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goodness were inferences from a multitude of populated worlds. A generation later, Immanuel Kant also invoked natural theology in propounding galactic star systems and in peopling this grander universe with intelligent life graded according to the analogy of nature. Meanwhile, Eric Engman's little-known Uppsala dissertation (1740) had already exposed the poverty of the cosmological tradition that culminated in Kant. From Plutarch's *De facie* to Fontenelle's *Entretiens* proponents of extraterrestrial life had argued well and reasonably but, Engman showed, not better or more reasonably than their adversaries. Reason could not decide this debate, and sufficient empirical evidence was and still is lacking.

Especially in the earlier chapters, specialists may quarrel with Dick on certain points of fact or may wish for greater depth, but on the whole his book is a triumph of intellectual-historical synthesis and deserves a wide readership.

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HUBERT L. DREYFUS and PAUL RABINOW. *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. Afterword by MICHEL FOUCAULT. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1982. Pp. xxiii, 231. \$25.00.

Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow's *Michel Foucault* provides a welcome discussion of developments and transformations in the thought of one of the most complex and influential of recent French theorists. Although their account is often philosophical in orientation and does not systematically focus on the problem of Foucault's attempt to provide a critique of historiography, it should nonetheless interest historians. Indeed, the attempt to track the modifications in Foucault's writings is itself a task to commend the book to anyone seeking an Ariadne's thread through the immense labyrinth spawned by the controversial French master. But this virtue of the book is also in certain respects its limitation.

Dreyfus and Rabinow claim that they are providing "a reading of [Foucault's] work, bearing in mind a certain set of problems, i.e., an interpretation" (p. xv). What they actually provide is less a reading in the contemporary critical sense than a perspicuous analytic schematization illustrated by crucial aspects of Foucault's thought and punctuated by objections to it (often paralleling, in semiauthorized fashion, the retrospective self-criticisms of Foucault himself). In other words, their study follows and attempts to clarify Foucault's own self-interpretation, and it does relatively little to test this self-image against a close reading of the texts themselves with special attention to the actual uses of language in them and the "intertextual" relations between them. Nor is

there any discussion of the rhetorical and stylistic dimensions of Foucault's writing, including its more problematic elements, such as the very opacity and terminological profusion of texts in which Foucault seeks a transparent technical lexicon. (For the historian, an obvious but nonetheless crucial issue in this respect is the extent to which Foucault's rhetoric tends to ride roughshod over the problem of furnishing convincing empirical evidence for his various theses and assertions.) Dreyfus and Rabinow even run the risk of unintentional self-parody when they quote a conceptually rarefied, lyrically diffuse, almost incantatory passage that sets one's eyes twinkling and one's brain awirling and then proceed to paraphrase or comment on it with unflappable analytic sobriety. Their own use of language, which turns Foucault's dance of the seven veils into serviceable domestic homespun, makes their enterprise a very active appropriation (or "interpretation") of Foucault.

In the process, their own painstaking method of conceptual clarification and parsing of arguments at times illuminates issues in an extremely valuable fashion, but, at other times it harbors unexamined assumptions and questionable tendencies of its own. For example, they convincingly argue that Foucault in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* had no cogent account of the role of discursive rules and their relations to social practices. But they also tend to repeat Foucault's own dubious assumption that texts may always be seen simply as "tokens" covered by "types" of discourse. This assumption is, however, particularly problematic with respect to complex texts, indeed those texts partially serving to institute—but also to contest—what Foucault calls discursive practices (texts, by the way, that include Foucault's own). Dreyfus and Rabinow also tend too readily to deny any direct involvement of natural science in political and cultural issues, such as the domination of nature. Conversely, they see normative and normalizing social order only in terms of insidious, totalizing domination, to the exclusion of modes of sociability and the interplay between norms and teaching by example in sustaining social life. Sometimes confusing as well are Dreyfus and Rabinow's recurrent bouts with the putative problem of the connection between discursive and non-discursive practices. Here they employ the notions of the discursive and the nondiscursive in rather unspecified, even labile ways, and they do less than Foucault to elucidate the relationship of various uses of language to one another and to the activities with which they are, in Foucault's term, "articulated." (Most often they seem, for unstated reasons, to restrict the discursive to the decontextualized theoretical or formal level of language use, but at other times they make it as broad as the use of language in general.)

Dreyfus and Rabinow's entire treatment of the question of Foucault's relation to structuralism is marred by the fact that they rely on an overly formulaic and at times dogmatic conception of structuralism that gives little idea of the movement as an intellectual adventure that attracted a variety of impressive figures and was played out in their highly intricate, sometimes ironic texts. Thus they do not bring to the understanding of structuralism the tense interplay of involvement and distance that Foucault calls for in a "genealogical" account. Nor is there any sustained inquiry into the problem of the relation between structuralism and those partially immanent critiques of it often termed "post-structuralist." By jarring contrast, there are numerous comparisons of Foucault's views with rather uncritical accounts of John Searle's variant of speech act theory and T. H. Kuhn's conception of paradigms—approaches that had little formative role in the development of Foucault's perspective. As a result, one gets little historical or theoretical sense—here one cannot separate the two—of the discursive contexts that (as the authors themselves acknowledge on page 127) were significant for the elaboration of Foucault's approach. These contexts were in good measure shaped by figures whom Dreyfus and Rabinow for the most part do not even mention (Althusser, Barthes, Derrida, Lacan, *et al.*). Dreyfus and Rabinow both follow Foucault's own understandable desire for marginal differentiation from his fellow French superstars and, notably in the first part of the book, treat him in a manner that is most adapted to his reception by a specific Anglo-American audience, particularly one with an interest in the procedures and strategies of analytic philosophy.

Within the context of their own assumptions, however, the book is admirably executed and well worth reading—especially the second half where the pace of the analysis picks up considerably. Quite helpful is the discussion of the recent Foucault and the way in which his current work takes him in directions significantly different from those mapped out in the earlier writings. Noteworthy in this respect is, of course, Foucault's inquiry into the social practices that coordinate power, knowledge, the body, and the constitution of the subject of discourse. Here Foucault makes the argument that repression is not the most general form of domination; sexual liberation may itself accompany the proliferation of the techniques of "bio-power" such as the confession. Hermeneutic and clinical sciences arose to interpret the discourse of the signifying subject, and they found their *frères ennemis* in structuralist sciences that explained the human being as signified object.

Exceptionally acute is Dreyfus and Rabinow's treatment of how Foucault's own earlier projects, especially that of a quasistrukturalist "archaeology of

knowledge," generated internal problems that led him to abandon their more extreme claims. Foucault confronted the same impasses he criticized in the "human sciences." Theoretical binds (such as that besetting the subject-object dichotomy) were combined with the practical neutralization of the detached "archaeological" observer who was untenably situated both inside and outside history and unable to enter the debates that agitated it. The resultant dilemmas induced Foucault to work out what Dreyfus and Rabinow call an "interpretive analytics" that for them goes beyond (yet retains selected aspects of) structuralism and hermeneutics in its pragmatically based attempt to write a "genealogical" history of the present. (The book also contains an extremely valuable essay by Foucault himself that is one of the very best introductions to his recent work.)

One may certainly follow Dreyfus and Rabinow in recognizing the historiographical and political significance of Foucault's current attempt to extend Nietzsche's exploration of will-to-power dynamics. But the question they do not raise is whether Foucault tends over time to go from one extreme to another: from the insistence upon the operation of abstract archaeological rules to an emphasis upon the anomic play of power. Obscured in this movement is the issue of the actual and desirable role of legitimating norms in both authorizing and resisting various uses and abuses of power—norms that cannot be seen exclusively either as derivations of formal rules or as juridical masks for the myriad assertions of omnipresent power. The recent Foucault is engaged in an important critique of the principle of sovereignty, be it the sovereign will of divinity or of its secular surrogate, the people. But the tendency to occlude the problem of normative practices not derived from a sovereign source (including the archaeological rule) leads Foucault to interpret society and politics predominantly in terms of power, strategy, and tactics—a tendency that may well reinforce some of the most questionable features of modernity.

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JOAN LEOPOLD. *Culture in Comparative and Evolutionary Perspective: E. B. Tylor and the Making of Primitive Culture*. (Beiträge zur Kultur-anthropologie.) Berlin: Dietrich Reimer. 1980. Pp. 183.

In this scholarly contribution to the "Beiträge zur Kultur-anthropologie" series, Joan Leopold discusses and evaluates the sources familiar to Edward Burnett Tylor (1832–1917) in his writing of *Researches into the Early History of Mankind and the Development of Civilization* (1865) and *Primitive Culture* (1871). Six