Philosophy of Economy
Russian Literature and Thought

Gary Saul Morson, Series Editor
PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMY
The World as Household

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Introduction
Catherine Evtuhov

The end of a century and the beginning of a new one can be a moment of self-consciousness, when people pause in their usual activities to reflect on the direction of their civilization and to wonder what the future might hold. The cities of Europe—from Paris to St. Petersburg, from Berlin and Vienna to Moscow and Kiev—became consumed, in the final years of the nineteenth century, by a passion for introspection and experimentation, by a rejection of old moral norms and a taste for the good life, by a joyful creative energy and a worldly decadence. In Russia the twentieth century was ushered in by a whirlwind of creative activity, a veritable explosion in all spheres of cultural and artistic life from literature, painting, and music to theater and ballet. This movement—the “Silver Age” of Russian culture—was accompanied by an equally intense philosophical search. It was a moment when thinkers and writers reflected on, questioned, and tried to formulate the bases on which their society rested.

Sergei Bulgakov (1871–1944) was one of the major figures of the Silver Age. His complicated and broken intellectual path is symptomatic of the turbulent and wide-ranging spiritual quest of the early twentieth century. A prominent Marxist intellectual in the 1890s (among those known as “legal Marxists”), he was at the forefront of the intelligentsia’s rejection of Marxism and turn to Christianity in the 1900s and 1910s. Author of the leading articles in the seminal publications Problemy idealizma
[Problems of idealism] (1902) and the famous *Vekhi* [Landmarks] (1909), Bulgakov also played an important role in the Union of Liberation and in the revolution of 1905. As economist, philosopher, publicist, politician (delegate to the Second Duma), editor, founder of a Christian Socialist party, member of the Moscow Religious-Philosophical Society, and eventually delegate to the 1917 All-Russian Council of the Orthodox Church, Bulgakov combined a deeply serious academic life with equally serious political activity. He was also a close friend and collaborator of such figures as Nikolai Berdiaev and Pavel Florensky, who have since become more familiar in the West. Bulgakov was among the prominent intellectuals exiled from the Soviet Union at the end of 1922; during his “second life” in Paris he became, arguably, the twentieth century’s foremost Orthodox theologian.

*Philosophy of Economy* (1912) is a work of social theory. On the simplest level it is Bulgakov’s rejection of Marxism. In his youth Bulgakov had reveled in the iron laws of historical materialism, finding pleasure and indeed exaltation in the sense of his own insignificance vis-à-vis the forward march of history, but by 1900, Marxism’s subjugation of individual well-being in the present for the sake of a shining future seemed to him bothersome. Thus *Philosophy of Economy* was also an attempt to formulate an alternative philosophy that preserved what Bulgakov considered Marxism’s main insights yet eliminated its disregard for individual human dignity. In the politics of the 1905 revolution, Bulgakov’s position was easily identifiable as classic liberalism: he advocated freedom of conscience, freedom of speech (glasnost’), national self-determination, the rule of law, a constitution, and the abolition of autocracy. Yet the difficulties of implementing these conditions on Russian soil led Bulgakov, as well as contemporaries such as Semën Frank, Bogdan Kistiakovsky, Mikhail Gershenzon, Sergei Trubetskov,
and others, to a deeper articulation of the philosophical and spiritual principles that underlay his quest for a society ordered according to just and legal norms. Philosophy of Economy was the fruit of these searchings.

**Sergei Bulgakov: A Brief Biographical Sketch**

Sergei Bulgakov was born in the small town of Livny in Orel province, to a mother of noble background and a father whose family had been provincial priests for six generations. Like many members of his generation, he was to retain a sense of his original social identity in the provincial “middle intelligentsia” even after he became a prominent representative of the rarefied urban elite. An intensely religious and church-oriented childhood was followed by a loss of faith at the age of fourteen or fifteen, partly under the influence of German philosophy. In this respect, Bulgakov’s biography reiterates the trajectory of the preceding generation of radical intelligentsia—Dobroliubov, Chernyshevsky, Shchapov were all seminarians from clerical families who rejected their childhood faith in favor of radical politics. Bulgakov left the seminary and entered the secular *gimnaziia* in nearby Elets.

During his years at Moscow University in the 1890s, Bulgakov established his reputation as one of Russia’s leading Marxist intellectuals. A student of the famous economist, statistician, and teacher Alexander Chuprov, Bulgakov was graduated in 1894 and immediately began teaching statistics and political economy at the Moscow Technical Institute; he also began a publicistic career with reviews and articles in left-leaning “thick journals”—*Mir Bozhii* [The world of God], *Novoe slovo* [The new word], and others. *O rynkah pri kapitalisticheskom proizvodstve* [On markets in capitalist conditions of production], published in 1897, thrust him into the forefront of politi-
cal debate with its argument that capitalism could be achieved in Russia without recourse to the external markets that had formed an essential element of capitalist development in western Europe. Like his fellow adherents to the philosophy of so-called legal Marxism (a rather awkward label, invented by its critics, that referred to believers in Marxism who did nothing illegal and hence were not subject to police persecution), Bulgakov believed that capitalism was a necessary stage of development for all nations and therefore denied the possibility of a “special path” for Russia.

On the crest of his success, Bulgakov traveled to Berlin (as well as London and Paris) for two years in order to pursue his studies and to make the acquaintance of leaders of the German and Austrian Social Democratic movements—Kautsky, Bebel, Braun, Adler; he plunged, with enthusiasm, into German radical politics and also began a doctoral dissertation, Kapitalizm i zemledelie [Capitalism and agriculture]. These two years, however, proved to be an unexpected turning point. Like many Russian intellectuals who traveled to the West for the first time (Herzen in Paris in 1848 is the archetypal example), Bulgakov found the practice of revolutionary politics in Europe disillusioning; the problems, furthermore, of working-class organization in turn-of-the-century Germany were very different from the most pressing political issues in Russia, where, after all, the industrial proletariat was small and weak, and revolutionary debates centered on the transformation of a completely inadequate organization of agriculture resulting, even as late as the 1890s, in frequent famine. European culture, too, had its surprises: Bulgakov described his encounter with the Sistine Madonna in the Zwinger Gallery in Dresden as a spiritual experience that made him, the convinced Marxist, break down in pious tears. Whether as a result of spiritual doubts or of inconsistencies in his scientific results, by 1900 Bulgakov found
it difficult to conclude his dissertation, which he had originally conceived in a Marxist vein. The massive work, which investigated agricultural structures in England, Germany, France, Ireland, and the United States, ended by asserting the inapplicability of Marxist theory to agriculture and, hence, the impossibility of any generalized description of capitalist society. When he returned to Russia in 1900, Bulgakov was in a state of spiritual crisis.

This crisis was to establish the new parameters of Bulgakov’s intellectual life for the ensuing two decades; from this moment began an intensive search for a worldview to replace the Marxism that had proved inadequate. The external aspects of Bulgakov’s life remained constant: between 1900 and the 1917 revolution he taught political economy, first in Kiev, at the university and also at the Polytechnical Institute, and then (beginning in 1906) in Moscow. He resigned from Moscow University with a group of 120 of the most prominent professors in 1911, in protest at government policy toward the university; but he continued to teach at the Moscow Commercial Institute, which had been founded by Muscovite merchants in 1907. But, more significant, Bulgakov the once-prominent Marxist now became an equally prominent participant in the renewal in art, literature, and philosophy known as the Silver Age. In this capacity he became the inventor of the slogan “From Marxism to Idealism,” which described the intellectual trajectory of an entire generation of Russian intellectuals. Bulgakov experienced and gave voice to the period’s “discovery” of idealism and eventually of Christianity. He experimented with neo-Kantianism in the early 1900s, but he ultimately found in Orthodoxy a system of beliefs that could replace his Marxist creed of the 1890s. Philosophy of Economy was a result of the preceding decade’s search and Bulgakov’s most important contribution to the philosophy of this immensely fruitful creative period.

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At the same time, up to Stolypin’s dismissal of the Second Duma in 1907, Bulgakov was an active member of the liberation movement. One of the founding members of the Union of Liberation (to become the core of the Constitutional Democratic (“Kadet”) Party) in 1902, he contributed to its radical newspaper, Osvobozhdenie [Liberation], and wrote the agrarian program eventually to be adopted by the Kadets. Unsatisfied with Western-style political parties, he tried to found an alternative Christian Socialist party as a Duma delegate, but with limited success. Bulgakov became disillusioned with politics after the failure of the radical Second Duma, whose insistence on the expropriation of gentry lands met with absolute rejection from the government. Bulgakov also became a major figure in a widespread movement for a religious “reformation” of society among the intelligentsia. This movement (similar to contemporary developments in Germany) sought to bring about social reform by instituting changes in the church and by bringing the church and the secular intelligentsia closer together. In this capacity, Bulgakov was a founder of the Moscow Religious-Philosophical Society and editor of a religious publishing house; he also briefly published a religious newspaper, put out the thick journal Voprosy zhizni [Questions of life], and became a delegate to the 1917 All-Russian Council of the Orthodox Church.

Bulgakov’s evolution away from Marxism and toward Orthodox Christianity culminated in 1918 when, following the Bolshevik victory, he took holy orders and thus, following a long and circuitous journey, returned to the faith of his childhood. Soon afterward he left Moscow for the Crimea; at the end of 1922 he became one of the boatload of prominent intellectuals to be literally shipped out of Russia by the new Soviet regime. After a short while in Prague and Berlin, Bulgakov went to Paris and began his new life as an Orthodox theologian.
and rector of the Paris Institute of Orthodox Theology. This final period of Bulgakov’s activity continued entirely within the church; it is interesting to note, however, that the central doctrine of his theology, the theory of Sophia, the Divine Wisdom, or “sophiology,” was first formulated in *Philosophy of Economy* (see chapter 4), that is, in a secular context. Bulgakov’s sophiology was condemned as heresy in 1935 by the Moscow patriarchate. During the years between his emigration and his death in 1944, Bulgakov wrote a number of significant theological works as well as popularizations of Orthodox doctrine; he also became an important figure in the ecumenical movement of the Christian churches.3

### Inner Spirit Versus External Forms: Philosophy of Economy in the Context of Turn-of-the-Century Europe

Bulgakov’s search for a new social philosophy was part of a broader European movement that historians, following H. Stuart Hughes, have come to summarize as the “revolt against positivism.”4 At the turn of the twentieth century, thinkers throughout Europe questioned the foundations of nineteenth-century attitudes toward science, literature, and society. This intellectual revolution, whose magnitude and intensity surpassed those of any such movement since the Romantic revolt against the Enlightenment, rejected a number of scientific and philosophical attitudes associated, for these thinkers, with positivism’s faith in the capacity of science to resolve human problems: positivism’s critics revolted with equal force against materialism, mechanism, and naturalism. In social thought, the questioning of dominant nineteenth-century beliefs frequently involved a reevaluation of Marxism (as well as Feuerbach, who was seen as a primary proponent of ma-
materialism) and a dissatisfaction with the application of Darwinian theories to social life. The revolt against positivism took a variety of forms: German neo-Kantianism and neo-idealism, Sorel’s rethinking of Marxism as “social poetry,” Freud’s “discovery” of the unconscious, and Saussure’s approach to language as structure (as opposed to the historical researches of nineteenth-century linguists) are a few of the more important examples.

Bulgakov’s dramatic transition from Marxism to idealism and, eventually, Christianity, coincided with, and formed a part of, the revolt against positivism that engaged many of his Russian and European contemporaries; Bulgakov might be considered the Russian counterpart of Sorel in France and Croce in Italy. When Bulgakov announced the primacy of ethical values in 1901–1902, he did so because Marxism, with its dialectical world-historical vision of modes of production replacing one another until the ultimate Socialist Golden Age, seemed to him merely a variant or manifestation of a greater evil: positivism. Bulgakov had begun to question the worldview that underlay Marxist economic theory. He did not merely reject one scientific theory to replace it with another; rather, he quite consciously formulated his Marxism as a Weltanschauung and saw it as subsumed in a concrete metaphysical system called “positivism,” simultaneously submitting the entire system to reevaluation and criticism.

What did Bulgakov mean by “positivism,” and why did he consider it an inadequate basis for a vision of society? To a large extent, Bulgakov equated positivism with what he called the “theory of progress.” Bulgakov spoke for an entire generation of Russian intellectuals—figures such as Dmitri Merezhkovsky, Nikolai Berdiaev, Petr Struve, and Semen Frank—when he claimed that positivism, as a code of social morality, provided a vision of history as progress toward a perfect earthly
society, sacrificing the good of present generations for that of the future. Belief in science, furthermore, had attained the level of a religion, had become its own moral code; yet, precisely because science did not and could not address the problems of metaphysics and of religion directly, if its essential suppositions were elevated to the level of a religion it would provide false direction for human behavior. Bulgakov argued that at no time could man live by science alone; people needed metaphysics and religion. Given this condition, positivism had become much more than a scientific theory—the theory of progress had become a theodicy; scientificity had swallowed up religion and metaphysics, claiming for itself the rights of both. But, again according to Bulgakov, the attempt of positivism to establish a scientific religion had failed; instead, science had ceased to be science and become a religion. The subject of this religion was humanity, which itself became deified; the goal of the religion of progress was the good of future generations, and therefore it demanded the sacrifice of the present one. Positivism in general and Marxism in particular, in other words, subjugated the needs of individual human beings here and now for the sake of the vaguely defined future well-being of collective humanity.

Although his initial questioning of Marxism and positivism had taken place in the final years of the nineteenth century, Bulgakov finally formulated his own solution—his original theory of society—only in the 1910s. The turn-of-the-century European critics of Marx, depending on the specific reasons for their rejection of Marxism, went about refuting him in various ways, ranging from revisionism to Weber’s powerful counter-argument of religious and ethical values as a driving force in history. Bulgakov’s particular answer to Marxism and positivism took the form of a “philosophy of economy.” In his book of this title, Bulgakov replaced Marx’s vision of society as a class struggle based on material interests, in which the mode
of production determined social forms and ideologies, with a view at whose crux stood the relation between man and nature. Like many European social theorists, Bulgakov turned to a way of thinking about society familiar to all eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Christians: he took as his point of departure an imagined original state in which man and nature lived in perfect harmony. To this initial state, analogous to the State of Nature postulated by Locke or Rousseau, Bulgakov gave the name “Edenic economy”— the world as it existed in Paradise, before original sin. Yet, again following the familiar pattern, the world in which we currently live is fatally separated from this harmonious existence by the Fall of man—which Bulgakov saw as a “metaphysical catastrophe” that dragged all of creation into a sinful, empirical state in which man must struggle for survival, eking out a painful existence from an unfriendly, mechanized nature. This is the world in which we live now, prisoners to our material needs; and this is the world, said Bulgakov, that Marx took to be the only real one, basing his doctrine of economic materialism on the “fallen” state of humanity. But whereas the eighteenth-century theorists proposed the idea of a social contract as a way of regulating relations among people, as well as between them and the government, in this imperfect world Bulgakov turned to a biblical notion—Sophia—as a way out of the mere labor “in the sweat of our face” that characterizes our existence in the fallen world. The Divine Wisdom, Sophia, which according to the Old Testament was present with God at the Creation (Prov. 8:22–23) and “shines in the world as the primordial purity and beauty of the universe, in the loveliness of a child and in the gorgeous enchantment of a swaying flower, in the beauty of a starry sky and a flaming sun-rise,” was an elusive concept that Bulgakov took care never to define precisely: Sophia consisted of the totality of eternal ideas that confronted God at the creation; yet the notion of Sophia
is in constant flux, it is joyousness, it is play, it is wisdom, it is love. Bulgakov’s enterprise was to introduce the notion of Sophia into social and economic life. Sophia potentially suffuses the grim world of work and the struggle for survival: in rare moments of revelation, we catch a glimpse of what life was once like in the Garden of Eden. The economy, even if Eden had been irretrievably lost, could once again become “sophic”: what we must do is find within ourselves this hidden potential for perfection and work to *resurrect* nature, to endow it once again with the life and meaning that it had in Paradise, and thus to complete the cosmic cycle of Fall and Resurrection. It was in our power to transform the world, to bring it to life, to return it to that perfect harmonious existence in love and labor from which Adam and Eve wrenched it with their sin. In Bulgakov’s vision people’s relations to each other, furthermore, were defined not by consent or contract but implicitly, by virtue of their common inspiration and participation in the shared task of nature’s resurrection.

What gave this vision its power was not simply its iteration of a coherent argument against Marxism but the fact that it rested on a widely accessible cultural and religious foundation. For Bulgakov, this foundation was clearly and unambiguously Christian. The second part of his answer to Marx was formulated in a book originally intended as the second volume of *Philosophy of Economy, Svet nevechernii* [The unfading light] (1917): whereas *Philosophy of Economy* stands alone as an “ontology of economy,” or a study of the general foundations of the economic process, it was *Svet nevechernii* that provided the argument advanced in the former with “a particular understanding of the nature of the world and of man, i.e. a particular cosmology and anthropology”: “What is the essence of the world? What is the essence of man? How do we understand the world, the ‘transcendental object’ of economy, and what is man,
its ‘transcendental subject’? A particular system of cosmology and anthropology is implicit in every philosophy of economy, and this is why we must before all else distinguish and establish the corresponding cosmological teachings as we study the world-views which interest us.”

Svet nevchernii set out a religious and specifically Orthodox Christian vision of the world that inspired and supported the philosophical and political-economic enterprise undertaken in Philosophy of Economy. Yet if Bulgakov’s own roots were in Orthodox Christianity, his social philosophy potentially had a more universal appeal. The idea of the Divine Wisdom was particularly close to Bulgakov because of its important role in the Orthodox (both Greek and Russian) liturgy and in Orthodox iconography; yet its value as a social-philosophical concept derives, at the same time, from its universality. Sophia was much broader than Christianity; it had roots in Gnosticism and Judaism and parallels in Platonism (the World Soul); indeed, the sense of elusive and beautiful divinity would not be alien to a Muslim or even a Buddhist.

Bulgakov’s “sophic economy” went further than the insistence on “individual rights” of his days in liberal politics: the new social philosophy affirmed human dignity by attributing meaning and creativity to the most prosaic of tasks in our daily life and work. Each furrow plowed, each page written, could potentially bring the individual closer to Sophia. The worth and fulfillment of each individual, moreover, was augmented by the very reassurance that one was not alone but was a participant, along with one’s fellow human beings, in a larger, cosmic, and beautiful process.

A number of striking features in this vision of life in society mark Philosophy of Economy as one of the variety of original conceptions that constitute the “modernist” enterprise. Among them is Bulgakov’s substitution of a “resurrective” model of
history—the Christian cycle of Fall and Resurrection—for the linear “theory of progress” that he had so condemned in positivism. For positivism, at least in its unadulterated version, the goal of history lay at the end of a long process in which mankind gradually approached, and finally achieved, a perfect world. This basic model might include a Hegelian element of revolutionary transformation at key moments of historical development. Bulgakov, instead, saw human history as a contingent process, developing in the conditions of a fallen world. Although we must constantly work to reflect the model provided by Sophia in our daily existence, we have no guarantee that this labor will bring us any closer to a perfect existence. The end of the world will come, as we know from Scripture; but the realization of the life of the future age remains ultimately independent of the earthly goals of mankind. Christianity provided Bulgakov with a means for avoiding the construction of but another utopia: a “sophic economy” was not a paradise to be achieved on earth but a constantly present vision inspiring us to work for the restoration of the harmony of nature and culture that humanity had lost in the Fall. This Christian, eschatological philosophy of history anticipates the use of this same resurrective model by the existentialist philosophers, and particularly Heidegger, whose notion of the “thrownness” of Dasein corresponds to Bulgakov’s description of history as the result of the Fall.

Another, related, essential characteristic of the sophic economy was its emphasis on process rather than on ends. Bulgakov, despite his rejection of economic materialism as a comprehensive view of the world, believed that it had discovered an essential insight in its emphasis on labor. In other words, apart from being a vision of society, Bulgakov’s sophic economy was also an ethic—but one that prescribed joyful labor “in Sophia” as an antidote to the grim eking out of existence that was so preva-
lent in life and accepted as necessary by Marxism and other economic doctrines. Sophia’s constant radiant presence could endow work with meaning and beauty, and the constant, joyful creation of one’s own life gave meaning to existence. Here, as well, Bulgakov’s theory reminds us of contemporary western European ideas. Specifically, Bulgakov’s man, poised for action, “holding a tool in one hand and the flaming torch of knowledge in the other” (chapter 5), recalls nothing so much as Henri Bergson’s active and intelligent subject: “Harnessed, like yoked oxen, to a heavy task, we feel the play of our muscles and joints, the weight of the plow and the resistance of the soil. To act and to know that we are acting, to come into touch with reality and even to live it, but only in the measure in which it concerns the work that is being accomplished and the furrow that is being plowed, such is the function of human intelligence. Yet a beneficent fluid bathes us, whence we draw the very force to labor and to live. From this ocean of life, in which we are immersed, we are continually drawing something, and we feel that our being, or at least the intellect that guides it, has been formed therein by a kind of local concentration.”9 The Bergsonian vision of a theory of knowledge entirely fused with a theory of life betrays a neo-Romantic refutation of positivism shared with Bulgakov. Furthermore, Creative Evolution (1907), like Philosophy of Economy, builds on the perception of a world constantly in flux, in which not only the creation of an artistic or intellectual genius but also the life and labor of ordinary people acquires creative meaning. The Bergsonian élan vital, the profound conviction of a deeper meaning in life than permitted by the “mechanism” of positivist, Darwinian evolutionary theory, coincides with a similar leap in Bulgakov’s thought from strictly philosophical argumentation to an affirmation of the meaning and joyousness of life that he calls Sophia.

But most important, Bulgakov’s sophic economy includes
what is perhaps the single characteristic that the many variants of the modernist rejection of positivism had in common: a new attention to things beyond the material world, an effort to look beyond physical reality to essences invisible to the naked eye. In keeping with this new recognition of the “disparity between external reality and the internal appreciation of that reality,” the central feature of Bulgakov’s sophic economy, and one that complements its rejection of a linear conception of history and emphasis on process rather than ends, is its replacement of a social theory—Marx’s—that, like most social theories of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, described society in terms of external forms (institutions, classes, forms of government) by a vision that instead stressed the internal content, or “spirit,” of society. Bulgakov, partly as a result of disappointment in the liberation movement’s unsuccessful struggle to throw off autocracy and set up a constitutional form of government in 1905–1907, was by 1911 no longer interested in institutions: Philosophy of Economy asserted the socially creative and transformative power of the attitude with which economic life was conducted, rather than the governmental forms it took; Sophia was potentially compatible with different types of institutions. What went on in the mind and soul of the individual social and economic actor—the khoziain, or proprietor—was as essential a part of the economic process as its ultimate goals or organizational structure. In this sense, Bulgakov’s theory conformed to the shift of focus of social thought, characteristic of his age, from “objective” and clearly visible forms to the more nebulous area of subjective motivation. The originality of his work, however, lay in his explicit identification of this “only partially conscious area” as Sophia. Not “content to dwell in a twilight zone of suspended judgment—open to metaphysical possibilities, yet wary of dogmatic assertion” like his Western counterparts, Bulgakov took the revolt against positivism all the way—
and ended up with a modernist philosophy that was also deeply religious.

*Philosophy of Economy* was also a contribution to the contemporary Europe-wide debate on the tasks and limitations of social science. In his discussion of freedom and necessity, the status of the social sciences, and the position of economic materialism as a doctrine, Bulgakov made a case for the behavior of social collectivities as distinct from, and governed by different rules than, individual behavior, when Durkheim, LeBon, Sorel, and Pareto were discovering the collective as a result of their particular sociological research. Despite its metaphysical tone, *Philosophy of Economy*, like the writings of the European sociologists, was firmly rooted in concrete social-scientific investigation: the relevant discipline, in the Russian case, was statistics, which, from its inception soon after the emancipation of the peasantry in 1861, had acquired a high degree of sophistication and extremely broad application in the Russian countryside. Bulgakov argued against his fellow political economists and statisticians, who derived prescriptions for individual social action—usually revolutionary or at least radical—from the results of statistical studies: *Philosophy of Economy* was an effort to preserve individual free will while accepting the picture of society yielded by statistical averages and mathematical calculations.

**A Philosophy of Life: Bulgakov and the Nineteenth-Century Russian Philosophical Tradition**

Bulgakov was particularly well placed for the revolution in social thought at the turn of the twentieth century. When European thinkers revolted against positivism, they were in fact rejecting certain attitudes—rationalism, mechanism, and
soon—that had been targets for attack by a powerful tradition in Russian thought over the course of the nineteenth century. Positivism had, indeed, become an almost religious credo for the Russian intelligentsia in the 1870s (of which Turgenev’s Bazarov serves as the classic emblem), but it was challenged as early as 1874 by Vladimir Soloviev, who perceived a “crisis in Western philosophy,” and specifically a crisis of positivism, twenty years before it actually erupted on the European scene. Following his Romantic predecessors, the Slavophiles, Soloviev argued against the “rationalism” of Western philosophy and proposed that philosophy as abstract, purely theoretical cognition had nothing more to offer. Modernism’s challenge to positivism coincided with the issues raised earlier by Soloviev and other Russian thinkers, many of whom were preoccupied throughout the nineteenth century with the inadequacy of abstract speculation and concerned with the problem of constructing a philosophy that would address life instead of enclosing itself hermetically in an artificial intellectual universe incapable of communication with the outside world. When Bulgakov challenged the positivist theory of progress and its excessive rationalism and intellectualism, he had a rich tradition on which to draw; the terms in which he formulated his notion of the sophic economy depended heavily on the efforts of his Russian predecessors.

Every thinker or philosopher functions within a particular cultural and intellectual tradition whose boundaries are defined both subconsciously—by language, early education, cultural atmosphere—and consciously—by teachers, reading, and so forth. The Russian intellectual tradition of the nineteenth century, although describable in terms familiar from the history of Western thought—Enlightenment, Romanticism, positivism, modernism—remained original and independent in the manner in which it assimilated and combined ideas, in the
questions that it singled out as important, the elements it inserted from more ancient Russian or Byzantine sources, and its approaches to the business of philosophizing itself. By 1900 Russian thought had developed a comprehensive vocabulary of approaches and concepts as essentially and inextricably interwoven with the ideas they expressed as, for example, acceptance and understanding of the terms *sign, signifier,* and *signified* are essential to a reading of contemporary structuralist philosophy. Sergei Bulgakov was a Russian thinker in the sense that his ideas inscribed themselves in the intellectual tradition that had taken shape in Russia over the course of the nineteenth century; his work can be meaningfully interpreted only if elements of this inheritance are taken into account.

*Filosofija khoziaistva,* or *Philosophy of Economy,* was premised on an interaction of two disciplines: Bulgakov believed that philosophy and political economy existed in artificial isolation and that insights from each discipline could productively be brought to bear on the other. Bulgakov sought simultaneously to construct a theory of society, or political economy, that placed the inner relation and interaction of man and nature, subject and object (a concern of idealist philosophy) at its center, and to introduce a new epistemological principle, borrowed from political economy—namely, labor—into the discipline of philosophy proper. This dual definition of *filosofija khoziaistva* depended in part on language. *Khoziaistvo* in Russian means both “economy” and “household.” *Khoziaistvo* as “economy” refers not merely to attributes of economic life proper—GNP, budget, interest rates, taxes—but to life in society more generally; a nation’s economy has connotations of the life of a giant household. *Khoziaistvo,* furthermore, is not a static term, for it refers equally to the *process* of economic activity or of life in society. The notion of *filosofija khoziaistva,* playing on these various possibilities, evokes an entire field of shifting mean-
ings that Bulgakov articulates in accordance with various specific contexts and that, taken as a whole, comprise a composite conceptual image. We reconstruct the content of *Philosophy of Economy* from Bulgakov’s various uses of the term: *filosofia khoz\-ziaistva* seeks to understand the world as the object of labor, it addresses the problem of man and nature, it is “oriented” on the fact of economy, it is an epistemological basis of political economy, it is a continuation of Schelling’s *Naturphilosophie*; and in a conscious play on the Kantian inquiry into knowledge, it poses the question, “How is economy possible?”

The result of these shifting semantic uses is more than a mere rhetorical image. Instead, it is a fully independent concept that reflects a dominant concern of Russian nineteenth-century philosophy: Bulgakov, like many of his predecessors, was concerned above all with constructing a worldview that addressed the real concerns of our life in the world, that treated human beings as active creatures, interacting with the world around them. What Bulgakov termed an interaction of the disciplines of philosophy and political economy was a restatement of Russian philosophy’s preoccupation with life, a fear of theories constructed in the comfort of the philosopher’s study and having no real application: bringing the concerns of political economy to philosophy was a means of introducing the realities of labor, wealth, and poverty into an otherwise meaninglessly abstract intellectual exercise. Both Bulgakov’s emphasis on the inner relation, or “spirit,” of the interaction of man and nature—which, as we have seen, refutes Western political economy’s (including Marx’s) emphasis on external forms of social structure—and his concern with integrating philosophy and political economy in a single theory of society reflected a rejection of rationalism and abstract intellectual activity with deep roots in Russian intellectual history. Specifically, in placing the problem of man and nature at the center of his view of society, Bulgakov gave
voice to a major but sometimes implicit concern of Russian philosophy, which had absorbed a preoccupation with man’s relation to the world around him from German Romanticism. At the same time, Bulgakov’s focus on the inner spirit followed a Russian tradition of concern with organicism and wholeness. Finally, in seeking to make labor, or activity, into an epistemological principle, Bulgakov continued Russian philosophy’s disdain for “armchair philosophers” passively ensconced in the safety of their study: philosophy must engage with life and is of interest only insofar as it helps us understand and eventually transform the world.

When Bulgakov formulated his view of society in terms of a relation between man and nature, he was explicitly reiterating and posing anew a central question of German Romantic philosophy; at the same time he was also following a pattern of Russian thought, established by the Slavophiles, that distrusted excessive rationalism and identified with the Romantic poets and philosophers who had rebelled against the Enlightenment’s preoccupation with reason and concentration on the workings of the human mind at the expense of the forces of nature. Bulgakov was bothered by the problem of accounting for the existence of a world outside the thinking self, a problem he expressed sometimes as that of the relation of man and nature and sometimes as that of the relation of subject and object.

Bulgakov’s neo-Romanticism, that is, his conscious repetition of the Romantic problem of subject and object, man and nature, appealed above all to the writings of Schelling, specifically to his *System of Transcendental Idealism* coupled with the *Naturphilosophie*. Like his fellow Romantics, Schelling was concerned with the fundamental problem of the relation of the self to the external world. Schelling objected to the narrow limits Kant had imposed on his investigation of knowledge and
sought to expand transcendental idealism until it became what
it ought to be—a general system of knowledge. Schelling, un-
like his predecessor and teacher Fichte, treated the self and the
external world with equal seriousness. Whereas Fichte had “re-
solved” the problem of subject and object by making the non-I
a projection of the I, Schelling approached the same question
by constructing two simultaneous and complementary systems.
The first, the Naturphilosophie, took the object—nature—as a
given and sought to explain its relation to the subject. Through
reflection, nature ultimately became its own object, as man’s
study of it endowed nature with reason. Conversely, transcen-
dental idealism—the second part of Schelling’s philosophical
system—began with the subject and sought to explain how it
was connected with the object. In other words, transcenden-
tal idealism was an effort to justify our basic perception that
there are things which exist outside ourselves. The problem of
the relation between subject and object permeates Schelling’s
writings, for he considered the explanation of the coincidence
of subjective and objective as the basic task of philosophy.

The “Romantic attitude” permeated much of nineteenth-
century Russian poetry, prose, and philosophy, and even the
way of life of many intellectuals, particularly in the second
quarter of the century—during the reign of Nicholas I. Russian
thinkers did not participate in the initial emergence of Roman-
ticism: Romantic thought and literature flowered late on Rus-
sian soil, but intensely and over a very long period. In a famous
passage in My Past and Thoughts, Alexander Herzen describes
an exalted atmosphere in which “people who adored each other
became estranged for entire weeks because they could not agree
on a definition of ‘transcendental spirit,’ were personally of-
fended by opinions about ‘absolute personality’ and ‘being in
itself,’” and “the most worthless tracts of German philosophy
that came out of Berlin and other provincial towns and vil-
lages, in which there was any mention of Hegel, were written for and read to shreds—till they came out in yellow stains, till pages dropped out after a few days.”

Attitudes from worship of creative genius to love of nature to blissful immersion in moments of insight or sharpened perception had their origin in a Romanticism thoroughly assimilated and become a way of life.

Russian thinkers of the mid-nineteenth century did not, in contrast to Bulgakov, address the subject-object problem explicitly; instead, they absorbed Romanticism’s basic anti-Enlightenment spirit so that, in the teachings of the Slavophiles, it turned into a distrust and antipathy for rationalism in general. For them, the question of the external world was less a philosophical problem than a fundamental attitude: they had no patience for abstract speculation and turned above all to matters with social or practical implications. The critique of rationalism became a dominant theme of Slavophile thought.

Instead of seeing the Enlightenment’s emphasis on the thinking subject as a problem philosophy was able to solve, the Slavophiles perceived undue concentration on the subject as a symptom of a broader “crisis of rationalism” that had struck all of Western thought, including Romanticism. Western philosophy, argued Kireevsky, had exhausted the rational principle. “For, when a man denies any authority except his own abstract reasoning, then can he go beyond a world view in which the entire existence of the world appears to him as a transparent dialectic of his own reason, and his own reason as the self-consciousness of universal being?” Western philosophy was at a dead end, for its excessive rationalism prevented it from addressing the problem of the world outside the thinking self.

This antirationalist frame of mind to a large degree explains the appeal of Schelling, of all Romantic philosophers, to educated Russian society. Schelling could at the very least be credited with having perceived the bankruptcy of Western ratio-

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nalism, and if Hegel represented the apogee of rationalism or intellectualism, Schelling was the sole Western thinker to have created a foundation on which Russian thought could build. Schelling’s aestheticism and religious sense, and above all his uncomfortableness with a philosophy confined to the realm of reason and purely abstract speculation, made him arguably the most significant Romantic thinker for Russian ideas in the nineteenth century. This was a tradition that Bulgakov followed in constructing his indictment of undue “intellectualism” in Western philosophy and in focusing his inquiry on the relation of man and nature—or of man and the world around him.

Bulgakov emphasized the *inner* relation of man and nature, the “spirit” of a particular economic system, in contrast to the external forms of social organization that generally form the substance of Western social theory. In doing so, he adopted a no less deeply rooted attitude of Russian thought. Once again it was the Slavophiles who, in a fusion of the Romantic penchant for organicity with principles of Orthodox Christian theology, stated that inner form and spirit were more essential categories than the abstract, logical, external factors of institutions or types of government—and that it had fallen to Russia, as opposed to the corrupt and rationalized West, to develop this principle and to express it for the benefit of humanity.

For the Slavophiles, external social forms, most particularly the dominant autocratic form of government in the Russia of their time, were of merely secondary importance. The foreign traveler in Russia, for example, would be likely to perceive the bureaucratic and administrative structures that were actually quite superficial and of little import to the manner in which life was actually experienced. What was important about Russian society, for the Slavophiles, was not its external forms—
most particularly autocracy. Western European societies, they suggested, were based on violence and on a formality of personal relations, and social life was limited to a battle of parties and interests; the essence of Russian life, in contrast, could be found in a deeper community based on true Christianity. The crucial features of Russian society were the organicity and communal agreement that did not necessarily strike a beholder who never looked beyond external structures.

Thus Slavophile thought turned to such matters as family relations, the peasant commune, and the church instead of the questions of administrative organization, types of government, and distribution of power familiar to Western social theory. The distinction—entirely taken for granted, especially in social thought of the Victorian era—between the “private” and the “public” spheres did not exist for the Slavophiles: instead they articulated in their writings the axiom that how one conducted oneself in daily life was an expression of a social and political attitude.

This emphasis on internal social structures took its cue simultaneously from the antihierarchical theological principles of Russian Orthodoxy and from an organicism characteristic of Romanticism. Specifically, it found powerful expression in the concept of sobornost’—articulated most influentially by Alexei Khomiakov and adopted by subsequent thinkers including Bulgakov. Sobornost’—literally, the “conciliar” principle—stood for “an association in love, freedom, and truth of Christian believers, which Khomiakov considered the essence of Orthodoxy.”22 Sobornost’ meant, on one hand, community and wholeness; as Bulgakov remarked, emphasis on the collectivity, on humanity as a whole, had become a “distinguishing characteristic” of Russian thought.23 As summarized concisely in a quotation from Kireevsky that Khomiakov placed in Kireevsky’s obituary, the Slavophiles argued that “rationality and division constitute
the basic character of all of Western civilization. Wholeness and wisdom constitute the character of that civilizing principle which, by God’s grace, was laid at the foundation of our [Russian] intellectual life.” Remarkably, on the other hand, the value of sobornost’ was that this very sense of community and wholeness actually permitted the full development of an individual’s integral personality as opposed to the one-sided emphasis encouraged by a rationalistic society preoccupied with external forms, parties, and interests. The Orthodox Church, and consequently a society in which it played a major role, consisted of a community of individual believers, each of whom had a part both in the organizational life of the church and in the formulation of dogma. Sobornost’, in other words, implied a participatory vision of church and society, in contrast to one in which an ecclesiastical hierarchy had a monopoly over the population’s belief and daily life.

The fusion and mutual reinforcement of the individual and the community in the notion of sobornost’ struck a delicate balance. One of the most colorful, and precarious, expressions of the principle belongs to another Slavophile, Konstantin Aksakov, in a description of the village commune that was to captivate and influence many Russian thinkers even after Stolypin abolished the institution in 1909:

A commune is a union of the people who have renounced their egoism, their individuality, and who express their common accord; this is an act of love, a noble Christian act, which expresses itself more or less clearly in its various other manifestations. A commune thus represents a moral choir, and just as in a choir a voice is not lost, but follows the general pattern and is heard in the harmony of all voices: so in the commune the individual is not lost, but
renounces his exclusiveness in favor of a general accord—and there arises the noble phenomenon of a harmonious, joint existence of rational beings (consciousnesses); there arises a brotherhood, a commune—a triumph of the human spirit.26

The lack of tension between the individual and the collective in the notion of sobornost, the sense that the individual personality could find full expression only in interaction with a larger community, marks Bulgakov’s philosophy as well: the Slavophile style of thought lies at the basis of his formulations. In Bulgakov’s Christian economy, the “transcendental subject” of the economic process is humanity as a whole, rather than individual persons: what is remarkable in Bulgakov’s vision is that he seeks to affirm and preserve human dignity precisely by inscribing the daily activity of individual human beings in a process that unites them with their fellows. This coexistence of individual and community is surprising from the perspective of Western social philosophy, in which the opposition of individual rights and the claims of the collectivity are virtually axiomatic. Bulgakov’s solution to the “deification” of collective humanity and sacrifice of the individual he had perceived in Marxism was more interesting than a mere proclamation of the primacy of individual values: his Christian economy focused attention on the individual’s motivation, yet preserved human beings’ belonging and participation in a larger human community.

Yet a third aspect of Bulgakov’s philosophy—namely, his effort to introduce labor as an epistemological principle for philosophy—gives expression to a characteristic attitude of Russian thought. Bulgakov argued that, in the labor theory of value, Marxism had discovered a principle that, if applied to

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philosophy, could potentially overcome the sterility and undue concentration on the thinking subject that he perceived in contemporary neo-Kantianism. By proposing labor as a philosophical principle, Bulgakov meant that we, as philosophers, must look at the process of man’s life in the world as the starting point of philosophy, and he proposed a fundamental perception of man as an active, working creature. At first glance, this approach seems to originate in the Christian tendency to emphasize life as the most fundamental category of thought or experience, and indeed Bulgakov’s very formulation of his insistence that “thought is born of life” depends heavily on Christian philosophy and imagery. Yet the insistence on the primacy of life also coincides with the attitude of a strong and entirely un-Christian current in Russian thought, formulated most powerfully by Nikolai Chernyshevsky and expressed by numerous followers, that constituted an essential component of the psyche of a thinker who, after all, had begun his career as a member of the radical intelligentsia.

In the 1860s Dmitri Pisarev scandalized public opinion by maintaining that a pair of boots was superior in value to the works of Shakespeare. Chernyshevsky formalized this statement and made it into a creed of the radical intelligentsia. Borrowing from the utilitarianism of Mill and Bentham, as well as from Comtean positivism, the “men of the sixties” postulated the ultimate scientific explicable of man and human society and the possibility, based on this knowledge, of a rational reordering of society to the mutual benefit of its members. Inextricable from this basic approach was the belief that both natural science and art were ultimately subordinate to life. Chernyshevsky’s theory of “rational egoism” began by claiming the possibility of understanding man as a whole through understanding him as a physical organism and ended by maintaining that the standard by which human actions must be
judged was the benefit they brought. His complementary aesthetic philosophy posited that “art is life,” in other words, that beauty was that which reflected life most perfectly. His argument concluded with an assertion of the complete dependence of aesthetics on social reality and his complementary evaluation of art solely in terms of its utility. Chernyshevsky’s extremely influential novel *What Is to Be Done?*, which became the handbook of Russian radicals, was a literary model for the total structuring of life according to rational principles of women’s equality and the socialist organization of labor: the transformation of society would take place through the transformation of personal, sexual, and working life, and the emerging “new people” would be its instrument.

Bulgakov shared with his predecessors among the radical intelligentsia their orientation towards life rather than abstract aesthetic or philosophical contemplation. The positioning of life over art implied a prescriptive stance, fully assimilated by Bulgakov. Like Chernyshevsky’s novel, *Philosophy of Economy* is an answer to the question, What is to be done?, and though Bulgakov’s response differs dramatically from Chernyshevsky’s, and even more from that given by Lenin in his composition of the same title, his thought shares with these two countrymen’s the prescriptive element implicit in any philosophy that places action (or labor) at the very foundation of thought.

Russian philosophy often strikes the Western reader as flawed or at least peculiar: as I have tried to show in Bulgakov’s case, this impression results from Russian thinkers’ use of ideas and concepts familiar in Western thought but discussed in unfamiliar combinations and contexts. Russian intellectual history does not—like, for example, Chinese philosophy—proceed from entirely different assumptions and entirely different sources than Western thought; instead, it is premised on an
interplay of elements from Western philosophy with peculiarly Russian concerns and ideas, with the result that intellectual currents that might be mutually contradictory in some Western countries—for example, Marxism and neo-Kantianism, or Decadence and Christianity—often coexist in a happy symbiosis. Philosophy of Economy is constructed, following this pattern, on a fruitful interaction of the concerns of the European revolt against positivism with antirationalist, “life-oriented” elements of a specifically Russian intellectual tradition. The result is an original, Christian, and modernist vision of society that focuses on the inner spirit of life in society rather than on institutions or external forms and that prescribes an ethic of active and joyful labor “in Sophia” as a substitute for the Golden Age, the paradise on earth that was the pathos of the Marxist vision.

Bulgakov’s social philosophy grew out of the same concerns that animated Western liberals: the effort to implement Western-style liberalism and parliamentarism in Russia between 1904 and 1907. For a variety of reasons, however, Bulgakov founded the respect for the individual that he shared with these thinkers on a different basis—religion. Therefore the notion of human dignity became the center of Bulgakov’s philosophy—a concept that might be considered “deeper” or at least different from classic liberalism’s focus on the rights of the individual. The result is potentially productive for the theory of liberalism itself. Bulgakov’s philosophy captures elements missing or lost from Western liberalism: it “re-Christianizes” a tradition that once had roots in evangelical Christianity; it captures a sense of inspiration and creativity as an essential aspect of social and economic life; by appealing to the Russian philosophical tradition, it achieves a comfortable synthesis of the individual and the collectivity (one of the greatest difficulties for Western thought). Bulgakov’s philosophy was formulated within the context of Western thought and Orthodox Chris-
tianity: it needs to be integrated back into these two traditions. Some of the problems with Bulgakov’s vision are obvious: a social theory, after all, that does not address social and governmental structures must, taken in isolation, prove inadequate to the task of proposing a viable social system. Yet in the West, where institutions are firmly in place, a coherent philosophical articulation of the role that dignity, creativity, “inner spirit,” and community play as factors in economic life can usefully complement liberal social and economic theory.

The history of Philosophy of Economy as a text reflects the larger story of Russian religious philosophy. The book was widely read and discussed among educated Russians in the first years after its publication, but it was erased from the public consciousness as the aesthetic and social utopias of the Bolshevik Revolution crowded out such non-Marxist and anti-Marxist philosophies, to be reborn in a wave of popularity that greeted Silver Age philosophy and literature as the Soviet system collapsed. Bulgakov’s work has acquired a new immediacy in recent years: the reevaluation and ultimately the complete rejection of Marxism by a significant part of the Russian intelligentsia adumbrated, in microcosm, the similar evolution of Soviet society as a whole that is taking place today. Bulgakov’s religious philosophy is representative of a school of thought—one including Berdiaev, Frank, Florensky, Shestov, Gershenson, and others—that sought to articulate the philosophical bases on which Russian society rested and that has become a crucial point of orientation as Russia redefines its identity. The particular force of Bulgakov’s social philosophy, so far as Russia is concerned, is that it brings together religion—in the form of an ethic affirming human dignity—and a theory of khoziaistvo, or economic life. His vision of history as a cycle of Fall and Resurrection, death and rebirth, reflects a very deep
theme of the Russian cultural consciousness. Even the specific form taken by this theme in his work—namely, the resurrection of nature through the labor of man as proprietor (khoziain)—was an important concern in Russian thought and art not only in his own time but well into the 1920s (perhaps the most interesting example is the work of Andrei Platonov). At the same time, his description of economic life as khoziaistvo, as the life of a large household, amounts to the clearest philosophical articulation of a mode of economic existence that in the 1990s became characteristic of the management of Russia’s cities, farms, and enterprises. Bulgakov’s sophic economy is among the ideas that can provide material for discussion in the present reevaluation of ideologies and institutions, a reevaluation that involves philosophical reorientation as well as a restructuring of markets, property rights, legal norms, and political and administrative institutions.

In general, I have been guided by my desire to make this book a text that is useful for the contemporary reader. Bulgakov’s points of reference include works that have become standard over the past century and those that have receded into oblivion. The former include various texts of Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Marx, and Bergson. In each of these cases I have tried to update Bulgakov’s notes by citing easily available modern editions, rather than the originals or obscure Russian translations used by Bulgakov. Other widely read thinkers of the nineteenth century such as Ernest Häckel, Thomas Buckle, Eduard von Hartmann, or Adolphe Quetelet—equally a part of Bulgakov’s worldview—now need to be explained; I have done so in the glossary of names at the end of the text, while citing, usually, the same editions that were available to Bulgakov.
I would like to thank Gary Saul Morson for his enthusiasm for this project. I am also grateful to Hubertus Jahn for checking my translations from the German; to Chris Monika for his help with the glossary; and to Jane Zanichkowsky for editing the manuscript.

Washington, D.C.
Philosophy of Economy
The World as Household
I do not intend to justify the topic of the present investigation in these lines, for I believe that it speaks for itself and requires no particular justification. It is not, of course, for the author to judge how well he has come to terms with his task, and the imperfections of its execution are evident enough to me. I have no doubt only of one thing—of the immense significance of the problem itself, to which, I am convinced, the tomorrow if not the today of philosophy must belong. To comprehend the world as the object of labor and economic action is a task to which economism, criticism, pragmatism, and mysticism equally lead us. And I attribute immeasurably more significance to posing this question than to any given effort to resolve it. In the development of philosophical thought the posing of problems and their recognition generally plays a primary role; this is what provides the impulse for philosophical creativity and defines its themes.

For the author, the present study also has special significance, for it draws up the balance of an entire period of life influenced by economic materialism, and it is the debt of the author’s philosophical conscience in relation to his own past. The fact of economy always aroused philosophical “surprise” in me, and the problem of the philosophy of economy—of man in nature and nature in man—has in fact never left my spiritual horizon but only turned about to show various aspects. The initial effort to make sense of this fact was for me the theory of economic materialism with various critical amendments. And although this theory quickly ceased satisfying my conscious-
ness, as the perceptions of childhood cease to satisfy it, yet the
questions that it answers in its own way have retained all their
force. We cannot simply turn away from the problem of eco-
nomic materialism in the name of abstract “idealism” (as do
those who turn “back to Kant,” or those who “combine” Kant
with Marx), for such “idealism” does not contain any answer to
this problem but merely leaves it outside its attention.

The problem of economy is taken in the present investiga-
tion in a triple dimension simultaneously: scientific-empirical,
transcendental-critical, and metaphysical. And such a means
of investigation is not determined by the whim of the author
but suggested by the very essence of the matter. For the same
thing that, in the empirical sphere, constitutes the object of
“experience” and poses problems for science, constitutes the
construction of a “transcendental subject” when regarded from
the standpoint of cognitive forms, and, finally, descends deep
into the metaphysical soil with its ontological roots. This hier-
archy of problems opened before me of itself in the course
of investigation, as it grew deeper. Initially, in the effort to
make sense of the fact of economy, it was most natural to turn
to the science about economy (political economy), which con-
structs a particular branch of scientific “experience” from the
phenomena of economic reality. Yet in doing so it remains deaf
and blind to everything that transcends the boundaries of this
experience. It isolates but one particular side of the problem of
economy. It is, of course, correct within the limits of its par-
ticular tasks, but it would be terribly myopic, having equated
the whole with its part, to limit the theory of economy to its
phenomenology. Beyond these boundaries the investigation of
our question inevitably falls into the sphere of general philo-
sophy. To sense the boundaries of phenomenology by revealing
science’s logical schematism is the task of critical philosophy,
of “critical idealism,” which here plays an irreplaceable role,
freeing us from the hypnosis of scientific empiricism; and who-
ever has once experienced its liberating action will always re-
main grateful to critical idealism, even if he does not accept
the critical Beatrice for the “beautiful lady” of philosophy. But
critical idealism remains powerless before the problem of econ-
omy in its essence: here the purely theoretical, schematizing
nature of critical philosophy, with its incapacity for realism,
shows itself most clearly. Hence critical idealism decisively ap-
peals to metaphysics—to ontology and to natural philosophy,
where the problem of the philosophy of economy ultimately
ends up. Thus, this very action realizes the connection of phi-
losophy and science that is postulated in theory, and it seems
to me that this can be mutually beneficial. Social science is un-
doubtedly in need of a productive tie with philosophy, in order
to cope, with its help, with the inner disintegration that threat-
ens it, for the general crisis of scientific consciousness that has
imperceptibly crept up on us must here be particularly draining.
Philosophy, meanwhile, in confronting such a life problem, is in
this measure liberated from that scholastic formalism in which
“criticism” increasingly entangles it.

The problem of the philosophy of economy also acquires a
peculiar pointedness for the contemporary religious conscious-
ness. In a time of decaying dogmatic self-consciousness, when
religion is most frequently reduced to ethics, merely tinged
with pietistic “sufferings,” it is particularly important to set
out the ontological and cosmological side of Christianity, which
is partly revealed in the philosophy of economy. But this is en-
tirely impossible using the means of contemporary Kantianized
and metaphysically emptied theology; instead, we must turn to
the religious ontology, cosmology, and anthropology of Saints
Athanasius of Alexandria and Gregory of Nyssus and other
fathers of the church. These teachings are at present philo-
sophically dead capital in the field of dogmatics, and, most

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frequently, are simply denied, and philosophical and economic materialism on one hand, and idealistic phenomenalism on the other, arise on the ruins of Christian materialism. Among the tasks of the present investigation is the effort to translate some of these teachings into the language of contemporary philosophical thought and thus to reveal how the truths of religious materialism are distorted and obscured both in materialism and in idealism.

Only a part of this whole project is realized in the present volume: namely, we here examine the general bases of the economic process, or its ontology. To the second part will fall the problem of the justification of economy—its axiology and eschatology; in part, the problem of the relation of flesh and spirit (the ethics of economy) and of the meaning of history and culture will be investigated here. But the foundation for these theories is partially contained in the present section, which can, within the limits of its task, be seen as a complete, independent whole.

As a parting word to this book, as the expression of its pathos and aspirations, let us remember Fedor Dostoevsky’s prophetic words: “Love all God’s creation, the whole and each grain of sand in it. Love every leaf, every ray of God’s light! Love the animals, love the plants, love everything. If you love everything, you will perceive the divine mystery in things” (from Father Zosima’s lessons in *The Brothers Karamazov*).

“‘What is the mother of God? What do you think?’ ‘The great mother,’ I answer, ‘the hope of the human race.’ ‘Yes,’ she answered, ‘the mother of God is the great mother—the damp earth, and therein lies great joy for men’” (the words of the old woman in the Cripple’s story, in *The Possessed*).

*Moscow, 18 January 1912*
I

The Problem of the Philosophy of Economy

I. Contemporary “Economism”

One of the most outstanding traits of contemporary humanity’s outlook is something we might call the economism of our epoch. So-called economic materialism constitutes merely the most radical and perfect formulation of this general attitude and, however questionable this doctrine may seem to us, however shaky its philosophical, scientific, metaphysical, and empirical foundations, this deeper significance makes it something more than just a scientific doctrine that crumbles when it is shown to be inadequate. In a certain sense, economic materialism is actually indestructible, insofar as it describes the immediate reality of a particular experience or apperception of the world that seeks theoretical expression in a scientific or philosophical doctrine. The doctrine may be quite unsuccessful in its execution, but this does not invalidate the mood that created it. That particular, undeniable life truth that our contemporary society has glimpsed and intimately felt with great seriousness and bitter sincerity makes economic materialism in a sense irrefutable. It cannot be simply denied or rejected like any other scientific theory. It must be understood and interpreted, not only in its obvious mistakes and weaknesses, but also in that profound content which shimmers through it. It must be, not denied, but overcome from within, explained in its limitations as a philosophical “abstract principle,” in which one side of the truth is sold as the whole truth. In a word, the problem of economic
materialism must be investigated, but not only in its contempo-
rary formulation, in which it bears too clearly the traits of the
accidental circumstances of its historical origins and the spiri-
tual individuality of its creators. For the unprejudiced thinker
it is clear that, apart from its rude and unfortunate current ex-
pression, the theory of economic materialism could be worked
out much more fully, clearly, relevantly; in general, it leaves
much room for improvement. If we abstract ourselves from any
possible formal expression of this doctrine, it becomes clear
that the essence of economic materialism remains as a prob-
lem standing inevitably before the philosophizing mind of our
time with its strong economism. Our time understands, feels,
experiences the world as a household, and human power is mea-
sured in terms of wealth. In contrast to the voluntary or invol-
untary asceticism of Franciscan or Buddhist epochs of history,
which despise wealth and deny its power over man, our epoch
loves wealth—not money, but specifically wealth—and believes
in wealth even more than it believes in the individual. This
is not merely mammonism, low and selfish (which exists now
as it has existed in all times); no—this is economism. Life is,
above all, an economic process: such is the axiom of this contem-
porary economism, expressed in most extreme and even pro-
vocative form in economic materialism. This is why economic
materialism has such survival power, combined with the ap-
peal of ideological radicalism, its sharpness actually increased
by its naïveté and immediacy. And this is the secret of the pecu-
liar enchantment of economic materialism, thanks to which it
so hypnotizes contemporary minds. I will say even more: not
to experience this enchantment at all, not to feel its hypnosis
(even if one does not abandon oneself completely), means to
have some defect of historical self-consciousness, to be inter-
nally alien to contemporary reality, remaining either above it
(which is accessible but to a few individuals) or artificially to

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fence oneself off from life (which is why I am so little impressed and, frankly, have so little sympathy for armchair “idealism,” ignorant of life).¹

Economic materialism or, let us say more briefly, economism, is in fact the reigning worldview among political economists, although, theoretically, many of them do not subscribe to it, perhaps because it has become the party dogma of social democracy and scandalizes many with its ideological radicalism. In practice, for lack of anything better, economism suffuses political economy, in which, in general, the expansion of special investigations, or scientific practice, bears no correlation whatsoever to the development of philosophical self-consciousness or reflection. In its scientific practice, political economy either proceeds on the basis of empirical generalizations and observations of a limited and specialized nature, or, insofar as it appeals to more general points of view, it consciously or unconsciously falls into the framework of economism, usually in its most naively dogmatic form. There is a close, unbreakable tie between political economy and economism as a worldview. In fact, economic materialism is the reigning philosophy of political economy. In practice, economists are Marxists, even if they hate Marxism.

The limitations of the horizons of economic thought, thus revealed, find expression not so much in the prevalence of the philosophy of economism (though this, too, is symptomatic) but in its naive dogmatism. It is as though the dogma of economism were the only possible, and moreover the self-evident, philosophy of economy generally. For this reason, the primary task of philosophical criticism is to shatter this naive dogmatism and, by questioning it, to make it the object of a special philosophical investigation.

We cannot reproach political economy for depending on particular philosophical presuppositions that it takes as apodictic
truths or axioms. All scientific knowledge is partial and fragmentary and therefore is never constructed without such axiomatic presuppositions. It adheres to them as to an anchor thrown into the shoreless sea of discursive knowledge, into the infinity of possible problems and objects of science. No specialized investigation is conducted \textit{ab ovo}; rather it begins, so to speak, in the middle, for it always depends on an entire series of contingent or certain axiomatic principles, that is, it is always \textit{dogmatically} conditioned. Such is the inevitable dogmatism of our scientific thought, and no “criticism” can free us of it, although there is a tendency to forget about this dogmatism too easily and to present the results of such contingent knowledge as knowledge \textit{quand même}, as absolute truth. Only that scientific inquiry can be acknowledged as “critical” that is conscious of its dogmatic contingency and takes it into account in determining the critical mass or theoretical value of its propositions.

Thus the science of economy, or political economy, is also a dogmatically conditioned branch of human knowledge. It is contingent both in its empirical dimension (here, too, there is greater awareness of this contingency, for example, the connection of political economy with technology) and in its general philosophical underpinnings. One or another philosophy of economy, establishing the presuppositions of political economy, is decidedly not created within itself, is not the result of scientific investigation, as is sometimes thought, but is incorporated in science a priori, although it predetermines the character of its conclusions. Economic materialism (in statistics, radical Queteletism) had the courage to extract these presuppositions and mold them into an independent philosophical system; in so doing, it revealed the secret of political economy, which had used its principles silently and under cover, naively considering them to be the fruit of its own scientific work. At
the same time economic materialism, by extracting and dogmatizing what had merely been assumed by scientific practice, made these presuppositions into an independent problem, thus ultimately aiding in the awakening of critical thought in this field. The discipline of economics currently finds itself in a severe philosophical crisis: the rejection of a conscious adherence to economic materialism has left economics completely devoid of any philosophical basis and turned it into an abstract manipulation of empirical facts and observations, so that it can barely be taken seriously as a science. For this reason the problem of the philosophy of economy or, better, the totality of these problems is now of interest not just to philosophy but also to specialized economic investigations.

What seems self-evident in practice often poses the greatest problems for the philosophical mind. Such, for example, is the entire theory of knowledge that, essentially, investigates self-evident forms of cognition and perceives in them the most difficult and complicated philosophical problems. This deceptive obviousness results in the common acceptance of such propositions as immutable and apodictic, so that to deny them seems absurd; or, as frequent in specialized sciences, they are taken as proven within the realm of that particular science; the outcome, in our time of scientific specialization, is a peculiar but characteristic dogmatism of specialized sciences. We require the effort of philosophical analysis to free ourselves of this. We must begin to doubt that which it is unusual or improper to question, we must look with the naive eyes of a foreigner or a savage, for whom starched collars and white cuffs, self-evident for us, seem peculiar, and who asks about their true purpose.

Matters are just about thus with political economy. It, too, takes for granted too much that it received at its birth and has therefore become accustomed to treat as its organic attribute, its constant baggage. If we grant free reign to philosophical
doubt while reading a current political-economic tract, we immediately see how deeply this dogmatism of presuppositions penetrates its construction and how divinely innocent of this it remains.

The science of economics belongs to the most contingent and philosophically least independent of disciplines; yet it has accepted the dominant role assigned to it by our wealth-conscious epoch, striving to become the regal legislator of thought and expanding its influence far beyond its own horizons. Insofar as it succeeds, it does determine the general economism of our epoch—the distinguishing characteristic of its historical self-consciousness. Political economy with its economism is particularly in need of a reevaluation and deepening of its principles, of renewal through philosophical doubt. The philosophical examination of the basic principles of economic action and economic thought has become imperative; such is the task of the philosophy of economy, which evaluates not only the philosophical a priori of political economy but of the economic worldview generally. Naturally, however, its own problematic lies deeper than the simple service to political economy would require. The philosophy of economy belongs to philosophy generally, constitutes a significant part of it, and is not merely the illegitimate child of political economy. What, then, is the philosophy of economy as a philosophical teaching?

II. Philosophy and Life

The definition of the task of the philosophy of economy is, to a significant extent, connected with one’s understanding of the tasks of philosophy generally; yet what these should be is at present the subject of much disagreement. One might say, however, that the answer to this basic, apparently preliminary question—what is philosophy?—generally contains the essence
of a particular philosophical system and reveals its central assumptions. If we look at any one of the philosophical orientations of the past and present, we can see that they differ first of all in their understanding of this initial question. Apparently, there is no generally valid solution to this question; moreover, it cannot be resolved by specialized argumentation within a given philosophical system. On the contrary, this question poses itself outside any single philosophical system, which indeed is then constructed around this already existing question. What does philosophy want to be, what is the topic of interest toward which it is “oriented,” what is the ultimate immediate given standing before it? This is what predetermines a philosophical system. This manner of posing the problem intentionally uncovers this central nerve of the philosophical system. For many contemporary philosophers, even the combination of the concepts—the philosophy of economy—seems unacceptable or shocking, not so much because the combination of these two words in a single title sounds odd but because philosophy is here definitely and openly given a particular predicate; for philosophy likes to think of itself as “pure” and independent contemplation and balks at the idea of a philosophy of anything. It is true, the contemporary ear has begun to accustom itself to such expressions as, for example, the philosophy of culture, or of art, of law, and so on (even “philosophy of money,” circulated by the skeptical philosophical impressionist Simmel), yet these phrases are rarely used with any degree of self-consciousness and “critical self-evaluation” and, in any case, still await philosophical explication. On the other hand, it is true that the greatest representatives of absolute, independent philosophy such as Fichte or Hegel developed systems of the philosophy of law, culture, history, but for them these were merely particular parts of a general system, with no independent value. For them as well, a philosophy of economy or of something else, that is, proceed-
ing from this given reality, would have been a debasement and betrayal of philosophy. The dogma of the independence of philosophy, in the sense of its closedness and self-sufficiency and thus its absoluteness, was for them not subject to doubt; such is Hegel’s grand system in its Luciferian pride, such is Fichte’s first system (the 1794 *Theory of Science*).

I deny this independence and self-sufficiency of the philosophy of the self-styled absolute spirit, which generates both pure nothingness and pure everythingness and thus equates itself with the Creator. Philosophizing is always about something that stands before us as an immediate and uncontingent given, or, to use a current phrase, philosophy is always oriented toward something outside itself. And this also determines the more general and fundamental question of the relation of philosophy to life, which never leaves the field of philosophical consciousness and becomes particularly acute in periods of exaggerated, one-sided intellectualism such as post-Kantian absolute idealism or recently in neo-Kantian rationalism. Life is more immediate than, and prior to, any philosophical reflection or self-reflection. Life is ultimately undefinable, though constantly in the process of definition; it fills our judgments with content but is never exhausted by them. It fills all the twists and turns of our existence and, more particularly, of our thought; it is the maternal womb, the inexhaustible source, the immeasurable depth. Life is simultaneously everything and nothing, for it cannot be attributed to any particular something and thus be categorized and defined. It is outside time and space, for, although it is expressed in spatial and temporal phenomena, it is never fully exhausted by them and remains prior to them. It is not life that exists in space and time, but spatiality and temporality that are manifestations of life. Life cannot be reduced to anything simpler than itself, although it proceeds from the Source of life, the God of the living but not of the dead. Philosophical self-

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consciousness inevitably runs up against life as its primordial principle. Life cannot be deduced from any reasons and is in this sense miraculous, it is freedom, reigning over necessity. In relation to life, all aspects of being are but partial definitions: will, thought, instinct, consciousness, the subconscious spheres, even being itself, the copula is and the predicate of existence have meaning only in relation to the essential, which is life, supposing its particular manifestations or states as particular definitions. There is no being in abstracto; there is only concrete being for itself, self-determining life. And this miraculous source of life is reflected in a myriad of individual consciousnesses while retaining its identity and unity. Life is the mystery of world being, accessible to experience but unfathomable to the mind; it is that primordial light in which both consciousness and difference are born. It is into this shoreless ocean that philosophy throws its anchor, seeking that point where the Archimedes trigger of a philosophical system can be applied, weighing the entire universe on its scales; philosophy inevitably requires a point of reference outside itself that is immediately given and inalienable, in order for the possibility itself of philosophizing not to be destroyed. Creation from nothing is given to man neither in the field of philosophy nor in other things. The content of philosophy depends to a significant extent on where and how this anchor is thrown, on what impresses or “surprises” (σαυμάζει) the thinker, or on the orientation of philosophy; so we could write the history of philosophical systems as the history of various philosophical orientations.

Life is the maternal womb that gives birth to all of its manifestations: both dreamy nighttime consciousness full of endless possibilities and hopes, and the daytime, waking consciousness that generates philosophical and scientific thought—both Apollo and Dionysus. It is of foremost importance to keep in mind that thought is born of life and that in this sense philo-
sophical reflection is life’s own self-reflection; in other words, the logical principle, the *logos* of life, originates in that concrete and indivisible whole in which what is logically impenetrable and transcendent to thought unites indivisibly and yet discretely with the logical principle. Life, as the concrete unity of the logical and the alogical, remains of course supralogical, cannot by accounted for by any logical definition, which would necessarily be concerned only with schemas and boundaries rather than with its living texture; yet this does not make life alogical or logically indifferent. Life gives birth to thought, it thinks and has its own self-consciousness, it reflects on itself. The logical principle has boundaries that it cannot cross, but within them it reigns unchallenged. The alogical is impenetrable to the logical; yet it is itself constrained by the logical. The logical and the alogical are connected and interdependent. Thus light presumes an ever-present darkness (*καὶ τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ σκοτεινᾷ φαίνεται*—“And the light shineth in darkness,” John 1:5) and joy ever-conquered sadness (Schelling), while the warmth of love is generated by a muted flame that has ceased to scorch (Jakob Böhme). Only such a view makes the possibility of apprehending and knowing being intelligible, explains the possibility of philosophy, of science, even of simple common sense and generally of any kind of thought that rises above simple automatic instinct. Thought is born in life and of life; it is a necessary hypostasis of life. For this reason it is not outside life; it is not transcendent but immanent, although not in the sense of contemporary immanentism, which equates being with (logical) consciousness and therefore puts an equality sign between the logical and the essential and which, consequently, denies the alogical root of being.

But the history of philosophy has produced two interpretations of this dual nature of life, logical and alogical. One of them considers the logical principle as the fundamental prin-
ciple of being, perceiving being as self-developing thought, thinking itself, generating itself and turning in on itself in a closed philosophical system; this is intellectualism. The second interpretation emphasizes the reverse side of the dilemma and pronounces the priority of the alogical over the logical, of instinct over reason, unconscious over conscious; this is anti-intellectualism, a-logic taken to the extreme of anti-logic.

Intellectualism represents an extraordinarily powerful current in contemporary European philosophy and might even be called a hereditary illness that first appeared in its forefather Descartes with his ultra-intellectualist Cogito ergo sum. Despite all the ambiguity and lack of clarity of this statement as it was developed by Descartes, history has interpreted it in the most intellectualist sense possible, that is, that being and ultimately life, as well as the individual personality (sum), require a rational basis and can receive it from philosophy. Philosophy is then torn from its roots and inevitably falls into a delusion of grandeur, immersing itself in a world of dreams and shadows, sometimes grand and fascinating, but ultimately lifeless. In other words, an epoch of dreamy idealism opens, for which cogitare = essere = vivere—the “Copernican” pretensions of the armchair know-it-all. European philosophy is still in the throes of this illness. In the course of further development, intellectualism has taken two courses: absolute idealism, which with its inevitable panlogism proclaims the boundless universality of the logical principle, self-conscious thought, which achieves its ultimate expression in philosophy (according to which philosophy is higher than life, is its goal and product); and critical rationalism, in which metaphysical panlogism gives way to “scientific idealism,” and the role of world wisdom is assumed by formal schemas of scientific cognition. The boldest representatives of intellectualism in contemporary metaphysics are, of course, Fichte in his first system of Ich-philosophie (developed

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in the *Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre* [Foundations of a general theory of science] and the *Grundriss der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre* [Basics of the general theory of science], 1794, and also in two *Einleitungen in die Wissenschaftslehre* [Introductons to the theory of science], 1797), and particularly Hegel, who reaches the ultimate extreme of intellectualism. Hegel’s general significance in this context is well known; a specific explication of his system from this point of view lies outside the scope of the present work.\(^6\)

Scientific rationalism, the other form of contemporary intellectualism, is represented by scientific positivism but also finds conscious and “critical” expression in neo-Kantian idealism, with its pancategorialism and panmethodism, and in contemporary methodologies of science or so-called scientific philosophy. This trait is more or less characteristic of all neo-Kantianism in its most influential branches, but it finds its most complete and radical expression in the teachings of the so-called Marburg school headed by Cohen, that Hegel of scientific rationalism.\(^7\) Here philosophy is openly and clearly oriented toward science, and above all towards mathematics, and the concepts of specialized sciences with their abstract categories are interpreted as the single, higher, thoroughly rational reality, generated from meonic nothingness by scientific reason. Science is the ὄντος ὤν of reality, whereas philosophy, as a system of categories, as the self-consciousness of scientific reason, is the ὄντος ὤν of science. The alogical is ignored, whereas the irrational is acknowledged only as a possible problem, as an “ewige Aufgabe” [eternal task], that is, it is merely inserted into the system of categories and thus rationalized.

The true founder of the contemporary philosophy of intellectualism is, of course, Kant. Both of its branches—panlogism and pancategorialism, Hegelianism and Cohenism—are bound to Kant by inheritance. Schopenhauer, and Schelling,
and Fichte of the second period have in one or another manner also been connected with him, however; this shows that Kant’s works conceal in themselves various possibilities but in themselves are devoid of sufficient definition (thanks to the lack of clarity in the theory of the role of “Empfindung” [sensation] in the theory of knowledge and the ambiguity of the metaphysical theory of the Ding an sich [thing in itself]).

On the opposite pole to intellectualism is contemporary anti-intellectualism, which is however simultaneously generated by intellectualism as a reaction to it and is therefore incapable of overcoming it. The distinguishing characteristic of anti-intellectualism is skepticism concerning the independence of the logical principle. This skepticism originates in the tendency to view reason as nothing but a tool of life, guided by blind, alogical, almost antilogical instinct. Reason acquires the status of an instrument, valuable only insofar as it is useful. Thus reason is not only deprived of the autonomous sovereignty of self-generating thought attributed to it by intellectualism but is actually seen as a product, or as a means. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel all sought to understand the history of reason in its self-consciousness and development, but their task was limited to an analysis only of the development, not of the genesis of reason, and therefore has nothing in common with anti-intellectualism’s contemporary effort to explain the very origin of reason, for it acknowledged the rights of reason and assumed it to be primordially given. Anti-intellectualism, in contrast, proceeds on the silent, or even half-consciously articulated, presupposition that reason originated in time, that is, that there could have been a time when there was no reason. In this case we must go farther and admit that reason could have not been at all, and life might have remained blind and instinctive. We do not find this even in Schopenhauer, the philosopher of blind will who comes closest to anti-intellectualism; even

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for him, reason necessarily originates together with the beginning of the world-historical process: the world as will is necessarily also representation. The irrationalism combined with instrumentalism of the effort to reduce reason to evolutionary accident (not, of course, in the sense of lack of empirical reasons, but in that of the absence of ideal inevitability) unquestionably degrades reason and questions the very possibility of cognition, that is, by the same token, the possibility of its own self. This irrationalism suffers from self-destructive skepticism—the lot of every radical skepticism that advances any sort of positive statement. At present, the most different thinkers, with varying degrees of philosophical consciousness and for different philosophical motives, rally around the flag of anti-intellectualism: Darwinists in epistemology—including, on one hand, Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and Simmel, and on the other the economic materialists and some philosophical materialists (hylozoists such as Häckel); then Bergson and his followers, moving the significance of instinct to the forefront; and, finally, contemporary pragmatists. For some this is the flag of rebellion against Kant and neo-Kantianism and the discovery of metaphysics and religion (Bergson and some of the pragmatists); for others, “pre-Kantians after Kant,” on the contrary, this is a means of shielding themselves from any metaphysics or religion and decisively affirming themselves in the zoological calling of human apes, while simultaneously appropriating the throne of the superman. Reason cannot be desecrated by reason itself, however, and *la raison toujours finira par la raison*. The fundamental and inalienable flaw of anti-intellectualism striving to be philosophy, that is, a logical system, is the impossibility of justifying its own existence and goals by its own principles. Here the classic example of a self-contradictory judgment, falling into a vicious circle, inevitably repeats itself: one Cretan said that all Cretans were liars, therefore, as a Cretan, he must
have lied, and his own statement contradicts the truth; however, in this particular case it turns out that he said the truth and Cretans are really liars, but then he, too, lied, and so on. Anti-intellectualism justly and powerfully emphasizes the boundaries of intellectualist rationalism. Life is broader and deeper than rational consciousness, and this consciousness has its own history, for below and behind it lie “subliminal,” subconscious, or pre-conscious spheres. Although the rational-discursive daytime I is the sharpest expression or symptom of life, it grows out of the depths and has roots in the darkness of the nighttime, dreaming I; the personality is immeasurably deeper and broader than its consciousness at any given moment. Life in nature acquires consciousness by a long and roundabout path, not immediately. This truth was felt with great immediacy by the “historian of reason,” Schelling, before any Darwinism or evolutionism. If we limit ourselves merely to correcting the perversities of presumptuous scholastic rationalism, then we still don’t have anti-intellectualism, which consists precisely in the destruction of the necessary, primordial, and ideal connection of logical and alogical and immerses the light of reason in the dark elements of the alogical. By doing so, it in fact carries out a sentence on itself as a philosophical teaching. Only the basic mood of anti-intellectualism, the rebellion against deadening rationalism, is valuable; but “we cannot live by rebellion alone” (Dostoevsky) even in philosophy, for here too rebellion is that same slavery, but in reverse, making us the spiritual prisoners of rationalism instead of overcoming it.

Thus life is the concrete and indissoluble unity of the logical and the alogical, and only this proposition makes the fact of knowledge comprehensible; in philosophy, in science, and even in our self-consciousness we find this same living synthesis of logical and alogical. Life is not antilogical, is not alien to the logos; logos is the connection of things, necessarily having

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transsubjective or objective meaning—this axiom is constantly presupposed by thought and lies at the foundation of our logical self-consciousness. But at the same time thought is necessarily tied to the alogical principle and is constantly reflected from it (as the I in Fichte’s system depends on continuous points of non-I for its expression); thought has a substratum outside itself, or, in other words, life is not exhausted by thought, and thought is not yet being, although all that which exists can be thought. The general relation between thought (both scientific and philosophical) and its object is characterized by the possibility of thinking all that exists, but also by its alogical nature. All of living reality is ideal-real in all of its dimensions; it is alogical-logical. By itself this synthesis evidently represents something supralogical, not quite accessible to thought—a wall that logical thought encounters as its ultimate limit. And this living and mysterious synthesis of two different yet not contradictory principles—the logical and the alogical—takes place in every act of thought.

Logical thought, abstracted from the concrete unity of logical and alogical, is based on the possibility of reflection, which re-creates reality as an ideal series (or, rather, many ideal series) of logical concepts, symbols, or schemas of living, concrete unities. This construction of ideal series of reality, based on the abstraction of the logical principle and the symbolic expression of concrete, supralogical reality through concepts—this symbolism of logic or “algebra of thought” (Couture’s expression)—does not, in itself, transcend the boundaries of life and in this sense is also a concrete living act, from which the odor of life, the aftertaste of “psychologism,” cannot be removed by any epistemological disinfectant. (In general the “cleaness” that attracts contemporary epistemologists, the distance from any kind of “psychologism,” that is, from life that is supralogical and inexhaustible by logical thought, is of course un-
attainable, and even the effort to achieve it is the product of the malady of intellectualism, which equates thought and being.) But this ideal, purely logical reflection of concrete ideal-real reality is actually a sort of extraction of the logical principle; and if we examine life only in the light of this principle, we are convinced by the illusion that we really have understood life in all its depth, and, for this limited and contingent point of view, thought really is equivalent to being. The intellect is capable of constructing an abstract world, wholly rational and “transparent,” or intelligible, alongside the concrete world, and a luminous edifice is erected on a dark and impenetrable foundation. The ideal power and light of the logos is revealed in its perception of itself as the beginning of being.

Ideal reality—the construct of logical thought—is thoroughly logical and rational; it can contain no dark, hidden nooks and crannies; it is entirely accessible to logical criticism and subject to “critical self-accountability.” In it everything is connected and continuous (Kontinuität is the basic law of thought, as Cohen so vehemently insists), and there is no room for hiatuses or omissions. Such is the nature of thought as it is revealed through analysis of its activity in its ideal expression, in the science of logic, and in the analysis of cognition, that is, epistemology. Thought is self-sufficient in its development, in its dialectics, in its tasks and problems; it is held together by a system of categories that, in turn, are inextricably bound to each other, and to this extent even pancategorialism holds (for its monstrous lies begin only where it imparts ontological significance to its epistemological propositions and explicated them as intellectualistic metaphysics). But we must never forget that thought, based on abstraction from life, is the product of the reflective activity of reason, the self-reflection of life. Thought operates through judgments and concepts that are something like agglutinations of thought, crystallic formations.
that are then substituted for whole, supralogical life. These logical symbols and symbols of symbols, concepts and categories, are in fact the columns that support the suspended, lacy bridges of scientific and philosophical thought and on which the idealistic *fata morgana* stumbles. Even so they cannot be considered to be hanging in the air, for their mass grows into the ground. Concepts remain symbols or schemes of living reality. They are *given* by life, and they in turn set up problems for thought. Contemporary intellectualism has become too accustomed to play with postulates, obscuring the givens on whose basis they have been set up. But one cannot solve a problem without data; this would be like trying to solve an equation consisting only of unknowns.

It is the givens that serve as the point of departure for one or another mental construction and admit of no proof; they possess apodictic certainty and are obligatory for thought, and they must be accepted as a self-evident axiom certified in the process of life. But, of course, the act of reflection itself, the concentration on one or another manifestation of life, is a free act (as deeply felt in Fichte’s system), an act of creation of life. This arbitrary concentration on one or another point or “fact” of life is precisely what I call orientation on this fact. For example, so-called scientific philosophy is actually the philosophy of science, oriented on the fact of scientific cognition (as is made clear in Cohen’s system), whereas epistemology is in the same sense the philosophy of thought and cognition. General philosophy (the metaphysics of being) reflects on being (life) as a unity in its most general and abstract definition, in its total continuity and contingency (Plotinus, Hegel). Of course, we could reserve the title of philosophy for only this last type of philosophizing, thus removing all the other, more particular themes or motifs of philosophical systems from the field. But this would be merely a terminological distinction. In its essence,
philosophy remains pluralistic, and it has different themes and orientations. Thought can cover a more or less wide circle of problems as it begins at a particular point of departure and eventually returns to it. In the end, these testimonies of life are the "Empfindung" [sensation] that lies as a dead weight at the bottom of Kant’s Erfahrung [experience], they are the "external impulse" (äußerer Anstoß) that remained impenetrable for Fichte’s idealistic system. This is the “otherness of spirit” that even Hegel was compelled to introduce into his system. Finally, this is the μὴ ὄν (and not οὐκ ὄν) that is by no means nothing, but only uncertainty in Mr. Cohen’s teaching of reiner Ursprung [pure origins]. Life inevitably intrudes into the realm of the logical, becomes immanent to the knowing consciousness, while remaining simultaneously transcendent to it in its concrete, supralogical unity. This is the Ding an sich that, though transcendent with respect to rational systems, inevitably penetrates even the most self-contained idealistic philosophical construction. Life is not transcendent for the living being with its whole living experience, but it is transcendent for its faculties of cognition, reflection, and thought. Life is the Ding an sich in its immediate mystical depths of phenomenal experience; this is how it comes to the surface of thought and knowledge, as foam or reflections appear on the surface of a bottomless body of water.

The idea of the concrete synthesis of the alogical and the logical in the supralogical unity of life lies deep in the Christian teachings of God’s three hypostases and of the creation of the world from the earth “without form, and void” through the word. In contemporary philosophy, this idea is developed with one or another variation in a series of philosophical systems; here we can include Schelling, particularly in the last period, Schopenhauer, Hartmann (who defends this idea with particular energy both against Hegelianism and against materi-
alism), Vladimir Soloviev, and Prince S. N. Trubetskoy. Different thinkers have arrived at similar solutions of the question of the nature of thought, though approaching it from various angles.

III. Philosophy and Science

Thought is intrinsically “oriented” rather than independent, it is thought about something; and this something is determined somewhat arbitrarily, for reflection is an act of freedom. But, similarly to the way in which paths covering an entire sphere may be drawn through any point on its surface, or to the way in which an infinite multiplicity of curves or lines may intersect in a single point, so, in principle, any one specific orientation may hold the key to a whole series of philosophical problems and, consequently, holds the possibility for their resolution. Obviously, not all orientations are in practice convenient and accessible for the thinking being, who in this sense is subject to spatial and temporal, personal and historical limitations; hence, practically, we must speak not of all possible orientations but only of the few that are the most practical and therefore natural (just as geometers deal not with all theoretically possible geometries but only with those that contribute to the understanding of our three-dimensional space, that is, mostly with Euclidean geometry). There are not set boundaries here, however, owing to the unity and connectedness of life and the law of continuity of thought: everything is in everything else and everything can be found in everything else. But, precisely for this reason, there can be no single, “royal” path for thought; rather, given a multiplicity of initial orientations, we must also acknowledge a multiplicity of paths for thought and therefore the objective “significance” of various constructions. In other words, there can be no single total philosophical system like that
in which Hegel and the idealists believed, confusing abstractness with general applicability and taking the most abstract system for the most universal. To perceive a reality in which *everything* is rational and inevitable and there are no accidents, to find everything in everything else in a single unified whole, immediately to apprehend the entire dialectic of world being—this means to look on the world with God’s eye, to transcend discursive thought, to step outside of time. This would really be that concrete idealism, that thinking of reality, to which Hegel pretended, whereas discursive thought is capable of finding everything in everything else only by moving from one thing to another, proceeding from the particular to the particular and finding the general only in the process of transition. For this reason, discursive thought, that is, philosophy, and to an even greater extent science, is *pluralistic by nature*; the single truth is the *Ding an sich*, transcendent for cognition as a given but immanent as a goal, as the ideal of cognition (Kant’s “idea”). Therefore philosophical systems can *justifiably* differ among themselves depending on their initial orientation or, in other words, one can construct different scientific and philosophical systems by proceeding from different points of orientation to arrive at equally valid assessments of a particular object; this is analogous to measuring the same mountain from different sides and standpoints in different light and still arriving at uncontradictory projections of the same object. Different points of view can, to a point, coexist peacefully, while the mutually contradictory ones eliminate each other. (This thought forms the basis of the history of philosophy for Hegel and his successors, including S. N. Trubetskov.)

It is difficult to refrain from comparing philosophical creativity to art, for a philosophical system is also a type of artistic creation, a “poetry of concepts”; it contains inner necessity and logical order, as a work of art contains a necessary consistency.
and harmony in the relation of parts to the whole, self-evident to “artistic reason” if logically unprovable. Yet the planning of the composition gives free rein to creative freedom, and the initial orientation requires artistic tact: here philosophical-artistic talent demonstrates itself most.

The point of view advanced here, following necessarily from our general understanding of the relation of philosophy and life, has nothing in common with skepticism, which undermines any possibility of objective cognition; it is, rather, aesthetic relativism in philosophy, acknowledging in principle the possibility of a plurality of philosophical paths and transforming philosophy into philosophies, as well as science into sciences. The progress of philosophy and science, then, depends not on unity of direction (which we decidedly do not observe in the history of ideas) but on the unity of the functions of thought and cognition, as the self-reflection of life, single and continuous. I presume that faith in absolute systems has been undermined forever—by the crazy pretensions of Hegel’s absolute idealism, by the efforts of recent criticism with its refined and corrupting relativism, and, finally, by the progress of scientific knowledge in its multiplicity and complexity. The need for a system, for architectonics lies too deep in reason for us to free ourselves of it; not only every philosophical doctrine but also science strives to build itself into a closed system of concepts and to connect ends with beginnings. In constructing such a system, however, the contemporary thinker (if he does not fall into delusions of grandeur or naive dogmatism) does not claim to present a single, absolute philosophy. In this fact the well-being of contemporary individualism finds satisfaction, as it seeks to express itself in the individualization of philosophical creativity. The meaning of the history of philosophy, too, is determined according to this understanding of the nature of philosophy. The history of philosophy becomes not only the history of “the dis-
covery of ideas of the absolute,” as Hegel justly saw it, but also a survey of the various motives of philosophical creativity or, what is the same, its various initial orientations. In any case I suppose that these definitions, in practice, coincide, for the discovery of new ideas of the absolute comes about thanks to the discovery of new ways of thinking about it. The absolute is of course unique, although it appears many-faceted for those who approach it by different paths. The above, in principle, also justifies the task of the present investigation. The proposed understanding of philosophy removes the objections to an effort to construct a philosophical system oriented on economy as a fact of life. This task, of course, cannot be understood in the absolutistic spirit of the claims, inherited from the Enlightenment and Hegel, of absolute idealism or economic materialism; the philosophy of economy does not aspire to be an absolute system, containing in itself all philosophical truth in pure form, possessing the key to open all locks. My posited problem pretends to less: I wish to say only that we can approach a general philosophy of life by proceeding also from this aspect of life, and therefore perceive some hitherto unexplored aspects, that is, that a philosophical system can also be constructed as a philosophy of economy. There can be as little objection to a philosophy of economy as to a science of economy, at least unless we fall into skepticism with regard to knowledge generally.

But where, then, does the dividing line between philosophy and science lie? What distinguishes one from the other? First of all, it is clear that it cannot be the object of investigation, for both have a single object, which is life in its self-reflection and, moreover, only the aspects of life that can be studied both by scientific investigation and philosophical analysis. The distinction between philosophy and science lies not in their object but in their cognitive orientation, the methods by which they, respectively, approach the object. They also perceive the object

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differently and ask different questions about it. Science is specialized by nature. Scientific study proceeds by isolating its object; it is intentionally one-sided. Science cuts little pieces out of reality and studies them as if they were, in fact, all of reality. Science fragments life, divides up reality into separate parts that it then proceeds to put together again in a new mechanism; in its theories, science gives us the schema of this constructed mechanism. What is adjacent to or outside the boundaries of the given science is either a matter of absolute indifference to it or exists only insofar as it intrudes into its specific investigations. In contrast, philosophy is little inclined toward the detail that distinguishes science. Philosophy is interested in that which is of least concern to science—the connection of given phenomena with the general, the place they occupy with respect to life as a whole. It examines the world and its various aspects as a whole and in the light of the construction of this whole. We might, perhaps, say that philosophy seeks the explanation of the living meaning of phenomena studied by science in their individuality. This is why adjacent fields of inquiry are outside the reach of science: its tacit assumptions are precisely the proper task of philosophy. Thus political economy and the philosophy of economy, for example, both study the economic process, but one engages in detailed analysis, whereas the other looks for its general meaning. The first asks, *what?*, the second asks, *how?*

Philosophical reflection is always directed toward the whole of life, whereas scientific reflection looks at separate parts of it. For this reason, it turns out that philosophical concepts, although larger in scope than scientific concepts, are inevitably poorer in content; they are more general and abstract, for they serve as cognitive instruments in the resolution of problems broader than scientific ones. We can therefore define philosophy as a theory of life as a whole in its most general definition.

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Actually, S. N. Trubetskoy’s definition of metaphysics as a science of being approaches this understanding. In fact, the terminological question of whether we must call philosophy science, or whether this title should belong to specialized sciences alone, is really of secondary importance. Of course, formally speaking, we could call philosophy science, insofar as it is, like science, a methodically constructed system of concepts, but the difference between the cognitive interests of philosophy and science would remain unmarked if we were to adopt this terminological identity of the two. Therefore I feel that, instead of equating philosophy and science, we should see them as two different directions of our thought and cognition.

IV. Criticism and Dogmatism
At the present time it is impossible to speak about philosophical questions without paying at least minimal tribute to the “theory of cognition” and without kowtowing before the Chinese dragon of “criticism” that currently embellishes the portals of the philosophical academy. Criticism or dogmatism? “That is the question.” In my opinion—neither one nor the other. First of all, true philosophical criticism and “criticism” are not only not identical but differ from each other in varying degrees. “Criticism” can, and does, in contemporary scholasticism, suffer from dogmatism no less than the dogmatics of times past, and among the “criticists” who consider themselves critical philosophers there are, as always, few who really deserve the title. The most ambitious and influential criticistic constructions of our time (those of the so-called Freiburg and Marburg schools: Windelband’s and Rickert’s teleological idealism and Cohen’s and Natorp’s logic of pure cognition) suffer from the unabashed dogmatism of their fundamental propositions: in one, the fragile and unstable apparatus of contemporary scientific thought

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is automatically accepted as the absolute foundation of philosophy; in the other, certain patterns of cognition are mistakenly thought to be absolute, and transformed by a series of sophisticated reasoning into an ethereal “object of cognition.” And yet each of these schools considers itself to be the true heir of Kantian criticism. Of course, coherence and self-accountability, strict logic and conceptual clarity, in other words, critical self-control are desirable for all, and who would refuse to be a critical philosopher in this sense! — in fact we all like to consider ourselves as such. All creative philosophical minds have undoubtedly been truly critical philosophers, for they clarified one or another question and introduced new problems; it would be naive to think that there was no philosophical criticism before Kant. Actually, this assumption bears no relation to historical fact. At the same time, there is no particular “inventor’s secret” that holds the key to all philosophical criticism. Contemporary “criticism” is merely a scholastic orientation based on a terribly exaggerated evaluation of Kant and his (supposed) “Copernican philosophical achievement.” We can see the philosophical illness of modernity in neo-Kantian criticism, that “alchemy of cognition” of our day; perhaps it represents the twilight of philosophy.

The contemporary argument between dogmatism and criticism can be reduced to the question of establishing normal relations between the practice of life in its immediacy, its immersion in the object of knowledge, with its concomitant indistinguishability of subject and object, or form and content, a priori and a posteriori, on one hand, and, on the other, criticism, which expresses reflection with respect to the given act of knowledge and is already a secondary potential, to use Fichte’s expression. The critical investigation of knowledge is always a second story erected on a given foundation; it is reflection with respect to a fact of knowledge that has already taken place.
As Fichte says about his *Wissenschaftslehre* [Theory of science], and as can be applied to all *Erkenntnisslehre* [theories of cognition], “not one of its thoughts, statements, or declarations is taken from real life, nor does it correspond to real life. These are properly thoughts about thoughts which one has or ought to have, statements about statements . . . , declarations about declarations.”

Every act of knowledge, as an act of life, is in this sense necessarily dogmatic, that is, distinguished by its immediacy, self-absorption, and unreflective self-sufficiency. Such also was, of course, the *Critique of Pure Reason* as it was conceived in the mind of its author, before, as a ready product, it became a touchstone on which the critical mice could sharpen their teeth. Thought and knowledge are creative acts, and creativity is immediate: creative notions and ideas are conceived in the consciousness, not fabricated in a critical laboratory like a homuncule. So there can be no critical guidelines that would really teach us how to wield the instruments of knowledge, for criticism arrives only post factum and is a reflection on an already completed act of cognition. For this reason it is impossible to learn criticism, and professional “criticism” is an empty pretension. Thought and knowledge cannot be based on or justified by criticism, for they themselves are facts, existing before any criticism and independent of it. Criticism engages in the analysis and description of givens of knowledge, but it is not its legislator. Here it is appropriate to remember Hegel’s words, born of the immediacy of philosophical power, of the very depth of thought’s self-consciousness.

*Critical* philosophy’s main point is that, before proceeding to knowledge of God, the essence of things and so on, we must first investigate the *possibility of cognition* and whether it is applicable to such tasks; first we must study the *instrument* we
intend to use to accomplish our task; if it is no

good, all of our labor will have been in vain. This

thought seemed so plausible that it provoked much

surprise and sympathy, and diverted the attention

of cognition from objects to its own self, i.e., to

formal principles. If, however, we are not deceived

by words, we can see that other instruments can be

investigated and evaluated only upon their perfor-

mance of the task for which they are intended. But

the investigation of knowledge cannot be under-

taken otherwise that through cognition itself; to in-

vestigate such a “tool” means nothing other than
to engage in cognition. But to wish to know be-

fore knowledge is just as ridiculous [ungereimt] as

the scholastic’s wise rule—to learn to swim before

jumping in the water.  

There is no movement, said the bearded elder,

The other was silent and began to walk before him . . .

Alexander Pushkin

Criticism, which would like to be logical and to leave noth-
ing without critical reflection, moves in a circle and resembles a

snake trying to catch its own tail. For as it critically investigates

immediate, “dogmatic,” unreflective knowledge—knowledge,

so to speak, of the first potential—it promotes this knowledge
to the second potential and recreates the same first potential
in a new cognitive act—that is, it knows immediately, unref-

ectively, immersing itself in the object of its knowledge. To

put it in contemporary language, it commits the mortal sin of

“psychologism,” and therefore a criticism of criticism becomes

necessary, that is, knowledge of a third potential, which in turn

requires knowledge of a fourth, fifth, . . . n, n + 1 . . . potential.

In other words, we have here a regressus in infinitum—evil
infinity precisely where we need a finite quantity, all of which shows the falseness of the problem itself.

Knowledge is rational by nature; it is, or at least strives to become, an organism of concepts and judgments. In relation to the alogical-logical fullness of life it is abstract and mediated, but, at the same time, as living action, it is immediate and “dogmatic,” and this living dogmatism of knowledge cannot be dissolved by any criticism. On the contrary, we must admit that it is this dogmatism that makes criticism possible and is tacitly acknowledged by criticism. Consequently, dogmatism and criticism are connected and interrelated, not opposed and hostile to each other. The practice of knowledge, which originates in the depths of life, is immediate, naive, dogmatic; knowledge reflecting on itself, checking itself, testing itself, is critical.

This is how I perceive the problem of the critique of knowledge.

The above in no way denies the problems of the theory of knowledge, nor does it diminish its importance as a scientific or philosophical discipline; rather, I wish only to refute its significance as a legislator of knowledge and the assumption that a theory of knowledge must precede knowledge itself. Two types of problem remain for the theory of cognition: the scientific and the philosophical or, if you will, the metaphysical. The scientific task reduces to an analysis of knowledge from the standpoint of its general forms, or a critique of knowledge in the proper sense. The philosophical task consists in the explanation of the fact of knowledge, the explication of its life meaning. In the Critique of Pure Reason, as in the contemporary theory of cognition, these two tasks are frequently confused or insufficiently distinguished despite their differences, and this confusion is intentional, for it is in keeping with the spirit of Kant’s entire system. The philosophy of knowledge generally and the philosophy of science in particular are necessary and important.
divisions of philosophy, although they may have a very different significance from that now attributed to them by "scientific philosophy."

V. A Preliminary Definition of Economy

In the current empirical world, "life lives" only in a constant struggle with death. The "organic" world, the kingdom of life in its various forms, is surrounded by a hostile atmosphere of death, of the deadened and mechanistic, of stifling necessity. Under "the heavy shroud of graying skies," under this leaden sky, on a poisoned, plague-ridden earth, life seems a sort of accident, an oversight or indulgence of the part of death. Encircled by a ring of death, constantly threatened by the yawning abyss of nonbeing, life timidly and stingily huddles in the corners of the universe, saving itself from final extermination only through a terrible struggle. For if it cannot be completely exterminated, life is constantly in the process of being destroyed as it becomes the prey of nonbeing, waiting to strike from all sides and in all guises. Life is not separated from nonbeing by an impenetrable wall that would make these attempts futile. It is imperfect in itself, for it is fragile, temporary, mortal.

The coexistence of life with death, the living with the nonliving, the material, is one of reality's greatest paradoxes and an eternal riddle for the mind. There is only life, and all that exists, exists only in the light of life. Things, so-called dead nature, that is, everything in which the signs of life are apparently absent, are only a minus of life, its negative coefficient, but outside of this definition, which, though negative, is expressed in terms of life, things turn into phantoms and disappear. They are visible only in the light of life, as objects emerge from the meonic darkness of nonbeing (potential being) when the sun rises and disappear again into nonbeing in the dark of night.
Even death exists only thanks to life and in its light; death is nonlife, for it is defined only as the negation of life; it is but the shadow of life, and outside of life it is nothing, it does not exist—“God made not death” (Wisd. of Sol. 1:13), it does not have an independent strength of being. We cannot say that the absolute nothing (οὐκ ὄν, in contrast to the positive if indefinite μὴ ὄν) is; it drags along its contingent existence as a shadow of being, or its mirror image, requiring some kind of true being for its phantom existence. Still, the struggle between life and death, light and darkness, the living and the thing-like, penetrates our entire life, rendering it imperfect, limited, nonabsolute.

If the struggle of life and death is so irresolvable on the surface of world being, then this is only because this struggle takes place also inside being, in the very heart of the world, which is capable of supporting only mortal life, that is, life that, although absolute and extratemporal in its metaphysical character, yet, in full contradiction to its essence, is not absolute in its factual existence. Metaphysically, the death of the living is not only unnatural but self-contradictory, and hence logically inconceivable; we cannot think through this concept because of its inner inconsistency, and yet empirically this has become the most general and profound law of existence. This paradox holds a riddle for thought. We have become so accustomed to death, to the very idea of mortal life, that we are no longer amazed by this contradiction, which is however much deeper and more radical than in such juxtapositions as, for example, hot ice, cold heat, black whiteness.

Nonetheless, however we may explain it, at present only mortal life exists in the world, and this is so widespread that death has become an attribute and sign of life—for only the living can die. Consequently, life is affirmed in the kingdom of death that surrounds it on all sides and penetrates into all of its pores. Life
can therefore be only an unceasing struggle with death; it is achieved not passively but in the constant tension of battle. The struggle for life against the powers of death—in an ontological as well as a biological sense—is the most general definition of existence. Death constrains life to the point of mutual self-destruction: the Darwinian struggle for survival! Death uses the life of some as a tool for the death of others; the victory of life in one point actually becomes the victory of death in another.

We experience the struggle for life as imprisonment by necessity, by the deadened mechanism of nature, by the "empty and bustling elements" of the world, all of which threaten one thing: death. Cold and heat, fog, rain, drought, a hurricane, a river, an ocean—all are hostile, and all threaten life. Blind necessity, unintelligible raging elements, deadened mechanism, iron fate—these are all guises in which the spirit of nonbeing, "the prince of this world," Death, appears.

The dead mask of thingness, alienation, impenetrability for man lies upon nature, and only the chosen seers know that, in reality,

Nature is not what you think,
Not an empty, soulless face,
It has a soul, it has freedom,
It has love, it has a language.
_Fedor Tiutchev_

But even they receive this revelation only in moments of poetic inspiration; even for them, the same world of things, a dead desert under a leaden sky, where death and destruction wait on every step, exists in everyday reality. The living being feels itself the slave of necessity and mechanism. Life, in contrast to the iron necessity of mechanism, is the principle of freedom and organicism, that is, free intentionality.

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The struggle of the teleological with the mechanical principle, of the organism with the mechanism, is the struggle of life and death. The organism conquers the mechanism, although without eliminating it as causality. The law of the organism is Schelling’s causality through freedom (Kausalität durch die Freiheit), or aseism. We can say that the entire world-historical process proceeds from the contradiction between mechanism, or thingness, and organism, or life, and from nature’s effort to transcend mechanism—the principle of necessity—within itself in order to transform itself into an organism—the principle of cosmic freedom, the victory of life, or panzoism.

The immediate expression of this subjugation of being to the prince of darkness, to the spirit of death and nonbeing, is man’s fateful dependence on the satisfaction of his lower, animal, so-called material needs, without which life cannot exist. The struggle for life is therefore first of all the struggle for food, and in this man resembles all the rest of the animal world. Insofar as this resemblance exists, the entire human economy can be seen as a particular case of the biological struggle for existence.

Thus every living being, including man, must defend its existence, protect life from death. But this defensive relation does not exhaust the struggle for life, for it seizes the first possible opportunity to become an offensive battle, striving to confirm and broaden life, to tame the antagonistic elements of nature and to subjugate nature’s forces to its aims. The territories of freedom and necessity are in constant flux with respect to each other; life—freedom—seeks to expand its acquisitions and to surround itself with a sphere of ever-increasing radius. This struggle to broaden the sphere of life and freedom at the expense of necessity, in which life transforms the conquered pieces of mechanism into parts of its organism and melts the cold metal of thingness in the fire of life, can take various forms; it can proceed with primitive instruments or with all the tools
of knowledge, but its content remains the same: the defense of life and the broadening of its sphere, the transcension of the dead mechanism through the forces of life, in other words—the creation of life. The two aspects of this activity—the defensive and the offensive, the protection and the broadening of life—are inextricably connected, are but different sides of the same process. However successful this struggle may be, it still cannot be stopped at will; it is forced rather than voluntary.

The struggle against the antagonistic forces of nature for the purpose of defending, affirming, and broadening life, with the aim of conquering and taming these forces, becoming their master, or proprietor, is in fact what—in the broadest and most preliminary fashion—we call economy. Economy in this sense is characteristic of all living things, of the animal as well as the human world: Why can’t we speak of the economy of bees or ants, or of the economic meaning and content of the animal struggle for existence? Yet in the precise sense of the word, economic activity is characteristic only of man, and it includes, as particular and subordinate elements, aspects of the economy of the animal world. The traits distinguishing human from animal economy will be clarified at a later point.

Thus economy is the struggle of humanity with the elemental forces of nature with the aim of protecting and widening life, conquering and humanizing nature, transforming it into a potential human organism. The economic process can therefore be described also as follows: it expresses the striving to transform dead material, acting in accordance with mechanical necessity, into a living body with its organic coherence; in the end, the aim of this process can be defined as the transformation of the entire cosmic mechanism into a potential or actual organism, the transcension of necessity through freedom, mechanism through organism, causality through intentionality—that is, as the humanization of nature. The task of economy is determined
precisely by this disintegration of being, the contradiction and mutual limitation of freedom and necessity, life and death: if absolute, immortal life reigned in the world (and, consequently, the universe were a universal organism), if there were no room in the world for mechanism with the threat of death, then the only form of causality would be causality through freedom or teleology; likewise, if life were completely destroyed, and the kingdom of dead mechanism knew no bounds, the world would find itself in the dark night of nonbeing, lacking the illumination of life and freedom. The actual state of being is an unfinished, transitional stage, a precarious balance, which seeks to acquire stability in the very process of struggle. Economy is the expression of the struggle of these two metaphysical principles—life and death, freedom and necessity, mechanism and organism. The progress of economy is the victory of the organizing forces of life over the disintegrating forces and deeds of death, but is it really a victory over its metaphysical essence? Economy is the struggle with the mortal forces of the prince of darkness, but is it capable of standing up to the prince himself? Is economy capable of chasing death from the world and, by conquering death, to transcend its own condition? Or, instead, is it impossible to cure the illness of the heart of the world, poisoned by death, through economic activity? Is a new creative act of the Divinity, through the force of Him who “conquered death” required to “destroy the final enemy—death”? This final question we pose here simply as a logical boundary; its discussion belongs to the eschatology of economy (in the second part of this work).

But if economy is a form of the struggle of life and death, and is a tool of life’s self-affirmation, then we say with as much certainty that economy is a function of death, induced by the necessity to defend life. In its most basic motivation it is unfree activity, for this motivation is the fear of death, characteris-
tic of all living things. However far man goes in his economic progress, he remains a slave, subject to death, even as he becomes a master.

In defining economy as the actual defensive-offensive relation of man to nature, we expand its boundaries, apparently farther than accepted in political economy, which is limited by the aims and possibilities of specialized investigation.22

The characteristic distinguishing economic activity is the presence of effort, labor, directed toward a particular goal. Economy is the activity of labor. Labor, and particularly involuntary labor, defines economy. In this sense economy can be defined as the struggle, through labor, for life and its expansion; labor is the basis of life from an economic point of view. Life arises naturally through birth, that is, without the conscious application of labor, but maintaining it through economy already requires work. Labor is that value that brings life-supporting goods. This truth lies like a dark anticipation at the basis of the so-called labor theory of value in political economy.

“All economic goods are the product of labor.”23 Rodbertus’s formula, which reflects perfectly the general worldview of political economy, retains its accuracy and meaning outside the limits of the discipline. Within political economy, particularly in the “theory of value,” it receives an excessively narrow, materialistic, and mercantile definition; it bears the stamp of economic materialism, as well as of the conscious one-sidedness of our field of specialization. Already from its conception—in mercantilism, in the writings of the Physiocrats as well as of Adam Smith and other representative of the classical school, and, finally, in socialism—political economy strives to define more exactly the concept of “productive,” that is, economic labor, in order to delimit the field of specific investigation, which would otherwise expand infinitely to include all cultural sciences. In political economy this intentional narrowness leads
to a one-sidedness and vulgarity in its conclusions; for the philosophy of economy this intentional narrowing of perspective would be not only unnecessary but even harmful. Economy in its essence includes human labor in all its applications, from the worker to Kant, from the sower to the astronomer. The distinguishing trait of economy is the re-creation or acquisition of goods, material or spiritual, through labor, as opposed to receiving them as a gift. This human activity is the fulfillment of God’s word—In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread—and this includes all bread, that is, spiritual as well as material food: it is through economic labor, in the sweat of our face, that we must not only produce material goods but create all of culture.

The world as household is the world as the object of labor, and to this degree also the product of labor. Labor is the trademark of economy; in this the labor theory of value is correct, as is political economy, which accurately feels the universal, cosmic significance of labor, although it is incapable of expressing it properly.

Is labor definable? There are efforts to define labor in political economy, but they pursue specific goals in conjunction with the theory of value and are unsuccessful even in their limited aims; furthermore, they are too materialistic to satisfy us. Labor is the expenditure of nervous-muscular energy—such, for example, is Marx’s widespread and influential definition. But, the insufficiency of such a definition for mental labor aside, it is not difficult to see that this expenditure of energy is only the expression of labor. Labor in its inner basis, as a feeling of outwardly directed effort, is not subject to any definition, although experience and observation reveal its manifestation to be active will, an active effort to come out of oneself. The capacity for labor is one of the characteristics of a living being; it expresses the flame and sharpness of life. Only he lives fully who is capable of labor and who actually engages in labor.

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The principle of labor is related, and, in a sense contradictory, to the natural or “given” principle. Economy, as the re-creation and expansion of life through labor, is opposite to nature, as the totality of what is given (to man), the “natural” forces of life and its growth. Man is born not through an economic act; he develops in his mother’s womb and grows after birth, gaining physical and spiritual strength, finding spiritual forces within himself. All sorts of processes in nature take place independently of economic activity, and the universe, in the end, is not created through an economic act. Rather, only the universe’s existence establishes the subjective and objective possibility of economic activity, including both the capacity and possibility for labor. Economic activity is in this sense but a part of the life of the universe, a moment in its growth. But at the same time it is a necessary moment, included in the plan of the universe as the empirical manifestation of self-conscious life. Culture— the expansion of life through realized labor— requires nature as a precondition (in the sense of its precultural or extracultural, extra-economic state). Nature without labor, without a working culture, is incapable of revealing all of its forces, at least in man; it cannot abandon its dreamy state. On the other hand, culture has no creative powers that are not already given in nature. And even through all of our efforts (that is, through all the powers of culture) we cannot add so much as an extra cubit to our height, in the words of the Savior. Nature is thus the natural basis of culture; it is the material for economic activity; outside of nature, economic activity is as inconceivable and impossible as concrete experience is impossible outside of life.
The Natural-Philosophical Bases of the Theory of Economy

I. Idealism and Natural Philosophy

Every economic act consists in a certain objective action and requires a man’s coming out of himself to act in the external world. It is a certain exertion in the world of things and an action on things: whether this is the labor of an agriculturist, an industrial worker, a mechanic, an engineer, or a scientific researcher, or whether this is work to organize a factory with mechanical division of labor or trade and speculation, economy in all these cases is an action on things, that is, objective action. *Im Anfang war die Tat*, says economic practice; and it is not for nothing that Marx put “Praxis”—which is what we here call objective action—at the center of the doctrine of economic materialism. All of economy is precisely such objective action and presupposes, of course, a certain objective reality. It is the constant action of the proprietor, the *subject of economy* (at this point it doesn’t matter whether the subject is individual or collective) on things (nature or matter, depending on the particular philosophical construction), that is, on the *object of economy*. Every economic act realizes a certain fusion of subject and object, the penetration of the subject into the object, the subjectification of the object—or the subject’s exit from itself into the world of things, into the object, that is, an objectification of the subject. In this sense economy, abstracted from any given form or content, however they may vary, is subjective-objective action, the real unity of subject and object. The subject acts in
accordance with particular goals, whereas the object—nature, or the world of things—is determined by a mechanical regularity, the iron logic of causes and consequences. And in every economic act, teleology and mechanism fuse in a total mutual penetration: without ceasing to be a mechanism, nature, within the framework of the economic act, becomes anthropomorphic, just as in the organs of our body mechanism is complementary rather than contradictory to functional adequacy.

Thus we can define the content of the economic act as the fusion, or partial identification, of nature’s mechanism with human teleology, the transformation of the mechanism of causality into the mechanism of goals, into ends-means all in one, and this is what we generally call conquering nature.²

Economic acts of all sorts are so prosaic and familiar that they seem to us natural and hence in need of no explanation. This is why we need a certain effort of philosophical abstraction to see that what seems to us self-evident is actually a mysterious riddle and poses a serious and difficult philosophical problem. Many ages of scientific experience went by before Kant posed his “Copernican” question: How is this experience possible, what are the conditions and presuppositions, the a priori of knowledge? And the same ages of economic life have passed by until philosophy has begun consciously to pose the question: How is economy possible, what are the conditions and presuppositions, the a priori of objective action? Of course, economy is a real fact, just as experience in the Kantian sense is a real fact. But here we are asking not about the fact itself but about its principle, about its necessary premises, both positive and negative. The task of philosophical analysis is, having isolated these premises, to examine the bases on which they rest. This task, then, is first of all critical and analytical, and in this sense is completely analogous to the task of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Second, the task is metaphysical, insofar as we here in-
vestigate the premises of economy not just formally but also from the standpoint of their positive content.

But the true founder of the philosophy of economy is not Kant, the philosopher of subjective idealism and passive reflection, but Schelling, the philosopher of nature and objective reality. Kant’s philosophy was, by virtue of its very topic, incapable of being a philosophy of action as the philosophy of economy must be; it was exclusively a philosophy of quietistic contemplation, the calm theoretical isolation of subject from object, in which the object is merely reflected in the subject and the issue is only the conditions of this mirrorlike reflection. Kant’s subject does not act, it only beholds, and this is why his theory is armchair philosophy. And even in Kant’s practical philosophy, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, whose postulates occupy such a central position in Kant’s theory and which is so important in revealing the true motives of his system—the religious-metaphysical and the religious-ethical (so emphatically shunted aside by contemporary neo-Kantians)—the discussion is not about action itself but about the norms of objective or correct action on the part of the subject, about the ethics of action but not its practice. This is why “practical” reason, too, actually remains no less theoretical, abstract, and subjective than theoretical reason. Here, too, the glass wall dividing the Kantian subject from the object, that is, from nature and the world, remains intact, and the subject retains its contemplative-mirroring quality. Because Kant’s philosophy is one of contemplation and not action, subject and object are here merely counterposed one to another, and the activity of reason is limited to filling in transcendental schemas of cognition. Hence there is no objective reality, nor is there nature as reality, existing as a foundation for its intellectual construction by an epistemological subject. Kantian matter, whose a priori definition he labored so hard to determine, can be only con-
structed and theoretically beheld but not felt. It is a mirror image of the subject; it stands in the same relation to real nature as the apples drawn by Apelles, which attracted only stupid birds, to real apples, or as ideal talers to real ones (to use Kant’s famous example). It is only a priori and not a posteriori, because, in order to establish the a posteriori sense of nature, to experience the cognitive a priori in action, the subject must descend from the throne of contemplation and mix in the crowd, like Faust when he left his study to immerse himself in the people and in action. Otherwise, in his isolation, he will never know whether the cities and gardens he sees before him are reality or a fata morgana. He cannot disperse the illusions of solipsism. He must make a jump into reality, to commit an action that will reveal to him something new both about himself and about the object he contemplates. For, in Schelling’s splendid comparison, “the spirit is everlastingly an island, never to be reached from matter without a leap”; and such a leap for the Kantian subject in the process of cognition (= spirit) to the object (= matter) can only be action. So Kant’s philosophy, despite its primacy of practical over theoretical reason, is in the deepest sense of the word antipragmatic. Its reality is illusory and subjective; the world and nature are projected as they appear to the transcendental—but not transcendent—subject, who remains outside of life, outside the world, outside nature though not supernatural. The acknowledgment of the primacy of subjective will over subjective reason, or practical over theoretical reason, does not signify for Kant an exit into objective activity, for this has no place in his philosophy; only the cognitive conditions of this objectivity, which, however, may be and may not be, are in evidence. Kant himself recognized this impossibility of affirming the objectivity of scientific experience in the subject alone, and this led to his need to seek support outside the vicious circle of subjectivism. He was able to gain
this foothold in the subject only outside of reason, that is, in will, calling it metaphorically practical reason, although this guileless terminological masquerade can hardly fool anyone.

The radical rationalism of subjectivism led to a no less radical voluntarism, that is, irrationalism. The fundamental premises forming the linchpin of the entire system—the theory of real existence or the Ding an sich, of freedom and necessity, of the human spirit, are hidden here in a philosophical closet. Kant’s system disintegrates from within, and this is its intrinsic pathos. The philosophical tragedy of Kant is that, although he was inspired by the pathos of objectivity and reality, and strove to free himself from subjectivism and solipsism, in which he rightly sensed the foul spirit of nonbeing, he nevertheless approached this goal by a purely speculative, contemplative path. In order to do this he killed living reality, transformed it into an image, a schema, before beginning to study it in its concreteness. He sought life in death and the sweet smell of the fields in the pent-up air of his study.

But if subjective idealism wearing the mask of philosophical reality was a result largely outside Kant’s intention, in Fichte it became a battle cry, as he took Kant to his logical conclusion and revealed his secret. Here I mean, of course, Fichte’s first system, his Ich-philosophie. And what Kant states in the indicative mood, Fichte expresses in the imperative. Subjective idealism is transformed into an absolute, epistemology into undisguised, combative metaphysics, and Fichte no longer fears solipsism, illusionism, or a-cosmism, to which his teaching on the world as non-I inevitably leads. In his system, the world becomes merely the boundary of the I, is posited as non-I, and in this sense is the creation of the I. If the Kantian transcendental subject calmly dreams and passively reflects the shadows of being, then the Fichtean I—true, obeying a certain unconscious “external impulse” (äußerer Anstoß)—projects various
conditions of being onto the screen of consciousness together with a ray of light, creates the world by itself. But since man cannot actually create, this pretension leads him only to transform all that exists into an illusion, a dream, and sprinkles the living with the water of death.

Weh! Weh! Du hast sie zerstört
Die schöne Welt
Mit mächtiger Faust;
Sie stürzt, zerfällt!
Ein Halbgott hat sie zerschlagen.
(Alas!
You have shattered
The beautiful world
With brazen fist;
It falls, it is scattered—
By a demigod destroyed.)

_Faust, pt. 1, 1607–12_

Radical subjectivism and illusionism are what Fichte’s philosophy of action comes to in the end, for it is founded not on the mutual relations of subject and object but merely on the self-assertion of the subject, “the primacy of practical over theoretical reason,” which is, however, realized only in the sphere of the subject.

Absolute doing (absolute Tathandlung), as the assertion of the non-I as a boundary of the I, equates the human I with the divine I, for which there is no difference between wishing and doing, thought and being, which really can posit the non-I as its other, not limited by it but possessing it. Fichte’s philosophy equates God’s image in man—the formal limitlessness and universality of our self—to its primordial image—a pathetic delusion of grandeur, a reductio ad absurdum of subjective idealism,
which is nowadays repeated, but without Fichte’s own pathos and inspiration, by contemporary “immanentists.”

Fichte’s system, even more than Kant’s, claims to be a philosophy of action—the self-generation of the epistemological I depends on the activity of the active I. But the I’s activity remains purely idealistic; it has no transsubjective meaning; it cannot come out of itself to touch the real non-I or super-I. The subject remains even more firmly sealed than Kant’s under a glass hood with the air pumped out, and in this airless space it dreams objective being—alas! of zero dimension.

Apparently, an invisible yet impenetrable glass wall, a whole system of mirrors had been erected between the subject and the object. Only a powerful blow could shatter this wall and break through to objective reality. This great philosophical act was committed by Schelling in his first system, particularly in the Naturphilosophie. Schelling “broke through to the free and open field of objective science” from stifling Kantian-Fichte idealism, where the world and nature became mere rational images, and conquered “freedom and animation of thought,” according to his own expression. In Schelling’s person, life once more conquers death in the philosophical consciousness. He achieves this victory with the aid of two profound and meaningful ideas: the identity of subject and object and the understanding of nature as a living, growing organism. There are few ideas in the history of philosophy to which posterity has responded so ungratefully as to Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, which incidentally rests on the mystical natural philosophy of Jakob Böhme and Franz Baader. I mean, of course, not the details of its execution, which were connected with the natural science of his time (although they were productive for the latter) and which now must be abandoned and worked through anew, but the basic idea, the fundamental problem or task of his philosophy.
Although the philosophical idea of nature and the problem of natural philosophy are not absolutely new—let us remember the theory of the world soul in antiquity: in Plato and Plotinus, then in the church fathers: Saint Gregory of Nyssus and the Pseudodionysius, Saint Maxim the Confessor, then J. Scotus Erigena—it has been so far lost in modern Western philosophy, beginning with Descartes (also Spinoza, whose mechanistic pantheism, *Natura sive Deus*, is a particularly important moment), as to be virtually nonexistent at present. It leads a dark and obscure existence only in various materialistic teachings of a hylozoistic hue (Häckel!), which are really the nemesis of contemporary philosophy: if, in the name of the rights of the spirit—and not only of the spirit, but of the epistemological subject—it kills nature, then here the spirit is killed in the name of dead nature and is proclaimed an epiphenomenon of a combination of atoms. The division and hostile opposition of nature and spirit turns out to be fatal to both sides. Schelling refuted this opposition and went about studying nature as unconscious spirit and spirit as nature realizing itself.

Nature, for the intellect, is but the object of contemplation, an object existing in the subject and for the subject. But is there a nature outside the subject and, so to speak, prior to the subject? And doesn’t the subject itself exist in nature? How does nature enter into the subject, or how does it find it not only within, but also outside itself? Or, to generalize all of these questions, let us ask ourselves: *How is nature possible?* Given the division of subject and object, in which being is equated with consciousness, that is, determined only in the subject, these questions are entirely unanswerable. The concept of experience must be deepened, and the concept of being broadened, including not only the givens of consciousness but also what is outside its boundaries—the unconscious or extraconscious, or what we may, together with Schelling, call “depotentialized conscious-
ness.” This broadening of being beyond the boundaries of immanent consciousness, its inclusion in the composition of being as its product, the acknowledgment of the existence of an entire world beyond the boundaries of consciousness signified a philosophical revolution, and it was Schelling who brought it about. Fichte had already approached this revolution when he was forced to admit that there is a such a thing as goal-oriented action, an unconscious or preconscious intellect: for the self’s conscious action is preceded by a series of necessary and unconscious assertions that make up part of the conditions of consciousness and knowledge. This theory marked the path of future development, but it was Schelling and not Fichte who followed it. (Schopenhauer, and later Hartmann, also develop this theme, but they stand apart in the world philosophical tradition.)

II. Schelling’s Philosophy

Schelling’s fundamental philosophical theory of identity, of the identity of subject and object, spirit and nature, was precisely such an answer to the question of the interrelation of subject and object or, what is in a certain sense the same, of the possibility of nature existing outside ourselves, of us in nature and nature in us. “Nature must be the visible spirit, and the spirit must be invisible nature. Thus the problem of how nature is possible outside ourselves is resolved here, in the absolute identity of the spirit within us and nature outside of us.” In the light of the philosophy of identity, the universe looks like a ladder with rungs or “potentials,” like an evolutionary development whose general content is the expression of the spirit. “The dead and unconscious products of nature are merely abortive attempts that she makes to reflect herself; inanimate nature so-called is actually as such an immature intelligence, so that in her

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phenomena the still unwitting character of intelligence is already peeping through. Nature’s highest goal, to become wholly an object to herself, is achieved only through the last and highest order of reflection, which is none other than man; or, more generally, it is what we call reason, whereby nature first completely returns into herself, and by which it becomes apparent that nature is identical from the first with what we recognize in ourselves as the intelligent and the conscious.”11 For this reason nature appears as a series of stages of development or, to use the language of contemporary biology, evolutionary transformism. Long before Darwin, we find that healthy kernel which exists in Darwinism and in evolutionism generally in Schelling, but in the form not of a controversial biological hypothesis but a necessary metaphysical postulate.12 “Philosophy must accept (annehmen) that there exists a gradation of the stages of life in nature.”13 “The universal world process rests on a progressive although constantly contested victory of the subjective over the objective.”14 The philosophy of identity thus fills in the unbridgeable chasm that has formed between the subject and the object in critical philosophy, acknowledging their primordial unity as stages in the development of the same life principle, the subject-object, which has merely split into two poles in the course of this development—the subject and the object. This distinction between subject and object, ideal and real, is relative; it comes about in the process of nature’s self-development and self-definition. There is no such distinction in the Absolute (however one may define it); for it, acts of consciousness are simultaneously objects, the opposition of subjective and objective is extinguished in their initial identity, and the universe is the revelation of the Absolute, in which nature and spirit, object and subject, are eternally identical. The self-reflection of the Absolute is revealed to us as the development of the world. The first, as an initial image and source, is the natura naturans,
the second, the *natura naturata*, as the inevitable product of the first. Here we can already discern the beginnings of the further development of the philosophy of identity, which, in Schelling’s second period, grows into a grandiose religious-philosophical system. But here we have only to concentrate on this essential Schellingian idea as it is established in his general philosophy of identity in the natural-philosophical writings and the *System of Transcendental Idealism*.

Externally, the idea of the philosophy of identity resembles what is at the present time called *monism*; usually, this name implies materialism of a more or less hylozoistic hue (for example, Häckel). Without having to subject dogmatic materialism once more to criticism in order to demonstrate all of its impotence before problems of consciousness, cognition, and will, let us say only that the peculiar genius of Schelling’s philosophy is precisely that it overcomes materialism through a positive philosophical theory. Materialism rests on the fact of a mechanism of nature independent of ourselves and capable of coercing us; in contrast, idealism denies nature by reducing it to a mere image. Thus materialism is a sort of inevitable shadow of idealism, its complement: just as the latter is a philosophy of the subject, so the former is a philosophy of the object. Neither form of monistic philosophy—neither the immanent-idealistic, crossing out the object for the sake of the subject, nor the materialistic, destroying the subject in the name of the object—is capable of explaining the living unity of subject and object. Materialism and idealism are reconciled in the highest unity, in the unity of developing life. “Why do you seek the living among the dead?” Schelling seems to say to materialism. “Feel Me, for spirit has no flesh and bones,” it has been said to skeptical idealism. Schelling expressed one of the most fundamental truths of Christianity in the philosophical language of his time. For Christianity is equally far from materialism and subjective
idealism; it removes the contradiction between flesh and spirit in its teaching of man as spirit incarnate, the living unity of both. In this sense Christianity is also a philosophy of identity (although it is dualistic in its ethics). Neither Platonism nor Neoplatonism, viewing the body as an envelope for the soul or as a dungeon for it, nor the new idealism, which turns flesh into a subjective image, can know the unity of spirit and flesh that Christianity teaches. This is the basis for the doctrine that the human incarnation of God brought about a divinization of the flesh. And the incarnation took place not just for show or externally but in reality and with finality. Christ retains the flesh that he took upon himself forever; he was resurrected with this flesh and will retain it at the Second Coming—such is the teaching of the church. This is why death, which breaks and temporarily rends the union of spirit and flesh, is something metaphysically unnatural, damaging man’s substance as spirit incarnate.

Sometimes Schelling follows the example of the ancients in calling this higher unity—possessing the qualities of a universal (transcendent) subject, the universal spirit, and the universal object, the womb of all creation,16 the natura naturans—by the name of the “world soul.” Of course, Schelling here depends on Böhme’s mystical teaching and Baader’s “theosophy.”

Thus the real connection of subject and object, established in every act of consciousness and will, finds its explanation in the unity of the world soul, the universal subject-object. Particular individuals take part in this unity. It provides the key to understanding the aspects and regularities of nature that are accessible to cognition. Kant explained the regularities of nature by the cognitive a priori; according to his philosophy, it is reason that imparts regularity to nature. Later Hegel, expanding Kant’s idea into a metaphysical system, attempted to construct laws of nature a priori, as the activity of a universal, supernatu-
ral reason, having no need of the empirical but positing it as a moment in its development. But this idealistic interpretation of natural science, which concentrates on the formal-logical, “transcendental” side of the laws of nature, is powerless to give proper attention to its concrete content, to the real multiplicity of natural phenomena that make up these regularities. They exist for idealism not as such, in their living, concrete reality, but only as raw material for logical processing, just as, for the geometer, there exists no multiplicity of real bodies but only their figures. Schelling posed this problem differently. From the standpoint of the philosophy of identity the very opposition of a priori and a posteriori, subject and object, disappears and loses its sharpness. “Our knowledge is thoroughly a priori precisely because it is originally entirely empirical. . . . In fact, insofar as the self produces everything from itself, knowledge is a priori. But insofar as we are not conscious of this activity of the self, there is nothing a priori in us, and everything exists only a posteriori.” In the same sense “nature is a priori, i.e., each part of it is predetermined by the whole, or by the idea of nature generally.” This a priori-ness is confirmed by experiment. “Every experiment is a question to nature, which it must answer. But every question contains a hidden a priori judgment; each experiment, insofar as it is a real experiment, contains a hypothesis.” The history of nature is the history of consciousness, and the initial steps of its development are preserved in it, this “transcendental memory of reason,” in which reason recreates its stages, that is, comes to know nature. “Plato’s idea that all of philosophy is remembrance is in this sense accurate; all philosophizing is the remembrance of that state when we were identical with nature.” Later Schelling calls nature the first or old testament and says that “we have a more ancient revelation than any that is written: this is nature, which contains within itself primordial images as yet unexplained by any
man.”20 With respect to this universal connectedness and “a priori-ness” of nature, Schelling remarks that “nature is infinite in each product, and each product contains the seed of the universe.”21

Thus nature and intellect are two poles of a single essence. Nature is unconscious reason, it embodies blind expediency,22 and it amazes us precisely because it acts as a mechanism yet simultaneously as a clear teleology.23

Proceeding from the general postulates of the philosophy of identity, Schelling (most systematically in the System of Transcendental Idealism) resolves a question that had no place in the system of subjective idealism: How is objective action possible? How does desire transform objects? The task of “transcendental philosophy” (in the Schellingian sense of the word) is to show how the intellect achieves objective being, corresponding to its essence (whereas the task of Naturphilosophie was to show the reverse—how nature comes to the intellect and becomes conscious). The correspondence of images and objects can be of two types: images can be related to objects as their copies (ideal duplication) or as their examples (projections, models); the former arise of necessity, the latter arbitrarily and freely. The possibility of the former constitutes the foundation of all theoretical knowledge; the possibility of the latter—practical activity. This poses a general question for transcendental philosophy, connecting theoretical and practical philosophy: How can the intellect be simultaneously a copy and a model? “How does the objective change by means of the ideally imagined (bloß Gedachtes), in a manner that corresponds with the image?” This question, utterly irresolvable for purely subjective philosophy (idealism) or purely objective philosophy (dogmatic materialism), is easily solved according to the idea of the original identity of subject and object, intellect and nature. “How anything could pass from freedom to the objective world would be com-
pletely incomprehensible, if this world were something existing in and for itself [an sich Bestehendes], and would also be incomprehensible even assuming a pre-existing harmony which, in turn, would be possible only with the mediation of a third, of which the intellect and the objective world both were variants. . . . The question, consequently, is precisely the following: how can anything define itself in me through free activity, to what degree am I unfree, to what degree am I contemplative? The postulate that my free activity is based on causality means: I behold it as being based on causality. The self that acts is distinguished from the self that beholds, yet at the same time they must be identical with respect to the object; what is posited as active in the object must also be posited in the contemplative, the active I must determine the reflective I. For I learn that the self is active only from its identity with that self which beholds and is conscious of action. The active (apparently) does not know, it only acts, is only an object; only the contemplative knows and is therefore a subject; how then can we avoid identity, for what is in the subject is posited in the object, and what is in the object is posited in the subject?"24 “It would be equally hard to understand how a realization of our purposes in the external world could ever be possible through conscious and free activity, unless a susceptibility to such action were already established in the world, even before it becomes the object of a conscious act, by virtue of that original identity of the unconscious with the conscious activity. But now if all conscious activity is purposive, this coincidence of conscious and unconscious activity can evidence itself only in a product that is purposive, without being purposively brought about. Nature must be a product of this sort . . .”25

Blind intellect, unconscious will, acting with infallible expediency in nature, attains consciousness in aesthetic activity, whose distinguishing trait is the connection of the unconscious

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creativity of genius with consciousness. All of nature is such an unconscious but living work of art, “the objective world is but an incipient, as yet unconscious poetry of the spirit,” which becomes conscious in art. The mystery of the world, the identity of the ideal and the real, is revealed in art. This is why Schelling calls art the “universal organ of philosophy.” Aesthetic activity is creative, it is free, but simultaneously is subjugated to necessity (“patti Deum,” he remembers the ancients’ term for inspiration). “Only genius is such a conscious-unconscious creator in art, and it has the same meaning for aesthetics as the self for philosophy.”

In genius, the basic contradiction (of consciousness and unconsciousness), although it “is otherwise completely irresolvable,” becomes resolved. “It is self-evident that art is at once the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy, which ever and again continues to speak to us of what philosophy cannot depict in external form, namely the unconscious element in acting and producing, and its original identity with the conscious.”

These fruitful ideas, which have only been sketched here and which are developed in his works (incidentally, with varying degrees of completeness), have turned out to be forgotten and unused in the history of philosophy and still remain dead capital, although they captivated and amazed Schelling’s contemporaries. The reigning neo-Kantianism, whose formal idealism has ruined our taste for Schellingian ontologism and which is once again far removed from objective reality, to which he “broke through” with such an effort, is least of all inclined to understand the significance of these ideas. They were noticed and preliminarily evaluated in contemporary philosophy (with the exception of Kuno Fischer, who studied Schelling with his usual sincerity and dedicated the sixth volume of his history of philosophy to him) only by the philosopher of the unconscious: not, of course, Schopenhauer with his blinding self-infatuation,
which prevented him from seeing the proximity of some of his basic metaphysical ideas to Schelling’s, but Eduard von Hartmann—indisputably the greatest of German thinkers of the second half of the nineteenth century, and his followers. But they address only one aspect of Schelling’s teaching, and this is his theory of unconscious goal-orientedness, of the blind intellect. Only the Russian philosophical literature can point to a productive and even creative development of Schelling’s natural-philosophical ideas: this is in Vladimir Soloviev’s philosophical system, so congenial to Schelling. Soloviev, especially in his so-called second period, is remarkably close to Schelling, more so than has been acknowledged so far (although he does not borrow directly from Schelling, the latter’s powerful influence fertilizes his creative work). The theory of the world soul and of nature, which in general plays such a major role in Soloviev’s philosophy, is in the “Lectures on Godmanhood” immediately contiguous to Schelling (of both the first and the second periods). I do not make an exposition here of Soloviev’s corresponding teachings because they are easily accessible to those who desire to acquaint themselves with them.

The philosophy of economy, as a philosophy of objective action, must necessarily be a conscious continuation of Schelling’s enterprise. Naturally, it must be free of any Schellingian dogmatism; it merely takes Schelling’s basic idea as a theme or task for contemporary philosophy. We cannot, however, neglect the fact that it was Schelling who, with his philosophy of identity, laid the foundation for the philosophy of economy, although we must add that he himself not only did not investigate this aspect of his own problem but apparently was not even conscious of it. The problem of the philosophy of economy has arisen with tremendous force in the life and consciousness of the last decades, so brightly colored with “economic materialism.” Incidentally, on the basis of what has been said
so far, it should be clear that the problem of “economic materialism,” too, or the action of the economy and in it nature on man and, in turn, man on the economy and in it nature, is first and foremost a natural-philosophical problem, and only through philosophical misunderstanding does Marx’s school take the idealistic intellectual Hegel as its godfather, not noticing that Schelling would be much more useful. But more about this later. In the meantime, after this brief and preliminary orientation in the history of recent philosophy, let us turn to the investigation of our own problem. How is economy possible? What are its a priori premises or preconditions? What is the philosophical significance of the essential functions of the economic process?
The Significance of the Basic Economic Functions

I. Consumption

Economic life can ultimately be reduced to a metabolic process, to something like circulation or an alternation of inhaling and exhaling. In the language of political economy, production corresponds to inhalation, consumption to exhalation. The economic cycle consists in these two acts, production and consumption; these are the essential economic functions. For this reason the general question How is economy possible? reduces to two more particular questions, namely: How is production possible, and how is consumption possible?

Let us begin with consumption.

Every living organism, as a body, as organized material, is inextricably connected with the universe as a whole, for the universe is a system of mutually connected and mutually penetrating forces, and one cannot disturb so much as a grain of sand, destroy so much as an atom, without, to one or another degree, disturbing the entire universe. Regardless of whether we conceive the universe dynamically, as a system of forces or energies, or statically, as in a state of precarious equilibrium, it remains for us a unified entity by virtue of this continuous connection of all of its parts. To presuppose several universes would necessarily include their interaction, that is, would merely expand the notion of universe, transforming it into a system of several worlds forming the unity of the cosmos; or it would introduce the contradictory concept of two (or more) coexisting
systems of forces, for some reason isolated and impenetrable to each other. Such impenetrability, such cosmological pluralism would be conceivable only for qualitatively distinct worlds representing different metaphysical stages of being such as, for example, the spiritual world and our world, “heaven and earth,” or the afterworld and this world. The unity of the universe is axiomatic for any understanding of the world; it affirms the continuity of causality that penetrates the universe and establishes the physical communism of being. My moving my pen on a piece of paper, thus redistributing the atoms of ink, paper, the steel of the pen, and so on, is in principle just such a cosmic event as astronomical or geological catastrophes, though perhaps of lesser force (and even this is not certain, for we cannot measure these two events against each other). Now, as I sit at this desk, I experience on myself the infinite complexity of the positive and negative influences of cosmic forces, and not only of the sun removed from us by millions of kilometers but of all visible and invisible suns of the world. A cosmic change, incomprehensible to me in its origins, may bring about an atmospheric state, a heat wave, sufficient to end a life that is dear to me or to make my own existence impossible.

There is a certain cosmological karma of essences. The unity of the universe, the physical communism of being, means that, physically, everything finds itself in everything else, every atom is connected with the entire universe; or, if we compare the universe to an organism, we can say that everything enters into the makeup of the world body.

We cannot stop at acknowledging this physical communism of being, for the universe is characterized not only by a general correspondence, a continuity and connectedness of the world of physical matter, but also by a certain relation between living, or organized, matter and nonliving, or dead, matter or, in other words, between organic bodies and inanimate matter. A bound-
ary runs through the entire universe, dividing it into two kingdoms: the living and the nonliving. Let science wear itself out in the effort somehow to step over or erase this boundary and, failing to find it, begin even to deny its existence. After all, it exists in fact if not in theory, as there is the living and the nonliving. And the general relation between the two fields is that the kingdom of life constantly intrudes on the kingdom of nonlife, seizes and carries away cold, lifeless matter with its warm tentacles, and transforms it into living material, organizes dead matter into a living body. But, conversely, it does not have the strength to maintain this transformation forever; life is not capable of penetrating dead matter with its warmth so thoroughly that it will never cool again. There comes a time when bodies—whole or in parts—turn once again into dead matter, into the primordial metaphysical “earth” about which man, and with him all living things, were told: “dust thou art, and into dust shalt thou return” (Gen. 3:19). The dam dividing the waters of life and death turns out not to be impenetrable: they constantly filter through and mix with each other. This communism of life and death, this mysterious identity of the living and the dead, the mortality of all life but also, apparently, the life-capacity of the nonliving, are among the most fundamental pillars of our earthly being, on which the possibility of an economic relation to the world also depends. Life is death, and death is life, such is the formula of this identity. In more complete and developed form it would be expressed thus: life passes into a state of lifelessness, or death, that is new or transcendent to it, while the lifeless, or dead, is raised into a different, higher state of life that is also transcendent to it. This identity, constantly standing before us in an innumerable quantity of acts and potentials, is an experiential fact, self-evident to all. Yet the philosophical explication of this fact confronts the consciousness with the irresolvable riddle of

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life and death: How is it possible to think this identity and this transcendence? And what is more real, more primordial, more substantial: life or death, the living or the dead principle? Is life merely an epiphenomenon of death, death’s lovely decoration, a mirage called up by the play of physical forces? But then the sense of life, its self-consciousness (which by far precedes the self-consciousness of the individual) becomes an unattainable miracle toward which there is no scientific or logical path, and nothing remains but to jump across the abyss, as the dogmatic materialists actually do. Or is the opposite correct: There is no death, there is only life, which occasionally freezes and practically disappears but always remains in potential, exists as if in a faint, and the universe is only the development of the infinite potentials of life, a ladder made up of its rungs? Following the ancients (Plato and particularly Plotinus), Böhme and Baader, Schelling and Vladimir Soloviev, I consider this monism of life, panzoism, in contrast to the monism of death, or the panfanatism of the materialists, to be the single metaphysical hypothesis capable of resolving this difficulty; and even materialists, by falling into pantheistic hylozoism, anthropomorphizing nature, attributing teleology and even aesthetics to it, divinizing it (like Häckel), essentially deny panfanatism and approach panzoism.

Matter that has been organized by life is already a body; and a body is the totality of organs by means of which life overcomes dead matter. Through the body, thanks to the connectedness of the universe, life in its various manifestations penetrates into the entire cosmos. The cosmos is in this sense the potential body of a living being, an organism in potentia. This potential, of course, may never be realized, or may be realized only in part. It exists in a dual sense.

First, every living body organizes matter, and not just a given quantity of matter, as it may appear when we consider it stati-
cally, but matter in general, for dynamically there exists but a single matter, *prima materia*, and this matter (the “mother of life,” *Mητηρ ζωῆς*, the Platonic meon), as a system of forces, is one and continuous. The life-giving principle, as it takes possession of this matter, forms, so to speak, knots of life in it that are not isolated but dynamically connected as a system of interrelated forces; these are not separate and discrete spheres of life but life itself in its various manifestations. Life organizes matter in an infinity of points and centers, fertilizes the receptive feminine principle, the lifeless Meon, with its active male principle. The *Eros* of life is born of *Poros* and *Penia*, wealth and poverty, activity and passivity. Ideas—forms, entelechies—become embodied in formless passive matter and form monads.

Outside of this organization matter exists on the very border of nonbeing (ο"κ ὄν), understood in the sense of metaphysical nonexistence, dwelling in a state of semi-being, unrealized being, as pure potential (μὴ ὄν).

Second, apart from this general and abstract unity of life and matter, the active and the passive principle, life is also universal in an entirely concrete sense. Life is given not only in the logical consciousness, which contains the universe as an ideal, but also in the potential expansion of the living being’s sensuality, which in principle has no boundaries or, more precisely, whose boundaries correspond with those of the universe. Our bodily organs are like doors and windows into the universe, and all that enters us through these doors and windows becomes the object of our sensual penetration and, in the process, becomes in a sense part of our body. All that emerges from the meonically dark realm of semi-being and is illumined by life becomes something like the periphery of our body: all that we see under the microscope or through the telescope—the microscopic world, distant from us in the depths of space, and the heavenly bodies, distant in its breadth—all that is accessible to our cognition and
that somehow affects our sensuality and thus enters the illuminated sphere of life, all of this, that is, potentially the entire universe, can become our body, its external, peripheral extension. This is why ultimately, the entire universe, which now, as a world of lifeless meonic being, in itself but not for itself, appears to us under a shroud of mechanism and a mask of lifeless thingness, is, or rather can become, an organism as soon as the shroud is lifted and the mask taken away. This is how we should understand Schelling’s profound idea that “the universe is for the intellect [or, following our deduction, for life] but a separate and cruder organ of self-consciousness, just as the individual organism is its more immediate and refined organ,” and that “the organism is actually nothing other than a reduced [zusammengezogenes] image of the universe.” This gives new meaning to the oft-repeated idea that the entire universe is born and dies with every individual. This means, among other things, that the universe in general is life’s field of operation as it illumines the meonic darkness, the potentiality of material being, with its light. So we ought to interpret this expression a good deal more literally than is usual. We should limit it only in that, because of the multiplicity of life’s manifestations and centers, life can never be entirely conquered by death, which destroys only certain of these centers, and therefore the universe can never die completely, that is, plunge into the emptiness and formlessness of meonic semi-being, in which nothing happens and no events take place. Thus Life and Matter (the Meon) confront each other as two antipodal principles, attracting and defining each other but at the same time mutually repellent. Life requires a foundation or substratum, an inertia that is to be conquered and activated through its sharpness, as light presupposes darkness, warmth cold, and joy sadness to be overcome. The absolute organism of the universe, life’s final victory over the meon, forever cloaking it with life and exiling death,
and the meon’s absolute mechanism, “the earth invisible and empty” before the creative word of Genesis (1:1)—these are the two metaphysical limits, the two poles of being in the world. The current world epoch has not stabilized on one or the other side—neither on the side of chaos, emptiness and mechanism nor on that of organism, immortal life, plenitude. A fatal duel is raging between Life and Death . . .

Yet such a struggle is possible only between principles that, though different and even opposite, still have something in common. More precisely, we can say that this is a struggle not so much of two principles but of two states of the same universe, and the struggle itself is but a symptom of the unhealthy condition of being, though this might be called a case of growing pains: the forces of nonbeing, the meonic elements, have risen up and revolted against the forces of life but can still be conquered by it. Only this makes possible that constant, incessant partial resurrection or resuscitation of dead matter, its temporary revival, although after a certain time it falls back into its faint. The possibility of a struggle between the animate and the inanimate is contingent on their substantial identity, where their state or condition is, however, different. This primordial identity of the living and the nonliving is expressed in nourishment and in the growth and expansion of life that are associated with it. By nourishment in the broadest sense we mean the most general metabolic exchange between the living organism and its environment, including not just food but respiration and the effects of the atmosphere, light, electricity, chemistry, and other forces on our organism, insofar as they support life. Nourishment understood even more broadly can include not just metabolism in the indicated sense but our entire “sensuality” (in the Kantian sense), that is, the capacity to be affected by the external world, to receive impressions or irritations of the senses from it. We eat the world, we partake

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of the flesh of the world not only with our mouths or digestive organs, not only with our lungs and skin in the process of respiration, but also in the course of seeing, smelling, hearing, feeling, and general muscular sensation. The world enters us through all the windows and doors of our sense and, having entered, is apprehended and assimilated by us. In its totality this consumption of the world, this ontological communication with it, this communism of being, lies at the foundation of all of our life processes. Life is in this sense the capacity to consume the world, whereas death is an exodus out of this world, the loss of capacity to communicate with it; finally, resurrection is a return into the world with a restoration of this capacity, though to an infinitely expanded degree.

In order not to complicate the issue by distinguishing among various particular forms of nourishment (I am aware that I am using this term in a sense unusual for physiology, but it quite precisely conveys the required shade of meaning, namely, concerning the support of a living organism by a nonliving environment), let us focus our attention on nourishment in the narrow sense, that is, on food. What is to eat? We are not free in the choice of our food, for through it we can take in not only life but also death; the struggle for life and death, or the struggle for survival, is in the entire animal world concentrated in food. Life is impossible without food, since we cannot receive nourishment through the atmosphere; the skeleton of death stands behind us and spurs us on in our search for food. What, then, is food? For the natural scientist the question of food is, of course, a complex problem of our organism’s physiological functions, and the study of food is a chapter of physiology. Yet, whatever the physiological organs of nourishment, biological science by no means eliminates nor resolves the more general metaphysical question of the meaning of food. How can matter that is alien to my organism become my flesh, enter into my body? Or, to
put the same question backwards: How does my flesh, a living body, turn into dead matter, entirely after death but partially over the course of my entire life, in the form of excrement, falling hair, nails, evaporations, and so on? Here we have the most vivid expression of the cosmic communism of which we spoke above. The boundary between living and nonliving is actually removed in food. Food is natural communion—partaking of the flesh of the world. When I take in food, I am eating world matter in general, and, in so doing, I truly and in reality find the world within me and myself in the world, I become a part of it. In the immediate sense, I eat this bread here. But dynamically, as a result of the unity and connectedness of the universe of which we have spoken, I take in the flesh of the world in general in the guise of this bread. For the history of this bread, as of every particle of matter, contains the history of the entire universe. In order for it to grow and receive its current form, the collective action of the entire world mechanism in its past and present is required. And not only this bread, but every particle of the food we eat (and every atom of the air we breathe) is in principle the flesh of the world. And we are able to partake of the world’s flesh, to support our life, to eat, only as creatures or children of this same world. Food in this sense uncovers our essential metaphysical unity with the world. Creatures transcendent to this world and outside of it would be incapable of eating and by the same token incapable of immediate and direct action on this world; in order to obtain this capacity, they had first to become incarnate (or to “materialize,” as spirits are supposed to do at mystical séances). For the world of spirits, light or dark, as for souls that have departed from our world and exist in the afterworld, our world remains transcendent, and they lack a foothold from which to act in it. It remains for them an abstract concept rather than a reality, much as the afterworld seems to us. And God, too, having honored this
world with freedom and autonomy and therefore created it as extradivine being, outside himself, can act on it only through external, transcendent exertion, as a deus ex machina, or else through new creation. Even God had to become incarnate in the world in order to act on it from within, as an inner-worldly resurrective force. “And the Word was made flesh.” God—the Word brings about a transcendence; he partakes of worldly being (“and lived with men”) from extraworldly being in order, having raised the world to himself, to save it.

If food is a means of communion with the flesh of the world, regardless of its shape and quantity, then partaking of Christ’s flesh and blood in the form of bread and wine is communion with the flesh of the Son of God, the divinized flesh of the world, which can also be conceived only dynamically. And as food maintains mortal life, so the eucharistic meal means to partake of immortal life, in which death is conquered once and for all, and the deathlike impenetrability of matter is overcome. It is immanent to our world as its divinized flesh, but it is simultaneously transcendent to its current state. God’s incarnation created a new, spiritual flesh—the flesh of the world is raised to a higher, immortal potential, and we anticipate its imminent transfiguration in the sacrament. In this sense we can say that the holy food of the Eucharist, the “medicine of immortality” (φάρμακον τῆς ἁμαρτίας), is food, but potentialized food; it nourishes immortal life, separated from our life by the threshold of death and resurrection. “He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him... so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me” (John 6:56–57). As we take the world with its mortal life into ourselves by partaking of the flesh of the world, and those who take this food die, so those who taste “manna from heaven” take in its life-giving force. “And I will raise him up at the last day” (John 6:54), Christ promises them. In this sense we can say that the greatest Chris-
tian sacrament is anticipated by such a simple act of daily life as eating; the anticipation of this sacrament, the effort to receive grace and healing communion through naturally partaking of the flesh of the world, also explains the origins of pagan natural sacraments, for example, the Greek mysteries.\(^4\)

Thus the possibility of *consumption* is in principle based on the metaphysical communism of the universe, on the primordial identity of all that exists, thanks to which metabolic exchange and circulation are possible; it is premised, above all else, on the unity of living and nonliving, on the universality of life. The appearance of life, its nourishment and expansion, are possible only because the entire universe is a living body. Of course we ought not to understand this assertion as a natural-scientific statement, for it contradicts its essential facts and foundations. Natural science proceeds—correctly for its own purposes—from a distinction rather than identification of the living and the nonliving. It perceives the boundary dividing the organic and the inorganic, the living and the dead, as immutable, and this constitutes the strength of its position. But the assertion made here in no way intrudes into natural science’s sphere of competence but operates, so to speak, above these particular truths of natural science. It proceeds from an understanding of the world that is perfectly reconcilable with all of natural science’s divisions and fragmentations of nature. Natural science, in all the complex makeup of its component disciplines, divides and fragments nature in the interest of studying it, creates an enormous number of separate experiments from a single whole, and poses a multiplicity of particular problems. The natural elements determined by natural science possess widely differing characteristics and are virtually inconvertible into each other. Nature’s totality in its immediacy disappears without a trace; nature dies in the process of scientific investigation. It is like a corpse whose muscles and nerves are studied in an anatomical

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lesson. And, just as it is impossible to reassemble all the organs of a corpse back into even a dead, not to speak of a living body, after they have been thus studied, so natural science, which exists only in its various branches—for there is no such thing as the study of nature as a whole—is incapable of synthetically reassembling the world from its scattered elements. It remains fragmented and dead. The ideal of natural science, of course, would be to overcome this fragmentation of study, this theoretical murder of nature that permits the study only of nature’s corpse.

If such a transcendence were to take place, then the divisive activity of the various natural-scientific disciples would also be overcome, and the relative nature of all those distinctions, which actually does not threaten the initial unity or identity of nature, would become clear. But what is merely an ideal for the study of nature, for its current state not only does not correspond to this goal but actually contradicts it, remains irrefutably as the a priori metaphysical premise of any scientific experiment. But this same primordial identity or unity of nature receives clear and we might even say apodictic confirmation in the fact of consumption, in which the boundary between the living and the dead, the animate and the inanimate, is lifted. In it nature receives assurance of the possibility of universal reanimation. Consequently, despite all the differences and peculiarities of the natural elements, of the forms and states of matter, and even if we completely acknowledge the principium individuationis et differentiae, nature is still one, and this unity is discernible in that essential economic function—consumption. Apparently, all the variations in the natura naturata’s products, which for natural science appear not to be accessible to any further division or dissection, still do not reach the essence of being, are not given in the natura naturans, but are merely states or products of nature; they do not themselves compose the cre-
ative forces of the *natura naturans*, which rises above each of its separate products yet at the same time unifies them.

Thus the sphere of competence of natural science and its theories remains untouched by the proposed assertion of the unity or identity of nature, but, on the other hand, no objections on the part of anatomizing natural science can refute this thesis, which constitutes but the philosophical expression of elementary facts, immediately given and therefore having a claim to apodictic certainty (for both mathematics and epistemology are constructed on the basis of similar facts or givens). We can say that consumption not only bears witness to nature’s identity but that it is itself this identity manifested in action, identity *in actu*. Thus I adduce all the changes, normal and pathological, in the life of my body to a single force or energy—that of my bodily organism, in which all of these various, occasionally mutually contradictory or even apparently mutually exclusive phenomena develop and disappear, while the unity and self-identity of the organism’s forces, its entelechy, remains in full force, like the *natura naturans* in relation to the *natura naturata*. And what we see in the organism as in a model, a “compressed universe,” we see also in the relations between living and nonliving in the universe, the *natura naturans*, which we cannot deny if only because, as the producer of everything and not itself a product, it cannot be opened and studied either with the aid of an anatomical scalpel or under a microscope (as, incidentally, all that regards the living forces of organism, the *natura naturans*, the dynamics of life, also cannot be studied by these methods useful only for the *natura naturata*, the statics of the universe).

A rapprochement, a synthesizing as well as an analytical approach, must take place between the ideal of knowledge of living nature, the unified *natura naturans*, and natural science—the study of nature’s products, *natura naturata*. Even experi-
mental science brings us to the establishment of nature’s unity in its specialized investigations. Natural philosophy constructs a second story above it, although it takes the form of a light and unstable structure. The ideal here is such a fusion of natural philosophy and natural science that the former would cover natural science while the latter led directly to philosophy."

II. Production

Now let us turn to the second of the two particular questions that together compose our general query: How is economy possible? Now we face the question: How is production possible?

Production is the exertion of the subject on the object, or man on nature, such that the subject of the economic process imprints or realizes his idea, objectivizes his goals, through the object of his economic action. Production is, first of all, a system of objective actions; the subjective here becomes objectivized: the boundary between the subject and object is removed, and the subject comes out of himself into the object.

The product of the economic process is a subject-object, something in which the distinction between subject and object is extinguished; it is an item belonging to nature and to the world of objects, to the non-I, yet it is at the same time completely saturated in human teleology, the embodiment of a subjective goal, and it realizes a model or idea projected in advance in the subject. In this aspect the product of any finished productive act is like a work of art, which is characterized by the mutual penetration of matter and form or idea. The distinction between the economic process and art belongs to their tasks and to their metaphysical nature, but they are quite similar in this formal moment, in the subject-objectness of their products. In both cases the shroud of alienation (objectness or thingness) from man or the subject is partially removed from the world,
and ideas and goals begin to penetrate and shine in things; mechanism gives way to teleology or, more precisely, becomes inextricably and even indistinguishably identified with it.

What, then, do we mean by production as an objective action? First of all that the subject comes out into the object, and not merely the ghost of an object but a real one, comprising a part of objective, universal “experience.” Kant posed the question of how objective knowledge, experience, was possible, but only in the sense of a passive, mirrorlike reflection of reality. Schelling already raised the issue of how the contemplative, cognitive, Kantian I could contemplate its own self in an active, Fichtean capacity, or how the identity of the cognitive and active I was possible. Our own problem is a variation and special case of Schelling’s general problem, which he himself poses (in the *System of Transcendental Idealism*) primarily epistemologically, although he does grant the possibility of its natural-philosophical, ontological formulation. The problem here is, how is transsubjective action, action on an object, which we have in production, possible? Without doubt, this problem is stated and taken into account in epistemology, but it inevitably leads us to ontology. Only perhaps the most desperate solipsism or a-cosmism—itself a particular, skeptical ontology—will reject this transition; yet even for it the problem remains of how to account for the appearance even in a dreaming consciousness of the idea of objective action as opposed to subjective concepts. We should point out that production has no place in the contemplative notion of Kantian experience: although it is formulated by the epistemological subject or by categories of reason, a situation in which the subject, leaving his epistemological observatory, would become an agent in the cosmic current is not only unanticipated but actually excluded in advance. The Kantian subject could only register such an event, observing it from outside; he would equate human actions with

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a turning spit (using Kant’s famous comparison), placing them in the category of causality and inspecting them only as mechanically proper objects of experiences, “phenomena,” but no more than that. This is why the question of the real existence or nonexistence of the external world remains so inaccessible to Kantian philosophy with its calm armchair solipsism, for pure reflection is indifferent to whether this world is drawn on paper or constructed from papier-mâché, so long as it yields a consistent image of experience, whether is has before it Condillac’s talking statues or living people. It has no need to feel these objects or knock on this reality. Only for the philosophy of objective action, that is, the philosophy of economy, does the question of the living reality of the external world acquire burning urgency and inevitability, for it deals with the issue of entry into this objective reality. As Schelling so beautifully says, “the world becomes objective for us only through action. We act freely, and the world exists independently of us—these two propositions must be synthetically combined.” The world comes into existence for us only as the object of our action. A field that we see in a dream and in reality may be indistinguishable in their visual impression, yet the difference between them is that the first can merely be contemplated by a passive, dreaming consciousness, whereas the second can become the object for action by a waking, active, living consciousness.

We can poke holes in a ghost or spirit in every possible direction, like the shade of Hamlet’s father, leaving only a sensation of emptiness, nonbeing, deception. But we recognize the unghostly world of living reality as the object of our action and, at the same time, as an opposing or counteractive force, that is, as an object of economic action. The real coming out of our I into the non-I and, conversely, this non-I’s pressure on the I, the entire practice of mutual interaction of I and non-I, establish the reality of the external world and fill the empty and cold realm.
of the non-I with strength, warmth, bodies, turning the mirage of the non-I into nature and, at the same time, placing the I in nature, organically fusing them in a single universe. This active, economic relation to the world constitutes the living basis for that “naive realism” that comprises humanity’s universal natural epistemology before any philosophical reflection and that is retained in practice despite any destructive, skeptical conclusions of philosophical solipsism. Of course, no critical philosopher has been able, nor will ever be able, to instill in humanity a real doubt in the existence of nature or of its own body as an organ of the I in nature; this is by dint of man’s immediate economic relation to the world, his constant coming out of the I into the non-I. Economy, as a constant modeling or projection of reality, and also the objectification of the I’s ideas, is a real bridge from the I to the non-I, from the subject to the object, their living and immediate unity that needs no proof but, instead, must itself, as an immediate given of our economic experience, become the foundation of further constructions. The relation between the I and the non-I is a relation between two worlds or two energies in constant interaction. And only an economic relation to the world can properly illuminate the function of cognition, the nature of pure reason, and the theoretical I. That pure reason, or that epistemological, that is, abstractly reasoning subject, for whom the very existence of reality becomes the primary problem and who wears himself out in endless doubts on this question, simply does not exist in reality. The entire epistemological or theoretical question of the relation of subject and object was invented in the philosopher’s study and is a figment of logical fantasy, a sort of pangeometry; this epistemology deals not with man but with myth; it is utopian in the worst sense of this word, as the denial of reality. And if it does establish important truths, this is only insofar as it betrays its own position and takes up
that of realism. This abstraction of theoretical reason is followed by a similar abstraction of practical reason understood, incidentally, only in an ethical and not in an economic sense. In reality, neither one exists independently, and there is only a living unity of theoretical-practical reason. In the meantime they have something like two “desks,” and each deals with specific “files”: the “theoretical reason file” and the “practical reason file.” Further, what turns out to be irresolvable on the desk of theoretical reason is simply conveyed to the desk of practical reason, and what could not be verified at the first desk is verified at the second. This is the crux of contemporary neo-Kantian scholasticism, generated by Kant with his “Copernican act,” which consisted in the murder of the living, active I and the dissection of its corpse into two parts—with the aim of later assembling a whole body from the two dead halves. Kant’s pure reason belongs not to the living I incarnated in the body, and connected through the body with the entire universe, but to an anatomical concoction of cognitive forms, a skeleton composed of bones and tendons. Practical reason knows nothing of what theoretical reason is doing; it is theoretically deaf and blind, but only because of this can it be practical reason.

Thus, man’s economic relation to the world, theoretical-practical, projective-active, ideal-real, subjective-objective, is of primary significance both for epistemology and for general philosophy. Philosophy must proceed not from a false conception of an entirely fictive epistemological subject but from the only conception of an active economic subject given to us by experience. Our entire philosophical orientation, the type of problem that then arises, will be completely different, and a whole series of false problems and imaginary difficulties of subjective idealism will fall away automatically.

Thus it is not the world or experience that is given to us in the I or that is a conception of the I; it is not the object that
is contained in the subject, as subjective idealism teaches; nor is the subject generated by the object, as dogmatic materialism teaches, asserting something entirely irrational, inconceivable, and miraculous in the most absurd sense, but the subject is given to us only in interaction with the object, as a subject-object: I am in the world or in nature, and nature is in me. Hence the I is not finished, immutable, given abstract, as for subjective idealism, but incessantly growing, developing, living. This changing relation between the subject and object, the unfolding of the I in nature, is life, that is, growth, movement, and dynamics rather than statics. It is this living, active, economic I that ought to be the point of departure for philosophy. Contemporary pragmatism, insofar as it does not unite with skeptical relativism, comes remarkably close to this idea, and Bergson comes even closer.

In analyzing economy as production, we have once again returned to the same philosophical idea—that of the inevitable identity of subject and object, I and non-I, consciousness and nature, which in reality become identical in the economic process. Only this proposition can be the basis for the possibility of production. Indeed, the possibility of objective action, the I’s active coming out into the non-I, or the expansion of the sphere of the I into the non-I, becomes intelligible only if there is a certain similarity between them, if they find themselves, so to speak, on the same metaphysical plane. It is impossible to displace so much as a single atom in the world without being oneself in this same world and having a foothold in it. We cannot explain the interaction of I and non-I on the premise of their being alien to each other. Thus we arrive at the conclusion of the metaphysical homogeneity of the I and the non-I, or the identity in them of the economic logos, expressed in nature’s practical willingness to yield, its receptivity with respect to the I’s tasks and projects. The same economic logos

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that acts in nature as a blind organizing force, and that expresses itself semiconsciously in the animal world as instinct, becomes fully conscious only in man; as a result, idea and matter, fused together in nature, receive independent existence as subject and object. In the subject-object nature sees itself, becomes conscious of itself, acts on itself, creates itself. The blind, elemental, or instinctual labor of nature becomes the conscious labor of man.

Thus the living connection between subject and object, the bridge leading the I into the world of realities and irrevocably connecting him to this world, is labor—human reality, objectivized anew and thus objectivizing the world for us. Thanks to labor there can be no subject alone, as subjective idealism would have it, nor any object alone, as materialism holds, but only their living unity, the subject-object, and only when we inspect its one or another aspect by means of methodological abstraction do a subject and object separate out from it. This polarity or duality of being is extinguished only in the Absolute, which is simultaneously subject and object for itself. This is why the subject’s coming out of itself into the object is by definition excluded for it, and subject-objectness is postulated in a single, identical, timeless act: the mystery of the holy Trinity and intratrinitarian life!

Labor, which occupies so much space in theories of political economy, thus acquires primary importance in epistemology as well, although the latter has never taken it seriously into account, has not “oriented itself” on the fact of labor, of living energy soldering subject and object inseparably together, although this would mean merely orienting itself on what is most immediately given. Political economy, in contrast, though it has never from its inception neglected the principle of labor, has, as a result of its lack of philosophical sophistication and the limitations of its spiritual horizons, failed to use this principle...
properly, to find an appropriate place for it. And it received a place entirely inappropriate to its philosophical significance. First of all, political economy—in theory in the works of Adam Smith, in practice in those of most of its exponents—narrowed the concept of labor to that of “productive” labor, expressed in material goods. Consequently, attention was focused on a single aspect of labor, the objective one, which is actually its periphery, while its significance as a bridge between subject and object, by means of which the subject comes into the object and realizes its ideas, project, and models, was entirely neglected. Technology (in the broadest sense), as the capacity for projecting or modeling, is already implicit here, and political economy, as a historical science, concentrating on the concrete and changeable, rests its attention more willingly on the history of technology than on its general theoretical problem, which remains the same for Watt’s machine or the most complex contemporary machine, as for a primitive hammer or stone axe, and this is: How is it possible for the subject to come out of itself into the object through labor? How is modeling or projecting possible? How is objective action or an entire system of such actions, that is, technology, possible? Scientific technology, too, evades this question, in its complete concentration on working out detailed practical problems.

But if political economy with its “economic materialism” knows labor only in its products or objects, and misses it in the subject, then an analogous error repeats itself at the opposite pole—in Kantian subjective idealism. The Kantian, and even more the neo-Kantian, subject is idle; it is absolutely passive and devoid of any working energy. This deprives it even of a healthy consciousness of its own subjectness, the reality of the I, for which reason it can, together with Hume, question the existence of the personality, reducing it to a “cluster of conceptions” or, together with Kant, reducing it to a formal unity of
consciousness ("unity of transcendental apperception"). Hence the fatal and hopeless determinism of this philosophy as an expression of the subject’s utter passivity, the absence in it of any sense of actuality, self-determination, asism.

Before such a subject or, rather, inside it, in its consciousness, a theatrical presentation takes place, and a life unfolds of which he is only the audience, watching from his armchair but not taking part. And even this contemplation happens as if of itself, without any expenditure of energy and labor. But no such idleness exists in consciousness; it is invented or "postulated." Cognition, as an act of will, also requires energy, effort, labor; and labor, as an integral part of the cognitive process, ought to free us from the sense of the I as a mirror and the world as a phantom no less than does the economic process. In this sense cognition, too, is economic activity and involves labor; it also overcomes the division of subject and object and leads to their mutual penetration. The reality of the I is not open to doubt when it reveals itself as actual energy, or if it, to use Leibniz’s expression, realizes itself as a monad. And as every project making up an economic act already contains within itself the model of a future product, so the cognitive process already contains a model of future knowledge or its projection in the form of a question, an anxiety, a search: without questions there can be no answers, and all of our knowledge is nature’s answer to the needs of our spirit. All of knowledge is the economic projection of future answers through questions posed. Here the object of exertion through labor is the external world, but in an ideal rather than a spatial or topographical sense: what is now extra- or subconscious, but can potentially be illuminated by consciousness and added to its riches, is an object of cognition full of possibilities as infinite as those offered by the external world as an object of economic action. In this sense knowledge is economic action, the subject, or I, coming into
the non-I (rather, into the not-yet-I), and the primordial unity of the I and the non-I, the subject and the object, is realized is each cognitive act. What existed in a dreamy, potential state as the unconscious, or as the possibility of knowledge, becomes actualized in consciousness. The I is enriched not from within itself as consciousness, or subject, but from within itself as unconscious, or object; otherwise we could not apprehend the cognitive process as a constant interaction between subject and object. The subject tears off the skin of unconsciousness, breaks through to its object by the process of labor, quite analogously to the process we have in the production of material goods. We might say that economy is a cognitive process turned sensual or externalized, whereas cognition is the same process but in ideal, asensual form. In both cases the opposition of subject and object is overcome; in both processes the same metaphysical basis reveals itself, namely, the identity of subject and object, and life unfolds as the constant expression, deepening, and discovery of this identity, coupled with the overcoming of this polarity. The path of this resolution, which is also the path of life, is labor. Every conscious, intentional overcoming of the opposition of subject and object in the ideal or the sensual sphere is an act of labor. All we can get for free is either, on one hand, instinctive, preconscious, or Unconsciously teleological, fully objective action (for example, the working of our heart) or, on the other, higher contemplation or artistic or religious revelation, in which the I gives itself to the object, fusing with it, and loses itself, immersing itself in the fullness of experience. Of course these two spheres of action through labor, the ideal and the sensual, manifesting themselves in the world of ideal images or materialized ideas, are so sharply distinguished from each other only in their extreme manifestations; reality presents a milder mixture of the two spheres. In any case, neither cognition, the production of ideal products, nor economy, the production of
material products, as processes of labor in which energy is expended, permit of serious and sincere doubt of the existence of the subject or the object, or of their interaction and mutual penetrability, that is, of reality and causal connection. This is the foundation of the point of view that is pompously labeled “naive realism” by “critical” philosophy; actually, this is life realism or, more precisely, economic realism. Labor, as the basis of epistemology, thus removes the problem of the existence of the external world (and also the other I), showing it to be an idealistic invention, a phantom of abstract thought.

The significance of labor, so underestimated by epistemology, has found a certain appreciation in political economy. But, in keeping with the specialized character of economic science, this assessment is contingent and limited: labor is usually placed among the factors of production, along with land and capital, in the theory of the production of material goods. Yet, although this classification may have some specialized relevance, it is entirely devoid of general philosophical meaning. In this respect the assessment of labor expressed in so-called labor theories of value is much more interesting. Here labor is not placed merely among other factors of production; instead, it is assigned unique importance as the basis of the value of goods.

Yet in vain would we look here for philosophical extension or explication of this idea. It is understood in an extremely narrow sense, merely as applied to explaining the mechanism of prices and to the theory of commodity exchange value. As a result the concept of labor contracts in political economy to a Smithian definition of productive labor, that is, labor expressed only in material products. For example, Marx defines values as accretions or crystals of labor and labor as the expenditure of human energy; energy is, in turn, defined with crude and naive materialism as the expenditure of nerves, muscles, bones, physiological energy. But—we could object against such a nar-
row understanding of labor—the labor theory of value is itself a product of labor and hence of economic activity, for its development and assimilation, too, presupposes an expenditure of intellectual energy or, in Marx’s language, the expenditure of nervous and mental energy. Moreover, like the labor theory of value, theories constructed to refute it, denying the universal significance of the principle of labor, are equally products of labor, just as are material goods, and are just as varied in quality, utility, and applicability as they are. But despite all its narrowness we cannot deny to the labor theory of value the general philosophical achievement that it unambiguously moved to the forefront the importance of the principle of labor, so unappreciated by philosophy. It reflected, albeit inadequately, man’s sense of reality, the essential importance of labor and economy for life. In this sense the grain of truth contained in labor theories of value remains viable, although only if given a different interpretation than that of its creators, who hid this grain in an opaque shell. We can explicate the fundamental ideal of the theory of exchange value as follows. Primary premise: labor is the highest principle of economic life and its foundation; secondary premise: this primary role of labor must also be expressed in the phenomenology of economic life, on the surface of its manifestations; conclusion: thus exchange ratios, or commodity values, are defined by the quantity of labor expended on their production. Clearly, however, its creators, in the effort to glorify labor (partly from motives of socialist mangodhood) entirely obscure their own idea and give it a petty, ugly expression that turns out to be indefensible even on narrowly scientific grounds. Commodity prices, even on the admission of the creators of the labor theory of value (Ricardo, Rodbertus, and Marx), do not correspond with labor values, to which the honorary role of an ideal, theoretical arbiter of values is ascribed; they did not, apparently, consider it possible to deprive labor

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entirely of this significance. But in reality, determining the rela-
tion of market prices to labor values is of no importance, or even
interest, in evaluating the significance of labor as the founda-
tion of economy. Prices may never correspond to labor values
(which, moreover, cannot even be theoretically calculated with-
out an abundance of leaps of logic and irresolvable equations
with many unknowns), and still the significance of labor as the
foundation of economy will remain in full force. If the primary
premise of the labor theory of value is correct and, to some de-
gree, the secondary is also correct, then the conclusion bears
absolutely no relation to either premise, because it transfers the
question from a theoretical plane to commercial practice, to the
market. If the labor theory of value, at least in pure form, has
long been indefensible even within political economy, then its
philosophical idea, or rather its adumbration, is extremely valu-
able and, once freed from its inappropriate and ugly form, may
be further developed. And in this political economy has proved
itself ahead of philosophy.

It has become clear from the above that the question of how
production is possible is equivalent to that of how economic
labor is possible. If we designated the totality of various pos-
sible means of man’s action on nature with definite aims de-
termined in advance as technology, then we can reformulate our
question as: How is technology possible? How can we charac-
terize the technical relation of the subject to the object, of man
to nature? The possibility of technology, apparently, presup-
poses the accessibility in principle of nature to human action,
its receptivity to human aims. As a consequence of the gen-
eral connectedness of nature, the unity of the cosmos, we must
speak of the accessibility or obedience of nature generally to
man. Although man remains immeasurably far from possession
of nature, this path is open to him. Nature is the passive, re-
ceptive, feminine principle; man is the active, male, conscious
principle. Thus nature, with its reigning blind intellect of instinct, becomes conscious of itself and acquires vision only in man. *Nature becomes humanized,* it is capable of becoming man’s peripheral body, submitting to his consciousness and realizing itself in him. In this sense man is the center of the universe; he names the animals and, of course, the plants and minerals; the logos of the world realizes itself in him, and this potential mastery of the world (once lost) is partially and gradually realized through the economic process. Thus we once again return to the central ideal of Schelling’s natural philosophy, that of the identity of subject and object or, what is the same, of the identity of nature as the unconscious creativity of the spirit and its conscious reiteration. Only this identity, this profound and intimate kinship of nature and spirit, makes both consumption and production, and economy itself, possible, as a subjective-objective process, as identity *in actu.* Schelling calls the history of nature the history of self-consciousness, and it ends with the appearance of consciousness. But, having reached this threshold through the struggle of unconscious and blind, if teleological and hence reasonable, forces, nature seems to grow out of itself. Unconscious growth is supplemented and partly replaced by conscious recreation; the given and instinctive becomes conscious and is achieved through labor; the “natural” is replaced by the “artificial,” that is, by the economic-conscious. Nature, having achieved self-consciousness and the capacity for labor on itself in man, enters into a new epoch in its existence. Economic labor is as if a new force of nature, a new world-creating, cosmogonic factor, which however remains distinct in principle from all the other forces of nature. The *economic epoch* is such a definite and characteristic epoch in the history of the earth, and hence of the cosmos, that we can divide all cosmogony into two periods: the instinctive, preconscious, or preeconomic—before man’s appearance—and the conscious, or
economic—after his appearance. Of course, we speak here not in the sense of contemporary evolutionism but mean, instead, the expression of the living forces originally deposited in the universe by the Creator. The world in its collected, final form with Adam—humanity—at the center is made by the Creator, and what unfolds in time and constitutes the content of history merely recreates the inner connection and interrelation of the world’s elements that was destroyed by the original sin.

We can also say that the \textit{natura naturans}, which lies at the foundation of the \textit{natura naturata} but is hidden and suppressed by it, realizes itself in man. Man, slowly and gradually freeing himself from slavery to things, the products of the \textit{natura naturata}, removes the deathly shroud from nature and apprehends its creative forces. He understands that nature as a product is but a creation of the \textit{natura naturans}, although distorted by the evil reign of the “prince of this world,” for whom, however, the \textit{natura naturans}, the immaculate soul of the world, remains inaccessible. And the \textit{natura naturata}, our current earth and heaven, which are an imperfect product of the \textit{natura naturans}, “will come with noise,” are to be re-created, and a new earth and heaven, a new flesh, will appear; but first this heavy, leaden shroud of thingness and lifeless petrification must be lifted away from this world. But here we enter already into the eschatology of economy, which for now is outside our scope. In economy, in the conscious re-creation of nature, we can see a certain adumbration and anticipation of that liberation of the \textit{natura naturans} from the fetters of the \textit{natura naturata} of which the apostle said that “all of creation submitted to the bustle of decay not of its own volition but by the will of him who subjected it,” fallen man, the soul of the world, and that “all creation suffers and awaits its liberation” from the imprisonments of thingness, from that heavy numbness in whose somnolence it dreams of its liberation.
I. Man and Humanity

What we call economy is empirically expressed as a plurality of disparate economic acts performed by separate people over the course of time and space, just as knowledge (science) exists only in the form of separate acts of cognition, scientific experiments, specialized investigations. But when we take economy as a generic term (just as when we think of knowledge as a conceptual whole), we unquestionably transcend this division into disparate acts and regard them as the manifestation of a single unified and coherent function that is more than merely the algebraic sum of its parts. We then see these separate acts dynamically, as partial manifestations of a unified activity subject to its own particular norms. These norms cannot be established inductively, by investigating separately each concrete economic or cognitive act. They can be established only a priori, through an analysis of generally applicable or transcendental conditions of knowledge or, in our case, of economy. Ultimately, of course, this transcendental analysis must check itself against economic experience.

One such a priori proposition of economy (as, again, of knowledge) is its hereditary or historical character. Although empirically it is true that economic activity takes the form of a myriad of disparate acts, if we look at it dynamically, over time, we see that it is actually a unified and connected activity whose subject is not the individual but the genus. We would miss
the essential content of economy (or of science) if we failed to perceive the whole that exceeds the limits of these particular economic (cognitive) acts. An atomistic approach, which proceeds by division, would in this case prevent us from making the appropriate analysis, for economy as a whole is not only logically but also empirically prior to separate economic acts. The economic system must already be in existence in order for these separate acts to be possible, and not the other way around: they are not simply fractions but parts of an organic whole that is larger than the simple sum of its parts and that alone can endow them with meaning. Each economic act acquires meaning only when it is inscribed in an entire economic system, in a certain organic medium, similarly to the way in which one or another substance behaves differently when introduced into a living organism than in its original inorganic context; it is defined not only independently but also through the organism that reacts in one or another way to its properties. And just as an organism is of course not merely the sum of all of the substances of which it is made up, so also economy (and, again, knowledge) is an organic, synthesizing activity that exists, so to speak, above the individual manifestations that attain definition only by reference to this larger whole. Although at any given moment economy (or science) exists through those who participate in its process, it can not be equated with these participants; the system as such exists independently of particular individuals who come and go in it. This hereditary, historical nature of economy is what distinguishes human economic systems from animal ones. Of course, the process of consumption is familiar to the entire animal world, although that of production is most frequently reduced to simple expropriation and the destruction of other species in the struggle for life, where the essential tools become teeth and claws. If it is pos-

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sible to speak here of labor at all, then this is only in the sense of the difficulty of the struggle, although, it is true, almost all animals must expend labor in the construction of housing, and some actually engage in regular economic activity, for example, beavers, ants, and bees. But although the labor of bees or ants, their “economy,” does follow a collective principle, still this unity has very narrow boundaries. They are defined by the needs of the economic organism, which reproduces itself immutably from generation to generation and remains entirely alien to history. Essentially, the collectivity of bees or ants does not extend beyond the given hive or anthill and never reaches the species as a whole, which exists as such only for the natural scientist. In this way the animal “economy” differs qualitatively from human society, which, though based on the same common forms (the family) as animal societies, is capable of expansion to include, sooner or later, the entire human species. Animal society presents a changeless instinctual reproduction of the same process, with no progress, and political economy as a historical science would find itself at a loss if confronted with this immobility. Human economic activity, in contrast, is a process of social-historical development, and political economy teaches this as a self-evident truth. This means that human economy is not only collective (as for animals) but also social in a broader sense. Human economic activity is inherently social. Every individual entering into the economic process occupies a specified place, and individual contributions acquire social, transsubjective meaning as part of a whole system. Just as, according to Aristotle, the state as a whole exists prior to its parts, so economy as a social system exists prior to its participants.

The human economy develops both extensively and intensively, so that at each historical stage at least some part of the preceding process becomes integrated into the present; the
present grows out of the past, assimilating it organically, similarly to the way in which fetal development recapitulates biogenesis. But at the same time the new species, this integral of the preceding historical series, contains within itself some new element, and this is what constitutes historical development in nature and in human history. This creativity, this constant introduction of new elements is what renders historical processes—among them economy (and knowledge)—possible. History is thus individual rather than typical. In this sense, history is not subject to universal laws, although the laws of causality do operate within it.

Human economy is a social process that develops over time—this proposition, made up of self-evident facts, has the flavor of apodictic certainty. The history of economic life studies the concrete forms assumed by economic organization; it orders the various types of economic systems (natural, exchange, national, international) as successive stages of a single process, representing them as the realization of a hidden potential. This process is not finished, and it proceeds not in a straight line but by a crooked, broken spiral; it begins from several different points at once, frequently breaks off, and occasionally regresses. In other words, the capricious material of history, “whose deity is license,” reveals only the general nature of the process without presenting it in finished form (for this would signify the end of history). The economic process is inherently social (prior to the formulation of any socialist or communist theory), for it is driven not by individuals but by historical humanity. The single true transcendental subject of economic activity, the personification of pure economy, is not any given individual but humanity as a whole. Economy would be impossible and incomprehensible if we did not acknowledge the existence of such a transcendental subject, bringing unity to the many dis-
parate acts that make up the economic process. These various acts would fall apart without such a subject, would fail to coalesce in a total system. Here it will be objected that there are many causal mechanisms thanks to which the economic system comes together as a whole and that these mechanisms form the subject matter of the discipline of political economy. But we can answer that nothing can come together by itself and that such a mechanistic explanation asks only how without asking what. Such an approach causes historians and economists to lose sight of the whole in their concentration on the parts, and we can only recommend that they return to Aristotle with his profound notion of the logical priority of the whole over the parts and of ends over means. The question of the economy as a whole, existing prior to particular economic events (in the sense of course of logical and not chronological priority), must naturally attract our attention, though it stands outside the realm of empirical investigation or economic science: this is the problem of the philosophy of economy. This problem is analogous to the transcendental problem of knowledge in general: Is there a transcendental subject of knowledge who imparts unity to separate acts of cognition? Although the transcendental character of knowledge can at the present time be considered more or less cleared up, the problem of the transcendental character of economy has not yet been addressed. In essence the question here is one and the same, namely: What can we say about the transcendental subject that lies at the foundation of all economic and cognitive processes and brings coherence to knowledge and economy as energies? Do knowledge and economy exist dynamically, as energy or power, as well as empirically, or statically? Kant’s error lay in his epistemological individualism, or atomism. His transcendental subject of knowledge, the epistemological I, is an individual,
though, it is true, sterilized and cleansed of any “psychology,” that is, of empirical concreteness. Kant’s epistemological subject—around which the world turns in Kant’s philosophy (this is his notorious “Copernicanism”)—exists neither in empirical reality, for it is concrete, psychological, and therefore not “clean,” nor outside the experience of this reality, for entry into the transcendental realm is forbidden. Therefore the epistemological individual is here merely a methodological fiction, a method (as Cohenism proclaimed) and nothing more; knowledge remains deprived of a true subject. Kant’s *Critique* destroys much more than he intended; it subjectivizes not only the object of knowledge, transforming it into a mere representation, but also its subject, placing it somewhere in a transitional area between the empirical and the transcendental, in the middle between yes and no. This nail, hammered into the air, would not suffice to support so much as a feather, let alone the entire universe that “Copernicus” Kant wants to attach to it. A transcendental subject of knowledge cannot be reconciled with a multiplicity of epistemological subjects as mutually impenetrable entities. Such subjects would be transcendental with respect to each other, and this would make objective or all-human knowledge completely impossible; yet this universal validity (*Allgemeingültigkeit*) is central to Kant’s epistemology. But precisely this idea of universal validity does not fit into Kant’s transcendental philosophy: it is too big a fly, and it tears the fine epistemological web. A general theory of knowledge is impossible unless we make the leap toward acknowledging the existence of a general transcendental subject, rather than simply postulating a subject as a methodological device (as Kant does). Inevitably, epistemology here leads us to metaphysics, to the ontological premises of the possibility of cognition. The transcendental subject of knowledge is a function of knowledge and is realized through separate individuals.
but is supraindividual both in its task and in its significance, as well as in its potential. Individuals are only the eyes, ears, and organs of the single subject of knowledge, which possesses all the force of knowledge, its energy, its depth, and its products. It forms the foundation of knowledge not only in its infinite diversity of content but also in its unity of form—in generally applicable norms, logical laws, transcendental forms of sensibility, and cognitive categories. It is this subject that brings the infinite multiplicity of experience together in one space, organizes it in subsequent moments of a unified time, and ties it with an unbroken causal connection. All of the traits that Kant considers to be a priori, suspended somewhere between being and nonbeing, in fact belong to this subject and are assimilated by it into the cognitive process, as Fichte has rightly shown. Both the a priori and the a posteriori of knowledge belong to it. Either separate acts of cognition are absolutely independent and transcendent with respect to each other, in which case there can be no absolute knowledge, or these acts of cognition exist in a real, single, knowing being, as his activity or energy. Hence there must really exist a subject that has the positive power of knowledge both in its general, formal aspects and in the infinite multiplicity of its content, only partially known by humanity. This subject is what makes possible the potential for universal knowledge, for which every person strives. The limits of our knowledge are determined only by the external limitations of human life, energy, and health; in principle, one person of genius and tremendous capacity for work could attain complete knowledge of everything. This remains the ideal of education: for a single subject to achieve universal knowledge, to realize empirically that which is the property only of the transcendental subject. Theoretically, knowledge could be organized to make it accessible to the human consciousness. The latter is empirically limited but potentially infinite and
capable of assimilating any content. In its thirst for knowledge the human consciousness is capable of encompassing everything; each individual consciousness contains absolute strivings natural only for the transcendental subject. Universal knowledge, though never realized, is given to us as a potential, as a thirst.

Thus, there does exist a transcendental subject of knowledge that establishes the unity of knowledge both formally, or epistemologically, and in terms of content, or scientifically. Knowledge is really one and is integrated in this subject. It is merely realized through individual acts of cognition, which become the vehicle for its complete expression and, ultimately, coalesce into a whole in the course of the cognitive process. Only one truly knows, but many engage in the process of cognition. This one, this transcendental subject of knowledge, is not the human individual but humanity as a whole, the world soul, the divine Sophia, the Pleroma, natura naturans—it appears under various names and in various incarnations in the history of ideas. In modern German philosophy only Schelling has a theory of the universal subject, in his philosophy of identity. This theory occupied a prominent place in Plato and then Plotinus, was known to the Stoics, and achieved unique significance in Christian philosophy, namely, in the doctrines of the Logos and the first and second Adam, in the works of St. Dionysius the Areopagite, St. Maxim the Confessor, and St. Gregory of Nyssus, and in J. Scotus Erigena, as well as in Böhme’s mystical revelations, adopted by Franz Baader; in recent times, this problem has spontaneously appeared in Russian philosophy so prominently that it has become its distinguishing characteristic. This is particularly true of Vladimir Soloviev’s philosophical system, in which the notion of the world soul, or of humanity as the divine Sophia, occupies a major place. The same concept forms the basis of S. N. Trubetskoy’s epistemology and is more or
less shared by the contemporary Russian philosophers who are of the same philosophical orientation.

Man can attain knowledge in his capacity as the eye of the world soul insofar as he carries within himself the rays of the pleroma of the divine Sophia. Only the “sunniness” of his eyes (following Plato’s and Goethe’s expression) permits him to see the sun. But he does so only imperfectly because his cognition occurs through the disorganized fragmentation of empirical reality. For this reason he is only a piece of his potential self, who furthermore obscures his higher nature through this very fragmentation, although it could serve as a window to that higher nature. Impenetrable darkness, where there is no knowledge and no differentiation, reigns outside this source of light. Yet man has a glimpse of that greater knowledge of which he himself is an imperfect bit; it is through him that transcendent knowledge expresses itself, just as a feeble flame partakes of the same light as do the sun’s rays.

Everything we have said so far about knowledge and its transcendental subject applies equally to economy and its transcendental subject. Knowledge itself (as we will see below) is also economic activity, insofar as it involves labor. In practice, knowledge in its pragmatic dimension and economic activity become one. Knowledge and economy cannot exist independently: knowledge creates models and plans essential to economic organization and itself exists only as part of the economic system. Man cannot progress in knowledge without simultaneously realizing this progress in practical life. Economy is knowledge in action; knowledge is economy in theory. A single synthesizing function is responsible for integrating economic acts into an economic system, cognitive acts into science, separate human actions into history. Economy, knowledge, and history are all interrelated, for all are functions of the transcendental subject.
We must emphasize once more that there is one subject and not many: the transcendental subject of knowledge, of economy, of history is clearly one and the same; it founds and objectivizes all of these processes, transforming the subjective into the transsubjective, synthesizing the fragmented actions and events that make up economy, knowledge, and history into a living whole. But what can we say about this subject? How can we characterize it on the basis of this synthesizing function? What can we say about the world soul—humanity (for, clearly, this subject is the world soul as it reveals itself through this synthesizing function)? In order for economy to be possible, the subject—the world proprietor, or demiurge—must be part of the natural world, must be immanent in empirical reality. Economy is contingent on belonging to the world. But economy as a product, natura naturata, constitutes a mechanical collection of forces that, though connected, are not conscious of any unifying center. And although nature seems an inanimate mechanism, in fact it contains the potential for being a living organism. The living, organizing force contained in nature becomes evident only in the struggle to overcome the lifeless, mechanical state in which nature exists in empirical reality and in which it is subject to the laws of blind necessity. Natura naturata presents a picture of a struggle of life and death, the essence of the cosmic “economy.” Insofar as nature can liberate itself from the heavy burden of mechanism and necessity only through its own forces—through a cosmic process involving labor—the demiurge must also be subject to the same laws as the rest of creation. Like Heracles, he must submit to natural necessity: the demigod must clean out the Augean stables. In order to work with nature as it exists in empirical reality, the demiurge must enter into it, must become a link in the chain of inevitability to which the natural world is subject.
In order to incite nature to rebel against itself, the demiurge must simultaneously—like Prometheus struggling with the despotic ruler of the universe, like Siegfried battling the dark forces of the fate that binds men and gods alike—remain higher than nature, must contain within himself the flame of life in a deadened world. In a natural world, he must be supernatural. He must possess the keys to the mysteries of nature, must be the living prophet of its ultimate resurrection. He must be the “redeemer of nature” (Schelling), by the same token redeeming his own sin of the original corruption of nature. He must become the mediator between the *natura naturans*, as an organism of living ideas-energies, and the *natura naturata*, its frozen and therefore distorted reflection. He becomes the link between a higher world where life is triumphant and a sleeping, lethargic nature that appears quite dead, though in fact its metaphysical basis remains free of the forces of death and non-being. The spirit of nonbeing holds its mirror before the lips of deadened nature, and no damp condensation—the sign of life—appears. These deathlike images multiply in the mirror of nonbeing, the kingdom of nonbeing becomes filled with them, and death becomes animate as it begins to reflect life, however pale. The kingdom of nonbeing receives positive definition and turns into a mechanism, and the ghosts of death fill the world and erase the line between the truly existing and the meon. And so it was until the new Heracles penetrated into the kingdom of the shadows, illuminating the twilight of death and the darkness of nonbeing with the light of his Resurrection.

But arise! Do not let your aching soul
Bow down before fate.
Though you are defenseless and disarmed,
Challenge death to a deadly battle.
And on the twilit threshold,

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In the crowd of weeping shadows
The enchanted gods
Shall recognize you, Orpheus!
The peals of the victorious song
Will shatter the firmament of Hades,
And pale death’s master
Shall surrender Eurydice.

V. Soloviev, “Three Feats.”

In the economic process the demiurge organizes nature, transforming its mechanistic character once more into an organism and its lifeless products into the living forces that generated them, changing nature—which has become merely an object—once more into a subject-object, reestablishing the lost and forgotten unity of natura naturans and natura naturata. In so doing, he makes the economic system into a work of art, in which each product glows with its own idea, and the world as a whole turns into a cosmos—a chaos that has been conquered, tamed, and illuminated from within. Thus the victory of economy is expressed in the cosmic victory of beauty; this is the prophetic significance of the maxim that beauty will save the world.

Humanity as the soul of the world thus works within nature but is also transcendent with respect to the natural world. In this sense, the world soul is analogous to Plotinus’ profound notion of the soul-monad, which penetrates and organizes all the functions of the individual organism; it directs them, rules over them, becomes immanent in them, yet simultaneously remains transcendent with respect to the body. In empirical reality, however, humanity belongs to the natural world, and the economic process unfolds in the conditions of a cosmic illness, a division between the natura naturans and natura naturata. The goal of economic activity is to overcome this division, to restore...
the primordial unity of living nature. Man as part of nature also carries within himself the self-consciousness of nature as a whole, potentially contains the entire universe within himself. Man is thus an expression of the world soul, the perfect center of the world; in this sense nature resembles man, as I have mentioned above. Each human individual potentially partakes both of *natura naturans*, the creative soul of the natural world, and of *natura naturata*, nature as it exists at present. This is what makes economy into a single, unified process, involving a common task for all of humanity. Each individual economic act is essentially part of a single true economic process in which the subject of economic activity acts on its object, bringing about an interaction of the *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*. The economic process is actually a synthetic effort, both extensive and intensive, to possess a single object through labor and economic activity (this is known as the “development of productive forces” in the language of political economy). The transcendental subject, the world soul, *natura naturans*, strives to possess the natural world, *natura naturata*, to make it transparent so that the subject can recognize itself in nature. This is the goal of economy, already beyond history; and again there is here a similarity with knowledge, whose goal of truth also lies beyond the cognitive process as such, for when we achieve it the very notion of truth as an object of discursive knowledge vanishes. Truth is not an object of cognition, for all knowable truths are multiple and contingent. *Truth is a state of being*, such is the central position of the world soul in the world, in being as well as in consciousness, so that to think being and to exist in thought become possible. Knowledge itself as a division of subject and object, alien to each other, will ultimately disappear in the supreme synthesis of consciousness and being, the ideal and the real. The path of knowledge leads to the elimination of
knowledge; all of its partial truths will dissolve in the immediate experience of Truth, being in Truth. The truths of knowledge assume a single Truth as essence, and this establishes a single path for knowledge. The ultimate path of economy and of knowledge is the same, and their limit is the organization of the world as Truth and as life.

The single subject of economy, the world soul, acts in history through an indefinite quantity of separate, independent centers—individual human minds and wills. Its unity becomes realized only in multiplicity; its organic coherence becomes apparent only in the external succession of events in time and in the existence of a causal connection. The mirror is broken into many shards, each of which reflects the world in its peculiar way. There does not seem to be any humanity as an ideal unity, as a world soul; instead we see only people, a mechanical collection of individuals externally united by kinship, nation, or state. The organic connection among people, which bears witness to the unity of humanity as a whole, is limited to a tie of birth: humanity is a sort of huge family, a union of fathers and children (although science cannot prove the origination of the entire human genus from common forefathers). But the fact of humanity’s biological unity (expressed through inheritance) as a genus is of tremendous symbolic importance: it expresses empirically the metaphysical unity of humanity, without which human history would shatter, would become mysterious and incomprehensible. Defining the genus, which natural scientists treat as a given, is actually a tremendous metaphysical problem. When scientists explore the mechanisms of inheritance, which defines the genus, they believe their task to be limited to establishing particular facts of heredity, but philosophically this only poses the real problem in all of its breadth: What is this mysterious force, this magic, that permits unity in multiplicity? Only the existence of genetic prototypes, ideas realized
in nature, can make the notion of genus intelligible. For each genus contains within itself an idea, primordially existing in the divine Sophia, of which individual representatives are merely copies or examples.

Die Rose, welche hier dein äussres Auge sieht,  
Die hat von Ewigkeit in Gott also geblüht.  
(The rose that you see here with your external eye  
Has forever bloomed in God.)

Es ist kein Vor, noch Nach: was morgen soll geschehn,  
Hat Gott von Ewigkeit schon wesentlich gesehn.  
(There is neither before, nor after: what must happen tomorrow  
Has in its essence been known to God from the beginning.)12

And not only the rose blooming in God’s mind but the whole world is really the artistic re-creation of the eternal ideas that together make up the ideal organism, the divine Sophia, the Wisdom that existed with God before the Creation and whose joy is “with the sons of man.” This Wisdom says about itself (Prov. 8:22–31):

22. The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old.  
23. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was.  
24. When there were no depths, I was brought forth; when there were no fountains abounding with water.  
25. Before the mountains were settled, before the hills was I brought forth.  
26. While as yet he had not made the earth, nor

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the fields, nor the highest part of the dust of the world.

27. When he prepared the heavens, I was there; when he set a compass upon the face of the depth:

28. When he established the clouds above; when he strengthened the fountains of the deep:

29. When he gave to the sea his decree, that the waters should not pass his commandment: when he appointed the foundations of the earth:

30. Then I was by him, as one brought up with him: and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him;

31. Rejoicing in the habitable part of his earth; and my delights were with the sons of men.

We read about the same divine wisdom in the uncannical book of the Wisdom of Solomon (9:9): “And with thee is wisdom, which knoweth thy works, and was present when thou wast making the world, and which understandeth what is pleasing in thine eyes, and what is right according to thy commandments.”

The world of ideas, discovered for philosophy by Plato, contains the metaphysical basis for the hereditary character of life in general and human life in particular; heredity executes by biological means the task set by ideas-energies, or the Aristotelian entelechies. *Natura naturans* consists of these entelechies, organically connected and hierarchically ordered. This hierarchy of entelechies is crowned by man, who serves as the living link between the two worlds of mountains and valleys, *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*. Man exists only as species or genus. But should we understand man according to a nominalist or realist interpretation, that is, is man a concept formed by generalizing from many separate individuals, or does it ex-
press some deep ontological unity? Which is first, Adam or adamites? It seems to me that only the acknowledgment of a prior unified humanity—a metaphysical forefather, Adam—can explain the characteristic connection of the individual and the all-human in the human personality. What makes an individual human is not the individual principle but his expression of that which is common to all of humanity. Humanity is one although it has many faces. This is not a sentimental phrase but the expression of an ontological relation. Each individual partakes of humanity as a whole, as many religions and philosophical theories have postulated.

Dass du nicht Menschen liebst, das tust du recht und wohl,  
Die Menschheit ist’s, die man im Menschen lieben soll.  
(You are right not to love men as such,  
For it is humanity that we must love in man.)\(^{15}\)

Man’s potential humanity, his potential unity with all of mankind, lies much deeper than the individuation that divides human beings. Each individual partakes of a larger humanity, regardless of how long he lives, how much or how little he is able to experience in his empirical life, or which corner of the world kaleidoscope is revealed to him. Man’s life means not only his temporary and limited existence but, more important, his unity with the whole of mankind, a unity that is realized with a greater or lesser degree of perfection. It is therefore just to say that

Ein Kind, das auf der Welt nur eine Stunde bleibt,  
Das wird so alt, als man Methusalem beschreibet.  
(A child who has spent but an hour in this world  
Is already as old as Methuselah.)\(^{16}\)

And before this child potentially opens the abyss described by the same poet-thinker:

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Der Abgrund meines Geist’s ruft immer mit Geschrei
Den Abgrund Gottes an: sag, welcher tiefer sei.
(To the abyss of my soul always calls
The abyss of God: pray tell, which one is deeper?) 17

This original, metaphysical unity of humanity is a positive
spiritual force acting in the world as a unifying principle.

Mensch, alles liebet dich, um dich ist’s sehr gedrange:
Es laufet all’s zu dir, daß es zu Gott gelange.
(Everything loves you, man, everything strives for you,
And runs to you, in order to come to God.)

This primordial unity made possible original sin for humanity
as a whole—that ontological sin which spread from Adam to
all men. But the same unity also makes possible salvation in
Christ through the church as a new unifying center; humanity
becomes the body of Christ so that Christ as a person can re-
create human nature, thus becoming a new Adam of whose
flesh and blood humanity partakes. This unity must however
be understood not mechanically but as a dynamic process over
time and manifested in history, in knowledge, and in economy.

Humanity in its unity is nonetheless made up of many sepa-
rate individuals, whose self-expression is not hampered by their
inclusion in the whole. The oneness of humanity is not empty
but consists of coordinated and united multiplicity, for indi-
viduality as a particular ray in the pleroma of Sophia in no
way contradicts the notion of the whole, which allows its parts
to develop freely. Each person, with the unique self that our
individualistic era so prizes, perceives and interprets the world
in his own way, and these various interpretations supplement
each other. In fact, the harmony of individuals in free love and
active unity is a source of particular happiness for each par-

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To dissolve in the supraindividual, to find oneself in others, to love and be loved, to reflect each other, to transform individuals into centers of love instead of discord, to see the possibility of new love in each newborn person—this is to realize the ideal given to humanity and expressed in Christ’s words: “That they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee” (John 17:21). Ultimately these many individuals overcome their divisions to exist in harmony, but in the present imperfect reality this multiplicity often takes the form of discord, of conflict among individual egos. Selfness throws its heavy veil over all of life, transforming it into a vale of tears and sorrow, implanting deep melancholy, sadness, and dissatisfaction. This state of things originated with the Fall, which is the basis of the entire historical process. Humanity exists empirically only as a succession of generations coming and going from the historical arena. The struggle of individuals, groups, classes, and nations—\textit{homo homini lupus est}, the law of struggle for survival—becomes a general rule in the human world as well as in the animal kingdom. “Men as brothers” realize their brotherhood only as Cain and the cainites did, and the earth is red with the blood of brothers. The unity of the human species, however, which is ultimately indestructible for it lies beyond history, becomes subjectively expressed in mankind’s constant striving for love and solidarity, in the search for an ideal social order. That which exists in consciousness as an imperative is contained in the metaphysical realm as being. The world and humanity in the world, removed from their original state, strive to return to it. Social ideals are the hypothetical formulation of the higher unity and harmony that actually exist in the metaphysical world.
II. The Sophic Economy

So far we have defined the content of economic activity as the struggle between life and death, as the restoration of the connection between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, or the resolution of nature’s stiff and lifeless products into the forces that generate them, as the organization of nature. Through economic activity nature can recognize itself in man.¹⁸

Through economic activity, man is capable of transforming nature according to his will; he constantly creates a cultural reality—new goods, new knowledge, new feelings, new beauty—alongside the “natural” world that is given to him. This capacity for economic and cultural creativity is particularly evident in our day, when the limits of the possible seem practically to have disappeared. The world is “plastic,” it can be re-created, and in different modes. Our children will live in completely different circumstances, and we dare not even guess the conditions in which our grandchildren will live. Everything has become fluid, as if the *natura naturans* and *natura naturata* are flowing together; we live in the consciousness of the constantly growing power of economic activity, which in turn opens limitless possibilities for the creation of culture. This situation stands like the Sphinx’s riddle before the contemporary Oedipus. What, we must ask, gives man the power to create the world in this fashion? There are three possibilities: Is this a sign of humanity’s coming of age as it reasserts its lost rights over nature, our entry into a new cosmic era? Or is it a sly magic trick perpetrated on feeble humanity by the Antichrist, stealing the energy of the divine creation, in order to blind pathetic humanity with this stolen power? Or, finally, is it man himself, who, accidentally generated from blind matter, has now, by force of the same accident, achieved a sufficiently high level

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of nervous organization that he dares take matters into his own hands to mold himself into a new species, a superman?

The last of these propositions does not deserve philosophical discussion, although it is a widespread belief even now: it is a purely materialistic vision that sees absolute chance as the ultimate explanation of everything; in other words, it merely hides the absence of a real explanation. How could man emerge by himself from the dead mechanism of nature? How can inert and blind matter subject itself to his creative impulses, relinquishing its mysteries and secrets? And how can man then transcend his own self to make himself into a higher being? There can be no answer to such questions. This is purely mythological thinking, a return to naive naturalism. But the materialist myth is actually less satisfactory as an explanation of the universe, and answers fewer questions, than the tales about the living characters of the old mythology. Uranus and Neptune, Gaea or Cybella, the Great Mother giving birth to the children of Earth are at least living forces, whereas contemporary materialism’s absolute chance, which creates from a bag full of jumping atoms, operates with nothing but dead agents. But let us leave the dead to bury their dead.

What then is the source of human creativity, in economy, in culture, in science, in art? Creative activity requires, first, will and intentionality, and, second, power, or the possibility of executing the initial conception; both aspects involve freedom, for unfree creativity is a contradiction in terms. All creativity requires labor, effort, will—all symptoms of self-determination. The individual must exist in order to will, and in order to create he must not only desire but also be able to fulfill the task he sets himself; otherwise creativity will turn out to be either impossible or incomplete. And here we approach the crux of the problem of economic creativity. Since man obviously is not
all-powerful, he cannot create from nothing but must draw on the existing world in re-creating his new, artificial world, the world of culture. He can imprint his ideas on the created world, experiment with it, and find in it the answers to his questions; in economic activity, the new world of culture takes shape. But where does he find the images, the model ideas on which to base his creative activity? This is really the same question as that of the source of artistic or scientific inspiration: Whence comes the creative conception, the mentally perceived image, that tortures the artist and seeks expression in the word, in sound, in marble? Whence the anxiety of the scientist over certain problems, an anxiety that makes science itself possible? Whence the conception of the activities that constitute the economic process? Whence the invention of the technology that makes this process possible? Nature reveals its “secrets” only to those who know where to look for them and would remain impenetrable to man if he did not possess a certain intuition in his search.

If Kant inquired into the possibility of experience from a formal standpoint, then the question of its possibility from the standpoint of content is also appropriate.

For epistemological formalism, which reduces the I to a function of the unity of transcendental consciousness, such a question is completely unresolvable and even impossible. It ascribes a merely contingent existence to the subject in its transcendental function; yet this same subject is endowed with the magical power of generating all of experience (only in the background a mysterious x lingers, the irrational external impulse). Nothing, creating everything from nothing—such is the content of transcendental idealism as an ontological theory.

The theory of the transcendental subject, the world soul, resolves this question differently. Humanity is and always remains the unifying center of the world in the eternal harmony
and beauty of the cosmos created by God. The empirical world is immersed in “process,” in time and space, in history, and as such is imperfect and disharmonious; yet, like humanity itself, it is never wholly separated from a higher metaphysical reality, from the divine Sophia that ever soars above the world, illuminating it through reason, through beauty, through . . . economy and culture. *Natura naturata* with its mask of death still remains a creation of the *natura naturans* and, though they are *in actu* separate, they remain eternally linked *in potentia*. The world as cosmos and the empirical world, Sophia and humanity, maintain a living interaction, like a plant’s nourishment through its roots. Sophia, partaking of the cosmic activity of the Logos, endows the world with divine forces, raises it from chaos to cosmos. Nature always perceives her reflection in man, just as man, despite his faults, always perceives his own reflection in Sophia. Through her he takes in and reflects in nature the wise rays of the divine Logos; through him nature becomes sophic. Such is this metaphysical hierarchy.

This resolves the puzzle of human creativity, for in all fields—in knowledge, economy, culture, art—it is *sophic*, that is, it partakes of the divine Sophia. Man’s participation in Sophia, which brings the divine forces of the Logos to the world and plays the role of *natura naturans* toward nature, makes human creativity possible. Man can “conquer” nature only insofar as he potentially contains all of nature within himself; he comes to possess nature in the process of realizing this potential. Thus, as Plato pointed out, *knowledge is really remembrance*—not in the theosophical sense of remembrance of past lives but metaphysically. Human creativity is really a re-creation of that which preexists in the metaphysical world; it is *not* creation *from nothing* but replication of something already given, and it is creative only insofar as it is free re-creation through work. There is nothing *metaphysically new* in human creativity; we can only
reproduce a likeness of the images that are divinely given to us. Only God can create from nothing, whereas the created world, including man, is not absolute and therefore incapable of metaphysical originality. In fact, man is free—and in this sense capable of originality—only in choosing the direction his activity takes; he is not free to choose his own nature, his own self, which is given to him. Human creativity can only reproduce a likeness, not create an image; it can only re-create, in the course of the historical process, that which already is as an ideal model. If creation takes matters into its own hands, seeking a model outside of the divine Sophia, it shapes a shadowy, satanic world alongside the given, created one. Satan not only becomes a metaphysical robber and pretender, ascribing to himself that which the Creator gave him, but also makes himself the spirit of nonbeing and death, for he consciously seeks the center of his being outside the Creator, in the sphere of metaphysical nonbeing, in the kingdom of shadows. He projects this shadowy, parasitic world (the existence of a “hanger-on,” to use Dostoevsky’s expression) onto being and becomes the “prince of this world,” that is, of the shadowy state of the cosmos, until the final division of light and dark and the ultimate unmasking of this shadowy existence. Such is the only possible result of man’s effort to create absolutely, from nothing; this is satanism.

Human creativity in its proper function as re-creation has nothing in common with such a usurpation, although it also may become infected with satanism. But this topic belongs to the eschatology of economy.

So economy is sophic in its metaphysical basis; it is possible only because man belongs simultaneously to both worlds, to Sophia and to empirical reality. He is simultaneously the potential center of the cosmos and a product of the real world; he is above the empirical world yet subject to its laws. For him, nature is potentially transparent and throws off her shroud;
yet at the same time he himself is draped in this shroud, is hobbled by a deep cosmic sleep. Economy is sophic in its potential but not in its empirical reality with its mistakes, false starts, and failures. Historical humanity engages in economic activity with all of its empirical limitations, and the economic process rarely visibly reflects the light of Sophia. Yet it always partakes of Sophia, for the economic process is the effort to overcome nature by culture, to “humanize” nature. In this sense nature is basically already nata, created, but it is also natura, re-created. Insofar as this occurs through culture, we can say that culture re-creates nature, thus removing the usual opposition of nature and culture.

But there are absolute limits to this process, for man cannot create new life. This inability to expand the creative forces of nature, to extend his influence to natura naturans, the source of life, defines man’s limitations as a created being. Life is given by God and cannot be broken down or explained. Life proceeds from the Source of Life outside of this world, the living God, who does not know envy and who creates life through divine love:

Nicht du bist, der du lebst, denn das Geschöpf ist Tod, Das Leben, das in dir dich leben macht, ist Gott. (It is not you who live, for all that is created is dead, But the life that is within you is God.)

Thus life comes about not through labor or economic activity but through birth, that is, through the realization of a primordial life force. We can broaden the sphere of life, perhaps even resurrect life, but we can not create it, be it the life of a miserable bug or a homuncule in a test tube; so economy becomes a function of life that exists prior to any human activity. This divine flame, lit by creative love, is the basis for all natura naturata.

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And under the impartial mask of matter  
Everywhere burns the divine flame . . .  

V. Soloviev

The task of the cosmic and historical process is to expand the flame of life, so that it penetrates, warms, illuminates all of creation, but it is not for us to worry about creating the flame itself, for this would be equivalent to the ridiculous attempt to generate one's own self. The creation of the world is essentially finished—"God rested from His works"; the potential elements of the world, its sophic nature, have already been determined as the immutable foundation of all of man's activities as history unfolds. But even the thought that the created might create life is false, for the Source of Life cannot have left untouched anything worthy of being. Besides, all of creation already lives, though it lies in a deathlike, nightmarish sleep. It is true that death exists, that everything that is born must die; but is not the death that we see in the world merely a rebirth, or perhaps a postponement of life? We cannot yet answer this question, but we do know that, although the individual dies, the genus remains. Death reaps the harvest of life but not life itself. This does not mean that we are immortal, or that we have vanquished death, as the naturalists would have it, but it does indicate that death is contingent. It lacks the strength to prevent the generation of life on earth, difficult as life's struggle may be, or completely to cut off life that has already begun. Death becomes merely a function of life. It is a condition of the historical process into which life is inevitably drawn as a result of its relativity and subjection to time. But death breaks this fragile form.

The content of economic activity is not the creation of life but its defense, its resuscitation from a deathlike state. Even if this activity transforms the entire world, and life is reestab-
lished in all of its might, this will remain merely a re-creation, for, as N. F. Fedorov taught, empirical reality intrinsically contains the potential for becoming the best of all possible worlds. This principle is what distinguishes the two religions from each other—mangodhood, for which man is not created but creator, and Christianity, in which man receives his task of re-creation, of economic activity, from God. And here we arrive at the basic question of religious self-definition: with God or against him—a choice that is completely free and not externally determined.

The notion of the sophic nature of the economic process requires further explanation. If we establish that this nature constitutes its driving force, then the question of the precise connection of Sophia with economic activity arises. Why does our empirical reality remain alienated from Sophia and resist its influence passively or even actively? In the empirical world, being is fundamentally irrational and hence antisophic, and Sophia exists only as a postulate to be realized in the process of history. How can we explain such a state of things? What hypothesis (not scientific, of course, but metaphysical) would render it comprehensible?

Although the world is chaotic in empirical reality, in the sphere of extratemporal existence it in fact is Sophia, shining with the light of the Logos, without which “was not any thing made that was made” (John 1:3). The world is alienated from Sophia in its current condition but not in its essence. Even in its chaotic state, “lying in sin” and living in struggle and disharmony, it retains its connectedness and partakes of the light of Sophia. The chaotic elements are linked in a universal whole, illuminated by life that shines within it; and man, though as an individual he is torn from his sophic unity, retains his sophic roots and becomes the instrument for bringing Sophia to nature. The current stage of struggle between entropic and organizing forces is comprehensible only as a vio-
lation of Sophia’s primordial unity, in which the metaphysical center of being becomes displaced and a general illness of being results; this decentralization results in the world’s being plunged into the process of becoming, of subjection to time, to contradictions, evolution, economy. The chaotic state of the empirical world is the result of a falling away from the sophic world in its complete and absolute harmony, where everything finds itself in everything else and ultimately in God, through that timeless metaphysical act that in religion is known as original sin and that involved not man alone but all of creation. This idea is the fruit not only of religious experience but also of philosophy, for example, Schelling, in the Philosophical investigations on the nature of human freedom and Soloviev (in the “Lectures on Godmanhood,” as well as in other works). The basis of the world process is freedom as the foundation of the creation of the world, as the essence of God’s image. Sophia—primordial humanity—as the soul of the world is the center of all creation insofar as it rejects its own selfness, but it is also essentially free and therefore may realize the dark side of its being in exercising a blind and chaotic will (the only will recognized by Schopenhauer). Sophia lies like a blanket over the world, but the world itself is chaos. Both individuality and its extreme of selfness are made possible by this primordial exercise of will.

The “metaphysical Fall” is a major hypothesis for the philosophy of economy. Of course this was not an event in time, and we would search in vain for its traces in the annals of history or in paleontological evidence, where scientists are currently looking for traces of prehistoric man. But we can see its imprint in the very existence of the historical process, which bears witness to the primordial catastrophe just as the results of a volcanic eruption indicate the existence of the volcano itself.
Plato distinguished a heavenly and a popular Aphrodite; a similar distinction identifies a heavenly, timeless Sophia and an empirical Sophia, or metaphysical and historical humanity. Plato saw the connection between the two merely as Eros; but for us as Christians, Christ—the Logos incarnate—is the tie between the metaphysical and the empirical worlds. The Logos was present and active in the world even before its incarnation in Christ; as Schelling eloquently puts it, Christ acts in history even before his incarnation, though not in the person of Christ. Divine Providence manifests itself in the universal connectedness of the world, in the gradual generation of life in all of its aspects before man, in man’s first steps in history. And this logos of things, this universal connectedness, also makes the economic process possible: economic activity is a sophic process that gradually raises the world to a higher level until, ultimately, that Sophia which now shines in the beauty of a flower or of the starry sky becomes fully realized. God leaves the world and mankind free to define themselves through the experience of good and evil for, by Schelling’s prophetic expression, “nothing in the universe can remain ambiguous.”

The world must attain self-consciousness through immersion in itself and thus also in the immediacy and sharpness of experience. Yet even in this process the energies of the world remain sophic, though they are used in a willful and imperfect manner. Sophia shines in the world as the primordial purity and perfection of the universe, in the charm of a child and the enchantment of a fluttering flower, in the beauty of a starry sky or of a flaming sunrise (in whose rays the young Vladimir Soloviev saw her in the Sahara desert—see the poem “Tri svidaniia” [Three encounters]). These sophic rays are what attract us to “nature,” though in fact such a state is supernatural with respect to the present state of creation. Here, instead of unity we find multiplicity, separation instead of internal coherence. In the current, fallen state

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of empirical reality, time and space, which seem to connect
things, actually divide them, for they are merely a mechanical
tie. The heavy pall of mechanism lies on the body of Sophia,
and the law of external causality remains the only connection
among things. The world has turned into a deadened natura
naturata, a pure object with no subject. The initial immediacy,
the intuitiveness of contemplation, the identity of knowledge
and consciousness, the subject-objectness of being in Sophia
have all been lost, and knowledge has become abstract and dis-
tant; “pure reason,” rationality, has replaced the Logos, which
has hidden to become merely the inner, secret connection of
things. Ratio, scientific or theoretical reason, emerges from the
ruins of the sophic; it becomes the lantern with which we seek
the Logos in the nocturnal darkness (and in the philosophy of
rationalism this lantern whose light, after all, really comes from
the sun, is actually equated with the sun).

In becoming a kingdom of objects, the world becomes ma-
terial: the inert weight of material being settles on it. Life sur-
vives only because its seeds, sown by the Creator, are indestruc-
tible; the metaphysical revolution transformed the condition
but not the essence of the world, plunging it into a deathlike
faint but preserving the seeds of life. But life is forced to find
refuge in distant corners where it must constantly battle the
forces of death. Though life reigns in the sophic world, in em-
pirical reality it must, so to speak, obtain death’s permission for
its mere existence. The organizing power of life proves insuffi-
cient to save its creations from destruction. Death, however, is
not an inner necessity for the organism as such, for death is
not created by God but is a function of the current, sinful em-
pirical reality. Here, of course, death is an inevitable part of life;
it is a step toward its ultimate resurrection (we shall speak of
the metaphysics of death in the eschatology of economy), but
this inevitability is merely a product, perhaps even the worst
manifestation, of the general malady of being, and death re-
 mains the worst enemy. Fragmentation replaces solidarity, and the struggle for survival becomes the law of life in the human as well as the animal world. Life is oppressed by the soulless world, and its flame smolders under the ashes. Life and consciousness, potentially capable of containing everything, become reduced to an almost animal state. Human history, the path from barbarism to civilization, becomes a struggle for widening the con-
sciousness of life not only to all of humanity but extending to nature as well, so that ultimately the world of dead, opaque ma-
terial becomes transformed into living energy. Because he is one with nature, man resurrects his own dormant forces by simulta-
neously resurrecting those of nature, transforming matter into his own body, tearing it from the calcified skeleton of *natura naturata* and warming it with his flame. The shroud gradually falls from the already putrid body of Lazarus, who awaits the command, Lazarus, come forth!

The purpose of economic activity is to defend and to spread the seeds of life, to resurrect nature. This is the action of Sophia on the universe in an effort to restore it to being in Truth. Sophia acts through the medium of historical humanity, and it is Sophia that determines the teleology of the historical process. The world as Sophia, though it has fallen into a false and hence mortal condition, must regain being in Truth through labor, or through the economic process. If selfness in man could only be vanquished through self-improvement or religious dedication, selfness in nature is vanquished through labor and in the his-
torical process. Economic activity overcomes the divisions in nature, and its ultimate goal—outside of economy proper—is to return the world to life in Sophia.

Not only the ultimate goal but also the origins of economy lie outside of the historical economic process proper. The current economy was preceded by a different one, a different type of

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labor—free, selfless, loving, in which economic activity merges with artistic creativity. Art has preserved the prototype of this primordial type of economic labor. Originally, economic activity was the harmonious interaction of man with nature; this was the Edenic economy, preceding the historical process that began with the Fall. Before the original sin, God led man, the natural lord of the world, the living tool of the divine Sophia, into the Garden of Eden (into which man was to transform the whole world) and bade him “to dress it and to keep it” (Gen. 2:15). All the birds and animals were brought to man so that he might name them according to their species (Gen. 2:19–20). Thus economic activity and investigation (“science”), the labor on a real and ideal object, began in an Edenic state, when the metaphysical essence of man’s relation to the world was still unharmed, when he did not fear death or hunger, for the tree of life was accessible to him: the labor of cognition and action could here be performed only in a spirit of love toward God’s creation. In this sense we can speak of the Edenic economy as the selfless loving effort of man to apprehend and to perfect nature, to reveal its sophic character. But after the Fall of man, which in religious terms corresponds to a cosmic catastrophe, the meaning and motivations of economic activity changed dramatically. The heavy shroud of economic need descended on economic activity and hid its sophic character; the struggle for survival became the goal of economy, and economic materialism became its natural ideology. The economic process became the realization of God’s judgment on sinful humanity: “in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken” (Gen. 3:19).

Sophia rules over history, manifesting itself as Fate, as causality, as the law of progress (which positivist sociologists try in vain to establish by strictly empirical means). Our only assurance that history has meaning, that it exists at all as a uni-
fied process with a given creative goal, that it is not simply a cyclical process or uniform mechanism or absolute chaos, is the consciousness that it is directed by Sophia. History is organized around a center that lies outside of the historical process; the earthly Sophia appears only because it has a guide in the heavenly Sophia, which directs it with its creative energy. This higher guidance is what prevents life from being more than simply a war of all against all, an animal struggle for survival; instead, collective humanity, in the course of economic development, conquers nature thanks to the higher force that Hegel calls “the cunning of reason” and that we here call the sophic nature of economy.

Sophia, which establishes the ultimate connection of all things, cannot be understood through science, which only observes nature’s regularities and patterns (compare the following chapter). We have already seen that Truth cannot be attained by theoretical knowledge, which is based on the division of subject and object and on the disintegration of being; Truth lies beyond knowledge. For this reason it also cannot be expressed in terms of discursive knowledge, and the holy men who rose, like the apostle Paul, to the “third heaven” could tell us nothing of the “unsaid words which man may not speak” that they heard there. Inexpressibility and consequently mystery surround Truth like a cloud; only those who are worthy of becoming the tools of its revelation can attain Truth. Sophia can be perceived only by means of revelation: Truth reveals itself in miraculous, intuitive ways independent of scientific cognition. This revelation can take on different forms: religious, as myths and symbols; philosophical, as the brilliant intuitions of philosophical geniuses; artistic, as works of art, through which (according to Schelling’s definition) the infinite shines through the finite. Sophia reveals itself, finally, in the mysteries of personal religious life. Whoever has once experienced the inex-
pressible knows about this, and whoever has not is incapable of understanding it. Only one path leads directly to Truth—the path of the religious deed, the acceptance of the One who said of himself: “I am the way, truth and life”; whoever partakes of life in Christ already partakes of life in Truth. He becomes a living member of the divine Sophia, the body of Christ, his church, and in so doing apprehends the sophic world—for us merely an ideal—as living reality. He becomes transparent and sophic; Sophia—that sun which shines and warms us while remaining invisible—emerges from the clouds and openly stands in the middle of the sky. The lives of the saints are filled with such visions of Truth. But they are not unknown to the extra-Christian world as well, in thinkers and ascetics distinguished by a particularly acute religious sense (Plotinus’ light, Socrates’ “demon,” the experience of Buddhist monks, Brahmins, and so on). Of course, in religious terms, an abyss lies between the experience of the world as sophic for people within and outside of the church, for example, between the experience of Christian asceticism and Hindu yogism. But here we are less interested in this difference than in the simple statement of the fact that we can glimpse the sophic world even now, though to varying degrees and by different means. But the further investigation of this question leads us already to the philosophy of revelation, which does not at present constitute the subject of our inquiry.
The Nature of Science

I. The Multiplicity of Scientific Knowledge

Truth is not an immediate object for theoretical knowledge. The single Truth is inaccessible or transcendent to discursive knowledge; it therefore constitutes, to use Kantian language, but an “ideal” of knowledge. Because Truth is beyond history, only movement, rather than a clear goal, is evident in the latter; history stretches out in an endless series of discourses in knowledge and action. Truth as such doesn’t fit into any one of these particular projects, with the result that, in practice, there is no one truth but only the many truths of various sciences and only particular historical goals. Knowledge and history are both “evil infinity” with no natural end, as Kant and especially neo-Kantianism—that contemporary form of the philosophy of evil infinity—have pointed out. This brings us to the question of the nature of science. There is a fundamental and insuperable antinomy in the nature of scientific knowledge: all scientific knowledge exists only on the assumption that there is a Truth; yet it itself fragments this one Truth into a multiplicity of particular, specialized truths that either contradict each other or, more often, simply have no relation to each other. They resemble a network of wires stretching above the roofs of a big city, going in all different directions and for all different purposes. This image—including the wires being put up as well as those already in place (and also the ones that will or might be put up in the future)—accurately conveys the interrelation of the various sciences. The latter, though we consider
them to be part of a unified science, in fact function indepen-
dently and separately because specialization and the division
of labor become necessary. The possibility of this far-reaching
specialization of knowledge and the resulting contingency and
relativity of scientific propositions, because they are so special-
ized, is a problem that needs to be clarified in philosophical
terms. Otherwise the most irresponsible skepticism will have
free play here, demanding, before this infinite series of special-
ized truths: What is Truth? or, before the long list of sciences:
What is Science? One of the most important problems for the
philosophy of science is the justification of science. It is too easy
to succumb to the temptation to forsake Science for sciences
and Truth for truths (as Bazarov once did). When people try
to defuse this doubt by referring to the single ideal of knowl-
edge, or by hesitantly expressing hope for a final synthesis of
scientific knowledge, they are really only giving voice to a faith
that is inappropriate here, particularly since it is contradicted
by the real progress of science, which is becoming increasingly
fragmented rather than unified.

At one time there was a hope of overcoming this fragmenta-
tion by means of a classification of the sciences, in which they
would be ranged on a scale from the simple to the complex,
and thus integrated as a series. Comte’s famous classification of
the sciences was constructed on this principle (as is Spencer’s),
with a naive faith in a single scientific worldview, in scien-
tific synthesis, or a synthesis of the sciences. Sciences with a
simpler object are here represented as premises for the more
complex sciences, so that the entire organism of sciences looks
like a coherent chain of syllogisms. The apt observation that
the data of one science can be used for another forms the basis
of Comte’s classification. The most obvious example is mathe-
metics: mathematics as a method, as a totality of equations that
are worked out and resolved, can be applied everywhere where there is number or measure, where phenomena can be schematized as quantities—though always up to a point. I will not dwell on the difficult problem of the limits of the mathematical method in science. But it would definitely be wrong to say that the degree of applicability of mathematics determines the degree of scientific validity, making it possible to construct an a priori schema of sciences based on their relation to mathematics—as Cohen is trying to do now (though even he is not really successful, for there turns out to be a whole group of sciences governing the “ethics of pure will” alongside the “logic of pure cognition,” not to speak of aesthetics). However great the mathematicization of particular sciences or of their interrelation, this clearly does not provide the proper criterion for constructing either a hierarchical ladder of progression from the simple to the complex, or circles charted from a single center if with different radii. It would be more accurate to imagine a multiplicity of circles charted from different centers and with different radii and hence irregularly intersecting—a labyrinth rather than concentric circles. Comte imagined the diagram of sciences as follows:

I... a
II... a + b
III. (a + b) + c
IV. (a + b + c) + d
V. . . . (a + b + c + d) + e

and so on, but the real interrelation among the sciences is expressed by various combinations of whole and fractional quantities that, although they may have some common parts, have them in different degrees and different combinations:

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I. $a + \frac{1}{2} b + \frac{1}{3} c + \ldots f$

II. $\frac{1}{4} a + b + \frac{2}{3} c + \ldots + e$

III. $\frac{1}{2} b + c + \ldots + g + \frac{1}{3} e$

and so on.

In a word, although there really is a certain coherence, a mutual dependence, and even contingency in the development of science, yet there is no natural hierarchy that would permit us to situate all the sciences in a neat, consistent diagram or classification. On the contrary: ever since science stood up on its own two feet and recognized its own strength, it has been progressing rapidly in the opposite direction—that of specialization. Science is becoming more and more powerful but at the same time more and more fragmented. We might even get the impression that science can actually exist independently of Truth, making do with its own utilitarian, pragmatic criteria. From here it is just one more step to skeptical relativism, for which truth is only utility. Contemporary pragmatism in fact takes this step.

Pragmatism is in this respect an important symptom of the scientific self-consciousness of our age—the awareness of the relativity of scientific knowledge. It affirms in principle the qualitative distinction between the one Truth in its princely glory and the multiplicity of particular propositions established by particular sciences and that also call themselves truths. Yet, as scientific methods grow more sophisticated and our immersion in the logic of science deeper, the relative and utilitarian nature of these partial truths, and the fact that they are qualitatively distinct from Truth, become increasingly clear. The instrumental nature of scientific truths, their contingency and dependence on a given task, comes to the fore, while scientific theories come to resemble mere working hypotheses. The relativism of scientific truths has become so obvious that we hear
cries of science’s bankruptcy on one hand and accusations of pragmatism on the other.

It is true that science does not deal directly with Truth: pragmatism’s skepticism is right on this count. Scientific knowledge is not and cannot be summed up in any kind of synthesis: increasing specialization is a law of scientific progress. A scientific, as opposed to a philosophical, synthesis of the sciences into Science is a utopia, for science has no way out of the empirical world, where all is multiplicity. We mustn’t forget that sciences create their own objects, set up their own problems, and determine their own methods. There can thus be no single scientific picture of the world, nor can there be a synthetic scientific worldview. Each science yields its own picture of the world; it creates a reality of its own, which may or may not resemble the reality of another. Each creates its own cosmos as it works out a coherent system of scientific concepts. Each has its own style, and stylizes reality in its own way, so that “any fact can be generalized in an infinite number of ways.” Stylization is as characteristic of science—as an art of logic, as creativity with concepts—as it is of art. This is why our representations of the world from the perspectives of mathematics, astronomy, history, economics, philology, and so on will be different. They might connect, strung together like beads on a string; but they will never form a single whole, or maybe only partially and at particular moments. At the same time, stylization is for science a conscious point of departure—an intentionally one-sided approach to the world: a given spatial body exists for the geometer as such, regardless of whether it is the body of a person, a doll, or a mannequin; a given force exists for the physicist, be it generated by a human, a horse, or a steam engine; and a given numerical quantity exists for the statistician, whether it indicates a criminal or a saint, an idiot or a genius; and so on. This is why the picture of the world yielded by science really always exists
only in the images yielded by particular sciences: it is always contingent. We can use it for a particular purpose or project, but no one of them can pretend to be an adequate reflection of life’s concreteness and hence cannot force us to view life through its lens alone. The sciences are connected among themselves by their formal aspects, their methodism, the logical techniques of concept formation, rather than by their content (which is only sometimes, and partially, possible). Contemporary efforts to create a “scientific philosophy,” or a philosophy oriented on science, pursue the path of panmethodism—the methodological unity of the sciences—but they no longer have in mind the ideal of a general synthesis of scientific theories. Sciences are united in the oneness of their (transcendental) subject—man as universal humanity—and in their substratum—the single all-penetrating and all-creating life, which generates them from its womb, from mysterious and immeasurable depths.

This living, supralogical rather than logical, unity of the sciences in the creator of science himself and in the maternal womb of life overcomes their mutual impenetrability and fragmentation.

Extrascientific, and for that matter suprascientific, reality is fuller and deeper, more immediate and “naive,” as well as more amorphous, than scientific, categorically formulated reality. Which reality is more real: the scientific or the extrascientific? Does science establish being and reality through pure logic? Or are these mere logical shadows, contingent on the existence of objects to cast them? Is reality a “differential” (Cohen’s invention), that is, a logical-mathematical concept, or is reality given, if only in raw form? Or, to speak more concretely, which is more real: my impression of music and color, or the corresponding mathematical formulae of aural and visual waves? Only immediate experience is real in life; only naive realism has the right idea. Life is always naive, as all wholeness and im-
mediacy is naive. Scientific, contingent, reflective reality always has meaning only in a particular interpretation, in a particular context. Even were science to succeed in understanding the entire universe as a mechanism moving with clocklike regularity, even were science, with its contingent orienting constructions, to find such a construction most convenient, life in its majestic immediacy would be just as little threatened as a landscape, which does not become less colorful and lovely from being subjected to topographical surveys and depicted on maps. Adrian Sixt’s “student” (in Bourget’s novel *Le Disciple*) need not have been so frightened of his teacher’s formulae that he lost his faith in life and placed the authenticity of scientific reality higher than that of life: he could have calmly reflected that, even were his teacher right, then only with a certain lower, contingent, limited correctness; certainly he would not have succeeded in scooping up the sea with a sieve.

One of the most significant facts of contemporary scientific and philosophical consciousness is that it acknowledges the relativity and contingency of scientific propositions. This is not the same relativity of all knowledge that Auguste Comte’s positivism preached, for it was precisely positivism that had naïve, dogmatic faith in science—that absolute that it denounced aloud:

Sie tranken heimlich den Wein
Und predigten öffentlich Wasser.
(They secretly drank wine
While publicly preaching water.)

_Heinrich Heine_

For Comte (and now partly for Cohen), scientific reality is true reality and science is above life because it is its quintessence; it reveals the irrefutable, eternal, iron laws of life: cognition means finding these laws, discovering them in the true
sense of the word. The positive theory of science has been destroyed for us above all by the successes of science itself, which have demonstrated in practice all the inexactness and contingency of what seemed the most immutable scientific truths; they, in turn, have consequently been relegated to mere working hypotheses. The development of natural science over the last decades (beyond my scope in this book) bears eloquent witness to this; the most sensitive scientific minds of our time (for example, Poincaré) have given voice to this impression. Alongside the practice of science, the development of critical philosophy has made a contribution here, particularly in the more recent efforts of neo-Kantianism, which seek to be “scientific philosophy” and actually are working out a theory of science. Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp (the “Marburg school”) are most important in this respect; the methodological writings of Rickert, Windelband, Lask, Husserl, and others are also relevant. They have all broadened and deepened the channel dug by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, which Cohen aptly characterizes as a critique of pure science, that is, a theory of science. “Scientific philosophy,” which found its most coherent and radical expression in Cohen, insistently stresses the significance of apriorism in science; in fact this is supposed to be what transcendental philosophy does, discovering these a priori schemas and constructing a philosophical system from them. Ironically, this apotheosis of pure scientism ends up as a remarkably convincing demonstration of the relativity and contingency of scientific truths and of the relativism of science in general. All of transcendental idealism, beginning with Kant and ending with Rickert and Cohen, reveals the truth that science is constructed by people, and that the formal, idealistic a priori penetrates to its innermost depths. We need only juxtapose two conceptions of science: positivism’s naively dogmatic view, for which science merely reveals itself in man, who in turn becomes a

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mere receiver or mirror for the reflection of the laws of nature, and idealism’s view, once proclaimed by Kant—“Reason prescribes laws to nature, rather than constructing them a priori from nature” (Prolegomena, p. 102)—and now proclaimed by Cohen—“being is the being of consciousness” and “consciousness, as the consciousness of being, is the consciousness of cognition” (Logik der reinen Erkenntniss, p. 14). In the first case the cognitive subject, who gives himself to the object and merely reflects it, is completely passive; in the second this passivity is attributed to the object generated by the cognitive subject.

The idealist analysis of cognition in general and various sciences in particular, as well as the critical theory of science in general, has, independent of its larger philosophical conclusions (“transcendentalism”), been of enormous positive significance for overcoming the temptation of scientific dogmatism, which is philosophically embodied in positivism. The critique of scientific reason has shown, completely clearly, not only that sciences are constructed, but how they are constructed. This has given rise to the problem of the justification of science. From an autocratic legislator of knowledge it has become a subject, submitting to the judgment of logic and epistemology. In the process, though, the instrumental, approximate, contingent nature of the concepts of any particular science becomes apparent, making a skeptical or at least critical attitude toward them possible; in this sense idealism, despite all its philosophical absolutism, resembles pragmatism. The kinship of idealism and pragmatism as forms of relativism in science, although they follow from different philosophical premises, is an amazing fact of the contemporary philosophical consciousness, although it is concealed by the apparent hostility of these two currents. None other than Kant is therefore the father of scientific pragmatism, and its most prominent contemporary exponents are Cohen, Natorp, and Rickert, who in turn
have something in common with Bergson and the American pragmatists. Rickert’s methodological theory of the formation of natural-scientific and historical concepts also has pragmatic implications and is only superficially related to his epistemological teleology. Many of Natorp’s statements concerning the “method of the exact sciences” (Über die Methode der exakten Naturwissenschaften), which apply Cohen’s ideas, are susceptible to completely pragmatic interpretation in the spirit of Poincaré’s radical scientific pragmatism. Idealism when it deals with real science is actually doing the same thing as pragmatism, if we can forget for a moment about its epistemological absolutism or transcendentalism: namely, it humanizes knowledge and underscores the significance of the formally subjective factor in scientific cognition (though it conceives it as inhuman or superhuman and fears “impurity” or “psychologism” above all else). The bottom line of both epistemological idealism and positivist pragmatism is scientific anthropologism. The problem of science ends with the mystery of man, and the theory of science becomes a division of philosophical anthropology. Man is the creator of science, ζωόν μαθηματικόν—a creature capable of science. What lies behind this capacity, what premises are connected with it?

II. The Economic Nature of Science

Man stands in an economic relation to nature, holding a tool in one hand and the flaming torch of knowledge in the other. He must struggle for his life, that is, engage in economic activity. Science is also born in this struggle, it is its instrument and outcome. It reflects the world as it appears to the calculating proprietor, and we know with what different eyes the practical proprietor and the dreamy contemplator, the artist or philosopher, look on the world. Everything appears in an entirely
different perspective to the proprietor with his downturned head and back bent by work than to someone who regards the world from the heights of contemplation or artistic observation. The elusive and capricious development of science that we observe results from the collection and pasting together of a scattered universe from separate pieces—a sort of economic mosaic. Plato’s famous example (in the Polytheus) of a cave with prisoners locked inside, watching the mere shadows of things and constructing their understanding of these things by their shadows, can also be applied when describing an economic-scientific relation to the world. Science, instrumental and pragmatic, is apparently defined by the position of the prisoners in the cave and by their relation to the source of light. We need only slightly modify this position, and the entire orientation, with all its problems and methods, also changes, just as it would change if man were suddenly to be able to fly in the air, or live in the water, or if he became microscopic in size, or became a two-dimensional creature, and so on. If the cave were to be directly illuminated, and our eyes were capable of enduring this, every relative, contingent orientation would be abolished, and science, born in the realm of shadows and half-shadows, would become unnecessary. Science is marked with the stamp of its origin.

In addition to the practical and utilitarian nature of knowledge, noted by pragmatism, it is important to recognize the economic nature of knowledge, because life is a continuous economic process transpiring in the intensity of labor. Economic materialism has had the privilege of apprehending this important truth, although its primitive philosophical apparatus has so far stood in the way of its further development. Avenarius and Mach’s theory of the economic nature of mental acts, and the principle of conservation of energy (Kraftersparung) characteristic of scientific thought, are also ideas of this sort.7

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Science is a social process involving labor and directed toward the production of ideal values, that is, of knowledge, which are necessary or useful to man for various reasons. As a process involving labor, it is a branch of man’s economic activity generally, which is directed toward supporting, defending, and expanding life and which is at the same time an organic part of life. No household can be run by purely mechanical means, without any plan or teleology: the elements of a cognitive-scientific approach to the world as an object of economic activity are inalienable from it, and in this sense science has never been and never will be something man can do without. There is an enormous quantitative difference between the scant knowledge of the practical proprietor and the results of a scientific experiment, because of the difference in their methods, their breadth, their systematization of experience; but there is no qualitative distinction, no difference in principle. Still, at a given stage of development, a differentiation in the household’s economic activity takes place, and the production of ideal, cognitive values, separating out from the single process of life in labor, begins to lead a separate and independent, if not entirely self-sufficient, existence.

The labor that is expended on science pursues two fundamental aims: to broaden experience or accumulate knowledge (which can be compared with the inherited creation of material wealth and culture passed from generation to generation: roads, cities, well-farmed land, factories and industrial plants, and the like), and to organize them, to generalize them scientifically into concepts or laws (which can be compared with the accumulation of capital, the capitalization of the products of labor for the purposes of production). Both have the most direct and immediate relation to economy.

Science is above all the regular and systematic study of “facts,” their discovery and confirmation; it is specialized at-
tention and systematic observation. For the greater part of scientific discoveries have to do precisely with the discovery of new facts, that is, the broadening and deepening of the world that appears to the naked eye and to the unequipped consciousness. Science calls the scientific cosmos forth from the meonic twilight, awakens dreaming meonic being to life, and consequently broadens the possibility of life, its universality and energy. As the miner carves new ores from the cliffs, so the scientific worker calls new being—which he does not create but exposes and liberates—to life, forth from the darkness. This labor is conducted according to a strict and definite plan, applying instruments and experiments that refine and sharpen our senses, according to established rules (methods), as if by a single collective worker; scientific cooperation presents an example of cooperation in general. Particular sciences act as storage-houses of experience, in which the transcendental subject of science, humanity, as opposed to separate, empirically contingent and limited individuals, acquires sensible being, becomes almost empirical whereas it was once superexperiential. As a treasury of knowledge, science is a sort of condenser of life experience. Science does not limit itself to accumulating knowledge but strives always to systematize and generalize it in hypotheses. Its tool here is the concept, which symbolizes an indefinite quantity of similar phenomena and compresses them into laws; scientific thinking uses concepts to piece together scientific theories. Correctly, that is, usefully, constructed scientific concepts serve as a condenser not just of life experience generally but also of scientific experience. Scientific theories, which strive to connect various concepts and represent them in simple formulae or laws, are, in turn, condensers of these condensers and, consequently condense experience to a still greater degree. This explains why the principle of conservation of energy really holds in science and why it strives to achieve a

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goal with a minimum expenditure of effort: this is the fundamental principle of economic activity, and science is economic in its structure.

Science’s economic nature manifests itself in the manner in which it is rooted in life, too. As, in the production of economic goods in the narrow sense of the word, labor is expended for the production of commodity values having utility, that is, capable of satisfying essential or nonessential, actual or invented but nonetheless real needs, so in science the production of ideal goods, the labor of research, is directed toward the satisfaction of needs dictated by life. Man disposes of a limited quantity of labor and cannot waste it aimlessly or uneconomically; play, the expenditure of energy without any aim and justified only within itself, constitutes an exception, and there is no room for pure jeu d’esprit in science. In science as in economy, labor is expended for the satisfaction of an existing or an emerging need. Science is an answer to a question that precedes science. Practical motives or life interests, imperiously resting their attention on a given aspect of life, call into being a corresponding science. The history of science is not the history of the coherent logical development of science, as it would emerge from purely theoretical relations; rather, life impulses and practical needs have called different branches of knowledge into being in different periods. We can see this especially clearly in the development of the natural and technological sciences, and also of the social sciences, in the nineteenth century. Before our eyes, practically every life question calls forth a scientific response, creates a science for itself. It is true that, in the course of scientific development, something other than what was intended has been discovered, much as Columbus discovered America in his search for a roundabout way to India. Even as it experiences the influence of life interests, science in turn exerts a powerful influence on life. It does not remain outside of life and, conse-

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quentely, stands in a living interrelation with all that exists. In any case the sciences emerge on the basis of a selection process; only particular themes are taken from the infinite sea of possible experience. Science formulates life questions arising from a particular interest in a manner convenient for itself and technically appropriate, but it still remains true to the initial interest, just as all sorts of medical disciplines serve but a single life task—the preservation of human health.

Thus science already bears a certain economic flavor even at its inception. We should of course not exaggerate this proposition, which is basically valid for science in general or for a given group of sciences but not always applicable to its various departments and disciplines, however necessary they may be for the scientific life of the whole. Science also has its peculiar logic of development, which generates particular constructions, sometimes of a purely theoretical nature, with an inner necessity. Yet if we take a wider perspective, we will easily be convinced of the existence of practical motives for the emergence of these constructions as well. We need only refrain from too crude an interpretation of these ideas—something of which economic materialism is guilty: to acknowledge the economic nature of science in no way signifies to explain it completely by economic motives in the narrow sense. True, a significant proportion of sciences, examined as a whole, are of an economic-technological nature in their practical application. We can say this of both mathematical (including pure mathematics) and descriptive-experimental natural science: technology, agriculture, medicine, transportation—all are directly related to economy. We must admit this of the social sciences, too, which are of an entirely practical nature. Economic materialism’s most paradoxical assertions of the connection of technical and social sciences with a capitalist economy are in this case not always exaggerated. Science and technology (in the broadest rather
than in the narrow sense) are very closely related. Yet, though the connection of science with technology, or the technological nature of science, is one of the more important traits of scientific knowledge, and one that the philosophy of science must take into account, we ought not to project this on all of science and directly equate science and technology, for the latter is aimed at the resolution of economic problems. Science does not only serve economic needs, and man does not live by bread alone. There may also be other practical interests—although these, too, are also questions of life orientation and the development of rules of internal and external behavior, and they are also resolved by science. The various departments of humanistic knowledge belong here—history in all its branches, philology, philosophy. In a sense we might even place art in this category, as labor inherited from generation to generation in the service of beauty. Although even here the expenditure of labor introduces an economic element, and although science and art are not torn from roots in life with its practical interests, yet the ideal, spiritual nature of these needs does not permit us to relegate them to technical, applied, economic knowledge. The makeup of the sciences reflects the needs of man, who creates them according to his needs, both practical-economic and ideal. Only one thing is impossible: for a science to emerge and exist that serves no need at all, neither practical nor ideal, and that would therefore be uninteresting and unnecessary. The sciences are born of life but, once generated, develop according to their own laws and lead an independent existence. Science is an attribute of man, his tool, which he creates for one or another task. Science is thoroughly anthropological and, insofar as actuality and economy in labor is the essential nerve of human history, science is also economic, or pragmatic. In order to understand science we must understand man. It is not science that explains man but man who explains
science. The philosophy of science is a branch of philosophical anthropology.

In accordance with its dual, objective-logical and pragmatic nature, science must be checked by a dual criterion, evaluated not only according to the logical correctness of its conclusions, their coherence and utility, economy of thought, grace, and elegance, but also according to its practical, orienting utility. In other words, because science has a dual criterion, the nature of scientific error or misjudgment is also dual. We can clarify this thought using the example of mathematics, which is currently sometimes seen as the logic of science itself, or at the very least the citadel of pure scientism. And yet the profound investigations of one of the most prominent contemporary mathematicians reveal in entirely accessible form the economic nature even of mathematical thinking. Namely, in discussing the question of non-Euclidean geometry (Lobachevsky and Riemann), which, though constructed according to different axioms than Euclidean geometry, is no less logically coherent, Poincaré arrives at the following conclusion, generally characteristic of contemporary scientific thought and at the same time so distant from Cohen’s oblique formalistic absolutism: geometric axioms, whose difference explains the plurality of possible geometries, are “conventions; our choice among all possible conventions is guided by experimental facts; but it remains free,” so that “the axioms of geometry are only definitions in disguise. What, then, are we to think of the question: Is Euclidean geometry true? It has no meaning. We might as well ask if the metric system is true, and if the old weights and measures are false; if Cartesian coordinates are true and polar coordinates false. One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient.” and this is decided by experience. Here pragmatism penetrates to the very heart of scientific thinking—to mathematics. The enormous significance of the mathematical
method for science in general is also based on considerations of practical convenience—the reduction of qualities to quantities and the application of measurement and counting wherever this is at all possible. Yet beyond these boundaries the application of mathematics becomes useless and even harmful and turns into a caricature. A typical example is Bentham’s moral arithmetic, which makes an effort to apply numbers to ethics. I am afraid that in contemporary “logistics” we also have an example of how not to use mathematics in logic. We can find similar examples in political economy, too, where there is also an effort to create something like a calculus of human needs, utilities, values. We should mercilessly apply the criterion of pragmatism to such constructions: despite their elegance and logical coherence, perhaps even cleverness, such constructions are useless, for they have no orienting value and must hence be acknowledged as scientific misjudgments.

III. The Sophic Nature of Science

Thus the problems that science sets for itself, which determine the objects and patterns it investigates, arise from man’s need to orient himself with respect to his position in the world; scientific theories and hypotheses have a merely auxiliary meaning and can be likened to scaffolding that becomes unnecessary after a building has been constructed. Because of their economic nature, the sciences have their raison d’être in utility rather than in Truth. They are in this sense tools of the struggle for existence; they are an accurate swipe of the hand, a precisely aimed blow, a sharp glance; in them the transcendental scientific-economic subject sees, hears, feels the world as the object of his economic activity. Yet radical pragmatism, with its skepticism and tendency to see in utility the single criterion of truth, is deeply wrong. It cannot account for logical con-
sciousness—the necessity of drawing certain conclusions from certain premises that is indubitably characteristic of science and forms its logical foundation. Scientific propositions, whatever their origin, indisputably have a basis in logic, and this creates scientific certainty and affirms their “meaningfulness.”

Objective and logical connectedness—the logic of ideas inevitably based on the logic of things, which penetrates both being and consciousness, both subject and object, and hence presupposes a certain identity of consciousness and being—is what makes science scientific and keeps its propositions from becoming arbitrarily subjective or voluntaristic. Science is free and pragmatic in setting up its object and its problems; it is at liberty to ask about the critical mass of atoms or the number of jackdaws on a cross, to count stars in the sky or penetrate into the depths of the earth; this is its business. But, given a particular task and particular elements of a problem, an objective logic of things, a certain iron necessity, comes into play and dictates a particular solution—providing that we do not mock the obvious and proclaim that $2 \times 2 = \text{a paraffin candle}$. And this logic is no longer pragmatic or economic but pure; this is what makes science and even economy itself possible. It is the ideal structure of cognition but also the transsubjective connection of things. Reality is logical; it is coherent; this coherence is identical with logical thinking, it opens and yields itself to it. The identity of subject and object that we established above as an a priori of economy becomes evident in terms of its objective and logical form, as well. The connection is not immutable in its forms and manifestations. It is plural and multifaceted. This is why we find it in different forms, using different methods, and in relation to different objects. Hence also the multiplicity of sciences and the possibility of scientific progress, that is, the broader and deeper penetration into this connection. The connection is universal for it is the connection of everything with

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everything else. In science, it takes on the form of a universal causal connection, pulling the world mechanism together. Without this connection there would be neither identity nor differentiation. But the connection is. There is a Logos of the world that in turn sets up a logic of things, a logic of sciences, a logic of actions: everything exists in an all-penetrating connection. For the world in its positive basis is not Chaos but Sophia.

Science is sophic: this is the answer we can give to skeptical pragmatism and dogmatic positivism. It is removed from Truth, for it is a child of this world, which exists in a state of untruth, but it is also a child of Sophia, the organizing force that leads this world to Truth, and it therefore bears the mark of truthfulness, Truth as a process, as becoming. Like the Platonic Eros, the son of Poros and Penia, wealth and poverty, the absolute organism and the mechanical disorganization, it belongs to both worlds. It is limited, relative, instrumental, but at the same time, as it advances, new shrouds concealing Truth from our eyes progressively fall away, and Truth shines through, if only like a fortune-teller’s mirror.

Logic, then—which has both ideal and real meaning because of the initial identity of subject and object and because subjective and objective are essentially only conscious or unconscious manifestations of a single process, of a single principle that is higher than the distinction of subject and object or the opposition of conscious and unconscious—furnishes the formal defense for the truth of scientific propositions. In terms of content, the truthfulness of science is based on its sophic nature; Sophia’s organizing power makes it possible. In it Sophia comes to possess the world. We might say that the awakening of the world’s self-consciousness finds expression in science, as the world’s deathlike stiffness falls away. So real progress does occur as science develops. This functional unity points to the exis-
tence of a single science—not as unified knowledge but as unified action. Here science merges with the economic process in general and becomes one of its factors. Science is a tool for reviving the world, for the victory and self-affirmation of life. Its positive result is that the inert, dead, impenetrable world progressively loses these characteristics and yields to encroaching life.

If we do not acknowledge this objective logical connection of things—the primordial sophic nature of the world and the secondary sophic nature of science—then the fact of science, the fact of economy, and history itself become an unfathomable miracle, some kind of hocus pocus or revelation of “nature’s” secrets. But it is not possible to follow this train of thought to its logical conclusion without falling into obvious contradictions or crude mythologizing, without transforming the dead and scattered aggregate of “nature,” as it appears to a mechanistic worldview, into a living creature, if only into that goddess in green clothing and with moist eyes that Turgenev describes in his prose poem “Nature.”

IV. Epistemology and Praxeology

Scientific knowledge is active or, to put it differently, it is technological. The fact that technology—the conversion of knowledge to action, the leap from contemplation to reality—is possible shows that scientific cognition, or the logical connection of concepts, is transsubjective, that is, that cognition is technically useful. In other words, technology is logical or logic is technological. Mathematics is of “cognitive value” not only because it is an absorbing game of the logical imagination but because it forms a support for technology; differential calculus proves useful for the construction of a railway bridge. Science not only constructs logical models of reality but also creates

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projects for acting on it; it is this connection of projecting and modeling, knowledge and action, that needs to be conceptualized philosophically. A pure theory of cognition is not enough, indeed it is impossible, for we need a theory of action based on knowledge, a praxeology rather than an epistemology. The problem of pragmatism only begins where its proponents think it finished.

The problem of science in its praxeological dimension does not fit at all into the formulation proposed by Kant with his purely reflective, really only theoretical, inactive reason. Cognition for Kant is only modeling, not projection verified by life. Cohen justly remarks that Kant deals with nature as an object of science (Natur als Wissenschaft). Yet nature ought first to be understood as an object of economy (Natur als Wirtschaft). We cannot feel nature’s reality in the mirror image given by Kant’s epistemology; this is why the problem of the reality of the external world and the other I, as has been shown above, becomes for him fatally irresolvable. For theoretical reason the world, too, has only a theoretical existence; it is, so to speak, projected onto a plane like a series of diagrams and sketches. These may be accurate or inaccurate from the standpoint of their logical elegance, but we have no way of knowing whether they have any transsubjective, living meaning. Kant’s very formulation of his problem cut off the path to living reality and condemned him to a labor of Sisyphus, a constant chase after the ever-escaping shadow of reality. Kant’s concept of a phenomenon, formed by the a priori forms of cognition, does not take into account the possibility of action; otherwise it would have to be reevaluated in a realist spirit, and this would inevitably lead to a reevaluation of the entire theory of the forms of consciousness, of the phenomenon and the corresponding thing in itself. About the world, theoretically constructed, Kant could justifiably argue that “reason dictates the laws of nature,” but
we must add that perhaps this nature does not exist, like the
ideal three talers in Kant’s famous example, whose being does
not follow from their concept. If we can convince ourselves of
the real, rather than the ideal, existence of the three talers only
by feeling our pocket, then we can convince ourselves of the
real existence of theoretically constructed nature only by feeling
it, that is, moving outside the boundaries of theoretical con-
ceptualization. “We must move outside it in order to impart
to it the characteristics of existence,” as Kant puts it. Only
practice or technology can convince us that science is not erect-
ing a phantasmagoric world but is somehow related to reality.
Hence the bridge constructed according to mathematical cal-
culation in a sense validates calculus. Within the boundaries
of Kant’s epistemology, though, there is absolutely no means
of drawing a distinction between three real or ideal talers,
because theoretically, in their content as “concepts,” they are
identical, and Kant acknowledges this; they are differentiated
only by their “position”—the predicate of being. There is no
reality outside the logical for theoretical reason; Cohen, follow-
ing Kant, takes this idea to its logical conclusion—something
for which the “Marburg school,” in which reality is openly re-
placed by science, must be given credit. This point of view is the
last word of armchair, “scientific” idealism. Kant himself con-
stantly wavers between idealism17—toward which the logic of
his philosophy pushes him but which (as represented by Berke-
ley) he does his best to refute—and realism. His living sense of
reality forced him to hold on to realism; however, there is no
basis for this in Kant’s theory of phenomena, and this wavering
(already reflected in the distinction between the first and the
second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason) creates a source
of confusion in Kant’s system and finally leaves open what for
him is a fundamental question: “Wie ist Natur selbst möglich?”
[How is nature itself possible?] (Prolegomena, sec. 36).
these waverings and showing the inescapable duality in Kant’s understanding of nature would be an interesting task, leading to the very center of Kantian thought and revealing the falsity of his Copernicanism. Only Schelling with his “breakthrough to reality” was able to tear the spider web of Kantian epistemology and to lay a path to the philosophy of economic realism, which does not break the unity of cognition and action, nature as science and nature as economy.

Thus epistemology orients itself on the fact of theoretical cognition (or “science”) and tries to find a path to reality, to tear the net of idealism. But theoretical knowledge, within whose boundaries epistemology remains, is idealistic in its very essence; it deals with algebraic signs rather than concrete arithmetic quantities. Yet in reality there is no such thing as purely theoretical knowledge; it is an abstraction, for knowledge exists only as a moment of an action’s concrete unity and constitutes a part of the process of life as labor and as economy. Economy is a no less immutable fact than knowledge, but it is more general and hence logically prior to knowledge. The theory of cognition, when it is oriented on the fact of economy, that is, not just theory but also technology, will look quite different than its abstract theoretical counterpart. Subjective idealism can be overcome only on the basis of economic realism—the living authenticity of the objects of labor, and knowledge becomes transsubjective thinking. To tear apart the concrete unity of the moments of theory and practice, knowledge and action with the purpose of later pasting a living whole together from its two parts—pure and practical reason—would be to take the wrong path, to set up unnecessary difficulties and irresolvable problems. I do not deny these problems of the theory of knowledge, but I do deny their present abstract formulation. There is a certain a priorism and schematism, tossed like a net on immediate life experience, in scientific cognition, as epistemological analy-
sis clearly demonstrates. The Kantian epistemological subject is the mind of a scientist preparing an experiment. The a priori forms of consciousness in their peculiarity constitute the object of the theory of scientific cognition or, as the current expression goes, pure logic. It is not, however, the highest and final court before whose tribunal all questions can be resolved. Instead, science itself requires justification or philosophical conceptualization, and this is why a science about science, a philosophy of science, emerges. The latter is not infrequently transformed directly into philosophy (Cohen, Husserl) and expounded as a “philosophical system.” The same happens with the philosophy of transcendentalism.

V. Science and Life

Science is a function of life; it is born in the process of labor, and the nature of all labor is economic, that is, has the aim of defending or expanding life. Life never rests; it is in a state of ceaseless tension, actuality, struggle. Life is in this sense an unceasing economic process. It is action in which moments of reflection or theoretical knowledge exist only as moments of action. An economic relation to the world includes a theoretical orientation in the world, that is, science, as a necessary tool. Science is born of practical need and develops following the same impulse. This pragmatism, the economic nature of science, is established by the position that the subject occupies in relation to the object in the process of scientific knowledge. Economy is contingent on the alienation and mutual impenetrability of subject and object, of living and nonliving being. The subject penetrates into the object through economy, brings it closer and moves out of itself into the object, assimilating it and making it transparent and penetrable. But in order for this act—the triumph of life, whether in a single act or in the

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whole economic-historical process—to be possible, the object must first stand apart in all its alienation, impenetrability, objectness, in all its multiplicity and chaos. As it prepares to make its leap, or to begin its work, the subject makes ready, taking aim like a tiger before it leaps on its prey, and freezes for an instant in this pose. However brief this instant, it is essential and unavoidable in the process as a whole: it is a part of it and can be only understood as such a part, but at the same time it has a certain coherence or wholeness in itself. At the moment of this preparatory pose, attention is entirely transferred to the object, and the subject seems to disappear or hide, and only the object of study remains. This is pure scientism, a scientific relation to the world. So scientism is but a pose assumed by life, a moment in life. Therefore it cannot and should not legislate over life, for it is really its handmaiden. *Scientia est ancilla vitae.* Scientific creativity is immeasurably narrower than life, for the latter is living, continuously realized subject-objectness, the subject and object in their polarity and their living unity, expressed not in scientific cognition but in economic action, whereas science is only objective. Objectivity and impersonality are considered virtues for science, and, indeed, it ought to be impersonal (subjectless, extrasubjective) and objective; in it the subject temporarily moves out of itself and thinks itself in the object, exists in the object so that it seems that the pure object alone remains. From this position, or from that window through which science surveys the world, the subject with its immediate, living relation to the object, with the rays of life that it radiates, is invisible. Similarly, we would search in vain for a tall mountain, looming over the landscape and comprising all its beauty, if we were ourselves on its summit. We cannot see the spectral landscape from this vantage point, thought this does not mean that it cannot be seen at all.

When we approach the world scientifically, it becomes trans-
formed from an arena of struggling life into a regulated world of objects connected mechanically to each other. Wherever science directs its lantern, all living colors fade and faces harden as if in response to a solar eclipse, and nature becomes a dead desert with an anatomical dissecting room. Life runs away, for it has no place in this kingdom of shadows, of subjectless objects, of materialized abstractions; life itself is here examined only as an object, that is, as a mechanism or a machine. To comprehend life scientifically means to explain it mechanically, to turn organisms into machines: not for nothing was the phrase l’homme-machine, “scientism,” transformed into philosophy, uttered by the philosopher of enlightenment, in ecstasy at its scientism.

Everything that bears the imprint of the subject and contains signs of life is irreconcilable with a scientific, purely objective relation to the world. Science deliberately commits a murder of the world and of nature, it studies nature’s corpse, it is the anatomy and mechanics of nature; and biology, physiology, and psychology are equally guilty of this. Science throws a net of mechanism, imperceptible as are the threads of a spider web to a fly, over the entire world. A scientific and a mechanical worldview are synonyms. A scientific relation to the world is a relation to the world as mechanism. Within these boundaries the kingdom of science is impregnable and permits of no incursion. The question is only whether this kingdom is universal, whether it does not leave sufficient territory around it to permit surrounding it and taking it prisoner. The object is plural by nature, and this plurality puts pressure on and oppresses the consciousness, which requires a multiplicity of orientations to deal with this plurality. Science cuts pieces of reality out of the living organism in order to orient itself in them and determine their mechanical regularity. And then it pieces an already dead nature back together from these excised bits. Nature as

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universal organism, ἐν καὶ πάν, does not yield itself alive to science, and nature’s murder takes place on the very threshold of science, just outside the borders of its kingdom. This is why practitioners of science have no memory of the past, and, with naive dogmatism, they equate reality in the form accessible to science with reality generally; in other words, ontological significance is ascribed to scientific methodology. In this manner the false assumption that a scientific relation to reality is in fact the deepest and most authentic takes root and flourishes, and the intentional limitations of science are forgotten. All of scientific positivism is such a naive philosophy of the pure object apprehended (it is unclear how and by whom) by science. What positivism does naively and dogmatically is done with critical refinement by criticism, and particularly in its recent form of “scientific philosophy.” The philosophy of “pure experience” and of “pure consciousness” is a philosophy of subjectless experience, or that pure objectness that is characteristic of science. Reality as a pure object inevitably becomes a world of things, existing in a relation of mechanical causality to each other. The recognition of nature as a mechanism, permeated by a single causal connection (never, of course, fully knowable, but postulated a priori) is in a sense a methodological premise of science, an economic approach to nature in the effort to apprehend its “mysteries” and “secrets” (Bacon). This, to parody Hegel’s famous expression about the *List der Vernunft*, is economic cunning (*List der Wirtschaft*), half-consciously, half-instinctively accomplished by life as it freezes in a contemplative pose before penetrating into the object with all its subjectness.

Science’s fundamental conviction or assumption, fully accepted by scientific philosophy as well, namely, that the given array of world elements cannot be changed or expanded, follows from its relation to nature as a mechanism. The law of
conservation of world elements means that all changes in the world ought to be understood only as a result of the mechanical interaction of these elements, and the possibility of any new creation, any enrichment or growth of the world, is excluded in advance (hence the rejection in principle of the miracle, that is, the disruption of the current laws of nature formulated using these elements—science’s well-known fear of miracles). Science lays claim, at least in the ideal, to compiling an exhaustive inventory of world being.\(^9\) Hence also its claim to an unlimited capacity for prediction, which would make it possible to portray the world, to quote Dubois-Reymond,\(^{20}\) as “one immense system of simultaneous differential equations, [as] a single mathematical formula.” Kant expresses this same thought even with respect to human actions; it lies at the basis of sociological determinism: it was stated in most radical form by Laplace and later by Huxley.\(^{21}\)

And, having portrayed the world as such a mechanism, science proceeds to break it down into atoms (in the broadest sense of the word) and to tear the whole into parts using, in Bergson’s clever words, a cinematographic method,\(^{22}\) and hence it destroys the unity, the wholeness, the continuity in nature’s life. Science’s relation to nature is artificial and pragmatic as opposed to immediate and selfless. Science has a voluntary, active origin; it is not a penetration into the object as it is (which, incidentally, is impossible because the pure object, the thing, is an abstraction, and the object exists only for the subject) but an economic orientation inside it, a preparation for action. The indicative mood of science always precedes the conditional and is followed by the imperative.

Thus science is a contingent relation to nature as a pure object and, consequently, as a mechanism. Scientific thinking and a mechanical understanding of the world, or scientific determinism, are one and the same. Science exists only as a deter-

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\(^1\) Tseng Bulgakov / PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMY / sheet 193 of 358
ministic system, that world mechanics of which Kant, Laplace, and others dreamed. But it is clear that the philosophical question of freedom and necessity remains entirely outside scientific consciousness. The scientific orientation is so narrow, specialized, and pragmatic that all the questions arising beyond its threshold do not exist for it, including the definition of the subject in relation to the object, or of the will in relation to action. This does not exist for science in the same degree that no qualitative distinction among bodies that he studies as figures and volumes exists for the geometer: for science, a marble statue and the model that it reproduces are entirely identical. Despite all its infinite richness and complexity of content, science is extraordinarily simple, elementary and impoverished in its task. Its only commandment proclaims: know the world as a mechanism, act as if it were only a mechanism that can be completely understood. But it would be useless to ask science about the validity of this commandment itself.

VI. On the “Scientific Worldview”

An ontological interpretation is frequently ascribed to science’s contingent-pragmatic mechanical worldview, according to which the world is not only scientifically apprehended as a mechanism, permitting a mechanical orientation toward it, but actually is a mechanism, and all of being is interpreted on the basis of this mechanism. The cognitive, economically oriented subject is imperceptibly led out the door and replaced by an extraworldly, contemplative, inactive scientific reason, to which the contemplation of this mechanism is ascribed. Only thus is that pure object, which does not correspond with any subject and therefore embodies pure mechanism, obtained. Then the world is seen as a totality of things, whereas the knowing reason, as a totality of their schemas, appears as a passive sche-
matism of the world. All is accessible to cognition, all partakes of thingness, mechanicity, objectness—this is the catechism of the metaphysics of scientific rationalism. This scientific rationalism, this mechanical worldview represents such a typical disease of contemporary philosophy that it requires explanation as well as refutation. Like economic materialism as an idea, it is stronger and more powerful than its various specific formulations. For scientific rationalism can now say of itself: “my name is legion, for we are many.” For all currents of thought (and not just of thought but, more important, of life), which bear the name of “enlightenment” in its many manifestations, lay the foundation for scientific rationalism. Locke and Hume, Bacon and Mill, Kant and the neo-Kantians, Moleschott and Häckel, the majority of scientists—all are conscious or unconscious, active or passive, militant or peaceful exponents of scientific rationalism. It comprises the spiritual atmosphere of our time, we breathe it imperceptibly for ourselves; in it the sense of the mystery and depth of being disappear and mysticism and religion are extinguished. Mephistopheles, the spirit of scientific rationalism, produces a table of logarithms with a flat sneer and with the words eritis sicut dei scientes bonum et malum, and maliciously looks on as God’s world is ground at this mill. Of course such a significant and influential current of spiritual life cannot be based solely on theoretical delusion; it must have deep roots in the illness of being, in its fragmentation, in which we can indeed perceive the beginning of discursive knowledge, that is, of science and scientific philosophy. As for its blossoming in our time, we will say together with Marxism that the roots of contemporary rationalism lie in the economy, in the intense economic life of our time (not in vain do certain economists, for example, Sombart, consider rationalism the distinctive feature of contemporary capitalist industrialism). Kant and Watt, Cohen and Siemens are children of a single economic epoch—

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capitalism. Our time is characterized by a terrible intensity of economic energy, expressed equally in the development of science and in the economic conquering of the cosmos. This intensity is expressed in the extreme immersion of the subject in the object and is accompanied by a certain displacement of the center of consciousness. Before being conquered, the object temporarily conquers its conqueror. At the same time economy’s successes are not yet sensible enough to provoke a feeling of victory over the object, its dissolution in the subject. The hypnotizing influence of the object being conquered, the tensing of the muscles and the will in the course of conquering it, is naturally reflected in contemporary humanity’s historical consciousness by the successes of scientific rationalism. The high value of science as a tool has led to the expansion of its field beyond its real limits and has provoked an effort to use this key to unlock locks that it does not fit at all. From this that unhappy product of the era of rationalism—the ideal of “scientific philosophy,” that is, a scientific resolution of supra- and extrascientific questions—was born.

But although science transforms the world into a lifeless mechanism, it is itself a product of life, a form of the subject’s self-definition in the object. Even the mechanism that for a mechanistic worldview seems a universal ontological principle is only the subject’s contingent self-definition. The mechanism is a boundary for the subject, the absence of organism; but the limited is prior to what limits it, and life is not established but only limited by the mechanism. The mechanism itself is a negative rather than a positive concept; it expresses the absence of life, that is, life (the subject) here senses its limit, but in order to pass beyond it rather than stop before it once it has been perceived. Life’s tentacles, spreading forward and meeting dead limits before them, seek a way out or around them. Life remains for us an immediate given, possessing the positive
attribute of being, and the concept of mechanism or thingness, negative in relation to it, is formed by denying this positive feature, is its shadow; and apart from this negative definition it would disappear entirely as a pure minus, as nothing. Hence mechanical causality is defined as the negation of life; it is the negation of will and organic causality. And for this reason alone mechanism not only cannot account for life but must itself be justified on the basis of its relation to life. Bergson’s great philosophical achievement was to show (particularly in the *Creative Evolution*) the primordial nature of life and the contingency on it of scientific rationalism and mechanism.

This is why, generally speaking, a relation to nature as to a mechanism is above all “economic cunning,” a tactical device by encroaching life, whose secret and real intention is to conquer and dissolve in itself everything nonliving and mechanical, and the ultimate aim of economy, or its natural limit, consists in making a universal human organism out of the universe. Mechanism in the organism serves only as a means for its ends; it is its *how* rather than its *what*. What is unconscious is unfree and mechanical; what is conscious, intentional, teleological is organic, although the mechanism of means may remain the same in both cases. This is why, in discovering one or another pattern of causes and effects, one or another mechanism in nature, life strives to possess it, to include it in its organism, and this is why expanding knowledge of nature as a mechanism is but a preparation to its possession as an organism. The organism is the recognized and acknowledged mechanism; the mechanism is still unorganized, but potentially organizable, nature. A scientific image of the world, the world as object and consequently as mechanism, is but an instantaneous photograph, similar to the photograph of a wave at the moment when it is cresting. But it is clear that, just as this position of the wave is comprehensible only in relation to the preceding and
following moments in the wave’s life, but not in itself, so a scientific image of the world as pure mechanism expresses a moment of reflection before action, the greatest possible opposition of subject and object, their counterposition, which will be followed by that fusion and mutual identification to which any economic act is ultimately reducible. The mechanism of nature discovered by science, the knowledge of its patterns, opens the possibility for organizing economic activity. If the mechanism as the boundary of life and of the organism is experienced as the oppressive, nightmarish force of deathlike necessity, then, on the other hand, it is actively recognized as the possibility of organism, of life’s triumph, of the victory of the conscious over the unconscious in nature. For, as we have already said many times, man does not create from nothing but merely re-creates and transforms; man must have a mechanism before him as the material for his action, as a foothold for his activity. “That for which there can be no room in nature must be entirely impossible.” The coherence of the moments of cognition and action, the significance of science in economy as a means of economic orientation, is hidden for us because the function of economy, like the function of knowledge, is realized as a whole only by the transcendental subject, by historical humanity in its totality (or, at least, in large groups), whereas life is immediately given to us only in its individual, limited form. The curse of involuntary fragmentation lies on the latter; it is an infinitely small fraction, an atom of the total process. This is why individual human persons realize primarily one or another aspect of the economic process, some its cognitive, contemplative aspect and others the active aspect. Hence it is natural that the estate of scholars, as a result of the complexity of their profession and the difficulty of their task, having separated from society in a closed guild, has acquired a peculiar contemplative, armchair relation to life expressed in the idea of scientific
regularity; for people of action, in contrast, the world appears plastic and changeable. So the horror of a mechanical world-view results not from the idea of the universal connection of all that exists, accessible to us as a system or, rather, the various systems of various sciences, for there is nothing oppressive to the heart in this connection itself; rather, it follows from a feeling of life’s constriction, of nature’s alienation from us with its deathlike impenetrable face and its indifference or hostility to man. Nature’s mechanism, its corpse, scares us away by its presentation of the world as a kingdom of death in a struggle with life and throws its deathlike shadow on our life. Science orients us in this kingdom of death and hence itself acquires a deathlike aspect. Death conceals itself behind this mechanism and threatens us. The world is a mechanism only insofar as it is the kingdom of death. But to the degree that it is the arena of a struggle of life and death, it is a future organism. We are slaves to this mechanism to the degree that we are slaves of death; these are different expressions of the same content. But the dead is not conscious of itself as dead, and pure mechanism is not conscious of its mechanicity. The horror of death can appear only in the living. Mechanism and organism, necessity and freedom, death and life, although they limit each other, are also contingent with respect to each other, and, through their division, interaction, and struggle, bring about the necessity of competition, a process that, if only it is not infinite, must lead to an end marking the end of this process: to the complete victory of death or of life. But can nonbeing—that which is not and exists only as a shadow—triumph? There is only life, and that which is taken for death and for lifeless mechanism is damage or discontinuity in life, its faint, which is accompanied by the faint of nature as well. And that mechanism which is studied by nature, this bark of being, is merely the imprint of life’s faint in nature—deathlike paleness, insensitivity, but not

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death. The proprietors, nature’s sons and stepsons, slave and master, overseer and worker, works ceaselessly to revive nature. He tries to warm deadened creation with the warmth of his life. He is not capable of preserving this life even in himself as an individual; it is preserved only in the genus as a whole, while the individual must acknowledge the power of his enemy—death—over him. And in this lies the tragic nature of this struggle: a gap constantly forms between the subject and the object; death cuts off their connection with its sickle, but it is replaced anew.

VII. Science’s Self-Consciousness

Science cannot comprehend itself, cannot provide an explanation of its own nature, without passing beyond the boundary of determinism and of a mechanistic worldview and entering onto the territory of metaphysical problems. Even if everything is a mechanism, as science assumes and affirms, what is science itself as knowledge, as the contemplation and self-consciousness of this mechanism? How did it appear as a sort of appendage to this mechanism, as its ideal reproduction or mirror image? Who ideally reproduces this mechanism, and how? If we propose that mechanism, that is, pure objectness and consequently absolute unconsciousness, reproduces itself, calls for its own self-consciousness, then this means to proclaim a rather bold absurdity and to poke merciless fun at the law of contradiction by ascribing self-consciousness, that is, subjectness, to the object—or else simply to deny the initial point of view and pass over to a new one that has not yet been investigated.

Therefore it suffices merely to pose the question of science’s self-consciousness as the hypnosis of a mechanistic worldview, and the enchantment of this horror weakens, for it is impossible to conceive of science as an entirely passive, mirrorlike
reflection of the world mechanism. First of all, the very existence of such a reflection would be inexplicable, for the world of pure mechanism, remaining such and only such, would have no knowledge and consciousness of itself as a dead body, since it appears as a mechanism only for the organism, just as death exists only in life, for life, and because of life. But, apart from this, this notion of the mirrorlike and passive nature of knowledge as a reflection of the world bears absolutely no relation to reality, for knowledge itself is action, and only its products later acquire the frozen features of objectness: science is created by labor, it is a function of life. Hence the relation between the mechanism and its reflection in the consciousness, or science, can clearly also not be conceived as a mechanism but leads outside its limits and breaks its boundaries. Knowledge as activity, and systematized scientific knowledge in particular, is never of a purely objective nature but also has the object before it; it is the identity of subject and object constantly in the process of realization, passing from the potential to the actual, to the revealed connection of things, the logos of the world. When I study the starry sky, a telescopic picture of the world, or else the world of the infinitely small, its microscopic spheres with their particular rules and connections of being, I do not always remember that this is my picture of the world, constructed within me, a living potential of the world, as I plunge myself into the infinite object. In a sense it is necessary, for this, to acknowledge that I and the starry sky or the microscopic world are one, capable of fusion or identification. Every act of knowledge is such a partial identification of subject and object, their unity as it is felt and revealed, as the answer to a question is a unity of question and answer. Both knowledge and economy can ultimately be based on this identity of subject and object, as has been clarified above. And in this sense I find the starry sky within myself; otherwise I would not see it above me. All knowledge is in this
sense self-consciousness. The roots of knowledge are in Sophia, in the ideal identity and self-consciousness of the world, in its ideal organism. The mirror theory of science closes its eyes to the prophetic and creative anamnesis that actually takes place in science as well, despite its mechanistic worldview, as in any activity that is alive and hence based on universal identity and the universal connection of things. For reason (ratio), which merely draws diagrams of things, describes them and approaches mirlorlike passivity in its activity, is barren. It does not give birth to scientific ideas but merely uses those already in existence, registers and checks them; it is thought’s accountant and not its creator. In reality, creative thoughts and new ideas do not result, in science too, from reason’s accounting, but are born and reach consciousness from the depths of preconscious identity, Sophia. They dawn on their creators analogously to the way in which inspiration dawns on the artist; they are themselves the fruit of a certain inspiration, of eros rather than the cunning of accounting, and, once born, they fall into the hands of their strict nanny and demanding midwife. Scientific reason in its sterility cannot give birth to science; science, like all that is living and creative, is generated and created through extra-scientific, suprascientific means, and scientific genius, like any other, is the capacity to see clearly above or deeper than what is given by reason. But science keeps a precise inventory of the world as it opens itself to suprascientific, creative, sophic consciousness; science is the minutes of the revelation of the world as sophic, insofar as science becomes contemplation and knowledge and insofar as the subject, having achieved its exit into the object and realized its identity with it, returns from actuality to potentiality and hence projects the connection of things on the screen of the object as a mechanism.

Science introduces the light of differentiation and regularity into the dark chaos of inert matter, the confusion of cosmic
forces and elements. It ideally organizes the world as an object and permeates the chaos of phenomena with the light of ideas, of universal and rational laws.\textsuperscript{26} Science is the proprietorship of reason in nature, the restoration through labor of the ideal cosmos as an organism of ideas or ideal regularities in which cosmic forces are harmoniously merged and primordial matter and primordial energy—the “foremother” of being—take shape. In the process of labor and economy science penetrates through the bark and pith of the chaos-cosmos to the ideal cosmos, the cosmos-Sophia. The world then truly arises as a unity, but not in the sense of Kant and Laplace. This unity will be realized not in an abstract formula of universal determinism but through an organism of ideas, which mechanical unity merely reflects in an upturned and distorted image. Such is the ideal limit of scientific knowledge.

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I. Freedom and Causality

The reflecting (“epistemological”) subject, abstract and lifeless, confronts the object, or topic, of cognition, as something outside himself; his only relation to this object is the function of cognition—that ideal assimilation into science that is but one of the activities of man as living, concrete subject. The same subject, in his capacity as an economic actor, not only reflects on the object before him but feels it outside himself, alienated from himself. He experiences the object not only as a problem of knowledge (or his own ideal limit) but as the limit of his power, his very being, and for this reason strives to push back this limit, to warm the cold and alien object with his subjectivity, to introduce it into his life, to assimilate it to himself one way or another. Just as the dualism and opposition of subject and object form the foundation of discursive knowledge and scientific experience, so their dualism and opposition in action and in life form the foundation of the interaction of subject and object, that is, economy. Insofar as the object in economy is experienced as the limit of the subject’s power, it expresses necessity and unfreedom for the subject; insofar as this limit is constantly pushed back and removed by the subject, it becomes the realization of his freedom. Freedom in economy has necessity, that is, its opposite, as its object. In action, in the economic process, the synthetic unity of these two principles—which, taken separately, are mutually exclusive—is realized. In similar fashion an
inert and formless mass of stone or marble becomes the material for the realization of a sculptural or architectural idea, for the embodiment of ideal forms. Thus also the light of knowledge and consciousness is ignited in the darkness of ignorance and obscurity of unconsciousness and overcomes them. Similarly, necessity constitutes the constant substratum, or foundation, of freedom, permitting freedom to triumph over it.

The question of the synthesis of freedom and necessity as the basis and essence of the economic process—both its foundation and the task it sets for itself—requires clarification. First of all, what is freedom, how are we to understand it? In order to pose this question properly we must first entirely exclude that false interpretation that looks at the whole issue only in relation to scientific determinism, to the idea of mechanical, causal regularity. This way of posing the question passes quick, but not fair, judgment on itself, for the notion of freedom is tossed overboard, virtually without discussion, as “unscientific,” and rightly so. Freedom is indeed an unscientific, extrascientific, or, if you will, suprascientific (though not antiscientific) concept and, once caught in the net of science, it tears them and slips out of them, for they are completely unsuited for such a catch. We know that science is the apprehension of nature as a mechanism, in its pure objectivity; this is its fundamental purpose. Clearly, admitting any interruption of the mechanism or limitation of its sphere of mastery will contradict this methodological premise and the science that rests on it. Therefore there is no room for freedom in science, and this is accepted by scientific dogmatists and critics alike. Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* painstakingly patched up all the crevices in the building of science (“experience”) and investigated it from top to bottom in order to convince himself that freedom could not penetrate it. Actually, even without such an investigation one need not doubt that in nature, seen as a pure object

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of knowledge and hence as something outside the subject, as a mechanism, any principle so essentially connected with the subject as freedom must be absent. Still it would be erroneous to draw the conclusion common to determinists and that in our day forms the foundation of a “scientific worldview”; in fact we ought precisely not to impart ontological, metaphysical meaning to the methodologically contingent principles of experience and scientific cognition of phenomena (see chapter 5). Freedom thus understood is but nondeterminism (or even antideterminism) and has no positive definition. Its conceptualization is exhausted by a denial of causality; in other words it is identified with absence of causality, absolute occasionalism, the reign of *sa majesté le hasard*. Arguments opposing free will try to show that every act of will is somehow motivated, whereas psychic causality is unthinkingly equated with natural mechanism,¹ which, as such, cannot be reconciled with the acknowledgment of freedom understood as absolute lack of causality. Efforts to demonstrate the absurdity of the concept of free will also follow from this general understanding of freedom; such is the famous example of Buridan’s ass dying of hunger between two haystacks because of its inability to undertake a free, that is, unmotivated, choice, to give preference to one or the other of them. Even Kant transgressed against the philosophical concept of freedom by admitting an experience so closed, phenomena so mechanical, that even all subjective, free acts could be calculated in advance by a mathematical formula of the world. He equated the feeling of freedom through human action to the consciousness of a rotating spit, were it to be endowed with such consciousness (and the gist of this comparison is its awkwardness and contradictoriness: a spit that acknowledges its own rotation as *its own* is no longer a spit). In any case, Kant deserves all the more recognition for his theory of intelligible freedom (which Schopenhauer so prized). True

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to his well-known claim that metaphysics is impossible, Kant puts this unquestionably metaphysical theory into the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

A negative understanding of freedom as nondeterminism, noncausality, or absolute occasionalism places freedom outside the world in the emptiness of nonbeing, and it is easy for defenders of determinism to deal with it given this interpretation. But freedom is a positive as well as a negative concept. Freedom is not noncausality but *self-causality*, the capacity to act of oneself (*a se*, hence the unmelodious but convenient expression *aseism*), to commence causality from oneself, to refract the chain of causality in one’s own fashion and thus to disrupt the principle of general mechanism.

Freedom is a particular form of causality: the capacity to *cause* in the exact sense of the word. For this reason the problem of freedom and necessity does not belong to the phenomenal-empirical world and can be adequately posed only outside the limits of scientific determinism. Causality has a dual nature: it can be causality through freedom or through mechanism, thus in fact becoming a union of freedom and necessity. Freedom, or the capacity for self-causality—aseism—constitutes a necessary attribute of living beings, whereas necessity is mechanism—a lifeless principle. Therefore empirical causality is but a mask that may be hiding either a living face or the congealed and in places temporarily deadened body of the world. The opposition of freedom and necessity from this perspective is the opposition of life and death, the living and the lifeless.

Causality in the living comes from within the self (which finds immediate expression in the capacity for self-motivated actions and for coordinating actions and goals), and in this sense what is alive is free. But life itself and consequently freedom presents a whole scale of gradations. The living is self-determined, but real freedom belongs only to the spirit, hence

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to living creatures that are carriers of the spirit, that is, human beings (the world of disembodied spirits remains outside our scope). The capacity for self-causality is will (thus freedom and free will are synonyms, for the quality of freedom as self-causality belongs only to the will), but will achieves its full expression only given full self-consciousness. Only the individual personality possesses fully conscious freedom. The opposition of I and non-I (as the limit of the I) first arises only for the I; freedom and necessity exist not only as a fact but enter into consciousness. The individual is crowned by freedom as the living unity of will and rational consciousness (which are bifurcated and placed in opposition in Kant’s system). As I’s, as individuals, we recognize our freedom; individuality is freedom, as is so powerfully expressed in Fichte’s system. The persuasions of determinism are powerless before this immediate, living testimony of freedom in our own consciousness. The positive expression of freedom consists in individuality, which defines the self-causality of the given individual: links of an absolute, individual nature are included in the world chain of mechanical causality; thanks to them, world causality is in places refracted in a new way. Here causa non aequat effectum, and there is no mechanical explanation for this aseism in the past of the universe; it is something absolutely new. Causality through freedom, conditioned by the individual’s self-definition, is untraceable and transcendent for mechanical causality although, in its various manifestations, it does enter into the general chain of world causality. For this reason it is impossible to understand the world only as a mechanism, as do representatives of radical determinism (Laplace, in part Kant and others); it must be understood not only as a machine but as a living being. Strands of freedom are woven into the fabric of world necessity, and they subvert its wholeness and continuousness. Therefore reality is not a mechanism (which expresses only one side of
being) but *history*, that is, something that, although interconnected, is also individual: similar in particular parts but absolute and never repeating itself. Causality through freedom makes it this way.

Actually, mechanical determinism turns out to be inadequate even from the perspective of a law of causality: a *multidirectedness* of causes is possible; in other words, a given effect can equally be produced through different combinations of causes, and therefore, taking the effect as our point of departure, we are not able to reconstruct a progressive causal series.⁴ There is no determinism in the Kantian-Laplaceian sense even in the confines of the causally conditioned world, for here too there is room for different possibilities.⁵ These fine points are already within the sphere of determinism, however; they are what we might call its degrees, and although they have enormous methodological importance they do not affect the general opposition of freedom and necessity.

In his individuality and in his sense of self, man carries the consciousness of his freedom, his individual aseism, his qualitative definition. This unity of qualitative definition and the givenness of one’s own I—through which it becomes to a certain degree an object for itself (for we all know ourselves through experience), with an immediate sense of self-identity insofar as the I is its own creation—brings us to the very depths of being, to that whirlpool through which the roots of the temporal penetrate into the supratemporal, or eternal. My I, as an individual, as the basis of my own aseism, functions as a given for my temporal, developing I as it reflects all the vicissitudes of being in the world. This extratemporal, given I defines the temporal I that is directly woven into the chain of causality. The empirical I thus apparently turns out to be secondary, dependent on the original I (Kant called it intelligible). Therefore the determinists do not stop at enrolling this I, too, in the ranks...

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of mechanical causes, *ad majorem scientiae gloriām*, under the rubric of innate character (here biological theories of heredity help out, as does the translation of this question into the language of materialistic naturalism). But this manipulation would work only if we did not have an immutable consciousness that our I is our own creation and therefore we are responsible for it. We are such because that is how we want to be. True, our substantial I, as the foundation and hence also the limitation on our empirical I, removes uncertainty and forces self-definition. Yet, all the time, we still feel that it is not someone from outside but we who limit ourselves—and thus create our own fate. This fatalism of individual freedom, the feeling of freedom as necessity (on which tragedy is founded), can be understood as our I’s testimony—indeed an act of our free self-definition: our creation as free beings, as we are and not otherwise, did not take place without our participation; creation was by the same token our self-creation. God as the perfect and absolute Individual, as Freedom itself, wished in his love to honor man with his image, that is, freedom, and therefore freedom is included in the plan of the universe as its foundation. The act of creation therefore inevitably includes man’s freedom of self-definition; here the creative act of divine omnipotence fuses with the free reception and assimilation of this act on the part of the created. Freedom as aseism is an inalienable moment in the process of creation. The unity of creation and self-creation, divine power and human aseism, is of course untraceable and inexplicable through discursive reason, which follows only causal schemas. This act that lies at the basis of our entire consciousness cannot of course simultaneously become its object. But it must be postulated by reason, for consciousness inevitably comes up against it as its own basis, and we know this from our own immediate sensation. The roots of consciousness, from which its light will be born, remain eternally outside this consciousness.
and are buried in darkness, but consciousness experiences its own connection with its foundation, which is how we can, if only obliquely, be sure of its existence. The roots of our empirical self, unfolding in time, are anchored in extratemporal being, in that creative and also self-creative act through which we are brought into being and into time. We do not enter the world as a tabula rasa in either a metaphysical or an empirical sense; no, we enter it as qualitatively defined individuals. If this self-definition is not conclusive and leaves room for temporal, empirical self-creation, the roots of being nonetheless remain in the extratemporal, transcendent sphere.

Man exists not through his own powers but through the will of God; not just the origin but the continuing existence of species is an uninterrupted creative act. “These wait all upon thee; that thou mayest give them their meat in due season. That thou givest them they gather: thou openest thine hand, they are filled with good. Thou hidest thy face, they are troubled: thou takest away their breath, they die, and return to their dust. Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created: and thou renewest the face of the earth” (Ps. 104:27–30).

Man is a creation in the sense that he realizes in himself God’s idea of him. As a qualitatively defined individual, he embodies in himself the creative idea, contains a given ideal task, exists before time as God’s conception. Our ideal images (the guardian angels we all have) exist before time in the spiritual world while we realize their likeness through our life and thus—by virtue of our freedom—come to resemble them or recede from them. These ideas about us are given and, as such, they constitute the principle of metaphysical necessity within us, as our basis and nature. We did not define ourselves but have been conceived and wished thus by God, who called us out of nonbeing. We are created like all creation, like all animals and plants. Only God is a self-sufficient creature who exists
through his own force, contains his own foundation within himself, whereas the foundation of our being in its qualitative definition lies not within us but in God. But God realizes his idea of us through the principle of freedom. In bringing qualitatively defined souls to life, in creating these souls, he gave them the chance to participate in their own creation, defining themselves in their individually endowed being through a free act. The realization of an idea through freedom allows for different possibilities or modes. As the elements of divine plenitude, the intelligible world (κόσμος νοητός), all human ideas or individualities, qualitatively defined and therefore distinct from each other, partake of their eternal self-identity in the synthetic unity of the divine Sophia. They are equal or equivalent to each other as are two sides of an equation, or as two points on a circle are of equal value although each has its own qualitative definition corresponding to its place on the circle. The act of freedom and self-creation introduces qualitative distinctions not only in its intent but in its very existence, for through it individuals receive and embody in themselves their own idea, their ideal task; they differentiate their ideal being modally, so to speak, according to the intensity of their realization of the idea that “it is brightness that distinguishes one star from another.” Therefore people are born different, for their souls—created but free creatures—differ already in the act of birth (of course we must understand this here not in the dimension of temporal succession but in that of ontological relation). The essence of this free act is inexplicable for it is noncausal, whereas explanation in the language of discursive thought means reduction to causes, to the preceding links in the chain of phenomena; here this chain is only beginning, and we are dealing with absolute self-causality of the will.8

The theory of man’s ideal preexistence in God as Sophia and of his creation on the basis of freedom is anchored in the
deepest bases of Christian philosophy. But it begins to assert itself already in the ancient world—in Plato (for whom, however, it is insufficiently distinguished from the completely unrelated theory of transmigration of souls, or metempsychosis) and with complete philosophical clarity in Plotinus. In the Christian mind it finds clear expression in the works of Origen, in St. Gregory of Nyssus and Maxim the Confessor, in Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, in J. Scotus Erigena, and in the mystical theology of Jakob Böhme and Franz Baader; contemporary philosophy owes a particular debt for developing this idea to Schelling’s profundity (the extensive quotations from his tract on freedom adduced in the notes are characteristic of his point of view), and he is joined here by Vladimir Soloviev. Curiously, all his rationalism notwithstanding, Kant, too, comes very close to this theory in his discussion of the intelligible freedom of will that Schopenhauer so highly prizes. Not having found any room for freedom in the scientific determinism of his “experience,” Kant places it in the noumenal sphere of the “thing in itself” and proposes that the empirical character is defined by a free, extratemporal, supraexperiential, mentally apprehensible act; it is a matter of “intelligible” freedom. Connected to this is Kant’s other equally profound and significant theory, namely, “radical evil” in human nature as a symptom of human freedom.

II. Freedom and Necessity

Thus the individual’s “intelligible” nature is freedom. The individual realizes the divine theme of his being on the basis of freedom. The different possibilities inherent in this freedom as they unfold in history, with its essential antinomianism and struggle of opposing trajectories, are not our concern here, for they belong to the eschatology of economy. For now it suf-
fices to establish the significance of freedom as self-causality or as a self-sufficient type of causality—namely, causality through freedom. The subject, in a world whose division into subject and object forms the basis of knowledge and of economy, is, in its capacity as carrier of freedom, concrete energy, endowed with definable attributes, whereas the general relation of the subject-object becomes defined independently in each particular case, depending on the characteristics of the given subject. Here is the source of the subject’s inevitable “subjectivism” (or according to the current expression, “psychologism”)—the smell of individuality contemporary epistemologists are trying so hard to get rid of. Each I is individual, concrete, and peculiar because it is naturally free. If individuality, as an attribute of the individual personality, and freedom are identical, we can say that the subject represents the principles of concreteness of individuality, though not of an abstract and universal I—for the I cannot be generalized or reduced to a lowest common denominator. The I can only be individual and concrete, never generic. The universality, the real unity and shared nature of different I’s, the fusion of individuals into humanity, is based on their genuine participation in a unified whole of which they are individual aspects, rather than on any imagined abstract, generic identity. They resemble each other through this common foundation and common content, rather than the principium individuationis—the principle of isolation and mutual impenetrability, the naked selfness inevitably tending toward solipsism (according to which we could apply to the I Leibniz’s description of monads as windowless). The I as an isolating principle cannot be overcome within the subject and its selfness; it is vanquished only through the object, when the subject, without relinquishing its qualitative definition, ceases to apprehend itself as a limit or separation and instead experiences itself as universality through participation in the single essence of the
divine Sophia, or ideal humanity. The evil fire of selfness dies out, subsumed by the flame of universal love.

Concrete individuality is will and energy as well as consciousness. The nature of freedom is active and present-oriented, not passive. Freedom strives towards power; it has no internal limits; the will is limitless. It is absolute thirst, it wishes everything and transcends every given boundary. This aspect of freedom is identical in the absolute as well as the relative, created being. The Creator has honored the crown of his creation, which in humanity has achieved spirituality, that is, individuality, with his image of limitless being. In their freedom people are gods, creatures potentially intended for divinization, capable of merging into the ocean of divine being—and fusing and merging are possible only for what is like and of one substance in the first place. This is why nature’s reunion with God occurs only in man and through man as a natural-supernatural being. The divine incarnation itself—that most intimate union of the Creator with the created and simultaneously the divinization of the world—which would have been impossible were it not for the presence of this divine form, the human individual, in the world; for the divine Logos could enter nature and become Jesus Christ, the Godman and God in nature, only by way of freedom. Without this path, this bridge, only the possibility of external mechanical or magical action on nature would remain; only divine power, capable of creating and re-creating the world, would remain, to the exclusion of the divine love that unfolds in self-humiliation, in the descent to created being, in the incarnation of God in man and through him in the natural world. Created nature would not have been capable of accommodating the Unaccommodatable in its manger if the same nature’s freedom had not earlier said, “Behold the handmaid of the Lord; be it unto me according to thy word” (Luke 1:38) and had not thus opened its womb to the divine incarnation.
Man is divine in the formal limitlessness of his consciousness and his freedom; he wishes to be all for everything. But his freedom as active energy, as power, is distinct from this self-apprehension with its absolute intentionality, its mysterious, hieratical potential that is at once remembrance and prophecy. Endowed with the capacity to wish infinitely much, each individual is capable of infinitely little.

The limit of freedom as power is necessity. The object as the expression of necessity is inimical and alien to the subject as the embodiment of freedom. But the very existence of this limit permits freedom to apprehend itself in its individuality; it becomes conscious and reflective only in its opposition to necessity and enters into open conflict with it.

This polarization of freedom and necessity is absent only where they do not oppose and mutually limit each other. It is absent in inanimate nature and is only vaguely detectable among living beings—"moaning, suffering creation." It also cannot exist in the Absolute. The freedom of the Absolute has not boundaries and therefore coincides with absolute necessity: God wishes only what he can, and he can everything he wishes or might wish. Wishing and becoming merge in one act; the freedom to wish already contains in itself sufficient grounds for its realization; in fact they fuse with and subsume each other to such a degree that they become completely indistinguishable and cease to exist in separation or opposition. The concept of divine freedom and omnipotence does not, apparently, admit of that purely negative interpretation given to the concept of freedom in scientific determinism—as absolute occasionalism and self-determination. Nothing can be farther from divine omnipotence than this self-determined occasionalism, according to which God can want absolutely anything the limited created mind might make up. All kinds of pathetic and crazy little ideas, the invention of our sinfulness and limitedness, can obvi-
ously not become the object of divine desire, for the very idea of ascribing relative and limited wishes to the Absolute and Unlimited Being, the effort to equate the whole and its parts, is an obvious contradiction, and the problem falls apart from its own internal contradictions before it can even be posed. Yet certain smart-alecks manage to present this impossibility as the limit on divine omnipotence, arguing that God is not omnipotent because he cannot wish evil, banality, stupidity, and all the other things their lazy heads can come up with. Divine freedom is diametrically opposed to occasionalism—which is at once determinism turned inside out and absolute necessity. God wants only one thing, corresponding to his nature, his wisdom, his goodness and his love, on which the necessity of his self-revelation in creation is constructed. Divine freedom is positive rather than negative; God can want only one thing—Good—and can be only one thing—Love. And if God is Love he cannot want anything that is not love or not quite love; he wishes the maximum, and that in the form of maximum perfection. We cannot ascribe the whims of a self-willed, despotic being to God’s omnipotence; rather, it means that as Creator of everything, God experiences no limits on his power except the ones he sets for himself through his Love, leaving room for the freedom of created beings, thus limiting himself and humiliating himself voluntarily in the name of free love. Therefore absolute free will is holy will, and the highest freedom lies in capitulation to a certain holy necessity (Schelling).

But if necessity is subsumed in freedom at the center of being, their interrelation is quite different on its peripheries. Insofar as created being affirms itself as particular, separate, peripheral, and decentralized, it experiences its freedom as limited and ideal rather than real. The inevitable conflict of freedom and necessity arises in the created consciousness and establishes the concept of history. Freedom turns out to be constrained.
and limited by necessity. The object stands in opposition to the subject in real life, not just in ideal theory. The subject lives in the object without consideration for its will or its freedom. The object is for the subject the deaf and blind force of necessity, moira, fate—the fate not of divine will but of mechanical necessity, dead and inert matter impossible to blame or complain about. And yet the subject is immersed in this object, freedom is tightly soldered to necessity—so much so that they can be distinguished only through philosophical analysis. The concrete subject both opposes necessity and absorbs it. As an empirical individual, he is actually created, up to a point, by this very object, that is, necessity; to this degree he does not belong to himself, is not his own creation (like Fichte’s I), for he has accepted and absorbed the object as necessity in himself and in his consciousness and continually repeats this acceptance and absorption. The empirical I becomes the form through which what is given the I by necessity and received from the surrounding environment becomes apprehended as one’s own, as an attribute of selfness. The individual as a living synthesis of subject and object therefore represents a completely inextricable conglomeration of freedom and necessity, of I and non-I. Both of these principles are in a state of constant flux, motion, struggle, rather than calm and equilibrium, and this interaction is the content of life itself: the I lives not only in itself and through itself but in the world and through the world. Only God contains everything in himself and nothing outside himself, which is why there is no object for him; more precisely, the object is subsumed through its absolute identity with the subject; it is eternally contained in the single cognitive act of will that establishes the world’s existence. Subjects, as centers of world consciousness in this created world, inevitably find the object, the non-I that outside the subject exists in the form of necessity, also present inside themselves.
It is easy on these grounds, in affirming the force of necessity over the subject aware of his freedom, to conclude that this freedom is fleeting or even nonexistent, to pronounce the individual wholly a product of necessity. This is exactly what all deterministic theories do: they deny freedom in the sense of aseism and regard the individual as a sort of mechanism, a reflex or sum of different causes and influences. In these theories the subject is explained by the object, whereas in reality it is, to the contrary, the object that is postulated by the subject; individuality and freedom, as well as the living sense of power,¹⁰ are immediately given us in the subject (Fichte was right on this), and the lifeless and inert object is defined only secondarily. Individuality cannot be accounted for in deterministic terms, proceeding from the absolute object, except as the dogmatic and unproveable proposition that the I’s consciousness is an epiphenomenon of material processes or an excretion of the brain (a naive and vulgar, but honest, formulation). The peculiarities of the problem of interrelation of freedom and necessity are obviated in deterministic theories by simply ignoring half of it. The problem is precisely how to understand this unity of freedom and necessity, individuality and nonindividuality. Outside this unity life is unthinkable, and only if we cross it out and regard everything as lifeless and mechanical can we defend the determinists, but in this fantastic fiction there will first of all be no room for them with their science and their cognition, with their postulates and directedness of the will.

I would suggest the following resolution. Concrete individuality, rather than being passive and reflective, is an active principle functioning in the present; it is will endowed with attributes. Therefore it refracts the entering non-I in its own particular fashion, rather than absorbing it like an empty room with windows and doors thrown open, or a blank sheet of paper receptive to any notations that might be inscribed on it. The
same non-I can be reflected and refracted differently and with absolute particularity in different I’s: this reflection differs in quality as well as quantity. We might say that if there are no identical I’s, there are also no identical non-I’s, that is, the concrete non-I is as individual as the I. The non-I becomes the field for the realization of the I’s freedom—its object or potential. It reveals the I’s aseism, or qualitative definition. This is why we know ourselves only through life experience. Freedom is the very essence, the very nature of the I (as Fichte demonstrated), and therefore cannot be taken away from or lost to the living person. The various ways in which the self seems to be defined are each inevitably its independent, self-willed self-definition.

The enemies of freedom would object that everything happens in accordance with particular motives and hence following psychological obligation or necessity; man is a product of his environment and the I is a product of the non-I. This is both correct and incorrect. Unquestionably, every empirical individual as a subject in the object is a product of the environment insofar as it reflects the object’s influence, which in turn comes from outside us and our will. However we might imagine this dependence, it remains true that the world, the entry of the object into the subject, in the end defines the subject’s content in the activity of its reason, sentiment, and will, as well as in its passive receptivity. Whatever complex of impressions or piece of the world the given subject happens to come upon ends up defining his lot in life. Of course, there is still a further question whether the individual’s predetermination and linkage to a particular environment might not also admit of metaphysical explanation—namely, whether it would be possible to presume a correspondence between the individual’s free self-definition or self-consciousness in eternity with its empirical fate in temporal life. Anyone who is capable of conceiving the world as endowed with an inner, supratemporal unity, for

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whom the interconnectedness of things is not limited to mechanical causality, must inevitably postulate these connections and correspondences in metaphysical terms. Man as an intelligible, extratemporal creature defines himself in terms of his empirical being through an act of freedom, while his spirit selects and creates his physical and historical body. And before all else the connection between fathers and children, the power of heredity, is inevitably rooted in the intelligible world and can of course not be considered a purely empirical fact explicable in terms of a mechanical succession of cause and effect. However convincing this connection might seem, however likely it might be that man as intelligible being is the cause of himself as empirical being, in fact their mutual correspondence remains a metaphysical postulate; a deeper apprehension of this connection is impossible because it brings us into the transcendent realm. Therefore it would be unfortunate for the philosophical defense of freedom against militant determinism if it were forced to rely only on this more or less problematic postulate. But freedom provides us with a much more immediate testimony that no one can strip of its potency. This is its testimony to itself in our own self-consciousness. Determinism could be true only if our I were dead rather than alive, but to permit this premise is a *contradictio in adjecto* because individuality is life. The I apprehends the world as a concrete, qualitatively defined subject rather than as a blank spot. The subject makes all its decisions as *its own*, as its self-definition, however involuntarily they may be imposed from without by the object, and indeed they reflect its qualitative definition, or aseim. No absolutely identical decisions or actions exist even if the external circumstances seem similar. Actions and decisions are first of all causally conditioned or motivated, so much is true; but this is a psychological, as opposed to a mechanical, causality, to which the subject freely contributes. Science with its theories
of mechanical determinism never penetrates into the laboratory of the will where decisions are made and created. The embryology of action, of voluntary self-definitions, remains entirely outside the purview of scientific observation, which is aware only of pure objectness; it is beyond experience. Only decisions that have already been taken enter experience, just as only ideas that have already been born and have taken on some kind of shape enter the consciousness, igniting in the darkness or arising from obscure depths. It is true that all decisions that have already been taken are, in fact, motivated, that is, are causally determined, but they were once born in the womb of freedom. This is why free will itself remains transcendent and inaccessible to scientific experiment, which acknowledges only events and facts that have already been executed. The act of unity of subject and object, their mutual identification, which is what life is about, is accomplished through the subjectively executed decision or act of will under the object’s pressure, and no rationalistic definition of the process is possible. This is a synthetic unity of freedom and necessity—neither freedom nor necessity but that living synthesis given in the process of life. No further rationalization or analysis of this fact is possible. What happens here is something completely individualized that cannot be expressed in terms exclusively of freedom or of necessity. Nonetheless the unity of subject and object, freedom and necessity, in the act of life, may take on varying intensities and forms that in fact express the entire range of life with its energy and its power.

III. The Spirit of Economy

Freedom participates in the creation or, rather, transformation of the world to the degree that it finds expression in creativity,
distinct from the dead mechanism of things. Of course it can-
not create from nothing, for it is limited and not omnipotent,
but these limitations do not reduce it to a mere variety of me-
chanical causality, either. Where there is life and freedom, there
is room for new creation, but not for any sort of automatic
causality that would flow from a definite and immutable world
mechanism, wound up like a clock. Each individual, however
weak, is something absolutely new in the world, a new element
in nature. Each person can be seen as the artist creating his
own life, drawing strength and inspiration from inside him-
self. Therefore there is no room for lifeless determinism, which
assumes a limited number of causal elements and their permu-
tations in history. As we already know, there can be no theory
of history a priori, that is, constructed on the basis of a given
number of causal elements. History is created, just like indi-
vidual life. We can say that creativity and freedom leave their
brightest imprint in our capacity for labor, for every creative
act is contingent on work and an effort of the will. Only free
creatures, that is, people, possess the capacity for conscious,
planned, creative labor. A machine only transforms power, and
an animal works only when forced and without any purpose
of its own, or else submits to instinct; only man labors con-
sciously, and human labor is an entirely incomparable, special
force of nature. Human labor seen as an interconnected whole
is human history itself. How is human history possible? What
are its a priori conditions? As we know already (from chapter 4),
we need to postulate a transcendental subject of history, a uni-
fied humanity, making a single history, synthesizing its labor
and capable of inheritance or tradition, in order to “deduce
the concept of history” (to use Schelling’s expression). Free-
dom is not fragmented, decentralized, or ungovernable, nor is
it meaninglessly wasted energy; instead, it must be drawn into

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the solid banks of necessity in order to serve the unfolding of
a single grand plan. History must “exhibit a union of freedom
and necessity, and be possible through this union alone.”

Freedom is the general foundation of the creative process,
whereas necessity defines its limits and to this degree predeter-
mines freedom and directs its development. Necessity exists
both for the individual person and for historical humanity as
a law that governs life. This predeterminism is ontological in
nature, it is the analytical unfolding through freedom of some-
thing that exists only in embryonic form yet already potentially
is. The world soul, both before and after its fall, with all its
potentials, however disorganized, is the true determining force
in history, for it extratemporally contains everything in the
world and therefore predetermines humanity’s historical fate.
Man with his hidden possibilities and historical forces is fully
transparent to God, and this is what guarantees history’s out-
come in accordance with a divine plan. Freedom extends to the
historical process itself but not to its outcome. Divine activity,
guiding man through necessity, is thus the highest determin-
ing force in history. We can only speak of the meaning and
tasks of history, construct a philosophy and eschatology of his-
tory, once we have acknowledged the dependence of history’s
course on this historical order of things; by the same token the
Apocalypse—the revelation of the future as well as of the past,
of “things which must shortly come to pass” (Apoc. 1:1)—
becomes possible.

Far from denying freedom as the basis of history, this meta-
physical determinism actually presupposes it. History leaves its
impression through the spirit, that is, freedom. The spirit of his-
tory, the spirit of the age is true reality rather than merely an
image. History is most profoundly created through the spirit,
for the peculiarities of history are defined by causality through

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freedom. The stamp of creativity and freedom marks all of its aspects. We cannot isolate any given aspect of history that would be a pure and automatic mechanism. Isolating particular aspects of history is actually impossible (except abstractly), because of the unity and connectedness of life, though one might think that man is more free in some aspects of life than in others. But freedom cannot be a matter of degrees: it is either there or it isn’t; it is either automatic mechanism or living creativity, and there is no point even asking about quantities or proportions of freedom and necessity in any particular case. Therefore economy, both in the broad and in the narrow sense of political economy, is also creativity—a synthesis of freedom and necessity. If necessity seems completely obvious here, performing as an iron law oppressing all life, then freedom, too—man’s creative relation to labor with the varying possibilities it presents—is an inalienable part of the concept of economy, even if it is circumscribed by this iron ring. The usual belief that economy is the sphere of necessity alone, the kingdom of mechanical regularity, originated primarily as a consequence of the influence of political economy, with its contingent stylization of economic reality (see chapter 8 on this). We must stress, with particular energy, the truth that even political economy is beginning to apprehend as it ripens as a science: economy seen as creativity is a psychological phenomenon as well; or, speaking even more precisely, economy is a phenomenon of spiritual life to the same degree as all other aspects of human activity and labor. The spirit of economy (for example, the “spirit of capitalism” so much written about now, particularly by such prominent economists as Sombart and Max Weber) is once again a historical reality rather than a fiction or an image. Each economic age has its spirit and is in turn the product of this spirit; each economic age has its particular type of “economic man” gener-
ated by the spirit of economy, and we can declare him a “reflex” of given economic relations only if we subscribe to that logical fetishism of which political economy becomes a victim when it regards economy—the development of the forces of production, various economic organizations, and so on—through the prism of abstract categories without regard to their historical concreteness. In this sense political economy is badly in need of an injection of true realism, which necessarily includes “causality through freedom” as well as historical psychologism, capable of recognizing the spiritual atmosphere of a given age. The understanding of economy as a phenomenon of spiritual life opens our eyes to the psychological of economic ages and to the significance of shifting economic worldviews. It leads us to a problem of extraordinary importance both in practical and in scientific terms—namely, the significance of the individual in the economic process. The concept of economy as a creative process with room for freedom also leads us to questions of the ethics and eschatology of economy and in fact makes these questions possible; we have yet to investigate them later in this book.

IV. Freedom as Power, Necessity as Impotence

Freedom and necessity are synthesized through creativity but, insofar as they continue to be apprehended as polar opposites, they are juxtaposed as linked and yet mutually repellent antinomies. Life is an antinomy, but thought does not deal well with antinomies; it stumbles up against them and experiences them as a limit to be remarked on but not overcome. Life cannot be fully rationalized, and it is the antinomies of reason that define the limit of human rationalism. Transcende te ipsum, transcend yourself, or humbly accept the limitations and weak-
nesses of reason when confronted with the mystery of life—this is what the conscious antinomy of reason says to discursive self-consciousness. Rational antinomy and logical impossibility do not always add up to impossibility in real life, and antinomies that are logically impenetrable to discursive reasoning might have primary practical significance as they resolve themselves through motion, through “evil infinity,” through striving toward an obviously unattainable “ideal.” Kant already pointed to this twist in the idea of antinomies in trying to remove theoretical doubt’s poison tooth; the antinomy of freedom and necessity that interests us, and that everyone finds in his immediate consciousness and experiences as the opposition of the power of his infinite wishes and impotence of his capacities, is among the antinomies on Kant’s list. Freedom and necessity reflect each other by virtue of their antinomian connection and characterize man’s discursive existence in time. We can be higher or lower than this opposition but it is removed only when discursiveness ends and time comes to an end. For the Divinity, in whom freedom coincides with necessity and everything is subsumed in a single act of the will, there is strictly speaking neither freedom nor necessity in our human sense. The opposite pole lies outside the limits of life in pure corpleness, in indivisible objectness. The consciousness of freedom flares up in the soul only through the sense of its limitedness, just as a roundabout path through the non-I is required in Fichte’s system in order for the I to achieve full consciousness of its individuality. Freedom strives to overcome any boundary drawn by necessity, for absolute and limitless striving defines its very nature—that flame of life that ignites the ancients’ “wheel of being” (τροχὸς τῆς γενέσεως). This limit is overcome, really rather than ideally, in fact rather than desire, by the penetration of the subject into the object through labor in the economic

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process. In this sense necessity forms the indefinitely expand-
ing foundation of freedom. When we operate in the sphere of
economy we can think of natural “poverty,” the dependence on
the blind and imimical forces of nature, in terms of the object,
whereas the accumulation of wealth and the development of
the forces of production are associated with the subject. Wealth
is power, a plus on the side of the subject, whereas poverty is
impotence, a plus on the side of the object. Speaking in eco-

nomic terms the object is the concrete non-I for the subject,
violently forced on it rather than being freely posited by an act
of the I—a limitation rather than a self-limitation. The sub-
ject, or proprietor, strives to make the world—the object of the
economic process—transparent for the subject as it relinquishes
itself to his will and becomes an organism from a mechanism,
thus bringing about an ideal of equilibrium and neutralization
of freedom and necessity: by extending my hand, I am execut-
ing a mechanically contingent action, but I do not conceive of
it in this way, for my consciousness sees this movement as free
and yet real and objective. In this sense our body is of enor-
mous theoretical significance, for it objectively reconciles the
antinomy of freedom and necessity, if only in a limited sphere.
Our body is for us a subjectivized object or objectified subjec-
tivity (though suspended in a fragile equilibrium that can easily
be damaged by illness, death, or the relative independence of
the body from the spirit).

Man strives to achieve economic freedom, power over a
nature that is alienated from him, economic power, or “wealth.”
Sometimes he seeks to cast a spell on this nature through
magic, to subjugate it to sorcery; sometimes he strives to con-
quered it through science. However different ancient magic and
the science that has replaced it may seem in their methods
and general premises, they are identical in this task. In both
cases man strives to achieve power over nature, and whatever
magic with its occult methods of penetrating into nature’s “elementals” gave him is the same thing he receives from precise science though it applies quantification and measurement. Magic and science are one in this goal. The ancient magi were the scientists of their time, contemporary scientists the magicians of science. Economic freedom that overcomes the object as a mechanism alien to life is power rooted in knowledge. Adam could only name the animals because he already knew the names intuitively and carried within him a cryptogram of all creation. Knowledge is self-cognition and the self-consciousness of the world in man. Here German idealism’s famous formula, so unfortunately taken up by Marxism, applies: freedom is the acknowledgment of necessity. Freedom and necessity and their polar opposition disappear only where power coincides with will, which is possible only with the increase of economic power. This economic freedom or power does not affect the content of desire itself. Man can wish different things: in his desires he can be higher or lower than himself, can serve God or Satan, Christ or Antichrist, and in this he realizes his spiritual freedom. But as an incarnated spirit and hence inextricably connected to the world and capable of action in it, he also requires economic freedom or power and is capable of possessing it. At the limit, man can wish and be capable of everything: he can be God’s likeness and can participate in the re-creation of Eden, or he can corrupt the earth, having become only flesh like humanity on the eve of the Flood, or he can become the devil’s tool in his fleshly and worldly separation from God. Power is only a means and a tool for freedom. But no one and nothing can diminish or augment this freedom: it is always characteristic of man as the image of God in him.

“O man, you have been created as neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor immortal! For you must, in accordance with your will and to your honor, be a free artist and

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architect and create yourself from your own material. You are free to descend to the lowest rung of animality. But you can also rise to the highest spheres of the divine. You can be what you will!" With these words the inspired Renaissance thinker Pico della Mirandola sent the new man on his way in his speech “On the Dignity of Man.”
The Limits of Social Determinism

I. The Style of Social Science

The currently popular doctrine of social determinism, which conceives human life as a mechanism of cause and effect and views history as subject to immutable laws, conflicts with our understanding of life as a ceaselessly interactive synthesis of freedom and necessity—as creativity or as history. A deterministic view of history likens its movement to the wound-up mechanism of a clock and therefore considers itself capable (in principle if not in fact) of scientifically predicting the future, of “prognosis” based on a calculation of causes and effects; sociology then becomes a sort of inferior or incomplete astronomy or, more generally, “mathematical natural science.”

This type of sociologism—a creation of nineteenth-century scientific thought—finds its most radical expression in two immensely influential currents of social philosophy—Comteanism and Marxism, and also radical Quételetism in the field of statistics. The problem of freedom and necessity, creativity and mechanism, has been very sharply posed in contemporary social science, and we must figure out one or another way to deal with it. I would resolve this question in favor of freedom and creativity, thus taking up a position against sociological determinism on the basis of the above discussion of the nature of science, but we also need to address the application of this general approach to social science in particular.

Like every science, social science is rooted in practical need, in the necessity to direct one’s actions properly. If there are
any spheres of scientific knowledge whose pragmatic roots are completely obvious, then the social sciences and their subgroup, the economic sciences, are unquestionably among them. The need for social action generated by nineteenth-century socio-economic development has led us inevitably to the burgeoning of the social sciences that we observe today. The instrumental, directive, technical nature of these sciences is so obvious that many have come to doubt that a branch of science in which practical interests and questions of social behavior so clearly overshadow and swallow up theoretical issues can be considered science at all. In addition the very soil of scientific investigation is so fluid here that it tolerates only temporary constructions, easily erected and equally easily destroyed; even now social science is forced into a defensive pose as it maintains its rights to existence as a science (which may be the source of those hasty efforts to put sociology on a scientific foundation and thus calm one’s own and others’ concerns about its scientific status).

Whatever the contemporary state of social science, however—perhaps merely more honest about its pragmatism than other sciences—it is not distinguished from them in any way; it is the youngest daughter of a common mother and has inherited both her strong and her weak characteristics. Apart from its practical usefulness, social science must, in order to legitimize its existence against the skeptics, demonstrate its own clearly defined topic of investigation and acquire its own unique methods. Does social science have such a clear topic or, better, does it know how to find and establish it, and does it have the appropriate methods at its disposal? I believe that answer is positive: yes, social science has its topic of investigation—this is social life in its diversity and self-determination. In many cases the birth of a new science is immediately connected with the discovery of an object inaccessible to quotidian observation and requiring either special conditions (for example, a laboratory
experiment) or special instruments that refine and sharpen our senses—such as the microscope, telescope, or measuring instruments. A similar discovery of an object for social science—the social environment or social body—occurred when the existence of a special superindividual or supraindividual environment, refracting rays in its particular way and having its own particular characteristics and laws, was established. We have still not fully gotten over the amazement and even shock that gripped Quételet (and earlier Süßmilch) on his discovery of the statistical regularities of social life, which since then have been dedicatedly studied in their various manifestations. Political economy came upon a similar supraindividual environment—the elemental force of capitalism, inclining individuals’ lives according to its own rules—even earlier. Social telescopes, microscopes, and measuring instruments have already been directed on the social body throughout a century, and a multiplicity of social laboratories in universities, scientific institutes, and statistical think tanks have been working on its investigation. It would be a waste of effort these days to prove that the social body exists and has a definite construction and texture, and if this was not noticed earlier it was only for the same reason that the microscopic world was unknown before the invention of the microscope. There is a unity of human actions that is larger than their individuality or the mechanical summation of their parts. There is something like a social organism (however ill-used this analogy may be, it is still of some value), and, though this social body cannot be apprehended by our sensory organs and hides from them as if in a fourth dimension, it can be located by scientific instruments; the elusiveness of this social body is by no means an argument against its existence. Science has become accustomed to dealing with the unseen and intangible and yet fully empirical world. Thus the social organism too has a fully empirical, scientifically accessible essence,
as opposed to some kind of imagined, metaempirical, or metaphysical unity of humanity. Its study is the subject of social science and its various branches.

Social science is not interested in human life in its immediate and concrete form as it emerges from the particular voluntary and creative actions of particular individuals; its attention turns, instead, to whatever characterizes a group of individuals as a whole. Everything individual is extinguished and dies before it reaches the threshold of social science, and the echoes of life itself don’t even reach there, for the air has been sucked out and the space sealed. The individual exists merely as a sociological atom or cell, rather than as a creator of life or as a microcosm. For example, for a statistician he is merely a unit endowed with features expressing the whole of which he is a part, and moreover the potential subject of, in turn, criminality, marriage rates, death rates, birth rates, and so on; further, for an economist he is either an “economic man” or a member of a given class, for a “sociologist” he is a member of a given social group.

In other words he is treated mercilessly and without respect in social science. It sees him only as a cell of the social body just as a mathematician sees him only as a geometrical body, a mathematical quantity. Every science stylizes reality in its own way, and all scientific concepts are products of such intentional and conscious stylization; in fact the model for all such scientism is the mathematical stylization of reality, which transforms it into a world of geometric bodies and mathematical quantities. A science that constructs itself critically and is conscious of its own nature must necessarily be aware of this style or (to use Kant’s expression) the “constitutive” features of its subject. It asks definitively and receives an equally definitive answer. Just as mathematical formulae “give back only what has been put in,” so sciences answer only their own questions; they have power only within their particular sphere of competence, and

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the insufficient demarcation of spheres of competence, accompanied by the transgression of their boundaries, is a constant source of irritation. The multiplicity of sciences is dependent on a precise and clear definition of the specific competence of each science, in fact is contingent on its conscious one-sidedness. If, however, the conclusions of specialized sciences are applied outside their intended sphere, if they are accepted as absolute truths about things and about life, they generate a whole series of the pseudoscientific nightmares that hover above our times like a thick cloud. One of these nightmares, which Carlyle heatedly but illogically tried to sow in his literary efforts, is social determinism as a particular case of mechanical fatalism.f There is a tendency to see social science’s particular triumph in the experimental proof of the unfreedom of human will, of the mechanical determination that likens man to all other things in the external world. The notion of man as a mechanical automaton, activated by social and other laws (a contemporary rethinking of Condillac’s statue or LaMettrie’s *l’homme machine*) apparently finds support from social science. The data of Quételet’s moral statistics were interpreted in this fashion in Buckle’s famous history of civilization. Marxism takes up approximately the same position, with its fatalism on the basis of class psychology. The most believable of such conclusions are of course the data provided by statistics, which gives us a yearly “budget” of criminality, suicides, marriages, even absentmindedness (the number of letters mailed without an address), rather than the dubious—sometimes likely and sometimes fantastic—claims of sociology or of political economy. The “law of large numbers” plays the role of magic wand here because it looks mathematically sound and is moreover inaccessible to nonmathematicians. Fortunately we have a scientific work that, in mathematically competent fashion, clears up the misunderstanding that so frequently accompanies the “law
of large numbers” and that leads people to think, falsely, that statistical regularity has anything at all to do with the problem of individuality and freedom or unfreedom of the will. I have in mind A. A. Chuprov’s insightful study Ocherki po teorii statistiki [Essays on the theory of statistics] (1909), to which I would refer the interested reader. By analyzing various theories of probability and logically investigating the problems posed by social science, Chuprov determines that statistics deals with wholes as a special, independent phenomenon, whereas “neither probability nor the law of large numbers address the particular case” (203), and therefore “statistical correctness says nothing about the mechanisms of will” (270). “The most limitless freedom is perfectly reconcilable with the factual pattern of quantities in moral statistics” (273). Statistical regularity, expressed by average repetition, can follow from radically different individual events. “If we mix the blackest villains with the purest angelic souls in a single mass for the purposes of statistical investigation, we will arrive at the identical statistical picture of patterns of criminality as if all the subjects were normal, gray people” (278). “Objective probability, which is what statistics and the law of large numbers deal with, is by its very essence unrelated to any particular single case. It describes the connection between ‘general’ causes and their various consequences” (339). Leaving aside the particulars of Chuprov’s statistical model for studying wholes—a method that obviously has a great future not just in social sciences but in other branches of knowledge—I emphasize here the essential conclusion of his study: the claims of statistics relate to an entirely different plane from the one in which we encounter the concrete and individual.

Does that average type used by statistics, expressing the regularities of the whole, actually exist in nature? Is there a subject possessing average vice, average marriageability, an average birth rate, average absentmindedness? Or, perhaps, might this
average be the expression of a law of nature operating with the inevitability of a physical or an imposed juridical law? Apparently not. In my concrete being, I can become a part of any statistical average; I can appear as a unit for “categorical calculation” in any category whatsoever and still remain myself without drawing any closer to the various average types. My individuality and this statistical fiction, that it is now so fashionable to portray through various drawings and diagrams, exist on different levels and do not intersect. The statistical average reflects the patterns of my individual behavior as little as my weight or height express my character. Does this mean that statistics is just a “mind game” or mental triviality? Not at all. Statistical observations retain their full significance as a response to a given, clearly defined question. Average death rates therefore have serious and completely practical application when we are dealing with life insurance just as average fire rates apply to fire insurance or average criminality for prison improvement and the politics of criminal law. In general averages play an enormous role in practical life, and “regular patterns of statistical calculations, their tendency to fluctuate from year to year only within particular boundaries, is an empirically determined fact... this is one of the fundamental though little noticed bases of contemporary culture” (Chuprov, 249). This regularity, which can be explained by the relative stability of the general conditions of life, is not at all mysterious and is the result of causes that change little or not at all. “The regularity of statistical quantities is the result of the confluence of a variety of circumstances rather than a law determining the development of events.” But statistical averages that characterize the general circumstances of life must not be applied to individual cases. Their significance is just for orientation and is relevant only in circumscribed boundaries and for a particular practical goal; therefore it would be a colossal scientific and philosophical...
misunderstanding, generated by “the pathetic idea of connecting statistical regularity to the problem of determinism” (Chuprov, xxxiii), to draw any metaphysical conclusions regarding the question of free will.

So-called sociological generalizations, which seek to compress logically the greatest possible quantity of individual facts into wholes and then to formulate relatively simple formulas or “laws,” are logically similar to the method of statistical averages. Although the scientific and practical value of the “laws” thus far advanced by sociology is more likely to make us question the very existence of this science, nonetheless these “laws” seen from a formally logical perspective (Comte’s “law of three states,” Spencer’s evolution, Marx’s development of capitalism) represent a type of abstraction, applicable only to wholes and useful only for particular goals and within particular limits, that reminds us of statistical averages. They can express certain constants of individual facts, but by no means can they determine the facts themselves. The basic concepts of sociology share this supraindividual nature by virtue of their logical structure. Let us take as an example the concept of class so beloved by Marxist sociology. What is class? Is it created by the simple summation of individual psychologies, with each individual expression the essence of his class in its primary characteristics? We could hardly defend such a definition of class, in which the part is equated to the whole, and the individual to the collective, because this would essentially mean no more and no less than to affirm belief in the reality in the average statistical subject and equate it with the concrete individual without further discussion. Apparently the only possible understanding of class is to conceive it as an abstraction and also a sort of average expressing the regularities of a given collectivity. Class is defined by class interest, that is, by the external productive and behavioral stance that follows from it. Consequently there is
no such thing as class psychology as individual, and if Marxism constantly mixes or even identifies the two, although the sociological and psychological, ethical and even metaphysical points of view become conflated, this is the fruit of Marxism’s general philosophical muddiness and incompleteness (compare chapter 9). The concept of class is a schema of social relations; actually it is a schema that is useful in its own sphere and for a particular purpose but loses all sense and becomes a caricature of itself outside its boundaries. The frequently repeated assertion that no class in history has collectively renounced its “interests,” whereas only individuals can become “declassed” (although a single case of subversion of natural law is in principle sufficient to disprove it), is a characteristic example of the misunderstanding of the concept of class. Others in response wish to find a case in which a class would behave against its own class interests. But neither the proponents nor the opponents of this view pay sufficient attention to the true meaning of the concepts of class and class interest. Is there such an interest as an a priori objective norm from which one might depart or not? What do this affirmation and this denial mean? For class, with all its attributes—class interest, class behavior—exists only in the sense of an average pattern extrapolated from the behavior of individuals viewed as a social “collectivity.” The concept is a posteriori and empirical rather than a priori or normative; it represents the logical schema of a particular scientific style characterized by the compression of a multiplicity of phenomena into a single unity, a “collectivity,” and expresses a certain likely expectation (ceteris paribus, naturally) of one particular behavior as opposed to another. It is fully analogous to standard statistical forecasting, though with of course much less precision. Therefore that predetermined class behavior we are discussing simply does not exist; “class interest” in this sense is a logical fetish and a fiction, the assertion we have
been looking at is simply empty. The only thing that is true is that the behavior of individuals may be examined both individually and socially (in terms of class, profession, nation, state, humanity). But to sell these a posteriori schemas, these empirical generalizations, as a theoretically established law operating with “natural,” inevitable necessity would be logically inconsistent.—How often man becomes the slave of fetishes of his own creation!

Social science, particularly in its specialized branches such as political economy, broadly applies another method of compressing phenomena and stylizing reality alongside the statistical and sociological stylization that compresses disparate phenomena into collectivities—namely, conscious abstraction and isolation, the intentional simplification and hence methodological perversion of which science, in general, is not afraid. Every science simplifies reality, replacing concreteness with its inaccessible complexity and vagueness with schematic concepts. Yet this schematism has degrees and can lead to obvious fictions (as in law, for example), when the degree of abstraction is very high. In simplifying reality, we make it accessible to logical apprehension by means of concepts (Rickert). For example, abstract (or “theoretical”) political economy applies everywhere the method of deduction from certain simple affirmations that serve as axioms but actually represent methodological fictions or schemas. A methodical logical construction (which itself allows for error) permits clarification of the significance of a particular “factor” submitted to abstract investigation. Only this isolating method permits the establishment of the peculiar “laws” known to political economy (compare chapter 8). We cannot object in principle to the method of abstraction and isolation as such. Let political economy invent nonexistent spineless people (as Ruskin objects); this is acceptable so long as its practitioners are aware that this is what they are doing.
and do not insist on passing judgment on spines in particular. So be it: the uglier the better: for mathematics above all else distorts reality, imagining lines and figures that exist nowhere in pure form, transforming the world into geometric bodies, and yet this logical self-determination is what gives it its force within the boundaries of mathematical judgment wherever it penetrates. There is no reason for the political economist or sociologist not to follow the example of the mathematician, particularly because it is typical of science generally. Only one thing is necessary: to remember the critical mass of such conclusions and not to transcend their competence. For example, even the fiction of an “economic man,” constructed by political economy, has some value as an orientational device in life, but if we use it as a prism for life and history it will yield an ugly and simply inaccurate image. Then matters will look as if science initially becomes abstracted contingently and methodologically from the existence of a spine in human beings but ends by denying it entirely. We might say that drawing the line for abstraction is a matter of scientific or scientific-aesthetic tact.

II. SOCIOLIGSM AND HISTORICISM

Thus the social sciences operate, characteristically, using methods of abstraction and logical isolation, conscious simplification and stylization of social reality. All social sciences are specialized: there are no nonspecialized sciences among them, and this applies equally to that general rather than specialized science, “sociology,” which is more fantasy than reality, or else semiscientific imitations and surrogates masquerading as science. Each specialized science examines social life in its own fashion, from a particular angle, charting its particular curve, perhaps intersecting but never coinciding with another, on the globe of knowledge. Like science in general, the social sciences
are many and diverse, as are therefore the laws and patterns they determine. This means, however, that no one of them, in expressing some particular aspect of social life, penetrates into its ultimate depths or fully interprets social reality. In concentrating on one aspect, each social science leaves aside the rest as irrelevant; yet from the perspective of life as a whole this distinction does not exist, and what is irrelevant in one respect may be entirely relevant in another. The living whole of social life does not willingly submit to the scalpel of scientific analysis, just as living nature slips away from science; hence social science’s every claim fully to penetrate social life in its utmost depths, to determine its currents and its “creative evolution” scientifically, must be rejected as illegitimate. The directives regarding particular aspects of life that are the sphere of social science and that, within this sphere, appear as predictions, are quite approximate, though their practical significance can sometimes be enormous.\(^8\)

By the way, “scientific” socialism’s claims to predetermine social life and even human history in general, to find a “law of social development,” must be rejected for the same reason, as entirely uncritical self-aggrandizement: \(\textit{ne sutor ultra crepidam.}\) But more on this later.

The possibility of the illusion that social science can predetermine social life rests on a silent premise that establishes the distinction between history and sociology, namely, the premise of \textit{ceteris paribus}: these laws and patterns remain in force only so long as nothing new, which would undermine the previously determined law, materializes in the given complex of phenomena and causes. \textit{Types} and \textit{laws}, whether static or dynamic—the recognized constants in space and time—are dependent on the premise that social science possesses a basic inventory of active social forces, excluding the “irrelevant,” and that reality is uniform and repeats itself within certain limits,
and is therefore subject to laws. The notion of a “social physics” or of a “natural-scientific” method in the social sciences stems from this methodological premise; forgetting this, sociology lapses into illegitimate claims. The regularities of social science are methodologically created by sociological reason rather than “discovered” in science or in social reality; they form the foundations of sociological cognition. Kant’s statement with respect to science in general, that our reason is the legislator of nature and endows nature with subsequently perceived regularities, is of particular relevance to social science, which through its a priori throws a net of mechanism, immutability, and uniformity over social life, so that only what is caught in the net can be apprehended in the cognitive process. But we can’t mistake the net itself for the catch, triumphantly displaying it as a scientific discovery or scientific conquest, whereas it is actually only a tool or method rather than an outcome or result. Therefore social determinism is not a conclusion of social science but a methodological premise on which its very existence is contingent.

It is natural that freedom and creativity remain outside social science’s sphere of vision and that its exponents, hypnotized by their own methodology, frequently and completely reject them. Human freedom as creativity brings something entirely new and individual to social life, undermining the uniformity and the typicality of social life postulated by sociology. In reality both the uniformity and the typicality are but a fiction with no relation to concrete reality, so that social science is in this sense based on fiction, although the same is true of other sciences that adhere to their own methodological contingencies. Social reality is that living creation of history that sociology entirely sweeps aside, rather than the mechanism sociology postulates. Sociology and history repel each other logically, for there is no history for sociology and no sociology for history. Yet at the same time history studies that same social life as sociology,
though already past or passing. Historical science, turning entirely to a completed past—a finished product—knows no freedom and explains everything according to the law of causality, seeing everything in the light of determinism. Nonetheless this interpretation, insofar as it deals with a single, discrete, and nonrepetitive past, still differs from a sociological understanding of history, which would see primarily what is uniform and typical in the past, rather than the individual and historical, and therefore the sociological study of history and so-called historical pragmatism, which establishes concrete causal links among individual events, are profoundly different methodologically.

The concrete creation of life in which living causality, that is, causality through freedom, operates is for this reason inaccessible to the sociological method and slips out of its net. Herein lies sociology’s impenetrable limit. Therefore the idea of “historical law” or historical prediction is the fruit of a profound misunderstanding; it mixes incompatible concepts. For practical purposes, in order to orient oneself in a particular task, it might be admissible or useful to equate history with a social mechanism: just as one may without any great loss equate the earth’s surface at short distances with a horizontal plane, so can individual departures be dismissed as irrelevant; but it is equally obvious that although this decision might be acceptable for today’s prediction of tomorrow, it will not work for the next day after that. Sociological orientation works only within the boundaries of a given setup and only while it remains “essentially” unchanged.

Living causality, or causality through freedom, is not a force that merely deflects events from their linear—average or median—path and can therefore be relegated to the ranks of “accidental causes” like an “illegitimate comet amongst calculated stars,” as Quételet still thought. The opposition of freedom and necessity eludes the opposition of necessary causes (those
that correspond to a given pattern) and accidental causes (that
to do not correspond to it). First of all, “accidental causes”
is a self-contradictory expression and has none but a contin-
gent meaning: there are no accidental causes, for they are all
equally necessary. Second, not only “free will” but a whole
series of other, mechanical and entirely unfree, causes would
sift through its excessively large sieve and have to be counted
among these accidental causes in this contingent sense. The
opposition of freedom and necessity addresses the very means
of causality—in one case mechanical, through necessity, and in
the other creative, through freedom—and not just a classifica-
tion of different categories of causes according to their relation
to a given pattern. As has already been clarified above, human
freedom has little in common with absolute occasionalism or
nondeterminism: it is determined by the particular framework
(or terminal points) within which it operates, although never
mechanically, passively, in machine-like fashion, and therefore
it is always accompanied by an individual or creative coefficient,
large or small, but never entirely absent. We find the reflec-
tion of human will and activity in the products of free will and
creativity, in the human actions studied by social science, be-
cause they ripen and develop in particular circumstances rather
than in an airless space. But we could never say that only “acci-
dental” causes or individual departures from the norm are free
whereas the others are subject to necessity: as actions they are
all equally free, and as products they are all equally determined.

But if social science is constructed on a fiction, namely, the
obviously incorrect proposition that the individual is nonindi-
going and the presumption of the typicality and regularity of
what in its very essence denies the typical and the regular, then
its very existence becomes problematic. Indeed, how is social
science possible if its basic premises are obviously hypothetical?
if its constructions are so clearly pragmatic and its objects and

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patterns so diverse? All we can say is that social science has no worse claims to legitimacy than other sciences. Its raison d’être is practical utility. Social science as a science of collectivities, of society as a whole or of a supraindividual organism, arose in an age when applications that took collectivities—social, economic, and other—as their object were particularly widespread and provoked the emergence of branches of science dealing with such collectivities. Of course, practical need could not alone have created a whole science if there had been no basis in the nature of science itself and its relation to being. The roots of science lie in the sophic nature of creation, in that the objective or transsubjective interconnection of things is logical and accessible to cognition and becomes known through the law of causality. Discursive knowledge as it passes from one object to another is always contingent on its particular tasks; although it makes possible the cognition of interconnections among things, and this interconnection constitutes the objective basis of scientific cognition, it is not absolute and multiple by virtue of its own nature; it can only guarantee that essences are truly apprehended through science, if only in prismatic refraction (“as in a fortune-teller’s mirror”), and that science partakes of truthfulness if not of Truth. The problem in social science, as in any specialized science, is merely how to achieve—taking disparate, particular points of departure and operating in conditions of methodological contingency—if not Truth, then its imperfect reflection, truthfulness. How can science’s pride and strength, methodologism, not function at the same time as a full and conclusive obstacle to cognition of essences? Another way to pose this question would be: How can science’s obviously fictional methodological premises not get in the way of proof through practice, its technical capacities and usefulness in the real world? In application to social science the question is: How is politics possible—that applied social mechanics based on social
science, or theoretical social mechanics? As in other cases, practice bears witness in favor of this applicability and affirms it. Of course the guidelines provided by social science are by nature different from those of physical science: they are vaguer and more approximate, leaving room for art and intuition. But this does not change the general problem. The ontological roots of social science as of any science lie in the universal connectedness of being, tangible in different loci and different directions. Everything is in everything else and connected with everything else: this general ontological foundation of science is true of social science as well.

III. The Problem of Social Politics

All science gives expression to a reflective moment in human action, and social science as well is a moment in social action: it represents a tool of social technology or, what is the same, social politics. We already know that science is technological and technology is scientific, that is, action presumes reflection and reflection is a part of action. Social politics is the nerve of social science and possesses the keys to all its buildings. Of course social science cannot impart a greater degree of scientific validity to social politics than it already has, but it does lend full support to that.

The potential scientific validity of social politics is in no way undermined by the part that subjectivism, here as in every sphere of activity defined by pragmatism, plays in it. We saw above that every activity, including social, represents, as creativity, a synthesis of freedom and necessity. In this case freedom is expressed precisely by subjectivism—by the voluntary intentionality of social activity, by the moment of evaluation, whereas necessity is expressed in scientific dependence on means. There is not any more determinism—though many
imagine it—in social politics than in any other living activity; therefore if by scientific validity we mean complete determination, then we must acknowledge that there is no such thing as scientific social politics just as there is no scientific activity in general, for science is inactivity and frozen reflection—the opposite of activity. On the contrary, if we define scientific validity as the implementation of experimental data in designing a plan of action, then social politics can indeed be scientific—and often is in reality.11

What is social politics’ sphere of action, what is the art that uses it as its technology? As we see from the preceding exposition, social politics has its particular sphere and its particular object: action on collectivities, on the social body. The sphere of this activity is constantly expanding: the increasing socialization of life and the consciousness of this socialization, the socialism of life and sociologism of consciousness in the political, socioeconomic, and cultural spheres continually expand and affirm the competence of social politics.

The result is a constantly increasing mechanization of life, the prevalence of the abstract and diminution of the concrete in human relations. Social politics replaces love, which is possible only in relation to an individual and not to a collectivity—be it party, class, or humanity—with loyalty to ideas (no wonder the opposition of love for those close to us, living and concrete, and “sociological” love for the distant has made an appearance in our age).12 The warmth of human relations is edged out by socially utilitarian rationalism, immediacy of feeling replaced by the infamous adherence to “principle,” so that the successes of socialism and the growth of social solidarity are by no means accompanied by an increase in love or even sympathy and a decrease in enmity among people. Rather, the contrary: socialism can be a matter of simple calculation and profit, “interest” rather than love, and socialism by itself says nothing about

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more love among people. Social politics is a mechanism that can be started up by different impulses: this is why it is possible for Vladimir Soloviev’s Antichrist—the ultimate incarnation of human evil and self-love—to be the apogee of socialism, for socialism does not depend on love, although there is also no reason why it should not be compatible with socialism. A socialism of love is of course also possible (how else could we define what people such as Morrison, Charles Kingsley, and other English “Christian socialists” were doing in the 1850s?), but, generally speaking, social politics as the sphere of scientific rationalism and the sociological mechanization of human relations is far indeed from immediate feeling (which makes it unsurprising that such coryphaeai of socialist politics as Lassalle and especially Marx are distinguished by their dryness and even harshness of character, making them look least of all like “philanthropists” or friends of humanity). Politics’ domination in human life is inevitably accompanied by a loss of immediacy, a rationalization and mechanization of life.

It does not follow from the possibility of a scientifically valid social politics that a single political system, the only really scientific one, will emerge from a given set of scientific premises. To the contrary, different directions in social politics, equally founded in science, can be the result of identical scientific givens; in other words, the given scientific instrument can be put to a variety of uses. Only an incorrect understanding of the nature of science and of the boundaries of social determinism generates the widespread belief that only one scientific social politics is possible. Radical determinism forms the foundation of so-called scientific socialism, too. Above we touched on this theory in connection with the limits of social prediction, but this misunderstanding has taken such deep root in so many circles that it requires closer examination. In what sense is socialism a “science,” can it consider itself scientific, and in

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what sense is this conjunction of words an oxymoron—a round square, fried ice—or does it resemble such concepts as scientific painting, scientific music, scientific bravery?

The possible degree of “scientific” validity for socialism and socialist politics, speaking in abstract and conceptual terms, is identical—no more and no less—than for any other social politics, in the sense that it can take scientific data into consideration and use them in its plans (or, of course, act contrary to them). Socialist politics remains, like any other, an art (téχνη), “technical”; but like anything technical, it can be grounded in science: we already know that science gives technology its foundation while technology, in turn, “guarantees” science. Social politics as a technical tool is, by virtue of its active nature, given direction by the will: it sets the ideals of politics, whereas science is merely consulted regarding means and not ends. Politics acquires a socialist hue not because science demands this but because particular persons or social groups want socialism and, rightly or wrongly, see in it a panacea for all socioeconomic ills, want it prior to and beyond any science because it is desirable and not because it is scientific. The illusion of “scientific socialism” by which Marx and Engels blinded themselves and their docile followers consists precisely in the belief that science can serve not only as a support for socialist politics, providing some backup for socialist hopes, but as the very foundation of the will to socialism itself. Even if we accept that the inevitability of a given development is scientifically foreseeable (which is of course in itself completely impossible), this still does not necessarily generate the will to this development. Unquestionably, will and faith, with a peculiar religious coloring, lie at the foundation of socialism, and this of course applies to Marx and Engels, too.

When people say that science is favorably disposed to socialism or even forecasts its advent, this can mean two things.
First it can mean that certain aspects of contemporary economic development, certain of its “tendencies,” would lead to socialism if extrapolated mentally: the fact of a certain natural and inevitable although significantly exaggerated concentration of capitalist industry (though not agriculture!) can serve as the scientific point of departure for socialist politics. The social politician can make use of it for particular purposes, analogously to the way in which the practice of fire insurance uses the data of fire statistics, that is, as a means of scientific orientation. This practical socialism can be only partial (Stücksozialismus); for it everything “is in the movement, not in the final goal” (Bernstein). Second, the theory of scientific socialism can be associated with the belief that the advent of an earthly paradise, the ideal state of life for both individuals and society, bringing with it the resolution of all life questions and signifying the “leap from necessity into freedom” (from Vorgeschichte into Geschichte), has a scientific foundation. In this sense socialism has of course as much in common with science as do Islamic images of paradise.

But even much more modest predictions can be ascribed to social science only with extreme caution: the “developmental tendencies” favorable to socialism that can be established by science have very little in common with the “natural-scientific laws” for which Marx mistakes them. These are only “empirical laws,” scientific generalizations that merely express the equilibrium of a given state of affairs without making any claims to its permanence or indeed that of the tendencies themselves. They have a completely different logical makeup than, for example, the laws of mechanics or of mathematical natural science; they capture the general regularities of a given collectivity only with respect to consequences rather than generative causes, which limits their meaningfulness.

Within the parameters sketched above, however, social sci-
ence not only can but must strive to be scientific. It must beware of arbitrary fantasizing, quixotism, or “utopianism” as much as of the pedantry of imagined scientism; it must soberly listen to life’s voice, and science can help with this. True science is here the synonym of living realism.
The Phenomenology of Economy

I. The Task of Political Economy

The sense of economy as an interaction of collective humanity and nature, sophic in its foundations and endowed with cosmic meaning, is not of course present in the minds of particular economic actors as they go about their practical lives. Their attention, riveted to the particular, remains ignorant of the whole. Disparate cognitive acts are addressed only to a particular problem rather than to knowledge generally, as an interaction of man and the world, though ultimately they together comprise the phenomenology of knowledge; disparate households, or disparate economic acts, are addressed toward particular economic aims rather than the ultimate goals of economy as a whole. Economy as the unified action of the transcendental economic subjects breaks down into phenomena and has its own phenomenology; we can understand its principles only from the perspective of a philosophy of economy, though any given moment could be the object of a particular scientific investigation, if only from a particular, specialized point of view. Economy as phenomenology—as it exists in immediate empirical reality—is a voluntarily or involuntarily acknowledged necessity, imposed on us from outside. We experience it as the scourge of poverty, as the constraints of a life constantly exposed to danger. This is why economic activity looks like a struggle for life, and for a given standard of living in particular. Even if we think of economy in its creative dimension as a synthesis of freedom and necessity, in our immediate apprehension we feel
material poverty constantly encroaching on us as a limitation on our freedom, as a burdensome necessity, inescapable save by escaping life itself—a destiny glooming over life like the curse uttered in Paradise. Of course, labor as creativity is neither a curse nor unfreedom but the expression of man’s exalted appointment as the image of God. But labor, like everything in temporal and discursive life, is an antinomy, and labor in the sweat of our face, as economic necessity, bears the stamp of slavery to the elements, of banishment from Paradise, of the inability to live in harmony with creation. Even this forced labor cannot eliminate human freedom, for the consciousness of unfreedom and slavery is itself an attribute of an essentially free being who acknowledges, remembers, and values his freedom; in fact, freedom and necessity presuppose and mutually define each other, mirror each other, as has been shown above. We are not even conscious of what is inherent in us and in our freedom, although this freedom is the precondition both of our sense of being constrained by necessity and of our economic activity itself; likewise the sun’s rays form the precondition of the hues we perceive in particular objects, although they have no color of their own. In contrast we are acutely aware of anything that constantly limits our freedom and threatens our life, setting up obstacles to our will. Economic necessity is a factor of this sort, for no one can be naturally free of it, although it may be partially and temporarily neutralized by particular social conditions. Terms such as need, want, and poverty, and their corresponding opposites economic well-being, utility (consumption value), and prosperity, are therefore appropriate and natural expressions in which to inscribe economic life and its questions and answers. Poverty and want pose the questions, and human labor and utility shape the answers.

The fact that economic labor is never isolated or individual is not in need of proof. Man as part of a genus partakes of the rich
inheritance of preceding humanity’s economic labor and himself labors in constant awareness of the influence of his contemporaries; if collective humanity is the transcendental subject of economy, then economy, whatever form it may take, is a social phenomenon for the individual, empirical man as well. Nonetheless he may not be aware of the transcendentally collective nature of labor, or that he himself belongs to the collective economic subject; on the contrary, any given socioeconomic structure seems to him a limitation on his will, a violent necessity imposed on him from outside. He needs to take it into account as he does the necessity of nature. This is why economic necessity is always socioeconomic necessity to one or another degree; man confronts nature as a member of human society, but his fellows are his fellow prisoners in labor and competitors for the division of its spoils, rather than voluntary allies (though they can become the latter). These spoils, whatever they might be and whatever needs they might satisfy, are created by human labor; they are “values” and constitute “wealth.” The striving to increase wealth and overcome poverty serves as a stimulus for economy. Yet wealth and poverty, even if socially contingent, nonetheless constitute a fact of individual life. The essence of the economic process as a whole, and its transcendental principles, are almost completely overshadowed by this general race for wealth—a competition that fragments the single, unified economic process into disparate, fractional particles. Political economy—the scientific phenomenology of economy—is oriented precisely on this fact: wealth (and its opposite, poverty) as the lot of the individual, even if socially contingent; the individual urge to acquire wealth and the resulting competition among individuals, groups, classes, and nations. This point of departure defines both the style and the set of problems addressed by political economy. So-called mercantilism—the cradle and the first “school” of scientific political economy—as
a frank apology for personal greed, and the “economic man” as a sermon for commercialism, naively expose political economy’s central nerve and reveal the focus of its orientation. Subsequent schools of political economy manage to obscure the unity and immutability of this initial orientation through their polemics: the physiocrats and Adam Smith, Ricardo and Malthus, free-traders and protectionists, differ in their particular theories but not in the initial problem. Political economy is the science of national prosperity insofar as it can become a personal possession, or, conversely, of personal economic gain insofar as it depends on social conditions.

In characterizing political economy’s scientific style, we need to take into account, on one hand, the vagueness of its subject matter and, on the other, the sheer bulk of the raw data—observations on various aspects of past and present economic life that contemporary economic science is gathering and ordering with a considerable expenditure of energy. If we wish to pinpoint economic science’s defining characteristics, we involuntarily end up stylizing it, taking political economy not so much as what it is right now as what it would like to be. The first obstacle we encounter is the vagueness of its most basic concept, wealth, which is as amorphous and unclear as most “real-life” notions. We know that the concept of wealth and the related notions of productive and unproductive labor, forces of production, production, are defined differently in different schools of political economy, ranging from the early economists’ narrow mercantilism and the equally narrow economic materialism of the physiocrats, Adam Smith, and the socialists, to List’s and the historical school’s broader definition, and finally to John Ruskin’s complete fuzziness. Wealth is money, whose source is commerce; wealth is agricultural products, whose source is agricultural labor; wealth is the material products of all labor, whose source is the work of the industrial or agricul-

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ural worker; wealth is everything that gives joy and adorns life, everything that is useful and pleasant: political economy has tried all these and other definitions on for size, focusing alternately on one or another aspect of this concept. Any one of these definitions is of course equally valid, though also equally arbitrary. Our choice is dictated by practical motives, and also partly by historical conditions: it is quite clear to us why the mercantilists defined wealth as money, the physiocrats, as agricultural products, the free-traders, as industrial products, the socialists, as all material goods, and Ruskin, as human life; each is right from his own relative point of view, matching the definition to the given end. But it is equally difficult to fix the definition to any single attribute, however important and obvious, even, say, “material” needs, primarily because it is impossible to distinguish so clearly between material and ideal needs. Even food or clothing, for example, which look like the most material of all needs, turn out to have an ideal aspect, for they reflect man’s general spiritual or cultural stage of development. Conversely, ideal pursuits such as literature, art, or science can serve as a means of satisfying material needs. And what about lighting? or means of transportation? or shall we classify electricity as material if it is in a restaurant and spiritual if it is in a study or a school? Does the mail serve spiritual needs when it brings a book or a letter and material needs when it carries a bill or an advertisement? Is a telephone material in a factory and spiritual in a monastery? Man is spirit incarnate and spiritualized flesh—a spiritual and material being. This is why there is no distinct boundary between the material and the spiritual and why everything has two sides; from this standpoint everything should be included in the science of economy. But only the philosophy of economy can take a position of this kind; it would be inappropriate and unproductive for the science of economy, which is obligated to address specialized problems.
We can’t even make labor into the fundamental criterion of wealth, even though it is the foundation of economic activity, for this definition, too, would be completely vague. Labor is the basic condition of all human activity, whether it be Kant’s philosophizing or a peasant’s plowing, and political economy needs to find a way of distinguishing these two activities—at least on a practical level if not in their essence. We are forced to conclude that the concept of wealth and all its subordinate concepts are defined arbitrarily and pragmatically, depending on the orientation of scientific interest, and are neither subject to nor require logical consistency or closure. In fact, this very vagueness and shifting definition of the concepts of wealth and poverty give political economy the flexibility and mutability it needs to adapt to historically changing tasks; it sustains the measure of empiricism and historicism necessary for a science that deals with history, that is, with changes over time. The object of political economy, however vague its logical definition, is in practice quite clear; it can be defined sometimes in one and sometimes in another parameter, each time delineating a corresponding logical profile.

II. Political Economy’s Scientific Style

Political economy’s scientific style is defined by the sociologism that it seeks to introduce into our understanding of concrete phenomena in life or in history. Ultimately, political economy (even when it is historically inclined) is a sociological science in its desire to establish laws of economic life; its contribution is a set of particular, a priori methodological premises and, above all, a characteristic sociological determinism (see the preceding chapter). This determinism enables it to neglect individuality and replace it with groups and classes—“collectivities” in which the individual is fully overshadowed by the typical, thus
eliminating freedom and creativity and leaving room only for relentless social regularity. This is how political economy as a science is constructed, and this is how it stylizes economic life.

Political (or social) economy is utterly uninterested in the phenomena of individual economic life as such; it comprehends and interprets them only in relation to other phenomena, as social collectivities. The basic concepts developed by political economy cannot even be applied to an individual phenomenon, for they have no relevance to it and operate beyond its boundaries. The individual exists for political economy only as the average specimen of a social type: for example, a given worker, Ivan Sidorov, exists here as a member of the proletarian class. Another way to put it is that the individual exists only as a fractional part of some collectivity comprising a single whole: for example, a given producer represents a fraction of the “market,” of the power of supply and demand. This whole exists (logically) prior to its parts: it breaks down into these parts, making room for them, rather than being assembled from them. This peculiar and as yet poorly understood logic of political economy’s basic concepts—by means of which multiplicity is compressed into unity, isolating selected aspects of phenomena—is analogous to the method of statistical collectivities but is at the same time significantly different; we need to take these features into account if we are to understand political economy’s scientific style. Political economy’s most basic concepts—the analyses on which it particularly prides itself, such as the concepts of capital and capitalism—operate with precisely such collectivities: they really exist in the aggregate, but not in any one of their constituent parts taken separately. The single individual can obviously be neither a capitalist, nor a proletarian, nor a member of an economic class at all, if he is taken in isolation; it is equally obvious, however, that these classifications are projected onto him by these collectivities, which focus
their colored lenses on him and suffuse him with first one, then another hue. Thus we might say that the magnifying glass of political economy sees both more and less than the naked eye; it notices what for the eye is entirely inaccessible but fails to perceive the obvious; it ignores everything connected with individuality while taking into account everything that transcends its boundaries and forms class or group phenomena. If we assume the standpoint strictly of the individual, we can say that, in reality, there are no collectivities at all, they are merely inventions of an idle imagination: there is no capitalism, no capitalists or proletarians, but only concrete subjects, living people with names, last names, and biographies. Conversely, if we follow the method of collectivities, we will find no room for biographies or even individual dates, just as, seen from a sufficient height, separate houses flow together into streets, forming blocks and then the general image of a city. If we begin from the individual, we could conceivably arrive at the social and collective through the most thorough research (not practically possible) and manage along the way to capture all of reality as well. There is, however, no direct path from the study of the collective to the individual; the transition can only be made by a leap. This is why the individual and the social are in practice distinct worlds—an example of how the scientific study of reality, despite its postulated universal connectedness, actually divides reality into disparate, mutually unrelated worlds.

The overwhelming significance of statistical observation in political economy makes sense in light of its fascination with collectivities, with the general, the typical, the average. Statistics—as a method of mass observation and “categorical calculus,” rather than for its own sake—has naturally become a subordinate branch of political economy; as such it frequently lapses (in this it is not alone) into a superstition of numbers and seeks in them what isn’t there. Yet political economy couldn’t
do without statistics for its most basic task of studying and defining social groups and social relations; at the very least it would be extremely constrained, limited to extracting “deductive” propositions—so empty as to be completely banal or abstract—from within itself. (In practice so-called theoretical political economy really does operate this way.) Other methods of “categorical” description of reality are of equal value to political economy as statistics, for example, historical research or sociological questionnaires. These provide the material on which it bases its “collectivities” and the “laws” or types of their development.

The method of collectivities, statistical or otherwise, destroys the individual, replacing it with class masks, social maps, and diagrams. Even though phenomena such as exchange, production, distribution, and consumption have an individual dimension, the moment they become the object of study for political economy they are regarded only as types or collectivities. Political economy examines these individual manifestations as an abstract average, takes up a perspective from which separate figures merge and become general, typical, and uniform. “Deductive” political economy is completely constructed on a particular representation of a typical or average form of behavior, any departure from which is seen as accidental or irregular. The infamous “economic man”—that crucially instrumental concept of political economy that we can either indignantly deny with Ruskin or Carlyle, as a slander of reality, or judiciously apply so long as we find it of practical use, ever conscious of its instrumental and contingent nature—is precisely such a stylized collective type (reminiscent of the image we get if we photograph many faces on the same film). Of course no representation of the typical corresponds to reality, in which everything is individual and nothing is repeated; it is a *pars pro toto*, where just one element, only more or less similar in its
various manifestations, is isolated, only then to throw away the “more or less” and everything else and thus to arrive at a logical distillate—the “economic phenomenon in pure form.” Political economy’s basic principle that the phenomena of economic life are typical or repetitive forms the general methodological premise of economic regularity. Yet this statement obviously excludes not only the individual but anything that is new or historical: nothing happens in this political-economic world, as was earlier the case for the sociological one; there are no events save a sort of economic perpetuum mobile. It is assumed that the entire inventory of economic reality and causality has already been accounted for and that beyond that nothing can happen. True, the “laws” of political economy claim in principle to deal with the dynamics as well as the statics of phenomena—the order in which they follow as well as the phenomena themselves. It is not difficult, however, to come to the conclusion that these dynamics are as static and analytic as the statics: they merely reveal and realize existing possibilities to the exclusion of any new or unexpected causes. Hence they too take as their point of departure the notion of an exhaustive inventory of reality or assume the premise of ceteris paribus. Marx’s “prognosis” concerning the evolution of capitalism into socialism (described in the preceding chapter) is typical in this respect: it is premised entirely on ceteris paribus and constitutes a mental extrapolation of just one “tendency,” a generalization from isolated aspects of contemporary reality. The “tendencies of economic development” established by statistics and political economy are constructed on this same model. Nothing new—the denial of anything historical or individual—thus becomes the war cry of the eldest daughter, political economy, as well as of the mother, sociology.

The use of economic concepts and patterns in application to the completed past differs somewhat from their use in the
still-open present and future. They become ready-made models that help to generalize about historical reality. We mustn’t of course deny the scientific utility of ready-made theoretical models within certain limits. Such abstract concepts, for example, as natural economy or capitalism are now widely used in researching the economic history of countries or periods that might not themselves have provoked the construction of these particular concepts. The past is illuminated by the projector of the present’s scientific concepts; actually we always see the past through contemporary lenses. It is nonetheless clear that modeling and modernization, which to many constitute the quintessence of the scientific approach, sometimes obscure historical reality in its colorful individuality, even though the stylization of history according to the tastes of contemporary political economy—the application of ready conceptual schemas and orientations—can be convenient. The currently fashionable dressing up of Greeks and Romans, Babylonians and Egyptians as modern capitalists and proletarians can, however, be as dangerous as it is convenient, and we may one day be forced to rid historical science of these modernizing weeds. Even to the degree that these formulas and models can claim scientific validity, they remain necessarily highly abstract and schematic, which is why they are useful in the first place. They are the first tentative marks on a yet-undrawn map. Bücher’s (and earlier Rodbertus’s) historical models, and Eduard Meyer’s and particularly Pöhlmann’s opposing ones (which go furthest in the modernization of antiquity), are all examples of this type of modernizing schematization in its positive and negative dimensions.

Thus only the static rather than the dynamic aspects of society are actually accessible to political economy as a branch of sociology; there is room in this static science for making the development and fruition of what already exists intelligible,
but not much for the new making of history. This peculiarity is what results in political economy’s neglect of the individual personality and its deterministic denial of human freedom, its typical sociological determinism. Political economy studies man only in his oppression, catches him in the state of necessary self-defense, instead of approaching him from the perspective of his free creative relation to life. It replaces the individual personality as universal actor, as the living source of all that is new in history, with the economic machine postulated by Bentham and reminiscent of the contemporary automatic dispenser: if you deposit a coin, it will produce a candy or a piece of soap, but no more. All constructions of the economic man, whether individual or collective, are in fact based on the image of an economic machine; hence political economy’s inevitable and total fatalism—the obverse side of its methodological determinism. Again, this works up to a point and for certain goals: we can be content in certain limits with a machine instead of a personality. But if we forget about the contingent, practical, methodological nature of these economic categories, we begin to lapse into economism, so widespread in our day, with its accompanying fatalism, which in turn generates one of the most horrible nightmares of modern life. Poverty is nightmarish and real enough in itself not to require the addition of a theoretical nightmare in the form of immutable and inevitable “laws of economic development” or the doom of “class psychology” and economic egoism. If all this were true, there would have been no benign acts or even good impulses in history; in fact there would not even have been the economic development that is such a firm article of faith for modern proselytizers of economic Islam. They are wrong to affirm that there is an iron law that is the same and equally inescapable for all. It is on the other hand true that there is a certain obligatory framework for action,
but it simultaneously creates a space for individual creativity, leaving room for manifestations of freedom.

As soon as political economy turns to concrete historical reality and tries to understand it as creativity as well as mechanism, the significance of the individual personality as a creative principle of economy and history begins to come to the fore. Thus far we have characterized political economy as a sociological or “nomographic” discipline; however, the above-mentioned vagueness of its logical contours permits us to acknowledge the presence of purely descriptive elements—historical, “idiographic” science. No science can sustain systematic and exclusive sociologism to the end; therefore no science can actually represent its given logical type in pure form. A constant movement, ascending and descending—the transition from the concrete to the abstract, to generalized concepts or “laws,” and then the return to reality through scientific means—takes place in scientific life. Science’s very pragmatism insures that nomographic elements, though they might present an important part and even the logical focus of science, do not in themselves constitute a goal; they are needed only as means to provide orientation, are valuable insofar as they are useful. The value of the “laws” that political economy can, like any other science, establish in any desired quantity and direction depends entirely on their practical utility. Perhaps “laws” with the pathetic destiny of decorating an amateur scientific museum like oversized flowers grown in a logical greenhouse will be discovered—something particularly possible in the field of so-called “theoretical” political economy. Theoretically there are no limits to the process of logical construction: only life’s tasks and the pragmatism of science can establish those. Political economy has long concerned itself with theories of value—unquestionably much more than it should have—but has not included
in its purview a problem that is really important, namely, the theory of value of economic theories, in which the criterion of utility (as well, of course, as logical consistency) would be applied. Political economy was born under the star of commercialism, that is, of completely practical motives, of the need to figure out the complexities of the economic mechanism. It is the child of capitalism and is in turn the science of capitalism; it provides instructions for proper economic behavior. Whether openly or not, political economy resolves practical tasks, and theory is a means for practice; therefore it must really be directly or indirectly useful rather than being a mere logical toy. Obviously this utility doesn’t always take the form of immediate practical usefulness. For example, is the general theory of capitalist economy, which studies the “collectivity” of separate households with a pretty significant degree of abstractness, really useful from this standpoint? I think it is, although there can be no immediate practical application: this theory provides us with a general picture of everything that happens in contemporary economic life and defines it as a type. However abstract and constructed it may be, like any other theory, still it is empirical in important ways and adheres to experience; it is a shortened formula for an indefinitely large quantity of facts. On the other hand, can we consider the various theories of value, profit, and capital that form the content of so-called theoretical economy, with its endless controversies, to be equally valuable? I think not, however elegant, sharp-witted, and graceful some of them may be from the logical and aesthetic point of view (precisely what deceives and leads us astray), because they are not really empirical any more, even though they take empirical facts as their point of departure; they do not help us sort out these facts and don’t even try to do so, choosing instead to investigate some kind of profounder depths or to pose meta-empirical though also not metaphysical problems, thus result-
The possibilities for abstract theorizing in science in general and in political economy in particular are endless, which is why it should always be under the control of conscious critical pragmatism which asks, *cui prodest?* The sort of progression from fact to theory where there is no going back is quite possible. Theory is the product of the saturation of scientific thought, the crystallization of science; and this is why no science can do without theory, although the bridge connecting the two shores should never be removed. Nomography remains a means for idiography, or in other words theory for practice, which in the end is always concrete and historical.

The indiscriminate accumulation of empirical material of dubious scientific value—the *false empiricism* of the pseudohistorical school—is the opposite pole from uncontrolled theorizing. Now everything that has any “facts” in it, particularly in the cabalistic form of a statistical table, is mistaken for science. And yet economy of thought and consequently of scientific method is the supreme rule of science: logical aesthetics demands that there be nothing extra or useless. Every science, as has been demonstrated above, has to ask about something; this question determines the researcher’s interests and thus establishes in advance the “facts” and choice of facts and contains the kernel of the answer—the scientific theory. Collecting facts with no guiding aim in mind is not science at all but a mere scientific game. Sciences must be constructed, and scientific regularities established, using the intellect; they cannot be found by poking around in garbage piles as if they were old rags; thus there is no more science in facts than is put there by the scientific intellect.

The history and the contemporary state of political economy abound with examples of one or another extreme—of excessive theoretical abstraction and of unprincipled collection of facts, so prevalent in contemporary historicism. The path of healthy

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scientific empiricism passes in between both extremes; in the end it is determined by the researcher’s scientific tact.

Like social science in general, political economy comprises a unity of economic theory and economic politics. Theory helps orient us in practical questions and provides general guidelines or premises yet, by virtue of its abstract nature, never provides specific directions concerning the concrete, final outcome. Thus it is not possible simply to insert numerical quantities, perform certain operations, and come up with a final result. Rather, the guidelines are always provided in general and vague form, assuming in addition a role for intuition, creativity, or just sharpness. This is why political economy by nature is an art, though a scientific art. Political economy cannot tell us exactly whether we should conclude a treaty with Germany, or what type of workers’ insurance we should choose, or whether a given strike will be productive. Every scientific judgment on a concrete issue combines general and particular, nomographic and idiographic concepts; in economic politics this combination, because of the complexity of the object—economic life—and the consequently relatively low scientific level of political economy, becomes particularly confusing. The path from the general to the particular is a logical leap—one that, furthermore, one could make in different directions—rather than a gradual progression. This is why it is so difficult for scientists to arrive at any sort of agreement either about facts or about what conclusions to draw from them—thus casting doubt on the validity of the science itself, as if science could have some kind of secret about how to approach fact. Because it is so abstract, political economy has trouble answering questions concerning collectivities—as by the way do all sciences—but the difficulties multiply when it has to deal with individual phenomena, so that in the end any scientific judgment becomes impossible. How, for example, could we say whether the given industri-
alist N will prosper or go bankrupt, based on our knowledge of crises in general and this crisis in particular? or whether a particular branch of industry will win or lose? Isn’t it clear that political economy has to tell the industrialist that he as N doesn’t really exist at all, for it acknowledges the class of industrialists as a whole rather than individual Ns? In many cases these abstract judgments are devalued and become mere commonplaces. In such cases scientific premises can be supplemented by judgments based on practical reason, or common sense, which, fertilized by the data of scientific analysis, then masquerade as scientifically based conclusions. It should then not come as a surprise that more disciplined scientific minds, nurtured on the moderate and quiet, and hence less detectable, pragmatism of the natural sciences—at least in comparison to that which reigns or even rages in political economy—can permit themselves to doubt the scientific validity of political economy and even its right to scientific existence, whereas more philosophically inclined minds are prompted once again to pose skepticism’s chastening question: What is science? Were we to investigate political economy’s logical structure more fully we would need to go into greater depth and detail, which I cannot claim to do here; instead, I would like to limit myself to these few remarks, which clarify the philosophy of economy’s general approach to problems of phenomenology.
Economic Materialism as a Philosophy of Economy

I. Economic Materialism as Philosophy and as Science

It is very easy to criticize so-called economic materialism, demonstrating its roughness and incompleteness, its ugly one-sidedness. It has too many aspects that are indefensible and open to criticism. Among philosophers it evokes only disdain for its crude dogmatism and naive materialism, and this inadequacy of form precludes any desire on their part to examine its substance. For the educated public, which “sympathizes with all that is lofty and beautiful” and prizes aesthetic culture above all else, economic materialism reeks too strongly of workers’ sweat and industrial smoke; to them it looks like barbarism, incapable of appreciating “cultural values,” and they turn away with an air of self-satisfied fastidiousness, rejecting it without really paying attention. Finally, the wide ranks of its socialist supporters, having turned it into a dogma of proletarian catechism, are just as little capable of raising its scientific and philosophical prestige. Indeed it might seem that the philosophical researcher of our day has no reason to deal with economic materialism any more than, for example, with the materialism of Vogt and Moleschott, and that it ought to be left in peace. All the same I would suggest that we have no right to despise economic materialism until we have seriously dealt with the problem that it poses. The imperfection and incompleteness of its philosophical form, relatively accidental and
trivial, belies the vital significance of the problem presented by economic materialism, which remains unimpaired by the unacceptability of its philosophical premises. Neither neglect nor squeamishness can diminish or destroy the significance of this problem, which continues to attract the attention of fresh minds, unhypnotized by criticism or aestheticism. It is insufficient simply to reject economic materialism, as is incidentally true for every theory that poses a significant life problem, by turning away in impotence or from lack of interest; it must be overcome, and overcome only by positive means, having acknowledged its truth and understood its motive but declined its limitations and perversions. The grim honesty of life experience speaks in economic materialism; it devotes its attention to the meaning of poverty, to the anxiety about a piece of daily bread that grooms over most of mankind. Yet it should occupy its own unique place in the history of philosophy by virtue of its philosophical significance and not only because of these ethical characteristics. It is the first effort to construct a philosophy of economy; it consciously poses the problem of the philosophy of economy for the first time, and a new theme, ushered in not by armchair contemplation but by living impressions of reality, sounds in the history of ideas. I believe that this theme, because it is anchored in life, bears witness to the philosophical authenticity and not mere fantasy of economic materialism’s main message. Recently it has received another boost: appreciation for economic materialism’s philosophical significance has been increased by the successes of the philosophy of pragmatism, which is in some ways similar. We might express the relation between them as follows: economic materialism represents a variant of pragmatism, a particular example of it, and can hence be called economic pragmatism. This influential, though not particularly profound, philosophical theory of our day reiterates

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the significance and viability of economic materialism’s basic theme from a new angle.2

Economic materialism as a philosophical theory orients philosophy on the fact of economy. Moreover, this is not, for it, merely one of many possible philosophical orientations, alongside which others are also permissible; rather, it is the only possible orientation, and this philosophy of economy sees itself as essential truth (although there are no such expressions in the discourse of economic materialism); it is philosophy κατ’ ἀκροατικόν, an absolute philosophical system that attains the mystery of being and reveals it in a scientific doctrine. Here we hear an echo of Hegel with his claim to the absoluteness and hence uniqueness of his system. Having lost many of Hegelianism’s strong sides, economic materialism has retained its ambition and absolutism. It also shares with Hegelianism the extreme intellectualism that distinguishes the latter: however irrational history’s driving force—namely, the development of productive forces, unfolding with blind mechanical inevitability—economic materialism never doubts the adequacy and rationality with which it can express this irrational reality, further confused by all sorts of illusory ideologies; it admits of no dark, un-rationalizable residue and leaves no room for mystery. Life’s mystery is completely revealed by economic materialism. Where Hegelianism’s intellectualism equated consciousness with being, seeing the rational as real and the real as rational, this other intellectualism, replacing panlogism with pan-alogism, universal blindness, and irrationality, is burdened with contradictions of which Hegel knew nothing. Incidentally, economic materialism shares this trait with all materialism, both pre- and post-Hegelian.

Fundamentally, economic materialism represents a metaphysical or at least meta-empirical philosophy of history, something like a historical ontology. This is no less the case because,
following the spirit of the time with its reaction to idealism, and
strongly influenced by Feuerbach’s materialistically tinted posi-
tivism, the creators of economic materialism declared war on
any metaphysics and believed they were subverting it. They be-
lieved that they were uncovering the material roots of all meta-
physics and thus exposing its illusory, ideological nature. In
reality, however, economic materialism, like materialism gener-
ally, represents merely a naive or dogmatic metaphysics, igno-
rant of its own nature. The history of philosophy is full of
examples of such unconscious metaphysics. Economic materi-
alism poses a problem of clearly metaphysical nature, actually
exactly the same one that Hegel resolves in his consciously
metaphysical philosophy of history. The famous “turning Hegel
on his head” (auf den Kopf stellen) that Marx ascribes to him-
self refers only to the content of the theory: the role of absolute
spirit is ascribed to the economic base but not to its problem,
which remains exactly the same. In this respect Marxism really
is Hegelianism with a new face (only, of course, in the phi-
losophy of history). It suffices to delve a bit deeper into the
essence of Hegel’s philosophy of history to become convinced
of the extent of this similarity and influence. The first question
Hegel poses in the philosophy of history is: What is the mean-
ing of world history, what happens in it or what is its result? In
keeping with the general content of his philosophy, accord-
ing to which the universal spirit achieves self-consciousness, real-
izing itself through freedom, Hegel answers: “World history is
progress in the consciousness of freedom.” Marx and Engels
borrow this idea, and even this formula, from him (purely, of
course, in an external sense), when they speak of a “leap from
the kingdom of necessity into the kingdom of freedom,” where
this last is identified for them with the socialist “future society.”
Despite all their denial of historical teleology and effort to pre-
serve a mechanical (“natural-scientific,” that is, purely causal)

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understanding of history, its general conception here also turns out to be immanent and teleological: history does not play itself out in a void but leads to a definite, internally coherent goal. The second question posed by Hegel in the philosophy of history is: How does history happen, by what means does it achieve its goal? According to Hegel, human interests, particular needs, various egoistic motives, as well as movements of passion creating historical actors, are the material of history. The particular motivations, of course, do not coincide with the tasks of history, and people do not know about them; only for great individuals do their private goals “contain in themselves a substantive element, comprising the will of the world spirit.” But the world spirit uses human desires and interests for its own ends; without being conscious of it, people realize its intentions, and this is the “cunning of reason” (List der Vernunft) that forces people to fulfill its will without knowing it. This is an objective, supraempirical, metaphysical rule of nature. Economic materialism assimilates this idea as follows. (It also affirms that history is a game of passions and interests that in its totality forms a struggle of economic classes.) A regularity beyond the particular aims of separate individuals or groups operates in history, and this regularity is determined by the development of productive forces, which goes through stages analogous to the phases of the universal spirit’s self-consciousness. Here it is the “cunning” not of reason but of the economic base that operates. Marx, in concentrating all his attention on the distinction in content between his theory and Hegel’s, imperceptibly for himself accepted without criticism what in Hegel is more important than content, namely, the metaphysical formulation of the problem entirely in the spirit of Hegel’s ontologism, and here again his theory is indistinguishable from post-Hegelian materialism, which also stood Hegelian idealism “on its head” and merely provided a new answer to the same problems. As a
philosophy of history, economic materialism is not an empirical, scientific, positive theory of historical development; rather, its ontological character is its most distinctive philosophical feature. As an ontological metaphysics, it shares the fate of all ontological systems, whether spiritualistic, materialistic, or idealistic. Before the tribunal of coherent positivism or neo-Kantian criticism it is as unacceptable and “unscientific” as the philosophy of Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Soloviev, Hartmann, for it asks what cannot be asked with the hope of obtaining a scientific answer, namely, what underlies historical phenomena and constitutes their meta-empirical metaphysical basis. The problem of economic materialism is essentially the following: What underlies the apparent colorfulness and variety of historical phenomena? What is the single regularity that connects the tangled multiplicity of immediate reasons and constitutes their foundation? This is not just a metaphysics of history in general but belongs to a definite, namely a monistic, type: it inherited this monism, in conjunction with a dialectical “method,” from Hegel (although Hegelian dialectics is here naively taken for ordinary evolutionism, however little they have in common), which is why it sometimes calls itself “dialectical materialism.” Economic materialism’s central theory of the “base and superstructure” answers precisely this ontological problem. According to this theory all of mankind’s historical life in its external and internal, political and social, cultural and spiritual manifestations is but a superstructure above the economic base and consequently has no independent metaphysical being, is only a “reflex,” is ontologically contingent precisely in the same sense that all empirical historical events are contingent for Hegel on the victorious march of the universal spirit, passing through various phases of its development. By this statement neither Marx nor Hegel denies the phenomenal being of all that they do not acknowledge as exist-
ing independently in an ontological sense, or what is merely a reflex. Everything that is “superstructure”—government, law, religion, morality—all this is not proclaimed by economic materialism not to exist; instead, even for Marx the empirical colorfulness of history exists as it does for everyone else, and the immediate causal connection of historical events presents a picture of a multiplicity of reasons and a confusion of events that cannot be fit into any monistic schema. Empirical history has its “pragmatism” of events, which is established by historical science. The causality of the “economic base” exists only in letzter Instanz (in the final analysis), rather than lying on the surface. This can be translated into philosophical language only as follows: it has metaphysical rather than empirical significance; it does not immediately establish a connection between phenomena but underlies them as their noumenal basis. The relation of the base to the superstructure is similar to the relation of the Ding an sich (thing in itself) and the phenomenon in Kant’s system or, still more clearly, in Schopenhauer’s: the economic base is the noumenon of history; it lies at the foundation of all its phenomena and generates them, and the relation between the noumenon and phenomena, the intelligible and empirical world, cannot of course be equated with empirical causality in history; if we characterize this relation, too, as causality, then we must add that ontological causality lies very deep and we ought not therefore to seek it on the surface. Here we may have an entirely different picture of causality, one that is variegated and colorful, disguising rather than revealing the single true, noumenal causality that acts in letzter Instanz. In order to apprehend it, we must know how to look into the depths, into the inner workings of the mechanism, and only after we have understood this Ding an sich, by speculative or intuitive rather than scientific-empirical means, its invisible breath will be felt in empirical reality, too, and reality will become com-
prehensible in its inner meaning. Systems of the metaphysics of history are generally constructed in this manner, for example, in Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Hartmann, Soloviev or, earlier, in Saint Augustine, Bossuet, Herder. The theory of economic materialism, or at least one of its aspects, and in my opinion the most essential and characteristic, also has such a meaning. Yet, because of the lack of philosophical clarity in the formulation and subdivisions of its problem, we can detect several distinct orders of thought, poorly reconcilable with each other but constantly intersecting, in the theory of economic materialism even in Marx and Engels (not to mention their followers). First of all this applies to the self-styled scientism of economic materialism, on which it prides itself, and which is so carefully underscored in the chaotic idea of scientific socialism, or socialism as a science. Economic materialism as a science, and consequently as the totality of generalizations regarding the factual development of history, reducing history primarily to economic development, is something entirely distinct from economic materialism as metaphysics, and the confusion of the scientific and metaphysical theories that takes place here leads to entirely unresolvable difficulties, primarily methodological in nature. If economic materialism wishes to be a theory of historical development, a scientific explication of facts or their generalization, then it is obvious that such a theory, whatever its content, cannot be advanced a priori, ante facta, but can be defended only post facta. It is obtained as the result of scientific investigation and is valid only within these boundaries. It retains the quality of “incomplete induction,” donec corrigetur, and thus can always be refuted by new facts. In principle even a single fact contradicting the theory would suffice, as it would suffice to destroy any of the most firmly anchored empirical “laws” of natural science, such as the law of gravity. Clearly, such a law can never lay claim to such a priori universal significance as that

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to which economic materialism pretended from the very beginning, and even before any investigation, on credit. It will not do to proclaim one’s scientism while flouting its most elementary requirements. The universality and ambition of economic materialism can be understood and in a sense justified only if we see in it a metaphysics of history, for, as has been pointed out above, metaphysical propositions do not rest on a scientific, empirical basis; actually, they might even explain the empirical world in their own way. But to insist on the rights and claims of metaphysics under the banner of experimental science would be at the very least to succumb to misunderstanding. In this point Marx really does turn Hegel upside down and in a much more radical manner than when he replaces the universal spirit with the economic base in the metaphysics of history. The transformation of economic materialism into a scientific, empirical theory, into a science, inevitably led to the degeneration of its original conception. Transposed in this tone, it forfeits the grand spirit it shared with Hegel and replaces it with the less-than-grand spirit of Jeremy Bentham with his moral arithmetic, together with the mercantile spirit of classical political economy. In economic materialism Hegel’s spirit struggles with the alien spirits of Bentham and Ricardo; it is the latter who are the victors. But this is what leads economic materialism to philosophical disintegration, because one cannot simultaneously exist in two planes, trying to integrate irreconcilable characteristics. Economic materialism is vulgarized in Benthamism and takes on sharp, angular, and frequently caricatural form. It degenerates into an effort to explain everything by greed and perceives only an economic explanation for the greatest historical developments: the history of the Reformation turns into the history of pig farming and landholding in the sixteenth century, the history of early Christianity into the history of slavery, latifundia, and the proletariat in the Roman Empire,
and so on. Bentham taught that man is guided in his actions solely by considerations of gain and utility, though perhaps in the broadest sense, and in them he saw the criterion of morality. He was further convinced that human motives are subject to precise calculation and understood sociology as a moral arithmetic. Here utilitarianism, as inspired as economic materialism, sought a universal explanation of all human affairs. Free-trading political economy, headed by Ricardo, translated the Benthamite idea of interest as the fundamental moving force in human psychology into its own language. The fiction of the “economic man,” a Benthamist in the sphere of economy, appeared, and since political economy regarded life only through the glasses of its specialized scientific interests, forgetting or ignoring everything else, the impression that economic man was for it man in general, or that man was by nature merely an economic egoist, sometimes resulted. Economic materialism as social Benthamism extended this same idea, without subjecting it to critical investigation, from individuals to social groups, and began to speak of class rather than individual interest. History, which appeared to Bentham as a struggle among individual interests, became for Marx a struggle among class interests, and the idea of class struggle as an explanation of the historical process took shape. A methodological rule follows from this dogmatically accepted premise: to seek a basis for every historical phenomenon in the class struggle and in the economic base and not to rest until it is discovered in one way or another. And thus, given the elasticity and, not infrequently, scarcity of historical data, one can practically always see that of which one is convinced in advance: the historical kitchen is in this respect much more flexible than the natural-scientific laboratory, and hence we have an entire series of economic explanations of various historical phenomena—law, religion, science, literature, art. The old ways of Hegelian metaphysics, rejected aloud, are alive.

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and well even now, and the presence of the quasi-scientific but actually metaphysical a priori of economic materialism with its “dialectical method” (that miracle of misunderstanding) introduces a tendentiousness into scientific investigation from which open, conscious metaphysics and true, coherent scientific empiricism are equally free. But, of course, apart from economic materialism as a monistic metaphysics of history with its social Benthamism, requiring a reduction of everything to economic interests and conducting a peculiar sort of police search on history to find them, there also exists a truly scientific orientation in historiography that willingly pays particular attention to the economic side of history. This historical economism does not pretend to be an a priori monistic philosophy of history. It is interested in the economic side of history simply from motives of historical realism, given economy’s indisputable living importance, but it bears no relation to methodological monism, to the stretching of history at all costs into the Procrustean bed of economic interests. Instead, it is easily reconcilable, or ought to be, with empirical pluralism, with the acknowledgment of the multiplicity of historical reasons or factors and their multifaceted interrelation. The economic orientation in history, though often confused with economic materialism, is actually quite different from it, for it remains entirely within the realm of “historical pragmatism” and does not claim to be a philosophy of history of any kind. Precisely this orientation, by dint of its scientific lack of prejudice, results in valuable scientific investigations, uncovering the real meaning of economy in historical development and facilitating the advance of economic history.

Thus economic materialism is a metaphysics of history that, not realizing its true nature, considers itself a science but never actually becomes one or the other. This duality contains the key to the contradiction that corrodes it. But in this sense its fate
is instructive for any “theory of the historical process.” Insofar
as it is really scientific, that is, empirical, it reflects the state of
knowledge in a given period and does not have the authority
to claim more general knowledge. Every general proposition
clearly leads beyond the boundaries of the strictly empirical
and must be included with premises of a more general nature
that are established by philosophy. In other words, any general
theory of historical philosophy is already a metaphysics of his-
tory—whether advanced by Hegel or Comte, Marx or Herder,
Bossuet or Lassalle. We should look at this with our eyes open.⁴

II. The Contradictions of Economic Materialism

The basic idea of economic materialism is that economy has
the defining role in history and in life, or that all of culture
is of an economic nature and bears the imprint of economy.
It apprehends the world as a household. This idea is profound
and meaningful in its essence, if freed from caricature and dis-
tortion; it is therefore amenable to further development and
elaboration. Economic materialism expresses being’s sense of
unfreedom and imprisonment by the elements in the fetters of
economic necessity; it reflects the tragedy of mortal life, con-
demned to a perpetual struggle with death. Pessimism’s pecu-
liar and severe honesty, fearless of the bitter truth, is inherent
in economic materialism, although neither its creators nor their
latter-day followers are conscious of all the pessimism of their
doctrine (actually, the source of their optimistic mood is less the
truths of economic materialism than their belief in its transcen-
don in history by means of a “leap from necessity to freedom,”
that is, in that socialist eschatology that is only mechanically
connected with this doctrine). Economy, the defense and ex-
pansion of life through labor, the creation of life through labor,
is the lot common to humanity; an economic relation to the

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world is its primordial and most general self-definition. Man does not create anything anew that did not already exist in nature in hidden or potential form, but he brings life's forces to the fore, realizing its possibilities through labor. Labor, directed both toward the external world and toward man himself, expended on the production both of material goods and spiritual values, creates something that, in counterposition to nature, the primordially given, bears the name of culture. Culture is hewn from nature only by man's labor; in this sense we can say together with economic materialism that all culture is economy. Economic labor, or mankind's cultural creativity, is generated and maintained by life's need for self-defense and self-expansion. Naturally, it develops through various stages, and at any given stage of development a general social coherence or social organization is characteristic, as economic materialism so aptly points out. To determine the general bases of the economic process is the task of the philosophy of economy with its peculiar problems; to establish the coherence and mutual dependence of various manifestations of economic labor or, what is the same, of different aspects of culture, is the task of empirical science, of concrete history. It is impossible here to advance an a priori theory, except as an empty banality, for the same reason that history in general cannot be apprehended a priori. A whole series of consequences follows from the necessity and universality of an economic relation to the world, while at the same time it also has a whole series of premises; both are uncovered by the philosophy of economy. Having stumbled on such an important topic, however, economic materialism strays from the proper path and passes to a different order of thought. Its blunder is that, instead of placing the problem of economy with all its premises at the center of attention and providing an independent philosophical analysis, economic materialism takes the concept of economy ready-made from a specialized science,
namely, political economy. Marx the political economist here paralyzes Marx the philosopher, something that applies even more to his followers. The contingent, scientific, pragmatic concept of economy, of economic labor and the forces of production, that political economy uses might be good enough for specialized purposes, but it has meaning only in those narrow limits, for a particular purpose, and not if we wish to address the problem in its full philosophical breadth. If philosophy is interested in the interconnections of phenomena with the whole, specialized science, which bears the mark of scientific pragmatism, intentionally focuses on one side of things. Political economy is satisfied with a definition of labor like those of, for example, Adam Smith, Ricardo, Rodbertus, or Marx (compare chapter 8). Here, economic labor is labor directed toward the production of only material goods or exchange values (which is why the philosophy of economy is without further reflection called economic materialism, although in reality it is not at all necessarily materialism, since economy itself is a process as much spiritual as material). Political economy doesn’t have to pose the general question of how labor is possible (just as every specialized science does not ask how cognition generally is possible), or what the relation of man to nature is and what general possibilities exist. Political economy remains distant from philosophical anthropology and even further removed from any natural philosophy: nature is regarded without further discussion as a workshop or storage space for raw materials, that is, merely as the possibility of economic labor. It considers this labor to be the main, perhaps even the only, factor of production with significance from the standpoint of human economy: hence the Smithian definition of wealth as a year’s labor, hence the extraordinary tenacity of a priori “labor” theories of value, labor, capital, profit. Political economy here reasons as contingently and pragmatically as the agriculturalist who connects

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his harvest only with his having sown the grain, although it is obvious how insufficient this perception is to understanding the entire process of the grain’s growth.

Economic materialism looks at economy in a political-economic sense and is thus really condemned to impenetrable materialism. Its task in this case inevitably becomes not the investigation of the economic side of life as a problem of the philosophy of economy but the stretching of the evidence per fas et nefas to show the dependence of all life and all culture on economy in the political-economic sense; economic science here acquires the same significance for the philosophy of history as logic for Hegel’s philosophy that of ontology. The concept of modes of production replacing each other at a given stage of the development of productive forces with “dialectical” inevitability was apparently worked out in the workshop of political economy for its own purposes, but now it has become necessary to attach humanity’s entire spiritual history to it, cutting history up into bits corresponding to these political-economic schemas. But of course political economy does not really have the weight of historical ontology; it is merely a specialized science like any other, and this effort to transform it into ontology inevitably leads to a series of exaggerations, distortions, violations of fact.

This illegitimate use of the concepts of political economy as exhaustive categories of the philosophy of economy completely obscures the logical horizons of economic materialism. It remains logically bound by them and sees before it ready-made and exhaustive categories where there should be only questions. It is thus consigned to logical immaturity and remains “unworked out and unfinished” (unfertig und nicht ausgedacht), as Stammler already characterized it. But he had in mind only the imperfection of its critical form, its epistemological side, whereas our judgment also refers to its substance. The applica-
tion of improper means, namely, specialized scientific concepts, to the resolution of problems of the philosophy of economy has led economic materialism to pass over the real questions without even noticing them; instead, it has created for itself an entire series of invented, poorly formulated, and hopelessly irresolvable problems, as it strives to represent the world as it is while looking at it through colored glasses. Such is the origin of various efforts at an economic interpretation of history. Economic materialism is in this sense nothing other than a philosophical delusion of grandeur on the part of a political economy elevating itself to the rank of historical ontology. And here Hegel really has been stood on his head: for him it was logic that had such ontological significance, not as a specialized science as we know it today, but as a theory of the general forms of consciousness and being; for Marx political economy merely as specialized science has acquired this same significance.

Economic materialism wishes to be a philosophy of history, a materialistic interpretation of history (materialistische Geschichtsauffassung), whereas by its logical structure it is a sociological rather than a historical doctrine. It strives, according to Marx’s idea, to transform social science, including history, into natural science, that is, to establish uniform, immutable laws of social life, according to which all that happens in history could be determined in advance. These laws must be equally applicable to diagnosis and to prognosis; having come upon the “law of development” of society, we can scientifically predetermine its future; hence a developed nation shows the way of future development of a backward nation. By “natural science” I of course mean a perception of events from the standpoint of their similarity or typicality, and not from the standpoint of their individuality and uniqueness, which would stamp them with the brand of historicism. But historical and sociological notions are mutually exclusive and repellent to each other.
We can illuminate particular aspects of history by sociological means, approach an understanding of history through what repeats itself or is typical, but to apprehend concrete history we must necessarily descend to the depths of the individual, historical, and unique. But then we must either completely reject or at least significantly modify the idea of “natural-scientific laws”—the logical pathos of economic materialism, which constantly wavers between an understanding of sociology as history and of history as sociology. This is most clearly evident in the tasks that it sets itself: sometimes it tries to interpret the most concrete historical phenomena materialistically—not, for example, Christian religion or the medieval knighthood in general, but Shakespeare’s or Pushkin’s poetry in particular; on other occasions economic materialism’s exponents themselves object to such imbecilities, and a pseudosociological, pseudo-metaphysical letzte Instanz, in which the “economic factor” is shyly hiding, comes to the fore. Economic materialism, which was originally a philosophy of history—a purely metaphysical theory of universal historical regularity—retains this logical peculiarity even as it is transformed into a scientific doctrine, but it replaces metaphysical with sociological, that is, once again metahistorical, regularity. One way or another, although it really doesn’t understand true, concrete history, it always seeks to explain it and to make scientific predictions. This is why, over time, so many confusions and contradictions about economic materialism have accumulated that we are prevented from determining its true logical face: it is a chameleon, constantly changing its logical coloration depending on circumstances.

Economic materialism’s sociologism nowhere manifests itself so clearly as when it ascribes to itself the capacity for scientific prediction, which constitutes its central eschatological nerve; this is what makes it into a historical philosophy of social-
ism. To what does this prognosis apply, and how far does its competence extend? Is it merely the expression of sociological trends established first of all *ceteris paribus*, assuming that certain basic developments remain constant (which is never true in history), and second, having relevance only for a given, clearly demarcated sphere of social relations within a given social “collectivity,” which is how statistics operates? Or are we really talking about humanity’s future life, that is, about future history, as is certainly the case in socialism, which “scientifically” predicts heaven on earth and thus inspires and ignites enthusiasm in men’s hearts? Neither one, nor the other, or one and the other. Capital’s tendency to concentration, which operates only within a particular social collectivity and loses all sense outside it, does not provide adequate material from which to carve, scientifically, an “earthly paradise”; nor can we scientifically make any conclusions concerning the leap into the kingdom of freedom and advent of the socialist elysium. These things are apparently possible only outside science, although the sociological foundation makes them look scientific, giving them the air of statistics or other large-scale predictions. Truly scientific elements are here dissolved in utopian ones, but the utopian are hidden behind a mask of scientism; complete confusion results.

There is another related contradiction that corrodes economic materialism: on one hand, it is radical sociological determinism, which regards everything through the prism of an inexorable iron necessity; on the other, it is no less radical pragmatism, a philosophy of action, which cannot but be to a certain degree undeterministic, for which “the world is plastic” and nothing is completely predetermined, inexorable, inevitable. Economic materialism remains helpless before the antinomy of freedom and necessity that it carries in itself: like Faust, it has two souls striving in opposite directions. This complication has long been noted in the literature. As consistent sociologism,

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economic materialism entirely ignores the individual, equating it with a zero quantity, a *quantité négligeable*. Individuals are seen not even as Condillac’s statues but as wind-up dolls jerked around on the string of economic interests. Clearly, this conception leaves room neither for freedom, nor creativity, nor any human pragmatism, and mechanism reigns over everything. But at the same time, economic materialism itself was born of pragmatism; it is merely a means of orientation with the aim of social action. And this action, we are further told, will break the force of mechanism and compel it to submit to its teleology. But where is this freedom and what is it? Where should we put it, where is there room for it in this desert of all-powerful necessity? For the victory of freedom over necessity presupposes as a condition the existence of these antinomies and their struggle and consequently the simultaneous existence and compatibility, to a degree, of freedom and necessity; but in economic materialism there is no room whatsoever for freedom. Man, as he is here portrayed, turns out to be below the antinomy of freedom and necessity, he is an object of necessity like a rock, like any physical object, and therefore the possibility of a struggle with necessity and victory over it becomes entirely incomprehensible. This contradiction stands exposed in economic materialism and, as I noted earlier, contradictory versions alternate or even unite directly in it. According to one of them, the wheel of history can be neither stopped nor turned back, or childbirth, once begun, cannot be reversed; according to another, it is possible to soften the pains of childbirth (but to what degree?) and even to conquer necessity by recognizing it. “Freedom is the recognition of necessity,” economic materialism trustingly repeats after Hegel, without noticing how foreign and treacherous this apparent ally is. But cognition itself is also action, committed with the participation of the will; a free act lies at the foundation of cognition. Cognition is the ideal transcendence of blind
necessity, and it is followed by a real transcendence. Thus the formula of freedom as recognized necessity is thoroughly pragmatic; it makes a breach in the stronghold of determinism so that defense becomes impossible and it must capitulate. The indefiniteness of economic materialism’s ethical theory can also be explained by this weakness on the issue of necessity. On one hand, economic materialism knows nothing of ethics, both because it denies the authenticity or at least the independence of all that is not economic and because ethics cannot be united with consistent determinism, and any effort at such a union is self-contradictory. Ethics and freedom, that is, indeterminism, which designate a space for a decision-making will, that is, for freedom of will, are inextricably connected to each other. On the other hand, it is an irrefutable fact that, in reality, economic materialism in its socialist interpretation is thoroughly ethical, and this includes Marx’s own tremendous ethical temperament. Socialism, at least in one of its aspects, is entirely an ethics of economy, a theory of economic imperatives that of course turns to human will, that is, to freedom. Economic materialism barely tries to escape from these contradictions and unites in practice what is philosophically irreconcilable. The most vulnerable spot in this field, however, is not the ethics but the epistemology of economic materialism. Although this last doesn’t deal with epistemology and even explicitly rejects it (already in Engels’s Anti-Dühring and yet more in the recent literature), epistemology does not permit of such easy dismissal and holds on with its tenacious claws, demanding “critical self-accountability.” Economic materialism requires no more, no less, than an explanation of the possibility of its own existence. How is such self-reflection possible, such self-consciousness or self-revelation of nature as we have in economic materialism, if the world is only a mechanism and man is completely subject to economic laws, and everything he does or thinks, even

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if it seems to him to have independent existence or meaning, is “in the last count” merely a superstructure or ideology, and consequently actually a sort of self-deception or illusion? How can clay know what the potter is doing with it, or a machine be conscious of its own mechanism? Does not this already mean to rise above this mechanism, that is, to stop being merely a machine? In this case the theory that proclaims the principle of universal machininess is apparently incorrect, for it itself is already above machininess and consequently makes a breach in universal machininess. Apparently, a similar cloud of doubt gathered for the creators of economic materialism, too, and then they sought to dispense with it, thinking up explanations for economic materialism’s self-consciousness: according to their theory, people’s eyes open to universal economic dependence at a particular stage of economic development, namely, that of commodity capitalist production, thus doing away with the ideological interpretation of history. Maybe so, but in reasoning in this way we place economic materialism no higher than all other rejected and despised ideologies: like them, it is equally necessary for its time and represents the ideological reflex of a particular economic formation. And that is all. But its truth or untruth is not at all established by this, for everything is equally necessary in its own place and in its own time, idealism as well as materialism, and they are indistinguishable with respect to their truth or falsehood from the standpoint of entirely consistent determinism. We could, of course, go further and examine the theory of determinism, too, as a product of necessity, as a historical reflex—and so on ad infinitum. We become mired here in the bog of skepticism, whence we extract first one, then the other leg in turn, yet can never withdraw both simultaneously, can never affirm the truthfulness of this theory nor reject it entirely. In any case one thing is clear: eco-
nomic materialism as a theory laying claim to scientific truth is inexplicable within the boundaries of economic materialism itself; it is incapable of theoretically demonstrating its own possibility, not to speak of its necessity, and powerlessly capitulates to skepticism. If it does not do this, then this is because, apart from the economic base, it is in fact based on the belief in human genius—not, of course, of all people, but of certain people who have been determined and canonized by the socialist church. Karl Marx, as a scientific researcher, is placed by the economic materialists outside the sphere of influence of economic materialism and, actually, he does the same himself. It thus becomes transformed from the scientific theory it wishes to be into a revelation, whose organs are the chosen prophets. Above, I described economic materialism as the most arrogant rationalism combined with an irrational metaphysics. Now we must supplement this description with the trait we have just established: this rationalism is based not on reason spilled into the world—for the world as a mechanism is not rational—but solely on the genius of a particular individual or individuals, prophetic soothsayers amidst this utter darkness. This theory unexpectedly ends as it began, with a radical hero cult that actually endows individuals with divine attributes and the capacity for higher, supernatural knowledge, and this despite its effort to exile the individual and concentrate its attention only on the masses and their movements. Belief in authority—this is the epistemology and the logical foundation of economic materialism. This is how the logical structure of economic materialism looks on closer examination. Obviously we cannot dwell on it for long given a certain philosophical sophistication, for it is burdened with contradictions that need to be overcome once they are acknowledged, and it is rife with confusions that need to be cleared up. We might even say that economic material-

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ism does not exist, and has never existed, as a philosophical system. Yet this does not diminish its significance in the history of ideas. As we have seen, it is a first stab at a philosophy of economy; it brings to the surface a new and, I believe, ore-rich vein. It expresses a vivid thought, poses a novel problem, and stimulates a new philosophical excitement. Marx’s role is something like Malthus’s was in relation to the issue of population. Virtually nothing remains of Malthus’s theory, yet the problem of population is eternally linked to his name because he brought it to public attention; the same is true for the problem of the philosophy of economy, which was first posed in economic materialism and that will naturally outlive it.

Beyond this philosophical value, though, economic materialism also expresses a particular life truth—practical and moral rather than theoretical. It might not always be noticeable to abstract theorizing, or accessible to its haughty imperiousness, which economic materialism in its own language taunts as bourgeois. Under the guise of cold rational and theoretical rigidity it conceals man’s sorrow about himself, the pain of the “king of nature” imprisoned by the elements of this same indifferent and even hostile nature. The economic tragedy of human life has found expression in this sorrowful theory, and its pessimism contains profound sincerity and truthfulness. A curse glooms over man, says economic materialism, for what if not a curse is this unfreedom of reasonable being in the hands of deathly, mindless, alien nature, this eternal danger of hunger, poverty, and death? The curse of dependence on nature generates another, more evil curse—the economic slavery of man to man, the eternal struggle among people because of wealth. This is the pain we glimpse in economic materialism, and this is the truth revealed in its scientific hieroglyphics. This is the truth expressed in the very first pages of the book of the genesis
of the human race, as the word of God’s wrath and God’s judgment on sinful man and all creation: “Cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life; thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee. . . . In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken” (Gen. 3:17–19).
Notes

Introduction


3. No monograph has yet been published in English on Bulgakov’s Parisian period, though Lev Zander, *Bog i mir* [God and the world] (Paris, 1948)—a two-volume work by Bulgakov’s disciple—focuses on these years. Bulgakov’s theology and its relation to modern civilization have
been addressed in Paul Vallière, Bulgakov (unpublished manuscript), and Vallière, “Sophiology as the Dialogue of Orthodoxy with Modern Civilization,” in Kornblatt and Gustafson, Russian Religious Thought.


5. Sergei Bulgakov, Philosophy of Economy, p. 151, this edition.

6. The notion of Sophia had been introduced into the cultural consciousness of the Silver Age with particular force by the poetry and philosophy of Vladimir Soloviev, for whom Sophia was a major theme. In the Lectures on Godmanhood, Soloviev conceived of Christ as having a male and a female component—the Logos and Sophia. A collection of Soloviev’s writings was published in English by Semën Frank (A Soloviev Anthology [New York, 1950]).


8. For more on the “sophic economy,” and on Bulgakov’s intellectual evolution in the context of the Silver Age in general, see Evtuhov, Cross and Sickle, especially chs. 8–9.


10. Hughes, Consciousness and Society, p. 16.

11. This, again, is Hughes’s expression. Ibid., p. 32.

12. Bulgakov, Philosophy of Economy, p. 35.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid., p. 44.

16. Ibid., p. 93.

17. Ibid., p. 94.


20. For a discussion of Schelling’s importance in the nineteenth century, see the introduction to N. V. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West in the Teachings of the Slavophiles (Cambridge, Mass., 1952); see also Vsevolod Setchkarev, Schellings Einfluß in der russischen Literatur der 20er und 30er Jahre des XIX Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1939).

21. For a contemporary version of this argument, see V. V. Kolesov’s intro-
23. Bulgakov, Philosophy of Economy, p. 130.
25. For further discussion, see Riasanovsky, “Khomiakov.”
27. Bernice Rosenthal has written about the importance of labor in Bulgakov’s thought (“In Search of an Orthodox Work Ethic,” in Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia, ed. Edith Clowes, Samuel Kassow, and James West [Princeton, 1991], pp. 57–74) —though I would argue that Bulgakov was articulating an existing attitude in Orthodoxy, rather than searching.
28. To cite but one example, Bulgakov speaks of a union of the “logical” and “a-logical” as “indivisible yet discrete” (“nerazdel’no i nesliianno”) —the description of the union of divine and human natures in the hypostasis of the Son. Bulgakov, Philosophy of Economy, p. 11.

Preface

1. See generally Sergei Bulgakov, Ot marksizma k idealizmu [From Marxism to idealism] (St. Petersburg, 1903), and the introduction to Bulgakov, Kratkii ocherk politicheskoi ekonomii [A brief outline of political economy] (Moscow, 1906). See also Bulgakov, Dva grada [Two cities] (Moscow, 1911), and Bulgakov, “Priroda v filosofi Vl. Soloveva” [Nature in Vladimir Soloviev’s philosophy], in O Vladimire Soloveve [On Vladimir Soloviev] (Moscow, 1911).
2. Here I am applying Vladimir Soloviev’s well-known expression to Christian ontology.

CHAPTER 1
The Problem of the Philosophy of Economy

1. This is because it isn’t really possible to consider the eclectic, philosophically unprincipled hodgepodge of ethics (recently, Kantian) and economic materialism that we see in the “historical-ethical current in political economy” to be any better than economic materialism itself. Disregarding all preventive measures on the part of ethics, the representatives of this school, with their veiled economic materialism (the school of Schmoller, Brentano, Bücher, and all the major contemporary German economists) in fact facilitated the spread of economism more than the most militant Marxists, for in reality it was they who applied the principles that the Marxists merely preached.

2. This question was posed with particular force in Rickert’s teleological criticism, as well as in Lask. See Emil Lask, *Fichte’s Idealismus und die Geschichte* [Fichte’s idealism and history] (Tübingen, 1902), and especially *Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre* [The logic of philosophy and the theory of categories] (Tübingen, 1911).

3. I am aware that the terminology I have chosen is somewhat inconvenient, for it bears traces of psychologism. But other oppositions that might constitute appropriate alternatives, such as rationalism-antirationalism and logism-antilogism, are equally susceptible to potential misunderstandings. It seems to me excessive to introduce neologisms for this purpose.

4. Descartes’s statement *Cogito ergo sum* suffers from a basic lack of clarity. In its most straightforward sense it can be understood as a claim of the most unbridled rationalism, in accordance with which being is established and conditioned by thought, and therefore thought precedes being, is prior to it. We have this Kanticized Cartesianism in contemporary neo-Kantianism, particularly in Hermann Cohen, *Logik der reinen Erkenntnis* [Theory of pure cognition] (Berlin, 1902), in which being is consigned to a place (definitely not the first) in a series of categories while all alogical or superlogical givens are completely excluded (in the theory of *reiner Ursprung* [pure origins]). This is the simplest and clearest interpretation of Descartes’s statement. Yet he himself not only proved unable to hold to it but blurred its radicalism by issuing a series of further commentaries (similarly, Kant, in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, blurred the radicalism of the ideas in the first edition). Therefore we can
find other interpretations of his thesis in Descartes himself; they transform it from a syllogism to an identity and deprive it of its raison d’être: *Cogito ergo sum* in this sense means *Sum cogitans ergo sum*, or even more briefly, *Sum ergo sum*—a formula that begins to remind us of Fichte’s *Ich bin Ich*. (Descartes addresses this issue in his responses to the objections to the *Discourse on Method*.) Finally, in the *Principles of Philosophy*, Descartes provides yet a third interpretation of his thesis that deprives it of all specificity: “by the word, to think, I mean everything that occurs in us in such a manner that we are conscious of it immediately within ourselves. Therefore not only to understand, to wish, to imagine constitute thought, but to feel also means to think” (pt. 1, sec. 9). In this interpretation Descartes’s thesis is deprived of its sharpness as an idea, and hence also loses its historical significance.

5. In Fichte’s philosophical work only the first period, up to about 1800, is characterized by a predominant intellectualism, which makes him a predecessor to Hegel; later he becomes more like Jacobi and in some respects like Schelling and Schopenhauer. (Emil Lask notes these periods in *Fichtes Idealismus*, pp. 71–72 and elsewhere, especially pp. 157–64.) But even in that first period Fichte’s philosophy can be interpreted as absolute idealism and therefore as completely intellectualist only through a one-sided reading. The essential idea of Fichte’s theory of science is that the self as action, as an act of freedom and self-creativity, forms the basis of cognition. Therefore the law of identity, which strengthens knowledge and rests on the identity of the I, has its basis outside the boundaries of knowledge. Knowledge or thought, however “pure,” cannot suspend itself in the air by a rope cast up into the sky: self-generating, self-contained thought, be it in Hegel or in Cohen, is equally far from this idealistic pragmatism that reveals philosophy’s inevitable hiatus. “In order for the real life of the I to become possible, an additional push through the non-I is necessary”—which in fact becomes the condition for the very existence of the I, or rather its activation, for “its existence consists in activity. . . . The theory of science is therefore realistic. . . . In the ideal everything depends on the I, but from the perspective of reality the I itself is dependent” (J. G. Fichte, *Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre* [Foundations of a general theory of science] (1794), in *Werke* [Works] (1845–46; repr. Berlin, 1971), 1:279–80). “There is no death, no lifeless matter, but life, spirit, and intellect all around: the kingdom of the spirits, no more, no less. To the contrary, all knowledge, if only it is knowledge, is being. . . . Matter is inevitably spiritual, spirit is inevitably material. There is no matter without life and soul, there is no life outside matter”

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This is I-ness, subject-objectness, and nothing more; the positing of the subjective and its objective, the consciousness and its conscious, as one whole; and decidedly nothing more besides this identity" (Fichte, *Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grössere Publikum über das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie* [A brilliantly clear report to the general public on the true state of contemporary philosophy], in *Werke*, 2:362–63). The primacy of life is declared in the *Sonnenklarer Bericht* (1801). Here *Wissenschaftslehre* [theory of science] as “ideas about ideas” or “science” is opposed to real life, and its pretensions to being a *Lebensweisheit* [life wisdom] or *Weltweisheit* [worldly wisdom]—pretensions of which other systems are accused—are rejected. In Fichte’s last period, in the “popular philosophical writings,” this pragmatism becomes a defining characteristic. Yet in constructing his system Fichte went further than necessary in the direction of intellectualism and idealism and was understood in precisely this sense. Most of all Fichte can be faulted for destroying nature, transforming it into a mere non-I and “äußerer Anstoß” [external impulse] for the I, thus relegating all life reality to the realm of the I. The latter thus acquires divine attributes, and the limited, created self is transformed into a universal, absolute I for which nature is merely a self-positing, a non-I. The philosophy of God-manhood leads to acosmism and illusionism. On the other hand, in the second period the idea of the primacy of faith over knowledge and of life over consciousness sounds with increasing confidence and entirely crowds out the unhealthy subjectivism of the first period. The following declaration, for example, sounds entirely Schellingian: “Such is the true meaning of transcendental idealism: all being is knowledge. The foundation of the universal is spirit itself, rather than soullessness [Ungeist] or the opposite of the soul [Widergeist], which would be impossible to conceive as united with the spirit.” (Fichte, *Darstellung*, p. 35).


7. “We begin with thought. Thought cannot have any source outside its own self. . . . Pure thought in itself, exclusively, must become the theory of thought or the theory of cognition. We seek to construct logic as a theory of thought, which is in fact a theory of cognition” (Hermann Cohen, *Logik der reinen Erkenntnis*, p. 12). “Logical thought is scientific
The question of the relation of the sciences is the question of the relation of their methods” (ibid., emphasis in original). Cohen develops this program of “scientific philosophy” in the spirit of radical idealism in his earlier works as well; see especially Kant’s *Theorie der Erfahrung* [Kant’s theory of experience], 2d ed. (Berlin, 1885), and *Das Prinzip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte* [The principle of the method of infinitesimals and its history] (Berlin, 1883). See the clear formulation of the “Marburg school’s” ideas in Paul Natorp, *Philosophie, ihr Problem und ihre Probleme: Einführung in den kritischen idealismus* [Philosophy, its task and its problems: An introduction to critical idealism] (Göttingen, 1911).

It is interesting to juxtapose Hegel’s general point of view here, as expressed in the famous introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, written in the context of his sharp polemics with Schelling. Here we read: “The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of such truth. To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title ‘love of knowing’ and be actual knowing—that is what I have set myself to do. The inner necessity that knowing should be Science lies in its nature. . . . Now is the time for philosophy to be raised to the status of a Science . . . to lay down that the true shape of truth is scientific.” G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford, 1977), pp. 3–4, emphasis in original. V. Jakovenko suggested a similarity between Hegelianism and Cohenism in his “Teoreticheskaia filosofia G. Kogena” [H. Cohen’s theoretical philosophy], *Logos* 1 (1910): 199–249.

8. We will encounter this limitation below, in the final chapter, when we discuss economic materialism.


10. See V. S. Soloviev in his first epistemology and S. N. Trubetskov in various works but most systematically in the “Osnovaniia idealizma.”

11. One might object to this interpretation of Hegelianism that it is precisely reality which, for Hegel, must constitute the content of philosophy: “reality is the content of philosophy.” Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* [Encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences in outline] (1830), in *Werke* [Works] (Frankfurt am Main, 1979), 20 vols., vol. 8, pt. 1, “Die Wissenschaft der Logik” [The science of logic]. Yet we need only appreciate how Hegel understands reality: for him only “what is rational is actual” (*Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox [Oxford, 1942], p. 11), whereas “an accidental existence cannot

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earn the emphatic name of real;—the accidental is an existence that has no higher value than the possible, and that can just as well not be as be” (“Wissenschaft der Logik,” p. 48). Reality in Hegel’s sense is the opposite of immediate, concrete life; it is of an ideal and metaphysical nature.


13. On this see chap. 5, “The Nature of Science.”

14. S. N. Trubetskoy defines metaphysics (coinciding with our concept of general philosophy) as the “critical science of essences or systematic ideology of essences” (“Osnovania idealizma,” p. 202, emphasis in original). The only thing of substance to add to this definition is an important caveat: this systematic ideology may be constructed differently depending on initial orientation.

15. This is exactly like the current disputes over who properly possesses the “logos,” disputes in which of course each side considers itself the genuine organ of the divine logos and the opposition a usurper. Fortunately the logos has not issued a patent on itself to any of the “logocists,” nor has the ratio bestowed the lifelong title of “critically thinking individual” on any of the rationalists.

16. This is the expression of Melchior Palágyi, *Die Logik auf dem Scheidewege* [Logic at a crossroads] (Berlin, 1903). There is a sharp critique of Kant’s epistemology, as well as of Kant’s method of abstraction and dissection in application to the living and indivisible unity of cognition, in the first part of this work.

17. In his second period Fichte contrasted this immediacy of life, which distinguishes cognition, with the mediation of reflection, its secondary and derived nature, with particular clarity. See, e.g., Fichte, *Sonnenklarer Bericht*, pp. 338 ff. “The philosopher as such is not a full-fledged person, but one in the state of abstraction, and it is impossible for anyone to be only a philosopher.” Fichte, *Rückerinnerungen, Antworten, Frage [Remembrances, answers, questions]*, in *Werke*, 5:348.


19. Ibid., p. 396.


22. *Economy*, as the science of political economy usually defines it, is planned activity of man directed toward the satisfaction of his material needs. This definition fits nicely in ours, which describes economy from the perspective of the proprietor and the subject.


CHAPTER 2

The Natural-Philosophical Bases of the Theory of Economy

1. In Marx’s theses on Feuerbach from 1845 (appended to Engels’s brochure *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie* [Ludwig Feuerbach and the decline of classic German philosophy], 2d ed. [Stuttgart, 1895]), which are remarkable for their implied references to the contemporary theory of pragmatism, we read: “1. The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism . . . is that the thing [Gegenstand], reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object [Objekt] or of contemplation [Anschauung], but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism—but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such. . . . 2. The question whether objective [gegenstandliche] truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness [Diesseitigkeit] of his thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question. . . . 11. The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Selected Works* (New York, 1968), pp. 28–30, emphasis in original. These theses pose, definitively if succinctly, the problem of the philosophy of economy.

2. Mechanism in the sense of causality, resulting from the nature and attributes of things, is by no means eliminated by the idea of teleology. Teleology certainly does not mean absence of causality or, more precisely,
absence of a defining nature, which would do away with the characteristics proper to things. Mechanism, as opposed to teleology, merely signifies its alienation from human purposes or its actual inaccessibility for human intention. In general mechanism is only a means of action, its how rather than its what. It is possible for it to operate with a real or apparent lack of purpose, or in direct opposition to human purposes, but this does not mean that it contradicts the notion of teleology in principle. Rather, it can be seen as a concept coordinated with the concept of a goal: every end requires a means, so that mechanism enters into the realization of the goal. At the same time not only can goals differ, but so can the degree of their coordination of causal mechanisms. We might go further to say that the concept of absolute mechanism, regardless of any goal-orientation, is unthinkable, for in actuality we always think teleologically, and consciously or unconsciously propose one or another goal of nature, and even explain the mechanism in these terms. In this sense all natural science is teleological—the Darwinian struggle of the fittest, the theory of the origin of species, and so on. All of political economy is (unconsciously) teleological even in its most objective manifestations (e.g., in economic materialism). On the question of the ends of economy see Rudolf Stolzmann, Der Zweck in der Volkswirtschaft: Die Volkswirtschaft als social-etisches Zweckgebilde [Purpose in the national economy: The national economy as a social and ethical construction] (Berlin, 1909).

3. Engels (and probably also Marx) objects to Kantian subjective idealism with a reference to the fact of technology, in the Anti-Dühring. (Compare also Marx’s above-cited theses on Feuerbach.) Just as this reference seems to orthodox, uncritical Marxists to conquer and destroy, so in Kantian circles this argument is generally regarded with condescension as philosophically naive. In fact neither is correct. Of course the reference to technology, as with any other fact of our experience, cannot refute Kant’s affirmation that every result of experience presupposes a particular a priori—the presence of certain forms of cognition through which it can be apprehended. In this sense the fact of technology is not in principle distinguished from any other fact—an eclipse of the moon, the motion of heavenly bodies, and so on. As a fact of cognition technology does not transcend Kant with his theory of the forms of cognition and of the epistemological subject. But as a fact of action technology really does not fit into Kant’s cognitive and merely reflective schemas, for it would require a different type of schema, totally outside Kant’s disposal, in order to be comprehensible. But the theoretical importance Engels ascribes to technology clearly belongs, by virtue of its remarkable suc-
cesses, to any economic act—no more to the most complex machine than
to the directed blow of a simple axe. Kant cannot of course be refuted by
the fact of economy or technology, but at the same time he cannot ac-
count for them from his reflective, theoretical position. It’s just that this
formulation of the problem does not fit into his schema.


5. This is not contradicted by the fact that Kant turns out at the same
time to be the father of scientific pragmatism in his theory of scientific
knowledge or in the critique of pure reason. Compare chap. 6.

6. On Fichte cf. chap. 1., n. 5.

7. Here are Schelling’s remarkable words, enunciated from a lectern at
the University of Munich (cited by Kuno Fischer, *Geschichte der neueren
Philosophie* [History of contemporary philosophy] [Munich, 1875–93],
7:329–30): “When I first became engaged in philosophical activity some
30 years ago, there reigned in this field a system of philosophy that was
powerful in itself and internally fully viable, but very distant from any
reality. Who would have believed at the time that an obscure teacher,
still a youth in years, could master a powerful philosophical system that,
however empty and abstract, nonetheless was linked to many beloved
currents? And yet this is what happened, not of course because of his in-
herent virtues or deserts, but by the nature of things, by the force of that
unconquerable reality contained in all things; and he will never forget the
gratitude and joyful acknowledgment expressed by the best representa-
tives of the nation’s spiritual life, although in our time few remember the
barriers and obstacles from which philosophy needed to be freed, for it
was then necessary to break into the free territory of objective science that
is now open to all, and to win the freedom and energy of thought whose
results are now enjoyed by all.” Doesn’t this period before Schelling’s
appearance remind us of the contemporary state of things in philosophy?

8. The only exception to this is Vladimir Soloviev’s philosophical system.
His theory of the world soul—to which he refers in his poetry as the
Eternal Feminine—gave new philosophical expression to the theories of
the classical philosophers, the fathers of the Eastern church, and Western
mystics (in particular Böhme and Baader). On this see Sergei Bulgak-
kov, “Priroda v filosofii Vl. Solov’eva” [Nature in Vladimir Soloviev’s
philosophy], *Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii* [Questions of Philosophy and
Psychology] 5 (1910), and also in *O Vladimir Solov’eve* (Moscow, 1911).


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12. The twenty-three-year-old Schelling writes in the preface to the first edition of *Von der Weltseele: Eine Hypothese der höheren Physik zur Erklärung des allgemeinen Organismus* [On the world soul: A hypothesis of higher physics regarding the universal organism], published in 1798: “At least a step towards the explanation (of organization and life) would be taken if we could show that progression [Stufensolge] of all organic beings came about through the gradual development of a single organization. The fact that our experience did not tell us about the transformation of nature and about the progression from one form to another is not proof that such a thing is impossible; for its defender could object that the changes to which organic as well as inorganic nature are subject can occur over an increasingly long period of time, for which short periods will cease to be significant and which are so long that we have not to this point had an opportunity to experience them” (Leipzig, 1911, pp. 444–45), emphasis in original. The most ardent Darwinist could borrow these arguments in defense of transformism from Schelling.
15. Compare Bulgakov, “Prirodavfilosofii Vl. Solov’eva.”
16. Incidentally, matter, which is to a certain extent analogous to Schelling’s nature, is characteristically designated in Plato’s *Timaeus* as a “mother” or “wet-nurse” (μητήρ, τιθηρή), and also as an essence deprived of form but capable of assuming various ones (ἐγκαταλείπον). Plato, *Timaeus*, XVIII, 49 A, 50 E, 51 A.
17. Schelling, *Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines System der Philosophie* [Introduction to the project of a philosophical system], in *Werke*, 1:691.
18. Ibid., p. 688.
21. Schelling, *Einleitung zu dem Entwurf*, in *Werke*, 1:703. The commentary reads: “a traveler in Italy might observe that all of world history can be depicted on a great Roman obelisk as on any product of nature. Every mineral body is a fragment of the history of the earth. But what is the earth? Its history is intertwined with the history of all of nature, thus
the chain stretches from minerals through all of inorganic and organic nature to the history of the universe.” This insight is partially characteristic of Leibniz’s Monadology as well: “65 . . . each portion of matter is not only infinitely divisible, as the ancients observed, but is also actually subdivided without end, each part into further parts, of which each has some motion of its own; otherwise it would be impossible for each portion of matter to express the whole universe. 66. Whence it appears that in the smallest particle of matter there is a world of creatures, living beings, animals, entelechies.” G. V. Leibniz, The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings, trans. Robert Latta (New York, 1985), pp. 255–56.

22. “For the peculiarity of nature rests upon this, that in its mechanism, and although itself nothing but a blind mechanism, it is nonetheless purposeful. If I take away the mechanism, I take away nature itself. All the magic which surrounds organic nature . . . rests upon the contradiction, that although this nature is a product of blind natural forces, it is nevertheless purposeful through and through.” Schelling, System, in Werke, 2:282 (Heath, p. 215).

23. As Schelling says in one of his latest and most profound works (“Die Darstellung des philosophischen Empirismus” [Exposition of philosophical empiricism], in Werke, 3:517–18), “the genesis of all of nature rests exclusively on the weight that the subject gradually acquires in relation to the object to the point that the object entirely becomes the subject in the human consciousness. Anything posited outside consciousness is in essence the same as what is posited within it. All of nature forms a single continuous [zusammenhängende] line that in one direction leads to the prevalence of the object and in the other to the clear prevalence of the subjective over the objective, though not in a way that in the last case the object would be completely destroyed and annihilated; on the contrary, it always remains in essence even when completely converted into subjectivity, but only in such a manner that the objective passes into a hidden state with respect to the subjective, becomes so to speak latent, just as in a clear body dark matter does not disappear but changes into clarity” (emphasis in original).


25. Ibid., 2:280 (Heath, pp. 213–14), emphasis in original.

26. Ibid., 2:293 (Heath, p. 224), emphasis in original: “Perfection is possible only though genius, which, for that very reason, is for the aesthetic what the self is for philosophy.”

27. Ibid., 2:301–2 (Heath, p. 231). Schelling continues: “Art is paramount to the philosopher, precisely because it opens to him, as it were, the Holy of Holies, where burns in eternal and original unity, as if in a single flame,

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that which in nature and history is rent asunder, and in life and action, no less than in thought, must forever fly apart. The view of nature, which the philosopher frames artificially, is for art the original and natural one. What we speak of as nature is a poem lying pent in a mysterious and wonderful script. Yet the riddle could reveal itself, were we to recognize in it the *odyssey of the spirit*, which, marvelously deluded, seeks itself, and in seeking flies from itself; for through the world of sense there glimmers, as if through words the meaning, as if through dissolving mists the land of fantasy, of which we are in search. Each splendid painting owes, as it were, its genesis to a removal of the invisible barrier dividing the real from the ideal world, and is no more than the gateway, through which come forth completely the shapes and scenes of that world of fantasy which gleams but imperfectly through the real.” Ibid., 2:302 (Heath, pp. 231–32), emphasis in original.

28. Compare Eduard von Hartmann, *Schellings philosophisches System* [Schelling’s philosophical system] (Leipzig, 1897).


30. This relation becomes clearest if we juxtapose a treatise such as the *Darstellung* with Soloviev’s youthful works.

31. See Bulgakov, “Природа в философии Вл. Солов’ева.”

**CHAPTER 3**

The Significance of the Basic Economic Functions

1. Scientific practice—which by virtue of its pragmatic nature and for reasons of expediency establishes an indefinite multiplicity of causalities corresponding to the multiplicity of science itself—in no way contradicts the truth of this philosophical statement, which, in a certain sense, represents the a priori of cosmology. This is how we should, for example, understand the words of Cournot, who reflects this idea of scientific pragmatism: “no one would take seriously the proposition that, by stomping one’s foot, one can influence the movement of a ship plying the waters of the opposite hemisphere, or disturb Jupiter’s planetary system; in any case the influence would be so minute that it would not be evident in any apprehensible action, and we are right not to take it into account. It is not impossible for an event in China or Japan to be reflected in what is to happen in Paris or London; but in general, unquestionably, the manner in which a Parisian denizen orders his day is in no measure dependent on what happens
in some Chinese city where Europeans have never penetrated. These are
as it were two not-so-large worlds, each of which contains its own chain
of causes and effects; and these chains develop simultaneously without
intersecting and without exercising the least noticeable effect upon each
other.” Antoine Cournot, *Essai sur les fondements de nos connaissances et
sur les caractères de la critique philosophique* [Essay on the foundations
of knowledge and on the nature of philosophical criticism] (Paris, 1851),
2 vols., 1:51–52. For science there are not just two such worlds but an
indefinite number (*n*), which follows logically from its nature (see chap. 5
below); but this practice of science reinforces rather than undermines
the philosophical idea of the unity of the universe and, hence, the continuity
of causal connections.

Transcendental Idealism, trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville, 1978), pp. 122,
123]: “That which constitutes the universe for it is merely the grosser and
remoter organ of self-consciousness, just as the individual organism is the
finer and more immediate organ thereof”; “Organization in general is
therefore nothing but a diminished and as it were condensed picture of
the universe.”

3. One is involuntarily reminded of Paracelsus’s formula: “Should you eat
a piece of bread, you will taste heaven and earth and all the stars in it.”
Cited by Johannes Claassen, *Jakob Böhme: Sein Leben und seine theosophischen Werke in geordneten Auszüge mit Einleitungen und Erläuterungen*
(Jakob Böhme: His life and his theosophical works, excerpted and with
introduction and commentary] (Stuttgart, 1885), 1:1. The communism
of being, which erases the boundary between man and the world, is one
of the fundamental ideas of Germany’s greatest mystic, Jakob Böhme,
as well as of his nineteenth-century follower, Franz v. Baader. “The
human body [we read in Böhme] is an extraction of the being of all
beings; or else it could not be called a likeness or image of God” (Claas-
sen, *Böhme*, 2:160). Man in this sense is not only a microcosm but also a
“micro-theos.” The same idea is in Baader: “All the stars and elements
are imprinted, more or less fully, in every organism as a microcosm, i.e.,
each is and functions representatively of how the macrocosm is and func-
als Inbegriff christlicher Philosophie* [Franz v. Baader’s life and theosophical
“What is usually called devouring and digestion of food is, as a moment
of assimilation, but a moment of the universal nourishing, incarnating, body-creating process, as opposed to the equally universal process of destruction of the body.” Claassen, Baader, 2:63.

4. S. N. Trubetskov has a good description of this in *Metafizika v drevnee Gretsi* [Metaphysics in ancient Greece]. In partaking of the mysteries (through grain and wine), “the Greek achieved the sacraments of naturalism: he partook immediately of the productive force of nature, he believed immediately in the *gods of bread and wine* and believed he would live and be resurrected through their inner power . . . Christianity does not acknowledge the pagan mysteries: through its idea it precedes them like all immediate and natural things.” Sergei Trubetskoy, *Sobranie sochinenii* [Collected works] (Moscow, 1907–12), 6 vols., 3:123–24, emphasis in original. On the Greek mysteries see Erwin Rohde, *Psyche: Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen* [Psyche: The soul and immortality in Greek philosophy], 3d ed. (Tübingen, 1903), 1:279 ff.

5. As Schelling says: “The highest consummation of natural science would be the complete spiritualizing of all natural laws into laws of intuition and thought. The phenomena (the matter) must wholly disappear, and only the laws (the form) remain. Hence it is that the more lawfulness emerges in nature itself, the more the husk disappears, the phenomena themselves become more mental, and at length vanish entirely. . . . The completed theory of nature would be that whereby the whole of nature was resolved into an intelligence.” Schelling, *System*, in *Werke*, 2:14 (Heath, p. 6).


8. The most penetrating of the idealists, Schopenhauer, adds to the definition of the world as representation, *also* will. But will and representation are for him entirely alien, mutually repellent, and not mutually penetrating principles; the will remains blind and representation illusory, which is why the practical consequence of Schopenhauer’s philosophy turns out to be quietism with the ideal of nirvana.

9. The ideas I am proposing here were thought through and sketched out before I knew Bergson’s philosophy and were formulated in the context of problems foreign to Bergson. But this does not diminish their closeness to certain aspects of Bergson’s worldview.

10. Fichte already feels the falseness of Kantianism precisely in the passivity of consciousness and proposes an active I instead of a passively contemplative one. Yet he is dealing only with an abstract and hence lifeless
subject that posits the non-I solely as its own boundary, but does not live a life in common with it. This is a “world in pocket format,” as Schelling acidly but rightly noted, a world as the object of the self’s epistemological exercises. This is why Fichte’s Tatbandlung [action] too remains the idealistic posture of the abstract subject and never becomes living Tätigkeit [activity]. The principle of labor as the living connection between subject and object, forming the basis for the world’s objectivity, turns out to be as profoundly alien to the Fichtean concept as to the Kantian. This is why Fichte’s absolut Tat [absolute activity] “is useless” and is incapable of resolving the solipsism of the enchanted enclosure of subjectivism, in which the self can dream, reflect, stand before the mirror in the pose of an active self, like Liudmilla in Chernomor’s castle. In the “popular philosophy” of his last period (Die Bestimmung des Menschen [The vocation of man (1800)], Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters [Characteristics of the present age (1804–5)], Über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten [On the scientist’s vocation (1822)]), Fichte expounds a theory of historical development that includes the philosophy of economy, but it has no connection with his first system, which left the deepest mark on the history of philosophy. Incidentally, a minor speech of 1794—“Über die Würde des Menschen” [On the dignity of man], in Werke [Works] (repr. Berlin, 1971), 1:412–16—stands out in his early period as a classic monument of idealistic manhood. Here we can perceive fully Schellingian ideas. Man “awakens nature” (p. 413), is capable of receiving “more complete creation” from it, “instructs rough matter to organize itself according to its ideal” (ibid.); all matter must receive “the stamp of its action upon it” (p. 415). This speech concludes with the statement that “all individuals are contained in a single great unity of pure spirit” (the world soul?).

CHAPTER 4

On the Transcendental Subject of Economy

2. Schelling says, “There can only be a history of such beings as have an ideal before them, which can never be carried out by the individual, but only by the species. And for this it is needful that every succeeding individual should start in at the very point where the preceding one left off, and thus that continuity should be possible between succeeding individuals, and, if that which is to be realized in the progress of history is something attainable only through reason and freedom, that there should also be the possibility of tradition and transmission [Überlieferung].” F. W. J.

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3. “The polis is prior in the order of nature to the family and the individual. The reason for this is that the whole is necessarily prior to the part. If the whole body be destroyed, there will not be a foot or a hand, except in that ambiguous sense in which one uses the same word to indicate a different thing, as when one speaks of a ‘hand’ made of stone. . . . We thus see that the polis exists by nature and that it is prior to the individual.” Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. Ernest Barker (1946; reprint, London, 1979), bk. 1, ch. 2, 12–14, p. 6.

4. Schelling says further: “Nothing whatever can be an object of history which proceeds according to a determinate mechanism, or whose theory is a priori. Theory and history are totally opposed. Man has a history only because what he will do is incapable of being calculated in advance according to any theory. Choice is to that extent the goddess of history [Die Willkür ist Göttin der Geschichte].” Schelling, *System*, in *Werke*, 2:263 (Heath, p. 200). In these words Schelling expresses the basic idea developed by Heinrich Rickert, *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung* [The limits of concept formation in natural science] (Tübingen, 1902; trans. Guy Oakes, Cambridge, U.K., 1986).

5. This distinction between causality and subjection to universal laws is clearly explained in Rickert’s above-cited methodological tract, as well as in Schelling’s thought (cf. n. 4).


7. Here, in the form of philosophical consciousness, Kant reflects the fundamental sin of Protestantism: its antiecclesiastical individualism, which breaks up humanity—the single body of Christ—into atoms. Kant was a product of Luther and the other reformers, who set up individual will and individual consciousness in opposition to the church and denied the reality of humanity’s supraindividual unity. This mystical misstep, which occurred in the depths of religious being, continues to bear fruit in consciousness and in action, in philosophy and in culture. Another source of neo-Kantianism is undoubtedly Judaism, or more particularly Jewish modernism, which approaches contemporary Protestantism closely in its dogmatic bases (“Jesuanism”). Extremely typical in this regard is the speech (at the Fifth Congress of Free Christianity in Berlin in 1910) in which Cohen expressed the central theme of his philosophizing:
Hermann Cohen, *Die Bedeutung des Judentums für den religiösen Fortschritt* [The significance of Judaism for religious progress] (Berlin, 1910). In the field of ethics the juxtaposition of Protestantism (namely Puritanism) and Judaism is proposed by Werner Sombart, *Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben* [Jews and modern capitalism] (Leipzig, 1911).

8. With respect to his philosophy compare Sergei Bulgakov, *Dvagrad* [Two cities] (Moscow, 1911), vol. 2.

9. This is what N. F. Fedorov means when he calls his philosophy “the philosophy of the common task.”


11. This idea is central to N. F. Fedorov’s philosophy.


13. Compare E. Kautsch, ed., *Die Heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments*, 3d ed. (Tübingen, 1910), 2:262, n. e. There is an alternative reading here—“as an artist” instead of “as one brought up with him”—but this is of no significance for our purposes.

14. Here we also read, about wisdom: “She guarded to the end the first formed father of the world, that was created alone, and delivered him out of his transgression, and gave him strength to get dominion over all things” (Wisd. of Sol. 10:1–2). “For He hath given me [says the author about himself] an unerring knowledge of the things that are, to know the constitution of the world, and the operation of the elements; the beginning and end and middle of times, the alternations of the solstices and the changes of seasons, the circuits of years and the positions of stars; the natures of living creatures and the ragings of wild beasts, the powers of spirits and the thoughts of men, the diversities of plants and the virtues of roots: all things that are either secret or manifest I learned, for She who is the artificer of all things taught me, even Wisdom” (7:17–21). This text clearly expresses the notion of science’s sophic nature. More on this: “But if riches are a desired possession in life, what is richer than wisdom, which worketh all things? And if a man longeth even for much experience, She knoweth the things of old, and divineth the things to come: She understandeth subtleties of speeches and interpretations of dark sayings: She foreseeeth signs and wonders, and the issues of seasons and times” (8:5, 8).

About wisdom itself: “For wisdom is more mobile than any motion; yea, she pervadeth and penetrateth all things by reason of her pureness. For she is a breath of the power of God, and a clear effluence of the glory of the Almighty . . . she is an effulgence from everlasting light and an unspotted mirror of the working of God, and an image of his goodness.”

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And she, though but one, hath power to do all things; and remaining in
herself, reneweth all things. . . . For she is fairer than the sun, and above
all the constellations of the stars: being compared with light, she is found
to be before it” (7:24–29). “For she is initiated into the knowledge of
God, and she chooseth out for him his works” (8:4).

15. Silesius, Cherubinische Wandermann, bk. 1, verse 163, p. 45.
16. Ibid., bk. 2, verse 168, p. 75.
17. Ibid., bk. 1, verse 68, p. 35.
18. In this sense man is, according to Schelling, “the redeemer of nature, the
fulfillment of all the prototypes contained in her. The Word, which fulfills
itself in man, exists in nature as a dark, prophetic word, still partially
unsaid. This is the source of those hints which find explanation not in
nature, but only in man. This also explains the finality of causes, compre-
hensible only from this point of view.” F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophische
Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (Leipzig, 1925),
19. Schelling, as we know, also calls knowledge remembrance in another
sense, i.e., as the conscious reproduction in us of the unconscious activities
of nature outside of us. Here there is no contradiction between Schelling
and Plato, for in this case it is also a question of remembering that which
is eternally, that which was given in nature but not yet recognized. In this
sense nature is a book of revelation containing the eternal ideas that are to
be remembered.
20. The “natural” is often contrasted with the “artificial,” and one is then
preferred to the other. Where Sophia shines with primordial immediacy,
where the initial perfection of creation is preserved, there this “natural”
becomes higher than all that is artificial: How, for example, could we
possibly compare anything from the imperfect artificial world with the
absolute perfection of a flower swaying in the sun? On the other hand,
where the “natural” expresses the current state of nature, alienated from
its sophic being, it has the opposite meaning: for barbarism, poverty,
p Hale, cholera, and finally death itself are all natural, though death is
also the limit of the unnatural in another sense of the word. In the first
case “natural” means more sophic, in the second, a greater alienation from
Sophia.
21. “Because God made not death; neither delighteth He when the living
perish: for He created all things that they might have being: and the prod-
ucts of the world are healthsome, and there is no poison of destruction
in them: nor hath Hades royal dominion upon earth. . . . God created
man for incorruption, and made him an image of His own proper being;
but by the envy of the devil death entered into the world, and they that belong to his realm experience it." Wisd. of Sol. 1:13–14; 2:23–24.

22. Silesius, Cherubinischer Wandersmann, bk.2, verse 207, p. 79.


25. This is how the origin of the world-historical process is described in Schelling: “All the power of the dark principle, as well as all the power of light, are contained in man. Both focal points are in him: the uttermost depths of the pit as well as the highest limit of the sky. . . . Because man emerges primordially (is created), he contains in himself a principle that is relatively independent from God; but since this principle is transformed into light (without ceasing to be dark in its foundations), there arises in man something higher, namely, the spirit. For the eternal spirit, saying the word, introduces unity into nature. The (real) uttered word exists only in a unity of light and darkness (vowels and consonants). Both of these principles, it is true, exist in all things, but not in perfect harmony because of the imperfection of what primordially emerged. The word, always less than fully realized and imperfect in other things, achieves fullness of expression only in man. The spirit, i.e., God as a really existing act, is revealed in the uttered word. The soul as the living identity of both principles is spirit, and spirit is in God. But if the identity of the two principles were equally indivisible in man’s spirit as it is in God, there would be no distinction between man and God, i.e., God would not be revealed as spirit. Therefore the unity that is indivisible in God must be discrete in man—this is precisely what constitutes the possibility of good and evil. . . . The principle, rooted in the foundations of nature, that divides man from God, is selfness in man; but the unity of this selfness with the ideal principle transforms it into spirit. Selfness as such is spirit, i.e., man is spirit, as a distinct creature (separated from God) permeated with selfness; this is indeed the essence of individuality. But as spirit, selfness by the same token ascends from the state of createdness to supercreatedness; it is will contemplating itself in absolute freedom,—it is no longer the tool of universal will operating in nature, but rises above and outside nature. Ascending in nature above the unity of light and dark principles, the spirit is above light. Consequently, as spirit, selfness is free from both of these principles. . . . Because it contains spirit, reigning over light and darkness, in itself, selfness can—if this spirit is not the spirit of eternal love—separate from light or, in other
words, willfulness can strive to become, on its own, as a particular will, what it should be only in its identity with universal will: because it is only insofar as it remains a nucleus, it wishes also to be as a periphery or as something created. Thus, a division between selflessness—become—spirit on one hand, and light on the other, takes shape, i.e., a rupture between principles indivisible in God. Will, emerging from its supernatural state in order to make itself as universal will simultaneously particular and created will, strives to alter the relation of principles, to put foundations above reasons, to use spirit, which is supposed to focus and concentrate, against this purpose and against creation; the result is discordance both internal and external to the will. Man’s will is the connection of universal forces; while it remains in its unity with universal will these forces also remain in divine proportion and equilibrium. But the moment that willfulness tears itself away from its focus as its designated place, the connection of forces tears as well; instead, mere particular will conquers, no longer possessing the power, like the original will, to unify these forces under its aegis and therefore necessarily striving to form its own separate life from these disparate forces, from this unruly army of desires and longings (each separate force is a particular desire, a particular lust); the creation of such life is possible insofar as, even in evil, there still remains the original connection of forces, the basis of nature. But because this life cannot be true and authentic life, which could exist only given the original relation of principles, there arises a false, if independent, life, a life of lies, the princedom of disturbance and destruction. It would be most accurate to compare this life with illness. . . . Every illness that embraces the universe is the result of the revolt of the original hidden forces: it emerges when the irritated principle, which should have remained in the quiet of the depths, as the sacred inner connection of forces, actuates itself, i.e., when the aroused sage abandons his calm dwelling in the center and enters into the environment of the periphery. . . . Illness of the particular also arises only because what has freedom or life only while remaining in the whole strives to exist on its own.” Schelling, Philosophische Untersuchungen, pp. 34–38 (Gutmann pp. 38–42), emphasis in original. The comparison of the world process with an illness belongs to Baader.

26. Sophia has many aspects, but here I am paying attention only to one, namely, the cosmic one. This is important to keep in mind so that we do not mistake this single aspect for the whole. But, because I am interested only in the problem of economy and the definition of its sophic basis, I feel justified in not exploring the manifold other sides of Sophia. Compare on this subject P. A. Florensky, Stolp i utverzhdenie istiny [The pillar
and ground of the truth] (Moscow, 1912; trans. Boris Jakim, Princeton, 1997), the chapter on Sophia.

27. For religion, this event is Adam’s sin in paradise. Even putting aside the many allegorical interpretations of this tale, however, we must remember that time before the original sin was ontologically different than after it, when our discursive time really began. This question of the relation between the metaphysical Fall of the soul of the world and the sin of the first man is one of the most difficult for religious-metaphysical speculation (it remains unclear both for Schelling and for Vladimir Soloviev). This question does not have independent or decisive significance for the present discussion; therefore I prefer to leave it aside.

28. “Man, though born in time, is created at the beginning of creation (as its focal point). The act which defines his life in time is itself outside time and belongs to eternity: it precedes life not in time, but stands outside the flow of time itself, and as an act eternal by nature, cannot be included in time.” Schelling, Philosophische Untersuchungen, p. 58 (Gutmann, pp. 63–64).

29. Ibid., p. 46 (Gutmann, p. 50).

30. “Activated selfness is necessary for life’s sharpness; without it there would be nothing but death, but the dreaminess of goodness; for where there is no struggle there is no life. Thus what is required is merely the awakening of life rather than evil itself. . . . Goodness itself without active selfness is inactive goodness.” Ibid., p. 73 (Gutmann, pp. 79–80).

31. The following profound statement about freedom as the basis of world history, which Kuno Fischer justly says “contains pure truth” (Geschichte der neueren Philosophie [History of contemporary philosophy] [Munich, 1875–93], 6:806), belongs to Schelling: “Why is all development so slow? Why even in the usual course of things do ever new obstacles arise the moment the goal seems within reach, thus delaying resolution indefinitely? There is only one answer to this: the world has primordially been set up so that everything is realized completely voluntarily. Nothing must be brought about through force alone. In the end everything must take shape through the interplay of opposing forces, and they must therefore retain their own will up to the very moment of exhaustion. Whatever changes may come about in these opposing forces must arise from within, rather than through external force; they must be configured so that they can eventually surrender voluntarily. . . . Measured and gradual overcoming of these forces reveals a particular law—that Providence that presides over this movement, as well.” Further, “The true future can only be the common product of destructive and protective forces. This is why

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the true future can only be created by strong characters, equally attached to the past, rather than by weak minds subject above all to any new testament invented by modern times.” Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung [Philosophy of revelation], pp. 262–63, 283, emphasis in original. Cited in Fischer.

Why does the world continue to exist after Christ’s incarnation, when selfness is already broken at the root? “We could say,” answers Schelling, “that God’s highest law is to preserve this opposing principle, for it is precisely on the basis of this principle (if it is thoroughly subjugated) that the higher affirmation of the divinity and glory of God is constructed. Whoever knows this law has found the key to the mysteries of the order of things; this opposing principle everywhere slows down the development of the divine world order.” Philosophie der Offenbarung, p. 194, emphasis in original.

32. This notion lies at the foundation of Charles Renouvier’s metaphysical cosmology, which constitutes a development of Leibniz’s monadology and is expounded in his tract Le personnalisme [Personalism] (Paris, 1903).

33. “The fact that the life of all organic creatures ends in decay cannot be considered a matter of primordial necessity; the interconnection of forces that constitutes life could equally, by its nature, have been indestructible. If there is anything assigned to become a perpetuum mobile, then this is obviously that creativity which supplements whatever shortcomings may have arisen with its own forces.” Schelling, Philosophische Untersuchungen, pp. 48–49 (Gutmann, pp. 53–54). Contemporary natural science expresses the same thought, at any rate in the works of certain of its exponents (Mechnikov).

34. This is the point of departure of theories about the interrelation between economy and art, about the economic aspects of art and the artistic aspects of economy. Art is the goal and limit of economic activity; the economy must return to its prototype, must become transformed into art.

CHAPTER 5
The Nature of Science


3. In Cohen, Kant’s Theorie der Erfahrung [Kant’s theory of experience], 2d
ed. (Berlin, 1883), and Das Prinzip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte [The principle of the method of infinitesimals and its history] (Berlin, 1883).

4. The fundamental idea of Fichte’s Theory of Science (already in 1794 and even more so in the later stages) is the primacy of the practical over the theoretical self, which in turn forms the basis for the principle of scientific pragmatism with its denial of a single preestablished path for scientific development. Fichte speaks on one hand of “the subordination of theory to practice . . . all theoretical laws are based on practical ones”; on the other, from here follows “absolute freedom of reflection and abstraction in the theoretical dimension as well . . . Fatalism, based on the assumption that action and will are dependent on the complex of our representations, will also be thoroughly destroyed, for it will become clear that, on the contrary, the complex of our representations is dependent on our urges and intentions.” J. G. Fichte, Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (1794), in Werke [Works] (1845–46; reprint, Berlin, 1971), 1:294–95, emphasis in original.

5. We read in Bergson: “All knowledge, properly so called, is then oriented in a certain direction or taken from a certain point of view. It is true that our interest is often complex. This is why it happens that our knowledge of the same object may face several successive directions and may be taken from various points of view.” Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics (1903; trans. T. E. Hulme [Indianapolis, 1955]), p. 39.

6. For example, the notion that such abstract scientific generalizations as the principle of conservation of energy represent purely formal constructions, without which physics could not exist, and that their truth is conditioned by their cognitive utility, is a perfectly pragmatic notion.

7. The defender of “pure logic,” Husserl, fully acknowledges the “economic” nature of techniques of scientific thinking when he says: “All the arts which belong here, and which are generally had in mind when there is talk of ’method’ in a certain pointed sense, have the character of devices which economize thought. They arise in history, and in the individual case, out of certain natural processes of thought-economy.” Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay (London, 1970), pp. 201–02, emphasis in original; cf. p. 204.

8. In this sense the object of any science is defined by its “relation to values.” Every science is living and practical and therefore “historical.” This is why I would consider Rickert’s clever classification of sciences into the historical and the natural-scientific to fall short of its goal. Rickert’s achievement was to point out the methods of abstraction and of indi-
viduation as moments clearly present in all sciences, and to show that the two are distinct from one another. But to keep dividing them up and to deduce a classification of the sciences from this division is senseless and leads nowhere. For Rickert himself this is interesting because it opens up perspectives for his teleological criticism, which contains the concept of “culture” (a mask for pragmatism); but for understanding the nature of science this distinction confuses more than it illuminates. I repeat: every science is born of interest and constituted through the relation to values (which Rickert considers to be a peculiarity only of historical sciences), but every science uses concepts of both a natural-scientific and a historical nature (in Rickert’s sense).

10. The current in contemporary logic represented by Husserl deserves credit for the establishment of this objective logical connection, in defense of the pure logic that manifests itself in human thought: “To the extent that no science is possible without grounded explanation, i.e., without theory, pure logic covers the ideal conditions of the possibility of science in general in the most general manner.” Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 246, emphasis in original.
11. “The law of causality is a universal objective truth and represents the unwavering defense of the objectivity of our knowledge and the infinite expanse of what is accessible to our cognition.” L. M. Lopatin, Polozhitel’nye zadachi filosofii [Positive principles of philosophy] (Moscow, 1891), pt. 2, p. 231.
12. “Not only our immediate knowledge but all human knowledge in general finds its ultimate expression in action. The most abstract of such ideas—the concept of being—contains the notion of activity in its most abstract form and yet in all its logical moments.” Ibid., emphasis in original.
13. The distinguishing trait of Cohen’s critical idealism is that “for it things do not exist except in thought and from thought,” and he relies in general not on sensual consciousness but “on science, in which all things are given and accessible to philosophical questions; the stars are given not in the sky but in the science of astronomy, and we designate those objects as given which we distinguish from products and constructions of thinking as abstracted from sensual experience. Sensuality is in the raisons de l’astronomie rather than in the eye.” Cohen, Prinzip der Infinitesimal-Methode, p. 127. Cohen’s idealism achieves it most strained moment in the Logik der reinen Erkenntnis.
14. Compare the section on production in chap. 3.
15. “Being is evidently not a real predicate, or a concept of something that can
be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely [@—S.B.] the admission of a thing, and of certain determinations in it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. . . . And thus the real does not contain more than the possible. A hundred real dollars do not contain a penny more than a hundred possible dollars. For as the latter signify the concept, the former the object and its position by itself, it is clear that, in case the former contained more than the latter, my concept would not express the whole object, and would not therefore be its adequate concept. In my financial position no doubt there exists more by one hundred real dollars, than by their concept only (that is, their possibility), because in reality the object is not only contained analytically in my concept, but is added to my concept (which is a determination of my state) synthetically [@—S.B.]; but the conceived hundred dollars are not in the least increased through the existence which is outside my concept. . . . Whatever, therefore, our concept of an object may contain, we must always step outside it [@—S.B., in order to attribute to it existence [@—S.B.].’’ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. F. Max Müller (New York, 1966), pp. 401–3 (pt. 2, div. 2, bk. 2, ch. 3, sec. 4 of *Elementarlehrbuch* [Elements of transcendentalism]).

This discussion is quite characteristic of the general theoretical nature of Kant’s philosophy, for which concepts are something primordial and immediate and to which one must “exit” in order to achieve being: armchair philosophy thinking of itself as Copernicanism!

16. “Kant’s theory of knowledge does not create a basis for the reality of the transsubjective world: the external world, as a phenomenon, is according to his theory only the sum total of the inevitable representations of the subject engaged in cognition.” N. O. Lossky, *Vvedenie v filosofiiu* [Introduction to philosophy] (St. Petersburg, 1911), 1: 207.
18. Kant returns repeatedly to the question of how the apprehension of the laws of nature is possible through the a priori categories of reason, or of how it is possible to achieve reality through the prism of subjectivity, but his answers are always hazy, lacking in coherence, and subject to a multiplicity of interpretations. See especially in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 115, 130–32, 175–77, 187–88, 263–64, 266, 346–47, 377–78. Here are two or three examples of his discussion of this question. In Supplement III to the *Critique of Pure Reason* we read: “Categories are concepts that we attribute to phenomena and also to nature, as the totality of all phenomena [*natura materialiter spectata*], they are a priori laws; and now we ask: since

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they are not deduced from nature, and not copied from nature (for otherwise they would be merely empirical), how can we understand that nature must be guided [sich richten] by them, i.e., how can they determine nature a priori if they are not taken from it? Here is the resolution of this riddle. It is not a bit more bizarre that the laws of phenomena in nature coincide with reason and its a priori forms — i.e., its capability to connect diverse things — than that phenomena themselves can coincide with the forms of sensual perception a priori. For laws exist only in relation to the subject in which phenomena are inherent, rather than in the phenomena themselves, and only insofar as they are rational; these laws exist only in relation to the sensual being rather than as phenomena in themselves. Regularity would be inherent in things in themselves outside the reason to whose cognition they are subject. But phenomena are merely representations of things that are unknowable in themselves. As simple [bloße] representations, they are subject to no unifying law except the one that unifies. . . . All natural phenomena, in their interconnectedness, can be placed in categories upon which nature (regarded simply as nature in general) is dependent because it is the foundation of its inevitable regularity [as natura formaliter spectata]. Reason lacks the capacity to attribute a priori laws to phenomena for any larger number of laws than those on which nature in general is founded, and which establish the regularity of phenomena in time and space. The special laws that deal with the empirical determination of phenomena cannot be deduced from this even though they are dependent on them [stehen unter ihnen]. In order to apprehend them at all, experience has to be added; but exclusively these a priori laws can teach us anything about this experience in general or, for that matter, about anything that is subject to cognition through experience.” Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. Karl Kehrbach (Leipzig, 1877), pp. 680–81, emphasis in original. Isn’t it obvious that this riddle remains unresolved here too, if we see the difficulty precisely in the question of the reality and transsubjectivity of cognition, of the connection of natura materialiter and formaliter spectata? Kant merely repeats his definitions an extra time here, showing clearly that the problem of technology and economy does not fit into them. The same happens in the *Prolegomena* as well, where the fundamental difficulty for Kantian apriorism stands out perhaps even more clearly by virtue of the greater conciseness and clarity of exposition, esp. in sec. 36, *Wie ist die Natur möglich?* [How is nature possible?]: “How is nature in the material sense, that is, as to intuition, or considered as the totality of appearances, possible? . . . By means of the constitution of our sensibility, according to which it is in its own way
affected by objects which are in themselves unknown [?—S.B.] to it and totally distinct [?—S.B.] from those appearances.” Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (New York, 1950), p. 65. (Contradiction is here piled on contradiction: although the objects are unknown, yet we know that they affect sensuality and that they are distinct from phenomena).

“The possibility of experience in general is therefore at the same time the universal law of nature, and the principles of experience are the very laws of nature. For we know nature only as the totality of appearances, that is, of representations in us; and hence we can only derive the laws of their connection from the principles of their connection in us, that is, from the conditions of their necessary union in one consciousness which constitutes the possibility of experience” (pp. 65–66). “The highest legislation of nature must lie in ourselves, that is, in our understanding” (p. 66).

Here Kant is no longer confronting himself with the delicate question of whether he will be able to distinguish, on the basis of this reason, between ideal and real talers and real from imaginary nature. Is there an “exit” or a passage from one to the other? Cohen too notices this difficulty and tries to resolve it: Cohen, *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*, pp. 311–14.

19. “Like ordinary knowledge, in dealing with things science is concerned only with the aspect of repetition. Though the whole be original, science will always manage to analyze it into elements or aspects which are approximately a reproduction of the past.” Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (1911; trans. Arthur Mitchell [New York, 1944]), p. 34, emphasis in original. “The essence of mechanical explanation, in fact, is to regard the future and the past as calculable functions of the present, and thus to claim that *all is given*. On this hypothesis, past, present and future would be open at a glance to a superhuman intellect capable of making the calculation.” Ibid., p. 43, emphasis in original.

20. Cited in ibid., p. 44.

21. Laplace says: “An intellect which at a given instant knew all the forces with which nature is animated, and the respective situations of the beings that compose nature—supposing the said intellect were vast enough to subject these data to analysis—would embrace in the same formula the motions of the greatest bodies in the universe and those of the slightest atom: nothing would be uncertain for it, and the future, like the past, would be present to its eyes.” Pierre Laplace, introduction to *Théorie analytique des probabilités* [The analytical theory of probability], cited by Bergson, pp. 43–44. Huxley expressed this same idea in more concrete form: “If the fundamental proposition of evolution is true, that the entire world, living and not living, is the result of the mutual interaction, ac-

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According to definite laws, of the forces possessed by the molecules of which the primitive nebulousity of the universe was composed, it is no less certain that the existing world lay, potentially, in the cosmic vapor, and that a sufficient intellect could, from knowledge of the properties of the molecules of that vapor, have predicted, say the state of the Fauna of Great Britain in 1869, with as much certainty as one can say what will happen to the vapor of the breath in a cold winter's day.” Ibid., p. 44.

22. “Modern, like ancient, science proceeds according to the cinematographical method. It cannot do otherwise; all science is subject to this law. For it is of the essence of science to handle signs, which it substitutes for the objects themselves.” Ibid., p. 357. “Of immobility alone does the intellect form a clear idea.” Ibid., p. 171. “We are at ease only in the discontinuous, in the immobile, in the dead. The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life.” Ibid., p. 182.


24. Schelling has interesting things to say about this: “What is this mechanism with which you frighten yourselves as with a ghost? Is mechanism something that exists of itself [für sich] or is it rather but the negative side [das Negative] of the organism? Shouldn’t the organism be prior to the mechanism—positive before negative? If in general the positive is assumed to be negative and not vice versa, the first to be second, then our philosophy cannot proceed from the organism as positive, and therefore the first cannot be explained proceeding from the second, for it is itself better explained by the first.” F. W. J. Schelling, Von der Weltseele . . . , in Werke: Auswahl in drei Bänden, ed. Otto Weiss (Leipzig, 1907), 1:445. “The organism exists not where there is no mechanism; to the contrary, where there is no organism there is mechanism” (ibid.).

25. In his earliest philosophical work, “Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie,” with its still Fichtean coloring, the twenty-year-old Schelling says, entirely in the spirit of his later natural philosophy: “the ultimate end of the ‘I’ is to make the laws of freedom into the laws of nature, and the laws of nature into the laws of freedom, to reproduce nature in the ‘I’ and the ‘I’ in nature” (Werke, 1:50). “Man’s highest calling is to recreate the unity of ends in the world as a mechanism, and to make the mechanism into a unity of ends” (1:94).

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27. Fichte rightly remarks about this that “assuming a continuous universality [Gültigkeit] of the mechanism of causes and effects, they contradict each other in the most immediate sense; what they say and what they do is contradictory. Namely, in establishing a mechanism, they rise above it; their thinking about it is something lying outside it. Mechanism cannot comprehend itself precisely because it is mechanism. Only free consciousness can comprehend itself.” J. G. Fichte, Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre [Second introduction to the theory of science], in Werke [Works] (repr. Berlin, 1971), 1:309–10.

28. As Schelling says: “The highest consummation of natural science would be the complete spiritualizing [Vergeistigung] of all natural laws into laws of intuition of thought. The phenomena (the matter) must wholly disappear, and only the laws (the form) remain. Hence it is, that the more lawfulness emerges in nature itself, the more the husk disappears, the phenomena themselves become more mental, and at length vanish entirely. . . . The completed theory of nature would be that whereby the whole of nature was resolved into an intelligence.” Schelling, System, in Werke, 2:14 (Heath, p. 6).

CHAPTER 6
Economy as a Synthesis of Freedom and Necessity


2. This dualism is eliminated in metaphysics, for the foundation of the world and hence of the world mechanism is freedom, but in its present state it is expressed in this bifurcation.

3. The question of free will has something in common with another of philosophy’s “vexed questions”—on the reality of the external world (see chap. 5). However this question may be resolved in scholastic systems, “naive realism” as a fact of living, immediate consciousness remains in full force and at least requires philosophical interpretation. Likewise we experience freedom of the will independently of any theoretical reflections about it, and our faith in it, as a fact, requires explanation.

4. This idea, supported by Henri Poincaré and by some mathematicians con-
cerned with the theory of probability, is extensively expounded in A. A. Chuprov, *Ocherki po teorii statistiki* [Essays on the theory of statistics] (St. Petersburg, 1909).

5. "Nature enjoys itself only in the richness of forms and (in the great poet’s expression) *arbitrariness* rejoices even in spaces that are dead and rotting. A single law of gravity, to which even the most mysterious phenomena of the heavens are ultimately reducible, not only permits but actually provokes world bodies to hamper each other’s movements; this is why there is a maximum of disorder in the most perfect order of the heavens. Thus nature determined the immense spaces that are protected by eternal and immutable laws broadly enough that the human spirit can enjoy the appearance of lawlessness within them." F. W. J. Schelling, *Von der Weltseele*, in *Werke: Auswahl in drei Bänden*, ed. Otto Weiss (Leipzig, 1907), 1:444.

6. Even in the creation of the prehuman world, the creative *let there be* only aroused nature’s creative forces instead of manufacturing ready products: "let the earth bring forth grass," "let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life," "let the earth bring forth the living creature."

7. "Even the continual existence (of creatures) is but a constantly renewed act of creation in which a single creature is brought into being precisely as a given, definite, discrete being, endowed with these and not other ideas, aims, and actions, rather than as some kind of vague and ill-defined general creature." Schelling, *Von der Weltseele*, in *Werke*, 1:110.

8. Here are Schelling’s profound observations on this topic: “In order for the intelligible being to be able to define itself, it must first be determined in itself—not of course from outside (which would contradict its nature) and not through some kind of inner, accidental, or empirical necessity, but on its own: it must determine itself as its own essence, its own nature. This is the definite, intelligible essence of a given individual person, not something general and indefinite. . . . However free and uncontingent the actions of the intelligible being, it cannot act except according to its inner nature or, what is the same, any given act can follow from its inner nature only in accordance with the law of identity and absolute necessity—which is at the same time absolute freedom; for only that which acts in accordance with its own particular essence, undetermined by anything else inside or outside it, is free. . . . The innermost necessity of the intelligible being is in fact freedom; man’s essence is *his own creation*; necessity and freedom coexist one in the other as one essence, appearing as one and then the other only when looked at from different perspectives; in itself it is freedom, while in its formal aspect it is necessity. The I, says
Fichte, is its own creation; consciousness is self-positing, and the I is identical to, rather than distinct from, it. But consciousness, because it is imagined only as the I’s self-definition or self-consciousness, is not primordial and, like everything else that is only consciousness, assumes being in the proper sense. This being, on which consciousness is premised, is not really, however, being, unless it is also consciousness; consequently, it is real self-positing: that initial, basic desire that endows itself with definition in its existence, and that constitutes the foundation and basis of all essence. . . . This resolution cannot arise in time; it is outside all time and therefore coincides with the primordial act of creation (although it differs from it as an act). Man, although born in time, is created as the origin of creation (as its focal point). The act that defines his life in time is itself outside time and belongs to eternity: it precedes life not in time, but in the process of all time, and cannot be included in time because it is eternal in its nature. Through this means human life communicates with the beginning of creation; because of this act man exists outside all that is created; because of it he is free and becomes himself an eternal beginning. However incomprehensible this idea might be to ordinary thought, every man has the corresponding feeling that he has been what he is from the beginning of time, and that he did not originate in time. . . . Of course a free act, when it becomes necessity, finds no room in our consciousness, for the latter is only ideal, and is only really self-consciousness; for the act precedes this consciousness as it does everything else and produces it; but this doesn’t mean that no consciousness of this act remains in man. . . . The most supreme connectedness reigns in creation; there is not that division and sequencing in time that we take for granted; yet the subsequent is contained in the previous, and everything that happens takes place simultaneously in one magical act. This is why man, too, appearing complete and determined in our life, chose this particular image in the initial act of creation and is born the same as he is in all eternity, for this act outside time defines even the characteristics of the bodily form he takes on.” Schelling, *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (Leipzig, 1825), pp. 56–59. [Of Human Freedom, trans. James Gutmann (Chicago, 1936), pp. 62–65, emphasis in original].

“God is the God of the living and not the dead. It is unthinkable for the most perfect being to experience ecstasy in a machine, even the most perfect machine. However we may imagine the progression of beings proceeding from God, we cannot in any case imagine it as mechanical, as a simple positing or performance, in which the created or produced is nothing in itself; likewise we cannot imagine it as an emanation for which

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what flows out remains identical to its source, i.e., is not independent or individual. The progression of things from God is God’s self-revelation. But God can reveal Himself only in what is like Him—in beings that are free and self-determining; their being has no other basis than God, but they exist just as much as God does. He says, and they are. . . . God contemplates things as they exist in themselves. Only the eternal, on which will and freedom rest, exists in itself. The notion of a contingent absolute or divinity is in no way self-contradictory; on the contrary, it is a central concept for all of philosophy. This divinity is essential to nature. Freedom and immanence in God are not mutually contradictory; rather, the free, as free, exists in God, while only the unfree, as unfree, necessarily exists outside God.” Schelling, Philosophische Untersuchungen, pp. 17–18 (Gutmann, pp. 19–20).

9. “Everything follows from God’s nature with absolute necessity; and everything that is possible by virtue of this nature must be the same token be real, while what is not real must be morally impossible . . . all conclusions rejecting the unity of possibility and reality in God are based on a purely formal interpretation of possibility, according to which everything that is not self-contradictory is possible. The familiar objection that, if we acknowledge the identity of possibility and reality, we must acknowledge all reasonably told novels as an account of real events, can serve as an example. . . . If this kind of empty possibility is sufficient for freedom, then we could agree that, formally, i.e., in abstraction from divine essence, our possibilities were and remain infinite. Yet this would mean to base divine freedom on an internally false concept, possible only in our imagination and not in God, for whom abstraction from His essence and His perfection is unthinkable . . . . There is only one possible world, as there is only one God, within divine reason itself as the original wisdom, in which God realizes Himself ideally or primordially.” Schelling, Philosophische Untersuchungen, p. 70 (Gutmann, pp. 76–77).


11. F. W. J. Schelling, System des transzendentalen Idealismus, in Werke: Auswahl in drei Bänden, ed. Otto Weiss (Leipzig, 1907), 2:276 [System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville, 1978), p. 201]. Schelling formulated the concept of history so well in this respect that we have only to cite his definitions: “An absolutely lawless series of events is no more entitled to the name of history than an absolutely law-abiding one; whence it is apparent: (a) that the idea of progress implicit in all
history permits no conformity to law such as would limit free activity to a determinate and constantly recursive succession of acts; (b) that nothing can be an object of history which proceeds according to a determinate mechanism, or whose theory is a priori. Theory and history are totally opposed. . . [See above, chap. 4, n. 4] (c) that neither absolute lawlessness, nor a series of events without aim or purpose, deserves the name of history, and that its true nature is constituted only by freedom and lawfulness in conjunction, or by the gradual realization, on the part of a whole species of beings, of an ideal that they have never wholly lost.” Schelling, System, in Werke, 2:263–64 (Heath, p. 200).

12. Schelling, Philosophische Untersuchungen, pp. 69–70, arguing with Leibniz, affirms that God has no choice among different worlds and possibilities and acts in absolute necessity, which for God is equivalent to absolute freedom. But human freedom and presumably the multiplicity of determinants or ways of attaining the same result (which Poincaré addresses) are already included in this plan.

13. See Sergei Bulgakov, “Narodnoe khoziaistvo i religioznaya lichnost’” [National economy and the religious personality], in Dva grada [Two cities] (Moscow, 1911). See also Sergei Bulgakov, Ocherki po istorii ekonomicheskikh uchenii [Essays on the history of economic theory] (Moscow, 1913).


CHAPTER 7
The Limits of Social Determinism

1. Of course we encounter social determinism in other thinkers as well; think for example of Robert Owen (see Sergei Bulgakov, “Sotsial’naia filosofia R. Ouen’” [R. Owen’s social philosophy], Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii [Questions of philosophy and psychology] no. 107 (1911): 167–85. In general it is quite prevalent in the spiritual atmosphere of our time.

2. The question of freedom and necessity was posed in full force for the author of these lines in the time of his fascination with Marxism, and it poked the first hole in it. Compare, in connection with Rudolf Stammoler’s epistemological idealism and the polemics with Petr Struve, Sergei Bulgakov, “O zakonomernosti sotsial’nykh iavlenii” [On the regularity of social phenomena] and “Svoboda i neobkhodimost’ chelovecheskikh

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deistvii” [Freedom and necessity in human actions], in Ot marksizma k idealizmu [From Marxism to idealism] (St. Petersburg, 1903).

3. On this “social physiology” Quetelet notes with enthusiasm: “This great body exists by virtue of the principles of self-preservation, just like everything else that comes from the hands of the Creator; it has its own physiology just like the lowest of organic creatures. Having ascended to the highest rung of the ladder we find laws everywhere that are as irrefutable as the laws governing the heavenly bodies; we enter into the realm of physical phenomena in which man’s free will vanishes decisively, giving way to the sovereignty of Divine creation. These laws, which exist outside time, outside human whim, together constitute a science of its own which I would call social physics.” Lettres à S.A.R. le duc régnant de Saxe-Coburg et Gotha sur la théorie des probabilités, appliqué aux sciences morales et politiques [Letters to the duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha on the theory of probability in application to the moral and political sciences] (Brussels, 1846), p. 263.


7. It would also be possible to interpret class interest as a behavioral norm, as a moral rule: act socially rather than individualistically, but socially only in such a way that furthers the class ideal. This is what Lassalle, for example, advocated, and it is also the ethics of social democracy. The statement examined in the text has a completely different meaning, however, because it is concerned with being rather than obligation.

8. What Chuprov says about the real-life significance of the permanence of statistical results applies to sociological averages in general: “Faith in the limited mutability of statistical results forms the basis of any calculation in the sphere of social existence. . . . This constancy is the foundation of accountability in both the private and the collective household. It constitutes the conditio sine qua non of the entire contemporary economic order, which is based on the broad division of labor and exchange of prod-
ucts that are produced for an indefinite market rather than for oneself or to fulfill an order. If the numbers expressing the summation of need of individual persons were subject to unlimited arbitrary fluctuations from year to year, the mechanism of the national economy would not survive.” Chuprov, Ocherki, pp. 249–50.

9. The question of the possibility of historical prediction, posed so sharply in Marxism and more generally in scientific socialism, has always been troubling for me, and the apprehension of its impossibility became a significant breach in my Marxism. See Sergei Bulgakov, Kapitalizm i zemledelie [Capitalism and agriculture] (St. Petersburg, 1900), 2 vols., 2:457–8: “Marx considered it possible to measure and predetermine the future by referring to the past and the present, whereas actually every age introduces new facts and new forces of historical development—historical creativity does not diminish. Therefore every prognosis about the future, if it is based on data from the present, is inevitably false. The serious scholar here takes on the role of prophet or soothsayer, leaving behind the solid territory of fact. Therefore with regard to predictions of the future I prefer an honest ignoramus to social wizardry and charlatanism. Our current sun illuminates only the present, with oblique reflections of the past. This is enough for us and for our life, for the pressing issues and interests of our day. But in vain do we fix our eyes on the horizon beyond which our waning sun is setting, igniting the new dawn of a coming unknown day.” I could add much now to these words, written twelve years ago, but I would subtract nothing.


10. “Should we deny human free will? I don’t think so. I think only that the activities of this free will are enclosed in excessively narrow boundaries and play merely the role of an accidental cause in social phenomena. Hence it follows that, if we pay no attention to individuals, but instead focus on things from a general point of view, the effects of all accidental causes will be paralyzed and mutually destructive, so that only the true causes through which society exists and is maintained will remain. The wisdom of the higher being established limits for our moral as well as physical qualities; it did not please him to allow man to usurp his eternal laws.” Adolphe Quételet, Du système social et des lois qui le régissent (Paris, 1848), pp. 69–70.

11. There was an apt sense in Russian “subjective” sociology that a certain
subjectivism—will rather than cognition—has influence in the construction of the social ideal. But it incorrectly relegated this subjectivism to scientific research, precisely the place where it should have been eliminated if we do not wish to devalue scientific work.

12. Here is the admission of a “sociological” man: “I could never understand [says Ivan Karamazov to Alesha] how it is possible to love one’s neighbors. It is precisely those who are close to us whom it is impossible to love, if anyone perhaps it is those who are more distant. . . . In order to love a person he has to be hidden, and as soon as he shows his face the love vanishes.” F. M. Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, bk. 5, ch. 4, “Rebellion.”

13. The striving for “scientific” socialism is just one of the manifestations—chronologically the earliest—of the all-embracing urge to “scientism” of our age, of this mania of science: alongside scientific socialism we have scientific philosophy, scientific ethics, even scientific religion (in contemporary Protestantism); the only thing missing is scientific art.

14. This is why, even if it is appropriate to speak of the regularity of social politics, this is only in the sense of regularity of the will, as, for example, the “Marburg school”—Rudolf Stammler, Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp—does.

15. Similarly, the scientifically determined necessity of the development of capitalism in Russia did not bring about a will to capitalism in Russian Marxists; to the contrary, their will was directed outside its limits to that social order which might transpire after “the muzhik gets boiled in the factory cauldron.”

16. I have pointed this out on many occasions in Bulgakov, Ot markizma k idealizmu and Deva grada (an investigation of the nature of social ideals).

17. We can see this even in the history of Marxism’s literary development: Marx positively resolved the question of socialism in 1844, and the system of “scientific socialism” was complete in the Communist Manifesto of 1848, thus preceding all scientific ideas contained in Capital, although Marx’s scientific research in the field of political economy, even according to his own account, dates only to his years in London in the ’50s and ’60s.

CHAPTER 8
The Phenomenology of Economy

1. The materialistic definition of wealth as the totality of material products, or sensually apprehensible objects, no longer corresponds to the contemporary state of production, however: neither the electric industry, nor the
chemical, nor transportation, nor the telegraph, nor the telephone fits into
Smith’s definition—even material goods have become dematerialized.

2. “However, knowledge of quantities and the fact of their greater or lesser
stability over even an indefinite segment of time is insufficient to con-
struct plans for the future. ‘The stability of statistical quantities is the
result of a confluence of a multiplicity of circumstances rather than a
law defining the course of events’ (Lexis).” A. A. Chuprov, Ocherki po
teorii statistiki [Essays on the theory of statistics] (St. Petersburg, 1909),
p. 379.

3. See Sergei Bulgakov, “Narodnoe khoziaistvo i religioznaia lichnost”
[National economy and religious personality], in Dva grada [Two cities]
(Moscow, 1911), vol. 1. Compare also Max Weber’s major work on Prot-
estantism and the “spirit of capitalism” (whose essential conclusions are
adduced in the cited chapter), as well as Werner Sombart’s newest study,
Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben [Jews and modern capitalism] (Leipzig,
1911).

4. Actually, motives of a practical nature, relevant only through sheer his-
torical association, enter into these quasi-theoretical debates as well (e.g.,
the quasi-socialist nature of the labor theory of value and the quasi-
antisocialism of nonlabor theories). This type of connection of theory
and practice, or false pragmatism, is nothing other than scientific ten-
dentiousness of the worst sort. I first proposed the interpretation of the
scientific value of economic theories adduced here in Sergei Bulgakov, Ot
marksizma k idealizmu [From Marxism to idealism] (St. Petersburg, 1903)
(cf. especially “Zadachi politicheskoi ekonomii” [The tasks of politi-
cal economy]); it is the fruit of immediate personal experience—many
years of studying economic theory—as well as methodological reflection.
Theory becomes most debatable and complicated where there is in fact no
problem or else it is unsatisfactorily posed and poorly understood.

CHAPTER 9

Economic Materialism as a Philosophy of Economy

1. However far from economism he may have been in general, Vladi-
mir Soloviev with his philosophical universalism nonetheless felt the
truth of economic materialism and grasped its peculiar motivation,
though he expressed this in slightly mocking form in the article “Idea
sverkhcheloveka” [The idea of the superman], in Sobranie sochinenii [Col-
lected works] (St. Petersburg, 1901–1903), 8 vols., 8: 316 ff. “Every idea is
by itself but a mental window. In the window of economic materialism

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we see only the rear or, as the French say, lower courtyard (la basse cour) of history and of the contemporary world." These friendly mocking words, however, acknowledge the particular truth of economic materialism and its peculiar philosophical motivation in a way that the idealist philosophers do not. But even Soloviev was of course wrong in presuming that the "idea" of economic materialism "turns its attention only towards the current and present" rather than toward the future (ibid.); here he might have learned much from the thinker who influenced him so much, N. F. Fedorov, whose worldview indisputably shares certain philosophical elements with economic materialism (compare Sergei Bulgakov, Dea grada [Two cities] (Moscow, 1911), vol. 2.

2. The kinship of pragmatism and economic materialism that becomes apparent on juxtaposing the foundations of both theories attains its clearest expression in Marx's famous theses on Feuerbach. See above, chap. 2, n. 1.

3. Adam Smith distinguished man's sympathetic or altruistic side from the egoistic or economic. He studies the first in the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the second in the Wealth of Nations. His followers completely forgot about this division (though it too is of course highly debatable), and, with Bentham's help, turned the methodological premise of the Wealth of Nations into a general theory of mankind.

4. See Sergei Bulgakov, "Osnovnye problemy teorii progressa" [The essential problems of the theory of progress], in Problemy idealizma [Problems of idealism], ed. P. I. Novgorodtsev (Moscow, 1903), and Sergei Bulgakov, Ot marksizma k idealizmu [From Marxism to idealism] (St. Petersburg, 1903).

5. We have a typical example of such an application of political-economic concepts as a key that is supposed to open the doors to all locks of history in Marx's famous judgment concerning the relation of economy to religion and on Christianity as a religion of production of goods. "For a society of commodity producers, whose general social relation of production consists in the fact that they treat their products as commodities, hence as values, and in this material [sachlich] form bring their individual, private labors into relation with each other as homogeneous human labor, Christianity with its religious cult of man in the abstract, more particularly in its bourgeois development, i.e., in Protestantism, Deism, etc., is the most fitting form of religion." Karl Marx, Capital, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York, 1977), 1:172. In this paradox Marx actually caricatures himself, although his followers unfortunately not only did not notice this unintentional lampoon but amplified it.

6. Rudolf Stammler, Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Ge-

_schichtsauffassung_ [Economy and law according to the materialist view of history] (Leipzig, 1896).
Glossary of Greek Terms

Greek terms used in order of appearance:

δαμαζ’ω: the “surprise” or wonder that marks the beginning of philosophy (p. 47)
καὶ τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ σκότῳ φαίνει: and the light shineth in darkness (p. 48)
ὅτως ἄν: implying real existence (ὅτως = really, actually) (p. 50)
μὴ ἄν, or “mean”.: “μὴ = not, the negative of will and thought, as οὐ of fact and statement; μὴ rejects, οὐ denies; μὴ is relative, οὐ absolute; μὴ subjective, οὐ objective.”* Thus for Bulgakov the opposition of μὴ ἄν v. οὐκ ἄν is an opposition of relative v. complete negation. (pp. 57, 69, 99)
οὐκ ἄν: see μὴ ἄν
Μητέρ ζωῆς: the mother of life (p. 99)
φάρμακον τῆς θανατοσίας: the medicine of immortality (p. 104)
ζῷον μαθηματικόν: mathematical animal or being (p. 166)
ἐν καὶ πάν: one and all (p. 184)
κόσμος νοητόν: the intelligible cosmos (νοητόν = “falling within the province of νοῦς, mental”*) (p. 204)
τροχὸς τῆς γειώσεως: wheel of being (p. 219)
tέχνη: “art or craft, i.e. a set of rules, system, or method of making or doing, whether of the useful arts, or fine arts”* (p. 242)
κατ’ ἐξοχήν: par excellence (p. 264)
tιθήσθη: wet-nurse (p. 298±)
ἐκμαγεῖον: substance that can be shaped or molded (p. 298±)

Angelus Silesius ("the angel of Silesia") is the pseudonym of Johannes Scheffler (1624–1677), a physician and scholar who converted to Catholicism in 1653, taking priestly orders and becoming a mystical poet in the tradition of Böhme, Paracelsus, Meister Eckhart, and his own teacher, Abraham von Franckenberg. His most important work is Der Cherubinische Wandersmann (1657), although he was also the author of numerous essays and theological tracts.

Athanasius (c. 293–373), bishop of Alexandria, spent much of his tenure struggling against the Arian heresy; he was a participant in the Council of Nicea (325) and convener of the local Council of Alexandria (362). His theological writings focused particularly on the dogma of redemption and elaboration of the trinitarian doctrine formulated at Nicea.

Richard Avenarius (1843–1896) is known primarily as the founder, together with Ernst Mach, of the positivist and hypermaterialist philosophical doctrine of empiriocriticism. Cognition, for Avenarius, was a form of biological behavior, and all of being could be reduced to experience in which self and object are present on equal terms. Avenarius and Mach were widely read by and influential for Russian Marxists, including Lenin, in the 1890s.

Franz Xavier von Baader (1765–1841), German Catholic mystic and physician, updated and disseminated medieval mystical doctrine (Böhme in particular) through philosophy and poetry. His ideas enjoyed wide popularity in Russia during the reign of Alexander I (1801–1825), as well as influencing F. W. J. Schelling and the development of Romanticism.

George Berkeley (1685–1753) was an Irish bishop whose system of spiritualist philosophy was formulated partly in response to reigning realist and materialist ideas and partly under the influence of John Locke’s sensualism. For Kant, Berkeley served as a representative of “dogmatic” (as opposed to critical) idealism.

Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932), German Social Democrat, formulated
some of the essential tenets of Marxist revisionism in the highly influential collection of articles *Problems of Socialism* in the late 1890s. Bernstein became convinced that capitalism was not doomed to failure and argued that gradual social reform, parliamentary participation, and cooperation with liberalism were legitimate forms of political action for socialists.

*Jakob Böhme* (1575–1624), German mystic and shoemaker—and the first philosopher to write in German—saw the opposition of good and evil as itself a manifestation of God, the eternal stillness. A major influence on Hamann, Schelling, Novalis, Hegel, Baader, and, earlier, Angelus Silesius, Böhme enjoyed a new wave of popularity in Russia in the reign of Alexander I and again during the Silver Age.

*Jacques Bossuet* (1627–1724), French Catholic theologian, proselytizer, and historian, was bishop of Metz, Condom, and Meaux. A prolific writer, he was the author of a plethora of sermons, speeches, and theological tracts as well as works of history. One of the themes of his historical writings was the decisive influence of Judaism on the culture of Greece and Rome.

*Paul Bourget* (1852–1935) was a French literary critic and psychological novelist whose books enjoyed popularity throughout Europe and in Russia. He was deeply influenced by Baudelaire, Stendahl, and Dostoevsky, among others. *Le Disciple* (1889)—a novel about the passions of love—also examined the responsibility of scientists for the moral consequences of their theories and warned against excessive skepticism.

*Lujo Brentano* (1844–1931), German political economist, was also a historian of the workers’ movement who, although siding with the *Kathedersozialisten* against free-traders, later joined Gustav Schmoller, within the “Union for Social Politics,” in opposing state socialism.

*Karl Bücher* (1847–1930) was a German political economist who wrote about such issues as the woman question in the Middle Ages, early modern urban population statistics, questions of tax policy, and Russian labor laws.

*Henry Thomas Buckle*’s (1822–1862) *History of Civilization in England*, though now forgotten, was one of the most influential works of history in the nineteenth century. Buckle believed that history could be studied according to the methods of the natural sciences and hence that human actions in historical development were subject to observable laws. The British historian and empiricist, himself influenced by Herder and Comte, became an important point of reference for
the Russian writer and radical Nikolai Chernyshevsky (*What Is to Be Done?*, 1864).

Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Chuprov (1874–1926) was a statistician and economist in St. Petersburg and then Dresden who became known as a leader of the Continental school of mathematical statistics. Chuprov wrote a number of works on the general theory of statistics and the theory of correlation in particular. His father, Aleksandr Ivanovich Chuprov, was Bulgakov’s teacher in the field of political economy and coauthor with A. S. Posnikov of the politically explosive essay “Vliianie urozhajev i khlebnykh tsen na nekotorye storony russkogo narodnogo khoziaistvo” [The influence of harvests and bread prices on aspects of the Russian national economy] (1897).

Hermann Cohen (1842–1918), German philosopher, was one of the leading exponents of neo-Kantianism and a founder, together with Paul Natorp, of the Marburg school. Initially concerned with building on Kant’s philosophy to account for the dualism of observation and thought, appearance and “thing in itself,” he later worked in the field of religious philosophy based on Old Testament Judaism.

Auguste Comte (1798–1857) was the founder of positivism and author of *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830–1842) and *Système de politique positive* (1851–1854).

Etienne, abbé de Condillac (1715–1780), French philosopher and brother of the equally distinguished abbé de Mably, was at one point a member of the circle of Encyclopedists and tutor to Louis XV’s grandson. His best-known work, the “Traité des Sensations,” analyzed the human senses and reflexes by proposing the model of a living but inanimate statue, which would gradually be endowed with one, then another, of the five senses, so that the independent effects of each could be investigated.

Antoine-Auguste Cournot (1801–1877) was the first successfully to apply mathematical models to political economy, carefully limiting his investigations to quantifiable phenomena such as prices and profits. One of the most engaging of his studies concerned the role of chance in causal chains of phenomena. Cournot was the author of numerous works on economics, philosophy, and the history of ideas.

Dionysius the Areopagite, first-century Athenian, was one of St. Paul’s converts to Christianity and an early Christian philosopher. His works, including those on the heavenly hierarchy, the church hierarchy, and the name of God, became an important foundation for medieval mystical theology, despite their disputed authorship (he was frequently
confused with the Christian proselytizer Dionysius of Gaul). Some of his writings were used by the monophysites in the dispute with the Orthodox (533) that followed the Council of Chalcedon.

Emil Dubois-Reymond (1818–1896), German physiologist, was particularly interested in the physical and chemical processes in the human organism. Together with Brücke, Helmholtz, and Ludwig, he was responsible for the rejection of the theory of vitalism. Apart from his experimental work, the most significant of which is the *Investigation of Animal Electricity* (1848), he also lectured on the history and philosophy of science.

John Scotus Eriuena, ninth-century philosopher and a native of Ireland, found a home at the court of Carl the Bald and, later, in England. His translations from Greek into Latin (Dionysius the Areopagite, Maxim the Confessor) became the main source for medieval mystics and scholastic philosophers. The main interest of his theological system proper lies in its synthesis of Greek and Latin (Augustinian) traditions. Eriuena was “rediscovered” in the early nineteenth century because of the similarities of some of his views with those of the German idealists.

Nikolai Fedorov (1829–1903), Russian philosopher and the eccentric and phenomenally erudite librarian of the Rumiantsev Museum (subsequently the Lenin Library) in Moscow, gathered his writings in a work called the *Philosophy of the Common Task*. Here he advocated, in a positivism so extreme that it merges with religion, the cosmic regulation of nature including space flight and the production of artificial rain through explosive devices; the preservation of all human activity in natural-historical museums; and finally the “resurrection of the fathers”—by which he meant bringing our ancestors back to life instead of engaging in reproduction. His ideas proved highly productive for Silver Age poets and writers.

Kuno Fischer (1824–1904), German historian of philosophy, was professor at Jena and Heidelberg and a brilliant lecturer whose interpretation of Kant laid some of the foundations for neo-Kantianism. His *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie* [History of modern philosophy] (1852–1893) sees the history of philosophy as the unfolding self-consciousness of the human spirit. It discusses the thought of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz; Kant; Kant’s followers and Fichte; Schopenhauer; Schelling; and Hegel.

Pavel Florensky (1882–ca. 1937) was a Russian mathematician, philosopher, and theologian whose thought was central to the Silver Age and has enjoyed a resurgence of popularity in the 1990s. His *Pillar and Ground*
of the Truth (1912) contains one of the most comprehensive expositions of the concept of Sophia, the divine Wisdom (letter 10).

Gregory (ca. 332-ca. 394), theologian and father of the Eastern church, bishop of Nysus, was the younger brother of Basil the Great and his helper in the struggle against the Arian heresy. Some of the themes of his work, which was influenced above all by Origen, include man in his relation to nature—as the link between heavenly and earthly; the disharmony in nature produced by the Fall; and the possible divinization of man.

Ernst Häckel (1834-1919), zoologist, was one of the first German Darwinists. In his scientific work, much of which was later superseded, he was particularly concerned with the origins of the animal kingdom and the relation of individual development (ontogenesis) to the origins of the species (philogenesis). Hylaozoism refers to the philosophical perspective that would endow material nature with animate characteristics, thus failing to distinguish between mechanical and spiritual or organic definitions of being.

Edward von Hartmann’s (1842-1906) metaphysical philosophy was immensely popular in his own time. His main work, Philosophie des Unbewußten [Philosophy of the unconscious], written when he was twenty-six, took Schopenhauer’s discussion of will and representation as its point of departure, claiming the primacy of representation and the unconscious.

Thomas Huxley (1825-1873) was an English zoologist whose achievements lay primarily in the fields of embryology and comparative anatomy. He made a splash in the popular consciousness with Man’s Place in Nature (1863; translated into Russian under the direction of A. Beketov), which argued that the anatomical differences between man and the higher apes were less than those between higher and lower apes.

Charles Kingsley (1819-1875), an English parson inspired by Carlyle and Morris, was one of the first Christian Socialists. His sermon “The Message of the Church to the Laboring Man” won him a loyal following among workers while almost costing him his priesthood. His novels Alton Locke and Yeast (1849) portrayed the hardships of rural and working-class life; the equally famous Hypatia (1853; translated into Russian) was about early Christianity.

Julien-Offray de La Mettrie (1709-1751), French physician and philosopher, was trained as a theologian. He became known as the founder of sensualism (arguing that the “soul” merely reacted to sensual impressions) and the originator of nineteenth-century materialism. His
L’Homme-machine (1748) was publicly burned for its materialist and atheist content.

Pierre Laplace (1749–1827), French mathematician and physicist, charted the movement of Earth’s moon and planets in the solar system. His Celestial Mechanics (1799–1825) and Exposition du système du monde (of which a Russian edition was published in 1861) enjoyed wide popularity. The “theory of Kant and Laplace” refers to two different cosmogonies of the solar system: Kant proposed, in 1755, that sun and planets alike formed, under the influence of gravity, from a cloud of freely moving particles; Laplace, in 1796, suggested that rings had progressively separated out from a rotating gaseous mass to form planets.

Emil Lask (1875–1915), professor of philosophy at Heidelberg, developed the ideas of Rickert and Windelband in his writings on the theory of cognition and of value.

Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–1864), German socialist, was a philosopher, lawyer, and economist as well as organizer of a pan-German workers’ union. His political program became the object of Marx’s venomous polemics in the “Critique of the Gotha Program.”

Friedrich List (1789–1846) was a German economist and publicist who, in the Nationale System der Politischen Ökonomie (1841) in particular, argued for a national economy as opposed to economic individualism. His advocacy of railroads and protectionist tariffs was instrumental in the process of German unification.

Nikolai Lobachevsky (1793–1856), Russian mathematician and rector of Kazan University, refuted Euclid’s eleventh axiom, which held that only one parallel could be drawn to a line through a given point, proposing a type of space he called the pseudosphere and establishing a non-Euclidean (nonplanar) geometry.

Lev Lopatin (1855–1920), Russian philosopher and psychologist, was a proponent of speculative philosophy; his most important work is Položiteln’ye zadachi filosofii [Positive tasks of philosophy] (1886–1891).

Nikolai Lossky (1870–1965), Russian emigre philosopher, an intuitionist, taught at St. Petersburg, Prague, and New York.

Hermann Lotze’s (1817–1881) philosophy and his most influential work, the Mikrokosmos (1856–1864) in particular, found an original equilibrium between idealism and realism. Lotze’s thought was one of the antecedents of the movement “back to Kant” at the end of the nineteenth century.

Ernst Mach (1838–1916), professor of physics at Prague University, held the philosophical view that complexes of sensations merged to form
bodies, rather than bodies producing sensations; thus there was no opposition of the I and the world.

Maxim the Confessor (582–662) was one of the most powerful theologians of the Eastern church and a scholar of Plato, Aristotle, and neo-Platonism. His life was spent largely in a struggle with the monothelite heresy (a “softer” version of monophysitism, which acknowledged Christ’s two natures—divine and human—but only one will or energy). His tongue and right hand were cut off for political treason (659), but his views prevailed at the Sixth Ecumenical Council at Constantinople (680). His commentaries on Dionysius the Areopagite were studied by J. Scotus Erigena, thus forming a link to medieval Western philosophy.

Ilya Mechnikov (1845–1916) studied the effects of infectious diseases on the human organism; for this work he received the Nobel Prize in physiology and medicine in 1908.

Edward Meyer (1855–1930) was a German historian of antiquity and one of the founders of the historical study of ancient Greece. His approach to historical methodology served as a foil for Max Weber’s “Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences.”

Jakob Moleschott (1822–1893), Dutch physiologist and physician, lived and worked in Utrecht, Heidelberg, Zurich, Turin, and Rome. He had to leave his position at Heidelberg in 1854, when he received a government admonition for excessive materialism. The most significant of his many works was Physiologie der Nahrungsmittel [Physiology of nutrition] (1850). Extremely popular in Russia in the 1860s, Moleschott, in association with Ludwig Büchner, came to stand for the development and dissemination of a materialist worldview.

Paul Natorp (1838–1916), founder with Hermann Cohen of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism, gave the epistemological orientation of the natural sciences a practical twist. The individual, according to Natorp, acquired his humanity by working for the good of society.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) is barely mentioned in Bulgakov’s text, yet his philosophy is a crucial subtext on several occasions. Most notably, when Bulgakov speaks of Apollo and Dionysus he is referring to Nietzsche’s essay “The Birth of Tragedy,” which was tremendously popular during the Silver Age and influenced in particular such poets and writers as Viacheslav Ivanov and Andrei Bely. Bulgakov also has Nietzsche in mind when he dismisses out of hand the notion of man molding himself into a new species, or superman (chapter 4).

Robert Owen (1771–1858), English social reformer and textile manufacturer, experimented with factory organization, utopian colonies in the
United States, and a market for the exchange of labor. He rebuffed the offer of Nicholas I (at that time heir to the Russian throne) to bring his factories to Russia.

Melchior Palágyi (1858–1924) was a Hungarian philosopher whose *Neue Theorie des Raumes und der Zeit* [New theory of space and time] (1901) provided some of the philosophical foundations for the theory of relativity.

Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494), Italian Renaissance humanist, was distinguished by his extraordinary erudition (twenty-two languages including Chaldean, Hebrew, and Arabic) and his precocious oratorical abilities.

Robert von Pöhlmann (1832–1914), a German historian, applied the methods of social and economic history to his study of ancient Greece and Rome; his interests included urban demography and the history of socialism.

Jules-Henri Poincaré (1854–1912), French mathematician, in addition to his work in pure and applied mathematics also wrote about the philosophy of science: *La Science et l’hypothèse* (1903), *La Valeur de la science* (1905), and *Science et méthode* (1908).

Adolphe Quételet (1796–1874), Belgian mathematician and statistician, was considered by early twentieth-century social scientists to be the father of statistics. Quételet proposed the application of precise scientific methods to the study of human behavior, founded the discipline of moral statistics, and introduced the notion of an average man whose type could be deduced from statistical data. Among his most significant works are *Physique sociale, ou essai sur le développement des facultés de l’homme* (1835; 2nd ed. 1869), *Lettres sur la théorie des probabilités* (1846), and *Du système social et des lois qui le régissent* (1848).

Charles Renouvier (1815–1903) was a founder of neo-Kantianism in France and propounded an antimetaphysical ethical personalism. His *Uchronie* (1876) traces the ideal development of rationalism and antimysticism from late Roman to his own times.

Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936), together with Wilhelm Windelband, founded the southwestern (Baden) school of neo-Kantianism. One of his concerns was distinguishing between value and reality; his *Limits of Concept Formation in the Natural Sciences* established key differences between the respective methodologies of the natural and the historical (human) sciences.

Georg Friedrich Bernhard Riemann (1826–1866), German mathematician and physicist, showed the possibility of non-Euclidean geometry by
applying the principles of integral calculus, for whose modern version he is largely responsible. The space created by infinitesimally small triangles turns out to be curved and allows the possibility that the shortest distance between two points may not be a straight line. Consequently, the sum of the angles of a triangle constructed from such lines will be different from the sum of two right angles.

Johann-Karl Rodbertus-Jagetzow (1805–1875), Prussian economist, historian, and parliamentarian, believed in gradualism (Kontinuität) and social equality, thus initially combining monarchism, nationalism, and socialism. His economic theories, emphasizing the importance of labor in determining value, brought him eventually to alliance with Social Democracy.

John Ruskin (1819–1900), English essayist, art historian, and social critic, was the object of Bulgakov’s attention in a 1909 article, “Ruskin’s Social Philosophy,” in Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii [Questions of philosophy and psychology]. Ruskin was the main theoretician of the pre-Raphaelite movement in art; his religious-ethical perspective on art and society attracted a broad following and influenced the aesthetic and practical program of William Morris and others.

Gustav von Schmoller (1838–1917), German political economist, proposed a notion of the national economy in opposition to individualism (Manchester school). An adherent of empirical inductivism, Schmoller supported protectionist tariffs and was close to the orientation of state socialism.

Ernst Werner von Siemens (1816–1892), German engineer, inventor, and industrialist, installed Russia’s first telegraph network in 1853. The multinational industrial empire he established has made Siemens into a household name even today.

Georg Simmel (1858–1917), German philosopher and sociologist, underwent a shift from biological evolutionism (Darwin and Spencer) to metaphysical idealism. His attention to the theory of value in history brought him close to the southwestern neo-Kantians; subsequently, he became an adherent of life-oriented Bergsonian metaphysics. The Philosophy of Money (1900) proposed to substitute money (value) itself for the national economy as the point of departure for a social philosophy.

Werner Stammel (1863–1941), German political economist and sociologist, developed a theoretical system that defined economy—economic orientation, organization, and technology—as a larger cultural reality.

Rudolf Stammler (1852–1930), German legal philosopher, was a leading proponent of a return to the principles of natural law. His theories

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about causality and teleology in the social and historical process, which sought to preserve a place for free will and planned action, provoked a heated polemical response from writers in Germany and Russia including Max Weber, Petr Struve, and Bulgakov.

Petr Struve (1870–1944), a prominent Western-style liberal politician and publicist, underwent an evolution (somewhat parallel to Bulgakov’s) from “legal Marxism” to idealism; he was one of the key participants in the volumes of articles Problemy idealizma [Problems of idealism] (1902), Vekhi [Landmarks] (1909), and Iz glubiny [From the depths] (1918).

Johann-Peter Süßmilch (1707–1767) was a German Lutheran pastor whose pioneering efforts to apply mathematics to the field of statistics anticipated the methods of Adolphe Quételet (to whom he was, apparently, unknown) a century later. He was primarily interested in investigating laws of population growth, in which he saw evidence of divine providence.

Sergei Trubetskoy (1862–1905) was one of a distinguished aristocratic family of philosophers, diplomats, and linguists. His philosophy was extremely influential for the idealist orientation in the Silver Age. His Uchenie o Logose [Theory of the Logos] (1900) in particular traced concepts of Christ’s natures to their roots in Judaic and Hellenic philosophy.

Karl Vogt (1817–1895), German naturalist, made his mark in the field of zoology. A Darwinist and a materialist, Vogt was also a popularizer of science whose Physiological Letters, Zoological Letters, and Lectures on Man, among others, were widely read.

Johannes Volkelt (1848–1930), professor of philosophy at Basel and Leipzig, sought to reintroduce metaphysics into Kantian philosophy in his two most important works, Kants Erkenntnisstheorie [Kant’s theory of cognition] (1876) and Erfahrung und Denken [Experience and thought] (1886).

James Watt (1736–1819), Scottish engineer and inventor, is best known for his perfection of the steam engine. In 1773 he declined an invitation from the Russian government to move to Russia.

Wilhelm Windelband (1848–1915), professor at Zurich, Strasbourg, and Heidelberg, was, with Heinrich Rickert, a founder of neo-Kantianism’s southwestern school. He proposed distinguishing the natural from the human sciences, calling the former “nomothetic” (subject to general laws), the latter “idiographic” (individualizing and descriptive).
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