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DISCOVERING COLUMBUS
Edited by Djelal Kadir

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Columbus and the Poetics of the *Propter Nos*

SYLVIA WYNTER

...And the eternal God, Our Lord, Who gives to all those who walk in His way glory over things which appear impossible, and this was notably one. For although men have talked or have written of these lands, all was conjecture, not getting a look at it, but amounted only to this, that those who heard for the most part listened and judged it more a fable than that there was anything in it, however, small. [From Columbus' First Letter, written to the Spanish Sovereigns on his way back from the voyage of 1492.]

...He came to the conclusion that it was possible to sail across the western Ocean to the island of Cipangu and other unknown lands. For since the time of Prince Henry, when the Azores were discovered, it was held that there must be other islands and lands to the west, for Nature could not have set things on earth so out of proportion that there should be more water than land, which was intended for His and the creation of souls.

...And all ... found that Cristovao Colom's words were empty, for they were based on fantasy, or on such things as Marco Polo's island of Cipangu. [The Portuguese chronicler, Barros, cited by Bjorn Landstrom.]

...For a long time, then, I reflected on this confusion in the astronomical traditions concerning the derivation of the motions of the universe's spheres. I began to be ensembled that the movements of the world machine, created for our sake (*propter nos*) by the best and most systematic artisan of all, were not understood with clarity by the philosophers, who otherwise examined so precisely the insignificant trifles of this world. [Copernicus, *De Orbus Revolutionibus*,

Introduction

The historian Daniel Boorstyn emphasizes that both the 1492 voyage of Columbus as well as those of the Portuguese that rounded Cape de Oro and later to land on the shores of Senegal West, Africa, some half a century before, must be seen in their direct relation to the expanding state of the modern West European monarchical state. This thrust, in turn, as J. G. A. Pocock suggests, related to these states',
struggles—as a new form of increasingly centralized socio-political organization—to challenge the decision-making power of the Papacy. They were to do this, primarily, Pocock further proposes, by attempting to transfer the "redemptive process" of the Church, one that had been effected within the logic of Judaeo-Christianity's other-worldly goal of Eternal salvation and its economy of spiritual redemption to the new state's own monarchical this-worldly goal. This goal was now that of the competitive growth, stability and expansion of its own civitas sacra, as the supra-ordinate goal from which the goal tree regulating the behaviors of its statal subjects was generated within the terms of a hegemonic political ethic. These new reasons of state ethic would increasingly displace the centrality of the Church's own supra-ordinate goal of the civitas dei by making the latter, and its dominantly religious ethic, into a function and arm of the state, as distinct from the practice of the Middle Ages, when the feudal sovereigns had the temporal arm of the Church.

During the transitional period of the new states' struggle to effect this transfer of roles and of power, the monarchs and the princes found useful allies in the religious movements of apocalyptic millenarianism that had social roots in the still marginalized yet emergent new mercantile, artisanary and lay professional categories to which men like Columbus belonged. Within the logic of the socio-political transformation that had begun to take place in Europe, these new social categories, as the bearers of a "utopian" apocalyptic millenarian vision, also sought, like the new monarchies, to disrupt or challenge the nunc stans or orthodox position of the Church, whose "ideology" or normative vision had become interwoven with the self-instituting and self-justifying discourse of the feudal structure of medieval Europe.

I use the terms "utopian" and "ideology" above, not in the sense originally given by Karl Mannheim but, as they have been redefined by Paul Ricoeur who makes use of some central points made by Clifford Geertz. Rather than seeing ideology as "false" consciousness, both suggest that all Ideologies (I shall capitalize the 1 to indicate this new meaning) serve a systemic function; they should be seen therefore as "mediating and integrating human action at its public level." In this context, Marx's seminal point that the function of ideology is to represent the partial group interest of any dominant or ruling group as if it were isomorphic with the common good of the group, representing this interest "as the only rational" and "universally valid one" should be seen as a strategy of surplus or over-representation. This strategy works to provide the general horizon of understanding on whose basis each order is unified and integrated. The cognitive distortions of each such strategy therefore play a systemic function. For under the layer of distorting representations specific to each such Ideology and to its system of legitimation, we discover the symbolic systems which orient behaviors, and which, as Geertz says, "provide a template or blueprint for the organization of social and psychological processes . . ."

Ricoeur also redefines the term utopia away from its normal pejorative meaning of escapist consciousness. He argues that it too plays a systemic role. Since given that all Ideologies and their "general horizons of understanding" or systemic-integrating consciousness, must necessarily remain, in Wittgenstein's phrase, "impervious to philosophical attack," the counter-role of such utopian models of thought is to challenge the dominant Ideology from a place outside its order-specific mode of rationality—from u-topia, nowhere. So that, while such modes of utopian rationality remain generally without social effectiveness during "normal times," at specific conjunctural times of change they are enabled to emerge from obscurity, to "shatter a given order" by the proposal of an alternative order, and to give the "force of discourse to this possibility." Ricoeur's concept of Ideology can therefore be linked to Richard Rorty's recent definition of truth as a function of solidarity and therefore of what "it is good for us to believe" within the logic of our culture's self-conception. Here, too, these truths should not be seen as "objective" but rather as true only within the terms of each culture's self-conception. This concept of truth as being systemic—common to both Ricoeur's Ideology as well as to Rorty's "truth of solidarity"—derives from an essay by Nietzsche. In "On Truth and Falsity in their Ultramoral Sense," Nietzsche proposed that all such "truths" are everywhere constructed by a "mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms" that are made to be seen after long usage as "fixed, atomistic and binding." Hence, it is only through the human subject's forgetting of itself as subject, (and what is more as an artistically creating subject), that if he/she is able to evaluate this truth as true" according to an ostensibly absolute standard of right perception; one which clearly cannot exist given the relativity of all our processes of auto-instituting subjectivity.

The point of the title of this essay is to propose that the train of counter-reasoning by which Columbus challenged the mainstream
geographical knowledge of his time, and especially his apocalyptic millenarian projection of the earth as having been created “for life and the creation of souls,” as reported, with disdain, by the Portuguese official chronicler Barros (see Epigraph 2), needs to be understood as a central component of that generalized “utopian” challenge by both Christian humanism and humanism proper to the Ideology of the scholastic order of knowledge. He therefore also challenged the “truth of solidarity” and “standard of right perception” on whose basis the feudal-Christian socio-political order had been integrated, and its rigidly vertical social hierarchies which had been oriented about the status organizing principle of caste (i.e., of noble blood and birth) also legitimated. If, as Pauline Moffitt Watts has documented, Columbus’s own challenge to orthodox geography cannot be understood outside of his religious apocalyptic millenarian belief that the second coming of Christ was a bare two centuries away, this challenge was also to form part of the wider phenomenon. Frederick Halllyn has defined this phenomenon as that of humanism’s poetics of the propter nos—that is, the thesis that the earth had been created for us, on mankind’s behalf, a thesis whose new “horizon of understanding” was to enable Copernicus (see Epigraph 3) to open the path towards a science of astronomy. In the same way, that is, as Columbus’s earlier voyage, and the utopian train of reasoning dismissed by all the learned as a burla (see Epigraph 1), would open the path towards the gradual development of a science of geography replacing the sacred geography of feudal-Christian Ideology.

Columbus, Ideology and Categorial Models: The Anagogical Thrust, Copernicus and The Poetics of the Propter Nos

I shall argue in summary form here that the hypothesis put forward by Columbus—within the counter-logic of his apocalyptic millenarian belief in the imminent Second Coming of Christ, and of all the peoples of the world having to be converted to the Christian faith—of an earth that had been intended for “life and the creation of souls” (Epigraph 2) was a central part of what Frederick Halllyn defines as the generalized poetics of the propter nos by means of which the intellectual revolution of Christian humanism was effected. This revolution was to question the scholastic order of knowledge and with it the arbitrary model of divinely creation in whose theocentric system of inference, the earth’s geography had been represented as being divided between habitable and uninhabitable realms: that is, realms supposedly within God’s redemptive Grace and realms outside it. Within this inferential logic, the universe had been represented as divided between the spiritually redeemed supralunar realm of the moving heavens, and the post-Adamic “fallen” terrestrial realm of the non-moving Earth.

Consequently, if the empirical reality of the lands of the torrid zones of the earth was subordinated to its role as a classificatory label,11 (in the logic of an aprioristic categorial schema which represented it as being uninhabitable because of the excessive heat), the empirical reality of the lands of the Western Hemisphere was also subordinated to its role as a classificatory label and “stereotyped image.” Label and image served as a boundary marker of uninhabitability, and therefore predetermined, that its lands should be represented as necessarily submerged, in its “natural place” as the heavier element of earth, under the lighter (and by implication, more spiritually redeemed) element of water. Analogically, the fallen realm of the terrestrial, of the human, was necessarily represented as being ontologically subordinated to the spiritually perfected realm of the celestial, the divine: representations that were, at the level of the feudal social structure, correlated with the empirical subordination of the peasantry and other non-noble categories to the nobility, and of the lay intelligentsia (men like Columbus), to the spiritually redeemed and therefore cognitively empowered mainstream academics, the clergy.

Hans Blumenberg has shown that the schematic opposition habitable/uninhabitable12 was itself generated from the conception of God specific to late scholasticism. This conception, implying an Aristotelianized unmoved Mover, and totally omnipotent God who had created the universe for the sake of His own glory rather than specifically for mankind’s sake, had then put forward a theocentric view of the relation between God and man. The former was able to intervene arbitrarily in the everyday functioning of nature, and to thereby alter the rules which governed the accustomed course (cursus solitus naturae), anytime He chose to do so.13 This view had led to two consequences. One was the production of a new astronomy and geography whose rules of representation and categorial models had to “verify” the apriori premise of a founding ontological divide between celestial and terrestrial realms (at the level of astronomy), and between the habitable-within-God’s Arbitrary Grace, and the uninhabitable outside it (at the level of geography). The second consequence was a generalized “epistemological resignation” with respect to
“fallen man’s” cognitive capacity to know the rules governing the everyday process of nature because they belonged to the realm of God’s potestas absoluta, who were therefore unable to depend upon the regularity of known rules governing nature in order to obtain access to their organizing or anagogic principles.14

This theocentric and arbitrary model of divine creation, as Frederick Hallyn points out in his book, The Poetic Structure of the World: Copernicus and Kepler, was challenged by the humanists’ counter-claim that the creation had indeed been made by God on behalf of, and for the sake of humankind (propter nos homines).15 Humanism’s reclamations of the relation between God and man on more reciprocally egalitarian terms opened the way for Copernicus to move beyond the epistemological resignation and the purely technical calculations of Ptolemaic-Christian astronomy in order to put forward the “anagogical threat”16 which, by making possible human inquiry into the organizing principles behind the creation, would make possible the eventual development of a science of astronomy.

In this context, the report given by Barros (Epigraph 2), of Columbus’s challenge to theocentric geography should be taken together with his letters/reports to the Spanish sovereigns in the wake of his voyage,17 as well as with Lope de Vega’s early seventeenth century “heroization” of Columbus as a dramatic figure directly inspired by divine guidance to think contrary truths (to contrario)18 to those of orthodox geography. These reveal that Columbus’s fervent apocalyptic millenarian belief in Christ’s imminent return to realize his kingdom—on an earth that had been divinely predestined for this eventual end—also belonged to the Christian humanist end of the continuum of the humanist intellectual revolution and therefore itself formed a part of the generalized poetics of the propter nos, on whose basis the feudal order of Latin Christian Europe would be transformed into the secular order of the modern state. Such an Earth made by God “for life and the creation of souls” as well as for the eventual gathering up and conversion of all the peoples of the earth as one flock into a new and single Christian sheepfold, clearly would have had to have been made by a Creator bound by this end, and according to the rules which such an end imposed. These rules, therefore, had also predetermined that all the seas, because intended for the spread of the Gospel as the means of the prophesied conversion of all the peoples of the earth, had to be as “all navigable”—“Mare Columbus” jotted on the margin of one of his books, “totum navigabile”—as the whole earth, because the Earth, intended for the realization of Christ’s kingdom, would have had to be logically all habitable.

The paradox here was that the parallel anagogical thrust of Columbus’s apocalyptic of the propter nos, by its positing of a rule-governed model of the earth’s creation, was to be the indispensable a priori of his voyage: it contradicted the premise that “God could not have placed any land”19 in the Western Hemisphere; indeed, He would have had to. Nevertheless, the equally firm conviction that all other religions would have to give way to the single “true” one, and all their believers would have to be converted, forcibly if need be by the vehicle of the Spanish state, would lead to a Janus-faced result. The same path opened up to a scientific geography would also open onto the phenomenon of what was to be the increasingly global colonization of the peoples of the earth by the modern post-feudal European state. It would come to act increasingly in the name of its own power and this-worldly goal of competitive expansion, rather than acting merely as before, as the temporal arm of the Church, or as a vehicle for the spread of its faith.

To “Discover and Gain” and the Paradox of 1492: The Incomplete “True Victory” and the New Propter Nos

Both the religious motivation of Columbus as well as his psychosocial drive for status and wealth, and the goal of expansion and centralization of the Spanish state,20 came together in the commission that was given to him early in 1492. This commission empowered him to sail west in order to find a new route to the spice trade of the East, and on his way to discover and gain, “that is, to discover, conquer, expropiate, and incorporate, any islands and mainland (islas y tierra firma), which because not occupied by Christians were, in the orthodox “ideology” of the time terra nullius (lands of no one) hence legitimately expropiable to the Spanish state.21 The commission bound the Spanish sovereigns to reward Columbus as the finder/gainer with all the usual privileges that were customary in such commissions. These privileges included centrally the grant of acquired noble states to be inherited by his descendants. Such a title was in effect a meritocratic model of hereditary noble status no longer based on the feudal caste organizing principle of innate virtù, or deeds of military valor that as Zigmunt Bauman points out, had been restricted to those of noble descent.22 Rather this grant expressed an emergent mode of virtù (or in Adam Smith’s fine phrase,
"economy of greatness") that could now be based on, *inter alia*, deeds of "discovering and gaining," within the context of the overall transformation of the feudal-Christian historical system-ensemble and its aristocratic status-organizing principle into that of the monarchical-statal. It is this process of transformation and shift from one mode of Ricoeur-type "ideology" or mode of subjective understanding to the other that Lope de Vega both canonizes and performatively enacts in his play by dramatizing Columbus as a new type of post-feudal hero.

The paradox of 1492 is posited in the increasingly sharp conflict which interprets it as a "glorious achievement," a heroic deed of discovery, "triumph for the Christian West" on the one hand, and on the other, a brutal invasion and conquest which led to the "genocidal extinction" of large numbers of the indigenes as well as the train of the now looming prospect of ecological catastrophe. But the events of 1492 can rather be interpreted as that inextricable process of insight and blindness that arose both from the new status-organizing and stadal mode of *virtus*, as well as from Columbus's own project. For it was precisely his strongly motivated "discover and gain voyage" linked to his fervent zeal to open a path to the East—both for trade and for the Christian conversion of the infidel—that had enabled him not only to withstand the mockery and derision of the mainstream scholars of the time, but also to implement the train of counter reasoning by which he could make his proposed voyage feasible to the sovereigns, to his hard-headed fellow Genoese, and to the royal court officials who were to be investors with the Crown in his enterprise.

These potential backers would have shared the view of the "normal" paradigm of their time, one whose system of abduction, inherited from the still feudal-Christian system, had mapped the hierarchies of the feudal social structure onto the objective reference of its Aristotelian picture of the physical world; that is, onto its representation of a physical reality made correlatable with these social hierarchies. Consequently, in addition to the picture of the earth as given by Lope's King of Portugal, of the Ocean Sea surrounding a tripartite land mass in which they would have shared, Columbus's backers would have also conceptualized the earth in terms of the analogical reasoning of the learned, terms on which Ricoeur's Ideology or Rorty's "truth of solidarity" integrating of the feudal order had been based. In this version of Aristote's physics the element of water *had*, inferentially, to be in its "natural place" above the element of earth, except in cases of "unnatural motion." In the same way, the non-nobles were also represented as submerged in their "natural place" beneath the noble caste, and the sublunary peasantry beneath the supralunary aristocracy, the "fallen" lay intelligentsia also found their natural place," as an ontologically inferior category under the voluntarily celibate clergy, who alone had access to eternal truth, and therefore to the "right perception" within the totemic logic of the feudal-Christian système, and the unified hermeneutics of its divine truth, both of which unified the givenness of the hierarchy of this social structure.

Consequently, not only would Columbus's backers have generally believed that the tripartite element of the earth's land that had emerged unaturally," above the element of water could only have been held above the water by the miraculous intervention of divine Providence (whose partial providence for man ended at the *nec plus ultra* sign of the pillars of Hercules), but also, as Lynn Thorndike points out, given the hold of this Aristotelianized Christian physics and its system of analogical reasoning, the new data provided by the empirical voyages of the Portuguese and others, would have been normally fitted into the same empty slots—as Moraes-Farias shows was also the case in the medieval-Islamic geography of Black Africa. Moreover, the paradigm of a heavier element *under* earth that was submerged under the lighter element of water would have made Columbus's proposal to sail west, in light of the vast inferential distance that would have had to exist between landmass and landmass, logically, appear to be folly—a fable, *burla*, evidence of insanity/*locura*.

The ongoing transformation of the feudal system-historical ensemble, that took place on the basis of the shift to the this-worldly goal of the *vitas saecularis* and its new mode of *Ideology* or subjective understanding, was therefore essential to the challenge to the earlier standard of right perception," as well as to the categorial model of the world. However, as Nietzsche suggests, one Ideology or representational system can only be displaced by another, whose new standard of "right perception" sees "with a venomous eye" the truths (and the model of its good man) of the earlier order, as *non-truths*, at the same time as it necessarily sees its own new "truth" as the "right perception;" that is, literally, the condition of its own auto-institution and stable replication such a truth. Thus once Columbus had arrived in an *antipodes* where his learned antagonists *there should have been no land* that was not submerged in its *natural place* under water, he was impelled to see the Christian peoples as "Idolators," and therefore to see their lands and original sovereignty as legitimately expropriable.
Here the very belief in divine inspiration that had filled Columbus with prophetic confidence now also filled him with the conviction of his culture-specific “truth” and its mode of perception/cognition—what we might call an alternative way of life and “right perception,” if we map the terms of the triadic formal model specific to the Judeo-Christian perception of the world’s population as being divided up into Christian (who had heard and accepted the new Word of the gospel), infidel Muslims and Jews who, although they were monotheists, had confused the Word, and those pagan polytheistic peoples who had either ignored or had not as yet been preached the Word. For Columbus, therefore, the Tainos or Arawaks, peoples whom he confronted on October 12, 1492 were a people whom he at once fitted into the empty slots of the mobile classificatory label of *idolator* that he had seen at work in Marco Polo’s narratives, one of his key texts. Juridically, he saw himself also in terms of the pattern that had been laid down in the “discovery and gain” clause of his commission—terms, that, as the historian William Washburn points out, had come to be commonly used in the commissions handed out over several centuries by European sovereigns to other potentates.

The model for this “discover and gain” pattern had been laid down by Fernández-Armesto details, in his book *Before Columbus: Exploration and Colonization from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic 1229–1492*, and by earlier contracts drawn up during the process of Western Europe’s mapping and occupying of the Eastern Atlantic (the Canary Islands, the Madeira Group, the Azores). Within the overall context of the crusading mission of Christian states both to convert...
of life,” have socialized us to be symbolically conspecific; so that we
come to experience ourselves as inter-altruistically kin-related.

The sociologist D.T. Campbell gives a valuable insight into the roles
of these founding origin narratives or cosmogonies in the “conditioning”
and inducing of our culture-specific modes of “generalized altruism.” He
points out that humans, although they live in complex large-scale soci-
eties like those of the social insects, are still primates, and have not been
evolutionary selected to be genetically aggregated on a large-scale basis;
nor are the mechanisms of role-allocating or of cooperation, genetically
specific to human order, as they are in the case of other organic species,
among whom such behavior is pre-determined. Rather our genetically
determined mode of primate competitiveness and its correlated “animal type” mode of instinctual and narrow kinship must be continually over-
ridden by the process of cultural conditioning effected by the culture-
specific systems of representation that can alone induce the modes of
altruism on which our complex social orders are based. Campbell writes:

It is precisely the opposition between the dispositional products of biological and
social evolution that makes evolution seem out of the otherwise anom-
alous or incomprehensible pre-occupation with sin and temptation in the folk morality
that our religious traditions provide. The commandments, the proverbs, the
religious “law,” represent social evolutionary products directed at inculcating
tendencies that are in direct opposition to the “temptations” representing for the
most part the dispositional tendencies produced by biological evolution. For
every commandment we may reasonably hypothesize a tendency to do otherwise
which runs counter to some social systemic optimum.34

If we see Campbell’s “social systemic-optimum” as the analogue of
Bauman’s concept of varna, of Adam Smith’s “economy of greatness,” or
of Gregory Bateson’s “descriptive statement” (which functions as the
“governor” about which the collective behaviors of all human orders are
stably oriented and induced),35 we can further propose that it is these
socio-systemic criteria which encode the ethical-behavioral imperative
specific to each order, that then function to induce the inter-altruistic
aggregating behaviors which are everywhere oriented to securing the
well-being of the specific propter nos of each “form of life.” Therefore
what Rorty calls the “truth of solidarity,” the truth of what it is good for
the us to believe, is itself only a proximate mechanism of what it is good for each “form of life” and its mode of symbolic conspecificity or of
generalized altruism, to have us believe as the condition of its own stable
institution and replication as such a human order or, in the terms of
Francisco Varela, autopoietic living system.36

Our symbolically induced mode of altruism is activated or triggered in
response to the imperative of helping those who have been socialized
within the same cosmogonic categories as ourselves, and who therefore
are a part of the same “us.” There is however, no such altruism towards,
or genuine co-identification with those whom our founding origin narra-
tives have defined by the oppositionally meaningful marker of Other-
ness to the “us.” While the “we” can be normally experienced only by
the members of such a “we,” all such others can be “integrated” only on
the basis of their physical and metaphysical group subordination. Columbus,
therefore, in perceiving the newly found peoples as idolators and
therefore, as the negation of his own Judaico-Christian “we,” could be-
have towards them only as potentially convertible Christians, only legiti-
mately expropriable, but also justly enslavable as had been the Zanj for
medieval Islam. So that in buying and selling as slaves even some
members of the Zanj who had been converted to Islam, medieval Isl-
amic Arabs breached the tenets of their faith, at the same time they
reinforced their conception of the mode of rationality or uqul of their
trading way of life by en-slaving those who were its absolute negation.
Similarly, Columbus’s perception of, and behavior towards, the newly
encountered peoples, only reinforced his conviction of the single truth of
his apocalyptic faith, of which the idolators and their conversion, and
their enslavement were only functions.

Both Columbus and his fellow-Spaniards therefore behoved towards
the Tainos or Arawak peoples in ways prescribed by the term idolator, and
therefore, as to a group legitimately put at the service of securing the well-
being of the particularistic nos of Christendom; the term idolator at the
same time was applied as if it were the propter nos of the human species
itself, within the logic of the apocalyptic messianic dream of the “one
sheepfold, one flock one shepherd.” The term idolator was, however, as
meaningless a term outside the Ideology of Judaico-Christianity in its
statal variant, as the term Zanj, of medieval Islamic geography had also
been meaningless outside the Ideology of medieval Islam. Instead, both
were classic cases of the deployment of mobile classificatory labels whose
“truth” depends on their oppositional meaningfulness within the respec-
tive classificatory schemas by means of which alone. I propose here,
human orders are enabled both to enact the role allocations of their social
structures (including the division of labor), and to legitimate them as they do so, since it is these classificatory schemes that serve to induce the specific modes of generalized altruism on whose basis human orders are integrated as the dynamic living systems of a unique level of existence. A hybridly biax and logos, organic and “linguaging,” level of the behaviors of subjects regulated by the narratively instituted “programs” that are the conditions both of humans and, therefore, of the cognitive phenomenon which defines the human, i.e., the mind.

The biologists Riedl and Kaspar point out in their book, The Evolutionary Bases of Reason, that the cognitive mechanism specific to the human species is the mechanism to which we give the term “mind,” is only “the most recent superstructure in a continuum of cognitive processes as old as life on this planet.” These processes are the “least tested and refined against the real world,” and it is only with the natural sciences that any true “victory” has been won in the ongoing “testing and refining” of the human cognitive capacity against the real world. This point enables us to put forward an ecumenically human interpretation of 1492, one which can place it as an event in the context of: as Fredric Jameson has recently proposed, a “vaster notion of history,” and, we propose, an interpretation that can be conceived of within the history of the evolution of the human cognitive mechanism in the process of its “testing and refining of itself against the real world.”

Such an interpretation would therefore base itself on Robert Pirsig’s view that Columbus’s voyage involved “a root expansion of thought,” as well as on Theophile Obeng’s overall view that the voyages from the Portuguese to Columbus were part of an intellectual mutation that was to provide all humanity with “a new image of the earth and a new conception of the cosmos” within the context of what Kurt Hubner calls the “generalized upheaval” of the Renaissance. In this view, the voyage of 1492, and the train of counter-reasoning which led to it was the first step (however, obscured by Columbus’s own factual errors) by which the species could obtain knowledge of the earth “as is,” in contrast to the earlier “knowledge of categories” geography that had been common, in the last instance, to all human cultures. In this interpretive context, Columbus’s variant of the poetics of the propter nos would be seen as the basis for humanity’s eventual winning of Riedl and Kaspar’s “true victory” with respect to knowledge of an earth that would now be perceivable as single and homogenous across the earlier divide of habitable and uninhabitable. Copernicus fifty years later, would, with a purely humanist variant of the poetics of the propter nos, also transform our knowledge of a universe that would gradually, come to be perceived as being as unified across the earlier divide of terrestrial/celestial; as the earth itself could now be perceived as unified in the wake of 1492.

In the aftermath of Columbus and the Spaniards’ arrival among peoples new to them, however, the phenomenon that Moraes-Farias analyzes in his paper, of the limits of a monotheistic and ostensibly universal right mode of perception (that is, in effect, merely the truth of a specific mode of “solidarity,” or “generalized altruism,”) would begin to emerge. Such world-views were limited with respect to how a quite other mode of cultural reality and therefore of rationality (as Bartolomé de las Casas would also brilliantly suggest with respect to the ritual-religious acts of physical sacrifice of the Aztecs) was to be understood from within the mode of truth or ideology specific to its culture and to its form of life.” Given that each such culture-specific mode of truth is not so much the expression, as Rorty argues, of what it is good “for us to believe,” but rather, as Campbell suggests, is the expression of what it is necessary for us to believe (i.e., Nietzsche’s “right perception”), as the condition of the instituting and stable replication of each such “form of life,” its mode of symbolic conspecifity or of ultra-sociality, and, therefore, its correlated mode of subjectivity or of the “I,” which together constitute a form of life or living system whose intentionality of stable replication and well-being must necessarily, once put in place, take precedence over its individual subjects, and, for its own sake, therefore rather than for ours, its subjects are regarded as propter nos homines.

The Paradox of 1492:
The Incomplete “True Victory” and the New Propter Nos

Lope de Vega’s play (published in 1614), dramatically enacts the first poetics of the propter nos and its redefined relation between man and God to which Columbus, Copernicus and the overall politico-cultural revolution of humanism gave expression. This poetics led to a dual outcome. It would lead on the one hand, to an eventual “true victory,” that of the human’s winning of its autonomy of cognition with respect to physical reality, and after Darwin, with respect to organic reality. On the other hand, it would make the winning of any such autonomy with respect to our understanding the social reality of which we are always participant
observers, as impossible as it was before Columbus’s and Copernicus’s positing of a rule-governed model of Divine Creation. Without that positing, such a “true victory” would have been impossible (at least in Judaeo-Christian cosmogonic terms), with respect to our knowledge of our physical reality.

At the end of his book, The Order of Things, Foucault points out that the concept of Man only emerged as a recent invention “of European culture since the sixteenth century.” Our present contemporary variant of the same Man, Foucault points out, only appeared “a century and a half ago,” as an effect of a change in the “fundamental arrangements of knowledge” that has led to our present disciplinary organization of knowledge. In the same way, the earlier variant of man had led to the earlier system of knowledge that he analyzes as that of the Classical episteme.44 In addition, as the anthropologist Jacob Pandian notes, both variants of Man had emerged as transumed forms45 of the originally Judaeo-Christian religious concept of the true self (whose non-truth had been encoded by the categories of the infidel and the idolator). In this process of transformation—I propose here—the topos of iconicity had functioned to suggest that two nouns man and human, in which the near similarity of their “morphosyntactic and segmental-phonological structure” is apparent, also share the same meaning. The culturally relative term man, as the desupernaturalized conception of the human, which evolved out of the Judaeo-Christian origin narrative and the cosmogonic system had therefore given rise to two variant models, the first hybride religio-secular and specific to sixteenth century European, the second now purely secular and global in its scope. In both cases, the term Man is made isomorphic: as a member of the class of all possible conceptions of the human, with the class itself i.e. the class of the concrete human species,46 and of all its possible modes of the human.

Columbus’s deployment of the concept of idolator within the terms of his triple aims (1) that of converting all non-Christians in preparation for the second coming of Christ, 2) that of expropriating their terra nullius to the State in the context of this this-worldly goal, and 3) that of legitimately enslaving the new peoples, and exacting tribute from others in order to ensure his financial backers a return on their investments and by the way to secure his own financial situation can therefore be seen as part of the transformational process by which the West “secularized” the religious model of the Judaeo-Christian true self. Consequently the term idolator was carried over as an “oppositionally meaningful” label into the now purely secular term, Indio/Indians. The new term Indio/Indians was verified by the institutional structures which socially constructed the indigenous peoples of a once-autocentric cultural world and model of being into, as Pandian points out, the first mode of the human other.

In the nineteenth century in the wake of the French, Haitian, and American revolutions as well as of the rise to a hegemonic role of the bourgeoisie and its new mode of “generalized altruism,” expressed in the form of the “nation-state,” Man, as Pandian further points out, was conceived as the now purely secularized variant of the true self.47 This new model of the true self put in place by the new “arrangements of knowledge” of our present disciplinary complex or episteme, was now conceptualized on the analogy of a natural organism, rather than as the spiritual being of original Christianity. At the same time its origin was projected, no longer in the terms of Genesis, but rather in those of a new origin narrative of evolution which functioned, however, as Glynne gives points out, to fill the same slot in our minds that Genesis had.48 Most centrally, as Pandian points out, a shift was made from the Indio as human Other, to the Negro (i.e. all African-descended peoples) as Other to Man—as, in effect, the mobile classificatory label “nigger.” In this shift, all peoples of African descent were now made into the empirically referent of the Other to the new true self that was now conceived of as “evolved” being (of a eugenics rather than noble line of descent). Consequently, the sign (signo) of their black skin was now made into the analogue of the Pillars of Hercules, as the nec plus ultra of ostensibly atavistic because evolutionarily diselected mode of human nature.” The sign was and is regarded as totally lacking in the mode of bourgeois rationality (represented as isomorphic with the highest degrees of genetically determined I.Q.),49 as the Zanj had been totally thinking in the medieval-Islamic mode of 'aqil, rationality.

As with the figure of the Zanj, therefore, that of the Nigger now served the oppositionally meaningful figure, that enabled the “truth” of the bourgeois mode of rationality to be represented as rationality-in-general. And therefore that its “truth” and standard of “right perception” as constituted by our present imaginative and theoretical orders of discourse, in their model of being Man, seem “firm, canonical, and obligatory,” extrapolated from the extreme sign of the black skin, the figure of the white “natives” (i.e. the Native Other) as well as their cultures, religions, ways of life—were also now made to serve, as thinkers from
Césaire to Saïd have demonstrated, as interchangeable “mobile classificatory labels” in the regime of truth of our present episteme, its systematic categorial models, and underlying classificatory schema. This schema from whose pre-analytic vision of things, “the mode of “objective truth” of our present Humanities and Social Sciences is rigorously rule-governed, elaborated.

Consequently within the logic of the founding topos of iconicity central to this underlying classificatory schema and which represents the model of being Man as if it were isomorphic with the concrete subject itself, both the figure of the Negro (the Nigger Other) and the Native, function, as the Indio had done earlier for the first time, to enable the specific over-representation that defines present ideology. This over-representation is that the well-being of the present model of Man is isomorphic with the well-being of the species—propter nos homines. In addition, the present suprastructural telos or goal of material redemption, as instituted by our present disciplinary organization of knowledge, is the goal by means of which global collective behaviors are hegemonically regulated, and whose propter nos is that of securing the well-being and stabilization of our present model of being Man. The original telos of redemption of the feudal-Christian order which our telos now replaces had been that of securing the well-being of the feudal-Christian model of being. But the modern telos which serves to secure the well-being of the bourgeois model of being Man represents the latter as having been isomorphic with the propter nos both of the concrete human species as a whole, and with that of the concrete human species as a whole.

The social results of the cognitive and perceptual distortions induced by this topos of iconicity and by its over-representation are to be found in the ongoing impoverishment, not only of the descendants of the groups who were the first to bear the weight of the West’s expansion, but also in the catastrophic situation of the “captive populations” in inner city archipelagos of joblessness, as well as in the global phenomenon of “underdevelopment.” All of these people, like Frantz Fanon’s logically damned, both perceived and behaved towards as the contradictory analogue of the Zanj, and of Columbus’s idolators, but now within the terms of our present “general horizon of understanding,” and in

depth that is instituted within our present world system and in its state subunits, by our present epistemological order.

As these jobless/underdeveloped categories/areas serve as “mobile classificatory labels” of the genetically dysselected boundary figures outside the limits of evolutionary Grace (as the jobholding/industrial categories areas are supposed to exist, as the ostensibly genetically selected or redeemed inside the limits of the same Grace), they are socio-institutionally produced as the embodiment of the legitimizing power; so too Zanj had been made to embody the category of the legitimately enslaveable, and the idolator, the category of the lands as terra nullius, were legitimately expropriable.

The “expansion of thought” of Columbus, like that of Copernicus, was so as “good for the feudal us to believe” at the level of geography, the presence in our contemporary world system of vast masses of non-redeemable Others, is the analogue of the uninhospitable beyond God’s Grace before the rupture when Columbus opened the path to “knowledge of the earth as it is.” The present situation of our cognitive mechanisms in the wake of 1492, as well as in Copernicus’s De Revolutionibus. This imbalance is between the victory of the autonomy of cognition gradually won over the

with respect to our species’ knowledge of our physical reality, the wake of Darwin, Mendel, and now the molecular biologists, to that of the organic reality of which we are ourselves a part, and the lack of any such knowledge with respect to the sociocultural reality of which we are subjects and participant observers.

The current impasse that confronts us, five hundred years after 1492, is with any “true victory” with respect to our knowledge of the rules given these purposes that govern us. The imbalance at the level of scientific-cultural evolution of our cognitive, and therefore of our orienting mechanisms, can now be seen, from hindsight, I propose, as being at the root of the “glorious achievement/genocidal extinction” of 1492. This imbalance can also be seen to be the direct result of the still heteronomous behaviors by which we are collectively governed. Examples are: the impoverishment and degradation of a majority of the peoples of the planet, (seen as the “jobless” and “underdeveloped” analogues of the Zanj and the idolators), and the
accelerating deterioration of the planetary environment that we share with other species, many of whom are now becoming extinct.

I should like to draw a parallel between the time of Columbus and Renaissance Europe with our own global time. The parallel can be stated in this way: within the context of the “civic,” religious and intellectual apocalypticism of the cultural revolution of humanism a “generalized upheaval” produced the modern world, and with it, the single history which we now find ourselves living. Both Columbus, and the other “men of the sea” as well as Copernicus, were part of the group of new lay intellectuals who, as Theophile Obenga points out, were not only able, through their synergistic interaction, to remake a Europe new in all its forms, but also to bring into being a transculturally observable and verifiable “new image of the earth” and “conception of the cosmos.” The generalized upheaval of the Sixties and of the global anti-colonial movements that also climaxl then, should be seen as the contemporary re-enactment of that epochal shift.

In this context, Kurt Hubner makes it clear that none of the new formulations of the Renaissance are to be understood outside the dimensions of the sociopolitical processes by which the supernaturally guaranteed feudal-Christian order was being transformed into the monarchical state. The traditionally hegemonic goal of spiritual redemption, as Pocock points out, has been transformed into that of the this-worldly goal of the civitas saecularis. As Hallin shows, the “poetics of the propter nos,” was the basis of the secularization of human knowledge (it is still in its Judaico-Christian cosmicognic form), that was first effected by the institution of the Studia Humanitatis and the rise of the natural sciences, both of which were themselves enabled by a fundamental re-thinking of the relation between the theocentric God of scholasticism and mankind. This rethinking led, as Pandian argues, to a new conception of the human as a rational being whose optimal socio-systemic examples were “embodied” in Shakespeare’s dramatization of Prospero in relation to Caliban, as well as in Lope de Vega’s dramatization of Terrazas in relation to Dulcanguellin. These plays offer examples therefore, of Foucault and Pandian’s first variant of Man and its human Others, the indios and the negros who were assimilated, as the degree zero, to the category of the Indo-Other.

The further parallel here lies in the present-day call for New Studies from the perspectives of groups who had been made to function as interchangeable mobile classificatory labels. Such labels had been made to signify that ostensibly the bearers possessed genetically determined inferior modes of intelligence, and were therefore to be legitimately subordinated within the logic of the biogenetic notion of order. This ostensibly evolutionary selected status was the organizing principle. But now a new image of the human, projected from several outsider group-views, (and therefore, from outside the limits of Rorty’s mode of solidarity, and of the “us” for whom our present “regime of truth” is “good to believe”), has begun to emerge. It is with this new image, that the possibility of a new and now ecumenically human propter nos, has at last appeared.

The Well-Being of Man or of the Human?
To Resolve the Paradox of 1492

The work of feminist scholars has alerted us both to the social construction of gender (with the category of “woman” functioning as a classificatory label analogous to that of the Zanj, as the ostensible lack of a generic sex which is that of the male), but also as well, to the always gendered construction of knowledge. However, within the logic of our contemporary order, the gendered aspect is but one aspect, and not the most central part of what is in reality a complex and systemic phenomenon. Insight into these more complex systemic processes was to emerge during the Fifties and Sixties, out of the conjunctural phenomena both of the global anti-colonial movements (the uprising of the natives), as well as of the black civil rights movement in the United States. The category of the black human Other (as the extreme form of the native other), moved out of its signifying “knowledge of categories” place. At this juncture, Frantz Fanon, the black Caribbean psychiatrist and proletarian activist who was situated at the crossroads of both movements, spoke against our present arbitrary and biocentric model of human behaviors. He called attention to the lawfully dependable nature of the functioning of the systemic processes by which, not only our modes of knowledge, but, more importantly, our modes of affect, and therefore of desiring, valuing, preferring, choosing, etc., are themselves always socio-symbolically constructed.

In his book, Black Skins, White Masks, Fanon describes our present “natural organism” conception of human beings and therefore, its biocentric model of the human which represents the individual as an evolutionarily, and therefore genetically determined agent who then arbitrarily decides how s/he should behave upon the world, and therefore
how to know, feel, desire, prefer, choose, etc. Against this he proposes a radically different model of human behavior which goes beyond the limits of the categorial models that are generated from the unified hermeneutic of “objective truth” of our present order of knowledge, and therefore from its Ideology. Basing his new concept on his empirical experience as a psychiatrist with both his “native” colonial subjects and his black patients, and therefore on his recognition of the reflex and autophobic nature of certain of their behavioral responses, Fanon would seek the extra-individual organizing principle that lay behind both the reflex and the autophobic nature of these behaviors.

He had noted the extent to which all naïve and colonialized subjects had been conditioned to experience themselves as if they were in fact as genetically inferior as the hegemonic “learned discourse” of contemporary scholars ostensibly represented them as being. (As obsessively, those of Columbus’s times had negatively represented the torrid zone/ Antipodes.) Fanon also became sharply aware that in his interaction with his black patients, he was witnessing this autophobic reaction in its most extreme form. As a result it would be on the basis of the dependable regularities of his black patients’ reflex aversion to the nec plus ultra sign of their own physiognomic features that Fanon was to make his own “anagogical thrust.” The “epistemological resignation” of orthodox Freudian psychology sought explanations for his patients’ behaviors in their ostensibly individually autonomous psyches, (or if not purely autonomous, merely familiarly oedipalized ones). Fanon sought to relate the “aberration of affect” which led to these behaviors, to a specific socio-systemic organizing process that had, in turn, induced the “aberration of affect” itself.

Freud, said Fanon, had placed the emphasis on the individual. He had therefore based the discipline of psychology on an ontogenetic perspective. But “besides ontogeny, there is sociogeny.” The problem of the black man’s self-aversive reactions was clearly not an individual problem. Rather it was that of the processes of socialization by which alone his patient could have been instituted as a reflexly self-aversive subject. The organizing principle of which the behavioral aberration was a law-like dependable effect, was the mode of the subject, of which the empirical individual subject was and is, normally, a heteronomously acting, thinking and feeling expression. And this was so even where the price is the “aberration of affect” displayed reflexly by Fanon’s patients as a function of realizing selfhood in the terms of our present optimal model of being, that of Foucault’s Man. The “aberration of affect” is displayed also as reflexly by all non-blacks, for whom too, the African physiognomy, culture, way of life and traditional modes of rationality have come to signify, as they had been discursively instituted to do, the outermost limits and nec plus ultra sign of barely human being. This is the origin of the reactive behaviors that we label racist.

As Pandian points out, all peoples of African descent have been made to function as the human Other within the present secular conception of the original Judaeo-Christian true self (who is, therefore, the ostensibly genetically damned, and whose Other, is necessarily the genetically damned). The reflex and demotivating aversion of both naïves and “Negro” to themselves is clearly a function of the socialization process by which the desire for being occurs in terms of the model of being Man whose totemic eponym is the Indo-European physiognomy, represented as the only normal mode of being human since, ostensibly, genetically redeemed by the Grace of evolution). The reflex is necessarily triggered by the fear and aversion to the appositionally meaningful classificatory label, whose objectively instituted sign of negation and non-being is that of the African physiognomy.

With his conceptualization of an always culturally constituted mask, or socio-systemic model of being, onto whose template all human individuals are socialized as the condition of being subjects, Fanon was therefore putting forward a new key to our understanding of the rule-governed processes that determine our human behaviors. This key was his identification of the functioning, in all human cultures, of differing modes/processes of sociogeny by which alone, humans can, as a third level of bios and logos (i.e. language) exist. realize the specific modes of narratively instituted humanness for which they are, as Lieberman makes clear, biologically, only pre-programmed.

The Cartesian modulation of the original poetics of the propter nos was premised on the lawful dependability of the functioning of the processes of nature. It had been further proposed that because nature was not necessarily providential for our human sake, knowledge of the rules that govern these processes could enable us to alter them to more directly suit our purposes. The experience of Fanon with his colonized “native” and black patients, reveals to us a parallel proposal. This experience had led not only to his recognition of the heteronomously governed nature of his patients’ ostensibly “purposeful” acts of preferring, or valuing, but also to the recognition that our present model of being Man was not necessarily
providential for the sake of his black, nor indeed of his “native” patients. The specific socio-systemic criterion (Adam Smith’s “economy of great-
ness”) according to which they had been socialized to desire “being,” was one which called for their reflexly self-avertive response to the “stereo-
typed image” of their own physiognomy, as the condition of the stable replication of its “form of life.” All such models of being, once they have been encoded by their founding narratives of origin, make the interest in their own stable replication as such models into a categorical imperative.

Hence our present middle-class model of being Man must necessarily, within the discursive logic of our present Ideology and mode of “right perception,” take precedence over the interests both of the flesh and blood individual subject, as well as of the human subject itself, together with, increasingly, that of the interests of all other nonhuman forms of life on this planet.

In the wake of Fanon’s formulation, a new poetics of the propter nos would necessarily have to engage in a redefinition of the relation be-
tween concrete individual men and women and the socializing process of the specific cultures which govern their purposes and their behaviors, including those of our present globally hegemonic culture, as it is pre-
sent instituted by its model of Man. If Giambattista Vico in his 1744 proposal for a New Science, had in this context, projected as its central require-
ment, the identifying of a “common element”—i.e. a “mental language common to all nations which uniformly grasps the substance of things feasible in human social life, and expresses it with as many diverse modifications as these same things may have diverse aspects,”54 Fanon’s projected concept of sociogeny which called for the explanation of his patients’ behaviors to be sought not in the individual psyche but in the process of socialization of the individual as a human subject, as a process which called for a socio-diagnostics, can be identified as such “a common element.”

The long years of mockery and derision which Columbus had to con-
front when he sought to breach the habitable/uninhabitable classificatory schema of the “learned...” can now be understood. It is clear that he sought to call in question, at the level of geography, the “categorial models” that were as instituting of the feudal-Christian mode of the subject. He thereby gave the “form of possibility” to a new utopian discourse able to challenge the apriori conceptual schema on whose premises the order integrating ideology of Europe had been based. In the old logic the torrid zone had had to be as uninhabitable as land in the Western Hemisphere to be nonexistent. Within the logic of our behavior-orienting ideology and conceptual classificatory schema, the analogues of the torrid zone/ Western hemisphere—i.e. the niggers, the non-whites, the natives—have to be both perceived as, and socio-institutionally produced to be in a large part poor and jobless, homeless, relatively lowly skilled, and underdeveloped. The classificatory schema based on the binary opposition of the genetically redeemed and the (supposedly) genetically condemned (Du-
bois’s Color Line),55 encodes the criterion of our contemporary model of Man, just as the binary opposition of the habitable/uninhabitable and of the celestial/terrestrial had encoded that of the feudal-Christian model.

The criterion of being of the feudal model of the subject, and its antonym (which when taken together, can be defined as that of the sociogenic code or principle), had been mapped onto the representa-
tion of the physical universe as well as of the earth’s geography before the anagogical thrusts of Columbus and Copernicus, and had thereby been made to seem “firm, canonical and obligatory.” Our present model of being and its antonym, is instead mapped on to the socio-economically produced categories of our empirical socio-global reality. This mapping relates to both enact and absolutize the sociogenic principle of our present model Man as the earlier mapping did in the case of the feudal-
christian model of being. The hypothesis (as I have proposed else-
where)56 is that our human and therefore culture-specific models of living and behaving are governed by rules, just as each organic species is governed by those of its own genomic principle.

The “anagogical thrust” of a new poetics for our times, and of its second “root expansion of thought” would therefore propose that these always narratively instituted “sociogenic principles,” or governing codes of symbolic “life” and “death”57 serve as the symbolic templates from which the ideology of each order, and the categorial models through which it is expressed, are generated. These codes serve as the standard of the culture-specific “right perception.” We can collectively know the social reality specific to our order in the terms that are needed to orient the order’s specific ensemble of collective behaviors. Society may then be properly replicated as a self-organizing living system whose intentionality must normally transcend that of its individual subjects.58 The transition from one ideology (Foucault’s episteme) to another, can occur only in moments of great rupture such as that in which Columbus’s apocalyptic-
millenarian projection of a rule-governed model of divine creation chal-
gen the mode of subjectivity (the sociogenic principle) and of
symbolic conspecificity about which the feudal-Christian order had instituted itself as a dynamic living system.

Looked at in this respect, the “generalized upheaval of the Sixties” as well as the anti-colonial movements which had preceded it can be seen as one event in which the movements of all subordinated categories out of the “classificatory” places assigned to them by the prescriptive “truths” of our present ideology (and, by its so to speak, “knowledge of categories” sociography), were and are the herald of such another far reaching rupture. Unlike the upheaval of the European Renaissance however, this rupture, although signalled by the entrance of the New Studies and their respective “lay” perspectives into the university system, has not as yet been fully elaborated at the level of the overall reorganization and rewriting of our present human sciences. Foucault shows that these sciences serve to institute our present model of being Man. This model is a priori represented as a purely natural organism, whose ostensibly ontogenetic subject preexists its processes of socialization/humanization.

If this new rupture is to be effected by the rewriting of our present episteme, it can be done only on the basis of the new methodological principle of sociogeny put forward by Fanon in the Sixties, and on its elaboration as a new and generalized poetics of the propter nos. The referent subject will be that of the concrete human subject whose “for the sake of” will necessarily be the well-being of the species, in the place of that of the global middle classes whose well-being is over-represented by our present ideology and its “stereotyped images.” The middle-class model of Man is represented as if it were isomorphic with the well-being of all humanity.

Such a new poetics therefore calls for the realization of Vicò’s proposed New Science, conceived as a mode of scientific humanism, based both upon Fanon’s hypothesis of sociogeny, and upon the recent findings of the neurosciences, including those which propose that the human mind emerged together with its symbolic representational systems defining human cultures and their processes of socialization. Fanon’s new image of the human as a socialized subject, and Campbell’s and Lieberman’s concepts of our linguistically instituted and therefore symbolic rather than genetic modes of inter-altruistic conspecificity, show that our genes cannot be the primary determinant of our human behaviors, as sociobiologists have proposed. Richard Dawkins’s “memes,” Campbell’s “folk moralities,” Misa Landau and Glyn Isaacs’s “narratives of Origin,” Hyer’s cosmogenies, and Merlin Donald’s “symbolic representation systems,” Rorty’s “metaphysico-epistemological ways of firming up our habits,” Jaime Carbonell’s “modes of subjective understanding,” Ricoeur’s ideology, Sperber/Lyotard’s dually denotive and deontic “knowledge of categories,” all serve to induce and orient the “right perceptions” that are the primary determinant of all our culture-specific ensembles of human behaviors—including our own.76

W.S. Crane has traced the process by which the original project of the Italian humanists, in which natural philosophy was to have been only a part of the more comprehensive process of human self-knowledge, was brought to end. The manifesto of this break, Crane points out, was given by Descartes in his declaration that the “Study of the Letters” which dealt only with “fables that stir the mind” had nothing to offer to the certain truths that could be obtained only by the study of natural philosophy and by the new method which he proposed as the route to this certainty.77 In this context, a new poetics of the propter nos able to effect, for our times, what the European laity, from Columbus to Copernicus, to Ficino, Lorenzo Valla, Pico della Mirandola effected for theirs, would be itself on the premise of the lawfully dependable functioning of precisely these “fables that stir the mind.” Such a poetics would therefore take these “fables” or origin narratives, and would put them forward as being fundamental to all our human orders. They are as central to any inquiry into the processes by which our behaviors are lawfully, dependably regulated, as the earth and the cosmos, for Columbus and Copernicus, were regulated on the basis of their respective versions of the poetics of the propter nos. The premise of an equally rule-governed model of human auto-institution as a third and hybridly bios/logos (i.e. language) level of existence, leads our new poetics of the propter nos to counter-propose against the contemporary ironic “epistemological resignation” of the post-modernists, that these “fables,” together with the signalling systems that they encode, function to regulate the biochemical or opiate-reward system of the brain, as the biologist James Danielli argues.

Danielli has proposed that these systems, causing the members of each organic species to display the specific behaviors needed to ensure its own well-being, ensure the stable perpetuation of its genome, and are, in the case of humans, everywhere regulated by discursively instituted systems of behavior-regulating meanings, which he proposes, should be called “opium of the people discourses.” after Marx.78 Danielli argues, that the process of social cohesion can be induced in humans only by means of semantic-biochemical correlations that are enacted
"Nature could not have put things so out of proportion . . ."

"Mare totum navigabile . . ."80

". . . mundus proper nos ab optime et regularissime opifice conditus . . ."81

"Since this world of nations has been made by men, let us see in what institutions all men agree and always have agreed. For these institutions will be able to give us the universal and eternal principles . . ."82

"Besides ontogeny, there is sociogeny . . ."

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1 This epigraph is taken from Morison's A New and Fresh English Translation of the Letter of Columbus, Announcing the Discovery of America (Madrid, 1957), 14–15.

2 This citation is given in Bjorn Landstrom's Columbus: The Story of Cristóbal Colón (New York: Macmillan, 1967).


13 Ibid., 172–176.

14 Ibid., 176–179.

15 Frederick Hallyn, 42–47.


18 See Lope de Vega, Felix. El Nuevo Mundo Descubierto por Cristóbal Colón, ed. J. Le Martinel and C. Minguet (Presses Universitaire de Lille, nd.). The citations from the play used in the paper are taken from this modern edition. The play itself was first published in 1614.

19 See specifically Columbus’s 1501 letter to the Sovereigns in Consuelo Varela, ed., 252–257, as well as the other range of letters in which he recalls with bitterness the arguments against his proposals that were put forward by the mainstream scholars of the time.

20 Spain based the centralization of her first modern state on the basis of a single official creed. This called for the suppression of both Judaism and Islam as the alternative creeds that had co-existed in the Spain of the Middle Ages. Both the concepts of limpieza de sangre as of limpieza de fe were theoretically religious and political concepts. J.H. Elliot’s classic, History of the Spanish Empire, etc. deals excellently with this process.


22 See Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Postmodernity and Intellectuals (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1987) for a discussion of the concept of virtù, especially in its feudal “warrior” form, 29–33. I use the concept of virtù as a culture-specific European form of each human culture’s behavior-orienting criterion of optimal behaviors. I have named this criterion, after Fanon, as that of the sociogenic principle which is the analogue, at the human level of life, of the code of inclusive fitness which functions at the level of organic life as a behavior-regulating principle based on the single criterion of reproductive success. I have developed this thesis in an essay “After Man, His Last Word: On Postmodernism, Les Damnés and The Sociogenic Principle,” which has been published in a Spanish translation in Nuevo Testazo Crítico (Department of Spanish and Portuguese, Stanford University) No. 7, 1991.

23 See Mario Vargas Llosa, “Questions of Conquest: What Columbus Wrought and What He Did Not,” Harper’s (December 1990). See also “The Last Dissident: An Interview with Noam Chomsky” by José Tono Martínez, Encuentro’s, 10, a Quincentenary Journal published by the Latin American Institute of the University of New Mexico and the Spain ‘92 Federation, Washington, D.C., Chomsky points out, that for the indigenous groups, 1492 “was an advent of genocidal destruction,” the result of an invasion. The official celebration sees it on the other hand “as a glorious achievement/discovery.”


27 Bartolomé de las Casas, in the course of his speech given at Valladolid, Spain in the 1560s in defense of the Indians against the settler faction whose theologian Ginés de Sepúlveda defended Spain’s right to the conquest of the indigenous peoples, knew, as he said afterwards, that he had said, “things that one had said before,” that indeed he had bordered on heresy. In defending the Aztec civilization against the charge that because of its ritual act of sacrifice, peoples “lacked” reason, he argued that it was precisely because such an act joined the Aztecs to be a rational act taken “for the good of the commonwealth,” that they both effected and defended it as their “truth.” Such an act, he later argued, was not a lack but rather an error of natural reason—in effect error of a specific and alternative mode of cultural rationality. See in this context, Sylvia Wynter, “New Seville and The Conversion Experience of Bartolomé de las Casas,” in Jamaica Journal (Kingston, Jamaica) 17, nos. 283 (May, 1984), 25–27.


Mudimbe, 45.

This was not unique to the indigenous peoples of the Caribbean. As Hernán Pulgar points out with reference to the indigenous peoples of the Canary islands, their lineage-tribal mode of solidarity prevented them from putting up a unified defense against the Spaniards. See Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Before Columbus: Exploration and Colonization From the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1229–1492 (London: Macmillan, 1987), 207–208. Equally, the indigenous
peoples of the Caribbean and the Americas, because of their more fragmented modes of inter-altruistic solidarity, were vulnerable to being used by the Spaniards, one against the other—that is because of their systems of a narrow lineage-clanlike conspecifity. These indigenous peoples of the Caribbean called themselves Tainos (i.e., good, noble) but the term also referred to their noble caste i.e., nativos. The alternative term Arawak has however come to be generally used in the English-speaking Caribbean.


39 Jameson made this point in an interview with Horacio Machín which has been published in a Spanish translation in Nuevo Texto Crítico (Dept. of Spanish & Portuguese, Stanford) No. 7 (1991).

40 He makes this points in his novel, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (New York: William Morrow, 1974).


43 See Wynter, 25.


45 For an analysis of the rhetorical strategy of transmutation or metalepsis see Harold Bloom, The Breaking of the Vessels (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 73–75.

46 While a class, say machinery, has, as members of its class cars, tractors, etc., a member of the class which represents itself as the class must necessarily function as what Daniel Sperber distinguishes as a specific mode of knowledge i.e., "knowledge of categories" as distinct from "knowledge of the world as it is." As such a mode of knowledge a member of a class, when presented as the class is thereby made into the generic member of this class, with all other members represented as being its lack.


48 Glyn Isaacs, 509.

49 In a key essay, "The Quest for the Intelligence of Intelligence," Humberto Maturana and Gloria D. Guifil make it possible to see how our present concept of "I. Q." functions in much the same way as did the concept of 'ual for medieval Islamic geographers as shown by Moraes Farias in his illuminating article published in the Journal of Social and Biological Sciences, 30 (1968). Note how Maturana and Guifil, while they make some scientific points, fall into the trap of the "knowledge of categories" mode of cognition based on their postulate of the human as a biocultural animal rather than as the unique third level of existence that it is.

50 Almé Césaire's Discourse on Colonialism 1960 essay was the precursor of Ward Said's in-depth study of the contemporary "categorial models" institution of "natives" as the analogue of the Zanj or peoples of Black Africa for levial Islamic geographers, as analyzed by Moraes Farias in his essay cited above. See Said's Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).

51 Hans Blumenberg shows how, through the discourse of Hobbes and others, the discourse of Theological Absolusm (which had been a function of the telos of Rational Redemption and of the economy of salvation) had been transformed into the telos of Political Absolusm. This latter had been I proposal of the telos of Rational Redemption on which the pre-industrial State
had been based. While not using these terms, Blumenberg also shows how through the Malthusian concept of a law of population, the discourse of Economic Absolutism (and therefore of the telos of material redemption) had, in turn, displaced, replaced that of Political Absolutism with its own discourse of Economic Absolutism; and, therefore, the purely political behavioral ethic with the concept of a purely economic ethic. See Blumenberg, op. cit. 218–226. I have also developed this argument more fully in a paper, “After the New Class: Janes, the Dummies, and the Autonomy of Human Cognition,” presented at an International Conference hosted by Wellesley College on April, 1991, and forthcoming in the publication of its proceedings.

52 The concept of a “boundary figure” is taken from Zygmunt Bauman’s book, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, New York: Polity Press, 1989) where it analyses the role of “boundary figure” played by the label, the “Jew” in Europe from Christendom to Aryandom: first for their Judaism, secondly for their Jewishness. Their fundamental role, he points out, is to “carry a message of alternative to this order, here and how is not another order, but chaos and devastation” 38–39.

53 Obenga. See note 41.

54 Pocock, the Machiavellian Moment, etc.

55 This biogenetic notion of order based on human hereditary variations has come to take the role-allocating place for our present global order that the physico-spiritual notion of order had taken for the feudal world, the notion of order that underlay the geography and the astronomy that Columbus and Copernicus called in question, with their respective anagogical thrusts.

56 See his collection of essays, articles and letters in Toward An African Revolution, trans. Haakon Chevalier, (New York: Grove Press, 1967). See especially the essay, “The North African Syndrome” which deals with the representation systems of medicine and psychiatry, revealing that they function much as did the representation-system that Moraes Farias analyzes with respect to the Zambian. Fanon makes clear the role that the construct of the North African syndrome plays in the process of inferiorization essential to the control of a subject to a “native” population group. See pages 6–7.

57 His call for a sociodiagnosis of these behaviors in the place of traditional psychoanalysis was Copernican in that it replaced the idea of autonomous psyche as the cause of behaviors with the new organizing principle of the already socialized psyche. See his Black Skins, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1964). 10–13.

58 The innumerable studies carried out since the Sixties on the imagery of women, Chicanos, Blacks, African natives, as well as Césaire’s Discourse of Said’s Orientalism, all reveal the rule-governed nature of these representations whose function is to induce feelings of inferiority in the group-category to which they stigmatize. Their multiple challenges to the projected objectivity of the representations therefore reenact Columbus’s challenge to the ostensibly divinely sanctioned representation of the Western hemisphere as uninhabitable.

By its representation of the family scene as the autonomous site of psychoanalytic reproduction, rather than as merely one of the central sites by which each society’s “socio-systemic optimum” and criterion of being is insculpted, Freudian psychology is unable to deal with systemic rather than merely familial processes. Furthermore, it substitutes the law of the father (leading to feminist scholarship’s misconception of “patriarchy”) in the place of the law of the sociopolitical principle or governing code.

See Franz Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks, 10–17.

Witness the widespread use of terms such as voodoo economics to denote see plus ultra of rationality.


V. E. B. DuBois made his famous declaration that “the problem of the 20th century is the problem of the Color Line—the relation of the darker to lighter races of men in Asia, Africa, in America and the islands of the sea,” B, in his collection of essays, The Souls of Black Folk.


This key point is elaborated by the Chilean biologist, Francisco Varela, in his Principles of Biological Autonomy.


See their respective works already cited.

See his The Meaning of Creation, etc.
Columbus and the Identity of the Americas

LEONARD HARRIS

COLUMBUS REPRESENTS the emergence of a new era in the Americas. Columbus is also a symbol of the community of nations and peoples that form the Americas. What should be the identity of the Americas, five hundred years after the watershed of their emergence? What sort of meaning should be encoded in the symbol of Columbus as legendary representative? I will explore problems involved in constructing a contemporary identity for the Americas through the prism of Columbus as symbol. I will be particularly sensitive to the complexity of changing realities in the Americas, and the difficulties in perceiving human activities as textual agents of transhistorical change. I tend several arguments, admittedly incomplete; the idea is to challenge prevailing ways of understanding collective identity, symbols of collective identity, and the necessary conditions for their epistemic efficacy.

I

King Arthur, neither king, diplomat, nor significant warrior in any battle against the Saxons, is nonetheless lionized in learned works of history and literature as the crucial agent for the emergence of English nationalism. Through the intentional and unintentional falsification, obfuscation, and erasure of historical atomic facts, i.e., facts shrouded in a myriad of theory, Arthur became a symbol of the nascent formation of English nationalism. George Allan writes, "Both the reality and the significance of Arthur are necessary to his legend, to the ways by which terror of history [its continual change] has come to be modulated, and the assurances of life's importances and my own life's particular importance." Arthur has become a symbol by which individuals gain a sense of self-assurance and meaning as instantiations or conduits for national glory. Regardless of whether historians continue the ground-