A New Fascism?

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ed. by Susanne Pfeffer
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In 2013, I invited Loretta Fahrenholz to make a new film for the Fridericianum as one of the first artists presenting a solo exhibition. Loosely based on Irmgard Keun's novel *After Midnight*, Loretta Fahrenholz produced a new film, entitled *Two A.M.*, which you can watch on the fourth floor of the Fridericianum tower. In her 1937 exile novel, Keun describes living in Germany during the Nazi era as a time of fear, government control, repression, denunciation and murder. Fahrenholz's socio-fiction film reveals a frightening similarity to the present-day of surveillance capitalism and re-emerging fascism. And that led us to the symposium we are doing today, where we are asking the following questions: Is there a new fascism emerging? Has fascism reinvented itself? Are old theories regarding fascism still adequate to analyse these new forms? Or do these terms only demonise people and political parties as Chantal Mouffe suggests? Is the experience and/or fear of disintegration the reason for discriminatory attitudes towards minorities, such as migrants, asylum seekers, Muslims, homosexual people and the homeless, as Wilhelm Heitmeyer’s research project suggests? Did the complicity of the left with a neoliberal elite lead to the rise of the right? And how can we form a counter-acting power, as G. M. Tamás asks today? Is a global civil war the only answer in this stage of development as Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi suggests? I think we are getting closer to trying to answer these questions today. I also think the urgency of this topic is undeniable, as is made evident by the very fact that you are here today. And I hope and I wish that the outcome of the symposium helps us to counter-act the uprising forces.
In his 1946 book *Die Schuldfrage*, Karl Jaspers, the philosopher who is credited as being one of the founders of the existentialist movement, said that we should distinguish between Nazism as a historical event and the concept of Nazism. I add that we also have to consider the social dynamics that gave rise to Nazism in the past century in order to compare them with contemporary social dynamics.

Just a short note: I distinguish between 'fascism' and 'Nazism' because I think that these two concepts refer to different cultural frameworks. It would be interesting to analyse the difference between the Baroque experience of Italian fascism and the Gothic experience of German Nazism but we are not here to make philological distinctions now.

Jaspers wrote that the quintessential feature of Nazism is techno-totalitarian and he argued that a full manifestation of the nature of Nazism might reappear in the future. Is that future now?
My point is that fascism will never reappear in the historical form we knew in the twentieth century, although some features of the fascist experience may resurface and are actually resurfacing today in a different context. Is this new context helping or countering the affirmation of Nazism?

In the last 15 years we have witnessed a social process that is very similar to the process that developed in the 1920s in Italy and Germany, notwithstanding enormous differences in cultural and technological context. After German workers had been defeated, impoverished and humiliated by aggressive financial strategies in the 1920s, Adolf Hitler was able to win democratic elections by saying: ‘Do not think of yourselves as workers, as defeated and impoverished workers. Think of yourselves as Germans, as white warriors, and you will win.’ As we know, they did not win. But they destroyed Europe. The point is that if we look at the planet now—from Narendra Modi’s India to Trump’s United States, to Orbán’s Hungary, Kaczyński’s Poland and Theresa May’s United Kingdom—what they are again saying is: do not think of yourselves as defeated, impoverished workers, think of yourselves as white warriors, and you will win. They will not win, but they might destroy the world.

They will not win: this has been important to know from the beginning. This is the point that will become dangerous in the next years. The promises that Donald Trump made to workers and the unemployed in the United States will not be fulfilled. In fact, he’s already betrayed his promises: on the day after his victory, the new US President chose three people from Goldman Sachs to be in the US government. This makes it crystal clear that the relationship between the global financial class and anti-globalist rising nationalism is absolutely unbreakable. There will be fights, negotiations and agreements between big corporations and new protectionism. But at the end of the day the people who pay will be the working class. Trump is a financial predator and he will take care of the interests of financial predators, not of unemployed or working people.

Conditions for American workers will not improve over the next six months, two years or five years. So what will happen, what will be the next step? When the administration realises that Trump cannot meet his demands or fulfil his promises, a scapegoat will be identified, a scapegoat will be pointed at as the enemy and will be attacked. In the United States, scapegoats are easy to find: Muslims, Blacks, and Latinos will be targeted by the election-winning Ku Klux Klan.

A situation like this may result in widespread racist aggression and civil war. War is the distinctive characteristic of the present time: what kind of war are we experiencing in the present?

Is the Third World War coming? I do not think so. In the same way that we cannot speak about ‘fascism’ in its proper sense, we also cannot speak about a ‘World War’ as we did in the twentieth century. Mainly because you cannot identify two fronts.

If you look at what is happening in the Middle East, for instance, just to focus on a specific location, you will see that there are not two or three fronts. Instead, you have a fragmentation of micro-conflicts, exploding one after the other.

In a sense, we might say that the current war is a long-lasting consequence of the privatisation of everything. This is no longer a war of national states. The national states are dead and Orbán and Trump will not revive them. National states are no longer the real actors of history. Nationalism is a sort of nostalgic mythology submitted to the reality of the global capitalism of our time. Nationalism and identitarianism are going to fuel war and violence. For a period, they could also disrupt the process of globalisation but they won’t replace the global corporations and the networked economy as the ruling force of our time.

Nationalism and fascism are mythological references, an expression of the desire for revenge, for violence. The desire for subversion cannot be expressed in progressive terms because the betrayal of the left is expressing itself in fascist terms.

But the techno-anthropological context in which fascism is resurfacing nowadays is totally different to the context of the past century. For this reason, we should start by understanding how anthropological mutation has changed behaviour, forms of life and cognitive patterns, particularly in the new generations. The present mutation is negating the ability of human will to govern social concatenations. The potency of political will—both in democratic forms and in authoritarian forms—is outpaced and replaced by a techno-linguistic automatism.

Human will is now a sort of ersatz, a sort of hysterical surrogation, or simulation. Fascism is rising as a desperate and demented rebellion against the impotence of the will, against the subjugation of human events to the automaton.
We have to simultaneously consider the different dimensions of the present global condition. One dimension is the creation of the global techno-linguistic automaton, resulting from the intersection between artificial intelligence, big data and the net. The other dimension is the nostalgia, the furious craving for a return of human potency. Impotence is the distinctive quality of our time. Impotence and the rage that impotence provokes — especially among white men — is, in my opinion, the deep and current return of fascism.

If you want to understand what is happening in the United States, you should read Jonathan Franzen. Jonathan Franzen is a writer who has been looking at the daily lives of American people and investigating the process of rotting, of decomposition of the American brain and the growing depression of the American psyche, of the white American psyche. Heroin consumption has increased enormously during the last ten years in the United States, but not in black neighbourhoods, nor in suburban Latino neighbourhoods. In midwestern white small towns heroin, along with many other kinds of opioids provided by Big Pharma, is spreading. If we want to understand what has happened in the United States, we have to read Freedom, we have to read The Corrections. These are extraordinary essays by Jonathan Franzen, which are novels — not philosophical or economic analyses — that help us grasp the decay of the white American psyche.

Currently, the American psyche is trying a sort of aggressive reconstitution and we have to focus on the relationship between the brain and the body in this peculiar situation.

What has happened in the last twenty or thirty years? These have been the years of neo-liberal governance on the one hand, and simultaneously, the years of the creation of the techno-linguistic automaton. What is the effect of the two simultaneous becomings of the world? In my opinion, the main effect is a growing separation of the brain from the body. The brain — the financial brain, the technological brain, the media brain — is becoming connected in a way that is more and more separated from the concrete life of the body, both the social and the erotic body.

So, you have a brainless body which is spreading into the territory of misery, unemployment and war, and you have a bodiless brain which is growing in the dimension of the virtual bunker, of the financial bunker. During the last ten years, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of September 2008, this separation of the brain from the body has resulted both in the impoverishment of bodily life and in a sprawling pathology of psychic life.

In Italy, as in the United States and in the United Kingdom, the salary of the average worker has been halved in the last 15 years or so. Simultaneously, the average working life has more or less doubled. In every family, people have to work much more than they did twenty or thirty years ago. This precarity means that the workers’ psychic energies are permanently mobilised.

This impoverishment and precariousness has resulted in humiliation: both political and existential humiliation. As far as I know, the concept of humiliation has never been thematised nor analysed in the sphere of political thought. What is humiliation after all? I would say that the meaning of the word ‘humiliation’ is linked with a form of renunciation, in which people are forced to become aware of their inability to fulfil their self-image. Humiliation means breaking down the relationship between self-image, expectation, perceived reality and recognition.

You are humiliated when you realise that your self-image is destroyed, denied by your real experience.

The white workers of the West have been humiliated by neo-liberal governance and by the centre-left governments that have enforced that governance. The identity of Western workers has been so humiliated that they have decided to identify themselves in a different way: as the white race. The white race is coming back: the ‘superior’ race, the race of predators. The sentiment of superiority, unmentionable but deeply entrenched in the Western unconscious and also in Western culture, has been contradicted and humiliated by the reality of financial capitalism, by the daily experience of impotence that is destroying people’s self-esteem and trust in the future. You see, the ambiguity of the word ‘impotence’ — the sexual implication of this word — is absolutely fundamental here if we want to understand what is happening in the Western world.

While a reaction to the humiliation inflicted on the Western psyche surfaces as nationalism and racism, a similar but opposed process is developing in the unconscious of the South of the world.

At this point I am going to quote a text by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Secretary of State in Carter’s administration, who belonged to the American establishment. He was the author of Out of Control, published in 1993, a book
in which he anticipated a crisis of the world order following the end of the Cold War. In that book he said that the end of the Cold War did not inaugurate an age of peace as imagined by Mr. Fukuyama. Brzezinski foresaw instability and chaos in the post-Cold War world.

In June 2016, Brzezinski published a very interesting article, entitled ‘Toward a Global Realignment’ in the magazine The National Interest. The title of the article is bland and the style is inelegant, but the words of Brzezinski had a frightening impact on me as I read them. Listen to his words:

Special attention should be focused on the non-Western world’s newly politically aroused masses. Long-repressed political memories are fueling in large part the sudden and very explosive awakening energised by Islamic extremists in the Middle East, but what is happening in the Middle East today may be just the beginning of a wider phenomenon to come out of Africa, Asia, and even among the pre-colonial peoples of the Western Hemisphere in the years ahead.

Periodic massacres of their not-so-distant ancestors through colonists and associated wealth-seekers largely from western Europe resulted within the past two or so centuries in the slaughter of colonized peoples on a scale comparable to Nazi World War II crimes: literally involving hundreds of thousands and even millions of victims. Political self-assertion enhanced by delayed outrage and grief is a powerful force that is now surfacing, thirsting for revenge, not just in the Muslim Middle East but also very likely beyond.

These words are shocking, but Brzezinski adds more, with the radical and implacable sincerity that someone who is looking back on his own life and on the history of the past would have:

Much of the data cannot be precisely established, but taken collectively, they are shocking. Let just a few examples suffice. In the 16th century, due largely to disease brought by Spanish explorers, the population of the native Aztec Empire in present-day Mexico declined from 25 million to approximately one million. Similarly, in North America, an estimated 90 percent of the native population died within the first five years of contact with European settlers, due primarily to diseases. In the 19th century, various wars and forced resettlements killed an additional 100,000. In India from 1857–1867, the British are suspected of killing up to one million civilians in reprisals stemming from the Indian Rebellion of 1857. The British East India Company’s use of Indian agriculture to grow opium then essentially forced on China resulted in the premature deaths of millions, not including the directly inflicted Chinese casualties of the First and Second Opium Wars. In the Congo, which was the personal holding of Belgian King Leopold II, 10–15 million people were killed between 1890 and 1910. In Vietnam, recent estimates suggest that between one and three million civilians were killed from 1955 to 1975.

As to the Muslim world in Russia’s Caucasus, from 1864 and 1867, 90 percent of the local Circassian population was forcibly relocated and between 300,000 and 1.5 million either starved to death or were killed. Between 1916 and 1918, tens of thousands of Muslims were killed when 300,000 Turkic Muslims were forced by Russian authorities through the mountains of Central Asia and into China. In Indonesia, between 1835 and 1840, the Dutch occupiers killed an estimated 300,000 civilians. In Algeria, following a 15-year civil war from 1830–1845, French brutality, famine, and disease killed 1.5 million Algerians, nearly half the population. In neighbouring Libya, the Italians forced Cyrenaicans into concentration camps, where an estimated 80,000 to 500,000 died between 1927 and 1934.

More recently, in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989 the Soviet Union is estimated to have killed around one million civilians; two decades later, the United States has killed 26,000 civilians during its 15-year war in Afghanistan. In Iraq, 165,000 civilians have been killed by the United States and its allies in the past 13 years... Just as shocking as the scale of these atrocities is how quickly the West forgot about them.

The quotation is long, I acknowledge that, but I think it deserves to be read.

Brzezinski is suggesting that we are now approaching the showdown of five hundred years of Western colonialism and of the white race’s domination of our planet. According to Brzezinski, the revenge of the oppressed populations of the South—impoverished and humiliated by white colonialism—is coming. It is well-known that we are going to face the consequences of environmental devastation. But we are also going to face the political and
military effects of the humiliation the white race has inflicted on the populations of the southern world and this may provoke unimaginable consequences on human civilisation. Socialism or barbarianism, we said fifty years ago. Socialism has been defeated, and the memory of socialism has been criminalised. It's no wonder that we are going to face barbarianism. Humiliated in the last 30 years by the financial governance, white workers are taking revenge. Against whom? First of all, they are taking revenge against the neo-liberal left. From Tony Blair to Bill Clinton, and from François Hollande to Matteo Renzi to Gerhard Schröder, the neo-liberal left-wing parties that have been in government in the years of the financial dictatorship have a clear responsibility. They are responsible for this incredible catastrophe that is happening nowadays. They have systematically betrayed the interests of the workers and now the working-class revenge has begun and is taking the shape of a fascist upheaval all over the Western world.

The revenge of the white workers is intersecting the other direction of revenge, which is happening on a planetary scale: the identitarian upheaval of people of colour.

This scenario is going to play out in the next decades. This is what I call the global civil war, the effect of privatisation and of war itself.

The Iraq War has not been waged by the American national state. It has been waged by Blackwater, Halliburton, ExxonMobil and so on. In the same way that the narcotics war in Mexico is not a national war, it is the most bloody war waged by neo-liberal enterprises like the Sinaloa Cartel and by neo-liberal entrepreneurs like Mister 'El Chapo' and many others like him. The effect of the total deregulation of the economy is the unchaining of the present civil war.

I want to say two final things. I want to imagine what will happen to the relationship between the brainless body and the bodiless brain in the near future. In order to imagine what is going to happen, I will look at some phenomena, for example the process of demonetisation in India. Scarcely noticed by the Western press, this process is based on a decision made by Narendra Modi. On 8 November 2016, Narendra Modi launched a new fashion: de-mo-ne-ti-sation. What is this? Demonetisation means that the existing currency, the money that common people have in their pockets, is suddenly no longer valid by a presidential decree. On that day at 6pm, the bank notes of 500 and 1,000 rupees were declared invalid because the In-
civil war will be. I don't know what the demented body is going to do in its fascist becoming. But we can easily predict that the unchaining of the demented body will provoke a fundamental trauma.

Secondly, I do not know what the effects of the trauma will be on the bodiless brain: what will happen in the global Silicon Valley, in the minds of millions of cognitive workers scattered around the globe. Although I am an avid reader of Evgeny Morozov— I recognise that his writings on corporate power in Silicon Valley are true— I do not agree with the implied identification of Silicon Valley with the economic power of the corporations. When I say global Silicon Valley, I am referring to the social force that is producing and inventing the network and its contents. The global Silicon Valley is the deterritorialised space in which millions of cognitive workers, engineers, poets, designers and programmers are working: a space of conflict, of conflicting interests and projects. The global Silicon Valley is you. It is one hundred million connected cognitive workers who are living in a condition of precariousness and suffering in every city of the world. Civil war in the streets of the United States and the beginning of a process of self-organising the cognitive workers of the world: this is the expectation that comes from my ignorance, from what I don't know about the future.
The Populist Moment

Chantal Mouffe

Following the success of Brexit in the United Kingdom and the victory of Donald Trump in the US elections, the media are spreading the fear that Western liberal democracies are in danger of being taken over by ‘extreme-right’ parties attempting to install ‘fascist’ regimes. What should we make of this fear?

Liberal democracies are no doubt being confronted with a crisis of representation that manifests itself in an increasing disaffection with established parties and in the rise of anti-establishment movements. This represents a real challenge for democratic politics and can lead to a weakening of liberal democratic institutions. However I contend that categories like ‘fascism’ and the ‘extreme right’ or comparisons with the 1930s do not suffice to grasp the nature of this challenge. They suggest that we are witnessing the recurrence of a well-known phenomenon, the return of ‘the brown plague’ that affects societies when exposed to economic difficulties that provoke an outburst of irrational passions. This implies that no special examination is therefore needed.

It is certainly not my intention to deny the existence of political groupings that can properly be qualified as ‘extreme right’. Fortunately they are marginal and they do not seriously threaten our basic institutions. There are also parties like Golden Dawn in Greece or Jobbik in Hungary with a clearly
‘neo-fascist’ character. But this is not the case with the FPÖ in Austria, the National Front under Marine Le Pen or the variety of right-wing nationalist parties that are now flourishing in Europe. In contrast to the traditional ‘extreme right’, the objective of these parties is not to overturn liberal democratic institutions in order to establish a dictatorship. Their strategy consists in establishing a political frontier between ‘the people’ and ‘the establishment’. They are better characterized as ‘populist’ and they require a different type of analysis.

To be sure, many people equate populism with fascism and the extreme right. This is clearly the tactics used today by the elites to disqualify all the forces who question the ‘status quo’. To understand the growing appeal of populist parties, we need to reject the simplistic vision disseminated by the media, which brands populism as pure demagoguery. The analytical perspective developed by Ernesto Laclau offers us important theoretical tools to address this question. He defines populism as a way of constructing the political, which consists of establishing a political frontier that divides society into two camps, calling for the mobilization of the ‘underdog’ against ‘those in power’. This is pertinent when seeking to construct a new subject of collective action—the people—capable of reconfiguring a social order experienced as unjust. It is not an ideology, and cannot be attributed a specific programmatic content. Nor is it a political regime. It is a way of doing politics that can take various forms according to times and places, and is compatible with a variety of institutional forms. Some populisms have been fascist, but there are many other forms and not all of them are incompatible with liberal democratic institutions. What they have in common is their opposition between the ‘underdog’ and those from ‘above’, but this type of mobilization can have democratizing results. This was, for instance, how the populist movement in the United States in the nineteenth century was able to redistribute political power in favour of the majority without putting in question the whole democratic system.

Populism, far from representing a pathology or a perversion of democracy, constitutes one of its important dimensions. Indeed, it refers to the dimension of popular sovereignty and the construction of a demos that is constitutive of democracy. It is precisely this dimension that has been discarded by neo-liberal hegemony. As a consequence we can say that we live today in a post-democracy and that the restoration of democracy requires a populist political intervention.

What exactly is meant by ‘post-democracy’? Let us begin by clarifying the meaning of ‘democracy’. As it is known, etymologically speaking, democracy comes from the Greek demos/kratos, which means power of the people. It is a principle of legitimacy that is not exercised in the abstract, but instead through specific institutions. When we speak of ‘democracy’ in Europe we refer to a specific model: the Western model that results from the inscription of the democratic ideal in a particular historical context. This model—which has received a variety of names: modern democracy, representative democracy, parliamentary democracy, constitutional democracy, liberal democracy, pluralist democracy—is characterized by the articulation of two different traditions. On the one hand, the tradition of political liberalism: the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the defence of individual freedom; on the other hand, the democratic tradition, whose central ideas are equality and popular sovereignty. Contrary to what is sometimes said, there is no necessary relationship between these two traditions, but only a contingent historical articulation which—as C.B. Macpherson has shown—took place in the nineteenth century through the joint struggles of the liberals and the democrats against absolutist regimes.

Some authors, like Carl Schmitt, affirm that this articulation produced an unvi able regime, as liberalism denies democracy and democracy denies liberalism; others, following Jürgen Habermas, maintain the co-originality of the principles of freedom and equality. Schmitt is certainly right in pointing out the presence of a conflict between the liberal ‘grammar’ of equality—which postulates universality and the reference to ‘humanity’—and the ‘grammar’ of democratic equality, which requires the construction of a people and a frontier between a ‘we’ and a ‘they’. But I think he is mistaken in presenting that conflict in terms of a contradiction that must inevitably lead pluralistic liberal democracy to self-destruction.

In The Democratic Paradox, I proposed to conceive of the articulation of these traditions—which are, indeed, ultimately irreconcilable—on the mode of a paradoxical configuration, as the locus of a tension that defines the originality of liberal democracy and guarantees its pluralistic character. The democratic logic of constructing a people and defending egalitarian practices is necessary to define a demos and to subvert the tendency of liberal discourse to abstract universalism; but its articulation with liberal logic allows us to challenge the forms of exclusion that are inherent in the political practices of determining the people who will govern. Democratic
liberal politics consists of a constant process of negotiation — through different hegemonic configurations — of this constitutive tension. This tension, expressed in political terms along the frontier between right and left, can only be stabilized temporarily through pragmatic negotiations between political forces. These negotiations always establish the hegemony of one of them. Revisiting the history of pluralistic liberal democracy, we find that on some occasions the liberal logic prevailed, while on others it was the democratic one. Nonetheless the two logics remained in force, and the possibility of an agonistic negotiation between right and left — specific to the liberal democratic regime — always remained.

If our current situation can be described as ‘post-democracy’, it is because in recent years, with the weakening of democratic values as a consequence of the implementation of neo-liberal hegemony, this constitutive tension has been eliminated and the agonistic spaces where different projects of society could confront each other have disappeared. In the political arena, this evolution was made manifest through what I proposed in On the Political, using the term ‘post-politics’ to refer to the blurring of the political frontier between the right and the left. By that term, I mean the consensus established between centre-right and centre-left parties on the idea that there was no alternative to neo-liberal globalization. Under the pretext of ‘modernization’ imposed by globalization, social democratic parties accepted the dikta of financial capitalism and the limits they imposed on state interventions in their redistributive policies. The role of parliaments and institutions that allow citizens to influence political decisions was drastically reduced, and citizens have been deprived of the possibility of exercising their democratic rights. Elections no longer offer any opportunity to decide on real alternatives through the traditional parties of ‘government’. Politics has become a mere technical issue of managing the established order, a domain reserved to experts. The only thing that post-politics allows is a bipartisan alternation of power between the centre-right and centre-left parties. All those who oppose this ‘consensus in the centre’ are described as ‘populists’ and presented as ‘extremists’.

Popular sovereignty has been declared obsolete, and democracy has been reduced to its liberal component. Thus one of the fundamental pillars of the democratic ideal was undermined: the power of the people. To be sure, ‘democracy’ is still spoken of, but only to indicate the existence of elections and the defence of human rights.

These changes at the political level have taken place in the context of a new mode of capitalist regulation, in which financial capital occupies a central place. With the financialization of the economy, there was a great expansion of the financial sector at the cost of the productive economy. Under the combined effects of deindustrialization, the promotion of technological changes, and processes of relocation to countries where labour was cheaper, many jobs were lost. Privatization and deregulation policies also contributed to creating a situation of endemic unemployment, and workers found themselves in increasingly difficult conditions. If one adds to this the effects of the austerity policies that were imposed after the 2008 crisis, one can understand the causes of the exponential increase of the inequalities we have witnessed in several European countries, particularly in the south. This inequality no longer affects only the working class, but also a large part of the middle class, which has entered into a process of pauperization and precarization. Social democratic parties have accompanied this development, and in many places they have even played an important role in the implementation of neo-liberal policies. This contributed to the fact that the other pillar of the democratic ideal — the defence of equality — has also been eliminated from the liberal democratic discourse. What now rules is an individualistic liberal vision that celebrates consumer society and the freedom that the markets offer.

The result of neo-liberal hegemony was the establishment, both socio-economically and politically, of a truly ‘oligarchic’ regime. It is precisely this oligarchization of European societies that is at the origin of the success of right-wing populist parties. As a matter of fact, they are often the only ones who denounce this situation, promising to defend the people against globalization, giving them back the power that has been confiscated by the elites. In many countries, they have used a xenophobic vocabulary to articulate the demands of the popular sectors which were ignored by the parties of the centre because they were incompatible with the neo-liberal project. The social democratic parties, prisoners of their post-political dogmas and reluctant to admit their mistakes, refuse to recognize that many of these demands are legitimate democratic demands, to which a progressive answer must be given. This is why they cannot grasp the nature of the populist challenge.

The strength of right-wing populism comes from the fact that it has been, in many countries, able to draw a frontier and construct a people in order to
translate politically the various resistances to the phenomenon of oligarchization induced by neo-liberal hegemony. Its appeal is particularly notable within the working class, but it is also growing within the middle class affected by the new structures of domination linked to neo-liberal globalization.

Classifying those right-wing populist parties as ‘extreme right’ or ‘neo-fascist’ is an easy way to dismiss their demands, refusing to acknowledge the democratic dimension of many of them. Attributing their appeal to lack of education or to the influence of atavistic factors is, of course, especially convenient for the forces of the centre-left. It allows them to avoid recognizing their own responsibility in their emergence. Their answer is to protect the ‘good democrats’ against the danger of ‘irrational’ passions by establishing a ‘moral’ frontier so as to exclude the ‘extremists’ from the democratic debate. This strategy of demonization of the ‘enemies’ of the bipartisan consensus might be morally comforting, but it is politically disempowering.

To design a properly political answer, we have to realize that the only way to fight right-wing populism is to give a progressive answer to the democratic demands that they are expressing in a xenophobic language. This supposes recognizing the existence of a democratic nucleus in those demands and the possibility, through a different discourse, of articulating them in a progressive direction. This should be the aim of a left-wing populism.

This crisis is the expression of very heterogeneous demands, which cannot be formulated through the left/right cleavage as traditionally configured. Unlike the struggles characteristic of the era of Fordist capitalism, when there was a working class defending its specific interests, in post-Fordist neo-liberal capitalism, resistances have developed at many points outside the productive process. These demands no longer correspond to social sectors defined in sociological terms and by their location in the social structure. Many are claims that touch on questions related to quality of life and have a transversal character. The demands linked to the struggles against sexism, racism and other forms of domination have also become increasingly central. In order to articulate such diversity in a collective will, the traditional left/right frontier no longer works. Federating these diverse struggles demands establishing a synergy between social movement and party forms with the objective of constructing a ‘people’, and for that a frontier constructed in a populist way is required.

We should be aware that such a project cannot be formulated without discarding the rationalist, essentialist approach dominant in liberal democratic thinking. Such an approach prevents us from acknowledging the necessarily partisan nature of politics and the central role of affects in the construction of collective political identities. To label the parties that reject the post-political consensus as ‘extreme-right’ or ‘fascist’ is to condemn oneself to political impotence. The only way to fight against right-wing populist parties is to address the issues that they have put on the agenda by offering them a progressive answer, able to mobilize common affects towards social justice. This should be the objective of a left-wing populist movement aiming at the recuperation and radicalization of democracy.

I am convinced that in the next few years the central axis of the political conflict will be between right-wing populism and left-wing populism, and it is imperative that progressive sectors understand the importance of involving themselves in that struggle. It is through the construction of another people, a collective will that results from the mobilization of the passions in defence of equality and social justice, that it will be possible to combat the xenophobic policies promoted by right-wing populism.

By recreating political frontiers, the ‘populist moment’ we are witnessing in Europe points to a ‘return of the political’. It is a return that may open the way for authoritarian solutions — through regimes that weaken liberal democratic institutions — but which can also lead to a reaffirmation and a deepening of democratic values. Everything will depend on the kind of populism that emerges victorious from the struggle against post-politics and post-democracy.

(2) Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005).
Right-Wing Populism in the Population and Escalation: An Empirical Analysis

Wilhelm Heitmeyer

I Aim and framework
This theory-led contribution seeks to undertake an empirical analysis of the economic, political and social developments that have contributed to the current extent of right-wing populist attitudes in Germany. First of all, we need to review the state of developments which have occurred since around the year 2000, in order to contextualize the current empirical findings. The framework is based on a published article (Heitmeyer 2001): ‘Authoritarian Capitalism, Depletion of Democracy and Right-wing Populism’. 
The concept included three elements:

1. We observe a development where global capitalism gains ever greater control over economic and societal development, while on the other hand democratic politics experiences a dramatic loss of control in the sense of the ability to develop an integrated society avoiding social inequality and so on.

2. This loss of control on the part of democratic politics leads to a depletion of democracy, a loss of control in personal biographies, a loss of influence of trade unions and processes of social disintegration.

3. The conclusion of the thesis in 2001 was that the winner of these processes will be right-wing populism and mistrust of the elites and the system.

Social Disintegration and Group-Focused Enmity
The current situation is obvious. A spectre is haunting Europe. The spectre of right-wing populism and nationalism. Right-wing populism is not new in Europe. Examples include Austria, Denmark, France, Hungary, the Netherlands and Poland.
In Germany, the situation has been changing since 2014, when the political movement PEGIDA emerged, especially in eastern Germany, along with the political party Alternative for Germany. Since then, a political bundling of long-existing right-wing populist attitudes in the German population has taken place.

What is the concept and what are the empirical results? Our longitudinal research project on group-focused enmity between 2002 and 2011 included annual representative surveys; we can therefore report on the situation before and after the emergence of the right-wing movement and party in Germany in 2014. The concept of group-focused enmity (Heitmeyer 2002) focuses on negative attitudes towards weak groups, which are the targets of devaluation, discrimination and violence. People become targets on the basis of belonging to such groups, independent of individual behaviour. Figure 1 shows the syndrome of group-focused enmity with at least twelve elements. It includes migrants, Muslims, Jews, homeless people, homosexuals, asylum seekers etc., measuring the societal climate against weak groups. (1: Fig. 1)

Fig. 1: The Syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity

Fig. 2: Process Model

Socio-structural Development — Dynamics of Integration and Disintegration

Policy and mobilization proposals of organized, subcultural right-wing extremism and of right-wing populism

Group-focused enmity
Attitudes within the population
The empirical analyses demonstrate that this is a syndrome. These are not isolated prejudices. All of them have a common background, a special ideology: the ideology of inequality in the sense of unequal worth.

The ideology focuses on two main differences: (1) differences between in-groups and out-groups, and (2) superiority and inferiority.

What are the results concerning attitudes in the German population, against the background of societal developments in the last decade, times in which financial crisis, political crisis and social crisis generate fear of social disintegration?

From a sociological perspective, we stress the dynamics and interactions between actors in three contexts. (Fig. 2)

1. Powerful actors in government and the influence of capitalist actors produce the circumstances of the integration-disintegration dynamics; for example fear of social disintegration.

2. Group-focused enmity in the population may result in attitudes against weak groups.

3. There are political actors in right-wing populist movements and parties and right-wing extremist groups who acquire legitimization for their activities from people with group-focused enmity attitudes, and in turn offer a home for their aggression and rage. Additionally, they criticize the political establishment.

There are several interaction processes (marked in the figure by arrows) (See Heitmeyer 2011). It is necessary to stress the dynamics between actors in the various fields. The central question is: what are the consequences of the dynamics of integration and disintegration as the basis of group-focused enmity in the population and in right-wing populism? It is therefore fruitful to consider a model from social disintegration theory (Heitmeyer/Anhut 2008). (Fig. 3)

The model has three dimensions on two levels: an objective and a subjective level. The first dimension focuses on the objective factor of reproduction through the labour market and the subjective factor of gaining recognition. The second dimension stresses the institutional factor in the sense of political participation in the public sphere — having a voice and gaining moral recognition as a political actor. The third dimension addresses social belonging in milieux etc. as a source of emotional recognition.

![Fig. 3: Social Disintegration Theory](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of Integration</th>
<th>Structural Integration (systemic integration on an individual basis)</th>
<th>Institutional Integration (communicative interaction)</th>
<th>Socio-emotional Integration (cultural and expressive social interaction)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agenda</td>
<td>Participation in material and cultural goods</td>
<td>Compromise between conflicting interests</td>
<td>Establishing emotional relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria</td>
<td>• access to partial systems (objective dimension)</td>
<td>• opportunities and willingness to participate in processes (political decision-making)</td>
<td>• recognition of personal identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• recognition (subjective dimension)</td>
<td>• adherence to basic principles (fairness, justice, solidarity)</td>
<td>• acceptance of collective identities and symbols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of recognition</td>
<td>Positional recognition</td>
<td>Moral recognition</td>
<td>Emotional recognition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The central thesis is that if there is a broad sense and experience of recognition deficits in the established system, people will look for alternatives to gain recognition through — for example — new social movements, parties and so on, in order to have a say in the public sphere. This may occur on the basis of group-focused enmity and devaluation and discrimination of identified out-groups — to mark the in-group’s superiority and the inferiority of the other. If there is fear or experience of social disintegration, there will be a higher level of group-focused enmity than when no fear or experience exist.

Three topics are important. First the factor of being threatened or not threatened by crisis. (Fig. 4)

It is obvious that people who feel threatened by crisis have much more negative attitudes towards targeted groups like migrants, Muslims and especially asylum seekers. Another important element is the feeling of disorientation. (Fig. 5)

This result shows that people who are disoriented in times of rapid globalized change have many more prejudices than others.
The role of participation is important for social integration. People who have no participation in public affairs have many more prejudices than those who participate.

These are only some aspects concerning the potential of attitudes in the whole population; they must be embedded in a broader analytical model. We tested these assumptions on the basis of the aforementioned framework (Heitmeyer 2001).

The basic figuration shows that there has been a control gain for authoritarian capitalism and a control loss for national politics. This control loss leads to a depletion of democracy, in the sense of a loss of popular confidence generated by policies associated with the aforementioned risks of disintegration, fear of loss of status, etc. for particular population groups. In particular, political alienation and criticism of a lack of representation create the path towards right-wing populist attitudes and support for right-wing populist movements and parties.
The Bundling of Attitudes by Right-wing Movements and Parties

If we focus on the potential of parts of the population with explicit right-wing populist attitudes, we must first explicate the criteria for measurement. In 2002, we included three criteria: agreement with xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and authoritarian aggression. The result in 2002 was that 20 percent agreed with all three. Between 2009 and 2011 — for example — we found increasing willingness among people with increasing right-wing populist attitudes to join political protests and, in certain cases, even willingness to use violence.

These are results that we published — in the sense of public sociology — several years before right-wing populist groups like PEGIDA and AfD grew in Germany. Additionally, specific prejudices against asylum seekers and Muslims were already present before summer 2015 and the arrival of large numbers of refugees in Germany. We had already found negative attitudes towards and mistrust of asylum seekers in 2011. And respondents were reporting feelings of foreignness in their own country (in relation to Muslims) even before the arrival of refugees from mainly Muslim countries in summer 2015. There are also broad suspicions that the Muslim community sympathizes with Islamist terrorist groups.

Examining Figure 8, we can see that there has been a long development of the potential of right-wing populism in Germany, mostly in the lower classes but also in the middle class. Concerning escalations, the increasing feeling of powerlessness as a basis for anger among people with right-wing and prejudiced attitudes (group-focused enmity) is an important factor.

Additionally, we found increasing willingness of individuals in the part of the population with right-wing attitudes to use violence. What are the effects of these prejudices and other attitudes in relation to right-wing populist movements and parties? It is obvious that there is a long-standing and broad potential for group-focused enmity in the German population. It requires only a few experts in mobilization, emotionalizing topics like a ‘flood of asylum-seekers’, to organize movements with increasingly aggressive attitudes and behaviour.
Right-wing populist movements and parties focus on four central topics:
(1) The fear of social disintegration in the population, in the sense of status relegation.
(2) The fear of foreign cultural infiltration by migrants, Muslims, etc.
(3) Political denationalization by the European Union.
(4) Alienation in the sense of criticism of democratic representation, against the political elites.

Very often, people with right-wing and right-wing populist attitudes have experienced or perceived recognition deficits. The elites in these movements and parties are playing with these issues in an increasingly emotional and aggressive manner. The elites of right-wing populist groups seem to be able to transform the feeling of inferiority in this part of the population into a feeling of superiority through nationalism and prejudice against weak groups, in this case against migrants, Muslims and asylum seekers. They do this to stabilize their own status.

IV The Escalation Model
This development is rather dangerous and has to be included in an escalation model.

In Germany we have a broad spectrum of problematic attitudes such as group-focused enmity, a right-wing populist movement and party, and additionally several radicalized milieus and potential terrorist groups. This spectrum is shown in Figure 11.

This concept shows that the attitudes of group-focused enmity in the population are very important. These attitudes deliver the legitimization for aggressive speech in right-wing populist groups. Mostly they do not employ violence, but other groups who collaborate with the right-wing populist groups, the radicalized milieus, do use violence against minorities, Muslims, asylum seekers and so on.

Mostly, we do not know what the trigger causes are. But it is obvious that the population is also responsible for discrimination and violence against asylum seekers. And violence against asylum seekers increased rapidly in 2015 compared with 2014.

Fig. 11: Escalation Model

(1) Terrorist Cells, e.g. NSU
(2) Support Networks
'Freie Kraefte', comradeships, Blood & Honour, Hammerskins. Characteristics: high politicization and massive propensity for violence, in part with the ability to take strategic and conspirative actions.

(3) Anti-system Groups
'Autonome Nationalisten', 'ordinary' comradeships with limited ability to take strategic action, subcultural right-wing extremism, NPD, 'Stiedlerbewegungen' and völksch groupings (Artamanen i.a.) Reichsbürger (without features of violence). Characteristics: clear rejection of the political order, partly with propensity for violence, emphasis on publicity.

(4) Right-wing Populist Groups

(5) Group-focused Enmity (GFE) as attitudes within the population for legitimation of radicalization
V Conclusion

The analysis indicates relationships between the economic manifestations of authoritarian capitalism, the effects of a negative attitude in parts of the German population towards the current state of the democratic political system and the authoritarian temptations of right-wing populist movements and parties. Escalations cannot be excluded. However, the trend is not automatically towards fascism. We need a broad societal discussion with those responsible concerning the emergence of right-wing populism and dangerous violence processes. In the current situation, neither the political elites nor civil society have suitable concepts to stop the success of the right-wing populism parties in Germany and Europe.
Fascism Without Fascism

G. M. Tamás

Well, I shall follow the advice of Chantal Mouffe and I will be both agonistic and affectionate. And I will also offer a compromise today. We have been told that we should avoid the word ‘fascism’. So, I am offering a compromise. Others will not use the word ‘fascism’ and I will not use the word ‘populism’ for a very simple reason: I do not think it exists. Now let’s return to the fundamental problem here. After what happened in the 1930s and the 1940s, including the small episode that was World War II, a very fragile consensus was established in 1945. For the first time since the crisis of fascism and war in the international arena, there was an eruption of socialist ideas. This idea has been formalised in the UN charter, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, which drew on some of the lessons of National Socialism in particular in an imperfect, insincere and hypocritical manner. This consensus has now been broken. In fact, it has been broken since 1989. After all, what was the fundamental procedure of fascism against bourgeois democracy and especially against socialism? The idea of bourgeois
democracy, bourgeois liberalism and the nation state, based on nineteenth-century liberal nationalism, was as follows: the aim of the political development of all those things was to approximate the idea of human rights and civil rights. In other words, to achieve a state of affairs in which nobody was allowed to be excluded from the political community. To be a member of the political community was the goal of democratic and socialist progress. It was also an aspect of nineteenth-century democratic nationalism that was based on attack, something that is very important, especially for us central Europeans, when all hell broke loose in the 1920s and 1930s: namely, the fact that you would be allowed to be a member of the political community if you were prepared to pay the price of admission, which was cultural assimilation. So, nations have been constructed through unification, as in the case of Germany, Italy, and later, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia etc. And these supra-ethnic nationalisms were not based on race, on tribe, on this, that or the other. If you agreed to speak the national language — as opposed to what Saint-Just called le patois contre-révolutionnaire, the dialects, and the controversial dialects — if you were willing to abandon the ‘langue d’Oc’ and accept the ‘langue d’Oïl’, then you would be accepted as a member of the national community with a teleology of equality in a political sense, which, of course, is the basis of classic republicans. This trend, albeit never complete and never sincerely meant, since all colonised people were excluded from it, was, however, still the aim. This planned development was broken by racism, which, of course, has always been the basis for imperialism. This imperialism is seen even in conservative works, such as Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism, where one of the foundations of fascist development is discovered in a colonial world view that was not just a political reality. If you’ve studied the history of ideas in England, then of course you will know how colonial ideas, Darwinism, social Darwinism, a strand of socialism and a strand of liberalism coincide with racist exclusion. John Stuart Mill was a racist and one of the colonialist founders of modern liberalism. And, in spite of all this, it was of course the [...] of this emancipation trend and the socialist revolution. That was one of the most important conclusions drawn by those who thought that capitalism, bourgeois democracy and bourgeois liberalism were not to be saved. That was the conclusion presented in the last sentence of The Communist Manifesto in 1848: ‘Workers of the world unite!’ The consequence of this was only felt in 1917 when the people of this world discovered that they had a common enemy: capitalism. Not the other proletarians of another country. It seems elementary, it seems commonplace, it seems banal, but even today it appears to be one of the most difficult things to realise, construct or build upon. It seems extremely difficult. Why does it seem so difficult? Because the essence of capitalism stands for crushing neo-liberals and social democrats and anyone similar; because capitalism stands for separation and division. How can a system — which is, after all, based on the domination of a minority — survive in the face of majority resistance? The answer: by becoming allies with part of the majority. And the main tools in this have of course always been religion, nation, race, this, that and the other. Nevertheless, some conceptual operations were needed. In a radical and historically important move, Adolf Hitler and his ideologues announced that there were some people in his country — legal inhabitants — who would be deprived of civil rights and would be excluded from the national community. He presented this idea to white people on the European continent — as that was itself a kind of colony — and made it possible for people who had already earned their place in a community to be excluded. This was a sort of liberation, elements of which you can see today in the latest developments and triumphs of the ‘extreme right’. This discovery made it appear as if there was a basis on which oppression, repression, discrimination and violence were morally justified. However, it wasn’t justified for the people who were members of the same moral community, but there were some individuals against whom violence and destructive passions were justified, permitted and even praiseworthy. This is a sort of liberation that sets something free.

Talking about political passions, and here I agree with Chantal Mouffe, is an abuse. You cannot really tell ‘passions’ and ‘reasons’ in politics apart. And our abstract passions, what kind of passions are they? But there was a liberation from the commands of morality, from the commands of generosity, from the commands of self-limitation. And that of course has replaced genuine emancipation. It was a radical change to existing society. And this was, of course, what a very unfashionable thinker today — Herbert Marcuse — called ‘repressive desublimation’. What happens, for example, with ‘political correctness’? Everyone, including professors, seems to be talking about political correctness. For example, in my own country [Hungary], none other than the prime minister said: ‘Now the tyranny of political correctness has finally ended and we are free.’ (In parentheses: What kind
of man needs his sincerity to be approved by superior authorities in New York?—Very strange! But what is he liberated from? Hypocrisy. He is liberated from hypocrisy. And now he can honestly say that the Roma are of inferior quality; that the Hungarian people are working hard and we cannot receive any migrants and refugees because we also have to pay for the Roma who do not want to work. OK, that is very simple: he is liberated. But what is liberated there? The faith, the passion and oppression. That is what is liberated. Finally that has been rehabilitated. Not only can you oppress women, ethnic minorities and foreigners, but you can also talk about it. So it is elevated to the rank of what is spiritual. It is not considered 'inferior'; it is not a dirty secret of a repressive society; it is the openly announced, a glorious title for dominion. And that is indeed experienced as liberation to a certain extent. Yes, well, the air has been cleared. Now we know that they want to repress and they want to kill and they want to discriminate and they want to live a passionate life of contempt. Good. So, now I will again follow Chantal Mouffe's advice and be agonistic about it and be agonistic about it in a very Athenian sense. You know about the Athenian rule, when there was real strife in Athens—civil war or other kinds—and those citizens who refused to take sides were exiled or imprisoned. The first duty of a democrat is to take sides. This is what I am proposing. I was very surprised to hear somebody say that neo-liberalism represented liberty. What? Liberty? The liberty of what? The liberty of whom? We are confronting versions of the same system: one hypocritical version, pretending to represent equality and liberty, and another that does not. There is a small difference. What we experienced as a victory of the anti-establishment, such as the election of Mr. Trump, is the most traditional, the most old-fashioned, oligarchic government that you can imagine: billionaires and generals. What is so new about this? This is the absolutely traditional upper class, taking power without hypocrisy, without pretending. This is naked power, this is in your face: 'You're fired!' Yes, that is the slogan of the new system and it is everywhere. Now the power systems have the courage to say: 'We do not want you! Do not come here! Do not live here! Get out! Get lost! You will be punished!' And this is supposed to be progress. Well, to a certain extent it is, because of course it is sincere. It is very sincere. These are not the class warriors, these are—to use an old traditional term, which is so dear to me as an old opponent of Stalinism and post-Stalinism—'enemies of the people'. The 'enemies of the people', who are representing small sections of interest and mobilising people against their own interest by invoking what? By trying to present, partly in a justified manner, the moral criticism of liberals, partial allies of the most oppressive capitalism and of social democrats. Here I agree with what we heard before. This kind of terror that we have been suffering from, accepting an order of repression and uniformity and exploitation as a 'system of freedom', this is gone. That is progress, if you wish. We will not call this 'liberalism', we will not call this 'democracy'. What we call it depends on your temperament. One thing, though, will not happen in these totalitarian systems: we are not likely to see concentration field camps filled with white people. Rather, we already have concentration camps filled with people of colour called 'refugee camps'. The question of an international order has been presented by none other than Immanuel Kant as a question of hospitality. He considered this idea in a famous work. As you will all know, especially in this country I suppose, hospitality was a condition of cosmopolitan order, by which Kant understood international republican order. Republican order in Kant's sense was a federation or a system of states in which all people are fully fledged citizens with rights, entitlements and dignities, and that the dignity is valid everywhere. The condition is that everywhere should have a just system. It is unimaginable that a system of exclusions like the present system of nation states and partial federations that is the European Union, which is not a universalist organisation, despite what Habermas might think about it or might have thought about it (he does not any longer), is just an association for rich, western European nations. But you see, you cannot build up a just and free world out of elements of injustice, inequality and so on. Now, let's go even a little deeper, if you will allow me. One of the most grievous harms inflicted on the emancipation struggles is our failure to differentiate between two kinds of 'socialism'. One I would call a 'resilient socialism' and the other a 'Marxist socialism'. What has been accepted as a socialist idea almost everywhere has, of course, been Rousseau's ideas and not Marx's. Marx's day is still to come. Rousseau and his followers—the Jacobins, the social democrats and Bolshevicks—believed that the understanding and the construction of an equal, dignified and just society comes about through equality, usually equality obtained through redistribution. But this is not Marx's idea. Marx's idea is not equality. Marx's idea is not redistribution. Marx's idea is an end to the commodity-producing system. An end to alienation. Emancipation from life forces.
of humankind estranged into the power arena of others. That is a theory, a liberationist theory in the sense of autonomy and not in the sense of equality. Equality may of course be a consequence; obviously a just society cannot be unequal, but as a consequence and not as a basis. And when socialists, social democrats and Bolsheviks tried to create a dignified, egalitarian and just society on the basis of redistribution, and in the case of the Bolsheviks, also a reversed value system, it was, of course, the Soviet Bloc, which was, for the first time in world history, at the pinnacle of the moral hierarchy. But what was there? Manual labour. Physical work. After tens of thousands of years, when it was the spirit, it was God, priests, sages, philosophers etc., and then of course came the aristocracy with the fiery souls, and the people who had to work for their living, who had to earn their bread, and who even in Athens, were of course not permitted to vote. Because nobody who has to work for a living can be independent. Nobody who is labouring for others can be autonomous. No fully-fledged member of a political community can be at the service of someone or something else at the same time. A real free political community must consist of free people. What does it mean to be a free political community that consists of exploited people under the command of the most stringent and brutal set of rules called technology? A work discipline and a time, a use of time, subordinated to a production of commodities. You enter an office, you enter a shop, you enter a factory and your autonomy disappears. And this is where you are spending the majority of your waking hours. What kind of a political community of free citizens can this be? This is obviously an illusion. And it has been proved many times to be an illusion, and of course there is the discontent, the humiliation, that ‘Bifo’ has spoken about this morning so eloquently and so poetically. Humiliation of people of colour, humiliation of white people, humiliation of poor and even humiliation of not-so-poor people by being dependent—even my intellectual colleagues, writing their submissions for grants, everybody collecting their points, everybody trying to get good marks in exams—there is not one single moment of independence. This is a free society? That is ridiculous! Well, let us stop pretending and being hypocrites. When people of course say, ‘our free community is threatened by this and that’, of course people can say: ‘This is a free community’. Should we defend your system? Why are people so neutral about the conquest of power by these really scheußlich [abominable] right-wing governments, such as my own? Because when the liberals tell them: ‘Up in arms! Save liberal democracy, save market capitalism, save inequality from the incursions of all sorts of unpleasant people!’ the people will say: ‘oh, yeah, right? Should we save a system that does not give us anything nice except cheap merchandise?’ So, people will not. We all hate Trump voters, and people who hate Trump agree on one point: This world as it is now is not worth saving. This is why the right is winning. This is why the right is winning. What is the great difference? That they are sincere? More oppressive than the rest? They are not so well mannered? Who cares about manners? Well I do, but I am old-fashioned. But even I do not think that this is very essential and very important, very substantive. I agree that contempt for Trump voters and for Brexiteers is not justified. We have come to a point where we do not resist any longer, because we do not think it is worthwhile. And hence come ideologies in the newspaper that say: ‘there is no difference between left and right’. Is there not? I mean: hierarchy and equality are the same, yes? Gain for others and suffering for these? And even the foolish resistance against this says: ‘This is really the same’. Let us be serious. Of course: it does not seem to be important. Because of the betrayals, because of the hypocrisy and because of what is the main fact of our age: the final defeat of the international workers’ movement. This is what has changed. This is why there is no alternative. For a very long time we have lived in a world where there was an alternative not only to the philosophy books, but you could go into the streets of many towns and you would come across a building on which Arbeiterheim [workers’ home] or Karl-Marx-Hof was written. You could tell in which Kneipen [pubs] your sort of people congregated. You could be sure that those people working in the big factories were against it all. And there was an idea that the working class was the first subaltern class in history to have not only a folklore of complaint, but also a high culture. Genuine literature, genuine philosophy, genuine social science. It was similar to the ruling classes of the past, in having conquered discourse through rational procedures, and it was immoderately proud of it, and, yes, committed the mistakes of positivism and scientism and other sins of this nature. That does not exist any longer. There is not a double system as there was during the Cold War, whatever the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China was worth, and I was always their enemy. It was certainly another world. It has preserved the presence of an alternative, at least symbolically for many. And we live in a world in which alternatives are not clear, are not visible.
and are not represented. But do we reconstruct such alternative and agnostic worlds by decrying difference: political and philosophical and moral difference? Yes, it is very unpleasant, because if you conduct a moral debate, sooner or later you will say that someone is a bad man. Yes, it may happen. That is, of course, not the aim of a moral discussion or a moral debate, but of course judgement of this kind has weight. And it is inconceivable that a real difference in a political community can be free of condemnation, of judgement, which are the consequences of moral choices. When poor old Elfriede Jelinek said that you should not talk to the FPÖ [the Freedom Party of Austria, a right-wing populist political party in Austria] voters, well yes, that is very clumsy. But by this, she does not mean that FPÖ voters are not human beings, she has been writing all her life about people who are typical FPÖ voters, but because she seems to think that it is intolerable to pretend that we share the same moral world with those people, who are advocating discrimination and distinction and hierarchy and oppression. It is difficult. You can, of course, have a conversation. I do. So, I would talk to conservatives and to extreme right-wing people and so on and so forth. But there is a limit. It is always the same and I guess that you might have had similar discussions: I am always told, ‘what you want — equal dignity for everybody, universal membership of a political community and to a nation — those are beautiful dreams. We are representing reality and reality is discrimination; reality is putting up boundaries, putting up frontiers and putting the people we do not like beyond those frontiers.’ And this is not the enmity of people who are thinking differently within the political community. This is establishing a boundary between political community and an area where there is no politics because there are no true human beings. ‘Politics is for us...’ — whoever ‘us’ may be — ‘...and we can deliberate, we can decide, we can dominate or we cannot dominate, but those who are outside, those may be human beings, but they are certainly not our fellow citizens.’ But what sense, since we are not members of the animal kingdom, what other sense is in the constitution of a human being that is devoid of political dimension? That we are biologically members of the same race? That is true. But what does it mean? What does it mean for thinking and feeling beings? Those people, who will be the members of the same humanity? If we are members of the same political community — and in order to be members of the same political community, to really have a say in our lives, in our fates etc., we will have to abandon all of our extant institutions.

In the last 500 years it’s been proven that the final result is always a massacre. It has been always like this. Until now. Look at colonial conquest, look at great revolutions, look at the great wars, including wars of liberation. Massacre after massacre. Oppression, violence, rape, torture, everything. Enough. Enough. Enough. Why not emancipation? Why not liberation? Why should we pretend to imitate our enemies, imitate their cunning, imitate their energy, imitate their dynamism? I do not envy their dynamism because it comes from the energy of rising above others. This is the energy of distinction. All societies are based on distinction, as Bourdieu said. All societies are based on distinction. All competitiveness, including the most virtuous one: being better at something, being excellent, being the first, being the most intelligent, being the most beautiful, being the fastest. Those are based on distinction, meaning ‘I am better than you’. And as long as the basis of that and as long as our concept of liberty is essentially competitive, it will be modelled on the bloody market. And not only the market: sports, contests, all our ideas of excellence are differential and hierarchical. In his famous book *After Virtue*, Alasdair MacIntyre said that our mistake of modernity was of course the temptation of equality. Because according to Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas and others, they knew better than us that the only virtue could be differential virtue. ‘Somebody is better than others’. This is the aim: to be better and better, which means comparison and contest. But comparison and contest for the losers is humiliation. Not everybody triumphs. It is a very nice idea to have a contest. We have this fuzzy fantasy that all of us are running in the same direction and somehow we’ll all be winners. But nobody runs in a contest if nobody is going to lose. There are no winners without losers. So, all these moral and political ideas are wrong if you want to be emancipated and ["desalinated"] (1:53:21). I have been talking about an essay that some of you may have read. It was published sixteen years ago in 2000 and it was called ‘Post-Fascism’. It has more recently been republished by openDemocracy along with other pieces on this subject.

I originally wanted to talk about those matters but hearing what’s been said here today, I decided to change my attack and to try to deliver a sermon to you. All right, I gave you a Heilige Lektion [religious oration] and because you can see my feelings, you can feel my feelings and my passions, I hope that I can maybe convince you, if not of anything else, than of my deep need to persuade you, that you should not go on tolerating all of this.

Thank you.
Biographies

The contributions are based on *A New Fascism*, a symposium held at Fridericianum on 17 December 2016 in conjunction with the exhibition *Two A.M.* by Loretta Fahrenholz.

Edited by Susanne Pfeffer

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A New Fascism?
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In 2013, I invited Loretta Fahrenholz to make a new film for the Fridericianum as one of the first artists presenting a solo exhibition. Loosely based on Irmgard Keun’s novel *After Midnight*, Loretta Fahrenholz produced a new film, entitled *Two A.M.*, which you can watch on the fourth floor of the Fridericianum tower. In her 1937 exile novel, Keun describes living in Germany during the Nazi era as a time of fear, government control, repression, denunciation and murder. Fahrenholz’s socio-fiction film reveals a frightening similarity to the present-day of surveillance capitalism and re-emerging fascism. And that led us to the symposium we are doing today, where we are asking the following questions: Is there a new fascism emerging? Has fascism reinvented itself? Are old theories regarding fascism still adequate to analyse these new forms? Or do these terms only demonise people and political parties as Chantal Mouffe suggests? Is the experience and/or fear of disintegration the reason for discriminatory attitudes towards minorities, such as migrants, asylum seekers, Muslims, homosexual people and the homeless, as Wilhelm Heitmeyer’s research project suggests? Did the complicity of the left with a neoliberal elite lead to the rise of the right? And how can we form a counter-acting power, as G. M. Tamás asks today? Is a global civil war the only answer in this stage of development as Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi suggests? I think we are getting closer to trying to answer these questions today. I also think the urgency of this topic is undeniable, as is made evident by the very fact that you are here today. And I hope and I wish that the outcome of the symposium helps us to counter-act the uprising forces.
In his 1946 book *Die Schuldfrage*, Karl Jaspers, the philosopher who is credited as being one of the founders of the existentialist movement, said that we should distinguish between Nazism as a historical event and the concept of Nazism. I add that we also have to consider the social dynamics that gave rise to Nazism in the past century in order to compare them with contemporary social dynamics.

Just a short note: I distinguish between ‘fascism’ and ‘Nazism’ because I think that these two concepts refer to different cultural frameworks. It would be interesting to analyse the difference between the Baroque experience of Italian fascism and the Gothic experience of German Nazism but we are not here to make philological distinctions now.

Jaspers wrote that the quintessential feature of Nazism is techno-totalitarian and he argued that a full manifestation of the nature of Nazism might reappear in the future. Is that future now?
My point is that fascism will never reappear in the historical form we knew in the twentieth century, although some features of the fascist experience may resurface and are actually resurfacing today in a different context. Is this new context helping or countering the affirmation of Nazism?

In the last 15 years we have witnessed a social process that is very similar to the process that developed in the 1920s in Italy and Germany, notwithstanding enormous differences in cultural and technological context.

After German workers had been defeated, impoverished and humiliated by aggressive financial strategies in the 1920s, Adolf Hitler was able to win democratic elections by saying: ‘Do not think of yourselves as workers, as defeated and impoverished workers. Think of yourselves as Germans, as white warriors, and you will win.’ As we know, they did not win. But they destroyed Europe. The point is that if we look at the planet now—from Narendra Modi’s India to Trump’s United States, to Orbán’s Hungary, Kaczyński’s Poland and Theresa May’s United Kingdom—what they are again saying is: do not think of yourselves as defeated, impoverished workers, think of yourselves as white warriors, and you will win. They will not win, but they might destroy the world.

They will not win: this has been important to know from the beginning. This is the point that will become dangerous in the next years. The promises that Donald Trump made to workers and the unemployed in the United States will not be fulfilled. In fact, he’s already betrayed his promises: on the day after his victory, the new US President chose three people from Goldman Sachs to be in the US government. This makes it crystal clear that the relationship between the global financial class and anti-globalist rising nationalism is absolutely unbreakable. There will be fights, negotiations and agreements between big corporations and new protectionism. But at the end of the day the people who pay will be the working class. Trump is a financial predator and he will take care of the interests of financial predators, not of unemployed or working people.

Conditions for American workers will not improve over the next six months, two years or five years. So what will happen, what will be the next step? When the administration realises that Trump cannot meet his demands or fulfil his promises, a scapegoat will be identified, a scapegoat will be pointed a finger at as the enemy and will be attacked. In the United States, scapegoats are easy to find: Muslims, Blacks, and Latinos will be targeted by the election-winning Ku Klux Klan.

A situation like this may result in widespread racist aggression and civil war. War is the distinctive characteristic of the present time: what kind of war are we experiencing in the present?

Is the Third World War coming? I do not think so. In the same way that we cannot speak about ‘fascism’ in its proper sense, we also cannot speak about a ‘World War’ as we did in the twentieth century. Mainly because you cannot identify two fronts.

If you look at what is happening in the Middle East, for instance, just to focus on a specific location, you will see that there are not two or three fronts. Instead, you have a fragmentation of micro-conflicts, exploding one after the other.

In a sense, we might say that the current war is a long-lasting consequence of the privatisation of everything. This is no longer a war of national states. The national states are dead and Orbán and Trump will not revive them. National states are no longer the real actors of history. Nationalism is a sort of nostalgic mythology submitted to the reality of the global capitalism of our time. Nationalism and identitarianism are going to fuel war and violence. For a period, they could also disrupt the process of globalisation but they won’t replace the global corporations and the networked economy as the ruling force of our time.

Nationalism and fascism are mythological references, an expression of the desire for revenge, for violence. The desire for subversion cannot be expressed in progressive terms because the betrayal of the left is expressing itself in fascist terms.

But the techno-anthropological context in which fascism is resurfacing nowadays is totally different to the context of the past century. For this reason, we should start by understanding how anthropological mutation has changed behaviour, forms of life and cognitive patterns, particularly in the new generations. The present mutation is negating the ability of human will to govern social concatenations. The potency of political will—both in democratic forms and in authoritarian forms—is outpaced and replaced by a techno-linguistic automatism.

Human will is now a sort of ersatz, a sort of hysterical surrogation, or simulation. Fascism is rising as a desperate and demented rebellion against the impotence of the will, against the subjugation of human events to the automaton.
We have to simultaneously consider the different dimensions of the present global condition. One dimension is the creation of the global techno-linguistic automaton, resulting from the intersection between artificial intelligence, big data and the net. The other dimension is the nostalgia, the furious craving for a return of human potency. Impotence is the distinctive quality of our time. Impotence and the rage that impotence provokes—especially among white men—is, in my opinion, the deep and current return of fascism.

If you want to understand what is happening in the United States, you should read Jonathan Franzen. Jonathan Franzen is a writer who has been looking at the daily lives of American people and investigating the process of rotting, of decomposition of the American brain and the growing depression of the American psyche, of the white American psyche. Heroin consumption has increased enormously during the last ten years in the United States, but not in black neighbourhoods, nor in suburban Latino neighbourhoods. In midwestern white small towns heroin, along with many other kinds of opioids provided by Big Pharma, is spreading. If we want to understand what has happened in the United States, we have to read Freedom, we have to read The Corrections. These are extraordinary essays by Jonathan Franzen, which are novels—not philosophical or economic analyses—that help us grasp the decay of the white American psyche. Currently, the American psyche is trying a sort of aggressive reconstitution and we have to focus on the relationship between the brain and the body in this peculiar situation.

What has happened in the last twenty or thirty years? These have been the years of neo-liberal governance on the one hand, and simultaneously, the years of the creation of the techno-linguistic automaton. What is the effect of the two simultaneous becomings of the world? In my opinion, the main effect is a growing separation of the brain from the body. The brain—the financial brain, the technological brain, the media brain—is becoming connected in a way that is more and more separated from the concrete life of the body, both the social and the erotic body.

So, you have a brainless body which is spreading into the territory of misery, unemployment and war, and you have a bodiless brain which is growing in the dimension of the virtual bunker, of the financial bunker. During the last ten years, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of September 2008, this separation of the brain from the body has resulted both in the impoverishment of bodily life and in a sprawling pathology of psychic life.

In Italy, as in the United States and in the United Kingdom, the salary of the average worker has been halved in the last 15 years or so. Simultaneously, the average working life has more or less doubled. In every family, people have to work much more than they did twenty or thirty years ago. This precarity means that the workers’ psychic energies are permanently mobilised.

This impoverishment and precariousness has resulted in humiliation: both political and existential humiliation. As far as I know, the concept of humiliation has never been thematised nor analysed in the sphere of political thought. What is humiliation after all? I would say that the meaning of the word ‘humiliation’ is linked with a form of renunciation, in which people are forced to become aware of their inability to fulfil their self-image. Humiliation means breaking down the relationship between self-image, expectation, perceived reality and recognition.

You are humiliated when you realise that your self-image is destroyed, denied by your real experience.

The white workers of the West have been humiliated by neo-liberal governance and by the centre-left governments that have enforced that governance. The identity of Western workers has been so humiliated that they have decided to identify themselves in a different way: as the white race. The white race is coming back: the ‘superior’ race, the race of predators. The sentiment of superiority, unmentionable but deeply entrenched in the Western unconscious and also in Western culture, has been contradicted and humiliated by the reality of financial capitalism, by the daily experience of impotence that is destroying people’s self-esteem and trust in the future. You see, the ambiguity of the word ‘impotence’—the sexual implication of this word—is absolutely fundamental here if we want to understand what is happening in the Western world.

While a reaction to the humiliation inflicted on the Western psyche surfaces as nationalism and racism, a similar but opposed process is developing in the unconscious of the South of the world.

At this point I am going to quote a text by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Secretary of State in Carter’s administration, who belonged to the American establishment. He was the author of Out of Control, published in 1993, a book
in which he anticipated a crisis of the world order following the end of the Cold War. In that book he said that the end of the Cold War did not inaugurate an age of peace as imagined by Mr. Fukuyama. Brzezinski foresaw instability and chaos in the post-Cold War world.

In June 2016, Brzezinski published a very interesting article, entitled ‘Toward a Global Realignment’ in the magazine The National Interest. The title of the article is bland and the style is inelegant, but the words of Brzezinski had a frightening impact on me as I read them. Listen to his words:

Special attention should be focused on the non-Western world’s newly politically aroused masses. Long-repressed political memories are fueling in large part the sudden and very explosive awakening energised by Islamic extremists in the Middle East, but what is happening in the Middle East today may be just the beginning of a wider phenomenon to come out of Africa, Asia, and even among the pre-colonial peoples of the Western Hemisphere in the years ahead.

Periodic massacres of their not-so-distant ancestors by colonists and associated wealth-seekers largely from western Europe resulted within the past two or so centuries in the slaughter of colonized peoples on a scale comparable to Nazi World War II crimes: literally involving hundreds of thousands and even millions of victims. Political self-assertion enhanced by delayed outrage and grief is a powerful force that is now surfacing, thirsting for revenge, not just in the Muslim Middle East but also very likely beyond.

These words are shocking, but Brzesinski adds more, with the radical and implacable sincerity that someone who is looking back on his own life and on the history of the past would have:

Much of the data cannot be precisely established, but taken collectively, they are shocking. Let just a few examples suffice. In the 16th century, due largely to disease brought by Spanish explorers, the population of the native Aztec Empire in present-day Mexico declined from 25 million to approximately one million. Similarly, in North America, an estimated 90 percent of the native population died within the first five years of contact with European settlers, due primarily to diseases. In the 19th century, various wars and forced resettlements killed an additional 100,000. In India from 1857–1867, the British are suspected of killing up to one million civilians in reprisals stemming from the Indian Rebellion of 1857. The British East India Company’s use of Indian agriculture to grow opium then essentially forced on China resulted in the premature deaths of millions, not including the directly inflicted Chinese casualties of the First and Second Opium Wars. In the Congo, which was the personal holding of Belgian King Leopold II, 10–15 million people were killed between 1890 and 1910. In Vietnam, recent estimates suggest that between one and three million civilians were killed from 1955 to 1975.

As to the Muslim world in Russia’s Caucasus, from 1864 and 1867, 90 percent of the local Circassian population was forcibly relocated and between 300,000 and 1.5 million either starved to death or were killed. Between 1916 and 1918, tens of thousands of Muslims were killed when 300,000 Turkic Muslims were forced by Russian authorities through the mountains of Central Asia and into China. In Indonesia, between 1835 and 1840, the Dutch occupiers killed an estimated 300,000 civilians. In Algeria, following a 15-year civil war from 1830–1845, French brutality, famine, and disease killed 1.5 million Algerians, nearly half the population. In neighbouring Libya, the Italians forced Cyrenaicans into concentration camps, where an estimated 80,000 to 500,000 died between 1927 and 1934.

More recently, in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989 the Soviet Union is estimated to have killed around one million civilians; two decades later, the United States has killed 26,000 civilians during its 15-year war in Afghanistan. In Iraq, 165,000 civilians have been killed by the United States and its allies in the past 13 years... Just as shocking as the scale of these atrocities is how quickly the West forgot about them.

The quotation is long, I acknowledge that, but I think it deserves to be read. Brzezinski is suggesting that we are now approaching the showdown of five hundred years of Western colonialism and of the white race’s domination of our planet. According to Brzezinski, the revenge of the oppressed populations of the South — impoverished and humiliated by white colonialism — is coming. It is well-known that we are going to face the consequences of environmental devastation. But we are also going to face the political and
military effects of the humiliation the white race has inflicted on the populations of the southern world and this may provoke unimaginable consequences on human civilisation. Socialism or barbarianism, we said fifty years ago. Socialism has been defeated, and the memory of socialism has been criminalised. It's no wonder that we are going to face barbarianism. Humiliated in the last 30 years by the financial governance, white workers are taking revenge. Against whom? First of all, they are taking revenge against the neo-liberal left. From Tony Blair to Bill Clinton, and from François Hollande to Matteo Renzi to Gerhard Schröder, the neo-liberal left-wing parties that have been in government in the years of the financial dictatorship have a clear responsibility. They are responsible for this incredible catastrophe that is happening nowadays. They have systematically betrayed the interests of the workers and now the working-class revenge has begun and is taking the shape of a fascist upheaval all over the Western world.

The revenge of the white workers is intersecting the other direction of revenge, which is happening on a planetary scale: the identitarian upheaval of people of colour.

This scenario is going to play out in the next decades. This is what I call the global civil war, the effect of privatisation and of war itself.

The Iraq War has not been waged by the American national state. It has been waged by Blackwater, Halliburton, ExxonMobil and so on. In the same way that the narcotics war in Mexico is not a national war, it is the most bloody war waged by neo-liberal enterprises like the Sinaloa Cartel and by neo-liberal entrepreneurs like Mister ‘El Chapo’ and many others like him. The effect of the total deregulation of the economy is the unchaining of the present civil war.

I want to say two final things. I want to imagine what will happen to the relationship between the brainless body and the bodiless brain in the near future. In order to imagine what is going to happen, I will look at some phenomena, for example the process of demonetisation in India. Scarcely noticed by the Western press, this process is based on a decision made by Narendra Modi. On 8 November 2016, Narendra Modi launched a new fashion: de-mo-ne-ti-sation. What is this? Demonetisation means that the existing currency, the money that common people have in their pockets, is suddenly no longer valid by a presidential decree. On that day at 6pm, the bank notes of 500 and 1,000 rupees were declared invalid because the Indian state decided to replace these banknotes for reasons that are difficult to understand. The real aim of demonetisation is a fast shift from the cash economy to the cashless online economy. People are obliged to forget about paper and to shift to online electronic payments. India is a country of 1.2 billion citizens and the bank notes of 500 and 1,000 rupees represent 86% of the country’s total currency. This means that, for weeks, people had no money with which to buy bread or to go about their daily business. Secondly, they are obliged to shift to the online economy. Notwithstanding recent technological developments in India, only 26% of the Indian population can use a computer, meaning that 75% of the Indian population are forced out of the exchange economy.

The social body—the brainless residue of the digital economy—is going to be decimated while the social brain is confined in the networked bunker. The brainless body is surviving at the margins, decaying and finally dying in a sort of monetary Holocaust because it is no longer able to access the dimension of money exchange, no longer able to buy bread. The body is residual and has to be eliminated. Those who cannot dance to the rhythm of neo-liberal competition are expelled from the planet, expelled from life, expelled from the right to survival, unless marginalised people create autonomous spaces of extra-economic exchange.

Do you have a word to define this? Is the right word ‘fascism’? I don’t know. I do not believe in conspiracies. I do not believe in malicious plots. Capitalism is the actor of our present tragedy.

One last thing: what is happening now? I have described very dark prospects, I know, very dark future landscapes. This is what I know, this is what I can assert about the present reality. As far as I know: there is no way out. But I do not know everything. My ignorance is my force.

First of all, I don’t know what is going to happen over the next few months in the United States. Civil war is a realistic scenario now as the Ku Klux Klan have taken the upper hand in a country whose population only half-belongs to the white race. And I don’t know what the next steps of the global
civil war will be. I don’t know what the demented body is going to do in its fascist becoming. But we can easily predict that the unchaining of the demented body will provoke a fundamental trauma. Secondly, I do not know what the effects of the trauma will be on the bodiless brain: what will happen in the global Silicon Valley, in the minds of millions of cognitive workers scattered around the globe. Although I am an avid reader of Evgeny Morozov—I recognise that his writings on corporate power in Silicon Valley are true—I do not agree with the implied identification of Silicon Valley with the economic power of the corporations. When I say global Silicon Valley, I am referring to the social force that is producing and inventing the network and its contents. The global Silicon Valley is the deterritorialised space in which millions of cognitive workers, engineers, poets, designers and programmers are working: a space of conflict, of conflicting interests and projects. The global Silicon Valley is you. It is one hundred million connected cognitive workers who are living in a condition of precariousness and suffering in every city of the world. Civil war in the streets of the United States and the beginning of a process of self-organising the cognitive workers of the world: this is the expectation that comes from my ignorance, from what I don’t know about the future.
Following the success of Brexit in the United Kingdom and the victory of Donald Trump in the US elections, the media are spreading the fear that Western liberal democracies are in danger of being taken over by ‘extreme-right’ parties attempting to install ‘fascist’ regimes. What should we make of this fear?

Liberal democracies are no doubt being confronted with a crisis of representation that manifests itself in an increasing disaffection with established parties and in the rise of anti-establishment movements. This represents a real challenge for democratic politics and can lead to a weakening of liberal democratic institutions. However I contend that categories like ‘fascism’ and the ‘extreme right’ or comparisons with the 1930s do not suffice to grasp the nature of this challenge. They suggest that we are witnessing the recurrence of a well-known phenomenon, the return of ‘the brown plague’ that affects societies when exposed to economic difficulties that provoke an outburst of irrational passions. This implies that no special examination is therefore needed.

It is certainly not my intention to deny the existence of political groupings that can properly be qualified as ‘extreme right’. Fortunately they are marginal and they do not seriously threaten our basic institutions. There are also parties like Golden Dawn in Greece or Jobbik in Hungary with a clearly
‘neo-fascist’ character. But this is not the case with the FPÖ in Austria, the National Front under Marine Le Pen or the variety of right-wing nationalist parties that are now flourishing in Europe. In contrast to the traditional ‘extreme right’, the objective of these parties is not to overturn liberal democratic institutions in order to establish a dictatorship. Their strategy consists in establishing a political frontier between ‘the people’ and ‘the establishment’. They are better characterized as ‘populist’ and they require a different type of analysis.

To be sure, many people equate populism with fascism and the extreme right. This is clearly the tactics used today by the elites to disqualify all the forces who question the ‘status quo’. To understand the growing appeal of populist parties, we need to reject the simplistic vision disseminated by the media, which brands populism as pure demagoguery. The analytical perspective developed by Ernesto Laclau offers us important theoretical tools to address this question. He defines populism as a way of constructing the political, which consists of establishing a political frontier that divides society into two camps, calling for the mobilization of the ‘underdog’ against ‘those in power’. This is pertinent when seeking to construct a new subject of collective action—the people—capable of reconfiguring a social order experienced as unjust. It is not an ideology, and cannot be attributed a specific programmatic content. Nor is it a political regime. It is a way of doing politics that can take various forms according to times and places, and is compatible with a variety of institutional forms. Some populisms have been fascist, but there are many other forms and not all of them are incompatible with liberal democratic institutions. What they have in common is their opposition between the ‘underdog’ and those from ‘above’, but this type of mobilization can have democratizing results. This was, for instance, how the populist movement in the United States in the nineteenth century was able to redistribute political power in favour of the majority without putting in question the whole democratic system.

Populism, far from representing a pathology or a perversion of democracy, constitutes one of its important dimensions. Indeed, it refers to the dimension of popular sovereignty and the construction of a demos that is constitutive of democracy. It is precisely this dimension that has been discarded by neo-liberal hegemony. As a consequence we can say that we live today in a post-democracy and that the restoration of democracy requires a populist political intervention.

What exactly is meant by ‘post-democracy’? Let us begin by clarifying the meaning of ‘democracy’. As it is known, etymologically speaking, democracy comes from the Greek demokratia, which means power of the people. It is a principle of legitimacy that is not exercised in the abstract, but instead through specific institutions. When we speak of ‘democracy’ in Europe we refer to a specific model: the Western model that results from the inscription of the democratic ideal in a particular historical context. This model—which has received a variety of names: modern democracy, representative democracy, parliamentary democracy, constitutional democracy, liberal democracy, pluralist democracy—is characterized by the articulation of two different traditions. On the one hand, the tradition of political liberalism: the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the defence of individual freedom; on the other hand, the democratic tradition, whose central ideas are equality and popular sovereignty. Contrary to what is sometimes said, there is no necessary relationship between these two traditions, but only a contingent historical articulation which—as C.B. Macpherson has shown—took place in the nineteenth century through the joint struggles of the liberals and the democrats against absolutist regimes.

Some authors, like Carl Schmitt, affirm that this articulation produced an unviable regime, as liberalism denies democracy and democracy denies liberalism; others, following Jürgen Habermas, maintain the co-originality of the principles of freedom and equality. Schmitt is certainly right in pointing out the presence of a conflict between the liberal ‘grammar’ of equality—which postulates universality and the reference to ‘humanity’—and the ‘grammar’ of democratic equality, which requires the construction of a people and a frontier between a ‘we’ and a ‘they’. But I think he is mistaken in presenting that conflict in terms of a contradiction that must inevitably lead pluralistic liberal democracy to self-destruction.

In The Democratic Paradox, I propose to conceive of the articulation of these traditions—which are, indeed, ultimately irreconcilable—on the mode of a paradoxical configuration, as the locus of a tension that defines the originality of liberal democracy and guarantees its pluralistic character. The democratic logic of constructing a people and defending egalitarian practices is necessary to define a demos and to subvert the tendency of liberal discourse to abstract universalism; but its articulation with liberal logic allows us to challenge the forms of exclusion that are inherent in the political practices of determining the people who will govern. Democratic
liberal politics consists of a constant process of negotiation — through different hegemonic configurations — of this constitutive tension. This tension, expressed in political terms along the frontier between right and left, can only be stabilized temporarily through pragmatic negotiations between political forces. These negotiations always establish the hegemony of one of them. Revisiting the history of pluralistic liberal democracy, we find that on some occasions the liberal logic prevailed, while on others it was the democratic one. Nonetheless the two logics remained in force, and the possibility of an agonistic negotiation between right and left — specific to the liberal democratic regime — always remained.

If our current situation can be described as 'post-democracy', it is because in recent years, with the weakening of democratic values as a consequence of the implementation of neo-liberal hegemony, this constitutive tension has been eliminated and the agonistic spaces where different projects of society could confront each other have disappeared. In the political arena, this evolution was made manifest through what I proposed in On the Political, using the term 'post-politics' to refer to the blurring of the political frontier between the right and the left. By that term, I mean the consensus established between centre-right and centre-left parties on the idea that there was no alternative to neo-liberal globalization. Under the pretext of 'modernization' imposed by globalization, social democratic parties accepted the diktats of financial capitalism and the limits they imposed on state interventions in their redistributive policies. The role of parliaments and institutions that allow citizens to influence political decisions was drastically reduced, and citizens have been deprived of the possibility of exercising their democratic rights. Elections no longer offer any opportunity to decide on real alternatives through the traditional parties of 'government'. Politics has become a mere technical issue of managing the established order, a domain reserved to experts. The only thing that post-politics allows is a bipartisan alternation of power between the centre-right and centre-left parties. All those who oppose this 'consensus in the centre' are described as 'populists' and presented as 'extremists'.

Popular sovereignty has been declared obsolete, and democracy has been reduced to its liberal component. Thus one of the fundamental pillars of the democratic ideal was undermined: the power of the people. To be sure, 'democracy' is still spoken of, but only to indicate the existence of elections and the defence of human rights.

These changes at the political level have taken place in the context of a new mode of capitalist regulation, in which financial capital occupies a central place. With the financialization of the economy, there was a great expansion of the financial sector at the cost of the productive economy. Under the combined effects of deindustrialization, the promotion of technological changes, and processes of relocation to countries where labour was cheaper, many jobs were lost. Privatization and deregulation policies also contributed to creating a situation of endemic unemployment, and workers found themselves in increasingly difficult conditions. If one adds to this the effects of the austerity policies that were imposed after the 2008 crisis, one can understand the causes of the exponential increase of the inequalities we have witnessed in several European countries, particularly in the south. This inequality no longer affects only the working class, but also a large part of the middle class, which has entered into a process of pauperization and precarization. Social democratic parties have accompanied this development, and in many places they have even played an important role in the implementation of neo-liberal policies. This contributed to the fact that the other pillar of the democratic ideal — the defence of equality — has also been eliminated from the liberal democratic discourse. What now rules is an individualistic liberal vision that celebrates consumer society and the freedom that the markets offer.

The result of neo-liberal hegemony was the establishment, both socio-economically and politically, of a truly 'oligarchic' regime. It is precisely this oligarchization of European societies that is at the origin of the success of right-wing populist parties. As a matter of fact, they are often the only ones who denounce this situation, promising to defend the people against globalization, giving them back the power that has been confiscated by the elites. In many countries, they have used a xenophobic vocabulary to articulate the demands of the popular sectors which were ignored by the parties of the centre because they were incompatible with the neo-liberal project. The social democratic parties, prisoners of their post-political dogmas and reluctant to admit their mistakes, refuse to recognize that many of these demands are legitimate democratic demands, to which a progressive answer must be given. This is why they cannot grasp the nature of the populist challenge.

The strength of right-wing populism comes from the fact that it has been, in many countries, able to draw a frontier and construct a people in order to
translate politically the various resistances to the phenomenon of oligarchization induced by neo-liberal hegemony. Its appeal is particularly notable within the working class, but it is also growing within the middle class affected by the new structures of domination linked to neo-liberal globalization.

Classifying those right-wing populist parties as ‘extreme right’ or ‘neo-fascist’ is an easy way to dismiss their demands, refusing to acknowledge the democratic dimension of many of them. Attributing their appeal to lack of education or to the influence of atavistic factors is, of course, especially convenient for the forces of the centre-left. It allows them to avoid recognizing their own responsibility in their emergence. Their answer is to protect the ‘good democrats’ against the danger of ‘irrational’ passions by establishing a ‘moral’ frontier so as to exclude the ‘extremists’ from the democratic debate. This strategy of demonization of the ‘enemies’ of the bipartisan consensus might be morally comforting, but it is politically disempowering.

To design a properly political answer, we have to realize that the only way to fight right-wing populism is to give a progressive answer to the democratic demands that they are expressing in a xenophobic language. This supposes recognizing the existence of a democratic nucleus in those demands and the possibility, through a different discourse, of articulating them in a progressive direction. This should be the aim of a left-wing populism.

This crisis is the expression of very heterogeneous demands, which cannot be formulated through the left/right cleavage as traditionally configured. Unlike the struggles characteristic of the era of Fordist capitalism, when there was a working class defending its specific interests, in post-Fordist neo-liberal capitalism, resistances have developed at many points outside the productive process. These demands no longer correspond to social sectors defined in sociological terms and by their location in the social structure. Many are claims that touch on questions related to quality of life and have a transversal character. The demands linked to the struggles against sexism, racism and other forms of domination have also become increasingly central. In order to articulate such diversity in a collective will, the traditional left/right frontier no longer works. Federating these diverse struggles demands establishing a synergy between social movement and party forms with the objective of constructing a ‘people’, and for that a frontier constructed in a populist way is required.

We should be aware that such a project cannot be formulated without discarding the rationalist, essentialist approach dominant in liberal democratic thinking. Such an approach prevents us from acknowledging the necessarily partisan nature of politics and the central role of affects in the construction of collective political identities. To label the parties that reject the post-political consensus as ‘extreme-right’ or ‘fascist’ is to condemn oneself to political impotence. The only way to fight against right-wing populist parties is to address the issues that they have put on the agenda by offering them a progressive answer, able to mobilize common affects towards social justice. This should be the objective of a left-wing populist movement aiming at the recuperation and radicalization of democracy.

I am convinced that in the next few years the central axis of the political conflict will be between right-wing populism and left-wing populism, and it is imperative that progressive sectors understand the importance of involving themselves in that struggle. It is through the construction of another people, a collective will that results from the mobilization of the passions in defence of equality and social justice, that it will be possible to combat the xenophobic policies promoted by right-wing populism.

By recreating political frontiers, the ‘populist moment’ we are witnessing in Europe points to a ‘return of the political’. It is a return that may open the way for authoritarian solutions — through regimes that weaken liberal democratic institutions — but which can also lead to a reaffirmation and a deepening of democratic values. Everything will depend on the kind of populism that emerges victorious from the struggle against post-politics and post-democracy.

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Aim and framework
This theory-led contribution seeks to undertake an empirical analysis of the economic, political and social developments that have contributed to the current extent of right-wing populist attitudes in Germany. First of all, we need to review the state of developments which have occurred since around the year 2000, in order to contextualize the current empirical findings. The framework is based on a published article (Heitmeyer 2001): ‘Authoritarian Capitalism, Depletion of Democracy and Right-wing Populism’.
The concept included three elements:

(1) We observe a development where global capitalism gains ever greater control over economic and societal development, while on the other hand democratic politics experiences a dramatic loss of control in the sense of the ability to develop an integrated society avoiding social inequality and so on.

(2) This loss of control on the part of democratic politics leads to a depletion of democracy, a loss of control in personal biographies, a loss of influence of trade unions and processes of social disintegration.

(3) The conclusion of the thesis in 2001 was that the winner of these processes will be right-wing populism and mistrust of the elites and the system.

II Social Disintegration and Group-Focused Enmity

The current situation is obvious. A spectre is haunting Europe. The spectre of right-wing populism and nationalism. Right-wing populism is not new in Europe. Examples include Austria, Denmark, France, Hungary, the Netherlands and Poland.

In Germany, the situation has been changing since 2014, when the political movement PEGIDA emerged, especially in eastern Germany, along with the political party Alternative for Germany. Since then, a political bundling of long-existing right-wing populist attitudes in the German population has taken place.

What is the concept and what are the empirical results? Our longitudinal research project on group-focused enmity between 2002 and 2011 included annual representative surveys; we can therefore report on the situation before and after the emergence of the right-wing movement and party in Germany in 2014. The concept of group-focused enmity (Heitmeyer 2002) focuses on negative attitudes towards weak groups, which are the targets of devaluation, discrimination and violence. People become targets on the basis of belonging to such groups, independent of individual behaviour.

Figure 1 shows the syndrome of group-focused enmity with at least twelve elements. It includes migrants, Muslims, Jews, homeless people, homosexuals, asylum seekers etc., measuring the societal climate against weak groups.
The empirical analyses demonstrate that this is a syndrome. These are not isolated prejudices. All of them have a common background, a special ideology: the ideology of inequality in the sense of unequal worth.

The ideology focuses on two main differences: (1) differences between in-groups and out-groups, and (2) superiority and inferiority.

What are the results concerning attitudes in the German population, against the background of societal developments in the last decade, times in which financial crisis, political crisis and social crisis generate fear of social disintegration?

From a sociological perspective, we stress the dynamics and interactions between actors in three contexts.\(^{(1)}\)

1. Powerful actors in government and the influence of capitalist actors produce the circumstances of the integration-disintegration dynamics; for example fear of social disintegration.
2. Group-focused enmity in the population may result in attitudes against weak groups.
3. There are political actors in right-wing populist movements and parties and right-wing extremist groups who acquire legitimization for their activities from people with group-focused enmity attitudes, and in turn offer a home for their aggression and rage. Additionally, they criticize the political establishment.

There are several interaction processes (marked in the figure by arrows) (See Heitmeyer 2011). It is necessary to stress the dynamics between actors in the various fields. The central question is: what are the consequences of the dynamics of integration and disintegration as the basis of group-focused enmity in the population and in right-wing populism? It is therefore fruitful to consider a model from social disintegration theory (Heitmeyer/Anhut 2008).\(^{(2)}\)

The model has three dimensions on two levels: an objective and a subjective level. The first dimension focuses on the objective factor of reproduction through the labour market and the subjective factor of gaining recognition. The second dimension stresses the institutional factor in the sense of political participation in the public sphere — having a voice and gaining moral recognition as a political actor. The third dimension addresses social belonging in milieus etc. as a source of emotional recognition.

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*Fig. 3: Social Disintegration Theory*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of Integration</th>
<th>Structural Integration (± systemic integration on an individual basis)</th>
<th>Institutional Integration (± communicative interaction)</th>
<th>Socio-emotional Integration (± cultural and expressive social interaction)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agenda</td>
<td>Participation in material and cultural goods</td>
<td>Compromise between conflicting interests</td>
<td>Establishing emotional relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria</td>
<td>• access to partial systems (objective dimension)</td>
<td>• opportunities and willingness to participate in processes of (political) decision-making</td>
<td>• recognition of personal identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• recognition (subjective dimension)</td>
<td>• adherence to basic principles (fairness, justice, solidarity)</td>
<td>• acceptance of collective identities and symbols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of recognition</td>
<td>Positional recognition</td>
<td>Moral recognition</td>
<td>Emotional recognition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The central thesis is that if there is a broad sense and experience of recognition deficits in the established system, people will look for alternatives to gain recognition through — for example — new social movements, parties and so on, in order to have a say in the public sphere. This may occur on the basis of group-focused enmity and devaluation and discrimination of identified out-groups — to mark the in-group's superiority and the inferiority of the other. If there is fear or experience of social disintegration, there will be a higher level of group-focused enmity than when no fear or experience exist.

Three topics are important. First the factor of being threatened or not threatened by crisis.\(^{(3)}\)

It is obvious that people who feel threatened by crisis have much more negative attitudes towards targeted groups like migrants, Muslims and especially asylum seekers. Another important element is the feeling of disorientation.\(^{(4)}\)

This result shows that people who are disorientated in times of rapid globalized change have many more prejudices than others.
The role of participation is important for social integration. People who have no participation in public affairs have many more prejudices than those who participate.

These are only some aspects concerning the potential of attitudes in the whole population; they must be embedded in a broader analytical model.

We tested these assumptions on the basis of the aforementioned framework (Heitmeyer 2001).

The basic figuration shows that there has been a control gain for authoritarian capitalism and a control loss for national politics. This control loss leads to a depletion of democracy, in the sense of a loss of popular confidence generated by policies associated with the aforementioned risks of disintegration, fear of loss of status, etc. for particular population groups. In particular, political alienation and criticism of a lack of representation create the path towards right-wing populist attitudes and support for right-wing populist movements and parties.
The Bundling of Attitudes by Right-wing Movements and Parties

If we focus on the potential of parts of the population with explicit right-wing populist attitudes, we must first explicate the criteria for measurement. In 2002, we included three criteria: agreement with xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and authoritarian aggression. The result in 2002 was that 20 percent agreed with all three. Between 2009 and 2011—for example—we found increasing willingness among people with increasing right-wing populist attitudes to join political protests and, in certain cases, even willingness to use violence.

These are results that we published—in the sense of public sociology—several years before right-wing populist groups like PEGIDA and AfD grew in Germany. Additionally, specific prejudices against asylum seekers and Muslims were already present before summer 2015 and the arrival of large numbers of refugees in Germany. We had already found negative attitudes towards and mistrust of asylum seekers in 2011. And respondents were reporting feelings of foreignness in their own country (in relation to Muslims) even before the arrival of refugees from mainly Muslim countries in summer 2015. There are also broad suspicions that the Muslim community sympathizes with Islamist terrorist groups.

Examining Figure 8, we can see that there has been a long development of the potential of right-wing populism in Germany, mostly in the lower classes but also in the middle class. Concerning escalations, the increasing feeling of powerlessness as a basis for anger among people with right-wing and prejudiced attitudes (group-focused enmity) is an important factor. Additionally, we found increasing willingness of individuals in the part of the population with right-wing attitudes to use violence. What are the effects of these prejudices and other attitudes in relation to right-wing populist movements and parties? It is obvious that there is a long-standing and broad potential for group-focused enmity in the German population. It requires only a few experts in mobilization, emotionalizing topics like a ‘flood of asylum-seekers’, to organize movements with increasingly aggressive attitudes and behaviour.
Right-wing populist movements and parties focus on four central topics:

1. The fear of social disintegration in the population, in the sense of status relegation.
2. The fear of foreign cultural infiltration by migrants, Muslims, etc.
3. Political denationalization by the European Union.
4. Alienation in the sense of criticism of democratic representation, against the political elites.

Very often, people with right-wing and right-wing populist attitudes have experienced or perceived recognition deficits. The elites in these movements and parties are playing with these issues in an increasingly emotional and aggressive manner. The elites of right-wing populist groups seem to be able to transform the feeling of inferiority in this part of the population into a feeling of superiority through nationalism and prejudice against weak groups, in this case against migrants, Muslims and asylum seekers. They do this to stabilize their own status.

IV The Escalation Model

This development is rather dangerous and has to be included in an escalation model. In Germany we have a broad spectrum of problematic attitudes such as group-focused enmity, a right-wing populist movement and party, and additionally several radicalized milieus and potential terrorist groups. This spectrum is shown in Figure 11.

This concept shows that the attitudes of group-focused enmity in the population are very important. These attitudes deliver the legitimization for aggressive speech in right-wing populist groups. Mostly they do not employ violence, but other groups who collaborate with the right-wing populist groups, the radicalized milieus, do use violence against minorities, Muslims, asylum seekers and so on.

Mostly, we do not know what the trigger causes are. But it is obvious that the population is also responsible for discrimination and violence against asylum seekers. And violence against asylum seekers increased rapidly in 2015 compared with 2014.
V Conclusion
The analysis indicates relationships between the economic manifestations of authoritarian capitalism, the effects of a negative attitude in parts of the German population towards the current state of the democratic political system and the authoritarian temptations of right-wing populist movements and parties. Escalations cannot be excluded. However, the trend is not automatically towards fascism. We need a broad societal discussion with those responsible concerning the emergence of right-wing populism and dangerous violence processes. In the current situation, neither the political elites nor civil society have suitable concepts to stop the success of the right-wing populism parties in Germany and Europe.
Well, I shall follow the advice of Chantal Mouffe and I will be both agonistic and affectionate. And I will also offer a compromise today. We have been told that we should avoid the word ‘fascism’. So, I am offering a compromise. Others will not use the word ‘fascism’ and I will not use the word ‘populism’ for a very simple reason: I do not think it exists. Now let’s return to the fundamental problem here. After what happened in the 1930s and the 1940s, including the small episode that was World War II, a very fragile consensus was established in 1945. For the first time since the crisis of fascism and war in the international arena, there was an eruption of socialist ideas. This idea has been formalised in the UN charter, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, which drew on some of the lessons of National Socialism in particular in an imperfect, insincere and hypocritical manner. This consensus has now been broken. In fact, it has been broken since 1989. After all, what was the fundamental procedure of fascism against bourgeois democracy and especially against socialism? The idea of bourgeois
That was one of the most important conclusions drawn by those who via etc. And these supra-ethnic nationalisms were not based on race, on development of all those things was to approximate the idea of human rights of this emancipation trend and the socialist revolution. It was also an aspect of nineteenth-century democratic nationalism that was based on attack, something that is very important, especially for us central Europeans, when all hell broke loose in the 1920s and 1930s: namely, the fact that you would be allowed to be a member of the political community if you were prepared to pay the price of admission, which was cultural assimilation. So, nations have been constructed through unification, as in the case of Germany, Italy, and later, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia etc. And these supra-ethnic nationalisms were not based on race, on tribe, on this, that or the other. If you agreed to speak the national language—as opposed to what Saint-Just called le patois contre-révolutionnaire, the dialects, and the controversial dialects—if you were willing to abandon the 'langue d'Oc' and accept the 'langue d'Oil', then you would be accepted as a member of the national community with a teleology of equality in a political sense, which, of course, is the basis of classic republicans. This trend, albeit never complete and never sincerely meant, since all colonised people were excluded from it, was, however, still the aim. This planned development was broken by racism, which, of course, has always been the basis for imperialism. This imperialism is seen even in conservative works, such as Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism, where one of the foundations of fascist development is discovered in a colonial world view that was not just a political reality. If you've studied the history of ideas in England, then of course you will know how colonial ideas, Darwinism, social Darwinism, a strand of socialism and a strand of liberalism coincide with racist exclusion. John Stuart Mill was a racist and one of the colonialisit founders of modern liberalism. And, in spite of all this, it was of course the [...] of this emancipation trend and the socialist revolution. That was one of the most important conclusions drawn by those who thought that capitalism, bourgeois democracy and bourgeois liberalism were not to be saved. That was the conclusion presented in the last sentence of The Communist Manifesto in 1848: 'Workers of the world unite!' The consequence of this was only felt in 1917 when the people of this world discovered that they had a common enemy: capitalism. Not the other proletarians of another country. It seems elementary, it seems commonplace, it seems banal, but even today it appears to be one of the most difficult things to realise, construct or build upon. It seems extremely difficult. Why does it seem so difficult? Because the essence of capitalism stands for crushing neo-liberals and social democrats and anyone similar; because capitalism stands for separation and division. How can a system—which is, after all, based on the domination of a minority—survive in the face of majority resistance? The answer: by becoming allies with part of the majority. And the main tools in this have of course always been religion, nation, race, this, that and the other. Nevertheless, some conceptual operations were needed. In a radical and historically important move, Adolf Hitler and his ideologues announced that there were some people in his country—legal inhabitants—who would be deprived of civil rights and would be excluded from the national community. He presented this idea to white people on the European continent—as that was itself a kind of colony—and made it possible for people who had already earned their place in a community to be excluded. This was a sort of liberation, elements of which you can see today in the latest developments and triumphs of the 'extreme right'. This discovery made it appear as if there was a basis on which oppression, repression, discrimination and violence were morally justified. However, it wasn't justified for the people who were members of the same moral community, but there were some individuals against whom violence and destructive passions were justified, permitted and even praiseworthy. This is a sort of liberation that sets something free. Talking about political passions, and here I agree with Chantal Mouffe, is an abuse. You cannot really tell 'passions' and 'reasons' in politics apart. And our abstract passions, what kind of passions are they? But there was a liberation from the commands of morality, from the commands of generosity, from the commands of self-limitation. And that of course has replaced genuine emancipation. It was a radical change to existing society. And this was, of course, what a very unfashionable thinker today—Herbert Marcuse—called 'repressive desublimation'. What happens, for example, with 'political correctness'? Everyone, including professors, seems to be talking about political correctness. For example, in my own country [Hungary], none other than the prime minister said: 'Now the tyranny of political correctness has finally ended and we are free.' (In parentheses: What kind
of man needs his sincerity to be approved by superior authorities in New York?—Very strange!) But what is he liberated from? Hypocrisy. He is liberated from hypocrisy. And now he can honestly say that the Roma are of inferior quality; that the Hungarian people are working hard and we cannot receive any migrants and refugees because we also have to pay for the Roma who do not want to work. OK, that is very simple: he is liberated. But what is liberated there? The faith, the passion and oppression. That is what is liberated. Finally that has been rehabilitated. Not only can you oppress women, ethnic minorities and foreigners, but you can also talk about it. So it is elevated to the rank of what is spiritual. It is not considered 'inferior'; it is not a dirty secret of a repressive society; it is the openly announced, a glorious title for dominion. And that is indeed experienced as liberation to a certain extent. Yes, well, the air has been cleared. Now we know that they want to repress and they want to kill and they want to discriminate and they want to live a passionate life of contempt.

Good. So, now I will again follow Chantal Mouffe's advice and be agonistic about it and be agonistic about it in a very Athenian sense. You know about the Athenian rule, when there was real strife in Athens—civil war or other kinds—and those citizens who refused to take sides were exiled or imprisoned. The first duty of a democrat is to take sides. This is what I am proposing. I was very surprised to hear somebody say that neo-liberalism represented liberty. What? Liberty? The liberty of what? The liberty of whom? We are confronting two versions of the same system: one hypocritical version, pretending to represent equality and liberty, and another that does not. There is a small difference. What we experienced as a victory of the anti-establishment, such as the election of Mr. Trump, is the most traditional, the most old-fashioned, oligarchic government that you can imagine: billionaires and generals. What is so new about this? This is the absolutely traditional upper class, taking power without hypocrisy, without pretending. This is naked power, this is in your face: 'You’re fired!' Yes, that is the slogan of the new system and it is everywhere. Now the power systems have the courage to say: 'We do not want you! Do not come here! Do not live here! Get out! Get lost! You will be punished!' And this is supposed to be progress. Well, to a certain extent it is, because of course it is sincere. It is very sincere. These are not the class warriors, these are—to use an old traditional term, which is so dear to me as an old opponent of Stalinism and post-Stalinism—'enemies of the people'. The 'enemies of the people', who are representing small sections of interest and mobilising people against their own interest by invoking what? By trying to present, partly in a justified manner, the moral criticism of liberals, partial allies of the most oppressive capitalism and of social democrats. Here I agree with what we heard before. This kind of terror that we have been suffering from, accepting an order of repression and uniformity and exploitation as a 'system of freedom', this is gone. That is progress, if you wish. We will not call this 'liberalism', we will not call this 'democracy'. What we call it depends on your temperament. One thing, though, will not happen in these totalitarian systems: we are not likely to see concentration field camps filled with white people. Rather, we already have concentration camps filled with people of colour called 'refugee camps'. The question of an international order has been presented by none other than Immanuel Kant as a question of hospitality. He considered this idea in a famous work. As you all will know, especially in this country I suppose, hospitality was a condition of cosmopolitan order, by which Kant understood international republican order. Republican order in Kant's sense was a federation or a system of states in which all people are fully fledged citizens with rights, entitlements and dignities, and that the dignity is valid everywhere. The condition is that everywhere should have a just system. It is unimaginable that a system of exclusions like the present system of nation states and partial federations that is the European Union, which is not a universalist organisation, despite what Habermas might think about it or might have thought about it (he does not any longer), is just an association for rich, western European nations. But you see, you cannot build up a just and free world out of elements of injustice, inequality and so on. Now, let's go even a little deeper, if you'll allow me. One of the most grievous harms inflicted on the emancipation struggles is our failure to differentiate between two kinds of 'socialism'. One I would call a 'resilient socialism' and the other a 'Marxist socialism'. What has been accepted as a socialist idea almost everywhere has, of course, been Rousseau's ideas and not Marx's. Marx's day is still to come. Rousseau and his followers—the Jacobins, the social democrats and Bolsheviks—believed that the understanding and the construction of an equal, dignified and just society comes about through equality, usually equality obtained through redistribution. But this is not Marx's idea. Marx's idea is not equality. Marx's idea is not redistribution. Marx's idea is an end to the commodity-producing system. An end to alienation. Emancipation from life forces
of humankind estranged into the power arena of others. That is a theory, a liberationist theory in the sense of autonomy and not in the sense of equality. Equality may of course be a consequence; obviously a just society cannot be unequal, but as a consequence and not as a basis. And when socialists, social democrats and Bolsheviks tried to create a dignified, egalitarian and just society on the basis of redistribution, and in the case of the Bolsheviks, also a reversed value system, it was, of course, the Soviet Bloc, which was, for the first time in world history, at the pinnacle of the moral hierarchy. But what was there? Manual labour. Physical work. After tens of thousands of years, when it was the spirit, it was God, priests, sages, philosophers etc., and then of course came the aristocracy with the fiery souls, and the people who had to work for their living, who had to earn their bread, and who even in Athens, were of course not permitted to vote. Because nobody who has to work for a living can be independent. Nobody who is labouring for others can be autonomous. No fully-fledged member of a political community can be at the service of someone or something else at the same time. A real free political community must consist of free people. What does it mean to be a free political community that consists of exploited people under the command of the most stringent and brutal set of rules called technology? A work discipline and a time, a use of time, subordinated to a production of commodities. You enter an office, you enter a shop, you enter a factory and your autonomy disappears. And this is where you are spending the majority of your waking hours. What kind of a political community of free citizens can this be? This is obviously an illusion. And it has been proved many times to be an illusion, and of course there is the discontent, the humiliation, that ‘Bifo’ has spoken about this morning so eloquently and so poetically. Humiliation of people of colour, humiliation of white people, humiliation of poor and even humiliation of not-so-poor people by being dependent—even my intellectual colleagues, writing their submissions for grants, everybody collecting their points, everybody trying to get good marks in exams—there is not one single moment of independence. This is a free society? That is ridiculous! Well, let us stop pretending and being hypocrites. When people of course say, ‘our free community is threatened by this and that’, of course people can say: ‘This is a free community’. Should we defend your system? Why are people so neutral about the conquest of power by these really scheußlich [abominable] right-wing governments, such as my own? Because when the liberals tell them: ‘Up in arms! Save liberal democracy, save market capitalism, save inequality from the incursions of all sorts of unpleasant people!’ the people will say: ‘oh, yeah, right? Should we save a system that does not give us anything nice except cheap merchandise?’ So, people will not. We all hate Trump voters, and people who hate Trump agree on one point: This world as it is now is not worth saving. This is why the right is winning. This is why the right is winning. What is the great difference? That they are sincere? More oppressive than the rest? They are not so well mannered? Who cares about manners? Well I do, but I am old-fashioned. But even I do not think that this is very essential and very important, very substantive.

I agree that contempt for Trump voters and for Brexiteers is not justified. We have come to a point where we do not resist any longer, because we do not think it is worthwhile. And hence come ideologies in the newspaper that say: ‘there is no difference between left and right’. Is there not? I mean: hierarchy and equality are the same, yes? Gain for others and suffering for these? And even the foolish resistance against this says: ‘This is really the same’. Let us be serious. Of course: it does not seem to be important. Because of the betrayals, because of the hypocrisy and because of what is the main fact of our age: the final defeat of the international workers’ movement. This is what has changed. This is why there is no alternative. For a very long time we have lived in a world where there was an alternative not only to the philosophy books, but you could go into the streets of many towns and you would come across a building on which Arbeiterheim [workers’ home] or Karl-Marx-Hof was written. You could tell in which pubs your sort of people congregated. You could be sure that those people working in the big factories were against it all. And there was an idea that the working class was the first subaltern class in history to have not only a folklore of complaint, but also a high culture. Genuine literature, genuine philosophy, genuine social science. It was similar to the ruling classes of the past, in having conquered discourse through rational procedures, and it was immoderately proud of it, and, yes, committed the mistakes of positivism and scientism and other sins of this nature. That does not exist any longer. There is not a double system as there was during the Cold War, whatever the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China was worth, and I was always their enemy. It was certainly another world. It has preserved the presence of an alternative, at least symbolically for many. And we live in a world in which alternatives are not clear, are not visible
That is true. But what does it mean? What does it mean for thinking and what other sense is in the constitution of a human being that is devoid of we can decide, we can dominate or we cannot dominate, but those who are judgement, which are the consequences of moral choices. When poor old Elfriede Jelinek said that you should not talk to the FPÖ [the Freedom Party of Austria, a right-wing populist political party in Austria] voters, well yes, that is very clumsy. But by this, she does not mean that FPÖ voters are not human beings, she has been writing all her life about people who are typical FPÖ voters, but because she seems to think that it is intolerable to pretend that we share the same moral world with those people, who are advocating discrimination and distinction and hierarchy and oppression. It is difficult. You can, of course, have a conversation. I do. So, I would talk to conservatives and to extreme right-wing people and so on and so forth. But there is a limit. It is always the same and I guess that you might have had similar conversations: I am always told, ‘what you want — equal dignity for everybody, universal membership of a political community and to a nation — those are beautiful dreams. We are representing reality and reality is discrimination; reality is putting up boundaries, putting up frontiers and putting the people we do not like beyond those frontiers.’ And this is not the enmity of people who are thinking differently within the political community. This is establishing a boundary between political community and an area where there is no politics because there are no true human beings. ‘Politics is for us...’ — whoever ‘us’ may be — ‘...and we can deliberate, we can decide, we can dominate or we cannot dominate, but those who are outside, those may be human beings, but they are certainly not our fellow citizens.’ But what sense, since we are not members of the animal kingdom, what other sense is in the constitution of a human being that is devoid of political dimension? That we are biologically members of the same race? That is true. But what does it mean? What does it mean for thinking and feeling beings? Those people, who will be the members of the same humanity? If we are members of the same political community — and in order to be members of the same political community, to really have a say in our lives, in our fates etc., we will have to abandon all of our extant institutions.

In the last 500 years it’s been proven that the final result is always a massacre. It has been always like this. Until now. Look at colonial conquest, look at great revolutions, look at the great wars, including wars of liberation. Massacre after massacre. Oppression, violence, rape, torture, everything. Enough. Enough. Enough. Why not emancipation? Why not liberation? Why should we pretend to imitate our enemies, imitate their cunning, imitate their energy, imitate their dynamism? I do not envy their dynamism because it comes from the energy of rising above others. This is the energy of distinction. All societies are based on distinction, as Bourdieu said. All societies are based on distinction. All competitiveness, including the most virtuous one: being better at something, being excellent, being the first, being the most intelligent, being the most beautiful, being the fastest. Those are based on distinction, meaning ‘I am better than you’. And as long as the basis of that and as long as our concept of liberty is essentially competitive, it will be modelled on the bloody market. And not only the market: sports, contests, all our ideas of excellence are differential and hierarchical. In his famous book After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre said that our mistake of modernity was of course the temptation of equality. Because according to Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas and others, they knew better than us that the only virtue could be differential virtue. ‘Somebody is better than others’. This is the aim: to be better and better, which means comparison and contest. But comparison and contest for the losers is humiliation. Not everybody triumphs. It is a very nice idea to have a contest. We have this fuzzy fantasy that all of us are running in the same direction and somehow we’ll all be winners. But nobody runs in a contest if nobody is going to lose. There are no winners without losers. So, all these moral and political ideas are wrong if you want to be emancipated and [desalinated?] (1:53:21). I have been talking about an essay that some of you may have read. It was published sixteen years ago in 2000 and it was called ‘Post-Fascism’. It has more recently been republished by openDemocracy along with other pieces on this subject. I originally wanted to talk about those matters but hearing what’s been said here today, I decided to change my attack and to try to deliver a sermon to you. All right, I gave you a Heilige Lektion [religious oration] and because you can see my feelings, you can feel my feelings and my passions, I hope that I can maybe convince you, if not of anything else, than of my deep need to persuade you, that you should not go on tolerating all of this.

Thank you.
Biographies

The contributions are based on *A New Fascism*, a symposium held at Fredericianum on 17 December 2016 in conjunction with the exhibition *Two A.M.* by Loretta Fahrenholz.

Edited by Susanne Pfeffer

Franco 'Bifo' Berardi is a contemporary writer, media theorist and media activist. He founded the magazine *A/traverso* (1975–1981) and was part of the staff of Radio Alice, the first free pirate radio station in Italy (1976–1978). He has published numerous essays about culture and social movements in magazines such as *Semiotext(e)* and *Chimères*. His books include *Mutazione e Cyberpunk* (1994), *Felix* (2001), and *And: Phenomenology of the End*, which was published by *Semiotext(e)* in 2015. His most recent publication is *Futurability: The Age of Impotence and the Horizon of Possibility*.

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