

REARTIKULACIJA

UMETNIŠKO-POLITIČNA-TEORETIČNA-DISKURZIVNA PLATFORMA ARTISTIC-POLITICAL-THEORETICAL-DISCURSIVE PLATFORM
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10, 11, 12, 13



Iron Mask, White Torture, performance and installation, conceived by Marissa Lôbo, 2010. *Iron Mask, White Torture* was presented at the group exhibition "Where do we go from here?" at Secession, Vienna, 2010.

Performers: Agnes Achola, Alessandra Klimpel, Belinda Kazeem, Flavia Inkiru, Grace Latigo, Steaze, Sheri Avraham, Njideka Stephanie Iroh, Marissa Lôbo.

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Iron Mask, White Torture, performance and installation, conceived by Marissa Lôbo, 2010

Short report from the performance *Iron Mask, White Torture*, conceived by Marissa Lôbo. Report by Collective of Black Women Subjects in Art Space, written by Marissa Lôbo and Sheri Avraham. Date of the performance: July 2, 2010, time: 19.30, space: Secession, Vienna.

THE SPACE: A MUSEUM

A space of epistemological violence production. Appropriation of the history of the "other," a constant reproduction of the White Western desire of exposing and determining the otherness, the pure empire of Voyeurisms.

INTRO Time 1 at 18:59

Nine black women and women of colour, with black outfits and bright blue eyes, are spread out in the exhibition space, observing the artwork amongst the spectators. Their presence and their homogeneous appearance cannot be ignored. The occupation has started. The nine women's costumes symbolize two important anchor points in the history of black resistance.

Their black outfits give tribute to the Black Panther Party, expressing their importance as a significant resistance group in all of black history. The second aspect can be discovered through the bright blue contact lenses, as they relate to the blue eyes of Anastácia, who was enslaved, and because of her struggle for freedom, becomes a symbol for colonial resistance.

PRESENTATION Time 2 at 19:27

The curator presents the title of the exhibition, "Where do we go from here?". She makes reference to Martin Luther King, Jr., who originally proposed this question. "Where do we go from here, Vienna?" – isn't this such an ironic question to ask when your history is imprinted in every corner, and at the same time we revile openly and legally a deep-rooted racist structure, as for example, in the election campaign, or as it is defined by the legislature enforcing "Alien Laws." In the gallery space, the loud noise from the audience swallows the voice of the curator in her attempt to carry an opening speech. Some, more devoted to the ritual than others, surround her with the honest intention to hear. The rest wobble around, waiting for the bar to open its hatch, disregarding the curator's intention. This particular scenario is not different from any of the other Gallery / Museum / Art Space openings that take place in Vienna. The same artists, curators and mainstream media are here again in a celebration of the white territory. Praising their visual gaze regimes of exclusion of otherness. "Where do we go from here?" – is an exhibition where the other is invited as a guest to present his/her work and then is being asked: where do you go from here?

THE PERFORMANCE Time 3 at 19:34

One long, empty table slowly gets occupied with nine black women and women of colour. They sit next to each other and stare directly at the audience. Their blue eyes appear very clearly as an element that has been shoved into the black subject body. This physical illustration is meant to

evoke a certain dissonance within the viewer – a white middle- and upper-class – the typical guest of such an event. For a moment, he has been disturbed in his ritual and is compelled to witness such a gaze upon him. Nine different women with different backgrounds are telling the same story through their blue-eyed gaze. The story consists of a mask and its physical form that have been created and constantly revised in order to enforce the white male supremacist. They are re-telling the history, but now from a different body. Thus, the female black body tells the history of suppressions and mutations.

THE FINAL CUT Time 4 until 20:05

Sitting at the table the group has started to prepare a genealogical critique, they create a moment for ignoring the white canon that is legitimized by knowledge produced by Western or Eurocentric epistemologies. With this mask, the colonizer tried to silence the black subject. The group articulates and gives voice to all objects exhibited in art museums that have been an object of theft, violence, lies and silence. The reading starts with a repetition of the name Anastácia by each of the nine performers. Then each woman, one after the other, exposes firmly thoughts by black feminists. Thoughts that concern racism and sexism, Africa Diasporas, black identities and colonization are juxtaposed with critical migration politics and "rethinking black feminism as a social justice project. This develops a complex notion of empowerment, shifting the analysis toward investigating how the matrix of domination is structured along certain axes – race, gender, class, sexuality and nation" (as Patricia Hill Collins says in "Black Feminist Thought"). The mask of silence is broken with each of the quotations.

"There is a mask of which I heard many times during my childhood. [...] Formally the mask was used by white masters," – is the first sentence uttered by the performers. It is from Grada Kilomba. It is striking; it is like an echo (THERE IS A MASK, THERE IS A MASK, THERE IS A MASK). Quotes from important black women theoreticians that are read in the intervention-performance are here to reinforce black feminist struggles that have taken place as a collective voice and for reconceptualising the definition of knowledge.

In the last minute of the performance, they take the Blue Eyes out, they leave the space and some applause comes from the audience. This is a violent moment of contemplation on the art work, and the strong voice by Grace Latigo asks: "Is there something to be applauded here?"

Not to forget the question that doesn't want to be silent: "Where do we go from here?"
Nowhere! – We are here to stay!

Texts quoted in the performance are by bell hooks, Grada Kilomba, Patricia Hill Collins, Araba Evelyn Johnston-Arthur, Belinda Kazeem, Claudia Unterweger, Njideka Stephanie Iroh and Grace Latigo.

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FOTEM



KAZALO/CONTENTS

[1, 3] **INTERVENTION** Marissa Lôbo: WHAT IS ANASTÁCIA KEEPING SILENT? OR WHAT DOES ANASTÁCIA SEE? THE MANY ANASTÁCIAS

[4-8] **(HARD) CORE** Marina Vishmidt: ČLOVEŠKI KAPITAL ALI STRUPENO PREMOŽENJE: PO MEZDI / HUMAN CAPITAL OR TOXIC ASSET: AFTER THE WAGE

[8-9] **QUEER** Tatjana Greif: VOJNE NA ZELENICI / WARS ON GREEN FIELDS

[9-10] **LEZBIČNI BAR / LESBIAN BAR** Nataša Velikonja: UJEMITE TATU! (vpije tat) / CATCH THE THIEF! (the thief cries out)

[10-11] **POZICIONIRANJE / POSITIONING** Jovita Pristovšek: OD ŠTETJA TELES DO TELES, KI ŠTEJEJO / FROM BODY COUNT TO BODIES THAT COUNT

[12] **STATE OF EXCEPTION** Hansel Sato: AUSTRIAN NEWS/ÖSTERREICHISCHE NACHRICHTEN

[12-13] **NEW FASCISMS** Staš Kleindienst: EU – SOME THOUGHTS ON IDEOLOGY

[13-14] **CRITIQUE (OF EXHIBITIONISM)** Danila Mayer in collaboration with Muzaffer Hasaltay and Onur Serdar: KENTLERDE SANAT – ART IN CITIES. CONSIDERING ART BIENNIALS WHILE LOOKING AT THE 11th INTERNATIONAL ISTANBUL BIENNIAL

[15] **REARTIKULACIJA** Marina Gržinić: DECOLONIALITY OF TIME AND SPACE

[16-17] **DEEP THROAT** Sandi Abram: THE ZENITH OF KNOWLEDGE-FEUDALISM THROUGH CREATIVITY: ON PROPERTY, CYBERSPACE AND ART

[17-19] **DE-COLONIALITY** DECOLONIAL THINKING AND DOING IN THE ANDES: A CONVERSATION BY WALTER MIGNOLO WITH CATHERINE WALSH A PROPOS OF HER BOOK INTERCULTURALIDAD, ESTADO, SOCIEDAD. LUCHAS (DE)COLONIALES DE NUESTRA EPOCA (Interculturalism, State, Society. (De)Colonial Struggles of Our Times)

[20-21] **HARD (CORE)** Marina Gržinić: JUSTICE AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM

[21-22] **RADICAL EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE** Rubia Salgado: LEARNING AND TEACHING THE HEGEMONIC LANGUAGE GERMAN IN THE CONTEXT OF MIGRATION

[23-24] **STATE OF EXCEPTION** Alanna Lockward: WILD AT HAIR. IngridMwangiRobertHutter: Masks and Skin Politics as a German DeColonial Knowledge Production

FORMACIJA RADIKALNE KRITIČNE PRAKSE: NI RADIKALNE PRAKSE BREZ RADIKALNE TEORIJE, A TO TUDI NI VSE!

Kakšen je smisel kritike sistema danes, ko je bilo že toliko napisane-ga, oziroma ali še obstaja možnost realne kritične refleksije o vse ostrejših oblikah izkoriščanja in podrejanja, ki bi se lahko vpela v kolektivno zavest ter posledično privedla do spremembe? Danes smo priča različnim nagovorom, da gre pri kritičnem diskurzu za opozarjanje na nezmožnost delovanja sistema, za družbeno ozaveščanje in lokalizacijo skupnega imenovalca novega globalnega boja, ki utegne nemara sprožiti odpor do dominantne strukture moči – kapitala, natančneje profita in privatne lastnine. Problem ni v kritiki, pač pa v obliki te kritike, v načinu, kako naj jo definiramo, konceptualiziramo in na katerih temeljih naj jo zastavimo. Tako se zastavlja vprašanje, na katere teoretične temelje naj se opremo pri redefiniciji kritične prakse. S katero teorijo naj interveniramo? Zato nam gre pri radikalni kritični praksi za radikalen teoretičen diskurz, ki se formira na prehodih različnih družbenih praks; od umetnosti, filozofije in teorije do političnega aktivizma. Na njihovi osnovi organizira svojo prakso, jih vanjo vpenja in – kar je najpomembnejše, prek njih intervenira v celotno družbeno strukturo. Radikalno kritično prakso ne zaznamuje samo večplastno delovanje, ampak nova politična angažiranost, ki omogoča repolitizacijo politično kastriranega subjekta.

Projekt *Formacija radikalne kritične prakse* analizira in izpostavlja vlogo produkcije radikalnega kritičnega diskurza danes, njegovo intervencijo v širšo družbeno strukturo ter potencialnost, ki jo prinaša s seboj. Kontekstualna razširitev, ki se vzpostavlja prek večplastnega načina delovanja, omogoča sočasno intervencijo na različna družbena področja, njihovo izboljšanje in spremembo. Razumevanje tega preobrata zahteva razumevanje novih paradig in struktur, skozi katere se ti odnosi vzpostavljajo tako na praktičnem nivoju, kjer določeni projekti sprožijo družbeno reakcijo, kakor tudi na teoretski ravni, kjer projekt intervenira tako, da izgrajuje in dopolnjuje instrumentarij, s katerim je mogoče analizirati in preučevati vse bolj zaostrene družbene razmere.

V tokratni multipli številki časopisa *Reartikulacija* predstavljamo del te formacije, ki prek znanstvenega, umetniškega in aktivističnega delovanja analizira različne družbene vzvode, ki oblikujejo sodobno družbo kot nekrosocialno, teorijo le kot brand in aktivizem le kot stil. Z druge strani pa prinaša načrtno povabljen projekto, teorije in umetnostne prakse, ki s svojo analitično močjo in umetniškim ter kritičnim delovanjem ponujajo opcijo za radikalno možnost tukaj in zdaj.

Končno naj zapišemo, da je situacija izdajanja *Reartikulacije* iz številke v številko slabša, cenzura se dogaja na ravni pridobivanja potrebnih sredstev za vsakokraten izid, partnerji, ki so projekt finančno podpirali, počasi izginevajo, denarja je vse manj, javna sredstva pa so zaradi birokratiziranosti nedosegljiva. Dostop do njih je tako rekoč pisan na kožo peščice tistih, ki s svojo rutinarno dejavnostjo odgovarjajo viziji države, po kateri naj umetnost, kultura in teorija pragmatično izpeljujejo svoj minimum, proizvajajo čim manj kritična dela in vse bolj menedžersko učinkovit in kapitalistično globalno informativen program.

Marina Gržinić in Sebastjan Leban

FORMATION OF RADICAL CRITICAL PRACTICE: THERE IS NO RADICAL PRACTICE WITHOUT RADICAL THEORY. YET, THERE'S MUCH MORE TO IT!

What is the point of criticizing the system today when there has already been so much written about it? Or better, is it possible to produce a real critical reflection upon the ever more poignant forms of exploitation and subjugation to interject into the collective consciousness in order to provoke a change? We are confronted with various ideas holding that critical discourse is a warning sign against the impossibility of the system to function, that it involves but the raising of social awareness and the localization of the common denominator of the new global struggle that might perhaps unleash resistance against the dominant power structure – capital, and more precisely, profit and private property. The problem is not in the critique as such, but in the way in which it is formed, in its definition, conceptualization and rationale. Therefore, the question arises as to what theoretical basis to draw upon in redefining critical practice and what theory to call upon for intervention to occur. It is precisely for this reason that radical critical practice aims at producing radical theoretical discourse that takes shape at the intersection of different social practices – from art, philosophy, theory to political activism – organising upon them its own practice, incorporating them into its own agency and, more importantly, intervening through them into the social structure as a whole. Radical critical practice is not marked only by multilayered agency, but also by a new political engagement that allows for the repoliticization of the politically castrated subject.

The project *Formation of Radical Critical Practice* analyzes and brings forward the role of production of radical critical discourse in the present, its intervention into the social structure and its potentiality. The extension of context that is established through the multilayered mode of agency enables a simultaneous intervention into different social fields, their improvement and change. In order to understand this shift, one needs to understand new paradigms and structures that allow for the establishment of these relationships at the practical level, where particular projects trigger a social reaction, as well as at the theoretical level, where a project means building and upgrading the tools needed for the researching and analysis of the ever more strained social conditions.

The present multiple issue of the *Reartikulacija Journal* presents these very formations, analyzing through scientific, artistic and activist agency various social agents that frame contemporary society as the necrosocial, theory as a mere brand and activism as a style. Moreover, it brings forth systematically chosen projects, theories and artistic practices that by way of their analytical power and artistic and critical activity offer the option for a radical possibility here and now.

Finally, the situation of *Reartikulacija* is getting worse with each issue – censorship is occurring at the level of receiving the necessary funds for publication, financing project partners are slowly disappearing, money supply is curtailed, and public resources are inaccessible due to bureaucratization. These last are only accessible, so to speak, to the handful of those whose routine operations tally with the state's vision of art, culture and theory meant to pragmatically take the line of least resistance, producing not-too-critical works and carrying out an increasingly managerially efficient and capitalist-oriented global informational program.

Marina Gržinić and Sebastjan Leban

Marissa Lôbo
**WHAT IS ANASTÁCIA KEEPING SILENT? OR
WHAT DOES ANASTÁCIA SEE?**

THE MANY ANASTÁCIAS

Legend has it that Anastácia was a blue-eyed Bantu, enslaved and transported to Brazil and forced into silence by her owners with an iron gag. There are various reasons for this brutal form of punishment, depending on the perspective it is viewed from. One significant version places the iron mask as vengeance for resisting sexual exploitation by the so-called “master” of enslaved Africans; another portrays the mask as punishment for Anastácia’s political disobedience as she joined a Quilombola, a resistance movement of run-away enslaved Africans.

The metal mask represents several sadistic aspects of colonialism within which violence is notoriously legitimized through the brutal desire of a white man for the sexualized and de-subjectivized Black body. This ambivalent imago goes beyond the image of a victim of colonial violence and represents the fighters who refuse to be silenced. With the iron mask and her unbroken look, she is read as the rebellious subaltern that is forced into silence – or not? But what is Anastácia keeping silent?

The adoration of holy Anastácia is profoundly popular in Latin America and multifaceted, but she never reached the official status of saint (the Catholic Church declared her to be non-existent in 1987). She is worshipped as a rebel and a fighter for the movement of enslaved Africans, as a Black woman who resisted against the sexual violence/power of the so-called “master,” as a martyred innocent servant of God.

The “Movimento Negro” of Brazil refuses to recognize Anastácia as a Black icon because the cult surrounding her comes from Catholicism, which had strong ties with the colonial authority and transformed enslavement into the symbolic authority/power of missionary work. Worshipping Anastácia, who had her torturers’ blue eyes and was forced into silence, would redeem the oppressor and not the oppressed.

The many faces of Anastácia make the indissoluble ambivalence of this imago clear: it is the Black woman who was not obedient, who did not listen to orders, who was enslaved, but with the face of the warriors, who stares balefully and relentlessly, who was forced into silence and screamed incessantly: I am not a slave.

Anastácia’s Bluest Eyes

In her book “The Bluest Eye,” Toni Morrison undertakes a poetical critique of the dominant ideal of beauty, which white supremacy

transfers into the fantasies of the ideal body. The desire for blue eyes is the effect of internalised racism, created by colonialism and which entrenches itself as trauma in the unconsciousness of the Black subject. The dream of blue eyes obscures the view of Black identity. Anastácia’s striking “bluest eyes” tell the story of distorted desire and of symbolic and sexual violence/power through the white colonial ruler. The colonial ruler appropriates the Black body and instrumentalizes it as an exotic object of desire, which the hyper-sexualized Black woman must serve as. Anastácia pays for her resistance against this violence/power by being tortured with the metal mask, which leaves her eyes visible; a blue that mirrors desire pervaded by racism.

The Mask of Silence

Anastácia was sentenced to speechlessness, a form of punishment notoriously administered by the regime of enslavement, a system marked by sadistic excesses of violence, which are repeated and perpetuated in today’s society, a society characterized by structural racism.

“The mask represents, in this sense, colonialism as a whole: Why must the mouth of the Black subject be fastened? Why must she or he become silent? What could the Black subject say if her or his mouth were not sealed? And what would the white subject have to listen to? In other words, who can speak? What happens when those who were forced to be silent start speaking? And above all, what can we speak about?” (Grada Kilomba)

A Critical Genealogy

Anastácia with the metal mask is a figure from the sinister times of the regime of enslavement that degenerated to the melodramatic subject and motive of rhetorical outrage. She is a figure of the present. The racist and sexist power relations she embodies are omnipresent. Anastácia, Josefina Soliman, the names remain hidden.

“In a culture of domination, preoccupation with victimage is inevitable.” (bell hooks) But the history of Black resistance and its protagonists remains just as hidden.

What does Anastácia say if one places her beyond worship and condemnation into a critical genealogy that Black theorists have been working on for decades? Does one place her in “a class of women and people of color” as someone who asserts oneself and puts up resistance between theory and practice? Does one place her in a new context of re-figuration of Black history through the production of knowledge from activist practice? So is Anastácia talking about the possibility of resistance, as bell hooks stated: “Even the most subjected person has moments of rage and resentment so intense that they respond, they act against. There is an inner uprising that leads to rebellion, however short-lived. It may be only momentary but it takes place. That space within oneself where resistance is possible remains.”

This Anastácia resists against the symbolic power of being a victim, an object, an object in a museum, a saint. She has the penetrative glare of someone who sees and in doing so focuses on colonialism and its perpetrators.

Marisa Lôbo, activist, member of the autonomous organization for women migrants, maiz, Linz; studies Post-Conceptual Art Practices at the Academy for Fine Arts in Vienna.

Translation from German by Njideka Stephanie Iroh.



Iron Mask, White Torture, performance and installation.



Iron Mask, White Torture, installation view.

(HARD) CORE

Marina Vishmidt ČLOVEŠKI KAPITAL ALI STRUPENO PREMOŽENJE: PO MEZDI

To je sekvenca premišljevanj o afirmaciji in negaciji, o identifikaciji in ločitvi. Določujoča negacija kot strateška afirmacija, identifikacija konkretnih univerzalij in ločitev od mrtvega odnosa. Te smernice bomo preiskovali z nanašanjem na trenutni položaj plačanega¹ in neplačanega delavskega razreda, večinoma v Veliki Britaniji [VB], kjer 'dolg' postaja ideološki beli šum in praktični horizont vse družbene in politične imaginacije. V spontani ideologiji konzervativne varčevalne agende je zadolženost gospodinjstva zamešana z državnim primanjkljajem, kjer so ostanki gospodarstva, ki ga pesti kriza, žrtvovani 'zadolženosti' – kot revni ljudje oderuhom, tako tudi VB vlagateljem vrednostnih papirjev. Nacionalistična pripoved, ki govori, da smo 'vsi skupaj v tem', eliminira kakršenkoli prostor za razpravo o tem, kdo bi moral nositi večjo odgovornost za krizo in kdo plačevati zanj. Napovedani varčevalni rezi so popolnoma jasni – napihnjen javni sektor ter socialni transferji so tisti, ki so odgovorni, in tistim, ki jim gre najslabše, bo odvzeto tudi tisto malo, kar imajo, kot pravi biblijska parabola.² A za zdaj vendarle prevladuje fatalistični konsenz, ki ga utrjuje grožnja onstran meja razprave: 'dolg'.

Dolg si je ustvaril družbeno pomembnost brez primere in skora-jda zasenčil delovno teorijo vrednosti, ki je veljala hkrati kot načelo akumulacije kapitala in kot načelo, ki stoji za strukturno vlogo dela v družbenih odnosih, organiziranih skozi formo vrednosti. Družbena logika špekulacije je na delu (sic) tudi v predpostavki človeškega in družbenega kapitala, ki je vsako človeško aktivnost, kot trdi Jason Read, na novo določila kot investicijo, ki bo v prihodnosti potencialno omogočala dostop do večjega družbenega bogastva. Pojem 'človeškega kapitala' služi tudi k izkoreninjenju kakršnegakoli antagonizma med lastniki produkcijskih sredstev in tistimi, ki lahko prodajajo le svojo delovno silo, saj so oboji razumljeni kot investitorji, ki čisto naravno zasledujejo maksimalni dobiček.³

Dolg je bil seveda tudi glavno gonilo akumulacije zadnjih nekaj desetletij, od deficitarne porabe v javnem sektorju, odvisnem od finančnega razcveta, ki ga je poganjalo obilno trgovanje z zadolžnicami, zavarovanimi z dolgom,⁴ kot tudi drugi vsečno kvantificirani instrumenti tveganja, pa do značilne prakse financializacije – ustvarjanja profita iz neznanско povečane porabe kreditnih proizvodov, katerih povpraševanje je ustvaril prav njihov lastni učinek zmanjševanja mezd. V akumulaciji, ki jo financira dolg, problem ni več vrednost, ampak bogastvo; in ker delavci niso proizvajali bogastva, ampak so v bilanci predstavljali breme, se je vstop v močno poblagovljen dolg izkazal za edini način poplačila stroškov ustvarjalcem bogastva, podjetnikom. Potrošniški dolg pa je bil, kot verjetno ni treba posebej omenjati, tista sila, ki je napihnila premoženske vrednosti, ki so se tako impresivno zrušile pred dvema letoma, skupaj s povpraševanjem, ki ga je uspel ohranjati. Znotraj tega scenarija moramo razmišljati o tem, kaj premik od delavca do dolžnika, kot dokončne družbene identitete večine ljudi danes, napoveduje glede politične recompozicije v času, ko jih bosta nezaposlenost in zmanjševanje socialnih pomoči [*welfare*] pustila z minimalnimi sredstvi, s katerimi bodo bodisi odplačevali dolg ali pa jih porabili za nujne življenjske potrebe. Varčevalni proračuni pa, kot se je zelo očitno pokazalo po vsem svetu, takoj sprožijo protinapade na terenu reprodukcije, kot se je to zgodilo v primeru Grčije in Španije. Zmanjševanje izdatkov za socialo je namreč prva redukcija, ki jo zahtevajo agencije za davčno disciplino; in ko malo plačana ali neobstoječa dela postanejo norma, te javne storitve postanejo vprašanje preživetja, kar je stanje, ki ga še dodatno poslabšujejo varčevalni ukrepi. Ko se začne v kriznih časih razmerje med plačanimi in neplačanimi nagibati v negativno smer, reprodukcija postane politično bojišče, pa čeprav le skozi čisto silo števila ljudi, ki ne morejo priti do plače, kot tudi s pomembno kategorijo 'revnih delavcev' [*working poor*], ki se morajo zanašati na nadomestila. Sam obstoj 'revnih delavcev' pa je najbolj razviden dokaz – če ga potrebujemo – da je kapital, in ne zadolženi delavec, tisti, ki parazitira na državi, saj le-ta zaposlovalcem dovoljuje izplačilo izredno majhnih plač, ki jih je nato pripravljena suplementirati. Napadanje socialnih storitev z moralistično retoriko osebnе odgovornosti – kot na primer s splošno sprejeto idejo o 'kulturi odvisnosti' [*dependency culture*] – je možno le v svojem absolutnem zanašanju na zdrav razum, ki zabriše sistemske sile, ki so, če ne že zasvojene, pa dejansko odvisne od obstoja nadizkoriščane, nezaposlene, ilegalizirane in obupane 'delovne sile'. Ignorirati mora strukturno nujnost nizko plačane in neplačane rezervne armade, ki kapitalu (vključno z državnimi in polzasebnimi subjekti [*entities*]) omogoča nižanje mezd, saj država v strahu pred hujšimi posledicami na koncu poskrbi za stroške reprodukcije. V tem smislu je vsa socialna politika [*welfare*], ne glede na njeno raven radodarnosti ali skoposti, ne glede na to, koga prepozna za 'zaslužnega' ali za 'neupravičenega', korporativna socialna politika – njena funkcija je namreč le v izboljšanju delovanja trga, ne pa v redistribuciji. Odveč je poudarjati, da 'socialni reformi', tako kot varčevanju, spodleti na njenih lastnih ekonomističnih pogojih. De-

javniki zmanjševanja povpraševanja in stroški upravljanja [*policing*] s socialno politiko prek njenega prenosa na profitne organizacije, ki so spodbujane za zmanjševanje socialnih izdatkov, se namreč na koncu izkažejo za veliko dražje od deleža državne porabe, ki jo je socialna politika obsegala na začetku. A če so zasebni podizvajalci zadovoljni, tabloidi pa pomirjeni, potem tržišča zagotovo opravljajo nadurno delo v dobro javnega interesa.

Vendar pa je, ne glede na očitnost in dolgotrajen obstoj teh protislovij, pomembno vedno znova poudariti, da boj, ki je pred nami, ni boj proti tržni racionalnosti, ki bi ji nasprotoval skupek bolj 'socialnih' ekonomskih načel. Nobene racionalnosti ni, razen plenjenja in kanibalizma, ki za zdaj določata pogoje kapitalistične akumulacije. Kot so v svojih delih izčrpno pokazali David Harvey in drugi, in kar je enako razvidno tudi ob branju časopisov, je 'ekonomska racionalnost' rdeča nit za avtoritarne upravljavske režime državne oblasti. Neoliberalizem je državni projekt z državno financiranimi programi za organiziranje konkurenčnosti čez celotno družbeno življenje. Ker je to v prvi vrsti ideološki projekt, imajo zanj objektivne okoliščine in rezultati zelo majhno veljavo in zato tudi razkrivanje njegovih morilskih in hinavskih nepravilnosti nima nobene teže; legitimnost mu lahko odvzamemo le ideološko. Argumentirati to je, paradoksalno, lažje, ker so bile same objektivne okoliščine s strani ideologije izoblikovane do te mere, da se, kot predlagajo nekateri, 'razrednemu odnosu' bliža konec, komunizem pa je prvič mogoč brez predhodne, 'programske' afirmacije delavskega razreda. Delo ni več na voljo objektivno, niti ni kot politična identiteta zaželeno subjektivno, čeprav ta manko vsebine vladajočemu razredu ne preprečuje, da ga ne bi še naprej vihtel kot gorjačo discipliniranja.⁵ Čeprav so bile te ideje prisotne vsaj od sedemdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja s strujo postavtonomističnega gibanja 'Ničelnega dela' [*Zerowork*] in z vsemi variacijami stališča 'zavračanja dela' na komunistični in anarhistični ultralevici, pa danes v svojem ponovnem vzniku vstopajo v precej drugačno politično okolje treh desetletij neoliberalne reakcije, globaliziranega kapitalizma in destrukcije organiziranega dela, da ne omenjamo deindustrializacije Evrope, Severne in Južne Amerike, Bližnjega vzhoda in Afrike ter obširne nizkostopenjske [*low-grade*] industrializacije delov Azije in Kitajske. 'Komunistična ideja' mora sedaj upoštevati, da zavračanje dela ni politična izbira, ampak prerogativ, ki ga izvaja stopnja kapitalizma, ki ima od ugotovitve, da je dolg dosti bolj profitabilen kot produkcija presežne vrednosti, vse manj potrebe po slednji.

V viziji 'varčnosti' je vsakdo potencialen parazit na solventnem telesu nacije, ki poskuša na globalnih trgih poravnati [*compound*] nacionalne obrestne mere. In zakaj se ne bi tako tudi obnašal? Kaj je rezultat procesa, ki se zadnji dve desetletji odvija v VB, ki večino populacije postavlja v položaj dejanskega ali virtualnega odpadka sistema? Kaj bi lahko bila (anti)politična subjektiviteta človeškega kapitala, ki se je spremenil v strupeno premoženje? Ko so finance univerzalno sprejete kot izvor vse vrednosti, stroj akumulacije ni več produktivna investicija, ampak renta. Proizvajanje bogastva se zvede na trgovanje s 'fiktivnim kapitalom', skupaj z iskanjem rente in kapitalizacijo/omejevanjem obstoječega (javnega) premoženja. Ker lahko delavci k tej valorizaciji prispevajo le prek dolga, prav ta predstavlja točko delegitimacije sedanje logike kapitala. Zavračanje dolga mora zasedi mesto zavračanja dela znotraj situacije, v kateri je delo tako ali tako že zavrnjeno s strani kapitala.

Vendar pa ob vsem tem ostaja zelo nejasno, v kolikšni meri, če sploh, so bile takšne politične implikacije izpeljane pri zagovorniških skupinah, sindikatih in lokalnih [*grassroots*] strankarskih aktivistih na britanski levici. Težko zaznamo resno obravnavo dolga, poleg generičnega stališča, da 'ne bomo plačevali za vašo krizo'. Nobenega spora ni glede tega, da *nekdo* mora plačati; to pa v veliki meri sestoji iz oblikovanja ekonomskih argumentov v prid enega sektorja na (implicitno) škodo drugega. Nikjer ni zakrnelo gledišče mainstreama britanske socialistične levice očitnejše kot v kampanjah 'Pravice do dela' in 'Zelenih služb', ki se, že odkar je udarila 'kriza', pojavljajo na njenih marginah. Zanje se zdi, da spregledujejo nekaj bistvenega glede delovanja kapitala danes (da ne omenjamo hkratne reakcionarne in idealistične perspektive zahteve po 'dobrih službah'): bogastvo se ne proizvaja več skozi produktivno investicijo, delavci pa nočejo služb, temveč le denar. Čemu bi se sicer vsi najvidnejši primeri militantnosti na delovnem mestu v zadnjih nekaj letih, od zasedb tovarn do 'ugrabljanja šefov' [*bosssnappings*] ter groženj z razstrelitvijo tovarn, vrteli okrog boljših paketov nadomestil za izgubo dela namesto ohranjanja delovnih mest? Niti kapital niti delavci niso zainteresirani za službe: danes vsakogar zanima le še premoženje. Kapital nima niti naklonjenosti niti sredstev, da bi v tem trenutku delavcem ponudil več izkoriščanja. Vendar pa se je potrebno zavedati, da osnova družbene pogodbe ostaja izkoriščanje, ki je najučinkoviteje doseženo brez služb v okviru gospodarstva, ki temelji na kapitalizaciji dolga. Mar ni parola 'okrevanja brez služb' [*jobless recovery*], ki se pojavlja v današnjih ekonomskih analizah, zgrajena na predpostavki, da nas lahko potrošnja (oziroma 'zaupanje potrošnikov') kar sama, tj. skozi še en kreditni mehurček, popelje nazaj k razcvetu? Brez pomena je, da je globalno ekonomsko krizo sprožilo razpočenje systemskega kreditnega mehurčka; kreditni mehurčki so edina predstavljiva pot vrnitve k normalnosti, tako kot so katastrofalne neoliberalne politike le še intenzivirane v posledicah njihovega odmevnega neuspeha.

¹ Primerjaj izjavo Owena Hatherleya glede te poante v njegovi blogerski objavi, 'Work and Non-Work': 'A delo še vedno poteka naprej, nadzorovano, brutalno in idiotsko, kot je bilo zmeraj. Thatcherizem s človeškim obrazom zatrjuje, da je unil delavski razred, v resnici pa delo perpetuira do vedno večje absurdnosti, še posebej, ko hoče svoje 'jedro volivcev' spomniti na njihove korenine v gibanju garaških razredov. Britanska delovna mesta za britanske delavce. Vojna proti delomrznežem. Delaj več za večji zaslužek. Delavski procesi [*work trials*] za invalide, kognitivna vedenjska terapija za tiste, ki nočejo delati. Tisti, ki ne dela, naj tudi ne je. Danes mora biti edini odziv na to: stranka [*party*] delavcev (katerakoli in kjerkoli že je) mora biti proti delu.' Ter bolj rigorozen razvoj, nanašajoč se Marxove kategorije v tekstu iz Endnotes, 'Crisis in the Class Relation': ' /.../ proletariat vedno bolj postaja *tisto, kar je producirano s strani kapitala, ne da bi samo produciralo kapital*. Kot populacija, ki je kapitalistični produkciji preprosto odvečna [*superfluous*], a ki tudi nima nikakršne avtonomne oblike reprodukcije, je presežna populacija reproducirana kot *stranski učinek* kapitalistične produkcije. Ker njena samoreprodukcija ni posredovana skozi izmenjavo s kapitalom produktivnega dela za meздо, s kapitalom ne sklene kroga, tako da se njena eksistenca kaže kot kontingentna ali nebitvena glede na kapital. /.../ S tem, ko mezdna oblika izgublja svojo osrednjost v posredovanju družbene reprodukcije, se sama kapitalistična produkcija vse bolj kaže kot odvečna [*superfluous*] glede na proletariat: je tisto, kar nas naredi za proletarce in nas nato tukaj zapusti. V takšnih okoliščinah se horizont pojavlja kot horizont komunikacije; neposrednega izvajanja ukrepov, da bi zaustavili gibanje vrednostne forme in da bi se reproducirali brez kapitala.' *Endnotes*, št. 2, str. 17–19; dostopno tudi prek: http://endnotes.org.uk/articles/2.

Iz te perspektive se zdi razvidno, da lahko danes za kapital proizvajamo bogastvo (ne vrednosti) le skozi naša odplačevanja dolgov. Ali ne bi moral biti v tem primeru dolg prevladujoče žarišče odpora in revolta, namesto pošiljanja zahtevkov imaginarnim do-brotnikom za imaginarne službe? Nadalje je treba vedno znova ponavljati, da se kakršnakoli zahteva po službah še preveč dobro ujema z vladno propagando proti 'delomrznežem', ki jim bo odvzeta socialna podpora, če ne bodo neodvisno prišli do spoznanja, da 'delo osvobaja', kot naj bi povedal trenutni minister za delo in pokojnine v neki navedbi. Ta, nedvomno nenamerna⁶ ponovitev nacionalsocialističnega slogana, osvetljuje 'obsceno' agendo man-tre 'vsi smo skupaj v tem', ki prinaša precej šibko legitimacijo na-povedanih varčevalnih ukrepov. Vsaj na tej točki ni nobenega ods-topanja od prejšnjih zgodovinskih obdobj, kjer je bilo slabšanje gospodarskih okoliščin uporabljeno za izgradnjo nacionalističnega konsenza, ki je utrl pot fašizmu.

Če so delavci sedaj 'človeški kapital', potem se lahko moment negacije družbenih odnosov, ki so nas pripeljali do sem, začne z afirmacijo – afirmacijo bolne in vse bolj hirajoče narave kapitala s strani njegove 'človeške' različice (tega, kar smo nekoč poznali kot 'variabilni kapital'). Z maksimizacijo 'človeškega kapitala' znotraj in zunaj dela se teren reprodukcije (socialne službe, zdravstvo, nas-tanitve) kaže kot najbolj neposredna arena, v kateri lahko ta kapi-tal postane kolektivno disfunkcionalen, kar je tudi nujnost v dobi intenziviranega biopolitičnega nadzora in kriznega upravljanja, ki ga za 'odvisne' populacije v VB predstavljajo socialne službe.⁷ Po-kornost 'uporabnice' storitev, izolirane, upravljane [*managed*] in ponižane ob odsotnosti zaposlitve, ki bi ji omogočila preživetje brez zatekanja k državnim podporam, je tisto, kar bi moralo biti preizprašano s strani uporabnikov kot tudi socialnih delavcev pri 'dostavi' [*delivery*] pomoči in v solidarnosti. Zavedati se je potrebno, da so socialne podpore dejansko 'družbene mezde', ki ne sestojijo iz dobrodelnosti države, ampak iz vrednosti, ki je izvljučena iz nekdan-jih in trenutno zaposlenih delavcev, kot tudi iz vrednosti, ki se iz teh delavcev pretoči prek davkov in DDV-a. Pozicija ponižne prošnje mora biti transformirana v pozicijo 'predrznosti', upravičene in kolektivne apropiacije. Če konec koncev ni več nobenih delavcev, mar ne bi moral potem 'človeški kapital' vsekakor uveljaviti svojo lastno serijo zahtev, tako kot je kapital zadnjih 40 let uveljavljal svoje na račun izključitve vseh drugih?

Dialektika afirmacije in negacije zasluži določeno mero pojasnitve. Vsaka praktična kritika vključuje oba momenta, ne pa tudi linear-nosti ali progresivnega vektorja med njima. V vsakem družbenem gibanju moramo imeti identifikacijo pozicije (izključitve, nepravilčnosti) v protislovju, preden je mesto izključitve negirano z reorganizacijo samih pogojev pravičnosti ali vključitve na drugi osnovi. To lahko vidimo v feminističnih in queer gibanjih, kjer mora biti strukturna vloga 'ženske' ali 'homoseksualca' natančno iden-tificirana znotraj odnosov kapitalističnega patriarhata, preden la-hko spol in heteronormativnost doživita svoj prevrat. Enako je pri 'klasičnem' razrednem boju: družbena afirmacija delavcev kot dis-kretnega razreda, katerega interesi so nezdružljivi z interesi šefov in organizacije, ki je s tem vzpostavljena, je predpogoj za politični imperativ negacije mezdnega dela in kapitala. Mobilizacija okrog 'krivice' (Rancière) predhodi in se ohranja v eliminaciji pogojev, ki proizvajajo to 'krivico'; pogojev, ki usmerjajo definicije pravičnosti in istočasno izključujejo, da bi določene vrste ljudi postavljale zahteve prek teh definicij (kot na primer izključitev žensk in mnogih drugih iz dometa 'Pravic človeka' francoske revolucije⁸ – kar pa ni preprečilo, da ne bi po 'Pravicah človeka', kot programu za osvo-bodilni boj, posegle ženske in haitski sužnji). Če uporabimo drug besednjak, lahko motrimo 'praznino' ali 'točko nekonsistentnosti' situacije (Badiou) kot tisto, kar je z njenega gledišča nevidno, a je zanj kljub temu določujoče; gibajoče protislovje. Za Marxa je to soobstoj popolne enakosti v prodaji in menjavi delovne sile v kapi-talizmu ter izkoriščanja v produkciji. To kolektiv Malgré Tout razlaga na naslednji način:

'Strukturna nepravilnost ni odsev neuspeha ali delne disfunkcije kapitalizma: po eni strani je popolnoma konsistentna in ne pušča nobenega prostora za kritiko; po drugi strani pa je ta nepravilnost tisto, kar vzpostavi ali naredi kapitalizem za možen, je njegova točka nekonsistentnosti, nujno nevidna kapitalizmu samemu. Svobodna, pravična in racionalna pravila trga, zakoni ponudbe in povpraševanja imajo tako svoj izvor v nepravilnosti, odtujitvi in absurdnosti, ki so za sistem nepojmljive in posledično popolnoma legalne in konsenzualne celo v očeh velikega števila delavcev in sindikalistov. Zato poanta ni toliko v tem, da nepravilnost sproži vstajo, ampak da prej vstaja izsili nekonsistentnost sistema: da se sistem kot nepravilen razkrije v luči revolucionarnega političnega projekta.'⁹

Lahko se zgodi, da morda sploh ne bomo prepoznali politične akci-je, uporabljene za razkritje te točke nekonsistentnosti in praktično zavrnitev njenih pogojev, saj predlaga novo vrsto identifikacij, ki ne zadevajo le tega, kaj konstituira nepravilnost ali 'krivico', ampak tudi, kaj pomeni delovati politično. In delitve, ki jih vpeljuje, niso tiste domače, saj njen cilj ni več v prilagoditvi konkretnih pojavov glede na idealno strukturo, ampak v preizpraševanju strukture kot take in subjektivitet, obenem singularnih in univerzalnih, ki so v njej producirane: '/o tej/ poziciji se ni mogoče »pogajati« oziroma na njo ni mogoče odgovoriti iz normalnosti situacije, saj implicira njeno destrukcijo. Tako politična akcija preneha biti parcialna zahteva, da bi postala singularnost: nekaj, kar je s stališča situacije nepredvidlji-vo, ker preizprašuje njene same temelje. Tu ne gre več za vprašanje razreda, ampak neumestljivega ali anomalnega političnega subjek-ta, ki pa ne eksistira izven situacije. Je subjekt, ki vznikne iz situacije, a ni povezan [*linked*] z njo, saj ga situacija ne predvideva. Ta sin-gularnost je hkrati univerzalna od samega trenutka, ko vpelje pre-lom, ki zadeva vse prebivalce situacije (buržoazijo, malo buržoazijo, intelektualce, umetnike, proletarce itd.), nad katerimi sedaj visi odločitev glede njihove pridružitve boju, ki ne preizprašuje le situ-acije, ki jo naseljujejo, ampak tudi to, kaj so sami na sebi!'¹⁰

⁶ [V izvirniku: *inadvertent* – tudi nepazljivo.]

⁷ Glej tekst Madame Tlank 'Battle of all Mothers (or: No Unauthorised Reproduction)', dostopen prek: http://www.metamute.org/en/The-Battle-of-all-Mothers.

⁸ [Avtorica najverjetneje meri na *Deklaracijo o pravicah človeka in državljana*.]

⁹ Manifest Kolektiva Malgré Tout, zapisan leta 1995. Dostopen je na mnogih spletnih mestih, med drugim tudi prek: http://www.gtrlabs.org/node/106.

¹⁰ *Ibid*.

Ta odtegnitveni moment (stavke, zavračanje nadzorovanja, zavračanje vstopa v delovne *[workfare]* programe, deljenje informacij in resursov med upravičenci *[claimants]* samimi, namesto med upravičenci in državo, ter celo množična in organizirana 'prevara z nadomestili') lahko postane konstitutiven moment pri povrnitvi družbene legitimnosti, za katero se za zdaj zdi, da je v ekskluzivni posesti trgov. To se lahko zgodi pod pogojem, da mu uspe preiti od zavračajočega ter 'parcialnega' do 'univerzalnega' delovanja, ki reorganizira večinsko dojemanje splošnega interesa – dojemanje, ki je pogostejše in večkrat nezavedno kot odkrito na strani trgov kot pa ljudi (oziroma, ki zavrača razločevanje med njimi). Ko je legitimnost države utemeljena v njeni odgovornosti do trgov – ki so videni kot resnični generatorji bogastva –, ne pa do javnosti, ki je videna kot zgolj porabnik tega bogastva, morajo biti delavci tisti, ki bodo to navidezno *[apparent]* realnost zrušili prek svoje nove primarne vloge zadolženih potrošnikov ali virov neproduktivne akumulacije bogastva ter hkratne vloge *neproduktivnih* delavcev,¹¹ plačanih ali neplačanih, ki proizvajajo blago ali pa upravljajo z odnosi.

Cilj tega teksta je pregled razvoja politik reprodukcije, ki bo vodil k preciznejši predstavitvi oblike, ki bi jo lahko prevzele 'politike dolga'. Najprej si bomo pogledali zgodovino politik reprodukcije skozi Gibanje za socialne pravice *[Welfare Rights Movement]*, italijanski avtonomistični feminizem, kampanjo Mezd za gospodinjska dela in 'samoredukcijo' v Italiji v sedemdesetih, Zveze upravičencev *[Claimants' Unions]* v osemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja in zveze Brezposelnih delavcev ter iniciativ in današnji VB. V drugem delu bomo raziskali tezo, da mora biti zahteva neproduktivnega dela do neproduktivnega kapitala upoštevana kot del dekompozicije odnosa mezda – delo – kapital, ki jo obravnava 'komunizacijska' struja (Theorie Communiste in Endnotes). Ta dekompozicija, ki se ni zmožna niti subjektivno (nihče se več ne identificira s svojo službo) niti objektivno (zakon in globalizirana restrukturacija lo-mita moč delavcev) utemeljevati na delu kot politični identiteti ('so le boji za staro pravdo'¹²), se mora, kot smo že videli, uveljaviti prek točke nekonsistentnosti situacije. Tej lahko znotraj 'politike dolga' začasno podelimo ime 'nekapitalizirano življenje' *[uncapitalized life]*, tako kot je 'svobodna človeška dejavnost' v času, ko je bilo mezdno delo še odločilno tako za odnose produkcije kot emancipatorične boje, označevala človeško prakso onkraj meznega dela. Razredni odnos, kot ga spodaj opisuje Marx, je morda v svojem historičnem zatonu:

'Kapitalistična produkcija, gledana kot kontinuiran povezan proces, kot proces reprodukcije, torej ne producira le blaga, niti le presežne vrednosti, ampak producira in reproducira tudi kapitalistični odnos; na eni strani kapitalista, na drugi meznega delavca (*Kapital, 1. knjiga*).'

Vendar pa razredni odnos med upnikom in dolžnikom v tem vakuumu cveti, vse dokler je kapitalizem v svojih bistvenih potezah še vedno z nami in dokler mora večina populacije preživeti znotraj njegovih zakonov ter to preživetje vezati na vrednostno obliko. Marx znova poskrbi, da nam ne uide dejstvo, da 'je vsak družbeni proces produkcije, ko je viden kot povezana celota in v trajnem toku svojega nenehnega obnavljanja, hkrati tudi proces reprodukcije' (str. 711). K historičnim (in še vedno veljavnim) figuram gospodinje in upravičenca do socialnih prejemkov dodajamo figuro dolžnika in poskušamo na tleh politike reprodukcije slediti politiki dolga. Kaj se zgodi s konceptom 'družbene mezde' *po* mezdi?

Reprodukcija v gospodinjstvu, reprodukcija gospodinjstva

Če se gibljemo kronološko in za izhodišče (ki je na nek način arbitrarno, še posebej za zgodovinarje delavskorazrednih, skupnostnih in ženskih gibanj) vzamemo Gibanje za socialne pravice, ki se je v ZDA na sceni pojavilo v šestdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja, se to kaže kot zanimiv primer, saj si je skupaj z Gibanjem za državljanske pravice, drugim valom feminističnega gibanja kot tudi z bolj radikalnimi, v skupnosti zasnovanimi frakcijami gibanja pod vplivom nacionalizma, kot npr. Črnimi panterji in Mladimi Lordi *[Young Lords]*,¹³ delilo aktiviste, zahteve in kampanjske taktike. Gibanje za socialne pravice so sestavljale matere samohranilke, v tistem času glavne porabnice socialnih storitev v ZDA. Bile so med prvimi, tako v Gibanju za državljanske pravice kot tudi v gibanju za žensko osvoboditev, ki so svoj boj odkrito umestile v polje družbene reprodukcije. V sistemskih nepravilnostih, ki so upravljale njihova življenja, so osnovale to, kar bo postalo znano pod geslom 'osebno je politično'. Bile so tudi prve, ki so poimenovala in analizirale strukturno protislovje, ki je poganjalo njihove zahteve do države – prispevek neplačanega gospodinjskega dela k učinkovitosti kapitalistične ekonomije –, in prve, ki so svojo reproduktivno funkcijo združile z ekonomskim položajem. Predlagale so, da bi bilo to reproduktivno delo prepoznano in vrednoteno na enak način kot plačano delo na delovnem mestu, ter ta predlog spremenile v politično prakso, kjer so s stranpoti marginalnosti in osiromašenosti zahtevale svoj glas in subjektno pozicijo: kot ženske, kot matere samohranilke, v mnogih primerih kot Afroameričanke ter kot prejemnice socialne pomoči. Napram patriarhalni 'moški mezdi', plačani moškemu delavcu kot glavi družine, so zahtevale 'družbeno mezdo', družbeno odgovornost kapitala za 'eksternalije' poblagovljene, a neplačane družbene boji – skrb za otroke in starejše na primer. Emblematična za njihov boj sta bila tudi dostojanstvo in svoboda pred nadlegovanjem, nadzorom in skorumpirano birokracijo. Kot je bilo v dialektiki afirmacije in negacije skicirano poprej, je Gibanje za socialne pravice afirmi-

11 Neil Gray, 'The Tyranny of Rent', Variant 37, str. 37–43 v tiskani izdaji, na spletu pa prek: http://www.variant.org.uk/37texts/13RentTyranny.html. 'Ko je McLay leta 1990 predlagal, da skupine, kot je npr. *Workers City*, kažejo v prihodnost, je govoril o tradicionalni podobi delavca kot *proizvajalca bogastva*, ki je postajala z vsakim dnem bolj problematična. In dejansko danes v Glasgowu proizvodni sektor zajema le šest odstotkov trga delovne sile, medtem ko dela v nizko plačanem storitvenem sektorju predstavljajo 88 odstotkov delovne sile.' Ta podatek prihaja iz poročila, ki ga je leta 2009 izdala Univerza v Glasgowu, z naslovom 'Beyond Aspiration: Young People and decent work in the de-industrialised city': http://www.variant.org.uk/events/Doc7Poverty/BeyondAspiration.pdf.

12 [V izvirniku: '*only reivindicative struggles*.]

13 Mladi Lordi iz Portorika so, tako kot njihovi vrstniki Črni Panterji, kombinirali nacionalistično in antirasistično agendo s 'skupnostnim delom', ki je poleg neposrednih akcij obsegalo samoorganizirane programe varstva otrok, izobraževanja ter distribucije hrane. Glej Jennifer 8. Lee, »The Young Lords' Legacy of Puerto Rican Activism«, *New York Times*, blok City Room, 24. avgust 2009, in Frank Edwards, 'Young Lords 40th Anniversary' prek http://www.areachicago.org/p/issues/6808/young-lords-40th-anniversary/; za izvore gibanja glej tudi http://www.nationallyyounglords.com/. O Gibanju za socialne pravice glej *Welfare Warriors: The Welfare Rights Movement in the United States*, avtorice Premille Nadasen, Routledge, 2004, ter *Bread or Justice: Grassroots Organizing in the Welfare Rights Movement* Neila Bailisa, Lexington Books, 1974.

ralo 'krivico', da bi lahko negiralo družbene okoliščine in družbene identifikacije – patriarhat, kapitalizem in rasizem –, ki so to krivico naredile za možno, pravzaprav nevprašljivo, ter jih spremenilo v svoje naravne tarče. Vendar pa bi lahko rekli, da je bil, splošno gledano, dokončni horizont prakse in analize tega gibanja za večino njegovih članov – tako kot v mainstream gibanjih za državljanske pravice ter ženskih gibanjih (ki so se pojavila malo kasneje) – prej izboljšava lastnega položaja znotraj obstoječega stanja kot pa njegovo resno preizpraševanje, kar je imelo svoje taktične kot tudi politične razloge. Institucionalizacija gibanja v Nacionalni organizaciji za socialne pravice (1966–1972) *[National Welfare Rights Organization]* mu je podelila pogajalsko moč na višji ravni, vendar pa so reakcionarna družbena klima Nixonovega obdobja in notranji razcepi (glede razširitve gibanja na revne delavce v nasprotju z redefiniranjem sociale kot feminističnega vprašanja) privedli do uničenja organizacije. Pri tem so svojo vlogo nedvomno igrale tudi protivstajniške dejavnosti ameriške vlade, glede na prekrivanje aktivistov za socialne pravice s Črnimi panterji in drugimi radikalnimi (kot tudi zmernimi – CIA ni vlekla nobenih takšnih ločnic med svojimi notranje koloniziranimi) skupnostnimi akcijskimi skupinami.

V zgodnjih sedemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja so začele struje marksističnega feminizma v Italiji, povezane z analizami gibanj Delavska moč *[Worker's power]* in Autonomia, izpostavljati idejo, da reprodukcija konstituira tudi 'skrivno bivališče', kot se je glede produkcije, v njenem nasprotju z od sonca obsijano enakostjo menjave, izrazil Marx. Ker neplačano delo, ki so ga v gospodinjstvih večinoma opravljale ženske, prav tako kot delo tovarniških delavcev, proizvaja blago delovne sile, ki je nato za mezdo prodano na trgu, so omenjene struje predlagale, da bi lahko tudi ženske formirale 'avantgardo' organizacije delavskega razreda in zavračanja dela. Do te točke so ženske v gospodinjstvu (posredno) proizvajale presežno vrednost.

Pričakovane posledice te redefinicije ženskega dela so merile na pripoznanje neplačanih delavk kot subjektov politike delavskega razreda in na širše obravnavanje 'ženskih vprašanj' kot 'razrednih vprašanj' ter razumevanje njihovega antagonističnega odnosa do kapitalističnih interesov na enak način, kot to velja pri vprašanjih mezdnih delavcev. Drug razlog [za to redefinicijo] pa je meril na aktualizacijo reprodukcije (varstva otrok, zdravstvene nege, prostitucije, oblastnih odnosov v gospodinjstvu in skupnosti), ki naj postane resnično politično prizorišče spora, namesto da sledi 'revolucionarni logiki, ki je na podlagi hierarhij kapitalistične organizacije dela vzpostavila hierarhijo revolucionarnih subjektov'.¹⁴ Nazadnje so nekateri izmed elementov te pozicije prišli do zaključka, da mora biti gospodinjsko delo – če že producira blago, morda celo vrednost, tj. ker na splošno gledano izpolnjuje minimalne pogoje kapitalističnega dela –, tako kot katerokoli drugo delo plačano s strani kapitala 'neposredno', 'po svoji vrednosti', namesto da se mu namenja mizerne dodatke socialnih izplačil ali 'družinsko mezdo'. Poleg številnih konceptualnih, političnih in praktičnih problemov, ki se jih je ta analiza lotila, pa je imela tudi sama podobno število težav. Konceptualno gledano lahko rečemo, da v kapitalu nobeno delo ni plačano 'po svoji vrednosti', saj potemtakem prilaščanje *[extraction]* presežne vrednosti ne bi bil prvi zakon kapitalističnega dela. Drugi ugovor izhaja iz Marxove teze, da je 'biti produktiven delavec nesreča' in da ima enačenje gospodinjskega dela s produktivnim delom politični pomen le v 'delavsko orientiranem kontekstu' *[workerist' context]*, fiksiranem z razločevanjem med produktivnim/neproduktivnim delom, ki je tovarniškega delavca videl kot hegmonskega, namesto da bi priskrbel svoje lastno orožje proti produkcijskim odnosom. Politično gledano, kar smo tudi že na hitro izpostavili, je povezava emancipacije ženskih gospodinj z mezdo utrjevala osrednjost države ali 'totalnega družbenega kapitala' pri reprodukciji delavcev in družin, hkrati pa je ženske spremenila v ujetnice doma, namesto da bi predgručila družbenospolne vloge ter radikalno premaknila strukturo družine v bolj kolektivno in egalitarno smer. Poleg tega se je soočila s paradoksom 'tranzicijske zahteve', ki hoče reformirati kapitalistične odnose na način, da ne bi bili več kapitalistični; paradoks, s katerim se danes prav tako sooča ideja 'temeljnega dohodka'. Nazadnje pa bi se praktični problem vrednotenja gospodinjskega dela pod enakimi pogoji, kot to velja za mezdno delo, vrtel okrog problemov meritve in prenehanja *[withdrawal]* dela: '/.../' kako bi lahko bila mezda izračunana, če pa primanjkuje instrumentov merjenja delovnega dne? Kako bi lahko 'stavka' v gospodinjstvu preseгла nujne aspekte skupnostne podpore za boje v drugih sektorjih razredne sestave?¹⁵

Kampanjo Mezd za gospodinjska dela bi lahko nadalje obravnavali kot napetost med preskriptivnim in deskriptivnim: kako nam lahko kritičnost do produkcije vrednosti pomaga preseči vrednost? Če gremo zopet po poti afirmacije in negacije, bi se afirmacija glasila nekako takole: tudi me proizvajamo vrednost in smo produktivne delavke, zato nas mora delavsko gibanje upoštevati in razširiti svoj koncept vrednosti, da bo vključeval tudi neplačano ali 'družbeno' delo. Negacija te trditve pa bi lahko šla v smeri: če tudi me proizvajamo vrednost, je ta pojem potemtakem tako širok, da razpade; ni več tehnična, ampak takoj postane politična kategorija. To je bila (med drugimi) dejansko pozicija Silvie Federici, ki svari pred dobesedno interpretacijo programa Mezd za gospodinjska dela in svoj poudarek raje namenja njegovim strateškim horizontom in kritičnemu karakterju, temu, kar poimenuje za 'Mezde proti gospodinskemu delu'. Prispevek italijanske avtonomistične feministične perspektive se bolj kot v produktivistični agendi povišanja vseh na enako osnovno raven izkoriščanja nahaja v pobudi k posplošitvi zavračanja dela prek razširitve kategorije tega, kaj konstituira delo, in v zagotavljanju, da 'skrito polje' reprodukcije ne bo nikoli več pozabljeno v analizi ter akciji proti kapitalističnemu izkoriščanju. Kot je nedavno glede zapuščine Mezd za gospodinjsko delo za današnja antisistemska gibanja zapisala Federici:

'Ko smo rekli, da je gospodinjsko delo dejansko delo za kapital, da kljub temu, da je neplačano, prispeva k akumulaciji kapitala,

14 George Caffentzis in Silvia Federici, 'Notes on the Edu-factory and Cognitive Capitalism', v *The Commoner*, št. 12, poletje 2007; v Edu-factory Collective, ur., *Towards a Global Autonomous University: Cognitive Labour, the Production of Knowledge and Exodus from the Education Factory*, Autonomedia, New York, 2009; in preko: http://www.commoner.org.uk/12federicicaffentz.pdf.

15 Nicholas Thoburn, *Deleuze, Marx and Politics*, Routledge, London/New York, 2003, peto poglavje; ali prek: http://libcom.org/library/deleuze-marx-politics-nicholas-thoburn-5.

smo vpeljali nekaj izredno pomembnega glede značilnosti kapitalizma kot sistema produkcije. Ugotovili smo, da kapitalizem sloni na ogromni količini neplačanega dela, da ni ekskluzivno ali primarno zgrozen na pogodbenih odnosih; da mezdni odnos skriva neplačano, suženjstvo podobno naravo tako velikega deleža dela, na katerem temelji kapitalistična akumulacija /.../ Z drugimi besedami, prek spoznanja, da je to, kar imenujemo »reproduktivno delo«, teren akumulacije in potemtakem tudi teren izkoriščanja, smo bili zmožni reprodukcijo videti kot teren boja /.../'.¹⁶

Mimogrede naj še dodamo, da se je italijanski marksistični feminizem pojavljal v zelo disparatnih oblikah, čeprav je ta, ki je opisana zgoraj, zaradi originalnega in daljnosežnega vtisa svojih analiz morda postala najbolj slavna. V oboroženih frakcijah, ki so se v Italiji pojavile konec sedemdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja, so obstajali tudi feministični elementi, katerih naporj se niso omejili le na 'skrito polje'. Njihova tarča so bile tudi zdravstvene klinike, ki zaradi 'razlogov vesti' uporabnicam javnega zdravstva niso hotele opravljati splavov, a so to z veseljem storile za visoko plačilo, kot tudi sweat-shopi, ki so večinoma zaposlovali mlade in imigrantske ženske.¹⁷ Poudarek na reprodukciji kot političnem bojišču, ki so ga najbolj konsistentno razvile feministke, lahko razumemo tudi kot ključen za prevladovanje organiziranih in neformalnih kampanj 'samo-redukcije' in 'proletarskega nakupovanja' v Italiji sedemdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja. Skupine najemnikov bi delovale na enostranski in organiziran *[concerated]* način, da bi znižale svoje najemnine ali obratovalne stroške ali plačevale manj oziroma sploh nič za javni prevoz ali špecerijo (čeprav je očitno, da so morali biti delavci v teh sektorjih do določene mere kooperativni, da so tovrstne taktike lahko uspele).

'Družbena tovarna' plačanega, neplačanega in neformalnega dela je za avtonomistični marksizem postajala vse pomembnejša s tem, ko so aktivisti 'sledili delavcem ven iz tovarn'. Ti so odhajali iz razlogov, ki so nihali med splošno subjektivnimi (množično zavračanje) in splošno objektivnimi (množična nezaposlenost). Istočasno se je še naprej nadaljeval razkol med feminizmom in razrednim bojem za delitvami med socialističnimi feministkami, separatisti, buržoaznimi in socialdemokratskimi feministkami itd., kar je zapletalo situacijo, v kateri se je podrejenost žensk tako očitno kazala kot navzoča v kapitalističnih razrednih odnosih (in religioznih običajih), a ki je enako dobro uspevala tudi med 'tovariši' v levih krogih. V marksistični praksi ostaja artikulacija odnosov med patriarhatom in kapitalizmom (kot tudi konstruiranja in izkoriščanja rase),¹⁸ kjer sta seksizem in rasizem videna kot delitvi v globalnem delavskem razredu in hkrati kot relativno avtonomna, kot pojava, ki sta obenem naddoločena in kontingentna, ena izmed najbolj spornih prelomnic. Premišljevat i o njunih odnosih na način, ki bi bil primeren sedanji kapitalistični dekompoziciji v vsej njeni neenakosti, je izjemno kompleksen in nujno potreben projekt – in to navkljub vsem virom, ki jih je priskrbelo trideset in več let marksističnega in materialističnega feminizma ter queer teorije, da ne omenjamo zgodovinske in dejanske prakse.

Vendar pa je lahko daljnovidna apropiacija reproduktivnega polja s strani italijanskih avtonomističnih feministk za politično akcijo prek njegovih 'domačih informantov', torej tistih, ki so že opredeljeni s pomanjkanjem dostopa do družbene vidnosti in ekonomske moči, sedaj uporabljena za kontekstualizacijo organiziranih bojov zoper zmanjševanja socialnih izdatkov, ki so svoj prepovor doživele v VB v času Thatcherjeve, ponovno pa se postopoma pojavljajo tudi danes. Reprodukcija kot družbena mediacija vrednostne oblike zunaj delovnega mesta je bila očitno vseskozi problematična, kot je bilo ilustirano zgoraj. Toda prav v obdobjih, ko pričjenja ta specifična mediacija za vedno večje število ljudi prevladovati nad srečanjem s formo vrednosti na delovnem mestu (tj. v časih množične nezaposlenosti in kapitalističnega restrukturiranja), začena imeti politizacija reprodukcije širše posledice, ki niso več omejene le na tiste, ki začasno padejo v kategorijo neplačanih in ki se odločijo za organizirano medsebojno pomoč in svetovanje. Praktične posledice tega so lahko precej različne, če raziščemo skupine iz osemdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja. Vmesna in nizkonivojska narava nekaterih skupin upravičencev lahko nenadoma doseže raven pozornosti, za katero udeleženci v nekaterih primerih niso pripravljeni ali pa je ne morejo vzdrževati na materialni ravni. V nekaterih drugih primerih lahko organizacija koleba med vlogo kampanjske skupine z radikalnimi zahtevami in vlogo 'ponudnika storitev', kjer lahko kot podizvajalec na koncu postane 'ponudnik storitev' za državo – nekaj, kar se bo le še razširilo z ideološko zavezo sedanje britanske vlade, da bo povečala delež prostovoljnega sektorja na področjih, ki so bila prej v oskrbi države: 'Veliko družbo'.¹⁹

Do sedaj pa se takšna dialektika med samodejavnostjo in podporo, kljub trenutni destruktivni klimi pretečih in neupravičenih varčevalnih ukrepov, ni uspela prevesti v širšo mobilizacijo, ki bi

16 Silvia Federici, 'Precarious Labour: a Feminist Viewpoint', Variant 37 prek: http://www.variant.org.uk/ 37texts/Variant37.html#L9 ali v tiskani izdaji str. 23–25.

17 Glej Vincenzo Ruggiero, 'Sentenced to Normality: The Italian Political Refugees in Paris', *Crime, Law and Social Change*, št. 19, 1993, str. 33–50. Referirano v Pat Cunningham-ame, 'Italian feminism, workerism and autonomy in the 1970s: The struggle against unpaid reproductive labour and violence', str. 7, op. 31; @mnis: *Revue de Civilisation Contemporaine de l'Université de Bretagne Occidentale*.

EUROPES / AMÉRIQUES http://www.univ-brest.fr/amnis/.

18 Izpeljati tezo, da je bil rasizem, (prek kolonializma in suženjstva) koekstenziven in instrumentalen pri vzniku kapitalizma, je relativno enostavnejše kot v primeru podreditve žensk, ki se zdi zgodovinsko dosti starejše in bolj razširjeno. Silvia Federici v *Caliban and the Witch* poda jasen *[trenchant]*, če ne docela uspešen prikaz teze o sočasnem vzniku kapitalizma in podreditvi žensk v dobi 'primitivne akumulacije'. Silvia Federici, *Caliban and the Witch: Women, The Body and Primitive Accumulation*, Autonomedia, New York, 2004.

19 ['Velika družba' je program, ki ga je predstavila sedanja britanska vlada. Če poskušamo grobo povzeti njegove glavne usmeritve, je na deklarativni ravni njegov cilj, da vlada 'več oblasti in možnosti podeli ljudem', saj smo pri izgradnji družbe udeleženi 'vsi skupaj'. To naj bi se doseglo prek številnih ukrepov, med drugim: s spodbujanjem prostovoljstva (ki bi lahko do določene mere preprečilo zaprtje nekaterih javnih ustanov, v nekem specifičnem primeru npr. muzeja), za katerega se tudi predvideva, da bo igralo večjo vlogo tudi pri upravljanju javnih storitev. Različne skupine bi morale imeti možnost, da vodijo pošte, knjižnice, prevozne storitve in oblikujejo stanovanjske projekte. Javnim uslužbencem bo ponujena možnost za ustanovitev kooperativ, katerih lastniki bodo zaposleni, pogojevali pa se bodo lahko tudi za prevzem storitev, ki jih ponujajo. Kritike tega programa, ki poteka vzporedno z varčevalnimi ukrepi, med drugim opozarjajo, da je namenjen predvsem zmanjševanju izdatkov države, ki ji ni več potrebno plačevati tistega dela javnih uslužbencev, katerih obveznosti bodo preložene na prostovoljce.

Povzeto po: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10680062; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/ 8688860.stm; http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/topstorynews/2010/05/big-society-50248.]

uskladila interese brezposelnih in še vedno zaposlenih. Povedano drugače ji ni uspelo, da bi kot politične redefinirala te sociološke ali faktične kategorije. Vendar pa je takšna usklajenost ne glede na to, kako bo vzpostavljena, in četudi jo bo morda vodila bolj preračunljivost kot leva komunistična analiza, nepogrešljiva za delegitimizacijo varčevalnih ukrepov in za poraz političnega projekta, ki jih ustvarja.

Islingtonska akcijska skupina neplačanih (1980–1986) skupaj z drugimi akcijskimi skupinami upravičencev ter stavkami socialnih delavcev [*benefit workers' strikes*] iz osemdesetih in devetdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja, ki se danes nadaljujejo z nacionalnimi in lokalnimi vejami Sindikata nezaposlenih delavcev, Brightonskim centrom za nezaposlene, Edinburško zvezo upravičencev ter londonskimi in edinburškimi Koalicijami proti revščini [*CAP – Coalitions Against Poverty*], Hackneyvsko solidarnostno skupino in skupinama Rešite naša občinska stanovanja ter Rešite naše vrtnce, predstavljajo najvidnejše zgodovinske in sedanje akterje boja na področju reprodukcije v VB. Na različne načine se perspektiva suče okrog vzpodbujanja odpora in kolektivne aktivnosti med vedno bolj demoniziranimi 'neupravičenimi prejemniki nadomestil' [*benefit scroungers*], ki se še posebej dobro zavedajo, kakšni so učinki razreševanja državnega dolga na njihovih plečih, a ki jim lahko nasprotujejo večinoma le individualno in nepovezano, tj. s položaja poraza. Včasih gre tudi za načelni položaj 'zavračanja dela', kjer je prejetanjen nadomestil videno kot neposredno prilaščanje družbeno proizvedenega bogastva, ki je sicer odtujeno njegovim proizvajalcem. V osnovi pa gre za zasedbo 'skupnih dobrin socialne države' [*welfare state commons*] in vseh protislovij, ki sledijo iz tega položaja. Tako kot pri bojih na univerzah ali bitkah proti privatizaciji socialnih stanovanj, gre tukaj bolj za nepripravljenost, da bi se pre-pustilo še tisto malo, kar od javnih dobrin ostaja nepoblagovljeno, kot za podpiranje ustaljenega modela javnih služb (čeprav se zdi, da je v Angliji na področju visokega šolstva, kjer sta visoko rastoči študentski dolg in šolnine v višini do 10 tisoč funtov za celotno šolanje [*full degree*] sedaj postala normi, ta boj izgubljen; univerze so še vedno brezplačne na Škotskem). Ta reaktivna, zaščitniška [*rear-guard*] orientacija potrjuje – čeprav je morda manj opisna za osemdeseta leta prejšnjega stoletja (ki so imela bolj svež spomin na organizacijo delavskega razreda) kot za sodobne skupine –, da je za vse naštete formacije bistvena situacija poraza. Čeprav politična kriza [*political conjuncture*] zahteva posplošitev bojev, pa to zaenkrat preprečujejo tri desetletja dekompozicije delavskega razreda, sindikatom sovražna zakonodaja in mirovanje javnosti. Vendar pa to še ne pomeni, da je prihodnost naddoločena, celo ne bližnja prihodnost. In mar ne bi mogla dekompozicija najti svoje lastne specifične moči? Ali bi lahko rekli, da delo negativnega še vedno drži, tudi če gre za vprašanje negacije dela?

Opomba: Izvorno zamišljen v dveh delih se bo material, na katerega se v tekstu sklicujemo, vendar ga ne obravnavamo širše, pojavil v avtonomnem tekstu za Reartikulacijo v letu 2011.

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Marina Vishmidt HUMAN CAPITAL OR TOXIC ASSET: AFTER THE WAGE

This is a sequence of reflections on affirmation and negation, on identification and severance: determinate negation as strategic affirmation, the identification of concrete universals and severance from a defunct relation. These lines will be explored with reference to the current situation of the waged and unwaged working class, most proximately in Britain, as “debt” becomes the ideological white noise and the practical horizon of all social and political imagination. Household indebtedness is confused with the state deficit in the spontaneous ideology of the Conservative austerity agenda, as what remains of the crisis-riddled economy is sacrificed to the “debt” – as poor people to loan sharks, so Britain to the bond investors. The nationalist narrative of “we’re all in this together” eliminates any space for discussion as to who might bear greater responsibility for the crisis, and who should be paying for it. The announced cuts make it all too clear – it’s the bloated public sector and welfare payments which are responsible, and those that have the least shall have even that taken away, as the Biblical parable goes. Yet a fatalistic consensus prevails for now, trans-fixed by a menace beyond dispute: the “debt.”

Debt has taken on an unprecedented social centrality, almost eclipsing the labour theory of value as both the principle of capital accumulation and the principle behind the structural role of labour in social relations organized through the value-form. The social logic of speculation is also at work [sic] in the premise of human and social capital which, as Jason Read argues, has reformulated every human activity as an investment in a future of potential access to greater social wealth. The notion of “human capital” also serves to eradicate any antagonism between those who own the means of production and those who only have their labour to sell, since both are understood to be investors seeking to maximize a return, which is only natural.¹

Debt has of course also been the prime driver of accumulation for the past couple of decades, from deficit spending in the public sector contingent on a finance boom driven by the opulent trade in CDOs

¹ Jason Read often writes on the anthropology of neoliberalism: “To quote Etienne Balibar, ‘The capitalist is defined as worker, as an ‘entrepreneur’; the worker, as the bearer of a capacity, of a human capital.’ (Balibar, 1994: 53). Once ‘capital’ and ‘investment’ have been redefined so broadly, the scope of the economic is drastically redefined. Any activity that increases the capacity to earn income, from learning a new computer program to getting one’s teeth whitened, is an investment in human capital. Economic rationality, the balancing costs and returns, risk and benefits, is removed from the specialized realm of the market, from the specific science of economics, to become tantamount to rationality altogether. Neoliberalism thus entails a particular version of ‘capitalism without capitalism’, a particular way of dispensing with the antagonism of capitalism while maintaining private property and inequality.” ‘Reductions and Amplifications of the Political’, Unemployed Negativity blog post, 20 October 2009, <http://unemployednegativity.blogspot.com/2009/10/reductionsamplifications-of-political.html>

(Collateralized Debt Obligations) and other fancifully quantified risk instruments, to the characteristic business of financialization – profiting from the hugely expanded consumption of credit products that its own effect of suppressing wages had created a demand for. In debt-financed accumulation, value was no longer at issue, but wealth; and as workers did not produce wealth, but were a liability on the balance sheet, the only way they could reimburse the wealth creators, the entrepreneurs, was by going into heavily commodified debt. And consumer debt, it need hardly be added, was the force that inflated the asset values that crashed so impressively two years ago, along with the demand it was able to sustain. It is in this scenario that we must look at what the shift from worker to debtor as the definitive social identity for most people today augurs for political re-composition in a time when unemployment and welfare cuts will leave them with marginal resources to either pay debts or meet more immediate needs. And, as has been plentifully evident around the world, austerity budgets trigger counter-attacks on the terrain of reproduction at once, as in Greece and Spain. This is because “social spending” is the first reduction demanded by the agencies of fiscal discipline, and public services become the stakes of survival when low-paid or nonexistent jobs become the norm, a condition exacerbated by cuts. In times of crisis, when the ratio of waged to unwaged starts to tilt negatively, re-production becomes the political battleground, if only through sheer force of numbers of people who can’t get access to a wage, as well as the important category of the “working poor” who have to rely on benefits. The very existence of the “working poor” is the clearest demonstration, if required, that it is capital and not the indebted worker who is the parasite on the state, as the state allows employers to pay minuscule wages which it then agrees to supplement. The feasibility of targeting social services with the moralistic rhetoric of personal responsibility – like the received idea of a “dependency culture” – relies absolutely on a common sense which blacks out the systemic forces which are genuinely dependent, if not addicted to, the existence of a super-exploited, unemployed, illegalized and desperate “workforce.” It has to ignore the structural necessity of a low-waged and unwaged reserve army which enables capital (including state and semi-private entities) to suppress wages, since the state ultimately meets the costs of reproduction in fear of worse consequences. It is in this sense that all “welfare,” regardless of its levels of generosity or parsimony, regardless of whom it identifies as “deserving” or “scrounging,” is corporate welfare, since its function is ameliorative to the operations of the market, rather than redistributive. Needless to say, “welfare reform,” like austerity, fails on its own economic terms. The factors of decreasing demand and the cost of policing welfare by outsourcing it to for-profit organizations that have an incentive to cut the welfare rolls ends up being far more expensive than the portion of state expenditure welfare comprised in the first place. But if private contractors are happy, and the tabloids are appeased, than markets are surely working overtime in the public interest.

No matter how obvious these contradictions seem to be, and how long they’ve been around, it is worth pointing out time and time again that the fight we have on our hands is not one against market rationality, to be countered with a more “social” set of principles for the economy. There is no rationality, only the looting and cannibalism which set the terms of capitalist accumulation for now. As the likes of David Harvey have exhaustively shown in their work, but which is no less obvious from reading the newspapers, “economic rationality” is a red herring for authoritarian managerial regimes of state power. Neoliberalism is a state project, with state-financed programs of engineering competitiveness across the entirety of social life. Because it is first and last an ideological project, objective circumstances or results have very little standing in it. Thus there’s no relevance to exposing its murderous or hypocritical inequities; it can only be drained of legitimacy ideologically. The argument is easier to make, paradoxically, because the objective conditions themselves have been shaped by the ideology to the point where, as some propose, “the class relationship” is coming to an end and communism is for the first time possible without a prior, “programmatic” affirmation of the working class. Work is no longer available objectively nor desirable subjectively as a political identity, although this lack of content does not prevent the ruling class from continuing to wield it as a disciplinary cudgel.² Although these ideas have been around since at least the 1970s, with the “Zerowork” strain of post-autonomist thinking, and all the variations of the “refusal of work” stance on the communist and anarchist ultra-left, their re-emergence now comes into the very different political landscape of three decades of neoliberal reaction, globalized capitalism and the destruction of organized labour, not to mention the de-industrialization of Europe, North and South America, the Middle East and Africa and the vast low-grade industrialization of parts of Asia and China. The “communist idea” now has to take into account that the refusal of work is not a political choice, but a prerogative exercised by a stage of capitalism that has much less need of surplus-value production since the discovery that debt is far more profitable.

In the vision of “austerity,” everyone is potentially a parasite on the nation’s solvent body, looking to compound the nation’s interest rate in the global markets. So why not behave like one? What is the outcome of a process, underway for at least two decades in the UK, whereby the majority of the population is positioned as the actual or virtual waste of the system? What could be the (anti-)political subjectivity of human capital turned toxic asset? When finance is universally agreed to be the source of all value, the machine of accumulation is rent, not

² Compare Owen Hatherley’s enunciation of this point in his blog post ‘Work and Non-Work’: ‘Yet still, work goes on, as controlled, brutal and idiotic as it ever was. Thatcherism with a human face claims to have abolished the working class, but it perpetuates work to an ever more ludicrous extent, particularly when it wants to remind the ‘core voters’ of its roots in the movement of the toiling classes. British jobs for British workers. War on the workshy. Work more to earn more. Work trials for the disabled. Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for those who don’t want to work. He who does not work, neither shall he eat. Today, the only response to this has to be – the party of the workers, whatever or wherever it is, must stand against work.’ Then the more rigorous development through Marx’s categories in the Endnotes text, ‘Crisis in the Class Relation’: ‘[...] the proletariat increasingly becomes that which is produced by capital without producing capital. As the population that is simply superfluous to capitalist production, yet one which has no autonomous mode of reproduction, the surplus population is reproduced as a side-effect of capitalist production. Since its self-reproduction is not mediated through the exchange with capital of productive labour for the wage, it does not close the circuit with capital, and its existence thus appears as contingent or inessential relative to that of capital. [...] As the wage form loses its centrality in mediating social reproduction, capitalist production itself appears increasingly superfluous to the proletariat: it is that which makes us proletarians, and then abandons us here. In such circumstances the horizon appears as one of communism; of directly taking measures to halt the movement of the value form and reproduce ourselves without capital.’ *Endnotes*, no. 2, pp. 17–19; also at <http://endnotes.org.uk/articles/2>

productive investment. The generation of wealth boils down to trade in the “fictitious capital,” along with rent-seeking and capitalization/enclosure of existing [public] assets. As the only way workers can contribute to that valorization is through debt, debt stands as the point of de-legitimation of the current logic of capital. A refusal of debt must take the place of refusal of work in a situation when work is being refused by capital anyway.

Having said that, it is very ambiguous for now to what extent, if at all, such political implications have been drawn by the campaign groups, unions and grassroots party activists on the British left. It seems difficult to detect a real consideration of debt going on, besides the generic “we won’t pay for your crisis” standpoint; there is no disputing that *someone* does have to pay, and this by and large consists of making an economic case for one sector at the (implicit) expense of another. Nowhere is the stunted outlook of the mainstream British socialist left more conspicuous than in the “Right to Work” and “Green Jobs” campaigns that have been appearing on its fringes since the “crisis” hit. They seem to be missing something central about how capital operates nowadays (not to mention the simultaneously reactionary and idealist perspective of demanding “good jobs”): wealth is no longer created through productive investment, and workers don’t want jobs, they just want money. Why else would all the most visible instances of workplace militancy in the past couple of years, from factory occupations to “bossnappings” and threats to blow factories up, all center around better remuneration packages for job losses rather than the maintenance of jobs? Neither capital nor labour are interested in jobs: all anyone is interested in these days are assets. Capital has neither the inclination nor the resources to offer workers more exploitation right now, but there has to be recognition that exploitation remains the bedrock of the social contract, and it is achieved most efficiently without jobs in an economy premised on the capitalization of debt. Isn’t the “jobless recovery” appearing as the watchword in economic analysis today built on assumptions that consumption (or “consumer confidence”) can single-handedly drive a return to prosperity, that is, through another credit bubble? It is immaterial that the global economic crisis was triggered by the bursting of a systemic credit bubble; credit bubbles are the only conceivable avenue of a return to normality, much as disastrous neoliberal policies are only intensified in the aftermath of their resounding failure.

It seems evident, from this perspective, that we can only produce wealth (not value) for capital now through our debt repayments. In that case, shouldn’t debt be the pre-eminent focus of resistance and revolt, rather than petitioning imaginary benefactors for imaginary jobs? Further, it needs to be restated time and again that any demand for jobs dovetails all too harmoniously with the government propaganda against the “workshy” who will be forced off welfare if they don’t come to the independent realization that “work sets you free,” as the current Work and Pensions secretary has been quoted as saying. This no doubt inadvertent refrain of the National Socialist slogan throws light on the “obscene” agenda of the “we’re all in it together” mantra providing the rather flimsy legitimization of the announced cuts. On this point at least, there is no departure from earlier historical periods where worsening economic conditions were used to build up a nationalist consensus that paved the way for fascism.

If workers are now “human capital,” then the moment of negation of the social relations that have brought us here can start with affirmation: the affirmation of the sick and deteriorating nature of capital from the side of its “human” variant (what was once known as “variable capital”). As “human capital” is being maximized in or out of work, the terrain of reproduction (social services, health, housing) seems like the most direct arena in which this capital can become collectively dysfunctional, also a necessity in the era of intensified biopolitical surveillance and risk management which social services represent for “dependent” populations in the UK.³ The docility of the service “user,” isolated, managed and humiliated in the absence of an employment allowing her to exist without recourse to state benefits, is what needs to be questioned by the users, as well as by the service workers, at the point of “delivery” and in solidarity. It must be recognized that social benefits are actually a “social wage,” and consist not of charity from the state, but of the value extracted from formerly and currently employed workers, as well as that funnelled from them in taxes and VAT. The position of supplication has to be transformed into a position of “insolence,” of justified and collective appropriation. After all, if there are no more workers, then surely oughtn’t “human capital” assert its own series of claims, as capital has asserted its claims for the past 40 years to the exclusion of all others?

The dialectic between affirmation and negation needs some clarification. Any practical critique entails both moments, though not a linearity or progressive vector between them. In any social movement, there needs to be an identification of a position (of exclusion, of injustice) in the contradiction, before the place of exclusion is negated by re-organizing the terms of justice or inclusion themselves on another basis. We can see this in the feminist and queer movements, where the structural role of the “woman” or “homosexual” must be accurately identified within the relations of capitalist patriarchy before gender and heteronormativity can be overturned. The same thing with the “classical” class struggle: the social affirmation of workers as a discrete class with interests incompatible with those of bosses and the organization this engenders is a precondition for the political imperative to negate wage-labour and capital. Mobilization around the “wrong” (Rancière) precedes, and persists through, the elimination of the conditions that produce that “wrong,” the conditions which orient the definitions of justice and at the same time, exclude certain kinds of people from making claims via those definitions (like the exclusion of women and many others from the scope of the French Revolution’s “Rights of Man” – which did not prevent the “Rights of Man” being seized by women, by Haitian slaves, as the programme of their fights for liberation.) Using another set of terms, we can look at the “void” or the “point of inconsistency” of the situation (Badiou) as that which is invisible from its point of view, but which is nonetheless primary for it; a moving contradiction. For Marx, it is the co-existence of perfect equality in the sale and exchange of labour power in capitalism with exploitation in production. This is glossed by the Malgré Tout Collective thus: “Structural injustice does not reflect a failure or a partial dysfunction of capitalism: on the one hand, it is perfectly consistent and it leaves no room for reproach; on the other hand, this injustice is what

³ See ‘Battle of all Mothers (or: No Unauthorised Reproduction)’ by Madame Tlank, at <http://www.metamute.org/en/The-Battle-of-all-Mothers>

establishes or makes capitalism possible, it is its point of inconsistency, necessarily invisible to capitalism itself. Thus the free, just and rational rules of the market, the laws of supply and demand, have their origin in an injustice, an alienation and an absurdity that are unintelligible to the system, and which are, consequently, perfectly legal and consensual even in the eyes of a large number of workers and trade unionists. This is why the point is not so much that injustice sparks up rebellion, but rather that rebellion forces the inconsistency of the system: it's in light of the revolutionary political project that the system reveals itself as unjust."⁴

It may be that political action that is used to expose this point of inconsistency and to practically refute its terms may not even be recognizable as political action, because it is proposing a new set of identifications – not only of what constitutes injustice or a “wrong,” but of what it means to act politically, and the divisions it introduces are not the familiar ones, since it is no longer seeking to adjust concrete phenomena to an ideal structure, but to question the structure as such, and the subjectivities produced in it, which are at once singular and universal: “[the] position is not ‘negotiable,’ or cannot be answered from the normality of the situation, because it implies its destruction. In this way, political action ceases to be a partial claim, so as to become a singularity: something unforeseeable by the situation because it questions its very foundations. At this point it's no longer a matter of a class, but of an unclassifiable or anomalous political subject. This subject does not exist outside the situation. It's a subject that arises from, but is not linked to, the situation because the situation does not foresee it. At the same time, this singularity is universal from the very moment it introduces a rupture that concerns all the inhabitants of the situation (bourgeois, petit-bourgeois, intellectuals, artists, proletarians, etc.), who now have to decide whether or not to commit to the struggle that questions not only the situation they inhabit, but also what they in themselves are.”⁵

This subtractive moment (strikes, refusals to be monitored, refusals to enter into “workfare” programs, sharing information and resources between claimants rather than between claimants and the state, or even mass and organized “benefit fraud”) can become a constitutive moment in reclaiming the social legitimacy which seems to be the exclusive property of markets for now, provided it can move from a dismissible, “partial” activity to a “universal” one which re-organizes the majority perception of general interest – a perception that is more often than not, more often unconsciously than overtly, on the side of the markets rather than other people (or, rather, refuses the distinction between them). When the legitimacy of the state is grounded in its responsibility to markets – as the true generators of wealth – rather than to the public, who are deemed to just consume this wealth, it has to be workers who break down this apparent reality through their new primary role as indebted consumers, or sources of unproductive wealth accumulation, at the same time as through their role as *unproductive* workers,⁶ waged or unwaged, commodity-producing or relationship-managing.

An itinerary of the politics of reproduction, leading up to a more precise exposition of what shape the “politics of debt” could assume, is the goal of this text. First, we will revisit the history of the politics of reproduction through the Welfare Rights Movement, Italian Autonomist feminism, the Wages for Housework campaign and “self-reduction” in 1970s Italy, the Claimants’ Unions of the 1980s and the Unemployed Workers unions and initiatives in present-day Britain. In Part Two, we will explore the thesis that the claim of unproductive labour to unproductive capital must be asserted as part of the decomposition of the wage-labour-capital relation discussed by the “communisation” current (Theorie Communiste and Endnotes), which entails the impossibility of asserting a work-based political identity (“only vindicative struggles”), either subjectively (no-one identifies with their jobs) or objectively (workers’ power is broken by law and by globalized restructuring) and which, as we have already seen, needs to be asserted through the point of inconsistency of the situation – for the politics of debt, we can provisionally name it as “uncapitalized life,” just as “free human activity” came to name human praxis beyond wage labour when wage labour was decisive, both to relations of production and struggles for emancipation. The class relation Marx describes below may be in its historical eclipse:

“Capitalist production, therefore, under its aspect of a continuous connected process, of a process of reproduction, produces not only commodities, not only surplus-value, but it also produces and reproduces the capitalist relation; on the one side the capitalist, on the other the wage-labourer.” (*Capital*, vol. 1)

But the class relation between creditor and debtor flourishes in that vacuum, so long as capitalism in its core lineaments is still with us and so long as most of the populace has to survive within its laws and mediate this survival through the value-form. Again, Marx ensures it doesn't escape us that, “When viewed, therefore, as a connected whole, and in the constant flux of its incessant renewal, every social process of production is at the same time a process of reproduction.” (p. 711) To the historical (and still current) figures of the housewife and the benefits claimant, we add the figure of the debtor, and try to trace a politics of debt on the ground of the politics of reproduction. What happens to the concept of the “social wage” *after* the wage?

Reproduction in the Home, Reproduction of the Home

To move chronologically, and to take a starting point which in some ways will appear arbitrary – certainly to historians of the working-class, community and women's movements – the Welfare Rights Movement coming onto the scene in the 1960s in the United States stands as an interesting case, as it shared activists, demands and campaign tactics with the Civil Rights Movement and the second-wave feminist movement, as well as the more radical community-based and nationalist-influenced factions of the movement like the Black Panthers and the

Young Lords.⁷ The Welfare Rights Movement was composed of the single mothers who were the main constituency of U.S. social services of the time. They were among the first, both in the Civil Rights and the women's liberation movements, to position their struggle squarely on the terrain of social reproduction. They grounded what came to be known as “the personal is political” in the systemic inequities that organized their lives. They were also the first to name and analyze the structural contradiction that drove their demands on the state – the contribution of unpaid domestic labour to the efficiency of the capitalist economy – and were the first to associate their reproductive function with an economic position. They suggested that this reproductive labour be recognized and valued in the same way as paid labour in the workplace, and also turned this into a political practice, claiming a voice and a subject position from the sidelines of marginality and impoverishment: as women, as single mothers, as African-American in many cases, and as social welfare claimants. They claimed a “social wage” as against the patriarchal “family wage” paid to the male worker as the head of the family, the social responsibility of capital for the “externalities” of commodified but unwaged social being – looking after children and the elderly, for example. Dignity and autonomy from harassment, surveillance and corrupt bureaucracy were also emblematic to their struggle. As traced earlier in the dialectic of affirmation and negation, the Welfare Rights Movement affirmed a “wrong” in order to negate the social conditions and the social identifications – patriarchy, capitalism and racism – that made that wrong possible, indeed unquestionable, and rendered them its natural targets. Yet it can be argued that overall, like the mainstream of the Civil Rights and women's movements (which came a bit later), the ultimate horizon of the movement for most of its members, in praxis and analysis, was that of improving their position within the current state of affairs rather than seriously challenging it, which would have had its tactical as well as its political reasons. The institutionalization of the movement in the National Welfare Rights Organization (1966–1972) lent it negotiating power at a higher level, but the reactionary social climate of the Nixon era, as well as internal splits (over expanding the movement to include the working poor vs. redefining welfare as a feminist issue) ended up destroying the organization. U.S. Government counter-insurgency activities no doubt also played a role, given the overlap of welfare rights activists with Black Panthers and other radical (as well as moderate – the CIA drew no such distinctions amongst its internally colonized) community action groups.

In the early 1970s, the currents of Marxist feminism in Italy associated with the Worker's Power and Autonomia analyses started to put forward the idea that reproduction also constituted a “hidden abode,” as Marx spoke of production in its contrast with the sunlit equality of exchange. They proposed that since unpaid work conducted primarily by women in the home produces, the same as factory workers, the commodity of labour-power, which is then sold on the market for a wage, that they could as well form the “vanguard” of working-class organization and work refusal. Until that point, women at home were (indirectly) producing surplus value.

The desired consequences of this redefinition of women's work was that unwaged workers would be acknowledged as subjects of working-class politics, and that “women's issues” could be more broadly addressed as “class issues” and understood as antagonistic to capitalist interests in the same way as the issues of waged workers. Another reason was to actualize reproduction – childcare, health care, prostitution, power relations in the home and community – as a properly political site of contestation, rather than continuing to abide by the “revolutionary logic that established hierarchies of revolutionary subjects patterned on the hierarchies of the capitalist organization of work.”⁸ Finally, some elements of this position, though not all, came to the conclusion that if housework produced a commodity, maybe even value, i.e., it fulfilled the minimal conditions of capitalist work in general, then it should be paid for by capital like any other work “directly;” “at its value,” rather than through the miserly margins of welfare payments or the “family wage.”

Alongside the number of conceptual, political and practical problems addressed by this analysis, there were a similar number of problems with the analysis itself. On the conceptual side, it could be claimed that no labour in capitalism is ever paid for “at its value,” or else surplus-value extraction would not be the first law of capitalist work. The second objection would follow from this, that for Marx, “being a productive worker is a misfortune,” and that the identification of domestic labour with productive work only made it politically meaningful in the “workerist” context, fixated as it was by the productive/unproductive labour distinction and which saw the factory worker as hegemonic, rather than providing a weapon against the relations of production in its own right. On the political side, as was swiftly pointed out, linking the emancipation of female houseworkers to the wage both reinforced the centrality of the state or “total social capital” to the reproduction of workers and families, and trapped women in the home rather than renegotiating gender roles and radically moving the structure of the family in a more collective and egalitarian direction. Additionally, it faced the paradox of the “transitional demand” that asks to reform capitalist relations in a way which would make them no longer capitalist; a paradox equally confronting the idea of the “basic income” today. Finally, the practical problem of evaluating housework in the same terms as waged work would revolve around problems of measure and withdrawal of labour: “[...] how exactly a wage could be calculated, given the lack of instruments for the measurement of the work day? How could housework ‘strike’ overcome the necessary aspects of community support for struggle in other sectors of the class composition?”⁹

⁷ Like their contemporaries the Black Panthers, the Puerto Rican Young Lords combined a nationalist and anti-racist agenda with ‘community work,’ which consisted of self-organized programmes in childcare, education and food distribution alongside direct action. See Jennifer 8. Lee, ‘The Young Lords’ Legacy of Puerto Rican Activism’, *New York Times*, City Room blog, Aug. 24, 2009 and Frank Edwards, ‘Young Lords 40th Anniversary’ at <http://www.areachicago.org/p/issues/6808/young-lords-40th-anniversary/>; also <http://www.nationalyounglords.com/> for the origins of the movement. For the Welfare Rights Movement, see *Welfare Warriors: The Welfare Rights Movement in the United States* by Premilla Nadaser, Routledge, 2004 and *Bread or Justice: Grassroots Organizing in the Welfare Rights Movement* by Lawrence Neil Bailis, Lexington Books, 1974.

⁸ George Caffentzis and Silvia Federici, ‘Notes on the Edu–factory and Cognitive Capitalism’, in *The Commoner*, issue 12, Summer 2007; in Edu-factory Collective, eds., *Towards a Global Autonomous University: Cognitive Labor, the Production of Knowledge and Exodous from the Education Factory*, Autonomedia, New York, 2009; and at <http://www.commoner.org.uk/12federicicaffentz.pdf>

⁹ Nicholas Thoburn, *Deleuze, Marx and Politics*, Routledge, London/New York, 2003, Chapter 5; or at <http://libcom.org/library/deleuze-marx-politics-nicholas-thoburn-5>

Wages for Housework could further be discussed as a tension between the prescriptive and descriptive: how does a critical position on the production of value help us overcome value? Proceeding through the moments of affirmation and negation again, the affirmation would go something like: we, too, produce value and are productive workers, so the workers’ movement has to take us into account and expand their concept of value to include unpaid or “social” labour. The negation could then be, if we produce value, then value is so broad as to fall apart; it immediately becomes a political rather than a technical category. This was in fact the position of Silvia Federici, among others, who cautions against the literal interpretation of the Wages for Housework programme, placing emphasis rather on its strategic horizons and its critical character, what she terms “Wages against Housework.” Rather than the productivist agenda of raising all to the same baseline of exploitation, the contribution of the Italian Autonomist feminist perspective was to push for a generalization of the refusal of work by expanding the category of what constituted work, and to ensure that the “hidden realm” of reproduction would never again be forgotten in the analysis of and action against capitalist exploitation. As Federici has recently noted on the legacy of Wages for Housework for today's anti-systemic movements:

“When we said that housework is actually work for capital, that although it is unpaid work it contributes to the accumulation of capital, we established something extremely important about the nature of capitalism as a system of production. We established that capitalism is built on an immense amount of unpaid labor, that it is not built exclusively or primarily on contractual relations; that the wage relation hides the unpaid, slave-like nature of so much of the work upon which capital accumulation is premised [...] In other words, by recognizing that what we call “reproductive labor” is a terrain of accumulation and therefore a terrain of exploitation, we were able to also see reproduction as a terrain of struggle [...]”¹⁰

Parenthetically, it should also be added that Italian Marxist feminism took on very disparate forms, although the one chronicled above has perhaps become the most renowned due to the originality and far-reaching impact of its analysis. There were also feminist elements of the armed factions that emerged in Italy towards the end of the 1970s, and their efforts did not transpire in the “hidden realm” alone – they targeted health clinics that refused to provide abortions to users of public healthcare for “reasons of conscience,” but were happy to do so for a steep fee, as well as sweatshops employing mainly young and immigrant women.¹¹ The emphasis on reproduction as a political battlefield most consistently developed by the feminists could also be seen to be key to the prevalence of both organized and informal campaigns of “self-reduction” and “proletarian shopping” in 1970s Italy; groups of tenants would take unilateral and concerted action to lower their rent or utilities, or pay lower prices or nothing for public transport or for groceries (although clearly the workers in these sectors had to be co-operative to some extent for these tactics to succeed).

The “social factory” of waged, unwaged and informal work did become increasingly central to Autonomist Marxism, as activists “followed the workers out of the factories,” who were leaving for reasons ranging from and between the broadly subjective (mass refusal) and broadly objective (mass unemployment). At the same time, there continued to be a caesura between feminism and class struggle, with divisions between socialist feminists, separatists, bourgeois and social democratic feminists and so forth complicating a situation where the subordination of women seemed so clearly to be attendant on capitalist class relations (and on religious customs) but seemed to flourish equally well in Left milieus among “comrades.” An articulation of the relations between patriarchy and capitalism (as well as the construction and exploitation of race)¹² where sexism and racism are seen as both divisions in a global working-class and as relatively autonomous, as phenomena which are both overdetermined and contingent, continues to be one of the most vexed fault lines in Marxian praxis; a thinking-through of the relations between them which is adequate to the present moment of capitalist decomposition, in all its unevenness, is a project of staggering complexity and no less staggering urgency, even with the resources supplied by thirty or more years of Marxist and materialist feminism and queer theory, not to mention historical and actual praxis.

However, the prescient appropriation by the Italian Autonomist feminists of the reproductive field for political action by its “native informants,” by those already defined by their lack of access to social visibility and economic power, can now be used to contextualize the organized struggles against welfare cutbacks that found a resurgence in Thatcher-era Britain and are making a gradual reappearance today. Reproduction as the social mediation of the value-form outside the workplace has clearly always been problematic, as the foregoing has illustrated. Yet it is in times when this particular mediation starts to eclipse the encounter with the value-form in the workplace for increasing numbers of people, i.e., in times of mass unemployment and capitalist restructuring, that the politicization of reproduction starts to have more general repercussions which are no longer limited to those temporarily falling into the category of the unwaged and who decide to organize for mutual aid and advice. From examination of the 1980s groups, the practical consequences of this can be quite disparate. The interstitial and low-level nature of some claimants’ groups can suddenly acquire a degree of visibility for which in some cases the participants are not prepared, or materially cannot sustain. In some cases also, the organization can shuttle between being a campaign group with radical demands and a “service provider,” and can finally end up subcontracted as a service provider for the state – something which is only going to escalate with the present UK government's ideological commitment to expanding the role of the voluntary sector in what were formerly areas of state provision: ‘The Big Society’.

¹⁰ Silvia Federici, ‘Precarious Labour: a Feminist Viewpoint’, Variant 37 at <http://www.variant.org.uk/37texts/Variant37.html#L9> or in the print edition pp 23–25.

¹¹ See Vincenzo Ruggiero, ‘Sentenced to Normality: The Italian Political Refugees in Paris’, *Crime, Law and Social Change*, No. 19, 1993, pp. 33–50. Referenced in Pat Cunningham, ‘Italian feminism, workerism and autonomy in the 1970s: The struggle against unpaid reproductive labour and violence’, p. 7, note 31; @mnis: *Revue de Civilisation Contemporaine de l'Université de Bretagne Occidentale*

EUROPES / AMÉRIQUES <http://www.univ-brest.fr/amnis/>

¹² It is relatively more straightforward to make the case that racism was both coterminous with and instrumental to the emergence of capitalism, via colonialism and slavery, than to make the same case for the subjugation of women, which seems historically much older and more widespread. In *Caliban and the Witch*, Silvia Federici makes a trenchant, if not altogether successful argument, for the co-emergence of capitalism and the subjugation of women in the era of primitive accumulation: Silvia Federici, *Caliban and the Witch: Women, The Body and Primitive Accumulation*, Autonomedia, New York, 2004.

Such a dialectic between self-activity and support has so far not been able to translate into a broader mobilization which finds a commonality between the interests of the unemployed and the still-employed, even in the current destructive climate of the impending and gratuitous cuts. It has, in other words, not been able to redefine those sociological or factual categories as political ones. Yet such a commonality, in whatever terms it is set out, and whether it's guided more by expediency than left communist analysis, is indispensable to the de-legitimation of the cuts and a defeat of the political project that is generating them.

The Islington Action Group of the Unwaged (1980–86) along with other claimants’ action groups and benefit workers’ strikes of the 1980s and 1990s, and going into the present with the national and local branches of the Unemployed Workers Union, the Brighton Unemployed Centre, the Edinburgh Claimants Union and the London and Edinburgh CAPs (Coalitions Against Poverty), the Hackney Solidarity Group, Save Our Council Housing and Save Our Nurseries, comprise the most visible historical and present-day actors of the struggle on

QUEER

Tatjana Greif VOJNE NA ZELENICI

Na zelenicah Johannesburga se je »*začela vojna*«. Tako senzacionalistično so slovenski mediji napovedali otvoritev svetovnega nogometnega prvenstva v prestolnici Južnoafriške republike, mestu, kjer se dnevno zgodi petdeset umorov in sto petdeset posilstev. Naslednja novica je bila ta, da nogometne žoge, ki jih brcajo nogometni milijonarji, šiva suženjska delovna sila revnih otrok tretjega sveta.

Nek drug športni novinar je v eter evforično prisegal, da je slovenska »*nacionalna reprezentanca svetinja*«, o nogometu »*pa že ptički*«, kot se mu je zareklo, »*lajajo*«. Z nogometom, pa tudi z arhivom tretjega rajha, je – tako izgleda – navdihnjen reklamni oglas za slovensko mobilno telefonijo, ki kaže svetlolasega belega dečka v nogometnem dresu, kako na praznem, megalomanskem stadionu, v siju božanske reflektorske svetlobe zravnano, himnično prepeva in pri tem zre nekam v temne višave. Bil bi dobra konkurenca propagandnim nacifilmom tipa »*zdrav duh v zdravem arijskem telesu*«, kakršne je za berlinsko olimpijado v tridesetih letih snemala Riefenstahlova. Verjetno ni slučaj, da deček prepeva *Kekčevo pesem*. Vandotov Kekec, ta vedri alpski pastirček, je lep primer rasistične in ksenofobične otroške literature. Arijska rasa otrok – nogometašev v oglasnem spotu, posnetem na dunajskem stadionu, je rasa dečkov, deklic seveda ne. Raznovrstni militarizem na umetnih zelenicah prav lepo zaobjame misel Nobelove nagrajenke Elfriede Jelinek: »*Šport, ta trdnjava majhnega človeka, iz katere lahko strelja.*«

Ministrstvo za šolstvo in šport Republike Slovenije je v maju, mesecu mladosti in ljubezni, sprožilo nacionalno kampanjo »*Ponosen sem na spol*«. V izjavi, ki jo vneto podpisujejo dijaki in dijakinje, je zapisano: »*Človeštvo je razdeljeno v dva (s)pola. Združena tvorita celoto za nadaljevanje civilizacije.*«

Kampanja Ministrstva za šolstvo je izključevalna in nestrpna, saj s predpisano komplementarnostjo dveh spolov izključuje vse ostale oblike partnerske skupnosti in družine, razen tistih, sestavljenih iz moškega in ženske, ter v celoti negira možnost različnih spolnih identitet. V 21. stoletju je skoraj neverjetno, da kampanja v duhu arhaične, biologistične in patriarhalne mentalitete mladim predpisuje spolne stereotipe, rigidne spolne vloge, seksualno restriktivnost ter razpihuje nestrpnost do manjšin. Prokreacijo definira kot edino civilizacijsko načelo in dolžnost, hkrati pa v celoti zanemarja vzgojni moment ozaveščanja o pomenu varnih spolnih praks. Ministra za šolstvo Lukšiča smo lahko gledali, kako v spremstvu znane mladinske pisateljice ponosno spremlja »prostovoljno« podpisovanje izjave, smehljajoč se in obkrožen z mladino.

Le nekaj dni zatem je isti minister v televizijski oddaji¹ zatrjeval, da ne podpira kontracepcije. Pravica do svobodne izbire glede načrtovanja družine in rojstva otrok je temeljna, z ustavo in zakoni zajamčena državljanska pravica, zato ostaja nejasno, kako je mogoče, da eden izmed vladnih ministrov, v uradni funkciji vladnega ministra, zagovarja stališča, ki so v nasprotju z zakonskimi predpisi, veljavnimi v državi, katere minister je. Da si je minister zadal sistematično utrjevati patriarhat, kaže tudi dejstvo, da je uvedel posebne seminarje za pedagoške kadre, na katerih učitelji in učiteljice lahko utrjujejo znanje o »pravih, trdnih, tradicionalnih, biološko in naravno pogojenih spolnih vlogah« in o tem, kaj je »pravi« moški in kaj »prava« ženska.

Da vzgojno-izobraževalni sistem v Sloveniji resnično izvaja biopolitike, je videti tudi na spletni strani Zavoda Republike Slovenije za šolstvo. V okviru kurikula za osnovne šole sta v poglavju *Vzgoja za zdrav način življenja*, v rubriki *Različne oblike spolnega vedenja* homoseksualnost in transseksualnost navedeni skupaj z deviantnimi in celo nekaterimi kaznivimi dejanji, in sicer: »*Homoseksualnost, mazohizem, sadizem, nekrofilija, eksibicionizem, transvestizem, transseksualizem, voajerizem, fetišizem, posilstvo, incest, prostitucija, pedofilija, sodomija, pornografija.*«

Homoseksualnost in transseksualnost se navajata na isti ravni z nekrofilijo, posilstvom, incestom, pedofilijo in sodomijo, ki so kazniva dejanja po zakonodaji RS. Inštitucije na področju šolstva bi morale prve vedeti, da je homoseksualnost – poleg biseksualnosti in heteroseksualnosti – ena od treh vrst človekove spolne usmerjenosti, transseksualnost pa ena od oblik spolne identitete. Vrženi v isti koš s kriminalnimi pojavi in bolezenskimi kategorijami predstavljata pomensko zlorabo, ki vodi v ostale zlorabe, nestrpnost in nasilje.

Julija letos se je v Sloveniji zgodila že deseta parada ponosa. Njen

the terrain of reproduction in the UK. To different degrees, the perspective is about encouraging resistance and collective activity among the ever-more demonized “benefits scroungers” who are uniquely aware of the effects of the state deficit being resolved on their backs but only have the means to confront them in a largely individualized and piecemeal fashion, i.e., from a situation of defeat. It is also sometimes about the principled “refusal of work” position, viewing benefits as a direct appropriation of socially produced wealth otherwise removed from its producers; and then, fundamentally, it is about occupying the “welfare state commons” and all the contradictions of that position. Like the struggles in the universities or the battles against social housing privatization, it is less about upholding the entrenched model of public services than it is about refusing to concede what little remains of non-commodified public goods (although that struggle would seem to be lost in terms of higher education in England, where fees up to £10,000 for a full degree and rocketing student debt is now the norm; universities are still free in Scotland). This reactive, rear-guard orientation, though it might seem to be less descriptive of the 1980s – which had a more recent memory of working-class organization –

moto »*Dovolj čakanja!*« je dobesedno ilustriral tudi plakat, ki prikazuje dolgo vrsto bolj ali manj prepoznavnih GLBT-identitet, kako potrpežljivo čakajo na avtobusni postaji. Avtobusa pa od nikoder. V tednu parade, v katerem so se odvile številne kulturne in zabavne prireditve, so aktivisti po Sloveniji potovali s kombijem pod naslovom *Gverila Mavrica* in mimoidoče zalagali z zloženkami in kondomi ter obešali plakate. To paradno popotovanje so oglaševali kot »*gverilsko*« akcijo, ki seveda z gverilskimi strategijami nima ničesar skupnega. Vendar pa – z vidika prizadevanj Ministrstva za šolstvo RS, ki v 21. stoletju predpisuje izključno dva spola, zaukazuje prokreativno heteroseksualno spolnost ter prepoveduje kontracepcijo – že samo javno razdeljevanje kondomov lahko predstavlja gverilsko nevarnost. Tako daleč smo v državi članici EU, NATO-pakta, OECD in ostalih vojaško-ekonomskih integracij.

Letos se je prvič zgodilo, da je kak hrvaški predsednik uradno sprejel organizatorje parade ponosa. Predsednik Ivo Josipović je že v svojem inavguracijskem govoru omenil spolno usmerjenost in tudi sicer nima težav z javnim zagovorom človekovih pravic – za razliko od številnih politikov, tudi slovenskih, ki jim manjšinska vprašanja pomenijo preveliko volilno tveganje. Hrvaški paradni aktivizem je predsednikovo povabilo takoj označil kot »*pomemben zgodovinski trenutek v prizadevanjih za izgradnjo pravičnejše, boljše in srečnejše družbe za vse ljudi*«.

Vendar so organizatorji letošnje devete zagrebške parade ponosa, milo rečeno, ubrali čudne strune za doseganje taistega cilja. Presenetili so s kampanjo, ki naj bi GLBT približala ljudski večini, a je bila vizualno prejkone odbijajoča, vsebinsko pa mestoma celo sporna, saj uporabljala nacionalistično in naciskin ikonografijo in se celo spogleduje z ustaštvom. Videospot je predstavljal mešanico infantilne MTV-jevske pop kulture, cepljene na puhlo tranzicijsko mentaliteto. Refren »*Fuck You*« naj bi vabil simpatizerje na parado, a jih v resnici omalovažuje, sproščeno petje in poplesavanje mladih, belih, zdravih, veselih in srečnih teles pa kaže nadvse popačeno podobo homoseksualne stvarnosti v regiji. Uporaba naciskin ikonografije, nogometnih dresov, zlasti pa mahanje z noži v spotu je morda dvoumna parodija, a vendar gre za utrinek trenutnega stanja homoaktivizma.

Tudi serija petih plakatov naj bi predstavljala »*izzivalni obrat*«. Osrednji plakat nosi frontalno podobo vrste z barvo popleskanih golih zadnjic, pod katerimi je napis »*Hrvaška to lahko pogoltne*«. Pogoltne kaj? Več kot sporna je tudi uporaba slogana »*Za brak spremni*« kot parafraza ustaškega gesla »*Za dom spremni*«. Eden od plakatov prikazuje dva objekta mladeniča v nogometnih dresih rdeče šahovnice, ki se poljubljata. Zraven je napis »*Zaščitimo vsak poljub*«. Ne le, da je podoba nogometnega gejevskega parčka zavajajoča – zlasti če vemo, da se nogometni huligani vsako leto pošteno znesejo nad udeleženci parad širom vzhodne Evrope –, temveč je tudi slogan plakata povzet po nemški medijski kampanji »*Protect Every Kiss*«, naravnani proti nasilju nad geji. Plakat s teto-virano roko in stisnjeno pestjo pravi »*Gremo globlje*«, na plakatu z uniformiranim mladim policistom, ki drži plastični dildo, pa piše »*Organi reda so tu, da služijo*«. Uporaba mačistične in militantne ikonografije za sprevračanje predsodkov, nestrpnosti in sovraštva ni ravno vzor premišljene strategije za spremembo javnega mnenja. Parade ponosa kot množični dogodek, skupinsko *outiranje* ali masovno javno poljubljanje so vse dlje od realnosti, mejijo na komično karikaturu asimilacije, normalizacije, pristajanja na vse za ceno družbenega sprejetja.

Letos se je tudi prvič zgodilo, da je kak srbski predsednik sprejel predstavnike gejevskih in lezbičnih aktivistov in podprl parado ponosa. Le dan zatem, ko se je srbski predsednik Boris Tadić srečal s predstavniki *Gejevskega in lezbičnega infocentra GLIC*, je srbska Wikipedija izbrisala stran GLIC iz svoje domene, češ da ni relevantna. Je pa za srbsko Wikipedijo toliko bolj relevantno, da objavlja fašistične in homofobične skupine.

Evropski poslanec in bivši predsednik litvanskega parlamenta Vytautas Landsbergis in slovaška poslanka Anna Záborská sta v Evropskem parlamentu razglašala, da je pedofilija povezana s homoseksualnostjo. Njun britanski kolega Michael Cashman je oba pozval, naj že enkrat »*prideta iz klozeta*« in se končno *outirata* kot tiskovna predstavnika Vatikana.

Glasnike Vatikana imamo tudi v Sloveniji, ki jo je junija obiskal najbolj homofobičen kardinal Tarcisio Bertone, ki je aprila v Rimu sklical tiskovno konferenco, na kateri je za pedofilske škandale v RKC okrivil geje. Njegov obisk – sicer ravno na dan 65. obletnice osvoboditve koncentracijskega taborišča Mathausen – so slovenski mediji oglaševali kot »*top iz rubrike*«. A ne le to, nedavno je tukajšnje občestvo doživelo kulminacijo soglasja med katoličani in islamsko skupnostjo, ki so složno združili moči proti pravicam istospolnih parov in družin. Ljubljanski nadškof Anton Stres ter ljubljanski mufti

than of the contemporary groups, confirms that the situation of defeat is fundamental to all the listed formations. Although the political conjuncture demands generalization of struggles, three decades of working-class decomposition, union-hostile laws and public quiescence are preventing this from happening at the moment. But this is not to overdetermine the future, even the immediate future. And couldn't decomposition find its own specific power? Could we say that the labour of the negative still applies even when it is a question of the negation of labour?

Note: Originally conceived in two instalments, the material referred to but not extensively discussed in this text will appear in an autonomous text for *Reartikulacija* in 2011.

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Nedžad Grabus sta na novinarski konferenci javno podpisala skupno izjavo »*Zakonska zveza in družina – stebra družbenega in verskega življenja*«. Oba duhovnika sta povedala, da »katoličani in muslimani visoko cenijo zakonsko in družinsko življenje, zato se zavzemajo za pravico vsakega otroka do družinskega življenja v skupnosti očeta in matere«. Ponovno smo poslušali izrabljene fraze o tem, da je družina osnovna celica družbe, ter izvedeli, da so člani katoliške in islamske skupnosti v Sloveniji poklicani, da se v javnosti zavzemajo za zaščito zakonskega in družinskega življenja. Vlogi očeta in matere sta »ključnega pomena za skladen osebnostni razvoj zakoncv in otrok«. Ko gre za geje in lezbijke, raznorodne verske hierarhije brez težav premagajo zgodovinske razlike in hitro dosežejo »veliko soglasje«. Še dobro, da so si tudi organizatorji Rock Otočca v okviru festivalske ponudbe omislili sveto mašo.

Eurostat je ob svetovnem dnevu beguncev objavil podatke o številu podeljenih azilov v državah članicah EU v letu 2009. Skupno so države članice lani podelile zaščito 78.800 prosilcem za azil. Največ azilov so podelile državljanom Somalije, Iraka in Afganistana. Več kot tri četrtine vseh azilov so podelile Velika Britanija, Nemčija, Francija, Švedska, Italija in Nizozemska. Slovenija je lani ugodila dvajsetim prosilcem za azil, in sicer desetim prosilcem s Kosova ter po petim iz Srbije in Kazahstana. Števila in smeri deportacij iz EU na *Eurostatu* niso objavili.

Tatjana Greif je doktorica arheologije, lezbična aktivistka, publicistka, urednica zbirke ŠKUC – Vizibilija in Časopisa za kritiko znanosti.

Tatjana Greif WARS ON GREEN FIELDS

On the green fields of Johannesburg “*war broke out.*” Such was the spectacular announcement made by the Slovenian media on the opening of the World Cup football championship held in the capital of the Republic of South Africa, the city that sees 50 murders and 150 rapes happening on a daily basis. News followed about the slavish Third World child workforce hand stitching football balls that are then kicked by football millionaires.

A sports journalist on another occasion yelled euphorically into the ether, proclaiming the Slovenian “*National football team a saint*” and saying, in a slip of the tongue, that football is something “*birds are already barking about.*” Football and the archives of the Third Reich seem to have been the inspiration for the Slovenian mobile operator ad campaign that features a dark-haired boy in a football dress standing upright under the shine of divine floodlight in a huge empty stadium, hymn-like singing and staring up into the dark. He would make a good rival to the Nazi propaganda films of the “*healthy spirit in a healthy Aryan body*” kind. Just like those shot by Reifentahl for the Berlin Olympics in the Thirties. It may well be no accident that the lad is singing the *Kekec’ song*; Josip Vandot’s Kekec, the cheerful alpine shepherd boy, is a fine example of racist and xenophobic children’s literature. The Aryan race of children – footballers in the advertising spot shot in the Vienna stadium is a race of boys, indeed, not girls. Militarism most diverse on the artificial green fields is well described in the thought of the Nobel Prize-winner Elfriede Jelinek: “*Sport, this stronghold of the little man, from where he can shoot.*”

The Ministry of Education and Sport of the Republic of Slovenia released in May, the month of youth and love, the national campaign “*I’m proud of sex.*” The statement the pupils are eagerly signing goes: “Humankind is divided into two (*poles*) sexes. *Joined they form the whole for the continuation of civilization.*”

The Ministry of Education campaign is exclusive and intolerant for it excludes by way of the ordered complementarity of two sexes all forms of partnerships and family other than those composed of male and female, thoroughly negating the possibility of different sexual identities. In the 21st century, it is almost unthinkable that such a campaign, in the spirit of archaic, biological and patriarchal mentality, prescribes to the young such sexual stereotypes, rigid sexual roles and sexual restrictiveness, instigating intolerance towards minorities. Moreover, it defines procreation as the only principle and obligation of civilization, while at the same time neglecting completely the educative moment of raising awareness about the significance of safe sexual practices. And so we could see Mr. Lukšič, the Slovenian Minister of Education, in the company of a known youth writer Desa Muck proudly attending, with a smile on his face amidst the youth, the “deliberate” signing of the statement.

^[1] Kekec is a child protagonist of the homonymous story by the Slovenian writer Josip Vandot (t.n.).

Only a few days later, we could hear the same minister asserting in a TV show² that he is against contraception. The right to free choice as regards family planning and birth of children is a fundamental, constitutionally and legally guaranteed civil right. It remains unclear, however, how a governmental minister could possibly speak in favour of standpoints that are in stark opposition to the statutory provisions applicable in the country whose minister he is. That the minister has set himself the goal to systematically consolidate the patriarchate is proven as well by the introduction of specific seminars for the pedagogic staff where teachers can consolidate their knowledge about “right, firm, traditional, biological and natural sex roles”and about what makes for a “real” man and for a “real” woman.

Also bearing witness to the fact that the Slovenian education system carries out biopolitics is the web page of the Slovenian national Education Institute. In the framework of the elementary school curriculum, the section “*Education for a healthy way of life,*” in the rubric “*Different kinds of sexual behaviour,*” mentions homosexuality and transsexuality alongside the deviant as well as even some criminal offences, such as: “*Homosexuality, masochism, sadism, necrophilia, exhibitionism, transvestism, transsexuality, voyeurism, fetishism, rape, incest, prostitution, paedophilia, Sodomy, pornography.*”

Homosexuality and transsexuality are quoted alongside necrophilia, rape, incest, paedophilia and sodomy, which, according to the legislation of the Republic of Slovenia, qualify as criminal offences. Institutions in the field of education should be the first to know that homosexuality – besides bisexuality and heterosexuality – is one of the three types of human sexual orientations, while transsexuality is a form of sexual identity. Thrown into the same trash bin as criminal phenomena and health categories, they the subject of a case of abuse of meaning that leads to other abuses, intolerance and violence.

In July of this year, Slovenia hosted its tenth Pride parade. Its motto “*Enough waiting!*” is also literally illustrated by its banner, which shows a long queue of more or less recognizable GLBT identities waiting patiently at a bus station. Yet, the bus never comes. During the Pride parade week, in which numerous cultural and entertainment events took place, activists throughout Slovenia travelled with a van under the title *Rainbow Guerilla*, supplying the passers-by with leaflets and condoms and pasting posters. This year’s parade journey was advertised as a “*guerrilla*” action that has nothing whatsoever to do with real guerrilla strategies. However – from the viewpoint of the endeavours of the Ministry for Education, that in the 21st century envisages only and solely two sexes, ordering procreational heterosexual sex and prohibiting contraception – the public distribution of condoms seems to be able to potentially represent a guerrilla danger. This is how far a member state of the EU, of the NATO pact, of the OECD and other military-economic integrations has gone.

This year, for the first time, the Croatian president officially received the organizers of the Pride parade. President Ivo Josipović had already

² Verified. Pop-TV, June 1, 2010.

LEZBIČNI BAR/
LESBIAN BAR

Nataša Velikonja UJEMITE TATU! (vpije tat)

»*Mi Jelinčiča sploh ne vabimo več na televizijo, samo še glede Hrvaške,*« je na okrogli mizi o *novinarstvu* v ljubljanskem *lezbičnem baru*, ki ga vsako leto napadejo neonacisti, povedala urednica informativnega programa najbolj gledane televizije v državi. Jelinčič je predsednik *Slovenske nacionalne stranke*.

Potem je bila druga okrogla miza. *O revščini*. Govorile so tri profesorice z univerze in ena vladna birokratka. Vse lepo zalite in v kostimčkih. V prostoru tri študentke in en študent, pred barom cel kup rulje. Vprašam lezbijke, kaj se dogaja, in mi odgovorijo: »*Ah, noter se bogati pogovarjajo o revščini, mi, revni, smo pa zunaj.*«

Kar poglej v ljubljanske galerije in na ljubljanske ulice, kdo lahko živi in kdo lahko umre. Ti lahko živiš, jaz pa lahko umrem, kaj bi dolgovezili. Tudi Étienne Balibar lahko živi, publika znanstvenih simpozijev pa sploh. Tudi okroglih miz. Jaz ne, ker nimam *literarnih nagrad*, meni tvoj prijatelj, *član izbirne komisije Javne agencije za knjigo*, po *poklicu* filozof. Ima pa zato nagrade pesnik, ki je med drugim napisal slikanico o splavljenih zarodkih. Evo ti *Društvo za teoretsko psihoanalizo*.

Dalje: *Mestna občina Ljubljana* je letos z birokratsko finto ukinila denarno podporo *Lezbični knjižnici*. Mestna birokratka meni, da *Lezbična knjižnica* – ena od dveh preostalih v vsej Evropi – *nima dovolj točk*, s katerimi bi izpolnila pogoje financiranja. Tudi v *mestni izbirni komisiji* je nek tvoj prijatelj. Sprega – popolna. Vsi vi, etnologi iz *Združene unije Kongo*.

Ne slišiš. Naj nadaljujem. Ali poznaš lezbično založbo *Naiad*? Ne. Ne poznaš je, ker je bila ukinjena v trenutku, ko se je pri generični založbi pojavila Jeanette Winterson, ki je napisala dve lezbični knjigi, eno neprevedljivo in drugo o kristjanih, zdaj pa piše nekaj o kibernetiki. *Strejti* ste povedali svoje. Vi boste imeli lezbe na verigah, vi boste multiple nagrajenke generičnih založb vozili v indijske restavracije, da bodo hvaležne ribale umazano posodo do blišča.

Ali poznaš gejevsko založbo *Gay Sunshine*? Ne. Ne poznaš je, ker je bila ukinjena v trenutku, ko se je pri generični založbi pojavil gej Miki Miška. Poznaš gejevske in lezbične organizacije v Sloveniji? Ne. Ne poznaš jih, ker ste nosilci pravnega interesa za homoseksualne pravice v državnem parlamentu *katoliška cerkev*, *civilna iniciativa za družino* in *pravice otrok* ter štirje napaberkovani homoseksualci. Kdo je to naredil? Vi.

Da ste nedolžni. Če je vsaj ena lezbijka pri vaši generični založbi, ste nedolžni. Če je vsaj en homoseksualec v vašem generičnem inštitutu, ste nedolžni. Preko ovinka desetletij gejevskega in lezbičnega gibanja ste ustvarili novo obliko homoseksualca. Izločili

mentioned sexual orientation in his inaugural address and was not concerned by such public advocacy of human rights – unlike many politicians among them Slovenian as well, to whom minority issues means far too big an electoral risk. The Croatian parade activists soon labelled the president’s invitation as a “*significant historical moment in the endeavour to build a more just, better and happier society for all people.*”

However, the organizers of this year’s ninth Zagreb Pride parade, to put it mildly, have plucked some odd strings for achieving that same goal. They surprised with the campaign, which was supposed to draw GLBT nearer to the people’s majority, but was visually more likely repulsive, and in terms of content, occasionally even controversial, by its uses of nationalistic and Nazi-skin iconography, flirting even with the Ustasha movement. The video spot was a blend of infantile MTV pop culture, grafted into a hollow transitional mentality. The refrain “*Fuck You*” was meant to attract sympathizers to partake to the parade, belittling them in truth, while the relaxed singing and dancing of the young, white, healthy, cheerful and happy bodies showed a completely distorted image of the homosexual reality in the region. The use of the Nazi-skin iconography, football dresses, and above all, the waving of knives in the spot, might also be an ambiguous parody, reflecting at the same time the current state of homo activism.

The series of five posters is also meant to represent the “*provocative turnabout.*” The main poster bears a frontal image of a queue of people showing coloured naked buttocks under which appears the title “*Croatia can swallow it.*” Swallow what? More than controversial is also the use of the slogan “*Ready for Gay Marriage,*” which is a paraphrase of the Ustasha motto “Ready for the Fatherland.” A poster shows two young men in football dress with red chessboard patterns, hugging and kissing. Beside them the slogan “*Protect every kiss.*” Not only is the image of the football gay-couple misleading, all the more so since we know that football hooligans every year vent their rage on the parade participants throughout Eastern Europe, but the title itself comes from the German media campaign with the homonymous slogan which is oriented against violence over gays and lesbians. The poster with a tattooed arm and a closed fist says, “*Let’s go deeper,*” while the one with a young policeman in a uniform holding a plastic dildo goes, “*Police authorities are here to serve.*” The use of macho and militant iconography for subverting prejudices, intolerance and hatred can by no means be a model of a well thought-out strategy for changing public opinion. The Pride parade, as a mass event, as a group *outing* or a mass public kissing, is becoming all the more distant from reality, bordering rather on a comic caricature of assimilation, normalization and accepting just everything for the sake of social inclusion.

This year, for the first time in history, a Serbian president received the representatives of the gay and lesbian activists and supported the Pride parade. Only a day later, when the Serbian president Boris Tadić met with the representatives of the *Gay and Lesbian Info Centre GLIC*, the Serbian Wikipedia erased the GLIC page from its domain, claiming it to be irrelevant. However, what is all the more relevant is that

LEZBIČNI BAR/
LESBIAN BAR

Nataša Velikonja UJEMITE TATU! (vpije tat)

ste ga iz njegove vrste, ga dvignili v svoj razred, on se o homoseksualnosti posvetuje z vami, on misli, da je homoseksualnost družinska tematika, ker ste to rekli vi, ki vam je vse vaše življenje družinska tematika, nima pojma, kaj dela narobe, on je prebil zid in zdaj tako kot Spike Lee snema propagandne filme za vojsko.

Zadnjič so homokonzerve vsepovprek vpile: »*Ujemite homokonzerve!*« Bile so na vseh okroglih mizah in vpile: »*Dovolj je nasilja, hočemo poroke!*« Feministk ni bilo, kar jim tudi ni bilo prav. Homokonzerve hočejo priznanje, a ga od feministk ne dobijo. Tudi od lezbijk ne. Morda od žensk, ki spijo z ženskami. Homokonzerve so vpile: »*Pokažimo kulturno različnost homoseksualne skupnosti!*« Na njihovi letošnji *Paradi ponosa* je nastopalo dvesto sedemnajst *strejt* slovenskih estradnikov in estradnic. En od njih je bil lani obsojen za nasilni napad na gostjo diskokluba. Druga od njih je posnela himno slovenskim patriotom. Govorci so bili štirje tipi, izmenično *strejt* in *gej*. In tako naprej je s to kulturno različnostjo.

Ne slišiš. Tu nad mano tolče nevihta in sprašujem se, ali bo shranjeno vse to, kar pišem, ali bo udar vse scvrl. »*Če imam homoseksualca na intervjuju, potem zavoljo dinamike tudi sama zavzamem desničarsko stališče,*« je povedala novinarka dnevnega časopisa na eni od tistih vaših okroglih miz, »*tudi sama postanem malo Ljudmila Novak,*« je rekla. In je še rekla: »*Nadškof Stres ima popolnoma prav: katoliška vera je pač proti homoseksualnosti in on ima pravico do tega mnenja.*« Tako kot bo *katoliška cerkev* »*iz tega naslova,*« kot se dandanes reče, kmalu dobila pravico, da jo iz javne sfere, iz intelektualnega poklica pošlje nazaj v preteklost h kozam na gmajno – do njenega petega leta, nato pa v suženjstvo na dom mestne birokratke ali izbirnega filozofa. Ampak za zdaj, vsaj še za kakšen dan ali leto, noče biti na spisku, na katerem bi ob njenem imenu pisalo *Beng!* Tudi ona bo živila.

Vsepovsod je narod, ki zahteva linč vseh: lezbijk, pedrov, libertinov, anarhistov, komunistov, pravnikov, politikov, levice. Vsepovsod so neonacisti, po vseh gostilnah in vrtovih se derejo »*Tomorrow belongs to me!*« Drugo stran te vojne *zastopate* mestne birokratke, homokonzerve in filozofi iz izbirnih komisij. Iz tistih vaših *mnogoterih cvetov* in *pisanosti* in *različnosti* in *drugačnosti* ste narisali otroško risbo: eni so v rumeni majici, drugi v zeleni in tretji v modri ter seveda tri stalne karosrajce. Vi analizirajte to vaše početje. Vi imate čas in denar in možnosti.

»*Lezbična knjižnica ni dobila denarja,*« rečem. Pa pravi kolega gejevski aktivist: »*Ja, bo treba bolj lobirat.*« Menda se mu zdi, kako dobro je to povedal, kako pametno in zvito blebeta, in spet ponovi: »*Ja, bo treba bolj lobirat.*« In nihče od tistih novih homoseksualcev, katerih starejše brate in sestre so javne politike pred desetletji spravile iz *klozeta*, iz zapora, izpod vešal in tako dalje, nima pojma, kaj dela narobe.

In tudi letos so neonacisti tri dni zapored – pred praznikom *slovenske državnosti*, med njim in po njem – metali v *lezbični bar* moloto-

the Serbian Wikipedia continues to advertise fascist and homophobic groups.

MEP and former president of the Lithuanian parliament Vytautas Landsbergis and the Slovak MEP Anna Záborská declared in the European Parliament that paedophilia is linked with homosexuality. Their British colleague Michael Cashman has called on both to “*come out of the closet*” and finally out themselves as Vatican spokesmen.

The advocates of the Vatican are also present in Slovenia, which was visited in June by one of the most homophobic of Cardinals, Tarcisio Bertone, who in April convened a press conference in which he accused gays of paedophilic scandals in the RCC. His visit – which took place precisely on the day of the 65th anniversary of the liberation of the Mathausen concentration camp – was advertised in the Slovenian media as “*breaking news.*” What is more, recently, the Slovenian community experienced a culmination of a consensus between the Catholic and Islamic communities, who joined forces in solidarity against the rights of same-sex couples and families. Anton Stres, Archbishop of Ljubljana, and Nedžad Grabus, Mufti of Ljubljana, publicly signed at a press conference the statement “*Marriage and family – pillars of social and religious life.*” Both said that “Catholics and Muslims appraise highly conjugal and family life and therefore they strive for the right of every child to a family life in a conjugal community between father and mother.” Again we could hear truisms about the family being the fundamental nucleus of society and came to know that members of the Catholic and Islamic communities in Slovenia were being called upon to publicly strive for the protection of marriage and family life. The roles of father and mother are “*of key importance for a proper personal development of the married couple and children.*” Of course when it comes to lesbians and gays, diverse religious hierarchies easily overcome historical differences, gaining “large consensus” without delay. Thank God that the organizers of the Rock Otočec music festival also considered providing for a holy mass in the framework of the festival programme.

Eurostat, on World Refugee Day, made public the information about the number of asylum permits issued in the EU member states in 2009. Altogether, 78,800 permits were approved to asylum seekers. The majority of them were from Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan. More than three-quarters of all asylum permits were issued by Great Britain, Germany, France, Sweden, Italy and the Netherlands. Last year, Slovenia issued only twenty permits to asylum seekers, ten of who came from Kosovo and five of who came from Serbia and Kazakhstan each. However, what *Eurostat* failed to publish was the number and direction of deportations from the EU.

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Translated from Slovenian by Tanja Passoni.

LEZBIČNI BAR/
LESBIAN BAR

Nataša Velikonja UJEMITE TATU! (vpije tat)

vke, tako kot so jih tudi lani in tako kot jih bodo tudi naslednje leto, vse dokler ne bodo vsi homoseksualci in lezbijke lepo poročeni in doma in dokler ne boste tudi vse ve po gmajnah in bodo ulice prazne ali pa jih sploh več ne bo in bo vojne konec in bo Mir.

Urška, Tanja, Brane in jaz smo šli v *Kinoteko*. Bil je *Rocky Horror Picture Show*. Sedeli smo v zadnji vrsti, tako kot je treba, in ugibali, ali bo publika sodelovala. Čakamo, film se začne, pričakujemo, poslušamo v temo, »*ali kdo poje*«. Vprašam Urško, ona reče: »*Mislím, da ne, ne pojejo.*« Nobenih Transilvancev ni, nobenih vampirk ni, nobenih frikov, nobenih darkeric, nobenih gotikov, zgolj gledalci v rumenih, zelenih in modrih majicah in seveda v karosrajcah, ki gledajo film. Tanja mi šepne: »*Zdaj zdaj bom dobila napad shopliftinga.*« Ljudje sedijo in prav zares GLEDAJO film. Nič. Se začnemo zabavati sami, pojemo, mečemo fore, mahamo z lučkami od mobitelov, Urška z vžigalnikom ... Vse to v prvih petih minutah filma, in evo, že prihaja hostesa: »*Ali lahko ugasnete vžigalnike?*« Brane se začne režat čez stole: »*He he,*« se nagne k Urški: »*a si doživela generacijski prepad?*« Po koncu gremo na ulico na čik, prideta še Atila in Ana Marija, stojimo pred *Kinoteko*, Ani Mariji teži en tip: »*Ali si tudi ti bila med tistimi, ki so se zadaj nekaj drli?*« Ana Marija mu reče: »*Ampak saj to je bistvo tega filma*«. In on reče: »*A ne ne, jaz sem prišel, da bi v miru gledal film, in mi ni všeč, če se ljudje v kinu POGOVARJAJO.*«

Spomnila sem se na koncert *Pomaranče*. Verjetno sem bila še v osnovni šoli, metalka, koncert v novogoriškem *Kulturnem domu*, sedeži, bend začne šopat, najstniki skočimo na noge in benglamo. Jasno, v trenutku pride varnostnik, se dere na nas, kaže s prstom, naj se posedemo, in tako smo torej poslušali koncert *heavy metal* benda sede. To je bilo tam nekeje na prelomu v osemdeseta leta, in zdaj, preko ovinka desetletij alternativnih kultur in življenj, vlada ista projekcijska mašinerija, iste institucije so tu, ki nimajo pojma, kaj se dogaja, ki ne poznajo matičnih publik dogodka, ki ga prirejajo, dogodka, ki mu odrežejo pomen in kontekst in dopustijo samo prazne markerje in zombije, basta. Kdo je to naredil? Tudi vi. To je vaš zaključen krog.

Nič, ljudje hočejo imeti okrog sebe lepo cvetje. Sedimo za mizico pred barom, ti sediš vsa čemerna nasproti meni in mi glasno in jezljivo rečeš: »*Moramo že enkrat preseči to miselnost!!!*« Toliko, da nisi še udarila po mizi *A bo končno mir?!* Zahvalila sem se ti, da si prišla. V tem razbiraš distanco. Jasno, da te to razbesni, zato pa to počnem.

Nataša Velikonja je sociologinja, pesnica in lezbična aktivistka, Ljubljana.

Nataša Velikonja CATCH THE THIEF! (the thief cries out)

"We ceased to invite Jelinčič on TV, except in matters of Croatia," a woman editor of the informative programme of the most popular TV channel in Slovenia said at the round table *On Journalism*, held in the Ljubljana *lesbian bar*, which is attacked by the neo-Nazis on a yearly basis. Jelinčič is the president of the *Slovenian National Party*.

Another round table followed. *On Poverty*. The speeches were delivered by tree chubby and nicely dressed women professors from the university and one governmental woman bureaucrat. Three female students and one male were inside the bar, and a bunch of people in front of it. I asked the lesbians what was going on and got the answer *"ah, inside the rich are talking about poverty, while we, the poor, are staying outside."*

One just needs to look at Ljubljana's galleries and at its streets to see who is to live and who should die. You are to live and I should die – let's cut it short. Étienne Balibar is also to live, not to mention the audience of scientific symposia. Even of round tables. But not me, for I don't have *literary awards*, this is what your friend's opinion is, *the member of the selection jury of the Slovenian Book Agency*, philosopher *by profession*. The awards, on the other hand, have been given to the poet who, among other things, wrote a picture book on miscarried embryos. So much as for what concerns the *Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis*.

Furthermore: This year, *the City Municipality of Ljubljana* used a bureaucratic trick to abolish financial support for the *Lesbian Library*. The municipality woman bureaucrat's opinion being that the *Lesbian Library* – one of the two remaining in the whole of Europe – *is not eligible* to receive financial aid. Also in the current *city selection jury* is one of your friends. Perfect conjugation. All of you, ethnologists, from the *United Union of the Congo*.

Don't you hear? Should I continue? Are you familiar with the lesbian publishing house *Naiad*? No, you are not, because it was abolished as soon as Jeanette Winterson – the writer of two lesbian books, one untranslatable and the other about Christians, while now she is into cybernetics – stepped foot into the generic publishing house. *The straights* have had your say. You are to have lesbians in chains, and take multiple award winners of the generic publishing houses to Indian restaurants to have them rub the dirty dishes to glitter.

Are you familiar with the gay publishing house *Gay Sunshine*? No, you are not, because it was abolished as soon as gay Miki Mouse stepped foot in the generic publishing house. Are you familiar with the gay and lesbian organisations in Slovenia? No, you are not, because the advocates of legal interests for homosexual rights in the national parliament are the *Catholic Church*, the civil initiative *for family and the rights of children*, as well as four occasional homosexuals. Who is responsible for all this? You are.

You think you are innocent. If you have at least one lesbian in your generic publishing house, then you are innocent. If you have at least one gay in your generic institute, then you are innocent. With the passing

POZICIONIRANJE/ POSITIONING

Jovita Pristovšek OD ŠTETJA TELES DO TELES, KI ŠTEJEJO

22. septembra 2009 je UNICEF Slovenija na eno izmed najbolj prehodnih ulic v Ljubljani postavil kartonaste dvojnike ruandskih otrok. Humanitarna iniciativa s pomenljivim sloganom *Umaknimo ruandske otroke* z ulic predstavlja natančno tisti pogled, ki ga Walter Mignolo označuje za evropocentričnega. Reprezentacija ruandskih otrok v obliki kartonastih dvojnikov, umeščenih na Čopovo ulico v centru mesta, naj bi ponazorila razmere, v katerih ti otroci živijo. Kakršnokoli uničenje kartonastih otrok bi bila afirmacija njihovih realnih življenjskih pogojev.¹ Za zagotovitev hrane, oblačil, začasnega zavetja in izobrazbe UNICEF na otroka potrebuje 200 evrov. Ko je denar zbran, se kartonastega dvojnika dobesedno umakne z ulice. Simbolno dejanje se na tem mestu popolnoma materializira. Učinek je dosežen. Slaba vest, pomilovanje se kapitalizirata in izpred oči se umakne tisto, kar vzbuja slabo vest. Zadeva postane še kompleksnejša, če ulico uzremo v celoti. Trgovina ob trgovini, mimoidoči, kartonasta telesa otrok in *kralji ulice*, brezdomci, ki ravno tako kot kartonasta telesa prosijo za živež. Kar je skupno obema, je to, da se jima z donacijo življenjske razmere bistveno ne spremenijo.

Fantazija zahoda kot odrešitelja v primeru UNICEF-ove humanitarne iniciative je metaforično predstavila Ruando, s tem pa tako rekoč celotno Afriko – kot otroka, ki ga je treba obvarovati pred lastno destruktivnostjo, in istočasno kot otroka, ki ne bo nikoli odrasel. Infantilizacija, ki pa je vgrajena v strategijo reprezentacije, je že produkt kolonialnega diskurza, ki se danes nadaljuje v subtilnejših oblikah. Tudi destruktivnost je pravzaprav posledica dolge kolonialne zgodovine in tudi sedanje odvisnosti od tuje sistematične oblike pomoči (bilateralne in multilateralne), ki jo prvi svet že več kot petdeset let namenja afriškemu kontinentu in ki ni izpolnila pričakovanj in obljub o *trajnostni* ekonomski rasti ter redukciji revščine. Pravzaprav je revščino povečala, pahnila afriški kontinent v začaran krog sistematične pomoči in tako ustvarila novo obliko odvisnosti od finančne radodarnosti njenih prejšnjih gospodarjev.² Dambisa Moyo v knjigi *Dead Aid* v grobem definira tri oblike pomoči: humanitarno, dobrodelno in sistematično. Prvi dve definira kot kaplji v morje, slednjo pa kritično analizira. Po Moyevi relativno veliki transferji pomoči v revne države datirajo nazaj v 19. stoletje, v 50. letih 20. stoletja pa se je agenda o prestrukturiranju globalnega finančnega sistema (da se velika depresija ne bi ponovila) izpeljala skozi Marshallov plan, ki je uspešno

decades of the gay and lesbian movement, you have created a new kind of homosexual, segregating him from his kind, elevating him into your rank, having him consulting you on matters of homosexuality, having him thinking that homosexuality is a family issue because you say so, since to you your whole life is a family issue and he does not even have a clue about his wrongs, he breached the wall and found himself shooting propaganda films for the army in the fashion of Spike Lee.

The other day, the homocons cried promiscuously *"Catch the homocons!"* They partook in all the round tables, crying *"Stop the violence, we want marriages!"* No feminists were present, which was another stumbling block. The homocons demand recognition, but would not get it from the feminists. Not even from lesbians. Maybe they will get it from women who sleep with women. Again, the homocons cried, *"Let's show the cultural difference of the homosexual community!"* Two hundred straights of the Slovenian world of stars were present at this year's *Pride Parade*. One of them was found guilty last year of a violent attack on a woman in a disco club. Another one recorded the anthem for Slovenian patriots. The speeches were delivered by four men, alternately *straight* and *gay*. And so goes the story with this cultural difference.

Don't you hear? A thunderstorm is raving above my head as I wonder if what I'm writing will be saved or destroyed by a stroke of lighting. *"If I have an interview with a homosexual, then for the sake of the dynamics I myself take a right stance,"* said a journalist of a daily at one of your round tables, *"I myself become Ljudmila Novak a little,"* she said. And continued: *"The Archbishop Stres is right: Catholicism is against homosexuality and he has the right to such an opinion."* Just as the *Catholic Church* will soon get the right *"in this title"*, as they say nowadays, to send her back in time, from the public sphere, from the intellectual profession into the past, to the goats on the pasture – to her fifth year of age and then to slavery in a town bureaucrat's or a chosen philosopher's home. But for now, at least for a day or a year, she doesn't want to have her name on the list equipped with the postscript *bang!* She will live as well.

Everywhere there are nations that demand the lynching of them all: lesbians, gays, the libertines, anarchists, communists, lawyers, politicians, and the lefties. Everywhere there are neo-Nazis, in every pub and garden, they cry out *"Tomorrow belongs to me!"* And the other front of this war *is represented by you*, the city women bureaucrats, the homocons and philosophers from the selection juries. Out of those *various flowers* and *diversity* and *difference* and *otherness* of yours, you have drawn a child's drawing, the ones having yellow shirts, the others green ones and the rest blue ones and, of course, the three ever-present caro shirts could not be missed either. Go ahead, analyse your own doing yourself! You have all the time, money and possibilities.

"The Lesbian Library hasn't been granted funds," I said, and a colleague, a gay activist, replied, *"Well, I guess more lobbying will be needed."* He might have thought of how well he said that, how smart and cunning his chatter was, as he repeated once again, *"Well, I guess more lobbying will be needed,"* and none of these new homosexuals – whose elder brothers and sisters were, decades ago, brought out of the *closet*, from prison, from under the gallows and so on, by public politics – have any clue about what they are doing wrong.

rekonstruiral povojno Evropo, jo postavil na trdna ekonomska tla, predvsem pa zagotovil ameriški ekonomiji stabilnost, ko se je svet okrog nje rušil. Uspešna metodologija se je nadalje aplicirala na nerazvita področja. Pomoč je za Francijo in Britanijo postala ključna za ohranjanje strateškega geopolitičnega položaja, Ameriki in Rusiji pa je v času hladne vojne služila kot orodje za spreminjanje sveta v kapitalističnega ali komunističnega. Dekado šestdesetih označuje financiranje velikopoteznih industrijskih projektov, dekada sedemdesetih pa premik k pomoči kot odgovoru na revščino. V osemdesetih dobi pomoč status orodja za stabilizacijo in strukturne prilagoditve. Ker afriški dolgovi ogrožajo temelje globalne finančne stabilnosti, se prestrukturiranje dogodi tudi na področju dolgov, s tem pa se prenovi tudi finančna odvisnost. Afriški državni sektorji se privatizirajo in *politična suverenost postane podložna korporativni suverenosti*³. Njena ekonomija upravljanja prek izkoriščanja, izгона in izključevanja diktira prihodnje vojne cone.⁴ Strukturnalne prilagoditve so skupaj z ekonomskimi reformami diktirane s strani transnacionalnih inštitucij (World Trade Organisation, Word Bank in International Monetary Found). Banerjee navaja, da so »mednarodne finance in infrastruktura ključni orodji, da se razvoj dogodi v *nerazvitih* področjih, kjer morajo vlade demonstrirati *efektivno kontrolo in varnost*, kar pomeni, da morajo biti nekatere skupnosti eliminirane«⁵. Devetdeseta prinesejo agendo o pomoči kot prinašalki demokracije in vladnih reform. Kljub dejstvu, da je polovica od oseminštiridesetih podsaharskih afriških držav danes demokratičnih, pa demokracija kot podstat razvoja le-tega ni sprožila.

Začetek 21. stoletja prinese vznik *glamurozne* pomoči in ero moralnosti⁶ (1985 Live Aid Concert/Bob Geldof, ponovitev Live Aida, U2/Bono). Če je bila s strani zvezdnikov sprva promovirana zgolj humanitarna pomoč, zvezdniki danes promovirajo prav sistematično obliko pomoči. Era moralnosti, dolžnost ali bolje moralni dolg prvega sveta drugemu in tretjemu ni jasno nič drugega kot to, da prvi svet ostalima dvema prek idealov napredka, razvoja in inovacije ponudi nov dolg. Pomoč je profitabilna in pomoč vedno stane. Naj za primer navedem mikro makro paradoks, ki ga omenja Moyo. (Neimenovana) holivudska zvezda prepriča množice in zahodno vlado, da zberejo 100.000 mrež proti komarjem za ogroženo regijo. Mreže odpošljejo, jih distribuirajo in dobro delo je storjeno. Lokalni proizvajalec mrež je primoran odpustiti deset zaposlenih, od katerih je skupaj odvisno sto petdeset ljudi. V roku petih let bodo mreže proti komarjem neuporabne.⁷

³ Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee, »Histories of Oppression and Voices of Resistance: Towards a Theory of the Translocal«, http://www.reartikulacija.org/?p=612, december 2009.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid*, London 2009, str. 26.

⁷ Ibid. str. 44.

And this year again, the neo-Nazis were throwing the Molotov cock-tails into the *lesbian bar* for three consecutive days – before, during and after *Slovenian Statehood Day* – just as they did last year and just as they will do in the year to come, up until the moment when all homosexuals and lesbians will be well married and when everyone of you will be on the pasture, and the streets will be empty or there will be no more, and war will stop and Peace will prevail.

Urška, Tanja, Brane and I went to the *Kinoteka Cinema* to see the *Rocky Horror Picture Show*. Seated in the last row, as it should be, we were wondering whether the audience would be collaborating. While we were waiting, the film started, and still waiting, listening in the dark, I asked Urška *"Is anybody singing?"* *"I don't think so, nobody is,"* she replied. There were no Transylvanians, no vampires, no freaks, no woman Goths, no Goths at all, only spectators in yellow, green and blue shirts and, of course, caro shirts, watching the film. Tanja whispered to me, *"I'm right at the point of having an attack of shoplifting."* People were sitting and TRULY watching the film. Then, we started having fun ourselves, singing, cracking jokes, waving with lighted mobile phones, Urška with a lighter, all this in the first five minutes of the film, and there came the hostess, *"Turn off the lighters, will you."* Brane's laughter spread across the room right over the seats, *"hee hee,"* as he leaned towards Urška, saying, *"Have you experienced a generational abyss?"* When the film was over, we went out into the street for a cigarette, Atila and Ana Marija joined us. Standing in front of the *Kinoteka Cinema*, Ana Marija was harassed by a guy, *"Were you one of those who yelled in the back?"* Ana Marija answered, *"But that's the whole point of the film,"* and he replied *"O, no, no, I came to see the film in tranquillity and I don't like people TALKING at the cinema."*

I recall the concert of the *Pomaranča* band. Must have been in my elementary school days when I was a metal girl. The concert was in the Nova Gorica House of Culture, seats were set up. The band started rocking, us teenagers jumping on our feet, banging, and there came the security guard, yelling and finger-pointing at us to sit down. And so we listened to the concert of a *heavy metal* band seated. It was around the turn of the Seventies into the Eighties and now with the passing of decades of alternative cultures and lives, the same projection machinery governs, the same institutions are still existent which fail to know either what's going on or who the target audiences the events are organized for, events that they deprive of meaning and context, leaving nothing but empty markers and zombies. Enough. Who is responsible for this? You are, too. This is your closed circle.

However, people want to be surrounded by beautiful flowers. We were sitting at a table in front of a bar, you, sitting opposite to me, all moody, saying out loud in anger, *"We must do away with this mentality once and for all!!!!"* Almost pounding the table, you cried, *will there ever be peace?* I thanked you for coming. This is where you notice the distance from. It's obvious it drives you mad. That's why I'm doing it.

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Translated from Slovenian by Tanja Passoni.

Drugi primer, ki nazorno pokaže širše posledice izpolnjevanja moralnega dolga in fantazije zahoda kot odrešitelja, je kampanja za ukinitev otroškega dela v Sialkotu, v Pakistanu. V kampanjo (*Foul Ball Campaign*), ki je postala glavna svetovna tema aprila 1995 po BBC-jevem predvajanju dokumentarnega filma (*Children at Work*) o industriji ročno šivanih nogometnih žog (ta pokriva od 60–80 % svetovne produkcije žog), so bile poleg same industrije vključene številne (skrbno izbrane) nevladne organizacije. Dominantna naračija heroičnih agentov in relacije moči, ki so operirale za normalizacijo nesprejemljivosti otroškega dela in njegovo ukinitev, so v Sialkotu uvedle nov produkcijski režim. Šivanje žog kot eno slabše plačanih in manjvrednih del, ki se je prej odvijalo po domovih, je bilo zdaj premeščeno v šiviljske centre pod skrben nadzor, da otroci ne bi bili vpleteni v delo. Velika večina otrok je pomagala starešem (večino materam) pri dodatnem viru zaslužka. Delo na domu je ženskam omogočalo fleksibilen delovnik in dostojno diskretnost, v šiviljskih centrih pa so bile pogosto žrtve fizičnega in verbalnega nasilja.⁸ Kot trdijo Khan, Munir in Willmott, je bil to tipičen primer postkolonialne postavitve, kjer so vrednosti kolonialne moči rutinsko privilegirane v postavljanju okvirja, interpretaciji in naslavljanju problema otroškega dela. »Da so bile koristi za otroke vprašljive in da je večina žensk morala opustiti delo ter s tem pahniti svoje družine v še večjo revščino /.../, je bilo postransko dejstvo v vseh uradnih naracijah.«⁹

Kot že rečeno, je danes že skoraj šestdesetletna zgodovina sistematične oblike pomoči postavila afriški kontinent v vlogo otroka, ki ne bo nikoli odrasel. To je način, kako prvi svet danes percipira drugi in tretji svet s tem, da istočasno neguje pozicijo prvega sveta kot edinega odrešitelja. Kar leži v jedru humanitarne geste, je misija civiliziranja, narativnost imanentna kolonialni dominaciji in krščanski teologiji. Fantazija odrešitelja s podtonom superiornosti zahodnega sveta nad drugim in tretjim svetom, nad (*feminizirano*) »naravo«¹⁰ ali pa Freudove *fallen women* (*as the one who has to be saved from her own destructiveness with a little help of a gentleman*)¹¹, vzdržuje svojo pozicijo preko mitiziranja sistematične pomoči, ki v svoji osnovi ni nič drugega kot zadolževanje.

Morda pa ravno ta humanitarna iniciativa osvetli tisto, kar leži v samem jedru humanitarnega diskurza. Res je, da humanitarna gesta na prvi pogled deluje kot voluntaristična gesta, vendar je meja, ki jo postavlja humanitarni diskurz, donacija. Lahko bi rekli,

⁸ Farzad R. Khan, Kamal A. Munir, Hugh Willmott, Organisation Studies 2007;28;1055, »A Dark side of institutional Entrepreneurship: Soccer Balls, Child Labour and Postcolonial Impoverishment«, str. 1062–1069.

⁹ Ibid., str. 1056.

¹⁰ Angela Mitropoulos, »Legal, Tender,«http://www.reartikulacija.org/?=698, March 2010.

¹¹ Sigmund Freud, On Creativity and the unconscious: A Special type of choice of object made by man, str. 165–175.

¹ http://www.unicef.si/main/novica.wlgt?Id=5793, september 2009.

² Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid*, London 2009, str. 28.

da je ta meja pravzaprav tisto mesto, ki nam ne dopušča možnosti odločitve oziroma ki nas postavi na točko neizbire. Odgovoren subjekt se identificira preko donacije (kar istočasno pomeni, da si to odgovornost lahko privoščī), kar po drugi strani omogoča identifikacijo drugega subjekta kot neodgovornega (ne pa kot tistega, ki si donacije ne more privoščiti). Moralna odgovornost zahoda do ostalega sveta se tako kaže kot dolg, in tudi moralni dolg je danes tisti, ki ustvarja presežno vrednost.

Humanitarna iniciativa *Umaknimo ruandske otroke z ulic se po uspešnem* umiku kartonastih dvojnikov otrok s Čopove ulice nadaljuje s spletnim umikanjem otrok z virtualnih ulic po Sloveniji. Štetje umaknjenih teles spominja na diskriminatorno štetje padlih v Iraku ali na statistiko padlih v nedavnem ruandskem genocidu. Politika razstavljanja teles vedno vključuje razmerje moči med tistimi, ki so podvrženi takšni klasifikaciji, in tistimi, ki jo promovirajo.¹² Razstavljanje teles je razstavljanje asimetrije moči.¹³ Logiko reprezentacije teles ruandskih otrok bi lahko brali v okvirih teoretičnega koncepta normativnih somatehnik, ki ga je Goldie Osuri¹⁴ razvila na podlagi Appadurajevega koncepta enumerativnih skupnosti za primer Iraka. Somatehnike se ukvarjajo z vprašanjem, kako so telesa konstituirana skozi tehnologije produkcije vedenja (mapiranje, branje, reprezentacija).¹⁵ Te so neločljivo povezane s tehnikami vladanja, kjer so telesa konstituirana skozi vedenje kot identitetne kategorije za namen vladanja. To kombinacijo somatehničnega na *junkturi* epistemologije in vladanja imenuje za normativne somatehnike. »Politika reprezentativnosti, ki je politika statistike, pri kateri nekaj teles reprezentira ostala telesa zaradi numeričnega principa metonimije«,¹⁶ je torej povezana s samim postopkom upravljanja. »Identiteta je lahko somatehničen proces natančno zaradi tehnike in investicije v percepcijo nekega telesa v nizu kolektivnosti /.../«¹⁷, ta pa je lahko *somareligiozna*, *somakulturna*, *somaetnična* itd. Upravljanje s telesi kot postopek normativnih somatehnik se lahko na eni strani kaže kot domena biopolitike, na drugi strani pa kot prehod iz domene biopolitike v nekropolitiko (tudi smrt proizvaja presežno vrednost in smrt ima različne oblike).

Identiteta in s tem celotno družbeno polje se v času financializacije kot logike finančnega kapitalizma kažeta kot poblagovljeni oziroma – z besedami Marine Vishmidt – kot *»enoti kapitala«*.¹⁸ Komodifikacija ter s tem povezani devalorizacija (dela/identitete) in revalorizacija (dela kot dolga/identitete kot enote kapitala), ki zagotavljajo, da se družbeno polje v celoti konfrontira s kapitalom, vodijo v financializacijo (dela in produkcije/identitete). Dolg (kot je to pokazala analiza Vishmidtove) je danes baza za družbeno reprodukcijo.¹⁹ Če se je vrednost v času fordizma med drugim ustvarjala tudi skozi polje družbene reprodukcije, se v postfordizmu ustvarja preko devalorizacije družbenega. Ali kot je decembra 2009 v Ljubljani na simpoziju *Zakon kapitala: Zgodovine zatiranja* omenil S. Bobby Banerjee: »We do not count bodies, we do bodies that count.« Razvrednotenje ruandskih otrok se izpelje skozi njihovo zvedenost na kartonasto telo. Vsako telo ima natančno določeno vrednost (200 evrov). S tem je prevrednoteno v enoto kapitala, ki se kaže kot vložek oziroma investicija (da odkupimo moralni dolg). Telo tako postane izmenljiv finančni instrument (kot je npr. valuta) ali pa derivat finančnega instrumenta, namenjenega lažjemu trgovanju v času finančnega kapitalizma in katerega vrednost postane odvisna od špekulativnega ustvarjanja vrednosti. Kar je strašljivo, je ponovitev vzorca, ki je imanenten času trgovskega kapitalizma – trgovanja s telesi. Če se ustvarjajo le še telesa, ki štejejo (to so telesa, ki so zadolžena), potem ta zagotovo (p)ostajajo zvesta svojemu gospodarju.

Jovita Pristovšek (1982) je vpisana na podiplomski študij Akademije za likovno umetnost in oblikovanje v Ljubljani.

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- 12 Ur. Stuart Hall, *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices: The Poetics and The Politics of Exhibiting Other Cultures* (by Henrietta Lidchi), London 1997, str. 191.
13 *Ibid.* str. 197.
14 Goldi Osuri, »Identiteta in sokrivda pri nekropolitčnih angažmajih: primer Iraka«, prevod Tanja Passoni, <http://reartikulacija.org/?p=631>, december 2009.
15 *Ibid.*
16 *Ibid.*
17 *Ibid.*
18 Marina Vishmidt, »Value at risk: From Politics of Reproduction to Human Capital«, <http://www.reartikulacija.org/?p=708>, april 2010.
19 *Ibid.*

Jovita Pristovšek FROM BODY COUNT TO BODIES THAT COUNT

On 22 September 2009, UNICEF Slovenia placed cardboard doubles of Rwandan children on one of the busiest streets in Ljubljana. The humanitarian initiative, bearing the meaningful slogan *Remove Rwandan Children Off the Streets*, represents the very same view that Walter Mignolo denotes as Euro-centricistic. The representation of Rwandan children in the form of their cardboard doubles, placed on Čopova Street, in the very centre of the city of Lubljana, was supposed to re-create the conditions the children actually live in. Any destruction of the cardboard children would mean the affirmation of their real-life conditions.¹ To provide the food, clothing, temporary shelter and education for these children, The United Nations Children's Fund – UNICEF requires € 200 per child. Once the money is raised, the cardboard double is literally taken off the street. The symbolic act is thus fully materialized. The effect is achieved. The guilty conscience and pity is capitalized and what causes the bad conscience is removed from view. The whole matter becomes even more complex if we take an overview of the street. Shops, one next to the other, passersby, cardboard bodies of the children and the *Kings of the Streets*, homeless people that, similar to the cardboard bodies, are asking for food. What both have in common is that donation does not alter their living conditions substantially.

The fantasy of the West as savior in the case of UNICEF's humanitarian initiative – metaphorically speaking – *rendered* Rwanda, hence some-

¹ <http://www.unicef.si/main/novica.wlgt?ld=5793>, September 2009.

how the entirety of Africa, as a child that has to be protected from his or her own destruction and, at the same time, as a child that will never grow up. This infantilization, incorporated in the representation strategy, is already a product of a colonial discourse, nowadays continuing through more subtle forms. Destructivity is also actually a consequence of the long colonial history, as well as being the result of the current dependence on foreign systematic aid (bi-lateral and multi-lateral) that the First World has been giving to the African continent for over fifty years, and that has not met the expectations and promises of a *sustainable* economic growth and a reduction of poverty. It has actually increased the poverty, and has pushed the African continent into a perpetual cycle of systematic aid, thus establishing a new form of dependence on the financial generosity of their former masters.² Dambisa Moyo, in her book entitled *Dead Aid*, roughly defines three forms of aid – humanitarian, charitable, and systematic. She defines the first two as drops in the ocean, while critically analysing the latter one. According to Moyo, relatively large transfers of aid into poor countries date back to the 19th century, while in the 1950s the agenda of the global financial system reconstruction (to prevent the great depression from re-occurring) was carried out through the Marshall Plan that had successfully reconstructed the post-war Europe, set it on a stable economic ground and moreover, ensured the stability of the American economy at the time when the world around it was falling apart. The successful methodology was further applied to underdeveloped regions. Aid has, for France and Britain, become the key tool for the maintenance of their strategic geopolitical position, and in the time of the Cold War, for the United States and Russia, it was the tool for changing the world into a capitalist or a communist one. The decade of the 1960s was marked by the funding of large-scale industrial projects, the decade of the 1970s, however, presented a shift to aid as an answer to poverty. In the 1980s, aid assumed the status of a tool for stabilization and structural adjustments. As African debts threatened the bases of global financial stability, the re-structuring also occurred in the field of debts, thereby renewing financial dependence. African national sectors went private and political sovereignty submitted itself to corporate sovereignty. Its managerial economy began to dictate the future war zones through exploitation, expulsion and exclusion.³ Structural adjustments are, together with economic reforms, dictated by trans-national institutions (the World Trade Organisation, The Word Bank and The International Monetary Fund).⁴ Banerjee states that “international finance and infrastructure is a key requirement for ‘development’ to occur in ‘underdeveloped’ areas, of which governments must demonstrate ‘effective control and security,’ which means certain communities need to be ‘eliminated’”⁵. The 1990s brought about the agenda of aid as the bearer of democracy and governmental reforms. Despite the fact that half of the forty-eight Sub-Saharan African countries are democratic today, it was not democracy as the basis of development to trigger it.

The beginning of the 21st century has brought *glamour* aid and the era of morality⁶ (1985's Live Aid Concert/Bob Geldof, the repetition of Live Aid, U2/Bono). Even though at the very beginning, the celebrities promoted only humanitarian aid, it is they who nowadays promote systematic aid. The era of morality, duty, or even better, the moral debt of the First World to the Second and Third Worlds, is nothing else but that the latter two are – through the ideals of progress, development and innovation – offered a new debt. The aid is profitable, and it always costs. Let me, as an example, put forward a micro-macro paradox that Moyo mentions. An (unnamed) Hollywood star persuades Western crowds and a Western government to provide 100,000 mosquito nets for an endangered area. The nets are shipped and distributed, and a good deed is done. The local mosquito net manufacturer is forced to sack ten employees on whom (in total) a hundred and fifty people depend. In five years' time, the mosquito nets will be useless.⁷

Another example, evidently showing the wider consequences of fulfillment of the moral debt and the fantasy of the West as saviour, is the campaign for the abrogation of children's labour in Sialkot, Pakistan. In the *Foul Ball Campaign*, which became the main world topic in April 1995 after the BBC's broadcast of the documentary film *Children at Work* concerning the industry of hand stitched footballs (accounting for 60–80% of the world's football production), there were, beside the industry itself, numerous (carefully selected) non-governmental organizations involved. The dominant narrative of heroic agents and the power relations operating for the normalization of the unacceptability of children's labour and its elimination introduced a new production regime in Sialkot. The stitching of the balls, which was one of the worse paid and most inferior jobs, one that used to be carried out in homes, was moved to stitching centres, under careful supervision to ensure that children would not be engaged in labour. The great majority of children used to help their parents (mostly their mothers) with this extra source of income. Working from home enabled the women a flexible workday and a decent amount of discretion; however, in the stitching centres, they were often victims of physical and verbal harassment.⁸ As Khan, Munir and Willmott state, this was a typical example of a postcolonial setting, where the values of colonial power are routinely privileged in setting the frame, the interpretation and the addressing of the problem of children's labour. “That the benefits for children were questionable, and that the majority of women stitchers had to drop out of the workforce, plunging their families into deeper poverty, were details that went virtually unnoticed in all official narratives.”⁹

As already said, the now almost sixty-year long history of systematic aid has put the African continent into the role of a child that will never grow up. This is the way how the First World today perceives the Second and Third Worlds by its simultaneous nourishing of the position of the First World as the only saviour. What lies at the core of the humanitarian gesture is the mission to civilize, the narrative immanent to colonial domination and Christian theology. The fantasy of the saviour with the sub-tones of superiority of the Western world over the Sec-

² Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid*, London 2009, p. 28.

³ Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee, »Histories of Oppression and Voices of Resistance: Towards a Theory of the Translocal,« <http://www.reartikulacija.org/?p=612>, December 2009.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid*, London 2009, p. 26.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁸ Farzad R. Khan, Kamal A. Munir, Hugh Willmott, *Organisation Studies* 2007; 28; 1055, "A Dark Side of Institutional Entrepreneurship: Soccer Balls, Child Labour and Postcolonial Impoverishment," pp. 1062–1069.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1056.

ond and Third Worlds, i.e., over (*the feminized*) “*nature*”¹⁰ or the Freud's *fallen women*¹¹ (as the one who has to be saved from her own destructiveness with a little help of a gentleman), sustains its position through a mythicization of systematic aid, that is, in a nutshell, – nothing more than indebtedness.

Perhaps it is this humanitarian initiative that brings to light what lies at the very core of the humanitarian discourse. It is true that the humanitarian gesture – at first sight – seems a voluntary one. However, the limit set by the humanitarian discourse is a donation. It could be said that this limit is actually the point that does not allow us the possibility to choose, therefore setting us in a situation with no choice. A responsible subject is identified through a donation (which at the same time means that it can afford this responsibility) that, on the other hand, allows the identification of the other subject as being irresponsible (rather than the one who cannot afford a donation). The moral responsibility of the West towards the rest of the world is shown as a debt, and nowadays, the moral debt is what creates the surplus value.

The humanitarian initiative *Remove Rwandan Children Off the Streets*, after the *successful* withdrawal of the cardboard children off Čopova Street, continues online as well, with the withdrawal of children from the virtual streets of Slovenia. The counting of the bodies withdrawn from the streets resembles the discriminatory body count of the dead in Iraq or the statistics of the dead in the recent Rwandan genocide. The policy of body display always includes the power relation between the ones submitted to this kind of classification and the ones promoting it.¹² A display of people is a display of a power asymmetry.¹³ The logic of bodily representation of Rwandan children could be read in the frames of a theoretical concept of normative somatechnics that Goldie Osuri¹⁴ developed on the basis of Appadurai's concept of enumerative communities in the case of Iraq. Somatechnics deal with the way in which bodies are constituted through technologies of knowledge production (mapping, reading, representation)¹⁵. These are inseparably connected with governance, where bodies are constituted through knowledge as “identity categories” for the purpose of governance. She names this combination of the somatechnical, at the juncture of epistemology and governmentality, normative somatechnics. The “politics of representativeness, that is, a politics of statistics, in which some bodies could be held to stand for other bodies because of the numerical principle of metonymy”¹⁶ is therefore linked with the procedure of managing. “Identity may be a somatechnical process precisely because of the technique and investment in perceiving one's body in a set of collectivities. ...”¹⁷, and that can be either *soma-religious*, *soma-cultural*, or *soma-ethical*, etc. The body management as a procedure of normative somatechnics can be, on the one hand, regarded as a domain of bio-politics, and on the other hand, as a transition from the domain of bio-politics into necro-politics (death also producing the surplus value and death also taking up various forms).

The identity and together with it the entire social field, in the time of financialization as the logic of financial capitalism, present themselves as commodified or, as put by Marina Vishmidt, as “*the units of capital*”¹⁸. Commodification and the related de-valorization (of labour and identity) and revalorization (of labour as debt and identity as a unit of capital) that ensure the total confrontation of the social field with capital, lead into financialization (of labour and identity). Debt (as shown by the analysis of Vishmidt) is nowadays the basis of social reproduction.¹⁹

If value was, in the time of Fordism, also created through the field of social reproduction, in post-Fordism it is created through de-valorization of the social. Or, as it was mentioned by S. Bobby Banerjee at the symposium on December 2009 in Ljubljana entitled *The Law of Capital: Histories of Oppression*, “We do not count bodies, we do bodies that count.”The de-valorization of Rwandan children is carried out through their reduction to a cardboard body. Each body has a precisely determined value of € 200. With this act, it's revalorized into a unit of capital, as shown by the input or investment (to buy off the moral debt). The body thus becomes an exchangeable financial instrument (e.g., currency) or a derivative of a financial instrument that is aimed at easy trading in the time of financial capitalism and whose value depends on the speculative creation of value. What is frightening is the repetition of the pattern, immanent to the time of mercantile capitalism – body trading. If the only thing that is created are the bodies that count (i.e., the indebted bodies), then they are certainly becoming / remaining faithful to their master.

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- Jovita Pristovšek (1982) is enrolled at the MA programme at the Academy of Fine Arts and Design in Ljubljana.**
- Translated from Slovenian by Lili Anamarija No.**

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- 10 Angela Mitropoulos, »Legal, Tender,«<http://www.reartikulacija.org/?=698>, March 2010.
11 Sigmund Freud, *On Creativity and the Unconscious*, "A Special Type of Choice of Object Made by Man," pp. 165–175.
12 Ed. Stuart Hall, *Representation: Cultural Representation and Signifying Practices*, "The Poetics and the Politics of Exhibiting Other Cultures" (by Henrietta Lidchi), London 1997, p. 191.
13 *Ibid.* p. 197.
14 Goldi Osuri, »Identity and Complicity in Necropolitical Engagements: The Case of Iraq,« <http://reartikulacija.org/?p=631>, December 2009.
15 *Ibid.*
16 *Ibid.*
17 *Ibid.*
18 Marina Vishmidt, »Value at Risk: From Politics of Reproduction to Human Capital,« <http://www.reartikulacija.org/?p=708>, April 2010.
19 *Ibid.*

Hansel Sato
AUSTRIAN NEWS/ÖSTERREICHISCHE
NACHRICHTEN

Austrian News (Österreichische Nachrichten) was written and designed by Hansel Sato in May 2010.¹ It is actually not a newspaper, but an art project camouflaged in the form of a tabloid that satirizes popular Austrian right-wing papers. It uses the same visual language and diction of the typical yellow press, but re-semanticizes the content to infiltrate within it a political message against racism, xenophobia and discrimination. In such a way, the project uses the methods of artistic appropriation and is embedded in the tradition of adusting and communication-guerrilla. Also, Sato and a small group of helpers dressed up as newspapermen and newspaperwomen distributed the faux-tabloid in several metro stations and other public spaces in Vienna, without having legal authorization from the city administration. The amount of papers edited and distributed were 10,000. Hundreds of pedestrians and public transport users going to work took the paper and believed at first that *Austrian News* was just another free tabloid, until they realized that it was persiflage and an artistic statement against politics of exclusion. This was also aimed to open the debate in relation to Austria right-wing tabloids, for example, the newspaper *Kronen Zeitung*, which practically monopolizes the medial landscape. Austria has around 8 million inhabitants and the “Krone” has more than 3 million daily readers. On the other hand, some of the journalists of this paper have been accused of defending National Socialism. The aim of the project was to reach a bigger audience outside of the institutional frames of the art system in order to generate a reflection about the manipulation mechanisms of mainstream print media, which plays a powerful role in the reproduction of racism in Austria and other European countries. The reception from most of readers and from professional newspapers has been, in general, quite positive. Several articles were published commenting on the project and the webpage of the *Austrian News* has received more than 2,000 visits and hundreds of emails. The project was supported by the Austrian cultural association “SOHO in Ottakring,” Vienna and KÖR (Fund for Art in Public Spaces). On the other hand, the Austrian extreme-right party FPÖ is demanding the cancellation of every sort of subvention for the cultural association “SOHO in Ottakring,” which supported this project.

The newspaper’s back cover picture, being republished in *Reartikulacija*, with the image of a “female-Hitler” alludes to the Austrian politician Mrs. Barbara Rosenkranz. She was the candidate of the extreme-right party FPÖ running for the Austrian presidency in 2010 and the beginning of her candidature was supported by *Kronen Zeitung*. This woman has indirectly put into question the Nazi genocide. When once asked in an interview with Austrian Radio (ORF) whether she believed in the existence of gas chambers in the concentration camps during the Second World War, she replied that she has the knowledge of an Austrian “who went to school in Austria between 1964 and 1976 – so that is her knowledge of history and that she has no plan whatsoever to change it.” During that period in many Austrian schools, the history of the Second World War was not included in the curriculum at all.

The text in the picture “*We are proud of Austria because we don’t need this (person)*” was formulated by reverting the typical diction of radical nationalism. Sato turned it from a slogan of nationalism into a political statement, especially when reworking the known face of Nazism with the face of the candidate Barbara Rosenkranz.

Hansel Sato, artist, activist, based in Vienna.

¹ The full version of the newspaper can be downloaded from: <http://www.hanselsato.com>“t”_blank


NEW FASCISMS

Staš Kleindienst
EU – SOME THOUGHTS ON IDEOLOGY

The process of expanding the EU to post-socialist countries, with the biggest mass expansion in 2004, can be seen as logical consequence of the fall of the Berlin Wall and of the social and political changes of the early 1990s, which introduced the neoliberal capitalist way of thinking and doing to the then-closed markets. The Western tendency to break the Iron Curtain can be put in parallel with the neoliberal project and can be seen as a way to produce new territories capable of embracing free market ideology rather than just an effort to “liberate” the oppressed people and bring them human rights. The neoliberal market economy also exported a post-ideological state of mind to the Eastern European countries, introducing them to the end of great ideologies and including them into one big democratic world family. And one way of keeping the ideological foundations of the EU intact is also to constantly renovate its relationship towards its own different ideological and totalitarian histories. If we take a closer look at the European Parliament Resolution on European Conscience and Totalitarianism which the EU parliament adopted on April 2, 2009, certain conclusions can be drawn from it that can show us how the representation of contemporary European ideology works by organizing a matrix of relations towards its own history (or in this case, towards the history of Eastern Europe)¹ that legitimizes Europe’s own processes of violence and makes them natural to the functioning of the Union.

The document promotes European values by producing a diametrical difference between the violent past, conjured by great ideologies, and the peaceful present, ready to build on the idea of harmony among all nations that constitute the European Union. In this sense, the resolution acts as an “independent” arbitrary mechanism

¹ Although the resolution deals with all totalitarian regimes in European history, its focus is aimed on socialist regimes of Eastern Europe.



that puts a dualist perspective on the EU and its past. The rhetoric of this dualist perspective is simple and it fits perfectly in the general neoliberal discourse about the post-ideological democratic political system, making it the only natural and possible option of governing. In this case, the ideologies of the past are only there to steal away the title of the big bad troublemaker, while contemporary Europe is a place of happy coexistence and by no means a place where ideology happens. This rhetoric needs a system of symbols on which the past (totalitarian) regimes can be classified as bad examples of ideology and the neoliberal present can be fully extracted out of discourse about ideologies. This system of symbols is constructed on a basis of appropriating great modern discourses about freedom and human dignity and its institutions. With this, I mean the discourse of human rights, sovereignty, the UN, the Nobel Peace Prize, etc., and also more popular events such as the Olympic Games or the recent World Cup in South Africa. What I mean is that these symbols of the free world and democracy have been appropriated so that they can serve Western capitalist ideology in making it natural and diametrical to the violent past. Their value as symbols of freedom and peace works only on the level of representation; in reality, it produces effects that are in opposition to their rhetoric. For example, we can remember the clash between reality and representation which occurred before the opening of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing when the traditional Olympic torch relay (“In the context of the modern Games, the Olympic flame represents the positive values that Man has always associated with fire.”²) was interrupted by protests and the runners, in white sweatsuits, had to ride in a bus to prevent the Olympic fire from being extinguished. The other example could be the sovereignty of Iraq. In his book *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, David Harvey points out the way in which the Iraqi government was declared sovereign.³ On September 19, 2003, four orders were issued by

² Factsheet – The Olympic Torch Relay, http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reference_documents/Factsheets/The_Olympic_Torch_relay.pdf

³ David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, p. 5

Paul Bremer, the then head of the Coalition Provisional Authority; the orders included the full privatization of public enterprises, full ownership rights by foreign firms of Iraqi businesses, full repatriation of foreign profits, the opening of Iraq’s banks to foreign control, national treatment for foreign companies and the elimination of nearly all trade barriers. Now, these orders were in violation of the Geneva and Hague Conventions, which state that an occupying power must protect and not sell off the assets of an occupied country. Harvey states: “Though Bremer’s rules may have been illegal when imposed by an occupying power, they would become legal if confirmed by ‘sovereign’ government. The interim government, appointed by the US, that took over at the end of June 2004 was declared ‘sovereign.’ But it only had the power to confirm the existing laws.”⁴ In this example, we can clearly see how the conception of sovereignty changes from a condition of political struggle to that of an economic interest.

We could say that one of the more powerful tools for the naturalization of an ideology is the control over interpretation and representation. The above-mentioned resolution does just that in producing an image of the people from Eastern (post-socialist) countries as barbaric nomads who need to be civilized and taught democracy since they bear the burden of a traumatic totalitarian past. The extract of the resolution found on the web portal of the European Parliament in the Slovene language states that new members (those who came out of a totalitarian socialist past) have to accept the guilt and have to go on a mission to achieve reconciliation through: “acceptance of responsibility, an appeal for forgiveness and the encouragement of moral renovation.”⁵ This kind of rhetoric only helps strengthen the internal division in domestic political discourse since the majority of problems concerning, on one side, the question of socialism and revolutionary violence and,

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *European Parliament Resolution on European Consciousness and Totalitarianism* <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-PRESS&reference=20090401IPR53245>

on the other side, the collaboration with German and Italian occupiers, are very present in daily political chit-chat and are only there to help score political points, but not much more than that. But on the other hand, this kind of rhetoric also produces (on the level of discourse) a certain subordination of new European countries that have no other option but to fully accept a new democratic regime which was so generously given to them by the big Western European powers. In practice, this is seen in the race to “progress” and to achieve “a sufficient level of democracy,” where Eastern European countries become “suckers” for all the laws, decrees and regulatives that come from Brussels and embrace them, not only without any reflection, but also with a high degree of compliance. A film by the Slovenian artist Nika Autor entitled *Report on the Situation of Asylum Seekers in the Republic of Slovenia, January 2008–August 2009* clearly shows this attitude when, on a farcical celebration of the Day of Refugees, an official representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Mr. Bojan Trnovšek, is asked by the author how would he comment on the situation that the individuals who jeered at him during the speech were in fact the applicants for asylum and that it was they who didn’t agree with the event, he answered: “Look, about this, I must say that, in fact, in Slovenia, as such, it is taken care of in respect to international standards for asylum applicants as well as for refugees. So our law is, of course, in check with the law of the European Union. In such cases, we act according to standards that are placed in this segment in all countries of the European Union.”⁶ While this statement clearly shows the monstrous gap between the real problematics of asylum seekers in Slovenia (which Nika Autor’s film is exposing) and the bureaucratic way of governing and solving things in democratic countries, it also shows how the minds of our leaders are colonized by the EU; not only that they obey such regulatives completely, but that this can serve as an excuse for not doing anything to overcome real problems.

But the true power of the European Parliament Resolution on European Conscience and Totalitarianism is hidden not in its content, but in the absence of content, because the resolution completely bypasses the colonial violence of the so-called 'old Europe'. Some may argue that the resolution is focused on totalitarian regimes and that colonial violence has no place in such a document, but only its absence can produce a moral perspective which makes present a peaceful era, diametrically different from totalitarianisms of the past. Why is that? The answer lies in the discursive difference between totalitarianism (ideology) and colonialism (religion) as historical forms of governing. Both formations can be seen as a consequence of European history, with the difference being that totalitarianism functions as a political form and colonialism as an economic one. So while, on the one hand, totalitarianism represents itself as a series of symbols which derive directly from ide-

6 Nika Autor, *Report on the Situation of Asylum Seekers in the Republic of Slovenia, January 2008–August 2009*, 2010, experimental film.

ology and its institutions within the state, colonialism naturalizes itself through supra-national institutions such as Christianity and Humanism, that can make overseas expansion (and consequent exploitation) a universal project, a civilizing mission, the unquestionable act of exporting civilization’s greatest achievements (from scientific to spiritual and governmental) to underdeveloped countries and those in need. And this is the precise point through which we can link historical colonization with contemporary forms of subjugation through capital that today’s West is leading. The non-ideological framework makes colonization an economic paradigm rather than a political one, and through this, internalizes its political discourse so that no external reflection on its violent processes can be made. It is this elimination of externality that can make the imperial-colonial regime spread around the globe and work endlessly, as opposed to totalitarianism, where externality is criminalized, but can still identify totalitarianism as such. So if, on one hand, we have a clear reflection and distance (in a democratic regime of representation, of course) toward today’s closed societies such as North Korea or toward radical Islamic groups, being portrayed as origins of terrorism, which oppose democratic values of human rights, multiculturalism, etc., it is only on the condition that the latter are represented as universal ethical values not to be judged, and not as clear political and ideological paradigms. So this optic of representation enables processes of privatization, exploitation, subjugation and even death as inherent elements to the normal functioning of democratic regimes and as necessary consequences of expansion through democratization. A clear example of this is seen in the EU intervention in today’s Kosovo, where, under the guise of bringing stability to the region, institutions such as EULEX and K-FOR (NATO mission in Kosovo) are overseeing almost all local institutions and enterprises, from security, education, health care and media to businesses such as power supply, mobile telephony and construction. But even more, their intervention also serves as a platform to construct a new ideological subject in Kosovo, one that needs to be civilized and prepared to embrace a depoliticized, consumerist way of life and become an obedient part of market ideology. Agon Hamza states: “The civil society of Kosovo was created from outside, it was one of the neoliberal projects. It was created based on funding programs/projects from abroad, such as multicultural tolerance, human rights, co-existence between different ethnical, cultural, and racial groups, democratization, sustainable development, etc. The so-called needs of Kosovo’s society are being designed (mostly) by EU bureaucrats in Brussels; they design our needs, our future, and our demands. The people of Kosovo and of the Balkans in general are portrayed as an excessively violent, criminalized society, traumatized subjects, etc.”⁷

7 Agon Hamza, “The Specter of Ideological Apparatuses,” *Reartikulacija* no. 8, Ljubljana, 2009, p. 5.

The reality is that, even though the intervention was supposed to be temporary, only to enable the normal functioning of the new state, the internationals (a word used to describe the official staff of the intervention) are there to stay. So the state of Kosovo is left in a permanent state of exception, where everything is controlled by international institutions and serves only for Western interests. We could identify this as a contemporary form of colonization that works on different political, economic and social levels and uses a form of crisis as a launching point to deploy its mechanisms of control. Be it an unstable political situation such as Kosovo, an unfriendly political regime, natural or ecologic catastrophe or even an economic crisis produced from within the strongest financial centers, the neoliberal logic of expansion finds a way to rearrange political, economic and social relations in a way to introduce the logic of the free market as a necessary component of Western democratic and humanitarian intervention. We could see this in the case of the recent economic crisis, where the only solution given by the big powers was giving more financial support to multinational corporations so that they could put their production back to normal standards. In the case of Greece, the situation is even worse. Solving the financial collapse of a state by giving it financial support can do nothing in the direction of preventing the collapse from happening again and only puts a state into dependency on the generous helper – in the case of Greece, the EU.

So as opposed to the imposed ideological orthodoxy characteristic for totalitarian regimes, we could say that we live in an imposed capitalist orthodoxy, an heir to imperialism and colonialism, which integrates pluralism, multiculturalism, parliamentary democracy, human rights, the possibility of choice, etc., and, on the other hand, uses those same terms as ideological discursive apparatuses to naturalize processes of violence as side effects of expansion, inherent to the working of neoliberal ideology. I would like now to propose a flourish quote, written on the official web page of the EU: “Europeans cherish their rich heritage of values, which includes a belief in human rights, social solidarity, free enterprise, a fair distribution of the fruits of economic growth, the right to a protected environment, respect for cultural, linguistic and religious diversity and a harmonious blend of tradition and progress,”⁸ which clearly shows the moral standpoints on which the idea of united Europe stands, but on the other hand, we cannot go over its imperial and colonial histories, which constituted those same moral standpoints on foundations of exploitation and subjugation. Or to put it in the words of renowned Senegalese writer and director Ousmane Sembene, who, speaking from the “other side,” once said: “At a moral level, I don’t think we have any lesson to learn from Europe.”⁹

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8 “Europe in 12 Lessons: Lesson 1,” http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/lesson_1/index_en.htm

9 Ousmane Sembene, Personal Quotes, <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0783733/bio>

CRITIQUE (OF EXHIBITIONISM)

Danila Mayer in collaboration with Muzaffer Hasaltay and Onur Serdar
KENTLERDE SANAT – ART IN CITIES. CONSIDERING ART BIENNIALS WHILE LOOKING AT THE 11th INTERNATIONAL ISTANBUL BIENNIAL

Processes of globalization include the attempt to assert an all-encompassing dominance of “economic rationality.” This is precisely what Karl Polanyi and Pierre Bourdieu put their fingers on in pointing to non-capitalist groups and structures of exchange, distribution and reciprocity, as well as to the fatal and disastrous capitalization of the “fictitious commodities:” work, land and money (Polanyi, 1978; Bourdieu, 2000). It was the mentioning of Karl Polanyi and his work *The Great Transformation* in the accreditation booklet which instigated our interest in the 11th International Istanbul Biennial in 2009. His analysis of the dissection of economy from society as a separate sphere also suggests that “the arts” are another such artificially forged sphere. Furthermore, our interests also lay with Turkey and Europe and their mutual “othering” processes.

In post-war Europe, Western Europe was cut off from the Eastern communist bloc. In order to share in the West’s post-war workload at low cost, people were recruited from Yugoslavia¹ and Turkey. The effects of this labor emigration on the Turkish Republic were, e.g., a changed agriculture (from subsistence farming to cash-crops) and the transformation of class structures in villages and towns. These processes were negotiated among and between people and segments of families during the manifold migration and remigration experiences, which included endless departures, leaving and being left. Meanwhile, the Iron Curtain has shifted to the Mediterranean and the Bosphorus and the (mythical) continental divide they assumingly are. This coalesces with an assumed religious (i.e., “irrational”) difference.

The 11th International Istanbul Biennial, organized by the Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts and sponsored by Koç Holding was set for 12 September–8 November 2009, under the curatorship of What, How & for Whom/WHW. What, How and for Whom/WHW is a curators’ collective formed in 1999 and based in Zagreb, Croatia. WHW organizes various exhibitions, productions and publishing projects, and since 2003 has directed the program of Gallery Nova – a city-owned gallery in Zagreb. WHW members are the curators Ivet Čurlin, Ana Dević, Nataša Ilić and Sabina Sabolović. And so we traveled to Bogaz², the mythical divide between Asia and Europe.

11th International Istanbul Biennial

We are rejected at the entrance by two guards. One, who we already know, enacts this as a good joke and as an expression of his sympathy; the other is serious and is reacting to our outfits: we look poor, and we don’t sport our accreditation passes. Inside, Brian Holmes is presenting his new book, *Escape the Overcode*. He’s in a fabulous mood, beaming, waving at people in the audience. This little incident at Istiklal Caddesi – Independence Street – in Istanbul’s Taksim district was part of our Biennial experience. The inside-outside dichotomy was again obvious at the official opening, where the protests outside took up the biennial motto “insan neyle yasar?” (“What keeps mankind alive?”) and formulated a harsh criticism of the event. Inside, the curators’ text was simultaneously being recited, in Turkish, by young women in declamatory and explicit propaganda rhetoric: “insan neyle yasar?” To enter the large hall, people had to pass through gates and metal detectors very much like at airports. The area outside was packed, representative’s cars being waved through every few minutes. Here are some lines from the protest songs on the outside:

Our choir is called the rezil ordu (the mean horde)
 We let your masks drop
 What, How and for Whom? you asked –
 Now you are communists with sponsors.

And here is a sample from the curators’ text, read out loud and published in the Rehber (exhibition guide) and the Metinler (book of texts): “In present class society, politics without antagonism is illusory. The culturalization of politics, promoted by neo-liberal ‘diversity’ which allows for the euphoric celebration of a range of marketable differences ... must be replaced by the politicization of culture. Today when the dilemma ‘barbarity or socialism’ is more real than ever and the future of the world appears divided between pauperized war zones and the stable fascistoid systems of the rich zones, this is our task.” (WHW, 2009, p. 120)

In a contribution to the 11th International Istanbul Biennial’s Metinler (book of texts), Gökce Dervisoglu analyses the position of the arts in the Republic of Turkey³. While the arts were originally under the guard of the state, and their role was to propagate the ideals of the new nation, large family-owned industrial complexes (Sabanci, Eczacibasi, Koç) took over their main sponsorship in the 1970s. They were still propagating Turkey’s virtues, but, more and more, they were also promoting Western arts in Turkey. Sponsoring institutions are IKSVM (Istanbul Foundation for Culture & Arts, producer of the biennial and owned by Eczacibasi, the main sponsor of the Istanbul Modern Museum), the Sabanci Museum, and the Koç Group (the long-term main sponsor of the Istanbul Biennial from 2007 to 2016).

The Press Conference: the four curators of WHW, up on the podium,

3 See also Müller, Ariane (2005) on the reception of contemporary artists’ work, and Faroghi, Suraiya (2005) on arts in the Ottoman Empire.

looking stern and reserved, almost frozen. Is this the stage direction, or the difference established toward the sponsors and city executives? These are samples of contexts the 11th International Istanbul Biennial is situated in. How have the curators of What, How and for Whom/WHW worked with and against these conditions? In the Rehber (exhibition guide) and Metinler (the exhibition’s book of texts) of the biennial exhibition project, background information is amply provided: the biennial’s budget is listed, the artists’ citizenships and residences, figures about male/female participants. This no doubt expresses the curators’ intentions at being transparent. WHW also try to exit from the “double-bind discourses of global neoliberalism and local ethnonationalism” of both Istanbul and Turkey (Accreditation leaflet, p. 8).

The Istanbul city government lies with the AKP, the religious-conservative party. It is likely that they do not have staff in their ranks acquainted with international arts scenes, and that the sponsors themselves largely determine the biennial. But neither the exhibition guide nor its texts inform us about the interface sponsors/city government/curatorial collective. The curators openly reject approaches that “actively engage with their ‘home-cities,” a characteristic of “many of the biennials in recent years,” as noted by them. WHW are critical of biennials: “Today, biennial exhibitions are elements of cultural tourism through which cities attempt to use their benign and internationally communicative regional specificities to position themselves on the map of the globalised world; they are manifestations tending to ‘cultural shopping’ in which art is often presented as cool, fun, entertaining” (Accreditation leaflet, starting from p. 6). There are no attempts at ‘maximizing inclusion’ of audiences, the public, or city-dwellers in WHW’s concept. Consequently, the 11th International Istanbul Biennial does not explicitly include its host city in its view. Considering the works of art that WHW brought together under Brecht’s motto “Denn wovon lebt der Mensch?,” there is a regional accent regarding both the works and the artists.

Antrepo No. 3, Sanja Iveković’s red-colored leaflets on women’s rights in Turkey, are thrown on the floor all over the exhibition halls; the sound which accompanies Canan Senol’s dripping of milk from breasts on a screen follows you for several yards and then welcomes you back at the end of the round; and as a first and last impression, the neon sign “Don’t Complain” by Hüseyin Bahri Alptekin sets the parameters, being both a complaint in itself as well as a threat. In both the exhibition guide and the book of texts, the extensive advertisements sector, which is largely dominated by mass media and their variations of the motto, clashes with the contributed political texts. The Brechtian song, transplanted into Istanbul, is meant to be a radical motto for a radical show, financed by large industrial sponsors who are known in the international arts scene. This observation means that critique and criticized structures fall into one. But there is still inside and outside, you can still be part of it or not. This is what the protest at the 11th International Istanbul Biennial opening meant, taking place at the border between inside and outside and thus becoming noticeable.

1 Tito’s Yugoslavia played a crucial role in the formation of the important non-alignment movement.

2 Istanbul Bogazi: Istanbul is not complete without the traditional and unforgettable boat excursion up the Bosphorus, the winding strait that separates Europe and Asia.

What, How and for Whom is an Art Biennial?

At the entrance room as well: *Qalandia 2087*, a large three-dimensional utopian city model by Wafa Hourani which glimmers and glows in soft lights; people are not visible. Cities of the future and of the past: *Qalandia* reminds us of Ahmet Öğüt's work at the Venice Biennale, *Exploded City*. The text collection published in *Open. Cahier on Art and the Public Domain* no. 16/2009 gives some background on the special phenomenon of biennials⁴: "an arrangement of curated exhibitions and art installations;" can be "coordinated with the rhythm of contemporary international tourism ... between nostalgia and forgetting" (Groys, 2009, p. 64). Biennials are post-institutions and fulfill the post-Fordist demands of flexibility and immaterial working conditions: event-based character, temporary contracts, as Pascal Gielen argues. This often entails structural amnesia, negation of the local context, superficiality, and lack of concentration (Gielen, 2009, p. 16). These arts events "often put political issues onto their artistic agenda" to compensate for being "increasingly deployed for developing and marketing cities and regions" (Seijdel, 2009, p. 4). A real proliferation of biennials hosted by cities in the world began in the 1990s (see Thornton, 2008), and the exact number is not clear (WHW speak of 300, Rogoff of 146). What is not taken into the focus in the *Open. Cahier on Art and the Public Domain* contributions is the interplay between city and contemporary arts, which is usually⁵ needed to produce a biennial. It also takes into account only new biennials, and not its prototype, "La Biennale" in Venice.

La Esposizione Internazionale d'Arte

Venice – a lagoon city that came to huge success thriving on the seafarer trade, inventing many of the modes of financial transaction – is also an urban center with a great affinity with the arts, and hosts what is still the most successful biennial in the world while being the global capital of tourism as well. *La Esposizione Internazionale d'Arte* was founded in 1895 with the aim of strengthening the Serenissima's tourism industry, and was oriented toward world fairs and academic salons (Thornton, 2008, p. 225; Martini, 2005; Fleck, 2009). Belgium opened the first national pavilion in 1907. Other empires, the German Reich, Hungary, the British Empire (all in 1909) and the Russian Empire (in 1914) followed. France opened its pavilion in 1912. The present number is 77 exhibiting nations. The national pavilions are in the Giardini and in the Arsenal and, for roughly a decade, in Palazzi throughout the city. The nations are responsible for the maintenance and the exhibitions, which are organized⁶ either by national committees, a curator, a commissioner, or a consortium. There are no fixed rules, rather a set of conventions. The Biennale director curates an international exhibition in the Palazzo delle Esposizione della Biennale in the Giardini, and in the Arsenal: "Fare Mondi – Making Worlds," was such an international exhibition put together by the Venice Biennale director Daniel Birnbaum in 2009. It attempted to build "something common, something that can be shared. Perhaps new worlds emerge where worlds meet." ("Fare Mondi – Making Worlds," information leaflet/map, 2009).

Also situated at the Arsenal is the Turkish pavilion, or rather: container, "which stands alone with no doors." The pavilion "simultaneously gathers and divides the two works" of artists Banu Cennetoglu and Ahmet Öğüt (as stated by the curator of the Turkish pavilion, Basak Senova, 2009, p. 124). Öğüt's work, *Exploded City*, is a large three-dimensional model of a city;⁷ the text on the wall recites the story in which the Venetian Marco Polo reports to Kubilay Khan. The city consists, it emerges from the text, of models of buildings and vehicles which have been bombed since the 1990s.

Venice sticks to the established pavilion system of nation-states, with the original pavilions of the old monarchies and empires still situated in their representative positions in the Giardini. The Venice Biennale is therefore to be seen as showdown of concurring nations with art as projection screen for their liquidity. Some examples from the 53rd edition in 2009:

Iceland's national finance system has recently broken down. Therefore, the artists simply dwell in the Iceland Pavilion in the Palazzo Michiel dal Brusà, the entrance of which is on Strada Nova on the Canal Grande. The pavilion is commissioned by the Center for Icelandic Art on behalf of the Icelandic Ministry of Culture.⁸ – Young women from the Emirates come to Venice as collectors.⁹ – Or Iran: the pavilion's (actually an apartment in a small road) commissioner, Mr. Shaloei, is the director of Tehran MoCA and also the general director of the Visual Arts Center of the Ministry of Culture & Islamic Guidance. The "profoundly spiritual and religious touch" of Iran's contemporary artists, maintains Shaloei, is due to their connection with the heritage of Islamic art, brought about by the revolution. "This is consistent with human nature and what today's world is seeking." (Booklet published by the Institute for Promotion of Contemporary Visual Arts, 2009).

Brazil, a major global player, speaks in its leaflet of "deep crisis in the Western world," and of "a world currently undergoing a full geopolitical, economic and technological reconfiguration" (Juca Ferreira, Minister of Culture, text for the Brazilian pavilion). FUNARTE, the national arts foundation, emphasizes educational policy, the Arts as figurative spearhead for the development of human beings, and the questioning of "certain capitalist and neoliberal values" (Sergio Mamberti, president of FUNARTE).

In Venice, the system of national pavilions is a "laboratory where up-close studies could be made of the dominating economies and cultures which, in turn, reflected the functioning of the art market." (Martini, 2005). Brazil and Iran at the Venice Biennale are examples of nations that use art and the contemporary arts contexts for posi-

tioning their economies/ideologies on the world market,¹⁰ and play alongside private sponsors. But what about other, newer biennial events, e.g., Sao Paolo and Taipei?

Brazil's pavilion curator at Venice is Ivo Mesquita, who together with Ana Paula Cohen, also curated the 28th edition of the Sao Paolo Biennial in 2008. The second-oldest biennial was founded by industrial magnate Francisco ("Ciccillo") Matarazzo Sobrinho in 1951. The Bienal de São Paulo gave up the national set-ups as "they no longer convey the complex network of migrations and cultural flows that characterize modern life." Their approach for the 29th event in 2011: "However, it is important for the 29th Bienal de São Paulo to emphasize the place and time in which it is organized: from Brazil and from a time of rapid geopolitical reorganization of the world." (Official website of the Sao Paolo Bienal, accessed April 10th, 2010).

The Taipei Biennale 2008 took "urban transformation, the dire circumstances of foreign labor forces, divided nations and micronations, permanent conditions of war, ecological collapse, global unrest, and another lease on the world" (Hsu/Kortun, 2009, starting from p. 10), into its horizon. Curators Manray Hsu and Vasif Kortun wanted to "insinuate that it is possible and in fact necessary, especially today, to imagine, explore and propose another world" (ibid., p. 7).

These exemplary approaches can be elucidated by findings of expert observers and analysts of biennials.¹¹ Irit Rogoff speaks of "linked peripheries"; as biennial exhibitions around the world "have become a circuit of investigation, exchange and conversation that bypass the traditional centers of art and culture" (Rogoff, 2009, p. 114). Her hopes are that, "In the aftermath of hundreds of years of colonial empire and superpower dichotomies, the arts are becoming the site of a new cultural-geographical imagining." (Rogoff, 2009, p. 115). Simon Sheikh says that while biennials "remain spaces of capital, they are also spaces of hope" (Sheikh, 2009, p. 79); and Boris Groys describes biennials as models of "a new world order because every biennial tries to negotiate between national and international, cultural identities and global trends, the economically successful and the politically relevant." (Groys, 2009, p. 65).

Back to Taipei and to a different, more educational approach: Hsieh Hsiao-yun, director of the Taipei Fine Arts Museum (the editors of the 08TB reader), takes a potential public into view and aims at educational goals envisioned for the biennial. He emphasizes that the "system of distributed venues allowed contemporary art to permeate the city, blend with the everyday lives of citizens." In his Preface to the *08TB Taipei Biennial Reader*, he hopes that the publication will "broaden Taiwanese readers' understanding of the special topics presented" in the exhibition.

Cities as Hosts of Biennial Events

Processes connected to economic globalization also entail that nation-states become less important, even irrelevant, and are deep in debt.¹² But cities and metropolises have lives of their own that also depend on their economic base: Industrial production using hinterland raw materials; cities of agriculture; or specialization in trade? Or the establishment and maintenance of international financial control? A cultural focus, tourism, and experience economy? Manual production, sweatshops, part of the global assembly line? Or all of it, with segregated spheres of high arts and low wages?

Cities, and concentrated metropolises, are the locations of "high culture," and therefore of contemporary arts, the veterans being Paris, London and New York.¹³ Archaeology and urban anthropology find that cities, a form of human settlement for roughly 10 thousand years now (Jericho; and, later, Catal Hüyük in south central Anatolia¹⁴), came into existence by a shift in productivity¹⁵ – the "urban revolution," in Gordon V. Childe's term. A city is "the central arena on which the fateful drama of human wealth and inequality has been played" (Southall, 2000, p. 14). At present, the whole of human society is urbanized throughout due to late capitalism's urbanization of the countryside (Southall, 2000, p. 7). More than half of humanity lives in cities. Robert Redfield, scholar of the Chicago School of Sociology, talks about Great and Little cultural traditions, the latter being located in rural areas, while towns and cities host the former (Redfield, 1956). "Great" traditions are interconnected from city to city, drawing from and influencing local and regional specificities.

People working in cities provide wealth and economic power, and the proliferation of biennials in the recent years shows the organizing cities' potency as they provide options, space, infrastructure, personnel, advertising, and money for the event. Biennials offer work, options and opportunities for artists, curators and for the manifold (local?) enterprises catering to their needs (handicrafts, technology, food supply, organizing agencies). In the wake of the event, related local institutions thrive – galleries, print media, exhibitions – while the players in the arts world move from city to city¹⁶.

Empirical analysis of the decision processes at the city government levels still needs to be done. But we are certain that every biennial is before, during and after, intensely discussed not only by the artistic personnel and staff, the visitors, the participants, and the arts world in more or less intensity, but also in the departments of the city governments. These discussions are likely to be focused less on artistic, and more on economic and image, outcomes.

Conclusions: Mondialité and Thinking without the Other

So what we observe in the examples given (in the well-meaning utopia by Birnbaum for the Venice Biennale, in the protest-informed curatorial stance of the 2009 Istanbul biennial, in the programmatic publications of nation-states, and in curatorial and theoretical texts) is an orientation towards new worlds, with biennials either proposing or representing a new world order. Geo-politics make their appearance, the globe is envisioned anew.

But "geo-political" explanations draw new maps of the world. And maps of the earth always imply a possible handling of the planet, looking down from an Archimedes' point. Proposing "new worlds" also means new divisions, new borders and haphazard or arbitrary continents, regions, areas. This "dimension of global designs" (Mignolo, 2000, p. 77) is called *mondialisation* by Edouard Glissant. As "an other thinking," he proposes *mondialité* (Mignolo, 2000, p. 77), which is articulated in local histories of knowledge built also from the perspective of coloniality (ibid., p. 79). The "other thinking" is "based on the spatial confrontations between different concepts of history,"¹⁷ and while it is "a way of thinking without the Other" (ibid., p. 67), it is set apart from territorial thinking, "universally marginal, fragmentary, and unachieved."¹⁸ We try to think from the borders and from dichotomous positions. Border thinking in Mignolo's sense means critical reflection of knowledge production, thinking neither from assumed centers nor peripheries. Regarding the inside/outside border, as our experiences in Istanbul entail, it is possible to speak *inside*, but it becomes nullified by the context of sponsors, money, dependencies. Speaking *outside* is not heard. Speaking at the border, from the border, as the protests at the 11th International Istanbul Biennial opening did, puts its finger onto the very existence of a border, of a separating and segregating concept at work. A bit further, where the sculptors from the Academy of Fine Arts work on big slabs of stone, we sit with our breakfast and *orta kahve*¹⁹ from a kiosk. Looking over the water, the quick little boats on the Bogaz: it is the connection, not a divide.

Questions

Whatever curators' efforts to tell each other stories,²⁰ the financial situation of biennials and biennials' pavilions will determine their fate, and the ups and downs of host cities and nations will be reflected in the event. Financing a biennial is at present an interplay between national and city governments and large private sponsors. And, of course, nations', cities', and private investors' wealth is provided by the people who work, yet with differing modes of redistribution. Basic questions are: How do biennials operate; and under which conditions do they thrive or fail? How will the disintegration of some states, and the re-nationalization of others, be represented at biennial events? Additionally, and probably most important, the idea of "art" employed at biennials will have to be observed. The question is whether art continues to be seen as a system of its own, mythically dissected from society, like "economy" in Polanyi's analysis. If biennials keep on operating in this mode, we suppose the "new" world might not be very different from the old!

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- 17 An example for such a confrontation of concepts could have been the transplantation of Brecht's Denn wovon lebt der Mensch – insan neyle yasar? into the context of Istanbul.
- 18 Mignolo (2000: p. 68) cites Khatibi 1983: p. 19.
- 19 Black Turkish coffee with medium sugar
- 20 ... as WHW remark critically (2009: p. 95), referring to Boris Groys, *Art Power*, Cambridge 2008, p. 51.

4 See also the other contributions in the special edition of *Open*, on "The Art Biennial as a Global Phenomenon," which was an outcome of the scholars' discussions in a program at the First Brussels Biennial.

5 The Werkleitz biennial, e.g., took place in a rural setting in its first years (see website). The *Werkleitz Biennial* was held in Tornitz/Werkleitz near Magdeburg (Sachsen-Anhalt), Germany.

6 The British pavilion, e.g., is curated by the British Council (Thornton, 2008), the Austrian by a curator (team), and the German by a commissioner. See also the relevant websites.

7 See Öğüt's webpage www.ahmetogut.com

8 See also the video of Ragnar Kjartansson on YouTube (Vernissage TV) and at www.cia.is/venice.

9 I am grateful to Ariane Müller for this information.

10 In what ways taxpayers' money must be justified to the public in different nations and cities cannot be dealt with here.

11 Other contributors to the *Open* 2009 biennial issue are M. Hardt, B. Holmes, C. Mouffe and C. Esche.

12 Nation-states' financial conduct regarding support for contemporary arts, and which other demands for these must compete with, is another interesting realm for research.

13 London and New York are, together with Tokyo, the *Global Cities*, as Saskia Sassen analyzed in her seminal work (2001). In this metropolis, the control of the "global assembly line" is established and maintained.

14 Catal Hüyük is especially interesting, as "the earliest known urban representations of humans and animals" in "powerful and original artistic forms" were excavated from the densely built "rectangular buildings of sun dried brick, rising up the slope in serried rows, with entry only through apertures in their flat beam and rush roofs." (Southall, 2000, starting from p. 25). See also the publications of archaeologist James Mellaart, 1967).

15 E.g., Irrigation; or a technological progress in energy use.

16 While national background might decrease in importance in artistic circles, the citizenship one holds determines if one can move globally or not, thus determining to some extent the options for participation in the international arts circuit.

Marina Gržinić
DECOLONIALITY OF TIME AND SPACE

When I was asked to talk about time and space as artistic media in the 1960s and 1970s, this meant to talk about performance art from that period. The performances from that period were those where time and space (mostly in relation to or with the help of video recordings) were used as a material for construction of Western subjectivity. But I am interested in thinking about performance through its reenactment, which we can see everywhere around us these days. A major trend nowadays by artists is to repeat their own performances from the past, or to reenact some other performances from the past as a core of their art works, or to engage in a performative repetition of paradigmatic terms. The latter is best illustrated with the reusing of the word “former” from former Eastern Europe (that describes a precise geopolitical condition) for an empty performative but fully ideological move of de-re-framing of what is functioning today powerfully as Western Europe. The latter wants us to think that is “reborn” presently as *former Western Europe*. But more about this in the final part of the text.

Nevertheless, at the center of all these cases, from art works to discourses, remains the logic of repetition, being as well the logic of the functioning of global capitalism. As already developed in my previous texts for *Reartikulacija*, Santiago López Petit claims in his book *Global Mobilization: Brief Treatise for Attacking Reality* (2009), that global capitalism is an event and not a process, as global capitalism is nothing else but the repetition of one single event, which is the unrestraintment of capital (in Spanish *des(z)bec(ka)amiento*), which can be more colloquially grasped as the “unrestraining” or “unleashing” of capital. Different than previous historical forms of capitalism, global capitalism requires two repetitions working at once. These two repetitions are the founding repetition and the de-foundational repetition. They both create a rather paradoxical time and space, an *entanglement* of time and space, a term also used by Achille Mbembe when writing about the postcolony – on Africa – in 2001, stating that power and capital are acquiring a new dimension, that of an *entanglement*. So what is this all about? On the one side, with the founding repetition, the system of hierarchy is being constantly reestablished, leading to a constant reconstruction of a center and of a periphery; and on the other side, the de-foundational repetition presents itself as the erosion of hierarchies, producing dispersion, multiplicity and multi-reality.

In the 1960s and 1970s, unlike today, we only had the repetition of the center and the periphery. This is why instead of the global world, we would talk about the cold world – whoops, Cold War – functioning with the dividing of the world into two. But today is about two repetitions, repeated at any moment and in any place, that entangle the world. This entanglement is not a plural space of the social, political and economical, as often stated. On the contrary, it is a situation that does not allow for any kind of division. Entanglement means owning, and not unifying. In the end, it is a situation of co-propriety of power and capital. This is why, when somebody from let’s say Ukraine or Moldavia (I cannot say Slovenia, as we are the model of servitude to global capitalism), talks about a center and periphery, the well-educated Westerners laugh about what they term “the old division,” as what they see (as the French would say) is “multiplicité, multi-réalité...” This was precisely the narration of Sarkozy that stated in his infamous Dakar speech, when visiting Senegal in 2007, “Oh, you Africans, you talk about colonialism, but it was not so horrible, and today you have all these opportunities...” As argued by Mbembe, it was unthinkable that this clown, the product of the horrendous West European, French colonialism, could come to Africa today and claim that Africans have to stop living in the past, and accept the “benefits” of colonialism.

But from time to time, amidst this multiplicity and multi-reality, the police come, as they did in Greece when the students protested, and, without any “openness” towards the multiplicity of the students’ multi-reality, imprisoned hundreds of them at the university campus, or in France, in the meantime, when hundreds of Roma families were sent back to the periphery of the European Union, to Romania, and look – we could see the foundational repetition working quite mercilessly, and even more being backed up by, yes, hundreds of the EU laws that from Brussels “democratically” advise the EU member states. In case of France the EU “protested,” but the point is that precisely out of the EU’s multiplicity of hegemonic directions, that support and reinforce the EU institutional racism, was France able to deport hundreds of Roma families to the, as it is termed “non-existent,” periphery of EU.

To understand the difference of the logic of the repetition in contemporary art and culture in the 1970s, and today, when in global capitalism the two repetitions repeat at once, I will make a detour to contemporary performative arts. The 1970s are important as they are seen as a line of division between two forms of labor, that of Fordism and that of post-Fordism, which are also two periods in capitalism that mark the radical change in the way in which the processes of exploitation are conducted and the possibilities of resistance conceived. Post-Fordist mobility and precarity presently redefine migration processes, hiding the internal logic of global capitalism that has a tendency to reestablish slavery as the mode of labour in order to make more profit (graspable in the recent months, with the EU imposing the lifelong working period until death, so to speak, and with the EU policy “proposing” pensions below the guaranteed minimum for life, etc.).

At this point, our main thesis is that in the performance art from the 1970s, which is presented as an antithesis to contemporary reenactments, that is, as something original, is, in fact, already at work a repetition, precisely the foundational one, the one that repeats the center and periphery, and the self-sufficiency of the Western Institution of Art. This is a provocative statement as the Western performance art from the 1970s was always seen as something “non-mediated” and therefore an “original,” being on the other side of today’s reenactments.

The first performance I want to analyze is from 2009, has a title “*Movement.Privatized*” and was conceived and realized by Ana Hoffner, Austrian performer of the new generation. It starts with the reenactment of a video performance by the American artist Bruce Nauman from 1967–1968 entitled “Walking in an exaggerated manner in the perimeters of a square.” (Presented in *Reartikulacija*, No. 9, 2009). Hoffner, while repeating it, differently from Nauman, explains it; the analysis she points out while reenacting Nauman’s work is her work. I will expose some of the points brought up by Hoffner. I quote: “Nauman’s movement, in the privacy of his studio, exploring the relationship between the body and the space, was recorded by a camera, just like mine” – Hoffner states in her performance – “in order to be accessible to the audience. His walk is exaggerated – it is excessive, elegant, and perhaps even existential. Like many artists from that period, Nauman shows art as a process, as an activity, as work. This work, however, is not just a representation of the so-called reality. Art is something that is going on. Bruce Nauman’s walk within the perimeters of the square can be art as well. The artist walks in his studio, like a master in his house, a citizen in his country.”

Nauman is, therefore, I would say, as pointed out by Hoffner’s interpretation, completely self-sufficient just as is the art system that supported him, there was no evidence of the world surrounding Nauman in his performance from the 1970s. Hoffner stated that the square has to be specifically emphasized as a symbol of abstraction and erasure in modernity. She explains that the square not only forms a part of an art work, but it also marks the mode of functioning of capitalism, and it is maintained through its continuous proclamation of itself as the centre that absorbs all peripheries. It functions, I would argue, repeating the center of Western capitalism as being completely self-sufficient to itself. The “Other” in this situation is a total periphery, a desert, a nonexistent entity.

The second reference comes from another reenactment by Ana Hoffner, performed in 2010, entitled “I’m Too Sad to Tell You, Bosnian Girl.” Hoffner’s performance begins with her crying and, as she states, from that moment on, she records her live performance. Hoffner’s crying repeats the performance by Bas Jan Ader, a Dutch video artist, who cried for the camera, too, and filmed his tears in 1971, entitling his work “I’m Too Sad to Tell You.” You can find, as with Nauman, the original online on *YouTube*. If you want to get the whole performance “I’m Too Sad to Tell You, Bosnian Girl” by Ana Hoffner, you will have to invite her and pay her!

Hoffner explains: “Bas Jan Ader is so sad he can’t even say why, there are no words that can describe his sadness, and therefore, there should be no further explanation. Instead, the emotions themselves hold the validity. Their form becomes the content of an artistic work. ‘I’m Too Sad to Tell You’ – the title suggests that the reason for Bas Jan Ader’s tears is secondary, he hammers at the intensity of emotions, at their justification as emotions, independent of the context of their emergence.”

If Jan Bas Ader was crying because of the bloody colonial past of the Netherlands, of its history of colonizing other territories, enslaving, mutilating, killing others – this we cannot know. However, Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee, in his essay entitled “Live and Let Die: Colonial Sovereignities and the Death Worlds of Necrocapitalism” (*Reartikulacija*, No. 3, 2008), explains this accurately. He talks about the Dutch East Indies Company practices of conquering markets, eliminating competition, securing cheap sources of raw material supply, building strategic alliances, etc.

But let’s be clear, it is not a secret that no one was /is interested in the reasons, since the crying is sufficient; the sorrow of the Western artist, this is enough, no matter why.

What I want to say is that, for Bas Jan Ader, the Other, the remainder, the rest of the Dutch social bond, in the 1970s, does not need any historical explanation. As commented by Hoffner, “Bas Jan Ader puts the observation of himself into the contents of an artistic work.” In his work, in the 1970s, the Other, the remainder, the former colonized, like the migrant today, is just an insignificant product, since the whole structure, the social link, the time and space, they all serve the re/production of the Western subject, which is what is put at its center. The remainder does not count. The remainder can thus also be read as the work that seems to be wasted and that nobody knows what to do with except for, maybe, as stated by Alenka Zupančič, when there is an attempt to regulate it through the science of ethics.

For us, on the contrary, the way in which the remainder, “the thing,” “the object,” the Other, will be articulated is of vital importance, as this articulation opens the question of the place of art in politics. This is why the title of Hoffner’s performance has the addendum “Bosnian girl” – it says: I’m too sad to tell you, Bosnian Girl! That gives us a precise point of the possible radical political rearticulation of time and space of contemporary Dutch society, and I will say of the new Europe as well, as includes in its reenactment the traumatic remainder of contemporary Europe, – the Srebrenica genocide in 1995, and the war in BiH.

If we return to Bas Jan Ader, what a waste of tears for “the loss” that is only for himself, as we have no clue why he was crying, though from this waste, the institution of art and the society makes a surplus enjoyment, a profit for itself. In Bas Jan Ader’s case, we have the knowledge that “does not know itself” to such an extent that it can actually be prescribed in the manual for contemporary reenactments. This is why Lacan, in his seminar from 1969-70, in the book XVII, *On the other side of psychoanalysis*, comes out with a rather surprising claim (as emphasized by Zupančič) “that what is being stolen from the slave (and appropriated by the master) is not the slave’s work, but his knowledge.”

That is why the content of the 1970s’ western performances is seen as an “original,” while what is in fact being repeated under this “originality” is the western art autonomy (not being capable to think of anything else than of its empty institutional autonomy as its key ideology), reproducing as well the “simple” logic of the Cold War division between the West, as the center, and everything else, as its non-existent periphery.

Therefore, the two major points are: in the performances by Western artists of the 1970s, contrary to common thinking that we have to do with an original art work, already a singular repetition is at stake, the foundational repetition that left the content so to speak “untouched,” as what is repeated is the Western art’s ideology of its “autonomy”; in the 2000s, the reenactment repeats again the foundational repetition of the center and of the periphery, but it is now hidden beneath its form. This form is today only an aesthetical style, to such an extent that is more and more prescribed in manuals for contemporary reenactments of past performances. What we get today is not just an upside (turned) down (the supposedly “original” performance content being reenacted as an empty stylish form), but what we get is the contemporary performative reenacted Western ideology (of autonomy of art) made again so to say “unconscious,” presented now in the form of a game or joke to which is given a life of its own.

How does this reenactment work in the context of the so-called relation in between East and West of Europe? Former Eastern Europe and present Western Europe are no longer in opposition today, but in relation of repetition. An excellent case of such a repetition is the project *Former West* that was started in The Netherlands as an International Research, Publishing and Exhibition Project, for the period 2009–2012, curated by Charles Esche, Maria Hlavajova and Kathrin Rhomberg (http://www.formerwest.org).

Former West is not at all a joke, although it could be seen as such, but is a perfect logic of repetition, as the key logic of the global capitalism of today. What the project does? It claims today a perverse demand of equal redistribution of “responsibility” and “positions” between the East and West of Europe. That is, it is answering as well specifically to the demand urgently imposed by Germany after the fall of the Berlin wall claiming that East Germany and West Germany are to become “equally” outdated. This is of course abundantly financially supported by new European cultural financial institutions.

In the case of Eastern Europe, the former means that the processes of evacuation, abstraction, expropriation imposed by the West are actually “over”; as it was proclaimed by Germany in 2009, celebrating its 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall with the slogan: “Come, come in the country without borders” (and I will say without memory as well). But in the case of the “former” (as it should be at least written) Western Europe it implies a purely performative, empty, speculative gesture. While the East is excluded more and more from the materiality of its history, knowledge, memory, etc., the West is just performing it. It plays with a speculative format of itself; it wants us to think that its roots of power and capital are fictional! But this is not a strange move today, as it comes in a time when we talk about financialization; the word *former* in front of West presents a speculative matrix that gives the West the possibility to not be conscious of its own historical and present hegemonic power – and therefore not responsible for it. This speculative character of the *former Western Europe* resembles with perfect accuracy the speculative character of financial capitalism at the present, as well as its crisis. Be sure that in the future we can expect projects, symposia and statements in which the imperial colonizing forces, Britain, France, Netherlands, etc., will try to prove how they were also colonized in the past, and that what is happening to them in the present is the result of some strange forces having nothing to do with the internal logic of capitalism itself that has two drives only, making profit at any cost and privatization.

All these projects imply that it is possible today, as we are all in the same “merde,” or simply put crisis shit (however, what is forgotten is that this was produced by the First Capitalist World), to talk about “former” Western Europe in the same way as we talked about the former Eastern Europe in the last 20 years. *Former West* is presented as an unquestionable fact, not even as a thesis, as the *former West* does not imply not even quotation marks.

Former Eastern Europe is not an adjective, but a placeholder in the time that is accelerated to such a degree that the politics of memory presents itself as a memory of what was once political. What was once political is transformed through the performative repetition into pure a ideological knowledge, but with a proviso saying that therefore we should not be preoccupied with it, as it’s all just a pure process of performativity anyway. With the performative repetition, the processes of voiding, emptying, extracting, eschewing are going on. The *former Western Europe* makes imaginary what has already been identified as material in the former Eastern Europe, it transforms the materiality of past knowledge, of histories and strategies into imaginary levels. To put it differently, what was important at the level of content (the materiality of a certain history) is now made simply obsolete, ridiculous. Or, the now reborn *former West*, the old colonial power, wants to convince us that it is capable for a process of decolonization, but, as stated by Achille Mbembe, without self-decolonizing itself. Similarly to financialization this new decolonization is a “fictive decolonization.” As Mbembe explains “fictive” decolonization is decolonization without democratization, or, as what we see in the European Union “fictive” decolonization is decolonization without contesting its structural racism. The structures of exploitation, inequality and racism stay in such a way untouched in the EU, more accurately they are reinforced; the consequences are disastrous.

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Sandi Abram
THE ZENITH OF KNOWLEDGE-FEUDALISM
THROUGH CREATIVITY: ON PROPERTY,
CYBERSPACE AND ART

By the time the clock had struck the mid-20th century, there had already been a gradual and irreversible string pulling at and reinforcing its stroke in the production of goods. To simplify, the majority of fabrication in real socialism was (pre)occupied with the production of material goods, whereas certain occurrences altered the course of the river as in the era of neoliberal capitalism. Indicatively enough, the cognitive processes gained more and more merit, while still being confined in the undertones of the factory. Consequently, as the duo Negri/Hardt and Berardi taught us, the proletariat (manual labour) shifted to the cognitariat (immaterial labour); in other words, white collars substituted the blue ones until the final renunciation of collars altogether – thus, as we shall very clearly see, “non-collars.” Invisible suffocation incited taming liberal ideas to be sought in the public and other spheres, while simultaneously dictating its profitable dogmas (as if they were held leashed). Benevolently masking itself under the coat of profitability, profit-maximization, consumerism and competition, a new name has been launched: creativity. Slowly, and as well simultaneously, another space has been generated anew – cyberspace, or the World Wide Web, in which appropriation is plagiarized accordingly to the new context. Juggling with the question of creativity nowadays seems to be more than just a mere indifferent activity, but rather a moment that again corresponds to the omnipresent neoliberal capitalistic machinery and its topsy-turvy political boundaries. To take look at “creativity” from the hegemonic position of political and economic, and yes, from cultural and academic establishments, too, we should rather ask ourselves, what the potential of this concept really is. For creativity was driven offshore from its primordial essence, where, in a *sensu strictu*, it was now seen as a trigger for a transformation of the existent social order; as a *creative liberatory activity*, as suggested by Deleuze and Guattari.

To give you an example of a fresh neologism that oozes through the upper layers, adopting the steam of creativity, we see that the newpeak has a mouth full of “*creative*” directors, “*creative*” managers and “*creative*” workers merged into a “*creative*” class,¹ which, henceforth, compiles a “*creative*” economy,² consequently founding a “*creative*” city and “*creative*” infrastructure.³ As a pinch, the EU declared 2009 as being the “European Year of Creativity and Innovation,” and on the official webpage, the inauguration reads “Imagine. Create. Innovate”. Hence, that there is something rotten with creativeness becomes more and more evident. As prosperity is seen in indicators of economic growth that are consequently derived out from “creativity” understood strictly in financial terms that are simultaneously giving meaning and stroke to it by opening up a trilogy – that departs from the notion of property, continues in the field of education and ends up in cyberspace – we can see clearly the centripetal tendencies with which creativity is fed. It is not even necessary to look far away to see the consequences.

A textbook example of how to restrain the political amplitude using the terminology of creativity (and inherently art plus architecture combined with the obvious notion of property) is the Rog factory in Ljubljana, Slovenia. The Rog factory operated until 1991, then stayed closed and abandoned until 2006, when an informal group named TEMP reclaimed (and occupied as well) the factory space for temporary use. The factory is located centrally, in downtown Ljubljana. From 2010 onwards, in regard to Rog, the re-appropriation of the commons was claimed and the space presents a cultural and social centre that gives shelter to many activist realities; among others, to the Invisible Workers of the World (IWW), student initiatives, a movement of asylum seekers “World for everyone,” as well as for a broad range of artists.

In 2006, after 15 long years of stagnation, Rog – the Fordist Frankenstein – was brought back to life, and has been kicking with new impulses ever since. The resurrection has since been accompanied by the municipality’s administration structure (in Slovenian language known as MOL) trying to discourage realities and subjectivities in the Rog centre. Evidently, and symptomatically skyward, MOL’s endeavor to castrate Rog has been wrapped inside a benevolent cellophane where, in reality, through a *private-public* (!) collaboration, first, the current buildings are to be leveled to the ground, and second, on the cleaned up ruins, a *Center of Modern Art* (!) is to be erected on top.

To complement this grotesque picture, the previous 7,000 square meters are to be split – according to the “*black print*” – into *private* (80.69%) and *public* (19.31%) ownership, whereby the *private* “content” will comprise a hotel, apartments and commercial branches, while the *public* centers are to be exclusively reserved for *creative industries* (!), visual arts, exhibition surfaces and garages.

Let me now problematize all the exclamation points and accentuations.

Firstly, the dimensions do not just open questions regarding gentrification processes (a juxtaposition of “illegal” overnighters in an “illegal” squat against a “legal” apartment owner/hotel guest), but about an even more intertwined collaboration, labeled as gentrification via art, or more precisely, via “creativity.” Those sectors co-opted in the connotation of culture are unfolding themselves, as we are able to detect in Rog’s case. Secondly, while the resonances of *private-public* collaboration are still echoing, the political tides cannot be overseen in the debate over property. Despite a perpetual division line being presumed that is equivalent to the question “private versus public”, we nevertheless think that what we have here is primarily a melting together of both (“private with public”

and “public with private”) that shapes its dialectical reconfiguration into a phantom-like figure. In other words, the everyday life parcelization into two categories (private and public) seems only to be valid to a certain magnitude. Instead, I can speak of, say, the “*intraterrestriality*” affixed in the topology of urbanscapes (its further positioning within several “*diapazones*” will be found later on). The co-opted space (I would suggest speaking rather of a liberated than of an “occupied” space) resigns from the ontology of (private) property, evoking a gap – a yawn, fold or crack in the terrain; these *gray zones* (in our case, the Rog factory) are thus “*intraterrestrial*” interventions *par excellence*. Moreover, to borrow Arendt’s thought, the privatization of the public (and I would add, the commons) is intimately connected to the privatization of the political. Without reinventing the wheel, I will lean instead on Gregorčič’s thoughts, which resume the exact *raison d’être* of what is presented above, saying, “[t]herefore new communities that swarm in Rog, are not dangerous for MOL because of the revitalization of fifteen-year-old abandoned spaces, but because of the swarming of new and different forms of social activities, connections and collaboration.”⁴ In sum, if I stir the components presented so far, we are able to track down an explosive and rolling conglomeration: creativity has become not the Deleuzian becoming, but an ideological superstructure of labour and therefore exploitation. “The higher the buildings, the lower the morals” was once a shrill spit out in the country of raising Money.

Secondly, such (occupied-liberated) terrains and “in-your-face” political projects are compounding at least two other instances that I will give space to. Liberation from the autocratic chain, its possibility and its magnitude, was seen recently – again, not so far away from Rog. To magnify just a triad, hovering between material and immaterial production: the workers of Prenova, Prevent and Gorenje, three companies from Slovenia, the University of Vienna’s occupation and their comrades in Zagreb, Croatia (as well as similar cases worldwide), all together rearticulated a momentum that stopped the quotidian machinery, freezing subjugation with un-free-zing direct-democratic principles, autonomy and with (the tendency of) claiming back *life* as whole. Contemplations over the New School occupation-liberation noted that “[o]ccupation is the seizure and transformation of space. Whether as the takeover of a building, roadway or vacant lot, it manifests itself as an interruption, as the subversion of capitalist normality.”⁵ Thereafter, in the rearview mirror of Time, economic turbulences brought up alluviums previously hardly seen, or at least submitted to a neglected amnesty: sporadic and spontaneous reluctant moments against subjection of all colors and shapes – from self-organized strikes without parasitic syndicates (including bosses’ “kidnappings,” well, their detainment), across the necessary reclamation of public space, to the revival of autonomous students struggles. How then to attach the space/time component of such vibrations to the evasion from anchored mental frames? Evidently enough, the neologism “knowledge factories” (a lengthening of *factories* as such) is more than indicative here; just add spices of the Bologna University reform – valorization through credit (!) points (ECTS), Darwinist competition, shortening of study years, constitution of an imagined European student community, budget cuts, fragmentation of classes, usability of the learned, constant (re)evaluations – and you will get a perfect picture of the logic complementary to that of the neoliberal market that is intoxicating education (and, finally, creativity as the driver and a prerequisite of the latter); the sight at universities becomes the best example of where we are turning blind(folded).

Bernardi and Ghelfi⁶ concisely stated, “knowledge has become a central commodity of production and the most important source of contemporary capitalistic valorization.” These processes have been observable in circumstances of the facultative (under)ground, seeing that occupations-liberations have brought up an archetype of temporary inclination yet to be constituted in sense of place (permanent residence) and time (a longitudinal movement). A conformation of the transition from the Fordist factory model to a post-Fordist knowledge factory model and the drift backwards can be easily found. Platitudes and nebulous promises that the Slovenian Council for Science and Technology proposed as a “new deal” are cynical enough. The “new economy” would rise in a Slovenian Silicon Valley driven by biotechnology and the *Internet*.

Thirdly, if I dare to take another completely different matrix introduced partly with the example above, compounded out of creativity, knowledge, squatting, place/space and feudalistic tendencies, then the collision with cyberspace (so, a “new” terrain) is indeed inevitable, since it allows looking at the saturation of these convergences. I tend to illustrate this by bringing back to life the case in the 1990s of net.art, which in its beginnings had at its disposal all the potential of the cyberspace, continuing with more sophisticated aesthetical transformations of the binary code in the second millennia.

Alongside the emergence of Internet, a “new” type of art was “born,” addressed simply under the name net.art (or www art, internet art, web art, net art). Authors and theoreticians suggested that the main constitutive elements of net.art would be accessibility, inter-textuality, interactivity, multimediacy, relativization of the dichotomy author-original, hyperlinks, networking, etc.⁷ On the other hand, net.art initially shook off the baggage that (neo)avant-gardes had dragged through history, or even better, it did not have the liability of commodity-aesthetical incorporations. Wherefrom (neo) avant-gardes skated on thin ice, either because of representation as such or because of penetration into representational spaces/places, these artistic movements were being consequently drowned in the art-cold water. Referring to Marco Deseriis’s (a.k.a. snafu) lecture, in the net.art beginnings, its operators were not labeled as artists, since the primal material was code and code manipulation, therefore they dealt with aesthetics of the machinery, whereby the

4 Marta Gregorčič, “Rog – presenečanja iz katerih rojijo multitudine,” Časopis za kritiko znanosti, 34 (223), Ljubljana 2006, p. 10.
5 Jenny and Wayne, “SEVEN POINTS ON OCCUPATION,” in “The New School Occupation: perspectives on the takeover of a building or, why do student organizers bother to get out of bed in the morning?”, 2009, p. 22. <http://reoccupied.files.wordpress.com>
6 Claudia Bernardi and Andrea Ghelfi, “We Won’t Pay for Your Crisis, We Will Create Institutions of the Common!,” EduFactory webjournal, 0 issue, 2010, p. 108.
7 See, for example, Janez Strehovec, *Virtualni svetovi: K estetiki kibernetične umetnosti*, Ljubljana, 1994, and *Umetnost interneta: umetniško besedilo in besedilo v času medmrežja*, Ljubljana, 2003.

subject and the outcome was anonymous and dislocated. I would add that with(in) holistic aspects of visual, subversive and political self-sustainability on the Internet’s tabula rasa, they can be seen as thus being creative in the full sense of the word(s).

An important and rather discussible emphasis in brackets has been used above: net.art as “*new*” art. Beyond this camouflaged remark, a greater debate is hidden, questioning what is the *new* essence that could be found in net.art, or, generally speaking, what systems underlie the idea of art itself nowadays? This line of reasoning coincides with the idea of institutionalization, commercialization and, finally again, commodification of art; the Art world stands as a vampirical entity: absorbing fresh visual impulses into the authoritative art field, as Dickie, Danto, Groys and others would ponder. Such incorporation processes might indeed best be denounced as “ratification,” whereby not just cultural dispositives, but also the pleadings of others found in society or in the market ambushes, are elevating (un)materialized creative inputs, taking possession of mean(ings) and grounding them in reserved coordinates. Processes of which I am talking about include an entire spectrum, not solely of the symbolic or financial (ex)change, but moreover, they deal with the autocratic floating signifier, with the parasitism of which is provided within the horizon of the state and/or corporativism, and that accumulates finally in the neoliberal capitalistic doctrine. But let’s see how.

If, in the 1990s, the hype was dedicated to net.art, nowadays, parallels can be seen in the more refined visual emergence in virtual worlds.⁸ Among others, the name Second Life (SL)⁹ burns the eye. This three-dimensional virtual world accessible through the Internet (launched in 2003) simultaneously provides the most illustrative example where the tendency to adopt *arts* in virtual worlds can be detected, as well as the agenda behind it.¹⁰ To magnify one romanticized avatar-artist (resident): Gazira Babeli embraces and tries to personalize a “homo virtualis”; she¹¹ virtually materialized in the spring of 2006, and shortly thereafter caught attention with her so-called “non authorized [sic!] performances.”¹² For instance, among her first *performances* was “Second Jesus”, whereupon she was contacted by Linden Labs, who thought she was trying to offend Christian beliefs. More attention-grabbing was the “Grey Goo” *performance*, which incorporated the idea of self-replicating objects. Another cross-breed between Baudrillard’s simulacra and Benjamin’s reproducibility was *personified* by the intervention “Buy Gaz 4 One Linden Dollar,” where the entire appearance was sold for couple of cents.

If I close my eyes to the fact that Gazira (and, consequently, SL) might somehow be a present-day psychosis, the simultaneous presentation of Gazira as “subverting traditional conceptions regarding place, time, body, identity and behavior that we are acquiring from everyday life,”¹³ stands out too boldly to ignore. Although it shall be acknowledged the intention of confronting conformist art customs, the phenomenon of Gazira is still watered down when co-opted and contextualized. What do I mean by that? To awake the term *artivism*, where the basic motive is not to create an aesthetic, but rather a political effect. “[A]n activist is not an artist, but he/she is still not without a ‘knack for art;’ an activist is an artist as much as is inevitable, no more and no less; the artisanship is a side effect of a political act.”¹⁴ Having said that, are *performances* of an anonymous avatar *within* SL consequently subversive, political or activist? The last emphasis is crucial; could a critical (artistic?) position be achieved by acting in a hermetic and privately owned space? In addition, could it be subversive if it turns a spectator into a *performer* (or even a *spectacle*)? The answer is simple: no. Even though unconventional statements may be recognized through Gazira’s actions, the issue, however, remains the same: *performances* seem to be a supplementary, so to speak, “artification”: an aesthetical (and ideological) incorporation in the (art) machinery (and, further, in the logic of the Real) where its Fata Morganic “radicalism” evaporates along with them. Therefore, one cannot ignore the SL totality – the narration of a phenomenological indisputable “pure” virtual reality. It is a fact that SL is privately owned; inherently, consumption between residents is desired and regulation then becomes ordinary. In other words, a *resident* is, in fact, a *volunteer* producing contents and mean(ing)s (or surplus values) in SL and pushing even further the concentric of this cyber-land. The relation resident-art-creativity, as we see above, twists with accumulation/benefit – not of everyone in SL¹⁵ – but of Linden Labs especially (as the owner), which makes a profit from it. The misleading of the Internet’s liberatorial potential cannot be more ironic than when we, in 2010, remember Bay’s words from 1985: “The banalization of TV, the yuppification of computers & the militarization of space suggest that these technologies in themselves provide no determined guarantee of their liberatory use.”¹⁶

Again, I am dealing here with the platform’s terms, code and parameters, which, originating far away from the unbound individual imaginary, are rather patronizing, conformist, regulated and authorized. Drahos and Braithwaite,¹⁷ analyzing the drift of the liberational technological pathos, speak of “informational feudalism.” If we add to this the exemplary slogans on SL’s official webpage (causing hiccups, if we remember the EU diction), “*Second Life is a*

8 See Tom Boellstorff, *Coming of Age in Second Life: An Anthropologist Explores the Virtually Human*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008, for a debate over the terminological accuracy of using “virtual worlds.”

9 SL, through a free client program, enables its users, called Residents, to interact with each other through avatars, who can explore, socialize, participate in individual and group activities, and create and trade virtual property and services with one another, or travel throughout the SL. Its Terms of Service ensure that users retain copyright for any content they create, and the server and client provide simple digital rights management functions. Extract from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Life.

10 In this consideration, Steinbeck (2009), for instance, listed 652 Second Life “art galleries” in Second Life while this paper was being composed.

11 At least that is the officially “identified” *gender*. I do not exclude the assumption that there might be even several persons *controlling* Gaz’s avatar.

12 See <http://gazirababeli.com/GAZ.php>

13 The text was written on the leaflet from the performance *Acting as Aliens* in Gallery Kapelica, Ljubljana on November 3, 2009.

14 Aldo Milohnić, “Artivism,” *Maska*, 90-91, Ljubljana 2005, p. 12.

15 A generalization might be present: to a resident who invented something and then sells his/her creations, this remark is not fully suitable.

16 Hakim Bey aka Peter Lamborn Wilson, “T.A.Z.: The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism,” 1985. <http://theanarchistlibrary.org/taz-temporary-autonomous-zone-ontological-anarchy-poetic-terrorism>.

17 Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, *Information Feudalism. Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?*, Earthscan, London, 2002.

playground for your imagination. Design, build, code, perform and collaborate. Expand the boundaries of your creativity,” then I suggest rather that we expand the field; indeed, as we are subjected to the lobotomization wherein “knowledge society” should be the frenetic imperative and drive of each and every one of us, then it is more appropriate to speak of “knowledge-feudalism.” Among the hallmarks of cognition, as we have already clearly seen, again bursting out is the undisputed category of creativity, even through operating with a double combination; the new (old?) terrain and immaterial production (performance?) flows into a pervasive “creative”; a *voluntary* “creative” class that is *voluntarily* producing profit and rent in a semi-illusionary space, in a latent matrix that is benevolently dominant – therefore, it is possible to say that SL is, in fact, the largest user-generated virtual economy in the world.¹⁸ Berardi¹⁹ is right in arguing that the cognitariat, forming a non-existing virtual class, is indeed explaining the post-Fordist (net)economy, while I tried to put forward very clearly that the (en)throne(ment) in the era of knowledge-feudalism is for the time being reserved for Creativity.

18 According to Linden Labs, residents in 2009 spend more than 481 million hours in Second Life (a 21% growth over 2008) while user-to-user transactions totaled US\$567 million (a growth of 65% over 2008). <http://blogs.secondlife.com/community/features/blog/2010/01/19/2009-end-of-year-second-life-economy-wrap-up-including-q4-economy-in-detail>
19 Franco »Bifo« Berardi, “Cognitariat and Semiokapital,” interview by Matt Fuller & snafu@kyuzz.org, 2001. http://subsol.c3.hu/subsol_2/contributors0/bifotext.html.

DE-COLONIALITY

DECOLONIAL THINKING AND DOING IN THE ANDES: A CONVERSATION BY WALTER MIGNOLO WITH CATHERINE WALSH
A PROPOS OF HER BOOK INTERCULTURALIDAD, ESTADO, SOCIEDAD. LUCHAS (DE)COLONIALES DE NUESTRA EPOCA/ Interculturalism, State, Society. (De)Colonial Struggles of Our Times¹

INTRODUCTION

Catherine Walsh, born and educated in the U.S. and residing in Quito since 1995, is one of the key thinkers of the project modernity/(de)coloniality. Her contribution is unique in many respects. As a U.S. citizen who decided to migrate to the South and engage as she does in epistemic, political and ethical struggles in the Andes, Walsh's thinking and doing transcend the limitations, as well as the short-sighted critics, of **identity politics**. What Walsh does instead is to engage in **identity in politics**. Identity in politics closes the possibilities of dialogue in defense of a national or ethnic identity. Identity politics is shared by both the hegemonic nation-state as well as by the “minorities” within a nation-state. Both sides of the coin are the legacies of Western modernity, from the earlier Christian identity politics to the secular identity politics of the modern nation-states (e.g., France, England, Italy, Germany). The formation of modern/colonial nation states in 19th century South and Central America mainly followed the European model of the nation-state based on identity politics (e.g., national identity by birth and by citizenship). The struggle toward future plurinational states in the Andes, to which Walsh has devoted a lot of attention, is a consequence of the crisis of identity politics. Identity in politics assumes the historicity of identities, but uncoupled from the state. Thus, the concepts of interculturality and plurinationality, that come from Indigenous thinking and doing, open up identity politics toward identity in politics.

Catherine Walsh's work in Ecuador and in the Andes (Bolivia and Colombia, mainly) – as an academic and public intellectual – has been outstanding over the years. She has worked and continues to work with Indigenous and African descendent communities and organizations, not as an anthropologist or “expert,” but as an ally. This has included collaborations with the Intercultural University Amawtay Wasi, support of community-based efforts in Afro-centered education, recent collaborative work with African descendent women's and youth organizations in the project “Mirada Negra” (Black Gaze), and the development of a national report for the state institution CODAE (the Council of Afro-Ecuadorian Development) on reparations and affirmative action. She also has a number of shared endeavors with the Afro-Ecuadorian historian, thinker, leader and activist Juan Garcia, known as the “grandfather of the black movement” and the “worker of the process.” With Garcia, a key figure in epistemic and political debates about territory, ancestry, rights and knowledge, Catherine has engaged in several publications, public presentations, and above all, the building of the Afro-Andean archive held at the Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar in Quito.

At the Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, where she is a senior professor in the department of Social and Global Studies, Catherine has created – with the support of its Rector, Dr. Enrique Ayala – a regional Andean PhD program in (Inter)Cultural Studies where the project modernity/(de)coloniality is the original Latin American orientation that supplants the common tendency, in Third World universities, of “importing” models of the social sciences and the humanities from Western Europe or the U.S. This program is the only one of its kind in Latin America.

The investigations that led to the publication of the book that prompted this interview form part of Catherine's support, dialogue and work with Ecuador's Constituent Assembly, particularly on issues related to Afro and Indigenous rights, interculturality and the plurinational state (issues that are extensively developed in her book). They are also reflective of dialogues with advisors and key actors in Bolivia's Constituent Assembly.

Although the content of Walsh's investigation and political-intellectual work is located particularly in the Andean region of South America, the logic of coloniality and process of decoloniality go beyond the continent and the region: they resonate in all local his-

Creativity out of the box

The shared feature of the decolonization of knowledge, where imaginary machines (cf. Shukaitis) (communally) weave together, rearticulate and make visible the neglected, consequently means stepping out of the shadow, out of the installed social, political and economical claustrophobia contained in private and (partly) public spaces (here, 9/11 is surely a milestone). Concerns regarding terrestrial nodes, privatization of education, domestication of cyberspace, problematization of the art world, precarity of work conditions and the commodification of the quotidian are to be juxtaposed indeed to petrified goings on, the ones reproducing conditions by their own measures and visions. The hypochondria of human rights (cf. Močnik) and the reduction to the subject's mimic are perfectly installed into the genealogy of knowledge-feudalism, whereupon the noise caused masks alternative frames. Saying that, just stumbling across the approximately 15,000 empty apartments in Ljubljana and their vertiginous price per square meter, causes us to think outside the predisposed frames. To re-appropriate knowledge, creativity and spaces means (re)creating a parallel self-sufficient imaginary, acting in accordance to it, and having the option to contemplate over its surrounding circumstances.

To call a spade a spade: if immigrant workers in Slovenia are pushed into (neo)slavery (surrounded by all of its gruesome consequences) for “our” own “well-being,” building in -10 degree temperatures, while slogging through meter-thick snow, sports-entertainment-

tories on the planet that, at different moments over the past five hundred years, have had to endure the interference of Western European and U.S. local histories carrying their global designs. “The former Eastern Europe” is not an exception, as it faces its absorption by the magical transformation of “the former Western Europe” into the European Union.

MIGNOLO: Catherine, the strong arguments you put forward in the book are persuasive and at the same time provocative. Persuasion and provocation are the consequences, in my reading, of the combination of new and fresh information on the one hand and a novel conceptual apparatus that owes not much, if anything, to mainstream social sciences (since you deal with “estado y sociedad”), owes not much to cultural studies either (since you deal with “interculturalidad”), and owes little to Marxism (since you deal with “luchas”). At the same time, the book is the result of many years of research, thinking and doing (your activism in and with Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities). That is to say, you did not plan, say five or six years ago, to write this book and consequently began doing research toward it, but, on the contrary, the book came out at the junction of your research and activism, on the one hand, and the historical events unfolding in Bolivia and Ecuador in the past 3 to 5 years.

Would you like to comment on the processes that ended up in *Interculturalism, State, Society. (De)Colonial Struggles of Our Times (Interculturalidad, Estado, Sociedad. Luchas (de)coloniales de nuestra época)*?

WALSH: Your question points to what I understand as a central concern in intellectual-activist work: How and why do we do what we do, and what for? That is to say, what are the intentions and pretensions behind this work, how are we engaged and with whom, and with what responsibilities, purpose and motive. But also fundamental is the consideration of what we do with such work, how such work can end up not just in a written text, but also, and more importantly, contribute to the struggle and to a more reflective and informed praxis.

As you know, such questions and concerns have guided my work both previously in the United States and now in the last 15 years in Ecuador. The way I came to such work cannot be separated from my activist roots or the years of dialogue with Paulo Freire. Yet here in the America of the South, it finds reason in the relations of collaboration built over time with Indigenous and Afro-descendent movements, relations that came at the initiative of these movements and leaders. To research or study *about* these movements has never been my method, approach, desire or goal. And this is probably what characterizes my work and writings as distinctive. This latest book is reflective of this positioning.

Let me first contextualize a bit. In the spaces of dialogue and collaboration with indigenous and Afro movements, particularly in Ecuador and the Andean region, but also elsewhere, my interest has been on understanding and supporting political, social and epistemic struggles and projects, particularly those that push not only for community-based vindications but also – and many times from these claims – for a broader interculturalization and decolonization of institutions, structures (including knowledge) and society at large. In this sense, my intellectual concern has been with how these struggles, projects, practice and thought enable a deeper understanding of what the historic indigenous leader Luis Macas has called the “colonial tare” and, subsequently, of decolonial paths and possibilities. But such concern for me is not separate from engagement, agency and action; it is part and parcel of what I assume as my praxis. As such, in my teaching, writing, and in my work with movements, communities and organizations, my attention is toward facilitating, making visible and giving credence to such possibilities and paths. That is to say, it is to enable and take seriously the understandings, comprehensions, transgressions and disruptions made possible by a thinking *from* and *with* social struggles and actors.

So how does this connect to the processes that resulted in this book? For quite some time, I had been feeling the urge to write a text that brought together my reflections and work over a number of years related to “interculturality,” an urge brought about in large part by the petitions of various groups in the region for such a text. My idea initially was to write this book in order to then begin to move on in future work to other concerns of interest.

festival-commercial-business (ergo, “creative” in the full, twisted and dictated meaning of the word) complexes *a la* Sport Park Stožice in Ljubljana (182,000 square meters that integrates a football stadium and a multi-purpose sports hall with a big shopping centre, covered by the artificial landscape of a recreational park), we must not only rearticulate such regimes and their normalization, but also the pervasion of this logic into the quotidian normative – its capacity for internalization of neo-colonial norms of capitalism without sanctions.

An example of this situation is the non-provided health security for migrant seasonal workers in Slovenia. Because of this, an uninsured Macedonian migrant worker seeking urgent medical assistance was left dying on the steps of the Ljubljana central hospital facility for urgent cases. He did not receive any response whatsoever from the arrogant-ignorant medical staff (and, consequently, neither from the medical profession altogether) but was forced to leave the facility, which resulted in his death at its threshold. Ferid Saiti (and many others like him) died in agony. Yes, victims indeed have names and families. However shocking and illustrative such an ending is, it is at the same time a beginning for a demand to sharpen creativity and knowledge.

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Interculturality in Ecuador, as you well know, has a meaning quite different from that in operation in North America and Europe; in fact, it is this latter signification adopted by multilateral and transnational institutions that is increasingly becoming hegemonic in the South. But that is the subject of another conversation. What I want to point to here is interculturality as a political project of the movements. In the late 80s, the National Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador–CONAIE, named interculturality as an ideological principle in its political project. Such naming carried the definition of interculturality as a social and political process and project aimed at transforming social structures, institutions and relations, and of course such transformation has implied the constructing of a Plurinational State. This is the understanding of interculturality that has guided my work, one that conceives interculturality as fundamental to decolonial resurgence and struggle.

However, it was the urgencies of a rapidly changing political climate and the emergence of Constituent Assemblies both in Ecuador and Bolivia in 2007–2008 that had issues of interculturality and plurinationality at their base that made for a shift in my initial book venture. As movement leaders and activist intellectuals directly and indirectly engaged in the Assembly processes made clear to me, there was a need to deepen understandings related to the notions of a plurinational and intercultural State and to afford some points of comparison between the emergent processes in Ecuador and Bolivia within the broader frame of decolonization. The book then became part of a broader project to support and contribute to these processes and initiatives.

In fact, as I was writing the text, I was actively involved in Ecuador's Constituent Assembly. In addition to the invitation by the president of the Constituent Assembly to give a presentation to assembly members and their advisors about the significance of these terms and what they could afford for a refounding of State and society, I informally supported several assembly members, working most closely with the assembly woman representing the Afro-Ecuadorian movement. Being in touch on almost a daily basis with the debates related to interculturality, plurinationality and correlated concerns in Ecuador, and in frequent dialogue with folks engaged in the same processes in Bolivia, made me think, interrogate and write from a situated and involved position. While the book is not only about these debates and processes, the perspectives, analysis and considerations presented in the text are necessarily informed by this lived experience.

But there is also something more to add in answer to your question and that is with regards to the difference I intend to mark with the typical ways of understanding and doing “research.” In contrast to a book that presents the results of a research study – which of course presupposes distance, objectivity and neutrality – my book was conceived as a kind of pedagogical tool of analysis, debate, dialogue and reflection that intends to actively engage the reader. As I explain in the Introduction:

“An analysis and reflection that not only demonstrates the struggles entailed and on which the project of interculturality is constructed, but that also provokes social, political, ethical, and epistemic considerations regarding society, State, life, and even ourselves. An analysis and reflection with the vocation of intervention, with the desire to engender a thinking *with* distinct knowledges, beings, logics, cosmovisions, and forms of living. I refer here to the possibility to set in motion an inter-thinking and inter-relating that does not pretend to assume the perspective of the other, but instead permits difference to intervene within oneself, opening in this way new intercultural perspectives of living ‘with,’ of co-living or co-existence.”

As such, research for me is a pedagogical enterprise that is necessarily tied to praxis.

MIGNOLO: Thanks, Cathy. Your answer rehearses and at the same time enriches the arguments and it gives them a context in which to understand why you insist on the epistemic dimension, next to the ethical and the political. Let's bracket the last two for the moment, and come back to them later. While going through your arguments, and particularly when they engage the State, I was thinking that the State was monopolized by the social sciences, particularly sociology and political sciences. You have been trained in sociology, and therefore, in the frame of the social sciences. But you have delinked from the social sciences' normativity in a very creative

1 The book, written in Spanish, is divided into three parts and seven chapters. Published by Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar-Ediciones Abya-Yala, 2009.

way. Therefore, I surmise that when you engage the State you are also committing an act of epistemic disobedience. What I mean is that when you talk about activism in the context of your book, that activism shall not only be understood as engaging in debates and solutions set up by the epistemology of the social sciences. One example, your brilliant critique of the white-mestizos/as leftist intellectuals mapping a solution for Bolivia that preserves their comfortable epistemic belief in the principle of the social sciences, recognizing the “Indian nations” but dismissing the epistemic principles upon which they base their arguments and claims. It is clear that you are not only supporting the content of Indigenous arguments, but mainly you are supporting and engaging their own epistemology. Would you like to comment on the links between epistemic disobedience and scholarly activism?

WALSH: The social sciences have, since their beginnings in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Europe, served the interests and project of the State. Such complicity is evident in Latin America as well, despite critical tendencies – particularly in the 60s and 70s – that worked to question and transgress the hegemonic and imperial frame. As you suggest, my point of departure is not the social sciences nor is it the State per se. In fact, the State has never been my focal point of interest or concern; I have rather considered it a structure to work against.

While it is true that part of my academic formation was in sociology, it was by no means typical. In the 1970s, sociology was in fact a terrain of sociopolitical activism in the U.S. university in which I was enrolled, a university known for its radicalism with regard to the Vietnam war, the struggles of women and people of color, and for its strong Marxist tendencies and search for alternatives to the capitalist system. My study and formation was not just in the classroom, but in other circles where political and intellectual militancy were intertwined. Such experience taught me from the outset about the limitations of the epistemology of the social sciences and its frame for studying and interpreting the social world. In essence, it began to make evident what I now consider to be central: that is the radical difference between epistemology understood in a positivist sense as a closed system of knowledge and reason that interprets and gives meaning to the world (having us believe that we get to the world through knowledge), and epistemology understood from an indisciplined and decolonial stance. It is from this latter perspective that epistemology takes on another meaning: open, plural and grounded in the belief that from the world – and from the multiple logics, cosmologies and life systems therein present – we get to knowledge, to knowledges in their pluriversal forms.

My perspective or stance is obviously this latter one. As such, and returning to the subject of my book, the challenge I assume is to *think with* epistemological frames that do not originate in the State but in the struggles of ancestral peoples and movements, and that take visible form in their arguments, demands and claims. This is not to presume a cultural relativism or essentialism, nor is it to argue “purity” in terms of indigenous and Afro knowledges. Instead, it is to put in evidence other epistemological premises – premises “otherwise” – for (re)thinking such things as nature, justice, coexistence, authority and life. It is these premises that challenge the monocultural and uni-national structure of the State and its institutions, but also the epistemic frames for society and State historically put forth by white-mestizo intellectuals and elite, frames that, as you say, find their base in the social sciences. But such frames also resonate true in the nationalist-state projects – of the past and present – of history, art, literature and education. My intention then is not to assume an indigenous or Afro thought, nor is it to negate or deny other intellectual production. Rather it is, on the one hand, to make visible and evident the colonial complicities of “official” knowledge and epistemic agendas in constructing and securing the monocultural and uni-national State, its hegemonic structures and institutions. And, on the other hand, it is to make present the emergence in Ecuador and Bolivia of radically different frameworks that enable a rethinking and refounding of State and society for all, recognizing the intense conflicts that these frameworks engender.

Does such intention mark an epistemic disobedience and scholarly activism as you suggest? I guess I would have to say yes.

MIGNOLO: I would like to connect what you just said with the exploration, in your book but also in other places,² of the concepts of “development” and “sumak kawsay” in Kichwa (“sumaqa qamaña” in Aymara). Since you have addressed the issue and the reader can consult your arguments in Spanish, Portuguese and English, I would like to pursue one specific topic that seems to me central today not only in the Andes but in the world, and particularly in every country beyond the G7 where the notion of “development” applies. What I mean is that “development” doesn’t seem to be a problem for the U.S., Germany or Japan. These countries are assumed to be already “developed” and in charge of leading and showing the way to the rest of the world how to “develop.” Now, “sumak kawsay” (which is a concept of Indigenous epistemology and was included in the Constitution of Ecuador) is being enthusiastically endorsed (or appropriated) by the right and by the left. One can find today the expression “Sumak Kawsay” in the web page of the United Nations and also in a wealth of articles in which the expression is linked to “socialism.” It seems to me that it is becoming clear that beyond the liberal “common good” and the socialist “common,” now we have another option, that is neither a third way nor a universal substitution of the previous two (Western) concepts (the common good and the common), but something altogether different, which is “the communal” (as it was clearly described by Felix Patzi Paco). Patzi Paco explicitly argued for the communal as an alternative to the liberal system (the common good), but one can say that the communal cannot be subsumed under socialism either. We seem to be at the junction in which a seismic epistemic shift is taking place, an epistemic *Pachakuti*.³ This seismic epistemic shift is also taking place in between the Western concept of “Nature” and the

Andean concept of “Pachamama” or “Madre Tierra.” They cannot be mutually translated although they are “entangled,” as you said and as has been the case since 1500, between Western consolidation and expansion and the epistemologies “superseding” them.⁴

In sum, the epistemic shift is a shift in the geopolitics of knowing, understanding and reasoning. Since this conversation will be published first in *Reartikulacija* and the most immediate reader will be the reader of Eastern Europe (for whom notions such as “commons” and “communism” are in their immediate history), how would you explain the global dimension of what is going on in the Andes today? What I mean is that the communal is a regional concept (like the common good and the common), but it is also a global one as global as the common and the common good). Consequently, next to liberalism and socialism as two Western political philosophies and visions of the future, there is the communal, and the communal is the decolonial, which means that it is a political philosophy and vision of the future that cannot be subsumed either by liberalism or by socialism.

WALSH: Your question brings to the fore a series of issues and concerns that, in essence, reveal not only the operation of radically opposed logics and frameworks of civilization, but also, and more importantly, emergent efforts that seek articulations, interculturalizations and more plural modes and constructions of co-thinking, co-existence and co-living. The fact that these logics, frames and efforts are being made visible in the Andes does not limit them to this region; they can, as you say, also be understood from a global dimension.

The elements set forth in the new Ecuadorian Constitution serve as a clear example. This Charter is the first in the world to recognize nature – understood not as natural resources but more broadly as Pachamama, Mother Nature or Mother Earth – as the subject of legal rights, including the right to restoration or reparation. It is also the first to identify knowledge as plural, to include ancestral knowledges as also technological and scientific, and to make these knowledges a necessary and obligatory component in education. And it is the first to make “buen vivir” or “sumak kawsay” its transversal axis. In fact, there are more than 75 articles that directly take “buen vivir” as their focus, including in areas as diverse as water, food, culture, science, habitat and housing, health, education, work, legal rights, territory, economy, participation, and Latin American integration, among others.

As I have argued in my book and elsewhere, such incorporation cannot be understood as a sort of multicultural “add on.” Rather, it is indicative of an effort to “think with” the logics and civilizational frames of indigenous communities (and also, in a somewhat different way, of African descendent communities). It is the result of the years of struggle and mobilization of these movements, and most particularly of the force of the indigenous movement that, since 1990, has pushed forth shifts in the traditional homogeneous and monocultural view of the country and transgressed the hegemonic projects and paradigms of a *mestizo* nation.

In this sense, and while keeping and extending the collective rights established in the 1998 Charter, the new Constitution takes a much more radical step; it makes ancestral-cosmological logics and frames part of the fabric of the building a new intercultural and plurinational country for all. In essence, it affords a new conceptualization as public policy, an answer to the urgency of a radically different social contract, an alternative to – or maybe better said, a way away from – capitalism and the “culture of death” of its neoliberal project.

Here I see a clear connection to the “global dimension” that you mention above. That is to say, the issue and concern at the fore are not so much the recognition of “other” logics and frames and the support of their continuance for ancestral peoples, which could result in little more than parallel models of society, community, and State, with the ancestral still in a subordinate and marginal position. Rather, the advance and ongoing challenge that the Ecuadorian Charter affords is that it begins to *think and act with* these logics and forms of reason that give centrality to Mother Earth and to life, an important step not only for Ecuador, but for the planet. This seems particularly imperative in today’s world increasingly defined by capitalist crises, rampant xenophobia and racism, death and destruction.

However, the problem is when such logics, frames and designs become co-opted and diluted of their real and radical significance. Said different, the problem is when they are collapsed into new liberal, humanistic, and even socialist paradigms and frameworks, a kind of re-coloniality under the guise of humanism and of progressive and leftist politics.

Let me start with the issue and concept of development. As I have argued elsewhere, the last decade has seen a shift in Latin America in the notion of development from economic progress towards a more humanistic (and Western Eurocentric) view focused on the individual and the quality of life. Such notion – typically referred to as integral and sustainable human development – finds ground in four key criteria: liberty, autonomy, coexistence and social inclusion. The first two emphasize individual agency, will power and determination: the capacity of the individual to exercise control over his or her own life. The second two are complementary; they anchor individual welfare and assure conformity within a social system that increasingly works to control cultural diversity and make it functional to the system. Together, these criteria pretend to weave in Latin America a new sense of common welfare and common belonging.

Of course, we can ask what is the idea and meaning of “common” at work here. It is the uniting of free individuals within a model (of citizenry, community, country, nation, region) that surpasses ethnic collective identities and, most particularly, indigenous nationalisms. The common here purports to enable, as the International Development Bank–IDP and the United Nations Development

Project–UNDP argue, a more equitable, inclusionary, and cohesion-ary society, a society, of course, that remains under and within the dominion of liberalism as we know it today and the world market. But what is especially interesting –and in the context of your question and our conversation – is the present role of Europe and the European Union in promoting an idea and meaning of a common sentiment that is rooted within their (the European) model of social cohesion and development and aimed to make Europe (read: Western Europe) the most competitive and dynamic economy in the World.

Social cohesion has, in fact, been one of the key objectives and strategies in consolidating the European Union model. It is understood as the capacity of a society to secure the well-being of all of its members, minimize conflicts, disparities and differences, and avoid polarization. The policy and politics of social cohesion – a convergence of the social-democratic tradition with its emphasis on the State, politics and rights, and the social-Christian tradition focused on the family, civil society and community – have aimed to confront internal fragmentation within Europe and reestablish a common sentiment from which to build European integration. Social cohesion, in this sense, establishes a desirable horizon for the nations forming part of the European Union, a medium, as Eugenio Tíron points out, for harmonious, balanced and sustainable development where all citizens (supposedly) feel integrated within the social weave.⁵

While the efficacy of such strategy and model can clearly be questioned in terms of the inequities within the Union itself, its “Western” hegemony and orientation, and its racialization and exclusion of nonwhite immigrants and non-Christian religions, this is not the subject of our conversation here. Rather, what I wish to point out is the imposition of this strategy and model in Latin America today, what the recently formed EUROSociAL⁶ calls the “[European] ideal of what should be a dignified society ...A possible horizon for the politics of development in Latin America.”⁷ Social cohesion now constitutes, according to the Office of Cooperation of the European Commission, the most important objective and action of European Union and Latin American cooperation⁸ and a required component of all project funding. Critically exploring the meaning of social cohesion and creating a significance not only more consonant with community-based realities but defined by these communities themselves has, in fact, been the focus of the work I have recently been involved in with the Network of Afro-Latin American and Afro-Caribbean women and the Foundation “Azucar” in their project “The Black Gaze” (La Mirada Negra) funded by the European Union-Italian Cooperation.

Going back to the issues you raise, the broader problem here is with the new formulation and imposition of notions and paradigms – maybe better termed “paradogmas” – of common welfare and the common good that intend to confront and overcome – within the frames of social cohesion, integration and humanistic development – the “other” logics and civilizational frames that “buen vivir” or “sumak kawsay” – roughly translated as living well or collective well-being – afford. Making “sumak kawsay” part of state development policy – or even worse UNESCO policy – in a way that empties it of its real sociohistorical, ancestral and cosmological significance (including the significance established in the 2008 Constitution) is one example. This is what I have criticized (in my article which you cite) with regard to current development policy in Ecuador. In this policy, “buen vivir” or “sumak kawsay” are used interchangeably with development and as the State. That is to say, “buen vivir” as development is the State. And it is the State that signifies what is development and “buen vivir.”

The problem here is to two-fold. On the one hand, it is the ascertaining from above (from government and the State) of policy that portends to define and regulate “sumak kawsay” or “buen vivir.” And, on the other hand, it is locating such definition and regulation within the frame of citizenry understood as individuals, a frame that challenges as antiquated and counterproductive the continued presence of social movements, the collective and the communal. The concept of “buen vivir” points to notions, logics, practices and modes of living grounded in collective well-being and the mutual dependence of all beings (human and otherwise). Its point of departure is the collective, a co-dependence, and the complementarity and relationality that both necessarily entail. Its translation in public policy, however, is beginning to suggest something else: the idea that all begins and rests with individuals (as citizens), who together can build a common project and thread. This, in essence, seems to be the philosophy and general sense behind Ecuador’s so-called “citizens’ revolution.”

Here we can witness a difference with Bolivia, where the notion of the communitarian (a plurinational and communitarian State and a representative, participatory and communitarian democracy) is a central component to the processes of change. This is not to discount the difficulties, complexities and contradictions within the Bolivian process (initially similar but increasingly distinct from the processes we are now living in Ecuador). Instead, it is to suggest the contrasts between efforts to construct a plurinational State, efforts that assume the communal or communitarian as one of its basic components, and efforts to promote a so-called “citizen revolution” where individual agency and participation (including across differences) are key. And, of course, all this points to another concern: that is the meaning in this context of “revolution” as well as of 21st Century Socialism.

While space does not allow me to elaborate on this concern, let me make just a few short comments. First and as you pointed out above, it is liberalism that promotes the common good and it is socialism that argues for the common. The communal you suggest is something different, not subsumed by liberalism or socialism. I agree that the logics, philosophies and world-views underlying each of these concepts and practices are radically distinct. Yet in

2 The topic of this question has been addressed in the book that motivates this conversation, and also – in English – in another interview for *Developments* 53.1 <http://www.sidint.net/interview-with-catherine-walsh-human-development-and-buen-vivir/>. See also her articles in the same issue, “Development as *Buen Vivir*: Institutional Arrangements and (De)colonial Entanglements.”

3 The Indigenous Pachakuti Movement (*Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti*) is a left-wing indigenous party in Bolivia founded in November 2000.

4 By Western epistemology here, I mean basically, the epistemology built on the six modern imperial languages (Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, German and English) founded in the two classical languages (Greek and Latin), which became part of the West during the Renaissance.

5 Eugenio Tíron, “La ‘cohesión social,’ o el retorno de Europa en América Latina,” Barcelona, 2007.

6 EUROSociAL is an alliance among the European Union, IDP, UNDP, and the Economic Commission of Latin America (CEPAL) with the support of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

7 <http://www.programaeurosociel.eu>

8 See <http://www.cumbresiberoamericanas.com/imprimir.php?p=712>

the emergent conceptualizations, practices, policies and models of State in Ecuador and Bolivia, as well as in the practices and life styles of the communities themselves, the lines are not always clearly drawn or the borders clearly delineated.

First off, let's think about the new context of State. As I have described above, the incorporation in the Ecuadorian Constitution of these other logics, philosophies and world-views, is made nebulous in new laws and public policy where communities, the communal, and the communitarian lose the force of real meaning, collective voice and concrete signification. The reference to 21st Century Socialism clouds the issue further. While assuming distance from the socialism (or socialisms) of the past, but continuing its overall ideological legacy and term (that is, of "socialism"), this supposedly new manifestation works to include difference. It recognizes racism, sexism and other institutionalized frameworks and apparatuses of coloniality, power and discrimination, and it recognizes the right to collective territory, autonomy and community-based authority. However, and as I mentioned above, it gives centrality in its conceptualization to "citizens" understood in their difference and diversity; citizens as individuals. In this context, community is perceived as a group of individuals, individuals whose role is to participate in and support the [socialist] State, not question its practice or authority, or its understanding and promotion of the "common," in essence the "common good." Here the lines between the "common" and the "common good," between socialism and new forms of liberalism (and humanism or humanistic neoliberalism), are increasingly blurred.

Different tensions are present in the Bolivian case. There, the "communal" has become a point of contention in its definition and hegemonic positioning as Aymara. The primary goal of the Constitution and the Evo Morales government is to build a new Plurinational State grounded in the idea of the "communitarian." Yet what is beginning to become evident is the conflict present in these very terms (the communitarian, the plurinational, and the communal) when they deny or overlook the plurality of meaning and practice inherent within and derive from the singular, utopian and abstract, and not from concrete contexts. For example, lowland indigenous nations in Bolivia argue that the models of territory, community and autonomy being discussed today are not representative of their realities and thus are beginning to protest and rise up. Indianist sectors say the model being developed is not Aymara enough. Similarly, arguments for distinctions between rural and urban manifestations are increasingly frequent; the city of El Alto, with a majority Aymara population, being a clear example. Also key are considerations, not only in Bolivia, but also in Ecuador and the region, of how ancestral practices that include the communal, the collective and the community-based are being co-opted, fractured and split by the presence and interests of "outsiders," most especially those involved in the exploitation of natural resources and the destruction of Mother Nature or Earth. In these latter contexts, resistance, but also new strategies of the collective and communal, become part of everyday struggle, practice and living.

All this is to say that what is occurring today in the Andean region is supremely complex. For those of us that live in this part of the world and are committed to and involved in the process of change and struggle, hope intertwines with frustration and even despair. And that is because of the new paths and possibilities being constructed, but also because of the new strategies of domination, control and co-optation being waged. The coloniality of power, of knowledge, of being and of nature in this context, is simultaneously being transgressed and reconstructed.

Still, in the effort to move away from the models and paradigms of the past (including those of the Right and the Left) and to build and mold new processes and projects that think and act with indigenous and African descendent peoples, cosmologies and practices, Ecuador and Bolivia are breaking a radically different ground. The challenge, as I have attempted to make clear here, is not to resurrect or reconstruct the communal, nor is it to assume or impose a third philosophy and model of society and State (with liberalism and socialism being the first two) that can be exported elsewhere. Instead, and from my perspective, the present and emerging challenge is to make real a *thinking and acting with* the peoples, nations and communities, and the knowledges, histories and life-based cosmologies that have been suppressed, subalternized and denied. It is to move away from and beyond the lineal precepts of the modern, of development, and of progress, precepts clearly interlocked with the designs of transnational capitalism and the market. And it is to fashion a practice of society and State (possibly under different terms) that engenders and derives from the plurinational, and works to encourage and enable articulations and convergences, interculturalizations of a sort that give centrality to the necessary interconnectedness and interdependence of beings, nature, knowledge and/as life.

MIGNOLO: Now Cathy, everything you just said, supported of course by the long tradition in your own work, including your creation and leadership in the PhD program in "Latin American Cultural Studies" at the Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar, bring to the table the crucial issue of the "orientation" of knowing and understanding. Let me see if I can make clear the issue I am trying to address, and I would ask if you could contribute to its clarification.

The term "studies" in "Cultural Studies" doesn't make clear to me what the study of culture is for. Stuart Hall links cultural studies to the political, and that is good, but I still feel a certain dissatisfaction with it. I admire Stuart Hall's work, but I still feel I am in a different track, parallel of course and complementary, not opposed or in competition. So the questions are: What is research for? What do we want to know and understand and why do we need to know it? Simplifying matters, I would like to put the issue in the following terms: there is a tendency in the U.S. and European academia, but also in Latin America and East Asia and South Asia, to operate on the basis of "change": "change" becomes a goal and a mission in itself. So, you "study" to change the vision or interpretation of certain events or problems of the previous generation; you study to "change and update" the discipline (and you are in what Lewis Gordon describes as "disciplinary decadence"). Striving for change is a very modern goal, which is maintained in all post-modern phi-

losophies. Postmodernism doesn't question the basic principles of modernity, it questions some of its consequences in the history of Europe. Consequently, postmodernity is predicated on the very basic and modern mission of "change."

Reading/listening to you, in the previous answer and in your published works, I would say that "Cultural Studies" doesn't describe what you do (and I hope what I do, either). I see your work as research projects prompted, invoked and demanded not by any discipline in particular (even Cultural Studies), but by the issues and problems you encounter in your daily life as an academic and activist, as an academic/activist and as an activist/academic. Research is always for some thing: for the academy itself (disciplinary decadence), for the State (cf., departments of political sciences, public policy, law), for the corporations (departments of economy, of computer sciences, of biotechnology, etc). What is the research, knowledge and understanding you (and others like you, engaged in a particular politics of knowing and understanding) for? One way to make these issues more concrete would be to say that your research is for education and socio-economic justice. Now the question would be, if your research is for/oriented toward those goals, what disciplinary paradigm (paradogma) informs your research? Is it a discipline in particular or "something" else that is being defined in the process of thinking and doing and in that process displacing the assumptions we have about what knowledge is all about and what knowledge is for?

WALSH: Here you bring up a number of concerns, Walter, that I think are crucial to our work. The first has to do with what Iris Zavala described a number of years ago as the problem and the politics of naming.

Over the past year, I have been asked on three different occasions to explain my understandings of cultural studies, particularly in the context of the doctoral program that I direct and that you mention above, a program in which you are also a faculty member. These reflections will soon be published in Spanish in a collective volume edited by Nelly Richard and in the journal *Tabula Rasa*, and in English in an article entitled "The Politics of Naming: (Inter)cultural Studies in De-colonial Code" that will appear in a forthcoming issue of *Cultural Studies*. I also take up this concern in an earlier article published in the dossier that you coordinated for *Cultural Studies* in 2007. In these texts, I discuss some of the reasons why we chose to name this program as such, including the strategies and politics of this naming, and make evident the elements and perspectives that define and orient its project. Let me say something here about these two concerns in the context of the questions you raise above.

You may recall that our use of "cultural studies" at the Universidad Andina first began in the late 1990s as an area of focus or study within the master's program of Latin American Studies. The idea was to create a space for critical work that linked the cultural with social, political, economic and epistemic struggles, structures and frameworks. Calling this space "cultural studies" was, in essence, strategic. In fact, it was part of an interest and effort shared with Santiago Castro-Gómez of the Universidad Javeriana in Bogota and the Institute Pensar. On the one hand, this naming enabled us to locate our efforts within a broader named legacy that, in the 50s and 60s and particularly under the direction of Stuart Hall, understood the cultural as clearly political, as a place of differences and of social struggle with regard to the dominant hegemony, including that of academia. In this sense, our understanding and use of "cultural studies" at the outset was not as an academic program or discipline to replicate, either from its base in Birmingham or its traveling (and mostly de-politicized) manifestations elsewhere. Instead, we considered it as a formation and project of intervention, transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary in character and possibility, to be constructed, thought and articulated from this region; a project or projects not interested in the study of culture per se, but in the ways that the cultural intertwines with the political, social, economic and epistemic within a matrix of power grounded in, as you have made so clear in your work, the ongoing relation of modernity-coloniality. The strategy thus, and on the other hand, was in this very politics of naming. Given its international recognition as a field of study "permitted" within the disciplined structure of the academy, "cultural studies" gave us a place of leverage to argue from; a place and space that could not be simply localized to Bogota or Quito.

I am sure you remember the meeting of our project modernity/coloniality/decoloniality in Quito in 2001 and the large public event for the Andean region planned to coincide with this meeting. That event, as you recall, focused on the problematic, the challenges, the disciplinary, political and ethical predicaments, and the politics of naming of cultural studies – or better yet (inter)cultural studies – from Andean America. Again, there was a strategy at work here that was essential in getting off the ground the intellectual-political project now reflected and constructed, since 2002, in our doctoral program, a project and program that, as you well know, takes seriously the social, political, epistemic and ethical challenge, project and work of interculturality and of decoloniality. The strategy was to open up a dialogue among committed intellectuals – from universities, social movements and other places of praxis and struggle – focused on the possibility of (re)thinking and (re)constructing "cultural studies" – or (inter)cultural studies – as a space of political and critical encounter and of diverse knowledges. A place of encounter among disciplines, rationalities and forms of thought, and intellectual, political and ethical projects grounded in distinct historical moments and distinct epistemological places, with the aim of confronting the socio-political fragmentation and divisions that neoliberalism has encouraged and of building shared postures and projects of intervention towards a more just social world.

Here, the idea – first in the event and since in our doctoral project-program – has not been to create or identify new objects of "study," or to simply propose study "on the basis of change," a (post)modern proposition as you mention above. Rather, it is to recognize the need, especially in the Andean region, but also elsewhere, for spaces and places of critical thought, analysis and reflection *from* and *with* the struggles being waged in the context of what Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui has called the long colonial horizon, and toward deeper understandings of the operation of this horizon, of the structures of domination – epistemic, political, social, cultural and economic – in order to assume a position and to intervene.

To name this cultural studies – or (inter)cultural studies as I prefer – is one option, certainly not the only one. It is an option grounded in a politics of naming that, for us in Quito, has helped construct a field of possibility within the university, transgressing its traditional boundaries, disciplines and disciplining, and walls. It is an option that enables a convening of intellectual-activists from a variety of fields and from throughout the Andes and Latin America, under a rubric and graduate program whose name has resonance and relative acceptance in the academic university domain, but whose content is not rigidly disciplined or defined. This is especially important when one takes into account the fact our students are, for the most part, university faculty and that such jobs, unlike the U.S. or Europe, are almost always precarious. In this context, "Latin America cultural studies" or Latin American (inter)cultural studies, as we more frequently call it, is part of a necessary strategic politics of naming.

Is this naming part of how I describe what I do? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that I believe that the university is one place – certainly not the only one – where we can build ongoing processes and projects of critical interculturality and rouse decolonial postures, perspectives and thinking. Such work requires different strategies, including those that give new and different meaning to established and accepted rubrics. The "inter" here of (inter)cultural studies is to engage an "other" conceptualization, practice and understanding, one that in the Andean region calls up interculturality and its social, political, epistemic and ethical project. The "inter" works to disrupt and destabilize, to intercede, interfere and intervene in the "cultural," to bring to the fore a series of issues, concerns, conflicts, tensions, struggles, and to push for different engagements and articulations, particularly with regard to knowledges and life visions. It is this engaging, interceding, disrupting, interfering and intervening that I take as central in my work.

Of course, and on the other hand, "cultural studies" as it is typically constructed and understood does not describe what I do, nor do I feel that I really "fit" within its field. Postcolonial studies, as constructed and defined, often seen as an offshoot of cultural studies, particularly in metropolitan countries, also does not feel quite right. In this sense, I guess there really is no discipline or field that fits me or that I fit into. Similarly, there is no one discipline or field that clearly informs my work. I am sure that you probably feel the same.

But I also do not feel comfortable describing my work as "research projects." Rather, I see it as tied to, driven by and directed toward a project and projects that are simultaneously epistemic, political and existence-based; a project and projects that are concerned with understanding, and with shaping, encouraging and constructing "other" ways of being, knowing and intervening in the world, ways that the geography of reason, the geopolitics of knowledge and the colonial matrix of power have endeavored to subordinate, negate, silence and deny. Thus, and as I mentioned before, I am not interested in the research enterprise that studies "about," but instead in the critical, pedagogical and decolonial posture and possibility of thinking, understanding and acting "with," all the time realizing that this "with" necessarily requires challenging what it is I think I know, how I know it, and the purposes it serves.

So here, and in closing, I guess I am going back to the beginning of our conversation. Research for me is a pedagogical enterprise that is necessarily tied to praxis. As such, it is pedagogy – or the pedagogical – and not research per se that drives, defines and describes my work. I refer to pedagogy here not as a discipline or field but as a methodology, as a process and practice of doing, and as the work to be done; pedagogy, as Frantz Fanon once made clear, in order to build a new humanity that questions. As such, and pulling together much of what has been said above, it is the critical projects and processes of interculturality and decoloniality – and their intimate ties – that inform my pedagogy, work and perspective. It is they that give rhyme and reason to the particular politics of knowing, understanding and doing in which I am – and I believe you are also – engaged.

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Marina Gržinić
JUSTICE AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM

Pierre Hazan's book *Judging War, Judging History: Behind Truth and Reconciliation* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California), published in 2010, is the English translation of the book, originally published in French in 2007. The English version brings as well a newly written final chapter with the title "The Epilogue." The book is Pierre Hazan's doctoral thesis that resulted from his work as a United Nations correspondent in Geneva for the French newspaper *Libération* and the Swiss daily *Le Temps*. At this post, he has covered many international crises, including those in the Balkans, the Great Lakes region of Africa and the Middle East. He has produced four television documentaries with the Franco-German channel ARTE and Swiss Public Broadcasting TV; these documentaries explored such subjects as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and universal jurisdiction. He was a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, in Washington DC, and a fellow at Harvard Law School (2005–2007). At present, he teaches at Geneva University. He is also a human rights consultant and a writer on international affairs, and more specifically on post-conflict justice (International Criminal Tribunals and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions).

What is the book about? Bluntly put, it is about human rights, a notion that is becoming increasingly globalized, or more accurately said, universalized, and because of this, when it comes to their protection, the so-called "global justice" is invoked. In order to come to this, there has been a whole process of transitional justice cases from the 1990s on (the marker of the new international situation is represented by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989), starting with a case activated in the mid-1980s, the Argentine National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons.

In the last instance, the book presents the analysis of the shift from the Cold War to the post-Cold War and the war against terror(ism) from 2001 on, monitored and orchestrated by the world powers, the U.S. and Western Europe, the old colonial forces, of course. The book clearly marks, I would say, two historical events of global capitalism, the 11/9 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall as a communist implosion, and the 9/11 2001 fall of the World Trade Center's Twin Towers as a global capitalism explosion.

So what we can learn from the book? Global capitalism's PROLIFERATION of new states after the fall of the Berlin Wall (in the so called post-Cold era in which we live today) was possible only with at the same time initiated DISINTEGRATION of the Westphalian principle of the sovereignty of nation-States. This, I called it, "proliferation-disintegration" mechanism that took place with the fall of the Berlin Wall is based therefore on two processes not necessarily obviously working together but definitely at the same time; these two processes though being entangled are perceived as disconnected. This is the logic with which the big international powers succeeded to maintain ORDER in the mass of new states, "new born" states, "re-born" with the fall of the Berlin wall. Before proceeding maybe just a quick note on what the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 established as a way of working and managing the World almost until the fall of the Berlin wall. It is recognized by scholars of international relations that the Westphalian model, as the modern, Western-originated power principle, established an international system of states, multinational corporations and organizations as sovereign subjects in the political arena.

Therefore I can state that the "proliferation-disintegration" mechanism working at once, that is possible to be grasped while reading the book, is one of the most pertinent points of Hazan's analysis. This point sustains clearly another thesis that was developed by the Spanish theoretician Santiago López Petit in his book *Global Mobilization: Brief Treatise for Attacking Reality* (2009), that global capitalism is nothing else but the repetition of one single event, which is the unrestraintment of capital. And more, in difference to previous historical forms of capitalism, the repetition of the unrestraintment of capital, as formulated by Petit, requires two repetitions working at once. These two repetitions are the founding repetition and the de-foundational repetition that cover so to say each other (they present an alibi for each other) and hide their constitutive entanglement.

Rephrasing what I just said: the uneasiness that was provoked by the proliferation of new states was not solved as in the past times with direct and brutal force of control by the world powers but by an intensified process of disintegration of the Westphalian principle of the sovereignty of nation-States on one side, and at the same time with the transformation of the imperial nation-States into war-States on the other. What's global justice (with its many formats of appearance, one being for sure the transitional justice and many other demands for universal human rights) got to do with these changes? It facilitated, initiated and implemented, made workable so to say, the transition of imperial nation-States to war-States and at the same time allowed for the proliferation of numerous new born states without the old nation-State sovereignty. The book presents the genealogy of human rights and, at the same time, within this genealogy we can identify another process; the trajectory of capitalism and the notion of a transition of sovereignty from nation-State sovereignty to transnational institutions of power and the war-State politics that have curbed the idea of a sovereign nation since the 1990s; until that moment the old nation-State was a master at home. But today nation-States can no longer, at least in theory, give amnesty to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide (p. 152). In fact, what we can clearly see is the development of a new sovereign entity, and this is the war-State. Transitional justice and the demand for "universal" respect of human rights played a key role in this process. Global justice was the framework where these processes were conceptualized or even more precisely where they were naturalized.

Therefore, the question is whether the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and the subsequent de facto partitioning of Kosovo and the 2003 Iraq War reflected higher principles, or if the real justification was simply the U.S. and the West's promotion of their political and economic interests. In the case of Srebrenica, the Dutch

soldiers/UN have never clearly shown any repentance. So those without economic and military power have to accept the universal, global capitalism protocol of international justice that does not apply, however, when major power forces/ war-States (the U.S., Russia and China) are at stake. When the United Nations General Assembly convened a conference in Rome in 1998 "to finalize and adopt a convention on the establishment of an international criminal court," it was adopted by a vote of 120 for and 7 against, with 21 countries abstaining. The seven countries that voted against the treaty were Iraq, Israel, Libya, the People's Republic of China, Qatar, the United States and Yemen. As of October 2009, 111 states are party to the statute, and a further 38 states have signed but not ratified the treaty. Only 3 of the 57 member countries of the Islamic Conference Organization are parties to the ICC (Palestine joined in January 2009). There is a clash between the African and Arab-Islamic side on the one hand, and the West on the other. This is why Hazan presents in-depth the only Reconciliation Commission in the Arab world constituted in Morocco. A whole chapter in the book is about the Morocco Equity and Reconciliation Commission.

As one of the effects of global justice and its supposedly universal character, Belgium and Spain subjugated their national law to the protocols of universal jurisdiction. This resulted in Palestine filing a lawsuit against Israel in Belgium. It is a paradoxical situation, as the majority of the members of the Arab League regard the ICC as an institution on the payroll of the West and the Palestinians are seen as the sacred cause of the Arab world, and Palestine legitimized the court by filing a lawsuit against Israel. Hazan's point is, therefore, that what matters and what is important is this broader field of confrontation that aims "to impose its narrative in the public space and to marginalize its opponent" (p. 169).

Hazan points out that the shift that happened in the genealogy from the 1990s to today in the principle of universal justice is connected with the second major reshuffling in the international community that happened with 9/11 2001 (the first, of course, is 11/9 1989, which marked the end of the Cold War). The major difference between these two periods is that the majority of cases listed in the 2000s are, contrary to the 1990s' tribunal wars, persecutions and cases, still in conflict. Belgium, Great Britain, New Zealand and Spain's national courts, which act under the principle of universal jurisdiction, are today tribunals and commissions of inquiry that relate to international crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of terrorism). The 1990s cases are societies themselves in transition: the ex-dictatorships of South America, the ex-Communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe, the post-apartheid of South Africa (the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)) and the Rwandan holocaust. In 1995, the victims of gross human rights violations were invited to go before the South African TRC and to give testimonies about their experience. In this transition, Hazan says it was less about "criminalization" than about a certain social reconstruction. Practically, the confessions were concluded with the obligatory point of a certain social reconstruction. Truth, as emphasized by Hazan, is already part of the political and ideological mechanism and adjusted by it. It also presupposes the adjustment of memory.

In 1996, Margalit and Morzkin stated that "the process of how people are made to vanish has become a distinctive feature of the postwar conceptions of what memory is." It is clear that this is a process of a massive violation of human rights, and not only and solely when it is connected with physical death or massacres, but also when it results in symbolical death. The Erased People in Slovenia are such a case.

The "transitional justice" coined in 1992 is a post-Cold War product that cemented into the process of reconciliation a new agency of international relations, and this is the court (p. 10). In the background of this court, it is possible to draw a genealogy of the politics of punishment and pardon after 1945. The handling of the Nazi crimes was the "womb" (Hazan's word) wherefrom the concept of transitional justice was born. The handling of the Nazi crimes started with the Nuremberg trials and it allowed the United Nations to re-create itself by way of the international judiciary system. The Nuremberg trials exposed three roles of justice: One, the International Judge, the U.S.; Two, the Jewish State, the spokesman for the millions of victims; and Three, The Naming of the Criminal – Nazi Germany. The Nuremberg trials put forth the idea that the genocide of Jews was the product of a horrible war aggression. Nazi acts that had occurred before were never prosecuted. The allies did not want to embarrass themselves. The way they treated minorities and people living in their colonies was far from exemplary, so they did not wish to expose themselves to criticism. The Nuremberg trials were a self-censorship (pp. 16–17) with clear political ends. Twenty years later, in the mid-1960s, under the more and more vanishing feeling of the horror of the Holocaust, we had the spectacular kidnapping of Adolf Eichmann, who was hiding in Argentina, and his prosecution in Israel. Ben-Gurion used the Eichmann trial, Hazan argues, to cement the Israeli society in commemorating the martyrs. It produced a new figure, the new Jew, the citizen-soldier with the Zionist ethos, different from the Jews of the ghetto who were in their Diaspora condition (p. 24). The Nuremberg trials were to present a judicial and historical truth, the Eichmann trial presented a change, "the crime not needed to be proven, but a symbolic charge carried out."

In Chapter Two, Hazan talks about the strengths and weaknesses of transitional justice, the history of which has three principal stages that are for us extremely relevant, as they frame a world we have been witnessing over the last 20 years. We talk about the post-Cold War period that has changed the world radically. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and also in relation to the post-Fordist model of capitalist production, it was necessary to draw a new world. Globalization encompasses all this, and in order to allocate capital and privatize public goods, and also in order to make profit in the global world that lost its Iron Curtain, a stable (that means a new imperial, hegemonic) legal frame was needed.

But let's take one step at a time.

The first period (accurately described on pages 29 – 30 in the book) is about the steps taken to satisfy the post-Fordist model of labor mobility in order to get cheaper labor, etc., and is in connection with the waning of dictatorship(s). It began with the establishment

of the truth commission in Argentina and ended with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa in 1995. If, in the first stage, we had a clear division, with perpetrators on the one side and of the victims on the other, then in the second stage, there was already a transition, a multiplication of ethnic identities and the using of the law by the international society to curb them. The second stage is fully grounded in the 1990s and it overlaps with the first one and at the same time differs radically from it. It covers the former Yugoslavia and the construction of ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. This happened in 1993, in the middle of the war, but it did not stop the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. The second period stretches from 1992 to 2001. It launches judicialization of international relations, and it could also be called governmentalization of these relations, putting the post-Cold War into administrative, legal forms. The period is called multiculturalist, as it hides its process of judicialization of the entire global capitalist society – culture included, if we just take into consideration the lawsuits against some of the U.S. artists, from that against Andreas Serrano to a more recent one against Critical Art Ensemble (what shall be called "the disciplining of the avant-garde in the U.S.").

The second period ends so to speak with 2001, when global capitalism is enthroned with a new format of the nation-State, which is the war-State (the U.S., Britain, etc.) that not only demands justice but also takes it in its hand and shapes it (Iraq). If the first and second stages deal with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and it is true that the Cold War lasted long enough for the connection between capitalism and Nazism to pass into oblivion, now it is time to get rid of the curtain and open up the full setting of a new elaborated capitalism that needs markets, cheap labor and administrative frameworks. In 2001, there is a paradoxical situation, as opposed to the transitional justice that was so triumphant in the 1990s. Now it's the moment of its eclipse. From 2001 on, instead of reconciliation and restoration (as it was in the 1990s, with the successful South African case), there is mostly criminalization. This is also connected with the transformation in the era of global capitalism from the nation-State into the war-State. The war-States represent great powers while the new nation-States are transitional in their restricted sovereignty or lack of any sovereignty, a kind of a "Dolly the sheep" –State, artificially constructed through a biotechnological process of military intervention and capital allocation. The state of Kosovo was born in vitro, without any self-determination, but by a decree by international power(s), i.e., the U.S.

Hazan states: "(S)eparating transitional justice into different periods also emphasizes its successive reorientation. It reveals a purely instrumental vision – that of the 'toolbox' – that tends to hide: the ideological changes, the intervention of new actors, the role of Great Powers – in one word, transitional justice's relation to politics." This reference is actually an excellent description of the biopolitical that changes into the necropolitical, acts of genocide, the massive violations of human rights all seem to be possible to be managed and dealt with by "administrative sciences." Already with the South African experience in 1995, the view on the truth commission, as Hazan states will "no longer appear as a default solution but, on the contrary, as a positive choice, as much in moral terms as in political and strategic." (p. 33). It presented the promise of restorative justice. It presented the new social engineering of transitional justice. This means simply that there is nothing natural with justice, less with the memory. In the context of South Africa, there was a compromise reached between these two contradictory demands, the demand for justice and the demand for amnesty. As Hazan puts it, "it was a process with which the incapacity of rendering justice was transformed into the affirmation of a higher truth and justice" (p. 33). It was the concept of restorative justice in order to produce a social consensus. This was termed social utopia, and as Hazan states clearly, there are three fundamental points that separate the Argentine and South African cases. In the South African case, the demand was a complete confession in order to get amnesty. It switched the way of understanding amnesty that was not equal to amnesia. In such a way, the victims' families obtained the information that would never be possible to obtain in a normal trial. And it was more affordable. This is not a cynical point, but, as stated by Hazan, "in this, a naturalist representation of the sense of history" was attained (p. 34). The outcome was a process of national healing that consisted of the expression of memory of crimes participating in the elaboration of a new social contract (p. 36). The result was as well the link of Christian forgiveness and African *ubuntu* (that speaks of the very essence of being human). This also shows the difference before and after the Cold War. In the Cold War, amnesty was considered the catalyst for reunification, par excellence (p. 38). It was the idea of the social to be a unity achieved through silence. Today, everybody talks, there is almost nothing else that we have; but what we say – that is a question!

In the post-Cold War era, sacredness is transferred from the State to the victims. According to my elaborations in the past on the topic, this shift very much follows the way of functioning of global capitalism, that is grounded in hegemony on one side and fragmentation, multireality and multidispersity on the other. It follows as well the change from Fordism to post-Fordist capitalism, that happened in the 1970s, this shift presents itself today in a different relation between capital and power. If there was a unity between capital and power in Fordism, today they stay in a relation of a co-propriety. Unity meant silence instead of (or as) justice, today it has changed into truth instead of (or as) justice, where truth is the proliferation of the stories by the victims, measured by a co-propriety of capital and power. This transition from silence to speech, from forgetting to recounting, is translated into the resurgence of morality of international relations that seeks to expel violence from history. Practically, this means to depoliticize justice while not taking it out from the daily politics and power relations. These are two completely different positions.

The political is kidnapped by fragmentation, while the geopolitical influence is growing monstrously. This came out fully as the major logic of transitional justice with the Durban Conference in 2001. This was a world conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance held in Durban, South Africa. It was organized on August 31, 2001 and it evaporated from our minds, in a certain way, because of 9/11; also, it was the premonitory sign of what Hazan terms as the passage that began taking

place in 2000 from restorative justice toward its criminalization. Hazan elaborates the Durban conference in a separate chapter in the book.

If the South African process of reconciliation was the last hope of judicialization as a restorative mechanism that helped to construct a new social contract, then the Durban conference proved to be a flop and represents the full entrance of the logic of criminalization, sped up by the event of 9/11. The Durban Conference brought up two points. The African states, due to the past slavery and colonialism, asked for compensation. The West, finding itself triumphant after the end of the Cold War, found the proposition “to re-humanize” (the word used by the African states) itself with the compensation to African states to be absurd. For the West, the slave trade and colonialism were perfectly legal at the time they were practiced. The West insisted as well that the practice of slavery be recognized much earlier in the past, before colonialism, etc. The Netherlands, Spain and Portugal insisted on this strict legalism. It is important to state that this was a point regarding the Srebrenica holocaust, when the Dutch soldiers under UN jurisdiction failed to protect Srebrenica, supposedly being unable to act legally, leaving 8,000 men to be slaughtered. The second point of failure of the Durban conference was the orchestrated denunciation of the Jewish State, and the assimilation of Zionism and racism. This resulted in the American withdrawal from the conference, elegantly escaping the addressing of the issue of compensation for slavery. At the end, a statement that did not contain the proposed wording against Israel was figured out.

In short, what we can additionally learn from the book is the radically changed perception of the whole judicialization of international relations through a move from reconciliation toward punishment. The process most often established and envisioned by or through the U.S. is called by Hazan “ameriglobalization” (p. 43). The rise in power of international criminal justice depended “thus, on the political weight of the American superpower and the attractiveness of the cultural model of the ‘benevolent hegemon’” (p. 44), which means that we have a pure state-of-exception measure as international justice. As argued by Agamben, the state-of-exception is an act of perverted benevolence, an exception of the law but guaranteed by the law. It is a decision that is made when the sovereign suspends the law in order to claim legality through security and protection.

The already mentioned Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) brought not only the formalization of transitional justice, but cemented the two poles of the judicialization of the world, where justice and reconciliation commissions work, or better, conflate, entangle with the policies of punishment. It could be said that if in the time of colonialism what was exported was education and religion, today in the time of (neo)coloniality we see another process. The West exports concepts of justice and the universal order to smoothly safeguard its economic interests with a system of legally framed procedures; with the same system of laws in the West that is today being imposed globally as a universal principle of protection of private property and patents of ideas, a circulation

of capital is being made unleashed. In the last instance, culture and religion can be, like we saw with the system of the reform of today’s universities (the Bologna agreement to create European Higher Education), formalized and borderless at the same time. In other words, and to say it with Hazan, “the mission ‘civilisatrice’ has been reformulated through international criminal justice.” Or even more pertinently stated, what we have today is the “international community’s neo-Kantian vision of universal values defended by supranational legal institutions” (p. 48). Perhaps it is important to say that one of the outcomes of these passages that transcend the question of transitional justice as such, but enlarge the importance of this book, is about the logic of global capitalism and the role of NGOs. The process of judicialization of international relations was pushed forward by, as named by Hazan, the “new entrepreneurs of norms” – the NGOs. They are called, by Hazan, the missionaries of humane globalization, and more precisely, they function, as elaborated by him, as moral guardian referees, and mediators to the states that have developed a niche market in international relations, like Switzerland, Sweden, Norway and Canada. Their exemption from WWII and their being without a colonial past is today the condition for their issuing of paychecks within the field of international relations and human rights.

The case of the passage from restorative to criminal justice is not only going on in an international framework, but is repeated in the national framework. The punishment included in the nation-State’s judicial ideological and repressive apparatuses is reflected, for example, in the new penal law of Slovenia that was discussed only within Slovenia alone. With Hazan’s book, among others, it is finally getting its international framework. The defining point of this passage was 9/11 2001, which opened the Bush administration’s war against terrorism. Situated during the process of the judicialization of international politics that was going on through the setting of transitional justice by way of which the politics of a universal reign of reason was established, the war against terror could inscribe itself within a well-prepared international “justice” framework. Transitional justice allowed the judicialization and later the criminalization of the world to occur. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was done on legal grounds, but as always, what was claimed to be “a ten-day war” is still lasting. The point of Hazan is clear. Under the dirty politics is – of course I will say – economy as well as philosophy. He states that it was the neo-Kantian wind that carried the process of judicialization of international relations and prepared the terrain for what he names Hobbes criminalization in the new millennium. This is why in the very end of the book, in the “Epilogue” of the book, we have mostly a summary of these cases. The International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague is, at the moment, conducting a trial against the ex-leader of the Bosnian-Serbs, Radovan Karadžić. Hazan also made a list of several other cases of prosecution, from that in February 2009 against the Chief of the Khmer Rouge massacre in Cambodia (around 1975), to that in March 2009 against the acting head of the Sudanese state. The indictment of Sudanese president Al-Bashir in March 2009 divided the South and the North. To these, he adds the December 2008–January 2009 conflict in Gaza and the Georgia–Russia conflict of October 2008.

For Hazan, the challenges of international justice are more aggravated in the Middle East.

What is the role of transitional justice, then?

It is obvious that transitional justice with its judicial framework filled an ideological function of protecting the interests of global capitalism through the clearing of the terrain. It was done on civilization premises that allowed for the implementation of a “universal” legal system. International justice has a double role, I would say. One is the internal role and the other is the external one, but they work together. In the internal role, there are two lines of forces: reconciliation between two violently opposed groups, and between the civil society and the state; but at the same time, the other, external relation is active as well. This is the relation between capitalism and its persistent exploitation; at its center are the states that export wars in many different ways while trying to keep their citizens calm in the old, colonial Europe. There are four levels of functioning that have clearly crystallized themselves.

The first one is legal ambiguity, meaning that general amnesty is forbidden for the perpetrators of international crimes. But as Hazan points out, which crimes are subjected to punishment and which are not? Who decides? There is ambiguity situated between justice and peace, this is how it is explained; but I would say it is about which dictators can be sent to the garbage in history and which cannot. Such as in the case of Saddam Hussein, who was, until 2003, supported by the great powers. As Goldie Osuri shows, Great Britain/U.S. actually produced him. When he became an obstacle to imperial power interests, he was discarded. The second level is the competition for victimhood, which is also connected with the process of reparation being transferred from the state to individual victims. As we saw with African colonialism, who can get the reparation, is a question of power. The competition for victimhood is actually established by those who want to wash their hands of responsibility. The third level is justice perverted by politics. The number of cases reported by Hazan is striking when intervention, punishment and justice have to be applied. Such as in the case of the Congo, when the Security Council did not consider creating an international criminal court for the conflicts during which millions of men, women, and children perished. The last, the fourth level, as developed by Hazan, is the technocratic illusion. It is about the managing of war crimes, being in line with the over-empowered judicialization of the world, which shows clearly its cynical contour if we think about the Srebrenica Holocaust, for example.

Hazan’s book is a compelling study of what is to be expected in the future of global politics dictated by the logic of the war-State and its established global judicial framework. The picture is not promising.

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RADICAL EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE

Rubia Salgado LEARNING AND TEACHING THE HEGEMONIC LANGUAGE GERMAN IN THE CONTEXT OF MIGRATION

A Story as an Introduction

I teach a German course for migrant women in *maiz*, a self-organized center for migrant women in Linz/Upper Austria.¹ Last week, we were working on the topic of leisure. This is a classic example of curriculum when teaching a foreign language, which we try to deal with in a differentiated manner. We dealt firstly with the content, taking into consideration gender-specific and class-specific aspects and interweaving them with the topic of work (morale, discipline and obedience, definition, importance, forms of work, and so forth). Afterwards, we discussed the choice of leisure activities in Linz. Who can do what when in Linz? Who wants to do what in Linz? Who can afford what? We talked about our experiences. The follow-up activity was to plan a city tour of Linz. The learners were supposed to show the city to someone who would be visiting them soon. This was then to be presented in the form of a poster. They began their work by going through information brochures on the city of Linz and magazines, picking out their “stations,” constructing sentences, cutting out pictures from the brochures. After about half an hour, I began walking around answering questions, and the participants had the opportunity to present their formulated sentences and their approaches. I also asked some questions and made comments. Everything was going “as planned.” I walked over to M. She was working very intensively for the first 30 minutes. There were a few pieces of paper on her desk. She read her text aloud to me: “Dear A. Take the train from N. at 2 pm; I will pick you up at the train station at 8 pm.”

This situation is representative of the daily routine of teaching at *maiz*. Even though some learners have already acquired the needed lexical and grammatical skill, they are not able to fulfill a task such as the one described above. Most of them have been in school for a short period of time (2 to 3 years). Some of them have not been to school.

Although I question the reason for this lack of success, given such examples, and therefore question my methodological decisions and want to reflect on these critically, I have to admit that a hint about the problem already lies in the description of it: the first time

the problem was described in the text, it was not the methodological decision or the structure that was said to be inadequate, but the student, for not being able to complete the task as it was given.

I sat down with M., explained the task to her again and asked her questions to see what she understood. She was able to answer my questions. We talked about Linz, we looked through the brochures together, and I showed her pictures, figuring out whether she could recognize the buildings. One of the buildings that she did recognize was the Lentos building, the museum for contemporary art, a glowing rectangular building on the shores of the Danube. She knew that it was called Lentos and that it was a museum. I asked her whether she had ever been inside Lentos. No, never. I briefly explained to her what happens in this place. She was silent and looked down at her materials. As I remember, it took a long time until she looked up at me and asked: “What is a museum?”

This Text?

This text intends to approach the question of how the processes of teaching and learning the hegemonic language German in the context of migration can become critical and politicizing. The example above has been mentioned in order to reflect on unquestioned methodical presuppositions in this field.

“German as a foreign or second language deals with the exploration of the German language and the culture of German-speaking countries under the condition and from the perspective of it being foreign, with particular emphasis placed on the processes of learning and teaching a language as well as its linguistic and cultural context.”² While German as a foreign language (“Deutsch als Fremdsprache” – DaF) works with German taught in foreign countries, German as a second language (“Deutschen als Zweitsprache” – DaZ) deals with the German language in the context of migration.

This text is situated within the field of DaZ, German language in the context of migration for migrants with adult education, and is therefore outside the realm of a school context and foreign German studies (DaF).

This text takes up threads from other interwoven texts. Many are from texts on the subject of German as a second language, particularly those that consider the power dimension of language. Others are from the field of pedagogy, especially those that choose critical and deconstructivist approaches, which regard education in the sense of it being part of a process of the construction of meaning, thereby defining language as action and as a means for conjecturing a different reality. Other threads come from texts that deal with

the situation of migrants in Western Europe from a post-colonial perspective.

Dominant Methodological Approaches to German as a Second Language

In the struggle to develop and implement didactic approaches that distance themselves from the idea of reducing the learning process to a one-channeled transfer of knowledge and enable a learning process in which the learner can actively take part, many different models have been created. In the field of the didactics of foreign languages, the beginnings of communicative didactics began to establish themselves in the 1970s. This approach was that the teacher and the learner are two partners in communication and to facilitate this partnership was a higher goal in education. Also important are action-oriented didactics, which gained a lot of importance in the 1980s along with the communicative didactics, both of which equally reject the one-channeled transfer of knowledge in the favor of putting the focus on the independent activity of the learners. The relation between student and teacher is therefore not one dominated by authoritarianism, but by a method of teaching that is defined by a partnership or an open relationship.³ Classes for a foreign language or a second language should therefore orientate themselves in a participatory manner, should support independent learning and focus on the participants, i.e., knowledge, experience and previously acquired skills should be taken into account and be incorporated within the classes.

Another approach that has been widely recognized since the 1980s for the teaching of a foreign or second language is the intercultural approach. It established itself on the level of didactics in reaction to social transformation in the context of globalization (e.g., international migration, global transfer of information through mass media). The beginnings of a highly successful spread in the field of the teaching of a foreign or second language can be identified, among other things, as part of the reformulation and development that took place within regional studies (Bechtel, 2003).

Another factor that played a part in the establishment of the intercultural approach is, in my opinion, that the teaching of German as a second language has close ties to promoting integration. For the expectations and regulations on the part of the founders, which are in line with the migration policies of the state, can be fulfilled with the contextual and methodological focus of intercultural education.

Criticism of the Concept of “Interculturality”

Wolfgang Welsch formulated a principal criticism of Interculturality (approximately 15 years ago), in which he criticized the “separatist

¹ *maiz* is an organization by and for migrant women and was created in 1994 out of the necessity for changes with regards to migrants’ living and working situation in Austria, as well as in accordance with the strengthening of political and cultural participation. www.maiz.at

² Definition from the Website of the Institute for German at the University of Vienna, Department for German as a foreign and second language (<http://daf.univie.ac.at/ueber-uns>).

³ http://www.hueber.de/wiki-99-stichwoerter/index.php/Handlungsorientierter_Unterricht,

character of culture” and the old idea of a closed and unified national culture (Welsch, 1995).

Almost ten years later, in *Introduction into the Pedagogy of Migration*, Paul Mecheril remarks that intercultural pedagogy prioritizes “culture” as the central dimension of difference. Focusing solely on culture would mean a constraint for learners and would thereby render questioning the concept of identity based on lines of difference (nationality, ethnicity, gender, age, religion, class/ social status, educational background, property) impossible. Paul Mecheril further criticizes the concept of acknowledgment, which constitutes one of the central principles of intercultural pedagogy. Migrants are acknowledged as being culturally “different” rather than as being political and personal subjects. Therefore, the power relations are ignored and the aim of the transformation of the given circumstances is not recognized. Acknowledgment is granted to those who can “come close to the ideal of the ‘functioning member of society:” those for whom it is possible to recognize given structures and articulate them. (Mecheril, 2004)

The intercultural approach draws attention away from structural problems and projects these problems onto external, cultural determinants. It is a predominant approach that makes structural change in the sense of political and jurisdictional equality, as well as critical analysis of society and the discussion of power structures in the framework of pedagogical activity, impossible.

Didactics as Ideology?

What is understood as integration on government levels in Austria means that migrants must acquire knowledge of the national language, norms must be accepted and respected, and the laws of the accepting country must be obeyed.⁴ Intercultural approaches in DaZ German language courses in the context of migration provide the ideal framework to adhere to these requirements, because when they are working on topics such as leisure time, living, health and hygiene, eating habits, school systems and work in Austria (fixed content of most curricula and textbooks), learners can be taught the national norms, conventions and regulations. As with the treatment of laws, these are taken for granted and can therefore not be questioned. The use of a contrastive methodology suggests an atmosphere of tolerance, by not classifying others’ norms as being wrong or less valuable; however, what is expected is that the “national” norms and rules are learned, respected and used. Any critical or inspiring notion that questions this discriminating legal situation as well as the relations of power or the fact that migrants are in a minority position within society, in which their political rights are denied to them, is not to be found in either the curricula or the textbooks used in Austria. (Compare, among others, Faistauer, et al., 2006, or Österreichischer Integrationsfonds (Austrian Integration Funds), 2006)

Instructional Program or Political Education?

In DaZ classes, as can be seen in multiple documents by teacher organizations⁵ that are based on dealing with the textbooks and curricula, the goal is the support of a linguistic and cultural integration of migrants. The creation of a framework that enables the participation on a political level in the society is formulated as a demand; however, the possibilities for the participation of migrants as protagonists within this struggle for the creation of this framework is neither part of the curricula nor of the textbooks.

Instead, migrants are often taught how they are expected to live in the dominant society, how to behave. The goal is to transfer transport the norms, codes and values – all in accordance with a non-authoritarian and participatory methodological direction, therefore beginning from the individual standpoints and perceptions of the learners, taking into consideration their experience and situation in a contrastive practice. The program of intercultural learning in the field of DaZ follows a normative intention and can therefore be used as an instructional program that eliminates any deviance.

One could ask whether intercultural learning in the subject of German as a second language derives from a “civilizational impulse.” I also think that questioning whether this impulse can be seen as a continuation of Europe’s colonial history would be relevant.

Based on these criticisms, I want to advocate that the work of DaZ can be seen as political education as well as a pedagogical practice,

4 E.g., compare the definition of integration in the “Einführungspapier für den Nationalen Aktionsplan für Integration” / Ministry of the Interior (<http://www.integration.at/>) and the definition found on the website of the Koordinationsstelle für Integration in der Abteilung Soziales at the local government http://www.landoberosterreich.gv.at/cps/rde/xchg/SID8E046312E7FAC4FA/ooe/hs.xml/26903_DEU_HTML.htm
5 E.g., Final statement of the Transnational Expert Forum “Language and Migration” – Support of Integration – Realizing Human Rights – Competent teaching for the support of integration. Goldrain/South Tyrol, November 2007. Or: Final statement of the Trinational Expert Congress “Language and Integration” – Support of language acquisition – Realizing Human Rights – Integration cannot be reached through coercion and sanction. Vienna, April 2006. Download of both documents: http://www.oedaf.at/texte/der_oedaf/wofuer_steht/stellungnahmen.htm

and one that enables and fosters an engagement with the given reality as one that can be shaped (Freire, 1988).

On the basis of the definition of the Austrian Community for Political Education,⁶ political education takes place when reflections on politics and society are achieved from pedagogical activity, when critical consciousness, independent judgment and courage for political participation are supported, when through the educational practice options for action and intervention are created or developed.

Interlinked with supporting the language skills of the learners in the fields of morphosyntax, lexis, phonology and pragmatism, a process of political education could also be formed. Language education would happen when dealing with topics from the daily activities of the participants and in the context of a critical analysis of the situation of living and working for migrants in Austria.

The process of teaching and learning the dominant language of German as political education would imply, taking into consideration the sense of a radical pedagogy:
– that the dimension of critical appropriation and critical usage of language would be prioritized within the training of normative verbal expression and comprehension;
– that language would be regarded in its dialectical relationship to reality, i.e., as a normative instance that is constitutive for the preservation of existing power structures and as an action that is therefore constitutive for reality itself;
– that learners and teachers together would develop and explore strategies for participation and for the transformation of living situations in a dialogical process;
– that syllabuses and courses would be influenced by a socially critical, queer feminist, anti-racist and non-Eurocentric epistemological stance;
– that critical appropriation of hegemonic knowledge would at the same time consist of improvement, acknowledgment and critical reflection of marginalized knowledge that should be supported; and
– that all participants in the learning process would confront their values in relation to the hegemonic legitimized knowledge and with their own positions in society.

What is a Museum?

To formulate and follow these goals and principles, one first has to acknowledge migrants as subjects capable of acting. And here we have already mentioned the interrelated problem: Who is in the position to understand and articulate themselves within the dominant structures in a way that they can even be heard? (Mecheril, 2004)

The question of the participant in the story at the beginning of this text raises a number of further questions: The first question concerns the application of certain didactic approaches. Who is in the position to understand the essence of a task formulated in accordance to the communicative approach?

The decision to organize the course of a dominant language in accordance to the intercultural or communicative approaches, without taking specific experiences and pre-existing knowledge of the participants into consideration on a level of teaching and learning methods, stands in direct opposition to reaching the goal of organizing the course in a non-Eurocentric epistemological approach. Then the principle of orientation on the living situations, biographies, interests, etc., of the learners must not only be applied on a level of content but also in the organization of the courses methodologically. The contextualized questioning of the dominant didactic approach should therefore consequently work on differentiated methods and materials for the course.

Another question concerns supposed “self-evident truths” that one takes for granted: Who experiences the city in the format of a tour? The bourgeois view in the encounter of a foreign city becomes normality and the learners are tasked to adopt these hegemonic ways of approaching, perceiving and orientating themselves as well. This situation could illustrate how, on a pedagogical level, the learning migrants are classified as people who suffer from orientation and information deficits. But this situation could also take place within a practice of pedagogy that positions itself in contrast to this last one and is guided by the principle of acknowledging, improving and expanding the knowledge and competences of the learners. Because working in the context of education with migrants within a hegemonic society makes a certain tension visible: on the one hand, learners should participate considering their own specific knowledge, backgrounds, experiences, values and norms; on the other hand, they should adapt to the norms, values and knowledge of the dominant society. The process of critical education is not about preferring one of these positions; it is about the tension between both of them. (Freire/Macedo, 1990). Nor is it about distinguishing oneself by recognizing that “there are other different

6 <http://www.politischebildung.at/>

and equally legitimate positions” as portrayed within the concept of intercultural learning (Holzbrecher, 2010). It is about focusing on the relations of power that lead to the legitimization of values, norms and knowledge and making out of this an integral part of the learning and teaching process.

The question that arises here relates to the knowledge and the *not knowledge* of the participant. She knew the word *museum* and she knew that the Lentos was a museum, but she did not know what a museum was.

Like other powerful educational and cultural institutions, as with other places of hegemonic knowledge production, the museum provokes desire and exclusion. To acknowledge these mechanisms of exclusion and to refuse to enter these places is a possible posture of opposition. A different way of looking at it is to idealize *not knowledge* about a museum as an alternative to that which is hegemonic by not regarding this knowledge as necessary to survive in a hegemonic society. A further approach is to engage in breaking down these mechanisms of exclusion and to create new gateways. An approach that I would stand for is to break down the barriers while simultaneously transforming hegemonic space (which is represented here by the museum) and relations of power. (Mörsch, 2009)

Where to?

Paulo Freire urges teachers to ask themselves the question, for whom and in whose interest do they work. In the sense of a radical pedagogical approach, he formulates an option for teachers: that they work for the interest of the excluded learners, for social and political change, for the liberation of the oppressed. He puts this call in the context of an analysis of the entanglement of education and the interests of those in power and with the thereby resulting statement that education is always political and can therefore never be neutral. According to Freire, teachers who define their practice as being neutral would be supporting discriminating and exploitative situations and structures. (Freire, 1988)

But what are the interests of migrants? Who defines them? How to elude the danger of homogenizing a group? Do teachers thereby become liberators? With what legitimacy?

María do Mar Castro Varela and Nikita Dhawan make us aware that “the discourse of emancipation creates the subjects to be liberated.” This discourse is normative, as it produces criteria that define who can be emancipated and who cannot. In this sense, they ask the question: “Why is a female bank manager emancipated, where a Moroccan cleaning woman is not?” “Emancipation,” they write, “shows itself to be strongly connected to the humanist discourse that needs *savages*, so to speak, to define humanity.” (Castro Varela / Dhawan, 2004)

Therefore, I would finally like to add further challenges that I feel confronted with as a teacher who has decided for a politicizing and critical practice: to involve myself with reciprocity (i.e., to engage in the learning process both from the side of a teacher as well as a learner) without denying relations of power (Gramsci, 2004; Freire, 1988); to critically problematize the goal of liberation and simultaneously support a dialogical process; to constitute adult education with migrants as a place to practice the ability to act politically; to question taking things for granted. Again and Again.

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Translation from German into English by Christopher Hütmannsberger



STATE OF EXCEPTION

Alanna Lockward

WILD AT HAIR

IngridMwangiRobertHutter: Masks and Skin Politics as a German DeColonial Knowledge Production

While participating in the trans-disciplinary event **The Black Atlantic**, organized by the House of World Cultures in 2004, I came into contact for the first time with Black German postcolonial discourses and activism. It became clear to me that a new path of knowledge production was being opened within my long-time interest in Black Diaspora Studies. The first part of this research consisted in looking into one newspaper, *Der Tagesspiegel* [The Daily Mirror] to find how Black identity was rePresented. The first approach to this research is the content of my Master's thesis at the Institute for Art in Context of the University of the Arts Berlin, entitled "Black-Schwarz-Afro. Widerspiegelung eines Wortfeldes im Tagesspiegel 2004–2006" [Black-Schwarz-Afro: Counter Reflection of a Word Field in the *Daily Mirror* 2004–2006].

I have continued my research on this subject within the framework of very recent theories on the DeNaming (EntNennung) of white German identity¹. Based on them, I was able to defend my disputed first version (the teachers at UdK rejected my work because they felt accused of being racist), and eventually obtained my degree.²

The concept of EntNennung (Nicht/Benennung) was crucial in proving my case: that DeNaming white identity was the first sign of a white supremacist construction of a German identity. For the other part of my argument: that Black-German identity was also de-Mentioned completely in all of the 100 articles of my compilation, I created a new category inspired by and within this innovative theoretical linguistic frame: EntErwähnung (DeMentioning). This differentiation intends to clarify the asymmetries between the normalizing invisibility of privileged subjects and the ostracizing invisibility of marginalized ones. I am still in the process of detecting which linguistic (de)practices could be considered part of EntErwähnung. During the process of writing "Diaspora," an essay included in a recent book on racism and discrimination in the German language, for example,³ I realized that when Black Feminist epistemology as well as Black epistemology and knowledge production is ignored in a text that deals with Blackness construction issues in Germany, in public issues such as "integration" and immigration, as well as in German history, this is also EntErwähnung. I base my argument on the EntErwähnung of the amazing historical research of Fatima El-Tayeb (2001): *Black Germans: The Discourse on Race and National Identity 1890–1933*, which is not mentioned in two specialized references: the Dictionary of Political Sciences (2005) and the Small Dictionary on Africa (2004), published after El-Tayeb's landmark work.

Both linguistic categories EntNennung (DeNaming) and EntErwähnung (DeMentioning) could be circumscribed within practices of DeEnunciation, which I would like to relate to what Roland Barthes calls 'new semiologies': "We need new concepts to grasp it, not the old ones of sign, signifier, signified, connotation and denotation, but 'citation, reference, stereotype'. We need to offer an 'antidote to myth', and its reifications, languages which are 'airy, light, spaced, open, un-centered, noble and free', a 'new semiology.'⁴

The first time that the category Black-German was printed in *Der Tagesspiegel* during 2004–2006 was in relation to a brutal racist attack committed against an academic. Arguably, this mention does not necessarily mean that the political self-position of Black-German identity is recognized here, but this is not the right moment to go further into this.

The following account on how *Tagesspiegel* covered Ermiyas M.'s case with regards to EntNennung (DeNaming) and EntErwähnung (DeMentioning) is presented in the aforementioned essay "Diaspora." I depart from the thesis of Fatima El-Tayeb (2001) that white Germany was legally prescribed during its brief and brutal colonial intervention in the African continent,⁵ which literally declared Black-German identity as an oxymoron. I would like to paraphrase El-Tayeb, stating that white Germany was born in Namibia. In order to bring this experience to current debates on identity, and from a European perspective, I have contributed the new category "EntErwähnte Diaspora" (DeMentioned Diaspora), to talk about a deNamed Black Diaspora and the epistemic violence inherent to these racist laws, which are still fully applied in Germany to this day.

In this account, we can reflect on how the identity of the academic, Ermiyas M., was constructed in *Der Tagesspiegel*: "In the twenty-seven articles analyzed (between 18.04.06–23.08.06), Ermiyas M.

is characterized sixty-three times as the Other and, in this respect, seven times in connection to his skin and hair. That the perpetrators were white was never mentioned, the only reference to their identity is evident in the term neo-Nazi and in one allusion to their short haircuts. Ermiyas M.'s identity as an academic, father and German, was only mentioned once. His identity as Black-German is re/Presented four times respectively as: "Deutschafrikaner", "Deutschäthiopier" and "Deutsch-Äthiopier", and only once as Black German: "schwarze[r] Deutsche", as mentioned before. His status as a recipient of white German racism against Black People is reproduced twenty times with the textual re/production of the "N. Word".⁶

In my current research, I counter reflect these practices of DeEnunciation and racial profiling with the postcolonial knowledge production of the artistic entity IngridMwangiRobertHutter, who predominantly addresses normalizing white supremacist German identity constructions with the use of their own skin and hair. This is how they describe their collective work: "I'm IngridMwangiRobertHutter. And I try to develop a consciousness in which I have those two bodies. So when I make art, I put that masculine white body in relationship to this feminine "black" body. This is very exciting, because we are dealing with the materiality of the body. It expands the breadth of the whole theme: the concept for me comes from living. It's how you live it, how you work with it, how it manifests itself, rather than just projecting the idea that we want to be one person."⁷

In "Neger, Don't Call Me" (1999), moving image and moving image rePresented as still image portraiture are juxtaposed in a manner characteristic of this collective. In IMRH's work, it is common to witness an element reappear in different media with a different title, sometimes translating its meaning into a new context, especially with the intervention of performance. The artist's dreads become one with her face establishing the perimeters of the stereotype challenged by the title. The mask conveys an identity constructed by means of an epistemic violence which denies a person any claim of individuality. Only white subjects have personality, Black persons instead have "features." These "features" are reduced to absurdity in this visual equation where the "wildness" associated with Black hair is portrayed simultaneously in nine different frames, on video, with one single image agglutinating the alleged danger of these strange yet familiar masks, juxtaposed on top. The interaction between both bi-dimensional planes is then projected into one single screen, as a phantasmatic tattoo on these colonizing views of the Black subject, in this case, a woman. In one of the nine screens, she is playing freely with her hair, creating waves of resistance in a kind of possession, a common practice in many shamanic cultures that has found its most popular stereotype in the colonizing demonization of voodoo, for example. The four chairs in this installation narrate the cultural shock experienced by Ingrid Mwangi when she first arrived in Germany after spending the first fifteen years of her life in Kenya. Permanently confronted with the epistemic violence of Otherness in an extremely hostile environment, she is giving voice to Black German experience with a very intimate tone; the audience can decide whether to silence her by literally "s(h)itting" on her experience, or to listen. . .

With an even subtler strategy, in the video art "Wild at Heart" (1998), a blurry image of the artist is seen through the bars of her dreads, while we listen to the murmuring roar of a beast. The double-consciousness of the Black subject is rendered visible again by reducing it to absurdity. How can an animal-like creature defend its case if not by means of indeed roaring and grunting its claims to become part of a "civilized" white hegemonic society?

In "Neger" (1999), the artist is using the single-channel video format to fixate the permanence of the stereotype in a classic first shot portrait; the white background plays a more significant role in this media. It is almost impossible not to be enchanted by its formal beauty; Blackness and exotization once again play their treacherous and seductive game; the artist demands from us a more proactive involvement with the subject in both meanings of the word, with the portrayed individual and with the complexities of the issues brought up by this masquerade.

There are plenty of hidden knowledge production agendas in IMRH's manipulation of her own hair. IMRH's pioneering involvement with this subject in a local German and also a broader Black European context is particularly groundbreaking, not only because it is produced in a gender-challenging collaborative mode, but also because it is rigorously multi-mediatic, as mentioned before. On a personal note, in a group exhibition that I organized in Berlin in 2009, I explored my issues with my own hair, addressing the compulsive need to make it look as white as possible and juxtaposing this longing with certain power issues of my curatorial persona and those of a Black Diaspora woman performing hetero-normativity and beauty.⁸

Playing with a characteristic synesthetic stamina, transforming the visual into text and vice versa, in the performance "Regen-Neger" (1999), the artist frees her voice, yet another constant in her performances. She has experimented with this medium since being introduced to it by New York performance artist Shelley Hirsch, a pioneer in expanded voice techniques. Her powerful voice creates unsettling sounds; she chirps, shouts and screeches in primal tones. While translating with her disturbing sounds the consequences of this double-consciousness, this bodily incarnation of Otherness aims at transmitting a knowledge of oppression that by no means pretends to be absolutistic or plainly accusatory, but which is instead open to transformation in the sense that Patricia Hill Collins understands Black feminist epistemology.

The German palindrome "Neger-Regen" is commonly reproduced in popular culture; this and many other extremely racist statements against Black People are embedded in the German language and culture. Another example is the children's game: Who is afraid of the Black Man?

Hair and skin as a medium share an established tradition in the visual arts, and above all in performance art; this tradition is especially meaningful in the context of Black feminist epistemology for more than one reason. The interplay between different levels of meaning in, for example, the relationship between text and image is extremely relevant. As Ellen Gallagher says in reference to her collage work "DeLuxe": "I am definitely working with characters that are culturally recognizable, this body, this 1939 to 1970, this moment. The way the word Negro brings to mind something that is impossible with the words African American or Black. A particular span of time, a something passing. There's that idea of loss and ghosts. It's something that's more than just me. It's about this stacking of my own resonances or dissonances with the material, but the material itself has a structure, which has a life through me, beyond me, before me, after me. It's material that I am activating. I am making a private language within this material to reanimate this material. Each repetition is an initiation. These characters are initiated into this altered state, but you remember them from before I touched them."⁹

Blackness *á la* MwangiHutter has a very different agenda to that of Gallagher, since contrary to the U.S., the "N. Word" is not a historical subject in printed media; as we have seen before, this term is constantly reProduced in German media without (still) major consequences.

In the first article of *Der Tagesspiegel* that made a clear statement on the Germanness of Ermiyas M.'s status as a citizen, based for instance on his membership in a soccer club and the social-democrats' party, SPD, in spite of the author's intention to question the until then commonplace of constructing Ermiyas M.'s identity as a non-German, the reProduction of the "N. Word" is still not part of this critical approach. The role played by dreadlocks in the white male fantasies on the Black subject is portrayed with extreme accuracy in the same article: "...two men pass by the bus stop, maybe they are [the white Germans] Björn L. and Thomas M., that were imprisoned on Thursday night as suspects. It was a fatal encounter: **The big Black** [man, individual, person, human being, Black-German, perhaps...?] whose dreadlocks reach nearly to his waist, and two [white German] men, one a petty criminal, the other known to the police as a sympathizer of the extreme right."¹⁰

Here we encounter Black hair as a signifier of "positive" exotization, and male Blackness is again associated to those white sexual fantasies so thoroughly analyzed by Frantz Fanon in *White Skin, Black Masks*. Whenever Black Diaspora's knowledge production and epistemology is ignored, I consider it also as part of the all-inclusive field of EntErwähnung. This idea is discussed in depth in my aforementioned essay "Diaspora."

It might be useful to point out here that German printed media is exceptional with regards to racism against Black People. German politicians are more updated about issues like, for example, racial profiling than the press itself. To paraphrase this statement: Germany might be the only country in the world where the media is more conservative than the politicians.

Civil Rights initiatives such as der braune mob and KOP – Rechtshilfefonds für Opfer rassistischer Polizeigewalt [Legal Assistance for Victims of Police Brutality] are lobbying intensively to introduce the notion of racial profiling into the public space. As a result, the German government has already included racial profiling as part of its National Action Plan Against Racism [NAP – National Aktionsplan gegen Rassismus].¹¹

This government initiative was made public in 2008; eleven years before, IMRH created "Black Half – Half Black" (1997), a self-explanatory diptych in which the idea of the mask as hair and vice versa is already announcing the artist's preoccupation to translate Black Diaspora's experience specifically to the German context. Germany is still embedded in colonialist language practices, which have already been declared taboo by any standards of journalistic practice in the United States, for example, for many years.

The second element by means of which white hegemonic society constructs Otherness with regards to the Black subject is the most visible one: Skin. As in other works, "The Skin Thing" (2006) stretches the notion of projection beyond its familiar boundaries. Here, the screen is the body and the projector, the sun. The artist exposes her upper body wearing a stenciled t-shirt, which is then later separated as a fetish, no wonder it is a white one... The mark, however, remains indelible. In this piece, the actual passiveness of the artist is oversized when presented as an installation; her body is made two meters long.

Other works "portray" a headless body reinforcing the absence of subjectivity by which the white hegemonic gaze constructs its fantasy of the colonized subject, especially of women.

On the one hand, the Black female body is the constant by which the rule of otherizing is established, the white male body appears only on rare occasions. "Wearing the Object of Contemplation" (2007) evokes the solution of this riddle; all these efforts have finally made sense, it is possible to find a way in which the white subject can reflect on and literally project his own colonizing constructions and practices on his own body, in a way that is neither patronizing/patriarchal nor responds to the demands of white guilt.

And finally, this entire colonizing mess is solved in "Resolution of Lies" (2008), a poetic equation found, not surprisingly, in Nature, indeed... We can hear the sound of silence in this image. Its powerful self-explanatory "nature," its iconographic stamina and self-referentiality might also be a trap of our own senses. This iconographic reproduction of the shape of the continent, on a rock that seems to have captured by pure chance the residues of a blood deluge, conveys the notion of a never ending randomized algorithm of questions, of possibilities, historical, biographical, cosmic, physical,

⁹ *The Brooklyn Rail*. "In Conversation with Ellen Gallagher," <http://www.brooklynrail.org/2005/03/art/ellen-gallagher>

¹⁰ Lichtenbeck, Philipp/Mitarbeitsstaff, Tiede, Peter, 22.04.2006, *Der Tagesspiegel*, Third page: Before it was dark around him. Father, a PhD student, member of the SPD, footballers – who is the victim of the racket of Potsdam.

¹¹ <http://www.derbraunemob.de>, <http://www.reachoutberlin.de>, <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/090/1609061.pdf>

¹ A. Lann Hornscheidt, "(Nicht) Benennung: Critical Whiteness Studies und Linguistik", in Eggert, M./Kilomba, G./Plesche, P./Arndt, S. (eds), *Mythen, Masken, Subjekte. Kritische Weißseinsforschung in Deutschland*, Unrast, Münster 2005. The concept of Nicht-Benennung of whiteness is basically a white German feminist adaptation to racial profiling from a linguistic perspective. The first reference I found on this subject, in Germany, was in the guidelines for journalistic practice edited by <http://www.derbraunemob.de>. They were already included as an annex in the first version of my Master's thesis.

² "[Alanna Lockward] is prejudiced in the way that the results of her research are already established from the beginning. In the first sentences of her introduction, she talks about the discriminatory use of language in *Der Tagesspiegel*, which in her simplified opinion is established by the fact that when a white German is the victim of a crime, any mentioning of a phenotypic feature is irrelevant, while the newspaper does mention this phenotypic feature if the victim is a Black German. It does not occur to her, that the norm must be treated differently from the exception." Dr. Volker Hoffmann, 2006: First evaluation. In a second evaluation, Volker Hoffmann accepted my thesis after the theories of Antje Lann Hornscheidt's on (Nicht) Benennung were presented as a scientific reference. No other substantial changes were made in the content of my previous (rejected) version. (The bold is from Volker Hoffmann, the underline and capital letters in "Black German" are mine).

³ Nduka-Agwu Adibeli/Hornscheidt, Antje Lann (ed.), *Rassismus auf gut Deutsch*, Brandes & Apsel, Frankfurt a. M., 2010.

⁴ Roland Barthes, *Image-Music-Text*, Fontana Press, London, 1977, p. 168.

⁵ "It was at this meeting (Berlin Conference, November 14, 1884–February 23, 1885) that Africa's final fate at the hands of the imperial powers of Europe was sealed. To be sure, the colonial enterprise was short, a mere but brutal seventy years (as the history of the Belgian Congo under Leopold II reminds us). Yet it left an indelible mark, whose crude, schematic features remain difficult both to erase and to reconcile with civilized conduct." Okwui Enwezor, 2001, p. 12.

textual, visual, and, and, and... How do we know that this image was taken in the African continent, for example? Is this question relevant at all? What are the truths that remain hidden in the white supremacist constructions of the African continent? What are the lies? What remains entErwähnt in these constructions? Could EntErwähnung become a methodological translation of lies, of silences?

I argue that not only was white Germany born in Namibia, but also, that the construction “Africa” was invented IN Germany during the Berlin Congo Conference of 1884–1885. How is it possible that such historical facts remain “unknown” in white supremacist Germany? Grada Kilomba has a very clear way to explain this: “Once confronted with the collective secrets of racist oppression and the pieces of that very dirty history, the *white* subject commonly argues: ‘not to know...’, ‘not to understand...’, ‘not to remember...’, or ‘not to believe...’ These are expressions of this process of repression by which the subject resists making the unconscious information conscious; that is, one wants to make the known unknown [EntErwähnung]. Repression [EntErwähnung] is, in this sense, the defense by which the ego controls and exercises censorship of what is instigated as an ‘unpleasant’ truth. They say they do not know! But if I know, they too have to know as we co-exist in the same scenario. They say they have never heard of it! But how come, if we have been speaking it for 500 years. Five hundred years is such a long time. What do they want to know? And what do they want to hear?”¹²

“If” (2003) was inspired by a similar image printed in the magazine *Der Spiegel* with the title “Hitler’s Admirers.” The white subject of IMRH suggested that the Black subject should impersonate all the women on the frame, and in a similar way the Black subject suggested that the white one should impersonate Hitler. This dynamic is very much associated with the *raison d’être* of this artistic entity: “[...] how would Ingrid Mwangi and Robert Hutter have related to each other only seven decades ago? [...] And: how far have we succeeded in overcoming this history? In previous works I have been discussing the concept, history and reality of Blackness, beginning with my personal story, and going beyond that into further identification with what it must mean to be discriminated, exploited and violated, by the mere fact of dark skin color [...]. My artistic strategy has become increasingly one of identification; to take the place of the other, in order to feel, to understand. In “If,” I take a similar approach of putting myself in place of the other, but resulting in a different outcome, for the viewer will not as willingly accept my identification with the white as he does with the Black. In this case, ‘the Other’ are those who should have known, who knew and who benefited.”¹³

I add: ...who still benefit from not being confronted with the epistemic and structural violence against Black People in Germany, mainly because of the enormous epistemic profit ensured and sedimented in/by EntNennung and EntErwähnung.


This text was presented as a lecture at the Workshop/Research Meeting “Feminist Perspectives on Racism and Migratism as Concepts for Analysing Swedish and German Realities from a Constructivist and Postcolonial Perspective,” Uppsala University, May 13th–15th, 2010, organized by Prof. Dr. Antje Lann Hornscheidt.

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¹² Grada Kilomba, *Plantation Memories: Episodes of Everyday Racism*. Unrast, Münster, 2008, p. 21. (The brackets are mine).
¹³ IngridMwangiRobertHutter: “If,” 2005, Statement. http://www.ingridmwangiroberthutter.com/mh/text_ingridmwangiroberthutter_about_eventualities.html



INGRIDMWANGIROBERTHUTTER, *Black Half – Half Black*, 1997, 2 C-prints, 34 cm x 42 cm, courtesy of the artists.



INGRIDMWANGIROBERTHUTTER, *Neger, don’t call me*, 1999, video projection, 4 chairs with loudspeakers, 11:34’, loop, digital Dolby surround sound, courtesy of the artists.



INGRIDMWANGIROBERTHUTTER, *If*, 2003, C-print, 168 cm x 125 cm, produced with the support of the Museum for African Art, New York, courtesy of the artists.