Anti—Natural prompts invited artists and theorists into a range of responses to notions on the production of the natural where the human imperative is the need to produce or change nature to re—nature nature and so to make the highest poverty the diagonalising of new ecologies and forms of life without the supra—prosthetic of Nature itself

In an evening of inevitable naturalism of condemnation by the condemned Anti—Natural includes works by

Calum Gunn

Dani Ploeger

Danilo Mandic

Himali Singh Soin

Inigo Wilkins

Jelena Stojkovic

Jonathan Kemp

Laboria Cuboniks

Marina Vishmidt

Nihal Yesil

Paul Abbott

Roc Jimenez de Cisneros

Sabina Ahn

Tim Goldie

Felix De Bousies

_blank

Law and Nature:
A Rendering of Order

Danilo Mandic

BIRTH

Bang, a big bang.

A birth of cosmos [a well-ordered whole, harmonious system, natural order of the universe, the nature of universe]

Scream, the primal scream.

A birth of a child [a being, a human being, a natural person, a legal subject]

The word nature comes from natus – 'to be born'. What is born is natural. Nature gives birth. Giving birth to what?

Order. Force that directs. Ordering the nature, ordering itself.

Universal rules becoming natural rules. Law is order. Law is born from natural order.

It is not our focus to trace the origin, but the origin is where we begin.

ORDER

'The nature of things is nothing but their coming into being (nascimento) at certain times and in certain fashion.'[1]

'In the beginning is imitation.'[2]

Law and nature coincide with order.

The order of nature – a source of human behaviour. Subjected to the natural, embedded in nature, imperatives that bind. Humans 'are naturally impelled to preserve the memories of the laws and orders that bind them...'[3]

Natural orders are imitated, played out and integrated into a social order. The natural law follows from the reason, the human nature.[4] Law imitates nature and sets the rules. Physis and nomos – forceful material reality and law.

Even before recognised as rights, the rules are only natural functions.

APPROPRIATION

The pollution is natural. The pollution is part of nature. Self-sustainable waste.

Bodily discharges appropriate places. The forgotten foundation of property rights. What precedes the property right is the natural right par excellence – 'appropriation takes place through dirt',[5] spit, shit, piss, sperm.

The foundation of property right comes from the innate actions and natural behaviours of polluting. It is 'common to all living beings'.[6]

1   Giambattista Vico, *The New Science* (Cornell University Press, 1948) 58
2   Michel Serres, *Genesis* (The University of Michigan Press, 2009) 119

3   Giambattista Vico, *The New Science* (Cornell University Press, 1948) 66
4   Michel Serres, *Natural Contract* (The University of Michigan Press, 2008) 35
5   Michel Serres, *Malfeasance: Appropriation through Pollution?* (Stanford University Press, 2011) 3
6   *Ibid.*, 12

Cultivation of the soil, clearing it up, and inseminating to impregnate.

Mediated through techne, the cultivation of the soil is the origin of culture. What precedes culture is waste, shit.

Nature and culture first described material qualities and processes, before becoming self-sustained entities.[7]

Marking what is mine by piss. '[W] hat is properly one's own is dirt.'[8]

Birth of the right to possess.

Demarcations and divisions are the origin of domination and possession.

Dead bodies fertilise the soil. Their blood and corpses give birth to nations, our native lands. Appropriation through death.

A birth is preceded by appropriation. A male 'deposits a product that is not very different from urine, at least in terms of its origin.'[9]

Appropriation objectifies.

CULTURE NATURE

Natural right precedes the positive right laid down by the human.

Nature – an object of appropriation.

Culture is born with nature. Nature dies in culture. Culture dies with nature. Nature dies with culture.

VIOLENCE

Violence through gaining.

Nature's order is violence. Lawless violence. It is its disordering order.

Our order is violence. War is a legal state of conflict settled by declarations.[10]

Demarcations and lines of distinction, exclusion through appropriation.

Wall. Law. Wall. Law. Wall. Law. Wall. Llaw.

5

Denk Malik

7   Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (Fontana Press) 219
8   *Ibid.*, 3
9   *Ibid.*, 28-9

10   Serres, *Natural Contract*, 8

ACCORD DISCORD

The line is porous, a constant exchange.

Law sets itself as a medium through which such exchange is possible. Rigid and flexible, hard and soft.

Law joins two sides together, binds them, and sets an order according to which a harmony is achieved. Law idealises balance and harmony.

Law imitates nature. In its imitation it personifies and becomes a nature of another order.

Law sets rules that go beyond nature.

An anti-natural means to establish relations between persons.

Divisions. Exclusions. Violence.

The social contract was signed. Rise of division between nature and culture.

Law fails harmony.

OBJECT

The natural order moves from agricultural fields to the city. A concentrated space of waste, sewage and infrastructure. Social order is a transient enclosure that comes with property, identity, policing and balancing.

The natural order is not present. It is mediated through our technological means. They in turn become a medium affecting the milieu.

Production of the natural – imperative to change and produce nature – re-nature nature.

Hard pollution: nuclear waste, plastic.
Soft pollution: information, codes.

Appropriation objectifies. Nature becomes an object.

The only difference between us and them is the emergence of an object.[11]

What is an object?

A thing perceived or presented to the senses.
A thing that is lying before us, thrown in front.

A cause or a thing that gives rise to a debate, argument, disharmony, something that must be decided upon.

To object is to discard, throw in front of oneself – a birth of oppositions.

The subject and the object.

We might never know the origin of what preceded the other, but the origin is where we begin.

'The first known subject is a legal subject.'[12]

11 Serres, *Genesis*, 87
12 Michel Serres, *'Revisiting The Natural Contract'* (CTheory,
    5 Nov 2006) < http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=515 >
    accessed 15 December 2015

SUBJECT

Human beings acquire legal personhood when they are born. A subject has human qualities, an object does not. People are subjects of law. Property, animals, stones, plants are object of law.

Human and non-human. Value and fact. Moral and immoral.

Law ascribes specific identities and features. It recognises innate characteristics. Subjects become persons. A subject subjected to a thing.

'Legal subjects proclaim the rights of objects.'[13]

RIGHT

There is nothing natural to acquiring rights. Recognition of rights is subject to decision. A delayed, maybe never achievable, response to social rearrangements and demands.

Nature is an object that lies down in front of us…bare naked. A site, a stage where subjectivities have roles and wear masks.

Asserting rights where nature becomes a stage for role plays, ideological spectacles.

ACTS

'Act I contrasts those things we can manipulate, and things we cannot manipulate. In Act II, we increasingly manipulate things we formerly could not master. Then suddenly, in Act III, we find ourselves subordinated to those things we manipulate, which, because we manipulate them, begin to manipulate us in return. This is the stage at which nature suddenly reconstitutes itself as the sum of its parts and strikes back at us.'[14]

The world becomes a quasi-object.

WORLD OBJECT

An extension of appropriation, from local to global, and an increase of number of subjects.

Appropriation and pollution from localised becomes global and the technology as an artefact of our culture extends further and increases the waste.

The world-objects – the nuclear waste, pollution, information – enveloping the whole world.[15]

Breaking the distance between who throws and what is thrown in front, between the observer and the observed. Embodying the time, space, speed and energy.

Re-creation of nature.

13 *Ibid.*

14 Michel Serres, *'A Return to the Natural Contract'* in Jérôme Bindé (ed.), *Making Peace with the Earth* (Berghahn Books and UNESCO, 2007) 135

15 Serres, *'Revisiting The Natural Contract'*, (CTheory)

We live in these new objects as in the world.
The new object becomes quasi-subject.

Object that possess a dimension equivalent
with one of the world's dimensions.[16]

The objects cannot be seen and we only know, or we
have been told about their presence…soft pollution,
sign, data, information, spreading in excess…

'The owner of a blast furnace was able to dirty the
air all the way to the ocean and the stratosphere and
thereby increased his property on earth, water, and
air, without limits. Whether he intended to or not, his
property swelled and became global and exploded.'[17]

[BANG]

A naturalistic appropriation that exceeds
the natural appropriation.

Pollution emanates from our will to appropriate,
our desire to conquer and expand the space of our
properties. To cover and enclose is natural.[18]

Pollution through appropriation has lost the
marking, it is difficult to understand the erased
borders, where pollution ends or starts.[19]

From nature to culture. From hard to soft.

Fading away.

No more native lands. Global techniques
reaching out. Writings, signs, logos, texts,
data, sounds are spreading out.

Amplification.

Spreading out in the space as this sound emanates
and pollutes this space. Don't tell me you can't
see 'an anus in the baffle of a loudspeaker?'[20]

The sound is unaffected by walls.

'When property knows no limits, the space it
occupies no longer belongs to anybody.'[21]

We live in these new objects as in the world.
The new object becomes quasi-subject. The
objects cannot be seen and we only know, or
we've been told about their presence…

From matter to energy to an interactive subject.[22]

'[T]he objective status of the collective subject
changes…from formerly active, it becomes the passive,
global object of forces and constraints that result from
its own actions; the status of the world-object also
changes as, from formerly passive, it becomes active,
from formerly a given, it becomes our de facto partner.
Thus we can no longer describe the scene of knowledge
and action with the medieval couple of subject-object.'[23]

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16   *Ibid.*
17   Serres, *Malfeasance*, 66
18   *Ibid.,* 71
19   *Ibid.*

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20   *Ibid.,* 42
21   *Ibid.,* 71
22   Jean Baudriallard, *The Illusion of the End* (Polity Press, 1994) 80
23   Serres, '*Revisiting The Natural Contract*', (CTheory)

'In this universal recycling of waste, a sort of
our historic task, the human race is beginning
to produce itself as waste-product.'[24]

PERSONS MASKS

Who has the right to become a legal person?

Law is an articulation of the human voice.

A person = per sonor – by means of a
sound. A thing to sound through.

The object is rejected a right because it is voiceless.
The animal, the tree, the plant or the plankton are silent.

Are they?

They do not have a voice for law's ears.

Threatening rocks, clouds, lightning flashes and
thunders, volcanoes, hurricanes – might and destructive.
The nature wears masks and appears in different forms.

Persona is not to resound everywhere but is to wear
the skins of wild beasts. Ancient law introduced so
many empty masks without subjects…rights invented
by imagination. Inventing stories. Dramatic fables, true
and severe are the origins of the law of persons.[25]

Anthropomorphising nature by giving a voice
is a form of fighting anthopocentrism.

Law is performative. A stage of sounds and masks.

Nature and culture produce their own masks.

'Earth and life produces overlapping epitomised in the
human – 100 percent nature 100 percent culture.'[26]

A rendering of nature enacted by rendering orders.

[ECHO enters the stage!]

Nature is not alive. But we are.

24   Baudriallard, *The Illusion of the End*, 78
25   Vico, *The New Science*, 349-50

26   Michel Serres, *Biogea* (Univocal Publishing, 2014) 50

Point to the Line

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Himali Singh Soin

If at all, there are zeros. Circular

Ruins from India, reinvented everywhere.

But there is no One. Anything is

All things and also naught.

Picture men at the cosmic casino taking

Photographs of money. Blinking and beeping

Loud enough so they don't have to hear the

Hurl of bombs in Baghdad. They ask how

Many. How many what. What if.

What if the world occurred only once?

It would have an arc, of course.

The Waltz, The Tumble, The Rest.

We'll scramble the letters on our refrigerators,

Then dance to Tom Waits' Closing Time.

But who will attest to anything when our signatures

Will have no name? Will there be books?

Maybe it'll give us a chance to quiet. Start walking

Like mapmakers to countries we don't know the capitals of

And never return—

At first, it was leveled. When will it be filled? Over what will it brim? Does it have a philosophy, can it guess its own meniscus? Can it laugh? Or does it drool, drip, drown in all of its possible states--solid, liquid and gas, so fluid that they melt and merge into one another?

They say that with every glass of water you drink, you imbibe at least one molecule that has passed through a dinosaur. There are always more molecules of water than there are glassfuls.

That rock that fell from Mars onto Earth in 1911 in Egypt, so full of solid water. Death stones from demons or broken nooses from the neck of orbits or petrified tears from some unnoticed terrestrial.

We are estranged from that which we are most familiar.

Leavings, scraps.

Inscribed, decorated or prophesied.

Magician's faint wishes or unrealized inclinations.

Notes of chords, played in succession.

Various shades of Red.

The pictures were called pictures of the floating world

because of their preoccupation with the pleasures of the moment. That is, indirectly.

Producing happiness.

It came whirling through the atmosphere, tails of white smoke forming figures of leviathans and unicorns in its wake, falling to the ground with a thud and a plank, then whirring with wistful life waiting to view its own visibility. Newfangled insects with horns and circular algal blooms the size of the sun, and sponges and corals and mollusks and bryozoans and crinoids and barnacles and platypuses and turtles spotted with milkweed with eyes like the sphinx and hands like Saturn.

I imagine a glass large enough to hold the whole ocean, so that when this rock—an omen or an idol—falls again, it may be falling now, it might land, with a splats into my rather large glass. I drink the meteorite: carbonates and amino acids and kryptonite and all the radiation and all the luminosity that water in light affords. When the chemists of the future will look for some plausible theory, they will find life everywhere.

Two of the brightest stars.

Hesitating, delaying.

Phantom

or extinct before it ever lived.

A fossil from the future.

Then one day the ocean spills into every machine and parched throat and swollen eyes, the water drips dry. There is no churn, no cuckooing, no rings, no red. The clocks break and the wind rustles all reflexivity and whole skies tumble and I splinter into another rock, spraying Egypt with manna and the glass breaks. There is no water. I drink the meteorite: carbonates and amino acids and kryptonite and all the radiation and all the dust that light affords. When the chemists of the future look for some plausible theory, they find no life.

Sudden obstruction by an abnormal particle.

Where we are is everywhere, all of the time.

An artistic movement based on absurdity and accident.

People who predicted the future from the text

in a book opened at random.

Rough edges of pages before they are trimmed. Placed on a diagonal.

The Great Ice Age.

That is, the earth.

That is, pitch black.

Anti-Natural Talk

Inigo Wilkins

The concept of nature is on the one hand a mainstay of diverse forms of conservative ideology where the natural is predominantly opposed to the artificial, the idealistic, and the deviant or perverse.

On the other hand, there is an attempt to overcome the oppositions entrenched in this conservative perspective by expanding the concept of nature so that it includes technology, fantastic ideas, and unconventional behaviour.

The conservative position is overly deterministic; it justifies normative prescriptions concerning what *ought* to be the case by pointing to naturalistic descriptions of what is the case.

The expanded concept of nature is overly indeterministic – its emphasis is on the indeterminate potential of becoming but by extending the concept of nature to all behaviour the normative capacity for judgment loses its purchase. By fetishizing natural processes of self-organisation over representation and the propositional articulation of reason it remains complicit with the neoliberal logic of late capitalism .

An adequate conceptualization of nature must navigate between these positions.

In contrast with the conservative position nature is neither a given nor a justification. The market does not naturally tend towards the formation of fair prices. Income inequalities and traditional gender roles are not human nature. Neither the ecological nor the social can be seen as a natural order, they are not fragile equilibria that must be guarded against technical and social transformations. They are both artificial constructions that have never been anything but far from equilibrium.

In contrast with the expanded conception of nature we must make a distinction between a naturalistic description of different levels of information processing dynamics that accounts for the normative-linguistic capacity for the top-down control of behaviour according to propositionally articulated reasons.

To be human is to enter into a game of artificial self-construction at the level of the social – this is an ongoing process of alienation from nature, a progressive deracination from the local exigencies that constrain thought and behaviour. Nature is no reason, and reason is not natural even if it is part of our nature. As Negarestani says reason is inhuman and 'Inhumanism is the labor of rational agency on the human' this is the elaboration of what it means to be human. Nature reflexively grasps its anti-nature and thus transforms itself. Freedom is not given but is performed or produced in this labor of reflexive transformation.

In order to grasp the true nature of this freedom it is necessary to avoid two tendencies to misconceptualise the relationship between reason and causality; on the one hand ruthless reductionist accounts that aim to eliminate the inherited illusions of folk psychology, on the other hand emergentist accounts that argue for the irreducibility of thought to causal processes. The former deny the normative-linguistic force of reason, the latter deny the causal-naturalistic explanation of reason.

To give a mathematical description of a process is to naturalise it – to explain it according to natural laws. When Galileo mathematised the supralunary realm he naturalized the heavens.

To claim that something is not amenable to explanation according to natural laws is anti-scientific mystification.

For Bergson, and for Deleuze, the lived experience of duration is natural, in a vitalistic expanded conception of nature, but cannot be mathematized so is not amenable to explanation according to natural laws.

This is a mystification of experience. On the contrary, the lived experience of duration can be naturalized according to a neurophenomenological description of the global architecture of consciousness.

What cannot be axiomatised, and what is in that sense anti-natural, is reason. The normative-linguistic capacity of thinking can be explained in terms of the causal structure of neuronal activity, but a description of the neuronal activation patterns in the brain at any one state is no indication of what its subsequent state will be.

If we give a description of an inanimate object like a rock, specifying its position and velocity we can calculate with accuracy where it will be at some point in the future.

Being here entails that it will be there.

But there are no entailing laws for predicting the trajectory of biological organisms or neural assemblies.

However, this does not mean that the freedom of thought is just the unpredictable randomness of neuronal activation patterns.

The freedom of rational subjectivity, its logical irreducibility to any naturalized description, is its capacity to acknowledge, construct and revise rules and to perceive think and act according to these commitments

Reason is fully naturalistic, in the sense that it is amenable to scientific explanation in terms of its causal structure and its functional properties, whilst also

requiring a further level of description that must be addressed at the normative level of commitments and entitlements.

The definition of freedom has been bound up with the philosophical problem of necessity and chance, determinacy and indeterminacy, and this has caused a great deal of confusion.

Continental theory is in particular to blame for promoting a 'botched dialectic' that makes 'self-organising' randomness and perturbations below the threshold of measurement the wellspring of freedom and creativity against the rational description of systems in terms of mechanistic determinism.

Countering this 'pseudo-libertarian imposture of chaos' does not mean returning to a dualistic conception in which material processes are reduced to the linear causal regime of particle impacts and opposed to some form of spontaneous unconstrained freedom. Rather, it demands a reconceptualization of the relation between reason and randomness that resists the temptation to hypostatise chance.

This argument follows René Thom's criticism of the glorification of chance in the form of random fluctuations and perturbations in the diverse philosophies of Monod, Prigogine, Atlan, and Serres. I think Thom's critique can be extended to the very different ways in which randomness, self-organising systems and noise have been misconceptualised and fetishised in philosophies such as Deleuze, in political economy, and in the theory and practice of music (which I don't have time to go into).

Thom's argument follows from a negative definition of randomness, as what exceeds simulation or formal description. he explains that the capacity for simulation

or formal description is relative to a certain scale of observation, and that this is particularly true for the analysis of complex hierarchically organised systems such as us.

It could be argued that Thom has a merely epistemological understanding of randomness, and cannot thereby think its ontological scope. However, this would be mistaken; his argument is that any talk of randomness presupposes the definition of a frame of reference, or context, and a language or means of representation; 'any discussion on the theme of "chance vs. determinism" must begin with an examination of the languages and formalisms which permit making a phenomenon the object of a realm of knowledge.' This approach is corroborated by James Crutchfield's 'computational mechanics', which also argues that any measure of disorder is relative to the descriptive tools employed, and the specification of this language is defined by what the model is intended to observe.

Thom begins with an epistemological definition of randomness and draws an ontological conclusion from this; he affirms the ultimate describability of nature in principle (i.e. the non-existence of fundamental limits to reason), and *thereby* denies the *hypostatisation* of chance: 'To assert that "chance exists" is therefore to take the ontological position which consists in affirming that there are natural phenomena which we shall never be able to describe, therefore never understand.' Thom's negative ontological claim might be rephrased as the positive assertion that for any context-specific or scale-relative *appearance* of randomness, there are no a *priori* limitations to its description or scientific understanding at another scale. One might argue then that randomness exists (has an objective ontological status), but *only* as an effect of information processing dynamics and multi-scale complexity.

To summarise we are not free because of the indeterminacy of nature or because of a lack of constraints, but because the complex hierarchically nested structure of constraints in dynamic systems such as ourselves enables us to control our behaviour according to rules and make choices according to reasons. As techno-scientific knowledge progresses more and more complex phenomena will yield to a naturalized description, finally leading to a fully objectified account of experience.

Having a naturalized description of something makes various control opportunities available that were hitherto unimaginable. The more that consciousness is given a natural description the more that we can gain traction on the parochial limitations of biological cognition and transcend them. This is the infinite goal of anti-nature, lean forwards and activate the revisionary-constructive engineering loop.

The Photographic Colour

Jelena Stojkovic

This wallpaper / work compiles
a selection of textual excerpts
that relate, in one way or another,
to what can be regarded as
the 'anti-natural' status of
the photographic colour.

If told, this story could read:

Although photography was enthusiastically
termed as the 'pencil of nature' in one of the
earliest texts dedicated to the medium (Talbot,
1844), its impossibility to 'capture' and 'fix'
nature might be observed precisely through
its relation to colour. Whereas colour and form
are considered as united in nature (Baudelaire,
1846), the photographic colour is understood
to be independent (Moholy-Nagy, 1925) from
the aesthetic value of nature (Roh, 1929). In
other words, photography never shows the
true colour of nature (Wittgenstein, 1950),
which is an agent of matter itself (Smithson,
1969). In effect, the photographic colour only
begins when it no longer corresponds to natural
coloration (Eisenstein, via Barthes, 1970). We
can think about the photographic colour through
its particular relation to space (Deleuze, 1981),
as purely theoretical (Flusser), as a 'corruption
of culture' (Batchelor, 2000), or as one of
the essential elements that allow a constant
renewal of the medium (Stojkovic, 2015), but it
is never 'natural', or is implicitly 'anti-natural'.

By not making the logic of its narrative apparent,
however, and leaving the range of possible
connections between the excerpts open, the
wallpaper / work also questions whether the
process of writing itself can, in one way or
another, also be regarded as 'anti-natural'.

Jelena Stojkovic

LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN AND LONGMANS.

LONDON. 1844.

William Henry Fox Talbot

other by the intervening system of green or blue veins. The study of the same object under a magnifying glass will show in however small an area a perfect harmony of tones, grey, blue, brown, green, orange and white, warmed with a touch of yellow, a harmony which, with the interplay of the shadows, produces the sense of structure in the work of colourists, different in nature from that of the draughtsmen, whose problems amount to no more than those of copying from a plaster cast.

Colour, then, means the balance of two tones. A warm tone and a cold tone, the contrast between them constituting the whole theory, cannot be defined absolutely; they exist only in relation to each other.

The eye of the colourist is the magnifying glass. I do not mean to conclude from all this that a colourist should build up his picture by the minute study of the intermingled tones in a very limited space. For if we were to admit that each molecule were endowed with a particular tone, matter would then have to be infinitely divisible; moreover, art being only an abstraction and a sacrifice of detail to the whole, the important thing is to concentrate attention particularly on masses. What I was concerned to show was that if such a thing were possible, the tones, however numerous they might be, provided always they were in logical juxtaposition, would merge naturally, in virtue of the law that governs them.

Chemical affinities are the reason why nature cannot make mistakes in the arrangement of these tones; for in nature form and colour are one.

Nor can the true colourist make mistakes; he may do anything he likes because he knows by instinct the scale of tones, the tone-value, the results of mixing, and the whole science of counterpoint, and, as a result, he can create a harmony of twenty different reds.

This is so true, that if for example some anti-colourist land-owner had the notion of repainting his country house in some

Charles Baudelaire

II.

The first essential is to clarify the relationship of **photography** to the **painting** of today and to show that the development of technical means has materially contributed to the genesis of new forms in **optical** creation and has split the hitherto indivisible field of optical expression. Until photography was invented, painting combined within itself the missions of representation and expression in colour. Now since the division, one field embraces

> pure **colour** composition, the other
> **representational** composition.

COLOUR COMPOSITION: The pure inter-relationships of colours and light-values, similar to what we know in music as composition in acoustical relationships; that is, the composition of universal systems, independent of climate, race, temperament, education, rooted in biological laws;

REPRESENTATIONAL COMPOSITION: Relationships of elements imitatively derived from without, objective elements with associative contents, as, in acoustical composition, speech exists side by side with music; this is the composition of systems dependent upon climate, race, temperament, education, rooted in association and experience. Creative elements which are rooted in biological laws can also be mobilised as constructional and compositional auxiliaries•).

This division is not undoing all that the human spirit has achieved hitherto; on the contrary: the pure forms of expression are being crystallised and are becoming more telling in their effect for being autonomous.

•) *Representation* is not identical with nature or a slice of nature. E.g., when we seek to fix a fantasy or a dream the results are equally representational.
In the hands of an original artist *representation* becomes *creation*, otherwise it remains mere *reportage*. The introduction and spread of colour photography, a development which has had a very short history, in no way alters this situation.

8

today it is in use in all establishments, and tomorrow, meanwhile having become cheaper, every pupil will have one. whole classes of tiny children will drum in chorus on noiseless little typewriters.

the camera will likewise soon have passed those three typical stages. for it is not only the medium of wonderful pictorial **sport**, but has extremely practical backgrounds. today already the enormous increase of illustrated papers indicates how indirect view (written) is giving way to direct report (pictures of interesting incidents). thereby new possibilities take rise, not so much for draftsmen as for photographer-reporters in the broadest sense, at least for the grasping ones among them. whosoever in 1800 on a long journey wrote a diary of 300 pages, would in the present time take home 100 metres of leika-film-band that contain more complete memories than the word, being charged with contemplation. making use of the international language of outer environment that fundamentally neither changes after centuries nor after countries, the effect extends over a vast area of space and time. with regard to sociology it may be stated that photography serves the capitalistic upper classes by its steadily increasing insertion into advertisement. by a photograph we can gain a more accurate notion of the articles offered than by ever so suggestive a drawing. on the other hand the camera supplies a want of the lower classes: for we often meet a common man on a sunday excursion attempting to fix an incident of his holiday experience. all the more important is it therefore, that books providing a good horizontal section of the best results of the time should come to the masses.

from reporting in the broadest sense, as one of the main provinces of human craving for life, such pictorial preparation should be severed as aims at producing a **surface imbued with expression.** here some misinstructed people still raise the question, whether — in principle — to produce a photo full of expression and finished to the very corners can be an impelling inner necessity. what we mean is the question whether we are — exclusively in this sense — concerned here with **art**, commonplace men and "connoisseurs", both of whom generally are misforms of existence, still often meet in refusing to the most finished of photographs the quality mark of "art". either there is here but the semblance of a problem, since the definition of art is wholly time-bound, arbitrary and ungreat, or human sight is totally deformed and susceptible only to one kind of beauty even opposite nature. if however we understand art as an end in itself, called forth by man and filled with "expression", good photographs are included. yet should art be understood but as manual production expressed **by the human hand** under guidance of the mind (what would be unwise, indeed), we can establish a new category without diminishing the aesthetic value of these forms. it is a grave, subjectivist error to believe that forms pervaded by the aesthetic arise exclusively when every line has sprung from the "smelting-pot of the soul", i. e. the mind-guided hand of man himself. of the three vast realms of all expressive appearance the above limiting definition would contain but **one.** neither aesthetic perfection of certain forms in **nature**, nor of certain **machines** likewise not created for expression, would be possible.

in this book we encounter forms quite coming up to the above definition, that in fact establishes but one rate, one **quality.** they are the photos in which we wish nothing to be moved, raised or levelled, no part to be either materialized or dematerialized, &c. there surely are people who will declare even of the **best** of photos that they do not reach graphic art in power of expression. yet that this is not a question of **photography** can be demonstratet, inasmuch as the very same people usually also refuse new painting and new graphic art, whether it be abstract, constructivist, or objectivist art. whosoever finds the photographs in this book, for instance, far-fetched in section, stiff and unorganic (I have met such people), generally has the same reproach ready for painting and graphic of the younger generation. sufficient proof that this has nothing at all to do with a special problem of "photography and mechanism", but rather with the new, tenser, and more constructive seeing.

photography is not mere **print** from nature, for it is (mechanically) a turning of all colour value, and even of depth in space, and structure in form. never-the-less the worth of photography lies in the aesthetic value of nature itself. is it but necessary to master the implements of photo-

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Jelena Stojković

273. In a film, as in a photograph, face and hair do not look *grey*, they make a very natural impression; on the other hand, food on a plate often looks grey and therefore unappetizing in a film.

274. What does it mean, though, that hair looks blond in a photograph? How does it come out that it *looks* this way as opposed to our simply *concluding* that this is its colour? Which of our reactions makes us say that? – Doesn't a stone or plaster head look white?

275. If the word "blond" itself can sound blond, then it's even easier for photographed hair to look blond!

276. It would be very natural for me to describe the photograph in these words "A man with dark hair and a boy with combed-back blond hair are standing by a machine." This is how I would describe the *photograph*, and if someone said that doesn't describe it but the objects that were probably photographed, I could say the picture looks *as though* the hair had been that colour.

277. If I were called upon to describe the photograph, I'd do it in these words.

278. The colour-blind understand the statement that they are colour-blind. The blind, the statement that they are blind. But they can't use these sentences in as many different ways as a normal person can. For just as the normal person can master language-games with, e.g. colour words, which they cannot learn, he can also master language-games with the words "colour-blind" and "blind".

279. Can one explain to a blind person what it's like to *see*? – Certainly; the blind do learn a great deal about the difference between themselves and the sighted. And yet, we want to answer no to this question. – But isn't it posed in a misleading way? We can describe both to someone who does not play soccer and to someone who does 'what it's like to play soccer', perhaps to the latter so that he can check the correctness of the description. Can we then describe to the sighted person what it is like to see? But we *can* certainly explain to him what blindness is! I.e. we can describe to him the characteristic behaviour of a blind person and we can blindfold him. On the other hand, we cannot make a blind person see for a while; we can, however, describe to him how the sighted behave.

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ness and light. Color as an agent of matter filled the reflected illuminations with shadowy tones, pressing the light into dusty material opacity. Flames of light were imprisoned in a jumbled spectrum of greens. Refracting sparks of sunshine seemed smothered under the weight of clouded mixtures—yellow, green, blue, indigo and violet. The word "color" means at its origin to "cover" or "hide." Matter eats up light and "covers" it with a confusion of color. Luminous lines emanate from the edges of the mirrors, yet the surface reflections manifest nothing but shady greens. Deadly greens that devour light. Acrylic and Day-glo are nothing to these raw states of light and color. Real color is risky, not like the tame stuff that comes out of tubes. We all know that there could never be anything like a "color-pathos" or a pathology of color. How could "yellow is yellow" survive as a malarial tautology? Who in their right mind would ever come up with a concept of perceptual petit mal? Nobody could ever believe that certain shades of green are carriers of chromatic fever. The notion that light is suffering from a color-sickness is both repugnant and absurd. That color is worse than eternity is an affront to enlightened criticism. Everybody knows that "pathetic" colors don't exist. Yet, it is that very lack of "existence" that is so deep, profound, and terrible. There is no chromatic scale down there because all colors are present, spawning agglutinations out of agglutinations. It is the incoherent mass that breeds color and kills light. The poised mirrors seemed to buckle slightly over the uncertain ground. Disjointed square streaks and smudges hovered close to incomprehensible shadows. Proportion was disconnected and in a condition of suspense. The double

Eighth Mirror Displacement

Ninth Mirror Displacement

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occurs against a different visual shot and thus gives rise to corresponding associations. It is the same with colour: colour begins where it no longer corresponds to natural colouration . . .' Then, the signifier (the third meaning) is not filled out, it keeps a permanent state of *depletion* (a word from linguistics which designates empty, all-purpose verbs, as for example the French verb *faire*). We could also say on the contrary – and it would be just as correct – that this same signifier is not empty (cannot empty itself), that it maintains a state of perpetual erethism, desire not finding issue in that spasm of the signified which normally brings the subject voluptuously back into the peace of nominations. Finally, the obtuse meaning can be seen as an *accent*, the very form of an emergence, of a fold (a crease even) marking the heavy layer of informations and significations. If it could be described (a contradiction in terms), it would have exactly the nature of the Japanese *haiku* – anaphoric gesture without significant content, a sort of gash rased of meaning (of desire for meaning). Thus in image V:

> Mouth drawn, eyes shut squinting,
> Headscarf low over forehead,
> She weeps.

This accent – the simultaneously emphatic and elliptic character of which has already been mentioned – is not directed towards meaning (as in hysteria), does not theatricalize (Eisensteinian decorativism belongs to another level), does not even indicate an *elsewhere* of meaning (another content, added to the obvious meaning); it outplays meaning – subverts not the content but the whole practice of meaning. A new – rare – practice affirmed against a majority practice (that of signification), obtuse meaning appears necessarily as a luxury, an expenditure with no exchange. This luxury does not *yet* belong to today's politics but

than the preceding one. The optical world, and the tactile–optical world, is swept out, wiped away. If there is still an eye, it is the "eye" of a hurricane, as in Turner, which more often tends to the bright than the dark, and which designates a rest or stopping point that is always linked to an immense agitation of matter. The diagram is indeed a stopping or resting point in Bacon's paintings, but it is a stop closer to green and red than black and white; that is, a rest surrounded by an immense agitation, or, on the contrary, one that surrounds the most agitated kind of life.

To say that the diagram, in turn, is a stopping point in the painting is not to say that it completes or constitutes the painting; indeed, on the contrary. It acts as a relay. We have seen that the diagram must remain localized, rather than covering the entire painting (as in expressionism), and that something must *emerge* from the diagram. Even in the *malerisch* period, the diagram covers everything in appearance only. It does in fact remain localized, no longer in surface, but in depth. When the curtain striates the entire surface, it seems to be in front of the Figure, but if we look closely, we can see that in fact it falls *between* the two planes, in the interval between the planes. It occupies or fills the shallow depth, and in this sense remains localized. The diagram always has effects that go beyond it. As an unbridled manual power, the diagram dismantles the optical world, but at the same time, it must be reinjected into the visual whole, where it introduces a properly haptic world and gives the eye a haptic function. It is color, and the relations between colors, that form this haptic world and haptic sense, in accordance with relations of warm and cool, expansion and contraction. Certainly the color that shapes the Figure and fills the fields does not depend on the diagram, but it does pass through the diagram and emerge from it. The diagram acts as a modulator, and as the common locus of warm and cool colors, of expansions and contractions. In every part of the painting, the haptic sense of color will have been made possible by the diagram and its manual intrusion.

Light is time, but space is color. Painters we call "colorists" are those who tend to substitute relations of tonality for relations of value, and who "render" not only the form, but also shadow and light, and time, through these pure relations of color. Certainly it is not a question of a better solution, but of a tendency that runs through painting and leaves behind characteristic masterpieces, distinct from those that characterize other tendencies. Colorists can indeed make use of black and white, light and dark; but this is because they treat light and dark, black and white, as

concept 'green' is based on ideas that have been drawn from the world; but between the green of the photograph and the green of the field a whole series of complex encodings have crept in, a series that is more complex than that which connects the grey of the field photographed in black and white with the green of the field. In this sense the field photographed in green is more abstract than the one in grey. Colour photographs are on a higher level of abstraction than black-and-white ones. Black-and-white photographs are more concrete and in this sense more true: They reveal their theoretical origin more clearly, and vice versa: The 'more genuine' the colours of the photograph become, the more untruthful they are, the more they conceal their theoretical origin.

What is true of the colours of photographs is also true of all of the other elements of photographs. They all represent transcoded concepts that claim to have been reflected automatically from the world onto the surface. It is precisely this deception that has to be decoded so as to identify the true significance of the photograph, i.e. programmed concepts, and to reveal that in the case of the photograph one is dealing with a symbolic complex made up of abstract concepts, dealing with discourses re-encoded into symbolic states of things.

Here we must agree about what we mean by 'decode'. What am I doing when I decode texts encoded in Latin characters? Am I decoding the meaning of the characters, i.e. the sound conventions of a spoken language? Am I decoding the meaning of the words made up of these characters? The meaning of the sentences made up of these words? Or do I have to look further – for the writers' intentions, the cultural context behind them? What am I doing when I decode photographs? Am I

the primitive, the infantile, the vulgar, the queer or the pathological. In the second, colour is relegated to the realm of the superficial, the supplementary, the inessential or the cosmetic. In one, colour is regarded as alien and therefore dangerous; in the other, it is perceived merely as a secondary quality of experience, and thus unworthy of serious consideration. Colour is dangerous, or it is trivial, or it is both. (It is typical of prejudices to conflate the sinister and the superficial.) Either way, colour is routinely excluded from the higher concerns of the Mind. It is other to the higher values of Western culture. Or perhaps culture is other to the higher values of colour. Or colour is the corruption of culture.

Here is a near-perfect example of textbook chromophobia: 'The union of design and colour is necessary to beget painting just as is the union of man and woman to beget mankind, but design must maintain its preponderance over colour. Otherwise painting speeds to its ruin: it will fall through colour just as mankind fell through Eve.'[1] This passage was written in the last decade of the nineteenth century by the appropriately named Charles Blanc, critic, colour theorist and sometime Director of the Arts in the 1848 Socialist government in France. It is interesting on a number of counts. Blanc identified colour with the 'feminine' in art; he asserted the need to subordinate colour to the 'masculine' discipline of design or drawing; he exhibited a reaction typical of phobics (a massive overvaluation of the power of that which he feared); and he said nothing particularly original. For Blanc, colour could not simply be ignored or dismissed; it was always there. It had to be contained and subordinated – like a woman. Colour was a permanent internal threat, an ever-present inner other which, if unleashed, would be the ruin of everything, the fall of culture. For our contemporary chromophobic architect, colour also represents a kind of ruination. Colour for him signifies the mythical savage state out of which civilization, the nobility of the human spirit, slowly, heroically, has lifted itself – but back into which it could always slide. For one, colour was coded in the feminine; for the other, it

This question becomes especially pertinent in relation to the 'colour effect' produced by the contingent, chemical glitch. For Jameson, to be able to 'imagine' a new colour is by no means a question of simple formalism but aims at a production of new qualities, a required rudimentary step in a larger project (of science fiction): to envisage and propose potential ways into the future by inventing altogether different social worlds (Jameson 2007: 119, 101). However, in the history of photography 'newness' was often associated with colour, as the advancements in understanding of its chemical basis were rendered sensational in different periods of time. Upon his first encounter with autochromes in 1907 Alfred Stieglitz described the technique as 'The New Color Photography' (Stieglitz 1907). At the moment when an extensive application of colour photography was fully acknowledged with the 1981 MoMA show, the same title (*The New Color Photography*) was appropriated to reassign it the category of 'newness' once again, this time divorcing it from projection as a required means of presentation. Re-introducing the historical narrative of the relation between colour photography and projection into the post-cinematic and digitally-attuned gallery space on Magdy's part appears ironically appropriate to reflect on the historical longevity of the technological status of this 'newness': Managing to overcome the obsolescence of autochromes, once analogue colour photography finally became independent, it would not be too long before it was to become obsolete itself, with the introduction of digital technology only a decade away. The 'new' replaces the 'old', which was 'new' at some point in the past, and we enter another cycle of repetition.

As Flusser reminds us, colour photography was made available by combining theoretical advancements in optics and chemistry (Flusser 2000: 43). Although colour is based on the same theoretical premises as black and white, it is more deceptive, or, as Flusser puts it, 'the "more genuine" the colours of a photograph become, the more untruthful they are, the more they conceal their theoretical origin' (44). Magdy's slide-based works prompt us to rethink such a 'theoretical' origin of photographic information, both in its analogue and digital incarnations. Whereas the alchemical tradition might have entertained the thought of producing a 'new' colour by assigning it a

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Excerpts from:

William Henry Fox Talbot; Beaumont Newhall ([1844] 1969). *The Pencil of Nature*. New York: De Capo Press.

Charles Baudelaire; David Kelley ([1846] 1975). *Salon de 1846*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Ludwig Wittgenstein; G E M Anscombe ([1950] 1977). *Remarks on Colour*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Robert Smithson ([1969] 1981). *The Collected Writings*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Roland Barthes ([1970] 1977). *Image, Music, Text*. New York: Hill and Wang.

Gilles Deleuze ([1981] 2003). *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation.* London: Continuum.

Vilém Flusser ([1981] 2000). *Towards a Philosophy of Photography.* London: Reaktion.

David Batchelor (2000). *Chromophobia*. London: Reaktion.

Jelena Stojkovi (2015). What Colour is the New? Chemicals and Projection in Basim Magdy's Slide-Based Works (Unpublished).

Rare Metal Martini

Jonathan Kemp

electrodes of undoped silicon wafer and
gallium are immersed in vodka and a current
of 12 volts is passed between them for at
least an hour to form a gallium infused
electrolyte. This electrolyte is then drunk
as a rare metal martini

the rare metal cocktail effects a simple strategy to highlight aspects of techno-
industrial processes that act on the human body to suggest a technological
subjectivation through the industrial-technological inscription of our being -
for example, recent analyses by the US Geology Survey exposed unexpected
amounts of precious and rare earth elements in human waste, and research
is now centred on developing an economy of extraction from these outputs -
personal communication with Dr Kathleen Smith of USGS, September 2015.

*toxicity levels for such diluted ingestion are low according
to the US Hazardous Substances Data Bank)a database of
the National Library of Medicine's TOXNET system.

Laboria Cuboniks

Diann Bauer

Diann Bauer

Anti–Natural Talk

Marina Vishmidt

Marina Vishmidt

Aneta Grzeszykowska
Selfie nr10

In this short intervention today, I would like to explore the idea of recursion and reflexive forms of temporality and see how they function as engines of critique within a text. This inquiry acts as a development of ongoing research into speculation as it can materialize in different contexts and as different strategies as an orientation towards a future and a suspension of the present. I am concerned to elaborate a 'negativity' within speculation which can give a political valence to the total mutability and idealism that the notion of 'speculation' usually carries, and its overdetermination by discourses and realities of finance as they re-define contemporary social life in a thousand different ways. To look at the how a text can explore and explode its own material construction by means of aspects of recursion and speculation which use time as their main instrument will thus form my chief topic for today. I will be drawing my examples from Neïl Beloufa's 2007 film *Kempinksi*, Werner Hamacher's writing on Hegel's 'speculative sentence', Deleuze's notion of the 'I' split by time in *Difference and Repetition*, and a few other side-notes.

[clip Kempinski – 2 minutes]

What we are seeing here is a very simple formal – or, rather, linguistic – experiment that lends the dubious genres of ethnographic documentary and artists film an instant science-fictional dimension. The speculative power of the film is achieved by a very simple trick – the present tense replaces the future tense in the statements of the speakers, who were simply instructed to imagine a future and speak of it in the present tense.

This work enacts an alienation of time which structurally belongs to time, or rather how time registers in language. The present, in this film, is constitutively alienated from itself, enabling a future to replace it, a future which we visually see voiced from within quite

pre-modern conditions and which is infused with animistic thinking. This allows us to understand how temporality can become reflexive and create a torsion, a twisting, in a text as it turns around to look back at itself. This then creates an opening for the viewing situation – whether it is the filmmaker viewing the subject of the image, or the viewer seeing the film – to manifest its instability of subject position and terms of reference as well. In a 2009 interview, Beloufa said:

'I make work that reflects back on itself while I'm making it. My production is a means to form collusion between not only the object and myself but between the object and the viewers. The viewers' relationship with the piece takes the place of the piece. I like Artaud's notion of "subjectile," which as Derrida defines it is that which lies "between the surfaces of the subject and object."'

Here we can see Beloufa's interest in recursion. Recursion is a subset of *metonymy*, the literary strategy where a part represents the whole. In recursion, a poetic, fictional or cinematic text – to take just a few possible variations- refers to some aspect of itself as a narrative or structural strategy, breaking its fictional universe through the insertion of a device. It's a kind of 'breaking of the fourth wall' presumed to stand between viewers and the text, its 'absorption' or self-sufficiency as a contained world, in art historian Michael Fried's terms. Recursion can be exemplified by a scenario such as we see a painting on a wall in a film scene, and later the characters walk into the painting and it becomes the mise-en-scene of the fictional universe, with the rest of the film being absorbed into it. An example in literature could be that a text composed by means of algorithms, or 'textual machines' – such as French proto-surrealist Raymond Roussel's *Locis Solus* - occupies itself in its narrative fabric almost exclusively through the description of fantastical, mind-bending machines

which could only exist in the text, and could probably not have come into being any other way except with the help of those algorithms. We could probably think of a lot of other examples, also with photography and internet art.

Beloufa's reference to work that reflects on itself is quite general, and we can say it's also quite general to a lot of contemporary art's critical disposition, that it reflects on itself in its construction process, this is standard. However, it reflects on itself in a particular way which is precise and critical: it inserts an additional plane of temporality into the filmmaking situation through the use of language, and it also works with the temporality of the viewing situation as a further alienating, but also meaning-layering device. The whole film then becomes a reflection on the irruptive social potential of time. He goes on to say how the film behaves differently watched in a set-up that establishes the temporality of a narrative progression, that is, in a cinema setting, or as a loop in the gallery. In the first scenario:

'When the video is considered to have a start and an end, the work gets more strange as the narrative becomes more important than the artistic gesture itself. In this case, a clearer meaning is expected to come out of it: metaphorical interpretations flow.' whereas in the second:

'It's just a simple situation that doesn't evolve along a story-line from the beginning to the end. Whatever interviewees say in "Kempinski," stays flat. The only climax is the viewer's relation to the piece trying to figure out the meaning of the (fake) narrative.'

What is perhaps important to note here as well is that, regardless of how sophisticated we are as viewers and image consumers, the film plays on cultural conventions of authenticity which come into play whenever a Western filmmaker undertakes to convey a representation of

reality or 'everyday life as it is lived' on the African continent. Beloufa could be saying if authenticity and exoticism are habitually inseparable in the codes of representation of the African other, why not go all the way and make an authentic exotic intervention in the contemporary, that is, to cast Africa as already in the future, no longer part of our time, or rather, the living embodiment of a split time where fantastic actualities are us conveyed to using totally mundane settings and grammars – and this simply by tweaking the form of time in language, and then the cinematic apparatus' ability to render universal and specific at the same time?

We can further touch on Walter Benjamin's observation on how cinema has the power to break open reality through camera movement and montage, of exploding and revealing banal reality, making it dynamic, as well as uncanny. In the same moment, we can allude to Deleuze's writing on cinema's 'powers of the false' vs its realism, and his revisitng of the realism debate via the concept of the crystalline image: 'Two regimes of the image can be contrasted point by point; an organic regime and a crystalline regime [...] A description which assumes the independence of its object will be called 'organic'. It is not a matter of knowing if the object is really independent, it is not a matter of knowing if these are exteriors or scenery. What counts is that, whether they are scenery or exteriors, the setting described is presented as independent of the description which the camera gives of it, and stands for a supposedly pre-existing reality. In contrast, what we will call a crystalline description stands for its object, replaces it, both creates and erases it [...] and constantly gives way to other descriptions which contradict, displace, or modify the preceding ones. It is now the description itself. [...] pure descriptions which develop a creative and destructive function.' He then goes on to say 'crystalline descriptions, which constitute their own object, refer

to purely optical and sound situations detached from their motor extension: this is a cinema of the seer and no longer of the agent *[de voyant, nonplus d'actant]*.'

There is however another element from Deleuze's work I'd like to mention here, and thatis his discussion of temporality in a much earlier work, 1968's *Difference and Repetition*. There, in the second chapter, 'Repetition for Itself', he talks about how time – the pure conceptual form of time as a basic intuition in Kant, but also the experience of time which may or may not be formed by this philosophical postulate – introduces difference into the subject, into the 'I'. Time is thus situated as a source of reflexivity in language, as we saw with *Kempinksi*, and the contingency of the perceiving, thinking subject, which Kant sought to unify in the transcendental unity of apperception (the subject which is aware of herself being aware of herself as a continuous entity in time), is seen by Deleuze as perpetually unravelling insofar as it is subject to consciousness of itself in time:

It amounts to the discovery of Difference - no longer in the form of an empirical difference between two determinations, but in the form of a transcendental Difference between the Determination as such and what it determines; no longer in the form of an external difference which separates, but in the form of an internal Difference which establishes an a priori relation between thought and being. Kant's answer is well known: the form under which undetermined existence is determinable by the 'I think' is that of time ... The consequences of this are extreme: […] It is as though the I were fractured from one end to the other: fractured by the pure and empty form of time. In this form it is the correlate of the passive self which appears in time. Time signifies a fault or a fracture in the I and a passivity in the self, and the correlation between the passive self and the fractured

I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, the element of the Copernican Revolution.

The passive object and the active subject of perception, according to Deleuze, can never form a unity of the sovereign subject because they are constitutively divided by time. Now of course we can say an almost endless amount about this as an interpretation of Kant and its consequences for Deleuze's project, but I will leave this very suggestive direction here Earlier I mentioned recursion as a powerful agency of dissolution within a text, and its critical force deriving from the speculative corrosion it inflicts on elements of a text which have to retain a certain stability in order for the reader or viewer's identification with a coherent fictional universe to be effective: it is thus clearly an alienating gesture in the classic *verfremdungseffekt* sense. However, as a principle of construction, when one element, image or entity in a text takes on a level of effectivity or reality effect different from that of the others, when it ruptures the textual fabric, we can also see in operation what the poet and theorist Amy De'Ath writes on recursion as an *affective* relation between the materiality of the textual object and the abstraction of structure (both within it and outside it, as the comments on the screening and filmmaking situation I mentioned above on *Kempinski*); recursion as an intimacy with structure (both narratively/ diegetically and formally within a text), a sort of handling of the structure as just another element within the text. This establishment of a relation between materiality and structure can be termed critical, or a premise for critique, insofar as it is engaged in enacting the 'absolute contingency' of a diegetic reality, or casting into form the contingency of the non-diegetic reality it is approaching within the text and pushing the reader to encounter as contingent the world in which she is reading, which makes possible or impossible the conditions for her reading. An example of recursion at the micro-level

of a sentence would be 'the speculative sentence'. It is also a demonstration of reflexive temporality insofar as the reader and the text co-exist in a time which must constantly be re-started and revised.

The 'speculative sentence' is a technique employed by Hegel in his philosophical writing, and analysed in depth on the literary theorist Werner Hamacher in his book *Pleroma*. It is a kind of loop, constructed in such a way that the reader must perform the movements of the speculative dialectic (negation of negation, for example) as she reads: getting to the end she realizes she will have to return to the beginning given the conceptual trajectory the sentence has led her on. Hegel says that 'this movement, which constitutes what the proof was meant to accomplish, is the dialectic itself'. Thus the conditions for comprehension posited at the beginning of a sentence are undermined by the dynamic of the sentence, so that those conditions are no longer there by the end and have to be revised on the basis of what has happened in the meantime. The speculative proposition destroys the presuppositions of a reading – it is recursive (a material co-presence or encounter between the critique and the work) – the reading shatters and reconstitutes the subject of reading, volatilizing the static and linear relationship between the subject and predicate both grammatically and epistemologically. However, the 'simple', or initial reading persists as remainder within the speculative reading; the reading is afflicted by the splitting within its own presupposition, just as in the Deleuzian scenario, the I is afflicted by the splitting introduced in its by time, by time which cuts through the presupposition of a unified subject synthesising the object world as the fabric of a relation. This self-eradicating, self-subverting dramaturgy of reading is thus structured by a kind of determinism at the heart of which is a kind of thoroughgoing contingency: the speculative sentence constantly poses and withdraws meaning,

but all the withdrawn meanings pile up, and their juxtaposition is unforeseeable. It is likewise a recursive structure, in that the narrative of the sentence as it initially appears is unstable, and is in danger of forming a new narrative while you're reading, as an unnoticed element suddenly becomes definitive and starts to shift or even obliterate the premises you took as a point of departure. This constitutes, in my analysis, the critical negativity of recursion, with negativity and contingency posed here as affiliated rather than opposed. The reflexiveness of the temporality lies in the looping-back on itself of the process of following a conceptual itinerary in time; time is de-naturalized, rendered thick and aberrant, prone to jolts and stoppages – as all the strategy of alienation with regard to time, it renders form and content indistinct, where both become material premises of construction. A reflexive temporality in a text aligns with recursion as an ongoing erasure of the presuppositions of writing (and reading), a performed negation and construction in the register of speculation, which is say, a material critique of the real by the ruthless working-out of its intrinsic contingency.

Nihal Yesil

Nihal Yesil

Tender Internal FRX 3.5 Anti-Natural

— — —

Paul Abbott

On this occasion, at a distance, I speak on behalf
- but I am not, Queen of the shell. I lie.

FANCIFUL CHICKPEA, MY CRAVING CHARM

I am Q.Vagus 3.kXAN

I am still "Pure Joy" I am Smokie time-saving

The usual before: the meaning of this misunderstanding
is not resolved by the same military technology which
has blown the limbs off so many young bodies. Today, or
here, but to the contradictory rules of the game of another
hostile climate.

MY LOVEABLE HEART THIRSTS FOR
YOUR AFFECTIONATE AMBITION

Apparently the immediate future was filled with
hope. They had recorded that what I did was "Rise",
although the proof was not publicly available,
and blood still collected at the fingertips.

Introduced at the party summer of 1937, I was offered
a mutational driver, with a richer geometry, inviting
contamination between edges. This had happened before.

Halting, out-of-order in a shell of procedures that
softened the sea, I was natural, unmixed, unadulterated
- slicing through daily hydraulics, from Sad to Glad.

They told me to "walk into the original, walk in
to the real - we will guide you to a more liveable
place so that, Based on Ordinals, you can taunt
mortal injury without actually experiencing it"

MY LOVE PANTS FOR YOUR WISTFUL AMBITION.
YOU ARE MY COVETOUS RAPTURE, MY
PRECIOUS ADORATION, MY CRAVING CHARM

But the same brace that made it easier to walk was causing
skin breakdown and other difficulties, and it was not until
two years later that I could have any meaningful interaction.

I could hear a seeping sound clearly at odds with what
coagulates around the base of the point in question.
Offset by bloat, it spun infection in the shape of words:

"You are supposed to want to hold my hand, a third
point, or contact: the aptitude and diligence of your
prostheses always increase a bodies abilities - they are
a source only of new powers, never of problems."

MY FANCY EAGERLY LIKES YOUR FONDEST HUNGER,
MY PASSION CURIOUSLY ADORES YOUR HEART

I had bent one knee, but this still gets repeated
everyday: I told them I put my clothes on slowly and
methodically because the shock absorber in my foot
is not afraid of permanently partial identities.

(Pause, the room)

In a field rapidly becoming vertically integrated,
without much - skin in it - I cry hard, and slow,
and use my gravity not reaching your top.

MY FELLOW FEELING CURIOUSLY LOVES YOUR
WINNING SYMPATHY, BIRDSONG PARASITE
SEDUCTIVELY WOOS YOUR BEING.

But we still don't recognise you

YOURS BURNINGLY

Paul Abbott

Roc Jimenez
de Cisneros

THE ICONOCLAST IS THE STRONGEST BELIEVER IN THE POWER OF IMAGES. NOT EVEN THE IMAGE-WORSHIPPING IDOLATER COMES EVEN CLOSE.

Breath

———

Sabina Ahn

```arduino
int Pin[] = { 5, 6, 9, 10};    // Output to
Dimmer pin

int Pin5 = 7; // output to relay pin
int Pin6 = 8;

int mic = A5;

int stat = 0;
double criteria = 0; //to disable filterling
for MIC signal input, put "0"
double val= 0;
double val2 = 0;
double maxstep = 128;
double dim = 0;                // Dimming
level (0-128)  0 = on, 128 = 0ff
double dim2 = 0;
double inc = 1;

void setup() {
  Serial.begin(9600);// Begin setup
  for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
     pinMode(Pin[i], OUTPUT);// Set AC
Load pin as output
  }
  pinMode(Pin5, OUTPUT);
  pinMode(Pin6, OUTPUT);

  // Set the Triac pin as output
  attachInterrupt(0, zero_cross_int,
RISING);    // Attach an Interupt to Pin 2
(interupt 0) for Zero Cross Detection
}

void zero_cross_int() {
   int dimtime = (75*dim);
   delayMicroseconds(dimtime);    //
Off cycle
   for(int i = 0; i < 4; i++)
digitalWrite(Pin[i], HIGH);   // triac
firing
   delayMicroseconds(10);        //
triac On propogation delay
   for(int i = 0; i < 4; i++)
digitalWrite(Pin[i], LOW);    // triac Off
}

void loop() {
  val2 = analogRead(mic);
  if(val2 < criteria) {
    val2 = 0;
  } else {
    (val2 - criteria) / (1024 - criteria) *
1024;
  }

  Serial.println(int(val2));
   val2 = val2 / 1023;
   val = pow(val2, 0.03125) * 64;
   dim2 += (val * inc * pow((1 - val2),
2)) + (PI / 10 * 3);
   if (dim2 >= 0 && dim2 <= maxstep)
{
     dim = dim2;
   }
   if (dim2 > maxstep) {
     dim = maxstep - (dim2 - maxstep);
     dim2 = dim;

   inc *= -1;
  }
  if (dim2 < 0) {
    dim = abs(dim2);
    dim2 = dim;
    inc *= -1;
    //maxstep = 128 * val2;
  }

//on/off//
  if (val2 != 0) {
   if (stat == 0)
   digitalWrite(Pin5, HIGH);
   digitalWrite(Pin6, HIGH);
    stat = 1;
  } else {
   if (stat == 1)
   digitalWrite(Pin5, LOW);
   digitalWrite(Pin6, LOW);
    stat = 0;
  }

   delay(0.2);
}
```

Tim Goldie

45

Tim Golde

Felix De Bousies

Felix De Bousies

push remote control switch : ON
pick up bell and start ringing. (1min)
BELL

run + ◇1
WARNING : This is a humble attempt to penetrate and
subvert your understanding of the the nature of reality
(twice)

run + ◇2
episode 1 " The parts of the car are not the car,
but there is no car other than its parts"
(twice)

run + ◇3
GONG
Indian philosopher Nagarjuna said:
every single object of the universe,
including thoughts, has parts
every single object of the universe depends upon its parts
but whatever has parts is not its parts (twice)

run + ◇4 + enter
is the headlight the car? no, it's just a part of the car
run + ◇5
iss the starter motor the car? no, it's just a part of the car
run + ◇6
is the car stereo the car? no, it's just a part of the car
run + ◇X
is the safety light the car? no, it's just a part of the car
run + ◇7
is the cooling fan the car? no it's just a part of the car
run + ◇9
is the horn the car? no it's just a part of the car
run + 1◇
Is the alarm the car? no, it's just a part of the car

run + 11

GONG
it seems like none of the individual parts are the
car itself, otherwise we would have many cars.

run + 12

Nagarjuna wonders if the car is not simply the
collection of its parts, each performing their function
PLAY SEQUENCE 1

run + 13

each part functions to fulfill its designated function
but functions are just conventions betweens human minds.
so if we change the function of the parts, is there
still a basis to call their collection 'a car' ?
PLAY SEQUENCE 2
(3min)

run + 14

GONG
Where is the car, that the fan, lights,
motor, doors,... are parts of?
We think we see cars, but all we ever see
is parts of cars. Just from seeing certain
parts, we develop the thought 'car'.
Then, we relate to 'the car' as i if it
was anything more a thought.
(twice)

run + 15   very slow

GONG HITTING QUICKER & QUICKER
'natural' means not made or caused by humans but
because our reality is a collection of conventions between
human minds, each convention being just a thought,
made of different parts, which themselves have parts...
it follows that
nothing is 'natural' or 'antinatural' from its
own side, everything is a creation of mind. the
concept of nature is just a creation of mind.
as much as this moving message is.

BELLS JOIN IN
dispelling the veil of a false reality, we break
free from the golden cage of conceptual thought
and bathe in the true nature of reality

[SILENCE]
BREAKING THE GLASS...PAUSE
PLAY SEQUENCE3

run + 16

thanks to Nihal, Johnny, Nagarjuna, Apiary Studios,
and Bloomberg for making this happen

LOVE

End.

The Five Anti-Natural Elements

— — —

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These five images were generated from field recordings related to the Wu Xing (the Five Elements, also translated from Chinese as the Five Processes, the Five Phases, and the Five Movements). These five natural elements—wood, fire, earth, metal, and water—classify all phenomena using analog and inductive reasoning. The Wu Xing is a generative cycle that explains everything, from cosmic cycles to the succession of political regimes.

If all phenomena come from a combination of these five natural elements, can anything be anti-natural?

If water is natural, a field recording of water is also natural because it captures that natural sound; or is it anti-natural because it is not the sound of water, but a recording of it?

If a field recording of water is natural, an image generated from it is also natural because it consists of the same data; or is it anti-natural because it is not a recording of water, but a graphical representation of it?

All anti-natural things are generated from combinations of natural things and everything that can happen happens. And if everything than can happen happens from the natural, then nothing can never really be anti-natural.

the end

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