Félix Guattari: An Aberrant Introduction

GARY GENOSKO

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Félix Guattari: 
An Aberrant Introduction
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Abbreviations


This book is dedicated to Marlene Genosko
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Introduction

Pierre-Félix Guattari (1930–92) neither fits into our carefully manicured academic divisions nor settles comfortably into the valorized betweens of the interdisciplinary fashions of the season. Despite the recent publications of English translations of two books, *The Three Ecologies* and *Chaosmosis*, Guattari remains unknown, unless it is through his problematic subsumption as a partner of Gilles Deleuze. Even under such less than desirable conditions, Guattari’s influence may be said to be quite strong but unacknowledged, and poorly understood. Guattari’s major theoretical statements remain untranslated. In his native France the binarization of his life and work has already been achieved: activist or intellectual, but not both. The judgement that he was an activist, despite his work with Deleuze, may have made him a star, but kept him outside the orbit of intellectuality (one residual effect of this has been to unearth more and more of Deleuze’s politics).

In the English-speaking world, Guattari has occasionally been poorly mounted as a specimen of postmodernism. This has become a category of convenience for all those thinkers that lack a proper place and from whose legacy it is difficult to convince granting organizations and administrators that profit may be realized. ‘No doubt,’ Guattari once admitted (SS 70), ‘a certain kind of politics and a certain social implosion have occurred. But I believe that there is a collective, unformed search, from above and below, for another kind of [micro] politics.’

I consider Guattari to have been both an activist and an intellectual and will draw a transversal line between them. Guattari was, in the best sense of the word, a drop-out. By this I not only mean that he abandoned the study of commercial pharmacy (see his notes, circa 1948, FFG N08–29), but also that he never received his undergraduate degree in philosophy from the Sorbonne, breaking off his studies to pursue a career in psychoanalysis. Guattari was 15 when he met Jean
Oury, through Jean’s brother Fernand, and by the time he reached 20 years was taken under Jean’s wing, visiting him first at the psychiatric clinic of Saumery. Only three years later Guattari would assist in the foundational work at La Borde and help write the clinic’s ‘Constitution de l’An 1’ the year it opened in 1953.

Guattari’s career was also shaped by the friendly tutelage of another master, whom he had met when he was just 23, Jacques Lacan (it was not until 1962 that Guattari ‘graduated’ to a training analysis [didactic] with Lacan, joining the Ecole freudiennne de Paris [EFP] as an analyst member in 1969). From the two, then, Guattari got a life and career – the absolute master (Lacan), and the master of a dangerous Lacanian heterodoxy (J. Oury). Guattari’s formative intellectual milieu was Lacanian. Long-time member of the La Borde medical staff Jean-Claude Polack once observed ‘When I first arrived at La Borde one didn’t have the right to speak if one had not gone over Lacan with a fine tooth comb’ (in Oury et al. 1977: 21). Clearly, Guattari was an adept. And, in a way, he never abandoned either of them, working with Oury at La Borde until the end, and despite the machinations of Lacan’s sinister son-in-law, retained his membership in the EFP. Dropping out is no guarantee of autonomy and flexibility, anyway, especially where psychoanalytic practice is concerned.

I think of Guattari as an activist intellectual or, considering Guattari’s attachment to Sartre, which I explore in both chapters 1 and 2, an engaged, responsible intellectual. In this Introduction I want to present a new strategy for approaching his work. The framework is the question of the drift from intellectual-academic to activist-analyst (as he was called, albeit somewhat flippantly, in the French press, ‘Mister Anti’), from intra- and inter- to extra-. Interdisciplinary activities were of little use to Guattari since they are indelibly stamped with the paradox of the between: subject to an institutional orthodoxization and normopathy that allows them to be valorized from an already established disciplinary perspective as exciting ‘places’ to visit and extend one’s normal, core work. Guattari poked fun at interdisciplinarity in its limited sense and referred to it as an abracadabra word deployed cynically by many pretenders. But he made several significant attempts to theorize a metamethodology adequate to the passage from pluri- to transdisciplinarity in his not widely read proposal and report
writing (for UNESCO and other organizations) as well as in reflections on ecosophy. Indeed, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000: 414, n. 4) point out in *Empire* that they had two models for the broad interdisplinarity that informed their approach: Marx’s *Capital* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. Guattari’s career as an activist and organizer may be presented in a way that shows how he went about creating experimental assemblages, between and beyond the covers of books. His militancy was radically transdisciplinary, as plateaued as ATP. This book is neither a biographical account nor a book-by-book summary of Guattari’s accomplishments. These are two of many things that makes it aberrant.

What inspires a sixteen-year-old with a dead-end McJob to try to organize her fellow employees into a bargaining unit in the face of the intimidating power of a multinational known for union busting? What drives high school and university students to travel hundreds and even thousands of miles in order to participate in the collective body of protest against globalization and hemispheric free trade? There are no simple answers to these questions, especially since the general tenor of youth culture and market ideology produces a form of serial subjectivity that rewards uniformity through pseudo-singularity and punishes abnormality, on occasion preying upon it, discouraging oppositional, alternative practices, unless dissent is commodifiable and alternative subjectivity is operationalizable for workplace, school, and competitive leisure environments. Youth militancy outside of traditional party apparatuses – and the young conservatives have surely outnumbered everybody in recent memory – cultivates a singularity that is not simply reducible to the comforts of Web-based activism, yet this is of the utmost significance since it is automodelization at work in the constitution of its own hyperlinks, resources and communities. And to be sure, it poses a growing problem for the traditional parties of the Left. Of course, singularization on the Web does open itself to the worst forms of self-interested promotion and fashionable followership. Guattari underlined that capitalist subjectivity foregrounds infantilism, heroic consumers who will live forever, while suppressing all conditions expressive of finitude. The constitution of a milieu of militancy, of singularizing, non-particularistic assemblages, not subject to preformed, ready-made formations of the sort that massified culture
Incessantly delivers like payloads dropped from great heights, goes some way in providing a portrait of a young activist as a social experimenter. New ways of collective belonging are scenes of subjectification that situate the answer to the above questions outside of the interiority of an individual, beyond psychology, phenomenology, and even beyond unidimensional explanations based on what one says, or one wears, in a heterogeneous range of components – facets and factors, domains, relations and practices. The ability, then, to see an issue in its globality is vital to Guattari’s approach.

Adolescence is itself a revolution, Guattari once claimed (SS 66), and some never recover from the ravages of puberty; but, although adolescence is often tied up in individual and couple issues, it is sometimes connected to broader social forces through machines – the fry basket, the length and the proper diameter of the cut potatoes – and not always through recognizable channels of mediation such as discourse, labour classics, and party memberships (the first thing to understand about assemblages is that they are not reducible to speech, subjects and signifiers, nor even micro-groups, because they call the group into question). Still, the precise thickness (nine thirty seconds of an inch) of the fries, the six rows of six hamburger patties that should be put on the grill at one time and placed in a motion moving from left to right, connects with a union local organizing machine. Adolescence then takes on a militant tone and the hundreds of percent mark-ups on fries connects with employment security.

New organizations, non-standard forms of communication and direct semiosis between machines and politics (pirate radio, hacktivism, collective actions by progressive cyclists, raving . . . and how they become sterile and mediocre once Hollywood, private business, and the state get ahold of them) all contribute to the creation of new forms of subjectivity and they appear all of a sudden, without obvious leaders, triggers and inner circles.

How, then, did Guattari become a militant at sixteen years of age? (Chy 189) A child, then, of the Liberation, and all of its ‘extraordinary wild imaginings, above all those of the auberges de jeunesse [youth hostelling movement; since 1956 known as the Fédération Unie des Auberges de Jeunesse, but of German origin]’ (PT 154). Fernand Oury (1920–98), was instrumental in getting Guattari involved during the
summer ‘caravans’ he organized in the Paris suburb of La Garenne-Colombes (for working class suburban youth like Guattari himself, who grew up in the same department in nearby Villeneuve) for the youth hostelling movement in France (the latter was established in the early 1930s and had gathered impetus later in the decade with the use of hostels as accommodations for paid holidays under the Front Populaire government). The non-religious, para-scholastic activities for French youth that took off in the heady atmosphere of the immediate postwar years were facilitated by militants and innovators such as the Oury brothers and formed a cluster of antididactic practices emphasizing autonomy and self-reliance from which institutional pedagogy drew its inspiration, adapting such lessons to the primary and secondary schools. A schoolteacher in suburban Paris who specialized in maladjusted youth, using a non-scientific method, of sorts, based on a selected appropriation of some of Célestin Freinet’s decidedly non-theoretical, everyday practices that eschewed originality, especially around the printing press (printing a collectively created journal and using it as the basis for scholarly lessons and correspondence between school classes and schools) as a organizing principle for manual and intellectual, individual and group work, F. Oury’s influence was decisive for Guattari in both practice and theory. Guattari once remarked that ‘my presumed competence in this domain [setting up an intra-hospital committee at La Borde] was due to the fact that since the age of sixteen I had always been a “militant” in organizations like the “Youth Hostels” and a whole range of activities for the extreme left’ (Chy 189).

Before founding La Borde, the psychiatrist Jean Oury trained under the ‘red psychiatrist’ François Tosquelles at the clinic of St Alban (1947–9) and later practiced at Saumery (1949–53). For him ‘Saumery represented a kind of concrete initiation period into the technical and medical problems posed by psychopathology, but equally an initiation into a collective life with all its misadventures’ (Oury et al. 1977: 20). Guattari, Oury recalls, visited him for long periods at Saumery. Saumery was also Guattari’s initiation into psychiatry. It was during this period that Oury convinced him to abandon his study of commercial pharmacy (Oury 1992: 11).

Saumery was a small clinic that had already expanded from twelve
to 50 beds. Oury had tried out on a small scale what he would later attempt on a larger scale at La Borde. Much still needed to be accomplished, although a few ground-breaking innovations such as the creation of quasi-independent, intra-hospital Therapeutic Clubs for patients were inherited from the geo-psychiatric experiments initiated by Tosquelles at St Alban (PT 40).

The absence of a psychiatric hospital in the department of Loir-et-Cher presented the opportunity to build something original from the ground up at Cour Cheverny. It was the treatment of psychotics that set La Borde apart from most hospitals in France. It was also, at first, a private clinic, until la sécurité sociale stepped in. From time to time La Borde has been plagued by its reputation, especially in the early 1990s when it attracted the attention of French health administrators because it was spending too much of its budget on staff and not charging enough per day for beds.

While Guattari was there at the beginning, his involvement increased after 1955, and was instrumental in developing la grille (see chapter 2). The myth of La Borde as an anti-psychiatric Mecca was propagated, J. Oury laments, not by those who worked there, but by the intellectuals who for a time spent their weekends and vacations there. While this is a crucial difference, an even greater one is found in Guattari’s reflections on how an activist background, which all the founders of La Borde shared, made his work possible (Chy 189). While Oury regrets that the clinic was not from the outset a public institution, primarily for economic reasons (an opinion that Guattari did not share), he also wanted to discount the myth that its private status gave the doctors freedom to experiment in ways that would not have been permitted in a public hospital.

In developing institutional pedagogy, Fernand learned much from Jean’s efforts at La Borde in the milieu of institutional analysis or psychotherapy. What both approaches appreciated, despite their obvious differences of purpose, was that the institutional context itself had to be analysed. To this end, around 1960, a diverse group of therapists and educators gathered around Tosquelles and the Ourys to discuss the problems of institutions, their production, modification through creative organizational solutions, etc., under the name of the Groupe de travail de psychologie et de sociologie institutionnelles (GTPSI). With the
founding of Fédération des groupes d’études et de recherches institutionnelles (FGERI) in 1965 – later, in 1968, FGERI would develop sub-groups such as CERFI, Centre d’études de recherches sur le fonctionnement des institutions, which published the journal Recherches, the organ of institutional psychotherapy that Guattari edited – not only did Fernand’s colleagues working in the Groupe d’éducation thérapeutiques (GET) on their ‘triangular’ experiments – ‘systematic triangulation of relations’ – with groups of students based on a signifying, mediating object, a collectively produced monograph, finally find interlocutors, but they found themselves in the company of psychiatrists, analysts, anti-psychiatrists, architects, urbanists, activists.... FGERI was nothing less than a transdisciplinary experimental research group that Guattari described, and we will see him deploy it once again in chapter 4 in a very different highly theoretical context, as a ‘detour through other disciplines that allowed false problems to be overcome (relative to functions of space: volumes, levels, communications, and the institutional and micro-political options of instigators and participants)’ (FFG ET09–26). The confluence of militancy and transdisciplinary experimentation had the goal of creating scenes of subjectification beyond, and this was how Guattari characterized F. Oury’s efforts, overcoming the ‘encasernée scolaire’ (school-as-barracks) subjectivity, for an appreciation of collectivity sensitive to heterogeneous components as well as local conditions that would be otherwise steamrollered if one arrived with prefabricated interpretive grids (FFG I02–22, pp. 6–7). Many of Guattari’s papers collected in Psychanalyse et transversalité (1972) were first presented as working papers to GTPSI and FGERI, as well as at a variety of conferences, and others appeared in psychoanalytic journals and broadsheets of the far left.

Elsewhere (GR 3ff) I described the struggles of this period such as the mythic status of St Alban (of course, the post-WWII reforms of the asylum system may be dated much earlier, circa WWI, to the therapeutic value of an ‘active and orderly collective life’ recognized by Herman Simon [PT 39; also Oury and Vasquez 1968: 241] and the ‘origins’ of radical psychiatry, the myths around La Borde, the struggles around changes in the delivery of mental health in France in the 1960s such as sectorization). Here I want to emphasize the critique of the institution in the pedagogical context taken up by F. Oury and his
colleagues in the Freinet movement. This perspective will help to explain some of the basic principles and influence of institutional psychotherapy and acknowledge Guattari’s ongoing interest in GET, especially the role played by the importance given to singularization, a matter I will take up in more detail in chapter 3 in the intersecting contexts of Japan, architecture and photography.

The principles and programme outlined in the classic statement on institutional pedagogy, *Vers une pédagogie institutionnelle*, picks up on themes vital to Guattari’s concept of the group. Oury emphasized the act of writing as an individual and collective project that not only allowed for the expression of meaningful interests by individuals, but realized success in communication, that is, being read or heard by one or more others (as we will see in chapter 2, the subjugated group speaks but is not heard). Teachers attempted to set up a pedagogical scene of subjectification that guaranteed the certainty of being read through the circulation of published, reproduced texts. Correspondence between individuals, between individuals and groups (entailing reading before the class, but only from those sections of one’s personal ‘free text’ that would interest the group, and upon which they would pass a certain kind of judgement, making corrections, suggestions, editing, toward its inclusion in a collective publication), and group to group exchange of collectively written manuscripts between geographically diverse schools (refocusing attention on otherwise overlooked everyday situations that would appear unique to other readers, i.e., describing the Paris Métro to a group of students in the Haute Savoie). For Oury, the ‘school journal is a privileged technique’ (Oury and Vasquez 1968: 43, 200) in the constitution of a third object that opens the students to the world (the grade school is not a total institution!). Oury echoes a great chain of psychoanalytic objects – partial, transitional, institutional – that would become less and less typical (representational and/or non-significantizable) and progressively singular, an important Guattarian theme developed in chapter 2 with regard to his choice objects, with this third object of the published text. This Gutenbergian realization of the collective around the movable type of the printing press in the real work of cooperative production may sound today out of date with the IT revolution (references to roneo duplication, linotype, monotype and stencils, abound) but the machinic
dimension of the third object remains intact since it opens the class to
the world and serves, pedagogically, as a focal point for lessons about
grammar, reading, and relations between class and community. And
the importance of triangles and thirds was not lost on Guattari.

One of Oury’s most enduring creations was the weekly event called
the conseil de cooperative, the cooperative meeting directed by the
students themselves. In Oury’s work (Oury and Vasquez 1968: 82),
an institution is defined by ‘the places, moments, status of each
according to his/her level of performance, that is to say according to
his/her potentialities, the functions (services, posts, responsibilities),
roles (president, secretary), diverse meetings (team captains, different
levels of classes, etc.), and the rituals that maintain their efficac-
ity . . .’. In the meeting the teacher is one among many participants
and, although she/he may veto any motions, the class remains active
as a self-directed group, like Guattari’s sense of a subject group that
formulates its own projects, speaks and is heard, and puts itself at risk
in pursuing its own ends and taking responsibility for them; indeed,
the conseil is sometimes silent, faced with tumult, until it finds
language. There is always a risk of disappearing, or simply being
ignored, in both cases where young students and mental patients are
concerned, upon their insertion into the broad socio-economic-politico
fields of normal child/adulthood. The conseil was for Oury the eyes of
the group (witness of each persons’ transgressions, successes . . .), its
brain, as well, and heart, a refining machine: it is the ‘keystone of the
system since this meeting has the power to create new institutions,
and institutionalize the milieu of communal life’ (Oury and Vasquez
1968: 82). The conseil is the pedagogical equivalent, on the organization
level, of la grille.

The mediating third object is a fundamental principle of the
institutional situation, following upon a critique, by Tosquelles and
others, of the dual therapeutic situation of psychoanalysis and the
alleged neutrality of analysts. Two becomes three. Tosquelles looked
beyond the dual analysis at the openings provided by ‘multiple
impersonal networks of the symbolic order . . . [toward] a form of
group therapeutics that is often established, with the doctor’s knowl-
edge, in psychiatric hospitals as a result of the material organization
and the psycho-social interactions between patients and between
patients and doctors’ (Oury and Vasquez 1968: 242). For Oury, ‘the introduction between the therapist and the patient of a mediation is the necessary condition for the cure at least at the outset, and is also the characteristic, if on can schematize it in the extreme, of institutional therapy. The mediation may be apparently an object (tool or aim) or a person or an institution that always proves to be more than an object or person’ (Oury and Vasquez 1968: 243). Such mediations may take diverse forms and, in the pedagogical milieu, the school journal, published by the class – a group subject – and the conseil, which brings the group to language, is an organizational institution created, re-invented and maintained by the group over time. A mediating third object exists outside of face-to-face relations, and upon which work is done cooperatively, and for which responsibility is collectively assumed, through a series of obligatory exchanges (one speaks of the journal, apropos of a resolution, etc.). In chapter 4, I also pursue the significance of the triangulation of otherwise dual relations through Guattari’s diagrams of the components of assemblages. This point needs to be underlined as a political geometry of sorts, as Fernand Oury put it with regard to the systematic triangulation of group relations: ‘We oppose triangular and dual relations. Interindividual relations in a constellation may be figured by triangles’ (Oury and Vasquez 1968: 254). To the extent, as we will see, that the group, discussed in chapter 2 in terms of its Sartrean legacy, is replaced by the more abstract assemblage in Guattari’s theoretical evolution, the fundamental value of the triangle cannot be underestimated, even though it is clearly not the triangulation of Oedipalization, the neurotic triangle, as opposed to the excentric schizoid circle (AO 124), though surely owing an equal debt to the double triangles of symbolic and imaginary in Lacan’s Schema R flanking the real, that is, cutting it. As we will see in chapter 4, Guattari encircled and excentricated the triangle so as to escape from its reterritorialization on static psychoanalytic categories. While much of Guattari’s work is based on an explicit critique of dualisms (a first principle of micropolitics), I will show in chapter 5 on the four functors of the schizoanalytic modelizations that he will build up an impressive array of multiple axes of interaction. But was his quadrature of the triangles $3 + n$ simply the doubling of the twos that he sought to overcome?
If an ‘anterior militantism’ was a feature of the careers of the founding members of La Borde, Guattari was also a young activist who attempted to create links across and between existing progressive movements. The simple observation that many militants agitating for social change would feel out of place being with psychiatric patients in a clinical setting formed part of the basic political intelligence for both Guattari and J. Oury since the mid-1950s (PT 15–16). Guattari participated in extreme left groups all through his youth – including the youth wing of the French Communist Party, working on its newspaper *Tribune de discussion*, the *Union Nationale des étudiants de France*; the CP couldn’t contain him and as the 1950s rolled on Guattari would participate in Trotskyist splinter groups and the revue *La Voie communiste* (1958–65), then the *Opposition de Gauche*, among non-party Leftists, while all around him groupuscules formed and unformed as wars of liberation ended, first in Algeria, and in some cases continued, as in Vietnam; during the late 1960s Guattari kept a close eye on the peace movement and the activities of the *Comité Vietnam national*.

One could compile an impressive list of radical credentials, and an equally long list of expulsions (for breaking through too many sectorial boundaries and defying authority), counter-formations (against hierarchizations, obligatory ideological pronouncements) and inventions of innovative micro-spaces of liberty. Guattari would later describe, using his seminal concept of transversality that I discuss in detail in chapter 2, unleashing mutant militant machines that would permit new social practices of liberation to sit astride diverse social groups with quite different interests to the Eros of anti-capitalist inequivalence: ‘One of the principal finalities of new social practices of liberation will be the development, much more than the simple safeguarding of the collective and individual process of singularization, by which I mean everything that gives to these initiatives a character of living subjectification, irreplaceable experience, which “is worth the trouble”, which “gives purpose to life”’ (Guattari 1985: 106).

Every decade of Guattari’s life had its own texture of radicalism. Indeed, one might be tempted to call him a professional radical in the manner of Saul Alinsky, whose ability to think transversally in anti-corporate struggles in the 1970s against Eastman Kodak, for instance,
led to tactical innovations such as the use of stock proxies (held by progressive or sympathetic organizations, signed over to the community organization agitating for social responsibility, and used as a negotiating wedge) (Saunders and Alinsky 1970). In the heat of anti-psychiatry’s perilous lurching between utopianism and orthodoxy, between truly inspired political radicalism and apologetic reformism, Guattari’s colleague, family therapist Mony Elkaïm, organized in Brussels in 1975 an antidote to anti-psychiatry: Le Réseau international d’alternative à la psychiatrie. The perspective of a popular alternative to psychiatry refused decontextualizing diagnoses, labels and violent treatments (guineapigism, death as a normal side-effect) toward the birth of new forms of militancy around the ‘condition of the mental patient’ (MRr 148) that would follow upon and renew the early strategies of the Therapeutic Clubs, the politicization of the training of psychiatric nurses by Centre d’entraînement aux méthodes active (CEMA; see Oury and Vasquez 1968: 216–17 and MRr 149), like the political and moral education of children in the holiday camps of the Hostels movement. The examples are too numerous to exhaustively catalogue: Elkaïm in the South Bronx, using his family network analysis; Giovanni Jervis in Reggio Emilia, Franco Basaglia and the mental health employees association, Psychiatria Democratica, the SPK in Heidelberg, the anti-fascist and psychiatric struggles in Spain by medical interns, the documentary films about psychiatric survivors such as *Fous à délier, et alia* (SS 177ff) and dozens of other groups, projects and publications (see GR 2ff).

Guattari’s wide-ranging anti-anti-psychiatry activities during this period were often directed against the schizo superstars and rampant familialism of the British scene, Mary Barnes, Laing’s Philadelphia Association, and the like, a matter I consider briefly with reference to the first wave of anti-psychiatry, Thomas Szasz, in chapter 1. Instead of emphasizing this history, I want to reconsider Szasz on the basis of his pragmaticism.

And I haven’t even mentioned May 1968 yet! The ‘powerful wave’ that Guattari was surfing at this time seemed to break in May ’68: ‘68 was a very ambiguous moment’ (Chy 68, modified). Indeed, Guattari thought: ‘I am convinced that all of the possible variations of another May 68 have already been run through the computers at IBM’ (PT
INTRODUCTION

Thus begins the battle of viruses between overactive bureaucracy against generalized class struggle; against revolutionary impasses – my journal, my group, the party of $x$ – and the truths of theory and organization, Guattari found the work of desire in the multiplication, and multiplicity, of groupuscules freed from the impasses of interiority, looking outwards, towards collective identity beyond the bourgeois individual, family and workplace, and televisual superegos. Long before the computer had become a kind of ‘pagan god’ (FFG ET05–13, p. 12), Guattari had figured transversality as an anti-dogma, autopoetic virtual, viral machinic power (Ansell Pearson 1997: 188).

There are many points at which Guattari’s militantism overflowed party containers but, more importantly, he wanted to explore ways of overcoming both traditional parties of the working class (inertial institutional objects substituting themselves, that is, their bureaucratic reproduction, for those they represent – big unionism) and highly specialized political groupuscules that at least attempted to evade the anti-productive traps of such empty objects by embodying revolutionary subjectivity, but so often got stuck in demagoguery and lost their grip on social reality. His analytic experiments with the FGERI were turned toward this end, modelling themselves simultaneously on Lenin’s elitism (machine of the revolutionary vanguard, professional revolutionaries all, disciplined paramilitary men, to boot) and Gramsci’s political refocus on the emarginati (marginalized persons, with whom he was ‘organic’ as a disabled, Sardinian, proletarian, rural, politically inexperienced, casual writer . . .), the party as a Modern Prince, not very centralized, not strictly political, but cultural-ideological-educative, with a leadership linked organically to the mass and its diverse groupings whose creative interventions are more important than their mechanical application of orders issued from above. The paradox of the young Guattari’s attachment to Lenin is much in evidence and it is instructive (permanent revolution is permanent analysis?), not because it points to a weakness – a Leninist who is not very Leninist – or an overestimation of FGERI, about which he had few illusions because of its undeniable distance from influencing key sectors of production, but because of the enormity of the task he set himself circa 1965–7 in the presentations that constitute ‘La causalité, la subjectivité et l’histoire [Causality, subjectivity and
I believe that there is still reason to be Leninist, at least on the precise point that there is little point expecting the spontaneity and creativity of the masses to establish analytic groups in a long-lasting way – if one is still allowed to say Leninist considering that the present objective is no longer the promotion of a highly centralized party but rather a means by which the masses may take control of their own situation’ (PT 202). No facile invocation of interdisciplinary research will suffice, nor molar militarism: ‘only an analytic venture outlined against the background of revolutionary praxis can pretend to a true exploration of the unconscious – for the good reason that the unconscious is nothing other than the real that is to come, the transfinite field of potentialities received by open signifying chains which await being opened and articulated by a real agent [agent] of enunciation and effectuation. What this comes down to is that signifying breakthroughs, even of the most “intimate” kind, including those from so-called “private life”, could turn out to be decisive cruxes of historic causality’ (PT 203–4). A molecular Leninism? How, then, can an analytic undertaking provide the means for the masses to understand and take control of their lives? Already, then, we have a sense that the unconscious is a concern of everyone; that psychoanalysis, radically renovated, may be crossed with political groups in order to produce new, creative, institution building transversal communications. That politics doesn’t abide by programmes, that revolutionary praxis may stir in the most unlikely – from the perspective of the leadership – places (the aforementioned fry basket), which are the same places where the most subtle forms of alienation often go unanalysed. Still, singularity must be respected. Becoming political is itself a breakthrough. Communism may have failed, Lenin’s institutional innovations may have been distorted; this much must be admitted. Ultimately, Guattari will call the October Revolution itself into question as a model for future revolutions. And, in fact, the Gramscian side of the equation is also called into question. A curious footnote announces with regard to the significance of the Leninist breakthrough that Guattari’s concept of transversality (one of the key concepts developed by him) is ‘after all, nothing other than an attempted analysis of democratic centralism’ (PT 200, n. 19). The thrust of Guattari’s Leninism is revealed here at the expense of the
Gramscian valorization of the moving, dynamic organic relations between heterogeneous components (intellectual nucleus, subaltern groups) of a progressive democratic centralist party (Gramsci 1971: 155, 188–9). How best to awaken the collective will? Surely not by means of psychoanalysis! Was Guattari an organic intellectual? His deployment of transversality as a mode of critique of the organic party suggests otherwise. The idea of a ‘Leninism’ in scare quotes does not entail an either/or but a Janus-faced conception of the party that Guattari developed through his non-absolute distinction between subjugated and subject groups.

Deleuze (1972a in PT: vi) outlined this distinction in relation to Guattari’s Leninism in an instructive way (whereas the approach I take in chapter 2 is through its Sartrean legacy), pointing out that these two groups are two sides of the same institution, two kinds of centralism, let’s say: a subjugated centralism ‘operating by structuration, totalization, unification, substituting for the conditions of a true collective “enunciation” an assemblage of stereotyped statements, cut off from both reality and subjectivity’ (1972a in PT: vi). And subject groups, detotalized, creative, collective assemblages of enunciation, operate a critique of hierarchy and ‘ceaselessly confront themselves at the limit of their own non-sense, of their own death or rupture’. A precarious centralism whose organicity and democracy threaten to fall under the sway of a master-leader-priest after a ‘paranoiac contraction’, and harden into an irrevocably military nature, eradicating heresy and persecuting deviants (the ‘male party’, as Pasolini once jokingly called the Italian Communist Party).

Ridding himself of retroactive illusions about May 1968 and noting the emergence of diverse social movements in the wake of the events – *Groupe d’information sur les prisons, Groupe d’information sur les asiles, Centre d’étude, de recherche et formation institutionnel*, we enter the Foucault years (MRr 141) and Guattari’s micropolitical recoding (their mutual dispute with Lacanianism) of the microphysics of power that Foucault diagrammed as a process of subjectification (GR 177), of the critique of the individual toward the collective assemblage, and process of singularization within collectivities in the ‘analytics of finitude’. In short, an affirmative, pragmatic Foucauldian existentialism that mass-produced subjectivity masks with infantile visions of eternity. Fou-
cault’s own concepts were tossed into the collective tool-box in which two complementary visions of micropolitics emerged in the rhizomatic conception of power as relational, operational, constitutive of social reality (with its regimes of power), and has as a principle of its immanence, resistance as a mode of possibility. Foucault, and then Deleuze and the promise of CERFI and collective research and experimentation, which were apparently dashed by Deleuze when he and Guattari began their collaboration (Chy 28) since Deleuze wanted them to work alone, together, apart, yet between. In chapter 1 I pose the problem of the reception of Deleuze’s work as a way of erasing Guattari, a phenomenon that is as hard to avoid as it is to do something about. But something, I will insist, must be done.

Since, however, Guattari situated his energies before and after 1968 (noting the demagoguery that infected Vincennes) the events themselves remain somewhat mediocre, simulational, a little too beautiful. Their ambiguity is captured by Guattari in his reflection on FGERI, which occupied the Théâtre de l’Odéon: ‘The FGERI was rather extraordinary: no funding, no grants and even so there were more than a hundred people, from very different backgrounds, who would meet in order to deepen the theme of widening the scope of analysis, moving it beyond the limits of the couch and the psychoanalytic structuralism that had begun to install itself in a despotic way around Lacanianism. The negative aspect was that this technique of “brain-storming” could become an alibi for doing nothing. . . . Some reflections like this sounded the alarm: Girard saying, at the moment when I began working with Deleuze: “Well, now Félix reads . . .”’ (Chy 28, modified). It was François Girard who attacked Anti-Oedipus because its authors inadvertently defended psychoanalysis by buying into the univocal relation between the psychoanalytic triangle and all other triangles, an insufficiently analysed political geometry (Girard 2001: 696ff). Yet, another ambiguity arises to counter the suspicion of the first: Deleuze and Guattari’s statements, circa 1977, on behalf of the Comité de liaison contre la répression against the extradition of German lawyer Klaus Croissant, sympathetic toward the Baader–Meinhof Gruppe, from France back to Germany. For readers of Guattari, Deleuze is an enigma: the one who can simultaneously assert that ‘all of us are groupuscles’ and withdraw from groups, as Guattari indi-
And then Italy. To borrow another coinage by Pasolini from the early 1970s that he used to describe the network of power established and fortified by the Christian Democratic Party in Italy, as well as the opposition parties which colluded with it, *Il Palazzo*, counter-hegemonic struggle requires that the Palace be put under renovation! With the compromising historic compromise, *compromesso storico*, of 1973 (to 1978) in which Enrico Berlinguer’s Communist Party entered the Palace with its traditional enemies the Christian Democrats, thus becoming a Partito di Governo rather than a Partito di Lotta, little hope remained that renovations would ever get under way. By the time of Gianfranco Sanguinetti’s (aka ‘Censor’) *True Report on the Last Chance to Save Capitalism in Italy* (1975; partial translation, Censor 1980), in which the compromise is said to be ‘solely for the communists’ and the alleged perils of the ‘revolutionary’ Italian Communist Party (ICP), entering the sphere of power is an illusion exported by the ICP itself. This piece of Situationist agitation in which the ICP will be forced to make those who refuse to work do so, interest in the Italian situation, in the historic compromise, the Red Brigades, and the flowering of the Autonomy movement in 1977, spread among French intellectuals, pitting Baudrillard against Guattari, for instance, in the determination of the meaning of the events. For the former, they were an implosive, non-localizable, decentred turning inward of subversion and the particularization of the incalculable consequences of this ironic process (the inward collapse of the idea of revolution which is more potent than revolution itself); while on the other hand, for Guattari, they were valorized as molecular politics, new forms of collective belonging and expression with both anti-capitalist and anti-socialist deterritorializing potential, without a plan or distinct programme for the future.

It is appropriate, especially for English readers of both Baudrillard and Guattari, to consider their responses together since the work of the New York-based publishing collective Semiotext(e) has innovated in presenting much important work by both thinkers in its influential *Foreign Agents* series. While this strategy has led to some confusions due to the absence of critical commentaries on the texts, Guattari has...
cast a long shadow over the Semiotext(e) project since his appearance in 1975 at the Schizo-Culture Conference at Columbia University; Sylvère Lotringer’s (1999) own reflections on Guattari, and Deleuze, among others in New York in the early 1970s is a valuable intellectual chronicle about the emergence of ‘French theory’. Indeed, one sees between New York and Paris numerous fructuous cross-pollinations in the life of journal projects: Lotringer worked with CERFI and Recherches in 1973, turning the project into an early issue of Semiotext(e), ‘The Two Saussures’, and he would later get involved in the journal of international leftist culture and thought, Change International, during the early to mid-1980s; Charles Wolfe’s longstanding contributions to the journal founded by Deleuze and Guattari, Chimères, etc.

Guattari believed that the molecular revolution, the necessity of which follows from his bald statement ‘there will be no more October revolutions’, will not take place through traditional political organizations but, on the contrary, will be generalized, transversal, deterritorialized. The events of March 1977 (of course, later in September there would be mass arrests of professors, including his friend Antonio Negri, et alia, closing of editorial houses, etc.), mass demonstrations by workers and students and unclassifiable urban radicals ending in riots in the streets of Bologna as the Communist mayor called in the police in armoured cars, the conflict broadcast by the pirate radio station, Radio Alice (after the events of March it was closed), are discussed by Guattari in detail. Both Baudrillard and Guattari, however, put the emphasis on the ‘originality’ of these events; only Guattari considered the Italian inventiveness to be hopeful in a progressive political sense, whereas Baudrillard was content to connect this originality with the implosive form into which meaning disappears.

Although it may be appropriate to contrast Baudrillard and Guattari on the events in Bologna in the spring and fall of 1977, Guattari once noted that it is not so much what the French think of such issues that really matters, as he looked around his apartment and saw a number of Italian friends and militants hiding out in exile, but what can be learned about the current situation, especially in France ten years after 1968, from the Italian point of view. In a short poignant preface to Bruno Giorgini’s Que sont mes amis devenus? outlining precisely this
point, Guattari wrote (in Guattari 1978: 5): ‘Rather than consider Italy as a case apart, endearing, but all things considered, aberrant, doesn’t it demand of us that we attempt a clarification of the other social, political and economic situations – those with more apparent stability, deriving from a more assured state power – through a reading of the tensions that are currently at work in that country?’ Guattari valued the ability to move from one situation to another: ‘Always draw the connections, always keep a little distance, so as to remain alert in the thick of things.’

By 1975 Guattari had already become president of the Collectif de soutien aux radios libres in Paris, a support group for the free radio movement. A line may be drawn from free red radios in Italy, the free green radio in France, from the German Greens to Guattari’s participation in the French Greens, via Brice Lalonde’s Radio Verte, the early success of his Paris-Ecologie electoral lists in the late 1970s (not to mention his stunt on TF1 in which he produced, during the municipal elections of March 1977, a small radio, a ‘free green radio’, in order to separate the Greens from the Reds as far as direct democracy was concerned; see Cojean and Ezkenazi 1986: 9ff) and the later splinter party Génération Ecologie under his leadership (est. 1990), that would hold Guattari’s interest, enough that he would stand unsuccessfully as a political candidate. A deluge of free radios followed – Radio Libre 44, Radio Fil bleu . . . Tomate – just as the Left was losing political power.

With the founding of the Centre d’initiative pour nouveaux espaces de liberté (CINEL) in the late 1970s, Guattari connected the campaign against the extradition of Klaus Croissant, free radio events, action committees of all sorts against state-sponsored micro-fascisms and the rise of the conservative ‘new philosophers’, the ‘CNRSization of research’ [Centre national de la recherche scientifique], as Guattari referred to it (FFG ET09–26, p. 156ff), state (social) science, if you will, that is part of the French intellectual unconscious, and state repression in Italy in the course of the Autonomy movement (the Appel des intellectuels français contre la répression en Italie, protesting the mass round-up and jailing of Leftist intellectuals and professors; open letters to the press, interviews across Europe, meetings [Mru 153ff]). All the diagrammatic effects of these struggles for places of freedom demon-
strated a kind of evolution of militantism toward new forms of collective assemblage and explorations of their potentialities. The theoretical task would be to diagram assemblages and their components and fields, a task which I describe in detailed semiotic terms in chapters 4 and 5.

The action committees simply proliferated: Comité de solidarité avec le peuple du Nicaragua in the late 1970s; in the early 1980s the Assembly for South Korean Democracy, Non à la France de l’apartheid (1981). At the end of the ‘winter years’ of the early 1980s that saw the rise of the Right, racism, nationalism, postmodernism, the dissolution of the Left, the spent energy of radicalism, Guattari’s visits to Japan in the mid-1980s, detailed in chapter 3, provided him with a new perspective from which to understand the dialectic of archaic and modern, that also marked his work on Integrated World Capitalism in Europe and the move to common markets, free trade zones, beyond so-called nationalist and corporatist archaisms, and his counterproposal to embrace the archaic against the modern, if this meant giving a voice and material means to genuine minority liberation movements: ‘Yes, we are all archaic and your modernity, you can stick it where you like’ (Guattari 1985: 109). The encounter of archaic and modern will be repeatedly reworked by Guattari. It is an important sociological refrain in his thought, but not a pseudo-scientific sociologism. It is also a dangerous gamble because, as Guattari recognized, recourse to archaic references is a hallmark of racism: ‘We end up in a general disarray which leads people to huddle around fictions or archaisms. This is the source of racist attitudes and contortions’ (AH 39). We get, Guattari believed, the racism we deserve as a consequence, in France at least, of the political failures of the Left, and the inability to find the institutional means to incarnate new modes of subjectification in a time of economic change for a truly transcultural and multinational, postcolonial society.

During the mid-1980s, Deleuze and Guattari separately intervened in the pages of the Revue d’études Palestiniennes (the grandeur of Arafat, and then Marx) in the wake of the massacres at Sabra and Chatilla (Deleuze 1984a; GR 218–30), while Guattari attempted, together with Negri, to reinvent communism. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Guattari played a role in the counter-offensive Front de résistance...
against Le Pen’s fascist and racist Front national; he articulated his ecological vision beyond left and right, in theory in *Les trois écologies*, in the dailies and on the hustings, joined the Socialist pacifists against the Gulf War (1991), and engaged in a transmediterranean dialogue for peace in the former Yugoslavia against the horrors of ethnic cleansing. Guattari’s vision of ‘a new way of doing politics’ sought to transcend party fractionalism (the splintering of France’s Green party – Antoine Waechter’s majoritarian Les Verts and Brice Lalonde’s breakaway Génération Ecologie – is an unfortunate example of fractionalism, despite the apparently sacrosanct ideal that Les Verts would be neither right nor left). Flare-ups around whose name would be put forward on the party’s electoral lists in regional elections, as well as strategic positioning against far right candidates from the Front national during the early 1990s, merely exacerbated the problem of party unity and the limits of autonomy. Guattari’s vision recaptures the sense of the ecology ‘movement’ in general which would, if applied to party politics, allow its recomposition in a way that respected pluralism and diversity. As Guattari (1992: 8) wrote in the pages of *Le Monde*: ‘Disconcerted, disgusted by traditional politics, a major section of opinion turns towards ecology. Vague aspiration, but indicative of an opening towards “something else”, hoping to see the birth of other social, economic and ecological practices, a different vision of the future. It is up to the plural ecology politics movement to give expression to this aspiration. By way of programmatic content that articulates the ecology of nature with that of the city, of society, it looks to do the same with that of the spirit. But also through the invention of a new way of doing politics, at once more convivial, more engaged with everyday realities, but no less articulated through pressing planetary questions that could lead us to revise the fundamental goals of our societies.’

But the state of the ‘molecular revolution’ at the end of the 1980s in France was extremely precarious. Although Guattari put great faith in ecology, a generalized ecosophy, from the depolarization of French society two forces were clearly visible in the dull greyness: ‘A society that loses its poles of value becomes amorphous, unable to face change. For example, after the Spanish Republic was crushed, Francoist Spain slept for many decades. Democracy supposes a relative state of tension,
where the collective intelligence arranges itself in multipolar formations that can apprehend economic and social realities from contrasting angles. French society today seems to be nearly depolarized. Values, those of Left and Right, have lost their traditional consistency. Only the obsessives of the National Front, bound to the cause of a totalitarian regime, and ecological thematic, which have yet to be well embodied politically, emerge from this fuzziness’ (Guattari 1990a: 2). Far from capitulating to this postmodern condition, Guattari held out hope that by refocusing on the molecular level new possibilities would emerge from attending to what each of us does at his or her own level. Guattari continued: ‘Where are the new vitamins of meaning? How to repolarize the socius and the psyche? Perhaps by opening our eyes, and beginning to take stock of the thousands of initiatives – sometimes microscopic – which teem, stagnating or proliferating, within the social fabric: all the attempts to change life in certain areas, imagine a different urbanism, create a different kind of school, a different kind of business, a less desperate old age – not to forget, certainly, the prisons, or the psychiatric lock-up. In short, always, and now more than ever: the molecular revolution. Socialism will place at the centre of its preoccupations changing daily life, close relations and solidarity. It will show concretely how “something can be done”, even in the most difficult situations, or it will disappear from the charts of hope, and move aside, possibly in favour of a new ecological pole.’ From 1970 to 1990, then, hope was found not in the revolutionary vanguard but in the intimate spheres of the everyday in civil society that can find political expression in new modes of valorization (of work and leisure) and the formation of solidarities with those both near and distant.

Guattari was interested in alternative kinds of research, such as action research, that was not undertaken by specialists but collectively framed and elaborated by those who live the problems. This was especially important for Guattari in his work in Brazil in the favelas where, together with his Brazilian friends, he had ‘the intention of creating a centre of alternative research which would lead to innovative experiments; it’s a way of funding the programs and then of plugging them into education, health . . .’ (FFG I02–21, p. 6). Institutional innovation outside, across and beyond typical funding corridors and organizational maps of influence was conjoined with broader social
critiques of the formation of subjectivity in a massively mediatic environment toward a post-media universe in which singularity may emerge from the reigning seriality. But Guattari was aware of the paradox at issue here: ‘How can the singularity of mediatic expression be recovered? Here’s the paradox: if it is mediatic, it is not singular. And yet it is necessary that it is at once mediatic and singular’ (FFG I02–21, p. 11). This is why the World Wide Web was so important for Guattari: a becoming network, becoming miniature, becoming portable, that provided the opportunity, he reflected, of studying the dreams of Kafka with two or three like-minded persons or watching a football match. That, in a nutshell, was what he meant by the post-media era (an antidote to postmodernism he formulated during a Brazilian sojourn while contemplating leaving France) and he was, despite his dislike of football, respectful of those who are passionate about it despite the obvious problems big matches create as spectacles designed for those denied access to the \textit{jouissance} of capitalist elites and highly productive of a wide range of social problems (FFG I02–21, p. 12).

How, then, did he hold all of these heterogeneous components together? What gave them consistency? Guattari’s dense theoretical work constituted an attempt to find concepts adequate to the expression of the connections between diverse militant practices. Much of this book is devoted to a discussion of basic principles such as transversality (chapter 2), singularity/subjectification (chapters 1 and 3), component-group/assemblage-field relations (chapter 4), and the four ontological functions (chapter 5). The issue of consistency across a truly heterogenous field is not a matter of neatly tying everything up in a unidimensional manner nor a question of simply discerning patterns. There is, however, consistency in the effort to experiment with, at both practical and theoretical levels, sometimes simultaneously, though oftimes not, relations of interdependency, assembling, and alliances. This is why I have emphasized the problem of interdisciplinarity in this Introduction. For Guattari, the movement from interdisciplinarity, with all its compromises, toward transdisciplinarity was both inevitable and necessary. Interdisciplinarity was a kind of ecosophical problem of interdependency, not just a new topic in fairly fixed fields. This irreversible movement – a much stronger,
affirmative version of what I call a drift toward indiscipline away from institutions such as universities (under molar pressures of the marketplace or molecular desires of undisciplined affiliations and extravagances) — was an internal force whose very existence necessarily transformed how interrelations between living systems, social structures and psychical processes are conceived. Simply put, this internal movement was evident, thought Guattari, in the IT revolution because its complex objects compose a world of interdependent hypercomplexity irreducible to unidimensional evaluation on the single basis, let’s say, of the market, or of predictive, objective science. And this hypercomplexity was itself transformative of method as such. To put this in another way, Guattari’s life of militant engagements and struggles on numerous fronts itself necessitated a reflexive grasp of its consistency through a theorization of the character of the relations between its diverse components. Guattari’s preferred term of transdisciplinary research was a call to rethink relations between science, society, politics, ethics and aesthetics through the development of a metamethodology adequate to this new field of relations.

Readers of Guattari’s last book, *Chaosmosis*, will recognize that schizoanalysis had become an attempt at transdisciplinary metamethodology, modelling assemblages by means of which beings are incarnated in their singularity through four ontological functions (material Fluxes, machinic Phylums; incorporeal Universes, existential Territories): ‘Schizoanalysis, rather than moving in the direction of reductionist modelizations which simplify the complex, will work towards its complexification, its processual enrichment, toward the consistency of its virtual lines of bifurcation and differentiation, in short towards its ontological heterogeneity’ (Chs 61). Although Guattari was aware that even metamodelizations can retreat into theoretical binarisms in which Fours fall back into Twos, or get stuck on an existing modelization, such methodological innovation is not merely an option.

‘There is no general pedagogy relative to the constitution of a living transdisciplinarity’, Guattari wrote (FFG ET20–24, p. 15). FGERI was an experiment, not a definitive model. Even today, as bringing together interdisciplinary research teams in private and public labs and research centres is becoming a general goal, hyperspecialization (and all of its counterproductive effects) still rules the day. In his jointly written
(with Sergio Vilar in Barcelona) report to the Assistant Director General of UNESCO on the operation of interdisciplinary research, ‘From Pluridisciplinariness to Transdisciplinariness via the Complex Objects which compose the Object World and its Interdependent Hypercomplexity’, Guattari offered a vision of the tasks of metamethodology beyond the postmodern condition of the rule of paralogy and dissensus (his engagement with dissensus will need to be carefully disimbricated from that of Lyotard’s, a task to which I turn in chapter 1 and return to in chapter 3). Still, Lyotard (1984: 52–3) also had to reckon with what had become of the post-1968 popular slogan of ‘interdisciplinary studies’ in the current team-based interdisciplinary approach (i.e., valorization of brainstorming, social scientific tokenism in state sponsored scientific research) to knowledge production (research) and its transmission (mass and elite versions) under the growing influence of the marketplace.

For Guattari and Vilar, ‘the organization of human culture by disciplines belongs to the past, although to a certain degree it is a necessary point of departure in the advance towards domains of knowledge that involve new practices and changing styles of individual and collective life’ (FFG ET05–13, p. 3). Within university systems, disciplines remain closeted and largely ignorant of one another. While there has been much fanfare about interdisciplinarity, there has been little effort expended at the level of method to realize its implications. The authors note the risk that interdisciplinary might become nothing more than a kind of ‘magic word’ the utterance of which would make a given project interdisciplinary, while changing nothing. Despite such degradations, the task becomes, then, the elaboration of a genuine metamethodology that would upset existing power/knowledge formations.

The authors elaborated eight conditions:

1. call into question a given discipline’s ability to understand the globality within which it finds itself;
2. adopt a humble attitude in the face of the immense field of knowledge of the real;
3. open one’s own assemblages toward heterogeneous fields of dialogue and other forms of mutual exchange;
4. do not abandon specialization as an ideological principle but, rather, proceed irreversibly by fluctuation and bifurcation toward transdisciplinarity, each discipline according to its own speed and willingness to make sacrifices or suffer ‘amputations’;

5. certain theoretical approaches will need to be deconstructed, but hopefully not in an anarchic way, so that existing disciplines may see the confluence of concepts and problems from a new theoretico-pragmatic and virtual perspective;

6. the creation of numerous cross-references is not heresy but has always existed to some extent;

7. from a critical interdisciplinary perspective, certain scientific positions of alleged self-sufficiency and omnipotence will be subject to definitive critique (no more queen of the sciences, more pure [higher] than applied [lower], etc.);

8. *intra*disciplinary graspings of the virtualities of heterogenous, evolving fields will have repercussions for the movement toward transdisciplinarity (FFG ET05–13 pp. 6–9).

None of these points is isolated from more global cultural, political and institutional transformations. The important point is that transdisciplinarity goes beyond interdisciplinarity and is caught up in the general movement of deterritorialization that is rhizomic and mixes heterogenous axiological dimensions. Guattari and Vilar supposed that researchers will be predisposed toward a transdisciplinary perspective on the basis of their grasp, even at first from within their own disciplines, of the character of emerging and quickly changing complex objects such as data processing systems, and their value for elaborating a transdisciplinary perspective. This openness means that researchers will have to familiarize themselves with concepts from other disciplines and learn how to work with them, especially around efforts to understand the multidimensionality of complex objects. In this way, certain common fundamental traits of such complex objects may come to be known relative to cultural elements (subcultural utilizations); social elements (gender and race interests), as well from micro- and macro-perspectives crossed by diverse universes of value; economic factors in local, regional, national and global contexts; technico-scientific develop-
ments; and ecological implications. The principal characteristics of complex objects, relative to the areas just listed, are crossed by processes that reveal: dynamic instabilities; contingencies and vulnerabilities; entropic irreversibility; and creative possibilities of negative entropy. The metamethod would map theoretically and empirically the transitions, transformations and effects of complex objects which, because they constantly undergo changes based on imbalances between their elements, must be capable of modification in their turn. In this last respect, Guattari’s four functors serve as he put it as ‘safety barriers or warning lights’ (Chs 61) that guide and hopefully preserve the emergence and constitution of complex compositions from a chaotic field, with a nucleus of chaomosis, in which precariousness, uncertainty and creativity override fixity, structure and universality (Chs 59). Metamodels are on their faces far too simplistic to account for this complexity, and Guattari repeatedly underlined this point, especially with regard to the four functors because they are often divided in two, twice, sometimes thrice (between actual discursive Fluxes and Phylums and virtual non-discursive Universes and Territories; assembled by expression and content planes).

In Guattari’s conceptual nomenclature, metamodels are not to be confused with metanarratives because they eschew universality for the sake of singularity, and the self-constitution of references, organization, relations, and limits. This makes Guattari’s metamodel akin to a continuous process of automodelization that attempts to extract its own consistency, rather than deriving it from a universal syntax or model that produces one kind of subjectivity, from the components of the assemblages to which it relates. As far as militancy is concerned, metamodels are not just abstractions because they require the putting into place of the organizational and institutional means for their collective realization. GTPSI, FGERI, CINEL, la grille at La Borde, were all transversal, transdisciplinary ‘solutions’ at work in the same sense that a team of researchers seeks a solution or answer. The enduring problem is how to do it, how to assemble a workable collectivity that will function as a counter-current against all the seductions of fall-back positions, become aware of its own blockages and automutilations, as well as finding ways to realize its potential,
risking itself in the face of others. How is a ‘Leninist breakthrough’ made and preserved and a breakdown avoided? This was the question, I am suggesting, that animated Guattari’s life and work, his activist-intellectuality, and it is my task to show how this divide was transversalized.
CHAPTER 1

Representing Guattari

The problems and prospects of representation are intimately related to the translation, reception, and distribution of ideas. The literature on Guattari is modest, but growing; in relation to the burgeoning literature on Deleuze and even Deleuze and Guattari, it is miniscule. How is the work of Guattari accounted for within our traditions and institutions? He is not easily assimilable to philosophy; nor does he comfortably wear the psychoanalytic label; his activism and political theorizing would normally place him in a political studies camp, but there is no sign of him there; indeed, is he a literary critic or an architectural theorist? Why not? Claims of this sort tend to be highly selective, and multiply as Guattari’s work is embraced on the margins or, as some would prefer, cutting edges, of critical practices. This inability to pin him down is something that readers will simply have to bear and resist the attempt to rigidify his thought, to make of molecularity a molar masterpiece. We can become prisoners of our own scholarly apparatuses and methods, and the construction of a magnificent reception facility for a fundamentally undisciplinable (genuinely transdisciplinary) thought operates with the violence of inscription and will to conformity that must be resisted. This is why this introductory text takes great pains to remain aberrant and deviate from the closure recommended by the packaging of key ideas and core concepts, bearing impressive labels. My own work in The Guattari Reader was a case in point. In France, Guattari is considered an activist rather than a philosopher or even an intellectual. Still, it is quite incomprehensible to some French readers that I emphasized anti-psychiatry as a social movement that could handily frame Guattari’s career. After all, Guattari had what may be described as an ambivalent relationship to anti-psychiatry, despite his praise for David Cooper, for instance, whom he considered ‘a genuine researcher’ (FFG I.21–49). But this framing device had the virtue of placing his work and practice
in relation to key variants of this significant social movement. However, it also had the unfortunate effect of reinforcing a very problematic, albeit popular, conception of Guattari as an activist ‘rather than’... a philosopher. I needed a framing device that would introduce Guattari’s work without distorting it; yet my choice aggravated the issue: in aligning him with this social movement, even in a critical way, I may have reinforced a representation that I did not support for I consider Guattari an activist-intellectual. This is the sort of quandary that animates this first chapter.

In this first chapter I want to briefly use five areas relevant to Guattari’s thought and practice – anti-psychiatry; postmodernism; receptions of his work with Deleuze; subjectification; transversality – to demonstrate problems and prospects of existing representations. These existing ideas are often no more than skirmishes, passing analogies, allusions to ways in which Guattari’s thought may be placed, asides that constitute pleasing diversions on the road to a real topic; of course, some are more developed than that. I want to study these for the sake of their insights and distortions. It is not that they are patently wrong or misleading; rather, they alert us to significant issues without really developing them, leaving much work to be done. Therein lies their value: the most interesting instances are signposts without a road; otherwise, they rely upon an already signed route. In any event, we will have to be prepared to both rough it and luxuriate in existing modes of transport.

FRENCH LAING OR NEW SZASZ?

Every reader of Guattari adopts a strategy of representation through which his work is assigned a place within one or more recognizable streams if not traditions. I want to appreciate what such placements do and do not tell us about Guattari. Eugene Holland (1999: vii) offers a ‘rough equivalent’ with immediate qualifications: ‘Guattari can be considered the rough equivalent in France of R. D. Laing or David Cooper in England, Thomas Szasz or Ernest Becker in the United States – except that Guattari, in addition to being a leading theoretician of the innovative La Borde psychiatric clinic, was also a militant...
political activist who always sought to link his (anti)-psychiatric reforms and theorization to working-class and community-based revolutionary politics.’ Having ‘roughly’ placed Guattari in a social movement known as anti-psychiatry by making him an ‘equivalent’ of several of the movement’s major figures in two other countries, it is immediately noted that he worked at an ‘innovative’ psychiatric clinic and was a kind of activist-intellectual. This is a standard strategy; Guattari also engaged in it, wondering whether what Franco Basaglia attempted at Gorizia was the ‘Italian equivalent of the anti-psychiatry of Laing’ (at the level of the institution; GR 44). Holland merely flags the relationship instead of exploring it. He leaves his readers with a great deal of work to do since, although the milieu of European anti-psychiatry was Guattari’s to a certain extent, it is not obvious what he had in common with the likes of Thomas Szasz or R. D. Laing. This strategy is as obvious as its problems are intractable. I think it is best to place the emphasis first on the rough, and then on the equivalent.

Let’s first take the example of Laing. Guattari’s review of several of Laing’s books in French translation announces with its title – ‘The Divided Laing’ – the failure of this variant of anti-psychiatry: ‘Laing is himself divided: revolutionary when he breaks with psychiatric practice, his written work gets away from him and, whether he likes it or not, is used for purposes alien to its inspiration’ (GR 39). Laing’s brand of anti-psychiatry, perhaps less than others, is open to reformist recuperations because it did not break with the personological and familialist models of the psychoanalytic and psychiatric establishments. Laing was guilty of ‘psychoanalysm’. For Guattari, Laing failed to grasp the reductive implications of his writings, as well as the lack of rigour and concreteness of his ‘practices’ (i.e., the ‘mirror games’ of his poetic knots, his utopian ‘mystical wisdom’ and meditative retreats). Sure, Guattari appreciated the communitarian experiments of the Philadelphia Association, chaired by Laing, such as Kingsley Hall in Bow (East London) from 1965–70. But one had to admit, Guattari wrote, that ‘no psychiatric experiment has been long-lasting’ (GR 38). And this is one of the things that made Guattari’s winter years of the early to mid-1980s so long and cold: the failure of the utopian communities and political experiments of the 1960s and 1970s.
In the course of his review of Mary Barnes and Joe Berke’s *Two Accounts of a Journey Through Madness*, Guattari (GR 48) turned to Laing’s failings:

Laing thought that he could outwit neurotic alienation by centering the analysis on the family, on its internal ‘knots’. For him, everything starts with the family. He would like, however, to break away from it. He would like to merge with the cosmos, to burst the everydayness of existence. But his mode of explanation cannot release the subject from the grip of the familialism that he wanted only as a point of departure and which reappears at every turn. He tries to resolve the problem by taking refuge in an Oriental style of meditation which could not definitively guard against the intrusion of a capitalist subjectivity with the most subtle means at its disposal. One doesn’t bargain with Oedipus: as long as this essential structure of capitalist repression is not attacked head-on, one will not be able to make any decisive changes in the economy of desire and thus, in the status of madness.

As Guattari explained, ‘familialism consists in magically denying social reality, and avoiding all connections with real fluxes’ (GR 49). There would be no anti-Oedipus, an elaborate attack on reductive familialism, in this variant of anti-psychiatry. Was Guattari the ‘rough equivalent’ of Laing? Not if the measure is familialism. The English schizo-superstar Mary Barnes, whom Guattari once dubbed the ‘missionary of Laing’s therapy’ (GR 49), proved to be as adept as her therapists at playing the interpretation of choice at Kingsley Hall. In the end, Guattari merely posed a rhetorical question: ‘Has Mary-the-missionary at least helped the anti-psychiatrists clarify the reactionary implications of their psychoanalytic postulates?’ (GR 54).

Let’s now consider Thomas Szasz’s classic *The Myth of Mental Illness* (1967), the first of two ‘myth’ books (followed by *The Myth of Psychotherapy*). Although used pejoratively, the idea that mental illness is a ‘myth’ conjured by psychiatry and its imitator, psychoanalysis, is socially and politically irresponsible because it entails the abandonment of persons suffering at least from existential, moral and interpersonal dilemmas and problems, there is much more to Szasz’s position and
critique as later versions of it would have us believe. Indeed, a rule of thumb in contemporary discussions of this social movement is that it was accommodated by its one-time enemies, who turned the gains of the movement against themselves through exaggerated claims of progressivism within institutions and by abdicating responsibility for patients in the name of the very dangerous and nebulous model of community care (the same voices contributing to the erosion of community by equating it with the ‘market’ and downloading responsibility onto social services starved for cash). The points of contact between Szasz and Guattari may be found, however, in their recourse to semiotic models that are based on non-linguistic signs and problems of translation from one sign type to another, as well as the deleterious effects of a monosemiotic theory, most commonly recognized as a purely linguistic approach to signification and communication. This may come as a surprise to some since the salient connection is not where one might expect.

One of the central themes of Szasz’s *The Myth of Mental Illness* is the semiotic analysis of hysteria. Inspired by the American pragmatic tradition, Szasz uses the sign types of Charles Morris, themselves inherited from C. S. Peirce, to advance a triadic conception of the sign relation (sign user–sign–object) and a three-part classification of signs: index (in which the sign and object are causally connected), icon (between the sign and object there is a relation of similarity), and symbol (sign and object are related by an arbitrary convention). Szasz distinguishes between communication by means of symbols, that is, linguistic communication, and other types of non-linguistic communication. Like Szasz, Guattari (IM 19) also maintained a distinction between semiology or translinguistics and semiotics; the latter is a method that is not dependent on linguistics. Although this is a fairly widespread distinction, its implications are profound. For Szasz it means that communication by means of the bodily signs of hysteria such as paralyses, seizures, blindness, deafness, and various noises, are not strictly speaking a language since language consists of conventional signs. Instead, he analyses hysteria as a form of communication between sufferers or patients and helpers or physicians through the deployment of iconic signs. Guattari likewise claimed in somewhat hyperbolic terms that linguists are imperialists who not only have
attempted to annex semiotics by making it depend upon linguistic categories, but try to exercise their sovereignty over every domain, especially the social field, either by relating it back to language, or simply by not considering this single measure of signification to pose a problem. The prime target for Guattari was the sovereign reach of linguistics over pragmatics. Szasz understands this position well since Morris problematized it in his work by including actual sign users in context in his definition of semiosis. Despite this, philosophers of language and linguists understood pragmatics negatively as what was leftover in the study of the creation of meaning after semantics accounted for signification (with no reference to actual sign users).

Szasz and Guattari both engage in pragmatics; for the former, a 'pragmatics of protolanguage' (hysterical bodily signs), and for the latter a 'pragmatics of the unconscious' (emerging from a critique in micropolitical terms of the alleged unity and autonomy of language, and an unconscious that was not the concern of specialists, especially those who would see in it the structure of language). The importance of pragmatic philosophy – regardless of whether it is derived from Perice, Morris, or even Dewey in the case of Ernest Becker’s approach to mental illness ‘as action that bogs down . . . even though thought may continue furiously’ (Becker 1964: 3) – for anti-psychiatry is buried deep within Holland’s ‘rough equivalence’.

Just as Guattari turned his critical attention to both generative and structural linguistics to launch his critique of linguistic imperialism, Szasz turned to philosophy of language, employing its terminology to situate his semiotic interests at a level below the distinction between object language (defined through conventional signs) and metalanguage (symbols of symbols). Hence, his use of protolanguage to describe iconic, bodily signs in a hierarchy of languages defined through the nomenclature of philosophy of language. This was a procedure he repeated in several different ways (i.e., showing that protolanguages express messages but not knowledge, and have a lowly cognitive status as purely expressive, non-discursive, and idiosyncratic). In recuperating the possibility of a systematic semiotic of bodily signs, decoded against a medical model that would see them as anatomically or physiologically determined, and against a philosophical model that situated them below the bottom rung of signifying systems, Szasz and Guattari took
the same road by investigating diverse modes of semioticization, analysing their communicative efficacy, and showing that they are easily misunderstood (leading to misdiagnosis and misinformation because non-discursive signs have many poorly defined referents) in the course of being translated into language, that is, into a semiological mode foreign to them. This claim radically challenged language’s sovereignty as the semiotic standard. In Guattari’s terms, such translation crushes semiotic polyvocity and excludes a-signification.

Although Szasz and Guattari share a semiotic orientation, their deployment of the tradition differs significantly. Whereas the former bases his use of icons on visual similarity — hysterical bodily signs ‘present’ and ‘portray’ and thus communicate in quite idiosyncratic ways the sufferer’s sense of his/her own problems, in ways often modelled on organic disturbances — the latter separates the diagram, one of Peirce’s examples of icons, from the dominant visual mode of iconicity, in order to explore the relations of its parts (spatial relations and social relations), escaping the otherwise restrictive idea of visual similarity. I am not suggesting that Szasz was uncritical in his deployment of icons. On the contrary, he used resemblance to demonstrate the semiotic weaknesses and blunders of Freudian symbolism (i.e., the ambiguity and tedium of iconicity in dream symbolism, as well as Freud’s struggle to explain the mechanisms of symbolization, especially Frau Cäcilie’s facial pain and its precipitating slap in the face in Studies on Hysteria, without reference to iconic and indexical semiotic relations, although he certainly tried to do so, suggesting that ‘it may be that [hysteria] does not take linguistic usage as its model at all’ (Freud and Breuer 1986: 254–5). For Szasz (1967: 122ff), semiotic sensitivity helps solve the Freudian riddle of the relation between a verbal insult and bodily pain in hysteria.

Far from constituting a critique of Holland’s suggestive comparison, several careful reflections on its implications have shown how difficult it is to generalize about Guattari’s relation to English and American, and other strains of anti-psychiatry, and these considerations point in turn to the necessity of appreciating Guattari in relation to the continental tradition of the movement with all the peculiarities of the French situation (not to mention the Italian experience) and the practices of the Clinique de la Borde itself. I turn to these near the
end of chapter 2 in more detail and they will make us wonder about
the wisdom of situating Guattari in the anti-psychiatry tradition. As for
the semiotics broached above, detailed explication of the Guattarian
hybrid theory will appear in chapter 4.

DISSENSUS AND POSTMODERNISM
What is Guattari’s relationship with postmodernism? It has become a
cliché of sorts to cite Guattari’s fulminations against postmodernism in
a refrain of clarification based upon either: (i) some sort of adherence
to somewhat distressed Leftist political principles by those using the
citation; or (ii) in an effort to once and for all clear the air – ‘to
forestall any misunderstanding’ (Bogard 1998: 52, n. 1) – of any
possible contamination of Guattari’s (and sometimes one’s own) work
by postmodern ‘apoliticalism’ or ‘neo-liberalism’ and ‘conservatism’,
Guattari considered postmodernism to have the following features: it
was cruel, cynical, conservative; it constituted a reterritorialization of
capitalist subjectivity on a global scale; as a intellectual and artistic fad
it added nothing new since it was a mirror of the formalist abuses of
modernist methods such as structuralism; and, it operated in the
absence of any conception of the possibility of collective social action
or, at best, entailed a feeble sense of collectivity; those thinkers with
whom postmodernism was identified, rightly or wrongly, were guilty
of the abdication of ethical responsibility for the sake of a passing
‘condition’ of consciousness that Guattari believed was ‘the paradigm
of all the submissions, all the compromises with the status quo’ (CS
54). For Guattari, postmodernism constituted an impasse as far as
progressive social and aesthetic practice was concerned.

Guattari’s position against postmodernism has also been used to
isolate him as a ‘reactive critic’ who ‘by dint of wilful or negligent
misinterpretation of postmodernism, simply provides a set of protocols
for its reception’ (Pefanis 1991: 7). However, Guattari did not offer a
reading or textual analysis of either the work of Lyotard or Baudrillard;
in a way, then, it is ridiculous to claim that he misread them. He
wilfully disagreed with them, and his citations of their work are at
best highly selective. He did not misread them, then, in the name of a
question about the potential of postmodernism to provide a critical
alternative to consumer society the answer to which was provided in advance through an appeal to a hegemonic ideology (i.e. Marxism), as Pefanis suggests. If he would have seriously read them, he would have seen the obvious parallels. Instead, Guattari disagreed with postmodernism’s post-politicalisms but struggled with the points at which his own and such ideas crossed paths.

At times Guattari had recourse to the very concepts the deployment of which he criticized Lyotard in particular for falling back upon; that is, ‘all the values of consensus, he tells us, have become out-dated and suspect’ (CS 56). For instance, the much vaunted concept of ‘dissensus’ in postmodern theory is also embraced by Guattari since a ‘dissensual metamodelization’ (GR 272) escapes every attempt to reduce it to established modelizations (historical materialism and liberal economics alike). In the later Guattari, ‘dissensus’ is highly valued, in fact, it is named as a prize value alongside diversity and heterogeneity (GR 265), and linked explicitly to his hopes for a revolutionary shift from a consensual mass media to a dissensual post-mass media era. In the same way that Pefanis contrasts Guattari, the alleged reactionary, with the position of Fredric Jameson, whose openness he prefers, Lyotard criticizes consensus because it is linked in the work of Jürgen Habermas with a grand narrative of emancipation. These positions are dependent on their foils. Lyotard’s incredulity toward metanarratives entails the same disbelief before the adequacy of consensus as a principle of validation and the end of discussion. Lyotard’s version of a ‘dissensual metamodelization’ is paralogy, that which is contrary to reason and models based on grand narratives. In other words, for Guattari the dissensual post-mass media era would see the abandonment of universals (psychoanalytic models of the unconscious, structuralist mythemes, mathemes, etc., scientistic causality). The horizon of consensus as a kind of transcendental guarantee of ultimate agreement in a community of knowers in an ill-defined future (but one which is still within the Enlightenment project) is rejected by both Guattari and Lyotard; for the former, it is conformist and normopathic (desingularizing); for the latter, it is inadequate for postmodern science and an instrument of terror when tied to the power of a system to legitimate itself. For both thinkers, consensus is dangerous when it becomes a fixation, an orthodoxy. Of course, this is only to state the matter
crudely, for Guattari held out hope for happiness as a result of fundamental social change that would make dissen sus a kind of right, and Lyotard believed that consensus was possible, but only as a state subject to cancellation and only at the most local levels.

Both Guattari and Lyotard would have agreed that consensus had become a problem. Why it was a problem for Guattari (1991a: 2) may be seen by considering his vision of the post-mass media era in ‘Pour une éthique des médias’. It needs to be acknowledged that Guattari’s desire for a transition – exiting from one era and entering the next – rested on what Baudrillard (1983: 2) once referred to as the ‘imaginary representation’ of the masses as passive (a receiving structure), but typically full of potential. Guattari notes that ‘mass-mediatic alienation’, resorting to the cliché of television as a plug-in ‘hypnotic drug’, takes many different cultural forms; in Japan, for instance, ‘the intensive practice of playing video games and reading comic books’ has spawned identifiable psychopathological phenomena affecting both children and adults. Isolation and silence, passivity and alienation, in both cases, result from what Guattari dubbed the ‘abandonism’ of becoming totally absorbed in the screen or the panels. In a straightforward sociological sense which is the immediate context of his article (a conference on Franco–Japanese Convergences) Guattari is interested in how the relationship between technological modernism and archaic cultural traits are ‘combined’ in both France and Japan without ‘clinging to an archaic past, but inventing new ways of thinking and experiencing that have at least the same existential consistency as those of the past’ (Guattari 1991a: 2).

Beyond the unflinchingly capitalist ethos of modernization theory, and the relation it posits between tradition and poverty, as well as its banal evolutionism based on an ethnocentric conception of progress, Guattari wanted to ask: how can such consistency be achieved in the face of the problem of abandonism, the political fallout of which concerns the displacement of the power to create consensus? The ability of leaders (of political parties, unions, associations) in democracies to create consensus around certain issues has weakened considerably as media and advertising have assumed this role. Mass consensus is now created in terms of responses to commercial media messages. ‘There is a weakening of true debate,’ Guattari argues, ‘and an
avoidance of authentically dissensual problematics.’ This is where Guattari parted company with Lyotard: dissensus was not the new end of dialogue, but merely a ‘transitory phase of the state of media’ out of which something new will emerge. Genuine dissensus cannot be achieved under current conditions in which it is simulated (shortsighted use of new information technologies for the gain of multinationals; production and distribution is controlled either by private or public interests; a situation in which relations between producers and consumers are of concern only after a product has been brought to market; absence of effective bodies, nationally and internationally, to investigate mediatic manipulation); yet Guattari thought that authenticity – ‘a redefinition of social democracy articulating the power of consensus and the right to dissensus, difference, and singularity’ – may be achieved in the post-mass media era.

Ideas about post-mass media have been taken up by contemporary communication theorists because like Guattari they, too, have witnessed the profound challenges new media pose to existing regulatory regimes enforcing national standards and systems of distribution, separation of producers and consumers, and the commercial division and conquering of artificial territories (Crowley and Mitchell 1994: 4–5).

Guattari’s ‘post’ does not make him postmodern; for him, put roughly, postmodern meant the market, whereas dissensus entailed artistic singularity, both of which must be ultimately overcome, a matter to which I will turn in chapter 3. Guattari retained precisely what was suggested by Lyotard in a clarificatory letter: ‘... the difference between modernism and postmodernism [re: architecture] would be better characterized by the following feature: the disappearance of the close bond that once linked the project of modern architecture to an ideal of the progressive realization of social and individual emancipation encompassing all humanity’ (Lyotard 1992: 75–6). Guattari’s ‘prospective perspective’ on the media used some of the watchwords of postmodernism but retained an emancipatory horizon. Guattari really did have a plan for the planet: ‘the question of the ethics of the media and the prospective orientation of new communications technologies, artificial intelligence and control constitute, alongside the ecological problematic, [is] one of the two axes of
recomposition of a progressive way of thinking about the planet, today’
(1991a: 2). And to speak of a plan for the planet that challenges rather
than ‘capitalizes’ on the globalization of capitalism is not very postmod-
ern, after all.

Guattari’s deployment of dissensus is not confined to aesthetic
theory. In an untitled paper co-written (circa 1986) with Dany Cohn-
Bendit on the reinvention of political organizations, Guattari appealed
to the value of singularity in dissensus as opposed to general consensus
around party programmes. Here, philosophy meets activism:

The goal is no longer to reach a working consensus on several
general statements covering the range of current political problems
but, on the contrary, to further what we call a culture of dissensus,
working to deepen particular positions toward a resingularization of
individuals and groups. What must be envisaged is not a program-
matic accord that erases differences but a collective diagram permit-
ting the articulation of individual practices to the benefit of each,
without one imposing itself on the other . . . (FFG ET07–06)

The post-mass media environment of the singular production of
subjectivity (non-equivalent automodelization), all the benefits that
Guattari recognized in the computer, while remaining cognizant of
its limits such as the demands of the market, find a political,
organizational register in the critique of the programme reminiscent of
Anti-Oedipus – no minoritarian submissiveness – no discipline of the
vote – no central committee . . . yet no complete naïveté either –
some moments of centralism, some secrecy, some spin doctoring. This
valorization of dissensus so angered new philosopher Luc Ferry (1995:
112–13) that he levelled a series of charges against Guattari each more
outrageous than the last – foolishness, contempt for discussion,
destruction of the idea of a republic, hence, anti-Republicanism,
racialism – demonstrating his contempt, despite himself, for the very
principles he allegedly holds so dear: democratic values, public discus-
sion and community.

Deleuze and Guattari. D+G. D/G. D–G. D&G. DaG. Deleuzo-Guattarian. Philosopher and psychoanalyst/activist. No matter how creative the combination, no matter how wily or woolly the disjunction, conjunction or connection, none adequately evoke the remarkable accomplishments of Deleuze and Guattari’s collective projects and all beg the question of how they worked together, apart, and, as we know from those rare instances in which they actually discussed the character of their collaborations in interviews and letters, between one another, out of step, out of rhythm, sweeping each other away, transporting one another’s ideas: ‘WHAT WAS IMPORTANT FOR US WAS LESS OUR WORKING TOGETHER THAN THIS STRANGE FACT OF WORKING BETWEEN THE TWO OF US. WE STOPPED BEING “AUTHOR”. AND THESE “BETWEEN-THE-TWOS” REFERRED BACK TO OTHER PEOPLE . . .’ (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 17). THE VERY PROLIFERATION OF THESE SHORTHAND DESIGNATIONS ACROSS THE SECONDARY AND TERTIARY LITERATURES SUGGESTS THE SEARCH FOR A MEANS TO EXPRESS A CREATIVE COLLABORATION, WHAT DELEUZE REFERRED TO AS ‘ASSEMBLING [A WORK] BETWEEN US, NEITHER UNION NOR JUXTAPOSITION’, WHOSE PRESENT FATE HAS BEEN IN TOO MANY INSTANCES TO RENDER THE ‘CO-’ OF CO-AUTHORSHIP INOPERATIVE. IT IS NOT SO MUCH A MATTER OF CHOOSING THE
mobile surface of the ocean (Félix) or the hill whose rare movements are interior (Gilles), in Deleuze’s Japanese tableau (Deleuze 1984b); but, rather, not being able to do otherwise despite flagging the need to do so.

Another mode of approach, another name: Pierre-Félix. Although I have used Guattari’s proper name before with impunity, there have often been occasions when it has been returned to me with an editor’s stroke through it as if I have made some kind of error. But Guattari (Chy 7) himself used it to acute autobiographical effect in his self-portrait as a little schizo: ‘I often changed my style, my preoccupations and my character; to the extent that I was called Pierre by my family and Félix in my other worlds.’ A common-enough experience I should think. Indeed, no less an authoritative reference than Deleuze (in PT: v) may be produced: ‘It so happens that a militant and a psychoanalyst have joined forces in the same person and that, rather than remain separated, the two continually intermingle, interfere and communicate, often taking the one for the other. This is quite a rare event since Reich. Pierre-Félix Guattari is hardly likely to be bothered by problems of the unity of the Ego.’ The hyphenated name is split, its two worlds crossed, without a guarantee of unity: the transversality of the name. Really, he used to be called Pierre by those who knew him as a young man, like his schoolteacher Fernand Oury (Oury and Vasquez 1968) who refers to him as Pierre Guattari, psychologue; Martin Joughin once noted that ‘Oury’s brother was the young Guattari’s schoolteacher, and the two met in 1945 when “Félix” (born Pierre) was fifteen’ (in Deleuze 1990: 186, n. 1). The idea of putting Pierre in brackets is a sub-directive of the order-word of the critical literature, sometimes relegated to footnotes and diacritical apparatuses of capture.

There is another question that is raised from the order in which we know the names of Deleuze and Guattari and is only rarely reversed; when it is reversed as Guattari and Deleuze, it is a political reordering, an act of resistance, a dangerous heterodoxy. Against what or whom? All the little orthodoxies that mark the secondary literature and support the order-word; the machine coupling one ‘Deleuze’ after another ‘Deleuze’. The order-word: Deleuze and then Guattari. It seems so innocent until the order is obeyed, positioning these two
thinkers in a fixed relation, and issuing a demand that is carried out by their readers. What does this entail? Synecdochial strategies of representation erase Guattari in the name of Deleuze who then stands for both, part to whole; a rhetorical figure rendered visible by means of a symptomatic reading; not a Deleuzian symptomatological reading, either, unless one means that Guattari, a doctor, is treated like a patient! From another perspective, consider Roman Jakobson’s (1960: 356–7) analysis in his model of communication centred on the poetic function of a message such as *Deleuze and Guattari*: ‘Why do you always say *Deleuze and Guattari*, yet never *Guattari and Deleuze*? Do you prefer Deleuze to Guattari? Not at all, it just sounds smoother.’ Considerations of efficiency, compactness, sound shape of a verbal sequence, and syllable gradation all contribute to the resulting ranking of Deleuze before Guattari: a poetics of the order-word. Still, the poetics of the name order in Jakobson’s example works so well because it has become customary, unaccounted for, by those who repeat it.

Once again, the order is suspicious if we think of the ‘Matthew effect’, a concept developed by Robert K. Merton (1968) to describe the tendency to attribute responsibility and reward fame to the first in line in co- or multiple-authored papers. The one whose name comes first gets primary credit. The better-known author garners greater attention and this generally leads to a retroactive revalorization of his/her early, less well-known publications, perhaps to the degree that even an entire stratum of rejected works – Deleuze’s ‘repudiated’ Christian works prior to 1953 – are now dutifully listed in bibliographies and busily translated while works on the cusp – the Hume book – are acknowledged and translated and (re)introduced. Still, repudiated or not, in an article by a twenty-year-old Deleuze, ‘Du christ à la bourgeoisie’, it is said ‘we can already recognize anti-Hegelianism as a driving force of his thought’ (Hardt 1993: xviii); indeed, Hardt is not alone, for Uno (1999: 45) sees in this essay the ‘manifestation of essential problems that Deleuze will never cease reformulating and elaborating upon for the rest of this philosophical life’. What this involves is well known: retroactive appreciation from the point of view such articles have allegedly generated; a perfect tree logic that derives the acorn from the existence of the tree and the natural unity
of a career and thought. From this follows selection: Deleuze’s *Instincts et institutions* leans toward the warm, illuminating sun of the present better than *Empiricism and Subjectivity* (Hardt 1993: xvii).

The question of attribution of authorship is itself posed by Deleuze and Guattari themselves, and their hyperbolic claims about how many of them were at work on their books tempts some to ‘impatience’ (Olkowski 1991: 285). But this feeling is put to work in an elaborate strategy that segues into a lesson in semiotics: you can use Deleuze for a synecdoche of Deleuze and Guattari, and even bracket, capture and subdue Guattari – ‘(and Guattari)’ – even though the synecdoche itself falsely represents the authors because it suggests that their ideas may be disimbricated; at the extreme this tries one’s patience because both of them retain their proper names simply out of habit and tend to disappear into an assemblage of authorial affects. The synecdoche is in the end justified because it raises the thematic issue of how the ‘authors’ rewrite semiotic and linguistic categories. The synecdoche ‘Deleuze’ is really a trope for semiotic innovation. Of course, he gets the last word (Olkowski 1991: 302).

It is easy to imagine that there are mutually advantageous becomings of the wasp-orchid type between Deleuze and Guattari: Deleuze’s becoming-Guattari and Guattari’s becoming-Deleuze. Has the order-word and synecdoche ‘Deleuze’ distorted this sort of becoming? Yes, there can be no question that the collaborative alliance between the two bodies involved in mutually advantageous becomings is misinterpreted by injecting a power relation that subordinates Guattari, forcing power to pool around the figure of Deleuze, and turning a non-appropriative creative mutual enhancement of intellectual powers into an appropriative one – not in the vulgar sense of separating Deleuze’s ideas from Guattari’s in the co-authored works, but by using the Deleuzian canonized corpus as the proper estimation of their mutual becomings, using the constraints of university philosophy (not to mention the latter’s imperialist ambition) as a process of capture of Guattari’s extradisciplinary, anacademic flows of ideas.

The question of ‘Deleuze-thought’ – the erasure of individuality and the blockage of the name of Guattari – was posed by Charles Stivale (1985) and put directly to Guattari in the form of a question, to which Guattari responded:
I can’t give you a simple answer because I think that behind this little phenomenon, there are some contradictory elements. There is a rather negative aspect which is that some people have considered Deleuze’s collaboration with me as deforming his philosophical thought and leading him into analytical and political tracks where he somehow went astray. So, some people have tried to present this collaboration, often in some unpleasant ways, as an unfortunate episode in Gilles Deleuze’s life, and have therefore displayed toward me the infantile attitude of quite simply denying my existence. Sometimes, one even sees references to *L’Anti-Oedipe* or *Mille plateaux* in which my name is quite simply omitted, in which I no longer exist at all. So, let’s just say that this is one dimension of malice of a political nature. One could also look at this dimension from another: one could say, OK, in the long run, ‘Deleuze’ has become a common noun, or in any case, a common noun not only for him and me, but for a certain number of people who participate in ‘Deleuze-thought’ as we would have said years ago ‘Mao-thought’. ‘Deleuze-thought’ does exist; Michel Foucault insisted on that to some extent, in a rather humorous way, saying that this century would be Deleuzian, and I hope so. That doesn’t mean that the century will be connected to the thought of Gilles Deleuze, but will comprise a certain re-assemblage of theoretical activity vis-a-vis university institutions and power institutions of all kinds.

If they cannot be understood together, how can we expect them to be understood apart, especially since they were already apart, together? Not everybody believed the (counter-)Foucauldian hyperbole – ‘this century cannot simply be described as “Deleuzean”’ (Goodchild 1996: 205) – but it still served as a buzz phrase, a ready-made publisher’s blurb, a kind of shorthand for an intellectual bonanza, and high-handed intimidation of those entertaining doubt – that would spread its conceptual tendrils far and wide and in the process generate virulent popular backlashes, wild parodies, weedy Websites, obsessive ’zines, pop intellectualism, and an explosion of interest in conceptualizing the virtual, not to forget learned critiques along with a substantial share of expositions, even though a minimum of effort has been expended on understanding Guattari. All of which is reminiscent of the ‘Baudrillard
Scene’ of the mid-1980s and the earlier phenomenon of McLuhanism in the 1960s (macluhanisme also reached Deleuze and Guattari directly, as in Anti-Oedipus through the question of electric language, and indirectly in A Thousand Plateaus through the model of Eskimo culture and smooth, nomadic, haptic space that they received through the work of McLuhan’s associate Ted Carpenter; see Genosko 1999: 48–50 and 110–11); these scenes reach down into everyday life and, in the case we are considering, equally shape discourses about, and the production of changing cultural forms like furniture (Cache 1998), hypersurface informational architecture (Perrella 1998), and cyberspace – including how it talks about itself and is talked about: its resources, debates and interactions of all sorts.

Amid the Deleuziana, it is not possible to speak of a ‘Guattari studies industry’, even though the activities of his place of employment have long been the subject of personal, professional and political intrigue, and even filmed, as Nicolas Philibert showed us in his documentary La Moindre des choses shot in 1995 at La Borde during a performance by inmates of Witold Gombrowicz’s ‘Opérette’. Long before Philibert, the experimental educator Fernand Deligny (1913–96), whose entire career was dedicated to the care of abnormal children, arrived at La Borde in 1966 and shot his award-winning film, with Jean-Pierre Daniel, La Moindre geste; later, in 1975, Renaud Victor would produce the film Ce gamin-là, based on Deligny’s non-therapeutic (‘anti-psychiatric’) care of autistic children in Monoblet (established in 1967) (see Bédarida 1996; also GR 155)

During the ‘Sokal affair’, American physicist Alan Sokal and his Belgian colleague Jean Bricmont sought to demonstrate the abuse of science in almost all contemporary French philosophy – including Deleuze and Guattari – and to definitively debunk it on a ground upon which it did not depend. The strategy of critique of conservative philosophers has many tired refrains, one of the most common being to apportion blame to a supporter of a subculture, such as Guattari (who was at one time in the late 1970s Président du Collectif de Soutien aux Radios Libres) in the case of the free radio movement, for its failure. The situation is much more complex than such a reductive position would have us appreciate.

All of the above remarks on the order-word were written in the
context of collecting, organizing and selecting some three decades worth of secondary literature on Deleuze and Guattari for a three volume collection (Genosko 2001). I have not exhausted the lessons of this fascinating exercise, but I do not want to belabour the point, either. There is, nonetheless, one more issue to be raised with regard to the and under discussion. Guattari’s *L’inconscient machinique*, a book of remarkable clarity, at least on the level of his statement of the systematic elaboration of the programme of research he was undertaking at the time and its expected results, may be constructively read as a kind of workbook for what would become *A Thousand Plateaus*. Guattari (IM 15, n. 4) put it this way in a footnote, adding that the ideas he is advancing in his book ‘are inseparable from the work that Gilles Deleuze and myself did together . . . [and] that is the reason why, when I am compelled to use the first person, it is equally singular or plural’. Guattari was careful to point out that he was also not making a point about the ‘relative paternity of ideas’. The and at issue does not entail a search for who wrote which bit – this should be a sobering thought for every reader (and translator) who have informally accused Guattari of penning the incomprehensible bits. However, if this happens to be one’s cup of tea, the manuscripts, notes and drafts may be consulted in order to determine who added the title in hand, in whose handwriting the drafts were written, etc. (see the ‘Notes and Brouillons’ TOC of the FFG).

Even the modest application of a scholarly apparatus to Guattari’s IM and Deleuze and Guattari’s ATP with a view to understanding the route of a concept’s development, can be quite revealing. Consider the respective chapters concerning faciality (chapter 4 and plateau 7). For Guattari, faciality is a fundamental category of redundancy of the machinic unconscious (alongside refrains), and further classified under the coordinates of semiotic efficiency as a kind of redundancy of resonance bearing upon the semiological components of subjectification and conscientialization (IM 16; 18). Guattari had two goals: the description of how capitalistic faciality (globalizing, phallicizing, binarizing) serves to subjugate desire and establish itself as the universal reference point, and indicate the transformative potential of a diagrammatic faciality (singular, transversal, destratifying, articulating) that is not caught or recuperated by the former, even if the latter is not
altogether separate from it. He begins with a three-point system of eyes–forehead–nose (triangle of facialization), linked immediately to the psychological literature, ethological imprinting (think of the cute face described by Konrad Lorenz’s *Kindchenschema*), and even the *Gestalt* of the mirror stage; but then, this triangle is itself one point, a third eye, in another triangle, consisting of self and object. This double triangulation ‘operates a semiological capitalization around the individuated subject of enunciation’ (IM 76).

Capitalistic facialization works through many binaries; i.e., setting up and exploiting two poles of the reassuring face and face of anguish (IM 82); the ‘lazy eye’ and ‘crossed eyes’ that attract the attention of the specialists because these faces have deviated from the so-called norm (psychiatrically biunivocalized); the faciality–landscapity binary found in the man in the Moon and face of Mars, a ‘diagram for the research of space and the becoming extraterrestrial (alien) of man’ (Angel 1997: 546); a specific syntax (it is x, y or nothing, excluding all else that creates the illusion that ‘all else’ upon closer inspection really reveals that it is just x, y, or nothing, anyway, reducing uncertainty, ensuring familiarity); the fashion face that is all surface, but white, straight, feminine; but even if the white face is presented by a black drag queen, it still draws ‘its circle of power’ (Griggers 1997: 4).

The ATP version launches into an analysis of the white wall/black hole system (or black wall/white hole) as an abstract machine of faciality producing individual faces (human and non-human). The triangles are gone, and the psychological literature appears later, and in shortened form, playing a lesser role (hence, fewer questions of Gestalt-effects – personalized conscientialization of faciality – ‘you have your mother’s eyes’ as familialism). Although it has become a refrain of the critical literature to cite the interview in which Deleuze (and Parnet) explained that at the time of ATP Guattari was working on black holes (astrophysics) and he was meditating on white walls (canvas, white cube) and the concepts were brought together to form the abstract machine of faciality, both sides of the equation were already developed in Guattari’s own work in which the white circular screen (a mediatic diagrammatic production of ersatz totemic faces, for instance, or animal faces transfigured into daddy or prince charming,
specifying capitalistic subjectification [IM 83]) was the surface on which semiotic components were (re)assembled in ways that changed dispositions in conformity with face-types: capitalist power could put on a happy face. The salient point is that Deleuze’s remarks illustrate a process of working between and should not, like all statements in interviews, be read uncritically. Guattari’s study of capitalism is subjacent to the despotic face (expansionist, imperialist, colonizing), still functioning by binarization (especially face/landscape), but subject to specific definitions by means of limit-faces. The ATP version concerns itself with answering the Guattarian question about abstract machines: what triggers them, and when? Well, besides nursing, loving, close-ups, posters of the leader in the streets ‘certain assemblages of power require the production of a face, others do not’ (ATP 175). Which ones, then? Precisely the ones that are defined: despotic and authoritarian. I will return to Guattari’s art-critical application of faciality in chapter 3 in my discussion of Japanese culture since this is the direction in which his work moved in his essay on Keiichi Tahara’s photographs and Shin Takamatsu’s buildings. But the point is to appreciate the salient emphases in the workbook and the ATP, not to mention other essays on faciality, rather than occluding such appreciation, which is a consequence of erasing Guattari.

Let’s hope that this century will not be known as Guattarian.

SUBJECTIFICATION

One of the features of Guattari’s brand of theorizing that makes it difficult is the creative combination of traditions, concepts, thinkers and issues that readers encounter at almost every turn. For disciplined readers this may be more than aggravating or enervating: it may constitute either an impasse or a springboard into the beyond. Either way, such creativity – label it however you like in terms of juxtaposition, synthesis, adventure, folly – is sometimes read as a sign of confusion; at other times, as brilliance, and perhaps even invention of a perplexing singularity. Such ways of thought certainly raise the hackles of disciplinary cops. One of the most strangely familiar couplings that occur throughout Guattari’s writing is his combination of literary criticism and certain forms of therapy in the formulation of
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a theory of subjectivity. Although one need only recall that Freud was as much a stylist as a thinker, and Lacan’s importance as a literary figure was enormous, especially in Anglo-American interdisciplinary circles, I am not suggesting that Guattari should be read as literature, in the way that Lacan thought Freud could be profitably read (indeed, there was a time when he could only be read through narrative: detective novel, key novel . . .). In the psychoanalytic tradition, one learns to tolerate this sort of transversality of sitting astride literary criticism and therapy. While Guattari belongs in this tradition, he managed to make it appear strange, even when set against the negative determinations of the unconscious that was structured like a language, that is, in which the puzzle of the subject resulted from the meaninglessness of the individual (which the phallus hides) in the semiolinguistic system (Symbolic order) defined by what it is not, differentially and negatively, yet interdependently.

Although Guattari’s creative combinations stubbornly cling to practical concerns, they do lend themselves to classic splits between social and psychological, as opposed to literary uses; indeed, both are in evidence. Schizoanalysis has been much more influential as a method of criticism, for example, following in the Lacanian vein. Transversality, too, is being pushed in this direction; Guattari himself pointed toward painting when he wrote of Jean-Jacques Lebel that his personal method, his process of auto-enunciation, involved multiple plastic arts and aesthetic, social, and affective practices.¹ The combinations of dialogical criticism and child psychology (Bakhtin and Stern) is the very sort of creative connection that is needed if thought and action are to elude the traps of pre-set coordinates and warmed and ready recodings. For with Bakhtin–Stern the emphasis is on mutually implicated innovations in criticism and therapy, and the possibility of destabilizing and breathing life into the common-enough narrative-case study paradigm that dominated psychoanalytically-inspired criticism for so long. But the goal for Guattari was not elegant criticism – it was a process theory of subjectification and an attempt to give a new role to affect. And this is what makes it both familiar and strange.

For Guattari, ‘subjectivity is plural – polyphonic, to borrow a term preferred by Mikhail Bakhtin. It is not constituted by a dominant, determining factor that directs other factors according to a universal
causality’ (GR 193). Bakhtin (1984) developed the concept of polyphony in his analysis of the novels of Dostoevsky, using it to criticize a range of existing interpretations. As the above quote suggests, one of the key features of polyphony is its irreducibility to a single common denominator, whether it is an ideology or the linguistic signifier, an object world illumined by the single ray of the creator’s insight, a spirit evolving dialectically toward some unity. Genuine polyphony entails that the plurality at issue remains ‘unmerged’, independent, coexisting, interacting. Guattari transposed Bakhtinian conceptual language from the analysis of the novel to a context in which it was used to place under scrutiny psychoanalytic conceptions of subjectivity, which occupy the place of the homophonic novel in Bakhtin, that is, the novel stripped of its heterogeneity and plurality of consciousnesses in opposition and swallowed up by a single, unifying consciousness. Now, this is what psychoanalysis often does to the subject with its familialist models, developmental progressions, backwards looking fixations, linguistic imperialism, etc. However, Guattari then turned to the work of Daniel Stern to complement his use of Bakhtinian polyphony and demonstrated that therapeutics may escape the destiny of phase-specific psychoanalytic developmental models. This is precisely Stern’s point in contrasting his prospective approach to experience of self as a primary developmental organizing principle with psychoanalytic models that see in developmental stages, with regard to different criteria and what counts as a decisive event, ‘potential periods of fixation . . . that will later result in specific psychopathological entities’ (Stern 1985: 19).

Guattari read Stern together with Bakhtin in a restricted sense. According to Stern, the four main senses of self – emergent-core or physical-subjective-verbal – while conforming to major developmental shifts, are not successive, sequential phases but simultaneous. Simultaneity and interactivity of these four active and polyphonic senses or ‘domains’ of self is illustrated for Stern in love making. In short, they all survive adulthood and are elaborated, in their distinctiveness, throughout it.

The first emergent self is ‘not yet’ subject, much like Bakhtin’s definition of polyphony, to a single organizing subjective perspective (Stern 1985: 28) that will later appear with the role of the body and
basic self-experiences (agency, coherence, affectivity, history) of the core self. Up to two months the infant experiences, according to Stern, the process and product of emerging organization; hence, an emergent self.

Some of the features of Stern’s work on an emergent self, particularly the role played by self-reference and affect, have been noted by Paul Bains (1997: 513) who describes the ‘brilliant portrayal of the non-conscious sense of self already available at birth. The fusional, transitivist “emergent self” that ignores the oppositions self–other, subject–object.’ Bains follows Brian Massumi (1995), who explores the contrast between intensity and structure and equates intensity and affect, opening the later to the paradoxes and logic-defying inclusions of the ‘realm of potential’ (virtual) in order to reach the autonomy of affect itself. What makes affect autonomous is that it escapes confinement (by a particular body) and limitation by what actualizes it (emotions, for instance, or perceptions): ‘something remains unactualized, inseparable from but unassimilable to any particular, functionally anchored perspective’ (Massumi 1995: 96). Here is where Stern (re)enters the picture. Affective escape is ‘nothing less than the perception of one’s own vitality, one’s sense of aliveness, of change-ability. . . . One’s “sense of aliveness” is a continuous, unconscious self-perception (unconscious self-reflection),’ writes Massumi (1995: 97). This is what Stern describes as one of the processes of the infant’s amodal perception: vitality affects. Amodal perception involves the translation of information from one sensory modality to another, even though the initial information may not belong to a particular modality at all. The infant’s sensory experience of the properties of things and persons is of amodal qualities, sometimes referred to as global and abstract qualities of experience because of their elusiveness (feeling of intensity as opposed to something heard).

Stern uses the term vitality affects in contrast to categorical affects to describe feelings that are intimately related to vital processes. Infants are immersed in such feelings, and they impinge upon them, indeed, Stern writes ‘we are never without their presence, whether or not we are conscious of them’ (1985: 54). Vitality affects may or may not be tied to discrete categorical affects (happiness, anger). In short, vitality affects (of a patterned or contoured rush or wave) do not have to be
linked to a categorical affect signal. They escape discrete categories of affect and are said to be inherent in all behaviour. Stern clarifies this point: ‘for example, one can see someone get out of a chair “explosively”. One does not know whether the explosiveness in arising was due to anger, surprise, joy or fright. The explosiveness could be linked to any of those Darwinian feeling qualities, or to none. The person could have gotten out of the chair with no specific category of affect but with a burst of determination. There are a thousand smiles, a thousand getting-out-of-chairs, a thousand variations of performance of any and all behaviours, and each one presents a different vitality affect’ (Stern 1985: 56). A thousand plateaus: there is no need to derive a vitality from categorical affect; no need to explain the way or manner of a performance by its content; no need, then, for an anchor (categorical signal); and, if there is an anchor, the vitality affect is not completely assimilable to it.

Guattari’s emphasis on certain aspects of the emergent self that Stern describes shifts to a feature of a further self (subjective) and the issue of intersubjective sharable and non-sharable affects. Interaffectivity involves a one-year-old’s ability to look at his/her parent’s face for an affective signal that will influence his/her own state of feelings and shape his/her actions. Affective exchanges such as this are both the primary medium and subject of communication for prelinguistic nine-to twelve-month-old children (Stern 1985: 133). Affect exchange is shortly thereafter attuned, as Stern puts it, through cross-modal matching (a child’s verbalizations may be met with a gestural performance that captures its feeling – as Stern says, ‘attunement renders feeling’ [1985: 142]). At the opposite pole are two related experiences: the psychotic’s alienation and isolation; or, conversely, the feeling of complete transparency to a world in which nothing remains private or non-sharable. These two conditions highlight extreme instances of ‘non-sharable affects’; most of the time, however, some middle ground is experienced in which it is understood that not all feelings are sharable (Stern 1985: 136, especially note 5). It was the ‘dialectic’ between sharable and non-sharable affects that interested Guattari (Chs 6; GR 195) in the self that emerges in the first two domains (emergent and subjective). This nascent subjectivity was intimately tied to affect and transversality as well, that is, to a universe defined by communi-
cation and exchange of affect rather than self/other and subject/object divides (a polyphony of ‘unmerged’ but connected pluralities).

This is what made Stern’s work so important for Guattari: it helped him define subjectivity as a collective assemblage – before and beyond the individual – especially in terms of prepersonal and ‘preverbal intensities’ and work from a ‘logic of affects rather than a logic of delimited sets’ (escaping the latter’s claims to comprehensiveness or universal status such as psychogenetic stages like oral-anal-genital or complexes, Chs 9; cf. GR 196).

With this theorization of subjectivity, then, we seem far from the Cartesian–Kantian–Husserlian subject who constitutes the world through meaning-giving acts. The Husserlian certitude is that – on the one hand, Kant didn’t understand the access that we enjoy to the transcendental subject that is able to have an originary intuition of itself and, on the other, Descartes’s knower and his doubted world was essentially a negative model that didn’t go far enough in recognizing that the ‘I’ stands outside the world – there is an identity between constitutive subjectivity, the ultimate source of meaning, and the world within its power. What is interesting about this phenomenological backdrop? Guattari’s concept of transversality returns to phenomenology. The issue of the backward-looking interpretation that Guattari sought to overcome in his theory of subjectivity awaits us there.

TRANSVERSALITY: OVERVIEW/EXTENSION/INTERPRETATION

Guattari’s essay ‘Transversalité’, dating from 1964, has been available in French since 1972, but an English translation, recognized as flawed but serviceable in its literalness especially when considered in relation to many of the other translations undertaken by Rosemary Sheed in the out-of-print Molecular Revolution (MRp), has not attracted much direct commentary (an exception is Murphy’s detailed analysis of the Sheed translation, 2001: 795–803). Since the concept appears throughout Guattari’s published work, and the seminal concomitant distinction between subject groups and subjugated groups has been revisited by Guattari in his collaborations with Deleuze most notably in Anti-Oedipus as well as in his own writings and been rigourously applied to a literary
text by Massumi (1988), following the model of Deleuze’s application of it in his essay ‘The Literary Machine’ from a later edition of *Proust and Signs* (Deleuze 1972b), it may have escaped comment because of its obviousness; or, perhaps, it has been overshadowed by or simply conflated with schizoanalysis. Whatever the case may be, everyone in the field seems to know what it means; still, much is presupposed about the concept’s infancy. Recent work on Guattari has traced the concept’s origins (Bosteels 2001) to certain passages in Louis Althusser and Jean-Paul Sartre, although Guattari was the first to fully develop and apply it. Still, transversality is not unknown across the philosophical literature (Schrag 2001).

In this section I want to review several significant places in which Guattari’s conceptual tool of transversality has been represented as an overview, extension, and interpretation. It is in the final example of interpretation that we will be able to pick up the relationship suggested above between phenomenological subject, backward-looking orientation, and transversality.

**Overview**

If a definition of this rich and important concept is necessary to get the final section of this first chapter off the ground, it may be said that transversality belongs to the processual subject’s engendering of an existential territory and self-transportation beyond it. The key concepts involved are: *mobility* (traversing domains, levels, dimensions, the ability to carry and be carried beyond); *creativity* (productivity, adventurousness, aspiration, laying down lines of flight); *self-engendering* (autoproduction, self-positing subjectivity), territories from which one can really take off into new universes of reference.

Bruno Bosteels (2001) has sketched a valuable outline of what needs to be included in any consideration of Guattari’s concept of transversality. He describes it in this manner: as a tool for heightening and maximizing an institution’s therapeutic coefficient – which exists in its bureaucracy and officialdom, structures, roles and hierarchies. The tool may be used by groups creatively autoproducing themselves as they adapt, cross, communicate and travel, in short, as they traverse different levels, segments and roles.
Bosteels’s (2001: 889) characterizations of transversality indicate its importance for Guattari and himself: he likens transversality to a ‘flash of lightning traversing all of Guattari’s writings’; a little later, Bosteels calls transversality ‘the mainspring of Guattari’s prolific conceptual machine’ (2001: 892). All too briefly, we are provided with a suggestive overview of the concept’s development in Guattari’s thought from the 1970s to the 1990s: from specific Freudian applications via the transference to a full-blown ontological principle in its own right. Attention is duly paid to the unity of transversality and assembling; if collective assemblages are for Guattari prepersonal (before the individual) and beyond the individual, indicating the social dimension (but not exclusively human) of Guattari’s sense of ‘collective’, then transversality also operates prepersonally but across all segments and dualisms, as well as beyond them.

Bosteels (2001: 894) also flags some of the practical analytic implications of this tool: analysis in a transversal setting requires one to distinguish between “interpreting” or “tracing” a case in retrospect according to either universal complexes or structural mathemes from “mapping” a process in action following a functional diagram.’ In this way, Bosteels indicates that there were hangovers in the breaking away from interpretation toward mapping in the development of Guattari’s thought. A schizoanalytic cartography maps, one may say, the transversality of processual subjectivity, but this sense of mapping, as Bosteels reminds us, is that of enacting, not imitating. The distinction between map and territory therefore falls away: the map engenders the territory. It is the mobility, creativity and self-engendering of transversal subjectivity. The map helps subjectivity take flight. And Bosteels has presented his readers with an admirable map that will send them into orbit toward a full-blown investigation of the complex concept of transversality from the beginning to the end of Guattari’s long career.

Bosteels does not mention that readers of Guattari are on very slippery postmodern ground with regard to this conception of mapping since it is akin to that used by Baudrillard to explain the precession of simulcra – the map that precedes and engenders the territory. While this version also escapes the representational imaginary, the Borges fable, Baudrillard thinks, has come around full circle. The consequence of this collapse of the question of coincidence between map and
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territory, and even of the madness of extensivity (a map exactly covering the territory), is hyperreality. Clearly, though, subjectification is not a Baudrillardian generative model, the anterior finality of the code.

Extension

By means of an ‘extension’ into conceptuality and individuality of Guattari’s sense of transversality, Bryan Reynolds and Joseph Fitzpatrick (1999) demonstrate its applicability as a critical tool in their reading of De Certeau’s critique of panopticism and his elaboration of weak, tactical and temporal practices of everyday life. First, two kinds of territory are distinguished: subjective and transversal. The former is essentially conditioned and imposed by hegemonic power. This is close to Guattari’s idea that there are specific semiotics of subjectification deployed by Integrated World Capitalism to delimit and impoverish consciousness and that these are, in some instances, introjected by subjugated persons who have come to desire oppression; this is akin to the ‘intensive’ reach of reification such that certain mental faculties, modelled on the fate of labour power, are detached from human consciousness and then placed at odds with one’s personality, and this is a condition that one may come to contemplate but not change or imagine a way to transcend (Lukács’s [1971: 100] telling example, borrowed from Marx, of the journalist’s objectivity, detached and disposable item of a reified consciousness, that is at odds with the convictions of subjectivity, and a sorry compensation for real, political convictions and feelings, that instead are ‘prostituted’).

The latter, ‘transversal territory’, which gets its energy from a ‘transversal power’, is the site of pure potentiality and marked by such valorized terms as ‘transgress’ – ‘deviate’ – ‘defy’ – ‘cut across’ – ‘disorganize’ – ‘smooth space’. What induces such deviant transgressions? According to Reynolds and Fitzpatrick (1999: 74), ‘anything from criminal acts to natural catastrophes to the daily practice of walking in the city’. Miss Lucy’s advice to Shorty in Eddie Cochrane’s rockabilly song ‘Cut Across Shorty’ – cut across the field of play and win the race, for he is her libidinal favourite in the hillbilly contest staged for her hand. While subjective territories require forgetting
(panoptic surveys and cartographic grids, fixed places, proper names, clear sight lines, etc.), transversal practices, gathering here all of the driftworks that must have inspired De Certeau in the first place, take the form of unforgetting: ‘a recollection of the spatial practices that the creation of maps attempted to forget’ (Reynolds and Fitzpatrick 1999: 74). Tactical transversal deviations inspire new semiotics against the proper signification of place names, for example, or the contemporary subculture of real world hacking opens through trespassing otherwise closed, controlled properties. This extension has a tendency to individuate what is otherwise a non-individuated concept, namely, the components of subjectification, in the figures of walkers, among others (whom are ‘like peddlers carrying something surprising’, to paraphrase De Certeau). Moreover, the subjective-transversal distinction is modelled on Guattari’s distinction between existential Territories and incorporeal Universes: finite, familiar constrained worlds and infinitely open, transformative, unpredictable, uncoordinated, worlds that transport one out of the everyday. In Reynolds and Fitzpatrick’s extension, however, transversal power generates singularities that would otherwise remain trapped in the repressive grids of propriety, strategy, and cartographic projections, geometrical reductions that limit access to new territories. Everyday practices transport one beyond the constraints of existential territories – extrinsic coordinates – of subjectivity in the capitalist city. In this extension we see how Sheed’s translation of Molecular Revolution still circulates and informs critical extensions. Now, there is no investigation of Guattari at stake here (this translation requires one to go elsewhere, back to PT) but the extension of the concept that recuperates another seminal distinction as I outlined above. What is most worrying is its application to individuals (the ‘walkers’, not really gendered or racialized or assigned ages, abilities, etc.) and the implied distinction between these and groups. The individual is a figment of bourgeois ideology (PT 161); likewise, group subjectivity is not embodied in a chosen individual, a leader; processes of subjectification are irreducible to a rationalist-positivist conception of the individual (PT 162–3). Since for Guattari the individual is a degraded form, this makes it necessary for Reynolds and Fitzpatrick to extend transversality away from what it would otherwise not concern itself with, except as an error. Despite
the relevance of their descriptive extension of transversal space, the bodies that traverse it — and where, we might ask, is the group walker, the walker assemblage? — are not connected with Guattari’s theory of subjectification.

Interpretation

Interpretation is at odds, Bosteels has argued, with mapping, with a cartography of the transversal unconscious. This has not prevented phenomenologists such as Schrag (2001) from reworking the Sartrean legacy of Guattari’s concept of transversality in order to repair the ship of rationality in a coherent and consistent way while still at sea in the choppy waters of postmodernism. The Sartrean usage of the term appears in The Transcendence of the Ego as a way of explaining how consciousness unifies itself within duration: ‘It is consciousness which unifies itself, concretely, by a play of “transversal” intentionalities which are concrete and real retentions of past consciousnesses’ (Sartre 1957: 39). Sartre is criticizing the transcendental subject as opaque, heavy, monadic, the death of consciousness, etc. But he uses transversal to describe how consciousness consolidates past consciousnesses. This is a backwards-looking deployment of transversality that remains within a phenomenological philosophy of subjectivity. Schrag is clear on this point and criticizes Sartre for limiting transversality to the gathering of moments over a retentional continuum and thus suppressing the protentional vector. The latter is a key feature of Guattari’s use of the concept, but its forward-looking character is not explicated against Sartre but rather, against psychoanalysis. It is for this reason that the Sartrean origins of the concept in Guattari remain obscure, despite his other debts to Sartre, to which we will turn in the next chapter. This is also the feature of transversality that Schrag (2001: 873) wants to borrow from Guattari: its lines ‘traverse a protentional horizon’ and thus transversality has an open texture. Along the way, Schrag notes the necessity of refiguring the privilege of consciousness accorded by phenomenology as an originary principle for the sake of the texture of transversality qualified as social, communal, institutional and historical; yet, Schrag retains the Sartrean phrasing of the ‘play of transversality’. In Schrag’s hands, transversality remains mobile — in fact it undergoes,
as rationality, an ‘odyssey’ of sorts that is neither seduced by postmodern sirens nor lured into provocative ports. Within the transversal play of thought, reason appears in three praxes: evaluative critique (discernment); engaged articulation (sense that recollects retentionally and anticipates protentionally); and incursive disclosure (postulating a referent beyond textuality). The third feature reveals this transversality to have an oppositional spirit of irruption and resistance. But Schrag is trapped in a logic of replacement: transversality serves as an alternative to ahistorical vertical models in which universals issue from above and horizontal, transhistorical, slices of time, and set up residence between them (for, after all, transversality is a creature of the middle where it tends to accelerate). Logos gets a makeover as a new praxis and reason works in the transversal play of thought and action. We have here a new and improved version of phenomenological interpretation: a solution to the perennial question of how to get a valuative dimension into the analysis. This is the purpose that transversality serves for Schrag. Despite this hermeneutic distortion of transversality (and every other example of nomos) towards a logos, a fundamental ground of meaning, Schrag’s analysis is valuable for the insight he provides into the importance of turning away from a backwards-looking account.

In the next chapter we will have occasion to reflect on Guattari’s debts to Sartre, especially in terms of the theory of groups. There are many points of contact between these two thinkers, politically and philosophically, yet this relationship is complex and fraught with temptations toward overcoding that must be resisted. Similar political entusiasms are evident in the German scene of anti-psychiatry in their mutual exhortations of the efforts of the Socialist Patients’ Collective – a collection of about 40 patients and their doctor – during the crisis at the polyclinic of the University of Heidelberg of the early 1970s. Despite Guattari’s opinion that this group was burdened with an ‘ossified Hegelianism’, they nevertheless created an ‘unambiguous political cleavage’ (MRr 152) as a modest intra-hospital experiment turned into a mass protest in direct response to the institution’s resistance and the repressive violence of the German State. Both Sartre and Guattari valorized this episode because it revealed the direct link between mental illness and political struggle. Guattari (MRr 154) wrote: ‘To put it in a somewhat excessive manner, the SPK is in a
way the equivalent to the Paris Commune on the level of proletarian struggles.’ Sartre took much the same line in the early 1970s, voicing his support for the SPK in terms of the link it revealed between illness and capitalism, the exposure of which subjected the membership to ‘the worst repression of capitalist society’ and ‘an imbecilic imprisonment’. If the referent for Guattari was the Paris Commune, those 72 days in 1871, for Sartre it was specifically Engels’s *Situation of the Working Class* and the description of all the illnesses of alienation wrought by industrialization. The unity of illness and alienation under capitalism was at the heart of much of European anti-psychiatry, and clearly a central theme of *Anti-Oedipus* as well, but here Sartre bears witness to the truly transversal step of the SPK by indicating the implications in practice that the doctor, too, is ill, and the illness is a contradiction shared by doctor and patient (Sartre 1987: 5); moreover, the traditional cure that would integrate the patient into society, that is, alienated, atomized and dehumanized, is fundamentally inadequate, hence necessitating the creation of an ‘other society’ in which illness may reach its revolutionary potential in a collective setting.

In this chapter we looked at representations of Guattari for the sake of what they could teach about creating fertile lines of interpretation and closing off such opportunities, sometimes despite themselves. The example of anti-psychiatry revealed, against the grain of the proposed ‘rough equivalent’, a contrast with Laing and a shared pragmatic approach with Szasz; the latter was an unexpected outcome that required a displacement onto the issue of the philosophical origins of semiotics in both Szasz and Guattari. Guattari’s fulminations against postmodernism were shown to yield sympathetic deployments around the shared ideas of dissensus and the ‘post-’ of post-mass media. Further, the erasures and negations of Guattari, upon which he once commented, in the Deleuzian critical literature exposed a largely unintentional trend that unfortunately closed-off more fructuous strategies of critique. The juxtapositions around polyphony paved the way for the emergence of the important theme of affect in Guattari’s theory of subjectivity, which then veered, by means of the rejection by Guattari of a backward-looking orientation, toward the Sartrean origins of the concept of transversality. The conversion of a backward-to forward-looking, protentional perspective was revisited in the final
section on the limits of hermeneutical refiguration of transversality in the phenomenological tradition, in addition to the contrast delivered by the productive overview and problematic extension of transversality in a manner that decomposed toward the individual Guattari’s sense of subjectivity as a group (and assemblage) phenomenon.

NOTES

1. The article in question was translated and posted on the GLOBE E site Issue 8: ‘Jean-Jacques Lebel: Painter of Transversality’, trans. Melissa McMahon, http://www.arts.monash.edu.au/visarts/globe/issue8/jjltxt.html. However, Guattari also deployed Stern’s coexisting stratifications of self to describe the many styles of George Condo’s paintings: ‘all your “periods” coexist in this polyphony: blue, clown, linear, volumic, monochrome, etc. It’s as if a symphony was articulating all the levels of your own “self” that you explore and simultaneously invent through your painting.’ See Guattari’s (1990b) ‘Introduction’, in George Condo (Paris: Daniel Templon, 1990), p. 5.

The value of Guattari’s work on subjectification for the understanding of artistic production (especially visual art) has not been fully appreciated, despite his emphasis on the aesthetic paradigm in his final book, Chaosmosis. Despite many examples in his work of how he engaged in art criticism and interpretation, schizoanalysis has not strongly influenced visual arts discourse. The value of Guattari’s approach is that it situates itself beyond the problematic of representation in that of auto-production and, ultimately, that it isn’t tied to the work of established artists but to all forms of liberation (Chs 91). Here is an example of how it may be applied.

If all of the work of the late British artist Helen Chadwick (dead at 42 years in 1996) was, ultimately, about herself, it would be wrong to claim that her work was for this reason narcissistic; yet, the idea of Chadwick’s narcissism has captivated many critics. Since the self at issue was actually Chadwick’s body and its manipulable traces, it would be more revealing to say that her art was rigorous in its self-referentiality, instead of slavish in its psychoanalytically-inspired diagnoses of contented self-love, even those that were post-Freudian in orientation. What made it rigorous was that the materiality of artistic production displaced autobiography, mere self-reproduction, and ironic auto-reference, to be sure, as Chadwick established new cartographies of corporeality. And the mappings of her body, her cartographic corporealities, did not simply discover a body waiting to be reproduced. Cartography is, after all, beyond representation, the map is the territory. Map making is not at all an exercise in mimetic reproduction. It is a
forward-looking, creational activity. The autobiographical dimension of Chadwick’s work is therefore misleading. Of course, she was her own model, etc. The enfleshed body she pursued was not reclaimed, not a rendering of the familiar and familial self, but one that was produced, as she put it, on ‘the brink of I’. An ‘I’ that wasn’t there to be mapped, but is indistinguishable from its mappings; an ‘I’ that was disinterred from its supposed interiority and placed in an aesthetic process of autopoesis that allowed it to spread out, far and wide, through its urine, for instance, in the series of Piss Flowers created during her tenure as artist-in-residence at the Banff Centre for the Arts in the winter of 1991. Evoking and challenging a largely masculine Canadian pleasure – pissing in the snow – the void left by her urine in the snow was filled with liquid plaster, transforming a negative into a positive; and, as the cast was inverted bottom to top, it formed a flower; the vaginal tower or pistil shot of the flower was created by Chadwick’s urine, and the male skirt or perhaps stamen around it by that of her partner David Notarius. While everyone knows that urine is a provocative material with shock value, especially when it is combined with religious iconography, Chadwick’s piss art eschewed sensationalism. Diverting urine from its sensationalist and thus banal use in the art world, Chadwick extracted a singularity trait (urine in snow) and deployed it to bring into existence a field of posies, her piss posies, thereby rupturing the semiotic of human waste, not to mention the scandal of this substance in the art press, by turning it into a trigger for a new universe, a field of flowers.

In an interview given on the occasion of her installation of *The Oval Court* at the ICA in London in the summer of 1986, she noted she had abandoned photographs for photocopied images in the process losing the objectivity of the lens and gaining a kind of immediacy and directness that nevertheless lacked verisimilitude in the blue-tinted photocopies with which she worked, moving, then ‘from the reductive to the accretive, from static harmonics to a pulsation’. Piecing together images from fragments of cut photocopies, Chadwick mapped her body as a collage, across which intensities flowed, in twelve different figures of her experiences of desire. The court of photocopies was arranged on a platform raised some nine inches above the floor, around a central area in which rested five golden spheres. Around the walls of the gallery Chadwick posted enlarged photocopies of the spiralling columns of the Baldachino from St Peter’s in Rome, with swags decorated with photocopies of vegetable and animal matter. This leftover matter was then composted in a glass case adjacent to the court, and entitled *Carcass*: the perishable remains standing in contradistinction to the imperishable gilded spheres, but in comparison with the flux represented by the photocopies. The photocopy was, for Chadwick, a medium well-suited to convey the ‘impermanence of subjectivity’. And her editing of
hundreds of photocopies constituted a complex map of an emergent subjectivity whose territories were distinguished in processual terms of relations with an array of objects and animals: there is a refrain of edible creatures (lamb, skate, monkfish, rabbits, crabs, squid, sardines, goose) and an abundance of fruits and vegetables, in varying states of decomposition, in which the artist has entrenched nude images of herself, in order to affirm pleasure in the collapse of the distinction between subject-object parallel to that of map-territory. The subjectivity engaged in a process of auto-affirmation is the objects and beings which/who are vital to it: on ‘the brink of I’, or in Guattari’s terms ‘across the threshold of consistency’ (Chs 93), autoproduction is symbiotically linked (interfacing) with those others it helps engender.

Chadwick (1992: 29) herself has written of *The Oval Court* that ‘the essential elementary self is gone, evaporated into a vigorous plurality of interactions’. Subjectivity is produced in terms of these plural interactions in which things do not have to submit to the sovereign ego and a ‘coherent narrative’ – what Guattari called ‘semiotic linearity’ (Chs 30) – that walks one through them. In this piece Chadwick is inviting her audience to track the discontinuous flows of herself into a series of territories in which she is not sovereign, the centre, but distributed among things of equal standing, in relation to which and in terms of which she is defined. Every territory brings into focus coordinates of herself by means of animals, vegetables, flowing textiles, mirrors, etc. These ‘diagrammatic fields’ as Chadwick called them are not strictly speaking representative of anything. They are productive of the real rather than representative of an existing reality. These diagrams are ‘events to be’, a real yet to come, Universes of virtuality. Chadwick’s art may be said to be about herself if by this is meant that her works enlarged the constellations of reference of her subjectification.

2. Attention to the Sartrean legacy of Guattari’s thought may begin to call attention to and suggest itself in many places that would otherwise go unnoticed. For instance, the modest reflection ‘I Am God Most of the Time’ (Chy 51) may suggest to the eager hermeneut certain themes in Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis, in particular, the fundamental human project, in all its paradoxicality, of the in-itself’s desire to become for-itself, or God. The metamorphosis of human being into God, the desire for the former to be its own ground, founding the world and itself, is a useless passion because the effort is in vain. But even if Guattari’s idea of God as a spell cast upon existence echoes Sartre, the idea that he has become the in-itself-for-itself, and slips back into finitude if he has a headache, should make one wonder. The general point is that care must be taken in representing Guattari and the debts of his thought, especially in contexts in which it is deemed essential that he is located in a recognized tradition.
If a single philosopher may be said to haunt Guattari’s work, it is surely Sartre. In a supplement of the French newspaper *Libération* devoted to Sartre, Guattari (FFG ET03–12) made a confession of extraordinary candor: ‘For me, Sartre is an author like Goethe or Beethoven: you either take everything or leave it. I spent almost fifteen years of my life being totally saturated not only with Sartre’s writings but also by his actions. Everything I have said and done is in some way marked by him. His reading of nothingness, of detotalization, became, in my work, deterritorialization; his conception of seriality, of the practico-inert, influenced my notion of the group subject; his understanding of freedom and the type of engagement as well as intellectual responsibility, which he incarnated, have remained, for me, if not imperatives, at least immediate givens.’ Finally, these translations are underscored by a call not so much for a ‘return’ to Sartre and a renewed idea of social practice, which has been called into question in postmodern thought, but for the recognition of Sartre as an antidote to the abdication of responsibility in general in postmodern theory: ‘Sartre is a verb that is conjugated in the present.’
CHAPTER 2

Transversality

Understanding Guattari’s early formulation of the function of transversality requires an investigation into a relation that he considered at length, exploring its practical and political implications; that is, the relation between transversality and the modification of the objects incorporated (technically introjected) by the superego, which leads to nothing less than a dehabituation of the superego to its police operations and imposition of rules. The superego is, after all, a tough nut to crack since, according to Freud, it is primarily coloured by one’s parents (especially one’s father) but is also open to later influences such as the media, as well as a variety of archaic influences (some phylogenetic inheritances), not to mention long-abandoned objects, which places it in the topography farther from consciousness than the ego. There are a few concentrated bursts about transversality in interviews with Guattari and here and there in his published work one finds reflections on several of his somewhat awkward and orthodox early formulations, but nothing more sustained. Indeed, a mere two years after the ‘Transversalité’ essay, Guattari remarked in passing that ‘in different places and under different circumstances, I advanced different things: for example, I spoke of the “objects introjected by the superego”. . .’ (PT 151). His repeated use of the word ‘different’ underlines how much his attitude had changed in such a short time (from 1964 to 1966, to be precise), and it makes all the difference to read this repetition as an affirmation of change as opposed to the symptom of a fixation.

Not only, then, is an explication of the relation that founds the earliest expression of the concept long overdue, but such an explication needs to be placed in the context of Guattari’s subsequent deployments of it; none of which are as concentrated as his original paper, and many of which diverge in an interesting manner from his early considerations. One can imagine that for those readers unfamiliar with
the concept’s development and the slow moulting of its psychoanalytic shell, its adjectival deployments may seem to simply multiply, while at the same time the substance of the concept becomes less and less stable, acquiring a second order existence of formal emptiness (empty of history, reality and contingency), while remaining rich in meaning, opening itself to postmodern appropriations without practical consequences for any person or institution, which would not be in the spirit of Guattari’s thought. Over the course of his career, transversality became for Guattari closer and closer aligned with ontology. But we will not fully appreciate this until chapter 5.

The concept’s mutation over time is a consequence of the array of new ideas with which it intersected in Guattari’s later writings. It must not be forgotten that the concept of transversality had for Guattari practical tasks to perform in a specific institutional setting. This is not to suggest that it was not a philosophical concept; rather, even beyond the restricted field of psychopathology in France in the tradition of critical psychiatry, the idea was to use it imaginatively in order to change institutions as we know them, beginning with the psychiatric hospital. The concept is, then, embedded in the history of critical psychiatric struggle in France. Key figures in this domain readily admit that there are limits to the reach of innovations such as institutional psychotherapy. Both Guattari and J. Oury, for example, agreed that respect for the singular and the maintenance of heterogeneity were important components of institutional psychotherapy as it was practised at La Borde. Oury (1980: 17) explicitly outlined the political dimensions of microsocial practice of the psychiatric collective against the more general political problems of ‘global society’ (involving political parties, oppressive state systems, ‘revolutionary’ ideologies, etc.); yet the former was not detached from the latter. In fact, despite this view of the limited valency of micropolitical practice, it was used to ‘radically call into question the functioning of political groups (i.e., cells, party functionaries, etc.)’. Guattari’s analysis of ‘the Leninist Breakthrough’ (PT 183ff) is perhaps the best example of this.¹

The excavation and explication of the concept of transversality is my choice of means by which to present an overview of the life and work of Guattari. It is a thread, to use one of Freud’s favourite metaphors, that may be pulled in order to unravel a life because it
runs through everything. It is, however, not without its knots, tangles, and weak points; in the end, these only make it more interesting. Transversality is not merely a representational device, a biography by other means. Rather it is productively presentational and transdisciplinary.

The key signposts along the way are, firstly, transference and the concept’s psychoanalytic scaffolding; secondly, the coefficients of transversality; thirdly, the debt of his theory of groups to Sartre’s dialectical sociology. Having reached this point, I will then fourthly show how Guattari used the concept in his analytic practice at La Borde; fifthly, I compare and contrast Guattari’s early with his later uses of transversality through a reflection on the relevance of it for ecosophy. In the end, I want to ask about the relationship between transversality and Eros.

BEYOND TRANSFERENCE

Guattari developed the concept of transversality through his interest in finding a kind of therapy adequate to an institutional context; in other words, what happens to classical psychotherapeutic technique focused on the cure of an individual on a couch when the environment changes to a psychiatric hospital? What becomes of both technique and its theoretical aims in the hospital? Guattari’s institutional work at the Clinique de La Borde called into question the analytic relation of analyst–analysand, the so-called face-to-face, dual relation, for the sake of the analysis of groups in a clinical setting (or, as we saw in the Introduction, the third, mediating object of institutional pedagogy). The institution, Guattari argued, was not simply a backdrop against which classical dual analyses might be undertaken, regardless of their Freudian or Lacanian lineage. The analyst had to come to terms with the effects of the setting on how she/he would normally proceed. Why groups? At the most basic level, French critical psychiatry involved breaking down the concentration camp-like conditions of segregation of inmates, rigid hierarchies of authority, locked rooms, severely limited freedoms, intense surveillance, etc. These decisions entailed at the level of the structure of the institution a greater openness toward a collective psychotherapy in which all the personnel of the place would participate in the creation and definition of the institution.
The straight gate to the critique of psychoanalysis was through the transference relation because it is the cornerstone of psychoanalytic method; the transference is a libidinal tie between the analysand and analyst, the stage upon which everything that is pathological in the patient may be rehearsed, as it were. It is an aid to the analysis (the analyst must take advantage of the love the analysand feels for him or her, for this love is an important manifestation of the transference and must be dealt with and, ultimately, dismantled piece by piece), but also a force of resistance. As mischievous and seductive as the transference can be, it is the sine qua non of a successful treatment. Once it is dislodged and the dual analysis sidestepped, the full effects of the ‘institutional object’ may be appreciated. Guattari’s critical appreciation of transference took place through an analysis of the subjectivity of groups and involved the understanding of how places of treatment such as psychiatric hospitals may themselves actually prevent treatment, having been ‘radically diverted from their manifest social finality’ (PT 90–1) to such an extent that they reinforce and exaggerate the existing problems of the patients in their care. The concept of transversality is fundamental to the critique of the psychiatric hospital and therapeutic method. Clearly it represents Guattari’s first major theoretical contribution; put simply, transversality was Guattari’s answer to the transference when it was critically reevaluated in the context of the treatment of groups of patients in a collective hospital setting.

In his training analysis with Lacan – which lasted some seven years from 1962–9 – and critical reading of the texts of Freud on the transference relation, Guattari had already learned to despise the transference because it was, as he wrote: ‘fixed, insolubly mechanical . . . obligatory, predetermined, “territorialized” on a role, a given stereotype, making it worse than a resistance to analysis; it’s a kind of internalization of bourgeois repression by the repetitive, archaic and artificial reappearance of caste phenomena with their procession of fascinating and reactionary group phantasms’ (PT 79). The transference is an artifact of the analysis, and hence artificial; it is also, Guattari strongly implied, an effect contributing to guruism in psychoanalysis. While Freud’s own reflections on transference over the course of his remarks on technique shifted markedly from his view of it as a therapeutic alliance to a form of resistance, Guattari goes far beyond
this creeping scepticism. The dual analysis was, in Guattari’s experience, subject to various sorts of mystification because of the perverse deflection of the transference into a cult of an absolute master who, famously, ‘founded, alone’, and rebaptised psychoanalysis in the waters of structuralism, but whose retreats into aestheticism not only spoke volumes about his contempt for the lives of his patients (technical elitism and theoretical sophistication equalling, in Guattari’s estimation, ‘abominable practices’ with the obverse resulting in interesting practices of family therapists with ‘discourses of an insufferable pedantry’ [FFG 102–22, p. 7]), but cultivated a legion of sycophantic followers and fascistic lieutenants; this was, essentially, Guattari’s objection to Lacan’s EFP; yet, he remained a member (Analyste membre) despite his criticisms.2

This may have been Guattari’s political position on the school, but his theoretical suspicions were also much in evidence. In an essay originally published in 1964, ‘The Transference’, Guattari foiled the expectations of readers of Anti-Oedipus with a bone to pick about triangulation, when he wrote: ‘in the transference there is virtually never any actual dual relation. . . . At the moment we envisage this relation [of mother and child] in a real situation we recognize that it is, at the very least, triangular in character. In other words, there is always in a real situation a mediating object that acts as an ambiguous support or medium’ (GR 63). Those readers who have internalized the lessons of Anti-Oedipus, especially the critique of Oedipal triangulation, need to keep in mind that Guattari’s early work often contained accommodations of triangularity. So, let’s not get ahead of ourselves. What exactly did he mean by this? The ‘real situation’ is institutional life and the ‘mediating object’ is the group taken in institutional context. Guattari is borrowing not so much from his teacher Lacan, but from D. W. Winnicott (reinforced by F. Oury’s appeal to third objects in institutional pedagogy). And the triangle in question is not the famous Mummy-Daddy-Me but, instead, a third factor that is not strictly speaking a thing at all but a space, that is, the institutional object.

What is the institutional object, as it were, of transference in its new environment? Hospital/clinic-based psychotherapy (that is, if it has been deterritorialized from its typical status as a wing, floor or
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Department) requires a critique of the institution. One of the means by which this will be accomplished is through transversality because this foregrounds the institutional context, its constraints, organization, practices, etc., all those things and relations which normally exist in the background; in short, the group is how one gets at the institution. The idea of an institutional object captured, for Guattari, the massive conjugation of all of the effects on individuals and bureaucracies (patients, analysts, administrators), on theoretical concepts and analytic practices and goals, of the hospital setting. His reference to the ‘mediating object’ suggests that he was modelling his institutional object on Winnicott’s transitional object but in a more general way, a matter he mentioned in passing in a footnote (PT 82, n. 7). The emphasis on objects was not to the detriment of subjects because Guattari’s overriding interest was in the production of new forms of subjectivity that an institution could facilitate as it was being collectively created, as long as it was not tied to a deathly organizational reproduction – a frozen organigramme.

Like Winnicott’s transitional object, Guattari’s institutional object was not really a thing as such; indeed, things as such are not transitional. Rather, transitional phenomena occur in an ‘intermediate area of experience’ and a ‘potential space’ posited by Winnicott between infant and mother and, later, between patient and analyst; or, in Guattari’s professional milieu, between patient and nurse, nurse and doctor, intern and doctor, as hierarchies are restructured and responsibilities are cyclically reassigned. Transversality holds open this ‘potential space’ of creativity and collectivity. As the infant separates his or her mother from him/herself, he/she moves from the state of being merged with to being in a relation to her (Winnicott 1971: 14–15). Indistinction is replaced by a space of signification as the mother is positioned as ‘not-me’ by the infant as opposed to a ‘me-extension’. The mother, like the analyst, must adjust accordingly to this new relation with a willingness to let go. This shift from dependency to autonomy in the variable ‘potential space’ is for Winnicott paradoxical: it exists but cannot exist because infant and mother are joined and separated. If this paradoxicality is not tolerated, neither infant nor patient will have the opportunity to achieve personal autonomy. Tolerance is vital because what makes this space ‘intermediate’ is that
its contents – objects representing the infant’s or patient’s transition – are neither assignable strictly speaking to psychic reality nor the actual world. To express this somewhat differently, a transitional object such as the mother’s face is presented intermediately to the infant in such a way that she/he remains unaware that she/he is not its creator.

The ‘potential space’ between is where reliability is manifested, that is, the mother’s love and the analyst’s involvement, and this reliability gives the infant or patient ‘confidence’ in what Winnicott calls the ‘environmental factor’ (Winnicott 1971: 102–3); confidence is felt on the basis of experience and will be different for every individual. How, then, does one create an environment of confidence in a psychiatric clinic?

The institutional object, like the transitional object, represents all the phenomena associated with contextualizing the psychotherapeutic cure and foregrounding the environment. The question of confidence was just as vital for Guattari (PT 90–1) since this very environment was problematic: ‘psychiatric hospitals [like dual analyses undertaken in them] certainly provide us with the best example of “institutional objects” radically detoured from their manifest social finality.’ Despite themselves, psychiatric hospitals produce illness rather than treat it. The institutional object is known by means of group subjectivity, and the innovative conceptual tool used to pose the question is transversality. The foregrounding of the institutional context and the positing of this object, knowable through the subjectivity of the group, entails that the object plays a vitally important role in the life of such groups; just as the Lacanian objet a is the cause of the subject’s – here, group’s desire – and informs its fantasy life, the institutional object is what is real for these group subjects because they participate in its creation through negotiation and in the process develop new forms of subjectivity.

The issue of ‘background’ is also vital in the treatment of psychosis. From the very outset, La Borde had agreed with the department in which it was located, Loir-et-Cher, to accept every kind of patient, including psychotics. Here it is useful to revisit a principle of Lacanian analysis of psychosis: the collapse of the Symbolic, the very background, the foundation, against which human, intersubjective communication takes place (a subject’s relation to the Other fails); to put
it more technically, in psychosis there is a tear in the signifying systems of the Symbolic (foreclosed signifiers return via the Real, however, in fantasy, patching over the tear with delusions). Writing of institutional psychotherapy from a Lacanian perspective, Oury explained that it was necessary to be conscious of everything one was doing (i.e., such as making a decision) in being there with the group of patients and that the style of relation, one’s ‘ways of being’, served as the ‘bruit de fond’, background noise, as it were: ‘In a collective, it is the ensemble of these styles that provides a kind of bruit de fond. It’s at this level that there is something essential concerning psychosis’ (Oury 1980: 26). Institutional psychotherapy attempts to allow psychotic patients to search for a foundation to correct the symbolic deficiency in their delusional worlds (which might include the institution). The analyst must be careful not to select some delusional element as a ground or guarantee for the Symbolic (i.e., some drug or biochemical explanation). This is why Oury emphasized background noise, subtle styles of interpersonal relations, over explicit grounds of truth (answers) upon which the tear in the patient’s Symbolic would be supposedly repaired, but, instead, actually only integrated into the fantasy as delusional material (i.e., if the Name-of-the Father is foreclosed from the signifying chain, its locus in the Other, and with this failure [to enter the Symbolic], a delusional superego, a fascist Daddy, may appear that torments the subject (Lacan 1977: 217)). Both Oury and Guattari greatly emphasized creative organizational solutions that inherited from the French tradition – the Therapeutic Clubs set up earlier by Oury at St Alban in Saumery, and the development of what became known as la grille – ‘a kind of instrument for regulating the necessary institutional disturbances’ (FFG ET04–13).

Guattari’s generalized sense of the Winnicottian object as the creative space that a transversalized institution holds open is obviously quite different from the Lacanian version advanced by Oury, even though the latter still appeals to institutional psychotherapy’s goal of ‘patiently deciphering the networks of alienation, taking account of the masks and compromises, in order to clear access routes to the real’ (Oury 1980: 17). Unblocking energies blocked by oppressive institutional systems is the work of the collective microsocial practice engaged in at La Borde, even if the Lacanian version of the space held
open (to create points of anchorage for the psychotic, for example) does not entail a theory of subjectification (the subject barred, all of enigmatic consequences of being ‘for an other’, to paraphrase Oury) very similar to Guattari’s. Oury’s unrepentant structuralizations of the collective – whether they are Greimasian, Lacanian, or otherwise, are not upheld by Guattari. It is not that his models are less semiotic; they are, however, less linguistic, more material, and less inclined toward the topological (concerned with proximity of relational terms with regard to the defining criteria, and negative definitions of relationality) in favour of the processual, emergent and self-organized, although some would claim that even post- or structural models are heirs to structure-thought. It is no easy task to delineate Guattari’s attitude towards structuralism since early in his career he carefully separated the critique of authorial intentionality operated by Barthes, among others, reducing subjectivity to ‘the wake of all the codes which constitute me’ (Barthes 1974: 10), a deception produced by a mirage (causality is stripped from human praxis and embedded in structure, as Guattari put it: ‘human praxis no longer has anything to do with pure subjectivity’, PT 175), from Lacan’s more positive retheorization of the residuality of subjectivity in his version of structuralism in which the subject is not wholly reducible to and symmetrical with structure because of its dependency on residual partial objects, for example; thus the subject ‘is kept from entirely succumbing to its mortiferous passion of abolishing itself in a pure and ideal structure’ (PT 176). To put it another way, when Lacan borrowed the sign structure and overlaid it with algorithms and his concept of desire, the bar between signifier and signified was invested with a power, a resistance it had hitherto lacked (the subject for whom desire is barred). This does not rescue intentionality, of course, but it does regain in a convoluted way both reality and history from the purity of structure, which was Guattari’s point. It is worthwhile recalling Guattari’s anecdotal reflection on certain habits of linguistifying all sorts of tasks at La Borde: ‘Oury invented the term “linguistic” as if the work in the laundry had become assimilable to that of a local linguistics. At that time one made much of linguistics and one of our friends, Claude Poncin, spoke of “situemes” in comparing intra-institutional relations and the relations between phonemes . . .’ (FFG ET04–13, p. 6).
By the end of the 1970s, however, this would have changed since even the disymmetry between subject and signifier in Lacan was dismissed as Guattari’s own theoretical model matured: ‘The status of the subject does not rest therefore on the play of signifiers, as one would say in structuralist psychoanalysis; it is assembled by an ensemble of heterogenous components . . .’ (IM 43). The fruits of the critique of structuralism were harvested at this moment in concepts of the assemblage – collective – of enunciation in a mixed semiotics with a pragmatic and material foundation. The critique of structuralism in ATP (critique of invariants, universals, homogeneity, majoritarian languages and the rest) was already accomplished.

Subjectivity is a group phenomenon. It is deindividuated (from ego psychology), depersonalized (from personological egology) and ecologized (fully interrelational and polyphonic, although even this dialogical term has structural overtones from Barthes’s [1974] polyphony of codes, for instance), a consequence of foregrounding the social environment of the institution. There are different kinds of subjectivity, but they are always of the group. Subjectivity involves, then, non-predetermined interrelations, non-linear and non-logical unfolding, and the production of differences. Remember this: if the part has priority over the whole, as it does for both Guattari and Deleuze, the whole cannot predetermine the future of the part. From Winnicott, Guattari also developed a sense of the between, the potential space. In his later collaborations with Deleuze, transversality is explicitly a creature of the middle, a non-localizable space; this is the position of ATP; Deleuze (1988: 122), too, thought Spinoza could be read by way of the middle, rhizomatically, in terms of impersonal forces, speeds and slownesses. Guattari would eventually place great emphasis on potential as in virtual: it isn’t contained in the actual and isn’t constrained by typically dyadic frames (analyst–analysand; left and right banks). It is, rather, a space in which becomings are truly creative – radically open and simply not what is now actual. Near the end of his life Guattari theorized along these lines a virtual ecology. And the unconscious, then, would be no longer the object of specialists, but the concern of everyone.
COEFFICIENT

In Guattari’s early writings, transversality is thought of in terms of a coefficient, a quantity theorized with the assistance of a therapeutic bestiary (horses, porcupines, flocks of birds and moulting animals, not to mention the creatures of the psychoanalytic bestiary) in terms of a degree of blindness or the wearing of adjustable blinkers by the members of various groups in an institution. In my interpretation, I have emphasized the bestiary over the connotations the concept has across mathematics, physics, thermodynamics, architecture, etc. I take this approach because Guattari never carefully worked out its scientistic implications, leaving the labour of explication to his animals. For those doubters, think of the equine imaginary of ATP: unfortunately, the extraordinary reflections on horses — obviously, there’s Little Hans, Equus eroticus . . . — do not normally make it onto the indexes of big concepts. He did suggest that the coefficient he had in mind was borrowed from thermodynamics, although it was not one of performance, but that of entropy. Guattari (PT 80–1) first asked his readers to imagine a group of interns among whom existed a great potential for transversal relations within the group and outside of it. As a group, interns normally have little real power, work long hours, are dangerously tired, etc. Their high level of transversality would remain latent to the extent that its institutional effects would be extremely limited. Despite the obvious import of social lines of force in this situation, Guattari proposed a thermodynamic comparison: ‘one could say that the excessive institutional entropy of this state of transversality leads to the conduction or the encystment of every weak impulse to locally reduce it.’ The transversality unavailable for affecting widespread institutional change actually increases by absorbing every hesitant or vague tendency to disturb it. This state of transversality seeks to return to its latency, that is, to maximize its entropy. It is certainly no easy task to find the group(s) that actually holds the key to ‘regulating the latent transversality of the entire institution’; even those that appear weak may prove to be powerful. Guattari (MRr 247–8) later returned to the concept of the coefficient in the course of characterizing psychoanalysis as a politico-religious movement with a vested interest in the collective paranoia which it studies. He was fascinated by the
character and functioning of such paranoia, and proposed to ‘determine
the nature of a coefficient of collective paranoia, a coefficient comple-
mentary and inverse to what I had proposed, about ten years ago, as
the coefficient of transversality.’ The latter is connective and commu-
nicative, and the former is restrictive and reticent.

Guattari likened the ‘interpretation’ of institutional entropy to
transference, with the proviso that it was neither something estab-
lished, analysed and dismantled on the way to a successful dual analysis,
nor, in the context of group analysis, was it something given by
someone for this express purpose, individual or otherwise, by simply
stepping into the role of analyser (PT 79). Although ‘interpretation’
may be given by anyone, even the ‘imbecile of the ward’, who makes
him/herself heard at the right time, from which it follows that
interpretation must be met halfway, which itself entails a peripatetic
psychiatry that is not stuck behind a desk or a couch or even limited
to one hospital ward – the ‘psych’ floor – it is still the analyst (or
whomever is occupying this position) who must identify it as such;
yet, this is not his/her exclusive prerogative. Even if the analyst does
not hide behind a rigid hierarchical power relation in which the nurses
do not communicate with him/her (they only take directions) but only
with the patients, he/she cannot simply efface him/herself. The Master
must allow him/herself to be displaced. The (un)Master must assume
responsibility for his/her actions and interpretations because they may
stifle transversality. If the Master isn’t displaced, what are the conse-
quences? Well, he/she might mistakenly install him/herself as a
superego model for the analysand; this renders transference onto the
Master a common enough affair. While Lacan (1977: 246; 251)
certainly struggled in his writings with the ethical error of this way,
especially in his criticisms of British analysts who made the mistake of
setting themselves up as model superegos with which their analysands
should identify, it became grossly distorted in his cult following,
according to Guattari. Guattari guarantees the renunciation of the
exploitation of this position through the Master’s displacement in the
transversalization of institutional hierarchy, while maintaining an empty
locus for an emergent ‘analyser’ (analyseur de groupe) to occupy; an
analyser, then, in the sense of an optics that would bring to light
(disperse or reflect) like a prism certain tendencies of the group (i.e.,
to mutilate itself bureaucratically). Guattari suggested the following of transversality: it may be low or high; it may be opened or restricted; it may be latent or manifest; it is homogeneous, even though different intensities exist here and there in the institution; it is a property of groups, and it is always present to some degree, just as the transference, as Freud once thought, was present from the outset of the analysis, in the somewhat banal sense that anyone who can potentially libidinally cathect onto another person is engaged in intimate communication (hence, even psychotics).

What is at stake here in the displacement of the Master is captured in the practice of ‘removing the compartments around the medical secret’ by opening to inspection and discussion the dossiers of both patients and physicians, a common practice at La Borde (FFG ET04–13, p. 9).

Let’s consider Guattari’s own horses, which illustrate the coefficient of transversality:

Imagine a fenced field in which there are horses wearing adjustable blinkers, and let’s say that the ‘coefficient of transversality’ will be precisely the adjustment of the blinkers. If the horses are completely blind, a certain kind of traumatic encounter will be produced. As soon as the blinkers are opened, one can imagine that the horses will move about in a more harmonious way. (PT 79)

Blinkers prevent transversal relations; they focus by severely circumscribing a visual field. The adjustment of them releases the existing, but blinkered, quantity of transversality. While horse blinkers are supposedly preventative – that is, they prevent a horse from being frightened or distracted – they may also cause a fright by their very restrictiveness. Indeed, the opening of them may initially produce less than harmonious relations; and, as for the harmony of group relations, they are certainly not guaranteed by the opening of blinkers. Transversality is the tool used to open hitherto closed logics and hierarchies. Guattari continued: ‘Let’s try to represent the manner in which people comport themselves in relation to one another from the affective point of view.’ To put it bluntly, horseplay was commonplace in psycho-
analysis. Guattari’s choice of the blinkered horse is reminiscent of the example Freud used in *The Ego and the Id* (SE 19: Section II; and *New Introductory Lectures*, Lecture XXXI, SE 22) to explain what the ego is in relation to the id: ‘like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse; with this difference, that the rider tries to do so with his own strength while the ego uses borrowed forces.’ The weakness of the ego (which also obtains in relation to the superego to which it is servile) is compensated by its tactical ingenuity in getting the horse to go where it wants, even if it must on occasion merely guide the horse along the way it wants to go. What Guattari leaves out of his analogy, among other things, is the person whose task it is to adjust the blinkers. Horses, like persons, can be broken, that is, the transversality of the groups in an institution can be destroyed by the rigid imperatives of management, nurses, doctors, State systems of oppression and massive imaginary structures that make debilitating demands on collectives and individuals, and reduce individuals to particulars in a dyad of Universal-Particular that robs them of all singularity (Oury 1980: 16ff). On the floor, even the relatively simple idea of work rotation at the heart of ‘the grid’ caused a certain degree of irritation. Initial resistance by patients to work schemes – ‘I’m here to be treated, not work!’ – yielded the acceptance that work had a ‘therapeutic coefficient’, as Guattari put it (FFG ET04–13, p. 4). The adjustment of work rotation was originally conceived in terms that were too romantic and a little systematic. Adjustments that moved one person from a material task to an ergotherapeutic task, or another from a social to a bureaucratic task, did not always allow for the segmentation (of tasks themselves) and the subtlety for which it was first hoped.

Guattari followed his shift from horses to persons by jumping from horses to porcupines: ‘According to Schopenhauer’s famous parable of the freezing porcupines, nobody can stand being too close to one’s fellows.’ Guattari is following the trail laid down by Freud in his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* when he also quoted Schopenhauer to make the same point. The group is characterized, Freud thought, by the character of its libidinal ties. Both Guattari and Freud quote Schopenhauer:
One cold winter’s day, a company of porcupines huddled together to protect themselves against the cold by means of one another’s warmth. But they were pricked by each other’s quills, and it was not long before they drew apart again. The persistent cold drew them back together, but once again they felt the painful pricks. They alternately drew together and apart for some time until they discovered an acceptable distance at which they would be free of both evils. (PT 60; Freud SE 18: 101)

Presumably, a high coefficient of transversality does not straightforwardly produce harmonious group relations. The adjustment of the blinkers of patients by hospital officials, that is, from on high, or from below by an activist group of patients themselves, is likely to have little effect in traditional settings in which blindness is systematically deployed by an institution for its own ends because it is an effective way of maintaining the status quo, reinforcing its authority, and producing docile bodies through psychopharmaceutical ‘adjustments’. Additionally, the parable of the porcupines is itself not dynamic enough to completely nip in the bud any incipient mythmaking about group togetherness.

Transversality is generally facilitated by opening and maximizing communication between the different levels of organization in an institution. At this point in his career Guattari was still working with the Freudian manifest–latent distinction. So, when he writes of the possibility of adjusting, that is, strengthening or weakening the coefficient of transversality, he immediately appeals to two different dimensions of communication: manifest and latent. Now, transversality is unconscious. What this means as a working principle is that the groups holding the real power (read latent) in the institution do not necessarily coincide with those groups who manifestly run the place (the clinic is really run by a particular group of patients or head nurse). This being the case, the levels of transversality in the groups with the real power ‘unconsciously determines the adjustment of the extensive possibilities of other levels of transversality’ (PT 80). There isn’t just one level of transversality but, rather, many levels and, moreover, openings at one level have effects at another. Guattari continued:
The problem of the real relation of forces needs to be analyzed: everyone knows that the law of the State is not made by the ministries. Similarly, in a psychiatric hospital it may happen that de facto power eludes the official representatives of the law only to be distributed among various sub-groups: departments, big shots or – why not? – patients’ clubs, staff associations, etc. (PT 81)

The questions are who is in charge here and now and, who has the potential to take charge? Which group can occupy the ‘potential space between’? On the level of the expression of reformist sentiments it is desirable, Guattari suggested, that the caregivers themselves, the doctors and nurses, ‘control the factors capable of modifying the atmosphere, the relationships, the real running of the institution’. But an analysis based upon transversality does not accept the simple declaration of reforms for this still implies a vertical hierarchy as much as a dichotomy between internal reform and external militant agitation. Guattari was highly critical of reformist sentiments (every attempt at ‘social adaptation’) in the anti-psychiatry movement because they prevented fundamental change; indeed, innovations at the staff level tended to retreat into ‘institutional interests’ (GR 43). In every instance the militant analyst seeks the groups holding the real power. Holding power is not a static matter to be revealed once and for all: ‘the subject of the institution, the effective – that is to say unconscious – subject, is never given once and for all. It has to be flushed out . . .’ (PT 81). More concretely, in his observations on ‘the grid’, Guattari pointed out that some people took advantage of the work rotation schedule – some who should have known better! At other times and for reasons that remained obscure, certain tasks were valorized – working in the laundry room became a privilege at one point; at other times it was a ghetto. It wasn’t always easy to see where ‘power’ was and how it worked. At first, Guattari put the system into motion, along with two or three workplace monitors, and later a collective of grilleurs – displaced by a group of grilleuses – emerged and the system became more sophisticated (FFG ET04–13, p. 13).

All of this has a rather explicit Freudian ring to it (and as we will see with regard to Guattari’s later recoding of psychoanalytic categories
and topographies onto ontological dimensions, there is a persistent psychoanalytic shadow hanging over everything): the introduction of transversality in the group is like Freud’s introduction of ‘a new class of psychical material’, the latent dream-thoughts, thus necessitating the investigation of the relation, through the processes of the dream work, between the manifest content of dreams and the latent dream thoughts. The meaning of a dream must be ‘disentangled’, just as the group holding the real power must be similarly ‘flushed out’. Is transversality horizontal or vertical or both? It is anti-top down, organizationally speaking, and not purely horizontal. Taken individually, these orientations are impasses; taken together, they are blinkers. Both must be swept away. You can’t solve problems on the ward by issuing official directives from on high; and you can’t hide issues and respect singularities in the horizontal drift across a single plane. Horizontal or vertical – that is not even the question since a creature of the between like transversality must constitute its own set of original, polydimensional and polycentred operations in creating an atmosphere conducive to the appreciation of everybody’s singularity.

THEORY OF GROUPS

Guattari’s non-absolute distinction between two kinds of group subjects, subjugated groups and subject groups, is maintained by appeals to the difference between the ability to make a statement (subject group) as opposed to having one’s cause heard but without verification of it; the subject group’s alienation has an internal source arising from its efforts to connect with other groups, thus exposing its members, risking their security, responding with collective paranoia and neurotic obsessions; whereas the subjugated group’s alienation is thought to have an external source, from which it protects itself by withdrawing into itself and constructing richly paranoid protective formations, providing a kind of refuge and a distorted sense of security for its members. The manifest–latent distinction is employed to indicate that the unconscious desire of the group ‘needs to be decoded through an interpretation of the diverse ruptures of meaning arising in the phenomenal order’ (PT 76). As I mentioned earlier, this sort of group analysis does not attempt to grasp the ‘static truth’ (universal) of a
particular range of symptoms. Indeed, the analytic goal of the modification of the different coefficients of transversality existing in and among the groups in an institution cannot be said to be aligned with ‘group engineering’ or ‘role adaptation’, even though Guattari explicitly described how the ‘strengthening of an existing level of transversality in an institution allows a new kind of dialogue to establish itself in the group’, thus enabling a patient to use the group ‘in the manner of a mirror’ in order to manifest hitherto repressed aspects of both the group and him/herself; this gives one a ‘collective mode of expression’. A patient’s joining of a subject group, functioning in the manner of a ‘pure signifying chain’, allows him/her to ‘reveal him/herself to him/herself beyond his/her imaginary and neurotic impasses’ (PT 82); whereas, if a neurotic or psychotic were to join a subjugated group, he/she would have his/her narcissism reinforced or find a place that would accommodate the silent exploration of his/her passions. And there is a certain freedom in this. Let’s not label one group good and the other bad. A new kind of subjectivity is produced through the confrontation with singularities emerging from an evolving, adaptive, responsive and flexible system for articulating individual and collective affects in relation to specific tasks.

A few points of clarification are required. Guattari sought, in other words, to make room for the emergence of interpretation in its singularity and irreducibility to making sense: ‘The silence of a catatonic can make up a part, perhaps even constitute the masterpiece, of an institutional assemblage of enunciation’, as he later remarked in an interview (GR 137). The joining of a subject group enables a patient to become a signifier in a communication system whose members are interdependent, yet simultaneously in a relation of difference, but nonetheless totally involved in a collective process which frees one from the individuated hell of isolation (the structural definition of systemic entities by means of their opposition to other entities has, in this context, a liberatory ring to it). The use of the group as a mirror suggests that the patient can minimally perceive others like him/herself, and is in this way drawn into an intersubjective relation; such a relation is not, however, dual in the sense that Lacan attached to the phantasies of the Imaginary register (where all such mirror phenomena are placed) in which the subject finds that he/she
is another, the mirror image alienating him/her from him/herself, as if he/she is captured by it. A signifying chain is not conceived of as a straight line (Lacan’s rejection of the linearity of the signifier [1977: 154]), and not even a coil, but as a series of layered, ever-widening loops, linked with other such loops (Lacan’s rings of a necklace that are themselves rings in other necklaces made of rings [1977: 153]) with vertical and horizontal dependencies (value and signification), as well as the fundamental structures of association (metaphor and metonymy). To use the group as a mirror is to experience oneself as a group subject. Now, multiply this by about 150 – the approximate number of patients and staff at La Borde, and then add all of the features of the building, grounds, contents – and the system of interactions becomes rather complex.

Guattari’s two kinds of groups are modelled on Sartre’s distinction between serial being and the group in fusion. Concerning this legacy he has written in an essay ‘La Borde: A Clinic Unlike Any Other’:

A word that was fashionable then was ‘seriality’, which defined, according to Jean-Paul Sartre, the repetitive and empty character of a mode of existence arising from the way a practico-inert group functioned. (Chy 191)

The members of a series are united in being turned towards an exterior object in which they have an interest, embodying a prior praxis without having a project in common of which they are aware and, indeed, without really being aware of one another. Guattari was deeply interested in how to move a group out of serial being, and this definition corresponds to what he called a subjugated group. The subjugated group’s unity lies, then, outside itself; the nurses appearing each day to administer medications unite the individuals on a ward, but in their separateness, because their practico-inert being is determined by the psychopharmacological imperatives of the institution. The nurse is an agent of a practico-inert structure, and to resist his/her requires an enormous effort of critique of the reasonableness and efficacy of the behaviours he/she presupposes, both of the patient, him/herself, the doctors, the medical schools, the drug industries, etc. To put the task practically, how does one transversalize the nursing
function? For example, at La Borde it was found, more or less by accident, that the administration of medicine, by different persons, in different places, had significant effects. Sometimes it wasn’t the change of role that was important so much as the effect of distributing the medicines in a new place (i.e., the dining hall) that produced subjective changes.

Guattari wasn’t merely attracted by a fashionable concept. The Sartrean legacy touched him quite deeply. One cannot help but notice the emotional texture of his references to the scapegoating of Sartre during the public acrimony over his novel *Nausea* and media hysteria regarding suicide rates among French youth (GR 72), or the value and influence of Sartre as his model of a reflective, militant intellectual (GR 121); the restrictiveness of Sartre’s vision is duly noted as well, with reference to ‘Saint’ Jean Genet (GR 218). The list goes on and on. Perhaps the most telling testimony was embedded in Guattari’s reflections from 1966:

> Another of my benefactors was Sartre. It is not an easy admission to make. I like Sartre not so much for the coherence of his theoretical work but, on the contrary, for all his zigzags, all his errors, for all of his good faith about his mistakes, from *Les Communistes* and *La Nausée* to his attempts at integrating Marxian dialectics into mainstream philosophical thought, an attempt that surely failed. I like Sartre because of his failure; it seems to me that he positioned himself transversally in relation to the contradictory demands that tormented him but which he never let go; he solved no problem, with the exception of never succumbing to the elegance of structuralism or the dogmatic certainties of several distinguished adherents of Maoism. (PT 154–5)

In an otherwise highly charged dialogue staged by Constantin Boundas (1993) between Sartre and Deleuze, the microscopic attention paid to what emerges as the central contrastive point, the structure of alterity, erases any trace of Guattari. This is especially evident in the passing mentions of the theory of groups, but no less telling when Sartre’s so-called ‘confusions’ about the structure of alterity are firmly placed on the shoulders of the subject/object dialectic, in opposition to Deleuze’s
foreclosure of the Other that reaches beyond both subjectivity and alterity. Guattari, Deleuze and Boundas have in their own ways appreciated the lessons of Sartre’s confusions. It makes a great deal of difference whether these confusions are valued for their political or phenomenological lessons, especially since the latter may themselves contextually ‘bracket’ or foreclose the former in a manner that abstracts the staged dialogue from its practical setting – the street, the clinic, the self-protective groupuscule. I do not wish to accommodate the dialectic. I want to underline Guattari’s appreciation of Sartre’s inelegance, his confusions, on emotional and political bases, and to find in them a force that animates the best in Guattari’s political dialogues with Negri and others: the feeling and admission of failure; confusion on the part of a generation of defeated radicals; the personal effects of the disintegration of movements and relationships; the effects of aging on one’s vision of a militant social practice, of trying to reanimate widely discredited movements in the face of monumental transformations, the maturing of a new generation, and the ripening of intergenerational strife; the experience of prison, of harassment by the state and the media; of the passing of one’s cherished interlocutors (the death of Guattari in 1992, of Tosquelles in 1994, of Fernand Deligny in 1996, Fernand Oury in 1998, etc.).

The subject group is a kind of group in fusion that has liquidated its seriality and come together in ‘the flash of a common praxis’, in mutual reciprocity rather than mutual Otherness, but still united in the first instance in virtue of a common object defined in Sartrean terms as external (Sartre 1976: 253ff). The distinction is non-absolute, and a subject group can easily decay into a subjugated group; the latter ‘inert gathering with its structure of seriality is the basic type of sociality’, according to Sartre (1976: 348). The movement in Sartrean dialectical sociology from collectives to groups, from serial being to groups-in-fusion, from subjugated to subject groups, registers the presence or absence of the source of unity: it is either here or there. Hence, the subject group has interiorized its external source of unity and made of it a common objective, refining and restructuring it along the way. This negation of an external negation (not a common praxis defined from the outside but the negation of this) takes place in specific material circumstances and entails that the praxis of one member is
the common action of everyone in the group: my praxis is yours, too. Importantly, the results of this totalized understanding must be continually interiorized if the group is not to decay back into seriality. The failure to fully liquidate seriality amounts to the equivalence of subject and subjugated groups.

Any reader of Guattari’s essay on transversality may also notice that he very early on introduced a passage from Freud’s late essay (originally 1933) on ‘Anxiety and the Instinctual Life’, from the New Introductory Lectures (S.E. 22) in which the distinction between anxiety produced by an internal as opposed to an external danger must have had some bearing on his reading of the sources of alienation in the two kinds of group subjects. More specifically, Freud maintained that there are determinants of anxiety appropriate to every developmental phase (i.e., castration in the phallic phase), but that these are never completely dropped. Guattari seized upon castration – which Freud went to some length to justify as a real, external danger – as a key to social relations in advanced capitalist and socialist bureaucratic societies: there is no end to its threat, under various guises. Guattari (PT 74) considered castration to be a ‘supplementary term in the situational triangulation of the Oedipus complex, so that we will never finish with this threat which will permanently reactivate what Freud called “an unconscious need for punishment”.’ The logic of this supplement is that, understood as a ‘social reality’, the need for punishment will be blindly repeated. Its basis is in an ‘irrational morality’, Guattari specified, since it cannot be articulated as an ‘ethical legality’: irrational to be sure, and a ‘danger’ belonging to the signifying logic of contemporary society. The threat of punishment plays, then, a regulatory role: it is blind but socially effective. What is regulated is desire.

If the castration complex is never satisfactorily resolved, and the need for punishment is endlessly repeated, it follows that the super-ego’s growth will be stunted and the ego will be sacrificed on the altar of the mystifications of so-called great leaders who are at once fathers-kings-gods, and whose abilities to actually intervene in ‘the signifying machine of the economic system’ were never very great, anyway, even though they were and are commonly and ‘collectively pseudo-phallicized’ by voters and the party faithful. It is the castration complex that compels the little boy to give up his incestual attachments to
mummy and ambivalence toward daddy, and with the threat of
castration the superego is born, and thus daddy’s warning to his son –
stop playing with yourself – is forever perpetuated, and forever
triggered by desire, which cannot be separated from repression. With
little girls things are, as Freud tried to have it, quite different because
the threat of castration does nothing to demolish the Oedipus complex
and the girl has no incentive to develop a superego akin to her
brother’s. Freud mused that the formation of the little girl’s superego
is impaired. Of course, Freud changed his mind about the parallel
between boys and girls several times, until he decided to change the
order of the Oedipus and castration complexes: with girls the castration
complex comes first and precipitates the Oedipus complex. The girl
doesn’t have, so the story goes, any of the smashed bits of the Oedipus
complex with which to fashion a cruel superego for herself. The point
of this diversion into Freud’s fabulations is to show that Guattari (PT
75) believed that the analyst must attend very carefully to the ‘goal of
modifying the objects “incorporated” by the superego, transmuting
such objects in a sort of new “intitiatic” reception, clearing from its
path the blind social demand of a certain castrative procedure to the
exclusion of all else.’ Why should parental threats be constantly
repeated as if life was an interminable drama of the threat of
persecution for our desires? Indeed, why should the mythic threats of
psychoanalysis be constantly repeated as if life was an interminable
analysis? Guattari is seeking nothing less than a way to limit the effects
of the legacy of castration in the superego’s hold over desire. In an
interview from 1973, Guattari (Chy 214–5) remarked of Freud’s final
reflections on the castration complex in men and women in his
‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’ (S.E. 23) that it rested on
familialism (the heterosexual family and even the cancellation of
homosexual desire in the struggles of men against a passive or
‘feminine’ attitude toward other men) and phallocentrism (women’s
penis envy and the need to convert it into a normative heterosexual
desire for a child). Guattari pointed out that psychoanalysis runs up
against the final barrier of men who cannot master their castration-
anxiety because they refuse to acknowledge that there may be times
when they have to adopt a passive attitude towards other men (they
cannot accept being cured by another man) and women who cannot
acknowledge their lack of a penis and, thus, their anatomical destiny, and as a result become depressed, and, worst of all for the economy of psychoanalysis, cease to believe in a cure. Feminist scholars have made much of this Freudian shipwreck on the reef of castration, turning to Lacan’s structural version of psychoanalysis for a way out (Ragland-Sullivan 1991: 57; Gallop 1985: 20). In *Anti-Oedipus*, what is lamented is ‘resignation to Oedipus, to castration’ that accompanies the introduction of lack into desire. In short, ‘psychoanalysis castrates the unconscious’ from which it requires belief rather than production (AO 59–60).

The modification of ‘introjects’ stripped of their familialism (every desire mediated by mummy-daddy) would break the exclusivity of the mythical phallus in determinations of the common lot of the sexes, what Guattari referred to as its ‘initiatic’ reception such that the superego would open itself, would ‘admit’ something new, in the same manner as blinkers are opened (the blindness motif is a psychoanalytic symbol for castration, anyway), and entail that desire no longer triggers repression. Psychoanalysis is, as Guattari once called it, ‘the best capitalist drug’: it’s legal in most places and you can get off on its ritual interpretations and how it makes desire a family affair, shutting the door of consulting rooms on the social. And its fixation on the superego, indelibly stamped by daddy’s authority, means that all through life desire is crushed by the injunctions and prohibitions of the same castrating daddy requiring either that desire should desire its own repression or burn itself out with guilt by resisting repression: in school, in church, in politics, in the doctor’s office, during visits with your mummy, and especially in the consulting room. How did Guattari modify and transmute the objects incorporated by the superego without setting off repression? He explained in an interview ‘The Best Capitalist Drug’:

About ten years ago [circa 1963–4] I introduced the notion of transversality to express the capacity of an institution to remodel the ways of access it offers the superego so that certain symptoms and inhibitions are removed. Modification of the latent coefficient of transversality implies the existence of an erotic focal point, a group eros, and a take-over – even if partial – of local politics by a
group-subject. A social formation can modify the erotic ‘causality’ which sets off the activity of the superego. This modification of the ways it accommodates the superego leads to a radical transformation of the whole of the [Freudian] topography. (Chy 215)

The superego overcodes desire with repression and persecution in the name of the father. Resignation invades desire; the best a man can hope for is to take his place in the great chain of cold and remote daddies, hiding behind their newspapers and pipes. Guattari concerns himself with desire in the group, a group Eros that does not belong to an individual ego but is a larger formation that cannot be represented through the intermediaries of the family. Many individuals in subjugated groups live and/or phantasize their group belonging by means of subjugation (Oedipus and castration): the head doctor, the nurse, the intern, the janitor are all daddy (AO 64). Transversality has the task of ensuring that the institution doesn’t produce Oedipalizable objects through its routines and representatives, and that the potential middle is opened.

An early formulation of the problem of castration by Guattari, circa 1964, written with Oury, explained that ‘transversality is the place of the unconscious subject of the group, beyond all the “objective” laws which found it, and the support of the group’s “desire”’ (FFG ET01–36, p. 1). The subject group actively assumes responsibility for its own project, while the subjugated group passively receives directions. This distinction entails different relations between the concrete projects of individuals and the Eros of the group, which may either castrate individuals (deny them rights) or accommodate them (upon submission). The issue is that of tolerance: how much will a group take from certain individuals? What will precipitate its automutilation? How will it limit its own potential? These are situations that need to be analysed as they unfold. Adjustment of the coefficient of transversality may change the initiatic style of the group, allowing it to face what it previously could not without damaging itself or scapegoating one of its members; a group may learn how to innovate.

Although Guattari never stopped taking about groups, he did adapt his Sartrean language to an entity coloured less by the histories of sociology and therapy; an entity that was less specific and loosened
from the speech of a subject, and the signifier. For Guattari, ‘the group is often only a decoy (leurre)’ that does not allow one to ‘globally’ appreciate all of the machinic dimensions of entangled components, their transformations, passages, blockages, etc. (FFG ET09–26, p. 156). His shift from group to assemblage also entailed a shift to machine from structure or, rather, a machinic group as opposed to a complex system or structure; but, with the proviso that Guattari wanted to extract machinic components from structures (i.e., the machinic objet petit a from a linguistically structured unconscious; PT 243–44). The proverbial fly or, better, bug (Y2K) in the structural-network of cyberointment, the lack that symbolizes lack, ‘irreducible, unassimilable to structural references’, decentres the individual from him/herself and makes impossible a passage to the other.

HOW TO GET OUT FROM BEHIND THE COUCH

Guattari (PT 83) wondered ‘how can the head doctor be convinced to accept and even solicit questions about his actions, without having him recoil before the panic fear of being torn to bits?’ The doctor’s acceptance of this questioning, his/her ‘assumption of the phantasm of breaking apart . . . plays an essential role in the setting up of a transversal structure’ and the modification of the objects incorporated by the superegos of the patients (and, indeed, of the doctor as well). This assumption puts the doctor into direct contact with the phantasms of the group, and enables the group to learn a new role, and to question and redefine old roles. It is through this process that the aforementioned ‘initiatic’ acceptance of new objects by the superego may be brought about, primarily by setting up ideals which directly affect what the superego incorporates; castration doesn’t evaporate but, instead, it is ‘articulated with social demands different from those that the patients have previously known in their familial, professional and other relations’ (PT 83). The castration complex may be, then, modified according to local conditions involving new organizations (patients’ clubs) and access to new media (plastic arts, or food preparation, administering medications . . . ) affording opportunities for resingularization through the opening of new universes of reference to hitherto unartistic persons, non-cookers, and the like. When the
head doctor relinquishes for a time, for instance, his/her privileges by participating in the various groups of the institution, in the course of which he/she takes up a variety of different responsibilities, this redefinition of roles contributes to the erosion of the head doctor’s social status and the ‘alienation phantasy’ underlying it, as well as having widespread repercussions in the institution (PT 83). Transversality is fundamentally and radically social and political and in addition its implementation requires a great deal of courage and trust on the part of everyone concerned; it is also extremely local, involving a local politics, that of the subject group acquiring enough power to be capable of formulating a goal and trying to achieve it; and a group of sufficiently activist doctors willing to risk their exalted status. But the modification of the objects incorporated by the superego requires nothing less than a very high level of experimentation irreducible to experiments by the staff themselves. Remember Deleuze and Guattari’s admission from *Anti-Oedipus* (67): ‘We are not saying that Oedipus and castration do not amount to anything.’

Every local context must be appreciated; this is precisely the role of ‘the grid’, and all of the intra-hospital organizations that sprang up within and beside it. Such an approach required a militant commitment to institutional critique and, to the credit of Guattari and his colleagues, a great deal of personal courage to abandon the well-established posture of the distant, untouchable doctor-teacher-professor. Indeed, as Guattari’s close colleague and mentor, Jean Oury, once said of the grid: ‘This is more important than the ravings of pseudo-intellectuals who have never picked up a broom!’ (Oury et al. 1977: 20). Constant questioning is risky for where there are reassurances there are also obsessional defence mechanisms, which explains why castration is not just easily theorized away as some psychoanalytic hobbyhorse.

Within the system of work rotation, however, compatible tasks were neither easily found nor managed. Guattari (MRr 166–7) once described how the emergence of a leader – a tyrannical cook with a strong sense of territory in the kitchen at La Borde – constituted a social and institutional knot that needed to be untied. This sense of knot is borrowed not from Lacanian topology but, rather, from Laing, despite Guattari’s (GR 40) criticisms of the mirror games of the
latter’s familialistically-tinged poetry. The cook’s tyranny over the kitchen is irreducible to its familial underpinnings as well as static decodings of the oppressive power relations resulting from inter-individual manoeuvring and temporary micro-sociological constellations (inexplicable valorizations, crises of confidence, complaints, boredom). Knots such as these, to the extent that they tie up the work rotation, ‘can appear inescapable at an elementary micro-sociological level [but] are perhaps no longer so in a living institutional structure’ (MRr 167).

A living, dynamic conception of the institution requires the placement of the knot in relation to it and in social context (government supervision, suppliers, and other clinics), the leader’s relation to the transitory group hierarchies, and his/her conception of the social relations for which he/she militates. The cook’s refusal to allow free access to the kitchen, Guattari wrote:

> is inseparable from the government officials who supervise the clinic as well as the repressive phantasms which crystallize the roles, functions and alienating modes of the division of labour, as much at the level of technical services as treatments.

All the desiring machines relating to eating, with preparing and providing nourishment are, in this way, more or less blocked. (MRr 168)

How, then, does some ‘authority’ intervene without exacerbating the sado-masochistic relation to authority of the cook? The goal, Guattari thought, was to ‘“turn” the symptom “leadership” to the profit of a more “constructive” and satisfactory drive.’ The failure to follow the lead of desire no matter where it goes in order to find a place at which the cook’s desiring-machine can communicate with the alimentary machines of the patients and staff will only result in a kind of ‘turning’ that distorts and adapts desire to a more useful, that is, normal role (making ergotherapy in the kitchen function at whatever cost), which Guattari wanted to avoid.

While we are on the subjects of cooks, it is instructive to consider another of Guattari’s anecdotal reflections about life at La Borde. In the course of an interview from the mid-1980s, he remarked:
In a period of time in which everyone was very unhappy, an event sprang forth which, without being able to know precisely why, changed the atmosphere. An unexpected process led to the secretion of different universes of reference; one sees things otherwise. Not only does the subjectivity change, but equally the fields of possibility change, the life projects. For example, a cook, originally from the Ivory Coast, decided to return there. However, he had no means to establish himself again in his village. He worked at La Borde for a number of years and was much loved. A group formed to help him, which transformed itself into an association in accord with the law of 1901: La Borde-Ivoire. They collected twenty thousand francs to assist him in his move. Later a doctor and a nurse went to visit him. Then, in turn, a kind of village came to visit La Borde for three months. Now there is a group of six patients who are going there for three weeks of vacation. Here we have a process of institutional singularization. Is this psychotherapy? Good works? Militancy? In each case the local subjectivity was profoundly modified, especially its latent racism . . . (GR 128–9)

This description illustrates the transformative effects of the work of a club (formed under a French law dating from 1 July 1901 permitting anyone to form a group with a specific social goal) and how the grid was used as a ‘complex operator’ adjusting the transversal resonances of existential fields of reference, specifically the colour of the cook’s skin and the meaning of the Ivory Coast in a racist group phantasy. Of course, by the 1970s Guattari had explicitly theorized the accommodation afforded to regressive phenomena in a generative schizoanalysis and their modification in a transformational pragmatics. Whether this was the aforementioned tyrannical cook is unimportant. The example also sheds some much-needed light on why patients in French psychiatric facilities, unlike those incarcerated in North America, can form associations and work toward goals outside the institution. Typically, psychiatric inmates in North America are stripped of their rights (loss of liberty: commitment and then a review, but in that order), and this has informed the shape of the anti-psychiatric struggle there, putting a great deal of emphasis on human rights. In France, the formation of subject groups has a legal foundation to build upon. But this does not
mean that struggles against ‘treatments-experiments’ such as electroshock are irrelevant to Europe, and even to La Borde. Indeed, commenting on electroshock, specifically ‘its technical and ideological mythification and the importance in emergencies, in decisions, of the technique of ambulatory electroshocks’, Oury (1980: 316–17) defended himself against Italian anti-psychiatrists who pointed out brutish (sauvage) practices at La Borde like electroshock – but by belittling them as ‘anti-... I don’t know what’ and pointing out the Italian origins of the ‘treatment’. Oury then turns to this question: ‘What is traumatic in electroshock? For me, it’s the word “shock”. And above all the phase of awakening. But what is traumatic there, can be by contrast of an extraordinary interest on the level of reconstruction, of contact ... thus, the problem of contact, it matters.’ Ultimately, the awakening – after the convulsions, coma, and sleep – and the contact (in the communication sense of a phatic function) regained – is in many instances complicated by a wide range of immediate adverse effects (making it traumatic) and lingering ‘side-effects’ (amnesia, permanent brain damage). But this phase may also be, in some cases, ‘almost idyllic’, Oury concludes. The practice of electroshock by the psychiatric establishment was targeted by anti-psychiatric movements around the world as one of the most irresponsible and barbaric pseudo-treatments, and was accompanied by a critique of all convulsive therapy and the scientific rhetoric of ‘side-effects’, especially those all too common lengthy lists that include death. The use of it at La Borde makes it difficult to situate the clinic in the milieu of certain mainstream strains of anti-psychiatry struggle, despite the innovative, initiatic organization of the place.

Reflecting on his own experience in a variety of militant organizations in the 1950s in another important early essay ‘The Group and the Person’, Guattari remarked that regardless of whether or not the groups actually had any real effect, the important thing was, rather, that ‘certain types of action and concentration represented a break with habitual social processes and, above all, a rupture with the modes of communication and emotion inherited from the family’ (PT 156). This rupture was critical for distinguishing between subject and what Guattari sometimes called, lapsing into Sartrean language, ‘object’ groups (corresponding to subjugated groups, but employed by Sartre
[1976: 371–2] to indicate the totality of a group of persons constituted as an object insofar as I see it and it influences my course of action, as opposed to a group-subject, which I totalize without ever seeing, but on the basis that it sees me, making me its object, and threatening my freedom), and in addition presented ‘a minimal possibility of taking hold of the desire of the group . . . and a possibility of escaping from the immutable determinisms whose models are furthered by the structure of the nuclear family, the organization of labour in industrial societies (in terms of wages and hierarchies), the Army, the Church, the University’; in Freud’s group psychology, one may recall, the Church and the Army served him as primary examples of complex, artificial groups with leaders which furthered his characterization of the group by the libidinal ties between its members and with its leader(s), that is, horizontal and vertical relations. For Guattari, the same leader can participate in both kinds of groups.

Clearly, transversality was a key element of a militant practice aiming at a rupture with inherited models of organization. To transversalize the organization of a given institution is a creative act giving rise to subject groups capable of internally generating and directing their own projects, ensuring that organization remains close to the groups themselves, while simultaneously avoiding the slide into bureaucratic sclerosis; in diagramming the ‘Leninist rupture’ and the rise of the molar dictatorship of Stalin, for example, Guattari (PT 159) suggested that the most excessive repressive measures were required to equal and exceed the ‘richest current of social expression history has known’. Militants are often condemned to the phantasms of subjugated groups (the infantile disorders of ultra-leftism) which keep them from exploring the ‘real texture of an organization’; they get hung up on the significations produced by the leadership rather than producing their own signifiers and speaking in the name of the institutions they create adequate to the course of their actions (not a party and its lines and programme for these are ‘machines of repression producing antiproduction, that is, signifiers which plug and prohibit the emergence of all subjective expressions of the group’). Similarly, even subject groups may become bewitched by their own phantasies, losing their sense of direction for a time; these phantasies are transitional, however, and
correspond to changes inside the group, rather than those requiring the subordination of the group (PT 167). In *Anti-Oedipus* (348–49) the discussion of this point emphasized the mutual imbrication of the groups while maintaining the distinction between real, non-hierarchical coefficients of transversality and symbolic structures of subjugation, using the language of opening and closing to thread the subject–subjugated distinction through the fabric of desiring-production.

Institutional innovations such as the grid put into place by Guattari and his colleagues at La Borde constituted a break with habit and routine that laid the groundwork for an initiatic reception (admission and innovation) and representation by the superego of new institutional objects and social relations. The transformation and diversification of routine and the presentation of real heterogeneity; the transversalization of hierarchy and the demonstration of the mutability of inherited models (from the family and the division of labour, to the irreducibility of the subject group to an individual delegated to interpret the situation, although I have suggested that certain tensions persist around this theme); the opportunity for active participation in social affairs: all of these breaks and ruptures formed an integral part of what Guattari characterized by the term ‘intitiatic’.

In reflecting on his experiences in radical groups of various sorts, Guattari did not emphasize their effectiveness. Rather, he emphasized their initiatic value in the sense ascribed above to ‘the grid’. Significantly, Guattari’s experience of militancy gave him a creative edge in his dealings with institutions; they acquired ‘a sort of plasticity, at least at the level of representation in the intentional field’ (PT 157). The revolutionary and institutional creativity of subject groups can be stifled and crushed when the links between their organizations and projects are broken. Guattari’s example is the legacy of Stalin. The group closes in on itself and gets caught up in its own phantasmatic representations of its own organization:

the revolutionary organization has become detached from the signifier of the discourse of the working class to the profit of a totalization closed in on itself and antagonistic to the expression of the subjectivity of different sub-ensembles and groups, of these
subject groups of which Marx spoke. Group subjectivity has no other means to express itself except in a phantasmatization which confines it to the sphere of the imaginary. (PT 160–1)

‘Breakthrough groups’ decay into subjugated groups in this manner. The psycho-socio-political question is how to break from this imaginary (which can consist of no end of oddities from fascist delusions to theoretical noodling) and get back to the exploration of what was really significant (a real historical rupture and signifying break) in the first instance and that eluded or broke from repetition, seriality and death.

Astute readers will have noticed Guattari’s clever misreading of a quotation from Marx’s ‘Introduction’ to the Grundrisse (1973: 86): ‘Lastly, production also is not only a particular production. Rather, it is always a certain social body, a social subject, which is active in a greater or sparser totality of branches of production.’ Guattari moved from the social subject to the subject group via ‘a correlate of phantasmatization, with an element of social creationism that I tried to schematize in “transversality”’ (PT 154), as he put it. Social creativity, especially that of subject groups in relation to institutions, is moulded by the group phantasies delivered through modern initiations (various forms of apprenticeship, bourgeois phantasies of the university, failure neuroses of the Left) into dominant institutions. It would be incorrect to strictly separate phantasy from reality because the texture of an organization is also composed of imaginary mechanisms. These subjective phenomena, however, are irreducible both to individuals and to manifest conditions (like soldiers marching back and forth in a square, or students lining up to register for their classes). Guattari’s intentionally provocative transversalization of the Marxist social subject is at the expense of the inability of the worker’s movement to grasp group phenomena (it’s not their fault, really, Guattari adds, we are all at fault, because we rely on the wrong indicators). As I suggested above, Guattari’s (PT 163) bestiary explains the transversality of the group; here, he uses the image of a migrating flock of birds to suggest what is wrong with trying to explain group belonging rationally, or individually, or in relation to official dictates, or manifest events in general: ‘it has its own structure, shape, function, and course, all of which are
determined without a meeting of the central committee, nor the elaboration of the party line!’ While this image of the migrating flock overdetermines group coordination and togetherness, it served Guattari as a foil for the inadequacies of social theories of groups and woodenness of political bureaucracies. But it is not only a foil: it also provided him with a way to underline how a group may suddenly coalesce when it finds someone or thing upon which to hang a hitherto latent phantasy, what Guattari called an ‘imaginary territorialization, a phantasmatic corporealization of the group which enfleshes subjectivity’ (PT 164).

Guattari often turned his therapeutics, at times rather vulgar if one thinks of parapraxes as the easiest pickings of psychopathology, to pointed political ends with great mischief and delight. Consider his inflammatory 1970 essay ‘The Maso-Maoists and the Impossible May’, which hangs on what Freud called a ‘political misprint’. Quoting the Cahiers de la Gauche prolétarienne (G.P.), Guattari points out a typesetting error that rendered the G.P.’s recognition of the supposed ‘universalité et sans [instead of dans] sa réalité en France’ (PT 276). Guattari even beseeched his comrade typesetter at L’Idiot international not to correct the typo he was exposing and to remain calm. This taunt led Guattari, who duly notes the erratum slip provided by the Cahiers, as well as the G.P.’s refusal of Freudianism, to use both of these as evidence that a lesson was underway about parapraxes, unwittingly sponsored by the G.P. itself. One cannot but knowingly exclaim: Traduttore-Traditore!

TRANSVERSALITY IN THE LATER GUATTARI

I would now like to place Guattari’s early elaboration of transversality in the context of the development of his thought by jumping ahead to his final published work, Chaosmosis (Chs). I need only remind readers of a series of modifications that have taken place in his relationship to psychoanalysis. Consider, then, Guattari’s first essay in the book, ‘On the production of subjectivity’. Guattari’s transversalist conception of subjectivity escapes the individual–social distinction as well as the
givenness or preformedness of the subject either as a person or individual (the unconscious as a pre-programmed destiny); subjectivity is both collective and auto-producing (fundamentally open to all possibilities). *Chaosmosis* is full of refrains of Guattari’s thought: his criticism of linguistic semiology and structuralism in the name of a-signifying phenomena; rejection of Freudian psychogenetic stages of development in favour of a polyphonic conception of subjectivity of coexisting levels. Guattari favoured what he referred to as ‘pragmatic applications’ of structuralism (requiring machinic extractions from it); one such manifestation was the psychoanalytic theory of partial objects, especially the Lacanian theory of the *objet petit a*, which he at times read through Bakhtin, especially as it concerned the autonomization of subjectivity in relation to aesthetic objects, the so-called ‘partial enunciators’: these are the references (objects) by means of which subjectivity enunciates itself (Chs 13) and are irreducible to a simplistic body-person or society-centric configuration of desire. The partial objects survive in Guattari’s thought as a legacy of the machinic in the psychoanalytic. A transversal conception of subjectivity entails the connection and embodiment in unpredictable constellations of these heterogeneous partial-objects-enunciators. Why parts? Because they are the stuff of poetry: the fragments of discourse assembled by poets in order to engender new Universes of reference (FFG 102–22).

It is fair to say that the one specific thing Guattari held onto from his training was the theorization of the partial object. Transversality was worked through this concept because it served, in Guattari’s aforementioned early paper ‘The Transference’, to critique the dual analysis (the mother–child relation is triangular to the extent that there is a third detachable, displaceable object at issue – hair or, even better, the mother’s love [Lacan 1977: 197–8]). Lacanian, Kleinian and Winnicottian partial objects were all put into service, at one time or another by Guattari, even if their psychoanalytic specificity was challenged in the process; everybody remembers how, in *Anti-Oedipus*, Kleinian part objects were detached from their missing wholes and given interest, partiality, that is, as partial objects not subject to any exclusions. Holland (1988: 61) has shown that the schizoanalyst cuts Lacan’s (1977: 193–4) L-schema of the psyche in two; only the top relation between the subject of speech S and his/her partial objects is
transversality

retained, and the bottom relation between the ego, or what of the
subject is reflected by his/her objects, and the Other, upon whose
discourse the subject depends, is refused; that is, the Imaginary and
Symbolic relations are discarded for the sake of the contact of the
schizo subject’s desire with its partial objects in the Real. It needs to
be mentioned, not as a corrective to Holland but, rather, harkening
back to the early papers of Guattari, that this was not yet the case, for
the redefinition of roles, especially of the chief doctor, situates him/
her on the symbolic plane and ‘his/her role, now “articulated like a
language”, will find itself in direct contact with all the signifiers and
phantasms of the group’ (PT 83). What this entails is, in strictly
Lacanian terms that Guattari would supercede, that ‘the grid’ is
inscribed in the Symbolic by means of a multiple semiotics (scriptural,
gestural, temporal [day-week-six months], etc.) and that the uncon-
scious transversality that it releases is structured semiotically. Lacan’s
topography of the unconscious was, of course, structural-linguistic. In
other words, the early Guattari could not have done without the
Symbolic register; but by the time of Chaosmosis, Guattari would be
quite clear that the machinic unconscious was not structured like a
language because the interaction of semiotic components and systems
of intensity were not reducible to linguistic structure nor to a universal
syntax such as the castration complex or Oedipus or mathemes. What
Holland suggests, however, is that invoking the pre-personological and
the post-subject evades the traps that come along with entry into the
Symbolic as well as the mirror games and impasses, not to mention
the individuated organization, of a typically psychoanalytic imaginary.

Reflecting on his essay on transversality some years after its initial
publication, Guattari (MRr 168–9) noted: ‘I still accepted that certain
techniques could, as such, contribute to the modification of what I
then called “objects incorporated by the superego”.’ It incorrectly
appeared as if there was ‘on one side a superego, set in a person, and
on the other side, a social context which interacts with it.’ The
institutional technique of work rotation was unfortunately applied in a
rather mechanical way to the modification of the institutional objects,
leaving the impression that the transversal analysis of the unconscious
concerned individual interiority and social exteriority. Guattari did not
want to leave the impression that such an analysis was psychologistic
and personological. He additionally underlined that the institutional techniques developed at La Borde were themselves only as effective as the ‘collective project which sustains them, the collective assemblage in the midst of which they are placed, is itself articulated in a micopolitics of desire relative to a much greater social field’ (MRr 169).

The partial object survived Guattari’s turn against his own analyst and was generalized into an ethico-aesthetic theory of the subjectification that escaped the shackles of personological, familial, and structural linguistic models; not just an object a, but b, c, d, . . . There is a more or less direct link between the militant’s ability to modify the institutional objects and conditions toward their new initiatic acceptance and the production of a kind of subjectivity that is not stunted by institutions under the sway of capital, for instance, which produces serial and elitist forms of subjectivity. Partial subjectivation became a key part of a transversalist, singularizing conception of the relation between, to adopt the language of Hjelmslevian glossematics as Guattari understood it, expression and content planes; the transversal relation at the level of form is between the phonemic system and semantic unities. But this initial relation was still too linguistic for Guattari. This struggle against linguistic imperialism was felt in many fields. Guattari then envisaged a critique of the formation of matter into semiotic substance such that the substance would be shattered with the transversal relation between enunciative substances of a linguistic nature and non-semiotically formed matter; between, then, the linguistic and the machinic orders, whose relation would constitute machinic assemblages of enunciation. His guiding idea was to describe form–matter relations that skirted the category of substance, on both the planes of expression and content, and christen these a-signifying semiotics, as a way out of glottocentric semiology, and a move towards the urging along and mapping-out of these creative subjectifications as they appear, embodying themselves in existential territories as they, to quote Guattari (Chs 28), ‘extract complex forms from chaotic material’. The critique of linguistics was the handmaiden of the larger effort to expose social relations in which subjectivity was formed in a way that was massified, infantilized and desingularized (i.e., the production of subjectivity is not only a matter of speech).
Guattari’s interest in the production of subjectivity required a new model – actually a metamodelization, in the wake of such crises of existing ‘grand’, scientific modelizations affecting the relevancy of psychoanalysis, structuralism, marxism, etc. – of the unconscious, beyond the work of both Freud and Lacan, loosened from ‘tradition and invariancy’, that is, the objective truths of the psyche. This critical position brushes Guattari up against the task of postmodernism: to think the consequences of disbelief in grand narratives. Guattari’s approach is forward-looking, but not teleological, yet suggests a paradox of all ‘meta’ thought: it suppresses or excludes some narratives for the sake of others at another level, and when belief in these others wanes, so too does the meta’s regulatory power. Guattari became a forward-looking cartographer of the unconscious, a pragmatist working formations centred on assemblages of subjectification, rather than a backward-looking scientific interpreter of a restricted topography all of whose roads led back to childhood or, for that matter, to the signifying chain:

Gilles Deleuze and I have similarly refused the Conscious-Unconscious dualism of the Freudian issues, and all the Manicheanist oppositions that follow on the level of oedipal triangulation, castration complex, etc. We opted for an unconscious of superimposed, multiple strata of subjectifications, heterogeneous strata of development with greater and lesser consistency. An unconscious, thus, that is more ‘schizo’, liberated from familialist yokes, and turned more towards current praxis than towards fixations and regressions on the past. An unconscious of flux and abstract machines, more than an unconscious of structure and language. (GR 197–8)

The analytic problematic shifts from a backward-looking interpretation of the symptoms of pre-existing latent material to the forward-looking, pragmatic application of singularities towards the construction of new incorporeal constellations in Universes of reference for subjectification. The heavy reliance on the castration complex that marked Guattari’s early writings was subject, by the time of Anti-Oedipus, to a definitive critique; which is also to say that it didn’t definitively go away. Rather, over the years since that time Guattari’s emphasis changed so
much that it is deployed as a point of contrast. Is, then, Guattari’s metamodel a metanarrative of the postmodern type? Not at all, he believed, since a schizoanalytic metamodelization was not itself a ‘general model . . . but an instrument for decoding systems of modelization in diverse domains’ (CS 27). A decoding machine that had at its disposal various tools (transversality, a post-psychogenetic conception of subjectification, non-linguistic semiotics) for the critique of all ‘pragmatic models of submission to modern systems of alienation and “soft” exploitation’ (CS 65) and for ‘develop[ing] possible openings onto the virtual and onto creative processuality’ (Chs 31).

With these points in mind let’s consider what remained of transversality. I am not so much interested in its diverse adjectival deployments. Rather, it seems to me that stripped of its overt psychoanalytic scaffolding (except for the modified theory of partial objects) and the institutional analytic framework in which it was originally conceived and practised for some 30 years, the concept is radically opened to hitherto unimagined mutations and complexifications across all sorts of domains; yet even the simplest idea that subjectivity is not interiority but the product of diverse ‘existential dispositions’ is liberating in therapeutic contexts. In other words, transversality still signifies militant, social, responsive creativity. Guattari was well aware of the risks of this kind of openness and of the concept’s progressive deterritorialization from existing modelizations. He emphasized that transversality was not a given, an ‘already there’, but always to be conquered through a ‘pragmatics of existence’ (Chs 125). In his early works transversality needed to be released and consolidated through some specific institutional activity, but not toward a norm given in advance. Transversality was an adjustable, real coefficient, decentred and non-hierarchal, and Chaosmosis put the accent on its in-betweenness. Transversality as a ‘bridge’ (i.e. across domains in an ontology of four functors) is an idea that occurs several times; the concept retained its break with horizontal and vertical coordinates, its deterritorializing character, its social and political experimentality, and connection with production, especially the production of subjectivity, and the collective assemblages of enunciation. In chapter 5 I will return to the relation between transversality and ontology.
Guattari’s emphasis on analytic methods aimed at modifying introjected objects places the emphasis on mental ecology and the object in question in the later work is ecosophic. Ecology is vital to the consideration of how to model the psyche in a way that is sensitive to a world tied up in impasses of every kind. We know that the old topographies of the psyche had been abandoned by Guattari. In Guattari’s (Chs 91) hands, ‘an ecology of the virtual is . . . just as pressing as ecologies of the visible world.’ What he is suggesting is that Universes, one of four ontological domains alongside Fluxes, Phylums and Territories, whose domain is that of virtuality and incorporeality, that is of ‘potential space’, needs to be understood ecologically; which is to say in terms of interrelations, interfaces, autonomous becomings. Simply put, these new, incorporeal, divergent Universes that don’t realize predetermined or pre-existent wholes or principles, but are genuine becomings of subjectivity reaching forward into its transversal potential, were of immense interest for Guattari: ‘beyond the relations of actualized forces, virtual ecology will not simply attempt to preserve the endangered species of cultural life but equally to engender conditions for the creation and development of unprecedented formations of subjectivity that have never been seen and never felt’ (Chs 91). Guattari escaped the poverty and sterility of the simple realization-of-the-possible model by appealing to a virtual ecology in which the finite, existential Territories actualized and made visible by new media technologies (one of his examples is computer-aided design), for instance, opened onto new, unprecedented incorporeal Universes in which subjectivity could find its autonomy by (re)singularizing itself. The relation between the domains moves from a real manifestation (finite Territories) to boundless virtual Universes, and back again; but the values of the latter are supported by the former. Such Universes are ‘incorporeal ecosystem(s)’ (Chs 94) likened to the objects typical of the history of psychoanalysis, despite the latter’s poverty, as a point of contrast, but also to underline especially with reference to Lacan’s objet a – partially deterritorialized and resistant to specularization and significantization – the difficulty if not the impossibility of representing them. One hears echoes in Guattari’s description of being ‘transported into a Debussyist Universe’ a much
earlier idea of transference that he borrowed from his colleague Jacques Schotte: transference as a kind of amorous transport beyond everyday existential Territories. Transference as transporation – transversality.

As we are amorously transported into the Universe of Guattarian theory, it is pragmatic to consider how this version of ecosophy would have sounded on the hustings as he stood for office in the Paris regional elections under the banner of a Green politics that saw him move transversally between two parties: Les Verts and Génération Ecologie. Between the two – that was the point: Guattari’s transversal ‘double membership’ in both parties was unprecedented in the French Greens in the climate of a political game of either/or, and others followed suit. This strategy was also an attempt to refigure the divisions of labour in French Green politics between becoming majoritarian Waechter-politicos and counter-cultural minoritarian Lalonde-militants – the former got elected and the latter defended the earth.

Universes lack extrinsic coordinates and are thus not open to ‘direct objective representation’ (Chs 125). This is an important principle for Guattari because it allowed him to escape a reifying scientific super-ego, as it were, that plagued the analysis of mental objects. But what sort of ‘objects’ are these? Guattari wanted to go further, to really deteritorialize them and get outside his own fourfold domains so as to posit a ‘pre-objectal entity’ transversal to all the domains, not subject to space and time, speech, representation, and only whose slowing down from its alleged ‘infinite velocity’ enabled the deduction of the existence of more properly speaking ‘objects’ which subjectivity uses to forge itself. This peculiar ‘being before being’ was Guattari’s (Chs 126) attempt to finally elude pre-established coordinates by borrowing the idea of the pre-verbal, emergent subjectivity of the potential space between the paradoxically undivided and sharable yet soon to be divided affective space between self and (m)other (GR 195). With this ‘pre-objectal’ and ‘pre-personal’ logic, irreducible to the individual and desingularizing seriality and related closures, Guattari posited the existence of a primary, instinctual subjectivity on the model of the primary process postulated by Freud; he used the same language in describing the catalysing of fragments of Fluxes in finite existential Territories – in Freud the ‘binding’ of impulses – and their embodiment in the name of Eros over Thanatos does, here and there, nod to
Thanatos as one possibility in the ‘praxic opening’ of existential Territories. Despite his rigorous rewriting, and the originality of his own theoretical metapsychology, Guattari’s model remained, despite himself, close to the Freudian Unconscious, further deterritorialized (just think of Guattari’s criteria listed above and strongly recall Freud’s characterizations of the Unconscious: included middle or exemption from contradiction, mobility, timelessness, replacement of extrinsic coordinates).

Someone once declared in the pages of *Recherches*: ‘God is dead. But not the unconscious!’ Long live the unconscious! But is it dead?

**GROUP EROS**

If Freud’s dualistic metapsychology ultimately comes down on the side of death, of the death drive over Eros, then Guattari’s concept of transversality and his theory of the group subject are radically anti-Freudian at least as far as metapsychology is concerned. To put it another way, Guattari staked a sociological claim with Eros, while Freud chose an anti-sociological principle in the name of Thanatos. For Guattari, Eros and the group triumphed over Thanatos and the individual. All of Guattari’s psychoanalytic debts are paid off with this decision: he resists Freud by enforcing Eros and society over the death drive of the narcissistic individual. The narcissist is coerced into sociality in the name of creative spirit and sexual instinct, of the myth that love is not in the end conquered by death.

Transversality rests, then, on group Eros. Nothing and no one is brought into communication without it. Indeed, if Guattari’s goal is the modification of the introjects of the superego, the establishment of a ‘new group law’, then his conception of the superego demands that it is not irreparably tainted by the death drive. Now, in the service of Eros, Guattari did not demand of the group that it definitively exorcise the death phantasies of individuals; he stated that ‘it is necessary for even negative and destructive phantasmagorias to acquire modes of expression’ (3E 58). Individuals may re-experience such phantasies in the group, but group identity will check the retreat of their negativity into narcissistic solitude by providing a setting and experimental routines in which they may be actualized and even maintained (Eros
is, after all, a great preserver). The Eros of the group makes, as Guattari noted, certain demands on individuals, one of which was the assailability of individual phantasies; the group may even demand that the individual abandon the phantasy of group belonging. Guattari not only resisted the Freudian death drive – and this was especially clear in *The Three Ecologies* where he openly rejected it as an ‘intra-psychic drive’ – but the legacy of the dualistic metapsychology. He did this by developing a conception of the individual as fundamentally a group, a social subject, a subject group, of which there are two kinds, and by refusing to reduce violence and negativity that must be transversally abreacted (as in the cathartic psychotherapeutic method of expelling pathogenic affect by revisiting the trauma to which it is attached [3E 58]) to intrinsic essences of human being, the death drive that lays in wait for moments of weakness. The choice of Eros entails the group subject, that is, a definition beyond the traditional dualities of society and individual, Eros and Thanatos. Guattari was well aware that his own early conceptualization of the superego and the social were, for example, too dualistic; in his later work he sought to overcome the heavy philosophical burdens of threes with models composed of four dimensions, connected transversally, but still, in a fairly obvious way, aligned with Freudian concepts: Fluxes (unconscious) – Phylums (drives) – Universes (complexes) – Territories (transference). In those cases where he retained some kind of triad, as in *The Three Ecologies*, he clearly stated that he was not ‘going beyond’ Freudianism but reassessing and reorienting it towards the future.

Ultimately, transversality may be best appreciated in terms of its praxic opening and the virtual potential it holds for subjectification. While the gamble of Eros risks the misunderstanding of a myth of group togetherness, Guattari did not fail to point out that transversality was only livable according to diverse modalities involving as much crisis and banality as responsibility for innovation and the challenge of its permanent reappraisal.

Although it is in the pages of *The Three Ecologies* that Guattari clearly announced the triumph of Eros over Thanatos and its significance for ecology, with the redeployment of classic psychoanalytic concepts such as abreaction and cathexis, this does not suffice to understand the role of death in Guattari’s thought. By the same token, Guattari’s
ecologies are thought of as ‘transversal tools’ that he used to work on subjectivity, to connect its relatively autonomous components with one another and establish ‘interiority’ at their crossroads (that is, recovering it in a practical manner), in addition to connecting them with other molecular fractures and assemblages. In this regard an ecologized conception of subjectivity is thoroughly interrelational and ecological problematics may install themselves in or attach themselves to almost any component. The tools are supposed to be effective even when they are applied to the ‘rusty bolts’ of subjectification that result from the introjection of unidimensional Western value systems (rivet-head Fordist subjectivity; tubehead jolts-per-minute subjectivity with a short memory and low literacy; computer geek subjectivity with a scotomized social life), which is the unfortunate case in many post-socialist European countries as Western capitalist values, announced by media hungry for new markets, flush out the older unidimensional and serialist sameness that defined the Communist superego with a flood of shiny, shallow and new signifiers of subjectivity. Along similar lines, Guattari also cited the example of the introjection (sometimes forced) of oppressive power by the oppressed, which has its corollary in the same reproduction of ‘pathogenic models’ by those who would defend the oppressed against their oppressors.

Little is understood, however, simply by posing as a solution Guattari’s choice of Eros over Thanatos. If we return for a moment to his early remarks on death and subjectivity, Guattari wrote: ‘We are always dead once there is a concept of death, even before we are born, since we cannot think of existing outside of death’ (PT 182). There is, then, no easy way to dismiss death, just as there is no easy way to reckon with a superego.

NOTES

1. A refrain in Guattari’s consideration of group subjectivity concerned the events in 1903 in which the Bolsheviks or Majoritarians, under Lenin’s leadership, defeated the so-called ‘opportunist’ Mensheviks or Minoritarians (not on all points, of course), but in terms of control of the central committee of the party at the Second Congress and the party organ, Iskra. This breakthrough of 1903 unleashed the percussive Bolshevik libido that transformed organizationally and institutionally the revolutionary worker’s
movement, but not before a good deal of post-congress wrangling and, a year later, the establishment of a Lenin-led faction with its own newspaper, and then the demand for a split, once and for all, between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, revolutionaries and moderates, respectively. As I indicated in the Introduction, Guattari then posed fundamental questions of political sociology: what is the relationship between the vanguard and the mass? The signifying event of a revolutionary ‘break’ in history called for the reinvention of the party – which model should inform it (militaristic dictatorship, organic, anti-authoritarian)? – and the emergence of a new political subjectivity that had escaped from serial sameness, repetition, and death (PT 157–58; 176ff; IM 183–5). From this early statement all the way to Guattari’s ecological politics of the late 1980s, the question of the political sociology of the party remained constant and for this reason, with explicit reference to Lenin, problematic: according to the French Green political division of labour mentioned above, there is the vanguard or party of the avant-garde, the Green nobles whose social ecology is the economy, and the mass organization, marching forth to defend the earth (FFG ET10–03).

Guattari never abandoned the issue of how to be a militant. He was certainly frustrated by party politics, but his discussions of party structures, aside from his collaboration with Dany Cohn-Bendit on a dissensual model, were not much in evidence, compared with his rejection of party programmes in AO, for instance. In his later work Guattari tended to throw up distinctions between generalized desingularization that, by means of the reduction of social practices to market values, produced a unidimensional subjectivity (serial, capitalist, predatory yuppie), as opposed to a precarious resingularization that risked exposure to the winds of fashion but embraced processual creation across domains in the production of a multidimensional subjectivity. He used this distinction to frame particular problems, such as humanitarianism.

In his review of Xavier Emmanuelli’s Les Prédateurs de l’action humanitaire, Guattari (1991b: 12) argued that while it is important to recall that Doctors Without Borders, which has been a powerful ‘attractor’ of the social imaginary, was launched through a ‘masterfully orchestrated publicity operation’, the question of the desingularizing power of media and markets must be taken into account: ‘Like it or not, the conquest of opinion is part of the whole social enterprise, on a grand scale. Anything and everything is acceptable in this realm. If anything needs to be questioned here, it is the controlling grip exerted by advertisers and financiers over large-scale media, and, in consequence, over many cultural and humanitarian areas. What comes to be asserted today is a “market” for culture, a market for “ecology”, a “market” for humanitarian action with their instances of power, their
lobbies, their leaders – why not! The whole question is to know if these spheres of collective subjectivity are inexorably fated to fall under the sway of the dominant capitalist market.’ What sort of institution needs to be created so as to avoid falling into measuring humanitarian action as a market value, as a problem of delivering messages to audiences? Despite Emmanuel’s temptation to return to the simplification that is Christian charity as a foundation for humanitarian action, ‘his book sheds valuable light upon the complexity of the transnational aid organisations which tend to crisscross the globe. This complexity helps retain the association, in coherent systems, of otherwise profoundly heterogeneous components.’

2. Others have suggested much the same of Guattari in his heyday (Turkle 1980). Guattari himself was deeply troubled as an analyst of the EFP of his position as ‘Guru Despite Himself’ (Chy 11). Guattari was only 23 years old when he first met Lacan. His attachment was so great during his student years at the Sorbonne that his friends mockingly called him ‘Lacan’ (FFG 102–21). Despite his criticism of Lacan and structuralist method, Guattari remained an Analyste membre, hoping that something would arise to challenge the technical elitism and reactionary theorizing (as far as the relations between desire and the social field are concerned). But if Guattari’s anecdotes about his analysis are accurate, he regularly launched into ‘favourite diatribes’ against the conditions of the EFP, to which Lacan would respond with a deep breath, acknowledge certain ‘distortions’, and claim that despite everything, analysis would continue to exist (FFG ET09–26, p. 136, 143).

3. I first developed the concept of the bestiary of theory in relation to classic psychoanalytic texts (Genosko 1993; 1994). My goal was to reveal the ‘moral’ tales – the pillars and remarkable caninophilia of the Freudian bestiary – told by the reproduction of animals found therein, as well as in the professional and domestic lives of analysts such as Freud, Ernest Jones and Marie Bonaparte. I later (Genosko 1996; 1997; 1998) turned my attention to Deleuze and Guattari, suggesting, somewhat schematically, that the psycho- and schizoanalytic bestiaries of Freud and Guattari overlap on the matter of how they do things with horses and porcupines. I was inspired by the extraordinarily insightful and provocative plateau 2 of Deleuze and Guattari’s ATP on Freud’s case of the Wolf-Man. It seemed to me that they showed for the first time how productive the close scrutiny of the animal life of a text could be. Subsequently, scenes of animal reproduction became for me a way of reading Deleuze and Guattari’s own writings; a way, then, of tracking their arguments across the plateaux by means of signs left by the animals of their own theoretical bestiary. While this sounds remarkably simple – as simple as following fresh tracks – it takes practice, as any
naturalist would admit – even a bad bird watcher like Freud – remembering the alleged vulture of Leonardo – and a firm grasp of the identifying features of the species at issue. For his part, Guattari was fascinated by Australian birds, especially the territorial activities of bower birds, such as the Brown Stagemaker (arguing that territory emerges with expression, in the milieu components such as leaves placed pale-side up on the display ground of the Stagemaker), as well as the deterritorialized grass stem behaviours of certain chaffinches. Territory is the result of the becoming expressive of milieu components and expressive qualities may be called art, making territory the consequence of art rather than aggression (and other drives). In ATP, the Brown Stagemaker was used to critique Austrian ethologist Konrad Lorenz’s position which states the basic assumption of ethology that aggression presupposes territory. The strategy of Deleuze and Guattari was to loosen territory from aggression (and instinct in general), and give to territory new connections by including heterogeneous components of passage (such as bird song) toward a non-reductive description of inter-assemblage relations. As Éric Alliez (1993: 92) has observed: ‘Art perhaps begins with the animal, that is, with the animal that establishes a territory and builds a house . . .’. Alliez (1993: 94) clarifies the terms of the Deluzoguattarian critique of Lorenz: heterogenesis replaces phylogenesis, becoming overcomes evolution, expressive qualities dominate functions, assemblages supercede behaviours.

The aggression thesis was one among many ‘ethological misunderstandings’, as Guattari called them (IM 117), based on binary, hierarchized tree models such as innate/acquired; inhibition/release; biodeterminism/freedom of invention that a rhizomic approach would explode. Guattari wrote: ‘The behaviourist bias that consists in postulating that a complex behaviour can result only from the connection between systems of inhibitors and releasing mechanisms leads inevitably to the loss of limit states, the “mechanical ruptures”, diagrammatic potentialities, lines of creative flight through which evolution selects its means of adaptation’ (IM 119).

It is useful in this regard to consider Guattari’s famous deployment of the wasp/orchid relation after Rémy Chauvin (IM 123–24; also Massumi 1992, 165, n. 30). It seems simple, yet reductionistic, to see that the orchid uses the wasp for the purposes of pollination, and the wasp relies on the orchid for food: ‘The ensemble of systems of transcoding authorizing these coming and goings from the vegetal to the animal kingdom appears completely closed to all individual experimentation, to all apprenticeship and to all innovation.’ But the symbiotic relationship between wasp and orchid is ‘productive’ of ‘surplus value of the code’ that is in excess of the encodings of sex and food, and a ‘new assemblage’ emerges, ‘a line of evolutive flight is released on the bio-ecological rhizome’ (IM 124) or a
'shared deterritorialization' takes place (ATP 293). The important principle at stake for Guattari was that the greater the specialization (functions), ritualization (in the pragmatic fields of the species), and closedness of the genetic coding, adaptive value, etc., the more felicitous the conditions for innovation, deterritorialization and invention.

Guattari’s approach is generally applicable to similar problems posed in the ethological literature by Lorenz and his colleagues with regard to the study of cuteness. The biologist Stephen Jay Gould has argued that Mickey Mouse’s progressive juvenilization – what is known as neoteny – moved toward the features of his young nephew Morty. This was accomplished by an increase in eye size, head length and cranial vault size; Mickey’s arms and legs and snout were thickened, his legs jointed, and his ears were moved back. This growth toward childhood, Gould (1980) contends in his essay ‘A Biological Homage to Mickey Mouse’, represents the ‘unconscious discovery’ by Disney and his artists of the biological principles outlined by Lorenz. While ‘keeping it cute’ seems a more conscious than unconscious demand for graphic refinements, this quibble does not detract from the insight generated by the meeting of Mickey and Lorenz since Gould explains that ‘the abstract features of human children elicit powerful emotional responses in us, even when they occur in other animals’. The attributes of cuteness described by Lorenz and other ethologists are the very features of infancy acquired by Mickey. These attributes are said to trigger ‘innate releasing mechanisms’ of caring and the related affective responses of adults to children. A cute Mickey is more affectively involving, and more saleable, than a jealous, wise-cracking rodent with a pointy snout. Cuteness is an abstract machine.

Cuteness produces a feeling of warmth and closeness accompanied by behaviour patterns of caring associated with brood-tending about beings or objects aroused by their specific infantile attributes. What are these attributes? In the early 1940s Lorenz (1981) developed his Kindchenschema, the infant schema for the aesthetic proportions of the heads of human and non-human animals considered cute. The large, soft round proportions of the heads activate the caring response in adults while those that are smaller and more angular, do not. Widely discussed in the ethological and popular literatures, and repeatedly returned to by Lorenz in light of new experimental data refining the schema, this research provides a list of the physical (as well as one behavioural) attributes constituting an ethological definition of cuteness:

1. Head large and thick in proportion to the body;
2. Protruding forehead large in proportion to the size of the rest of the face;
3. Large eyes below the middle line of the total head;
4. Short, stubby limbs with pudgy feet and hands;
5. Rounded, fat body shape;
6. Soft, elastic body surfaces;
7. Round, chubby cheeks;
8. Clumsiness.

Lorenz describes an innate releasing mechanism (IRM) in human adults that is triggered by configurations of key attributes, in this case those of cute infants, eliciting affective patterns of behavior such as the desire to cuddle, pat, use pet names in a high-pitched voice, generally care for, perhaps nurse, bend down one’s head towards, etc. The attributes characterizing cute infants are naturally IRM-effective in the absence of a gestalt or absolute complex of attributes. That is, IRMs react positively to the sum of heterogeneous attributes, defined not in terms of absolute values but, rather, by the perception of intervals and relations between attributes. Lest one assume that the IRM is thoroughly innate or a drive, Lorenz defines it as a function that may be made more selective by learning.

Importantly, the IRM may be activated more effectively by models or dummies than by natural beings. It reacts remarkably unreflectively, Lorenz remarks, to supernormal objects consisting of qualitatively and quantitatively modified attributes, and to adults as well as long as they possess some of the aforementioned characteristics. Simulated cute bodies with certain exaggerations/diminutions are sometimes more IRM-effective than natural bodies; that is, many people will simply gush over them. It needs to be added that the social display of gushing over someone/thing and related forms of emotional extravagance is a way to signal that one is really involved in a certain activity.

Lorenz’s experimental rule of thumb is that ‘an IRM can be assumed to be at work whenever an organism is “taken in” by a very simple dummy model’; conversely, in the event that the attempt to elicit a certain response fails, it is not assumed that an IRM is not involved. Instead, it may be that an inhibition relating to a specific configuration of attributes has been learned, or the tested subject was not ready to respond, or the experimental protocols were poorly defined (i.e., the results of one experiment to which Lorenz refers were considered contradictory because the instruction given was to choose the most baby-like model, a question more affectively ambiguous than being asked to choose the model one would like most to cuddle).

Lorenz believed that the Kewpie doll represented ‘the maximum possible exaggeration of the proportions between cranium and face which our
perception can tolerate without switching our response from the sweet baby to that elicited by the eerie monster’. Many filmic creatures occupy a threshold between cute and eerie, however, calling forth varying responses from different groups (children and women as opposed to men), as one may recall in the case of E.T., some of whose attributes (protruding forehead, head size, and large eyes) were cute while many others were not (gangly limbs, long fingers). E.T.’s wrinkled skin was more difficult to pin down since it was simultaneously that of a newborn and an elderly person. E.T. was at once infantile and aged, cute and eerie, childlike and wise; cute attributes are combined with those signifying bodily deterioration and aging to form a powerful configuration of releasers. Whomever responds positively to the former may also recognize and respect, by paying attentive care to the signs of experience and wisdom, those of the latter.

For Guattari, Lorenz is stuck in the massive innate/acquired binarism even though he opens releasing mechanisms to cultural (simulated) and learned (aesthetic discrimination and cultural coding) influences. Certain attributes may constitute a mutational line of flight that goes in the opposite direction of mothering responses toward a variety of abusive responses (unwanted attention, petting or fawning), playing on the ambiguity of involvement elicited by attributes of cuteness and physical regimes of delayed maturation, especially in sports such as gymnastics (young female pixies). In this milieu one may appreciate the sporting value, the telegenic value, cultural modelling of certain athletes, etc., in other words, the semiotization of the components in an inter-assemblage in which IRMs (genetic) may be selected, experimented with (by coaches and trainers, not merely by cartoonists!), and learned by audiences. The larger social fields of cuteness connect with linguistic feminism of the 1970s (the so-called ‘genderlects’ approach to language) and kitsch, which may exploit cuteness for commercial purposes, but the commercial exploitation of cuteness and sentimentality in general is, regardless of questions of aesthetic adequacy and trumped-up philosophical charges against the expression of feelings of tenderness, sweetness and cuddliness that are unfortunately commonplace, a matter of serious concern for what is called the industry for social expression (greeting cards, plush toys, kid’s culture, etc.). If cuteness is loosened from IRMs, as territory was loosened from aggression, then innovation in expression becomes possible as the abstract machine of cuteness deterritorializes and we get the art of Jeff Koons or Takashi Murakami, among others.

Even a textual bestiary makes demands on animal fanciers. Initially, I had some trouble distinguishing the true lobsters of plateau 3 from the spiny lobsters of plateau 11 in ATP. Contextual or field conditions are not, of
course, the main concern, nor is it a question of mastering a scientific literature; rather, the bestiarist is called upon to track these creatures as they perform varied theoretical work and to bring to bear a certain amount of background knowledge, in the manner of a naturalist, upon the discussion of the services performed. The animal life of texts is one of the three preoccupations of what I have elsewhere dubbed undisciplined theorizing, in which I used the work of Guattari as an example of a line of indisciplinary flight that shot over the head of the paradoxical valorization of the space between disciplines in the academy (Genosko 1998).

As an example, consider the trails of lobsters (among other crustacea). The photograph of the underside of a lobster, bearing the subtitle ‘double articulation’, appears at the outset of plateau 3 (ATP 39). The authors turn a classic linguistic concept to geological ends (linguistics and geology are, after all, concerned with stratification), through the mediation of a lobster. ‘God is a lobster,’ they write, ‘or a double pincer, a double bind’ (40). Guattari, too, employed the image of an epistemological crab in CS (68). It has two prominent claws, each with pincers. Just like two strata, each with its own layers, not to mention the expression and content planes described by Hjelmslev: within each plane there is both form and substance. This is commonly called a double dichotomy.

God may be a lobster because all strata are his/her/its judgements, but is this a cosmic lobster? The question of the cosmic lobster is tied less to divine stratification, coding and territorialization than to destratification, decoding and deterritorialization, without forgetting the reterritorializations relative to them. This can’t be the cosmic lobster. Why? Well, it’s a true lobster. And the cosmic lobster that occurs later in ATP in plateau 11 is a spiny, a rock lobster – remembering the B-52’s version.

The cosmic lobster makes an appearance in plateau 11. In their characterization of territorial functions which suddenly acquire autonomy and enter into new assemblages in a variety of ways, Deleuze and Guattari constitute a rich vocabulary of ‘opening’: ‘swinging’; ‘draw a line of deterritorialization’; ‘take wing’; ‘take off’; ‘budding’ (326). Deleuze and Guattari revisit here the question of the intense centre of a territory as the ambiguity of the Natal (325–6) which is exterior to the territory, but the focal point of many different territories, and they cite several examples of ‘prodigious takeoffs from the territory, displaying a vast movement of deterritorialization directly plugged into the territories and permeating them through and through’, among which is the ‘march of lobsters’ (326). This march leaves the question of passage between assemblages behind: ‘there is something of the Cosmos in these more ample movements’ (326). In an important footnote (ATP 549, n. 26), Deleuze and Guattari refer to the
speculations of marine biologist, scientific adventurer and inventor of the aqualung, Jacques Cousteau, in his film on the march of lobsters, *L’Odysseé sous-marine de l’équipe Cousteau*, film no. 36, *La marche des langoustes*. Unfortunately, I have not been able to consult this film. It’s a spiny lobster at issue here; a lobster quite different from that of plateau 3 (spiny lobsters are the source of tails, not claws). The spiny lobster lacks prominent pincers. In the footnote, there is a spotty description of spiny lobster mass migration, which I will supplement with reference to the technical literature.

The mass migration of spiny lobsters off the coasts of the Yucatan, the Bahamas, and Florida, among other places, takes place in the autumn. The nocturnal ‘queuing’ (in single-files) begins before the autumn storms and may take several weeks to complete. These queues have many lengths (as little as two lobsters), and their formation each autumn is a seasonal refrain. The march of the queuers is connected with cosmic force, with tellurian pulses. Migration over long distances (up to 50 km) takes place after periods of stormy weather. What attracts Deleuze and Guattari to this example is that spiny lobster migration is not tied to a reproductive function (pre- or post-reproductive) and remains somewhat of a mystery, although there are no shortage of suggestions in the literature on animal migration and navigation about its adaptive significance (see Herrnkind 1969).

Perhaps, Deleuze and Guattari note, following William Herrnkind, the lobster specialist from Florida State University whose writings on the spiny lobster are extensive (and whose main work has been on lobster populations near the Bahamas), it is a ‘“vestige” from the last ice age’. This idea is suggested by Herrnkind and Kanciruk (1978: 435) who state: ‘The hypothesis most clearly fitting present data is that the mass migration is a concentrated seasonal movement adapted to moving the population from the shallow banks, subject to severe cooling, to the oceanic fringe where conditions are suitable to overwintering. Clearly, shallow waters over much of the range of the species cooled to temperatures of 10 degrees C or less for long periods during glacial winters. . . .’ Below 12–15 degrees C, the spiny lobster can neither feed nor complete moulting.

But perhaps, following Cousteau, ‘it is a premonition of a new ice age’. Deleuze and Guattari favour a forward-looking rather than a backward-looking interpretation based on a glacial referent. Whatever the factual case may be – and it is understood that the earth is between ice ages – this phenomenon reveals the passage from a territorial assemblage to a social assemblage connected with cosmic forces (‘pulsations of the earth’, Cousteau suggests, which Herrnkind believes are wave surges along the ocean floor, coupled with a decrease in temperature, a lower light level all through October during the night queuing period and later in the month, mass
migration itself; for the biologist, tellurian pulses are rendered as ‘stimuli’ to be tested). This constitutes the fourth kind of refrain of departures from a territory ‘that sometimes bring on the movement of absolute deterritorialization’ (327). Such deterritorializations are dangerous. In the case of the cosmic lobster, a mass slaughter by fishermen ensues, a seasonal depopulation for the sake of their tails.

Deleuze and Guattari’s opening to the deterritorializing Cosmos is not a radically indeterminate openness. The cosmic ‘breakaway’ of Deleuze and Guattari is a matter of precision and localization, not a vague wandering about, but a series of queues. The cosmic breakaway is a matter of precision and localization: queuing. Deleuze and Guattari also urge sobriety, and this is related closely to subtraction. The plane of consistency is defined in terms of subtraction, simplicity and sobriety. Subtract against every inclination to add. In other words, moult like a spiny lobster that cannot be tagged and traced during its territorial wanderings and deterritorialized cosmic breakaways.

The spiny lobsters mentioned in the note are one of four examples of famous, troubling and mysterious cases of ‘vast movements of deterritorialization’. Nothing is said about the others: salmon returning to spawn; supernumerary gatherings of locusts and chaffinches; magnetic and solar-guided migrations. Guattari (IM 140, n. 38) used the example of the chaffinches, citing an ‘immeasurable gregariousness’ beyond the assemblage of reproductive territorialization: ‘In 1945–46, a “dormitory” in Ajoie witnessed the gathering of 27 million birds; whereas in 1950–51, one hundred million chaffinches regrouped near Thoune.’

4. One may be wondering about what becomes of the superego in the period of AO. One of earliest reviews of AO that appeared in English pointed out with surprise that: ‘Of all the objections made to recent psychoanalytic gospels, none is stranger and more saddening than that which urgently warns us against the perils of having a psyche without a superego. One would have thought that Necessity, or the interplay of individuals with the “machines” of the world, was sufficient superego on its own, without having to cope with internal restrictions almost invariably born of fear or envy’ (Anonymous 1973: 296). It’s true: Deleuze and Guattari were constantly looking over their shoulders for traces of superegos, and they found all sorts of superegos (in literature, art . . .). The fact that they kept looking was evidence enough that one didn’t just discard the superego.

The mutual derivations of subjugated and subject groups tells us a great deal about the survival of the superego because the former is perfused with ‘the mechanisms for the repression of desire’, and the strong superego of this hierarchized group is constrained with the non-hierarchized latter group
which apparently has no superego; instead, the subject group ‘opposes real coefficients of transversality to symbolic determinations of subjugation’ (AO 349). The non-absolute distinction between the two kinds of groups requires one to uphold the superego. Looking backwards at the surrealist group, Deleuze and Guattari saw the superego named Breton, whom they contrasted with Artaud-the-Schizo; still, they admitted that ‘there will always be a Breton against Artaud’ (AO 134). There will always be, in other words, a superego. Even the most revolutionary subject groups will run up against one.

5. The ‘double membership’ was brought to my attention by Emmanuel Videcoq during a conversation in Paris, December 2000.

6. Shortly after Guattari’s death, a motion was introduced at a meeting of Les Verts and Génération Ecologie, the task of which was to reach an agreement for the following elections explicitly referring to ‘the memory of philosopher and psychoanalyst Félix Guattari’: ‘It is only by catalyzing a collective acting out that the ecological idea can become something more than a superficial fashion’ (S, J.-L. 1992).


8. According to Todd Dufresne in his recent Tales from the Freudian Crypt (2000), the anti-sociological implications of Freud’s metapsychology are first seen in relation to the mother, who turns out to be an agent of Eros, the ‘abstract force’ of society against biology, working against the child’s death drive. Society interferes with narcissism: Eros is a group subjectification interfering with the individual’s id-driven narcissism. This is the revenge of the group psychology. Further, the mother, like everyone and thing external, is secondary and a force: others are external stimuli, not necessarily subjects at all, part of the collective energy known as Eros that restricts the organism’s narcissism. Dufresne summarizes the Freudian view in this way: ‘Death is the essence of an authentic individuality that is denied under the compulsion or threat of a society that demands for every subject a group identity – to wit, a life’ (158). The only therapy true to psychoanalysis is, Dufresne concludes, euthanasia (159). Traditional psychoanalytic therapy merely plays at death and this makes it a miserable ‘piece of sociality’ (164). But even this is shown by Dufresne in his analysis of the positive ‘love’ transference to be inhabited by the death drive – ‘latent, metapsychologically determined hostility toward the self’ (177).

The strength of Dufresne’s analysis of Freud’s metapsychology (he also stages the same argument with regard to the problem of suggestion and the analysand’s creation of false memories through the analyst’s ‘bad technique’ (167ff)) is that it reveals precisely why it is necessary to leave psychoanalysis alone: its critics are like external energy stimulating its growth, without
which it would simply choke on its own waste: ‘This is a wicked irony for critics who thereby become the greatest propelling force in an ever-expanding economy of psychoanalytic desires’ (165). Critics, patients, pupils, everybody, including Guattari, with the exception of the father himself, Herr Freud, interferes with the unassailable position of the one absolute narcissist.

9. It is useful to put into relief Guattari’s early suspicions about the politics of transference, which he lived through during his training under Lacan, in terms of a recently published conversation on this topic he had in 1989 with the Israeli analyst Bracha Lichtenberg-Ettinger (Guattari 1997: 613): ‘In my work I do not focus on transference. My role consists in helping the patient develop means of expression and processes of subjectification that would not exist with the analytic process. Often transference is nothing more than opposition to the analysis, which Lacanians tend to use manipulatively.’ Orthodox analysts would dismissively claim that Guattari was simply not engaging in analysis since he eschewed transference in his individual practice as well as in his institutional work at La Borde. Manipulation is tied to typical analytic cries of ‘resistance’! This is how analysts protect their honour, Guattari remarked; the question of the so-called ‘negative transference’, which Freud described as the clouding over of the fair skies of the treatment, puts the blame on the patient for a change in the weather, rather than leading to a self-questioning by the analyst about why the treatment is going nowhere; it is also a typical reason given to go on interminably – oh, the negative transference, well, it’s business as usual!

10. Transversality is an agent of Eros; it is clamour against silence; it is reaching out against withdrawal; it is mobility against immobility, warm to cold. The death instinct unbinds, it throws a wrench into togetherness. Readers of Deleuze and Guattari (Land 1993: 74) have pointed out that there is an unfortunate tendency in some works (ATP) to all too hastily make light of the death instinct by calling it ‘ridiculous’; other readers (Dale 2001: 74) confirm that what is ridiculous about it is a twofold connection: with desire as lack; and with masochism as the product of phantasy. Both Land and Dale return to AO and recover the relation between the full body-without-organs (as the model of death, itself beholden to catatonic schizophrenia, which entails that death has been schizophrenized), continuity, dissipation (zero intensity), immanence, anti-production. But the model alone does not suffice when the idea is to refuse death as an abstract principle or instinct; instead, it is a part among parts. A model converted into experience that ‘is felt in every feeling, what never ceases and never finishes happening in every becoming’ (AO 330). And then the experience is reconverted to the model, rejoining the body-without-organs, which in turn sets out once more on the
path to experience, animating different machine-parts, functions, repulsions, attractions, etc. This cycle defies the conceptualization of death as an abstract principle which is necessary for a dualism like Eros and Thanatos: ‘there is no death instinct because there is both the model and the experience of death in the unconscious’ (AO 332). In AO (331), Deleuze and Guattari explicitly use the example of Freud’s death instinct – which makes one wonder about Land’s (1993: 74) unfounded question: ‘is Freud ever really engaged in Anti-Oedipus’ – as yet another instance of how desire is not merely limited but liquidated, that is, how Freud turned his back on his greatest discovery. But there is not much new in this, as the authors admit, since the argument that they advance is borrowed from Paul Ricoeur (1970: 308–9). The death instinct turns psychoanalysis once and for all into an exercise in unhappiness, malaise, and mortification. And in the end, culture (Eros) in its struggle against deathly egoism and aggression, makes death work against death. This is its great ‘ruse’: it plants a spy, guilty conscience, in the individual. This is also, for Deleuze and Guattari, how culture makes do with the little bit of life that the death of death bequeathes: resignation, cowardice, guilt are all that is left of life.
CHAPTER 3

Japanese Singularity

diagrams of intensities
at the intersection of all the scenes of the possible
choreography of desire’s throw of the dice
on a continuous line since birth
becoming irreversible of rhythms and refrains of a
haiku-event

I dance not in the place but I dance the place
Min Tanaka

the body weather

Guattari, Excerpt from ‘Présentation du programme de
danse Buto de Min Tanaka’ (AH 159)

The question of the relationship between Guattari and Japan was first posed for me through two scenarios.

First scenario. The Japanese Deleuze scholar and translator Uno (1995) once lamented in the pages of Le Monde that Deleuze, the philosopher of nomadism, was hardly a great traveller; nevertheless, this did not make him any less nomadic, of course. This situation did not prevent Uno (who was one of three translators, along with Akihiro Ozawa and Toshihiko Tanaka, of the Japanese version of Mille plateaux, Sen no puratoo: Shihonshugi to bunretsushou, 1994) from proposing to Deleuze: ‘a short lecture in Tokyo and a drive around Japan at the moment when the cherry trees are in blossom. He smiled: “Not bad, springtime in Japan, not bad”.’ Deleuze never visited Japan. This constituted for Uno a ‘lost rendez-vous’ but nonetheless did not exclude many fructuous encounters with Deleuze. Uno admits that the relationship between Deleuze and Japan is somewhat of a contrivance, at best: ‘I don’t know if it is really serious to pose the question Deleuze and Japan or even Deleuze for the Japanese.’ I draw attention to this little journalistic appreciation for the moment at which Uno
Remarks: ‘To a certain extent, Félix Guattari was much more fascinated by Japan and the singular creation of a post-industrial subjectivity through the combination of the ultra-modern and archaic.’ By posing the relation Deleuze–Japan, Uno exposes the relation Guattari–Japan, an effect of a contrivance. This exposure actually runs counter to the reception of transversality in Japan, which appears to emerge through Deleuze’s *Proust* book, rather than issuing from Guattari, and does so by means of architecture which, ironically, was one of the areas that so interested Guattari, rather than Deleuze. Elsewhere Uno (2001: 1016) makes precisely this point while commenting on the role of architecture in the Deleuze and Guattari works: ‘Guattari rather than Deleuze tried to intervene in questions of architecture and urbanism, offering visions of architecture capable of producing alternative desire.’ If we want to understand what it meant to work between, certain features of the Japanese reception of Deleuze and Guattari prove felicitous because they confound the sort of expectations created by interpretive practices that would have one settle on one thing or the other.¹

Second scenario. Again, in the pages of *Le Monde*, Guattari, writing with Gisèle Donnard (1988), evokes a millennial scenario in which north African nations, harnessing a ‘colossal collective labour force, acculturated to advanced computer technologies’, combine to make the Mediterranean a social, cultural and economic global powerhouse that eclipses a Europe in demographic decline. A radical post-post-colonial vision? In the course of this ‘troubling scenario’ which, if it happens to come to pass, will ‘greatly upset a number of accepted positions in Europe’, the authors suggest: ‘Unless Europe [especially France] eventually decides to turn herself toward this new Africa, as today Japan is turning toward the powers bordering on the [South] China Sea . . .’. The new ‘supple system of citizenship’ that one can decide to exercise and enter into like a contract is better adapted to, Guattari and Donnard suggested, migratory flux, European unification, and new conditions in which subjectivity is produced. A week later, the passing reference to Japan brought a letter from a retired French diplomat once stationed in Japan, who focused on the claim that Europe needs to turn toward Africa as Japan turns toward the nations bordering the Sea of China. As far as the letter writer was concerned,
Japan does not turn and open itself toward its neighbours and it hasn’t suffered from its closedness on matters of immigration and ethnic identity! This thinly veiled racist response, that doesn’t want to interrogate the conditions of Japanese racialist colonialism (see Ching 1998), directed against African immigrants in France was couched in terms of a sociological rejoinder: Guattari and Donnard’s grasp of international relations is unfortunately influenced by their millennial fantasy; the letter was titled ‘On ne devient pas Japonais’ [One doesn’t become Japanese]! If there is a general lesson from this second scenario, it is that we will need to pay close attention to the sociological foundations of Guattari’s claims about Japan. For, after all, Japan constitutes, as Uno indicated, one of the classic sociological examples in the study of stratification of the combination of archaic and modern. To what end(s) will Guattari deploy this knowledge of social stratification in which caste and class combine in a meritocracy with a legally reformed but powerful lineage of social privilege?

It must be admitted that the question of the relation between Guattari and Japan is posed here against competing claims: why not Chile, Brazil or even Italy? Think of the seminars, interviews, lectures and discussions in which Guattari participated in Sao Paolo in August and September of 1982, published together with Suely Rolnik under the title of *Micropolitica* (Guattari and Rolnik 1986), or Guattari’s dialogue with Brazilian activist Lula (Guattari and Lula 1982). In the early 1980s Guattari was active in Brazil, and then became interested in Japan in the mid-to-late 1980s. Guattari’s restlessess assisted in the transversal connections that he made at different stages of his life. The Japanese question gets us moving transversally. What it also does is demonstrate how Guattari responds to a confrontation with Japan’s singularity or, better, with Japan as a singularity machine. He certainly had singular visions of Japan, for instance, as is evident in a post-capitalist reverie of Tokyo’s pride: ‘Vertigo of another Japanese way: Tokyo relinquishes its status as the Eastern capital of Western capitalism in order to become the Northern capital of the emancipation of the Third World’ (FFG ET02–12, p. 5). The question of the Japanese way, a ‘third way’ of sorts, is intimately linked to the dialectical modes of reasoning deployed by Guattari in his consideration of sociological (in addition to his overcoming of the consensus–dissensus dualism in
which he found himself caught in a postmodern bind) and architectural concepts (especially in his encounters with Shin Takamatsu) used in his interpretations. Guattari was primarily interested in how the relationship between technological modernism and archaic (pre-industrial) cultural traits are creatively ‘combined’ in Japan without ‘clinging to an archaic past, but inventing new ways of thinking and experiencing that have at least the same existential consistency as those of the past’ (Guattari 1991a: 2). He sought, then, to apprehend through a dialectical enquiry the fusional genesis of several pairs of concepts (archaic—modern; consensus—dissensus; interior—exterior) to which he repeatedly returned in order to avoid freezing them in a snapshot (a whole ‘third term’) that would have mistakenly brought their processual movement to a premature halt and robbed them of potential singularity. It turns out that the transversal relation between Guattari and Japan concerns singularity.

Guattari’s interest in architecture and Japanese culture is not particularly well known. Perhaps even less well known are the critical applications of Guattari’s important concept of transversality by architects and architectural critics in Japan. The issue may be productively explored in relation to a particular house, what I call the transversal house of Kazuo Shinohara. The following sketch will suffice to give direction to further work that deals with other houses and buildings, especially those of Shin Takamatsu about which Guattari has written (Guattari 1994) during his participation in 1987 with Christian Girard and others in the competition ‘Symbol France-Japan’, which appeared in the 1989 Europalia Exhibition ‘Japan in Belgium’ and with whom he engaged in a published discussion about architecture and singularity (Takamatsu 1989).

ITINERARY AND DOCUMENTS

Guattari’s mid-1980s visit to Japan was a catalyst for a number of reflections, phantasms, projects and proposals on diverse subjects ranging widely from cuisine, through Tokyo itself, to intercultural artistic and intellectual exchanges between France and Japan. Although it is difficult to date with any precision his visit(s), due largely to undated or partially dated and unpublished lectures and articles, this is
not an insurmountable problem. Of course, Guattari engaged in dialogues during other periods with Japanese intellectuals (for instance, his conversations in 1980–81 with Tetsuo Kogawa and Masaaki Sugimara were published as *Seiji kara kigou made: Shisou no hassei genba kara*, 2000) and, more generally, it is fair to say that Guattari’s writings were better known and more widely available in Japanese than in English, which lags far behind in this regard. The 1990s saw the publication in Japanese translation of Guattari’s seminal texts *Psychoanalyse et transversalité* (Seishin bunseki to oudanseki: Seidobunseki no kokoromi 1990); *La révolution moléculaire* (both editions – Bunshi Kakumei: Yokubou shakai no mikuro bunseki 1988; Seishin bunseki to kigou 1996); *L’inconscient machinique* (Kikaijou Muishiki: Sukizo bunseki 1990); *Les années d’hiver* (Tousou kikai 1996); *Cartographies schizoanalytiques* (Bunretsubunsekiteki Chizu Sakuseihou 1998); and multiple editions of *Les trois écologies* (Mittsu no ekorojii 1991; 1993; 1997) were published, in addition to several original Japanese titles. The bulk of the translation work has been undertaken by Masaaki Sugimura of Ryuukoku University in Kyoto.

Guattari visited Tokyo in 1985 and delivered his important statement on postmodernism, ‘L’impasse post-moderne’ (orig. 1986; see GR), which should have settled once and for all the issue about his alleged complicity with the apoliticalism of style and capitulation to late capitalist subjectivity and, in terms of architecture, the capitulations of the decorated shed (which is what Guattari learned from Las Vegas). Indeed, Japanese economist Asada Akira’s (1989) recollections of his discussions with Guattari about Japan’s frenzied infantile capitalism put such a statement into context; Guattari (Chy 25) praised Asada’s perception of the unique features of subjectification under Japanese capitalism, which constituted an important inflection on the character of IWC (Integrated World Capitalism): ‘How to release an inventive, machinic collective passion that would proliferate, as the case in Japan seems to be – without crushing people under an infernal discipline? Oppressed minorities exist in Japan, women continue to be treated as inferiors, childhood is torture. But it is true that the hypermodern cocktail, the high-tech current, and the return of archaic structures found there are fascinating! Perhaps not enough attention has been paid to certain theoreticians, like Asada Akira, who perceive
that capitalism in Japan does not function on the same bases as it does in the West. Oligarchies do not have the same privileges, class is not delimited in the same way, the work contract is not experienced in the same way. . . .’ Guattari considered the peculiarities of stratification in Japan to constitute a new inflection on capitalistic subjectification.

For his part, Asada recalled a ‘delirious discussion’ with Guattari in Japan about a typology of three capitalisms:

- **elderly**: a static and inactive capitalism of European societies with a history of a mercantile system and a rigid adherence to a transcendental signifier against which individuals identify themselves;
- **adult**: a more dynamic and competitive system in which entrepreneurialism combines with the internalization of the transcendental signifier in which individuals are responsible to themselves and see their neighbours as models and rivals; this made modernization possible;
- **infantile**: the Japanese never matured, however, and learned that modernization didn’t really require maturity, anyway; whether the vertical control was internalized or remained external also didn’t matter because there are neither elderly nor adult types; instead, the ‘relativistic competition exhibited by other-oriented children provides the powerful driving force for capitalism’.

A little bit of Lenin, and a bit of Freud: infantilism is, no matter what the reference, a disorder typical of consumer societies. We have a partial answer to Guattari’s interest in the character of the Japanese unconscious: at the very least it seems to show some signs of ‘archaic’ fixations (incestual libidinal fixations of childhood and cultural traditions) and in this sense psychoanalytic doctrinairism. But infantilism involves the following sorts of manipulations: engineers display a childhood passion about machines; advertising rejoices in childish word play; children play freely within a soft, horizontal, passive, protected maternal safety net of indulgences. In the 1970s, Asada remarks: ‘the value of becoming an adult declined . . . while Japan’s infantile capitalism swept over Asia’. High-tech progressivism, repetitive work
on machines (monomaniacal pachinko players), rampant infantilism, archaic fixations and machinic dope trips (high-rise driving ranges): ‘The Japanese structure their universe and order their emotions within the proliferation and disorder of machines, while hanging on to their archaic references. But, above all, they are crazy for machines, for a machinic kind of buzz’ (SS 101). It was precisely this machinism that impressed Guattari.

There was also Guattari’s poem in honour of Min Tanaka’s presentation of a Buto dance performance in Paris of the year before (AH 259) and, in 1985, a catalogue essay from works by Kyoto-born, but long-time resident of Paris, Keiichi Tahara, whose photographic exhibition travelled from the French Embassy in Tokyo (see CS; and Bastin 1991) to Paris at the Espace Photographique de la Ville de Paris in 1991. In January and February of 1985, Guattari put together a joint proposal with Jean Kalma, ‘Proposition relative à l’organisation de manifestations d’artistes japonais, parallèlement aux expositions de l’automne 1986, dans le Forum du Centre Pompidou’, to invite Japanese artists – actors, dancers, writers, filmmakers, musicians, visual artists, designers, directors, and philosophers – to perform and show in Paris. This document is interesting for the way Guattari and Kalma organized their presentation, shifting in the first draft from a numbered list of justifications – the nature of the exhibition space, possibilities for original installations, importance of invitees – and programme descriptions to a series of four ‘paradigms’ that reveal how the authors organized Japanese cultural production within a curatorial context, but which moves toward a statement of the originality of Japanese capitalism. I consider this document to constitute a statement in a curatorial context of how to realize a transdisciplinary practice, even though it is not particularly orginal in the Parisian context given the efforts throughout the 1980s of Pierre-Maurice Aubry to bring Japanese artists, writers, and intellectuals to Paris through the Ecole Normale Supérieure.

The first paradigm of ‘humanist modernity’ refigures the blending of tradition and contemporareity in terms of the ‘crossroads’ from which certain ‘pivotal’ Japanese artists stand (i.e., Teshigahara Hiroshi, filmmaker, perhaps best known for Woman in the Dunes, 1964); the second ‘high-tech’ paradigm, represented by composer Sakamoto
Ryuichi, founder of Yello Magic Orchestra, constitutes a less ‘established’ tradition (reaching back only 30 years or so) and more pop in outlook; the third is the ‘Buto paradigm’, linked to dancer-theoretician Hijikata Tatsumi and, undoubtedly, in Guattari’s poetic invocations, to Min Tanaka, with whom he met in 1985 and co-authored ‘Kousoku to zen-en: agencement 85’ in the weekly journal *Shuukanbon* 35 (June 1985); the fourth ‘paradigm of primitivity’ may be seen in the work of Nakagami Kenji, whose scripts, novels and performances regain popular festivals and minoritarian traditions. Loosening the paradigms from specific performances, however, was accomplished through their deployment for the sake of a critical perspective that would become a signature of Guattari’s encounter with Japanese singularity. First, with regard to writing, the paradigms would illuminate ‘the paradoxes of a scriptural expression still heavily charged with the most archaic polysemies and to which, however, is assigned the task of expressing the rigor of techno-scientific algorithms’; and second, socially, they opened onto ‘the reconversion, in a more general way, of social archaisms of every kind which are put to work in the service of an exceptional work discipline based on a legitimation of powers that are products of a system qualified as “feudalist–democratic”; all of which confer upon Japanese capitalism an originality and a vigor without equal’ (FFG ET04–23, p. 4). Asada (with Aubry 1985: 40) once observed in an interview that the Japanese reception of *Mille Plateaux* hinged on its significance for Japanese capitalism, which was in the process of rupturing and becoming anarchic.

This sociological refrain in Guattari’s thinking about Japan found diverse media in which it could be elaborated. Although not all of his reflections found their way back to the singularities of the blending of archaic and modern, many different examples are in evidence and each reveals a different facet of Guattari’s dialectical enquiry. Consider, then, the question of food. Picking up on the significance of the kitchen at La Borde and the knots there that were tied and untied by ‘the grid’, Guattari observed in a fragmentary text written for the popular Japanese magazine *Brutus*, part of the French chain that owns *Elle Japon*, that: ‘In a clinic like La Borde, we always ensured that the kitchen space was wide open to all patients and staff. Fantasms played in the “scene” of the kitchen and their expression often turned out to
be very important for the possibility of recovery or improvements.’ This passage may be profitably read alongside Guattari’s consideration of the kitchen at La Borde as ‘a little opera scene’ (Chs 69) replete with acting, dancing, playing with props and materials, a heterogeneous Territory, a ‘drive machine’ irreducible to orality, crossed by diverse materials and fluxes, whose aforementioned openness to other partial enunciators of subjectification in the institution (menu planning, pastry workshops), revealed its ‘coefficient of transversality’. Indeed, Guattari provided one example of a fantasm in which a character from a pasta commercial (an external operator) was semioticized onto a chef (Chs 69). The scene of the kitchen could be a place ‘closed in on itself and subjected to roles and functions, or . . . in direct contact with Universes of alterity which help the psychotic out of his existential entrapment’ (Chs 70). Cooking was not understood as therapy or training but as a material of expression that could open onto new Universes; however, in the case of psychosis, the return from a psychotic Universe to a collectively worked Territory like the kitchen would require of the individual not so much a voluntary act but what Guattari called ‘the induction of a collective assemblage of unconscious enunciation’ such that she/he would be ‘led to take the initiative, to accept responsibility’ (Chs 70).

Guattari then shifts topic slightly: ‘The particular case of the use of raw meat in Japanese cuisine merits a special study. It simultaneously points to archaisms contributing to Shintoism and to a hyper-sophistication of practices (moeurs)’ (FFG ET10–02, p. 2) Guattari’s contrast between the simplicity of the Shinto religion and the hyper-sophistication of Japanese cuisine, especially as regards the ‘antagonistic and complementary’ universes of the raw and the cooked, are not developed but suggests Barthes’s (1982: 20) observations on the essential visibility of raw food in Japanese cuisine and its ‘twilight’ passage into the cooked (i.e., sukiyaki): ‘This Rawness, we know, is the tutelary divinity of Japanese food’, the death of which is enacted before the diner by a cook who does not cook but, instead, exquisitely prepares dishes (here are the hyper-sophisticated practices Barthes likened to writing and graphic artistry, especially calligraphy).

On 2 October, 1985, Guattari was interviewed by T. Wada of the London-based Eurobureau of the Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*. In
a wide-ranging discussion that touched on many details of Guattari’s personal life – his petit-bourgeois upbringing in a working class Parisian suburb, Courbevoie, his first encounter with Lacan, the significance of Kafka whom he believed articulated his imaginary life better than he was able, and professional aspirations and disappointments (to participate in action research designed and initiated by those who live the problems and questions being investigated in an innovative alternative setting, and how he was prepared to leave France for Brazil, where he might better realize such an ambition; French governmental attempts to discredit Greenpeace as a symptom of how power functions as a death-machine, and not only in relation to the 10 July 1985 bombing of the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland by the French secret service, the sterility of the free radio movement after private business and religious organizations got into the game) – Guattari worked his way toward Japan.

Like the project with Kalma discussed above, he wanted ‘Le siècle de Kafka’ exposition at the Centre Pompidou of the previous year to travel to Japan as part of an intercultural exchange, a project that failed to materialize. In this interview ‘Kafka’ is an assemblage to whom Guattari attributed self-understanding of his imaginary life and gave status as semiotic scaffolding for articulating a hope and humour that otherwise would have been beyond him. Neither Kafka nor Guattari are solitary individuals. The value of Kafka is irreducible to Guattari’s self-understanding, for the Kafka assemblage connects with Japan, which itself connects to all of Guattari’s curatorial projects through the Pompidou Centre, especially in relation to projects for intercultural exchanges between France and Japan, but also with the relevance of Kafka for the Japanese production of a subjectivity for the twenty-first century: ‘Japan is a country where the subjectivity of the 21st century is being invented for better and for worse but, when I say it of Kafka, I don’t mean what is often understood, that the 21st century will be something sombre, sad and bureaucratic’ (FFG I02–21, p. 9). ‘Kafka’ is the vehicle of the general humour that connects Guattari’s self-understanding and his vision, through Japan, of a subjectivity for the twenty-first century, but isn’t shackled to individuated interiorities. For Kafka is an author – better, a general function – Guattari acknowledged, full of humour – which was both a line of
escape from himself (not an absolute escape but a way of situating himself in a web of connections) and a way into understanding how Japanese singularities could be connected. As Guattari said to Wada: ‘There is for example someone for whom I have great respect, Kobo Abe [Japanese novelist] who is truly singular and Kafkaesque.’ The assemblage expands if we recall Guattari and Deleuze’s observations on the two interpenetrating states of architecture (and bureaucracies) in their *Kafka* book, the problem of the interpenetration of archaic and new (future) ‘archaisms with a contemporary function’ is attributed to Kafka: ‘It seems to us Kafka was one of the first to recognize the historical problem’, (K 74–5), the very problem, it needs to be underlined, of Guattari’s understanding of Japan, and a reference that connects (each opening onto the other) the sociological with the literary, and the economic with the fairy tale.

One of the papers that Guattari presented in Japan shortly after his interview with Wada, ‘L’inconsent machnique et le révolution moléculaire’, handmarked ‘Japon 10/10–25/10’ (FFG ET01–57), summarizes the major themes in the title but works through disparate illustrations underlining the non-universality of the machinic unconscious which, despite its openness in relation to the circumscribed, traditional Western unconscious, cannot be exported unproblematically to the unconscious in Japan. The problem, as Guattari saw it, was that globalization manipulated and programmed the unconscious so that it appeared transnational, like capital’s decoded flows. Guattari took great pains to specify, even when he used examples from consumer capitalism in Paris, to make a point about the machinic unconscious, to avoid generalizations. For example: ‘There exists in Paris a large department store called Samaritaine. Its motto is – “You can find everything at Samaritaine”. It’s the same with the machinic unconscious – it is absolutely essential that everything is found there, it is the sole condition . . . [Guattari inserts a remark at this point warning against the subjugations of consumer society] . . . of its creative richness and its infinite ability to change the world’ (FFG ET01–57, p. 5). Having dispelled the seductions of consumerism, Guattari returns to a favourite theme: the contrast between an unconscious shackled to the past, to archaic fixations, or a forward-looking, machinic conception: ‘The machinic unconscious is not the same all over the earth! The phantasms
of the Japanese of the Heian Era [794–1184] [Taika is crossed out in
the manuscript] no longer have much to do with those of the
contemporary denizens of Tokyo.’ The archaic–contemporary sociologi-
cal hybrid is here, under pressure of a forward-looking unconscious
and going beyond archaic fixations (a tell-tale phrase when applied to
the traditional Western unconscious because it recalls Freudian archaic,
phylogenetic inheritances), redeployed for the sake of a critique of the
thesis that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. Guattari is alerting his
audience to the proper register in which the lesson of stratification
must be read and what does not follow in its wake (the Western
unconscious and the fixity of archaic inheritances). Even though, in his
interactions with Asada noted above, there is some acceptance of
infantilism and hence, as I suggested above, a lingering whiff of
psychoanalytic doctrinarism. It is not so much the characters and loves
from childhood that recur in adult dreams, nor the residues of infantile
attachments to machines that cling unpressed during certain robust
periods of adult economic life. Guattari warned: ‘Above all else, do
not confuse capitalistic infantilism with its vibrating zones of collective
hysteria such as the syndrome of puerlism, ‘kawaiii’, the reading-drug
of Manga comics or the intrusiveness of loukoum music which is, to
my taste, the worst kind of pollution’ (FFG ET02–12, p. 2). Pachinko,
Manga, Pocket Monsters – whatever!: these are zones of childishness
within an infantile economic web with a maternal ambience, in other
words, symptoms of a syndrome which, Guattari once noted elsewhere
(1991a), have recently been given ‘properly psychopathological
descriptions (among the youth, the ‘withdrawn clan’ [clan de muré] or
otaku zoku and, among adults, the ‘withdrawn husbands’ [bles mari muré]
or otaku teishu).’ But even the association between capitalistic infantil-
ism and maternal ambience is troublesome since Guattari pointed to
‘the paradox of female and maternal values omnipresent but so
rigorously circumscribed and repressed’ (FFG ET02–12, p. 2). A clue
to Guattari’s position here is contained in a somewhat cryptic remark:
‘Becoming child of Japan; becoming Japanese of our future childhoods’
(FFG ET02–12, p. 2). The reference forward to childhoods that would
become Japanese suggests that the cocktail of archaic and modern is
irreducible to an infantile or primitive mind that persists in the
unconscious through psychogenetic maturation because of the rejection
of such stages and the hybridity of Japanese capitalism which is without certain key stages. The future is, then, towards childhood rather than adulthood and Guattari’s point of reference here is to progressive juvenilization – what is known as neoteny – a hallmark of cuteness, with which Japanese pop culture is awash and which has become a major export product (Hello Kitty!). Astute readers may have sensed the presence of another French figure who also invoked Japan – Alexandre Kojève. Consider the effects on his thinking about Hegel of his 1959 visit to Japan: the footnote he added to his introductory lectures on Hegel regarding post-historical Japanese civilization whose socio-historical resemblance with Europe (through feudalism) was superceded by the gratuitous negativity of a democratized snobbery – which peaks in the Noh theatre, tea ceremony, and flower arranging, according to Kojève – and whose ultimate effect would be the Japanization of the West (Kojève 1969: 162). Kojève’s response to this one of a kind civilization on the basis of superfluous formalized values, as opposed to historical values or real content like revolutionary struggles around work and war was, regardless what one thinks of it, couched in the language of singularization, the form’s proliferation and its creativity. Of course, Guattari thought that the Japanese didn’t supercede feudalism but reterritorialized it in contemporary repressive structures affecting women, for instance, and, in fact, used the only thing the country had left after the war, its archaic attachments, as infrastructure for rebuilding despite the alienating forms it took (SS 101; 275). I will discuss below (note 5) a further station along this line in Sartre’s encounter with Japan in 1965.

In a further paper, ‘Langage, Conscience et Société’ presented in Osaka (FFG ET03–13), Guattari developed his investigation of the production of subjectivity by contrasting market-driven postmodernism with a dissensual, artist-driven culture in order to reach a third position. Using the example of architects-urbanists, he noted that they, on the one hand, embody consensual public taste in their works, yet, on the other hand, engage in creative aesthetic processes from which singular works result. Guattari looked toward a ‘transference of singularity’ resulting from a back and forth movement, a dialectic between a new order and the redundancies of public taste, the correlate of which would be ‘the constitution, sometimes ex nihilo
of a collective interlocutor through surveys or social experimentation’. This dialectical overcoming as a third way for the production of subjectivity with specific reference to the consensual–dissensual couple, turned on Guattari’s interpretation of the success of Shin Takamatsu. It is worth quoting Guattari at length:

It is a matter of paving the way for creation, accentuating, indeed, exacerbating, the contradictions relative to the systems of material and economic constraints, consensual taste and the desire to invent new forms. And the paradox here is merely apparent. Consider, for example, the work of a Shin Takamatsu. It is quite revealing to observe that certain of his commercial buildings have resulted in the doubling of their clientele, enticed by their extraordinary originality. In an earlier era in France we experienced the same thing with the Centre Georges Pompidou which attracted stupified crowds because of the audacity of presenting modern art in what looked like a factory! (FFG ET03–13, p. 16)

This dialectical solution offered by Guattari using Takamatsu as an example is a step further than his criticism of consensus as a desingularizing compromise typical of massification that we discussed in chapter 1 (but which still survives in Guattari’s work here and there), but not unlike his treatment of the archaic–contemporary pair in that he revisited it and worked out its potential in relation to new contexts and examples, always leaving room for fresh reworkings that place sociological considerations (stratification) among other factors.

Guattari’s interest in the work of Takamatsu revolved around the question of singularity. This important concept is animated by a kind of ancient metaphysical principle in its own right – like attracts like – or, as Guattari put it in a discussion with Takamatsu: ‘singularity invites new singularities, contrary to universality that presupposes consensus’ (Takamatsu 1989: np). Elsewhere, Guattari (CS 299–300) defined the sort of singularity he had in mind with regard to architecture: ‘the singularization at issue here is not simply a “supplement of the soul”, a “personalization”, or “after sales service”. It concerns modalities operating at the heart of the architectural object upon which is conferred its most basic intrinsic consistency.’ Singular-
ization is a self-organizing process that at its most basic level concerns bringing together ensembles of diverse components (material/semiotic; individual/collective), that is, assemblages (‘straddling’, in interaction, between radically heterogeneous domains’ [CS 29]) that deploy their own intrinsic references (inventing relations with the outside as well), and the analysis of their effects (especially transformations) on the formation of subjectivity beyond the individuated subject and prefabricated versions of him/her; for Guattari, ‘the assemblage of enunciation “exceeds” the problematic of the individuated subject, the consciously delimited thinking monad, faculties of the soul (apprehension, will) in their classical sense’ (CS 28). An assemblage of enunciation is, then, no longer slavishly linked to speech or writing (any single semiology or archaic reference prototype-system), but to other semiotics. Neither is an assemblage simply subsumable under ‘categories’ that trap and curtail references, such as Guattari (CS 29) suggested in an amusing example of dishclothes and towels that would not be subsumable under the category of laundry or linen but, instead, would be capable of singularized becomings, indeed, involve articulations of any number of components.

The theoretical goal of Guattari’s reflections on architecture was to describe the essential modalities of consistency at play in an architect’s elaboration of a concept; in other words, the analysis was directed not so much at the finished product but at the project and the enumeration of all the different types of ‘enunciative materials’ and how architects exploit them in ‘architectural enunciations’. From two different angles, or modalities of consistency – polyphonic (perceptual-discursive-diachronic) and ethico-aesthetic (non-discursive-affective-synchronic), Guattari listed eight types of assemblages of enunciation and three axes/ordinates respectively:

I. geopolitical: slowly evolving points of reference (demographic, climactic, global economic);
II. urbanistic: local laws – zoning, planning – and built context;
III. economic: sources of funding and diverse valorizations of projects, budgetary considerations, cost-benefit analyses;
IV. functional: specific uses of built spaces in relation to two networks:
i. complementary horizontal insertion into interconnected urban centres in IWC;

ii. vertical integrations of the micro- and macro- kind on the infrastructural levels of high tech systems to sewers; involving three collective enunciators: stratified social body of class, age, race, gender, region; specialized and sectorized social bodies; experts and techies;

V. technical: engineers, builders, suppliers, opening onto product inventors and testers, marketers, etc.;

VI. signifying: embodiment of symbolic forms, ideologies, and largely unconscious culture-specific inheritances regarding built forms;

VII. existential territorialization: engendering territories with reference to three kinds of spaces as concrete architectural operators:
   i. Euclidean (self-identical, unambiguous);
   ii. Projective (imaginary);
   iii. Labyrinthine (rhizomatic, enfolded);

VIII. scriptive: articulatory (of all the above components), diagrammatic drawing that engenders the territory/object it maps out; when Guattari wrote of the ‘diagrammatic distance that [this enunciation] introduces between expression and content’ (CS 298) he accented the destratification of semiotic doubles-distinctions for the sake of a new creative axis.

The terms of the diagrammatic intervention into the classic diachronic-synchronic divide of structural linguistics, yielded three ethico-aesthetic aspects (affect cannot be captured discursively through such oppositions):

I. cognitive: capturing, by knowing, the coordinates (energy-space-time) that link together certain discursive assemblages of enunciation (scriptive and geopolitical-urbanistic-economic-functional-technical);

II. axiological/ethical: including all anthropocentric valorizations, overcoding typical of signifying semiologies (and of the sixth enunciation above);
III. aesthetic: determining completion thresholds (threshold effects) for built objects, at which point they find their autonomy.

The eight discursive enunciations of the architectural object are ‘exterior’ aspects, while the latter three, non-discursive, ethico-aesthetic aspects are ‘interior’ or phenomenological. And it turns out that for Guattari, in turning the architectural object toward affect, from which issues the energy to articulate the above listed enunciations, ‘the art of the architect would rest in the capacity to apprehend these affects of spatialized enunciation’ (CS 300). In other words, the emphasis falls on the last three consistencies: cognitive – the architectural object collapses into the imaginary; the axiological – in which its alterity crumbles; and aesthetic – in which it does not attain a consistency sufficient to hold either forms or intensities. And all of these are active, in movement, but as Guattari noted (CS 255) in a “backwards” ontological flight towards fractalization and transversal semioticization, ‘from which results [the] power of existential auto-affirmation’. Thus, the architect, in Guattari’s estimation, must be able to ‘detect and processually exploit the ensemble of points of catalytic singularities open to embodiment as much in the perceptible dimensions of the architectural apparatus as in the formal compositions and the most complex institutional problematics’ (CS 301). This activity takes place against the capitalistic flows, which Guattari represented as a devastating force that ‘eliminates all traces of subjective singularization to the profit of a functionally, informatively, and communicationally rigorous transparency’ (CS 299). Before and after the period of the Cartographies schizoaanalytiques and the severe critiques of capitalism and postmodern architecture found therein, Guattari had and would again progressively dialecticize his position, especially through reflections on Japanese capitalism and architecture.

Let’s attempt an example here, but on a slightly different scale. Guattari described the apprehension of affects of spatialized enunciation in terms of architectural forms that, unlike closed gestalts, operate as ‘catalytic operators releasing chain reactions among the modes of semiotization which we draw out of ourselves and open us to new fields of possibility’ (CS 300). Affect often addresses one as a ‘feeling of intimacy and existential singularity’ (the ‘aura’ of an old apartment
or neighbourhood). Takamatsu once reflected, circa 1988, on his own arrogance, pedantry and alleged immunity to socio-economic forces, in trying to resist ‘Kyoto’ in a move toward ‘an exquisite architectural lexicon so pure and lofty that it could only be described with ringing phrases like “architecture for architecture and by architecture”’ (Takamatsu 1988: 57). But in the manner of Guattari when he described how, in his apartment, ‘the sombre red of his curtain enters into an existential constellation with the nighfall, with twilight, engendering an affect of uncanniness’ (CS 254), Takamatsu listened to the slow, barely discernible beat, an ancient rhythm of the city, whose quickenings and shifts foiled every attempt to build a pure, autonomous work like a modernist masterpiece. Takamatsu’s move toward nonconceptual form signals an openness to an affect (pulse) that made him sense his buildings were meant to be lost, to forfeit their forms; that the identity they retained was the result of mere happenstance, against ‘the heavy viscosity of the city’s history’. It is not a question of abandoning oneself to the ‘dominant inertia’, as Guattari put it, but of acknowledging, in Takamatsu’s words, ‘that each time I attempted to build on this horizon where such mundane notions of style and idiom are of little effect, the process of groping for a feasible structure made me scream with pain’ (1988:62). Kyoto, the city of Takamatsu’s great works of the early 1980s, moulded him, as Guattari also observed, but it made Guattari wonder about the relationship between the architect and the context of his work. Indeed, this very question animated Guattari’s investigation of Takamatsu’s singularizing machines.

With this understanding of architectural singularity in hand, working within the general dialectical framework of the unity of consensus and dissensus in a third term, a popular avant-garde that attracts its own followers, Takamatsu (1989) describes, in response to Guattari’s questions, how the exteriors of his buildings, especially the meaning they have for the public, stands in opposition to their interiors; the latter have their own systems, and a certain degree of autonomy from the exteriors. However, it is in what Takamatsu calls the gap, a third term in which the exterior and interior become mutually reinforcing and their relations are inverted so that the interior is treated as an exterior and the exterior becomes a kind of interior (i.e., it is given depth), that the autonomy of the interior collapses. Design’s goal is
not to reveal tiny jewels hidden inside immense exteriors but, rather, complement an equivalence of scale of exterior and interior in a ‘thrilling and critical struggle’ with these mutual systems.

A further adventure of this dialectic, with a different content, is in order. Guattari’s (1994) article on ‘The Architectural Machines of Shin Takamatsu’ revisits several streams of thought outlined above: firstly, the question of Kyoto as a kind of constraint is revisited, secondly, this is done dialectically, and thirdly, accomplished in relation to an image of the Buto dancer Min Tanaka, who becomes a model of this third way. Guattari sets up a contrast between Le Corbusier – an architectural object is embedded in a context and remains in a continuous relation with it – as opposed to Mies van der Rohe – an architectural object is detached from its context and in a discontinuous relationship with it. The ‘third way’ at once exploits a certain degree of closed perfection as an aesthetic architectural object (detachment) yet remains open to its context (attachment) in the manner of a Buto dancer: ‘This suggests to me the position of a Buto dancer, such as Min Tanaka, totally folded into his own body and, however, hypersensitive to every perception emanating from the environment’ (Guattari 1994: 133). An open enfoldedness, one may say, that is also fractal, given symmetries at the micro- and macro-levels and interior and exterior (a point made by Takamatsu regarding Kyoto and noted by Guattari), and in reference to a vaguely defined Japanese tradition but whose salient feature is a principle of design based on unity and continuity of architecture–garden–nature realized through the deployment of various devices (hedges in gardening, grills and screens on domestic buildings). For Guattari, Takamatsu incorporated the urban conditions themselves (supersaturated) into the design of his buildings; here is rehearsed a now familiar theme, in the process of this incorporation Takamatsu ‘transfigures ancient existential relations between nature and culture in inventing an other nature from the urban fabric, as if in reaction to his hypersophisticated creations’ (Guattari 1994: 134). Integration is one thing, Guattari tells us, but transformation of the context by the building as if ‘by the wave of a magic wand’ is quite another accomplishment; ARK ‘transforms the environment . . . into a kind of vegetal machinic landscape’. In ATP (172), face/landscape relations are based on mutual evocations: ‘Architecture positions its ensembles
houses, towns or cities, monuments or factories – to function like faces in the landscape they transform.' This reworking of the socio-
logical register through the dialectical overcoming of the architectural object–context relation that revivifies the ancient nature–culture con-
tinuity in a wholly artificial context, is how Guattari approached Takamatsu’s work. It is not merely a question of working the distant beat of Kyoto into architectural design that would constitute a passive solution. There are, of course, other solutions to the dialectical tension between interior–exterior; tradition–modern; nature and culture; private–public such as the focus on the intermediary ‘gray’ zone offered by Kisho Kurokawa, in pell-mell references to Deleuzoguattarian concepts such as machine, minor, chaosmosis and Baudrillardian notions of ambivalence, for instance (Kurokawa 1988; 2001). But Guattari’s sense of the power of a building like Takamatsu’s ARK to operate a ‘contextual mutation’ is tied to the role of singularization mentioned earlier: such mutation is a process of ‘existential transference’ through which a building’s creative autonomy is able to generate a massive following by triggering in each person captured by the architect’s vision their own processes of singularization. Guattari’s point of reference was Piano and Rogers’s Centre Georges Pompidou, but the contour of his argument is relevant to Frank Gehry’s explanations of the success of his Bilbao Guggenheim Museum.

Guattari’s elaboration of the ‘marvelous Japanese singular’ (FFG I02–21: 13–14) has a tradition of sorts in French Durkheinianism. Baudrillard’s sense of Japan’s singularity, which is explicitly elaborated along Barthesian lines of radical exoticism (impenetrability), rests on the idea that it will never be Western, despite its capitalistic dynamism, overdevelopment, hyperurbanism, and socio-semio-technical spectacu-
larity. All of its play with signs, techniques and objects ‘is practiced with a sort of distance, an operational purity that is not overburdened with the ideologoes and beliefs that have punctuated the Western history of capital and technique’ (Baudrillard 1990: 148). In other words, for Baudrillard, Japanese singularity may be attributed to an efficaciety and detachment whose ‘very genius comes from somewhere else’. Readers of Baudrillard (Gane 2000) have heard in this explana-
tion echoes of Durkheim’s footnote on Japan in his Rules of Socio-
logical Method (1982: 118). For Durkheim, ‘Japan may borrow
from us [Europe] our arts, our industry and even our political organization, but it will not cease to belong to a different social species from that of France and Germany.’ In a similar vein, but obviously without the biologism, rationalist abstractions, sharply drawn dichotomies (social or individual; sociology or psychology; normal or pathological) Guattari observed that ‘all the trends (vogues) of the West have arrived on the shores of these islands without resistance. But never has the wave (vague) of Judeo-Christian guilt that feeds our “spirit of capitalism” managed to swamp them’ (FFG ET02–12, p. 1). There is in Guattari’s remarks a similar diagnosis of resistance (incorporation of everything without being overwhelmed) that Baudrillard reproduced from Durkheim. Although the grounds are different in each case, the position articulated by Durkheim through his biological analogy in which social species, unlike biological species, are less clearly delineated and individuated by inner forces (heredity) than the latter, but still manage to, despite the absence of a strong ‘inner force that perpetuates them despite countervailing factors in favour of variation which may come from outside’ (Durkheim 1982: 116), remain impenetrable and draw their identity and strength from elsewhere. Yet, as Guattari continued, the Durkheimian biologism returns with the question of mutation: ‘Might Japanese capitalism be a mutation resulting from the monstrous crossing of animist powers inherited from feudalism during the “Baku-han” and the machinic powers of modernity to which it appears everything here must revert?’ Dialectical mutation is part of a process of genesis. Durkheim discounted economic and technological states as being too unstable to define social species, but Guattari deployed them for their combinatory potential in order to produce singularity along the same lines: as I discussed earlier, he used the caste system of feudal Japan and individual achievement in contemporary capitalism or in general mutations of closed and open systems; of course, Japan is not sociologically unique in this regard, but its singularity may be appreciated dialectically from this initial insight. Elsewhere Guattari posed two questions of this dialectic: ‘Is it enough to say that the ancient surfaces of Yin and Yang, raw and cooked, analogical iconicity and “digital” discursivity, still manage to merge opposites? Or that today the Japanese brain reconciles its right and left hemispheres according to specific modalities or any other such
unsound and harmful nonsense in which a number of anthropologists seem to delight?’ (FFG ET02–12, p. 3). Perhaps even his own efforts at working through these oppositions remained too archaizing and simplistic, as he was prepared to admit.

TRANSVERSAL HOUSE

I conceived of a nonlinear construction that defies a narrative carrying a singular story line. The visitor can read his or her own meaning, which the architect cannot predict. In other words, this architecture produces meaning as a machine produces objects. It is a ‘space machine’.

Kazuo Shinohara, Tanikawa House, 1974 (Shinohara 1992)

... so that I spent my time running from one window to the other to reassemble, to collect on a single canvas the intermittent, antipodean fragments of my fine, scarlet, ever-changing morning...


The concept of transversality, which Guattari developed in the early 1960s, began to circulate in Japan through Deleuze’s essay ‘The Literary Machine’ from a later edition of Proust and Signs (1972b). This concept was deployed by Kazuo Shinohara (1976) in his essay ‘When Naked Space is Traversed’, consisting of remarks on the house he built for poet Shuntaro Tanikawa in Naganohara. This usage is important for it reveals that the concept was first put into circulation through Deleuze rather than Guattari and, more importantly, that the former’s critical application of it to a literary text (Marcel Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past) not only explicitly stripped transversality of its psychoanalytic scaffolding with regard to the modification of the superego and empowerment of groups, that is, its specific institutional political applications, realized through the transformation of institutional routines and the lives of those who live and work in them. Despite what I would describe as Deleuze’s retreat into literary criticism, a matter which has been misunderstood by some architecture critics (Stewart
to the extent that they interpret this retreat incorrectly and collapse the positions of Deleuze and Georges Poulet (1977) on the question of totality and unity as the consequence of bringing together hitherto non-communicating objects, even though Deleuze was careful to distinguish his position from that of Poulet, repeatedly underlining that his goal was not to use transversality as a tool for establishing such unity but as an affirmation of difference, the means remained for a reapplication of the concept to lived space and its interpretation. The route of this concept’s journey will be of great interest to readers of Deleuze and Guattari.

Shinohara’s Tanikawa House of 1974 consists of two spaces – one for the winter, and the other for the summer. It is built on an ungraded, treed slope, and its summer space has an earth floor; for Shinohara, the slope, as well as the black, moist dirt of the unfloored space stands in stark contrast to the geometrical space of the building, that is, its verticals and angles, despite the building’s simplicity and the architect’s desire to eliminate even the most elementary significations of posts, struts and walls toward the realization of what he called an ‘antispace’.

Among the key features of the summer space is the slope of the dirt floor, which drops 1.2 metres over a 9 metres expanse, and the relative heights of the north and south walls. Shinohara writes:

The act of traversing expresses a basic function in relation to the combination of site-level differential and the geometric space of the main room. Because of the two-to-one relation of the interior heights of the north and south openings, as one traverses this space, one’s vision alters from perspective to reverse perspective and back to perspective again. (1976: 68)

The person traversing this space is not the first person of the architect and the phenomenal alterations of his experience but, rather, it is the survey of a third person; it is not, then, a question of the architect’s explanations of the design and the personal circumstances surrounding its creation. The ‘naked reality’ of the space is revealed, indeed, produced, by the survey of its traversal, which Shinohara theorizes with reference to the concept of transversality in Deleuze’s essay ‘The
Literary Machine’, a work that was available in Japanese translation during this period. Eschewing his own authority, then, Shinohara appeals to Deleuze, whom he gives the last word, quoting the following passage:

It is transversality which assures the transmission of a ray, from one universe to another as different as astronomical worlds. The new linguistic convention, the formal structure of the work, is therefore transversality... (Deleuze 1972b: 149–50)

Deleuze is interested in the transversal dimension of Proust’s monumental novel *Remembrance of Things Past*, and he borrows directly from Guattari’s sense of transversality as an unconscious dimension of an institution. Shinohara’s appeal to the third person is precisely that of the Deleuzian (1972b: 124; 149) insect or bee which enables female and male reproductive organs of flowers to communicate by pollination. The third object or person or thing is a transversal creature bringing together without uniting or reducing to one, non-communicating fragments – the so-called partial objects. In its own dimension, a flower’s reproductive organs communicate by means of a transversal bee, yet ‘remain non-communicating according to their own dimension’ (Deleuze 1972b: 149). Shinohara’s third person brings sloping earthen floor and built geometry into communication through altering perspectival lines of sight; transversality requires a third person capable, through everyday acts of travelling such as crossing a street or square, of bringing together hitherto non-communicating objects; whereas, in their own dimension, they are non-communicating, even though they may be contiguous, like the floor and walls of a house, or its summer and winter sections, the structure and the hill on which it is built, etc.

Thus, the basic principle animating the idea of an ‘antilogs’ machine in Deleuze, and in Shinohara’s Tanikawa House, the ‘antispaces’ machine which did two things, involves: (i) stripping away significations clinging to basic structural features; and (ii), like Proust’s narrator in ‘Within a Budding Grove’ running back and forth between windows on the opposite sides of a train in order to assemble the fragments of a sunrise, the person in the summer space of the Tanikawa House
walks up and down its sloping dirt floor: walking uphill toward the low north interior height, and turning around and walking south downhill toward the southern interior wall twice its height – an antito
totalizing and disunifying stroll. This anonymous third person is the honey bee of this singular transversal house.

FACE AND MACHINE

Faciality is used by Guattari to describe the machinic components of both the architecture of Takamatsu and the photography of Tahara. He first developed the concept of faciality — that is, its machinic, micropolitical sense — in his work on the machinic unconscious and later reworked it together with Deleuze in ATP (see my chapter 1). I begin with the Takamatsu paper and the ‘facialization of the façade . . . and the molecular dismantling of the face’ (Adams 2000: 30), then shift to the photographs, the photographic portraits, because, surely, if the warning against anthropomorphizing the face and resemblance in general (façade of facialization) is to be heeded, the latter series of famous artistic faces are surely a trial. If we follow the advice given in ATP (188), the face may be dismantled by swimming through its eyes, capturing and relaunching particles (faciality traits) from the depths of the black holes as nonsubjective, and following asignifying lines across the white wall of signification. Guattari read Takamatsu’s accomplishments in terms of the reinvention of Japanese subjectivity. Take, for example, Guattari’s reference to Kirin Plaza that begins his little essay ‘Proud Tokyo’: ‘Luminous cubes atop buildings — are they signposts in the sky to interpellate the gods? Most certainly out of pride, in the manner of the medieval towers of Bologna’ (FFG ET02–12, p. 1). The luminous cubes refer to the four patterned rectangular lanterns that reach toward the sky from the four corners atop the structure. This building was the most memorable character in Ridley Scott’s otherwise forgettable Black Rain (1989). The lantern form is a good example of the singular produced through the mutation of tradition and hypermodernity. Guattari’s most sustained example in the essay on Takamatsu is his dental clinic ARK (Kyoto, 1981–2), a singularity producing singularities. The architectural object produces singularities in those who experience it (transferences that open new
worlds of reference and engender new existential territories and assemblages of enunciation) and effects a mutation of the milieu surrounding it. In this essay, then, Guattari’s task was to describe the machinic components of Takamatsu’s buildings and indicate their role in the dismantling of the facialized façades. On the iconic level, ARK acknowledges machinic motifs from the train station nearby; yet, the overtly machinic becomes vegetal-cosmic having released a kind of threshold effect of faciality (an abstract machine that seizes upon certain components, defacializes, and carries them in new semiotic directions). The building itself is a non-subjective machine. Deterioralization is both vegetal, that is, rhizomic, and cosmic (which is an opening in a territory described as an animal — Brown Stagemaker, Spiny Lobster). The machinic-vegetal parallels a shift in register described by Guattari as stones in a Zen garden (natural elements or abstract forms); it is insufficient to simply categorize Takamatsu’s early buildings as urban machines (a molar politics of faciality as opposed to a molecular politics in which singularity traits are released and connected with other such traits, not necessarily facial).

There are seven machinic components the abstract forms of which I retain here from Guattari’s selection among Takamatsu’s oeuvre:

- ruptures of symmetry: repetition of vertical lines crossed by diverse transversal elements such as v-forms and rectangles;
- interlocking (perfect and imperfect) decentred forms: cylinders—cubes, cylinders—rectangles, angles—curves;
- horizontal and vertical openings: perpendicular splits, vertical and horizontal slits (doubled, tripled and quadrupled);
- separation of the building into two superposed parts consisting of different styles: stacked styles in which the ground level blends into the surroundings and the upper superstructure intrudes upon them;
- inclines opening onto voids: staircase doubled in a mirror or ending on a landing appearing as an impasse;
- chasmic openings: cubic buccal assemblages;
- ocular structures: windows and other openings that facialize the façade either in a cyclopean manner; by pairing, or squaring, or crossing, or merging (as in the ‘Killing Moon’ symbol, a signature
Takamatsu form, that Guattari likened to an owl’s head, in the case of Origin 1 [Kyoto, 1981], but that is often figured as a sword [Killing Moon, 1984] or a razor-like scythe with a handle like a sickle, stretching across the face of a full, glowing autumnal moon, the combination of which Adams [2000: 33] describes as ‘an assemblage of animal-machinic becomings’.

What seems to have been generally overlooked is that the sword and the house by the name of Killing Moon (Mitsui House, Kyoto, 1986) that Takamatsu designed was inspired not, as many prefer, by Marinetti’s poem/manifesto (‘Let’s Murder the Moonlight’), but by the song ‘The Killing Moon’ by British new wavers Echo and the Bunnymen! (Fawcett 1988: 144). This perhaps deflates the prevailing hyperbolic insistence by architectural critics on the ‘birdlike/angelic lighting fixtures on the upper floor (at night the house is a pin point of an architectural celestium . . .’ [Fawcett 1988: 146]) since the final stanza of the song sets precisely this scene under ‘starlit nights’ – ‘The sky all hung with jewels/The killing moon/Will come too soon’.

Guattari then shifted his attention from description to the architectural process – from object back to project in accordance with the architectural enunciation – from the object that crossed a threshold of autonomization to the principle phases of a work by Takamatsu in particular: (i) fantasm at the level of drawing; (ii) delivery and detachment (object related to its drawn fantasm); (iii) contextual embedding and interior–exterior relations. This final point is a future point of reference that Guattari thought of as the ‘new dialectical rendez-vous’ between interior and exterior in Takamatsu’s work, which was the main topic of his discussion with the architect discussed above.

**DISMANTLED PHOTOGRAPHIC PORTRAITS**

Guattari’s essay ‘The Faciality Machine of Keiichi Tahara’ (CS 311ff) begins with a question about the relation between photographic portraiture and the representation of faces, and quickly moves into a
consideration of the ‘existential transference of enunciation’ to the viewer affected by the photographer’s ability to ‘turn certain traits [of his subjects] to other ends’. The question that animated his exploration of Takamatsu’s work returns here in a more abstract language: the singularity machines producing singularities, these existential transfers of like producing like, are recoded in an augmented Barthesian photographic nomenclature of the ‘punctum’ understood as the unleashing of an affect that pierces the viewer.

These are no ordinary portraits, even though their subject matter – largely, but not exclusively, European masters of art, cinema, literature, architecture, etc., are all well-known from Beuys and Bofill through Truffaut and Burroughs to Arman and Soupault. Thus, Guattari established the three components of the ‘Tahara machine’: (i) deterritorializing cutting-up of the face; (ii) fractal rupture of the look; (iii) a new proliferation of significations linked to a proper name (CS 311). The first component is dealt with under the rubric of the spatial recentring of traits of faciality with an orientation toward a dismantling that reveals new becomings beyond the human. Guattari’s key examples were framing devices such as windows or mirrors (used effectively in at least two different photographs to different ends: becoming vegetal through the envelopment of Christian Boltanski’s head and torso in the leaves and branches of a tree within the frame of a window in the foreground and a becoming mineral in the photograph of Bram van Velde in which a background window stamps the subject with petrification and eternalization). A further method of deterritorialization is the use of vertical bands of light to illumine certain traits, which is especially pronounced in the image of Bofill in which all that remains of his face is a straight vertical cut of light, no more than one quarter of the photo’s surface, Guattari emphasized, highlighting his left eyebrow, eye, a corner of his mouth, and a deep ‘transversal crease’ passing from a shadowy nostril, curling around his mouth (all constituting a ‘residual luminous mass’). This ‘vertical cut’ is interior as opposed to exterior to the face; in the case of the latter, many variations are evident, some more obvious than others (i.e., the columns of light on Daniel Buren’s face). A further method involving the play of light is described as the use of blurring (sometimes cigarette
smoke) to decentre focal distance and allow for the emergence of a trait from a black mass, on occasion distinguishing two planes of fuzziness.

Consideration of the second component found Guattari returning to the Bofill photo in order to excavate the ‘fugitive resurfacing’ of his almost invisible right eye from miniscule flecks of white from the darkness to the right of the vertical band of light; Guattari made much of such points and moving spots of light/white and in one instance they are ‘detached from the eyes, literally dragging the glance toward us (Kounelis)’ (CS 317). It was in this ‘play of complementarity’, in the destabilization of faciality traits (described in terms of lighting and centring in the first component), that he began to diagnose the stirring of an existential transference. Guattari wrote: ‘Henceforth, the structural key to the image no longer belongs to the “photographic referent” such as Barthes defined it [the necessarily real thing placed before the lens]. It is transferred into the imagining intentionality of the onlooker [regardeur]. My look is “implicated” [embringue] in the mise en existence of Bofill; without it, his soul would scatter on the four winds. But this appropriation turns against me, clings to me like a suction cup. This being-there, in its precariousness, wraps me like skin; it doesn’t stop looking at me from the interior of myself. I am bewitched, marabouté, expropriated from my interiority’ (CS 314). Next time it is the image of the bearded Arman that stings Guattari: a face split between left and right by a half-lit beard on the left and a glittering metallic sculpture in the background in an otherwise black mass on the right. Other examples of this ‘existential effect’ of fractalization of the look involve obscuring the eyes by horizontal bars of shadow (Maurice Rheims); half-closed eyes (Mario Merz); an iris that becomes the centre of a light-look (Laura Betti).

For Guattari, the ‘unleashing of this existential transference of enunciation, this capture of the look of the portrait’ (CS 315), emanates from the core of the image, the Barthesian punctum, and pierces the onlooker. But Guattari rejected both the backward-looking orientation of Barthes toward what has been and his perpetuation of a memory of his mother for the sake of a new orientation presented by Tahara’s photographs away from the identities of his subjects and allusions to them (i.e., as I mentioned above in the case of Buren).
Barthes’s choice of a private photograph of his mother contained what Guattari elsewhere called a syntax of faciality (in this case familial) and severely circumscribed its sense (loss, death, memory). Despite the public character of the faces of Tahara’s portraits which slide perilously toward a homogeneous identification that wraps itself around a ‘supreme iconic marker’ (MI 98) – these are portraits of great celebrity artists, after all – Guattari argued that ‘here, the manifest faciality no longer totalizes the faciality traits which, on the contrary, begin to interfere with the contextual traits. It brings into play deterritorialized Universes of existential reference’ (CS 316), This brings us, then, to the third component, with which Guattari concluded: ‘The proper names that Keiichi Tahara leads us to apprehend under a new angle, become the notes of a musicality that exceed them in every way. It is not a matter, I repeat, of denoting an identity or connoting a message. We are no longer in the register of identifications and mediatized communications’ (CS 318). Tahara frees us from the limits of celebrity faces of the art world, leading to other meanings and references, in a deterritorializing photographic defacing.

THE QUESTION OF JAPANESE SINGULARITY

In conclusion, it is useful to contrast Guattari with Baudrillard on the question of Japanese singularity. For Baudrillard, singularity is not a value judgement, although he invokes it against the forces of globalization; it is not explicitly valorized on the grounds of its creativity as it was for Guattari. For Baudrillard (2001), Japan was never encumbered with Western universal values, and precisely for that reason it successfully accomplished globalization without the loss of any of its singularity (that would have been erased with Western universals). Guattari thought that Japan was never encumbered with adulthood, and remained infantile and blissfully machinic. Japanese singularity was seen by Guattari in the mutations of its forms of capitalism, diagnosed through the dialectical unfolding of the archaic–contemporary; consensus–dissensus; interior–exterior terms. Importantly, if for Guattari singularity was comparable and exchangeable, that is, its originality could be communicated machinically on the model of like produces like (singular architectural accomplishments produce singularity in
those who experience them), then for Baudrillard singularity is incomparable, inexchangeable and not at all tied to originality or creative accomplishments, it is literal, event-like, radically other. This is the most basic difference. Yet when reflecting on singularity, both Guattari and Baudrillard turn toward the example of Japan (both turn to Barthes’s *punctum* to understand the tranferences brought about by photography) and this places them in a modern French sociological tradition at least as old as Durkheim and, in addition, as Guattari suggested, in a literary tradition as well, through his dream of Kafka in Japan.5

NOTES

1. A Zen Deleuze emerges through his work on Lewis Carroll (see Hertz-Holmes 1987). For instance, pure events, surface nonsense, a mist hanging over the earth, the ‘unhistorical vapor’ ungraspable by logic except in silence, which makes it both interesting and ‘like Zen Buddhism’ (Why 140): ‘not the sword, but the flash of the sword, a flash without a sword like the smile without the cat’ (Deleuze 1997: 22). Or, in the manner of Zen archery: ‘Thus the Zen archer does not shoot at a target. Instead, a countereffect perverts the oppositional configuration inasmuch as the fourth person singular gives the remarkable but unmarked impression that the target has already been hit while eliminating the necessity of aim. Mastery requires neither luck nor technical skill; it is the disciplined realization that for the shot to succeed nothing at all need be realized’ (Hertz-Holmes 1987: 146).

2. I am very grateful to Mr Hiroshi Kobayashi, based in Tokyo, and editor of the weekly e-mail magazine *hon no merumaga* directed at booksellers, http://www.aguni.com/hon/, for providing me with bibliographic information regarding Japanese translations of Guattari’s books and articles, some of which I mention in this chapter.

3. Kurokawa’s work provides a wealth of examples of how a concept such as the between (appearing variously as in-between and ‘grey’) is deployed in order to contemporize the principles of metabolist architecture which were based on a tree rather than a rhizome model; in this respect Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts are used in the service of updating this architectural movement by bringing out its repressed rhizomic dimension. Although many examples of this strategy may be cited in the work of Kurokawa (concerning machines and chaosmosis, in particular), there remains a tendency in his work to retain the idea of symbiosis between hitherto divided realms and this is especially clear in his conception of an intermediary space, the very space of
the middle in which transversal passages between irreducible multiplicities take place. But for Kurokawa the importance of the middle is interpenetration and symbiotic relation, overcoming the dualism of interior and exterior by means of multivalent transitional spaces defined by hedges, lattice walls and verandas in domestic spaces and the projection of facades and covered plazas in larger public projects; yet, at the same time he is willing to eschew his search for unity and replace it with a more dynamic idea of the interior–intermediate–exterior as a plane of immanence that is not defined by its functions but by its affects (allowing him to retain the idea of thresholds between the spaces), transversal relations and their assemblages. Kurokawa (1988: 123) writes: ‘Relation is a source of dynamic creation, from which a manifold variety of “existences” rise, appear and take shape . . . The internal and the external do not exist from the start as self-defined entities. I continue to be interested in the dynamic relationships produced by heterogeneous elements . . .’. The rhizome is transversal because it connects heterogeneous spaces at different speeds and grows from the middle, undermining the interior/exterior distinction, without the presupposition of an original unity; rather, it sweeps the original dualism away like the banks of a river.

4. Deleuze’s Proust and Signs appeared in Japanese translation by Akira Unami, Professor of Art Studies, Meiji Gakuin University, Tokyo, in February 1974 (Hosei University Press) under the title Puruusuto to shiinyu: Bungaku kikai toshiteno ushinawareta toki wo motomete – roughly, Proust and Signs: In Search of Lost Time as Literature-Machine.

5. The long shadow of Sartre also falls on Guattari’s exploration of Japanese themes. In the notes to chapter 1 I indicated the extent to which Guattari modelled himself and many of his ideas on Sartre, whom Guattari was simply not willing to condemn for his ‘blindness’ about the existence of the gulags, etc. Indeed, Sartre’s visit to Tokyo and Kyoto in 1965 for three connected lectures on intellectuals – ‘A Plea for Intellectuals’ (1974: 228–85) – posits a convergence of sorts between postwar Japan and France on the issue of the meddling intellectual – meddling in what is not their business, which is their real business. I am not suggesting anything more than a tangential connection between Guattari’s visit to Japan twenty years after that of Sartre. Still, if Sartre encouraged Japanese writers to resist US imperialism, Guattari would accept, in a micropolitical frame of struggles against poverty and homelessness, ‘the invitation of the “Action Committee and Mutual Aid” of Sanya, and make a pilgrimage to the place where the Yakuzas assassinated Mitsuo Sato, the progressive filmmaker who investigated the Japan of the disenfranchised (non-garantis), precarious and rebellious. Kobo Abe remarked on the fact that Sanya is perhaps less representative of an absolute misery than an irrevocable refusal of the existing order. He himself declared that it would be ‘worthy of
Sanya’ (FFG ET02–12, pp. 4–5). Sanya is a district in Tokyo in which foreign and day labourers live. Many are homeless and live in makeshift shelters made of found materials.

For his part, Guattari certainly concerned himself with the role played by television in France and Japan in creating intellectuals; in the latter, Guattari’s interviewer Wada remarked: ‘If you don’t appear on television, you don’t exist. Guattari: A novelist fails to appear on Bernard Pivot’s show, she/he doesn’t exist. It’s an absurd situation. It means that all the great poets don’t exist!’ (FFG I02–21, p. 11). Guattari was well aware of the enormous circulation and power of the Asahi Shimbun in which his interview would appear, and distribution was certainly not lost on Sartre, especially when it came to literary supplements devoted to his work that reached audiences on an unprecedented scale (Cohen-Solal 1987: 408). Intellectual blockbusters are known in both France and Japan (i.e., ‘AA gensho’ – the Asada Akira phenomenon described by Ivy [1989: 26–8] after Asada and Aubry [1985]).

Sartre’s investigation of the singular was, of course, quite different from Guattari’s, and dealt with the contradiction of political particularism of intellectuals transmitting the values of the dominant class that moulded them and the free, universalist spirit in which they conducted their research, which makes them suspect and turns them into monsters, even as they attempt to grasp the contradiction that produced them by turning the knowledge of class particularity and universality on society and, ultimately, apprehending the historical singularity of the working class.
CHAPTER 4

Mixed Semiotics

GLOSSEMATIC DETOUR

The glossematic theory developed by Louis Hjelmslev and H. J. Uldall during the 1930s as members of the so-called linguistic ‘school of Copenhagen’, and later elaborated by them separately in the 1940s, has the reputation of being theoretically abstruse and Byzantine in its complexity (Eco 1976). Linguists are, however, prepared to admit both that Hjelmslev was ‘without pity for his readers’ and that reading him is ‘as arduous as it is rewarding’. Bertha Siertsema’s (1965) effort to explain rather than build upon glossematics, albeit in a manner with which Hjelmslev would not have always concurred, and to propose changes to his definition-riddled theory which would straighten out inconsistencies arising over the course of its development and bring it into line with current linguistic coinage, has led at least one critic to comment with some irony of her work: ‘so well has she carried out her task that one may fear lest her success in rendering the terminology more easily intelligible might contribute to its wider spreading’ (Haas 1956). The ‘no pain, no gain’ response to Hjelmslev must ultimately reckon with the agonies of success. This is, I believe, no less true of Guattari’s uses of Hjelmslevian and Peircean concepts in the description and application of a mixed semiotics. In spite of its reputation, Guattari has made glossematics serve the pragmatic ends of schizoanalysis. At the heart of this chapter is the question of how an arid algebra of language may serve a pragmatics of the machinic unconscious and take a place in Guattari’s call to radically recast social practices.

Why Hjelmslev? At the time of his death in 1965, Hjelmslev’s writings were well-known to French linguists and semioticians through the pioneering study in 1946 of André Martinet (1942–5) on Hjelmslev’s seminal Prolegomena To A Theory Of Language (1969) which was then available only in Danish. In addition to the influential work of
Martinet one may add the writings of Nicolas Ruwet (1964; 1973), oft-quoted by French readers of Hjelmslev; and it was through the initiative of a group of linguists centred around A. J. Greimas that Hjelmslev’s *Le langage* appeared in France a year after the Danish master’s death in 1965 (three years later, the French translation of the *Prolégomènes* appeared in 1968). It was, however, Barthes who popularized Hjelmslevian terminology by developing a connotative semiotic whose staggered systems were modelled on Hjelmslev’s distinction between connotation and metasemiotic (metalanguage); Expression–Relation–Content described the relation of the former semiotic of the expression plane with the latter metasemiotic of the content plane. Barthes’s trademark analysis of stacked and staggered systems was introduced in its simplest form during the 1950s in *Mythologies* and developed in the 1960s through the seminal essay ‘Eléments de sémiothèque’ (1964). This popular brand of glossematic-inspired structuralism was caught in the critical anti-structuralist sweep conducted in the early 1970s by Baudrillard among other thinkers for whom signifying relations were homologous with repressive and reductive social structures.

In a milieu characterized by a variety of critical engagements with and creative departures from structuralism and semiology, Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus* found a place in the widespread critique of the signifier and the prevailing anti-Saussureanism of the period but with one important exception. Unlike Baudrillard, for instance, who saw in the linguistic theories of Hjelmslev and Barthes further examples of the ideology of signification, Deleuze and Guattari combined a critique of a linguistics of the signifier with praise for Hjelmslev: ‘We believe that, from all points of view and despite certain appearances, Hjelmslev’s linguistics stands in profound opposition to the Saussurean and post-Saussurean undertaking’ (AO 242). Neither Deleuze nor Guattari followed Barthes’s translinguistic approach to semiology (see Massumi 1992: 154–55, n. 45). To do so would have brought them into step with the practices of specialists who exercise control over diverse signifying phenomena by making them dependent upon language. To claim, for instance, that translinguistics is imperialistic is to recognize that signification is a power relation, one of whose effects has been the colonization of all signifying phenomena. What is most disturbing in
the tag of ‘linguistic imperialism’ is that Hjelmslev has long been recognized as one of its agents, even though his sense of language is not, strictly speaking, reducible to actual languages. While linguistics ordinarily concerns particular languages, Hjelmslev’s algebra aims to calculate the general system of language in relation to which particular languages would reveal their characteristics. But the calculation of theoretically possible formal relations at the level of the general system includes non-materialized elements, that is, elements not realized in any existing languages. The glossematist is not, then, a linguist proper for she/he is interested in a virtual (potential) language. And this suits Guattari well as he did not find in linguistics principles directly applicable to his projects. Indeed, he wrote of his engagement with Hjelmslevian categories and concepts as a ‘detour’ (IM 39ff).

Although it is commonly understood that Hjelmslev’s debts to Saussure were enormous, the position taken by Deleuze and Guattari on their relationship may be arrived at by seizing on Hjelmslev’s (1971: 39) statement that ‘glossematique theory must not be confused with Saussurean theory’. The specific object of Hjelmslevian structural linguistics is *la langue* – an essentially autonomous entity consisting of internal dependencies among categories. Glossematics studies neither *le langage* nor *la parole*, as Saussure employed them. Hjelmslev’s purely structural-logistical type of linguistic research which conceives of *la langue* as form independent of substance, takes off from the final sentence of Saussure’s (1966: 232) *Cours de linguistique générale*: ‘the true and unique object of linguistics is language [*la langue*] studied in itself and for itself’. Hjelmslev’s immanent linguistics cannot be counted among any of the post-Saussurean projects such as that of the Prague school in which *la langue* is not independent but, rather, dependent upon usage and *la parole*; nor does glossematics adhere to the letter of Saussurean linguistics as it is read by his Genevan interpreters. While Hjelmslev generously admitted that the *Cours* could be read in different ways owing to certain ambiguities in the text (it was after all cobbled together from lecture notes and the manuscript sources reveal no end of inconsistencies), glossematics would nevertheless pursue the ideal of studying *la langue* ‘in itself and for itself’. Moreover, Hjelmslev’s divergence from Saussure may be explained in large measure by his, as one reviewer of the *Prolegomena*
put it, ‘one-sided interpretation of the Saussurean concept of la langue’ as form and not substance, emphasizing Saussure’s theory of value (Garvin 1954: 90). Where does this leave substance? Ultimately, it is Guattari’s answer to this question that interests me because he took a doubly opposite tack by rejoicing in the abstractness of form but by bringing substance into the picture, if only in the end to skirt around it.

The work of Hjelmslev is for Deleuze and Guattari ‘profoundly opposed’ to Saussurean and post-Saussurean ‘isms’ inasmuch as it takes the high road of form by studying la langue – la langue is a manifestation of a typological class to which it belongs, and the type is a manifestation of and thus subordinate to the class of classes, la langue or species-language (Hjelmslev 1971: 31–2). Deleuze and Guattari do not complain that Hjelmslev’s theory is too abstract. For its high level of abstraction is precisely one of its virtues, and they rejoice in the irreducibility of the planes of expression and content to signifier and signified. Hjelmslev was not a ‘signifier enthusiast’; nor did his definitions of the planes require their manifestation in psychological substances, as Saussure indicated. Deleuze and Guattari think that Hjelmslev’s theory ‘is the only linguistics adapted to the nature of both the capitalist and the schizophrenic flows: until now, the only modern (and not archaic) theory of language’ (AO 243; ATP 66ff and 98ff). This kind of linguistics theorizes language as an inclusive and intensive continuum, whose variations conform neither to linguistic constants nor variables, but are open to continuous and hitherto unrealized conjunctions. Glossematics may be brought into the schizoanalytic fold because it offers a rarely permitted (grammatically, that is) freedom to connect and combine phonemes into possible morphemes; to pursue, in other words, unusual if not unnatural connective syntheses, generalizable in structural terms as unrestricted and unpoliced passages, meetings and alliances at all levels and places. Glossematics starts to schizz in the Prolegomena as Hjelmslev (1969: 57) ‘feel[s] the desire to invert the sign-orientation’ of traditional linguistics. For Hjelmslev, a sign is a two-sided entity whose expression and content planes are understood as functives which contract their sign-function. These functives are present simultaneously since they are mutually presupposing. Glossematics becomes modern at the moment when Hjelmslev,
reflecting on the fact that a sign is a sign of something, maintains that this entity can no longer be conceived of as only a sign of content-substance (a content-substance or the conception of a thing is ordered to and arranged under a content-form by the sign). A sign is equally a sign of an expression-substance (the sounds subsumed by an expression-form of phonemes). Expression and content and form and substance are the double dichotomies of Hjelmslevian signification. Hjelmslev attempts to destroy the hierarchy and directionality of signification which was hitherto based upon the definition of the sign as that of an expression-substance for a content-substance by carrying to its radical end the mutual solidarity and equality of linguistic expression and content. It should be possible, Hjelmslev (1969: 75) believed, to devise a grammatical method for the study of linguistic expression by ‘start[ing] from the content and proceed[ing] from the content to the expression’. Against Hjelmslev, Siertsema (1965: 61–3) and others have argued that it is only possible to analyse content by proceeding from linguistic expression. This argument has provoked charges of idealism against Hjelmslev because the inversion implies that an analysis might begin with a concept (content-substance) ordered to its form by the sign in a way which forgoes words or the means to identify the content in question without first expressing it in some manner. Clearly, then, in these terms, Hjelmslev was not a ‘signifier enthusiast’.

Although Hjelmslev may have pursued a rarefied vision of linguistic form, this venture did not entail for Deleuze and Guattari an ‘overdetermination of structuralism’. They clearly rejected Ruwet’s critique of the combinatory freedom permitted by Hjelmslev’s generative grammar – in ATP (99) they reversed Ruwet’s structural interpretation of agrammaticality by claiming that atypical expressions produce variations in correct forms rather than correct forms producing atypical expressions – in order to recoup Lewis Carroll’s ‘Jabberwocky’ and James Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake* – the two texts which Ruwet (1973: 30) used as examples of a ‘type of creativity . . . [with] . . . only extremely distant connections with the creativity which operates in the ordinary use of language’. Joyce’s phonemes can be monstrous, exploiting phonologically grammatical possibilities (and otherwise!) and raising the stakes of semantic content. Deleuze and Guattari refigured Ruwet’s appeal to the proximity of ordinary language and rule-based creativity,
but not in order to uncritically valorize an unbounded creativity well beyond the demands of a grammatical model to account for competence and the subtleties of degrees of acceptable usage in which, after all, they, too, communicated (deterritorialization in language is not an absolute value); to be sure, the concept of linguistic competence is not one that Deleuze and Guattari held in high esteem. The examples they cite (Carroll, Joyce, e.e. cummings) are not marginal literary figures, and their choices reveal that agrammaticalism is not produced by and reducible to correct grammar. In fact, for Deleuze and Guattari it was precisely the opposite since agrammatical writing forces language to face its limitations.

Although Deleuze and Guattari were at odds with Ruwet on several points, they embraced his observation that the order of the elements is not relevant in glossematic syntax. This is one of the reasons why Hjelmslev’s linguistics is ‘profoundly opposed’ to Saussureanism: ‘the order of the elements is secondary in relation to the axiomatic of flows and figures’ (AO 242–3). Ruwet (1973: 293–4) points out that Hjelmslev has a set-syntax rather than a concatenation or string syntax. The order of elements in the set is not relevant at the level of content form (what would correspond in transformative grammar to deep structure) and contains less information than the string. What is axiomatic for Deleuze and Guattari and Hjelmslev is that a set is a more productive machine than a string. The creative aspects of language are at the outset marginalized and trapped by the dominant grammatical and syntactical machines, as Guattari argued in La révolution moléculaire, yet there are experimenters tunnelling through the walls of dominant encodings, the wall of the signifier, following in Hjelmslev’s wake (MRr 307ff).

Guattari’s brand of anti-structuralism hinged on a definition of signification based upon Hjelmslev’s rethinking of la barre saussurienne between signifier and signified as a semiological function rather than an association. Saussure’s definition allowed structuralists to separate the signifier from the signified (i.e., this is how la barre lacanienne works) in the name of the signifier (i.e., a postmodern metonymic slide and all other reductions of content to formal signifying chains). Guattari adopted Hjelmslev’s position on the mutually presupposing solidarity of expression and content in order to ensure that neither term would
become as a simple matter of course independent of nor more dependent on the other. This was a prophylaxis against signifier fetishism. Guattari interrogated the aforementioned solidarity so as ‘to search for the points of articulation, the points of micropolitical antagonism at all levels’ (MRr 242). Guattari defined signification as an encounter between diverse semiotic systems of formalization (asignifying and signifying) on the planes of expression and content imposed by relations of power. The encounters between formalizations of expression and content required that the semiological function was read micropolitically because the mutual presupposition of the planes exhibited a variety of shifting power relations. Guattari attempted to uncover the social and political determinations of signifying phenomena through the use of modified versions of Hjelmslevian categories. How does a schizoanalyst study modes of semiotization without being contaminated by the apolitical and largely asocial categories of linguistics and semiology? The answer to this question, Guattari claimed (IM 39ff), was either to smash or dismantle their categories through a detour by way of Hjelmslev. I want to emphasize several elements of this detour as they pertain to the semiotization of matter. The detour around the minefield of the signifier and structuralism, indeed, the history of the philosophy of language itself, is posed in this way by Guattari: ‘Logos or abstract machines?’ The schizoanalyst also takes great interest in the formation of matter; that is, in non-semiotically formed and semiotically formed matter.

First, a few words on Hjelmslev are in order. For Hjelmslev, there is an unformed ‘amorphous mass’ common to all languages called purport (matter). Unformed purport is formed differently in English (‘I do not know’) and in French (‘Je ne sais pas’), as well as in other languages. Purport is like sand, Hjelmslev (1969: 52) suggests, formed in different ways in different moulds (languages). Purport is formed into substance. In fact, Hjelmslev writes that ‘it has no possible existence except through being substance for one form or another’. Content-purport is ordered by a specific form into content-substance. The form is in an arbitrary relation to the purport. In the same way, expression-purport is ordered by a specific expression form into an expression-substance. Consider the following representation proposed by Jurgen Trabant (1981: 94):
The unilateral arrows on both the expression and content sides represent the formation of purport into substance. The bi-directional arrows in the centre between expression form and content form show that the sign-function tends toward a de-materialization into pure form. Hjelmslev designates the two functives which contract the sign-function as content form and expression form, by virtue of which exists content substance and expression substance. The form, Hjelmslev (1969: 57) remarks in one of his most famous examples – which Guattari (MRr 278) also quoted – is ‘projected on to the purport, just as an open net casts its shadow down on an undivided surface’. Form is as abstract as a shadow; it is not the net, but its shadow. Purport is formed in different ways in different languages. Hjelmslev may have derived his notion of a continuum from the two shapeless masses of Saussure – two vague planes (ideas and sounds) upon which language links the two together – but he finds Saussure’s version wholly unsatisfactory. For Saussure situates language in the ‘borderland’ (Saussure 1966: 113) between thought and sound, the combination of which produces form, not substance, and thus implies, mistakenly in Hjelmslev’s (1969: 46) estimation, that the two masses can be treated separately. There is for Hjelmslev no universal formation, although he considers the formation of purport to be a universal principle. Purport itself cannot be known except through its formation. In other words, linguistics studies formation in the service of a science of expression and content taken on ‘an internal and functional basis’ (1969: 79). What Hjelmslev has in mind is an algebra of language whose terms may have no natural designations. In addition, the analysis does not depend on individual natural languages, even if these are included in its general calculus. What matters for Hjelmslev is whether structural types are ‘manifestable in any substance’. ‘Substance’, Hjelmslev (1969: 106) writes, ‘is thus not a necessary presupposition for linguistic form, but linguistic form is a necessary presupposition for substance.’ Linguistic form is a constant which is manifested and substance is a variable which is manifesting; form is known linguistically through substance, but glossematics is really interested in actual and potential
linguistic forms, rather than describing which substances have allowed form to be recognized.

With this brief in mind, I will turn to Guattari’s specific interventions. ‘We get the unconscious that we deserve!’ Guattari provocatively stated at the outset of IM (7); if there is a choice, why should it be an unconscious structured like a language, and composed of mathemes? Still, in this regard one wonders about the glossematic desire to discover irreducible invariants of the linguistic algebra called glossemes, which suggests that we may very well get, if we’re not careful, the unconscious we don’t deserve; don’t forget to take the Guattarian detour. Instead of linearity, chains, sign play, paradigmatic clustering, Guattari innovated with the concept of assemblage (recall Guattari’s sense of this concept as superceding that of groups), which is firstly a solidarity (let’s say a consolidarity) of content and expression. What impressed Guattari was the contentlessness (formal and abstract) of Hjelmslev’s concepts and their mutuality: two planes, expression and content, with constants and variables, that is, forms and substances, respectively. Guattari’s machinic unconscious is not backwards looking, entailing regression, or fixed in/on a particular discourse/language. Rather, it is forward looking and open to what is possible (it operates on the ‘matter of the possible’). This unconscious is a machine producing and reproducing the words and images of the classical psychoanalytic conception, but also deterritorialized interactions. One of the tasks of schizoanalysis is to describe the material and semiotic features of these interactions. Abstract machines are productive (i.e., faciality is an abstract machine producing concrete faces). Abstract machines assemble the so-called ‘crystals of possibility’ or ‘quanta of possibles’. They are not, however, abstract universals. They cannot be formally described in a pure logical space exterior to what they act upon; they are not realizable in such a space. What is unique about them is that they are realized in their contingent manifestations, in the points of singularity they convey (here is the influence of Hjelmslev – the manifestability or realization of principles of formation which, going beyond Hjelmslev, are always related to power: ‘The unity of a language is always inseparable from the constitution of a formation of power’ (IM 25–6). That is, they are produced by their
production. Abstract machines do not constitute a logos, a universal code (no universal formation) governing the construction of messages or manifestations from which they are separate. With abstract machines, nothing is played out in advance in terms of specific complexes and psychogenetic stages. However, abstract machines attest to the ‘law’, Guattari noted (IM 12), of the general movement of deterritorialization. Deterritorialization ‘“precedes” strata and territories’ (IM 13). Guattari specified that in this general movement abstract machines ‘constitute a kind of changing matter – what I call a kind of optional matter (matière à option) – composed of crystals of potentiality catalyzing connections, desтратifications and reterritorializations as much in the animate as in the inanimate world’ (IM 13). Moreover, they ‘always involve the assemblage of components irreducible to a formal description’ (IM 13). This entails a view of the form–matter relation that detours around substance formation because the optional matter may remain unformed – think, Guattari is suggesting, of continuous variation rather than the formation of substances, of nonformal functions and unformed intensities. The assemblages are neither subjects nor objects; they are irreducible to individuated subjects whose unconscious dream-thoughts are open to interpretation through their dream-contents, for instance. Still, Guattari is not setting up an absolute distinction between universal and contingent; the former can wane toward the latter, and the latter can wax toward the former.

Guattari is also not denying that the unconscious works inside of individuals; it just isn’t stuck there. In his revised conception, the unconscious also works in an expanded social field (in families, institutions, communities) and may be constructed as an open map with rhizomic features (incessant modifications, multiple connections, reversals, inversions). A pragmatic schizoanalysis focusing on the unconscious proceeds by means of a critique of language and signification, under the heading of syntagmatic trees (linguistic universals, unity and autonomy of language, exile of pragmatics, recovery of semiotic categories beyond the restrictions of structural linguistics). Rhizomes elude the rampant dichotomania of linguistics and structuralism in general, have no deep structure, and are connected with non-linguistic modes of decoding.¹ For Guattari, the Hjelmslevian detour
made the non-separability of terms a foundational principle of sorts (i.e., Guattari considered non-separability, separability and quantification to be the three types of quantum energetico-semiotic configurations of the schizoanalytic unconscious beyond the energetics of the Freudian unconscious, especially the death drive (CS 77ff) that led to the rejection of the *langue* (social) *parole* (individual) distinction, Saussure’s so-called methodological distinction, arresting the drift toward a pure science of language in the name of a micropolitical pragmatic approach (IM 26). Guattari considered glossematics to be ‘fundamentally immanentist’ in its perspective on the opening of language to semiotics (CS 75–6).

In any Hjelmslevian analysis, one must consider the formation of matter into substance (form–matter–substance) on the planes of expression and content. There are, then, five intersecting criteria or strata. But Guattari’s approach to three of these criteria needs to be put in relief. Guattari makes two claims about form. First, Hjelmslev did not consider it alone. While this is technically accurate, one needs to recall that substance is not a necessary presupposition of form (this does not exclude consideration of it, however). Beyond this fine point of interpretation, there is a larger issue at stake. Guattari detours through Hjelmslevian form because he wants to abandon, with reference to Hjelmslev’s distinction between system and process (like many of Hjelmslev’s terms, they regrettably coincide with structural linguistic terms such as syntagmatic and paradigmatic, text and language) any consideration of autonomous forms. Forms in his estimation do not exist unless they are put into action. The point Guattari made concerning system and process – that it was a mistake to autonomize the process – refers to Hjelmslev’s distinction between system (language) and process (text) which contract their function, even though Guattari was prepared to consider the notion that the process cannot exist without the system, the latter being ‘not unimaginable without a process’, as Hjelmslev (1969: 39) put it, for the reason that there may be a text as yet unactualized – a virtual text – that is, a potential text.

Guattari pointed out (IM 226–7) that ‘in Hjelmslev’s system, purport (*le sens*) remained entirely dependent upon form [it is only substance for a form]. It is only in postulating the existence of a
universe of abstract machines beyond all formalisms that it may be understood how to free one’s theorizing from the linearity of modes of encoding, formal syntactic constraints and arbitrary relations of linguistic signification. Machinic purport (le sens) is not at all an ‘amorphous mass – according to Hjelmslev’s expression – that would await the arrival of an external formalism that would then animate it. Machinic purport is manifested through a multidimensional spatial, temporal, substantial and deictic rhizome in terms of which it carries out all possible transmigrations, and all transmutations . . ’ (IM 227). Bosteels (2001: 899) put it most elegantly when he pointed out that Guattari’s most innovative recoding of the Hjelmslevian categories involved a diagrammatic a-signifying semiotic that ‘works flush with the real’ and has ‘direct purchase on the continuum of material flows in the purport’. For Guattari, beyond form were abstract machines that are not representational. Substance, which Guattari tended to treated as a couple substance/form, is what results when becomings of abstract machines are actualized or fluxes harnessed. Against the grain of Hjelmslev, matter may be for Guattari considered independently but only from its formation as a substance and in terms of unformed, unorganized material intensities. With Hjelmslev, Guattari noted that his French translators were wise to identify matiè re and sens, as in matiè re-sens, for the Danish Mening [purport]. Guattari further explained his detour through Hjelmslev as a way of: (i) escaping the tyranny of the signifier–signified binarism; (ii) eluding the abstraction of the signified; (iii) breaking the negative, differential identity of the sign defined against other signs ad infinitum; (iv) challenging signifier despotism and fetishism. Guattari developed a tripartite typology of modes of semiotization through an analysis of the intersection of the five criteria (strata). (See Figure 4.1.)

The first are a-semiotic encodings. These include ‘genetic encoding or any type of so-called natural encoding which function independently of the constitution of a semiotic substance. These modes of encoding formalize the field of material intensities without recourse to an autonomous and translatable écriture’ (MRr 279). A-semiotic encodings are in an external relation (outside the expression-content planes) to the intersecting criteria, engaging form and matter but not substance. There is no semiotic substance at issue. Guattari employed Hjelmslevian con-
cepts to create a new category of encoding: if semiotically formed matter is substance, then a-semiotic encodings are non-semiotically formed matter. Guattari’s statement that ‘there is no genetic writing’ implies that ‘natural’ a-semiotic encodings cannot be totalized or territorialized on a specific semiotic substance or stratum. They are, after all, a-semiotic: ‘There is no differentiation and autonomization between one biological stratum, the object of encoding, and an informational stratum’ (MRr 253). Without a semiotic substance, such encodings cannot be directly translated into another system. This does not prevent, it is important to add, biologists from transposing a-semiotic encodings into graphic semiotic or signifying substances. This is a form of semiotic capture, organization or, even better, as Guattari notes, discipline.

Second, consider *signifying semiologies*. These concern sign systems with semiotically formed substances on the expression and content planes. Guattari distinguished between *symbolic semiologies* and *semiologies*
of signification. The former involve several semiotic substances whose quasi-autonomy is retained because they cannot be completely translated into a single substance (Guattari referred to what are known as simpler, perhaps even cruder, non-linguistic semiotic systems, whose very crudity allow them to retain a certain degree of independence from universalizing encodings); these remain decentred, as it were. Guattari had turned the semiotic tables around by reversing the standard claim that non-linguistic systems are translatable into linguistic systems but that linguistic systems are not fully translatable into non-linguistic systems. Symbolic semiologies have numerous strata, none of which can constantly overcode the others. The substances or strata of semiologies of signification are centred on a single substance dominating and overcoding all others (commonly, this is linguistic substance and the totalitarian signifier). Within the second mode of semiotization, Guattari moved from semiologies with multiple to only two strata (which are really only one in the case of the semio-linguistic machine showing two faces and producing conjunctive syntheses). Connective syntheses are reterritorialized in the double articulation of expression and content, that is, by the disjunctive syntheses which capture them, but themselves remain capable of reconnection. The productivity of the connective syntheses is divided between and distributed among two planes in signifying semiologies (which have distorted the Hjelmslevian planes in the image of the linguistic sign) under the referential function of the sign: a denoted real and a representational image. Signs, Guattari specified (MRr 255), are cut off from the real because they must pass through the mental world of representations (in every triangle of meaning, the passage from sign to thing – even if it is non-extensional – goes through the mental or at least representational summit). To be cut off from material intensities is to be trapped in a ‘signifying ghetto’ lorded over by a despotic signifier whose goal is to ‘treat everything that appears in order to represent it through a process of repetition which refers only to itself’ (MRr 256). Signification echoes to infinity because it is supremely redundant. The subjectivity produced in the world of signification is a shut-in, a semiological shipwreck. Enunciative polyvocicity is crushed by being split between a subject of enunciation and the subject of the statement: ‘The subject of the statement has become the respondent of the subject of
enunciation by the effect of a sort of reductive echolalia’ (MRr 256). This splitting effectively accomplishes the individuation, personalization and gender specification of the subject of the statement bound to je-
tu-il/elle. Polyvocity becomes bi[uni]vocity. In all of this, Guattari’s goal remained the discovery of ‘the residual traces, the transversal flights of a collective assemblage of enunciation that constitute . . . the real productive insistence of all semiotic machinism’ (MRr 256–7). In order to reach this schizoanalytic goal, Guattari required a third category.

The third category is *a-signifying semiotics*. There is a circular connection, skirting around signifying semiologies, between form and matter, but without leaving – unlike a-semiotic encodings – the expression and content planes. It is this circularity which allows a-signifying semiotics to remain independent of, and in a non-hierarchical relation with, signifying semiologies and language. Guattari specified that a-signifying semiotics retain a partial use for signifying semiologies. The polysemiotic connections established between the abstract machines (form) and material intensities escape the overcoding functions of signifying semiological systems (they are not arbitrarily related, as I pointed out above). But neither are they completely deterritorialized nor reterritorialized. Consider an example from linguistics such as idioms. Idioms jump over denotation and form assemblages by grouping existing words together, giving them new connotations. Idioms even focus on what are called ‘prone words’ (such as, in English, ‘take’ and ‘get’ – ‘take off, eh’; ‘get real’) and hijack them. The a-signifying semiotic potential of idiom formation is constantly threatened by paranoiac recodings of signifying semiologies (respectable academic grammar – grammar is imperative: ‘The formation of grammatically correct phrases constitutes, for a “normal” individual, the preliminary step in a complete submission to the laws’ (IM 29) which want to reduce them to a single proper, formal, substance. *A-signifying semiotics* leave behind significative redundancies for the production of non-redundant, even improbable, and original conjunctions of signs and material fluxes. Such conjunctions between semiotic and real material machines, which create a-signifying collective assemblages, do not imply that the semiotic machines are less real than the material machines, nor that the material machines are less semiotic.
On the contrary, they share these attributes. The question of the conjunction between signs and fluxes, between abstract machines and material intensities, between form and matter, are all unmediated by representation; they are, in other words, in constant and direct contact (Bosteel’s ‘flush’ also indicates Guattari’s rejection of Saussure’s sense of language as a link or a bridge between two masses). There is no recourse to representative structures. Guattari described the shift from signifying semiologies to a-signifying semiotics in terms of the de-localization, de-privatization, anoedipalization of the individuated subject of enunciation to a collective assemblage of enunciation. He correlated the individual with signification and the collective with machinic assemblages, adding that the signifier plus the signified and form plus substance equalled signification (individuation of phantasms belonging to subjugated groups) and that collective assemblages of enunciation consisting of conjunctions of abstract machines and material fluxes belonged to the phantasms of subject groups. Guattari then enumerated dialectically negative and positive attributes of the individual–collective relation: signification involves self-reference and thus the rupture of machinic conjunctions, whereas collective assemblages may give up comprehension, being in some instance without signification for anyone, for the sake of creating meaning directly from the fluxes (MRr 260). Signification thus has no machinic meaning because of the absence of conjunctions with the real fluxes. The collective assemblages composed by creative machinic connections of semiotic and material fluxes cannot be individuated, having left the field of representation. A-signifying semiotic machines free desiring production, the singularities of desire, from the signifiers of national, familial, personal, racial, humanist, and transcendent values (including the semiotic myth of a return to nature, to the pre-signifying world of a-semiotic encodings); in short, desiring production is freed from all ‘territorializing alienations’ and set coordinates (MRr 263); elsewhere, Guattari described how ‘signifying formations of power, in order to maintain their positions, seem forced to submit to a sort of permanent escalation of adaptation and recuperation of a-signifying machinisms’ (IM 103–4).

This freedom must not be exaggerated. Signifying semiologies are only tools to be employed in the semiotics of schizoanalytic practice in and outside of radicalized (transversalized) institutions. Mixed semiotics
has the task of ‘furthering the formation of relatively autonomous and untranslatable semiotic substances, by accommodating the sense and non-sense of desire as they are, by not attempting to adapt the modes of subjectification to signification and to dominant social laws. Its objective is not at all to recuperate facts and acts that are outside the norm; on the contrary, it is to make a place for the singularity traits of subjects who, for one reason or another, escape the common law’ (MRr 284). For Guattari, this was the task of a genuine analytic practice that involved respect for singularities. One of the important elements of this practice was the recognition that the subject in contact with desiring machines in a-signifying semiotics oscillates between reterritorializations on signification and deterritorializations into new machinic conjunctions. This oscillation helps to explain why signifying semiologies still have a role to play. Guattari’s semiotics was always, it needs to be emphasized, mixed.

Further, on this point Guattari wrote: ‘in schizoanalysis free rein will be given to oedipalizing representations and paranoid-fascist fantasms in order to better plot the effects of their blockage of the fluxes, and to relaunch the process in a sort of machinic forward flight’ (MRr 269). One of the trademarks of Guattari’s schizoanalysis is his focus on subjective redundancies (black holes such as the gaping hole in the person of the Lacanian analyst whose silence signifies a lack for the patient and transference onto which proved impossible, but this was the foundation of his mastery into which his followers disappeared, only to be regurgitated as ‘intolerant disciples’ and ‘ultraconformist bureaucrats’ (Dufresne 2000). These technical details should not obscure the more general issue of whether or not the detour solves more problems for schizoanalysis than it creates. By the time Guattari published IM in 1979, his reasons for turning to Hjelmslev had become quite explicit. Guattari’s opening salvos were directed against linguistic imperialists because they attempted to annex both semiotics and pragmatics and used structural analysis to depoliticize their domains of inquiry; these salvos lead at once to the choice of Hjelmslev as an alternative while running against the grain of glossematics. For if there is no language in itself (unified and autonomous), and if, on the contrary, language ‘always remains open to other modes of semioticization’, as Guattari thought (IM 25), then Hjelmslev’s efforts to
establish the truth of Saussure’s linguistics must be counterbalanced (to say the least) in some manner (Hjelmslev even theorized against the grain of his own thought regarding Saussure by pointing out, for example, that languages are composed of signs made of non-signs, against the statement of purity in Saussure that nothing foreign or material enters into the psychical sign). Guattari detours since he does not continue the Hjelmslevian project; instead, he takes up certain categories because they ‘appear to be the only ones resulting from a truly rigorous examination of the whole of the semiotic problematic, by drawing out, in particular, all of the consequences of calling into question the status of content and expression’ (IM 40). Guattari had, however, two regrets about glossematics: (i) ‘le bi-face hjelmslevien’ of expression and content coincided with other ‘binarist reductions’; (ii) Hjelmslev seemed to willingly participate in the sovereign over-coding of language when he wrote ‘in practice, a language is a semiotic into which all other semiotics may be translated’ (Hjelmslev 1969: 109), thus leaving ample room for the glottocentric Barthesean reversal of Saussure’s statement concerning the place of linguistics in semiology. Guattari wanted nothing to do with this dogma. His attention to the semiotic formation of substances on the planes of expression and content is nevertheless modelled on Hjelmslev’s interpretation of the formation of linguistically unformed matter into substance. A language casts a shadow like a net over the amorphous thought-mass of purport and lays down boundaries in this sand; purport is continually reworked in different ways by different languages. The French word car (‘for, because’) and the English word car (‘automobile’) have the same expression purport but different content purport; the French dix (10) and the English ten (10) have the same content purport but a different expression purport. Guattari makes light of Hjelmslev’s metaphors of the ‘net’ and of ‘sand’ by arguing that there are not, on the one side, ‘little building blocks of semiological construction and, on the other side, the amorphous mass of potentiality’. Guattari’s ‘potentiality is a matter just as much differentiated as the most material of matters’ (IM 205–6). Anyone who has been to a beach would recognize this under foot, under a bare foot in a contiguous relation with the sand, unmediated by a shoe. There are several species of signs and semiotic connections involved in the formation of matter and the conjugations
of unformed material fluxes, and many of these in Guattari’s work are borrowed from the work of Charles Sanders Peirce. But the Peircean borrowing, like the Hjelmslevian detour, in no way exhausts Guattari’s delineation of the semiotics of assemblages.

For instance, in a modified Peircean categorization (still respecting the categories and the trichotomies of signs), Guattari (IM 206–9) described the basic semiotic dimension of components, a semiotic of machinic creativity, to which one need attend in the manifestations of the abstract machines in assemblages: iconic components in which virtuality (potentiality) is emphasized in the representation of a potential object whose actual existence is not attested to (i.e., seeing a shape in the clouds without positing the thing in the sky); indexical components involve the virtual becoming real – real actualization – but in which reference is not strictly speaking extensional (not a thing as such); and components of encoding (machinic redundancy) involve a series, a bridging operation typical of thirds (symbols) in which chains are based upon a principle – here, of transitive relations (given A–B, B–C, then one assumes A–C; the symbol in this case is a rule about these sorts of relations). In each category, the abstract machine will need to respond by: (i) simply acknowledging the icon such as it is (a description of a shape in the clouds); (ii) appreciate the indexical fixation on its maximal point, following from the secondness of indices in which description is eschewed, for the sake of forcing attention on an object (actualization); (iii) respect the internal relations specific to a machinic redundancy and its referential series. Further, components of semiotization or components of passage refer back to their own messages and constitute a reflexive semiotic redundancy in which the discrete components in a series refer to entities in a syntagmatic chain (semiotic redundancies), but reversibly. This chain is a kind of specialized substrate, Guattari indicated, that carried out the semiotic functions of the components. This required the abstract machines to attend to specific intra-component relations (discrete or digital); relations between the components and the substrate; and the type of signs at issue in the substrate (those compatible with syntagmatic chains). Now, components of subjectification deterritorialize the components of passage (always on the lookout for machinic mutations in which to get involved such as CB radios, pirate radios, UNIX programming . . .) and yield
seven types of redundancies for which abstract machines need to account. Guattari’s construction of a triangular stack of seven (I prefer to call it a rack from billiards), was based on two models – the triangular model of meaning inherited from Ogden and Richards of symbol–reference–referent and the Hjelmlevian expression/content planes.

The importance of the triangle in Guattari’s semiotics as a modelling device cannot be underestimated, but may be best appreciated in the larger context of his engagements with threes and thirds of all sorts. But Guattari’s deployment of it did a great deal more than simply acknowledge its enduring character in semiotics (the triangle is remarkably versatile as a model and is still in circulation today in discussions of the cybertext as a textual machine – a device producing verbal signs for consumption by a participant reader through a material medium: verbal sign-operator (human)-medium; see Aarseth 1997: 21). Guattari innovated semiotically within the confines of the triangular form (a summary of his innovations are noted in Figure 4.4).

Redundancies are presented in a non-hierarchical way (i.e., although one redundancy may be emphasized in a given assemblage, it is not exclusive, does not give it a kind of ontological priority, nor invariance), as in Figure 4.2:

I. morphemes of the referent
II. a-signifying
III. iconic

I–III. These result from the deployment of the triangle of meaning and the planes of expression and content on the semiotic redundancies and occupy the corners of the triangle. The syntagmatic chain, the substrate of the component of passage, is deterritorialized on the plane of expression (corresponding to a-signifying redundancy) and reterritorialized on the content plane (corresponding to iconic redundancies). But, in addition, Guattari conceived of the triangle as a device for demonstrating the emergence of an individuated subject in an ‘angle of signifiance’ that he drew across it from the left side opening onto the right side from the position of the redundancies of signification to those of representation (between VI to V, see below) NB. III. These
Figure 4.2  Seven semiological redundancies

Figure 4.3  Angle of signification
are ‘mentalized’ and ‘represented’ contents such as Saussurrean signifieds and Peircean diagrams.

IV. designation
V. representation
VI. signification

IV–VI. These are developed through I–III and occupy the sides of the triangle.

VII. subjective. This is put into place by IV–V–VI but also III.

Within the constraints of Figure 4.2, Guattari embedded two triangular tracks: I–II–III–I; IV–V–VI–IV.

Figure 4.3 shows the angle of signification. In this figure, two operations of subjectification occur – the first, which is objective, figures the subject as a signifier; the second, which is fusional, figures the subject as a pure icon, empty and paradigmatic. The space of representation, between I (morphemes of the referent) and III (icon), now matter and soul, respectively, reterritorializes the icon on the figure of God, or soul, against pure materiality, and the interior of the triangle itself is split between the lower axis of nominalist designation (signifier-matter) and the upper axis of divine signification. The ‘upper nave’ of the sentiment of signification is situated between two limit cases of signifying subjectification: the first is a fusional sentiment of appropriation that dumbs-down, conforms and reels in; the second is a cartographic hyperlucidity that extracts proliferating singularities, links them transversally and thereby eludes the black holes of psychoanalytic complexes. With regard to these redundancies, abstract machines must attend and negotiate the material reality of the referent; and the realities of representation of concepts, sign systems and individuated subjects.

By ‘nominalist designation’ (signifier-matter) Guattari elsewhere suggested it was a “‘terminalist’ . . . viewpoint . . . which makes semiotic entities the tributaries of a pure subjectivity” (Chs 30). To which he added the following contrast: or ‘subjectivity [is] an illusory artefact’. The obscurity of these references to what was a medieval metaphysical quandary known as the realist–nominalist debate is
perhaps compounded by Guattari’s use, in Chs at least, of a non-reductionistic compromise position in his discussion of the character of the incorporeal, virtual parts of assemblages. For an Aristotelian nominalist, mental processes (intellection) are the abstract generators of universal ideas (especially words like nouns) that otherwise have no substantial reality; in Guattari’s words, semiotic entities are subordinate – tributaries – to mental processes. Whereas on the realist side, subjectivity is an illusory artefact given that individuals are accidents and universal ideas (Platonic realism of the Ideas) have substance. Guattari thought it was useless to come down on either side (so he suggested that both be affirmed simultaneously) which, in his context regarding the status of the incorporeal (corresponding to the medieval debate over the status of universals), would entail subordinations – ‘universalist reductions’ – and distinctions between enunciative subject–semiotic machine–referent object. The deployment of the nominalist designation in a variation on a semiological triangle is entirely appropriate given that debate about signification, representation and abstraction is central to the history of semiotics.

Working further with triangles – which he would eventually reject in a metamodelization based on Fours because Threes always tend to collapse back into Twos (dualisms) (Chs 31) and, anyway, triangles posed a bit of a problem as the fully-formed ‘familial constellation’ (AO 51, 62) that keeps shattering or unforming, scattering across the social field and showing up everywhere – Guattari turned to the components of consciousness (conscientielles). These are drawn in two directions: toward the exterior and the morphemes of the referent; toward the interior, an involuted semiotic black hole, that is ‘produced by the knot of resonance that suddenly arises when a point of recentring is constituted between semiological redundancies’ (IM 218). The knot slips and this slippage has two faces: powerlessness (semiological) and surplus (machinic), the latter emitting diagrammatic sign-particles (see further the following diagrammatic components). In the meantime, Guattari outlined two redundancies: interaction – supporting themselves on redundancies more territorialized than themselves; resonance – losing the support of those more territorialized for the sake of emptying their substances toward deterritorialization in which subjectification escapes all coordinates and hits a wall of nothingness.
which, however, proves to be porous only to sign-particles that serve as vectors for abstract machines. The subjective black hole implodes toward the centre of the semiological triangle and is cultivated by the Lacanian analyst but, more importantly, permits Guattari to show how the aforementioned knot of resonance recodes-reterritorializes the seven semiological redundancies in terms of traditional nosographic descriptors (the triangle’s summit corresponding to hysterical redundancies, its three corners forming obsessive-hysteric-schizo, etc.). This reterritorialization on psychoanalytic categories occurs throughout Guattari’s theorizing, it is a refrain that serves as a negative example, yet its very repetition suggests the stubbornness of psychoanalytic thought, and its ability to colonize discourses. The components of consciousness imply two divergent micropolitics: the first involves the doubling of systems of redundancy by resonance in the creation of a simulacral world of support; the second sees absolute deterritorialization ‘debited’ by a relative deterritorialization, but one invested with a disruptive molecular power that crosses all semiological assemblages. This brings us to the diagrammatic components. A few general theoretical remarks are perhaps first in order.

DIAGRAMS

Although some semionauts hold that semiology lifted off under Hjelmslev from the Saussurean launching pad, it was Peirce, as Deleuze and Guattari wrote, who ‘is the true inventor of semiotics. That is why we can borrow his terms, even while changing their connotations’ (ATP 531, n. 41). In ATP, Deleuze and Guattari regretted that Peircean icons, indexes and symbols were ‘based on signifier–signified relations (contiguity for the index, similitude for the icon, conventional rule for the symbol); this leads him to make the “diagram” a special case of the icon (the icon of relation)’. In order to liberate the diagram from the supposed yoke of the Saussureanism which infects icons, for example, Guattari developed the semiotic category of diagrammatism through the division of icon and diagrams along the lines of signifying semiotics and a-signifying semiotics, the latter involving signs which are more deterritorialized than icons. Diagrammatic machines of signs elude the territorializing systems of symbolic and signifying semiotics
by displaying a kind of reserve in relation to their referents, forgoing polysemy and eschewing lateral signifying effects. Although they have meaning for me, most of my scribbles concerning this notion did not make their way into this chapter because they could not be translated into a communicable semiology. Still, such scribbles function independently ‘of the fact that they signify or fail to signify something for someone’, which is only to say that they do not behave like well-formed substances in a universal system of signification and fail to pass smoothly through the simulacral dialogism of ideal models of communication (MRr 310–11).

For Peirce, however, diagrammatic reasoning is iconic: ‘A Diagram is mainly an Icon, and an icon of intelligible relations . . . in the constitution of its Object’ (CP 4.531). In Guattari’s terminology, a diagram may connect deterritorialized material fluxes without the authority of a signifying semiology. Returning to Peirce, a diagram is mainly but not exclusively an icon. It incorporates certain habits involved in the creation of graphic abstractions (in geometry and syllogistics); it also has the indexical feature of pointing ‘There!’ (CP 3.361) without, however, describing or providing any insight into its object. Since a diagram displays in itself the formal features of its object, it may be said to take the place of its object: ‘the distinction of the real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream’ (CP 3.362). This simulation defied, Guattari thought, the territorializing effects of representation and denotation. In Peirce’s work, too, diagrams can be deterritorializing because they are iconic – icons do not lead one away from themselves to their objects, rather, they exhibit their object’s characteristics in themselves. Icons can be indifferent to the demands of dominant semiotic formalizations. While a Peircean could rightly claim that Deleuze and Guattari have engaged in acts of interpretive violence by playing favourites with iconic phenomena, their approach to Peirce is, I think, uncannily Peircean. It needs to be recalled that Deleuze and Guattari did not feel any compulsion to honour the concepts which they borrowed from their semiotic masters.

In their reading of this American master, Deleuze and Guattari adopted a Peircean attitude towards Peirce. They read him against himself by extending interpretation beyond his conventional definitions.
This is precisely the approach Guattari adopted in his use of Hjelmslevian categories, and it is what Peirce called critical-philosophical thinking since it requires that one observe an author’s line of thought, from which one then extrapolates imaginatively. Take, for example, Deleuze and Guattari’s phrase: ‘Look at mathematics: it’s not a science, it’s a monster slang, it’s nomadic’ (ATP 24). This glance at mathematics is Peircean. An active mathematical mind is, according to Peirce, necessary for interpreting signs. The ability of mathematics to travel is part of its dynamic character. Peirce held that mathematical practice or what he called theorematic reasoning bears little relation to the semi-mechanical deductive inferences and demonstrations of logical calculus. A monster slang is not limited to a class or profession or generation. Mathematical slang is not the exclusive concern of mathematicians; the slang of the machinic unconscious is not the exclusive concern of shrinks; slang is not the sole object of linguists. It is a playful practice involving active and creative experimentation. In his discussion of theorematic reasoning (CP 4.233), Peirce wrote: ‘It is necessary that something be DONE’. An a-signifying abstract machine is diagrammatic. So too is theorematic reasoning. What was a necessary question for Lenin and Jerry Rubin, was a question of necessity for Peirce. Points are made and stretched. Hypotheses are advanced. Algebraic relations pour forth. Pins are stuck in maps. Pages are covered in scribbles. Living mathematical thought involves the construction of diagrams and experiments with points, surfaces, lines, etc. Deleuze and Guattari’s diagram is also constructive. It conjugates physically and semiotically unformed matter; in Hjelmslev’s linguistics, functives contract (draw together) their function. A diagram is a pure matter-function machine joining together and changing the shape of semio-chips – edges, points, particles, degrees of intensity, etc. When Guattari wrote of assemblages of enunciation he meant more generally semiotization, thus eluding the reduction of the statement to semiological signification characterized by personological oppositions by a subject (moi-je) for an impersonal, deterritorializing, diagrammatic multiplicity, il. As Deleuze and Guattari put it in Kafka: ‘we don’t believe that the statement can be connected to a subject’ (K 83) for K is a function rather than a person. In short, the diagram facilitates connections between the most deterritorialized particles of expression and
content. Diagrams are irreducible to icons, Guattari contended, because icons remain encysted in pre-established coordinates. Guattari added that semiotically formed substances may be diagrammatized by being emptied as if pieces of them were flung centrifugally along certain vectors toward new spaces to which they cling.

Let’s revisit Hjelmslev’s metaphor of the net. Hjelmslevian purport is like sand which can be put into different moulds (i.e., the formal moulds of different languages). In the formation of purport into a content-substance and expression-substance by content-form and expression-form, form lays down lines like a net casting its shadow onto an ‘undivided surface’. For Guattari, this sand was already differentiated. Is this net a diagram? The idea of this net throwing its shadow and ‘netting’ purport is antithetical to certain aspects of Guattari’s polysemiotic typology; the idea suggests that diagrammatic, a-signifying semiotic productions of meaning have not escaped the signifying machines of semiological authority. A-signifying semiotics establish connections between material fluxes which have not been semiotically formed as substances, but these connections mix with signifying semiological substances, even of the most despotic types driven by signifier fetishism and the demands of structural isomorphism. The net is a signifying semiology driven by the linguistic domination of purport, but it is also full of a-signifying holes irreducible to the ties that bind it. Heeding Guattari’s warning not to oversimplistically oppose signifying semiologies (paranoid-fascist) to a-signifying semiotics (schizo-revolutionary), a general enough warning applicable to trees-rhizomes as well, in the name of a truly mixed semiotics, the character of diagrammatism needs to be further delineated by the sign-particles of an a-signifying semiotic. Indeed, recalling the position of the circle of signifying semiologies within the diagram of semiologically formed substances on the planes of content and expression, as opposed to the two open curves that join the categories of matter and form without substance (a-signifying semiotics) around the aforementioned closed circle, Guattari found in the sign-particle an example of this. As a productive diagrammatic force, sign-particles establish new relations between matter and form (by definition deterritorializing, destratifying, desubjectifying, they exploit semiotically machinic potentiality through acceleration, proliferation, miniaturization, magnification), skirting
around both representation and denotation, old and massive semiologies of signification, emptying and flinging centrifugally the semiological substances. In short, Guattari centrifugalized the semiological triangle of meaning. Considering the lines across the categories of Figure 4.1 once again, Guattari’s sense of a curved line between form and matter finds another expression between two kinds of components of passage: signifying components engender loops (substance of expression) of subjective redundancy in passing from one matter of expression to another while a-signifying diagrammatic components of passage pass ‘over’ the subjective and signifying loops and make a direct connection between figures of expression (linguistic or non-linguistic), abstract and concrete machinisms, and singularity points of the referent (IM 232–3). These two components show that assemblages of semiotization are essentially compromise formations.

If the components of consciousness (binary machines) install a zero degree of machinic desire (death drive), then such components are contaminated by the sign-particles that optimize their machinic potentiality (but Guattari advised his readers not to confuse desubjectifying diagrammatism with the collapse of the components of consciousness because consciousness exists independently of the individuated subject). These sign-particles are not, Guattari held, really semiotic entities as such; rather, they are characterized by the fact that they cling to the abstract spaces of machinic potentialities and provide support for the abstract machines that de-form, desemiologize, and desubjectify existing assemblages through molecular semiotizations. Guattari wrote: ‘The sign-particles associate the smallest degree of actual consistency with the greatest degree of potential consistency. As such they represent an intermediary chain between, on the one hand, abstract machinisms and, on the other hand, a-signifying semiotic figures, morphemes of the referent and the most deterritorialized representations’ (IM 227). Abstract machines exist independently of the redundancies; but abstract machinic sub-ensembles of sign-particles invade and deploy the redundancies; and concrete machinic sub-ensembles also parasitically engulf and dominate the redundancies but, unlike the abstract machinisms, are carried along by heterogeneous redundant fluxes (IM 228). ‘The abstract machine is not random’ (ATP 71), Deleuze and Guattari wrote. Its semiotics must be carefully
worked out. This is why it has been necessary to describe in some detail Guattari’s mixed semiotics.

Guattari characterized assemblages in this way: ‘In the final analysis, the consistency of assemblages depends on the degree of diagrammatism of their components. An assemblage is inconsistent when it is emptied of its quanta of possibility, when the sign-particles leave it and travel to other assemblages, when the abstract machinisms that specify it harden, degenerate into abstractions, become encysted in stratifications and structures, when finally it sinks into a black hole of resonance or succumbs to the threat of pure and simple disintegration (catastrophe of consistency). It acquires consistency when, on the contrary, a deterritorialized machinic metabolism opens it to new connections, differentiating and complexifying what I have called its ‘machinic nucleus’, when it extracts from its internal texture points of singularity in order to have them pass into the rank of traits of singularity and machinic redundancies, and in this manner reveals in the real the quanta of possibility that it possesses specifically from the viewpoint of the plane of consistency of abstract machinisms’ (IM 228).

Before I pursue in greater detail Guattari’s specification of the assemblages, let’s review his strategies of diagramming triangles in a schematic representation. (See Figure 4.4.)

Guattari inherited the basic Anglo-American semiological triangle of meaning and augmented it with Peirce’s triadic conception of semiosis, which reintroduced the referent, without solving in any straightforward way the quandaries of referentiality that have beset European sign theory in the Saussurean tradition. Following through his analyses in IM, we saw Guattari, in the context of his discussion of the operations of abstract machines on different kinds of sign relations, intensities, sign-particles, give different values to the triangle’s angles and explore their effects on representations of the subject (angle of signification that opened between matter and soul, referent and interpretant). He split this triangle in order to explore the signification of subjectification – the units of the triangle by means of which the individuated subject is signified, in both upper and lower sections. On the left side of the triangle, the subject is a point of intersection (IM 214) between a-signifying and iconic redundancies that may be treated differently according to objectifying or subjectifying approaches (subject as some
sort of signifier or as an empty icon). On the right side, the space of representation opened upwards (reterritorialization) toward icons of ‘mental reference’ (God, soul) and downwards (detterritorialization) toward mythic pure matter. The abstract machines must account (as they construct and draw-diagram) for much more, then, than one type of consistency: material reality of the referent; reality of representation
and concepts; reality of sign systems; reality of individuated subjects (IM 214–15). The involuted triangle shows how interiority can implode if it is cultivated for ‘profit’ (IM 220). Here, Guattari works the centre of the triangle; the other side of this operation is the centrifugalization of the triangle, a clearing operation of semiological substances and an escape from the redundancies; the initial rack and its nosological recoding round out Guattari’s six variations. Besides the sheer semiotic ingenuity displayed by Guattari, his attention to the means by which the most molecular and revolutionary components may be detected and the optimal conditions for new modes of subjectification is unique in the history of semiotic thought.

ASSEMBLAGES

Taking Figure 4.1 as an example of how Guattari constructed his own diagrams, I want to investigate how he defined assemblages in IM. Guattari was careful to warn his readers (see IM 216, n. 16) that his diagrams, referring to the components I discussed above, were ‘hypersimplified reductions’ and that a pragmatic analysis of icons and indices in a concrete situation would require a much more complex and open cartography in the sense of Umberto Eco’s ‘open work’ (see Genosko 1998: 73ff). Generally, an assemblage of the enunciative or semiotic type is an ensemble of heterogeneous components with a machinic nucleus, which results from the crossing of molecular and abstract consistencies; hence, three basic dimensions of schizoanalysis are components of passage (crystallizing machinic nuclei and sustaining their extraction of quanta of possibility from their matter of expression); assemblages (enunciative or semiotic) whose means of expression, communication, representation give to them a ‘sensibility’ (IM 197); and machinic nuclei that are crossing points for the manifestations of abstract machines and the semiotization of concrete material machines. An assemblage of enunciation may be called collective to the extent that it escapes preformed, subjective structures that dominate and reduce it. Assemblages are machinic since abstract machines are contingently manifested in them, that is, they find a certain existential consistency they otherwise don’t enjoy; yet, they are never tied down once and for all to fixed coordinates. Abstract machines enter ‘real’
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Concrete assemblages through a process of negotiation rather than through coding on the basis of universal principles; but this is not a unidirectional relationship (K 86–7). Abstract machines must attend to the semiotic specificities of the components. Guattari’s distinction between abstract and concrete machines, just as that between assemblages and components, was not, in his most advanced theorizing, particularly significant (simply put, Guattari wrote that you can’t really separate the space race from the Apollo spaceship that put men on the moon, NASA, the Kennedy administration, etc., and if you insist on it, you end up in a vicious circle [CS 123–4]). All assemblages of enunciation concerning human beings are mixed (IM 52), as opposed to non-semiotic assemblages that concern the non-human worlds of bees and termites, for instance, where subjectivity doesn’t enter into the equation (CS 32), to the extent that they are derived as much from signification as from diagrammatism.

Figure 4.1 shows us how to intersect two planes with three categories in order to produce general types of relationships based on interactions across the lines between categories and in certain of the squares as opposed to others. Let’s say that such intersections may be further specified by the addition of subdivisions within the categories generated or by the addition of new dimensions. Regarding consistency, Guattari proposed three levels under the heading of existential coordinates:

Molar: effects with weak resonance (purely formal) and weak interactions (surplus value of stratified overcodings).

Molecular: effects with strong resonance across semantic, political, poetic, fields and strong interactions (faciality, refrains).

Abstract: found beyond coordinates in abstractions such as Capital and Power and in sign-particles that define the machinic nuclei of assemblages in terms of possibility (derivable from abstract machines).

These three levels of consistency (dynamic, non-homogeneous ensembles of different levels each of which have their own effects) are the concern of the two different domains of pragmatic components or
types of schizoanalysis: the *generative* type (interpretive, analogical and signifying) is interested in the effects of molar consistency, whereas the *transformational* type (non-interpretive, non-linguistic and a-signifying) looks into the effects of both molecular and abstract consistencies; recall that Guattari defined the machinic nucleus of an assemblage in terms of the crossing of diagrammatic consistencies of molecular and abstract. These are best thought of as two different approaches: the generative emphasizing weakness by loosening and untangling knots and avoiding crises, while the transformational would emphasize strong, creative, adventurous, mutational deterritorializations. Guattari then crossed the three coordinates of existential consistency with two coordinates of efficiency (redundancies of resonance: semiological, subjectifying) and machinic redundancies (interactive a-signifying diagrams) in order to produce six fields of consistency. In Figure 4.1 he worked on and across the six squares with his lines of classification based on degrees of formation. In Figure 4.5 he enlisted redundancies of resonance and machinic redundancies and three levels of consistency to create six segmented fields of consistency. Guattari then devoted his attention to the two fields under abstract consistency in order to develop the differences and relations between principles of abstraction and abstract machines; the former simulate the later in order to
Figure 4.6  Four general types of mixed assemblages of enunciation

actively neutralize and recuperate them, whereas the latter are never purely diagrammatic and the singularity traits they convey tend to proliferate on and across the former!

In a further diagram, Guattari intersected the two pragmatic components of generative and transformational with four criteria derived from redeploying Hjelmslev’s distinction between expression and content and their contraction, as well as the semiotic components at issue in the characterization of the type of enunciative assemblage defined as four general mixed types in a cluster of sixteen squares. (See Figure 4.6.)

This diagram reflects Guattari’s pragmatic approach to the unconscious, that is, one that links inextricably politics and language (all studies of language have a politics), and proceeds by means of a contrast between rhizomes and trees (rationalist, Chomskyan, revelatory Cartesianism). The rhizomatic approach eschews deep structure for a productive, creative, cartography. Guattari used broad categories which held multiple designations of essential pragmatic orientations: here, the pragmatic components (limit cases of two types of schizo-analysis) serve to distinguish between two general types of generative, interpretive transformations (analogical and semio-linguistic) from the
two general types of non-interpretive transformational components (intensive symbolic and diagrammatic). The four bracketed terms are the four semiotic components of the interpretive and non-interpretive pragmatic transformations, which are then further delineated in three ways by ‘functions of content’ — ‘articulations of content and expression’ — and ‘assemblages of enunciation’. The four mixed types are:

**One:** analogical generative transformations with semantic content generating semantic fields; these fields envelop their referents and the assemblages are territorialized on speaking subjects and collectives (i.e., clans).

**Two:** semio-linguistic generative transformations with signifying content centred on syntagmatic formations of linguistic units according to the principle of linearity generating fields of significance characterized by double articulations (segmentation of speech into its smallest meaningful units and their further division based on equivalence); while still subjective, these assemblages are more deterriorialized than the first since they put their referents at a distance (outside the system from which value issues).

**Three:** intensive symbolic and a-subjective transformations whose contents index referents through illocutionary speech acts, for instance, acts that are performed by the locution uniting saying and doing, as well as through refrains and faciality (components of passage), generating destratifying, machinizing, and desubjectifying lines of flight rather than fields, the assemblages of which are deterriorialized toward the collective and a-subjective.

**Four:** diagrammatic, a-subjective transformations with a-signifying content articulated on the plane of consistency in which the machinic assemblages display direct connections between form and matter.

Instead of drawing lines across and over the squares as we saw in Figure 4.1, Guattari explored the combinatorial possibilities of the squares of Figure 4.6 by means of transformations between semiotic components. Proceeding by twos, Guattari enumerated two pairs of transformations based on the interpretance/signifiance distinction:
1. i. C to A: a collective, a-subjective, deterritorialized assemblage is reterritorialized onto a field of interpretance; interestingly, Guattari used the idea of relations between semiotic systems – interpreting and interpreted systems – that yielded what may be called the imperial principle of linguistics (language is the interpreter of all semiotic systems and it combines two distinct modes of significance – at the level of the sign and discourse [Benveniste 1969: 132–3]) to illustrate how a fascist group is constituted through adherence to mystical components (IM 56); ii. D to B: a machinic a-subjective collective assemblage is (re)subjectified through a field of signifiance, the semantic field in which the meanings produced by discourse are ordered and cleaned up.

2. i. B to C: a subjective assemblage dominated by semio-logic is modified by means of ‘new indexical “charges”’ that Guattari described as involving the proliferation of meaning and sound (polysemy and homophony); ii. B to D: the content of a subjective, signifying assemblage escapes all representational devices in the midst of an a-subjective and a-signifying assemblage that has it jettison its formedness (i.e., sign-particles untying the knots of faciality and landscapicity or figure-ground).

The two pairs of remarks included by Guattari (which he takes up once again at the end of his discussion of assemblages) indicate two directional forces at work: the first territorializing, subjectifying, signifying and individuating; the second deterritorializing, desubjectifying, collectifying and machining. He specified that these were not elementary building blocks of a ‘machinic semiotic’. Some features are, however, more elementary than others and Guattari extracted these in order to establish three limited pragmatic fields on the basis of assemblages of enunciation, semiotic components and pragmatic fields, after the establishment of which he returned to the issue of transformations. Crossing three with three produced nine descriptors of three fields (read in order of assemblage, then field, then components):
I. territorialized symbolic fields of icons and indexes that result from multiple semiotic encodings (mythographic, gestural), but are not mutually translatable except through collective, rhizomatic pragmatics (problem solving) that conjoin without reducing them to a unifying substance of expression, while at the same time tolerating deterritorializations. We are in the neighbourhood of symbolic semiologies.

II. individuated, abstract signifying field of semiological triangulation in which heterogeneous semiotics become subordinate to and dependent upon a single signifying substance. Here, we are discussing semiologies of signification of the sort that Guattari noted above as an abstract capitalistic redundancy of resonance: an abstraction that neutralizes and hierarchizes, reterritorializes, subjectifies, individuates and organizes diverse semiotics (with a limited tolerance for diagrammatic sign-particles based on their compatibility with capitalistic abstraction) around capitalistic social relations (IM 63–4).

III. collective machinic a-signifying diagrammatic fields of sign particles (as per above, a-signifying semiotics) in which the semiotic machines are ‘flush’ with the social and material machines. Indeed, the semiotic-material distinction is no longer relevant. ‘What matters here,’ Guattari wrote, ‘is neither the existence of a particular differential index, nor that of a coding or a machine of signs: it is the “passage à l’acte” of an ensemble of quanta of deterritorialization’ (IM 69), that is, the maximization of diagrammatic potentiality by abstract machines, otherwise called experimentation with the virtual. It is interesting to note that the degree of tolerance of semiosic hybridization and deterritorialization increases from I–III although the indices of I and the abstractions of II remain, but occupy a secondary place, in the IIIrd field. This last consideration leads into the question of inter-field pragmatic transformations.

Guattari distinguished between assemblages that are transformed toward the generative (interpretive) and away from it toward the transformational (non-interpretive) pragmatic (C–A, D–B; B–C,
While the fields are based on the assemblages, which is a bit of an understatement, since they are generated by them, they are carefully distinguished because the transformations at stake move only toward the non-interpretive, that is, from the semiological to the semiotic: ‘four types of pragmatic fields that result from the “intrusion” of non-interpretive transformational components (symbolic and diagrammatic) into interpretive generative fields (analogical and signifying)’ (IM 71).

Why is this necessary? Well, semiological assemblages of enunciation imply the communicability of language, which Guattari wanted to displace as ‘merely one means among other of communication’ (IM 70). Recalling Figure 4.6, the semiotic components C and B enter the semiological components and produce four fields, respecting the general distinction between generative and transformational: C–A (field of interpretance; interpretive semiologies such as magic); C–B (field of signification; signifying semiologies of structural psychonalysis); D–A (scriptural symbolics, such as tarot and geomancy); D–B (scriptural diagrammatics like maths, informatics, music). It may happen, Guattari realized, that these fields could be put in reverse in such a way that the generative-interpretive would dominate the non-interpretive and this would find expression in the structuralization of the fields into universal subject positions (A–C hysteric; B–C paranoid; A–D phobic; B–D obsessional). In order to avoid this, Guattari emphasized the relative character of the fields and refused to give priority to those enumerated in his text. He illustrated this relativity in several examples of ‘mixity’ (which is a kind of guarantee) showing that fields dominated by one transformation may put another field into play as a form of resistance, stabilize or reterritorialize a determinatorializing subjective drift by allowing the latter to fulfil itself, and to acknowledge the haunting presence, even in the most determinatorialized pragmatic fields dominated by diagrammatism, of subjects of enunciation.

The basic concepts of Guattari’s semiotics discussed in this chapter were based on borrowings from Hjelmslev and Peirce, the manifestation of the abstract machines in the subtly differentiated component–assemblage-fields, as well as the constant injunction of mixity, which functioned at a number of levels from sign types to the avoidance of binarist reductions. What we will need to consider now is how Guattari developed an analysis of the plane of consistency, and how
Threes become Fours; how, in other words, we get from triangles to squares.

NOTES

1. Guattari thought that Freud repeatedly turned away from his greatest discoveries – the machinic vision of the Project (1895) and molecular multiplicities of the unconscious (‘The Unconscious’, 1915). But Guattari believed this of almost everyone from whom borrowed as he criticized them in some manner. Guattari explicitly linked his remarks on Freud with those concerning Noam Chomsky (IM 28). Chomsky’s generative grammar had a deleterious effect on linguists, thought Guattari, who have superficially reproduced the deep–surface structure distinction among other features of Chomsky’s formalism (especially his fondness for trees), and abandoned the initial machinic dimension of his work. In fact, Guattari attributed the conception of ‘abstract machine’ to Chomsky (IM 41, n. 29), a claim he repeated in Chs (23): ‘we find it in Chomsky’ but it is ‘too bound up with language’. Guattari would have had available to him in French translation Chomsky and Miller’s extraordinary essay on abstract automata (including Turing machines) in his investigation of competence and performance (Chomsky and Miller 1968). There is a certain irony to Guattari’s learned borrowing of terms from Chomsky. Guattari’s distinction between generative and transformational schizoanalysis is obviously borrowed from Chomsky’s distinction between base rules generating deep structures and transformational systems that map grammar onto surface structures, in addition to the weak generative capacity (of languages defined by his theory) as opposed to the strong generative capacity of linguistic structure (of systems of structural descriptions) also deployed by him (he limits himself to the former in the L’Analyse). But Guattari, while carefully balancing his observations, devotes a great deal of attention to the strong, molecular consistency, that escapes systems of redundancy, of the transformational type as opposed to the weak, molar interactions of the generative type. Guattari’s discussion of assemblages of enunciation in IM (70, n. 29) deliberately used Chomsky’s terminology in a way that gave it the exact opposite meaning: the discussion of the relationship between syntactic structures and semantic representation in Chomsky turns on the generation of grammatical relations by base rules and their transformational mapping onto surface structure as the phonological, phonetic and semantic components of propositions, whereas Guattari’s pragmatic transformational components (a-signifying, deterritorialized, ‘releasing’ abstract machines) ‘are first in relation to those components “generating” effects of signification and subjectification’.
CHAPTER 5

The Four Functors

PRELIMINARY CONCERNS

_Chaosmosis_ presented in compact form the more elaborate and complex analyses of the four functors developed in _Cartographies schizoanalytiques_. Just as _L’Inconscient machinique_ served as a workbook for _A Thousand Plateaus_, CS laid out in detail, excruciating for most readers, even those hardened by the mixed semiotics that animated the Hjelmslevian detour, the ontology upon which _Chaosmosis_ would be based. Some reviewers seem to have missed the significance of Guattari’s own books in framing _Chaosmosis_ between, for example, two collaborative works with Deleuze, ATP and _What is Philosophy?_: ‘A synopsis of the concerns of Félix Guattari in the decade between the publication of _A Thousand Plateaus_ and _What is Philosophy?_, _Chaosmosis_ combines the terminology of the former with the aesthetic and “ecosophic” drive of the closing chapters of the latter’ (Dowd 1996: 50). Between 1980 and 1991, Guattari published several important theoretical works, but especially relevant in this context were CS and _The Three Ecologies_ (both in 1989). The failure to look at Guattari’s own theoretical work and instead frame it through collaborations with Deleuze is a by-product of the erasure of Guattari, some of the effects of which I pointed to in chapter 1.

Whether the synoptic character of _Chaosmosis_ qualifies it as a popularization – chaasmotic cartographic schizoanalysis . . . for the masses – recalls a similar concern with Hjelmslev’s book _Language_ which was written for a popular series of linguistics texts for students rather than mass market consumption; ‘It is by no means simply a “glossematics for the millions”’ (Fischer-Jørgensen 1965: xv). Compared with CS, _Chaosmosis_ is pop, but not simply so. As I showed in chapter 2 with regard to the framing of transversality in early and later texts, _Chaosmosis_ touches upon many concepts that Guattari developed in
the 1960s. *Chaosmosis* is synoptic, with regard to the work of CS on the four functors, but is also a work that reaches back to key concepts in order to give them new codings. Decoding, recoding, mixing, hybridizing, distinguishing, typologizing: there is a torrent of semiosic activity in Guattari’s thought and it tends toward complexification.

One such coding has attracted the attention of numerous readers, some of whom may be counted among the contributors to the meta-scientific strain of criticism in the Deleuze and Guattari literature. In this strain, attention has been drawn not only to the general significance of philosophical biology and physics for their work, but also to the decisive influence of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela on Guattari’s later use of the concept of autopoiesis, especially in *Chaosmosis*. Although I will not pursue it at any length here, the expanded field of dialogue across ‘second-order cybernetics’, to use the felicitous expression of Heinz von Foerster, schizoanalytic metamodellization and the systems theory-based family therapy of Mony Elkaïm (1997) is still largely unmined. Of course, this assemblage has its own internal disequilibria, as lines of influence tend, inasmuch as Guattari borrows and adapts Maturana and Varela’s conception of autopoetic machines, taking it beyond the biological and individual (Chs 39) into social and technical systems: ‘Autopoiesis deserves to be rethought in terms of evolutionary, collective entities, which maintain diverse types of relations of alterity, rather than being implacably closed in on themselves’ (Chs 39–40). By the same token, Elkaïm attempted to renew the scientific foundations of the family therapy in which he was trained – ‘When I began working as a family therapist, I was taught that families function according to the laws that govern stable open systems’ (1997: xxix) – and found ‘inspiration’ in scientific works among which are counted Maturana and Varela’s work on human perception and the nervous system, in addition to Guattari’s nomenclature (assemblages, singularities, refrains), again adapted to his own ends. But Elkaïm (1997: 68) does not consider families strictly speaking as autopoetic machines.

One would need to inquire into the necessity of Guattari’s rethinking of the restrictions of Varela’s autopoietic machines given that, as Elkaïm points out, Varela also criticizes the biological individual as
epistemological ground (1997: 52). And in the same light, Ansell Pearson (1997: 195) has warned that ‘the claim that autopoetic systems are organizationally “closed” can be misleading if it is taken to imply that these systems do not interact with their environment. Such systems are closed simply in the sense that the product of their organization is the organization itself.’ Guattari’s introduction of a greater need for ‘diverse relations of alterity’, hence openness, against an unduly monadic, invariant, and stable autopoiesis, does not misunderstand Maturana and Varela’s idea of ‘operational closure’ at the level of organization, yet openness to perturbations at the level of structure, but objects to their recursive definition of environmental perturbations because they entail that encounters with alterity may destroy the machinic or are impossible since there are no truly independent inputs (such perturbations of structure being defined in the closed terms of organization, that is, specified and recognized as such, and for which compensations are constantly produced in the name of stability). In this respect, within the terms of operational closure of autopoietic machines, alterity is not truly alter, a source of dialectical enrichment, it is a ‘pretext’ based on internal rules and limits. This, it seems, is at the heart of Guattari’s need to rethink autopoietic machines. Yet Guattari, despite what Cary Wolfe (1995: 51) suggests, in abandoning certain postulates of first-order cybernetics for those of second-order thinkers (see 3E 54–5), does not easily fall into line with regard to second-order cybernetics, either. The restriction of autopoietic machines to the realm of the living is countered by Guattari when he clarified, for instance, that machines are not animals, that is, not living, but nonetheless autopoietic (Chs 34). Wolfe operates under the burden of an image of Deleuze and Guattari as practitioners of postmodern theory, to the broad currents of which he wants to connect second-order cybernetics.

Moreover, Guattari expressed doubts about systems-based family therapy in several places because it, for instance, risked objectivism in its analysis of videotapes of family discussions, thus not fully appreciating the interference of the observer on the system observed; it tended to fit families into the therapeutic scenes of subjectification it modelled, reducing heterogeneity and losing singularity for the sake of the repetition of situations; it suffered from a failure to accede to a
true metamodelization because too great an emphasis was still being placed by Elkaīm on classic, first-order cybernetic conceptions like the double bind (FFG I02–22 and Guattari 1989: 17; and 3E 55). Guattari was always restlessly borrowing, redefining, reapplying, crossing borders and orders, making him hard to pin down; as a friend once said, ‘what always . . . filled me with wonder was his singular capacity to “hold the two ends of the chain”’ (Chesneaux 2001: 544).

In discussing his specific conception of autopoetic machines, Guattari revisited his important distinction, dating from the late 1960s, between machine and structure, which belongs to a genealogy of machines in Guattari’s thought, from its Lacanian stirrings through the precise typology of breaks of desiring machines in AO (detachment [connective synthesis], slicing-off [disjunctive synthesis], residual [conjunctive synthesis]) to its autopoietic dimension. In *Chaosmosis*, machinic autopoesis cannot be unified and translated by a structure erected around a powerful single category such as the signifier, or a single principle, whose eternal redundancy haunts it (Chs 37). The supplementary dimension of alterity of the machinic is contrasted with the homeomorphism of the structural; the former is based on disequilibrium, the latter on equilibrium. It is this exterior reference to both human and non-human, virtual and actual universes, that allows the machinic to escape the totalizing hold of a structure that would overcode all of the networks in universes of reference, along the same principles, denying their singularity: ‘Machinic propositions elude the ordinary games of discursivity and the structural coordinates of energy, time and space’ (Chs 38). This makes the machinic unstructuralizable (unknowable and inarticulable at the level of the person, like the *objet petit a*) and especially not binarizable, and decisively ‘non-discursive, auto-enunciating, auto-valorizing, autopoetic’. The discussion of autopoesis in *Chaosmosis* regains Guattari’s earliest formulations of the machinic *objet petit a* even while explicitly rejecting ‘the well-known Lacanian principle: “a signifier represents the subject for another signifier” [or Guattari’s version of a group structure that represents the subject for another structure, PT 246]’ but while retaining the ‘partial enunciators in multiple domains of alterity’ (Chs 45) and, in addition, turns our attention once again to the Leninist break.

In a sobering vein, Guattari reflected (PT 247–8):
the question of revolutionary organization is that of putting into place an institutional machine whose distinctive traits would be an axiomatics and a practice that ensures it does not fall back on various social structures, especially on the state structure, apparent keystone of dominant relations of production, though it no longer corresponds to the means of production. The imaginary snare and trap is that nothing seems to be articulable today outside this structure. The revolutionary socialist project, which was set on the goal of seizing the political power of the State, considered as the instrumental basis of the domination of one class over another class, and the institutional guarantee of the control of the means of production, has itself been caught in this trap. It has structured itself as a trap to the extent that this objective, of such consequence for social consciousness, no longer corresponds to economic and social forces. The state such as we understand it is now completely decentred in relation to fundamental economic processes.

Guattari developed this insight in his typology of capitalisms to which I will turn in my Concluding Remarks. The Leninist break was machinic (a tautology, really, since machines make break[throughs]) from the moment when Lenin’s proposal for a tripartite party organization at the Second Party Congress in 1903 was passed. A break occurred which the Bolsheviks were at least initially able to exploit: ‘a revolutionary project, as a machination of an institutional subversion, should reveal such subjective potentialities and, at each stage in the struggle, protect them against their “structuralization”’ (PT 248). But a machine is not a single point or moment. It may resist the signifier, but may be seduced by its own fantasies of structure, caught in the trap of believing in the necessity of depending on a structure upon which the current economic situation of globalization would tell us one can no longer depend. The voice of Negri comes through here: not only will there be a need to rethink the top-down minority vanguard of Lenin (an external organization, despite its adequacy, given the composition of the working class, at that time; hence the need for a Lenin–Luxembourg rapprochement (CLU 162–4), but that the state is deterritorialized and integrated into IWC (technologically progressive, socially conservative, with the state pushed to the third
position behind production and the market, and which promotes ‘increased participation in the trans-national space of valorization’ [GR 245]). What is required is a radical questioning of the socialist strategy of seizing the state and then withering it away in light of its displacement and subsequent mutational forms.

The rhizome of the Leninist break[through] that Guattari drew in IM (184) may have begun in 1903, and had to weather many setbacks, even if organizationally its future had already been outlined a year earlier in theory in What is To Be Done? – the machine of the Leninist party with a vanguard of full-time professional revolutionaries. But by the early 1920s with the New Economic Policy, the intractable problems of the bureaucractic caste, economic crises, the revolution itself, war, Lenin’s strokes and death, etc., the map of the break-through would lead to the dictatorship of Stalin: ‘The fact that this Leninist “transformation” ultimately swung over into the field of redundancy of Stalinist bureaucratism shows that, in this domain, the systems of maps and tracings can always reverse themselves, that no structural foundation, no theoretical legitimation, can definitively uphold a revolutionary “competence”’ (IM 183). This ‘new map of the political unconscious’ was followed by other maps, especially during the First International which, as Guattari noted, ‘literally “invented” a new type of deterritorialized working class’ based on Lenin’s optimism about the success of proletarian revolution and the model of the Soviets around the world.

Despite his penchant for scientistic – albeit critically contested – codings, Guattari’s later writings retain the political acuteness that animated the paradoxes of desire and machinism through an explicit Lacanian–Leninist ligature. By the time of IM, the Leninist break was deployed as a lesson about the impasses of molecular revolution, namely, molar Stalinism; yet even there Guattari’s optimism allowed him to imagine a micropolitical schizoanalysis that would not fall back on ‘organizational, programmatic or theoretical instruments but, fundamentally on mutations in social pragmatics’ (IM 183). The renewal of Communism with Negri, the development of the theory of IWC with Alliez, and the scientific codings of machines, are the consequences of continually calling into question inherited ‘general laws’ and uncritical presuppositions. This is why, in an important respect,
there are so many codings of basic concepts in Guattari’s work; and
this necessitates revisiting them in light of emerging criticisms and
more and more subtle ways of discerning their features. Scientific
borrowings cannot be isolated from politics, psychoanalysis, semiotics,
poetry, painting.

I indicated in the course of chapter 2 when I first mentioned the
four functors, that they were recoded (like the redundancies) against
and beyond psychoanalysis (Chs 126). We have already considered the
machine, how it was coded afresh by autopoiesis and what Guattari
thought was lacking in its original conception, that is, an alterity that
freed it from structure and could be deployed in many registers – the
ontological modalities of machinic alterity are infinite (Chs 44–5). It is
time to turn to the ontology of the functors, but not before briefly
considering the specification that it is transversal.

TRANSVERSAL ONTOLOGY

In chapter 2, I explained how Guattari developed his concept of
transversality in a clinical context in terms of the prevailing conceptual
architecture of Freudian theory. A concise working definition of
transversality is that in a clinical context it is a measure (a so-called
coefficient) of how much communication exists between different
levels, in different directions, of an organization. The goal is to
increase the coefficients of transversality, that is, to reduce blindness
and bureaucratic-mindedness in favour of openness, overcoming the
impasses of both vertical and horizontal organizations, by means of
creative organizational innovations such as la grille. Let’s say that Lenin
could not solve the problem posed by an intransigent bureaucracy,
tsarist and bourgeois administrators – with red ribbons in their
buttonholes! – and hence failed to increase the coefficients of bureau-
cratic transversality through purges in the judiciary, radical decree after
decree, appointments of revolutionaries, growing authoritarian central-
ism, and the like, in the years after the Revolution. Or transdiscipli-
narity must explore its transversality, initiating new connections
between science–society–ethics–aesthetics–politics, while struggling
against reductionistic academic versions of this process that have
become increasingly pegged on profit (corporate campuses) or accept-
ing of multidisciplinary fuzziness without real institutional commitments, or simply highjacked as further exploitations of existing power imbalances in given institutions between the sciences and the humanities (the coefficient of transversality of which would be zero because no relation would exist between the benefits predicted by interdisciplinary formations and what actually resulted from them in terms of activities undertaken by each of the participating disciplines). There is more than a single coefficient in any institution. An increase in the coefficients of transversality within different levels of the clinical institution required redefining the relations between staff and patients, the modification of the superego of groups, initiation of new dialogue within and between groups, and between those inside and outside the walls.

Guattari’s early explanations were marked by such Freudian couplets as latent–manifest and conscious–unconscious. As transversality was deployed in *Chaosmosis*, the clinical referent slipped into the background for the sake of foregrounding the character of the ontology defined partially by the functors and their relations. Additionally, Guattari rejected typical couplets from Heidegger and Sartre, yet without completely abandoning a ‘phenomenological’ perspective (Chs 60): ‘No couplet – Being–being, Being–Nothingness, being–others – can claim the status of an ontological binary digit’ (Chs 38). *Chaosmosis* is not forthcoming on what makes it phenomenological, although it doesn’t exclude description of mental processes and their correlates. Even though Guattari is dismissive of Heideggerian ontology on the grounds that it tried to grasp the ‘univocal truth of Being through techné’ (Chs 53), this is a contentious point to say the least since phenomenological method is often mistakenly thought of as techné – procedures and rules that allow one to get the right results – and there is much to recommend the position that Heidegger rejected consideration of his phenomenological method of the thinking of being, especially in *Being and Time*, as techné.

The importance of the Fourth category was explained by Guattari not merely in terms of eluding the tyranny of couplets, ontological or otherwise, or even Threes, but as the addition of another term that would be ‘an nth term: it is the opening onto multiplicity’ (Chs 31); or, in CS (93), ‘3 plus n’. No advantage is given to signifying binaries.
(syntagmatic chains, syntaxes, etc.) or to triangulations and Threes, although both occur. The assemblages of enunciation remain open in a radical way because ‘no ontological plinth is given. . . . Being crystallizes through an infinity of enunciative assemblages associating actualized discursive components . . . with non-discursive, virtual components’ (Chs 58–9). Creativity, complexification, openness, singularity: these are preserved in the metamodel of the four functors against the fixity of structures, universals and simplifications of inherited coordinates.

The schizoanalytic metamodelization of *Chaosmosis* corresponds to the cartographic analytics of the functors of deterritorialization in CS (39ff). Guattari’s theoretical goal, he explained, in developing the four functors was first and foremost to avoid submitting schizoanalytic cartographies of subjectification to the scientistic superego that prevails over all psychological work (CS 47). His *aesthetic* reorientation had nothing to gain by mimicking science; it connected itself instead with a fictional map that engendered its territory. In this sense, the ‘ontological pragmatics’ of non-representational cartographies of subjectification ‘consisted in deploying and putting into intensive concatenation specific existential qualities’ (CS 52) that gave shape to ‘crystals of singularization’. This is the practice of transformational pragmatics, and the language of *crystallization*, from CS to Chs, entails the singularity of Being’s incarnation (otherwise annexed by a single signifying economy that obscured the ‘points of ontological crystallization’ [Chs 59], generating heterogeneities from ‘crystals of ontological auto-affirmation’ [CS 204–5]). Guattari described the ‘onto-logic’ in Chs as a ‘machinics of existence whose object is not circumscribed with fixed, extrinsic coordinates’ (Chs 65). As an aside, the consistency between IM and Chs on the site of transformational pragmatic–analytic intervention in the name of ontological heterogeneity is remarkable even with the myriad of new codings that the latter work accrued: the modification (discernibilization, proliferation, diagrammatization) of the machinic nuclei of assemblages became nuclei of virtual autopoesis that are modified first by their discernibilization (toward their actualization), diagrammatization (changing their material of expression), and then by proliferation through transversal relations between components, but without the heavy semiotic of the
molecular passages of signs (IM 193–4; Chs 61). An obvious difference from IM to CS and Chs is that there are more inaccessible realms in the less rationally semiotic later formulations (i.e., whereas machinic nuclei of assemblages in IM are discerned at the crossroads of different types of consistency [molecular and abstract machinic], the autopoetic nuclei of the machinic multiplicities, slipping out of the semiotic register and into the transversal assembling of ‘partial enunciations’ [unformed matter], are ‘inaccessible’, especially their incorporeal dimensions, Chs 24; 31).

Guattari’s diagrams and tables of the four functors and the domains proper to each tell us a great deal about his attempts to overcome simple problems of doubling couplets (all sorts of reductive dualisms), of evoking logical and semiotic squares in a segmental quadrature of deterritorialization (the four domains result from segmentation of the plane of consistency). In CS (41) Guattari wrote of the ‘two couples’ that constituted the four categories – actual and virtual and possible and real – to which he added other couples – some familiar, like expression and content (Chs 60) and some less familiar but with a broadly semiotic lineage. (See Figures 5.1a and 5.1b.) By the time of Chs, Guattari saw the expression and content couple as a problem to be overcome because it was still too much stained by linguistics and automatic contraction that would restrict the openness of assemblages of enunciation (the detour became a dead end). His references to the left and right hand sides of the figure further exacerbated the question of whether or not his Fourth term constituted an advance over the ingenious Threes discussed in the previous chapter since he kept adding couple upon couple. The Threes are still very much at work here. Guattari advanced by analogy with the important form–substance–matter distinction – which he profoundly modified to describe diagrammatic deterritorialization by means of sign-particles between form and matter (IM 224–5) – in relation to the Fours: just as substance is the manifestation of form in matter, existential Territories are the manifestation of incorporeal Universes and machinic Phylums in material Fluxes (CS 84, n. 1), given that substance is akin to Territory, Universes and Phylum are akin to form, and Fluxes are akin to matter (unformed). The abstract machines of the domain of Phylum are a new coding of the a-signifying semiotics with a purchase on material fluxes
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**Figure 5.1a** Assemblage of the four functorial domains

**Figure 5.1b** Expanded field of the four functorial domains
THE FOUR FUNCTORS

(Flux), whereas the existential incarnation (Territory) of the incorpo-
real constellations (Universe) metamodel as virtual rather than actual
the former relation.

However, Guattari used the example of two options of Freudian
cartography as they concerned libido and the unconscious to demon-
strate the core features of Figure 5.1a. On the left side, libido either
pursues a deteritorialized option toward abstract matters of the
possible (Phylum), or is reterritorialized into the psychogenetic stages
and dualisms (Eros–Thanatos) of stratified Fluxes; on the right side,
the unconscious explores deteritorialized lines of alterity that are both
original and unheard-of (Universes) or takes refuge in the Territories
of the repressed according to various reterritorializing maps of the
mind that Freud developed over the course of his career, most
pertinently, between the dream book and the ‘The Unconscious’, ‘Ego
and the Id’, and ‘New Introductory Lecture 31’. (CS 44–7; Chs 62).
Guattari was also, like Freud, mapping the unconscious. Without being
reductionistic, Guattari’s cartography of the schizoanalytic unconscious
is situated against but in the tradition of the Freudian metapsychology of
diagramming the psychical topography and the two systems (Cs. [Pcs.]
Ucs.), description of their characteristics, communications, conflicts,
classifications (of instincts), and emergence of the Ego–Id–Superego –
the three regions – or indeed, the Lacanian tripartite system of Real–
Imaginary–Symbolic. Guattari took great pains to decentre his cartog-
raphy from the linguistic signifier, from the many psychoanalytic
dualisms (primary–secondary process); to render the domains contin-
gent and evolutionary in relation to technology, art and science, and
avoid reductive prototypes of subjectivity (CS 32ff). Whether or not
he was successful will need to be carefully considered.

What is the Fourth/nth term, anyway? How many is an open
Three? The diagramming of the transversal relations between hetero-
genous domains: material and energetic Fluxes (F); an abstract
machinic Phylum (P); existential Territories (T); leaves incorporeal
Universes (U) that escape the coordinates of F, P, and T (CS 74). The
Fourth term is the virtual possible and, together with the actual
possible, these envelop the actual real and virtual real. Guattari linked
both powerlessness and unreachable foundations with Twos; pyramidal
dialectical trees with Threes, and the generation of non-prioritized,
proliferating trans-entity interactions that respected the principle of autopoesis with Fours.

Of course, Guattari grafted other codings over the Hjelmslevian analogy. In CS, he introduced a variety of means of defining the values and characteristics of the four domains, especially in relation to the energy (generalized and loosened from the Freudian coordinates, ultimately from the death drive), levels and entities proper to each in the schizoanalytic unconscious, the constraints of the metamodel and arguments supporting it. Guattari’s model of the unconscious had three types of energetic-semiotic quantic configurations describing inter-entity relationships: non-separability, or synchronic compossibility (intrinsic reference); separability or diachronic complementarity involving time and becoming (extrinsic reference); and quantification operating between non-separability and separability, but not subordinate to them (non-separability being the semiotic superstructure of separability; quantification being the pragmatic superstructure of separability). Each had their own tensors (although Lyotard used this concept to describe a singular point of libidinal intensity such as Dora’s throat against the semiotic nihilism that a sign stands for something for someone, this extra-semiotic element produced libidinal intensity through force and singularity, like a proper name, as opposed to signifying meaning through differentiation; 1993: 54–6) and because Guattari was concerned with describing inter-entity relations by means of this mathematically derived concept, it may be thought of as a generalized vector of such relations. These relations, about which more will be written shortly, are constrained by those between the levels of the unconscious that Guattari presented (it is evident from Figure 5.1a that there are not, for example, direct connections between Fluxes and Universes and Territories and Phylums, but Guattari invented indirect links by means of synapses). So, in the first instance, one of the tensors of non-separability is Expression and Content (extrinsic reference of deterritorialization) and the other is System and Structure (intrinsic reference of deterritorialization). Both concern deterritorialization and this axis occupies the place of both possible and real in Figure 5.1a (where possible was, infinite, irreversible, deterritorialization, far from equilibrium, shall be; and where
the real was, finite, reversible deterritorialization close to equilibrium shall be (CS 86)). The tensors of separation are semiotic (engendering laterally, from their point of origin, sites of entities of meaning – hence largely Territorial functions) and the surplus value of possibility, which relays the site of entities of meaning and transfers them, via synapses of effect – situated between Fluxes and Phylums – and affect – situated between Territories and Universes – to pragmatic effects and subjective affects. The tensors of quantification are synaptic: they are, as I just suggested, relays for the transfer of the surplus value of possibility toward the sites of entities polarized as either systematic or structural. As I indicated in Figure 5.1a, each domain has a figure in which entities are situated: Fluxes=Complexions; Phylums=Rhizomes; Territories=Cut-outs; Universes=Constellations. Although Guattari preferred to diagram the domains as four parallel sub-ensembles in a topological space in order to give some depth to an otherwise two-dimensional diagram such as Figure 5.1a and its variations, the latter were commonly used.

As for the metamodel’s constraints, there are restrictions on direct tensorial relations that I have already mentioned (but which the synapses mediate); tensorial relations are subject to dissynchrony; and the levels, corresponding to the three configurations governing inter-entity relations but based upon order of presupposition: Level 1 has no presuppositions; Level 2 presupposes Level 1 (semiotic); Level 3 presupposes Levels 1 and 2 (pragmatic and subjective). Guattari’s work is not very far removed in spirit from what Freud and Lacan did in their diagrams and algorithms. Freud even went so far as to compensate for weaknesses in his diagrams, asking his audiences to make mental corrections. Constraints include how the id relates to the external world only via the ego, the specification of certain types of entities (cathetic intensities that are mobile or not), and topographic relations of semiological algorithms defined by two cumbersome structures (metaphor and metonymy), etc. Despite Guattari’s warnings about the profound modification of psychoanalysis by schizoanalysis, he continu-ally introduced codings that suggested precisely the diminishment of such modifications. For example, the fourfold segmentation of domains on the plane of consistency is based on two arguments:
1. for discursivity, an ontological argument: if there is a given (donné), there is thus giving (donnant);
   - unitary, discontinuous divisions of Territories and constellations of Universes (giving);
   - plural, continuous, fusional complexions of Fluxes and rhizomes of Phylums (given);
2. for deterritorialization, a cosmological argument: two domains of intrinsic reference without immediate intersection yield a given corresponding to an intrinsic systematic reference and a giving corresponding to an intrinsic structural reference;
   - finite, reversible, deterritorialization referenced around a point of equilibrium;
   - infinite, irreversible deterritorialization referenced far from a point of equilibrium

The problem is that giving–given corresponds to expression–content as does structure–system, on top of which Guattari develops his division of the unconscious into three levels reflecting the later topography of Freud’s ego–id–super–ego model, a primary, secondary, and tertiary unconscious, each with their own tensors. Remember the pairings that pile up in the two-dimensional Figures 5.1a and 5.1b, with their expansions, are worked by processual cycles (Figure 5.2) and seem to lack real depth. Guattari struggled with representing the four domains (CS 80).

**Level 1. Primary Unconscious**

Level of Intrinsic Reference: Systems and Structures
Reversible Tensors:
(a) systemic referent, on the side of the given between sites of entities of Flux and those of Phylums (left side of Figure 5.1a) (i.e., systems that articulate material and energetic Fluxes on abstract machinic rhizomes);
(b) structural referent, on the side of giving, between sites of Territorial entities and incorporeal Universes (right side of Figure 5.1a) (i.e., a musical structure that crystallizes rhythms, melodies of incorporeal Universes; a biscuit that conjures an incorporeal Universe of another time and place but, through globalization,
becomes available everywhere, leads to the Universe’s implosion, and the existential Territories of subjectivity become ambivalent about their own taste).

SUMMARY: F=complexion; P=rhizome; T=cut-out; U=constellation.

Level 2. Secondary Unconscious
Level of Extrinsic Reference: Semiotic Tensors
Irreversible Tensors of:
(a) persistence, vectorized from Systems to Structures (from given to giving):
– sensible tensors virtualizing sensible contents within existential Territories (i.e., cutting out from diverse Fluxes a refrain of territorialization in an ethological assemblage, as in the Stagemaker’s upturned leaves on its display ground selected from the Flux of leaves);
– noematic tensors virtualizing the noematic contents within Universes (i.e., smile of the Cheshire cat, unlocalizable as a point in space);
(b) tensors of transistency, vectorized from structures to systems (giving to given):
– diagrammatic tensors actualizing diagrams in Fluxes (i.e., a machine-readable magnetic strip of a bank card that, in conjunction with a personal identification number, provides access to an account);
– machinic tensors actualizing abstract propositional expressions in rhizomic Phylums (i.e., the incorporeal faciality of Christ projected on machinic capitalist Phylums, already traversing spaces before being deployed; already always there).

SUMMARY: F–T=sensible; T–F=diagrammatic; P–U=noematic; U–P
– machinic.

Level 3. Tertiary Unconscious
Persistence and Transistency: Pragmatic (between F and P) and Subjective (between T and U) Synapses
(adjusting the three configurations of non-separation, separation and quantification in different ways on earlier Levels: on L1, in the presentification of the backwards-looking potentialities of Systems and Structures; on L2, forward looking surplus value of possibility of semiotic concatenations)

(a) **Bivalent synapses** result from the conjunction of two *afferent* tensors of consistency — F and P — effect of extrinsic coding (i.e., perception without foundation, hallucination) and T and U — affect of extrinsic ordination (i.e., a ‘real impression’ of a dream).

(b) **Trivalent synapses** result from the conjunction of two *afferent* tensors and one *efferent* tensor resulting in:
   - Consistency F — closed systemic effect (i.e., closed cybernetic loop);
   - Consistency P — open systemic effect (i.e., micro-social systems upon which family therapy strives to intervene);
   - Consistency T — closed structural affect (i.e., function of the mature Freudian topography);
   - Consistency U — open structural affect (i.e., becoming vegetable, child, animal).

(c) **Tetravalent synapses** either associate effects of extrinsic coding (consistency F and P) with open and closed systemic synapses or affects of extrinsic ordination (consistency T and U) with open and closed structural synapses:
   - pragmatic synapse (between F and P): an affect is virtualized when an assemblage is polarized by a relation of persistence emanating from pragmatic to subjective;
   - subjective synapse (between T and U): an effect is actualized when an assemblage is polarized by a relation of transistence emanating from subjective to pragmatic (hence, a play of virtual persistent implosion and actual transistent expansion without destroying the two poles of effect and affect).

**SUMMARY:** F–P=open systemic effect; P–F=closed systemic effect; T–U=open structural affect; U–T=closed structural affect. (Note: summary based on correction to Table 3, CS 91; see also the tensors and entities mapped in CS 83.)
Schizoanalysis encounters the primary unconscious indirectly (through its second and third levels mediations; or, as Freud once put it, through dreams and neuroses), and exercises no influence over it. However, things are different on the second level. Here, schizoanalysis works on all of the facets of the components of semiotization (i.e., multiplying or reducing them; heightening discernibilization or globalizing their operations [CS 87]). No prejudice for the actual (effects) over the virtual (affects) exists at the third level in the schizoanalytic study of assemblages, thus no privilege is accorded to what is clear and distinct, neatly castrated and capitalized. The preservation of complexity that is the heart of the progressive discernibilization of unconscious levels, interactions and processes, required Guattari to continually graft new codings upon his elementary metamodels. Does this grafting, especially when it involves semiotic couplets such as afferent (leading to)—efferent (conducting away), and system—structure, diachrony—synchrony, and endo—exo (in the sprawling suburbs of Figure 5.1a), constitute a creeping return to the sort of structuralism that Guattari sought to overcome, albeit in a mongrel form? Is this a mongrel semiotics beyond hybridity and mixity, a fuzzy proliferation? While mongrelization is an effect of the discernibilization of heterogeneities, schizoanalysis aligns itself with a dynamic view of structure dominated by functions – a fourfold, self-organizing ontology – that borrows from the various contributors to the study of structure (from Saussure to Chomsky and beyond), yet reverses some of the basic principles of structure such as stability, predictability and simplicity. Still, the homological constancy of different variations of the four domains is accomplished by the addition of pairs of terms. The question that needs to be kept in mind as we turn to Guattari’s treatment of the assemblages of enunciation in terms of the four functors, but by revisiting the expression–content distinction and form–substance–matter relations that defined the category of a-signifying semiotics, is how mongrelization preserves transversality. Why are the diagrams so complex? They have to be, for as I mentioned in chapter 2 in my discussion of the grid of work rotation, it is relatively easy to grasp the idea using a few persons, but imagine what it would be like when 150 persons were in the system, in dynamic tension, producing singularities.
The treatment of the assemblages of enunciation in the CS provides a striking example of how Guattari regained earlier models and worked them into new formulations with all of their complex codings and grafts. In CS, Guattari revisited the assemblages of enunciation in a way that complexified his approach in IM, reviewed above in chapter 4. Here, the relations described still concern characteristics of the heterogeneity proper to the assemblages. When this heterogeneity develops within a register of the same entities it is said to be striated; and if it involves transformations between registers of entities it is smooth. Guattari described the processual cycle of striated/smooth relations across the four domains in two ‘passes’ or ‘approaches’ that are distinguished by the directionality of the ‘cycle’ around the square of the four domains (Flux–Phylum–Universe–Territory) as opposed to full birectionality between domains (F–P; P–U; U–T; T–F). Regarding birectionality between domains, a clockwise procession means the cycle of assemblages engages new domains, while a counterclockwise recession modifies those previously passed through. (See Figure 5.2)

By definition, however, smoothing is a function of ontological
conversion and thus is locatable between the domains; whereas striation is a process by which virtuality and possibility are enriched and in this respect is found in each of the four domains proper. The state that results from a ‘passive’ ontological mutation (smooth) is nourished with new potentialities by an ‘active’ process (striation). Each smooth space has a character specific to its conversion function and frames, on either axis, a given domain (so that the striated domain of instantiated Flux is the product of two smoothings, the first on the axis F–T, that is, a sensible, cognitive, affective, territorialized existential homogenization, and secondly, on the axis F–P, a machinic opening to the possible, more deterritorialized, in the extraction of traits — giving expression to them and ultimately, passing from the expressive to the intensive striated domain of the machinic Phylum in which such traits constitute abstract machines — from the discontinuous, striated Flux, articulating the Fluxes in a bipolarized Expression–Content double). This analysis of the transformations and passages and relations of heterogeneity refigures the general types of mixed assemblages based on the distinction between generative-interpretive analogic and semiotic and transformational non-interpretive symbolic and diagrammatic, the three fields of concatenation of components and assemblages, and inter-pragmatic field transformations of IM. But the question of transformative passages (between domains) remains vitally important, as does the concept of fields (of manifestation, F and T and possibility, P and U), and the diverse ways in which components are, in general, associated. Much of Guattari’s treatment of the domains is taken up with details about a fairly fundamental transformation between sensible and incorporeal fields, and how to avoid the problems of Platonism. Figure 5.2 shows Guattari’s smooth and striated assemblages of enunciation (I have not exhausted the types of smooth and striated realtions between domains). The two ‘passes’ are indicated by different arrows. This corresponds to how Guattari worked on the assemblages in ‘phases’. Let’s consider their operations:

I. sensible smoothness = linearization (discursive sequences of redundancies);
II. striated instantiated Fluxes = sequencing (digitalization and binarization);
III. machinic smoothness = possibilization by means of the Expression–Content polarization (energetic conversion of static molar Fluxes to dynamic molecular possibility);

IV. rhizomatic striation = interaction of possibilities in abstract machines (association of heterogeneous components as in the wasp–orchid example that supercedes a bipolar relation by traversing individuals, evolution of the species, ecological niches, etc.);

V. incorporeal smoothness = phase spaces and their deterritorializing transitions that are paradoxical in their mixiture of traits (infinitely slow and fast; distinct and non-distinct);

VI. striation of virtual states = auto-affirming incorporeal enunciations singularized in new and unpredictable constellations of Universes of reference (fecund moments that overshadow other moments, jockeying for position);

VII. auto-referential smoothness = intensive, internal, pure affirmation of difference (being-for-itself or ontological autonomy);

VIII. existential striations = crystals of ontological auto-affirmation generate alterity and heterogeneity which are captured in new fields of possibility (existential finitude).

SUMMARY: Relations of compossibility between P and U mean that traits are not truly discernible, whereas there is a real distinctiveness (separation and determinability) of traits between F and T. I have emphasized in my ordering the directionality of the first pass. The domain of Universes – striations of virtual states is the Fourth term, the aesthetic paradigm of universes of art works. The Universes of artworks are valorized as a kind of transversal creativity and uncertainty (irreducible to art as such, but a paradigm for liberation of every kind, Chs 91), from which follows an ethical-political responsibility for the thing created (Chs 107).

What is striking about Guattari’s approach may be seen most clearly in Figures 5.1a and 5.1b, and earlier in Figures 4.5 and 4.6: the matriciel (matrix or gridlike) crossing of dimensions and their various codings (I have not discussed many of Guattari’s codings of the four
domains, especially those concerning functions, time, causality, myth [see CS 234]). This strategy dispenses with linearization and uses both vertical and horizontal axes to guarantee a transversal intersection between virtual, non-discursive domains and actual, discursive domains (T, U and F, P, respectively in Figure 5.2). Guattari’s cartographies of the schizoanalytic unconscious outlined in summary form in this chapter, and elsewhere in this book, are designed to allow for the production of assemblages of enunciation in which points of singularity in a given situation are discerned and preserved. Gridlike figures, to use a slightly different terminology, capture the see-saw or dance of chaos and complexity – speaking with your mouth full – in which a differentiated, chaotic flux of a mouthful of food (inside) and an outside of complexity, elementary articulations of speech, is interfaced by orality (which doesn’t mean, Guattari noted, that cartography is bound to speech or that complexity must be reduced to language, or a psychogenetic stage). This is not psychoanalytic orality but a machinic orality that ‘speaks with its mouth full . . . in the same space, it is complexity in chaotic involution and simplicity in the process of infinite complexification’ (Chs 88). But ‘capture’ is not quite the right word; capture and release is perhaps better because the constellation of incorporeal Universes, understood pragmatically, capture a situation but also ‘release’ or produce lines of virtuality the exploration of which may open fields that contribute to a patient’s resingularization (Chs 17–18). Recall that domain U is n, radically open, to whatever power is required. It is also evident that Guattari’s metamodel operated by a single constraint that made it different from the semiotic square: a constraint on inter-functorial interactions (and hence on the character of assemblages) since there is no direct contact (tensorial relations) between F and U and T and P. In the semiotic square, the categories are generated by means of different kinds of operations/relations beginning from corner to corner contradiction. All models have constraints, of course, which prevent them from collapse, but orient the generation of terms. The assemblage of the four functors puts a great deal of emphasis on peripheral expansions and passages and the mediating roles of synaptic effect/affect between striated corners of F and P and T and U (the micro-striations of each which were treated in great detail by Guattari, but not described here and he
expanded upon Figure 5.2 by considering each domain’s ‘enunciative’
dimensions and how they interact with each other [CS 234]; for
instance, each inter-domain relation is dominated by a particular kind
of operation and function: singularization/synaptic – activation and
opening of deterritorialized references (unpredictable transports of the
Proustian kind) [P–U]; heterogenesis/pathic – exploration of the
unknown virtuality of substances (madeleine) [T–U]; irreversibiliza-
tion/diagrammatic – catalysis of selection and conversion (baked batter
in madeleine moulds) [P–F]; and necessitation/existential – machinic
material of expression (batter) [F–T]). My goal in this chapter has not
been to provide an exhaustive review of Guattari’s descriptions of the
four functorial domains but to outline some of their major features.

If a life could be diagrammed, and not even Freud believed this as
the scope and power of psychoanalysis was progressively diminished; if
all of the threads, to use Freud’s metaphor, of a life could be pulled
and displayed in a great tangled multitextured heap overflowing with
knots, broken pieces, and great spools (like the tangle of frenzied lines
in the aleatoric Bussotti score from ATP 3 [Genosko 1998: 73ff]), and
an analyst could, together with analysand, unravel the heap, spread it
out, unknot and knot as appropriate without neatly tying it up through
a reductive representation but, instead, producing new forms from
which analytic cartographies would be fashioned, then one would need
to establish domains, their entities and relations, the characteristics of
the concatenation of their components, but without losing sight of the
little snags that bear a world and would be lost if assimilated to a
backwards-looking symbolic hermeneutic in the face of such a daunting
task. This is what is expected of a schizoanalytic cartography, despite
its perilous homologies with the psychoanalytic topography, and the
incessant addition of new codings that bear an alarming resemblance to
the dichotomies of structuralism and are written up in encyclopedias
of semiotics. Guattari made evident, through repeated warnings, that
representation was not the goal; that pragmatic deployment was only
possible if complexity was preserved and flexibility maintained; and,
that all of the codings attached to the metamodels (the details of which
I have only been able to hint at in this chapter) allow complexity to be
preserved.
Closing Statement

If this book has a numerology that suggests the contours of Guattari’s thought, it is this: neither One, nor Two, but some of Three, and definitely Four, and more. While seductive, little formulas can be dangerous, especially when they run backwards. AO taught as much: ‘4,3,2,1,0 – Oedipus is a race for death’ (359). The Oedipal machines reduce all sociodesiring production to 3, augmented with One or More, but not to infinity.

So, let the cutdown begin: 4 – the mobile phallus; 3 – flexible familialism (no daddy? how about an uncle or neighbour?); 2 – either the father or mother kills a child; and 1 – narcissism (cyclical repetition); 0 – the ego encounters its own death. Blastoff! Thanatos. The problem is that Eros turns out not to be merely a series of cardinal numbers because it rejects 1, (already being opposed to 0) and is intersected by Two, Three plus n (ordinal coordinates). One is already two because it is binarizable in many different possible ways (cardinal/ordinal; intratextual/continental theory of reference or extratextural analytic philosophical approach), then triangulated (all of the operations on the basic triangular representation of reference in Figure 4.4, pyramidal organization, tight-knit family Eros), and released by the Fourth term, guarantor of the exploration of possibility, of the infinite in the finite (3 + n, the fourth functor, quadrangular); yet, this is what also happens to Oedipus when it is structuralized as empty loci whose relationships require a mediating Fourth term (empty phallic functor), which makes Oedipus portable and adaptable and thus all the more valuable for psychoanalytic missionaries (Oedipus in Africa, why not?). The addition of a Fourth term may actually contribute to the accomplishment of both binarization and extended triangulation. The contours of Guattari’s thought are dogged at every step by the psychoanalytic numerology. This is why Guattari’s sense of 1, 2, 3, 4 . . . ran ahead of itself.
NEITHER ONE

Overcoding issues from a centrepoint, from One (State, God, Signifier, King’s English, Universal time). The universal principle is One, origin of transcendent formalism, the risk of glossematic algebra, the compromise formation called consensus. Cogito is also One, molar phenomenological point, shipwrecked Cartesian ego, as opposed to a molecular subjectivity: ‘An infinity of creative assemblages without the intervention of a supreme Creator . . . such are the objects of a new type of analysis of the unconscious’ (IM 164). Already One is Two: molar and molecular – they are continuous and mutually convertible, the former being the political zero degree of the latter, but they are dissymmetrical in their ends (IM 161). Likewise, subject groups decay into subjugated groups, while the latter may find their voices, assume responsibility and expose themselves to the risk of the outside.

NOR TWO

Guattari fulminated against ‘Manichean dualities’ (GR 264) such as rich and poor, north and south, and all related ‘old reference systems based on an oppositional split of left–right, socialist–capitalist, market economy–state planned economy . . . ’ (GR 270). Guattari looked beyond these tired reference systems, rather than trying to find a centre equidistant from either pole or a dialectical synthesis that would collapse back or forward onto One. Yet depolarization had acute political consequences: leading to multipolar perspectivalism and the sluggishness of amorphous conditions lacking democratic tension (beyond left and right wasn’t necessarily the ecological movement, but rightwing extremism). One was already Two, and Two was already Three: in the sense that ’a binary notation, in fact, always rests on three elements if the existence of the separation between the signs is taken into consideration’ (PT 136). Two is already Three: the mediating object of the dual analysis, the third spaces and or objects of institutional pedagogy and analysis, are prime examples. Fernand Oury and C. S. Peirce were the masters of Threes to whom Guattari looked for strategic antidotes to binarisms.
BUT SOME OF THREE

Guattari creatively deployed and explored triangular diagrams (split horizontally, imploded, centrifugalized), especially in IM, beginning with the semiological triangle or model of meaning. The triangle of meaning was crossed by binary divisions between left and right sides that made meaning run through the summit from left to right (a-signifying semiotics skirted around the substance-summit). Guattari’s turn to Peirce was based less on a preference for Threes than on semiotic’s lack of dependency on linguistics. But the irreducible triadicity of Peircean signs, whose phenomenally appearing objects were partially identical (perspectively; otherwise, if, for instance, the complex sign that I have presented of Guattari’s thought is truly complete, it would generate an interpretant equal to its object, which is not the case) with the interpretants generated by their signs, allowed Guattari to escape the dichotomania of structuralism. And, of course, Oedipus, but familial Eros only really gets going when it is quadran- gular, given the phallus. In this respect, Three is already Four, if only because it is made of a doubled binary.

AND DEFINITELY FOUR

Why definitely? From the time of IM to CS Guattari moved from Three to Four-place maps. If Oedipus was a danger to be overcome at Three, then the semiotic square was to be overcome at Four. Constitutional models such as those of Greimas (1987) are foundational, revealing elementary structures in the tradition of Cartesian linguistics. Guattari’s objections to Chomsky’s linguistics are applicable to those of Greimas – the alleged stability of a stratum of competence – deep structure – must be accounted for through an analysis of levels of power and to whom benefits accrue (individual or universal subjects); modelling succumbs to a ‘retroactive universalizing process’ that legitimates abstractions as epistemology (they have always and already been there and are constitutive features of human knowing); semiotic enslavement serves class interests under the cover of scientific neutrality – ‘Reject the idea that the syntactic markers of capitalist languages express the fundamental requirements of the human condition’ (GR 143).
Interestingly, though, Greimas’s interpreters call attention to the Fourth term in the semiotic square – the negation of the negation – for the sake of its productivity, virtuality and novelty. It is filled in last because it is ‘the place of a great leap, the great deduction, the intuition that falls from the ceiling . . . ’ (Jameson in Greimas 1987: xvi). The Fourth term is, let’s say, the most absent and therefore hardest to grasp. Guattari’s Fourth term is haunted by this semiotic structure because it is also the striated corner of a great possibility, the incorporeal complexity of virtual possible Universes. Again, Guattari’s metamodels are dogged by certain of the models they hoped to overcome. For this reason Guattari’s Fourth term must be $3 + n$, not just a single number, but a great opening and taking responsibility for non-discursive constellations in the future. The so-called ‘third way’ is always larger than it seems.

AND MORE

Guattari (1990a) never resigned himself to the collective stupors induced by mainstream politics and media. Walking ‘a finite path with infinite possibilities’, he explored a transdisciplinary militancy that would not be reduced to either/or such as intellectual or activist. He was possessed by the problems of party programmes and the artificial horizons of consensus, of the character of vanguard groups, of splintering groupuscules detached from power and production, and of making possible dissensus. Finitude must be explored against the empty promises and fantasms of the televisual imaginary; its infinity of possibilities requiring micropolitical struggles for semiotic polyvocity, against the dominant codes of the adult world (authority, hierarchy, capitalistic social relations) that are antagonistic to transversal, unauthorized, transdisciplinary crossings and violation of allegedly constitutional constraints. Four is always more than simply Two constraining, overcoding pairs.

The life of transdisciplinary militancy may have begun for Guattari at fifteen or sixteen years, but perhaps we should say that he was a late bloomer. As he once suggested, micropolitical struggle begins in the daycare, with infants labouring on games and toys, videos, gender and race relations, hierarchies and, in general, codes by means of
which they may be translated into the socioeconomic system (FFG ET02–14, p. 3). The counter-currents of the desiring economy of the daycare, that are undisciplined and run up against its organizational coherence, are trapped by the reproduction of the adult codes by those who work there, and whose work is undervalued, ghettoized and poorly remunerated. For Guattari there was always other ways of doing things, complexifying componential heterogeneity, respecting singular (auto-modelling) and collective (general modelling) assemblages. The same old barriers were thrown up again and again: fear, timidity, boredom, reticence, close-mindedness, laziness. Each time they were taken down, more arose in their wake. But each time this occurred over the course of a militant struggle for an enriching change, a singularity was confronted, and if it could become the basis, in terms of its relationship to the institutional structure that gave expression to it (limits, implosions, unanalysed procedures), of an analysis of how fixity precludes heterogeneity, then a new organizational form could be envisaged that presented new possibilities, and respect for processual creativity.

This last example, a return to childhood, also underlines the affinity between, despite itself, the psychoanalytic milieu and schizoanalysis. Indeed, Guattari’s life and work of transdisciplinary militancy and its metamodellation was indelibly stamped by the analytic perspective, a point to which he repeatedly returned as a kind of reminder about what was at stake and could not be dismissed.

I do not want to leave the impression, however, that the analytic milieu overdetermined all else. For in Guattari’s political practices there was an explicit theorization of capitalism, a residue of which we saw in chapter 3 in his discussions with Asada about the character of Japanese capitalism. Guattari developed a theory of globalization, which he referred to as Integrated World Capitalism (IWC), through a remarkable collaboration Eric Alliez. I will devote the remainder of this Concluding Statement to this theory because it puts into context the more abstract ruminations with which this book has concerned itself.

Guattari and Alliez were, in this work of the early 1980s, on the forefront of globalization theory as well as positioned, before the letter, on the frontlines of the anti-globalization movement, along with their colleagues in the *Change international* group. The centre of their
theory is a non-general typological description of the multiple forms of capitalist modes of valorization. Understood as a ‘general function of semiotization’, capitalism exercises an integrative and transformative semiotic power over a diverse domain of machines (technical, economic, social, desiring). It is, moreover, a deterritorializing power whose processual nature relies upon its avoidance of despotism for the sake of the marginal freedoms it permits. From the most diverse machinic operations (material and non-material) capitalism extracts and exploits a surplus value, having drawn them into its exchangeist ‘framework of equivalence’. Capital decodes or deterritorializes existing populations, traditions and organizations, and recodes or reterritorializes them on a socio-economic system of production; it decodes all determinations of value and recodes them as quantities against the general equivalent of money; it operates on a deterritorialized plane of immanence, rather than from a transcendent outside (Hardt and Negri 2000: 326–7). Capital conjoins these decoded flows, some of which existed for a long time in different social formations that were not so marked by decodings but, instead, consisted of codings and overcodings. Numerous contingent factors made conditions favourable for the encounter of these decoded and deterritorialized flows. Under such favourable conditions, capitalism appropriates production and becomes ‘the new social full body’, characterized by a generalized decoding and immanence. The capitalist machine enters into relationships with itself or becomes filiative as it reproduces its immanent limits and the crises upon which it depends in ever widening and deepening extensions and intensions. Capital, for example, seizes upon the overcoding of infantilism as a form of subjugation and enriches itself on it.

Guattari and Alliez proposed a minimal model consisting of three evaluative terms: processes of machinic production; structures of social segmentation, considered in terms of the state; dominant economic semiotic systems, considered in terms of the market. Each historic mode of capitalistic valorization is described on the basis of the priority given to one of these terms. The order of priority for IWC is production – market – state. Colonial monopoly capitalism is also ordered by the priority given to production: production – state – market. This is not exhaustive, nor is it meant to be. It reveals, however, certain tendencies and emphases which, in the latter, involve
rapacious imperialist powers bleeding peripheral countries by holding commercial monopolies over resources extracted for the home and world markets, with no regard for the disorganization of the colony in question, nor the disintegration and degradation of the inhabitants and their land (and the legitimate status of their claims to it).

What makes IWC new is its innovative means of semiotization and increased capacity for the ‘machinic integration’ of molecular diversity. Here, production reterritorializes and capitalizes all of the segments of social reproduction, the latter having the axioms of racism, sexism, and conservatisms of all sorts. ‘Permanent restructuration has become the only rule of the capitalistic process itself, and crisis the very form of circulation’ (Guattari and Alliez 1983: 105). And crisis is the choice integrative means deployed by IWC (production/circulation/information/social resegmentation). Importantly, then, production integrates or reterritorializes information and circulation, resegmenting society, giving to capital a ‘maximal synergetic fluidity’ (a proliferation of fluid and mobile productive networks, of temporary labour, etc.). One of the many virtues of Guattari and Alliez’s work is its clarity about the significance of information for IWC. The state becomes the trader (and even a speculator) in transnational flows, free-trade zones, minimizing and liberalizing (or rather decentralizing and privatizing) its national responsibilities (neo-liberalism). A capitalism that prioritizes production (before market and state) does so for production’s sake.

IWC may present itself as the ‘highest stage of capitalism’, a so-called advanced form, but for Guattari and Alliez it was only one among other modes. It can coexist with other capitalisms that prioritize the market (proto-capitalist economies; liberalism) or the state form (state capitalism; Asiatic mode of production). Despite the fact that Guattari later wrote – ‘the subjective impasse of IWC, capitalism of permanent crisis, appears total’ (CS 25) – Guattari and Alliez were hopeful: ‘IWC’s capacity for adaptation and its reconversion of assemblages of economic enunciation may perhaps find its limit with the renewal of the capacity for resistance from all of the social strata that refuse its “unidimensionalizing” finalities. Certainly, the internal contradictions of IWC are not such that it must ineluctably succumb to them. But its illness is perhaps no less fatal: it results from the accumulation of all the lateral crises it engenders’ (1983: 105).
Given IWC’s unprecedented integrative capacity and fluidity (featuring the mobile state and factory), what are its limits? Whatever the limits actually turn out to be, Guattari and Alliez believed that IWC could be brought down by ‘the development of new collective responses – new assemblages of enunciation, evaluation and action . . . (Appearance of new, popular war machines in Nicaragua; struggles for workers’ control in Eastern Europe; struggles of auto-valorization of the Italian type; multitude of vectors of molecular revolution in all spheres of society)’ (1983: 105). Guattari and Alliez argued that with IWC information becomes a factor of production. Capital becomes cybernetic and seeks a global informatization of society which goes hand in hand with global mass-mediatization (in this respect Guattari and Alliez’s position is complementary to the vision of postmodernity as an intensified form of capital that has invaded representation as the cultural and economic merge). IWC can then expand and exercise social control through its networks. Guattari repeatedly asked with regard to this transnational computerization, the information revolution: ‘why have the immense processual potentials brought forth by the revolutions in information processing, telematics, robotics, office automation, biotechnology . . . up to now led only to a reinforcement of earlier systems of alienation, to an oppressive mass-mediatization and an infantilizing consensual politics?’ (CS 22). Emancipatory social struggles must insist on and protect the fundamental right to singularity (CS 23). But it is difficult to fight for singularity when capital produces a subjectivity that resembles its own fluidity and mobility; this compatibility has been investigated by Hardt and Negri (2000: 331–2) in terms of the surveillance society of control and its production of subjectivities compatible with its features of hybridity and modulation, in a global capitalist village (immanent, smooth) of incessant communication. Hardt and Negri elegantly fuse Guattari and Deleuze’s visions of IWC and control, announcing the displacement of disciplinary societies based on confinement by control societies that capitalize on the breakdown of institutional sites with ‘free-floating’, open systems ‘just as rigorous as the harshest confinement’ (Deleuze 1995: 178) but characterized by modulations (alterations according to circumstances) rather than moulds (firmly set and into which one must be made to fit): continuous assessment, postponement of every end, passwords that
allow coded ‘dividuals’, as Deleuze called them, to move from one complementary institution to another or, conversely, fall between them.¹

With Negri, Guattari added a new layer to the theory of IWC. Integrated World Capitalism remained a flexible semio-social science of exploitation, but had at its centre the nuclear state. Computerization is inseparable from mechanization and militarization. Outbreaks of singularization – in the liberation movements of the 1970s – challenge the translation of life time into capital time, that is, into an infinitely codifiable system based on general equivalence. The production and reproduction of cybernetic subjectivity and the dislocation and mystification of the knowledge possessed by counter-hegemonic forces have themselves been used by IWC to break the desire for social transformation and reinvention. Transversal and alternative struggles need to find new ways to cooperate, manoeuvre, and wrestle desire, the material and technical transformations of (post)modernization, and knowledge, from the impositions of capitalism. There are many traps and obstacles along the way, especially along the information superhighway, despite its much vaunted lateral transversal connectivity.

Guattari further developed his analysis of IWC in his work on generalized ecology, offering this definition: ‘Post-industrial capitalism, which I prefer to describe as Integrated World Capitalism, tends increasingly to decentralise its sites of power, moving away from structures producing goods and services towards structures producing signs, syntax and – in particular, through the control which it exercises over the media, advertising, opinion polls, etc. – subjectivity’ (3E 47). Guattari outlined the semiotic regimes upon which IWC was founded: economic, juridical, technico-scientific, and subjectification (3E 48). These are not causally related since ‘IWC is all of a piece: productive–economic–subjective’. IWC produces certain forms of subjectivity by semiotic means and keeps them distinct by affording one legitimation while cultivating resignation in the other. Guattari specified two types of subjectivity typically produced and employed by capitalistic societies: serial subjectivity, nodding to Sartre (wage-earners and the ‘insecure’ or ‘non-guaranteed’); and elitist subjectivity (ruling social strata). The main goal of Guattari’s generalized ecology was to allow for the resingularization of individuals and collectivities through the radical
questioning of the limited subjective formations of capitalism; a very elementary example was discussed earlier – Guattari’s double membership in both of the split factions of the French Green party – ‘something which he alone could have dared’ (Chesneaux 2001: 544). Ecological praxis in its broadest psychical, social and environmental senses, must identify ‘dissident vectors of subjectification’ and work towards their emancipation and maximization by opening up a-signifying ruptures and creating conditions conducive to the formation of new alliances. But Guattari never lost sight of the depth of the problem because capital’s intrusive ‘intension’ infiltrates mental ecology, returning to the sense of the psychoanalytic formulation of transversality: how can one modify and transmute the objects and messages (subjunctive procedures such as: evade singularity, limit existential refrains, feel like you will live forever) incorporated/internalized by the superego/unconscious? This is not, Guattari specified, a return to the individual and his/her machinic enslavement (SS 215). Capital’s interest in mental values entails that ‘even though its enunciation is individuated, there is nothing less individual than capitalist subjectivity. The overcoding by Capital of human activities, thoughts and feelings makes all particularized modes of subjectification equivalent and resonant with each other. . . . The capitalist order claims that individuals should only live for an exchange system, a general translatability of all values so that their slightest desire is felt to be asocial, dangerous, and guilty’ (SS 215). For Guattari, Capital was Orwellian.

Guattari’s transdisciplinary assemblages, his inter- and intra-institutional molecular transportations, passages between, transversal reworkings, calls for pooling creativity and ‘creative uncertainty’ (Chs 134), the rescue of subjectivity by means of resingularization – all of these supersede the obvious contrast in Guattari’s life and work between militancy and abstruse theory, accessible (signifying assurance of communication) yet highly specialized (at times a-signifying, minor, stoking the deterritorializing diagrams of schizoanalytic metamodelization). Guattari himself was a subject group, a collective assemblage, a machinic *il* rather than a structuralized personal *moi-je*. 
1. Deleuze’s emphasis was on continuity and integrated circuitry within an intensified discipline adapted to institutions without walls. In an interview with Negri, Deleuze addressed the issue of resistance to such ceaseless control, even though he wasn’t especially hopeful: ‘Computer piracy and viruses, for example, will replace strikes and what the nineteenth century called “sabotage” (“clogging” the machinery). You ask whether control or communication societies will lead to forms of resistance that might reopen the way for a communism understood as the “transversal organization of free individuals”. Maybe, I don’t know’ (Deleuze 1995: 175). This opens a space for the invocation of the multitude, a concept that marks a passage from group subject, through assemblage, and beyond in its formulation as posse or the figure of the new militant armed with transversal tools (Hardt and Negri 2000: 413). Against the hegemony of communication, Deleuze raised this idea: ‘The key thing may be to create vacuoles of noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control.’ A kind of creativity, then, that was not linked to communication but broke it at some point by establishing cavities through which its messages could not pass or, to put it in positive terms, passed all too well. An example of the latter is a kind of Deleuzean hacking that eludes control temporarily without destroying the network; rather the network’s ability to identify the hacker is broken by the creation of a vacuole of the sort known as an ‘unauthorized access device . . . which masks the user’s true identity’ (Thomas 1998: 392) but allows one to make use of the technology. The vacuole-barrier-mask (Jobs and Wozniak’s famous ‘blue boxes’ for phone phreaking, and all subsequent boxes – red, beige, brown, coffee . . . ) doesn’t mask the hacker’s actions, which may be monitored but, for a certain time at least, separate such actions from the body of the actor-hacker performing them, in the gap between authentication and identification. An example of the former vacuole as noncommunication suggests more virulent forms of network attacks of the sort developed by hacktivists such as the creation of disturbances through denial of service attacks (using FloodNet software that swarms sites and saturates lines), redirecting browsers to alternative sites, replacing site contents (spoofing, virtual grafitti), and worms and viruses (autonomously propagated or encouraged through user stupidity) whose eradication may require network shutdowns. The result is ‘Freedom Downtime’ and this is a huge step beyond the infantilizing logic of consumerist personalization toward the right of reappropriation (Hardt and Negri 2000: 406–7).
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