The Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies, an independent research, design, and educational corporation directed by Peter Eisenman, was founded in New York in 1967. *Oppositions*, the Institute's primary organ, first appeared in September 1973 and remained the single most important journal of architecture theory until 1982. In issues 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the journal, each of its editors, Kenneth Frampton, Mario Gandelsonas, Peter Eisenman, and Anthony Vidler, published an independent editorial that together marked out many of the major categories of architecture theory in the 1970s and 1980s.

Frampton's reading of the Heideggerian Raum as a place of possible resistance to the techno-scientific and mass-cultural attacks on the fundamentally phenomenological aspect of architectural experience prompted his proposal for a dialectic of ends and means, of "place" and "production," that already anticipated his later work.1 Gandelsonas's "Neo-Functionalism" categorized dialectically, for the first time, the position epitomized by the work of Robert Venturi—"neorealism"—and that represented by Aldo Rossi, Peter Eisenman, and John Hejduk—"neorationalism"—and identified modernist functionalism's underdeveloped concern with the problem of meaning ("since function is itself one of the meanings that could be articulated by form") as a possible third term.2 Vidler's apologia for Rossi and the Tendenza, the "third typology," identified its "ontology of the city" as a possible base for the restoration of a critical role to architecture.3 Eisenman, in his editorial reprinted here, gathered up his preoccupations with structural linguistics, conceptual art, and avant-garde autotellic procedures, and characterized a "post-functionalist" position that would recognize architecture's epistemological status.

As its title suggests, Eisenman's essay enters into a mode of thinking that Gregory Ulmer has called "post-criticism," which is constituted primarily by the application of certain devices of modernism (such as the direct incorporation of a formal fragment into a collage, or the aleatory process of montage) to critical representations.4 Rather than simply deriving its forms from functional needs, Eisenman sees modernism as "work on the language itself. . . . It fundamentally changed the relationship between man and object away from an object whose primary purpose was to speak about man to one which was concerned with its own objecthood."5 A properly modernist architecture should be not so much a subjective innovation (on the model of the artist-as-genius) as a search for objective knowledge that lies outside the artist, within the very materials and formal operations of architecture. Such a research discovers the new in the given "language," immanently, through an articulation and redistribution of its elements. Hence the importance of representation: the architectural object, on this view, is just a representation of architectural logic itself.

Eisenman earlier called such a formal object-become-simulacrum-of-process "cardboard architecture": "Cardboard is used to shift the focus from our existing conception of form in an aesthetic and functional context to a consideration of form as a marking or notational system. The use of cardboard attempts to distinguish an aspect of these forms which are designed to act as a signal or a message and at the same time the representation of them as a message."6 Further, he
associated cardboard architecture's effects with the defamiliarization and alienation effects of a Brechtian modernism. In the present essay, he historicizes such concerns as part of a new episteme, a posthumanist paradigm heralded by James Joyce, Arnold Schönberg, Hans Richter, and others, and theorized in the anti-humanism of Michel Foucault and Claude Lévi-Strauss.

But as important as its effort to push architecture into this new paradigm is what is entailed when architecture represents the very process of "architecting": that the effort to represent the inner logic of the object in the object itself is made not because of some preordained decision to exclude other considerations but because of the felt consequence of a historical evolution crucial, if not unique, to the discipline of architecture itself. This evolution, which began with modernism, fuses the practice of architecture with the critique of architecture and replaces the functional object with a theoretical one.

Notes

7. "While the architectural system may be complete, the environment 'house' is almost a void. And quite unintentionally—like the audience of the film—the owner has been alienated from his environment. In this sense, when the owner first enters 'his house' he is an intruder; he must begin to regain possession—to occupy a foreign container. In the process of taking possession the owner begins to destroy, albeit in a positive sense, the initial unity and completeness of the architectural structure." Peter Eisenman, "To Adolf Loos & Bertold Brecht," *Progressive Architecture* 55 (May 1974), p. 92.
The critical establishment within architecture has told us that we have entered the era of "post-modernism." The tone with which this news is delivered is invariably one of relief, similar to that which accompanies the advice that one is no longer an adolescent. Two indices of this supposed change are the quite different manifestations of the "Architettura Razionale" exhibition at the Milan Triennale of 1973, and the "Ecole des Beaux Arts" exhibition at The Museum of Modern Art in 1975. The former, going on the assumption that modern architecture was an outmoded functionalism, declared that architecture can be generated only through a return to itself as an autonomous or pure discipline. The latter, seeing modern architecture as an obsessional formalism, made itself into an implicit statement that the future lies paradoxically in the past, within the peculiar response to function that characterized the nineteenth century’s eclectic command of historical styles.

What is interesting is not the mutually exclusive character of these two diagnoses and hence of their solutions, but rather the fact that both of these views enclose the very project of architecture within the same definition: one by which the terms continue to be function (or program) and form (or type). In so doing, an attitude toward architecture is maintained that differs in no significant way from the 500-year-old tradition of humanism.

The various theories of architecture which properly can be called "humanist" are characterized by a dialectical opposition: an oscillation between a concern for internal accommodation—the program and the way it is materialized—and a concern for articulation of ideal themes in form—for example, as manifested in the configurational significance of the plan. These concerns were understood as two poles of a single, continuous experience. Within pre-industrial, humanist practice, a balance between them could be maintained because both type and function were invested with idealist views of man’s relationship to his object world. In a comparison first suggested by Colin Rowe, of a French Parisian hôtel and an English country house, both buildings from the early nineteenth century, one sees this opposition manifested in the interplay between a concern for expression of an ideal type and a concern for programmatic statement, although the concerns in each case are differently weighted. The French hôtel displays rooms of an elaborate sequence and a spatial variety born of internal necessity, masked by a rigorous, well-proportioned external façade. The English country house has a formal internal arrangement of rooms which gives way to a picturesque external massing of elements. The former bow to program’ on the interior and type on the façade; the latter reverses these considerations.

With the rise of industrialization, this balance seems to have been fundamentally disrupted. In that it had of necessity to come to terms with problems of a more complex functional nature, particularly with respect to the accommodation of a mass client, architecture became increasingly a social or programmatic art. And as the functions became more complex, the ability to manifest the pure type-form eroded. One has only to compare William Kent’s competition
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entry for the Houses of Parliament, where the form of a Palladian Villa does not sustain the intricate program, with Charles Barry’s solution where the type-form defers to program and where one sees an early example of what was to become known as the promenade architecture. Thus, in the nineteenth century, and continuing on into the twentieth, as the program grew in complexity, the type-form became diminished as a realizable concern, and the balance thought to be fundamental to all theory was weakened. (Perhaps only Le Corbusier in recent history has successfully combined an ideal grid with the architectural promenade as an embodiment of the original interaction.)

This shift in balance has produced a situation whereby, for the past fifty years, architects have understood design as the product of some oversimplified form-follows-function formula. This situation even persisted during the years immediately following World War II, when one might have expected it would be radically altered. And as late as the end of the 1960s, it was still thought that the polemics and theories of the early Modern Movement could sustain architecture. The major thesis of this attitude was articulated in what could be called the English Revisionist Functionalism of Reyner Banham, Cedric Price, and Archigram. This neo-functionalist attitude, with its idealization of technology, was invested with the same ethical positivism and aesthetic neutrality of the prewar polemics. However, the continued substitution of moral criteria for those of a more formal nature produced a situation which now can be seen to have created a functionalist predica-
ment, precisely because the primary theoretical justification given to formal arrangements was a moral imperative that is no longer operative within contemporary experience. This sense of displaced positivism characterizes certain current perceptions of the failure of humanism within a broader cultural context.

There is also another, more complex, aspect to this predicament. Not only can functionalism indeed be recognized as a species of positivism, but like positivism, it now can be seen to issue from within the terms of an idealist view of reality. For functionalism, no matter what its pretense, continued the idealist ambition of creating architecture as a kind of ethically constituted form-giving. But because it clothed this idealist ambition in the radically stripped forms of technol-
ological production, it has seemed to represent a break with the pre-industrial past. But, in fact, functionalism is really no more than a late phase of humanism, rather than an alternative to it. And in this sense, it cannot continue to be taken as a direct manifestation of that which has been called “the modernist sensibility.”

Both the Triennale and the “Beaux Arts” exhibitions suggest, however, that the problem is thought to be somewhere else—not so much with functionalism per se, as with the nature of this so-called modernist sensibility. Hence, the implied revival of neo-classicism and Beaux Arts academicism as replacements for a continuing, if poorly understood, modernism. It is true that sometime in the nineteenth century there was indeed a crucial shift within Western consciousness: one which can be characterized as a shift from humanism to modernism. But, for
the most part, architecture, in its dogged adherence to the principles of function, did not participate in or understand the fundamental aspects of that change. It is the potential difference in the nature of modernist and humanist theory that seems to have gone unnoticed by those people who today speak of eclecticism, post-modernism, or neo-functionalism. And they have failed to notice it precisely because they conceive of modernism as merely a stylistic manifestation of functionalism, and functionalism itself as a basic theoretical proposition in architecture. In fact, the idea of modernism has driven a wedge into these attitudes. It has revealed that the dialectic form and function is culturally based.

In brief, the modernist sensibility has to do with a changed mental attitude toward the artifacts of the physical world. This change has not only been manifested aesthetically, but also socially, philosophically, and technologically—in sum, it has been manifested in a new cultural attitude. This shift away from the dominant attitudes of humanism, that were pervasive in Western societies for some four hundred years, took place at various times in the nineteenth century in such disparate disciplines as mathematics, music, painting, literature, film, and photography. It is displayed in the non-objective abstract painting of Malevich and Mondrian; in the non-narrative, atemporal writing of Joyce and Apollinaire; the atonal and polytonal compositions of Schönberg and Webern; in the non-narrative films of Richter and Eggeling.

Abstraction, atonality, and atemporality, however, are merely stylistic manifestations of modernism, not its essential nature. Although this is not the place to elaborate a theory of modernism, or indeed to represent those aspects of such a theory which have already found their way into the literature of the other humanist disciplines, it can simply be said that the symptoms to which one has just pointed suggest a displacement of man away from the center of his world. He is no longer viewed as an originating agent. Objects are seen as ideas independent of man. In this context, man is a discursive function among complex and already-formed systems of language, which he witnesses but does not constitute. As Lévi-Strauss has said, “Language, an unreflective totalization, is human reason which has its reason and of which man knows nothing.” It is this condition of displacement which gives rise to design in which authorship can no longer either account for a linear development which has a “beginning” and an “end”—hence the rise of the atemporal—or account for the invention of form—hence the abstract as a mediation between pre-existent sign systems.

Modernism, as a sensibility based on the fundamental displacement of man, represents what Michel Foucault would specify as a new episteme. Deriving from a non-humanistic attitude toward the relationship of an individual to his physical environment, it breaks with the historical past, both with the ways of viewing man as subject and, as we have said, with the ethical positivism of form and function. Thus, it cannot be related to functionalism. It is probably for this reason that modernism has not up to now been elaborated in architecture.

But there is clearly a present need for a theoretical investigation of the basic implications of modernism (as opposed to modern style) in architecture. In his editorial “Neo-Functionalism,” in Oppositions 5, Mario Gandelsonas acknowledges such a need. However, he says merely that the “complex contradictions” inherent in functionalism—such as neo-realism and neo-rationalism—make a form of neo-functionalism necessary to any new theoretical dialectic. This proposition continues to refuse to recognize that the form/function opposition is not necessarily inherent to any architectural theory and so fails to recognize the crucial difference between modernism and humanism. In contrast, what is being called post-functionalism begins as an attitude which recognizes modernism as a new and distinct sensibility. It can best be understood in architecture in terms of a theoretical
base that is concerned with what might be called a modernist dialectic, as opposed to
the old humanist (i.e., functionalist) opposition of form and function.

This new theoretical base changes the humanist balance of
form/function to a dialectical relationship within the evolution of form itself. The
dialectic can best be described as the potential co-existence within any form of two
non-corroborating and non-sequential tendencies. One tendency is to presume ar-
chitectural form to be a recognizable transformation from some pre-existent geometric
or platonic solid. In this case, form is usually understood through a series of
registrations designed to recall a more simple geometric condition. This tendency is
certainly a relic of humanist theory. However, to this is added a second tendency
that sees architectural form in an atemporal, decompositional mode, as something
simplified from some pre-existent set of non-specific spatial entities. Here, form is
understood as a series of fragments—signs without meaning dependent upon, and
without reference to, a more basic condition. The former tendency, when taken by
itself, is a reductivist attitude and assumes some primary unity as both an ethical and
an aesthetic basis for all creation. The latter, by itself, assumes a basic condition of
fragmentation and multiplicity from which the resultant form is a state of simplifica-
tion. Both tendencies, however, when taken together, constitute the essence of this
new, modern dialectic. They begin to define the inherent nature of the object in and
of itself and its capacity to be represented. They begin to suggest that the theoretical
assumptions of functionalism are in fact cultural rather than universal.

Post-functionalism, thus, is a term of absence. In its negation of
functionalism it suggests certain positive theoretical alternatives—existing fragments
of thought which, when examined, might serve as a framework for the development
of a larger theoretical structure—but it does not, in and of itself, propose to supply
a label for such a new consciousness in architecture which I believe is potentially
upon us.