skillful, more successful, or more workmanlike, than any other. There are no virtuoso or apprentice dreamers. Accordingly, it makes no sense to say that one dreams well or badly, so that the comparison between dreaming and drawing is exposed as absurd. There is a lot in that, but I would still want to insist that some people’s dreams could be more vivid, more imaginative, more creative, than others. It seems perfectly easy to see what the claim would mean. It is useless to object that such a difference in quality of dreams could never be distinguished from a difference in the skill of narrating one’s dreams, for again it seems quite clear that one might recognize that another person’s narration of his dream retailed events of a complexity and extravagance that one’s own dreaming never matched. And perhaps, after all, there may be a sense in which children learn to dream, as they certainly learn ‘how to tell their dreams and how to discern dreaming from waking. The latter two skills they acquire by hearing others recount their dreams, and by having their own would-be narratives and purported recollections criticized. It may be that in the same way, by trial and error, they gradually learn to have the sorts of dreams that are current in their societies.

F. E. Sparshott

Victoria College, Toronto

MALRAUX AND MARXIST METHODOLOGY

In writing any book review, it seems to me, two preliminary conditions must always be met: (a) the book under examination must be understood and its main ideas adequately reported; (b) if critical, the review should buttress its position with arguments. The handling by Liliane Welch (JAAC, Spring 1974, p. 427) of my Malraux study, L’Absolu et la forme, fails on both counts.

First, Welch lacks a grasp of the Marxist methodology. She doesn’t even notice that my work is structured to bring out the genesis, character, and function of an intellectual conception, with the interrelations and codeterminations of these aspects. Moreover, while trying to situate Malraux’s philosophy of art in the broader European context of a given era, I tried my best not to reduce his personal contribution to the style of thinking (the cultural models) which I find. My third procedure was to accept as much from Malraux’s world-view as possible; it is a genuine dialogue and a Marxist aufhebung.

Welch moreover errs in concluding that as a marxist I only take account of art vs. history. I give much emphasis to nature, the human psyche, and archetypes; however, I do argue that history must be the main mediation—that any person’s struggle with destiny occurs in social history and the shape it takes must be explained by reference to social history.

Wider still of the mark is Welch’s summary claim that my openness is spurious and that I use political criteria. The dialogue, it should be noticed, goes on to the last page of the book. Moreover, Welch is unable to distinguish that the confrontation is between two differing world-views; it is not a political argumentation, and indeed I oppose the political qualification of the Malraux world-view, just as I reject the critique offered by G. Duthuit. Slogans and ready-made formulas have no more place than any accusation of Malraux since he no longer is a revolutionary. Instead, I describe his position and pose my arguments, finding that his idea of homo abyssus est is unfounded.

The only ground for her criticisms offered by Welch comes in the last sentence, where clumsily she restates Malraux’s idea. But precisely this is the rub: for I have thoroughly discussed that thought and shown where and why I differ. Welch doesn’t confront my arguments in the slightest way. She only utters some magic words about having to check man’s fate against this Mysterious Destiny.

Stefan Morawski

Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw