaving with it. To leave and not to leave at once: or rather, to be leaving

without leaving perpetually. Leaving and going back at once. As if an automobile could move in reverse and in drive at once and with equal force—and so go nowhere. An extreme ambivalence that looks like stasis. Movement in place: an ambivalent place: the object, the representation, the mediator, the substitute, the replacement.

In which case, as ambivalences, object/representation/mediator/substitute/etc. appear to be composites: a “place” which is at once *place-returning* and *movement-from-place*. The motif of place: it must assume another place since its insistence is precisely that two or more positions have/are the same location. The object which re-presents the subject, cannot, despite its insistence, be the subject since it is somewhere else. Insistently, Hegel’s logic can only account for the movement of the verb *to be*—this is that, but the verb *to be* is only one action among many, and even its action is ambivalent. (Bernard Bolzano: “equality . . . is nothing other than a special instance of difference . . . the combination, the synthesis, asserted and expressed by the ‘equals’ sign, does not dispel the difference of the terms standing on either side of it but rather intensifies this difference.” Cassirer calls this the “curse of mediation,” but why a curse?).¹⁵ Its insistence, that *two are one* (a movement from plural to singular), always marks the reverse, that *one is/are two* (a movement from singular to plural), the undoing of its unity.

A place we are in is a substitution (replacement/representation/object/predicate/signifier/slave) for *the* place (presence/subject/signified/master); but presence never exists before it is represented (it is created at the moment of its loss). The subject is constituted by its loss in the subject that returns it; the signified, by the signifier (loss and return at once); Hegel’s master only exists through the unsatisfactory mediation/recognition of the slave. From which we learn that slave, mediator, representation, replacement hold the position of power precisely because they are not *the* position but a *subordinate* upon which *the* position depends. Or rather, they create that from which they incessantly move away. Place: the creation and denial of place.

What if the subordinate should cease to lend its support? Or if the mediator should cease to mediate? But this occurs even as mediation occurs. Only through B, A’s reflection, does A become a presence. A can only exist through the mediation of B that simultaneously departs from its mediation. We cannot even write $A = A$ without writing, necessarily, imperceptibly, $A \neq A$.

$A = A$, the principle of identity, thus the principle of non-identity. Heidegger revises the classical reading of $A = A$ from “every A is itself the same” to “every A is itself the same with itself. Sameness implies the relation of ‘with,’ that is, a mediation, a connection, a synthesis: the unification into unity,” that is, “*belonging together*.”¹⁶ But that is also dispersion from the created unity. Each of the readings of the principle of identity must be read as non-identity as well. $A \neq A$: every A is different from itself. Every A is itself different with itself (or without itself, or *from* itself). Identity as departure from identity.

An object channels and resists the return of its subject. Its action is plural—actions, schizo. The action that Derrida also marks in the word *différance* that he finds in others' dialectics, the action that he re-marks with a silent *a* (*différance*) as the action on which dialectic depends, which, in-deed, also interrupts it. The object differing and deferring the subject that it institutes (c.f. Lyotard on the *tableau vivant* in *L'acinéma*).¹⁷ The shimmering image of subjugation, like the luster of a mirroring simulacrum, differing and deferring from the master that it simultaneously invents. A *Playboy* centerfold, Miss May, a sexual object apparently, apparently dominated, who/which escapes domination and control with her/its simulation/representation of a non-existent desire, the gaze directed upon it/her. An object returns to a subject, and an object resists the return. We have frequently followed the return. Too frequently. Incessantly. Without apparent alternative. We have rarely marked the resistance-movement, remarked the direction that it marks, the movement that goes no-where. Toward *no-place*. *A-way*. *Dis-place*.

Near the end of the *Phenomenology* Hegel writes of "an object which, just by being in a relation, has not yet attained its full freedom."¹⁸ Just by being in a relation. Just by being an object.

At Hiroshima, during the Atomic Blast, those near the center dissolved. Nevertheless, as they dissolved, their bodies, blocking the heat's waves, cast shadows of relative coolness on the stones where they stood—a moment before, walking somewhere. Or anywhere. Perhaps, nowhere at all. As the stones burned, the space where the shadows fell burned less intensely, and negative silhouettes of the shadows were etched by the surrounding heat into the pavement. Stone pathways. It was at the instant that the bodies dissolved and representational traces appeared (negatives, like the negative hands on the walls of the paleolithic cave-dwelling at Gargas) that the bodies, for the first time, became presences.

When I walk in the sun, is there any insistence that the shadow before me, moving as I walk, represents my presence? But only if it represents (or if there is a representation) will the presence *be*. Why not ME / SHADOW / MOVING / APART?

Still sun: isn't that source, origin, light? Isn't *sun* the underlying presence overhead? Perhaps. Or, at least, if there were one sun. But *sun* too is multiple. Suns. Lights. And the interactions between multiples—like musical intervals in Cage's intended/unintended sounds—those unintended are marked in the score as spaces—act as lights. Multiples, as the sequences that a metaphor would limit, but metaphor like *the* sun which is always exploding into suns. And the sun itself, only at issue if it is not one of these suns. The issue: (from) what John Cage calls the German turn of mind, the insistence that what happens here must be what is happening everywhere else.

Act(s) as lights (of) suns / Mont Sainte-Victoire / Cézanne's / landscapes / grafting passage(s) / colors / lights / interactions, multiple(s), acts. *Passage*(s. Not one. No where.)ways.

ANTI-OEDIPAL STRATAGEMS II SCRIPTURE AGAINST SCRIPTURE

“For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places.”

Paul's letter to the Ephesians. A double citation, which the double quotation marks: since in citing Paul, we are necessarily, by chance, citing Blake's use of Paul—on the third page of *The Four Zoas*, where Paul's letters—the text quoted above—have been grafted into Blake's text—at the top of the page and at the beginning of the epic—so as to allow the sap of the latter to circulate through the former—a portion of living tissue transplanted from one place to another in order to grow.

An initial passage then, from Paul and from Blake—or passages [textual fragments, in which there is travel, passage, like the journey and day(light), or at least French day, *jour*, in a journal—and between which there is *passage* as in Cézanne's landscapes—each of his late paintings of Monte Sainte-Victoire is plural—pluralities of planes on passages of light] in which, as we wish to imply, a journey may occur from which there is no return, the return, in Paul's letter, being synonymous with what Nietzsche calls *ressentiment*.

How do we read Paul's letter? From one position, from the “outside”: it is part of the semi-clandestine rhetoric of a subjected group within the power mechanisms of the Roman world(s). Paul writes from prison against the forces that have imprisoned him—not against men, but against the system in which he and they participate. The words then wrestle with power.

For power: even as they were written, these words were privileged, of a sacred text, that fights in the name of a truth. The Christian, Nietzsche writes, is a “rebel against everything privileged,”¹⁹ but a rebel in the name of a (*the*) higher privilege. From another position, from “inside” the community in which it is exchanged, Paul's letter has the authority of a leader's words to his followers. Its authority will, as we know, expand.

What exactly is the interaction with power in Paul's words? Aimed at positions of mastery, their weapon, a word, *wickedness*, a word that depends on a hierarchy of values, a whole mythology of narratives, for its force, Paul's letter will divest *the rulers of the darkness of this world*, a negative moment. At the same time it will replace them with the *good*, the *we* who *wrestle*. Rulers will be replaced by rulers as the powers of darkness are at once annulled and preserved, uplifted into the power of light. Power destroyed, power returns. New subjects subjected. New masters. *Aufhebung*. Paul's letter is an instrument of dialectic. Words of *return*. Nietzsche: “The attempt to destroy priests and theologians culminated, thanks to Paul, in a new priesthood and theology—in a new ruling order.”²⁰

When Blake cites Paul, he re-marks his letter. Paul wrestling against Roman power, Jewish power. Blake wrestling with Paul, against the majesty of Paul's words against majesty. Another rebel against privilege. But here, at least, there is no return. Since Blake's quotation cannot replace the authority of other words with itself. Since the authority it attacks is its own. The powers, the darkness, the wickedness, the high places are the powers, darkness, wickedness, and high places of the words themselves, of Paul's letters. And as the words attack themselves, as their power is turned against them, negating them, the words move away from themselves along a path from which there is no return. Any return would be of Paul's letter, not of Blake's citation of Paul's letter. Blake's re-mark will be effaced by any return; silently it interrupts all return—indeinitely. Like graft—illicit profits which deprive a government of its legitimate revenues.

A double passage then, or, as Lyotard suggests, two stratagems or ruses. 1. Paul's: a master ruse which invokes a hierarchy of values against a hierarchy of values in order to preserve the mechanism of mastery through unending sublations. 2. Blake's: a weak ruse, that invokes no hierarchy but turns the master discourse against itself. In order to gain passage out, without return. A master discourse, with its strategy of master ruses, functions by subordinating or subjecting others to it. Turned against itself, it will subordinate itself and eliminate mastery. "The perspective is that of the multiplication of minorities without majorities."²¹

ANTI-OEDIPAL STRATEGEMS III DEPARTURES WITHOUT NOSTALGIA

How to find the precarious balance, the nomadic resting-place, the place where intensities can be safely reduced to zero, to the body without organs, sleep, where tomorrow's intensities will be free to leave, without repression, without nostalgia? The point of potential home = the point of potential departure. The monument/tent that re-presents presence (home) but presents absence (not-home).

We have learned much, we New Zealanders, at the furthest end of the extra-territorial lines of flight, the colonial ultimate. We were discovered first by the proud Oedipal *vaka*.²² Ranging the Pacific Ocean, passing down the colonial passage from Hawaiki to deterritorialized Hawaiki, the nostalgic ever *vaka-Hawaiki*, that makes of every landing-place something like Hawaiki, the mimetic machine sailing down the oracular line of differentiated being in search of the colonial space to reintegrate being, to restore the re-undifferentiated state before exclusion, before the oracle, before the choice between self and other, writer of mimetic art, tragedian, traveler, agent of the Central Bureau of Polynesian Culture, disseminating returns. Naming the last land Aotearoa,²³ perhaps because it lies on the final horizon, floating, without mimesis of home.

Then the colonists came, recreating pastoral Victorian England, "but as the children grew/ It was something different, something/ Nobody counted on."²⁴

Finally the teachers, the Scots from the Disruption. How to depart from the Established Church? Not in protest but in disruptive departure? For protest is negation, exclusionary, oracular, repressing, authorizing Home as the positioning power, the dominant force, the colonial center. No protests to reinforce the Oedipal family! No revolutions!

Rev. Norman MacLeod flees with his small Disruption flock to Nova Scotia, but the Atlantic is too small, the tentacles of the Church reach after.²⁵ So he sets sail again, round Cape Horn in the little ships, testing God, till they reach New Zealand, to Waipu, the fair stretches of beach and pohutukawa, the home too far from home to be home, the grafting stock. But he is himself the negation, the minus sign, not-Establishment. Only with his death is the Disruption complete, his followers free from the Establishment, without nostalgia, without return. But always with the small ships ready, ready to depart again.

We have begun long ago to prepare for the one-way passages of tomorrow, to train the Orpheuses of our future flights to depart for stars unknown without the need to look backwards, breeding in-flight children who will not remember the point of departure nor live to see the point of arrival, passengers on the long passages. We are already skilled in the anti-Oedipal strategems with which those *vaka* can be freed from nostalgia, from the body without organs, we the people of the outer colonies, we New Zealanders.²⁶

We have learned to live in the ambiguous home: home as point of arrival = home as point of departure. When we sense the Oedipal home disrupt, we sense the disruption and depart, for we have learned that beyond the long white cloud there is a resting-place with no name. (There are too many resting-places beyond the stars for us to give them all names.) And when it is winter, we rest on the ground and do not depart. But when the season of the godwits comes we gather for the long flight.

For departure is not truly FROM or TO, it is simply BECAUSE. The BECAUSE is the rising earth, readying for disruption: eruption, sedition, boredom. The flight is across the empty spaces. But we do not carry the Oedipal earth; we have learned to forget Hawaiki and its Oedipal history. Our once-upon symbols were the disruption of Atlantis, of Hawaiki, of the Established Church; our new symbol is the Bomb, Hiroshima, the folding planet that trains us to hurl ourselves towards the stars on the long anti-Oedipal flight of our future, where we have forgotten the point of departure and will die without seeing the point of arrival.

Fictions, externalizing, symbolizing, the inner facts of departure. We depart simply because we are positioned. We find the earth beneath our feet possessed by the petty tyrant, the bureaucrat, wishing to establish power by positioning us below his power, the Established Church minister establishing doctrine, the literary critic capitalizing on his text and its readers, those who seek to establish Oedipal structures around us.

The New Zealander has become the vagabond teacher of how to live without position, with no point from which to depart, to which to arrive, every moment in flight or at rest but on unpossessed ground, ready to use

every trap as a point of departure, every block as a *clinamen* of destiny. The name of the line of flight is from one point of view departures, from another the machines of desire. The line moves into liner because of its inner intensities, the fragmentations of soul, the denials of the unitary body without organs. The liner deterritorializes because it has seen the Star of Bethlehem or the Bomb at Hiroshima. If we stand still, we will see it depart. If we flow down the oceans of movement, we will see a million liners pass by among a million stars. Ours is a-way among many ways.

NOTES

1. VAKA—a canoe (Tongan, Marquesan, Mangarevan). In Maori *waka*; Samoan *va'a*; Tahitian *vaa*; Hawaiian *waa*. Cf. *VAKA*—a prefixed causative 'to cause, to make to do' (Nguna, cf. Fijian *vaka*, a prefix inferring either similitude or causation). In Maori *whaka*.; Samoan *fa'a*; Tongan *faka*. Definitions derive from E. Tregear, *The Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary*. Wellington, n.d., pp. 592, 606.
2. From Leonard Cohen, "Suzanne takes you down" in *Selected Poems 1956-1968*, New York: Viking, 1968, p. 209.
3. Definitions here derive from *The Oxford English Dictionary*.
4. Cf. Jacques Derrida, "La double séance" in *La dissémination*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972, p. 230; and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Kafka, pour une littérature mineure*. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1975, pp. 47, 49.
5. For these terms see Deleuze and Guattari, *Capitalisme et Schizophrénie: L'Anti-Oedipe*, Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1972, *passim*, e.g., p. 25: Intensities "sont toutes positives à partir de l'intensité=0 qui désigne le corps plein sans organes."
6. See Robert Dyer, "Translation as celebration" in *The Yale Review*, 65, Summer 1976, 600-5.
7. A Zen phrase, cf. Isshu Miura and Ruth Fuller Sasaki, *The Zen Koan*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1965, p. 89.
8. Jacques Derrida, "Differance" in *Speech and Phenomena*, trans. D. B. Allison, Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 159.
9. Jean-François Lyotard, "Notes sur le retour et le capital" in *Des dispositifs pulsionnels*, Paris: Union Générale d'Éditions, 1973, p. 318.
10. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of the Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967, p. 121.
11. Cf. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1970, pp. 78-124.
12. Jacques Lacan, "The Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious," trans. Jan Miel, in *Structuralism*, ed. Jacques Ehrman, Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970, p. 115.
13. Cf. *Kafka*, p. 13.
14. Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Conversations on Freud" in *Freud*, ed. R. Wollheim, Garden City: Anchor Books, 1974, p. 9.
15. Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms III: The Phenomenology of Knowledge* trans. R. Manheim, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957, p. 4.
16. Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, trans. J. Stambaugh, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969, pp. 24-29.
17. Lyotard, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-69.
18. Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 806.
19. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ*, trans. W. Kaufman, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, New York: Viking, 1968, #46.
20. Nietzsche, *op. cit.*, #167.
21. From Lyotard's discussions of weak and master ruses at the *Semiotext(e)* colloquium, Schiz●—Culture, Columbia University, 13-16 Nov. 1976, and Five College Seminar in the Humanities, Smith College, 20 Nov. 1975.

22. See n. 1 above.
23. The Polynesian name for New Zealand, "The long white cloud."
24. Allen Curnow, "The Unhistoric Story" in Curnow, *A Book of New Zealand Verse 1923-50*, Christchurch: Caxton Press, 1951, p. 140.
25. For a factual account of this flight see Neil Robinson, *Lion of Scotland*, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1952.
26. *We* are not all New Zealanders.

diacritics

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The Fiction of Analysis

SYLVÈRE LOTRINGER

"*Gradiva*, Freud had never gone so far . . ."

—*Anti-Oedipus*

Strange mirror that *Gradiva*, that small novel by Wilhelm Jensen, proffers to all the revolutions of desire. It is by means of it that Freud demonstrates to the general public, for the first time, his concept of the unconscious relative to repression ("Delusion and Dream in Jensen's *Gradiva*," 1907); within it that André Breton celebrates the "new countenance," which is sublimatory of beauty ("*Gradiva*," 1937); finally it is through it that Deleuze and Guattari locate, or better yet produce, a Freud who is fairly unexpected inasmuch as he is made in their image: bearded socio-libidinal philosopher, hirsute schizo-revolutionary militant merrily liberating—hallucinating continents and cultures . . .

Perhaps it did go a bit too far, or even a great deal too far, but what difference does loyalty to the letter make: that psychoanalysis, for better or for worse, replaced a religion in its dying moments does not mean that we must approach it with a pious attitude, quite to the contrary; that the analyst deliberately assumed the role of *Pater Familias* does not require that we harbor a special respect for the authority of his Name; that the analytical relationship was adopted to the model of the legal contract does not require in any way that we be subjected to its law. We will consider, in the perspective opened by *Anti-Oedipus*, what it is that allowed psychoanalysis to lend itself to the diverting of a desire whose very existence it had revealed. Which is what will lead us to pose the problem of repression, "the cornerstone of psychoanalysis," and of sublimation. From here on, Freudian theory is valuable only inasmuch as it is able to trace a *direct* passage to the revolutionary unconscious cathexes of the libido. But is this still within its scope? I will initiate here a "return to Freud" not in order to wrest him from the normalizing excesses of Ego psychology and restore him to his first truths, as Jacques Lacan would have it, but rather with the idea of probing the analytical enterprise at its very foundations: the signifying apparatus that it did not invent but rather received at birth and retained in its workings even in what appears to be its most extreme and advanced incursions, such as the analysis of *Gradiva*.

One wonders whether the revolutionary aspect of *Gradiva* comes from Freud or from Jensen (these names—all names—are invoked here to designate

Sylvère Lotringer teaches French and Comparative Literature at Columbia University. This article is part of a study he is presently completing on Analytical Fiction, Fiction of Analysis.

regions of intensity, rather than a process of intention). It becomes even more difficult to distinguish between the two when Freud insists on blurring the boundaries, turning the novel into a complete replica of the analytical situation: "The procedure which the author makes his Zoë adopt for curing her childhood friend's delusion shows a far-reaching similarity [with the analytic method which] consists, as applied to patients suffering from disorders analogous to Hanold's delusion, in bringing to their consciousness, to some extent forcibly, the unconscious whose repression led to their falling ill—exactly as Gradiva did with the repressed memories of their childhood relations." (Standard Edition, IX, 88). An assimilation of this nature will be less astonishing if one recalls that *Gradiva* was chosen, at Jung's suggestion, precisely because of an uncanny familiarity that, in all fairness, should have troubled him . . . Since Freud without a moment's hesitation reduced the "poetic creations" to real persons and the "Pompeian fantasy" to a simple, "psychiatric study" of the sort that would confirm in its very details the essence of his discoveries, I will be obliged to follow him into this terrain. Without unquestioningly accepting his questions. Ultimately Freud affirms that literary works, just as much as the morbid cases, reveal the laws that govern the life of the unconscious: "The conclusion seems inescapable that either both of us, the writer and the doctor, have misunderstood the unconscious in the same way, or we have both understood it correctly. This conclusion is of great value to us . . ." (S.E., IX, 92). In reality this imprisons us within a dilemma that produces answers in the guise of questions. Since *Gradiva* is seen as the infinite reflection of the analytical method, the analysis of the novel must serve as an absolute proof of Freudian theory. Now this conclusion is of so great a value for Freud that it is carefully predetermined, the analyst in fact striving to bind all the lines of flight, to confine all the singularities of the text into an immense network of redundancies.

It becomes all the more urgent to drive a wedge between the doctor and the novelist. To accomplish this all we need do is allow *Gradiva* to speak. Instead of forcing ("applying") psychoanalysis on literature to the point of identifying one with the other, as Freud does, I will attempt to turn literature *against* psychoanalytic interpretation in a way that should reveal the nature of its axiomatics. In other words, I would like, repaying him in kind, to turn Jensen's text into a non-interpretative machine that is "analytical," in the etymological sense, ready to decompose, and even dissolve, the body of Freudian theory.

THE DICKENS OF THE COUCH

How does Freud go about restoring desire to the enchanted family circle and "delusion" to beneath the heel of repression? Let us briefly summarize the facts of the novel, as analysis sees it.

Norbert Hanold, the "hysterical" hero of Jensen's *Gradiva*, has been sworn by his family to exalt "by that very activity the glory of his Father's

name" (another crime of the Name of the Father!). Thus, he will be an archaeologist just like Papa. The thirst for knowledge is marked, in Leonardo da Vinci, by the cool repudiation of sex and sexuality. As we know, sublimation permits one in fact, in varying degrees, to avoid repression whose very presence it attests to. Thus we see in Norbert the deformed return of the repressed libido within the intellectual operations. From there the strange fascination of the archaeologist for a Roman bas-relief representing a woman in motion. Freud sees this fact as the cornerstone of the story: "For one day it came about that one particular sculpture of that kind laid claim to the whole of the interest which is ordinarily directed only to a living woman, and with that his delusion was there. We then see unrolled before our eyes the manner in which his delusion is cured through a happy turn of events, and his interest displaced back from the marble to a living woman." (S.E., IX, 46). Behind the stone is the woman; behind the present is the past, the opportune return of a childhood friend, Zoë, of whose very existence Norbert had "forgotten." Love was the truth of his delusion. End of the novel and of the analysis.

But there remains one question: by what routes had Norbert arrived at his aversion towards women? Jensen doesn't ask this question, which is especially curious since everything in the novel, a fact that Freud emphasizes, appears to be suffused with meaning. Is it possible that the issue of repression, for Jensen, is never even posed? Freud remains prudently silent here. This reserve becomes all the more striking in that soon after he will build a whole "psychoanalytical novel" out of the meager fact of a memory of Leonardo. Jung touched upon this crucial point: "One question which you leave open, and which the critics may pick on, is this: why is the complex in Hanold repressed?" That the repressed begging to return remains unexplained is to "expose" Freud's demonstration. Gradiva's heel is in danger of becoming his Achilles' tendon . . .

In the second edition, Freud also advances the idea that repression is the result of an incestuous love for a sister who has vanished. He undoubtedly does not stress this point in order not to shock his audience, but he had long since remarked, in more specialized studies, that such relations between children are by no means rare and their psychical consequences extraordinarily far-reaching: "The two individuals remain linked by an invisible bond throughout the whole of their lives" (S.E., III, 215). At that time, Freud still persisted in referring the incestuous relations of a brother with his sister to sexual experiences dating further back, to a still earlier seduction by an adult that the children in fact were merely supposed to repeat. Freud would soon after abandon the theory of seduction by interpreting as *the child's fantasy* that which, from all appearances, as Deleuze and Guattari emphasize, begins inside the father's head—or the analyst's. And yet to the extent that here incest is not referred to any scene or fantasy of seduction, nor even to a facile symbolism which converts the sister into a substitute for the mother, the "intimate childhood association" forcibly pulls us out of a classic Oedipal situation, and constitutes a tremendous step beyond the familial circle.

Freud hastens to thwart the escape of desire onto a new modality of sublimation. Roughly outlining a "bold construction" solely for Jung's sake, he proposes that Jensen's younger sister had always been ailing: "She had a horsehoof foot and limped, later she died of tuberculosis. This pathological element had to be excluded from the embellishing fantasy. But one day the grieving author came across the relief and saw that this deformity, the horsehoof foot, could be refashioned into a mark of beauty. *Gradiva* was now complete—a new triumph of wish-fulfilling fantasy."¹ Triumph of the family romance . . . Illness, deformity, tuberculosis, death, grief, idealization: Victorian pathos. Psychoanalysis reveals itself for what it is: fiction.² Freud, or the Dickens of the couch. Was it not, after all, the analyst himself who recognized with some ingenuity, in his *Studies on Hysteria* (1895), that ". . . it still strikes me myself as strange that the case histories I write should read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious stamp of science" (S.E., II, 160)?

The fact that Freud comes to see the "Gradivian" gait as some sort of fetishistic fixation, for which he as yet has no explanation³, will only serve to confirm the pertinence of the thesis of the displaced return of a repressed past. Shortly afterwards, he effectively assigns to fetishism the nature of a partial repression in the context of sublimation: "Part of the complex is repressed and in compensation for that another part pertaining to it becomes idealized. (A historical parallel is provided by the mediaeval contempt for women and the simultaneous exaltation of the Virgin Mary)" (*Freud/Abraham*, 18 Feb. 1909). The interpretation is now complete: from the mineralized woman to the living woman, from the singular step to the incestuous club-foot, from the family to conjugality, the circle is closed. All that was missing was the Virgin!

It was perhaps a cheaply-won victory. Any interpretation involves a power of conviction—that ultimately answers to power alone—so that it is difficult to disengage oneself, except to examine the specifically *strategic* scope of an element, of an event. Norbert's epistemophilia, far from being any indeterminate sublimation or the unavowed research for that public secret which is the desire to know where babies come from (cf. Leonardo), constitutes quite simply an affirmative act of rupture with an oppressive framework. *Even if one must act like Daddy to free oneself!* Archaeology is not a family refuge; in reality it is the investment of a completely different territory from which to ignore the family at the very moment one appears to be yielding to its demands. Thus, for Norbert it is not a matter of reproducing the family in the name of some form of conjugality. From this arises his hatred towards couples, for which there is no need to invoke the hysteric's disgust from which he would have to be wrested in order to "pay off the debt to life with which we are burdened from our birth" (S.E., IX, 49), as the inventor of libido pompously proclaims. Our conscious sense, he will explain more crudely, turns away from the memory just as a nose recoils from some fetid object, which in reality is desired (S.E., I. 269). This

interversion of the affect in and of itself comes to bear witness to the existence of a repression.

But after all what is this disgust all about? From what refusal of triangulation does it come to testify? As with Artaud, the rejection of sexuality is directed not against desire, but rather against "the idiot periplum wherein is locked/propagation, the periplum of daddy-mommy/and child" (*Ci-Git*, 1947). Artaud can say that we must destroy this *stinking* world that put him away, but by "stinking" is meant, metaphorically, servile, resigned, sated. World of conjugal copulation, of *distilled*, diverted, abstract love turned precisely into metaphor, a world which, on the contrary, is *insufficiently fetid and fecal*, since, in the name of procreation, it forestalls the "anal sexual desire," the *libidinal* energy: "The anus is always terror, and I do not concede that we lose excrement without being torn by the loss of our soul" (*Lettres de Rodez*, 1945). Who dares to speak of repression or sublimation before this desire that sex feels itself to be "an orgasm of insurgence"? Of course, some will object, Artaud-the-Momo, as any self-respecting schizo, regressed to the anal stage while Norbert-the-hystero was satisfied by repressing the final phase of libidinal organization. His disgust, therefore, is supposed to pay homage to Phallus and Kastration. Really. To establish such distinctions, in the final analysis, amounts to turning the "familial" neuroses, which shake the Oedipal triangle, into the best guarantor of the familial order. To which side does perversion belong?

HISTORY AND REPRESSION

Thus a semiotic link has leapt at the heart of the chains of integration, letting loose a *non-transposed* or idealized desire: Norbert's fascination with a cast that has "nothing noteworthy for his science." Nomadic form, without specific territory, and from no definite epoch: trans-historic. And the archaeologist is moved not by the formal beauty nor even by the woman's (indifferent) face, but rather by the vertical position of her right foot. The representation of someone *in motion*. This is moreover the name with which he dubs her: Gradiva, "she who walks in splendor."

Desire has attached itself to a particular postural component which doesn't cease to dismantle the person in order to slip upon social formations and rave about Greece, about Rome, about History. This movement, always dodging localized, differentiated, bi-univocized relationships, is of an impersonal, or better, *trans-personal* order, since it has "something humanly commonplace." Certainly it deals with a woman, but in this context sexual identity is of little importance. When consulted, an anatomist further confirmed this indifferenciation: the verticality of the foot is not distinguished according to gender. Gradiva, the "decontextualized" kinetic element able to merge with all situations, gait outside of signification open on an ever-floating plurality of meaning, rejects any attempt at insertion into the exclusive disjunctive logic submitted to the principle of contradiction. Greek-Latin, antique-contemporary, wife of a hunter-relative of a poet,

woman-non-woman (*Gradiva-Gradivus*), living-dead, stone-skin, slow-fast (*lente festinans*), immobile-in motion (“suspended flight”), she is each of these states taken separately insofar as they neither exclude the others nor contradict them by invoking some identification of opposites, some extenuated dialectical resolution. This movement is inherently indivisible, and yet at each moment specified in terms which are neither brought together nor separated, but rather kept at a distance from all contradiction. Gradiva is the proper name of a singularity without individuation, a de-delimitation of the global person, always ready to restore itself in an *exclusive* synthesis (instead of an inclusive disjunction), a moving region to which sexes, qualities, and races come each in its turn to communicate. This is the reason one can say Gradiva is from everywhere-from nowhere: a singular, paradoxical multiplicity, she escapes all attempts at dichotomization. Even that which will oppose-reconcile her to Zoë, the childhood sweetheart.

The libido does not have to be desexualized or sublimated, i.e. repressed in varying degrees, in order to cathect the socio-historical arena. The first effect of his connection to Gradiva is to launch Norbert into the streets, his eyes fixed at ankle-level, on this side of all differentiation. Scientific ardor immediately interpreted by Freud as an erotic interest directed toward the person. The *in motion* which starts the scientist moving, which throws him in the streets like an ankle-high dog, “like a little boy” dressed in his nightgown in the center of the marketplace, or like one demented on the roads of Italy, is rather “the mark of a complex abstract machine that could manifest itself independently of all subjective affectation: be it a person, an army, a flea, an object, a machine, an effect, an idea. It concerns itself with all the modalities of walking-towards.”⁴ One is reminded of Nietzsche’s affirmation, in the *Genealogy of Morals* (ch. XIII):

Just as popular superstition divorces the lightning from its brilliance, viewing the latter as an activity whose subject is the lightning, so does popular morality divorce strength from its manifestations, as though there were behind the strong a neutral agent, free to manifest its strength or contain it. But no such agent exists; there is no “being” behind the doing, acting, becoming; the “doer” has simply been added to the deed by the imagination—the doing is everything. The common man actually doubles the doing by making the lightning flash; he states the same event once as cause and then again as effect.

The *walking-towards*, a machinic index, a de-territorialized semiotic feature, is not in the order of the body but rather of *events* such as Gilles Deleuze defines them in the style of the Stoics: “We cannot say that they exist, but rather that they subsist or insist, having that minimum of existence that suits that which is no-thing, a non-existent entity. These are not nouns or adjectives, but verbs. They are neither agents nor patients, but the results of actions and passions, of “impassibles”—impassible results. They are not the living presents, but rather infinitives.”⁵

It is always possible, however, to restore the primitive, the *doing*, the verb of pure becoming, to the nouns and adjectives. The "personological" identity re-imposes itself, the proper noun substitutes itself for the verb on movement: Zoë, "life" (noun), "alive" (adjective), comes to replace *Gradiva*. From the incorporeal logical attribute, unlimited, dividing itself infinitely in the past and the future in a way that eludes the present, hence all temporal-corporeal depth necessary for repression, *Gradiva* accedes to the presence of Zoë, that is, to an anchorage simultaneously in the finitude of the (repressed) past and of the future (removal of the repression).

This is the common man's doubling working out of the *doing* that is *Gradiva*. Freud finally distinguishes a depth behind the surface in becoming, a repressive cause behind the effect of an alleged return, a "doing" of the doing that is none other than Zoë. Production sinks into a phenomenon of echo, the *point-sign*, that mounted a broadside attack on the world of representation (of the sign), gives birth to "that little changeling, the *subject*" (Nietzsche). The libido, thereby receiving its personological repression, counter-determines its object. From a-subjective *point-sign*, *Gradiva* becomes the extensive body where History voids itself into self-representation.

It is at this moment, at the furthest distance ever ventured, and the furthest distance from any actual adventure, that Freud begins to praise Jensen for having lingered over "the valuable similarity which his delicate sense had perceived between a particular mental process in the individual and an isolated historical event in the history of mankind" (S.E., IX, 40).

Here Freud was undoubtedly on the verge of giving the amorous cathexis of the libido a direct access to History. However, he merely sees this connection as a simple substitution between two finite, isolated, individualized terms. And that which governs this exchange is none other than a "valuable similarity," that is, the law of Value. To substitute "historic antiquity for childhood" is, in reality, to make of history a subjective representation and to make of the *point-sign* (the *Gradiva*-effect), by which the flows that cross society "vibrate," a *sign* representing something (a woman) for someone (a man) against a background of absence (incapacitation of desire, definition of reality as unattainable). To succumb to this sort of logic, as Freud did, is to empty history of its historicity, to erase with one stroke of the pen the massive movements that stir people and continents in order to erect in their place, as on a darkened stage, the immobile screen of private consciousness. Theatre of shadows, duplicitous cavern. The opening of the analytic compound onto the outside, in *Gradiva*, remains essentially—but not exclusively—a tributary of this eternal confinement. History penetrates that enclosure for the first time, but on tiptoes, by the back door of metaphor, through the bars of interpretation.

Everything had already been decided when Freud turned the burial of Pompeii into the very metaphor of repression. Hanold's repression no longer needs a certified motive, nor a hazardous "construction" inasmuch as the major symbol of the novel remains to guarantee its existence. And that's all

that matters for Freud: to demonstrate the existence of a repression, even if its causes remain hypothetical, is to root in reason his concept of the unconscious. It follows then that to dislodge Freud from the protective perch of the symbolic, to return to the excavation of Pompeii without any pre-conceived ideas, is to re-open the whole case of the unconscious.

INTERPRETATIVE DELUSION

"The delusions of paranoids have an unpalatable external similarity and internal kinship to the systems of our philosophers"

—S. Freud

Norbert takes to the highroad. He walks in a twilight state⁶ running away, knowing neither the cause nor the destination. Towards the South, towards liberty, pushed into wandering by "*a nameless feeling*." The intensive fever that animates him prolongs in appearance only the delusion (the false idea) provoked by a dream in which Gradiva is threatened with death by the eruption of Vesuvius. The dream succeeds in confirming Norbert's primitive hypothesis that Gradiva was both Greek and Pompeian. In the working out of the delusion we recognize the *power of conviction* that all interpretation, regardless of its nature, spawns; the "episodic" delusion that arises from the dream, in a very strict sense, adheres closely to the very functioning of the analytic machine: "The fact, finally, is familiar to every psychiatrist that in severe cases of chronic delusions (in paranoia) the most extreme examples occur of ingeniously elaborated and well-supported absurdities" (S.E., IX, 72). This is why Freud feels so much at home with delusions, into whose classic expression he tirelessly incorporates Norbert's nomadic *motion-emotion*.

Inversely, this is the reason Norbert must "forget" the all-too-convincing dream in order to set himself in motion. Freud recognizes it in his own way at the moment he injects repression into Norbert's "trip": "How could this forgetting of the dream, *this barrier of repression between the dream and his mental state during the journey*, be explained, except by supposing that the journey was undertaken not at the direct inspiration of the dream but as a revolt against it, as an emanation of a mental power that refused to know anything of the secret meaning of the dream?" (S.E., IX, 68). But that's precisely the problem: the motion-emotion is in open revolt against the attribution of a secret meaning to the dream. For the dream does not deal with knowledge (the deciphering of enigmas) but *with power*. Interpretative power that exercises its authority beneath the battered banners of the truth. They make you hunt for something beneath an alleged, deformed production that the oneiric images form, while in reality you're caught in a net of images, in a play of meanings. The more you try to understand, the harder it becomes to get out. The more you are subjugated, the closer you are to being "cured."

The forgetting, in which Freud does not fail to recognize immediately a symptom characteristic of hysterics, in fact assumes an *affirmative* role to

the degree that it frees Norbert of his spatio-temporal attachments, that it projects him into an intensive present (Aïôn) that is totally alien to the successive logic of repression. The forgetting creates "a little *tabula rasa* of the consciousness, so as to make room again for the new . . . and this shows at once why it is that there can exist no happiness, no gladness, no hope, no pride, no real *present*, without forgetfulness" (Friedrich Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, II, 1). From the fact that the patient does not have a single memory of the allegedly repressed representations, Freud is wont to conclude that he is doomed to reproduce them in his actions: the patient *repeats* an action "without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it . . . As long as the patient is in the treatment he cannot escape from this compulsion to repeat; and in the end we understand that this is his way of remembering" (S.E., XII, 150). Strange reasoning that converts an active forgetting into a shameful repetition and that incapacitated repetition into a way of remembering! The patient is on the road to being cured, therefore, when he enters into a world of pure redundancies . . . The greater the redundancies, the greater the signification, according to the communication theory. For its part, the intensive journey, once disguised as a delusion and thus restored to the oneiric model, becomes "meaningful." But this signification injected into the wandering teaches us nothing we didn't already know. Such is the banality of the symptom that signifies so much by telling so little.

To help deliver the maximum information from the a-signifying frenzy is not, for all that, our intention. On the contrary, the essential is to arrive at circumventing the singularity of an action that undoes all codes. Without forcing the producing onto the (re-)produced, or the present onto the representation. Without grafting the *being* onto the *doing*, the memory onto the forgetting. Memory, says Nietzsche, is a festering wound (*Ecce Homo*, I, 6). We can heal the wound only if we stop referring our feelings to the past; in other words, if we stop probing ever deeper into the cut: "The man in whom this preventative apparatus is damaged and discarded is to be compared to a dyspeptic, and it is something more than a comparison—he can 'get rid of' nothing." Memory is hard to digest since it burdens the present with the whole infinite weight of the representations of childhood. Norbert's trek does not activate memory; in no way does it reproduce interminable, *visceral* struggles; it is instead the production of production, the experience of a feeling from which the intelligence strives endlessly to extract all the bitterness of the *ressentiment*.

The *preventative apparatus* (the forgetting) never ceases to protect the present from the blows of memory and to restore to the affect the position that science and meaning attempt to usurp. But science is obstinate, and from the outset, within the very concept it elaborates, it introduces the well-supported absurdity which it then proceeds to systematize. In fact, the very word "delusion" (*Wahn*) already authorizes all the reappropriations. Moreover, Freud quickly abandoned the study of what he calls the "hysterical delusion" as opposed to the paranoid delusion. The temptation

becomes all the greater for him to find *beneath* the intensive frenzy that has seized Norbert that which the delusion openly presents. On the contrary, we must specify those distinct states of which some, fantasies, hallucinations, delusions, arise from the subjective representations which are always tributary to repression, regardless of its mode of production, whereas the other, the delirious thrust, springs forth from *doing* in a pure state, from libidinal energy that is unchecked inasmuch as it is without memory and without finality.

Deleuze and Guattari put forth a distinction that fits precisely that which we are trying to produce here: "We often speak of hallucinations and of delusions, but the hallucinatory 'I see, I hear' and the delusional 'I think' presuppose a deeper *I feel* that endows hallucinations with their objects and delusion with its content . . . Delusion and hallucination are secondary in relation to the truly primary emotion which experiences nothing but intensities, becomings, and passages" (*Anti-Oedipus*). The subject is itself secondary in relation to that primary energy that brings it to the unmediated real. It is continually being born in the brutal blows rained upon this primordial *I feel* by the hallucinatory *I see, I hear*. The wandering thus is in no way homogeneous or continuous: in reality it is made up of a multiplicity of transsubjective shiftings, of transductive states through which intensity ebbs into identity, and vice versa. The hallucination in the guise of Zoë-Rediviva will have to reimpose itself in Pompeii once and for all in order that the forgetting itself be forgotten and that the frenzy be reabsorbed into a signifying delusion, into "visual mnemonic images," pointing unabashedly towards memories that have been suppressed or have remained memories: "It was only when he caught sight of Gradiva that he suddenly remembered the dream and became conscious at the same time of the delusional reason for this puzzling journey" (S.E., IX, 68).

Freud does not waste time. He doesn't even wait for Norbert to arrive at Pompeii before turning this voyage à la Beckett, that even Freud recognizes as "senseless," into a flight in the face of eroticism, of "*the physical presence* of the girl he loved." But that is precisely the crux of the matter: by what right does Freud assimilate eroticism, the un-limiting of the becoming sexual, desire in motion, with the living present, the lively Zoë? Why force the flux onto an object if not in order to reconstitute opposite it, or better yet in it, an enclosed subject? If you are in motion, it means you are looking for me. If you are looking for me, it means you have found yourself . . . Ancient casuistry. What Freud cannot stand is the schizo *walking-towards*: "My patience with pathological natures is exhausted in analysis. In art and life I am intolerant of them."⁷ Freud cannot tolerate a really senseless voyage. He immediately sees it as *puzzling*, that is such as it calls upon his prodigious faculties as decoder. Freud needs to understand, to interpret; a-significance drives him crazy. It must at all costs be made into an enigma, and the enigma into a *delusional cause*: "Hanold's journey was *from the first* calculated to serve the delusion, and was intended to take him to Pompeii, where he could proceed further with his search for Gradiva" (S.E.,

IX, 66). To interpret the delirious fever as a delusion amounts to finding it an object, and the ready-made object, imposed *after the fact*, is Zoë. Zoë is the future-past present of Gradiva to the degree that she is, for Freud, merely her surrogate—her representative and interpreter.

“What Freud calls “passivity” in Norbert does not arise from his purposeless walking, but rather from the wish he attributes to Norbert of being “taken captive by the girl he loved” (S.E., IX, 93). In fact, though, Norbert is injected with that passivity from the moment his flight is made into the *representation* of something else. The detail is of little importance; what matters is that the voyage has an underside, a depth, that “his insight into the reasons for the journey at the bidding of the delusion was inhibited” (S.E., IX, 69), that it *signifies* something that we will be able to gather, interpret, and put into circulation. If it is not the victory of repression, at least the intimation of the repressed; if not the fear of love, at least the search for its living trace. Or both successively, simultaneously; it will be more operative, more probing, more effective: ambivalence, ambiguity, the *double determination of symptoms* correlative to the double psychic appurtenance . . .

What turns Zoë into an accomplished therapist is the way she always plays both ends of the same game. She does not lend herself to Norbert’s becoming-mad, to his becoming-bachelor except to restore him to the becoming-sensible, to becoming-maso, to becoming-husband.

Freud perceived perfectly the means Zoë uses to cure Norbert of his madness. She reabsorbs his crisis, sutures the semiotic break, restores the well-oiled gears to the signifying machine: “So the author shows us his hero after his flight from love in a kind of crisis, in a state of complete confusion and distraction, in a turmoil such as we usually find at the climax of an illness, when neither of the two conflicting powers has any longer a sufficiently superior strength over the other for the margin between them to make it possible to establish a vigorous mental regime. *But here the author intervenes helpfully, and smoothes things out by making Gradiva appear at this juncture and undertake the cure of delusion*” (*Ibid.*).

But who, or what, is this Gradiva who undertakes the cure, or better yet the *curettage* of the motion-emotion? How is one to situate it in relation to the becoming-unlimited, to the machinic index that detached Norbert from the signifying chain and forced him to accede to another semiotic order? That particular Gradiva, undoubtedly, must be a kind of replica of that woman *in motion* who threw him into the street and pushed him to his crisis . . . The answer is already inscribed in the very wording of the question, in the definition which has been given us of the *Gradiva-effect*. It is sufficient to change once more the regime of significations, to impress the posture onto the person and the intensity (the accent) onto the intention: the *walking* woman onto the walking *woman* . . . This in effect is *Rediviva*, Pompeiian specter resuscitated for Norbert’s sake, feminine replica of the Gradivian step affecting the abstract machine of an index of subjectivity and conferring on the infinitive infinity a living, present substance.

The problematics of both the novel and the analysis is entirely summed up by this opposition of distinct *regimes*, be they intensive or extensive, representative or productive, within the same signifying apparatus. The collapse of meaning, the unrestrained unfolding of libido being produced at the outset, how to arrange things so that the gap is filled, meaning restored, desire choked, the frenzy bound and the flight made up as a sequence, an accord, indeed a Destiny on the stage of memory? In other words: how is one to *represent* the machinic element, the sign of strength, while assigning it an opportune surrogate (this is Jensen saving his wager by means of Rediviva)? How to *interpret* the “walking-towards” in terms of resemblance (this is Freud digging up a temporal depth with the aid of “trivial similarities” in order to justify his theory of repression, which is to say of the unconscious). Since neither representation nor interpretation is primary, the effort common, in the last resort, to both the analyst and the novelist, aims at inserting the de-delimitation of the *moving-towards* into a field of pure redundancies.

STONED TALK

“the numerous inscriptions, which, by good luck, may be bilingual, reveal an alphabet and a language, and, when they have been deciphered and translated, yield undreamed-of information about the events of the remote past, to commemorate which the monuments were built. *Saxa loquuntur!* [‘Stones talk!’]

—S. Freud

From the start one can assign two principal modalities to these redundancies: 1) the Pompeian Scene in which Norbert’s deterritorializing crisis finds itself blocked by virtue of its being represented, reproduced and mimeticized, within the features of Gradiva-Rediviva, precursor to Zoë. Theater that translates (“surrogate”) and in so doing betrays, in the guise of curing, the Gradiva-effect. 2) the Other Scene, that of Norbert’s dreams, which no longer entails interpretation as Freud would have it, nor even a counter-interpretation since both assume, in precisely the same way as the Pompeian scene, an *interpretative function* working within the novel.

The two scenes mirror one another inasmuch as both assign a precise topology and a particular substance to Norbert’s delusion: Pompeii as the end of wandering, Gradiva-Rediviva-Zoë as the end of desire. From there one begins to see the “*bait*” function, assumed, even from the very title of his study, by the parallelism (binarism) established by Freud between delusions and dreams, both considered as offshoots of the unconscious. And undoubtedly Freud is right to consider both of them as such, with the crucial difference that *they don’t belong to the same unconscious*—and that they are not its offshoots in the same way. Freud having included beforehand frenzy within delusion, the juxtaposition of the two terms has as its clearest effect, if not as its ultimate function, the occultation of a third term. Before anything else, we must split the delusion in two (“scissipariser,” as Georges

Bataille would have it) if we are to recover the singularity of the affect and the specificity of the unconscious. Productive and intensive unconscious on the part of affective frenzy, expressive and representative unconscious on the part of the dreams-delusions of *Gradiva*. But Freud merges the former with the others in order to submit them to the "meaningful" model of the dream of which the *Traumdeutung*, cited in the opening passage of the study, remains the jealous guardian.

The *I feel*, which is nothing but reality experienced in its material, incorporeal integrity (as a body without organs, without organism), is made henceforth to testify, on a delusional mode, to an alienation from reality: "In the mechanism of a delusion we stress as a rule only two factors: the turning away from the real world and its motive forces on the one hand, and the influence exercised by wish-fulfillment on the content of the delusion on the other." (S.E., XXIII, 267). All too familiar mechanism: the psychotic "delusion" considered as a turning away from reality, the rejection of the external world being supplemented by an overcathexis of the ego proper (*narcissism*). This amounts to missing the mark twice: if "delusion" indeed deterritorializes, it is surely not in such a fashion that it "loses" reality (reality is a metaphysical abstraction generated by the sign-matrix), rather in order to do away with the repression imposed by a specific social-Oedipal set-up (cf. Artaud). To make such an uprooting a narcissistic unfolding upon oneself amounts to forcing the affective flight into the straight jacket of the ego, i.e. into an organized *social* body fabricated for the convenience of power. Double subjugation. All that remains, at this point, is to perceive in the "contents" of the delusion the displaced and deformed repetition of a memory that had to pay its dues to repression in order to come into being . . .

Let us carefully examine the manner in which Freud conceives of Norbert's "delusion." He assigns it two principal characteristics: "In the first place it is one of the group of pathological states which do not produce a direct effect upon the body but are manifested only by mental indications. And secondly it is characterized by the fact that in it 'phantasies' have gained the upper hand—that is, have obtained belief and have acquired an influence on action" (S.E., IX, 44). Inasmuch as the first characteristic is to be found within the psychic/somatic opposition, and Freud does not return to elaborate specifically as to his notion of "mental indications," so we are free to assimilate these with *phantasies*, the starting point of the second characteristic alluded to. In effect, phantasy belongs to the mental realm, and, as opposed to hysterical symptoms, does not impress itself onto the body. Moreover, Freud supports this view since further on he names *phantasies* and *actions* as the two symptoms of delusion.

This distinction quickly gives way to a reduction whose significance will be immediately discernable: Norbert's actions, *that is to say his voyage in intensity*, are completely overturned in the "pathological mental processes." The pragmatic, productive characteristic of "phantasies" is piloted completely by morbid representations. And what comes to overcode in its turn

these representations is precisely that of which the archaeologist, obviously, is unaware, namely the repression of his erotic feelings . . . From here on in everything that occurs in the world of actions—leave your family! destroy the bars of your cage! change your life!—will be projected onto the stage where the psyche acts itself out before a full house. A battle behind closed doors between two psychic forces, “between the power of eroticism and that of the forces that were repressing it; the manifestation of this struggle was a delusion.” (S.E., IX, 49).

What then is an *active* fantasy if not libido in full flow storming the walls of representation and overthrowing all the significations that attempt to shackle it. Norbert’s “trip” does not sanction the omnipotence of morbid phantasies over the actions of the subject; rather, it marks the setting in gear, independently of any representatives, or beyond all representation, of desire and of the world.

The wandering is clearly the denial of the interpretative power which always bases itself on the instinct for knowledge. Norbert’s epistemophilia abandoned him under the influence of *an unnamed sixth sense* that has nothing whatever to do with the “lifeless, archaeological view”⁸ of science. The understanding that this sense produces is one with *delusion*. The dead of Pompeii awakening and beginning to talk “in toneless spirit-lanugage” (DD, 177), Norbert’s philological virtuosity is no longer of any help whatsoever. He literally loses his Latin: of what use is it to have been a master in the art of deciphering the *graffiti* if the stones around him are henceforth “viewed without the esoteric aid” of archaeology (DD, 174)? It is not a matter here of decoding the meaning of a city out of which “stirred a feeling that death was beginning to talk, although not in a manner intelligible to human ears” (DD, 176). A trans-individual death of this sort does not require interpretation or pathos. This is not the threatened image of a living reality, as the young woman in the dream memorized by Norbert, but rather the incorporeal, impersonal dying of death that speaks; it is the silent speech of the word speaking to non-human ears.

He who wishes to hear this mute speech must accede to non-human desire. To attain the singularity of a moment brought to its boiling-point, of a cosmic present that burns its own tracks in the immediate hemorrhage of the past-future: “Anyone who harbored a desire for such a comprehension had to stand alone, among the remains of the past, the only living person in the hot noonday silence, in order not to see with physical eyes nor hear with corporeal ears. *Then something came forth everywhere without movement and a soundless speech began*; then the sun dissolved the tomb-like rigidity of the old stones, a glowing thrill passed through them, the dead awoke, and Pompeii began to live again” (DD, 179). This is the *event*, atemporal and apersonal shudder, trans-mortal trance that eludes the life-death couple, pure mobility of a present without substance and without quality, in motion infinity of the *coming forth*, non-limitative, incorporeal becoming of *speaking*.

This sixth sense has the peculiar consequence of dispossessing whoever

yields to it of any form of fixed identity, of transporting Norbert "into a strangely dreamy condition, about halfway between a waking state and a loss of senses" (DD, 178). Delirious disturbance that completely resists analysis, and thus a cure, to the degree that it rejects the status of the subject and the cleavage that makes him such. Thus, it would be a mistake to confer individual effectuation upon the frenzy, even if language keeps forcing it to mesh with grammatical categories that are from the start apprehended under the subjectivity of the sign, under the sign of intersubjectivity.

The infinitive knows no personal pronouns. Norbert's in motion tolerates but one very special form of "he," even if it is by that person, and not by the interlocutive *I-you*, that the story is told. To present in non-deictic terms this deterritorialized process that is motion-emotion, in effect it becomes necessary to invent a person that is not so plainly the still too personalized "non-person," that Emile Benveniste opposes to the other "personal" pronouns, *I* and *non-I* (that is, *you*); an empty sign that is not so ready to re-fill itself with a subjective and even imaginary plenitude; a discursive indicator referring not to a substantive, a state, or a certified body—to any "correlation of personality"—but to an *inflexible* verb; a de-delimiting of all deictics as well as all diacritics; in a word a fourth person who participates in the impersonal madness of the sixth sense. This fleeting *shifter* "is the *one* of impersonal and pre-individual singularities, the *one* of pure happening where *he* dies as *it* rains (*"il meurt comme il pleut"*). The magnificence of the *one* is that of the event itself or of the fourth person."⁹ Then *he* must die, so that *it* can come forth, so that *it* can begin, without any defined movement and any distinct speech, advent of a singular event, production by subjective counter-effectuation of a machinic "it," of an abstract index which is none other than the becoming in motion.

Perhaps now we will better understand the nature of this strange awakening of the dead, of this peculiar resurrection of Pompeii which does not occur as part of some sterile opposition between the dead and the living, but rather as the becoming-unlimited of the present and the becoming-impersonal of the person: "What had formerly been the city of Pompeii assumed an entirely changed appearance, but not a living one; it now appeared rather to be becoming completely petrified in dead immobility. Yet out of it stirred a feeling that death was beginning to talk . . ." (DD, 176). Machinic murmur alien to any knowledge (the dead talk "in toneless spirit-language"), *speaking-towards* divorced from all intentionality or signification ("not in a manner intelligible to human ears"), in a word, cosmic enunciation free of all subjective appropriation.

The city as becoming-non-mortal of death or the becoming-non-living of life must avoid the phantasy of a living reality at the same time it eludes the brutal deathblow of the archaeological monument, of the "entombed city." This is the reason it appears at this moment as a pure vibratory movement, "fiery breath" burning houses and walls, "ocean of light" wresting the old stones from their funereal torpor, solar flux, "steeping everything with trembling, glittering, dazzling splendor." The non-human speech of Pompeii

will be the silent one of ruins swept by the ancient Atabulus, hot-breathed wind blowing in the radiant, a-temporal intensity of the sun.

There is no relationship between the searing space of the Pompeiian noon and the cold, depersonalized knowledge to which science professes. The scientific signifying machine, having created before itself a subjective relative void, everything was ready for a surplus of deterritorialization, giving access to the solar infinity (this is the frenzy) or, on the contrary, for a neurotic, interpretative reappropriation to occur, leading without a single blow to a theatrical, solitary burial (this is the delusion-dream). Consequently the lifeless archaeological vision oscillates between two orders of signs, between the fascination with a postural, a-signifying element and the terror of an absence-of-having in which is discovered the absence-of-being; between the splendor for nothing and for everything of the city-intensity and the enigma for someone of the city-intention.

If the archaeologist, arriving at Pompeii, eludes the memory of his anguish, if, "strangely enough, he did not even once remember that he had dreamed some time ago" (DD, 174), it is not because of the wall of repression, but rather because he has crossed from an objective, impersonal view to an intensive, transpersonal grasp of the world. The scientific vision not being in itself theatrical, though always ready to be staged, "he felt not the least suggestion of anything dream-like." Nevertheless for the person to reaffirm his title to the event is cause enough for the oneiric scene, and thus the representation, to recover all its power. The a-subjective motion-emotion henceforth can wrap itself in the becoming conscious of the repressed: the lava blocks were arranged "in faintly glowing void between the silent walls and by the side of column fragments. Then suddenly—With open eyes he gazed along the street, yet it seemed to him *as if he were doing it in a dream*. A little to the right [. . .] Gradiva stepped buoyantly . . . As soon as he caught sight of her, Norbert's memory was clearly awakened to the fact that he had seen her here once already in a dream . . ." (DD, 180). The reappearance of the postural element in the guise of Gradiva-Rediviva assumes the same interpretative function as in the dream and that is the reason the cosmic delirium disappears when faced with an oneiric copy that nevertheless constitutes its instantaneous annihilation. This is the deferred action of the Other Scene. The Pompeiian representation can begin now, finishing the work of the dream.


Translated by Daniel Moshenberg

NOTES

1. 24 November 1907: *The Freud/Jung Letters*, Princeton University Press, 1974.
2. Cf. "Freud and Dora: Story, History, Case History," in Steven Marcus, *Representations*, Random House, 1976.
3. "Unfortunately I have not even a trace of foot worship, and that is why I am so completely at a loss about the whole problem" (26 December 1908), *A Psycho-Analytic Dialogue: Freud/Abraham*, New York: Basic Books, 1965.

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4. Félix Guattari, "La Politique de l'énonciation," *Semiotext(e)*, I, 3, 1975, p. 15.
5. Gilles Deleuze, *Logique du sens*, Minuit, 1969, p. 13.
6. Freud describes a comparable psychotic attack in one of his patients who had "fled from her house and husband in a twilight state and gone no one knew where, without ever having become conscious of her motive for decamping in this way" (S.E., XII, 154: "Remembering, repeating and working-through," 1914).
7. Letter of April 1929 to Theodor Reik regarding "Dostoevsky and Parricide," S.E., XXI, 196.
8. Wilhelm Jensen, *Gradiva: A Pompeian Fancy* in Sigmund Freud, *Delusion and Dream* [DD], Boston: Beacon Press, 1956, p. 179.
9. Gilles Deleuze, *op. cit.*, p. 178.



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
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Nietzsche's Return



“Beyond Freud and Marx,
brother Nietzsche at the
dawn of counter-culture”