

COMMUNICATION AND CLASS STRUGGLE

703

1. Capitalism, Imperialism

An
Anthology
In 2 Volumes
Edited by
Armand Mattelart
And
Seth Siegelaub



IG/IMMRC

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INTERNATIONAL GENERAL
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IMMRC international mass media research center
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The second volume,
2. LIBERATION,
SOCIALISM,
will be published in
1979-80, and will
analyse the
development of
popular and
working-class
communication
practice and
theory.

COMMUNICATION AND CLASS STRUGGLE:

1. CAPITALISM, IMPERIALISM

Selection, Introduction and Preface

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Seth Siegelau

PREFACE:
A COMMUNICATION
ON COMMUNICATION1. PRE-CAPITALIST COMMUNICATION
(TRANSPORTATION)

The struggles of the oppressed classes are the living foundation upon which is built the communication process. The history of these struggles is long, difficult, contradictory, and especially, cumulative. In its genesis, this history begins with the individual and collective struggle to satisfy physical needs, and progresses to include the struggle for the satisfaction of intellectual and emotional needs as well. Throughout these struggles, first against nature, and then also between tribes, clans, nations, castes, and finally, between classes, the role of communication has always been central. The reason for this, in a word, is that communication is nothing more, nor nothing less, than the articulation of the social relations between people. In a profound sense, communication is one of the most unique products—and producers—of society's development. One could further say that along with human labor, communication's evolution is a characteristic unique to the human species.

Communication, as a bond between real people, taking place in real time and real space, however, can never be a general, abstract phenomenon. Just as, in the words of Marx, "In the social production of their existence men inevitably enter into definite relations which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage of development of their material forces of production,"¹ it can also be said that men and women enter into communication relations which are likewise independent of their individual will. How people communicate, where and when they communicate, with whom they communicate, and even to a certain degree what and why they communicate, in short, the way they communicate, i.e., their mode of communication, is in function of the historical process. Each different communication form produced by this age-old process has been closely tied to the conditions in which it first arose and was later elaborated and generalized.

Even the word "communication", with its present specialized connotation dictated by our form of society, severely limits our comprehension of this

1. Karl Marx, Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), reprinted in Section A of this volume.

2. The telegraph in 1844, to communicate between people beyond the range of the eye or ear (the telegraph, in fact, was a product of the needs of transportation, and grew out of the railway). Obviously, earlier, there were smoke signals, drums, bells, etc. On another level, writing on buildings and even, in a certain way, buildings themselves can be considered as a form of communication.

3. Or under certain conditions, the surrogates for certain people: couriers, messengers, etc., which later gave rise to the post office and the mails.

ongoing process, for it fails to communicate the great variety of human conditions which give rise to communication. By stressing and reflecting only the more advanced, developed aspects of the communication process—i.e., that concerning how people transmit *information* between themselves—this special definition tends to hide the equally important fact that from the dawn of civilization until the nineteenth century,² the transmission of information between people meant concretely the "transmission" of people themselves,³ that is, *transportation*. But even this additional facet does not convey all the different aspects of communication. For along with the physical movement of people on land, water and air, there is also the movement and exchange of goods by and between people, which in our epoch takes the form of commodities and the circulation of capital. It is only by considering these four moments—the movement of people, of goods, of information, and last, but certainly not least today, of capital—as simultaneous components of an overall communication process, can we even attempt to reconstruct and understand communication as it is really lived at a given moment by people: men and women, groups, and especially, classes.

Although this anthology concerns the specific communication forms which have unfolded and are unfolding within only two broad historical epochs—capitalism, and then, socialism—these modes of production include within them, other earlier modes of communication inherited from pre-capitalist social formations. The accumulation of these experiences is thus a world process which embraces not only the recent cultural experiences of North America and Europe, but equally the old, often unpublicized, cultural lives of Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Latin America.

In broad succession, these pre-capitalist formations are the Primitive Communal, Asiatic, Ancient, and Feudal societies, each with its own mode of material production (economic structure; the productive forces and relations of production) and corresponding legal, State, political and ideological production (superstructure). It is the interaction between these two instances in their multiformity, which molds the different communication and transportation forms characterizing each successive era of humanity. While these forms reproduce the social conditions from which they issued, they also can serve, along with other forces, to exacerbate the contradictions latent within these conditions and help to destroy them. Nevertheless, even in the rapid, revolutionary transition from one social formation to the next, earlier, "lower" cultural forms and ways of communicating and transporting are rarely destroyed, but rather are used in other ways, adapted, re-combined, and given new and different values and importance in light of the new dominant social relations which imprint each successive epoch.

These multiple ways of moving people, things and ideas—and especially, today, capital—ways which naturally envelop a type of content as well, could also be thought of as responses to certain needs generated by a given system of production at a certain stage of its evolution. These needs, usually well-broadcasted and circulated in society, however, should not hide the fact that they can also enclose other, unreported needs which correspond to the dif-

ferent fundamental interests of other classes. As we will see elsewhere, these needs create different responses in communication and transportation, as well as in other of society's practices.

Thus the growth of certain communication and transportation forms, not unlike parallel ones developing in other economic branches, could be understood as the dominant response at a given moment conditioned by two interrelated requirements:

1. The first need is economic and structural. It pertains to the specific communication and transportation tools or instruments required by a given mode of production to maintain itself and expand. The nature of these tools, however, in turn, is framed by the level of the existing means of production. (This dialectic takes us immediately to the vital production centers of each social formation. In our epoch: no radio without the electronics industry; no film without the electrical and chemical industries; no "mass" press without steam power and paper manufacturing; no publishing without advanced metalworking studios, etc.) These instruments, however, should not just be thought of as physical objects, as they equally "are" a connected level of human accomplishment, involving the practices, techniques, skills, information and knowledge needed to create, produce, operate and develop them further. This ensemble of tools/skills can be called the means of communication and transportation.

2. The second need is political and ideological, and thus, superstructural. It depends directly on the intensity of overall social antagonisms, articulated or not. These superstructural elements, including the State, are much more difficult to assess than the material level of production, but they certainly are no less important in determining how and why different forms of communication evolved and are evolving, as will be clearly seen in many of the texts in this anthology.

The rise of the "mass" press, for example, could be seen as being simultaneously a dominant response to the economic necessity to increase the movement of manufactured goods and also a response to the pressing political need to communicate with all those who are doing the manufacturing. This implies that the workers are already organized in production and in political struggle, too, and that they thus pose a political threat. This, in turn, indicates that there exists a certain level of industrial production, including steam and mechanical power, and also in this case, paper manufacturing which are prerequisites for the "mass" press. More recently, for example, TV satellites, in addition to being a dominant response to the economic need to increase the circulation of capital and information linked to it, could also be seen as a response to the political need to

4. Some researchers tend to see communication history as being essentially the history of the means of diffusion. Given the poverty of much of the current programming and how it is diffused, it is not by chance that certain interests want to avoid drawing too much critical attention to how this production process results in a specific type of cultural product. Another aspect of this emphasis on diffusion is McLuhan's "The medium is the message", which, in its way, serves to distract us almost as much as the television programs he rarely talks about.

contain the rise of the national liberation movements, which have become a greater threat to imperialism given the increasing interrelationship between different parts of the world based on the imperialist division of labor.

But these are only two random examples taken from the extraordinary multiplicity of communication forms produced throughout history. What interplay of forces, what accumulations, lead to the creation and generalization, for example, of speech, and the orator, the actor, the messenger, the bellman, the crier, the musician, the informer? Numbers, writing, the alphabet, paper, and the scribe, the author, the translator, the composer, the post office and the postman? The clerk and copyist? The wheel, the cart, the wheelbarrow, the stagecoach, the bicycle, the railway, the truck, the tractor, the automobile, the trolley, and bus? The canoe, the sampan, the dhow, the sailboat, the warship, the freighter? The book, the printer, the editor, the proofreader, the publisher, the bookseller, the librarian? The gazette, the daily press, and the journalist? The poster, the handbill, and the manifesto? The typewriter and typist, the secretary, the stenographer? The communication researcher? The cable, the telegraph, the telephone? The film? The phonograph? The airplane? The radio? The movie star? The television? Space travel? And in the U.S., the CB (Citizen Band) radio?

Obviously, there are more or less important achievements, some which characterize an epoch and others which are improvements of earlier forms. Nevertheless, in all cases, we should continue to look deeper and deeper into the social, political, ideological and psychological, as well as economic, realities which are usually obscured by the brilliance of "scientific" inventions and the skills that they call for. These forces are the real framework and "reason" for how and when certain means developed and were extended in the particular way that they were—or were not. Is it possible that a certain type of research can no longer pose questions concerning these realities, because in doing so it would have to admit to the existence of the struggle of these forces, of classes, and would have to reply in relation to them?

The development of communication forms today, moreover, should not just be conceived as being a one-way history of the quantitative increase in the means of diffusion and consumption, a concept itself which is well-diffused and thus well-consumed today under monopoly capitalism. Although certainly an integral part of the communication process—but, in a certain way, perhaps over-developed today—diffusion and consumption are preceded by an equally determinant element, that of production, a concept of which is not very well diffused nor consumed at all in our epoch⁴ (one which, moreover, is the basis for a popular communication strategy).

Thus while each social formation gives rise to its own dominant mode of communication, which can be characterized by the way it arranges and combines the existing forms and develops new ways of communicating in function of its ruling interests, it appears that certain formations have been the battleground for the rise of such qualitatively new ways of human intercourse that they have not just co-existed with other forms, but have profoundly dominated and altered them, as have the electronic radio and television forms in relation to other forms today

under monopoly capitalism.

Excluding here Feudalism (copying and the rise of printing), and the rise of capitalism and colonialism (which are treated extensively in Armand Mattelart's Introduction and the texts in Section C of this volume), there appear to be two earlier modes of production whose relationship to the development of communication deserve to be tentatively outlined here:⁵

—Early Primitive Communal Society, savagery, and the formation of the mouth and the rise of speech and language; and

—late Primitive Society-Ancient Society and the rise of numbers, writing and the alphabet

The social structure characterizing early primitive society is the natural, kinship family, and the sole form of ownership is family, tribal common ownership. At the outset, the primitive level of the productive forces means that all production is consumed by the family-tribe-clan in the reproduction of their community. The very earliest stage of this society, savagery, can be described as being the separation of the human species from other animals, and its physical formation in its struggle to survive against nature, first organized as nomads gathering food, and then by hunting and fishing.⁶ As part of this struggle there arose the need to talk:

On the other hand, the development of labour necessarily helped to bring the members of society closer together by increasing cases of mutual support and joint activity, and by making clear the advantage of this joint activity to each individual. In short, men in the making arrived at the point where they had *something to say to each other*...

First labour, after it and then with it speech—these were the two most essential stimuli under the influence of which the brain of the ape gradually changed into that of man....⁷

With the formation of the mouth-speech-language,

5. I hardly feel qualified to undertake this. Despite the important work produced by a number of people, some of whom are cited below, the relative rarity of marxist historical analyses on communication, in its largest sense, is somewhat surprising, considering the very high level of marxist historiography in general. We would welcome hearing from people who have done, or are familiar with, such research; we would be very interested in working with them to contribute to such a series of studies. For basic historical periodization and background see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1970, especially pp. 42-50; Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1972, which also includes his important unfinished essay "The Part Played by Labor in The Transition From Ape to Man", pp. 251-264, and an introduction by Eleanor Burke Leacock; Marx, *Grundrisse*, London: Penguin, 1973, especially pp. 474ff; and a selection of Marx and Engels' texts, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1964, edited with an important introduction by E.J. Hobsbawm. For more specific research on communication and transportation, in addition to the voluminous and important work of the French Communist Marcel Cohen, including, *Language: Its Structure and Evolution*, 1970, and *La Grande invention de l'écriture et son évolution*, 2 volumes, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1958, see also the texts in Section C, Part I in the first volume of this anthology, especially that of Robin

we have the first and most elementary mode of human communication: a dialogue. It is oral, direct in space and immediate in time. It appears as the dominant mode of communication of this social formation, and the specific achievement of this culture.⁸ Its character is closely bound to the social conditions which engendered it: the limited small-scale natural community (limited both in population and geographically) where relations are face-to-face.⁹ Why would someone want to write or to telephone someone else, or to watch the chief on television, when they could just talk?

While the generalization of this mode, speech, under a variety of climatic, geographic and thus, social conditions, with its effect on the formation of sounds, language and ideas, has made speech the most concrete, expressive communication form of each cultural formation, because it is produced by virtually everyone, it has been subject to profound modification in the course of the rise of more complex social conditions. Today, speech, as dialogue, has been extended in space via the telephone, for example. However, with radio and television, speech also has been reduced to a one-way monologue. There are, furthermore, other constraints against speech, such as in the silence in the courtroom, before the Lord, or in the church, that is, the lack of speech caused by awe, by "respect", or perhaps, most important, by fear. Today, imperialism, in its particular way, is concerned with speech and language, that is, with destroying subaltern speech and languages, as in the United States where, for example; in the beginning of the twentieth century, the speech and languages of the new immigrant populations were destroyed by the ruling forces in favor of the dominant language, English.

But to return to primitive society. With the increase of population came the increase in physical needs, and the growing necessity to control nature

Murray and Tom Wengraf "Notes on Communications Systems"; the list of books in Section C, Part I in the bibliography published in the appendix to this volume; V. Gordon Child, *Man Makes Himself*, N.Y.: New American Library, 1951; El Lissitsky, "The Future of the Book", *New Left Review* (London), 41, January-February 1967 (to be published in the second volume of this anthology); the unpublished manuscript of Olga Kozamara "The Neglected Potentialities of Television in the Development of Consciousness and Culture", Sarajevo, Yugoslavia, May 1971, 12pp mimeographed, and the collection of texts *Marx and Engels on the Means of Communication*, edited with an important introduction by Yves de la Haye (forthcoming, N.Y.: International General, 1979).

6. This initial biological formation of the primary human sensory organs—the hand/work, the mouth/eating and communication, the foot/transportation, and the eye, ear, and with them the brain and consciousness—and their physical extension in time and space is both the foundation and the fruit of all subsequent social development, in communication and transportation, as well as elsewhere.

7. Frederick Engels, "The Part Played....", *op. cit.*

8. There were probably other incipient forms: gestures, signals, impermanent markings, etc.

9. These are the social conditions towards which McLuhan thinks we are now advancing with the global or tribal village.

and the means of subsistence. Among the responses were metal-working (weapons and tools), domestic handicrafts (the loom), the domestication of animals, and then, agriculture, which meant a fixed settlement. It is especially the development of the latter, the increase in space (fixed land, territory) and the growing efficiency of agricultural tools and skills (including the wheel, cart), which enables the community to gradually increase productivity and yield an agricultural surplus. The surplus, in turn, makes possible the increased production of handicrafts, and eventually gives rise to exchange. This development also aggravates the division of labor inherent in the family (the patriarchal appropriation of the labor of the women and children), which in the tribal structure manifests itself in the hierarchical division between the chief and members, which eventually leads to slavery. Externally, the increasing contact between different tribes takes the form of the barter of goods, but more commonly, of war, an early activity of organized society. (Unfortunately, war, along with the police, internally, has since been dead-center in the structuring of communication as we know it today, from the ancient war chariot to the space flight program, in passing by the radio.)

In late Primitive communal Society-Ancient Society, with the growing division of labor between agriculture and handicrafts, in its diversity, specialization and productivity, exchange becomes generalized not only within each tribe, clan or nation, but also between different nations, which continue to merge for their mutual interest and protection or through conquest and pillage. A principal product of the division of labor is the growing separation between the country (agriculture) and the town (handicraft manufacture), wherein the town now becomes the dominant center of development, the seat of each nation and the location of the newly-emerging State. While the dominant form of ownership is still communal, now membership in the community is much more selective, and gradually private property, first moveable, then eventually immovable, begins to take its place. On this economic structure arises a corresponding social structure to take the place of the tribe, the first based on exploitation. In broad outline, it is composed of the citizen freeman and the slave. The latter, who worked, and were part of the communal lands, were also to be used later for other public works, especially transportation, such as ship-building and road-building, etc.

But the generalization of exchange did not only mean the exchange of products, it also meant closer connections between different peoples and cultures, and the exchange of their experiences, ideas and knowledge. The growing accumulation of products and knowledge imposed new needs on human relations. This accumulation could no longer be contained or conveyed by the earlier oral mode with its limited, immediate and direct character. The

10. This is not just a play on words. Historical records, in communication and elsewhere, should be carefully viewed not just to determine who produced them, but also to know who had the means, reasons and need to keep, store, save and transmit certain records, and not others.

growing variety of human experience, and especially, the interdependency of the different facets of this knowledge, gave rise to the need to record in a more permanent way this information, both to transmit it between generations through time (a new means to transport the history of a community, or at least part of one), and also, in space, between contemporaries, and different communities. This way of communicating is writing, and its complement, reading. Although writing first emerged during this distant epoch, it would be many thousands of years of struggle before it could even approach universality, which it still hasn't done, even today. Furthermore, this goal today, in a certain way, has become more difficult, more in contradiction with the ruling forces, with the rise, for example, of "functional" illiteracy, and ignorance produced by capitalism. This is especially due to current attempts to reduce the State educational apparatus to an absolute minimum and to the related imposition of high-profit audiovisual technology.

With writing, speech becomes permanent and immortal, but not for everyone. While speech is generalized and the master and slave can both speak (though not necessarily between themselves, not the same language), writing is concentrated in, and appropriated by, the ruling master as part of his other accumulation of property, which writing further serves. (This process is also a facet of the appropriation of the country by the city, and an embryonic form of the appropriation of physical labor by mental labor.)

The history of writing has been written through the economic and cultural lives of the Sumerians, Chinese, Egyptians, Aztecs, Mayans, and lastly, the Phoenicians, the great trading nation, among other civilizations. Although it has flowered through the successive development of numbers, pictograms (pictures), ideograms (word symbols), and finally, letters and the alphabet, it appears that the earliest recorded¹⁰ need and general use of writing, not by chance, is for record-keeping, accounting, to keep track of the growing volume and rate of exchanges, including slaves. Only later is writing used for the administration of the rising State machinery, war, treaties, legal documents, city affairs, and also, histories, etc. As it develops alongside moveable private property, writing itself, on public walls and then private papyrus, becomes a new form of property, intellectual private property, which further accentuates existing social divisions, rich/poor, master/slave.

Even though writing first appeared as a response to the new needs generated by the rise of Ancient society and the town and city, it was especially its specific social structure which allowed it to expand and develop in the way it did: a society founded on agricultural slavery. This first form of exploitation permitted the community to produce a large enough food surplus to support the growing caste of what we call today "intellectual workers", who were needed by the social system to keep the "wheels of progress" rolling, that is, needed to undertake the scientific research to advance the ruling social interests. Here we find the formation of the astronomer, the navigator, the accountant, the mathematician, the engineer, the architect, the State and military officials, the reli-

gious priest, etc., each of whose special position in production made it possible to develop writing concretely in its application to each one's work. Here also appeared the first "specialized communicator", for lack of a better word, the scribe, who later, under feudal conditions, evolved into the more specialized copyist and clerk, and then afterwards, with the rise of the bourgeoisie with its different communication requirements, the even more specialized journalist.

If this anthology begins with this quick evocation of two, very early, pre-capitalist moments and their possible relation to the rise of communication, it is neither for academic reasons nor for nostalgia.

It is rather to try to situate the present historical epoch, and a reading of this anthology, in the context of a long human struggle which has yielded not just the means, techniques and skills of communication, but also, and perhaps foremost, a certain level of human being, people, in our real historical dimension. As such, these inherited communication experiences are a living part of our present political struggles. Even though the advance of these experiences and forms, and even their very sense, purpose and direction, are today determined in large part, by the needs of monopoly capitalism with its particular electronic apparatus, nevertheless, these forms are also developed and used by the subaltern classes in function of their interests, needs, and struggle. It is in the extension and deepening of this struggle that we concretely continue to find new, more socially-developed ways to move ourselves, our products, and our ideas, in communication, as well as elsewhere.

II. COMMUNICATION PRACTICES AND THEORIES

One of the most important elements in the development of political struggle within communication is the development of our understanding of the nature of this struggle. The degree of our understanding, which itself is conditioned by this reality, has a profound effect on how we further elaborate our communication practice and fight that imposed by the dominant classes.

11. This production is remarkable, both quantitatively as well as qualitatively, as will be seen in the few selections in this anthology. At the International Mass Media Research Center (IMMRC), even with our small-scale artisan production and limited resources, we have been able to document over 10,000 marxist, critical and progressive books, pamphlets, articles, theses, etc., written since the nineteenth century in some ten languages and covering 43 communication subjects, only a small part of which have been published so far in our *Marxism and the Mass Media* bibliography. (A selection of about 500 of these works, published in book form and related to the contents of this first volume can be found in the appendix to this volume). Obviously, this reflects but a very small fraction of the work actually produced. To begin with, it hardly includes any work produced in the Eastern European, African, Asian, Middle Eastern, and Oceanic languages and dialects of which there are thousands, which all together express the consciousness and culture of three-quarters of humanity. Furthermore, it includes very little material, as we will point out later, by journalist and communication industry unions and their branches and locals (especially important here are

Our need to clarify, synthesize and generalize our communication theory and relate it to our real experience, however, does not take place in isolation; it evolves under the domination of the ruling social forces, who also continually strive to develop their communication theory in light of—or dark of—their communication experience, and fundamental interests and needs. The confrontation between these two opposing types or "blocs" of practice/theory, however, is not unique to the field of communication; it is present, in different ways and degrees, throughout society. Each economic sector and allied intellectual discipline, with its own specific workers, history, dynamics and questions, also reflects (and contributes to), in its own way, the larger, basic conflicts of social interest which characterize a given social formation at a given moment. Of this interplay of interests and forces, it is especially the level of the means of material and ideological production, and the political struggle between the antagonistic classes situated in relation to these means, which etch out the way communication is produced by a given cultural system, and also, the way the system is articulated and reproduced through its multiple communication forms, both dominant, as well as subaltern.

The interplay between these fundamental socio-economic conflicts and their representation in the State, the political and cultural spheres is clearly a very complex process and varies greatly from place to place, and from period to period. How all these conflicts mold a communication apparatus is specific to each social formation, its specific historical development, a development which also includes, externally, a society's communication with other social systems, and thus its relation to different levels and conditions of production and struggle, some of which are more advanced than others.

Today, under monopoly capitalism, the rich world production of marxist communication theory¹¹ arising from these diverse conditions is very difficult to "grasp" through the tightly-controlled, highly centralized and uniform network of dominant communication theory, under the hegemony of the

the printing and typographer unions which have a long history of militant action), of which there are hundreds, perhaps thousands, many of which are progressive and some, marxist. Lastly, the production of left political parties and groups, and popular organizations, while large despite their limited economic means, is often of a tactical and immediate nature. This usually means that this work is printed on inexpensive ephemeral communication media: mimeographed tracts, press releases, bulletins, small newspapers (often of irregular production), pamphlets, etc., which are usually not saved for lack of time, space and money. Thus it is difficult and expensive to find and document this production, assuming of course, that one even has the political will to do so.

A brief remark on the bibliographic act itself. Despite the scholarly pretensions which may underlie their use, bibliographic listings and footnote references in books should not be mistaken for being a form of academic showmanship. Documentation, too, is a political action, a communication instrument, and in certain cases, an act of solidarity as well, which can help the reader of a book situate its author in relation to the past and present intellec-

United States. It is difficult to grasp in more than one sense. Not only is there the more advanced problem of "understanding" the work itself, but also the more elementary problem of even "finding" or "locating" this work physically. This difficulty, however, does not only affect the circulation and consumption of existing left, critical, and progressive communication research, but especially affects its production in the future. This difficulty could be attributed to three interrelated conditions produced by the society in which we find ourselves.

The first, and most elementary conditioning factor is the status of marxist theory, in communication research and elsewhere, under capitalism. Although it is certainly not the only critical reflection concerned with human liberation, it is still the most highly developed, and, potentially, open system of critical concepts concerned concretely with explaining how we struggle to realize this liberation in its fullest, social sense. One of the reasons why its analytical concepts are so central is that their formulation has been, and is, consciously linked to the experiences of the oppressed classes, and at its most critical, marxist theory can serve to achieve an understanding of these experiences and possibly further advance their most emancipatory aspects. The ruling forces have no need for such a militant social theory, which in questioning and analyzing the operation of their society, could also possibly contribute to threatening its very existence, if sufficiently developed, communicated and generalized. Thus capitalism does what it can, systematically and organically, to minimize, marginalize, and deform the production and distribution, and thus consumption of left, critical and progressive theory in communication, as elsewhere. Obviously, as suggested earlier, how, if, or to what degree, it can do this depends on the ensemble of different conflicts throughout society. One reflection of the overall level of these antagonisms in our society, however, is precisely the degree of circulation of left and progressive theory and who, where, when, and on what level it is exchanged: by oral, written, printed and/or broadcast means. The degree of this circulation, usually limited, for us, to the first two means and part of the third, contributes to frame the "pictures in our heads", how we see ourselves, the basic questions of our society, and thus how we see communication and its study within society.

One link in this circulation process, for example, is the bookstore, one of the primary means for the actual labor which influenced and lead up to a particular work. Unfortunately, under capitalist pressure, there is a great tendency for marxist communication researchers also to avoid, consciously or unconsciously, the precedents for their work. The effect of this, which makes a work appear more original than it really is, is to isolate it by cutting it off from its conscious historical and social context, with all that this implies politically. For us, doing political documentation of left communication theory, our work of tracking down this research and trying to reconstruct its evolution is thus made even more difficult than it should be, because many researchers, for some strange reason, hold back this type of historical information, even to the point that many left researchers do not even know what they themselves have written over the years.

movement of published marxist, critical and progressive theory (in communication and elsewhere), of local, regional, and international production. But there are bookstores and there are bookstores, and not all sell left books and reviews. Of the tens of thousands of bookstores which compose this communication network or sub-system, there are perhaps three general socio-economic types.

By far the most frequent—often situated in the most highly-trafficked areas (and usually connected to essential transportation) and imposing themselves on the largest possible public, reading or otherwise—the newsstand, hardly sells any left publications at all (as W.H. Smith in England, Independent News in the eastern U.S., or Hachette in France, or the small local newsstands controlled via distribution by these monopolies). The next most frequent type, but reaching far fewer readers, is the better "quality" general or specialized bookstore (technical, art, religious, etc.), which is often dependent on and shaped by (and located near, too) an educational or university institution, where there are a certain, but small number of left publications sold. Lastly, the least frequent type, which is often also near a university or in a popular or low-rent neighborhood, is the left (or sometimes, community) bookstore which attempts to sell primarily left and progressive publications out of political conviction.

Obviously, this categorization is very schematic and it is constantly changing. There are combinations of these types and also other ways in which books are distributed; via direct mail, book clubs, etc., plus new forms of merchandizing as in the increasing sale of books in highly-trafficked supermarkets in the U.S. or the rise of the FNAC, the chain of discount bookstore supermarkets in France, and under certain conditions, overtly right-wing bookstores. Furthermore, this distribution is directly contingent on other factors in production and consumption: the state of the printing and publishing industries, literacy and buying power, for example. Nevertheless, the very existence of these different types of bookstores, the proportion of each of them, and how left and progressive publications circulate through them (and also contribute to changing them), are one index, among others, of the state of production of a certain society, and the level of overt antagonisms tied to this production. (For example, in Portugal in mid-1975 one found Marx's, Lenin's and many left Portuguese political writings on the newsstands in small country train stations, which was not the case afterwards in early 1977, even in Lisbon). Another aspect of book circulation is how it affects the organization of books which characterize each of these different types of stores, and in more distant way, how our perception of the world is affected by this organization when we visit and "consume" these stores. (By their mere omnipresence and familiarity, the contents and organization of the newsstand type of store, for example, are assimilated intimately as part of our daily life and thus appear more normal, whereas a visit to the contents and organization of left bookstores, because of their rarity and physical distance from many of us, is often an event, and thus their influence tends to have a "special" and unusual

quality about it, not unlike a visit to the theater as opposed to turning on the television. This aspect too would be an interesting subject to look at in depth.)

Concerning left and progressive books specifically, it would be useful perhaps to trace how they are circulated in a society at a particular moment. For example, concerning this book on communications published in early 1979, which you have in your hands; where, through which means, for what reason, and when did you find out about it? By word-of-mouth? In a letter from a friend? In an advertising mailer? In a magazine article; if so, which type? In a book? On radio or television? By chance, browsing in a bookstore? ¹² Furthermore, once made aware of this book, could you locate it in a library, if so, where, what type and when? If you could afford it, did you buy it directly from the publisher or through what type of bookstore? (We hope that all your books are purchased through a left bookstore, for this too is a political act). If in a bookstore, did you find it in the subject section "Sociology", "Film", "Language", or "Communication", ¹³ or in the political/ideological ghetto called "Marxism" or "Socialism"? A map of how all these and other variables function and how all left and progressive ideas, books, as well as other forms of communication, move around, could perhaps be a very helpful way to improve the circulation, and thus production of our theory in communication as elsewhere.

The second factor affecting our perception, and thus development of marxist communication theory is the fact that its overall production is fragmented, stratified and hierarchical. There is a lack of communication, and often isolation, between categories of left intellectual workers producing communication research. The current pre-dominant source of

12. We should not underestimate this. For our research this is one of the most important forms of education, and an important source of ongoing information on communication. In many respects, a good left bookstore, particularly one which is open on the world, is probably a more important vehicle of communication for us than most libraries, which for political as well as economic reasons, often do not have certain books, or only have them after a long delay. Furthermore, a bookstore on the street is more accessible, as are its books, whereas libraries are usually difficult to enter, in every sense of the word, especially for people not attached to the university structure. It is for this reason that the closing of the Joie de Lire bookstore in Paris in early 1976, despite the struggle by its employees to save it, represents for us in Paris the loss of an important means of communication.

13. In fact, there are not many "Communication" sections in left bookstores, which is one expression, among others, of the state of consciousness of this question's specificity.

14. Obviously, not unlike the formation of the bookstore network, this too depends on the overall level of struggle, and the specific conflicts around communication. In capitalist Europe, for example, this is not the case for Italy.

15. The purpose here is to underline this relationship and its possible complementary nature, not to make it necessarily appear antagonistic. Furthermore, on a larger scale, this concern for the relations between intellectual workers should not eclipse another, more important one, that of the formulation of communication theory by those

production (and also consumption) is from often-specialized left intellectual workers located in the privileged academic sector. It is this sector which provides the bulk of research which some people consider to compose the entire field of communication research. Alongside, but separate from this type of production, however, is that of other left intellectual workers either linked to "practical" communication activities, such as unions (journalism, printing, communication, and otherwise), or linked to broad-based national and local popular organizations, and left political parties and groups. Between these two types of left producers of communication theory there is usually little working communication¹⁴ and thus the circulation between them of their respective production is often small. The result is that the academic production of communication theory often tends to be lopsided in that it almost exclusively focuses on the communication life of the dominant forces and what they are doing ideologically, etc., without examining this life in its real relation to the life of the oppressed classes, in communication and elsewhere. University production appears to represent the whole of left communication theory, when, in fact, it only is one part of it (although sometimes, a very important part). This predominance of academic production has a great impact on orienting how—or if—we perceive the social unity of communication theories and practices, and now we formulate the communication "question" in its overall social dimensions.¹⁵ This predominance is clearly evident in the fact that the vast majority of left, critical and progressive communication research, published and circulated in book form,¹⁶ is produced within the academic circles, and that in this production it is rare to see even a passing remark on the communication work of a union, popular organization or left political

who cannot publish it, but "only" write, talk and live it daily.

16. For example, in the political struggle in post-fascist Portugal and its manifestation on communication. If one wanted to understand the role of communication and the theory produced by this struggle—and there are a number of opposing reasons why one would—and one looked to the usual sources of information such as books, etc., one would find relatively few. If we look at the popular means of communication, public meetings, newspapers, tracts, and especially, the *comunicado* (press release), however, our understanding becomes a little clearer. It appears to me that the legacy of fifty years of fascism and its retardation of education in general, and newspaper journalism education in particular, played a non-negligible part in shaping how this confrontation took place. Unlike advanced capitalism, where advanced journalism often serves as a mediation between social forces and the reality in which they live, in Portugal, it appears that the newspaper and journalism played another role. By often just reprinting, in whole or in part, the *comunicados* written directly by the many partisan primary actors in this battle (in light of course, of the conditions within each newspaper), the newspaper, for a certain time, served as a direct and unmediated communicator for the voice of those directly involved in these battles, something which very rarely occurs in monopoly capitalism, even when the latter is threatened. For more information, see the IMMRC bibliographic documentation to be included in Fernando Perrone, *Portugal: Political Struggle and the Mass Media*, N.Y. International General, forthcoming 1979.

cal party, and even rarer still, to find a precise and complete bibliographic or footnote reference to such work.

This hierarchy in the production of left and progressive research internally, is magnified many many times externally in the international context, in the predominance of research produced in the imperialist countries in relation to that produced in the rest of the world, especially, the "third" world. Here the full power of the imperialist countries, especially in their economic exportation/imposition of "finished" intellectual goods along with their languages, cultures and preoccupations (and thus the marginalization of subaltern languages, cultures and preoccupations) serves to further distort our understanding of the communication process by preventing us from appreciating the diversity of social conditions on which it is based. This reinforces the existing condition of intellectual production in the imperialist countries, and makes it even more difficult for us to grasp that the communication experiences of the oppressed peoples are a major part of the global history of communication, and as such, have a profound relationship to communication's future evolution, both theoretically and practically.

The third and last factor affecting the production of communication theory is specifically due to the dominant forms of communication created by monopoly capitalism and their essential role in fashioning the production, distribution and consumption of goods, ideas, values, and especially, people. The ever-expanding size of this tightly-

17. In the U.S., where advertising is extremely developed, it has virtually become the communication model dominating all human intercourse, from the packaging of news content to the rapid turnover of personal friendships. Historically, it has unfolded over a number of stages, and today comes in at least three different sizes: the sale of specific products ("product advertising"), the "sale" to the public of a specific company or group of companies, or an economic sector ("corporate or institutional advertising"), and more recently, social advertising ("public service (!) advertising"), which concerns directly the "sale" of society itself or certain of its values, as in the recent "American Economic System....and Your Part In It" campaign. The latter giant-sized sub-form, of course, is only a highly-developed version of propaganda which did such active service (especially, military) up through the end of World War II. With the post-war restructuring of the U.S. economy and the new-style "cold" war, the former active "political" propaganda theory was taken over by the new seemingly-passive "economic" advertising, about the same time as the aggressive U.S. War Department was incorporated into the new, bigger and "better" Department of Defense, which took it under its wing on 18 September 1947.

18. This does not just concern how we look at communication, as suggested earlier, but also what communication we look at. It is not surprising that the newspaper, film, radio and television are the subject of the vast majority of communication studies, inasmuch as these instruments are important for both the ruling and subaltern classes (the press and film, especially, have a long history of more or less autonomous practice as will be seen in the second volume of this anthology). However, what is somewhat surprising is that left and progressive researchers, especially in the academic spheres, have produced so few studies on, for example, conversation, the post office, the telephone,

controlled, highly-centralized and uniform network, which is constantly justifying its related theory and handbook, makes it extremely difficult for anybody to get a critical word in edgewise, as many people have managed to note anyhow. This is not just a figure of speech. In the United States this apparatus and its related culture physically never lets you alone, both in time as well as in space: loud radios blaring everywhere, 24 hour-a-day television broadcasting, advertising¹⁷ on everything that moves (buses, taxis, cars, etc.) or will move in the future. This growing omnipresence, and its affect on our consciousness, including that of communication researchers, however, does not just organically affect the production of dominant practice and theory (although it indeed has contributed to change its study of the social sciences in general, which are often framed by their communication concepts and presuppositions). Perhaps the most profound affect of the ubiquity of this network is to distort and marginalize any other forms of communication and with them, the classes who continue to develop these forms. This makes it exceedingly difficult to formulate a marxist communication theory under monopoly capitalism, a theory which could possibly integrate the electronic means into a unified, global human communication process.¹⁸

III. ON THE PRODUCTION OF THIS COMMUNICATION

As the first general¹⁹ anthology of marxist writ-

printing, paper, bookstores, libraries, posters, photocopies, tracts, copyright, etc., etc., forms and means of communication which, although not dominant, are nevertheless experienced day in and day out by most people living in capitalist society, including communication researchers. To qualify this in one important sense, however, left political parties have created a large body of work concerning certain of these forms, but this work will not be found under the "heading" of communications, as we now know it, at least, but rather under the "heading" of agitation, propaganda, organizing, etc., which will likewise be treated in the second volume.

19. We should try to clarify what is meant by "general". There are many, many excellent collections of marxist and progressive writings on communication—although not in the English language, translated or otherwise—and we have included more than 100 of them in the bibliography at the end of this volume. Although we have greatly benefited from their contents, and organizational work of their editors, we have tried, in our way, to develop them further, both pedagogically and also organizationally. In very schematic outline, the contents and organization of these existing anthologies—known to us—with a few important exceptions, could be characterized as being of three basic types: (a) a selection of texts organized around one communication subject, such as language, international communication, the comics, press concentration, television, etc., by contributors from one or possibly a number of countries; (b) a selection of texts, usually organized around a number of related communication aspects (usually the bourgeois apparatus/theory) as they manifest themselves in one country, usually by contributors from that country; and lastly, (c) a combination of (a) and (b), a larger selection of texts organized usually by subjects or themes but limited to contributors living within the same geo-political area (usual-

ings on communication, information and culture, this two-volume work is intended as a contribution to the analysis of the relationship between communication practice and theory, and how the latter have developed—and are developing—in the context of class struggle from the rise of capitalism out of feudalism in Europe, through the advance of the popular and working-class struggle for the realization of a liberated society, socialism, on a world scale today.

More specifically, this anthology is intended to respond to three interrelated questions at the heart of our understanding of the communication process as it has unfolded during these historical epochs:

—how basic economic, social, ideological and cultural forces condition communication, and how, in turn, communication reflects and affects our comprehension of these forces;

—how bourgeois communication practice and theory have specifically evolved as part of the capitalist mode of production, and

—how in the struggle against exploitation and oppression, the popular and working classes have developed and are developing their own communication practice and theory, and a new, liberated mode of communication, culture and daily life.

The answers to these questions, like the living processes they reflect and attempt to understand, are not simple nor eternal. They are as varied as the historical conditions in which these questions are posed and as varied as the individual and collective consciousnesses which answer them in theory, as well as in practice. In selecting the 120 marxist and progressive texts which compose this two-volume anthology, we have tried to convey the richness and variety of these responses and their interrelationship, both in their contemporary as well as in their historical sense.²⁰

The need to take stock of this accumulated wealth of communication experience, as it has been articulated by some of those who have lived, and are living it, is neither false nor pedantic. By attempting to trace the historical nature of communication, information and culture, our need is eminently contemporary and political: to learn from this experience, to better distinguish between the "organic" and "conjunctural" movement in communication, to use the

ly the NATO or European capitalist countries, especially the United States, England, German Federal Republic, and the Scandinavian countries, occasionally France, very rarely Italy, Spain or Portugal, but also rarely Japan or Canada, for example). However, one important exception we should point out is the 566-page Cuban anthology edited by the Universidad de la Habana, "Medios Masivos de Comunicacion" (published in *Referencias* (Havana), III, I, 1972). The diversity of its contributors and its plan of organization make it one of the best communication anthologies produced to date, although here too, after having been inspired by this work, we have tried to build and develop on it.

20. This diversity is not very well conveyed in the first volume of this anthology, however, because it concerns the rise of capitalism whose fullest development has taken place in Europe and the United States, and thus there is an over-abundance of texts from this region of the world (although even from this region we still are missing much important work produced in the German Federal Republic,

words of Gramsci, to better discern the specific nature of each class' communication, and especially, to draw the political implications flowing from present tendencies in communication. It is hoped that in doing this, this work will contribute, in some small way, to further advancing our communication practice as part of our broader struggle against the ruling forces, for the rise of a liberated society.

Thus, this anthology should not be consumed passively as a compilation of isolated and specialized communication texts. Nor as a quick, easy "reader", or sermon, delivering the universal marxist communication "overview". Nor as an "objective" report on "what's happening", or "new trends" in communication research. Nor, on another keyboard, as a collection of our "favourite" marxist and progressive communication texts, nor even a collection of the "best-known" marxist texts on communication. These types of communication used to convey information about communication are already well-distributed and can be entrusted to others for further elaboration as part of their social practice. (Is it necessary to mention here that the production of a certain type of book also calls for a related form of distribution and consumption?)

But back to our need to be conscious of our practice. The selection of the texts in this anthology, therefore should not be considered as just a mechanical assembling of pre-existing texts. Its underlying principles, its organization, its theoretical-historical framework, and its presentation, are not passive, fixed and closed. This work is not meant as a finished monologue, but rather as an ongoing dialogue. It is intended to be active and open, despite the fact that you cannot directly reply to it. It is an attempt to communicate with the reader, to further stimulate the questioning of communication by introducing, perhaps, some new aspects of the question, so that each reader can, in his or her own way, make new connections and ask new questions in light of his or her specific experience, and in so doing, contribute with his or her answers to the further elaboration of a marxist theory of communication.²¹

This book, however, is not just *about* communication, it is itself a form of communication. The struggle to produce this book is not just confined to the ideological struggle to clarify the relation between

the Scandinavian countries and especially, Italy). The nature of the second volume, however, will allow us to better reflect the reality of the world production of communication theory.

21. One aspect of this problem. It appears to me that there is a real political need today to clarify the difference and the relation between the domain of aesthetics, art, literature, theatre, etc., and that of communication, in all its forms. What part of culture are they? Is one more freedom and the other more constraint? The individual and the collectivity? Private and public? Fiction (film) and Truth (journalism)? At the beginning of the century they appear to be similar, as evidenced by the debate around Lenin's "Party Organization, and Party Literature" (1905). Perhaps the response to this question is the importance of Brecht's life and work? There is a huge body of theory on literature, art, etc., which should be tied into communication. In fact, in many critical moments, they appear to be almost indistinguishable, as for example, in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, which will be treated in the second volume of this anthology.

our practice and theory, and that imposed on us. It also—and especially—includes the struggle to produce the physical, “social” entity as well. While its political purpose is to contribute to questioning the rules of capitalist society as they relate to communication, nevertheless, this work is conditioned by the dominant forces in that form of society. In its “editorial” production and in its “material” production, it does not escape the ruling economic laws of monopoly capitalism, which increasingly function to marginalize, censor and destroy certain subdominant forms of printed communication at the expense of more profitable, dominant ones, such as the “mass” paperback, and especially, the electronic means of communication.

Although it is a specific type of intellectual labor which has stamped this book and given it its character, this central aspect is only peripheral for capital (in the immediate) and barely affects the material production process.²² If our labor, and that of all the other people who, directly and indirectly, contributed to the creation of this work, are to be given real social expression in the form of a book, it must be first “translated”, so to speak, into the dominant social language: capital. Thus the material production of this work can be considered as the sum of four interrelated economic elements:

—(a) its pre-production, editorial costs: general overhead, administration, authors, translators, permissions, etc.;

—(b) its production costs proper: typesetting (the labor of the typist, the machinery, etc., figured at a rate per 1,000 signs or words); printing (the amount and size of the pages, the weight and “quality” of the materials: labor, paper, ink, the printing negatives and plates, machine running time, the folding and binding time, final delivery and/or storage, etc.); and

—(c) its cost of distribution (including free copies to the contributors, to certain left libraries and organizations around the world, to reviewers, etc., damaged unsalable copies, and also unpaid sales, etc.) via direct mail, but mostly through bookstores and distributors, etc. (currently at least 50%, but moving upwards).

Thus by adding up all these costs and dividing by the amount of copies produced, one arrives at the production cost per unit. For the “general” type of intellectual product, similar to that which you have

22. Under our present political conditions, that is. There are many countries and moments, in which the problem of content is posed on a more direct political level, which is a higher, more conscious form of censorship, itself a negative word for what we all do every day, i.e. choose. Furthermore, in the largest possible social sense, it is still poverty, overwork, fatigue, etc., which are the most endemic and generalized forms of censorship we know.

23. This is calculated on an ensemble of factors, royalties, print run, hardcover and/or paperback edition, etc., so that, generally speaking, the publisher realizes about a 15% profit when the edition is sold out. For intellectual commodities, “mass” paperbacks, with their large printings and scale economies, and resulting low per-unit cost, this figure goes to 10, 15 or more, which allows for higher profit margins, and thus waste, including heavy promotion and advertising, as well as the regular destruction of unsold

in your hands now, whose printing is usually limited to between 2,000 and 5,000 copies, the final selling price is calculated by multiplying the per unit cost by a coefficient of 4 or 5 to arrive at the final selling price.²³

But the increasing large-scale monopoly production and distribution of books makes it ever-more difficult, that is, “unprofitable”, for a small publisher to produce (and distribute) small-scale printings with a “reasonable”, “competitive”, etc., per unit cost and thus cover price.²⁴ For the small, non-left or -progressive publisher, the problem is “solved” by either increasing the cover prices as called for, or by changing the content of their books and their immediate appeal, etc., to be able to possibly reach a larger public, permitting the production of larger, more profitable printings (or a combination thereof). For the small left or progressive publisher, however, these cannot be “solutions”. Increasing prices beyond a certain minimum point would further limit the size and nature of their book’s possible public, and would thus tend to negate their very political *raison d’être*.²⁵ Normally, the problem is “solved” (under capitalism) by having left publishing subsidized by a political party or more often by other means, and/or by decreasing, as much as socially possible, all the labor costs attached to editorial production: little or no salaries, or overwork for editorial workers, little or no payment to authors, contributors, translators, etc., and, to a lesser degree, also, by sometimes reducing the size; and quality of the material (typesetting and printing) production as well.

The production of this book is no exception to these conditions and the difficult struggle of all small publishers, distributors and bookstores, especially left and progressive ones, to survive and develop, each in their way, under monopoly capitalism. But this book, too, has its specific characteristics. Firstly, one of the co-editors, Seth Siegelau, is also director of the publishing house which is the economic basis for the research work of the International Mass Media Research Center, and secondly, the “subsidy” for this work has come in the direct form of the unremunerated five-year labor of its editors, Armand Matelart and Seth Siegelau, the grossly underpaid labor of its three translators, Colleen Roach, and Mary C. Axtmann (who was assisted in the Spanish texts by Arturo C. Torrecilla), and lastly, the unpaid labor of Rosalind Boehlinger who did the final proof-books called “pulping”.

24. If the large publishers do it, it is generally at a loss for prestige, etc., in which a book is written-off against their real business—i.e., successful large-scale publishing. However, as mentioned earlier, under certain political conditions, this large-scale publishing can very well include left books. Normally, however, publishers can also print more copies of left books, because they possess a strong distribution-network through which they can promote and sell them.

25. Obviously small left and progressive publishers can increase the scale of their production too (as well as the content of some of their books, which can be especially directed towards the university and libraries), but this increase is intimately dependent on their readership, the nature of which is molded by the larger conditions and thus surpasses the individual “solution” of a single publisher.

reading of the book.²⁶

The important contribution of the three people who did the long and difficult translations, which represent 21 texts out of the 64 in this first volume (or approximately, 180,000 out of about 375,000 words), should not be underestimated, even though capitalist society and publishers tend to devalue this type of labor, usually at the expense of well-known authors whose pen is often a source of greater surplus value. We should be more conscious of the importance of this work, particularly in so far as translation itself is a form of communication between different cultures, and that the translation of left political theory is thus not only a high technical achievement, but also a political act of great value and solidarity.²⁷

The editorial production of this book has also called for the collaboration of many of the authors whose work is included here, which meant obtaining their permission to use their work. This permission, in most cases, was also understood as a political act, and most of the authors gave us this permission without any payment, and in many instances, this even included the right to use their text in all the different language editions as well.²⁸

But even with all the militant labor which has gone into this book’s production, the economic conditions in the publishing industry during the book’s evolution between 1973 and 1979 have nevertheless directly affected it in at least two ways: its organization, and its price.

In the early preparation of this anthology, we thought that the principal elements needed to outline the communication process could possibly be organized and contained within a single, unified volume, whose price, if not inexpensive, at least would not be too expensive. This, however, has not been the case, and the increasing production costs, along with our growing appreciation of the complexity of the question and the diversity of the responses, have made it necessary to organize and produce this work in two separate volumes:²⁹

1. CAPITALISM, IMPERIALISM, which stresses the formation of the capitalist communication apparatus, ideology and “mass” culture, and,
2. LIBERATION, SOCIALISM, which stresses the development of popular and working-class

26. The financial arrangements for this book are the following: if and when the cost of production, which includes modest payments to the translators, is met (as of this writing about US\$18,000, mostly for typesetting and printing), the publisher takes 50%, and each of the co-editors, 25%. Clearly the question for us is how to get the money: either by a loan, and/or by having the typesetter and printer wait for their money as long as possible, until the book is “making” money, so to speak. To a limited extent, however, this money also comes from the sale of earlier publications as well.

27. We should note here, in passing, that to attempt to retain the integrity of each translated text, the citations of national currencies, if any, such as the Italian lira, French franc, etc., have been kept in their original denomination. Even national currencies cannot be reduced to equivalent US Dollars, although many people seem to think that everything can be reduced to U.S. standards.

28. Some could not, however, but this is limited to

communication practice and theory.

However, this two-volume format should not be taken structurally or formally, as if there was an actual break between their subjects. The two should be understood as being dialectical aspects of the same unified real process. This is clearly seen in many of the analyses included in the anthology, the best of which could very easily be included in either the first or the second volume.

Lastly, the question of the price of this book. We are painfully aware that the relatively high price of this book does not serve, directly, to help change the nature of the production of marxist communication theory, as mentioned earlier, and in a more general way, the accumulation of intellectual capital by certain sectors of society and not others. In short, the price of this book effectively means, unfortunately, that it will be primarily purchased (and read) by those who already have the economic means and access to the means of information and distribution through which this book will very likely circulate.

Nevertheless, it is our more distant hope that it can still serve, in small indirect way, to heighten understanding of the communication process, and in so doing contribute to advancing our communication practice and its part in our larger struggle against the dominant forces, for a liberated society.

those situations where the work of the author is owned by a publisher. Unfortunately, there was also a case where we could not use a text because it was too expensive. A brief, 2,500 word text written by an important U.S. sociologist could not be used because the executor of his estate wanted \$200.00 for its use, which was almost as much as all the other texts put together. Lastly, in a larger, indirect way, this book can also be thought of as “including” the experiences and knowledge gained by many other people, past and present, who have influenced the authors and ourselves, the editors, via our talking, looking, reading and mutual action. The fact that these people may not always be cited, does not, in any way, mean that they have not also had a real effect on the content of this work.

29. The two-volume format also makes it possible, economically, for the sale of the first volume to perhaps help pay for the production of the second volume, as well as preparing the groundwork for its eventual sale, hopefully in late 1979.

Armand Mattelart

INTRODUCTION: FOR A CLASS ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATION

"For too long, culture has been defended only with spiritual arms, but attacked with material arms. Being itself not only something spiritual, but also and above all, material, it should be defended with material arms."
Bertolt Brecht, July 1937

CRITIQUE AS A STATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

This first volume of the anthology is not what is known as a history of communications, even though the texts are sometimes arranged to reflect a chronological history. Other works may be consulted for a more encyclopedic, detailed account of the specific chronological history of the press, radio and other media.¹ Neither does this anthology attempt to be an exhaustive dictionary of communication terms.

Nevertheless, even though this anthology is not what is generally accepted as a chronological history, it still expresses a history. This is so for two basic reasons. First of all, because of the sixty-four texts which we chose and brought together in this first volume, after having examined many others, all represent a specific history, the history of a certain form of resistance to a given communication system.

All of the texts, whether written individually or

1. All of the advanced capitalist countries, and sometimes even those of the periphery, have produced a history which relates the facts and events marking the media's trajectory (see for example, in the United States, one of the most recent compilations, L. Lichty and M. Topping, *American Broadcasting: A Source Book On the History of Radio and Television*, New York, Hastings House, 1975. For France, see Pierre Miquel's well-documented research *Histoire de la radio et de la télévision*, Paris, Editions Richelieu, 1972). Many of these works reflect an idealist concept of the development of society. They are thus converted into an official history or class saga in which the established power has its particular model for the organization of the media legitimized as the only existing possibility, and as being in the "nature of things." The different phases through which the bourgeoisie's culturally dominating apparatus has passed are "purified" in these histories, which become a chain of inventions discovered by a handful of geniuses, or a series of scientific adventures, or a succession of modernizing operations, the fruit of so-called technical progress. Our objective here is not to reject these official histories. Even if we are in disagreement with the perspective orienting their analyses, these histories often contain very useful research information. For example, in Lichty's and Topping's work on U.S. broadcasting, we find several invaluable articles, covering topics very rarely treated, such as how soap operas became a vital element in the programming of the first radios, or articles which

This text was translated from the French by Colleen Roach. English translation Copyright International General 1978. This is its first publication.

collectively, were brought together to present a critique² of the communication apparatus under capitalism and imperialism. They do not merely show us *how* the communication objects and cultural products emerged, but especially, *why* they emerged. The authors discuss the relations of social necessity which link a given form of communication to a definite stage of development in a specific society. The term *critique* may at first seem too broad a criteria for establishing the line of demarcation which has determined our selection of texts. It is as broad as the range of political positions from which these different critical points of view may be exercised. Therefore, for the time being we shall use the generic term "critique" before going on to develop our own critical concept, that of *class analysis*, which has led us to unite the articles in this anthology, and to organize them in a specific way. Later, in reading the texts, the reader will discover the relatively large range of critical positions used to view the communication apparatus. All of the authors, in their own way, have taken up a position on the battlefield, and all represent a definite point of view on this battlefield. All, to varying degrees, by dismantling or merely describing the mechanisms of the bourgeoisie's ideological domination, reveal levels of critical consciousness which in turn, represent levels of resistance to the *status quo*.

These different levels of critique reflect the levels of struggle which developed or are still developing in the different situations which the authors experienced. They also indicate the content of the authors' own involvement in these struggles. It was through concrete practice in society, in a social

demonstrate how, since 1928, U.S. radio has been a mass advertising medium. What is completely ignored is an analysis of *why* these phenomena occur. As long as these histories are filtered through another system of interpretation, through a different class position, in many cases they may be indispensable sources of information for those attempting to formulate a media history unmediated by the interests of the ruling classes.

The history of the cinema is the only area of the media with a long tradition of materialist studies capable of rivaling the official histories of this means of communication. See for example, the monumental work of the French marxist Georges Sadoul, *Histoire générale du cinéma*, 6 volumes, Paris, Denoel, 1975; and the work of the Swiss marxist, Peter Bachlin, *Histoire économique du cinéma*, Paris, La Nouvelle Edition, 1947 (translated from the German; it also has a very interesting bibliography of historical writings).

2. Marx himself used this term in the title of one of his most important works (*A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*). Although it remained unfinished in his lifetime, it allows us to appreciate how an analysis of super-structural production would have completed his examination of capitalist society's economic level. Paraphrasing Marx, we also might have entitled this anthology "A Critique of the Political Economy of Communication". It is essential that the original meaning of the term *critique* be re-established. This term has been too often used either to harbor positions and analyses which are far from being critical, or — to play on the double meaning of the word — one could say that these analyses hardly contribute to placing capitalist society in a critical state which would precipitate its crisis.

formation with its own particular history, as Marx would say, that they learned to identify capitalism, the opposing system, and became acquainted with the ballistic laws and the resistance of different materials. The research topics themselves, as well as the methodology used to approach a given object or subject, are, in effect, historically determined. They express movements of ideas, which, in turn, represent movements of reality. This is already known, but it should be restated.

To understand this movement of reality, we need to listen to a group of printing workers struggling against industrial concentration and its model of a computerized press. This is just as important for the progress and elaboration of a science of communication as the work developed by a university researcher by means of surveys and reflection. It is most unfortunate that information from a mass organization is generally not accessible in the circuits where university knowledge is produced and distributed (these are also the same circuits where anthologies and "readers" are most often available). The imposition of this division of labor, which sets up game preserves and obliges us to live in closed corporatist systems, is precisely the basis for the legitimacy of the communication circuit which is challenged throughout this book. In order to break down these barriers, we must restore, alongside what is known as the "power of the intellect" and "sanctified", codified knowledge (much too often confused with the very possibility of reflection itself), the power of consciousness, meaning the faculty which permits access to an understanding of the social process. We only regret that this first volume of the anthology has very few texts by militant researchers or popular organizations which show how the practices of subaltern classes produce knowledge, and how the accumulation of practices resisting the dominant system is transformed into a class memory, and how this is transformed into the overall organization of this class to change the world. We are consoled by the fact that the texts we do have which come from workers' organizations are among the most forceful in this anthology.

There is a second reason why these texts claim the status of history. The primary purpose of this first volume of the anthology is to elucidate the genesis of the mode of production of communication under capitalism and imperialism. This overall orientation of the work also provides the basis for each of the texts which make up the anthology, regardless of their specific theme. In general, the approach adopted in most of the texts reflects the same methodological proposition that structures the entire anthology. Each article is faithful to the concern which inspired this anthology, that of recounting the historical process of communication. As a whole, the texts attempt to reconstitute a mode of production; for example, the development of a concept, a theory, a technical discovery, a mode for the social introduction of technology, or a form of State organization. The work thus attempts to avoid the risk of merely juxtaposing an endless series of unrelated

3. See in this volume: Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) "On Journalism and Objectivity", Chile, 1971.

monographs. Just as the acknowledged deficiencies, or those which the reader will discover, represent areas to be further researched, the present texts are offered as an attempt to construct a research methodology based on an analysis of production as a total phenomenon.

The texts chosen for this anthology express the history of the capitalist mode of production both by their presence and by the absences which they force us to recognize. Indeed, there are vast virgin areas yet to be covered by research and reflection on communication. Paradoxically, certain zones of these virgin areas are sometimes very crowded and give the impression of a great wealth of information. Apparently, certain terrains have been discovered and already present a great degree of cultivation. The theme of imperialism is one example amongst many others. There are innumerable studies that describe the invasion of magazines, television serials, advertising messages and other cultural merchandise from the United States in Third World countries. Yet in the literature on this theme there are very few analyses which are capable of explaining how imperialist power works in connection with the internal bourgeoisies and the local ruling classes, which serve as its relay accomplice. There are also very few studies which explain why a message that seems identical in Paris, Rio de Janeiro or Tokyo is both the same and profoundly different.

In speaking of other particularly important gaps, we should note the lack of research on the role of journalists as reproducers of a conception and mode of production of communication. One could suspect a certain class complicity between these two types of "knowledge-bearers", professional news-producers and professional communication researchers. Is it possible that researchers have avoided a critical examination of the social function of the news-producers in order to avoid questioning their own role as mediators for a mode of production and exchange of information and knowledge coherent with the entire capitalist mode of production? It is important to point out that the text on this subject which is presented in this volume (one of the only ones which we were able to find) was produced in a very particular context,³ during the Popular Unity period in Chile. It was during this period that this class analysis of the role of the journalist circulated in the form of a mimeographed article. Under circumstances characterized by the rise of a class movement animated by the subaltern classes, poor people in urban and rural areas challenged the exclusive right of the information-professionals to produce news. As a consequence, the journalists who supported the revolutionary process were led to dismantle the subtle mechanisms of their own social alienation as well as the alienating news they elaborated. The new reality the country was living through demanded a re-definition of the social relation between the transmitter and the receiver, opening a new possibility for the production of news.

Therefore, the absence of certain themes and analyses in this anthology is not due to the fact that researchers or research centers, in spite of the so-called impetus created by the "competitive spirit" in

the academic community, have not had the bright idea to set out in search of unknown lands. The absence or presence of certain types of research is above all a reflection of individual and collective states of consciousness when faced with communication as a form of power.

Of course, there are certain "privileged" moments of history (which often have a very high social cost, such as in Portugal and Chile, to refer to the most recent cases) that particularly favor critical analyses of reality. These are moments when the social conflicts clearly expose the rationality of the ruling classes, whose operating mechanisms are normally extenuated by everyday life. These experiences accelerate the pace of history, and sometimes events which would normally only take place in the course of several decades, occur in the space of a few years. They are privileged moments because the critique of the old order can be carried further thanks to the new possibilities opening up, which acquire authority and credibility through the profound changes taking place. In the first volume of this anthology the texts written in Vietnam, Peru, Chile, Cuba and Cape Verde, amongst others, bear witness to these revolutionary or pre-revolutionary moments. The full appreciation of the significance of these periods of social crisis and revolutionary upheaval will be found in the second volume of this anthology.

Other particularly crucial moments of class struggle, when the relations of force are less favorable to popular movements also reveal, in abrupt fashion, the nerve structure of the system of domination. The different types of European fascism in the thirties, as well as the more recent military States in Latin America, planned to function as exceptional forms of the capitalist State and no longer as systems cut off from its history, also shed light on the mechanisms that appear in diluted form when present in the daily normality of capitalist society. Bertolt Brecht, a direct witness of fascist oppression, wrote in 1935:

Fascism is the historic phase in which capitalism has entered; that is to say, it is both something new and old. In the fascist countries, capitalism only exists as fascism, and fascism can only be combated as the most shameless, impudent, oppressive, and deceptive form of capitalism. Therefore, how can one tell the truth about fascism, which one claims to combat, if nothing is said against that which engenders it—capitalism?⁴

It is precisely for this reason that our section on the

4. Bertolt Brecht, "Art et politique", in *Sur le réalisme*, Paris, L'Arche, 1970. The way official historians analyze the communication systems operating under fascism (which are invariably equated with those operating under socialism) show just how empty their analyses are when it is a question of dealing with capitalism's States of Exception. The only manner in which they may emerge from their state of perplexity is by simplifying the problem to an extreme, and by doing precisely what Brecht denounced: ignoring the intimate links between fascism and capitalism. For a functionalist approach to the fascist phenomenon as reflected in communication, see Charles Wright, *Mass Communications: A Sociological Perspective*, New York, Random House, 1959.

formation of the capitalist mode of communication ends with two works written in the forties on the nazi ideology of mass indoctrination and its model for establishing a radio network, in keeping with the desire "to subjugate the minds while hardening the hearts," in the words of Brecht. It is for this same reason that the last section of the first volume, on the evolution of monopoly capitalism, concludes with four texts that deal with the militarization of culture. Various aspects of this subject are treated: the McCarthy campaigns during the cold war, the means used in the cultural and ideological aggression against Vietnam, the increasing involvement of establishment social sciences in counter-insurreccional research, and finally, an analysis of the State ideological apparatuses under the military dictatorships of the South Cone in Latin America. Tightening of the mechanisms used for ideological control reaches the highest stage in the totalitarian State, the State without mediation, the State of brutal force. The fact that we illustrate the nature of the military State by making explicit reference to the Latin-American countries, does not mean that we have forgotten that other peoples on other continents are also ruled by similar martial laws, such as Indonesia, Iran and Thailand, for example. Nor should we forget that in regions that are not so far away, the State of emergency and emergency legislation are being called into use much more frequently, even though this takes place within the context of civil society, as in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Besides the heated moments of the revolution and the cold moments of fascism and dictatorships, there are other periods when the schemas of domination become clearly manifest. These are the periods of economic crisis. The Great Depression of the thirties and the structural crisis which the world capitalist economy is presently undergoing are moments characterized by a complete re-organization of the entire capitalist State and economic apparatus. New political forms are being elaborated, the partitioning of both surveillance and discipline is being extended, and new mechanisms of social control attempt to make the citizen-consumer-producer accept the new international division of labor as well as the new conditions for achieving surplus value. In this sense, the military States constitute the "top-phase" of these new political forms caused by the change in the model of international accumulation of capital. Other repercussions (in other contexts) are reflected in the revival of authoritarianism and the austerity plans in capitalist democracies, which place the mechanisms of power and economic control in an increasingly limited number of hands. As such, by revealing the system's fragility, these moments of restricted liberties challenge the so-called permanence and universality of the solutions offered by the ruling classes for resolving the problem of humankind's happiness. They also testify to the need for other alternatives, for a different organization of social relations, and for another mode of production of daily life. It is therefore not surprising to note that many of the works we have chosen to illustrate the

monopoly phase of capitalism are firmly rooted in the economic crisis.

Finally, there is the colonialist period, where the unequal conditions of cultural exchange between different peoples appear in the most naked form. According to Marx, "Capitalist civilization should not be observed in the metropolis, where it is disguised, but in the colonies, where it walks around naked." The history of the early years of the Havas News Agency, the first large, multinational communications enterprise, which was founded in 1835, and whose greatest development took place under the banner of French colonialism, illustrates how the large colonial powers divided amongst themselves the exploitation and plundering of information, just as they divided up copper, cotton and other raw materials. The history of international information also has agreements for the division of the world, its own Berlin treaties. The case of the Philippines, which in this volume, represents a particular moment of colonialist history, is significant for more than one reason. It represents one of the first conquests during the period of classical imperialism, that of financial and monopoly capital, which began in the big economic depression of 1873. The first modern monopolies developed within the great upheavals in the world-wide capitalist economy, within the context of this international industrial depression, which lasted until the beginning of the 1890's. In order to find a solution to this crisis, comparable in the history of world-wide capitalism to that of the 1930's and 1970's, the United States decided to lay the foundations for an economy based on exports. The policies designed to restore economic order relied on expansionism as an alternative to the recession. However, unlike the 1970's, the nations subjected to economic as well as military conquest and occupation were culturally colonized using a justification explicitly founded upon the principle of "manifest destiny". This was defined as a "moral mission assigned to the Nation by Providence." The civilian governor of the Philippine Islands, William Howard Taft, who one year later was elected president of the United States, declared in 1901, before the American Senate: "One of our great hopes in elevating those people is to give them a common language and that common language, English, because through the English language certainly, by reading its literature, by becoming aware of the history of the English race, they will breathe in the spirit of Anglo-Saxon individualism..."⁵ The same year, when the Philippine Islands were conquered during the Spanish-American Wars, the United States replaced

5. *American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection, Testimony Taken From Hearings on Affairs in the Philippine Islands Before the Senate Committee on the Philippine* — 1902 Henry F. Graff, editor, Boston, Little, Brown, 1969. For the history of cultural colonization in Puerto Rico, see Aida Negron de Montilla, *La americanización en Puerto Rico y el sistema de instrucción pública 1900-1930*, Editorial Universitaria, Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1977; Manuel Maldonado-Denis, *Hacia una interpretación marxista de la historia de Puerto Rico y otros ensayos*, Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico; Luis Nieves Falcon, "Imperialismo cultural y resistencia cultural en Puerto Rico", a paper presented at the

the old Spanish Empire in Cuba and Puerto Rico. The latter, an occupied territory which has become a neocolonial testing ground for new imperialist strategies, today is used to launch models to decentralize the polluting industries away from the metropolis, just as forty years ago, this island was used to try out new policies for sterilizing women from the popular classes. In the same way, the ghetto Puerto Ricans in New York, along with the Blacks and other minority groups, were the preferential targets when the new educational television series, such as *Sesame Street*, were launched.

Certain gaps in this anthology illustrate that there are areas which still need critical research. However, other gaps are intentional and certain themes have been consciously and purposely omitted. These exclusions are due to a logical choice arising from the perspective from which the texts have been selected. Traditional textbooks teach students in their most tender years at the university to rely on the well-known key-formulas for understanding the media: *Who says what, in which channel, to whom, with what effect?* These are the magic words of this ready-to-go, ready-to-think methodology. They are like an advertising slogan, reflecting the same marketing concerns which inspired their launching. It is an apparently "objective" formula with only one possible interpretation. For the moment, we shall not engage in a lengthy discussion on the definition of *who* and *what*. The famous *who* hides the identity of the transmitter. The search for this *who*, which has been baptized "control analysis", when it is not limited to a study of social psychology, at very best, leads to an analysis of property. By stopping at the ownership of the media, this eliminates the concept of power or power structure which would invalidate the compartmentalized approach to communication study. As far as the *what* is concerned, we can get some idea of what this will be like in examining the methods proposed for content analysis, "designed to achieve an objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communications." This idea is in striking contrast to the most elementary concept of ideology, and its corresponding methodology, which attempts to reveal the latent content of the message, based on value systems and the self-legitimation of a given class.

The first four questions of this empiricist abracadabra are posed, although in a different way, throughout this first volume.⁶ Lasswell and Berelson certainly would not recognize themselves in this revised and corrected version.

The last question, with *what effect*, is not posed

International Conference on Cultural Imperialism, held in Algiers, 11-15 October 1977.

6. Nevertheless, an explanation is called for. In the vast domain of ideological analysis, we have deliberately eliminated the more specific area of "production of discourse", that is, what many analysts continue to mistakenly call "content" analyses on the media, whether it be newspapers, comics, television series, films, advertising messages, etc. Actually, the production of discourse is an area of research which offers great possibilities and where, in the last few years, the contributions of marxist-oriented linguistics and semiology have had a decisive influence. A

in this first volume. Functionalist sociology has made us too accustomed to viewing the study of effects within a therapeutic and operational context.⁷ The aim of this sociology has been to better the relationship between a given audience and a commercial enterprise, the message transmitter, in order to arrive at a balance between the receivers' desires and the needs of business and the system. In this market perspective, the receiver is only considered as a passive consumer of information or leisure commodities. However, as shown by some studies the audience does not necessarily accept reading the messages sent to it by the ruling class with the code prescribed by this class and its culture. The receiver does not necessarily adopt the attitude which will make these messages coherent with the bourgeoisie's dreams of stability and the survival of its order.⁸ The meaning of a message is not limited to the stage of transmission. The audience may also produce its own meaning. The class consciousness and social practice of the listener-reader-spectator either allows him or her to accept or reject the inexorable, totalitarian effect of the message, its McLuhanian fascination. As Amílcar Cabral, the assassinated leader and theoretician of the liberation movement in the Portuguese colonies, reminds us, a culture of liberation was developed as a reaction against and in

compilation of the different contributions which take into account the achievements and deficiencies of these studies would be the basis for another much-needed anthology. For a stimulating introduction to the marxist analysis of language and semiotics, see the work of the Soviet, Mikhail Bakhtin (V.N. Volochinov) published in Leningrad in 1929-30 and translated into French in 1977 as *Le marxisme et la philosophie du langage, essai de la méthode sociologique en linguistique*, Paris, Editions de Minuit. See also Jouri Lotman, *Esthétique et sémiotique du cinéma*, Paris, Editions Sociales, 1977 (translated from the Russian). The reader should also consult the writings of Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, Christian Metz, and Eliseo Verón.

The second volume of this anthology will evaluate the contribution made by semiology to the elaboration of a Marxist theory of communication.

7. It is sufficiently revealing to examine this tendency of functionalism through its concept of *dysfunction*. Any dysfunctioning of a means of communication is established according to the existing institutions' schemes. It is characterized by its potential danger to the balance of the existing social system, and never by any dynamic qualities which might engender another system. The greatest defect in the functionalist approach, which permits classing it amongst the status-quo ideologies, is not the fact that it does not perceive the possibility of rupture with the system, but that the prospective transformation suggested by this dysfunction are simply never taken into consideration. For a critical analysis of the establishment social sciences, the reader should consult, in addition to Dallas W. Smythe's article on the political character of science included in this volume, the following works: Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, "Sociologues des mythologies et mythologies de sociologues", *Les Temps Modernes* (Paris), December 1963; Nicholas Novikov, "Critiques de la sociologie bourgeoise" *L'Homme et la Société* (Anthropos, Paris), 3, January-February 1970; Adolfo Sanchez Vasquez, "La ideología de la neutralidad ideológica en las ciencias sociales", *Historia y Sociedad* (Mexico), 7, 1975; Eliseo Verón et al, *El proceso ideológico*, Buenos Aires, Tiempo Contemporáneo, 1971; José Vidal-Beneyto, "La

spite of the dominant cultures (and there is no doubt about the overpowering strength of these cultures). This culture of liberation was and is incarnated in the liberation movements which expelled and vanquished the colonizer, at least in the theater of military operations. Therefore, a dominant message may have the opposite effect of what is intended, and may be returned to the sender. Ratings, which attempt to determine how an audience will respond to a given cultural product, avoid dealing with the needs that are not fulfilled and the demands which arise unbeknownst to the transmitter. The critical capacity of the receiver should not be over-estimated, but neither should it be under-estimated. In how many countries do the Aryan heroes of the television series, *Mission Impossible*, fighting against the rebels, undergo a process of identification which is the exact opposite of that intended by the imperialist code, and how often are they viewed as the "bad guys" in the story?

A French anthropologist-historian recently posed the question as to what the consumers or dominated do with the messages they hear, see, or read. He advanced an interesting hypothesis, based on the following comparison:

For a long time researchers have been studying the ambiguity that destroyed from the inside, the "success" of the Spanish colonizers over the Indian ethnic groups.

dependencia de las categorías conceptuales en las ciencias sociales", a paper presented at the International Conference on Cultural Imperialism, held in Algiers, 11-15 October 1977; Andre Gunder Frank, *The Sociology of Development and the Underdevelopment of Sociology*, London, Pluto, 1970; and Irving Horowitz, *Three Worlds of Development*, New York, Oxford, 1966.

8. See Michèle Mattelart and Mabel Piccini, "La televisión y los sectores populares", *Comunicación y Cultura* (Buenos Aires and Santiago de Chile), 2, 1974. The U.S. sociological communications "effect" approach known as the *theory of uses and gratifications* shows that the "effect" researchers are not concerned with evaluating the capacity of the different social classes to subvert media messages. This approach, which attempts in vain to make up for the gaps and deficiencies of another "effect" approach, *the theory of escapism*, is so firmly rooted in the conviction that the media and their corresponding social structures are immutable elements, that it is impossible to even imagine a research topic such as "message subversion" being taken into consideration. Indeed, a communication sociology which makes use of the psychological terms of social apathy, escapism, and narcotic dysfunction (as if the media were a drug without any know origin) as well as so many other notions for identifying the problem of effects, can hardly be asked to awaken from its somnambulistic theorizing, and to begin making concrete analyses of the popular classes' passive and active resistance to ideological domination. The U.S. sociological "effect" approach to communications and the critical "subversive" approach are like two opposing planets, since they reflect class positions and class views which are irreconcilably different. As Che Guevara stated *à propos* of this kind of irreconcilability: "You cannot ask an elm tree to grow pears." For an understanding of the view of effects as presented by U.S. sociology see the classical work of Joseph T. Klapper, *The Effects of Mass Communications*, Glencoe, Free Press, 1960. For a recycled version of the concept, see Denis McQuail's *Towards a Theory of Mass Communication*, London, Collier MacMillan, 1969.

Subdued and even consenting, often these Indians converted the liturgies, the representations or laws which they were forced to accept, into something other than what the conquerer hoped to obtain through their imposition; they subverted them not by challenging or changing them, but by their way of using them for and in function of references that were outside of the system they could not escape from. These groups were different and foreign within the very order which assimilated their external existence; they escaped from the system without leaving it. The force of their difference resided in their "consumption" procedures.⁹

The second volume is particularly concerned with an analysis of the forms of popular resistance to the dominant culture, and with an examination of the alternatives that already exist, as presented in texts which show the responses of subaltern classes to cultural domination. Studies examining the way in which the dominated classes decode the cultural products of the ruling classes are very rare. The great lack of information in this area should be stressed. *The mechanisms of power have been rather extensively studied, but the way the subaltern classes receive and make use of these messages has not been the subject of great interest.* In the hierarchy of struggles, this form of *defensive resistance* guarantees, prepares and supports other responses to the hegemonic culture, which constitute an *offensive resistance*. Through this resistance, the popular movement, based on various levels of consciousness attained in its reality, engenders its own communication networks for defending its interests. We should examine the degree to which left organizations are aware of and perceptive to these popular, molecular and daily procedures, and whether these organizations favor the liberation of this defensive resistance within a political strategy of grass-roots creation of cultural power.

SCIENCE/POLITICS

A "world history" of research permits a clear view of the importance of historical conditions presiding over the production and consumption of knowledge. In a well-known article,¹⁰ the North American sociologist R.K. Merton, attempting to define the limits of the discipline of "communication sciences," compares the *sociology of communications* with the *sociology of knowledge*. The former, he asserts, is located geographically in the new world and the latter in the old world. Bordering on caricature, he opposes the vague and visionary historical method of Durkheim, Mannheim, Marx and Engels, to the soundness of the survey techniques and content analyses used in the sociology of communications. According to this view, the latter

9. "Entretien avec Michel de Certeau", *Le Monde* (Paris), 31 January 1978, pp. 1-2. By the same author, see in particular, *La culture au pluriel*, Paris, 10/18, 1974; and *La prise de parole: pour une nouvelle culture*, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1969.

10. Robert K. Merton, "The Sociology of Knowledge and Mass Communications" in *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Glencoe, Free Press, 1957.

11. Michel Foucault, *Surveiller et Punir*, Paris, Gallimard, 1975, pp. 226-7.

represents an objective search for truth, which is in striking contrast with the value judgements that characterize the systems of the sociology of knowledge. This leads Merton to make the following, disarmingly simple, judgement: "The European imagines and the North American observes; the North American conducts research on a short-term basis; the European speculates on a long-term basis. The North American knows what he is talking about. The European doesn't know what he is talking about." As a matter of fact, this representative of functionalism refuses to call things by their right names. What he has in mind, disguised by his glaring dichotomies, is the opposition not only between a judgement based on fact and value judgement, but between *science* and *politics*. This debate is the subject in more elaborate terms, of many other works which represent the functionalist school, even though the rejection of politics means that this opposition is hardly ever explicitly recognised. (Unfortunately, use of this dichotomy is not limited to the functionalist current — certain progressive researchers also incorporate it into their analyses.) We shall return to this subject at a later stage, and the texts of this anthology will demonstrate that the observation of empirical facts is not just reserved for the empiricists. One is tempted to contrast Merton's attempts to codify the study of mass communications in terms of scientific discipline, with Michel Foucault's reflections on the different disciplines and the genealogy of investigation-inquiry-survey as forms of knowledge and power. He points out that the 18th century, the historical moment when the forms of knowledge-power were meticulously organized,

invented the techniques of discipline and investigation, undoubtedly somewhat as the Middle Ages invented the judicial investigation. However, completely different means were used.... The judicial investigation represented the sovereign power assuming the right to establish truth by a certain number of prescribed techniques. Since this time, the judicial investigation has become a part of Western justice... However, its political origin and its connection with the emergence of States and monarchic sovereignty should not be forgotten. Neither should one lose sight of its later development and its role in the formation of knowledge. The investigation was undoubtedly the rudimentary basis necessary for the constitution of the empirical sciences; it was the juridico-political matrix for this experimental knowledge... Vast empirical knowledge which dealt with the affairs of the world and transcribed them within the order of an indefinite discourse which noted, described and verified the facts... undoubtedly followed the operational model of the inquisition... What this politico-judicial, administrative and criminal, religious and lay investigation was to the natural sciences, the disciplinary analysis was to the humanities. These areas of study which our "humanity" has been enchanted with for more than a century are technically modelled after the dreadful and minute details of the different disciplines and investigations in these areas.¹¹

In Europe, things are not as simple as vulgarized empiricism would have us believe. The state of mass communication research in France, for example, reveals, with its excesses and deficiencies, a rather

contradictory situation. The empiricist school has numerous followers, even if its representatives who have introduced audience surveys in France are twenty years behind their Anglo-Saxon colleagues. The critique of the communication apparatuses does not have its own school, but rather several individuals¹² who have included it in a wider area of analysis of the mechanisms of culture and power. The first two French texts which we have chosen¹³ were written, significantly, by two authors who for some time have been working in parallel areas of research that are not specifically connected with the media. Reference is made to Pierre Bourdieu, who is more directly concerned with analyses of educational processes and the multifaceted universe of cultural practices, and Henri Lefebvre, who is more interested by the problems of the State. Nevertheless, there is an important body of theoretical and conceptual studies and research which could be invested in an analysis of the media, but the connection is hardly ever established. This is the case with the analyses on the State and power by Althusser, Balibar, Foucault, Poulantzas, and Rancière.¹⁴ However, the very concept of an Ideological State Apparatus (developed by Althusser) of which communication apparatuses are only one branch, has oriented a great deal of research on the mass media and education in other geographic areas, such as Latin America. In French universities (the schools of communication and information science are relatively recent and reflect the

12. See for example, Jean Baudrillard's works, especially, *Pour une critique de l'économie politique du signe*, Paris, Gallimard, 1972. We should also keep in mind the earlier works of Edgar Morin on the culture industry; for example, *L'Esprit du temps*, Paris, Grasset, 1962.

13. See in this volume Pierre Bourdieu, "Public Opinion Does Not Exist"; Henri Lefebvre, "Work and Leisure in Daily Life". The reader should also follow the work of the research group directed by Pierre Bourdieu, who edits the journal *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris (with summaries in English and German). One of the most interesting contributions of Henri Lefebvre to the analysis of mass culture is undoubtedly his work, *Everyday Life in the Modern World*, London, Allan Lane, 1971.

14. In particular, Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, London, New Left Books, 1971. For one of the most constructive criticisms of Althusser's theory of ideology, see the article by the Argentine sociologist Emilio de Ipola, imprisoned for the last two years by the dictatorship in his country, "Crítica a la teoría de Althusser sobre la ideología", *Uno en dos* (Medellin, Colombia), 5, 1975 (in French in *L'Homme et la Société* (Paris), 41-42, 1976). See also the critical evaluation of Robin Cheesman and Carsten Kyhn, "Notes on Mass Communications and Class Consciousness" in *Contributions of the Mass Media to the Development of Consciousness in a Changing World*, papers from the International Association of Mass Communication Research (IAMCR) Conference, held 17-21 September 1974 in Leipzig.

One of the most misleading tendencies of Althusserian ideological theory is that its monolithic and verticte concept of how the dominant ideological apparatuses function does not conceive of them as being subject to class contradictions. The most concrete effect of this approach is that its field of observation marginalizes the resistance practices of the

influence of a U.S.-inspired technocratic approach) certain young individuals, who are not yet well-known, are contributing to the development of a marxist theory of communication.¹⁵ There is also an important current, in the sociology of literature, which is concerned with expanding its analyses to include products of sub-literature and mass culture.¹⁶ Although it does not represent a global approach to the communication apparatus, the analysis of the production of discourse, based on the school of semiology¹⁷ and presented in the magazine *Communications*, has been particularly fertile in France. However, within the last few years there has been a strong tendency within this current towards formalism, which has caused a great deal of criticism and suspicion. The question might be asked as to why there is such an abundance of Parisian journals dedicated to critical analysis of the cinema (*Cahiers du cinéma*, *Ca-Cinéma*, *Ecran*, *Cinématique*, *Positif*, *La revue du cinéma*) and why there is such a lack of material presenting academic studies on communications. First of all, it should be pointed out that the cinema tends to be considered as the technological relay of literature, which is still the indication *par excellence* of culture for the French social formation. The over-development of the narrative theory, of the analysis of the production of discourse, and the sanctification of language may also be viewed as other examples of a tropism which has drawn the study of communication towards the literary field.

We should also examine the seductive nature of

dominated classes against the dominant ideology, as well as it marginalizes the internal incoherencies which characterize the operation of these ideological apparatuses. This remark, however, is not intended to invalidate the concept of State Ideological Apparatus (or, in the words of Gramsci, Hegemonic Apparatus), but only to question the way this concept is defined by the French Marxist. In Latin America, the influence of Althusser's theory, which in the beginning was a decisive step in the critique of the ideological apparatuses, later, with the intensification of the political process, was mediated and refuted by the hard reality of class struggle. We will return to this subject in the second volume of this anthology.

15. See in this volume the articles of Yves de la Haye (from the Université de Grenoble) and of René Péron (from the Université de Rennes). Within the same current, see the excellent collective study on *Capitalisme et industries culturelles* by Alain Lefebvre, Armel Huet, Jacques Ion, Bernard Miegge, and René Péron, Grenoble, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1978; and also Barbier-Bouvet, Béaud and Flichy, *Communication et pouvoir*, Paris, Anthropos, forthcoming 1978.

16. See the work carried out at the Université de Bordeaux under the direction of Robert Escarpit, and that of the Study Group on the Sociology of Literature, at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, under the direction of Jacques Leenhardt.

17. At the present time, in the field of semiology, certain types of research are being carried out that further develop and stimulate a marxist approach to culture and ideology. Especially relevant are the works on the concept of "ideological formation", complementary to that of "social formation", in C. Haroche, P. Henry, and M. Pécheux, "La sémantique et la coupure", *Langages* (Paris), 24, December 1971. Christian Metz's writings on the semiology of the cinema should also be consulted.

McLuhan's doctrine in France.¹⁸ His theory had the merit of focussing on materialist assumptions for analysing new communication technology, but unfortunately his approach to these phenomena is discredited by serving the interests of an idealist interpretation of the dominant order. Questioning the reasons for the success of the University of Toronto professor in French educational circles, a French researcher concluded his study with the following concise remarks:

General-purpose typologies, slogans with an anti-conformist appearance, and an unexpected order of presentation—all meet the expectations of a public which, in its educational experiences, should provide a present or future place for the electronic mass media. For a reader with little time, or someone who hears about McLuhan's work second or third hand, the degree of generality in his theses, and their evident vagueness, make him a marvellous and unclassifiable theoretician. Undoubtedly, the relative success of McLuhanism in academic milieux is a result of two factors: the need for a philosophy of the media and an unusual work, which, lacking any scientific basis, does not limit access for the reader with little time or no formation, and who is not warned by any critical analysis of McLuhan's approach. One should also add that in France studies on the media have a particularly high rate of dissimulation. There is hardly any systematic analysis that incorporates economic and sociological aspects of communications. Semiology, and of course, technology, are the only areas that have attracted the curiosity of pedagogues. Unlike certain countries in Latin America, there is no empirical knowledge of certain concrete repercussions of media ideology, which would banish their unconditional acceptance and prevent any euphoric celebration... It is thus possible to theorize about audio-visual methods in a way that would never be possible in economics, sociology, or even psychology of education. The mistrust and caution normally exercised by pedagogues in these disciplines are not applied to studies on audio-visual media.¹⁹

Nevertheless, the absence of a global, critical approach to the means of mass communication in France should not obscure the fact that democratic responses are developing, by means of popular movements. These responses constitute so many alternatives to the dominant system, so many points of reference for a new theory of communication.²⁰ Any judgement about the lack of a critical approach to mass communications should not be based on the slight concern for this subject expressed in university centers and academic circles. Rather, this should be viewed as an indication of the crisis of the university apparatus, less and less in touch with a national reality defined in terms of classes. Certain intellectuals have already stressed that many university sectors occupy a rear-guard position as far as perception of social movements is concerned. As many researchers have already pointed out, the fact that the intellectuals were

unable to predict the surge of protest movements in May 1968 was evidence of the distance separating them from the popular classes. This observation is still valid today. There is a lack of connection between the development of cultural forms of resistance and popular creation, and their assumption by universities as subjects for scientific investigation. A good example of this phenomenon is the analysis (included in this first volume of the anthology) offered by the workers' committee of Chaix Printers,²¹ one of the pillars in the monopoly domination of French printing. This text clearly examines, from a trade union perspective, the effects of the current economic crisis on the printing and book industries. In order to understand why it takes so long for university research to catch up with national realities, we must take into account the gulf separating the researcher from the national reality. When viewed in terms of social classes, this is nothing less than the gulf between the class whose function within capitalist society is to elaborate science, that is, the intellectual petite bourgeoisie, and the class whose dynamics guide the transformation of reality.

During the last fifteen years, the gap between these two classes was reduced in Latin America, where the interests of certain university centers and those of the national liberation movement coincided. The political terrain occupied by McLuhan's theories in France was occupied in Latin America by forces offering an alternative to his idealism. His messianic doctrines based on "naive optimism" had to seek refuge in their functional enclosure, from which they should never be allowed to leave, unless progressive forces open the doors and permit them to take over the terrain. This enclosure is defined by the large multinational manufacturers of advanced technology, who are more than happy to use this global vision of capitalist society in the satellite era as a basis for their mercantile language.

Nevertheless, around 1960, communication research in Latin America, still at an embryonic stage, was almost exclusively in the hands of the functionalists, who came straight from the North American universities. Scholarships and grants from the Ford and Rockefeller foundations assured the formation of Latin American students in the higher education centers of the North. The most well frequented were the Universities of Michigan, Columbia, and Stanford. When necessary, professors from the United States even travelled to Latin America to establish university chairs in communications or schools of communications. In 1963, Charles Wright founded the chair of sociology of communications within the Sociology Department at the Catholic University of Chile. This case is mentioned because it is particularly symbolic. Ten

20. See for example, "La presse d'expression locale", *Alternatives* (Paris), 2, 4th Quarter, 1977.

21. See in this volume "The Book: The Workers Struggle Against the Crisis, Waste, Monopolies and Authoritarianism". For a recent discussion of the relations between the working class, the intellectuals, and revolutionary theory in France, see "Les intellectuels et le pouvoir" *Politique Aujourd'hui* (Paris), 1-2, 1978.

18. On 18-19 October 1977 the newspaper *Le Monde* (Paris) published two interviews with McLuhan, "Entretien avec Marshall McLuhan". For a critical examination of the McLuhan doctrines, see Sidney Finkelstein's text in this volume.

19. François Mariet, "Le mcluhanisme dans l'éducation" *Le français d'aujourd'hui* (Paris), 38, June 1977.

years later, before the *coup d'Etat* that overthrew President Salvador Allende, one of the most productive marxist communication centers in Latin America had replaced this department.²² The orientation of this center was diametrically opposed to that of the author of the basic manual on the functionalist approach (*Mass Communications, A Sociological Perspective*, published in Buenos Aires in 1963). However, it was Wilbur Schramm and his disciples who had the greatest influence over the network of communication research and training in all of Latin America, except Cuba. This massive penetration of North American academia was greatly facilitated by the intervention of international organizations where the United States played the leading role. Thus in 1958 CIESPAL (Centro Internacional de Estudios Superiores de Periodismo en América Latina), a specialized regional organization of UNESCO was created, with headquarters in Quito, Ecuador. Books and manuals on functionalism were translated by USIS (U.S. Information Service) and thousands of free copies were distributed in the universities by the U.S. embassies.²³ Much before the old world, the Latin American continent was exposed to all of the theoretical and methodological teachings of Anglo-Saxon empiricism. The texts used to spread these teachings were those of Merton, Lasswell, and Talcott Parsons, and especially those of Schramm, whose classical work *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication* was translated and advertised by CIESPAL itself. This later became the bible of the journalism and communication schools, which were

22. Reference is made to the Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Nacional (CEREN) which published the *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional*.

23. On the book distribution policies carried out in Latin America by the USIA and other official organisms, especially in the field of communications, see Warren Dean, "The USIA Book Program: Latin America", *Point of Contact* (New York), 3, September-October 1976. The following statement is made by the author: "More than half the books translated by the USIA are in the social sciences — politics, economics, international relations, sociology, pedagogy and 'area studies.' The rest are divided evenly between the sciences, arts and letters. Very nearly all of the scientific books are connected in some clear way with policy — mass communication technology, management psychology, environmental management, oceanic resources, energy resources and so on... Clearly there is no intent to transfer technology for free".

24. For an acritical historical record of the trajectory of these schools, see Raymond B. Nixon, "La enseñanza del periodismo en América Latina," *Comunicación y Cultura*, 2, 1974, pp. 197-212 (document published in English by the Institute of International Education (IIE) and the Council on Higher Education in the American Republics (HEAR); New York, 1970). For a critical evaluation of the various research currents on communications in Latin America. See Hugo Assman, "Evaluación de algunos estudios latino-americanos sobre comunicación masiva," report presented at the 10th Latin American Sociological Congress, 8-12 July 1974, San José, Costa-Rica; Hector Schmucler, "La investigación sobre comunicación masiva," *Comunicación y Cultura*, 4, 1976. *Comunicación y Cultura*, a tribune for political reflection on the communication process in Latin America, was founded in May 1973 in Santiago de Chile and was subsequently transferred to Buenos Aires and then

created at an increasingly rapid rate. The first journalism school in Latin America was founded in 1934 in Buenos Aires, under the patronage of the dean of the University of Columbia's Pulitzer School of Journalism. It was one of the first professional journalism schools.²⁴

Three major factors were responsible for the rising interest in communication studies. First of all, there was the development of television and the resulting adaptation of communication networks to the reinforced penetration of the multinationals (advertising and public relations agencies, firms specializing in public opinion, and commercial and marketing research). Secondly, there was the emphasis placed on the development of social reform policies, which demanded the widespread diffusion of new knowledge and techniques. These social measures included modest agrarian reforms, which attempted to stimulate "modern" attitudes in the peasants in order to reconcile them to the increasingly urgent need to install a veritable capitalist economy in agriculture, as well as birth-control policies, which, in order to limit the so-called demographic explosion, attempted either by reason or force, to convince women of the popular classes that they should limit the number of children and, concerning the family, should adopt criteria "favorable for social change."²⁵ Educational reforms which responded to the necessity for training the work force, capable of nourishing these so-called modernization policies, were programmed along the same lines. The expansion of the educational systems allowed the U.S. foundations and

Mexico where it is presently published by Editorial Nueva Imagen. For a viewpoint which falls into this trap of the science/politics dichotomy while proclaiming just the opposite, see Eliseo Verón, "Acerca de la producción de concimiento: el estructuralismo y la semiología en Argentina y Chile", *Lenguajes* (Buenos Aires), I, 1, 1975, pp. 96-125.

25. In order to illustrate the links between birth-control policies in the Third World and the promotion of advertising strategies, we may refer to extracts from the works of U.S. population sociologists, written during this period. In a document prepared for a seminar on birth control, held in Medellín (Columbia) in 1965, Donald Bogue from the University of Chicago, expressed the following viewpoint: "The sociologist's assertion that there is a need to administer treatment on a massive scale to lower-class individuals may seem bothersome to medical and social welfare professionals who bear the heaviest responsibility in adopting family planning programs. It is an old tradition that work in these two fields should be done on an individual basis... If, when launching a family planning program, the doctors adopt the same philosophy as that used in their professional practice, there will be comparatively little progress. The progress that is made will be extremely localized, while vast sectors of the population will be neglected. The end result will be a very high cost price per individual. On the contrary as far as possible, we should influence individuals in massive quantities..." And how can the adherence of the masses be promoted quickly and efficiently? Industrial civilization's modern advertising techniques during this period seemed to accommodate all possible hopes and fantasies, or in the words of one U.S. birth-control expert, "Family Planning literature should make use of beauty and sex-appeal", "One may," continued Donald Bogue, "legitimize family planning by publishing the signatures of famous celebrities who are powerful and who will inspire confidence.

universities, seconded by the Peace Corps, to intensify their penetration by promoting, in many countries, radio and TV educational pilot projects. From the beginning of the sixties, Colombia was converted into a "privileged" laboratory for testing the application of audio-visual technology to the widest possible range of instruction (adult education, primary and secondary grades, etc.). And it was no accident that this experimental platform in Colombia served as a launching pad for the first initiatives proposing satellite TV for Latin America. The third element, which provides a context for these moderate reforms, was the utopia of the Alliance for Progress. This program was launched by President John F. Kennedy as imperialism's response to the challenge presented by the Cuban revolution. This utopian project reflected the dream of democratizing access to intellectual and spiritual commodities. It relied on the "revolution of rising expectations" as conveyed by the mass media and the so-called mass culture to make the populations believe that this utopia was already reality. This "mass consensus" culture, addressed to the "average citizen", supported the new class alliances which, relying on the middle-class parties, hoped to transform the different sectors of the Latin-American populations in accordance with the middle-class way-of-life in the United States.

In this panorama dominated by the school of *communication research*, fortunately there was one exception, that of Venezuela. During the sixties, this country was shaken by guerilla movements and the class struggle was intensified. Venezuela, along with Puerto Rico, experienced the brutal impact of the modern television and advertising apparatuses installed by the businessmen who escaped from the Cuban revolution. The very first critical analyses of the technological apparatuses of communication were developed in Venezuela.²⁶

Throughout the continent, the "return to sender" was especially violent, since the dependence had been so strong. It was principally in the second half of the sixties that a specifically Latin American approach to research began to evolve. An initial theory, the theory of dependence, crystallized this first period of reaction. This theory was originally elaborated within ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America), a United Nations regional organization with headquarters in Santiago de Chile.

Massive birth control may be efficiently employed if one spreads the news that doctors, clergy, film actresses, powerful businessmen, lawyers, scholars, etc... approve family planning. In the same way, information on the use of contraception in other countries (Spain, Italy, France and other Roman Catholic nations, for example) will facilitate approval and acceptance." (*Boletín del segundo seminario sobre demografía* (Medellín), October 1965). For an imperialist view of its birth-control policies, see R. Hill, J.M. Stycos and K. Back, *The Family and Population Control in Puerto Rico: Experiment in Social Change*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1959; B. Berelson (the specialist in "content analyses"), *Family Planning and Population Programs: A Review of World Developments*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1965.

26. See the writings of Antonio Pasquali, *Comunicación y cultura de masas*, Caracas, Monte Avila, 1963. In the

It was one of the few institutions during this period where progressive sociologists and economists expelled from their countries could work. The researchers working in this organization devoted a great deal of attention to the unequal relations between the metropolis and peripheral countries.

The rupture provoked by the Cuban revolution and the consequent development of a strong anti-imperialist current which affected the consciousness of many intellectuals was obviously related to the questioning of existing relations with the United States. The theory of dependence acted as a backdrop for the discussions and the search for alternative policies which marked the decade of the sixties.²⁷ During this period, the capitalist model for expansion, based on import-substitution, and in use throughout Latin America since the great depression of the thirties, began to give increasingly evident signs of exhaustion. The fundamental questions being asked during the sixties were the following: What type of class alliances would the popular forces endorse? What might be substituted for the former development model? Did the Latin American bourgeoisie have a national project or was it so dependent and alienated that it was incapable of assuming the leadership of a relatively autonomous development process? In attempting to answer these questions, the researchers and theoreticians of the theory of dependence made considerable progress in forming a critical analysis of the sub-continent. However, their analysis was limited to the fundamental contradiction between the center and the periphery. The tendency to assume that this was the only contradiction resulted in the lack of a class analysis based on each nation's specific reality.

The first attempt to elaborate a theory of communication originated from this theory of dependence, which in its beginning stages, was not particularly concerned with ideological and cultural domination. Towards 1968, primarily in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela, numerous studies denounced the national and international power structures underlying the messages of the press, radio and advertising. In addition, content analysis of cultural products, television series, comic strips, womens' magazines, etc. was also inaugurated in this period.²⁸ At this time, the most important influence was that of semiology research in Europe. This research introduced, within the field of ideolo-

beginning of the seventies, Ludovico Silva published two important works, *La plusvalía ideológica*, Caracas, Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1970, and *Teoría y práctica de la ideología*, Mexico, Nuestro Tiempo, 1971. The first study on the big international news agencies and their treatment of information on Latin America also appeared in Venezuela, Eleazar Diaz Rangel, *Pueblos sub-informados*, Caracas, Monte Avila, 1968.

27. See the works of Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (*Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina*, Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1971); Theotonio dos Santos (*El nuevo carácter de la dependencia*, Santiago de Chile, Centro de Estudios Socio-Economicos (CESO), Universidad de Chile, 1968); and André Gunder Frank (particularly his *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, New York, Monthly Review, 1967).

28. For a valuable insight into the importance of this

gical analysis of the production of discourse, the concept of latent or implicit content and a methodology derived from linguistics.²⁹

We must also point out the concrete influence of the Cuban revolution during the sixties, especially as far as exposing the different forms of cultural colonization. Three journals, in particular, *Pensamiento Crítico*, *Casa de las Américas* and *Cine Cubano*, provided a forum which stimulated analysis in this area. On the practical level, the Instituto Cubano del Arte e Industria Cinematograficos (ICAIC) in Havana proposed new terms of discussion, based on the creation of a new Latin American cinema.³⁰ The Havana Cultural Congress, held in 1968, revealed the importance of the Cuban Revolution on the ideological and cultural fronts, as this was the first time in a Third World country that the strategy of U.S. cultural imperialism was thoroughly examined.

The effervescence of the university was also very important during this period, and played a crucial role in challenging the mode of production in research and science. Chilean students were in the vanguard of the student movements which developed in the late sixties. In 1967 (one year before their European counterparts), they occupied the premises of the Catholic University of Santiago, the oldest fief of the bourgeoisie. They challenged the university institution, and demanded that the class character of higher education be abolished. It should be added that this student movement was only one sign of the rise of similar movements throughout the dominated social classes. For example, there was also a radicalization of the peasantry, who demanded a more substantial agrarian reform than that authorized by the regime of the Christian Democratic President, Eduardo Frei.

The first years of the seventies witnessed the advent of the pre-revolutionary process in Chile and Argentina, the rise of popular struggles in Bolivia and Uruguay, and the installation of a progressive military regime in Peru. All of these situations provided a favourable ambiance for the second stage in the elaboration of a communication science and practice integrated with the process of national liberation. It was no longer merely a question of rupture within the university, which remained a relatively closed institution. The mass struggles that

research see the bibliography at the end of this volume, and the ongoing bibliography edited by the International Mass Media Research Center, *Marxism and the Mass Media: Towards a Basic Bibliography*, New York and Bagnolet, France, International General, 1973-4-6-8-.

29. The influence of structuralism was particularly strong in Argentina, Chile and Peru. The works which had the most impact were: Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, Paris, Seuil, 1958, *Le système de la mode*, Paris, Seuil, 1967, and *Le degré zéro de l'écriture*, Paris, Seuil, 1953; Algidas Greimas, *Sémantique structurale*, Paris, Larousse, 1966, and the review *Communications* (especially issues 4, 1964 on "semiological research", and 8, 1966 on "structural analysis of narratives"). In Venezuela the influence of the Frankfurt School was already being felt in the early sixties (a compilation of the work T.W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer was later published as *La sociedad*, Buenos Aires, Proteo,

took place and the new political perspectives formed in these countries fostered the emergence of new themes in mass communication studies. The approach prevailing before the upsurge of pre-revolutionary struggle was unable to predict that these themes would materialize, and, in fact, did not even suspect that they existed. The importance of communication in determining the outcome of the revolutionary process revealed that it was essential to approach all the means of mass communication as an integral part of the State apparatus, especially in a period when the principal question was knowing what to do with a State inherited from another class. It was no longer sufficient just to expose the mechanisms of dependence; it was urgent that the offensive of the bourgeoisie's media be analyzed so that it could be combatted. It became imperative to study the significance of the messages of the bourgeoisie, a bourgeoisie which was allied to imperialism and on the way to becoming openly fascist. Another crucial task was to determine the class character of the so-called "mass culture," and to evaluate the degree to which the different genres and the other divisions characterizing the mode of production of the dominant messages (comics, magazines, photo-novels, television serials, variety shows, etc.) in the existing society could be used in another definition of social relations with the reader or television viewer. Finally, it was important to detect the concrete alternatives for popular participation and popular power which had started to germinate precisely in this area, the communication front of the cultural battle. Of course, the responses that were advanced, because of subsequent events, were necessarily limited to a preliminary stage. Nevertheless, these experiences made a vital contribution to the elaboration of a communications theory in a period of rupture. This will be one of the main subjects covered in the second volume of this anthology.

Today, most individuals or groups who participated in the elaboration of this new theory and practice of communications are in exile, in prison, or have 'disappeared'. Undoubtedly, since these theoretical efforts are no longer sustained by a rising popular movement which made them credible and real they are now much more difficult to support. However, benefiting from the contributions and

1969). It should be pointed out that the work of the Frankfurt School (except for Marcuse) was not well known in France until the seventies. Before this date, Edgar Morin and the review *Communications* had introduced in France some of the concepts forged by this school, notably that of the culture industry created by Adorno and Horkheimer in 1946 in their *Dialectics of Enlightenment* (New York, Seabury, 1972).

30. See Peter Schumann, *Kino und Kampf in Lateinamerika: Zur Theorie und Praxis des Politischen Kinos*, Munich, Hanser, 1976; and the numerous articles published in the review *Cine Cubano* (Havana). The papers from the Havana meeting have been published in English as *Voices of National Liberation: The Revolutionary Ideology of the "Third World" as Expressed by Intellectuals and Artists at the Cultural Congress of Havana, January 1968*, Irwin Silber, editor, Brooklyn, N.Y., Central Books, 1970.

lessons of these experiences, another area of research has opened up, which is part of a different battle, that being waged on the institutional front, which, in turn, is part of the international class struggle. The most important aspect of this struggle is that of the non-aligned countries to install a new world order of information, which would challenge the monopoly of the big international news agencies. CIESPAL and UNESCO are allies of this movement, as the United States no longer controls these organizations as it did in the 1950s and early 1960s. The Third World countries, now representing a mass force, intend to see that their wishes are respected³¹, and are demanding a de-colonization that goes beyond that which has already been won.

The rise of the institutional front as flag-bearer of the concerns and new demands being expressed in the field of communication should not signify a retreat on the other battle fronts, which, although less capable of stimulating a certain international consensus, and publicly not as gratifying, are more linked to the concrete historical conditions providing the framework for the construction of a popular alternative in each nation. The *coups d'Etat* mean that the enemies won a battle; they have not won the war. Former investments continue to work for the future.

Nevertheless, we cannot be satisfied merely with the battle on the institutional front. In a period when imperialism is also demanding a new international order, it is necessary to connect this front and the research it inspires with the more specific fronts, defined by each process of national liberation. If this connection is not made, the denunciation of and the search for ways of resisting imperialist domination risk being engulfed by the postulates and strategies of Social Democracy, a doctrine and movement now very much in favor on the international scene. The most important characteristic of this Social Democratic Movement is precisely that it appropriates and expropriates the revolutionary themes and popular demands and uses them as a facade and rhetorical device for hiding their refusal to recognize big capital, both international and national, as the enemy. At the present time, when Social Democracy is everywhere multiplying its bids and offers, acting as if it were the only alternative to the atrocity of military dictatorships, there is a very strong temptation to convert what should be a tactical front into a strategic front. These remarks obviously transcend the Latin American context, and this temptation should be fought against by all

31. We will examine these attempts made to liberate international information in the second volume of this anthology. The numerous UNESCO conferences dedicated to this theme testify as to its importance: *Conférence intergouvernementale sur les politiques de communication en Amérique Latine et dans les Caraïbes, Déclaration de San José (Costa Rica) et Recommandations 12-21 July 1976: Résolutions de la 19ème réunion de la Conférence Générale de l'UNESCO*, Nairobi, 34th session, 26 November 1976; and *Colloque sur le libre flux de l'information*, Florence, Italy, 18-20 April 1977. On the free flow of information doctrine, and its corresponding imperialist practices, see Herbert Schiller's article, included in the present volume, and the studies of the Finnish researchers, Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis, one of which was published by UNESCO (*Television*

left researchers, regardless of where they are working.

The reason why we have given such a detailed description of the evolution of different communication theories in Latin America is first of all because it reflects a personal experience. We have closely followed and lived all of the events mentioned, from 1962 to 1973. If we compare this evolution with the situation in France, even in a very general way, it is because we are now beginning another experience. However, there is another reason for having described in such detail what took place in Latin America. This continent can serve as a paradigm, since, over what was in fact a very short period, certain historical events took place which allowed theory to advance through several stages. Each stage contradicted the implications of Merton's theories, which built a barrier between politics and science, between practice and theory. This analysis of the relationship between communication theory and social practice should be repeated in other historical situations, and in other hemispheres and continents. For example, the phenomenon which occurred in certain universities in the United States, such as Stanford, should be carefully studied. Wilbur Schramm was among the notables of this university, but it was also the host for an influx of Latin Americans who were influenced by the revolutionary experiences of the seventies, and who helped provoke a dialectical exchange challenging the tenets of a science which in 1960 seemed to be permanently established.³² However, in order to appreciate the limits and exact consequences of this interaction within the United States, the question should be posed as to why researchers as experienced as Herbert Schiller and Thomas Guback, amongst others, after more than ten years of work, are still relatively isolated within an establishment that continues to subscribe to the recycled tenets of the functionalist school.

Within another area of analysis, it is necessary to examine how researchers from central countries, whether from the United States or Europe, act in complicity with the law of unequal exchange. According to this law, communications studies carried out in peripheral countries receive very little attention and it is only with great difficulty that they influence, publicly, research currents at the international level. How can one legitimize studies made on the cultural dependence of the Third World which only have bibliographical footnote references

Traffic, A One-Way Street?, Paris, 1974). See also the special issues on information and the new international order of the two reviews, *Instant Research on Peace and Violence* (Tampere, Finland), 4, 1976, and *Development Dialogue* (Uppsala, Sweden), 2, 1976. See also the results of the seminar on the same theme organized by the Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales (ILET), presented in the collective work *La información en el nuevo orden internacional*, Mexico, ILET, 1977. For an historical appraisal of the big news agencies, see the descriptive text of Pierre Frederix in this volume.

32. See the different articles published in the *LACDES Quarterly* (Latin America and Caribbean Development Education Students), Stanford University, Stanford, California.

in the dominant Anglo-American language?³³ When dealing with situations dominated by unequal exchange, we should apply the same terms of surplus value and appropriation used to describe economic exploitation, even when we are analyzing anti-imperialist studies in the metropolis which support national liberation struggles in the Third World. It is necessary to revolutionize the practices of a science involved in revolutionary change. Merton views the intellectual world as being divided between the United States and Europe. His geographic orbit is that of the central powers. Those who are privileged enough to have a critical conscience should go one step beyond in their own analyses. At present, the imperialist principle of the "free flow of information" is being increasingly demystified, and attempts to construct a new "international order of information" are multiplying. Therefore, it is perhaps time to question the functioning of the "free flow of knowledge and information" also within the international community of researchers and workers occupied in the sector of culture and the media.

The African continent is notably absent in this first volume. The abundance of critical studies and research that one finds in Latin America does not have a counterpart in this region of the world. There are very important researchers working in the field of economics, such as the Egyptian, Samir Amin, who has made a decisive contribution to the theory of underdevelopment. However, this is not the case for communications, where, within the field of university research, there are hardly any researchers engaged in establishing a critical science of the media.³⁴ In this respect, it would be useful to mention the conclusions presented in the work of a

33. On linguistic colonization by Anglo-American, see Bernard Cassen, "La langue anglaise comme véhicule de l'impérialisme culturel", a paper presented at the International Conference on Cultural Imperialism, Algiers, 11-15 October 1977; and Henri Gobard, *L'Aliénation linguistique*, Paris, Flammarion, 1976.

34. Amongst the writing of Samir Amin, see especially *Accumulation On a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment*, New York, Monthly Review, 1974; and *L'Impérialisme et le développement inégal*, Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1976. A special issue of the journal *The Insurgent Sociologist* (VII, 2, Spring 1977), dedicated to imperialism and the State, also contains valuable insights and has several articles by Samir Amin and critical evaluations of the theories of Poulantzas and Theotonio dos Santos, amongst others. One of the few African sociologists presently engaged in a marxist appraisal of the media question is Babacar Siné (*Impérialisme et théories sociologiques du développement* (with introduction by Samir Amin), Paris, Anthropos, 1975; and *Education et media en Afrique Noire*, Paris, UNESCO, July 1975). The cinema has been studied much more than other sectors of the media; there are numerous left African film-makers who have made theoretical analyses of their experiences. See amongst others, Comité d'Action Cinématographique (CAC), *Cahiers des Rencontres Pour un Nouveau Cinéma*, four volumes, Montreal, CAC, 1975. Particular attention should be given to the papers of Ferid Boughedor (Tunisia) and Med Hondo (Mauritania). See also "Cinéma africain — Entretien avec Sidney Sokhona—Notre cinéma", *Cahiers du Cinéma* (Paris), 285, February 1978, pp. 48-58. Two recent meetings resulted in many texts on the question of cultural

French anthropologist, who attempted to outline the history and sociology of African studies. These conclusions have a certain relevance to the field we are studying:

Africa is dominated by world imperialism, and the cultural forms of this domination and exploitation serve as a mask and a justification for this very domination. African studies are a part of this domination, since they are monopolized and manipulated by the West. Therefore, African studies bear the direct and indirect consequences of this situation, especially by refusing to employ theoretical concepts which might expose this domination and even bring about its downfall. The fact that African political regimes accept this situation explains why western control is maintained, especially in the field of African studies. Sociology of African studies, therefore, must lead to a political and ideological critique. The solution to the scientific problems posed by African studies is not only scientific. Above all else, it is political... The architects of this solution will especially be the Africans themselves. However, specialists on African studies should also make theoretical, ideological, and practical contributions to the search for this "political" solution. It is particularly important that these specialists seek out a response in their own field, as it constitutes one of the most mystifying elements of western hegemony in Black Africa.³⁵

Although Africa has been unable to develop an autonomous scientific apparatus, its liberation movements have given birth to a generation of thinkers for whom the theory of an African culture is intimately linked with that of political emancipation. In order to support this line of action, we have chosen a text of Amílcar Cabral on the role of culture in liberation struggles.³⁶ It should be mentioned that many of these liberation movements in the

imperialism and the audiovisual media in Africa. The first was the Epernay Symposium organized in February 1977 by the Institut National de L'Audiovisuel (INA) on the theme "Le monde de l'audio-visuel et le choc culturel". Numerous African researchers participated in this gathering (the reports were published by the INA, Service de Relations Extérieures, Centre Jules Ferry, Paris). The second meeting is that which has already been mentioned several times, the International Conference on Cultural Imperialism, organized by the League for People's Rights and Liberation, held in Algiers between 11-15 October 1977. The majority of the reports presented at this conference will be published in *L'Homme et la Société* (Paris), 47-48, forthcoming 1978 and *Comunicacion y Cultura* (Mexico), 6, forthcoming 1978. Amongst the papers on Africa, special attention should be given the Benoit Verhagen's work "Le rôle de l'éducation dans l'impérialisme culturel et technologique: le cas du Zaïre", the closing speech of Taleb Ibrahimí, a counsellor to Algerian President Boumedienne, Mwanza Mbala Kapiamba's report, "La presse au Zaïre", and the experiences in Guinea-Bissau as reported by the Minister of Education, Mario Cabral. For a wider range of bibliographic references, often uneven and not very critical, see Sidney Head, "African Mass Communications: Selected Information Sources", *Journal of Broadcasting*, XX, 3, Summer 1976.

35. Jean Copans, *Critiques et politiques de l'anthropologie*, Paris, Maspero, 1974.

36. Amílcar Cabral, *Unidade e luta I: A arma de teoria*; and *Unidade e luta II: A pratica revolucionaria*, Lisbon, Seara Nova, 1976. The writings of other African liberation leaders should also be consulted: see Samora

former Portuguese colonies were developed within cultural milieux that brought together poets and folklorists, and where culture was an integral part of preparation for battle, as well as a part of the battle itself. In order to broaden the somewhat unilateral perspective of the French anthropologist previously cited, and to balance out his judgement on imperialist domination in Africa, we should state that the conceptual tools forged in liberation struggles guided by movements that stress the specificity of culture, will undoubtedly be of decisive importance in elaborating this new African social science.

THE MODE OF PRODUCTION OF COMMUNICATION

The essential concept which helps to structure our entire approach is that of the mode of production. In one of his most important texts, the preface to the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx wrote:

In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general.³⁷

In *Capital*, the most mature work of Marx, he goes on to say: "The various economic epochs are distinguished one from another, not by differences in what is actually made, so much as by differences in the instruments of labour."

It is paradoxical that Marx and Engels, who, on numerous occasions, used the concept of mode of production, never defined it. It is possible to view this concept as applying only to the economic functioning of society, thus limiting the mode of production to material commodities. However, the context of Marx and Engels' analyses invite us to view this theoretical concept as a tool which may be applied to the social totality. Thus it is possible to use this concept not only for the economic structure of society, or according to Marx's terms, the overall relations of production established between individuals (serfdom, wage-earners), which corresponds to a definite phase in the development of productive forces (production tools, work methods and the workers who employ these

Machel, *Le processus de la révolution démocratique populaire au Mozambique*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1977; Mario de Andrade, *A guerra do povo na Guiné-Bissau*, Lisbon, Sá da Costa, 1974. Since the independence of their countries the liberation movement in the former Portuguese colonies are developing an original approach to the practice of communication during the transition to socialism. Mozambique is a good example, see Armand Mattelart "Communication et transition au socialisme: l'expérience du Mozambique", *Revue Tiers Monde* (Paris), forthcoming 1978 (a special issue dedicated to *Audiovisuel et développement*). For Guinea-Bissau, see *Guinee-Bissau: Reinventer*

methods), but also for the juridical and political superstructures that correspond to definite forms of social consciousness.

The manner in which the communication apparatus functions, which determines the elaboration and exchange of messages, corresponds to the general mechanisms of production and exchange conditioning all human activity in capitalist society. Our purpose here is not to make an exhaustive inventory of the different factors included in the mode of production concept when applied to an analysis of the communication process, but rather to clarify the essential elements involved in this process. At the very best, we can give a general idea of the basic premises upon which this concept is founded. Thus, the mode of production of communications includes all of the production instruments (all machines used to transmit information, including not only radio and television, but also paper, typewriters, film and musical instruments), working methods (fragmentation in different genres, the codification of information used in the transmission of messages, gathering of information, etc.), and all of the relations of production established between individuals in the process of communication (relations of property, relations between the transmitter and receiver, the technical division of labor, and all forms of organization and association). An essential part of the analysis is that which attempts to explain how different structural systems of TV, radio, cinema and the press have been set up, and how through these systems certain models for social relations have been successfully implanted. It is also vital to study how, as a result of the development of productive forces within the context of class confrontation, these systems changed, or had to change, and continue to do so.³⁸

The mode of production is also the juridico-political superstructure (the State, laws, etc.) as well as the ideological superstructure (system of ideas, images, standards and feelings which naturalize a particular practice and form of communication as the only possibility). In this sense, ideas and social practices dealing with the freedom of press and expression, and with the professional ethics of the communicator, constitute the specific ideological forms which, within the sphere of communication and news, confine the communication process within a given framework and legitimize its function of reproducing all of the social relations within the capitalist mode of production. The texts which are grouped in Section B (The Bourgeois Ideology of Communication) attempt to elucidate all of the ideological forms which, together, act as a "cement" (as

l'éducation, Geneva, Institut d'Action Culturelle Document, 1977; and Marcos Arrunda, Samora Machel, Amílcar Cabral, Paulo Freire, in "Political Education in Africa", an issue of *LARU Studies* (Toronto), I, 3, June 1977.

37. The complete text is presented in this first volume. The quotation which follows is from *Capital*, I, London, 1972, p. 172.

38. Section C (The Formation of the Capitalist Mode of Communication) and Section D (Monopoly Capitalism Imperialism and Global Ideological Control).

Gramsci understood the term) for the mode of communication. We have thus selected texts which examine the ideas of freedom of the press and expression; the myth of the communication revolution; the principle of the social division of communication labor; the concepts of public opinion, objectivity, mass culture, change and development; the dichotomy between work and leisure; and the concept of science, or more exactly, that of communication science. The social practices corresponding to these ideas and concepts are an indissociable dimension of the operational field of ideology.

Various texts in this first volume of the anthology, and many others in Volume two, insist upon two points that are generally neglected, if not openly avoided, concerning the analysis of ideology. First of all, ideology is not merely a system of ideas, or representations. It is also and above all a set of social practices. Thus, the ideology of journalism englobes not only ideas on objectivity, freedom of the press, public opinion, communication science, etc., but also the multiple practices which establish this ideology as the only way of envisaging and realizing journalism. These practices may include, for example, the practice of gathering information (hunting down news), the practice of writing and editing, photographic operations and montage, as well as the practices of scientific observation of journalistic phenomena. All of these practices, miniature "modes of production" reproducing the major mode of production, reflect a form of social relation with the receiver of information. The second element, as stated by Lenin in his critical notes on national culture, reminds us that if it is true that a bourgeois culture, a ruling ideology exists in every capitalist nation,

The elements of democratic and socialist culture are also present, if only in rudimentary form, in every national culture, since in every nation there are toiling and exploited masses, whose conditions of life inevitably give rise to the ideology of democracy and socialism. But every nation also possesses a bourgeois culture (and most

39. For example, the analyses of Hans Magnus Enzensberger, *The Consciousness Industry*, New York, Seabury, 1974.

40. The many works in Section B (The Bourgeois Ideology of Communication) demonstrate with eloquence the particular character of this science and theory of communication. The authors, from very different critical perspectives, challenge the concepts which have been established as an immutable basis for accepted ideas and models. By demystifying the class character of the bourgeoisie's disciplinary apparatus, these texts help us to understand the degree to which the term "science" has been usurped by the bourgeois communications approach. We should be asking ourselves whether or not this "science" is, in reality, actually composed of an unscientific hodgepodge of techniques, opinions, prejudices, and doctrines destined to reproduce and reinforce the hegemonic position of the ruling classes and to impose their interests, modes of action and reflection, tastes, and obsessions as being those shared by all classes.

We may also pose the following question: Doesn't the way in which McLuhan's prophetic doctrines dominate the references of this science, and the manner in which its "meta-language" passes itself off as a "theory of the media", serve as one indication, amongst others, of the

nations a reactionary and clerical culture as well) in the form, not merely of "elements", but of the dominant culture.

This is what Lenin also refers to as the proletarian "class instinct." In the very interior of the capitalist mode of production, the working class brings into play spontaneous forms of resistance to its exploitation, which have as a correlate equally spontaneous forms of class consciousness. The analysis of ideology cannot be confined to the domain of the ruling ideology. For, if a dominant ideology exists, there also exists a dominated ideology, or rather, an ideology that is struggling against domination. This simple observation has far-reaching consequences. It implies situating the debate on ideology within a concrete context: that of the class struggle.

Having arrived at this stage of our analysis, we may now ask ourselves whether or not a marxist theory of the media exists. This is a very important and basic question, which should be asked before reading the texts in this anthology. According to certain diagnoses on the absence of a theoretical and practical body of propositions capable of constituting a revolutionary strategy vis à vis the media, particularly the audiovisual media, a marxist theory and practice are almost nonexistent.³⁹ Although we are in agreement with the observation that there are many deficiencies in the marxist analysis of this domain, especially concerning the search for alternatives to the capitalist system of organizing the media, it seems to us that a hasty judgement should not be made on the inexistence of a marxist theory of communications. One thing is certain: there is not a unified marxist theory on the transformation of the media comparable to that of the bourgeois "scientific" apparatus, both disciplined and disciplinary, and its so-called theory of the reproduction-conservation of the media.⁴⁰ Denying this would be tantamount to refusing to recognize the real divergencies, both tactical and strategic, which separate the propositions of the various tendencies which claim to be founded on historical materialism. As recent events have

weak foundations of the conceptual body which Merton termed, with such arrogance and self-assurance, a "sociology of communications"? Perhaps these doctrines were developed at just the right moment, in order to fulfill a latent expectation of many empiricists, by providing them with a codification principle that also served as an attractive packaging for their personal intuitions and viewpoints. The messianic character of doctrines supporting establishment sociology, is, in fact, the logical extension of the functionalist theory of the media. U.S. sociology has always situated the media outside of the relations of power, and beyond the social contradictions inherent in the structures of society. The "autonomization" of the media, and the omission of their historical and social dimension can only lead to a conception which postulates that the media engender a *sui generis* effect on a non-determined and non-determining society, where class differences and conflicts disappear.

The success of these doctrines in the academic and professional milieux of the Establishment simply confirms the fact that the sociology of communication has become the branch of social sciences that is the most influenced by the laws which it pretends to analyze and explain, especially the law of sensationalism, the "iron law" governing the transmission of mass cultural production. Indeed, with

demonstrated, most clearly in Portugal and Chile, the debate on a media strategy is necessarily part of the larger debate on the relations between the party and the masses, on the status of the creator, on the relationship between the individual and the collectivity, on the attitude to adopt *vis à vis* the entire State apparatus, and on the importance of mobilizing class consciousness in order to take power. In spite of the tentative nature and errors of these experiences, these questions lead to elements of praxis for forging a revolutionary theory, even though it may lack the apparent certitude of the so-called communication science offered by the capitalist organization of the media. The many practices and analyses developed during revolutionary struggles yield the knowledge necessary for a theory of transforming the means of communication. We will not elaborate on this point here, as the second volume of the anthology will be concerned with measuring the degree to which this theory already exists, as well as its contributions and limitations.

It is very often forgotten that marxism is not a study of socialism, but of capitalism. This reminder is the basis for another aspect of our reply to the question: is there a marxist theory of communication? Historical materialism offers a body of conceptual theory which enables us to analyze the mechanisms of ideological domination present in the capitalist system. This body of concepts is scattered in many directions. It has rarely been coded and systematized with a view towards eventually applying it to the field of communication.

As we know, Marx was unable to finish his work and, although on numerous occasions he did provide theoretical elements essential for studying the juridico-political, and ideological levels, he actually only finished the analysis of the economic aspects of the capitalist mode of production. As Lenin noted

Marx did not limit himself to just an "economic theory",

McLuhan and his disciples, the sociology of communication obeys the same laws which it is supposed to examine. These doctrines and this meta-language, in essence, are nothing more than a product of this mass culture itself.

The same vicious circle and the same sophisms are also incorporated in population sociology, highly publicized by U.S. educational foundations and their experts in the Third World. This should not be viewed as an accidental occurrence. Both communication sociology and demographic sociology are *militant* branches of bourgeois order and social sciences. They serve as direct logistic supports for concrete policies and identified industrial-commercial interests. Population sociology had its "take-off period" under the aegis of the imperialist birth-control policies financed by the Ford and Rockefeller foundations and the omnipresent Population Council. As far as communication sociology is concerned, one of its missions is to create a use-value for the immaterial and material cultural-industrial products, in quest of commercial outlets that are often uncertain and imprecise. It is sufficient to examine the abundance of euphoric and miraculous discourse praising the video cassettes, video-discs, cable TV, computerized and "cashless" society, and especially the tele-educational panacea, in order to be convinced of the role of this so-called scientific apparatus, which serves as a decoy to avoid confronting the politico-economic stakes and interests of communication. The high-soaring lyricism of the "global village" obscures the cynical reality of the

in the usual sense of the term; although *explaining* the structure and development of a social formation *exclusively* by the relations of production, he always and everywhere analysed the superstructures corresponding to these relations of production, and clothed the skeleton in skin and blood. The considerable success of *Capital* is precisely due to the fact that this book of the "German economist" had revealed to the readers the whole capitalist social formation as a living thing—with the facts of daily life, with concrete social manifestations of class antagonism inherent in the relations of production, with the bourgeois political superstructure which protects the domination of the capitalist class, with its bourgeois ideas of freedom, equality, etc., with the bourgeois family relations.⁴¹

In the preface to his *Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy*, Marx's announced intention of examining the law, State and ideology of the capitalist mode of production, was never fully developed during his lifetime. Of course, other revolutionary theoreticians, such as Lenin, Mao Tse-tung and especially Gramsci, completed these first contributions. The texts of these authors which we have chosen for Section A (Basic Analytic Concepts) constitute an attempt to establish a basic classification of the tools which might be used in research on the communications apparatuses. It goes without saying that these texts should stimulate further reading of their authors. Rosa Luxemburg should be added to this list, and especially her theories on imperialism and the process of the international accumulation of capital.⁴² The fact that these texts are placed at the beginning of the first volume of this anthology does not mean all the texts we have selected follow the tenets of marxism. The deficiencies in marxist research on the media does not allow us to present only texts using this methodology, which is valid for examining all forms of production.

Besides the main concept of mode of production that enables us to recognize the social totality, these theoreticians provide us, more specifically, with a

"corporate village".

Undoubtedly, no branch of bourgeois sociology has attained the degree of sensationalism observed in communication sociology and demographic sociology, nor so wholeheartedly embraced the world of the spectacle. Striking the same note, we might re-baptize communication sociology as "scoop sociology."

For an examination of how demographic sociology has its roots in functionalism, see Armand Mattelart, "Une lecture idéologique de l'essai de T.R. Malthus sur le principe de population", *L'Homme et la Société* (Paris), 15, January-March, 1970, pp. 1883-219.

41. V.I. Lenin, "Who Are the 'Friends of the People'?", *Collected Works*, I, Moscow, Progress, 1972.

42. Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital*, New York, Monthly Review, 1964 (with a very helpful introduction by Joan Robinson). The essential contributions made by this revolutionary woman should not obscure the masculine hegemony characterizing the elaboration of marxist theory. The lack of a feminine presence is one sign, amongst others, of the deficiencies which may be observed in the practice of revolutionary movements, and particularly in the struggle against the bourgeoisie's ideological apparatuses. Like the deficiencies observed in the approach towards the means of communication and mass culture, this masculine tropism demonstrates the present limits of the marxist critique and

class theory, which furnishes the basis for a *theory of the State* and a *theory of ideologies*. This class theory brings into the field of observation a certain reality, that of classes and their struggles to defend their own interests. Bourgeois sociology of communications has done everything within its power to avoid incorporating this reality into its perspective. Using the notion of class in an analysis of the media means directly refuting the postulates of empiricism, which propose the following: reality is just as it appears, the meaning of the message is limited to its explicit content, all relationships established between individuals and social groups are transparent, and the exchange effected between the producer and the consumer, between the transmitter and the receiver, between the center and the periphery is an exchange carried out under conditions of equality and objectivity. The notion of class contradicts the sacred truth according to which, since everyone is free to receive information, everyone is also free to express and transmit his or her own information to others.

The importance of a class analysis is that it insists upon the fact that because the class owning the economic and ideological means of production appropriates the production of antagonistic social forces, it has to impose its order and reality as the only existing possibility.

It is through the State that the ruling class exercises its hegemony over other classes, that is to say, its activity in the area of political control (creation of a "collective will" and of a consensus) as well as cultural control (where it fulfills its intellectual and moral role). "The historical unification of the ruling classes is expressed in the State," Gramsci wrote, and he defined the State as "the concrete form of a definite economic world, of a specific system of production." Before defining the modern State he elaborated upon its specific nature, and compared it with the State as it existed in previous modes of production:

In the ancient and medieval State, both politico-territorial as well as social centralization (the one is a function of the other) were minimal. In a certain way, the State was a mechanical bloc of social groups, often of different races; although living under constraint and politico-military pressure, which could become acute at certain moments, the subaltern groups preserved their own way of life, with its specific institutions.

The *integral State* now replaces the fragmented State:

In the place of the mechanical bloc of social groups the modern State substitutes their subordination to the

"questioning-practice" of daily life, the most familiar and complex arena where the reproduction of power takes place.

Similarly, the same kind of hegemony exercised by marxist theoreticians of the central countries may be observed in the selection of texts in this section. However, this predominance is only transitory and apparent. The second volume of this anthology will demonstrate and stress the fundamental contribution made to revolutionary theory and practice by struggling peoples in peripheral countries. For example, we may cite Jose Martí, a contemporary of Lenin, without whom it would be difficult to understand the uniqueness of the Cuban Revolution. Another example would be that of the Peruvian, José Carlos Mariategui, a

active hegemony of the ruling and dominant group. It abolishes certain forms of autonomy which reappear in other forms: political parties, trade unions, and cultural organizations.⁴³

This active hegemony that the ruling class exercises over all of society through the State, a product of irreconcilable class antagonism, according to Lenin's terms, takes on multiple forms. The coercive function of the State is assured by the apparatuses of repression (as incarnated in public forces) such as the army, the police, the courts, the prisons and the administration. However, beyond this institutionalization of direct force, the State requires organized consensus. The State cannot merely be content with carrying out repression, a repression which Lenin defines in his theory of the State, when commenting upon Marx; it must assume a function of *mediation*, to use a term adopted by Gramsci. This function of mediation installs the State as *educator* and guarantor of organized consensus:

The revolution introduced by the bourgeois class in the conception of law, and thus in the function of the State, consists primarily of the will to make minds conformist (hence the ethical character of the Law and the State). Former ruling classes were essentially conservative in that they did not tend to propose an organic transition of other classes to their own class, that is, to "technically" and ideologically broaden their class sphere. Their perspective was that of a closed caste. The bourgeois class, on the contrary, presents itself as being in continuous movement, capable of absorbing the entire society, by assimilating it to its cultural and economic level. The State thus becomes an "educator"....⁴⁴

This function of educator and mediator is assured by institutions that Althusser designated as Ideological State Apparatuses and which the Italian theoretician grouped together within the concept of civil society. The following would be included in this concept: school, the family, law, the political system of parties, trade-unions, cultural institutions, and, of course, since that is our main interest, the means of mass communication. Taken as a whole, the State machinery (directly repressive and ideological) assures the political conditions necessary for reproducing the relations of production. Therefore, a marxist view of the communication apparatus should first of all be situated within the context of this theory of the class-State.

Within the analysis of the class-State we find one of the most illuminating concepts used to approach the problem of the role fulfilled by the modern media apparatus and the professional and

contemporary of Gramsci, who remains relatively unknown to marxists in the central countries, as is the case with numerous other militant theoreticians from Africa and Asia. Once again, we should point out the urgent need to begin questioning the law of unequal exchange, operating even within the revolutionary camp.

43. Antonio Gramsci, *Quaderni 3, Quaderni del carcere*, Turin, Einaudi, quoted by Christine Bucu-Glucksmann, *Gramsci et l'Etat*, Paris, Fayard, 1975, one of the best analyses of Gramsci's theories.

44. Antonio Gramsci, *Cuaderni 28, Antología*, selection, translation and notes by Manuel Sacristán, Mexico, Siglo, XII, 1974.

intellectual categories that manage it in order to form an organized consensus. In attempting to expand his theory on the State, Gramsci undertook a study of the formation of intellectuals. It was in this study that the term *organic intellectual* was first used. The intellectual category was defined in terms of its position and function within the social structure. This concept allows one to view the entire apparatus used in elaborating and diffusing culture in the capitalist mode of production as delegate and carrier of ruling-class hegemony in civil society. The concept of the modern organic intellectual, which is materialized in the media apparatus, is the privileged moment and space, *par excellence*, where the State dissimulates to the greatest degree its plan for the use of brutal force, and its authoritarian, coercive nature. We should note in passing that the concepts of hegemony and organic intellectual, as elaborated by Gramsci, are not only connected to a theory of the State, but also to a theory of the party. The link established between these two theories proves to be a very important contribution. Seen from the perspective of the revolutionary classes, it provides the basis for a very useful approach in the second volume where the relation between the transmitter and the receiver of messages will be viewed in terms of the relation between the party and the masses. This implies the need to conceive the party not as an organ of *representation* of the popular classes, but as an effective organization of popular power.

Another fundamental contribution of marxist theory is its concept of ideology, as a premise for a new epistemology, for a new approach to the theory of knowledge. This contribution resides in the relation that is made between the superstructure and the base. The superstructure is the *reflection* of the social existence of men and women. In other words, the production of ideas and opinions by individuals does not happen in an autonomous way (ideas do not appear out of thin air, and it is impossible to speak of their pure filiation). Neither are ideas developed in a purely autogenous way (they are not solely dependent on the will of men and women). Ideas are intimately linked to their material activity, the processes in real life and its praxis. By adopting a dogmatic and therefore, undialectical interpretation, certain individuals wanted to limit this approach to the cognitive process, this philosophy of the praxis, to a mechanistic and simplistic schema, thus reducing the superstructure to a mere expression of the economic base. It is evident that this narrow interpretation has caused numerous misunderstandings, which have very concrete repercussions on the position adopted by the left in class struggle, and more particularly, during the revolutionary process and the specific moments of socialist construction. In all of these instances, the stakes of the ideological battle are under-estimated, especially in the fields of

culture, daily life, and our major concern here, communication. Specifying the superstructure's degree of autonomy or heteronomy in relation to the base is therefore not an academic exercise, but a need which arises from the necessity of elaborating a strategy destined to defeat the ruling order. The mechanistic theory often represents an evasive tactic which eliminates from the revolutionary perspective the question of mobilization. It condemns experiences which, by attempting to modify social relationships before the productive forces have sufficiently developed, dare to raise the popular level of consciousness beyond the real bases of social life. Marx's analysis, which was necessarily limited to an examination of the economic level, warns against a Stalinist orientation, which would limit the sphere of relations of production to the material plane, and would inevitably result in the divorce of theory from political practice. A very controversial statement of Gramsci reads as follows: "The infrastructure and the superstructures form an historic bloc." To disassociate the infrastructure from the superstructure would be like separating the flesh and blood from the bones. It would mean returning to the dichotomies established by the bourgeoisie's ideological order, such as body/mind (which includes the social divisions of labor, such as manual/intellectual, amongst others) and matter/ideas. Lenin's usage of the term *reflection* cannot be interpreted literally. This word has a very precise meaning and takes into account the interaction between the superstructure and the infrastructure. Indeed, in the marxist theory of knowledge, the idea of reflection is intimately linked to the concept of process, which is one of the most important concepts of marxist analysis, since it merges with the concept of mode of production. Thus, reflection always means that a "connecting relationship exists between at least two systems of relations; the notion of reflection therefore functions as an index or a sign of this connecting relationship"⁴⁵

Marx's analyses abound with central or secondary observations on the complexity of the juridico-political and ideological superstructures. In a text which is also very controversial, he questions the meaning that the works of Shakespeare or Greek poetry and mythology have in the era of machines. Ideas, value systems and visions of the world do not transcend the era when they appeared and the structures which they expressed. Marx asks whether the ideas on nature and social relations which nourished the Greek imagination are compatible with the advance of technical inventions:

Where does Vulcan come in as against Roberts & Co., Jupiter as against the lightning rod, and Hermes as against the Crédit Mobilier? All mythology masters and dominates, and shapes the forces of nature in and through the imagination; hence it disappears as soon as man gains mastery over the forces of nature.

Is it not true that the context of the oral tradition, which made both possible and necessary the gestation of Homer's epics, vanishes in a milieu conditioned by mass diffusion techniques? "...Is Achilles possible where there are powder and lead? ...Are not singing and reciting and the muse necessarily put out of existence by the printer's bar?"⁴⁶ One can ask the same

45. Jean-Louis Houdebine, "Sur une lecture de Lénine: de la notion de reflet au concept de processus" in *Théorie d'ensemble*, Paris, Seuil, 1968, p. 295.

46. Karl Marx, Introduction to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, reprinted in *Marx and Engels on Literature and Art*, Lee Baxandall and Stefan Morawski, editors, New York, International General, 1975, pp. 136-7.

question concerning modern mythology, which very quickly is made obsolete by technological advances. What happens to Superman, with his X-ray vision, in the era of the laser beam?

This concern with the contents of the superstructure is carried even further in Gramsci's works. It should not be forgotten that he was a contemporary of Bertolt Brecht, who also re-examined cultural practice in capitalist society. Gramsci treats this problem in such a precise way that he asks questions of the following nature: Are libraries part of the infrastructure or the superstructure? And scientists' laboratories? And musical instruments? This same kind of question is treated again when he views the printing industry as "an element that is inseparable from several ideological facts: science, literature and religion." Gramsci attempts to answer these questions when he writes the following:

There exist superstructures which have a material structure, but their character remains superstructural. Their development cannot be explained by the immanent development of their specific material structure, but by the material structure of society. A class is formed on the basis of its position in the means of production. The development and the struggle for power, or for its preservation, create superstructures that determine the formation of a specific material structure. Scientific thought is a superstructure which creates scientific instruments, music a superstructure that creates instruments... logically, but also chronologically we have: social infrastructure—superstructures—material structure of the superstructure.⁴⁷

One last remark: if the mode of production concept is of primary importance in approaching historical materialism, there is another concept which is just as important and which is intimately connected with that of the mode of production, the concept of *social formation*. This may be defined as the way a mode of production exists in a specific historical situation. The material basis of a society is never founded on just one mode of production. Even if capitalist relations of production predominate within a given society, other types of relations of production reflecting pre-capitalist social forms of organization may continue to exist. The social formation is the result of the way these different relations of production are organized under the hegemony of the specific relations which imprint their character upon the society. As Marx wrote in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, "In every form of society, it is a definite production and the relations which it engenders which give every other production and the corresponding relations their rank and importance."

Just as we have applied the concept of mode of

47. Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni 4, quoted by Buciu-Glucksmann, *op. cit.*

48. The criteria for selecting the texts in Section A posed great difficulties inasmuch as the selection had to take into account the different levels of knowledge and familiarity with marxist theory, which varies according to different groups of readers. For some readers, living in Latin America, for example, who are more familiar with marxist texts, these selections will only be a reminder, whereas for others, they will be an initiation into marxist theory. This is especially true for many students in the

production to the process of communication, it is possible to use the concept of social formation to designate the specific characteristics that the capitalist mode of production of communication assumes in each specific society. The characteristics adopted by the process of communication in each social formation may be observed through a particular combination of relations of production, instruments of production, work methods, relations of power and class, struggles, forms of state domination, etc., which produce a media system that is both the same and different in each historic space. Our previous observations on the existence or non-existence of research in the various fields of communication in different types of society were specifically concerned with outlining the particular configuration of a social formation. In this way, we attempted to show how the quantity of analyses and the nature of the subjects examined, as well as the methods used, reflect both the state of maturity of a capitalist media system, and/or the degree of social contradiction nourished by this system and the entire society. Moments of social crisis and revolutionary agitation can reveal the political stakes of the media and accelerate the implementation of analyses and theories which, in other contexts, are principally stimulated by the necessity of making the existing society function. The phenomenon of the "politicization" of research in Latin America, judged excessive by many, is only the logical result of the material and social conditions (*class struggle*) of existence and the reproduction of knowledge. The integrating myth of the "global village" has as a function to level out the particularities which are expressed in each social formation, clearing the way for speculation based on idealistic discourse.

In this first section, which presents basic analytic concepts, the text of Marx dealing with the fetishism of commodities (from *Capital*) may seem very difficult to comprehend. This difficulty should not obscure its importance, as it stresses, much more than the other texts, the complexity of the economic mechanisms through which culture and the standards for daily activity and exchange among individuals become material. The analysis made by Marx of the merchant relations leads us to the roots of this new *mode of communication* that capitalism has installed amongst individuals, the network of *circulation and exchange of commodities*. This is the matrix in which the mass communication network develops. Lenin's text, which precedes this examination of fetishism, serves as its introduction, for it calls to mind the essential points of Marx's contribution on surplus value, and the laws which rule the capitalist mode of production.⁴⁸

United States, even though as one U.S. teacher, Bertell Ollman, recently stated: "At many American universities, Marxism G 2010 or Communist Theory V 1106 or Socialist Thought A 2242 are no longer "know your enemy" kind of exercises, and the number of serious courses on the subject is constantly increasing." However, he then added, "Unfortunately the opportunity they offer for promoting a true understanding of Marxism is frequently lost, either wholly or partially, under the weight of problems inherent in the university context." (Bertell Ollman, "On Teaching

STORIES AS THE STANDARDIZATION OF HISTORY

There are certain expressions which are continually used when referring to communication. However, the very expressions which are used the most, are also those which are hardly ever defined. The continued use of these notions increasingly masks the social origin of communication products. *Mass culture* and *popular culture* are amongst these terms which are very much in demand precisely because they are so commonly confused.⁴⁹

The dividing line between these two concepts is not always well established. One often finds hagiographic studies on the TV which use clappers to confirm the success of TV series. The communication flow that these series supposedly establishes with the "people" is used as a pretext for claiming that there is a strong link between media culture and popular culture. Vote by consumption is used as a standard which allows for all possible appropriations and distortions of the "popular" concept. In response to progressive criticism, a famous TV writer (*Maverick*, *The Fugitive*, etc.) refuted the "wet-blanket" argument of certain detractors in the following way:

Every person of common sense knows that people of superior mental constitutions are bound to find much of television intellectually beneath them. If such innately fortunate people cannot realize this gently and with good manners, if in their hearts they despise popular pleasure and interest, then, of course, they will be angrily dissatisfied with television. But it is not really television with which they are dissatisfied. It is with people.⁵⁰

Moreover, it is through this type of argument which assimilates commercial success with "popular consent", that U.S. television asserts the right to occupy throughout the universe the leisure hours of "Mr. Everyman," disregarding criticism from the intellectuals — supposedly inclined towards sophistication — or from the people, who may very well disagree with the prevailing interpretation of its tastes, ambitions and wishes.

Without making analogies that are too mechanistic, textbooks or even more learned texts, have a tendency to acclaim mass culture as the heir to the various artisanal or semi-artisanal forms of expression which preceded the appearance of the means of mass diffusion. A clear and straight line is thus drawn between the centuries, uniting the Bayeux tapestries depicting the conquest of England by William the Conqueror, the cave paintings, or even the small sculptures on Trajan's column, with

Marxism", *The Insurgent Sociologist* (Eugene, Oregon), VI, 4, Summer 1976.)

49. An example of semantic confusion is the title of Horace Newcomb's *TV, The Most Popular Art*, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday-Anchor, 1974.

50. Roy Huggins, "What's Wrong With the Television Series", *Action* (published by the Director's Guild of America), September-October 1969.

51. On the history of the mode of production of comics, see one of the only marxist works on this theme: Roman Gubern, *El lenguaje de los comics*, Barcelona, Ediciones Peninsula, 1974.

comic strips. This modern cultural product is thus catapulted to the summit of cultural accumulation, and "crowns" the artistic patrimony of nations. This process of appropriation adorns itself with all of the virtues of erudition, in order to better hide the fact that it lacks the very minimum of a sociological basis. As Lenin retorted to those who stated that capital and capitalism existed well before the emergence of the capitalist mode of production: "This is like comparing Great Rome to Great Britain." The result of this assimilation is that it avoids recognizing the conditions of production of modern mass culture. Once these conditions have been eliminated from view, as one can easily imagine, the social function fulfilled by this culture in the concrete reality of a given society, also disappears. This curious way of portraying the past, which actually transforms real history into a story in a comic strip, has as a result the masking of its real progenitors. It is obviously much more exciting and fantastic to think that the designers of the Bayeux tapestries were so overflowing with genius that they were able to anticipate the history of modes of production and different forms of social organization, than to make a sober analysis, connecting comics with Hearst and Pulitzer's "Penny Press," and to link their appearance in the Sunday supplements with the necessity of increasing the circulation of a sensationalist press. And yet, upon close examination it becomes apparent that the birth of comics offers a paradigm of the history of the mode of production of mass culture. This culture emerges with the mass communication system, a system which according to the standard definition, permits almost simultaneous delivery of identical messages, through extremely rapid reproduction and distribution mechanisms to a relatively large and homogeneous group of people, in an anonymous relationship.

The trajectory followed by comics since the end of the last century provides a perfect illustration of the standardization process, which is the principal characteristic of the industrialization of culture.⁵¹ This process involves standardization of size and structure, as well as the creation of genres. An example of this standardization is provided by the evolution of the size of cartoons. In the beginning, they were more elaborate and took up an entire page, but with the standardization of the smaller tabloid format they were progressively reduced to a multitude of small panels with simplified features. The themes also have become more uniform, and since only those which stimulate consensus are useful, their range has been severely limited. It would be interesting to examine how the grouping of family and emotional themes, through the creation of girls' strips and family strips, has advanced the standardization process. It is symbolic that the first image of the Outcault comic strip (dating from the end of the last century), which took up an entire page, was filled with small Cuban flags being waved by the poorer classes in the slums of New York. Thirty years later, the girls' strips exalted the conformist spirit, while comic strips such as Little Nemo, who thumbed his nose at the system, disappeared from the commercial horizon.

And it was no accident that during the economic recession of the thirties the family and emotional genres were very much in vogue. The transmitters, frightened and panicked by the collapse of the system, acted as if they were seeking refuge from the reigning incertitude in the only remaining source of security: the family nucleus. A resurgence of these same "security" themes may also be observed during capitalism's present structural crisis. Proof of this is furnished by the rise in the production and ratings of family television series. The popularity of series such as *Roots* may also be explained by the same logic.

Analyzing the role of women in the strategies for dissimulating the present economic crisis through mass culture, a researcher recently arrived at the following conclusions:

The scarcity of production and capital increases the necessity for ideological re-investments. After having made women the radiant symbols of "affluence" advertising, the keystone for democracy based on desire, the economically infirm order can no longer make the same eclectic offers sparkle, and must try to restore the hegemony of moral values... Another reflex-response, another dialectic in the superstructure of the crisis, another adaptation of mass culture to the stagnation of the outside world, is expressed by the fabulous audience ratings for the family sagas on TV. The home, setting par excellence of the anti-trip, the space assuring women's confinement within the system of production and property, becomes, around the tube, the return to "history," a history conceived of in terms of belonging to a lineage, and in terms of a voyage back to the original sources, back to the family cradle.

The very title of the most well-known of these sagas, *Roots*, could hardly be more significant. The success it had in New York (which prepares the way for the television diffusion in all capitalist countries) is more than symptomatic of the restoration of the family theme as an element of social cohesion... "Roots", by plunging back into the former times of slavery and racial discrimination, revives the black nationalist vein through the vicissitudes experienced by the different generations of the same family. Of course, by exalting the epics of the under-privileged, one of the most violent contradictions of the U.S. nation is exorcised. However, the reason why this exorcism unites both the white and black populations around the life and struggles of the Haley family, since its days in the African village, is because

52. Michèle Mattelart, "Les femmes et l'ordre de la crise", *Tel Quel* (Paris), 74, Winter 1977, an issue on "feminine research". In relation to the rise of the women's movement in the last two decades, this return to the familial and moral order constitutes a regression, very similar to the return to a retrograde conception of relations of authority (masculine predominance, supremacy of male leaders), promoted by the recent disaster films, which are a product of the present crisis. This regression presents an accurate image of what is occurring today in all of mass culture. As this same researcher stresses: "The tension between modernism and regression is found in all of the discourse accompanying the development of technology, of which the disaster films are both the offspring and the bad conscience. In these films, the technology escapes from its creators like Frankenstein from his master, in order to better disguise the relation of power. This dichotomy between modernism and regression, which may be revealed through other expressions, reflects the mode according to which capitalism assures the social insertion of new technology, symbolically enclosed with the totalitarian

this story also acts upon an area of the subconscious, which is accented by the crisis. This more existential range is confirmed by a code for new behavior, in fact, therapeutic, which accompanies the promotion of the new product: "Discover your roots. Fight against your feeling of rootlessness!"

The family, the main anchor of continuity, becomes the only horizon where, with healing value, everyone's ethnological itinerary appears. As the exclusive point of reference, the family rejects any attempts to portray (or question) the outside world and its institutions. The intervention of these institutions would only weaken the force of this saga's main theme, which is that of moral strength represented by family unity, an element of order in disorder, a solid rock amidst the fluctuations of joy and sorrow. The accent placed upon the self-sufficiency of the family home responds to the nostalgia for the good old times, before the barriers between ages and sexes were broken down, before divorce and the break-up of the family, and the nostalgia for the time when the woman-family within the social body assured the serene permanence of everyone's role, thus acting as a home-port for the adult and juvenile expeditions of men. Thanks to this "emotional economics" the domestic chamber is established as an order-constituting entity, a mini-State which absolves the Maxi-State from its failings, and which collaborates with the institutionalized society, abolishing the relations of force, and obliterating once again the existence of power.⁵²

If we are not yet convinced of the historical character of mass culture, and its "mobility in immobility", these propositions should at least lead us to question the myth of its "apolitical" nature and restore a concept of politics that is less restrictive than that which is limited to the orbit of partisan electoral or parliamentary discourse. We will have the occasion to return to this topic at a later point.

In the standardization process, the influence of the syndicate, a typical U.S. creation, was decisive. This commercialization apparatus exercised a tremendous control, as it appropriated the right to alter or eliminate certain comics, the right to modify dialogue, and was even able to name a successor when an artist died or abandoned his trade. The result of this control was to stimulate the assembly-line production of comics, which reached a new stage of development when it came to conquering international markets. In order to become universally and easily recognizable, the features are simplified

camp of virile values. The more this technology acts as an instrument of domination, the more it symbolically needs a non-aggressive counterpart, a sort of softness to redeem and attenuate the overwhelming masculine force. This is a false dialectic between the notion of threat and protection. A woman whose status as someone to be protected is continually re-validated compensates for the repressive meaning of technological development as an extension of male force. As long as the system is moving towards a soft brand of fascism, in order to advertise and sell it to the public, it may as well rely on the images of eternal femininity, which portray women as a bevy of bees gathering honey around the big offensive machines. In fact, it is just as if, in order to contain and repress the revolutionary meaning of the development of science and technology, and in order to prevent these productive forces from adopting another operational mode, the existing order had to cultivate continuity, as well as the permanence of the values and symbols which prescribe behavior and distribute social roles."

and the city is reduced to an endlessly repeated, stereotyped silhouette. Submitted to this process, the small characters, supported by the Empire's force, become symbols used to win over universal consensus. So that this example's full value as a prototype is understood, we should add that the comics industry was one of the first, along with the talking film industry, to introduce in its production process the principle of the division of labor, with scenarists, designers, landscape artists, colorists and the entire pyramid of detail specialists.

We could make similar observations *ad infinitum*, concerning other products of this veritable culture-merchandise. Indeed, the school textbooks or the so-called "popular" encyclopedia that teaches children how mass culture and modern communications came into being could hardly interpret the idea of history in a different way. To do so would be tantamount to undermining the archetypes which legitimize their very existence. This so-called pedagogic material is built on the same idea of history as that which inspires the fantastic adventure stories found in the pages of the comics. They both help each other and work together and individually to produce an image that is coherent with the capitalist mode of production which has assigned them a specific role in transmitting its models for life and daily aspirations.

The idealist vision of the hagiographers of mass culture is in some ways similar to that of certain of its critics. In effect, we see the same dissimulation and concealment used in the debates opposing mass culture and cultivated culture. According to these debates, mass culture is cheap and inferior, a caricature and parody of learned culture, which, in contrast, is liberating and non-alienating. In order to exonerate mass culture from its deficiencies, it would be sufficient to raise the aesthetic quality of these cultural products and to give a *carte blanche* to creation. In limiting the debate to a discussion of the degree of aesthetic quality in mass production, once again the faulty construction of mass culture inherent in the capitalist system is hidden, as well as the function these cultural commodities fulfill in the reproduction of social relations.

We can help to clarify the confusion between popular culture and mass culture by comparing the original versions of popular fairy tales with the adaptations made by the Disney conglomerate, which brought these stories to the TV and cinema screens, and had them re-incarnated in its amusement parks, or revived in its comic strips. It is generally acknowledged that fairy tales such as those collected by Grimm or Andersen, for example, to cite the most well known, crystallize a culture of defense elaborated by the people. Using the words of Bruno

Bettelheim in his psychoanalytic study of fairy tales, "the function of these stories, these tales, is to relieve the imagination from the constraint imposed by the domination of power."⁵³ This is true, even if most of the fairy tales have been contaminated, as in any ideological process, by the myths originating from other classes and by the learned culture emanating from higher classes.⁵⁴ What happens to these stories when the industrial cultural apparatus takes over? We can take as an example the story of Snow White, one of the most well-known and oldest fairy tales, which has different versions in all of the languages and countries of Europe, and is even to be found on other continents. In the original story, the seven dwarfs have neither names nor individual personalities. The cinematographic adaptation made by Disney (it should not be forgotten that Snow White, his first film, served as the model for future productions) gave each dwarf an individual personality, undoubtedly intended to bring them closer to the spectator, and to make each of them a vehicle for easy mechanisms of sympathy or rejection. According to Bettelheim, the "rectifications" made by Disney disturb "the unconscious comprehension of what the dwarfs symbolize: an immature and pre-individual form of existence that Snow White should transcend." Another example is that of the changes imposed upon the tale of The Three Little Pigs. In the original version, like that of Snow White, the small characters had no individuality. This story teaches children that foresight accompanied by hard work allow one to conquer the worst enemy, the wolf. The houses built by the little pigs are symbols representing the stages of an individual's evolution, while the characters' actions represent attitudes towards the world, personal life styles that are situated between the two opposing poles of the traditional dilemma — the pleasure principle and the reality principle. Only the last little pig is capable of postponing his pleasure until later. Unlike the original tale, Disney's adaptation accords the greatest importance to the mishaps which occur in pursuing the wolf, and to the suspense that results from the rising thrill of the adventure. Assuming the same abusive rights as a comic-strip syndicate, Disney changes the cast by adding characters (such as that of the little wolf) which alters the structural significance of the stories. These popular fairy tales, which at one time were a sort of riposte to the dominant ideology, in the hands of the magus of fantasy who adapts them, become instruments of oppression, as it were. In appropriating these stories, which constituted a makeshift patrimony of explication and resistance to a reality of domination, Disney, in his happy-go-lucky hit-parades, becomes their grave-digger.⁵⁵

This colonization is so asphyxiating that there is hardly any space left in the panorama of mass culture for another alternative to develop. We can smile when Bettelheim, with the best of intentions, advises parents to read their children the original versions of these therapeutic stories, which help them to understand and dominate their fears and anguish. One of the consequences of the saturation produced by the formulas of mass culture is that the vast majority of

children and parents can only have access to these stories through the deformed products of the Disney Corporation. When an excerpt of Bettelheim's book was published in France a progressive mass circulation weekly (*Le Nouvel Observateur*) found nothing better to illustrate the passages from this psychoanalytic study of fairy tales than a Walt Disney image of Cinderella. Moreover, one may reproach Bettelheim for not having foreseen such an incongruous presentation of his work and for only being occasionally concerned with the modern renditions of these tales, the original versions of which he analyzes so remarkably.

Furthermore, the concept of popular culture cannot be limited to what Bettelheim seems to view as the golden age — the period before the emergence of the means of mass communication. Solutions for present reality cannot be found only in the mythology created by the people before the industrialization of culture. The technological age stimulates particular conflicts, and a particular kind of anguish, but also, particular responses. The patrimony of yesteryear's popular culture cannot be the only source providing redemption. Popular culture today, as a culture resisting the arsenals of power, should embrace the traumas of the world in which we live. As Michel de Certeau recently stated, "We must search for popular culture amongst the living and not the dead." If not, we risk formulating a "retro-concept" of popular patrimony.

This brief comparison, suggested by a reading of Bettelheim, allows us to see how a culture conveyed by the media attempts to deprive the people of its memory. While giving the illusion of relying upon and assuming a patrimony of myths, this culture actually standardizes, serializes and appropriates history, which it mutilates and reduces to a series of miscellaneous news items (*faits divers*). *The greatest standardization is undoubtedly that of historical time.* Just as the comics and the entire mass cultural apparatus are offered as the pinnacle of cultural accumulation, the bourgeoisie, as a class, considers itself as the last stage in the evolution of human society. This is why it claims to be universal, and why, in order to have its own history appear as "natural", and the only possible interpretation, it must colonize the history of other classes. This is the only way it can assure its ideological hegemony within a particular mode of production, capitalism. The "de-historizing" and reduction of history into a series of *faits divers* presides over all of the standards ruling the transmission of reality. There are many other examples, besides the distortion of popular fairy tales. The bourgeoisie's daily appropriation of the life experiences of other classes in information-merchandise, out of context and out of history, is another case in point.

In explaining the emergence of genres, simplifying formulas and stereotypes as predominant means for transmitting messages by the media, too often

56. According to the definition given by Robert C. O'Hara, *Media for the Millions: The Process of Mass Communication*, New York, Random House, 1961, p. 131.

one has the habit of using other stereotypes, and other simplifying formulas. The constraints and limitations of time and space, which define both the media and its agents, as well as the receivers, are all too frequently invoked as the ultimate reasons behind the process of simplification, a cardinal rule of mass communication. Simplification "refers to the presentation of an event, an action, or an idea apart from its matrix, as though it were a self-contained entity unaffected by other events, actions or ideas."⁵⁶

The limitations and constraints of space and time are only one link in the chain of simplification, and they do not constitute the most significant part of this process. The main question to be posed is much more important: Why, in this limited space and time, is there a specific method of ordering reality and a given programming of forms, which irrevocably exclude class analysis, class conflicts, and, in a word, politics? Restoring the historico-social dimension, the multi-faceted nature of an idea, of an action, or of an event, is not necessarily incompatible with reduction of time and space. The problem is to know why, in the capitalist mode of transmitting messages, the reduction which takes place always results in the atomisation of reality. In order to furnish a valid response to this question, reference must be made to the guiding principle behind all social relations of production in the capitalist mode of production. In the same way that the extraction of surplus value demands that each worker be considered in an individual and individualistic relationship with the master of the material means of production, in the area of symbolic commodities, the relation that is established between the receiver of messages and the dominant transmitter (the master of the ideological means of production) is based on the criteria of atomisation, and each message should reproduce the receiver's status as an isolated individual. The forms of transmitting reality, the very concept of information in capitalist society, must reproduce this principle which inspires the morals of this society, and which makes the individual believe that his well-being only depends on himself. Through this analysis the global character of the concept of the mode of production can be perceived. This concept allows one to envisage just how a given type of social relation is multiplied *ad infinitum*, determining every form of manufacture, exchange and circulation of commodities, whether they be material or symbolic. These relations are reflected both in the way the reader establishes contact with his newspaper (the act of buying, and the act of reading) as well as in the way reality is presented and organized in this newspaper.

This principle of individualism, of fragmentation, is the very basis for the ideological disorganization of the oppressed classes which is needed by the ruling classes if they are to impose their hegemony. For the bourgeoisie, these abstract individuals that it designates by the euphemistic term of citizens, are isolated atoms in a State totality, who are unable to comprehend that their pseudo-democratic relationship with the State is actually an abstract relationship which masks the fact that all of the

53. Bruno Bettelheim, *The Uses of Enchantment*, New York, Knopf, 1976.

54. See Marc Soriano, *Les contes de Perrault, culture savante et traditions populaires*, Paris, Gallimard, 1968.

55. For another aspect of "Disneyan" standardization, that imposed on music, see T. W. Adorno and Hans Eisler, *Komposition für den Film*, Munich, Rogner und Bernhard, 1969; and Serge Eisenstein, *The Film Sense*, New York, 1942.

institutions of the class-State are instruments of domination. In the same way, the receivers of information, through all the mechanisms of the individualist, normative model, are subject to the illusion of communication.⁵⁷

A MODE OF EXCHANGE BETWEEN MARKETS AND CLASSES

Mass culture, media culture, and means of communication are three terms which are not necessarily synonymous. The messages conveyed by the media all participate in this mass culture that we have tried to define, by contrasting it with popular culture. However, this mass culture is not limited to the products which circulate in the technological apparatuses of mass communication. We will return to this point later.

The term "means of communication," to which "mass" is generally added, has had an even more confused trajectory. First of all, the term "means of communication" is rarely used by bourgeois sociologists, and has been hidden behind the economically and politically neutral terms "communication media", "mass communication media", and particularly, "mass media". Thus the materiality of the means of communications is obfuscated, and the immaterial aspects are emphasized; the final result is that the product of the media is substituted for the production process of communication. Nevertheless, when first used, this term offered particularly fertile ground for a materialist approach to culture. It was already being used at the end of the last century, by Charles Horton Cooley, who is considered to be the father of North American social sciences. He believed that he had discovered the characteristics common to various technological developments consolidated during this period, and proposed grouping innovations as dissimilar as the railroad and the telegraph within the concept of *means of communication*. (This intuitive insight was quickly forgotten by official North-American Social Science, in its rush to adhere to the "culturalist" interpretation of functionalism.) The weight of the infrastructure on the cultural relations between individuals was recognized. The locomotive engine, a technical means of circulating and exchanging commodities and people, as well as messages, is very symbolic, for it expressed the new social relations which emerged in this era, and provided the model for the future mission of the other means of communication which shortly afterwards developed to convey the emerging mass culture. In the beginning of the century, these technical achievements, which openly revealed their character as a unilateral means of invasion and

exchange, were forerunners of the modern function of television, radio and satellites. These trains, which drained the raw materials from Africa and Central America and which, when the indigenous populations attempted to assert their rights, brought in contingents of marines or expeditionary forces to crush the rebellions, were the privileged tools of big colonial capital. And it is not by mere chance that Lenin, in *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, insisted so strongly on the circumstances of social necessity which presided over the globalization of the railroad networks:

Finance capital and the trusts do not diminish but increase the differences in the rate of growth of the various parts of the world economy. Once the relation of force is changed, what other solution of the contradictions can be found *under capitalism* than that of *force*? Railway statistics provide remarkably exact data on the different rates of growth of capitalism and finance capital in world economy...

Thus, the development of railways has been most rapid in the colonies and in the independent (and semi-independent) states of Asia and America. Here, as we know, the finance capital of the four or five biggest capitalist states reigns undisputed. Two hundred thousand kilometres of new railways in the colonies and in the other countries of Asia and America represent more than 40,000,000,000 marks in capital, newly invested on particularly advantageous terms, with special guarantees of a good return and with profitable orders for steel works, etc., etc.

Capitalism is growing with the greatest rapidity in the colonies and in overseas countries...

Thus, about 80 per cent of the total existing railways are concentrated in the hands of the five biggest powers. But the concentration of the *ownership* of these railways the concentration of finance capital, is immeasurably greater, for the French and English millionaires, for example, own an enormous amount of shares and bonds in American, Russian and other railways.

Thanks to her colonies, Great Britain has increased the length of "her" railways by 100,000 kilometres, four times as much as Germany. And yet, it is well known that the development of productive forces in Germany, and especially the development of the coal and iron industries, has been incomparably more rapid during this period than in England—not to speak of France and Russia.⁵⁸

After having written this work, in the preface to the French and German editions, Lenin once again took up the same arguments.

The building of railways seems to be a simple, natural, democratic, cultural and civilizing enterprise; that is what it is in the opinion of bourgeois professors, who are paid to depict capitalist slavery in bright colours, and in the opinion of petty-bourgeois philistines. But as a matter of fact the capitalist threads, which in thousands of different intercrossings bind these enterprises with private property in means of production in general, have

mouvement révolutionnaire, Paris, Anthropos, 1974 (English translation: London, Harvester, forthcoming 1978).

58. V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1970, pp. 116-8. For a glimpse of the railroad network in Africa today see the report published by the magazine *Africa* (London), April 1978, "Special Study: Land Transportation in Africa".

converted this railway construction into an instrument for oppressing a *thousand million* people (in the colonies and semicolonies), that is, more than half the population of the globe inhabiting the dependent countries, as well as the wage slaves of capital in the "civilized" countries.

The railway map of Africa is today still a vivid illustration of what Lenin observed at the beginning of the century. It overwhelmingly reflects the history of the different colonizing processes. The railways connected colonial administrative centers—usually on the coast—with mining districts, or ensured communication with remote regions for reasons of control. Moreover, there are nine different railway gauges on the continent. Five of the nine gauges in use are unimportant since they are very small lines. The imperial gauge (3 feet 6 inches or 1067 mm) is the standard in the ex-British, Belgian and Portuguese territories, and the 1000 mm gauge is found in the ex-French colonies. This latter gauge was also used in German East Africa (now Tanzania). At the present time, this country possesses two different systems, one inherited from the German colonizer, and the other based on the British imperial gauge. Certain railroad lines reveal even more clearly their economic mission and the economic needs they fulfill. Some of Africa's railways were even built according to a specific mineral gauge, at 1435 mm (for the transport of mineral ores), thus allowing for a heavier axle load. In light of these observations, we might inquire as to the "natural" character of these competitive railroad networks, which make it materially impossible for trains built according to the British system to circulate in neighboring Francophone countries.

At present, how many technocratic declarations naively praise the dissemination of modern communications technology, such as satellites and data processing networks, by referring to them as "simple, natural, democratic, cultural and civilizing" enterprises?

Marx himself, in the few texts where he used the concept of means of communication, gave it the same material definition as that employed by Lenin:

The revolution in the method of production in industry and agriculture, likewise necessitated a revolution in the general conditions of the social process of production, that is to say in the means of communication and transport. In a society whose pivots (to use Fourier's expression) were, first, small-scale agriculture, with its subsidiary home industries, and, secondly, urban handicraft, the means of communication and transport were utterly inadequate to the requirements of the manufacturing period, with its extended division of social labour, its concentration of the means of labour and of the workers, and its colonial markets; communications and transport, therefore, had to be revolutionised, and were in fact revolutionised. In like manner, the means of transport and communication handed down from the manufacturing period into the period of large-scale

59. Karl Marx, "Machinery and Large-Scale Production," *Capital*, I, London, Everyman's Library, 1972, pp. 106-7. See also Yves de la Haye, editor, *Marx and Engels on the Means of Communication*, New York, International General, forthcoming 1979.

60. Bertolt Brecht, *Écrits sur la littérature et l'art: I. Sur le cinéma*, Paris, L'Arche, 1970.

industry, soon showed themselves to be an intolerable fetter upon this new type of industry, with its febrile speed of production, its vast gradations, its continual transference of capital and labour from one sphere of production to another, and its newly created ties in the world market. Thus, over and above extensive changes in the construction of sailing ships, the means of communication and transport were gradually adapted, by a system of river steamships, railroads, ocean steamships, and telegraphs, to the methods of production of large-scale industry.⁵⁹

The foregoing texts of Marx and Lenin should serve as invitations, first of all to investigate the genesis of the other productive forces such as the press, radio and television which constitute the media, and then, as invitations to elucidate the nature of the social imperative explaining their emergence. The texts in Section C are particularly concerned with this aspect of the analysis.

The revolution in the mode of production also accounts for the emergence of the communication and mass culture networks. This phenomenon is difficult to grasp, because it evolved and continues to evolve with the needs of the expansion of capital. Mass culture in the forties is very different from that of the seventies (or that of 1977) when the process of accumulation of capital needs to shape another type of consumer and worker-mentality. Nevertheless, one thing is certain—this mass culture was born when industrial capitalism matured, and the circumstances under which it emerged continue to define its constituent elements. A distinctive feature of this culture is the opposition between work and leisure. When referring to the organization of the cinema in capitalist society, Brecht defined mass culture as

precisely this sharp opposition between work and leisure, characteristic of the capitalist mode of production, which separates all intellectual activities into those which serve the interests either of work or leisure, and which organize the latter into a system reproducing the work force. Distractions should not contain any element that is part of work. Distractions in the interest of production should be dedicated to non-production....The individual who buys a ticket to the movies is transformed before the screen into an idler and an exploiter; and since the individual has made himself the object of exploitation, it may be said that he or she is a victim of "im-ploitation."⁶⁰

Leisure, divorced from labor, is not satisfied with merely inspiring the different genres and forms of mass entertainment intended to fill up non-working hours. It has imposed its standards on every mass transmission of information that takes place. Leisure is no longer limited to invading the world of fiction, for it has also slipped into the world of facts. This can be seen in the television news in certain countries where there is a striking similarity between the way of transmitting information and that used for the dramatized formulas of the commercials.

This colonization of leisure which has taken the form of mass culture, corresponds to the bourgeoisie's utopian dream of offering its subjects, aside from work, a virgin territory free from social contingency and contradictions. The more leisure contaminates sectors of individual and collective life, the more

57. On the atomization process, see Patricio Biedma (an Argentine researcher who disappeared in Buenos Aires in September 1976), "Prensa burguesa, prensa popular y prensa revolucionaria", in Armand Mattelart, Patricio Biedma, Santiago Funes, *Comunicación masiva y revolución socialista*, Santiago de Chile, Prensa Latinoamericana, 1971 (republished: Mexico, Diogenes, 1973), and by the same author, "La lucha ideológica en torno a la prensa en Chile", *Comunicación y Cultura*, 1, July 1973. See also Armand Mattelart, *Mass Media, idéologies et*

widespread becomes the illusion nourished by the bourgeoisie of creating a true "realm of liberty."

Moreover, it should be noted that the periods of economic recession, with its inevitable massive unemployment, shatter the work/leisure dichotomy, since "free time" no longer signifies relaxation and idleness, but the anguish of not having a job. In these specific moments affronted by capitalist society, when there is considerably increased time to listen to leisure's alienating messages, the question of the media's omnipotent "dictatorship" over the audience takes on new meaning.

We can well imagine that in such situations, which reveal the major contradiction upon which this mass culture is constructed, and which it attempts to camouflage, the reality of the recession dilutes the illusion of a realm of liberty and brings into evidence the realm of necessity. The discrepancy between the reality lived by the unemployed and the behaviour standards proposed by the media, therefore, has every chance of being dramatically exposed. The conditions fostering a critical reading of the media are thus considerably enhanced.

61. This progression is very well illustrated by the history of the first multinationals, who were also the pioneers in establishing land and maritime communication networks in a good number of peripheral countries. The most striking case is undoubtedly that of the banana monopoly, United Fruit. Indeed, it is almost impossible to trace the history of railroad and maritime navigation in Central America and certain countries in South America, without taking into account this company. (It owns the largest private fleet in the world, and did not hesitate to lend its ships to the CIA mercenaries who, in 1961, launched the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion). In the same vein, it is difficult not to recognize the importance of this company when tracing the evolution of imperialist policies, and more specifically, when dealing with imperialist strategy on the communication front. The recent book of Thomas McCann, who for almost 20 years was a United Fruit executive, documents what many already knew or suspected (*An American Company: The Tragedy of United Fruit*, New York, Crown, 1976):

United Fruit Company had earned the title, "*El Pulpo*", because it deserved it... Within three decades of its founding, United Fruit had become a government unto itself, in many instances more powerful and larger than the host countries in which it operated. The values of the era allowed the company to take without giving back in reasonable proportion. It allowed growth without sharing of the wealth, without the creation of meaningful local opportunities, without changing its style or direction when conditions warranted such change. United Fruit bought protection, pushed governments around, kicked out competition, and suppressed union organization.

In word and deed, United Fruit mirrored American economic and political determinism. When Theodore Roosevelt wanted the Panama Canal, America got the Panama Canal. Our interests there were protected by the United States Marines, who were used to make sure Colombia couldn't put down the revolt that made Panama a separate and cooperative republic. Presidents Monroe and Coolidge read the same doctrine into history: they protected continental neighbors against a marauding world; they sent troops to protect marauding U.S. interests against our victim neighbors. For the most part, all that was seen of these efforts north of the border were the benefits. But at the other end of the telescope,

Mass culture fulfills a need engendered by the political system of representative democracy, which appeared along with the development of capitalism. Just as the locomotive and the telegraph accompanied capitalism's need to open up new markets, and find new sources of raw materials, in order to permit the advance of its mode of production, for a similar reason, the mass communication and mass culture network accompanied the bourgeoisie's need for an opening towards other social classes. The emergence of this network corresponds to a new mode of circulation and exchange amongst these social classes. The reason why, for a considerable length of time the penetration of capitalism in peripheral countries was primarily achieved through the advance of the locomotives (filled with marines, when necessary), was because the imperial bourgeoisie in these colonial realities did not feel it necessary to extend its cultural network to the subaltern classes. The globalization of the more insidious networks of cultural invasion was carried out when the need for a new international division of labor became evident to the ruling classes.⁶¹ Mass

the United States Government and the Octopus whose interests and policies that government nurtured were seen as one and the same: brutal, monolithic, oppressive.

Through the decades, the policy of the American government abroad had wavered. It drifted from the peaceful commitments of early Pan-American congresses to the bare divisiveness of 1928 Havana Conference. But through this conflict between the efficiencies of capitalism and the ideals of democracy, America blandly assumed—because Americans at home saw so little of the consequences of their deeds—that the actions of the past in Central America could be washed away at any time with words, and that Yankee conduct would again be trusted by all Latin Americans merely because we said once more that it should be.

It wasn't until 1955 that the United Fruit Company was officially equipped with a public relations department. According to McCann, the first results could hardly be called brilliant:

United Fruit officially created a Public Relations Department in 1955; within a year it comprised a staff of twenty-eight—including me—with a budget of one and a half million dollars. The company was running an institutional advertising campaign in Spanish language publications, the theme of which was "The Living Circle." "The Living Circle" was essentially a great big wheel superimposed on a map of the Americas: from North America came an endless supply of all the good things that man—North American Man, that is—could make: cars, refrigerators, radios, TV sets, tires and other manufactured items. And from Latin America came all the materials and agricultural products one could take from the land: raw rubber, minerals, lumber and especially bananas. "The Living Circle" amounted to a graphic representation of colonialism and that's the way Latin's viewed it. Not until the company had invested millions in the campaign did it make the discovery that it was the subject of great resentment and rancor in the Central American markets where the ads were running, in that it appeared to make a virtue of exploitation. But even the fact that Latin Americans choked on it was not enough to bring the program to an end. The company was so isolated from the impact of its actions and attitudes that the ads continued for almost five years in the tropics, inflaming Latin's and working

culture assures everyone's access to spiritual commodities, and makes everyone participate in the themes and values which must hold together a consensus supporting class democracy. It is in this respect that mass culture is a veritable system of reproduction for labor power. As certain texts in this anthology demonstrate, it is because this culture is born in what appears to be a democratic context, that its messages are sometimes incompatible with capitalism's States of Exception, such as military dictatorships or fascism.

Mass culture, as a mode of organization of the mass communication network, is actually linked to the constitutional liberties defined by the political regime known as liberal democracy. This culture is to a certain degree the material extension of *freedom of speech and opinion*, as defined by the hegemonic class, and represents the best the bourgeoisie has to offer for the "expression" of other classes. Here we will make use of Gramsci's term *civil society* to clarify mass culture and its different supports (later, we will see that these supports are numerous and diverse). The function of civil society is to render opaque the reality of the repressive, brutal force of the class-State by sublimating and disguising it as symbolic violence. In the capitalist State of Exception, the State abandons its liberal trappings and assumes the exclusive task of direct terrorism aimed at the subaltern classes. In the military States of South America, for example, where established power cannot rally all of the classes around its model of economic and social development, mass culture is deprived of the terrain where it germinated, a mode of organization and a mode of class relations based on the acceptance of the necessity of a "consensus", or a "collective will." The narrowness of the social base supporting the military regimes contrasts with the liberal bourgeoisie's broad system of class alliances. The mission of ideological conditioning carried out by mass culture, which disguises social inequalities and class barriers, is annulled when the ruling power openly displays its class orientation through its practices of vertical repression and over-exploitation of popular classes.

These exceptional situations, when opposed to normal situations, are rich in lessons for whoever tries to understand how mass communications and mass culture reproduce a very specific political apparatus. For, paradoxically, in these instances of rupture in liberal order and legality, *certain* sectors of mass culture, which, under democratic rule were far from being subversive, can become very subversive indeed. We have made explicit reference to *certain* sectors, as the military dictatorships are

against any conceivable company interest.

The political events of the two preceding years had demonstrated the necessity of creating a public relations department. In 1953, Guatemala's president-elect, Jacobo Arbenz, had begun an agrarian reform program. In order to offset this revolutionary attempt, which risked depriving it of its latifundia, United Fruit mounted the first large-scale public opinion campaign in the modern history of counter-revolution. All of the metropolis's media were mobilized against Arbenz and his adversaries were given arms. In order to plan this campaign, United Fruit hired Edward T.

also capable of appropriating expressions and products of mass culture. A recent illustration of this appropriation by the military is provided by the public relations campaign recently launched by the U.S. advertising firm Burson Marsteller, on the occasion of the world soccer championship held in Argentina. This campaign, launched on behalf of the Argentine dictatorship, is intended to present a democratic image of the repressive military regime. Of course, this is nothing new, as many dictatorships and conspiring corporations throughout the world rely on such agencies to clean up their image.

To return to the question of popular subversion of mass culture under these regimes, there are numerous examples, such as mass spectator sports events which in these realities can become enclaves of resistance to the overwhelming oppression. In Europe, a short while ago, this was the case in Spain. Under Franco, the soccer matches were a form of popular resistance to the regime. In the absence of constitutional liberties, such as the right of assembly, freedom of speech and opinion, as well as the impossibility of publicly authorized solidarity, the stadium became one of the only places where the collectivity could meet and express itself. The sports arena was transformed into an arena fostering a new means of political expression. Thus the different soccer teams were chosen in function of a political line of demarcation that was obvious to the spectators. The victory of certain well-known teams represented a far-off victory over the dictatorship, and the success of other teams represented a vote of confidence in the Franco regime.

We may also refer to those other stadiums in Santiago de Chile, which have become so tragically renowned since they were used as concentration camps after the *coup d'Etat* in 1973, when they became universal symbols of genocide. (One will recall Resnais's film *Providence*, made in 1976). At present, these stadiums have been deserted by the Chilean people, who are nevertheless football fanatics, as a sign of protest against the repression.

In these realities, the products of mass culture which, when offered in liberal democracies have a repressive character can become "free areas" that provide occasions for the expression of popular discontent. Any opening in the direction of the democratizing themes of this culture is a ray of light in the dark night of fascism. The politics that the liberal bourgeoisie has tried to confine to the parliamentary arena for better channeling the hard reality of class confrontation, the politics that the dictatorships banish from public life, subtly takes over all of the terrain capable of nourishing any kind of

Bernays, the "father of public relations", the biggest name in his field, and the nephew of Sigmund Freud.

As soon as Arbenz was overthrown, the banana company quickly forgot its former fears. It wasn't until the end of the sixties that United Fruit, concerned about its bad reputation and agitation by trade-unions commissioned the Cambridge-based research firm of ABT Associates (the same firm which developed the *Politica* simulation models used by the Pentagon against the Allende government) to prepare a report on the possibilities of using the promotion of social reforms to improve its image.

political expression. In the cinema, films that denounce the tyrants in any form, can be converted into pretexts for collective murmuring commentary.

These regimes engender their own mass cultural production. The fact that Spain, under Franco, created new kinds of *fotonovelas* and sentimental novels, exemplified by *Corin Tellado*, which are presently flooding the Latin American markets, and the Latin market in the United States, can perhaps be explained in terms of this authoritarian context. An analysis of this phenomenon should not be mechanistic, but should take into account the entire complexity of the production process involved. We may advance several hypotheses: First of all, do these products come into being as the result of a response that expresses a certain dose of resistance (even if it be very weak) to the institutionalized repression? Secondly, if this is so, what has been the role of international commercialization in the recuperation of these products, or, in other words, has the penetration of the Spanish photo and sentimental novels in foreign circuits signified the elimination of the subversive meaning of the product to conform to the standardized norms of established capitalist genres? The third possibility is that these cultural products are directly based on and function for the pro-Franco ideology.

In this same perspective, we may also examine the role played in this country by the tourist industry, another vehicle of mass culture. In the Spanish media system, is it not true that the tourist sector of the cultural industry acted as a locomotive force, as a front that facilitated the dissemination of mass culture? What did this tourism and its euphoric myths represent, when viewed alongside the drab and dull dominant culture of Francoism? In order to answer these questions correctly, we must first of all answer another fundamental question: what were the political and economic circumstances which compelled the government to open the frontiers and promote a tourist industry with its new mode of circulation and exchange of commodities, messages and individuals. And, more recently, in a transitional period in Spain, we should examine how, when liberty of expression has a tendency to be confused with libertinism, an invasion of these cultural products has accompanied the process of liberalization in this country. An analysis of the moments immediately following the demise of

Franco and Salazar, when the newspaper kiosks overflowed with Playboy and similar magazines alongside classic marxist texts, would have been very instructive to understand the discrepancy between a culture developed under capitalism's liberal form and the extremely obscurantist culture also imposed by capitalism, but in its authoritarian version.⁶²

Further on, we will see that what may be said about communications and mass culture may also be stated apropos of the scientific apparatus that studies them, for this apparatus also clearly reflects the material context from which it has emerged. Bourgeois sociology of communications is indeed only capable of approaching its subject of study under liberal democracy's normal operating conditions.

Mass culture is, of course, first of all identifiable through cultural products or merchandise that is distributed on a mass scale, whether it be radio or television series, news-releases, magazines, comics, records, films, commercials or video tapes. The "culturalist" vision, nevertheless, has shown too strong of a tendency to view mass culture only through these products, thus making fetishes out of them, and in doing so avoiding recognition of the political function that these messages fulfill in the capitalist mode of production. For, it should be stressed that mass culture has become the vulgarized superstructure of this mode of production. Above all, this culture represents a life style, forming a unique and coherent totality, which creates daily standards that contribute to supporting the dynamics of consumption and production. In a certain way it is a democratized, popularized version of the ideology of domination. The nature of power has changed. "Mass culture" wrote the Italian film-maker Pier Paolo Pasolini, "cannot be an ecclesiastic, moralizing and patriotic culture. It is directly linked to consumption, which has internal laws and an ideological self-sufficiency capable of automatically creating a power that no longer knows what to do with the Church, the Fatherland, and the Family, as well as other similar fads."⁶³

This mission of democratizing and vulgarizing the themes presented through mass culture is particularly well illustrated by the text in this anthology on the concept of modernity. The ideology of modernization, which is at the very center of the con-

62. For further analysis of public opinion as an expression of the liberal conception of information and culture, see in this volume the texts of Pierre Bourdieu, Jurgen Habermas, and my own text, "Notes on the Military State". An interesting area of research on cultural production under a dictatorship is provided in the invaluable work on the Spanish cinema under Franco written by a Catalan marxist, Domenec Font, *Del azul al verde, el cine español durante el franquismo*, Barcelona, Avance, 1976. Amongst the many works of another Catalan marxist, Roman Gubern, see especially *Raza (un ensueño del general franco)*, Madrid, Ediciones 99, 1977. For Portugal, see Eduardo Geada, *O Imperialismo e o fascismo no cinema*, Lisbon, Morais, 1976. On the use of sports by military States, see a recent series of articles entitled "La dictature argentine et la coupe du monde de football", *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Paris), April 1978.

63. Pier Paolo Pasolini, "Etude sur la révolution anthropologique en Italie", in *Ecrits corsaires*, Paris, Flammarion, 1975, p. 72.

However, we should qualify our remarks concerning this quotation from Pasolini if we want to avoid the myth of the universality and uniformity of mass culture. Each social formation, in function of the level of social struggles and the productive forces, re-formulates, in its own manner, the homogenizing elements of mass culture. Thus, mass culture, in a given social formation, can very well integrate the values connected to the Church, the Fatherland, and the Family, and not just treat them as passing "fads". We must insist on the fact that mass culture is not a bulldozer, but rather an organic framework in which other earlier hegemonic ideologies of domination unite and establish new combinations. It is these combinations which provide the specific essence of mass culture in each social formation.

cept of change and movement tolerated and promoted by the bourgeoisie, and which is also reflected in the most important theories of development elaborated by the economists and sociologists of the system, is reflected daily in magazines, styles, shop windows, attitudes on daily life, and even certain proposals aimed at recuperating the women's liberation movement.

Capitalism's evolution has made mass culture take on the characteristics of a vulgarized superstructure. This becomes increasingly evident with the movement towards monopoly capitalism. From this point of view, mass culture is present just as much in a supermarket, on a highway, in a stadium, in the organization of a trip to the capital, as in an amusement park or a political campaign designed on the basis of electoral marketing standards. We will return to this subject when we examine how the rationality of this standardized culture begins to penetrate sectors that are not yet effected by industrial rationalization (by serving as a norm for their industrialization). Education is an example of this.

For the moment, we shall confine our remarks to the tourist industry, which is also used by one of the texts in this anthology to illustrate the penetration of imperialist cultural patterns. This industry is, in fact, structured according to the same standards, and fulfills the same functions as written and audiovisual mass cultural products. Tourism's mode of organization is actually one expression, amongst others, of this mass culture. It is not just by chance that in the comics, Donald, his nephews and Uncle Scrooge are always fleeing the metropolis only to end up in exotic peripheral countries. For the majority of the inhabitants in these countries, the life styles and philosophies of these anthropomorphic ducks are just as a meaningless and unattainable as the idea of spending a night in ITT's Hotel Sheraton, lying on the private beaches owned by the Hilton, Western International or Ramada Inn, renting a luxury car from Hertz or Avis, or signing an American Express traveler's check.

For purposes of analysis, the tourist industry has an advantage over other sectors of mass culture. It is an area where, in a very evident way, all of the different means of communication converge. It includes what Marx and Lenin referred to, the means of transportation, as well as the more well-known means of communication, the modern mass media. The base and superstructure of this industry form a constellation of the most varied kinds of logistic material: advertising and travel agencies, along with their posters, commercials, jingles, brochures, vacation guides, tours and cruises, by land, air or sea. Beyond these basic elements, there are harbors and airports, with their standardized international language (and other marginal languages), the corresponding fashions, a way of travelling, and the *mise en scene* of the voyage and film and photographic souvenirs. We should not neglect the many other material and immaterial messages, incorporated into the distribution of territorial space in the architectural constructions of the hotels, tourist villages, and restaurant chains, as well as the standardization of hotel service

and dining.

The value of this type of micro-analysis of the reproduction of a way of life is reinforced in reading the following passage from an article in the September 17th, 1973 issue of *Time* on McDonald's one of the most well-known fast-food restaurant chains (At that time this enterprise employed some 130,000 workers in nine different countries, from Western Europe to Japan and Australia, and operated 2,500 restaurants):

Still, McDonald's manages to make its licensees, restaurant managers and burger slingers seem as standardized as its machines and cuisine. Licensees and managers of company-operated restaurants must graduate from a ten-day course at McDonald's "Hamburger University," a gleaming \$2,000,000 institution in Elk Grove Village, Illinois. The course leads to a Bachelor of Hamburgerology degree, with a minor in French fries. In the field, licensees and managers are incessantly hounded by roving inspectors (called "field supervisors") to make sure that the restaurant floor is mopped at proper intervals and the parking lot tidied up hourly. If a manager tries to sell his customers hamburgers that have been off the grill more than ten minutes or coffee more than 30 minutes old, Big Brother in Oak Brook will find out...

Grillmen, "window girls" (order takers) and other hired hands must conform to strict rules. Men must keep their hair cropped to military length, and their shoes (black only) highly polished. Women must wear dark low shoes, hair nets and only very light makeup. Viewing the results, Harvard Business School Professor Theodore Levitt describes McDonald's as "a machine that produces, with the help of totally unskilled machine tenders, a highly polished product. Everything is built integrally into the machine itself, into the technology of system. The only choice available to the attendant is to operate it exactly as the designers intended."

There is hardly a need for commentary. This text provides us with a more complete, authentic definition of the material/cultural standardization process than that which we have attempted to present in preceding pages.

The tourist trade is undoubtedly one of the sectors of mass culture which enables us to envision in the most concrete manner, how, in this era of monopoly capitalism the line of demarcation normally established between infrastructure and superstructure has an increasing tendency to disappear. It shows us how the myths which formerly only circulated through mass media products are now materialized in everyday objects and daily life styles. The most striking and well-known manifestation of this process of materialization is undoubtedly that of the Walt Disney amusement parks. This industry also dramatically reveals the search for the bourgeoisie's utopian "realm of freedom." As an archetype, this industry announces the coming of the future society, which is already being referred to as the "tertiary" (service) society, or the "lost paradise regained," according to the tourist advertisement of a U.S. airline serving the Caribbean.

This mass culture, which certain researchers crystallized too quickly, is essentially an historical process. The evolution of the productive forces and class contradictions which condition this culture also determine its dynamics. The concentration process

presently taking place and the technology which is born in this context thus are responsible for the emergence of messages that are very different from those the former age of the industrialization of culture has accustomed us to receiving. It is unfortunate that research in communications has hardly touched upon the progression of genres (police series for example) or the successive changes which myths undergo (such as that of Superman, as we have already suggested). Research that employs a vertical analysis of the ideological process is very much in favor, and there is a lack of a diachronic perspective that registers the distance covered by these genres and myths as related to the conditions of class struggle presiding over the emergence of these productions.⁶⁴ In the final analysis, this deficiency might be explained by the fact that too many researchers consider the dominant ideology as a monolithic and ageless phenomenon. It is forgotten that this ideology is a changing system, a Medusa which absorbs and rejects according to the phases of a struggle in which it is an active participant. Every product of the dominant culture not only conveys the conciliating, oecumenic utopia of the class which produces it, but also the existing contradictions of this class's order.

There is a relative wealth of studies that trace the way a given technological model (whether it be radio, television or computers) is established. Unfortunately, this is not the case when it is a question of examining why certain genres, formulas, or stereotypes came into being, and the needs that they fulfill. In order to avoid a vulgarized, mechanistic materialism à la McLuhan, it would be necessary to concentrate more on connecting what are known as "content" analyses and analyses of production of discourse with the changes taking place in the regime of capitalist accumulation, with the changes in the relations of the dominated classes with the bourgeois State, with the changes in the composition of the ruling classes and their systems of alliances, and with the evolution of current technical advances. It is obviously understood that technology is not only the infrastructure, since the model according to which it is socially introduced is superstructure. Moreover, as far as communications technology is concerned, it conveys messages that are actually standards of behavior. Just as some researchers have tried to elucidate why certain patents, modes of manufacturing and organization of cinema, TV, and radio predominate over other patents and other modes, it is urgent to search for the reasons why specific forms of expression, and a determined aesthetic have been installed as standards, and why and how this has been done at the expense of other alternatives. We have searched in

vain for a critical analysis of the manner in which television series, for example, appeared and evolved. Neither are there very many studies explaining the line of continuity between the first serialized novels, the radio and TV soap operas, and the TV serials. The lack of historical studies in this domain undoubtedly explains why so much haphazard speculation on the "nature" of modern media can circulate and occupy the terrain. However, many analyses, realized with a more or less critical perspective, have been made on the serials presently being shown on television.⁶⁵ To make reference to another genre, one might inquire as to why the Disney heroes were more sympathetic towards the protestors (especially the unemployed during the Great Depression of 1930) at the dawn of the Disney industry than during the present economic crisis. To answer this query, one may first of all examine the multiplication of characters which, since the thirties, have made their appearance on the scene, and which have provided functional solutions for every possible problem in imperial society. This increase in the number of Disney characters might have brought about more diversified open expression of present conflicts, but finally, only signified greater restrictions in expressing these conflicts. The code has been increasingly stereotyped and frozen. This funnel-like progression characterizes the one-dimensional evolution of numerous sectors of mass culture, which have become louder but not wiser. The paradox of this apparent opening which is at the same time a closing clearly illustrates the present tendency of mass cultural production towards standardization and diversification, or rather towards a *process of diversification within standardization*.

Concerning the frontiers of mass culture, we will make one final comment. When the first products of this culture appeared (in the press, at the end of the last century), the separation between leisure and work was relatively clear. The class that owned the means of production had direct control over the reins of its mode of production, and administered it personally. Mass culture, outside of the workplace, assured that the ruling class would always be provided with contingents of "happy", exploited human beings, while at the same time *standardizing the means for subduing their hearts and minds*. Today, another kind of standardization is being devised, *the standardization of administration, of management*. A strata of technocrats has taken over the administration of the system from the bosses and owners. The ideological enrollment of these management delegates has been gradually assured by the constitution of a behavior code which brings together what may be called the culture of business, management, public relations and

Marie Piemme's study, *La propagande innovée*, Paris, 10/18, 1975. although Horace Newcomb is not a critical marxist, his compilation, *TV, The Most Popular Art* (op. cit.), is one of the rare works written by a researcher from the United States which provides extremely varied analyses on television series. See also the various studies published in the *Journal of Communication* (Annenberg School, Philadelphia) since 1974.

64. In a certain way the writings of Stuart Ewen are a good example (much too rare) of the diachronic approach to a given sector of mass culture, in this case, the advertising apparatus. See in this volume his "Advertising as Social Production", which should be complemented by a reading of his latest work: *Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of the Consumer Culture*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1976.

65. For a marxist analysis of television serials, see Jean-

commercial research. The bridge between classical mass culture, which was only developed around leisure activities, and the business culture was long ago extended by the marketing apparatus, the summit of the commodity culture, and essential component of the media's advertising appeal. In order for the mass culture and the business culture to meet, the only thing necessary was the rationalization of the organization of work. It seems extremely difficult not to speak of a new business communication network and culture, for which many students are being trained in communication schools throughout the world, especially when one encounters so much evidence of the need of business "to communicate". A company specializing in the use of audiovisual methods for businesses inserted this advertising tract in the principal French advertising trade journal:

Gentlemen, Uncontrolled information, the grapevine, corridor conversations...information is always circulating in your business, but, unfortunately, not always in the way you would like, and often this information is distorted. Although a business's external communication is generally handled by press and advertising agencies, or public relations firms, internal communication is handled with much smaller means. If you cannot find enough time or the proper solutions for making known your policies, why not confide their expression and diffusion to a professional? Our collaboration takes the concrete form of a management newspaper, as well as closed-circuit television broadcasts, and offers audiovisual information programs and even training. There are as many solutions as there are businesses and budgets. The important thing is that information circulates and that you have in hand the means to make it objective.⁶⁶

Indeed, at the present pace, it is definitely very difficult to precisely define the notion of communication. It is truly no longer possible to limit it to the domain of leisure and free time. In order to establish clearer frontiers, it would first of all be necessary to analyze the status of culture and information in the present phase of monopoly capitalism. We will return to this point further on.

ANOTHER FORGOTTEN NORMALITY

Despite the difficulties in establishing the domain of communication, we should not confine ourselves to the unequivocal notion of communication bestowed upon us by a science of communication marked by the obsessions of a class which isolates and disciplines each particular reality in order to better mask the overall social reality. It should be recognized that communication can embrace other domains than those covered by the more or less broad definition circumscribed by the ruling classes' cultural practices, leisure or business activities. Indeed, if another approach to communication is used, that of the class struggling against the bourgeoisie's ideological hegemony, the prevailing notion of communication is necessarily discredited. If this does happen, the reason is that the social divi-

66. Inserted in the French advertising trade journal *Stratégies* (Paris), 132, 24 January-6 February 1977. This journal is an imitation of *Advertising Age*, the big U.S. advertising trade publication.

sion of labor, which has confined communication to a given sphere, is challenged. An example, extreme but very illustrative, is provided by the peoples who, in their struggles against the colonial or neo-colonial occupation armies, transform every fighter into a messenger, a journalist. Likewise, it becomes very difficult to circumscribe the field of education, when a people has decided to convert every inhabitant into an educator of his or her neighbor, thus challenging the social relation of production between teacher and student, transmitter and receiver. What happens to our habitual notion of education and communication when the people apply the program of the Guinée-Bissau liberation movement: "The individual who knows a little more should teach the individual who knows a little less." The validity of the various dichotomies upon which communication is constructed in the capitalist mode of production is thus questioned: matter/spirit, productive labor/non-productive labor, manual labor/intellectual labor, practice/theory, and politics/science.

These forms of struggle show how rigorous the partitioning of practices is in capitalist society. Furthermore, when this principle of the social division of labor is examined, it becomes obvious that all of the compartments, and all of the cells reflect the corporatist concept upon which the mode of production of life in this society is founded. This corporatism is essential, so that everyone in his or her particular practice and order, may reproduce the great Order, without realizing it.

The notion of communication is backed up by the entire social organization of a given society, *in normal operation*. The truth of this observation is illustrated by the fact that no communication theory elaborated by the establishment sociologists can explain situations of rupture, that is, situations where the legitimacy of the bourgeoisie's communication apparatus breaks down. This is what happens in all pre-revolutionary situations, when the bourgeoisie, losing the electoral majority, has its concept of public opinion or majority opinion challenged, and must reformulate the relation it maintains with its own clientele.

We should further examine those historical situations where the bourgeoisie lost the executive power, and the parliamentary majority, while preserving its communication apparatuses. The recent history of Chile is, in this respect, very significant. It shows how the ruling class's mode of organization of communication is far from being a static entity. In a period of rupture when the bourgeoisie's "class preservation instinct" plays a predominant role, and when the bourgeoisie realizes that the balance between the classes is no longer in its favor, it does not hesitate to abandon the sacred principles of its own legality and objectivity, and transform the media into an offensive arm for recapturing its lost power. Through its actions, the ruling class itself demonstrates the impossibility of abstractly defining "freedom of speech and press," and proves that every definition of liberty must take into account the concrete relations of force which condition the application of these principles. Under the Popular Unity

Government, for example, the bourgeoisie preserved control over its media and even increased its potential. For the ruling class, the risk that the middle classes would go over to the camp of the left was a terrifying reality. Its traditional class alliances were weakening and it was therefore necessary for the bourgeoisie to reconsider its relations with the social classes and groups that might join the opposing front. Unable to create a consensus for their counter-revolutionary project, and incapable of even hoping to attract the subaltern classes to their side, the bourgeoisie transformed its *mass* media into an openly *class* media. The exclusive role which characterizes the bourgeoisie's media in liberal normalcy, that of dividing the public and more specifically, disorganizing the solidarity of the oppressed classes, no longer was of primary importance. Instead, the media became powerful tools for organizing those dissatisfied with the Allende regime, who were transformed into the bourgeoisie's allies. Hereafter, the "militant, mobilized and politicized" media (all terms which in times of social peace, the bourgeoisie abhors) no longer addressed their messages to the "average citizen" who serves as a reference for *mass* communications, but to specific, concrete sectors of the population, converted into relays and reflections of the political strategy adopted by the dominant class, with the logistic support of U.S. imperialism. This strategy consisted of imitating the methods and invading the battlefields that are normally the privileged arsenal of left forces (strikes, street demonstrations, grass-roots mobilization, mass agitation, etc.). In another work we referred to this process as the "mass line" of the bourgeoisie, its expropriation of Leninist principles of mass organization.⁶⁷ The profile of the reader, the TV viewer, and listener was no longer established according to a mythical average, but by "mass fronts", which included the truckers' union, medical colleges and merchants' associations out on strike, the women's groups demonstrating with their pots and pans in the streets, in brief, this "silent majority" which suddenly revealed its true class-visage. The media and its journalists, transformed into "war correspondents," covering these various fronts, accompanied all of these mobilized sectors, stimulated them and served as their outposts and ideological avant-grade. This change in the ruling class's communication model was symbolized by the graphic evolution of the bourgeoisie's oldest and most important newspaper, *El Mercurio* (founded in 1827). In

1969, this newspaper boasted that because of its seriousness, sobriety and contents, it was the *Times* of Latin America. In 1973, it was transformed into a veritable campaign poster and political pamphlet. This graphic mutation shows precisely how, during periods of social war, the bourgeois model of communication changes and makes obsolete the rigid separation into genres, the division of communication work functional to periods of social peace. Thus the diversified discourse characterizing the different types of newspapers in periods of bourgeois normality (different, that is, depending on the targeted social group or class), tend to homogenize and melt into a unique discourse, and the line of demarcation between journalism genres blurs. The experience of the Chilean political process reinforces our conviction that one of the cardinal elements which must be considered in analyzing a communication model, and tracing its evolution, is that which refers to the fluctuations in the class alliances that determine the media's targets.

Functionalism, a theory of social balance, excels in passively registering how the press, radio and television function within the context of bourgeois normality. However, it is incapable of offering a schema of interpretation and explication when dysfunctioning is so great that the hegemony and legitimacy of the existing communication order and the class that corresponds to it risk being overthrown, thus allowing another project of social organization to emerge. In the Third World countries, the functionalist theory of social regulation has only offered a limited schema of interpreting reality, as the means of communication are merely agents of "modernization." However, since many Third World countries do not follow this modernization model, which maintains intact the structures of domination, this so-called universal theory reveals itself to be a false theory, since it is not verifiable in practice.⁶⁸

What Marx wrote in the afterword to the Second German edition of *Capital* a propos the classical bourgeois science of political economy, is, in these periods characterized by a radicalization of the class struggle, especially applicable to the bourgeois science of communications: "In so far as Political Economy remains within that horizon, in so far, i.e., as the capitalist régime is looked upon as the absolutely final form of social production, instead of a as a passing historical phase of its evolution, Political Economy can remain a science only so long as the

bourgeois communication apparatuses in times of crisis. A very important study is Hector Schmucler's and Margarita Zires' "El papel político-ideológico de los medios de comunicación: argentina 1975, la crisis del lopezreguismo", *Comunicación y Cultura* (Mexico), 5, 1978.

68. See especially the theories of E. Hagen, D. Lerner, J.T. McClelland, W.E. Moore, L. Pye, E. Rogers, W. Schramm, and I. de Sola Pool. for a critique of these theories, see Peter Golding, "Media Role in National Development: Critique of a Theoretical Orthodoxy", *Journal of Communication* (Philadelphia), XXIV, 3; Luis Ramiro Beltrán, "Research Ideologies in Conflict", *Journal of Communication* (Philadelphia), XXV, 2, Spring 1975.

67. See Armand Mattelart, *Mass Media, idéologies et mouvement révolutionnaire*, op. cit.; "Appareils idéologiques d'Etat et lutte de classe", *Cahiers du Cinema* (Paris), 254-255, 1975, pp. 6-32 (an interview with Armand Mattelart, reprinted in English in *Chilean Cinema*, Michael Chanan, editor, London, British Film Institute, 1976); Michèle Mattelart, "The Feminine Version of the coup d'Etat", in *Sex and Class in Latin America*, June Nash and Helen Icken Safa, editors, New York, Praeger, 1976. See also Michèle Mattelart's article, "Notes sur une bourgeoisie d'octobre: presse libre et radios libres dans la contre-révolution", *Cahiers de Recherches de Sciences des Textes* (Université de Paris VII), 5, Spring-Summer 1978. We might add that there are very few studies on the

class struggle is latent or manifests itself only in isolated and sporadic phenomena." In the vast U.S. panoply of social sciences, on the checkerboard of the specific areas of sociology (sociology of the family, communications, population, and military and political sociology, etc... with their systems of sub-compartments), one square remains strikingly empty, that which should be occupied by a *sociology of crisis*. But it is utopian to think that this square will one day be filled. It must remain deserted because the introduction of the notion of crisis as a subject of examination would have as a first and last consequence the introduction of a crisis in the ensemble of these microscopic sociologies. Since true history can only be written by analyzing the history of crises, the interpretations of social processes and phenomena that may be offered by bourgeois sociology are doomed to remain forever at the half-way stage. (And this notion of crisis is particularly relevant when we attempt to reconstruct the history of the modes of production, circulation and exchange of information.) This undoubtedly explains why the bourgeois sociologists have such a disdain for historical studies. This brings to mind Merton's scorn for what he terms the vagueness of the historical approach. This is also the reason why, when these sociologists venture out into historical fields, we have such abistorical results as McLuhan's melting pot. These sociologists cannot help but expose their encyclopedic knowledge, which, disguised as "information opulence" or a superabundance of empirical data, masks their incomprehension of the interplay of social forces, as well as their structural incapacity to apprehend and retain the decisive moments when the hegemony of a given class is challenged, and when the foundations of the entire social edifice begin to crumble.

The established notion of communication, which appears neutral, "objective," "universal" and without class connotations, in fact excludes other possible modes of production of communication. Thus, communication studies and all forms of expression developed through struggles threatening the "social balance" are excluded from consideration. For example, the network of clandestine information being created and used by numerous peoples resisting oppression has been completely ignored, and yet it constitutes an entirely new kind of communication system, with far-reaching implications. This type of resistance allows us to make the observation that the term "mass communication" has been usurped by the ruling classes; in these situations where a mass struggle demands and produces its own forms of production and exchange

69. For an examination of these two opposing cases, see Marcos Arruda, Amílcar Cabral, Samora Machel, and Paulo Freire, in "Political Education in Africa", an issue of *LARU (Latin American Research Unit) Studies* (Toronto), 3, June 1977; Josiane Jouet "Ivory Coast: The Out-of-School Television Project, A Critical Analysis", *LACDES Quarterly* (Stanford, Ca.), V, 2, March 1976. See also, in a wider field of application, the studies of Martin Carnoy at Stanford University. The conception of communication technology as a mass line dictated from on high is well

of information, one may rightly use the expression "mass communication," which makes the consumer/producer dichotomy disappear. In capitalist society, mass communication means mass consumption. The bourgeoisie can only envisage the technology of mass communication as a tool which allows it to apply a mass line from on high, the only response it can provide to the pressures exerted by the oppressed peoples. A graphic example of this confrontation between two types of mass line and mass communication is provided in Africa, where two countries coexist within the same geographic periphery: the Ivory Coast, where the neocolonial bourgeoisie, with the enormous assistance of capitalist advanced technology for TV education is attempting to resolve the problem of schooling its citizens, and Guinea-Bissau, where every inhabitant is mobilized to be transmitter of knowledge.⁶⁹ A few thousand kilometers from this area, on the same continent, and still within the context of mobilization, one finds Tanzania. This nation, with greater means at its disposal than Guinea-Bissau is adapting video technology so that it might be used in developing knowledge that is compatible with the rise of a popular conscience.

An appraisal of these clandestine networks brings us into an uncharted world. When illustrating the use of the media in a revolutionary war one generally has recourse to the remarkable text of Frantz Fanon, "This is the Voice of Algeria", one of the only existing texts on the handling of a technical apparatus in such situations. And yet, this experience during the war against the French occupation forces was only the visible part of the information-network front. This network included the comings and goings of the liaison officers between the underground and the city, the newspapers of the *wilayas* (military zones), the network of exchange with prisoners in France where the lawyer very often served as a mediator, the letter sent through the post office whose importance was not suspected by the colonial power, the agit-prop of the popular theater groups, and especially the actions which obliged the occupant's newspapers to speak of the struggle of the Algerian people.

These forms of communication may seem to be exceptional. Nevertheless, they represent the fate shared by many peoples, even today. Can we continue to ignore, for example, the fact that in numerous countries, which are submitted to the rule of military dictatorships, psychological warfare has become a daily way of life, a new normality? Can we continue to avoid the realization that these realities demand, in order to confront the enemy, that we

expressed by the apologists for the Brazilian dictatorship: "Tele-education by satellite, even with all of its defects, seems to be one of the only possible means of solving the problems of education in the country. One of the other options—amongst others—which we are not free to choose, would be political mobilization of the population, thus transforming education into a veritable national crusade." (L.P. Costa and E. Siqueira, "Eis o satélite brasileiro de comunicacoes", *Estado do Sao Paulo* (Sao Paulo), 18 April 1976.

revise from top to bottom, the *civilian* concepts which we are accustomed to using in examining the ruling-class communication system and that of the oppressed classes? There is a flagrant contradiction between the fact that half of Latin America lives under the exacting conditions imposed by military regimes, veritable occupation forces in their own countries, and the fact that many researchers, in analyzing these situations, continue to be guided by a notion of communication bequeathed by the liberal doctrine of information. Isn't there a risk that science, continuing to live from its legitimacy as a discipline formalized once and for all, will become a superstructure completely cut off from the reality of class struggle?

It is time to disinter this other branch of communication studies which is normally not offered in communications departments, but which is available in courses given to soldiers and officers in all of the armies, navies and air forces of the world. Examples of this little-known area of communication are found in the instruction offered at Fort Bragg, by the U.S. School of Psychological Warfare, or by the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center. At the latter school, in 1962, the new subject of counter-insurgency was first inaugurated, for which the Pentagon had expressly recommended and authorized the use of "material for anti-communist indoctrination," by pointing out that the "technico-military training would lose a great deal of its impact if it were offered in an ideological vacuum." Many of the founders of the functionalist sociology of communications, who did not hesitate to lend a helping hand in the ideological justification and operational research of the South-East Asian wars, also have made a name for themselves in elaborating the theory of psychological and counter-insurrectional warfare. The most well-known of this group, Ithiel de Sola Pool, today has become the most ardent defender of the "free flow of information" doctrine.⁷⁰ It is also time to disinter the lessons provided by all those who struggled against these forms of aggression, and in doing so, accumulated and combined practice and knowledge. One might multiply *ad infinitum* the examples where new forms of communication have emerged that are different from those normally listed in the official histories or manuals on mass communication. The latter are, in point of fact, veritable legends of power. These new attempts range from the workers' or grass-roots newspapers, wall newspapers, wall paintings to the apparently more modern experiences known as the "pirate" radios. They also include the more exceptional experiences where the totality of the media system may be changed because a revolutionary process has begun.

The second volume of this anthology will deal

70. In the beginning of the seventies, this MIT researcher, author of numerous works on "content analysis" and media effects, especially in underdeveloped countries, directed three large counter-insurrectional research projects for the Departments of State and Defense (such as Project AGILE). For an analysis of his conception of the "free flow of information", see Ithiel de Sola Pool, "International Aspects of Computer Communications",

more thoroughly with this rarely-analyzed field of communication. For now, we should retain one essential point: we cannot speak of communication as a fixed concept to which one can apply positive or negative signs. In other words, it is impossible to speak of communication from a revolutionary perspective without re-defining the very concept of communication imposed by bourgeois sociology. Once again, we return to the opposition between mass culture and popular culture, in order to stress the fact, as was well expressed by Michèle Mattelart, that

popular culture cannot be envisaged as a formal substitute for mass culture, but as a qualitatively different practice, the end of pre-history, as Marx would say, carried out by other social actors. Between mass culture and popular culture is the distance that separates a system whose legitimacy is founded upon the subjugation of consciences and a system in which the "masses" cease to be the submissive spectators of a representation contrary to their interests and become the active subject of a cultural experience linked to their own project for liberation.⁷¹

This perspective allows us to appreciate the necessity of abolishing the concept according to which it is possible to place any content in any container, or to place any kind of world view in any kind of envelop. The form/content division which this concept nourishes is the basis for numerous misunderstandings, both on the right and the left. For example, this disassociation underlies numerous "content analyses" produced by functionalist sociology. Many of these content analyses have studied the social setting for the intrigues of television and radio serials or other cultural production, especially their themes, and the professional and personal status of their characters. However, the narrative forms, such as the serial, through which these "contents" are expressed, are simply left in the dark. Isn't the narrative form *in itself* ideological? Doesn't it reflect a vision of the world through the partitioning it imposes on reality? We are led to believe that these forms and genres have become intangible, accepted once and for all as sacred, *neutral*, and innocent. We can understand this attitude on the part of a "science" that accepts as the terms and limits of its analysis, the repressive frontiers of existing society. Indeed, how can we ask the science that is supposed to reproduce the legitimacy of the system to challenge the structures represented by the genres, and to interpret them as a manifestation of a social division based on classes, or a relation of power? However, the perpetuation of this form/content division is less understandable in certain sectors of the left. This separation reflects the same dilemmas as are present in the endless discussions on the opposition between infrastructure and superstructure. The divorce

Telecommunications Policy, December 1976. On the connections between social sciences and counter-insurrection, see in this anthology, Carol Brightman and Michael Klare, "Social Research and Counterinsurgency".

71. Michèle Mattelart, "Création populaire et résistance au système des media", a paper presented at the International Conference on Cultural Imperialism, Algiers, 11-15 October 1977.

between form and content is, moreover, only a variant of this opposition. This perspective favors research which is unable to grasp the mode of production of communication in its totality, as well as research that ignores the contours of this "material culture" of which Brecht spoke. A logical consequence of this divorce is that culture and cultural struggle are placed outside of the class struggle and beyond the political arena.

The problem becomes dramatically evident when it is time to transform the media. Is it possible to place contents and world views favourable to revolutionary projects in narrative forms which were designed to perpetuate an order which is against these projects? In order to have mass media that respond to the needs of popular national liberation, is it sufficient merely to have left journalists and creators work for a newspaper, radio or TV station, and produce left articles or programs? In other words, in order to destroy the class character of the communication apparatus is it enough just to reverse the plus and minus signs? This debate can only be opened if we add one last question, which, in fact, should be the first one asked: Is it possible to change the class character of the bourgeois State by merely changing the relations of force? In answering this question, the importance of dealing with the communication apparatus as an integral part of the State apparatus becomes evident.

Many revolutionary processes have dealt with this issue, but have not always been able to find a satisfactory solution. We will examine these different responses in the second volume of this anthology.

For the moment, these reflections allow us to understand why it is urgent to define the nature of the Bourgeois State's communication apparatus and to fully appreciate how it functions as an instrument of class hegemony, both at the most abstract superstructural level, as well as at the level of the most

72. Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Hearing of 20 November 1969. It was around 1940 that all of the U.S. government organs became aware of the necessity for adopting a strategic perspective in approaching the international ideological and cultural battle. As a matter of fact, after World War I, as part of its isolationist policy, the U.S. government had dismantled the external propaganda organisms that had been mounted to fight against Germany. The adoption of an ideological strategy went along with that of a global defense strategy. The Latin American countries were the first victims of this new policy. Of course, since 1823, the Monroe Doctrine had recognized that in order to guarantee the national security of the United States, foreign powers had to be prevented from stepping foot on the hemisphere. Nevertheless, it was not until the eve of World War II that the U.S. approached its neighbors with the idea of setting up a multi-lateral defense system. Before this date, the U.S. Armed Forces only kept up permanent relations with the Naval Forces in Brazil and Peru. These relations were assured through a naval mission, which, by a special derogation of the U.S. Senate, was maintained not by the U.S., but by the host country! The first U.S. military mission was installed in Columbia in 1938. The Panama Canal Zone and the Caribbean area had the sad privilege, from the beginning of the century, of being integrated into the metropolis's global defense system. What was a natural,

concrete daily behavior. The bourgeoisie has imposed a mode of communication which corresponds to a mode producing daily life. We must take into account the intimate participation of communication with the totality of relations of production and social relations in order to comprehend its function as a reproducer of the daily legitimacy of these bourgeois relations of domination. It can never be overstated that a new means of production for communication can only be built upon a global modification of these class relations, which in turn, will install a new concept of *communication* based on a new concept of *mass*.

CULTURAL IMPERIALISM

It is always with a certain apprehension that the problem of imperialism is approached, and especially what is known as cultural imperialism. This generic concept has too often been used with an ill-defined meaning.

When the imperialists themselves recognize the existence and the importance of this cultural imperialism they free this notion from the narrow limits in which it is usually confined. As might be imagined, such occasions are very rare, since usually imperialists can be counted on to deny the existence of this form of imperialism. When they do recognize the existence of this type of aggression, it is never their own. They can measure its significance as long as it is due to another ruling power than that to which they owe allegiance. Nelson Rockefeller, who was in charge of Inter-American affairs during World War II, made the following declaration in 1969, before the American Senate: "There probably aren't many here who remember that in 1940 the Nazis held the dominant position with the military throughout the other American republics—both in terms of training and equipment—and most important—in ideological influence."⁷² The year 1969 was also when Rockefeller wrote the famous document entitled *The Rocke-*

geographic alliance actually facilitated the success of a series of punitive expeditions.

The co-existence of ideological and military strategies is particularly well illustrated by the geopolitical theory which was behind the concept of "hemispheric defense" and which appeared for the first time in Nicolas John Spykman's work, *America's Strategy in World Politics. The United States and the Balance of Power*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1942. In this analysis, which designates the U.S. position in the world power distribution, Spykman, before proposing measures for reinforcing the ideological war, attempts to characterize the complementary nature of the Latin-American and Anglo-Saxon cultures, reviews the networks of cultural influence maintained by Spain, France and Great Britain, and outlines in great detail the fascist offensive in Latin America. One of the most illuminating testimonies for the history of U.S. cultural imperialism is undoubtedly that where Spykman relates the actions undertaken by his country on the cultural front in order to counter Nazi propaganda and ideology on the sub-continent:

President Roosevelt created an Office for the Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics. The new director assembled around him a staff of vigorous young business executives and energetic "public relations" experts and

feller Report on Life in the Americas, where he exonerated his country's own practices of ideological and cultural penetration. It is highly instructive to place his observation about Nazi penetration alongside the explicit celebration of American cultural influence found in this report. Referring to the barriers protecting the Latin American military against revolutionary threats, the Rockefeller Report stressed the beneficial role played by U.S. assistance programs for the Latin American Armed Forces. Rockefeller speaks of this assistance as "exposure to the fundamental achievements of the U.S. way of life that many of the military forces of the other American countries have received through the military training programs which the U.S. conducts in Panama and the U.S.A." What could be more logical than this double standard? The definition of imperialism, which contributes on a daily basis to the erosion of the cultural identity and vitality of nations by the insidious penetration of a very particular way of viewing life, is precisely believing in the universality of its values and imposing them as if they were self-evident truths, as if they corresponded to the natural and happy evolution of things. In spite of himself, Rockefeller, adds fuel to the fire.

A preliminary danger lies in wait for analyses on imperialism, and more particularly on cultural and ideological imperialism. Without intending to, many studies are devoted to, and actually re-validate the myth of imperialism's omnipotence and omniscience. How many critical studies of imperialism are victims of a counter-fascination with power? The quantity of cultural products bombarded from the metropolis is such that they would seem to submerge any possible resistance. If such a vision, bordering on the apocalyptic, is evident in certain denunciations, and even certain analyses, the reason is that imperialism is often treated as a *deus ex machina*. This is a very useful formula because it may provide a false expla-

began to study new forms of approach that would speak with the appeal of advertising and the conviction of cash. Emphasis was placed on the improvement of transportation and communication, the encouragement of travel, and the development of a commercial intelligence service.

Government and private enterprise have thrown themselves into the new campaign with all the fervor and enthusiasm of a religious crusade. Latin America is the fashion; it is more, it is a mission. The broadcasting companies have accepted the German challenge and are providing the republics to the south with a constant stream of entertainment and news. The great news agencies are making special efforts to give the Latin American press more adequate information about North America. *Time* is publishing a special air-mail edition for distribution below the Rio Grandé, and *Reader's Digest* appears in Spanish translation. The movies have agreed to pension their Latin American villians and to select their gigolos from Lusitania and Ruritania, the only countries that have not registered diplomatic protest about Hollywood's assaults on national character.

Cultural rapprochement is going full blast, at least in North America. The pattern, first devised by the leaders of the Pan-Hispanic movement, has been taken over by us and enlarged into something stupendous. The

nation for the failure of certain strategies designed to confront this imperialism. "The enemy was so strong that he was invincible."

Bombardments are always carried out against a social actor. All of the processes analyzed outside of concrete battle conditions, outside of a class analysis, and outside of the movement of social forces, necessarily create the impression that the victorious progression of the aggressor is inevitable. How can we be on guard against such a misleading orientation?

A first therapeutic measure consists of not confusing the logic of capitalism's survival with the inevitability of its victories. The increasingly perfected forms of social control, and the increasingly totalitarian methods used, are necessary so that the process of accumulation of capital can continue, and under these conditions, it is the aim of so-called cultural imperialism to contribute to the formation of a citizen that conforms to capitalism's requirements. This reinforcement of the instruments of cultural domination, that no one interprets as a healthy sign for capitalism, also expresses an attempt to respond to a crisis situation where the realization of profit is increasingly countered by the rise in social struggles. The unrelenting cycle of the expansion of capital, created by the process of accumulation and the necessity of realizing a profit should not be confused with its self-proclaimed image of a triumphant march.

A second way to avoid a misinterpretation of imperialism's power is by reverting to an apparently elementary perspective, that which situates imperialism and its action within the interplay of the relations of force. Imperialism can only act when it is an integral part of the movement of a country's own national social forces. In other words, external forces can only appear and exercise their deleterious activities in each nation through mediation with internal forces. Alone, these external forces cannot play a decisive

Rotarians, Kiwanis, and Lions are eating their luncheons to the accompaniment of speeches on Brazilian economics. The women's clubs of the country meet to knit for British soldiers and listen to lecturers who make them sigh over the cultural hunger of Peruvian Indians. Night classes all over the country are swarmed by people who want to learn Spanish. Every up and coming university is increasing its courses on Latin America and holds at least one institute a year on South American problems. If the co-operation of our Latin neighbors is dependent on the popular appreciation of the rumba in the United States, the future is indeed bright.

The chapter from which this passage was taken had as a caption, Hitler's famous remark: "The place of an artillery barrage as a preparation for an infantry attack will in the future be taken by revolutionary propaganda. Its task is to break down the enemy psychologically before the armies begin to function at all."

In fact, the U.S. cultural industry was taking a decisive step in the process of internationalization. This was done for commendable reasons, the struggle against Nazi totalitarianism. However, with the rise of the large multinational corporations and the corresponding transformation of the Imperialist State, what at the very beginning seemed to be an initiative for popular liberation, was converted into a movement conspiring against the cultural identity of nations and their process of liberation.

role. To pose the problem of imperialism therefore also means posing the problem of the classes which act as its relays in these different nations. This also means treating the question of the relations between the local ruling classes and the metropolis, and weighing their degree of independence vis à vis the hegemonic power. In an era that abounds with denunciations of the multinationals, it is urgent to analyze the notion of *national culture*, a term used by Lenin, in the text on this subject included in this anthology, to refer to those cultures elaborated and managed by the ruling classes of each nation. All of these different precautions would help us to avoid assimilating very different realities that are faced with American hegemony, such as France and Brazil. They would also put us back in contact with the specific nature of imperialist involvement with local bourgeoisies.

This class approach would also have the merit of reconciling the study of the multinational macro-system that conceals relations between nations, with that of the various national realities. It is in these local realities, in specific class relations, within a given state of productive forces, and with a particular historical heritage, that other ways of struggling against the imperialist power are developed. Too many studies, unintentionally, have a tendency to consider the multinational enterprise as an entelechy, while, in fact, it is a product of history, as is the social formation from which it has emerged and in which it plays an active role. Gramsci, who was not exposed to the ubiquitous nature of these dominant forms of capitalist organization, nevertheless felt it necessary to analyze the combination of national and international forces. In a work that is very helpful for examining political situations, and where the concept of *relations of force* is set forth, one finds the following instructive passage:

It is also necessary to take into account the fact that international relations intertwine with these internal relations of nation-states, creating new, unique and historically concrete combinations. A particular ideology, for instance, born in a highly developed country, is disseminated in less developed countries, impinging on the local interplay of combinations. This relation between international forces and national forces is further complicated by the existence within every State of several structurally diverse territorial sectors, with diverse relations of force at all levels (thus the Vendée was allied with the forces of international reaction, and represented them in the heart of French territorial unity; similarly Lyons in the French Revolution represented a particular knot of relations, etc.)

In order to illustrate the influence of a developed country on a less-developed country during a period which was as yet unfamiliar with the internationalization of the cultural industry, Gramsci continues by using the then-existing circuits of ideological transmission:

Religion, for example, has always been a source of such national and international ideological-political combinations, and so too have the other international organisa-

73. See the text of Gramsci, "Analysis of Situations, Relations of Force", in this volume.

tions—Freemasonry, Rotarianism, the Jews, career diplomacy. These propose political solutions of diverse historical origin, and assist their victory in particular countries—functioning as *international political parties* which operate within each nation with the full concentration of the international forces. A religion, Freemasonry, Rotary, Jews, etc., can be subsumed into the social category of "intellectuals", whose function, on an international scale, is that of mediating the extremes, of "socialising" the technical discoveries which provide the impetus for all activities of leadership, of devising compromises between, and ways out of, extreme solutions. [Our italics—AM]⁷³

This notion of *international political party* should be stressed. It should be further examined in order to specify the outlines of cultural imperialism today and the function it fulfills as *organizer* of mentalities favourable to the present model of international expansion of capital and extraction of surplus-value. This international political party would, in a certain way, be the counterpart of correctly defined proletarian internationalism.

To completely define a perspective situating imperialism and its action within the interplay of the relations of force, it is also necessary to deal with the levels of consciousness which confront this force in a specific reality, and as a consequence, with the popular cultures or national liberation cultures which nourish responses to aggression. These cultures represent another inexorable movement, that of the rising tide of revolution, which Rosa Luxemburg opposed to the necessity—also inexorable—for the accumulation of capital.

The existence of specific kinds of mediation within each society, within each social formation, as well as the character of these different types of mediation, create a wide variety of encounters with imperialism. In the Latin American countries, where the monopolistic bourgeoisies since genesis have been connected to the metropolis by an umbilical cord, the signs of cultural penetration are openly exposed everywhere in society. Manifestations of this relationship between the metropolis and the peripheral countries are not lacking: excessive dependence on the big international news agencies, mainly of U.S. origin (UPI, AP), which become the exclusive channels for receiving world information; excessive dependence on imported television productions which in certain countries such as the Dominican Republic represent more than 60% of programming; and subjection through higher-education and union-training programs, established under the patronage of the multinationals and the U.S. There are many other signs of this penetration, but it reaches its greatest height in the important area of cultural and ideological dependence (Rockefeller will bear witness) as exercised by the Pentagon through its assistance programs for the Latin American Armed forces and police. This is an aspect of dependence which is not often stressed in texts denouncing "cultural imperialism." And yet this variant is extremely important in the peripheral nations where it determines the emergence of a new form of State, military States, and within these States, new apparatuses for cultural domination.

The ideological and practical effect of these permanent relations is pointed out in the diary of General Prats, former Chilean Minister of Defense during the Popular Unity government, published posthumously after his assassination in Argentina, in September 1974. On the 19th of November, 1973, one reads the following entry:

For the average Chilean soldier, it was always clear that the Armed Forces in Chile had two potential enemies: the external and internal. Although in the first case, there was unanimous agreement that the external enemies were Peru, Bolivia and Argentina, in the second case, the concept of "enemy" was much more abstract. Concerning the internal enemy, the criteria formed by those who received instruction at the U.S. Army School of the Americas, and other schools sponsored by the Pentagon, gained an increasingly clear predominance. In 1973, in the ranks of the Chilean army, there were already 3,000 soldiers who had earned diplomas at the Army School of the Americas. Most of them faithful to the stereotypes and reflexes inculcated into them at their courses, believed that they were liberating the nation from the "internal enemy." Their crime can only be explained by their naivete, their ignorance and their political myopia.⁷⁴

It is interesting to compare this reflection with what another general of the same nationality stated in 1934. In recounting his memoirs as a soldier formed by the Prussian military mission in the years beginning in 1890, he noted what he himself referred to as the "process of Germanization" of the Chilean army. This reminiscence is all the more significant since it draws attention to the sedimentation of the various layers making up the ideology of dependence in a specific area of reality.

Back then, the regulations were not as complete as those of today's army. We had little handbooks instead of real regulations. The troop commander's manual, translated from German, the tactics of Letow Vorbeck, and the tactics course of Meckel, also translated from German, were undoubtedly the most important texts at the disposition of an officer wishing to perfect his tactical knowledge...Although professional literature was rare, the working spirit reigning in the army, supported by healthy emulation, was admirable. In the interior of each unit, the officers worked with great zeal, as they hoped to wangle a trip to Europe as a recompense for their efforts. This was the highest aspiration of all of the young officers. In our desire to imitate the German army, we decided one fine day to adopt its uniform. The Military Academy set the example. In 1899, if my memory is correct, it appeared for the first time in its new and brilliant uniform: the Prussian helmet, the blue tunic and the black pants. Several years later, towards 1904, this uniform was adopted by the entire army. Thus we were transformed into Prussian soldiers.

Nevertheless, there were already in the ranks of the Chilean army, officers who challenged this exportation of a mode of organization of power. This particular general, undoubtedly a young officer at the time, was one of the rebels. "In our desire to imitate," he criticized in an article published in the provincial

74. General Carlos Prats, *Une vida por la legalidad*, Mexico, Fondo de cultura económica, 1977.

75. General Carlos Saez M., *Recuerdos de un soldado, El ejército y la política*, Santiago de Chile, Ercilla, 1934.

76. *Industrie et société* (Paris), 14, 1975.

press, "we naturally gave credit to the regulations, methods of instruction, and military customs of the Germanic army. However, we wanted to go even further, by converting our soldiers, who had nothing German about them, into a new-style Prussian army."⁷⁵ Besides the instructors, uniforms and manuals, the Prussian army transmitted its conception of the General Staff, its notion of vertical relations between troops and officers, and its system for organizing military regions. Meanwhile, Krupp sold Prussian ammunition and canons to the Chilean Armed Forces.

Dominant nations have always used military assistance programs as the avant-garde of their imperialist cultural approach. As of 1956, all of the instruction given at the schools in the Panama Canal zone eliminated English in favor of the Iberian languages. Particular care was given to pedagogic manuals and materials. Each year, from 25,000 to 30,000 pages of instruction material are translated in these schools from American to Spanish. The U.S. Army General Staff, with headquarters at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and one of the biggest training centers for officers from Latin America, at the end of World War II brought out a multinational edition of its famous journal, *The Military Review*, long before American civilian magazines and approximately at the same time as that most multinational of magazines, *The Readers' Digest*. In 1970, *The Military Review* celebrated the 25th anniversary of its Brazilian and Hispanic-American editions in Latin America. The French, German and Italian military have not benefited from such consideration, and can only keep abreast of the latest advances in U.S. military thinking by decoding the American language.

This shows us the differential rate and the differential means used by U.S. imperialism in its penetration of the European countries, where it operates through more complex alliance systems, such as NATO and its branches. However, it should be kept in mind that most of the Western armies carry out maneuvers in U.S. tanks, and operate missiles and fly fighter-bombers made by General Dynamics. In 1975, 60.7% of the military aeronautic equipment used in the Federal Republic of Germany was produced by the U.S. In Belgium and Denmark this figure reaches 65%, and in the Netherlands goes as high as 75%. France and the United Kingdom were the least effected: 7% in France, and 13% in the United Kingdom.⁷⁶

Evidence of U.S. imperialist penetration that can be apprehended by the public, by so-called public opinion, is thus less striking and less visible in Europe than in Third World countries. French newspapers, for example, are less dependent on U.S. news agencies, as far as information is concerned. However, it should be noted that, as for wire-photos, all of the industrialized capitalist countries rely almost as exclusively as the Latin American countries on the monopoly exercised in this area of journalism by UPI and AP. Thus, when reporting on the riots in a country such as Tunisia, a former French colony, the progressive Parisian newspapers

reproduced the same AP photo of a burned truck that was published in *The International Herald Tribune*. The proportion of U.S. programs shown on the French television stations does not go beyond 18%, which seems negligible when compared with South Korea, where the figure reaches 90%. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the percentage of American television series shown in France has definitely increased in recent years. On the first channel, U.S. serials accounted for 10.4% of the programming in 1974, and in 1976, this figure jumped to 17.4%. This increase was a result of the denationalization and "modernization" of the former O.R.T.F. (Office de la Radiodiffusion et Télévision Française).⁷⁷ However, there are no European countries where the U.S. foundations have penetrated in so scandalous a fashion as was the case in Chile, for example, where in 1965, under the cover of sociological research like Plan Camelot, a vast espionage operation was launched. The National Academy of Sciences of the United States, the USAID, and the most varied scientific associations (see the text "Science as Cultural Imperialism") have never succeeded in establishing in Europe the same kind of inter-university cooperation which was imposed upon Latin America.

The fact that the signs of cultural colonization are less visible (although taking a walk in Belgium is almost the same as walking through an American suburb, and in all of Europe, with the exception of France, the five biggest advertising agencies are usually branches of the five biggest U.S. agencies) means that many sectors of the public even go as far as snickering when imperialism is spoken of, especially cultural imperialism. The individual speaking in this vein is accused of "third-world-izing" the old world, which they claim is still very resistant. Beside the fact that it is difficult for a nation to forget its hegemonic imperialist role in the past, the skepticism in those who snicker may be explained not only by the fact that they themselves have not personally experienced imperialism's domination, but also by recalling that "America" still means for many Europeans, the America of the Liberation, the America of the Marshall Plan. In addition, the social-democratic ideology with its alliances does not exactly favor a critical look at the U.S. metropolis. To a certain degree, it is thus understandable that

77. Commission des Affaires Culturelles, Familiales et Sociales, Assemblée Nationale, "Radiodiffusion et télévision", Report No. 2350, 12 October 1976.

78. "Europe: More and More Motels in a Confused Market", *Business Week*, 29 May 1974, p. 36. The same observation may be made for fast-food restaurant chains. As a *Time* correspondence noted (17 September 1973): "McDonald's has had some stumbles. It has expanded overseas with all the zeal of missionaries bringing hamburgers to the heathen. 'We are educating people to a whole new way of life—eating with your fingers instead of forks,' says Roy Kreiner, who directs McDonald's advertising in West Germany. Still, McDonald's European branches lost \$1,000,000 last year, partly because too many were located in suburbs, which are not flourishing overseas quite as much as in the U.S. The company is now shifting abroad to downtown locations, where it is drawing big

some Europeans would be skeptical. The notion of a monolithic, triumphant imperialism, wiping out all diversity and homogenizing all cultures, can provoke a legitimate refusal to recognize the very existence of imperialism. The idea that imperialism invades different sectors of a society in a uniform way must be destroyed. What must be substituted is the demand for an analysis that seeks out the particular milieux that favorize this penetration. From this point of view, we may even speak of "clandestine fronts." Indeed, some terrains are more friable than others. There are also those that offer either a passive resistance, resistance to a "modernization" model, or an active resistance, anti-imperialist mobilization. How can the main features of these more friable terrains be identified? In returning to an elementary analysis of the ruling class, one perceives that the most colonized territory is not that where the mediation of intellectuals or liberal, critical and progressive creators is still exercised, nor where a union struggles to defend the workers' interests (although admittedly at times with a corporatist outlook).

In contrast, the favorable territories where penetration may be flagrant but without causing a public scandal, are those which gravitate around the projects of the monopolistic bourgeoisie. Here, the evidence is much more bountiful. An example can resume and graphically illustrate the situation. Around 1968 there was a boom in the building of American hotel and restaurant chains almost everywhere in the world. Approximately 50 Holiday Inn Hotels existed in 1958, 1000 in 1968, and 1700 in 1977. This rising curve was attenuated by the economic crisis. Holiday Inn had originally planned to control 4000 hotels in 1977. However, other factors also played a role in this slow-down. The chairman of the Howard Johnson chain, who, in 1972 was forced to sell his lone European unit, explained the reasons behind this action to a *Business Week* correspondent: "We are too americanized to make it in Europe. There's a different attitude towards eating and travel." (In the *Physiology of Taste*, Brillat-Savarin wrote, in 1826: "The destiny of nations depends on the manner in which they nourish themselves"). The chairman added: "Our company is now drawing up plans for a new chain of more European-style motels."⁷⁸ Having decided that in the future his company should try to determine the weak areas of

crowds of both foreign nationals and tourists eager for a taste of home. One American girl, stopping at the Paris McDonald's on the Champs-Elysees, explains: 'Over here you're supposed to try new things. So I tried the Big Mac.' " The same note was struck in a report published in *Business Week* (14 July 1975): "Foreign ventures, which seemed to offer unlimited expansion possibilities for U.S. chains, have often back-fired. With inflation and other problems lowering profits of Kentucky Fried Chicken Store's foreign stores, the company will open only 50 this year vs. 100 in 1974. McDonald's recently closed three stores in Holland, but sees growth in Canada, Australia, Germany, and Japan." Such commentary provides an element which, once again, should help us to establish a specific typology of cultural penetration in different nations. Such a typology—even though formulated on the basis of a rather unusual perspective—would help us to understand why and how

the market, he observed that the world of business travel offers possibilities for massive penetration. "The distinction between American and European styles is not so marked in business travel. The motels that do best, in fact, are those orientated toward the new-style Common Market businessman. Such customers make frequent cross-border business trips and hold U.S.-type conventions that the traditional European hotels are often not equipped to handle." The chairman's advice, therefore, was to construct hotels around airports and business centers, and not to be so concerned with building hotels everywhere that cater to all types of clientele. This gives an excellent idea of what the privileged enclaves of penetration are.

According to our view, these enclaves are all expressions of this business and management culture, the most obvious archetype of which is found in the business magazine, the organ expressing the managers' ideology. Recently, the French founder of one of these magazines, all of which resemble Number 1, *Business Week*, admitted the following: "The reason why we want to bring out a '*Business Week à la française*' is because we see no reason why we shouldn't make use of a good model that already exists."⁷⁹ In the area of business magazines, there is no lack of similar examples. They reflect the original model much more faithfully than the news magazines which, although patterned after U.S. formats, still conserve a certain national idiosyncrasy.⁸⁰

Another manifestation of cultural dependence is found in the area of scientific research, as particularly expressed in scientific publishing. In the French scientific milieu, the alarm was recently sounded in a report on the present situation in scientific publishing:

French scientific publishing is being voluntarily sacrificed, as is scientific research. A high official stated that it would be sufficient to subscribe to American scientific journals and magazines in order to replace costly scientific research....Nevertheless, the French journals

certain nations are transformed into the preferential allies of imperialism. A recent victory bulletin from the U.S. fast-food invaders in Japan should remove any doubt left about the need for this kind of research: "The Americanization of the Japanese, in full swing since the occupation, has reached a new peak. Fast foods are becoming a way of life, especially in Tokyo, where more than 1,100 pizza parlours, hamburger stands, fish-and-chip shops, coffee shops, donut shops, and the like took in over \$515 million last year; with U.S.-based ventures accounting for 53% of that....Leading the invasion is McDonald's Corp., whose 50/50 joint ventures with importer Fujita & Co. has 127 outlets, a 26% share of the hamburger market, and projected sales this year of \$145 million—a 50% leap over last year." (*Business Week*, 17 April 1978).

79. *Stratégies* (Paris), 15, 16-29 June 1975.

80. However, we should not be fooled here either. Numerous sectors of cultural life which are not necessarily part of the business culture have been invaded by the U.S. production methods. Here, also, there are outposts of cultural penetration. This is the case in France for the publisher Robert Laffont which for many years has been partially owned by Time-Life and also for smaller publishing houses which have made themselves a place in the sun by introducing U.S. best-sellers. Moreover, one of

and magazines, today relegated to the minor ranks, were in the avant-garde of scientific combat for more than a half a century. A large number of present works rely upon the discoveries published in these reviews....The practice of scientific language linked to research work contains a dynamic that results in the birth of new words and concepts that are sometimes difficult to translate and transpose into another language. Thus, the political and economic imperialism of the USA will soon be accompanied by an intellectual imperialism that will increasingly grow stronger"⁸¹

The fact that research has been handed over to the large national and multinational companies is of particular relevance. In June 1977, the famous U.S. mass-circulation scientific magazine, *Scientific American*, announced that a French edition would be launched in November. The name of this French version completely eliminates the place of origin: *Pour la Science* (For Science).

However, over and above these palpable signs of penetration, materialized in magazines or other audiovisual products, there is the invasion of the model of U.S. technology. Just because ITT resells its branches in France out of fear of the rise of a popular government, does not mean that it loses remote control over the model of social relations to which its technology corresponds. Returning to the field which is of most specific interest here, culture and information, we can give as an example of this dependence on U.S. technology, that of computers and data processing as applied specifically to economics. American supremacy over data banks and networks, through companies specializing in the elaboration and analysis of economic models, such as the Data Resource Group, Chase Manhattan Econometrics, and General Electric Mapcast, has already caused serious concern:

Any attempt at strategic, economic or industrial investigation necessarily involves the use of instruments and data controlled by organisms of the United States. Another result of the hegemonic position these organisms occupy on the world market is that the means at their disposal are constantly reinforced, through the in-

these publishers openly admitted to the seduction exercised by the U.S. style: "The concrete realism I found in America was important to me. The French often seem ashamed to be in business. We have ideas, we're literary. Over there you say 'book business'. It's a fundamental difference. I want to be an American publisher." (quoted by Herbert R. Lottman, "Small Houses, Big Books", *Publishers' Weekly* (New York), 7 June and 20 September 1976). In addition, the process of the internationalization of cultural production, particularly that of publishing, is a factor of primary importance in stimulating the adoption of U.S. style and indeed U.S. language. The director of the Hachette monopoly, when accused of "denationalizing" the language of his editions (40% of Hachette publications are in a language other than French), made the following revelation: "we're not traitors to the French language because of that. If we want to support French publications, we'll do an even better job of it if we have a strong distribution network, and the way to develop and maintain that is to include English—and Spanish—language materials as well." (quoted by Herbert R. Lottman, "Hachette Defines its Worldwide Intentions", *Publishers' Weekly* (New York), 30 September 1974).

81. Pierre Sartor, "L'Édition scientifique", *La vie de la recherche scientifique* (Paris), December 1976.

creasingly effective unequal exchange of national information and contributions....Can't the U.S. companies' control of instruments and data lead to the imposition of hypotheses, lines of reasoning, results, and therefore, indirectly, certain choices? Aren't the European economies, the French economy, capable of possessing decision-making instruments, instruments that define their future, and which are designed and exploited under their own responsibility?⁸²

Little by little, the totality of computer networks and data banks applied to economics, in the broad sense of the term, is becoming dependent on U.S. manufacturers of advanced technology, who by far have the leading role in the field of electronic semi-conductors, telecommunications and aerospace. A French industrial enterprise often has easier access to economic data concerning France by subscribing to specialized networks in the U.S. (who dominate 60 to 70% of the data processing market worldwide and exercise a quasi-monopoly over scientific and technical information) than by requesting information from national institutions in France.

A practical lesson for the anti-imperialist struggle should be gained from this reality in the industrialized countries. This is a lesson which may be added to that which emerged from the struggle of the peripheral nations. Attention should be given not so much to the visible signs, to the more or less dense circulation of foreign products, but rather to the models which establish the reference for what is "modern", whose penetration is much more subtle and is exercised through agents that are not necessarily conscious accomplices. We are dealing with the highest stage of imperialism, which installs systems and modes of organization of power. In this phase, depending on the conditions of the national and international relations of force, imperialism is quite capable of adapting to local conditions and "nationalizing" its vehicles of invasion.⁸³

We must also combat the idea of the uniform planetarization of cultures, a concept which avoids posing the problem of specific national realities, which screen and survive the invasion. We cannot envision imperialism as being akin to Attila's fire and blood invasions.

Insisting upon the reality of U.S. imperialism should not obscure the existence of secondary imperialist forces, which, in their own time, were hegemonic. France's role in Africa is one example amongst others. Its penetration is far from being restricted to the exportation of educational materials or television equipment. In certain countries, French imperialism

82. Jean-Michel Quatrepoint, "La domination américaine sur l'informatique économique est de plus en plus nette", *Le Monde* (Paris), 11 June 1977.

83. A model for the "nationalization" of U.S. productions is provided by the educational television series, which Samuel Perez Barreto analyzes for the Latin American reality in this volume. In addition, the reader should also consult the Children's Television Workshop and Harvard University (Edward L. Palmer, Milton Chen, Gerald S. Lesser), *Réponse au requête pour présenter Sesame Street à l'étranger: Suggestions pour l'adaptation internationale*, New York, CTW, 1976 (published in French). On the process of "nationalization" of comics, see David Kunzle's introduction to Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart, *How to Read*

still retains an allure of open military intervention, to say nothing of the power of its industrial multinationals. Chad is an example of this reality. In other countries, such as the Ivory Coast, more than 40% of the industrial capital is held by French interests. Besides the preferential territories that were reserved for its use in the distribution of world power, French imperialism serves as a relay for the mass-culture products from the United States. What triumphs in New York also rules in Paris, as in Rio and Tokyo. The dictatorship of audience ratings decides the fate of TV programs on U.S. screens (three out of ten new series launched on the New York stations in September 1975 were banished before the following spring). When television stations in foreign countries buy these series, they follow this market dynamic reflected in the claquers in the metropolis. The choices made by the French stations and the adaptation in Paris by the dubbing companies contracted by the branches of the U.S. firms, also constitute, in turn, relays of domination directed towards so-called Francophone countries. The same observation may also be made concerning British imperialism on the Asian continent and in certain African countries, or, even in Ireland. Mention should also be made of Japan and especially Germany, whose emergence as the "left wing" of U.S. imperialism is very disturbing, as recently seen in the counter-revolution in Portugal.

Without resorting to the rather complicated term "secondary imperialism" in the analysis of massive exportation of cultural products, it is nevertheless necessary to speak of countries such as Mexico, India, Egypt or Italy, which, all to varying degrees, are centers of production for the matrixes of so-called popular soap operas. We should not mistakenly think that U.S. imperialism has always taken the initiative and always created everything in every domain, and forget that for entire continents, local productions participate wholeheartedly in the phenomenon of acculturation. It would be useful to trace the dissemination of Mexican film production, which, supported by Hollywood, beginning in the forties was massively diffused throughout the Latin American continent, stifling national expressions of cinematographic creativity. The history of the Argentinean cinema was thus subjected simultaneously to both the assault of the star system as well as this creole Mexican version of Hollywood.⁸⁴ Although today the *telenovelas* produced by numerous Latin American countries are in a strong competitive

Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic, New York, International General, 1975; and Michèle Mattelart's preface to the French edition of the same work (*Donald l'imposteur, ou l'imperialisme raconté aux enfants*, Paris, Alain Moreau, 1976).

84. See José Agustín Mahieu, *Breve historia del cine argentino*, Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1966. On the formation of the Egyptian cinema, see Yves Thoraval's thesis, *Regards sur le cinéma égyptien*, Beyrouth, Lebanon, Publications of the University Cultural Center/Dar El-Machreq Editeurs, 1977. On the Mexican cinema, see Emilio Garcia Riera's monumental work, *Historia documental del cine mexicano*, 8 volumes, Mexico, Era, 1965—.

position via à vis U.S. series on television, this situation should only be viewed as a manifestation of the existence of growing importance of sub-imperialism.

MONOPOLY CULTURE

We have recognized the importance of studying the class alliances that imperialism nourishes on the territories which it invades. However, it is also necessary to carefully analyze its take-off and to appreciate how the class composition and historical evolution of the metropolises confer upon the imperialist process through the years another content, if not another nature. Here we arrive at the two-faced character of imperialism: it has a certain age, and yet at the same time is also ageless. It is ageless because the barbarian-like practices which resulted in the extermination of native populations three centuries ago, are approximately the same as those which in certain areas of the world today lead to the genocide of the working and peasant classes. A Latin-American historian who lived through the *coup d'État* in Chile made the following remark:

Pinochet's military [that was nourished on the U.S. assistance celebrated by Rockefeller and denounced by Prats] treated the Chilean workers like the *conquistador* Pedro de Valdivia had treated the Mapuche Indians. The fact that, in the name of "God's justice" they also burned foreigners' bodies (in September, xenophobia was elevated to a ritual) demonstrates to what degree they considered Chilean workers, the plebs, as also being foreigners. In relation to the paradoxical, oligarchic history of Chile, the Marxist workers behind the Popular Unity government, actually were, in a certain way, foreigners.⁸⁵

Despite the recurrence of its practices, cultural imperialism has, nevertheless, undergone profound changes. The most important qualitative leap has taken place in the last fifteen years. And this is precisely one of the reasons why we are somewhat reluctant to use the rather monolithic notion of "cultural imperialism."

First of all, we must be very clear about the meaning and limits of the term "cultural." During the colonization period, despite the presence of the educator, the soldier and the settler, the three "representatives of patriotic duty," who inevitably followed the merchant and the missionary, the indigenous subjects of these former empires still led daily lives which could cultivate a certain patrimony. In spite of the administrative, linguistic and educational policies of assimilation, certain popular traditions

85. René Zavaleta Mercado, *El poder dual*, Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1973.

86. "Acculturation et acculturation", in *Ecrits corsaires*, op. cit., pp. 48-52.

87. In explaining this aggression, it is useful to refer to the concept of *ethnocide* developed by certain anthropologists. "If the term genocide refers to the idea of 'race' and to the desire to exterminate a racial minority, the term *ethnocide* may be applied not to the physical destruction of individuals, but to the destruction of their culture. In short, genocide assassinates the bodies of different peoples, while *ethnocide* kills their spirits" (Pierre Clastres, "De l'ethnocide", *Encyclopedia Universalis*; also published in *L'Homme* (Paris), XIV, 34, July-December 1974).

still prevailed. The testimony of Amilcar Cabral reminds us of the limitations of these colonial policies and rebels against the hasty generalizations which ignore or neglect an essential aspect of the problem: the indestructible nature of the popular masses' cultural resistance to foreign rule.

Using the Italian situation to reflect upon the new methods of colonization, Pasolini pointed out the profound differences that separate two stages of cultural aggression. "No one doubts", he wrote in December 1973, in one of his many articles in the Roman newspapers,

that television is authoritarian and repressive, as no other means of information in the world has ever been. The fascist newspaper and the Mussolini slogans on the farms are laughable in comparison and are (tragically) just as ridiculous as the plow when placed alongside the tractor. Fascism, I repeat, even in its very essence, was not capable of scratching the soul of the Italian people, while the new fascism, thanks to the new means of communication and information (especially the television) has not only scratched it, but torn it, raped it and befouled it forever.⁸⁶

It is possible to disagree with Pasolini when he uses the term "fascism" to characterize the present situation. However, we must recognize, under the apocalyptic glow of his imagery, the lucidity he uses in stressing the qualitative leap separating two forms of ideological and cultural control, two phases of capitalism. The first phase is frantic and "monumental", and especially requires concrete verbal homages, and is thus more superficial and less interiorized than the second, which, on the contrary, demands and provokes unconditional commitment interiorized in a model of daily life. Traditional fascism attempted to capitalize on the historic patrimony by a grossly distorted idealization of the past. In attempting to undermine popular memory, to make differences and specificities disappear, and to banish history by use of a much more treacherous and diffuse procedure, isn't today's capitalism during this period of the internationalization of capital, endowed with a power that has a much more corrosive effect on minds?⁸⁷

New increasingly sophisticated technology permits a greater degree of centralization. However, behind this technological progression are outlined the changes which have taken place in the entire imperialist State apparatus. It is increasingly difficult to define the true boundaries of culture. We should not make television the exclusive agent of the new organization of the reality of control, as Pasolini seems to do in his writings. This would be tantamount to McLuhanism without McLuhan. Although television is the most easily identifiable media within the context of a traditional concept of culture, it is only one of the agents of centralization.

Bourgeois culture, at the present time, is determined by a new mode of presence and interaction between the different areas and agents of imperialism. What are the concrete repercussions of the present stage of U.S. hegemonic capitalism on the definition of culture and its mode of production? Posing this question is another way of analyzing the effects of the process of centralization and monopoli-

zation in the production and diffusion of cultural commodities.

The reason why we are presently witnessing a tightening of all the apparatuses which diffuse imperialist culture and ideology, is primarily because its sectors and agents, isolated from each other, no longer fulfill the same level of efficiency and profitability as they once did. Certain rapprochements are already known, such as that which permitted the meeting between the industrial sphere and military rationality. The importance of this liaison can never be over-stressed. The principal technological models for transmitting culture and information owe their existence to this alliance between the multinational industrial firms and the military apparatus. The computer, the satellite, and electronics itself are all direct descendants of this permanent association that has materialized in a certain type of State, that which emerged at the end of World War II, the *National Security State*. This was the very same State which, some twenty years later, would be exported towards the realities of the Southern Cone countries in Latin America.

The rapprochement between the private and public sectors is a product of this main alliance, wherein the private sector is associated with the management and planning of State interests. In certain cases, this sector even substitutes for the governmental bureaucracy. This interconnection explains how a multinational telecommunication company such as ITT could become not only an overseas manufacturer of telephones, but also an agent of order, and if need be, an agent of conspiracy. In order to demonstrate this interpenetration of missions and the change which has taken place in the imperialist State's apparatus, nothing could be more significant

88. See "A Course of Instruction in Corporate Protective Services, IBM as Target for Terrorists: IBM Papers", *Berkeley Barb* (Berkeley, Ca.), 22-28 November 1974.

89. The texts included in Section D (parts 1 and 2) of this anthology should be consulted. An essential work for understanding monopoly capitalism remains Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy's *Monopoly Capital*, New York, Monthly Review, 1966.

90. The objection may be made that this alliance between hardware and software has always been characteristic of U.S. monopolies. For example, firms such as Westinghouse, RCA, and General Electric were not satisfied with merely developing TV and radio equipment. For, as soon as this technology was elaborated, they also established and managed radio and TV stations and studios. We may also refer to American Telegraph and Telephone, which in 1920-30, had a decisive role both in controlling patents for sound and light and in the expansion of the film industry. (See in this anthology, N.R. Danielian's text, "American Telephone and Telegraph Co.: Science in Business", as well as that of the Film Council, "A Brief History of the American Film Industry".) This same AT&T had already carried out a similar operation in the telecommunications industry, by merging the manufacturing of telephone equipment and switching stations with the administration of telephone and telegraph services. (In 1977, AT&T still controlled almost 80% of telephone service in the United States).

All of these cases demonstrate the vertical and horizontal integration of the telecommunications industry represent a phase of monopoly capitalism. This phase may be viewed as a reflection of a specific moment of the mode of

than IBM's reply to the threat of urban guerilla activity against its branches. In 1974 it urged its personnel, in a training course, to read the works of the Brazilian revolutionary leader Marighella, just as twelve years previously, Kennedy recommended that the Pentagon officers read the writings of Che Guevara and Mao Tse-tung.⁸⁸

The process of industrial concentration⁸⁹ has emerged as another significant factor. The big hardware manufacturers have taken over the centers where programs, such as educational messages and leisure patterns, are elaborated. They have transformed themselves into new pedagogues, by, on the one hand, selling their services to the educational institutions, and on the other, incorporating in their own technological products the programs and messages of the publishing, cinema and television firms which they have bought. Perhaps it is this alliance between hardware and software⁹⁰ which provides the clearest illustration of the integration of different sectors involved in cultural production. The publishing industry can serve as an example. Not very long ago, this sector was generally considered as a "cottage industry," a sort of artisanal sector. Towards the end of the sixties, the selling and re-selling of publishing houses was accelerated. Most of those sold were older, established publishing houses that were absorbed by large conglomerates. An example is the takeover in 1976 of the publisher Simon & Schuster by Gulf & Western, a multifaceted multinational which also controls Paramount Pictures. The same year, the international branch of the Italian Fiat empire (for cross-overs also operate on the international level)⁹¹ took over Bantam Books, one of the largest publishing houses in the U.S. The insertion of the publishing industry into

production, circulation and exchange of information which corresponded to the different political and economic necessities of capitalist expansion. The present fusion between hardware and software, which signifies the globalization of mass-production standards and their extension to sectors previously unaffected by the "profit maximization" dictate, occurs in a period when the maturing of the capitalist State's ideological apparatuses is reaching its highest stage.

The present moment in the mode of production of communications is characterized by the global process of the "taylorization" of social control. Gramsci, in his study on "Fordism", used the term "taylorism" to designate the rationalization of the State apparatus (see Antonio Gramsci, "Americanism and Fordism", *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1973.) This is commanded by the new cultural, political and economic requirements necessary to continue the accumulation of capital.

91. One of the principal new modes of presence and interaction between imperialism's different domains and agents, is undoubtedly that inspired by the new international division of labour, a result of the structural crisis now being experienced by capitalist economies. First of all, the convergence of the central capitalist countries is given a concrete form through the famous Trilateral Commission, which is designed both to prevent uncontrolled competition, and to present a common response to the demands of the oil-producing countries. The constitution of this commission helps render the international capitalist front more compact. Of course, this front is not free from contradictions. For example, although on the one hand, one

larger systems results in different dynamics on the book market. The search for quick profit gives birth to other models which themselves emerge from the natural alliance within the same conglomerate of television, cinema and book interests. The production of books based on films and series is intensified, but even more important is the fact that the selection standards which rule the audio-visual media impose their hegemony in the publishing world. An example of how these criteria triumph is the development of what U.S. publishers already are calling "phony books." In addition to these new products, the best sellers, which often surpass the million mark, are all attached to cinema and television production. A book is no longer used as the basis for a film, as was the case before. Now the process is reversed and the successful television series and film results in the publication of a book.⁹²

may observe a rapprochement between certain U.S. firms and their Nippon colleagues as far as video-discs or video-cassettes are concerned, on the other hand, various protectionist measures are being taken to counter the over-expansionist ambitions of Japanese electronics. In the present emergency context, the principle of "every man for himself, and the devil take the hindmost" rules the day.

Nevertheless, in the midst of these contradictions, new types of multinational alliances are still being made. An example of this new type of alliance would be the collaboration between MCA and Philips for the perfecting of a new video-disc. The Dutch firm manufactures the video-records and players, while the U.S. firm, proprietor of Universal Pictures, unloads its film and serial inventory into the video-discs.

In addition, the re-deployment of the capitalist economy and the necessity for decentralizing the Empire's police power promotes countries such as Brazil, Iran and Indonesia to the ranks of an international police force, which acts as a watch-tower over neighboring countries. The present era, with its sub-imperialist powers, also has its own forms of cultural penetration. The policy of direct intervention is being replaced by a policy of mediated intervention. It is within this context that the "nationalization" of vehicles of cultural dependence, as mentioned previously, should be understood.

92. For a view from the inside of the system, see "Special Report—America's Press: Too Much Power for Too Few?", *US News & World Report*, 15 August 1977.

93. Up to this point, the analysis of the different supports of this mass culture has been too compartmentalized. In general, not much attention has been paid to studying these elements in relation to each other, except as competitors. For example, one might study the cinema in relation to TV, comics in relation to wirephotos, books in relation to news magazines, tourism in relation to women's or fashion magazines, and many other possible cross-overs.

Present conditions of monopoly capitalism demand that we consider all of these as a system, at the interior or which each media, to differing degrees, obeys the rationality which fixes them as a part of the whole. Each specific media situated on a line of continuity, actually reflects a different state of productive forces, a different state of the movement of capital, and consequently, of the maturation of the monopolization process. Each media reflects a different correlation of social forces, varying contradictions, and different degrees of consciousness, both in the transmitters and the receivers. Monopoly capitalism tends to level out these discrepancies, these imbalances, and attempts to breach the gaps and to reinforce the interaction between all of the system's compartments, to accelerate, as

it is therefore necessary to define this tightening—reinforced by the crisis of the capitalist economy—in general terms. The model for this tightening of control is that of the sector with the greatest degree of technification, that is, the sector whose manufacturing norms have achieved the highest degree of standardization and mass diffusion. This efficient privileged sector is television, where marketing laws were refined from a very early date and which became the "automatic distributor of standards". It is here that commercial interests and the sensationalist allure exercise their dictatorship. The specific production norms of education and cinema (which were different from television) have been made uniform by this industrial rationality. In the final analysis, all transmission of knowledge falls under the rule of the media and mass culture, and becomes part of the spectacle.⁹³ As a recent example of this

it were, the global process of standardization and centralization. Apropos of this discussion, it should be pointed out that when speaking of the problem of power and communication, we have too great a tendency to use generic terms. The *ruling class* is not an entelechy or a metaphysical entity, and the concrete definition of this class and its evolution provides the basis for complex analytical propositions.

A correct and complete analysis, both differentiated and unified, would permit determining exactly when each media becomes of economic and/or political importance for the ruling power, that is, when the media actually begin to function as an integral part of the State apparatus. For example, the fact that between 1961 and 1967 in France, a series of progressive experiences in the field of educational TV were able to develop from within the very interior of governmental structures (and in spite of them), shows to what point established power had at this time neglected viewing the media as an instrument of hegemony. It wasn't until the protest movements of 1968 that the government began to formulate a strategy for television motivated and stimulated by political objectives. The ruling class did not complement this political strategy with an economic strategy until 1974, during the re-organization of the State radio and television, ORTF. The "privatization" of the TV stations reinforced the power of advertising, and gave a *carte blanche* to the most modern sector of the monopolistic bourgeoisie. By encouraging the competitiveness of television news, which could not be conceived of without rivalry amongst the different stations, the U.S. model for news broadcasting was firmly installed. It therefore took about ten years for French TV to begin functioning as a major apparatus of the ruling class hegemony, and to serve as a locomotive, as a point of reference for the other components of the media system.

To better understand the specific character of the television network as it developed in the French social formation, it would be useful to compare its development to that in Great Britain and the German Federal Republic. One aspect of this evolution is that until General DeGaulle took power in 1958, the French government, unlike London and Bonn, relatively held back the extension of the television network. One of the reasons for this attitude, without doubt, is the political and economic priorities marking the 1950s. This period was, effectively, a period of *reconstruction*, whose priorities were to develop the heavy industrial sectors (steel, building construction, and military electronics, etc.) which retarded the development of consumer goods and the establishment of a sector to produce mass electronic goods. The years 1958-59 mark the first turning point in the history of French television. In a context of a

phenomenon, we can cite the launching of the "new philosophers," which demonstrates; in France, the present tendency for marketing standards to colonize the transmission of certain areas of academic knowledge.

The new educational series, such as *Sesame Street* and *The Electric Company* are the paradigms for this transfer of the parameters of mass culture to mass education. The advertising appeal, which is the foundation of the media's law, serves as a vehicle for the educational plans proposed to the infantile public. These series are the archetypes of the new mass pedagogy, which the manufacturers of technology, in conjunction with the educational foundations, have launched in order to bridge the gap between formal education and leisure. They are a new way to increase the media's capacity for diffusion and open new vistas, new markets to audiovisual technology, which is establishing itself in the fields of education and training for civic life.⁹⁴

In light of the reorganization that followed and responded to the crisis in the cinematographic industry from 1969-72, which resulted in the dismemberment of Hollywood in favor of various conglomerates, we may rightfully ask if the margins of manoeuvre during the pre-crisis period no longer exist. The film industry has been virtually taken over by marketing models which exercise their dictatorship both over the choice of themes as well as

policy which included an increase in the production of consumer goods and credit spending, DeGaulle in October 1958 instituted the first statute for the television. (For more information see "La télévision, historien d'Etat", an issue of *Forum-Histoire* (Paris), 9, May 1978.)

The year 1974, along with the re-organization of the State radio and television, also witnessed the eruption of sophisticated selling and advertising techniques in the presidential political campaign, as well as the introduction of voting—simulation models that were launched in the United States in 1960. This shows to what degree, in the French social formation, the mass culture apparatuses and the sectors in which this culture reigns as a behavior standard are lagging behind the U.S., a social formation where these apparatuses have reached their greatest level of maturity.

In the same vein, it is urgent to decompartmentalize research on the other ideological apparatuses. The resistance of the teaching profession in many countries to the introduction of classroom audio-visual methods, should be analyzed and encourage comparison of the different phases through which the apparatuses of communication and education may pass.

Finally, it should be pointed out that in this monopoly process, the ruling classes are also capable of proposing and structuring models for "decentralizing" culture and mass information. Nevertheless, these models are only promoted when this "other" conception of communication does not challenge the ruling model for the vertical organization of the media. Numerous and varying examples of this may be cited. The latest—and probably the most caricatural—is the project developed by Warner Communications Inc. (the large conglomerate which includes film and TV divisions, publishing houses, record firms, perfume manufacturers, video-games, etc.). This project, known as QUBE, is attempting to install a new kind of two-way pay cable-TV service in the pilot region of Columbus, Ohio. Launched in November 1977, it has been advertised as a system which proves the potential virtues of this technology by allowing

the channels of distribution. Certain observations and research have a tendency to confirm our suspicions. The distribution of films after the crisis reveals the basis of new strategies for inundating the market. There is an enormous multiplication of copies distributed for purposes of submerging the terrain and prohibiting any competition. For example, instead of using the twenty or thirty copies normally used to launch a film, Warner Bros., in order to assure an unprecedented premiere of its film *The Towering Inferno*, sent out simultaneously 100 copies to Japan.⁹⁵

However, we must go further in our analysis of the alliances defining a situation of monopoly culture. Research in this area is rare, almost nonexistent, but there are some examples which allow us to suggest a field of study. In 1976, the Wimpy International restaurant chain, a division of the British "Lyons" conglomerate, wholesale distributor of cakes, teas and Indian spices, decided to fight its competitor from the United States, the McDonald's chain, by launching a rather original promotion campaign. The London branch of the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency, acting as its promotion agent, hired for this campaign, which was intended to advertise the chain's 750 restaurants, no less than Mr. Savalas, alias Kojak, the hero of the famous television series. The explanation given to the press was the following: "Mr Savalas is very popular and

the public to participate in the transmission of messages. The evaluation made by the backers of this system shows how this new feedback operation reproduces the rationality of the former dominant system, and constitutes a new market outlet: "More than two-thirds of those QUBE TV homes are pushing the much-promoted "response" button, allowing them to interact with the local, live "Columbus Alive" program. Viewers use the QUBE console buttons to respond to surveys, engage in audience participation games and to request brochures or other information from advertisers." (*Advertising Age*, 20 February 1978, p. 61). In order to place these kinds of operations within a structural framework, see Judy Strasser's text, "Cable TV: Stringing Us Along" in this anthology.

The attempts to decentralize communication can be much more complex and often become the theater of battles where sectors challenging the dominant cultural apparatus, attempt to infiltrate, taking advantage of this opening in the media system. In many countries the refusal of the ruling power to permit a generalized use of cable TV, testifies as to the complexity of the stakes involved in the social application of this technology. The diatribes which the "free," "green" or "pirate" radios have given rise to are also evidence of this same refusal. Attempts at recuperation of these experimental efforts are also taking place simultaneously. (One of the most incisive analyses of the contradiction emerging in the application of "alternative" technology within the capitalist framework is undoubtedly that made by a research group in Montreal, and presented in *Media communautaires et idéologie de participation*, Montreal, Conseil de développement des media communautaires, Bulletin de Liaison, January 1977).

94. See our analyses on the mode of production of *Sesame Street* in *Multinationales et systèmes de communication*, Paris, Anthropos, 1976 (English translation: London, Harvester, forthcoming 1978).

95. See Thomas Guback, "Marketing de choc pour une domination mondiale", *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Paris), March 1977.

research suggested that his big bulk, his penchants for snacks, and his basically unsophisticated image made him a believable Wimpy consumer."⁹⁶ In January 1977, Columbia Films announced its intention of "maximizing world-wide production efforts." Result: the first film to benefit from this decision was *The Deep*, an offshoot of *Jaws*. The recipe for this maximization consisted of searching for "more functional tie-ins between the film's theme and the advertising support."⁹⁷ Instead of relying exclusively on tee-shirts or other traditional means used in launching a film, it was now a matter of establishing a direct line between the film's theme and the merchandise which could be used to advertise it, such as swimming pools, underwater watches and cameras, scuba-diving equipment, and frozen seafood... The thin line separating fiction from reality is quickly disappearing. Marx, around 1850, wrote that the ruling modes of thought would become more and more abstract and that this abstraction was a *sine qua non* condition necessary for the bourgeoisie to make its particular ideas accepted as universal by all of the other classes. Today he would turn over in his grave. In a literal sense we could say that the ruling ideology is becoming more and more concrete. Are we now entering the phase of *capitalist realism*? The characters of fiction are stepping out of the television screen and the comic strips in order to become the material components of daily life in our world. However, the mystification pointed out by Marx continues to be total. Just because these TV and comic strip characters are walking around on the streets with us, does not mean that they are revealing the identity of their producers and their particular mode of production. We should note in passing that the mass cultures reinforce the mass culture, or rather that the media mutually reinforce each other in order to repeat *ad infinitum* the circle of their repetition, etc. The television heroes, with their way of life, eating, drinking, walking and talking, frequent the restaurant chains, which, in turn, act as vehicles of mass culture patterns with a way of life reflected in their menus, their "golden arcs", and the discipline and cleanliness of their employees.

If we can speak of totalitarianism in referring to the action of the ideological apparatuses of mono-

96. "Wimpy Moves to Block McDonald's in London", *Advertising Age*, 12 July 1976.

97. James P. Forkan, "Big Promotion Thrust on *The Deep* Signals New Directions for Columbia", *Advertising Age*, 24 January 1977.

98. See in particular the texts in Section D (part 2). On the concept of "information society", see Edwin B. Parker, "Social Implications of Computer/Telecoms Systems", *Telecommunications Policy*, December 1976. On the stakes involved in the information system, see for example, Becky Barna, "Ford's Privacy Report", *Computer Decisions*, February 1977; Laurie Nadel and Hesh Wiener, "Would You Sell a Computer to Hitler?", *Computer Decisions*, February 1977. One of the most illustrative reports is that made by a special commission in France, composed of trade unionists and communication experts, which examines the social consequences of the application of tele-data processing (*Informatique et libertés*, Paris, La Documentation Française, 1975): Each social formation under capitalism has its own

poly capitalism, it is especially because any problem which affects a particular sector affects the entire system and allows us to appreciate the global nature of the stakes involved. The crisis of the CIA, for example, cannot be interpreted simply as the crisis of an espionage agency but as that of an entire information system. The solutions found for the problems plaguing this organism reinforce the truth of this observation. The recent reorganization of the CIA, confided to a super-chief, an admiral, which has resulted in greater centralization and an increased capacity to plan the action of the military and civilian apparatuses has brought about a stricter control of intelligence activities. Needless to say, this reorientation increases the military rationality of the capitalist State. In addition, this reorganization of the intelligence agencies also fits in with the restructuring of the U.S. empire's entire information apparatus, from the multinationals' research centers and consulting firms to the official organisms that collect and prospect energy data. The reform of the CIA has also recently been reflected in certain Latin American countries in the Southern Zone. Chile, under the pressure of Carter and his "human rights" policies, in August 1977, announced the suppression of the DINA, the political police guilty of so many horrendous crimes committed against the Chilean people. The powers held by this body were transferred to the intelligence agencies of the three branches of the Armed Forces. This new step towards the militarization of the State apparatus dissimulates the bloody, arbitrary character of General Pinochet's praetorians, and clears the way for a more technical, asepticized repression.

When IBM advertisements state that our epoch is increasingly that of the age of information following the stone age, the iron age, and the industrial age, they are both fooling themselves and not fooling themselves (although they are always trying to fool us).⁹⁸ They are fooling us when they try to hide the fact that this quantitative and qualitative mutation of the mode of production, circulation and exchange of information is a necessity of State monopoly capitalism whose existence and dynamics they obscure. They are also fooling us when they present information as a resource placed at the service of everyone and all peoples, without taking into

way to express the quantitative and qualitative changes its mode of communication is undergoing. The IBM advertisement reproduced here perfectly expresses the U.S. version of the myth of the "information society." The following advertisement expresses the French version: "The communication society has begun. The production society was yesterday. The consumer society is today, but, for how much longer? Tomorrow we will see the summit of the communication society, a society where the relations between men, thanks to the accumulation of technology and the deepening of knowledge, will become more and more complex. And thus, more and more important. It will be necessary to organize these relations. Advertising communication has shown its worth. Today used to develop business relations, tomorrow it will be called upon to develop social, cultural and human relations." (Eleuthera, A French advertising agency, in *Le Monde* (Paris), 24 May 1978).

IBM Reports

Information: there's growing agreement that it's the name of the age we live in.

Human history has long been described in terms of Ages whose names reflect the stages of development through which mankind has passed: the Stone Age, the Bronze Age, the Iron Age and so on—down to the Industrial Age, which established the foundations of our modern society.

Today, there is growing agreement that we have entered a new era, a post-industrial stage of development in which the ability to put information to use has become critical, not only to the essential production of goods, but to efforts to provide a better life for the individual, as well.

This new era is being referred to with increasing frequency as the Information Age.

Information in the Information Age

Changes in our perception of information itself—its nature as well as its scope—have accompanied this profound shift of emphasis in our society.

Much has been written about the so-called "information explosion." It has been pointed out, for example, that the number of technical journals published throughout the world today exceeds 100,000, and that the total body of technical information is now doubling every ten years.

At the same time as the volume of information has been increasing dramatically, our understanding of the meaning of the term information itself has also broadened—to encompass a wide variety of timely data relating to "how things really are" across the whole spectrum of human activity.

A heartbeat, for example, can be extremely meaningful information when recorded and analyzed on sophisticated electrocardiogram equipment. So can electrical impulses reflecting the load level in a power network, or numeric digits representing the availability of a seat for you on an airplane—when processed by a modern computer.

These and a wide range of similar types of data are clearly recognized today as information, the kind of information on which we increasingly de-

pend for the growth and health of our economy, the smooth-functioning of our institutions—and, even more important, for the quality of our individual lives.

Information—an inexhaustible resource

Information is one of the few resources not in danger of exhaustion on this shrinking planet. It is unique because the supply is limitless, because it actually becomes more valuable with use and because—when properly managed and applied—it can greatly enhance our use of all our other resources, natural, human and economic.

One reason, of course, that information has proved to be such a dynamic resource is the fact that there exists today a remarkable technological capacity for dealing with it rapidly and effectively.

Through a vast array of electronic tools and techniques, mankind is able to accumulate, organize, store, interpret, retrieve and transmit information on a worldwide scale, in a volume, at a speed, and with an accuracy that would have been impossible barely two decades ago.

It is also a technology that continues to grow and that has proved to be amazingly efficient in economic terms. As advance has followed advance, the cost of processing information has steadily declined. Since the 1950s, the cost of performing 100,000 calculations on an IBM computer has fallen from \$1.26 to less than one cent—and the downward trend continues.

Putting information to work for people

IBM makes many different products—from computers to copiers—but clearly, the essence of our business is information.

As a company, we are committed to exploring the limits of technology to find better, more imaginative and more productive ways to help put the benefits of this uniquely valuable resource to work for people.



account the international and national relations of force that condition its production and access. However, there is no fooling around when, in speaking of the information age, they point out the multi-faceted nature of this term, which covers the information given by the electrocardiogram, as well as the information on a country's energy resources and the need so-called modern society has for this new raw material in order to advance, or rather, in order to overcome the crisis and to continue the process of accumulation of capital. But the advertising slogans fool us again when in analyzing global information, they eliminate from consideration the systems for producing and extracting information constituted by the practices of torture in capitalist States living under a State of exception. The present stage of imperialist aggression teaches us the fundamental lesson that from now on it is difficult to limit the battlefields where the confrontation takes place with the eternal enemy, the forces of darkness and barbarism.

We are no longer living in a period when the producers of technology used for the regimentation of the popular masses openly proclaim in black and white, the real function of their repressive machines and tools. In 1924, IBM was exclusively involved in selling the first Hollerith tabulators and punch clocks. Half a century ago one could read on the facade of its first repair shop installed in the Parisian suburb of Vincennes "Société Internationale des Machines Commerciales, Appareils Enregistreurs Automatiques pour le Contrôle du Personnel" (literal translation: International Business Machines Company: Automatic Registering Equipment for Personnel Control). We should recall that technology for controlling workers was first used on a wide scale during capitalism's first big structural crisis during 1873-1890. Today it is no accident that the language used to transmit the dominant classes' response to the crisis takes on another form: the low-profile forms used by modern computer technology for domesticating workers and citizens.

We have come a long way from the time of the modern computers' ancestors, and the time when an inventor named Jacquard perfected a weaving loom capable of being programmed to mass reproduce identical flowers and leaves on cloth. We have also come a long way from the time when Herman Hollerith, the Columbia University laureat, used these first mass reproduction techniques as well as the research of the Englishman Babbage on the "analytical engine", to perfect the first punch card system which, in 1890, enabled the U.S. government to carry out a census of the entire population four times more rapidly than in 1880.

Yet, these distant times are symbolically very close to our modern times, when the necessity for social control is reinforced and when computerized capitalism no longer asks its behavior-coding machines to cut out flowers and leaves, but rather a specific type of citizen, consumer and worker. These are also times when modern capitalism reveals the increasing importance it accords to the use of the knowledge industry in perfecting class control and domination. Since the standardization of commodi-

ties no longer provides the dominated classes with a "realm of liberty," the bourgeoisie cannot help but wish for the standardization of men and women.

The texts in this anthology invite us to discover past and present symbols and realities that define the history of communications as the history of the material and immaterial culture of antagonistic classes.

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Karl Marx**(from)****A CONTRIBUTION TO
THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY****(1859)**

In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundations, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the social, political, and intellectual life processes in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins the epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophic—in short, ideological—forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order ever disappears before all the productive

forces for which there is room in it have been developed; and new higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself. Therefore, mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, we will always find that the task itself arises only when the material conditions necessary for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation. In broad outlines we can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois modes of production as so many epochs in the progress of the economic formation of society. The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production—antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but of one arising from the social conditions of life of the individuals; at the same time the productive forces of development in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism. This social formation constitutes, therefore, the closing chapter of the prehistoric stage of human society.

The texts in this section are reprinted from the editions published either by Progress Publishers, Moscow, or the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, with the exception of the texts of Antonio Gramsci which are from *Antonio Gramsci: Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, editors and translators, London, 1971, and Marx and Engels' "Ruling Class and Ruling Ideas" from *The German Ideology*, C.J. Clarke, editor, London, 1970, which are both reprinted by permission of the publisher, Lawrence and Wishart.

The original source of the texts which are not otherwise

noted in the text title are as follows: Lenin "Marx's Economic Doctrine" from *Karl Marx*; Marx "The Mystery of the Fetishistic Character of Commodities" from *Capital*, Vol. I; Lenin "The Place of Imperialism in History" from *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*; Lenin "Class Society and the State" from *The State and Revolution*; and Lenin "National Culture" from "Critical Remarks on the National Question".

All footnotes are written by the author of the text unless otherwise noted.

Frederick Engels
 (from)
LETTER TO
HEINZ STARKENBURG
 (25 January 1894)

Here is the answer to your questions:

1. What we understand by the economic relations, which we regard as the determining basis of this history of society, is the manner and method by which men in a given society produce their means of subsistence and exchange the products among themselves (in so far as division of labor exists). Thus the *entire technique* of production and transport is here included. According to our conception, this technique also determines the manner and method of exchange and, further, of the distribution of products, and with it, after the dissolution of gentile society, also the division into classes, and hence the relations of lordship and servitude and with them the state, politics, law, etc. Further included in economic relations are the *geographical basis* on which they operate and those remnants of earlier stages of economic development which have actually been transmitted and have survived — often only through tradition or by force of inertia; also of course the external environment which surrounds this form of society.

If, as you say, technique largely depends on the state of science, science depends far more still on the *state* and the *requirements* of technique. If society has a technical need, that helps science forward more than ten universities. The whole of hydrostatics (Torricelli, etc.) was called forth by the necessity for regulating the mountain streams of Italy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. We have known anything reasonable about electricity only since its technical applicability was discovered. But unfortunately it has become the custom in Germany to write the history of the sciences as if they had fallen from the skies.

2. We regard economic conditions as that which ultimately conditions historical development. But race is itself an economic factor. Here, however, two points must not be overlooked:

a. Political, juridical, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., development is based on economic development. But all these react upon one another and also upon the economic basis. It is not that the economic situation is *cause, solely active*, while everything else is only passive effect. There is, rather, interaction on the basis of economic necessity, which *ultimately* always asserts itself. The state, for instance, exercises an influence by protective tariffs, free trade, good or bad fiscal system; and even the deadly inanition and impotence of the German Philistine, arising from the miserable economic condition of Germany from 1648 to 1830 and expressing themselves at first in pietism, then in sentimentality and cringing servility to the princes and

nobles, were not without economic effect. That was one of the greatest hindrances to recovery, and was not shaken until the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars made the chronic misery an acute one. So it is not, as people try here and there conveniently to imagine, that the economic situation produces an automatic effect. No. Men make their history themselves, only they do so in a given environment, which conditions it, and on the basis of actual relations already existing, among which the economic relations, however much they may be influenced by the other, the political and ideological relations, are still ultimately the decisive ones, forming the keynote which runs through them and alone leads to understanding.

b. Men make their history themselves, but not as yet with a collective will according to a collective plan, or even in a definite, delimited given society. Their aspirations clash, and for that very reason all such societies are governed by *necessity*, the complement and form of appearance of which is *accident*. The necessity which here asserts itself athwart all accident is again ultimately economic necessity. This is where the so-called great men come in for treatment. That such and such a man and precisely that man arises at a particular time in a particular country is, of course, pure chance. But cut him out and there will be a demand for a substitute, and this substitute will be found, good or bad, but in the long run he will be found. That Napoleon, just that particular Corsican, should have been the military dictator whom the French Republic, exhausted by its own warfare, had rendered necessary was chance; but that if a Napoleon had been lacking another would have filled the place is proved by the fact that the man was always found as soon as he became necessary: Caesar, Augustus, Cromwell, etc. While Marx discovered the materialist conception of history, Thierry, Mignet, Guizot, and all the English historians up to 1850 are evidence that it was being striven for, and the discovery of the same conception by Morgan proves that the time was ripe for it and that it simply *had* to be proved.

So with all the other accidents, and apparent accidents, of history. The further the particular sphere which we are investigating is removed from the economic sphere and approaches that of pure abstract ideology, the more shall we find it exhibiting accidents in its development, the more will its curve run zigzag. But if you plot the average axis of the curve you will find that this axis will run more and more nearly parallel to the axis of economic development the longer the period considered and the wider the field dealt with.

Antonio Gramsci
STRUCTURE AND
SUPERSTRUCTURE
 (1929-1935)

The proposition contained in the "Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" to the effect that men acquire consciousness of structural conflicts on the level of ideologies should be considered as an affirmation of epistemological and not simply psychological and moral value. From this, it follows that the theoretical-practical principle of hegemony has also epistemological significance, and it is here that Ilich [Lenin]'s greatest theoretical contribution to the philosophy of praxis should be sought. In these terms one could say that Ilich advanced philosophy as philosophy in so far as he advanced political doctrine and practice. The realisation of a hegemonic apparatus, in so far as it creates a new ideological terrain, determines a form of consciousness and of methods of knowledge: it is a fact of knowledge, a philosophical fact. In Crocean terms: when one succeeds in introducing a new morality in conformity with a new conception of the world, one finishes by introducing the conception as well; in other words, one determines a reform of the whole of philosophy.

Structures and superstructures form an "historical bloc". That is to say the complex, contradictory and discordant *ensemble* of the superstructures is the reflection of the *ensemble* of the social relations of production. From this, one can conclude: that only a totalitarian¹ system of ideologies gives a rational reflection of the contradiction of the structure and represents the existence of the objective conditions for the revolutionising of praxis. If a social group is formed which is one hundred per cent homogeneous on the level of ideology, this means that the premises exist one hundred per cent for this revolutionising: that is that the "rational" is actively and actually real. This reason is based on the necessary reciprocity between structure and superstructure, a reciprocity which is nothing other than the real dialectical process.

1. Totalitarian: in the sense of "unified" and "all absorbing" [Q.H., G.N.S.].

V.I. Lenin
MARX'S ECONOMIC
DOCTRINE
 (1913)

"It is the ultimate aim of this work to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society" (that is to say, capitalist, bourgeois society), says Marx in the preface to *Capital*. The investigation of the relations of production in a given, historically defined society, in their genesis, development, and decline — such is the content of Marx's economic doctrine. In capitalist society it is the production of *commodities* that dominates, and Marx's analysis therefore begins with an analysis of the commodity.

VALUE

A commodity is, in the first place, a thing that satisfies a human want; in the second place, it is a thing that can be exchanged for another thing. The utility of a thing makes it a *use-value*. Exchange-value (or simply, value) presents itself first of all as the ratio, the proportion, in which a certain number of use-values of one sort are exchanged for a certain number of use-values of another sort. Daily experience shows us that millions upon millions of such exchanges are constantly equating with one another every kind of use-value, even the most diverse and incomparable. Now, what is there in common between these various things, things constantly equated one with another in a definite system of social relations? What is common to them is that they are *products of labour*. In exchanging products people equate to one another the most diverse kinds of labour. The production of commodities is a system of social relations in which the individual producers create diverse products (the social division of labour), and in which all these products are equated to one another in exchange. Consequently, what is common to all commodities is not the concrete labour of a definite branch of production, not labour of one particular kind, but *abstract* human labour — human labour in general. All the labour power of a given society, as represented in the sum-total of values of all commodities, is one and the same human labour power: millions and millions of acts of exchange prove this. And, consequently, each particular commodity represents only a certain share of the *socially necessary* labour time. The magnitude of value is determined by the amount of socially necessary labour, or by the labour time that is socially necessary for the production of the given commodity, of the given use-value. "Whenever, by an exchange, we equate as values our different products, by that very act, we also equate, as human labour, the different kinds of labour expended upon them. We are not aware of this, nevertheless we do it". As one of the earliest economists said, value is a

relation between two persons; only he ought to have added: a relation disguised as a relation between things. We can understand what value is only when we consider it from the standpoint of the system of social relations of production of one particular historical formation of society, relations, moreover, which manifest themselves in the mass phenomenon of exchange, a phenomenon which repeats itself millions upon millions of times. "As values, all commodities are only definite masses of congealed labour time." Having made a detailed analysis of the twofold character of the labour incorporated in commodities, Marx goes on to analyze the *forms of value and money*. Marx's main task here is to study the *genesis* of the money form of value, to study the *historical process* of development of change, from single and causal acts of exchange ("elementary or accidental form of value", in which a given quantity of one commodity is exchanged for a given quantity of another) to the universal form of value, in which a number of different commodities are exchanged for one and the same particular commodity, and to the money form of value, when gold becomes this particular commodity, the universal equivalent. Being the highest product of the development of exchange and commodity production, money masks and conceals the social character of all individual labour, the social tie between the individual producers who are united by the market. Marx analyzes in very great detail the various functions of money; and it is essential to note here in particular (as generally in the opening chapters of *Capital*), that the abstract and seemingly at times purely deductive mode of exposition in reality reproduces a gigantic collection of factual material on the history of the development of exchange and commodity production. "If we consider money, its existence implies a definite stage in the exchange of commodities. The particular functions of money which it performs, either as the mere equivalent of commodities, or as means of circulation, or means of payment, as hoard or as universal money, point, according to the extent and relative preponderance of the one function or the other, to very different stages in the process of social production." (*Capital*, Vol. I)

SURPLUS VALUE

At a certain stage in the development of commodity production money becomes transformed into capital. The formula of commodity circulation was $C - M - C$ (commodity — money — commodity), i.e. the sale of one commodity for the purpose of buying another. The general formula of capital, on the contrary, is $M - C - M$, i.e. purchase for the purpose of selling (at a profit). The increase over the original value of the money put into circulation Marx calls surplus value. The fact of this "growth" of money in capitalist circulation is well known. It is this "growth" which transforms money into *capital*, as a special, historically defined, social relation of production. Surplus value cannot arise out of commodity circulation, for the latter knows only the exchange of equivalents; it cannot arise out

of an addition to price, for the mutual losses and gains of buyers and sellers would equalize one another, whereas what we have here is not an individual phenomenon but a mass, average, social phenomenon. In order to derive surplus value, the owner of money "must ... find ... in the market a commodity, whose use-value possesses the particular property of being a source of value" a commodity whose process of consumption is at the same time a process of creation of value. And such a commodity exists. It is human labour power. Its consumption is labour, and labour creates value. The owner of money buys labour power at its value, which, like the value of every other commodity, is determined by the socially necessary labour time requisite for its production (i.e. the cost of maintaining the worker and his family). Having bought labour power, the owner of money is entitled to use it, that is, to set it to work for the whole day — twelve hours, let us suppose. Yet, in the course of six hours ("necessary" labour time) the labourer creates product sufficient to cover the cost of his own maintenance; and in the course of the next six hours ("surplus" labour time), he creates "surplus" product, or surplus value, for which the capitalist does not pay. In capital, therefore, from the standpoint of the process of production, two parts must be distinguished: constant capital, expended on means of production (machinery, tools, raw materials, etc.), the value of which, without any change, is transferred (all at once or part by part) to the finished product; and variable capital, expended on labour power. The value of this latter capital is not invariable, but grows in the labour process, creating surplus value. Therefore, to express the degree of exploitation of labour power by capital, surplus value must be compared not with the whole capital but only with the variable capital. Thus in the example given, the rate of surplus value, as Marx calls this ratio, will be 6:6, i.e., 100 per cent.

The historical prerequisites for the genesis of capital were, firstly, the accumulation of a certain sum of money in the hands of individuals and a relatively high level of development of commodity production in general, and, secondly, the existence of a labourer who is "free" in a double sense: free from all constraint or restriction on the sale of his labour power, and free from the land and all means of production in general, a free and unattached labourer, a "proletarian", who cannot subsist except by the sale of his labour power.

There are two principal methods by which surplus value can be increased: by lengthening the working day ("absolute surplus value"), and by shortening the necessary working day ("relative surplus value"). Analyzing the first method, Marx gives a most impressive picture of the struggle of the working class to shorten the working day and of governmental interference to lengthen the working day (from the fourteenth century to the seventeenth century) and to shorten the working day (factory legislation of the nineteenth century). Since the appearance of *Capital*, the history of the working-class movement in all civilized countries of the world has provided a wealth of new facts amplifying this

picture.

Analyzing the production of relative surplus value, Marx investigates the three main historical stages by which capitalism has increased the productivity of labour: 1) simple co-operation; 2) division of labour and manufacture; 3) machinery and large-scale industry. How profoundly Marx has here revealed the basic and typical features of capitalist development is incidentally shown by the fact that investigations into the handicraft industries of Russia furnish abundant material illustrating the first two of the mentioned stages. And the revolutionizing effect of large-scale machine industry, described by Marx in 1867, has been revealed in a number of "new" countries (Russia, Japan, etc.) in the course of the half-century that has since elapsed.

To continue. New and important in the highest degree is Marx's analysis of the *accumulation of capital*, i.e., the transformation of a part of surplus value into capital, its use, not for satisfying the personal needs or whims of the capitalist, but for new production. Marx revealed the mistake of all the earlier classical political economists (from Adam Smith on) who assumed that the entire surplus value which is transformed into capital goes to form variable capital. In actual fact, it is divided into *means of production* and variable capital. Of tremendous importance to the process of development of capitalism and its transformation into socialism is the more rapid growth of the constant capital share (of the total capital) as compared with the variable capital share.

The accumulation of capital, by accelerating the supplanting of workers by machinery and creating wealth at one pole and poverty at the other, also gives rise to what is called the "reserve army of labour", to the "relative surplus" of workers, or "capitalist overpopulation," which assumes the most diverse forms and enables capital to expand production at an extremely fast rate. This, in conjunction with credit facilities and the accumulation of capital in means of production, incidentally furnishes the clue to the *crises* of overproduction that occur periodically in capitalist countries — at first at an average of every ten years, and later at more lengthy and less definite intervals. From the accumulation of capital under capitalism must be distinguished what is known as primitive accumulation: the forcible divorcement of the worker from the means of production, the driving of the peasants from the land, the stealing of communal land, the system of colonies and national debts, protective tariffs, and the like. "Primitive accumulation" creates the "free" proletariat at one pole, and the owner of money, the capitalist, at the other.

The "*historical tendency of capitalist accumulation*" is described by Marx in the following famous words: "The expropriation of the immediate producers was accomplished with merciless Vandalism, and under the stimulus of passions the most infamous, the most sordid, the pettiest, the most meanly odious. Self-earned private property" (of the peasant and handicraftsman), "that is based, so to say, on the fusing together of the isolated, independent labouring individual with the conditions of his

labour, is supplanted by capitalistic private property, which rests on exploitation of the nominally free labour of others.... That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the labourer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many labourers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalist production itself, by the centralization of capital. One capitalist always kills many. Hand in hand with this centralization, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever-extending scale, the co-operative form of the labour process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labour into instruments of labour only usable in common, the economizing of all means of production by their use as the means of production of combined, socialized labour, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market, and with this, the international character of the capitalist regime. Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation, grow the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated." (*Capital*, Vol. I)

New and important in the highest degree, further, is the analysis Marx gives in the second volume of *Capital* to the reproduction of the aggregate social capital. Here, too, Marx deals not with an individual phenomenon but with a mass phenomenon; not with a fractional part of the economy of society but with this economy as a whole. Correcting the mistake of the classical economists mentioned above, Marx divides the entire social production into two big sections: I) production of means of production, and II) production of articles of consumption, and examines in detail, with arithmetical examples, the circulation of the aggregate social capital — both in the case of reproduction in its former dimensions and in the case of accumulation. The third volume of *Capital* solves the problem of the formation of the *average rate of profit* on the basis of the law of value. The immense advance in economic science made by Marx consists in the fact that he conducts his analysis from the standpoint of mass economic phenomena, of the social economy as a whole, and not from the standpoint of individual cases or of the external, superficial aspects of competition, to which vulgar political economy and the modern "theory of marginal utility" are frequently limited. Marx first analyzes the origin of surplus value, and then goes on to consider its division into profit, interest, and ground rent. Profit is the ratio between the surplus value and the

total capital invested in an undertaking. Capital with a "high organic composition" (i.e., with a preponderance of constant capital over variable capital exceeding the social average) yields a lower than average rate of profit; capital with a "low organic composition" yields a higher than average rate of profit. The competition of capitals, and the freedom with which they transfer from one branch to another equate the rate of profit to the average in both cases. The sum-total of the values of all the commodities in a given society coincides with the sum-total of prices of the commodities; but, owing to competition, in individual undertakings and branches of production commodities are sold not at their values but at the *prices of production* (or production prices), which are equal to the expended capital plus the average profit.

In this way the well-known and indisputable fact of the divergence between prices and values and of the equalization of profits is fully explained by Marx on the basis of the law of value; for the sum-total of values of all commodities coincides with the sum-total of prices. However, the equation of (social) value to (individual) prices does not take place simply and directly, but in a very complex way. It is quite natural that in a society of separate producers of commodities, who are united only by the market, law can reveal itself only as an average, social, mass law, when individual deviations to one side or the other mutually compensate one another.

An increase in the productivity of labour implies a more rapid growth of constant capital as compared with variable capital. And since surplus value is a function of variable capital alone, it is obvious that the rate of profit (the ratio of surplus value to the whole capital, and not to its variable part alone) tends to fall. Marx makes a detailed analysis of this tendency and of a number of circumstances that conceal or counteract it. Without pausing to give an account of the extremely interesting sections of the third volume of *Capital* devoted to user's capital, commercial capital and money capital, we pass to the most important section, the theory of *ground rent*. Owing to the fact that the land area is limited, and, in capitalist countries, is all occupied by individual private owners, the price of production of agricultural products is determined by the cost of production not on average soil, but on the worst soil, not under average conditions, but under the worst conditions of delivery of produce to the market. The difference between this price and the price of production on better soil (or under better conditions) constitutes *differential rent*. Analyzing this in detail, and showing how it arises out of the difference in fertility of different plots of land and the difference in the amount of capital invested in land, Marx fully exposed (see also *Theories of Surplus Value*, in which the criticism of Rodbertus deserves particular attention) the error of Ricardo, who considered that differential rent is derived only when there is a successive transition from better land to worse. On the contrary, there may be inverse transitions, land may pass from one category into others (owing to advances in agricultural technique, the growth of towns, and so on), and the notorious "law

of diminishing returns" is a profound error which charges nature with the defects, limitations and contradictions of capitalism. Further, the equalization of profit in all branches of industry and national economy in general presupposes complete freedom of competition and the free flow of capital from one branch to another. But the private ownership of land creates monopoly, which hinders this free flow. Owing to this monopoly, the products of agriculture, which is distinguished by a lower organic composition of capital, and, consequently, by an individually higher rate of profit, do not participate in the entirely free process of equalization of the rate of profit; the landowner, being a monopolist, can keep the price above the average, and this monopoly price engenders *absolute rent*. Differential rent cannot be done away with under capitalism, but absolute rent *can* — for instance by the nationalization of the land, by making it the property of the state. Making the land the property of the state would undermine the monopoly of private landowners, and would lead to a more systematic and complete application of freedom of competition in the domain of agriculture. And, therefore, Marx points out, in the course of history bourgeois radicals have again and again advanced this progressive bourgeois demand for the nationalization of the land, which, however, frightens away the majority of the bourgeoisie, because it too closely "touches" another monopoly, which is particularly important and "sensitive" in our day — the monopoly of the means of production in general. (Marx gives a remarkably popular, concise, and clear exposition of his theory of the average rate of profit on capital and of absolute ground rent in a letter to Engels, dated August 2, 1862. See *Briefwechsel*, Vol. III, pp. 77-81; also the letter of August 9, 1862, *ibid.*, pp. 86-87). For the history of ground rent it is also important to note Marx's analysis showing how labour rent (when the peasant creates surplus product by labouring on the lord's land) is transformed into rent in produce or in kind (when the peasant creates surplus product on his own land and cedes it to the lord due to "non-economic constraint"), then into money rent (which is rent in kind transformed into money, the *quitrent* of old Russia, due to the development of commodity production), and finally into capitalist rent, when the peasant is replaced by the agricultural entrepreneur, who cultivates the soil with the help of wage labour. In connection with this analysis of the "genesis of capitalist ground rent," note should be made of a number of penetrating ideas (especially important for backward countries like Russia) expressed by Marx on the *evolution of capitalism in agriculture*. "The transformation of rent in kind into money rent is not only necessarily accompanied, but even anticipated by the formation of a class of propertyless day labourers, who hire themselves out for wages. During the period of their rise, when this new class appears but sporadically, the custom necessarily develops among the better-situated tributary farmers of exploiting agricultural labourers for their own account, just as the wealthier serfs in feudal times used to employ serfs for their own benefit. In this way they gradually acquire the ability to accumu-

late a certain amount of wealth and to transform themselves even into future capitalists. The old self-employed possessors of the land thus give rise among themselves to a nursery for capitalist tenants, whose development is conditioned upon the general development of capitalist production outside of the rural districts." (*Capital*, Vol III, p. 332.) "The expropriation and eviction of a part of the agricultural population not only set free for industrial capital, the labourers, their means of subsistence, and material for labour; it also created the home-market." (*Capital*, Vol I, p. 778.) The impoverishment and ruin of the agricultural population lead, in their turn, to the formation of a reserve army of labour for capital. In every capitalist country "part of the agricultural population is therefore constantly on the point of passing over into an urban or manufacturing proletariat.... (Manufacture is used here in the sense of all non-agricultural industries). This source of relative surplus population is thus constantly flowing.... The agricultural labourer is therefore reduced to the minimum of wages, and always stands with one foot already in the swamp of pauperism." (*Capital*, Vol. I. p. 688.) The private ownership of the peasant in the land he tills constitutes the basis of small-scale production and the condition for its prospering and attaining a classical form. But such small-scale production is compatible only with a narrow and primitive framework of production and society. Under capitalism the "exploitation of the peasants differs only in form from the exploitation of the industrial proletariat. The exploiter is the same: capital. The individual capitalists exploit the individual peasants through mortgages and usury; the capitalist class exploits the peasant class through the state taxes." (*The Class Struggles in France*.) "The small holding of the peasant is now only the pretext that allows the capitalist to draw profits, interest and rent from the soil, while leaving it to the tiller of the soil himself to see how he can extract his wages." (*The Eighteenth Brumaire*.) As a rule the peasant cedes to capitalist society, i.e., to the capitalist class, even a part of the wages, sinking "to the level of the Irish tenant farmer — all under the pretence of being a private proprietor." (*The Class Struggles in France*.) What is "one of the causes which keeps the price of cereals lower in countries with a predominance of small peasant land proprietorship than in countries with a capitalist mode of production"? (*Capital*, Vol. III, p. 340) It is that the peasant cedes to society (i.e., to the capitalist class) part of his surplus product without an equivalent. "This lower price (of cereals and other agricultural produce) is consequently a result of the poverty of the producers and by no means of the productivity of their labour." (*Capital*, Vol. III, p. 340.) The smallholding system, which is the normal form of small-scale production, deteriorates, collapses, perishes under capitalism. "Proprietorship of land parcels excludes by its very nature the development of the social productive forces of labour, social forms of labour, social concentration of capital, large-scale cattle raising, and a progressive application of science. Usury and a taxation system must impoverish it everywhere. The expenditure of capital in the price

of the land withdraws this capital from cultivation. An infinite dissipation of means of production and an isolation of the producers themselves go with it." (Co-operative societies, i.e., associations of small peasants, while playing an extremely progressive bourgeois role, only weaken this tendency without eliminating it' nor must it be forgotten that these co-operative societies do much for the well-to-do peasant, and very little, almost nothing, for the mass of poor peasants; and then the associations themselves become exploiters of wage labour.) "Also an enormous waste of human energy. A progressive deterioration of the conditions of production and a raising of the price of means of production is a necessary law of small peasants' property." In agriculture, as in industry, capitalism transforms the process of production only at the price of the "martyrdom of the producer." "The dispersion of the rural labourers over larger areas breaks their power of resistance while concentration increases that of the town operatives. In modern agriculture, as in the urban industries, the increased productivity and quantity of the labour set in motion are bought at the cost of laying waste and consuming by disease labour power itself. Moreover, all progress in capitalistic agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the labourer, but of robbing the soil.... Capitalist production, therefore develops technology, and the combining together of various processes into a social whole, only by sapping the original sources of all wealth — the soil and the labourer." (*Capital*, Vol I, end of Chap. 15.)

Karl Marx

THE MYSTERY OF THE FETISHISTIC CHARACTER OF COMMODITIES (1867)

At the first glance, a commodity seems a commonplace sort of thing, one easily understood. Analysis shows, however, that it is a very queer thing indeed, full of metaphysical subtleties and theological whimsies. In so far as it is a use-value, there is nothing mysterious about it—whether we regard it as something whose natural properties enable it to satisfy human wants, or as something which only acquires such properties as the outcome of human labour. It is obvious that man, by his activity, modifies the forms of natural substances so as to make them useful to himself. For instance, the form of wood is altered when we make a table of it. None the less, the table is still wood, an ordinary palpable thing. But as soon as it presents itself as a commodity, it is transformed into a thing which is transcendental as well as palpable. It stands with its feet solidly planted on the floor: but at the same time, over against all other commodities, it stands on its head; and in that wooden head it forms crotchets far stranger than table-turning ever was.

Thus the enigma of commodities does not arise out of their use-value. Nor does it depend upon the nature of the factors of value. For, in the first place, no matter how different the kinds of useful labour or productive activity may be, it is a physiological fact that they are all functions of the human organism, and that every such function (no matter what its content and its form may be) is essentially the expenditure of human brain, nerve, muscle, sense organ, etc. Secondly, as concerns that which underlies the determination of the magnitude of value, namely the duration of this expenditure, or the quantity of labour, our senses enable us to distinguish between the quantity and the quality of labour. Whatever the social conditions, men must have had an interest in the time requisites for the production of food, though the degree of that interest must have varied at various stages of social evolution. In fine, whenever human beings work for one another in any way, their labour acquires a social form.

Why, then, does the labour product become enigmatic as soon as it assumes the commodity form? The cause must obviously lie in the form itself. The essential likeness of the kinds of human labour is concentered in the form of the identical reality of value in the products of labour; the measurement of the expenditure of human labour power in terms of its duration, takes on the form of the magnitude of value of the labour product; and, finally, the mutual relations between the producers, in which the social character of their labour affirms itself, assume the

form of a social relation between the labour products.

Thus the mystery of the commodity form is simply this, that it mirrors for men the social character of their own labour, mirrors it as an objective character attaching to the labour products themselves, mirrors it as a social natural property of these things. Consequently the social relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour, presents itself to them as a social relation, not between themselves, but between the products of their labour. Thanks to this transference of qualities, the labour products become commodities, transcendental or social things which are at the same time perceptible by our senses. In like manner, the impression which the light reflected from an object makes upon the retina is perceived, not as a subjective stimulation of that organ, but in the form of a concrete object existing outside the eye. But in vision, light actually passes from one thing, the external object, to another thing, the eye. We are dealing with a physical relation between physical actualities. On the other hand, the commodity form, and the value relation between the labour product which finds expression in the commodity form, have nothing whatever to do with the physical properties of the commodities or with the material relations that arise out of these physical properties. We are concerned only with a definite social relation between human beings, which, in their eyes, has here assumed the semblance of a relation between things. To find an analogy, we must enter the nebulous world of religion. In that world, the products of the human mind become independent shapes, endowed with lives of their own, and able to enter into relations with men and women. The products of the human hand do the same thing in the world of commodities. I speak of this as the *fetishistic character* which attaches to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced in the form of commodities. It is inseparable from commodity production.

The foregoing analysis has shown that this fetishistic character of the world of commodities is the outcome of the peculiar social quality of the labour which produces commodities.

Useful objects only become commodities because they are the products of the labour of individuals or groups of individuals working independently of one another. The sum total of the labour of all these private individuals and private groups makes up the aggregate of social labour. Inasmuch as the producers do not come into social contact until they exchange their labour products, the specifically social character of their individual labour does not manifest itself until exchange takes place. In other words, the labour of individuals becomes an effective part of the aggregate of social labour solely in virtue of the relations which the process of exchange establishes between the labour products and consequently between the producers. That is why the social relations connecting the labour of one private individual (or group) with the labour of another, seem to the producers, not direct social relations between individuals at work, but what they really are: material relations between persons and social relations between things.

Not until they enter the realm of exchange do

the labour products acquire, over and above and distinct from their use-objectivity (which differs from one kind of product to another), a social value-objectivity (which is of like nature in them all). This cleavage of the labour product into useful thing, on the one hand, and thing of value, on the other, does not become practically effective until the process of exchange has become so widespread and so important that useful things are produced expressly for exchange—so that the values of things have to be taken into account in the very act of production. Thenceforward the labour of private producers does really acquire a twofold social character. On the one hand such labour must, as definitely useful labour, satisfy a definite social demand, thus taking its place as a constituent of the general aggregate of labour, as part of the spontaneously developed system of the social division of labour. On the other hand such labour can only satisfy the manifold wants of the producers who perform it, in so far as each particular kind of individual or private useful labour is exchangeable for every other particular kind, because each ranks equally with the others. Such an equalisation of utterly different kinds of labour can only be achieved by ignoring their actual unlikeness, by reducing them to terms of that which they all share as expenditures of human labour power—abstract human labour.

In the minds of the individual producers, this twofold social character of their individual labour is mirrored only as a reflection of the forms which, in daily life, are manifested by the exchange of products. Thus the socially useful character of the producers' individual or private labour, is mirrored in the form that the labour must be useful, and useful to others; while the socially useful character that one kind of private or individual labour ranks equally with any other kind, is mirrored in the form that the products of labour, though of different kinds of material bodies, are all alike as things of value.

When, therefore, human beings bring their labour products into relation with one another as values, it is not because they recognise that the things are no more than the material wrappings for this or that amount of homogenous human labour. On the contrary, exchanging labour products of different kinds one for another, they equate the values of the exchanged products; and in doing so they equate the different kinds of labour expended in production, treating them as homogenous human labour. They do not know that they are doing this, but they do it. Value does not wear an explanatory label. Far from it, value changes all labour products into social hieroglyphs. Subsequently, people try to decipher these hieroglyphs, to solve the riddle of their own social product—for the specification of a useful object as a value is just as much a social product as language is. The recent scientific discovery that labour products, as values, are but the material expressions of the human labour expended in their production, marks an epoch in the evolutionary history of mankind, but does not suffice to dispel the semblance of materiality which has been assumed by the social character of labour. Physical and chemical science have analysed air into its elements, but the

familiar bodily impressions produced on our senses by the atmosphere persist unchanged. Just so, after the discovery of the true nature of value no less than before, those entangled in the meshwork of commodity production regard as universally valid a truth which is in fact true only for one particular form of production, namely commodity production. They continue to believe without qualification that the specifically social character of mutually independent acts of individual or private labour consists in their general likeness as human labour, and assumes in the labour product the characteristic form of value.

In actual practice, the first concern of one who exchanges the products of labour is to know what quantity of other products he will get in return for his own, to know the ratio of exchange. When such ratios have been sufficiently matured by custom to acquire a fair amount of stability they seem to arise out of the very nature of the labour products, so that, for instance, 1 tone of iron and 2 oz. of gold are regarded as being of equal value, just as a pound avoirdupois of gold and a pound avoirdupois of iron have the same weight notwithstanding the differences between chemical and physical properties of the two metals. The fact is that the value character of the labour products only becomes stabilised by their acting and reacting on one another as magnitudes of value. These magnitudes are perpetually changing, independently of the will, fore-knowledge, and activity of those who make the exchanges, whose own social movement seems to them a movement of things—of things which control them, instead of being controlled by them. Not until commodity production is fully developed, does scientific insight grow out of experience. Then it becomes apparent that the different kinds of individual or private labour (carried on independently of one another, and yet universally dependent on one another as spontaneously developed branches of the social division of labour) are continually being reduced to their socially proportional measure. How is the reduction achieved? In this way, that, in the chance and ever-varying exchange relations between products the labour time socially necessary for their production exerts its coercive influence like an over-riding law of nature. The law of gravity exerts an over-riding influence in like fashion when a house tumbles about our ears. Thus the determination of the magnitude of value by labour time is a secret hidden away beneath the manifest fluctuations in the relative values of commodities. The discovery of the way in which the magnitude of value of labour products is really determined, removes from this determination the semblance of being purely fortuitous, but does not affect the material form of the process.

Man's thought about the forms of social life, his scientific analysis of these forms, runs counter to the actual course of social evolution. He begins by an examination of the finished product, the extant result of the evolutionary process. The characters which stamp labour products as commodities, the characters which they must possess before they can circulate as commodities, have already acquired the fixity of the natural forms of social life, when economists begin to study, not indeed their history (for

they are regarded as immutable), but their meaning. Thus it was only the analysis of the prices of commodities which led to the determination of the magnitude of values, it was only the common expression of all commodities in money which led to their being recognised as "values". But this finished form of the world of commodities, this money form, is the very thing which veils instead of disclosing the social character of private or individual labour, and therefore hides the social relations between the individual producers. When I say that coats or boots or what not are related to linen as the general embodiment of abstract human labour, the statement seems manifestly absurd. Yet when the producers of coats, boots, etc., bring these commodities into relation with linen as the general equivalent (or with gold or silver as the general equivalent, for the nature of the case is just the same), it is precisely in this absurd form that the relation between their own private labour and the collective labour of society discloses itself to them.

These forms are the very things that comprise the categories of bourgeois economics. They are the socially valid, and therefore objective, thought-forms, which serve to express the relations of production peculiar to one specific method of social production, namely commodity production. Consequently, all the mystery of the world of commodities, all the sorcery, all the fetishistic charm, which enwraps as with a fog the labour products of a system of commodity production, is instantly dispelled when we turn to consider other methods of production.

Political economists are fond of Robinson Crusoe, so we, too, will take a look at this lonely islander. His wants are few and simple, but he has some wants at least, and must therefore undertake various kinds of useful labour. He must fashion tools, make furniture, tame lamas, fish, hunt, etc. I am not here concerned with his praying and the like, for Robinson Crusoe delights in these kinds of activity, and looks upon them as recreation. Despite the variety of his productive functions, he knows that they are but various forms of the activity of one and the same Robinson Crusoe, and are therefore nothing but different manifestations of human labour. Under stress of need, he has to allot his time suitably to this, that, and the other function. In the sum of his activities, the assignment of more space to one and less to another is determined by the greater or the less extent of the difficulties that have to be overcome in attaining the useful end he has in view. In this matter, experience is his teacher, and our Robinson (having saved timepiece, ledger, pen, and ink from the wreck) soon begins, as becomes an Englishman, bookkeeping in due form with himself as subject of the entries. He writes an inventory of the useful objects he owns; specifies the routine work necessary for their production; and records the labour time which, on the average, definite quantities of the respective products cost him. The relations between Robinson and the things which comprise the wealth he has created are so simple that even Herr M. Wirth could understand them without undue mental effort. Nevertheless, all the essential

determinants of value are therein contained.

Let us now transport ourselves from Crusoe's sunlit isle to the darkness of medieval Europe. In the island, we have one independent person, the only inhabitant. In Europe during the Middle Ages, all are dependent: serfs and barons, vassals and suzerains, laymen and priests. Dependence characterises the social relations of material production, no less than the spheres of life that are established upon these relations. But for the very reason that relations of personal dependence form the groundwork of society, it is not necessary that labour and the products of labour should assume fantastic shapes differing from their real ones. They enter into the social mechanism as services in kind and payments in kind. The natural form of labour, its particular form, is here the immediate social form of labour—in contradistinction to what happens in a society organised upon the basis of commodity production, where abstract labour, its generalised form, is the immediate social form of labour. Forced labour (*corvée*) can be measured by time, just as easily as commodity-producing labour; but every serf knows that what he is expending in the service of his lord is a definite quantity of his own labour power. The tithe which must be handed over to the priest is a more tangible reality than his reverence's blessing. Whatever view we take of the masks in which the different personalities strut upon the feudal stage, at any rate the social relations between individuals at work appear in their natural guise as personal relations, and are not dressed up as social relations between things, between the products of labour.

If we wish to study labour in common, or directly associated labour, we need not go back to the spontaneously developed form which confronts us on the threshold of the history of all civilised races. An example nearer to our hand is offered by the patriarchal industry of a peasant family working on the land, and producing for its own requirements grain, cattle, yarn, linen, clothing, and the like. For the family, these various articles are diverse products of the family labour, but they are not interchangeable as commodities. The different kinds of labour which generate these products (tillage, cattle breeding, spinning, weaving, tailoring, etc.) are in their natural form social functions, inasmuch as they are functions of the family, which has its own spontaneously developed system of the division of labour—just as commodity production has such a system. The division of labour among the various members of the family, and the appointment of their respective labour times, are determined by differences of sex and age and by seasonal changes in natural working conditions. The expenditure of each individual's labour power, as measured by the duration of the labour, assumes from the outset the aspect of a social determination of labour, since from the outset the individual exertions of labour power function merely as instruments of the joint labour power of the family.

Finally, for a change, let us consider an association of free individuals who work with jointly owned means of production, and wittingly expend their several labour powers as a combined social

labour power. In this case, all the characteristics of Robinson Crusoe's labour are reproduced, except that the labour is social, instead of being individual. Robinson Crusoe's products were exclusively individual, and were therefore useful objects for himself alone. The total products of our imaginary association is a social product. Part of this product is used as a means for further production, and therefore remains social. Another part is consumed as subsistence by the various members of the association, and has therefore to be distributed among them. The way in which this distribution is effected will vary in accordance with variations in the nature of the social organism which carries on the work of production, and in accordance with the corresponding level of historical evolution attained by the producers. Let us assume (merely for the sake of a comparison with commodity production) that each producer's share of the necessities of life is determined by the amount of time he has worked. In that case, the labour time will play a double role. On the one hand, its allotment in accordance with a definite social plan enables the various kinds of labour to be duly proportioned to the various social needs. On the other hand, the labour time serves as standard of measurement, first as regards the share of each individual producer in the joint labour, and secondly (because of the foregoing) as regards the amount of the social product which each individual is entitled to consume. The social relations between human beings, on one side, and their labour and the products thereof, on the other, remain perfectly simple and perfectly clear, alike in production and in distribution.

Suppose a society made up of the producers of commodities, where the general relations of social production are such that (since products are commodities, i.e. values) the individual labours of the various producers are related one to another in the concrete commodity form as embodiments of undifferentiated human labour. For a society of this type, Christianity, with its cult of the abstract human being, is the most suitable religion—above all, Christianity in its bourgeois phases of development, such as Protestantism, Deism, and the like. But in the ancient Asiatic method of production, in that of classical Greece and Rome, and so on, the transformation of the labour product into a commodity, and therefore the transformation of men into the producers of commodities, played a subordinate part—which, however became a more important one in proportion as this type of society was passing into its decline. Like the gods of Epicurus, or like the Jews in the interstices of Polish society, genuinely commercial peoples existed only in the intermundane spaces of the antique world. The social productive organisms of ancient days were far simpler, enormously more easy to understand, than is bourgeois society; but they were based, either upon the immaturity of the individual human being (who had not yet severed the umbilical cord which, under primitive conditions, unites all the members of the human species one with another), or upon direct relations of dominion and subjugation. They were the outcome of a low grade of the evolution of the productive powers of labour; a grade in which the relations of human beings to one

another within the process by which they produced the material necessities of life, and therefore their relations to nature as well, were correspondingly immature. This restrictedness in the world of concrete fact was reflected in the ideal world, in the world of the old natural and folk religions. Such religious reflexions of the real world will not disappear until the relations between human beings in their practical everyday life have assumed the aspect of perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations as between man and man, and as between man and nature. The life process of society, this meaning the material process of production, will not lose its veil of mystery until it becomes a process carried on by a free association of producers, under their conscious and purposive control. For this, however, an indispensable requisite is that there should exist a specific material groundwork (or a series of material conditions of existence) which can only come into being as the spontaneous outcome of a long and painful process of evolution.

True that political economy has now achieved an analysis, however incomplete, of value and the magnitude of value, and has discovered the content hidden within these forms. But the economists have never even mooted the question why the content should assume these forms; why labour should be represented by the value of the product of labour, and the quantity of labour (as measured by its duration) by the magnitude of the value of that product. It is writ large on the face of these formulas that they belong to a type of social organisation in which the process of production is the master of mankind, and in which mankind has not yet mastered the process of production. To the bourgeois mind, however, they seem as self-evident as, and no less a natural necessity than, productive labour itself. That is why bourgeois economists treat pre-bourgeois forms of the social productive organism much as the Fathers of the Church have always treated pre-Christian religions.

The extent to which certain economists have been led astray by the fetishistic character that attaches to the world of commodities, the manner in which they have been deluded by the semblance of objective material reality that is assumed by the social attributes of labour, is shown (to give one instance among many) by the wearisome and absurd dispute concerning the part played by nature in the creation of exchange-value. Since exchange-value is nothing more than a specific social way of expressing the labour that has been applied to a thing, it cannot contain any more natural (material) substance than does, for instance, the rate of exchange.

The commodity form is the most general and the least developed form of bourgeois production. For this reason, it makes its appearance early, though in a less dominant and typical manner than to-day. For this reason, likewise, the fetishistic character of commodities is comparatively easy to discern. But when we come to more developed forms, even this semblance of simplicity vanishes. Whence did the illusions of the monetary system arise? The mercantilists (the champions of the monetary system) regarded gold and silver, not simply as substances which, when functioning as money, represented a social

relation of production, but as substances which were endowed by nature with peculiar social properties. Later economists, who look back on the mercantilists with contempt, are manifestly subject to the very same fetishistic illusion as soon as they come to contemplate capital. It is not so very long since the dispelling of the physiocratic illusion that land-rents are a growth of the soil, instead of being a product of social activity!

Not to anticipate, I will content myself here with giving one more example relating to the commodity form itself. If commodities could speak, they would say: "Our use-value may interest human beings; but it is not an attribute of ours, as things. What is our attribute, as things, is our value. Our own interrelations as commodities proves it. We are related to one another only as exchange-values." Now let us hear how the economist interprets the mind of the commodity. He says: "Value [exchange-value] is a property of things; riches [use-value], of man. Value, in this sense, necessarily implies exchanges; riches do not." Again: "Riches are the attribute of man, value is the attribute of commodities. A man or a community is rich, a pearl or a diamond is valuable." A pearl or a diamond is valuable as a pearl or a diamond! Hitherto, no chemist has been able to discover exchange-value in a pearl or a diamond. But the economists who discover this chemical substance (persons who make a special claim to critical acumen) find that the use-value of the articles in question attaches to them independently of their material properties; and that, on the other hand, their value does attach to them as things. What substantiates this view is the remarkable fact that the use-value of things is realised without exchange, by means of a direct relation between things and men, whereas their value is realised only in exchange, only in a social process. Surely, in this connexion, every one will recall the excellent Dogberry's instruction to neighbour Seacoal: "To be a well-favoured man is the gift of fortune, but to write and read comes by nature."

V.I. Lenin

THE PLACE OF IMPERIALISM IN HISTORY

(1916)

We have seen that in its economic essence imperialism is monopoly capitalism. This in itself determines its place in history, for monopoly that grows out of the soil of free competition, and precisely out of free competition, is the transition from the capitalist system to a higher social-economic order. We must take special note of the four principal types of monopoly, or principal manifestations of monopoly capitalism, which are characteristic of the epoch we are examining.

Firstly, monopoly arose out of a very high stage of development of the concentration of production. This refers to the monopolist capitalist combines, cartels, syndicates and trusts. We have seen the important part these play in present-day economic life. At the beginning of the twentieth century, monopolies had acquired complete supremacy in the advanced countries, and although the first steps towards the formation of the cartels were first taken by countries enjoying the protection of high tariffs (Germany, America), Great Britain, with her system of free trade, revealed the same basic phenomenon, only a little later, namely, the birth of monopoly out of the concentration of production.

Secondly, monopolies have stimulated the seizure of the most important sources of raw materials, especially for the basic and most highly cartelized industries in capitalist society: the coal and iron industries. The monopoly of the most important sources of raw materials has enormously increased the power of big capital, and has sharpened the antagonism between cartelized and non-cartelized industry.

Thirdly, monopoly has sprung from the banks. The banks have developed from humble middlemen enterprises into the monopolists of finance capital. Some three to five of the biggest banks in each of the foremost capitalist countries have achieved the "personal union" of industrial and bank capital, and have concentrated in their hands the control of thousands upon thousands of millions which form the greater part of the capital and income of entire countries. A financial oligarchy, which throws a close network of dependence relationships over all the economic and political institutions of present-day bourgeois society without exception — such is the most striking manifestation of this monopoly.

Fourthly, monopoly has grown out of colonial policy. To the numerous "old" motives of colonial policy, finance capital has added the struggle for the sources of raw materials, for the export of capital, for "spheres of influence," i.e., for spheres for profitable deals, concessions, monopolist profits and so on, and finally, for economic territory in general. When the colonies of the European powers in

Africa, for instance, comprised only one-tenth of that territory (as was the case in 1876), colonial policy was able to develop by methods other than those of monopoly — by the "free grabbing" of territories, so to speak. But when nine-tenths of Africa had been seized (by 1900), when the whole world had been divided up, there was inevitably ushered in the era of monopoly ownership of colonies and, consequently, of particularly intense struggle for the division and the redivision of the world.

The extent to which monopolist capital has intensified all the contradictions of capitalism is generally known. It is sufficient to mention the high cost of living and the tyranny of the cartels. This intensification of contradictions constitutes the most powerful driving force of the transitional period of history, which began from the time of the final victory of world finance capital.

Monopolies, oligarchy, the striving for domination instead of striving for liberty, the exploitation of an increasing number of small or weak nations by a handful of the richest or most powerful nations — all these have given birth to those distinctive characteristics of imperialism which compel us to define it as parasitic or decaying capitalism. More and more prominently there emerges, as one of the tendencies of imperialism, the creation of the "rentier state", the usurer state, in which the bourgeoisie to an ever increasing degree lives on the proceeds of capital exports and by "clipping coupons." It would be a mistake to believe that this tendency to decay precludes the rapid growth of capitalism. It does not. In the epoch of imperialism, certain branches of industry, certain strata of the bourgeoisie and certain countries betray, to a greater or lesser degree, now one and now another of these tendencies. On the whole, capitalism is growing far more rapidly than before; but this growth is not only becoming more and more uneven in general, its unevenness also manifests itself, in particular, in the decay of the countries which are richest in capital (England).

In regard to the rapidity of Germany's economic development, Riesser, the author of the book on the big German banks, states: "The progress of the preceding period (1848-70), which had not been exactly slow, stood in about the same ratio to the rapidity with which the whole of Germany's national economy, and with it German banking, progressed during this period (1870-1905) as the speed of the mail coach in the good old days stood to the speed of the present-day automobile ... which is whizzing past so fast that it endangers not only innocent pedestrians in its path, but also the occupants of the car." In its turn, this finance capital which has grown with such extraordinary rapidity is not unwilling, precisely because it has grown so quickly, to pass on to a more "tranquil" possession of colonies which have to be seized — and not only by peaceful methods — from richer nations. In the United States, economic development in the last decades has been even more rapid than in Germany, and for this very reason, the parasitic features of modern American capitalism have stood out with particular prominence. On the other hand, a comparison of, say, the republican American bourgeoisie with the

monarchist Japanese or German bourgeoisie shows that the most pronounced political distinction diminishes to an extreme degree in the epoch of imperialism — not because it is unimportant in general, but because in all these cases we are discussing a bourgeoisie which has definite features of parasitism.

The receipt of high monopoly profits by the capitalists in one of the numerous branches of industry, in one of the numerous countries, etc., makes it economically possible for them to bribe certain sections of the workers, and for a time a fairly considerable minority of them, and win them to the side of the bourgeoisie of a given industry or given nation against all the others. The intensification of antagonisms between imperialist nations for the division of the world increases this striving. And so there is created that bond between imperialism and opportunism, which revealed itself first and most clearly in England, owing to the fact that certain features of imperialist development were observable there much earlier than in other countries. Some writers, L. Martov, for example, are prone to wave aside the connection between imperialism and opportunism in the working-class movement — a particularly glaring fact at the present time — by resorting to "official optimism" (à la Kautsky and Huysmans) like the following: the cause of the opponents of capitalism would be hopeless if it were precisely progressive capitalism that led to the increase of opportunism, or, if it were precisely the best paid workers who were inclined towards opportunism, etc. We must have no illusions about "optimism" of this kind. It is optimism in regard to opportunism; it is optimism which serves to conceal opportunism. As a matter of fact the extraordinary rapidity and the particularly revolting character of the development of opportunism is by no means a guarantee that its victory will be durable: the rapid growth of a malignant abscess on a healthy body can only cause it to burst more quickly and thus relieve the body of it. The most dangerous of all in this respect are those who do not wish to understand that the fight against imperialism is a sham and humbug unless it is inseparably bound up with the fight against opportunism.

From all that has been said in this book on the economic essence of imperialism, it follows that we must define it as capitalism in transition, or, more precisely, as moribund capitalism. It is very instructive in this respect to note that the bourgeois economists, in describing modern capitalism, frequently employ catchwords and phrases like "interlocking," "absence of isolation," etc.; "in conformity with their functions and course of development," banks are "not purely private business enterprises; they are more and more outgrowing the sphere of purely private business regulation." And this very Riesser, who uttered the words just quoted, declares with all seriousness that the "prophecy" of the Marxists concerning "socialization" has "not come true"!

What then does this catchword "interlocking" express? It merely expresses the most striking feature of the process going on before our eyes. It shows that the observer counts the separate trees,

but cannot see the wood. It slavishly copies the superficial, the fortuitous, the chaotic. It reveals the observer as one who is overwhelmed by the mass of raw material and is utterly incapable of appreciating its meaning and importance. Ownership of shares, the relations between owners of private property "interlock in a haphazard way". But underlying this interlocking, its very base, is the changing social relations of production. When a big enterprise assumes gigantic proportions, and, on the basis of an exact computation of mass data, organizes according to plan the supply of primary raw materials to the extent of two-thirds, or three-fourths of all that is necessary for tens of millions of people; when the raw materials are transported in a systematic and organized manner to the most suitable place of production, sometimes hundreds or thousands of miles, when a single centre directs all the consecutive stages of work right up to the manufacture of numerous varieties of finished articles; when these products are distributed according to a single plan among tens and hundreds of millions of consumers (the distribution of oil in America and Germany by the American "oil trust") — then it becomes evident that we have socialization of production, and not merely "interlocking"; that private economic and private property relations constitute a shell which no longer fits its contents, a shell which must inevitably decay if its removal by artificial means be delayed; a shell which may continue in a state of decay for a fairly long period (if, at the worst, the cure of the opportunist abscess is protracted), but which will inevitably be removed.

The enthusiastic admirer of German imperialism, Schulze-Gaevernitz exclaims:

"Once the supreme management of the German banks has been entrusted to the hands of a dozen persons, their activity is even today more significant for the public good than that of the majority of the Ministers of State." (The "interlocking" of bankers, ministers, magnates of industry and rentiers is here conveniently forgotten.) ... "If we conceive of the development of those tendencies which we have noted carried to their logical conclusion we will have: the money capital of the nation united in the banks; the banks themselves combined into cartels; the investment capital of the nation cast in the shape of securities. Then the forecast of that genius Saint-Simon will be fulfilled: 'The present anarchy of production, which corresponds to the fact that economic relations are developing without uniform regulation, must make way for organization in production. Production will no longer be directed by isolated manufacturers, independent of each other and ignorant of man's economic needs; that will be done by a certain public institution. A central committee of management, being able to survey the large field of social economy from a more elevated point of view, will regulate it for the benefit of the whole of society, will put the means of production into suitable hands, and above all will take care that there be constant harmony between production and consumption. Institutions already exist which have assumed as part of their functions a certain organization of economic labour: the banks.' We are still a

long way from the fulfilment of Saint-Simon's forecast, but we are on the way towards it: Marxism, different from what Marx imagined, but different only in form."

A crushing "refutation" of Marx, indeed, which retreats a step from Marx's precise, scientific analysis, to Saint-Simon's guesswork, the guesswork of a genius, but guesswork all the same.

Frederick Engels

(from) LUDWIG FEUERBACH AND THE END OF CLASSICAL GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

(1888)

When, therefore, it is a question of investigating the driving powers which—consciously or unconsciously, and indeed very often unconsciously—lie behind the motives of men who act in history and which constitute the real ultimate driving forces of history, then it is not a question so much of the motives of single individuals, however eminent, as of those motives which set in motion great masses, whole peoples, and again whose classes of the people in each people; and this, too, not momentarily, for the transient flaring up of a straw fire which quickly dies down, but for a lasting action resulting in a great historical transformation. To ascertain the driving causes which here in the minds of acting masses and their leaders—the so-called great men—are reflected as conscious motives, clearly or unclearly, directly or in ideological, even glorified, form—that is the only path which can put us on the track of the laws holding sway both in history as a whole and at particular periods and in particular lands. Everything which sets men in motion must go through their minds, but what form it will take in the mind will depend very much upon the circumstances. The workers have by no means become reconciled to capitalist machine industry, even though they no longer simply break the machines to pieces, as they still did in 1848 on the Rhine.

But while in all earlier periods the investigation of these driving causes of history was almost impossible—on account of the complicated and concealed interconnections between them and their effects—our present period has so far simplified these interconnections that the riddle could be solved. Since the establishment of large-scale industry, that is, at least since the European peace of 1815, it has been no longer a secret to any man in England that the whole political struggle there turned on the claims to supremacy of two classes: the landed aristocracy and the bourgeoisie (middle class). In France, with the return of the Bourbons, the same fact was perceived, the historians of the Restoration period, from Thierry to Guizot, Mignet and Thiers, speak of it everywhere as the key to the understanding of all French history since the Middle Ages. And since 1830 the working class, the proletariat, has been recognized in both countries as a third competitor for power. Conditions had become so simplified that one would have had to close one's eyes deliberately not to see in the fight of these three great classes and in the conflict of their interests the driving force of modern history—at least in the two most advanced

countries.

But how did these classes come into existence? If it was possible at first glance still to ascribe the origin of the great, formerly feudal landed property—at least in the first instance—to political causes, to taking possession by force, this could not be done in regard to the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Here the origin and development of two great classes was seen to lie clearly and palpably in purely economic causes. And it was just as clear that in the struggle between landed property and the bourgeoisie, no less than in the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, it was a question, first and foremost, of economic interests, to the furtherance of which political power was intended to serve merely as a means. Bourgeoisie and proletariat both arose in consequence of a transformation of the economic conditions, more precisely, of the mode of production. The transition, first from guild handicrafts to manufacture, and then from manufacture to large-scale industry, with steam and mechanical power, had caused the development of these two classes. At a certain stage the new productive forces set in motion by the bourgeoisie—in the first place the division of labor and the combination of many detail laborers [*Teilarbeiter*] in one general manufactory—and the conditions and requirements of exchange developed through these productive forces became incompatible with the existing order of production handed down by history and sanctified by law, that is to say, incompatible with the privileges of the guild and the numerous other personal and local privileges (which were only so many fetters to the unprivileged estates) of the feudal order of society. The productive forces represented by the bourgeoisie rebelled against the order of production represented by the feudal landlords and the guild masters. The result is known: the feudal fetters were smashed, gradually in England, at one blow in France. In Germany the process is not yet finished. But just as, at a definite stage of its development, manufacture came into conflict with the feudal order of production, so now large-scale industry has already come into conflict with the bourgeois order of production established in its place. Tied down by this order, by the narrow limits of the capitalist mode of production, this industry produces, on the one hand, an ever increasing proletarianization of the great mass of the people and, on the other hand, an ever greater mass of unsalable products. Overproduction and mass misery, each the cause of the other—that is the absurd contradiction which is its outcome, and which of necessity calls for the liberation of the productive forces by means of a change in the mode of production.

In modern history at least it is, therefore, proved that all political struggles are class struggles and all class struggles for emancipation, despite their necessarily political form—for every class struggle is a political struggle—turn ultimately on the question of economic emancipation. Therefore, here at least, the state—the political order—is the subordinate, and civil society—the realm of economic relations—the decisive element. The traditional conception, to

which Hegel, too, pays homage, saw in the state the determining element and in civil society the element determined by it. Appearances correspond to this. As all the driving forces of the actions of any individual person must pass through his brain and transform themselves into motives of his will in order to set him into action, so also all the needs of civil society—no matter which class happens to be the ruling one—must pass through the will of the state in order to secure general validity in the form of laws. That is the formal aspect of the matter—the one which is self-evident. The question arises, however: What is the content of this merely formal will—of the individual as well as of the state—and whence is this content derived? Why is just this willed and not something else? If we inquire into this we discover that in modern history the will of the state is, on the whole, determined by the changing needs of civil society, by the supremacy of this or that class, in the last resort by the development of the productive forces and relations of exchange.

But if even in our modern era, with its gigantic means of production and communication, the state is not an independent domain with an independent development, but one whose existence as well as development is to be explained in the last resort by the economic conditions of life of society, then this must be still truer of all earlier times, when the production of the material life of man was not yet carried on with these abundant auxiliary means, and when, therefore, the necessity of such production must have exercised a still greater mastery over men. If the state even today, in the era of big industry and of railways, is on the whole only a reflection, in concentrated form, of the economic needs of the class controlling production, then this must have been much more so in an epoch when each generation of men was forced to spend a far greater part of its aggregate lifetime in satisfying material needs, and was therefore much more dependent on them than we are today. An examination of the history of earlier periods, as soon as it is seriously undertaken from this angle, most abundantly confirms this. But, of course, this cannot be gone into here.

If the state and public law are determined by economic relations, so, too, of course is private law, which indeed in essence only sanctions the existing economic relations between individuals which are normal in the given circumstances. The form in which this happens, can, however, vary considerably. It is possible, as happened in England, in harmony with the whole national development, to retain in the main the forms of the old feudal laws while giving them a bourgeois content; in fact, directly reading a bourgeois meaning into the feudal name. But, also, as happened in Western Continental Europe, Roman law, the first law of a commodity-producing society, with its unsurpassably fine elaboration of all the essential legal relations of simple commodity owners (of buyers and sellers, debtors and creditors, contracts, obligations, etc.), can be taken as the foundation. In which case, for the benefit of a still petty-bourgeois and semi-feudal society, either it can be reduced to the level of such a society simply through judicial practice (common law) or,

with the help of allegedly enlightened, moralizing jurists it can be worked into a special code of law to correspond with such a social level—a code which in these circumstances will be a bad one also from the legal standpoint (for instance, Prussian *Landrecht*). In which case, however, after a great bourgeois revolution, it is also possible for such a classic law code of bourgeois society as the French *Code Civil* to be worked out upon the basis of this same Roman Law. If, therefore, bourgeois legal rules merely express the economic life conditions of society in legal form, then they can do so well or ill, according to circumstances.

The state presents itself to us as the first ideological power over man. Society creates for itself an organ for the safeguarding of its common interests against internal and external attacks. This organ is the state power. Hardly come into being, this organ makes itself independent vis-à-vis society; and, indeed, the more so, the more it becomes the organ of a particular class, the more it directly enforces the supremacy of that class. The fight of the oppressed class against the ruling class becomes necessarily a political fight, a fight first of all against the political dominance of this class. The consciousness of the interconnection between this political struggle and its economic basis becomes dulled and can be lost altogether. While this is not wholly the case with the participants, it almost always happens with the historians. Of the ancient sources on the struggles within the Roman Republic only Appian tells us clearly and distinctly what was at issue in the last resort—namely, landed property.

But once the state has become an independent power vis-à-vis society, it produces forthwith a further ideology. It is indeed among professional politicians, theorists of public law, and jurists of private law that the connection with economic facts gets lost for fair. Since in each particular case the economic facts must assume the form of juristic motives in order to receive legal sanction; and since, in so doing, consideration of course has to be given to the whole legal system already in operation, the juristic form is, in consequence, made everything and the economic content nothing. Public law and private law are treated as independent spheres, each having its own independent historical development, each being capable of and needing a systematic presentation by the consistent elimination of all inner contradictions.

Still higher ideologies, that is, such as are still further removed from the material, economic basis, take the form of philosophy and religion. Here the interconnection between conceptions and their material conditions of existence becomes more and more complicated, more and more obscured by intermediate links. But the interconnection exists. Just as the whole Renaissance period, from the middle of the fifteenth century, was an essential product of the towns and, therefore, of the burghers, so also was the subsequently newly awakened philosophy. Its content was in essence only the philosophical expression of the thoughts corresponding to the development of the small and middle burghers into a big bourgeoisie. Among last century's

Englishmen and Frenchmen, who in many cases were just as much political economists as philosophers, this is clearly evident, and we have proved it above in regard to the Hegelian school.

We will now in addition deal only briefly with religion, since the latter stands furthest away from material life and seems to be most alien to it. Religion arose in very primitive times from erroneous, primitive conceptions of men about their own nature and external nature surrounding them. Every ideology, however, once it has arisen, develops in connection with the given concept material, and develops this material further; otherwise it would not be an ideology, that is, occupation with thoughts as with independent entities, developing independently and subject only to their own laws. That the material life conditions of the persons inside whose heads this thought process goes on in the last resort determine the course of this process remains of necessity unknown to these persons, for otherwise there would be an end to all ideology. These original religious notions, therefore, which in the main are common to each group of kindred peoples, develop, after the group separates, in a manner peculiar to each people, according to the conditions of life falling to their lot. For a number of groups of peoples, and particularly for the Aryans (so-called Indo-Europeans), this process has been shown in detail by comparative mythology. The gods thus fashioned within each people were national gods, whose domain extended no further than the national territory which they were to protect; on the other side of its boundaries other gods held undisputed sway. They could continue to exist, in imagination, only as long as the nation existed; they fell with its fall. The Roman world empire, the economic conditions of whose origin we do not need to examine here, brought about this downfall of the old nationalities. The old national gods decayed, even those of the Romans, which also were patterned to suit only the narrow confines of the city of Rome. The need to complement the world empire by means of a world religion was clearly revealed in the attempts made to provide in Rome recognition and altars for all the foreign gods to the slightest degree respectable alongside the indigenous ones. But a new world religion is not to be made in this fashion, by imperial decree. The new world religion, Christianity, has already quietly come into being, out of a mixture of generalized Oriental, particularly Jewish, theology, and vulgarized Greek, particularly Stoic, philosophy. What it originally looked like has to be first laboriously discovered, since its official form, as it has been handed down to us, is merely that in which it became the state religion, to which purpose it was adapted by the Council of Nicaea. The fact that already after two hundred and fifty years it became the state religion suffices to show that it was the religion in correspondence with the conditions of the time. In the Middle Ages, in the same measure as feudalism developed, Christianity grew into the religious counterpart to it, with a corresponding feudal hierarchy. And when the burghers began to thrive, there developed, in opposition to feudal Catholicism, the Protestant heresy, which first

appeared in southern France, among the Albigenses, at the time the cities there reached the highest point of their florescence. The Middle Ages had attached to theology all the other forms of ideology—philosophy, politics, jurisprudence—and made them subdivisions of theology. It thereby constrained every social and political movement to take on a theological form. The sentiments of the masses were fed with religion to the exclusion of all else; it was therefore necessary to put forward their own interests in a religious guise in order to produce an impetuous movement. And just as the burghers from the beginning brought into being an appendage of propertyless urban plebeians, day laborers, and servants of all kinds, belonging to no recognised social estate, precursors of the later proletariat, so likewise heresy soon became divided into a burgher-moderate heresy and a plebeian-revolutionary one, the latter an abomination to the burgher heretics themselves.

The ineradicability of the Protestant heresy corresponded to the invincibility of the rising burghers. When these burghers had become sufficiently strengthened, their struggle against the feudal nobility, which till then had been predominantly local, began to assume national dimensions. The first great action occurred in Germany—the so-called Reformation. The burghers were neither powerful enough nor sufficiently developed to be able to unite under their banner the remaining rebellious estates—the plebeians of the towns, the lower nobility, and the peasants on the land. At first the nobles were defeated; the peasants rose in a revolt which formed the peak of the whole revolutionary struggle; the cities left them in the lurch, and thus the revolution succumbed to the armies of the secular princes, who reaped the whole profit. Thenceforward Germany disappears for three centuries from the ranks of countries playing an independent active part in history. But beside the German Luther appeared the Frenchman Calvin. With true French acuity he put the bourgeois character of the Reformation in the forefront, republicanized and democratized the Church. While the Lutheran reformation in Germany degenerated and reduced the country to rack and ruin, the Calvinist reformation served as a banner for the republicans in Geneva, in Holland, and in Scotland, freed Holland from Spain and from the German Empire, and provided the ideological costume for the second act of the bourgeois revolution, which was taking place in England. Here Calvinism justified itself as the true religious disguise of the interests of the bourgeoisie of that time, and on this account did not attain full recognition when the revolution ended in 1689 in a compromise between one part of the nobility and the bourgeoisie. The English state church was re-established; but not in its earlier form of a Catholicism which had the king for its pope, being, instead, strongly Calvinized. The old state church had celebrated the merry Catholic Sunday and had fought against the dull Calvinist one. The new, bourgeoisified church introduced the latter, which adorns England to this day.

In France the Calvinist minority was suppressed in 1685 and either Catholicized or driven out of the

country. But what was the good? Already at that time the freethinker Pierre Bayle was at the height of his activity, and in 1694 Voltaire was born. The forcible measures of Louis XIV only made it easier for the French bourgeoisie to carry through its revolution in the irreligious, exclusively political form which alone was suited to a developed bourgeoisie. Instead of Protestants freethinkers took their seats in the national assemblies. Thereby Christianity entered into its final stage. It had become incapable for the future of serving any progressive class as the ideological garb of its aspirations. It became more and more the exclusive possession of the ruling classes, and these apply it as a mere means of government, to keep the lower classes within bounds. Moreover, each of the different classes uses its own appropriate religion: the landed nobility — Catholic Jesuitism or Protestant orthodoxy; the liberal and radical bourgeoisie — rationalism; and it makes little difference whether these gentlemen themselves believe in their respective religions or not.

We see, therefore, religion, once formed, always contains traditional material, just as in all ideological domains tradition forms a great conservative force. But the transformations which this material undergoes spring from class relations, that is to say, out of the economic relations of the people who execute these transformations. And here that is sufficient.

In the above it could only be a question of giving a general sketch of the Marxist conception of history, at most with a few illustrations as well. The proof must be derived from history itself, and in this regard I may be permitted to say that it has been sufficiently furnished in other writings. This conception, however, puts an end to philosophy in the realm of history, just as the dialectical conception of nature makes all natural philosophy both unnecessary and impossible. It is no longer a question anywhere of inventing interconnections from out of our brains, but of discovering them in the facts. For philosophy, which has been expelled from nature and history, there remains only the realm of pure thought, so far as it is left: the theory of the laws of the thought process itself, logic and dialectics.

Antonio Gramsci

HISTORY OF THE SUBALTERN CLASSES: METHODOLOGICAL CRITERIA

(1934-5)

The historical unity of the ruling classes is realised in the State, and their history is essentially the history of States and of groups of States. But it would be wrong to think that this unity is simply juridical and political (though such forms of unity do have their importance too, and not in a purely formal sense); the fundamental historical unity, concretely, results from the organic relations between State or political society and "civil society."

The subaltern classes, by definition, are not unified and cannot unite until they are able to become a "State": their history, therefore, is intertwined with that of civil society, and thereby with the history of States and groups of States. Hence it is necessary to study: 1. the objective formation of the subaltern social groups, by the development and transformations occurring in the sphere of economic production; their quantitative diffusion and their origins in pre-existing social groups, whose mentality, ideology and aims they conserve for a time; 2. their active or passive affiliation to the dominant political formations, their attempts to influence the programmes of these formations in order to press claims of their own, and the consequences of these attempts in determining processes of decomposition, renovation or neo-formation; 3. the birth of new parties of the dominant groups, intended to conserve the assent of the subaltern groups and to maintain control over them; 4. the formations which the subaltern groups themselves produce, in order to press claims of a limited and partial character; 5. those new formations which assert the autonomy of the subaltern groups, but within the old framework; 6. those formations which assert the integral autonomy, ... etc.

The list of these phases can be broken down still further, with intermediate phases and combinations of several phases. The historian must record, and discover the causes of, the line of development towards integral autonomy, starting from the most primitive phases; he must note every manifestation of the Sorelian "spirit of cleavage". Therefore, the history of the parties of the subaltern groups is very complex too. It must include all the repercussions of party activity, throughout the area of the subaltern groups themselves taken globally, and also upon the attitudes of the dominant group; it must include as well the repercussions of the far more effective actions (effective because backed by the State) of the dominant groups upon the subaltern groups and their parties. Among the subaltern groups, one will

exercise or tend to exercise a certain hegemony through the mediation of a party; this must be established by studying the development of all the other parties too, in so far as they include elements of the hegemonic group or of the other subaltern groups which undergo such hegemony.

Numerous principles of historical research can be established by examining the innovatory forces which led the national Risorgimento in Italy: these forces took power and united in the modern Italian state, in struggle against specific other forces and helped by specific auxiliaries or allies. In order to become a State, they had to subordinate or eliminate the former and win the active or passive assent of the latter. A study of how these innovatory forces developed, from subaltern groups to hegemonic and dominant groups, must therefore seek out and identify the phases through which they acquired: 1. autonomy *vis-à-vis* the enemies they had to defeat, and 2. support from the groups which actively or passively assisted them; for this entire process was historically necessary before they could unite in the form of a State. It is precisely by these two yardsticks that the level of historical and political consciousness which the innovatory forces progressively attained in the various phases can be measured — and not simply by the yardstick of their separation from the formerly dominant forces. Usually the latter is the only criterion adopted, and the result is a unilateral history — or sometimes total incomprehension, as in the case of the history of Italy, since the era of the Communes. The Italian bourgeoisie was incapable of uniting the people around itself, and this was the cause of its defeats and the interruptions in its development.

In the Risorgimento too, the same narrow egoism prevented a rapid and vigorous revolution like the French one. This is one of the most important problems, one of the most fertile causes of serious difficulties, in writing history of the subaltern social groups and hence the (past) history *tout court* of the Italian States.

The history of subaltern social groups is necessarily fragmented and episodic. There undoubtedly does exist a tendency to (at least provisional stages of) unification in the historical activity of these groups, but this tendency is continually interrupted by the activity of the ruling groups; it therefore can only be demonstrated when an historical cycle is completed and this cycle culminates in a success. Subaltern groups are always subject to the activity of ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise up: only "permanent" victory breaks their subordination, and that not immediately. In reality, even when they appear triumphant, the subaltern groups are merely anxious to defend themselves (a truth which can be demonstrated by the history of the French Revolution at least up to 1830). Every trace of independent initiative on the part of subaltern groups should therefore be of incalculable value for the integral historian. Consequently, this kind of history can only be dealt with monographically, and each monograph requires an immense quantity of material which is often hard to collect.

V.I. Lenin

CLASS SOCIETY AND THE STATE (1917)

1. THE STATE AS THE PRODUCT OF THE IRRECONCILABILITY OF CLASS ANTAGONISMS

What is now happening to Marx's teaching has, in the course of history, happened repeatedly to the teachings of revolutionary thinkers and leaders of oppressed classes struggling for emancipation. During the lifetime of great revolutionaries, the oppressing classes constantly hounded them, received their teachings with the most savage malice, the most furious hatred and the most unscrupulous campaigns of lies and slander. After their death, attempts are made to convert them into harmless icons, to canonize them, so to say, and to surround their *names* with a certain halo for the "consolation" of the oppressed classes and with the object of duping the latter, while at the same time emasculating the *essence* of the revolutionary teaching, blunting its revolutionary edge and vulgarizing it. At the present time, the bourgeoisie and the opportunists within the working-class movement concur in this "doctoring" of Marxism. They omit, obliterate and distort the revolutionary side of this teaching, its revolutionary soul. They push to the foreground and extol what is or seems acceptable to the bourgeoisie. All the social-chauvinists are now "Marxists" (don't laugh!). And more and more frequently, German bourgeois scholars, but yesterday specialists in the annihilation of Marxism, are speaking of the "national-German" Marx, who, they aver, educated the workers' unions which are so splendidly organized for the purpose of conducting a predatory war!

In such circumstances, in view of the unprecedentedly widespread distortion of Marxism, our prime task is to *re-establish* what Marx really taught on the subject of the state. For this purpose it will be necessary to quote at length from the works of Marx and Engels themselves. Of course, long quotations will render the text cumbersome and will not help at all to make it popular reading, but we cannot possibly avoid them. All, or at any rate, all the most essential passages in the works of Marx and Engels on the subject of the state must without fail be quoted as fully as possible, in order that the reader may form an independent opinion of the totality of the views of the founders of scientific Socialism and of the development of those views, and in order that their distortion by the now prevailing "Kautskyism" may be documentarily proved and clearly demonstrated.

Let us begin with the most popular of Engels' works; *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, the sixth edition of which was pub-

lished in Stuttgart as far back as 1894. We shall have to translate the quotations from the German originals, as the Russian translations, although very numerous, are for the most part either incomplete or very unsatisfactory.

Summing up his historical analysis, Engels says:

The state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without; just as little it is 'the reality of the ethical idea,' 'the image and reality of reason', as Hegel maintains. Rather, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in sterile struggle, a power seemingly standing above society became necessary for the purpose of moderating the conflict, of keeping it within the bounds of 'order'; and this power, arisen out of society, but placing itself above it, and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state. (Pp. 117-78, sixth German edition.)

This expresses with perfect clarity the basic idea of Marxism on the question of the historical role and the meaning of the state. The state is the product and the manifestation of the *irreconcilability* of class antagonisms. The state arises when, where and to the extent that class antagonisms objectively *cannot* be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable.

It is precisely on this most important and fundamental point that the distortion of Marxism, proceeding along two main lines, begins.

On the one hand, the bourgeois and particularly the petty-bourgeois ideologists, compelled under the weight of indisputable historical facts to admit that the state only exists where there are class antagonisms and the class struggle, "correct" Marx in such a way as to make it appear that the state is an organ for the *reconciliation* of classes. According to Marx, the state could neither arise nor maintain itself if it were possible to reconcile classes. According to the petty-bourgeois and philistine professors and publicists it appears — very frequently they benignantly refer to Marx to prove this — that the state does reconcile classes. According to Marx, the state is an organ of class *rule*, an organ for the *oppression* of one class by another; it is the creation of "order", which legalizes and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the conflict between the classes. In the opinion of the petty-bourgeois politicians, order means precisely the reconciliation of classes, and not the oppression of one class by another; to moderate the conflict means reconciling classes and not depriving the oppressed classes of definite means and methods of struggle to overthrow the oppressors.

For instance, when, in the Revolution of 1917, the question of the significance and role of the state arose in all its magnitude as a practical question demanding immediate action on a mass scale, all the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks immediately and completely sank to the petty-bourgeois theory that the "state" "reconciles" classes. Innumerable resolutions and articles by politicians of

both these parties are thoroughly saturated with this petty-bourgeois and philistine "reconciliation" theory. That the state is an organ of the rule of a definite class which *cannot* be reconciled with its antipode (the class opposite to it), is something the petty-bourgeois democrats will never be able to understand. Their attitude towards the state is one of the most striking manifestations of the fact that our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks are not Socialists at all (a point that we Bolsheviks have always maintained), but petty-bourgeois democrats with near-Socialist phraseology.

On the other hand, the "Kautskyite" distortion of Marxism is far more subtle. "Theoretically", it is not denied that the state is an organ of class rule, or that class antagonisms are irreconcilable. But what is lost sight of or glossed over is this: if the state is the product of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms, if it is a power standing *above* society and "*increasingly alienating* itself from it," then it is obvious that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, *but also without the destruction* of the apparatus of state power which was created by the ruling class and which is the embodiment of this "alienation". As we shall see later, Marx very definitely drew this theoretically self-evident conclusion as a result of a concrete historical analysis of the tasks of the revolution. And — as we shall show in detail further on — it is precisely this conclusion which Kautsky ... has "forgotten" and distorted.

2. SPECIAL BODIES OF ARMED MEN, PRISONS, ETC.

Engels continues:

In contradistinction to the old gentile [tribal or clan] organization, the state, first, divides its subjects according to territory.

Such a division seems "natural" to us, but it cost a prolonged struggle against the old form of tribal or gentile society.

The second distinguishing feature is the establishment of a public power which no longer directly coincided with the population organizing itself as an armed force. This special public power is necessary, because a self-acting armed organization of the population has become impossible since the cleavage into classes.... This public power exists in every state; it consists not merely of armed people but also of material adjuncts, prisons and institutions of coercion of all kinds, of which gentile [clan] society knew nothing.

Engels further elucidates the concept of the "power" which is termed the state — a power which arose from society, but places itself above it and alienates itself more and more from it. What does this power mainly consist of? It consists of special bodies of armed men which have prisons, etc., at their command.

We are justified in speaking of special bodies of armed men, because the public power which is an attribute of every state does not "directly coincide" with the armed population, with its "self-acting armed organization."

Like all revolutionary thinkers, Engels tries to draw the attention of the class-conscious workers to the very fact which prevailing philistinism regards as least worthy of attention, as the most habitual and sanctified not only by firmly rooted, but one might say petrified prejudices. A standing army and police are the chief instruments of state power. But can it be otherwise?

From the viewpoint of the vast majority of Europeans of the end of the nineteenth century whom Engels was addressing, and who had not lived through or closely observed a single great revolution, it could not be otherwise. They completely failed to understand what a "self-acting armed organization of the population" was. To the question, whence arose the need for special bodies of armed men, placed above society and alienating themselves from it (police and standing army), the West-European and Russian philistines are inclined to answer with a few phrases borrowed from Spencer or Mikhailovsky, by referring to the growing complexity of social life, the differentiation of functions, and so forth.

Such a reference seems "scientific" and effectively dulls the senses of the man in the street by obscuring the most important and basic fact, namely, the cleavage of society into irreconcilably antagonistic classes.

Were it not for this cleavage, the "self-acting armed organization of the population" would differ from the primitive organization of a stick-wielding herd of monkeys, or of primitive man, or of men united in clans, by its complexity, its high technique, and so forth; but such an organization would still be possible.

It is impossible, because civilised society is split into antagonistic and, moreover, irreconcilably antagonistic classes, the "self-acting" arming of which would lead to an armed struggle between them. A state arises, a special power is created, special bodies of armed men, and every revolution, by destroying the state apparatus, clearly demonstrates to us how the ruling class strives to restore the special bodies of armed men which serve it, and how the oppressed class strives to create a new organization of this kind, capable of serving not the exploiters but the exploited.

In the above argument, Engels raises theoretically the very same question which every great revolution raises before us in practice, palpably and, what is more, on a scale of mass action, namely, the question of the relation between "special" bodies of armed men and the "self-acting armed organization of the population." We shall see how this question is concretely illustrated by the experience of the European and Russian revolutions.

But let us return to Engels' exposition.

He points out that sometimes, for example, in certain parts of North America, this public power is weak (he has in mind a rare exception in capitalist society, and those parts of North America in its pre-imperialist days where the free colonist predominated), but that, generally speaking, it grows stronger:

... The public power grows stronger, however, in proportion as class antagonisms within the state become

more acute, and as adjacent states become larger and more populated. We have only to look at our present-day Europe, where class struggle and rivalry in conquest have screwed up the public power to such a pitch that it threatens to devour the whole of society and even the state.

This was written not later than the beginning of the nineties of the last century, Engels' last preface being dated June 16, 1891. The turn towards imperialism — meaning the complete domination of the trusts, meaning the omnipotence of the big banks, meaning a grand-scale colonial policy, and so forth — was only just beginning in France, and was even weaker in North America and in Germany. Since then "rivalry in conquest" has made gigantic strides — especially as, by the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century, the whole world had been finally divided up among these "rivals in conquest", i.e., among the great predatory powers. Since then, military and naval armaments have grown to monstrous proportions, and the predatory war of 1914-17 for the domination of the world by England or Germany, for the division of the spoils, has brought the "devouring" of all the forces of society by the rapacious state power to the verge of complete catastrophe.

As early as 1891 Engels was able to point to "rivalry in conquest" as one of the most important distinguishing features of the foreign policy of the Great Powers, but in 1914-17, when this rivalry, many times intensified, has given rise to an imperialist war, the social-chauvinist scoundrels cover up the defence of the predatory interests of "their own" bourgeoisie with phrases about "defence of the fatherland," "defence of the republic and the revolution," etc.!

3. THE STATE AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF THE OPPRESSED CLASS

For the maintenance of the special public power standing above society, taxes and state loans are needed.

"In possession of the public power and of the right to levy taxes, the officials," Engels writes, "as organs of society, now stand *above* society. The free, voluntary respect that was accorded to the organs of the gentile (clan) constitution does not satisfy them, even if they could gain it...." Special laws are enacted proclaiming the sanctity and immunity of the officials. "The shabbiest police servant" has more "authority" than the representatives of the clan, but even the head of the military power of a civilised state may well envy an elder of a clan the "uncoerced respect" of society.

Here the problem of the privileged position of the officials as organs of state power is raised. The main question indicated is: what is it that places them *above* society? We shall see how this theoretical question was answered in practice by the Paris Commune in 1871 and how it was slurred over in a reactionary manner by Kautsky in 1912.

As the state arose from the need to hold class antago-

nisms in check, but as it arose, at the same time, in the midst of the conflict of these classes, it is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class. Not only were the ancient and feudal states organs for the exploitation of the slaves and serfs but the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage labour by capital. By way of exception, however, periods occur in which the warring classes balance each other so nearly that the state power, as ostensible mediator, acquires, for the moment, a certain degree of independence of both. Such were the absolute monarchies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Bonapartism of the First and Second Empires in France, and the Bismarck regime in Germany.

Such, we may add, is the Kerensky government in republican Russia since it began to persecute the revolutionary proletariat, at a moment when, owing to the leadership of the petty-bourgeois democrats, the Soviets have *already* become impotent, while the bourgeoisie is not *yet* strong enough simply to disperse them.

In a democratic republic, Engels continues, "wealth exercises its power indirectly, but all the more surely," first, by means of the "direct corruption of officials" (America); second, by means of "an alliance between the government and Stock Exchange" (France and America).

At the present time, imperialism and the domination of the banks have "developed" both these methods of upholding and giving effect to the omnipotence of wealth in democratic republics of all descriptions into an unusually fine art. If, for instance, in the very first months of the Russian democratic republic, one might say during the honeymoon of the "Socialist" S-R's [Socialist-Revolutionaries] and the Mensheviks joined in wedlock to the bourgeoisie, Mr. Palchinsky, in the coalition government, obstructed every measure intended for curbing the capitalists and their marauding practices, their plundering of the treasury by means of war contracts; and if later on Mr Palchinsky resigned (and, of course, was replaced by another exactly like Palchinsky), and the capitalists "rewarded" him with a "soft" job at a salary of 120,000 rubles per annum — what would you call this — direct or indirect bribery? An alliance between the government and the directors of syndicates, or "merely" friendly relations? What role do the Chernovs, Tseretelis, Avksentyevs and Skobelevs play? Are they the "direct" or only the indirect allies of the millionaire treasury-looters?

The reason why the omnipotence of "wealth" is better *secured* in a democratic republic, is that it does not depend on the faulty political shell of capitalism. A democratic republic is the best possible political shell for capitalism, and, therefore, once capital has gained control of this very best shell (through the Palchinskys, Chernovs, Tseretelis and Co.), it establishes its power so securely, so firmly, that *no* change, either of persons, of institutions, or of parties in the bourgeois-democratic republic, can shake it.

We must also note that Engels is most definite in

calling universal suffrage an instrument of bourgeois rule. Universal suffrage, he says, obviously summing up the long experience of German Social-Democracy, is "the gauge of the maturity of the working class. It cannot and never will be anything more in the present-day state."

The petty-bourgeois democrats, such as our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and also their twin brothers, all the social-chauvinists and opportunists of Western Europe, expect just this "more" from universal suffrage. They themselves share and instil into the minds of the people the false notion that universal suffrage "in the *modern* state" is really capable of ascertaining the will of the majority of the toilers and of securing its realization.

Here we can only indicate this false notion; only point out that Engels' perfectly clear, precise and concrete statement is distorted at every step in the propaganda and agitation of the "official" (i.e. opportunist) Socialist parties. A detailed exposure of the utter falsity of this notion which Engels brushes aside here is given in our further account of the views of Marx and Engels on the "*modern*" state.

Engels gives a general summary of his views in the most popular of his works in the following words:

The state, then, has not existed from all eternity. There have been societies that did without it, that had no conception of the state and state power. At a certain stage of economic development, which was necessarily bound up with the cleavage of society into classes, the state became a necessity owing to this cleavage. We are now rapidly approaching a stage in the development of production at which the existence of these classes not only will have ceased to be a necessity, but will become a positive hindrance to production. They will fall as inevitably as they arose at an earlier stage. Along with them the state will inevitably fall. The society that will organize production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the Museum of Antiquities, by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe.

We do not often come across this passage in the propagandist and agitational literature of present-day Social-Democracy. But even when we do come across it, it is mostly quoted in the same manner as one bows before an icon, i.e., it is done to show official respect for Engels, and no attempt is made to gauge the breadth and depth of the revolution that this relegating of "the whole state machine to the Museum of Antiquities" presupposes. In most cases we do not even find an understanding of what Engels calls the state machine.

4. THE "WITHERING AWAY" OF THE STATE AND VIOLENT REVOLUTION

Engels' words regarding the "withering away" of the state are so widely known, they are so often quoted, and so clearly reveal the essence of the customary adulteration of Marxism to look like opportunism that we must deal with them in detail. We shall quote the whole argument from which they are taken.

The proletariat seizes the state power and transforms the

means of production in the first instance into state property. But in doing this, it puts an end to itself as proletariat, it puts an end to all class differences and class antagonisms; it puts an end also to the state as state. Former society, moving in class antagonisms, had need of the state, that is, an organization of the exploiting class at each period for the maintenance of its external conditions of production; that is, therefore, mainly for the forcible holding down of the exploited class in the conditions of oppression (slavery, villeinage or serfdom, wage labour) determined by the existing mode of production. The state was the official representative of society as a whole, its summation in a visible corporation; but it was this only in so far as it was the state of that class which itself, in its epoch, represented society as a whole: in ancient times, the state of the slave-owning citizens; in the Middle Ages, of the feudal nobility; in our epoch, of the bourgeoisie. When ultimately it becomes really representative of society as a whole, it makes itself superfluous. As soon as there is no longer any class of society to be held in subjection; as soon as along with class domination and the struggle for individual existence based on the anarchy of production hitherto, the collisions and excesses arising from these have also been abolished, there is nothing more to be repressed which would make a special repressive force, a state, necessary. The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole — the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society — is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not 'abolished', it *withers away*. It is from this standpoint that we must appraise the phrase 'free people's state' — both its temporary justification for agitational purposes, and its ultimate scientific inadequacy — and also the demand of the so-called anarchists that the state should be abolished overnight. (*Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science [Anti-Dühring]*, pp. 301-03, third German edition.)

It may be said without fear of error that of this argument of Engels' which is so remarkably rich in ideas, only one point has become an integral part of socialist thought among modern socialist parties, namely, that according to Marx the state "wither away" — as distinct from the anarchist doctrine of the "abolition" of the state. To prune Marxism in such a manner is to reduce it to opportunism, for such an "interpretation" only leaves a vague notion of a slow, even, gradual change, of absence of leaps and storms, of absence of revolution. The current, widespread, mass, if one may say so, conception of the "withering away" of the state undoubtedly means toning down, if not repudiating, revolution.

Such an "interpretation," however, is the crudest distortion of Marxism, advantageous only to the bourgeoisie; in point of theory, it is based on a disregard for the most important circumstances and considerations indicated, say, in Engels' "summary" argument we have just quoted in full.

In the first place, at the very outset of his argument Engels says that, in seizing state power, the proletariat thereby "abolishes the state as state." It is not "good form" to ponder over the meaning of this. Generally, it is either ignored altogether, or is considered to be something in the nature of "Hegel-

ian weakness" on Engels' part. As a matter of fact, however, these words briefly express the experience of one of the greatest proletarian revolutions, the Paris Commune of 1871, of which we shall speak in greater detail in its proper place. As a matter of fact, Engels speaks here of the proletarian revolution "abolishing" the *bourgeois* state, while the words about the state withering away refer to the remnants of the *proletarian* state *after* the socialist revolution. According to Engels the bourgeois state does not "wither away," but is "*abolished*" by the proletariat in the course of the revolution. What withers away after this revolution is the proletarian state or semi-state.

Secondly, the state is a "special repressive force." Engels gives this splendid and extremely profound definition here with the utmost lucidity. And from it follows that the "special repressive force" for the suppression of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie, of millions of toilers by handfuls of the rich, must be replaced by a "special repressive force" for the suppression of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat (the dictatorship of the proletariat). This is precisely what is meant by "abolition of the state as state." This is precisely the "act" of taking possession of the means of production in the name of society. And it is self-evident that *such* a replacement of one (bourgeois) "special force" by another (proletarian) "special force" cannot possibly take place in the form of "withering away."

Thirdly, in speaking of the state "withering away," and the even more graphic and colourful "ceasing of itself," Engels refers quite clearly and definitely to the period *after* "the state has taken possession of the means of production in the name of the whole of society," that is, *after* the socialist revolution. We all know that the political form of the "state" at that time is the most complete democracy. But it never enters the head of any of the opportunists who shamelessly distort Marxism that Engels is consequently speaking here of *democracy* "ceasing of itself," or "withering away." This seems very strange at first sight; but it is "incomprehensible" only to those who have not pondered over the fact that democracy is *also* a state and that, consequently, democracy will also disappear when the state disappears. Revolution alone can "abolish" the bourgeois state. The state is general, i.e., the most complete democracy, can only "wither away."

Fourthly, after formulating his famous proposition that "the state withers away," Engels at once explains specifically that this proposition is directed against both the opportunists and the anarchists. In doing this Engels puts in the forefront that conclusions drawn from the proposition that "the state withers away" which is directed against the opportunists.

One can wager that out of every 10,000 persons who have read or heard about the "withering away" of the state, 9,990 are completely unaware; or do not remember, that Engels directed his conclusions from this proposition *not* against the anarchists *alone*. And of the remaining ten, probably nine do not know the meaning of "free people's state" or why an attack on this slogan means an attack on the oppor-

tunists. This is how history is written! This is how a great revolutionary teaching is imperceptibly falsified and adapted to prevailing philistinism! The conclusion directed against the anarchists has been repeated thousands of times, vulgarised, dinned into people's heads in the lowest form and has acquired the strength of a prejudice; whereas the conclusion directed against the opportunists has been slurred over and "forgotten"!

The "free people's state" was a program demand and a widely current slogan of the German Social-Democrats in the seventies. This slogan is devoid of all political content except for the fact that it describes the concept of democracy in the pompous philistine fashion. In so far as it hinted in a legally permissible manner at a democratic republic, Engels was prepared to "justify" its use "for a time" from an agitational point of view. But it was an opportunist slogan, for it expressed not only an embellishment of bourgeois democracy, but also failure to understand the socialist criticism of the state in general. We are in favour of a democratic republic as the best form of the state for the proletariat under capitalism; but we have no right to forget that wage slavery is the lot of the people even in the most democratic bourgeois republic. Furthermore, every state is a "special force for the suppression" of the oppressed class. Consequently, every state is not "free" and not a "people's state." Marx and Engels explained this repeatedly to their party comrades in the seventies.

Fifthly, this very same work of Engels'; of which everyone remembers the argument about the withering away of the state, also contains an argument of the significance of violent revolution. Engels' historical analysis of its role becomes a veritable panegyric on violent revolution. This "no one remembers"; it is not form in modern Socialist parties to talk or even think about the significance of this idea, and it plays no part whatever in their daily propaganda and agitation among the masses. And yet, it is inseparably bound with the "withering away" of the state into one harmonious whole.

Here is Engels' argument:

...That force, however, plays another role (other than that of a diabolical power) in history, a revolutionary role; that, in the words of Marx, it is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant with the new, that it is the instrument by the aid of which the social movement forces its way through and shatters the dead, fossilized political forms — of this there is not a word in Herr Dühring. It is only with sighs and groans that he admits the possibility that force will perhaps be necessary for the overthrow of the economic system of exploitation — unfortunately, because all use of force, forsooth, demoralizes the person who uses it. And this in spite of the immense moral and spiritual impetus which has resulted from every victorious revolution! And this in Germany, where a violent collision — which indeed many be forced on the people — would at least have the advantage of wiping out the servility which has permeated the national consciousness as a result of the humiliation of the Thirty Years' War. And this parson's mode of thought — lifeless, insipid and impotent — claims to impose itself on the most revolutionary party which history has known! (P. 193, third German edition, Part II, end of Chap. IV.)

How can this panegyric on violent revolution, which Engels insistently brought to the attention of the German Social-Democrats between 1878 and 1894, i.e., right up to the time of his death, be combined with the theory of the "withering away" of the state to form a single doctrine?

Usually the two are combined by means of eclecticism, by an unprincipled, or sophistic selection made arbitrarily (or to please the powers that be) of now one, now another argument, and in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, if not more often, it is the idea of the "withering away" that is placed in the forefront. Dialectics are replaced by eclecticism — this is the most usual, the most widespread phenomenon to be met with in present-day official Social-Democratic literature in relation to Marxism. This sort of substitution is, of course, no new thing, it was observed even in the history of Greek philosophy. In falsifying Marxism in opportunist fashion, the substitution of eclecticism for dialectics is the easiest way of deceiving the masses; it gives an illusory satisfaction; it seems to take into account all sides of the process, all tendencies of development, all the conflicting influences, and so forth, whereas in reality it presents no integral and revolutionary conception of the process of social development at all.

We have already said above, and shall show more fully later, that the teaching of Marx and Engels concerning the inevitability of a violent revolution refers to the bourgeois state. The latter cannot be superseded by the proletarian state (the dictatorship of the proletariat) through the process of "withering away," but, as a general rule, only through a violent revolution. The panegyric Engels sang in its honour, and which fully corresponds to Marx's repeated declarations (recall the concluding passages of *The Poverty of Philosophy* and the *Communist Manifesto*, with their proud and open proclamation of the inevitability of a violent revolution; recall what Marx wrote nearly thirty years later, in criticizing the Gotha Program of 1875, when he mercilessly castigated the opportunist character of that program) — this panegyric is by no means a mere "impulse", a mere declaration or a polemical sally. The necessity of systematically imbuing the masses with *this* and precisely this view of violent revolution lies at the root of *all* the teachings of Marx and Engels. The betrayal of their teaching by the now predominant social-chauvinist and Kautskyite trends is expressed in striking relief by the neglect of *such* propaganda and agitation by both these trends.

The supersession of the bourgeois state by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution. The abolition of the proletarian state, i.e., of the state in general, is impossible except through the process of "withering away".

A detailed and concrete elaboration of these views was given by Marx and Engels when they studied each separate revolutionary situation, when they analyzed the lessons of the experience of each individual revolution. We shall now pass to this, undoubtedly the most important, part of their teaching.

Antonio Gramsci

HEGEMONY (CIVIL SOCIETY) AND SEPARATION OF POWERS

(1930-4)

The separation of powers, together with all the discussion provoked by its realisation and the legal dogmas which its appearance brought into being, is a product of the struggle between civil society and political society in a specific historical period. This period is characterised by a certain unstable equilibrium between the classes, which is a result of the fact that certain categories of intellectuals (in the direct service of the State, especially the civil and military bureaucracy) are still too closely tied to the old dominant classes. In other words, there takes place within the society what Croce calls the "perpetual conflict between Church and State", in which the Church is taken as representing the totality of civil society (whereas in fact it is only an element of diminishing importance within it), and the State as representing every attempt to crystallise permanently a particular stage of development, a particular situation. In this sense, the Church itself may become State, and the conflict may occur between on the one hand secular (and secularising) civil society, and on the other State/Church (when the Church has become an integral part of the State, of political society monopolised by a specific privileged group, which absorbs the Church in order the better to preserve its monopoly with the support of that zone of "civil society" which the Church represents).

Essential importance of the separation of powers for political and economic liberalism; the entire liberal ideology, with its strengths and its weaknesses, can be encapsulated in the principle of the separation of powers, and the source of liberalism's weakness then becomes apparent: it is the bureaucracy—i.e. the crystallisation of the leading personnel—which exercises coercive power, and at a certain point it becomes a caste. Hence the popular demand for making all posts elective—a demand which is extreme liberalism, and at the same time its dissolution (principle of the permanent Constituent Assembly, etc.; in Republics, the election at fixed intervals of the Head of State give the illusion of satisfying this elementary popular demand).

Unity of the State in the differentiation of powers: Parliament more closely linked to civil society; the judiciary power, between government and Parliament, represents the continuity of the written law (even against the government). Naturally all three powers are also organs of political hegemony, but in different degrees: 1. Legislature; 2. Judiciary; 3. Executive. It is to be noted how lapses in the administration of justice make an especially disastrous impression on the public: the hegemonic apparatus is more sensitive in this sector, to

which arbitrary actions on the part of the police and political administration may also be referred.

THE CONCEPTION OF LAW

A conception of the Law which must be an essentially innovatory one is not to be found, integrally, in any pre-existing doctrine (not even in the doctrine of the so-called positive school, and notably that of Ferri). If every State tends to create and maintain a certain type of civilisation and of citizen (and hence of collective life and of individual relations), and to eliminate certain customs and attitudes and to disseminate others, then the Law will be its instrument for this purpose (together with the school system, and other institutions and activities). It must be developed so that it is suitable for such a purpose—so that it is maximally effective and productive of positive results.

The conception of law will have to be freed from every residue of transcendentalism and from every absolute; in practice, from every moralistic fanaticism. However, it seems to me that one cannot start from the view that the State does not "punish" (if this term is reduced to its human significance), but only struggles against social "dangerousness". In reality, the State must be conceived of as an "educator", in as much as it tends precisely to create a new type or level of civilisation. Because one is acting essentially on economic forces, reorganising and developing the apparatus of economic production, creating a new structure, the conclusion must not be drawn that superstructural factors should be left to themselves, to develop spontaneously, to a haphazard and sporadic germination. The State, in this field, too, is an instrument of "rationalisation", of acceleration and of Taylorisation. It operates according to a plan, urges, incites, solicits, and "punishes"; for, once the conditions are created in which a certain way of life is "possible", then "criminal action or omission" must have a punitive sanction, with moral implications, and not merely be judged generically as "dangerous". The Law is the repressive and negative aspect of the entire positive, civilising activity undertaken by the State. The "prize-giving" activities of individuals and groups, etc., must also be incorporated in the conception of the Law; praiseworthy and meritorious activity is rewarded, just as criminal actions are punished (and punished in original ways, bringing in "public opinion" as a form of sanction).

**Karl Marx
Frederick Engels**

RULING CLASS AND RULING IDEAS

(1845)

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an "eternal law".

The division of labour, which we already saw as one of the chief forces of history up till now, manifests itself also in the ruling class as the division of mental and material labour, so that inside this class one part appears as the thinkers of the class (its active, conceptive ideologists, who make the perfecting of the illusion of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood), while the others' attitude to these ideas and illusions is more passive and receptive, because they are in reality the active members of this class and have less time to make up illusions and ideas about themselves. Within this class this cleavage can even develop into a certain opposition and hostility between the two parts, which, however, in the case of a practical collision, in which the class itself is endangered, automatically comes to nothing, in which case there also vanishes the semblance that the ruling ideas were not the ideas of the ruling class and had a power distinct from the power of this class. The existence of revolutionary ideas in a particular period presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class; about the premises for the latter sufficient has already been said above.

If now in considering the course of history we detach the ideas of the ruling class from the ruling class itself and attribute to them an independent ex-

istence, if we confine ourselves to saying that these or those ideas were dominant at a given time, without bothering ourselves about the conditions of production and the producers of these ideas, if we thus ignore the individuals and world conditions which are the source of the ideas, we can say, for instance, that during the time that the aristocracy was dominant, the concepts honour, loyalty, etc. were dominant, during the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts freedom, equality, etc. The ruling class itself on the whole imagines this to be so. This conception of history, which is common to all historians, particularly since the eighteenth century, will necessarily come up against the phenomenon that increasingly abstract ideas hold sway, i.e. ideas which increasingly take on the form of universality. For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones. The class making a revolution appears from the very start, if only because it is opposed to a class, not as a class but as the representative of the whole of society; it appears as the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class.¹ It can do this because, to start with, its interest really is more connected with the common interest of all other non-ruling classes, because under the pressure of hitherto existing conditions its interest has not yet been able to develop as the particular interest of a particular class. Its victory, therefore, benefits also many individuals of the other classes which are not winning a dominant position, but only insofar as it now puts these individuals in a position to raise themselves into the ruling class. When the French bourgeoisie overthrew the power of the aristocracy, it thereby made it possible for many proletarians to raise themselves above the proletariat, but only insofar as they become bourgeois. Every new class, therefore, achieves its hegemony only on a broader basis than that of the class ruling previously, whereas the opposition of the non-ruling class against the new ruling class later develops all the more sharply and profoundly. Both these things determine the fact that the struggle to be waged against this new ruling class, in its turn, aims at a more decided and radical negation of the previous conditions of society than could all previous classes which sought to rule.

The whole semblance, that the rule of a certain class is only the rule of certain ideas, comes to a natural end, of course, as soon as class rule in general ceases to be the form in which society is organised, that is to say, as soon as it is no longer necessary to represent a particular interest as general or the "general interest" as ruling.

Once the ruling ideas have been separated from the ruling individuals and, above all, from the re-

1. Universality corresponds to (1) the class versus the estate, (2) the competition, world-wide intercourse, etc., (3) the great numerical strength of the ruling class, (4) the illusion of the common interests (in the beginning this illusion is true), (5) the delusion of the ideologists and the division of labour.

Antonio Gramsci
**THE CONCEPT OF
"IDEOLOGY"**

(1929-35)

"Ideology" was an aspect of "sensationalism", i.e. eighteenth-century French materialism. Its original meaning was that of "science of ideas", and since analysis was the only method recognised and applied by science it means "analysis of ideas", that is, "investigation of the origin of ideas". Ideas had to be broken down into their original "elements", and these could be nothing other than "sensations". Ideas derived from sensations. But sensationalism could be associated, without too much difficulty, with religious faith and with the most extreme beliefs in the "power of the Spirit" and its "immortal destiny", so that Manzoni, even after his conversion and return to Catholicism, even at the time when he wrote the *Inni sacri*, continued to adhere in principle to the theory of sensationalism, until he learnt about the philosophy of Rosmini.¹

How the concept of Ideology passed from meaning "science of ideas" and "analysis of the origin of ideas" to meaning a specific "system of ideas" needs to be examined historically. In purely logical terms the process is easy to grasp and understand.

It could be asserted that Freud is the last of the Ideologues, and that De Man is also an "ideologue". This makes the "enthusiasm" of Croce and the Croceans for De Man even more curious — or would it there wasn't a "practical" justification for their enthusiasm. One should examine the way in which the author of the *Popular Manual* [Bukharin] has remained trapped in Ideology; whereas the philosophy of praxis represents a distinct advance and historically is precisely in opposition to Ideology. Indeed the meaning which the term "ideology" has assumed in Marxist philosophy implicitly contains a negative value judgement and excludes the possibility that for its founders the origin of ideas should be sought for in sensations, and therefore, in the last analysis, in physiology. "Ideology" itself must be analysed historically, in the terms of the philosophy

1. The most effective literary propagator of ideology was Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836), because of the ease and popularity of his exposition. Another was Dr. Cabanis with his *Rapport du Physique et du Moral*. (Condillac, Helvetius, etc., are more strictly speaking philosophers.) Link between Catholicism and ideology: Manzoni, Cabanis, Bourget, Taine (Taine is the *chef d'école* for Maurras and others of a Catholic tendency); also the "psychological novel" (Stendhal was a pupil of De Tracy, etc.). Destutt de Tracy's main work is the *Elements d'Ideologie* (Paris 1817-18). The Italian translation is more complete (*Elementi di Ideologia del Conte Destutt de Tracy*, translated by G. Compagnoni, Milan, Stamperia di Giambattista Sonzogno, 1819). In the French text a whole section is missing, I think the one on Love, which Stendhal knew and used from the Italian translation.

relationships which result from a given stage of the mode of production, and in this way the conclusion has been reached that history is always under the sway of ideas, it is very easy to abstract from these various ideas "the idea", the notion, etc. as the dominant force in history, and thus to understand all these separate ideas and concepts as "forms of self-determination" on the part of the concept developing in history. It follows then naturally, too, that all the relationships of men can be derived from the concept of man, man as conceived, the essence of man, *Man*. This has been done by the speculative philosophers. Hegel himself confesses at the end of the *Geschichtsphilosophie* that he "has considered the progress of the concept only" and has represented in history the "true theodicy". Now one can go back again to the producers of the "concept", to the theorists, ideologists and philosophers, and one comes then to the conclusion that the philosophers, the thinkers as such, have at all times been dominant in history: a conclusion, as we see, already expressed by Hegel. The whole trick of proving the hegemony of the spirit in history (hierarchy Stirner calls it) is thus confined to the following three efforts.

No. 1. One must separate the ideas of those ruling for empirical reasons, under empirical conditions and as empirical individuals, from these actual rulers, and thus recognise the rule of ideas or illusions in history.

No. 2. One must bring an order into this rule of ideas, prove a mystical connection among the successive ruling ideas, which is managed by understanding them as "acts of self-determination on the part of the concept" (this is possible because by virtue of their empirical basis these ideas are really connected with one another and because, conceived as mere ideas, they become self-distinctions, distinctions made by thought).

No. 3. To remove the mystical appearance of this "self-determining concept" it is changed into a person—"Self-Consciousness"—or, to appear thoroughly materialistic, into a series of persons, who represent the "concept" in history, into the "thinkers", the "philosophers", the ideologists, who again are understood as the manufacturers of history, as the "council of guardians", as the rulers. Thus the whole body of materialistic elements has been removed from history and now full rein can be given to the speculative steed.

Whilst in ordinary life every shopkeeper is very well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is, our historians have not yet won even this trivial insight. They take every epoch at its word and believe that everything it says and imagines about itself is true.

V.I. Lenin

NATIONAL CULTURE

(1913)

of praxis, as a superstructure.

It seems to me that there is a potential element of error in assessing the value of ideologies, due to the fact (by no means casual) that the name ideology is given both to the necessary superstructure of a particular structure and to the arbitrary elucubrations of particular individuals. The bad sense of the word has become widespread, with the effect that the theoretical analysis of the concept of ideology has been modified and denatured. The process leading up to this error can be easily reconstructed:

1. ideology is identified as distinct from the structure, and it is asserted that it is not ideology that changes the structures but vice versa;

2. it is asserted that a given political solution is "ideological" — i.e. that it is not sufficient to change the structure, although it thinks that it can do so; it is asserted that it is useless, stupid, etc.;

3. one then passes to the assertion that every ideology is "pure" appearance, useless, stupid, etc.

One must therefore distinguish between historically organic ideologies, those, that is, which are necessary to a given structure, and ideologies that are arbitrary, rationalistic, or "willed". To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity which is "psychological"; they "organise" human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc. To the extent that they are arbitrary they only create individual "movements", polemics and so on (though even these are not completely useless, since they function like an error which by contrasting with the truth, demonstrates it).

It is worth recalling the frequent affirmation made by Marx on the "solidity of popular beliefs" as a necessary element of a specific situation. What he says more or less is "when this way of conceiving things has the force of popular beliefs", etc. Another proposition of Marx is that a popular conviction often has the same energy as a material force or something of the kind, which is extremely significant. The analysis of these propositions tends, I think, to reinforce the conception of *historical bloc* in which precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, though this distinction between form and content has purely didactic value, since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces.

As the reader will see, the article in *Severnaya Pravda* made use of a particular example, i.e., the problem of the official language, to illustrate the inconsistency and opportunism of the liberal bourgeoisie, which, in the national question, extends a hand to the feudalists and the police. Everybody will understand that, apart from the problem of an official language, the liberal bourgeoisie behaves just as treacherously, hypocritically and stupidly (even from the standpoint of the interests of liberalism) in a number of other related issues.

The conclusion to be drawn from this? It is that all liberal-bourgeois nationalism sows the greatest corruption among the workers and does immense harm to the cause of freedom and the proletarian class struggle. This bourgeois (and bourgeois-feudalist) tendency is all the more dangerous for its being concealed behind the slogan of "national culture". It is under the guise of national culture — Great-Russian, Polish, Jewish, Ukrainian, and so forth — that the Black-Hundreds and the clericals, and also the bourgeoisie of all nations, are doing their dirty and reactionary work.

Such are the facts of the national life of today, if viewed from the Marxist angle, i.e., from the standpoint of the class struggle, and if the slogans are compared with the interests and policies of classes, and not with meaningless "general principles", declamations and phrases.

The slogan of national culture is a bourgeois (and often also a Black-Hundred and clerical) fraud. Our slogan is: the international culture of democracy and of the world working-class movement.

Here the Bundist Mr Liebman rushes into the fray and annihilates me with the following deadly tirade:

Anyone in the least familiar with the national question knows that international culture is not non-national culture (culture without a national form); non-national culture, which must not be Russian, Jewish, or Polish, but only pure culture, is nonsense; international ideas can appeal to the working class only when they are adapted to the language spoken by the worker, and to the concrete national conditions under which he lives; the worker should not be indifferent to the condition and development of his national culture, because it is through it, and only through it, that he is able to participate in the international culture of democracy and of the world working-class movement. This is well known, but V.I. turns a deaf ear to it all....

Ponder over this typically Bundist argument, designed, if you please, to demolish the Marxist thesis that I advanced. With the air of supreme self-confidence of one who is "familiar with the national question", this Bundist passes off ordinary bourgeois views as "well-known" axioms.

It is true, my dear Bundist, that international

culture is not non-national. Nobody said that it was. Nobody has proclaimed a "pure" culture, either Polish, Jewish, or Russian, etc., and your jumble of empty words is simply an attempt to distract the reader's attention and to obscure the issue with tinkling words.

The elements of democratic and socialist culture are present, if only in rudimentary form, in every national culture, since in every nation there are toiling and exploited masses, whose conditions of life inevitably give rise to the ideology of democracy and socialism. But every nation also possesses a bourgeois culture (and most nations a reactionary and clerical culture as well) in the form, not merely of "elements", but of the dominant culture. Therefore, the general "national culture" is the culture of the landlords, the clergy and the bourgeoisie. This fundamental and, for a Marxist, elementary truth, was kept in the background by the Bundist, who "drowned" it in his jumble of words, i.e., instead of revealing and clarifying the class gulf to the reader, he in fact obscured it. In fact, the Bundist acted like a bourgeois, whose every interest requires the spreading of a belief in a non-class national culture.

In advancing the slogan of "the international culture of democracy and the world working-class movement", we take from each national culture only its democratic and socialist elements; we take them only and absolutely in opposition to the bourgeois culture and the bourgeois nationalism of each nation. No democrat, and certainly no Marxist, denies that all languages should have equal status, or that it is necessary to polemise with one's "native" bourgeoisie in one's native language and to advocate anti-clerical or anti-bourgeois ideas among one's "native" peasantry and petty bourgeoisie. That goes without saying, but the Bundist uses these indisputable truths to obscure the point in dispute, i.e., the real issue.

The question is whether it is permissible for a Marxist, directly or indirectly, to advance the slogan of national culture, or whether he should oppose it by advocating, in all languages, the slogan of workers' internationalism while "adapting" himself to all local and national features.

The significance of the "national culture" slogan is not determined by some petty intellectual's promise, or good intention, to "interpret" it as "meaning the development through it of an international culture". It would be puerile subjectivism to look at it in that way. The significance of the slogan of national culture is determined by the objective alignment of all classes in a given country, and in all countries of the world. The national culture of the bourgeoisie is a fact (and, I repeat, the bourgeoisie everywhere enters into deals with the landed proprietors and the clergy). Aggressive bourgeois nationalism, which drugs the minds of the workers, stultifies and disunites them in order that the bourgeoisie may lead them by the halter — such is the fundamental fact of the times.

Those who seek to serve the proletariat must unite the workers of all nations, and unswervingly fight bourgeois nationalism, domestic and foreign. The place of those who advocate the slogan of national culture is among the nationalist petty bour-

geois, not among the Marxists.

Take a concrete example. Can a Great-Russian Marxist accept the slogan of national, Great-Russian, culture? No, he cannot. Anyone who does that should stand in the ranks of the nationalists, not of the Marxists. Our task is to fight the dominant, Black-Hundred and bourgeois national culture of the Great Russians, and to develop, exclusively in the international spirit and in the closest alliance with the workers of other countries, the rudiments also existing in the history of our democratic and working-class movement. Fight your own Great-Russian landlords and bourgeoisie, fight "their culture" in the name of internationalism, and, in so fighting, "adapt" yourself to the special features of the Purishkevishes and Struves — that is your task, not preaching or tolerating the slogan of national culture.

The same applies to the more oppressed and persecuted nation — the Jews. Jewish national culture is the slogan of the rabbis and the bourgeoisie, the slogan of our enemies. But there are other elements in Jewish culture and in Jewish history as a whole. Of the ten and a half million Jews in the world, somewhat over a half live in Galicia and Russia, backward and semi-barbarous countries, where the Jews are forcibly kept in the status of a caste. The other half lives in the civilised world, and there the Jews do not live as a segregated caste. There the great world-progressive features of Jewish culture stand clearly revealed: its internationalism, its identification with the advanced movements of the epoch (the percentage of Jews in the democratic and proletarian movements is everywhere higher than the percentage of Jews among the population).

Whoever, directly or indirectly, puts forward the slogan of Jewish "national culture" is (whatever his good intentions may be) an enemy of the proletariat, a supporter of all that is outmoded and connected with caste among the Jewish people; he is an accomplice of the rabbis and the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, those Jewish Marxists who mingle with the Russian, Lithuanian, Ukrainian and other workers in international Marxist organisations, and make their contribution (both in Russian and in Yiddish) towards creating the international culture of the working-class movement — those Jews, despite the separatism of the Bund, uphold the best traditions of Jewry by fighting the slogan of "national culture".

Bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism — these are the two irreconcilably hostile slogans that correspond to the two great class camps throughout the capitalist world, and express the two policies (nay, the two world outlooks) in the national question. In advocating the slogan of national culture and building up on it an entire plan and practical programme of what they call "cultural-national autonomy", the Bundists are in effect instruments of bourgeois nationalism among the workers.

Antonio Gramsci

THE FORMATION OF THE INTELLECTUALS (1929-35)

Are intellectuals an autonomous and independent social group, or does every social group have its own particular specialised category of intellectuals? The problem is a complex one, because of the variety of forms assumed to date by the real historical process of formation of the different categories of intellectuals.

The most important of these forms are two:

1. Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields. The capitalist entrepreneur creates alongside himself the industrial technician, the specialist in political economy, the organisers of a new culture, of a new legal system, etc. It should be noted that the entrepreneur himself represents a higher level of social elaboration, already characterised by a certain directive [*dirigente*] and technical (i.e. intellectual) capacity: he must have a certain technical capacity, not only in the limited sphere of his activity and initiative but in other spheres as well, at least in those which are closest to economic production. He must be an organiser of masses of men; he must be an organiser of the "confidence" of investors in his business, of the customers for his product, etc.

If not all entrepreneurs, at least an *elite* amongst them must have the capacity to be an organiser of society in general, including all its complex organism of services, right up to the state organism, because of the need to create the conditions most favourable to the expansion of their own class; or at the least they must possess the capacity to choose the deputies (specialised employees) to whom to entrust this activity of organising the general system of relationships external to the business itself. It can be observed that the "organic" intellectuals which every new class creates alongside itself and elaborates in the course

1. Mosca's *Elementi di Scienza Politica* (new expanded edition, 1923) are worth looking at in this connection. Mosca's so-called "political class" is nothing other than the intellectual category of the dominant social group. Mosca's concept of "political class" can be connected with Pareto's concept of the *elite*, which is another attempt to interpret the historical phenomenon of the intellectuals and their function in the life of the state and of society. Mosca's book is an enormous hotch-potch, of a sociological and positivistic character, plus the tendentiousness of immediate politics which makes it less indigestible and livelier from a literary point of view.

2. For one category of these intellectuals, possibly the most important after the ecclesiastical for its prestige and the social function it performed in primitive societies, the

of its development, are for the most part "specialisations" of partial aspects of the primitive activity of the new social type which the new class has brought into prominence.¹

Even feudal lords were possessors of a particular technical capacity, military capacity, and it is precisely from the moment at which the aristocracy loses its monopoly of technico-military capacity that the crisis of feudalism begins. But the formation of intellectuals in the feudal world and in the preceding classical world is a question to be examined separately: this formation and elaboration follows ways and means which must be studied concretely. Thus it is to be noted that the mass of the peasantry, although it performs an essential function in the world of production, does not elaborate its own "organic" intellectuals, nor does it "assimilate" any stratum of "traditional" intellectuals, although it is from the peasantry that other social groups draw many of their intellectuals and a high proportion of traditional intellectuals are of peasant origin.

2. However, every "essential" social group which emerges into history out of the preceding economic structure, and as an expression of a development of this structure, has found (at least in all of history up to the present) categories of intellectuals already in existence and which seemed indeed to represent an historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated and radical changes in political and social forms.

The most typical of these categories of intellectuals is that of the ecclesiastics, who for a long time (for a whole phase of history, which is partly characterised by this very monopoly) held a monopoly of a number of important services: religious ideology, that is the philosophy and science of the age, together with schools, education, morality, justice, charity, good works, etc. The category of ecclesiastics can be considered the category of intellectuals organically bound to the landed aristocracy. It had equal status juridically with the aristocracy, with which it shared the exercise of feudal ownership of land, and the use of state privileges connected with property.² But the monopoly held by the ecclesiastics in the superstructural field³ was not exercised without a struggle or without limitations, and hence there took place the birth, in various forms (to be gone into and studied concretely), of other categories, favoured and enabled to expand by the growing strength of the central power of the monarch, right up to absolutism. Thus we find the

category of *medical men* in the widest sense, that is all those who "struggle" or seem to struggle against death and disease, compare the *Storia della medicina* of Arturo Castiglioni. Note that there has been a connection between religion and medicine, and in certain areas there still is: hospitals in the hands of religious orders for certain organisational functions, apart from the fact that wherever the doctor appears, so does the priest (exorcism, various forms of assistance, etc.). Many great religious figures were and are conceived of as great "healers": the idea of miracles, up to the resurrection of the dead. Even in the case of kings the belief long survived that they could heal with the laying on of hands, etc.

3. From this has come the general sense of "intellectual" or "specialist" of the word "*chierico*" (clerk, cleric) in

formation of the *noblesse de robe*, with its own privileges, a stratum of administrators, etc., scholars and scientists, theorists, non-ecclesiastical philosophers, etc.

Since these various categories of traditional intellectuals experience through an "*esprit de corps*" their uninterrupted historical continuity and their special qualification, they thus put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group. This self-assessment is not without consequences in the ideological and political field, consequences of wide-ranging import. The whole of idealist philosophy can easily be connected with this position assumed by the social complex of intellectuals and can be defined as the expression of that social utopia by which the intellectuals think of themselves as "independent", autonomous, endowed with a character of their own, etc.

One should note however that if the Pope and the leading hierarchy of the Church consider themselves more linked to Christ and to the apostles than they are to senators Agnelli and Benni, the same does not hold for Gentile and Croce, for example: Croce in particular feels himself closely linked to Aristotle and Plato, but he does not conceal, on the other hand, his links with senators Agnelli and Benni, and it is precisely here that one can discern the most significant character of Croce's philosophy.

What are the "maximum" limits of acceptance of the term "intellectual"? Can one find a unitary criterion to characterise equally all the diverse and disparate activities of intellectuals and to distinguish these at the same time and in an essential way from the activities of other social groupings? The most widespread error of method seems to me that of having looked for this criterion of distinction in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities, rather than in the ensemble of the system of relations in which these activities (and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them) have their place within the general complex of social relations. Indeed the worker or proletarian, for example, is not specifically characterised by his manual or instrumental work, but by performing this work in specific conditions and in specific social relations (apart from the consideration that purely physical labour does not exist and that even Taylor's phrase of "trained gorilla" is a metaphor to indicate a limit in a certain direction: in any physical work, even the most degraded and mechanical, there exists a minimum of technical qualification, that is, a minimum of creative intellectual activity.) And we have already observed that the entrepreneur, by virtue of his function, must have to some degree a certain number of qualifications of an intellectual nature although his part in society is determined not by these, but by the general social relations which specifically characterise the position of the entrepreneur within

many languages of romance origin or heavily influenced, through church Latin, by the romance languages, together with its correlative "*laico*" (lay, layman) in the sense of profane, non-specialist.

4. Thus, because it can happen that everyone at some time fries a couple of eggs or sews up a tear in a jacket, we do not necessarily say that everyone is a cook or a tailor.

industry.

All men are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals.⁴

When one distinguishes between intellectuals and non-intellectuals, one is referring in reality only to the immediate social function of the professional category of the intellectuals, that is, one has in mind the direction in which their specific professional activity is weighted, whether towards intellectual elaboration or towards muscular-nervous effort. This means that, although one can speak of intellectuals, one cannot speak of non-intellectuals, because non-intellectuals do not exist. But even the relationship between efforts of intellectual-cerebral elaboration and muscular-nervous effort is not always the same, so that there are varying degrees of specific intellectual activity. There is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded: *homo faber* cannot be separated from *homo sapiens*. Each man, finally, outside his professional activity, carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is, he is a "philosopher", an artist, a man of taste, he participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it, that is, to bring into being new modes of thought.

The problem of creating a new stratum of intellectuals consists therefore in the critical elaboration of the intellectual activity that exists in everyone at a certain degree of development, modifying its relationship with the muscular-nervous effort towards a new equilibrium, and ensuring that the muscular-nervous effort itself, in so far as it is an element of a general practical activity, which is perpetually innovating the physical and social world, becomes the foundation of a new and integral conception of the world. The traditional and vulgarised type of the intellectual is given by the man of letters, the philosopher, the artist. Therefore journalists, who claim to be men of letters, philosophers, artists, also regard themselves as the "true" intellectuals. In the modern world, technical education, closely bound to industrial labour even at the most primitive and unqualified level, must form the basis of the new type of intellectual.

On this basis the weekly *Ordine Nuovo* worked to develop certain forms of new intellectualism and to determine its new concepts, and this was not the least of the reasons for its success, since such a conception corresponded to latent aspirations and conformed to the development of the real forms of life. The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, organiser, "permanent persuader" and not just a simple orator (but superior at the same time to the abstract mathematical spirit); from technique-as-work one proceeds to technique-as-science and to the humanistic conception of history, without which one remains "specialised" and does not become "directive" (specialised and political).

Thus there are historically formed specialised

categories for the exercise of the intellectual function. They are formed in connection with all social groups, but especially in connection with the more important, and they undergo more extensive and complex elaboration in connection with the dominant social group. One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer "ideologically" the traditional intellectuals, but this assimilation and conquest is made quicker and more efficacious the more the group in question succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals.

The enormous development of activity and organisation of education in the broad sense in the societies that emerged from the medieval world is an index of the importance assumed in the modern world by intellectual functions and categories. Parallel with the attempt to deepen and to broaden the "intellectuality" of each individual, there has also been an attempt to multiply and narrow the various specialisations. This can be seen from educational institutions at all levels, up to and including the organisms that exist to promote so-called "high culture" in all fields of science and technology.

School is the instrument through which intellectuals of various levels are elaborated. The complexity of the intellectual function in different states can be measured objectively by the number and gradation of specialised schools: the more extensive the "area" covered by education and the more numerous the "vertical" "levels" of schooling, the more complex is the cultural world, the civilisation, of a particular state. A point of comparison can be found in the sphere of industrial technology: the industrialisation of a country can be measured by how well equipped it is in the production of machines with which to produce machines, and in the manufacture of ever more accurate instruments for making both machines and further instruments for making machines, etc. The country which is best equipped in the construction of instruments for experimental scientific laboratories and in the construction of instruments for experimental scientific laboratories and in the construction of instruments with which to test the first instruments, can be regarded as the most complex in the technical-industrial field, with the highest level of civilisation, etc. The same applies to the preparation of intellectuals and to the schools dedicated to this preparation; schools and institutes of high culture can be assimilated to each other. In this field also, quantity cannot be separated from quality. To the most refined technical-cultural specialisation there cannot but correspond the maximum possible diffusion of primary education and the maximum care taken to expand the middle grades numerically as much as possible. Naturally this need to provide the widest base possible for the selection and elaboration of the top intellectual qualifications — i.e. to give a democratic structure to high culture and top-level technology — is not without its disadvantages: it creates the possibility of vast crises of unemployment for the middle intellectual strata, and in all modern societies this actually takes place.

It is worth noting that the elaboration of intel-

lectual strata in concrete reality does not take place on the terrain of abstract democracy but in accordance with very concrete traditional historical processes. Strata have grown up which traditionally "produce" intellectuals and these strata coincide with those which have specialised in "saving", i.e. the petty and middle landed bourgeoisie and certain strata of the petty and middle urban bourgeoisie. The varying distribution of different types of school (classical and professional) over the "economic" territory and the varying aspirations of different categories within these strata determine, or give form to, the production of various branches of intellectual specialisation. Thus in Italy the rural bourgeoisie produces in particular state functionaries and professional people, whereas the urban bourgeoisie produces technicians for industry. Consequently it is largely northern Italy which produces technicians and the South which produces functionaries and professional men.

The relationship between the intellectuals and the world of production is not as direct as it is with the fundamental social groups but is, in varying degrees, "mediated" by the whole fabric of society and by the complex of superstructures, of which the intellectuals are, precisely, the "functionaries". It should be possible both to measure the "organic quality" [*organicità*] of the various intellectual strata and their degree of connection with a fundamental social group, and to establish a gradation of their functions and of the superstructures from the bottom to the top (from the structural base upwards). What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural "levels": the one that can be called "civil society", that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called "private", and that of "political society" or "the State". These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of "hegemony" which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of "direct domination" or command exercised through the State and "juridical" government. The functions in question are precisely organisational and connective. The intellectuals are the dominant group's "deputies" exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government. These comprise:

1. The "spontaneous" consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is "historically" caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production.
2. The apparatus of state coercive power which "legally" enforces discipline on those groups who do not "consent" either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed.

This way of posing the problem has as a result a considerable extension of the concept of intellectual but it is the only way which enables one to reach a concrete approximation of reality. It also clashes with preconceptions of caste. The function of orga-

nising social hegemony and state domination certainly gives rise to a particular division of labour and therefore to a whole hierarchy of qualifications in some of which there is no apparent attribution of directive or organisational functions. For example, in the apparatus of social and state direction there exists a whole series of jobs of a manual and instrumental character (non-executive work, agents rather than officials or functionaries). It is obvious that such a distinction has to be made just as it is obvious that other distinctions have to be made as well. Indeed, intellectual activity must also be distinguished in terms of its intrinsic characteristics, according to levels which in moments of extreme opposition represent a real qualitative difference — at the highest level would be the creators of the various sciences, philosophy, art, etc., at the lowest the most humble "administrators" and divulgators of pre-existing, traditional, accumulated intellectual wealth.⁵

In the modern world the category of intellectuals, understood in this sense, has undergone an unprecedented expansion. The democratic-bureaucratic system has given rise to a great mass of functions which are not all justified by the social necessities of production, though they are justified by the political necessities of the dominant fundamental group. Hence Loria's conception of the unproductive "worker" (but unproductive in relation to whom and to what mode of production?), a conception which could in part be justified if one takes account of the fact that these masses exploit their position to take for themselves a large cut out of the national income. Mass formation has standardised individuals both psychologically and in terms of individual qualification and has produced the same phenomena as with other standardised masses: competition which makes necessary organisations for the defence of professions, unemployment, over-production in the schools, emigration, etc.

5. Here again military organisation offers a model of complex gradations between subaltern officers, senior officers and general staff, not to mention the NCO's whose importance is greater than is generally admitted. It is worth observing that all these parts feel a solidarity and indeed that it is the lower strata that display the most blatant *esprit de corps*, from which they derive a certain "conceit" which is apt to lay them open to jokes and witticisms.

Mao Tse-tung (from) ON PRACTICE (1937)

Before Marx, materialism examined the problem of knowledge apart from the social nature of man and apart from his historical development, and was therefore incapable of understanding the dependence of knowledge on social practice, that is, the dependence of knowledge on production and the class struggle.

Above all, Marxists regard man's activity in production as the most fundamental practical activity, the determinant of all his other activities. Man's knowledge depends mainly on his activity in material production, through which he comes gradually to understand the phenomena, the properties and the laws of nature, and the relations between himself and nature; and through his activity in production he also gradually comes to understand, in varying degrees, certain relations that exist between man and man. None of this knowledge can be acquired apart from activity in production. In a classless society every person, as a member of society, joins in common effort with the other members, enters into definite relations of production with them and engages in production to meet man's material needs. In all class societies, the members of the different social classes also enter, in different ways, into definite relations of production and engage in production to meet their material needs. This is the primary source from which human knowledge develops.

Man's social practice is not confined to activity in production, but takes many other forms — class struggle, political life, scientific and artistic pursuits; in short, as a social being, man participates in all spheres of the practical life of society. Thus man, in varying degrees, comes to know the different relations between man and man, not only through his material life but also through his political and cultural life (both of which are intimately bound up with material life). Of these other types of social practice, class struggle in particular, in all its various forms, exerts a profound influence on the development of a man's knowledge. In class society everyone lives as a member of a particular class, and every kind of thinking, without exception, is stamped with the brand of a class.

Marxists hold that in human society activity in production develops step by step from a lower to a higher level and that consequently man's knowledge, whether of nature or of society; also develops step by step from a lower to a higher level, that is, from the shallower to the deeper, from the one-sided to the many-sided. For a very long period in history, men were necessarily confined to a one-sided understanding of the history of society because, for one thing, the bias of the exploiting classes always distorted history and, for another, the small scale of production limited man's outlook. It

was not until the modern proletariat emerged along with immense forces of production (large-scale industry) that man was able to acquire a comprehensive, historical understanding of the development of society and turn this knowledge into a science, the science of Marxism.

Marxists hold that man's social practice alone is the criterion of the truth of his knowledge of the external world. What actually happens is that man's knowledge is verified only when he achieves the anticipated results in the process of social practice (material production, class struggle or scientific experiment). If a man wants to succeed in his work, that is, to achieve the anticipated results, he must bring his ideas into correspondence with the laws of the objective external world; if they do not correspond, he will fail in his practice. After he fails, he draws his lessons, corrects his ideas to make them correspond to the laws of the external world, and can thus turn failure into success; this is what is meant by "failure is the mother of success" and "a fall into the pit, a gain in your wit". The dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge places practice in the primary position, holding that human knowledge can in no way be separated from practice and repudiating all the erroneous theories which deny the importance of practice or separate knowledge from practice. Thus Lenin said, "Practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate actuality."¹ The Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism has two outstanding characteristics. One is its class nature: it openly avows that dialectical materialism is in the service of the proletariat. The other is its practicality: it emphasizes that theory is based on practice and in turn serves practice. The truth of any knowledge or theory is determined not by subjective feelings, but by objective results in social practice. Only social practice can be the criterion of truth. The standpoint of practice is the primary and basic standpoint in the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge.²

But how then does human knowledge arise from practice and in turn serve practice? This will become clear if we look at the process of development of knowledge.

In the process of practice, man at first sees only the phenomenal side, the separate aspects, the external relations of things. For instance, some people from outside come to Yenan on a tour of observation. In the first day or two, they see its topography, streets and houses; they meet many people, attend banquets, evening parties and mass meetings, hear talk of various kinds and read various documents, all these being the phenomena, the separate aspects and

the external relations of things. This is called the perceptual stage of cognition, namely, the stage of sense perceptions and impressions. That is, these particular things in Yenan act on the sense organs of the members of the observation group, evoke sense perceptions and give rise in their brains to many impressions together with a rough sketch of the external relations among these impressions: this is the first stage of cognition. At this stage, man cannot as yet form concepts, which are deeper, or draw logical conclusions.

As social practice continues, things that give rise to man's sense perceptions and impressions in the course of his practice are repeated many times; then a sudden change (leap) takes place in the brain in the process of cognition, and concepts are formed. Concepts are no longer the phenomena, the separate aspects and the external relations are things; they grasp the essence, the totality and the internal relations of things. Between concepts and sense perceptions there is not only a quantitative but also a qualitative difference. Proceeding further, by means of judgement and inference one is able to draw logical conclusions. The expression in *San Kuo Yen Yi*,³ "knit the brows and a strategem comes to mind", or in everyday language, "let me think it over", refers to man's use of concepts in the brain to form judgements and inferences. This is the second stage of cognition. When the members of the observation group have collected various data and, what is more, have "thought them over", they are able to arrive at the judgement that "the Communist Party's policy of the National United Front Against Japan is thorough, sincere and genuine". Having made this judgement, they can, if they too are genuine about uniting to save the nation, go a step further and draw the following conclusions, "The National United Front Against Japan can succeed." This stage of conception, judgement and inference is the more important stage in the entire process of knowing a thing; it is the stage of rational knowledge. The real task of knowing is, through perception, to arrive at thought, to arrive step by step at the comprehension of the internal contradictions of objective things, of their laws and of the internal relations between one process and another, that is, to arrive at logical knowledge. To repeat, logical knowledge differs from perceptual knowledge in that perceptual knowledge pertains to the separate aspects, the phenomena and the external relations of things, whereas logical knowledge takes a big stride forward to reach the totality, the essence and the internal relations of things and discloses the inner contradictions in the surrounding world. Therefore, logical knowledge is capable of grasping the development of the surrounding world in its totality, in the internal relations of all its aspects.

The dialectical-materialist theory of the process of development of knowledge, basing itself on practice and proceeding from the shallower to the deeper, was never worked out by anybody before the rise of Marxism. Marxist materialism solved this

3. *San Kuo Yen Yi* ("Tales of the Three Kingdoms") is a famous Chinese historical novel by Lo Kuan-chung (late 14th and early 15th century).

problem correctly for the first time, pointing out both materialistically and dialectically the deepening movement of cognition, the movement by which man in society progresses from perceptual knowledge to logical knowledge in his complex, constantly recurring practice of production and class struggle. Lenin said, "The abstraction of *matter*, of a *law* of nature, the abstraction of *value*, etc., in short, *all* scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and *completely*."⁴ Marxism-Leninism holds that each of the two stages in the process of cognition has its own characteristics, with knowledge manifesting itself as perceptual at the lower stage and logical at the higher stage, but that both are stages in an integrated process of cognition. The perceptual and the rational are qualitatively different, but are not divorced from each other; they are unified on the basis of practice. Our practice proves that what is perceived cannot at once be comprehended and that only what is comprehended can be more deeply perceived. Perception only solves the problem of phenomena; theory alone can solve the problem of essence. The solving of both these problems is not separable in the slightest degree with practice. Whoever wants to know a thing has no way of doing so except by coming into contact with it, that is, by living (practising) in its environment. In feudal society it was impossible to know the laws of capitalist society in advance because capitalism had not yet emerged, the relevant practice was lacking. Marxism could be the product only of capitalist society. Marx, in the era of laissez faire capitalism, could not concretely know certain laws peculiar to the era of imperialism beforehand, because imperialism, the last stage of capitalism, had not yet emerged and the relevant practice was lacking; only Lenin and Stalin could undertake this task. Leaving aside their genius, the reason why Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin could work out their theories was mainly that they personally took part in the practice of the class struggle and the scientific experimentation of their time; lacking this condition, no genius could have succeeded. The saying, "without stepping outside his gate the scholar knows all the wide world's affairs", was mere empty talk in past times when technology was undeveloped. Even though this saying can be valid in the present age of developed technology, the people with real personal knowledge are those engaged in practice the wide world over. And it is only when these people have come to "know" through their practice and when their knowledge has reached him through writing and technical media that the "scholar" can indirectly "know all the wide world's affairs". If you want to know a certain thing or a certain class of things directly, you must personally participate in the practical struggle to change reality, to change that thing or class of things, for only thus can you come into contact with them as phenomena; only through personal participation in the practical

4. From Lenin's notes on "Subjective Logic or the Doctrine of the Notion" in Hegel's *The Science of Logic*, Book III. See V.I. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *The Science of Logic*", *Collected Works*, Russian ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 161.

struggle to change reality can you uncover the essence of that thing or class of things and comprehend them. This is the path to knowledge which every man actually travels, though some people, deliberately distorting matters, argue to the contrary. The most ridiculous person in the world is the "know all" who picks up a smattering of heresy knowledge and proclaims himself "the world's Number One authority"; this merely shows that he has not taken a proper measure of himself. Knowledge is a matter of science, and no dishonesty or conceit whatsoever is permissible. What is required is definitely the reverse — honesty and modesty. If you want knowledge, you must take part in the practice of changing reality. If you want to know the taste of a pear, you must change the pear by eating it yourself. If you want to know the structure and properties of the atom, you must make physical and chemical experiments to change the state of the atom. If you want to know the theory and methods of revolution, you must take part in revolution. All genuine knowledge originates in direct experience. But one cannot have direct experience of everything; as a matter of fact, most of our knowledge comes from indirect experiences, for example, all knowledge from past times and foreign lands. To our ancestors and to foreigners, such knowledge was — or is — a matter of direct experience, and this knowledge is reliable if in the course of their direct experience the requirement of "scientific abstraction", spoken of by Lenin, was — or is — fulfilled and objective reality scientifically reflected; otherwise it is not reliable. Hence a man's knowledge consists only of two parts, that which comes from direct experience and that which comes from indirect experience. Moreover, what is indirect experience for me is direct experience for other people. Consequently, considered as a whole, knowledge of any kind is inseparable for direct experience. All knowledge originates in perception of the objective external world through man's physical sense organs. Anyone who denies such perception, denies direct experience, or denies personal participation in the practice that changes reality, is not a materialist. That is why the "know-all" is ridiculous. There is an old Chinese saying, "how can you catch tiger cubs without entering the tiger's lair?" This saying holds true for man's practice and it also holds true for the theory of knowledge. There can be no knowledge apart from practice.

Antonio Gramsci

ANALYSIS OF SITUATIONS,
RELATIONS OF FORCE

(1933-4)

The study of how "situations" should be analysed, in other words how to establish the various levels of the relations of force, offers an opportunity for an elementary exposition of the science and art of politics—understood as a body of practical rules for research and of detailed observations useful for awakening an interest in effective reality and for stimulating more rigorous and more vigorous political insights. This should be accompanied by the explanation of what is meant in politics by strategy and tactics, by strategic "plan", by propaganda and agitation, by command structure or science of political organisation and administration.

The elements of empirical observation which are habitually included higgledy-piggledy in works of political science (G. Mosca's *Elementi di scienza politica* may be taken as typical) ought, in so far as they are not abstract and illusory, to be inserted into the context of the relations of force, on one level or another. These levels range from the relations between international forces (one would insert here the notes written on what a great power is, on the combinations of States in hegemonic systems, and hence on the concept of independence and sovereignty as far as small and medium powers are concerned) to the objective relations within society—in other words, the degree of development of productive forces; to relations of political force and those between parties (hegemonic systems within the State); and to immediate (or potentially military) political relations.

Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental social relations? There can be no doubt that they follow. Any organic innovation in the social structure, through its technical-military expressions, modifies organically absolute and relative relations in the international field too. Even the geographical position of a national State does not precede but follows (logically) structural changes, although it also reacts back upon them to a certain extent (to the extent precisely to which superstructures react upon the structure, politics on economics, etc.). However, international relations react both passively and actively on political relations (of hegemony among the parties). The more the immediate economic life of a nation is subordinated to international relations, the more a particular party will come to represent this situation and to exploit it, with the aim of preventing rival parties gaining the upper hand (recall Nitti's famous speech on the *technical impossibility of revolution in Italy*). From this series of facts one may conclude that often the so-called "foreigner's party" is not really the one which is commonly so termed, but precisely the most nationalistic party—which, in reality, represents not so

much the vital forces of its own country, as that country's subordination and economic enslavement to the hegemonic nations or to certain of their number.¹

It is the problem of the relations between structure and superstructure which must be accurately posed and resolved if the forces which are active in the history of a particular period are to be correctly analysed, and the relation between them determined. Two principles must orient the discussion: 1. that no society sets itself tasks for whose accomplishment the necessary and sufficient conditions do not either already exist or are not at least beginning to emerge and develop; 2. that no society breaks down and can be replaced until it has first developed all the forms of life which are implicit in its internal relations.² From a reflection on these two principles, one can move on to develop a whole series of further principles of historical methodology. Meanwhile, in studying a structure, it is necessary to distinguish organic movements (relatively permanent) from movements which may be termed "conjunctural" (and which appear as occasional, immediate, almost accidental). Conjunctural phenomena too depend on organic movements to be sure, but they do not have any very far-reaching historical significance; they give rise to political criticism of a minor, day-to-day character, which has as its subject top political leaders and personalities with direct governmental responsibilities. Organic phenomena on the other hand give rise to socio-historical criticism, whose subject is wider social groupings—beyond the public figures and beyond the top leaders. When an historical period comes to be studied, the great importance of this distinction becomes clear. A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves (reached maturity), and that, despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making every effort to cure them, within certain limits, and to overcome them. These incessant and persistent efforts (since no social formation will ever admit that it has been superseded) form the terrain of the "conjunctural", and it is upon this terrain that the forces of opposition organise. These forces seek to demonstrate that the necessary and sufficient conditions already exist to make possible, and hence imperative, the accomplishment of certain historical tasks (imperative, because any falling short before

1. An allusion to the international element which "represses" domestic energies can be found in G. Volpe's articles published in *Corriere della Sera*, on 22 and 23 March 1932.

2. "No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions for their existence have matured in the womb of the old society. Therefore mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, it will always be found that the task itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation." Marx, Preface to the *Critique of Political Economy*.

an historical duty increases the necessary disorder, and prepares more serious catastrophes). (The demonstration in the last analysis only succeeds and is "true" if it becomes a new reality, if the forces of opposition triumph; in the immediate, it is developed in a series of ideological, religious, philosophical, political, and juridical polemics, whose concreteness can be estimated by the extent to which they are convincing, and shift the previously existing disposition of social forces.)

A common error in historico-political analysis consists in an inability to find the correct relation between what is organic and what is conjunctural. This leads to presenting causes as immediately operative which in fact only operate indirectly, or to asserting that the immediate causes are the only effective one. In the first case there is an excess of "economism", or doctrinaire pedantry; in the second, an excess of "ideologism". In the first case there is an overestimation of mechanical causes, in the second an exaggeration of the voluntarist and individual element. The distinction between organic "movements" and facts and "conjunctural" or occasional ones must be applied to all types of situations; not only to those in which a regressive development or an acute crisis takes place, but also to those in which there is a progressive development or one towards prosperity or in which the productive forces are stagnant. The dialectical nexus between the two categories of movement, and therefore of research, is hard to establish precisely. Moreover, if error is serious in historiography, it becomes still more serious in the art of politics, when it is not the reconstruction of past history but the construction of present and future history which is at stake.³ One's own baser and more immediate desires and passions are the cause of error, in that they take the place of an objective and impartial analysis—and this happens not as a conscious "means" to stimulate to action, but as self-deception. In this case too the snake bites the snake-charmer—in other words the demagogue is the first victim of his own demagogy.

These methodological criteria will acquire visibility and didactically their full significance if they are applied to the examination of concrete historical

3. Failure to consider the immediate moment of "relations of force" is linked to residues of the vulgar liberal conception — of which syndicalism is a manifestation which thought itself more advanced when in reality it was taking a step backward. In fact the vulgar liberal conception, stressing relations between political forces organised in the various forms of party (newspaper readerships, parliamentary and local elections, the mass organisations of parties and trade unions in the strict sense), was more advanced than syndicalism, which gave primordial importance to the fundamental socio-economic relation and only to that. The vulgar liberal conception took implicit account of this socio-economic relation too (as many signs clearly indicate), but it insisted besides on the relation of political forces — which was an expression of the former and in reality contained it. These residues of the vulgar liberal conception can be traced in a whole series of works purporting to be connected with the philosophy of praxis, and have given rise to infantile forms of optimism and folly.

4. See *La Révolution française* by A. Mathiez, in the A. Colin series.

facts. This might usefully be done for the events which took part in France from 1789 to 1870. It seems to me that for greater clarity of exposition it is precisely necessary to take in the whole of this period. In fact, it was only in 1870-71, with the attempt of the Commune, that all the germs of 1789 were finally historically exhausted. It was then that the new bourgeois class struggling for power defeated not only the representatives of the old society unwilling to admit that it had been definitively superseded, but also the still newer groups who maintained that the new structure created by the 1789 revolution was itself already outdated; by this victory the bourgeoisie demonstrated its vitality *vis-à-vis* both the old and the very new.

Furthermore, it was in 1870-71 that the body of principles of political strategy and tactics engendered in practice in 1789, and developing ideologically around '48, lost their efficacy. (I am referring to those which can be resumed in the formula of "Permanent Revolution"; it would be interesting to study how much of this formula passed into Mazzini's strategy — for example, in the Milan insurrection of 1853 — and whether this happened consciously or not.) One piece of evidence for the correctness of this point of view is the fact that historians are by no means of one mind (and it is impossible that they should be) in fixing the limits of the group of events which constitutes the French Revolution. For some (Salvemini, for instance) the Revolution was complete at Valmy: France had created its new State and had shown itself capable of organising the politico-military force necessary to assert and to defend its territorial sovereignty. For others the Revolution continues until Thermidor — indeed they speak of various revolutions (10 August is a separate revolution, etc.).⁴ The interpretation of Thermidor and of the work of Napoleon provokes the sharpest disagreements. Was it revolution or counter-revolution? For others the history of the Revolution continues until 1830, 1848, 1870 and even until the World War of 1914. All these views are partially true. In reality the internal contradictions which develop after 1789 in the structure of French society are resolved to a relative degree only with the Third Republic; and France has now enjoyed sixty years of stable political life only after eighty years of convulsions at ever longer intervals: 1789, 1794, 1799, 1804, 1815, 1830, 1848, 1870. It is precisely the study of these "intervals" of varying frequency which enables one to reconstruct the relations on the one hand between structure and superstructure, and on the other hand the development of organic movement and conjunctural movement in the structure. One might say in the meantime that the dialectical mediation between the two methodological principles formulated at the beginning of this note is to be found in the historico-political formula of Permanent Revolution.

The question of so-called relations of force is an aspect of the same problem. One often reads in historical narratives the generic expression: "relation of forces favourable, or unfavourable, to this or that tendency". Thus, abstractly, this formulation explains nothing, or almost nothing — since it

merely repeats twice over the fact which needs to be explained, once as a fact and once as an abstract law and an explanation. The theoretical error consists therefore in making what is a principle of research and interpretation into an "historical cause".

Meanwhile, in the "relation of forces" various moments or levels must be distinguished, and they are fundamentally the following:

1. A relation of social forces which is closely linked to the structure, objective, independent of human will, and which can be measured with the systems of the exact or physical sciences. The level of development of the material forces of production provides a basis for the emergence of the various social classes, each one of which represents a function and has a specific position within production itself. This relation is what it is, a refractory reality: nobody can alter the number of firms or their employees, the number of cities or the given urban population, etc. By studying these fundamental data it is possible to discover whether in a particular society there exist the necessary and sufficient conditions for its transformation — in other words, to check the degree of realism and practicability of the various ideologies which have been born on its own terrain, on the terrain of the contradictions which it has engendered during the course of its development.

2. A subsequent moment is the relation of political forces; in other words, an evaluation of the degree of homogeneity, self-awareness, and organisation attained by the various social classes. This moment can in its turn be analysed and differentiated into various levels, corresponding to the various moments of collective political consciousness, as they have manifested themselves in history up till now. The first and most elementary of these is the economic-corporate level: a tradesman feels *obliged* to stand by another tradesman, a manufacturer by another manufacturer, etc., but the tradesman does not yet feel solidarity with the manufacturer; in other words, the members of the professional group are conscious of its unity and homogeneity, and of the need to organise it, but in the case of the wider social group this is not yet so. A second moment is that in which consciousness is reached of the solidarity of interests among all the members of a social class — but still in the purely economic field. Already at this juncture the problem of the State is posed — but only in terms of winning politico-judicial equality with the ruling groups: the right is

5. Religion, for example, has always been a source of such national and international ideological-political combinations, and so too have the other international organisations — Freemasonry, Rotarianism, the Jews, career diplomacy. These propose political solutions of diverse historical origin, and assist their victory in particular countries — functioning as international political parties which operate within each nation with the full concentration of the international forces. A religion, freemasonry, Rotary, Jews, etc., can be subsumed into the social category of "intellectuals", whose function, on an international scale, is that of mediating the extremes, of "socialising" the technical discoveries which provide the impetus for all activities of leadership, of devising compromises between, and ways out of, extreme solutions.

claimed to participate in legislation and administration, even to reform these — but within the existing fundamental structures. A third moment is that in which one becomes aware that one's own corporate interests, in their present and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too. This is the most purely political phase, and marks the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex super-structures; it is the phase in which previously germinated ideologies become "party", come into confrontation and conflict, until only one of them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself throughout society — bringing about not only a union of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a "universal" plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups. It is true that the State is seen as the organ of one particular group, destined to create favourable conditions for the latter's maximum expansion. But the development and expansion of the particular group are conceived of, and presented, as being the motor force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the "national" energies. In other words, the dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups, and the life of the State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superceding of unstable equilibria (on the juridical plane) between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups — equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group prevail, but only up to a certain point, i.e. stopping short of narrowly corporate economic interest.

In real history these moments imply each other reciprocally — horizontally and vertically, so to speak — i.e. according to socio-economic activity (horizontally) and to country (vertically), combining and diverging in various ways. Each of these combinations may be represented by its own organised economic and political expression. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that international relations intertwine with these internal relations of nation-states, creating new, unique and historically concrete combinations. A particular ideology, for instance, born in a highly developed country, is disseminated in less developed countries, impinging on the local interplay of combinations.⁵

This relation between international forces and national forces is further complicated by the existence within every State of several structurally diverse territorial sectors, with diverse relations of force at all levels (thus the Vendee was allied with the forces of international reaction, and represented them in the heart of French territorial unity; similarly Lyons in the French Revolution represented a particular knot of relations, etc.).

3. The third moment is that of the relation of military forces, which from time to time is directly decisive. (Historical development oscillates continually between the first and third moment, with the

mediation of the second.) But this too is not undifferentiated, nor is it susceptible to immediate schematic definition. Here too, two levels can be distinguished: the military level in the strict or technical military sense, and the level which may be termed politico-military. In the course of history these two levels have appeared in a great variety of combinations. A typical example, which can serve as a limiting case, is the relation involved in a State's military oppression of a nation seeking to attain its national independence. The relation is not purely military, but politico-military; indeed this type of oppression would be inexplicable if it were not for the state of social disintegration of the oppressed people, and the passivity of the majority among them; consequently independence cannot be won with purely military forces, it requires both military and politico-military. If the oppressed nation, in fact, both embarking on its struggle for independence, had to wait until the hegemonic State allowed it to organise its own army in the strict and technical sense of the word, it would have to wait quite a while. (It may happen that the claim to have its own army is conceded by the hegemonic nation, but this only means that a great part of the struggle has already been fought and won on the politico-military terrain.) The oppressed nation will therefore initially oppose the dominant military force with a force which is only "politico-military", that is to say a form of political action which has the virtue of provoking repercussions of a military character in the sense: 1. that it has the capacity to destroy the war potential of the dominant nation from within; 2. that it compels the dominant military force to thin out and disperse itself over a large territory, thus nullifying a great part of its war potential. In the Italian Risorgimento the disastrous absence of politico-military leadership may be noted, especially in the Action Party (through congenital incapacity), but also in the Piedmontese Moderate Party, both before and after 1848, not to be sure through incapacity but through "politico-economic Malthusianism" — in other words, because they were unwilling even to hint at the possibility of an agrarian reform, and because they had no desire to see a national constituent assembly convoked, but merely waited for the Piedmont monarchy, free from any conditions or limitations of popular origin, to extend its rules to the whole of Italy — sanctioned only by regional plebiscites.

A further question connected with the foregoing is whether the fundamental historical crises are directly determined by economic crises. The answer is contained implicitly in the foregoing paragraphs, where problems have been considered which are only another way of presenting the one now under consideration. Nevertheless it is still necessary, for didactic reasons, given the particular public which is being aimed at, to examine each of the ways in which a single question may present itself as if it were a new and independent problem. It may be ruled out that immediate economic crises of themselves produce fundamental historical events; they can simply create a terrain more favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of thought, and certain ways of pos-

ing and resolving questions involving the entire subsequent development of national life. Moreover, all assertions concerning periods of crisis or of prosperity may give rise to unilateral judgements. In his historical outline of the French Revolution, Mathiez, in opposition to the vulgar traditional history which aprioristically "discovers" a crisis coinciding with every major rupture of social equilibrium, asserts that towards 1789 the economic situation was in an immediate sense rather good, so that it cannot be said that the downfall of the absolute State was due to a crisis of impoverishment. It should be observed that the State was in the throes of a mortal financial crisis and considering which of the privileged social orders would have to bear the sacrifices and burdens necessary for the State and Royal finances to be put back in order. Furthermore, if the economic position of the bourgeoisie was flourishing, the situation of the popular classes was certainly not good either in the towns, or, especially, on the land — where they suffered from endemic poverty. In any case, the rupture of the equilibrium of forces did not occur as the result of direct mechanical causes — i.e. the impoverishment of the social group which had an interest in breaking the equilibrium, and which did in fact break it. It occurred in the context of conflicts on a higher plane than the immediate world of the economy; conflicts related to class "prestige" (future economic interests), and to an inflammation of sentiments of independence, autonomy and power. The specific question of economic hardship or well-being as a cause of new historical realities is a partial aspect of the question of the relations of force, at the various levels. Changes can come about either because a situation of well-being is threatened by the narrow self-interest of a rival class, or because hardship has become intolerable and no force is visible in the old society capable of mitigating it and of re-establishing normality by legal means. Hence it may be said that all these elements are the concrete manifestation of the conjunctural fluctuations of the totality of social relations of force, on whose terrain the passage takes place from the latter to political relations of force, and finally to the military relation which is decisive.

If this process of development from one moment to the next is missing — and it is essentially a process which has as its actors men and their will and capability — the situation is not taken advantage of, and contradictory outcomes are possible: either the old society resists and ensures itself a breathing-space, by physically exterminating the élite of the rival class and terrorising its mass reserves; or a reciprocal destruction of the conflicting forces occurs, and a peace of the graveyard is established, perhaps even under the surveillance of a foreign guard.

But the most important observation to be made about any concrete analysis of the relations of force is the following: that such analyses cannot and must not be ends in themselves (unless the intention is merely to write a chapter of past history), but acquire significance only if they serve to justify a particular practical activity, or initiative of will. They reveal the points of least resistance, at which the force of will can be most fruitfully applied; they suggest immediate tactical operations; they indicate how a

campaign of political agitation may best be launched, what language will best be understood by the masses, etc. The decisive element in every situation is the permanently organised and long-prepared force which can be put into the field when it is judged that a situation is favourable (and it can be favourable only in so far as such a force exists, and is full of fighting spirit). Therefore the essential task is that of systematically and patiently ensuring that this force is formed, developed, and rendered ever more homogeneous, compact, and self-aware. This is clear from military history, and from the care with which in every period armies have been prepared in advance to be able to make war at any moment. The great Powers have been great precisely because they were at all times prepared to intervene effectively in favourable international conjunctures — which were precisely favourable because there was the concrete possibility of effectively intervening in them.

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Armand Mattelart

COMMUNICATION IDEOLOGY AND CLASS PRACTICE

(Chile, 1971)

I. THE NATURE OF COMMUNICATION PRACTICE IN A DEPENDENT SOCIETY

The fact that the Chilean ruling class kept hold of its means of communication under the Popular Unity government gave the ideological struggle a peculiar character. To penetrate this specificity more deeply we must investigate the position occupied by these media in the bourgeoisie's and imperialism's overall strategy to dissimulate and invert reality. In other words, we must outline the class enemy's ideological power, beginning with the particular field of mass communications.

Fetishes

In capitalist society all activity and all products are part of the world and logic of the market. Language itself, which allows the meaning of this activity and these products, whatever they may be to be transmitted to the public, is that of the merchant, transformed into the lord and master of all language. The mercantile form is the general form of exchange. The activity and products of communications do not escape dominant social relations. To establish this mercantile form of communications and make it a natural activity, which the dominated (the 'receiver') do not suspect is an instrument of class domination, the media undergo a process of fetishisation—like every product and activity. Through this, living people are metamorphosed into 'things' (factors in production), and things are given life. Thus, money 'works', capital 'produces'. In the same way, the media 'act'.

To guarantee its legitimacy, the capitalist mode of production needs a body of fetishes to confirm its rationality of domination. The appearance of these fetishes is intimately bound up with the development of the productive forces. Marx spoke of the fetishism of commodities and money, and described them as inherent to the capitalist mode of production. The transformation of a process or a phenomenon into a fetish comes about through its "crystallisation in the form of an object seen in isolation"¹ abstracted from the real conditions of production. Thus, for example, the bourgeoisie makes a fetish of wealth by

crystallising it in the form of precious metals such as gold or silver, which detaches it from its origins—the process of the accumulation of surplus value which is extracted by the class owning the means of production. Equally, economists fetishise when they posit their theories about the determination of value by the nature of things and products in themselves. Marx brought the fetish into the light of day by revealing that behind the concept of *labour value*—which is both the apparent form of a phenomenon and, the real expression of a particular class—lie two other underlying concepts which do not appear on the surface (i.e. in the discourse of bourgeois economists): the *value of labour power* and *labour as creator of value*. "It is pure illusion which makes the social character of labour appear to be that also of things, of products in themselves." Bourgeois society determines the value of products through exchange, but refuses to recognise what it is that endows them with value: the labour *expended in their production*. Every fetish reflects an entire rational corpus of mechanisms whose purpose is to obscure the social relations of production prevailing in a given society. The fetish of communications conceals the repressive and manipulative power of the dominant technology of dissemination (a veritable new *productive force*) and characterises it as a force for liberation and happiness. It is in this guise that it is presented to the dominated.²

1. Karl Marx, *Critique of Political Economy*, Moscow, Progress, 1970, p. 155.

2. However, one should not think that the ideology which legitimates and naturalizes the penetration of imperialism's culture merchandise always takes the form of this daily, surreptitious language. The discourse of other sectors of the ruling class is much more explicit and abrupt. For example, the war-mongering schizophrenia of the generals (active and retired) who have adopted this self-apology of Richard Nixon's: "Today, no power on earth is stronger than the United States, and none will be stronger in the future" (Congressional Speech, 1 June 1972). Here are two samples of another type of discourse concerning mass communication. "The supremacy in communications is one of the keys to the control of space, and today this means political, military, economic and social mastery over all the nations in the world" (General Sarnoff, President of RCA, in a speech given at the Fifth Conference of the American Legion, Washington, D.C., 1 March 1965). Here is another: "For a long time, military and economic power, either jointly or separately, have been the pillars of our diplomacy. Today, they still fulfill this function, but the growing influence of the masses and the people on government, as well as the growing consciousness of governments concerning the people's aspirations following the revolutions of the twentieth century, have given birth to a new dimension in the management of foreign policy. In foreign policy, certain objectives can be realized by direct contact with people of foreign countries, rather than with their governments. By using the modern intermediary techniques and instruments of communication, it is today possible to reach important and influential sectors of the population of other countries to inform and influence them and perhaps at the same time motivate them towards specific actions. These groups, in turn, can exercise important pressure on their governments" (Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive*, 1964). For a more detailed analysis of this type of discourse, see Herbert

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A New Fetish: The Means of Communication

In the universe of fetishes, the communications media appear to be endowed with autonomy, "a will and mind of their own". They are a kind of epiphenomenon transcending the society in which they are inscribed. In a world governed by technological right, they become an actor and take on the appearance of a natural force. Such distancing allows the ruling class to disavow its monopoly ownership over the ideological apparatus. It can thus arrogate to itself the right to denounce "the pernicious and disturbing influence" and "vulgar, violent and pornographic content" of the press, radio, TV and cinema, shielding itself behind a mask of moralism. The mass media, the characters in the technological drama, are considered to be the principal influence on society, due to the freedom of action they enjoy.

The media introduce a new concept of revolution, that of rising expectations, without showing the basis for it, as a substitution for that of genuine revolution. The model is as simple and as circular in scholarly texts as it is in electoral speeches. Here is an example taken from a speech by the right-wing candidate during the 1970 presidential elections in Chile:

Everyone agrees that stable and durable progress is impossible without the accelerated economic development which will allow the legitimate aspirations of the masses to be satisfied—aspirations which are growing daily due to the formidable rise of the communications media in the modern world.³

This personification of communications goes even beyond this, as the vanguard in counter-insurgency strategy communications move onto the offensive and try to capture from the left their notions of revolution.

In order to camouflage the counter-revolutionary function which it has assigned to communications technology and, in the final analysis, to all the messages of its mass culture, imperialism has elevated the mass media to the status of revolutionary agents, and the modern phenomenon of communications to that of revolution itself. It is a new version of the 'green revolution'. As is well known, one of the first testing-grounds of the 'technological revolution' was the orchestrated celebrations of the new manures, new fertilizers, new machines and new insecticides as the miraculous remedies for Third World underdevelopment. The agrarian reforms born under this ideological banner were transformed into something much more than simple modernizing measures. All this enabled the problem of land ownership to be happily avoided. Monopoly control of the means of production and

I. Schiller, *Mass Communications and American Empire*, Boston, Beacon, 1971.

3. Jorge Alessandri's 1970 electoral platform, *El Mercurio* (Santiago de Chile), 11 January 1970.

4. E.B. Weiss "Advertising Nears a Big Speed-up in Communications Innovation" *Advertising Age* (Chicago), 19 March 1973, p. 52.

5. Usiar Pietri "Las comunicaciones como revolución" *Vision* (Santiago de Chile), XL, 8, 22 April 1972.

distribution could be passed over in silence and emerge unscathed at the end of it all. In their whitewashing of the apparatus of domination, the oligarchies and their technocratic brains hid from view the elementary fact that the application of these new procedures would be blocked by the kinds of social relations they would come up against, and that even if they did manage to develop a few profitable parcels of land, this could never, in any case, meet the needs of the whole country. At the present moment, a similar role is being played by the celebration of modern communications technology—which the North American monopolies have christened 'the communications revolution'. "The communications revolution which has taken place over the last seven years has stimulated the desire to consume, collective social responsibility, the youth revolt, the women's revolt, the fashion revolt and the era of individual judgement: in short, a new society."⁴ But to achieve its ends, imperialist power needs more than the pens and inspiration of its North American publicists. In the sub-continent as well it has recruited 'theorists' of the new conception, its McLuhanesque sepoys. Nothing is more telling than these extracts from an article entitled *Communications as Revolution*, published in the Latin American double of *Time*, the magazine *Vision*, which is edited in Spanish in New York or Miami:

History, seen from a birds' eye view, has taught us to conceive of revolution as an act of violence, prepared, organised and executed in a manner which, for want of a better word, we may call military. We imagine that revolution is a decisive action requiring preparation, a commando, a plan and an ideology. An entire structure, complete with chiefs, prophets, activists, command decisions and explosive actions...

There have been other processes of general and rapid change in the history of the western world, which have not corresponded to this commando model of programme and action. These were, indeed, the great transforming revolutions which took place without any preliminary ideology, without organised direction, without bureaucracy either clandestine or open, with neither activists nor professional revolutionaries. Changes of ideology, of social structure and of values have on the whole been the sure and almost anonymous outcome of factors which cannot be attached to personalities nor reduced to a political creed...

Some European observers, such as J.F. Revel in a pointed and disturbing book *Neither Marx nor Jesus*, have begun to think that the new world revolution has already begun in the United States, characterised by the incredible transformation of relationships and life which technological change has brought about.

The most important and most decisive of these changes is that of communications. Men have been literally precipitated, with no previous preparation, into a global experience of communications which must effect their thought and their relationships far more than any creed or ideological propaganda has been capable of doing...

This is the true revolution of our times, and its agent is the marvellous and growing complex of communications.⁵

We know that the continual movement within the productive forces is, as Marx said, a revolutionary dynamic of primary importance. But, this

permanent revolution of productive forces which, under the aegis of capitalism, modifies all material and spiritual production, far from suppressing the class struggle and reconciling labour with capital, merely governs the conditions within which this class confrontation unfolds. It should never be confused with what Lenin called 'the revolutionary moment' when the ruling class can no longer maintain its domination in an unchanging form and conditions become intolerable for the oppressed masses, who intensify their struggles. The one-sided McLuhanesque concept of revolution only obscures the emergence of these indications of the revolutionary moment, which cannot be realised nor overcome *solely* in function of the play of productive forces.

Technology in itself tends to propagate a content, substituting itself for ideological schemas and banners, thus eliminating class interests. It becomes the neutral space of the apolitical. Understood in this way, this new fetish can be seen as a pseudo-actor, elevated to the level of a progenitor of phenomena and social processes, which conceals both the identity of the manipulators and the function of the ideas and images they pour out to buttress the social system they rule. By setting itself up as subject and cause, to the complete exclusion of any other possible determinant, 'communications' blank out all schemas of social stratification and present to the receiver the image of a headless society, guided throughout by the same undifferentiating determinism. To reinforce this mystification, the fetish carries along with it a series of related concepts, all signifying social amorphousness, such as 'consumer society', 'society of abundance', 'mass society', 'modern society', 'public opinion'.

These key terms in the taxonomy of 'modern' communications conceal the fact that a particular social class unilaterally imposes its meaning on the interpretation of reality. In other words, its language, repeated endlessly by the media as it daily reasserts and reproduces itself, functions as a screen, alibi and coercive device. It becomes the formula by which it dissolves itself back into the heady universe of heavy exotic concepts: modernity, advertising, consumption, tourism: ahistoricism as the mode of everyday life. In the name of this public opinion, the oligarchy's press demand the repression of social movements. They use the rise in levels of consumption as a means of proving to the middle sectors of the population the fatuousness of changing the structure of things, and to mobilize them in support of its social project. Public opinion and the concept of modernity become the imaginary actor sustaining the monolithic interests of a class and allowing a particular private vision to pass as that of the public. This actor to whom both a negative and a positive role is ascribed alternately depending on the occasion, always transmits the repressive messages of the class, without discussing them and even if they are contradictory. Within this anti-historical framework, a symbolic game of false dialectics is played out. The actor-hero, because he lacks any social identity, attains neither autonomy nor meaning in himself, and is content to be simply the

one-sided projection of the concerns and themes inherent in the life and survival of the dominant groups. He is a symbol of consensus, diffusing all conflicts and differences between concretely situated actors by composing the image of an unanimity and artificial reconciliation which in reality everything makes impossible. Modern society and the 'communication revolution' messianically bring about the fusion of consciousnesses which are actually separated by the reality of class conflict.

The Mythology of The System

The second aspect of the fetishisation of this form of communication lies in the ideological character of the messages transmitted. Ideology is a store of signs belonging to the rationality of a class's domination. These signs are prescribed by their function in masking the basis of a given society. If they did not possess this character, they would reveal the mystification brought about by this class in determining the meaning of reality and defining objectivity. There is probably little need to recall Marx's statements that in class society the dominant ideas are those of the ruling class, which also determines its historical period, and that the class which holds the material power is also the dominant spiritual power: "The dominant ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relations, these relations expressed as ideas, which make of one class the ruling class. In other words, they are the ideas of its dominance." The dominant ideology fulfills a practical function by conferring on the system a certain coherence and relative unity. It penetrates the various spheres of individual and collective activity, and thus cements and unifies the social edifice (to use Gramsci's formula). It allows individuals to take their places naturally in the fulfilment of practical activities within the system, and thus participate in the reproduction of the apparatus of domination without realizing that they are making themselves accomplices in their own exploitation. For the individual inserted into the capitalist system, ideology is a lived experience, but one which he lives without being aware of the "true forces which set him in motion". The *modus operandi* of the ideological process consists overall in causing the true driving forces to be forgotten; in other words making people lose sight of the origins of the *existing social order* so that they live it as if it were a *natural order*. Indications that all institutions are instruments of social coercion are effaced. The objective is to relieve bourgeois society of the contradictions which, if they are not mediated, are likely to reveal the incoherence of that society and bring about the breakdown of its unity. It is this contradiction, the basis of social domination, which allows the establishment and continuing existence of a system of production and distribution of goods where a minority appropriate surplus value. It explains away the disjunction between social property and capitalist appropriation and the antagonism between the actors in the mode of production.

This 'imaginary collective' creates for the indivi-

dual the illusion that the society in which he is evolving and the concrete relationships which he lives all exist under the star of social harmony and escape class struggle. When conflicts and antagonisms arise he can explain them as the consequence of a natural law, and not of the particular mode of production operating within society. The means of communication and its mythic models (to make use of a term by Barthes⁶) fulfil a particular function: that of isolating the forces capable of unmasking the imposture of the class exercising control over them. When a phenomenon appears which is capable of exposing the system's immanent contradictions, the myth does not conceal the empirical fact. Instead it makes any meaning it might contain about social reality vanish by providing an explanation for it which hides the contradictions of the system.

Examples of this abound in the Chilean right's response to the agrarian reform of the reformist Christian Democrat regime. According to the liberal press it was the actions of agitators and the chimeras of bureaucrats fancying themselves as theorists (and who denied the 'experience' of the landowners) which lay behind the violent demands for reform which were exploding in the countryside. The cause of these demands were never sought in the concrete conditions of land ownership, in the reality of a system of production. None of the supposed causes of the reform had anything but the most external relationship with the reality of agriculture. The myth nurtured by the landowners showed their inability to conceive that reality could give rise to the need for change; and this translated itself into a systematic justification of the structural factors shaping their class power.

The myth empties social phenomena of their reality, and acquits and purifies the system. It deprives these phenomena of their historical meaning and integrates them into 'the nature of things'. Myth, then, domesticates reality, and annexes it for the benefit of a pseudo-reality imposed by the system—which draws its 'reality' from the acceptance of the basis of the edifice of dominant ideology. In other words, on the condition that it admits ruling class legitimacy as the parameter of objectivity and universality.

However, it is not adequate to outline the general characteristics of the mass communications media's role in disseminating class norms in the same way one would those of the other ideological State apparatuses such as the school, the family, etc. A product of new technology, and as such laden with particular implications, the mass media correspond to a particular stage in the development of the productive forces. This fact has inevitable repercussions on the kind of ideology they propagate, above all when it is remembered that we are discussing a

6. Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, London, Cape, 1972.

7. Letter by Hans M. Enzensberger to the Rector of Wesleyan University (Middletown, Ct.), cited by Mauro Fotia "Structure du pouvoir et sociologie politique contemporaine aux USA" *L'Homme et la Société* (Paris), 17, 1970, p. 57.

dependent society [Chile], one which is therefore very backward in relation to the technological models in the metropolitan centres. But before looking into this, we will make a few comments about the relation between the ruling class and ideological production.

A Conscious Frankenstein?

It would be a mistake to infer ingenuously from what we have been saying that the ruling class is hyper-conscious of history, or to interpret literally the images which appear in some left propaganda characterizing the representatives of this class as clawed monsters symbolizing all the horrors and abominations the world has known. "The cohesion of a class" said a German writer about imperialist power, "and particularly that of the ruling class, is the product of evident common interests and not of secret agreements and conspiracies. I am not imagining nor talking about monsters. The bankers, generals, board members are, as everyone knows, far from being the Frankenstein in comic strips, but on the contrary are cultivated and very aimable, as they were in Germany during the thirties. Neither chamber music nor charitable impulses are foreign to them. Their *moral insanity* does not arise from their individual personalities, but from their social function."⁷ In the Preface to the first German edition of *Capital*, Marx was already drawing attention to the error of making psychological readings of domination, when he wrote:

So as to avoid possible misunderstandings, one thing more. I have never painted the capitalist or the landowner in rosy tints. But we are concerned here with individuals only to the extent that they personify economic categories, or are the supports for the particular class interest and relations.

It is in order to mask over the second aspect of reality mentioned here by Marx that bourgeois morality, which assimilates private and public morality, has established the stereotype of the man who is 'rich, but austere and honest', thus excusing both the capitalist, the big proprietor, as well as the system as a whole. "Mister So-and-So is a millionaire, and owns factories and banks, but he goes to his office by bicycle, works into the small hours and, moreover, helps people in need." This morality institutes what we might term the rational administration of luxury for those privileged by capitalist accumulation. It protects the framework of values necessary to the administration of the apparatus of domination and to its reproduction by the dominated. It is important, therefore, to emphasize the non-intentional dimension inherent in domination, as much in relation to the receiver as the transmitter, the dominated as the dominant.

To say that ideology, as a system of representations, is inseparable from the lived experience of individuals is to say also that it pervades their habits, tastes and reflexes. This means that the great majority of people live without the foundations of these representations ever appearing in their consciousness. It is a question of a state which is lived as social nature, but which is

imposed by a mode of production which permeates the whole of life: the living process of an axiom.

This affirmation that the individual lives a universe of representations without discerning its organising principle, due to his being unable to apprehend the totality as a coherent whole, leads us to another fact: that the problematic of ideology is distinct from that of the conscious object. It is more than probable that having revealed the structures of the bourgeois messages transmitted by the press, comic strips or television, the researcher will find that the majority of readers refuse to accept his analysis. This refusal will be accentuated to the degree that the analysis touches on elements which are most integrated into daily life—the easier they are to 'naturalise' the more banal they seem. These readers will insist that from such an analysis—which takes a skein of representations and unravels it to its ultimate implications—emerges machinery which is far too machiavellian to be a genuine reflection of a reality to which, for better or for worse, they are habituated. They cannot accept that the kinds of stratagems for social domination which such an analysis denounces can really converge in the reality which they live without feeling particularly oppressed. They find it difficult to admit the possibility that messages can be read in two ways which yield such different decodings. On the one hand, there is their own, as ordinary readers and listeners, the primary, atomized reading of the information transmitted. On the other, there is that of the researcher or political militant, who sets out from the proletariat's class position and seeks in every unit of discourse its links with the objective interests of a class and its project for society. The same dilemma exists for the transmitter of the message. The lead writer of a liberal newspaper, in refusing to recognise himself as author of a product which has been demystified in this way, will always plead not guilty based on the evidence that he did not intend to write such a thing, so could not have done so.

In a complete opposite context from that of a liberal newspaper, it is still possible that a message which an author believes is subversive, in a film or novel, for example, is in fact completely recuperable by the system he wishes to undermine. This will happen to the extent that the latent structures on which his message is founded and which order its meaning sanction the principles of the system he claims to attack. This danger accounts for much of the difficulty of revolutionary creation in a place and time historically determined by the bourgeoisie. Every creative act which seeks to question the apparatus of domination risks continuing to carry within itself the mark of the system in which the creator is inscribed. In order to determine the revolutionary nature of a body of signs used by an apparently subversive transmitter, we must go beneath the surface of the message or discursive vehicle and establish the degree of congruence between the immediately visible level of the work and its implicit structures. Marx gave us the first example of this in *Capital*. To put it differently, we must see how the socio-historic context and the

weight of these structures mediate supposedly individual and free creation.

These brief remarks have enabled us to point out a fundamental characteristic of the way in which ideology operates, and to underline the lack of social autonomy of individuals. At the risk of redundancy, it should be recalled that ideology is not the abstract construction of a single individual or class. It is intimately related to the particular mode of production and social formation, and is functional to it, allowing it to be reproduced along with the hegemony of the class which represents capital.

Finally, it is important to point out that this does not mean that the dominant and the dominated, and the classes they represent, are no more than automata, programmed from the moment they are inscribed within a social structure. What disarticulates such a rigid scheme and saves us despite ourselves from this strict determinism is, to put it very concisely, the reality of the class struggle. The degree of consciousness of the phenomenon of domination is precisely a function of the level attained by this struggle. (We'll return to this point later when we evoke, as examples, on the one hand, the factors which are leading the Chilean ruling class to a high level of consciousness and the quite explicit planning of a class strategy, and on the other, the proletariat's leap of consciousness as it reaches the possibility of exercising power.)

As corollaries to what we have been saying arise the political problems of how to elevate the dominated's level of consciousness and, to return more precisely to our proposition, of creating access to a demystified reading of the messages of the dominant culture. Most particularly, the ideological reading of reality cannot be left to technicians specialised in ideological configurations. This tends to impose an ahistorical structuralism which is incapable of formulating anything beyond the rules of functioning of discourse. Semiotics and the 'sciences of signification' cannot impose themselves as substitutes for consciousness and become the unique and indispensable key to the deciphering of the reality of domination. It is time to question the conception, and class position, implicit in the numerous approaches to demystification which tend to substitute for a *process of gaining consciousness* a *process of intellectualization*. This conception risks reinforcing the exclusive power of a formalistic and technocratic sector of the petty bourgeoisie which wishes to preserve its privileges as the determiner of the import and meaning of social phenomena, and whose implicit judgement is that there exists absolutely no way of bringing about the decomposition of the schema of domination apart from academicism and the study of semiotic models. An equally valid ideological reading, at the very least as a first stage, and one which must be combined with a plan for a militant science, is that achieved by means of the instruments already available to the proletariat in the course of deepening its own class consciousness. This is an area which is ready and waiting for the work of the parties, and which, moreover, can give rise to many questions about ways of apprehending agitation in the so-called cultural

sphere. We will have occasion to return to this point.

II. IDEOLOGY AND AUTHORITARIAN PRACTICE IN THE MEDIA

The Closed Nature of Bourgeois Press Freedom

During the past few months the local bourgeoisie and its international accomplices in the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA)⁸ have greatly intensified their campaign in defense of the freedom of the press and expression. The purchase and take-over by the Chilean State of the bankrupt publishing house Zig-Zag, which belonged to a banking group tied to the Christian Democrats, and the judicial inquiry into the administration of *El Mercurio*, the biggest bourgeois newspaper, after accusations of financial irregularities, have provided a pretext to denounce the supposedly coercive measures taken against the 'free press' and freedom of information. Such campaigns, however, are not isolated cases. On the contrary, they occur at regular intervals. The response which they elicit from the left is well worth a few moments' reflection.

The possibility of making the revolution with the legal apparatus of democracy instituted by the bourgeoisie may be open to discussion. What is certain is that such a proposition loses all validity when the issue at stake is the viability of resorting to the ideology of domination in order to put a stop to the ideological offensive with which that class defends itself. In other words, to take up an expression used much during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, you cannot oppose the flag of the bourgeoisie by waving the flag of the bourgeoisie. Despite appearances, this observation is far from being a truism; for it is exactly when the bourgeoisie threatens its class-adversary on the terrain of the freedom of press and expression that the defenselessness of that adversary becomes particularly sharply apparent. The bourgeoisie seems to have monopolised the keys to the code which allows it to settle whether or not such freedom really exists. In the last analysis, it is its 'class' notion which makes the final summing up, closes the debate and delivers the verdict. This notion is characterized by the same distance from its class roots as is the entire mythology of 'totalitarianism' adhered to by those who criticise marxist regimes from the right. One of the cardinal errors made by left critics in their denunciations of socialist regimes is precisely their frequent unreserved, and apparent unconscious resort to the myths of bourgeois ideology, interpreted by them as the norms of democratic perfection. All too often such judges throw out the baby with the bathwater. It goes without saying that the water itself helps turn the mills of McCarthyism, whose patrons, naturally enough, receive it very well. 'Freedom of the press and expression', however progressive the phrase might have been historically, provides the most accessible territory for that form of bourgeois colonisation in which even those who define themselves as

8. The IAPA is a New York-based and U.S.-dominated organization which brings together all the owners of the mass communication media in Latin America and North America.

defenders of humanism (a 'natural' humanism to which they lay exclusive claim) let themselves be trapped.

In the kangaroo court of the IAPA the accused (the Popular Unity government) believes that he should face the charge, and so takes up his assigned role in the polemic. Going onto the offensive, the accused replies in the defensive, just like a child caught red-handed. He declares his innocence, tries to deny the charge and prove that his actions have not transgressed any 'universally' accepted code.

When a response becomes necessary, a denial seems to be the only one possible. For tactical reasons, we forget to ask ourselves what our concept of freedom of the press and expression really is. Clearly, we must be careful not to underestimate the tactical exigencies governing the terms of our response. But this does not mean that in defining a strategic position we must enclose ourselves in the enemy's concepts. Why is it that this defensive attitude must inevitably prove abortive?

The accused surrounds himself in the circle of his class adversary's arguments, making use of collective representations which the enemy has engendered, and which are his own. (One might very well ask whether in the final analysis this attitude doesn't mean that the enemy, despite having been defined as a class enemy at the level of discourse, is not in fact able to discard this identity if, at the latent level, he is able again to assume his disguised power as dominator). The arguments for the defense are borrowed from a fund of arguments which in fact sanction the defendant's own dominated position. The accused therefore implicitly corroborates the assumption that the notion of freedom of information deployed by the bourgeoisie is an absolute *model*. In this way, the adversary is able at will to displace attention from where the stakes are highest, the nerve centre where social domination is clearest and his defense of his economic power is explicit, to a point where this domination can be dissimulated, diluted and camouflaged. For the bourgeoisie, freedom of the press is simply an *alibi* allowing it to intercept the dominated's attention and divert it to areas where conflicts likely to reveal the presence of class interests are unlikely to occur. The accusation made against the [Popular Unity] government that it attacked the freedom of expression is a diversionary tactic pure and simple. At the tribunal of the bourgeoisie, judge and lawyer are in connivance, the accused is reduced to impotence, deprived of all but the right to dance about in rage, while the people, the great absentee at this verbal tournament, finds itself condemned in absentia.

The only way to escape this rationality of domination is to explode it by elaborating a new concept of freedom of the press and expression, forcing the bourgeoisie to contradict its own concept ("Make the rigid relations dance by whistling their own tune," as Marx used to say) and above all by bringing the new concept into real material existence. This is what we propose later on. For now, we will examine the classic evolution of the discussion, stopping to look more closely at a number of points where the contradictions of the bourgeois concept can be taken

by surprise.

1. The freedom of the press is the freedom of property. It is functional to the interests of the owners of the means of production. The liberal means of communication only transmit messages which take into account the protection of these interests.

2. The local bourgeoisie uses its international rearguard to propagate chaos in a particular country and to tighten the ties of imperialist solidarity. It is common knowledge that the defenders of press freedom acknowledge no home country other than capital. What, after all, is the mechanism on which the IAPA campaign is founded? It is very simple. The message transmitted by the Chilean newspaper returns to its point of origin, reinforced by the authority conferred on it by having been reproduced abroad. It reaches such extremes that a lead writer in Santiago, who also happens to be the Chilean correspondent for an Argentinian newspaper, can comment in his Santiago column on the editorial which he himself wrote two days previously for the newspaper of the other side of the Andes. We are witnesses to an IAPA tautology. Its campaign is no more than a massive exercise in chewing its own tail. It might be imagined that the editor of the Brazilian daily *O Globo*, for example, possesses a certain independence and relative autonomy. It would be an illusion. In fact, he simply applies formulae worked out previously between them by the bosses of the IAPA.

3. 'Freedom of the press' belongs to the catalogue of bourgeois liberal principals. The bourgeoisie itself is in fact unable to apply it in its full sense, and reverts to official censorship when its interests are threatened, as is shown by the censorship laws in Uruguay, Brazil, etc. Faced with the menace of popular movements, enlightened bourgeoisies and military dictatorships alike sing the same song.

"Truth is concrete," said Brecht, because it is discovered in the union of life and practice. The ideology of domination operates precisely through abstraction and idealisation, which confer universality on the expression of particular interests. Thus, when the bourgeois project, abandoning the panegyric spheres of its 'pure democracy,' actually has to concretise its abstract notion and its ideal of freedom of the press and expression, it finds itself constrained to accept the mediation of the capitalist enterprise as the producer of information and, as a condition *sine qua non*, the mercantile orientation and professionalisation of that liberty. The liberation of expression for the citizen passes through the boss and surplus value. It is here that the mystification principally resides. As Marx and Engels wrote, "the first freedom of the press consists in it not being a trade."⁹

The Verticality of The Message

9. Karl Marx "Debating the Freedom of the Press" in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels *On Literature and Art*, Lee Baxandall and Stefan Morawski, eds., New York, International General, 1974, p. 61.

This concept of press freedom, which justifies the power of information as belonging to a property-owning minority, is related to a conception of the organisation of the mass media which is expressed in the message's verticality. In accordance with the schema, the mass media function unilinearly, from top to bottom. A transmitter transmits the superstructure of the capitalist mode of production to the receiver, an audience, the great majority of which does not see its own preoccupations and modes of life reflected in the messages transmitted, but rather the aspirations, values, and norms which bourgeois domination considers to be most favourable for its survival. A message, manufactured by a group of specialists, is imposed on a receiving public whose only participation in the orientation of programmes which it will consume consists in lending itself periodically to *rating surveys*, which are no more than market studies of the commercial viability of a pre-existing programme-product. Such studies are, in fact, self-surveying plebiscites. They are part and parcel of the endless network of sophisms which cements the ideological foundation of bourgeois domination. During a press conference, the editor of a right-wing Chilean newspaper said:

You are all opposing the freedom of the press when you allege that it is no more than the freedom of property. The facts prove you wrong. The daily sale of 300,000 copies constitutes a veritable plebiscite, and one which is the highest expression of personal freedom of choice.

What our bourgeoisie does not say is that this is a bourgeois institutionalised plebiscite which not only imposes but also pre-ordains attitudes and tastes, and only once these are determined and fixed allows itself the luxury of simulating democracy. Those who propound the idea that in capitalist society production is determined by the 'dictatorship of the consumers' adhere to the same concept. Clearly, this bourgeois schema is the expression of a hierarchical culture, corresponding to the class divisions it perpetuates.

Frequently, it is the people themselves who provide the raw material of information. Thus, what is at issue is the appropriation of an event or a piece of news, in which the people are the actors, in order to legitimate the system of domination. In the same way that the proletariat does not recognise in commodities the fruits of labour which *they* have provided, the masses, the actors in the social process, do not recognise themselves in the products elaborated by the central transmitter which injects meaning into historical cultural processes. In appropriating the news to itself, the ruling class appropriates the product of social forces and proclaims itself absolute master and sole interpreter of the interests of society as a whole. The bourgeoisie, therefore, can be said to possess the dynamic of information. Whoever the actors in an event may be, the bourgeoisie credits it to its own account. The liberal communications medium transmits the spectacle which the bourgeoisie creates for itself and for others from out of its own life. Having understood this, we can see that the message in fact reflects the social practice of the bourgeoisie, and never that of the

people. The chain of authoritarian mechanisms, moreover, is infinite, because all the consequences of cultural dependency make themselves felt within it.

Thus, in conclusion, we can say that the bourgeoisie has imposed on us not only a mode of organising the transmission of messages, but also a concept of communication. It is a fact that so far we have been unable to envisage mass communications separately from advanced technology. This is surely the result of the authoritarian concept of communications which in turn arises from the fact that those who possess the technological power are also those who are able to transmit the messages.

In a revolutionary process, the task must be to demystify this mechanism for the colonization of one class by another, by establishing a two-way flow of communication between transmitter and receiver. This means that the communications media must become a tool for the expression of the practice of the dominated groups. The message must not be imposed from above, but rather the people themselves must create the messages which are destined for them, and in which they are the actors. When the local bourgeoisie and the imperialist metropolis are dislodged from their role as creator and arbitrator of culture, the mass media will lose their transcendental character. Consequently, the notion of freedom of press and expression will lose its abstract character. In the course of this process of concretization, the privilege of expression will be torn from the hands of the minority and the idea of freedom of expression will cease to be a class utopia.

The Social Division of Communication

THE COMMODITY FORM

An analysis of the origins of this authoritarian division between transmitter and receiver leads us beyond the practice of communications itself to the principles and mechanisms which govern the totality of social relations. In capitalist society, creative activity takes the form of the production of commodities, goods exchangeable on the market. The results of human activity take form of commodities. This fact of their interchangeability is the universally shared characteristic of all products and all activity:

Wealth, in societies governed by the capitalist mode of production, defines itself as an immense accumulation of commodities.... A commodity is, before anything else, an external object, a thing which, by virtue of its properties, satisfies human needs, of whatever kind these may be. Whether these needs arise in the stomach or in the imagination, the same holds true.¹⁰

The distance which we have observed between the transmitter and receiver is simply the reproduction of the space separating the producer from the consumer. People living this dominant social relation only see in it the expression, in one of the multiple spheres of their daily activity, of a modality everywhere present in the capitalist form of

society. They no more participate in the determination of televised, radio broadcast or printed products than they do in the decisions affecting the nature and hierarchy of material consumer goods; all this escapes the alienated and atomised consumer. This passivity, resulting from the process of alienation, affects the transmitter as much as it does the receiver, given that the alienated consumer is also an agent of production.

The reproduction of the totality of the social relations of production is not halted by the fact that messages are conveyed to different publics. Thus, the closed circuit—in the sense of one-way—of mercantile bipolarity is repeated at every level, prescribing the forms of expression whether of reality or fiction. The message-commodity served up by the transmitter to the receiver arrives ready packaged. It is a product; it issues from the production process, and is, as its etymology indicates, finished, achieved, 'perfect'. Moreover, it is a product which can fit into the whole gamut of relationships from paternalism to authoritarianism. It may suggest, or insinuate or impose, but always it evades the participation of the user and determines a univocal mode of reception. This is one of the reasons why the language of bourgeois mass communications can be said to be essentially repressive. It is a language which constrains the receiver by imprisoning him within a subjugating product. The same effect of subjugation, paradoxically gives the transmitter the impression of freedom, when in fact he is increasingly enslaving himself. Such is the magic and pseudo-dialectic of advertising discourse between master and servant. To arrive at the final instance of this 'ritualistic and authoritarian' discourse—which takes in everything from the transmission of *fait divers* to the soap-opera television serial—we would find ourselves back very clearly at the notion of order through which the ruling class manipulates the masses, and which makes bourgeois society a closed society. It is in the fact that this class considers the order it has installed to be the absolute and definitive form of social production that the malthusian, and therefore repressive, character of this order resides. The communications media, endowed with the pseudodynamic of false consciousness, is enthroned as the bureaucracy of the ruling forces' ideological power. Through its vertical language this bureaucracy administers the assumed untouchability of this order's legitimacy. It elevates this order into a code of social harmony, occasionally to be readjusted, but never altered. If it appears to embody a principal of equilibrium, this is precisely because of the mystification perpetrated by the class which has organised all social institutions in its own image. Its primary use of coercion—called by some institutionalised violence—consists in a false consciousness which transforms a partial concept and a relative truth into an absolute value, elevating the particular version of a class to the status of supreme norm governing the behaviour of the masses.

THE FRAGMENTED UNIVERSE OF COMMUNICATION

The authoritarian forms of mass transmission of cultural products crystallize the social division inherent in bourgeois society. The fragmentation of communications practice into stereotyped genres and formats (magazines, romance magazines, sports reviews, comics, etc.) introduces the reader or listener into particular worlds which appear as autonomous and compartmentalised. By concealing their fragmented nature, these prevent comprehension of the real world as a totality within which class oppositions are manifested. Through this determination of different publics, bourgeois and imperialist power ensures the satisfactory functioning of its society, gives material form to divisions between individuals and classes, and concretises the dichotomies contained in its language and culture of domination by granting these compartmentalised users privileged access to spheres of interest, rules of conduct, taboos and specially reserved fields. (In televised discussions, for example, it is assumed that young people should talk about young people's concerns, that women should talk about women's matters). However, even in a society such as Chile, this cultural patch-work operation in fact contradicts the bourgeois concept of *mass communication* from the very moment when the pattern of different clienteles follows a line between different social classes. While nationally produced and imported women's magazines, for example, find almost all their readership in the upper levels of the population, the romance magazines [*fotonovela*] are reserved entirely for popular readership:

This fact is, moreover, reflected in the lay-out and format of the material. The former—women's magazines—conform to the new formal demands, the contemporary imperatives of technology as presently structured, vulgarized by consumer goods in general and the image-based media (cinema, TV) in particular. In other words, these magazines are integrated into the formal competitive circuit of the technological world. The romance magazines mediate this influence and "demonstration effect" more slowly and partially. In the final analysis, the dialectic transmitter/receiver is conditioned by the need to discriminate between differing desires. This results in the fixing of parallel expressive registers, the formal manifestation of the dominant-dominated relationship in the domain of aesthetic solicitation.¹¹

Each of these genres and formats (which appear in all the media) isolate the reader within a particular sectional, class language which is definitively antipathetic to reality as a whole. We might say that each one reconstitutes a false total world. On being introduced into these closed universes, the reader is persuaded to conceive of them—the world of sport, of the detective, of romance—as independent totalities, unarticulated with each other. They unfold outside his daily experience, and establish their own laws of operation at the margins of history. A domain of 'genre rules' is established which becomes the

11. Michèle Mattelart "El nivel mítico de la prensa seudoamorosa," *Los medios de comunicación de masas: la ideología de la prensa liberal en Chile*, Santiago de Chile, CEREN, 1970, p. 221.

universal code for deciphering the world. Thus, the language of the sports magazine is the operational language of sports, prescribed by the ruling class's code regarding the role preserved for the practice of sport. In more general terms, this particular language, for example, also signifies the status given to the body; it is a code which makes an abstraction of 'careful cultivation of the body' and represents this class's conception of leisure and physical strength. If further evidence is required, it is only necessary to consider the authoritarian significance and ideological connotations of the innocent motto to be found woven into the ideology of sports magazines: "Clean mind, clean body." The women's magazine, on the other hand, encloses the woman in the world of the myth of femininity, however retouched and modernised it may be, denying her in fact the right to the emancipation which it purports to promote. The romance magazines enclose the reader in the 'order of the heart'. Each one of these cultural products reproduces in its own way the false antinomies which systematically block any desire to change existing social relations (spirit/matter; work/leisure; tradition/modernity; family/politics). We must be clear about this. It is not variety, or an abundance of choices, which is in itself coercive; it is rather this class's approach to and its chopping up of reality which is. It is this presupposition, on whose basis every magazine and even the least significant of every television channel's programming operates, which marks them out as repressive. It would be a complete aberration, for example to discover a sports magazine, published by a capitalist publishing house, questioning the concept of sport which provides its basic reference point and which legitimates it. Just as it is impermissible to query the global concept of order, so it is to put into question the 'particular orders' which animate it.

But there are even more insidious and unexpected forms in which the closed nature of the media manifests itself. An example of this is the 'moral' which usually ends narrative plots, particularly in drama. These typify the coercive principal governing all the products of mass culture. Nothing represents more completely this closed form of discourse than this 'moral' with its very particular form of resolution of the enigmas which it pretends to offer to the participatory activity of the consumer. Through their repetitive mechanisms and obsessional refrains, these forms of discourse and narrative put man on the same level as things—the men they represent as much as those who receive, read, see or listen to them. The dramatic denouement completes order's loop—the loop.

10. Karl Marx, *Capital*, I, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1970.

Pierre Bourdieu

PUBLIC OPINION DOES NOT EXIST

(France, 1972)

"I say that to speak is to express an opinion, and that opinion consists of an explicitly pronounced discourse." Plato

First of all, I should make clear that my purpose is not to mechanically and simplistically denounce public opinion polls. Even if there is no doubt that opinion polls are not what they would have us believe, they are not what many would-be demystifiers have claimed either. The polls can make a useful contribution to social science if they are treated rigorously with certain precautions. Neither am I attacking the people who carry out opinion polls; they are doing a certain job which, if not reducible to the pure and simple sale of products, can not be completely identified with legitimate scientific research either.

THREE IMPLIED POSTULATES

Having thus prefaced my remarks, I would like to enumerate three implied assumptions which must be challenged in order to arrive at a rigorous and solid analysis of opinion polls:

—first, every opinion poll supposes that everyone can have an opinion; or, stated otherwise, that the production of an opinion is within everyone's range of possibility. At the risk of offending a naively democratic sentiment, I contest this;

—second, it is taken for granted that all opinions have the same value. I believe that it can be proven that this is far from the truth, and that by gathering a plurality of opinions which do not have the same real importance, the results are very severely distorted; and

—third, the simple fact of asking everyone the same question implies the hypothesis that there is a consensus about the problem, that is, an agreement about which questions are worth asking.

These three postulates imply, it seems to me, a whole series of distortions which can be found even when all the conditions for methodological rigor are fulfilled in the gathering and analysis of the data.

Opinion polls are often criticized on technical grounds, by challenging the representativity of the samples, for instance. Given the methods presently used by the polling institutes these objections hardly

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seem valid to me. They are also accused of biasing the questions, or more accurately, of providing a bias in the formulation of the questions. This is closer to the truth, and often an answer is inferred by the way in which the question is posed. Thus, in spite of the elementary precept behind the composition of a questionnaire, which requires that one give all possible answers "a chance", omissions are frequently made either in the questions themselves or in the proposed answers, or else, the very same option is proposed several times in different ways. Unless one has taken a preparatory survey, one is never sure of having foreseen the whole range of possible responses. One can thus anticipate a repetition of certain answers giving a greater chance to the answer which has been proposed more than once; or else, among the answers anticipated, one can omit a particularly important possible question, thus taking away the likelihood of a certain answer appearing.

THE INEVITABLE PROBLEMATICS

I therefore think that there are biases of this kind and it would be interesting to investigate the social conditions underlying their appearance. The sociologist supposes that nothing happens just by chance and that these biases can be explained. Most of the time they are related to the work conditions of the people who produce the questionnaires. However, there are other factors as well. The fact that the problematics devised by the polling institutes are subordinated to a specific kind of demand; any investigation of the generating principles behind these problematics must ask who can afford to pay for an opinion poll.

Recently, we undertook an analysis of a large national survey on the French people's opinion of the education system, which was based on a random sample of answers given in reply to a questionnaire published and distributed in the French newspapers. To control the validity of our sample, we looked through the files of a number of research institutes, notably IPOP (Institut Française d'Opinion Publique) and SOFRES (Société Française des Enquêtes par Sondage), for all the questions dealing with education. We found that more than two hundred questions on the education system were posed since May 1968, compared with less than twenty between 1960 and 1963. This indicates that the problematics which are imposed by this kind of organization are closely linked to the socio-political conjuncture and are dominated by a specific kind of social demand. In other words, the problems posed are political problems. The question of education, for instance, cannot be posed by a public opinion institute until it becomes a political problem. The difference can be immediately noted between these research institutes and those which generate their own problematics, if not out of a clear blue sky, at least with a much greater distance from a direct and immediate social demand.

A summary statistical analysis of the questions asked in this survey showed us that the great

majority of them were directly linked to the political preoccupations of the "ruling power." If we were to amuse ourselves right now by making a list, and if I were to ask you to write the five questions which you feel are most important in the field of education, we would surely receive a very different list from those actually asked by the opinion polls. The question "Should politics be introduced into the secondary schools?" (or variations on the theme) was asked very often, whereas the question "Should the curricula be modified?" or "Should there be a change in the way classes are taught?" was very rarely posed. Questions of major importance, at least from another perspective.

THE FUNCTION OF THE POLLS

The problematics proposed by the opinion polls correspond to specific interests. Any problematic can be said to correspond to specific interests, but in this particular case the interests which support these problematics are political interests, and this fact governs both the meaning of the responses and the significance which is given to their publication. The opinion poll is, at the present time, an instrument of political action; its most important function is perhaps to impose the illusion that a public opinion exists, and that it is simply the sum of a number of individual opinions. It imposes the idea for instance that in any given assembly of people there can be found a public opinion, which would be something like the average of all the opinions or the average opinion. The "public opinion" which is stated on the front page of the newspapers in terms of percentages (60% of the French are in favor of...) is a pure and simple *artefact* whose function is to conceal the fact that the state of opinion at any given moment is a system of forces, of tensions, and that there is nothing more inadequate than a percentage to represent the state of opinion.

We know that relations of force can never be reduced to relations of force: any exercise of power is accompanied by a discourse aimed at legitimating the power of those who exercise it. One could even say that there is a tendency in the exercise of power towards its self-concealment as such, and that complete power is only realized when it is fully concealed. Stated simply, the politician who yesterday said "God is on our side" today says "Public Opinion is on our side."

This is the fundamental effect of the opinion poll: it creates the idea that a unanimous public opinion exists in order to legitimate a policy, and strengthen the relations of force upon which it is based or make it possible.

THE "NO REPLIES"

Having stated my purpose at the beginning, I shall try to quickly indicate the operations which produce this *consensus effect*. The first operation, which begins with the assumption that everyone must have an opinion, consists in ignoring the "no replies." For some time now, instead of saying "50% of the French are in favor of the discontinuation of the railroads," the newspapers say

"50% of the French are for, 40% are against, and 10% have no opinion." But that isn't enough information; for instance, you ask people "Are you favorable to the Pompidou government?" You register 30% "no replies", 20% yes, 50% no. You can say the number of people unfavorable is greater than the number of people favorable and there is a remainder of 30%; or you can re-calculate those favorable and those unfavorable, excluding the "no replies". This simple choice is a theoretical operation of great importance about which I would like to reflect a moment.

Eliminating the "no replies" is the same as what is done in an election when there are blank or null ballots; the implicit philosophy of electoral surveys is thus imposed on opinion polls. On close examination, however, one finds that the rate of "no replies" is generally higher in women than in men, and that the margin between men and women increases as the problems posed become more specifically political. This is true to such an extent that we were able to determine, out of a list of different questions, which ones could best be considered political, just by evaluating the margin between the "no replies" by women and men. Another factor: the more a question concerns problems of knowledge, the greater is the margin of "no replies" between more-educated and less-educated people. Another observation: when the questions have to do with ethical problems (example: "Should children be punished?") the margin of "no replies" between social classes is slight. Another observation: the more a question poses conflictual problems, concerns a "thorny" contradiction (such as a question on the situation in Czechoslovakia for persons who vote Communist) or generates tensions for a particular category, the more "no replies" will be received from that category. In other words, a simple statistical analysis of the "no replies" offers information about the meaning of the question, as well as the category of people questioned, the category being defined as much by the *probability of having an opinion at all* as by the conditional probability of having a favorable or unfavorable one.

THE IMPOSITION OF THE PROBLEMATIC

The scientific analysis of opinion polls shows that there exists practically no catch-all problem: no question which is not reinterpreted in function of the interests or non-interests of the people to whom the question is posed. Thus the first imperative in evaluating a poll is to ask what question the different categories of people thought they were answering. One of the most pernicious effects of the opinion surveys is to put people in a position where they must answer a question they have never thought about, or mistakenly answer a different question from that which was asked, the interpretation only being a record of the misunderstanding.

I stated earlier that the opinion polls could be re-used scientifically; however, this supposes certain precautions which are excluded because of the social conditions under which the research

organizations operate. Journalists who want things to be simple, further simplify the already simplified data which they have been given, and when it reaches the public, it is likely to read as follows: "50% of the French are for the discontinuation of the railroads." A rigorous interpretation of the opinion polls would require an epistemological examination of each of the questions asked, plus, concerning the system of the questions, an analysis of the whole system of answers, which together would be the only way to know what were the questions the people really thought they were answering.

Questions having to do with moral issues, for example, the punishment of children, relations between teachers and students, and so on, are problems which are perceived as ethical problems as one descends the social hierarchy, but which can be political problems for the upper classes. One of the distorting effects of surveys is the transformation of ethical responses into political responses by the simple imposition of a particular problematic.

THE TWO PRINCIPLES IN THE PRODUCTION OF OPINIONS

In fact, there are several principles which can be used to generate a response. First of all, there is what could be called "political competence," a notion which corresponds to a definition of politics which is both arbitrary and legitimate, both dominant and concealed as such. This "political competence" is not universally distributed. It varies with the level of education. In other words, the probability of having an opinion on all the questions which presuppose a certain political knowledge can be compared to the probability of going to a museum; it is a function of a person's level of education. Some astounding variations can be observed: whereas a student involved in a far-left movement perceives forty-five different divisions to the left of the Parti Socialiste Unifié, a middle-level executive sees none at all. In an election, one thinks in terms of the political gradations far left, left, center left, center, center right, right, far right, etc. One of the important facts we found as a result of a test we developed was that difference social categories would use this scale in a very different way from that taken for granted by "political science" investigations. Certain social categories use very intensely a small section of the far left; others use only the center, while still others use the whole range; an election turns out to be the aggregation of totally different spaces; those people who measure in centimeters are added together with those who measure in kilometers, or to use a better image, those who use a scale of 0 to 20 with those who use only 9 to 11. Competence is measured, among other things, by the degree of finesse of one's perception (the same is true of aesthetics, where some people can distinguish five or six stages in the development of a painter). This comparison can be pushed even further. Just as in aesthetic perception, there is a prerequisite: people must first think of the work of art as a work of art, and once they have done so, they must create

perceptual categories to construct and structure it, etc.

Let us suppose a question formulated in the following way: "Are you for a structured education or a non-structured education?" It can be constituted as a political question, the representation of the teacher-child relationship being integrated into a systematic vision of society. It can be considered as a political question by some people; for others it is strictly a moral question. In the questionnaire which I mentioned earlier, we asked people "For you, is it political or not to go on strike, wear long hair, participate in a rock festival, etc.?" We wanted to see just how people use this dichotomy; obviously one finds very great differences according to social class.

The first condition for the production of opinions is thus to be able to perceive a question as being political; the second, once having established it as being political, is to be able to apply political categories to it, categories which may be more or less adequate, more or less refined, etc. These are the specific conditions for the production of opinions which the opinion surveys assume to be universally and uniformly fulfilled when they first postulate that everyone can produce an opinion.

The second principle according to which people produce an opinion is what I call "class ethos" (not to be confused with "class ethic"), by which I mean a system of implicit values which people have interiorized from childhood and from which they generate answers to very different types of questions. An example: I think the opinions which people exchange at the end of a soccer game between Roubaix and Valenciennes owe a great deal of their coherence and logic to a class ethos. Judgements like "It was a beautiful game, but too rough" or "It was well-played, but not very beautiful to watch," which appear to be arbitrary, like tastes and colors, are probably generated by a very systematic principle, a class ethos.

THE DISTORTION OF MEANING

Many answers which are considered political answers are in reality produced by a class ethos and can be given a totally different meaning when they are interpreted on political grounds. I shall illustrate this and you will see that what I have said is far from abstract and unreal. Here I must refer to a specific sociological tradition, prevalent especially among political sociologists in the United States, who commonly speak of the conservatism and authoritarianism of the popular classes. These ideas are based on a comparison of the international results of surveys or elections which tend to show that each time the popular classes are asked, in any country, about problems concerning relations of authority, individual liberty, freedom of the press, etc., they give answers which are more authoritarian than the other classes; so the global conclusion is made that there is a conflict between democratic values and the authoritarian and repressive values which have been interiorized by the popular classes (the author I have in mind, Lipset, refers to American democratic values). Thus the following

eschatological vision is arrived at: if we raise the standard of living and level of education, we will reduce the propensity to repression and authoritarianism, etc., which are linked to low income and low level education, etc., and we will thus produce good citizens of American democracy and will do away with Communist parties like they have in France or Italy. It appears to me that the crux of the problem is the meaning of the answers to certain questions. Imagine a group of questions like the following: "Are you for the sexual independence of married couples?", "Are you in favor of a non-repressive education?" "Are you in favor of the new society?" Now imagine another type of question, like: "Should professors go on strike when their jobs are threatened?", "Should teachers act in solidarity with other civil service employees during periods of social conflict?" These two groups of questions receive replies structured inversely in relation to social class. The first group of questions, which deal with a certain kind of change in social relations, or shall we say, in the symbolic form of social relations, provokes responses which are increasingly favorable as one ascends the social hierarchy and the hierarchy in the level of education; inversely, the questions which deal with real transformation of the relations of force between classes provoke increasingly unfavorable answers as one ascends the social hierarchy.

Thus the statement "The popular classes are repressive" is neither true nor false. It is true to the extent that the popular classes tend to have a much more rigid and authoritarian idea about moral problems concerning relations between parents and children or between the sexes. Concerning problems of political structure, which brings into play the maintenance or transformation of the social order, and not just the conservation or transformation of the modes of relationships between individuals, the popular classes are much more favorable towards a transformation of the social structure. We have seen how certain problems posed in May 1968, and often poorly posed, in the conflict between the Communist party and the leftists, is intimately linked to the central problem which I have just tried to present, concerning the nature of the answers people give in reply to the questions asked, that is, the principle upon which they produce their answers. The opposition I made between these two groups of questions actually amounts to the opposition between the two principles in the production of opinions: an authentically political principle and an ethical one, and the problem of the conservatism of the popular classes is produced because this difference is ignored. Thus, what I have called the effect of imposition of the problematic, an effect utilized by all opinion polls and political investigations (beginning with elections), results from the fact that the questions asked in an opinion survey are not the questions which are a real concern for the people questioned, and the responses are not interpreted in function of the problematic used by different categories of respondents in their actual reply. Thus the *dominant*

problematic, whose image is provided by the list of questions posed during the last two years by the polling institutes, is the problematic which essentially interests the people who hold power and who consider themselves to be well informed about the means of organizing their political action. This problematic is very unequally overcome by the different social classes and it is important to note that the different social classes are more or less apt to produce a counter-problematic. Concerning the reaction to a television debate between Servan-Schreiber and Giscard d'Estaing, a polling institute posed questions like "Is success a function of talent, intelligence, work, personal worth?" The answers received revealed nothing about objective truth, but did, in fact, reply to the question "To what extent are the different social classes conscious of the objective laws governing the transmission of cultural capital?" It could be said generally that the lack of consciousness of these laws increases as one descends the social hierarchy, and in the present state of society, the popular classes are particularly mystified by the school system. One can understand why the attachment to the myth of talent, of rising through the school system, of the impartiality of the school system, of the equity in the distribution of jobs according to skills, etc., is very strong in the popular classes. There is no counter-problematic; it can exist for a few intellectuals but it does not have social force even though it has been taken up by a few parties and groups. The popular classes are thus not conscious of the truth of the mechanisms and they cannot produce a counter-problematic: the whole ensemble of social conditions prohibits it being diffused. We might add that it is not enough for a party to put into its program the struggle against the hereditary transmission of cultural capital; "scientific truth" is subject to the same laws of diffusion as ideology. A scientific proposition such as "cultural capital is transmitted by the school and by the family" is like a papal bull on birth control: one is only preaching to the converted. It is diffused according to certain laws; the probability that it will be accepted by some and rejected by others can be determined sociologically.

MÖBILIZED OPINION

The idea of objectivity enters into an opinion survey by asking questions in the most neutral terms so as to give equal chance to all possible answers. In reality one could ask if the most perfectly rigorous opinion survey is not one in which the imperatives of neutrality and scientific objectivity are overridden entirely. Rather than asking "Some people are in favor of birth control, others against; how about you?...", it would provide a series of explicit positions taken by groups elected to establish and diffuse opinions, so that people could place themselves not in relation to a question to which they must invent both an answer as well as a problematic, but in relation to problematics and responses which have already been prepared. In other words, the opinion survey would be closer to reality if it totally violated the rules of objectivity and gave people the means to

situate themselves as they really do in real practice, in relation to already formulated opinions. As a hypothesis, imagine at a given moment a problem like teaching where all the courses are known in advance. A content analysis of the general press, the trade union press, the political press, etc., would be the basis for a sort of map which would contain all the known positions. Anyone who proposes a position which is not on the map would be considered eclectic or incoherent. Every opinion is objectivity situated in relation to a series of known positions. One commonly speaks of "taking a position"; the expression must be understood in its strongest sense; the positions are there before us and we *take* them. But we do not take them haphazardly. We take the positions which we are predisposed to take in function of our position in a certain domain. For example, in the intellectual domain, at a given moment, we can say that an individual, given the particular circumstances, has a certain probability of taking one position rather than another. Obviously there is a small margin of freedom, but there are positions which are posed with greater immediacy and force. A rigorous analysis of ideologies should seek to explain the relation between the structure of positions to be taken and the structure of the range of positions already objectively occupied.

I arrive now at the problem of the forecast value of opinion surveys. We know that opinion surveys, except for certain accidents, have a very high forecast rate regarding elections, but they seem to fail when one compares an early result with a later one, whenever there has been an intervening crisis. In other words, the opinion surveys capture quite well the structure of opinions at a given moment, in a stable situation, but they do not capture the potential state of opinion, and more exactly, the movement of opinion. This occurs because they capture opinions in a situation which is not the real situation in which opinions are formed, and because they perceive the opinions themselves and not the ongoing conditions which produce them. There is a considerable difference between the opinion which people produce in an artificial situation such as a survey and the opinion they produce in a situation closer to the daily-life situation in which opinions are confronted and confirmed, such as conversations among people of the same milieu, etc. Thus, in a psychological experiment, we asked ten people to state their opinion on the length of two pieces of metal, which were in fact the same length. Afterwards, we took nine of the people aside and asked them to say that the two pieces of metal were not exactly the same length. Then we asked all the ten people the same question a second time, and found that the tenth person now says that at first he thought that the two pieces were the same length, but now it seems to him that they're not exactly the same length, etc. The situation in which opinions are formed, in particular in times of *crisis*, is of this type; people are faced with already formed opinions, opinions upheld by certain groups and they must choose between opinions because they must choose between groups. This is the principle behind the

politicizing effect produced by a crisis: one must choose between groups who define themselves politically and who increasingly define their position in function of explicitly political principles. The important thing is that the opinion survey treats public opinion like the simple sum of individual opinions, gathered in an isolated situation where the individual furtively expresses an isolated opinion. In real situations, opinions are forces and relations of opinions are conflicts of forces. Taking a position on any particular problem means choosing between real groups, which leads us to see that the second postulate, the assumption that all opinions are equal, is totally unfounded.

Another law can be deduced from our analysis: the more one is involved in a certain problem, the more one will be interested in it and the more opinions one will have about it. Going back to the example of the education system, we find that the rate of response is very closely related to one's personal proximity to the education system, either as an employee, professor, parent or former student, and the probability of one's having power over the issue in question. Mobilized opinion is the opinion of influential people. If the Minister of Education acted in function of an opinion poll (or even a superficial reading of a poll), he would not do what he does when he acts really as a politician, in response to the telephone calls, the visit from the director of the Ecole Normale Supérieure, or from a dean, etc. In reality he acts much more in function of forces of actually formed opinion, which enter his field of vision only to the extent that they have power, because they have already been mobilized.

INCLINATIONS AND OPINIONS

In order to forecast, for example, what will happen to the university system in the next ten years, I think that the understanding of *mobilized opinion* is essential. However, at the same time a reading of the opinion survey can also help us to discover something which does not yet exist in the state of an opinion and which can suddenly emerge in a time of crisis. By opinion I mean propositions which are formulated in a coherent discourse. Do those people who do not answer or who say they have no opinion really have no opinion? I think that taking the "no replies" seriously means that the inclinations of certain categories of people cannot attain the status of opinion, that is, the status of a formulated discourse which aims at coherence, and intends to be heard, imposed, etc. In crisis situations, where formulated opinions are expressed, people who had no opinion will not choose one haphazardly. If they perceive the problem as being political (for workers, questions of salary or of work cadences), they will choose in terms of political competence; if the problem is one which they do not perceive as being political for them (repressive relationships within the company) or if the problem is not yet clearly perceived, they will choose by what is called class instinct, but which has nothing to do with instinct: it is a system of deeply unconscious inclinations which is the principle behind innumerable choices in extremely different areas ranging from

aesthetics to everyday economic decisions. The traditional opinion surveys produce the bizarre effect of destroying simultaneously both the study of pressure groups and opinion, and the study of dispositions which cannot be expressed in the form of an explicit discourse. That is why the opinion survey, in its present use, is incapable of generating any kind of reasonable prediction about what would happen in a crisis situation.

OPINION POLLS AND ELECTIONS

Let us imagine a problem like the education system. We could ask: "What do you think of the policies of [the Minister of Education] Edgar Faure?" This type of question is very much like an electoral survey in that the answer doesn't tell us very much. We could then go on and ask: "Are you in favor of bringing politics into the high schools?" Here we find a very clear division; but even so, within the upper classes, it's more complicated; the intellectual fractions of these classes tend to be in favor, but with reservations. If we follow with another question: "Can teachers go on strike?", we find a sharp division in the answers. Among the popular classes there is a kind of transfer of specific political competence and people know exactly what to say. We could also ask "Should the curricula be transformed?" "Should grades be based on final exams?" "Should parents be represented on teachers' councils?" Should competitive exams be done away with?", and so on. Behind the question "What do you think of the policies of Edgar Faure?" there were all these other questions, and people immediately took a position based on something which a good questionnaire could only grasp if it used at least sixty questions, whose variations in every direction could then be observed. In the case of one type of question, the opinions would be related positively to the position in the social hierarchy, and in another, they would be related negatively, or perhaps just a bit, or up to a certain point, or even not at all. Thus, when one asks a general question like the one about Faure one accumulates phenomena which are related in very different ways to social class. What is interesting is that specialists in political sociology have noticed that the relationship between social class, and practices and opinions, etc. which is usually observed in almost every area of social practice, is very weak when it comes to electoral phenomena, to the degree that some of them do not hesitate to conclude that there is no relation whatsoever between social class and the fact of voting for the right or for the left.

In reality, if we keep in mind that an election poses in a single syncretic question what can only be reasonably understood in two hundred questions, and that some people measure in centimeters and other in kilometers, along with so many other variables, one will realize that the act of voting is a question of chance. Perhaps the traditional question of the relationship between voting and social class should be posed in the opposite way: why is there in spite of everything, a relationship at all, even a

weak one? Why does it not simply follow a distribution curve? There is a very great elasticity in electoral opinions: the opinion expressed by a vote is defined in an essentially negative way; there are points beyond which one cannot pass, yet within these defined limits, there is a certain leeway. This is all the more true when the strategy of electoral campaigns is to obscure the questions and conceal the differences between candidates in order to win undecided votes. All this leads one to ask what is the function of both the electoral system and the opinion surveys, whose properties are so similar. To put things in very gross terms, I believe that the electoral system is an instrument whose very logic tends to attenuate conflicts and differences, and thus naturally tends to be conservative. We can ask ourselves what we are really doing when we use this instrument. One could draw the conclusion, perhaps, that it is really better than we think and we should continue to use it. A revolutionary party which wants to increase its strength in the existing relations of force, based on this analysis, can develop counter-problematics as its main strategy, systematically using the procedure instinctively used for generations (the counter-strategy of "its the same difference" as a refusal of the problematic). The problem of a party which has defined its objectives is not to provide answers but to provide people with the means of being the producers, not of their answers, but of their questions, and in doing so produce their means of defense against questions which are imposed upon them simply because they do not have any others.

In another perspective, it could be concluded that just as people must be taught certain things in school before they can go to a museum, if electoral contests are to be less absurd, the difference between the implicit postulates of the electoral system and reality must be as small as possible. In other words, people must have the means of producing opinions; they must therefore have the means to appropriate them. What this means is that from primary school on, people must have a real political education.

One might also be led to say: I do not want to play the electoral game because in the existing structure of society, with the present distribution of cultural capital being one of the factors which defines the capacity for producing opinions, it is an illusion to believe that equality can be achieved in the voting booth. It could be concluded that only active minorities are capable of mobilizing opinion. These very different conclusions could be drawn, among others. What is sure is that by studying the operation of opinion polls one gets an idea of the way this particular type of poll, the electoral survey, functions, and the effect it produces.

In brief, in saying that public opinion does not exist, I mean it does not exist in the form which some people, whose existence depends on this illusion, would have us believe. At present, there is, on the one hand, mobilized opinion, formulated opinion, pressure groups mobilized around a system of interests; and on the other, certain inclinations,

Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR)

ON JOURNALISM AND OBJECTIVITY

(Chile, 1971)

opinions in an implicit state which, by definition are not really opinions, if by opinion we mean a formulated discourse with a pretention to coherence. What I have been considering here is the definition of opinion which is implicitly used in the public opinion survey. It is not my opinion on opinion itself. It is only an explicit definition of opinion as it is employed by the people who produce the opinion polls when they ask people to formulate opinions or to take positions on already formulated opinions. This is what I mean when I say that opinion, the sense of the social definition implicitly accepted by those who prepare or analyze or use opinion polls, simply does not exist.

In capitalist society, the mass communication media serve the dominant classes. This is generally accomplished by an attempt to impose the supposedly eternal universality and validity of the bourgeois ideological worldview. The techniques developed by each of the communication media have been conditioned by mechanisms which assure the fulfillment of this ideological function. Furthermore, the communication media—especially in urban centers—have acquired a decisive importance in the coercive action of the dominant classes.

These observations have all become near-platitudes; nevertheless, any mass media discussion today must take them into consideration. As precarious and undeveloped as they may be, these considerations are important, since they not only challenge a particular form of action of the dominant ideology and the bourgeois media, but also directly concern the action and ideology of the media workers themselves. Furthermore, such a discussion poses the general problem of ideology, its nature and development and the techniques by which it is transmitted. The discussion is important, therefore, since it not only concerns the specific field of the newspaper worker, but because, in order to be adequately posed, presented and developed, it must also incorporate a more general problematic, one which transcends the area of journalism and confronts the framework of society as a whole, understood as the manifestation of human practices conditioned by the mechanisms of production.

Although this discussion of the media, the role of its workers and the sense of their possible transformation is in its first stages, certain basic concepts can be noted. To the extent that these concepts are introduced into the discussion in a concrete and creative way, a critical self-consciousness in journalistic practice may be furthered. Moreover, they hold the keys to an active and fruitful incorporation of the media and their workers into the political tasks which are advancing the struggle waged by the oppressed sectors of society for the achievement of economic, political and cultural liberation.

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Every social practice in bourgeois society has been invested with an ideological framework which justifies it, gives it meaning and tends to maintain its status in function of its position in the ensemble of social activities. Just as the concrete action of a psychiatrist, a writer or a politician have their nature and meaning assigned to them in bourgeois society, the practice of the workers in the communication media has been given its ideological basis, its particular social role and its general significance and direction.

One of the pillars of the bourgeois conception of journalism is what has been called "objectivity", a notion which has practical as well as moral implications. Throughout the history of journalism, the requisite of objectivity has been elaborated and proposed as a way of approaching reality, as a mechanism for transmitting this approach, and as a *desideratum*, the ultimate moral goal of the profession. Thus objectivity is not only a formal requisite for the isolated journalist: the journalist himself has come to accept his activity as a synonym for so-called objectivity.

Now, what is the nature of this objectivity?

First of all, it supposes the existence of an exterior reality which must be described "such as it is" by someone possessing the adequate skill.

Second, it implies that the viewpoint of the person responsible for the description is capable of selectively penetrating reality, discerning between what is important and what is in contingent, what is worthy of being described and what is not.

Third, it demands that the description be self-contained, in other words, that judgements between good and bad, for instance, not enter explicitly into the description. Any judgement would thus belong to the world of *effects*, the result of the reader's interaction with the description: journalism, therefore would be a practice of effects, and the objective description, rather than being responsible for the judgement would simply be the source of the individual reader's reflexion. According to this theory, the description of reality "such as it is" would act upon the individual consciousness which would be responsible for giving meaning to the description, lending it political value and interpreting it in terms of a particular conception of the world.

Fourth, regarding the technical aspects themselves, objectivity presupposes the elimination of the journalist's subjectivity, reserved exclusively for the process of selecting material and for his "intelligence" in discerning between what is important, what is "news", and what isn't. "Objectivity" also influences the practice of news production, and the norms determining how news is to be transmitted: a news item must be clearly written, detailed, stating the "how, where and why" of the event. The "how" and "where" imply the description of a particular event and a particular place. The "why", according to the demands of objectivity, must be presented only in terms of the opinions given by the event's protagonists and witnesses.

Fifth and lastly, objectivity responds to a

notion of the reader which is peculiar to a society in which the roles of individuals and groups are strictly assigned, and in which the division between manual and intellectual labor implies that only a select few are capable of generating ideas and communicating them while the majority can only receive the communication, even if these communications are alien to the events in which the receivers were actually the protagonists. In sum, it is a conception of passive readers, who are suited only to take in the news each new day so as to better forget the news of yesterday.

Why must we criticize this so-called objectivity? Because by analysing this notion point by point, it will lead us to some very concrete conclusions.

1. *Does there exist an exterior reality which can be described "such as it is"?* The only reality which men know is one which is modified by their consciousness, since the act of knowing corresponds to the arrangement of observable data by means of a highly complex, but thoroughly *human and historical* mechanism, present in every individual and corresponding to the society in which this individual lives and to his particular place in that society. *The idea that there exists an exterior reality whose facade can be perceived without any distortion or falsity is a conceptual error, but one which is a part of the ideology of class society, the ideology of the dominant class.* What exists is not an exterior reality, but a certain knowledge, a humanization of reality, produced by individual action and conditioned by the totality of society. Therefore no description, even the most strictly scientific and seemingly free from subjectivity can escape an ideological connotation. Since the ideology of the bourgeoisie, the dominant ideology in capitalist society, is a false consciousness, the bourgeoisie believes that it knows reality when it actually knows only the apparent reality of and for capitalist society. Likewise, the concepts of freedom, or nationality, or labor and capital are rationalized, ideologized by the bourgeoisie's need for domination: freedom means freedom of property, which is at the same time slavery for those who are not property-owners; nationality is the nationality of the economic and political interests of the national bourgeoisies, which simultaneously implies a negation of nationality whenever those interests transcend the national arena and become imperialist; labor is what capital makes possible, what the owners of the means of production allow the workers, even though, paradoxically, it is the labor of the worker which actually creates the existence of capital. Thus, as we said, the concept of objectivity is part of the ideological framework of the bourgeoisie. In opposition to this exterior reality, described "such as it is", there is a different reality, one in which the oppressed classes are the protagonists, a society in which they are excluded from power. In their search for their rightful hegemony, in the search to bring together their fundamental action and their mastery over society, they generate a new ideology, a new conception of the world, which is not objective, and does not want to be. It is the ideology of a world in transformation, in which the

myths coined by the bourgeoisie, their entire production of false-consciousness, are forever vanquished and will never again block the path of history towards a universe of concrete freedom for all men and women.

2. We have said that the concept of objectivity as a practice implies that the journalist has a perspective capable of selectively penetrating reality, determining what is important and what isn't. But what is this selective capacity? Given exterior reality, given *data* about this reality, its facts and events, certain events are chosen, characterized as news and exhibited according to certain priorities. Thus what is called objectivity is nothing more than a biased selection of data. By "biased" we mean that the selection is determined by the social praxis of the specific group to which this social praxis belongs, is linked or is subjected. Thus the basic "intuition" of the journalist, the ability to pick the "news" out of the opaque exterior world, is only a disguise, a mask which hides and even sanctifies an ignorance of the mechanisms which are behind this selection and which make it possible. Lastly, objectivity is the consecration of an ideological interest and a class interest as a universal value. By promoting objectivity to the sacrosanct level of a technical, individual value, the essentially alienating nature of supposedly "objective" journalistic practice is hidden.

3. Journalistic description is supposed to be self-contained, and judgements are supposed to be limited to the exterior world being described, an *effect* produced by the interaction between the news and the readers. Of course, since we already criticized the possibility of a description of reality "such as it is" on the basis of its ideological and historical connotations, it follows that such an interaction conceals the real role played by journalistic action as a transmitter of ideological judgements. These judgements are indeed implicit in the selection, and in this sense it becomes clear that even an apparently "descriptive" form, such as photography, the "mirror image of reality", is ideological, not only in the selection of its subject, but also in its framing, the angle which determines the foreground and background images, and in any filter used to tint or color the photo. "Objectivity", with its pretext of not going beyond its own limits, in reality goes far beyond. The way in which objectivity does this is one of the most difficult characteristics to understand about the bourgeois ideological organization of journalistic practice.

4. The sanctification of the technique of "objectivity", as a way of hiding the subjectivity of the newspaper worker completes the bourgeoisie's picture of this social function. The bourgeois notion of objectivity imposes a form of "how-where-why" on the writing itself which reinforces perfectly the commercial and "educational" nature of the events described. It is in this sense that the supposedly "pure" technique of "objectivity" must inevitably produce an efficient and attractive news package ready for consumption. Objective technique is the technique of alienation of the journalist's work. Just as the worker looks upon his own product, the fruit

of his own labor, as something alien to him, something foreign, the technique of journalistic objectivity alienates the newspaper worker from his own product, an alienation serious enough as an individual phenomenon, but even more painful, since it is an alienation proposed and transmitted as a collective consciousness. The journalist, portrayed as a privileged member of society, a romantic figure, is in reality twice damned by the nature of his practice in capitalist society: condemned first of all to be unable to recognize himself in his own product, and then condemned to be an agent of the ideological alienation of the exploited sectors which consume his product.

5. Lastly, objectivity responds to the notion of a passive reader, a conception of the reader which is implicit in the division between manual and intellectual labor. Thus, in capitalism, the journalist's role is to give a voice and a presence to the reality of those who have been denied their own means of expression and who must receive them from the "experts", those who have been awarded this privilege by the division of labor. If, on the one hand, bourgeois ideology calls for the reader's active participation, encouraging the journalist to leave judgements up to the reader, on the other hand, it refuses the reader such an active participation, cutting down on his creative incorporation in the world, by obliging him to passively receive the ready-prepared news commodity, with no possibility for this news to be activated by his own consciousness. Thus in offering the journalist the possibility to be active, objectivity offers the journalist the same bait which it refuses the reader.

One of the most harmful fallacies behind the notion of objectivity is the idea of the "natural" division between manual and intellectual labor with its consecration of specific, compartmentalized social roles, each with its own professional grievances. Only a revolutionary conception can rapidly destroy the theoretical basis of this division, show its historical origin, and create the means to overcome it. Bourgeois "objectivity" is only a means of prolonging the image of a society which must "naturally" have its news professionals, while the real protagonists of the most important news, the protagonists of history itself, the workers, must wait in the hope that the talent, the "intuition" and the technique of the journalist will testify selectively to their vital practice. In this sense, we can say that the journalist should be considered as the first reader, not as a privileged reader, but as one more reader of what is happening around him. The journalist who conceives of himself as a reader can make of his work a self-conscious practice, like the conscious practice of an historically-formed reader who belongs either to the ideology of the dominant classes or to the developing ideology of the oppressed classes. Journalist-reader, conscious of yourself, your interests and your practice, know that the fallacy of objectivity can only be destroyed by the newspaper workers' increasingly lucid political experience.

We have just pointed out and criticized certain characteristics of so-called journalistic objectivity.

From this criticism flows a fundamental consequence: the need to challenge the present social role of the journalist and the very nature of his professional policy and to seek a new practice which together with an elevation of his political consciousness will lead toward his true liberation.

II

The journalist is too often conceived of as a *thing*, an agent whose entire function is limited to a specific practice on the fringes of the major and minor vicissitudes and transformations in the history of mankind. Conceived of as a thing, a self-contained technique, the journalist is considered to be an entity with an unlimited capacity for assimilating technical knowledge, increasing his efficiency, and in short, improving the means of communication upon which his condition is based. Behind this conception lies another of the fallacies of bourgeois society, for the journalist is not a thing, a technical entity: he is a *social relation*.

We will not attempt to enter into all the complexities of this topic here. We will only try to introduce, as we have been doing, elements for discussion, concepts of the problematic being developed. To consider the journalist as a social relation is to immediately pose the question: relation between what, between whom, and why? Let us examine these questions one at a time.

First of all, the journalist is a relation between the ideologized world of knowledge, and the equally ideologized world of those who must assimilate this knowledge. In this sense, the journalist is the relation between the knowledge created by the division of society into classes—generated and utilized by the dominant classes—and those who are on the receiving end of this circulated and massified knowledge: the economically oppressed and culturally dominated classes. Backed by the conception of the "objectivity" of his practice, the journalist becomes a link, a communicating vessel, a distributor of bourgeois knowledge and ideology. It has already been said that the objectivity of journalistic practice helps the hierarchical and autocratic structure of the mass communication media to orient the news produced by the journalist in the interests of the ruling classes. This is true, but it does not fully describe the problem. If objectivity is the fundamental theoretical and practical trait of the journalist, what matters for bourgeois society is the real social relation which is established by his practice and which is hidden behind the ideological veils, behind the false consciousness. It is in the interest of bourgeois society to maintain this social relation in which the journalist plays the main role, as long as the bourgeoisie is assured of the longevity and efficiency of a means of communication with the sectors which they dominate and use in their own interests. It is this social relation which must be exposed, revealed in order to be challenged, challenged in order to be changed. It is not the hierarchical nature of the mass communication media which guarantees the fulfillment of the social relation of the journalist in bourgeois society. It is the social relation itself which requires the auto-

cratic and hierarchical structure of the media. And this structure of the media cannot be transformed without modifying the social relation on which it rests. We have already said that it is a relation between the bourgeois world of knowledge and the world of those who must assimilate this knowledge. It is also a relation between the dominant classes and the dominated classes, between the State as a political expression of the hegemonic sectors and the social base on which is founded the hegemony of the minority. In this sense, the journalist-as-social relation could be characterized as a transmission belt for the mechanisms of domination, in that it furnishes by its very nature the channels through which flow the essential concepts of obedience which guarantee the preservation of social domination. The journalist is said to inform; in reality, information is the materialization of a way of communicating power. By the very nature of the bourgeois State, information about what is happening in the country, in the world, and within the State's own acts is a "democratic" way of keeping people up-to-date about what is going on. Informed, aware, "up-to-date", the people thus observe the scenario devised by the agents who lead society towards a destiny about which, when the time comes, they will also be "informed". The greater the appearance of popular "participation" given by the news, the more effective is civil obedience. This problematic is worth meditating in detail, since the journalist-as-social relation in its dual role as a vehicle for the transmission of knowledge controlled and directed by the dominant classes, and as a mechanism for consolidating obedience to the State, belongs strictly to a society divided into classes, to bourgeois society, whose end and overcoming provides the fuel for the discussion presently taking place among the mass communication workers. The "why" of this social relation is simply a derivative of the social elements which it connects. The reason "why" is to attempt to maintain the social functioning and structuring of society as a whole by legitimizing the class basis of the accumulation of knowledge making possible obedience to the bourgeois political State, by means of the passive receptivity of the exploited majority.

III

If what we have said up until now is true, it will be easy to ascertain the aspects of journalistic professional policy which must be discussed in depth. Freedom of the press is a banner which has been raised not only by journalists, but even more so by political groups. Numerous journalists have been imprisoned, tortured and assassinated by the ruling regime when the denunciations and political battle waged by these journalists threatened the regime's stability and political power. In a society in which the ruling class exercises maximum control over the mechanisms of coercion, freedom of the press is a professional demand of the highest order. Nevertheless, it is possible to remove the discussion from the framework of freedom vs. lack of freedom proposed by bourgeois social practice and insert it into another framework which not only contemplates the problem but also surmounts it.

The question of freedom cannot be posed in abstract terms; it must be considered in terms of social classes and social functioning; in sum, as a historical and political concept. The journalists' demand appears to be that of freedom to exercise their "objectivity" within bourgeois society. Although this professional freedom has been and continues to be a battle of the highest order, one should also ask if this demand is not also for freedom for a politically and historically determined social relation, for an alienated professional practice, for a form of journalism which, while posing the need for freedom, forgets to pose the problem of its very social nature. To this question, one must add the essential problem of the society which divides manual and intellectual labor: the demand for freedom of the press, for the individual concrete journalist, will always be abstract and perhaps even reactionary, if it is not accompanied by a growing consciousness of his condition as an intellectual worker, socially privileged, and whose social status corresponds strictly to the social relation which bourgeois society has determined for it. The newspaper workers must raise the banner of freedom as a declaration of battle against the social division of labor and challenge this social division in their own professional policy. How? By trying to permanently relate their specific practice to a global conception of society, and by lucidly and resolutely incorporating themselves into the political struggles of the oppressed sectors. Here the professional [gremial] demands come in. We must keep close watch over them to be sure that behind their liberating appearance, these demands do not conceal a sameness, a perpetuation of a privileged status, making the newspaper workers a kind of proletarian oligarchy and preserving the privileges granted to journalists by the bourgeois press, so that they would better contribute to maintaining the bourgeois in power.

IV

If all of these subjects are the basis for a transformed journalism practice, it must also recognize the following points:

—It is indispensable to create the possibility of a journalism-as-social relation different from that coined by bourgeois society. This social practice would be characterized by an alteration of the sectors to which it communicates, by its victory over the myth of journalistic objectivity. As an alternative to the communication between the world of bourgeois knowledge and its assimilation by the dominated, and between the bourgeois State and the oppressed classes, we can envisage communication between the dominated sectors themselves, who, at present, as a result of the bourgeois mode of domination, have lost their identification and the consciousness of the totality of their social practice and their class interests.

It is not a question of maintaining the nature of the relation as it exists in the capitalist world, but rather of making journalistic practice contribute to the development of the class consciousness of the oppressed, to mobilize them, and in short, to increase their political consciousness. Furthermore, by acting as a channel of communication between

these sectors and by trying to constantly vary his functions, the journalist will begin to observe that his own role, and the very technique of his medium—supposedly solid and efficient—is being reworked, modified and challenged by the new outlook of the social subjects who have been put into contact.

—This is also the moment to discuss the present level of self-awareness concerning journalistic practice as a technique. The professional must realize that this privilege to select which has been assigned to him is political as well as ideological. And that this "gift" of selectivity does not correspond, in most cases, to the true constitution of the fundamental motor forces of the historical process. It is thus necessary that those journalists who are animated by the will to change this condition challenge their practice and their techniques, trying to give them a different effectiveness. This practice should no longer be concerned with rendering reality "such as it is", but rather with transmitting the form in which the oppressed classes, by means of their political vanguards—but not by them alone—visualize their fundamental problems and their victories. In short, the important thing is to integrate the transformed technique of the journalist into a situation where it will report the advance of history through the voice of the protagonists of history, since this transformed technique also implies that the journalist himself become one of history's many protagonists.

—Overcoming the division of labor within the newspaper business thus becomes of the utmost importance. There must be a single organization representing all the class interests of all the workers, intellectual and manual, who produce the communication media. It is on the basis of a practice of common demands, and on the collective participation in the discussion of the content, that professional action, as such, can be altered and enriched. It is impossible to wage a professional battle which continues to feed, by its very nature, the bestial defects of capitalist society.

V

But the elements we have noted here, as brief as they may be, are no more (or less) than basic concepts for discussion. This discussion should take place within the professional organizations of the journalists, and these organizations should set themselves political objectives according to sector, so that a practice is generated which makes discussion truly effective and removes it from the interchange of ideas and abstract theorizing. It is in this sense that one basic demand takes on special importance: the control over the means of production of mass communication. This control assumes two fundamental instances: control of the economic policy of the media, and control over communication policy. As a control over economic policy, there must be a battle to reduce the manipulative power wielded by the bourgeois class in its role as owner; the struggle for economic demands is a very effective way to contribute to the workers' vigilance over the economic manipulations at the base of

bourgeois ownership. In the control over the administration of communications, two levels can be quickly distinguished: (a) the structure of the enterprises themselves; and (b) the quality, orientation and significance of the communications. With regard to the first level, it is obvious that the battle for equal participation of the manual and intellectual workers in the discussion of the hierarchical structure of the enterprises can assemble the majority of the workers, and can also be the basis for a political battle leading to a growing participation in the selection of the communications being diffused. The second level concerns the nature of journalistic work, and it is this demand which can be the basis for a creative and concrete discussion of the themes which have been noted here.

VI

We must insist: only a political objective, considered not only on the level of journalists' professional organizations, but also in its concrete realization within each communication enterprise, is apt to further the workers' consciousness of their own work, to make them progress by dissolving the ideological crystallizations which guarantee not only their alienation in terms of their own work, but also their submission as workers. It is not, lastly, a matter of workers acquiring a new consciousness and a new, lucid understanding of their social function and their specific roles by means of a decree, or a sudden enlightenment. Only a political battle, related to the general interests of the oppressed sectors—who in this moment of the Chilean process are the vanguard—will be able to advance journalistic practice towards a truly revolutionary moment.

Henri Lefebvre

WORK AND LEISURE IN DAILY LIFE

(France, 1958)

Throughout history, the critique of daily life has been undertaken in many different ways: in philosophy and contemplation, dreams and art, violent action in warfare or politics. By escape and evasion.

The common element in these critiques: they were the work of particularly gifted, lucid, active individuals (philosophers, poets, etc.). Nonetheless, this individual lucidity or activity was only a semblance or an illusion which hid a more profound reality. These works were in fact the product of a specific time and a specific class, whose ideas set themselves above daily life, in the realm of the exceptional and the dominant. The critique of daily life was thus a critique of the daily life of other classes, which was essentially founded upon a disdain for productive labor; at best, it criticized the life of the dominant class in the name of a transcendent philosophy or dogma, which nevertheless still belonged to that class. The critique of the "world" and the "mundane" which was produced from the Middle Ages until the bourgeois eighteenth century when the "worldly" element burst into art and philosophy, must thus be understood in this sense.

One of the most recent forms of the critique of daily life, in our time, was the critique of the real by the surreal. Surrealism, in leaving daily life in search of the marvelous and the surprising (both immanent and transcendent aspects of the real), made platitudes unbearable. This had a certain merit, but it had a negative side: the transcendental disdain for the real, and, for example, for work (the break between the surrealists and marxists, inevitable from the start, culminated during a memorable meeting of the Association of Revolutionary Artists and Writers concerning the Soviet film, *The Path of Life*).

Nevertheless, today's man, whether or not he writes his critique, spontaneously carries out in his own way, the critique of his daily life. And this critique of daily life is itself an integral part of daily life, realized in and through leisure.

The relationship between leisure and daily life is not simple: between the two terms there is both unity and contradiction (and thus a dialectical relationship). It cannot be reduced to the simple relationship between "Sunday" and "everyday," represented as exterior and only different from one

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another. Leisure—here we will take the concept itself for granted—cannot be separated from work. It is the same man who, after work, rests or relaxes or does whatever he chooses. Every day, at the same time, the worker leaves the factory, and the employee, the office. Every week, Saturday and Sunday are spent on leisure activities, with the same regularity as that of the weekdays' work. Thus we must think in terms of the unity "work-leisure," because that unity exists, and everyone tries to program his own available time according to what his work is—and what it is not. The role of sociology is thus to study how the lives of working people and their specific place in the division of labor and society as a whole are "reflected" in leisure, or at least in their demands concerning leisure.

Historically, the "work-leisure" relationship, in terms of *real individuality* and its development, has always been presented in a contradictory way.

Before bourgeois society, individuality or more precisely, personality,¹ hardly had a chance to develop except outside of productive work. In ancient times, in the Middle Ages, and even during the period when bourgeois social relations were mixed with those of feudalism—the seventeenth century, that of the "gentleman"—the man who could develop himself was the man who didn't work.

However, the aristocrat, the clerk linked to the feudal system, or the bourgeois "gentleman" only appear to be outside the social division of labor and social practice. In reality, they are prisoners of the separation between manual and intellectual labor. Furthermore, directly or not, consciously or not, they have a social function, even if it is only on an ideological level. Leonardo da Vinci was an engineer as well as an artist. And Rabelais was first a doctor, then a writer, an encyclopedic mind and an epic novelist. Montaigne was an administrator. And Descartes was an officer, then scholar. To the extent that the men of this period were *really* separated from social practice and consecrated only to leisure—to laziness—they were doomed to perish as persons and as a class.

Yet another element complicates the question. During those periods, within those modes of production, productive labor was an intimate part of daily life: for example, the lives of the peasants and artisans. Even today, the profound difference between peasant life and the life of the industrial worker is precisely the inherent productive activity attached to the peasant's life as a whole. The workplace surrounds the house; work is not separate from daily life. Formerly, the imperatives of the peasant community (the village) regulated the celebrations

as well as the organization of work and domestic life. Thus to a certain extent a lifestyle sprung up which was not individual in the strict sense, since it was a lifestyle in which men were bound by the ties—and the limits—of the community or guild.

Bourgeois society overthrew these elements and their relationships: in one sense it differentiated and separated them, and in another it united them in a whole. Bourgeois society, particularly during its period of ascendancy, gave work another value, but at the historical moment when the relationship between work and the concrete development of individuality emerged, work became more and more fragmented. At the same time, the individual, who was increasingly involved in complex social relations, became isolated and withdrew into himself. Individual consciousness was split (into private consciousness, and social or public consciousness) and splintered (individualism, specialization, separation of areas of activity, etc.). Thus simultaneously, man "as man" was separated from man as worker (more clearly in the bourgeoisie than in the proletariat, of course). Family life was separated from productive activity, and also from leisure.

There follows from this a certain obscurity in the very concept of daily life. Where is it to be found? In work, in leisure, or in family life and the private moments "lived" outside of culture? A preliminary response to the question should be offered. Daily life envelops these three elements, these three aspects. It gives them their unity and their totality, which determines the concrete individual. This answer is not, however, totally satisfactory. Where does this living contact between the individual concrete person and other human beings take place? In fragmented work? In family life? In leisure? Where is it most concretely realized? Are there many different modalities of contact? Do they culminate in representative models? Or in fixed behavior? Are they complementary or, contradictory? What are their interrelations? Which is the decisive sector? What are the moments of poverty and wealth of this daily life which we know to be both infinitely rich (at least virtually) and infinitely poor, exploited, and alienated? What is this daily life which must be exposed for what it is, and transformed so that its wealth may be realized and developed into a new culture?

The exteriority of the elements of daily life (work—family life and "private" life—leisure) is alienating. And yet, at the same time, they may contain differences and fertile contradictions. In any case, a whole (a totality) must always be studied in the relationship between its parts.

The social history of leisure reveals transformations in the fact as well as the notion.² In the course of its development, its steps have been combined or opposed, and new needs have been born.

At first, leisure takes place as a global undifferentiated activity, hardly distinguishable from other aspects of daily life (the Sunday afternoon stroll with the family, shopping, etc.).

At a higher stage, leisure becomes more

passive. The spectator in front of the movie screen is the current example and model of this passivity whose potentially "alienating" nature was immediately evident. The commercial exploitation of these passive attitudes is particularly easy.³

Finally, at the highest degree, leisure arouses an active attitude which manifests itself in personal, highly specialized occupations and hobbies requiring technical skills (and thus, containing technical elements). This takes place only on the condition that this technical skill be external to the person's professional activity (example: photography). This is cultured or cultural leisure.

These brief observations immediately bring to light the contradictory nature of leisure, both in itself and in relation to daily life. It covers opposing directions and possibilities: some lead towards poverty, by the path of passivity; others lead towards enrichment; some are undifferentiated (although valid at a certain level), others are highly differentiated; finally, some types of leisure lead towards an escape into nothingness, while others rediscover "nature," immediate sensual life, sometimes by means of highly developed technical skills, such as in skilled sports or amateur filmmaking.

Modern industrial civilization, with its fragmented labor thus creates a *general need for leisure*, while simultaneously, within the framework of this need, it gives rise to differentiated *concrete needs*.

This is a remarkable example of how a new, *spontaneous* social need has been oriented, defined, modified and shaped by the social organization in the satisfactions which society offers the individual. This civilization, however, in creating techniques in response to new needs, has given these techniques a meaning and character which are "extra-technical." It produces "leisure machines" (radio, television, etc.). It gives rise to forms of play which transform old games, which sometimes are opposed to other activities, sometimes mixed together with them, as in camping, for instance, where it is hard to distinguish between work and leisure, and all of daily life becomes play. The concrete social needs thus determined are increasingly differentiated according to age, sex, group. They can thus be spontaneously distinguished as individual needs and collective needs, as in the distinction, for instance, between individual sports and team sports.

Today, the most striking need—in bourgeois, capitalist *society*, which shapes in its own way the needs which stem from a certain level of *civilization*—concerning the masses' need for leisure, is undoubtedly that of the *break*. Leisure must be a break from daily routine (at least in appearance), not only from work, but from family life as well. Thus the nature of leisure as *amusement* is accentuated: leisure must not bring with it any new worries, obligations or requirements, it must free one from worries and necessities. According to interviews on the subject, relaxation and enjoyment are

3. This was analyzed during a study week held at Marly, France from 28 March to 3 April 1955. (See the publications of the Centre d'Education Populaire, Marly.)

4. Notably those interviewed by the team headed by Joffre Dumazedier.

the essential features of leisure.⁴ A family reunion is no more a real "leisure" activity than is an afternoon of gardening or odd jobs at home. People interviewed tended to reject ambiguous forms which implied an obligation. The cultural dimension did not seem to matter to them (which is not to say that it did not matter *in fact*). They distrusted anything which had a pedagogic connotation and emphasized the ability of leisure to *distract* them and take their mind off work, to provide *rest* and *relaxation*, a *compensation* for the difficulties of daily life. If we can trust the subjective testimonies recorded in these interviews, this is just as true, or even more so, of the workers (proletarians) as it is of the other social classes.

Thus a work of art inserted into daily life (a painting or a reproduction hung on the wall, for instance) would not constitute an element of leisure. Nor would a book read in an armchair, unless it were a source of escape (a travel, adventure or detective story) or relaxation (picture books, comics, or the "digests" which are like pre-digested food). Leisure would more likely be found in visual images, or in films. Especially those visual images and films which are far-removed (at least in appearance) from *real life experience*.

So-called "modern" man looks to leisure for an end to fatigue and tension, an end to worry and concern. He looks for what is now known in common terminology as "relaxation." In fact, there is an ideology, technology, and technocracy of relaxation. (This relaxation can be achieved in different ways, some passive, by eliminating the content of life and substituting a void, and others active, by the control over muscular action.) "Modern" man thus hopes to find in leisure what is absent from his work and family or "private" life. Where does he find happiness? He hardly knows and rarely asks. So a "world of leisure" tends to develop, a world which is purely artificial, ideal, and outside of daily life. But how can such an artificial world be created without constant reference to everyday life and the changing contrasts implied by it?

In the past we find more than one example of an art whose goal was to beautify daily life by means of a clever transposition. This type of art presented a flattering image of daily life by imposing a style on it which at the same time acknowledged the reality. Flemish and Dutch painting are good examples. In today's bourgeois society, if a new art is to be considered new, it must be a break from daily life. (This is the very obstacle faced by attempts at realism in art.) Thus the art of producing such a break has become a carefully appropriated and exploited commercial technique. Clever purveyors produce daily quotas of *everday life* images, in which the ugly becomes beautiful, the void becomes full, and the sordid becomes great. And the horrible becomes "fascinating." The exploitation of the needs and dissatisfaction which characterize "modern" man is so clever and so persuasive that it is difficult not to be seduced or fascinated by these images, without hardening into a puritanism which rejects along with this "sensationalism" life itself and the "present."

The presence of sexuality in imagery—and in leisure in general—is a phenomenon which needs to

1. The term "individuality", in its strict sense is used only in reference to those forms of consciousness and activity which developed in the eighteenth century.

2. Joffre Dumazedier gave the following definition of leisure: "Any occupation to which a worker can devote himself by his own free will, outside of professional, family and social needs and obligations, in order to relax, entertain or cultivate himself" (Colloquium held on 10 January 1954 at the Centre D'Etudes Sociologiques sur les Loisirs). See also the article by the same author in the volume "Civilisation quotidienne" in the *Encyclopédie française*.

be studied in detail. Our era has witnessed the disappearance of some ridiculous taboos—taboos which became ridiculous only after having been quite serious—which forbid the discussion of sexual problems, the use of clothing as an exterior sign of sexuality, the sight of the body, and nudity. And yet, almost as if these things still were forbidden their violation continues to be shocking. An image with an erotic meaning (more or less specifically) or even the mere sight of a female body produces a violent attraction. Advertising has not yet exhausted the effectiveness of the image and we can assume that it is very deeply rooted. The exhibition of sexuality and nudity is a break with everyday life and as such, is sought after in leisure, such as reading and entertainment.⁵ The undressed woman can be seen on the billboards, shop-windows, magazine covers, films. Yet this escapism has much in common with a generalized neurosis: this sexuality is a sad eroticism, tired and tiring, and mechanical. In this unleashing of sexuality, there is no real sensuality, and that is perhaps its most profound characteristic. We are not criticizing eroticism for being immoral or lewd or for corrupting children, etc. Others will certainly do this for us. What we are criticizing in "modern" eroticism is the lack of real sensuality, one which implies beauty and grace, ardor and modesty, and fulfillment of desire. In "modern" eroticism, we escape from daily life, without escaping at all. With the purely apparent and superficial shock, and the brutal effects, we are only led back to the secret of daily life: dissatisfaction.

Charlie Chaplin gave us a *true inverse-image* of modern times: its image reflected in a living man, through his trials, his sufferings, his victories. But here we enter the vast area of the *illusory inverse-image*, a false world. It is false for three reasons: first of all, because it is not a world; next, because it projects itself as if it were real; and finally, because it follows very closely upon the real, while substituting its opposite. For example, in replacing real unhappiness with fictitious happiness it responds to a very real need for happiness with a fiction. Likewise, when it substitutes dramatic unhappiness for sordid unhappiness. And so on. This is the "world" of most of the movies, press, theatre and music halls; a large sector of leisure-time activities.

This split between the real world and its inverse-

5. Psycho-physiologically, the sexual image suddenly "refreshes" the unconditioned excitant by already being combined with many conditional "stimuli" included in the "stereotypes". The sexual image connects the excitant to a new signal (for instance, the brand name of a product on a billboard). The effectiveness of these images thus presupposes both the conditioning (the banality) and the insufficiency of this conditioning, the absence of social fixation and force of human "instinct". It presupposes an obscure need to go from an usual but unstable and undominated conditioning to a new conditioning, in short: dissatisfaction.

6. Real strangeness (a valid aesthetic category) can be found in the works of Melville, Gogol or Kafka. It is important to distinguish real strangeness from the strange (and mystifying) *tone* used to speak in a banal way about banal things. The inverse-image can also be a valid literary device (as in *No Exit*, Jean-Paul Sartre's best play, short,

image is strange one. For it does not lead to the strange but rather to false strangeness, shoddy mysteries presented as being omnipresent.⁶

Of course, the fictitious and mystifying "world" of leisure cannot be reduced to the exploitation of sex, sentimentality and crime. *Sports* is another category worth examining.

The original image of sports was that of physical culture, individual energy, and team spirit: a veritable school of health. What is the fruit of these great ambitions? A vast social organization (commercial and otherwise) and a great display—sometimes spectacular—of competition. Sports vocabulary is not lacking in humor. People who go to the racetrack and bet on their favorite horse officially call themselves "sportsmen." Every football team has its "supporters," even though they may never have even touched a football in their lives. All they have done is to take their car, the bus or subway to go and watch the game. They participate in the action and "play" by proxy. They may shake with enthusiasm, jump up and down, but never do they leave their seats. A strange case of "alienation." In sports, an activity apparently incompatible with illusion, we again find an inverse-image, a compensation for daily life.

Thus an analysis of the relationship between leisure needs and the needs of other sectors which together make up daily life poses many difficult problems. It is not enough to describe the facts. In order to analyse the content, a conceptual framework is required. For this the philosophical concept of alienation is particularly indispensable. In one sense, a concept generated "outside" of sociology, alienation has become a scientific concept which enables the sociology of daily life to constitute itself both as a science and a critique.

Georges Friedmann has examined the problem in the relationship between work and leisure in a long and richly documented study on human labor entitled *Où va le travail humain*.

Basically, in Friedmann's book, leisure is identified with freedom, while work is identified with necessity. According to him, every day technologies are changing the conditions of existence: "Every moment of life is increasingly penetrated" by technologies and the technical environment surrounding man becomes more dense every day.⁷ The notion of a technical environment has been

sombre, brilliant, and *definitive*). The case of children's publications is different from that of the romance and detective publications. But the common element here too is the break, the sense of the strange. Children's publications and literature nonetheless have their own themes. The child's world, less and differently structured than that of the adult, does not need an analogous inverse-image. In reality, there is no child's world. The child lives in society, and the world of the adult is already strange, foreign—or despicable. As children, they are already a *critique of the daily life of adults*, but they must enter it to look for their future and work out their possibilities. From this point of view, in the best children's literature, a familiar animal (a dog, duck, mouse) is used with a critical purpose as a support for an inverse-image in which the banal is transformed into fantasy and the fantastic.

7. *Où va le travail humain*, p. 22.

generalized and extended from man's relationship to the machine to the whole of daily life. However, the human sciences, an expression of man's uncontested right to control the machine and its effects,⁸ can modify the technological environment. This can be achieved by the intellectual, moral and social re-evaluation of work, by

Tightening the bonds of interest between the worker and society, strengthening the stimulants which justify his work, however fragmented they might be, and integrate him into the collectivity.⁹

This human problem is therefore twofold: on the one hand there is the rational organization of work, and on the other, the rational organization of leisure, and especially of "*compensatory leisure*," where the workers can express their personalities.¹⁰ Freedom in and by work then seems to come primarily from the intervention of the theoretician, the psychotechnician, or the sociologist, in other words, from "the human sciences applied to industrial work."¹¹ The "human sciences" assure freedom "to the extent to which it is possible in this area," which appears to be not very much according to Friedmann, for the technological environment follows its destiny. And this applies not only to capitalist society,¹² but to any industrial civilization.

Only the domain of leisure escapes the technological environment, necessity, and depersonalization. In leisure, we have already gone beyond the technological. We have taken the leap from necessity to freedom, from slavery to self-fulfillment.

Georges Friedmann had the undeniable merit of posing these problems in their full breath. He concretely demonstrated, with present-day examples, Marx's theses on the alienation of the worker by his equally alienated work. (For Marx, however, the alienation of the worker by fragmented labor and the machine is only one aspect of a larger—total—alienation inherent in capitalist society and the exploitation of man by man).

It is clear that the development of the productive forces (techniques) has consequences in the sphere of *social relations*, which are structurally related to these techniques. Many marxists have become prisoners of a class subjectivism; the notion of class struggle for them concerns the social relations of production (in a capitalist regime) and is limited to them alone. Because of this they have neglected the importance of the relations of production insofar as they are linked to the development of the productive forces. This has happened in spite of Lenin's analysis of monopoly capitalism:

Its very base is the changing social relations of

8. *Op. cit.*, p. 242.

9. *Op. cit.*, p. 244.

10. *Op. cit.*, pp. 336-364.

11. *Op. cit.*, p. 268.

12. *Op. Cit.*, p. 370.

13. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916). [Reprinted in Part A of Volume I of this work—Eds.]

14. Marx, *Morceaux choisis*, introduction by Norbert Guterman and Henri Lefebvre, Paris, Gallimard, 1964, p. 234.

production....it becomes evident that we have socialization of production....that private economic and private property relations constitute a shell which no longer fits its contents.¹³

Proceeding from an abstract notion of class struggle, marxists have not only failed to study the recent modifications in capitalism as such, but have also neglected the "socialization of production" and the new content of specifically capitalist relations. Such studies might have been able to modify the notion of class struggle and led to the discovery of new forms of struggle.

"Industrial sociology" posed these questions. Whether or not it answered them correctly or completely is another question. But it is certain that since the analyses by Marx and Lenin, the productive forces have developed, and this economic fact can only have had consequences on the level of social phenomena.

Marx's statements on work and its relationship to leisure opened an area of research, but did not solve all the problems. He said that work would become man's primary need, a statement which is only clear in appearance. For society, for man as a social being, for the "collective worker," work has objectively always been the first need. Did Marx mean that the *individual* man would transform this objective need into a primary subjective need? Did he mean that man would in this way put an end to alienation in and by work? Undoubtedly. But this statement is hard to accept when applied to "modern" fragmented work. Moreover, if we consider this statement in light of automation, the extreme point of technology and the modern productive forces, a new interpretation is called for. This is because automation tends to differentiate labor into highly-skilled labor and totally unskilled labor.

It can certainly be affirmed that work is the basis for personal development in social practice. It links the individual to other workers (in the workplace, social class, and social whole) and to knowledge as well. Furthermore, it necessitates and makes possible a multi-faceted technical and scientific education which dominates the entire production process and social practice. However, the possibilities of human development can only be realized after considerable difficulties. Under no circumstances can the fragmentation of work be considered favorable to the development of personality: whatever the social and political context, it remains "alienating."

Marx, on the other hand, also wrote:

the realm of necessity continues to exist. It is beyond this realm that the development of man's powers begin, the true realm of freedom, which is an end in itself. But this can only become manifest by basing itself on the realm of necessity. The shortening of the work day is its fundamental condition.¹⁴

In light of Marx's statements, the development of the need for leisure and the needs of leisure, thus have a profound significance. Georges Friedman and recent French sociology were right to emphasize its importance. That said, can we accept without reservation the notion of leisure as being a moment of freedom within necessity? Or as a leap from

necessity into freedom? As Marx said (after Hegel) necessity does not disappear with freedom, and freedom is based on necessity. Neither one can be represented as exterior to the other, they are always relative. The notion of free leisure time is true only up to a certain point, and beyond that point it is insufficient. By pushing this notion too far, there is a risk of forgetting that *alienation exists as much as in leisure as in work* (alienation inasmuch as the worker tries to "dis-alienate" himself!).

The dialectical analysis of leisure and its relationship to work (an analysis which is an integral part of the critique of daily life) thus can complement the investigations by "industrial sociologists" and "sociologists of leisure."

Within the framework of bourgeois society and the capitalist regime, work is experienced and endured by the worker as a foreign, oppressive power. Not only does the technical division of labor and the social division of labor superpose and impose themselves on him without his understanding why, but furthermore, he knows that he does not work for himself, neither directly nor indirectly. Moreover, the fragmented nature of individual labor goes hand in hand with the increasingly complete socialization of productive labor. Fragmentation and socialization are dialectically contradictory aspects of the labor process under highly developed productive forces. Fragmented labor is only meaningful and productive within a global or total labor. The worker thus develops a double need in relation to his own work.

On the one hand, the worker desires to *know* about the structure of which he is an integral part: the enterprise where he works, as well as society as a whole. This is one way of resisting and freeing oneself from the imposed constraints, through control over necessity. In capitalist enterprises, "human relations" and "public relations" respond in a mystifying way to these confused but very real aspirations. Marxist critiques of these recent schools, of American origin, have made the mistake of seeing only their ideological content, ignoring the fact that they correspond to a very real *social need*, born of the socialization of labor. They have ignored the socialization of labor, on the supposition that it was only possible under a socialist regime, when in fact it depends as well on the development of the productive forces. They did not see that capitalism responds to a need with ideology, whereas socialism responds with knowledge. On the other hand, the error of non-marxist industrial sociologists was to show that these innovations (human relations, etc.) responded to a real need, but only so they could then bend and change the direction and meaning of this need by reducing it to the dimensions of the enterprise and its need for the workers to cooperate with the bosses.

Outside the enterprise, the worker has need of a clear-cut break from his work, a compensation, for which he turns to leisure, amusement, and entertainment.

As such, leisure appears as the exceptional and "non-everyday" within the everyday.

No one can leave daily life behind. The marvelous can only be maintained in the agreed-

upon fiction and illusions. Escape is impossible. Yet we desire to have close to us—at arm's reach, if possible—the illusion of escape. This illusion is not entirely illusory, but constitutes a "world" both apparent and real (the reality of appearance and the appearance of reality). This illusion is something other than daily life, and yet it is as wide open and as integrated into daily life as possible. We work to have the possibility of leisure, yet leisure means only one thing: to get away from work. A vicious cycle.

The sociologist is thus confronted with a series of activities and passivities, forms of sociability and communication which can be studied. While he analyses and describes them, criticizing their (partially) illusory nature, he must also begin with the fact that they contain in themselves a spontaneous critique of daily life. By the very fact that these activities and passivities are something *other* than daily life, they *are* a critique of daily life, and yet they are part of daily life itself and as such are *alienating*. Thus simultaneously, they can have a real content and respond to a need, and yet have an illusory form and a deceptive appearance.

Leisure, work and "private life" thus form a dialectical whole, a global structure. From this global structure can be reconstituted an historically accurate picture of individuals and humanity at a given stage of their development: at a given stage of their alienation and dis-alienation. We will quickly mention just a few examples of this:

The café [or bar or pub]: this is generally an extra-domestic and extra-professional meeting place, where people gather by personal preference (at least in appearance) by street or neighborhood, rather than by profession or by class (although there are a certain number of cafés restricted to a certain profession or social class). It is a place where the "regulars" can find a certain apparent luxury, and speak freely (about politics, women, etc.). Although this may be a superficial freedom, nevertheless, there is a fierce attachment to it: the café is a place where people *play*.

The amusement park: a popular institution, whose preservation and industrialization are rather astounding. The loud noise and the music furnish the sought-after break. One enters a lowly, restless microcosm both extraordinary and vulgar. For seemingly little money. The only thing excluded from this microcosm are things which remind one of work. Otherwise there is something for everyone: knowledge (the aquarium, the wax museum, etc.), eroticism (the belly-dancers), travel, adventures, sports, and all kinds of marvels.

The *radio*, and, even more, *television*, abruptly invade family and "private" life with the presence of the entire world. Here, the seemingly "live" presentation brings with it the illusion of simultaneity, truth and participation.

Here we again encounter certain characteristics of cultural or cultured leisure. These forms of leisure have functions which are both new and traditional (comparable to the act of reading a printed book, listening to songs and poems, or watching a dance recital). Their content is not just entertainment and relaxation, but knowledge as well. Productive

activities—and specialized technical skills—are not avoided, but dominated. Sometimes, technical skills which have become obsolescent in production have become, or are becoming, play, such as sailboating. Lastly, this cultured leisure revives the feeling for physical existence, nature, and sensuous life (or as the specialists would say, it updates the audio-visual environment with modern technologies).

Among the many leisure activities which should be studied by concrete sociology, one strikes me as particularly remarkable.

We are all aware that the French school of painting has been important throughout the world for more than a century. But are we sufficiently aware that in France painting has become an art of the masses? and that France—for reasons which are still unclear—is becoming a nation of painters? The "Sunday painters", who spend their leisure time painting, number in the tens—and perhaps hundreds—of thousands. There are countless local or guild exhibitions. Thus, at a very high cultural level, leisure can go beyond technical skill and become art. At this level, leisure tends to recapture the whole of life through a particular form of expression. Leisure then involves an original search (regardless of whether it is skillful or awkward) for a lifestyle. Perhaps, an art of living and happiness.

To sum up, work, leisure, and family life and "private" life form a whole, which we can call a "global structure" or "totality", if we clearly understand the changing and transitory historical nature of this structure. The critique of daily life, considered as one aspect of concrete sociology should undertake a large study which would examine the nature of professional life, family life and leisure activities and their multiple interrelations. Such a study could disengage the living, new and positive elements—the real needs and satisfactions—from those which are negative and alienating.

Leonardo Acosta

MASS MEDIA AND IMPERIALIST IDEOLOGY

(Cuba, 1973)

The terms "mass communications" and "mass media" which emerged in the United States are misleading in more than one sense. In the first place, such media do not really constitute a vehicle of human communication, for communication implies a dialogue, an exchange, and the mass media speak, but do not permit a response. At best, they are means of transmission or diffusion. In the second place, the term, "mass," as employed by bourgeois sociology, is an abstract, vague and equivocal concept; the reference to "mass media" could somehow incorrectly suggest the use by the popular masses, of certain vehicles to transmit messages, something which does not occur in capitalist society. Furthermore, if we are dealing with the broadcast media, we must know to what ends they are directed, and who is in a position to utilize these media to realize these goals.

THE MASS MEDIA AND THE POWER STRUCTURE

The mass media, from the press to television, were developed for the first time in the United States, the paradise of monopoly capital and modern financial imperialism. The mass media and their final product, so-called "mass culture", assume a more important role every day, as an ideological-industrial complex devoted to the justification and perpetuation of the capitalist system, and in particular, the North American financial-political-military complex that constitutes the core of yankee imperialism.¹

The modern mass media are, first of all, powerful private enterprises which require great capital investment due to the increasingly "sophisticated" technology that they employ, which, in turn, requires highly specialized personnel. These

1. We must clarify the term "financial" as used in this article. It refers to financial capital understood as the merger of banking capital with industrial capital, a well-known yankee phenomenon. Concerning the misleading expression "mass culture" we shall go further. The critics of this pseudoculture have coined other expressions to designate it: for example, the theoreticians of the so-called "Frankfurt School" such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno call it the "culture industry", and the North American sociologist Dwight MacDonal satirically uses the term "masscult".

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enterprises are intimately linked to the industrial system and the North American state through the well-oiled advertising machine. Thus, the imperialist superstructural apparatus includes four key elements, inextricably interrelated: *technology-mass media-advertising-"mass culture"*. Each element has, in turn, generated its own theoretical school of thought, which could be considered either as a separate differentiated philosophy, or as we will do here, as a global ideology of the system with various derivative subideologies. This new ideological universe of imperialism is basically an updated version of the old philosophical, or rather mythological categories of capitalism, as modified by modern technology. This updated ideology is also capitalism's latest ideological weapon designed to contain the advance of Marxism-Leninism.

In the growth and consolidation stage of North American capitalism, the ideology that attempted to justify the actions of the nascent empire was still surrounded by a mystical, messianic halo. Like previous imperialisms, the North American one filled the nineteenth century with messianic or pseudoscientific theories, assigning themselves the mission of extending their values, institutions and interests throughout the world.²

Numerous circumstances undermined the old messianic imperialism: World War I, the October Revolution, the financial crisis of 1929, the discredit of the Nazi and fascist messianisms, were all more or less decisive factors. As a result of these defeats, the messianic irrational aspect of capitalism has been marginalized to an ultra-reactionary tendency of minor importance which has been gradually replaced, together with the rest of the classic repertory of bourgeois mythology, by an ideology less irrational in appearance. The fundamental difference between the earlier ideology and this new ideology (and its variations), resides in the latter's refusal to consider itself as an ideology, thus avoiding a direct confrontation with Marxism-Leninism.³

In 1916, Lenin analyzed the new emerging financial imperialism. Since then, imperialists have zealously tried to demonstrate that today's capitalism is "different" and that the theses of Marx and Lenin are no longer valid; imperialists even avoid the word capitalism and substitute for it euphemism such as "consumer society," "neocapitalism," "postcapitalism," "advanced industrial society," or "mass society". They abandon the myth of the inherent progress of capitalist development,

2. A brief but revealing synthesis of North American political messianism can be found in Claude Julien's book *l'Empire Américain*, Paris, 1969. Concerning the origins of such chauvinistic slogans we can go back to the era of the yankee politician Henry Clay, who in 1824 already called his protectionist and paternalistic theories the "American System".

3. Beginning with the emergence of a proletarian ideology, historical and dialectical materialism, bourgeois ideology has been more and more on the defensive. To the anarchy of capitalist production has corresponded a genuine proliferation of philosophical and religious schools. On this aspect, see Lenin's classic text "On the Significance of Mili-

only to replace it with semantic variations such as "economy of growth," "expansion" or "development," and the new myth of the "scientific—technological revolution."⁴

Clearly, capitalism has changed and is constantly changing. Is it not surprising that capitalism revamps its techniques and, consequently, its ideologies, the same way that a suit goes out of fashion from one year to the next? Capitalism, by its very essence, needs renewals and changes of face in order to survive, although it continues to be the same system of exploitation that Marx analyzed and that we know is condemned to disappear. Indeed, Marx and Engels clearly stated in the *Communist Manifesto*:

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. . . . All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.

The present "mass media culture" is nothing other than the superstructure of a "supertechified" modern capitalism, which corresponds to the changes—*never* qualitative—that have occurred in capitalist society, particularly North American. These media, belonging to the yankee "power elite" are used for the manipulation of the exploited classes by the same minority which controls the industries, the banks and the North American state. The complex operation of the media and the mystifying terminology that has been created around it are closely related to the values of the so-called "consumer society."⁵

THE MEDIA: HISTORY AND PSEUDOHISTORY

The history of these manipulative mass media—if we exclude the written press—begins in this century, starting with the new technologies and particularly, the development of electronics. We are thus dealing with a recent phenomenon. But the capitalist ideologists claim to have discovered the media's roots in a distant and respectable past, and

tant Materialism" [to be reprinted in Volume 2 of this anthology], and the interesting article of the academician T. Timoféiev "Fantasmas del Marxismo" in *Unión Soviética*, 5, 1972.

4. On the present validity of Lenin's thesis of 1916, see Pierre Jalée, *L'Impérialisme en 1970*, Paris, 1969.

5. There have been diverse attempts at redefining capitalism in its present state of development, according to some of its most notorious characteristics: consumption, advanced technology, militarism, the plunder of raw materials in the exploited countries, etc. An interesting approach is that of Adolf Kozlik, *El capitalismo del desperdicio*, Havana, 1972.

have even interpreted history itself as the "history of human communication," thus constructing one of the subideologies of modern imperialism, whose central ideology is based upon technology and technological development.

The "mass communication" experts trace the origin of these media back to the radio or the telegraph, as well as to the African drums or the smoke signals of the Plains Indians. They consider the mural motifs of the Egyptian tombs of the Aztecs and Mayan codexes as ancestors of modern comics. When they refer to the architecture of ancient civilizations, they interpret it as an effective mass media for the transmission of signs which bare the ideology and culture of the epoch.⁶ Although these comparisons may often be valid, they cease to be *when they become only the history of ideology or philosophy, because they isolate the human communication phenomenon from its socio-economic context, and in doing so reduce the communication process exclusively to its technological aspect.* This pseudohistorical approach deliberately ignores the socio-economic structures of every society, in an attempt to conceal the notions of *class and class struggle.*

For instance, we can agree that a Mayan or Hindu temple, or a gothic cathedral, might be the expression of the ruling ideology within the respective societies that created them, ideologies infused into plastic forms whose conventional signs could be understood even by the illiterate masses.⁷ But it is not valid to consider these works as realizations of abstract "human genius" and at the same time attribute to these works the mission of transmitting certain eternal values. This leads, following usual bourgeois logic, to the identification of "human genius" with the values transmitted, when in fact these transmitted values have never been abstract or eternal, because they are imprinted with the domination of one class over another. It is in this way that the history related by the "mass communication" experts becomes an idealist filching of history in which abstract and immutable "human genius" through successive technical discoveries becomes synonymous with "progress".

There is no doubt that technological invention has played a role of great importance in the development of the media (mass press, photography, telegraph, telephone, phonograph, radio, film, television), but their use has always been sub-

6. A classic example is the book of Lancelot Hogben, *From Cave Painting to Comic Strip: A Kaleidoscope of Human Communication*, London, 1949. Other authors very often use these comparisons. See Umberto Eco's "Towards a Semiotic Inquiry into the Television Message" in *Working Papers in Cultural Studies* (Birmingham, UK), Autumn, 1972.

7. In this sense we have used the example of the baroque as an expression of the ideology of the domination of the Spanish empire in the article "El barroco americano y la ideología colonialista" in *Unión* (Havana), 23, IX, September 1972 (also in *Comunicación y cultura* (Buenos Aires), 2, March 1974).

8. Michel Crozier, *La fabricación de hombres*, Buenos Aires, 1954. At the present time, Crozier has attained the

ordinated to the social context in which they emerged, since they have always been controlled by those who possessed the necessary resources to industrialize the technical invention.

THE TECHNIQUES OF PERSUASION

It seems sufficiently established that the 1930s were the turning point in North American propaganda. At least two main research trends developed during the depression which later evolved into techniques for persuasion or manipulation, which would afterwards be widely put into practice.

First, Elton Mayo and a team of Harvard professors, taking as point of departure the work of the French sociologist Frederick La Play, developed a psychological approach to the problems between workers and employers. This approach, first led to the method of public relations in which employers created a more favourable image of themselves; and secondly, to "human engineering", specially conceived for dealing with the workers. This technique was termed the "manufacture of men" by Michel Crozier, in an essay that is already a classic.⁸

With *public relations*, businessmen for the first time turned to the laboratory. Its complement, "human engineering", defined itself as communications, as a "science of human communications."⁹ Behind this phraseology a very simple fact is concealed: the use of psychology and advertising methods against the workers to prevent the formation of a class consciousness or to dilute it where it already exists. "Human engineering" begins with the premise that the capitalist system must never be questioned; any rebellion against it is treated as a neurosis, and the workers as "potentially ill" individuals who need to be cured and "adapted" to the environment in which they live. The worker is always considered as an individual "case"; the workers' existence as a class is unknown. Sociology is psychologized and human engineering is established as "therapy", although in the final analysis, it is simply a mixture of advertising, bribery and demagoguery.

The other important source of the new persuasion techniques also dates from the 1930s: the school of "motivational research" which imposed, around 1950, a radical transformation in the methods of advertising agencies by providing the new weapons of psychology and psychoanalysis. The

presidency of the French Association of Sociology and is dedicated to defending the capitalist system and attacking marxism, as illustrated by his book *The World of the Office Worker*, Chicago, 1971.

9. In the studies done on mass media or on "neocapitalist society" we very often see a series of terms taken from different disciplines (communication, environment, design, computer programming) with codes, projects, models which sometimes make up a veritable gibberish. But the use of certain words is rarely accidental and can take us by surprise. Studies in semantics have proliferated in the United States since Alfred Korzybski's work *General Semantics* in 1933 and his popularizers (S. I. Hayakawa, Stuart Chase), and have been assimilated to the techniques of manipulation.

acknowledged pioneers of this movement were Ernest Dichter, president of the Institute for Motivational Research, and Louis Cheskin, director of the Color Research Institute of America.¹⁰

Since then, the advertising agencies have used the services of these organizations, while some of the most important agencies have formed their own staff of psychologists and sociologists to search for the hidden motivations that induce the public to buy a product. The J. Walter Thompson Agency (one of the biggest in the world today), was one of the pioneers. With the primary objective of increasing its contracts, this agency hired the well-known psychologist of the behaviorist school,¹¹ John B. Watson.

From the 1930s on, North American social scientists have participated in activities that could scarcely be considered "scientific". The journalist Vance Packard years ago denounced the participation of several social science professors in a seminar at Columbia University for dozens of New York "public relations experts". In this seminar, as Packard reveals, these manipulators were taught "the types of mental manipulation they could try with the greatest possibilities of success".¹² This unusual prostitution of men of science by the business world and its Madison Avenue advertisers is a complex process. Is it not paradoxical, to say the least, that the specialists in the so-called "human sciences" are highly paid to use people as guinea pigs for tracking down the most hidden human motivations, solely for the advantageous use by the business and political manipulators.

In the eyes of the manipulation experts, Packard tells us, "we are image lovers, given to impulsive and compulsive acts. We annoy them with our seemingly senseless quirks, but we please them with our growing docility in responding to their manipulation of symbols that stir us to action." As if to confirm this assertion, the magazine *Advertising Age*, on the principal organs of the advertising world, declared: "In very few cases do people know what they want, even when they say they do."

CONSUMPTION AND ADVERTISING

In 1949, at the height of McCarthyism, the president of the United States Communist Party, William Z. Foster, wrote the following:

More and more, capitalism uses propaganda in its

10. One of the first works published concerning the new techniques is by Cheskin, "Indirect Approach to Market Reaction" in the *Harvard Business Review*, 1948.

11. "Behaviorism", "Human Relations", or "Behavioral Science", the dominant tendency in North American social science, equivalent to operationalism in the physical sciences, is based on a radical empiricism limited to the description of behaviours or operations, and denies the elements of dialectical and historical contradiction, thus suppressing critical conceptual thought. It is what Marcuse analyzes and calls "one dimensional thought", which in our opinion, constitutes the positive contribution of his book, *One Dimensional Man*.

12. Vance Packard, *The Hidden Persuaders*, New York, 1956.

furious struggle against socialism.... With that purpose, it resorts systematically to its vast press, radio, school, church network, together with many other media to influence the minds of people. Never, in all human history, has such a broad and well organized campaign of lies been waged as in the present ideological struggle against socialism. (*The Decline of World Capitalism*, Mexico, 1950)

Less than twenty-five years later, the falsehood has become a daily and even trivial reality, and therefore much more difficult to fight, thanks to the advertising techniques and their omnipresence through the mass media. The present falsehood no longer depends on religion, messianism or political slogans, although these give it weight; it is no longer situated in an illusory heaven, nor in a problematic predestination. Now social values are worldly, visible, solid and ready to be consumed, although finally they are as deceptive and mythic as the old ones.¹³ The traditional utopian dreams seem to have been materialized today almost at our fingertips in the new universe of objects and gadgets that Madison Avenue advertises and splashes on billboards, posters, packaging of products, color magazine ads and millions of television screens. The formerly transcendental values have taken shape in the *value-objects* of the civilization of consumerism and comfort. Politics, art, religion have also gradually been transformed into objects of consumption. This fact, in itself, is not new, however. It is the extent to which consumerism has assumed the character of the ruling ideology of a system which is constituted in a totally closed and manipulated universe, of unmistakable fascist tendencies.

Marx had already observed that in capitalist society even works of art and other spiritual values become commodities. When he referred to the circulation of commodities, he pointed out that "nothing resists this alchemy, not even the bones of saints, and even less the most delicate of sacrosanct things."¹⁴

But even in the United States, Veblen observed the peculiarities of what he called the "pecuniary culture." Following in the path of Veblen, Max Lerner says that "the spirit of business has guided the foreign policy of North America, as it guided the political apparatus, the judicial system, the interpretation of the constitution, the press, the churches, and even the workers' movement."¹⁵ In the

13. Concerning this aspect, T.W. Adorno says: "This absorption of ideology by ideology does not mean however the 'end of ideologies'. On the contrary, advanced industrial culture is, in a specific sense, *more* ideological than its predecessors, to the extent that ideology can at present be found within the process of production itself" (T.W. Adorno "Cultural Criticism and Society" in *Prisms*, London, 1967).

14. Karl Marx, *Capital*, I, London, 1972.

15. Thorstein Veblen. *The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions*, New York, 1961; Max Lerner, *America as a Civilization*, New York, 1957. We can go back even further to discover revealing testimonies of this "spirit of America" dominant in the North American culture. For example, in the era of the expansion west of the

modern language of advertising, John G. Schneider of the advertising agency Kenyon and Eckhardt stated during the 1950s that from the moment they invaded the world of politics, they succeeded in "transforming candidates into commodities, where political campaigns were sales promotions, and the electorate, the market."

Advertising, the veritable incarnation of that "business spirit" which has traditionally dominated North American life, has become a basic source of techniques for political and ideological propaganda, and has invaded the state apparatus, the electoral campaigns, the church, family life, and daily behavior. Considering that almost all the mass media (newspaper, magazines, radio, and TV) depend economically on advertising, one can appreciate the magnitude of control that the advertising agencies exert. The sociologist Armand Mattelart considers them central to the "creation of needs and for the transmission of standards of behavior and consumer aspirations."¹⁶

As a direct consequence of the omnipresence of advertising, a conventionalization of the trivial, everyday little lie is produced, creating a kind of complicity, acquiescence, or neutralization of critical consciousness. It has been estimated that each day every North American is directly exposed to 1600 advertising messages.¹⁷ The mass media transmit every minute an ad which when presenting a product confers on it an emotional content by using the techniques we spoke of earlier. Thus, in advertising a soap, an ad offers not cleanliness, but "beauty"; it sells not shoes, but "beautiful feet"; a car is a symbol of prestige, power, social status, refrigerators represent "security"; any canned food promises "vitality"; the cosmetic companies offer hope and romantic adventures; the cigarette and beverage brands are identified with symbols of "virility" or refinement.¹⁸ The ads also evoke the most deep-rooted North American myths: the Founding Fathers, religion, the family or motherhood.¹⁹

Appalachians, the writer and missionary Timothy Flint wrote of his preaching in Saint Charles, Missouri in 1818: "when I came here, religion was seen as a despicable thing. Why did they invite me to come here? For speculation. A clergyman, a church, these are words that give strength to an ad for selling parcels of land." (John E. Kirkpatrick, *Timothy Flint: Pioneer, Missionary, Author, Editor*, Cleveland, 1911).

16. Armand Mattelart, "La dependencia del medio de comunicación de masas" in *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional* (Santiago de Chile), 3, 1970.

17. The date comes from *Time*, 12 October 1962, quoted by Jesus M. Martínez "Para entender los medios: Medios de comunicación y relaciones sociales" *Cine Cubano* (Havana), 69-70.

18. Advertising in Cuba in the fifties, directed by yankee firms like McCann Erickson, with its emphasis on sensuality and use of pseudo-popular language, reflected the slogans stressing a philosophy of "living for the moment". Also the conventionalized lie of the "new ingredients" like Colgate with "Gardol", Gleem with "GL-70": the "magic filter" or "filter 15".

19. See David Reisman, *The Lonely Crowd*, New York, 1956, on the importance of glamour in the presiden-

In this manner, the indirect methods of persuasion, generally based on the projection of images, appeal to unconscious motivations (instincts, frustrations or repressed desires of the consumer), by creating a gratifying image of the advertised product. One of the most clever insidious techniques is the fragmentation of images which are then unconsciously reconstructed in the mind of the receiver.

These advertising techniques—supported by bourgeois sociology, social psychology and psychoanalysis—are the vehicle for a form of ideology which the sociologist Jules Henry, a follower of Veblen and Max Lerner, called "pecuniary philosophy."²⁰ In 1955, a key year for the advertising explosion, the agencies received, in the United States alone, nine billion dollars from industry, and the revenues have continued increasing. The talk was of a "marketing revolution", and the President of the National Sales Executives Association dramatically announced: "Capitalism is dead! Consumption is king!" The semantics continue as a substitute for social revolution. The consumer society is based on the artificial creation of needs and luxuries to generate superfluous consumption. Thrift, a traditional bourgeois virtue, was permanently abandoned as a social value. According to the most well-versed theorist of "neocapitalism", John K. Galbraith, "the individual serves the system not by supplying it with savings and resulting capital; he serves it by consuming its products.... In turn, inevitably, this affects social values. A family's standard of living becomes an index of its achievement.... the level of consumption is the proper measure of social merit."²¹

As the basic instrument for creating or stimulating superfluous needs and for increasing consumption, advertising has reached its limits as seen by two ads published in the *New York Times*: in one of them, the text simply said "Buy Something!", the other one, bore the following full-page message: "Create More Desires!"²² It is not surprising that

tial elections. On the use of the myth of the cowboy in the presidential campaign of Lyndon Johnson, see Manuel Moreno Fragnals "El papel de los medios informativos" in *El capital extranjero en america latina*, Comisión Cubano de la UNESCO, 1962. A typical example of the use of God and religion for advertising ends is an ad for shoes whose text says "We create shoes the same way that God created your feet" (*Newsweek*, 9 October 1972).

20. Jules Henry, *Culture Against Man*, New York, 1965.

21. John K. Galbraith, *The New Industrial State*, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1975, pp. 54-5.

22. The first example is taken from Vance Packard (*op. cit.*); the second from the book already quoted by Jules Henry, in which he also makes the following incisive observation: "As the technological impulse mines the earth and takes its riches.... advertising dredges the hidden needs of man". Basing himself on present-day facts, Henry arrives at essentially the same conclusion that Karl Marx arrived at a century ago when he stated "Capitalist production is only able to develop technology in combination with the social process of production by undermining simultaneously the two original sources of all wealth, the earth and man" (*Capital*, I).

Jules Henry says that in the United States "not religion, but the elevated standard of living is the opium of the people." Advertising, by manipulating such basic feelings as frustration and hope, has created a systematic dissatisfaction with any old or outdated fashion. And even the lifespan of fashion itself is continually getting shorter: last year's car model is already "old" and is a symbol of social and economic instability. The record industry offers the extreme example of songs which go out of style in 2 weeks. Galbraith offers us an interesting view of this phenomenon: "In a culture that gives great attention to technological change there will be a natural presumption that every "new" product is intrinsically better than the old one.... This explains the repeated use in almost all advertising of the adjective 'new'."

Galbraith, ex-ambassador to India and ex-economic advisor to John F. Kennedy, has described in *The New Industrial State* the relation between advertising and consumption with a frankness that borders on cynicism:

Advertising and salesmanship—the management of consumer demand—are vital for planning the industrial system. At the same time, the wants so created ensure the services of the worker. Ideally, his wants are kept slightly in excess of his income. Compelling inducements are then provided for him to go into debt. The pressure of the resulting debt adds to his reliability as a worker.

This conception of advertising as a totalitarian weapon to control the desires of the exploited is what professor Philip J. Allen of the University of Virginia calls the North American "Great Project," which consists of using the mass media to create new collective goals through manipulation.²³ Advertising, when it went beyond its own field, passed from the strategy of sales for commercial products to the strategy of domination itself, by invading electoral campaigns and foreign policy. In particular, it began to trace the new lines of action in the world campaign against the socialist countries and the liberation movements, placing cultural and ideological penetration high on its "global strategy" priorities. The imperialist press and other media are the perfect vehicles for this gigantic ideological diversion.²⁴

THE IMAGES OF THE IMPERIALIST PRESS

As parent of the mass media, the written press is probably the most prestigious of all the media. According to Bernard Berelson, Director of the Behavioral Sciences Division of the Ford Foundation,

23. Another expert human engineering manipulator, Edward L. Bernays, recommended "People should be controlled by the manipulation of their instincts and emotions rather than by trying to change their reasoning" (*The Engineering of Consent*, Norman, Oklahoma, 1955).

24. Galbraith has concretely pointed out the role of advertising as a promoter of the global increase of consumption and as propaganda for the goodness of the system for which it sets policy. Furthermore, advertising produces the "images of the state" which according to Galbraith must be accepted as if they were reality. (*op. cit.*) On the ideological offensive of the United States in Latin

the daily press offers a series of well-developed characteristics, such as the comfort of a brief reading that allows, or produces, the illusion of being "well-informed" or "up-to-date" on the world news; the creation of a reading habit that eventually becomes compulsive; the reinforcement of the reader's feeling of security, by giving him "authoritative opinions" by which to evaluate an event or a situation; and the illusion that certain "prestige" values are transferred to the reader.

Another effect of the written press (which is reinforced by all other media) is the saturation of its readers. Beyond a certain point the memory blanks out and critical judgement is neutralized. The Sunday edition of the *New York Times* alone saturates the reader with so much trivial information that the impact of the news on the genocidal war against Indochina, for example, is diluted. A complementary technique is the systematic bombardment of news around a specific subject to create a "climate of opinion."²⁵ By projecting images around a theme the ostensible purpose is to provide information. But the images used are designed to capture the unwary; the techniques are multiple: the fragmentation of images, analogies, neologism, synecdoches, metaphores, pejorative adjectives (or verbs and adverbs), and other stylistic, linguistic and even phonetic resources.

World War II provided abundant, although contradictory, examples of the use of these techniques, for the end to the confrontation meant that the yankees had to vindicate the Nazi and Japanese militarists and to transfer the image of the "aggressor-enemy" to the Soviet Union. The anti-Soviet campaign was based on sensationalist articles and clichés, veritable "ideological pills", such as the famous "Iron Curtain" or the "Soviet Bloc", presented as archenemies of the supposedly "Free World." A Manichean world was created in which international politics was reduced to a struggle between "East" and "West." The yankee press deliberately abstained from translating Russian terms like *politburo*, *Komintern*, and *Kolkhoz*, converting them into word-fetishes with a negative content, with the connotations of *foreigner*, *enigmatic*, and *dangerous*. This technique was useful later, when they applied the same terms to revolutionary phenomena in other countries, so as to provoke unconscious negative reactions by means of analogy.

Whereas the old fascists were vindicated, converted by some magic wand into "democratic allies", the negative image of Nazism is still used. An example is the yankee version of the Indo-Pakistani

America, see our work "La ofensiva ideologica del imperialismo" *Tricontinental* (Havana), 34, 1973.

25. Cuba has been the object of two gigantic yankee press campaigns: one waged by the Hearst newspaper empire in favor of intervention during our war for independence; and the second, the enraged and defamatory offensive initiated after the triumph of our revolution in 1959. Concerning the first, see Claude Julien (*op. cit.*), and L. Vladimirov, *La diplomacia de los Estados Unidos durante la guerra hispano-americana*, Moscow, 1958, pp. 42-3. Concerning the second, see the text by M. Moreno Fraginals (*op. cit.*).

conflict that culminated in the independence of Bangladesh.²⁶ The analogy with Nazism had been used earlier in the anti-Nasser campaign, based on an artificial parallel between the Hitlerian genocide against the Jewish people and the confrontation between Nasser and a reactionary and expansionist Israeli state, patronized by North American imperialism. Another example. During the presidency of General de Gaulle, France showed a centrifugal tendency within NATO, and when France signed several bilateral agreements with the Adenauer government, the North American press used the formula "Bonn-Paris Axis", which was immediately associated with the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis, hardly a pleasant memory. During World War II the North American press used the derogatory term *japs* to refer to the Japanese. Later, during the Cold and Korean Wars, the epithet *reds* was preferred to any other, probably because of its phonetic association with *japs*. Likewise, the pejorative term *vietcong* is phonetically associated to *Congo* and thus *Negro*, a negative connotation in an eminently racist country. The "yellow peril" myth was also exploited from a racist context. For Cuba, the press invented the alliteration "castro-communism", which it later used in reference to other countries, where "pro-castro uprisings", "castro-communist guerillas" or "pro-castro regimes" were seen.

Since the worst enemy of capitalism resides in the force of the exploited masses, the repertory of working class stereotypes in the imperialist press is very broad. The first rule that the press seems to follow is that the exploited masses are never *composed of human beings*, hence the analogies with animal or subhuman attitudes and characteristics. A typical example is the "Communist hordes" or "Chinese hordes" which imperialism tried to use to explain its defeat in Korea. Any revolutionary demonstration becomes an uprising in which "mad" or "wild" mobs shriek and loot liquor stores, the idea being to identify revolution with orgy, and usually the reference is to "communist-led mobs."

The repertory of antiproletarian images sometimes coincides with that of colonialist images, although each has different historical roots.²⁷ The image of the colonized as lower, bestial beings,

26. An AP dispatch exemplifies the procedures to which we refer. In the lead, we read of a landing of Pakistani troops who captured the Indian army by surprise described as the "greatest military landing since that of the British Army at Dunkerque during the Second World War." Two descriptive paragraphs follow, and in the last one, an explanation of what happened in Dunkerque and who the British forced to retreat. The parallel is obvious: the Pakistanis are identified with the British ("good") and the Indians with the Germans ("bad").

27. The anti-proletarian images of the bourgeois press have as their prime antecedent the campaign waged against the Paris Commune; on this aspect, see Paul Lidsky, *Les écrivains contre la commune*, Paris, 1970. On the colonialist images and the myth of anthropophagy, see Roberto Fernandez Retamar's essay "Caliban" in the *Massachusetts Review* (Amherst, Ma.), XV, 1-2, Winter-Spring 1974.

28. The French magazine *Paris Match* offers an excellent example. De Gaulle was visiting Cambodia while the yankees bombarded Hanoi. On the cover, the text

dates from the days of the conquest of America and has a long tradition deeply rooted in the imperialist countries and even in the colonized ones. The imperialist press, movies, television and advertising continue their contribution to this image, as does a great part of the ethnology and anthropology produced in Europe and North America. The oldest colonialist myth, anthropophagy or cannibalism, was used more than four hundred years ago to justify the extermination of the Caribbean Indians, and less than ten years ago to justify the Congolese massacre in Stanleyville. Advertising has created such stereotypes as the Mexican taking his siesta under his huge sombrero. Cinema has elaborated a broad imperialist repertory, from Tarzan to Gunga Din to the modern and more subtle "neocolonialism" evident in films such as *Murphy's War*.

We find a very frequent use of stereotypes in the mass circulation magazines like *Time*, *Newsweek* and especially *Life* and *Paris Match*, whose reactionary content is presented in the most aggressive and vulgar way. The preponderance of visual images (photojournalism, color ads) makes the last two magazines excellent vehicles for the glorification of the capitalist system and the slander—in the guise of objective photojournalism—of socialism and the countries of the so-called Third World. A detailed analysis of the "hidden" ideological content of these magazines (which goes beyond the scope of this work) would be very useful.²⁸

NEW THEORY FOR OLD PRACTICE

Under the impact of Shannon's theory of information, a "science of communications" has been formed, about which there is an abundant bibliography in Europe and the United States. A new *pleiade* of "experts" has emerged to explain, arrange and theorize the different communication processes into one whole. The sociological, psychological and operational aspects of the mass media are thus united in a theory which, in the final analysis, only reaffirms what the older manipulatory practices had previously established.²⁹

Separate investigations and comparative studies have been made on the different mass media. But as Joseph Klapper, one of these experts, admits, the

reads: "On the frontier of war, De Gaulle talks of peace" and the photographic image emphasizes the gigantic De Gaulle striding majestically between two rows of Cambodian girls, who are dressed in red skirts. The hidden message can be deciphered as "The red orient inclines before the French peace mission", although the French peace is represented by a general in full uniform. On the rear cover of the magazine, there is an ad for a new book: the biography of Adolf Hitler, supposedly a "truthful" and "unabridged" version of the emotional conflicts that forged his personality. To attribute the criminality of fascism to a youthful amorous frustration is the overt purpose of the book. The hidden message is something else. In the lower left corner there is a coupon to cut out and send in (and the book will be sent free). The text says: "The coupon is good for...." The word "good" ("bon" in French) is in big letters and exactly under Hitler's name on the cover of the book, also in big letters. The resulting image is HITLER BON. The product they are really selling is fascism.

29. Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, *The Mathe-*

comparative study never produces exact conclusions, since the citizen finds himself simultaneously subjected to all of the media and influenced by what is called the "accumulative effect". Klapper, a specialist in the techniques of "collective persuasion", is a member of the Research and Evaluation Staff of the USIS (also known as USIA), known the world over for its propaganda activities, cultural penetration and espionage.

Some of the conclusions arrived at by Klapper are worth noting: (1) the acknowledgement of the public's resistance to change established ideas, which favors propaganda for the maintenance of the *status quo*; (2) the irrational character of the motivations and attitudes of a majority of individuals; (3) the superiority of *monopoly* propaganda, that is, propaganda which does not have to confront a counterpropaganda that could attenuate or nullify its effects; (4) the monopolistic character of the propaganda of the North American media, and its subordination to the advertising agencies and industry; (5) the reinforcement of the capitalist system and its profit basis due to the control exercised by advertising over the press, radio, television, etc.; (6) the supplementary reinforcement of the system through the high percentage of entertainment programming; (7) the importance of "channeling" to make the public accept a value or a product that is different from the solidly established ones, in other words, the direct clash with established values should be avoided, "channeling" the new tendency within the old molds; (8) the use of "repetition with variations" is more effective than the simple obsessive repetition recommended by Goebbels; (9) the "reward" character of the mass media messages, especially in the form of identification and conformity with the system, and the relaxation derived from "entertainment"; and (10) the prestige of the media in themselves, and their capacity to confer prestige and authority on the messages that they transmit or to the persons who transmit them.

This last aspect of the mass media brings into evidence the myth or fetish character of today's bourgeois society:

To all the economic and juridical mythology—delved into by Marx—which allows the ruling class to control the means of existence of a people, another has been added, with the development of what could be considered a new *productive force*: the mass communications media. These new forces are the technological power of manipulation and indoctrination. To control them is to control consciousness through the daily massive legitimization of the base of power of a class.³⁰

Mathematical Theory of Communications, Urbana, Illinois, 1949. See also Abraham Moles, "La ciencia de la comunicación" in *Era Atómica: Enciclopedia de la ciencias modernas*, VII, Barcelona, 1965, and his "Teoría informacional de la percepción" in *El concepto de información en la ciencia contemporánea* (Royaumont Colloquium), Mexico, 1966.

30. Armand Mattelart, "Por un medio de comunicación de masas no mitológico" in *Referencias* (Universidad de la Habana), III, 1, 1972.

31. Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton "Mass Communications, Popular Taste and Organized Social Action" in *Mass Communications*, Wilbur Schramm, ed.,

The same conclusions arrived at by Klapper have been reached by other experts like Paul K. Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton who consider that the mass media "confer prestige and increase the authority of individuals and groups, legitimating their status." In addition, they recognize the narcotic dysfunction of the mass media and its role in engendering conformity through "the everyday prose in the magazines, radio programs, newspaper columns which confirm and approve the present structure of society and continually underline the duty to accept it." This theme is repeated by Wilbur Schramm, for whom "the first requirement of an effective message... as any advertiser knows, is that it be related with one of the needs of our personality: the need for security, or *status*... etc."³¹ Thus, the "communications experts" have done nothing more than to endorse, behind a fashionable scientific or pseudoscientific jargon, the methods of manipulation that the advertisers already knew and were practicing thirty years ago. The function of all this mass communication theory thus becomes clear: first, to provide a theoretical and methodological endorsement for the establishment's manipulators; and second, "to dilute the problems provoked by the media's power to manipulate, and integrate these problems into the panorama of the social and technological realities of the modern era which we should just learn to live with."³²

Following the models established by North American sociology, the studies on mass media reflect the same constant: the elimination of class concepts, the psychologizing of social phenomena, the emphasis on the isolated individual, the family and the small group. The old bourgeois myth of "public opinion" is replaced by the new myth of "mass media" and "mass culture." The quantitative criteria of "income level" replaced the class concept in yankee sociology,³³ and the flesh and blood bourgeoisie and proletarian were masked behind the omnipresent and mythical "average" person. In the modern "consumer society" this average person is converted into the *ideal passive consumer*; who is then projected by the system and raised to the level of a model whose conformist patterns of social behavior are approved and encouraged. This model brings with it a process of *homogenization* of the receiving public, which leads implicitly to the *eclecticism of the mass media*, where there is a little something for everybody. This is why mass circulation newspapers, movies, radio and television programs contain a little of everything, each of them becoming, as befits the pecuniary ideology of the system, a kind

Urbana, Illinois, 1960; Wilbur Schramm "How Communication Works" in *Process and Effects of Mass Communications*, Urbana, Illinois, 1955; Joseph Klapper, *The Effects of Mass Media*, New York, 1949; Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Patricia Kendall, *Radio Listening in America*, New York, 1948; Lazarsfeld, and Bernard Berelson, *The People's Choice*, New York, 1945.

32. Jesús M. Martínez, *op. cit.*

33. See Lloyd Warner's *Social Class in America*, Chicago, 1948, wherein no fewer than six different classes are considered in line with the dominant criteria of North American sociology: income level.

of supermarket of ideological products. Violence, eroticism, adventure, jokes, music, science, sports are all reduced to the level of self-service products, a form of tourism. The mass media convert their audiences into tourists who do not need a physical change of place.

But the homogenization process cannot be considered apart from the inverse and symmetrical process: that of *specialization* or *fragmentation* into genres, destined for groups with particular interests or inclinations. This contributes even more to the receivers' losing sight of the class base of society and consequently to their "accepting its messages as having arisen from a natural order."³⁴

THE "NEW WORLD" OF ELECTRONICS AND "MASS CULTURE"

The imperialist mass media system combines advertising with its news, entertainment and culture, although the latter should perhaps be called pseudo-culture, especially when we refer to the typical products of the media, "mass culture", "cultural industry", or "pop culture". However, some media are more "massive" than others, some more "cultured." For instance, the cheap and mass publication of classic books in paperback is not objectionable, nor are the recordings of good music, or the television presentation of a work by Shakespeare or Calderon. However, the digests and the adaptations, for example, which condense works to shorten the reading time thereby conforming to the supposed dictates of our "speed age", or which deform works to make them more accessible to the "average" audience, are something else again.

With the appearance of the international news agencies, the capitalist press took the technical step which made it permanently imperialist. But it was the film and the radio which were decisive in imperialist expansion.

The film offered a means of entertainment, suited to a purely passive and emotional reception of cultural models through visual, non-discursive images. Based on the principle that *seeing is believing*, the film was the best vehicle for disseminating the stereotypes that today invade all the "mass culture", especially the star system, which serves to reinforce individualism and the cult of personal success, and obliterate class structure.

Radio proved its political efficiency in Franklin D. Roosevelt's campaigns and considerably broadened the capacity to diffuse cultural stereotypes, with the advantage over film of "entering every-

34. Armand Mattelart "Por un medio de comunicación de masas no mitológico" (*loc. cit.*). A list of works dedicated to specific genres would be endless, but it is worthwhile to mention those of Umberto Eco on the comics, as well as that of Michèle Mattelart "Nivel mítico de la prensa pseudoamorosa" in *Referencias, op. cit.* Concerning "fan magazines" there are important contributions by Armand Mattelart, as well as on the use of sports by the bourgeoisie for reactionary ends.

35. There is an anecdote from the Cuban advertising world during the neocolonial republic which relates how a group of intellectual aristocrats attempted to influence the

where without asking permission". Taking elements from the press (news and editorials) the radio also adapted literary genres such as drama and comedy, and especially, the serial novel, which evolved into the famous soap operas addressed to the specific housewife audience and invariably sponsored by the soap companies.³⁵

One of the principle by-products of the radio, along with the record industry, was the *large-scale commercialization of music*. The music-radio interrelationship is important because fifty to sixty per cent of all radio programs consist of music.³⁶ However, two trends must be distinguished: (a) functional music, created by the radio (and to a lesser extent, the movies) which began as background music and which since has been heavily exploited by the recording industry in the sale of music to work by, eat by, wake by, bathe by, discuss by, etc. (an example is cocktail music which has evolved into a genuine fundamental genre in the "North American way of life"); and (b) pop music, the line of least resistance developed to impose an "average taste", and promote the models of the Hollywood star system, on which is built the specialized film and pop music "fan" magazine industry. The importance of music as a catalyst of the "pop culture" in the sixties has been decisive.³⁷

Undoubtedly, the radio has many advantages over the film in its role in mass manipulation. The first advantage is that it addresses *isolated individuals* or small groups like the family. In traditional theatre and concerts, the audience could exchange opinions during the intermission, which encouraged a critical attitude. As the film developed into giant corporations, controlling the technical apparatus, distribution and exhibition, it broke down these traditions by isolating the spectators in the dark and eliminating the intermissions, although at least the audience still gathered in the same social space which occasionally became the site of protests and riots in reaction to some films. Radio (and television) on the other hand, offer a *false option*, one which permits the listener to change from one station (or channel) to another, while, in the line of least resistance, he avoids the need to criticize the rejected program. The radio is also a superior means for advertising, which has given it—first for economic, and later, technical reasons—a great advantage: its *ubiquity*, mobility and manufacture as a relatively cheap consumer product.

Whereas movies continue to be a public event, even though the darkness and the continuous showings have made them semi-private, radio enters the home or accompanies the listener anywhere as a

soap magnate Ramon Crusellas to raise the quality of the radio program series he sponsored. The response of the entrepreneur was that "My programs are for laundry women."

36. The figure is generally valid for all the countries with statistics on the subject. The data is from Alphons Silbermann, *La musica, la radio y el oyente*, Buenos Aires, 1957.

37. We will not go into a detailed analysis here of the primary role of music in the pop culture, which we will undertake in a future study.

form of property, ever smaller thanks to the transistor. It is, moreover, an object that talks, that transforms its bearer into a permanent listener. *The philosophy of consumption is thus fused with that of the mass media and takes the form of a fetish object which, dressed in the latest style, is presented and sold as the finished product of a system; a product which in turn, speaks in defense of that system.* As could be expected, the culmination of the mass media is television, which synthesizes the main qualities of the film and radio (sound, image, color, words, music). The television set has become the new ritual magic center of the home. As Günther Anders notes, "The family has been restructured as a miniature audience, and the home into a miniature theatre modeled on the movie house." This occurred because "Whether this consumption is a 'genuine communal experience'... is a matter of indifference to the mass producer. What he needs is not the compact mass as such, but a mass broken up or atomized into the largest possible number of customers."³⁸

The great importance today of the modern media for the capitalist system has been openly recognized by John K. Galbraith: "Radio, and especially television, have become primary instruments for the manipulation of the consumer's demand.... *The industrial system is profoundly dependent on commercial television and could not exist in its present form without it.*"³⁹

The radio and television aphorism "Let the world enter your home," was proposed in 1948 by W. Porché, General Director of Radiodiffusion Française in his speech "L'Univers dans notre chambre." "Television is our most important weapon because of its world-wide character", said the president of RCA in turn. In the same way the capitalist press uses sensationalism to recreate a non-historical world where only the extraneous and exceptional have importance, the electronic media introduce the extraordinary, unexpected and the remote into the home as a daily experience in which "reality becomes illusion", to use the words of Anders. Far from transforming the labor and the life of the worker into something creative, as Marx proposed, far from bringing the mass media near to life and "giving more attention to how the worker and peasant masses indeed build the new with their daily effort" as Lenin suggested, the capitalist media proceed in exactly the opposite direction. Under the weight of the extraordinary and the sensational, everything is transformed into a daily show, from real space flights to science fiction, from the murder of a

38. Gunter Anders, "The Phantom World of TV" in *Popular Arts in America*, B. Rosenberg; D.M. White, eds., Glencoe, Illinois, 1957.

39. Galbraith, *op. cit.*, p. 213 (our emphasis). Another fact which reveals the extraordinary importance of TV for the yankee establishment is explained by Vance Packard in reference to the presidential campaign of Eisenhower, who used the famous movie actor-director and television producer Robert Montgomery as an advisor exclusively for the television questions.

40. T.W. Adorno "Television and the Patterns of Mass Culture" in *Mass Communications*, W. Schramm, ed., Urbana, Illinois, 1960. On the repressive manipulation of

real president or the annihilation of a real Vietnamese village to the daily crimes of the police dramas and westerns. Reality and fiction are confused in a technologically-processed pseudo-reality from which we are excluded, except as passive consumers.

In the detective or horror programs—as T.W. Adorno pointed out—the spectacular fact is crime, but the settings are familiar and everyday (the corner bar, the subway). This creates an atmosphere of fear in the presence of the daily objects on the streets, stimulates distrust for strangers, alienates people and pigeonholes them within their family life or the small world of the office or workshop. According to Adorno, these programs produce a "simulated excitement", but the danger is that this excitement is transferred frequently to real life.⁴⁰ The great stylistic paradox of the electronic mass media can be summarized in this way: *in fiction, realism dominates, while in the news programs, sensationalism dominates, that is, the strange, unexpected, fantastic.*

Another technique used by television consists in what several critics (Adorno, Lowenthal) have termed the "multi-layered structure" of the message in which an "overt message" directed to the consciousness of the receiver is superimposed on an underlying or concealed "latent message". This technique manipulates associations by projecting images indirectly. The overt message, generally reflects the official ideology of the system (liberty, democracy, individualism), while the latent injects the spectator with the mimetic image of the system and the submission to its paternalistic and authoritarian values. The latent message of many television dramas and comedies is essentially the "uselessness of rebellion", and the "convenience of conforming".

The TV heroes, like those of the movies, respect the system, conform to it or defend it. They fight abstract "crime" to which are usually attributed psychopathic causes often foreign in origin (anti-communist message). As can be assumed, the re-writing of history without workers' struggles, their victories and heroes, is absolute.⁴¹ But furthermore, the language of the mass media is fundamentally historical, and tends to constrain history in an absolute present, oversaturated with activities while producing the illusion that everything is in constant change, although it would be more accurate to say, as does Armand Mattelart, that in the modern "consumer society" "everything is moving but nothing changes."⁴²

fear Jules Henry says "When fear penetrates all aspects of culture and becomes a dominant driving force, the culture freezes in fixed attitudes of attack and defense" (*op. cit.*, chapter 2).

41. In the article cited by Jesús M. Martínez which we have quoted there is an excellent analysis of this situation.

42. Bourgeois propaganda obsessively insists on speaking of change, the same way that advertising reiterates the adjectives *new, revolutionary*. A recent and typical example is the ad for the Sony U-Matic color videocassette system, which defines the gadget as "a new and revolutionary means of communication" which is "changing our world" (*Newsweek*, 16 October 1972).

TECHNOLOGY AND THE END OF IDEOLOGIES

The rise in the level of consumption, the mass media benefits for workers, and the elevation of the worker's standard of living in the "advanced" capitalist countries, are the facts that the theoreticians of "neocapitalism" present in their attempt to refute the marxist analysis concerning the exploitation of the worker. What these theoreticians forget is that marxism already explained long ago that paradoxical situation. In 1858, Engels wrote to Marx "The English proletariat is becoming more bourgeois everyday." "Naturally", he added, "In a nation that exploits the whole world, this is, to a certain extent, normal." Lenin also foresaw the "tremendous danger of occidental parasitism: the formation of a group of advanced industrial nations whose upper classes would receive substantial tributes from Asia and Africa [and we can add: from Latin America], by means of which they would hold great masses domesticated...."⁴³ In other words, the founders of Marxism-Leninism had already foreseen that the plunder of the colonial and semicolonial world makes possible the relative elevation of the standard of living of the worker in the imperialist nations. But even so, the alienated situation of the worker in the imperialist countries continues to be that described by Marx in 1844: "The increasing value of the world of things determines the direct proportion of the devaluation of the world of men." And he added:

Whatever the product of his labor is, he is not. Therefore the greater this product, the less is he himself. The *alienation* of the worker in his product means not only that his labor becomes an object, an *external* existence, but that it exists *outside him*, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien.⁴⁴

In the present situation, the search for profit is the driving force behind the technology which propels the constant increase in production and renders products obsolete from one year to the next; advertising and the mass media constitute a parallel superstructural activity to bring consumption into line with production. But in turn, the mass media themselves depend on technology (mainly electronic). For this reason, technology acts as a driving force both in the structure and in the superstructure, and has come to constitute the center of a new ideology: *the technological element has absorbed and fused in itself the old capitalist myths giving them a new presentation.*

We have seen how the bourgeois myth of progress is updated through technological

43. V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Chapter 8, "The Parasitism and Decay of Capitalism".

44. Karl Marx, "Estranged Labor" in *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, New York, 1972.

45. The bourgeoisie has always tried to identify democracy and liberalism, to the point of making them interchangeable terms, when in reality they are two

euphemisms such as *development, growth* or *expansion*. The capitalist theoreticians have now invented as an infallible "measure of progress", the increase in the Gross National Product. The same process has been applied to the old myth of "liberty" and "democracy"⁴⁵ that have been absorbed by the new supreme values of capitalism: *technology* and *consumption*, symmetrical and complementary, which give new meaning to the old myths, regenerating them. Thus bourgeois democracy becomes *consumer's democracy*. The bourgeois electoral process, which was always based on a lie, is now a lie of another sort: it no longer proposes a political option, although it might be between different parties; now a kind of collective ritual is established, but one in which each individual chooses their *preferred image*. Freedom could be redefined according to the new canon law as *freedom to consume*, to choose among a number of consumption alternatives. The "free enterprise" of yesterday corresponds today to the entrepreneur's and "executive's" *freedom to outline the parameters of consumption*, that is, to decide what is to be consumed and how much, as well as what the consumers will want in the near or distant future.

Technology is presented by bourgeois ideologists as a promoter of change from traditional capitalism to a "new era" which would suppress the contradictions and establish the capitalist utopia. The manipulative powers are thus hidden behind the apparently more rational and more "noble" aspect of the system so that technology now becomes the center of attention. With the "technological revolution" bourgeois ideologists pretend to have arrived at the historical point where social revolution is unnecessary.

But the fundamental ideological fact is that technology is *negated as ideology and presented precisely as the end of ideologies*. It is thus more than paradoxical that a system which alleges having arrived at its maturity and overcome its contradictions elevates as its ultimate justification an ideology that denies itself as such. In reality, lacking ideological values capable of confronting Marxism-Leninism, the bourgeois prefers to proclaim the era of "the end of ideologies" and the uselessness of ideologies vis-a-vis a technological reality that supposedly surmounts them and makes them unnecessary. Thus marxist conceptions are declared *passé* and a dialectical confrontation is avoided which would demonstrate capitalism's ideological poverty.

To complete their model, bourgeois ideologists establish technological progress as the "motor of history" and define the historical stages of society according to the degree of technological development, ignoring the importance of different modes of production and the contradictions which each mode

different things. With a full awareness of the bourgeois verbal tricks, Lenin stated that "proletarian democracy is a thousand times more democratic than any bourgeois democracy." Della Volpe further comments that these words "would ring false" if he had said that the proletarian democracy was more liberal. See Galvano Della Volpe, *Rousseau y Marx*, Buenos Aires, 1963.

produces. Their outline of history can be summarized in this way:

- I. Pre-industrial Society
- II. Society in the Process of Industrialization
- III. Industrial Society
- IV. Advanced Industrial Society (or Consumer Society)

The model is clearly set forth by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, one of the French theoreticians of the technocratic ideology.⁴⁶ Here societies at different stages of historical development and with antagonistic social systems, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, are arbitrarily combined into the same category; and those countries which have been exploited and whose economies have been deformed by imperialism are euphemistically termed "backward", "underdeveloped" or "developing".

John K. Galbraith presents his own outline of history based on motivations, which can be represented in this way:

Social System	Dominant Characteristic of Production	Motivation
Feudalism	Ownership of Land	Physical Compulsion
Classical Capitalism	Capital	Percuniary Compensation (Compulsion by hunger)
Neocapitalism (Consumer Society)	Information, Education, Scientific Intelligence	Identification and Adaptation

A key concept of Galbraith's economic theories is that of the "technostructure." The ex-advisor of John F. Kennedy openly defends the "great modern corporations" or the monopolies and state monopoly capitalism, discarding as old rubbish capitalism's traditional dogmas of "free enterprise" and the "market economy".⁴⁷ Only "mature big business", states Galbraith, in collaboration with the military-state apparatus, can supply the large capital that modern technology requires. According to him, this is what determines the character of "advanced industrial society", taking the decision-making process away from the entrepreneur or management, and giving it to what he calls the "technostructure", a "technocracy" composed of teams of scientists, engineers, designers, production experts, market researchers and sales directors, among others. Supposedly, this "technostructure" does not operate according to pecuniary motivation, but rather by in-

46. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, *The American Challenge*, New York, 1968. This book, aside from its technocratic content, is a bastard political argument to intimidate the world and threaten it into becoming more American-like. Among the French technocratic ideologists quoted are Raymond Aron, Francois Perroux, and Gilbert Simondon. Among the Anglo-Saxons are Lewis Mumford, Fairfield Osborn, Peter Drucker, and R.J. Forbes. For a typical model of technological history, see the book of T.K. Derry and Trevor Williams, *A Short History of Technology From the Earliest Times to 1900*, New York, 1960.

dividual and group "adaptation and identification" with business objectives, which in turn, are identified with those of society. This conception is hard to accept, and has been exhaustively refuted. Pierre Jalée, for instance, states "It is not a question of knowing who makes the decisions, but rather for whose benefit."⁴⁸

The classic argument of the technocratic capitalist ideology is supplied by Peter Drucker who summarizes the problem in this way: "Before World War II, free enterprise and communism were generally measured by their respective pretensions of being able to create a just and free society. Since World War II, the question is rather: which system will more quickly lead economic development toward a modern technological society?"⁴⁹ With this simple expedient, technological emulation supplants class struggle. Following this line of thought, the alienation of the worker in capitalism ceases to be a consequence of his exploitation, and becomes a technical problem derived from the man-machine relationship, which will be *magically* resolved by technological advances bringing together the increasing productivity of the machine, automation, urbanization and the transformation of the human environment, the infinite possibilities of the mass media and its "culture for all", and the "redefinition of desires and motivations."

The two basic pillars of this ideology which denies itself as such—its concept of history and progress, and its pretensions of "neutrality"—are extremely vulnerable to marxist criticism. In reality, technology depends in the final analysis on the economic laws that rule every society, while in turn, it exerts an influence on them. Nevertheless, when a revolution provokes a qualitative leap in society, technology remains, but now it will advance in accordance with laws derived from the new relations of production.

Although social formations change by qualitative leaps (revolution by the exploited class), technological progress is produced by the gradual accumulation of knowledge, sometimes of a new quality, that leads to the "extinction" of the former qualitatively different elements, but not their violent destruction. By transposing technological change into the social domain (the history of technology as the history of humanity), a transposition is made which is as false and reactionary as the one made by the social darwinists of the past century when applying the laws of biology to human history.

The other sophism besides this concept of history, that of "neutrality", is the key concept by which technology, as a "neutral" vehicle of progress, will transcend class struggle and politics. This new

47. Galbraith, *op. cit.*

48. Pierre Jalée, *op. cit.* See also C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, New York, 1968; Victor Perlo, *The Empire of High Finance*, New York, 1957; Ferdinand Lundberg, *The Rich and the Super Rich*, New York, 1968. For a critique of Galbraith's economic theses, see Abram Mileikovski, "The New Ideas of Galbraith", *New Times* (Moscow), 28, 7 July 1972.

49. Peter Drucker, *Technology, Management and Society*, London, 1970.

"technological rationality" is part of the dogma of "scientific neutrality" and is used as a support in the attacks of empiricism against dialectics.⁵⁰

An excellent appreciation of this problem is that of the Soviet economist Guennadi Jromushin:

Technology is a powerful instrument of human activity. In opposing social systems, it serves different ends and ideals. In the capitalist system, technical progress deepens the antagonistic contradictions, accentuates the inhuman character of capitalism... Socialism eliminates the contradiction between the unlimited possibilities of the technical-scientific revolution and the inhuman exploitation of its results, placing technology at the service of society.⁵¹

In another context and from another perspective, the sociologist Lucien Goldmann addressed the problem during a discussion following a paper presented by Norbert Weiner at the international Royaumont Colloquium:

There is a science, it is neutral; there are complicated machines, which do not participate in any way in value judgements... But science, and machines and techniques built from that science are always the work of men and enter into a circuit of human behavior... Even though the individual science producer or machine maker may be unaware of the value judgements, the society which produced these machines does have value judgements which act upon these machines... Thus the problem is posed not of a separate technique and a separate society, but of one society with its technique that has its value judgements.⁵²

THE TECHNOCRATIC SUBIDEOLOGIES

We have seen how the ruling class, in the emission of its messages through the mass media, operates according to two main modalities: (a) addressing itself simultaneously to a *homogeneous* and *atomized* public (and always related directly to the individual),⁵³ and (b) appealing to specific groups, differentiated by sex, age, or interests like sports,

50. These attacks form part of the old reactionary arsenal and were already present in the polemic that led Lenin to write his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* in 1908. In the United States, there is a long anti-dialectical tradition whose fundamental pillar is philosophical pragmatism especially in the form given it by John Dewey.

51. Guennadi Jromushin "Bourgeois Theories of Social Pessimism: Origins and Consequences" *New Times* (Moscow), 29, 14 July 1972. The new techniques accentuate the domination of the monopolies and with it, class contradictions. See also Eugen Varga *El capitalismo del siglo XX*, Moscow, nd., and the article of Heinz Gambke and Heinz Hummler "La comunidad de clases y capas socialistas" *RDA*, XII, 5, 1971.

52. *El concepto de información en la ciencia contemporánea* (Royaumont Conference), Mexico, 1966; the paper by Norbert Weiner "Man and the Machine". See also the discussion centred around the paper by Lucien Goldmann, "Importancia del concepto de conciencia posible para la comunicación", which, by introducing dialectical political concepts provoked an irate reaction from the majority of Western scientists, who invoked the "neutrality" of their respective fields [See also the text of Dallas W. Smythe in this volume—Eds.]

53. The direct appeal to the individual, to that mythical "average man" of North American sociology, has been a mainstay of advertising; phrases like "Why not you?",

hobbies, etc. The same procedure is applied to the most "cultured" sectors, and the characteristic ruling ideology of the system is fragmented to satisfy each one of these groups. It is not by accident that a theoretician like Galbraith places so much emphasis on the importance of "group feeling" and the identification of the individual with the narrow universe of the group, branch, or department in which he works. These *sub-universes*, as Galbraith calls them, create the illusion among the personnel supervisors that "nothing is as important as the personnel policy", and the lawyers add that "the legal office is the real brain of the company." The same illusion is made by the accountant in respect to accounting, and each specialist of their own respective specialization. Thus, the technocratic ideology adapts itself to the self-promotion of the members of each *sub-universe*, creating what we can call sectorial ideologies.

The technocratic ideologists assign a privileged role to some sectors, presenting them as universal panaceas for the construction of the "Future Society", wisely and rationally organized or "designed" by the technocracy. Servan-Schreiber, for instance, prophesizes three "technical revolutions" for 1980: (a) generalized automation in industry; (b) general urbanization; and (c) a revolution in information. Great importance is given to the sectorial ideologies or subideologies of cybernetics, communication and mass media, and urbanism.⁵⁴

A revealing example is that of architecture, whose sphere of action today includes urbanism, regional planning and "environmental design." There is a great deal of literature on these subjects, hundreds of specialized revues and an increasing glorification of architecture and urbanism by the mass media.⁵⁵ Why so much publicity? In the first place, architecture constitutes by itself a very efficient

"Yes, you can!", or "Especially for you" are classics. Even Uncle Sam himself uses the method of individual direct appeal in his billboards. The group approach is more recent and proceeds from recent tendencies in sociology, psychology and anthropology. "Group studies" have become imperative for every self-respecting manipulator. One of the basic theoretical contributions to this trend is that of George C. Homans, *The Human Group*, New York, 1950.

54. It is significant that the well-known diplomat and ex-advisor for the State Department, George F. Kennan, one of the promoters of the "cold war" and the "containment policy" in the fifties, recently proclaimed the "salvation of the human environment" as one of the North American "missions" for the coming years (*Time*, 6 November 1972).

55. The pioneer film in the glorification of the architect was probably *The Fountainhead*, in which Gary Cooper appears as the anarchist-architect who dynamites entire blocks of buildings for aesthetic motives. Michelangelo Antonioni has shown a great preference for the architect-protagonist (*The Red Desert*, *l'Aventura*). The cinema of Western Europe has continued this tendency. The figure of the architect-hero seems to lend itself to the combined characteristics of businessman and artist, and has partially replaced the more aggressive traditional stereotypes like the cowboy or the tycoon.

means of propaganda, and as such it has been used by Roman emperors, French kings or Latin American dictators. Furthermore, architecture is a form of "mass media", and as such is both infrastructure and superstructure, industry and art, technology and ideology. The frequent imperialist "development projects" presented as models for the so-called Third World, not only are fabulous business affairs, but also colossal advertising campaigns, as illustrated by the "model cities" of Brasilia and Chandigarh.⁵⁶

The architectural and urbanistic technocracy has important ideologists in Lewis Mumford, Bruno Zevi, Siegfried Giedion, and "supergenuses" like Le Corbusier, Gropius and Mies Van der Rohe. At the present time, the principal brain of "urbanocracy" and design is Buckminster Fuller, ex-advisor for the State Department, who has occupied several positions in various monopolies. The subideology for which Fuller is spokesman makes proposals which can be resumed as follows: (a) the world can be transformed by changing the *physical environment* that surrounds the human being, which can be done only by technology, without the need for political change; and (b) the architect will assume a leading role in society, by being an "optimal organizer of social work". According to this subideology, the architect's tasks is to "design the world" or "design the future". In addition, he expresses himself as an enemy of politics, an attitude summarized in his phrase that "more lives have been saved by antibiotics than "Acts of Congress."⁵⁷

The diffusion of this sectorial ideology, directed primarily to a cultured and specialized public is, nevertheless, much wider than it would seem. Fuller's influence has gone beyond the university lecture halls, revues, the international congresses, and he has become one of the idols of the world-wide hippy movement.⁵⁸ Thus, an apparently "neutral" discipline like architecture, linked to technocratic concepts and the mass media, and occasionally mixed with a dose of Malthusian economics, becomes an ideological toothpaste ready for consumption, endowed with a sparkling content of almost mystical subjectivity.

56. Of the dozens of articles on Brasilia that could be quoted, we will mention only one, particularly sensational, "The Fantastic Change in Brasilia" in *Life* (en Espanol), 30 May, 1960, with 6 full pages of photography. Another "fantastic city" is Chandigarh, in India, built following the plans of Le Corbusier. These mechanisms are exposed and denounced by Joao Vilanova Artigas in *Le Corbusier y el imperialismo*, Sao Paulo, 1952; and Virgilio Perera Pérez "El negocio de la infraestructuras y la manipulacion de arquitectos", Cultural Congress of Havana, 1967.

57. Already in 1963, attempts at penetrating Cuba with this technocratic ideology were rejected in the final resolutions of the First International Meeting of Professors and Students of Architecture held in Havana. A complete demystification of the theories of Buckminster Fuller is contained in the articles "Richard Buckminster Fuller y la planificación mundial" and "Reclutando cuadros para el futuro" by Virgilio Perera Pérez, for whose collaboration on this work we wish to express our thanks. See also Joao

A perhaps more complex case of mystification is the furor which arose around the "new philosophy" of Herbert Marcuse, another subideology within the technocratic trend, this time combined not with elements of the new design tendencies, but with psychoanalysis. Like Fuller, Marcuse was converted into an idol and a theoretician of student and youth groups of the United States and Western Europe, and adopted by white middle class youths, who, curiously enough, often characterized themselves by their refusal to restrict themselves to an ideology. This was a trait of the North American New Left.⁵⁹

Marcuse occasionally criticizes the society to which he belongs, as evidenced by his *One Dimensional Man*, in which he states: "In the face of the totalitarian features of this society, the traditional notion of "neutrality" of technology can no longer be maintained. Technology as such cannot be isolated from the use to which it is put; the technological society is a system of domination....The technological rationality has become a political rationality."⁶⁰ Nevertheless, as the very subtitle of his book reflects (*Essay on Advanced Industrial Society*), Marcuse works within technocratic ideology's conceptual categories. This is also reaffirmed by his refusal to distinguish between capitalist and socialist countries, a position which he carries to an extreme in his anti-Soviet book, *Soviet Marxism*, a result of his years of work at the Russian Institute at Harvard. Furthermore, Marcuse's characteristic critiques—sometimes very well aimed—of the "consumer society" are directed from an elitist and anarchistic position, which defends above all the right to "individual protest" and the "intellectual and emotional refusal to follow the current".

The touchstone of Marcusean ideas can be found in his postulate on "the disappearance of the historical forces which, in the preceding stage of industrial society seemed to represent the possibility of new forms of existence." The international bourgeois press has promoted this thesis, which declares that the revolutionary role of the working class has ceased and has been superseded by students, racial minorities and fringe groups.⁶¹ We do not think that this is Marcuse's central idea, which would

Vilanova Artigas *Los caminos de la arquitectura moderno*, Sao Paulo, 1953.

58. *IT* (*International Times*), a London magazine of the British hippies, is a faithful mouthpiece of Fuller. Other ideologists of the new design tendencies are Christopher Alexander of the Institute for the Design of Environmental Structures in Berkeley, California; and Walter Reagan, of the Kennedy family circle, who promotes "cosmic architecture". Particularly relevant throughout this wave of propaganda is the role played by the Archigram group, considered to be the "Beatles of architecture".

59. See Carlos Monsivais "Minima introducción a la nueva izquierda", *Siempre!* (Mexico), 3 July 1968.

60. Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man: Essay on Advanced Industrial Society*, London, 1964.

61. See Yuri Zhukov's "On the False Prophet Marcuse and his Student Agitators" *Pravda* (Moscow), 30 May 1968. Reprinted in *Algunos opiniones sobre Herbert Marcuse*, Havana, 1968.

be the same as admitting in the final analysis, that Marcuse advocates some type of revolution, a revolutionary alternative. On the contrary, we read in *One Dimensional Man*:

Advanced industrial society is approaching the stage where continued progress would demand the radical subversion of the prevailing direction and organization of progress. This stage would be reached when material production...becomes automated to the extent that all the vital needs can be satisfied while necessary labor time is reduced to marginal time. From this point on, technical progress would transcend the realm of necessity, where it served as an instrument of domination and exploitation...Technology would become subject to the free play of the faculties in the struggle for the pacification of nature and society.

In other words, the revolution remains postponed until technological progress by itself leads to a point at which a society passes automatically from the "realm of necessity" to that of freedom. This magical point, similar to the "omega point" of Teilhard de Chardin, brings us back to the same providential god that all imperialisms have invoked. Marcuse ends in the irrationalism that he pretends to combat, and enters the domain of utopia. The origin of that point in which necessity becomes freedom can be found in another bestseller of Marcuse: *Eros and Civilization*. It is the point at which "non-repressive satisfaction" is substituted for the "reality principle." Freudian psychoanalysis, erected as a technocratic subideology, made Marcuse the "prophet of the sexual revolution" and the idol of a youth fed up with the dead weight of its puritan tradition.⁶² The "sexual revolution" slogan, skillfully manipulated to counterbalance the "scientific-technical revolution" serves the system as a diversionary weapon in its arsenal designed to contain the only revolution that the ruling classes fear: that which will sweep them forever from power.

THE SORCERER OF THE MASS MEDIA

Concerning the constant demands of advertising and the manipulation of the mass media, Marcuse said that the media provoked a "mimesis", an identification of the individual with the system, through mechanical, automatic reaction, as "must have been characteristic in forms of primitive association." This image of the primitive tribe reappears in the technocratic utopia of Marshall McLuhan, another

62. In reality, Marcuse did no more than provide a theoretical framework for a movement whose main precursors include the magazine *Playboy*. The "sexual revolution" of the sixties, like other phenomena mentioned here, had without a doubt, deep social and historical roots, although they were skillfully manipulated for purposes of entertainment. More recently, the U.S., to give itself a "new image" abroad, has attempted to halt the growing wave of pornography.

63. Marshall McLuhan, *The Gutenberg Galaxy*, Toronto, 1962; *Understanding Media: The Extension of Man*, New York, 1965; *The Medium is the Message*, New York, 1967.

64. It is not by coincidence that all these new "prophets" always propose extravagant utopias: there is a

one of the new "prophets" of capitalism, who sees humanity as a huge and happy primitive tribe which although spread out over the planet can keep in direct communication thanks to the modern mass media.

Whereas Buckminster Fuller elevated design as the technocratic *raison d'être* designed to create a "new human environment", McLuhan chooses the mass media for the same role, and takes his place among those who remake human history as the "history of mass communications": first came the writing "revolution", then Gutenberg and printing, and at present we are in the era of electronic communication, which will unify the world in a common culture, creating a new electronic universe of peace and well-being. McLuhan appears very original, because he plunders diverse sources without quoting them, making them disappear behind a language based on slogans, as he does when he affirms that every technique is the extension of a biological function (the tool a continuation of the hand; the wheel, the foot; writing, the sight). But this was already stated one hundred years earlier by Karl Marx. The key magic formula of McLuhan is "the medium is the message", in which is emphasized the negation of thought and the deification of technology. It does not matter what the press or the radio messages say, it is their very existence which is important. Thus, radio or television become fetishes: it is the mythification of the mass media.⁶³

Another concept frequently used by the new prophet is *environment*, so dear to the urbanocrats. "Each technology creates a new human environment", says McLuhan, and the environment created by electronics is that of the mass media, where the media themselves constitute the message. TV, for instance, has surpassed the limits of traditional education: the student supposedly prefers "the mystical world of electronically processed data" to traditional and boring school education. Our prophet suggests, as a "strategy", raising the teaching level of television. But, we ask ourselves, "for what?", if the TV is itself the message? As everything seems to indicate, the McLuhan utopia turns out to be a world-wide public drugged before the image of a mystical electronic universe, in direct communication with the entire planet, thanks to the yankee satellites. A new and more effective *opium of the people*, this time distributed on an ecumenical scale and manipulated by the financial oligarchy.⁶⁴

large tradition—capitalist and Anglo-Saxon—backing them up. The first technocratic utopia dates from 1627 when Francis Bacon published his *New Atlantis* (concerning this see the recent book of Benjamin Farrington, *Francis Bacon: Philosopher of Industrial Science*, London, 1973). Another important source is the political tale *Oceana* by another Englishman, James Harrington, which had a great influence on the political thought of North America in the beginning of the nineteenth century. In contrast to the utopian communists Thomas More and Campanella, the imaginary republic of Harrington is the *utopia of private property*, based on economic agrarianism and democratic egalitarianism among the "land owners". The reason why it took root in "Old Virginia" was because this beautiful egalitarian structure was in fact supported by the work of the black

The technocratic utopia of the mass media is the latest pseudo-scientific fantasy destined for consumption by all the semi-cultured and colonized snobs hungry for such novelties. Further down the novelty hierarchy we have the media in action: science fiction and the comics, two irreplaceable sources of evasion and conformity, other products of the "mystic world" of which the sorcerer McLuhan speaks. The apparent technological rationality of the "advanced industrial society," from the empiricism of its sciences to the pragmatism of its actions, is just the mask that covers the irrationality of a predatory system.

In imperialism's ideological universe, from the advertising jargon to the most "cultured" art, an aura of mysticism surrounds every rhetorical phrase, every iconic system, and every electronic circuit. It is the new Kingdom of God, a god who gives his blessing to consumption and business, and who speaks in advertising lingo to defend the system, and who in turn, is invoked with fervor by its politicians. But the mass media, the new opium, also utilizes and manipulates certain older opioms, for the media's own ends, as seen by the publicity given to the pseudo-mystical hippies and the promotion of Occultism, Yoga and Zen which have invaded the publishing houses and mass circulation magazines.⁶⁵

SURROUNDING "MASS CULTURE"

The so-called "mass culture" (or cultural industry or pop culture) is the mass media's final ideological product for consumption by the masses. It has it propagandists and also its detractors whom Umberto Eco calls respectively "integrated" and "apocalyptic."⁶⁶ The Italian semiotic critic's observation that the "apocalypics" have their roots in an aristocratic position is correct. In this category should be included Günther Anders, Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and Dwight McDonald. The latter's critique of "mass culture" is based especially on its being an "inferior" culture compared to the values of "true culture", that is, the elitist Western culture. Nevertheless, a great part of these criticisms are valid, although the reader needs an equally critical attitude toward the authors, since the culturalist rather than class approach to these questions leads to dangerous confusion.

The "integrated" school (Ernest Dichter, Eric Larrabee, Daniel Bell or Gillo Dorfles) try to make us see that in the culture of the mass media lies the realization of the cultural form of the democratic utopia. Umberto Eco feigns a strict neutrality in the polemic, but in reality, he is subtly inclined towards the defenders of "mass culture". He is right when he asks himself: "Up to what point do the 'apocalyptic"

slaves of the plantations. Finally, we must remember the persistence of the myth of the Great Society which began with Adam Smith, was repeated by John Dewey and culminated in the war crimes of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon.

65. These are all recurring movements. Occultism and Theosophy represented in the last century what Yoga and Zen represent today. And doesn't the hippy movement itself resemble in certain respects the mystical and anarchic

texts only represent the most sophisticated product offered for mass consumption?" The success of a Marcuse or an Adorno as the petty bourgeoisie's fashionable philosophers proves him right. According to Eco, it is through this mass culture that the proletariat "consumes bourgeois cultural models, believing them to be their own autonomous expression." He further points out that the molds of this subculture continue to be those of the "superior" culture, and that through the cinema or the TV, stereotypes and situations are represented "that do not have any connection with the real conditions of the audience, but continue nevertheless to be felt as model situations."

Despite the fact that Umberto Eco uses marxist categories and concepts like class struggle and proletariat, there is in his work an over-estimation of the technology of mass media as a transformative element of man and society, which brings him near to McLuhan.

Although we recognize positive aspects in Eco's work, we are in disagreement with him when he says that the problem of mass culture is that "at the present time it is manipulated by economic groups that pursue lucrative ends, and produced by specialists who provide what is thought to be most profitable, without allowing for the massive intervention of men of culture in production." This argument overlooks the totalitarian essence of the capitalist mass media culture, and suggests its possible modification through the insertion of "men of culture" into this apparatus. Furthermore, Eco reproaches those who believe that "the only solution seems to be the total negation of the model."

That "model", in the final analysis, is the capitalist system. And when Eco tells us that "within the model the contradictions are still active" and the sum of infinitesimal changes will lead to a qualitative change, it is clear that this line of thought can only lead to a new type of reformism.

Of course, Eco knows this, and he warns us that "the category of reformism is absolutely inapplicable to the world of cultural values." Which in principle is correct, but confusing, in that it eludes the true question: how to substitute authentic popular and proletarian culture for the culture manipulated by the capitalist power centers?

The only possible answer is revolution, which destroys the capitalist power structures and places the mass media in the hands of popular power. But this is not the solution that Eco offers.

The "massive intervention of men of culture" into the imperialist mass media apparatus suggested by Eco is not only incapable of producing qualitative change in society, but also contributes to perpetuating the system. It seems that the Italian

"perfectionist" movement? This pro-abolition group of the mid-nineteenth century, which staged extravagant mass demonstrations, was headed by the young John Humphrey Noyes of Vermont, who proclaimed the exclusive right of Jesus Christ to the throne of the world and proposed "the overthrow of the nation".

66. Umberto Eco, *Apocalípticos e integrados ante la cultura de masas*, Mexico, 1968.

semiotic critic is interested only in the cultural problems and not the transformation of society, when he poses the question in the following terms: "What cultural action must be taken to permit these mass media to be the vehicle of cultural values?" He does not question the presence of an "industrial society" whose mass media have created a new language. Apparently, it is a question of a stylistic renovation which has constant repercussions on the level of the so-called superior arts, promoting their development.⁶⁷ In other words, Eco's interest is the promotion of the "superior arts" within the technological context of the mass media and its "mass culture." Here he coincides fully with an "integrated" critic like Gillo Dorfles.

But Dorfles' position leaves no doubts. Dorfles is an optimist who believes that utopia already exists on earth, thanks to the mass media. He is a passionate defender of "mass culture", and at the same time an aesthetician who only accepts the forms of the Western avant-garde as the "authentic art" of our era. He admits the fetishistic character of objects in the consumer society and the creation of mass media myths, but he justifies them through a *sui generis* distinction between "mythogenic elements" (negative) and "mythopoyetic elements" (positive).⁶⁸

Dorfles says, for example, that "The creation and enjoyment of images is a perennial necessity of man... and this is not the place to bring up the importance of the imaginative element as a cathartic, diagnostic and therapeutic factor." This mass therapy is familiar to us. Dorfles dissipates our doubts, exalting *ergomania* (also called human engineering, biotechnics, or applied psychology) and industrial design as infallible aids against alienation. Logically, for Dorfles, this alienation is not produced by exploitation, but by the "mechanization of work", in the relation of worker to machine. Thus, we are on familiar ground. But Dorfles goes further, and denies that exploitation is the principal cause of alienation since there are "other alienating motives... which affect not only the worker actually exploited, but also the more or less innocent exploiter." Evidently, this "innocence" is the idyllic root of Dorfles' optimism, and he proposes the acceptance of the mass media as natural producers of the myths and rites of our era, as being the "appropriate ritual" of our civilization.

These myths and rituals will gain acceptance "through the many forms of pop art - comic strips, songs, dances, film, television, magazines, whereas this acceptance is limited in the 'cultured' arts forms. The solution can only be an eventual transformation

67. Lamentably, many Latin American intellectuals have been seduced by these "new" trends in a colonial attempt to be "up to date".

68. Gillo Dorfles, *Nuevos ritos, nuevos mitos*, Barcelona, 1969.

69. Lenin had already written in 1922: "One only has to recall the vast majority of fashionable philosophical trends that arise so frequently in European countries", and that "at every turn in the road appear reactionary schools and sub-schools, philosophical tendencies and sub-tendencies." ("On the Significance of Militant Materialism" [to be reprinted in Volume 2 of this anthology—Eds].

of pop art into 'authentic' art, slowly and progressively raising the level of these creations." We are faced with the same question as Umberto Eco over the gradual transformation in and from culture, but Dorfles, less cautious, blissfully affirms: "We find ourselves absorbed and we are participants of a mass society that rules and will forever rule the earth." This *mass media imperialism* is the same as that of McLuhan, and since Dorfles admits the obsolescence and consumption of objects and images, values and fashions, *all that remains is a myth: the media themselves. The media is a myth. The media is the message.* But who sends the message? Dorfles clarifies: "Man wants to brand the universe with his seal, he wants to become the owner of things—natural or man-made—that are close to him." Thus, we continue with the logic of domination.

Out of the domination of one class emerged the media and their spurious pop culture. The media "recreate" present history, in which they attempt to assign to the masses the role of *passive subjects*, spectators, the same way that the advertising jargon converts the *producers* into mere *consumers*. It is the imperialist bourgeoisie that diffuses the supposed "mass culture". This "culture", intended to overwhelm the spectator with its huge productive and reproductive apparatus emitting images and sounds, is the authoritarian talking machine of the bourgeoisie.

TOWARDS THE LIBERATION OF THE MASS MEDIA

The cultural and ideological penetration of the imperialist media in Latin America and the rest of the world is well known. Its objective is the cultural colonization of the planet following the models of "mass culture", and the latter's more refined elitist variants, destined for the mimetic dominant classes and the "cultured" sectors of the colonized countries. The media propose the unqualified acceptance of the technological models of television and the other media, as if the media were "neutral," and cultivate philosophical schools and cultural fashions (subideologies) which spread the germs of colonization.⁶⁹

The confrontation of this ideological offensive must begin by a total demystification of imperialist mass media manipulation and its pop culture, against which the most effective weapon is Marxism-Leninism with its dialectical method. In a country dominated by imperialism and its satellite bourgeoisies, the ideological struggle is arduous, and inseparable from the other forms of struggle for liberation and the implantation of revolutionary power. The means of communication of the proletariat and other progressive forces are always at a lower, more "primitive" level than those of the bourgeoisie, who control the resources. The exploited class "is condemned to use to the maximum the means of transmission given up by the ruling class" as was pointed out in the Latin American context by Jesus M. Martinez. But the organization of the revolutionary masses can make those media

as effective as the guerilla rifle or the Vietnamese bamboo traps have been against imperialism's artillery, tanks and airplanes.

Nevertheless, any attempt at "improving" the capitalist media or "influencing them from within," as Umberto Eco suggest, is destined to failure, since in this way what could be a factor negating the system becomes a critical sector of "opposition" within the system, reproducing the traditional rules of bourgeois parliamentary democracy in the domain of the media. Only through a revolution in which the ownership of the media passes to the proletariat could these media be used to liberate the masses and not to mentally enslave them. But the ownership of the media is not enough: the determining factor will be the "extent to which the people are the transmitter and not only the receiver" as Armand Mattelart proposes, that is, the extent to which the revolutionary mass organizations will have access to the media.

One can apply to the mass media in general, what Lenin proposed with regard to the communist press, when he emphasized its inherent opposition to the bourgeois mercantile press guided by individualism and the drive for profit, and stated that the communist press should be not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, but also a collective organizer.⁷⁰ Equally applicable to the technological-ideological apparatus of the mass media is the warning of Commandante Ernesto Che Guevara: "Never forget that behind every technique there is someone who commands it, and that someone is society, and that one is either for or against that society; and that in this world there are those who think that exploitation is good, and those who think that exploitation is bad and must be done away with; and that even when no one talks of politics on either side, the political man cannot relinquish this situation which is inherent in his human condition." Che also warned with his usual clarity: "To use the weapon of technology in the service of society, one must have the society in one's own hand; and to have the society in one's hands, one must destroy the factors of oppression, one must change the present social conditions in some countries and deliver the weapon of technology to technicians of all kinds, to the people. And that is the task for all of us who believe in the need for changes in certain regions of the world."⁷¹

70. From "Where to Begin" [to be reprinted in Volume 2 of this anthology]. In the Soviet Union "the socialist news media were free, from the beginning, from the need to hide their real social mission or camouflage their relevance for a specific class" says Spartak Beglov, who refers to the role of the media in the new society as communicators and organizers, "that is, as instruments to lead the working masses to a political consciousness of their guiding role in the new society" ("Medios de información masivos en la URSS" in *Referencias* (Havana), III, 1972.)

71. Ernesto Che Guevara, Speech at the closing of the First International Meeting of Professors and Students of Architecture, Havana, 29 September 1963 (in *Obras 1957-1967*, I, Havana, 1970).

Michèle Mattelart

NOTES ON "MODERNITY": A WAY OF READING WOMEN'S MAGAZINES (Chile, 1971)

"An article which will keep you up to date on today's make-up and make you laugh about what they said yesterday. With photos of the decade."

Vanidades Continental
(Santiago de Chile), 17 June 1971

The concept of modernity has assumed the role of an aegis, a watchword in the production of goods and signs in capitalist industrial society. A thorough inquiry into this concept may prove to be one of the more worthwhile ways of approaching the guiding principle of a system of social domination which justifies its dynamism and its notion of progress by repeating everyday and *ad nauseam* the litany of the constant improvement in unlimited consumption and technological happiness. Among the words describing the benefits and achievements of this ruling society, unifying and glorifying them, and thus contributing to the reproduction of their fertile evolution, there is a key term: modernity. Among its peers and triumphal synonyms can be found: fashion, today's world, new and novel, always with a disdainful attitude towards yesterday, and paradoxically so, since we will have more than one occasion to catch them in worship at the shrine of "tradition"

A REVEALING SUBSTITUTION

Marx showed that when the bourgeoisie rose to power, they delayed the process of history and froze the notion of movement in their code of domination. The bourgeois regime interprets capitalist order not as a transitory phase of the historical process, but rather as the absolute and definite form of social production. This same holding back of history obliges them to ceaselessly renew their reserve of arguments designed to make the dominated believe that the solutions that they propose for human liberation and happiness are the definitive ideal of civilization and culture. Having established their order in this rigid form, having naturalized and eternalized it, one of the most sensitive domains of bourgeois mystification becomes that concerning its concept of change. By disguising the origin of this concept, they try to cover up the fact that, in the final analysis, the

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notion of change which the bourgeoisie promotes amounts to nothing more than a repudiation of change.

After a hegemony in distinguished grey, predominated by the figures of the judge and the legislator, guardians of bourgeois juridical-political ideology, and where, in the privacy of the home, the stock quotations were faithfully consulted in the liberal morning press, there now explodes an irreverent splash of color and extravagance, the advertising bazaar of technological society. The passage from this earlier order to this apparent anarchy brought with it a new-style bourgeoisie, a new kind of imperialism, a new kind of manipulation, operating essentially through the mass communications apparatus. The concepts which once cemented bourgeois institutionality and assured a consensus on the profile of the perfect citizen, law-abiding and respectful of representative democracy and established morals, seem to be overridden by science and technology. These now take form in a daily routine which craves happiness and which evinces no kinship with the harsh mechanics of the dawn of industrialization nor, to use another image, with the stuffy formality of the parliaments. In other words, a technocratic ideology has superseded the formerly dominant juridical-political sphere. But this time, domination (hidden, disguised) is exercised through extremely diversified channels, allowing a much more total infiltration of everyday life. Its powers are multiplied, and now attempt to satisfy every possible need. The noticeable shift in the ideological center of gravity from the juridical-political sphere to the technocratic sphere signifies a shift in the nucleus of the signs which are articulated in the power strategy. This substitution is obviously adapted to a particular moment in the development of the productive forces, since it protects, in a more functional way, the interests of the hegemonic pole.

We shall here try to analyze how modernity has become an ideology of constant movement and progression, daily regeneration, and effervescent mutation, masking the permanence and static quality of the structures of the order which generated it. Our objective is to analyze the insistent modernity imposed upon us every day by society (advertising jingles, elegant fashions, new forms, artificial atmospheres, plastics, *savoir-faire*) as well as the ensemble of images, the spiritual and motivating dimensions which assure individual and collective response to a conception of development enclosed in its own determinism. In other words, we will try to bring to light certain aspects of the myths which have been devised to create, or more precisely, replenish cultures so they will function within the modernizing concept of social development. Within the pattern of dependency, we must point out (even when it seems time-worn and obvious) that this replenishment of the superstructure aggravates its disparity with the infrastructure. The awakened desires, the patterns of behavior, the models of life, the euphoria of consumption proposed by the ideology of modernity and radiated by the imperialist pole, are increasingly removed from anything really possible, given the

structures of production and the purchasing power of certain layers of society, those in the overwhelming majority. The ideology of modernity is an integral part of a superstructure which conceives of revolution as genetically technological and, in its principle lines, antithetic to socialist revolution. Deciphering this ideology requires a close examination of new forms of control over behavior and aspirations, and a reading of the signs which express its existence in everyday life.

One final remark: the concept of "modernity" or "the modern" evoke almost inevitably the opposing term within that manichean tension which constitutes the axis of the classical analysis of the movement of society: the tension between the landmarks of the "modern" and the "traditional". While we do not deny the accumulation of technical, material and spiritual accomplishments by which modernity has been identified with the notion of progress, we shall take the opportunity provided by the mention of this classic polarization to round off the definition of our perspective: our perspective, rather than invalidating this identification of the modern with the notion of progress, will reconstruct the bourgeois notion of modernity, which is symptomatic of the adhesion of bourgeois sociology to postulates acritical of the existing order. It is clear that this "modern-traditional" dichotomy means situating the process of human liberation within the system of the class which arose victorious out of feudalism, the bourgeoisie. This model of development which defines change as the mere modernization of structure, is inscribed in a one-dimensional conception which concedes the ruling permanence of a given order without questioning its genesis.

I. A FIRST APPROACH TO THE MYTH

As a starting point from which to concretely challenge the concept of modernity we have chosen to examine magazines directed to women, knowing full well that among the many obstacles they present to the researcher the greatest are undoubtedly the apparent triviality or insignificance of these publications, as well as their restriction to very specific interests. Without trying to be pompous, we could refer back to some authoritative arguments and allege that the treatment of the topic of women's magazines already has antecedents in the sociological, semiological and philosophical production of people as well known as Edgar Morin, Roland Barthes and Henri Lefebvre, all French by some strange coincidence, and also, perhaps with a different intention and focus, that of Adorno and Horkheimer, who studied quite thoroughly the cultural industry, an area in which women's publications are only a sub-topic. Our choice of the topic of women's magazines has, however, more substantial reasons: while apparently specific, this subject has had an increasing tendency to abandon its specificity. The press in general, as well as the ensemble of the mass media (film, radio or television) are continually being colonized by these

feminine-style values which together make up a stereotype of femininity: ideas and values ruled by the heart, domestic activity, everyday life and intimacy are obsessively present in all the products of the cultural industry. It is easy to demonstrate the gravitation of these ideas and values towards advertising. All the lines of impact of the so-called revolution of rising expectations finally converge in women. Furthermore, (and here we are struck by the compact totality of the phenomenon) electoral propaganda has adopted as an unspoken central idea the theme of the mother associated with the child (calling to mind femininity, childhood, innocence and helplessness). The right uses these images quite openly to determine and prescribe a kind of behavior aimed at preserving the liberal order and repelling any attempt to alter it, in a violent or non-violent way. "Political" marketing techniques simply take advantage of the orientation of the configuration of symbols used by commercial advertising. Now, we can clearly perceive the "universal" value of the images, manipulated by the dominant ideology, when, in the same electoral contests, the Left, for tactical reasons (and often, lack of strategy) uses these same themes of the woman and child. This leads to a crystallization of defensive attitudes, centred primarily in the sphere of private interests and the security of the family. The family, the last stage, the most subtle and yet the most sure, in the social reproduction of the State apparatus, the last stage of "civil society". This is the strength of the stereotype of femininity in our societies, in its traditional or its up-to-date version. By the mere hidden power of the image, by its simple insinuations, a woman's face—and we are not referring here to the "stars"—calls to mind non-aggression, security, legitimacy and compromise.

A Mythic Antagonism

Since the woman, as image or reality, endures this "everyday" side of life more than the man, and occupies the center of this everyday world, she is destined to be the best focal point from which the culture of modernity could irradiate, a modernity which in so many ways imposes itself on the context of daily living, *molding atmospheres, gestures, desires*.

We shall depart from this myth of femininity, which equates the idea of woman with the negation of change, or if you prefer, from this mythical antagonism between woman and change, and shall lead into the concept of modernity, trying to explain how it is manipulated by the dominant ideology, especially through women's magazines, as an alibi for change: how modernity reaffirms the myth of femininity, giving it a new validity, a new justification.

This antagonism between the concepts woman/change certainly goes back to the fact that, in all cultures, myths associate the image of the woman with the life-giving elements: earth and water, elements of fertility and permanence. The image of woman is linked to the idea of continuity, perpetuation, timelessness. Against the transient

nature of upheavals, crises and chaos, corresponding to the concept and representation of change, is played and contrasted the cyclic timing of woman, which traces concentric lines leading forever back to the starting point, unifying past, present and future, a time which flows, in which the eternal roles are performed: marriage, home, motherhood. The pattern of a woman's life is portrayed as the antithetical justification of and compensation for the pattern of a man's life, whose action is inscribed in the dialectic of a reality of struggle and domination of the world.

With the development of technology, it became necessary to introduce the notion of modernity, modernity as representation and practice, in order to create a semblance of newness, to say nothing of revolution, in social life, and especially in women's lives. Change, in as much as it affects women, became synonymous with integration into the "modern". And it is the image of the happy woman, the woman dazzled by the desires and possibilities of consumption, and by the desires and possibilities of progress, which is the best publicity for modernity, fostering the immersion of technology into daily life: woman becomes the "smile of modernity"

The Tropism Of A Class

Women's magazines cultivate and diffuse this myth of the modern which is proposed as a universal (this must be emphasized because this self-attributed universality presents the first mythical aspect); a model founded on a cliché of the woman of a very comfortable socio-economic group of an industrialized society of the capitalist sphere. Of course this model fantasizes somewhat on the situation of these women, extrapolating the well-being, freedom, and pleasure which they have attained in their daily lives. A very general analysis of this modernistic framework exposes two levels of alienation: the first, inherent in the model itself and euphorizing, as we just suggested, the life-style, the atmosphere and purchasing power attained by a particular class in a central country; the second, revealed in a more or less mechanistic transplantation of this model to the reality of a country of the periphery. (Relating this to the local arena, we might point out that a Chilean magazine such as *Paula*, edited by a group of upper-middle class Chilean women, does not manifest the same scandalously dependent character, on a single normative scale, as does *Vanidades Continental*, edited in Miami and distributed throughout Latin America, even though both magazines are published by the same company and under the same trademark).

It is the pattern of social stratification implied in these magazines which furnishes both the take-off point for the myth and its base of reference. Even if the magazine evokes or describes other life-styles, even if it refers to other social groups, in the final analysis all the recommended and publicized articles, all the news, all the centers of interest, the preoccupations and the themes are subordinated to the all-powerful exclusiveness of this normalizing

pattern whose perspective deforms any concrete establishment of the message within a socially given reality. The amorphous society proposed by the pattern is far from innocent, since it revolves around an illusion of the class which has the greatest chances of entering this fantasy world.

The examples are legion.

A "letter to the editor" from a young office worker tells of her anxiety about inviting her section head and co-workers to her home, which is located in a rather precarious, low-prestige neighbourhood. The response leaves unanswered the question of this girl, who is ashamed of her social position and afraid to reveal it. The solution—almost unconsciously—makes use of the supreme artifice, suggesting the use of wall-paper with a novel design, along with other ruses of wicker and clay, as a way of getting through this hierarchical confrontation unscathed. In other words, if we may add unneeded strength to this salient example, all the signs "to be found at your fingertips" are really the signs which make up the universe of a class which reveals and distributes them with a paternal gesture and confers upon this extension of the benefits of its esthetic order the value of an initiation, a revelation of a secret code, a ritual leap. It couldn't be otherwise, since the absolute norm which regulates all the articles on interior decorating, for example, is based invariably on houses, gardens, and neighbourhoods pertaining to the limited sector of the bourgeoisie. The bohemian fantasy of adorning a garret, a forgotten corner of an old mansion, is a far cry from the urgent need of refurbishing an office worker's only room.

"A newlywed couple of architecture students have made their home above a garage. It's small but very cheerful. The trick was in the simplicity of everything they put inside." Although certain items shown in the accompanying photos (an ultra-modern stereo system, geometrical and folding furniture bought from their exclusive distributor) contradict the low-key complacency of the description of the text, in reality, the total effect is indeed achieved through color and simplicity. But these come across as qualities devoid of their present-day significance in the market and stripped of their connotation for style: after having run the whole semantic gamut to describe the bareness and scarcity, simplicity emerges as the key to this atmosphere of new forms and modern exquisiteness, making simplicity a selective and expensive taste.

"Their house, so typically Chilean, deserved to be photographed. It was constructed with the intention of conserving the Chilean style of open houses, full of patios and corridors, yet cozy — and above all — inexpensive, because their budget was limited." The article needed to emphasize that this dream house, offered to the eyes of the readers, fits into an open, democratic structure, corresponding to a

1. We could cite many examples of the way in which the message is fixed within an exclusive and excluding atmosphere. The norm is that of a particular class. The experiences of other groups are negated. A few titles should suffice: "The joys of the indispensable daily bath," "Prolong the delights of your morning bath," etc.

generalized profile of a prospective buyer (low-cost, easy payments, savings and loans). Again, the text minimizes, excuses and tries to remain detached from the visual spectacle, the elitist heyday spreading through the colonial corridors, sun patios, private terraces, indescribable bathrooms, is regenerated in every decorative astuce and "find", and in the multitude of far from insignificant signs: a Manila shawl, an antique sideboard, etc. It is from this pinnacle of refinement that the Chilean essence is supposed to radiate. The idiosyncratic is defined by the tropism of a particular class with its possessions and possibilities. Yet a simple displacement of the context strips the myth bare.¹

The universality of the superstructural pattern — as if the lifeblood of the bourgeoisie flowed through the veins of the entire population — vanishes into air when this archetype is confronted with the empirical reality into which it is supposed to be inserted, a reality which is obsessively dialectical and chaotic. By confronting the model with the reality in which it operates its mythical aspect can clearly be seen. It thus assumes all the characteristics of an ensemble of signs functional to a particular order. By abstracting a concrete pattern of social stratification, and polarizing it into a class, women's magazines have succeeded in eliminating from their spectacle the struggle led by the antagonists of a mode of production which allows a few to benefit from what the majority has produced.

It seems unnecessary to follow these first observations on the mythical aspect of modernity by emphasising the importance of fashion as a universal determining factor in women's magazines. Fashion as an aspiration and reconciliation of all women, usurping the category of democracy, or using democracy as an alibi, can be seen as an implicit attempt to wipe out any trace of the problematic of society, and substitute the ideology of fashion/modernity for the necessity of a critical consciousness. This proposal is orchestrated by the whole numbing apparatus which provides the euphoria of images and vocabulary which have become a basic element in the system of style.

The simple bringing together, within the space of a magazine, of, for instance, the fashion news and a new recipe, throws some light on the referential density of this closed universe or order which, beneath the appearances of all which is practical, ordinary, healthy and "found at your fingertips", evokes elements of certain surroundings (supposedly those of daily life) which are clearly those pertaining exclusively to a particular class, and regenerating its reveries.

Supplement: Women's Liberation

Further on, we shall examine how the image of women being promoted by this type of magazine has adopted certain characteristics which make up the traditional or conformist model. We shall attempt to show that the change which this image of women undergoes is minimal, never surpassing the limits of a contextual adaptation, defined by modernity, and never signifying an aggression against the principles

of the system. In other words, as far as the image of the female entity diffused by these magazines is concerned, we can hypothesize that in bourgeois ideology change is subject to the condition of invariability; in other words, invariability is the condition of the variations.

And in this sense it is surprising to find this fixation of women's magazines for all those "traditional" topics geared to "heart economics": the letters from the lovelorn, serialized novels, horoscopes; or geared to that other fundamental and obligatory axis: that of the duties of the housewife, "home economics". "Supplement: Women's Liberation". This special section, accompanying *El Mercurio*, Wednesday, 30 June 1971, was announced as a series of articles specially dedicated to the woman and *her world, the home*. (The significant association was underlined by us.) The deliberately deceitful, emancipating title was a trap, a way of disguising and, at the same time, subversively revitalizing the enclosure it represented. These rubrics, which testify to the anti-intellectual, obscurantist prejudice of bourgeois ideology concerning women, have as their implicit and ultimate goal the refinement of the isolation of the female being, on the one hand, within the inessential and the frivolous, and on the other, within a world apart, cut off from concrete global reality: the home. When a woman's intellectual or artistic value is recognized, this new attribute is made to function very much like that of style, or like social rhetoric: a function which is neither existential nor experiential, but rather symbolic, representing status or class. Furthermore, these "extra" functions are always subordinate in bourgeois mythology, which emphasizes the superior, determinant validity of the eternal roles. The woman who writes novels, and who, as a writer, irradiates the image of an artist, with a dose of the bohemian, must, in order not to be seen as a rebel, prove her submission to the eternal status of femininity; children justify novels and novels, children, and here we are alluding directly to the observations of Barthes, in one of his *Mythologies* entitled "Children and Novels".

Having silenced the only concrete frame of reference, that of society, women's magazines have come to base themselves on what is "natural" and on those attributes considered intrinsic to women. Here we perceive the point of fusion between the traditional and the modern; the message which segregates its interests according to the definition of the audience, implicitly defined and accepted as a subordinate group, then renews its links with the components of tradition in order to promote a new archetype. The argument of woman's nature — the only common denominator in this system — becomes an argument of authority, enclosing the emancipation and liberation of women within the very limits of their gender: "Delicately feminine", "Romantically feminine", "To make you a real woman". "Every design, every outfit, every detail was created delicately, so that this season you will be more feminine, more a woman... and in style." Advertising never escapes this tautological circle in

which women's liberation is expressed. But the terms feminine-feminizing which are used to describe all the new concepts (and in particular those with subversive possibilities) are self-limiting. In a masochistic-euphorial tension, flirtatiousness, the desire to be found attractive, the woman-as-prey, are all given modern authority through women's magazines, and the relations of woman-world and woman-man which are implied therein are revalidated, confirmed and eternalized. "Bring them to their knees", "Feel deadly", "Steal the show", "Be an attention-getter", thanks to exhibitionist boots or imported perfumes, which, while reaching the height of a supposedly emancipating process, in reality keep reifying woman and assimilating her evolution into the movement of the competition and dynamism of fashion. The nucleus of the implicit theory of women's liberation projected by this model consists in rescuing her from the privacy of the home and launching her into an outside world where she can be individualized and liberated thanks to a competition based on the acquisition of goods and the fervent respect for fashion. Our remarks on this phenomenon would not be complete without recalling an image which is so profusely reiterated in the ads for masculine clothing and cosmetics, where the woman graphically assumes a position of a sophisticated slave, thrown at the feet of the man who conquers and dominates her. An attitude which materializes the old balance of roles, those of the master and the servant. *The traditional is confirmed and eternalized in the modern.*

It can be argued that this model of modernity also favors types of behavior which do not ordinarily fit into traditional patterns of conduct. Among them, *work*. Even if it does constitute a topic of greater complexity, its emancipating value is still impaired by the unrealistic treatment to which it is submitted. Work is stripped of its experience and is deconcretized. Not only work which allows a woman to leave the domestic scene, but work in general. It takes on an exalted look. It is the ingredient of a happy world, with no bodily or material resistance. Physical and psychological hazards are overcome. Frustrations, conflicts, the all-powerful hierarchy vanish into air. "Why do you insist on showing the woman who comes home from the office as if she were someone coming home from a party?" It is a deformation, a compensation. But as the question indicates, not all the readers allow themselves to be taken in by the iconography. By not taking into account the concrete conditions of life and capacity for work, women's magazines resign themselves to illustrating the notion of work as if it were a miraculous therapy, when, in reality, work is often the foremost instrument of alienation and accentuation of points of conflict. The airplane mechanic poses, smiling, impeccable, next to the model who sports the same helmet as he does. By resorting to signs of the work sphere (commonly connoted by participation in advanced technology — or, which would be almost the opposite, as we shall see later on, by its fusion with nature), the fashion show is allowed a superficial, fictitious contact with the concrete world

and the reality of everyday life which, through a movement of interaction, also becomes a show, the decor of leisure. Or else, they try to plant fashion in a "popular setting": we increasingly see photographs of fashion collections in the most primitive villages, those farthest away from technical civilization.

And Yet, Two Parallel Orders

A confrontation between two examples of women's publications, women's magazines on the one hand, and "romance" magazines on the other, could illustrate the fact that modernity is morphology, restoring a permanent, identical content and a norm whose aim is to promote conformism. Between "romance" and "women's" magazines, the first and foremost distinction is in the area of visual perception. It exists on the level of morphology. And relying on an earlier and quite precise study of "romance" publications² we can say that their contents are guided by the same principles and achieve their coherence in an identical semantic structure, significant of a purpose: that of maintaining a particular order. Or, if we reject the disassociation of form and content, and come face to face with the message as a specific technology whose content and form interact and mutually determine one another, we will say that both examples are functional to the system; that the rhetoric which unfolds in both of them is functional to the extent that both are based on escapism, the romance magazines in the "traditional" sense, the women's magazines in the "modern", and that they both absolve the existing structures.

An observation which is glaringly obvious. The mass communication apparatus, in this age of monopoly concentration, cannot contain products which contradict its laws of functioning.

Nevertheless, it is important to go beyond this purely visual differentiation between the two types of publications directed to women. On closer examination, the themes which they embrace, the orders which they encode, actually translate the different ideological zones in which they operate: the order of the heart, on the one hand, and the order of consumption on the other, each one accompanied by particular modalities of promoting a certain kind of behavior in their readers.

Both products of modern capitalism, "women's"

2. Michèle Mattelart: "El nivel mítico de la prensa pseudoamorosa," *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional*, 3, 1970; Santiago de Chile. (Also published in: Michèle Mattelart, *La cultura de la opresión femenina*, Editorial Era, Mexico, 1977.) (Translator's note: The author is making a distinction between the "romance magazine," in Spanish *fotonovelas* (photo-novels), a common genre in Europe and Latin America, which are generally composed of sentimental stories, illustrated by photographs: a kind of "soap opera" in print, and "women's magazines" (*revistas femeninas ilustradas*) which combine fashion, stories, recipes and news items.)

3. [The preceding three paragraphs in the text were added by the author in 1978, as was the following note:] The reader who may wish to follow the development of our analysis may refer to two more recent articles, in which these ideas are developed more deeply. The first, written

(fashion, etc.) magazines and "romance" magazines (*fotonovelas*) pertain nonetheless to particular moments and different mechanisms of bourgeois domination. They are complementary. Of course, the "romance" magazines have a greater tendency to develop under the obscurantism promoted by fascism and other present-day authoritarian regimes, in which their circulation surpasses that of the "modern" magazines. Yet they are also quite present within the normal framework of liberal democracy. The "women's" magazines, on the other hand, correspond to the "enlightened" dimension of the ruling class. The two genres express the different alliances which the bourgeoisie seeks to establish with women of the various layers of society. And the variations which can be found, according to the historical moment, in the predominance of one genre over the other, are inseparably related to the type of consensus which the bourgeois State can induce (and the model of development which it patronizes).³

The layout of women's magazines is defined by the demands and criteria of modernity, which can be characterized in terms of slickness, ingeniousness, variety, avant-garde photography and, in a word: luxury. The relative scarcity of these signs of modernity in the romance magazines, which are guided more by triviality and banality, is just another indication of the segregation which prevails in "mass" communications media, and particularly within those intended for specific audiences. These media manifest, quite simply, this illusive character of universalization which is supposed to be brought to life by modernity, and for which the mass communications media constitute one of the decisive exponents. In reality, the media are impregnated with an idea of culture, a structure of taste which reflects a discriminatory pattern: luxury, refinement, vanguardist design, for some; persistence of obsolete forms, gloomy iconography, poor quality design for others. The illusively *universalizing* modernity of taste and culture, despite its rhetoric of standardization, nevertheless must ultimately respect the scales imposed by empirical reality, the reality of class society, even if it is only to continue the task which falls to it in the division of labor under monopolistic conditions: a less "modern", less sophisticated form means a lower price, and consequently, an extension into a broader social clientele.⁴

shortly after the Chilean *coup d'Etat*, shows the changes which occurred in bourgeois women's publications in the service of counter-revolution. Cf. Michèle Mattelart, "Chile: the feminine version of the *coup d'Etat*" in *Sex and Class in Latin America*, edited by June Nash and Helen Icksen Safa, New York, Praeger Publishers, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976. Also published in *NACLA's Latin American Report*, IX, 6, Sept. 1975, under the title: "Chile, the feminine version of the *coup d'Etat*, or When bourgeois women take to the streets" (with a good introduction by *NACLA*). In a second article we deepened our analysis of the relation between women's mass media and the conjunctures of crisis and shortages. Cf. Michèle Mattelart "Les femmes et l'ordre de la crise" in *Tel Quel* (Seuil, Paris), Special issue on "Recherches féminines," 74, Winter 1977.

4. We find the same phenomenon in "erotic" mag-

The incursion of modernity in the morphology of (local) mass media conforms, therefore, with the decision not to attack the dichotomy or the disparity between the products of the cultural industry. Another illustration of the fact that when the myth is tracked down, we discover that empirical reality obliges it to take off its mask.

The New Repression

In women's magazines, this constant renewal of the formal aspects, this search for variety is related to consumption, based on the principle of the obsolescence of forms and the "dynamism" of newness. This cult of the ephemeral reveals the essence of modernity, but as a class strategy: This periodic system of renewal, which in most cases is no more than a simple readjustment of units which themselves remain unchanged, is rich in mythical significance. Like fashion, it becomes a social practice; like fashion it reveals the coercive nature of modernity: what's being worn, what you must wear, what you must no longer wear. In women's magazines, daily life is organized in a repressive way, by the persuasive ideology of consumption, by advertising, which is simply the rhetoric of modernity. Indeed, all the objects which fill the consuming universe of these magazines reveal the coexistence of two levels or two functions: a practical level, an instrumental presence, and a symbolic level, whose implicit aim is to feign status or prestige. Although the use-function of the objects is accessory or artificial, their mythic function is real; they manifest "modernity"; they advertise their own ideology and thus close the circle. Women are imprisoned within the signs of modernity, just as they were imprisoned, not long ago, within the signs of the bourgeoisie: piano lessons and education in convent schools.

II. GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE MYTH

We have rapidly surveyed this process of dilution of change brought about by the ideology of modernity, basing ourselves principally on women's publications. We were able to emphasize that in reality there are a great many examples which illustrate the thesis that modernity simply reiterates the structural elements of the system while giving them a fresh look. Now our interest is to refine the definition of the concept of modernity diffused by

azines. A quick survey of the non-linguistic material (picture, photos) of various magazines of this type reveals that the presence of eroticism follows differential lines and adheres to a dichotomy of taste and culture which we have just pointed out. At this level, nonetheless, we must avoid introducing the notions of good and bad taste, which would entail the risk of assimilating the "pornography" of the most popular magazines into the second category. Actually, it would be highly arbitrary to give a positive evaluation to the eroticism of a magazine like *Playboy*, with its high-society cover-girls, and models, and condemn the magazines and supplements of the popular press, relegating the local striptease artists, amateur or professional, to the bottom of this scale. It is obvious however, that the discrepancy between these levels is directly linked to a supposed or symbolic

the consumer society, which advertises objects and types of behavior, and shapes a style and a culture.

Modernity can be found in various compartmentalized and individualized areas, as we suggested in the previous section: urbanism, architecture, interior decoration, commercial art, writing, economic development and planification, etc., areas which all operate around an implicit model of organization of social relations. Each of these specific fields is significant of a virtual participation of the different social groups in cultural production, and thus in a general way in the determination of historical progress. Anticipating a more exhaustive analysis of the concept of modernity, we will define this *participation* as being restricted to the consumption of forms, devised and imposed by an emitter who influences the culture and the process of development of the dependent society. We shall locate this participation within the superstructure which creates "modern" aspirations directed towards a model of economic development subordinated to the dynamic demands of the economy of the metropolis, and creates a culture which will serve as a basis of implementation for this universalized model of society. We will try to detect the major lines of this strategy which imports symbols which are in tune with this project of development. *Beyond the objective qualities of modernity*, we will try to detach it from its innocent facade, its banal justification, its way of inserting itself in the order of things, where it corresponds to a supposedly "natural" notion of progress.

A Fictitious Eternity

Modernity crystallizes such apparently unrelated qualities as healthiness, beauty, rationality, freedom, confidence, originality, the avant-garde and the *unsurpassable*, which *nonetheless is constantly being surpassed*. These qualities achieve coherence through their integration into the notions of progress and victory over the unhealthy and the primitive, ideas which are proposed as the luminous, indisputable goal of a certain process of speculation on the future of humankind, the end of all alternatives.

Now, nothing is more unstable than an integral definition of "the modern", nothing more difficult to establish than an inventory of its components.

Whereas modernity should logically be *stabilized*,⁵ after resolving, perfecting and incor-

break in the cultural spheres and is designed to respect the order of segregation. The *Playboy*-style magazines represents the height of sophistication and refinement of the metropolitan modern sphere, while the others evade foreign mediation and satisfy popular creole taste in the matter, leaving the photos of blond foreign nudity for the "Sunday" consumption of proletarians.

5. Thanks to the globalizing aspect of the concept, modernity appears to be fragmentable. To be modern, to live in a modern world, choose modern furnishings, are all expressions which tend to assimilate existences and hide a decrease in possibilities and atmospheres behind a dazzling surface. For some people, modernity stopped being represented by a bathroom or plumbing system a long time ago, and took on other dimensions: air conditioning,

porating the characteristics which are supposed to compose it, and whereas the notion of modernity vindicates permanence, its concrete exponents have, rather than stability, an accelerated rhythm of *death*. They are constantly being replaced by newer ones and relegated to the past tense. *Obsolescence* always goes along with modernity, and the tension between them reveals their essential equivalence with the false dynamism of a commercial circuit and the deceptive movement of a closed world. Every day or every season something new appears to replace its predecessor, when it isn't the same object (presented in a more attractive wrapper, for instance) which, being moderately metamorphosed, supplants for a while its former appearance, now an object of derision. Remember: "An article which will keep you informed on today's makeup and make you laugh about what they said yesterday". It is thus easy to show that this false eternity of modernity corresponds in the most narrow way possible to the primordial need for consumption; its newness is that of the showcase, the coercive phosphorescence of the *dernier cri* which hides, beneath sensationalism, the code and the plan of a class.

It is this same spectacularity which allows what is really no more than *repetitive banality* to become a source of constant information. The system reproduces itself exactly, but all the while removing its anecdotal signs. On this level, the system appears as a sequence which is always open. The symbols which pay tribute to the same order are repeated, but each time their surface is brought up to date.

Rejuvenation of appearances. The permanent essence remains intact. The notion of change allowed by modernity is graphically expressed in clothing, the packaging which undergoes constant modifications in order to unleash and satisfy new libidinal and aesthetic needs and incorporate new techniques and materials. Appearance becomes a guiding principle to the extent to which it sets the very limits of change and the presentation of information about the world. In this order of ideas, a question might be suggestive and enlightening: What is a modern factory? Automatically a series of images come to mind, in an apparently disorderly parade: assembly lines with an accelerated work rhythm — an indication of successful output — guaranteed health conditions, a cheerful and airy canteen, colorful overalls, executive offices resembling the hotels and airports which are part of the soaring international progress. No one would think to wonder about the relations between the boss, or better, the technostructure, and the workers which prevail in the factory. The modern factory can conceal a system of production and social relations which are a part of an intangible and atemporal order. But this will not cause modernity to lose its

heated pools. Nonetheless, the real inequalities of reality assure that, for the majority, attainable modernity remains within a very modest dream and can be summed up by a minimal improvement in the conditions of daily life and work.

6. Jean Baudrillard, "La morale des objets" in *Communications* (Paris), 13.

value, if the objection should be raised, since modernity develops essentially outside of the concrete sphere of social relations.

Democracy of Desires

Modernity has its own particular way of entering the world of the individual. It is presented as a cheerful, colorful, healthy formula for life, which transcends routine and in which conflicts are resolved the way acne is cured. The objects, clothing, fetishes, artefacts, in which our desires converge are constantly being renewed in this rhetorical order which values the new for the mere fact of being new. And since on a technical level the new is implicitly a symbol of progress, the incitement is continually legitimized and regenerated.

Supported by the whole news and advertising apparatus, modernity intimately penetrates everyday life, mobilizes the perceptive possibilities of the individual and appeals to the accessibility of all his or her senses through visual, audible and sensual references. The images projected by women's magazines, posters, TV programs, shopwindows, neon lights and all the other advertising formulas — whose maximum efficiency is achieved through this convergence of stimuli — unleash the object's first mode of life, which is its existence, its mental, psychic or neurotic incorporation into the experience of the individual. On the level of desire, technology embraces all of everyday life; contact with modernity is democratic. The universe of mass information which fosters the imaginary state of things does not segregate its audience. But the phenomenon, at the moment of acquisition, assumes a private aspect. Formal democracy thus comes up against the hardest reality: that of purchasing power and frustration.

Nonetheless, one cannot equate the relative openness of modernity with the variation of the phenomenon found in dependent societies. In the central countries, modernity has become a kind of watchword of standardized consumption, and the conformity of the clientele with the product allowed for this pseudo-universalizing type. It was possible to create a common denominator on the basis of the indicators of prestige of a certain majority, a phenomenon which led Baudrillard⁶ to state that "the international of prestige" has replaced the political international in the countries of the European Common Market. This uniformity has been carried over to the streets, where it effectuates an integration, superficial or not, of the masses. The noticeable or ostentatious differences between the layers of society are erased in the countries of the metropolis. In the street, the margin between the publicized reality of modernity and the reality of the consumer is allowed to persist, but it is accompanied by the possibility (unified and destined to be rewarded on a large scale) of participating in the same signs. In fact, in every area in which it operates, modernity effects an artificial homogenization of the basis of the appearance and image which the individuals themselves project. It acts as the superficial

eraser of the differences of status which clothing, for instance, would denote if this totalitarian emitter of models did not exist.

In any case, in dependent society style appears, in the first analysis, as the privilege of an elite which, having used exclusively certain forms and peculiarities, extends (with a more commercial than paternalistic interest) their use to a larger public. Meanwhile, it regenerates its power of exclusivity through models more representative of the *dernier cri*. It is important to take note of these transfers of significance: the same style which originally conferred aristocracy, after a period of diffusion, confers democracy. At its peak, modernity is limited to the search for the distinctive signs of an elite and is sanctioned for its values of prohibitive consumption. In this sense, local modernity does not faithfully reproduce the reality of the hegemonic countries, where the splendid objects sold in the Place Vendome or Fifth Avenue greatly surpass the semantic field of modernity, since they cannot be contained within a parameter of standardization. In the creole capitals, there is no room for the Place Vendome, the Faubourg St. Honoré or Fifth Avenue. Once an article has been established in a common pattern of consumption in the central economies, it is exported to dependent societies, where it becomes elitist. This disbalance demonstrates the fact that when a product is imported, it is used in much more limited circles than those for whom it was originally intended. Nevertheless, through the particular procedures of acclimation of a style, this phenomenon is to a certain extent counteracted. Actually, domestic economy contributes to the process of standardization. The small workshops and part-time seamstresses who make up maxi-skirts, for example, and copy the basic lines of a fashion design, albeit imperfectly, take possession of an area which in the central economy appertains to an industrialized sector of economic activity.

After a period of marked elitism, the democratization of the signs of style causes them to lose their power of attraction for the hegemonic group. Moreover, such a standardization would tend to give a dying image of the dominant class, implying its loss of the dynamics of newness. This class is thus obliged to perpetually feed the process of renovation in order to respond, in a dialectical movement, first to the commercial demands, which make them promote the democratic phase of style, and second, to the symbolic demands, which require a constant replenishment of their reserve of exclusive goods and models. It is this dialectical movement which established democratization as the strategy of a class and as the expression of its false consciousness, since, in vulgarizing "its" style, it hurries to leave the scene in search of another bit of tinsel which will revitalize its avant-garde privilege.

The Democracy of Themes

"In *Paula* this week:

- The loveliest Chilean weavings photographed in the countryside.
- How you yourself can lacquer your furniture

and paint your house! A complete chart of modern colors which can give new life to any surroundings.

- How you can transform an old room into a cozy, dual-atmosphere apartment.
- A dramatic report on the daily tragedy experienced by the wives of the unemployed.
- *Paula* was there: the fashion festival organized by the Christmas Committee.
- And an indispensable guide for any homemaker: the ABC of First Aid."

Another phenomenon of dilution of those elements which the system cannot contain, and their recuperation into the cohesion of the myth, is that which we shall "sycrétism". All the content, all the information, are present or at least represented in the publications, responding to the need to satisfy the widest variety of interests. We therefore find the frivolous side-by-side with the important, the mundane with the political, sentiments with cooking, children with gardening, and, in another order of ideas, the subversive with the reactionary. Nor does advertising shrink from this paradoxical contiguity, this appropriation of a linguistic register. This would be startling, were it not accompanied by an adulteration of the meaning and a draining of the power of orientation of certain words, which are genuinely alien to the ideological sphere of these magazines. As the slogan for *Eva* magazine says, "*Eva* has many reasons to be subversive."

The lay-out itself allows for this paradoxical contiguity. But the phenomenon of contiguity also permits a neutralization of the potentially aggressive contents and a dilution of the revolutionary potential of certain informative articles: the news of a new outburst of guerilla violence is recuperated by means of its juxtaposition with the announcement of the love affair of some prince. Moreover, the revolutionary content is itself neutralized by means of another phenomenon of dilution: the homogeneity of style. The rewriting of all the news leads to a particular style, characteristic of the genre, and which constitutes the supreme syncretism between the prosaic and the euphoric, through the use of various ruses, such as the use of a language dominated by a familiar, personalized tonality, an effusive and brilliantly cozy tone. As Adorno pointed out, the more "massification" increases, and the more the technical-bureaucratic nature of the production of mass culture develops, "the more this ideology speaks to men with the sweet voice of the wolf disguised as Grandma".

One of the areas in which women's magazines exhibit a predilection for this syncretism is in the interviews with more or less famous celebrities. Let us first make clear that in no way does this relative opening towards the outside world violate the universe of the magazines, since it always conforms to the magazine's code. An example of this is the fact that these articles systematically give preference to the expression of show business personalities: singers, actors, etc. Any violations of the established order which could be attributed to this would-be vanguard are minimized, since the dominant

ideology is careful to isolate these figures in a special category, that of the *enfant terrible*. Their productions (even when subversive) may be enjoyed as part of "culture", stripped of any relation with the political. It is significant, in addition, that the people chosen are only able to cross the threshold of women's magazines when they have already achieved recognition elsewhere, and when their appearance guarantees sensationalism.

The magazines appropriate their names and prestige, but never contribute to their discovery. Ironically, this universe, obsessed by novelty, only pays tribute to the new when it has already passed the inspection of the general audience, and when the message radiated by this newness is ready to be adopted as one of the cultural categories of the bourgeoisie.

Let's take the example of an interview, recently published in *Paula*, with a singer known for expressing values subversive of the social order, and devoid of political ambiguity. The interviews are generally conducted in this way, as can be seen in the interview with protest singer Victor Jara:⁷ "But today he is already a winner. His latest LP for the Discoteca del Canto Popular, DICAP, has had a fabulous success. Its title is "Canto Libre" [Song of Freedom], but it is no longer really protest music..." Olympian nature is thus the first credential. The second, always revealed as a surprise and a discovery during the course of the conversation, is the *Man*. In this particular example, a mixture of humanity and domesticity is highlighted. The expression of the life experience of the individual — mediated by the interview — infallibly revolves around the significant landmarks of women's magazines: "he talks to *Paula* about love and women, about his life and dreams, his work and ideals". If the person is harder to integrate and offers more resistance to the mechanisms of mimicry, the solution is to make use of this very resistance and emphasize the natural and irremediable distance between the world of the magazine and the Olympian rebel, seen as an incidental object of consumption. A preliminary reserve is established: between him and *us* there is a barrier. His universe is a whole (separate from ours), a popular whole, the origin which explains the sense of definition, the political motivation and the rebellious dimension of the repertoire. "A troubadour who sings to his people." The two worlds are defined as exact parallels. His *being of the people* explains his *singing for the people*, and defines and limits the personal logic of a life, the authenticity of Victor Jara, ruling out any possible explanation beyond that determined by the magazine as "natural". A certain amazement is evident on the part of the magazine, upon realizing that Another Order can be sung about and longed for by someone, different from themselves and yet having qualities on which they

7. In the days following the *coup d'Etat* of 11 September 1973, Victor Jara was arrested at the Universidad Técnica de Santiago and imprisoned in the National Stadium. As he sang to boost revolutionary morale, accompanying himself on the guitar, his hands were cut off by the military in front of his fellow prisoners, and he met his death soon after.

believed they had a monopoly. "This rough man, with his Indian features... conceals a tenderness which is hard to resist. After talking to him for a while, it is hard to believe that he is the author of those stinging songs. On the other hand, we understand those other songs, those full of poetry, a better reflection of the Victor Jara we met." In virtue of this supposed split between two sources or two alternatives of a personality, the recuperation of the rebellious entity is made possible, as well as his incorporation into more acceptable, assimilable categories. This fear of the *whole man* reveals the purely artificial nature of syncretism, and of the obvious fiasco when women's magazines try to surpass the fragmentation of their informational and referential universe.

This unification, merely wishful, exists only on the level of empty rhetoric, which doesn't know how to deal with the word "culture". Perhaps it suspects that the uneasiness which it experiences regarding the term is significant not only of a conceptual weakness, but also of its inability to establish a foundation, an order, and a coherence, in other words, to appropriate for itself a world view which is not its own. A magazine states: "In reality, those who become drug-addicts are very few. They are those who have less: intellectually, culturally, within the family, or the psychic, economic, physical or spiritual domains." Given such an avalanche of juxtapositions, what's left of the notion of culture?

In addition, it should be stressed that this syncretism does respect certain shadowy areas and taboo areas. However this in itself could be the topic of another article conceived within a different perspective. Although this note exempts us from a deeper commentary, we cannot pass up the opportunity to point out a very deep significant omission made by women's magazines. It is the way in which the presentation of "history" necessarily amputates those events called "political", with no fear of falling into the most arbitrary obscurantism. "During the ten years of *Vanidades* existence, incredible things have happened: man has gone to the moon, transplanted hearts, accomplished great changes in art, literature, cinema, fashion, youth. All of these have been gathered into this special anniversary issue." The magazine's way of cutting out events from the Large Outside, the exterior world, conforms exactly to the narrowness of the Small Order of the magazine, and responds to the demands of intimacy, spectacularity and sensationalism.

The dehistoricization of this world forces it to look towards naturalness for a perpetual reference of values. "The genuinely natural line." There is a need to be forgiven for the earlier refinement by putting the emphasis on naturalness, the guardian of simplicity and healthy morality. The more sophisticated and sumptuous the object, the greater the rhetorical reliance on naturalness and the return to nature. The new proves its worth by its approximation to the natural, and its goodness is asserted on the background of a fresh country scene in which romp the couple and the child, all luminous in the morning air: "Menth-O-Dent. They were right to call it new. The

purified and purifying product." Alongside pottery from Pomaire, Chile, and handwoven blankets is displayed a New Line of elegance, with its accent on naturalness, innocently hiding the clearly foreign connotation of the novel brand of shoes being advertised: Royle.

By a process of sublimation, a form of life corresponding to concrete naturalness is done away with. Corresponding to the signifier "rural" is a signified deformed by the urban angle of vision, the photography appropriates the forms of poverty and simplicity, but not their content. Ahead of us, as we already mentioned, lies the spectacle of an abstract, touristic and anecdotal countryside. It serves as a foundation in a style which salvages from the wilds the traditional materials and forms, woollens, rustic weaving and basketry, bridging the gap between rural and urban life with a yearning to make naturalness the guardian angel of the consumer civilization. And at the same time to emphasize and take advantage of the esthetic values which such products acquire within the atmosphere of wealth and development of the city.

For the starving man, it is not the human form of food that exists, but only its abstract being as food; it could just as well be there in its crudest form, and it would be impossible to say wherein this feeding-activity differs from that of *animals*. The care-burdened man in need has no sense for the finest play; the dealer in minerals sees only the mercantile values but not the beauty and the unique nature of the mineral: he has no mineralogical sense.⁸

Style and the Cosmos. The All-Powerful Object

"This is the world of your security: Right Guard."
"Enter the dynamic world of Nescafé."
"The year's world-wide success! Golobo. Panties. so wash-and-wear they'll take you round the globe!"

In the advertising jargon of fashion, there is invariably a reference to the "world", the product becoming the center of a universe which seems to expand until it has the dimensions of the globe and in this way emancipates all its consumers. Simultaneously, it creates a community around it. Behind an apparent openness which would seem to imply the acceptance of a certain anonymity, intimate tendencies surface. The product becomes the new way to fight against isolation and repel the unknown and the strange. Its particular order corresponds exactly to the order which regulates women's magazines and which they in turn promote and advertise: the world of the home, the world of women, the world of youth. The consumers clan triumphantly enters the new and spectacular Braniff ad: "The Clan says: Let's end the farce. Let's make a Crediclan and it's done, overnight! Now, we'll arrange for plane tickets, hotel rooms, trips and car rentals. Down with bureaucracy, roared the clan!"

8. *Marx and Engels on Literature and Art*, L. Baxandall, S. Morawski, eds. New York, International General, 1974, p. 52.

The Braniff Clan eliminated differences. Through objects and goods — they claim — is achieved the integration which liberates the individual and his power of decision, giving him at last the right to speak out and discover the world. His participation is stimulated.

(The world of the object? It is the realization of communist society. No need for change. Your happiness is right here. Our daily coffee or detergent will at last satisfy your desire to be yourself. They will fulfil your need to give your opinion, to be in command of your own experience. They will give you pleasure, freedom and fantasy, to you and to all those who can now share your good fortune.) The consumers rise to power.

Another key element in advertising jargon is the grouping of the products and therefore their beneficiaries, around the creative centers, the real promoters and exponents of the forms and attitudes of consumption: "Paris, New York, London, Lux soap preferred by all". "The fabrics with the same modern patterns which were the rage in Europe last season." The acquisition of these goods, invested with the magnificence radiated by the diffusing centers, actualizes, by means of the phrasing of its sales pitch, the mythical participation in the lifestyles and images of the upper regions of imperialism, which concede a little of their exclusivity and fortune with every new design. The advertising mirage takes in this reiterative attempt to overcome the complex of the peripheral countries, and this same incentive is repeated in creole areas, where the modernist model, through ritual acts of consumption, symbolically gratifies the desire for integration into the society which generated it.

In the intellectual domain, we find a strikingly identical phenomenon. Cultural references in advertising revolve around the "best sellers", regardless of the object's place in the hierarchy of cultural productions. The only criteria used are sales, prestige, controlled good taste, and the indispensable style. Before going on to examples, however, let us note that advertising only penetrates the category of culture in order to disguise the colonization to which it contributes, limited to the domestic sphere. Advertising seeks to situate the object within the noble chain of the power of the immaterial (relative immateriality, however, contaminated with immediacy by its consecration as an object of fashion): "My favorite books range from Norman Mailer to Marcuse and McLuhan. But don't get me wrong. I also love the incredible adventures of Fleming's James Bond... I am a woman of my time in every way, and that's why I also dress in modern, practical clothes... like my Dunova sweater set." The ellipsis is not ours. It constitutes the pause needed before closing this example of modern eclecticism.

We should now highlight the mechanism of inversion operating in this integrationist strategy, by virtue of which advertising has become an ideological form. A qualitative transfer is produced between the subject and the object. The inanimate world (things, objects) becomes animated, while in an exact parallel, the animate world loses its

animation. To a humanized object corresponds a reified being. And if this being manages to recover its quality, movement, dynamism and personality, it is through the mediation of the object. The valorizing connotation is found not in the being, but in the thing. The relationship between individuals is transformed through the introduction of the product, and through technical and commercial innovations: "Me... You... Airomint." Graphically, the pre-eminent value, the mouthwash, is inserted between the two faces of the couple and encourages the meeting, taking priority over the quality of love. Moreover, there can be seen a constant wavering between the semantic field of affectivity, on the one hand, and that of the object on the other. The mouthwash just mentioned "guarantees clean speech." "Airominted breath" contributes to the purity of the couple. In this movement of constant transposition, you no longer know who is who. Love and sensuality are crystallized in socks or lipsticks, promoted to the ranks of essential actors. The human-to-human relationship disappears, with the resurgence of the human-object couple, which seems to rest on the same libidinal-affective tendencies and tends to satisfy them in a much more effective and less painful way. The object is integrated in the individual sphere, evidently making use of the frustrations felt by the consuming entity in the domain of interpersonal and sexual relations. It proposes a compensation for the complexity and hardness of the confrontation with the world.

"Fabiola Pantyhose are adorably smooth. They tenderly hug your leg." Durability is transformed into fidelity, proximity to the skin into sensuality, silky fiber into caresses and affection. Fidelity, tenderness, smoothness, sensuality, an intimate comprehension of the desire for liberation: the object replaces the best lover and moves into the centre of the narcissistic relationship one has with oneself. Thus, through the world of the object, and in the democratized and standardized context of consumption, the mythology of the good and bad genies, fairies and gnomes is now recreated, and a magic universe is staked out beneath the efficient and rational surface of modernity. "In order to hear this message integrally, you have to give up the idea that we have entered rational societies (called industrial) from which magic and utopias vanished a long time ago and where only ideology lingers a while before disappearing."⁹

In response to our last observations, someone might object that advertising is an autonomous area and that the meanings which we have discovered and pointed out may not be valid outside of this limited sphere, which is functionally exacerbated and schematic. This objection fades in the light of a global examination of these publications which emit a perfect compactness. The mechanism of reduction of reality operates throughout the many areas, whose fragmentation confers a mosaic quality on women's magazines. The advertising language which makes the object the mediator of relationships both

between the individual and him/herself and the individual and others is only reflecting a constant of the language of modernity which evades an unsteady, deep and conflicting reality, to the benefit of the false harmony of the object.

Gradually, the power of the object proceeds, through a simplistic but subtly disguised escalation, towards an apotheosis. In this very perspective, a feature (non-commercial) article published in a Sunday magazine section is revealing: "Black Power" it says, "has come to feminine beauty. After the violence of the streets and the black liberationist literature, the cult of blackness has arrived at the lighter, frivolous world of cosmetics... Up until now, the world of cosmetics has always looked to the white woman for inspiration. This is what is changing." Black Power could not remain outside of the myth of universalization. The eternal feminine will allow for the recuperation of the most subversive elements. Angela Davis's rivals do not escape the natural condition of women, and class struggle, supported by demands for racial equality, is transformed into an innocent phenomenon of beauty contests. Helped by those myths which turn secondary and accessory values into essential ones, segregations are absorbed and conflicts disarmed. The object, cosmetics, universalizes, integrates and levels off all the contradictions.

III. CONCLUDING REMARKS

We have had several opportunities to witness the way in which the culture of modernity approaches the individual and creeps into his conscious and subconscious life. Among the preferred forms in the strategy of advertising action, we should take special note of the most obvious: The mythical incentive, newness, is given emphatic value through the graphic solution of capital letters: NEW LINE. This form, corresponding to the sudden triumphant rise of the tone of voice in the code of broadcasting, is indicative of the affirmative character assumed by modernity within consumer society's global cultural plan. This is the same holy terror—constituting a fundamental aspect of communication in our societies—to which Marcuse refers, speaking, after Barthes, of affirmative culture or closed discourse. Morin, on the other hand, in a humorous tone, takes part in tracking down the repressive forms which have their source in the communication phenomenon, interpreting advertising language as a "meta-national anthem."

As Morin clearly shows, modernity occupies the centre of the duality—inherent in the advertising message—between information and incitement, to the extent to which its "signifiers," or concrete supports, cover the global field of temptations, assuring proteiform combinations and benefiting from the power of ubiquity, while its "signified" is equipped with the notions of dynamism, change and irreversible progress. In other words, modernity is the formula of the opening of the consumer world towards the future, characterized by the rhetoric of fantasy, which hides the essential fact that the theme of newness just plays back the deceptive myths of

9. Edgar Morin, preface to Cadet and Cathelat, *La Publicité*, Paris, Payot.

bourgeois culture and assures the perpetuation of the process of dependency. Modernity allows the technocratic society to stimulate the alliance with liberating ideologies. Responding to a strategy of consumer massification, it tries to eliminate the sign of the act which it propitiates, by offering itself as a way of integration into the ideology of harmony, health and happiness. It tends to make one forget that the compulsion of consumption which unleashes deep selfish forces, in its search for a temporary pleasure in buying, makes the consumer a prisoner. Through modernity, the act of consumption disappears as a cultural act which contributes to developing an individualistic and repressive civilization.

As we have seen, woman is at the center of this strategy for action. Through her, all the emancipating postulates of modernity are shown, and through her, as we have emphasized, they are all absorbed. The institutional basis of her status and her participation in the production of goods remains unscathed. Marriage, the family, the controlled disbalance between the roles and the authorities, come forth as the elements of the order whose static nature must be recognized in order to establish the norms of the harmony—always precarious, but ceaselessly desired—within the very walls of the cage. Normality continues to be defined in relation to an untouched order and an intangible legality. Now, as we have noted, woman, limited and held down in this way, is the center of the everyday world. Through woman's temporality, a quality of life and reality is attained, a whole atmosphere is created, a dimension of culture which is engraved in daily gestures.

The liberation of Eros is inscribed, likewise, within the emancipating self-definition of modernity. The consumer culture is undoubtedly nourished by this source of desire, disturbance, prohibition and frustration which sex continues to signify. Yet a key question emerges: Eros unchained or Eros chained? Answer: Eros, unchained, chained. The structure of motivations of which consumption is a part confuses sex with the elements of social success and access to the sphere of money and material well-being. As a model of liberation it offers the images of the advertising cover girls, neuter and antiseptic. Sex has become an esthetic-playful motif, rendered banal and stripped of both the dazzling nature of Eros and its cursed and painful aspects. Modernity continues to envisage sexuality as a compensation, the counterpoint of work, the source of leisure which rewards a life organized in such a way that the reality principle contradicts the pleasure principle, a life centered on the acquisition of goods which standardize and isolate, turning the individual away from the search for pleasure and mobilizing his or her instinctive energy towards goals other than those of Eros, as a possibility for real communication and immersion in the community. Fashion, for instance, constitutes the alibi of sexuality, a provocative and insolent alibi, certainly, but never the expression of the liberation of Eros; styles are the index of an exceedingly demanding submission to the imperatives of the social code which

dissolves pleasure in a narcissistic satisfaction and mundane enjoyment, and sublimates it to the level of conformity with the conventions of a social milieu.

Did you ever see the poster by the Cuban artist Fremez, where he sets the faces of two women against one another? One is the profile of a vamp, who is painting her mouth with a red lipstick, a very, very bright red. A red which becomes blood on the face of the Vietnamese woman, next to her, on the left.

Dallas W. Smythe

THE POLITICAL CHARACTER OF SCIENCE (INCLUDING COMMUNICATION SCIENCE), OR SCIENCE IS NOT ECUMENICAL

(Canada, 1971)

The naive view of many social scientists (which is not shared by many distinguished "hard" scientists) runs like this: Science is pure; it exists in a rarefied vacuum (as far as real world pressures are concerned) and is value-free. Therefore science is above politics. Somewhat lower on the purity dimension are the research-and-development men and the engineers whose work consists in the search for practical applications of pure science. These are the people who design the SST's and the supertankers which pollute the air and the sea. Obviously the technologists must be affected by politics, it may be conceded, but the scientists are and should be apolitical.

In international affairs the same dichotomy is naively assumed. Science is or ought to be ecumenical. Developing countries should accept North American science as politically sterile or neutral and in either case as beneficial. Even the fruit of the technologists such as communications satellites, TV or video cassettes, is assumed to be politically neutral. Who has not heard "Satellites (or TV or Cassettes) are neither good or bad; it depends on what they are used for"? Or, as General David Sarnoff remarked less elegantly, do you blame the plumber for what goes through the pipes?

The purpose of this paper is to show why this naive view is unreal, substantially untrue and mischievous. In the process I will make some observations on communications theory.

What do we mean by "science"? No precise definition is possible and dictionaries will not help us find an answer to the question. Einstein told us why:

Science as something existing and complete is the most objective thing known to man. But science in the making, science as an end to be pursued, is as subjective and psychologically conditioned as any other branch of human endeavour — so much so, that the question "What is the purpose and meaning of science?" receives quite different answers at different times and from different sorts of people.¹

Science might be described as many things: (1) as an institution; (2) as a method; (3) as a cumulative tradition of knowledge; (4) as a major factor in the development of production; and (5) as one of the most powerful influences on beliefs and attitudes to

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the universe and to man.²

As with science, so with scientific method, no simple definition is possible. A comprehensive description would list a number of mental and manual operations which have been found to lead to the formulation, finding, testing, and using of the answers to the general questions which are worth asking at any state of human development. Like methods used in ordinary life, the method of science is to define the job, to study it, to try to do the job, and to analyze and synthesize the results of the trial. The process is known as observation, experiment, analysis (taking apart) and synthesis (putting together again). The rules of the game distinguish scientific method from that of the artist or the manual craftsman in the rigour with which the scientific method attempts to identify the scientist's assumptions and preconceptions, and to prevent the scientist's own sentiments and variables extrinsic to the stated research design from effecting the results of the experiment. The techniques of classification and of measurement are essential to the exercise. "Theories" in the process are the grouping and relations of results from the use of the method. The application of the results is an essential part of the method for from it come, in the useful case of failure new observations, experiments, analysis and synthesis, and in the equally useful case of success a payoff in terms of greater understanding for purposes of prediction. The whole process embodies strong elements of curiosity and skepticism: the acceptance of organizing hypotheses as merely convenient and provisional, and thus experimental, critical attitudes towards every dogmatic proposition or belief system.

To this point, my description of scientific method has been at the level of tactics: the operational mode of the scientist as individual in the short run. But there is the strategic level of the method which determines the sequence of choice of problems to be solved, whether the strategy be the result of the individual scientist's strategies or chance or planned by groups in one way or another. At the strategic level, scientific method is the policy of the institution of science. At this level where the interaction of a host of scientists spread far over time and space is involved, the policy must be that science is *cumulative* and self-renewing. The process is dynamic. It is not cumulative in the sense of additive, but in the sense of building on past results through criticizing and often destroying them and then replacing them with "better" results. Among scientists a popular theory is merely the current champion. The scientist is always deliberately trying to change accepted "truths". This is one of the reasons why science inevitably must be involved with political influence in a complex interplay of support, challenge, response and tension. Another aspect of the policy of institutional science which necessarily puts it into the political process is the absolute necessity, both at the tactical and strategic levels, for

1. A. Einstein, *The World As I See It*, London, 1935, quoted in J.D. Bernal, *Science in History*, London, Watts, 1957, p. 5.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 5-6.

science to look to the practical results of its work.

Science is not a matter of thought alone, but of thought continually refreshed by practice. That is why science cannot be studied separately from technique. In the history of science we shall repeatedly see new aspects of science arising out of practice and new developments in science giving rise to new branches of practice. The professions of the modern engineer are very largely directly due to scientific progress.³

What do I mean by the "political character" of science and technique? I mean that science and technique necessarily involve *choices* of problems to be studied and knowledge to be put into practice and that such choices arise out of and are conditioned by, as well as affecting in turn, the on-going social structure of power relationships. If one starts with Norbert Wiener's definition of information,⁴ it is obvious that scientific and technical "information" is especially potent information for it confers control over the processes of nature. Who gets control over such information reasonably expects his power position to be improved as a consequence. I do not mean by the political character of science and technique that scientists and engineers are typically dishonest in their conduct of the tactical processes of their research (e.g. by falsifying evidence, introducing bias intentionally, etc.) though doubtless this has happened. I do mean, however, that scientists have been and do tend to be drawn by the prospects of successful careers into politically popular areas of science where research funds are provided generously by government, industry, or foundations and I mean that within those areas of science scientists tend to shape (sometimes unconsciously) their research programs with an eye to the interest of the granting agency in the particular problems selected to study. Two large examples come to mind. The demands of the Manhattan Project during World War II and of the post-war nuclear weapons program influenced a whole generation of physicists and mathematicians in this way. And the consequences of the Russians' orbiting Sputnik were that a similar political bias was responsible for drawing scientists in all areas into the orbit of space technology. These are not isolated events, albeit conspicuous ones. If one reviews the grant programs of U.S. government agencies in the past 15 years one finds examples ranging widely into biology where the problems posed range from the ocean floors to the role of insects and birds in carrying biological and chemical weaponry. In the social sciences the counter-insurgency program of the Pentagon has sparked a wide variety of research grants ranging from anthro-

3. *Ibid.*, p. 17

4. Information is "a name for the content of what is exchanged with the outer world as we adjust to it and make our adjustment felt upon it." Norbert Wiener, *The Human Use of Human Beings*, N.Y., Doubleday, 1950, p. 17.

5. J.D. Bernal, *The Social Function of Science*, London, Routledge and Sons, 1939, p. 5-6.

6. Bernal, *Science in History*, p. 374.

7. Quoted by Bernal, *The Social Function of Science*, p. 6.

8. Utilitarianism (Bentham), free trade (Ricardo and J.S. Mill), Darwinism.

political to communications studies.

Are these events exceptional, limited to the recent past and to the United States? Of course not. In principle science and technology always exist in a political (i.e. human) context and are part of the power processes of mankind. The Platonic idealist notion that science was concerned with pure thought was, as Bernal says, self-contradictory.

If the contemplation of the universe for its own sake were the function of science as we know it now it would never have existed, for the most elementary reading of the history of science shows that both the drive which led to scientific discoveries and the means by which those discoveries were made were material needs and material instruments. The fact that this view could have been held so successfully for such a long time can only be explained by the neglect, by scientists and historians of science, of the whole range of man's technical activities though these have at least as much in common with science as the abstractions with which the great philosophers and mathematicians occupied themselves.⁵

It is unnecessary for me to document in detail the nature of the political mood or sense of urgency which led particular scientists to the choice of problems they posed and solved. For example, the period from the Renaissance to the 19th Century was one in which the white people of Western Europe spread their imperial systems to conquer and exploit the yellow, black and brown peoples of the earth. It was the period of overseas exploration and such exploration posed practical problems. The statistical tables of the astronomers and the pendulum and balance wheel clocks of the physicists meant the saving of ships and cargoes. The first subsidized scientific institution in England was the Royal Observatory at Greenwich. The interest in astronomical problems of Galileo, Copernicus and Newton therefore had valuable payoffs, in e.g. the method of finding the longitude. The technical problems of the textile industry required a chemical industry for its technical development; and the foundations of modern chemistry were laid in Western Europe in the 18th Century.⁶ In that period the unity of thought and practice was not in question. Francis Bacon said it frankly:

The roads to human power and to human knowledge lie close together and are nearly the same; nevertheless, on account of the pernicious and inveterate habit of dwelling on abstractions, it is safer to begin and raise the sciences from those foundations which have relation to practice and let the active part be as the seal which prints and determines the contemplative counterpart.⁷

The formal rationalization of science by the business system took place in England in the 19th Century. It was part of that mid-century system of liberalism which rested on the practical success of the possessive individualistic ethic in the political economics of a worldwide empire.⁸ It coincides with the formal institutionalization of science through the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1831 to serve as a focal point for scientists to communicate with the general public, as well as a number of professional societies together with their journals. In a large sense, the business community formally established science as its servant and thereby set in motion

the processes which increasingly made commodities out of scientists and their products. As Bernal says:

A scientific world appeared, consisting of professors, employees, in industrial laboratories and amateurs, but in contradistinction to the scientific world of the seventeenth century, it claimed as its function only the realm of fact and not the realm of action. The great controversies of the nineteenth century, such as that of evolution, were fought out in the field of ideas. Scientists claimed no part in the direction of State or industry. They were concerned with pure knowledge. It was a satisfactory arrangement to both parties. The industrialists made use of the work of the scientists, and generally paid them for it, though not much; the scientists had the satisfaction of knowing that they were living in an age of indefinite progress to which their labours, in a manner which it was unnecessary to examine, were contributing the largest share. At the time when science should have been most obviously connected with the development of the machine age, arose the idea of pure science: of the scientist's responsibility being limited to carrying out his own work and leaving the results to an ideal economic system, ideal because natural and open to the free play of economic forces.⁹

The view of the universe given by Newton, Copernicus, and Descartes has held us in the west in thrall for more than three centuries. It was a view of the universe and everything in it as a machine — a perpetual motion machine. As J. Robert Oppenheimer described it,

The giant machine was not only causal and determinate; it was objective in the sense that no human act or intervention qualified its behaviour.¹⁰

Because this seemed to be true — at least as the fruit of physical science had a spectacular payoff — it followed that man himself should be viewed as a perpetual motion machine. On this model the development of the science of man and his social affairs inevitably assumed the character which has been referred to as "scientism": a mechanical view of man, denial of the reality of man's freedom, his consciousness, his subjective ethics, aesthetics and his apparently disorderly politics. The inhuman quest for neutral objectivity in the study of mankind was a necessary corollary of the scientific approach to social affairs. And an analytic reductionism necessarily took place in the process of this positive science of man.

The drive toward neutral objectivity in a scientific approach to human affairs logically meant that its practitioners would avoid the untidy and subjective areas of controversy when they designed their study of men — which meant that they tried to be non-political. Inevitably, however, the so-what question arose and in the end all of their systems proved to have a political pay-off — that is the end-result was a political judgment. Not surprisingly, the political inference from their scientific studies was to propose that men should be manipulated in the service of a system which treated them mechanically.

9. Bernal, *Ibid.*, p. 28-29.

10. J. Robert Oppenheimer, *Science and the Common Understanding*, N.Y., Simon & Schuster, 1954, pp. 13-14, quoted in Floyd W. Matson, *The Broken Image*, N.Y., Doubleday and Co. 1966, p. 1.

11. Matson, *Ibid.*, p. 24

Commonly, the scientifically-oriented researchers cast their own class as rulers, although sometimes they avoided this kind of value role, offering the services of their kind to the rulers of the capitalist system, or even Nazi or Communist systems.

Time does not permit me to trace in detail the history of this positivist tradition (which began long before the Logical Positivists) in philosophy and the social sciences. Locke, Hobbes and Spinoza gave the most powerful, general impetus to it. Hobbes' theory of knowledge anticipated logical positivism in its rejection of metaphysics and its insistence on semantic precision. His psychology foreshadows the mechanistic shape of behaviourism. His political philosophy presented a rationalization of a mechanically-conceived society in which authoritarianism ensured the successful manipulation of the common man. Spinoza considered man's actions and desires "in exactly the same manner as though I were concerned with lines, planes and solids." He represented a host of others who followed him in arguing that science contained a means of attaining true freedom, through neutral objectivity and detachment. Freedom, then became the acceptance of mechanical necessity. His faith was in an enlightened administration by an aristocracy of talent drawn from the rising middle class.

In the 18th Century the physiocrats in France and Adam Smith and Joseph Townsend in England developed systems of economic thought in which atomic individualism was the basic assumption about human beings. In the 19th Century, the utilitarian systems of Bentham and James Mill in England refined the mechanics of hedonism and provided the ideological rationale for consumerism — the basis of Madison Avenue. Jevons, by isolating the study of markets from their real political context (as Smith and other classical political economists had not), identified economics with market phenomena. Meanwhile in France, Saint-Simon, and following him, the founder of modern sociology, August Comte, developed positivism in the shape of a vision of society as a manipulative mechanical, rationalized technocracy, with intellectuals (like themselves) at the helm. Darwinism was happily incorporated into similar scientific systems of method and theory by Herbert Spencer, the American William Graham Sumner, and the Austrian sociologist, Ludwig Gumplowicz. For Sumner political democracy was the "pet superstition of the age" and as Matson says of his views:

What men mistook for natural rights and moral values were only 'the rules of the game of social competition which are current now and here'. Political ideals were unscientific fantasies, devised to pacify the restless and avoid the tackling of practical problems. The desire for equality was a 'superstitious yearning'; there could be no place for sentiment in the conduct of human affairs; nothing but might had ever made right, nor ever would. All the cherished notions associated with the dignity of men were only passing fancies, the ephemera of the folkways; and Sumner looked forward with barely disguised impatience to their passing.¹¹

Gumplowicz reveals the political character of this scientific detachment plainly when after a statement similar to Sumner's he concludes that man's illusion

of freedom and equality was incompatible with the state. The only real choice open to men was between submission to "the state with its necessary servitude and inequality, and anarchy."

Psychology was dominated by the scientific approach before logical positivism appeared. The significance of the substitution of behaviourism for associationism in psychological theory was that in the former there was an explicit intention to condition people into accepting social relations based on technology as interpreted and administered by psychologists, whereas the associationism of Hume and Hartley referred the process to an abstract and immutable process of nature. John B. Watson, father of American behaviourism, put it this way:

The interest of the behaviourist is more than the interest of a spectator; he wants to control man's reactions as physical scientists want to control and manipulate other natural phenomena.¹²

For Watson, the purpose for which men were to be manipulated was to serve the business system which he joined as an advertising executive shortly after founding his school. Hull and the "S-R" school of psychologists similarly viewed man as a robot.¹³ B.F. Skinner's point of view differs from Hull's perhaps mainly in its greater emphasis on attachment to a particular method and a desire to make psychology an applied science in the service of the "survival" of the current social system.

When we turn to recent work in political science, sociology and communications theory, the same situation is found. "Social Engineering" is the cruder, public relations man's version of "behavioural science". Behavioural science is the cross-disciplinary unity of those who would reduce the social sciences to the means by which man in all his activities is treated on the level of a conditioned and manipulated animal. The servility of the role of the scientific sociologist is aptly revealed by the distinguished American sociologist George A. Lundberg:

If social scientists possessed an equally demonstrably relevant body of knowledge and technique of finding answers to questions [to what he says physical scientists have] that knowledge would be equally above the reach of political upheaval. The services of real social scientists would be as indispensable to Fascists as to Communists and Democrats, just as are the services of physicists and physicians.¹⁴

Harold Lasswell's prodigious production of books over the past 40 years make him one of the chief architects of "behavioural science". And in him there are the familiar characteristics: a solid foundation of logical positivism with its pretensions to neut-

12. John B. Watson *Behaviourism*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958, original edition in 1924, p. 11. Quoted in Matson, *sup. cit.*, p. 40.

13. Clark L. Hull, *Principles of Behaviour: An Introduction to Behaviour Theory*, N.Y., Appleton Century, 1943, p. 27.

14. George A. Lundberg, *Can Science Save Us?* N.Y., Longmans Green, 1947, pp. 47-48.

15. See Matson, *ibid.*, pp. 86-89 for a useful analysis of Lasswell.

16. Hert, Feigl, "Logical Positivism" in D.D. Runes, *Twentieth Century Philosophy*, p. 382. Quoted in Archie J. Bahm, *Philosophy: An Introduction*, p. 111.

ral objectivity and its analytic reductionism. With Lasswell, however, the political values which are eschewed by intent appear in fact in his self-professed role as servant of "the democratic society". With his brilliant skills and protean political activity he has appeared to some as the potential Goebbels of America.¹⁵

Supporting and extending the manipulative and anti-human tendencies which flowed from the Newtonian perpetual-motion model of the universe has been the specific philosophical doctrine of logical positivism. Founded by Mach in the cynical environment of Vienna in the decadent late 19th Century Austro-Hungarian empire, positivism held that science was simply the most convenient mode of arranging sense impressions and that any discussion of the real material world was useless and meaningless metaphysics. Mach's positivism was pushed a step further by Wittgenstein, writing in Vienna (in the deeper cynical setting of the 1920's), followed by (among others) A.J. Ayers, Ogden and Richards in England and by Carnap and Korzybaski in the United States. These men focussed Mach's positivism on the symbol systems by which man embodies sense impressions. For them meaningful statements must be either (a) those which are tautological or (b) those which can be tested by possible sense experience. Science became value-free with a vengeance. A rule of observational testing was prescribed. "Concepts and assertions are meaningless if no operations can be specified that define the former and test the latter."¹⁶ This limited science to what could be counted in a laboratory. And as positivists are wont to say, after Wittgenstein, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." This effectively denies the possibility of social science (other than as behaviourist), most of aesthetics, ethics, and history. As some reluctant anonymous graduate student put it, "Ours not to reason why, ours but to quantify."

I give this much attention to logical positivism because of its pervasive effects in the social sciences and communications in particular. I refer to its influence on psycholinguistics and experimental-social psychology. If time permitted we might explore the way it has affected the arts through the Madison-Avenue manipulator and mystifier, Marshall McLuhan, for whom also technique, not content, is what is important, and for whom man becomes nothing but a combination of sensory activities to respond passively to whatever our social system provides him.

Communications theory and research unfortunately falls mostly into the behaviouristic, positivistic category which I have traced to the Newtonian mechanical view of the world. Bernard Berelson in speaking approvingly of a quarter-century of work in public opinion said,

... the field has become technical and quantitative, a-theoretical, segmentalized, and particularized, specialized and institutionalized, 'modernized', and 'group-ized' — in short, as a characteristic behavioural science, Americanized. Twenty-five years ago and earlier, prominent writers, as part of their general concern with the nature and functioning of society, learnedly studied public opinion not 'for itself' but in broad historical,

theoretical, and philosophical terms and wrote treatises. Today, teams of technicians do research projects on specific subjects and report findings. Twenty years ago the study of public opinion was part of scholarship. Today it is part of science.¹⁷

James B. Conant said of a similar formulation regarding sociology by George A. Lundberg:

[It] is a typical description of what is often called scientific behaviour, but I venture to suggest it is not a description of the characteristic way the natural sciences have advanced; it is rather an account of the use of very limited working hypotheses not dissimilar to those employed in everyday life.¹⁸

Surely western communications research and theory (when admitted at all) is now at the level of administrative work dependent on the establishment, to the extent that Berelson's evaluation be correct.

The behaviourist and positivist when he faces the areas of political life has, as Matson says, three choices, each of which is allegedly value-free and a-political:

First, he may choose to concentrate upon those mechanical and peripheral details of the political process which can be readily manipulated by the quantitative method of sampling, scaling, testing and content-analyzing—such matters as electoral statistics and mass media research ('who says what to whom through which channel'). Second, the behaviourist may take up his measuring rods and push on into the central areas of politics, ignoring their ambiguity and trivializing their content; in the words of Hans Morgenthau, he 'can try to quantify phenomena which in their aspects relevant to political science are not susceptible to quantification, and by doing so obscure and distort what political science ought to know.' Finally, the behavioural scientist may abandon political realities altogether and retire to the heights of pure Method — with the vague intention of some day returning to the world when the master formulas have been computed and the tests for statistical significance are in.¹⁹

I say "allegedly value-free and a-political" because any commitment of resources, whether material or personal, in the context of the real world obviously has a dialectical political consequence: either in some fashion to support or change the ongoing social system, or to clarify and obfuscate political issues or both. As Mark Twain somewhere said, Who are you neutral against? In general it may be said that behaviourism and logical positivism have provided a 20th Century rationale for conservative, conformist and escapist activity. By asserting the individual is an isolated atom they made it socially respectable for intellectuals to find busy-work to justify their own ineffectiveness in the real world, — and to make comfortable careers for themselves by the ready rewards for "counting" more and more about less and less. By asserting the individual is an isolated atom they provided a model for the academic world which coincided ideologically with the model of free-enterprise capitalism with its atomistic producers and

17. Bernard Berelson, "The Study of Public Opinion" in Leonard D. White, (ed) *The State of the Social Sciences*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956, pp. 304-305.

18. John B. Conant, *Modern Science and Modern Man*, New York, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1952, p. 119.

19. Matson, *ibid.*, p. 70.

consumers. In fact the resemblance between a building full of university professors of psychology all in their cubbyholes busy with their behaviouristic experiments on rats and that of a modern department store with its departments all let out to concessionaires is close: both are markets in which free enterprise tries to establish its limited market monopolies of information.

All of this should demonstrate sufficiently that science must be political. It arises out of the activities of mankind whose life has a political context. It is the kind of information which has the greatest "multiplier" effects in terms of practical consequences and therefore lies ultimately with political power processes. I have shown that even when scientific types set out to be non-political they invariably end up being political in the outcomes they envisage for their work. Let me now briefly anticipate the counterattack from such quarters. It may be claimed that I am anti-science, that I oppose the use of mathematical and statistical tools, that I am just one of the "feely" types who verges inevitably into navel-watching, or, more moderately, simply that I want to throw out the valuable uses of quantification along with the undesirable trappings which it sometimes has. In short, that I would throw out the baby with the bath. Nothing could be further from my viewpoint. I welcome mathematical and statistical tools and qualification in the social sciences and a major part of my professional life has involved their use and continues to do so. My objection is to their employment to attack questions which are not stated correctly, i.e. as science with a capital S states its researchable questions. My objection is to their predominant use in administrative research where the social context of the research is uncritically accepted by the researcher as given, where values are excluded in the assumptive context of the research. I consider quantification is essential to social science, but that social science as such (leaving aside administrative research for Madison Avenue, governments, etc.) must be framed with the explicit recognition of its human, i.e. its political context.

The burden of my remarks about western social science has been very pessimistic. The situation I have portrayed, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, is disastrous, but remediable. While the main stream of western social science has been a parody of the spirit and practice of Science (with a capital S), there has been a saving remnant of critical theory in the west. Increasingly there is evidence that valuable uses of Marxist theory are coming to be appreciated in the western social sciences. C. Wright Mills, Veblen, Morgenthau, and many others have avoided the mechanical perpetual motion machine trap.

What can one say of communications theory in this context? At present it consists of bits of little theory resembling remnants of a jigsaw puzzle two weeks after the holiday gift season when most of the pieces have been swept out with the trash. Some day I predict, communications theory will take a grand definitive form. It will be a large theory which comprehends the historical scope of man as a message-system using animal. It will explicitly recognise the context in which message systems originate, exist

and are transformed into qualitatively different systems. This context will involve the functions of institutions of all kinds (from the family and tribe to world organisations) which use such message systems. To get significant communication theory the problem must be formulated correctly. A correct formulation must be historical in the sense of incorporating a theory of history. A correct formulation must at the threshold recognise that the scientific study of message systems is not the private preserve of psychologists or psycholinguists, or anthropologists and certainly not of journalists. Rather it is a matter central to the natural scientist, the specialist in the humanities, the specialist in the fine arts, the philosopher, and the mathematician as well as to the social scientist (among whom I class the historian) And finally, a correct formulation of the problem will be set in a critical framework in which the nature of theory itself is also subject to continual critical scrutiny. We are a very long way from now having even a first approximation to a first draft of an adequate theory of communication. But the first step is to address ourselves to the problem. As the Chinese say, in order to walk 5,000 miles, it is necessary to walk the first mile.

Sidney Finkelstein

McLUHAN'S TOTALITARIANISM AND HUMAN RESILIENCE (USA, 1968)

McLuhan's description of the world rapidly approaching through the new electronic media and technology comes as balm to the heart of those lacerated by the troubles of our day. One world of humanity is at hand, whether we like it or not, he says. Are people worried, or indignant, over tensions in Africa and the Middle East, or by the barbarous spectacle of the most wealthy and industrially advanced country in the world employing all its technology to massacre the people of Vietnam? This, he says, is merely a rough form of bringing equilibrium among cultures. War was always "the speedy dumping of industrial products on an enemy market to the point of saturation. War, in fact, can be seen as a process of achieving equilibrium among unequal technologies" (p. 299)*. Are white people worried about the ghetto uprisings or the clamor of Negro people against their condemnation to joblessness, slums and discrimination? Take heart, McLuhan says, brotherhood is being forced on us by electric technology. The world is becoming a village, with the kinship that characterised the primitive tribal village. "As electrically contracted, the globe is no more than a village ... It is this implosive factor that alters the position of the Negro, the teen-ager, and some other groups ... They are now *involved* in our lives, as we in theirs, thanks to the electric media" (p. 20).

McLuhan warns against "the folly of alarm about unemployment" (p. 304). Let automation throw more people out of work. It points to a future when nobody will have to work, and everybody will be rich, like coupon-clippers. A Land of Cockaigne is at hand, when the biggest problem of people will be that of finding something to do, or something to spend their money on. "The problem of discovering occupations or employment may prove as difficult as wealth is easy" (p. 65).

Although this may sound to the naive like socialism, McLuhan's vision far transcends so stodgy a thought. He writes pityingly about Marx, who, he says, was obsessed by such matters as how people produced and distributed the necessities of life.

* All citations and quotations from McLuhan are taken from his *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*, 2nd ed., New York, New American Library, 1966, unless otherwise noted.

This text was first published as the concluding chapter of the author's *Sense and Nonsense of McLuhan*, New York, International Publishers, 1968. Copyright International Publishers 1968. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

Marx, to McLuhan, was utterly unaware that not people but media were the real propelling forces in history. Media even make people unnecessary. No socialist ever thought of a world where nobody would have to work. The sorry best that Marx and Engels could offer was: "From each according to his abilities; to each according to his needs." Yet there are strange connections between Marx and McLuhan, which make it necessary to present a quick sketch of Marx's thought for the full comprehension of McLuhan. Much of McLuhan seems like Marx seen through a distorting mirror.

Both Marx and McLuhan find qualities in early tribal society that were lost in the subsequent social changes, and will reappear in a new form in future society. An important element to Marx was that the means of production, like the hunting grounds, the land that was tilled, the waters that were fished, were held in common. The impelling force for change was the rise of private property, coming about through the development of tools, techniques, means for mastering nature and expanding production and the growth of trade. Slowly and in various forms, property accumulation and exchange turned into the private ownership of the means of production, accompanied by the exploitation of human beings, as with slavery. Around the organization of labor to serve the rulers, state structures rose, with the surplus product making possible the support of armies, priesthood, a hierarchy of officialdom, servants and workshops of craftsmen, all for the aggrandizement of the rulers, who became a ruling class. Great leaps in production took place, along with skills, arts, knowledge and technologies.

But because this progress occurs in a society divided into antagonistic classes, one profiting from the exploitation of another, leaps are inevitably followed by disaster, organization by chaos. The ruling class abhors changes in the social structure. Yet its need to retain its position, its drive for wealth, its intensification of production and exploitation, and the accompanying rise of new technologies, are a process of change which arrive at the point of threatening the social structure. There are external rivalries to seize its wealth, and wars both of defense and to gain more sources of labor. There are internal rivalries for power, with divisions and struggles among the rulers. As the burdens laid upon the workers become heavier, there are revolts. The ruling class can no longer control the forces it itself has set in motion. Production with its technological change reaches a point where its continued fruitful operation demands changes in the production relations, or the social structure. And since the ruling class cannot so transform itself, the economic machinery is clogged and crises arise, resulting eventually in revolutionary upheavals.

A new ruling class, coming to power after such an upheaval, is better able than the old to put the new developed productive forces to work. But since this class also exists by exploitation, it is eventually faced by crises and disasters. So, in the ancient epoch of slavery, or exploitation through the ownership of human beings, great empires rose, one destroying another, until finally slavery itself was more or less

replaced by serfdom, or various other forms of exploitation and feudal servitude of a peasantry on the land. And as the feudal system and an exploitative landed aristocracy rose to a peak of power in Europe, its very wars, rivalries, and need for products on which to expend its wealth, engendered the rise of city industries and a middle or bourgeois class which eventually drove the landed aristocracy out of power. This middle class, becoming the modern capitalist class, could carry on vast leaps in production, with factory and machinery. And it too was exploitative, the servitude taking place under the guise of "free bargaining". In this bargaining the worker is really not free, since the means of production are privately owned or commanded, and it is to the owners or commanders that the worker must offer his labor power, in order to get the necessities of life. And capitalism is likewise faced by a series of crises, until its relatively small, or "free enterprise" character is changed to the domination of great monopolies and trusts. This twentieth-century capitalism of monopolies and trusts again moves through economic crises and disastrous wars.

To Marxists, through these leaps, disasters and changes that have made up the history of exploitative society, there has been a continuity of human progress. For if in early tribal or primitive society there was communal ownership of the means of production, human life was but one step above that of the animal kingdom, enslaved by nature, and anything but "free". In the zig-zags of subsequent social history there were irrepressible developments of means for mastering nature, of real knowledge of the external world, and with these, increasing human sensitivities and powers. There were successive stages in the knowledge of the makeup and nature of society itself, and in the ability of human beings collectively to control the forces they themselves set into motion. With the rising expansiveness and complexity of social life, and accumulated knowledge, there were flowerings of human mentality, individuality and personality. Through the social upheavals, each such development, whether or not carried on around the needs of a particular ruling class, became the possession of a wider body of people. Thus history, for all its checkered character, is also one of successive stages of human freedom, or the growth of the human being and the ability to make the world outside of him his own.

Capitalism, to Marxism, is the last possible epoch of human exploitation. For in its monopoly stage it has organized production on a vast scale, both within the country in its manufacturing and distributive process, and over the world, in its investments, markets, and hunt for labor and raw materials. This "socialization" of production is accompanied by an intensification of the opposite of socialization; the individual, anarchic ownership and command of the means of production, with the competitive drive for profits and the constant need to expand its investments. These two "opposites" come into conflict. Monopoly capitalism cannot use its new and enormous technologies for general welfare, but only for private profit and war. It is racked by internal conflicts, the absorption of the weaker by the

stronger, and also by revolt of the very peoples whose lives it has disrupted by forcing them into the grip of its operations. As disaster looms, as potentialities for material progress turn into new and greater threats of widespread human destruction, the working people, for their own protection, must move to take over the means of production in the name of society itself. An end will come to the self-alienation of the war of "all against all", which has its inception in the private ownership of the means of production and reached its terrifying climax under capitalism. All people will work and share in the rising opportunities for a full life and culture made possible by their joint labor. Nations can live and progress in friendliness, mutual assistance and understanding. In a sense, the communal ownership of the land in early tribal life could be said to reappear on a world scale, but the differences are crucial. Precisely because of the growth of human knowledge of the external world and of depths within the human being himself, through the successive stages of society humanity approaches the collective task of mastering nature for human needs on a level not of enslavement but of freedom.

Even with this most schematic and sketchy outline, the possible source for McLuhan's views and the drastic alterations he has made, become apparent. Thus the primitive tribe becomes to McLuhan a kind of model for the future society arising, but on a level of exaltation that removes it from the sphere of reality. The real element of communal ownership of the land is of no interest to McLuhan, and accordingly there is no interest in the fact of primitive enslavement to the unknown forces of nature, the short life-span, the incessant need for food and the destruction by tribes of one another in the hunt for food until better production allowed conquered people to be used for slaves. The only important element to him is that these tribes were "oral"; the people were happily within "the tribal trance of resonating word magic and the web of kinship." Their senses were unified. They were untroubled by meditation. Each sensation aroused an immediate reaction. "Oral cultures act and react at the same time". Thus the people were rounded, whole men, with complete brotherhood. "Tribal cultures cannot entertain the possibility of the individual or the separate citizen" (pp. 86, 87, 88).

So with the forces that disrupted tribal society, McLuhan shows no interest in such factors as private property in the means of production, the formation of social classes, the question of who did the labor and who owned the product, or even in the rise of production technologies. For a philosopher of "media", McLuhan is highly selective even with "media". Thus to McLuhan, what detribalized humanity and disrupted this peaceful "trance" was only the phonetic alphabet, literacy, reading, writing and their successive revolutions culminating in the printed book. The senses were thus disassociated from one another and the "visual" sense put on top of the disrupted hierarchy. Individualism came into being, along with logic, "lineal" and "sequential" thought, the pursuit of knowledge, humanism, the fragmentation of the human being, nations, nation-

alism, wars, and the ability to "act without reacting". Such is the decline humanity has suffered.

The electric technology has now changed all this. By eliminating literacy and restoring the unity of the senses through their basis in touch, it is bringing back the happy tribal trance, but now on a world scale, making the entire globe into a single village. The basic conflict today is between those who shortsightedly are addicted to the old culture of literacy, logic and fragmentation, and those who understand and welcome the liberation that the electric technology like TV is bringing to their sense equipment. "Today we appear to be poised between two ages — one of detribalization and one of retribalization" (p. 299). Non-involvement, produced by literacy, is being replaced by total involvement. "In the electric age, when our central nervous system is technologically extended to involve us in the whole of mankind and to incorporate the whole of mankind in us, we necessarily participate, in depth, in the consequences of our every action" (p. 20).

One of the attractions of this picture is that the process of arriving at this happy state is so easy. All we have to do is sit back and let the electric technology reshape our senses. The old, benighted, angry social critics demanded that people study, learn the makeup of the world, society, and economics, master history, think for themselves, enter politics. McLuhan laughs at this. By participation in "depth", and "involvement", he does not mean anything like conscious study and understanding. People no longer need to read. Words stand in the way of the single world consciousness that is coming upon us. Just as primitive tribal society had no need for words, but only sound and touch, so the future world tribal village will have no need for verbalization, with the conscious thinking and logic it entails. "Electricity points the way to an extension of the process of consciousness itself, on a world scale, and without any verbalization whatsoever. Such a state of collective awareness may have been the preverbal condition of men" (p. 83).

In fact, any conscious act of criticism or questioning is not only useless, but harmful. The only understanding demanded of us is that we understand, and so welcome, what the electronic age is doing to us. Docility is the road to the future. "Electromagnetic technology requires utter human docility and quiescence of meditation such as befits an organism that now wears its brain outside its skull and its nerves outside its hide" (p. 64). This is the triumphant liberation of man. TV and computers do our thinking for us, radiating their messages into our brain. McLuhan demands "higher education" for his future, but this education is only in how the electric technology is worked. There is no need for any knowledge other than applied techniques. "With electricity we extend our central nervous system globally, instantly interrelating every human experience" (p. 311).

Knowledge, to McLuhan, has nothing to do with understanding. It is simply accumulation of data, and computers do this for us. "Today it is the instant speed of electric information that, for the first time, permits easy recognition of the patterns and

formal contours of change and development. The entire world, past and present, now reveals itself to us like a growing plant in an enormous accelerated movie" (p. 305). It could be pointed out that to watch a growing plant in an accelerated movie gives no clue to what makes the plant grow. And a mass of accumulated data is never a substitute for the difficult and literate brain process of understanding the forces behind them.

This move to the glowing future is being carried out by the great corporations. Antiquated are the old cries of alarm of the "trust-busters", or of social critics demanding that the great banks and corporations be curbed, and prevented from taking over the country. The "harsh logic of industrial automation," says McLuhan, has changed all this. "Totally new structures are needed to run a business or relate it to social needs and markets. With the electric technology, the new kinds of instant interdependence and interprocess that take over production also enter the market and social organization" (p. 310).

Despite McLuhan's disavowal of logic, a certain logic begins to appear in his picture: that of the great corporate structures adjusting their rivalries, dividing up the markets, and taking over the world. Other elements of the picture begin to fall into place. Labor would certainly not be eliminated. On the contrary, the structure would have to be fed by a vast amount of labor, presumably done mainly by the dark-skinned people. Around the corporate structure itself there could well be a considerable "aristocracy" of coupon-clippers, parasites, people with wealth and nothing to do, as well as those receiving the typical doles of a "welfare state".

McLuhan makes some suggestions for what such people should do for themselves. One is to engage in art. "This would seem to be the fate that calls men to the role of artist in society" (*ibid.*). The art would not be of social humanity, showing man's fellow human beings to be part of himself. McLuhan is quite explicit about what he feels the real role of art to be; a kind of adjustment of the mind to the way in which a new media environment reshapes the senses. Art is, he says, "exact information of how to arrange one's psyche in order to anticipate the next blow from our own extended faculties" (p. 71). There could also be recourse to the psychoanalyst's couch. True to his concept of media, McLuhan sees the couch itself, not anything that the analyst can say or do, as the means of adjustment. "As extension of man," he says, the chair is "a sort of ablative absolute of backside," while the couch, on the other hand, "extends the integral being" (p. 21).

But what about human kinship in this world-wide corporation empire? McLuhan's constant stress is not on kinship or brotherhood. The word he stresses continually is the tricky one, "involvement".

While we don't express any kinship for people the world over today, we are certainly involved with them. What is our burning and bombing of the land and people of Vietnam if not an "involvement"? Let some people on the other side of the globe nationalize their industry, and we are immediately "involved". We are "involved" when England devalues the pound; or when some corrupt military

and dictatorial government in Latin America or Africa is threatened by a popular movement. The owner of a factory and the workers on the machines don't act with brotherhood and kinship, but they are certainly "involved" with one another. Let the workers leave and the machines are worthless. Let the factory close its doors and the workers must starve or go on relief.

A different kind of involvement among world peoples has grown in the twentieth century; one of genuinely awakened mutual understanding, and realization of common needs, problems and humanity. The rise of a world literature, assisted by other arts, has only begun to erase the alienation which makes one people look on another as strangers. Especially in countries struggling to throw off hidden and open colonialism and economic servitude and backwardness, the growth of a literature revealing the realities of the people's existence and their human needs is prized as integral to the achievement of independence itself. As Frantz Fanon writes of Africa in *The Wretched of the Earth*

We believe that the conscious and organized undertaking by a colonized people to re-establish the sovereignty of that nation constitutes the most complete and obvious cultural manifestation that exists ... The new humanity cannot do otherwise than define a new humanism both for itself and others.

It is exactly this literary growth that McLuhan proposes to cut off at the roots, to make way for the new world approaching. It is the outmoded "Gutenberg medium".

Beneath the cloud of McLuhanese fantasy thrown over history and obscurantism thrown over media, lies the outline picture of a very real force growing in the world today, a move toward totalitarian control of the world's natural resources, labor and markets by the great interlocking industrial corporations. McLuhan's book is an exhortation to people to accept this new world a-coming as their happy fate. People must accept this coming servitude with docility, for what will control them is only an extension of themselves. They must cast away the obstructions to progress represented by rationality, thought, mediation, literacy, the humanist tradition of the arts themselves. They must give away their conscious mind for the happy blandishments of the kinesthetic appeal to the unity of the senses that shortcuts thought. The rounded person is a mindless person. Media or the extensions of man, are "Make happen" agents but not "make aware" agents" (p. 57).

McLuhan advises the future ruling powers on how to preserve the happy servitude of the new world-wide tribal village. He does not believe the economically backward peoples should share the advantages that have accrued to the colonializing "West". He raises an alarm: "With literacy now about to hybridize the cultures of the Chinese, the Indians, and the Africans, we are about to experience such a release of human power and aggressive violence as makes the previous history of phonetic alphabet technology seem quite tame" (p. 58). To get the full meaning of this, read "industrialization" for "literacy" and "phonetic alphabet technology". By no means must the economically backward peoples be allowed to attain the new technologies of

the West. "On the one hand, a new weapon or technology looms as a threat to all who lack it. On the other hand, when everybody has the same technological aids, there begins the competitive fury of the homogenized and egalitarian pattern against which the strategy of social class and caste has often been used in the past" (p. 299). We get an inkling of what he means by the new "tribalism" through the many references to the German Nazis as a "retribalized" people (pp. 204, 262, 264). Of course, says McLuhan, this was caused by Hitler through the "tribal magic" of radio, and radio is to McLuhan a "hot" medium. But radio is also part of the new electronic technology. And in the near future, as he envisages it, whole peoples can be kept in check through the adroit channeling of both "hot" radio and "cool" TV. "We are certainly coming within conceivable range of a world automatically controlled," he writes. "We could say, 'Six less hours of radio in Indonesia next week or there will be a great falling off in literary attention.' Or 'We can program twenty more hours of TV in South Africa next week to cool down the tribal temperature raised by radio last week.'" Thus the new corporation totalitarianism can run quite smoothly. "Whole cultures could now be programmed to keep their emotional climate stable in the same way that we have begun to know something about maintaining equilibrium in the commercial economies of the world" (p. 41).

It could be that McLuhan believes the present methods of controlling an economically backward, dark-skinned people, in the service of the great investment corporations, are out-moded, and soon to be replaced by electronic media. The present methods are certainly unwieldy, expensive and unpleasant; bribery of a segment of the population, the overthrow of popular governments, police oppression, the setting up of military dictatorships. Of course, "media" in the McLuhan sense do play a role, supplanting the local culture, and its potentialities of growth and self-consciousness, with outside cultural domination, including a cheap, imported, "lowest common denominator" entertainment. But a future of hordes of miners and plantation workers presumably with radios attached to their ears and television sets strapped to their chests, so that their psyches can be properly heated or cooled, is a preposterous picture.

And the probability is that McLuhan knows this too: that this vision of an electronic, automated, computerised dictatorship controlling the population by beaming radio and TV waves at them is presented tongue in cheek, as a sick joke. For there is a good deal of this sick joking in McLuhan, like dancing on a grave. Some of his more bizarre historical mis-statements are undoubtedly leg-pulling; as is his theory of war as a form of technological equalization. When questioned about United States intervention in Vietnam, and how he thought the conflict should be resolved, he wrote: "As a crash program of Westernization and education, the war consists of initiating the East in the mechanical technology of the industrial age" (*Authors Take Sides on Vietnam*, New York, 1967, p. 49). Certainly the pun on "crash" is a sick joke.

A form of pulling the reader's leg is McLuhan's method of apparently proving or confirming ideas through authoritative quotations that don't confirm these ideas at all. It was developed by McLuhan with remarkable finesse in his book *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (Toronto, 1962; U.S. edition, 1965). The meat of the book is the charge against the "Gutenberg technology" and "literacy" that is repeated in *Understanding Media*: man has become fragmented, he acts without reacting, he is addicted to logic and sequential thought, his senses are split apart, he is individualist, nationalistic, one-sidedly visual. Here the quotations are from poets, philosophers, natural scientists, historians, anthropologists, sociologists, art critics. At a rough estimate, they seem to comprise about a third of the book or more. There is also an impressive bibliography. And the extent to which these quotations don't at all make the points that McLuhan says they do is shocking.

For example, at the very opening McLuhan quotes from the first act of Shakespeare's *King Lear*, where Lear announces that he is retiring from kingship except in keeping the title, and the respect due it, and will split up his kingdom in three parts, giving each to one of his daughters and her consort. Now if there is one concept on which all Shakespearean critics agree, it is that Shakespeare prized a unified nation and felt that the medieval and feudal fragmentation of the land under the rule of little independent nobles, barons and soldiers of fortune only tore up the land in rivalries and wars. But McLuhan, "explaining" this quotation, makes a complete somersault. Lear in dividing his kingdom was not taking a backward step, but "proposing an extremely modern idea of delegation of authority from center to margin" (*The Gutenberg Galaxy*, p. 11). In other words, according to McLuhan, Shakespeare is not castigating Lear's backwardness but projecting, through Lear, a daring vision of the modern world where a state has various departments, operatives and specialized tasks. But even Shakespeare's Fool in *Lear* knows better: "When thou clovest thy crown in the middle, and gavest away both parts, thou borest thine own ass on thy back o'er the dirt." To hammer home the point of Lear's prophetic vision, McLuhan quotes his line, "Give me the map there," and says, "The map was also a novelty in the sixteenth century ... key to the new vision of peripheries of power and wealth" (*Ibid.*). But the map is older than writing. Ptolemy in the second century was famed for his maps. Lear is using the map not to plan explorations, but only, in the age-old customary sense, to mark out divisions of his land.

The contempt for the public implied in McLuhan's misuse of quotations is another manifestation of the undercutting of the human spirit, human resiliency, human creativity, and the human urge for freedom, that glares throughout McLuhan's view of history and approach to the present.

This gaping hole in McLuhan's thought was apparent in his first book *The Mechanical Bride* (1951; paperback, Boston, 1967). Written before McLuhan became aware of the significance of TV, and when the McLuhanese jargon itself was only in a germinal stage, it is a dramatically presented caustic, keen and

witty exposure of the "mythology" of modern merchandizing, advertising and popular arts, including magazines, detective stories, movies and comic strips. He used such phrases as, "controlling the childish mental processes of those locked in the mass dream", and the "trek towards the voluntary annihilation of our individual humanity." He wrote sharply of "Planned obsolescence... Production for use? Yes. But for the briefest possible use consistent with the rigging of the market for the pyramiding of profits" (p. 128).

He appealed for the restoration of sanity, to the heritage of rationality, thought, humanism, meditation, knowledge; in other words, to everything that he would later deride as "literacy" with its product of "split man", the "Gutenberg technology" with its unrealistic creation of reason. "Much hope, however, still emerges from those parts of the scene where rational self-awareness and reasonable programs of self-restraint can be cultivated ... The friendly dialogue of rational beings can also be as catching as it is civilizing" (p. 34). Or again: "Freedom, like taste, is an activity of perception and judgement based on a great range of particular acts and experiences. Whatever fosters mere passivity and submission is the enemy of this vital activity" (p. 22).

Yet this book does not make an all-over effect commensurate with the fireworks set off on each page. Narrow in scope, it seems to make the same point over and over again. It hammers at the most vulnerable points, at the expense of attempting something of a rounded picture of American life and popular culture. It gives the impression that the mass of people have no real life of their own, other than being imprisoned in the "mass dream" of the movies, slick fiction, and magazine ads. But they do have such a life. And McLuhan gives no inkling of the fact that this actual life is sometimes, if inadequately, reflected in the popular arts themselves.

It would be wrong, of course, to underestimate the power over the mind exercised by mass advertising campaigns, and by the thick streams of manufactured novels, tawdry songs, vacant-minded motion pictures. And yet works of independence, imagination and a sense of reality and humanity appear, which the people welcome. Popular music might be pointed to. Amid its stream of claptrap there appeared the songs of Gershwin, Handy, Kern, Porter, Carmichael, Rodgers. Jazz improvisation was created by the Negro people, and there appeared the rollicking and poignant musical expression, with its inner humanity and flag of freedom, of Armstrong, Morton, Ellington, Basie, Lester Young, Parker, Billie Holiday, Gillespie, Rollins and a host of others. Amid the claptrap of science-fiction appeared genuine criticisms of present-day society and concern for the future of humanity. Motion pictures, comic and realistic, have been powerful human documents. There has been the popular wave of revival of American folk song, and on its heels, the determined "election" by an immense, youthful public of its own favourite singers, and socially critical song writers, who break the standard mold. The commercial mentality still

dominates the control of these popular arts, but at least there is a struggle.

With the growth of TV from a starry-eyed baby to a lusty young monster, the "mass medium" most devoted to the service of the corporation structure and most integrated into that structure, McLuhan appears to have gone through a considerable change of mind. He has abandoned his critical view of mass media of today, and aims his shafts at their rivals from the past. That TV is the mass medium least responsive to popular creativity, imagination and pressures, that it devotes itself most single-mindedly to treating the public as an object of manipulation, a victim, is now to him an asset. Advertising, which he derided for its falseness in *The Mechanical Bride*, is now to him, "happy news". It is the most artistic, attractive part of magazines and newspapers, as well as an admirable feature of TV. In 1950, he spoke of content, being highly critical of the imposed "mythology" and "dream life" in the mass media and popular arts. He now derides the view that content has any importance. The "medium" itself is the "message". Where he once attacked "submission", he now applauds "docility" on the part of the public. Where he formerly found recourse in reason, mediation, rational thought, he now derides these as out-moded products of the fast disappearing "Gutenberg Technology". They inspired "fragmented" and "one-sided" man. The core of his world view has now become what was already apparent as an undercurrent in *The Mechanical Bride*, for all its sardonic criticism of manipulations of the public mind. This is his blindness to the resilience of the human spirit, to the creativity, independence and urge to freedom of the masses of people; qualities that have continually shown themselves in sudden and unexpected ways.

In *Understanding Media*, this blindness on McLuhan's part appears as a total distortion of history; human history with the humans who created it left out. "If the student of media will but meditate on the power of the medium of electric light to transform every structure of time and space and work and society it penetrates or contacts, he will have the key to the form of the power that is in all media to reshape any lives they touch." (*Understanding Media*, p. 60). All he can admit in his history is that electric light came like a mysterious genie and altered the senses with its magic wand. But who turned electricity from lightning that destroyed people into electric current that could be a tool for change? Who transformed the world with its use, and made it an immense, productive tool? Who envisaged and carried out the vast extensions of literacy and art that electric light made possible? McLuhan robs the human being of all his creativity and injects it into the media he created, so that the media become the creators and the human beings become the passive recipients, the slaves.

Although McLuhan wraps his "media" fantasy of history in whimsy, he is serious about his surrender to that corporate structure. An occasional barb indicates that he is chafing at his enlistment in its service. He has taken the path of other minds of our time, who have no love for the great corporation imperialism, but have decided it is too powerful to

oppose. Most ironic is the spectacle of a man who bears the title of Albert Schweitzer Professor of Humanities, at a great university, engaging in undermining the heritage of the humanities themselves, along with the sciences and history. A professor of the humanities is now the one against whom a defense must be raised of the humanities, of knowledge so far as it has been painfully achieved, of reason, logic and humanism. And this defense is raised not out of any nostalgia for the past, but because with the many real and awesome problems confronting us, the loss of this heritage leaves us the more impotent.

This irony is part of the greater irony of our times. This is that when knowledge of the world is available such as society never possessed before, knowledge embracing not only natural science but also art, history and the makeup of society itself, there rises in the intellectual world itself forces stifling the use of this knowledge. These are the forces of obscurantism. There is a vested interest in obscurantism. If its most prevalent form is an assertion of the impossibility of human beings ever to know anything, McLuhan can be credited with a novel and bizarre form of obscurantism. It is that of writing a travesty on knowledge.

C. THE FORMATION OF THE CAPITALIST MODE OF COMMUNICATION

1. *The Rise of Bourgeois Hegemony*

- Historical Modes 185 ROBIN MURRAY, TOM WENGRAF (UK, 1970)
Notes on Communications Systems
- Printing 188 FRANZ MEHRING (Germany, 1900)
In Memory of Gutenberg's Five-Hundredth Birthday
- The Book 195 ROBERT ESCARPIT (France, 1965)
The Mutations of the Book
- The Public 198 JURGEN HABERMAS (FRG, 1964)
The Public Sphere
- The Press 201 YVES DE LA HAYE (France, 1977)
The Genesis of the Communication Apparatus in France

2. *Colonialism*

- Culture 205 AMILCAR CABRAL (Cape Verde Islands, 1972)
The Role of Culture in the Liberation Struggle
- Education 212 RENATO CONSTANTINO (Philippines, 1970)
The Mis-Education of the Filipino
- The Press 220 CARLOS ORTEGA, CARLOS ROMERO (Peru, 1976)
History of the Evolution of Mass Communication in Peru
- News Agencies 225 PIERRE FREDERIX (France, 1959)
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3. *The Industrialization of Communication*

- Energy Monopolies: Electricity and Oil 227 V.I. LENIN (1916)
The Division of the World Among Capitalist Combines
- The Telegraph 231 J.D. BERNAL (UK, 1953)
Electric Light and Power
- Advertising 232 STUART EWEN (USA, 1969)
Advertising as Social Production
- Telephone/Electronics 241 NOOBAR RETHEOS DANIELIAN (USA, 1939)
American Telephone and Telegraph Co.: Science in Business
- Film 252 THE FILM COUNCIL (UK, 1936)
A Brief History of the American Film Industry
- Radio 260 ROLF LINDNER (FRG, 1974)
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4. *Fascism*

- Mass Indoctrination 268 ROBERT A. BRADY (USA, 1937)
The Arts and Education as Tools of Propaganda
- Radio 272 DERRICK SINGTON, ARTHUR WEIDENFELD (UK, 1942)
Broadcasting in the Third Reich

Robin Murray
Tom Wengraf

NOTES ON COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

(UK, 1970)

METHODOLOGY FOR THE ANALYSIS OF 'HISTORIC COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS'

The terminology and the approach adopted follow those of the marxist-structuralist school commonly associated with Althusser. Possibly this is only a metaphorical parallel; hopefully, it might suggest real theoretical connections.

(1) Every society ('social formation') possesses a particular 'historic communications system'. Each 'historic communications system' is to be understood as, and analysed in terms of, its particular *combination* of different 'pure' *modes of communication*.

(2) Every historic communications system ("H.C.S.") is to be understood as a complex *dominated* structure of modes of communication. In other words, in any H.C.S., *one* of the modes of communication present is *dominant* and whatever others are present are always subordinated. A "revolution in communications" should be understood as a *displacement of dominance*.

(3) Any given 'mode of communication' is to be characterised as a particular combination of certain *means of communication* and of certain *social relations in communication* which those means permit and generate and in terms of which the means are deployed.

(4) A given mode of communication may therefore be dominant in one H.C.S. and subordinated in another.

(5) The same *material means of communication* may form part of *different modes* of communication as the social relations which determine their operation are different.

(6) The specific unity of an H.C.S. is to be found in its relationship to the *dominant mode of production* which characterises the particular social-economic formation.

(7) In class societies, the H.C.S. will be found to operate in such a way as to confirm and enhance the *power and cohesion of the dominant class and to confirm and control the fragmentation and subordination of the subordinated classes*. The relation of modes of communication to the *State* is hence of particular significance.

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COMMUNICATION EXCHANGES: SYMMETRY/ASYMMETRY; ACCESS/EXPOSURE

This section deals with the different *technologies* or means of communication and the types of *social relations* which they *enforce, allow and prohibit*. It therefore points toward, but does not provide, an *enumeration* of characteristic modes of communication.

We take as our *base-line* for discussion, historic communication systems resting on a mode of communication whose material means (technology) allows (but does not enforce) *symmetric relations* of communication: *speech* (unmediated aural-oral).

Given an equal mastery of the language, the *oral exchange* is intrinsically symmetrical. All individuals have an equal capacity to initiate exchanges, an equal capacity to avoid and terminate exchanges, an equal capacity to determine the content of the exchange and the terms of any discussion. There is also an equal capacity to store and retrieve information from past exchanges. All individuals are equally exposed to such exchanges and have equal access to the means of operating them, since they require no more than a common language or code and normal physical condition of voice and ear.

(a) In a stratified society, such a symmetrical *means of communication* can come into contradiction with the *social relations of production*. We can therefore expect the development of *relations of communication* which impose a *ritual or juridical asymmetry of use* on intrinsically *symmetrical means*.

(b) The right to *initiate* and *terminate* speech becomes of critical importance when speech is the dominant means of communication. The rule becomes: "*Speak only when spoken to, and as directed*".

As an index of power, the right to "have one's say" or the contrasting obligation to speak only as and when required is of great value. Who must listen and who can speak, when and how, are questions always worth asking.

In our society, that is in an H.C.S. where immediate-oral speech is not generally a dominant mode of communication, we can still note the operation of ritual-conventional rules of speech in such face-to-face groups as the family, the work-team and particularly in the combat group, the army. Asymmetric social relations of communication and different modes of address are in our society seen as *instrumental or conventional* rather than *ritual or juridical*.

(c) *Bi-lingual social formations* exist, however, and the existence of a separate elite language is a powerful method of ensuring *asymmetrical speech relations*. Privilege can then take two forms:

(i) the *elite* alone speak a *second language* (Tsarist Russians speaking French; medieval Europeans knowing Latin) and can thus maintain secrecy and a restricted circulation of ideas: thus, the use of Latin to indicate the genitals in English vernacular literature and its use by Renaissance humanists in a way not exciting the 'ignorant populace'. Knowledge circulates in one language; ignorance is preserved in another.

(ii) the *non-elite* are forced to learn a *second* language, that of the elite. This is characteristic of imperial colonisation and its *de-legitimation of native languages*: only the metropolitan language is taught in schools, can be used in the law-courts or permits employment in the civil service. This performs a number of useful functions: (a) it places metropolitans at a permanent advantage vis-a-vis natives; (b) it forces the natives to learn a language that will expose them to metropolitan cultural products and hence to metropolitan cultural domination; (c) it makes it less likely for the dominant group to be able to preserve their original cultural traditions as a living, resistant resource. This also facilitates their primary orientation not to each other but to the elite.

Despite these qualifications, however, it has a certain validity to assert that *immediate speech* (unmediated aural-oral) is a relatively symmetrical means of communication, and that consequently in social formations where the dominant mode of communication is forced to use speech, a ritual-judicial differentiation of speech-rights is to be expected.

The development of *letters* and literacy, of *alphabets* provided a reader basis for a symmetrical relations of communications. Until the late nineteenth century, the *capacity to read and write* was always reserved for a minority: only recently have we seen the generalisation of literacy to the "dangerous classes". This more or less coincides with the *displacement of dominance from letters* to modes of communication involving *other sets of means*.

The *domination of letters* and the different material means it deployed have been well discussed by Innis and rather more confusingly by McLuhan. Changes in the material used (stone and chisel, brush and pen, pen and parchment, pen and paper); changes in rates and costs of output with hand-powered press and finally machine-powered press... all these have very considerable consequences in political terms.

We shall consider the *democratisation of print* and the differential capacity of the *market* to maintain *asymmetry of access* to the dominant means of communication.

(1) Under conditions of *mechanised printing*, there is relatively little need for specific ritual-judicial restrictions on access to the means of printing, given a sufficient *difference of incomes* between the rich and the poor. Those who can afford the expensive means of communication-production are unlikely to distribute subversive messages; those whose messages would be likely to be subversive are unlikely to have incomes sufficient to give them access.

(2) This probability of market-control being sufficient is increased when the cultural *capacity to receive* literary communications (the ability to read) is absent from all but a small proportion of those who would be concerned to receive subversive messages.

(3) However, (a) at a certain stage the dominated classes can come to develop a movement of self-education which threatens to expand the market for subversive communications, (b) if the cost of paper and print fall absolutely or relatively vis-a-vis

real incomes of the dominated classes, the equilibrium of asymmetry is threatened, (c) the inability to read subversive literary communications also involves an inability to receive conservative literary communications.

(4) There develops a system of *self-education* of the non-elite coupled with the development of a self-conscious underground and *subversive literary culture*. The market for a particular period fails to maintain the necessary asymmetry.

(5) The reaction of the dominant class is twofold: (a) repressive (b) pre-emptive:

(a) It becomes active in *repression*: the development of censorship, increasing the cost of printed materials by taxes on finished articles (Stamp Tax) or on raw materials, harassing of the channels of distribution. This involves both *judicial* operations and *fiscal-financial* ones.

(b) It eventually becomes active in *pre-emption*: it devotes resources to the development of mass-education either directly or (as in England) through interposed religious or other charities; it develops a commercial press aimed specifically at a working-class cultural milieu operating an often slight but always systematic alteration and subordination of its content. It is prepared first to tolerate, then to encourage and finally to enforce the capacity to read precisely to the extent that it feels that it can provide both the education and the predominant material that will be read. While the 'opposition press' produces intermittent pamphlets with haphazard distribution circuits, the 'establishment-commercial' press uses well-capitalised distribution networks to distribute floods of daily papers, weekly papers and journals and regular series of booklets.

Once its superiority is well-established, the judicial-repressive methods of control can once more be lifted. The market can now be relied upon here as in other fields to operate as a mechanism for the production, reproduction and expanded reproduction of inequalities and monopolies in communication. As a rule, judicial repression only comes in to play when for one reason or another the market has not proved sufficient.

ACCESS/EXPOSURE

Under certain conditions, we can discuss means of communication in terms of the privilege of *access*: what are the conditions for access to send communications through certain media; what are the conditions which restrict one's access to the means of receiving such messages?

Such an approach reflects a historical epoch in which the typical mode of domination was enforced ignorance through denial of access, was negative. Consequently, to learn to read, to be able to send seemed by definition to be unambiguous benefits in terms of an increase in *knowledge* (items received) and an increase in *power* (items sent). The higher the quantity of items circulated, the better!

We shall now consider the negative functions of access, that grasped under the subjective concept of exposure. We shall consider

(a) *restrictions on the ability not-to-send*;

(b) *restrictions on the ability not-to-receive*.

In Orwell's 1984, Winston Smith is involved in a technology with a high level of generated asymmetry: he has a television set in his room that cannot be turned-off (compulsory reception); the screen also transmits an image of his behaviour back to the agencies of social control (compulsory transmission).

(a) *restrictions on the ability not to receive* either aural or visual messages can be exemplified in (a) canned music and announcements in a variety of public places, air-raid and police sirens, street loudspeakers, private transistor radios turned up high; etc.; (b) street signs, posters and hoardings.

Streets are places for *hoardings and shops* to have access to people; commercial television is a method of putting a *hoarding in every home*.

The *countryside* is a diminishing area where people can retreat from enforced exposure to unwanted communications. If too many people take advantage of this liberty, then commercial facilities move in.

(b) *restrictions on the ability not to send* (a) at the level of print, compulsory tax returns, credit ratings, curriculum vitae, references and questionnaires, police and criminal records, identity cards and passports; (b) government access to telephones and the mail, corporate closed-circuit TV in shops and police TV in dangerous areas and dangerous occasions, one-way mirrors and concealed microphones etc.

(c) *subliminal transmission and reception* in which one is not even aware either of the advertisements and bias to which one is being subjected or of the concealed receptors through whom one is involuntarily transmitting.

We can note a distinction here: you have to focus on print and open a book; you can't avoid a picture, you can't not hear a sound.

COMMUNICATION EXCHANGES: MEMORY, SWAMPING AND RETRIEVAL

The contrast has been made between the *oral dialectic* of the medieval period and the *dissociated impacting* of the contemporary period. In the medieval period, the slowly accumulating stock of MSS literature meant the very considerable working-over and critical sifting and assimilation of this stock of written culture. A slow rate of written input: a high rate of confrontation of opinions and interpretations. In contemporary society, and 'information and publicity explosion' such as to produce a modern man perpetually reeling under a rate of unselected input that he can no longer work over and transform.

Previously, the communication of the present and the past through information storage and retrieval could only be prevented by the hunting-down of dangerous past printed information and their burning and elimination.

A less-obvious and more efficient method is that of swamping the individual with information in such a form and to such an extent that storage and retrieval is impossible. The ideal medium for non-

retrievable swamping is electric information: the message lasts outside the memory only for as long as it takes to say it. The thoughtful contrasting of past radio or TV news is technically rendered impossible. The life-span of printed paper is still much too long for adequate rates of obsolescence: for the vast majority, however, storage space and the absence of cross-referencing as a technical possibility makes it very rare for newspapers to be stored or efficiently sifted by private individuals.

Newspapers could be provided on storable accessible specialised sheets classified by subjects for retrieval and comparison: they're not.

Secrets are no longer kept by refusing to say anything: they are kept by providing public relations officials to keep saying everything except what is significant. 'Practical secrecy' is achieved by concealing omissions and half-truths with a constant supply of plausible non-confidential material and 'pseudo-events'.

Immense contemporaneity: little storage and retrieval, except by corporations and institutions who can usually set against tax the costs of organising checks for consistency and pattern over time.

TOWARDS A CHARACTERISATION OF THE BRITISH H.S.C.

1. The dominant means of communication being electric, the printed means (with the exception of mass-circulation press) and the immediate oral-aural modes of theatre, assembly, face-to-face discussion are thus given a comparative degree of freedom. A degree of freedom greater than they enjoy in conditions where their relative subordination is less clearly marked.

2. The electric media can be divided into the mediated-symmetrical means (telephones, walkie-talkies) and the highly asymmetrical means (televisions, radio).

(a) The symmetrical means of electric communication are not diffused as a social right or necessity. Phones for the dominated classes would merely permit them to contact each other more easily. Although phones and videophones are available for the wealthy, no great priority is given into making them as basic a social essential as water and gas. Indeed, the recent shift from a flat rate to a time-rate by the British Post Office suggests how little it is hoped to generalise telephones to the majority of the population. As regards the walkie-talkie (or mobile phone) they are legal in the States but illegal in Great Britain. A pocket transistor for reception of radio programmes is fine; a pocket transmitter is dangerous. The lonely crowd must be kept lonely.

(b) The asymmetrical means are placed outside of mass reach by the cost of transmission and by State monopoly in the granting of mass media licences. There is a state and a commercial sector in television and the same may develop in relation to radio. There is strong pressure for 'decentralisation' of media transmission which would benefit provincial and local dominant class forces and permit a greater dependence on direct or indirect local business fin-

ancing. The same pattern to increase dependence on business of cultural institutions can be seen in relation to the universities and colleges of the country.

In general, the State is concerned to keep members of the population from having direct access to screen time—with one exception. Commercial advertisements are specifically welcomed—indeed the government provides tax relief to encourage a business presence on the television screens once every fifteen minutes—and restricts direct social expenditure on those cultural operations that might make media workers independent of business. The commercial presence (interrupting the cultural flow) is the message about priorities: political parties and universities would not get the same tax relief for the purchase of screen time!

A non-profit orientation is a privilege reserved for the State radio: the right to non-official communications is reserved for business interests. The concern for advertising ratings thus tends to induce an "anticipatory orientation/socialisation" on the part of the workers involved.

3. Sub-electric media—mainly print. These technologies of production are becoming cheaper leading to the development of a multiplicity of *minority press* operations. The significance of this is firmly restricted by the 'commercialisation' of distribution and mass distribution networks being firmly in the hands of private and socially irresponsible monopolies whose effective censorship policy appears subjectively as safe commercial practice. The *socialisation of distribution* is a precondition for a flourishing of independent production. Market control of distribution leads to a drive for fewer items and more guaranteed mass-sales.

If the imperialism of free trade is not to lead to monopoly, then *space of the shelves* is as necessary as *time on the media*. Cultural production should be as subsidised and protected as small farm production. State could create a chain of non-commercial (university and college cooperative) bookshops, or provide tax-reliefs for bookshops who provided a full range of material.

Posters hoardings for the corporation are tolerated universally; political bill-posters or a wall-poster are likely to be prosecuted.

The current socialist struggle confronts 24-hour multiple variant electric media at oral speeds of contact with sound-and-vision power vs print-produced occasionals (not even a daily) under conditions of artisanal productions and restricted-circuit distribution.

Franz Mehring IN MEMORY OF GUTENBERG'S FIVE-HUNDREDTH BIRTHDAY (Germany, 1900)

Except for the present, no other time was as exciting and spectacular as the last half of the 15th century. Today we experience the struggle of the proletariat for emancipation and in the 15th century it was the attempts of the bourgeoisie to throw off the constraints and shackles of the feudal system. This struggle engendered such vigor and zest for life that it must have been a joy to be living at that time. The great nations which came into existence with the beginning of the capitalist mode of production created international trade, with Germany in the leading position. Trade and commerce flourished and along with it the arts and sciences. No fewer than 9 universities were founded between 1456 and 1505. Even today we marvel at the incomparable beauty of the works of Durer, Adam Kraft and Peter Vischer and many others which have been handed down to us.

This remarkable era did not come to an end with the close of the 15th century. As we well know, the German Reformation took place in the first half of the 16th century, a movement which started with bold revolutionary fervor yet at the end choked to death on the bloodshed and misery of the great Peasant War. But at the end of the 15th century, two great discoveries were made which were to revolutionize world trade and lead to the exclusion of the German nation from the world market for several centuries: the discovery of America by the Spaniards and the discovery of a sea route to India by the Portuguese. At that point the situation in Germany began to deteriorate, gradually at first and then ever more rapidly. This resulted in an abrupt change in the course of events which, despite its dramatic suspense, never quite obliterated the painful awareness of how difficult and agonizing a task it was for Germany to attain the status of a modern nation. The last half of the 15th century dawned like the aurora heralding the coming day in all its splendour, and in this respect too it was similar to our time. No other period in German history had such affinity to the emancipatory struggle of the proletariat as these great decades in which a German genius

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invented the art of printing, this black, most subtle, divine, holy and German art—this art of all arts and sciences as it was proclaimed at the time—decades in which the German workers disseminated this art to all lands and people with an industriousness and speed almost inconceivable even today when we have steam engines and trains.

It was Johannes Gutenberg from Mainz who invented this art and who, like no other before or after him, deserves the everlasting gratitude of all the civilised world. But the working class, above all, will remember this man with deep gratitude half a millenium after his birth because it was he who gave it the printed word and with it, its mightiest weapon.

Numerous contemporary testimonies credit Gutenberg with having invented the art of printing, yet claim to this achievement has not always gone unchallenged; for centuries a great number of German and foreign printers were given credit for the invention. Named as inventors are a certain Koster in Holland and a man called Castalid in Italy. There are even monuments erected in their honor, Koster's in Harleem and Castalid's in Feltre. In Germany it was Fust and Schöffer of Mainz, Mentel of Strasbourg and Pfister of Bamberg who challenged Gutenberg for the honor. The polemic pamphlets which issued from these disputes number in the thousands, but according to today's findings, and judging from the votes of confidence given to Gutenberg, he emerges victorious at the end.

One could almost say he emerged too great a victor in that some of his champions got carried away and set him up as some kind of superhuman genius. Had he been born 500 years earlier, they say, he would have invented the art even then; had he been born 500 years later we would still be waiting for the invention of printing. This, of course, leads to the old yarns which the ideological historians love to spin, high-brow fantasies about what course history would have taken if, for instance, the old Greeks had invented gunpowder or the Romans metal type casting. Considering the mere technical aspects of inventions, we know that they derive from historical necessity, which means, that every invention is a long time coming.

Inventions can give an important impetus to historical developments and few had such an impact as did printing, but each invention comes to fruition with the aid of historical development. The law of historical dialectics cannot be repudiated although it is constantly being challenged by super-clever ideologists. But all this does not detract from the inventors who responded to the challenge of their times and created something which had an epoch-making impact on the times to come. It happens quite often that things are invented prematurely and merely by chance, such as the spinning- or weaving-frame or the steam engine used for industrial purposes. If Chinese sources are correct, even Gutenberg's discovery had been made 400 years earlier. But such premature saplings are nipped in the bud and do not grow into giant trees whose foliage will provide shade for generations to come.

Viewed from this perspective, the only correct one, we may shed some light on the innumerable legends surrounding the invention of printing. It is indeed going too far if we make human passion, and a base one at that, solely responsible for the need to discredit Gutenberg. Such passion did, of course, more often than not play a part, but the quick dissemination of this invention is decisive proof that the time was definitely ripe for it. Commerce and trade which developed at such a rapid pace at the end of the Middle Ages had accelerated the intellectual intercourse between nations to such an extent that mass production of literary materials became a dire necessity. There were, of course, without a doubt, numerous attempts made to satisfy this need and these attempts can be traced back in time. It is misleading in a certain sense to talk about *book-printing* as an invention of Gutenberg. The mechanical reproduction of letter and design by means of *relief impression* had been already possible at the beginning of the 15th century by means of wood-engravings. The statement made by one of Gutenberg's contemporaries, which has been repeated over and over again, can certainly be applied to this forerunner of book printing, namely that "human liberty was handed a mighty double-edged sword, a sword capable of fighting for good as well as evil, for virtue and truth as well as sin and falsehood." The first products of wood engraving were saint's pictures and playing cards. These first wood engravers did not concern themselves at all with whether they were cutting illustrations or words, consequently the first books contained mostly illustrations with short texts and later evolved into small textbooks and chapbooks without illustrations. This kind of printing continued long after Gutenberg's invention. The printers performing this craft formed guild-like associations in Nuremberg, Augsburg, Cologne, Mainz, Lübeck and other cities, usually in coalition with the painter guilds.

After having once reached the stage of engraving solid wood planks it was just one more step to sawing these planks into single letters and recombining them to facilitate the reproduction of books. But it was nearly impossible to get proper alignment when placing these individual letters. The next logical step was to cut these letters out of metal. But even this procedure proved unsuccessful because cutting each letter by hand was too time-consuming. The alignment was now improved yet still not perfect. These flaws could only be eliminated by casting metal letters, and with this final step the art of printing was born. By recombining these letters—words, lines, sentences and pages could be reproduced through relief printed impressions. To go beyond xylography, the art of engraving by means of wooden planks, to typography, the art of printing with movable casted type was Gutenberg's invention.

It all seemed so easy once it had been accomplished. This is the way of all great inventions. Yet we should not discount the logical historical sequence which led from xylography to typography merely to maximize Gutenberg's credit. Perhaps Gutenberg

never even tried to print with wood engravings. It was, however, a long and laborious road, taxing all mental and physical resources, to get from the mere idea of typography to the execution of this idea which was almost perfected in Gutenberg's first pieces of printing. Yet we should never forget that the inventor was a product of his own time. He was not pursuing his own solitary goal; he was merely the first one to reach this goal which many others had endeavored to reach by exerting all possible efforts. The legends which tend to minimize the glorious achievements of great inventors always carry within them some retributive justice; every great inventor has always had his pace setters whose names have been partially or sometimes completely erased through time. It is difficult to evaluate all these inter-relationships in the case of Gutenberg. We know very little about him and even what we know about his life has not passed unchallenged.

Henne Gensfleisch, called Gutenberg, was born in Mainz in 1400. He was the son of Fryle Gensfleisch and Elsa Wyrich, and took the name of his mother's house which was located near the Christoph church. Although the inventor of printing took the name of his mother's domicile as a mere second surname unlike others in the Gensfleisch clan, this prophetic matriarchial name and not his father's prosaic name was to be remembered to posterity.

In the middle of the 15th century the city of Mainz had only about 6000 inhabitants and could not measure up to the thriving centers of bourgeois commerce like Frankfurt or Nuremberg, which were the leading cities of the Hanseatic League. This is attested to by the fact that the main enterprise in Mainz was weaving and that it only had 36 linen and wool weavers compared to Frankfurt's 312. But Mainz was reputed to be a large transshipment store for all goods transported on the Rhine and Main rivers, and even more so, as the ecclesiastical metropolis of the Holy Roman German Empire. It was also the seat of the arch-chancellor and the capital of the largest German diocese, which extended from the mouth of the Elbe to the headwaters of the Rhine. This superior position of Mainz in the ecclesiastical sphere was of no minor importance for Gutenberg's invention, although we should be wary of attributing too much importance to this fact. The medieval church contributed its mite to this invention and by doing so brought about its own demise. The church aided the discovery not as a spiritual benefactor but as an economic exploiter.

Aside from weaving, other crafts gained in importance and thrived on the religious and mundane extravagance of the late Middle Ages, namely, the gold- and silversmith's craft, the art of sculpture, the turner's craft, medallion making, the craft of the armourer, etc. The more precious the artisan's materials, the more the craft would be concentrated in the bishoprics. This was particularly the case in Mainz, being the clerical hub of Germany, a country totally exploited by the Roman Curia. The arch-bishop of Mainz was powerful enough to go fifty-fifty with the Pope on the money received from the

sale of indulgences, the practice which precipitated Luther's Theses. Aeneas Sylvius, later Pope Pius IX, tried to rationalize the papal bleeding of Germany by pointing to its wealth, as in the following: "Just look at the utensils in the churches, the reliques adorned with pearls and framed in gold, the opulence of its altars and its priests."

The goldsmith's craft was one of the most important at that time and reached its greatest development in the bishoprics. There were 29 goldsmithies in Mainz alone, while a very prosperous city like Nuremberg, a center of art and culture of the first order, had only 16. This craft also encompassed chemistry, mechanics and the whole sphere of graphic arts as applied to metals; it worked with gold, silver, pearls, precious and semi-precious stones, enamel, lead, bronze, copper, brass and even wood and iron. Technically it branched into the areas of embossing, welding, soldering, riveting, casting, pressing, gilding, dyeing, enamelling, wire netting, designing, engraving, etc. In short, this craft more than any other required a series of divers skills and practices: As a master of this goldsmith's craft Gutenberg first appears on the scene of history.

He left his birthplace around 1420, exiled by intestine quarrels in Mainz between the guilds and the patricians to which the Gensfleisch clan belonged. A document names "Henchen zu Gutenberg" as "ousted from civic privileges" but granted him amnesty. Because he left his hometown as an adult, we can assume that he received his artisan training in Mainz. A Strasbourg document of 1439 attests to his having been a master craftsman in the arts and sciences. He employed other goldsmiths and instructed them in gem-cutting. He also collaborated with them on the manufacturing of mirrors to be used by the pilgrims on their pilgrimage to Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle). In the bishoprics of both Strasbourg and Mainz the goldsmith's craft stood in the service of the church. The small hand mirrors produced at that time became quite valuable by being inlaid with diamonds, rubies, pearls and other cut stones and by being framed in sculptured ivory and with religious and profane sculptures out of precious metals. This common enterprise ended when the heirs of one of his partners brought a lawsuit against Gutenberg which was adjudged to be without cause and subsequently decided in favor of Gutenberg. This is of little interest except for the fact that court records of these proceedings, rediscovered in the last century, tell us something more about Gutenberg's stay in Strasbourg and give some indications from which we may conclude that already in 1439 Gutenberg had made the first attempts at constructing a printing apparatus with movable type. The testimony of the witnesses tells of an "unknown art" with which Gutenberg had tried to familiarize his partners and it also makes mention of a "press" which by means of two small blades connected four loose pieces, the latter having been kept a secret by Gutenberg. This mention is obviously too inconclusive to allow us to draw a case for or against the existence of such an apparatus.

It is possible, however, that already in Stras-

bourg Gutenberg was performing preliminary experiments which led to his great invention. We cannot presume that the complicated technical procedure—engraving the letter stamps (punches, matrices), striking them into a flat slip of copper (matrix), producing a mold for these matrices, casting the letters from this form and aligning them, and, finally executing the type-setting and printing — which he managed with such great mastery in his first pieces of print, could have been the work of a few months or even a few years. Besides a few pieces of print which corroborate this fact, we can find little information about Gutenberg's life except for promissory notes or those things which belong to the mortal part of an immortal undertaking; we cannot observe the genius at work, we can only find the common and everyday problems which impeded his great endeavors. He seems to have been one of those demonic characters who pursue a goal totally oblivious to everything which composes the life of "pragmatic people." A promissory note from 1442 is the last definite trace of him in Strasbourg and another one from the year 1448 is the first authentic evidence of his return to Mainz.

The note in Mainz for 150 guilders may have been used for the first experiments with movable type. Judging from a few preserved leaves, Gutenberg must have started by printing small prayer- and school-books. These pieces of print turned out so well that Johann Fust, a citizen of Mainz, decided in 1449 to advance Gutenberg 800 guilders, a quite remarkable sum for that time. The loan was made with 6 percent interest and enabled Gutenberg to proceed with the "work on the books" that is, to install a workshop which was pledged to Fust as collateral until the debt was paid. At the same time Fust became a partner in Gutenberg's business by providing 300 guilders annually, without interest, in return for a share in the profits. This money was to be used for the business as such, i.e., rent, wages, parchment, paper and ink. These were the arrangements according to Gutenberg and we have no reason to doubt his word. We can only draw inferences from the lawsuit suing for repayment which was brought by Fust against Gutenberg, and since a complete account of the proceedings is not available we have nothing else to go by except a short notarized synopsis of the hearing of 6 November 1455. Fust's contention that he had given 2 loans of 800 guilders each, which through compounded interest had increased Gutenberg's debt to 2026 guilders, shows obvious contradictions and even the fact that the court decided in his favour does not attest to the truth of his claim. The court seemed to have been partial to Fust because he was a member of a well-to-do family. It allowed him to make the incredible declaration under oath that he, the rich bourgeois-patrician, had to borrow the money himself with heavy interest from "Christians and Jews," and because Fust committed this act of perjury he won the case and Gutenberg faced ruin.

The first two important printings, the 36-line and 42-line Bibles date from this partnership with Fust. Even if we are inclined to give credence to

Fust's statements it is nevertheless true that he had no part in the invention itself. We can only speculate as to whether he dealt honestly with Gutenberg or whether he swindled him, but there is no doubting the fact that he was only what today we would call a capitalist entrepreneur in the business. Since neither the 36-line nor the 42-line Bible is signed, dated, or gives places of origin, it is very difficult to examine these first pieces of printing from an historical-critical standpoint. Judged from a point of view of technique we can say that the 36-line proceeded the 42-line Bible and according to reliable sources we can set the date 1450 for the first and 1456, at the latest, for the second.

These, the oldest Bible texts, are typographical imitations of the Bible manuscripts which were used up to that time. They were large folio volumes with double columns written in Gothic script which had been adopted for the Latin Bibles in the last half of the 12th century. Gutenberg imitated everything, including the customary abbreviations, so that no fewer than a hundred letter stamps had to be cut for the first printing of the Bible. The 36-line Bible consists of two large folio volumes of which 9 are preserved. In spite of some shortcomings, one of which being that the large type made the book quite cumbersome, this first product of the invention was quite an accomplishment. Gutenberg decided to make the type smaller, in order to get more lines in the columns and so remedied the problem of size. Thus the 42-line Bible which came into being shows improvements in the type and there are 30 copies which have been handed down to us. The larger number of copies of this latter print points towards a larger number of original prints. There is every reason to believe that the 36-line Bible had a smaller edition, perhaps not even many more were printed than are still at hand. In proportion to the initial investment it was not a good business venture and this might have been the decisive fact in the feud between the financier Fust and the inventor Gutenberg; the financier may have wanted to snatch the invention from the impractical genius when the 42-line Bible uncontestedly proved to be a practical proposition.

Subsequently Fust allied himself with the calligrapher Peter Schöffer, from Gernsheim, who had served him as a compurgator in his lawsuit against Gutenberg and with him founded a printing and publishing business which was to become world-known. Peter Schöffer presumably was an assistant of Gutenberg and therefore we simply cannot deny him an auxiliary share in the invention of printing as we can in the case of Fust, Schöffer's business partner and, later, father-in-law. Some credible contemporaries attributed to Schöffer major improvements which perfected Gutenberg's invention. The new printing shop of Fust and Schöffer published the *Latin Psalter* in 1457 which attained great acclaim not only because it was the first printed document which was dated but also because of its technical perfection, its several hundred matrices, its large initials which were cut in metal and its beautiful type. Its epilogue reads: "The present codex of psalms, decorated with beautiful initials and featur-

ing adequate rubrications; has been produced by a new art of printing and type without any usage of the pen, and was created through diligence in the honor of God by Johannes Fust, citizen of Mainz and Peter Schöffer from Gernsheim in the year of our Lord 1457, on the eve of the Day of Ascension." As we can see, Fust and Schöffer did not call themselves the inventors of the new art. Since Fust's treatment of Gutenberg was as a profiteering financier, one might surmise that he did not dare take credit for this invention while Gutenberg was still alive. This, of course, is a mere conjecture on the part of Gutenberg's zealous champions, who insist that Fust started legal proceedings against Gutenberg because the latter had worked on the body of the *Psalter* material and Fust tried to take it from him by illegal means. We have, however, enough data available at this time to offer convincing proof that Schöffer created this first dated piece of printing; an unsurpassed and still unchallenged masterpiece.

The above is of no importance with regard to the question of who invented bookprinting. Even if Gutenberg had only produced the 36-line Bible with its large type, or even only a small textbook, his glory and merit would not be diminished. One of his champions states correctly: "His crowning glory needs no biographical trivia, in fact all the later specimens of printing fade into oblivion in the face of a single, yet original typographical page." It is a prevalent and foolish mistake to judge the cultural-historical importance of the *Psalter* and 42-line Bible on the basis of their gold and color ornamentation. Such matters do not belong to the epoch-making invention of typography but rather to the customary art of book ornamentation as it had been practiced previously and of which medieval manuscripts offer much better and more authentic examples.

After the devastating blow dealt to him by Fust's despicable deviousness, Gutenberg continued his labors with tenacity. He found a new and more decent patron in one Dr. Humery, who also insured his invested interests by holding Gutenberg's workshop as collateral but who never misused this privilege, so that Gutenberg was able to keep his shop until his death. A new, great work, the so-called *Catholicon* was produced in this workshop. This work was a favorite dictionary and encyclopedia compiled by a Dominican monk. It was an outsize folio volume of 374 leaves in double-columns of 66 lines each. The epilogue reads: "Under the guidance of the Almighty at whose nod the tongues of children become eloquent, and who often reveals to the simple what he conceals from the wise, this outstanding book, the *Catholicon* was printed and completed in the year of our Lord 1460, in the exalted city of Mainz, which forms part of the famous German nation and which God's goodness has seen fit to distinguish above all other nations of the earth through such high inspirations and the gift of grace in quite a special way, without aid of a reed, quill or pen, rather thanks to a wonderful cooperation, relationship and harmony of letters, stamps and types." Since the type of the *Catholicon* could not have been set by Fust and Schöffer and

since there was no other printshop in Mainz at that time, this book must without a doubt have been printed by Gutenberg. The puzzle, which will never be solved, remains as to why Gutenberg even at this point in time did not attach his name to this piece of printing. It might have been because he was innately a very shy person or perhaps he wanted to reserve the honor for the Almighty. Perhaps he was intimidated by the more magnificent work of Fust and Schöffer or did not want to associate himself with this mechanical art, being, after all, an "aristocrat." All these are of course quite flimsy hypotheses no matter how ardently they have been promulgated. Even the more convincing argument pleading for the more plausible "tragic necessity" of the inventor of typography, that is, to protect himself through anonymity from the warrants of distress issued by his numerous creditors, does not hold water if we consider that Humery held the printshop as collateral and that he never badgered Gutenberg for money.

In 1462 Mainz was destroyed by fire in the fierce feud between Dietrich of Isenberg and Adolf of Nassau in a scuffle for the arch diocese. During this fire both printshops were destroyed. However, Gutenberg spent his last years in peace. The victor, Adolf of Nassau, appointed him courtier with an annual allowance of clothing, twenty "malterns" of wheat, two tuns of wine and an exemption from all dues, taxes and services.

It seems that a new printshop was opened in Eltville, the residence of Adolf of Nassau, under the direction or at least the supervision of Gutenberg. The printshop worked with the type used for the *Catholicon* and one of the printers married into Gutenberg's family. Gutenberg seems to have kept his home in Mainz, where he was also buried. His grave has disappeared and even the date of his death cannot be fixed, but it must have been around 24 February 1468, because on this particular date Humery pledged Adolf of Nassau that after his own death Gutenberg's complete equipment would be sold in Mainz and only to a citizen of Mainz, granting Adolf the right of pre-emption.

Gutenberg still lived to see the initial fast dissemination of his art. The destruction of the city of Mainz in 1462 provided the impetus when all the assistants of Fust and Schöffer were forced to migrate. But even this external event would not have had this kind of impact had not European culture at the height of its development thirsted for this "wonderful secret" like an arid ground for a refreshing rain.

The names of 1000 printers are still known to us from the period preceding 1500 when the first printed books (incunabula) appeared. Most of these printers were Germans. There were 5 new printshops established in Mainz, Ulm had 6, Basle 16, Augsburg 20 and Cologne 21. 25 printers were granted citizenship in Nuremberg at the end of the century. The most famous among them was Anton Koberger who worked with 24 presses and employed over 100 "apprentices" as typesetters, proofreaders, printers, bookbinders, illustrators

and illuminators. Establishments of like size were operated by Hans Schönsperger in Augsburg, by the master craftsman Johann Amerbach in Basle, by Wolfgang Lachner and by Johann Froben.

As quickly as in Germany, the art of printing spread in Italy with the help of German printers in Subiaco, Rome, Siena, Venice, Perugia, Naples, Palermo and other cities. In Foligno, Johannes Neumeister from Mainz printed the first edition of Dante's *Divine Comedy* in 1472. Just as numerous were German printers in Spain and France. Printers from Nördlingen and Strasbourg settled even on the uninviting island of St. Thomas.

The "German art" was transplanted to Ofen in 1473, to London in 1477, to Oxford in 1478, to Denmark in 1482, to Stockholm in 1483, to Moravia in 1486 and Constantinople in 1490. A humanist writer of that time boasted: "We Germans control the entire market of educated Europe." Out of the first printing shops developed the first publishing houses. Peter Schöffer's branch in Paris was estimated to have had a capital of 2425 *Goldtaler* in 1475, which was quite a sum for that time. Anton Koberger had "sixteen stores and warehouses in the most important cities of Christianity"; over 200 of his works, mostly large folio volumes, published before 1500 can be authenticated. The booktrade with Italy was handled mostly by the printers in Basle. Erasmus once wrote from Canterbury that most books sold to England came from the shop of Franz Birkmann in Cologne. The first German publishers were not only alert businessmen but also men of serious aspirations. Their names are remembered in the annals of science but they also promoted the arts by the wood engravings with which they adorned the products of their presses.

Along with typography, xylography continued to flourish. Wood engraving developed as an art after plate printing was replaced by the type printing. The golden age of wood engraving was of course in the 16th century at the time of Dürer, but it had already received an impetus through book printing. Book printing and wood engraving responded to the need of the time and flourished only as a result of these needs. The same reason holds for their turning away from ecclesiastic to worldly, from Latin to German literature. They both were responsible for the rapid dissemination of Sebastian Brant's *Ship of Fools* which appeared in 1494, one of the most important achievements of German literature in centuries. Brant's work was a daring satire on the spiritual and profane powers of the time and full of healthy and subtle humor. Among the 112 fools which Brant assembled on his ship he included the fools of books, who has many books and still acquired even more although he could neither read nor understand them. Brant's most important publisher calls him a literary star of the first magnitude.

He was a forerunner of the German Reformation which is historically inconceivable without the art of printing and wood engraving, without the efficient press, which flooded the land with the flying leaves of Luther's Theses, Hutten's

pamphlets and the Twelve Articles of the Peasant War. For the first time the new invention emerged as a mainspring of historical development which imparted to history that impetus which put the printed word ahead of the written or spoken word. Since then the printed word has been the classical weapon of all revolutions which have promoted the advance of our civilization, not in the sense that some shortsighted enemies of progress would have us believe, that is, as the cause of revolutions, but rather as the mighty tool of all revolutions in which the people have aspired to higher forms of human existence. That it was and always will be.

Printing could not prevent the decline of the German nation from the 16th to the middle of the 18th century. Even this free and noble art had to bear the heavy yoke. So much of all that it had created for centuries on German soil lies buried under dust and mould, never to be regained again. But then, once again, the spirit of the German people, along with the 25 compatriots of Gutenberg, secured for itself an honorable place among the civilized nations of the world. The poverty of the German nation is obvious when we compare the first prints of Goethe and Lessing with the magnificent works created by Gutenberg and Schöffer. But an abundance of triumphant light emanates from these thin and meagre pages and, as in Luther's and Hutten's time, the printed word became an irresistible revolutionary force.

Again it deteriorated and prostituted itself to the enemies of civilization, not in leather-bound volumes of theological polemics but in the capitalist newspaper rubbish about which is said: If printed it is as good as a lie. Yet for the third time we experience its historical mission in our time where it provides the strongest impetus to the emancipatory struggle of the modern working class. One might almost be inclined to say that the expression "German art" was imbued with a touch of prophecy right from the start; no other weapon was more effectively employed in the revolutionary struggles of the present century than the art of printing and it is for that reason that the German aristocracy and royalty have fostered an instinctive hatred for it. When the birthday of printing was to be celebrated a decade too soon in 1840, the celebration was prohibited in many places by the police, whereupon Herwegh wrote the following:

There is a mountain in Germany
it stands in Mainz at the Rhine,
with defiant attitude
it look upon the land.
Barbaross's dead sleep
was too long for Kyffhäuser,
so the mountain decided
to wake up for his king.
Ruined, he says, be
the black ravens' work,
the best mountain on earth,
that is Gutenberg.

Right from its inception Gutenberg's art stood at the vortex of historical progress, no matter how often it became the tool of regression. And in this

respect it differentiates itself profoundly from the other great invention made at the end of the Middle Ages, shooting with gunpowder, which sometimes perhaps furthered historical progress but has increasingly become the weapon of historical regression. To illuminate this comparison, Freiligrath, a famous proletarian poet, wrote the following lines on the 400th anniversary of Gutenberg's death, a statement which is more applicable today than it was thirty years ago and which shall conclude our tribute to Gutenberg:

Even gunpowder fought for freedom, light and
right -
yet usually it served as an executioner, a vile
hireling!

Too often it downpressed that which arose so
daringly and free,
Sending into loyal hearts its provost, the lead!
But other weapons are needed in the struggle
of our time -

And those were forged by you, the one we
celebrate today!

You forearmed our spirit, this oppressed spirit
of ours;

You equipped it with sword and armour and
led it into battle!

You gave it the golden arrows, the illuminating
darts -

And see, the shadows and their hanger-ons
retreated into hell!

Diadem and crowns faded, the darkness
vanished,

The sun blazed up, the day, the day did dawn!
Those weapons you handed to the world they
never paused,...

The feud between darkness and light still
continues!

The shadows which were driven behind the
gates of hell,

They dared and dared anew to come to the fore
again!

The masses still are swaying in the battle, to
and fro,

And we still call on you, you master and your
defense!

Apparitions everywhere! and if Rome does not
threaten

then someplace else, phantom after phantom!
In these past days it is the spectre of the monk,
Of the old powder monk which needs to be

banished!

more zealously than ever before he runs from
land to land,

he wants to conquer the world, the land also
the sea!

He is intent on destruction only, on super-steel
projectiles on the fastest bullet, on an iron

giant ship!

The earth a powder keg! All that for power and
glory!

And against freedom and liberated human
kind!

On, Gutenberg, to our aid! We are stepping to

your grave calling down our blessing and our
gratitude!
We know it now: No matter how long this
struggle lasts,
The victory will go to you, and through you to
the light!

Robert Escarpit

THE MUTATIONS OF THE BOOK

(France, 1965)

The first stage was probably that of the *volumen*, a roll of papyrus sheets pasted together, making it possible to handle an entire work, as required by the type of literary life which existed in Athens, and later in Rome in the classical period, with its copyists' workshops (which were true publishing houses), its bookshops, and the compulsory deposit of copies in the great libraries.¹

But diffusion here was on a relatively small scale restricted to rich amateurs, scholars in the orbit of a patron of the arts and, later, students and clerks. In the small society of the ancient city, public reading was the most unusual means of publication. Shorter documents were written on wax tablets while, for everyday writings, parchment, a cruder but also less fragile and less costly material than papyrus, had been available since the third century B.C.

Just because of its cheapness and its strength, parchment was the instrument which brought about the next mutation: cut into sheets which were then stitched together, it produced the *codex*, with the page arrangement characteristic of the modern book. This arrangement is much better suited, functionally, for reference and scholarly research than was the *volumen*. It is the ideal form for legal records (*code*, incidentally, is derived from *codex*), for sacred texts and for scholarly writings. It is suited to a civilization less interested in literature than in political security, theology and the preservation of ancient learning. From the fourth century of our era, for more than a thousand years, the manuscript of bound sheets of vellum, in the hands of the clerks, was to be the universal means of preserving, communicating and disseminating thought, not only throughout the Christian world but throughout the Arab and Jewish worlds as well.

So vitally important was the book that during the Middle Ages there was no more meritorious labour than to copy or illuminate a manuscript. The transport of books from monastery to monastery, from town to town, sometimes over very great distances, was organized with care.²

Because their artistic merits ensured their survival, we are most familiar with the beautiful illuminated manuscripts of the late Middle Ages, but there were also less costly books, especially books of hours, for daily use. As soon as they came into being, the universities organized the copying of classical texts for their students, so that a thirteenth-century scholar's textbook budget was not much greater, in

This text was first published as part of the author's *The Book Revolution*, London, Paris; Harrap, UNESCO, 1966. Copyright UNESCO 1966. Reprinted by permission of the author.

proportion, than that of his successors in the twentieth century.³

No matter how ingeniously it was organized, however, hand copying had its limits. From the fourteenth century onwards, new strata of society took up reading, which until then had been the clerks' preserve. These new readers—nobles and bourgeois, merchants and magistrates—had little use for latinizing in everyday life: they wanted technical works, it is true, but also books to entertain them, works of imagination, written in the vulgar tongue. Thus in the Romance dialects was born the "romance", the ancestor of the novel whose popularity hastened the next, decisive mutation of the book: printing.

Printing had an immediate and spectacular effect, but it appeared only when the time was ripe—which shows that a technical innovation can prosper only if it meets a social need. Paper, which was as indispensable to the development of printing as the tyre and macadam were, later, to the development of the motor-car, had been known in China for more than a thousand years when it reached Europe in the middle of the twelfth century—and even then it was coldly received by the authorities, who were worried about its frailty.⁴ Printing from movable type took much less time—two or three years—to cover the same ground. The times had changed, and the new conditions required that printing be discovered, invented or imported.

True, printing prospered because in Europe it encountered languages employing alphabetical script with twenty-six characters, the form best suited for its use, but it prospered even more because it encountered civilizations in the midst of rapid economic and cultural development, where the diffusion of the written word was beginning to create insuperable problems.

What was perhaps the most decisive discovery in history appeared, prosaically enough, to the first printers simply as a convenient way of speeding up the copying of books, improving their appearance and reducing their cost. Everything about the typo-

1. For books in ancient times, see the nineteenth-century study by Th. Birt., *Das antike Buchwesen*, 1882, or the standard manual by S. Dahl, *Histoire du livre de l'antiquité à nos jours*, 1933.

2. The *Mélanges d'histoire économique et sociale* offered as a tribute to Professor Antony Bebel, Geneva, 1963, contain (pp. 96-127) an interesting article by M. Stelling Michaud on the international transport of Bolognese legal manuscripts from 1265 to 1320.

3. The machinery for the publication of university texts is described in the Introduction (pp. 9-13) to the book by L. Febvre and Henri-Jean Martin, *L'Apparition du livre*, Paris, 1958 (In English: *The Coming of the Book: The Impact of Printing 1450-1800*; London, New Left Books, 1976.) Authentic, reliable manuscripts were hired out, under University guarantee, by the 'stationarii' or sworn university booksellers, to students desiring to copy them, or to professional copyists under contract.

4. Italy began to import paper brought from the Orient by the Arabs in the twelfth century. Paper manufacture in Italy began early in the fourteenth century, but even in the thirteenth century, despite its prohibition by certain chancelleries, paper was already currently used in France and Switzerland.

graphy, manufacture and publishing of books at this time shows that the printers were mainly concerned with commercial returns. The same concern can be seen in the choice of the first texts printed, all of which were likely to sell well; religious works, novels, collections of anecdotes, technical manuals and recipe-books formed the backbone of the catalogues of these practical businessmen.⁵

The success of the operation exceeded their best hopes. Some authorities estimate the number of *incunabula* — books printed before A.D. 1500 — at 20,000,000 in a Europe whose population numbered less than 100,000,000, most of whom were illiterate.⁶

This gave the book a new dimension, and no time was lost in exploring its possibilities. Only a few hundred copies of the first *incunabula* were printed; the average printing of a book did not go beyond 1,000 copies until the middle of the sixteenth century. In the seventeenth century it was between 2,000 and 3,000 copies, and continued at that level until the end of the eighteenth century. It was usually difficult to do better with hand presses, and, what is more, the printers, who by now were distinct from the booksellers who handled distribution, would have been afraid of cheapening their wares by making them too common. Guild ordinances restricted both the number of printing-presses and the size of printings. As a result, despite a steady downward trend, book prices in Western Europe remained at a level which made the book available to the well-to-do burgesses, but not to the middle classes in general, let alone to the workers. The latter, if not illiterate, had to satisfy their needs for reading material from the more ephemeral publications to be found in the pedlar's pack: broadsheets, ballads and almanacs.⁷

It can therefore be said that the printed book, which was the support and vehicle of the great European literature of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, took it only to a very small circle of society.

In the eighteenth century, England was the least illiterate society in Europe, and the country in which publishing was the most prosperous, but even the most popular books—*Pamela* or *Joseph Andrews*—never had a sale of more than a few thousand copies.⁸ In France, printings were decidedly smaller, and though Voltaire's witticism—fifty readers for a serious book and five hundred for an entertaining one—was surely an exaggeration, the fact remains that the reader of books represented a small aristocracy of written culture, or of "literature", as it was then called.

It was an international aristocracy. The absence of any kind of copyright agreement gave a stimulus to piracy in publishing which was morally questionable but culturally beneficial. American publishing, for instance, developed magnificently, after the United

States became independent, by establishing itself as a parasite upon the British publishing trade. Owing to their mercantile traditions or their political situation, such cities as Amsterdam and Lyons were, for centuries, international centres of diffusion for the reading public. The *Divine Comedy* took more than four centuries to make its way throughout Europe; twenty years were enough for *Don Quixote*, and five for *Werther*. Five or six major languages shared the literary universe; never has the sense of a world community of the literati been keener than during the eighteenth century.

But this aristocratic cosmopolitanism was directly threatened; the book had long been working up to a fourth mutation, mechanization, which was to destroy it. The premonitory signs were visible from the days of the Encyclopaedists on. As in the fifteenth century, new social strata, including the lower middle classes, took up reading and demanded books of a system which had not been designed for them, which by definition excluded them. This new need for reading matter was one of the causes of the development of the press, whose circulation figures were still, however, very small.

Faced with a developing market, printing and bookselling underwent a major change, as nascent capitalist industry took charge of the book. The publisher appeared as the responsible entrepreneur relegating the printer and bookseller to a minor role. As a side effect, the literary profession began to organize: until then literature had been left to the rich amateur or relied on the support of the art patron, but now the writer began to claim a livelihood from his works. From Dr Johnson to Diderot, men of letters raised the question of copyright and literary property.

In the last third of the eighteenth century, trends of thought which, though at variance with one another, all converged in the direction of spreading books among what was then called "the people"—Methodism in England, Encyclopaedism and later the revolutionary spirit in France, and, to a lesser extent, *Aufklärung* in Germany—suddenly made the need for reading matter an urgent problem.

Then, in a few years—between 1800 and 1820—a series of inventions revolutionized printing techniques: the metal press, the foot-operated cylinder press, the mechanical steam-press. Before the end of Napoleon's reign, more sheets could be printed in an hour than had been possible in a day fifteen years earlier. The period of large printings could begin.

It began in Britain, for most of the improvements in printing were of British origin. Walter Scott's novels heralded this development, but it really opened by Byron's well-known experience in 1814, when 10,000 copies of *The Corsair* were sold on the day of publication. The wave reached France about 1830,⁹ together with the heavy-duty press, and

Harvard, 1958.

8. According to Richard D. Altick, *The English Common Reader*, Chicago, 1957, pp. 49-50, the printings of these 'best-sellers' never exceeded 4,000 copies, and the average printing was 500 or 1,000. If it was successful, a book had between three and five printings.

9. To be precise, in 1836, with Emile de Girardin's *La*

by 1848 it had swept over the rest of Europe and America.

This change in scale produced far-reaching effects. First of all, the writer lost contact with the vast majority of his readers: only the "cultured" stratum of the population continued to participate, either directly or through the critics, in the formation of influential literary opinion, while the anonymous multitude of other readers now figured in the mythology of letters only as a boundless sea into whose waves the poet tossed at random the bottle bearing his message.¹⁰

But it was no longer possible to ignore the existence of the mass of readers who thenceforth were to support the book and make it an economic proposition. Just as the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century bourgeois had made the clerkly Latin book give place to the use of the vulgar tongue, so the new readers of the nineteenth century made the cosmopolitan book of the literati give place to the use of national languages. Large printings thus both required and facilitated the splintering of literary languages, leading to independent national literature. As nationalism awakened, the book kept step with the times.

And it kept step with the times in the awakening of class consciousness as well. One after another, the circulating library, the serial novel and the public library spread the book ever more widely among the social strata which the progress of education had opened to reading. In the revolutionary thinking of 1848, the book became a basic symbol. It was realized that the way to freedom lies through cultural conquest. As was to be expected in Britain and in the United States the popular book had a strong puritanical bias, and the stress lay more on its moral role than on its revolutionary value. Its efficiency as a social determinant was nevertheless very great, especially in the United States where, as Richard D. Altick phrases it, "the American author had learned more quickly than his English cousin how to write for a democratic audience."¹¹ The pirate-market having reversed its pre-Dickensian East-West trend, the American book was read all through the English-speaking world, including Britain and its colonies. By mid-century *Uncle Tom's Cabin* sold a million and a half copies in one year and played a part in the building of a progressive opinion in Anglo-Saxon countries comparable to that of *Les Misérables* ten years later in France.

But the first signs of a new, fifth, mutation of the book were appearing in Britain, where the inevitable consequences of capitalist industrialization developed earlier than elsewhere. While the newly published book was already being sold at the price of ten shillings and sixpence (half a guinea, the luxury trade's status symbol), which was to remain current up to World War II, from 1885 onwards popular re-

Presse. In one year, subscriptions to Paris newspapers rose from 70,000 to 200,000 (E. Boivin, *Histoire du journalisme*, Paris, 1949). In the literary field, the effects of large printings were not felt until a little later, between 1840 and 1848.

10. This is certainly one of the origins of the romantic myth represented by Alfred de Vigny's *La Bouteille à la mer*.

prints of good books began to appear, selling at about sixpence and in printings of tens of thousands of copies. By the end of the century, abridged novels and poems were being sold for a penny, and from 1896 on, one publisher was even to offer penny editions of unabridged texts by Goldsmith, Poe, Scott, Dickens, Dumas, Eugene Sue and Mérimée.¹²

But it was still too early for such undertakings. In a society where there was no internal mobility, the "masses" interested in this kind of reading matter were still only a privileged minority. Although Britain was rather ahead of the rest of the world in this respect, because of the rapid growth of its urban centres, the majority of the population of the other civilized countries still depended for their reading material on the bookstall and the pedlar: mutilated editions of old classics, sentimental novels, folktales, joke-books, ballads, almanacs, etc.¹³ In some parts of the world this situation was to last until after the Great War, and even until the second half of the twentieth century.

11. Richard D. Altick, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

12. George Newnes' Penny Library of Famous Books. See R.D. Altick, *op. cit.*, pp. 314-15.

13. On the position in France in the mid-nineteenth century, see the invaluable, because unique, work of Charles Nisard, *Histoire des livres populaires ou de la littérature de colportage*, Paris, 1964.

5. On the whole of this period of the history of the book, see A. Flocon, *L'Univers des livres*, Paris, 1961, especially Part III: *Les livres imprimés anciens*.

6. The perhaps somewhat optimistic estimate of L. Febvre and H.-J. Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 377.

7. On this question, see David T. Pottinger, *The French Book-trade in the Ancien Régime, 1500-1791*,

Jürgen Habermas

THE PUBLIC SPHERE

(FRG, 1964)

1. THE CONCEPT

By "the public sphere" we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body.¹ They then behave neither like business or professional people transacting private affairs, nor like members of a constitutional order subject to the legal constraints of a state bureaucracy. Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion — that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions — about matters of general interest. In a large public body this kind of communication requires specific means for transmitting information and influencing those who receive it. Today newspapers and magazines, radio and television are the media of the public sphere. We speak of the political public sphere in contrast, for instance, to the literary one, when public discussion deals with objects connected to the activity of the state. Although state authority is so to speak the executor of the political public sphere, it is not a part of it.² To be sure, state authority is usually considered "public" authority, but it derives its task of caring for the well-being of all citizens primarily from this aspect of the public sphere. Only when the exercise of political control is effectively subordinated to the democratic demand that information be accessible to the public, does the political public sphere win an institutionalized influence over the government through the instrument of law-making bodies. The expression "public opinion" refers to the tasks of criticism and control which a public body of citizens informally — and, in periodic elections, formally as well — practices *vis-à-vis* the ruling structure organized in the form of a state. Regulations demanding that certain proceedings be public (*Publizitätsvorschriften*), for example those providing for open court hearings, are also related to this function of public opinion. The public sphere as a sphere which mediates between society and state, in which the public organizes itself as the bearer of public opinion, accords with the principle of the public sphere³ —

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that principle of public information which once had to be fought for against the arcane policies of monarchies and which since that time has made possible the democratic control of state activities.

It is no coincidence that these concepts of the public sphere and public opinion arose for the first time only in the eighteenth century. They acquire their specific meaning from a concrete historical situation. It was at that time that the distinction of "opinion" from "opinion publique" and "public opinion" came about. Though mere opinions (cultural assumptions, normative attitudes, collective prejudices and values) seem to persist unchanged in their natural form as a kind of sediment of history, public opinion can by definition only come into existence when a reasoning public is presupposed. Public discussions about the exercise of political power which are both critical in intent and institutionally guaranteed have not always existed — they grew out of a specific phase of bourgeois society and could enter into the order of the bourgeois constitutional state only as a result of a particular constellation of interests.

2. HISTORY

There is no indication European society of the high middle ages possessed a public sphere as a unique realm distinct from the private sphere. Nevertheless, it was not coincidental that during that period symbols of sovereignty, for instance the princely seal, were deemed "public". At that time there existed a public representation of power. The status of the feudal lord, at whatever level of the feudal pyramid, was oblivious to the categories "public" and "private", but the holder of the position represented it publicly: he showed himself, presented himself as the embodiment of an ever present "higher" power. The concept of this representation has been maintained up to the most recent constitutional history. Regardless of the degree to which it has loosed itself from the old base, the authority of political power today still demands a representation at the highest level by a head of state. Such elements, however, derive from a pre-bourgeois social structure. Representation in the

1. Habermas' concept of the public sphere is not to be equated with that of "the public," i.e. of the individuals who assemble. His concept is directed instead at the institution, which to be sure only assumes concrete form through the participation of people. It cannot, however, be characterized simply as a crowd. (This and the following notes by Peter Hohendahl.)

2. The state and the public sphere do not overlap, as one might suppose from casual language use. Rather they confront one another as opponents. Habermas designates that sphere as public which antiquity understood to be private, i.e. the sphere of non-governmental opinion making.

3. The principle of the public sphere could still be distinguished from an institution which is demonstrable in social history. Habermas thus would mean a model of norms and modes of behavior by means of which the very functioning of public opinion can be guaranteed for the first time. These norms and modes of behavior include: a) general accessibility, b) elimination of all privileges and c) discovery of general norms and rational legitimations.

sense of a bourgeois public sphere,⁴ for instance the representation of the nation or of particular mandates, has nothing to do with the medieval representative public sphere — a public sphere directly linked to the concrete existence of a ruler. As long as the prince and the estates of the realm still "are" the land, instead of merely functioning as deputies for it, they are able to "re-present"; they represent their power "before" the people, instead of for the people.

The feudal authorities (church, princes and nobility), to which the representative public sphere was first linked, disintegrated during a long process of polarization. By the end of the eighteenth century they had broken apart into private elements on the one hand, and into public on the other. The position of the church changed with the reformation: the link to divine authority which the church represented, that is, religion, became a private matter. So-called religious freedom came to insure what was historically the first area of private autonomy. The church itself continued its existence as one public and legal body among others. The corresponding polarization within princely authority was visibly manifested in the separation of the public budget from the private household expenses of a ruler. The institutions of public authority, along with the bureaucracy and the military, and in part also with the legal institutions, asserted their independence from the privatized sphere of the princely court. Finally, the feudal estates were transformed as well: the nobility became the organs of public authority, parliament and the legal institutions; while those occupied in trades and professions, insofar as they had already established urban corporations and territorial organizations, developed into a sphere of bourgeois society which would stand apart from the state as a genuine area of private autonomy.

The representative public sphere yielded to that new sphere of "public authority" which came into being with national and territorial states. Continuous state activity (permanent administration, standing army) now corresponded to the permanence of the relationships which with the stock exchange and the press had developed within the exchange of commodities and information. Public authority consolidated into a concrete opposition for those who were merely subject to it and who at first found only a negative definition of themselves within it. These were the "private individuals" who were excluded from public authority because they held no office. "Public" no longer referred to the "representative" court of a prince endowed with authority, but rather to an institution regulated according to competence, to an apparatus endowed with a monopoly on the legal exertion of authority. Private individuals subsumed in the state at whom public authority was directed now made up the public body.

4. The expression "represent" is used in a very specific sense in the following section, namely to "present oneself." The important thing to understand is that the medieval public sphere, if it even deserves this designation, is tied to the *personal*. The feudal lord and estates create the public sphere by means of their very presence.

Society, now a private realm occupying a position in opposition to the state, stood on the one hand as if in clear contrast to the state. On the other hand, that society had become a concern of public interest to the degree that the reproduction of life in the wake of the developing market economy had grown beyond the bounds of private domestic authority. *The bourgeois public sphere* could be understood as the sphere of private individuals assembled into a public body, which almost immediately laid claim to the officially regulated "intellectual newspapers" for use against the public authority itself. In those newspapers, and in moralistic and critical journals, they debated that public authority on the general rules of social intercourse in their fundamentally privatized yet publically relevant sphere of labor and commodity exchange.

3. THE LIBERAL MODEL OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE

The medium of this debate — public discussion — was unique and without historical precedent. Hitherto the estates had negotiated agreements with their princes, settling their claims to power from case to case. This development took a different course in England, where the parliament limited royal power, than it did on the continent, where the monarchies mediatized the estates. The third estate then broke with this form of power arrangement since it could no longer establish itself as a ruling group. A division of power by means of the delineation of the rights of the nobility was no longer possible within an exchange economy — private authority over capitalist property is, after all, unpolitical. Bourgeois individuals are private individuals. As such, they do not "rule." Their claims to power *vis-à-vis* public authority were thus directed not against the concentration of power, which was to be "shared." Instead, their ideas infiltrated the very principle on which the existing power is based. To the principle of the existing power, the bourgeois public opposed the principle of supervision — that very principle which demands that proceedings be made public (*Publizität*). The principle of supervision is thus a means of transforming the nature of power, not merely one basis of legitimation exchanged for another.

In the first modern constitutions the catalogues of fundamental rights were a perfect image of the liberal model of the public sphere: they guaranteed the society as a sphere of private autonomy and the restriction of public authority to a few functions. Between these two spheres, the constitutions further insured the existence of a realm of private individuals assembled into a public body who as citizens transmit the needs of bourgeois society to the state, in order, ideally, to transform political into "rational" authority within the medium of this public sphere. The general interest, which was the measure of such a rationality, was then guaranteed, according to the presuppositions of a society of free commodity exchange, when the activities of private individuals in the marketplace were free from social compulsion and from political pressure in the public sphere.

At the same time, daily political newspapers assumed an important role. In the second half of the eighteenth century literary journalism created serious competition for the earlier news sheets which were mere compilations of notices. Karl Bücher characterized this great development as follows: "Newspapers changed from mere institutions for the publication of news into bearers and leaders of public opinion—weapons of party politics. This transformed the newspaper business. A new element emerged between the gathering and the publication of news: the editorial staff. But for the newspaper publisher it meant that he changed from a vendor of recent news to a dealer in public opinion." The publishers insured the newspapers a commercial basis, yet without commercializing them as such. The press remained an institution of the public itself, effective in the manner of a mediator and intensifier of public discussion, no longer a mere organ for the spreading of news but not yet the medium of a consumer culture.

This type of journalism can be observed above all during periods of revolution when newspapers of the smallest political groups and organizations spring up, for instance in Paris in 1789. Even in the Paris of 1848 every half-way eminent politician organized his club, every other his journal: 450 clubs and over 200 journals were established there between February and May alone. Until the permanent legalization of a politically functional public sphere, the appearance of a political newspaper meant joining the struggle for freedom and public opinion, and thus for the public sphere as a principle. Only with the establishment of the bourgeois constitutional state was the intellectual press relieved of the pressure of its convictions. Since then it has been able to abandon its polemical position and take advantage of the earning possibilities of a commercial undertaking. In England, France, and the United States the transformation from a journalism of conviction to one of commerce began in the 1830s at approximately the same time. In the transition from the literary journalism of private individuals to the public services of the mass media the public sphere was transformed by the influx of private interests, which received special prominence in the mass media.

4. THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN THE SOCIAL WELFARE STATE MASS DEMOCRACY

Although the liberal model of the public sphere is still instructive today with respect to the normative claim that information be accessible to the public,⁵ it cannot be applied to the actual conditions of an industrially advanced mass democracy organized in the form of the social welfare state. In part the liberal model had always included ideological components, but it is also in part true that the social pre-conditions, to which the ideological elements could at one time

at least be linked, had been fundamentally transformed. The very forms in which the public sphere manifested itself, to which supporters of the liberal model could appeal for evidence, began to change with the Chartist movement in England and the February revolution in France. Because of the diffusion of press and propaganda, the public body expanded beyond the bounds of the bourgeoisie. The public body lost not only its social exclusivity; it lost in addition the coherence created by bourgeois social institutions and a relatively high standard of education. Conflicts hitherto restricted to the private sphere now intrude into the public sphere. Group needs which can expect no satisfaction from a self-regulating market now tend towards a regulation by the state. The public sphere, which must now mediate these demands, becomes a field for the competition of interests, competitions which assume the form of violent conflict. Laws which obviously have come about under the "pressure of the street" can scarcely still be understood as arising from the consensus of private individuals engaged in public discussion. They correspond in a more or less unconcealed manner to the compromise of conflicting private interest. Social organizations which deal with the state act in the political public sphere, whether through the agency of political parties or directly in connection with the public administration. With the interweaving of the public and private realm, not only do the political authorities assume certain functions in the sphere of commodity exchange and social labor, but conversely social powers now assume political functions. This leads to a kind of "refeudalization" of the public sphere. Large organizations strive for political compromises with the state and with each other, excluding the public sphere whenever possible. But at the same time the large organizations must assure themselves of at least plebiscitary support from the mass of the population through an apparent display of openness (*demonstrative Publizität*).⁶

The political public sphere of the social welfare state is characterized by a peculiar weakening of its critical functions. At one time the process of making proceedings public (*Publizität*) was intended to subject persons or affairs to public reason, and to make political decisions subject to appeal before the court of public opinion. But often enough today the process of making public simply serves the arcane policies of special interests; in the form of "publicity" it wins public prestige for people or affairs, thus making them worthy of acclamation in a climate of non-public opinion. The very words "public relations work" (*Oeffentlichkeitsarbeit*) betray the fact that a public sphere must first be arduously constructed case by case, a public sphere which earlier grew out of the social structure. Even the central relationship of the public, the parties and the parliament is affected by this change in function.

sphere" (*Oeffentlichkeit*). The term *Publizität* describes the degree of public effect generated by a public act. Thus a situation can arise in which the form of public opinion making is maintained, while the substance of the public sphere has long ago been undermined.

5. Here it should be understood that Habermas considers the principle behind the bourgeois public sphere as indispensable, but not its historical form.

6. One must distinguish between Habermas' concept of "making proceedings public" (*Publizität*) and the "public

Yet this trend towards the weakening of the public sphere as a principle is opposed by the extension of fundamental rights in the social welfare state. The demand that information be accessible to the public is extended from organs of the state to all organizations dealing with the state. To the degree that this is realized, a public body of organized private individuals would take the place of the now-defunct public body of private individuals who relate individually to each other. Only these organized individuals could participate effectively in the process of public communication; only they could use the channels of the public sphere which exist within parties and associations and the process of making proceedings public (*Publizität*) which was established to facilitate the dealings of organizations with the state. Political compromises would have to be legitimized through this process of public communication. The idea of the public sphere, preserved in the social welfare state mass democracy, an idea which calls for a rationalization of power through the medium of public discussion among private individuals, threatens to disintegrate with the structural transformation of the public sphere itself. It could only be realized today, on an altered basis, as a rational reorganization of social and political power under the mutual control of rival organizations committed to the public sphere in their internal structure as well as in their relations with the state and each other.

Yves de la Haye

THE GENESIS OF THE COMMUNICATION APPARATUS IN FRANCE

(France, 1977)

The classic histories of the French press, written by Manevy, Ledré, and the monumental collective work directed by Terrou,¹ emphasize three factors conditioning the growth of information since the eighteenth century:

1. the Enlightenment and the struggle waged by the philosophers for a daily education, mass literacy, etc.;
2. the technological advances and especially, the invention of pulp paper, linotype and the rotary press; and
3. the adaptation of law, with the progressive substitution of an incentive form of law for a repressive negative law.

Although we do not contest the importance of these factors they can hardly be considered decisive; for they do not explain the upheaval which took place in the domain of social communication at the end of the nineteenth century. Unless one is satisfied with the mere descriptive history of events concerning the limited field of publishing (press runs, inventions, regulations, etc.), one is obliged to turn towards the global social structure to answer the key question, one which may appear rather naive at first glance: why did a popular press, printed in over one million copies become possible in the 1880s, whereas it had not been possible in 1850, and even 1860?

In 1881, the first decisive rupture in the evolution of information took place. Whereas up until that time the daily press, called "gazettes", had been militant instruments essentially intended to consolidate the different fractions of the bourgeoisie (or militant worker's instruments intended to establish the first foundations of the worker's organizations during the revolutionary periods of 1848 and 1870-1), the introduction of the commercial concept of the press aimed to capture the enormous mass of peasants, workers and employees and make them into faithful, paying

1. R. Manevy, *La Presse de la Troisième République*, Paris, J. Forrest, 1955; C. Ledré, *Histoire de la Presse*, Paris, Fayard, 1958; and Terrou, Bellinger, Godechot, Guiral, *Histoire générale de la presse française*, 5 vols., Paris, PUF, 1972.

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newspaper readers. The Law of 1881, which abolished the stamp tax, and the obligation to register copies of a newspaper for prior authorization to publish,² was a victory for the bourgeoisie. This new juridical framework sanctions the rise of the press-as-commodity, while it aided the decline of the press-as-correspondence (the political gazettes which were distributed exclusively by mail) which up until then had brought together the readers of such bourgeois newspapers as the *Constitutionnel*, *Journal des Débats*, *Moniteur*, *l'Univers*, and *Siècle* in a close communion, although restrained in number.

The expansion of the capitalist mode of production necessitated both the economic exploitation of the social communication sector to sell the growing volume of capitalist goods, and to rationally and systematically create a public opinion which would reach mass targets bringing together different social classes.

The daily newspapers *Petit Journal*, *Petit Parisien*, *Matin*, and *Journal*, referred to by press historians as the "Big Four", were the instruments used at the turn of the century for this massive transformation of consciousness and psyche. But the base of this transformation was economic and social. Just as the school system was to be the instrument used to organize the social distribution of generations to come, information was to penetrate the pores and daily life of rural society, largely obscurantist and backward, so as to bring their consciousness into line with the dominant characteristics of the new emerging society, as it was seen by the bourgeoisie.

Thus the popular press sang of the marvels of science and technology in world trade exhibitions; the triumphs of the steam engine and electricity; the epic stories of colonial conquest and the wonders of the world brought back from travel expeditions; modern bucolics of planned agriculture with fertilizer and machines; and images of the city set against a glittering backdrop of festivals, parades, theatres and cinemas.

This is how one of the lyric promoters of the

2. Before the press law of 29 July 1881, the legislation on the press was a veritable labyrinth of 42 different laws containing 325 articles resulting in great confusion for jurists and printers who wanted to ascertain their rights. With the new law, the entire information sector concerning business, professional and publication rights, was regulated by a single law.

Basically the law gave broad freedom to a sector previously controlled very closely by the *Ancien Régime*'s survivors. Previously advance permission and bail were required to publish a newspaper. It was also necessary to ask prior permission to poster, and it was forbidden to put up political posters; printers and bookstores had to have prior authorization from the Minister of the Interior; and finally, the public sale of newspapers was severely restricted. After 1881, printing, bookstores, publishing, public sale and poster were freed of these constraints; information was now seen less as a "menace against public order" than as a merchandise like any other.

3: *La National*, 1 March 1874.

4. Karl Marx, "Land Nationalization", *The International Herald*, 15 June 1872.

new press, Charles Sauveterre, defined its function: "If the press succeeds in creating a new class of readers, if the newspaper becomes a daily need for millions of human beings who had for so long been indifferent to what was happening around them, that humble sheet of paper will have performed an immense service to civilization."³

"Completely alien to the social movement outside the poor parcel of land where he busies himself,"⁴ the small peasant was, by his consciousness and by his existence, an obstacle to the development of capitalism and its commercial relations, particularly in France, as shown by the social history of the nineteenth century. The development of the railroad permitted the widespread distribution of the popular press, and the formation of a national market. With these new conditions and the lower price of the popular press came the fabrication of a public opinion which reached millions of new individuals who previously had only been able to formulate an opinion based on the limited relationships of the local community or through the occasional visit of the colporteur who sold the almanacs and Bibles.

The popular press thus inaugurated a new relationship between reader and transmitter, a new model of communication, a new scale in the production and transformation of current events. In its search for a language and form accessible to the greatest number, this was the embryonic form of the "mass line" of the bourgeois communication strategy.

The most remarkable, most distinctive feature of this new relationship and network was the appearance of a new type of journalist. Previously, the majority of newspapers were built around militant journalists whose work consisted in asserting —

EXTENSION OF THE FRENCH RAILWAY NETWORK

1850	3,010 kilometers
1870	17,733 kilometers
1890	36,672 kilometers
1910	49,385 kilometers
1914	51,662 kilometers

% OF ILLITERACY IN FRANCE (MEN OVER 20 YEARS OLD)

1832	53.21%
1852	38.14%
1872	21.49%
1892	8.50%
1914	3.75%

PRESS PRODUCTION: FROM THE POLITICAL GAZETTE TO THE MASS CIRCULATION DAILY NEWSPAPER

1824	Total French Gazette subscribers	54,674
1836	Print run of all Paris daily newspapers	70,000
1846	" " " " " "	200,000
1866	" " " " " "	350,000
1881	" " " " " "	1,984,521
"	" " the <i>Petit Journal</i> alone	634,000
1913	" " the <i>Petit Parisien</i> alone	1,500,000

sharply and incisively — the position of the class fraction or ideological interests which the organ supported:

A means of expression, the press is also the first rough outline of an organization; whereas the political parties did not yet have the hierarchy, secretariat or executive staff they would acquire later, the press offered a framework to coordinate action, and organize propaganda.⁵

The journalist of the nineteenth-century militant press, bourgeois or working-class, is an "organic intellectual" in the sense used by Gramsci: he condenses, clarifies, and directs the interests of the class or social stratum which he represents. Here the identity of interests between the transmitter and the receivers is clear and direct.

This militant climate, this close relationship between journalist and readers is also found in the working-class press of the epoch:

These men, for the most part craftsmen or of working-class origin began to publish newspapers less out of monetary interest, than out of a desire to devote themselves to the radical movement. Many writers were at the same time booksellers, sometimes even with a café with newspapers in their reading rooms, which like Watson's and Hetherington's in London, became discussion centers and meeting places for all kinds of radical activity.⁶

With the popular press, the organic intellectual gave way to the moderating and vulgarizing intellectual typified by the lead editorial writer of the *Petit Journal*, who wrote under the pseudonym of Thomas Grimm. The publication of his complete works would be a major contribution to our knowledge of the development of "common sense". To take only two examples, here is how Grimm plays on the chauvinistic sentiments to discredit the Workers' International; and how he uses the Christian concept of the family as the basic cell and model of society to condemn a strike:

As for the International's undertaking, it seems to me that its importance has been greatly exaggerated. The French worker is not cosmopolitan. He knows that with perseverance, thrift and industriousness he will attain the well-being offered by work, move ahead, become his own boss, and make his fortune. (9 March 1873)

A strike is a calamity. We see the proof in the relationship between the bosses and workers, which are not everywhere solidly enough established for industry to be one big family. We recommend the association of interests. (28 July 1878)

In this aspect of class struggle, "whose arena is the sign", to use the words of Baktine,⁷ Grimm gives the International a negative value by assimilating it with cosmopolitanism, just as he does when he presents a strike as being the negation of the family, the supposed model of society.

The whole stratagem consists in using a circular, polished, civilised discourse to pose these

5. Pierre Guiral, in *Histoire générale de la presse française*, II (1815-1871), p. 247.

6. Dorothy Thomson "La presse de la classe ouvrière anglaise", *Revue de la société d'Histoire de 1848*, special

taken-for-granted equivalents as being the expression of common sense, just the opposite of a brutal, polemical, biting discourse, like that of Valles, the writer-journalist of the Commune.

This new discourse is not an ideological graft upon a foreign body; it functions by using a rhetoric closely related to popular habits. From the complex connotations linked to each ideological concept—nation, people, class, State, peace, empire, etc. — "Grimm's system" isolates certain connotations, represses others, makes negative or positive metaphorical assimilations, and finally obtains the familiar air of the already heard, read or said which is the best assurance of the truth of "common sense": the feeling that we are on familiar and common ground.

If we speak at length of "Grimm's system" it is because it is really a genre in itself, a product of the objective and necessary relations between journalism and social relations, as it was shaped by the "Big Four" at the end of the nineteenth century. Thomas Grimm is a collective pseudonym capable of holding forth on any topic; the unity of the whole discourse being held together by its familiar common-sense style. From Grimm to Gicquel, today's well-known television newscaster, well-rounded, flowery talkers have stood on the platform of impartiality to thus fit the news into the mold of common sense.

Thus the same term, the press, came to designate two quite different realities. First, different in their function: on the one hand, a press designed to bring together by consolidating and organizing classes and social groups around common interests; and on the other, a press designed to bring together classes and social groups by weakening and disorganizing class interests. Second, different in their organization: on the one hand, a press composed of militants which loses money; and on the other, a press composed of professionals which makes money. Third, different in their outlook on the future: on the one hand, a press with a limited circulation and limited advertising whose history is subject to the vicissitudes of the political struggles which nourish it; and on the other, a press constantly searching for large circulation and advertising revenues (a model of communication which later will be the real criteria for the establishment of the mass radio and television).

In brief, on the one hand a means of expression for social movements; and on the other, an apparatus riveted to the movement of capital.


The Law of 1881, voted almost unanimously, except for Freppel, an ultra-reactionary fossil of the *Ancien Régime*, can be understood in terms of the double meaning attached to the concept of the freedom of the press;

— for the bourgeoisie, this noble concept hides and sanctions, above all, the possibility to expand a vast superstructural industry; and — for progressive forces, it is a matter of

issue, 1966, on the working-class press.

7. Michael Baktine, *Le Marxisme et la philosophie du langage*, Paris, Minuit, 1977, p.44.

THE TRIANGLE OF FORCES AND THEIR ARTICULATION CONDITIONING THE COMMUNICATION SECTOR



The dynamic "State — Capital — Social Movements", each with their own logic in the communication sector, are not separate and juxtaposed, but rather forces which combine, dominate and confront one another. The State arbitrates between the interests of the capitalists in the communications sector who above all want to make profits like any other merchant, and the interests of the capitalist class as a whole which considers the strategic importance of communication to propagate its

political values. Faced with the struggles of the dominated classes who express themselves in a militant form of communication (based on the three leninist principles of agitation, propaganda and organization), the bourgeoisie and its State ceaselessly play on the double aspect of the communication sector, as commodity and as ideological apparatus, putting one or the other forward as called for by the political struggle.

recognizing in law the freedom of expression dearly paid for during the nineteenth century by those who sought to give it a concrete social form.

Here is a brief exchange which took place during the parliamentary debate on the freedom of the press:

Clémenceau: "I know that there is a great temptation to use the repressive instruments which were designed to serve the monarchy, to now serve the Republic. But gentlemen, remember that all these arms were impotent in the hands of those who controlled them: have the courage to destroy them and throw them far away. Repudiate the heritage of repression which has been offered to you, and faithful to your principles, trust courageously in freedom." (Excellent! Repeated applause from several benches on the left.)

Lord Freppel: "I shall not vote for this law because by abolishing the offense of outrage against public and religious morals (Ah! Ah! from the left), against the religions recognised by the State, that is, against God and all that is most holy and sacred in the world, it delivers, sacrifices and abandons what it has the duty and mission to protect and defend."

8. *Journal Officiel* (Paris), 2 February 1881.

Clémenceau: "God will defend Himself quite well alone, he doesn't need the Chamber of Deputies."

Lord Freppel: "I shall not vote for the law because it rests upon an absolutely false principle, because legally speaking, it is not possible to have an offense against doctrines (Exclamations and ironic applause from the left)... any healthy philosophy recognizes that doctrines are precisely what govern all human activity...."⁸

Although just one of many possible reflections of class struggle through signs, gestures and ironic exclamations, nevertheless this historic session of the Chamber of Deputies expresses quite well the double movement in the relationship between the State/political society and civil society at the end of the nineteenth century:

1. With the rise of capitalism, the Church, principal ideological apparatus of the *Ancien Régime*, is incapable of functioning as the ideological "cement" of the social formation; and

2. The bourgeoisie, leaning on the rising social forces pitted against the Church and the landed aristocracy, sets up a new ideological apparatus: the education and information system, which are suited to the needs of its ideological cohesion.

In this social dynamic one will not find a *Citizen Kane* or a plot set in motion by clever manipulators; here we are confronted with an objective movement, corresponding to the transformation of the relations of force between two social formations. The meteoric rise of the popular press at the end of the nineteenth century reflects this change in the nature of the information and communication sector. Until the 1880s this sector was concerned with the expression of the specific interests of different strata of society, but with the appearance of the "Big Four", the press took over a new area: public opinion. While the Church, through its body of doctrine represented the essence of daily morality and imposed its own reading upon current events, the popular press secularized public opinion, reconstituting little by little a new daily morality on the basis of the new dominant interests.

The growing inadequacy of the Church's sermonizing to explain the transformation of the productive forces, the ceaseless upheaval in living and working conditions, and the process of industrialization and the problems they posed, left the field wide open for other explanations, and justifications.

The nature of this "field" is at one and the same time, a new market where capital can exercise its entrepreneurial capacity in the creation of a new industrial branch, and also a new apparatus which the State can use by keeping it in line through legal means, recommendations, prefectorial assistance,⁹ and when necessary, control more rigorously when there is an urgent need to bring the production of public opinion into alignment with State interests. Thus in 1914, the Censorship Office had to remind the superstructural industries that the pure logic of immediate profit for the newspaper owners had to be subordinated to the "national interest" of all the bourgeoisie. Like the armament industry, the press, an instrument of permanent moral and ideological rearmament, is more than just a commodity.

Amilcar Cabral

THE ROLE OF CULTURE IN THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

(Cape Verde Islands, 1972)

INTRODUCTION

The struggle of peoples against imperialist rule and for national liberation and independence, has become a tremendous force for human progress and is beyond doubt an essential feature of the history of our time.

Objective analysis of imperialism as a *fact* or historical *phenomenon* that is "natural," even "necessary," to the economic and political evolution typifying a great part of mankind, reveals that imperialist rule, with its train of misery, pillage, crime and destruction of human and cultural values, was not a purely negative reality. The huge accumulation of capital in a half dozen countries of the northern hemisphere as the result of piracy, sacking of other people's property and unbridled exploitation of their labour did more than engender colonial monopoly, the sharing-out of the world and imperialist dominion.

In the rich countries, imperialist capital, ever looking for higher profits, heightened man's creative capacity; profoundly transformed the means of production through the accelerated progress of science and technology; increased the socialization of work; and enabled vast strata of the population to rise. In the colonized areas, where colonization usually arrested the historical development of the people colonized—when it did not wipe them out altogether—imperialist capital imposed new types of relationships within the indigenous societies, whose structures thus became more complex. It instigated, fomented, sharpened and sometimes resolved social contradictions and conflicts. It introduced new elements into the economy, with the money cycle and development of domestic and foreign trade. It led to the birth of new nations out of human groups or peoples at varying stages of historical development.

It is not defending imperialist rule to recognize that, by reducing the world's dimensions it gave it new worlds, revealed new phases in the development of human societies and, in spite of or because of the prejudices, discrimination and

9. Colette Hirtz, in her monograph *L'Est Republicain 1889-1914* (Grenoble, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1973), brought to light prefectorial dossiers showing the very close attention the government paid to the daily press of the epoch.

This text was originally given as a speech at a UNESCO Conference held in Paris on 3-7 July 1972. It was edited by the LSM Information Center from a PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde) memorandum and first published in English in *Latin American Research Unit Studies* (Toronto), I, 3, June 1977.

crimes it gave rise to, helped impart a deeper knowledge of mankind-as-a-whole in movement, as a *unit* in the complex, diverse characteristics of its development.

On the different continents, imperialist rule fostered a multilateral, gradual (though at times abrupt) confrontation, not only between different men but between different societies. The practice of imperialist rule—its affirmation or its negation—required (and still requires) a relatively accurate knowledge of the *dominated object*, and of the historical reality—economic, social and cultural—within which it moves, this knowledge necessarily being expressed in terms of comparison with the *dominating subject* and its historical reality. Such knowledge is imperative for the practice of imperialist rule, which results from the usually violent confrontation of two *identities* distinct in their historical content and antagonistic in their functions. The search for such knowledge contributed to a general enrichment of the human and social sciences despite its being unilateral, subjective and very often unjust.

Man never before took such an interest in knowing other men and societies as during this century of imperialist domination. Thus an unprecedented amount of information, hypotheses and theories accumulated—especially in the fields of history, ethnology, ethnography, sociology and culture—regarding the subjugated peoples or human groups. Concepts of race, caste, clan, tribe, nation, culture, identity, dignity, etc., have received growing attention from those who study man and so-called “primitive” or “evolving” societies.

More recently, with the upsurge of liberation movements, it has become necessary to analyze the characteristics of these societies in terms of the struggle that is being waged in order to determine the factors that set it in motion or restrain it. Research workers generally agree that in this context culture takes on a particular significance. Thus any attempt to throw light on the true role of culture in the development of a liberation (pre-independence) movement can make an important contribution to the general struggle of peoples against imperialist rule.

I. CULTURAL RESISTANCE AGAINST “ASSIMILATION”

Because independence movements are as a rule marked, even in their beginnings, by a succession of cultural manifestations, it is usually taken for granted that they are preceded by a “cultural renaissance” of the dominated people. More than that: it is assumed that culture is a method of group mobilization, even a *weapon* in the fight for independence.

From experience of the struggle of my own people and, it might be said of all Africa, I feel that this is a too limited, if not erroneous, conception of the vital role of culture in development of the liberation movement. I think it comes of generalizing incorrectly from a real but restricted phenomenon

that appears at a particular level in the vertical structure of colonized societies: the level of colonial *élites* or *diasporas*. Such generalizations ignore or neglect an essential aspect of the problem: the indestructibility of cultural resistance to foreign rule by the mass of the people.

To be sure, the exercise of imperialist domination demands cultural oppression and the attempt at direct or indirect liquidation of what is essential in the subject people's culture. But this people is able to create and develop a liberation movement only because it keeps its culture alive despite permanent and organized repression of its cultural life—only because its politico-military resistance being destroyed, it continues to resist culturally. And it is cultural resistance which, at a given moment, may take on new forms (political, economic, military) to counter foreign domination.

With few exceptions the *era of colonization* was not long enough, in Africa at least, to destroy or significantly depreciate the essential elements in the culture and traditions of the colonized people. Experience in Africa shows that (genocide, racial segregation, and “apartheid” excepted) the one allegedly “positive” way colonial powers have found for opposing cultural resistance is “*assimilation*.” But the total failure of the policy of “gradual assimilation” of native populations is obvious proof both of the fallacy of the theory and of the people's capacity for resistance.¹

It can be seen that even in settlement colonies, where the overwhelming majority of the population is still indigenous, the area of colonial occupation, and particularly *cultural occupation*, is usually reduced to coastal strips and a few small zones in the interior. The influence of the colonial power's culture is almost nil beyond the capital and other urban centers. It is felt significantly only at the vertex of the social pyramid—the pyramid colonialism itself created—and especially affects what may be called the native lower middle class and a very limited number of workers in urban centers.

We find then that the great rural masses and a large percentage of the urban population—making up a total of over 99% of the indigenous population—remain apart, or almost so, from any cultural influence by the colonial power. This situation derives on the one hand from the necessarily obscurantist character of imperialist rule which, while despising and repressing the culture of the dominated people, has no interest in promoting acculturation of the masses—the source of forced labour and the prime object of exploitation. On the other hand, it derives from the effective cultural resistance of those masses who, subjected to political rule and economic exploitation, find in their own culture the one bulwark strong enough to preserve their *identity*. Where the indigenous society has a vertical structure, this defense of the

1. For the Portuguese colonies, the maximum percentage of assimilated persons is 0.3% of the total population (in Guinea-Bissau), after 500 years of civilizing presence and half a century of “colonial peace.”

cultural heritage is further reinforced by the colonial power's interest in protecting and strengthening the cultural influence of the dominant classes, its allies.

What I have said implies that, not only for the mass of people in the dominated territory but also for the dominant classes among the indigenous people (traditional chiefs, noble families, religious authorities) there is usually no destruction or significant undermining of culture and traditions. Repressed, persecuted, humiliated, betrayed by certain strata which have come to terms with the foreigner, taking refuge in villages, in forests and in the minds of the victims of domination, culture weathers all storms to recover through the struggle for liberation all its power of expansion and enrichment. That is why the problem of a “return to sources” or a “cultural renaissance” does not arise for the mass of the people. It could not, for the masses are the torch-bearers of culture; they are the source of culture and, at the same time, the one entity truly capable of preserving and creating it—of *making history*.

For a correct appreciation of the true role of culture in the development of the liberation movement a distinction must therefore be made, at least in Africa, between the situation of the masses, who preserve their culture, and that of social sectors which are more or less assimilated, uprooted and culturally alienated. Even though they are marked by certain cultural features of the native community, the native élites created by the colonizing process live materially and spiritually the culture of the colonialist foreigner, with whom they seek gradually to identify themselves in social behavior and even in their view of indigenous cultural values.

Over two or three colonized generations a social stratum is formed of government officials, business employees (especially in trade), members of the liberal professions and a few urban agricultural landowners. This indigenous lower middle class, created by foreign rule and indispensable to the system of colonial exploitation, has its place between the mass of rural and urban workers and the few local representatives of the foreign ruling class. Although its members may have somewhat developed relations with the mass of people or traditional chiefs, they usually aspire to a way of life similar to, if not identical with, that of the foreign minority. They limit their intercourse with the masses while trying to become integrated with that minority, often to the detriment of family or ethnic bonds and always at personal cost. But despite appearances and seeming exceptions, they do not succeed in crossing the barriers imposed by the system. They are prisoners of the contradictions within the social and cultural reality they live in. They cannot escape, under “colonial peace,” their condition as a “marginal” class. Both *in loco* and within the *diasporas* implanted in the colonialist metropolis, this “marginality” constitutes the socio-cultural drama of the colonial élites or native “petty bourgeoisie,” a drama lived more or less intensely according to material conditions and level of ac-

culturation, but always on the individual rather than community level.

Within the framework of this daily drama and against the background of confrontation, usually violent, between the masses and the colonial ruling class, a feeling of bitterness, a *frustration complex*, develops and grows among the indigenous lower middle class. Along with this they gradually become conscious of an urgent need to contest their marginal status and to find an *identity*. So they turn towards the other pole of the sociocultural conflict in which they are living—to the native masses. Hence the “return to the sources,” which seems all the more imperative as the isolation of the petty bourgeoisie (or native élites) grows and as its sense of frustration becomes more acute—as among the African *diasporas* implanted in colonialist or racial capitals. It is not by chance, then, that theories or movements like *Pan-Africanism* and *Négritude* (two pertinent expressions based mainly on the postulate that all Black Africans are culturally identical) were conceived outside Black Africa. More recently, the Black American's claim to an African identity is another manifestation, perhaps desperate, of this need to “return to the sources,” though clearly influenced by a new fact: the winning of political independence by the great majority of African peoples.

But “return to the sources” neither is nor can be, in itself, an *act of struggle* against foreign rule (colonialist and racial), nor does it necessarily mean a return to traditions. Needing to identify with the subject people, the indigenous “petty bourgeoisie” deny that the culture of the ruling power is superior to theirs, as claimed. “Return to the sources” then is not a voluntary step but rather the only viable response to the powerful pressure of concrete historical necessity, determined by an irreconcilable contradiction between colonized society and colonial power, exploited masses and foreign exploiting class. Every indigenous social stratum or class is obliged to define its position in relation to this contradiction.

When the “return to the sources” extends beyond the individual and expresses itself in “groups” or “movements,” this contradiction becomes sharp (concealed or open conflict), the prelude of a pre-independence movement or struggle for liberation from the foreign yoke. But this “return to the sources” is historically important *only* if it involves both a genuine commitment to the fight for independence and a total, definitive identification with the aspirations of the masses, who contest not merely the foreigner's culture but foreign rule altogether. Otherwise “return to the sources” is nothing but a means to obtaining temporary advantages, a conscious or unconscious form of political opportunism.

It must be pointed out that “return to the sources,” whether apparent or real, is not something that happens simultaneously and uniformly within the indigenous lower middle class. It is a slow, discontinuous and uneven process, the development of which depends on each person's

degree of acculturation, the material conditions of his life, his ideological training, and his own history as a social being. This unevenness is the basis for splitting the indigenous "petty bourgeoisie" into three groups in relation to the liberation movement.

a) a minority which, even if it wishes for an end to foreign rule, hangs on to the ruling colonial class and openly opposes the movement in order to defend its social security;

b) a majority of hesitant or undecided elements;

c) another minority whose membership participate in the formation and leadership of the liberation movement.

But this last group, which plays a decisive role in developing the pre-independence movement, can only succeed in really identifying itself with the mass of people (their culture, their aspirations) through participation in the struggle: the degree of their identification depending on the form or forms of the struggle, the ideological content of the movement, and the level of each man's moral and political awareness.

II. THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY

For part of the "native" lower middle class to identify with the masses presupposes one essential condition: that *against the destructive action of imperialist rule the masses preserve their identity*, different and distinct from that of the colonial power. So it seems important to determine in what cases this preservation is possible: why, when and at what levels of the subject society the problem of loss or lack of identity arises, making it necessary to assert or reassert, in the framework of the pre-independence movement, a different, distinct identity.

The identity of a given individual or human group is a biosocial quality independent of the will of this individual or group and meaningful only when expressed in relation to other individuals or groups. The dialectical nature of identity lies in the fact that it both *identifies* and *distinguishes*; for an individual (or human group) is identical with other individuals (or groups) only if distinct from yet other ones. Definition of an individual or collective identity, therefore, is at once the affirmation and negation of a certain number of characteristics defining individuals or communities in terms of *historical* (biological and sociological) coordinates at one moment in their evolution. Identity is not an immutable quality, for the very reason that the biological and sociological data that define it are in constant evolution. Biologically or sociologically there are, in time, no two beings (individual or collective) absolutely identical or absolutely distinct, for it is always possible to find distinguishing or identifying characteristics. So the identity of a being is always a relative and indeed a circumstantial quality, its definition requiring a fairly rigorous or restricted selection of the being's biological and sociological characteristics.

It must be observed that in the definition of identity the sociological aspect is more determining

than the biological. While it is true that the biological element (the genetic heritage) is the indispensable material base for the existence and evolutionary continuity of identity, the fact remains that the sociological element is the factor which, by giving this genetic quality content and form, gives it objective significance and makes it possible to confront or compare individuals or groups. Indeed, to arrive at an integral definition of identity, characterization of the biological element is indispensable but does not imply identification on the sociological plane; whereas two sociologically identical beings necessarily have a similar identity on the biological plane.

This fact shows on the one hand the supremacy of social life over individual life, for society (human society, for example) is a higher form of life. On the other hand it suggests that in understanding identity we must not confuse *original identity*, in which the biological element is the chief determinant, with *present identity* in which the chief determinant is the sociological element. Obviously the identity to be reckoned with at any given moment in the evolution of a being (individual or collective) is present identity, and any appreciation based solely on original identity is incomplete, partial and fallacious, for it neglects or is ignorant of the decisive influence of social reality on the content and form of identity.

In the formation and development of individual or community identity, social reality is an objective agent resulting from the economic, political, social and cultural factors that characterize the society's evolution or history. When we consider that the economic factor is fundamental, we can say that identity is, in some manner, the expression of an economic fact. Whatever the society's geographic setting and line of development, this fact is defined by the level of development of productive forces (the relationship between man and nature) and the relations of production (relations between man or categories of men within any one society). However, if we grant that culture is the dynamic synthesis of the society's material and spiritual reality and expresses both relations between man and nature and relations among different categories of men in one society, we may also say that identity, at an individual or community level, and apart from economic facts, is the expression of a culture. That is why to locate, recognize, or assert the identity of an individual or human group is, above all, to situate the individual or group within the framework of a culture. Now, as the chief support of culture in every society is the social fabric, it seems reasonable to conclude that, for a given human group, the possibility of preserving (or losing) its identity in the face of foreign rule depends on how far that rule has destroyed its social structure.

Here it is essential to consider the case of classical colonialism, which is what the pre-independence movement is contesting. In this case, no matter what may be the stage of historical development in the dominated society, its social fabric may suffer the following effects:

a) *total destruction*, along with immediate or gradual liquidation of the indigenous population and its replacement by foreigners;

b) *partial destruction*, with the establishment of a larger or smaller foreign population;

c) *apparent conservation*, conditioned by confinement of the indigenous society to geographic zones or reserves, usually lacking means of subsistence, along with massive implantation of a settler population.

The essential horizontal character of the African people's social fabric, due to the profusion of ethnic groups, means that cultural resistance and the degree of preservation of identity are not uniform. Thus, while it is true that in general ethnic groups have succeeded in keeping their identity, we find that the most *resistant* groups are those that had the most violent clashes with the colonial power during the phase of effective occupation² or the one that, through geographical isolation, have had least contact with foreign presence.³

The attitude of colonial powers towards ethnic groups is hopelessly contradictory. On the one hand this power has to divide, or maintain division, in order to reign, and therefore it encourages separation if not quarrels between ethnic groups. On the other hand, in trying to ensure perpetuation of its rule it has to destroy the social fabric, the culture and hence the identity of those groups. Moreover, it is forced to defend the governing classes of groups which (like the Peul people or nation in my country) gave it decisive support at the time of colonial conquest—a policy which tends to preserve those groups' identity.

As I said, regarding culture there are usually no important modifications at the summit of the indigenous social pyramid or pyramids (groups with a hierarchical structure). Each stratum or class retains its identity, integrated within the larger group, but distinct from the identities of other social categories. By contrast, in urban centers and in certain zones of the interior where the colonial power's cultural influence is felt, the problem of identity is more complex. Whereas those at the base of the social pyramid—that is the majority of the masses of working people from different ethnic groups—and those at the top (the foreign ruling class) keep their identities, those in the middle range of this pyramid (the native lower middle class)—culturally rootless, alienated or more or less assimilated—flounder in a social and cultural conflict in quest of their identity. The foreign ruling class, though united by a new identity conferred on it by the colonial power, does not succeed in freeing itself from the contradictions of its own society, which it imports.

When the pre-independence movement gets under way on the initiative of a minority of the native lower middle class in alliance with the indigenous masses, these masses have no need to

2. In my country, the Mandjaques, the Pepels, the Oincas, the Balantes, and the Beafades.

3. This is the case with the Pajadincas and other minorities of the interior.

assert or reassert their identity. They could never possibly have confused it with that of the colonial power. This need is felt only by the native lower middle class, who are forced to take a stand in the conflict between the masses and the colonial power. But reassertion of an identity distinct from the colonial power's is not general among the petty bourgeoisie. It is achieved only by a minority. Another minority asserts—often noisily—its identity with the foreign ruling class. The silent majority dithers, indecisive.

Even when there is reassertion of an identity distinct from the colonial power's and therefore the same as that of the masses, it is not manifested in the same way everywhere. Part of the bourgeois minority engaged in the pre-independence movement make use of foreign culture, drawing especially on literature and the arts to express the discovery of their own identity rather than the people's aspirations and sufferings that serve as their artistic theme. And just because they use the language and speech of the colonial power, they can only rarely influence the masses, who are generally illiterate and familiar with different forms of artistic expression. Still, that does not diminish the value of their contribution to the development of the struggle, for they do succeed in influencing some of the indecisive or backward elements in their own class and also a large section of public opinion in the colonial metropolis, especially intellectuals.

The other part of the "petty bourgeoisie," those engaged in the pre-independence movement from the very beginning, find immediate participation in the liberation struggle and integration with the masses the best way of expressing an identity distinct from that of the colonial power.

Thus identification with the masses and reassertion of identity may be temporary or definitive, apparent or real, when confronting the day-to-day efforts and sacrifices demanded by the struggle itself; a struggle which, even though it is the organized political expression of a *culture*, is also necessarily a proof not only of *identity* but also of *dignity*.

Throughout the process of colonialist rule, the mass of the people, whatever the social fabric of the group they belong to, continue to resist the colonial power. In the first phase of conquest, cynically called "pacification," they resist foreign occupation weapons in hand. In the second phase, the golden age of triumphant colonialism, they offer a passive, almost silent resistance, one characterized by many rebellions (usually individual, rarely collective), particularly in the areas of work, taxes and social contact with foreign or indigenous representatives of the colonial power. In the third phase, the struggle for liberation, it is they who furnish the main force for political or armed resistance, for contesting and liquidating foreign rule. Such resistance, protracted and multiform, is only possible because by preserving their culture and their identity the masses retain consciousness of their individual and collective dignity despite the vexations, humiliations and cruelties they are often

exposed to.

Assertion or reassertion by the native lower middle-class of an identity distinct from that of the colonial power does not and cannot help restore a sense of dignity to this social stratum. At this level a sense of dignity depends on each person's objective behavior, moral and social, and on his consciousness and attitude toward the two poles of social conflict between which he lives out the day-to-day drama of colonization. This drama is all the more intense because in discharging their functions the petty bourgeoisie are forced into continual contact with both the ruling foreigners and the masses. On the one side they suffer frequent if not daily humiliation at the hands of the foreigner; on the other they become aware of the injustices inflicted upon the masses and also of their rebellious resistance. Hence the paradox apparent in the challenge to colonial rule: it is within this native lower middle class, a social sector that colonization itself created, that the first important initiatives appear aimed at mobilizing and organizing the masses for the struggle against the colonial power.

Through all vicissitudes and regardless of its forms, this struggle reflects the growing awareness of a special identity; it generalizes and consolidates the sense of dignity, reinforced by the development of political consciousness; and it draws from the culture or cultures of the rebellious masses one of its main sources of strength.

III. LIBERATION: AN ACT OF CULTURE

A correct appreciation of what culture means in the pre-independence movement requires that a clear distinction be made between *culture* and *cultural manifestations*. Culture is the dynamic synthesis, at the level of individual or community consciousness, of the material and spiritual historical reality of a society or a human group, of the relations existing between man and nature as well as among men and among social classes or sectors. Cultural manifestations are the various forms in which this synthesis is expressed, individually or collectively, at each stage in the evolution of the society or group.

Culture has proved to be the very foundation of the liberation movement. Mobilization, organization and carrying out the struggle against foreign rule have proved possible only for societies which preserve their culture. Whatever the ideological or idealistic characteristics of its expression may be, culture is an essential element in this historical process. It is culture that has the capacity for elaborating or fertilizing elements which ensure the historical continuity of the society—at the same time determining its possibilities of progress or regression. Thus, as imperialist rule is the negation of the historical process of the dominated society, it is necessarily the negation of its cultural process. And because a society that truly liberates itself from foreign rule returns to the upward path of its own culture, nourished by the living reality of the environment, and rejecting the baneful influences

and any kind of subjection to foreign cultures, the struggle for liberation is above all else an *act of culture*.

The fight for liberation is an essentially political fact. Consequently, as it develops, it can only use political methods—including violence in an effort to end violent, always armed, imperialist rule. Culture, then, is decidedly not simply a weapon or method of group mobilization against foreign domination. It is much more than that. Indeed, it is on concrete knowledge of the local reality, particularly the cultural reality, that the choice, structuring and development of the best methods of fighting are based. Therefore, the liberation struggle must accord permanent importance not only to the cultural characteristics of the subject society in general, but also to those of each social category. For, though it has a mass aspect, culture is not uniform; it does not develop evenly within all sectors, horizontal or vertical, of society.

The attitude and behavior of each social group, class or individual towards the struggle and its development are clearly dictated by economic interests; but they are also profoundly influenced by culture. It may even be said that differences in cultural level can often explain differences in behavior among individuals of the same social category towards the liberation movement. It is on this plane, then, that culture attains its full significance for every person: comprehension of and integration in this social milieu, identification with the fundamental problems and aspirations of his society, acceptance or rejection of the possibility of progressive change.

Clearly a multiplicity of social categories, and particularly of ethnic groups, makes the role of culture in the liberation movement more difficult to determine. But this complexity does not lessen the decisive importance to the liberation movement of the *class character* of culture, more evident in the urban sectors and in rural societies with a hierarchical structure, but to be taken into consideration even when the phenomenon of class is embryonic. Experience shows that when revolt against foreign rule forces them to make a political choice, most members of the privileged categories put their immediate class interests above the interests of ethnic groups or the total society—hence against the aspirations of the masses.

Nor must we forget that culture, both as a cause and an effect of history, includes essential and secondary elements, strengths and weaknesses, merits and defects, positive and negative aspects, factors, both for progress and stagnation or regression, contradictions, conflicts. However complex the cultural panorama, the liberation movement needs to recognize and define its contradictory aspects so as to retain the positive values and *channel* them in the direction of the struggle, together with the added *national dimension*. It must be observed, however, that only when the struggle is actually under way does the complexity and importance of these cultural problems become fully apparent. So there have to be successive adaptations of strategy and tactics to realities which the struggle

alone can reveal. And only the struggle can reveal the inexhaustible source of courage which culture is for the masses of people—a source of physical and psychic energy on the one hand, but also of obstacles and difficulties, erroneous conceptions, indiscipline in the fulfilment of duties, and limitations upon the rhythm and efficacy of the struggle.

All this implies a permanent confrontation between the different elements within the culture as well as between the culture and the demands of the struggle. A reciprocal relationship between the culture and the struggle develops. Culture, as a foundation and source of inspiration, begins to be influenced by the struggle; and this influence is reflected, more or less clearly, in the changing behavior of social categories and individuals as well as in the development of the struggle itself. Both the leaders of the liberation movement—mostly from urban centers (“petty bourgeoisie” and wage-earners)—and the masses (overwhelmingly peasants) make cultural advances. They learn more about the realities of their country, rid themselves of class complexes and prejudices, burst the bounds of their limited universe, destroy ethnic barriers, acquire political consciousness, relate themselves more closely within their country and towards the world, and so on.

Whatever its form, the struggle requires the mobilization and organization of a large majority of the population, the political and moral unity of the different social categories, the gradual elimination of vestiges of tribal or feudal mentality and the rejection of social and religious taboos incompatible with the *rational* and national character of the liberating movement. In addition, the struggle brings about many other profound modifications in the *life* of the people. This is all the more true because the dynamics of the struggle requires the exercise of democracy, criticism and self-criticism, growing participation by the people in running their own lives, literacy, the creation of schools and health services, leadership training for persons with rural and urban laboring backgrounds, and many, other developments which impel people to set forth upon the road of cultural progress. This shows that the liberation struggle is not simply a cultural fact; it is a *cultural factor*, a process giving new forms and content to culture.

Within the indigenous society the action of the liberation movement on the cultural plane entails the gradual creation of a solid cultural unity, symbiotic in nature, corresponding to the moral and political unity necessary to the dynamics of the struggle. With the opening up of hermetic or isolated groups, tribal or ethnic-racist aggressiveness tends gradually to disappear, giving way to understanding, solidarity and mutual respect among the various horizontal sectors of society, united in struggle and within a common destiny in the face of foreign rule. These are sentiments which the mass of people imbibe readily enough if the process is not hindered by the political opportunism peculiar to the middle classes. Group identity and, as a consequence, a sense of dignity are also reinforced.

All this serves the movement of society as a whole toward harmonious progress in terms of new historical coordinates. Only intensive, effective political action, the essential element in the struggle, can define the trajectory and bounds of this movement and ensure its continuity.

Among representatives of the colonial power, as in metropolitan opinion, the first reaction to the liberation struggle is a general feeling of amazement and incredulity. Once this feeling—the fruit of prejudice or the planned distortion that typifies colonialist news—is surmounted, reactions vary with the interests, political options, and degree of crystallization of a colonialist or racist mentality among the different social sectors and even among individuals. The progress of the struggle and the sacrifices imposed by the need for colonialist repression cause a split in metropolitan opinion: divergent positions are taken up and new political and social contradictions emerge.

From the moment that the struggle has to be recognized as irreversible, no matter how much may be done to strangle it, a qualitative change takes place in metropolitan opinion. On the whole, the possibility if not the inevitability of the colony's independence is gradually accepted. Such a change expresses conscious or unconscious admission of the fact that the struggling colonized people have an identity and a culture of their own; though throughout the conflict an active minority, clinging to its interest and prejudices, persists in refusing them their right to independence and rejecting the equality of cultures which that right implies. At a decisive stage in the conflict, this cultural equivalence is implicitly recognized or accepted even by the colonial power—in an effort to divert the struggle from its objectives. The colonizers apply a demagogic policy of “economic and social promotion,” of “cultural development,” cloaking its domination within new forms. Actually, if neo-colonialism is above all the continuation of imperialist economic rule in disguise, it is also the tacit recognition by the colonial power that the people it rules and exploits have an identity which requires its own political direction for the satisfaction of a cultural necessity.

Further, by accepting the existence of an identity and a culture among the colonized people, and therefore their inalienable right to self-determination and independence, metropolitan opinion itself (or at least an important part of it) makes significant cultural progress and sheds a negative element in its own culture: the prejudice that the colonizing nation is superior to the colonized one. This advance can have important --transcendent-- consequences for the political evolution of the imperialist or colonial power, as is proved by certain facts of recent or current history.

Certain genetical-somatic and cultural affinities between various human groups on one or more continents plus more or less similar situations as regards colonial or racist domination have led to the formulation of theories and the creation of “movements” based on the hypothetical existence of *racial* or *continental cultures*. The significance of culture in the liberation movement, widely recognized or

sensed, has helped give this hypothesis a certain following. While the importance of such theories or movements—as attempts, successful or not, at seeking an identity and as a means of contesting foreign rule—should not be minimized, an objective analysis of culture leads me to deny the existence of racial or continental cultures. First, culture, like history, is an expanding phenomenon closely linked with the economic and social reality of a given environment, with the level of the productive forces and with the production relations of the society that creates it. Second, culture develops unevenly at the level of a continent, a “race,” even a community. In fact the coordinates of culture, like those of every other developing phenomenon, vary in space and time, whether they are material (physical) or human (biological and sociological). That is why culture—the creation of a community, the synthesis of balances and solutions engendered to resolve the conflicts that characterize it at every phase of history—is a social reality independent of man’s will, the color of his skin or shape of his eyes, and geographical boundaries.

A correct appreciation of the role of culture in the liberation movement requires that we consider its defining characteristics as a whole and with regard to their internal relations; that we avoid any confusion between what is the expression of an historical, material reality and what seems to be a creation of the mind detached from that reality; that we do not set up an absurd connection between artistic creations, valuable or not, and supposedly psychic and somatic characteristics of a “race”; and finally, that we avoid any non-scientific or ascientific analysis of the cultural phenomenon.

For culture to play its due part, the liberation movement must establish precise objectives to be achieved on the way toward reconquering the right of the people it represents and whom it is helping to make its own history and obtain the free disposal of its own productive forces, with an end to the eventual development of a richer culture—popular, national, scientific and universal. What is important for the liberation movement is not to prove the specificity or non-specificity of the people’s culture but to analyze it critically in the light of requirements of the struggle and of progress—to give it its place, with neither a superiority nor an inferiority complex, in universal civilization, as a part of the common heritage of mankind and with a view to harmonious integration in the present-day world.

The liberation struggle, which is the most complex expression of the people’s cultural vigor, their identity, their dignity, enriches culture and opens up new prospects for its development. Cultural manifestations acquire a new content and find new forms of expression. Thus they become a powerful instrument for political information and training, not only in the struggle for independence but also in the great battle for human progress.

Renato Constantino

THE MIS-EDUCATION OF THE FILIPINO

(Philippines, 1970)

Education is a vital weapon of a people striving for economic emancipation, political independence, and cultural renaissance. We are such a people. Philippine education, therefore, must produce Filipinos who are aware of their country’s problems, who understand the basic solution to these problems, and who care enough to have courage enough to work and sacrifice for their country’s salvation.

NATIONALISM IN EDUCATION

In recent years, in various sectors of our society, there have been nationalist stirrings which were crystallised and articulated by the late Claro M. Recto. There were jealous demands for the recognition of Philippine sovereignty on the bases question. There were appeals for the correction of the iniquitous economic relations between the Philippines and the United States. For a time, Filipino businessmen and industrialists rallied around the banner of the Filipino First policy, and various scholars and economists proposed economic emancipation as an immediate goal for our nation. In the field of art, there have been signs of a new appreciation for our own culture. Indeed, there has been much nationalist activity in many areas of endeavor, but we have yet to hear of a well-organised campaign on the part of our educational leaders for nationalism in education.

Although most of our educators are engaged in a lively debate on techniques and tools for improved instruction, not one major educational leader has come out for a truly nationalist education. Of course, some pedagogical experts have written on some aspects of nationalism in education. However, no comprehensive educational programme has been advanced as a corollary to the programmes for political and economic emancipation. This is a tragic situation because the nationalist movement is crippled at the outset by a citizenry that is ignorant of our basic ills and is apathetic to our national welfare.

NEW PERSPECTIVES

Some of our economic and political leaders have gained a new perception of our relations with the United States, as a result of their second look at Philippine-American relations since the turn of the century. The reaction which has emerged as economic and political nationalism is an attempt on their part to revise the iniquities of the past and to complete the movement started by our revolutionary leaders of 1896. The majority of our educational leaders, however, still continue to trace their direct

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lineal descent to the first soldier-teachers of the American invasion army. They seem oblivious of the fact that the educational system and the philosophy of which they are the proud inheritors were valid only within the framework of American colonialism. The educational system introduced by the Americans had to correspond and was designed to correspond to the economic and political reality of American conquest.

CAPTURING MINDS

The most effective means of subjugating a people is to capture their minds. Military victory does not necessarily signify conquest. As long as feelings of resistance remain in the hearts of the vanquished, no conqueror is secure. This is best illustrated by the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese militarists during the second world war. Despite the terroristic regime imposed by the Japanese warlords, the Filipinos were never conquered. Hatred for the Japanese was engendered by their oppressive techniques which in turn were intensified by the stubborn resistance of the Filipino people. Japanese propagandists and psychological warfare experts, however, saw the necessity of winning the minds of the people. Had the Japanese stayed a little longer, Filipino children who were being schooled under the auspices of the new dispensation would have grown into strong pillars of the Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Their minds would have been conditioned to suit the policies of the Japanese imperialists.

The moulding of men’s minds is the best means of conquest. Education, therefore, serves as a weapon in the wars of colonial conquest. This singular fact was well appreciated by the American military commander in the Philippines during the Filipino-American war. According to the census of 1903:

General Otis urged and furthered the re-opening of schools, himself selecting and ordering the text-books. Many officers, among them chaplains, were detailed as superintendents of schools, and many enlisted men, as teachers.

The American military authorities had a job to do. They had to employ all means to pacify a people whose hopes for independence were being frustrated by the presence of another conqueror. The primary reason for the rapid introduction, on a large scale, of the American public school system in the Philippines was the conviction of the military leaders that no measure could so quickly promote the pacification of the island as education. General Arthur McArthur, in recommending a large appropriation for school purposes, said:

This appropriation is recommended primarily and exclusively as an adjunct to military operations calculated to pacify the people and to procure and expedite the restoration of tranquility throughout the archipelago.

BEGINNINGS OF COLONIAL EDUCATION

Thus, from its inception, the educational system of the Philippines was a means of pacifying a people who were defending their newly-won freedom from

an invader who had posed as an ally. The education of the Filipino under American sovereignty was an instrument of colonial policy. The Filipino had to be educated as a good colonial. Young minds had to be shaped to conform to American ideas. Indigenous Filipino ideals were slowly eroded in order to remove the last vestiges of resistance. Education served to attract the people to the new masters and at the same time to dilute their nationalism which had just succeeded in overthrowing a foreign power. The introduction of the American educational system was a subtle means of defeating a triumphant nationalism. As Charles Burke Elliott said in his book, *The Philippines*:

To most Americans it seemed absurd to propose that any other language than English should be used in schools over which their flag floated. But in the schools of India and other British dependencies and colonies and, generally, in all colonies, it was and still is customary to use the vernacular in the elementary schools, and the immediate adoption of English in the Philippine schools subjected America to the charge of forcing the language of the conquerors upon a defenseless people.

Of course such a system of education as the Americans contemplated could be successful only under the direction of American teachers, as the Filipino teachers who had been trained in Spanish methods were ignorant of the English language...

Arrangements were promptly made for enlisting a small army of teachers in the United States. At first they came in companies, but soon in battalions. The transport *Thomas* was fitted up for their accommodation and in July 1901, it sailed from San Francisco with six hundred teachers — a second army of occupation — surely the most remarkable cargo ever carried to an Oriental colony.

THE AMERICAN VICE-GOVERNOR

The importance of education as a colonial tool was never underestimated by the Americans. This may be clearly seen in the provision of the Jones Act which granted the Filipinos more autonomy. Although the government services were Filipinised, although the Filipinos were being prepared for self-government, the department of education was never entrusted to any Filipino. Americans always headed this department. This was assured by Article 23 of the Jones Act which provided:

That there shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, a vice-governor of the Philippine Islands, who shall have all the powers of the governor-general in the case of a vacancy or temporary removal, resignation or disability of the Governor-General, or in case of his temporary absence; and the said vice-governor shall be the head of the executive department known as the department of Public Instruction, which shall include the bureau of education and the bureau of health, and he may be assigned such other executive duties as the Governor-General may designate.

Up to 1935, therefore, the head of this department was an American. And when a Filipino took over under the Commonwealth, a new generation of “Filipino-Americans” had already been produced. There was no longer any need for American overseers in this field because a captive generation had already come of age, thinking and acting like little Americans.

This does not mean, however, that nothing that was taught was of any value. We became literate in English to a certain extent. We were able to produce more men and women who could read and write. We became more conversant with the outside world, especially the American world. A more wide-spread education such as the Americans desired would have been a real blessing had their educational programme not been the handmaiden of their colonial policy. Unfortunately for us, the success of education as a colonial weapon was complete and permanent. In exchange for a smattering of English, we yielded our souls. The stories of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln made us forget our own nationalism. The American view of history turned our heroes into brigands in our own eyes, distorted our vision of our future. The surrender of the Katipuneros was nothing compared to this final surrender, this levelling down of our last defenses. Dr. Chester Hunt characterises this surrender well in these words:

The programme of cultural assimilation combined with a fairly rapid yielding of control resulted in the fairly general acceptance of American culture as the goal of Filipino society with the corollary that individual Americans were given a status of respect.

This, in a nutshell, was (and to a great extent still is) the happy result of early educational policy because, within the framework of American colonialism, whenever there was a conflict between American and Filipino goals and interests, the schools guided us towards action and thought which could forward American interests.

GOALS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION

The educational system established by the Americans could not have been for the sole purpose of saving the Filipinos from illiteracy and ignorance. Given the economic and political purposes of American occupation, education had to be consistent with these broad purposes of American colonial policy. The Filipinos had to be trained as citizens of an American colony. The Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation of President McKinley on December 21, 1898, at a time when Filipino forces were in control of the country except Manila, betrays the intention of the colonisers. Judge Blount in his book, *The American Occupation of the Philippines*, properly comments:

Clearly, from the Filipino point of view, the United States was now determined "to spare them from the dangers of premature independence", using such force as might be necessary for the accomplishment of that pious purpose.

Despite the noble aims announced by the American authorities that the Philippines was theirs to protect and to guide, the fact still remains that these people were a conquered nation whose national life had to be woven into the pattern of American dominance. Philippine education was shaped by the overriding factor of preserving and expanding American control. To achieve this, all separatist tendencies were discouraged. Nay, they had to be condemned as subversive. With this as the

pervasive factor in the grand design of conquering a people, the pattern of education, consciously or unconsciously, fostered and established certain attitudes on the part of the governed. These attitudes conformed to the purposes of American occupation.

AN UPROOTED RACE

The first and perhaps the master stroke in the plan to use education as an instrument of colonial policy was the decision to use English as the medium of instruction. English became the wedge that separated the Filipinos from their past and later was to separate educated Filipinos from the masses of their countrymen. English introduced the Filipinos to a strange, new world. With American textbooks, Filipinos started learning not only a new language but also a new way of life, alien to their traditions and yet a caricature of their model. This was the beginning of their education. At the same time, it was the beginning of their mis-education, for they learned no longer as Filipinos but as colonials. They had to be disorientated from their nationalist goals because they had to become good colonials. The ideal colonial was the carbon copy of his conqueror, the conformist follower of the new dispensation. He had to forget his past and unlearn the nationalist virtues in order to live peacefully, if not comfortably, under the colonial order. The new Filipino generation learned of the lives of American heroes, sang American songs, and dreamt of snow and Santa Claus. The nationalist resistance leaders exemplified by Sakay were regarded as brigands and outlaws. The lives of Philippine heroes were taught but their nationalist teachings were glossed over. Spain was the villain, America was the saviour. To this day, our histories still gloss over the atrocities committed by American occupation troops such as the water cure and the re-concentration camps. Truly, a genuinely Filipino education could not have been devised within the new framework, for to draw from the well-springs of the Filipino ethos would only have led to a distinct Philippines identity with interests at variance with that of the ruling power.

Thus, the Filipino past which had already been quite obliterated by three centuries of Spanish tyranny did not enjoy a revival under American colonialism. On the contrary, the history of our ancestors was taken up as if they were strange and foreign people who settled in these shores, with whom we had the most tenuous of ties. We read about them as if we were tourists in a foreign land.

ECONOMIC ATTITUDES

Control of the economic life of a colony is basic to colonial control. Some imperial nations do it harshly but the United States could be cited for the subtlety and uniqueness of its approach. For example, free trade was offered as a generous gift of American altruism. Concomitantly, the educational policy had to support this view and to soften the effects of the slowly tightening noose around the necks of the Filipinos. The economic motivations of the Americans in coming to the Philippines were not at all admitted to the Filipinos. As a matter of fact, from the first school-days under the soldier-teachers

to the present, Philippine history books have portrayed America as a benevolent nation who came here only to save us from Spain and to spread amongst us the boons of liberty and democracy. The almost complete lack of understanding at present of those economic motivations and of the presence of American interests in the Philippines are the most eloquent testimony to the success of the education for colonials which we have undergone. What economic attitudes were fostered by American education?

It is interesting to note that during the times that the school attempts to inculcate an appreciation for things Philippine, the picture that is presented for the child's admiration is an idealised picture of a rural Philippines, as pretty and as unreal as an Amorsolo painting with its carabao, its smiling healthy farmer, the winsome barrio lass in the bright clean *patadyong*, and the sweet little nipa hut. That is the portrait of the Filipino that our education leaves in the minds of the young and it hurts the country in two ways.

First, it strengthens the belief (and we see this in adults) that the Philippines is essentially meant to be an agricultural country and we cannot and should not change that. The result is an apathy toward industrialisation. It is an idea they have not met in school. There is further, a fear, born out of that early stereotype of this country as an agricultural heaven, that industrialisation is not good for us, that our national environment is not suited for an industrial economy, and that it will only bring social evils which will destroy the idyllic farm life.

Second, this idealised picture of farm life never emphasises the poverty, the disease, the cultural vacuum, the sheer boredom, the superstition and ignorance of backward farm communities. Those who pursue higher education think of the farms as quaint places, good for an occasional vacation. Their life is rooted in the big towns and cities and there is no interest in revamping rural life because there is no understanding of its economic problems. Interest is limited to artesian wells and handicraft projects. Present efforts to uplift the conditions of the rural masses merely attack the peripheral problems without admitting the urgent need for basic agrarian reform.

With American education, the Filipinos were not only learning a new language; they were not only forgetting their own language; they were starting to become a new type of American. American ways were slowly being adopted. Our consumption habits were molded by the influx of cheap American goods that came in duty-free. The pastoral economy was extolled because this conformed with the colonial economy that was being fostered. Our books extolled the Western nations as peopled by superior beings because they were capable of manufacturing things that we never thought we were capable of producing. We were pleased by the fact that our raw material exports could pay for the American consumption goods that we had to import. Now we are used to these types of goods, and it is a habit we find hard to break, to the detriment of our own economy. We never thought that we too could industrialise because in school we were taught that we

were primarily an agricultural country by geographical location and by the innate potentiality of our people. We were one with our fellow Asians in believing that we were not cut out for an industrialised economy. That is why before the war, we looked down upon goods made in Japan despite the fact that Japan was already producing commodities on par with the West. We could never believe that Japan, an Asian country, could attain the same superiority as America, Germany or England. And yet, it was "made-in-Japan" airplanes, battleships, and armaments that dislodged the Americans and the British from their positions of dominance during the second world war. This is the same attitude that has put us out of step with our Asian neighbours who already realise that colonialism has to be extirpated from their lives if they want to be free, prosperous, and happy.

TRANSPLANTATION OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

American education in effect transplanted American political institutions and ideas into the Philippines. Senator Recto, in his last major address at the University of the Philippines, explained the reason for this. Speaking of political parties, Recto said:

It is to be deplored that our major political parties were born and nurtured before we had attained the status of a free democracy. The result was that they have come to be caricatures of their foreign models with its known characteristics — patronage, division of spoils, political bossism, partisan treatment of vital national issues. I say caricatures because of their chronic shortsightedness respecting those ultimate objectives the attainment of which was essential to a true and lasting national independence. All throughout the period of American colonisation, they allowed themselves to become more and more the tools of colonial rule and less and less the interpreters of the people's will and ideals. Through their complacency, the new coloniser was able to fashion, in exchange for sufferance of oratorical plights for independence, and for patronage, rank, and sinecure, a regime of his own choosing, for his own aims, and in his own self-interest.

The Americans were confronted with the dilemma of transplanting their political institutions and yet luring the Filipinos into a state of captivity. It was understandable for American authorities to think that democracy can only mean the American type of democracy, and thus they foisted on the Filipinos the institutions that were valid for their own people. Indigenous institutions which could have led to the evolution of native democratic ideas and institutions were disregarded. No wonder, we, too, look with hostility upon countries who try to develop their own political institutions according to the needs of their people without being bound by Western political procedures. We have been made to believe in certain political doctrines as absolute and the same for all peoples. An example of this is the belief in freedom of the press. Here, the consensus is that we cannot nationalise the press because it would be depriving foreigners of the exercise of freedom of the press. This may be valid for strong countries like the United States where there is no threat of foreign

domination, but certainly, this is dangerous for an emergent nation like the Philippines where foreign control has yet to be weakened.

RE-EXAMINATION DEMANDED

The new demands for economic emancipation and the assertion of our political sovereignty leave our educators no other choice but to re-examine their philosophy, their values, and their general approach to the making of the Filipino who will institute, support, and preserve the nationalist aims. To persist in the continuance of a system which was born under the exigencies of colonial rule, to be timid in the face of traditional opposition would only result in the evolution of an anomalous educational system which lags behind the urgent economic and political changes that the nation is experiencing. What then are the nationalist tasks for Philippine education?

Education must be seen not as an acquisition of information but as the making of man so that he may function most effectively and usefully within his own society. Therefore, education can not be divorced from the society of a definite country at a definite time. It is a fallacy to think that educational goals should be the same everywhere and that therefore what goes into the making of a well-educated American is the same as what should go into the making of the well-educated Filipino. *This would be true only if the two societies were at the same political, cultural, and economic level and had the same political, cultural, and economic goals.*

But what has happened in this country? Not only do we imitate Western education, we have patterned our education after the most technologically advanced Western nation. The gap between the two societies is very large. In fact, they are two entirely different societies with different goals.

ADOPTION OF WESTERN VALUES

Economically, the U.S. is an industrial nation. It is a fully developed nation, economically speaking. Our country has a colonial economy with a tiny industrial base — in other words, we are backward and underdeveloped. Politically, the U.S. is not only master of its own house; its control and influence extends to many other countries all over the world. The Philippines has only lately emerged from formal colonial status and it still must complete its political and economic independence.

Culturally, the U.S. has a vigorously and distinctively American culture. It is a nation whose cultural institutions have developed freely, indigenously, without control or direction from foreign sources, whose ties to its cultural past are clear and proudly celebrated because no foreign power has imposed upon its people a wholesale inferiority complex, because no foreign culture has been superimposed upon it destroying, distorting its own past and alienating the people from their own cultural heritage.

What are the characteristics of American education today which spring from its economic, political, and cultural status? What should be the characteristics of our own education as dictated by

our own economic, political and cultural conditions? To contrast both is to realise how inimical to our best interests and progress is our adoption of some of the basic characteristics and values of American education.

By virtue of its world leadership and its economic interests in many parts of the world, the United States has an internationalistic orientation based securely on a well-grounded, long-held nationalistic viewpoint. U.S. education has no urgent need to stress the development of American nationalism in its young people. Economically, politically, culturally, the U.S. is master of its own house. American education, therefore, understandably lays little emphasis on the kind of nationalism we Filipinos need. Instead, it stresses internationalism and underplays nationalism. This sentiment is noble and good but when it is inculcated in a people who have either forgotten nationalism or never imbibed it, it can cause untold harm. The emphasis on world brotherhood, on friendship for other nations, without the firm foundation of nationalism which would give our people the feeling of pride in our own products and vigilance over our natural resources, has had very harmful results. Chief among these is the transformation of our national virtue of hospitality into a stupid vice which hurts us and makes us the willing dupes of predatory foreigners.

UN-FILIPINO FILIPINOS

Thus we complacently allow aliens to gain control of our economy. We are even proud of those who amass wealth in our country, publishing laudatory articles about their financial success. We love to hear foreigners call our country a paradise on earth, and we never stop to think that it is a paradise only for them but not for millions of our countrymen. When some of our more intellectually emancipated countrymen spearhead moves for nationalism, for nationalisation of this or that endeavour, do the majority of Filipinos support such moves? No, there is apathy because there is no nationalism in our hearts which will spur us to protect and help our own countrymen first. Worse, some Filipinos even worry about the sensibilities of foreigners lest they think ill of us for supposedly discriminating against them. And worst of all, many Filipinos will even oppose nationalistic legislation either because they have become the willing servants of foreign interests or because, in their distorted view, we Filipinos can not progress without the help of foreign capital and foreign entrepreneurs.

In this part of the world, we are well nigh unique in our generally non-nationalistic outlook. What is the source of this shameful characteristic of ours? One important source is surely the schools. There is little emphasis on nationalism. Patriotism has been taught us, yes, but in general terms of love of country, respect for the flag, appreciation for the beauty of our countryside, and other similarly innocuous manifestations of our nationality.

The pathetic results of this failure of Philippine education is a citizenry amazingly naive and trusting in its relations with foreigners, devoid of the capacity

to feel indignation even in the face of insults to the nation, ready to acquiesce and even to help aliens in the despoliation of our natural wealth. Why are the great majority of our people so complaisant about alien economic control? Much of the blame must be laid at the door of colonial education. Colonial education has not provided us with a realistic attitude toward other nations, especially Spain and the United States. The emphasis in our study of history has been on the great gifts that our conquerors have bestowed upon us. A mask of benevolence was used to hide the cruelties and deceit of early American occupation. The noble sentiments expressed by McKinley were emphasised rather than the ulterior motives of conquest. The myth of friendship and special relations is even now continually invoked to camouflage the continuing iniquities in our relationship. Nurtured in this kind of education, the Filipino mind has come to regard centuries of colonial status as a grace from above rather than as a scourge. Is it any wonder then that having regained our independence we have forgotten how to defend it? Is it any wonder that when leaders like Claro M. Recto try to teach us how to be free, the great majority of the people find it difficult to grasp those nationalistic principles that are the staple food of other Asian minds? The American architects of our colonial education really laboured shrewdly and well.

THE LANGUAGE PROBLEM

The most vital problem that has plagued Philippine education has been the question of language. Today, experiments are still going on to find out whether it would be more effective to use the native language. This is indeed ridiculous since an individual cannot be more at home in any other language than his own. In every sovereign country, the use of its own language in education is so natural no one thinks it could be otherwise. But here, so great has been our disorientation caused by our colonial education that the use of our own language is a controversial issue, with more Filipinos against than in favour! Again, as in the economic field Filipinos believe they cannot survive without America, so in education we believe no education can be true education unless it is based on proficiency in English.

Rizal already foresaw the tragic effects of a colonial education when, speaking through Simoun, he said:

You ask for equal rights, the Hispanisation of your customs, and you don't see that what you are begging for is suicide, the destruction of your nationality, the annihilation of your fatherland, the consecration of tyranny! What will you be in the future? A people without character, a nation without liberty — everything you have will be borrowed, even your very defects! ... What are you going to do with Castilian, the few of you who will speak it? Kill off your own originality, subordinate your thoughts to other brains, and instead of freeing yourselves, make yourselves slaves indeed! Nine-tenths of those of you who pretend to be enlightened are renegades to your country! He among you who talks that language neglects his own in such a way that he neither writes it nor understands it, and how many have I not seen who pretend not to know a single word of it!

It is indeed unfortunate that teaching in the native language is given up to second grade only, and the question of whether beyond this it should be English or Filipino is still unsettled. Many of our educational experts have written on the language problem, but there is an apparent timidity on the part of these experts to come out openly for the urgent need for discarding the foreign language as the medium of instruction in spite of remarkable results shown by the use of the native language. Yet, the deleterious effects of using English as the medium of instruction are many and serious. What Rizal said about Spanish has been proven to be equally true for English.

BARRIER TO DEMOCRACY

Under the system maintained by Spain in the Philippines, educational opportunities were so limited that learning became the possession of a chosen few. This enlightened group was called the *ilustrados*. They constituted the elite. Most of them came from the wealthy class because this was the only class that could afford to send its sons abroad to pursue higher learning. Learning, therefore, became a badge of privilege. There was a wide gap between the *ilustrados* and the masses. Of course, many of the *ilustrados* led the propaganda movement, but they were mostly reformers who wanted reforms within the framework of Spanish colonialism. In a way, they were also captives of Spanish education. Many of them were the first to capitulate to the Americans, and the first leaders of the Filipinos during the early years of the American regime came from this class. Later they were supplanted by the products of American education.

One of the ostensible reasons for imposing English as the medium of instruction was the fact that English was the language of democracy, that through this tongue the Filipinos would imbibe the American way of life which makes no distinction between rich and poor and which gives everyone equal opportunities. Under this thesis, the existence of an *ilustrado* class would not long endure because all Filipinos would be enlightened and educated. There would be no privileged class. In the long run, however, English perpetuated the existence of the *ilustrados* — American *ilustrados* who, like their counterparts, were strong supporters of the way of life of the new motherland.

Now we have a small group of men who can articulate their thoughts in English, a wider group who can read and speak in fairly comprehensible English and a great mass that hardly expresses itself in any language. All of these groups are hardly articulate in their native tongues because of the neglect of our native dialects, if not the deliberate attempts to prevent their growth.

The result is a leadership that fails to understand the needs of the masses because it is a leadership that can communicate with the masses only in general and vague terms. This is one reason why political leadership remains in a vacuum. This is the reason why issues are never fully discussed. This is the reason why orators with the best inflections, demagogues who rant and rave, are the ones that flourish

in the political arena. English has created a barrier between the monopolists of power and the people. English has become a status symbol, while the native tongues are looked down upon. English has given rise to a bifurcated society of fairly educated men and the masses who are easily swayed by them. A clear evidence of the failure of English education is the fact that politicians address the masses in their dialects. Lacking mastery of the dialect, the politicians merely deal in generalities.

Because of their lack of command of English, the masses have got used to only half-understanding what is said to them in English. They appreciate the sounds without knowing the sense. This is a barrier to democracy. People don't even think it is their duty to know, or that they are capable of understanding national problems. Because of the language barrier, therefore, they are content to leave everything to their leaders. This is one of the root causes of their apathy, their regionalism or parochialism. Thus, English, which was supposedly envisioned as the language of democracy is in our country a barrier to the full flowering of democracy.

In 1924 the eminent scholar, Najib Saleeby, wrote on the language of education in the Philippines. He deplored the attempt to impose English as the medium of instruction. Saleeby, who was an expert on the Malayo-Polynesian languages, showed that Tagalog, Visayan, Ilocano, and other Philippine dialects belong to the same linguistic tree. He said:

The relation the Tagalog holds to the Bisaya or to the Sulu is very much like or closer than that of the Spanish to the Italian. An educated Tagalo from Batangas, and an educated Bisayan from Cebu can learn to understand each other in a short space of time and without much effort. A Cebu student living in Manila can acquire practical use and good understanding of Tagalog in less than three months. The relation between Tagalog and Malay is very much the same as that of Spanish and French.

This was said forty-two years ago when Tagalog movies, periodicals, radio programmes had not yet attained the popularity that they enjoy today all over the country.

Saleeby further states:

Empirically neither the Spanish nor the English could be a suitable medium for public instruction in the Philippine Islands. It does not seem possible that either of them can become the common or national language of the Archipelago. Three centuries of Spanish rule and education failed to check use of the vernacular. A very small minority of Filipinos could speak Spanish in 1898, but the great mass of the people could neither use nor understand it. Twenty-five years of intensive English education has produced no radical change. More people at present speak English than Spanish, but the great majority hold on to the local dialect. The Spanish policy might be partially justified on colonial and financial grounds, but the American policy cannot be so defended. It should receive popular free choice, or give proof of its practicability by showing actual and satisfactory results. The people have as yet had no occasion to declare their free will, and the present policy must be judged on its own merits and on conclusive evidence... But teaching English broadcast and enforcing its official use is one thing, and its adoption as the basis of education and as the sole medium of public instruction is a completely different matter. This point cannot be fully grasped or

comprehended without special attention and experience in colonial education and administration. Such policy is exalted and ambitious to an extreme degree.

It aims at something unknown before in human affairs. It is attempting to do what ancient Persia, Rome, Alexander the Great and Napoleon failed to accomplish. It aims at nothing less than the obliteration of the tribal differences of the Filipinos, the substitution of English for the vernacular dialects as a home tongue, and making English the national common language of the Archipelago.

This is more true today. Very few college students can speak except in mixed English and the dialect. Our Congress has compounded their confusion by a completely unwarranted imposition of 24 units of Spanish.

IMPEDIMENTS TO THOUGHT

A foreign language is an impediment to instruction. Instead of learning directly through the native tongue, a child has first to master a foreign tongue, memorise its vocabulary, get accustomed to its sounds, intonations, accents, just to discard the language later when he is out of school. This does not mean that foreign languages should not be taught. Foreign languages should be taught and can be taught more easily after one has mastered his own tongue.

Even if the Americans were motivated by the sincere desire of unifying the country through the means of a common tongue, the abject results of instruction in English through the six decades of American education should have awakened our educators to the fact that the learning process has been disrupted by the imposition of a foreign language. From 1935, when the Institute of National Language was organised, very feeble attempts have been made to abandon the teaching of English. Our educators seem constantly to avoid the subject of language, in spite of the clear evidence of rampant ignorance among the products of the present educational system. This has resulted in the denial of education to a vast number of children who after the primary grades no longer continue schooling. In spite of the fact that the national language today is understood all over the country, no one is brave enough to advocate its use as the medium of instruction. There are arguments about the dearth of materials in the national language, but these are feeble arguments that merely disguise the basic opposition of our educational leaders to the use of what is native. Thus the products of the Philippine educational system, barring very few exceptions, are Filipinos who do not have a mastery of English because it is foreign, and who do not have a mastery of their native tongue because of the deliberate neglect of those responsible for the education of the citizens of the nation.

A foreign tongue as a medium of instruction constitutes an impediment to learning and to thinking because a student first has to master new sounds, new inflections, and new sentence constructions. His innermost thoughts find difficulty of expression, and lack of expression in turn prevents the further development of thought. Thus we find in our society a deplorable lack of serious thinking among great

sections of the population. We half understand books and periodicals written in English. We find it an ordeal to communicate with each other through a foreign medium, and yet we have so neglected our native language that we find ourselves at a loss in expressing ourselves in this language.

Language is a tool of the thinking process. Through language, thought develops, and the development of thought leads to the further development of language. But when a language becomes a barrier to thought, the thinking process is impeded or retarded and we have the resultant cultural stagnation. Creative thinking, analytic thinking, abstract thinking are not fostered because the foreign language makes the student prone to memorisation. Because of the mechanical process of learning, he is able to get only a general idea but not a deep understanding. So, the tendency of students is to study in order to be able to answer correctly and to pass the examinations and thereby earn the required credits. Independent thinking is smothered because the language of learning ceases to be the language of communication outside the classroom. A student is mainly concerned with the acquisition of information. He is seldom able to utilise this information for deepening his understanding of his society's problems.

Our Institute of National Language is practically neglected. It should be one of the main pillars of an independent country. Our educators are wary about proposing the immediate adoption of the national language as the medium of instruction because of what they consider as opposition of other language groups. This is indicative of our colonial mentality. Our educators do not see any opposition to the use of a foreign language but fear opposition to the use of the national language just because it is based on one of the main dialects. The fact that one can be understood in any part of the Philippines through the national language, the fact that periodicals in the national language and local movies have a mass following all over the islands, shows that, given the right support, the national language would take its proper place.

Language is the main problem, therefore. Experience has shown that children who are taught in their native tongue learn more easily and better than those taught in English. Records of the Bureau of Public Schools will support this. But mere teaching in the national language is not enough. There are other areas that demand immediate attention.

Philippine history must be re-written from the point of view of the Filipino. Our economic problems must be presented in the light of nationalism and independence. These are only some of the problems that confront a nationalist approach to education. Government leadership and supervision are essential. Our educators need the support of legislators in this regard. In this connection, the private sector has also to be strictly supervised.

THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Before the second world war, products of the

Philippine public school system looked down upon their counterparts in the private schools. It is generally accepted that graduates of the public schools at that time were superior to the products of the private institutions in point of learning. There were exclusive private institutions but these were reserved for the well-to-do. These schools did not necessarily reflect superiority of instruction. But they reflected superiority of social status.

Among students of the public schools, there was still some manifestation of concern for national problems. Vestiges of the nationalistic tradition of our revolution remained in the consciousness of those parents who had been taught in the mainstream of the rebellion, and these were passed on to the young. On the other hand, apathy to national problems was marked among the more affluent private school students whose families had readily accepted American rule.

Today, public schools are looked down upon. Only the poor send their children to these schools. Those who can afford it, or those who have social pretensions, send their children to private institutions. The result has been a boom in private education, a boom that unfortunately has seen the proliferation of diploma mills. There were two concomitant tendencies that went with this trend. First was the commercialisation of education. A lowering of standards resulted because of the inadequate facilities of the public schools and the commercialisation in the private sector. It is a well known fact that classes in many private schools are packed and teachers are overloaded in order to maximise profits. Second, some private schools which are owned and operated by foreigners and whose social science course are handled by aliens flourished. While foreigners may not be anti-Filipino, they definitely cannot be nationalistic in orientation. They think as foreigners and as private interests. Thus the proliferation of private schools and the simultaneous deterioration of public schools have resulted not only in lower standards but also in a definitely un-Filipino education.

Some years ago, there was a movement to grant curricular freedom to certain qualified private institutions as well as wider leeway for self-regulation. This was a retrograde step. It is true that this move was in answer to charges that state supervision would enhance regimentation. But in a country that is just awakening to nationalist endeavours, it is the duty of a nationalist administration to see to it that the moulding of minds is safely channelled along nationalist lines. The autonomy of private institutions may be used to subvert nationalist sentiments especially when ownership of schools and handling of social sciences are not yet Filipinised. Autonomy of private institutions would only dilute nationalist sentiments either by foreign subversion or by commercialisation.

OTHER EDUCATIONAL MEDIA

While the basic defect in the educational system has been responsible for the lack of nationalist ideals, there are other media and facilities that negate whatever gains are made in some sectors of

the educational field. The almost unilateral source of news, films, and other cultural materials tends to distort our perspective. American films and comics, American press services, fellowships in America, have all contributed to the almost total Americanisation of our attitudes. A distinct Filipino culture cannot prevail if an avalanche of western cultural materials suffocates our relatively puny efforts in this direction.

NEEDED: FILIPINOS

The education of the Filipino must be a Filipino education. It must be based on the needs of the nation and the goals of the nation. The object is not merely to produce men and women who can read and write or who can add and subtract. The primary object is to produce a citizenry that appreciates and is conscious of its nationhood and has national goals for the betterment of the community, and not an anarchic mass of people who know how to take care of themselves only. Our students hear of Rizal and Bonifacio but are their teachings related to our present problems or do they merely learn of anecdotes and incidents that prove interesting to the child's imagination?

We have learned to use American criteria for our problems and we look at our prehistory and our past with the eyes of a visitor. A lot of information is learned but attitudes are not developed. The proper regard for things Philippine, the selfish concern over the national fate — these are not at all imbedded in the consciousness of students. Children and adolescents go to school to get a certificate or diploma. They try to learn facts but the patriotic attitude is not acquired because of too much emphasis on forms.

What should be the basic objective of education in the Philippines? Is it merely to produce men and women who can read and write? If this is the only purpose, then education is directionless. Education should first of all assure national survival. No amount of economic and political policy can be successful if the educational programme does not imbue prospective citizens with the proper attitudes what will ensure the implementation of these goals and policies. Philippine educational policies should be geared to the making of Filipinos. These policies should see to it that schools produce men and women with minds and attitudes that are attuned to the needs of the country.

Under previous colonial regimes, education saw to it that the Filipino mind was subservient to that of the master. The foreign overlords were esteemed. We were not taught to view them objectively, seeing their virtues as well as their faults. This led our citizens to form a distorted opinion of the foreign masters and also of themselves. The function of education now is to correct this distortion. We must now think of ourselves, of our salvation, of our future. And unless we prepare the minds of the young for this endeavour, we shall always be a pathetic people with no definite goals and no assurance of preservation.

Carlos Ortega
Carlos Romero

HISTORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF MASS COMMUNICATION IN PERU

(Peru, 1976)

The most useful and effective way for us to treat our subject is to examine it in terms of the actual historical experience of a developing country. In its search for a viable starting point to begin its "take off" toward an integrated development, Peru has discovered the importance of a planned approach to communication in society and has thus begun to establish a national communication policy.

This planned approach fits in perfectly with the historical antecedents of the Latin American societies such as Peru. In Latin America we can see the intimate relation which has always existed between the determinant mechanisms predisposed toward subverting—in the broadest sense of the word—the established order, and the communication phenomenon.

We do not think we are being superficial by pointing out that during the three centuries of Spanish colonialism in Peru, there were two identifiable conditions which were closely interrelated and reciprocally conditioning. The first was the crushing absolutism based on the concept of the divine right of authority which permitted the total domination of society by a small closed elite, and the second was the absence of any mode of socially significant communication other than by oral and direct communication. Clearly this reciprocal interrelationship is very far from being exclusive to Peru, but it is symptomatic. Just as the Enlightenment and the Encyclopaedists in Europe coincide with the decline of the Spanish empire and mark the rise of Napoleonic France, in Latin America, and in Peru in particular, the first attempts to extensively disseminate modern currents of thought by printed impersonal means coincide in its timing, causes and effects with the beginning of an ideological process. This process, which was to change the illiterate character of Peruvian society, issued in the struggle for independence led by the Creoles, who were the enlightened and dominant stratum of the Peruvian society of the day.

A notable element in this struggle was the social influence exercised by the relatively large-scale diffusion of the works of the most important representatives of European philosophical and juridical thought. This included such works as *Le*

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Contrat Social and the *Discours sur l'Origine de l'Inégalité Parmi les Hommes* by Rousseau; *L'Esprit des Lois*, *Lettres Persanes*, and *Considérations sur les Causes de la Grandeur des Romains et de leur Décadence* by Montesquieu; *Cours d'Etudes* by Condillac; *Histoire Philosophique et Politique des Établissements et du Commerce des Européens dans les Deux Indes* by Raynal; *Les Droits et les Devoirs des Citoyens* by Malby, and other works by Voltaire, Filangieri, Necker, and Locke.¹ These books were part of the theoretical equipment handled with familiarity by those who can be considered as leaders of the fermenting Peruvian society because of the hearing they could command in influential social circles.

To these works naturally must be added the publication of the works of travellers such as Bouguer and Humboldt, and the circulation of such foreign and national reviews as the *Journal de Trévoux* and *El Mercurio Peruano*, and at a more definite political level, the periodicals such as *El Peruano* and *El Verdadero Peruano*.²

It is not therefore by chance that the first significant progress in the field of journalism in Peru (despite an illiteracy rate between 75 and 80%) should have taken place precisely during the period between the invasion of Spain by Joseph Bonaparte in 1808, and the battles of Junín and Ayacucho in America which confirmed the independence of Peru in 1821 and the other nations of the southern continent from Spanish rule in 1824.

This independence was not only the culmination of a far-ranging process of liberation, but also and simultaneously, the culmination of a slow but continuous trend toward overcoming the barriers imposed by pure direct oral communication. While in Peru at the end of the eighteenth century, when the authoritarian and providentialist concept of Spanish colonialism which guaranteed the viceroy's authority was questioned by neither the Spanish, the Creoles nor even the true natives, it was the initial development of social communication which began the final phase of a long economic, social and ideological process. The final stage of liberation, which among other phenomena was also affected by the reforms of the new Bourbon administration which hurt the interest of the Creoles and encouraged them to turn their eyes to the latest European doctrines, began to unfold with the rise of the weekly and biweekly press more than a quarter of a century before the arrival of General San Martín in 1821.

In spite of their elitist character, periodicals like *El Mercurio Peruano* and the *Diario de Lima*,

1. One of the most typical examples of the theoretical tools utilized by the intellectual leaders of the independence movement can be found in the nineteenth century monograph by José Mariano de la Riva Agüero, the first president of the republic, *Manifestación Histórica y Política de la Revolución de la América y Muy Especialmente de la Parte que Corresponde al Perú y Río de la Plata* [The Historical and Political Manifestation of the American Revolution with Special Reference to Peru and the Río de la Plata].

2. Augusto Salazar Bondy, *La Ideología de la Eman-*

which started in the eighteenth century, had a socializing effect on the field of social communication. This socialization had not been realized earlier by the "gazettes, nor the almanachs and the cosmographic guides" because of the content of these publications. As the Peruvian historian Pablo Macera has noted "no one could be moved by lists of officials and eclipses."³ This socialization could only be achieved by a relative "massification" of information, if the term is appropriate for such remote and embryonic conditions.

It should be remembered that this brief outline concerning a few instances in the relation between the communication phenomena and the general social process are presented here to serve the specific limited objectives of this publication. There is a fairly extensive Peruvian bibliography on these subjects which should be consulted for more detailed information. We do not want this publication to be accused of being an historical simplification.

With these considerations in mind, we want to state clearly that the relative "mass" orientation of information—above all philosophical, political and juridical—we are talking about became a subversive factor against the established order only in the context of other factors. First there was the attrition of the Spanish colonial power by the crisis in Spain which "opened possibilities for economic and political initiatives by the dominant classes" in its colonies;⁴ then there was the sharpening of conflicts of interests between Spain and the new emerging powers France, Holland and England; and finally, there was the consequent rise of the Creole bourgeoisies, such as the Peruvian (which however, was more timid than, for example, the Argentinian bourgeoisie). It is in this context that the Creole bourgeoisie gained a degree of economic autonomy and power which then began to call for its natural and indispensable complement, political power.

Thus, despite its mere incipient state, the relative "mass" orientation of information became a fundamental element of political power; and was quite naturally captured and exercised by the Creole bourgeoisie. Although this control over information was used by them in the fight for national independence in the face of foreign political control, it had a deep class sense regarding the actual exercise of power domestically.

This can be seen by analysing the "enlightened" journalism during the more-or-less extensive epoch of the struggle for independence, as well as in the radical liberal journalism which appeared approximately two decades after emancipation. Thus, *El Mercurio Peruano* which had played an important

cipación [The Ideology of Emancipation]. *El Peruano*, special supplement for the 150th anniversary of independence, Lima, 1971.

3. Pablo Macera, *El Periodismo en la Independencia* [Journalism in the Independence Era], Lima, Imprenta El Peruano, 1971.

4. Theotonio Dos Santos, *La Crisis Norteamericana y América Latina* [The North American Crisis and Latin America]. Santiago, Prensa Latinoamericana SA, 1970 (Colección América Nueva).

role prior to the victory over Spain became ever more clearly—to the degree its level of enlightenment became more elitist—the organ of a reactionary and Platonist intellectual aristocracy.⁵

Other organs and intellectual groups disseminating or communicating information, such as the *Amantes del País*, played the same role. Although they contributed to the subversion of the colonial order, at the same time they expressed the ideology of the dominant elites and ultimately represented their interests. Objectively, these organs and groups served the Creole bourgeoisie and their appropriation of economic and political power which might have been claimed by the masses who participated in the insurrection and the struggle for independence. This process of appropriation also implied the adaption of the superstructure to the transfer of foreign domination from Spain to England, who became the principal creditor of Peru and the other new republics as a result of its war loans and logistic support (which unmistakably were intended to be profitable investments).

Obviously, the use of journalism, and communication in general, to favor the appropriation of political power by the Creole bourgeoisie, and the consequent transfer of domination to a new foreign decision center was not a straightforward process. From the very beginning, the phenomena developed in the context of a complicated struggle between different tendencies which manifested itself, sometimes very bitterly, in the pages of their newspapers *El Peruano*, *El Verdadero Peruano*, *El Satélite*, *El Argos Constitucional*, *El Sol del Perú*, *El Correo Mercantil*, among others. The conflict between these tendencies became sharper after independence from Spain and continued throughout the nineteenth century. During this period the battlefield was extended by the appearance of the first provincial newspapers such as *El Patriota* and *El Lince del Perú* in Trujillo and *La Estrella de Ayacucho* in Arequipa, though these did not affect the special centralized importance of the Lima newspapers.

This struggle for power had two principal effects. First, it created a high level of politicization of liberal journalism in opposition to the academic journalism of the eighteenth century; and second, it reduced the struggle between the various tendencies to dimensions corresponding closely to the ideological shadings and spheres of interest of the dominant elites.

From the permanent confrontation and struggle between these tendencies—reflected in the awkward efforts to organize and manage the State, as well as in the field of journalism—we can clearly see two phenomena. On the one hand, the progres-

sive nature of the European springs which watered the ideologies of independence, and on the other hand, the essential conservatism of the tendencies which little by little imposed themselves on Peruvian society. This was undoubtedly the result of a long and complex process of ideological conditioning. However, the importance of journalism was that it converted the Creole's class demands and attitudes into the central motivations for emancipation.

Thus journalism has intervened and been involved in the historical social process from the epoch of emancipation throughout the life of the republic. As we have noted, journalism participated in questioning and destroying the providential postulate of the divine right of kings which buttressed the colonial ideology. For example, in *El Satélite* which attacked the destructive nature of this belief, even its religious aspect, by ironically pointing out that even supposing that it was true that "all diseases also come from God, this does not mean that it is forbidden to call the doctor." Journalism also played a part in praising the humanitarian thought which led to the abolition of slavery by General San Martín in August 1821. But it also played a part in conservative appeals to moderation. For example, when the liberals seemed to be destroying the old ideological and political values which were the basis for the former power structure and were consolidating their own social power. At this time, the liberal newspapers such as *El Verdadero Peruano* called for moderation by the political tendencies considered by them to be excessively radical, using conservative arguments to justify their consolidation, as seen in this quotation: "The contention that all men are perfectly equal is a physical, moral and political chimera.... Every society must have gradations and if there were none, within a very short time, with the bonds of subordination untied, we would fall into a homicidal anarchy."

Journalism was, in effect, the moving force and at the same time the catalyst for a social dialectic. The Creole-bourgeoisies were able to turn this social dialectic to their advantage precisely because of their control of revolutionary journalism, among other things. When it suited these bourgeoisies journalism was enlightened, cultivated, speculative and intellectual; and when the contrary suited them, it was aggressively anti-intellectual.

In general, while journalism expressed surprisingly advanced ideas from time to time, obviously these ideas did not have the greatest circulation. In spite of the political independence from Spain, the ideas which were circulated and imposed were those advocating and prolonging the old social stratification. These ideas, which in the past had given a privileged position to the colonialists and their descendants, after independence served the interests of their political heirs. One example of journalism's rare advocacy of advanced ideas was when the *Diario de Lima* in 1822 proposed a sort of agrarian reform: "It is very painful to see a large estate, extending over many different kinds of acreage of which only half or third is under cultivation, while its despotic and ambitious master refuses to rent small parcels to industrious persons in

dire circumstance."⁷ The author of the article goes on to contend that such land should be divided up, despite predictions that this would not work because of the lack of water supply or other obstacles. In opposition to these isolated voices, the majority of the press favored, for example, the great neocolonialist trap of an almost religious belief in the benefits to be had by opening Peru commercially to world trade. This supposed panacea was accepted to a large extent because of the superficial prophecies of wealth which were published by the newspapers, such as the following poem from *El Correo Mercantil* in 1822:

I already see trade
bringing in competition,
All that can be desired
for a good life,
And in return extracting
from different regions
the immense treasures
offered by our climes,
And diligent industry
actively exploiting
the raw materials
which the earth supplies us.

This type of prophecy became accepted and impeded an understanding of the complex problems posed by independence. This example, although almost anecdotal, illustrates how journalism prevented a correct understanding of the irreconcilable opposition between real independence and foreign commercial penetration. This opposition was in fact prophesied at the time by Conde de Moguel in a secret report suggesting that with the creation of the new South America republics, "the Pacific Ocean would become an estuary of the Thames."⁸ This, in fact, did occur because the new republics failed to give priority to a radical economic and social reform within each country. This fatal omission was encouraged by a press whose attitude from then on was to be the overt champion of the *status quo*. However, there have been exceptions throughout the history of the republic due to popular pressures and sporadic attempts at structural corrections.⁹ In the field of journalism, these exceptions, like the popular insurrections and the attempts at structural corrections, were aborted.

Thus the republican press was born and developed in close relation to a society whose structure remained essentially unaltered from the pre-independence period. However, it must be pointed out that there were numerous brief attempts to create a popular press to foment social change and compete with the press entrenched in and serving the existing economic-social structure. Throughout the more than 150 years of the life of the republic

7. Macera, *op. cit.*

8. Macera, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

9. Texts such as those cited previously and Emilio Romero, *Historia Económica del Perú* [Economic History of Peru], Lima, Edit. Universo, demonstrate the more or less ephemeral character of the many efforts made in Peru to develop a press to promote the subversion of the established order.

there are many examples of a popular press which never overcame the marginal existence imposed on them by the ruling elites' control of the power structure and economic mechanisms. In spite of the determination of its promoters, this press had a minimal influence and impact on the social history of Peru.

The "Grand Press", a relative term which can only be understood in terms of its long and influential life, began on 4 May 1839 with the foundation of the daily *El Comercio* by Manuel Amunátegui, a Chilean, and Alejandro Villota, an Argentinian. Amunátegui had served in the royalist and pro-colonialist army against the Chilean patriots, while Villota had fought in the liberation army. In joining together to begin *El Comercio* in spite of their old and apparently irreconcilable differences, they provide a perfect prototype for the origin of the "Grand Press" in Peru. This origin was based on the identification of interests between the representatives of different sectors of the dominant classes.

Almost four decades later, a nephew of Amunátegui, Don Luis Carranza, entered into partnership with Don José Antonio Miró Quesada of Panama and took over *El Comercio*, which after 1875 became the most combative defender of the conservative sectors. Carranza and Miró Quesada were active supporters of the Civilista party which for many years represented the highest ranking Peruvian "consular" oligarchy, and active opponents of populist democratic efforts such as that of Nicolás de Piérola. During the nineteenth century, all the more-or-less liberal newspapers, like *El Murciélago*, which attempted to compete with *El Comercio* were crushed and gradually disappeared. The central role of *El Comercio* continued until the beginning of the twentieth century. The only newspapers that were able to prosper along side it, although they were much less influential, were those newspapers also identified with sectors of the dominant classes, even though these newspapers represented different ruling class interests from those represented by *El Comercio*. However, outside the dominant class, *El Comercio* bitterly opposed all newspapers, such as the "heretical" anarchist newspaper *La Idea Libre*, which appeared at the beginning of the twentieth century. The political orientation of *El Comercio* continued unchanged until the beginning of the twentieth century, and after the death of Luis Carranza, it became the exclusive property of the Miró Quesada family.

The degree of social and political influence of *El Comercio* and the power of the Miró Quesada family in Peru can only be compared, in South America, with the Gainza Paz family and *La Prensa* in Buenos Aires, and the Edwards family and *El Mercurio* in Santiago. However, unlike them, *El Comercio* did not have direct, strong economic links with the ruling group of the Peruvian plutocracy. However, this did not prevent the politically influential newspaper from serving the interests of the plutocracy, and with rare and momentary exceptions it represented its most conservative

5. Macera, *op. cit.*

6. For an historical survey of the emancipation ideology the following may be consulted: P. Macera, *Tres Etapas del Desarrollo de la Conciencia Nacional* [Three Stages in the Development of National Consciousness], Jorge Basadre, *La Iniciación de la República* [The Beginning of the Republic] and *Perú Problema y Posibilidad* [Peru, Problem and Possibility].

tendencies.

In September 1903, the landowning interests founded *La Prensa* in Lima to compete with the Miró Quesada newspaper. In 1905, *La Prensa* merged with *El Tiempo* and under the direction of Alberto Ulloa Cisneros, it became, little by little, the spokesman for the more-or-less liberal bourgeoisie. Later, it was to become a defender of North American agricultural and industrial interests in Peru.

In April 1912, press modernization and the intellectual curiosity of the rising middle bourgeoisie led to the first Peruvian tabloid newspaper, *La Crónica*. The newspaper was directed by Clemente Palma, son of Ricardo Palma, author of the well-known *Tradiciones Peruanas*.¹⁰ But the clannish political interests of the dominant classes did not appreciate this attempt to create an up-to-date liberal journalism, and in 1931 it fell into the hands of the already powerful agrarian oligarchy, the Larco Herrera family, owners of extensive latifundia in the north of Peru. *La Crónica* remained their property until 1947 at which time it was taken over by the most powerful Peruvian financial group of the present century, the Prado family. The newspaper automatically became the platform for and defender of the interests of the Prado's closed financial oligarchy whose vast empire extended to commerce, insurance, urban real estate, and large-scale industry.

There was no significant change in the daily newspaper situation until 1960 when another personality of the upper bourgeoisie of Lima, Manuel Mújica Gallo, founded the liberal-democratic daily *Expreso*. Here again, the economic power groups dominating Peru showed the vulnerability of this kind of liberal-democratic adventure. But this time they used the modern subtle methods of subjection and financial control: advertising. By controlling the advertising mechanisms at the base of the newspaper company the dominant economic groups brought it to the edge of bankruptcy, at which time *Expreso* passed into the hands of Manuel Ulloa Elías, the direct representative of North American financial interests linked to the Rockefeller family.

Lastly, the new bourgeoisie created by the boom in the Peruvian fishing and fishfood industries, in turn, established a newspaper to defend their interests. After patiently starting regional newspapers in the interior, this new bourgeoisie began the daily *Correo* in Lima on 10 July 1962. It was owned by a prominent leader of the Peruvian fishing industry, Luis Blanchero Rossi. Later, when Blanchero Rossi became allied with foreign business interests, these new alliances were quickly reflected in the newspaper's political line. With the inland regional editions and the addition of the morning daily, *Ojo, Correo* became one of the most influential newspaper chains.

This resume of the history of the Peruvian press has outlined the kaleidoscopic movement characteristic of the communication media in the structure of its ownership and the changes in its owners. This

10. Ricardo Palma, *Tradiciones Peruanas* [Peruvian Traditions], Lima, Edit. Cultura Antártica SA, 1951.

history clearly shows the close relationship between the social-economic structure and the use and ownership of the major mass media.

Throughout the one and a half centuries of the life of the republic this close relationship has increasingly developed in proportion to the "massification" of the media of social communication and the intensification of technological development: motion pictures, radio, television, communication satellites, etc.

The successful competition of the radio and television, along with the film, which has gradually lead to their taking the place of printed journalism's long-standing influence on social development, should not make us forget that they too have been subjected to the same process of direct and indirect appropriation and control by the economic power elites.

Since the establishment of the first Peruvian radio broadcasting station on 20 June 1925, "OAX de Peru", the ownership of the increasing number of local and national broadcasting stations has been spread out in the hands of groups with relatively little economic power. However, this diversity of ownership has not prevented these stations from being in close and regular agreement with the interests of the dominant economic groups. There are many ways in which these radio stations are kept in line: through the control of their news services, program production and/or directly through advertising, that is, when it is not possible to own them outright or through the national broadcasting networks.

The situation concerning television is similar, with the difference that since the introduction of television in Peru in 1958, the links between the national and foreign economic power groups, essentially North American, have been much clearer than in the case of the radio.

In analysing the historical evolution of mass communication in Peru we do not want to make it appear that this evolution has been a linear process in which the Peruvians progressed from the Incan *quipu* to the transistor and the satellite. Rather than just providing a description of this process, we think it is more important to demonstrate the concrete characteristics of the communication process: its relationship to the mechanisms of ownership and control, and its use as a generalized and important aspect of a whole system of ownership of the means of production. From this whole system of ownership emerges the interrelationship, nexus, and mutual conditioning between the social process and the communication processes. It is for this reason that the basic postulate for any analysis of communication, or society, must begin with the intimate interrelation between them.

Pierre Frederix AGENCE HAVAS (France, 1959)

THE "BIG THREE" NEWS AGENCIES

In terms of the agreement between Auguste Havas, Julius Reuter, and Bernard Wolff¹ signed in 1859 at the Hôtel de Bullion, their three news agencies were to extend their network of offices at joint expense. In reality, each of them defended and advanced their own pawns. Havas moved towards the latin European countries, and Reuter toward northern Europe, southern Asia and the United States.² The Austro-Hungarian monarchy, to compete with the Paris, London and Berlin agencies, created a semi-official agency, the Telegraphen Korrespondenz Bureau ("Corrbureau"). On 30 May 1869, Havas and Reuters signed an agreement with the Director of Austrian Telegraphs, representing the Corrbureau, which was approved by the Minister of Commerce in Vienna.³ In the meanwhile, Havas, in 1867, made a three-year agreement with Wolff's Continental agency and the two agencies continued to exchange their dispatches. Wolff's Berlin agency, however, took advantage of its transmission priority on its own territory and thus made Reuter's position in Germany untenable. Reuters responded by asking Havas' support and proposed a merger between them.

Thus on 4 November 1869 Havas and Reuters signed the "joint purse agreement" in which they were to jointly use their dispatches "throughout the world": The profits and losses from the venture would be shared equally between them. The joint use of the services would be made in France under the name of Havas, Laffite, or Bullier; in England and in the British territories under the name of Reuter; elsewhere under the name Reuter-Havas or

1. The owners, respectively, of the Agence Havas, Paris; Reuters, Ltd., London; and the Continental-Telegraphen-Compagnie, Wolff's Telegraphisches Büro, Berlin. "The Agence Havas differs from the Reuters' agency in that it is an advertising agency, as well as a news agency. After 1860 the Agence Havas offered to 200 French provincial newspapers, unable to afford a news service, a daily news review without cash payments, but it asked in exchange the exclusive right to a certain amount of advertising white space on the third and fourth pages, this space to be sold or disposed of by the Agence Havas as it saw fit. Havas then turned about and sold this space for its own advantage.... The agency, in addition to distributing the news, therefore controls about 80% of the

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Havas-Reuter. The merger treaty was made for a twenty-year period, with cancellation possible after 1876.

However, the problem between Havas-Reuter and Wolff's Continental remained. This however was resolved two months later, when on 17 January 1870, the three big European agencies signed a general agreement. In terms of this agreement, Reuter left Germany;⁴ England, Holland and their dependencies became Reuter's exclusive territory, and Reuter further agreed to forward to Berlin the dispatches received from America. Germany, Scandinavia, Saint Petersburg and Moscow became Continental's territory; and France, Italy, Spain and Portugal, the territory of Havas. The Ottoman empire, Egypt and Belgium would be jointly exploited by Reuter and Havas. All the other countries, including America, were supposed to be "neutral territories", where the three agencies would have equal rights to gather news and look for customers.

This was the first "division of the world", undertaken for a twenty-year period by Auguste Havas, Julius Reuter and Richard Wentzel, Bernard Wolff's heir. This division did not prohibit any of the partners from sending reporters or establishing representatives in the territories reserved for the other partners, but only prohibited the *distribution* of information there, other than through the authorized channel. Obviously, this division in no way threatened the dominant position of the Associated Press in the United States, nor did it intend to prevent the creation of new agencies. What it did was to establish both in Europe and in all of its colonies, an organization so strong that nothing could be done without it. In fact, thirty-five years elapsed before the North America agencies dared to enter the empire staked out by the "Big Three" on 17 January 1870.

In March 1870, Havas and Reuter signed an agreement with Nilo Maria Fabra, the director of a Spanish telegraph agency in which the agency agreed to work for the next few years as Agencia Telegraphica Havas-Reuter, and afterwards as

advertising space in French newspapers." (from D.W. Desmond, *The Press and World Affairs*, New York, 1937, p. 57) [Eds.]

2. During the winter of 1866-7, Associated Press opened a bureau in London, and Julius Reuter had the foresight to immediately sign an agreement with them. But when he proposed to his Paris and Berlin partners in 1869, that they share the cost of the service he was receiving from New York, Continental preferred to negotiate with Western Associated Press of Chicago. It was not until six years later in 1873, that the first general agreement between New York, London, Paris, and Berlin was reached.

3. Corrbureau granted Havas and Reuter the exclusive news service from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, especially news from Vienna, Budapest, Prague, Agram and Lemberg, Havas and Reuter, in exchange, sent them all their news from France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, England, Belgium, Holland, Scandinavia, Russia, Germany, Asia, Africa and Australia. North and South America are not mentioned in the contract, aside from the quotations from the New York Stock Exchange.

4. With the exception of Hamburg, where Reuters kept its private customers for a few years.

Agencia Havas, Madrid. The Ritzau agency, in Copenhagen, a modest but well-managed organization, had established links with the "Big Three" as the Corrbureau had earlier. Now Bombay could communicate with Europe by wire via Teheran and Russia, and by cable via Aden, Alexandria and Malta. Solidly implanted in Lisbon, where his father was married sixty-two years earlier, Auguste Havas began to look toward South America; in France itself, he had 17,000 kilometers of railroads at his disposal to transport his printed news service and 41,000 kilometers of telegraph lines to transmit his dispatches.

HAVAS AND SOUTH AMERICA

The first cable linking Europe and South America reached the Brazilian coast in early 1874. Beginning 1 August 1874 the service of the Agencia Telegraphica Reuter-Havas was being published in the *Jornal do Comercio* in Rio de Janeiro. A Havas agent, Ruffier, was the correspondent for the two agencies there, and in 1875, Reuters sent Walter Bradshaw to Chile to represent both agencies in that country.

Dividing up the zones of influence in the Western Hemisphere between Paris and London looked like an easy job. North America and England share a common language, and Reuters needed a greater quantity of news than Havas concerning the United States. South America is closer to the latin European countries and of the big European agencies, Havas would undoubtedly be the best accepted there. What remained to be seen however was New York's reaction to the plan devised in Europe. Havas and Continental sent Reuter to negotiate on their behalf. On 29 September 1875, Julius Reuter, representing Reuters, Havas, Laffite, and Continental, signed a contract with the Associated Press which was signed by James C. Huston, AP's general agent in New York. In the terms of this contract the three big European agencies agreed to exchange news with AP via London, with AP paying a monthly compensation. In exchange for the exclusive distribution of foreign news in the United States, AP agreed not to distribute its services in Europe or South America. This contract, signed for a one-year period, was renewable indefinitely, and its general principles dominated relations between New York, London, Paris and Berlin for forty years.

After the European triumvirate had come to an understanding with its most powerful possible competitor, London and Paris agreed that Havas would take over the administration of the South American business, and Reuter would keep the business in the West Indies. It was then realized that all the cables from North and South America, particularly from Brazil, converged in London. If time was to be saved during transmission using these cables, Havas would have to set up its South America office in London, and not in Paris. But who would direct this office?

At this point there appeared a young collaborator, who, until his death in 1916, would be one of

Havas' most active foreign correspondents. Elie Mercadier's name seemed to be pre-destined: he had been the telegraph director in daily contact with Auguste Havas on the rue de Grenelle, during the siege of Paris. Two weeks after the signing of the agreement with Associated Press, Elie Mercadier moved into Reuter's London offices.

Mercadier's arrival in London at the end of 1875 coincided with the entrance of Julius Reuter's oldest son into the agency. Herbert Reuter was twenty-three years old, and had studied at Oxford. His father had great difficulty in discouraging him from the musician's career he had wanted to pursue. Nevertheless, the young Reuter devoted himself wholeheartedly to his task. Little by little he replaced his father, who was increasingly occupied by personal affairs. As Mercadier was given the added task of sending a supplement of English political news to Paris, the South America bureau, called "Amsud", in reality, was the embryo of the London office of Havas.

One of the principal difficulties in the organization of the South America service had been evident from the start: the extremely high cost of the transmissions. Seventeen years earlier, in 1858, when the first Ireland-Newfoundland transatlantic cable was inaugurated, the Atlantic Telegraph Company had envisaged a kind of shorthand. At that time — the era of Babinet's "echoes" — to transmit each letter of the alphabet was hard work and it was better to cable *nao* instead of *nation*, *investa* instead of *investment*. Afterwards, when the technical problems were solved, words flowed quickly, but the price still remained relatively high. In 1875, the cost of sending one word from Europe to Brazil was forty gold francs. The cable companies, moreover, put limits on the length of the dispatches.

The news agencies thus began to compose codes, as was done already by commercial firms. Initially this had been done to shorten the dispatches. Later on, when the prices went down, these codes were used particularly for secret or confidential messages. By the time Elie Mercadier began to work in London, Auguste Havas's telegraphic dictionary contained 80,000 words, taken from French, English, German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Romanian. The dictionary was used for the long-distance transmission of both the agencies' news dispatches and the private dispatches which businesses paid the agency to transmit.⁵ Obviously, the dictionary's "code" had to be constantly reworked or expanded to fit the circumstances. Each of the foreign correspondents had his own special "code" which could be used for anticipated events. In Paris, an up-to-date list was kept of the 400 "famous men" of Europe, whose death deserved to be communicated by a single word, via cable, to Rio de Janeiro. "Imperfore", for instance, meant: "The prince of Savoie-Carignan is dead." It saved the agency 120

5. These commercial dispatches made up what was called the "private service". The terms "grouped dispatches", "fractured dispatches", "packs", or "packing" seem to have been used indifferently to designate this kind of coded dispatch. The money saved by the code system was divided between the agency and the client.

gold francs (equal to about 25,000 francs in 1950). Of the 400 "famous men", 170 were French, and needless to say, the composition of the list was the subject of epic arguments.

Under these economic conditions the "Amsud" service could be no more than summary: a more complete service would have necessitated asking the few Latin American subscribers to pay a fortune. Although in 1882 the rates were reduced to 17 gold francs a word, Edouard Lebey of Havas still noted with concern: "Last month we sent no less than 210 words to South America, without counting the Spanish and Portuguese news." The dispatches from Rio, Buenos Aires, and Valparaiso to London also remained for a long time limited to figures which even 25 years later, looked quite ridiculous. American dispatches in the 1880s were worth their weight in gold or diamonds. Before announcing in a fifteen-word cable the massacre of a French mission in Brazil or a revolution in Uruguay, an agent first looked inside the cash register.

Hardly three months after his arrival in London, near Christmas 1875, Mercadier realized that business was going badly. Julius Reuter had set up a "private" service between South America, the West Indies, the United States and London, which required a costly bureau to be maintained in New York. The enterprise as a whole ran at a serious deficit and Reuter was the first to admit it. At the Havas offices on the rue Notre-Dame-des-Victoires in Paris there was reluctance to continue the joint purse agreement which obliged Havas to cover half the losses. Although the agreement could only be altered after 1 January 1876, on 20 May 1875, Havas and Reuter drafted a new contract.

This contract put an end to the merger of the two agencies, but it also reaffirmed their intention to back up one another against competitors. Following the general outlines of the accord of 1870 in which Havas, Reuters, and Continental "divided the world" for twenty years, it settled the respective rights of the French and English agencies in Egypt, Turkey and Switzerland. Austro-Hungary was mentioned as one of the territories which could be jointly exploited by Reuter and Havas. The most important innovation concerned South America, which appeared in writing for the first time. Henceforth it would be exclusively reserved for Havas.

Shortly afterwards, Bradshaw was replaced in Chile by a Havas agent, Arturo Salazar, who held the position for thirteen years, while other Havas agents kept their posts in Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo and Buenos Aires. In the Brazilian newspapers, the credit line Agencia Telegraphica Reuter-Havas was replaced by Agencia Havas.

V.I. Lenin

THE DIVISION OF THE WORLD AMONG CAPITALIST COMBINES

(1916)

Monopolist capitalist combines, cartels, syndicates and trusts divide among themselves, first of all, the home market, seize more or less complete possession of the industry of a country. But under capitalism the home market is inevitably bound up with the foreign market. Capitalism long ago created a world market. As the export of capital increased, and as the foreign and colonial connections and "spheres of influence" of the big monopolist combines expanded in all ways, things "naturally" gravitated towards an international agreement among these combines, and afterwards the formation of international cartels.


This is a new stage of world concentration of capital and production, incomparably higher than the preceding stages. Let us see how this supermonopoly develops.

The electrical industry is the most typical of the latest achievements, most typical of capitalism at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. This industry has developed most in the two most advanced of the new capitalist countries, the United States and Germany. In Germany, the crisis of 1900 gave a particularly strong impetus to its concentration. During the crisis, the banks, which by this time had become fairly well merged with industry, enormously accelerated and intensified the ruin of relatively small firms and their absorption by the large ones. "The banks," writes Jeidels, "in refusing a helping hand to the very companies which are in greatest need of capital bring on first a frenzied boom and then the hopeless failure of the companies which have not been attached to them closely enough."¹

As a result, after 1900, concentration in Germany progressed with giant strides. Up to 1900 there had been eight or seven "groups" in the electrical industry. Each consisted of several companies (altogether there were 28) and each was backed by from 2 to 11 banks. Between 1908 and 1912 all these groups were merged into two, or one. The diagram below shows the process:

1. O. Jeidels, *Das Verhältnis der deutschen Grossbanken zur Industrie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Eisenindustrie*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 232.

This text was published as chapter 5 of the author's *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, 1916.



The famous A.E.G. (General Electric Company), which grew up in this way, controls 175 to 200 companies (through the "holding" system), and a total capital of approximately 1,500,000,000 marks. Of direct agencies abroad alone, it has thirty-four, of which twelve are joint-stock companies, in more than ten countries. As early as 1904 the amount of capital invested abroad by the German electrical industry was estimated at 233,000,000 marks. Of this sum, 62,000,000 were invested in Russia. Needless to say, the A.E.G. is a huge "combine" — its manufacturing companies alone number no less than sixteen — producing the most diverse articles, from cables and insulators to motor cars and flying machines.

But concentration in Europe was also a component part of the process of concentration in America, which developed in the following way:

United States:

General Electric Company

Thomson-Houston Edison Co. establishes in Europe Co. establishes the French Edison Co. which firm in Europe transfers its patents to the German firm

Germany:

General Electric Co. (A.E.G.)

Union Electric Co. General Electric Co. (A.E.G.)

Thus, two electrical "Great Powers" were formed: "there are no other electric companies in the world completely independent of them," wrote Heinig in his article "The Path of the Electric Trust." An idea, although far from complete, of the turnover and the size of the enterprises of the two "trusts" can be obtained from the following figures:

America: General Electric Co. (G.E.C.)

	Turnover (Mill. marks)	No. of employees	Net profits (Mill. marks)
1907:	252	28,000	35.4
1910:	298	32,000	45.6

Germany: General Electric Co. (A.E.G.)

1907:	216	30,700	14.5
1911:	362	60,800	21.7

Well, in 1907, the German and American trusts concluded an agreement by which they divided the world between themselves. Competition between them ceased. The American General Electric Company (G.E.C.) "got" the United States and Canada. The German General Electric Company (A.E.G.) "got" Germany, Austria, Russia, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey and the Balkans. Special agreements, naturally secret, were concluded regarding the penetration of "daughter companies" into new branches of industry, into "new" countries formally not yet allotted. The two trusts were to exchange inventions and experiments.²

The difficulty of competing against this trust, which is practically world-wide, controls a capital of several billion, and has its "branches, agencies, representatives, connections, etc., in every corner of the world, is self-evident. But the division of the world between two powerful trusts does not preclude *redivision*. If the relation of forces changes as a result of uneven development, war, bankruptcy, etc.

An instructive example of attempts at such a *redivision*, of the struggle for *redivision*, is provided by the oil industry.

"The world oil market," wrote Jeidels in 1905, "is even today still divided between two great financial groups — Rockefeller's American Standard Oil Co., and Rothschild and Nobel, the controlling interests of the Russian oil fields in Baku. The two groups are closely connected. But for several years five enemies have been threatening their monopoly:³ 1) The exhaustion of the American oil fields; 2) the competition of the firm of Mantashev of Baku; 3) the Austrian oil fields; 4) the Rumanian oil fields; 5) the overseas oil fields, particularly in the Dutch colonies (the extremely rich firms, Samuel, and Shell, are connected with British capital). The three last groups are connected with the big German banks, headed by the huge Deutsche Bank. These banks independently and systematically developed

2. Dr. Riesser, *Die deutschen Grossbanken und ihre Konzentration im Zusammenhange mit der Entwicklung der Gesamtwirtschaft in Deutschland*, 4th ed., 1912; Georges Diouritch, *L'expansion des banques allemandes à l'étranger, ses rapports avec le développement économique de l'Allemagne*, Paris, 1909, p. 239; Kurt Heinig "Der Weg des Electrot trusts" *Neue Zeit*, XXX, 2, 1912.

3. Jeidels, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

the oil industry in Rumania, for example, in order to have a foothold of their "own". In 1907, the foreign capital invested in the Rumanian oil industry was estimated at 185,000,000 francs, of which 74,000,000 was German capital.⁴

A struggle began for the "division of the world", as, in fact, it is called in economic literature. On one side, the Rockefeller "oil trust", wishing to capture *everything*, formed a "daughter company" *right in Holland*, and bought up oil fields in the Dutch Indies, in order to strike at its principal enemy, the Anglo-Dutch Shell trust. On the other side, the Deutsche Bank and the other German banks aimed at "retaining" Rumania "for themselves" and at uniting it with Russia against Rockefeller. The latter possessed far more capital and an excellent system of oil transportation and distribution. The struggle had to end, and did end in 1907, with the utter defeat of the Deutsche Bank, which was confronted with the alternative: either to liquidate its "oil interests" and lose millions, or submit. It chose to submit, and concluded a very disadvantageous agreement with the "oil trust". The Deutsche Bank agreed "not to attempt anything which might injure American interests". Provision was made, however, for the annulment of the agreement in the event of Germany establishing a state oil monopoly.

Then the "comedy of oil" began. One of the German finance kings, von Gwinner, a director of the Deutsche Bank, through his private secretary, Stauss, launched a campaign for a state oil monopoly. The gigantic machine of the huge German bank and all its wide "connections" were set in motion. The press bubbled over with "patriotic" indignation against the "yoke" of the American trust, and, on March 15, 1911, the Reichstag by an almost unanimous vote, adopted a motion asking the government to introduce a bill for the establishment of an oil monopoly. The government seized upon this "popular" idea, and the game of the Deutsche Bank, which hoped to cheat its American partner and improve its business by a state monopoly, appeared to have been won. The German oil magnates already saw visions of enormous profits, which would not be less than those of the Russian sugar refiners. . . . But, firstly, the big German banks quarrelled among themselves over the division of the spoils. The Disconto-Gesellschaft exposed the covetous aims of the Deutsche Bank; secondly, the government took fright at the prospect of a struggle with Rockefeller, for it was very doubtful whether Germany could be sure of obtaining oil from other sources (the Rumanian output was small); thirdly, just at that time the 1913 credits of a billion marks were voted for Germany's war preparations. The oil monopoly project was postponed. The Rockefeller "oil trust" came out of the struggle, for the time being, victorious.

The Berlin review, *Die Bank*, wrote in this con-

4. Diouritch, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

5. *Die Bank*, 1912, 1, p. 1036; 1912, 2, p. 629; 1913, 1, p. 388.

6. Riesser, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

nection that Germany could fight the oil trust only by establishing an electricity monopoly and by converting water power into cheap electricity. "But", the author added, "the electricity monopoly will come when the producers need it, that is to say, when the next great crash in the electrical industry will be standing at the door, and when the gigantic, expensive electric stations which are now being put up at great cost everywhere by private electrical 'concerns', which are already obtaining partial monopolies from towns, from states, etc., can no longer work at a profit. Water power will then have to be used. But it will be impossible to convert it into cheap electricity at state expense; it will also have to be handed over to a 'private monopoly controlled by the state', because private industry has already concluded a number of contracts and has stipulated for heavy compensation. . . . So it was with the nitrate monopoly, so it is with the oil monopoly; so it will be with the electric power monopoly. It is time our state socialists, who allow themselves to be blinded by a beautiful principle, understood, at last, that in Germany the monopolies have never pursued the aim, nor have they had the result, of benefiting the consumer, or even of handing over to the state part of the promoter's profits; they have served only to facilitate at the expense of the state, the recovery of private industries which were on the verge of bankruptcy."⁵

Such are the valuable admissions which the German bourgeois economists are forced to make. We see plainly here how private and state monopolies are interwoven in the age of finance capital; how both are but separate links in the imperialist struggle between the big monopolists for the division of the world.

In mercantile shipping, the tremendous development of concentration has ended also in the division of the world. In Germany two powerful companies have come to the front: the Hamburg-Amerika and the Norddeutscher Lloyd, each having a capital of 200,000,000 marks (in stocks and bonds) and possessing shipping tonnage to the value of 185 to 189 million marks. On the other side, in America, on January 1, 1903, the so-called Morgan trust, the International Mercantile Marine Co., was formed which united nine American and British steamship companies, and which possessed a capital of 120,000,000 dollars (480,000,000 marks). As early as 1903, the German giants and this American-British trust concluded an agreement to divide the world in connection with the division of profits. The German companies undertook not to compete in the Anglo-American traffic. Which ports were to be "allotted" to each was precisely stipulated; a joint committee of control was set up, etc. This agreement was concluded for twenty years, with the prudent provision for its annulment in the event of war.⁶

Extremely instructive also is the story of the formation of the International Rail Cartel. The first attempt of the British, Belgian and German rail manufacturers to form such a cartel was made as early as 1884, during a severe industrial depression. The manufacturers agreed not to compete with one another in the home markets of the countries

involved, and they divided the foreign markets in the following quotas: Great Britain 66 per cent; Germany 27 per cent; Belgium 7 per cent. India was reserved entirely for Great Britain. Joint war was declared against a British firm which remained outside the cartel, the cost of which was met by a percentage levy on all sales. But in 1886 the cartel collapsed when two British firms retired from it. It is characteristic that agreement could not be achieved during subsequent boom periods.

At the beginning of 1904, the German steel syndicate was formed. In November 1904, the International Rail Cartel was revived, with the following quotas: England 53.5 per cent; Germany 28.83 per cent; Belgium 17.67 per cent. France came in later and received 4.8 per cent, 5.8 per cent and 6.4 per cent in the first, second and third years respectively, over and above the 100 per cent limit, i.e., out of a total of 104.8 per cent, etc. In 1905, the United States Steel Corporation entered the cartel; then Austria and Spain. "At the present time," wrote Vogelstein in 1910, "the division of the world is completed, and the big consumers, primarily the state railways — since the world has been parcelled out without consideration for their interests—can now dwell like the poet in the heaven of Jupiter."⁷

We will mention also the International Zinc Syndicate which was established in 1909 and which precisely apportioned output among five groups of factories: German, Belgian, French, Spanish and British; and also the International Dynamite Trust, which, Liefmann says, is "quite a modern, close alliance of all the German explosives manufacturers who, with the French and American dynamite manufacturers, organized in a similar manner, have divided the whole world among themselves, so to speak."⁸

Liefmann calculated that in 1897 there were altogether about forty international cartels in which Germany had a share, while in 1910 there were about a hundred.

Certain bourgeois writers (whom K. Kautsky, who has completely abandoned the Marxist position he held, for example, in 1909, has now joined) have expressed the opinion that international cartels, being one of the most striking expressions of the internationalization of capital, give the hope of peace among nations under capitalism. Theoretically, this opinion is absolutely absurd, while in practice it is sophistry and a dishonest defence of the worst opportunism. International cartels show to what point capitalist monopolies have developed, and the object of the struggle between the various capitalist combines. This last circumstance is the most important; it alone shows us the historico-economic meaning of what is taking place; for the forms of the struggle may and do constantly change in accordance with varying, relatively particular and temporary causes, but the substance of the struggle, its class

content, positively cannot change while classes exist. Naturally, it is in the interests of, for example, the German bourgeoisie, to whose side Kautsky has in effect gone over in his theoretical arguments (we will deal with this later), to obscure the substance of the present economic struggle (the division of the world) and to emphasize now this and now another form of the struggle. Kautsky makes the same mistake. Of course, we have in mind not only the German bourgeoisie but the bourgeoisie all over the world. The capitalists divide the world, not out of any particular malice, but because the degree of concentration which has been reached forces them to adopt this method in order to obtain profits. And they divide it "in proportion to capital", "in proportion to strength", because there cannot be any other method of division under commodity production and capitalism. But strength varies with the degree of economic and political development. In order to understand what is taking place, it is necessary to know what questions are settled by the changes in strength. The question as to whether these changes are "purely" economic or non-economic (e.g., military) is a secondary one, which cannot in the least affect the fundamental views on the latest epoch of capitalism. To substitute the question of the form of the struggle and agreements (today peaceful, tomorrow warlike, the next day warlike again) for the question of the substance of the struggle and agreements between capitalist combines is to sink to the role of a sophist.

The epoch of the latest stage of capitalism shows us that certain relations between capitalist combines grow up, based on the economic division of the world; while parallel and in connection with it, certain relations grow up between political combines, between states, on the basis of the territorial division of the world, of the struggle for colonies, of the "struggle for economic territory."

7. Th. Vogelstein, *Organisationsformen der Eisenindustrie und Textilindustrie in England und Amerika*, Vol. I, Leipzig, 1910, p. 100.

8. Robert Liefmann, *Kartelle und Trusts und die Weiterbildung der volkswirtschaftlichen Organisation*, 2nd ed., 1910, p. 161.

J.D. Bernal

ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER

(UK, 1953)

Electricity was not a new subject in the nineteenth century, but it was then that it was to receive its greatest theoretical extension and, in the form of the telegraph, to become an indispensable part of social life. Yet it was only at the end of the century, with the development of electric light and electric power, that its full practical capacities were beginning to be realized. The twentieth century was to be the electrical age. In electricity, unlike other aspects of technology, practice lagged far behind theory. The reasons for this were multiple, but as we shall see they were far more social and economic than technical.

The knowledge of electricity did not originate, as had that of chemistry, in an attempt to understand the uses men already made of natural forces. Natural electrical phenomena, though multiple, are not obviously connected and show themselves as trivial effects, like the attraction of amber for scraps of straw, or as the majestic but uncontrollable strokes of lightning. Indeed the study of electricity began only as a somewhat playful extension of that of its sister science, magnetism, which had already long proved its practical use in the compass. Gilbert was the first to recognize their relationship in 1600, but more than a century was to pass before a number of gifted amateurs took up the subject afresh and started a series of experiments that step by step elucidated its main principles. Among them was that great hero of the eighteenth century, Benjamin Franklin, who more than anyone else made electricity a science by linking the spark and the lightning flash and then fixing the knowledge in practice by inventing the lightning conductor.

A new era in electricity began in 1800, as already mentioned, with the discovery of the electric current and of the voltaic cell needed to produce it. But at first only a fraction of the potentialities of the current — its heating and chemical effects — could be appreciated and the methods of generating it were limited. The first important step to break this limitation was made early in the century — the discovery of Oersted in 1820 of the effect of electricity on the magnet, which joined the two sciences of electricity and magnetism and gave them a common mathematical basis of theory. This link was completed by Faraday's discovery, eleven years later, of the complementary effect of the generation of electricity by a moving

magnet. No new general principle entered into electromagnetism in the rest of the century. The main scientific effort throughout this period was devoted to the development of a quantitative and comprehensive theory, which culminated in Maxwell's great electromagnetic theory of light — the theoretical basis of the radio industry of the twentieth century. Some experimenters, it is true, studied the beautiful but complex phenomena of electric discharge and revealed, at the very end of the century, the existence of the electron, but its role, too, was to be in the future.¹

In the nineteenth century itself electricity was used for communication, light, and power, in that order. Everything that was done in these fields was implicit in the fundamental discoveries of Oersted and Faraday, but it took the whole of fifty years before these possibilities could be realized. Electric light came in during the eighties and the commercial use of electric power followed within a decade. The equipment needed for them did not require more engineering skill or capacity for research than was available in the thirties. Yet application, until the very end of the century, was halting and clumsy and remained on a very small scale. The delay can be put down to the combined effect of lack of vision and lack of funds for research and development. Brunel, one of the most far-sighted engineers of the mid-century, declared that electricity was only a toy. The few, like Faraday himself, who saw its possibilities lacked the inclination and the means to realize them. The actual advance came by a series of steps each of which had to pay its way before the next could be attempted. Most of the cost of electrical research had to be borne by the telegraph, the first commercially successful application of the new science.

THE TELEGRAPH

The electromagnetic telegraph was only the latest of a series of abortive attempts to use other properties of electricity, such as the discharge of condensers and the electrolysis of water, to send signals. The problem of telegraphy is really twofold; one aspect is the mathematical ingenuity in finding the most effective code for transmitting messages by unit signals, the other is the physical problem of sending and receiving those signals. The first was solved in 1832 by Morse who reduced the signal to its simplest element of dot and dash in a way so elegant that it still survives. The second was the fruit of the work of scores of electrical research workers, among whom are found the names of the most illustrious physicists, such as Henry, Gauss, Weber, and Wheatstone. The solution of the problems of current generation by batteries, of current propagation in networks of wire and of electrical measurement arose from and contributed to the development of telegraphy. It was in connection with these researches that both the methods and the

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1. Nevertheless, as will be shown, these researches were the means of improving the vacuum pump, without which the incandescent bulb would not have come into existence.

standards of electrical measurement were evolved. This was to lead to the understanding of the fundamental relations between electricity and magnetism expressed in Maxwell's electromagnetic theory of light. It also led to the addition of the new electrical units to the age-old weights and measures for determining quantities of a new commodity that could be bought and sold.

The telegraph came in with the railway and was almost essential for its speedy working; it became a great personal convenience, but its chief influence was commercial. By linking markets together it made them into one vast market for commodities and stocks in which a change in price in one part affected the whole system at once. As the telegraph advanced it opened the world to capitalism. For long, however, it was limited to land and short sea routes; the market of Europe and America were isolated from each other. The successful laying and operation of the transatlantic cable, which took the whole decade from 1857 to 1868, was a combined electrical, technical, and oceanographic triumph. To achieve it needed the full vigour, intelligence, and shrewdness of William Thomson — who rose to be Lord Kelvin on account of it. The details of the interaction of the scientific, technical, and financial problems it involved bring out most clearly the way in which science in the sixties was already being integrated into the economic system. Telegraph companies and later cable and telephone companies were the first purely scientific commercial enterprises. Nevertheless, though they gave employment to the new profession of electrical engineers² and provided some interesting problems for professors of physics, their direction was soon out of scientific hands and they contributed but a trifle of the vast profits they made to the advancement of science. The indirect material contribution of the telegraph to science was, however, an indispensable one. It provided the stock-in-trade for electrical experimentation — batteries, terminals, insulated wire (Faraday had to use wire from milliners or wind his own insulation), coils, switches, simple measuring instruments — and all at prices which even impoverished university laboratories could afford.

Though the telegraph was to be the nursery for electrical technology the problems it posed were limited by its use of very weak currents. It needed delicacy and speed rather than power. The main line of advance was to come from the sale of a commodity needed even more than communication — domestic lighting.

2. Edison claimed to be the first to have called himself an electrical engineer in 1870 but this is disputed. The Society of Telegraph Engineers in Britain was founded in 1871. Only in 1889 did it change its name to the Institute of Electrical Engineers.

Stuart Ewen

ADVERTISING AS SOCIAL PRODUCTION (USA, 1969)

I. "SHORTER HOURS, HIGHER WAGES"

Consumption is the name given to the new doctrine; and it is admitted today to be the greatest idea that America has to give to the world; the idea that workmen and masses be looked upon not simply as workers and producers, but as consumers.... Pay them more, sell them more, prosper more is the equation.

Mrs Christine Frederick,
Selling Mrs Consumer (1929)

In 1910, Henry Ford instituted the "line production system" for "maximum production economy" in his Highland Park, Michigan, plant.¹ The innovation, though in many ways unsophisticated, and hardly educated as to its own implications, was the beginning of a momentous transformation in America's capacity to produce. In quantitative terms, the change was staggering. On the 1910 line, the time required to assemble a chassis was twelve hours and twenty-eight minutes. "By spring of 1914, the Highland Park plant was turning out over 1,000 vehicles a day, and the average labor time for assembling a chassis had dropped to one hour and thirty-three minutes."²

Mass production was a way of making production more economical. Through his use of the assembly line, Ford was able to utilize "expensive, single-purpose" machinery along with "quickly trained, single-purpose" workmen to make a single-model, inexpensive automobile at a rate which, with increasing sophistication, continued to dwarf not only the production levels of premassified industry, but the output of less refined mass production systems.³

By the 1920s, interest in and employment of the industrial potential of mass production extended far beyond the automobile industry. In recognition of such industrial developments, the United States

1. Alfred Dupont Chandler, *Giant Enterprise, Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry* (1964), p. 29. Chandler is citing the *Federal Trade Commission Report on the Motor Vehicle Industry*.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

3. "...during a period of eighteen years commencing in 1908, Ford Motor Company manufactured and offered for sale only one basic model of passenger automobile.... This was the [black] Model T." See Chandler, pp. 27, 37.

This text was first published in *Radical America* (Cambridge, Mass.), III, 3, May-June 1969, and is reprinted as Part I of the author's *Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of the Consumer Culture*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1976. Copyright Stuart Ewen 1976. Reprinted by permission of the author.

Special Census of 1921 and 1923 offered a study of productive capacity⁴ which was one of the first general discussions of its kind.⁵ Consumer goods manufacturers were coming to recognize that mass production and mass distribution were "necessary" steps towards survival in a competitive market. Edward Filene, of the Boston department store family, a businessman founder of the consumer union movement, articulated the competitive compulsion of mass production. Competition, said Filene, "will compel us to Fordize American business and industry."⁶

And yet, what Filene and others meant by "Fordizing" American industry transcended the myopic vision of Henry Ford. While Ford stubbornly held to the notion that "the work and the work alone controls us,"⁷ others in the automobile industry⁸ and, (for our purposes) more importantly, ideologues of mass industry outside of the auto industry viewed the strategy of production in far broader social terms. Before mass production, industry had produced for a limited, largely middle- and upper-class market. With a burgeoning productive capacity, industry now required an equivalent increase in potential consumers of its goods. "Scientific production promised to make the conventional notion of the self-reliant producer/consumer anachronistic."⁹

The mechanism of mass production could not function unless markets became more dynamic, growing horizontally (nationally), vertically (into social classes not previously among the consumers) and ideologically. Now men and women had to be habituated to respond to the demands of the productive machinery. The corollary to a freely growing system of goods production was a "systematic, nationwide plan...to endow the masses with more buying power," a freely growing system of consumer production.¹⁰ The modern mass producer could not depend upon an elite market to respond to his production capacity. From a dependence upon local markets or localized markets scattered nationally,¹¹ the manufacturer was forced to "count on the whole United States if he [was]...going to manufacture a large enough quantity of goods to reduce the cost to the point where he [could]...compete with other manufacturers of the same goods"¹² and subsequently distribute his

4. Harold Loeb, *National Survey of Potential Product Capacity* (1935), p. 3.

5. This may be seen as a response to a combination of things. Aside from the fact of proliferating mass production methods, the 1921 depression/buyers' strike served as an impetus to this study.

6. Edward A. Filene, *The Way Out: A Forecast of Coming Changes in American Business and Industry* (1924), p. 93.

7. Chandler, p. 143.

8. Notably Alfred P. Sloan of General Motors. Sloan saw productive strategy in broad social terms. His biography, *My Life With General Motors* (1960), gives an account of these early developments.

9. Loeb, p. xv, in regard to "the capacity of the nation to produce goods and services. If full advantage were taken of existing resources, man power, and knowledge...every new invention, every improved method, every advance in management technique will increase the final quantitative

mass produced wares more efficiently and profitably. He was required to create an ideological bridge across traditional social gaps—region, taste, need and class—which would narrow prejudices in his favor.

Considering the quantitative possibilities of mass production, the question of "national markets" became one of qualitatively changing the nature of the American buying public. In response to the exigencies of the productive system of the twentieth century, excessiveness replaced thrift as a social value. It became imperative to invest the laborer with a financial power and a psychic desire to consume.

By the end of the depression of 1921, "productive machinery was so effective that even more so than before much greater markets were absolutely necessary than those provided by the existing public buying power."¹³ As the question of expanding old and creating new markets became a function of the massification of industry, foresighted businessmen began to see the necessity of organizing their businesses not merely around the production of goods, but around the creation of a buying public. "The changes that we shall be obliged to make in production," noted Filene, "will lead to pretty thorough overhauling of our machinery and methods of distribution, and, in the end, both the quantity and quality of consumption will be dictated by them."¹⁴ As the "twentieth-century industrialist...realized to a greater extent than did his predecessors, that he must understand the living world contained by his factory,"¹⁵ so too did he realize that he must understand and manipulate, as part of his productive apparatus, the total world occupied by his workers. The necessity to "influence human conduct," the knowledge that goods production meant social production, encoded within the rhetoric of some businessmen a revealing idiom: "human conduct" or the "consumer's dollar" became equivalent to industrial discoveries, more valuable to manufacturing "than the uses of electricity or steel."¹⁶ Within an ideal of a "scientifically" managed industry, raw materials and consumers were both viewed as malleable. They both would have to be shaped by the demands of the production line, pecuniary interests, and the

estimate." Such a question would be answered by "a running inventory of our approach to perfection rather than a research into existing capacity as determined by production." The survey considered such a potential too open-ended to effect meaningful speculation.

10. Edward A. Filene, *The Consumer's Dollar* (1934), p. 13.

11. Editorial, "The Phantom of National Distribution," *Printers' Ink* (hereafter, *P.I.*), CXXIV, No. 12 (September 20, 1923), p. 180. As the trade journal for the ad industry dating back into the nineteenth century, *Printers' Ink* is an invaluable source for any research in this field.

12. Ernest Elmo Calkins, *Business the Civilizer* (1928), p. 10.

13. Filene, *The Consumer's Dollar*, p. 29.

14. Filene, *The Way Out*, p. 50.

15. Loren Baritz, *The Servants of Power* (1960), p. 15.

16. Whiting Williams, *Mainsprings of Men* (1925), p. 297.

newly emergent managerial tools of capital.

As capitalism became characterized by mass production and the subsequent need for mass distribution, traditional expedients for the real or attempted manipulation of labor were transformed. While the nineteenth-century industrialist coerced labor (both on and off the job) to serve as the "wheelhorse" of industry, modernizing capitalism sought to change "wheelhorse" to "worker" and "worker" to "consumer."¹⁷

For the workers, the movement toward mass production had severely changed the character of labor. The worker had become a decreasingly "significant" unit of production within the modern manufacturing process. "The man who had been the more or less creative maker of the whole of an article became the tender of a machine that made only one small part of the article."¹⁸ The time required to teach the worker the "adept performance" of his "operation on assembly work" was a matter of a few hours.¹⁹ This development had significant repercussions both in terms of the way in which a laborer viewed his proletarian status and in term of the manufacturer's need to mass distribute the mountaneous fruits of mass production. The two phenomena merged in the redefinition of the proletarian status. While mass production defined labor's work in terms of monotony and rationalized its product to a fragment, some businessmen spoke of "economic freedom" or "industrial democracy"²⁰ as the blessing promised the worker by modern production methods. Yet the "freedom" and "democracy" offered by mass industry stopped short of a freedom to define the uses or to rearrange the relationships of production. "The industrial democracy I am discussing," Filene assured those who might fear its anticapitalist implications, "has nothing to do with the Cubist politics of class revolution."²¹ What was meant, rather, was that modern industrial production required that workers be free to "cultivate themselves" among the uncontested fruits of the new industrial cornucopia.

The endowment of the masses with "industrial democracy" was seen as a complex and involving process. Their traditional role in capitalism had afforded them neither the cash nor the conviction to

be so "democratized." It was imperative that the worker "desire a larger share in the mental and spiritual satisfactions of the property of his daily job much more than... a larger share in the management of the enterprise which furnishes that job."²²

Not only was this alleged democracy designed to define the modern worker as a smoothly running unit of industrial production, it also tended to define protest and proletarian unrest in terms of the desire to consume, making these profitable as well. By the demand of workers for the right to be better consumers, the aspirations of labor would be profitably coordinated with the aspirations of capital. Such convictions implicitly attempted to divest protest of its anticapitalist content. Modern labor protest should have no basis in class antagonism.²³

By the twenties, the ideological vanguard of the business community saw the need to endow the masses with what the economic historian Norman Ware has called the money, commodity, and psychic wages (satisfactions) correlative and responsive to the route of industrial capitalism.²⁴ There was a dramatic movement toward objective conditions which would make mass consumption feasible: higher wages and short hours. Giving official sanction to such visions, Herbert Hoover noted that "High wages [are the]... very essence of great production."²⁵ In 1923, Julius Barnes, president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, spoke of the need to prevent the overconcentration of wealth, which threatened the development of a "broad purchasing market necessary to absorb our production."²⁶ Certainly the movement to higher wages preceded the twenties but it is mainly in the twenties that this movement became linked to a general strategy to consumerize the worker. As early as 1914, Henry Ford had instituted the five-dollar work-day wage, but his innovation coexisted with a nineteenth-century Protestant value system which the worker was expected to maintain.²⁷ This system significantly clashed with the "economic freedom" that, out of necessity, attempted to subvert the moderation earlier valued for the masses.

The question of shorter hours was also tantamount to offering labor the "chance" to expand the consumer market. And yet, this notion of

aspects of the total life of the American worker. His concern for consumer rights reflected the ideology of progressive capital no less than did the writings of Edward Filene, who, although he had one foot in the "consumer category," placed his other on the side of financial power rather than in the monotony of factory life.

24. Norman Ware, *Labor in Modern Industrial Society* (1935), p. 88.

25. Walling, p. 212.

26. *Ibid.*

27. In an attempt to assure that his workers carried on a "moderate" life off of the job, Ford developed a *Sociological Department* staffed by thirty investigators who were "empowered to go into the workers' homes to make sure that no one was drinking too much, that everyone's sex life was without blemish, that leisure time was profitably spent, that no boarders were taken in, that houses were clean and neat." Baritz, p. 33.

"chance" like the notions of "industrial democracy" and "economic freedom", were subterfuges in so much as these alleged freedoms and choices meant merely a transformed version of capitalism's incessant need to mold a work force in its own image. "As modern industry... [was] geared to mass production, time out for mass consumption becomes as much a necessity as time in for production."²⁸ The shortening of hours was seen as a qualitative as well as quantitative change in the worker's life, without significantly altering his relation to power over the uses and means of production. In addition to increasing the amount of leisure, it was hoped that shorter hours would productively determine "to some extent, the use of leisure and consumption..."²⁹ Shorter hours and higher wages were seen as a first step in a broader offensive against notions of thrift and an attempt to habituate a national population to the exigencies of mass production. A capitalism that had previously required the worker to "live, move and... [have]... his being *there on the job*"³⁰ was now, in some industries, trying to undo such notions. Now priorities demanded that the worker spend his wages and leisure time on the consumer market. Realizing that earlier conditions had not been "favorable to such a worker's finding in, say, the sector of his home the sought-for satisfactions of forward movement and distinction," Whiting Williams, personnel director for a steel company and an ideologue of "scientific" management, felt that labor had developed a "suspicion" of such "sought-for satisfactions." Once again linking the rhetoric of freedom to the necessities of capitalism, Filene noted that,

modern workmen have learned their habits of consumption and their habits of spending (thrift) in the school of fatigue, in a time when high prices and relatively low wages have made it necessary to spend all the energies of the body and mind in providing food, clothing and shelter. We have no right to be overcritical of the way they spend a new freedom or a new prosperity until they have had as long a training in the school of freedom.³¹

Within the vision of consumption as a "school of freedom," the entry onto the consumer market was described as a "civilizing" experience. "Civilization" was the expanded cultural world which flowed from capitalism's broad capacity to commodify material resources. The experience of civilization was the cultural world this capacity produced.

And yet the "school of freedom" posed various problems. The democratic terminology within

28. Ware, *Labor in Modern Industrial Society*, p. 101.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

30. Williams, *What's on the Workers' Mind*, p. 299.

31. Filene, *The Way Out*, p. 202.

32. Ware, *Labor in Modern Industrial Society*, p. 95. According to Ware's studies, union manufacturing labor averaged 40-48 hours per week. Nonunion labor in similar industries averaged 50 hours per week, while labor in more traditional areas, mills and shops, worked 48-60 hours per week.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

34. Robert S. Lynd, "The People as Consumers,"

which the profitable vision of consumption was posed did not reveal the social and economic realities that threatened that vision. In terms of economic development, the financial growth of industrial corporations averaged 286 percent between 1922 and 1929. Despite wage hikes and relatively shorter hours in some industries,³² the average manufacturing wage-earner showed a wage increase of only 14 percent during this same period.³³ The discrepancy between purchasing power and the rate of industrial growth was dealt with in part by the significant development of installment-selling³⁴ which grew as an attempt to bolster "inadequate" markets in the economically depressed years of the early twenties.

Despite the initiation of a corporate credit system which offered consumers supplementary money, the growth of the productive system forced many industrial ideologues to realize the continuous need to habituate people psychically to consumption beyond mere changes in the productive order which they inhabited.

II. MOBILIZING THE INSTINCTS

The man with the proper imagination is able to conceive of any commodity in such a way that it becomes an object of emotion to him and to those to whom he imparts his picture, and hence creates desire rather than a mere feeling of ought.³⁵

Walter Dill Scott

Influencing Men in Business (1911)

Modern advertising must be seen as a direct response to the needs of mass industrial capitalism. Second in procession after the manager of the production line, noted Whiting Williams, "came the leader who possessed the ability to develop and direct men's desires and demands in a way to furnish the organized mass sales required for the mass production made possible by the massed dollars."³⁶ Advertising, as a part of mass distribution within modernizing industries, became a major sector for business investment. Within the automobile industry, initiated by the broad and highly diversified G.M. oligopoly, distribution came to account for about one half of that investment. Among producers of smaller consumer goods, the percentage of capital devoted to product proliferation was often greater.³⁷

In the 1920s, advertising played a role of growing significance in industry's attempt to develop a continually responsive consumer market. Although committed national corporations saw advertising as an invaluable component of critical

Recent Social Trends in the United States: Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, Vol. II (1933), p. 862. Such credit buying was initiated primarily in the automobile industry with the General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC).

35. Walter Dill Scott, *Influencing Men in Business* (originally published 1911; 1928 revised edition enlarged by Delton T. Howard), p. 133, 1928 edition.

36. Williams, *What's on the Worker's Mind*, p. 317.

37. "In some lines, such as whiskey and milk, distribution cost is from four to ten times the cost of production." Chandler, p. 157.

17. Whiting Williams, *What's on the Worker's Mind* (1920), p. 317.

18. Filene, *The Way Out*, pp. 62-63.

19. Williams, *Mainsprings*, p. 51.

20. Filene, *The Way Out*, p. 127.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

22. Williams, *Mainsprings*, p. 127.

23. By the 1920s widespread elements of the union movement had accepted such an ideology. Among others, William English Walling of the Labor Progressives dissolved the class struggle in one fell swoop. Virtually paraphrasing the ideologues of scientifically planned capitalism, he felt that "to bring labor to the maximum productivity, the American labor movement believes, requires new organization and policies in the administration of industry." See William Walling, *American Labor and American Democracy* (1926), p. 233.

Walling spoke of labor and consumer as interrelated

economic planning,³⁸ its acceptance was hardly universal. In its early days the mass advertising industry that developed in concert with the mass needs of industrial corporations continually had to sell itself to industry. Between 1918 and 1923, a greater percentage of articles in the advertising trade journal, *Printers' Ink*, were devoted to ways of convincing "ancient" corporations that advertising was a given of modern industrialism than were devoted to advertising and merchandising techniques. During the 1920s, however, advertising grew to the dimensions of a major industry. In 1918, total gross advertising revenues in general and farm magazines was \$58.5 million. By 1920 the gross had reached \$129.5 million; and by 1929, \$196.3 million. Such figures do not include newspaper revenues or, more significantly, direct-to-buyer advertising, which still comprised a major, though declining, sector of the industry.

In an address to the American Association of Advertising Agencies on October 27, 1926, Calvin Coolidge noted that the industry now required "for its maintenance, investments of great capital, the occupation of large areas of floor space, the employment of an enormous number of people."³⁹ The production line had insured the efficient creation of vast quantities of consumer goods; now ad men spoke of their product as "business insurance"⁴⁰ for profitable and efficient distribution of these goods. While line management tended to the process of goods production, social management (advertisers) hoped to make the cultural milieu of capitalism as efficient as line management had made production. Their task was couched in terms of a secular religion for which the advertisers sought adherents. Calvin Coolidge, applauding this new clericism, noted that "advertising ministers to the spiritual side of trade."⁴¹

Advertising offered itself as a means of efficiently creating consumers and as a way of homogeneously "controlling the consumption of a product."⁴² Although many corporations boasted of having attained national markets without the aid of advertising, the trade journal *Printers' Ink* argued that these "phantom national markets" were actually inefficient, unpredictable and scattered agglomerations of heterogeneous local markets.⁴³ The significance of the notion of efficiency in the creation of consumers lies in the fact that the modern advertising industry, like the modern manufacturing plant, was an agent of consolidated and multi-leveled commerce. As Ford's assembly line utilized "expensive single-purpose machinery" to produce automobiles inexpensively and at a rate that dwarfed traditional methods, the costly

machinery of advertising that Coolidge had described set out to produce consumers, likewise inexpensively and at a rate that dwarfed traditional methods. To create consumers efficiently the advertising industry had to develop universal notions of what makes people respond, going beyond the "horse sense" psychology that had characterized the earlier industry.⁴⁴ Such general conceptions of human instinct promised to provide ways of reaching a mass audience via a universal appeal. Considering the task of having to build a mass ad industry to attend to the needs of mass production, the ad men welcomed the work of psychologists in the articulation of these general conceptions.⁴⁵

The vanguard of the business community found the social psychology of such men as Floyd Henry Allport extremely useful in giving an ideological cohesion to much of what one sees in the advertising of the twenties.⁴⁶ Explicating his notion of the way in which man develops a sense of himself from infancy, Allport asserted that "our consciousness of ourselves is largely a reflection of the consciousness which others have of us... My idea of myself is rather my own idea of my neighbor's view of me."⁴⁷ This notion of the individual as the object of continual and harsh social scrutiny underscored the argument of much of the ad texts of the decade.

Whether or not the general conception of "self" as propounded by Floyd Henry Allport had a direct bearing on the *Weltanschauung* held by advertising in the 1920s is not clear. It was generally conceded, however, that a "knowledge of people—human nature"⁴⁸—was as necessary a constituent of social production as the line manager's knowledge of his raw materials was to goods production.

While agreeing that "human nature is more difficult to control than material nature,"⁴⁹ ad men spoke in specific terms of "human instincts" which if properly understood could induce people "to buy a given product if it was scientifically presented. If advertising copy appealed to the right instincts, the urge to buy would surely be excited."⁵⁰ The utilitarian value of a product or the traditional notion of mechanical quality were no longer sufficient inducements to move merchandise at the necessary rate and volume required by mass production.

Such traditional appeals would not change the disposition of potential markets towards consumption of given products. Instead each product would be offered in isolation, but not in terms of the nature of the consumer, but through an argument based on the intrinsic qualities of the item itself.

Distribution," *P.I.*, CXXIV, No. 12 (September 20, 1923), p. 180.

44. Baritz, p. 27.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

46. Williams, *Mainsprings*.

47. Floyd Henry Allport, *Social Psychology* (1924), p. 325.

48. Calkins, p. 123.

49. Scott, p. 3.

50. Baritz, p. 26.

The advertisers were concerned with effecting a self-conscious change in the psychic economy, which could not come about if they spent all their time talking about a product and none talking about the "reader." Advertising literature, following the advent of mass production methods, increasingly spoke in terms of appeals to instinct. Anticipating later implementation, by 1911, Walter Dill Scott, psychologist/author of *Influencing Men in Business*, noted that "goods offered as means of gaining social prestige make their appeals to one of the most profound of the human instincts."⁵¹ Yet the instinct for "social prestige," as well as others of a broad "constellation"⁵² of instincts, was channeled into the terms of the productive system. The use value of "prestige," of "beauty," of "acquisition," of "self-adornment," and of "play" were all placed in the service of advertising's basic purpose—to provide effective mass distribution of products. Carl A. Naether, an advocate of advertising for women, demonstrated how the link might be effected between "instinct" and mass sales.

An attractive girl admiring a string of costly pearls just presented to her would in no few cases make the one seeing her in an advertisement exclaim: "I wish that I, too, might have a set of pearls and so enhance my personal appearance." Such and similar longings are merely expressions of real or fancied need for what is advertised.⁵³

The creation of "fancied need" was crucial to the modern advertiser. The transcendence of traditional consumer markets and buying habits required people to buy, not to satisfy their own fundamental needs, but rather to satisfy the real, historic needs of capitalist productive machinery. Advertising was a way of making people put time and energy into what Calvin Coolidge referred to as as their "education"⁵⁴ to production. The investment of time and energy in deliberation over an advertisement, as described by Scott,⁵⁵ enacted in microcosm the commitment of one's total time and energy to consumption. Advertising demanded but a momentary participation in the logic of consumption. Yet hopefully that moment would be expanded into a life style by its educational value. A given ad asked not only that an individual buy its product, but that he experience a self-conscious perspective that he had previously been socially and psychically denied. By that perspective, he could ameliorate social and personal frustrations through access to the marketplace.

In light of such notions as Allport's "social self" and other self-objectifying visions of popularity and success,⁵⁶ a new cultural logic was projected by advertising beyond the strictly

51. Scott, p. 132.

52. Baritz, p. 26.

53. Carl A. Naether, *Advertising to Women* (1928), p. 97.

54. "When we stop to consider the part which advertising plays in the modern life of production and trade, we see that basically it is that of education... it makes new thoughts, new desires and new actions." Presbrey, p. 620.

55. Scott, p. 43.

pecuniary one of creating the desire to consume. The social perception was one in which people ameliorated the negative condition of social objectification through consumption—material objectification. The negative condition was portrayed as social failure derived from continual public scrutiny. The positive goal emanated from one's *modern* decision to armor himself against such scrutiny with the accumulated "benefits" of industrial production. Social responsibility and social self-preservation were being correlated to an allegedly existential decision that one made to present a mass-produced public face. Man, traditionally seen as exemplary of God's perfect product, was now hardly viable in comparison with the man-made products of industrial expertise. The elevation of man's works in the cosmos which has underlined the half-way covenant among New England Puritans was now being secularized into the realm of mass social production. It was felt that capitalism, through an appeal to instincts—ultimately feelings of social insecurity—could habituate men and women to consumptive life.⁵⁷ Such social production of consumers represented a shift in social and political priorities which has since characterized much of the "life" of American industrial capitalism. The functional goal of national advertising was the creation of desires and habits. In tune with the need for mass distribution that accompanied the development of mass production capabilities, advertising was trying to produce in readers personal needs which would dependently fluctuate with the expanding marketplace.

Exposing an affirmative vision of capitalist production, Calvin Coolidge reassured the members of the ad industry in 1926 that "rightfully applied, it [advertising] is the method by which the desire is created for better things."⁵⁸ The nature of capitalism, required an unquestioning attitude towards the uses of production. The use of psychological methods, therefore, attempted to turn the consumer's critical functions away from the product and towards himself. The determining factor for buying was self-critical and ideally ignored the intrinsic worth of the product. The Lynds, in their study, *Middletown*, noted that unlike ads of a generation before, modern advertising was

concentrated increasingly upon a type of copy aiming to make the reader emotionally uneasy, to bludgeon him with the fact that decent people don't live the way he does.... This copy points an accusing finger at the stenographer as she reads her motion picture magazine and makes her acutely conscious of her unpolished finger nails... and sends the housewife peering

56. "Physical or sex attraction... other things being equal, qualities which make one pleasing to look at or to caress render their possessor popular to many and loved by not a few." Allport, p. 365.

57. Not incidental to this direct appeal to the consumer's self-image, advertisers argued that "heavy expenditures for consumer advertising by a manufacturer... [might] induce merchants to favour him with orders." Harold Maynard, et al., *Principles of Marketing* (1927), p. 439.

58. Presbrey, p. 622.

38. Harry Tipper, et al., *Advertising: Its Principles and Practice* (1921), pp. 16-18. See also, Alvin Bunisicker, "Stabilizing Profits Through Advertising," *P.I.*, CXXIV, No. 13, p. 81.

39. Frank Spencer Presbrey, *The History and Development of Advertising* (1929), p. 620.

40. Calkins, p. 236.

41. Presbrey, p. 625.

42. Editorial, "Senator Borah on Marketing," *P.I.*, CXXIV, No. 5 (August 2, 1923), p. 152.

43. Editorial, "The Phantom of National

anxiously into the mirror to see if her wrinkles look like those that made Mrs X in the advertisement "old at thirty-five" because she did not have a Leisure Hour electric washer.⁵⁹

Advertising hoped to elicit the "instinctual" anxieties of social intercourse. Cutex Hand Preparations made of well-tended hands an armor against failure. Hoping to prepare the psyche for such an argument, Cutex advertisements declared in the *Ladies' Home Journal*, April 1920:

You will be amazed to find how many times in one day people glance at your nails. At each glance a judgment is made...Indeed some people make a practice of basing their estimate of a new acquaintance largely upon this one detail.

Even those whose physical appearances were marketably "safe," who appeared to be "the picture of health," were warned of the inscrutable perils with which they traveled. Listerine was offered as an agent to militate against "The Hidden Wells of Poison" that lurk and conspire against the "program[s] of pleasure" of even the most beautiful women.

The Lynds saw advertising "and other channels of increased cultural diffusion from without...[as] rapidly changing habits of thought as to what things are essential to living and multiplying optional occasions for spending money."⁶⁰ The critical analysis offered by the Lynds found unwitting support in predominant advertising theory. It was recognized that in order to get people to consume and, more importantly, to keep them consuming, it was more efficient to endow them with a critical self-consciousness in tune with the "solutions" of the marketplace than to fragmentarily argue for products on their own merit. Writing in *Printers' Ink*, Frederick P. Anderson spoke of the industry's conscious attempt to direct man's critical faculties against himself or his environment "to make him self-conscious about matter of course things such as enlarged nose pores, bad breath..."⁶¹

In mass advertising, the consciousness of a selling point was precisely the theorized "self-consciousness" of the modern consumer which had occasioned the Lynds' remarks.⁶² This consumer self-consciousness was clearly identifiable with the continuous need for product proliferation that informed modern industry. Linking the theories of "self-consciousness" to the exigencies of capitalism, one writer in *Printers' Ink* commented that "advertising helps to keep the masses dissatisfied with their mode of life, discontented with *ugly things* around them. Satisfied customers are not as profitable as discontented ones."⁶³

III. ADVERTISING: CIVILIZING THE SELF

In his sympathetic book on the *History and Development of Advertising*, Frank Presbrey articulated the conception of a predictable, buying, national population in proud and patriotic terms. "To National Advertising," noted Presbrey, "has recently been attributed most of the growth of a national homogeneity in our people, a uniformity of ideas which, despite the mixture of races, is found to be greater here than in European countries whose population is made up almost wholly of people of one race and would seem easier to nationalize in all respects."⁶⁴ Presbrey's conception of "national homogeneity" was a translucent reference to what Calvin Coolidge saw as "the enormous capacity for consumption of all kinds of commodities which characterizes our country."⁶⁵

The idea that advertising was producing a homogeneous national character was likened within the trade as a "civilizing influence comparable in its cultural effects to those of other epoch-making developments in history."⁶⁶ Yet not all of the conceptions of advertising were expressed in such epic and transhistorical terminology. Sensitive to the political and economic context of such notions as "civilizing," "national homogeneity" and "capacity for consumption," William Allen White bridged the gap between "civilization" and civil society, noting that modern advertising was particularly a formation of advanced capitalist production. Aiming his critique at internal and external "revolutionist" threats to capitalism, White turned contemporary conceptions of revolution on their head. Reasserting the efficacy of the American Revolutionary tradition, he argued that advertising men were the true "revolutionists." Juxtaposing the consumer market to revolution of a socialistic variety, White presented a satirical political strategy to halt the "golden quest" for consumer goods. "I would cut out the advertising and fill the editorial and news pages with material supplied by communists and reds. That would stop buying—distribution of things. It would bring an impasse in civilization, which would immediately begin to decay."⁶⁷ Identifying ad men with the integrity and survival of the American heritage, White numbered advertising among our sacred cultural institutions.

Through advertising, then, consumption took on a clearly cultural tone. Within governmental and business rhetoric, consumption assumed an ideological veil of nationalism and democratic lingo.

a brand name from the sorts of empirical comparisons that were more often possible a generation ago...There is a ceaseless quest for what advertising men call "million dollar ideas"...to disguise commodities still further by identifying them with cryptic characteristics." *Recent Social Trends*, I, pp. 876-877.

63. Roy Dickinson, "Freshen Up Your Product," *P.I.*, CL, No. 6 (February 6, 1930), p. 163.

64. Presbrey, p. 613.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 622.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 608.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 610.

The mass "American type," which defined unity on the bases of common ethnicity, language, class or literature, was ostensibly born out of common desires—mass responses to the demands of capitalist production. Mass industry, requiring a corresponding mass individual, cryptically named him "Civilized American" and implicated his national heritage in the marketplace. By defining himself and his desires in terms of the good of capitalist production, the worker would implicitly accept the foundations of modern industrial life. By transforming the notion of "class" into "mass," business hoped to create an "individual" who could locate his needs and frustrations in terms of the consumption of goods rather than the quality and content of his life (work).

Advertisements aimed at transforming pockets of resistance contained the double purpose of sales and "civilization." Resistance to the "universal" appeals of modern advertising was often dealt with in racial or national terms. In an article referring to immigrant readers of the domestic foreign language press, a writer in *Printers' Ink* noted that these *less American* elements of the population had not yet been sophisticated to the methods of modern advertising. While other Americans were portrayed as responding to appeals to universal instinct, the author noted that "Swedes and Germans...study the most minute detail of anything they consider buying."⁶⁸ It was felt that a particular form of advertising had to be developed to temporarily accommodate immigrant and other defined resistance to nationalization. While it was suggested that for immediate sales, ads could be written offering extensive proof of a product's intrinsic worth, other forms of advertising assumed the task of the "democratization" which Edward Filene had exalted. "Antidote advertising" and other, less theoretical tactics were designed to repudiate antique beliefs which had no place in the *social style* of modern industrial life. Often, such ads were geared to make people ashamed of their origins and, consequently, the habits and practices that betrayed them as alien. The Sherwood Cody School of English advertised that a less-than-perfect mastery of the language was *just* cause for social ostracism. "If someone you met for the first time made...mistakes in English...What would you think of him? Would he inspire your respect? Would you be inclined to make a friend of him? Would you care to introduce him to others as a close friend of yours?"⁶⁹ Rather than arguing that a knowledge of the language would be helpful in conversation and effective communication, the ad argued that being distinguishable from the fabricated national norm, a part of advertising's mythologized homogeneity, was a justification for social failure.

In an attempt to massify men's consumption in step with the requirements of the productive

68. George I. Krem, "The Foreign Language Market Wants Facts With Proof," *P.I.*, CXL, No. 5 (August 4, 1927), p. 108.

69. See Presbrey, "Illustrated Appendix."

70. *Ladies' Home Journal* (May 1924), p. 161.

machinery, advertising increasingly offered mass-produced solutions to "instinctive" strivings as well as to the ills of mass society itself. If it was industrial capitalism around which crowded cities were being built and which had spawned much of the danger to health, the frustration, the loneliness and the insecurity of modern industrial life, the advertising of the period denied complicity. Rather, the logic of contemporaneous advertising read, one can free oneself from the ills of modern life by embroiling oneself in the maintenance of that life. A 1924 ad for Pompeian facial products argued that

unless you are one woman in a thousand, you must use powder and rouge. Modern living has robbed women of much of their natural color...taken away the conditions that once gave natural roses in the cheeks.⁷⁰

Within such literature, the term "modern living" was an ahistorical epithet, devoid of the notion "Modern Industrial Society," and teeming with visions of the benefits of civilization which had emerged, one would think, quite apart from the social conditions and relations to which these "benefits" therapeutically addressed themselves. On the printed page, modern living was defined as heated houses, easy transportation, and the conveniences of the household. To the reader it may have meant something considerably different: light-starved housing, industrial pollution, poor nutrition, boredom. In either sense, modern life offered the same sallow skin and called for a solution through consumption. Within such advertisements, business called for a transformation of the critique of bourgeois society to an implicit commitment to that society.

The advertising which attempted to create the dependable mass of consumers required by modern industry often did so by playing upon the fears and frustrations evoked by mass society—offering mass produced visions of individualism by which people could extricate themselves from the mass. The rationale was simple. If a person was unhappy within mass industrial society, advertising was attempting to put that unhappiness to work in the name of that society.

In an attempt to boost mass sales of soap, the Cleanliness Institute, a cryptic front group for the soap and glycerine producers' association, pushed soap as a "Kit for Climbers" (social, no doubt). The illustration was a multitudinous mountain of men, each climbing over one another to reach the summit. At the top of this indistinguishable mass stood one figure, his arms outstretched towards the sun, whose rays spelled out the words "Heart's Desire." The ad cautioned that "in any path of life, that long way to the top is hard enough—so make the going easier with soap and water." In an attempt to build a responsive mass market, the Cleanliness Institute appealed to what they must have known was a major dissatisfaction with the reality of mass life. Their solution was a sort of mass pseudo-demassification.

A good deal of drug and toilet goods advertising made even more specific references to the quality of industrial life. Appealing to


59. Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrill Lynd, *Middletown* (1929), p. 82.

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 81-82.

61. Frederick Parker Anderson, "Conscious Advertising Copy," *P.I.*, CXXXVI, No. 8 (August 19, 1926), p. 130.

62. In "The People as Consumers," Robert Lynd further characterized the advertising of products of mass technology in terms of the questions of "uniformity" and the nature of the modern capitalist marketplace.

"Technological uniformity and complexity...tends to remove further the complex of characteristics blanketed by



The best way to get ahead!

YOU want to get ahead whether you stay in the service or go into business; you want to make money. The men who are earning the big pay are the men who are more interested in what they give, than in what they get. It works that way in business. The better you serve, the more opportunity you have for service. It has worked that way for us.

1927 is rewarding us; we opened a new store at 53 Broadway; others will open soon in Brooklyn and Fordham. More stores to serve more customers

WALLACH BROTHERS

Broadway corner 29th 489 Fifth Avenue opposite the Library 41st at 7th Avenue
Broadway below Chambers 12 East 42nd Street 245-248 West 125th Street
Downtown store 53 Broadway

dissatisfaction and insecurities around the job, certain advertisements not only offered their products as a kind of job insurance, but intimated that through the use of their products one might become a business success—the capitalist notion of individual “self”-fulfillment.


Listerine, whose ads had taken the word *halitosis* out of the inner reaches of the dictionary and placed it on “stage, screen and in the home,” offered this anecdote:

He was conscious that something stood between him and greater business success—between him and greater popularity. Some subtle something he couldn't lay his hands on...Finally, one day, it dawned on him...the truth that his friends had been too delicate to mention.⁷¹

When a critical understanding of modern production might have helped many to understand what actually stood “between them and greater business success,” this ad attempted to focus man's critique against himself—his body had kept him from happiness. Within the world view of a society which was more and more divorcing men from any notion of craft or from any definable sort of product, it was also logical that “you couldn't blame a man for firing an employee with halitosis to hire one without it.” The contingency of a man's job was

71. *Ibid.*, p. 133.

72. Carl Albert Naether noted that “Woman buys 80-90% of all things in general use in daily life.” The breakdown of this generalization specified: 96% of the dry goods, 87% of the raw and market foods, 67% of the automobiles, 48% of the drugs, etc. Naether, p. 4 (citing figures from Hollingsworth, *Advertising and Selling*).



A Kit for Climbers

Hard work, courage, common sense will prove stout aids on your way up in the world. But don't overlook another, one that is tied up with good manners—cleanliness. Any way you look at it, clean habits, clean homes, clean linen have a value socially and commercially.

How many successful men and women do you know who are not constantly careful of personal appearance and personal cleanliness? In any path of life, that long way to the top is hard enough—so make the going easier with soap and water.

For Health and Wealth use SOAP & WATER

PUBLISHED BY THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN SOAP AND GLYCERINE PRODUCERS, INC., TO AID THE WORK OF CLEANLINESS INSTITUTES

offered a nonviolent, apolitical solution. If man was the victim of himself, the fruits of mass production were his savior. Ads constantly hammered away at everything that was his own—his bodily functions, his self-esteem—and offered something of theirs as a socially more effective substitute.

In addition to the attempt on the part of advertising to habituate people to buying as a solution to the particular realities of a growing industrial society, ad men presented products as means to what they viewed as instinctual ends. Speaking often to women,⁷² ads offered daintiness, beauty, romance, grace, security and husbands through the use of certain products. Traditional advertising had conceived of these “ideals” as integrants of a Protestant notion of thrift and moderation. The dainty woman, a pillar of sense and temperance within the home, had been characterized as physically divorced from the marketplace, not to mention herself. Increasingly, within the text of ads in the twenties, these desires are fulfilled in the marketplace. Thrift no longer cohabitates with daintiness, but threatens to prevent it. Within the rhetoric of these ads, the accumulation of various products, each for a separate objectified portion of the body, was equated with the means to success. Correlative to Allport's vision of “social self,” advertising offered the next best thing—a *commodity self*—to people who were unhappy or could be convinced that they were unhappy about their lives. Each portion of the body was to be viewed critically, as a *potential* bauble in a successful assemblage. Woodbury's soap was offered as a perfect treatment for the “newly

important face of Smart Today,” another product promised to keep teeth white: “A flashing smile is worth more than a good sized bank account. It wins friends.” After she had used Caro Coconut Oil Shampoo, a dashing gentleman informs the lady, “I'm crazy about your hair. It's the most beautiful of any here tonight.” Within the vision offered by such ads, not only were social grace and success attainable: they were also defined through the use of specific products. You don't make friends, your smile “wins” them; your embellished hair, and not you is beautiful. “Smart Today” required one to compete on a social marketplace, though whatever was defined as smart would be gone tomorrow, yielding its momentary, though cataclysmic importance to a newly profitable “Smart Today.” As the ads intimated that anything natural about the consumer was worthless or deplorable, and tried to make him schizophrenically self-conscious of that notion, they offered weapons by which even people with bad breath, enlarged nose pores, corned feet and other such maladies could eclipse themselves and “succeed.”

As notions of failure were to be perceived within a style of self-denigrating-paranoia, notions of success were likewise portrayed in purely self-involved terms. Though the victorious heroines of cosmetic advertisements always got their man, they did so out of a commodity defined *self-fetishization* which made that man and themselves almost irrelevant to the quality of their victory. Their romantic triumphs were ultimately commercially defined versions of the auto-erotic ones of Alban Berg's prostitute, *Lulu*, who declared that “When I looked at myself in the mirror I wished I were a man—a man married to me.” (“*Als ich mich im Spiegel sah hatte ich ein Mann sein wollen...mein Mann.*”)

During the twenties, civil society was increasingly characterized by mass industrial production. In an attempt to implicate men and women within the efficient process of production, advertising built a vision of culture which bound old notions of Civilization to the new realities of civil society. In what was viewed as their instinctual search for traditional ideals, people were offered a vision of civilized man which was transvaluated in terms of the pecuniary exigencies of society. Within a society that defined real life in terms of the monotonous insecurities of mass production, advertising attempted to create an alternative organization of life which would serve to channel man's desires for self, for social success, for leisure away from himself and his works, and towards a commoditized acceptance of “Civilization.”

Noobar Retheos Danielian AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CO.: SCIENCE IN BUSINESS (USA, 1939)

During the twenty years from 1916 to 1935, the engineering department of Western Electric Company and, since 1925, the Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., both subsidiaries of A.T.&T., spent approximately \$250,000,000 on engineering and research. This sum it is safe to say, far exceeded the total operating budget, for instance, of Harvard University for the same period. The Bell Laboratories, Inc., is known today as one of the important scientific research organizations in the country. In variety of research and in amount of expenditure, Bell Laboratories is at least on a par with, if it does not surpass, the industrial research organizations of General Electric, General Motors, and Du Pont. The Bell Laboratories' total operating expenses, in 1930 alone, were \$23,547,000; in 1935, they were \$16,905,000. The scientists employed by Bell Laboratories conduct research in practically every phase of electrical phenomena, with particular emphasis on communications. Electronic physics, chemistry, magnetics, radio, applied mathematics, optical phenomena, and many other fields of inquiry are under constant study. Practical developmental work is constantly carried on in the creation and improvement of apparatus for wire and radio telephony, broadcasting, telegraphy, sound motion pictures, television, telephoto service, and other means of putting nature to work.

This enormous expenditure of money and the extensive activity in scientific research is not, of course, an altruistic undertaking merely to promote human knowledge and to render new and better services. They have, indeed, a well-conceived economic motivation. The immediate aim is to garner all the patents which the Telephone Company can obtain by development and purchase and to corner them, if possible, so that it can control the subject, whatever it is. As a result of this process, the Bell System owned or controlled over 9,000 United States patents and was licensed under 6,725 additional patents at December 31, 1934.

What are the business motives behind all this activity and large expenditure of money in research, inventions, and acquisition of patents? What is the effect, regardless of cost, upon competition, customers, control of industry, and technical progress? It is undeniable that these are questions of vital interest. The discoveries resulting from the work of

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these industrial laboratories have been distinctive, important, and essential to progress. They have not only made things better, but have created new services and industries. They have also made significant contributions to pure science. For these, no one would wish to deny just praise. In order to determine public policy, however, it is important to know what are the incentives, who pays the costs, who benefits. These matters have found little discussion in economic literature. Aside from the obvious claims of interested parties, there has been little firsthand evidence on the inner workings, the objectives, and the results of scientific research by industry.

In this chapter, Bell System's philosophy of the place of science in industry will be elucidated in the words of company officials. As the field of telephone communication is adjacent to the fields of radio, telegraphy, electrical manufacturing, and sound reproduction (motion pictures and phonograph record), this discussion will ultimately lead to an understanding of the present division of those industries among the Bell System, General Electric Company, Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, Radio Corporation of America, and the telegraph companies.

"OCCUPYING THE FIELD"

Many of the present-day industrial empires originated in particular inventions, and grew into powerful economic forces within the protecting walls of patent monopoly. George Westinghouse started with patented inventions on railway automatic air brakes and coupling arrangements. Later, the patents of Nikola Tesla, the Hungarian inventor, on multiphase alternating-current systems, and of William Stanley, of Great Barrington, Massachusetts, on transformers, gave Westinghouse his trump cards in electrical manufacturing. General Electric Company also had its beginnings in the consolidation of manufacturing establishments that were started by Thomas Edison and Elihu Thomson, based on patents for electric lamps, generators, and measuring devices. The McCormick reaper was the foundation of the International Harvester Company. And the Du Pont enterprises have had the full protection of patents, particularly in synthetic products and manufacturing processes.

The telephone system is no exception. The very nucleus of the first organization, the Bell Patent Association of 1875, was predicated upon the possibility of patenting Bell's inventions, even before they reached the stage of patent applications in Washington. Two years later, the only valuable assets possessed by Alexander G. Bell, Gardiner G.

Hubbard, and Thomas Sanders were the two patents on the "talking machine" issued to Alexander Graham Bell in 1876 and 1877. It was their protection that lured the Bostonian merchants and financiers into advancing a total of \$100,000 for the stock of two Bell companies in 1878, at a time when they were being challenged by the powerful Western Union Telegraph Company under Vanderbilt leadership. Once the Bell patents were salvaged from that assault—thanks to Gould's threat to Vanderbilt which led the latter to concede priority to Bell's patents—the Bostonians had a breathing spell until 1894, and they applied themselves to the exploitation of a desirable monopoly.

To be sure, in spite of Western Union's capitulation, a host of rival telephone companies were organized and the Bell patents were the target of many covetous attacks. But in each case the New Englanders pursued their adversaries relentlessly in the courts with infringement suits. Between the fall of 1877 and 1893, over 600 such suits were instituted.¹ The validity of Bell's patents on the telephone was finally sustained in 1888 by a four-to-three decision of the United States Supreme Court.² The contestants were many, and the issues intricate, but a margin of one vote was sufficient to insure the Boston financiers a monopoly over telephone communication until 1893-1894.

The protection of this monopoly did not rely entirely upon Bell's two original patents. It was surrounded by lesser rights on refinements of technique. When Theodore N. Vail became general manager of the National Bell Telephone Company in 1879, he anticipated the day when the company would be without the protection of the Bell patents. He surveyed the needs of the business and determined upon a policy which would make the company's position secure even after the expiration of the telephone patents. Vail was called upon, in the case of *Western Union Telegraph Company, et al. v. The American Bell Telephone Company*, to review the research and patent policies of the American Bell Telephone Company and its predecessors. Testifying for the defendant he revealed:

One of the first things that was fully developed in our minds was the necessity of occupying the field; not only that but of surrounding ourselves with everything that would protect the business, that is the knowledge of the business, all the auxiliary apparatus, the development of all kinds of apparatus for the development of the business, which was a very important feature. Just as soon as we started into the district exchange system we found out that it would develop a thousand and one little patents and inventions with which to do the business which was necessary, and that is what we wanted to control and get possession of.³

posed Report" refers to the *Proposed Report—Telephone Investigation* written by F.C.C. Commissioner Paul A. Walker in 1938; and "F.F.C., Report" refers to the *Report on the Investigation of the Telephone Industry in the United States*, the final, abridged version of the Walker *Proposed Report*, which was ultimately submitted by the F.C.C. to the U.S. Congress in 1939 — Eds.]

2. 126 U.S. I.

3. *Western Union Telegraph Company, et al. v. American Bell Telephone Company*, "Evidence for defen-

The early appreciation of the place of patents in the scheme of control led to the organization of an engineering department to pursue the development and patenting of all auxiliary apparatus that was necessary to conduct a telephone exchange service. In the words of T.N. Vail:

So from the very commencement we had our experimental department, so-called — either experimental or engineering, as you choose — whose business it was to study the patents, study the development and study these devices that either were originated by our own people or came to us from the outside. Then early in 1879 we started our patent department, whose business was entirely to study the question of patents and the patentability of these devices, to examine all patents that came out with a view to acquiring them, because, as I say, we recognized that if we did not control these devices, somebody else would, and we would be more or less hampered in the development of the business.... The business itself.... was protected from outside interference by the control of all apparatus which was necessary for carrying it on.⁴

Even the contract of November 10, 1879, with Western Union whereby the latter conceded the priority of Bell's inventions does not seem to have alleviated the fears of the Bell interests or abated their efforts in building up a wall of patent protection. To quote Vail again:

As I say, at that time the patent [first Bell patent] was not adjudicated upon, and there was some doubt as to whether it would be sustained or not, and we simply continued our efforts to surround the business with all the auxiliary protection that was possible, in order to make it indifferent to us whether the patent was extended or not.⁵

The Bell Company was successful in every contest involving the original patents. There at last came a day, however, when the Bell patents expired and could no longer defend the telephone monopoly. A host of independent telephone companies entered the telephone business in competition with the Bell licensees. The new era, however, found the American Bell Telephone Company prepared to stifle and harass competitors because it had a firm grip on the lesser patents which related to the practical exploitation of Bell's newly discovered art.

The patent on which greatest reliance was placed for suppressing competition after 1894 was one issued to E. Berliner, on November 17, 1891. This patent was applied for by Berliner in 1877, and was purchased by the Bell Telephone Company in the same year, but was not issued until 1891. It was claimed that it broadly covered the invention of the microphone. Since the most efficient telephone transmitter depended upon microphonic action, great hopes were entertained that this patent would preserve the Bell monopoly until its expiration in 1908.

These hopes, however, were not untroubled.

dant," vol. II, pp. 1542-43 (1907), cf. exhibit 1989, p. 20.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Exhibit 1989, pp. 20-21.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

The late James J. Storrow, for many years a well-known attorney in Boston and a close adviser to the management of the American Bell Telephone Company almost from its inception, expressed misgivings about the possible public reaction to such methods of continuing a monopoly. On November 17, 1891, he wrote to John E. Hudson, president of American Bell Telephone Company:

The Bell Company has had a monopoly more profitable and more controlling — and more generally hated — than any ever given by any patent. The attempt to prolong it 16 years more by the Berliner patent will bring a great strain on that patent and a great pressure on the courts. This has nothing to do with the validity of the patent, or the duty of the Courts to sustain it.... Patents which would stand ordinary litigation have been known to give way under great strain, if they turn on questions when it is humanly possible to take an adverse view.⁶

Storrow's warnings were prophetic. The public seethed with resentment against the Bell monopoly. Shortly after the Berliner patent was issued, a suit was brought by the United States Government to annul it on the ground that its issuance was wrongfully delayed in the patent office and that the American Bell Telephone Company was a party to the delay. The American Bell Telephone Company was successful in this suit. Later, however, the patent was given such a narrow construction as to render it of little significance in protection against competition. The attempt to extend the life of a monopoly, by successive patents covering essential phases of the telephone instrument, failed.

But the merchants and financiers in control of the System were undaunted. Now they swung into action through Western Electric Company, a subsidiary of American Bell. On November 13, 1894, they started a suit in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the Harrison International Telephone Company of Chicago. Four more suits were brought the same year, twenty-three the following year.⁷ The purpose of these suits was to harass independent manufacturers of telephone equipment upon whom the independent telephone companies depended for their equipment, inasmuch as the Western Electric would not sell telephone apparatus to any but Bell licensees by the terms of its contract of February 26, 1882 with the American Bell Telephone Company.

The purposes of these tactics appear clearly in the annual report of the patent attorney of the American Bell Telephone Company for the year 1892. In this report he described the effect of these suits upon competitors:

Referring to patents generally, I may report that the people of the West, so far as I could see, seem to be rather frightened at the idea of infringing patents, and the great number of the projected and organized rival concerns alter their construction in order that they may not infringe the patents of the Western Electric Company; but the outcome of this is that they thus sell and use inferior instruments.

From what I observed in Chicago, it appears to me that the policy of bringing suit for infringement on apparatus patents is an excellent one because it keeps the concerns which attempt opposition in a nervous and

excited condition since they never know where the next attack may be made, and since it keeps them all the time changing their machines and causes them ultimately, in order that they may not be sued, to adopt inefficient forms of apparatus.⁸

BUILDING UP FENCES

The occupation of the field and the construction of protective fences around it was accomplished, in part, by purchasing any valuable patents that could be found and, in part, by inventions arising from the engineering work of Bell System employees. From the very beginning, an experimental department was established whose business it was, to repeat Vail's words, "to study the patents, study the development and study these devices that either were originated by our people or came in to us from the outside."

An "Electrical Department" later called the Engineering Department, was organized in 1881. Its principal functions were to study the product of other manufacturers of telephonic devices, survey the field of patents to determine which ones were desirable, and conduct experiments on transmitters, receivers, and cable and pole lines. In 1884, the patent work was separated into a distinct department, but the functions of the mechanical or engineering group remained fundamentally the same. Its primary concern was the improvement of existing instruments and manufacturing methods.⁹

In contrast to later days, inventions of new methods of transmitting speech and the pursuit of research beyond the narrow confines of existing techniques, although recognized as legitimate fields of activity, were considered outside the practical aims of the enterprise. Hammond V. Hayes, who had become head of the engineering department in 1886, expressed his opinion about the limits of research within his department in his annual report in March, 1892, to President Hudson:

I have determined for the future to abandon this portion of the work of this department, devoting all our attention to practical development of instruments and apparatus. I think the theoretical work can be accomplished quite as well and more economically by collaboration with the students of the [Massachusetts] Institute of Technology and probably of Harvard College.¹⁰

This narrow program of engineering continued until 1907. Most of the important inventions were being made outside the Bell System, by independent manufacturers of telephone equipment, and by others in fields allied to electrical communication. The automatic exchange was invented in 1889, and patented in 1891, by Almon B. Strowger.¹¹ The hand telephone set was invented in 1878 by Robert G. Brown, chief operator of the Western Union sub-

siary, the Gold and Stock Telegraph Company. After the sale of Western Union interests in telephony to National Bell Telephone Company in 1879, Brown went to France and there introduced his hand telephone set, which later became the dominant type of instrument in Europe and came to be known as the "French phone".¹² It was not introduced by the Bell System on a large scale until 1926.

While the Bell System preferred that "theoretical work" be carried out in collaboration with students of the Institute of Technology and "probably of Harvard College", revolutionary inventions in fields adjacent to telephony were being created by independent research workers and scientists. Marconi invented wireless telegraphy in 1895, and patented his device in Great Britain and other countries in the following year.¹³ In 1900, Professor Michael Pupin, of Columbia University, obtained patents on loading coils, then the most advanced means of amplification of the voice in long-distance telephony.¹⁴ The Cooper-Hewitt mercury-arc repeater, also useful in long-distance communication, was invented and patented in 1906.¹⁵ In January, 1907, De Forest patented his revolutionary three-element vacuum tube, which is the heart of radio broadcasting, wireless reception, and amplification of long-distance conduction of electrical waves, whether used in radio, telegraph, or telephone communication.¹⁶

During this time, the only important invention coming out of the narrow precincts of Bell System research was the mechanical repeater of H.M. Shreeve, an employee, which became workable and useful in long-distance telephony by 1906. As for other patents, the Bell policy was to acquire control of them by purchase, if possible, or through an exclusive license. The Pupin patents, which were as fundamental in long-distance telephony as Bell's patents had been for receivers and transmitters, were acquired in 1900. They gave a monopoly to A.T.&T. in long-distance work, as Bell's had done in local exchange service. Exclusive domestic rights were secured under the Cooper-Hewitt patents on mercury-arc tubes, in wire telephony and telegraphy. But the significance and importance of radio, particularly as it affected telephone communication, was completely overlooked prior to 1907.

The policy of A.T.&T. with respect to research, inventions and scientific progress, is eloquently stated by Chief Engineer Hayes in his report to President Fish for the year 1906 (dated December 31, 1906):

Every effort in the Department is being exerted towards perfecting the engineering methods; no one is employed who, as an inventor, is capable of originating new apparatus of novel design. In consequence of this it will be neces-

B. Cole, *Wireless of Today* (London, 1924), chap. VI; Alvin F. Harlow, *Old Wires and New Waves* (New York: Appleton-Century Co., 1936), chap. XXII.

14. Frederick Leland Rhodes, *Beginnings of Telephony* (New York, 1929), chap. X.

15. Alvin F. Harlow, *op.cit.*, chap. XXIII.

16. C.R. Gibson and W.B. Cole, *op.cit.*, pp. 230-231; Chetwode Crawley, *op.cit.*, pp. 151-152.

sary in many cases to depend upon the acquisition of inventions of outside men, leaving the adaptation of them to our own engineers and to the Western Electric Company. [Author's italics].¹⁷

FRUITS OF MONOPOLY

The Bell System was, of course, successful in "occupying the field" completely, up to 1894. It exploited this position with high rentals and exacted between 30 and 50 per cent of the stock of licensees as a franchise fee, for the privilege of using Bell patents. Its earnings from the rentals on telephone instruments and dividends on franchise stock enabled the American Bell Telephone Company to pay dividends of \$12, \$15 and \$18 a share. In addition, a surplus of \$7,165,097 was accumulated and reinvested.

High rentals on telephone instruments naturally restricted the development of the industry. At the end of 1893, after seventeen years of Bell System operations, there were only 266,431 telephone stations in service. Even after the expiration of the original patents, an attempt was made to continue this situation with the use of the Berliner patent and Western Electric Company patents, with no success. Competitive telephone companies were organized all over the country. Under the impetus of this competition, rates were lowered and the number of Bell-owned stations increased to 1,317,178 at the end of 1902, an increase of more than a million stations in ten years. In the same period independent telephone companies introduced nearly 1,053,866 stations of their own. There were, therefore, 2,371,044 telephone stations in use at the close of 1902, as compared with 266,431 stations ten years earlier.¹⁸ During the same period Bell System revenue per telephone station went down from about \$90 in 1893, to close to \$55 in 1902, and continued to decrease during the next decade.

The Bell System did not relax its attempts to make the field exclusive, however. Although it conducted no original research, it acquired the most important patents useful in long-distance telephony. We have already seen how between 1899 and 1902, it eliminated its most formidable potential competitor, the Rockefeller-Widener sponsored Telephone, Telegraph and Cable Company of America. The Bell System continued, down to 1907, to fight the independent telephone companies, to attempt to gain control of independent manufacturers of telephone equipment, and to protect its long-distance business—which is the nerve system of a communications service—by acquiring all the im-

17. Exhibit 1951 A, p.105.

18. U.S. Census, *Special Reports, Telephones: 1907*, Table 8, p.21.

19. F.C.C., *Report*, p. 185; exhibit 1951 A, pp. 113-114; *Proposed Report*, p. 209.

20. Exhibit 2096 G, pp. 127-130. J.J. Carty was appointed chief engineers of A.T.&T. by the executive committee on July 2, 1907. On July 3, Carty wrote to one of the Associated Companies regarding the hand telephone set: "There are grave reasons which it is not practical to state in this letter why we should avoid taking the slightest

portant contributions of outsiders in the way of new inventions or improvements. In all this time, the theoretical research was left to students of the Institute of Technology and "probably of Harvard College", and no one was employed who, as an inventor, was "capable of originating new apparatus of novel design."

NEW FRONTIERS

The unimaginative Hammond V. Hayes had been in charge of engineering work since 1866. On July 2, 1907, two months after Vail became president, Hayes was replaced as chief executive of technical activities by John J. Carty, who was chief engineer of the New York Telephone Company, and an old associate of Vail during the early-eighties, when Vail was general manager of Bell interests. The influence of the new management was soon felt in A.T.&T.'s technical activities. In the first place, the laboratory work and research staffs were moved from Boston and Chicago to New York. Then the engineering personnel and expenditures were drastically reduced,¹⁹ in all probability in response to J.P. Morgan's stricture of May 8, 1907, to cut expenses in every possible way. Furthermore, greater emphasis was placed upon "standardization" of equipment as a method of decreasing costs and increasing earnings.

In line with the wave of economy, Vail and Carty shelved the French phone which their predecessors, Fish and Hayes, had begun to install on an experimental basis. Since 1904, the hand telephone sets had been placed in various parts of the Bell System for observation, and the opinion of the large majority of officials of subsidiaries was enthusiastically in favour of the new telephone. Only three dissents appeared, one of them John J. Carty's, and another U.N. Bethell's, both of the New York Telephone Company. When Carty became chief of the engineering department, he ordered the withdrawal of all French phones in use.²⁰ These were not to be introduced until twenty years later. This was one of the many effects of the bankers reorganization of A.T.&T.'s management in 1907. The new management preferred to cope with independent competition by a program of gradual absorption through acquisition, instead of fighting it, as Hudson and Fish were forced to do, by means of improvements and lower rates.

Under Hayes' engineering leadership, the Bell System had been blind to the potential significance of developments in radio. Marconi had patented his wireless system more than ten years before 1907,

step which might precipitate a general demand for these instruments. Therefore, if you can avoid the introduction of these sets without unreasonable effort you will avoid taking what might be a very important step in a very delicate matter.

"The situation is such and the issue involved is so serious that it would, in my judgement, require a very strong case indeed to justify putting out any of these instruments. In fact, the circumstances are such that I am about to call in all which we have placed experimentally on desks of telephone officials."

8. *Ibid.*

9. Exhibit 1951 A, pp. 14-15; also *Proposed Report*, p.204.

10. *Proposed Report*, p.206.

11. *Ibid.*, p.300.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 295-296.

13. Chetwode Crawley, *From Telegraphy to Television* (London, 1931), chap. XI; Charles R. Gibson and William

and experiments in ship-to-shore wireless telegraph service had been so successful that many sets were installed on ships. In 1906, the very year Hayes reported to Fish that he employed no inventors capable of original work, De Forest had succeeded in transmitting voice across his laboratory by wireless, and on January 15, 1907, he had obtained his patent on the three-element vacuum tube, the fundamental device of amplification in radio and long-distance wire communication. Even an astute and farsighted man like Theodore Vail did not fathom the possibilities of radio.

Vail was familiar with wireless, but at first he did not think that it created any serious threat of competition with wire communications. In August, 1907, three months after becoming president of the Telephone Company, he wrote to Robert Fleming (of London, England): "As to the 'wireless': I can only refer you to the success of the wireless telegraph and the inroad made by it upon the general telegraphic situation as compared with the promises and prophecies. The difficulties of wireless telegraph are as nothing compared with the difficulties in the way of the wireless telephone."²¹ For two years after Vail's induction as president, there was no realization in the Bell System of the potential threat of radio.

In the meantime, progress in radio communication continued. In the spring of 1907, De Forest organized his De Forest Radio Telephone Company, and by the summer of that year he had succeeded in transmitting voice through the air between two buildings in New York City, three blocks away from each other. At the request of Admiral R.D. Evans, De Forest also established a radio-telephonic communication system on twenty-four vessels of the United States Navy about to start on a world tour.²² In 1908, De Forest conducted broadcast experiments from the Eiffel Tower in Paris.

Fortunately for Vail and the Bell Systems, their deprecating attitude towards wireless was not maintained for long. As soon as the danger presented by this new means of communication was perceived, the lethargy pervading the Telephone Company's engineering department was dissipated, and the whole organization was immediately mobilized into action to defend invested capital. This belated awakening of the System to the realization of the importance of wireless is to the everlasting credit of John J. Carty, Vail's chief engineer.

Although Carty was not progressive in his views when he delayed the introduction of the French phone, he carved a permanent niche for his name in Bell System history by focusing attention upon the potentialities of wireless, and by causing the initiation of "fundamental research". He departed from the narrow, practical limitations on engineering work imposed by his predecessor, and initiated theoretical research into the less known provinces of electrical

science.

In a memorandum dated April 8, 1909, entitled "Additional Force Required—Engineer," Carty argued for intensive work on a "repeater," which is the Telephone Company's name for the vacuum-tube amplifier:

One additional argument making for vigorous work upon the development of a more powerful repeater I call to your particular attention. At the present time scientists in Germany, France, Italy, and a number of able experimenters in America are at work upon the problem of wireless telephony. While this branch of the art seems at present to be rather remote in its prospects of success, a most powerful impetus would be given to it if a suitable telephone repeater were available. *Whoever can supply and control the necessary telephone repeater will exert a dominating influence in the art of wireless telephony when it is developed.* The lack of such a repeater for the art of wireless telephony and the number of able people at work upon that art create a situation which may result in some of these outsiders developing a telephone repeater before we have obtained one ourselves, unless we adopt vigorous measures from now on. *A successful telephone repeater, therefore, would not only react most favorably upon our service where wires are used, but might put us in a position of control with respect to the art of wireless telephony should it turn out to be a factor of importance [Author's italics].*²³

Eventually, in 1911, Carty realized his desire to do research work on the "telephone repeater." A research branch was organized in the engineering department of A.T.&T. "To make adequate progress with this work," Carty stated in his annual report for 1911, "it was decided to organize a branch of the engineering department which should include in its personnel the best talent available and in its equipment the best facilities possible for the highest grade research laboratory work.... A number of highly trained and experienced physicists have been employed, beside a group of assistants of lesser attainments and experiences..."²⁴ As soon as the research branch was established, work on the telephone repeater problem was taken up on a comprehensive scale. Carty believed at that time that this was "a field of large possibilities which will unquestionably pay liberally for whatever investigations may be made."

To carry on the additional research required by this "fundamental" work, the engineering department had expanded more than in proportion to the normal growth of the business. In 1910, there were 192 engineers employed on development work, and the expenditures were \$493,527. In 1916, there were 959 men, and expenditures amounted to \$1,539,621. "This condition," Carty wrote in his annual report for 1915, "has been brought about by new demands for research in the fundamentals of the science of telephony; together with larger and very important activities in new branches of the telephone, telegraph and wireless arts."²⁵

Regardless of the results of the laboratory work, it was found that De Forest's three-element vacuum tube, patented in 1907, pre-empted the most essential single device in radio amplification. Therefore, A.T.&T. purchased all patent rights to the tube from De Forest in 1913, giving him personally only a non-

transferable right under his own patents. In 1914 and 1917, other inventions of De Forest were purchased. The total price paid for these patents is reputed to have been between \$200,000 and \$400,000—a bargain, if true.

Soon experiments in radio transmission were started by the Bell System. In 1915, a radio transmitting station was erected at Montauk Point, Long Island, and a receiving station was established at Wilmington, Delaware. Tests were conducted between these two stations. Other trials were made in the same year between Arlington, Virginia, and the Eiffel Tower, in Paris. Some time later, in referring to the reasons for carrying out Bell System development work, an engineer of A.T.&T. came to the conclusion that "The motive stressed appears to be the demonstration of the company's position in radio telephony by being the first to transmit speech across the Atlantic." In 1915, also, the first transcontinental telephone circuit was opened, a feat impossible of achievement without the vacuum-tube repeater.

The reasons for this incursion into radio research were explained by Frank B. Jewett, president of Bell Telephone Laboratories, in a letter dated March 9, 1932. From the very earliest days following Marconi, Mr Jewett explained, vast claims were made for radio, as to its field of applicability, the extent to which it might replace wire transmission, and the speed with which these claims were likely to be realized. In the face of these potentialities and the claims for their realization, and in the absence of information as to how far these claims were founded on fact, and how rapidly they might reasonably develop in reality, "it was early clear to the American Telephone and Telegraph Co., and to all in the Bell System," Mr Jewett wrote, "that a full, thorough and complete understanding of radio must be had at all times if the art of telephony and the business of the Associated Companies in the giving of telephone service was to be advanced and the money invested in that service safeguarded."²⁶

Maintenance of the credit of the corporation, the necessity of protecting existing investment, and the desire to retain a monopoly by controlling potential competitors, emerge as the determining motives of Bell System management policies. To maintain the credit of the company at a time when the bankers were loaded with unsold bonds in 1907, strict economy was exacted, even at the expense of suppressing a distinct improvement, the hand telephone set. This could be done without threat to the future stability of the System, for in place of lower charges and improved service as competitive weapons, Vail followed a policy of acquisition and control of independent telephone companies, with the co-operation of J.P. Morgan and Company. But when it was realized that the *status quo* was threatened by new inventions in a field of science then still in its infancy, it was decided to control it in

order to protect existing investment. The only way to protect telephone property from the aerial attacks of radio was to control the very instrument of such industrial warfare.

SQUATTERS' SOVEREIGNTY

The Bell System might well be concerned about the threat of radio developments in science and industry. Others were already in the race to control the necessary devices for long-distance transmission of high-frequency currents and their amplification. The Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company of America was the first radio company organized in the United States, having received its charter from New Jersey in November 1899. It was controlled by the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company, Ltd., of England, and had the American rights to the Fleming patent on the two-element vacuum tube. The American Marconi company had established a high-powered transmitting and receiving wireless telegraph station in New Brunswick, New Jersey, in 1913, for transoceanic service. Prior to that, its principal service was wireless communication with ships. But the Fleming two-element tube did not give sufficient amplification, and the Marconi company was forced to buy De Forest three-element vacuum tubes from Western Electric Company, the manufacturing subsidiary of A.T.&T.²⁷

The General Electric Company also had been engaged in research in the radio field, and had one patent of the greatest importance in wireless transmission, the Alexanderson alternator, which generated high-frequency electric energy of sufficient voltage for radio broadcasting. This alternator was General Electric Company's main asset in radio.²⁸

At one time, the British Marconi company almost obtained exclusive rights to the Alexanderson alternator. It is reported that President Woodrow Wilson was fearful that the transfer of exclusive rights in this machine to British interests would render international radio communication an English monopoly for years to come. He is said to have intervened in the negotiations. In April, 1919, so the story goes, Rear Admiral William H.G. Bullard, director of communications, and Commander S.C. Hooper, of the Bureau of Engineering, both of the United States Navy Department, visited the General Electric Company and asked the officers, as patriotic American citizens, not to give up their rights to the Alexanderson alternator and thereby make it impossible to establish an American radio communications company. Following these conferences with Rear Admiral Bullard and Commander Hooper, the General Electric Company ceased negotiations with the British Marconi company and proceeded to work out, with the officials of the Navy Department, a proposed contract under which a new company controlled wholly by American citizens might be formed. Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels did not concur in the contract, however. He stated to General Electric officials that he was in favour of government ownership of radio, that he doubted his power to execute such a contract without the consent of Congress, and that he would sign it only if the

21. F.C.C., Report, pp. 187-188.

22. Alvin F. Harlow, *op.cit.*, p. 464.

23. F.C.C., Report, pp. 189-190.

24. Proposed Report, pp. 212-213.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 220.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 210.

27. Federal Trade Commission, *The Radio Industry* (1923), pp. 11-12.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

Congress did not approve government ownership but authorized the Navy to deal with the matter otherwise.²⁹

General Electric Company then proceeded to organize the Radio Corporation of America in October, 1919. It purchased the stock of the American Marconi company from the British interests, and in November, 1919, arranged the transfer of all the tangible assets, patents, and good will of the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company of America to Radio Corporation of America. The General Electric Company extended the exclusive rights to use and sell, but not to manufacture, radio apparatus and devices under General Electric patents, which would include, of course, the Alexanderson alternator, to the Radio Corporation of America. The Radio Corporation extended exclusive rights to General Electric to manufacture under Radio Corporation of America patents, which included all the patents acquired from the British interests.³⁰

While General Electric was entrenching itself in radio, Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company was also making arrangements to acquire a strong competitive position. Prior to the war, it had done considerable development work in radio. In 1920, it acquired rights under the Fessenden heterodyne patents, useful in radio receiving sets, and the Armstrong patent on a regenerative or feedback circuit, which facilitated the proper performance of the amplifying functions of vacuum tubes.³¹

The result of the intensive development and acquisition of patents in the radio field by the competitive interests was a stalemate created by mutual patent interferences. This was appeased during the World War, when the United States Government guaranteed to protect the various manufacturers against all infringement suits. As a result, during this period, vacuum tubes were manufactured without regard to patents by Westinghouse, General Electric, Western Electric, the American Marconi Company, De Forest Radio, and others. Upon the termination of the war, however, A.T.&T. and the electrical manufacturers were at loggerheads. They found themselves fighting each other to occupy a terrain which was not marked by distinct boundary lines. Ownership of the various patents pertaining to vacuum tubes and circuits by different concerns prevented the manufacture of an improved tube for radio use. The Federal Trade Commission in 1923 enumerated a brief list of the important patents required in the construction and operation of vacuum tubes, which were in conflict:

- De Forest Vacuum Tube (A.T.&T.), overlapping Fleming Vacuum Tube (Radio Corporation).
- Arnold High Vacuum (A.T.&T.), interference with Langmuir High Vacuum (General Electric).
- Colpitts Grid Modulator (A.T.&T.), interference with Alexanderson Alternator (General Electric).
- Hartley Plate Modulator (A.T.&T.), interference

with White Plate Modulator (General Electric).

De Forest Oscillator (A.T.&T.) interference with Langmuir Oscillator (General Electric) and Armstrong Oscillator (Westinghouse).³²

There was overlapping not only in the various parts and circuits used with the vacuum tube, but also in the case of many other instruments. Each large manufacturer pushed its researches as far as possible, and then encountered a part, arrangement, circuit, or some characteristic that was already patented by another. This situation was present in telegraphy, sound recording, electrical circuit arrangements, and, more recently, photoelectric cells, telephoto, television, etc.

The only solution to the conflicts was to declare a truce, get together and draw up an agreement defining the rights of the various squatters on the frontiers of science. There were, of course, two possible ways of cultivating the field peacefully, without patent conflicts: Communal ownership of rights, or parceling out of specific plots to each party. The second alternative was chosen, and effectuated by what has become to be known as the "Radio Patent Pool".

DIVIDING THE FIELD

Peace was declared by the first License Agreement of July 1, 1920, between American Telephone and Telegraph Company and General Electric Company. The Radio Corporation of America and Western Electric Company became collateral parties by means of Extension Agreements. The reasons for the execution of this License Agreement, as expressed in the preamble, were more fundamental than the stalemate in the radio field. This agreement recited that its execution was prompted by the following situation:

...each party is in possession of information, patents and inventions applicable to, and has research organizations engaged in investigations bearing upon, not only its business but also the business of the other party; and

...various patents or applications for patents of the parties are involved in interference with each other in the United States Patent Office; and

...the restrictions upon each party imposed by the patent rights of the other and the uncertainties arising out of interferences have tended to, and if permitted to continue, will hamper and delay progress in the development and production of wire and wireless telephone and telegraph apparatus and systems; and

...the effective and prompt development of the arts in question can be secured only by the free and frank cooperation and exchange of information between the parties, which can not well take place if improvements and knowledge resulting from one party's cooperation with the other parties may without its consent be made available in its field to the use of others;...

For these broad reasons, an exchange of patent rights was effected by the contract. On March 7, 1921, Wireless Specialty Apparatus Company, and United Fruit Company, which owned certain radio patents, became associated with the radio patent pool by collateral agreements with General Electric Company. On June 30, 1921, Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company entered the pool by

agreements with General Electric Company and Radio Corporation of America on the one hand, and American Telephone and Telegraph Company and Western Electric Company, Inc., on the other.

As a result of the various agreements among the several parties, two groups, as distinguished from the contracting companies, became associated with the License Agreement of July 1, 1920:

The Telephone Group

American Telephone and Telegraph Company
Western Electric Company, Incorporated;
and

The Electrical Group or the Radio Group

General Electric Company
Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company
Radio Corporation of America (RCA)
United Fruit Company
Wireless Specialty Apparatus Company
Tropical Radio Telegraph Company.³³

Soon after the contract was executed, disputes arose as to the meaning of the various provisions. Nevertheless, what the parties had hoped to achieve by the contracts may be fathomed from the wording of the contracts and from the claims made by the various parties in arbitration proceedings which ensued in 1923. First and foremost, A.T.&T. received an exclusive license under the patents of all parties in wire telephony on land, and over cables not more than 100 miles in length. In other words, only the Bell System could use the patents of all the parties in giving wire telephone service. By this provision it precluded the possible development of a competitive wire plant for telephone communication. In this it was continuing a policy of defense against competition which had characterized the Bell System from the very beginning, as typified in the Bell patents, the absorption of the subsidiaries of Telephone, Telegraph and Cable Company of America in 1902, and the acquisition of the Pupin, Cooper-Hewitt, and De Forest patents.

More important than this, however, A.T.&T. obtained an exclusive license under the patents of all parties in radio telephony to make, use, and sell wireless telephone (radio) apparatus connected to or operated as a part of a public-service telephone communication system. Transoceanic radiotelephony on the other hand, was given exclusively to General Electric Company. By this, the Bell System forestalled any development of two-way radiotelephonic communication in competition with its existing land plant. That this was considered a victory of the first magnitude is apparent from the testimony of Frank B. Jewett, president of Bell Telephone Laboratories, in the Chicago rate case in 1932, when he stated in defense of the research work done by the System:

As I look back on it it seems to me that this enlarged and enhanced position [in radio research] played no small part in enabling us to reach our present satisfactory understanding with the General Electric Com-

pany and the Radio Corporation of America, and that if we never derive any other benefit from our work than that which follows the safeguarding of our wire interests we can look upon the time and money as having been returned to us many times over. [author's italics].³⁴

In radiobroadcasting proper, the Radio Group had the right to use its own patents and those of A.T.&T. to "establish and maintain" broadcast transmitting stations. It could sell only equipment manufactured with the use of its own patents, but not those of the Telephone Company. The absence of a license from the Telephone Company to General Electric and to Radio Corporation for the sale of broadcasting equipment confined the activities of the latter to operation of their own stations. The Telephone Company, on the other hand, could manufacture, use, and sell fairly acceptable apparatus for this purpose under its own patents. Thus A.T.&T. made no concessions in this field. Bell System's intervention, it will be made clear later on, was to monopolize radiobroadcasting as a Bell service, with slight concessions to General Electric and Radio Corporation of America to operate their own stations.

The Radio Group had a nonexclusive license in the manufacture and sale of radio receiving sets, but did not give a similar license to the Telephone Company. This business was divided between General Electric and Westinghouse. The Radio Group also received exclusive licenses "in the fields of power purposes, household devices, and distance actuation and control by wireless for other than communications purposes." It also received exclusive licenses "in the fields of railroad signaling (other than x-ray devices and appliances associated therewith) and radio goniometry." Train-dispatching apparatus was reserved exclusively by the Telephone Company. Finally, both groups granted to each other nonexclusive licenses in submarine signaling, scientific apparatus for use in laboratories, colleges, scientific societies (as distinguished from commercial use), wireless apparatus for experimental purposes, therapeutic apparatus other than x-ray devices, shop tools appliances, etc. In these minor fields, both groups had equal rights and could use each other's patents.³⁵

"NO MAN'S LAND"

Before proceeding further with a discussion of the results of research, patents, and pooling arrangements, it is pertinent to ask what was the philosophy underlying this continual extension of control into fields beyond telephone communications, on the part of the Telephone Company, and conversely, into communication, on the part of the electrical manufacturers? What were the motives of the companies? The available information permits only an analysis of the Telephone Company's side of the story.

A rational explanation of the developments in the years before and since 1920, both in the direction of research and in the settlement of conflicts through the radio patent pool, was expressed by J.E. Otterson in 1927. At the time Otterson was general commer-

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-22.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-24.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

33. Exhibit 289, p. 21.

34. *Proposed Report*, p. 234.

35. For copy of License Agreement of 1920, see Federal Trade Commission, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-139.

cial manager of Western Electric Company. Since then he has held the positions of president of Electrical Research Products, Inc., a subsidiary of Western Electric engaged in the exploitation of Bell System sound motion-picture equipment, and later president of Paramount-Publix Corporation. While he was with Western Electric Company he wrote a memorandum, dated January 13, 1927, since then known as the "Four Square Memorandum" in which he analyzed the role played by scientific developments in territories adjacent to telephony. He viewed inventions and patents as instruments of industrial warfare, not in competition, but for control. With slight and unimportant deletions, the memorandum is reproduced here, for it gives a concrete view of the motives of Bell System management in advancing into the outer fields of communications; it also depicts the conflicts of interest that exist between American Telephone and Telegraph Company on one side, and Radio Corporation, General Electric, Western Union, and International Telephone and Telegraph Company on the other. The memorandum reads as follows:

A primary purpose of the A.T.&T. Company is the defense and maintenance of its position in the telephone field in the United States. Undertakings and policies must be made to conform to the accomplishment of this purpose.

The A.T.&T. Company is surrounded by potentially competitive interests which may in some manner or degree intrude upon the telephone field.

The problem is to prevent this intrusion.

These interests are characterized by the General Electric Company representing the power and light group, the Radio Corporation of America representing the radio group, the Western Union Telegraph Company representing the telegraph group and the International Telephone and Telegraph Company representing foreign telephone interests. Other miscellaneous interests which may not fall in any one of these groups may appear as potential competitors at any time but the consideration can be confined to these four groups as illustrative of the whole.

Each of these large interests is engaged in development and research that is productive of results which have an application outside of their direct and exclusive field. Indicative of these activities we have between the A.T.&T. Company and the Radio Corporation such things as the Vitaphone, phonograph, broadcasting by wire, point to point wireless, wireless communication with moving objects.

Between the A.T.&T. Company and the General Electric Company:—Carrier current on power lines, communication with trains, train dispatching, switch control, Graybar activities.

Between the A.T.&T. Company and the General Electric Company:—Carrier current on power lines, communication with trains, train dispatching, switch control, Graybar activities.

Between A.T.&T. Company and International Telephone and Telegraph Company:—Vitaphone, phonograph, aids to hearing, pictures by wire, permalloy, submarine cable.

No effort has been made to develop a complete list of

36. *Proposed Report*, pp. 235-236.

37. *Brief of Bell System companies on Commissioner Walker's Proposed Report*, p. 50.

these activities but only a sufficient number to illustrate their character.

In the case of each of these activities the engineering in the major field extends beyond that field and overlaps upon the engineering of another major field and sets up a competitive condition in the "no man's land" lying between.

....
The regulation of the relationship between two such large interests as the A.T.&T. Company and the General Electric Company and the prevention of invasion of their respective fields is accomplished by mutual adjustment within "no man's land" where the offensive of the parties as related to these competitive activities is recognized as a natural defense against invasion of the major fields. Licenses, rights, opportunities and privileges in connection with these competitive activities are traded off against each other and inter-changed in such a manner as to create a proper balance and satisfactory relationship between the parties in the major field.

The contract between the A.T.&T. Company and the General Electric Company is an example of the character of arrangement that may develop out of an effort on the part of two large interests to avoid an invasion of their respective fields and a destructive conflict of interests. It was through trading off rights in connection with these competitive activities that an adjustment between the two interests was reached and the two major fields left intact.

....
It seems obvious that the best defense is to continue activities in "no man's land" and to maintain such strong engineering, patent and commercial situation in connection with these competitive activities as to always have something to trade against the accomplishment of other parties.

If the A.T.&T. Company abandons its activity in the commercial competitive field and other potentially competitive interests continue their activities, it means that they will carry their offensive right up to the wall of our defense and our trading must be in our major field against activities in their outlying commercial fields. The nearer the trading can be carried to the major field of our competitors the more advantageous trading position we are in.

....
On the whole, it seems to be essential to the accomplishment of the A.T.&T. Company's primary purpose of the defensive protection of its dominating position in the domestic telephone field that it shall maintain an active offensive in the "no man's land" lying between it and potentially competitive interests.³⁶

A.T.&T. repudiated Mr. Otterson's expression of policy. "It was not adopted," stated the company in its *Brief on the Proposed Report*, "and does not express a policy ever followed by the American Company or even a viewpoint held by any responsible official."³⁷ Such a clear-cut statement regarding views expressed by a Bell System official who had been general commercial manager of Western Electric, and who was entrusted during 1927-1935 with the promotion of Bell System's most important by-product field, *i.e.*, sound motion pictures, indicates that the issues are grave and must be weighed very carefully. The Federal Communications Commission, over a period of more than a year, considered the points raised by A.T.&T. against the staff reports dealing with Bell System's by-product activities, and the Bell System *Brief on the Proposed*

Report, and *in banc* rejected the criticism pertaining to this question of policy.³⁸

There is more direct evidence to indicate that Mr. Otterson's views did not express the vagaries of an ambitious mind, as Bell System's *Brief* implies, but represented in detail company policy, well-formulated and pursued over a long period of time. Statements by Vail and J.J. Carty, regarding the value of patents and research in protecting Bell System plant investment from competition, have already been quoted. A more concise statement of Otterson's "trading value" philosophy of research was given by Dr. Frank B. Jewett, vice-president of A.T.&T. and president of Bell Telephone Laboratories. Dr. Jewett wrote in memorandum to Vice-President Cooper of A.T.&T., dated June 30, 1932:

Experience has already proven conclusively that research undertaken in one field may turn out to have a by-product value in another field which is even greater than the direct value within the field in which the research was undertaken. Many of our own large values in the telephone business are directly the result of research work undertaken for an entirely different purpose and without realization of its direct application to the telephone business. In such cases the work would never have been started if our sole criterion was its prospective value in our going business.

While it is obvious that the basic inventions which control a large new field are not made very often, one can never tell where or when they will crop up. The tremendous growth in both fundamental and industrial research in recent years has unquestionably increased the probability of such inventions, with their covering patents, arising. When such patents do turn up, possession of a strong and unmortgaged patent position on the part of an industry needing rights is frequently the most powerful and sometimes the only available weapon for securing those rights. Ability to stop the owner of a fundamental and controlling patent from realizing the full fruits of his patent by the ownership of necessary secondary patents may easily put one in the position to trade where money alone might be of little value.³⁹

Mr Otterson's picturesque statement regarding the "no man's land" between A.T.&T. and other electrical manufacturing and communications companies is merely the concrete view of Dr Jewett's concept of the functions of research. In practical application, we shall see in the following two chapters, the "no man's land" of scientific research and inventions is no mere figure of speech.

This Napoleonic concept of industrial warfare, with inventions and patents as the soldiers of fortune, is a startling revelation of business policy, little appreciated in present-day discussion of competition, monopoly, regulation, and price policy. Mr Otterson's memorandum reveals that large aggregations of capital in our highly technical industries, such as communications, electrical manufacturing, and amusements, are engaged, by means of inventions and patents, in a *competition for monopoly control*

38. The Federal Communications Commission adopted the section in the *Proposed Report* to which the Bell System objected, without change. Compare *Proposed Report*, pp. 235-237 with F.C.C., *Report*, pp. 209-211.

39. Exhibit 1946 A, pp. 15-16.

40. *Ibid.*, P. 19.

instead of *commercial competition for markets*. When these interests meet in "no man's land," they do not fight it out, but shake hands, play a game of contract, agree not to trump each other's cards, and retire into their trenches, hoping that they have not been cheated in the deal and confident that they will be secure until the next important hand of inventions is dealt.

There are, of course, other motives than offensive and defensive warfare in the development of by-products. The minutes of the meeting of a "By-Products Committee" of the Bell System, held on August 6, 1925, enumerated such factors as incentive to invention, public good will, profits, and unsuspected contributions to improvement in telephone apparatus, as motives and results of the development work conducted by the Bell Telephone Laboratories. "It is recognized that while the development of telephone apparatus is and should be the prime objective," the committee concluded, "the development of these accessory products furnishes an incentive that is helpful in stimulating the enthusiasm and interest of the development engineers." Among the other conclusions reached, it was also stated that "Much good-will publicity accrues to the Bell System and the Western Electric Company as a direct result of development work in this [by-product] field." Considering all elements present, however, it was agreed that "development work in by-products is justified, providing that, overall, the business resulting from this endeavor is commercially sound and profitable; individual cases may not result in large profits—for example, the artificial larynx, but will result in direct public benefit and good will. But finally overall the business must be profitable."⁴⁰

The motives behind the feverish activity in research, and the acquisition of patents, in fields beyond and adjacent to the main field of activity of the communications and electrical manufacturing companies, may be summarized, therefore, as follows:

To defend existing investment of capital against the development of new, and perhaps better and more economical, substitute services controlled by rivals.

To possess an offensive weapon against others engaged in adjacent fields, in order to obtain patent concessions essential to the carrying out of the primary activities.

To obtain improvements in the service offered the public.

To reap incidental profits in the exploitation of by-products.

To render public service and engender good will for the company, by developing and offering for use devices which fill an essential need.

The experience of the Bell System since 1920 proves that it has been successful in achieving all these objectives, with the possible exception of public good will. At times, public good will has been sacrificed to the extent that any one of the other main objectives has been heavily emphasized, such as when independent radio stations and manufacturers of sound motion-picture equipment were

pursued relentlessly with threats of infringement suits. But the most significant consideration, in research, acquisition of patents, and pooling arrangements has been the attainment and preservation of monopoly control in the principle fields of operation.

Competition in inventions and acquisition of patents was intended to achieve, and did actually achieve, a monopoly in use and exploitation by the division of fields of activity through agreement among the contestants. This is highly reminiscent of the competition for colonies among the powers before the World War, which resulted in the partition of unoccupied territory for exclusive possession, and in the division of other territories into "spheres of influence." The ways of empire building on the economic front are analogous to those on the political front.

The Film Council

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY (UK, 1936)

THE FIRST PHASE, 1908-12

The period lasting approximately from 1896 to 1908 constitutes the pre-history of the American movie industry. It was an era of primeval chaos, marked by the mushroom-growth of "nickel-odeans" in all parts of the country and by the frantic efforts of the Edison interests to protect and of all other production groups to pirate the basic camera and projector patents controlled by the former.

With the formation of the Motion Picture Patents Company in January, 1909, the history of American film finance on a large scale can be said to have commenced. That company, sponsored by George Kleine, the leading importer of foreign films and equipment, was a combine of the nine most important manufacturers then existing, including the Edison, Vitagraph and Biograph companies, and of the Kleine firm. All these enterprises agreed to pool their numerous patent rights (most of them having made important additions to the original Edison patents) and to acknowledge the priority of the basic Edison rights, paying royalties for their use. Licences for all these patents were issued to all the members of the combine, but strictly withheld from all other producers and equipment manufacturers. By forming the General Film Company (the first national distributing organisation in the country) during the following year, this powerful monopoly rapidly obtained complete control of the distribution sphere, absorbing 57 out of the 58 film exchanges then existing. In addition, the company attempted to enforce the complete exclusion of all films except their own from the American screens. They issued licences, against a weekly \$2 fee, for the use of their projectors to all cinemas and threatened to prosecute under the patent laws any exhibitor who used the company's projectors to display films made by outsiders. Finally, the trust made a contract with the Eastman Kodak Company, according to which the latter agreed to supply film base only to the firms who were members of the pool. Fears of an anti-trust prosecution however, led to the abandonment of this monopoly arrangement in 1911.

The trust immediately proceeded to standardise the whole business of producing and distributing films by confining themselves exclusively to the

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production of the one- or two-reel shorts in vogue when the merger was formed and by charging uniform rentals for standard programmes composed of such films. The stranglehold of this monopoly, protected by the patent laws and paying tribute to the electrical industry, thus appeared complete and the astonishing history of its breakdown provides one of the most instructive chapters in the story of modern finance.

The formation of the trust naturally aroused the violent opposition of all producers, manufacturers and distributors excluded from its benefits, and the exhibitors as a whole felt an equally natural resentment against the restrictions imposed by the combine on their choice of programmes and against the enforce \$2 licence levy. It is a remarkable fact that, almost without exception, the founders of the concerns later fused in the eight major companies of today were in the vanguard of the struggle against the monopoly. Prominent among these independents were Carl Laemmle and R.H. Cochrane, the late and the present head of Universal, whose Independent Picture Co. (known as the "Imp") gave rise to the star system, when they made the experiment of indicating the name of an actress on the film. The actress in question was Mary Pickford, recently pirated by Laemmle from the trust, and the star system was destined to revolutionise the industry. Of equal importance were the efforts of Adolph Zukor and W.W. Hodginson, founders of concerns later merged in Paramount, to introduce full-length feature films. They first attempted to persuade the trust of the advantages of this policy, only starting as independents when their suggestions were rejected.

Foremost among the exhibitors fighting the trust was William Fox and the methods adopted by the combine to oust him are characteristic for the manner in which the struggle was conducted. One of Fox's projectionists was bribed by the trust men to take the films rented for exhibition from them nightly after the show to a house of prostitution in Hoboken. Shortly afterwards Fox's license was cancelled on the grounds that he had allowed the companies' films to be used for immoral purposes.

Fox was able, however, to defeat this ruse and the action for damages which he subsequently brought against the trust under the Sherman laws was followed by similar actions brought by innumerable other exhibitors. At the same time the combine was unable to suppress the continued pirating of their patent rights by independent producers, whose activities even before and during the existence of the merger were largely responsible for the selection of Los Angeles as the ultimate centre of the movie industry. This city being within easy reach of the Mexican border, it was a simple matter for the pirates to escape with their cameras to safety on the approach of the process servers and thugs hired by the enraged patent owners to smash up their equipment.

The overwhelming success of the feature film and star system experiments initiated by the independents and the actions brought by the exhibitors had already undermined the monopoly

hold of the combine by about 1912. It received its final blow when the General Film Company was dissolved by court order in 1915 and when the Supreme Court declared in 1917 that the purchaser of a patented projector could not be legally forced to exhibit only the manufacturer's own films.

The first film combine thus collapsed, in spite of its apparently inassailable strength, because it attempted to stabilise a new and entirely unprecedented form of mass entertainment at a time when the demand for that entertainment had only just been aroused and the lines of its future development were as yet wholly obscure. Lacking the great advantage of their opponents, who were not only of the people but also in continuous contact with the people, the executives of the combine failed to recognise the decisive importance of ever changing mass tastes entirely beyond the scope of ordinary rationalisation practices. In calling a halt they soon lagged behind the rapidly expanding requirements of their audiences, and despite their financial and organisational supremacy, they left the field to their opponents whose main strength lay in their ability to anticipate, instead of smothering, every new desire of the movie public.

THE SECOND PHASE, 1912-1929

The period commencing with the gradual eclipse of the patents monopoly and terminating with the general installation of sound equipment about 1929 and the impact of the crisis on the film industry during the following year constitutes the second phase in the history of American film finance. Its salient feature from the creative point of view was the emergence of the modern entertainment film of the pre-talkie era with its as yet largely undifferentiated general "human" appeals of sex, adventure, self-improvement, lavish settings, glamorous fashions and happy endings. From the organisational point of view this period saw the gradual consolidation, after incessant and bitter rivalry and many failures, of the eight major companies which dominate the industry to-day. These companies survived largely because they succeeded in breaking through the original isolation of the three distinct spheres of the industry: because as producers they secured a sufficiently widespread exhibition outlet for their films through the control of cinema circuits, or else, because as exhibitors and distributors they assured themselves of steady supplies at remunerative rentals by absorbing production units.

The Paramount organisation (a merger of Zukor's Famous Players with Lasky's) and other production units that jointly absorbed the Paramount distributing organisation founded by Hodgkinson and ultimately — in 1930 — controlled 1,600 cinemas in the U.S.A., is the outstanding example of the former type. Among the exhibitors, Loew's Inc., during the lifetime of its founder always closely allied (by family ties and personal friendships) to Zukor's group, established itself in production by the absorption first of the Metro and later of the Goldwyn and Mayer unit; Fox, while

expanding his theatre holdings entered production at a very early period and soon became one of the largest producers; First National Distributors, now absorbed by Warner Bros., commenced as a defensive alliance of leading exhibitors against the encroachments of Paramount and, having established a country-wide distributing organisation, first contracted with independent producers for the supply of feature films, and later established studios of their own. The prolonged struggle between Paramount and First National was probably the most dramatic aspect of the industry during this phase of its history. Organised in 1917 in reply to Paramount's block-booking policy and high rentals, the First National was controlled by the executives of some twenty-seven powerful theatre circuits who extended their influence by granting sub-franchises for the films distributed by them to other cinema proprietors. During 1919-21 their organisation embraced some 3,400 theatres in all parts of the country. In the production sphere, they actively pirated stars from their rival, even inducing Mary Pickford to leave Zukor at a time when she was at the height of her fame. Zukor was, however, able to meet this menace by production on a De Mille scale, while in the exhibition sphere, he met his opponents on their own ground with a ruthless cinema acquisition campaign. He succeeded in acquiring controlling interests in the circuits of several of the First National shareholders themselves and was thus able to work against his rivals from within their own ranks. Only a Federal anti-trust prosecution prevented Zukor from absorbing First National. But while this prosecution—as is invariably the case drawn over many years—caused him to alter his tactics, it did not affect the substance of his policy. It was the object of the prosecution to force Zukor to confine himself to either the production or the exhibition side of the film business. By making a formal separation of these two sides of his enterprises and organising each as a separate company, Zukor prepared himself to satisfy the letter of the law (although when the case was finally decided this demand had been abandoned). At the same time, however, Zukor continued the expansion policy with renewed vigour. First National received its final blow with the absorption by Zukor of its largest remaining circuit, the Katz-Balaban group. Samuel Katz, the head of this group was placed in charge of the Publix Corporation in which Zukor had merged all his theatre interests and a few years later First National lost their independence by the absorption of their last stronghold, the Stanley group, by Warner Bros. (1929).

It was this latter move that placed Warner Bros. among the leading companies in the industry. Their position had for a long time been a precarious one, until with Fox they acted as the pioneers for the introduction of sound (at first sound on disc) from 1925-6 onwards. Even after the overwhelming success of their first full-length sound films and especially of Al Jolson's "Jazz Singer" (1927) they were seriously hampered by their lack of national

exhibition facilities until their position was remedied by their control of First National.

Among the other companies RKO was organised under the auspices of the Radio Corporation of America at the end of our period (1928) as a merger of several production and exhibition interests, including the American Pathe unit. Universal and Columbia for a long time confined their activities to the supply of low cost features, with a few special efforts annually to act as their publicity front. Universal's theatre acquisition policy was mainly restricted to the lesser "neighbourhood" halls, while Columbia entirely refrained from this field. Lastly, United Artists arose as the distributing organisation of a number of independent producers and stars, too expensive for any of the large companies to maintain on their permanent payrolls.

From the financial point of view this phase is marked by the entry of Wall Street interests into the film world. The policy of financing their enterprises from their own profits which had sufficed for the earlier stages of the industry's development, proved inadequate in face of the vast new capital demands arising from the incomparably more expensive star-feature films and the theatre acquisition campaigns of the post-war years.

The Famous Players-Lasky group (Paramount), were the first to enlist the support of a Wall Street banking firm (in 1919) and until their last reorganization, Kuhn Loeb & Co. acted as their main banking affiliation. Within a few years Loew, Pathe and Fox shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange and by 1924 the securities of a dozen movie corporations were handled by Wall Street bankers. William Fox at first employed the services of the John F. Dryden-Prudential Life Insurance group, later changing over to Halsey Stuart & Co., while the Roxy Cinema, a New York hall, he acquired immediately after its construction, had been financed by S.W. Straus & Co.

Warner Bros. obtained the support of the Los Angeles banker, M. H. Flint for their earliest sound experiments, and through Flint's recommendations, they soon afterwards secured the backing of the Wall Street firm Goldman, Sachs & Co., who with Hayden, Stone & Co. remained their chief bankers until the crisis. The latter banking firm had entered the movie field as supporters of First National, one of their partners having been one of the chief figures behind the move to convert First National into a closely knit merger during the final stages of their struggle with Paramount.

Loew's chief banking affiliation was Dillon, Read & Co., one of whose representatives appears still to hold a position on the Loew board. Shields & Co and S.W. Straus & Co., were the bankers of Universal, while the San Francisco banker, A.H. Giannini, still an important figure in movie-finance, had close relations with W. G. McAdoo, J. Schenck and other United Artist executives, as well as with C. De Mille, Columbia and several smaller companies. Other financiers prominent in the industry during this phase were: J. Kennedy, a Boston banker, allied with one of the concerns later

merged in R.K.O.; J. Millbank, a wealthy capitalist allied with the Chase National Bank, Blair & Co., Southern Railway and similar concerns, who supported the independent activities of W.W. Hodgkinson after the latter's departure from Paramount; and F.J. Godsol, who at one time brought the support of the Dupont interests to S. Goldwyn's enterprises.

The entry of Randolph Hearst into the film industry also dates from this phase. He established his news reel service soon after the eclipse of the Patents Trust and owned various production units for shorts and feature films which were in course of time consolidated in his "Cosmopolitan Pictures" company. While the films of the latter unit were distributed first through Paramount and later through Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, the Hearst news service was at various times associated with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Fox and Universal. Hearst also acquired control of a few picture houses.

We may summarise the financial developments of this phase by stating that after an initial move towards decentralisation, when the industry emerged from the clutches of the Patents Trust, the foundations were laid for its concentration on a much higher plane. After releasing the undreamed of possibilities for the development of the film as a popular form of entertainment, the eight major companies slowly emerged as powerful groups controlling the most important positions in all the three spheres of the industry and intimately linked with prominent Wall Street banking interests. It is important to note, moreover, that towards the end of our period all the pioneer film executives, except W. Fox and C. Laemmle, had allowed the financial control of their enterprises to slip out of their hands into those of their bankers. As yet, however, the latter were in the main recruited from the leading investment and merchant banking houses and did not include, except indirectly, the peak figures in the American financial oligarchy.

THE THIRD PHASE, SINCE ABOUT 1929

The present and third phase of American film finance was heralded by two consecutive and closely related events of the first magnitude. It opened with the general adoption of sound, a technical revolution that not merely transformed the whole nature of film production but also proved to have so unexpectedly stimulating an effect on the box office that for a considerable time it was able to delay the impact of the crisis, then in its first violent phase, on the film industry. The second event was the crisis itself which was rendered so much the more violent, when at last it did affect the movies, by the enormous cost involved in scrapping perfectly good equipment and products and replacing it by even more expensive new installations as a result of the technical change just indicated.

In their joint effects these two sets of events revolutionised the financial no less than the technical basis of the American movie industry. The adoption of sound led to the emergence—after violent struggles, as we shall presently see—of a

new patents monopoly very nearly as complete in fact, if not in form, as the old patents trust of the pre-war years. At the same time the financial results of the crisis led to a transformation in the sphere of direct stock and banking control that in its general effect reinforced the hold over the industry of the powers behind the new patents groups.

The problem of the "men behind the movies" today therefore resolves itself into a dual enquiry: first an enquiry into the powers exerting an indirect control over the industry through their monopoly of essential equipment; and secondly an enquiry into the present situation with regard to the direct financial control, through majority holdings of voting stock or the monopoly of executive key positions, of the eight major companies.

The former analysis is presented graphically in the chart illustrating the indirect control over the film industry exercised by the leading financial groups through their sound patents monopoly, and the relations of the companies there indicated to the dominant Morgan and Rockefeller interests on the one hand and to the film companies on the other are specified in the explanatory notes attached to that chart. The key to the situation is provided by the co-operation resulting in joint control of the most important American patents in the sound equipment field, between the Western Electric Co. (a subsidiary of the American Telephone and Telegraph Co.) and R.C.A. Photophone (a subsidiary of the Radio Corporation of America). The former group of concerns is almost wholly Morgan controlled, while in the latter the Rockefeller interests appear at the present time to be as strong, if not more so than those of the Morgan group. Until recently all the major companies, except R.K.O., had contracted for Western Electric sound equipment, but in the past few months R.C.A. succeeded in adding Warner Bros., 20th Century-Fox, Columbia and at least one of the United Artists producers to R.K.O. as their licensees.

Since 1930 this American monopoly has been extended into a world monopoly by an agreement between the American groups and the most important German patentees A.E.G., Siemens-Halske and Klang film. Under this arrangement licenses are issued to film producers in all countries for the use of both the German and the American patents, while for the manufacture and sale of equipment certain countries are regarded as the exclusive territory of either the American or the German interests, the remainder being open to the products of either group on the basis of free competition.


The cash value of this monopoly is measured by the license fee of \$500 *per reel* charged until recently by Electrical Research Products Incorporated (the sound equipment subsidiary of Western Electric known in the trade as "Erpi") for all films produced on the Western Electric system. The following figures relating to the profits of "Erpi" during the eight years from January 1st, 1927, to the end of 1934 and published in the *Wall Street Journal* of July 18th, 1935, will serve to convey an impression of the aggregate value of these licenses. During this period "Erpi":

Repaid	\$5,750,000 spent by it on research and development.
Paid	\$5,700,000 royalties to the parent company (A.T. & T.C.).
Paid	\$4,000,000 dividends to the intermediate company (W.E.).
Accumulated	\$5,450,000 Undistributed profits in its treasury.

In other words the net revenues obtained by this concern from the sale and licensing of sound equipment during eight years (including the early phase when sound was not yet generally adopted) amounted to \$20,900,000.

As we have indicated, the establishment of this monopoly was not achieved without violent opposi-

INDIRECT DEPENDENCE THROUGH SOUND EQUIPMENT CONTROL



The Morgan group (J.P. Morgan & Co., and Drexel & Co.) is the most powerful financial group in the U.S.A. today. Its power, built up through international and investment banking extends to every sphere of American economy. In January, 1932, Morgan partners were represented on some 35 banks and 60 non-financial corporations with assets totalling about \$30 billion. Morgan influence is calculated to extend, directly or indirectly, to one quarter of the total corporate wealth of the U.S.A.

While the private wealth of the Rockefellers is even greater than that of the Morgans, their economic power, as expressed in the control of wealth, is not as great. Rockefeller power was built up on oil, though it now extends to many other spheres, including banking. Apart from their vast real estate holdings, Rockefeller interests appear to predominate in banks and other corporations with assets totalling about \$21.5 billion.

1. AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELGRAPH CO.: This four and a quarter billion combine was organised by Morgan and is still under Morgan "management" control (the 20 largest stockholders own less than 5 per cent of its total stock). 14 of its directors, including the president and vice-president, are more or less closely linked by cross-directorships to Morgan concerns, and a Morgan partner is a director of two important subsidiaries. Management links are reinforced by banking relations. A Rockefeller minority interest is represented on the board by W.W. Aldrich.

2. WESTERN ELECTRIC CO.: Manufacturing subsidiary of A.T. & T.C. Markets sound film equipment through its subsidiary Electrical Research Products Inc.

(ERPI). Western Electric equipment was until recently used under licence by all the major film companies except RKO.

3. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.: Largest electrical manufacturers in the world. Organised by Morgan in 1892. Morgan still predominant, one Morgan partner and three other Morgan men on board.

4. CHASE NATIONAL BANK: Largest commercial bank in U.S.A. Controlled by John D. Rockefeller group since 1930. W.W. Aldrich, brother-in-law of J.D. Rockefeller, Jr., is president, two other members of the inner Rockefeller "cabinet" are board members. Rockefeller family has also substantial stock holding.

5. RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA: Incorporated in 1919 by G.E.C. to take over control of Marconi Co., and patent rights of G.E.C., Westinghouse Electrical & Manufacturing Co., A.T.&T.C. and other concerns. Radio patent monopoly enforced under licensing system until 1930, when government anti-trust action led to a certain relaxation of control. The same action induced G.E.C. and Westinghouse to distribute their dominant stock interests of their stockholders, which implied a certain relaxation, though not elimination of control. At the same time Rockefeller interest became prominent and is still represented on the board (B. Cutler of Chase National Bank). Sound film equipment is produced and marketed through R.C.A. Photophone Co., which recently added Warner, 20th Century-Fox and Columbia to R.K.O. as its licencees.

tion involving prolonged litigation. Both the Warners and Fox had done a considerable amount of pioneer work before the telephone and radio interests decided to enter the sound film sphere on a large scale. In the case of Warner Bros. a long law suit between that company on behalf of the Vitaphone Corporation and Erpi was settled in 1935 with the payment of Erpi of back royalties on sound equipment and its release from further royalty obligations.

The struggle with Fox was even more dramatic. It involved not merely the personal ownership by W. Fox of the American Tri-Ergon patents (the patents used in the continental Klangfilm system), but also his retention, up to the period under discussion, of personal control over his film companies. Litigation concerning the Tri-Ergon rights was not settled until 1935, when the Supreme Court annulled W. Fox's patents, reversing the findings of all the lower courts by its decision. While there was still a possibility that W. Fox's Tri-Ergon claims might be corroborated, the vast market represented by the Fox companies might, however, be conquered for the Western Electric interests, if W. Fox were removed from their control. This was the objective of the bitter struggle fought out by the telephone group and the Fox bankers Halsey, Stuart & Co. on the one hand and W. Fox on the other between October, 1929, and April, 1930. At the commencement of this period the Fox companies were at the height of their prosperity, earning a net income of \$17,000,000 per year. W. Fox had embarked on three vast expansion schemes: the purchase of an important theatre circuit (the Poli group), the acquisition of the controlling interest in Loew's Inc. and of 49½ per cent voting stock in the holding company controlling Gaumont-British. In order to finance these deals Fox had obtained a \$15,000,000 loan from the telephone group and others amounting together to about the same figure from his bankers. These short term loans were to be repaid in the ordinary course of business by new stock issues. To his surprise Fox discovered, however, that the price demanded by his banking and telephone friends for this normal service was the abandonment on his part of control over his companies. Efforts to find alternative financial backing, although for a time apparently successful, proved fruitless in the end. Fox found himself face to face with a banking ring determined to wrest control from his hands and powerful enough to buy off even those bankers who at first were prepared to support him. After a long legal battle in which the telephone group attempted to throw the Fox concerns into receivership and which was further complicated by the filing of an anti-trust action against Fox on account of the Fox-Loew merger, the matter was finally settled by a victory of the telephone-banking ring. W. Fox sold out his voting stock for \$18,000,000 to a business friend of the Halsey, Stuart firm, H.L. Clarke, a Chicago utilities magnate associated with the Insulls. Fox, who remained on the board of his former concerns for a short period after these events, offered the free use of his Tri-Ergon sound

patents to these companies, but their new controllers preferred to enter into a licensing arrangement with the Western Electric interests at a cost to their shareholders of approximately \$1,000,000 a year. (See *Upton Sinclair Presents William Fox*, p. 324.)

COMMENTS ON THE EIGHT MAJOR COMPANIES

This part of the struggle between Fox and the telephone interests serves to illustrate the intimate inter-relation in the present financial position of the American film industry of the indirect form of patent control we have so far examined and the direct form of voting stock and management control to which we must now turn. It is necessary, however, at this point to stress the fact that here, as in any other sphere, control is not necessarily identical with ownership. The Fox case again provides a pertinent example. Prior to the change we have described control of these companies was vested exclusively in 5 per cent of the total capital which alone carried voting rights (although W. Fox also owned a substantial block of non-voting shares). After the change the situation was even more striking. The Fox companies, then affiliated to Clarke's General Theatres Equipment Inc., were controlled by three voting trustees, each of whom owned only one share of stock, the value of which in 1931 was a little over one third of a dollar. (See Sinclair, *op. cit.*)

The direct financial control of the eight major companies insofar as it could be ascertained from the information at present available in this country, is illustrated in chart 2. Taking the companies one by one the following situation emerges:

PARAMOUNT: All the Paramount interests were merged in 1930 in a new company known as the Paramount Publix Corp., which continued the expansion operations of the group on a large scale. Among other moves it acquired a controlling interest in the Columbia Broadcasting system, the second national radio service in the country, and established a production unit for talkies in France. In 1933 this company was thrown first into receivership and later into bankruptcy. It was reorganised in June, 1935, as Paramount Pictures Inc., control passing from Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to a group consisting of the Wall Street investment bankers Lehman Bros. and the Atlas Corporation, an investment trust within the Morgan sphere of influence. It appears that the Morgan telephone trust also acquired an interest in the company, and their influence was further strengthened by the appointment of J.E. Otterson, former chief of Erpi and prime mover in the struggle with Fox, to the controlling position of president of the new company.

Commenting on this change Representative A.J. Sabath, chairman of the Congressional Committee investigating real estate bond reorganisation, stated: "The reorganisation of the Paramount Publix Corporation, now Paramount Pictures Inc., was marked by 'collusion, fraud and conspiracy'. This is a case where control of the

company was grabbed by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and other interests" (*New York Times*, 11th October, 1935). From the report into the company's affairs presented by J.P. Kennedy in June, 1936, and not made public until recently, it appears, however, that the new management did not materially improve the standards of efficiency of its predecessors. In the first place, after a preliminary survey, Mr. Kennedy considered it a waste of time and money to continue his enquiry, unless far-reaching changes in the management of the company were effected. "At the time when any well-managed picture business should be making substantial profits, Paramount is not making money and, as now managed, gives no hope of doing so," he wrote (see *Time*, 27th July, 1936). "While current unsatisfactory results are cumulative effects of a chain of incompetent, unbusiness-like and wasteful practices to be detected in every phase of production, this pervading incompetence is directly traceable to a lack of confidence in the management and direction of the company's affairs in the New York Office."

One of the results of this report appears to have been the removal from the board of J.E. Otterson and his replacement by an experienced showman, B. Balaban. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from such organisational changes that the dominant Morgan control of the company had been in any way basically affected.

WARNER BROS.: The present financial control of this concern cannot be completely ascertained from the information at our disposal. The former banking affiliations, Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Hayden Stone & Co. appear to have been dropped and it is reported that at one time Western Electric had an interest, though certainly not a controlling one in the firm which is also tied up to some extent with R. Hearst. The situation in 1932 was that none of the Warner board members represented the giant interests (Morgan, Rockefeller, Mellon) with which we are mainly concerned in this section, but that the Guaranty Trust Co., Manufacturers' Trust Co., and New York Trust Co. (New York banks within the Morgan sphere of influence) were tied up with Warners as transfer agents and registrars for stock and as trustees and interest agents for bond issues.

TWENTIETH CENTURY-FOX: Shortly after the events we have described the General Theatres Equipment Inc. went into receivership which also affected the Fox Theatres Corp. Fox Films (the producing section of the Fox enterprises also controlling some of their theatre holdings) escaped receivership and was merged in 1935 with J. Schenck's Twentieth Century Corp. Chase National Bank which had backed Clarke retained the largest block of stock and probably the control of the concern after bearing a considerable proportion of the losses caused by the debacle of the old companies. This bank is now a Rockefeller concern, its president being W.W. Aldrich, brother-in-law of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and the Rockefeller family also have a substantial stock interest in it. The Morgan interests are represented in


Twentieth-Century-Fox by a minority holding of Atlas Corp.

LOEW'S INC.: In spite of the anti-trust action brought against Fox and later against General Theatres and of the nominal separation of Loew from Fox, the former company, whose chief executive is N.M. Schenck, brother of J. Schenck, is also in the Chase National Bank-Rockefeller sphere of interest (through the stock purchased originally by W. Fox).

UNITED ARTISTS: Our information for this group is again incomplete. It should be remembered, however, that the producers collaborating in this organisation finance their own films, though the company owns a studio, runs a world-wide distributing organisation and controls a string of first run theatres. In the summer of 1936 the San Francisco banker, A. Giannini was elected chairman and president of the U.A. organisation. Twentieth-Century-Fox, and therefore indirectly the Rockefeller interests, have a 50 per cent stock holding in United Artists Studios Inc. J. Schenck has also retained his presidency of United Artists Theatres of California Inc.

UNIVERSAL: In April, 1936, Universal Corp., a new holding company, acquired control of the Universal organisation through the purchase of common stock from Carl Laemmle and associates in accordance with an option originally given to Standard Capital Co. and C.E. Rogers. Over 90 per cent of the common stock was acquired for \$5,500,000. All the stock is held in a 10 year voting trust of which the California banker, A.H. Giannini, the president of Standard Capital, J.C. Cowdin; and the English miller, J.A. Rank are prominent members. J.C. Cowdin appears to have been vice-president of Blair & Co. and Bancamerica Blair Corporation (a prominent firm of investment bankers at one time allied to Chase National Bank and also to Giannini), he is at present also chairman of Transcontinental Air Transport Inc., and director of California Packing Corp., Curtiss-Wright Corp., Cheever Corp., Douglas Aircraft Corp., Whitehall Securities Co., Ltd., Sperry Gyroscope Co., Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co., Ford Instrument Co., Intercontinent Aviation Inc., Sperry Corp., and Waterbury Tool Co. According to the English trade press the new Universal holding company was formed through an agreement between Standard Capital and an English syndicate headed by Lord Portal and including also J.A. Rank. This latter syndicate is concerned in this country with the General Film Distributors Co., recently organised by C.M. Woolf. The Universal reorganisation provided for a merger of their British subsidiary with General Film, and the fact that J.A. Rank has been nominated a voting trustee, while he and another British member are directors of the new American holding company seems to indicate that the British interests have acquired a share in the control of the American parent organisation. In addition C.M. Woolf and H. Wilcox have been elected to the board of the American production company.

RADIO-KEITH-ORPHEUM CORP.: R.K.O.



organised as we have seen, in 1928 as a subsidiary of the Radio Corporation of America, is the third of the great film companies falling into receivership during the recent crisis. In October, 1935, R.C.A. sold half its interest in R.K.O. to Atlas Corp. and Lehman Bros., who also took a option for the purchase of the remainder. It appears, however, that the Rockefeller interest remains predominant in R.K.O., through direct stock holdings in the name of Radio City, the great Rockefeller real estate enterprise.

COLUMBIA: This company is at present controlled by a voting trust holding 96 per cent of the voting stock and consisting of A.H. Giannini and two of the company's founders, Harry and Jack Cohn.

CONCLUSION

The development of American film finance which we have attempted to outline in this brief sketch can be summarised as a spiral movement from early monopoly control at a time when the industry, measured by national standards, was but a minor sphere of economic life and when its undreamed-of possibilities of expansion threatened to be stifled by that monopoly hold, through a phase of meteoric expansion coupled with violent competition back again to monopoly control. It is a movement which is never for one moment basically deflected by the unceasing obligato of government anti-trust actions that enlivens its progress. Recently, as in the early years, the cry was raised that the bankers and big business men who were

tending to oust the experienced showmen from the control of policy were ruining the industry, and there were hopes that a new move towards independent production might break the fetters of monopoly. But today the movie world is one of the major industries of the country and the control of its leading units has been concentrated both directly and indirectly in the hands of the most powerful financial groups in the United States, if not the capitalist world. Today the movies are too valuable a prize for the men now in control to relinquish. And the recent changes in executive personnel to which we have referred indicates that the present rulers have learnt at least part of their lesson. But today, as from the first, the imponderabilia of box office appeal are the determining element for the industry's prosperity. Whether the movies will regain their former financial success ultimately depends on whether the Morgans and Rockefellers will find it to their interest in the unceasing change of American life to provide the masses with the type of pictures that alone will induce them to flock to their cinemas.

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Rolf Lindner

FIFTY YEARS OF GERMAN RADIO (FRG, 1974)

The real history of the electronic media, all of which developed under capitalist conditions, should distinguish within the contradictory tendencies of capitalist production between that which is technically feasible, and (a) that which is possible within capitalist relations, and (b) that which is in fact realized in function of the needs of capital at whatever time and in whatever form.

From the outset the prevalent, fundamental indifference of capital to the specific use-value of a commodity acquires special distinction within the sphere of the electronic industries, for they are—in contrast to traditional heavy industry or (even more clearly) to traditional consumer goods industries—“scientific and monopolistic from the outset.”¹

(According to Bernal, technical communication ventures such as “telegraph companies and later cable and telephone companies” are in fact “the first purely scientific commercial enterprises.”²)

The interrelatedness of production and science which has dominated the research laboratories of the electronic and chemical giants since approximately the turn of the century reinforces one of the prevalent contradictions of capitalism: its progressive aspect, the development of new use-values, is eclipsed by the tendency to realize only those possibilities which at a certain time offer the greatest profit. The (dis)order created by patent laws offers numerous opportunities for the monopolist to either block developments—because of the excessive investment costs or insufficient amortization of capital already invested in the production of other commodities—or, because of competition, to support innovations and thus dump products onto the market before they have been technically perfected. A complete history of the development of the mass media would be filled with such examples.

The capitalists' account of mass media innovations denies this contradiction and instead tries to give the appearance of engaging in uninterrupted scientific and technical progress in the service of humanity. Emphasizing solely use-value, they allow that which is more essential to them—namely, exchange-value—to fade into the background.

The contradictory history of the creation of use-values within capitalist society can hardly be more

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clearly expressed than in the following advertising slogan: “Searching for oil we found better methods of detecting brain tumours.” (IBM) The availability of diagnostic tests for brain tumors appears in the slogan to be an obvious outgrowth of the search for oil. Similarly, radio as a mass medium is historically represented as a ‘by-product’ of telegraph and telephone systems, especially as developed for military purposes.

The development of the wireless telegraph and the telephone is closely related to imperialistic tendencies present at the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1903 the “Gesellschaft für drahtlose Telegraphie mbH” (later Telefunken) was founded by AEG (“Allgemeine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft”) and Siemens and Halske in order to settle patent disputes and coordinate the utilization of patent rights. The dissimilar systems of Slaby-Arco (AEG) and Braun (Siemens & Halske) were thus consolidated and this facilitated a unified communication system for the various government branches. Production, marketing and research activity were concentrated in three areas; the radio-technical armament of the army and navy, the construction of radio stations in colonial areas administered by Germany, and the installation of coastal stations and on-board radio equipment for the merchant marine.

From 1907 to 1914 the technical development of telegraph and telephone systems surged forward at a rapid rate during the course of a bitterly competitive struggle for colonial and military contracts among Telefunken, “Lorenz AG für Signalbau”, “Telegraphie und Telephonie,” and the “Dr. Erich F. Huth GmbH”. In principal, the technical prerequisites for the development of radio as a mass medium had already been available with the invention of the high-frequency amplifier by Goldschmitt (in 1910 for Lorenz; in 1911 Telefunken followed with the high-frequency amplifier of O. von Bronck) and with Telefunken's patent for feed-back cathode tubes for sound-reception (in 1914, from an invention of A. Meissner). However, this idea did not immediately occur to the business world, which had, due to insufficient public contracts, just begun to concentrate upon the military sector. During World War I, AEG, Siemens and Telefunken were—aside from their traditional production program in electro-energy—totally occupied with the manufacture of components for submarines, battle-transmitters, portable transmitters and receiving stations, field cable and telephones, etc. The demand was so great that the “parent-firms, due to the overburdening of their own facilities for military production, were no longer in a position to adequately supply Telefunken, which in 1917 adapted its own research laboratories for manufacturing as a temporary measure.”³

1. J.D. Bernal, *Science and Industry in the Nineteenth Century*, London, 1953, p. 131. Reprinted in volume 1 of this anthology.
2. Bernal, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
3. Paul Richard Arendt, “Zum 50 jährigen Bestehen

In view of this, an anecdote which supposedly explains how radio came into being as a source of entertainment has the effect of a macabre irony. In 1917, Hans Bredow, the managing director of Telefunken, and later state secretary in the postal ministry, was experimenting at the western front with military tube-transmitters which were also used to transmit music (in his autobiography, Bredow advances the opinion that military service “is without a doubt a fountain of health for every normal young man”⁴). At this time, Bredow reports, I first realized that I had a profound duty to fulfill, one which I could never shun.”⁵

II

It was, however, the industrial crisis which followed the war which served as a more than adequate reminder of the possible utilization of the wireless telegraph and telephone for other than military purposes. In fact, Telefunken was in an almost hopeless predicament, since “the unfortunate conclusion of the war will necessarily affect us quite severely.”⁶ Quite so, since it resulted in “not only the loss of shipments in Germany [due to the Treaty of Versailles, R.L.], but more importantly the appropriation of almost all foreign investments and interests, which amounted to a significant percentage of Telefunken's total assets.”⁷

Besides the forfeiture of military contracts and the loss of the colonial network, the October Revolution struck a particularly painful blow to the industry. The Russian Empire, which had been relinquished to AEG and Siemens & Halske for their “utilization” by agreement with the American firms Westinghouse (1905) and General Electric (1907), was suddenly more distant than ever.

The productive capacities of the electric industry had grown tremendously during the war. However, the problem of putting this excess capacity to use after the cessation of military production was second to the major question: what to do with cancelled supply contracts worth several hundred million marks, and with the unsold radio-technical military goods.

In response to this problem the postal ministry submitted in January 1919, a report entitled “Employment of Radio Systems for Public Use” which included, among others, the following proposals: the reutilization of the European and overseas radio network; expansion of marine radio installations; formation of a radio network for air and rail transport; construction of a radio-telephone network, and—constituting as it were the preliminary stage of public radio—construction of a broadcast station

der Telefunkengesellschaft für drahtlose Telegraphie,” *AEG Mitteilungen*, 43, May/June 1953, 109.

4. Hans Bredow, “Im Banne der Atherwellen”, vol. II: *Funk im ersten Weltkrieg, Entstehung des Rundfunks*, Stuttgart, 1956, p. 30.

5. Bredow, p. 403.

6. Arendt, p. 109.

7. H. Rukop, “Persönlichkeiten und Ereignisse. Ein Querschnitt durch 50 Jahre Telefunken-Geschichte,” in

“for radio-telegraph transmission of general news reports.” These, however, were to be restricted—and this is the crucial limitation—to civil authorities, newspapers, banks, stock exchanges and industrial firms.⁸

But public contracts could not sufficiently compensate for the loss of military production. The expansion of the telephone network and the conversion of telephone-exchanges to self-dialing systems were of course lucrative objectives for AEG and Siemens, however the luke-warm concessions made in broadcasting—which was only semi-public insofar as it consisted of the wire services for business and the press—could not meet the electrical industry's needs in the long run. Thus the wire services appear, insofar as their historical development is concerned, to be testing grounds for public radio.

Telefunken understandably led the electrical industry in pushing for the introduction of public radio, since inasmuch as “military production had ceased in Germany and Telefunken had been forced out of the international market during and after World War I, a quite precarious situation would have resulted if public radio had not been introduced at that time.”⁹ Especially the report of July 1922 by the director of the government's “Office for Communication”, Professor Wagner, saying that the producers of radio tubes and receiver sets in America could not fulfill the market's demand, caused quite some concern among German top level executives.

An enormous radio-boom had in fact developed in the USA. General Electric, Westinghouse, American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) and the firm which they founded together, RCA (Radio Corporation of America),¹⁰ had in 1920 begun to manufacture tube and radio receivers and to build broadcast facilities. Supported by installment-payment plans which enabled even families of modest means to buy radios, the industry's growth was spectacular: in 1920 only one station had been established, in March, 1923 there were 550. The number of listeners reached five million in 1924, and the revenues of the American radio industry in the same year amounted to 1.6 billion marks. Contributing decisively to the boom in the USA was the fact that neither the sales and the purchase of radios, nor the construction and operation of private broadcast stations was government regulated.

Precisely the opposite was the case in Germany: laws written in 1908 governing the telegraph were still in effect and permitted the erection and operation of telegraph installations only with the approval of the central government. The

Festschrift zum 50 jährigen Jubiläum der Telefunken Gesellschaft für drahtlose Telegraphie, May 1953, p. 207.

8. A complete account of the proposals can be found in: Winfried B. Lerg, *Die Entstehung des Rundfunks in Deutschland*, Frankfurt, 1956, p. 75f.

9. Rukop, p. 207.

10. RCA was founded by the firms in order to share costs resulting from the purchase of patent rights from the American Marconi Company.

government position taken as to the sale of radios to the general public was of course a very cautious one in the Germany of the early 1920's, which was characterized by severe class struggles. Although it is not known whether radio was ever proposed as an instrument of propaganda or as a conscious tool of ideology, the possibility that a home-radio might be used to receive secret radio messages or even be converted into a transmitter was cause for concern to the Minister of the Interior; he certainly had not forgotten the telegraph appeal, "To All!" of the Berlin Worker's and Soldier's Council of November 9, 1918. Thus there existed the danger that radio—conceived as a distribution apparatus—could be transformed into, as Brecht said, a communication apparatus for the masses.

However, in the long run the government could not ignore the judicious argumentation of AEG, Siemens and Telefunken, especially after Bredow was appointed state-secretary in the *Reichspostministerium* and became an influential advocate of the nationally important firms. He proposed that only Telefunken, Lorenz and Huth be authorized to manufacture transmitters and receivers, since they had won the confidence of the government by supplying war shipments. "The technical standardization" could thus be "supervised and kept under surveillance"¹¹ (i.e., the possible variations of frequency-modulation would be more restricted and thus more easily controlled; in addition radio-fee collection and supervision would be simplified).

The domestic political deliberation led also to the designation of a legal wave-band and the restriction of programming in order to institute "a purely entertainment-orientated radio system, aside from news announcements and political reports."¹²

11. Lerg, p. 128.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 149. As mentioned, these notes concentrate on sketching the economic interests of the electrical industry in the introduction of a public radio system in Germany. Obviously the problem of program creation needs to be answered here. One thing is however clear, namely that a primarily *defensive* ideological struggle was led with regard to radio, an indication of the highly developed state of the general class struggle. This defensive aspect is shown in technical regulation (radios were manufactured to receive only certain wave-lengths), and in the regulation of content: news reports were drafted by the central government's "neutral" press center. Political broadcasts were intentionally replaced with so-called 'apolitical' entertainment broadcasts. What should be discussed, however, is the degree to which the concrete ideological content of such entertainment broadcasts was consciously determined. Equally important is the degree to which the content reflects the petit bourgeois heritage of entertainment and the educational values of those responsible for the broadcasts. In order to correctly answer that question, it is necessary that one bear in mind the fact that the first companies to write programs were privately owned and were only in business to turn their capital into profit. Since their profits resulted solely from the difference between the production costs and their share of the radio license fee (3/5 for the company, 2/5 for the postal ministry), it is obvious that they attempted to produce the programs as cheaply as possible. Thus the companies resorted to using the easily available products of the large record manufacturers such as Vox and Deutsche Grammophon (who

The drafting of news reports was later directly subordinate to the government press office. Thus was radio first conceived as—and named—"Vergnügungsrunspruch" (wireless-amusement).

The firms interested in the radio business naturally had not yet begun to concern themselves with the new medium's content. Although Telefunken, with the preparation of music programs in mind, had in late 1922 negotiated with two recording firms, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft and Vox, it had done so only to assure for itself a competitive advantage over its rivals, since Bredow had once remarked that only manufacturers who were in a position to produce radio programs at their own expense should be granted licenses.¹³ When this no longer proved necessary, the negotiations were broken off. Had things proceeded as the industrialists wanted, there would have been a communication device, but no communicants:

The growth of radio had opened up a new field which industry desperately needed for converting from war to peace-time production. Radio's cultural and educational value, about which so much was later said and written, at that time played no significant role. The fact is that radio fees produced considerable revenue for the postal ministry and for industry.¹⁴

Like American manufacturers, the German firms attempted to increase their capital by producing broadcasting equipment, receivers and radio-accessories without considering what actually should be communicated.

"They suddenly had the opportunity to say anything to anyone, but upon thinking about it, they found nothing to say."¹⁵

III

received in return inexpensive advertising). With this in mind, the interpretation of the KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschland) seems one-sided and undialectical. After noting that radio programming consisted mainly of bad "modern dance music" played "from early morning to late at night," the KPD concludes that "over-feeding the listener with insipid music is of course conscious political policy...music without content is supposed to put the proletarian and his class consciousness to sleep." (*Rote Fahne*—newspaper of the KPD—of August 5, 1927, quoted in Manfred Brauneck, *Die rote Fahne*, Munich, 1973, p.273.) On the other hand, the demands of the KPD have greater political significance, for unlike the social democratic circles which wanted only the right to help create programming, the Communists demanded the use of short-wave bands for their own purposes.

13. Things proceeded similarly in the United States. Either in pursuit of further profits or for tactical reasons, General Electric, Westinghouse and AT&T had taken over all program production and broadcasting. Obviously these projects, rather than bringing in profits, involved enormous expenditures. The inevitable solution was to allow industries and advertising agents to sponsor broadcasts. In 1926 RCA founded the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) which only two years later was receiving more than three million dollars for the sale of broadcast time.

14. Georg Reiniger, "Der deutsche Funkverkehr," *Diss.*, Munich and Halle, 1926, p. 38f, quoted in Lerg, p. 207.

15. Bertolt Brecht, "Der Rundfunk als Kommunika-

In March 1923, Telefunken, Lorenz and Huth obtained preliminary authorization for the manufacture of broadcast equipment and receivers. Five months earlier the firms had collaborated in the formation of a company ("Rundfunkgesellschaft GmbH") whose official goal was "the construction and operation of radio broadcast stations as well as the manufacture and sale of radio receiving equipment in Germany."¹⁶ The actual purpose of the company (of which Telefunken controlled 60%, Lorenz and Huth 20% each) was the monopolization of this venture through the creation of a 'patent-pool' which would make it legally impossible for competitors to manufacture radio parts and equipment without violating some aspect of the patent rights.

From the standpoint of the monopolists this precaution proved correct. During 1923 hundreds of companies were founded or quickly changed their production plans in order to profit from the new industry, another classical example of the indifference of capital towards the use-value which it creates.¹⁷ In May 1923 several of these moonlighting manufacturers who had begun relatively early to produce accessories for the English and American markets, formed an association entitled "Verband der Radio-Industrie" in order to protect their interests in Germany.

Following the inauguration of a new radio program in the offices of the record manufacturers Vox on October 29, 1923, the future direction of the "Verband" was settled:

They [the members of the association, R.L.] had to choose: they could engage in a struggle for patents with each large corporation, an undertaking fraught with risk, and, in case of defeat, prepare financially to bear the high cost of eventual demands for compensation; or they could secure the opportunity to manufacture by arranging an acceptable payment scheme for licenses."¹⁸

On the basis of negotiations between the association and the postal ministry in September 1923, and a petition from the association presented to the parliament in December deploring the monopolistic situation, talks were once again started with the "Rundfunkgesellschaft". Since it was clear that the monopoly was not feasible in its anticipated form, the facade of the organization crumbled very quickly. Telefunken, which owned the principle patents, was especially anxious to withdraw from the "Rundfunkgesellschaft" and

kationsapparat," in: D. Prokop, ed., *Massenkommunikationsforschung, 1: Produktion*, Frankfurt, Fischer, 1972, p. 31.

16. Quoted in Lerg, p. 131.

17. In this respect Lerg recounts (p. 183) a particularly "suitable" example. At a stockholders' meeting of the "Heinemanns Büstenfabrik AG" (a manufacturer of plaster and stone busts), the chairman included among other remarks the following: "The introduction of radio-telephone communication in Germany offers German industry the greatest of opportunities and prospects. In all probability we can count upon an expansion of radio among the public just as great as in England and America." Then, in "recognition of the future opportunities which radio has

began to negotiate with the "Verband"

On January 21, 1924 two contracts were signed. The first officially associated the members of the "Verband" with Telefunken while the second granted them limited manufacturing rights. (In December 1924 an agreement between "Verband" and Huth followed.) On the basis of these contracts the members of the association were

granted the right to utilize patents made available by Telefunken and others, namely RCA, Marconi, and General Electric [all of which had made arrangements with Telefunken for the German market, R.L.] for the manufacture and sale of radio equipment intended solely for the commercial market.¹⁹

Otto Kappelmayer, an enthusiastic radio announcer, glorified the decision; as far as he was concerned, Telefunken had "refrained from monopolizing the patents right from the beginning, because such action would have been contrary to the public interest."²⁰

In fact, however, the monopolistic arrangement became unworkable from an organizational, technical, and manufacturing standpoint due to several factors: the above-mentioned activities of the association, the long-term plans of the postal ministry for the construction of broadcast stations, and finally, the continually increasing number of moonlighting manufacturers offering detectors and other parts at low prices. In addition, the contracts as negotiated with the "Verband" best represented the interests of Telefunken and its parent firms AEG and Siemens & Halske. It was for example stipulated that only tubes obtained from Telefunken or a supply firm designated by Telefunken could be used in radios produced by members of the association. Thus the dominant interests of AEG and Siemens in the area of tube manufacture remained protected. In addition, the royalty fees for tube and detector mountings, frame-aerials, etc., were so high, that since many firms lacked adequate competitive resources, a certain 'cleansing' of the market was anticipated in the near future. The royalty-fee for a single tube-mounting was for example, 20 marks per unit for an order of up to 10,000; the fee was then reduced according to the size of the order to less than eight marks per unit. (In 1924, the per-unit royalty was replaced by a royalty on each product manufactured under Telefunken patents. It amounted to 10% of the net invoice price.) The "Verband" also assumed Telefunken's expensive surveillance of unauthorized manufacturers for a 7%

yet to discover within itself," it was proposed that the production of busts be abandoned and that the available capital be used to purchase facilities for wood and metal finishing and for the production of radio-sets and headphones.

18. Erwin Michel, first managing director of the association, quoted in Ernst Klöcker, "Das Funkwesen in Deutschland und die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung des Rundfunks," *Diss.* Erlangen, 1926, p. 66.

19. Gustav Laeae, *40 Jahre Rundfunkwirtschaft in Deutschland*, Dusseldorf, n.d., p. 78f.

20. Otto Kappelmayer, "Radioapparate als typische Markenartikel," *Der Markenartikel*, No.1, 1951, p. 25.

reduction in royalties and made the legal commitment to take steps against offenders.

In view of Germany's economic situation in 1924 it was especially significant that the association was obligated by contract to determine one year in advance the number of tube-mountings which would be needed, and then purchase according to the estimated figure. It is obvious that this stipulation freed Telefunken to a large degree from at least the worst effects of economic fluctuations.

The economy's course in 1924 proved soon enough that the granting of manufacturing licenses could hardly be deemed the selfless act which the public was initially led to believe it was. Due to the enthusiasm which radio had aroused,²¹ the "Verband" enormously overestimated license applications for 1924. Since the purchase stipulations included price reductions for large quantities, the association went ahead and committed itself to orders totalling 500,000 tube-mountings for 1924.

But then, early in 1924, it became clear that retailers were largely unwilling or even unable to absorb the production and cancelled contracts accordingly. The industry's first serious crisis developed and brought bankruptcy to countless businesses.²²

The situation began to improve only after the postal ministry, on April 1, 1924, lowered radio-fees from 60 to 24 marks a year. (On January 1, 1924, the number of licensed—as opposed to illegal—radio owners was 1500; in April, 8,000; in July, 100,000; in November, 350,000; and at the end of December, 500,000.) Nevertheless, the sales of the "Verband" members did not even approach the estimates. Instead of the anticipated 500,000 tube-mountings, only 100,000 tube- and somewhat over 80,000 detector-mountings were sold. On the basis of contractual obligations Telefunken was awarded a settlement in the amount of 300,000 marks in 1924.

The sale of manufacturing licenses undoubtedly played a considerable role in the post-war consolidation and growth of Telefunken. A similar opinion was expressed by Telefunken's leading engineer and former head of the tube-research center at Rukop in the *festschrift* marking Telefunken's fiftieth anniversary:

Telefunken was able to rebuild its business because it held important patents and had quality control in its tube manufacture, because it was able as well to supply radio transmitters and receivers, and especially because it could grant licenses to numerous large and small firms for the production of receiver sets and supply these firms with receiver tubes.²³

In a short time, radio-technical production became

21. The main enthusiasm for radio was not at first in its content, but rather in its technical attributes. Already in late 1923 the first amateur clubs were formed, and their members, often laboring for months, constructed detectors and tube receivers from inexpensive parts. One goal proudly reached was the reception of the most distant signal. The electrical industry attempted to hang on to the movement through several organizations, one of which was the "Funktechnischen Verein," headed by an AEG engineer. In regard to this *Die rote Fahne* commented "The capitalists are pleased that these proletarian amateurs are

Telefunken's most important commercial field. But the radio-boom was also advantageous for Telefunken's parent-firms: Osram, a firm consolidated in 1919 from light-bulb manufacturing companies owned by AEG, Siemens, and Auer, answered the massive demand for tubes needed for radio sets. The settlements concerning licensing which were reached between the members of the "Verband" and Telefunken help clarify the importance of the sale of tubes: records show that the number of tube-systems manufactured increased from 97,000 in 1924 to over two million in 1928. The radio business, which in 1928 had reached the first of many temporary records, provided the backdrop for the beginning of a new industry and a new media:

The initial ties of Telefunken's technology to the activities of its parent-firms became stronger and more complex as a result of the steadily increasing volume of production for Telefunken (mass production of radio equipment). The ties were further strengthened when AEG, Siemens & Halske and Telefunken founded a sound-film company whose object was gaining control of the new technology.²⁴

substituting technical interest for their social interest. Class consciousness is destroyed by excessive involvement with the technical problems of radio" (quoted in Brauneck, p. 250f). The amateur movement developed into the "Arbeiter-Radio-Klub," which later split into the "Freien Radio-Bund" (KPD-orientated) and the "Arbeiter-Radio-Bund" (social democratic).

22. Erwin Michel, quoted in E. Klockner, p. 67.

23. Rukop, p. 207.

24. Arendt, p. 111.

Raymond Williams

INSTITUTIONS OF THE TECHNOLOGY

(UK, 1974)

The technology of broadcasting was introduced as a marginal element in very complex social structures. It is indeed difficult to realise how marginal it then seemed, as we look back from a period in which broadcasting policies have become a central issue of politics. The key factor in the earlier period, as has already been emphasised, was that the directing impulse came from the manufacturers of broadcasting apparatus, and especially of receivers. Yet because of the general importance of radio telephony there was always another kind of pressure, from political authorities: questions of the security and integrity of the nation-state were implicitly and at times explicitly raised, but were complicated by the fact that the political authorities were thinking primarily of radio telephony while the manufacturers were looking forward to broadcasting. In Britain all transmitters and receivers had to be licensed by the Post Office, under an Act dating from 1904. When the Marconi company began broadcasting in 1920, there were complaints that this use for entertainment of what was primarily a commercial and transport-control medium was frivolous and dangerous, and there was even a temporary ban, under pressure from radio-telephonic interests and the Armed Forces. There were then complicated negotiations between the competing manufacturers, the Post Office and the Armed Services Committee; and in 1922 a consortium of manufacturers, who would provide programmes under terms agreed with the Post Office and the Government, was formed as the British Broadcasting Company. The keys to this agreement were the granting of monopoly to the Company and the decision to finance broadcasting by the sale of licences for receivers. In the period 1925-1926, through continuous controversy and negotiation, what had been essentially a public utility company was becoming a true public broadcasting corporation: the BBC which received its charter in 1926. Granted the elements of monopoly and of guaranteed finance from the sale of licences, it acquired as a by-product of regulation the necessary continuity and resources to become a producer rather than merely a transmitter of broadcasting. This qualitative change in the character of the institution was never clearly foreseen, at least by a majority of those involved in the negotiations, and its potential would not have been realised if the definition of broadcasting as a public service—which at the time meant very different things—had not been

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specialised; by its early controllers, to a positive programming policy. The specific elements in the British solution can be seen as threefold:

(i) the early development of Britain as an industrial society, with an extended communications network over a relatively small geographical area, had already to an important extent 'nationalised' its culture; it had, for example, led to a predominantly national press.

(ii) a dominant version of the national culture had already been established, in an unusually compact ruling-class, so that public service could be effectively understood and administered as service according to the values of an existing public definition, with an effective paternalist definition of both service and responsibility.

(iii) the character of the British State which, because of the compactness of its ruling-class, proceeded in many matters by appointment and delegation rather than by centralised state administration. This permitted the emergence of a state-regulated and state-sponsored public corporation which was yet not subject to detailed state control. The flexibility which was latent in this kind of solution, though continually a matter of dispute, permitted the emergence of an independent corporate broadcasting policy, in which the independence was at once real, especially in relation to political parties and temporary administrations, and qualified, by its definition in terms of a pre-existing cultural hegemony.

These were specific factors within what is otherwise a common area of pressures, as broadcasting was developed not only within a capitalist society but specifically by the capitalist manufacturers of the technological apparatus. As the varying solutions in different capitalist societies are examined it is clear that the technology as such was in no way determining. The bargain struck in Britain between state and capitalist interests was in terms of a limited separation of powers. The more typical solution, in Western European societies of a similar size, was direct state regulation of broadcasting, at the level of its early technical regulation, leading to direct state regulation of broadcasting production, as still for example in Italy and France. In Fascist societies this direct state control was a natural instrument of policy. In communist societies state control of broadcasting was rationalised as the guarantee and instrument of popular power.

The alternative solution, in a quite different direction, was that established in the United States. There was always pressure to control broadcasting in the national interest, but the manufacturers of equipment were too powerful to be controlled, and the competing consortia which they formed pushed out directly into a rapidly expanding market. Federal control was only established after the technical consequences of this kind of expansion had become chaotic, at that level of technology. The early broadcasting networks were federations of prime manufacturers, who then acquired production facilities as an essentially secondary operation: secondary, that is, to the production and selling of sets. The finance for production, in this highly competitive situation, was drawn from advertising,

in its two forms of insertion and sponsorship. More clearly than anywhere else, because all countervailing factors were less strong, the American institutions realised the pure forms of a simple applied technology. The manufacturing institutions, both directly in the sale of sets and indirectly in the supply of advertising money, determined the shape of broadcasting institutions. Thus the broadcasting public was effectively, from the beginning, the competitive broadcasting market. The major networks, which began forming in 1926, became the characteristic institutions of both radio and eventually television. Public service in any other than a market sense developed within a structure already dominated by these institutions. As it eventually emerged it was a classic kind of market-regulatory control, into which were inserted, always with difficulty and controversy, notions of a non-market public interest. Until 1927 the market competition was open and direct. From 1927 to 1932 the new Federal Radio Commission organised a system of allocation of frequencies, and from 1932 to 1937 attempted to control specific abuses, such as fraud. The 'airways', it was decided, were public property, and licence was given to competitors to use them, under technical controls and then regulatory controls to prevent specific abuses. From 1937, in radio and in the early period of television, the FRC, now the Federal Communications Commission, tried to keep the competitive market open, against strong tendencies to monopoly, especially in production. It was mainly after 1944 that the FCC began to try to define the public interest in terms other than keeping the market open. It sought to introduce standards of social usefulness, of political fairness, and of public morality. In the period of the development of television, these attempts were redoubled, but the structure of the existing institutions led to curious anomalies. Thus the Commission could revoke a stations's licence, but not really control the networks to which some of the stations belonged and others were affiliated. For most programme production, the networks were obviously responsible, yet the effective controls were on stations. This anomaly has worked both ways. A political administration seeking to control or limit television freedom (as under Nixon in 1972-73) can try to use pressure on the individual stations to get them to put pressure on the networks; mainly to alter their political content, especially in news reporting and commentary. This is rationalised as 'community control' of the 'irresponsible' networks, and the networks are indeed large private corporations without public responsibility. Yet since stations are bought and sold, subject to licence, they are themselves a capitalist version of community interests, but a small-scale capitalism dependent on the large-scale networks for broadcast production of any fully developed kind. Much of the argument about 'community television', in other societies, shows the same features of uneven competition between monopoly or network interests, small-scale local or pseudo-local capitalism, and the political power of the state.

It is then possible to abstract the basic early development of television institutions as a contrast

or competition between 'public service' and 'commercial' institutions. In Britain, especially, this has seemed a natural perspective, since the unique 'public service' definition of the BBC was in the mid-1950s successfully challenged by, and made competitive with, a commercial network: the Independent Television Authority (now the Independent Broadcasting Authority, with the addition of commercial local radio stations). This public authority (public in legal status and in the character of its constitution, commercial in its dependence for income on its contracted companies) owns its means of transmission but contracts for the provision of programmes with a number of regional companies. These obtain their own funds from selling insertion-advertisement time, and a national network and programming, dominated by the larger companies from the richer regions, is then built up, with some local variations. This network has been, from the beginning, of a commercial type, with a built-in relationship between 'peak-hour' programme planning and the selling of advertising time. In this sense, the contrast between 'public service' and 'commercial' television holds good, and in programming this is significant.

The same kind of contrast, though in more limited terms, can be made in the United States, where the first development was commercial and a public-service element was later added, in the margin or as a palliative. The Public Broadcasting Corporation was established as late as 1967, building on earlier work of the National Educational Television organisation (from 1952) and the Public Broadcasting Laboratory. Local stations of this type had been established from the 1950s (e.g. KQED, San Francisco, 1954), and there were Federal grants for station combination and co-operation from 1962. Throughout its development, this public-service television has been a poor relation of the commercial networks. Its production funds are subject to central control and in fact, through this, to political decision. The stations themselves are member-supported, and survive with great difficulty only by constant local fund-raising. Once again, however, the 'public service' and 'commercial' contrast has not only an institutional but a programming significance.

So useful a perspective ought not to be given up lightly. Yet it has to be critically reviewed in two respects: first, to take account of the ordinary terms of the commercial broadcasters' offensive against it; second and more important, to take account of the complicated relationship between a public authority and state and corporate political and economic interests.

As in the general rhetoric of the defence of capitalism, commercial broadcasting does not call itself commercial, let alone capitalist. It uses public-relations descriptions like 'free' and 'independent', and often contrasts itself with 'monopoly' and 'state control'. This rhetoric dissolves when we look at the character of the large American broadcasting corporations or of the British programme companies. In different ways these are conglomerates of established capital interests. (The difference between them follows from the earlier history of the institutions, in that the American

corporations belong to the large-capital spectrum while the British companies are mainly in the medium and even small-capital range.) Whatever public controls or policy definitions may then be set, the institutions have as their primary aim the realisation and distribution of private profit on invested capital, and this visibly affects their major policies. By contrast the public-service institutions are in effect non-profit-making, so that revenue is devoted almost wholly to production and development of the broadcasting service. Up to this point the contrast still holds, and needs to be emphasised.

Yet there is, at the next level, an undoubted ambiguity about the public interest, and especially about its relation to the State. Here a liberal rhetoric can be equally confusing, for there is no simple equation between the State in a capitalist society and the public interest in its broadest definition. The point is made harder to see by the existence of true state monopolies in broadcasting, as in societies modelled on the Soviet Union and as in some West European and developing countries. Here the state can be correctly identified with a partisan version of the public interest (whether approved or not, by those subject to it and by observers, is another question) and state control of broadcasting is a function of general state control of information and ideology. Where competitive versions of the public interest have in effect been eliminated, the situation is simple, if also dead. But where such competitive versions are active, as for example in France and Italy, the equation between state and public interest is especially vulnerable, and this leads not only to internal conflicts but, in modern conditions, to complicated international pressures which we shall have to examine. In the United States, where it was federal action, in response to many public and local initiatives, which established a limited public-service network, there is as yet no sign of any real insulation of a continuing broad-term public interest from the temporary political pressures of particular administrations. But even where such an insulation exists, as to some extent genuinely in Britain, in the case of the BBC, the equation of state and public interest, at the level of the formula of the public corporation or authority, must not be uncritically accepted. In real terms, after all, the government appoints the public authorities: characteristically, in Britain, former Ministers and politicians and members of the available full-time and part-time administrative bureaucracy. It is done with some skill and with the kind of window-dressing of marginal appointments on which any such system depends for its apparent legitimacy. But within its conventional terms all proposals for directly elected authorities, or for measure of internal democratic representation or control by actual producers and broadcasters, are very vigorously opposed. The authorities, as they stand, are then part of a complicated patronage system on which the real state, as distinct from the formal state, effectively relies. It is much less rigid than formal control through a Ministry, and it allows for marginal controversy between the competitive political

parties. In the looseness and indefiniteness of some of its structures it further allows for some genuine independence from immediate and short-term government pressures. But it depends, finally, on a consensus version of the 'public' or 'national' interest: a consensus which is first assumed and then vigorously practised, rather than a consensus which has ever been openly arrived at and made subject to regular open review.

Moreover, in all these varying systems the terms of the discussion of broadcasting institutions have remained obstinately local and marginal, while the real situation has become very general and highly dynamic. Essentially, the mode of discussion of broadcasting institutions has remained in what can best be called a pre-1950s stage, while the development of the 1950s and after have opened up a quite different broadcasting world.

Robert A. Brady

THE ARTS AND EDUCATION AS TOOLS OF PROPAGANDA (USA, 1937)

According to the Nazis the mass of the people are dumb. They are unintelligent, childlike, and inarticulate. They will accept without serious question whatever they hear or are told. They believe everything they read. They do not bother to think; they feel. Their lives are not pivoted on logic, but on emotion. They have no real initiative, no true creative powers, and they are incapable of any sort of self-discipline. They desire to be fed, to be entertained with exotic and melodramatic fancies, and they yearn to follow.

Like the child they are unstable, irresponsible, and capricious, turning easily from one brightly coloured fancy to another. They will be attracted by whatever is simple and naïve, whatever is dark, dangerous, and thrilling, whatever is extreme in size, or distance, or accomplishment, whatever is heroic and unheard of, whatever brings the gasp of wonder and the hush of awe.

They are likewise essentially and naïvely pleasure-loving. But, though lovers of ease, they are so thoroughly irrational that they do not count the cost of achieving their pleasures. Like the child who worked assiduously for hours in the garden, or the soldier wallowing in the mud of the front-line trenches, they will be satisfied for their labour and sacrifices by a cheap bauble, a bit of praise from some furtively admired hero, a medal, a badge, or a bit of palely reflected but resonantly heralded glory.

Nor, the Nazis assume, are the rank and file able to tell the difference between symbols and realities. Thus they may be given symbols instead of realities. They can be made to fight for "God and Fatherland," for "German Kultur," for "Blood and Honour." They can be made to endure poverty and die in rags and filth for "Mother and Home," the "Leader," the "People." They can be brought to sacrifice everything for "the good of the community," and to escape "Jewish Marxism." If necessary they can be conditioned to people the forests with demons, be fearful of black cats, and vomit at the sight of a Jew.

The "leaders," in other words, are free to choose not only the causes for which they wish to rally the support of the people, but also the symbols which sway their emotions. Properly conditioned, these symbols need have no necessary relationship to the real interests of the run of mankind. Indeed,

not uncommonly, popular support of the symbols chosen works directly against the individual and group interests of those who follow them, as is typically the case with mystical and patriotic issues.

This is the point of view of the *Junker*, the aristocrat, and the military war lord. It is also the point of view of the *nouveaux riche*, who believe the "able" always "succeed," citing themselves as examples, of the successful business man who identifies his economic power with possession of cultural qualities of which he may not have the slightest comprehension, and of the upstart political hack who has traded his demagogic powers for an overstuffed mansion or the hand of a daughter of the blue-bloods. These self-styled *élite* are always contemptuous of the "man on the street." They speak of labour, of the "broad masses" with condescension and scorn. They have no use for "democracy," for "individual freedom," for "representative government," except as these may be employed as slogans for the purchase and sale of popular support. If these slogans at any time get in the way of the "main chance," they will be done away with on the same principle which a knowing *débutante* employs when she strikes an unlikely prospect off her social list.

As business men have come more and more to dominate not only the economic but all other phases of modern life, they have come more and more to think of themselves as the *élite*. In the literature of even pre-Nazi Germany, and in that of contemporary America, England, and France, this theme runs strong. A graduate from Oxford, and at present general manager of a thriving London ice-cream business, was positive that "liberty had meaning and value for the able 10 per cent, but feudal status was all the masses were fit for." Lawrence Dennis's book, *The Coming American Fascism*, reflecting the opinions of the Union League Club and the National Association of Manufacturers, identifies the *élite* throughout with the successful business man. In this view the balance of the population cannot possibly be "free and equal," since they are without talent, without capacity for self-sacrifice, without "honesty and devotion" to their tasks.

The following quotation, taken from a speech delivered to the Illinois Manufacturers' Association (May 12, 1936) by Bruce Barton, American exponent of practical uplift, and publicity director of the Republican Party, is typical of the voluminous and rapidly growing literature in America expressing this point of view. He takes as an example of the problem faced by the advertiser, who must sell and civilise "folk whose ancestors battled for the mere necessities, but ... themselves accept ... as a matter of course that every luxury shall be theirs," the handicap committee of a golf club:

Any man in this room who has served on the handicap committee of a golf club has learned something of the curious involutions of the human heart. *The handicap system is an instrument of social justice.* It recognises the hollowness of that ancient lie that all men are created free and equal. A golf club knows that all men are not created free and equal. It knows that there are a few men out of every generation who, *by native talent*, are able to play in the seventies. That there are a few

more who, because of youthful opportunity or *self-sacrificing practice*, can score in the eighties, that a somewhat larger number, by virtue of *honest lives and undying hope*, manage to get into the nineties. But beyond these favoured groups lies the great mass of strugglers who, however virtuous their private lives, however noble their devotion to their task, pound around from trap to trap and never crack a hundred. If the handicaps can be reasonably fair and honest, a spirit of wholesome endeavour and mutual good feeling results. If the poor players are unfairly handicapped they will protest and throw out the officers. If, on the other hand, the good players are too much burdened they will not compete. *The management of the club passes into the hands of the dubs*; the club is likely to lose tone and eventually break up.¹

With threat to their rapidly growing economic power by either the government or labour, generalisations of this sort quickly lose their benevolent tone. In any crisis which challenges their position the assertions become more positive, the mood more uncompromising, the repression of opposition more savage. If the crisis be grave enough to strike at the heart of the "system," this general point of view is apt to crystallise quickly into a nation-wide programme of action. It is just this which has happened during the past few years in Italy, in Germany, in Portugal, Austria, Hungary, Brazil, and Japan. In the United States, as in practically all other capitalistically organised countries of to-day, we are witnessing a similar coalescence of business forces, directed to a similar end.

The end and aim is to make of business men the *élite* in power which they are so firmly convinced they are in fact. This *élite* possesses a peculiar flavour—a flavour which has over the past quarter century, and to an increasing extent as we come down to modern times, done so much to identify the interests of business with the military in fact as well as in the popular mind. The military has always been the strong right arm of the state, and as the state has fallen more and more under the direct control of business interests, the military has been gradually transformed into an instrument on behalf of business. It is not only that "trade follows the flag" in modern imperialism, but also that the flag goes wherever business interests are at stake. If this is abroad, the result is intimidation of weaker nations, the use of the threat of military power in the bargaining process with stronger nations, and at the most, conquest and war. If it be internally, the business men will ask for and expect to get the full mobilisation of the police and military ranks on behalf of any enterprise threatened with strikes or labour reprisals of any sort whatsoever.

Even more important is the mood which dominates both the military and the conduct of business-

1. It apparently has not occurred to Mr Barton that however satisfactory he may find the illustration for purposes of explaining variations in human ability, it is completely inverted when applied to the facts of relative economic opportunity. There is a handicap system in business life, but it is a handicap scheme not for offsetting the advantage of the strong, but for underwriting it against the weak. To make his illustration stick, Mr Barton would

as-usual. Fusion of the two is particularly significant because the drive, the attitude, and the point of view of both are fundamentally the same. Both believe in the propriety and ultimate necessity of power, brute force, and domineering authority. Neither believes in the principle of freedom of expression, thought, or belief. Whenever either acquires the perquisites of liberty, they proceed, if occasion seems to call for such action, immediately to its destruction. The frictionless ease with which business men have proceeded, under cover of the naïve idea of "self-government in business," to destroy all freedom of action in economic affairs is something perfectly understandable to the military mind.

The entire history of trusts, combinations, monopolies, cartels, and trade associations, of the struggles of employers with labour unions, and of business control over the media for disseminating news and information, demonstrates how fully the business men understand the uses of the symbols of freedom and tolerance for underwriting autocratic control. It is perfectly axiomatic that business men do not believe in freedom of thought or expression in any of the arts if the results are such as will challenge the business system in any significant fashion. In this mood it seems perfectly natural to them to think of the arts and the sciences as they think of a trade agreement, or a device for concealing profits from the tax collector. They do not, as a matter of course, mind mixing a clever advertising talk with a Brahms lullaby or a promotion story with a symphony if they can, thereby, make a few slick sales. In the same mood—"it pays"—they will plaster the country-side with sprawling signboards, exploit the sex fears of the innocent, the innocence and spontaneity of children, and the concern of the mother with a child.

As in the army the weapons of warfare are force, secrecy, repression, and the judicious deployment of the manikins of deceit behind a dress parade (barrage) of cleverly simulated virtues. It is not important, as any candid business man will tell you, that one be virtuous, but it is important that he appear virtuous—a fact which Andrew Carnegie, though most careful to explain in his revealing Autobiography, was not the first to recognise. Likewise there is no place for tenderness and mercy (called "sentimentality" by business men) in business, but it can use sentimentality (called "putting it across") galore. There is no value in any "truth" but that which can be sold; no merit in any "honesty" unless it can be made to pay. "War is war" they say in the army; "business is business" they echo on the bourse.

It is highly important that one think through the meaning of the union of the contemptuous attitude

need a golf club where the players in the seventies were given the handicap advantages, and the players in the hundreds had handicaps assessed against them. That a situation analogous to this obtains in business life is so notoriously true that Mr Barton will find no one, left or right, prepared to deny it. If the initial argument regarding ability gradations is not more than naïve, the implications drawn from it are directly contrary to indisputable fact.

towards the "great unwashed multitude" with the ethic—or, rather, lack of ethics—which sees nothing wrong in the least with wholesale commercialisation of the arts and sciences. For only then is one in a position to comprehend the real meaning of the Nazi programme for the arts—a programme which sees the arts as tools for putting across the interests of "business-as-usual" in the same matter-of-fact way as any routine advertiser will employ an artist to paint pictures of beautiful ladies in order to sell a patent medicine.

Whenever and wherever the business community is seriously challenged it has been prepared to expand its programme so as to utilise more fully the repressive powers of the military and the demagogic following of the party hack. In any crisis which seriously challenges its general authority such ruthlessness as it has exercised on the persons of its opponents is no more than a simple outgrowth and single expression of the attitude which it demands be effective in control of the arts. For in the arts ruthless suppression of all opposition means no more than expansion of tried and true methods of "business-as-usual." And, quite naturally, it never occurs to any of the active agents in such programmes that they are being ruthless or dogmatic. They are merely promoting what they see, via the profit and loss account, to be "sound thought" and "sound art." If this means that it will pay to do so, they will keep the symbols of "liberty," of "democracy," of "freedom," and of representative government, however much these may be emasculated in fact. If not they will not hesitate to abolish such symbols and substitute for them others which will be more effective in persuading the masses to follow where the *élite* choose to lead.

In Germany the business-military *élite* chose to destroy these symbols, but with this destruction there is nothing in the vast outpouring of the Propaganda Ministry and all its various subsidiary organisations which calls for serious modification of the foregoing sketch at any point. They name, in fact, what they condemn with bland candour. Speaking of the "liberal" society which the Nazi state has destroyed, they find this hateful past to have as its "highest principles ... freedom of the spirit, freedom of differences of opinion, of art, of science, and of conviction..."²

In "liberal" times, they argue, the state was formally separated from business, science, religion, and the arts. So far as the state was concerned, these were legally free. The state asked nothing more than that it have the right to exercise the police function with respect to these activities. Its attitude was essentially negative, or, more properly, *neutral*. Liberalism regarded all attempts to control the arts and sciences to predetermined ends as acts

of barbarism and police regimentation.

But in the new German state—in which the government and business are fused together—there must, according to the Nazis, be a "strong internal unity between state and culture." This condition finds its outer expression in the fact that the spiritual life of the people, as it reveals itself in cults, myths, and art, must in a certain definite way receive as its highest guiding laws, directive ideas, the right of formulation of which has been transferred to political bodies and the Leaders.³ The state, that is to say, must control all attitude-shaping influences completely, finally, and irrevocably. It can have no truck with ideas of freedom. "The sharp, unbridgeable, and absolute opposition of National Socialism to Liberalism lies in the fact that it sets against the idea of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of ideas, and a state without ideas itself, the notion of an *all-inclusive and decreed idea subjection and idea fixity*."⁴

There is no mistaking the intent. "For the National Socialist state, culture is an affair of the nation," it is a means for spiritual leadership, and required, therefore, to be positively manipulated in order that all may be educated to a sense of responsibility which promotes the shaping of the nation.⁵ In this state culture will no longer be under the influence of "changing, opalescent voting majorities and coalitions, but under a fixed, definite, absolute law..."⁶

This "absolute law" represents a transformation into "will and act" of the "viewpoint of the state." This viewpoint is, of course, that of the Nazis, and it sees "the state as a natural community—a natural community made up of a people fused together through ties of blood, speech, customs, and common experiences, and which in its most fully developed form we characterise by the term nation."⁷ The nation is "fixed and eternal," and stands "at the centre of all historical and political experience."⁸

The culture of this state comes out of a "wholly simple, wholly primitive perception" of the people, and in obedience to their will and law. Since it "grows out of the people" it "cannot be commended from above...it is not a state function, people's life and being."⁹ As actualisation of the feeling and "will of the people," the principles which underlie it "can in nowise be clarified and formulated."

How, the sceptical reader may well ask, can the Nazis assert at one and the same time that culture "is an affair of the nation" and that "it is not a state function" and "cannot be commanded from above"? How reconcile the statement that "culture is as free now as before" with the announcement that under National Socialism culture must be brought under the rule of law whose guiding principle is "all-inclusive and decreed idea subjection and idea fixity"? The answer is to be found in Nazi contempt for that type of logic which is based on "reason" and not on "feeling"—in short, on that type of logic which insists that contradictory statements are necessarily inconsistent.

The argument which they advance to

circumvent the charge of inconsistency is completely without subtlety or finesse. Speaking of the difference between the pre-liberal and the Nazi cultural authoritarianism, they offer this contrast: "Authority for National Socialism comes out of the people itself, not out of a power which rules superior over it; the will of the state comes out of the folkways, is free, sovereign, and of a new type."¹⁰ The will of the state is the "will of the people," and this is not to be found "on the surface of daily life and in day by day interests," but only where "the final and partially unconscious longing is formed." That is to say, out of the "national soul."

But this "authority" cannot be determined by vote, by popular election, by representation of the people, nor by allowing them any voice in the determination of policy. The Nazis have done away with all these things. The so-called elections still used are not elections but plebiscites, where negative voting is next to impossible, and where the casting of the ballot involves an act no different in spirit and mood than the shouting of *amens* in a Free Methodist camp-meeting—if one can imagine adding to the hysteria thereof a liberal admixture of fully implemented terror. How, then, is this authority determined? The answer is worth quoting in full:

Out of the national soul emerges the law from which the National Socialist leader derives his legitimation and his policies. He is not thus an organ of will superior to the people, but *instrument of the will of the people which exists in him*. Who rules the people of its own will, and who expresses the character of the National Socialist state in two syllables, we know as THE LEADER.

Leader is the opposite of magistrate. Who leads does not determine the objectives arbitrarily and by himself; that is done by the led. The led are the people. *But the Leader knows the goal and knows the direction... Who carries this spirit in him, who knows the direction, that person is the Leader.*¹¹

Not only does the "leader" know the direction and the goals, but he need not take counsel from the people at any point. He need not ask any of them what they think or believe, because, as the Nazis most emphatically insist, they do not know. And if they think they do, they probably think wrongly, and it is up to the leader to set them straight by cultivating their souls to a "correct" understanding. Hitler's argument on this point is perfectly explicit:

What we designate as 'public opinion' has nothing whatsoever to do with self-won experiences or the knowledge of individuals...Just as the confessional attitude is the product of education, and only the religious feeling slumbers in the inner man, so the political attitude of the masses is only the end result of what is frequently an almost unbelievably *tenacious and fundamental re-working of the soul and the understanding*.¹²

10. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

13. Quoted by F. Schumann, *The Nazi Dictatorship*, New York, 1936.

14. Bruce Barton, *op. cit.*

This is, of course, not one whit different from the famous and oft-quoted remark of the Kaiser: "Regarding myself as an instrument of the Lord, I go my way, whose goal is the welfare and peaceable development of our Fatherland, and in so doing I am indifferent to the views and opinions of the day."¹³ No different, with the small exception that Hitler does not acknowledge the Lord!

But it is likewise no different from that of the conventional business man, or his paid publicity agents, advertising men, and public relations counsellors. These people speak frequently and sanctimoniously of "service to the public" to whom they sell and from whom they make money. The people are sometimes called "the owners," while the business men are merely "men whom...owners have employed to build them more automobiles, to make them some clothes, to furnish them electric light, to bake them some bread."¹⁴ They cannot, the business men will tell you, sell anything the people do not want. Hence, the people, the buyers, control, and they only cater to the "needs," the "positive aspirations" of the real masters of the nation's affairs.

But they likewise assume that "the people don't know what they want," and that they can be made to buy almost anything if properly advertised. Furthermore, they believe that people can by appropriate propaganda be made to accept the business system, to believe that big business is an ideal expression of the will and genius of the nation, that labour unions violate "liberty" and run counter to the principles that underlie the social system, and that all opponents of the accepted business point of view are "reds" or "Marxians" or "Communists" and hence represent the blighting hand of a civilisation-destroying Pluto from the underworld. Like Hitler and the Nazis, they are contemptuous of the people whose interests they pretend to cater for, and they carry this contempt to the point where they see nothing inconsistent between speaking of the people as owners, guiders, and controllers and the position that the populace can be extolled, persuaded, propagandised, and bent to accept any point of view whatsoever. Nor do they see any contradiction in their assumptions when they proclaim the end result to be merely an expression of the "will" or "soul" or the fulfilment of the "desires" of the people.

The only difference to be found between the Nazi propaganda machine, to which all the arts and sciences are subjected in Germany, and the spirit of advertising and American "Public Relations Counsellors" is in the ease with which the German system is able to function because of its formal capture of the coercive powers of the state. But for this difference, both see in the arts and sciences instruments for "selling" a bill of goods to the public. When this has to do with small matters, relating to such things as the sale of specific commodities or services, it is known in both countries as "advertising." When it relates to larger matters—the "business system," "capitalism," "big business," or "National Socialism," it is called

2. *Deutsches Kulturrecht* (Hamburg), 1936, p. 5.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

"propaganda" or "public relations." The type of propaganda which in the United States is now being so actively promoted under the euphonious title of "public relations" is centralised in Germany under the control of the "Ministry for Propaganda and People's Enlightenment."

The conduct and spirit of the "Ministry for Propaganda and People's Enlightenment" is in thorough keeping with the spirit of advertising, the spirit of "public relations," the spirit of "business propaganda." Nowhere are these propagandists concerned in any wise with the "truth," since truth is simply irrelevant. They are concerned with sale of a bill of goods. The agency through which culture is co-ordinated for putting across the Nazi "public relations" bill of goods is called the National Chamber of Culture. It is worth examining in some detail.

Derrick Sington Arthur Weidenfeld

BROADCASTING IN THE THIRD REICH (UK, 1942)

I. THE BROADCASTING MACHINE

Broadcasting in the Third Reich means much more than the planning and diffusion of radio programmes. As with all other branches of human activity in Germany, it is a huge system of interlocking networks, knitting together and controlling everybody and everything connected with wireless. And every strand in the network finds its way into the hands of the Minister of Propaganda.

All the shares in the German Broadcasting Corporation, the R.R.G., are owned by the Propaganda Ministry; all broadcasting, from the planning stage to the last detail of presentation, is controlled by the Broadcasting Division of the Propaganda Ministry. Outside these spheres the Party and the Reich Chamber of Broadcasting between them watch over the listening aspect of the German radio. The Party, through its "wireless wardens" and "block wardens" in every village and town, help to install communal receiving sets, organizes group listening, lays down rules about the erection of aerials, and reports on illegal listening-in to foreign stations. The Chamber of Broadcasting, which is the technical and professional organization instituted in 1933, exercises a tight control over the manufacturers of radio sets, forcing them, if need be, to manufacture the type of set which the Government wants listeners to use. It has an equally firm grip on the retailers; and out of these functions arise the Chamber's intensive drives to advertise Government-approved wireless sets, such as the German "people's set" for the home market, and other German-manufactured sets for export abroad.

The Nazis realized, during their long sojourn in the wilderness before they attained power, the vast potentialities of broadcasting. They saw clearly that it could become one of the sharpest instruments in their hands for "educating" the whole German people into the National Socialist way of thinking, and feeling.

A description has already been given of how in the early 1930's Wulf Bley and Eugen Hadamowsky organized the sniping warfare of the National Socialist Listeners' Union against the wireless of democratic Germany, and how National Socialist radio study groups attached to the Gau offices of the Party pooled their findings and conclusions.

Both Bley and Hadamowsky in those early days defined clearly the task they visualized for the

This text was first published in the authors' *The Goebbels Experiment: A Study in the Nazi Propaganda Machine*, London, John Murray, 1942. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

wireless in riveting Nazi domination upon the German people. Bley wrote in 1933: "The German radio under National Socialist auspices must become the clearest and most direct instrument for educating and reorganizing the German people."

Hadamowsky put it still more vigorously: "Radio programmes," he said, "must shape the character and will-power of the German nation, and train a new political type."

An even wider and more arresting definition was uttered by Raskin, one of the early organizers of the German Overseas Broadcasting Service, who was killed in an air accident on his way to the Balkans in 1940.

"Real broadcasting," he said, "is true propaganda. Propaganda means fighting on all battlefields of the spirit, generating, multiplying, destroying, exterminating, building and undoing. Our propaganda is determined by what we call German race, blood and nation."

The broadcasting system which on March 6th, 1933, lay at the mercy of these men and their chiefs was a loosely knit organization under the general control of the German Post Office. Although nominally the provincial companies were financially independent, in fact a law of January 1928 secured for the Reich Post Office considerable power over them. The Post Office owned their fixed capital and, in addition, arranged some of the transmissions, such as the wireless news service for the Press, economic news broadcasts for business concerns, and the radio service to ships at sea. Owners of sets paid a licence fee of two marks a month, about 24s. a year. There was no regular independent national news service; only an organization known as "Dradag" (*Drahtloser Dienst A.G.*), which was entirely dependent upon the news agencies for its information and which sifted and selected news on behalf of the Government and communicated it to the provincial broadcasting companies, to be used as they thought fit. Later, this wireless-news-agency was taken over by the Ministry of Propaganda and developed into the source of supply of the German Radio's Home and Overseas News Services.

Soon after the creation of the Propaganda Ministry in March 1933 Goebbels issued a decree announcing that all shares of the R.R.G., the German Broadcasting Company, had been acquired by the Propaganda Ministry, and making it illegal for any other organization to broadcast. Thus at one stroke the monopoly of all German broadcasting was placed in Goebbels's hands. He got quickly to work.

On July 13th he appointed Hadamowsky Acting Commissar of the German wireless system with orders to "co-ordinate" the staff of all the stations. On August 16th Hadamowsky addressed a meeting of Party wireless wardens in the Berlin Sports Palace. He said:

We National Socialists must show a dynamism and enthusiasm for our work coupled with a lightning speed that will impress Germany and the world. In what field is speed more imperative than in that of propaganda and modern means of communication, such as the radio? Party Comrade Dr. Goebbels, our respected Minister, ordered me on July 13th to purge the German wireless of influences detrimental to our cause. I can now report

that the work has been done thoroughly. All major officials with anti-National Socialist credentials have been dismissed, though only one has behaved like a gentleman and hanged himself.

The *Volkischer Beobachter* reported that this last sentence was greeted with "prolonged laughter and cheers." The official referred to was Professor Neudeck, an upright democrat who had held a responsible post in the Central German wireless network.

By the methods implied in this speech Goebbels and Hadamowsky drove out of the broadcasting profession in Germany everyone who was not prepared actively to espouse the new ideology and policy.

As the legal owner of the R.R.G. the Propaganda Ministry set up a separate division, its Broadcasting Division, as a means of supervision. All the activities of the German broadcasting system, its political broadcasts, entertainment programmes, finance and technical planning, are directed by the Division, which is, as it were the Governing Board of broadcasting, representing the interests of the sole shareholder.

The Propaganda Ministry's Broadcasting Division however—particularly in wartime—has to share its influence over the broadcast output with other Ministries and with the High Command. Talks, commentaries and news items on world affairs often seem to be inspired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the High Command has secured a firm grip upon broadcasts on military topics. All news items about military operations, as well as the daily communique and the frequent special announcements, are broadcast as "from the High Command of the Armed Forces."

Goebbels has so far adopted the policy of putting in direct control of the Broadcasting Division only members of the trusted "Old Guard" of the Party. For years it was Hans Joachim Krieger who held the job. This man started his working life as an architect, was unemployed in the late 1920's and joined the Nazis as a full-time Party worker. He was made Gau wireless warden in Breslau and, after the Goebbels-Hadamowsky purge of the staffs of the German radio stations, Krieger became director of Breslau radio. Later he was made head of the Broadcasting Division of the Propaganda Ministry. His successor between 1939 and 1941 was Alfred Ingemar Berndt. Wolfgang Diewerge, who holds the post in 1942, is another Party member, seasoned in many battles of wits and fists for the National Socialist cause. From 1939 to 1941 he was the leading propaganda organizer under Gauleiter Forster in the headquarters of the Danzig-West Prussia Gau, where it was his task to advertise the German policy of racial humiliation and extermination in annexed Poland.

As an expert in vulgar atrocity propaganda Diewerge wrote in 1941 a pamphlet on an American book by Nathan Kaufmann which had advocated mass sterilization of all Germans after Germany's defeat. Party propagandists were eager to make the book widely known to the German people, since it presented the German nation with an even more

terrible alternative than that of fighting on under Hitler. Diewerge, by skilfully aligning quotations from Kaufmann's book with passages from Roosevelt's speeches, identified the opinions of the author—a little known writer who was expressing only his views—with those of Roosevelt. "Kaufmann," wrote Diewerge, "is Roosevelt's intimate friend and counsellor on European affairs." Several million copies of the pamphlet were sold in Germany. A few months after this successful venture Diewerge was, in December 1941, made Head of the Broadcasting Division of the Propaganda Ministry.

II. THE REICH CHAMBER OF BROADCASTING

The Chamber of Broadcasting, membership of which is compulsory for all professional staff, is a convenient instrument by means of which the directors of German propaganda mobilize and coerce broadcasters and the wireless trade for any desired task. It is also a means of excluding from the broadcasting profession anyone branded as racially or politically undesirable. It includes not only broadcasters and wireless engineers, but also the manufacturers and retailers of wireless equipment—all of them, commentators, announcers, transmitter engineers, programme organizers, manufacturers and sellers are subject to the orders of the President of the Chamber of Broadcasting, who has up to the present usually also been the head of the Broadcasting Division in the Propaganda Ministry.

One of the most important duties of the Chamber of Broadcasting is to stimulate interest in listening-in among the German public by large-scale advertising. The section of the Chamber which does this work is under Eugen Hadamowsky, and it has, for instance, carried out a great deal of concentrated publicity for the "people's wireless set" (*Volksempfänger*).

As early as 1933 two new types of receiving set were planned by the Propaganda Ministry: the "people's set," known as the Model V.E. 301 (301 stood for 30.1.33, the date of Hitler's advent to power), and the "communal listening set" D.A.F. 1011 (10.11.33 was the date when Hitler addressed Berlin workers in the big workshop of the Siemens factory). The "people's set" V.E. 301 cost 75 marks and its limited reception radius made it unsatisfactory as a receiver of stations outside Germany.

Radio exhibitions held all over the country, loudspeaker vans touring country districts, films, booklets and pamphlets, have all been used by the Chamber of Broadcasting in its drives to publicize the "people's wireless set."

There is no doubt about the success of these publicity campaigns inside Germany for the cheap receiving set.

In 1933 the number of listeners was just over 4½ millions. By 1938 this figure had climbed to 9½ millions. The number of "people's sets" sold during these years was 3,500,000. Although this represented no more than a proportion of all the sets sold in Germany during this period, it was nevertheless a substantial figure, and in 1938 85 per

cent of the purchasers of the V.E. 301 were workmen and clerks. A great mass of new proletarian listeners had been placed within the range of the Nazi broadcasting system in the years 1933 to 1938. In the latter year a new and even cheaper set, the "little set" (*Kleinempfänger*), costing only 35 marks, was put on the market, and 1938 and 1939 were record years for the German radio industry.

The manufacture of this great quantity of cheap receiving sets at first met with opposition from the German radio manufacturers. In his book *Hitler erobert die Wirtschaft* ("Hitler's Economic Victory"), Hadamowsky described the pressure applied to the industrialist through the machinery of the Chamber of Broadcasting in 1933. The original plan of the regime aimed at the making of half a million "people's sets," but in face of opposition from the manufacturers, who feared a falling off in the demand for more expensive sets, the figure was reduced to 100,000. However, at the German Radio Exhibition in August 1933 the "people's set" was so much in demand that the leaders of the Chamber of Broadcasting ordered the making of another 100,000 V.E. 301 sets. In his book Hadamowsky describes the growth of opposition among the wireless manufacturers and retailers. At a meeting of 200 members of the wireless industry, held on October 23rd, 1933, the Business Manager of the Chamber of Broadcasting declared that all discussion was at an end and that the manufacture of a third big consignment of "people's sets" would be ordered. "The meeting unanimously decided to comply with the demand," wrote Hadamowsky, "but even if their decision had been unanimous against, the manufacture of the V.E. would have been proceeded with."

Two other important functions of the Chamber of Broadcasting are the training of broadcasters, and research into listeners' reactions. Before the war anyone not on the R.R.G. staff who wanted to broadcast was tested by a "microphone examination committee" which formed part of the Chamber of Broadcasting, and which issued certificates of proficiency.

The listener research section of the Chamber complements the work done by the Party Broadcasting Office. While the Party Office concentrates mainly on the listeners' attitude to political broadcasts and investigates listeners' reactions for evidence of fluctuations in German morale and enthusiasm for National Socialist ideas, the Chamber's listener research section studies the listeners' reaction to details of presentation, such as the delivery and accent of the announcers and the timing of programmes. The Chamber also employs a small staff which co-operates with Dr. Kurt Wagenfuehr's Broadcasting Research Foundation at Leipzig University in "watching over the purity and uniformity of German broadcasting usage."

III. THE BAN ON FOREIGN LISTENING

Successful and sustained as was the campaign to publicize and sell the "people's set," the sales only reached a proportion of the sales figure for all

commercial wireless sets, and in 1938 only 3,500,000 licence-holders out of 9,500,000 were largely dependent for broadcast news and entertainment upon German Home Stations.

With the outbreak of war a step was taken which was designed to make this dependence universal. On September 1st 1939, the newly constituted Supreme Defence Council of the Reich, as one of its first acts, passed a decree forbidding Germans, under severe penalties, to listen-in to foreign radio stations. The decree is worth examination because its thoroughness and detailed character reveal the great importance which the German Government attached to this attempt to seal off the German people from all contact with the rest of the world.

There are two main offences under the decree. The first is intentional listening-in to foreign stations; the second is the dissemination of news and information obtained by such listening. The second offence is regarded as much graver than the first and can be adjudged high treason. The punishment for the first crime is usually penal servitude and only if extenuating circumstances can be proved can an offender be sentenced merely to simple imprisonment. The "crime" of dissemination is punished by hard labour or death.

Curious situations can arise under the decree. For example, a man dining in a friend's flat while a foreign station is switched on is guilty of intentional illegal listening-in. His host is of course, guilty both of illegal listening and of dissemination.

A special offence, defined as "complicity" in illegal listening-in is laid down by the decree. This, as an annotated version of the decree reveals, is mainly intended to apply to people who listen with "half an ear" or "without great interest." This part of the prohibition clearly envisages the case of a woman who may not be sufficiently interested in what she hears on the wireless, when it is turned on by her husband, to discover what station she is listening to. Under the decree she has a strong incentive to find out the source of any wireless programme switched on in her presence, otherwise she may find herself guilty of "complicity in illegal listening," which, though not such a serious "crime" as "intentional illegal listening," is nevertheless punishable by imprisonment.

The decree carefully lays down that the ban applies not only to news bulletins transmitted from foreign stations but to any broadcast whatsoever, including musical programmes. In January 1940 a special German broadcast explained that the enemy might at any time interrupt a musical programme to broadcast a brief news-item or talk, and that therefore listening-in to music from foreign stations might easily expose the German listener to the infection of "foreign lies." This fear was not groundless. For many months in 1941 the B.B.C. German Service broadcast a half-hour programme of light music, mostly jazz, interspersed with short news-items and political talks.

As they have extended their domination over Europe and brought more and more transmitters which were formerly in "foreign countries" into the service of German propaganda, the German

Government have been faced with the curious problem of defining anew what constitutes a "foreign station" for the purposes of the ban against listening. Were Brussels, Radio Paris, Hilversum and all the other stations in conquered territories to remain forbidden to the German listener, even when they were pouring forth German propaganda as directly inspired by Goebbels's directives as the *Deutschlandsender*?

The ban has, in fact, been modified to cover these new conditions, and the German listener is now permitted to tune in to any station which, though outside German territory, is controlled by German administration, civil or military. He can, therefore, listen-in to any station in Belgium, Holland, or Occupied France, as well as to those in Poland, Norway, Yugoslavia and Occupied Russia. Listening-in to Danish stations is still a "crime". Although Denmark was overrun by the Germans and is still occupied by German garrisons, she has been allowed to retain her political system. Danish news broadcasts still quote comments by the neutral press, chiefly those of Swedish newspapers, which are often out of harmony with official *Wilhelmsplatz* line. Kalundborg, the Danish radio station, can and does quote fully speeches by enemy statesmen such as Mr. Churchill, and those quotations, if heard by German listeners, would disclose differences from the German radio's own versions, which frequently contain distortions, and in which the German comment is often indistinguishable from the text.

It is equally "criminal" for the German listener to hear transmissions from Rome, from Lahti in Finland and from Bucharest, Budapest or Bratislava, although these stations are situated in countries which are allies and virtual satellites of the Reich.

Even in the "sealed off" Reich, however, the German Government, for its own convenience and for special purposes, allows a strictly limited number of people to listen-in to broadcasts from abroad. For purposes of counter-propaganda it has to be kept reliably informed about what is being said by radio stations all over the world, particularly enemy stations.

The degree prohibiting listening-in to foreign stations therefore provides that Germans may, if necessary, be issued with "foreign listening permits," which give them the right to listen-in as professional listeners (the equivalent of the B.B.C.'s monitors). But the holders of these permits are only entitled to listen-in to foreign stations in the course of their official work. As private individuals the ban applies to them. "Foreign listening permits" may also be issued to individuals other than Government-employed listeners, provided that a case is made out by the applicant based on the necessity of obtaining information for a purpose important to the war effort. In such cases the "listening permits" stipulate exactly what broadcasts the holder is entitled to hear, and as regards all the rest of broadcasting from abroad the ban applies to him.

Government-employed listeners and private holders of "foreign listening permits" in Germany are, of course, prohibited from disseminating what

they have heard from foreign stations. But the decree makes one interesting reservation: it stipulates that the ban on dissemination applies to professional listeners "unless dissemination is specially required by the authorities." This proviso may apply to, for example, leader-writers of German newspapers who would have to secure the permission of the Propaganda Ministry to quote passages from B.B.C. broadcasts in German.

IV. THE R.R.G.: THE GERMAN BROADCASTING COMPANY

When war broke out the R.R.G. (*Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft*) had four main organizational divisions: the Office of the Director-General; Programmes; Administration, and Engineering.

The present Director-General, Heinrich Glasmeier, came into the service of the Nazis out of a more "respectable" background than most of the Party veterans. He was a Free Corps fighter in the Ruhr in 1923, but most of his life before 1933 had been spent as Keeper of the Archives in the Province of Westphalia, and he became an expert writer on Westphalian genealogies and coats-of-arms. His first job under the new régime was that of director of Cologne Radio in 1933.

His own special department in the R.R.G., the Office of the Director-General, as it is called, controls three important functions—the transmission of news, the overseas broadcasting service and "broadcasting defence." This last function seems to be the systematic organization of the "jamming" of foreign stations.

The programme department of the R.R.G. is concerned mainly with entertainment programmes and with broadcasts of outside events, but the long-established daily talks reels and Front Reports are also put on the air by the programme department.

Each regional station is exactly modelled on the headquarters organization of the R.R.G. Each has its regional director, its programme organizer and its senior officials in charge of administration and engineering.

The R.R.G. controls the Greater German Wireless Network, consisting of the Deutschlandsender, which is responsible for the National Programme; the 13 Regional Stations (*Reichssender*; Stuttgart, Vienna, Cologne, Munich, Leipzig, Berlin, Saarbrücken, Hamburg, Breslau, Königsberg, Bochum, Frankfurt and Danzig), and a large number of smaller provincial and "local" stations (*Landessender*, such as Graz and Klagenfurt, and *Sender*, such as Gleiwitz and Friesland).

The Deutschlandsender, a powerful long-wave transmitter, which is fed from studios in Berlin, operates as the central station with programmes of a nation-wide appeal. The Deutschlandsender programmes depend to a large extent upon the Regional Stations. Every day a great deal of music is relayed from them, and when a local event deemed of national interest is broadcast from a Regional Station it is sometimes relayed in the National Programme. For example, the swearing-in of the Hitler

Youth in the East Prussian castle of Marienburg was broadcast by Königsberg and relayed by the Deutschlandsender.

Equally the Regional Stations make continuous use of the National Programmes, relaying long periods of the Deutschlandsender output each day. Thus all German Home Stations are hooked-up for the news and High Command communiqués. In addition, all or many of the stations in the network are linked up for the broadcasting of special events, such as Dr. Todt's funeral or Bulgaria's signing of the Tri-Partite Pact.

V. THE GERMAN HOME SERVICE

Goebbels once defined the task of broadcasting as a twofold one: to be the "instrument for forming a political will" and to be "a disseminator of culture." These two vague and bombastic definitions cloak the crude conception of radio as nothing but a medium of propaganda and a provider of relaxation. There is, in fact, in German home broadcasting hardly anything except, on the one hand, concentrated propaganda hammering home the daily directive of the Propaganda Ministry, and, on the other hand, distractions which release the mind from thought. Instructive talks, stimulating to discussion and analysis, such as the B.B.C.'s "Round Table Conference on India", are absent from the German wireless output.

The two tasks cloaked by Goebbels's formula are clearly reflected in the organization of the German Home broadcasting service.

All the news-bulletins, the daily Political Review, the three weekly political commentaries, and the three Armed Forces commentaries are partly compiled outside the R.R.G. in close collaboration with the Broadcasting Division of the Propaganda Ministry. In the R.R.G. the Office of the Director-General handles all this part of the output.

In the field of propaganda broadcasting the machinery of the R.R.G. is specially adapted so that the output shall be in complete harmony with that of the German press. This is ensured by the use of a common source of news and information by the German wireless and the German press. Both are dependent on the *Deutsches Nachrichten Büro* (DNB). While the newspapers receive a daily flow of news messages from the DNB itself, the R.R.G. is serviced by a special DNB subsidiary, the *Drahtloser Dienst*, which compiles all the wireless news-bulletins.

This "political leadership" of the R.R.G. by the Propaganda Ministry is further illustrated by the fact that Hans Fritzsche, the head of the Home Press Division and Chief Editor of the DNB, has since 1938 been a fairly regular political broadcaster; and the most striking manifestation of political guidance of the R.R.G. has been the regular reading since November 1941 to German home listeners of the Propaganda Minister's own weekly article in *Das Reich*.

In the field of "relaxation broadcasting" big changes became imperative in Germany during 1941.

The great strain imposed upon both the soldiers and the Home Front by the Russian campaign, the deprivations, the bereavements, the long hours of work in the factories, compelled a radical change of policy. Between 1938 and 1941 the German programmes of broadcast entertainment had assumed a peculiar staidness and solemnity, which was in part a result of the drive to purge the broadcast output of what was called the "Jewish spirit". In August 1938 Glasmeier, the Director-General of the R.R.G., in his annual address delivered in the Kroll Opera House, said:

Witty compering of wireless programmes gives the Jewish destructive spirit ample scope. It is inadmissible that on the same day the leading men of the National Socialist movement have spoken on subjects like the holiness of matrimony or the German soldiering spirit, these same subjects should be treated with ridicule or irony in some variety programme on the wireless.

The policy implicit in Glasmeier's declaration, was aimed at preventing all political satire — even of a good-natured kind — which might contain digs at the régime or the leaders. It also included the banning of markedly syncopated music, such as strongly rhythmic jazz, which was labelled "negroid". The staple fare became classical music and Viennese waltzes and operetta airs.

In 1941 indications appeared that this formula did not satisfy the need of the German Home Front and Armed Forces for release and stimulus under the increasing strain of the war. In June of that year Goebbels declared that "merrier and brighter" radio programmes were a necessity, and in the spring of 1942 drastic changes were made in the organization of "relaxation broadcasting". They were heralded by an article by Goebbels in the *Völkischer Beobachter* of March 1st:

Our experience with the problems of broadcasting has taught us that the programme of the radio has to depend not so much on theory as on practice. Soldiers at the Front after a hard battle appreciate what they call 'decent music,' which means light music, in their cold and inhospitable quarters. People are in general too strained to absorb more than two hours of an exacting programme. If a man who has worked hard for 12 to 14 hours wants to hear music at all, it must be music which makes no demands on him. After much preparatory work two programmes are now again to be broadcast during the main transmission hours: one on the Deutschlandsender for serious and classical music, another on the Reichssender for light entertainment music, especially during the evening... It is important to secure good humour at home and at the Front.

VI. A DAY WITH THE GERMAN LISTENER

An idea of the planning and nature of German Home programmes, as they existed in June 1942, can be formed by accompanying an imaginary German listener through a typical day's listening.

The day's broadcasting started as early as 5 a.m. with a kind of mail-bag for the German forces, followed by a quarter of an hour's light music. Farmers could listen to a "special talk broadcast for their benefit" shortly before 7, and the first news-bulletin of the day followed at 7. After this two hours

of music were broadcast, primarily for the entertainment of the housewife. The brief news-bulletin at 9 was little more than a repetition of the earlier one.

The continuity of the programme was broken by 50 minutes' silence between 9.20 and 10.10, and this allowed the listener to tune in to a *Reichssender* programme. Broadcasting was resumed on the Deutschlandsender at 10.10 with a long morning concert, offering a variety of both light and classical music, usually a relay from a *Reichssender*.

The two lunch-time news-bulletins at 12.30 and 2 p.m. were given at intervals during the long mid-day concert, which was mainly for the entertainment of factory workers. (The Party Propaganda Department has often claimed that the German worker owes this lunch-time entertainment to its initiative in approaching the German Labour Front, with whose help it achieved the necessary arrangement with the R.R.G.) The 12.30 news-bulletin wound up with the Political Review, a postscript of concentrated propaganda, and the bulletin at 2 p.m. usually embodied the daily communiqué of the High Command which purports to embrace in one comprehensive account the previous 24 hours' land, sea and air fighting.

During the early afternoon, until 5, the National Programme provided nothing but music, only interrupted at 3 for a second broadcast of the High Command communiqué, this time at dictation speed.

More news at 5 and an hour of music with varying appeal led to the peak period of the day's listening. The evening programme started at 6.30 with the half-hour programme, called "Mirror of the Times" — a series of short talks, outside broadcasts, and interviews with "men of the moment", interspersed with music. "Mirror of the Times" was the only programme in the day's broadcasting which presented the listener with new speakers and contained a "surprise" element.

Between 7 and 7.45 Front Reports, eye-witness accounts of land, sea or air fighting from the Propaganda Company reporters, were broadcast.

Before the first of the two principal news-bulletins of the day (which was broadcast at 8 p.m.) the most important political or military commentators held the field, for this was the time at which it was expected that the largest number of listeners would be at their sets. The German listener was offered both military and political commentaries, alternating on different nights: the three Armed Forces commentaries and a so-called Political Press and Radio Review, which from 1938 to 1942 was given by Fritzsche.

The second of the day's principal news-bulletins was broadcast at 10 p.m. and preceded two hours of light music and relaxation programmes. The National Programme ended at midnight, with a summary of the day's news. But after midnight listeners could tune in to the Regional Stations, which broadcast music until the small hours of the morning.

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I. FIRST A WORD FROM OUR SPONSOR

Let us suppose that one evening a Londoner, maybe you, decides to have a night out—away from the television and the children. Let us also suppose that when you come to write up your diary of the great night out you put in capital letters all those companies which have a Grade, Delfont or a Littler as one of their directors or are companies which are subsidiaries of larger companies which have one of these directors.

Away we go. You leave the children playing contentedly with the toys you bought them from CENTURY 21 TOYS LTD and reading their comic JOE 90 AND TV 21. Remember to turn off *The Saint*, networked on THAMES TELEVISION.

Into the car, insured with EAGLE STAR INSURANCE. Thus protected you opt for a quiet meal at THE GRILL AND GRIDDLE (or one of them; as a matter of fact). But maybe this is a big evening. In that case damn the expense and stroll into the CAFE ROYAL. Random toppers might care for a glass of wine at THE HUNGARIAN STATE WINE CELLARS LTD, or a cup of KARDOMAH coffee, lulled by MUZAK and accompanied by a PURITAN MAID iced lolly.

The big decision: cinema or theatre? There's always a friendly ABC near to hand, with a good chance that one of the films may be distributed by the Grades. It might even have been made by the ASSOCIATED BRITISH PICTURE CORPORATION. Make sure to buy a packet of TERRY'S Chocolates and listen carefully to the music. It might well be published by NORTHERN SONGS or NEW WORLD MUSIC LTD.

But perhaps you opt for live theatre. If you are loyal to the Grades there are at least eight theatres you can go to. Several others have their plays showing. Let us say you go to the GLOBE THEATRE (leased by ATV). You'll almost certainly see one of Prince Littler's H. M. TENNENT productions there. Wherever you go it is likely that some of the actors will be from the London Management Agency, of which Leslie Grade's son Michael is the joint managing director.

A floor show? Why not the TALK OF THE TOWN. Wherever you are in theatreland there's a good chance that the costumes have come from MONTY BERMAN'S, 75 per cent owned by ATV; with a bit of luck GENERAL BUILDING AND THEATRE EQUIPMENT LTD will have done something for the production.

How about some bowling now? Try AMBAS-

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SADOR or maybe TRANSWORLD BOWLING (UK) LTD. Pop in for a quick coffee at a FORTES cafe before moving off home.

Back in the pad. Time for a PYE record, or maybe one from the EMI stable—Parlophone, His Master's Voice, Columbia, Harvest, Capitol, State-side. Try the taperecorder—maybe the tape is from EMI.

Back to the box. THAMES is still showing a networked ATV production, using of course, EMIs new TV colour equipment. Off to bed at last, free to sleep and to exercise your final free choice: the radio and the BBC, using EMI tapes for their programmes.

You are not the only guy to have had a great evening.

II. BIG BROTHER'S THE GUY YOU ARE WATCHING

Today, the typical economic unit in the capitalist world is not the small firm producing a negligible fraction of a homogenous output for an anonymous market but a large-scale enterprise producing a significant share of the output of an industry, or even several industries, and able to control its prices, the volume of its production, and the types and amounts of investments.

Baran and Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital*

This is as true of the communications industry as it is of pharmaceuticals or motor cars. Most people in the industry are aware, to a lesser or larger degree, of the situation. For producers, technicians, actors, journalists, cameramen, directors, printers and so on, control is usually expressed in the short term: control over budgets, wages, over creativity, over what is produced. At the actual meeting point of financial interests and production it is not necessarily always apparent, or seemingly relevant to know the full extent of the particular organisation's interests.

Such interests can impinge in the short term: sometimes they can become manifest in a larger sense. But if we are able to have any sense of the real meaning of modern communications, it is this larger context that must become apparent. Only then can we begin to understand the part communications play in modern capitalism, how they contribute to the kind of society we have.

This article studies the activities, past and present, of two corporations in the communications industry: EMI and ATV. These two corporations between them hold enormous interests in the "leisure industry". Now the control of mammoth corporations such as these, although nominally in the hands of shareholders, is in fact in the hands of the board of directors and senior management, with one or two directors usually being particularly prominent.

In the case of the entertainment industry it is plain that two families are particularly prominent: the Grades (Lew, Leslie and Bernard Delfont) and the Littlers. Their interests, through a network of interlocking directorships, range from missile guidance systems and nuclear research through to every sector of the entertainment industry: theatre, television, cinema, commercial radio, to football

and ten-pin bowling.

It is almost impossible to fill in all details of the picture. Companies House is not replete with information hot from the Grade/Littler presses. Company records are only as up-to-date as the day on which the company filed its last set of public records, in some cases almost a year ago. Moreover, the structure of financial ownership and control of a company is only part of the story. Evidently the full answer lies not only in interlocking directorships, but also in the family links and personal friendships which influence decision-making.

Here, however, is an outline...

III. THE HISTORY OF THE GRADE/DELFONT/LITTLER INTERESTS

The history of the Grade family is essentially the history of how three men became theatrical agents, became bigger theatrical agents, and finally stopped being theatrical agents. For now neither Sir Lew Grade, Leslie Grade nor Bernard Delfont have extensive financial interests in theatrical agencies.

After brief careers as performers in show-biz (Bernard Delfont had joined an adagio act) they all began as actors' and artists' agents. In 1946 Lew and Leslie Grade formed a company with £200 cash. By 1967 the net capital employed by the company was to rise to £4.1 million. Then the Grade Organisation, as it had become, was swallowed by EMI.

Meanwhile, Bernard Delfont was building up his company, "Bernard Delfont Management & Enterprises Ltd". By 1965 this was worth at least £250,000. Then Bernard Delfont Management & Enterprises Ltd was swallowed up by the Grade Organisation, which was then swallowed up by EMI.

In 1952 a company called the Associated Broadcasting Development Company was founded. In 1954, Parliament created the Independent Television Authority, so that ABDC was allowed to become the Associated Broadcasting Company, which later became Associated Television. This, the first company to be formed, had as its nucleus the original triumvirate of influential lobbyists who had worked for commercial television. Among these was Norman Collins, an ex-controller of BBC television. But the triumvirate did not at first have enough money to satisfy the Independent Television Authority. Meanwhile Lew Grade with another show-biz man, Val Parnell, had formed their own TV company, financed by the merchant bankers, Warburg's. But ITA refused them a station—partly because ITA were more vigilant in those days: they had noticed that Val Parnell was involved in the large theatre company "Moss Empires"—and they thought enough was enough. But times change. So Lew Grade and Val Parnell merged with Norman Collins' group, who, by this time, had been given a television contract by the ITA.

It might seem strange that, after refusing to give Lew Grade and Val Parnell a contract to operate a commercial television station, the ITA should allow the two showmen to link up, particularly in view of the fact that, since Lew Grade and Val Parnell had most of the money, they controlled the company.

In any case, by 1955 ATV has established itself as a viable television station. In 1954 Norman Collins had an investment of £2,250 in ATV: by 1958 it was worth over £500,000.

Prince and Emile Littler started out hand in hand with their father's theatre in Woolwich. Prince was always more interested in management, Emile in the impresario business. By the early 1940s both brothers were becoming well-known as theatre owners and show producers: Emile found the shows and Prince staged them. And by the end of the war, the Littlers were controlling 47 theatres from their London offices. They built up the massive Moss Empires theatrical business, and merged with Stoll Theatres. By the end of 1964, the Stoll/Moss Empires business was worth over £5.5 million. Then Stoll Theatres/Moss Empires was swallowed up by ATV.

Leslie Grade, alone at the Grade Organisation since Lew had been dragged away by the excitement of ATV, had, in 1960, acquired about half of the shares of another big agency, London Management & Representation. And by this time he was already director of ATVs big subsidiary, ITC, Elstree Film Distributors, Ivy (Film) Productions, Pye Records and Leyton Orient Football Club.

Also in 1960, a friend of Leslie's and Lew's was appointed director of the Grade Organisation—Robin Fox. He had been an executive in the American entertainment giant, Musical Corporation of America (MCA). In 1961, MCA was forced to sell off its agency side, under US anti-trust laws. In London, the consequence was that many of MCAs top executives gravitated to the Grade Organisation, via their one-time colleague, Robin Fox. With them they brought numerous artists and actors. Thus the slight weakening of monopoly in one country strengthened the growth of the system in the other.

In April 1963 the Grade Organisation acquired half the shares in Harold Davison Ltd (another agency) for cash. In July 1964, the Grade Organisation acquired full control over London Management & Representation, and its subsidiary London Authors' Representation, London Artists (another actors' agent) and the remainder of Harold Davison. Among the directors were Leslie Grade, Robin Fox, Harold Davison, L.A. Evans, Kenneth Hall, D.M.E. Van Thal and Miss Olive Harding. In March 1965 the Grade Organisation acquired a majority holding in "Bernard Delfont Management and Enterprises and the Bernard Delfont Agency".

By this time, Leslie Grade had built himself a little empire which included not only all the most important theatrical agencies—but also music publishing and film production (*The Young Ones*, *Sparrows Can't Sing*, *The Servant*, *Summer Holiday* and *Wonderful Life*). In March 1966, the Grade Organisation bought itself a 20th birthday present. A whole chain of cinemas! It acquired all ordinary shares of Shipman and King cinemas for £1.5 million and 450,000 2s shares. Shipman and King owned 32 cinemas, of which 29 were in operation. And at this time in 1966, Lew Grade was the largest single shareholder in the Grade Organisation, Leslie Grade was Managing Director, Bernard Delfont was deputy Chairman—one big happy family. At

this stage the *Sunday Times* "Insight" column ran a story about the Grade family entitled "The Show-business Octopus".

The gist of the article was the Equity were about to complain to Harold Wilson about the monopolistic situation in the entertainment industry. The union was worried about the extensive control that the Grades were able to exercise over employment prospects for actors in the theatre, in television, in the cinema—through their ownership of theatres and theatrical production companies, through their interest in ATV, through their interest in film production companies and finally through their ownership of the biggest actors' agencies in London.

Evidently, these fears are not unreal. By a curious quirk of fate, Emile Littler has expressed them himself. And who better than he? In 1965, Emile's show "The Right Honourable Gentlemen" was playing at ATVs Her Majesty's Theatre. Prince Littler wanted the play moved to another theatre, as ATV wanted to use Her Majesty's. Some time later, the four leading stars in the play gave in their notice to Emile on the same day, and Emile thought that there had been a conspiracy by ATV, and the Grade Organisation. A long court case by ATV, London Artists and the Grade Organisation proved him wrong.

Of course, the situation has developed dramatically over the past three years. In 1966 EMI was a company with interests primarily in electronics for domestic and military use, and records. Its profits were £5.8 million after taxation. Then, in 1967 the Grade Organisation was taken over by EMI—and suddenly EMI had interests in film production, theatrical production, music publishing, cinemas, theatres, actors' agencies ... as well as records. In January 1968 EMI bought 25 per cent of the ordinary share capital of the Associated British Picture Corporation, and as the 1969 EMI report puts it:

Towards the end of 1968 it became apparent that it would be in the best interests of the Group to acquire the remainder of the ordinary capital of Associated British Picture Corporation Limited. We now own that company 100 per cent

It goes on to describe to its eager shareholders the benefits to them of the new arrangement:

This large and important group of companies consists of one of the biggest chains of cinemas in the UK [the ABC Chain—Ed.], the famous film studios at Elstree, a controlling interest in Thames Television Limited (which provides the London area with its weekly television programmes), a major interest in film distribution and other property interests. These are significant and complementary additions to our already wide entertainment operations. To complete the task of integrating ABPC into the EMI methods of operation will prove a long and complicated job and we welcome all their employees into the EMI group which, with the Grade Organisation and the Blackpool Tower Company, now becomes the largest entertainment organisation in the country, and worthy partner to our world gramophone record business.

But, as we have said, the history of the Grade family is the story of how the three brothers became rich and stopped being theatrical agents. For the

latest instalment in the saga involves EMI selling off its actors' agencies, acquired when it bought the Grade Organisation.

First to go was London International in July 1968—sold back to Robin Fox and Laurence Evans, the men who had helped build up this, the core of the old Leslie and Lew Grade agency into what it was.

But why did they sell it, and what has happened recently? A report in the *Private Eye* of November 1969 sums it up very well:

Last year EMI fought a tough battle to gain control of Associated British Pictures. AB Pictures argued that if EMI gained control, the Independent Television Authority would take away the Thames TV contract for weekday London television. AB Pictures company, ABC, partnered by Rediffusion, won the contract under the Hill reshuffle in 1967.

Undaunted by the rules laid down by the contract EMI went ahead with its unwanted bid and eventually won the day. The arrangement with ITA was that EMI would sell all its Grade agency businesses in return for keeping Thames. They included the Harold Davison group which takes in Lulu, Dylan, Jimi Hendrix and Sinatra. And the biggest of all agencies, the London Management group, which takes a cut out of Bardot, Jill Bennett, John Osborne, Ian Carmichael, plus a host of other celebrities.

Harold Davison bought his company back from EMI for an estimated £100,000—a third of the price he sold it to the Grade Organisation for five years earlier. A few weeks after he bought it, however, he sold it to Management Agency and Music, Tom Jones and Humphreys' company, for £350,000. No mean profit in a matter of a few weeks.

Two weeks ago the London Management agency business was sold to a company whose directors include Mike Grade, son of Leslie Grade. Mike and his pals are paying £250,000 for the agency side of EMI, which, by all accounts, except for a chain of cinemas, was the largest part of the entire EMI business.

A good question for EMI shareholders is why didn't the buying and selling figures seem to add up. No doubt, there is a good reason. After all, ITA told EMI to sell the agencies and nobody said anything about not keeping them in the family.

So the agencies are now in the safe hands of the Grades' old friends Robin Fox, Dennis Van Thal, Laurence Evans—all of whom were on the "happy family" board of the Grade Organisation in the good old days of 1964. And son Michael is being given his fair chance.

And so, from this multiplicity of original companies grew up what is essentially a duopoly: the vast EMI Empire with its £17.6 million profit (cf. £11.3 million last year) and the Associated Television Corporation Limited with its £11 million profit in 1969.

The Grade family with Prince Littler are central to this duopoly. The rest of this article looks at ownership in television and theatre, and examines the effect of this on standards.

IV. WHO OWNS WHAT IN TELEVISION

Thames Television has the week-day contract for the London area. In 1968 EMI gained control of Thames when it took over the Associated British Picture Corporation, and until November 1969 EMI

held just over 50 per cent of Thames equity through a holding company called Thames Television Holdings. Bernard Delfont is a director (one of 13) on the board of EMI.

But on November 7, 1969, the *Daily Telegraph* reported the following in its financial columns:

As part of a formula to dilute Electrical and Musical Industries' majority vote in Thames Television, Forte's Holdings and British Lion (Holdings) will each take up 20-25 per cent of new voting equity of Thames Television Holdings, which owns EMIs 50 per cent plus four shares in the London Weekday contractor, which is 49 per cent owned by Rediffusion Television.

This may fool the Independent Television Authority, but EMI shareholders can sleep easily—they must know that EMIs interests will be well looked after in the new deal. After all, Bernard Delfont is not only on their board, but he's also on the board of Forte's (Holdings). Charles Forte is on the board of Bernard Delfont's own company, "Bernard Delfont" Ltd.

British Lion must be pretty happy with the new deal: they've wanted an inroad into the lucrative television field for some time. And there shouldn't be too much awkwardness on the new board of Thames Television Holdings. Despite the fact that EMI own the Associated British Picture Corporation, apparently one of British Lion's competitors, Bernard Delfont's ABPC is already making a film in co-operation with British Lion.

And there's another possible advantage in the new deal. In its first 11 months' of operations Thames collected over £15,000,000 in advertising revenue: British Lion own British Lion Television Services—which makes commercials.

So the situation at present is that EMI has official control over about 25 per cent of Thames equity. Of course, the point that becomes quite clear is that the overt financial control situation is only a poor reflection of the actual control situation. EMI, under no legal pressure to dispose of their holding in Thames, would not have sold it off had they thought their interests not well guarded—and although from financial records it now looks as though EMI have a minority say in any decision making, it must be remembered that the Board of EMI have Bernard Delfont to represent their interest to the Board of Forte's.

At this point it is perhaps worthwhile to note that before EMI bought its way into Thames Television, it had already bought up the Grade Organisation with all its actors' agencies. Four principal shareholders in the Grade Organisation were Mr and Mrs Lew Grade and Mr and Mrs Leslie Grade. Lew Grade held 325,000 shares and his wife, Kathleen held 10,000. Under the 1964 Television Act, the ITA would have the right to object if Sir Lew Grade held shares in EMI because of its holding in Thames Television. His wife, according to the EMI share register, now owns 112,065 EMI shares. (Under the takeover agreement a shareholder in the Grade Organisation received one EMI 10s share for three Grade Organisation 2s shares.)

So, the current picture is that Leslie Grade and his wife own about £60,000 worth of EMI shares

(original value 10s, current value about 50s, which makes the holding worth about £300,000) and that Mrs Kathleen Grade owns an equivalent number of shares, in a company of which her two brothers-in-law are directors, in a company which owns a 25 per cent share in Thames Television—the television company which is supposed to be her husband's company's biggest competitor! At the same time, according to the 1969 share register, B. Delfont has 23,500 A ordinary shares in ATV—Thames' biggest competitor.

It is also interesting to note that the Associated British Picture Corporation tried for the London Associated Television contract and failed ... and that EMI was part of the consortium that tried for the Yorkshire contract. Westward Television has the seven-day contract for Cornwall and Devon. Until 1967, Emile Littler was on the board of Westward, and he still holds large numbers of shares in the company—over 500,000, of which at least 5,000 are voting shares—apparently the second largest block.

Emile Littler is also a director of an insurance company called Eagle Star Insurance. This has large shareholdings in a company called Telefusion, which has the chief holding in Yorkshire Television. The connection between Eagle Star and Yorkshire is such that they have a director in common—Mr Thomas Summerson—and, perhaps not surprisingly, Eagle Star Insurance owns shares in Rediffusion (which owns 49 per cent of Thames Television) together with shares in ATV.

Associated TeleVision Network Ltd is the company which, as we all know, has the Midlands franchise seven days a week. ATV Networks is the the most important subsidiary of the Associated TeleVision Corporation, of which Sir Lew Grade is the Managing Director and Chief Executive, and Lord Renwick is the Chairman. Their relative importance might be gauged by the fact that Lord Renwick is paid £5,333 and Lew Grade £40,000 per annum salary. Lord Renwick is Chairman of the Institute of Directors.

Despite the fact that he is associated with the monopolistic entertainment industry, Lord Renwick apparently believes quite ardently in the concept of "Free Enterprise". For, in the last year he has sat on the Council of the British United Industrialists, which according to the *Observer* "collected nearly £300,000 last year, most of which was put into the Conservative Party to spend on Free Enterprise propaganda". The *Observer* continues:

BUI is run by Colonel Hobbs, a former Bengal lancer working especially closely with one or two members of the Council. Their names earlier this year were Lord Renwick.... Hobbs works from a block of flats in Park Lane.... Lord Renwick uses the next door office as his West End Office, with direct lines to Associated Television and to Greenwells, the stock-brokers, where he is senior partner. BUI is dedicated to free enterprise in industry, and Renwick fits in nicely as former Chairman of the County of London Electric Supply Co., which was nationalised from under him in 1947.

So here you have a man sitting on the Council of an organisation whose aim is free enterprise propaganda, Chairman of a television company with

interests in theatre and connections with every other aspect of the communications and entertainment industry. He does not sit alone. On the board of ATV are two men well known in the industry—Hugh Cudlipp of the Mirror Group of publications, and Sir Max Aitken of the Beaverbrook Group of newspapers.

Another tie-up which is worth noting was reported in the *Financial Times* of August 30, 1968. Pye Records, a subsidiary of ATV, has joined up with EMI and Decca in a new company to issue cheap LPs to exploit the "new technique" of rack marketing.

V. THE NOMINEE COMPANIES

It has proved very difficult to trace the precise financial structure of all the television companies. Part of the difficulty has been the mammoth size of the task, but more significant is the device by which shareholdings can be held by a nominee to cloak the real holder. This occurs very frequently in television companies, where, for various reasons, large shareholdings are maintained by the so-called "nominee" companies.

For example, a recent list of nominee holdings:

ATV — Barclays Nominees (Branches) Ltd
 Glyns Nominees Ltd
 Bishopsgate Nominees Ltd
 RF Nominees Ltd
 Baring Nominees—a/c
 Granada Group — Barclays Nominees (Branches) Ltd
 Branch Nominees Ltd
 Yorkshire — Branch Nominees
 Bank of Scotland London Nominees Ltd
 Rediffusion (which holds 49 per cent Thames) —
 Bank of Scotland London Nominees
 Westward — Barclays Nominees (Branches) Ltd

So quite evidently, there is a certain amount of common ownership in the television companies. One nominee company which stands out among the others is Barclays Nominees (Branches) Ltd. When asked about their holdings, in their reply they regretted that:

we are unable to provide you with any information with regard to the shares in Associated Television Ltd, which are registered in our name. This Company holds shares to the order of Branches of Barclays Bank Ltd, which in turn hold them to the order of their customers, who are the beneficial owners of the shares so registered.

We questioned the ITA about the beneficial ownership of the nominee holdings, and the Authority replied:

Barclays Nominees (Branches) Limited is a subsidiary of Barclays Bank. The holdings in the three companies to which you refer are separate nominee holdings and we have made ourselves aware, so far as this is necessary, of the beneficial owners. It would be for the three companies to decide whether they wished to disclose this information...

Why "cannot" the ITA reveal who is behind these nominee holdings? Surely it is in the interest of the public that, for example, a nominee company which holds 412,000 shares in ATV should disclose

who is controlling the shares?

The ITA reply goes on: "In the absence of special circumstances, we would regard as relevant ... any holding of voting shares and a non-voting holding of above 5 per cent."

This means that the ITA is only interested in the beneficial ownership of shareholdings in the television companies above 5 per cent. So a person who wishes to control a company can do so quite easily ... and without fear of interference under the 1964 Television Act from the ITA. All he has to do is allow several companies which he controls, or several nominee companies to take 4 per cent shareholdings. If he has 13 such holdings he can therefore control the television company without the ITA ever becoming slightly concerned.

Holdings of some Nominee Companies in ATV (9 October 1969):

Barings Nominees Ltd	170,500	'A'	Ord
Bishopsgate	353,000	'A'	Ord
Glyns Nominees	412,000	'A'	Ord
Barclays Nominees (Aldermanbury)	88,000		
	+ 25,000		
	113,000	'A'	Ord
Barclays Nominees (Branches)	19,010	'A'	Ord
Barclays Nominees (Lombard St)	67,500		
	70,000	'A'	Ord

VI. THE WORLD OF THE THEATRE

For those heads reeling with these interlocking puzzles in television, the initial fact about the theatre end of the Grade enterprise can be stated quite simply.

Eight theatres are connected directly with Associated Television Corporation Ltd. The whole situation can be best expressed in tabular form with number of seats in brackets:

A. Directly connected with ATV:

Apollo (796)	Her Majesty's (1261)	Queens (989)
Drury Lane (2283)	Lyric (948)	Victoria Palace (1552)
Globe (907)	Palladium (2333)	
Total number: eight. Total seats: 11069.		

B. Theatres in which Emile Littler has interests:

Cambridge (1266)	Palace (1462)
Total: two. Total seats: 2728.	

C. Theatres in which Bernard Delfont has interests:

Prince of Wales (1139)	Saville (1206)
Total: two. Total seats: 2345.	

D. Theatres in the Albery Family Group:

Criterion (606)	Picadilly (1132)
New (887)	Wyndhams (771)
Total: four. Total seats: 3396.	

E. D.A. Abrahams Group:

Duchess (491)	Garrick (800)
Fortune (440)	Scala (1139)
Total: four. Total seats: 2870.	

F. Subsidised and other non-commercial London theatres:

Aldwych	Arts	Coliseum
Covent Garden	Festival Hall	Mermaid

National Sadler's Wells	Open Air Royal Court	Royal Albert Hall Westminster
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G. Other theatres:

Phoenix (1028)	Duke of Yorks (850)	Adelphi (1521)
Vaudeville (668)	Comedy (792)	Mayfair (310)
St Martins (550)	Ambassadors (453)	Savoy (1123)
Shaftesbury (1300)	Royalty	Whitehall (634)
Haymarket (900)	Strand (1085)	

When ATV acquired their theatres, improvements and renovations were eagerly awaited. People are still eagerly waiting. Theatre is, of course, home ground to the Grades, and many producers are quite frank in feeling that, in a perilous industry where five out of six productions lose money, the Grades are not the desperate enemies they might seem to be to outsiders. They are in a risky game and are prepared to back almost anything, and make informal agreements, to lessen the risks. More germane, of course, is what happens when the old showmen pass on to the final Big Top and the accountants get to work on a strict profit and loss basis. That is when such conglomerates really show their teeth.

Provincial Theatres

Over the past 10 years or so, there has been an interesting trend in the ownership of provincial theatres. Many of these are old, require extensive repairs and have large running costs. Consequently the large theatrical interests have come to see them as a drain on running costs, and in order to avoid probable closure many theatres have been taken over by city corporations and other public authorities to be run as subsidised amenities. Great Yarmouth Corporation, for example, is now the proud owner of three theatres—the Marina, the Wellington Pier Pavilion and the Gorleston Pavilion.

This situation has very definite advantages for the production companies. Instead of having to pay for the upkeep of the theatre in off-production periods as well as production theatre periods — as it would have had to while owning the theatre — the production company can now pay the often subsidised rent on the theatre for the duration of its production only.

Consequently, while more and more theatres pass from commercial to civic ownership, the proportion used by the large production companies like Howard and Wyndham and Moss Empires remains fairly constant. Of those theatres in the provinces which are still commercially viable, the Grade/Delfont/Littler interest still has a fairly large share. And it is surprising to note that their theatres, with an average seating capacity of 2060, have on average 1025 more seats than those of other private owners, and 1050 more than civic theatres used for variety and similar entertainment. And, as the next table shows, not only have they the largest theatres, they are all in prime positions. MOSS EMPIRES (a wholly-owned ATV subsidiary of which Prince Littler is Managing Director):

1. Birmingham Theatre, Birmingham
2. Empire, Liverpool
3. Palace, Manchester

4. Royal, Nottingham
5. Winter Gardens, Morecambe

STOLL THEATRES (a wholly-owned subsidiary of ATV. Prince Littler is Managing Director):

1. Hippodrome, Bristol

EMI (theatres owned through subsidiaries. Bernard Delfont is the Director who has been put in charge of the huge "Entertainment Division" of EMI):

1. Savoy, Coventry
2. Grand, Blackpool
3. Opera House, Blackpool
4. Tower Circus, Blackpool
5. Winter Gardens Pavilion, Blackpool

VII. FROM BOARDROOM TO SCREEN

What we have tried to suggest so far is that within the entertainment industry there is a hegemony of financial interest — an interest that extends through every kind of leisure activity that might be commercially exploitable.

But the fundamental question remains: does such a potential control situation realise itself in the actual control of entertainment standards, creative ideas, information, attitudes, and in the last analysis, of taste in our society?

Now we could go on, and on, and on quoting adverse reviews of the standards of programming on ATV, on the standards of production at some London theatres, or of some of the films seen at ABC cinemas. Undoubtedly there is an intellectual consensus on this question of entertainment standards. But questions of taste are almost invariably subjective. There is no rigorous system of TV criticism to separate the bad from the good.

The point is to show that financial power is synonymous with editorial control, that the profit motive does include certain commercial influences on programming standards and exclude others, and that the dominant financial influences are able to impose their own personal tastes, or what they conceive to be the mass tastes, throughout the entertainment industry.

The potential audience for any ATV programme shown only in the Midlands is estimated at over 2 million homes by the ITA. The maximum audience for any locally-shown programme is about a third of this, so that the number of people watching will be around 2½ million. Fortunately for Sir Lew, ATV programmes are very widely networked in all ITV areas, and the latest JICTAR ratings indicate the most popular ATV programmes have an audience of some 6½ million homes; that is, over 20 million people. Twenty million people regularly watching programmes which establish a certain and identifiable set of standards and which propagate a very definite set of values. But whose standards? and whose values?

Sir Lew Grade is Managing Director and Chief Executive of ATV. He has a large, grandly-furnished office at ATV house in Cumberland Avenue, off Marble Arch. At one end of the room hangs an oil painting: looking late 18th century it turns out to be a picture of ATV cameras beaming in

on a set of high-kicking dancers at the Palladium show. He takes a very great interest in the operations of the television company, and most people to whom we spoke inside the company saw his role as equivalent to Programme Controller in the other companies. He is very concerned with the effect of the Advertising Levy on his programme standards.

In April 1969, after the bestowal of the Queen's Award, Sir Lew wrote rapturously, in an open letter to his employees: "The award could not have come at a better time. The changes announced in the budget affect our television operation so drastically that our very existence is in jeopardy."

At the last count there were still four Rolls in the ATV House garage.

Grade's number two is Bill Ward, OBE, and Grade's number two-and-a-half is Robert Heller (Head of Factual Programming — Documentaries, Religion and Education). Next down in the hierarchy is Francis Essex, the 'Production Controller' — a recent appointment in the ATV structure. His status is made quite clear in a memo to producers from Bill Ward, dated June 10, 1969.

Talking about ATVs requirement that "style, pattern, format and all other elements are absolutely those which the company intended" he continues: "The company's ultimate authority in this lies in my office and in certain instances in the future I intend to delegate this authority in some areas to Francis Essex when he joins us in his role of Production Controller."

In terms of programming hierarchy, there is nothing between these three Grademen and the producers and directors. ATV's bureaucracy is certainly small — so that top management should be fairly accessible to producers — and producers are under direct control from top management.

So, how are programmes originated in ATV? Sir Lew talked to Peter Black of the *Daily Mail* a couple of years ago:

"Whereas 'Love Story' was formerly a writers' vehicle — 'what we do now,' Lew Grade said cheerfully, 'is we get a star, then we get a writer; and they work together on an idea that will suit the star.'"

One producer described the production process like this:

At ATV we're a bit like factory workers — Lew just hands us a programme idea and we're expected to turn the handle and produce a packaged parcel to order in three months.

Not a little of this haste may stem from Sir Lew's allegedly inspired performances at Networking Committees, where he will suddenly present a title, with no scripts to back it. As the Networking Committee works only in the short term, there may only be a couple of months to produce, write and devise a 13-week series.

Another producer: There's not enough creative participation by the programme makers at the right stage. We're given a subject and told to get on with it, and if we ask questions we're told, 'that's what Lew wants'. Lew buys ideas — and anyone working in TV objects to this — because we all want to be in at the beginning — to have time to formulate ideas — and this just doesn't happen because

ATV's an autocratic concern.

And this view is supported by a six-page memo sent to all executives, producers and directors by Bill Ward, Grade's closest assistant.

What I am trying to say here is that once the company has expressed its requirements in the clearest possible way for any kind of production that it does, it is incumbent upon those whose responsibility it is to carry through the requirement, to do so in the way that the company originally demanded.

It's important to remember that when Ward talks of the company, he's not talking about the collective will of the shareholders. Not even about the collective will of the company's employees — he's talking about those in real control of the day-to-day running of the company — Sir Lew Grade and his small band of advisers. So, how much creative control do the producers, story editors, writers, directors have? Back to Bill Ward's own capitals:

ONCE WE HAVE REACHED THE STAGE WHEREBY THE 'BRIEFING' HAS BEEN MADE ABSOLUTE and even though CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE TEAM MAY WELL DISAGREE WITH ALL OR PART OF THE BRIEFING CONCEPT, the 'brief' must be carried through in the way which was finally decided after discussion in depth with me, or with others to whom I delegate my authority.

And what happens to the producer who injects his own ideas into a programme? He has to go to see Ward:

I used to say to the poor unfortunate who came back having completed the task, or perhaps uncompleted the task would explain it better, 'When I send you for a pound of apples, it means I want you to deliver a pound of apples, not two pounds of bloody pears, I didn't ask for pears, I don't like them and I don't want them.'

N.B: This memorandum was addressed to all executives/producers/directors/management.

Later in the same memo, Ward goes on to talk about specific programmes in which he was disappointed: in particular he marks out a documentary examination of Trevor Nunn's production of *A Winter's Tale* at Stratford. He says of it:

We didn't want a documentary ... We wanted to portray a 'First Night' with the glitter, the 'celebrities', the critics, the audience, the atmosphere, and if possible the simulated performance of an opening night

We wanted to create a happening for the Midlands — to present the Bard (who could be considered perhaps to be more ATV's property than that of any other commercial company) as one of our offerings in the 'Saturday Specials' programme slot.

Quite clearly, programme origination in ATV is centred very much on Grade himself. Alan Tarrant, one-time Head of Entertainment at ATV, and still an admirer of Sir Lew, said this of him:

He's the governor. On the whole Lew prefers to go for talent to outside people because he's been a freelancer all his life, and thinks that no one can be that good if he hasn't got the ability to go freelance. Lew Grade buys ideas and people — he doesn't originate them — he just recognises commercial ideas and commercial people.

This, then, is the situation in all production

which comes under Bill Ward's aegis — roughly Light Entertainment, Drama, Serials. But the situation in the documentary department under Robert Heller is quite different. Here, according to one director, the difficulties are quite the reverse to those described above.

There is no one in the senior management who shows the slightest interest in the work we're doing. That puts you in a very exposed position because if the documentary has any trouble, you have to take absolute and final responsibility — and there's no one in management to back you up ... but don't get the idea that there's absolute freedom ... they always know what you're doing so there's always a fear lurking in the back of your mind.

And this lack of interest on the part of the company is very disheartening. Creativity is displaced in favour of tinsel in the Entertainment section, and in the Documentary department it's just ignored. In many cases ATV is less disposed towards creative programming because it is totally structured to operate against the creative idea, except when that idea has the value of pure commodity contained within it. Perhaps as a result of this, many talented people have left the company — but quite a few labour on, depressed by what they see as falling standards and the tightening of controls which results from the Advertising Levy's squeeze on programming budgets.

But perhaps the most important thing about the whole ATV operation is the way it is geared to the American market. Far more profit can be earned by having a programme networked in the States than in Britain, so perhaps it is not surprising that US standards are so influential. But, as one director pointed out, "ATV were given the licence to produce for British television, not for US television... and the scandal is that Lew Grade gets the accolade for this".

It was the Labour Government who gave ATV two prizes for export efforts, and made Lew Grade a knight for the same reasons. They may even give him a peerage for equalising British and American television standards.

Describing one ATV programme a television critic on one of the Nationals recently wrote: "It's bad enough watching American series bought up for English television (bar a tiny percentage the series we get are just so much pap) but when we get English series produced American style to appeal to the American market, it's going too far".

Going too far it may be, but then Sir Lew Grade has got the stamina. The growing penetration of commercial television in this country by American or American-style products is well known — and it is important to realise that ATV is in the forefront of this move toward internationalism. But pioneering has its rewards: among a number of programmes sold to the States last year were 40 episodes of 'This is Tom Jones', 10 hour-long shows starring Liberace, and a series of 12 shows starring Sandler & Young. ATV's total export earnings last year were well over £5 million.

How does this obvious orientation to the US market affect British programme standards? Firstly,

all programmes produced by ATV are eventually shown on British television — many of them covering the production costs in this way, thus leaving foreign sales to earn the large profits. And the point is that the American market is sufficiently powerful to pick and choose between the foreign-produced programmes offered to it. Those deliberately designed with the US market in mind are evidently those with the greatest chance of success. And so British audiences are subject to the presumed taste of the American viewer and the criteria of the US broadcasting companies.

The process is not a one-way affair. In exchange for the programmes the commercial companies sell to America, the commercial companies must buy the American product. The result is obvious.

But what does Sir Lew Grade think of the American influence? Returning to Peter Black's interview with him for the *Daily Mail*, we find that:

Lew denies that any of his Anglo-American projects have to be adapted to American tastes, and of course this must be so of the film series.

When you've thought of an idea like 'The Champions', any further Americanisation would be superfluous. But it is where differences of taste exist (between Britain and USA) that I begin to worry about Lew.

He admitted that comedy was 'difficult'. The first 'Spotlight' series had an American adviser. Now, said Lew, they do it all themselves. But that could mean they need no further advice. He admitted that the scripts for comedy variety shows sold to the US — Spotlight, Morecambe and Wise, half a dozen Palladium shows — musn't make purely British references.

And all this leads inevitably to what is called within ATV 'The International Product'.

A series with Judy Carne that went out here as Music Hall was scheduled, referred to and titled, for all save the ITA 'Kraft Music Hall'. American writers, directors, are brought over to work on them.

In the memo to which we have already referred, Bill Ward presents a radical critique of the Liberace series, which he compares unfavourably with two television film series, one British, one American: 'DEPARTMENT S' and 'THE NAME OF THE GAME'. Of these he writes:

Modern film techniques and conventions were being used in both cases, but there were built-in dramatic 'peaks' throughout both productions where, instead of a cut or mix came a fade-to-black, then a fade-up-from-black.

These peaks broke the accepted conventions which were present in all other parts of the story-telling, but they were perfectly acceptable to the viewer in that they became a convention of their own and did not in any way diminish the enjoyment of the viewer.

THESE TINY BLACK-OUTS WERE THE SPACES WHERE IN AMERICA THEIR COMMERCIAL BREAKS WERE INSERTED.

The Producers, both here and there, had faced the problem of international requirements and had solved this problem by using their techniques and produced an internationally acceptable show.

WE HAVE GOT TO DO THE SAME.

What effect does this orientation have on the people who work within the ATV set-up? One of the workers in the Elstree studios told us that "some pro-

grammes designed for the US market get priority over programmes which are number one in our own ratings".

The success of ATV in the field of export marketing exceeds by a long way what any other commercial company has done. Partly this can be explained by the extent to which the corporation is geared to overseas markets, but Sir Lew Grade's personality also had a great deal to do with it. His drive and energy, his business style appeal to the American executives, and over the 15 years since ATV became an operational television station he has been able to build up a confident business relationship with executives in the main US networks.

Nevertheless, it illustrates the kind of strength from which a company like ATV with highly profitable interests outside television, can negotiate. It also illustrates the importance for a television company of diversification. Of course, financial strength is not the only factor to be taken into consideration: at the time of the renewal of the television contracts ATV had far more experience of the industry than any other company apart from Granada, and had built up strength in certain fields, notably drama serials. This strength and experience was unchallengeable and the result is there for the world to see every night of the week.

VIII. SUBSIDIARIES: THEIR ACTIVITIES

Part of the 'success' story of the television companies is the success of their diversification policies. In its annual report for 1969, 83 principal subsidiary companies are listed alone—and the range of activities represented encompasses every kind of leisure. One field which ATV has only recently entered in a really big way is property development—and here they're represented by their subsidiary Bentray Investments. Success has been immediate—ATV have pulled off a staggering deal with the Birmingham City Council for a city-centre site for their own new television centre — their own little 'Paradise Center.' Somehow, ATV have managed to get a six-acre site in the heart of Birmingham for only £3,000 a year, a rent which can only go up by £5,000 in 40 years, so that by the year 2008 they will only be paying £35,000, and this when many estate agents in Birmingham value the land at £125,000 per annum right now. This means that over the next 40 years ATV will save an estimated £2 million. And if the worst comes to the worst? and ATV loses the Midlands contract at any time, then ATV has the right to let the site to the next TV company, and so lose no money.

The basis of the deal was an agreement in 1968 with Birmingham Council that "the site is not to be devoted to normal commercial purposes". In August last, ATV announced the following on these plans:

- a 30 story office tower and TV studios
- a 250- to 300-bedroom hotel
- an exhibition hall which would also seat 300 for conferences or sporting events
- a 1,250-seat theatre
- two 850-seat cinemas
- a shopping piazza
- a car park

- an air terminal
- a restaurant
- a public house

N.B.: "The site is not to be devoted to normal commercial development."

Within hours of hearing that ITA had rewarded them the contract for the Midlands, ATV asked Birmingham City Council for the Paradise site. The Council had previously earmarked the site for an exhibition hall, but this scheme was postponed "owing to Government restrictions on capital expenditure". The Council wanted the Midlands Independent Television Center in Birmingham; with all its prestige they felt that it could not allow the centre to be established outside Birmingham. And above all, they were attracted by the ATV promise to build a 30,000 square-foot exhibition hall-cum-theatre, with the prospect of starting to collect rent on the then vacant Paradise site. The Council voted its initial approval, and the final negotiations began.

The following month ATV presented their final offer. They indicated that they had "attractive cheaper offers in other Midland towns". But, according to an article in the *Sunday Times*:

- Coventry were asking a bigger rent for a smaller site.
- Plans for the Solihull site extended to studios and an administrative block only.
- Sutton Coldfield had not even offered a specific site.
- The Paradise Centre is close to the Birmingham Post Office Tower, which will link ATV with the national network. Landlines linking any other site would have been very expensive.

But the General Purposes Committee accepted the final offer, and took it to the 'Tory' controlled Council for ratification. ATVs terms, on which they got their final lease, were:

- a peppercorn rent for the first two years.
- for the first 10 years thereafter £30,000 per annum.
- for the next 10 years £35,000 per annum, subject to a rent review (in an upward direction only) to take place at the end of the 40th year and thereafter at 28-year intervals.
- option to purchase the freehold interest on terms to be agreed at the time of acquisition.

The commercial benefits of diversification are quite clear: as shown in the following breakdown of ATVs 1968 profit, television accounted for only 50 per cent of the corporation's pre-tax profit:

	£
Television	3,434,000
Films	852,000
Records and Music	879,000
Theatre	536,000
Merchandising, Publishing, Toys	121,000
Ten-pin Bowling	16,000
Background Music & Communications ..	37,000
Theatrical Costumes	62,000
Property	136,000
Investment	184,000
TOTAL	6,183,000

IX. THE FUTURE WITH CASSETTE TELEVISION

Cassette programmes that you play through your own television set may be the biggest revolution in home entertainment since the long-playing record — and ATV are in at the start of it.

Currently the most advanced system seems to be EVR (Electronic Video Recording) the product of a partnership of CBS of America, ICI and the Swiss firm CIBA. Initially, EVR is being promoted for its educational applications, but soon cassettes and players will be on sale for the huge 'home-entertainment' market. And this will be *soon*: EVR will be on the market in black-and-white by July, in colour a year later.

By 1972, an alternative system, developed by Philips, in co-operation with Sony and Grundig will have arrived. This will be the first real home colour TV recorder: you'll be able to record your favourite TV programme straight off the air, as well as buying the pre-recorded cassettes.

The programmes for these pre-recorded cassettes will, of course, be provided by the big film and TV companies. ATV and EMI are in a very strong position in this respect, having experience of large budget drama serials, films and variety shows. In fact, ATV will provide the first full EVR programme—an educational one—so that they will be able to build up a degree of early experience in the new medium, in much the same way that they were able to in live commercial television.

Cassette TV will open up a vast new field of operations for programme production companies, and it's no wonder that ATV are so interested in EVR. The biggest rewards will be for firms which can get international stars for their programmes, for firms which can tailor their programmes to an international (ie, US) market ... and we all know who's good at that. And with EVR as an outlet for its programmes, ATV will have less than ever to fear if some future Independent Television Authority dares to deprive it of its franchise.

And ATV are not the only company aware of these developments. Take Polytel, a new company with Lord Willis as Chairman, and Kenneth Rive as a joint managing director. They intend to produce 'high quality' cassette programmes for the EEC. Lord Willis is a close friend of Lew Grade's—and had an office in ATV House in his capacity as a sort of personal script adviser/ideas originator for Sir Lew. Kenneth Rive is an old friend of Leslie Grade's. Between them they established the Grade-Rive films company to produce films and handle 20 cinemas in the Gala chain.

But what sort of programmes are likely to go into these cassettes? Here, surely, is a medium ideally suited to the communication of minority interests. Cassettes could be made for people with very specific interests, without usurping the 'air-space' of those with broader interests. But it seems more likely that canned TV will come under the same commercial pressure that moulds the style and standards of broadcasting output today. The high cost of producing any programme compared with, say, an LP record, the eye on the American market: both argue for a maintenance of current 'popular entertainment' standards.

We're likely to have our canned TV laced with commercials: this could bring down the price of a cassette (to buy, or more likely to hire). As EVR themselves put it: "The gradual establishment of EVR as a standard item of domestic equipment represents further, an extremely important potential in *the promotional area*." They know how the system works, even if we don't. What better way of going about things than to make people buy their own ads. A fully integrated system.

As a cassette TV player becomes standard household equipment, hired out along with the telly, broadcast TV will have to reappraise its role as radically as the newspaper in the age of television. Broadcast serials, plays and variety shows will have to compete with the bewildering choice of programmes of these kinds on the shelves of the supermarkets.

Possible results? The transmitting companies will have to cut down on these 'timeless' productions. Culture will have to go — and be replaced by a more newspaper-type output of news, current affairs discussions and documentaries and sport. These, then, will be the programmes which have to draw maximum audiences and bring in the advertising revenue. How will they do it? Will we see a 'gutter press' of the TV channels emerge?

Radio Raptures

But let's not forget Emile and Prince. For they both have vision and foresight — a nose for the future. Both have clearly seen that money and power can be gained from the establishment of commercial radio stations. Prince Littler is already a director of European Radio Ltd and Radio Luxembourg (London) Ltd. Brother Emile, perhaps with the success of commercial television in mind, saw that the time was ripe for the introduction of commercial radio into this country. With this object in mind he at one point set up several companies. For example, he formed the Oxford Broadcasting Company Ltd in 1960, and in 1961 the Central England Broadcasting Company Ltd. The objects for which these companies were established are "to operate and to assist others in operating commercial sound broadcasting services overseas and (if and so soon as legislation permits) in the United Kingdom".

In 1966, one of the organisations urging the Postmaster General to ban the pirates was the Performing Rights Society, of which Mr Emile Littler is a member. *Private Eye* of September 2, 1966, has the following comment: "How moving to observe the struggle maintained by the Performing Rights Society on behalf of those of its members rendered poverty stricken by the wicked Pirate Radio Stations. The society was one of the first bodies to launch a steady campaign aimed at the immediate closing down of all off-shore broadcasting companies. At long last specific legislation is promised and the campaign looks like it is being brought to a successful conclusion.

"This will please out-of-work violinists all over the country. It will also please Emile Littler. Emile is one of the most influential of the Society's members.

And the Director of Bristol Broadcasting Ltd, and Hampshire, Kent, Oxford and Sussex Broadcasting Ltd."

It's now 1970, and the Tories stand a good chance at the General Election. Commercial radio stands a good chance at the next General Election. The cause of monopolistic control of ideas, taste, information stands a good chance at the next General Election too.

X. THE LAW

There are two regulatory agencies which *could* concern themselves with the activities of the Grade/Delfont/Littler monolith: the Independent Television Authority, and the Monopolies Commission. These are relevant extracts from the law as it refers to the activities of these two bodies:

THE MONOPOLIES AND RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES (INQUIRY AND CONTROL) ACT, 1948.

An Act to make provision for inquiry into the existence and effects of, and for dealing with mischiefs resulting from, or arising in connection with, any conditions of monopoly or restriction or other analogous conditions prevailing as respects the supply of, or the application of any process to, goods, buildings or structures, or as respects exports.

Under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1948 Act, although a single company cannot be referred to the Commission by name, monopolies of scale (enterprises which supply or process one-third or more of the goods of a specified class) which occur in any industry can be referred and reported on.

It is also the official position (stated in the annual reports on the Act and elsewhere) that Sections 3 and 4 empower the Board of Trade to refer oligopolistic situations to the Commission. These sections state that the Act applies where two or more persons supply one-third or more of the goods or processes in question and 'whether voluntarily or not and whether by agreement or arrangement or not, so conduct their respective affairs as in any way to prevent or restrict competition in connection with the production or supply of goods.

Under Section 15, the Commission could also be required to make a general report 'on the general effect on the public interest of practices of a specified class being practices which in the opinion of the Board are commonly adopted as a result of, or for, the purpose of preserving conditions to which the Act applies'.

The conditions of the Act apply when:

- (a) at least one-third of all the goods of that description which are supplied in the United Kingdom or any substantial part thereof are supplied by or to any one person, or by or to any two or more persons, being inter-connected bodies corporate, or by or to any such two or more persons as are described in subsection (2) of this section; or
- (b) any agreements or arrangements (whether legally enforceable or not) are in operation the result of which is that, in the United Kingdom or any substantial part thereof, goods of that description are not supplied at all.

THE TELEVISION ACT, 1964

- 10 (2) (b) It shall be the duty of the Authority to do all that they can to secure that there is adequate competition to supply programmes between a number of programme contractors independent of each other both as to finance and as to control.

- 10 (2) (a) It shall ... secure that persons who are disqualified persons as defined in subsection (3) of this section do not become or continue as programme contractors, either alone or in partnership with other persons.

- 10 (2) (3) (b) In subsection (2) (a) of this section 'disqualified person' means a person who being an individual or a body corporate, carries on business as an advertising agent (whether alone or in partnership), or has control over any body corporate which carries on business as an advertising agent ...

- 11 (5) (e) ... The programme contractor if so required, will give reasonable facilities to the Authority for inspecting the books, accounts, records and other documents kept by the programme contractor for purpose of any business carried on by him, and for taking copies of, or any part of, any such documents.

So the Monopolies Commission has the right to intervene in an industry when over 33 per cent of the goods offered to the public are supplied by a single person or organisation. The difficulty the Monopolies Commission might face is the impossibility of defining precisely the concept of 'commodity' in the entertainment industry. The products of the Grade/Littler grouping are not exactly goods, and in any case they control different sections of the entertainment industry — each of which has to be considered on its own.

There are two points to be made at this stage. Firstly, it is clear from the experience of the United States, where the Anti-Trust laws are more severe than the British equivalents, that within the contemporary structure of Western society the law cannot be allowed to play anything but an ineffective regulatory role unless it is to destroy the dynamic growth of the system itself (monopoly capitalism). While the philosophy of corporate growth and corporate freedom (as opposed to individual fulfilment and individual freedom — not, we must insist, as opposed to the regressive 'free market-capitalism') continues to flourish at every point in our anti-critical society, there can be no effective opposition to the growth of monopoly.

And where the laws are effective, the result is that the large corporation with its massive (now partly unemployed) resources simply uses them abroad, and grows through its overseas subsidiaries — thus maintaining the growth of the system in another guise. And certainly one of the implications of this internationalisation of capital is the necessity of an internationalisation of culture. And certainly ATV can claim to be in the avant garde of this movement.

But even 'effective' anti-monopoly laws cannot deal with groups which have informal agreements between themselves, and yet which are below the legal definition of monopoly. Moreover, who is going to design legislation to operate against the only industrial and commercial groupings which are able to compete effectively on the world market against the massive US combines? To legislate against, say, EMI and ATV Corporation would be to legislate against over £110,000,000 in export sales, with the majority in North America. Who is going to do that?

The second point we want to make is that in any

case the law misses the point. It is designed as legislation to operate against monopoly in order to restore some semblance of the ideal 'free market capitalism' of Enoch Powell. It is not designed as legislation to smash the growing threat to individual freedom which this system imposes. It is not designed to smash the control over communication — of ideas, attitudes and the information which shapes them — which has been built up.

And it never will be. For this control, this growth of monopoly in the entertainment industry, these laws themselves are all part of a system. It is the system we are against and the system we must attack.

René Peron THE RECORD INDUSTRY (France, 1976)

The record industry is an excellent example of the transformation of an intangible and unique artistic product, such as a song or piece of music, into a material and reproducible commodity.

More than any other industry of its kind, such as the publishing or film industry, the record industry reveals the logic of capitalist exploitation under the specific conditions needed to articulate these two processes necessary for its production.

I. THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RECORD INDUSTRY

After a brief period of experimentation,¹ the production of records was quickly organized on an industrial basis. From the end of the nineteenth century, there were three essential characteristics:

— record players and cylinders or records go hand-in-hand and are produced by the same companies;

— production is dominated by a few groups, some of which, even at this early date, had an international implantation: the multinationals Grammophon,² the US firms Columbia-Edison and Victor Records, and the French firm Pathé.

— the competition between these groups is extremely fierce; obviously there is the commercial competition and pricing, but there is also the technological competition with each of the companies vying to be the first to introduce new recording processes.³

The superiority of the record over the cylinder led to the cylinder's obsolescence in 1927. During the period between the wars, besides the heavy

1. In 1877 Edison applied for a patent for an instrument he called a phonograph which worked with a cylinder; also in 1877 the German engineer Emil Berliner, a US immigrant perfected the flat recording technique, the Grammophon.

2. In 1889 Berliner founded the Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft (DGG) and in 1893 the United States Grammophon which in 1898 created an English affiliate, the Grammophon Company which, in turn, took majority control of the German company.

3. Amplifiers, microphones, and especially, electric recording.

This text was written in collaboration with J. Cottereau and A. Sauvage as part of an unpublished study prepared in 1976 for the Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, "La Marchandise Culturelle" with A. Lefebure, A. Huet, J. Ion, and B. Miegé. It will be published by the Presses Universitaires de Grenoble in 1978. Reprinted by permission of the author. It was translated from the French by Mary C. Axtmann. English translation Copyright International General 1978. This is its first publication.

competition and technical innovations,⁴ there was a restructuring of the industry, leading to a greater concentration and the integration of the record industry into the electrical industry: EMI (Electric and Musical Industries) was formed by the merger of Columbia and Pathé in 1928, and in 1931 EMI merged with the Grammophon Company under the control of the English capital held by the latter; with the help of the Deutsche Bank, Telefunken bought up Deutsche Grammophon.

World War Two and the immediate postwar period led to new transformations, both of a general nature and specifically linked to technical and manufacturing conditions. The European economies were seriously weakened by the war; and England, which until then had a monopoly on the shellac used in making records now had a less favorable source of raw materials with the independence of India. The United States benefited from the gradual replacement of shellac by plastic (a petroleum derivative) which in turn was linked to the changeover from the old 78 rpm to the new microgroove longplay records.⁵ These transformations accelerated the restructuring of the industry which had begun in the preceding period, and finally stabilized along the following lines which are still more or less valid today (figures from 1971-1972):

RANK	COMPANY	COUNTRY	% OF MARKET
1	Pathé Marconi	GB	15
2	WEA	US	14
3	Phonogram	HOL	12
4	Polydor-DGG	WG	12
5	CBS	US	11
6	RCA	US	10

1. The Record Industry Is Highly Concentrated

A few multinationals dominate the world market. It is estimated that one and a half billion records are sold worldwide each year.⁶ With an

4. Although previously tested by RCA in 1933, the microgroove was perfected by CBS in 1947 and introduced in France by Barclay. The microgroove had an extraordinary effect on the development of the record market, which became a real mass market.

5. The Siemens & Haske group, which had bought up all the stock of Deutsche Grammophon in 1941, continued its success after the war thanks to the authorization of the British forces in Germany (it kept the trademark DGG for classical music, and founded the trademark Polydor for pop entertainment, while Archiv Productions was used for the records from its musicology studio). Later it entered into a partnership with Philips in the Polygram Company which shared their respective Polydor and Phonogram divisions.

6. USA, 422 million; Japan 165; Great Britain, 132; West-Germany, 130; France, 108; estimates for the rest of the world, 365 (1972 figures).

7. The order of classification varies each year depending on the number of hits produced by each company. However, we estimated that Pathé Marconi, Phonogram, Barclay, and Polydor-PGG each control between 10 and 20% of the market; and CBS (which has made a strong advance in France), Vogue, and Sonopresse each between 5

annual turnover of about 20 billion francs, six firms account for more than three-quarters of all the sales. Of the six companies, three are American and together they dominate more than one-third of the market.

If we examine the French market alone,⁷ we find that eight companies account for more than four-fifths of the sales. Of these eight, however, only three are controlled by national capital (Barclay, Vogue and Sonopresse). More than half the sales in France go to foreign multinationals. It should be noted, furthermore, that the classical music market is relatively more concentrated than the market as a whole and it is more dominated by the multinationals. At present, Polygram, a holding company of Phonogram and Polydor, and Pathé Marconi together control more than half of the classical market with the most important French companies, Barclay and Vogue, producing only pop entertainment music.

The reason why we have analysed the concentration of the record industry on the basis of its distribution structure are twofold: the availability of information and statistics on distribution, but even more importantly, the notion of "production" in the record industry is rather complex and difficult to define⁸ and is directly affected by changes and developments in the distribution process. In all cases the large corporations are involved in "production-publishing", but besides the distribution of their own products, they also distribute the products of other producers. This often represents a large part of their activity.⁹ A study of the respective impact of different companies on the national market in the case of France however, presents the disadvantage of falsifying somewhat an appraisal of the overall importance of the foreign companies¹⁰ and the relative importance of each firm,¹¹ because such a study does not take into account that it is a big export industry.

2. The Record Industry is an important Export Industry.¹²

and 10%. Then comes RCA Decca (an English firm distributed by Pathe Marconi), and Discodix Az. The other companies are small and very specialized, such as Musicdisc (which has grown considerably by simultaneously promoting classical and pop music), Vega, Ades, Chant du Monde, Harmonia Mundi, Erato, Valois, among others.

8. Furthermore, the term "producer" itself has a particular meaning within the business.

9. This is the particular case of Sonopresse, which is essentially a distributor.

10. "French" production (that of companies implanted in France) is the third largest in the Common Market and sixth in the world.

11. Barclay, for instance, exports around 25% of its production and has several affiliates abroad (in Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, and Japan) which not only distribute but do "remakes" as well. These licensing contracts for foreign production enter into stiff competition with pirate recordings, highly developed in certain countries (25% of the market in the US, for example).

12. This is why certain governments give substantial aid to the industry. It is the case in Great Britain but not in France.

In France, 14% of the record production was sold abroad in 1972, a turnover of 82 million francs, whereas the imports were 30 million francs. The amount of this balance of exchange has been consistently positive since 1968, and is improving: in 1974, the imports equalled only one-fifth of the exports. The phenomenon is even more remarkable in the area of tape recorders and pre-recorded tapes. This development corresponds to a strong and consistent increase in the exports to the Common Market countries and to the countries linked to the French franc, whereas exports to other countries have tended to decrease strongly in relative value over the past years, even if certain companies (Barclay, for instance) have entered the Japanese market.

This tendency corresponds partly to the particular conditions of production and commercialization of this kind of product and is related to its profitability.

3. The Record Industry Is An Integrated Industry

The multinational record companies are all integrated into larger trusts whose principal activity is not records, but areas closely related to them. There are two main types of affiliations.

The first, and most important, is the integration of the record companies into electric material equipment industries who manufacture the listening and playback equipment, such as record players. The principal activity of the world's four biggest companies is of this type: Pathé Marconi, integrated into EMI, which in turn merged with Thomson Houston in 1958; Phonogram of Philips; Polydor-DGG of Siemens; and lastly, WEA affiliated with an electronic trust.

The second type of integration is between the record company and a larger communication conglomerate, such as ABC, CBS, and RCA, which owns the US TV networks, publishing houses, and are heavily implanted in the new education and leisure industries. This is also a complementary aspect of EMI (which controls Pathé Marconi) which invests not only in the electric and electronic industries, but in television, movies, hotels and restaurants as well. Lastly, in France, we should mention Sylvain Floirat who is owner of one-third of the stock of radio station Europe 1, owner of an armament factory, and one of the main stockholders of Discodis Az.¹³

The functional relationship between these firms and the underlying complementary character of their products is the basis for these integrations. Thus, the sale of listening equipment (radios, record players, etc.) is closely linked to the development of record distribution. This is also true of audience ratings, and with it, the advertising receipts of a radio or television station which are dependent in large part on the popularity of its music and entertainment programming.

13. Discodis is the distribution company of Disc Az.

14. Based on gross profits before taxes.

4. The High Profitability of the Record Industry

A number of the high-level executives we interviewed in the record companies emphasized that record production was only a subsidiary activity of their groups, and insisted that a record company which was self-financing was looked upon favorably by its parent company. Although it is true that records represent a small percentage of the overall turnover of each group (for instance, 3% in the case of Philips), this does not mean that record production is little more than an advertising appendix for the sale of other products. Numerous indications on the contrary, show that records have a very attractive profit rate.

Even if the position of the record companies seems to indicate that they are used to promote the sale of listening and playback equipment, the promotion of records by the media is certainly not unilateral: radio and television broadcasts help sell records at least as much as the quality or popularity of records help develop the audience for a particular radio or television program. The size and diversity of the audience will be even greater to the degree that the hit records played on the program will be chosen from many different diverse record companies.

Record sales, furthermore, are not necessarily the most efficient promotional means to sell other products. There is no normative relationship (or semi-monopoly by a single manufacturer) between the sales of records and record players, as is the case in other branches of cultural production such as photography (cameras and film) or the new audio visual products (microfilm readers and cassettes). In the case of records, the buyer is relatively indifferent to the brand name and is much more sensitive to the work itself or the performer. In other words any record, produced by any company, contributes indifferently to the development of all brands of Hi-Fi and stereo systems.

The concentration of multinational capital in the record industry, plus the presence of a number of large corporations specialized exclusively in this area, indicates that beyond the complementary interests analysed earlier, capital is invested in this sector because of its profitability, and even, super-profitability.

Nevertheless, beyond these general indications, it is difficult to estimate the real rate of profit. The integrated and multinational structure of the industry makes it hard to isolate the norms and performance of the record industry by itself. However, we can put forth some general figures: concerning nine French companies between 1971 and 1974, based on an annual business survey published in the French revue *Entreprise*.¹⁴

Based on the available figures concerning operating expenses, and profit and losses, we find that almost all of the record companies had a rate of profit between 17 and 26%; one of the highest and most stable of any cultural industry. This has taken place in a context of a market in full expansion: beginning with the longplay microgroove record

the growth of the industry has increased steadily by the average of 19% per year between 1961 and 1964, before a rather sudden halt between 1965 and 1968 (where there was a regression in both value as well as volume). Since 1969, there has been a considerable expansion of the market, and during the next few years the rate of growth is expected to be around 20% a year, with considerable fluctuations from one year to the next. This halting rhythm shows that records are a difficult product to impose consistently and durably. This is true of those genres which live and die following the latest fad (hard rock, etc.) as well as it is true of individual products, at least in the pop music area. If this instability is an inherent character in the very use-value of a record which gives rise to a small, purely speculative "artisan" production, it does not explain the modalities and strategies used by the big capitalist firms to control and transform the conditions of record production.

II. CAPITALIST EXPLOITATION IN THE RECORD INDUSTRY

The production and realization of a record is a complex process. We will begin by a brief schematic analysis, first breaking down the different components, and secondly, elucidating their most frequent relationship.

1. The Components In The Exploitation Process.

The components in this process are presented in the order in which they appear in the successive stages in the production of the record. However, it is often rearranged or restructured because of the capitalist organization of production. This also effects the nature of each individual stage as well.

A. Concerning the production process:

— the first step is the *creation of the work*, the words and music of a song, for example, by an author and a composer (sometimes the same person);

— this work is then *printed on paper*, either by the artists themselves or by specialized sheet music or music publishing companies; and

— to protect their copyright interest in the work,¹⁵ which anyone could buy and perform once it is published and reproduced in many copies, the "creators" register the work in *printed form, with a (national) society of authors and composers* (in France it would almost always be the Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs Musicaux (SACEM)), which then takes care of the administration of these rights.

In order for the work to be produced in the material form of a record, many more operations

15. These are effective until 50 years after the artist's death.

16. In 1972, the French owned 8 million record players (barely one out of two households) compared with 30 million radios and 12.1 million television sets.

17. Besides the class differences, there are great disparities related to the place of residence (country, town, city or the Paris region), and related to age.

are necessary:

— the *performance*, which can be done by the same artist (author-composer-performer) or by one or several performers, such as a singer and a musician;

— the *recording*, which calls for the use of a studio, from which is produced an original magnetic tape; and

— lastly, the *pressing*, the final important step in the making of a record, when the original tape is transcribed onto a matrix or "master" from which will be printed the final record product. A few additional operations follow: the production of the record jacket, labeling and jacketing. All this is usually done by the pressing factory or studio, but it is sometimes sub-contracted out to a printer.

B. Concerning the marketing of the commodity, there are three stages which, likewise, are not always distinguishable and do not always follow the same sequence:

— the first step is the creation of a *demand*. This step is much more important in record production than in most other material production, because, as noted earlier, in the area of music or entertainment "needs", use value is not directly determined by concrete factors. This poses two specific types of problems to be overcome before the record is converted into exchange-value.

First there is the problem of the formation and extension of the listening public. In the field of records, this is not just an economic problem; it is also limited by socio-cultural barriers.¹⁶ Studies of record distribution according to classes and social strata show major disparities,¹⁷ especially concerning the distribution of classical and pop records, the two principal markets. Without entering into details, we will only note that although twice as many workers as middle-level executives never listen to records, 70% of working-class homes own records. Furthermore, the repartition of pop and classical records between classes shows the narrow upper-class foundation upon which rests the consumption of classical records.

Next, there is the need to develop consumption of a particular product at a particular time. Not just the consumption of records in general, but the consumption of a particular song or hit record of the month. We will not dwell here on the general processes involved in the social formation of "taste" which implies other determinant factors outside the specific process of record production (the formation of ideology, the dominant culture, fashion, etc.), but we do want to emphasize the importance of these factors in the creation of a demand. The formation of this demand calls for its own forms of intervention and relationships which go beyond the usual advertising campaigns and marketing studies of the record companies. These interventions imply an intermediary sphere between the production apparatus and the distribution apparatus, principally, the mass media and the State apparatus.

— the second step is the commercial stage in the realization of a record, which is carried out by the *distribution* network which links the production stage to the commercialization stage. The commer-

cialization stage itself is composed of two components: the *intermediary structure* (wholesalers, central buying offices of the department stores, rock jobbers),¹⁸ and the *retail structure* which in the past few years has become very concentrated (from 61% of all record sales in 1971 to 40% in 1973, with the share of the department stores and supermarkets growing to about 55%).¹⁹

— the third stage is the distribution of the proceeds of the record sales among the participating parties. Here we must explain the specific methods used to pay the creators for the use of the *artistic product*; the remuneration of the other parties is the same as in any other economic sector (salaries for some, profits for others).

Artists are remunerated for performance rights each time a song, for example, is performed "live" in public (at a dance, festival, concert, night club, radio, television, etc.). The amount of money, which is determined by a number of barometers, is paid by the organizers of the performance to a national society of authors and composers (like the SACEM in France), who in turn distribute the money (after deducting administrative expenses) in equal parts to the author, composer, and sometimes, the sheet music publisher (in this example, each gets one-third).

The mechanical reproduction of the song is paid on the same royalty principle. The party initiating the mechanical reproduction must pay an affiliate of the SACEM, the Société des Droits de Reproduction Mécanique (SDRM, the Society for Mechanical Reproduction Rights), a royalty of 8% of the *retail sales price* of the record. This sum is then distributed between the author, composer, and sometimes, the sheet music publisher, but in proportions more favorable to the publisher than in the case of the performance rights (50% instead of 33⅓%, the other 50% being divided equally between the author and composer). If the record is played in public, the organizer of the performance must pay part of the royalties to the SACEM,²⁰ for the performance rights, and part to the SDRM for the mechanical reproduction rights. The performers are paid by a royalty based on a percentage of the *wholesale price* of the records sold,²¹ while the studio musicians are paid at scale wages, in three-hour units.

2. Modes of Articulation Between the Components

It is at this level that the strategies employed by the capitalist in the record production industry become clear.

Theoretically, the entire process of production and realization of a record is accessible to the artists themselves. They can publish their works

18. These manage the record section in the retail stores. The COGEDEP, created in 1971 by nine of the biggest companies, is practically the only one in the business since 1974.

19. The discount chain FNAC alone accounts for 5%.

20. The amounts are based on the ratings of radio and TV stations.

themselves or have it done by independent companies already established in the business. They can rent a recording studio by the hour, and can even choose specialized personnel for the recording, the orchestration, and all the necessary technical operations. They can then make direct arrangements with an independent pressing studio.²²

However, this is not how it works. The production process is articulated very differently and is dominated, as we have seen, by the large corporations.

The first factor prohibiting the artist from controlling the transformation of their intangible product into a material record is the cost of this transformation. This cost is estimated at 20 to 30 thousand francs for a simple production. As soon as there is musical accompaniment of any importance, the price skyrockets. With the orchestration of a piece of classical music or an opera, the price can easily go as high as one million francs. Furthermore, the decision to cut a record after most of the costs have already been incurred, increases the gamble even more. Thus the risks involved, though not large by industrial standards, are far beyond the means of all but a very small number of professional artists.²³ Only two types of "private" entrepreneurs can undertake this type of production: established "stars" who are not tied by contract to a large corporation, or businessmen capable of advancing the money or bringing it together. This is the world of the "independent" producer, who presently, represents about 20% of the total turnover of the French record industry.

The second factor is directly related to the specific social conditions determining the use-value of an artistic work, particularly, in the field of pop entertainment. Here is where we find the informal 'show business' institution, a world composed of a few hundred people, without any particular qualifications, but well-placed in the network of the large corporations and entertainment, either in the business or artistic side ("stars", arrangers, musicians, etc.). The show business world recruits new talent either for itself or on behalf of the large corporations, and manipulates the instruments used to create the demand and the hits. Aside from the established "stars" who produce their own work, the independent producers usually belong to the show business world. The relationship between these small entrepreneurs, always looking for good speculative deals, and the large corporations are very complex and diverse: some drop out to manage their own businesses, while others enter as impresarios or artistic directors along with the artists they have discovered.

However, it is the large corporations which organize the most frequent mode of articulation, and they maintain their control through two types of

21. From 5 to 10%, according to their fame, with up to 13% for the "big stars".

22. Of the eleven pressing factories which print 90% of the French production, four belong to Pathé Marconi, Philips, Sofrason Arcaecum, and Vogue.

23. More than 80% are unable to support themselves by their work.

integration.

The first, which may appear functional, is in their *role as record producer*. In this role, the large corporations coordinate the dispersed elements and successive phases of performance, recording and pressing. In reality, this coordination includes more important facets which concern the very conception of the artistic product itself. Although there are many methods and techniques used to organize, directly or indirectly, the material production of the work, there are four principal ways the record producer controls the first step in the production process. First, the search for exclusive contracts to control the use of performed works and the assembling of a catalogue of sure winners. Second, the signing of licensing contracts to adapt and translate foreign works (a considerable part of record company profits come from this source, and there are obvious advantages for international corporations).²⁴ Third, the most direct intervention is the use of the original work as "raw material" and then manufacturing the artistic product around it using their own "house" personnel (lyricists, arrangers, sound technicians, etc.) and "house" performers. The record producers maintain a stable of singers on a "stringer" or trial basis, chosen not so much for their "talent" but for a series of secondary and specialized characteristics (type of voice, physical appearance, etc.) who can be used as needed: to sing in a particular style currently in fashion, or to follow up on a successful hit of a fading competing star with the hope that after a number of hits, he or she can then become the new star.

The fourth way a company creates and dominates the market in the conception of an artistic work is simply the institutional, economic and social role it plays in conditioning potential artists and their relationship to the public.

The *second form of integration is economic*, in the large corporation's integration of all the different legal aspects and physical stages of the production process.

The most strategic component is the sheet music company. All of the big record companies have a sheet music affiliate and any artist who wants to record with them must use their affiliate. The advantages for the record company are substantial. The sheet music publisher receives 33⅓% of the royalties for the performance rights paid to the SACEM and 50% of the mechanical reproduction rights paid to the SDRM. The large corporation through its sheet music affiliates not only recovers a part of the royalties it must pay to reproduce a

24. The international companies benefit from a product which comes to them practically free of charge from their foreign affiliates or associated companies.

25. Records are "perishable" products. A delay of ten days in the launching of a successful record can be a catastrophe.

26. The author develops this at length in a subsequent part of his essay [Eds.].

27. Only a few cooperative organizations, usually with a social or political base, have been able to develop their own distribution network. An example is "Expression Spontanée."

work, but it also gets free advertising, and even paid advertising, for its products. Every time a record is played on the radio, the sheet music affiliate receives both types of royalty payment.

The other physical components of the production process are less profitable. Only four record companies have their own pressing factory. However, they all have their own recording studio, but they also use the independents, as they also do for the pressing, depending on the volume and rhythm of record consumption.²⁵

Thus the capitalist corporations control the production process by controlling the relationship between the intangible song and the material record. The reason why they are not interested in the intangible stage or the material stage themselves can be found in the specific manner that value is created in this type of product.²⁶

We will conclude by the second type of capitalist economic integration which controls the relationship between production and commercialization: the distribution network. It is the most concentrated stage of the entire process (eleven distributors in France control 80% of the sales). Every big company has its own distribution firm. This last step is practically impossible to take independently.²⁷ The "independent" producers must use the services of one of the distributors. The largest, Sonopresse, was founded and quickly developed by playing on the contradictions between the artists and record companies, which they exploited by offering artists who produce their own records low-cost distribution contracts, often with guarantees (this price-cutting operation was financed by the publishing monopoly Hachette). This however is undoubtedly a transitory phenomenon, for Sonopresse will certainly change its terms and follow the same practices used by the other distributors-producers when it becomes firmly established.

French Communist Party Committee of Chaix Printers

THE BOOK: THE WORKERS STRUGGLE AGAINST THE CRISIS, WASTE, MONOPOLIES AND AUTHORITARIANISM

(France, 1976)

I. AUTHORITARIANISM AND AUSTERITY AGAINST THE PRINTING INDUSTRY

The crisis in the printing industry cannot be considered apart from the global context of the crisis of State Monopoly Capitalism.¹ The Twenty-Second Congress of the French Communist Party defined it as a structural crisis, a crisis of the capitalist system itself. The irregularities, imbalances, disruptions, and waste which currently affect this system affect the printing industry as well.

This is all the more true inasmuch as it is estimated that 40% of the turnover in the printing industry depends on general economic activity. The serious recession which began in mid-1973, and the reduction of advertising expenditures for 1973-74 limited the industry's markets. The extent of the recession and its repercussions on the printing industry can be fully appreciated when one knows that the industry's main client is the advertising industry, which represents 28.8% of the printing industry's turnover (next comes book publishing at 28.5%).

58% of the The French People Never Read Books²

There can be no doubt that the printing industry suffers severely from the constant attacks against the income of the popular classes.

58% of the French never read books. 75% of the books published are bought and read by 13% of the population.

They do not read because they do not have the time to read, nor the means to read, nor the reasons to read.

First, the time to read: where could these men and women whose lives are vowed to an overly-long work week possibly find the time, with the double workday imposed by housework, the time wasted on uncomfortable transportation, and the increasingly fatigued lifespan which further discourages opening a book?

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Then, the means to read: how can one have these means when salaries are insufficient and books so expensive.

In 1892, there were 414 daily newspapers. In 1945 at the time of Liberation there were only 203. In 1976, only 90 remained, 9 of them in Paris.

According to the preparatory documents of the government's Seventh Plan, the daily print run of newspapers has barely risen since 1939 (12 million copies) whereas the population has increased by 25%.

In fact, France has fallen to the bottom rung in Europe as far as public reading is concerned, while the socialist countries, which began far behind are now at the top of the ladder. As we know, the last two years have been characterized by an extremely vigorous policy of austerity: work conditions are more difficult, and purchasing power has decreased.³

Mr. Granet, the former Secretary of State responsible for books, has himself admitted that only 3% of the French use the public libraries, as compared with 20% in the USA, 30% in Great Britain, and 31% in the USSR.

In 1974, France devoted only 5 francs per person to public reading (of which 88% was at the expense of the local communities), as opposed to 25 francs in Great Britain and 60 francs in Denmark.

The budget for the library facilities themselves fell from 38 million francs in 1974 to 34 million francs in 1975, and 26 million in 1976.

The overall budget for public reading (facilities and operation) went from 94.1 million francs in 1975 to 93.2 in 1976.

These figures show clearly that there has been a real regression in public reading in France.

Another significant aspect: for the construction of the municipal library in Argenteuil, the State used its Value Added Tax to take back 9/10ths of its subsidy which finally came to only 190,000 francs in other words, only 2.5% of the cost (excluding the tax).

Moreover, although there are many aspects of the cultural crisis which we will not go into here,⁴ we should not overlook the deep moral crisis which is affecting the country.⁵ Recently, the monopolies have exhibited a very deliberate desire to debase people in every imaginable area.

Here we are thinking of the wave of pornography, but also, for example, the poor quality of television programming. It is not the audiovisual media in themselves which curb reading. What contributes to people's lack of reading is the cultural poverty of French television. The socialist countries have greatly developed the audiovisual media and

1. For an analysis of the causes of this crisis, see the report presented by George Marchais at the Twenty-Second Congress of the French Communist Party, *Le Socialisme pour la France*, Paris, Editions Sociales, 1976, pp. 24-39.

2. It should be pointed out that in popular language the word "book" very often is used to refer to a magazine. The surveys do not take this into account.

3. *Op. cit.*, pp. 10-23.

4. On this point see Roland Leroy, *La Culture au present*, Paris, Editions Sociales, 1972.

5. *Le Socialisme pour la France, op. cit.*, p. 39.

television, and reading has progressed at the same time. Moreover, all the surveys agree that television programs concerned with literature are successful even though they are shown rather late at night.

The campaign of degradation being waged by the monopolies is an important aspect of the current crisis, for the simple reason that it opposes the fact that more and more people are claiming control over their own lives.

The desire of the monopolies to impose a sub-culture tends to discourage French reading sensibilities, and without the slightest doubt, this has had an effect in limiting the printing industry's current market.

II. MONOPOLY DOMINATION, HERE LIKE EVERYWHERE ELSE

The printing industry is comprised of a vast number of small and medium-sized companies. In global terms, 50% of the employees work in companies with less than 90 employees, 21% of the companies have fewer than 6 employees, and only 22 companies have more than 1000 employees (17 in 1966).

In the book and periodical printing industry, the 10 largest companies (0.8% of the total) accounted

for 20% of the turnover, while in the publishing industry, the 10 largest accounted for 51% of the turnover.

In France the artisanal, commercial or service companies with fewer than 10 employees account for 27% of the work force. This means that the average size of printers is not much smaller than companies in other sectors of the economy. However, unlike other sectors, there are no big monopolies in this branch. The largest company, Neogravure, employs only about 3,000 people.

This does not mean however that the monopolies do not dominate this branch also (even if they find their domination falls short of what they would like it to be).

If the small and medium-sized printers are so numerous, it is because of the particularities of the product being made. This product generally requires a small specialized production to fulfill very specific needs, ranging from wedding invitations to advertisements to business cards, which are often printed in very small quantities.

Such a structure could lead one to think that there are no monopolies at all in the printing industry. However, this is not the case. First of all, the big companies, like Neogravure, are linked to

THE WORKERS' STRUGGLE AT CHAIX PRINTERS

21 NOVEMBER 1974:

Neogravure and Chaix: after three weeks of strike action and factory occupation, an agreement was signed with the Minister of Industry.

In this agreement, the workers at Chaix were to obtain:

— the maintenance of the existing industrial potential at Chaix, and

For the entire printing profession, the following:

— the return of all French-language publishing work presently printed abroad (60% of all French periodicals) which represents 15,000 jobs; and

— the establishment of a system of early retirement at 60 years of age, which represents 6,000 jobs, among other benefits.

DURING THE COURSE OF 1975:

The management of Chaix and the Minister of Industry manoeuvred to avoid application of the agreement of 21 November 1974.

In a confidential note dated March 1975 written by the director of Chaix, they even anticipated the use of provocations to get rid of elements they considered disruptive, especially the workers of the labor union CGT and the immigrant workers, among others, and they also envisaged shifting the clients of Chaix to other printers.

1975-1976:

Chaix itself declared bankruptcy on 6 December 1975.

Concerning the entire printing profession, the situation was aggravated by the disrespect of the

agreement of 21 November 1974 and the establishment of the Lecat Report (the basis of the government's Seventh Plan for the graphic industry). This report, in effect, foresees the elimination of 15-20,000 jobs in the printing profession from 1977 to 1980 (the equivalent of 1 out of every 5 workers).

The Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (PARIBAS), which controls Neogravure and Chaix, is responsible for this situation: Because PARIBAS has need of short-term profit, it has sold off the printing industry to the detriment of the cultural needs of France.

— At present, there are 11 occupied printing factories in France, of which 5 are located in the Paris region.

— The threat of layoffs weigh heavily on many other printers; Lang, Paul Dupont, Montsouris, Victor-Michel, Del Duca, among others.

PARIBAS, with the help of the government, has imposed taxes on the industry which facilitate and encourage French publishers to print outside of France.

Profits are being realized especially in the paper and publishing sectors:

— 82% increase in the cost of paper in one year; and

— 300-400% increase in the price of periodicals over ten years, while during the same period printing costs have only increased 80%.

Furthermore, the salaries in the French periodical and book printing industry (2,500 francs per month for a typographer) are the lowest in Europe.

financial groups like the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (PARIBAS). Then there is the capital invested by the printing industry itself whose weight and financial relations have a determinant affect on the entire profession. The present restructuring of the industry will only accentuate their domination unless it is checked.

Next, the printing industry is linked by its purchases and sales to other monopolies. With the technical progress of recent years, this has clearly accentuated.

While purchases in the printing industry represent only 34% of its (pre-tax) turnover, which is low compared with other branches of the economy (about 50%), technological progress, notably in typesetting, has made the printing industry an important market for the electronics industry.

For example, among the manufacturers of different typesetting and printing equipment can be found:

Siemens for keyboard perforators;
Thomson for video console terminals;
IBM and Harris for photo-typesetting;
Kodak and Agfa-Gevaert for photogravure film;
BASF and Dupont de Nemours for photopolymetal printing plates;
Creusot-Loire (Empain Schneider) for printing equipment, especially, offset (it furnishes 16% of French rotary presses).

Furthermore, we find Rhône-Poulenc behind the production of its affiliates or groups. Since 1 January 1976, the trust's activities concerning the production and distribution of graphic materials for printing machinery (notably offset plates) have been regrouped. The group is present in the Quadrimetral company, the world's largest manufacturer of poly-metallic offset plates, and in the Polychrome company, the world's third-largest producer of mono-metallic plates (it holds 26%).

Péchiney-Ugine-Kuhlman produces 75% of the chemical inks.

The monopolies also dominate the paper industry through financial groups such as PARIBAS and Banque de Suez.

The weight of the monopolies has become even clearer with the recent acceleration in the replacement of machinery.

Finally, the publishing industry has become more and more concentrated. The Seventh Plan expressed hopes for "a strong concentration on the commercial and financial levels." At the present time, a few powerful groups share most of the publishing market. The two most important, Hachette,⁶ and the Presses de la Cité group account for almost one-third of the publishing industry turnover, and are both quoted on the stock market.⁷

The printing industry is thus a sector which, no

6. Hachette regroups the publishers Grasset, Fayard and Stock and publishes the paperback series "Livre du Poche."

7. For more complete information see Antoine Spire, and J.P. Viala, *La Bataille du livre*, Paris, Editions Sociales, 1976.

8. *Le Socialisme pour la France*, op. cit., pp. 29-33.

matter how you look at it, as a buyer or a seller, it is dominated by the monopolies or by companies very closely linked to financial groups. Here, like everywhere else, there is not a single activity which escapes the monopolies.⁸

The Effect of Supplies

At every stage of the production process, we find the monopolies massively supported by the State.

As we have already said, this is very clear for the paper industry, one of the most concentrated industries in France.

Two financial groups presently share this sector: the Suez group, through the intermediary of Saint-Gobain, and the PARIBAS group, which in the last few years has acquired holdings in the largest paper companies and encouraged their concentration.

The domination of these few groups largely explains the difficulties in the paper industry: for them the only goal is to make as much profit as possible, even if it means multiplying the waste, artificially creating shortages, and increasing prices.

The wasteful investments in this sector has led to a decrease in the production of cardboard which went from 5,059,600 tons in 1974 to 4,100,000 tons in 1975 (it should be around 4,600,000 in 1976). And the results are well-known: shortages and higher prices, and greater profits than ever for the industrialists. And they merrily continue to invest in the most profitable products: de luxe papers, wrapping paper, household paper products, etc., to the detriment of newsprint. Newsprint makes up only 18% of paper production, and its production has fallen from 436,700 tons in 1960 to 270,000 tons in 1975, and should be about 260,000 tons in 1976.

In 1974, cries of alarm were heard: the sudden hike in the price of paper (82% in one year), and the difficulties in obtaining wood and pulp supplies had put all the newspapers and many printers in difficulty.

Publications quickly reduced their number of pages and their page format. The paper magnates used the shortages as blackmail and pretended to solve the problem by massive lay-offs, which was absurd. Some told stories of world-wide shortages, rationing, the pillage of the forests, and even, the wasting of paper!

Lastly, one must take into account the importance of the chemicals and particularly, the inks. The technical advances in this area have been considerable, and here, too, we find monopolies such as BASF. The prices of all these products has increased considerably in the last few years.

The Interaction With Technological Progress

The question of supplies has become crucial with the increased technological progress in printing machinery. The new technologies sometimes demand different types of paper. With offset printing, for instance, the publisher demands much smoother paper which is passed through a roller,

whereas for years they worked with paper which was merely pressed (and therefore relatively rough). The same goes for the inks whose chemical composition varies according to the type of plates being used (bi-metallic or mono-metallic).

Next, the progress of electronic automation has had a very rapid effect on the printing industry.

There is a permanent back-and-forth movement, an increasingly close interaction between the printing industry and its tributary branches. The investments in paper (or the new technologies) have had their effect on the printing industry. In turn, the new technologies used in the printing industry have affected other industries. Metallurgy, for instance, has been inspired by photo-engraving techniques in chemical machine finishing. This process consists of corroding part of a machine part by attacking it with a chemical after the rest of the part has been given an insoluble coating. The effects of this process are increasingly rapid and brutal, and call for continual re-fittings. Given the increasingly frequent technological developments, this tendency toward interaction is bound to develop more and more.

This interaction is increasingly felt by each employee in their own work and not only constitutes the basis for a solidarity of interests among the workers, but also shows that the ruinous monopoly competition must be done away with. As the Twenty-Second Congress of the French Communist Party emphasized, there must be an increasingly close and intense cooperation among the workers in all sectors.

However, the serious crisis which affects this sector cannot be understood only in the context of the crisis of its tributary branches or in the attacks against popular buying power. To fully understand the crisis it is necessary to see what is happening within the printing industry itself.

III. THE AGGRAVATION OF WASTE

On the whole, the new technologies have been used solely to save money on salaries (either through lay-offs or through down-grading worker's job qualifications). It is the monopolies who produce these machines and who promote the sale of one means of production rather than another. Economizing on the workforce, in order to make the costly machinery as quickly profitable as possible, along with the limited market, have brought about a permanent under-utilization of the means of production. This under-utilization has accelerated the additional accumulation of machinery so as to make up for the inefficient use of the older machinery. This, in turn, leads to save even more money on salaries, thus furthering the obsolescence of the recently installed means of production.

The printing industry in recent years thus has been the scene of considerable investments along with considerable waste.

The newly-introduced machines are indeed more efficient, faster, and more productive. But all the time gained in using these machines is wasted because they are bought and sold to make a profit.

This was the case with computerized type-

setting, introduced in order to take advantage of the high speed of photo-typesetting.

It was the same with the video correction system. But the problem is always the same. This is why the equipment manufacturers increasingly propose complete typesetting ensembles called "systems" which integrate separate elements (optical reader, computer, photo-typesetter, and a range of programs) into a unified whole. The introduction of these systems is the opportunity to place large amounts of capital. The same thing goes for the installation of large printing systems, notably roto-gravure.

Next comes the use of all these machines in a large-scale production line. This necessitates the additional accumulation of control and memory equipment with great capacity which makes it possible to eliminate the well-paid workers who formerly directed the operation of the machines.

Thus the movement to accumulate more equipment to make more profit, and to make profit to accumulate more equipment, clears the way through continuous waste and considerable obsolescence of machinery, for ever more powerful capital.

"In-House" Printing

The accumulation of all this machinery has been further accelerated by the fact that many enterprises (notably governmental agencies) now own their duplicating equipment, not only for internal communications, but often to print their own advertising mailers and similar material.

The employers' house organs (more than 500 of them) are often printed by the company itself, like at Citroën. This is more and more the case, given the political struggles within companies which require more frequent communications by the employers.

The appearance of the "in-house" printing facilities does not constitute a real savings for the large companies. Owning this equipment (sometimes including small rotary offset machines) constitutes only a new source of accumulation of the new means of production which contributes to aggravating their over-accumulation and waste. This means that the employees of the large companies which have "in-house" printing facilities do not benefit from them any more than the workers of the printing industry do. Moreover, the workers employed in these "in-house" printing centres do not benefit from the gains made by the workers in the printing industry.

Moreover, this considerable market is lost to the small and medium-sized printers. Due to the office duplicating machines these companies have lost an estimated three-billion francs worth of business. It should be further noted that the sale of this equipment is also dominated more and more by the monopolies, as shown by the recent agreement between CIT-Alcatel (CGE) and Agfa-Gevaert.

A Few Annotated Figures.....

The movement of accumulation which we have just described can be illustrated by a few figures.

The official statistics show that in the printing industry the fixed capital per employee doubled between 1950 and 1972.

Since 1950, in constant francs, the investments were multiplied by four.

Between 1967 and 1971, the total quantity of sheet-fed printing presses in France increased by 20%. For two-color machines (or larger) the quantity increased by 44%. The number of offset machines is presently increasing at a rate of 15% a year.

In global terms, between 1967 and 1971, production capacity increased by 30%, and 60% if one takes into consideration the speed of the machines.

With this, the hourly productivity related to this work increased 20% in ten years

Market Limitations and the Limitations in the Exploitation of the Workers

While the new technologies and the new accumulations gradually became implanted in the printing industry, and the productivity of the sector continued developing, the market for the industry's products stagnated. On the one hand, the printing industry had become a profitable outlet for electronic equipment which increased work productivity, but on the other hand, the limits of the domestic market (due to the crisis of capitalism and the austerity policy) prevented the market's absorption of the gains in productivity.

The example of offset printing is revealing. There was a rapid investment of capital in offset equipment because it offers the advantage, besides its reproduction quality, of being much faster in printing medium-sized print runs (a plate can be made up in 10 to 15 minutes). But the amount of capital placed in this area was so great that the accumulated means of production reached a level at which not all the capital could be used and make the same rate of profit. Thus, the crisis in offset printing has been particularly brutal: orders have declined by 64%; work hours have been cut back in 45% of the shops; 41% of the companies who use offset have had their turnover fall at least 30%. And now it is estimated that the number of offset machines exceeds the demand by 30%. What waste!

Furthermore, capital had difficulties in making profits due to the limitations in the exploitation of the workers. Even with efficiency reports, the use of down-time, the attempt to down-grade the job qualifications of the book workers by having them do all kinds of jobs, and the increase of work in teams (65% of the workers at Neogravure work in teams), the problem could not be solved. And just when it was thought that the problem was solved, new machines would come out, needing further reductions in salaries in order to put the new machines into production. And then there were the obvious physical limits to exploitation. For example, the use of the video correction system is difficult for any worker to bear for more than four hours a day.

The prices of the new machines, in the context of an inflationary economy has led to save even more on the employees. There is a constant decrease in the

percentage of skilled personnel in the industry. This is in contradiction with the best possible use of the new machines. For example, the operator of a video scanner must have a perfect knowledge of his worktool, the market for which he is producing, and the needs of the client, to be able to handle the equipment properly.

The waste, therefore, is first and foremost a waste of human labor (through unemployment and down-grading of job qualifications). Concerning the technological potential, it has already been noted that its proper use was incompatible with the Malthusian policy of the bosses and government against full employment.

Given the market limitations and the limits in the exploitation of the workers, the need to constantly introduce new means of production means there isn't enough room for all the capital. And each time a new accumulation of equipment takes place in production, it renders the previous machinery obsolete, a process continually necessitated by bigger capitalist interests. The small and medium-sized companies are of course the first effected not only because of the over-accumulation in the printing industry, but also, of the general character of the crisis in France.

Inflationary Policy

The need to profit from the immense investments in the printing industry has engendered a price rise in its products, especially since 1971 in order to finance other investments. Thus the price of *Paris Match* went from 1.20 francs in 1963 to 4 francs in 1976, a rise of 316%, while the actual cost of printing increased by only 84%. The weekly magazine *Elle* went from .80 francs to 4 francs, a rise of over 400%, while the cost of printing rose only 78.4%.

These rises in prices have in large part contributed to limiting the printing industry's market, thus driving capital out of the branch. Thus many small and medium-sized printers who did not have the most modern technologies have lost many clients who have taken their business to the big printers, whose machines can do the work more quickly.

The limits of the markets have in a contradictory way driven some printers to accumulate new means of production, in order to increase their competitiveness and conquer new markets; this has only aggravated the problem.

The elimination of the existing machines, or their under-utilization has affected not only the small and medium-sized companies, but also the largest printers like Neogravure.

IV. CAPITALIST PROFITABILITY AND THE STANDARDIZATION OF THOUGHT

In order to assure profits from all this costly machinery, capital increasingly needs to use it in large-scale production.

When first introduced into typesetting, the computer, with its high speed of operation, required the typesetting of a large number of books and publications. This tendency was in contradiction with the full use of the typesetting machines themselves, for it

was necessary to stop and immobilize the machines to make the necessary settings in order to put through a new text. The problem could be "solved" by purchasing new typesetting machines. But the governmental policy of increasing authoritarianism and austerity leave less and less room for a multiplicity of publications.

With the new computerized typesetting machines already mentioned, the costly part for the capitalist is not so much the machinery itself, but its operating cost, the preparation of its programs, while the daily work is performed by a worker whose job qualification increasingly tends to be down-graded.⁹

The highly developed techniques of computerized typesetting make it possible to do the page layout as well as the justification and corrections in the setting itself. These techniques replace some of the operations which were previously done manually, for example, the stripping-in of film negatives. Thus the editorial time and cost needed to prepare the typesetting programs are more important than the setting itself. The value of the new machines is therefore not to typeset a great variety of texts, but rather to save as much as possible on the cost of programming. The machine is operated only when it can be used over a long period with the same program and typographic rules. For example, the Siemens 40 T2 is used by the telephone company to typeset all the telephone directories.

Furthermore, the printing presses are increasingly costly, and must therefore be used almost without stopping. Under these conditions, profitability leads to printing a minimum of publications.

For the same reasons, rotogravure can be expected to develop even faster than offset. With rotogravure, the production is independent of any setting for format or size, etc.: all adjustments are made away from the machine on the cylinders themselves, usually, at the last minute.¹⁰ The technique promises waste equal to that of offset printing; with rotogravure, the waste will increase as soon as new setting techniques have been perfected.

The use of these machines and their profitability thus necessitates the publication of standard formats such as the paperback book (including the often insipid detective stories, and now "pocket porno"), and the novels, essays or directories which conform to the same typesetting program and same typographic rules.

Paperback Books

The publication of paperback books has grown tremendously. Almost one-third of the books published each year are in paperback format (91 million copies in 1974). Generally, these books are typeset by computerized photo-typesetting equipment, and printed on rotary offset machines which print two sides of the paper simultaneously in units of

9. We underline the word "tend" because the struggle of the workers does not allow the bosses to just down-grade job qualifications just like that. Also, to a certain degree the printers are obliged to re-introduce qualified workers to run the new machinery.

16, 64, or 128 at a rate which can reach 20,000 units per hour.

Generally the publishers try out certain titles in traditional format, and then put them out in paperback only when their success appears assured. In other words, the only books which reach a mass audience are those... which have already reached it.

Furthermore, the possible market for books is flooded with "mass market" titles. Due to the monopolistic content of a distribution policy which profits from the over-accumulation of books flooding the market, the price of paperback books has risen more and more, and they become less and less accessible. This sales strategy is dangerous because it creates a situation wherein books are very rarely published originally in paperback since there is not an assured market.

Not only have the prices risen, but the technical quality of paperbacks is deteriorating (particularly the binding). This just encourages the buyer to throw the book away. The publisher hopes that in this way the turnover of sales will be more rapid.

The Encyclopedias

The same can be said of the so-called "encyclopedias" which have been put on the market in the past few years and promoted with big advertising campaigns. Their distribution is based on and expresses a very real popular need: to know more about the world in which we live, and to attempt to answer and act upon the major problems of our time.

Generally these encyclopedias are prepared on ultra-modern equipment (computerized typesetting and high-level printing techniques) because of the complexity of the page layouts and the color work. Considerable advertising and promotion are used to make people believe that these encyclopedias contain everything that there is to know, without mentioning the sordid side of their advertising which appeals to the unemployed by blackmailing them to buy the encyclopedias to re-educate themselves to get a job. The customers go into debt in order to buy these publications, which consume their entire "book" budget.

The market is thus flooded, to the detriment of publications which reflects different currents of thought. In order to encourage a turnover in sales, one publisher, Alpha, launched a weekly thematic encyclopedia. This competes directly with the mass weekly magazines, and raises their advertising costs, which in turn encourages large-scale production.

The wastes of accumulation thus bring about wastes in unproductive expenses. Do people read more because of this? The question is not to read for the sake of reading, but to read to understand and develop oneself. But these publications tend rather to turn people away from reading because their content generally does not correspond to real needs. This is

10. There are studies being made to engrave directly on the rotogravure cylinders by means of an electronic gun. The British are studying engraving by laser beam. These technologies will make it possible to skip a number of operations. For the moment the laser is only used in the U.S.

why people often buy books which they never read.

The Weekly Mass Magazines

The need to make a profit on these new machines has also fostered the circulation of the weekly mass magazines such as *Télé-7-Jours*, *Le Point*, *L'Express*, etc. without there being a real ideological or political difference in their content. Here there is also a danger: the only things which can be published are those which will have a large market. The other publications are printed during the "gaps" in time left over by the mass weeklies.

The French People and their Diversity of Thought: An Achievement to be Preserved and Developed¹¹

We know that those in power have launched a policy of increasing authoritarianism. The rights of labor unions are put in question, and universal suffrage constantly violated. Television has become a propaganda machine. The press is increasingly restricted in its freedom of expression. This is a serious and threatening situation.¹²

And now to this must be added the dismantling of the printing industry with its grave consequences on the freedom of thought.

The large-scale production of publications all with the same ideological and political content is an important element in the struggle for power. This production policy serves the interests of the "heavy-weights" of the printing industry and gives them the greatest amount of profit from the over-accumulation of capital (albeit with growing objective difficulties, as we have seen). Production and content are thus two aspects of the same policy. And they serve neither the interests of the workers of the printing industry nor the people as a whole.

We must add that the monopoly use of all these technologies is becoming particularly dangerous for the freedom of thought. It will soon be possible to have news agency teletype dispatches read directly by an optical reader and then automatically printed in the newspaper just as they are received from the news agency. Goodbye freedom of writing! Isn't this what President Giscard d'Estaing was suggesting when he emphasized the difference between information and commentary?

As long as the written media is a source of profit and a means of accumulation the monopolies are not interested in purely and simply abandoning it. Moreover, the intensity of the political battle generated by the crisis, and the political perspectives of the Common Program and the activity of the Communists, prevents those in power from limiting themselves to the insipid content of radio and tele-

vision news. The very fact that *l'Humanité* is present everyday (especially in many workplaces, thanks to its sale by party militants) obliges those in power to fight at the level of the written media. But nevertheless, for economic and political reasons they continue to try to restrict the written media, to turn it into a tool for their own political propaganda and to standardize thought.

Our people must not be led towards a standardization. The Twenty-Second Congress of the French Communist Party traced the broad lines of a socialist society in which all currents of thought would be expressed.¹³ The progression of ideas in France is furthermore marked by a double movement: a convergence toward the larger goals of fraternity, freedom, justice and happiness, etc., but in ways which are constantly being multiplied, paths which come together while being diversified. This double movement will only become deeper. Socialist France will give it strength. That is why the workers who are struggling for their jobs, for their salaries, for their promotions, and for respect for their skills, are struggling for a greater initiative for human labor — a re-adjustment of the program — based on new techniques. In the final analysis, we are struggling against the over accumulation and under-utilization of machinery, and the standardization of thought, and struggling for the diversification of books, publications and ideas.

Armand Mattelart

THE GEOPOLITICS OF PAPER (France, 1977)

Two recent political crises and the present economic one illustrate the importance of the stakes involved in the paper industry. Normal capitalist conditions are not usually conducive to discussions on freedom of the press which reveal as clearly the material base of this freedom: paper, the raw material of journalism, and its control.

For the three years during the Popular Unity government in Chile one of the principal fronts in the information battle was the discussion on the nationalization of the paper industry. It should be kept in mind that the riches of Chile's forests represent Chile's second biggest export industry and source of foreign currency, after copper. The paper industry belonged to a monopoly owned by Jorge Alessandri, a former President of the Republic presently serving as the President of the military dictatorship's State Council, who at all times has been closely connected to Chile's biggest daily newspaper, *El Mercurio*. At that time, the conservative forces accused the government of trying to control the economic infrastructure to muzzle opposition voices. Taking into account the specific characteristics of this industry, Allende had proposed the creation of a Paper Institute where all the press and publishing groups would have been proportionally represented, and where prices would have been established. The nationalization project never saw the light of day. The paper monopoly cut back production, sabotaged distribution, and forced a substantial number of small and medium-sized printers to go bankrupt, which, of course, turned them against the Popular Unity government.

In revolutionary Portugal a similar battle was waged on the same front. During the Caetano government Eximbank and the First National City Bank had granted a loan for several million dollars for the development of the Portuguese paper industry. When the *Republica* newspaper affair began the two banks announced the indefinite postponement of the installation of the equipment which was already crated awaiting delivery in Helsinki. What a paradox that this very city at the same time was the site of the agreements on the free flow of ideas and information!

But political crises in themselves are not enough to see the real stakes involved. In 1973, the price of newsprint on the world capitalist market skyrocketed (more than a 75% increase in nine months, without taking into account the black market). The cost of energy, which in turn had repercussions on pro-

duction and shipping costs, and inflation, were all given as reasons justifying the excessive rise in prices. These false arguments, however, hardly touched the paper industrialists, who after a period of overproduction in the sixties followed up by creating the uncertainty of future stock supply and consumer panic. The official announcement of the "paper crisis" began a period of stock-taking and vast reorganization which revealed the economic rationality of the big producers.

In Colombia, for example, North American companies, sometimes with local capitalists, control almost 80% of paper production. It has three tissue-paper factories, and can satisfy its own needs for this material. Although Colombia also has a cigarette-paper factory which supplies the countries of the Andean Group, and manufactures and exports cardboard and high-quality paper to the United States and Latin American countries, it must import all of its newsprint. In France, on the one hand, the production of newsprint fell from 430,000 tons in 1970 to around 280,000 in 1973, while on the other hand, exports of high-quality paper increased. This logic of profitability points out in sharp relief the irrationality of such choices, especially in light of national independence. France, in spite of its large forests, in 1973 imported more than 60% of its newsprint and 46% of its paper pulp. The effects of this "massive disinvestment" policy (the term used by the labor union CGT) which relied on imports, were soon felt. Foreign wood producers began to prefer to export to France the finished paper product rather than the paper pulp, as they did before.

A VERY CONCENTRATED INDUSTRY

There are few countries which produce paper. This is a characteristic common to both the paper and oil industries. One can therefore see a certain similarity in the paper crisis and oil crisis. However, the resemblance stops there. Unlike the oil industry, the countries which produce paper are all highly industrialized. Forest resources are the only raw material which, until recently, the imperialist powers overlooked in their plundering of the Third World. In 1973, 55% of the world's forests were located in underdeveloped countries, but they produced scarcely more than 7 to 9% of the world supply of paper and paper pulp. Latin America, with almost one-fourth of the world's forest resources, only produced 6% and Africa fluctuated between 1 and 2%. Canada and the United States alone provided around 43% of the world supply; capitalist Europe, 27%; and the rest came principally from Japan (about 10%) and the socialist countries.

In the capitalist producing countries the paper industry is in the hands of a very small number of companies. In this respect, Quebec is a very good example. Canada is by far the world's largest producer of newsprint: in 1970, of the 23 million tons of newsprint produced in the capitalist countries, 8.6 million was produced by Canada. Of this quantity, 44% was produced in Quebec, and it thus furnished the capitalist world with 18% of its newsprint. In this very same Quebec, more than 80% of the forest con-


11. *Le Socialisme pour la France*, op. cit., pp. 85, 103-6.

12. *Op. cit.*, pp. 71-5.

13. The question of liberty and socialism is presented together with all the material from the Twenty-Second Congress of the French Communist Party. Once again, we ask the reader to see *Le Socialisme pour la France*, op. cit., especially pp. 67-75.

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QUEBEC: FINANCIAL CAPITAL IN THE PAPER INDUSTRY



SOURCE: Confederation des syndicats nationaux, *On est pas pour se laisser passer un sapin*, Montreal, Quebec, 1972.

cessions were held by five big companies: two branches of U.S. multinationals (ITT and International Paper), an English group, and two Canadian firms. ITT and International Paper—two pillars of the Rockefeller empire—alone held 42.5% of the forest concessions in Quebec, a territory four times the size of Belgium.

While ITT entered the industry quite recently, International Paper began in 1910, and was the first multinational operation in the U.S. paper industry. After having used up its own forests, the United States realized that instead of importing the raw wood and manufacturing the paper at home, it would be less expensive to produce the newsprint it needed in Canada. For more than 60 years, International Paper fixed the movement of paper prices, in spite of the common front set up by its Canadian competitors. Since its beginning in 1910, this company has come a long way: in 1977 it owns 25 factories in Canada, Europe and South America.

On the capitalist world market, with the exception of two British companies firmly implanted in Canada and the United States (Bowater and Reed International, each with a turnover of around 2.5 billion dollars), the fifteen most important producers of paper have their headquarters in North America. The most important is obviously International Paper, with a turnover of more than 3 billion dollars. Two European firms are sixteenth and seventeenth in line: a Swedish firm, Svenska Cellulosa, and a French firm, Begin-Say, with a turnover of 800 million dollars.

THE NEW ALLIANCES

Newspaper owners were the first to look for a way of protecting themselves against the paper crisis. Horizontal integration between paper producers and big publishers has become a goal of primary importance. This, in turn, has become another element accelerating the concentration of the press.

Already, during the thirties crisis, the Hearst group, to the great displeasure of the Canadian producers, surmounted its difficulties by forming a partnership with the Quebec branch of International Paper. Since 1970, one can hardly keep track of the large North American newspapers which have established similar mergers with the paper industry. The *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, the Gannet chain (which has bought up more than 50 regional newspapers in recent years) the Newhouse group (*Vogue*, *Mademoiselle*, *Glamour*), Dow Jones, (*Wall Street Journal*), and the *Chicago Tribune* have all advanced to the rank of owner or major stockholder in large newsprint firms in Canada, particularly in Quebec. Others have turned towards Mexico, where they have installed factories to recycle newsprint. The Time-Life group first became interested in the future of wood in the fifties, so much so that by

1. In 1973, FAO predicted a paper and cardboard shortage of 4.9 million tons in 1977 and 9.5 million tons in 1979.
 2. In 1976, North American paper industrialists, in particular, protested against the environmental protection laws. In 1976, anti-pollution costs were 3 billion dollars, and the industrialists estimated that to comply with existing standards would cost 12 billion dollars.

1977 forest and paper operations accounted for more than half of its turnover.

These types of mergers can only be understood within the larger context of the vast reorganization of the entire media industry: newspaper concentration, computerization, and the diversification of the newspaper corporations which have taken over or created publishing houses and moved into the audiovisual market. The same type of rapprochement took place earlier in the electronics field, where the manufacturers of hardware moved into the production of software programming.

The same partnership model between the paper and newspaper industry is also found in Great Britain. In 1969, for example, Reed International took over the press group IPC (International Publishing Corporation), owners of the *Daily Mirror* chain distributed throughout the Commonwealth. This model has also been exported. In Brazil and Argentina, the big newspaper publishers (*O Estado de Sao Paulo*, for example) are closely linked to large foreign and domestic paper companies. In other capitalist countries, this kind of partnership is not as frequent, though the crisis has accelerated the rendez-vous between the written press and the paper industry. Often there is a mediation between the parties which avoids the somewhat brutal aspects of monopolization found in the United States. The important national actions organized by the French labor unions during February 1977 against a government project for restructuring the paper industry indicates that this is a very timely issue.

NEW PRODUCERS?

One way of preventing paper shortages is the exodus towards the peripheral countries.¹ Many factors contribute to this movement: the decreasing forest resources in the metropolis countries; the excessive anti-pollution laws (costing an average of around 30% of the fixed investment needed to set up a factory) in the metropolis countries;² the shorter growing period on tropical plantations which reduces the period of maturity by 2 to 3 times (depending on conditions); and the lower wage scale and less frequent strike action (in the last four years Canadian producers have been particularly affected by lumberjack and wood worker strikes). This exodus could completely alter the map of world paper and paper-pulp production in the coming decades.

The great wave of investment is being directed toward Brazil and the southern cone of Latin America. Most of the firms which have established operations there have done so because of their approval of the geopolitical concepts of the military regimes, and thus they are directing their interest simultaneously toward Brazil, Chile and Argentina. The response to this new decentralized investment policy can be seen in the Chilean military's recent offer of several Chilean paper firms to large North American paper companies. Needless to say, this was done without any protest from the same bourgeoisie which screamed about the violation of press freedom under Allende! In Brazil, the huge forests in the Amazon are inspiring extremely ambi-

tious projects. If Brazil completes its program, it will be able to export 2 million tons of cellulose in 1980, and almost 20 million tons in 2000, nearly three-fourths of capitalist Europe's cellulose production in 1973. West Africa is another region planned for development; large projects are underway in Nigeria and Gabon, for example.

Who are the promoters of these projects? Unlike the period when colonial powers could do as they pleased in plundering natural resources, today they form joint ventures in partnership with national companies to prevent possible nationalization. Once again the same old faces are there. In Nigeria, a Canadian firm, a Norwegian firm, a French firm, and International Paper. In Gabon, the French oil monopoly Elf Erap, and a Swedish firm. In French Guiana, France has asked International Paper to study the possibilities of exploiting that region's forests. In Brazil, where the Japanese company Marubani alone has invested more than one billion dollars in a cellulose production plant, one finds all the Finnish, Swedish, Canadian and North American companies as well.

The latest protective measure against future paper risks is the change in the paper manufacturers themselves, from a traditional producer of a single item to a diversified company with many activities. In its 1975 annual report, International Paper defined its basic resource as "Land, with forests above and oil, gas and minerals below." Putting their money where their resources are, in the same year they purchased General Crude Oil. Although horizontal integration is on the agenda as a means of facing the "global energy crisis", obviously this only applies to the very biggest companies.

Roberto Bonchio

PUBLISHING IN ITALY

(Italy, 1973)

1. THE BOOK SITUATION IN ITALY

In recent years, despite the many difficulties experienced by the publishing industry there has been an increase in reading in our country.

The average annual expenditure per person on books of a general nature (which excludes technical and educational books) rose from about 400 lire in 1959, to 1,900 in 1965 and 2,250 in 1971. The total expenditure rose from 50 billion lire in 1959 (22 billion for school books, 8 billion for scientific and technical books, and 20 billion for general works) to 225 billion lire in 1971 (88 billion for school books, 25 billion for scientific and technical books, and 112 billion for general works). In 1957, books were read in 17.5% of all Italian families; in 1971, even though the figure appears a trifle optimistic, in 52%. Of the approximately 5,000,000 Italian families possessing books, 1,781,000 had up to ten, 2,100,000 had between eleven and fifty, over 550,000 between fifty and a hundred, and finally, 556,000 over a hundred. According to the latest figures, in 1972 out of every hundred Italian adults, twenty-four had read at least one book, and of these twenty-four, nine had read eight or more; five, from four to seven; and ten, three or less.

Putting these figures more in context, part of the increase in book expenditures is due to the fact that during the last ten years the constitutional requirement for compulsory education up to the age of fourteen has been carried out in its broad aspects, while another part of the increase has been due to the vertiginous increase in the cover price of each book. The low average income per person continues to be one of the major limits to a different rhythm of development. Italy remains far below the European levels concerning book buying: a little more than two books per person in Italy against 6.5 in Germany and 5.5 in the USSR and Hungary, etc. At the same time the crisis in the Italian library system has had a negative effect upon the development of reading and the promotion of the book.

Concerning production, according to the latest data of ISTAT, in 1971 14,641 titles (7,202 first editions) were published in Italy with a total printing of 99 million copies compared with 108 million for the previous year. Of these books, there were 5,000 educational titles with a total printing of some 30 million copies.

Again according to the latest figures available,

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dating this time from 1969, it was calculated that there were in Italy no less than 1,200 publishers, among them 120 educational publishers. However, only 300 were responsible for 90% of the production, and a little more than forty for 60%. Only 12% had their own means of distribution, 20% entrusted their distribution to an external organisation, and the rest used what means they could.

2. THE PROCESS OF CONCENTRATION

The current phase of development — which has been punctuated by the crisis of the small and medium-sized companies — had been marked by an even more incisive penetration of industrial and finance capital into publishing which has accelerated the process of concentration.

Already for some time, Italian publishing, and the big publishers in particular, have found support in sectors outside the cultural field. The connections are well-known, to cite only a few examples: Garzanti and the American chemical monopoly Dupont de Nemours, Etas-Kompass and Fiat, Fratelli Fabbri and Fiat again, and Vallecchi and Montedison. Towards the end of 1972, however, the great "earthquake" shook the Italian publishing industry. A leading part was played by IFI, the financial wing of Fiat, which had controlled Fratelli Fabbri for some time (holding 53% of its shares), and also, Etas-Kompass (whose shares are held by IPC, the *Daily Mirror*, the Nox Trust, and Caracciolo, brother-in-law of the Agnellis of Fiat). The latter publisher, which began twenty years ago with a predominantly technical and managerial list, had since widened its influence through agreements with Boringhieri, and Adelphi. Furthermore, it had bought into Olivetti Systed (audiovisual materials, from which it has even eliminated Olivetti in the last few days), and into Publikompass (co-owner with *La Stampa* of Turin), Publietas, the *Gazzetta dello sport*, and *Alto Adige*.

At the end of 1972 Bompiani was absorbed by Etas-Kompass, and there is persistent talk of Etas-Kompass's pressure upon Feltrinelli. Also in 1972, Guanda was taken over by Garzanti. It must not be forgotten that this is only what we know about; without doubt there are other deals going on less openly. Because of the immediate negative reactions to these takeovers, and the greater prudence and sensitivity of the exploiters in the cultural industries than those in other industries, today these moves proceed with greater discretion.

This process of concentration has above all one name: Agnelli, the owner of Fiat. It is not by chance that this process has suddenly accelerated with Agnelli's declaration of big business's "frank dialogue" with the world of culture, a world understood to be one of the most important instruments in the formation of public opinion. "Big capital marches on culture," as one famous Turin publisher remarked to the press.

The problem we have to confront is why all this has happened at this particular time. Objective reasons in part justify and facilitate this process: distribution difficulties for the small and medium-

sized publishers, rising costs, credit problems, the disproportionate high cost of technical rationalisation, shortage of editorial personnel, the ancient sins of Maecenism and megalomania (which, little by little, are being paid for), and the difficulty of foreign export, among other reasons. But the main reason is elsewhere: the Italian publishing industry, through the dynamics of mass culture, through the development of the schools, through the relative enlargement of the market, and, above all, in growth of the educational field, has opened new possibilities which were quickly appreciated by the industrial operators, ever on the look-out for new sources of profit and new means of hegemony over public opinion.

The small-scale and family management which have hitherto characterised our publishers and have kept them in the rear-guard of the nation's industry, tend to make them outmoded and unable to meet the need for new and more complex structures. The large publisher-printers (Mondadori, and Rizzoli) have the advantage of their own means of distribution. Furthermore, they benefit from the fact that Italy, albeit on a reduced scale, is still considered the printing plant of Europe, and they have the possibility to export art, illustrated and tourist books, and to undertake co-productions which the cultural publishers cannot do. The small publishers are helped in this respect, however, by the government which puts at their disposal the little it gives in this field, mainly through the Ministries of Education and of Industry, and the Office of the Prime Minister. On the other hand, the medium-size businesses on the border between artisan and industrial production face particular difficulties.

Other countries, more advanced than ours, which began with a more developed linguistic area, already passed through this phase of concentration some time ago. In the U.S., large corporations like Xerox, IBM, Bell & Howell, are already involved in many publishers, above all in the school and university book sector. Even a great publisher like Knopf who had the merit of launching writers like Hemingway and Faulkner has disappeared as an autonomous personality (although the imprint remains) because of this concentration process. In France we have had the Hachette phenomenon whose famous distribution network and publisher advances have ended up in their control over a major part of French publishing (Grasset, Stock, and Fayard). Also in France, there is the Presses de la Cité which controls the publishers Julliard, Plon, and Perrin, among others. Together they control a good third of French book production. Analogous phenomena have occurred in England (Penguin-Longman), and in Germany.

It was natural, therefore, that this process should reach Italy: there is a common logic in the capitalist system. Industry begins to see publishing as a good business opportunity and, at the same time, a mighty instrument to manipulate information. Just look at the educational book — fundamental in this field — which represents a third of the entire book production. In recent years the book has been trans-

formed and it is no longer the object of an elite. For the industrialist, given the present level of book consumption, it now has an interest which in many aspects is similar to that of the press and the other means of mass communication. The book, besides its profitability, spreads, albeit through the usual mediations, the values, content and ideas consistent with the owners of the means of production. This is the point of departure for the operation by Italian industry and finance, and it has changed the character of national publishing.

Finally, it is not without significance that this process should be happening during a phase in Italian society characterised by rightwing attempts at political and cultural restoration.

3. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONCENTRATION

Today, the process of concentration is presented under the guise of rationalisation. One talks of unifying purchases, organizational restructuring, and a common means of distribution, while preserving the autonomy of editorial policies. But in the modern book industry, distribution is for the most part a primary condition of production. It is perfectly understandable therefore why the offensive is launched from the distribution sector. If this operation is not blocked, it will lead to a virtual restriction of the cultural debate. There are significant but unconfirmed rumours that Etas-Kompass is creating its own distribution service, and that the Messagerie Italiana, the largest book distributor in Italy, is planning to further enlarge its book distribution service. It is necessary that we look beyond these contingent facts, so we can single out the principal tendencies and thus understand *today* what could happen tomorrow.

We will point out only some of the more dangerous aspects arising from the advance of this process of concentration.

The major risk is the diminution of the number of distinct editorial viewpoints: editorial choice will be in the hands of a few and these few will have the means to manufacture great authors and to impose them on critics and the public. The problem, however, is not a question of freedom of editorial choice in the absolute. Every author in Italy has, more or less, the chance to be published. The problem is rather *how* his book will reach the public. It is clear that the large conglomerates can have a book displayed in all the bookshop windows, discussed on television and radio, publicised widely, and imposed on booksellers and readers alike. This possibility, in a process of concentration, will inevitably wind up in the hands of a few people, in a centralised and commercialised management structure. In this context, through the imposition of consumption patterns, it will certainly be easier to homogenise, distort and twist all ideological messages.

In the second place, the presence of industry will end up conditioning certain editorial decisions, entrusting production to the law of profit which would value economic results over cultural ones.

The logic of profit will demand the expenditure of greater effort to launch *Love Story* or the *Godfather* than some work of cultural worth. Where economic and consumerist motives are wanting, political opportunism would step in, intent upon ideological manipulation. In the long run industry's domination would bring about a standardisation through the production of fashionable items intended solely to attract people to further stimulate consumption.

In the third place, there would be notable repercussions in the schools where similar concentration operations would block and stifle the birth of the first modest ventures by progressive and lay publishers in the area. Moreover, concentration will be a support for industry in its attempt to substitute itself for public initiative, and this would curb the production of interdisciplinary textbooks which pose difficult publishing problems.

In the fourth place, a process would develop, already underway, which would lead toward the disappearance of the editor — a multi-faceted intellectual — and the emergence of a type of cultural worker who would interpret publishing in terms of marketing and the fulfillment of specialised functions. We would see less — and this would not be bad — the mystifying mediation which today links the cultural producer and organiser with the publisher, and the real class role of the editor would be seen clearly.

In the fifth place, this process will tend to accentuate the unbalance between the north and the south. If already today, out of one hundred books, fourteen are sold in Milan, twelve in Rome, and only one in Palermo; if now, already, the southern market for books is scarcely relevant, the phenomenon will be inevitably accentuated by the tide of the logic of profit. This would be no different from what has happened to the rest of the Italian economy in recent years where the difference between the north and the south has opened like scissor blades.

Finally, there is the big problem of audiovisual materials which is closely linked to the process of concentration. It is well known that today it is precisely the large publishers who have concluded agreements in this field. Even if Mondadori has decided to shut down the department it set up to manufacture audiovisual playback equipment complete with programs — probably frightened by the possibility of a confrontation with the electronic giants Siemens, Philips, RCA — it continues to produce cultural documentaries for videocassettes. Giorgio Mandadori himself said some months ago that "we have a strong demand from the electronic industry for programs; in a year we forecast a sale of half a million videocassettes." Besides this, there is the evident tendency of the big publishers to form consortiums and to link up with the electronic industry giants: Fabbri Audiovisivi (Fabbri-Bell & Howell), and Tecnodidatta (Paravia-Philips), among others. Our main reactions concerning the introduction of these means of mass communication are not just limited to the means themselves, as some would have us believe, but they also concern who will determine the program production linked to

these means.

4. FOR THE DEFENCE OF CULTURAL FREEDOM, AGAINST THE CONCENTRATION OF THE PUBLISHING INDUSTRY

If it is true that concentration is strong, and that there is a rightwing offensive in motion in the cultural field and in the cultural institutions in our country, it is also true that the strength of the democratic movement and its culture is remarkable, and that Italian culture in its totality, from the cinema to publishing, is left oriented. Concentration will thus meet head-on with a huge contradiction: the fact that the new market that has been formed in recent years is made up of younger generations with richer interests, in whom the greater currency of ideas has created new needs, inquiries and engagements which are in contrast to the old culture and to the technocratic culture which industry seeks to impose. A reply to the attack of concentration can only be based on this reality. It must be a mass reply which will not be limited to only the alternative networks and the activities of the cooperatives, which, however useful, are hardly decisive. It must have its base in the democratic political movement and in the healthy, progressive forces of publishing.

To utilize the possibilities offered by the situation, it seems there are three directions to follow: organising a front of progressive cultural publishers; developing a class and union consciousness among cultural workers; and in the much wider context of the Italian political struggle for democracy, exercising constant pressure upon the State to institute a book policy.

Regarding the first point, it is ever more important and necessary to set up a co-ordination between the small and medium publishers who effectively fulfill a cultural function (in America, this would often be the equivalent of the university presses) to aim for a democratic renewal of culture and society. It is difficult to indicate here in any concrete way the forms and methods of such collaboration. It is certain, however, that if these publishers combine their forces in the field of distribution and promotion — perhaps in the beginning in some specific sector such as education, which is fundamental — they could develop a more decisive activity than at present. Other areas too could be the site of fruitful collaboration: credit agreements to facilitate payments; bulk purchasing agreements; and co-ordination of publishing programs so that an editorial alliance corresponded to an organisational decentralisation which would facilitate specialisation. The same proposals could be extended to bookshops for those publishers who have them. The operation of a consortium or a federation would not only bring economic advantages and savings on cost, but could create a democratically-oriented and sound structure for distribution and promotion.

In this context however particular attention could be given to the channels which large-scale concentration reaches only with difficulty: the Case del Popolo, the cooperative and trade union

organisations, the ARCI clubs, democratic associations in general, and the popular parties. A book club set up by the progressive cultural publishers to offer a common list to these organisations, with specific agreements with their organisers, would make this circuit, still for the most part untouched territory, a really effective means of distribution and be an experience of remarkable political and cultural significance.

Another interesting aspect which could emerge from the struggle against concentration is a new relationship between progressive cultural publishers and the regions and the whole fabric of local democratic organisations which by their very nature are opposed to monopolies and concentration. It is necessary to develop close links with these institutional tools which have an enormous potential for innovation. Often, however, their cultural interest has been confined and split inside the intricacies of an opaque bureaucracy and State that has always hindered and compromised any tendency whatsoever towards cultural decentralisation, the antithesis of constitutional order.

In the second place, a union and class consciousness must be developed among the cultural workers and all the other workers in the publishing houses. These are the real protagonists of publishing, who within the structure of a new unity with other workers and through their struggle and their pressure, will be able to have a more important decisive say in the affairs of a publishing company. These forces can obtain power to negotiate if their present atomisation is overcome by means of co-ordination centres (union, associations), and if their organisations forge solid links with workers in analogous sectors in the press and television. It is difficult to say if in the foreseeable future, there could be a union for all the information industries. It is significant in this respect that West German writers, for example, dissolved their own association to join individually as members of the printing workers's union.

Finally, the State must be asked — though the pressure of the democratic parties, appropriate associations, and unions — for a *policy for the book*, on the same lines as the policy for the cinema (even though this was rather poorly done). This could help the small and medium-sized publishers whose products really are culture. The realisation of measures could help these publishers and bookstores by providing various credit and financial aids, tax and postal benefits and reliefs, and by encouraging the formation of family libraries. This would enable those publishers not tied to industry to better carry on their battle. We must, moreover, ask the State, though the creation of new cultural infrastructures and the improvement of those already existing, above all, for a program that will contribute to making the book a mass need. We cannot forget that in 1971 the total expenditure on leisure activity by Italians was six million million lire and only one-sixth of this was spent on books and periodicals. It will be a hard struggle since the Italian government has always shown itself deaf to these questions.

Even when UNESCO proclaimed 1972 international book year, and invited member states to initiate promotions, our rulers completely disregarded the proposal. It was only after they discovered the absurd position in which they had put themselves in comparison with other countries (the first meeting of the co-ordinating committee took place in autumn of 1971), that they then "prolonged" the year to December 1973. Neither have they behaved any differently concerning the crisis of our library system. Even today many Italian regions are still without a state university library: Val d'Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Umbria, the Marches, Abruzzo, Lucania, and Calabria. There is a shortage of personnel (there is a single school for librarians located in Rome which awards two or three diplomas a year); the consultation services are all but paralysed; and hardly any card catalogues are up-to-date. The major problem, however, is that the libraries, precisely due to the absence of a State promotional policy for the book are virtually closed to the public, reserved for a cultural elite and more concerned with the conservation of the books than in their real circulation. Hence the necessity to revivify and modernise the existing library network, to endow it with the appropriate means, and to aid and not hinder the regions in their actions to create and develop new library structures. These actions could translate into reality the slogan so often bandied about, "reading as a public service."

The country's library system needs a profound revision along democratic lines: This means that apart from the university libraries, the national central libraries and some specialised ones, all the rest of the nation's patrimony of books must be designated as part of the public reading system, and organised on a provincial basis co-ordinated at a regional level and managed by consortiums of local bodies.

The formation of a parliamentary group, Friends of the Book, could prepare a law on book publishing which could contain in a more precise formulation the suggestions put forth here. This would seem both useful and necessary, although it is easy to foresee the hostility it will meet from those groups reflecting the interests of the concentration promoters.

The help which the State should rightly give to publishing must not only be wise and effective (how much money has been thrown away on "Libri d'Oro" and vague propaganda posters!), but also not syphoned off and diverted to ends other than that for which it was intended. Its destination must be made clear so that the help and facilities are not given — as happens today with the little that is done — to favour the concentration of huge publishing concerns instead of pluralism and culture.

Let us underline again that the battle for the book cannot be an isolated battle of those employed in the industry. The very proposals set out here could be purely defensive and vain if they were not elaborated in a climate of ideological tension necessary to the achievement of cultural hegemony, and if they were not developed in the context of the

wider struggle of the working-class and democratic movement confronted with the complexity of the problems of mass information and communication.

Only departing from the basic fact that publishing is a public service and as such, linked to the great questions of democracy in our country, will it be possible to conduct this battle in a just and effective way.

5. THE PARTY'S PUBLISHING HOUSE

The Communist Party, breaking with an old tradition of the Italian working-class movement which placed its publishing activity in a sort of ghetto and limited its influence to a small part of its militants, today possesses in its own publishing house, Editori Riuniti, one of the largest publishers in the country. It is present throughout the national territory and produces some two hundred and fifty titles a year with a total print run of some two million copies. In recent years, Editori Riuniti has effectively contributed to the ideological struggle of the party and to the emergence of a conscious party membership as part of its political battle by helping party militants to understand the conditions under which the working class struggles, and the basic tendencies at work in the system of social relations. This can be seen in the wide range of political and critical works it has published in addition to the major publication of the complete works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Simultaneously, Editori Riuniti, in the work it has produced, has overcome the positivistic conception of a subaltern culture which was so dear to the old socialist publishers. One could perhaps accuse Editori Riuniti of not being an "easy" publisher, but certainly it cannot be accused of falling into a crude cultural production politicised in a debased and subservient manner (already Gramsci, in any case, in 1918 pointed out the need for the workers to get away from vague generalisations of rehearsed pamphlets and to consolidate their spirit in a critical superior vision of history and the world in which they live and struggle). If today, authors like Mayakovsky, Gramsci, Lukacs, Della Volpe, Banfi, Dobb, Althusser and Ciari play an important part in Italy's cultural debate, if the thirst for marxism that has exploded since 1968 and is now widespread among the young masses has been able to meet with a serious response, this is in large part due to the initiative of Editori Riuniti.

Editori Riuniti has achieved important innovations in the popular and party "market". This can be seen in the distribution of over four million copies of the marxist classics; in the large-scale "special offers" bringing within everyone's reach Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks*, Marx's *Capital*, and the basic writings of Togliatti; in the instalment publication of hundreds of thousands of copies of the *History of the Resistance*, and the *History of Revolutions*; and in the huge success of the pedagogics series; the classics of democratic and enlightened thought; and current political affairs. The distribution and sale of books on easy credit terms has not just helped to sell the "big, expensive books," as is the case with normal companies which

sell on instalment, but it also has provided a large mobility to disseminate inexpensive books through door-to-door sales and a constant presence at political, trade union and cultural demonstrations to a new public which would not be otherwise accessible. Out of the experience of Editori Riuniti certain useful lessons may be drawn, although it should be realised that it is still far from fulfilling all the demands made upon it as the publishing house of a great popular party. Its publishing catalogue list is still weak in instructional texts for children and in works directly related to the school market. This is due to the failure to make full use of the Communist Party, the great instrument of liaison and osmosis with the popular market, and great cultural organiser and animator.

Our publishing house must once more become the driving force in the battle of the book, forging new links with party organisms, with democratic associations and with the trade union and cooperative movements. Its advantage over other progressive publishers lies in its familiarity with the popular circuits, along with its ties with political forces and democratic intellectuals. These links give it a greater role to play in the strategy against concentration which we have been talking about. At its present state, Editori Riuniti has need of a qualitative leap in the development of its book production and in its influence, which is closely linked to its relationship to the party. The party, in turn, will find nourishment in this relationship for its battle of ideas.

Only the party, however, and not the publishing house whose means are necessarily limited, can really counterbalance big capital and the imposition of its ideological production upon public opinion, through its many mediations, complex ramifications, and the articulation of its institutions and mass media. Only the party at the centre of a large democratic movement, can put into operation a comprehensive strategy for the whole problem of information in which the book is a fundamental moment.

This means in practice that the party must promote in parliament and throughout the country a vigorous policy for a democratic publishing industry, and develop an energetic activity to promote marxist books through discussions, lectures, special book months and book festivals, etc. Furthermore, the party must help comrades in its own publishing house and in the other progressive publishers to discover the organisational forms which can penetrate more effectively the mass circuits; to advance their collaboration with regional and local organisations; to create libraries in the party branches; and to initiate the setting up of factory libraries in such a way as to ensure that they are managed by the workers and their representatives, not by the factory owners. Along with this, the party organisation must be an antenna for the publishing house, and help it to become an open cultural centre which can receive signals from the party members at the base, and from other associations of cultural producers and consumers. One will thus be able to hope for a

radical change in the relationship between publisher and reader (at present, in this relationship the reader always ends up passive). This would establish a new osmosis between the publisher and reader, and distribution, once removed from the commercialism of consumer goods, would regain its dignity by being raised to a collaborative and not secondary role in the cultural action of the publisher.

Judy Strasser

CABLE TV: STRINGING US ALONG

(USA, 1971)

Community antenna television (CATV) systems have been around almost as long as television, tucked away in small communities where TV reception is bad. Low demand at first and more recently Federal Communications Commission restrictions have kept the cable from reaching most viewers living in the one hundred largest television marketing areas—that is, 85 to 90% of all set owners.

Yet cable television is clearly the “next generation” in communications technology. Capable of carrying unlimited information to and from homes and businesses across the nation, coaxial cable is the basic component of a much-heralded “communications revolution.” In the next few decades, experts promise, we will be able to shop, work, study, and be entertained without leaving home. Ralph Lee Smith sketched the future recently in *The Nation*:

As cable systems are installed in major U.S. cities and metropolitan areas, the stage is being set for a communications revolution—a revolution that some experts call “The Wired Nation.” In addition to the telephone and to the radio and television programs now available, there can come into homes and into business places audio, video and facsimile transmissions that will provide newspapers, mail service, banking and shopping facilities, data from libraries and other storage centers, school curricula and other forms of information too numerous to specify. In short, every home and office will contain a communications center of a breadth and flexibility to influence every aspect of private and community life.¹

But such consumer services form only the tip of the iceberg that is new communications technology. Some specific uses of the wired nation raise immediate objections. Police surveillance by cable represents an electronic threat which should send those of us now worrying about tapped telephones and bugged rooms running to some technologically underdeveloped country for safety. These systems, which provide part of the rationale for large expenditures on domestic telecommunications, already exist. In Olean, New York, the cable television operator installed a traffic and crime prevention monitoring system which allows one officer, sitting at headquarters, to survey 75% of the city's downtown area.²

Computer banks of financial, credit and other personal information already invade the privacy of each of us with a social security number. But when

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everyone is wired into the system, for every conceivable transaction—financial or other—which generates data someone might be interested in seeing, there will be no privacy.

The wired nation, in short, could fulfill Orwell's worst fantasies of 1984. Should we be concerned? Not at all, the experts say. Technology, they remind us, is neither good nor bad, but neutral. Properly applied, electronic communication methods will bring us another step closer to the land of milk and honey.

But in America today technology is *not* neutral; its use for good or evil does *not* depend merely on who is at the controls. Under the constraints of a monopoly capitalistic economic system and the corresponding undemocratic political system those in charge cannot apply any new technology for the benefit of society at large.

WHO PROFITS FROM PROGRESS?

Descriptions of the technological possibilities—either Orwellian or paradisaical—of a new technology mislead us. In our system, technology, whatever its technical characteristics, reinforces and enlarges existing social and economic inequities. We must not allow the shiny new machines—or their suave promoters—to blind us to this crucial function of technology.

Telephone technology provides a fine example. Technically, the telephone was a great advance: it allowed people, for the first time to converse across a distance. Progress! But for whom? The distribution of telephones in American cities is still so biased along class lines that pollsters avoid telephone surveys as poor indicators of public opinion. Fifty years after it introduced long-distance telephone, the Bell System finds that operators from poor backgrounds take longer to train because they haven't learned about person-to-person long-distance calls as children. Telephone technology is not neutral: it benefits the rich more than the poor. And if the telephone, which is most heavily used by businessmen, helps rich people increase their riches relatively faster than the poor, we can say that the technology actually hurts poor people.

Of course, the telephone was not introduced to help (or harm) humanity. From the beginning, the prime motive of the Bell System has been profit. And Ma Bell and her stockholders have unquestionably profited from the telephone technology.

Somewhere new technology may benefit the majority, but we don't live there. In America the probable impact of new technology is best assessed in the market place. Which economic interests are backing the introduction of new technology? Who will profit? How will profiteers be controlled?

CATV: REGULATING THE PROFIT-TAKERS

The development of the cable industry is a case study of the way the profit motive directs techno-

1. Smith, Ralph Lee, “The Wired Nation,” *The Nation*, May 18, 1970, p. 582.

2. Smith, p. 585.

logical change in this country. The earliest cable operators were small businessmen who owned television sales and repair shops in suburban and rural communities. To increase sales, they put up sensitive antennas and cabled distant television signals to local TV sets. Sales and profits did increase as residents discovered that the Community Antenna Television System brought them better reception and more channels.

Small business's enterprise and success might have produced rapid growth of the CATV industry but the larger, powerful broadcasting interests saw CATV as a competitor. As the number of TV stations in suburban and rural towns increased, broadcasters began to fear that cable, bringing in distant stations, would fragment the local broadcast market. If a viewer in rural Illinois could tune in Chicago, he might ignore his local station, which would lose advertising revenue as it lost its audience.

The Broadcast industry lobbied furiously and successfully against CATV, both in Congress (where politicians knew the broadcasters as important friends and powerful enemies) and at the Federal Communications Commission. Influenced both by its own stated policy of encouraging local TV stations and by pressure from Congressmen, the FCC had no qualms about protecting the industry it regulated.

At first, providing protection meant *denying* any regulatory authority over CATV. The new industry wanted FCC help in fighting telephone company practices that threatened cable growth. The telephone industry had recognized very early that two-way cable television was a natural extension of telephone service.

Phone companies began, in the early 1950s, to build their own CATV systems and to thwart other potential operators whenever possible. In 1956 a federal antitrust action forced AT&T to get out of the cable business. (The consent decree did not apply to other telephone companies; both General Telephone and Electronics and United Utilities are important cable owners.) The Bell System found another way to maintain control over cable communications: it entered into a series of lease back arrangements with cable operators. Bell companies build a substantial portion of a cable system and lease it back to the operator. Although the monthly rental rates are, in the long run, higher than the cost of building a CATV system, many small operators have entered into leaseback agreements because they have not been able to raise the considerable capital required to establish a system of their own.

Until quite recently, Bell System companies wrote contracts preventing operators from originating programming or providing two-way service. Both Bell and other telephone companies harassed other cable operators, sometimes refusing to lease poles or conduit space for cable, or endlessly delaying the negotiation of leaseback agreements. Although the independent cable companies complained bitterly of telephone company malpractice to the FCC, the Commission did not respond.

Still, CATV systems spread, and it soon became clear that ignoring the new technology was not suffi-

cient protection for broadcasters. In 1958 twelve TV station owners, testifying at Senate Commerce Committee hearings on the problems of suburban and rural television service, asked for legislative sanctions against the intruding cable. When Congress did not act immediately, the broadcasters turned to FCC. In 1959 the Commission ruled that it did not have jurisdiction over cable television because the industry did not use the electro-magnetic spectrum for transmission. Senator John Pastore (D., R.I.), a long-time friend of broadcasters, responded by introducing a bill providing for FCC licensing of CATV systems. The bill narrowly failed, but it spurred the Commission to re-examine its ruling. On second thought the Commissioners decided that they did in fact have jurisdiction over cable systems which used microwave relays to import signals. (Microwave technology, which employs high frequency radio waves to relay signals, has been regulated by the FCC since its invention. But microwave links were only one possible rationale for regulating cable; the FCC could have stepped into cable regulation earlier, using the public utility justification that gives the Commission authority over the telephone industry.) From 1962, when it began to rule on individual cases involving cable systems using microwave, the FCC slowly increased its authority over the industry. Cablemen, who had originally wanted some FCC protection, quickly reversed their position. But as the new technology spread, so did the broadcaster's desire for protection.

In 1965, the year that the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, CATV system (with a potential 50,000 subscribers) began operating, the FCC issued general rules for cable systems served by microwave. In February 1966 the Commission's “Second Report and Order” asserted FCC jurisdiction over all CATV. At the same time, the FCC placed stringent regulations on the importation of distant signals into the one hundred largest TV markets. Since the opportunity to receive stations from other cities was CATV's biggest selling point in markets which already had good television reception, the FCC's action effectively froze expansion of cable television in the top hundred markets. The broadcasters were safe, at least for the time being. The freeze did not begin to thaw until the Commission issued its “Proposed New Rules and Notice of Inquiry” on cable television in December 1968. One FCC commissioner's legal aide, echoing frequent charges that the broadcast industry rules the regulatory agency, has said privately that *the rulemaking procedure began only when the Commission felt that broadcasting interests had had sufficient time to buy into their potential competitor, CATV.*

WHO OWNS THE CABLE?

Whether or not the aide's charge is correct, ownership patterns demonstrate the degree to which broadcasters and other media owners have become involved in the cable industry. Writing in the *Saturday Review* in November 1967, FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson reported that broadcasters

accounted for "almost fifty percent of the franchise applications filed within the last year."³ Legg & Company's "Industrial Review" shows CATV system ownership as of August 1969:⁴

Group	% of Total Systems
TV-Radio Broadcasters	33
Telephone companies	25
Newspapers	15
Independents	27

Ralph Lee Smith estimates that broadcasters own 25% of the cable industry. The second largest owner is Cox Cable Communications, an affiliate of Cox Broadcasting, owner of VHF stations in Atlanta, Dayton, San Francisco-Oakland, Pittsburgh, and Charlotte and AM radio stations in Atlanta, Dayton, Charlotte, and Miami, as well as production and advertising subsidiaries. In addition to the direct broadcasters, CBS, NBC, and Westinghouse have considerable cable holdings.

Broadcast interests are not alone on the cable bandwagon. The largest cable system owner was formed in 1970 by the merger of H & B American Corporation and TelePrompTer. H & B, number one before the merger, started corporate life as a textile manufacturer. In 1960 H & B entered the communications business and began selling off all unrelated subsidiaries. The corporation acquired only cable systems and microwave relay systems, although it joined with another company in a venture providing marketing research services for TV advertisers and broadcasters. H & B American is now a subsidiary of TelePrompTer, which also owns CATV systems in Los Angeles and New York City jointly with Hughes Aircraft.

Other major cableholders include corporations which manufacture electronic equipment (including General Electric and General Instrument), and newspaper and magazine publishers (including Time, Inc.; Cowles Communications, the publisher of *Look* with newspaper interests in Des Moines, Minneapolis, Montana, and South Dakota; the Chicago Tribune Company; and the Samuel Newhouse empire, which includes major newspapers in Oregon, Missouri, New York, and Alabama, as well as *Vogue Mademoiselle* and other magazines). General Tire and Rubber, which owns large CATV holdings through its Cablecom-General subsidiary, is one of several conglomerates which have moved into the industry. Others include Gulf & Western (owner of Paramount Pictures) and Kaiser Industries.

Almost all of the large corporations now involved in cable have acquired their interests since

3. Johnson, Nicholas, "CATV: Promise and Peril," *Saturday Review*, November 11, 1967.

4. *CATV, A Cool Medium Turned Hot*, an industry review. Baltimore: Legg & Co., August 1969, p. 4.

5. Quoted by Smith, p. 598.

6. Smith, p. 598.

7. Baran, Paul A. and Paul M. Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital*. New York: Modern Reader, 1966, pp. 48-9.

8. Barnett, Harold J. and Edward Greenberg, "A Proposal for Wired City Television," *Washington University Law Quarterly*, No. 1 (Winter 1968), p. 1.

the FCC's 1966 assumption of regulatory control. The recent rapid ownership-shuffling in the industry reflects the tremendous potential for growth into the lucrative top one hundred markets. Small systems operators have had increasing difficulty finding capital for long term investment as larger corporations, which can afford to take an initial loss on their cable operations, have moved into the industry. A senior securities analyst who is an expert on CATV offerings predicts:

The likelihood is that within two or three years there will be about ten publicly owned companies, each with more than 200,000 customers...At that time it may be a lot harder for the CATV company with 20,000 or 30,000 customers to go public; but, on the other hand, there will be a very attractive and aggressive market for those who want to be acquired by the larger companies.⁵

As Ralph Lee Smith comments, "The autonomous locally owned cable system appears to be going the way of the buffalo."⁶

It is not unusual for a new technology to be pioneered by individual entrepreneurs and small businesses and then taken over by the large corporations. Major corporations increase their profits by avoiding risks. When a new technology has been developed sufficiently and its future looks clear and profitable, the big boys move in.⁷ If the new technology is a potential competitor, its acquisition is even more attractive.

THE "WIRED NATION": CABLE GROWS UP

Major investors are attracted not to the current state of cable television but to its future. They see cable as the logical forerunner of a nation of homes and businesses linked by a broadband, two-way "electronic highway." This vision was vividly sketched—on a slightly smaller scale—by Rand Corporation consultants Harold J. Barnett and Edward Greenberg in a paper commissioned by Resources for the Future, Inc. and the Brookings Institution for a September 1967 Airlie House symposium on communications.⁸ At the conference, which was inspired by President Lyndon Johnson's August 14, 1967 message to Congress on communication policy, government officials and industry and academic experts began to consider the problems to be studied by a newly appointed Presidential Task Force on Communication. In his message, Johnson had instructed the Task Force, headed by Eugene V. Rostow, ex-dean of the Yale Law School and a foreign affairs advisor to both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, to pay particular attention to the policy implications of such new communication technologies as satellites and cable television.

Barnett and Greenberg focused their attention on the economic and political problems posed by cable TV's potential to develop into a communications system duplicating and rivalling the telephone network. They proposed the "wired city" as a solution to these problems. "It would probably be sensible to merge the present telephone system into the WCTV [wired city television] system," the two economists told the planners assembled at Airlie

House. "In such an event, there could be available substantial economies in installation, maintenance, and operation of the WCTV system."⁹ The wired city (or nation) system would be a common carrier—that is, it would be licensed only to rent its facilities for the use of others, just as the phone company rents its lines and equipment to its customers.

Events of the past three years give every indication that the electronic highway is an idea whose economic time has come. Such diverse groups as the National Business Council, Americans for Democratic Action, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Industrial Electronics Division of the Electronics Industry Association (IED/EIA) have gone on record in favor of a wired nation. The ACLU and ADA hope that the vast expansion in communications capacity will increase the public's access to the media. As the ACLU stated before the FCC,

...cable television presently has the technological capability for developing a broad-band, two-way switched electronic communications system, interconnected over nationwide areas; this system could carry voice, data, record and pictorial intelligence and its two-way switching capability could provide the equality and freedom of selectivity and the equality and freedom of access mandated by the First Amendment.¹⁰

The ACLU might get a more realistic picture of the potential beneficiaries of the wired nation if it took a good hard look at its bedfellows. The IED/EIA proposal, filed before the FCC in October 1969, has much in common with the ACLU submission on the same docket. Litton Industries, IBM, General Electric, and other electronic hardware suppliers belong to the IED, a lobbying organization with Washington clout at least equivalent to the the broadcasters who have so far controlled the regulation of the cable industry. Electronics industry lobbying in Washington has primarily been directed at increasing defense appropriations. Why was the IED/EIA the first major industry group to call for an immediate commitment to wire the country?

THE WIRED NATION: AN ELECTRONIC PORK BARREL

Of course, the IED has not suddenly come to its senses and recognized the wired nation as vital, or even necessary, for the national welfare. On the contrary, the electronics industry recognizes the wired nation as a potential gold mine. Like the broadcast industry, which is buying up its competition by buying into cable, the electronics industry has waited out the risky R & D stage of the new technology, and is now anticipating profits ripe for the taking.

But the importance of the electronics industry's interest is not read in expected profits alone. *Why* it

9. Barnett and Greenberg, p. 6.

10. Comments of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) on Part V—Notice of Inquiry, filed before the Federal Communications Commission in the Matter of Docket No. 18397. Xerox copy, no date, p. 3.

11. Baran and Sweezy, chapters 6 and 7.

sees profit in the "wired nation" carries serious implications for the impact of the new technology on society.

In the past few years economists, government officials, and electronics industrialists have concluded that some alternative to the arms race may be required to maintain the industry. Just what this alternative—generally assumed to involve massive government expenditures—should be has been debated and experimented with for at least a decade. Two requirements are clear. First, production, research, and development must be similar to the military work for which we now have trained scientists and engineers, so that massive retraining programs will not be necessary. Second, the alternative must be politically feasible—since it may be impossible to get Congressional approval for enormous government expenditures on non-defense projects, the alternative must have some defense rationale. (The largest "non-defense" government expenditure has been on the federal highway program, virtually all of which has been justified as necessary for transportation of men and material in time of war or other national emergency. Similarly, education appropriations have been easier to obtain if they are rationalized as defense expenditures.)¹¹

In the early 1960s, the space race was offered as a "non-defense" alternative for the aerospace and electronics industries. The goal of putting a man on the moon required massive federal expenditures and men who had been trained in physics and missile engineering. It caught the public and Congressional imaginations: we would close the Sputnik gap and beat the Russians to the moon. And although the space race, as outlined by President Kennedy, was a form of peace race, the defense applications of satellites and missile delivery systems were obvious:

Unfortunately, the space race lost its public appeal. By the time Neil Armstrong took his "first tiny step for man" many people were wondering if, in fact, the enormous expenditures in space could be justified in light of growing problems on earth. The public's disaffection with the space program pointed up another political criterion for the project to save the electronics industry: it must appear to benefit the man on the street directly.

The wired nation concept is apparently being tested, by the government, by foundations, and by industry, as a new alternative project for the aerospace and electronics industries. Reports, studies, and proposals have proliferated recently, funded by the National Science Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Russell Sage Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the Federal Communications Commission, and others.¹² Arthur D. Little, Inc., the management consultant and research firm, has gathered such varied clients as IBM, Honeywell, Magnavox, Motorola, Sylvania, Dow-Jones, New

12. The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation last year granted \$500,000 for the establishment of a Commission on Cable Television which is currently studying the impact and prospects for the new medium. (*New York Times*, June 10, 1970) The National Science Foundation has funded a \$191,000 Stanford University interdisciplinary study of

York Times, Times-Mirror, Eastman Kodak and several CATV operators into a loose consortium called BCN (Broadcast Communications Networks). BCN's establishment has been informally cleared by both the FCC and the Justice Department; its goal is to establish one or two "wired communities" of ten to fifteen thousand homes by 1975.¹³ The Ford Foundation is also interested in investing in a pilot wired city, possibly Dayton, Ohio, or Palo Alto, California.¹⁴

The IED/EIA has already indicated in its FCC submission that it finds the work involved in wiring the nation (or providing some mix of coaxial cable and domestic communications satellites) appealing.¹⁵ Many of the defense contracts in the 1960s were for military telecommunications research, and it is not surprising that the electronics industry believes that work on domestic telecommunications would not require an enormous redirection of manpower.

The wired nation concept may also be politically feasible. Direct military applications of basic telecommunications research would probably increase if additional government investment in communications was justified on civilian grounds. In addition, the electronic highway can be given the same military rationale as has the interstate highway system. And police experts say that a two-way domestic telecommunications network will be a valuable weapon against criminal elements at home.¹⁶

Finally, the wired nation has caught the interest of liberals like those in the ACLU who believe that a properly regulated domestic telecommunications system will directly benefit the average citizen. Columbia University sociologist Amitai Etzioni, and Sidney Dean, chairman of the ADA committee of communications, are among the prominent liberals who have begun to fight entrenched cable companies to ensure that current cable systems are built with the capability of hooking into a two-way, nationwide electronic highway.

REGULATING THE PROFIT-TAKERS: FCC VS. OTP

Liberals do not trust unregulated corporations to protect the public's interest in wiring the nation. The ACLU, for example, outlines extensive constraints to be placed on domestic telecommunications systems by some government agency. But whether an agency exists or can be created to do this job remains to be seen.

The Federal Communications Commission, of telecommunications policy and new technology being conducted by Professors Donald A. Dunn (engineering-economic systems), Edwin B. Parker (communications), and James H. Rosse (economics). (Stanford University News Service release, July 17, 1970) See also Goldhamer, Herbert (ed.), *The Social Effects of Communication Technology*. A report prepared for the Russell Sage Foundation, RAND Corporation, May 1970, R-486-RSF; and Ford Foundation, *Comments in Response to the [Federal Communications] Commission's Notice of Proposed Rule Making of July 1, 1970*, Docket No. 18892, December 7, 1970, which cites four Ford Foundation-sponsored reports

course, is the agency responsible for guaranteeing "the public interest, convenience, and necessity" in communications matters. The FCC is sensitive to the desires of the industry it regulates; conservative economist Milton Friedman and liberal FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson agree that the communications industries have undue influence on the Commission's actions. In fact, the FCC is under attack from so many sides that it will probably need to be replaced or radically restructured to be influential in determining future communication policy.

This replacement/restructuring process is under way. In late 1968, the Task Force headed by Rostow recommended to President Johnson that a cabinet-level Secretary of Communications be appointed. The Secretary would direct a new Department of Communications, in which the various communications functions of the government would be consolidated, and which would have the authority to deal with policy issues raised by new communications technology. Johnson apparently disagreed with the Task Force report; he refused to make it public and it was finally released in May 1969 by Richard Nixon.

Nixon had already indicated that he did not agree with Rostow on who should determine domestic telecommunications policy. Less than a year after releasing the Rostow report—a time during which it received little publicity or discussion—the White House submitted to Congress a major reorganization plan for the executive branch. The plan established the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP), an advisory group with an initial staff of 30 professionals reporting directly to the President.¹⁷ Nixon, unlike Rostow, apparently believed that the makers of new communications policy should be responsible to the White House and not to Congress. As Director of Telecommunications Policy Nixon named the creator of the reorganization plan, 31-year-old Clay T. Whitehead. Whitehead, whose B.S. and M.S. degrees from M.I.T. are in electrical engineering, worked for the largely Air Force-financed RAND Corporation before joining President Nixon's staff.

Officially, the OTP does not compete with the FCC. Like the Office of Telecommunications Management which it replaced, the OTP is responsible for managing the government's extensive, chiefly military, telecommunications network. But the new office also advises the President on new policy issues—issues like cable television and domestic communications satellites which are cur-

by the RAND Corporation on cable television policy.

13. Lachenbruch, David, "Looking Ahead," *Radio-Electronics*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (February 1971), p. 4.

14. Thorwaldson, Jay, "Palo Alto Studying System of City-operated Cable TV," *Palo Alto Times*, March 8, 1971, p. 3.

15. Smith, p. 602.

16. Shaw, William, "Cable TV: Does it Have Law Enforcement Possibilities?" Part I, *Law and Order*, September 1970; Part II, October 1970.

17. *New York Times*, March 12, 1969; May 21, 1969; February 10, 1970.

rently non-governmental in nature, and for which the FCC and the Congress have heretofore been totally responsible.

How much will the OTP be able to influence the FCC or usurp its powers? During House Subcommittee hearings on the reorganization plan, Congressman Clarence J. Brown (R., Ohio) questioned witnesses extensively on this point. Brown was upset by a report in *Broadcasting* magazine that "Dr. Whitehead, who drafted [a] memorandum on satellites as well as on the need for reorganizing the executive's telecommunications policy-making machinery, made it clear last week the White House has no qualms about seeking to influence the [Federal Communications] commission or other so-called independent agencies."¹⁸

Although Clay Whitehead denied any desire to influence the FCC's "quasi-judicial" functions, Congressman Brown described the means by which the new OTP could affect Commission policy:

...the method by which it can be done is establish this Office, give it the muscle of direct association with the Presidency and the executive branch, provide it with the wherewithal to do the scientific research or evaluate the scientific research that is being done so that it speaks with scientific authority in this area, deny the Federal Communications Commission some of the resources through the Bureau of the Budget to provide similar scientific research or the accumulation of scientific research, and pretty soon you have muscle in the Office of Telecommunications and the Federal Communications Commission becomes a function of the Office of Telecommunications.¹⁹

The OTP was established last spring; Dr. Whitehead's appointment as director was confirmed in September. It is too early to tell how extensively the office will flex the not inconsiderable muscle it has been given, but it is not too early to anticipate the effects of its actions. Even before the establishment of the OTP, a White House policy statement authored by Dr. Whitehead influenced the FCC to back down from a planned pilot project for domestic satellites.²⁰ The new Office is perfectly placed to move on the issues its Director feels most important, and it is no more likely than the regulatory agency whose functions it threatens to serve the public's interest.

The *NCTA Bulletin*, newsletter of the cable industry's trade association, recently reported Whitehead's advice to officials of cities considering establishment of cable systems. The points made by Whitehead will alarm the liberals most concerned with insuring the public's interest in the new technology; they directly contradict, for example, the most important recommendations of the ADA and ACLU. Whitehead advised:

18. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Ninety-first Congress, Second Session. *Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1970*. March 9 and 10, 1970. Washington: U.S.G.P.O., p. 26.

19. Hearings, p. 29.

20. "A Hot New Breath Down FCC's Neck," *Broadcasting*, Vol. 79, No. 13, September 28, 1970, p. 24.

Exclusive operating rights are unnecessary and unwise. Franchise fees [paid to the city by the private cable operator] should be nominal.

Municipal ownership is not best for your citizens or your municipal government.

Be wary of "free" channels reserved for special services. [Free channels are occasionally requested by municipalities for educational and civic programming and police surveillance uses.]

Don't automatically treat cable as a public utility.²¹

Apparently Whitehead's politics favor industry's interests over the public's. But the interests of small cable operators represented by the National Cable Television Association are not necessarily identical with those of the electronic giants who belong to the IED/EIA. Whose interests is the OTP, in the long run, likely to serve?

THE OTP AND THE MILITARY- ELECTRONIC COMPLEX

The old Office of Telecommunications Management, which was part of the crisis-oriented Office of Emergency Planning, was directly controlled by the Pentagon.²² The OTP is not directly controlled; at least Clay Whitehead is not a retired general eager to turn his authority over to the Pentagon, as was the most recent Director of Telecommunications Management, Lt. General James D. O'Connell. But the OTP still shares—or delegates—much of its responsibility to the Department of Defense. For example, the DoD manages the 30 million channel mile National Communication System, which is 80% owned or leased by the military.

Even more important, RAND-trained Clay Whitehead and his staff are likely to work hand-in-hand with those men in the military and the electronics and aerospace industries who are searching for an alternative to weapons development. Whitehead's deputy director, Dr. George F. Mansur, was formerly director of microwave and space systems for Collins Radio Company, a major defense contractor.²³ William Plummer, associate director for international telecommunication, started to work for the government on telecommunications matters in the early 1950's. His career advanced steadily at the same time that the agencies for which he worked (Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, Office of Defense Mobilization, Office of Emergency Planning) were increasingly controlled by the Department of Defense.²⁴ Ralph Clark, associate director for national communications, managed the Washington office of Stanford Research Institute (SRI), a major recipient of DoD contracts, from 1957-59. Before joining the Office of Telecommunications Management in 1962, he served as assistant director of defense research, engineering, commu-

21. "Whitehead, Burch discuss CATV," *NCTA Bulletin*, February 17, 1971, p. 4.

22. Schiller, Herbert, *Mass Communication and American Empire*. New York: Augustus Kelley, 1969, chapter 3.

23. *Broadcasting*, p. 24.

24. *Who's Who in America*. Chicago: A.N. Marquis Co., 1968 ed.; Schiller, chapter 3.

nications, and data processing for SRI, a non-profit research giant directed by the presidents and board chairmen of many giant aerospace and electronic companies. He is a member of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association.²⁵

The electronics industry seems certain to benefit from a reorganization plan which places communications policy-making in the hands of men like these, responsible only to the President and not even—as are the FCC Commissioners—subject to Congressional approval. The Office of Telecommunication Policy is not even charged, as is the FCC, with protecting the public interest in matters so non-controversial as privacy. Congressman Cornelius Gallagher (D., N.J.), an outspoken critic of the National Data Bank idea, opposed establishment of the OTP on the grounds that it would be concerned with complex computer systems, and not with their consequences:

I call for the Congress to disapprove Reorganization Plan No. 1 unless the issue of computer privacy will become a part of the new Office of Telecommunication Policy. In addition we should have executive assurances that they will support the establishment of an independent regulatory agency to deal with the data banks, the computer, and the civil rights of citizens whose information is in so many of these systems.²⁶

The OTP is not charged with protection of privacy (or any other civil right); and the White House has not made any statement in support of an independent regulatory agency as called for by Congressman Gallagher. And, as Congressman Clarence J. Brown observed, the OTP is far removed from Congressional influence such as regulatory agencies often feel. Dr. Whitehead summed up his office's responsibility and influence at a press conference last fall: "The weight of the President can be presumed to be behind everything OTP does."²⁷

TECHNOLOGY FOR THE PEOPLE?

Controlled by these interests, whom can we expect the wired nation to benefit? Investors in the system seem certain to profit from a broadband, two-way telecommunications system for this country. Police experts tell us that such a system will help government keep track of its citizens and their activities. It will provide a new and more powerful marketing agent for businessmen to push their wares and increase their profits. It will bring the electronic industry out of its recession. But what will it do for you and me—or for society at large?

The telephone companies have found catering to the business more profitable than worrying about individual subscribers. (Two years ago, data transmission represented almost half of all the telephone traffic, and the figure has certainly risen.)²⁸ Surely the companies providing broad-band, two-way service will find the same true for them. When the individual citizen does make use of two-way telecommunications, it will most often be as a consumer of goods advertised on his console, or as a participant in some form of market research. (The first two-way use contemplated by the Sunnyside, California cable system involves leasing channels to mail order com-

WHO PAYS FOR THE CABLE?

Most of the \$300 million annual income of the 2500 existing cable systems comes from subscribers' fees averaging between \$5 and \$10 per month plus \$10-\$20 installation. It costs more to hook up a second TV or an FM receiver; subscribers to some systems may pay monthly cable bills of more than \$25. When cable systems add new services like video shopping and fire and burglar alarms, the cost climbs higher.

But cable systems cost a lot to build, and cable operators are always looking for new ways to increase income and fatten profits. As audiences grow, cable TV becomes an increasingly attractive advertising medium. Montgomery Ward, American Airlines, General Foods, Campbell Soup, Lever Brothers, and hundreds of local entrepreneurs already buy time on local cable programs. As systems comply with a new FCC regulation and begin to generate their own programming, ad revenues will zoom.

By 1980, according to one cable man, cable systems should take in well over \$2 billion each year. And by 1980, cable subscribers will pay twice for television—once to the cable company, and again to the companies that advertise on TV.

(Sources: *Broadcast Management/Engineering*, Jan. 1971; *Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 19, 1970; *Business Week*, July 12, 1969).

panies for advertising.)²⁹

Although home library service may be available, and two-way visual communications with politicians or friends may be possible, how many ghetto homes will have access to the system? We have little hope that the corporations controlling the cable network will be concerned with the Constitution when First Amendment rights interfere with maximizing profits. The government could subsidize the necessary hardware for poor people, on the grounds that access to the communications system is an inalienable right. But there is little precedent to encourage this daydream. Welfare recipients do not receive subsidies for telephone service, for television, or for purchasing newspapers or stamps to mail letters to editors. The FCC is not noted for protecting public access to broadcast communications. Perhaps more important, the OTP doesn't seem likely to propose policies which might encourage dissenters and give them an audience.

Even if the poor were given access to the communications system, how could it serve them? "Knowledge is power," Dr. Edwin Parker of Stanford University's Institute for Communication Research told a recent assembly of computer experts.³⁰ Parker and other communication scholars would have us believe that the powerful interests control-

25. *Who's Who*.

26. Hearings, p. 67.

27. *Broadcasting*, p. 24.

28. Irwin, Manley, "A New Policy for Communications," *Science and Technology*, Vol. 76, April 1968, p. 79.

29. Conversation with Norman K. Bennett, General Manager, Sunnyside Cablevision.

30. Parker, Edwin, "Information Utilities and Mass Communications," in *The Information Utility and Social Choice*, Montvale, N.J.: American Federation of Information Processing Society Press, 1970, p. 51.

ling this country are in power chiefly because they have a nearly exclusive command of the information sources in the society. Give the people access to the communication-information system, these experts argue, and the people will be able to wrest control from the lords. But this argument is nonsense! Business and government leaders control vast quantities of information inaccessible to the public. If this information *does* make them powerful, they will not make it available to others, regardless of the country's communication network.

Academic experts who argue that knowledge is power are blind to their own predicament. With all their information, they do not themselves command the power to prevent construction of the ABM, the destruction of the environment, or oppression of minorities. When the nation is wired, and we are all plugged into our home terminals, we will have no more power than we have now. And if the new technology, like past technologies, exacerbates existing social and economic inequalities, the influence we wield in the "wired nation" will be *less* than we command right now.

Ralph Lee Smith worries briefly, but realistically, that the cable will lessen the need for the affluent to enter the city, either for work or recreation. "Lack of concern and alienation could easily deepen, with effects that could cancel the benefits of community expression that the cable will [possibly] bring to inner-city neighborhoods."³¹ The decentralizing effect of the wired nation might be desirable in a society that does not trap individuals in racial and economic ghettos. But that society is not the United States today.

Most of the consumer services promised by promoters of the wired nation are superfluous frills or gimmicks designed to increase consumption of advertised goods. But not even the most reasonable-sounding services are guaranteed to benefit the individual. Who will determine what information is offered in the electronic library, accessible from every home that can afford the terminal and monthly charges? How will the individual, in the face of storage limitations certain to be imposed by the economic considerations of private corporations, guarantee that his voice is heard? Electronic media—radio and television—have already destroyed much of the impact of the print media, and yet it is generally only the print media (especially ditto and mimeograph) that even middle-class, politically active citizens can afford. Certainly, a wired nation will exacerbate this problem. What will become of the underground press if most generally accepted information appears only in electronic books and newspapers?

Technically, cable television and the wired nation represent "progress." The technology allows a more accurate approximation of face-to-face human communication across a distance than any technology yet evolved. But the technology presents dangers to human rights which are insurmountable, given the economic and regulatory structure of the

communications industries. Nor can we rely on the Federal Communications Commission or the Office of Telecommunication Policy to protect the public interest. The Commission has often demonstrated—most spectacularly in its protection of the broadcast industry in the face of a competitive cable technology—the extent to which it places industry's interest above that of the public. The new OTP seems particularly well designed to protect the interests of the military and the electronics industry in future telecommunications policy-making.

If the new technology will be impossible to regulate once it is established, given the current structure of our society, we are left with two alternatives. One is to assume that it will be introduced, given some sort of theory of the historical inevitability of technological "progress," and to attempt "to take every advantage of its tremendous potentials for social good,"³² knowing all the while that the battle is lost before it is joined. The other alternative is to oppose the introduction of the technology, and to limit its development in any way, at any stage possible, until the society is structured to allow the people to take advantage of the technology's potential. This is undeniably the radical alternative—and those who adopt it will be called impossibly backward, or even un-American. But it is also the only alternative which protects the individual from the ruinous effects of still more capitalist-controlled technological "progress"

31. Smith, p. 606.

32. Smith, p. 606.

Manuel Janco
Daniel Furjot

COMPUTERS: HISTORICAL CONDITIONS AND PROFIT REALIZATION

(France, 1972)

I. HISTORICAL CONDITIONS FOR THE APPEARANCE OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS

A socio-economic structure¹ such as the capitalist mode of production can only be maintained by developing itself. It is toward this need to preserve itself and grow, determining factors in the final analysis, that the education system is directed. As the necessary mediation in the reproduction of the social conditions of production, education more or less deliberately attempts to condition citizens to conform, almost automatically, to the dominant code of value judgements and social prejudices. It is to this same need for preservation and growth that scientific research is directed, resulting in all kinds of technical discoveries which contribute to the accumulation of capital.

The very short history of the computer shows how its development has satisfied the two essential needs for maintenance and growth:

—the needs of the military sector, which ever since World War II have had an increasing determination on the progress of the entire society according to the requirements of "National Defense",² and

—the need to rationalize economic choices formulated by the private decision-making centers, which, confronted by the rapid growth of the accumulation of the means of production, saw their profits falling. In order to survive, the private sector had to avoid by all possible means the repetition of the big economic crisis, and it re-organized itself around the public-military sector. This was the only way to make a maximum profit from the public-military orders, from the technological fallout from their research, and scale economies.

However, whereas these restrictions gave the computer its initial goals, and developed its means of action, we are now witnessing:

—first, a rapid change in the nature of its utilization; computers have gone from the stage of the mechanization of administrative work and accounting to that of scientific calculation needed for

This text is based in part on the article "L'informatique et le pouvoir" (*Le Monde*, 16 July 1970) written by Dubois, Janco and Vernicos, and the work of the Computer Committee of the Parti Socialiste Unifié, Paris, 1968. It was first published in the authors' *Informatique et capitalisme*, Paris, Maspero, 1972. It is published by permission of the authors. Translated from the French by Mary C. Axtmann. English translation Copyright International General 1978. This is its first English publication.

integrated management and the preparation of decision-making; and

—second, the extension of its field of application to all areas of human activity—from linguistics to sociological surveys to international politics. This extension has been accompanied by a growth in the importance of the electronics industry, which is fast becoming the dominant and determinant sector in the world economy.

These qualitative and quantitative transformations are a far cry from the simplistic analyses which tend to limit the development of computers and their application to the gradual improvement of generations of computers, the final result of "successful" or even "lucky" research work. The birth and development of the computer as we have already suggested, cannot be understood apart from its economic and political context, that is, apart from the need for a solution which alone, in the last analysis, can give rise to discoveries.

In this evolutionary process, there are three distinctive phases:

—*The phase of the crisis of the Western economy of the 1920s and 1930s.* At this time the capitalist economy and imperialism were in a period of over-production. In order to maintain itself in the marketplace and continue to make profits, private enterprise was obliged to lower its costs, "rationalize" the development of its production, and begin marketing and advertising. The introduction of multi-copiers (1923) then calculators (1950), first in the service sector, and later in industry, responded to these new needs. Although within individual businesses these decisions resolved certain difficulties, in the overall economy the problem was made worse by an increase in unemployment caused by technology, and by the increase in total wages with all the monetary implications which this implies.

—*The phase of the wartime economy and its consequences.* The warring nations, particularly the United States, decided to increase their military potential in order to make a maximum profit from their industrial resources. From then on, production would be "rationalized" on a national scale, based on the extension of technological research and organizational methods. It was at this moment that operational research began, along with a complex apparatus of forecasting and planning techniques. These achievements were subsequently taken over and generalized by the computer. The "rationalization" of the world economy was on the way to becoming a reality.

—*The present phase.* The need to "rationalize" multinational companies is particularly linked to the restrictions imposed by a new form of regional or international competition. The generalized use of

1. By "structure" we mean an ensemble including (1) the links between the various decision-making centers (businesses, administrations, social classes), and (2) the productive base.

2. The expenditures connected with the automation of the battlefield reached \$2 billion in 1970, and according to *Business Week* the figure will go up to \$20 billion during the next ten years.

computers has become a factor accentuating capitalist concentration (IBM, for example, controls two-thirds of the world production of computers).

II. COMPUTERS AND PROFIT REALIZATION

The historical background briefly presented here outlines certain tendencies which concern the future of computers. It is obvious that the mechanism implemented by the computers are being developed in order to penetrate all sectors of the economy. But this evolution, clear as it may be, is meaningless until it has been proved to be an irreversible phenomenon structurally linked to the capitalist system. Thus we must ask the question: Why computers? What is their goal in the final analysis, and who determines their generalized use?

On the economic level, the tendency for the rate of profit to fall is the stumbling-block of world capitalism. All of its problems, all of the difficulties it faces, can be traced back to this primary contradiction. In this perspective, we could say that the computer is technically the most recent attempt developed to counteract this tendency. In the last analysis, the computer's only goal is to neutralize this tendency. As such, we can thus see the computer's importance in the area of economic strategy.

Thus in order to understand the principle behind the operation of the computer, we must define its use in practice by first of all, examining its methods and possible areas of intervention.

When computer industrialists offer their clients the services of their computers essentially to improve their companies' profits, they mean that they are offering their customers four basic possibilities for making optimum profits:

POSSIBILITIES	APPLICATIONS
Reduction of General Expenditures	Administration and Accounting
Reduction of Production Costs	Operations
Income Growth	New Products, Improvement of Customer Service
Improvement in the Work of Functional Departments and Management Decisions	Information Systems and Simulation Models (Management Information System, Planning)

Source: Based on a McKinsey study, *Unlocking the Computer's Profit Potential*, N.Y., 1968.

3. In the area of production alone, it should be noted that the computer, as hardware, is a factor in the increase of the organic composition of capital, since it represents constant capital. To examine it as software we would have to first discuss the relations of production.

4. Quaderni Rossi, *Lutte ouvrières et capitalisme aujourd'hui*, Paris, Maspero, 1968.

5. According to the review *Les Informations*, 20% of French businesses are in the process of using computer-based automation.

6. We will only make passing reference to the problem of "process control" which cannot be assimilated to computers. In the area of production, computers are combined with other technical innovations, and it is impossible to dissociate the effects of the computers on

This clearly indicates that in the capitalist mode of production, the computer intervenes in both production and circulation, particularly, as we shall see, in the area which bourgeois political economy calls the "tertiary" or "service" sector.

1. Operational Aspects A. PRODUCTION

In the area of *production*, the goal is essentially to fight against the effects of the organic composition of capital by attempting to maximize the rate of exploitation. This is one way of reducing the cost of production.³ As pointed out in the *Quaderni-Rossi*,⁴ since the fundamental factor in capitalist evolution is the shrinking of variable capital in relation to constant capital, planning gradually became a necessity, beginning in the individual company and then spreading out into the marketplace and eventually throughout all of society. At the planning level, the computers can thus be used to "rationalize" the production process through the aid of automation, more particularly, computer-based automation.

This effort to maximize existing constant capital,⁵ in which research plays an essential role, is spread out over four continually interrelated sectors in the production process: preparation, supervision, execution and control of work.⁶ In the preparation of work, for example, we can say that the scheduling of work is a permanent confrontation between production needs and the means of production—in short, medium and long range—which attempts to conciliate all the variables, respecting delivery dates, the maximum use of machinery and personnel, and the minimum waste of time and material.⁷ Thus thanks to the methods of the Program Evaluation and Review Technique system (PERT) developed for NASA, the duration of each assembly-line operation can be regulated according to a desired work-rhythm so that successive operations can be balanced out and coordinated with parallel operations. Although we will not examine the ultimate consequences of this here, we must point out that these purely technical solutions are not neutral in human terms. The down-grading of skills and the fragmentation of work imposed by the capitalist mode of production are reinforced by automation. For the majority of workers, "rationalization" of the work process means an increase in the rate of exploitation through the

work from those of other technical discoveries. Computers are used not with the old production processes, but with new industrial machinery which have further rationalized the work necessary for production. We remind the reader that "process control" consists of the automatic operation of a process, "the use of a governor, usually including a computer, based on information representing, on the one hand, the real state of a production process, and on the other, its optimal operation conditions, which elaborates the commands which by reaction, forces the process to evolve towards its optimal operation conditions" (Soubies and Camy, *L'Informatique industrielle*). The applications are numerous, going from oil refining to printing.

7. Cf. Mario Sollina, in *Economie appliquée*, XXII, 4, 1969.

control and acceleration of the work rhythm, in reified terms, the elimination of slack time. Thus strengthening control over production requires the collection of information all along the assembly line, and particularly information by and about humans by means of terminal units—a substitute for the traditional foreman—which each operator uses to register his own output.⁸

B. CIRCULATION

Regarding the process of *circulation*, the computer can be considered as a powerful means to accelerate the speed in the rotation of capital, influencing the circulation both of merchandise and of money.

Thus since the computer can continually provide information concerning both the volume and the nature of orders, they can cut down both on delivery delays and the number of sales outlets, while avoiding the risks and costs arising from inventory depletion.⁹ Thanks to these techniques, and to computerized marketing systems (which to a certain extent can forecast the rate of consumption), production can be in direct contact with commercialization, leading to the elimination of intermediaries.¹⁰ This will allow big business to integrate industrial capital and commercial capital, and tend to eliminate the surplus value retained by the latter, bringing about a complete restructuring of the commercial apparatus. Concerning cash flow, the introduction of automatic billing and inventory control systems, or of more complex systems like that adopted by Westinghouse, are leading to a total re-organization of financial channels.¹¹ With this increase in the speed of circulation of money, the operating cash of the businesses will be decreased, as will bank deposits.¹²

C. THE "TERTIARY" SECTOR

The most massive introduction of computers has taken place in the "tertiary" or "service" sector.¹³ and in the entire administrative apparatus of the businesses. The goal is to reduce non-productive expenses, in other words, management costs. As noted by Paul Vidonne,¹⁴ the introduction of computers into the "tertiary" sector, has increased

8. These techniques would be profitable on the basis of 100 workers directly working on an assembly line (according to IBM, *L'ordinateur au service de la production, un exemple CLASS*). Chrysler-France (ex-Simca) was reputedly one of the first French companies to use such systems (they were apparently introduced for the first time shortly after the creation of the CFT, the management-controlled union).

9. The cost of handling, inventory and obsolescence represent on the average 25% of the value of the inventory. Cf. IBM, *Système d'information et de gestion de la production: Pics 4*.

10. DATAR, *Eléments pour un schéma directeur de l'informatique*, Paris, La Documentation Française, 1971.

11. Westinghouse registers hourly the movement of all cash in every one of its 250 bank accounts serving its different factories. If any factory treasury show a deficit, a bank transfer is immediately sent, while any excess sum is directed to the Westinghouse main bank for immediate

"productivity" precisely where it was the weakest: accounting, billing, payrolls, personnel records, insurance policy management, etc. Here again, as we shall see, the introduction of these new techniques is fundamentally transforming the work process, in the methods used as well as in the skills required. This will especially effect employment criteria, with the organization of work probably being remodeled along the lines of the productive sector.

In sum: we have seen that the generalized use of the computers was the technical solution responding to the need to fight the tendential fall in the rate of profit. It can thus be said that as long as there is a need to increase productivity, and reduce non-productive expenses, etc., the computer has an *operational function*.

2. Decision-making Aspects

But, as computers little by little take over all areas in which surplus value is extracted, and the services which lead up to decision-making, it assumes the role of a director. As director, it provides an operational rationality for the empirical procedures which were previously carried out in function of the pragmatism of the dominant ideology. The computer's essential function is therefore, in the final analysis, a *decisional function*. How does it operate?

Computer systems strengthen industrial logistics by determining investment programs, risk evaluation, etc. In short, the forecasts made using the computer are particularly useful to scout "territory"¹⁵ and encourage the development of integrated management. This integration is realized by establishing a program which serves as a representative and perfectible model of the business, and then integrating all the information concerning the business within this model.¹⁶ The information which is gathered close to its place of origin in the work process is treated by the model, which, according to pre-established rules, will either regulate or compensate for it when the information indicates that either a deviation or a de-stabilization has taken place. Decisions can thus be made with information which has been previously tested by the programmed computer, and then ultimately

investment. (Cf. *Harvard Business Review*, September-October 1966.)

12. BIPE, *Perspectives du développement des applications de l'informatique à long terme*. This could be an aspect of the struggle between banking capital and industrial capital were it not for the fact that the fusion of big capital makes this a false problem.

13. The branches most directly concerned are the banks, and the insurance companies. It is worth noting that one-third of the total turnover of the insurance companies is spent on management costs.

14. Paul Vidonne, *La production d'information*, Grenoble, IREP, 1972.

15. Cf. Marence and Urvey, *L'ordinateur et les stratégies des entreprises françaises*, ISET.

16. The fact that we are using here a thoroughly technocratic terminology does not in the least imply that we accept its validity. The validity of such notions as "information" and "model" will be challenged elsewhere.

integrated into the business model or the computerized management. This is called the Management Information System.¹⁷

3. The Computer as Objectification of The Functions of Capital

Through integrated management, the computer facilitates the capitalist mode of production's tendency to integrate many different functions, especially at the highest business levels. This has modified the status of the professional within the company hierarchy. The role of the executive has indeed been traditionally that of a collector, transmitter and producer of information (by the orders he gives and receives, the reports he makes, etc.). This privileged position in the information network is now threatened, since, thanks to the computer, the center of decision-making can be directly in contact with the different departments. The executive has lost his monopoly, his priority access to information, and his old role of intermediary has been challenged. We are thus witnessing a qualitative modification in the relations of production, brought about by a quantitative transformation in the productive forces. In other words, the "rationalization" of production means the reinforcement of the power structures, affecting in turn social stratification. Given the tremendous speed with which data can be processed, and the computer's near-perfect rationalization in the collection and production of information, business problems can be solved much more efficiently by this new system than they could in the past based on the old and rather unreliable hierarchical pyramid.¹⁸

Power is thus no longer delegated to an expensive mass of "right-hand" men; now it is placed in the hands of expert "decision-makers" who objectivize the functions of capital.¹⁹

Indirectly, computers concentrate the structures of authority by allowing the power to increase its control at all levels of the enterprise, and to thus decentralize without taking any risks.²⁰

In conclusion, we can say that computers are an economic necessity in the sense that with the socialization of the productive forces, they protect the unity of the capitalist enterprise in its new forms—holding companies, conglomerates, multinationals, etc.

17. At a second stage, individual models can in turn be integrated into a higher level composed of all the businesses and managements of a financial group or vertical chain of production. A third step is also conceivable, wherein all of the computers and data banks of a regional, national or even, international entity could be linked, allowing a decision-making center situated at the top of the hierarchy to control all the data and integrate its decisions into all the models of the territorial entity in question. Such a NIS (National Information System) already exists in Japan.

18. In the United States, there has been a gradual disappearance of middle management.

19. Concerning decision-making, March and Simon have written: "He who receives information... must have a certain degree of confidence in the process by which that information has been elaborated. In this case, the person who makes the immediate observations, evaluates them and transmits them to the rest of the organization becomes an

Confronted by the extension of the world market and the intensification of exchanges, the computer helps to concentrate a vast productive ensemble²¹ in a single economic subject. This is as true for the daily operation of different production units as it is for the utilization of research departments and investment policies.

important link between the data and the organizational action which depends on it... and it is rarely possible to control the facts communicated. That is why the integration of uncertainties (which is one moment in the elaboration of information) is often used, consciously or not, as a technical means of obtaining and exercising power. In a cultural context where it is not possible to openly contradict factual affirmations, particularly in areas where they are not in contradiction with intuitive perception, one can often gain acceptance for such factual affirmations as premises for decision-making..." (Quoted in "Division de travail et technique du pouvoir", *Les Temps Modernes* (Paris), April 1970.

20. "Division de travail et technique du pouvoir", *op. cit.*

21. Cf. Charles Bettelheim, *Transition vers l'économie socialiste*, Paris, Maspero, 1968.

Jean-Michel Caroit

THE COMPUTERIZATION OF A NEWS AGENCY: THE EXAMPLE OF AFP

(France, 1977)

It would have been surprising if the "computer revolution" had spared news agencies. Already used for some time in the management of news agencies, since a short while ago, the computer has also been used in the data processing of the news itself. Thus, on 9 October 1973, the board of directors of the Agence France-Presse (AFP) decided to begin using computers. Besides the need to compete with their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, this decision also reflected three other major preoccupations: the need to obtain more rapid and more selective handling of information, the need to resolve the problem of the saturation of the traditional means of receiving and transmitting news, and the need to reduce operating costs (essentially made up of wages).

AFP is not very well known to the public, who for the most part is not aware that the majority, if not almost all of the news read in daily newspapers or heard on the radio in France, in fact, is based on AFP news dispatches.¹ Like all other international agencies, AFP's vocation is to gather information from all corners of the globe, to process it editorially, and distribute it, in return for payment, as rapidly as possible, to its clients: newspapers, radio and television stations, and governmental and private organizations.

The data processing system at AFP has been operational since January 1976.² Generally speaking, it functions in the following way: dispatches arriving from all parts of the globe are put into a computer memory at the headquarters on the Place de la Bourse in Paris (with the old system the news "spilled" out from a battery of teleprinters). Each desk chief has in front of him a "rapid scanner" which enables him to take note, almost instantaneously, of the first two lines of each news article. Based on these first two lines, the desk chief judges the importance and urgency of the news and sorts it out accordingly. He can still look at the entire dispatch on a "video console" (a type of television screen that has replaced typewriters for journalists working at computerized desks). The editors at the different desks carry out all the dispatch-processing operations on their video consoles: deletions, additions, or changes of letters, words, sentences or paragraphs; punctuation; translation; etc. Once the

dispatch has been processed, the desk chief or one of his assistants decides who is to receive the news and give it a priority code. Once the information has been thus treated it is put into the computer's memory, which in turn, assigns it a place on a "waiting list" ready for diffusion.

The data processing system accelerates and rationalizes the operations needed to process information: the reception of news sent by regional and foreign offices (and in the future, news by the production services within headquarters); the internal distribution of this information to the various desks concerned according to the coded directions provided by the sender; the processing of the dispatches at the desks; and the transmission, filing and statistical control of the information received and diffused. Data processing also increases by approximately 20% the volume of information diffused. Whereas before all of the dispatches sent out had to be typed a second time by teleprint operators, now the information is transmitted directly by the journalists from the video consoles. This last consequence of data processing in AFP is also its main justification: in six years 130 teleprint operators' jobs out of a total of 170 have been eliminated which should rapidly make up for the expenses incurred by the machines (approximately 10 million francs), and in the future will make important savings in the agency's operating costs. Long drawn-out negotiations with the CGT Union of Book Workers have helped resolve the delicate problem of suppressing an occupational category, thanks to a system whereby operators who retire are not replaced, occupational retraining, early retirements, and indemnities for workers leaving voluntarily.

The installation of video consoles, however, has encountered strong resistance from journalists. A large majority of desk editors have judged insufficient the guarantees included in a draft agreement signed by the agency's management and the unions at the end of 1975. In November 1976, journalists at the German desk decided to boycott the video consoles that were installed and continued working on typewriters. Faced with the extension and prolongation of this boycott, and the serious consequences that would result from the delay in the installation of the data processing system, the board of directors finally authorized the management, on 8 March 1977, to meet the journalists' demands. These demands covered four areas: health, the rearrangement of work schedules so as to take into account the time needed for the installation of the machines, an increase in personnel, and the allocation of a uniform bonus in remuneration for the new technical skills and tasks asked of the journalists.

However, the satisfaction of these demands did not solve all the major problems. As far as health is

1. See the recent study on the AFP published by the Documentation Française in their "Notes et Etudes Documentaires" series, No. 4336-7, 23 November 1976.

2. For technical details on the AFP data processing system, see *Zéro Un Informatique*, 98, April 1976.

concerned, although prolonged use of the video consoles for several hours is still too recent a phenomenon to be able to arrive at any definite conclusions about its effects, those who work with this equipment frequently complain of visual problems and nervous fatigue. The long-term effects of the radiation emitted by these consoles on the genetic and cellular structure are completely unknown.

As far as the type of information, and its control are concerned, the consequences of data processing are less perceptible on a short-term basis, but at the same time more disturbing in terms of the future. Without entering into the question of the "neutrality" of data processing tools,³ either real or apparent, one can foresee the effects these tools will have on the shaping of information.

First of all, processing accentuates the standardization of information. At AFP, the data processing of the news reinforces the necessity for the journalist, as a "producer", to reduce by eliminating different shades of meaning, each event to two or three lines (the lead or caption) from which the desk chief bases his choice of news. Systematization can go further (this is not the case for AFP, but the system used by Mr. Deferre's Marseille newspaper *Provençal* should be mentioned): using content analyses and word frequency studies, one can imagine standard articles or sentences for each kind of event (inauguration, town council meeting, etc.) where the journalist would only have to fill in the blanks for the protagonists, the place, date, etc. For the editor working at the desk, the quasi-disappearance of the paper medium and its replacement by a video screen, eliminates erasing and makes it more difficult to compare two successive versions of the same text. There is a great temptation to send off the information just as it appears on the screen, as the role of the transmitter is more important and precedes that of the editor. The increase in the number of dispatches sent out, noticeable since the desks have been converted to data processing methods, is certainly not a guarantee of improved editorial quality or service.

A serious danger of uniformity will arise in the near future when it will be possible to connect AFP's data processing system directly to programmed typesetting equipment installed in different regional daily newspapers. Entire pages of international news, or French news of national significance can then be written at AFP and transmitted by perforated tape to the newspapers. The press barons can then dismiss half of their journalists (or more), and, at this highest stage of pluralism, the French can read from one end of the country to the other, a sole, uniform newspaper embellished with some local news. This process is already well underway in the United States, where hundreds of small newspapers, often in a situation of local monopoly, are content to let the AP or UPI perforated tapes feed their linotype machines.

3. See *Interférences* (Paris), No. 2, Spring 1975, and 3, Autumn 1975.

4. See *l'Humanité-Dimanche* (Paris), 58, 9-15 March 1977.

Another potential danger: a data processing system allows information to be transmitted from a console located outside of AFP (for example, by a propaganda agency, governmental or otherwise). The draft agreement signed by the agency's management and the journalists' unions, stipulates, of course, that the "dispatches will be checked by editorial teams that are qualified to do this work." However, there is reason to doubt how binding this guarantee will be in a difficult period.

Finally, it is to be regretted that the object of the data processing system chosen by AFP is only to rationalize the processing of the news. A more interesting project would have been to establish a veritable "information bank", available to all clients. The constitution of this kind of computerized documentation center, with all of the information diffused by AFP stored in the computer's memory, had to be abandoned because of lack of funds.

The misgivings one may have about the future use of data processing at AFP, unfortunately, are confirmed by recent events that compromise the work of the agency: the nomination, on 3 May 1976 of a high official who had held several posts in government information agencies to the post of AFP's Assistant Director General; the presentation of a proposed bill that would establish a "minimum service" at AFP limiting the right to strike as at the ex-ORTF [former French State Radio and Television]; and the increase in governmental pressure, especially as was the case during the last municipal elections.⁴ It should be remembered that according to its by-laws, the AFP should not, under any circumstances, take into account "influences or considerations whose nature will compromise the accuracy or objectivity of information." Respect for this fundamental obligation depends, finally, upon the will and capability of journalists, whether they work on consoles or typewriters, to resist the pressure of capitalism in any of its forms. All things considered, the introduction of data processing into an "information machine" as powerful as the AFP puts back on the agenda the question of the social control of information which is presently considered as a merchandise, except when it is politically threatening.

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Armand Mattelart

THE SATELLITE SYSTEM

(France, 1977)

In 1972, an international draft convention on direct satellite broadcasting was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly.¹ A large number of proletarian nations were disturbed about the possibility these space satellites offered for transmitting TV programs directly from a metropolis without having to pass through earth relay stations. These countries, in a world relation of force wherein the U.S. controls more than 65% of the world flow of information, feared an intensified cultural bludgeoning. They therefore asserted their rights to self-determination in this area, as they already have done in others. The U.S. delegate retorted that if such a right to sovereignty did indeed exist, a more essential right, according to his way of thinking, was that concerned with the free exchange of ideas and the free flow of information.

In 1974, in the same hemicycle, a similar confrontation took place. However, this time it was no longer a question of controlling the transmission of television programs. As part of a vast plan for solving the "energy crisis", NASA and General Electric had, shortly before, launched a satellite for the tele-detection of natural resources, LANDSAT or ERTS (Earth Resources Technology Satellites).² Again, the same countries rebelled against the collection of data on the earth and sub-soil carried out night and day by the cameras of this new type of satellite. These countries interpreted this data collecting as a new kind of spying on raw materials, carried out without the agreement of the countries concerned. Once again, the U.S. tried to impose its idea of space "liberalism", a derivative of its free-trade doctrine.

These debates demonstrate the close connection between information-for-the-control-of-minds and information-for-the-control-of-economies by sharply illustrating the global nature of the stakes involved, that is, the difficulty in establishing frontiers between the different applications of the new communication technology. The debates also confirm that the raw material of knowledge is assuming an increasingly important role in the present stage of the international accumulation of capital and the development of the productive forces. Certain U.S. experts are already presenting a new possible basis for the division of world power, the "data rich" and "data poor" criteria, which would separate the countries rich in information from those who are poor in this respect, as they are in others.

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However, we should not be fooled by this: if data collection is synonymous with riches as far as natural resources are concerned, it can also be synonymous with pure redundancy and impoverishment when it is a question of the volume of cultural production transmitted by a country. "Information wealth" often disguises the great poverty of production-line culture and an information without context or history.

The association between TV programs and tele-photos of mining deposits may be taken as a metaphor for the ties established by a political and economic regime between two fields which publicly appear completely distinct from one another. Dealing with the problem of information and communication at the present time means searching for other connections, other intersections, which at the end enable us to define the entire body of relations which characterize a communication system under State Monopoly Capitalism, the holy ground for all sorts of promiscuous alliances and partnerships.

Is it still mere chance that it was the secret dealings of a manufacturer of telegraph equipment, telephones, transistors and satellites which revealed U.S. imperialism's latest strategies for intervention against popular movements?

WHEN THE PARTITIONS FALL

The first promiscuous merger: the alliance between the new communications technology industry and the State. The ties were formally established in 1962, when the first telecommunications satellites were being tested. The U.S. founded COMSAT (Communication Satellite Corporation), which was given the responsibility for organizing and commercially exploiting this new technology. COMSAT was established as a private company of a new type. Half of its stock was offered to individuals (175,000) and the other half to 163 manufacturers of communication equipment. Four large multinational firms, American Telegraph and Telephone, ITT, General Telephone & Electronics, and Radio Corporation of America, bought more than 45% of the stock; 4.6% was divided amongst the other 159 firms. When the board of directors met, White House representatives were seated side-by-side with the stockholders' delegates. Thus, the power held by these large firms became a part of the State apparatus. The institutionalization of this partnership between government and private industry, beginning with one of the most advanced fields, was soon considered by certain economists as a model and forerunner of what might happen in other areas of U.S. industry.

In 1964, equipped with this new operational

1. Japan, with the help of U.S. firms such as General Electric, should launch the first satellite of this type in the near future.

2. In 1977, the U.S. will launch the third satellite of this type. Concerning the rulings resulting from these two debates, see Nicolas Mateesco Matte, *Droit aérospatial: de l'exploration scientifique à l'exploration commerciale*, Paris, Ed. Pedone, 1976.

tool, the U.S. proposed to the other capitalist countries the creation of an international network of communication satellites. Thus was born INTELSAT (International Telecommunication Satellite), which naturally fell under the administrative direction of COMSAT. When it was founded, the U.S. owned 61% of the shares of INTELSAT, but by 1977, this figure was diminished to 38%. However, U.S. technology hegemony is such that its aerospace industry is still able to pocket four-fifths of the construction contracts for the fifth-generation satellites which will be launched in coming years. COMSAT's position as administrator has been regularly renewed. In addition, the special rates given to U.S. press agencies (AP, UPI) for use of this international system have provoked storms of protests from their competitors in other capitalist countries (AFP, Reuters, among others).

This first experience has been the point of reference for all other applications of satellite technology, such as in aeronautical navigation and sea navigation. This was well illustrated in 1975, when the metropolis united its computers and satellites for the installation in 1980 of a vast data bank and teleprocessing information network called SBS (Satellite Business Service). At that time, the same model of co-operation between the State and private firms was put forth. After a series of intrigues, the choice of partners for this project was narrowed down to three: COMSAT (42.5% of the stock), IBM (42.5%), and one of the largest U.S. insurance companies, Aetna Life & Casualty. The initials of this new consortium are most appropriate: CIA!

COMSAT also became, along with the advance of telecommunication technology, one of the few negotiators for the installation of earth stations and national satellite systems in capitalist countries and certain socialist nations, such as Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of China. These systems only cover one region or country, and have developed rapidly since 1973. Following closely behind COMSAT, the expert in communications systems, other U.S. firms have succeeded in penetrating the market. Dependence vis-à-vis the U.S. model is such that, in the field of tele-data processing, for example, when two major French firms in 1976 became involved in the teleprocessing industry they had to form partnerships with U.S. firms: Thomson with Computer Sciences (the largest U.S. firm specialized in data processing systems and services), and Matra with the U.S. firm TRW. Then, of course, in 1975 there was the entire French computer industry which was handed over to Honeywell. Furthermore, there have been many disappointments in the preparatory program for the launching of the European Communication Satellite System (ECS) planned for 1980-1. The failure of the OTS (Orbital Test Satellite) launching in September 1977 due to the explosion of a NASA Delta-3914 launcher has increased the already considerable delay of European satellite technology. It will not be until 1980 that capitalist Europe will become independent of U.S. space launch vehicles for the launching of their satellites

into orbit. Lastly, on the international level, there is the increasing U.S. control over all computer networks and data banks which reach into all sectors of information.

The second merger: between military and civilian interests. The matrix for the highly-developed communication technology is military in origin. The permanent partnership of the industrial-military complex had made this technology possible. Financial support from this complex has allowed technological advances to prosper. For example: the U.S. air-defense system, SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) was the precursor of all the large civilian and military data processing systems in the capitalist countries. The first large civilian network in the U.S., ARPANET (Advanced Research Project) was developed under the guidance of the Pentagon. This network has kept certain characteristics which were part of the original military model. For example, the network of computers is linked up in such a way that numbered data may take several different routes through it, and should one or more computer centers be destroyed, the system as a whole will still function. However, this represents, undoubtedly, the least important aspect of the technical heritage, the most important being the alienating social relations established between the computer and its human target.

As far as satellites are concerned, between 1958 and 1972, the U.S. successfully launched 115 civilian satellites and 700 military ones. In 1969, tactical communication satellites of the U.S. Army used technology which would not be used in the civilian sector until six years later. In 1976, the Pentagon controlled 80% of the capacity of the "civilian" system of sea-navigation satellites.

Third merger and integration: between software and hardware. During the movement towards industrial concentration in the seventies, owners of advanced technology, after buying out other firms in publishing or audiovisual production, became producers themselves of cultural and educational programs. In this way, sectors which were not directly productive, and which, until then, had escaped industrial production methods, fell under the control of electronic and aerospace firms. A new kind of pedagogy thus came into being: from this point on, these firms began to manufacture textbooks, produce audiovisual equipment, and start adult education and technical schools, while at the same time continuing to offer the hardware. Some firms even participated in the installation of satellite systems: in 1975, among the ten biggest world producers in the educational industry, one finds Xerox, CBS, RCA, ITT, Westinghouse, General Electric and Litton.

This control of the educational apparatus has also been accompanied by a greater rationalization of research. All of the large service companies — advertising agencies and accounting firms, for example — which have also become more concentrated because of the crisis, have adopted more technical working methods. A veritable "brain reserve" has thus been formed, which contributes

to the formation of an enormous complex of research services adapted for all sorts of uses. This reserve is now being transformed into the bureaucracy needed by the large multinationals. As the review *Business Week* noted in 1973, the chief of staffs of the multinationals recognize the pressures caused by the new context:

Corporations, no less than countries, have been gathering information about one another for years. Among nations, it is called spying and may involve sophisticated techniques, lots of money, specially trained personnel, and covert methods. Companies are more likely to call it market research or commercial analysis, and until recently their efforts have been mostly fragmented and loosely planned, more tactical than strategic.

Now, with business more complex and the economic climate so uncertain, corporations are becoming far more sophisticated at scrutinizing the competition. They seek out more information, spend more time and effort analyzing it, and some even have full-time executives who specialize in ferreting out and interpreting nuggets about their rivals.

The denunciations of the intrigues of the CIA, reveal, beyond the mere scandal, the obsolete state of the present intelligence-gathering system, and show that the Empire needs a new global system of information collection. This system must fulfill the needs of the multinational firm in supporting its expansion and profit-maximalization; the needs of the government in exercising its political control over other nations; and lastly, the imperious need for mutual exchanges between the two. The new State practice in the field of information is specifically designed to meet this need.

THE ELECTRONIC GULAGS

The combination of political and economic factors have (and are) speeded up the establishment of a communication system which is more and more constraining and enveloping. Amongst the economic factors, one should point out the crisis in the aerospace industry, which has a direct effect on the electronics sector, of which the telecommunications industry is an integral part. The pressing need for the aeronautics industry to export (the bribery scandals are just one aspect of this) stimulates the international diffusion of new kinds of communications technology. The latest bribery scandal concerns Hughes Aircraft (the world's largest manufacturer of civilian and military satellites and pioneer in INTELSAT) and other companies such as General Telephone & Electronic (GTE) in Indonesia. The race to win the biggest contracts of the century has also started in this field which may be seen as an offshoot of the arms race. The figures involved in these contracts are staggering: in Indonesia, \$840 million has already been invested in a domestic communication program, and the principal beneficiaries in the satellite department have been Hughes Aircraft and ITT. In Iran, GTE

3. Cf. the author's "L'industrie aérospatiale américaine en difficulté" *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Paris), April 1976.

landed the largest contract that a private firm has ever won in the telecommunications industry: \$500 million. This contract was won despite direct pressure from the French government in favor of the French branch of ITT; the spectre of a possible left political victory in France was a decisive factor in the Shah's refusal to give in to this pressure.

Another economic factor is the process of "civil reconversion" of material originally conceived for use in war time. This process has been speeded up since the end of the Southeast Asian wars, and also, the end of the space race. This surplus of military equipment greatly contributed to the expansion of communication satellite systems as well as to the militarization of civil society, in general.³

Political factors are just as important. Because of the rising tide of popular struggle throughout the world, the U.S. can no longer be the "world's policeman" and it is constrained by necessity to employ "low profile" strategies. These strategies, in which the destabilization of mentalities is essential for successful intervention, means that a very special importance is given to techniques and technologies aimed at the persuasion of different social classes.

The advent of new developments in communication technology should also be seen in terms of the profound crisis now affecting the entire U.S. capitalist system. Faced with people living under the threat of unemployment and inflation, the system must recreate from above the credibility which it lacks at the base of the system. Superman always appears in periods of crisis, and the advocates of strong "law and order" speak loudest and strongest when the times are hardest. In order to reconstitute a popular consensus in the midst of a bankrupt era, the U.S. capitalist system has launched its own advertising campaign. The U.S. government, with the help of a group of advertising agencies, has just begun to use the Peanuts comic strip characters to "explain" to the U.S. people the benefits of capitalism as compared to communism, giving an interpretation of inflation, unemployment, and the crisis which is intended to reduce the significance of these problems and pacify the spirits. This gives a slight idea of how much importance the ideological means of social control will have in coming years.

However, the implantation of a large-scale, modern communications network under capitalism can only develop fully under totalitarian conditions. When radio broadcasting networks were first installed in the industrialized capitalist countries, historical conditions were very different than those today under which global communications networks are being installed. It is not just by chance that the first countries to be equipped, in the near future, with such a sophisticated network (which will be used for educational, judicial, medical, commercial and military purposes) will be Brazil, Indonesia and Iran. In the latter, the project's directors are under the direct control of the Pentagon, a unique case in the annals of telecommunications exporters.

The technological aid helps to modernize the neo-colonial State apparatus. One can imagine what the consequences of tele-repression might be like

when it is part of an institution defined by concepts such as "national security", and the "internal enemy."⁴

The countries equipped by non-U.S. electronics firms are hardly more "liberal". For example, we have Zaire, where the French Thomson-CSF has won an important contract.

In other realities, the myth of the "global village" — the world reunified by communication — is encountering strong resistance. In France, the report *Informatique et Libertés*, written by labor unionists and computer scientists after the discovery of the Minister of the Interior's plan, aptly called SAFARI, to start a computerized system of information on citizens, is perhaps the best French expression of such resistance.⁵ A symbol of the power's ongoing interest in the control of information can be seen in the birth of the doyen of world news agencies, Havas, which later became AFP. In the mid-nineteenth century, when the hegemony in the means of information transmission was on this side of the Atlantic, it was under the auspices of this very same Minister of the Interior that Havas began. According to a contract signed in 1841, Havas and its network of informers were supposed to send mimeographed daily bulletins to the State's prefectures, sub-prefectures and attorney generals. The government, after having used Havas' news transmission service by carrier pigeon, then allowed the news agency to use the first electric telegraph lines.⁶

The present phase of capitalist accumulation has reunified the two main functions of information; to provide the news, and, as was already the case in 1840, to serve as a police network for the guardians of public order.

4. In fact, this is only a return to sources. The concept of the State (the National Security State) was the direct descendent of the U.S. National Security Act in 1947. This act, which was inspired by the government's creation of the anti-communist psychosis, made possible the development of this technology in the U.S.

5. Cf. Report of the Commission *Informatique et Libertés*, La Documentation Française, Paris, 1975.

6. Minister of Cultural Affairs, National Archives, *Les archives de l'agence Havas*, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1969.

Maolsheachlainn O Caollaí BROADCASTING AND THE GROWTH OF A CULTURE (Ireland, 1975)

WHAT IS CULTURE?

It is always a worthwhile exercise to define one's terms. It helps to avoid misunderstanding and wasteful conflict about non-issues. The concept most likely to give rise to difficulty in our discussion is that represented by the word "culture". The multiplicity of definitions which have been recorded — the Canadian Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism mentioned the existence of 300 — does not help us to come to a common understanding.

The best way I have discovered of defining culture, as I understand it, is as follows: As members of a common species all people share a common set of fundamental needs which are derived from their common biologically determined requirements for survival, nourishment and shelter. The fundamental needs are reproduction, economic, social and political co-operation, ideology, aesthetic experience and communication. All of these needs are shared by all people and they are *always* met by cultural means. That is to say, in fulfilling their basic needs people develop over time, patterns of behaviour and thought which are passed on from generation to generation and modified by each succeeding generation to meet the continuously changing circumstances of life.

Thus in any culture we can classify the *Economic Institution* as all of the techniques used in organising the production and allocation of the goods and services people require to meet their material needs. The *Political Institution* would include the patterned means for making decisions on matters that affect the groups survival. *Ideology* might be defined as a guiding set of beliefs explaining the nature of the world and man's relationship to it and the cosmos. The *Aesthetic Institution* would be a system of techniques for the exaltation of human experience through manipulation of the senses — art, music, literature. Another major category of culture, *Language*, functions in culture to facilitate communication and communion, to act as a vehicle of culture, linking the dead generations with the living and the unborn, passing on accumulated experience, moulding the ways in which people think and forming the strongest of all the cultural bonds, binding people together as an identifiable and distinctive community.

This text was presented at a symposium on broadcasting policy organized by the Irish Transport and General Workers Union on 14 June 1975 as part of the campaign against the rebroadcasting of British TV in Ireland. Reprinted by permission of the author.

Each distinctive, identifiable people in the human family is distinctive and identifiable not because of racial characteristics but because of its unique conditions and experiences and its unique cultural response to them.

In summary, culture is a great pattern, of patterns of thought and behaviour, worked out by trial and error over the ages to meet the common basic needs of people. Since the circumstances of life are continually changing, culture must also continually change.

There is an inverted snobbery which holds that culture is the domain of upper class exploiters. This is nonsense, of course, because culture is the means by which we all survive. Having access to it is the right of all.

CULTURAL GROWTH

The basis of man's survival so far and of his progress through evolution lies in the ability to maintain balance between the cultural traditions necessary for continuity and the capacity for change essential for adaptation to changing circumstances.

Growth of a culture, therefore, implies this balance between maintenance of meaningful elements and change. It seems to me that "growth" also implies freedom, the freedom of a people to strike whatever balance they choose between maintenance of their inherited culture, development of it, and borrowing and adaptation of elements from other cultures.

The concept of freedom gives rise to some difficulties. We are all in favour of freedom, or so we convince ourselves, but it appears to me that there are false concepts of freedom WHICH DO NOT TAKE ACCOUNT of the restrictions under which all freedoms operate.

COLONISATION AND IRISH CULTURE

Our concepts of freedom are influenced by the conditioning to which we have been subject. Even a glance at our Irish history and another glance at our social, economic, aesthetic and lingual relationship with Britain will show that we were and are a dominated people. Our history has been one of colonisation, with a great number of the elements common to the colonisation of the African peoples described by Albert Memmi in *The Coloniser and the Colonised* and *Dominated Man* or Franz Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth* and *A Dying Colonialism*. To assume, as so many apologists for the *status quo* do, that we as a people have emerged from a history of colonisation unhurt, untouched by the processes which were designed to dehumanise, inferiorise and alienate us, amounts in my estimation to stupid, chauvinistic racialism. If one assumes that we can grow as a distinctive people within our present environment without taking cognisance of our cultural history, the implication must be that we have some racial characteristic which binds us together and from which we can take sustenance.

The fact is that we as a people have not yet overcome the dehumanisation, inferiorisation and alienation with which history has saddled us. The evidence for this lies in the national, inferiority complex and self-hatred which manifests itself in so many forms, not least of which is the contempt for the products of our own minds and hands as shown in the preference for foreign rather than home-made products and, if I may say so, in the current campaign to exclude the possibility of developing Irish broadcasting in favour of rebroadcasting the dominating country's TV service. We have been conditioned to see different cultures in a hierarchy with Anglo-American culture at the top and our own at the bottom. With this approach and given the massive domination of the world's TV screens by Anglo-America which was described earlier today by Dr. Varis, freedom is seen by many of our people as the freedom of the rich and powerful, of the prestigious, dominant and paramount countries and their culture to dominate the poor, weak and inferiorised. In this atmosphere we cannot grow.

For our culture to grow we need to throw off the traces of colonisation, to take a more objective view of the distinctive Irish elements in our own culture, to scale down the influence of the Anglo-American cultural elements and to widen our horizons beyond the Anglo-American cocoon.

BROADCASTING AND CULTURAL GROWTH

I hardly need to stress the importance of broadcasting, particularly TV to our efforts to obtain freedom for growth. For evidence of television's influence we have the immense expenditure on television advertising, that outrageous affront to human dignity, Government censorship of information, with which unfortunately we in Ireland are all too familiar, and the large body of scientific social research.

The role which can be played by broadcasting in the growth of our culture is twofold. It can make a contribution to the distinctively Irish elements, particularly the Irish Language. In our situation of widespread receptive bilingualism, it can facilitate use of Irish outside the Irish-speaking areas. Already, numerically, the main usage of Irish in Ireland is in listening to it on radio or television.

Father Mícheál Mac Gréil's comprehensive social study in Dublin showed that in 1973-4 almost 19 per cent of the adult population of Dublin use Irish regularly by listening to it on radio or television. Compare this with the fact that at the beginning of the century following the sudden language shift to English only about two per cent of the people of Leinster had a knowledge of Irish. Radio Telefís Éireann's TAM measurements have shown consistently that there is a very large audience for programmes in Irish, and this despite off-peak hours transmission and an extremely narrow range of material, i.e. news, public affairs and chat. There are no regular programmes for children, housewives, or farmers, no sports, films or series. Drama and documentaries are very rare. Nevertheless,

figures for the week ended March 23, 1975, showed the numbers of viewers as follows:

<i>Féach:</i>	600,000	<i>7 Days:</i>	742,000
<i>Gairm:</i>	298,000	<i>Eurovision Song</i>	
<i>Nuacht:</i>	456,000	<i>Contest:</i>	922,000


Nuacht, a news program, on December 8, 1974, when it was at 7.15 p.m. had 694,000 viewers. (*7 Days* is the equivalent in English of *Féach*. *Eurovision Song Contest* was one of the most popular programmes in English.)

To paraphrase Senator Brendan Halligan, Secretary General of the Irish Labour Party who has been arguing in favour of Anglo-American domination of our TV screens; it doesn't matter whether one objects to programmes in Irish, what matters is that they are watched. There is a strong case for a full service in Irish based on various international covenants of rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But the figures I have mentioned will for many be more convincing.

Let us compare the situation with that in Wales. The British Government has now decided to provide a full service in Welsh beginning with twenty-five hours per week. According to a submission by the Chairman of the BBC in Wales, the BBC's research shows that the range of audience for Welsh programs is between 10,000 and 125,000 — less than a quarter that for programmes in Irish. The decision to provide a service was seen as the only 'civilised' one open. The Welsh Council of Labour, which seems to have some more civilised views than other Labour parties nearer home, in its submission requesting establishment of the Welsh service said "Socialism begins from a concern for the human person, a concern which refuses to weigh one person as intrinsically more important than another" and "Broadcasting, however, could not remain indifferent to the fate of the language or the pattern of local life in Wales. Either some lead is given or by default broadcasting acts as a drive in the opposite direction". They went on to say "If the Welsh language is to survive, the force of broadcasting particularly television must be harnessed to support the language."

A priority need in Ireland is the need for a full spectrum of programmes in Irish. This can be achieved using the complementary principle between the existing channel and the planned second channel insuring that a programme in Irish on one channel would always be matched by a programme in English on the other.

Finally, I submit that the other major element in obtaining freedom to grow is concerned with scaling down Anglo-American content in broadcasting and extending our horizons to include all peoples. If we wish to promote change we must be able to compare ourselves with others. Franz Boas, the German/American anthropologist wrote: "The history of mankind proves that advances of culture depend upon the opportunities presented to a social group to learn from the experience of their neighbours". Our neighbours are all mankind, not merely the dominant, paramount groups who



His Master's Voice

happen to be best equipped to promote their own cultures.

The UNESCO-sponsored meeting at Tampere which considered Dr. Varis' findings on TV traffic made a number of recommendations which should be considered and acted upon:

1. Broadcasting organizations in each country should seriously study possibilities and take the necessary measures to balance the composition of their TV programme imports by enlarging the proportion supplied by the under-represented nations.

2. The cultural and communication policies of each country should be defined and the TV programme structure should be brought into harmony with these policies.

3. Attention should be paid to defining and attaining recommendable ratio's between:

- domestic and imported programmes
- different programme categories and contents
- programme importation shares in relation to different originating nations.¹

The proposal of the Government to use the planned second national TV channel to rebroadcast the British entertainment service, BBC1, in competition with the existing Irish national public service channel can serve only to copper-fasten our neo-colonial relationship with Britain and render impossible the development of television as a means of cultural progress.

Conversely the only structural possibility of meeting the needs I have outlined together with other needs which time has precluded from consideration, such as regional programmes, and greater participation and maximisation of the community's investment in aesthetic pursuits is to establish the second channel as a complementary part of the national public broadcasting service.

Science For The People

SCIENCE AS CULTURAL IMPERIALISM (USA, 1972)

The exploitation of Latin America, its natural resources and the labor of its people, to the tune of a multi-billion dollar investment backed up by billion dollar expenditures in counterinsurgency and population control technology is what is called imperialism. The particular form it takes in Latin America is neo-colonialism — control not through direct military rule, but through a local regime totally dominated by the weight of U.S. economic, military, and technological power. In addition to the many activities which we have discussed which are directly related to U.S. economic gains, there is a vast network of supporting activities which limit the options of the Latin American peoples for alternatives to foreign domination. These affect education, mass media, organized labor, community relations, etc., and, though more subtle, still constitute imperialism — cultural imperialism. The ultimate effect is to give the U.S. supreme voice in the internal and cultural affairs of these countries.

Cultural imperialism has two separate but related elements. One is the spread of an ideology and the other is the emulation of foreign cultural forms and their substitution for the native culture. Science plays an important role in both aspects. First, in the ideology which defines scientific and technological growth as progress, and the ultimate solution to the problems of social and political oppression, as the benefactor of all mankind regardless of class. Closely related is the myth of the political neutrality of science and the conception of science as the domain of a certain elite. Second, in the transfer of science to Latin America in a form which directly replicates that of U.S. science, a form as we shall see totally inappropriate to the conditions of the people of Latin America. We are not opposed to scientific and technological development in Latin America — we find it essential — but we must be critical of the function and impact of the present educational and scientific aid programs.

The level of understanding of many U.S. scientists about conditions in the Third World is illustrated by a member of the Committee on International Education in Physics who says:

The lack of adequate trained manpower and a scientific isolation from the rest of the world are the two main problems facing (the) less developed countries.¹

1. Michael Moravcsik, "Physics in the Developing Countries" *Physics Today*, Sept. 1972, p.40

This text was first published in the author's *Science and Technology in Latin America*, 1972. Reprinted by permission of the authors.

1. Kaarle Nordenstreng, Tapio Varis. *Television Traffic — A One Way Street?: A Survey and Analysis of the International Flow of Television Programme Material*. Paris, UNESCO, 1974.

Fortunately, there has been a response:

...We, as scientists, continue to help propagate the myth that science is a solution to everything. As if when scientific research goes on in a country, the country will develop and its people will be free. This has been proven wrong and a United Nations study on the Second Development Decade puts it very simply: "The argument that all research ultimately benefits everyone is now known to be false." Engaging on such a path only guarantees the existence of class structures by reinforcing the position of privileged ones over unprivileged ones. Science per se, without participating in the total challenge of the existing system of class exploitation can lead only to the reinforcement of that very system.²

Unfortunately the U.S. scientific aid programs appear to take the former perspective, and in so doing serve the interests of further capitalist expansion into the Third World. These aid programs are in the form of scientific exchange, curriculum development, and university reform. One of the foremost manifestations of their effect is the Latin American brain drain.

SCIENTIFIC AND EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

The participation of U.S. scientists in educational programs in the Third World has given us an indication of what results. For example, *Physics Today* has published several reports about teaching in India or Pakistan in which the main conclusion is that those participating in teaching there accomplished very little. They were overwhelmed by the poverty they saw, the lack of connection between their work and the human suffering around them, and the fantastic amount of elitism and personality cult among their privileged students and colleagues who utterly disregarded the needs of their people. But what our colleagues in those positions often did not realize was that their very presence as foreign experts, as revered sage men of nuclear science, tacitly justified the whole pattern of class domination. Far from combating the basic scheme of social inequity, they used its existence as a justification for their own work.

One quite large Latin American program is the Plan Chile-California,³ a plan of cooperation between the University of California and the University of Chile in Santiago. The budget is \$1 million per year (financed by the Ford Foundation) and has the stated purpose of promoting modern scholarly research in Chile. To do this it has attempted to transform the Chilean university into a modern U.S. institution. Under this program a cyclotron discarded by the University of California

2. Maurice Bazin, *Science for the People*, IV, 3 May 1972, p. 3. Central to the U.N. Second Development Decade is the World Plan of Action for the Application of Science and Technology to Development. This plan proposes that the developed countries contribute more to Third World Research and Development. Noting that 2/3 of the world's population lives in the Third World and that the developed countries spend \$45 billion per year on research and development as compared to \$2 billion by the

at Davis was sent to Chile, where the government now supports its operation. In order to furnish it with electricity, a power line was put through slums which do not have electrical power. The facility supports a few Ph.D.'s studying nuclear particles. As of 1971 it had produced one graduate student who was brain-drained away to Berkeley. In fact most of the money spent in the Chile-California program is for bringing graduate students to the U.S. A California physicist has been quoted as saying that this program is "One of our best ways to get the best graduate students possible from Latin America". It is worth noting that the Plan Chile-California contains no provisions for a program of mining engineering even though copper represents 80% of Chilean exports.

Another U.S.-sponsored educational program, Latin American Program for American Universities (LASPAU), run with AID money, brings Latin American students to study in the USA with the agreement that the student will go back to his or her university of origin. This program has been designed to allow foreign students to obtain a Masters degree and, in exceptional cases, the PhD degree.⁴ LASPAU states that the purpose in obtaining the Masters Degree is to rapidly increase the teaching skills and personnel of the university faculty in Latin America. The PhD degree is viewed under this program as an excessive preparation and specialization for the Latin American student who has to go back and alleviate the shortage of university teachers.⁵

This view has been challenged by some LASPAU students,⁶ who during their studies in a science program at a U.S. university have realized that the Masters Degree in their particular field does not prepare them enough to go back as accomplished teachers. These students believe that teaching is only textbook repetition if they are unable to generate new ideas through research. Therefore, they have requested LASPAU, with the total support of their Latin American universities, to allow them to continue to the PhD. This request was based on the necessity of obtaining sufficient training in laboratory techniques and practice to enable them to generate research related to the needs of the people of their countries.

This request, which conflicted with LASPAU's conception of the purpose of the program, was denied by LASPAU although exceptions have been made to other Latin American students known to be very sympathetic, or at best indifferent, toward the educational policies of LASPAU.

LASPAU's denial was followed by the withdrawal of the Latin American students from the

rest, the Plan proposes \$8.5 billion per year be spent in the Third World, \$1.25 billion in the form of aid from the developed countries (Michael Moravcsik, *op. cit.*).

3. Maurice Bazin, *Science, Technology and Latin America*, August 1972, unpublished mss.

4. LASPAU, *Explanatory Handbook*, 1969.

5. LASPAU internal memorandum describing annual meeting in New Orleans in October 1971.

6. Personal acquaintances of the authors.

program, taking advantage of the offer of their U.S. university, to finance their studies towards the PhD. This, again, with the authorization of the Latin American university. At that point, in one known case, LASPAU threatened to withdraw all its fellowships to the particular Latin American university. Thus it is clear that educational assistance policies are determined by U.S. agencies to serve their interests and not by the Latin Americans themselves.

All educational aid is not at the graduate student level. Many programs funded mainly by Ford are actively developing curricula to be used at all grade levels. Let us look at the content of one typical program.

In the early sixties, as soon as the Physical Sciences Study Curriculum (PSSC)⁷ was put together, it was exported to people who live in countries where eighty per cent of the population is barefoot in villages with no electricity. One brings to teachers who are part of the local well-off bourgeoisie the PSSC course in which examples instead of being taken from collisions of billiard balls are drawn from collisions of nuclear particles. In this manner one turns one's audience away from its nontechnical culture and surroundings towards some remote, ultimate nuclear truths which they cannot touch and which they can only admire through the descriptions offered by the travelling scientist from the U.S. And this guarantees the state of powerlessness of those whom one is teaching — their powerlessness in front of our technological and technocratic civilization. Students could not reproduce experiments with atoms. They could only admire the fact that we can do it. And they could only imagine us as living in a better world because we could do such experiments. While no one would want to deny these students an understanding of atomic physics, the result of the way in which the inaccessible glitter of modern science is introduced is that the best elements in the universities of underdeveloped countries emigrate; they get drained into our pure research programs, into our elite way of life; they succumb to our intellectual propaganda, even when we propagate it unconsciously. Those who have been brain-drained can only meet frustration if they ever go back to their country of origin. They have nothing to connect to there. They need contacts and the level of development which they met in the United States, and they end up in that state of total dependence in which they have to beg for money to buy American equipment. Through this elite type of education into which we have misled them, we have guaranteed their state of uselessness to their own country.

Thus programs like those we have discussed have the following effects on the Latin American university:

1. They introduce the concept of the American University Professor. This involves a whole set of attitudes based on individualistic competition, measurement of achievement through the number of papers published, foreign referee system and "accepted" journals.

2. They assure adoption of research projects of little importance to the country involved.

3. They create a drain on the intellectual resources of the country.

The above effects make it almost impossible for Latin American governments to carry out a planned scientific effort with the participation of their own universities. Planning is the only way that paying for their own scientific research is justifiable for these countries.⁸ Without planning, the university system becomes a knowledge factory containing scientific skills and an ideology which serves nobody's interests but her/his own individual ones, along with personal ambitions, and which may help to fulfill the requirements of American expansion:

Government sponsored research has come to dominate universities. Since the needs of the big corporations have carried them increasingly abroad, where the bulk of their profits are to be made, the university, as their partner, has moved abroad too⁹

THE BRAIN DRAIN

Many of the educational programs in Latin America appear to be aimed at creating an indigenous scientific elite. The reality is that local trained personnel is being seriously depleted by emigration. On a world-wide basis, the brain drain is suggested by the fact that the yearly contribution of the developing countries to U.S. medical manpower is equivalent in numbers to the entire output of the 15 U.S. medical schools graduating the largest number of Md's. In 1968, 30% of hospital resident physicians were foreigners.¹⁰ That Latin American countries are literally bled of their trained people can be seen from the following facts: in the Dominican Republic, out of 200 newly graduated physicians in 1962, 78 left for the U.S. — one half of the children born in the Dominican Republic, die before reaching the age of five¹¹; in Mexico, between 1966 and 1968, about 20% of graduates in engineering left the country¹²; Latin American brain drain totals for the period 1969-70 include 958 engineers, 410 natural scientists, 151 social scientists, and 683 physicians and surgeons accepted as permanent immigrants to the U.S.¹³ The sad trend of immigration of talent is also increasing on a world-wide scale. From 1960-1970 immigration of research scientists from all over the world to the U.S. increased five-fold, of engineers three-fold, and of physicians and surgeons also

report by the Committee on Government Operations, 28 March 1968.

11. Quoted by Bazin, *op. cit.*

12. NACLA, *Mexico 1968*, 1968.

13. NSF, *Science Resource Studies Highlights*, April 1971, NSF 71-11.

7. This post-Sputnik curriculum was designed for advanced high school students in the U.S.


8. "Chile: Planning for Science Faces Obstacles", *Science*, vol. 174, 1217, 1971, p. 1311.

9. A Embree *et al*, *NACLA Newsletter*, I, 9, Dec. 1967.

10. House Report No. 1215 of the 90th Congress, 23rd

IMMIGRATION OF SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS, AND PHYSICIANS TO THE U.S.; FISCAL YEARS 1960-1970

[THOUSANDS]



three-fold (see graph).

An analysis of the relationship between foreign aid and the depletion of local talent has been made in the Report to Congress of the Committee on Government Operations:

Thus, in 1967 the U.S. spent roughly \$75 million toward providing some 5400 trained persons for the very countries engaged in "exporting" nearly 5200 of their [own] scientific professionals. The statistical near balance between AID-financed manpower and brain drain outflow is made possible only by including U.S. technicians sent to this group of countries. If AID efforts to increase local manpower (3900 AID trainees) is compared to the outflow of local manpower (5200), AID comes out the loser, by 1300 professionals.¹⁴

This analysis should be read keeping in mind the statement made in 1965 by former Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, at the time of a change in the Immigration Laws to facilitate immigration of specially qualified people.

Our country has the rare chance to be able to attract immigrants of great intelligence and capacity. Immigration well administered, can be one of our great national resources.¹⁵

It is important to realize that of those who do

14. Quoted in Bazin, *op. cit.*, p.11

15. *Ibid.*, p.12.

16. S. Gutierrez Olivos and J. Riquelme Perez, *La Emigración de Recursos Humanos de Alto Nivel y el Caso de*

emigrate to the U.S., as has been the case with Chilean professionals, 66% have already done post-graduate studies in the U.S. These people emigrate not so much in quest of better remuneration but, to a large extent (58% of those who were consulted) because of professional progress considerations.¹⁶ It is evident that these emigrating professionals have adopted the norms of the university institutions that exist in the U.S. He or she does not find these conditions at home. Since the education received by these foreigners does not prepare them to work in their own country, the U.S. is the only place in which they can work.

CULTURAL IMPERIALISM AND CLASS STRUCTURE

It is generally recognized that the university selects the young people of high economic status that these are the ones who have a greater chance of doing post-graduate studies abroad. The practice of taking the U.S. scientific and professional standards as the norm seems to vary according to the socio-economic level of the Latin Americans. In a study it was found that the proportion of those who wish to study in the U.S. rises from 8% among students of low socioeconomic status to 17% among students of medium socioeconomic status to 21% among those of high socioeconomic status.¹⁷ The desire to study in other Latin American countries has no systematic relation to status. In this case, students were classified in the socioeconomic levels according to the degree of formal education of their parents or guardians.

We see that in Latin America, the ruling classes have been responsible in facilitating the penetration of U.S. corporations by yielding the human and natural resources of their country to foreign interests. In addition, they and those of the middle class are the ones who preferentially go to the university, do post-graduate studies abroad, migrate, and in any case, contribute through their identification with the *American way of life*, to the extension of American imperialism. The values of U.S. science and technology are important aspects of U.S. culture, and their acceptance and practice by Latin American scientists and technical people can only be to the cruel detriment of their people.

DEPENDENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN LATIN AMERICA

A cooperative program between the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and Brazil's National Research Council has been described by *Chemical and Engineering News* in the following words:

(In Brazil) Chemical expertise and advance manpower are needed in programs dealing with agriculture, mineral resources, and pharmaceutical, petrochemical, and industrial development. For example, the ultimate

Chile, Unión Panamericana, Washington, 1965, pp. 7-8.

17. G.A. Dillion Soares and M.S. de Soares, *La Fuga de los Intelectuales*, in *Deslinde*, Univ. Nacional Autónoma de México, p. 15.

goal is the establishment of research centers of excellence in Brazil that are independent of U.S. guidance.¹⁸

As stated, this is wishful thinking. The reality is that the talents of those who stay in Latin America do not flourish due to the simple fact that a great majority of the industrial processes in Latin America are tied to foreign enterprises. Marcel Roche, a Venezuelan scientist, tells us of his visit to a number of technological research institutes in Latin America.¹⁹ He was impressed by their lack of local clientele. The Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia Industrial in Argentina was in existence nine years before finally receiving four research contracts. Out of the principal Brazilian industries (those with 100 employees or with capital of more than \$100,000) less than 25% carry out research and more than half of those who said they do research had no more than one to three investigators with professional training. In Venezuela, the Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones Industriales, a private institution and the only one dedicated to industrial research has failed to develop. After 12 years of existence it still has only 5 professional researchers. Universities in Latin America carry none or limited applied research. Whenever industrialists need research they usually contract with foreign firms. Thus, little or no research is being done on oil in Venezuela, on wool in Uruguay, on tin in Bolivia, and until recently, on copper in Chile, all exports essential to each country.

The program between the U.S. NAS and the Brazilian Research Council can be viewed as a new stage in the misdevelopment of Latin American education and its dependence on the U.S. The basic contradiction in American sponsored scientific education will continue since expertise needed by the foreign controlled industries in Latin America has, up to the moment, come from the mother country. This contradiction might only take a new face the day U.S. firms realize that it is cheaper to do research in the foreign subsidiaries. At this point "the research centers of excellence" in Brazil may well become "independent of U.S. guidance" but absolutely dependent on the American corporation.

The unwillingness of the U.S. to share knowledge and technology with Latin America on a non-money making basis was again evident during the previously mentioned conference of the Organization of American States on the Application of Science and Technology in Latin American Development. One of the other resolutions that the U.S. delegation, headed by Philip H. Abelson (Editor of *Science* and AAAS heavy), refused to

18. *Chemical and Engineering News*, vol. 48, 1970, p.32.

19. *Cambridge Review*, 5 May 1972, p.115.

20. OAS Final Report, Specialized Conference on the Application of Science and Technology to Latin American Development, May 1972, OEA/Ser. C/VI.22.1, p. 51.

21. *Science*, vol. 176, 1972, p. 1077, and vol. 178, 1972, p. 13.

22. *Science*, vol. 165, 1969, p. 1328.

23. J. Leite Lopez, *Scientific World*, 3, 1972, p.8.

endorse reads:

To recommend to the Latin American countries that they adopt such measures as they deem appropriate so that foreign concerns will devote funds to conducting or contracting for research to be carried out locally, guaranteeing at the same time that the results of that research will be suited to national development objectives and that, in accordance with its interests, each country will be owner and beneficiary of those results.²⁰

Incidentally, no mention of this impasse between the countries of Latin America and the U.S. was made in either of the two misleading editorials on the state of Latin America science that Mr. Abelson wrote after his return from Brazil.²¹

THE U.S. AND UNIVERSITY REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA

Latin American opposition against U.S. imperialism has come to a large extent from the Latin American university. Students there realize that the use of technology will not benefit the society until the political system is changed and that this change has to be initiated and controlled by the Latin Americans independent of the economic and social schemes of the U.S. The effectiveness of the university insurgency is facilitated by the university's relative autonomy from the government and other political forces and the student's power and participation in university decisions. In some countries, universities have become the center of urban guerrilla activity and recruitment. U.S. interest in Latin America's higher education responds to the necessity of de-politicizing the Latin American university in order to achieve the political stability agreeable to U.S. expansion.

The university situation in Brazil since the military takeover in 1964, exemplifies the important role of the U.S. in shaping Latin American universities to a particular mold. In that country, according to a report published in *Science* by H.M. Nussenzveig:

An avalanche of political persecutions was unleashed in many universities and institutes, where military 'committees of inquiry' were installed, often subjecting professors to degrading treatment. Scientists, most of whom were alien to politics, were interrogated and arrested. Several were dismissed from their jobs. 'Colleagues' who had always been bothered by the presence of research-minded people in their midst hastened to denounce them as 'subversive'. In several institutes, the climate of terror and suspicion rendered all research activity impossible. As a result, many scientists left the country.²²

In 1969, just after the Brazilian government had decreed the dismissal of about one hundred university professors²³ a conglomerate consisting of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (with AID money), the U.S. National Science Foundation and the Anderson Atlantic Richfield Foundation on the other side, and the National Research Council of Brazil on the other, started a program in which U.S. PhD chemists are sent to develop graduate programs in Brazil (Universities in Rio and Sao

Paulo).²⁴ This bilateral agreement and the U.S. AID-Ministry of Education of Brazil project for the reform of Brazilian universities served to help solidify the new order established and to almost obliterate the student movement in Brazil. As a visiting mathematician points out in describing the "silence of peace" at the University of Sao Paulo:

...The students have of course some reason to use restraint. Decree 477, issued in 1969, suspends for three years any student involved in 'subversive activity', and this is loosely defined. To pin the wrong clipping on a bulletin board might qualify. Veja cites more than thirty cases where the 477 has been applied. But this figure does not seem to reflect what is actually going on. There is other legislation, in particular Art. no. 5, which eliminates the constitutional habeas corpus guarantees in the case of political crimes. Many students simply seem to disappear for a while, without any publicity. During these two months several students in the social sciences and in physics were arrested, or so I was told. No public information was available, and there was no open discussion of these cases. Among the people I met at least two had been in jail and under torture, both women. In August the director of the political science department was arrested because his wife was suspected of 'subversive activity' and again there was no public information or comment.²⁵

The Brazilian pattern of government intervention in the university has been followed in many other Latin American countries, notably Argentina in 1966 and Mexico in 1968.

In summary, the U.S. through its power to manipulate and control the educational system and institutions in Latin America prevents these countries from finding the socialist alternative to foreign domination, class divisions, and inhuman exploitation of their people.

Louis A. Perez, Jr.

UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCY: THE COLONIAL CONSTRUCT OF TOURISM (USA, 1975)

Travel from metropolitan centers to the West Indies has historically served to underwrite colonial systems in the Caribbean. The rhapsodic descriptions of early European explorers, seduced by the felicity of the Antilles, circulated throughout Europe, arousing in the metropolitan population widespread interest in the region. "Columbus devoted pages of his journal to the "very beautiful" island "distinguished by a diversity of scenery", a region that surpassed "anything that would be believed by anyone who had not seen it."¹ Little more than one hundred years later, the British explorer Robert Dudley spoke of the "extraordinary beauty"² and the wealth and fertility of the West Indies.

The discoverers' enthusiasm over the newly found Indies permitted the expanding European state, with some facility, to encourage metropolitan travel to the Caribbean as an instrument of expansionist policies. Lacking the perfected bureaucratic and military expansionist devices, the early modern imperial state of the sixteenth century Europe came to rely primarily on the travel and migration of the private citizenry to establish the basis of imperial authority.

The presence of Europeans in the Caribbean effectively if not always directly in the service of the distant metropolis established the necessary politico-military foundations upon which rival imperial states settled disputed claims. Migration and travel, in effect, substantiated de jure claims in the Antilles through settlement. Once jurisdictional disputes had passed, moreover, imperial centers required the presence of a metropolitan population to defend the islands against the occasional intrusion of foreign interlopers. "Effective occupation" resolved in the Antilles the vague and often conflicting territorial jurisdictions advanced in Europe. A metropolitan population abroad in the service of colonial authorities and mercantile agencies, lastly, consuming metropolitan products abroad and generating exports

1. Christopher Columbus, *Four Voyages to the New World*, ed. R.H. Major (New York, 1961), pp. 5-6.

2. Robert Dudley, *The Voyage of Robert Dudley ... to the West Indies, 1594-1595*, ed. George F. Warner (Nendeln/Liechtenstein, 1967), pp. 56-91.

24. *Chemical and Engineering News*, vol. 48, 1970, p.32.

25. Hans Foellmer, *Newsletter, Mathematics Action Group*, Summer 1972.

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from the metropolis, served to underwrite the emergent imperial economic system in the Caribbean. From the moment the West Indies passed under the sway of the European system, travel emerged as the concomitant imperative of empire. Indeed, travel became the means by which metropolitan authorities underwrote and sustained the colonial enterprise in the Caribbean.³

II

The movement of the metropolitan citizenry to the West Indies persisted into the twentieth century without any substantial modification of its essential colonial quality. Metropolitan centers continued to invoke the imagery reminiscent of sixteenth century imperialism to encourage twentieth century travel.

The rise of United States preeminence in the circum-Caribbean witnessed only a change in the form of travel without any significant variation of function. Travel remained a uniquely metropolitan activity, directed by American agencies, promoted by American capital, and patronized largely by American travelers. At the turn of the century, the United Fruit Company promoted travel interest in the West Indies and Central America as a method of utilizing empty cargo space aboard ships returning to the Caribbean. Throughout the early 1900's, the United Fruit Company operated the Great White Fleet, banana boats carrying passengers to the circum-Caribbean and returning to the United States with tropical cargoes. With the rise of air transportation, travel to the West Indies increased gradually.⁴ During the 1930's, travel to the Caribbean region increased steadily, with Cuba receiving the bulk of tourists, some 69,000 in 1938. Other islands hosted tourists in varying degrees:⁵

Jamaica	9,908	(1938)
Puerto Rico	5,822	(1938)
Trinidad	4,853	(1938)
Barbados	4,283	(1938)
Nassau	11,290	(1938)

The construction of air fields by the United States during World War II provided a distinctive boost to air travel at the end of the war.

In the past twenty-five years, international agencies, metropolitan authorities, and West Indian politicians have joined to mount major tourist programs in the West Indies. Immediately after World War II an Anglo-American Caribbean Commission convened to study for efficacy of an "area appeal" of the Caribbean for tourism.⁶ With the close of Cuba to the American tourist between 1959 and 1961, moreover, United States travel to the West Indies

generally became the dominant feature of the following decade. In January, 1972, the Caribbean Travel Association sponsored a tourism seminar in Puerto Rico under the motto "Towards a lasting tourism."⁷ The Organisation of American States (OAS) similarly committed itself to the promotion of tourism generally in the Western Hemisphere. The OAS effort resulted in a Special Inter-American Travel Congress in Rio de Janeiro in August, 1972, in recognition that "tourism is considered one of the world's leading income-yielding industries."⁸

Unlike its sixteenth century counterpart, which proclaimed unabashedly that the central benefit of metropolitan travel to the West Indies accrued primarily to the imperial state, twentieth century travel invoked the rhetoric of economic development to justify tourism. In substance, twentieth century travel continued in its primary capacity to serve the interests of metropolitan agencies. The Caribbean fauna and flora remained key attractions. The ideological construct, however, conferred on twentieth century travel, as an industry, the virtue of possessing the capacity to promote West Indian economic and social development.

Metropolitan promoters of tourism and West Indian collaborators couched twentieth century travel in the proposition that the tourist industry contributed directly to West Indian treasuries and promoted an increase in the standard of living in the Caribbean. When Jamaica launched its post-war tourist industry in 1945, government officials were confident:

From a purely economic point of view the Tourist Industry is a matter of business. It is classified as an 'invisible export' and is capable of increasing the wealth of the country through the influx of 'new' money. The free circulation of this new money will provide employment in dozens of different avenues of endeavor, will create other subsidiary industries, and become a vital factor in balancing the budget of the colony. In addition, it will play an important part in providing foreign currency and offsetting the loss sustained by the expenditure in other countries by our own nationals, of money earned in this country.⁹

Increased travel to the area, it was suggested, generated job opportunities and resulted in widespread employment of local labor; labor contractors and workers, producers of local materials, and local economies in general were identified as the primary beneficiaries of a well developed tourist industry in the Caribbean. The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission predicted with some confidence in 1945:

Local agriculture would gain through the creation of a much larger body of consumers. Standard food products of the West Indies would find a larger domestic market,

7. Irene Hawkins, "Turning Point for Caribbean Tourist Industry," *The Daily Gleaner* (Kingston, Jamaica), August 26, 1972, p. 20.

8. "OAS Plans to Expand Tourist Industry," *The Daily Gleaner* (Kingston, Jamaica), August 24, 1972, p. 11.

9. Jamaica Tourist Trade Development Board and the Tourist Trade Convention Committee, *Survey and Report on the Potentialities of the Tourist Industry of Jamaica* (Kingston, 1945), p. 2.

and a demand on the part of hotels, restaurants and other places of entertainment for products not normally produced to any great extent in the area would stimulate new production. Vegetable gardeners, fruit growers, fishermen, dairymen, and cattlemen would be encouraged to increase their production and improve standards of quality.¹⁰

In 1976, Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, Chairman of the Alliance for Progress Coordinating Council, gave further impetus to this view when he proclaimed at the Inter-American Tourist Congress that "tourism can become the most effective weapon in South America for redistribution of national, regional and international income."¹¹

Tourism, moreover, was seen as a way of promoting local industries and "native handicraft." "Tourist visitors," the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission suggested, "are inclined to buy souvenirs and products of all kinds manufactured in the countries they visit."¹² Tourism, lastly, offered many a way of encouraging a national identity, leading to the preservation of folk art and culture, the establishment of museums, and the guarding and preservation of monuments.¹³

III

Insofar as tourism is an economic activity directed by and organized for metropolitan interests, the travel industry has accomplished little to alter basic relationships rooted in the colonial past. Travel receipts, however bountiful, have failed singularly to generate economic development. On the contrary, travel contributed directly to further institutionalizing conditions of underdevelopment and the pattern of dependency was reconstructed in full monoculture economies. Capital continues to flow abroad and remains beyond the access of West Indian economies. Indeed, the organization of tourism further substantiates Andre Gunder Frank's observation that "underdevelopment was and still is generated by the very same historical process which also generated economic development: the development of capitalism itself."¹⁴

From the outset, the West Indies lacked the resources either to support the volume of tourists or underwrite financially the vacation life-style metropolitan agencies have imposed on the region. Tourism produced immediately, in yet another sphere, dependent economies and reinforced the structural basis of underdevelopment. By the late 1960's and early 1970's, a metropolitan population traveling to the West Indies contributed directly to

the economic development of the United States. The organization of metropolitan economic enclaves abroad, underwritten largely by the travel of the metropolitan citizenry, created new markets, promoted United States exports, and offered North American capital new sources of investment and profit.

Travel to the West Indies acquired in January, 1968, a particularly national mission when President Lyndon Johnson sought to discourage "all non-essential travel outside the Western Hemisphere."¹⁵ In seeking to protect the American balance of payments, the White House assigned to travel specific metropolitan purposes. Washington directed travelers to a market area in which the high American capital stake guaranteed a considerable return of total tourist expenditures to the United States.

Insofar as travel by Americans increased exports to the region, tourism provided directly a boost to United States exports. Tourist receipts surpassed all expectations. By 1970, the total expenditure of one million North American tourists in Latin America totaled some \$500 million. Foreign travel receipts in Jamaica alone in 1971 surpassed \$111 million.¹⁶ Visitors' spending in the United States Virgin Islands reached \$125 million in 1969.¹⁷ In the same year, tourist expenditure in the Bahama Islands went over the \$235 million mark.¹⁸

Concomitantly, American exports to the region increased commensurately. Indeed, the large import component necessary to underwrite tourism in the West Indies served at once to sustain metropolitan economic growth and foreign imports while perpetuating in the Caribbean conditions of dependency. The large import coefficient, in fact, belies claims advanced by travel agencies that tourism stimulates the local economies. Imported materials, foods prepared abroad, expatriate staffs, and the foreign support system necessary to underwrite tourism make up the "invisible" substructure accompanying the traveler to the region. Nowhere has the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission prediction that tourism stimulates local economies materialized. Indeed, local agricultural economies have had limited access to the tourist market; on the contrary, increased foreign imports serve the foreign traveler.

Expanded United States exports to the region to service the growing number of North American travelers has been the dominant feature of tourism in the West Indies. United States exports to the Caribbean in 1970 reached \$968 million — about fifteen

14. André Gunder Frank, *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution?* (New York, 1969), p. 9.

15. *Public Papers of the President: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-1969* (2 vols., Washington, D.C. 1970), p. 135. Cf. "LBJ and the Travel Trade," *Caribbean Report*, VI (February, 1968), p. 1.

16. Jamaica Tourist Board, *Travel Statistics — Jamaica, 1971* (Kingston, 1972), p. 3.

17. United States Department of Agriculture, *Agriculture and Trade of the Caribbean Region* (Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 47.

18. United States Department of Commerce, "World Trade Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean," *Overseas Business Reports* (December, 1970), p. 5.

3. Cf. Gilbert Sigaux, *History of Tourism*, trans. Joan White (London, 1966), pp. 27-39 and A.J. Norval, *The Tourist Industry* (London, 1936), pp. 15-51.

4. Sir Matthew Slattery, "Tourist Traffic Potential in the Caribbean," *Chronicle of the West Indian Committee*, LXXIX (October, 1964), pp. 534-536.

5. Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, *Caribbean Tourist Trade: A Regional Approach* (Port-of-Spain, 1945), p. 33.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

10. Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, *Caribbean Tourist Trade: A Regional Approach*, p. 15. See also Bishodat Persaud, "Impact of Tourism," *West Indies Chronicle*, LXXX (July, 1970), pp. 329-331.

11. Doreen E. Crompton de Calvo, "Tourism in Latin America," *Bank of London and South America Review*, III (April, 1969), p. 211.

12. Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, *Caribbean Tourist Trade: A Regional Approach*, p. 15.

13. Terrace Cullinam, "Tourism Beyond the Rio Grande," *Texas Business Review* (August, 1969), p. 4. See also Caribbean Organization, *Planning for Economic Development in the Caribbean* (Hato Rey, 1963), p. 94.

percent of total North American exports to Latin America.¹⁹ Two years later, United States exports to the Caribbean reached \$1 billion, while direct investments approached \$3.1 billion; at the end of 1974, United States exports reached some \$1.7 billion, a forty percent increase over the preceding year. In 1969, the British Leeward and Windward Islands alone imported from the United States goods valued at nearly \$121 million, including such tourist-related commodities as food, boats, furniture, heating and cooling equipment, telecommunications apparatus, and finished aluminium structures.²⁰ The United States supplied the Netherlands Antilles with more than fifty percent (\$67 million) of non-oil imports, of which "prepared food and tourist-related goods (e.g., clothing, cameras, jewelry, china, etc.) were the major items."²¹ The Bahama Islands tourist economy in 1970 depended entirely on foreign imports — the United States held fifty-five percent of the Bahamian market.²² The projected principal markets for the United States in millions of dollars in 1975 included: The Dominican Republic, \$460, Jamaica, \$361, the Bahama Islands, \$275, Trinidad and Tobago, \$235, and the Netherlands Antilles, \$206.²³ Assessing tourist prospects in 1972 for Trinidad and Tobago, the United States Department of Commerce could assure the American business community:

Tourism and the hotel industry are certain growth areas. Construction plans for several hotels are presently underway and room capacity is expected to double by 1972. The tourist activity will create a further demand for hotel furnishings, electrical and air-conditioning installations, refrigeration equipment, and swimming pools. In addition, American food product lines will be necessary to supply the North American tourists expected to fill these new hotels.²⁴

IV

The immediate impact of tourist-related imports is twofold. The expansion of tourism with a high import component, in the first place, exacerbates the chronic balance of payments deficit. Barbadian exports, for example, have increased by

19. United States Department of Commerce, "World Trade Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean," p. 2.

20. United States Department of Commerce, "Basic Data on the British Leeward Islands," *Overseas Business Reports* (August, 1970), p. 6.

21. United States Department of Commerce, "World Trade Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean," p. 5.

22. United States Department of Commerce, "Basic Data on the Economy of the Bahama Islands" *Overseas Business Reports* (August, 1971), p. 8.

23. United States Department of Commerce, "World Trade Outlook for Latin America," *Overseas Business Reports*, (December, 1974), pp. 5-6.

24. United States Department of Commerce, "World Trade Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean," p. 5. For a detailed breakdown of exports to the region see United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, U.S. *Foreign Trade: Exports Commodity by Country. Schedule B. Commodity, Quantity, and Value. Current and Cumulative, January, 1972.* (Washington, D.C., 1972).

25. United States Department of Commerce, *Foreign*

about \$4.5 million since 1967; in the same period, imports have more than doubled, increasing from \$50 million to \$117 million in 1970.²⁵ The five-fold increase in the number of tourists to the Bahama Islands (from 250,000 in 1959 to 1,300,000 in 1971) was accompanied by a rise of imports from \$71 million to \$302 million and an increase in trade deficits from \$64 million to \$248 million.²⁶

The high import coefficient of tourism in the West Indies, moreover, contributes directly to aggravating inflationary spirals. Cost of living rises steadily. The Retail Price Index in Trinidad increased some 9.3 percent in 1972; the following year the increase in food rose by some 13.8 percent.²⁷ The cost of living in Barbados in 1971 increased by some 10 percent while the Retail Price Index rose some 9 percentage points.²⁸

Tourist-generated employment is reminiscent of colonial monoculture systems which produced cyclical employment patterns. School holiday patterns, the industrial vacation customs, and climatic factors in both the tourist generating and receiving countries cause a highly seasonal structure to tourism. Employment and income tend to be concentrated in winter months (December to April), followed frequently by precarious marginality.

The parallel between agricultural monoculture systems and tourist employment does not end with the seasonal nature of work. Tourist employment, additionally, casts West Indies in the capacity of waiters, maids, bartenders, dishwashers, chauffeurs, and porters, receiving low wages in inflationary economies. At the same time, tourism diverts vital human and natural resources away from the host society in the construction of the new monoculture. In many islands, the sugar industry faced serious hardships as tourism competed with sugar for labor.²⁹ Agriculture in general suffers as the islands devote greater priorities to the tourist industry.³⁰ Frequently, those staples that continue to be produced locally are diverted to the tourist trade. Many goods which in the past were commonly consumed locally, including lobster, fruits and vegetables, go directly to hotels or appear in the markets at higher prices.³¹

Economic Trends (February, 1972), p. 6.

26. United States Department of Commerce, *Foreign Economic Trends* (June, 1971), p. 4.

27. Department of Commerce, "Trinidad and Tobago," *Foreign Economic Trends* (May 4, 1973), p. 4. Cf. Bank of Guyana, *Caribbean Economic News Review*, XXI (November 1-15, 1973), p. 3.

28. Department of Commerce, "Barbados," *Foreign Economic Trends* (November 1, 1972), p. 7.

29. See Bank of Guyana, *Caribbean Economic News Review*, IX (September 30, 1969), p. 7; Carleen O'Loughlin, *Economic and Political Change in the Leeward and Windward Islands.* (New Haven, 1968), p. 147.

30. In Bermuda, for example, one writer noted that "Agriculture has so dwindled that it is now confined to picturesque patches of land along roadsides, totaling a mere 740 acres. Bermuda produces only a fraction of its food, with no exports except cut flowers; even the Bermuda onion is now grown mainly in Texas." See Frank E. Manning, *Black Clubs in Bermuda* (Ithaca, 1973), p. 24.

31. O'Loughlin, *Economic and Political Change in the Leeward and Windward Islands*, pp. 147-148.

Outside small national elites, West Indian societies have failed singularly to gain access to the multi-million dollar travel industry. Indeed, West Indian government efforts to promote tourism frequently militate against national ownership. Legislation to encourage hotel and resort construction, for example, often offer to refund all import duties paid on construction materials needed for the building, extension, and furnishing of new facilities. The island governments also extend cheap or free land, equipment grants, liberal depreciation allowance, loan guarantees, and long term government loans to attract investment in the tourist sector. Taxes levied normally on property, hotel earnings, and corporate dividends are often waived for periods between ten and twenty years.³² In practice, legislation of this type favors foreign ownership. In St. Kitts and Montserrat, for example, the construction project is required to have a minimum of thirty rooms to receive full benefits,³³ in the Bahama Islands, the benefits provided under the Hotel Encouragement Act apply only to enterprises having a minimum of two hundred rooms.³⁴ The Jamaican governmental authorities very early opted in favor of larger hotel operations:

From the island's point of view and the quicker attainment of our Tourist Industry expansion we believe the encouragement of the large-size hotel would be advisable. Large hotels, either individual or operated as a chain mean the investment of large capital, and large capital means that the interests concerned must protect it by up-to-date and efficient management and operation. Part of their effort and a good deal of capital must be devoted to advertising and selling abroad from which the island in general benefits largely. On the other hand, many small hotels are too often operated on little or no capital, their small capacity is not capable of supporting experienced management or the highest class service, and they are able to participate only to a very limited extent, if at all, in either individual or collective advertising or publicity measures from which the island would generally benefit.³⁵

International and regional credit agencies, furthermore, discriminate against the small hotel, considered to be too unreliable as an investment.³⁶

Soaring land values, also, have made ownership of property on many islands virtually prohibitive to all but small national elites and foreign capital. In the Bahama Islands land values have doubled and trebled in the past decade.³⁷ Tourism has resulted in the alienation of national lands by and/or for foreigners;

32. For a general discussion of hotel incentive legislation see John M. Bryden, *Tourism and Development: A Case Study of the Commonwealth Caribbean* (London, 1973), pp. 133-152.

33. United States Department of Commerce, "Basic Data on the British Leeward Islands," p. 5.

34. United States Department of Commerce, "Basic Data on the Economy of the Bahama Islands," p. 4.

35. Jamaica Tourist Trade Development Board and the Tourist Trade Convention Committee, *Survey and Report on the Potentialities of the Tourist Industry of Jamaica*, p. 8. An average investment per bed is said to be in the range of some \$5,000 to \$10,000, depending on quality and location. See World Bank, *Tourism, A Sector Working Paper*.

36. Irene Hawkins, "Regional Approach to the Carib-

beaches and coasts have become the patrimony of foreign tourists. The local population, in search of cheaper land, is pushed further away from the coast. Increasingly, beaches are withdrawn from public use by hotel and resorts; undeveloped ones are held for purposes of speculation or with plans for future hotel and resort sites. The best beach frontage in St. Vincent, Antigua, Montserrat, and Barbados is owned privately and denied to public use.

Nor has tourism stimulated to any significant extent the local artisan economies. Expectations that the travel industry would promote "native handicraft" have generally not materialized. In-Bond shops in the West Indies offer far more attractive luxury merchandise to the tourist, free of duty and other import taxes. Foreign imports are sold to foreign visitors in shops largely expatriate-owned. "Most tourists spending in Montego Bay," one member of the Jamaican Parliament complained, "was in the In-Bond shops, and of little benefit to the ordinary people of the town."³⁸ Japanese photographic and electronic equipment, French perfumes, Swiss watches, English dinnerware, and Scotch whiskies account for a preponderance of tourist expenditures in the area of "souvenirs" in the West Indies. The token purchase of "native handicraft" is often a coincidental afterthought.

V

West Indian government expenditures committed to the development of tourism often sacrifice vital national services. Millions of dollars are allocated to Caribbean tourist boards to promote travel. Inevitably, tourist boards become increasingly responsive to business and financial sectors on which the travel industry depends.³⁹ The United States, as the major source of tourists, receives a preponderance of West Indian tourist-related expenditures.⁴⁰ The Jamaican tourist board received an allocation of some \$3.2 million for 1968-1969.⁴¹ Much of this budget covered expenses incurred by the promotional services of North American public relations agencies, United States television and radio time, newspaper and magazine space, and special promotional projects in the United States.⁴² Jamaican Tourist Board literature, travel brochures, and tourist pamphlets are printed in the United States; Price Waterhouse and Company audits the Jamaican Tourist Board books.

Infrastructure support of tourism makes addi-

bean Tourist Industry," *The Daily Gleaner* (Kingston), August 29, 1972, p. 9.

37. United States Department of Commerce, "Basic Data on the Economy of the Bahama Islands," p. 4.

38. "Crafts Markets," *The Daily Gleaner* (Kingston), August 25, 1972, p. 15.

39. This is suggested most vividly in H. Zinder and Associates, Inc., *The Future of Tourism in the Eastern Caribbean* (1969), p. 139.

40. In the Bahama Islands, Americans account for 85 to 90 percent of total visitors. In 1969, Americans made up over 78 percent of all travelers to Jamaica. A survey.

41. *Jamaica Tourist Board Annual Report*, (1968/1969), p. 10.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-5

tional claims on West Indian budgets. Road construction, airports, communication systems, utility services, sewerage systems, and deep-water facilities provide additional opportunities for North American investment and United States exports. While the ultimate desirability of many of these facilities is immediately apparent, at present expenditures on such projects accommodate the requirements raised almost entirely by tourism rather than meeting national needs. One of the finest highway sections in Jamaica connects the sparsely populated but highly tourist-visited region between Negril on the western tip to Montego Bay on the north coast; highway construction elsewhere in Jamaica languishes. Airport facilities are already inadequate to service the growing volume of air traffic and the larger jumbo jets. The government of Trinidad has allotted \$11.5 million for modernization of the airports at Piarco Crown points.⁴³ In Curacao and Aruba, airport improvement projects will cost an estimated \$25 million.⁴⁴ The increasing number of tourists arriving by cruise ships require new dock and pier facilities to accommodate the rise in sea traffic. The recently completed deep-water pier in St. Maarten, for example, is already considered inadequate.⁴⁵

Limited island resources similarly are strained beyond their capacities. The fresh water reserves of many islands, barely adequate for local consumption, are already strained beyond present capabilities. Expanded tourism has necessitated enormous expenditures and capital outlay for desalination plants to meet tourist-created needs. The arrival of tens of thousands of visitors added extraordinary pressures on limited sewerage facilities.

The expansion of tourist-generated infrastructure compels, in yet another area, expenditure of West Indian capital to support the travel industry. In the general scarcity of investment capital for Caribbean tourist infrastructure development, funds since the mid-1960's have emanated largely from United States corporations, loans from international loan agencies, and government loans. Construction contracts, foreign materials, and expatriate technicians further contribute to the flow of capital abroad. Recent sample West Indian loans from international lending agencies to finance the requisite tourist-related infrastructure needs include St. Vincente, \$425,000 to expand water supplies, Trinidad and Tobago, \$7.6 million for fresh water projects, Netherlands Antilles, \$25 million for airport improvements, Guyana, \$12.8 million to expand highways and St. Lucia \$1.2 million for airport development.⁴⁶ When the Dominican Republic launched its tourist drive in 1970, it began to direct an increasing

43. United States Department of Commerce, "Basic Data on the Economy of Trinidad and Tobago," *Overseas Business Report* (December, 1970), p. 8.

44. United States Department of Commerce, *Foreign Economic Trends* (February, 1971), p. 8.

45. United States Department of Agriculture, *Notes on the Agricultural Economies of Dependent Territories in the Western Hemisphere and Puerto Rico* (Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 21.

46. Cf. John Bryden and Mike Faber, "Multiplying the Tourist Multiplier," *Social and Economic Studies*, XX

share of national expenditures to providing the infrastructure support required to accommodate tourism. In 1974, the Dominican Republic received some \$100 million in foreign loans, largely for dam construction, port improvements, expansion of electrical power systems, increased water supply, road building and airport construction.⁴⁷

Infrastructure development facilitates the flight of capital to metropolitan centers. Untied Dutch Aid to the Netherlands Antilles frequently finds its way to the United States. North American firms received the contract for the water plant on Aruba and the VHF Omni Range Distance measuring equipment recently installed at the airports in Curacao and Aruba. Assistance from the Agency for International Development, tied-aid, are allocated to finance infrastructure projects and increase North American exports.⁴⁸ The deep-water harbours at St. John's Antigua was financed partly through a loan from the Export-Import Bank of Washington. The new \$6 million power generator and water desalination plant completed in Antigua in 1970 in anticipation of tourist requirements was financed and supervised entirely by the United States. The Stanley Consultants of Muscatine, Iowa served as the consulting engineers. Colt Industries, Inc., of Beloit, Wisconsin provided the generating plant; the desalination unit was installed by Aqua-Chem, Inc., of Waukesha, Wisconsin. The Johnson Construction Overseas, Inc., of Chappaqua, New York was contractor.⁴⁹

West Indian governments provide the requisite infrastructure demanded by foreign capital and are left with the debt while profits from tourism flow largely abroad. Several islands are already heavily in debt as a result of heavy tourist-related infrastructure investments and already make quite significant annual real losses of those public utilities that are financed from revenues which represent a contribution by governments to the tourist industries.⁵⁰ Tourism has contributed little to the economic development of the West Indies. West Indian governments provide the infrastructure support required by foreign tourist-related capital and are subsequently left in debt while the bulk of tourist receipts return to metropolitan agencies. The industry is foreign-owned and controlled from abroad; air and sea carrier, hotels and resort entertainment, accommodation and restaurant facilities, and local automobile agencies are dominated by foreign capital. A good many if not most of the more remunerative positions are occupied by expatriate staffs. One estimate of travel expenditures of \$1,000 distributes tourist spending into the following categories: \$315 on accommodations, \$385 on food and drink, \$150

(March, 1975), p. 5.

47. United States Department of Commerce, "World Trade Outlook for Latin America," *Overseas Business Report* (March, 1975), p. 5.

48. For a general discussion of finance organizations and the development of tourism see *Tourism, Sector Working Paper*, pp. 15-33.

49. *West Indies Chronicle*, LXXXV (December, 1970), p. 610.

50. Bryden and Faber, "Multiplying the Tourist Multiplier," p. 76.

on purchases, and \$150 on sightseeing — the large bulk represented by the sectors most heavily capitalized by foreign monies.⁵¹ Tourist expenditures do not remain within the region but are repatriated to metropolitan centers. The *net*, as a percentage of the *gross*, of foreign exchange earned on tourism fall far short of original expectation and promise. For every dollar spent in the Commonwealth Caribbean, seventy-seven cents returns in some form to the metropolis.⁵² "Unless substantial effort is made to retain the tourist dollar by way of production, packaging and marketing of local handicrafts and foodstuffs, and the presentation of local talent, music and drama," one St. Lucia government official feared, "St. Lucia will be a mere conduit pipe for the re-export of the tourist dollar."⁵³

Tourism adds still one more industry that demands immediate and short-range gratification of the developed metropolis at the expense of sustained and long-range economic growth of the underdeveloped periphery. In converting former agricultural monoculture economies to travel monocultures, characteristic at many levels of the "boom and bust" of the colonial economy, tourism renews and reinforces the historical process of underdevelopment. Already the predictable effects of this process have become visible.

Herbert I. Schiller

GENESIS OF THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION PRINCIPLES (USA, 1975)

"If I were to be granted one point of foreign policy and no other, I would make it the free flow of information."

John Foster Dulles

For a quarter of a century, one doctrine — the idea that no barriers should prevent the flow of information among nations — dominated international thinking about communications and cultural relations. The genesis and extension of the free flow of information concept are roughly coterminous with the brief and hectic interval of U.S. global hegemony, an epoch already on the wane. As we look back, it is now evident that the historical coincidence of these two phenomena — the policy of free flow of information and the imperial ascendancy of the United States — was not fortuitous. The first element was one of a very few indispensable prerequisites for the latter. Their interaction deserves examination.

As the Second World War drew to a close, attention in the United States at the highest decision-making levels was already focusing on the era ahead. In 1943, two years before the war's end, it was clear that the United States would emerge from the conflict physically unscathed and economically overpowering.

In the most general terms, the more articulate exponents of what seemed to be a looming American Century envisioned a world unshackled from former colonial ties and generally accessible to the initiatives and undertakings of American private enterprise. Accumulated advantages, not all of them war related, ineluctably would permit American business to flourish and expand into the farthest reaches of the world capitalist system. The limits that the very existence of a sphere under socialist organization put on this expansion were, it might be noted, neither agreeable nor acceptable, at that time, to a self-confident North American leadership.

The outward thrust of U.S. corporate enterprise was economic, but the utility of the cultural-informational component in the expansion process was appreciated at a very early stage in the drama. The rapid international advances of U.S. capitalism, already under way in the early 1940s, were legitimized as unexceptional and highly beneficial expressions of growing freedom in the international arena — freedom for capital, resources and information flows.

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51. Kari Levitt and Iqbal Gulati, "Income Effect of Tourist Spending: Mystification Multiplied: A Critical Comment on the Zinder Report," *Social and Economic Studies*, XIX (September, 1970), p. 329.

52. Frank McDonald, "The Commonwealth Caribbean," In Tad Szulc, ed., *The United States and the Caribbean* (Englewood Cliffs, 1971), p. 40. In the United States Virgin Islands, the import component is compounded by the large "alien" population in the tourist sector. See Arthur D. Little, Inc., *Inflation and Economic Growth in the U.S. Virgin Islands, A Report to Legislature of U.S. Virgin Islands* (1974), pp. 35-36.

53. In Gail Grynbaum, "Tourism and Underdevelopment," *NACLA Newsletter*, V (April, 1971), p. 9.

It was an especially propitious time to extol the virtues of unrestricted movement of information and resources. The depredations of the Nazi occupation had traumatized Europe and a good part of the rest of the world. Freedom of information and movement were the highly desirable and legitimate aspirations of occupied nations and people. And it was relatively easy to confuse truly national needs with private business objectives.

John Knight,¹ owner of a major chain of newspapers in the United States, and in 1946 the president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, made a point, which left out more than it explained, that many were expressing at the time: "Had not the Nazi and Fascist forces in Germany and Italy seized and dominated the press and all communication facilities at the start, the growth of these poisonous dictatorships might well have been prevented and the indoctrination of national thought in the direction of hatred and mistrust might have been impossible."

Free flow of information could not only be contrasted to the fascist mode of operations but also was associated with the hope for peace sharing by war-weary peoples everywhere. Palmer Hoyt,² another influential American publisher, declared a few months after the war's end:

I believe entirely that the world cannot stand another war. But I believe as completely that the world is headed for such a war and destruction unless immediate steps are taken to ensure the beginning at least of freedom of news — *American style* — between the peoples of the earth. A civilisation that is not informed cannot be free and a world that is not free cannot endure. [Emphasis added].

U.S. advocates of ease of movement of information then capitalized heavily on the experiences and emotions of people freshly liberated from fascist-occupied and war-ravaged continents. But accompanying the rhetoric of freedom were powerful economic forces employing a skillful political and semantic strategy.

In the first decades of the twentieth century, important sectors of domestic industry chafed impatiently at being excluded from vast regions preempted by the still-forceful British and French empires, i.e., the British global imperial preferences that tied together that colonial system's network of dependencies and sealed them off from commercial penetration by other entrepreneurs. The decisive role played by the British worldwide communications network — both its control of the physical hardware of oceanic cables and its administrative and business organization of news and information — which held the colonial system together,

1. John S. Knight, "World Freedom of Information," speech presented in Philadelphia, Pa., April 16, 1946. Published in *Vital Speeches*, 1946, 12, 472 - 77.

2. Palmer Hoyt, "Last Chance," speech delivered before the Jackson County Chamber of Commerce, Medford, Oregon, September 18, 1945. Published in *Vital Speeches*, 1946, 12, 60 - 62.

3. James Lawrence Fly, "A Free Flow of News Must Link the Nations," *Free World*, 1944, 8(2) (August), 165 - 69.

promoted its advantages, and insulated it from external assault, had not escaped attention in the United States. It was against these finely spun, structural ties that an American offensive was mounted. Conveniently, the attack could avail itself of the virtuous language and praiseworthy objectives of "free flow of information" and "worldwide access to news".

But there was no mistaking the underlying thrust. For years Kent Cooper, executive manager of the Associated Press (AP), had sought to break the international grip of the European news cartels — Reuters, foremost, and Havas and Wolff. Cooper's book *Barriers Down* (New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1942) described the global territorial divisions the cartels had organized and the limitations they posed for the activities of the AP. As early as 1914, Cooper wrote, the AP "board was debating whether the Associated Press should not make an effort to break through the Havas (French) control of the vast South American territory" (p. 41). He recalled, "The tenacious hold that a nineteenth century territorial allotment for news dissemination had upon the world was evidenced by each year's discussion of the subject by the Associated Press Board of Directors, continuing until 1934" (p. 43).

Cooper's indictment of the old cartels has an ironic quality today when U.S. news agencies largely dominate the flow of world information:

In precluding the Associated Press from disseminating news abroad, Reuters and Havas served three purposes: (1) they kept out Associated Press competition; (2) they were free to present American news disparagingly to the United States if they presented it at all; (3) they could present news of their own countries most favorably and without it being contradicted. Their own countries were always glorified. This was done by reporting great advances at home in English and French civilisations, the benefits of which would, of course, be bestowed on the world. (p. 43)

Cooper also recognised the significance of Britain's domination of the oceanic cables:

The cable brought Australia, South Africa, India, China, Canada and all the British world instantaneously to London on the Thames ... Britain, far ahead of any other nation, concentrated on the cable business. First it tied its Empire together. Then it stretched out and tied other nations to it. And in harmony with Victorian practices, the news that went through this vast network of cables gave luster to the British cause! (p. 11)

Cooper was not alone in seeing these advantages. James Lawrence Fly,³ chairman of the Federal Communications Commission during the Second World War, also drew attention to this subject:

Among the artificial restraints to the free development of commerce throughout the world none is more irksome and less justifiable than the control of communication facilities by one country with preferential services and rates to its own nationals...

Great Britain owns the major portion of the cables of the world, and it is a fair statement that, through such ownership and the interlocking contractual relations based on it, that country dominates the world cable situation. (p. 168)

This understanding of the power afforded by domination of communications was not forgotten. It was manifest two decades later when U.S. companies, with huge government subsidies, were the first to develop and then monopolize satellite communications.

The impatient U.S. press associations and governmental communications regulators found others in the country who recognised the advantages that worldwide communications control bestowed on foreign trade and export markets. *Business Week*⁴ reports:

... Washington recognises the postwar importance of freer communications as a stimulant to the interchange of goods and ideas. On a less lofty level it means that federal officials are trying to loosen the grip which the British have long held through their cable system, which they tightened after the last war through the seizure of German properties... In peacetime, reduced costs of messages will energize our trade, support our propaganda, bolster business for all the lines.

The magazine summed up the business view by quoting approvingly a comment that had appeared in the *London Standard*: "It [control of communications] gives power to survey the trade of the world and ... to facilitate those activities which are to the interest of those in control."

Of course, British power was not unaware of American interest in these matters. The influential *Economist* reacted tartly to Kent Cooper's expanding campaign, in late 1944, for the free flow of information. The "huge financial resources of the American agencies might enable them to dominate the world ... [Cooper], like most big business executives, experiences a peculiar moral glow in finding that his idea of freedom coincides with his commercial advantage... Democracy does not necessarily mean making the whole world safe for the AP."⁵ Nor did it mean, the *Economist* failed to add, retaining control for Reuters and British Cables.

The public official most directly concerned with formulating and explaining U.S. policy in the communications sphere immediately after the war was William Benton, the Assistant Secretary of State. Benton,⁶ who was to become a U.S. Senator and president of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, outlined, in a State Department broadcast in January 1946, the government's position on the meaning of freedom of communications:

The State Department plans to do everything within its power along political or diplomatic lines to help break down the artificial barriers to the expansion of private American news agencies, magazines, motion pictures, and other media of communications throughout the

4. *Business Week*, 1945, 87 (August 4), 32, 34, 41.

5. Quoted in "Charter for a Free Press," *Newsweek*, December 11, 1944, p. 88

6. *Department of State Bulletin*, 1946, 14(344) (February 3), 160.

7. Quoted by John S. Knight, op. cit., p. 476.

8. *Report of the United States Delegates to the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information*, U.S. Department of State Publication 3150, International Organization and Conference Series 111.5, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948.

world... Freedom of the press — and freedom of exchange of information generally — is an integral part of our foreign policy.

The economic aspects of the free-flow-of-information policy certainly were no secret, though the media neither dwelt on the self-serving nature of its widely proclaimed principle nor made the implications of the policy explicit to the public. Instead, a remarkable political campaign was organized by the big press associations and publishers, with the support of industry in general, to elevate the issue of free flow of information to the highest level of national and international principle. This served a handsome pair of objectives. It rallied public opinion to the support of a commercial goal expressed as an ethical imperative. Simultaneously, it provided a highly effective ideological club against the Soviet Union and its newly created neighboring zone of anticapitalist influence.

It was obvious that the fundamental premise of free enterprise — access to capital governs access to message dissemination — would be intolerable to societies that had eliminated private ownership of decisive forms of property, such as mass communication facilities. Therefore, the issue of free flow of information provided American policy managers with a powerful cultural argument for creating suspicion about an alternative form of social organization. It thus helped to weaken the enormous popular interest in Europe and Asia at the war's end in one or another variety of socialism.

John Foster Dulles, one of the chief architects and executors of America's Cold War Policy, was forthright on this matter: "If I were to be granted one point of foreign policy and no other, I would make it the free flow of information."⁷ This is a recurring theme in postwar U.S. diplomacy. For example, a couple of years later, the U.S. delegation to a United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information⁸ reported:

It is the hope of the six of us that this Conference helped to turn the tide that has been running against freedom throughout much of the world. It is our conviction that in the future conduct of our foreign policy the United States should continue to take vigorous action in this field of freedom of thought and expression.

Certainly the chronology of the launching and steadfast pursuance of the free-flow doctrine supports the belief that the issue had been thoughtfully prepared and carefully promoted in the critical period immediately preceding the end of the Second World War and the few years directly thereafter. Those who select the interval beginning in 1948 as the start of the Cold War era overlook the earlier period when the groundwork was prepared in the United States for the general offensive of American capitalism throughout the world. This was the time, too, as we shall see, when the free-flow question first came to prominence.

Well before the war was over, American business had incorporated the issue of free flow of information into a formal political ideology. In June 1944 the directors of the powerful American Society of Newspaper Editors adopted resolutions urging both major political parties to support "world free-

dom of information and unrestricted communications for news throughout the world."⁹ Thereupon, both the Democrats and the Republicans, in the next two months, adopted planks in their party platforms that incorporated these aims. The Democrats proclaimed: "We believe that without loss of sovereignty, world development and lasting peace are within humanity's grasp. They will come with the greater enjoyment of those freedoms by the peoples of the world, and with the freer flow among them of ideas and goods." The Republicans stated: "All channels of news must be kept open with equality of access to information at the source. If agreement can be achieved with foreign nations to establish the same principles, it will be a valuable contribution to future peace."¹⁰

In September 1944 both houses of Congress adopted a concurrent resolution that followed closely the recommendations of the editors and publishers. Congress expressed "its belief in the worldwide right of interchange of news by news-gathering and distributing agencies, whether individual or associate, by any means, without discrimination as to sources, distribution, rates or charges; and that this right should be protected by international compact."¹¹

Having sought and secured congressional endorsement of their aims, the directors of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, meeting in November 1944, then declared that "most Americans and their newspapers will support Government policies ... and action toward removal of all political, legal and economic barriers to the media of information, and ... our Government should make this abundantly clear to other nations."¹² The group noted with satisfaction that the newly appointed Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, Jr., had announced that "... the United States plans exploratory talks with other nations looking to international understandings guaranteeing there shall be no barriers to interchange of information among all nations."¹³

At the same time, the American Society of Newspaper Editors, in conjunction with the AP and United Press International (UPI), announced an international expedition of a delegation to "personally carry the message of an international free press into every friendly capital of the world."¹⁴ In the spring of 1945, while the war was still being fought, the delegation travelled 40,000 miles around the world, to twenty-two major cities and eleven allied and neutral countries, "on first priority of the War Department on Army Transport Command planes."¹⁵

While the private group of U.S. press representatives was making its international journey to

marshal support for the free-flow doctrine, the directors of the Associated Press "placed a fund of \$1,000,000 a year at the disposal of the Executive Director Kent Cooper to make the AP a global institution."¹⁶

In fact, as the war drew to a close, preparations for the promotion of the free-flow doctrine shifted from the national to the international level. With congressional and political support assured and domestic public opinion effectively organized, the free-flow advocates carried their campaign vigorously into the channels of international diplomacy and peacemaking that were becoming activated with the end of hostilities.

One of the first occasions that provided an opportunity for an international forum for espousing the free-flow doctrine was the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace convened in Mexico City in February 1945. Latin America, regarded for more than a century as a prime U.S. interest — with European economic influence practically eliminated as a result of the war — was a natural site for testing the new doctrine in a congenial, if not controlled, international setting. Predictably, the conference adopted a strong resolution on "free access to information" that was "based substantially on a United States proposal."¹⁷

The Western Hemisphere having been successfully persuaded of the merits of "free flow", attention turned to the rest of the world. International peacekeeping structures were being established; and the United States made certain that the newly created United Nations and the related United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), would put great emphasis on the free-flow issue.

The utilization of the United Nations and its affiliated organizations as instruments of U.S. policy and, additionally, as effective forums for the propagation of the free-flow doctrine, can best be understood in the context of the international economy thirty years ago.

In the 1970s, the United States often is on the minority side of the voting in the United Nations (on some issues in almost total isolation — e.g., on direct satellite broadcasting). In the 1940s, affairs were quite different.

Fifty states were represented in the first meetings of the United Nations in 1945, hardly more than a third of the present 143-nation membership. Of the original 50, two-fifths were Latin American states, at that time almost totally subservient to North American pressure. The West European member states were economically drained, politically unstable, and heavily dependent on the United States for economic assistance. The few Middle

Eastern, Asian, and African countries then participating in the UN were, with a few exceptions, still, in real terms, subject to the Western empire system. In sum, the United Nations, in 1945-48, was far from being universal, much less independent. In fact, it was distinguished by an "automatic majority", invoked whenever its heaviest financial supporter and economically strongest member desired to use it.

Western image-making and information manipulation often made a great play of Soviet obduracy, as reflected in its use of the veto. Unmentioned were the political and economic relationships that permitted decisions favorable to the United States to be voted routinely with overwhelming majorities. In this atmosphere the UN's endorsement of the free-flow doctrine was hardly surprising. It was also poor evidence that the principle had genuine international support or that its full import was appreciated. Rather, it offered a striking example of how the machinery of the international organization could be put at the disposal of its most powerful participant. What follows is a very brief review of the utilization of UNESCO and the United Nations itself for the propagation of the free-flow doctrine.

The earliest proposals for the constitution of UNESCO, which were drafted by a U.S. panel of experts and reviewed by the State Department, prominently espoused the free flow of information as a UNESCO objective.¹⁸ In an account of the meetings of the U.S. delegation to the constitutional conference of UNESCO in Washington and London in October and November 1945, the head of the delegation, Archibald MacLeish, repeatedly emphasized his (and the delegation's) conviction that the free flow of information was a basic principle.¹⁹ There is no reason to doubt this. Many people in the United States, especially in the literary and humanistic arts, fully supported the concept of the free flow, unaware of, or perhaps indifferent to, the central purpose the doctrine served or to which it was meant to be applied.

It is in this respect that the first report of the United States National Commission for UNESCO (an appointed group, heavily representative of the cultural arts), to the Secretary of State,²⁰ in early 1947, is an unusual document. It contained a mildly worded qualification with respect to the free-flow doctrine. The commission recommended:

The American Delegation [to UNESCO] should advance and support proposals for the removal of

18. *Proposed Educational and Cultural Organization of the United Nations*, U.S. Department of State Publication 2382, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945, pp. 5-7.

19. Luther H. Evans, *The United States and UNESCO: A Summary of the United States Delegation Meetings to the Constitutional Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, in Washington and London, October - November 1945*, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1971, p. 11.

20. *Report of the United States Commission for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to the Secretary of State, 1947*.

21. See Llewellyn White and Robert D. Leigh, *Peoples*

obstacles to the free flow of information in accordance with the report of the Committee of Consultants to the Department of State on Mass Media and UNESCO. *The Commission differs, however, with the Committee of Consultants in believing that the organization should concern itself with the quality of international communication through the mass media and should give serious study to the means by which the mass media may be of more positive and creative service to the cause of international understanding and therefore of peace.* [Emphasis added.]

The commission hastened to add, "The Organization should, of course, avoid at all times any act or suggestion of censorship."

The concern for quality rarely, if ever, found its way into official U.S. pronouncements on the desirability of the free flow of information. When suggested, as it regularly was by the state ownership societies, it was rejected out of hand as a justification for censorship and suppression. When it was also raised as a major consideration by the Hutchins Freedom of the Press Commission in the United States in 1946, it was simply ignored.²¹

From the start, UNESCO, with the U.S. delegation taking the initiative, made free flow of information one of its major concerns. In its account of the first session of the General Conference of UNESCO, held in Paris in November-December 1946, the U.S. delegation reported that it had proposed to the sub-commission on mass communications that "UNESCO should co-operate with the Subcommission on Freedom of Information of the Commission on Human Rights in the preparation of the United Nations report on obstacles to the free flow of information and ideas..."²² In fact, a section on free flow of information was created in the Mass Communications Division of UNESCO itself.

In the United Nations similar initiatives for stressing and publicizing the free-flow doctrine were under way from the outset of that organization's existence. The United Nations Economic and Social Council established the Commission on Human Rights in February 1946 and, in June 1946, empowered this commission to set up a subcommission on freedom of information and the press.²³

Earlier, the delegation of the Philippines Commonwealth had addressed to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, for submission to the first part of the first session of the UN's General Assembly, a draft resolution that proposed an international conference on the press with a view "to ensuring the establishment, operation, and circulation of a free press throughout the world."²⁴ With

Speaking to Peoples. A Report on International Mass Communications from the Commission on Freedom of the Press, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1946.

22. First Session of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Paris, November 19 - December 10, 1946. *Report of the United States Delegation, with Selected Documents*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947, p. 17.

23. Resolution 2/9 of 21 June 1946, Economic and Social Council, *Official Records* (First Year, Second Session), Lake Success, N.Y., United Nations, No. 8, p. 400.

24. *Yearbook on Human Rights for 1947*, Lake Success, N.Y., United Nations, 1949, p. 439.

9. John S. Knight, op. cit., pp. 472-73.

10. Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, *National Party Platforms, 1840-1964*, Urbana, Ill., and London, University of Illinois Press, 1966, pp. 404, 413.

11. *Congressional Record*, 90th Congress, 8044:58 Stat. (Pt. 2), 1119.

12. *The New York Times*, November 29, 1944.

13. *Editor and Publisher*, December 2, 1944, p. 7.

14. *The New York Times*, November 29, 1944.

15. *Editor and Publisher*, June 16, 1945, pp. 5, 64.

16. *Editor and Publisher*, April 21, 1945, p. 15.

17. *Report of the United States Delegation to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace* (Mexico City, Mexico, February 21-March 8, 1945), U.S. Department of State Publication 2497, Conference Series 85, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946, p. 21.

due respect to national sensibilities, it is impossible to imagine the Philippines' initiative, *preceding* the first General Assembly of the United Nations, without the support, if not encouragement and sponsorship, of the United States. The Philippines had been, since the end of the nineteenth century, and in a real sense still were in 1946, a dependency of the United States.

A new draft was introduced by the Philippines delegation to the General Assembly during the second part of its first session (October 15 — December 1946). This proposed that the international conference be extended to include other informational media such as radio and film. On December 14, 1946, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 59(1), which declared that "freedom of information is a fundamental human right, and is a touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated," and that freedom "implies the right to gather, transmit and publish news anywhere and everywhere without fetters."²⁴ The Assembly also resolved to authorize the holding of a conference of all members of the United Nations on freedom of information.

The United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information was held March 25 — April 21, 1948, in Geneva. It provided the international ideological polarization the United States' policy managers had expected of it. William Benton,²⁵ chairman of the United States delegation to the conference, explained: "Our Conference at Geneva, *as was to be expected* [emphasis added], is sharply divided.... The free are thus face to face with those whose ideology drives them toward the destruction of freedom." but, Benton continued, "... we are not at Geneva to make propaganda. We are there to do all that we can to reduce barriers to the flow of information among men and nations." Yet among the main objectives of the American delegation, still according to Benton, and hardly compatible with his plea for nonpartisanship, was "... to secure agreement upon the establishment of continuing machinery in the United Nations that will keep world attention focused on the vital subject of freedom of expression within and among nations."

The conference's final act, embodying essentially U.S. views on free flow of information, was adopted by thirty votes to one (Poland's being the dissenting vote), with five abstentions (Belorussia, Czechoslovakia, the Ukraine, the USSR, and Yugoslavia). The Soviet proposal that the final act be signed only by the president and the executive secretary of the conference instead of representatives of all the attending governments did not please the U.S. delegation. Nevertheless, perhaps because of the uneasiness aroused by the conference's overtly provocative character, the Soviet recommendation

25. William Benton (chairman, United States delegation to the Freedom of Information Conference), address delivered before the Anglo-American Press Club, Paris, France, April 7, 1948. Published in *Department of State Bulletin*, April 18, 1948, pp. 518 - 20.

26. "Accomplishments of the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information," *Documents and State Papers* (U.S. Department of State), 1948, 1(3) (June).

was unanimously adopted.²⁶

The conference voted also to refer the resolutions and its draft convention to the UN Economic and Social Council for consideration and eventual submission, for final adoption, to the General Assembly. In August 1948, after acrimonious and protracted debate, the Economic and Social Council submitted the entire parcel — three conventions and forty-three resolutions — without action or recommendation to the 1948 General Assembly, where it languished, without any actions being taken.²⁷ Despite the strong U.S. influence in the United Nations at the time, the organization's structure made it difficult to bulldoze all issues through the intricate web of committees, commissions, and the General Assembly.

The conference itself represented, in the eyes of U.S. observers, "in the main ... a victory for American objectives.... Out of 45 substantive propositions, the [U.S.] delegation voted against only one, and abstained from voting on only three, thus supporting 41 decisions of the Conference."²⁸ Others saw it differently. The *Economist* (London), for example, though generally approving of the work of the conference, noted:

...it was the impression of most delegations that the Americans wanted to secure for their news agencies that general freedom of the market for the most efficient which has been the object of all their initiatives in commercial policy — that they regard freedom of information as an extension of the charter of the International Trade Organization rather than as a special and important subject of its own. And the stern opposition which they offered to Indian and Chinese efforts to protect infant national news agencies confirmed this impression.²⁹

This assessment by the *Economist* reflected the continuing ambivalence of the United States' West European allies towards the issue of free flow of information. Though fully cognizant of the commercial threat the free-flow doctrine posed to their own communications industries, faced with the United States' media power, the Western market economies, especially Great Britain, nonetheless supported the principle as a means of embarrassing the Soviet sphere and placing it on an ideological defensive. On this question a united Western position defending private ownership of the mass media took precedence over the internal conflicts in the Western world about who should dominate these instruments.

Though efforts to gain wide international support for the free-flow concept was at best inconclusive, the two decades following the Freedom of Information Conference in 1948 saw the realization of the doctrine in fact, if not in solemn covenant. New communications technology — computers, space satellites, television — combined with a

27. United Nations documents E/Conf. 6/79 and E/1050, August 28, 1948.

28. John B. Whitton, "The United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information and the Movement Against International Propaganda," *American Journal of International Law*, 1949, 43 (January), 76.

29. *Economist*, May 1, 1948, p. 701.

powerful and expanding corporate business system, assisted the push of the United States into the center of the world economy.

Without public pronouncements, private, American-made media products and U.S. informational networks blanketed the world. Especially prominent were films, produced more and more frequently outside the country;³⁰ the exportation of commercial television programs;³¹ and international distribution of North American magazines and other periodicals. *Reader's Digest*, *Time*, *Newsweek*, *Playboy*, and Walt Disney Corporation productions reached millions of viewers and readers outside the United States. Moreover, foreign book-publishing firms disappeared into U.S. "leisure time" conglomerates. Along with these more or less conventional media penetrations, a variety of additional informational activities accompanied the global surge of private American capital. Foremost, perhaps, was the extension of the opinion poll and consumer survey, now undertaken all over the world, often under the auspices of American-owned research companies.³²

Largely as a reaction to the flood of American cultural material and the usurpation of national media systems that were required to disseminate it, a new mood with respect to the doctrine of free flow of information became observable in the international community in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Besides the free-flow view, one began to see frequent references to cultural sovereignty, cultural privacy, cultural autonomy, and even admissions of the possibility of cultural imperialism.³³

Another factor that perhaps is contributing to the shift of emphasis, outside the United States, away from the *quantity* to the *consequences* of free flow of information is the changed nature of the international community itself. Since 1945 more than ninety new national entities, most of them still in an early stage of economic development, have emerged to take their places in the community of nations. A paramount concern of these states is to safeguard their national and cultural sovereignty. Then, too, the results of two decades of *de facto* free flow of information have not gone unremarked. It is difficult, in fact, to escape the global spread of U.S. cultural styles featured in the mass media of films, TV programs, pop records, and slick magazines. Their influence prompts sentiments such as that expressed by the Prime Minister of Guyana: "A nation whose mass media are dominated from the outside is not nation."³³

Twenty-five years later, the 1948 comments of Robert D. Leigh,³⁴ director of the staff of the

30. Thomas Guback, *The International Film Industry*, Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press, 1969.

31. Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis, *Television Traffic — A One-Way Street? Reports and Papers on Mass Communication*, No. 70, Paris, UNESCO, 1974.

32. Herbert I. Schiller, *The Mind Managers*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1973.

33. *Intermedia*, 1973, No. 3, p. 1 (a publication of the International Broadcast Institute).

34. Robert D. Leigh, "Freedom of Communication Across National Boundaries," *Educational Record*, 1948, 29 (October), 381 - 91.

Hutchins Commission on Freedom of the Press, have a prophetic ring:

The main burden of my presentation is that in the present day, and especially across national boundaries, this faith in an omniscient world citizen served only by *full* flow of words and images is an oversimplification of the process and effect of mass communication... "Barriers Down" standing by itself is not adequate policy in the international field. The focus changes from free individual expression as a right, to the primary need of the citizen everywhere to have regular access to reliable information, and, also, ready access to the existent diversity of ideas, opinions, insights, and arguments regarding public affairs. This does not deny freedom, but it joins freedom with a positive responsibility that freedom shall serve truth and understanding. *The concept of responsibility, carried to its logical conclusion, may even imply defining a clearly harmful class of public communication which falls outside the protection of freedom itself.* (p.382)[Emphasis added in last sentence.]

Finally, the possibility of direct satellite broadcasting from space into home sets without the mediation of nationally controlled ground stations, whether or not likely in the immediate future, has created a sense of urgency concerning the question of cultural sovereignty. This has been especially observable in the United Nations.

The Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites was established in 1969 "to consider mainly the technical feasibility of direct broadcasting from satellites."³⁵ It has met more or less regularly since that time, extending its range from the technical aspects to the social, legal, and political implications of direct, satellite broadcasting.

Moreover, UNESCO, the strongest advocate of the free-flow doctrine at one time, has veered noticeably away from its formerly unquestioning support. In its Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of Information, adopted in October 1972, UNESCO acknowledged that "... it is necessary that States, taking into account the principle of freedom of information, reach or promote prior agreements concerning direct satellite broadcasting to the population of countries other than the country of origin of the transmission."³⁶ The UN General Assembly supported this view in November 1972, by a vote of 102 to 1 — the United States casting the single dissenting vote.

Reactions in the private communications sector in the United States was predictably hostile and self-serving. Frank Stanton,³⁷ one of the most influential American media controllers in the era of U.S. informational hegemony, wrote: "... the rights of Americans to speak to whomever they please, when

35. *Report of the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites of the Work of Its Fourth Session*, A/AC. 105/117, New York, United Nations, 22 June 1973, Annex 1, p. 1.

36. UNESCO Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of Information, Spread of Education and Greater Cultural Exchange, document A/AC. 105/109, 1972 (mimeographed).

37. Frank Stanton, "Will They Stop Our Satellites?", *The New York Times*, October 22, 1972, Section 2 (Arts & Leisure), pp. 23, 39.

they please, are [being] bartered away." His chief objection to the UNESCO document, he claimed, was that censorship was being imposed by provisions that permitted each nation to reach prior agreement with transmitting nations concerning the character of the broadcasts.

Stanton, along with a good part of the media's managers (including the prestigious *New York Times*), finds the right of nations to control the character of the messages transmitted into their territories both dangerous and a gross violation of the U.S. Constitution's provision concerning freedom of speech: "The rights which form the framework of our Constitution, the principles asserted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the basic principle of the free movement of ideas, are thus ignored."³⁷

Along with the hubris displayed in regarding the U.S. Constitution applicable to, and binding law for, the entire international community is a second, even more questionable, consideration. Stanton and those in agreement with him matter-of-factly assume that the United States' constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech to the *individual* is applicable to the multinational corporations and media conglomerates whose interests they so strongly espouse. Yet more than a generation ago, Earl L. Vance³⁸ asked, "Is freedom of the press to be conceived as a *personal* right appertaining to all citizens, as undoubtedly the Founding Fathers conceived it; or as a *property* right appertaining to the ownership of newspapers and other publications, as we have come to think of it largely today?"

Stanton et al extend the *property*-right concept of freedom of speech to all the advanced electronic forms of communication and expect universal acquiescence in their interpretation. But the national power behind this view is no longer as absolute or as fearsome as it was in 1945. The world is no longer totally dependent on, and therefore vulnerable to, the economic strength of the United States. A remarkable renewal of economic activity in Western Europe and Japan, significant growth and expansion of the noncapitalist world, and, not least, the experiences of the last quarter of a century have produced an altogether changed international environment.

This new atmosphere, as we have noted, is reflected in the voting patterns of international bodies — so much so, in fact, that U.S. spokesmen complain bitterly that the United Nations and UNESCO, in particular, are practicing a "tyranny of the majority" that "brutally disregards the sensitivity of the minority."³⁹ Worse still, these organizations are being "politicized."⁴⁰

38. Earl L. Vance, "Freedom of the Press for Whom?", *Virginia Quarterly Review*, 1945, 21 (Summer), 340 - 54.

39. John Scali, U.S. delegate to the UN, in a speech before the General Assembly, as reported in *The New York Times*, December 7, 1974.

40. *The New York Times*, Editorial, November 23, 1974.

41. *The New York Times*, December 12, 1974.

42. *Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consulta-*

It is worth quoting the response of the Algerian delegation to the United Nations to these charges, Abdellatif Rahal⁴¹ reminded the Assembly:

It may not be unimportant to begin by stressing that countries which today are rebelling against the rule of the majority are the very same which constituted the majority of yesterday, the same whose behaviour at that time represented the best frame of reference for judging the behaviour of today's majority ... Thus, if those who now criticize us protest the very rules which govern our work in this Assembly, they should remember that they themselves are the authors of these rules, let them not forget that the lessons they wish to give us today are worth little when compared with the examples they have already given us in the past.

To be sure, the United States and its closest allies (and competitors) still emphasize the free-flow doctrine as the basis for peace and international security. The Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, begun in mid-1973 and concluded in July 1975, made this very clear. In its preliminary consultations the conference was instructed to "prepare proposals to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds."⁴² And it was this issue to which the Western Delegates gave their greatest attention, seeking to make all other decisions contingent on a resolution of the free-flow question acceptable to themselves. British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home,⁴³ for instance, declared:

... the item ... on an agenda which deals with co-operation in the humanitarian field is in my judgement the most important item of our business. If our Conference is essentially about people and about trust then it is necessary that we do something to remove the barriers which inhibit the movement of people and the exchange of information and ideas.

But despite the insistence of most of the political and economic leaders of Western, industrialized, market economies on the continued importance of an unalloyed free-flow doctrine, alternate formulations are appearing. One was contained in the speech of Finland's President, Urho Kekkonen, before a communications symposium in May 1973. Kekkonen⁴⁴ in a comprehensive review of the fundamental premises of international communications, singled out the free-flow doctrine for his scrutiny:

When the Declaration of Human Rights was drawn up after the Second World War, the 19th century liberal view of the world in the spirit of the ideas of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill was the guideline. Freedom of action and enterprise — *laissez-faire* — was made the supreme value in the world of business and ideology, irrespective of at whose expense success in this world was achieved. The State gave everyone the possibility to function, but did not carry the responsibility for the

tions, Helsinki, Government of Finland, 1973, p. 15.

43. *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Verbatim Records, Part 1, CSCE/I/PV.5*, Helsinki, 5 July 1973, Sir Alec Douglas-Home.

44. Urho Kekkonen, "The Free Flow of Information: Towards a Reconsideration of National and International Communication Policies", address before Symposium on the International Flow of Television Programmes, University of Tampere, Tampere, Finland, May 21, 1973.

consequences. So the freedom of the strong led to success and the weak went under in spite of this so-called liberty. This was the result regardless of which of them advocated a more just policy for society and mankind.

Kekkonen applied this general perspective to international communication and the free-flow doctrine. He noted:

In the world of communications, it can be observed how problems of freedom of speech within one State are identical to those in the world community formed by different States. At an international level are to be found the ideals of free communication and their actual distorted execution for the rich on the one hand and the poor on the other. Globally the flow of information between States — not least the material pumped out by television — is to a very great extent a one-way, unbalanced traffic, and in no way possesses the depth and range which the principles of freedom of speech require.

These observations led Kekkonen to inquire: "Could it be that the prophets who preach unhindered communication are not concerned with equality between nations, but are on the side of the stronger and wealthier?" He remarked also that international organizations were in fact moving away from their original advocacy of the free-flow doctrine:

My observations would indicate that the United Nations and its educational, scientific and cultural organization, UNESCO, have in the last few years reduced their declarations on behalf of an abstract freedom of speech. Instead, they have moved in the direction of planing down the lack of balance in international communications.

From all this, Kekkonen concluded: "... a mere liberalistic freedom of communication is not in everyday reality a neutral idea, but a way in which an enterprise with many resources at its disposal has greater opportunities than weaker brethren to make its own hegemony accepted."

Kekkonen's analysis is, in fact, the general conclusion, however long overdue, that is beginning to emerge with respect to *all* international and domestic relationships — not just those concerned with communications. When there is an uneven distribution of power among individuals or groups *within* nations or *among* nations, a free hand — freedom to continue doing what led to the existing condition — serves to strengthen the already-powerful and weaken further the already-frail. Evidence of this abounds in all aspects of modern life — in race, sex, and occupational and international relationships. Freedoms that are formally impressive may be substantively oppressive when they reinforce prevailing inequalities while claiming to be providing generalized opportunity for all.

Rafael Drinot Silva

ADVERTISING: THE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF DAILY LIFE

(Peru, 1973)

"The great battlefield for the defense and expansion of liberty today is the second half of the globe: Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East....Much more than the conquest of lives and territories, it is a battle for the conquest of minds and spirits. In such a battle we cannot remain neutral." John F. Kennedy¹

"1. Advertising entails a double responsibility with respect to the economic system and to the lives of our people. For the public, advertising is the primary means of knowing what products and services, resulting from a system of free enterprise, they can freely choose in order to satisfy their needs and desires....For the advertisers, it is the primary way of persuading the public to buy their products or use their services within the framework of a highly competitive economic system."

Peruvian Association of Advertising Agencies²

Of the existing bibliography on mass communications media in Latin America we have found that, with the exception of a few cases of unusual quality, the advertising/mass media problematic has been neglected.

Furthermore, the little mass media research produced—in our country there are only about 20 studies, including books, theses and monographs—is more descriptive than analytical. We believe this to be generally the case for Latin America, although there are exceptions. In addition, of those who have studied the mass communications media, they have generally referred to the "problem" of advertising from two perspectives.

(a) They emphasize the prominent role of the advertising agencies as a power within the media, describing these power groups in themselves and in their relationship with different power groups in the system of production of a given country, or

(b) They refer to the ideological implications of advertising, emphasize its role in the reproduction of

1. Quoted in Nguyen Khac Vien "Algunas consideraciones sobre el neocolonialismo norteamericano", in *Breve historia del neocolonialismo norteamericano*, Hanoi, Ed. Lenguas Extranjeras, 1971.

2. Code of Ethics of the Peruvian Association of Advertising Agencies.

This text was first published in *Textual* (Lima), 8, December 1973. Published by permission of the author. It was translated from the Spanish by Mary C. Axtmann. English translation Copyright International General 1978. This is its first English publication.

capitalist ideology, describe or analyze the formation of "consumer societies", and/or stress the need to "clean up" racist, pornographic and vulgar images used in advertising.

As we understand it, advertising fulfills a fundamental role in capitalist society's system of production (as indicated above in the first point in the Code of Ethics of the Peruvian Association of Advertising Agencies). Of course, in the development of the mode of production ideology cannot be divorced from economics. Nonetheless, for analytical purposes we shall concentrate on its economic role because it is only in function of this role that we will be able to understand why the advertising agencies have power in the media, and what their role is in the process of development of the so-called "consumer societies".

I. ADVERTISING: THE TRANSMISSION BELT FOR THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

The statement "Production is immediately consumption. Consumption is immediately production" is old and circular, but nevertheless relevant. It is the basis for any analysis of the social process. However, it is not sufficient to untangle the process characteristic of each stage of humanity. Since it is necessary to characterize a mode of production in a more specific way, we are obliged to add the specificities of the capitalist mode of production. In this mode, the production of commodities implies two classes; one owning the means of production and the other possessing the labor power. This labor power creates value—materialized in commodities—which enters a marketplace where the relationship between individuals disappears and is replaced by a relationship between goods which appears real and objective. This fetishization of commodities takes place when the capitalist class expropriates part of the socially-created value, the surplus value.

Advertising is both a product and a cause—in that order—of this mode of production. Certain authors situate the appearance of advertising in its present form in the incipient markets of seventeenth century France,

....However, historical importance can be attached to the founding in 1836 of the newspaper *La Presse* by Emile de Girardin, an unimportant writer but a very imaginative business man, who appropriated the idea from a certain Dutacq, to this day completely unknown. Girardin's innovation, which introduced a new era, was to fix a subscription price to his newspaper at 40 francs a year, which was half the price of other newspapers, and to make up for losses by selling ads and announcements. The same year Dutacq founded *Le Siecle*, using the same formula, and the other Paris newspapers soon followed. The number of subscriptions rose to 200,000 in 1846, compared with 70,000 in 1836.³

According to Hauser, the source of this quote, Emile de Girardin's plan, "to make up for losses by selling ads and announcements" was just a clever

3. Arnold Hauser, *Historia social de la literatura y el arte*, III, Barcelona, Guadarrama, 1964.

business idea.

We prefer to classify the event as part of the process of capitalist development. With the industrial revolution in full bloom—or in the process of blooming—the marketplace had to expand and its expansion depended on the ability to make known the commodities being produced.

Newspapers were soon involved in this economic process, linking the producer and the consumer through advertising. This relegated the news to a secondary importance, which it usually remains except when the hegemony of the capitalist class is being questioned, at which time it becomes dominant.

Today, the marketplace where commodities and money are exchanged have developed to include twelve million inhabitants of a single city. Furthermore, the development of capitalism—with its mass communication media and its merchandise distribution network—has begun to integrate geographically isolated sectors, especially in dependent countries, bringing small cities and rural areas into this market system.

Thus today the dominant relations of exchange are obviously no longer those of a barter system. People who want to have their needs satisfied must know where the commodities they need are to be found. Although this sounds elementary, it is a new discovery for those who are just beginning to be incorporated into the market, either by integrating themselves into urban life or by the penetration of the market system into rural areas.

Thus advertising—although not alone—breaks the barriers of precapitalist economies and brings the message of the producer—the capitalist, owner of the enterprise—to the consumer.

The role of advertising is the product of the historical needs arising from the objective conditions in the development of capitalism. The press was the physical basis which allowed advertising to appear and organize the market in the beginning of the nineteenth century, although it was the development of the market which necessitated and facilitated both the rise of the press as well as advertising.

From then on, the market, advertising and the media developed together, with the nature of advertising and the communications media being determined by their participation in the capitalist economy. This is very important in analyzing the "contents" of the communications media and its almost inevitable advertising.

"Almost inevitable" means that, on the economic level, the media only fulfill their function in the mode of production to the extent that they facilitate advertising. In other words, the core of mass communications is advertising. Consequently, the real power of decision in mass communications is to be found in advertising, and in the advertising agencies. However, the advertising agencies only have power to the extent to which they link the enterprise with the communications media. The power of the advertising agencies over the media is thus based on their intermediary nature, although, as we will see later, it would appear that the agencies

have begun to be taken over by the enterprises, who occasionally even by-pass them to promote their commodities and services through their own public relations offices.

The above generalities are based on the most immediate observations of reality. Although there are communications media in certain capitalist countries which for very specific historical reasons are not advertising vehicles, these are exceptions and do not refute our thesis.

2. PROPAGANDA OR COMMUNICATION

So far we have discussed the role of advertising and its relation to the media and the market. Now let us consider the concept of the mass communications media.

Although the word "media" indicates an intermediary between the subject originating an action and the receiver of the action, the technological revolution "theory" or "theories" known as the "end of ideologies" fetishize the media and make them appear as the subject originating the action. In front of the viewer, it is the television (the sacrosanct, all-truthful commodity) which shows the events of the world, a world remade according to the needs of the groups which dominate the media. By making the television active, one of their goals is to hide the real author responsible for the information, the power group controlling the media, and through it, the entire ruling class. The use of an example might help to clarify our point: no one would say "a gun killed X"; rather they would say "someone killed X with a gun". However, one often hears "the radio is bad, the TV is bad". Aside from the meaning of the word "bad" for each listener, the person responsible, the author, has disappeared and has been replaced by the intermediary between the subject originating the action and its receiver. And in this twentieth century magic trick, the receiver becomes an object. In other words, the "receiver" becomes a blank slate for the propaganda of the power groups who generate, maintain and consolidate the existence of the viewer-as-object, or as a passive subject.

We have already questioned the concept of *communications* to a limited extent. Communication is supposed to imply a relationship, a give and take, but the media go only in one direction. Those who are the object of the "media" and its power group are informed, receive propaganda, and are confronted, but cannot reply. As Leonardo Acosta pointed out, the "media" transmit and diffuse, but do not communicate.⁴ We agree with this point, but there is another, more adequate concept to describe this transmission and diffusion: PROPAGANDA.

Propaganda can be explicit or implicit. If the author of a work is hidden behind the scenes, the propaganda is implicit. A program like *Father Knows Best* does not directly say to what power group it belongs, nor does it say what are the needs and interests of this power group; in the final analysis, it

4. Leonard Acosta, "Mass Media and Imperialist Ideology", 1973, published in volume 1 of this anthology.

doesn't even clarify the fact that those who produce, finance and write the show share the capitalist worldview. Furthermore, we do not expect them to tell us this because the bourgeoisie cannot conceive of the existence of classes and even more, class struggle. As the sole owner of the means of communications it imposes its worldview, but pretends that it is a dialogue. The nature of capitalist communications is vertical but pretends to be horizontal. The result is a propaganda which promotes a mode of production and consumption, a certain style of understanding of the social process, and an acceptance of canons of behavior. The communications media are thus propaganda media, since the nature of capitalist communications is to propagate the "American way of life". Therefore, from now on, we shall refer to communications media as propaganda media.

Lastly, the concepts "mass" and "collective" used by the bourgeoisie are idealistic concepts to the degree that they abstract the concrete character of the social groups functioning in the social dynamic. Concerning communications, these concepts refer to a communication between social groups. To the degree that these social groups are defined in function of the interests of the bourgeoisie, communication takes place between the representative of these groups selected by the bourgeoisie. Thus the "consumer", the "Peruvian", through the bourgeois representative will not be the proletariat or poor peasant. The radio announcer or journalist will present the opinion of the radio or newspaper as if they were the "consumer" or the "Peruvian". The radio and newspaper—simultaneously technology and merchandise—hide the class character of communication by propagandizing the dominant ideology. Therefore, we think that the appropriate concept to describe the "media" is CAPITALIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA.

We are obviously analyzing the "media" as they exist in the capitalist mode of production. However, in this mode of production, the "obvious" is what is apparent. And we are trying to break through the shell of appearances.

3. ADVERTISING AND PROPAGANDA

We shall now look at the concepts of advertising and propaganda together. The capitalist propaganda media necessarily imply what we call advertising and what we call propaganda, and although they essentially reflect different processes, they do overlap.

Advertising had its origin in the need to connect the spheres of production and consumption, making possible the acquisition of commodities. In this sense, advertising fulfills an economic function for the mode of production. Even if advertising is not exclusive to the capitalist mode of production, it is therein that it achieves its full realization, since this mode is precisely characterized by the production of goods essentially for exchange, rather than for consumption by its producer. And advertising fulfills this role of exchange by promoting a specific concrete commodity, whether the commodity be

Coca Cola or metal workers. It would be difficult to understand — or imagine — the capitalist mode of production without advertising. The magnitude of production and, at present, the rapid increase and variety of commodities would be impossible without information about them being diffused in the marketplace. This diffusion, whose role is to make commodities known, and to allow — oblige — them to be consumed, is what we call advertising.

Even if advertising makes known the existence of commodities, it is still propaganda in the sense we use the term (as we will see later). Advertising “sells” forms of economic behavior as well as social and political forms of behavior (that is, when and if they are different). The person who sees a soap commercial will not only aspire and desire the soap, but will also desire the context in which the soap is advertised; to be like the model (the image of the dominant group) at the beach or pool or at the countryside, etc., the context in which the dominant group reveals itself, or pretends to reveal itself. In sum, he or she aspires not only to have the commodity itself but also to be part of the group which appears to be the only one who consumes the commodity.

Propaganda's role is to generate the desire for social climbing, and its ultimate goal is not to promote commodity X, but to promote a way of life in which this commodity and all commodities are produced. In the program previously mentioned, *Father Knows Best*, the goal is to extrapolate the ideal family mold characteristic of an imperialist country onto the dependent countries where the dominant economic-political groups are imitations, and often excellent ones, of this ideal mold. Thus simultaneously, the imperialist center and local bourgeoisie become the ideal models for the dominated social groups in the dependent countries, reinforcing their dependency and domination. The object of the propaganda is to make the TV viewer aspire to foreign behavior without understanding that the road to become a member of the dominant class has a strong and impassable barrier. The problem is not to overcome the barrier, it is to change the individual individualistic aspirations for collective ones, the only effective way to knock down societies with barriers.

In this way, propaganda alludes to models of behavior in which commodities play an indispensable basic role — “clothes make the man” — yet they do so without alluding explicitly and directly to a specific commodity.

This conjunction, advertising-propaganda, is the essence of capitalist communication.

As some authors have pointed out, among them Mattelart,⁵ and Baran and Sweezy,⁶ capitalist

communication is no more than the union of advertising and propaganda. As an industry, it is motivated by profit and by the political necessities which facilitate the growth of profits. As Muraro has pointed out, the monstrous development of the capitalist propaganda media needs to be carefully analyzed in terms of the flow of currency to the big conglomerates in the dependent countries. However, it is not our aim here to undertake such an analysis, and we shall now try to look at advertising more concretely.

4. ADVERTISING AND DAILY LIFE

How does this advertising-propaganda function?

Here is an ad for a book:

Public Relations Agent?
Journalist?
Advertising Agent?
Communications are a Weapon!
Be Well Armed, Read
The Social Communication Media

On reading the book's table of contents we find Chapter 9 particularly interesting: “The Motivation of Assent”. The book is published by Editorial Roble, and the ad was placed in the review *Visión* on 21 October 1972. Examining first things first, we must know who is responsible for the communication, in this case, for the ad. From all appearances, it would seem to be the publisher. However, Mattelart has shown⁷ that the editorial product of Roble is the result of its close links with *Visión*, and the United States Information Agency (USIA) and its publication of technocratic books. It is unnecessary to point out the relationship of this agency with imperialism; we know it to be one of its best agents. Nor do we need to describe in detail the well-known work of *Visión*. Nonetheless, to refresh the memory, we might recall the fact that the president of its editorial board is Alberto Lleras Camargo, the ex-president of Colombia, frequent propagandizer for birth control, and a partner in many North American companies, as Mattelart has shown. Furthermore, because of his connections with the Rockefellers, he was made an administrator of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1967.

In order to clearly understand why “communications are a weapon”, we should recall first, the quote of Kennedy which began this article, in which he pointed out that the battle waged by imperialism “is a battle for the conquest of minds and spirits”, and second, that the USIA and the Rockefellers are deeply involved in the multi-faceted war industry, an industry which generates its own ideology. The chapter to which we referred, “The Motivation of Assent”, is characteristic of a kind of manipulative communications needed in this kind of battle: propaganda. Undoubtedly the function of this ad becomes clear when one sees the relations between the owners of the war machinery (the conglomerates and the Pentagon), and the owners of the machinery of ideological warfare (the Pentagon and the conglomerates). The functionality of the ad is manifest

5. Armand Mattelart, “La industria cultural no es una industria ligera: Hacia la fase superior del monopolismo cultural”, *Casa de las Americas* (Havana), 77, March-April 1973.

6. Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital*, New York, 1966.

7. Armand Mattelart, *Agresión en el espacio*, Santiago de Chile, Tercer Mundo, 1972.

in the characterization of “communications as a weapon”, in the group which is receiving the message (public relations agent, journalist, advertising agent), and in the verticle nature of the message itself, “The Motivation of Assent”.

It is thus obvious that advertising is not an *impromptu* product. It obeys an economic-political power structure, and it is there where we must begin in order to correctly situate our analysis.

But how does propaganda and advertising function as a guiding force, that is, guiding in the sense of channelling or orienting?

An example. The following headline appeared in the Peruvian newspaper *Expreso* on 18 February 1973:

TWO 13 YEAR OLDS BEAT A 17 YEAR OLD GIRL TO DEATH IN SWEDEN

Borass, Sweden (AP). Two 13 year old boys confessed today to having beaten a 17 year old girl to death yesterday, after reading about a similar crime in an American detective story.

In reality, this type of story is horrifying. However, what is really horrifying is that propaganda campaigns for the Vietnam War have made violence a normal everyday event for millions of North Americans, making the perverse and grotesque crime of imperialist aggression seem normal. This is truly horrifying. Furthermore, this daily life was created by the power groups like the Rockefellers, who actively intervened in the imperialist aggression and in the fabrication of the “herds” by means of “The Motivation of Assent”.

Now we will look at how advertising establishes the link between production and consumption, in other words, how the producers make known their commodities to the consumers by means of advertising.

Here is the women's page of the newspaper *La Prensa* of 27 June 1973 written by the journalist Lia Lavalle de Ledgard:

How many products we buy, merely because of the subliminal propaganda which enters our eyes and ears, and how many products we stop buying for the same reason.

In the magazine *Vanidades* of 1973:

The propaganda for Coca Cola since 1900 has been so ingenious that it is now a part of the public. No one thinks that a fruit juice can quench their thirst, because “Coke refreshes best.” Today all the money spent on advertising Coke is paying off.

And in *Expreso* of 22 March 1973, Germán Munoz writes:

The height of irrationality in private business was reached recently by the Brazilian representatives of

8. *Investigación en los medios de comunicación colectiva*, Lima, Escuela de Periodismo, Pontificia Universidad Católica, 1969.

9. General Anibal Meza Cuadra, “Discurso del Ministro de Transportes y Comunicaciones”, *Expreso* (Lima), separate section, 11 November 1971.

10. Humberto Espinoza et al, “El poder económico en el sector de los medios de comunicación de masas”, *Dependencia económica y tecnología: El caso peruano*, Lima, Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales, 1971.

International Flavour and Fragrances, a powerful New York pharmaceutical company.

Miles Laboratories are carrying out a “market study.”

(Obviously advertising needs a certain amount of planning in order to introduce a commodity, and in this case particularly, since the commodity, if not irrational, is at least “eccentric” in a country where millions of people die of starvation, as indicated by Germán Munoz.)

This perfume does not have the old, delicate fragrance of flowers, nor does it have the aggressivity of certain modern products which exhude an odor similar to that of marijuana. This is a perfume which smells like urine.

Now let us recall the Code of Ethics of the Peruvian Association of Advertising Agencies (APAP):

Advertising entails a double responsibility with respect to the economic system and to the lives of our people. For the public, advertising is the primary means of knowing what products and services, resulting from a system of free enterprise, they can freely choose in order to satisfy their needs and desires. [underlined by the author]

Here is how ANDA (APAP's Venezuelan counterpart) describes its function:

To protect the common interests of its member as buyers of advertising, and the essential values of advertising as an instrument or a means to increase or promote sales. [Underlined by author]

Now we will examine the “hard facts” to see if the businesses and businessmen (both in communications and elsewhere) attach as much importance to advertising.

In 1968, a morphological analysis of the largest-circulation newspapers in the country showed that the top seven were composed of at least 35% advertising, with the largest proportion being found in one newspaper which had 58.4% advertising.⁸

The television media, once more, prove the important, if not hegemonic, role of advertising. In the report by Meza Cuadra, the Minister of Transport and Communication, who presented the General Telecommunication Law in November 1971, it was stated that 37% of television programming was devoted to advertising. Out of 390 hours a week, 146 were advertising. Those hours not taken up by advertising can be broken down as follows: 8% cultural programming, 5% news, 6% sports and the remaining 44% composed of ‘soap operas’, series, videotape, films and live broadcasts.⁹

In Peru, during the first half of 1969, the relationship between the assets and the advertising budgets of the five biggest advertisers were as follows (in millions of Peruvian Soles):¹⁰

	ASSETS	BUDGET
CEPSA	45.45	20.95
Proctor and Gamble of Peru	24.01	16.99
Sears, Roebuck	156.29	12.23
J.R. Lindley & Sons	21.56	11.89
L. Barton Bottling	29.44	10.87

On the international level, these are the advertising budgets of the biggest advertisers (in millions of US\$):¹¹

Proctor and Gamble	\$265.0
General Foods	170.0
Sears, Roebuck	130.0
General Motors	129.8
Warner-Lambert	126.0

In Peru alone, in 1971, the billings of the J. Walter Thompson Agency were \$2.4 million.¹²

McCann Erickson's billings were \$40.8 million in six Latin American countries, and J. Walter Thompson, \$46.7 million in four countries alone.¹³

The billings of the four biggest U.S. agencies on the world market were (in millions of US\$):

J. Walter Thompson	\$774.0
McCann Erickson	593.9
Ted Bates & Co.	424.8
Leo Burnett Co.	422.7

Together, the top ten North American agencies made about \$4 billion.¹⁴

The advertising billings of the non-financial corporations had already reached almost \$1.8 billion in 1929, while in 1963 the sum had gone up to \$7.7 billion.¹⁵

Turning again to Mattelart's research, we learn the following about Venezuela:

An indication of the growing importance of advertising is the fact that in a five-year period the advertising transactions have increased 43% and during the same period, the income from TV advertising augmented 257%.¹⁶

Vasquez Montalban indicates that, according to the figures of the American Advertising Agencies Association, advertising in the U.S. press increased from \$645 million in 1944 to \$17.65 billion in 1966.¹⁷

Here is what a "mass communications media" like *Visión* says about advertising. In the issue of 16-30 June 1973, a long article on tourism states:

In the promotion of mass tourism, there are three elements: low prices, comfortable hotel accommodations, and the ability to make the consumer aware that the two exist...

One of the key elements of the tourist campaign initiated by Venezuela was the creation of a 8-day package deal New York-Macuto-Caracas, offered by very experienced travel agencies [maybe North American? RD], for the price of \$205.

This price was made possible thanks to a new winter fare for group travel offered by Viasa, the Venezuelan International Airlines, on the advice of the New York advertising agency which it had contracted.

"The ability to make the consumer aware that the two exist" is no more than advertising.

Here is a statement by a member of the advertising firm of Arthur, Robert and Hill of New York which graciously pocketed \$600,000 thanks to the

11. Armand Mattelart, *Agresión en el espacio*, op. cit.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*

15. Baran and Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital*, op. cit.

16. Armand Mattelart, *Agresión en el espacio*, op. cit.

17. Manuel Vasquez Montalban, *Informe sobre la información*, Madrid, Fontanella, 1971.

Venezuelan tourism campaign which "was carried out principally through the Travel and Leisure Section of the Sunday *New York Times*":

Early in 1970, the Macuto Sheraton [linked to IIT and Rockefeller's Chase Manhattan Bank] opened a new annex with 320 rooms. The Caracas Hilton [the Chicago financial groups Crown Hilton and TWA], surrounded by gardens in the heart of Caracas, is Venezuela's newest hotel, as well as the biggest, with a total of 422 rooms. But it won't be for long: a Holiday Inn with 600 rooms is already under construction in the same city [Holiday Inn = Morgan, and Lehman, Lazard, Goldman & Sachs, and through the second group, Avis, Braniff and AVCO financing].

Tourists don't arrive just through the wave of a magic wand. Winning them over is a gradual process, step by step, and each step must be very carefully planned.

A similar statement was made by Ernesto Gambetta de la Portilla, the General Manager of Lowder Advertising, in *La Prensa* on 27 May 1973:

The age of sophisticated innovations, and the Renaissance man is over; the market demands an ever-increasing capability and service, and this cannot be left up to lucky guesses.

Getting back to *Visión*, we find that advertising generates greater earnings for the businesses:

After the first year of the Avianca (Colombian Airlines) advertising campaign, tourism went up 400%, from 2,000 to 9,000 visitors. The tourist promotion also did wonders for Viasa. Before the start of the campaign, Viasa had an average of one flight a day from New York to Caracas. It presently has 13 flights daily.

5. CONGLOMERATES AND ADVERTISING AGENCIES

As obvious as it might be, we will repeat that capitalism is an international system. In 1973, there is no way that a dependent country can develop outside the grasp of international capital. Furthermore, capital tends increasingly to be international; production and services develop in a world context. IIT, a multinational business, owns no less than one hundred communications affiliates throughout the world, brazenly displayed in ads placed in all the businessman's magazines. The advertising agencies are obviously only an intermediary between the businesses and the capitalist propaganda media. But the increasing economic concentration of the multinationals and their control over smaller businesses, includes the advertising agencies also. In some cases, in order to survive, the agencies try to form international consortiums; sometimes they try to create alliances with foreign agencies; and sometimes they maintain both relationships. Undoubtedly, this new situation is conditioned by whether the conglomerates take them over directly, through stock transactions, or indirectly, through the placement of their account with an advertising agency.

Antonio Pasquali provides us with some useful information about Venezuela:

The Venezuelan advertising agencies (around 90 in 1963) had increased to 157 by March 1970. 148 are house

agencies, that is, agencies created directly by the advertiser [among them such powerful firms as Colgate, Philip Morris, Proctor and Gamble, Sidney Ross, and Sears, Roebuck — examples chosen by RD]. 14 operate domestically. From September 1958, the most important of these firms have been affiliated to the Venezuelan Federation of Advertising Agencies (FEVAR), which, since 1960, has been the national home of the International Advertising Association (IAA). In reality, only 14 agencies make up this Federation; however, they manage a substantial percentage of all the advertising budgets in the country.¹⁸

Among the 14 agencies, we find 6 of the international advertising trusts: Grant, J. Walter Thompson, McCann Erickson, Young and Rubican, Novas Criswell (Kenyon and Eckhardt) and Kittay Grey. Concerning one of these agencies, McCann Erickson, here is information from Jorge Florez:

In the U.S., it was founded through the union of two advertising men, McCann and Erickson, who handled the portfolios of Rockefeller's Standard Oil. In one of its many internal re-organizations, the oil company imposed the association on the two men, and won control of the newly-created agency. Although McCann Erickson never explicitly acknowledged this economic dependence, when it opened its offices in Buenos Aires — 35 years ago — it did so as a dependency of the oil company and, in the first years, Standard Oil paid the salaries of the personnel.¹⁹

In the case of Argentina, we see three kinds of relationships:

J. Walter Thompson, McCann Erickson, and Grant are affiliates of North American agencies. Lintas is an agency controlled by the Unilever-Lever Bros. economic group. Ricardo de Luca-Publicidad Tan is dependent on Gillette's advertising account, and its owner was made regional vice-president of the International Advertising Association.²⁰

And to certify that J. Walter Thompson is an international company, we only have to recall the headline of a news item recently published in *La Prensa* on 7 June 1973:

J. WALTER THOMPSON ESTABLISHES A NEW INTERNATIONAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Concerning Lowder Advertising, in the same newspaper:

The celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of Lowder coincided with its thrust into international advertising activity through multilateral agreements with prestigious American, European and Australian agencies, promising better service for its clients.

Thus the only possible conclusion is that *the presence of advertising is undeniable evidence of the existence of commodities and of their mode of production.*

18. Antonio Pasquali, *Comunicación y cultura de masas*, Caracas, Monte Avila, 1972.

19. Jorge Florez McGregor, *La red y la tijera*, Buenos Aires, Abece, 1972.

20. *Ibid.*

Thomas H. Guback FILM AS INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (USA, 1973)

The symposium on the International Flow of Television Programs held in May 1973 at the University of Tampere (Finland) has demonstrated the rapidly growing interest in the nature and consequence of the circulation of video materials among nations.

As the conference progressed, one point which became apparent was the extent to which the relatively new and highly conspicuous international trade in television programs has grown along lines already traced by the circulation of theatrical motion pictures over the last half century. It would seem as if the international film business had provided the prototype or model for television, and that would not be too surprising for in the United States, at any rate, many of the same companies are engaged in both fields.

Allied Artists, Avco Embassy, Columbia, Disney, MCA (Universal), MGM, National General, Paramount, Twentieth Century-Fox, United Artists, and Warner Brothers are important Hollywood companies which also deal in television programs for domestic and foreign consumption. Indeed, the member companies of the Motion Picture Association of America (the above minus Disney and National General) supplied 70 percent of the prime time programming on the three national commercial television networks during 1972—predominantly series produced directly for television, but also feature films made for theatrical distribution or especially for video.¹ The same companies (members of the Motion Picture Export Association) also are estimated to account for about 80 percent of television program exports from the United States. These amount to some 50,000 program hours annually, and might well run over 100,000 if data were available from more vigorous accounting methods.² Hollywood, then, is not just a film capital, but a telefilm capital as well.

As one might expect, the similarity between production and distribution of film and telefilm also

1. Motion Picture Association of America and Motion Picture Export Association of America, 1972: *A Review of the World of Movies* (New York) January 1973, pp. 28-29. Cited hereafter as MPAA/MPEA.

2. Tapio Varis, *International Inventory of Television Programme Structure and the Flow of TV Programmes Between Nations*. Institute of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Tampere, Finland. 1973, pp. 194-195.

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is apparent in the forms of financing, specifically in the rise of co-production in the making of television series. This method brings together capital from at least two sources, usually in different countries, to cover production expenses. While this kind of financing is relatively new to television, it is nonetheless increasing, and for a number of reasons. The cost of making splendid, showcase series can exceed the investment possibilities of one producer or television company, but the project can be realized if the financial burden is shared between two. In some cases, international financing of series can give one of the producing partners access to a market which hitherto had been relatively closed to it. This is true, for example, in the case of Anglo-American productions which for the British producer open the United States, a market traditionally difficult to crack for any foreign producer. That appears to be one of the motives behind the series on the British empire which united the British Broadcasting Corporation and Time-Life. The latter, it should be added, seemed to have its attention on the possibilities of extensions from the series into other forms of software—a new highly visual magazine influenced by television and material for video cassettes.

In 1972 there were 153 co-produced programs on BBC television, compared with 77 the previous year. The motive was not so much cultural exchange, but more the sharing of the production costs. Many were bi-laterally produced, but others involved up to thirteen different organizations.³ As Terry Hughes of the International Broadcast Institute in Great Britain has pointed out: "We will find co-production becoming far more important because it is the only way in which you can raise enormous sums of money to make not only TV programs but also to spin off into the other areas of new technology."⁴

Although co-production of telefilm series is still somewhat unusual, for theatrical motion pictures it is the dominant method in Europe and has been for at least the last decade. Official co-production in the European film industries takes place under terms set by treaties among nations, the first of which was signed in 1949 by France and Italy. In the years since, proliferating agreements have brought together many of the important film-making nations of the world. France, for instance, has treaties in force covering co-production with eighteen countries. From 1960 to 1972, she made 1,191 co-productions as against 744 films completely French.⁵

Similar figures confirming the importance of co-production could be presented for other countries in western Europe. What they do not show, however, are films made by two or more

partners not covered by bi-lateral treaties. Usually these involve American film-makers as the United States is not party to any co-production agreements, although American film subsidiaries abroad which come to have legal status as "foreign" production companies would necessarily fall under terms of treaties tying the host country to others. In actuality then, the number of pictures financed by two or more international partners is somewhat greater than just the number of co-productions. In the future, it is not totally unlikely that we will see co-ventures between even the United States and the Soviet Union, if the optimism of MPAA President Jack Valenti is a guide.⁶

Another similarity between film and telefilm which cannot be overlooked is the American hegemony throughout much of the world. A cross-section of the international flow of images would show American products dominant, while their position on video and film screens, the consumer end, is equally impressive. And where American programming is not the dominant television fare in a country, then it is often at least the bulk of imported material.

In Latin America about half of the programs are imported and most of those from the United States. As a result, a third of total programming time is filled by shows originating in this country. In some nations, Guatemala and Nicaragua in particular, half of all programming is American in origin while in Chile, Mexico, Venezuela and Peru it is about one third. The United States also provides about three-quarters of the foreign programs on television in Argentina and Colombia and about sixty percent of those in Uruguay.⁷ Although importation of series and feature films for use on television is much less in Western Europe, the same pattern is evident. Of imports, often two thirds of three-quarters are from the United States, with commercial systems relying more on such material than do non-commercial operations. Thus, aside from the socialist nations, the content of the international trade in television material is heavily weighted with products from America.

Startling as that may seem for television, it has been a long-established rule, if not tradition, in the American motion picture industry. Its position is summed up frankly and cogently by the MPAA: "The American movie is the world's most wanted commodity."⁸ With a market of more than eighty countries, the American film occupies more than fifty percent of world screen time and accounts for about half of global film trade.⁹ At every moment of the day, there is an American picture being shown someplace on earth. Upwards of 30 million people around the world see the average American film during its period of release outside the socialist

Bulletin d'Information, nos. 140-141, April-June 1973, p.2.

6. *Variety*, July 25, 1973.

7. Varis, pp. 45-61.

8. MPAA/MPEA, p. 2.

9. U.S. Department of Commerce, 1973 *U.S. Industrial Outlook*, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1973, p. 433.

countries.¹⁰ Economically, the MPAA estimates that American films annually make a favourable contribution in our balance of trade in excess of \$200 million.¹¹

Although film and television material demonstrate many parallels, we must be on guard against assuming that one is the carbon copy of the other. The trade in telefilm, at least for American companies, is likely to remain the small brother that it is and might never grow to truly rival the commerce in theatrical films. According to industry estimates, the worldwide television sales of MPAA member companies equal about a third of the total gross revenue derived from theatrical exhibition.¹² Evidence suggests, furthermore, that the world market for American television series is not expanding, and if anything is beginning to contract perhaps as much as fifteen percent in terms of dollar billings between 1970 and 1971 alone.¹³ Some competition comes from other nations now in the syndication business, while former importers gradually have come to produce greater shares of their own programming as their television operations mature, thus reducing their reliance upon the United States. Pressure to use indigenous talent in locally-made shows also contributes to reduction of imports.

Precisely how this affects American producers in actual dollar terms is hard to pin down. There is a paucity of reliable statistics about the American communications industry, and what data there are originates with the industry itself. The Federal Communications Commission does not solicit data on the nationality of filmed material presented on television nor on the magnitude and value of American telefilm exports. The kinds of economic questions posed by the Department of Commerce often are worked out by it in consultation with the MPAA. Reporting techniques are such that one cannot even discern the box office receipts of American pictures in their domestic market for the Department lacks a definition of "American film." As far as its estimates of the total motion picture box office are concerned, these are "projections based on past experience, historical trends, and judgmental factors used in conjunction with unpublished forecasts of various economic indicators," according to the Department.¹⁴

Granting the difference in market size for film and telefilm, one still must acknowledge that practices in the production and distribution of theatrical motion pictures serve as well the telefilm segment of the entertainment industry. Seen in still larger terms, furthermore, the international flow of film not only parallels but is part of the general flow of commerce around the world. Film has a place in the culture industry whose principles are fundamentally those of other manufacturing or service industries motivated by gain.

10. Jack Valenti, "The 'Foreign Service' of the Motion Picture Association of America," *The Journal of the Producers Guild of America*, 10:1, March 1968, p.25.

11. MPAA/MPEA, p. 8.

12. MPAA/MPEA, p. 28.

13. Varis, p. 194.

The motion picture has become a good to be manufactured and marketed, while the flow of them around the globe is guided by simple commercial imperatives. What is exported by one nation and imported by another—or more correctly, what is traded among businesses—is hardly based on any form of cultural policy. The kinds of consideration which guide the trade between, say, the United States and western Europe, are overwhelmingly economic in nature. This means that the films which are available at any moment on screens stem from commercial decisions rather than from consideration of aesthetic quality or more detached concerns about where a society ought to be going and how to get there. In the absence of a cultural policy, company accounts and management loyalty to stockholders become the arbiters, for philanthropy and service to the public (contrary to our popular, media-reinforced myths) are not intrinsic characteristics of the business system.

In recent years, much attention has been devoted to multinational corporations, their seemingly, sudden rise, and the kinds of consequences they have for societies around the world. Yet the multinational corporation has been the basis of the American film industry for perhaps the last half century. In this way, film has not only set the pattern for telefilm as we saw earlier, but it has provided an example of what one could expect from industry in general.

American motion picture companies not only export their products overseas, they also have subsidiaries which make, distribute, and exhibit films abroad. These chains of businesses were forged in the decades before World War Two and strengthened in the decades after, so that American film companies now have some 700 foreign offices employing 16,000 people. There is perhaps no industry in the United States which is so heavily dependent upon foreign markets as is the film industry. By the late 1960's foreign earnings represented about fifty-three percent of total film rentals. Indeed, the film industry derives a larger portion of its revenue from overseas than does any other large American industry.¹⁵

While American conglomerates often have been the corporations which have become multinational, the film companies were such before some of them were absorbed by conglomerates. It is not surprising that in the House Judiciary Committee's 1971 study of conglomerates one finds among the sample companies Gulf and Western Industries which acquired Paramount Pictures in 1966 and Desilu Productions the following year. In examining a list of impressive subsidiaries, the study pointed out that had it not been "for participation and accommodation by the banks, it would have been impossible for G&W to maintain its merger and acquisition program."¹⁶

14. Consumer Goods and Services Division, Office of Business Research and Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, letter to the author, September 18, 1973.

15. Valenti, p. 21.

16. United States House of Representatives, Commit-

3. International Secretariat of Entertainment Trade Unions, *Newsletter*, 9:1, January-February 1973, p. 5.

4. Institute of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Tampere (Finland), *Proceedings of the Symposium on the International Flow of Television Programmes*, Tampere, May 21-23, 1973, p. 62.

5. Centre National de la Cinematographie, *L'Activité Cinématographique Française en 1972*, supplement to

Another conglomerate, National General, in a reversal of the pattern, began as the owner and operator of the Twentieth Century-Fox theatre chain which was spun off from the parent corporation to comply with an antitrust judgment. From there National General spread to banking, insurance, book publishing, etc., and after receiving a court order amending an antitrust ruling, into film production and distribution at home and abroad.

The film companies are just a few of the 3,400 or so American corporations with interests in some 23,000 businesses overseas.¹⁷ The value of their gross output makes American enterprises abroad the third largest economy (of sorts) in the world, behind only the United States itself and the Soviet Union.¹⁸ Seventeen of the world's twenty largest multinationals (ranked by sales) are American. These seventeen had combined sales in 1970 greater than the GNP of France, the United Kingdom, or the People's Republic of China. In fact their sales make them the fifth largest economic power in the world.¹⁹ As such they have been shown to affect the international money market and rates of exchange among currencies.

Western Europe, particularly the European Economic Community, constitutes the largest foreign market for American motion pictures. It is also the area in which American film companies have concentrated their overseas production capacity, especially in Great Britain, Italy and France. Not surprisingly, this is the region in which American business in general has made substantial investments. Their magnitude demonstrates the strength of America's commercial movement abroad.

According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the book value of American private investment abroad in 1950 was \$19.0 billion; a preliminary figure for 1971 put the worth at over \$130.0 billion, a more than six-fold increase in only twenty years. In the same way, the value of American direct private foreign investment (branches and subsidiaries of American firms) was \$11.8 billion in 1950, but about \$86.0 billion in 1971.

As to geographical areas, Europe (excluding the eastern bloc) attracts an important and growing share of American investment, about a third of the total. The worth of our direct private investment there was estimated by the Department of Commerce to be more than fifteen times greater in 1971 than it was in 1950. The six original members of the Common Market accounted for the greatest increase. In 1950 direct investment there was valued at \$637 million, but by 1971 it was estimated to be worth \$13.6 billion, a more than twenty-fold growth

tee on the Judiciary, Report by the Staff of the Antitrust Subcommittee (Subcommittee No. 5), *Investigation of Conglomerate Corporations*, June 1, 1971, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1971, p. 187.

17. "U.S. Multinationals—the Dimming of America," a report prepared for the AFL-CIO Maritime Trades Department Executive Board Meeting, February 15-16, 1973, as reprinted in United States Senate, Committee on Finance, Subcommittee on International Trade, Hearings, *Multinational Corporations*, February and March 1973, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1973, p. 448.

(and larger than our investment the same year in the nineteen republics of Latin America). By contrast, the value of American direct private investment in the rest of Europe, including the United Kingdom, increased less than thirteen times, from \$1.1 billion in 1950 to about \$14.0 billion in 1971.

To look at this another way, one can consider the present composition of the European Economic Community. In 1971, the book value of American direct investment in the Original Six plus the soon-to-be-members — Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom — was about \$23.0 billion, or about twice as much as the 1950 value of American direct investment in the world.²⁰ The United Kingdom's entry, moreover, is the realization of American hopes and political manipulation for it gives the many U.S. firms in Britain easy access to the important continental market constituted by the other members. As revealed by McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Kennedy and Johnson: "If we had a single agreed tactical hope it was that Britain would secure admission to the Community. Nonetheless we had just enough wit to keep from shouting this hope aloud...."²¹

The international expansion of American business has been actively encouraged and aided by the government. The Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918 was one of the earliest efforts to stimulate exporting by small and medium size firms at a time when few companies, including the largest, were concerned much with foreign markets. Agitation for it began around the turn of the century when copper interests lobbied Congress. The Act permitted domestic competitors to cooperate in trade by forming export associations which might otherwise have been held illegal under the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts. In effect, this exemption allowed American companies to combine and to fix prices and allocate customers in foreign markets.

Fifty years of experience with this legislation has shown, according to one government study, that the major beneficiaries rarely have been firms that needed associations to cope more effectively with the strength of foreign competitors. Nor did the power of foreign cartels seem to be a reason prompting formation of associations. "More often than not," the Federal Trade Commission has observed companies "exercising the right [to form export associations] were least in need of it, being capable of supporting export programs on their own accounts and, in fact, typically doing so."²² Furthermore, the study cited a few products — sulphur, potash, carbon black, and films — and assumed that their export prices had been effectively influenced by such

18. Leo Model, "The Politics of Private Foreign Investment," *Foreign Affairs*, 45:4, July 1967, p. 641.

19. "U.S. Multinationals...." p. 475.

20. U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business*, 49:10, October 1969, p. 24; 52:10, October 1972, p. 21; 52:11, November 1972, p. 28.

21. McGeorge Bundy, "Europe Still Matters," *European Community*, No. 163, February-March 1973, p. 17.

22. Federal Trade Commission, *Economic Report [on] Webb-Pomerene Associations: A 50-Year Review*, Washington, Government Printing Office [1967], p. 59.

associations. (As if to confirm this, industry sources claim that despite civil war in Nigeria and political upheaval in Ghana, American film earnings in west Africa in 1967 — when companies were trading through the Motion Picture Export Association — were triple those of prior years when companies individually distributed pictures.²³)

The survey pointed out that in 1962, the only year for which data were presented, export associations founded under Webb-Pomerene legislation handled twelve product lines. In three — sulphur, carbon black, and motion pictures — these associations accounted for more than half the total value of exports of such products. Moreover, the FTC revealed that for America's theatrical and television film exports, over \$290 million worth (an estimated 80 percent of total film exports) was accounted for by associations founded under the Webb-Pomerene Act. The position of film was outstanding and unique because the other eleven products combined had less than \$208 million in assisted exports. To look at this another way, nearly 60 percent of all Webb-assisted exports were reported by film companies belonging to four associations. One of these, the Motion Picture Export Association, alone reported \$270 million in assisted exports — in other words, the bulk of film exports and more than the other eleven product lines put together.²⁴ Thus the present chief beneficiary of the Webb-Pomerene Act is the film industry, specifically the members of the MPEA.

Perhaps it was for this reason the FTC study observed that "firms currently obtaining the greatest assistance from Webb associations are, because of their size, also most capable of supporting independent export programs." It is also obvious that the cooperative activity by Webb association members — usually large firms operating in domestically concentrated markets — is more likely to have adverse effects on competition in the domestic market than would cooperative activity by fringe producers in concentrated markets or by producers in unconcentrated markets.²⁵

But encouragement of export trade was not just a feature of the early years of this century, nor have communication products themselves been overlooked. It is hardly a secret that during World War Two the State Department already was making plans for the post-war international spread of our print and film media, and of Tin Pan Alley music as well. The Informational Media Guaranty Program, established in 1948 as part of the Economic Cooperation Administration, permitted the converting of certain foreign currencies into dollars at attractive rates, providing the exported information materials earning the money reflected

23. "Higher Income From Abroad," *The Journal of the Producers Guild of America*, 10:1, March 1968, p. 30.

24. Federal Trade Commission, pp. 41, 53.

25. Federal Trade Commission, p. 47.

26. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, *U.S. Information Media Guaranty Program*, March and April 1967, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1967, p. 76.

27. Department of the Treasury, *DISC, A Handbook for Exporters*, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1972, p. [i].

the best elements of American life.

This was a decided advantage to American media, particularly film companies, for it allowed them to distribute products in difficult currency areas with complete assurance that a portion of the resulting revenue would become available to them in dollars. American media products therefore went forth into the world with the rank of ambassador. Film companies alone received almost \$16 million between the end of 1948 and mid-1966. Print media also received considerable payments (over \$2 million each to Reader's Digest and Time, Inc., for instance), prompting Senator Allen Ellender to complain that the IMG "is a Fund primarily to benefit a chosen few of our large publishing houses located in New York City."²⁶

More recent aid to overseas expansion of American business has taken other forms. The Revenue Act of 1971 included provisions permitting the establishment by an American business of a Domestic International Sales Corporation as a subsidiary to handle foreign sales. The DISC purchases from the parent and sells abroad. If the DISC derives at least ninety-five percent of its revenue from overseas sale, lease, or rental transactions, and other qualifications concerning incorporation are met, it can defer tax on up to half of its export income. These tax-deferred retained earnings can be used in export development activities or can be loaned to domestic producers of export products. However they become taxable if they are distributed to stockholders. In essence, the program's effect is to defer taxation in fifty percent of export earnings, a feature which led the European Commission late in 1972 to declare that this is equivalent to a tax exemption on exports and a violation of GATT.

There is no list available of companies conforming to criteria of the DISC program because the Treasury Department, with which appropriate documents must be filed, considers such information to be confidential. However the DISC scheme was designed, according to Treasury Secretary John Connally, "especially to encourage smaller businesses, which may have had little or no export experience, to export"—a rationale resembling that of the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act.²⁷

Further aid to the international expansion of American business has been provided by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, authorized in 1969 but formally organized in January 1971. OPIC is a wholly-owned government corporation with majority private sector representation on its board of directors, although it is an agency of the United States under policy guidance from the Secretary of State. Its objective is the more effective investment of American private capital and know-how in friendly developing countries and areas. It seeks to accomplish this by insuring American companies against loss due to certain political risks of currency inconvertibility, expropriation, war, revolution, and insurrection. It also provides direct dollar and foreign currency

loans for financially sound new investments or expansions of existing projects.

The Corporation has already placed part of its expropriation insurance liability with private underwriters. During Fiscal 1972, OPIC reinsured \$289 million of its then current coverage with Lloyd's of London and others, including the USSR's Black Sea and Baltic Insurance Company.²⁸ Political risk insurance has covered some two-thirds of American private investment (excluding petroleum) in eligible developing countries, or about \$500 million annually. At the end of Fiscal 1972, OPIC's maximum potential liability was \$2.3 billion for expropriation, based upon its more than 700 insured clients in 80 countries. During that year it paid Anaconda almost \$12 million in full compensation for the expropriation of its investment in a Chilean mine. It also received, but rejected, a claim from IT&T for \$92 million for its holdings in the Chile Telephone Company. As a lender, OPIC had more than \$200 million outstanding by mid-1972. Considering all its programs, OPIC has helped encourage more than \$4 billion of direct American investment abroad.²⁹

These are just a few of the ways in which government directly aids international business. Of course, there are less dramatic and more routine methods on the embassy level when foreign service officials assist American companies abroad in overcoming a variety of local political and trade obstacles. In the case of film, it is clearly understood they are "ambassadors of goodwill" and of great asset to our foreign propaganda program. For the industry however, the imperatives are commercial and it maintains a tenacious hold on its markets.

Advantageous trade terms for American films often have been the product of pressure exerted by companies, and not only on their foreign counterparts. As Jack Valenti, MPAA/MPEA president (and former White House aide to Lyndon Johnson) has observed: "To my knowledge, the motion picture is the only U.S. enterprise that negotiates on its own with foreign governments."³⁰ It is not surprising that the MPEA is often called 'the little State Department' for its duties and methods often parallel that government agency. The film association has offices or representatives in sixteen foreign cities while boards composed of representatives from member companies exist in thirty-eight. When American pictures keep half a country's theatres open and generate an important share of entertainment tax revenue, the threat of a market boycott through withholding of films can bring foreign adversaries to terms. It is hard to comprehend quite all the consequences of this, but according to Valenti, foreign governments earn more income from the showing of American films

28. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, *Annual Report Fiscal 1972*, n.p., n.d., p. 4.

29. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, *An Introduction to OPIC*, July 1971, p. 2.

30. Valenti, p. 22.

31. Valenti, p. 24.

32. Centre National de la Cinématographie, p. 12.

(through import, admission, and income taxes) than do the producers of those films.³¹

One factor contributing to the world-wide strength of American films is the virtual monopoly of international distribution achieved by American companies. There is no European company, for example, with the stature of, say Paramount or Twentieth Century-Fox. In effect, this locus of power means that a handful of distributors decide, by and large, which pictures circulate internationally among major film-making nations. As these companies also are important in financing production through distribution guarantees, they exert considerable influence on the kinds of pictures made for global audiences.

Even within markets the role of American distributors is substantial. During 1972 in France, a major continental market, of the 364.5 million francs (close to \$75 million) paid by exhibitors to distributors, almost 42 percent went to seven American companies. The remainder was divided among the 115 French distributors.³² This is not exceptional for data from other European countries demonstrate substantially the same situation. In 1970, seven American distributors in Great Britain were estimated to have received 84 percent (about \$44 million) of all film rentals.³³

Another important feature of the European cinema is the extensive American financing of European films. These are not simply American films shot on location to deplete accumulations of blocked and unexportable earnings, as was the case in the years after World War Two. Rather, these pictures meet all criteria for being granted British, French, Italian, or another nationality and thereby qualify to receive subsidy payments from various national aid schemes. The extent of American participation is such that in the decade up to 1972, two of every three 'British' features exhibited on the country's two main circuits were partially or entirely financed by American subsidiaries. In fact, American companies were financially involved in almost five times more British films than was the British government's chosen instrument, the National Film Finance Corporation.³⁴ In this respect, the British film industry is little more than an appendage of Hollywood and American companies. It is an example of what has been happening more recently in other industries: American companies export their production plants to take advantage of lower paid foreign labor and often tax incentives from foreign governments. "Runaway production" — a term coined a quarter of a century ago in the film industry — now is applicable to automotive, electronics and a host of other manufacturing fields. It has led some to wonder whether America of the future will not be simply a service economy, or as described in a report prepared for the AFL-CIO Maritime Trades Department — "a nation of

33. Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians, *Report of the A. C. T. T. Nationalisation Forum*, May 6, 1973, p. 15.

34. National Film Finance Corporation, *Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, for the Year Ended 31st March 1972*, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office [1972], p. 4.

hamburger stands" with "citizens busily buying and selling cheeseburgers and root beer floats."

In European film industries, the extent of American investment is usually obscure because data from these countries do not distinguish adequately between locally-financed and American financed pictures. Moreover, foreign subsidiaries of Hollywood companies usually acquire the nationalities of their host countries, making it difficult to identify the precise nationality of the source of money. Further, American subsidiaries not only make pictures abroad under their own names but they can supply finance to foreign producers as well, or guarantee loans made by foreign banks. It is evident that companies themselves are not especially helpful to a researcher for they are reluctant to release details of business practices for public scrutiny. As a result, American investment is masked in dozens of nominally "national" and co-produced films. One can scan the list published annually by the Centre National de la Cinématographie (or Italy's Unitalia or Spain's Uniespana) of completely national and co-produced pictures and not find a single reference to *American investment*. Nor do these nations have official co-production treaties with the United States. Yet behind the names of producers and their addresses in Paris, Rome, or Madrid often stand American subsidiaries or American production loans.

One recent case is *Ultimo Tango a Parigi*, an Italian-French picture, in the ratio 60:40 as far as financing is concerned, co-produced under terms of the treaty between those two nations. While the film fulfills the *legal* definition of an Italian-French co-production, it is in reality an Italian-American co-venture, and not simply because the male lead is Marlon Brando or a third or so of the dialogue is in English. Closer inspection of the French producer reveals it to be Productions Artistes Associés, a subsidiary of United Artists. According to the production contract of January 10, 1972, the 'French' producer contributed 40 percent of the estimated budget of 714,000,000 lire (about \$1.2 million) with United Artists receiving world distribution rights. The box office was to be divided 60:40 except for Italian and French speaking areas where all receipts were to be paid to the Italian or French producer, respectively. Other terms specified that the film was to be made under the Italian-French film agreement and that the principal role was to be given to Brando who was to be remunerated for his services by the Italian producer, P.E.A., to which Bernardo Bertolucci had transferred his scenario rights. The contract also stipulated that the production subsidies in Italy and France were to be paid respectively to the Italian and French producer.

35. Centre National de la Cinématographie, *Bulletin d'Information*, No. 139, February 1973, pp. 29-30.

36. Robert W. Gilbert, "Foreign Film Subsidies as an Aspect of Financing," *The Journal of the Producers Guild of America*, 10:3, September 1968, pp. 6, 8.

37. Eitel Monaco, president of Associazione Nazionale Industrie Cinematografiche ed Affini, quoted in Centre National de la Cinématographie, *Bulletin d'Information*,

The Last Tango in Paris is not an isolated case. At least a quarter, maybe more, of the 1972 Italian-French co-productions involved an American subsidiary as producer.³⁵ In virtually all cases its contribution to the estimated budget was only 20 percent, the legal minimum, but enough to secure 'French' nationality for the film and thereby access to the production subsidy in France, about 13 percent of the picture's domestic box office receipts.

There can be no denying that the subsidies to production in Great Britain, Italy, and France have been important factors in attracting American investment to those film industries, although the quantity of payments cannot be determined with any precision. It has been estimated, however, that for every dollar-equivalent of subsidy paid in France to American subsidiaries, they receive two in Italy and probably four in the United Kingdom. In some instances, through complex international co-production arrangements, American producers have been able to accrue subsidies from three countries for one film, covering as much as 80 percent of its production cost. It is not surprising then that through the 1960s, American financed films abroad rose from about 35 percent to 60 percent of the total output of American producers, although the early 1970s have seen a slight decrease in such activity overseas. Towards the end of the 1960s, American motion picture interests were investing an estimated \$100 million per year in films made outside the United States.³⁶ That figure is quite reasonable because the Italian industry released data revealing that in the decade to 1967, American companies spent a yearly average of \$35 million to acquire and to finance Italian features and to make their own films in Italy.³⁷

The position of American subsidiaries in that country is such that they contribute about half the annual budget of ANICA, the Italian motion picture trade association.³⁸ One of the recent achievements of ANICA was a campaign for tax reform which became effective in 1973. According to the association's managing director, Carmine Cianfarani, this legislative victory represented the equivalent of \$15 million in additional remittances to home offices by American companies in Italy.³⁹ However, through voting power in ANICA, American members can block certain moves which could make Italian companies more competitive in their own home market. In 1972, for example, American distributors there released twenty-four Italian films which were among the biggest box office attractions in the country. For reasons such as these, some Italians consider their film industry has been 'colonized' by American interests.

The American involvement in the financing and distributing of European films — quite apart from the large quantity of authentic made-in-USA

No. 108, December 1967, p. 233.

38. *Variety*, March 7, 1973. Additional details concerning American membership in European motion picture trade organizations is available in Thomas H. Guback, *The International Film Industry*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1969.

39. *Variety*, March 28, 1973.

films on European screens — had wide political, social and economic consequences which I have examined at length elsewhere.⁴⁰ Suffice it to say that preference is given to those kinds of pictures whose international marketing possibilities seem most satisfactory. Consequently, films are made for world markets rather than local ones, and this results in the closing of channels to the expression of indigenous cultural characteristics and the submerging of regionalisms in the mix demanded by international commerce. Further, the dependence of European film economies on American corporations means that Europeans have lost effective control of their industries, and thus of their own artistic destinies.

Those who are concerned only with the shadows on the screen and not their source are judging ends and disregarding means, for *how* something is done inevitably affects *what* is done. Europeans cannot lose control of the economic end of film-making and expect to retain autonomy in the cultural or social spheres. As a publication of the European Community Information Service has observed, the creation of Europe's continental market "has quickened the growth of American style corporate society on the old continent," though the transition is hardly completed.⁴¹ There is no question that the British film industry, and to a slightly lesser extent the Italian and French, have lost their autonomy by becoming tied to, and relying upon, American finance and distribution.

Some have hoped the framework of the Common Market would provide the mechanism and model for increasing relations and trade among film industries of member states, eventually leading to commercial and economic integration. However, it is unrealistic to believe that a *European* film industry can be constructed on *American* investment. What will be built is a large European market without internal trade restrictions, but the principal beneficiary will be American subsidiaries who will produce in the market and employ local talent, but only as long as they consider it profitable. Lacking any intrinsic loyalty to their host nations, these subsidiaries will manage investment and production according to their own demands and not the economic, cultural, or artistic needs of foreign countries. Some observers believe that as multinationals they will not even exhibit any loyalty to the United States. As the chairman of the American-owned Ronson's British subsidiary has been quoted as affirming: the executive "must set aside any nationalistic attitudes and appreciate that in the last resort his loyalty must be to the shareholders of the parent company and he must

40. "American Interests in the British Film Industry," *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Business*, 7:2, Summer 1967, pp. 7-21. "Les Investissements Américains dans le Cinéma Européen," *Cinéthique*, January-February 1970, pp. 33-40. "Film and Cultural Pluralism," *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, 5:2, April 1971, pp. 35-51.

41. Paul Kemezis, "The Consumer and the Common Market," *European Community*, No. 159, October 1972, p. 19.

42. "U.S. Multinationals..." p. 452.

protect their interests even if it might appear that it is not perhaps in the national interest" of the host country.⁴²

Whereas a decade or two ago, American film companies might have weighed their policies in terms of motion picture economy, it is evident today that as parts of 'leisure time' divisions of conglomerate corporations which themselves are multinational, fields far removed from the cinema can effect film policy. Universal marketing strategy, world-wide monetary patterns, speculation in Euro-dollars, corporate investment in district lands, or global industrial warfare—and how they are assessed by American multinationals—can be reasons influencing the ways in which corporations allocate resources by shifting men, material, and capital to meet their own needs. The major film industries in Europe cannot escape the shock waves from this because they have lost their sovereignty to huge international companies over which no country or any citizens can exercise power.

Acceptance of American investment has not solved, as some seem to think, the economic difficulties of European film industries. It has only postponed the day of reckoning, for these problems are endemic to a private market economy, regardless of the extent of state aids and subventions, whose presence only serve to confirm the inadequacies. There is continuous talk of establishing an American production subsidy or instituting tax incentives to lure more film-making to Hollywood. The American industry implies that it is not subsidized - at least in the United States. Yet its record over the last quarter century clearly indicates that it has availed itself of subsidies in foreign countries.

It is indeed a curious progression of events. The deluge of American films in Europe, most especially in the post-war period, restricted the market for those made locally by industries struggling to recover from the war. In an effort to help, governments created subsidy schemes to rejuvenate production whereas mandatory screen quotas assured that a portion of theatre time would be available for these films. But the chief beneficiaries, it seems, have been American subsidiaries abroad which garner important shares of production subsidies while screen quotas assure their films a reserved place in foreign theatres.

It is not to be seen as curious, however, that few voices in European film industries have attacked this intervention, for the short run American investment has meant a new source of production capital, utilization of studios, and access to the American market for selected films (even if little of the resulting revenue finds its way back to Europe). Even some left-wing entertainment trade unions in Europe have uttered only muffled, symbolic cries of protest while quietly appreciating more stable conditions, although the reduction of American finance in Britain in 1970 produced an unemployment crisis of sorts and served to spotlight anew the array of dangers. But the long run will demonstrate how this false prosperity, if it can be called prosperity, has no foundation beyond the immediate policies of a dozen or so American film

companies, some of which are themselves subject to conglomerate strategies.

What one British producer has said about the United Kingdom could apply equally to other nations: "We have a thriving film production industry in this country which is virtually owned, lock, stock and barrel, by Hollywood."⁴³ And it must be remembered, of course, that when American producers went abroad, they did not consider it 'runaway production,' but just good business. When they leave England, or some other country, it will be for the same reason.

Samuel Perez Barreto PLAZA SÉSAMO IN PERU (Peru, 1973)

1. IMPERIALIST PENETRATION AND EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION

Little by little, after many exhausting attempts by the world's more conscious and advanced educators, the concept and the use of television has begun to change throughout the world. One has only to read the recent UNESCO report *Learning to Be* prepared by a Commission headed by Edgar Faure to realize that throughout the world education has become more than just a profound preoccupation on the part of governments: it has also become one of the most disruptive and transforming of all community activities. Literacy campaigns and projects are being conducted all over the world; teaching methods and systems are being radically restructured; and symposiums, seminars, conferences and lectures are being held on adult education, career training, leisure time, the changing role of women, co-education, and education by television. Thus the concept "education" has unanimously been made synonymous with that of human development. Man is being constantly educated, through everything he does, feels and thinks, from his birth until his death. The countries most advanced in the area of education reforms — and Peru is currently among those most frequently cited — attribute less importance to traditional schooling than to "de-schooling" models, and to the extension of education in the interests and rights of the community. This being a world-wide movement with unlimited possibilities, it was only a question of time before the economic and political power groups in the capitalist countries would notice it and become deeply involved in its planning and consequences. From the beginning, the technicians and specialists who serve those in power realized the great danger a world-wide mass education movement presented to their masters. If, through a complete reformulation of the concept and methods of education, man gained access, as could be foreseen, to a critical consciousness, his rightful dignity and ultimately his most authentic and definitive liberation, the structures of society would undergo essential changes. This would bring about the collapse of the system of manipulation which is intended to numb the masses, promote irrational consumption, and maintain the Third World's dependency on the exploitation of their raw materials and markets. In other words, the fabulous intrigue of domination and dependency which was at the base of the capitalist countries'

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43. *Variety*, May 4, 1966.

almost unrestrained power and almost limitless economy, would abruptly end. Quick and clever action was thus needed.

The Ford Foundation has been expanding the markets of North American imperialism since the end of World War II, sending "scientists" to underdeveloped countries to evaluate physical, social and political conditions, under the guise of lending technical and economic "aid" for food, health and housing programs. In 1951 it expanded its interests to include the field of education. Two "charitable" organizations were founded: one for the progress of education in general, the other specifically for the development of adult education; both programs were to use television. The battle not to lose the war had begun in the very heart of the imperialist camp.

One must be profoundly naive to believe, after the lessons of history, in the good intentions of the Ford Foundation or any other foundation in the world supported by capitalist funds. A Columbia University study shows in great detail that the objective of the first Ford "charitable" organization was to be primarily "research on the application and effects of educational television," and that the role of the second was to be "a tactical arm concerned with the social and political implementation of Ford's policies."¹ In 1961, going further, the Ford Foundation launched the ETRC (Educational Television and Radio Center) and in 1967, became the principal source of funds, along with the Carnegie Corporation, the U.S. Office of Education and other U.S. governmental agencies, for the "Fourth Network": "public television", which was to produce and transmit non-commercial educational programs.

The intentions and tactics of the imperialist strategy, despite the subtlety and refinement used to disguise it, were obvious to revolutionary educators and specialists in the social communication sciences. Imperialism had begun to realize the impossibility of penetrating the depths of this world-wide process of reform in mass education through commercial-type television programs. Although these were still in use in many parts of the Third World, they were threatened to disappear, sooner or later, because their aims had been discovered. Although the dominant countries tried to maintain the commercial television programs as long as possible, it became necessary, in order to lessen and, if possible, hold back the process of the new world-wide education, to introduce "educational programs." These programs, to all appearances non-commercial, were able to avoid suspicion and to act freely from within upon the mentality of children and young people.

An obvious example is *Sesame Street*, a

1. For more information, see The Network Project, *The Fourth Network*, N.Y., The Network Project, 1974. pp. 17-27.

2. Armand Mattelart, *Agresión en el espacio*, Santiago de Chile, Tercer Mundo, 1972.

3. *El Tiempo* (Bogota), 27 September 1972, and *El Nacional* (Mexico, D.F.), 11 January 1973.

4. J. Munoz, "Plaza Sésamo", in *Ovaciones- Informaciones* (Mexico, D.F.), 11 January 1973.

television program designed for pre-school aged children, behind which can be found the Ford Foundation and the Fourth Network. Of course, *Sesame Street* is not the only program which the North American financial corporations and governmental institutions have produced as part of the new strategy of imperialist penetration of education. In the official catalogues can be found *The Electric Company*, *Hodgepodge Lodge*, and *Misterogers Neighborhood*, among others; but we are especially interested in *Sesame Street*, since its Spanish version, *Plaza Sésamo* has had a tremendous success in Latin America, and has tried every possible way to penetrate Peruvian television.

Before beginning our study of *Sesame Street*, and its counterpart *Plaza Sésamo*, let us cite Armand Mattelart's warning on the Ford Foundation's expansionist policies:

Every step taken by the Ford Foundation in communications within the U.S. reverberates in Third World communications. It is not a coincidence that the Foundation had prepared an experimental earth relay station for the "Indio" satellite financed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in order to study the use of educational TV. In 1971, they established in Columbia a centre for research and operational studies on mass communications. This followed the establishment, in 1970, of closed-circuit television in the universities of Sao Paulo and Buenos Aires. For the first time, imperialism, which literally took over other areas of social science, like the sociology of population, to back up its population control policies, realized that in the area of communications in Latin America, it had to make up for lost time.²

2. PLAZA SESAMO: THE SPANISH-LANGUAGE VERSION OF SESAME STREET

It has been reported in several publications that *Sesame Street* grew out of a 1968 conversation between North American educator Joan Ganz Cooney and the vice-president of the Carnegie Corporation. The Carnegie executive suggested the possibility of using television for children's educational programs and Mrs. Ganz Cooney conceived the idea for what would become *Sesame Street*.³ For anyone familiar with the way in which the North American financial corporations and foundations usually program their ideas and plans, it is difficult to believe that in the case of *Sesame Street* everything began so innocently and naively. Be it as it may, in 1969, with the initial budget of \$8 million brought together by the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity, the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, and several other businesses and educational agencies, both public and private,⁴ the Children's Television Workshop was founded and the work of researching and producing the series was begun. Success was guaranteed from the start. Given the Ford Foundation's experience in the field of "educational" TV and the interests of the Ford and Carnegie Foundations and the Fourth Network, *Sesame Street* was sure to combine every virtue, delight the North American junior audience, and impress most of its audience as being a

series with authentic and profound educational content. And so it was. Today *Sesame Street* is viewed by 80% of U.S. children between the ages of three and six.⁵ Moreover, the program is shown in 48 other countries, besides the Latin American area⁶ and, as many people maintain, "it is a 100% educational series."⁷

But, as we know perfectly well, the Latin American nations are of prime importance in capitalism's plan for penetration and domination, and therefore it wasn't long before the magnificent *Sesame Street* experience was applied to the Spanish-speaking countries of the American continent. The task was accomplished with great intelligence. Mexico City was chosen as the central headquarters for Latin America and the *Taller de TV Infantil*, an affiliate of the Children's Television Workshop, was established to produce *Plaza Sésamo*.

Of course, they insisted that the *Taller de TV Infantil de Mexico* was an independent producer and that *Plaza Sésamo* was "an original experimental TV series in Spanish."⁸ But this was only an attempt to make *Plaza Sésamo* more palatable to Latin Americans.

The executive producer of the *Taller de TV Infantil* is John Page, a North American who, after having worked for the United Nations for five years, came to Mexico in 1955 to work in commercial advertising. More recently he was the sales manager of *Tele-Revistas*. The production director of the *Taller*, Miguel Somera, has worked in movies, radio and TV for various affiliates of North American advertising firms such as Noble Advertising; Foote, Cone & Belding of Mexico; McCann Erikson of Mexico; Tompkins, Ray, Martel; and Kenyon & Eckhart. The graphic designer, Augustin Ytuarte Salazar, has worked as the assistant artistic director for many North American TV productions. He studied at Chouinard Art Institute and Woodbury College in the U.S. But most importantly, the main consultants for the *Taller de TV Infantil* are board members of the Children's Television Workshop: the president, Joan Ganz Cooney; the executive producer, David D. Connell; the international production director, Norton Wright; and an assistant producer, Lutrell Horne.⁹ These relations are widely acknowledged by the staff of the *Taller*. Juan Manuel Torres, head writer of the Mexican organization, admits:

Plaza Sésamo is the Latin American counterpart of a project for teaching by TV which did indeed originate in the U.S. This is why we work in close bilateral collaboration with the producers of *Sesame Street*.¹⁰

As far as the program itself is concerned, despite the insistence that it has "clearly Latin American characteristics", that "its characters are taken from the reality of our countries", and that "the vocabu-

5. *Teatro* (Mexico, D.F.), 20 November 1972.

6. *La Prensa* (Mexico, D.F.), 20 November 1972.

7. *El Heraldo* (Mexico, D.F.), 6 January 1973.

8. *Noticias: Documentos de información y propaganda del Taller de TV Infantil de Mexico*, 1972 (?) [Hereinafter "Noticias"]

9. *Ibid.*

lary as well as the diction of the series are particular to Latin America",¹¹ the producers themselves cannot deny (and they feel obliged to point it out in the documents published in *Taller* newsletter) that "filmed and videotaped material, including scenes with puppet characters, live scenes and animated drawings will be taken from the archives of *Sesame Street*."¹² This material, according to Norton Wright, the international production director of the Children's Television Workshop, "is adaptable to the specific cultural needs and tastes of societies throughout the world."¹³

The more advanced theories of teaching, and child education in particular, do not believe, however, in the adaption of supposedly universal models to specific cultural needs. Values are acquired not through abstract models adapted to the concrete situations particular to a given culture, but rather through the profound comprehension of the typical concrete situations of each culture, exposed, analysed and lived through educational experiences and methods. Since we will examine this educational concept in greater depth later on, here we will only point out the origin and ownership of the educational material.

John Page himself, the executive producer of *Plaza Sésamo*, has publicly declared that only 40% of the series will be taped in the studios of *Telesistema Mexicano*; "20% [he claimed] will consist of animated drawings and live filmed sequences produced in Latin America, and 40% will be material adapted from the international archives of the Children's Television Workshop."¹⁴

The "adaption" referred to by John Page, as proved by an evaluation first of the "pilot" program and then of episode number 24 of the series, is a simple dubbing of 40% of the *Sesame Street* material from English into Spanish. 20% of the production filmed in Latin America is an impression of Latin American reality as seen and expressed through a North American prism; and the remaining 40%, produced in the *Telesistema* studios, is a translation or derivation of the *Sesame Street* materials. This was confirmed by Professor Victoria Sáenz de Waite of the School of Education of the Universidad de Costa Rica, and consultant to the *Taller de TV Infantil*: "We are following the format prepared in the United States for *Sesame Street*."¹⁵ And it couldn't be otherwise, since the *Taller* in Mexico is an exact replica of the Children's Television Workshop in the United States: the executive producer of *Plaza Sésamo* is North American in his training and origin; the production director worked extensively for U.S. companies; the graphic designer studied in a North American art institute; Dr Rogelio Diaz Guerrero and his assistant, Dr Raul Bianchi, members of the *Taller*, received their training at the Children's

10. Juan Manuel Torres, *El Nacional* (Mexico, D.F.), 10 January 1973.

11. *Noticias*.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Expansión* (Mexico, D.F.), 12 July 1972.

Television Workshop, in the methods and techniques applied there;¹⁶ the four major sponsors of the *Taller* are the founders and directors of the Children's Television Workshop; the financial backers of the series are big U.S. foundations and enterprises like the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity, etc.; and the program is sponsored by another North American company: the Xerox Corporation.

The comments in the press clearly point out this fact. "An educational series, 'made in USA', copied in Mexico,"¹⁷ "Each program is based on the idea of *Sesame Street*"¹⁸ "The film and videotaped material from the *Sesame Street* archives was easy to dub into Spanish,"¹⁹ "Besides the live segments and the films of animated drawings, the program uses videotapes from the North American series *Sesame Street*,"²⁰ "They have used techniques, puppets and films of animated drawings which were created for *Sesame Street*, the English-language version of this series,"²¹ "*Plaza Sésamo* is a Mexicanised version of *Sesame Street*. A disappointing lack of originality,"²² "*Plaza Sésamo* is a TV program created in the U.S., with the title *Sesame Street*, but with a Spanish-language version produced in Mexico."

So, we can ask, where is the independence of the *Taller de TV Infantil de Mexico* and the Latin American identity in *Plaza Sésamo*?

3. THE CARACAS SEMINARS

The principal guarantee given by the executives of the *Taller de TV Infantil de Mexico* to the Latin American countries so that these countries would approve the showing of *Plaza Sésamo*, was its sanction by an "Advisory Board" made up of education experts from several Latin American countries, who have already held two seminars in Caracas, Venezuela. But the advice given by this group of educators, like so many aspects of our study, must be examined critically, not because of any doubts about the integrity of the participants—their intentions are above suspicion—but because of the little attention the directors of the *Taller* have paid to their recommendations.

Early in 1971, the first seminar was held in Caracas "to structure and develop a study plan for the series."²⁴ On the basis of the decisions made at this meeting, a "pilot" program was made, which was presented to the second seminar, planned "to review the educational aims of the series", and held on 9-10 March 1972 at the Sheraton Macuto Hotel in Caracas.

At this second seminar the following educators were present:

16. *Noticias*.

17. *TV Mejicana* (Mexico, D.F.), 96, 31 January 1973.

18. *El Universal* (Mexico, D.F.), 8 January 1973.

19. *Cine-Mundial* (Mexico, D.F.), 28 December 1972.

20. *Tele-Guía* (Mexico, D.F.), 23-29 November 1972.

21. *Excelsior* (Mexico, D.F.), 14 November 1972.

22. *El Heraldo* (Mexico, D.F.), 13 September 1972.

23. *Ultimas Noticias* (Mexico, D.F.), 19 September 1972.

24. *Noticias*.

Dr Rogelio Díaz Guerrero, for Mexico. Technical advisor at the College of Sociology and Director of the Center for Research in the Behavior Sciences at the Universidad Nacional de Mexico.

Professor Evaristo Obregón G., for Columbia. Member of the Department of Communications and Graphic Arts of the Universidad Tadeo Lazano, Bogota, Colombia.

Dr Pilar Santamaría de Reyes, for Colombia. Educational Television executive and official of the Organisation of American States.

Professor Elvira Paredes Deza, for Peru. Teleprofessor of Early Education at the Instituto Nacional de Tele-educación del Perú.

Professor Victoria Sáenz de Waite, for Costa Rica. Professor on the Faculty of Education of the Universidad de Costa Rica.

Francisco J. Seijo Gonzalez, for Bolivia. Advisor for Audio-Visual Education at the Ministry for Public Education, Bolivia.

Susana Szulanski, for Argentina. Professor of Pedagogy at the "Sara Ch. de Eggleston Kindergarten Institute", Buenos Aires.

Ana R. Underwood, for Puerto Rico. Professor of Teaching, and Pre-School and Primary School Education at the Faculty of Education at the Universidad Central de Venezuela.

Also participating in the seminar were:

John Page, Executive Producer of the *Taller de TV Infantil de Mexico*.

Ernesto García Cabral, Producer at the *Taller de TV Infantil*.

Zita Chao de Joyce. Chief of Education Programming of the *Taller de TV Infantil*.

Juan Manuel Torres. Head writer of the *Taller*.

Edward Palmer. Research Director of the Children's Television Workshop.

Norton Wright. International Producer of Children's Television Workshop.

Gerald Lesser. President of the National Advisory Board of the Children's Television Workshop and member of the Laboratory for Human Development at Harvard University.

Gretchen Bock. Assistant to the producers of *Sesame Street*.

The seminar was developed around four points:

I. Viewing and discussion of the "pilot" program.

II. Discussion of the educational aims of the program.

III. Consideration of the educational aims which could be added to the program.

IV. Participants' suggestions for production elements which could be used in the series.

Concerning point I, after a viewing of the series "pilot", the following consensus was reached:

(a) Taking into account the great differences in the learning processes between children, the material used should be presented through different methods, but always in a semi-structured way, so that the child will be stimulated to complete its development.

(b) A constant concern of the series' producers—which should be reflected in the episodes—must be the motivation for the children to advance from the perceptive process to the creative search for solutions.

(c) The "pilot" has a strong tendency to have the adults solve the problems, rather than giving the children this possibility. This was seen as a reflection of traditional educational methods in Latin America. The program must therefore stimulate the children by all possible means to acquire a lively inquisitive sense and learn to think for themselves.

(d) Noting that the "pilot" uses material alien to the experience of children of the less-privileged socio-economic classes, the producers were reminded that one of the first objectives of the program, as proposed at the first seminar, was to familiarize these children with their own environment and then to open a path toward understanding the world in general.

(e) Having noticed, as well, that the scenery used in the "pilot" is too urban, it was recommended that it be complemented by rural environments so that the children from such areas would not feel lost and out of place.

(f) A greater repetition of the musical themes throughout each episode would allow the children to retain them and gradually develop musical criteria.

Concerning point II, a polemic arose around the teaching of the alphabet. The members of the Children's Television Workshop said that they had decided to include it in the program for several reasons: "It is a tangible sign of knowledge," they said, "of which both parents and child can be proud," and "since the letters are taught separately, it is useful to show the complete alphabet so the child can see the context for the whole series of letters to be learned."

There were also disagreements concerning the teaching of numbers. The educators maintained that it is more important for the child to understand the concept which the numerals represent than to know the numerals themselves, since they are merely symbolic images. It was agreed that the solution was to achieve "a combined global and analytical approach which the children should learn directly by touching and feeling." For instance: taking one stick away from a group of five sticks, or adding X number of things to a group.

Another important contribution of the educators was the suggestion that the child should not only generate solutions to the problems themselves, but should evaluate situations as well. An example of how this could be achieved is by showing an airplane in an airport, and indicating that just by looking at it, you can't tell if it has just arrived or is getting ready to leave. In this way, the program could provide a valuable demonstration of the importance of finding out what we don't know.

In order to give concrete examples of forms of participation in decision-making, the educators indicated that the following situations could be

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*

shown:

"A child could be shown that he or she has to decide how to go home from school: on foot, by bus, with a friend or neighbour, etc....and then the child could be asked to analyse the various alternatives.

"An outing could be proposed, and the children asked to choose the place where they would like to go: the museum, the zoo, the park, the country, etc....letting them make the final decision and explaining the reasons.

"The children could invent ways of using various leftover material. This would, furthermore, help to develop their creativity."

It was agreed that the program should show the various roles which people play in the community: the street-sweeper, the shoemaker, the gardener, the carpenter, the public employee, etc., emphasizing that they are all working for the well-being and development of society.

Concerning point III, it was suggested that certain educational goals could be added to the list of those already studied for incorporation into the program. Among them were aesthetic development, including music and art. The staff of the Children's Television Workshop explained that they had already agreed to combine this category with the other educational objectives.

In point IV, the educators noted that the "pilot" has serious shortcomings in the use of vocabulary, using incorrectly such Spanish words as "charola" instead of "bandeja", "masera" for "camerera", "banca" for "banco", and "mono" for "lazo".

The episode in which the letter "T" is sold in a story ("*tienda*") was also criticized for its content, as was the scene on the cleanliness of the fountain in the plaza which ends with the fountain being made to work by a kick.

The first was considered inappropriate because it directly related the knowledge of a letter with a commercial economic sense. It is good for the child to know that there are things which are bought and sold, but it is also good for the child to clearly understand that some things cannot (and should not) be sold, such as knowledge, instruction and education. The second scene is also ill-chosen, because besides being crude, it is inexplicable for the child. It is illogical for a fountain to work because it is kicked. It was agreed that the two episodes would be modified.

4. THE TALLER DOCUMENTS

According to the documents published in the *Taller de TV Infantil de Mexico* newsletter, *Plaza Sésamo* is intended for children between the ages of three and six, and "was planned, not to impart conventional pre-school teaching, but to develop in the child a limited number of aptitudes."²⁵ The fundamental objectives of the series, as the documents in their newsletter indicate, are to carry out "an experimental educational program which would give the children cognitive skills and the emotional dispositions which the specialists consider an important preparation for the formal education they will be given in school."²⁶ Furthermore, it was

specified that "the first stage of the series would concentrate on preparation for learning to read, knowing numerals, reasoning and problem-solving, as well as helping the child to understand the world around him, the natural environment as well as that transformed by man."²⁷

The *Taller* indicated that the potential audience for *Plaza Sésamo* is "twenty-two million children in seventeen Spanish-speaking countries, including Puerto Rico, besides another eleven million in Brazil, where a Portuguese version is being produced with the name *Vila Sesamo*."²⁸ The entire program is composed of one hundred and thirty episodes, each an hour long, and is reportedly already being broadcast in Ecuador, Colombia, Chile, Puerto Rico, and Argentina. In May 1973 it will be expanded to the whole of Central America and Venezuela, and by June it is expected to be shown on television in Bolivia, Uruguay, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic.

As can be seen from all these facts, it is an extremely ambitious project. Besides the dangers inherent in its very origin (can we forget the interests of the big financial corporations and the agents of North American imperialist penetration and repression which are at the base of the program?), it risks influencing the formation of millions of Latin American children (thirty-three million, according to the *Taller* figures) and thus arresting the potential liberating influence generated by educational reforms.

It is of course true that these reforms, and specifically those already initiated in Peru, work to overthrow the rigorous "academicist" systems which the old forms of teaching established, and try to introduce much more flexible forms, largely derived from the positive choices of the organized community. In this sense, there would be no reason to oppose the educational contribution of an independent group of producers using a collective media such as TV for the purpose of encouraging the development of pre-school aged children. But, aside from the fact that one must be especially wary of experimenting with educational methods in pre-school children, and particularly now at the beginning of a process of revolution in human development, one cannot ignore the fact that *Plaza Sésamo* was not the outgrowth of any representative group of the organized community: on the contrary, it was the product of the most exclusive elements in the capitalist political and financial power structure.

The intention of the new education in Peru is to effect open and flexible systems which creatively emanate from a community base, are re-elaborated at the technical-normative level, and then returned to the social milieu in a constant process of dialogue, enriching for all. A vertical manipulation, which would impose upon the community a particular kind of thought and certain pre-established forms of conduct is considered

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.*

29. Augusto Salazar Bondy "Educación y revolución", *Expresso* (Lima), 8 April, 1973, p. 23.

undesirable. And this is exactly what is being attempted, and what has been accomplished in many countries by means of the program *Plaza Sésamo*.

An analysis of the documents published in the *Taller de TV Infantil* newsletter which were prepared by the executives and producers of *Plaza Sésamo* themselves, leaves little room for doubt. These documents, as we mentioned earlier, indicate for example, that *Plaza Sésamo* is "an experimental educational program, whose aim is to give children certain cognitive skills and the emotional dispositions." The use of the word "give" in a document prepared by specialists who are preparing a program in childhood formation reveals a very erroneous idea of educational criteria, from the point of view of reformed education. The child cannot be "given" cognitive skills, because the faculty of knowing is natural to the human being; the child has it within himself, since he has a mind adapted for knowledge. Cognitive skills can be stimulated, motivated and made dynamic, but they cannot be "given". The old educational systems, whose interest was to mold human beings according to a conservative, elitist, and marginalizing individualism, spoke of "giving" capabilities, "giving" knowledge, "giving" understanding and experience, because they undoubtedly did not want the resurgence of a state of consciousness which would reveal a profound reality: that it is man himself, by himself, who can and must know and understand, who can and must create himself and be. Until men understand this, as long as they believe that it is the educational system that provides everything—intelligence, understanding and self-realization—the old order will persist, with its teachers and disciples, masters and servants, powerful and needy, conquerors and conquered, rich and poor. That's the way things are, they claim, and you have to accept them. In these traditional systems, as pointed out by Dr Augusto Salazar Bondy, "the immobility or defense of the *status quo* constituted the essence of State policy and the condition of society as a whole."²⁹ This allowed those in power to enjoy their unjust privileges with the security that these conditions would be perpetuated without disruptions or dangers. The concept of education is however changing in Latin America, and Peru in particular is searching dauntlessly for the rise of a new human being who would be simultaneously the creator and the beneficiary of a society of dignity, justice and solidarity, a society with neither masters, bosses, nor deified and infallible leaders, where everyone can be masters and disciples in turn; and where the fundamental rule of all action comes from the participating community. A program like *Plaza Sésamo*, which pretends to "give" children not only "cognitive skills" but an "emotional disposition", in other words, to shape them into a way of thinking and a way of feeling, can only be a source of greatest concern to the true educational reformer. There must be a clear rejection of the danger of massification, and the tyranny, subjection and deformation of the human condition which it

implies.

5. THE EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAM

Preceded by a glaring press campaign, Bernard J. Flatow, sent to Latin America to promote *Plaza Sésamo* and sign the contracts for its broadcast in each country, arrived in Lima early in 1972 and made contact with TV Channels 4 and 5. Having been informed about the legal changes affecting Peruvian broadcasting which were taking place at the time, he requested an interview with the country's authorities, whose decision would be a determining factor. He was received by members of the Consejo Superior de Educación, the General Director of the Instituto Nacional de Tele-educación, and the Director of Comunicación Colectiva. After an extensive introduction, Flatow showed the *Plaza Sésamo* "pilot". A few days later, he was notified that the Ministry of Education authorities would not grant the required license and thus *Plaza Sésamo* could not be shown in Peru. The main reasons behind this decision were the following:

Plaza Sésamo is part of an educational concept which differs, absolutely, from the objectives established by the Peruvian Educational Reform.

1. Because it uses a system of separation between scenes composed of audiovisual elements which provide the child with a totally rigid, invariable and absolute concept of order.

The Peruvian Educational Reform proposes a creative, personal and constant participation with a very flexible concept of order based on circumstances, age and capacity. To impress upon children the idea of a permanent, rigorous and absolute order, by means of high-impact audiovisual images is contrary to the spirit of the General Education Law.

2. Because its concept of participation is leader-oriented and vertical. The adults seen on the program always ask the collaboration of the children and always teach them how to perform tasks, offering them norms and manners which are not only preconceived, but also imposed.

The Peruvian Educational Reform has clearly defined that the most important part in the act of participation is spontaneous desire and creative collaboration which can also be communicated from the bottom to top, from the children to the adults, and thus generate a dialogue rather than a series of one-way alienating orders.

3. Because *Plaza Sésamo* teaches letters and numerals according to the old abstract and mechanical memory system.

In the report presented by Prof. Elvira Paredes Deza, who represented Peru at the Caracas seminars, opposition was raised, as it was by other Latin American delegates, to an approach so alien to the concepts of reformed education. But the directors of the *Taller* did not take into account these observations which encouraged modern and humanistic teaching methods.

4. Because many of the puppets used in *Plaza Sésamo* are deformed figures of animals, some even

to the point of monstrosity. Besides offering a false idea of natural reality, they provoke unconscious motivations of fear, extremely dangerous for children.

5. Because the backdrops used for the filmed scenes are restricted to the urban experience, they marginalize and discriminate against the large Latin America peasant population.

6. Because the program puts the child in contact with a reality oriented towards elitism, consumerism, extravagance, unthinking obedience, conditioned participation and instruction by means of formal, modern and attractively presented motivations, which in fact are conceptually traditional and exclusive.

The Ministry of Education authorities were fully aware of the conceptual as well as the formal structure of *Plaza Sésamo*, having studied Prof. Paredes Deza's report and the correspondence from other Latin American countries. The projection of the "pilot" confirmed existing ideas. The decision not to allow the program to be broadcast in Peru was based on the principles of ideological sovereignty, the General Education Law, the Telecommunications Law, as well as other equally important principles and objectives of the Peruvian revolutionary process.

James Aronson

THE MAKING
OF JOE McCARTHY

(USA, 1970)

The conviction of Alger Hiss was the touchstone for the meteoric career of Senator Joe McCarthy as the scourge of Communism. In the political maneuvering of a midterm election year—1950—the Truman Democrats, the Dixiecrats, and the Republicans vied with one another to parade before a bewitched electorate the most accomplished record of anti-Communism. Haunting the capital was the specter of the Soviet bomb; but if the bomb had a sobering effect on the trigger-happy executives, there was no public evidence of this state. Rather, since it was accepted as gospel that the primitive Russians would not have developed the bomb by themselves, the major question in Washington was “who gave the bomb to Russia?”

Into the spotlight stepped Joe McCarthy, holding in his hand “a list of 205...a list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department.” This was February 9, 1950, in Wheeling, West Virginia. The next day, in Denver, the 205 had been converted from Communists to bad security risks. A day later, in Salt Lake City, McCarthy had reconverted the risks to card-carrying Communists but had reduced the number to 57. McCarthy made banner headlines the second week of February 1950, and he remained on page one almost without fail for more than four years.

The major concern with the discussion of McCarthy here is not to determine what made Joe run, but how Joe was able to run. How was he able to act and accuse with such license and publicity?

McCarthyism was neither a new nor an unusual phenomenon. It was an extension and public exaggeration of the prevailing policy of anti-Communism which did not warrant a new name. The ground had been thoroughly prepared for McCarthy since the end of World War II and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a great power which offered an alternative to capitalism. Communism had been firmly established in the American mind as a dirty word describing an evil way of life. The propagation of this premise had ebbed and flowed and been increased to flood tide whenever established power wished to stifle domestic opposition. The year 1950 was a time for flood. In their book *The Reporter's Trade* (Reynald

and Co., 1958), columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop wrote:

No purely political issue seemed to us bigger or more burning in the whole period of our work together [than McCarthyism]. But to call it a domestic issue is to misconstrue the real nature of McCarthyism. Like almost all the other great excitements of the postwar years—the Alger Hiss trials, the flaming B-36 row, the brief but savage rumpus over the firing of General MacArthur—McCarthyism was a by-product of the Cold war. More specifically, McCarthy was a by-product of the time when the Cold War became hot—the time of the fighting in Korea. Before the summer of 1950, McCarthy was essentially a fringe politician. McCarthyism was an ugly phenomenon of which the political reporter had to take account, but no more than that. It was only after the Korean war began that McCarthy became the decisive, dominating political force which he remained for four sordid, shameful years.

McCarthyism was not a by-product of the Cold War: it was an instrument of the Cold War. It is more than a misconception to group McCarthyism with the Hiss trials and the MacArthur incident. Hiss was not a by-product of the Cold War: he was a victim who became a slogan. Nor was MacArthur a by-product: he was a military arm of the Cold War which reached out too recklessly for power and got lopped off. In the last analysis, this was McCarthy's fate also. He served at the pleasure of the master—the established power—and when he overstepped his mark and sought to become a determinant in the master class, he was destroyed. McCarthy was as necessary to the advancement of the Cold War as Attorney General Palmer and his crusaders were to the anti-Bolshevik campaign after World War I. His witch-hunt facilitated the dismantling of the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, and the advancement of the Truman Doctrine.

McCarthy was not groomed by the masters of power for his role as was, say, General Eisenhower. Eisenhower arrived at the White House by way of the presidency of Columbia University which had civilianized him. But McCarthy was spotted as a useful instrument of the Cold War by a dependable scout, Monsignor Edmund Walsh, dean of the Georgetown University Foreign Service School—a training ground and virtually an adjunct of the State Department. Jack Anderson and Ronald W. May, in their book *McCarthy, the Man, the Senator, the "Ism"* (Beacon, 1952), described a meeting on January 7, 1950, a month before Wheeling, and six months before the Korean war began, during which McCarthy expressed to Walsh his concern over his flagging political fortunes and his need for an issue in the 1952 campaign, when he would come up for re-election. “How about Communism as an issue?” Walsh is quoted as saying. There was no question of Walsh's devotion to the State Department's Cold War policy, and there was little doubt of his perspicacity in selecting so cynical an agent of virtue and godliness as McCarthy. If Walsh was unable to foresee the extent to which McCarthy would go to remain in the headlines and that he would ultimately prove a hindrance to the Cold War, others were not so shortsighted. Among those others were the editors of newspapers which came under McCarthy's

fire as unlikely transmission belts for “the international Communist conspiracy.” On May 22, 1950, following McCarthy's assaults on Owen Lattimore and John Paton Davies for their role in shaping American policy in the Far East, the *Washington Post* said in an editorial:

For weeks the capital has been seized and convulsed by a terror ... a roaring bitterness, the ranging of Americans against Americans, the assault on freedom of inquiry, the intolerance of opposition.

The editorial did not underestimate “the cancerous evil of totalitarianism” which directed the Soviet Union and confronted the United States with “a secret conspiratorial force in our midst.” But, it said, if the burden of proof were placed on the accused, it would be “burning down the house of the American way of life in order to get the rats in it.” It feared that McCarthy and the lesser witch-hunters were draining the strength of the winter soldiers of the Cold War. It was as “foolish to reckon the witch-hunters the true foes of Communism as to reckon lynch mobs as the true foes of the sex maniacs.” The effect would be to “drive out of government the very brains which alone can give us victory in the Cold War.” The pairing of Communists and sex maniacs was enlightening of the editorial mind but not of the objective situation. The witch-hunters were no more after Communists than the lynch mobs were after sex maniacs. The real goal was to preserve the status quo against demands for political and economic change by persons who were beginning to insist on social justice.

The *Washington Post* recorded, but did not view with alarm, more dignified but equally terrifying performances a month earlier. At the annual meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington April 23, Secretary of State Acheson described Russian Communism as a threat to the existence of our government. Only a strong United States, he said, stood “between the Kremlin and dominion over the entire world.” Five days later, former President Herbert Hoover made a rare descent from his suite in the Waldorf Towers in New York to the ballroom below. There, before the convention of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, he asked for the expulsion of the Communist nations from the United Nations and the formation of “a new united front of those who disavow Communism.” The *Herald Tribune* April 29 said the speech was greeted with a “thunderous, almost impassioned ovation.”

It is clear that McCarthy's foreign policy—his entire career from 1950 on was based on foreign policy and its making—differed hardly at all from Acheson's or Hoover's. McCarthy's record showed remarkable agreement with the three most powerful lobbies in Washington, all of which had easy access to the State Department: (1) the German lobby, which sought a strong industrialized and militarized Western Germany; (2) the China lobby, one of whose dominant figures was Alfred M. Kohlberg, a wealthy dealer in Chinese curios, among which the prize piece was Chiang Kai-shek; (3) the Catholic Church lobby, for which Communism was the

secular devil who threatened its worldwide human and material holdings. What, then, accounted for McCarthy's remarkable rise in an area in which there was so little disagreement among so many practitioners? In their book on McCarthy, Anderson and May wrote:

You can discount [McCarthy's] personal ambition: that may have started the McCarthy flywheel, but it was the press that kept the wheel turning. You can discount his native cunning; had it not been for the Fourth Estate he'd have used this talent in a vacuum. Any way you slice it, it adds up to the same thing: If Joe McCarthy is a political monster, then the press has been his Dr. Frankenstein.

The buildup, said Anderson and May, began in Wisconsin's north country, where the “hustling young circuit judge” got a favorable press. As a Marine, he circulated his own version of the Rodgers-Hammerstein *South Pacific*, with himself as the male lead, and “watched it pop out like measles in one back-country paper after another.” This was the myth of “Tail-Gunner Joe,” the valiant fighter of the South Pacific theater in World War II, and the wounds that allegedly forced him out of the service. Actually, McCarthy quit the Pacific area in 1944 to enter the far more profitable political wars of Wisconsin. His “wounded leg,” which appeared in most stories as a combat wound, was the result of a non-combat piece of horseplay, magnified out of all proportion. When McCarthy transferred his operation to Washington as a Senator, Anderson and May wrote:

Capitol Hill reporters learned to like the smiling, accommodating Senator from Wisconsin, who always had something to say. Even if his pronouncements were far-fetched, they were always good for a Night Final line....But the headline that capped all other McCarthy headlines exploded on the morning of February 10, 1950, across the nation's front pages—after his Wheeling, West Virginia speech ... and [the press] gave it full play....For the rest of the year, the magic name “McCarthy” appeared more often in the teletyped stories that moved out of Washington than the name of any other Senator. How did Joe do it?

Part of the answer lies in the newspaper fraternity's devotion to the principle of objectivity. It is a violation of the unwritten creed for newsmen to mix opinion with fact; and so they gave Joe's wild accusations complete and factual coverage: They were telling the truth when they wrote: MCCARTHY CHARGES 205 REDS IN STATE DEPARTMENT. Joe indeed had made that charge. As to the truth or falsehood of his statement, the reporters felt that was out of their line; appraisals of Joe's accuracy were left for the columnists and editorial writers.

In *The Fourth Branch of Government* (Houghton Mifflin, 1959) Douglass Cater, for many years a Washington correspondent for the *Reporter* magazine and later a White House assistant in the Johnson Administration, pursued the “McCarthy miracle.”

McCarthy's skill ... lay primarily in his capacity to stage a single issue so as to dominate the channels of communication and to distract a national audience...He new how to rule the headlines...

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He had not even shown an awareness of the publicity potential of the Red Hunt until after the two-year period during which Alger Hiss was being exposed, tried, retried, and finally convicted. Then, in February 1950, only one month after Hiss received his sentence, McCarthy was off. Brandishing stage prop documents, which he never let anyone examine, he ingeniously mixed the proper proportions of the misplaced concrete and the farfetched abstraction to meet the requirements of newsmen... It was as if the press yearned for the really big lie... Nothing in the procedures of Congress or the press compelled him to reveal what he had [in the Wheeling speech]. His feat lay in transferring his myth of spy-infested America to more responsible newspapers.

Like many other analysts, Cater dwelt on the McCarthy method. He would call a press conference in the morning to announce a sensational afternoon press conference. That was enough for a big headline in the afternoon newspapers. In the afternoon the press conference might or might not be held. If it was held, it might produce new charges contained in documents waved by McCarthy before the newspapermen but never turned over to them. If it was not held, the reason would be an eleventh-hour hunt for a "mystery witness" whose information was so vital to the national security that he had already possibly fallen victim to the "international Communist conspiracy." "McCarthy held the headlines day after day," said Cater, "several times a day for the A.M.'s, the P.M.'s, the Seven o'Clock, and the late evening news ... He knew the ingredients for the 'lead,' the 'overnight,' the 'sidebar.' Of many things McCarthy was contemptuous, but he never neglected his press relations."

McCarthy had a talent for publicity "unmatched by any other politician of this century," said Richard H. Rovere, Washington correspondent of the *New Yorker* magazine, in his book, *Senator Joe McCarthy* (World, 1960), "The reporters ... were beginning to respond to his summonses like Pavlov's dogs to the clang of a bell." Rovere recorded the story of two reporters lolling around the Senate Office Building when along came McCarthy. "You two looking for a story?" he asked. McCarthy then asked them to join him on the subway car into the Senate where, patting his breast pocket, he said that he was going to subpoena President Truman. "You're not serious, Joe," said the reporters. "What are you going to subpoena him for?" "To testify about Harry Dexter White," said Joe. (White had been dead three years by that time.) Rovere wrote:

Of course it never happened—that is to say, Truman never testified, but the story got into print, even though the reporters to whom it was given were angry about the system that required them to publish "news" they knew to be fraudulent but prohibited them from reporting their knowledge of its fraudulence.

Among the newspaper critics of McCarthy who wrote about his relations with the press there is a common theme: It was the very "objectivity" of the free American press that prevented it from exposing McCarthy's lies in its news columns. This is how Rovere put it:

In time, what appeared to be the susceptibility of the press to McCarthy was held to be the cause of his lamentable successes. Why did the press publish this liar's lies? McCarthy knew the answer: it was not because publishers in general wished to circulate his mendacities or even because he had achieved a glamor that made him irresistible to the readers. It was because he had achieved a high elective office, because what he said counted for something (in fact, a great deal, as time went by) in the affairs of this nation, and because there was always the possibility that there was a mystery witness or that he would force Harry Truman to testify.

Rovere cited Walter Lippmann's comment: "McCarthy's charges of treason, espionage, corruption, perversion are news which cannot be suppressed or ignored. They come from a United States Senator and a politician ... in good standing at the headquarters of the Republican party. When he makes such attacks against the State Department and the Defense Department, it is news which has to be published." Then Rovere continued on his own:

It was also, of course, news that a United States Senator was lying and defrauding the people and their government, but—in large part because McCarthy was a true innovator, because he lied with an unprecedented boldness, because he invented new kinds of lies—even those newspapers that were willing to expose him found that they lacked the technical resources. If he was to be called a liar, someone had to call him a liar. The American press was simply not set up so that it could feature a "MCCARTHY LIES" feature alongside a "MCCARTHY SAYS—" story. If his fellow Senators had been ready to challenge each mendacity, or if either of the two Presidents of his day had been willing and able to denounce him, regularly, it would have worked. But that was not to be.

In *The Fourth Branch of Government*, Cater extends the theme of the mystique of objective reporting:

The extent of the communications failure McCarthyism presented can be measured by the fact that few of the reporters who regularly covered McCarthy believed him. Most came to hate and fear him as a cynical liar, who was willing to wreak untold havoc to satisfy his own power drive. But though they feared him, it was not intimidation that caused the press to serve as the instrument for McCarthy's rise. Rather, it was the inherent vulnerabilities—the frozen patterns of the press—which McCarthy discovered and played upon with unerring skill. "Straight" news, the absolute commandment of most mass media journalism, had become a straitjacket to crush the initiative and the independence of the reporter.

An ethical rule of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, entitled Fair Play, reads: "A newspaper should not publish unofficial charges affecting reputation or moral character without opportunity given to the accused to be heard." Responsible newspapers, Cater said, tried hard to live up to this rule and they failed "only when the accused, like Owen Lattimore, turned out to be in the wilds of Afghanistan." In practice, Cater said, it worked out like this:

Late one afternoon, Senator McCarthy might name a

person, more likely a series of them. All through the evening the accused's telephone kept ringing. He was told briefly the nature of the charge against him—let us say, "top Soviet agent"—and asked for a brief reply.

But the dilemma for the reporter and the headline writer remained. McCarthy's charge was controversial and unexpected—a news count of two. The denial was controversial and completely expected—a news count of one. Both were equally lacking in proof. Nobody carried credentials on his person to prove that he is not the "top Soviet agent."

Rovere and Cater and most of the journalistic critics of McCarthy thus have presented the press as an honorable, lumbering giant shackled and muzzled by the inexorable laws of a free press, unable to tell the truth about McCarthy. But the Anderson-May image persists of a journalistic Dr. Frankenstein, pecking away at his typewriter in an office in the National Press Building in Washington to create an ink-stained monster. The portrait of the press of the United States as an objective entity is a myth. There is nothing in the Canons of Journalism that compelled reporters to accept and editors to publish information allegedly contained in uninspected documents waved at them by a Senator. Such reports, if their content proved to be false, might have been excused once or twice on the ground of deadline or overzealous reporting. But when this happened day in, day out for four years, when every reputable Washington correspondent knew that the disseminator of this information was a proved liar, there was no shred of an excuse. Objectivity was mocked when almost every story was weighted in favor of McCarthy's fraud.

No other Senator was allowed by the press to make such undocumented and unsubstantiated charges without challenge. The case of McCarthy was particularly unusual because he had been selected by the vote of the same Washington correspondents as the worst member of the United States Senate. (The day this poll was announced, William T. Evjue of the *Madison* [Wis.] *Capital Times* recalled, the story was topped by a story about McCarthy frying chicken for some friends, and a picture of McCarthy with a new broom [sweeping clean] on the Capitol steps in Washington.)

There was a basic reason, however, for the so-called objectivity of the reporters and their editors. This was the acceptance of McCarthy's stated aim, however much the reporters and editors may have deplored his methods (not all of them did). The aim was to rid the country of the American branch of the "international Communist conspiracy" which threatened the American way of life. If a few innocents got hurt along the way, it was too bad, but that was the way it had to be. Innocents get hurt in all wars, and America was at war with the most insidious enemy ever encountered. The President had said so, Secretary Acheson had said so, the publishers of the American press had said so. This acceptance is made apparent in Cater's overgenerous description of the reporters' efforts to balance McCarthy's charges with responses from those who were accused by him.

But a victim of McCarthy was not "charged," as Cater put it: he was named. Why then should a

person who is not charged in a court of law or accused in a grand jury indictment be placed in the position of having to deny something he almost certainly never was—for example, "top Soviet agent"? Why should newspapermen assume the role of out-of-court prosecuting attorneys and demand to know by telephone whether a man is willing to admit or deny that he is a "top Soviet agent"—the penalty for admission being a prison sentence for sedition or treason, and denial, the possibility of a trial for perjury. McCarthy's charge, said Cater in a most unobjective opinion, was more newsworthy since it was unexpected; the denial would be expected and therefore not so newsworthy. Cater's comments about a person not carrying credentials to prove that he was not the "top Soviet agent," even if it was meant jokingly, is a theme for Kafka.

McCarthy knew—and the newspapermen knew—that a person named by McCarthy was branded with a virtually ineradicable stigma. The truth never caught up with McCarthy's lie as circulated by the press. In his book *The Loyalty of Free Men* (Viking, 1950), Alan Barth, editor of the editorial page of the *Washington Post*, demonstrated how the McCarthy-press process worked:

By the simple stratagem of charging a man with disloyalty, instead of with treason or espionage or sabotage it is possible to evade the constitutional requirements that he be indicted by a grand jury, that he enjoy a speedy and public trial by an impartial petit jury, that he be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and confronted with witnesses against him, that he be accorded the benefit of compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his favor. He is indicted and tried and sentenced by Congressional committee or administrative tribunal, with the same men acting as prosecutors, judges, and jury. The presumption of innocence supposed to surround him is ignored. The mere charge of disloyalty is treated as evidence of guilt...

It is the press which executes, so to speak, the sentences passed by congressional committees or by mere individuals speaking under the immunity from suits for slander or libel afforded by Congress. Newspapers especially tend to make headlines out of accusations and to treat denials less prominently. This stems in large measure from the concept of news as sensation and is scarcely less true of those newspapers that strive for objectivity than of those that deliberately use their news pages to serve editorial biases.

The concept of news as sensation was demonstrated admirably from the outset in the reports of McCarthy's speech to the Senate on February 20, 1950, following the uproar over the Wheeling charges of Communists in the State Department. By this time McCarthy had settled on the figure of 81, among whom, he said, were three very special cases who held the key to the "international conspiracy" in the State Department. Rovere's retrospective view of this performance is pertinent. In *Senator Joe McCarthy* he wrote:

Few newspapers could print—because few readers would read—reports of a length sufficient to give the true gamey flavor of the performance. Even if they had wished to do so, it would have been difficult to get the reports, for McCarthy's presentation had been so disorderly, so jumbled and cluttered and loose-ended,

that it was beyond the power of most reporters to organize the mess into a story that would convey to the reader anything beyond the suspicion that the reporter was drunk. There was a bedlam quality to McCarthy's speeches that seldom got through to those who never read them.

What did filter through, then, to a moderately conscientious reader of a moderately conscientious newspaper was the news that a United States Senator had delivered a long and angry speech giving what he claimed were details on 81 persons who he insisted were Communists in the State Department. ...But no newspaper could print the truth—because no newspaper could be sure it was the truth—that he had failed to identify even one Communist in the State Department. The reader might be advised by a favorite columnist or a radio commentator that McCarthy's past record did not inspire much confidence; at the same time, if he sought further enlightenment, he would be reminded that it had been far from impossible for Communists to get into the State Department. Alger Hiss had been convicted just one month earlier, and the Hiss trial has produced the name of at least one other Communist, Julian Wadleigh, who had betrayed Department secrets.

Rovere, the upholder of the canon of objectivity, in this apologia presented himself as a subjective purveyor of obfuscation, and as a first-rate example of Barth's thesis of the newspaperman-as-executioner. A study of the newspapers of the time has failed to turn up a story in which McCarthy's speech to the Senate was described as disorderly, cluttered, jumbled, or loose-ended. If this was the case—and there is no reason to dispute Rovere on this point—it would have been simple objective reporting to say so. Further, if the story of the speech was important enough for almost every newspaper in the nation to put it on page one, it is reasonable to ask why so few newspapers printed the text of the speech to allow their readers to judge it precisely on its contents. This would have eliminated the need for reporters to battle the bedlam in their news stories and to risk the reader's charge of "drunk."

Rovere might have noted, but did not, that McCarthy used the Hiss case to launch his new career. Rather, he accepted the unproven McCarthy charge of Communists in the State Department and went beyond the convicting jury in the second Hiss trial: he marked Hiss as a Communist and a traitor by describing Wadleigh as "at least one other Communist who had betrayed Department secrets." Hiss had been convicted on a charge of perjury—denying that he had delivered State Department papers to Chambers and that he had known Chambers after 1936. Wadleigh testified that he himself had taken State Department documents, but said he had no knowledge that Hiss had done so. The retrospective Rovere thus compounded his absolution of the press in the making of McCarthy with some nimble McCarthyism of his own.

Writing two years after McCarthy's death in 1957, Cater noted that McCarthy "did not turn up evidence to warrant conviction of any one of the countless numbers he put the finger on.... He did not succeed in setting up a single contempt citation that could be sustained in the courts." It was not necessary to wait until 1959 to come to the conclu-

sion: it was apparent to any newspaperman willing to dig for the facts. But few did, even though, as Rovere wrote, McCarthy had proved to be "an outrageous four-flusher" who could easily have been exposed if the will had been there.

McCarthyism, said Cater, was an "unparalleled demonstration of the publicity system gone wild, feeding on the body politic like a cancerous growth. It showed that publicity could be used as a crude instrument to bludgeon hapless officials" who were unable "to find an effective defense against its bludgeoning." Nor could either of the two Presidents who had to reckon with McCarthyism find a "satisfactory counter-publicity weapon."

The reason for the failure would seem to be obvious: McCarthy's theme was anti-Communism. This was the avowed policy of the two Presidents and their Administrations. The most effective counter-weapon to McCarthy would have been a denunciation and abandonment of the policy, or of the most vocal exponent of that policy—Senator McCarthy himself. Since neither of the Presidents nor their advisors were willing to adopt the first course, abandoning the policy, they had to adopt the second course, abandoning McCarthy. When the time was appropriate, when McCarthy had become an embarrassment to the President in office, to the armed forces, and to the image of the United States abroad, they implemented their decision.

The newspaper industry resents studies of the performance of the press by persons or groups outside the industry as infringement by amateurs. But in most areas of its performance, and particularly in relation to investigatory committees of Congress, it has forced others to take a closer look because the industry itself has undertaken so little inquiry of its own and offered almost no self-criticism. In 1952 Cornell University Press published a work entitled *The House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1945-1950*, by Robert K. Carr, professor of law and political science at Dartmouth College. While the book concerned itself mainly with the House committee, it went thoroughly into the whole question of Congressional investigation of "subversive activity," and its conclusions apply to McCarthy and the press.

Publicity, said Carr, in agreement with Rovere, Cater, Anderson, May, and most other journalistic analysts of McCarthy's career, has been essential to all Congressional investigations; it is a rare committee that has not depended heavily, since Martin Dies in 1938, "upon front-page press coverage of its activities as a means of effecting its purposes." The continuation of "screaming headlines" for thirty years Carr attributed to the committee's awareness of the news value of its activities and "the press's own enthusiasm to tell the committee's story." Carr wrote:

In the end, it is fair to say that the process by which the committee's labors and findings have been reported to the American people by the press, magazine, radio, and motion picture has become an integral and essential part of the investigation itself. This fact has clearly been recognized by members of the committee and its staff, and they have planned and executed the committee's program accordingly.

Committee members and staff set about to establish close relations with certain newspapers and newspapermen, and confidential information began to leak in both directions; anonymous and unofficial statements were planted in the press, virtually giving the statements official imprimatur, and a steady flow of sensational material was provided by the committee and "enthusiastically utilized by many papers." As a result, "a good deal of the news about the committee printed by the press has no basis in official action and has gone well beyond the mere reporting of events as they have taken place." Carr continued:

This ease with which any member of the committee has found it possible to obtain almost unlimited attention in the press for his remarks, whether casual or calculated, has been ... helped by the irresponsibility of an important part of the American press, which, either because it could not resist the opportunity to use a cheap, sensational story, or because it was thereby furthering its own prejudices, was unable to distinguish between an authoritative statement of an official spokesman and the mere babblings of a single member.

In the House Committee on Un-American Activities rivalries were intense, in contrast to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, where McCarthy was the undisputed leader. In the House committee, members developed their favorite newspaper leaks in information-swapping agencies. Committee counsel Robert E. Stripling acknowledged that the committee's pamphlet *100 Things You Should Know About Communism* was "prepared with the considerable aid" of Frank C. Waldrop, editor of the *Washington Times-Herald* (since absorbed by the *Washington Post*). He said that "newspaper friends of the Committee" had made inquiries for him at the Justice Department about the Department's reported plan to drop the Hiss case before it came to trial. The inquiry of course renewed the Department's flagging interest. Richard Nixon often referred to his close relations with Bert Andrews of the *New York Herald Tribune*. Whittaker Chambers, in his book, *Witness*, said it was Andrews who suggested to the committee the use of the lie detector in the Hiss-Chambers hearings.

It was Edward Nellor of the *New York Sun* (he also doubled for the *Washington Times-Herald*) who put the committee in touch with Chambers. Stripling again is the source of this information. The *Sun*, on August 12, 1948, took credit for initiating the Elizabeth Bentley-Whittaker Chambers espionage circus in Congress. If the *Sun's* claims were valid, Carr pointed out, "it is obvious that Nellor enjoyed the benefit of leaks from the federal grand jury in New York" before which Miss Bentley and Chambers testified and whose proceedings, of course, are supposed to be secret. It is possible that the Hiss-Chambers hearings "would never have been held had not newspapermen supplied the committee with leaks concerning the proceedings of the federal grand jury in New York." Carr, in his general conclusions on the press, said:

While the larger responsibility for the inadequacies of the story [about Congressional investigations] that has

reached the American people certainly rests with the committee itself, the press has not distinguished itself in its reporting of the story.... Newspapermen do have a great deal of discretion in selecting the stories that they think are worth telling and also in deciding how vigorously and persistently they will dig for the many details of such stories which are by no means on the surface merely waiting to be published. By and large, even the more respected and responsible papers have not been able to resist the temptation to emphasize the lurid aspects of the story, or to stress the testimony that suggested wrongdoing, while playing down the testimony that suggested the absence of wrongdoing. Nor have they taken the initiative in pointing out the obvious biases and errors in the testimony of irresponsible witnesses or even been able to avoid the introduction of new errors in their own reporting.... Even the best papers have all too frequently played up sensational witnesses, however irresponsible their testimony, have failed to report adequately the testimony of calmer witnesses or the replies of those who have been attacked, and have opened their columns too readily to the most trivial, ridiculous, or incredible musings, speculations, and predictions of committee members.

In his book *The Un-Americans* (Ballantine Books, 1961) Frank Donner, an attorney who has served as counsel for many uncooperative witnesses at Congressional investigatory hearings, supported Carr's conclusion:

If newspapers have a duty to report what takes place in a hearing, they should also report what has not taken place. It is impossible to discover from accounts of Committee hearings what the purpose of the hearing is supposed to be and whether hearings conform to the purpose. Beginning with the Hollywood hearings in 1947, the press—even when critical of the Committee—has rarely bothered to explore the gap between the Committee's exposure activities and legitimate functions as an agency of Congress. Few newspapers have asked: Is exposure a function of a Committee of Congress? Even moderate newspapers have acted as glorified press agents for the Committee's informers. An informer may fall on his face in public, but the press is either indifferent or silent.

Donner described a practice which was common knowledge to working newspapermen and Congressional committees—the operation of some newspapers, particularly in the late 1940s and early 1950s, of their own exposure mills. They trained reporters who specialized in "inside dope on the local Reds." In some cases, they latched on to an informer who had already testified before anti-subversive committees, or bought his "I-was-a-Communist-dupe" confessions before he launched his career as a witness. The practice was almost entirely abandoned after 1958 for various reasons: many Hearst and Scripps-Howard newspapers—the chief practitioners—closed down; the public evidenced a great boredom with the repetitious accounts; and by-lines themselves had died or disappeared as a result of drink, dope, general deterioration, or suicide. In one case, that of Howard Rushmore, an investigator for McCarthy, it was murder (of his wife) and suicide. But before the decline, exposure was a flourishing business and many newspapers took great pride in their accom-

plishments. After the House Un-American Activities Committee, then headed by Harold Velde, came to Seattle in 1954, the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* congratulated itself in an editorial.

The names exposed by *Post-Intelligencer* reporters from the 40s on were the same as those exposed in the House hearings. So thoroughly had reporters for this newspaper done their work that hardly a new name came out of the exhaustive Seattle hearings—merely confirmation of the painstaking evidence that had been gathered and published over the last ten years.

The editorial was especially appreciative of its reporters, Traynor Hansen, who had sought out Mrs. Barbara Hartle, a Communist leader, after her Smith Act conviction and “encouraged her to break with the Communist Party.” “Her decision,” said the editorial, “might have been indefinitely delayed except for this reporter’s initiative.”

Although he ably documented the role of the press in building up the witch-hunting committees and therefore the atmosphere of hysteria in the country, Professor Carr allowed his own firm conclusions to drift off into a kind of societal dilemma. Here he found accord with Rovere, who wrote that “one of the many secrets McCarthy seemed to know (without, probably, knowing that he knew) was that the American press reflects the American mind.” Carr’s formulation went like this:

The press is what it is, and when a society insists on hunting witches and doubting its own integrity, it is only wise to assume that its press will play along with such insistence and doubts and give the people what they seemingly want to read, and give it to them in colorful style and generous quantity.

Both the Carr and Rovere positions seem to me to be alarmingly misleading. The American press does not reflect the American mind—it reflects the views of established power which in turn seeks to mold the American mind to accept its prejudices. The American press seeks to shape public opinion, or even to replace public opinion, by fostering and presenting a unanimity of view which it then offers as public opinion. It was not “society” that insisted on hunting witches: it was governmental and industrial power assisted by what Carr himself termed an “enthusiastic” press. American society was not the instigator of the witch-hunts. There was, in fact, continuing outspoken opposition to the House Committee on Un-American Activities and an early revulsion to the McCarthy method which was silenced in part by the weight of the enormous uncritical publicity given by the press to the Senator’s activities. In almost every instance where public opinion has grasped the role of domestic repression in halting opposition to foreign policy, the press has proceeded, as a voluntary arm of government, to spread fear and hatred. The McCarthy era was indeed a prime example, in Cater’s words, of a “demonstration of the publicity system gone wild, feeding on the body politic like a cancerous growth.” But McCarthyism was a misnomer for what was happening. McCarthyism was in a sense the prevailing law of the land, but it was not McCarthy who made the law. His path had been cleared by the Smith Act,

the Walter-McCarran Immigration Act, and the Internal Security Act of 1950, all passed by overwhelming votes in the Congress. The atmosphere in the early 1950s was one of loyalty oaths and tapped telephones, suspicion and timidity engendered by inquisitors, and images of Bolshevik hordes fanning out from Europe to Asia. The United States, under the mantle of the United Nations, was engaged in a hopeless war in Korea, and France was heaving its next-to-last gasp of colonial asthma in Indo-China. “Society” in America did not inaugurate the era of American Imperialism, it was made an instrument of this policy by the shapers of the American destiny. The purpose of McCarthy and the witch-hunters in general was not to thwart the “Communist menace,” but to stifle independent thought which could lead to organized opposition to American policy.

As an honest and fair-minded political scientist, Carr would have been wiser to rest on his own documented findings rather than to place on “society” the onus for the transgressions of the press. Rovere, as a practicing journalist, knew the press from the inside and therefore knew better. Yet while there can be no excuse for the role of the press in the McCarthy Era, there ought to be no surprise. The newspaper industry, as part of the establishment complex, simply played its accustomed role even as, in accustomed fashion, it wrapped itself in the protective parchment of the First Amendment to ward off the slings and arrows of at least a small, outraged part of society.

The policy of anti-Communism remained intact before, during, and after the heyday of McCarthy. McCarthy himself phrased it with earthy accuracy in a story he liked to tell about Senator John W. Bricker, Republican of Ohio, who said to him: “Joe, you’re a real son of a bitch. But sometimes it’s useful to have sons of bitches around to do the dirty work.” Stated less crudely, the same forces that sponsored the political career of the indisputably legitimate President Eisenhower were responsible for the rise of McCarthy. Both men were necessary for the aims of American policy in the decade of the 1950s, though the roles they played in performing their tasks differed. McCarthy led the advance detachment preparing the ground which the Administration then occupied. Thus, yesterday’s extremism became today’s respectability. But the program and the goal remained the same and had the leadership and support of both Eisenhower and McCarthy.

In the campaign of 1952, Eisenhower was reported to be furious with McCarthy for imputing treason to General of the Army George C. Marshall. He said he did not approve of “character assassination” and was not going to campaign for, or give blanket endorsement to, anyone who proceeded in a manner that was not “decent, right, or fair.” But when McCarthy won his primary and the Presidential campaign train rolled through Wisconsin, Eisenhower was side by side on the rear platform with McCarthy, saying: “The purposes that [McCarthy] and I have of ridding the government of the incompetents, the dishonest and, above all, the subversive are one and the same. Our differences,

therefore, have nothing to do with the end result we are seeking. The differences apply to the method.”

Even the method itself was adopted as official policy when McCarthy got too close to the White House. In December 1953 Attorney General Herbert Brownell, in a speech delivered with White House approval, criticized Harry Truman for his “blindness” about Harry Dexter White and the alleged spies in government. There had been talk that McCarthy was thinking of the Presidency in 1956, and the White House was said to be somewhat uneasy. But the uneasiness more likely was produced by McCarthy’s investigation of the Army Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, an investigation which McCarthy himself later conceded was groundless. The *Wall Street Journal* on December 3, 1953, came close to the mark on White House strategy: “It was for the precise purpose of stealing Mr. McCarthy’s thunder that the President is said to have given advance blessing to Attorney General Brownell’s criticism . . .”

The press played its normal role throughout this period. The *New York Times* ran headlines reading: “ROSENBERG CALLED RADAR SPY LEADER”; “RADAR WITNESS BREAKS DOWN: WILL TELL ALL”; “MONMOUTH FIGURE LINKED TO HISS RING.” Later the *Times* acknowledged that it had done its readers a “great disservice, though an unavoidable one,” in its coverage of the Signal Corps investigation. The *Times* conceded there was no truth in any of the Fort Monmouth spy stories, but said it had had no alternative to printing them. “It is difficult, if not impossible,” said the *Times*, “to ignore charges by Senator McCarthy just because they are usually proved false. The remedy lies with the reader.” Richard Rovere commented on this statement in *Senator Joe McCarthy*:

To many people, this was rather like saying that if a restaurant serves poisoned food, it is up to the diner to refuse it. Yet the *Times* was, I believe, essentially right, for I suspect there is no surer way to a corrupt and worthless press than to authorize reporters to tell the readers which “facts” really are “facts” and which are not. Certainly in those countries where this is the practice, the press serves the public less well than ours.

It would hardly seem to be “serving the public” to print without challenge “facts” which reporters and editors should have regarded as highly questionable because they came from a source—McCarthy—whom they had come to know as highly suspect. It was not so difficult as Rovere suggested for reporters to get to the facts, nor for a newspaper editorially to question the character and motives of an investigation like Fort Monmouth. The reader depends on his daily newspaper for facts; he has no choice but to accept them or reject them. If he rejects them out of instinct, he is left with what he believes to be a false set of facts, but no truth. If the facts eventually come out—as they usually do—it is long after the event. The reader may then upbraid his newspaper and insist that the next time it seek out the truth. But by this time the newspaper has forgotten Fort Monmouth and may be busy with another case of

tainted news.

“Objectivity,” which would seem to be at the core of the Roverian dilemma, depends on many factors which often are entirely nonobjective. Melvin Mencher of the *Albuquerque Journal* (he later became a professor at the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism) demonstrated this in a review of the handling of a story on McCarthy and Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic candidate for President in 1952, in the *Nieman Reports* (Winter 1962). During the 1952 campaign, McCarthy issued a statement about a speech he was to give, and the Associated Press in its lead on the story said McCarthy asserted he would “show connections between [Stevenson] and known Communists and Communist causes.” In this actual speech, which the AP also reported, McCarthy named neither a single Communist nor Communist cause associated with Stevenson. The AP story did not record this fact. If someone had taken the time to compare the two McCarthy statements, Mencher said, and then called McCarthy a liar, undoubtedly AP would have carried the criticism as “objective journalism.”

Some papers played the Stevenson story down on the ground that McCarthy had made similar charges before and it was not news, in the strict sense. The second paragraph of the *New York Times* story said, “Senator McCarthy did not present any new material in his speech.” The *Milwaukee Journal* employed a device (Rovere would have disapproved) which it had been using for some time in dealing with McCarthy: its story had a parenthetical refutation of one of McCarthy’s points. Some newspapers buried the story; others listed all the accusations; still others eliminated most of the detailed allegations. In some stories McCarthy “blasted,” “charged,” and “accused.” In others he “tried to give his listeners the impression” or “sought to impress” or “reviewed virtually all of his previous charges.” This would indicate, said Mencher, “that objectivity is actually relative to the reporter, the desk, the makeup man and to less tangible forces.” Less tangible, perhaps, but more influential forces, such as sympathy or hostility toward Stevenson on the part of editor or publisher. It would also indicate that the *Milwaukee Journal* practice, if employed by other newspapers in the interest of immediate correction of false statements or distortions of fact, could have served the principle of objectivity far more effectively than the publication of one-sided material emanating from the Senator.

In the last weeks of 1953, neither the *Times* nor any other New York newspaper seemed interested in “new material” about McCarthy, particularly if it was being offered by persons who had suffered at McCarthy’s hand. In November a group calling itself the Trade Union Veterans Committee announced plans in New York for a “public trial” of McCarthy, with witnesses drawn from among those “who were attacked and maligned, or who are under attack now by McCarthy.” The charges against McCarthy were three counts of violation of the Criminal Code of the United States: acceptance of bribes while in office; violation of the Corrupt Practices Act; and conspiracy to subvert the Consti-

tution. The trial date was set for January 6th, 1954. Numerous halls refused to house the meeting, and radio and television stations expressed no interest in covering. Every New York metropolitan newspaper refused advertisements for the meeting. In only one instance was an explanation offered: the *New York Post*, which had accepted a check in payment for an advertisement, then returned it with a note reading, "Because of censorship the advertisement was omitted." News of the trial spread rapidly, however, and the newspapers which had refused the advertisements embarked on a campaign in editorials, columns, and nonobjective news stories to mark the event as a "Moscow trial" organized by "Reds." Five thousand persons filled the St. Nicholas Arena in Manhattan for the trial, and 2,000 more listened in a smaller hall in the same building. McCarthy was found guilty as charged, but on Capitol Hill he was still free and in favor, as President Eisenhower's State of the Union message that same week demonstrated. The *Washington Post* said:

When President Eisenhower socked the Reds it was like Old Glory being unfurled in the breeze, or the United States Cavalry arriving on the scene just in time to save the settlers from an Indian massacre.... Nothing else in the 55-minute speech evoked anywhere near such applause.

A few weeks later, Attorney General Brownell was proudly listing the record of the Eisenhower Administration: legal action against 54 Communist Party leaders, 12 "front" groups, and 714 "subversive" aliens; 12 unionists indicted on charges of falsely signing Taft-Hartley affidavits; and a proposal under study to outlaw the Communist Party. McCarthy was on a nationwide tour sponsored by the Republican National Committee, and it must have been a heady experience—so heady that it led McCarthy to make the move which eventually would destroy him. He denounced a respected Army officer, Brigadier General Ralph W. Zwicker of the Army Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth, as "not fit to wear the uniform" and undertook an investigation of the Army loyalty-security program. Speculation about McCarthy's ambitions for the White House in 1956 grew again, but Walter Lippmann disagreed. McCarthy's immediate objective, he said in his column of March 8, was

to show that even in the Army he is a bigger man than they are, and thus to expand his power by making himself feared. [McCarthy is] a candidate for supreme boss—for dictatorship—of the Republican Party.... His unconcealed purpose is to break and subdue the President and the Executive branch of the government, the Republican Party in Congress, the national organization of the party. If any Republican still thinks that McCarthy's prime target is Communism and not the capture of the Republican Party, he will live and learn differently.

The forces that had set McCarthy in motion back in 1950 now moved in unison to stop him. The White House took up the challenge and defended the Army; the Senate ordered an investigation of McCarthy; and the press cried "Enough!" On February 26, 1954, the *New York Times* said editorially:

This question [the Army's handling of the security investigation] sinks into unimportance compared to the question of a Senator pillorying a distinguished Army officer because the orders under which the officer acted are displeasing to the Senator. This fight ought to have been fought on the basic issue of whether or not the Executive branch of this government, including the Army, is being run by President Eisenhower or Senator McCarthy. The Administration has attempted to appease a man who cannot be appeased. We do not believe that the American people are so blind that they will fail to see what happened here. What happened here is a domestic Munich, and all the pious platitudes in the world will not hide that fact.

The *Washington Post* editorial on the same day also had a German analogy:

Who now dares, without threat of smear, proclaim the traditional doctrine that a man is innocent until proven guilty? The inquisitor is now the prosecutor, judge and jury. The confusion and distortion over the security risks in government are the direct result of this corrosion. The Foreign Service has been sacrificed on the altar of the false god, McCarthy. Now it is the military service. McCarthyism has succeeded in deflecting our attention from the real enemy in Communist imperialism to the suspicion of our neighbors. That is the way Germany, and particularly the German army, went under Hitler.

The editorial outrage was still confined to McCarthy's methods (the Communist imperialist enemy remained the universal anathema), but now these methods were threatening to discredit an institution vital to the fight against Communism—the United States Army—and, through it, the Presidency.

What the press would not discuss—and what was at the core of the matter—was discussed by two legal experts who served in the office of the Army General Council during the Army-McCarthy hearings in the spring of 1954. They were Norman Dorsen, professor of law at New York University, and John G. Simon, professor of law at Yale. In an analysis entitled "A Fight on the Wrong Front" in the *Columbia University Forum*, Fall 1964, they wrote that the Army loyalty-security program was fully enforced by the Army, and there was no dispute between the Army and McCarthy on this score. In fact, McCarthy's efforts caused the Army to apply its program even more vigorously and the civilian employees at Fort Monmouth suffered far more at the hands of the Army than they did at McCarthy's hand. The article concluded:

It was not Senator McCarthy who damaged Monmouth employees and Army draftees as much as their Pentagon superiors. McCarthyism could injure individuals only to the extent that those in power cooperated with it. Thus, destroying Senator McCarthy was not alone what the country needed. It also needed public officials who had the instinct, intelligence, and courage to do the right thing at the time when the issues arose—not two or three years later, when shelving McCarthyism would no longer create a storm. Senator McCarthy did present the ultimate test of the Administration's mettle, and the Administration, by eliminating him, eliminated the challenge. But that should never have been necessary.

Certainly, Dorsen and Simon agreed, the

Senator's decline and fall dated from the hearings: "Prolonged exposure to the public weakened his position as the man on horseback and sent him a horseless rider down the road to Senate censure and lonely obscurity."

The obscurity came swiftly, but the censure was delayed and, finally, mitigated. The original censure resolution was introduced on July 30, 1954, by Senator Ralph Flanders, Republican of Vermont, but was postponed after Senator William Knowland, Republican for California, raised strenuous objections. The resolution read: "Resolved, That the conduct of the Senator from Wisconsin is contrary to Senatorial traditions, and tends to bring the Senate in disrepute, and such conduct is hereby condemned." The Knowland move to postpone was supported by 75 Senators. The actual censure motion came December 2, and the vote was 67 to 22. The main basis for the censure had been changed, however, from the long-standing charges against McCarthy for general misconduct to a list of specific statements he had made about the select committee of the Senate that had been named to judge him.

And suddenly McCarthy was not news. The reporters who had been assigned to cover him for five years (they were known as the Goon Squad) were reassigned. When McCarthy spoke on the Senate floor, or when a speech was scheduled, the reporters in the press gallery found they had pressing business elsewhere. Pavlovian journalists who once responded salivating to his ringing calls for press conferences responded to other bells and turned to avoid him when they saw him coming down a corridor. Stories about his activities (he still sought to recapture the old magic with an occasional thrust) were buried inside the papers. Why did it happen? In *The Fourth Branch of Government*, Douglass Cater expressed bewilderment: "McCarthyism was killed as surely as it had been bred by the power of publicity. Nobody, not even the editors, could tell you why."

If the editors could not tell why, it was because they would not tell why. McCarthy had been assigned to oblivion by the established power. No decree was needed; it was understood. As a creature of the same established power, McCarthy had no personal army to overturn the sentence. He was finished. The time had come to rule out the McCarthy method. It was no longer needed—the job had been done and McCarthyism-without-fanfare had become prevailing policy. The task now was to get rid of the embarrassing instrument through which the policy had been institutionalized. Somehow, the question of journalistic objectivity in the coverage of McCarthy was no longer a problem. He was still a Senator, still the chairman of an important committee, but he was no longer news. If he was not news, there was no problem about the "mechanics" of the free press which had prevented reporters from detecting and communicating the basic fact of McCarthy's lies, as Cater phrased it, when he was destroying people daily on page one of the nation's press.

The altered attitude toward McCarthy as news

was underscored by Edwin R. Bayley, a political reporter from the *Milwaukee Journal* throughout McCarthy's rise to power, who later became dean of the Graduate School of Journalism at the University of California at Berkeley. McCarthy never communicated directly with Bayley because the *Journal* had been a severe critic of the Senator. But he sent messages, usually complaints about the handling of stories, through Dion Henderson, an Associated Press staff writer in Milwaukee. Henderson's office adjoined the *Journal* city room. He was then writing a novel about a politician, and the figure of McCarthy fascinated him. Whenever the Senator came to Milwaukee during the last two years of his life, he would visit with Henderson. In an article in the *New Republic* of May 16, 1960, Bayley wrote:

What they talked about, most of all, was newspapers. McCarthy was obsessed with the subject. He was bitter when, after his attacks inevitably turned against the Eisenhower Administration, he found himself relegated to the back pages. Why, he asked over and over, was the same kind of attack big news in '50 and nothing much in '55?

One Saturday afternoon Henderson came into the *Journal* city room with a statement that McCarthy had given to Henderson with a bet that the *Journal* would not print it. He had been reading Jefferson, McCarthy told Henderson, and the statement had been influenced by his reading. In it, he upheld the right to dissent, to hold unpopular, even subversive opinions; that was our most important right, he said, and no man should be persecuted for his beliefs. The statement was entirely out of character, and both newspapermen wondered whether it might not be a McCarthy trick to test the *Journal*. In any case, Bayley decided, it was something that could not be handled in a routine fashion, and his story sought "to put it into perspective, to indicate that I did not know whether it meant anything, but that this was what McCarthy had said. I tried to show how it conflicted with McCarthy's previous statements and actions, without being too editorial about it, and left it to the reader to make the judgement."

He turned the story in. It did not appear in the Sunday paper. On Monday he inquired and couldn't find anyone who knew of a decision not to use the story. Henderson had written a story also which had gone out over the AP state wire. His recollection was that two or three state papers had used 50 to 100 words on Monday in a routine rewrite of the original Saturday story. Bayley concluded about the *Journal* blackout:

I think the *Journal's* decision probably was right. It might have been a hoax, a last attempt to exploit the press. McCarthy might have repudiated it. Henderson however, thinks that McCarthy might have changed the whole direction of his career if the story had been run. If the story had been printed and noticed, it might have had the effect of showing up McCarthy as what he is now quite generally believed to have been—a reckless cynic who loved excitement and the feel of power, but who stood for nothing in particular. I think it was a last foolish gamble with what was left of his political capital to prove a minor point to himself about the newspapers

he hated. It was a gamble that he thought he had won.

Gamble or not, it proved conclusively a major point: McCarthy was no longer news. The sacred canon of objectivity no longer applied. He was still a Senator, still the man who had commanded more headlines than any other figure in America for five years, but the signal had been given, and, without need for meetings or conferences, the world of journalism had decreed him to be less than routine.

Phong Hien, Le Van Hao and H.N. ASPECTS OF NEOCOLONIALIST CULTURE (Viet Nam, 1974)

I. THE "POLITICAL WAR"

"At present, the war in Viet Nam has an ideological character... That is why political warfare weighs more heavily than any other issue," says Gen. Tran Van Trung, Head of the Political Warfare Department of the Saigon regime. Under this regime, all cultural activities are governed by "political warfare" (Chien tranh chinh tri), another name for psychological war (Psywar), which was brought to its peak with the Americanization of the war in 1965.

The same general defines "political war" as "a battle which employs intelligence, skill and ideological instruments to produce psychological and ideological changes in men."

The military junta rigged up by Washington regards "the army as the principal force in all political struggles to strengthen and maintain national union and do away little by little with social differentiations."¹ The Political Warfare Department, an arm of the Army General Staff, extends its ramifications into all units. On specific occasions, campaigns of downright misinformation have been organized, for instance in October 1972, to provide explanations on the imminent peace. These campaigns mobilize officers of all ranks, military cadets and NCO's, etc.

It goes without saying that political warfare is far from being merely the business of the army. It is the General Directorate for Public Relations, seconded by many other agencies, that co-ordinates and directs propaganda work among different strata of the civilian population. Particular attention is given to the rural people: "In the political struggle, we fully agree that the peasant element must benefit from our greatest solicitude because it is the majority and is the element that is particularly wooed by the communists."² "Rural pacification" moves up from threats to terror, mixed along with lies and corruption. In the cities, cultural fascistization is expressed among other things by the laws on the press and publication which become more and more draconian under the pressure of

1. General Nguyen Bao Tri, *National Defense Bulletin*, 38, August 1973.

2. "What Ideas has Peace Suggested to Us, What Must be Done?" *National Defense Bulletin*, 33, March 1973, p. 63. (Hereinafter "NDB")

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unfavourable political and military events.

THE 007-TT BRASS KNUCKLES

At a meeting with a dozen Western newsmen on September 18, 1971, Thieu declared that "If I am not loved by the people it is because there are too many newspapers in Saigon."³

It should be recalled that the putsch of November 1963 which put an end to the nine-year dictatorship of Ngo Dinh Diem led to a proliferation of sects, political parties, newspapers and magazines, especially in 1964. This anarchic upsurge was, however, of short duration. Taking the situation in hand again, the Americans pursued their plan: they removed the civilian administration in favour of the military junta which founded the State Leadership Council (June 1965) headed by Nguyen Van Thieu.

With the landing of the American GI's and the launching of a most barbarous war against the people, the regime became more and more fascist as "Americanization" was blatantly carried through: as far as the press was concerned, it was necessary to put a brake on public commentaries on the farcical nature of "national independence" which some official spokesmen themselves had to concede.⁴ An associate of Diem made this bitter remark:

When we cast a glance back on the events before and after [the putsch against Diem-Ed.], we can but feel sorry for the fate of a small nation which, behind the façade of independence, sees all levers of the administration in the hands of a foreign power.⁵

Following the people's offensive at Tet in 1968, the regime toughened up even more. Freedom of expression was hard hit. The promulgation of Law No. 19/69 (Dec. 30, 1969) re-opened the way to censorship, seizures of newspapers and magazines, incarceration of pressmen, measures which dealt severely with the student movement in Saigon and agitation in the cities as a whole. At the end of 1971, Thieu withdrew financial support from newspapers—a support which had hitherto enabled them to buy newsprint at favourable prices. The offensives and victories of the patriotic forces (Spring 1972) gave rise to a full-scale repressive campaign against the press, a campaign conducted by the Nixon-Thieu tandem in a bid to prevent the collapse of the regime. After having managed illegally to take special powers into his hands on June 27, Thieu put out a flush of decree-laws, no fewer than 60 in six months, among them that of April 4 (007-TT-SLU) against the press. By virtue of this new legal document, as of September 1st:

1. Newspapers had to pay 20 million piastres, other periodicals 10 million, as surety in anticipa-

3. *Hoa Binh*, Sept. 20, 1971.

4. "With the State Leadership Council and the Central Executive Committee, as of June 1965, the Americans virtually had complete freedom of action, at least in the military field, on SVN territory", *NDB*, 31, Jan. 1973.

5. Father Cao Van Luan, *The March of History: Memoirs (1940-1965)*, Saigon, Tri Dung Pub., 1972, p. 422.

tion of fines (Article 4). This was an "outlawing" of Saigon's own "constitution" which provides no restrictions on the freedom of opinion other than "offences against personal honour, national security and public morality."⁶

2. They could be closed down for a second offence against "public security and order" (Article 19).

3. Under the state of emergency, any organ doing harm to national security, defence, economy and finance is liable to be arraigned before a field military tribunal, and those responsible are liable to prison terms and fines ranging from one to five million piastres (Article 3).

The Saigon Press Council predicted in its communiqué of August 8, 1972: "The enforcement of this decree-law would trigger the gravest crisis ever seen in the history of the press."⁷

The 007-TT-SLU, as the *But Than* put it on August 6, 1972, was the *coup de grâce* for "a press already moribund or at least soulless." The consequences were not slow in coming. One month and a half after its promulgation, 30 newspapers and periodicals had ceased publication. The editor of *Viet Nam Nhat Bao*, apart from a suspended one-year jail term, had to pay a one-million-piastre fine for having reproduced an interview granted by Mr Xuan Thuy to the Soviet magazine *New Times*, and judged to be "favourable to the communist cause". Newspaper seizures could no longer be counted. It should be noted that many of the victimized organs, with circulations averaging from 60,000 to 70,000 copies, belonged to opposition parliamentarians.

The president of the Senate regards decree-law 007-TT-SLU as "an abandoned child", and "illegal" text.⁸ The Association of Newspapers Publishers "refused to recognize the new press law."⁹ Others said "In the grip of decree-law 007-TT-SLU, the press naturally becomes the monopolized voice of the flunkies of the oligarchy; if cannot but betray its *raison d'être*: to serve the truth and the masses."¹⁰ "This would amount to deadening public opinion, betraying the mission of the press."¹¹ Nguyen Manh Con, who claims to have behind him "30 years of anti-communism", pointed out "Decree-law 007 puts the press in the position of a man with a sword at his throat: the government shows clearly that it does not in the least take account of the reactions of press circles and the discontent of the majority of intellectuals."¹²

In the pattern of the 007-TT-SLU brass knuckles, other repressive measures hit the publishing business and culture as a whole. Deprived of the benefits of privileged prices as a subsidy, publishers are compelled to buy newsprint on the free market at exorbitant prices. Furthermore, they must pay a new tax immediately after publication of books.

6. *Chinh Luan*, August 7, 1972.

7. *Doi Dien*, 39, Sept. 1972.

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Tin Sang*, 2579, August 9, 1972.

10. *Doi Dien*, 39, Sept. 1972.

11. *Xay Dung*, 2568, Aug. 5, 1972.

12. Nguyen Manh Con "Reflections on the Formation of a State," *NDB*, 31, Jan. 1973.

With the current cost of living it is not hard to see the material difficulties that beset them. The lot of writers is very precarious under a regime of censorship which tends to multiply impossible taboos, to the point that a work prized by Thieu himself could not be published some time after the decree under the ridiculous pretext that "it came too late."¹³ Some poems released by the radio and the press could not be printed because of opposition from censorship.¹⁴ In a speech on November 29, 1971, Father Thanh Lang, President of the Saigon Pen Club said, "Censorship is now harsher than it was under the First Republic [of Diem], which was already condemned as dictatorial, it is harsher than under French domination.... The guillotine has fallen for good on the neck of the writer.... The road to life of the Vietnamese writer has become the road to death."¹⁵ One edifying explanation offered by an apologist of the Regime was that "there is only a minority of feeble and cowardly intellectuals. No doubt the government thinks it is difficult and even dangerous to give full liberty to intellectuals and to pamper them. In some cases of political struggle, if the intelligentsia, incapable of realizing their responsibilities, plum for dissident voices and gestures, the consequences will be very grave ... Perhaps it is within the framework of such speculations that the government is reacting right now against the intellectuals."¹⁶

The Political War Arsenal

The whole political war is orchestrated around the central theme of "nationalism:"

The word nationalism is used here first to designate an anti-communist political science... Sometimes, for the sake of propaganda, one dares to speak of 'nationalism' as if the bloc of nationalists too had a doctrine, a strategy and programs of action after the manner of the Communists. In reality, there never has been nationalism. So let us repeat that 'nationalism' is a word which designates an anti-communist stance on a purely realistic level ... To define the limits still more clearly, among those who pretend to be nationalists—if we take only into account those who are conscious of their option—only a minority is knowingly opposed to Marxism-Leninism, the majority oppose communism as a dictatorial regime....¹⁷

Proceeding from this remark of an official organ, the notion of "nationalism," nebulous and incongruous, can only be defined in opposition to the image of the communist "with a knife between his teeth and no national allegiance." In the conditions of Viet Nam, the official propaganda has had all the more difficulty in having this stereotype swallowed since it is public knowledge that the communists have been the soul of two national resistances and that the 'nationalists' have constantly

been on the other side of the barricade, with the French then with the Americans. To say nothing about the financial scandals triggered by the 'nationalists': "Anti-communism becomes the label of selfish entrepreneurs who abuse the slogans of democracy, liberty and peace, to smuggle, enrich themselves, enjoy the high life and line themselves up with foreign powers."¹⁸

"Political warfare" thus seeks to refurbish 'nationalism' and replenish the anti-communist arsenal. It pretends that as of late 1967, with the birth of the "Second Republic", "a national spirit has taken shape on South Vietnamese soil" which is no longer the prerogative of a regime as in Diem's time but belongs to a country, "the Republic of Viet Nam" struggling for survival against "communist aggression from the North."¹⁹ This is to recognize Viet Nam's political schism as final and adopt a viewpoint near to the State Department.

To justify the US presence, too damaging to the ideology of independence of which they talk, the "nationalists," who evidently fear no ridicule, affirm, "It is better to be a slave of the Americans than of the Russians and the Chinese."²⁰ One should "accept the Americans as one accepts a vital need for the survival of the South Vietnamese regime."²¹ People needed to be cured of "the utopian state of mind ... which demands of the Americans maximum aid in the means to fight the communists while bargaining with them over the smallest details."²² Details such as independence and freedom!

Thus, the "nationalist" Nguyen Van Thieu regime needs a new, somewhat gaudy coat of paint: "President Thieu's prestige has reached a peak. A national spirit is taking shape in the wake of this rise. [Thanks to him], the national spirit has become apparent and is growing to the extent that it is turning into national pride."²³

The militarization of the administration—from the centre to the village level, and the founding of the Democratic Party (of Thieu) are considered to be national necessities:

For the near future, the political tendency of most developing countries remains an authoritarian regime based on one-party hegemony. At present the military control political activities in most of these countries, but they seek to maintain their leadership by giving a civilian facade to the military regime and creating a ruling party backed by the army.²⁴

This is exactly the case of South Korea and other US-manipulated countries in Latin America.

It is natural that the "achievements" of Thieu's "national republican" regime—marvellous growth, military victories, agrarian reform, rural pacification, Viet Cong defectors (*Chieu Hoi*), democratic liberties—are the subject of endless panegyrics over the official radio and TV and in the press. A

13. *Dien Tin*, Nov. 23, 1973.

14. *Dai Dan Toc*, Nov. 23, 1973.

15. *Chinh Luan*, Nov. 30, 1972.

16. Nguyen Manh Con, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

17. *NDB*, 31, Jan. 1973, p. 57.

18. "Opium in Southern Laos and Anti-communism", *Tin Sang*, April 22-4, 1971.

19. *NDB*, 31, Jan. 1973.

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Chinh Luan*, Oct. 9, 1970.

22. "Opium in Southern Laos and Anti-communism", *Tin Sang*, April 22-4, 1971.

23. *NDB*, 31, Jan. 1973.

24. Tran Hoai Tran, "The Model of Political Evolution in Some Developing Countries" *NDB*, 34, April 1973.

Saigon newspaper observes not without irony.

No political news [i.e. no compromising ones-Ed.]. Political affairs are the business of the deputies and senators. The feature 'Opinions' has been suppressed because the citizen has no opinion to express. It is enough that one should place confidence in the clear-sighted and equitable State. The feature "Men and Events" has also been discarded: the men of the State are all talented people, everything done by the State is good. The news is supplied by the government-run agency Viet Tan Xa. It is absolutely accurate, true and reliable. The reader lives in constant well being. He eats well and sleeps soundly: when he comes home from work, he finds no trace of hooliganism, murder, thievery, or hold-up...²⁵

In the meantime, the classical bogey of the "sanguinary, heartless, anti-patriotic communist" has been exploited to the full to inspire a holy fear in less docile minds. The two principal targets are the "Viet Cong" (cadres and combatants of the NFL and the PRG of South Viet Nam) and the "Cong San Bac Viet" (North Vietnamese communists, implying all the leaders and cadres of the DRVN) towards whom hatred is publicly proclaimed. Far from being softened, the "Four Noes"²⁶ stand of Thieu was toughened still further after the signing of the Paris accord:

We recognize that peaceful co-existence with the Communists could not last if we are weaker than they are. We have no right to take a rest, thinking they need it like us. Communism is a poison which, enclosed or put under lock and key in a cupboard, remains a poison that can kill us at an inadvertent moment. We continue to regard the Communists as enemies.²⁷

There is no question of reconciliation or national concord with an enemy "having the same skin colour, the same race and sometimes linked by family sentiments", declares General Tran Van Trung whom we have already cited. To put a figleaf on an anti-national war commanded by foreign aggressors, Saigon has advanced a series of spurious arguments. The war of liberation waged by the people becomes an "internal", "civil" war, a confrontation between the communist and nationalist ideologies. The patriotic forces have been accused of aggression while Thieu's nationalist troops, even when they are commanded by US advisers and when they trampled upon Cambodian and Lao soil, are only "defending" the nation. A "political warfare" officer writes: "This is a conflict between communism and nationalism. The communists want to seize the remaining territories. The nationalist side, more moderate, is only doing a defensive job." The "nationalist South", symbol of "epic

25. *Xay Dung*, 2560, Aug. 9, 1972.

26. The "4 Noes": no to neutrality, no to coalition with the communists, no to legal communist activities, and no to partition of zones between communists and nationalists.

27. Nguyen Manh Con, in *NDB*, 33, March 1973, pp. 74-5.

28. Pham Huan, *A Day in Hanoi*, 1973, p. 6.

29. Phan Nhat Nam, *A Hot Summer*, Sang Tao, 1972, pp. 12, 126.

30. Pham Huan, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-1.

31. *Song Than*, March 17, 1973.

valour", is presented as a "martyr".²⁸

The term "aggressor" has been imputed not to the Americans but to the North Vietnamese of whom the members of the NFL are merely executive agents. The leaders of the DRVN and Workers' Party are billed as fanatic megalomaniacs. The militants of the NFL, "deluded poor unconscious creatures, plunged in illusion and menaced by constant danger", form an "inert, desperate and utterly weary mass." On the contrary the GIs are presented as "blocks of steel" "confident and calm", "with an unshakable will", "physically and spiritually tough", equipped with "sophisticated and effective weapons". As for the "republican soldier" (of Saigon) "he fights and subsists as an incarnate miracle"; "he is quite superior to his adversary in quality and courage" he is "audacity itself, the rising star of the battlefield."²⁹ No need to challenge here these gross distortions of historical truth.

Torrents of lies and calumnies continually rain upon the DRVN, the Socialist North. "Political warfare" deforms events and puts out month-and-year-long commentaries on the "lack of freedom", "the land reform", "cultural suffocation" and "poverty". It wants to put a brake on the "nostalgia for the North", a tendency which is building up slowly but steadily because, no matter what Radio Saigon may say, the North represents a past full of glory for the entire Vietnamese people, a past it perpetuates with its successful confrontation with the world's most powerful aero-naval armada. It wants but fails to remove from the prose and poetry of the South such phrases as "turning towards the North" "regret of the North", "back to the North".

Hanoi, the heart of the North and of the country as a whole, comes under the most furious attack. The tricks sometimes can be seen through with half an eye. It was enough, for instance, to send a "political warfare" officer to the capital for a four-hour visit on the occasion of the hand-over of American prisoners; after seeing a few streets through a car window, the envoy, plumping himself on being an impartial observer, exclaims, "The Hanoi of dream and poetry has disappeared in the space of 20 years", "Hanoi is no longer a place one could live in"; and by way of conclusion, this bellicose flourish: "Hanoi must be freed from this poisonous atmosphere."³⁰ Foreigners who have recently visited the old quarter of the centuries-old city can judge the following assertion by the correspondent of *Song Than*: "There is an anxious silence in the city, the silence of a crowd gathered at a meeting after the sounds of the 'long-lives' or the 'down-withs'." (March 15, 1973). One naturally exalts Saigon, "city of disorder, hot, dry, the last sanctuary to bury one's bones in ... land of human freedom."³¹

A Pseudo-Culture

The "political" warriors are aware that criticisms alone are not sufficient. "We don't limit the political struggle to the means to floor the adversary.... On the contrary we activate at the same time and in a serious fashion, struggle and construc-

tion. In fact, these two activities are inseparable.³² The Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu brothers had already launched the watchwords: Asia, Orient, Nation, Humanism, Emancipation ... But their house of cards under the signboard of "spiritualism—personalism" collapsed with them. Foresighted people have seen since 1965, the year of massive intervention by the GIs, that "It is very likely that the US is going to establish a military front now. But the military front will not fail to extend to the political front. And, finally, from the political front, it will extend to the cultural front. Victory will be decided on the cultural front..."³³ Saigon pretends to hold the monopoly of "truly Vietnamese culture."

"Under the regimes of dictatorship, such as the communist regime, how can culture exist? Or, to be more to the point, how can culture develop?" affirms Father Tran Thai Dinh, implying North Viet Nam and the South Viet Nam liberated zone. He presents the culture he terms communist as follows: "Under a dictatorship, there is only one voice, that of the dictator. There is the voice of the people, the voice of the revolutionary organizations, the voice of literature, but it is merely the echo of the voice of the dictator."³⁴

How does the Saigon regime, paradise of liberty, intend to build *its* culture? General Nguyen Bac Tri, one of the men in charge of "political warfare" gives this answer:

One must maintain an equilibrium between material progress, and spiritual and ideological progress, an equilibrium which in itself is the force of our traditional culture, in order to avoid running into a crisis resulting from the loss of equilibrium, a crisis which affects some advanced societies and which constitutes one of the characteristics of this century.

The strategic objective of this "synthetic culture" is to hit at the Communists:

This is an occasion to remove the boundaries between the countryside and the city, something which helps foil the hostile strategy which seeks to exploit this conflict, embrace the peasants and use the countryside to encircle the city."³⁵

In its "Proposed policy concerning culture and education" (June 12, 1972), the Government Council for Culture and Education states,

Culture is the way of life of a nation. It embraces everything relating to man in the community, from thinking, emotions and spiritual values to material realities. It consists of all that man has created and received in his relationship with his fellow-creatures and Nature. All these creations and these forms provide models for attitudes, ideology and natural values and aspirations, with the result that each nation is endowed with special characteristics while preserving the general traits of man.

32. Gen. Nguyen Bao Tri and Nguyen Ngoc Bach "The Political Struggle Against the Vietnamese Communists", *NDB*, 39, Sept. 1973.

33. Ho Huu Tuong, *Conference at Phu Xuan*, La Boi, p. 35.

34. "Conditions for the Development of Culture," *Bach Khoa*, 356, Oct. 15, 1971.

35. "The Political Struggle against the Vietnamese Communists," *NDB*, 39, Sept. 1973.

All this talk about culture is designed to mask two attacks against communism as viewed in the optic of Saigon: culture must transcend politics: it must enjoy a freedom which knows no bounds. This is an ugly joke contradicted by facts and the cultural fascistization described above, and decried by honest people in numerous articles.³⁶ The Saigon cultural market is flooded with American by-products. "In the name of assimilation of foreign cultures", noted the progressive writer Vu Hanh, "muck from foreign countries has been imported without discrimination..."³⁷

In recent years, although the American GIs have withdrawn from South Viet Nam, yet American culture at its worst remains. The Vietnamization of the war has not put a brake on the Americanization of life and customs. On the contrary the cultural Americanization effort, starting from 1954, is bearing poisonous fruit. The University of Michigan, the main education centre for the training of teaching personnel, the Peace Corps, the Pen Club, the USIS, the Rotary Club, the Asia Foundation, the Asia Cultural Association, the US Cultural Centre, the AID... with films, comic strips, scholarships and trips to the USA, the advisers, the GIs with their inevitable accompaniment of prostitution and brutalities, have done their work. "The American implantation in the fields of culture and art proves so serious that in Saigon, each person suspects his neighbour of being a stooge of the USA, even if he is critical of the Americans," writes a university professor in *Dien Tin* (Jan. 21, 1971). Nine radio stations, five million radio sets, 500,000 TV sets, three million dollars' worth of newsprint for the press and other publications — Washington supplies the mass media so generously.

It is interesting to underscore here an aspect of the influence of the American way of life on the way of thinking: sexual depravity is glorified as a product of "culture", "culture" being averse to "nature". With a great array of sexology and psychoanalysis, an abundant pseudo-scientific literature promotes the study of sex and sexual depravities. Dozens of books on "sexology" have been translated from French, English and German. It happens that two publishing houses raced each other to have translations of the same book off the press first. Some priests are now even taking pleasure in talking about libido and sex. The pseudo-existentialist veil of the years 1964-1968 which embellished fleshly furies under the labels of "harmony of two solitudes," "audacity in living, in being sincere,"³⁸ has fallen. In the 70's, people argue otherwise: the human body is but a garment, the sexual act is a "language" that expresses what is most human in man.

A commercialized art — in the form of beauty

36. For example: The Nguyen "Arts and Letters in the Face of the Perfidious Manoeuvres of the Cold War Network," *Trinh Bay*, 9 Dec. 1970; and "Is There Now a Line Concerning Arts and Letters?" *Doi Dien*, 25, July 1971, among others.

37. *Bach Khoa*, 331, Aug. 15, 1971.

38. Cf. "Glimpses of US neo-colonialism (II), *Vietnamese Studies* (Hanoi), 31, 1971, especially "Existentialism, Saigon Style," pp. 224-8.

shops, plastic surgery etc. — seeks to enhance the intimate details of the woman. Under the "summer dances" label, choreographers make the most of the feminine skin and flesh. Films in the same vein are termed "super productions". At another level, the adulation of foreign cultures is combined with the highlighting of a national inferiority complex. Father Tran Thai Dinh counsels: "From when do you reckon when you talk about our 4000-year history? Don't indulge in a vain pride of the past to shut your eyes on the tragic reality now prevailing!"³⁹ Professor Ta Chi Dai Truong is more specific: "The pride in the 4000-year culture is based on myths."⁴⁰ Such opinions were expressed just at the moment when foreign Vietnamologists themselves were discovering in the history of Viet Nam a tradition which partly explains the success of the resistance of its people to US aggression. Is it still necessary to point out that the introduction of American culture in particular is also an act of aggression, not an exchange on a basis of equality? It is rather part of a manoeuvre aimed at strangling our national culture, as has been denounced by the Catholic professor Ly Chanh Trung: it seeks to "transform us and our descendants into a sort of yellow-skinned Yankees, inferior to the Black Americans."

II. THE AMERICANIZATION OF EDUCATION: WASHINGTON AT THE HELM

The development of higher education in South Viet Nam is characterized by the more and more marked transition from an old-style colonialist cultural conception to a neocolonialist conception. After the signing of the 1954 Geneva Agreements, "mixed Franco-Vietnamese higher education" emigrated from Hanoi to Saigon. Pompously dubbed "National University of Viet Nam" (Vien Dai Hoc Quoc Gia Viet Nam) by the Ngo Dinh Diem administration, it involved in 1955 only a few dozen professors and lecturers and 2,000 students. US neo-colonialism was intent on seeing to it that the schools and especially the university, should be used to strengthen its ideological grip on the country; it sought to create and develop a higher education in the service of its schemes. Over the past 20 years, it has transformed higher education in South Vietnam into an organisation comprising eight universities with about 65,000 students:

Name of establishment	Year Founded	Characteristics and administration
1. University of Saigon	1955	State-run (Ministry of Education)
2. " Hue	1957	" "
3. " Can Tho	1966	" "
4. " Da Lat	1957	Catholic private (Episcopal council)
5. " Van Hanh	1964	Buddhist, private (Buddhist clergy)
6. " Hoa Hao	1959	private (Hoa Hao clergy)
7. " Minh Duc	1970	private (Catholic-influenced)
8. " Cao Dai	1972	private (Can Dai Holy See)

The heterogeneity of a half-state half-private system is to be noticed at once. But what this table

does not tell us is the foreign political and cultural impact involved in an educational system in the orbit of neo-colonialism.⁴¹

Within the framework of the Americanization of different aspects of social life, Saigon universities through a continuous and intensive process, even and especially after the pull-out of the GI's, have proceeded to the present stage of the "Vietnamization" of the war. Roughly speaking, American penetration⁴² has been carried out in two periods: it was slow and sporadic from 1955 to 1963, a period when French cultural influence predominated, but got into high gear after the fall of Ngo Dinh Diem, and has been particularly noticeable in the course of the last decade. American theorists have never concealed the fact that the cultural programs implemented in the form of aid or exchanges always go hand in hand with the policies of the State Department.⁴³

In the early 60's, the University of Hawaii tried to put into operation a program for the training of specialists in many fields of activity destined to work in the developing countries. In coordination with this, the USAID (United States Agency for International Development) funded teams of American experts and professors working in foreign countries as advisers, in a bid to promote the prestige of American culture and foster the development of foreign universities on the American pattern. Concerning South Viet Nam, three complementary programs were launched simultaneously:

1. Despatch of students to the US. Starting in 1951 when the Indochinese University was still in the hands of the French, it was strongly stepped up after 1963.

2. Despatch to the US (for more or less lengthy stays) of study groups of intellectuals and educationists.

3. On-the-spot aid to South Vietnamese universities by the sending of groups of US advisers, professors and other educational experts.

To this date, 10,000 or more South Vietnamese students have studied or are studying in the US, some 5,000 have returned to the country with American university degrees, and hundreds of intellectuals and professors of higher education have visited the metropolis in study groups.

These results are still far from meeting Washington's desires. The JUSPAO (Joint United States Public Affairs Office) has made known that by 1967, only 8 per cent of the professors at the University of Saigon held American Ph.Ds, while 37%

39. "Conditions for The Development of Culture," *Bach Khoa*, 356, Oct. 15, 1971.

40. *Bach Khoa*, 376, March 1, 1972.

41. Cf. Prof. Le Van Hao "Society and Culture in South Vietnam Cities under US Neocolonialist Domination," *Tap chi nghien euu lich su* (Hanoi), 118, Feb. 1969.

42. Cf. Doan Viet Hoat, "The Development of Modern Higher Education in Viet Nam, A Focus on Cultural and Social Political Forces," a Doctoral Thesis, not yet published.

43. Charles A. Thompson and Walter H. Claves, *Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy*, Indiana Univ. Press, 1963.

had got their degrees in France. The rate would be lower still for other universities.⁴⁴

To get rid of French influence still more quickly, the tempo of US visits by South Vietnamese university professors has been accelerated. Many American experts highly appreciate the efficacy of these measures, estimating that these academics, edified by the cultural and social achievements on the other side of the Pacific would see the Yankee advisers in a new light and show themselves more co-operative with them.

One of the major objectives of the USAID program for culture and education in Saigon consists in giving short term training in the US to the professors and experts in university administration so as to be able to dominate Saigon higher education by numbers and free it from the French grip.⁴⁵ Over the past six years, visits made to the US by professors and leaders of Saigonese faculties have multiplied. In 1967 five rectors of the universities of Saigon, Hue, Can Tho, Dalat (Catholic) and Van Hanh (Buddhist) sojourned in America and were received and encouraged by President Johnson. In 1968 it was the turn of 18 deans of faculty and university rectors; in 1969 seven other deans of faculty, etc. Within a few years, all responsible officials in Saigon higher education have made their pilgrimage to America. At the same time, USAID accelerated the remodelling of teaching programs and reorganization of the universities.

As early as 1957, a delegation of Michigan State University assisted in the founding of the National School of Administration (Hoc Vien Quoc Gia Hanh Chinh) which is responsible for the training of cadres for key posts in the regime: chiefs of district or province, heads of the ministries, the police and the intelligence services, diplomats, etc. USAID estimates that MSU has done a good job, as it has left a deep imprint on the organization, methods of work and programs of education. This success has encouraged the US authorities to act in the same direction: US advisers and actions on the spot, to change the face of Saigon higher education.

In 1961, a delegation from the University of Southern Illinois helped the South Viet Nam Ministry of Education remodel the program for the training of primary school teachers. It directly collaborated with the Saigon Teachers' Training College to run courses for the training of teachers for secondary pedagogical schools. The same work concerning teachers of secondary education was tackled by a delegation of the University of Ohio at the Saigon, Hue and Can Tho Teachers' Training Colleges.

In 1965, a team of experts from the University of Missouri helped a Saigon engineering school, while another team from the University of Florida

44. Doan Viet Hoat, *op. cit.*

45. USAID Saigon, Office of Education, *Participant Training: Objectives and Returns*, Vol. I, Saigon, 1967.

46. USAID Saigon, *Public Universities in the Republic of Viet Nam (A Report by Harry F. Bansberg and Others)*, Saigon, 1967, cited in Doan Viet Hoat, *op. cit.*

47. Cf. *Inaugural Speech at the University of Saigon Delivered by the Education Minister*, Oct. 1955.

did the same for the College of Agriculture, Forestry and Stock Breeding.

In 1966, a delegation of the University of Southern Illinois handed over to the Saigon administration a program for new-type secondary schools, dubbed "general secondary schools". The instructions were carried out to the letter: in the following year, 11 secondary schools were subject to conversion on an experimental basis.

In 1967, the University of Florida sent to South Viet Nam four teams for the study of teaching of agricultural science and three others to conduct research into the organization and administration of higher education.

At the end of the same year, after long months of work on the spot, a delegation from Wisconsin State University submitted to the Saigon administration a preliminary report—the work of seven American professors including two rectors and two deans—which gave a description of South Vietnamese higher education and proposed reforms. After the members of the delegation had been killed in a plane crash, another was formed to continue the work; it completed the earlier report and made the following suggestions:

—setting up of a Council for University Administration to administer state universities, this council would have the power to appoint and discharge rectors.

—formation of a commission of advisers for each rector, having the right to discuss the establishment of the budget and the program.

—integration of a whole series of institutes and colleges into the same system of higher education in order to facilitate measures of control and direction.

—merger of the faculties of Letters, Law and Science, for a teaching program preparatory to specialisation.⁴⁶

With the application of such measures, the contingent of "returnees from America", young and dynamic, who replaced a good number of French-trained professors at the controls, have energetically "Americanized" Saigon's higher education. Their efforts, however, run into a real cultural resistance: the patriotic students and intellectuals see in them allies and defenders of the White House and the Pentagon, whose crimes of aggression and genocide, as well as attempts at the corruption of morals, are going on in broad daylight.

In the Name of National Independence and Democracy

The characteristic of neocolonialism, in culture as well as in all other domains, is to make people believe that the indigenous government in its pay is defending national independence and democracy. Under this signboard, the Saigon authorities have advertised their anti-national and anti-democratic university reforms.

In 1955, they claimed that the University should be a melting-pot of Western and Eastern cultures.⁴⁷ Shrewd observers immediately saw in this orientation, inspired by the American advisers, a machiavellian manoeuvre. As a matter of fact, it

provided university people trained in the French style with an easy way out permitting them not to have to break at once with their culture and education. It opened the door to American culture. It gave an excuse for the Saigon administration to evade the question of the establishment of a national higher education urged by public opinion. It permitted this administration to continue to extol the outdated "Asiatic spirit" in its most conservative and most reactionary sense and which constituted the spiritual basis of the feudal and colonial epoch.⁴⁸

The coalescence of Eastern and Western cultures is a neocolonialist trap into which superficial or rootless intellectuals have been lured, besides the politicians who despise their own nations and fawn upon everything foreign. The fruit of this conception is a patched up, hybrid, anti-democratic, little realistic and anti-national culture and education which has nothing to do with a "coalescence" or a "synthesis".⁴⁹ Take the example of the Faculties of Letters: these institutes of "social sciences" regarded as "cultural and spiritual centres of South Viet Nam education" put emphasis on European and American cultures at the expense of Vietnamese culture. Until recent years, of the 30 subjects taught at the Saigon and Hue faculties of letters, three-fourths concern the USA, France, Britain, China and India. Only five concern Viet Nam. Courses on Viet Nam are only one-fifth of the total number. A university professor complains:

If the Faculty of Letters is considered the crucible of Eastern-Western culture, it is because the programs of study are divided equally among world cultures. The merger of East-West cultures is a nebulous tendency which has turned the university into a solid fortress of the urban intelligentsia, a bourgeois armchair intelligentsia.⁵⁰

Each university (Vien Dai Hoc) comprises a number of faculties independent of one another, almost without organic links. The faculties dispense an education which is fundamentally theoretical and general, academic, divorced from practice and from the reality of a South Viet Nam in the grip of misery, suffering, death, injustice and corruption. On this stagnant pond stands the university "like a lighthouse", but "a lighthouse without light"⁵¹; the professors fall back on indigested knowledge in face of a society turned upside down, the students ruminate on academic and bourgeois notions.

It is natural that such higher education is poor in research work, inventions and discoveries. Since 1955, that is, over a period of two decades, official

48. Prof. Nguyen Van Trung "Essays on Education and Higher Learning in Viet Nam" *Trinh Bay* (Saigon), 1967; Prof. Doan Viet Hoat "South Viet Nam Campus Crisis" *Tu Tuong* (Saigon), 1, March 1972.

49. Prof. Le Van Hao, *op. cit.*

50. Doan Viet Hoat "South Viet Nam Campus Crisis" *Tu Tuong* (Saigon), 1, March 1972.

51. The simile is from Prof. Ly Chanh Trung "Let's Try to Understand the Generation of 20-year-olds," a lecture given at the University of Can Tho, May 1971.

52. Prof. Le Van Hao, *op. cit.*

53. *Dien Tin* (Saigon), May 1973.

university publications of some value have been rare. Many a professor has had to turn to private publishers even abroad, to make his work known.⁵²

It suffices to read a few figures to perceive the unrealistic and anti-democratic character of South Viet Nam higher education. In the 1972-1973 academic year, more than 80% of the students (total enrolment: 65,000, three-fourths of them crowded in Saigon) went in for social sciences, the remainder for sciences, medicine, pharmacy, technology and architecture, etc. These proportions do not correspond with the needs of a region so economically undeveloped as South Viet Nam.

Eighty-five per cent of the students come from rich or well-off families, only 15% are children of farmers and workers, who must do other jobs while pursuing their studies. This is quite understandable since study entails great expenditures, apart from the high cost of living. But the student is still confronted with difficulties of all descriptions. The too rapid increase in enrolment (65,000 in 1972-73 as against only 2,000 in 1954-55) has disrupted the material foundations of the system and poses difficult problems as far as equipment and teaching materials are concerned. The buildings of the University of Saigon were not designed for lectures and research work. The Faculty of Sciences is installed in a former high school and the Faculty of Letters in a former barrack. The Thu Duc university quarter has just been completed, the new Teachers' Training College and the new Faculty of Sciences are hard hit by a shortage of equipment. Many lectures of the Faculty of Law are given in a theatre.

Difficulties of another order, and no small ones indeed, are in store for the student. In view of the academic and scholastic character of education, the young man enters the university more to get a diploma and earn his living than to satisfy his cultural needs. The regime which lives on war needs cannon-fodder. According to a current practice which is not on record in any text, it manages things in such a way that every year, the number of successful examinees does not surpass 20% of the total. The rate is lower still for higher studies. Public opinion, including that of the professors and students, has more than once condemned the eliminatory and draconian character of a university which produces too many "failures" and ends in "bankruptcy".⁵³ Even successful examinees cannot find jobs easily. Unemployment among intellectuals is so serious that a Saigon M.P. has alerted opinion in its disastrous effects on cultural life in the cities.

III. THE EXPLOITATION OF RELIGION

In the neocolonialist climate, religious organizations abound. No fewer than 30 are counted among the most important, with the total number of followers reaching close to one half of the population. Washington has done its best to steer to its advantage the four main religious currents: Catholicism, Buddhism, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, which, with their vast audience among the masses, the number of their cadres and their international relations, have become major politico-social forces.

We shall limit ourselves to studying here the typical case of the exploitation of the Catholic faith.

"Reactivated" Catholicism

In the wake of French colonialism, the White House has long wished to use the Vietnamese Catholic Church as a lever in dominating the country.⁵⁴ Aided by his brother Nhu, Diem, a protégé of Cardinal Spellman, made Catholicism the official doctrine of the regime to counter the revolutionary ideology. The 1963 putsch put an end to the efforts to spread their "personalism-spiritualism." But their successors, "President" Thieu and "Premier" Khiem in particular, have not renounced the use of the effective weapon of Catholicism.

The ultra-Catholics—excessively pro-American—have never forgiven some American factions and Saigonese politico-military forces for having liquidated Diem and dismantled his anti-communist edifice. Only five years after the death of the dictator, they proclaimed

We have had to wait until now for virtually everybody to recognize that Ngo Dinh Diem was an eminent President of South Viet Nam. The "National policies" of the strategic hamlets, the land development centres, the prosperity zones have been inscribed in golden letters along the path of national construction. The ultra-Catholics condemn the forces which have worked together to overthrow the regime of the First Republic in an absurd and inhuman manner and engender the present chaos.⁵⁵

One comes to understand the movement for the "Rehabilitation of Ngo Dinh Diem," prepared through a series of memoranda signed by adviser Lansdale, aide-de-camp Do Tho, and Father Cao Van Luan, a loyal protégé of the Ngo family. The Thieu administration has even patronized the commemoration of the anniversary of Diem's death. The latter has received a new halo through propaganda work seeking to spread the myth of an "independent spirit," victim of "his tough line" toward the Americans.

However, Father Cao Van Luan himself has recalled and not without bitterness, "You [Diem] understand the meaning of this adage; he who pats the pipers calls the tune. If you bluster, you will be smashed. The ultra-Catholics are realistic and do not let go their "big ally," although they do not know when this ally will drop them.⁵⁶ This "big ally," however, is not prepared to renounce so precious a card as Catholicism. He has created conditions for its reactivation. He continues:

In the conditions now prevailing in the country, war and post-war, through the two stages of the fight of the Vietnamese people, the Catholics must not only be

54. Cf. Mguyen Duc Dan, Phong Hein and H.N. "Ideological and Cultural Action" *Vietnamese Studies* (Hanoi), 31, 1971.

55. Tran Huu Tranh, "The Vietnamese Catholic and His Mission," *Organ of Information of the Vietnamese Catholics*, 1968.

56. Father Cao Van Luan, *op. cit.*

57. Tran Huu Thanh, *op. cit.*

58. Ngo Cong Duc, *Letter from the Vietnamese Catholics to His Holiness Paul VI*, August 1970.

present but also accept the mission of vanguard and leadership. The reason is that the Vietnamese Catholic community, though a minority, possesses a solid special doctrine, a tight organization extending from the family to the national levels, and talent at all levels, enabling it to take a lead and guide the social revolution. After the revolutionary effervescence of November 1, 1963 and the Buddhist struggle, one feels one's feet again and seeks a means to save the nation and society. One can but turn towards the Catholic elements.⁵⁷

Father Cao Van Luan merely revealed American calculations when he proposed to Ambassador Cabot Lodge that powers be returned to the Catholic-dominated Saigon military junta: Nguyen Van Thieu, president of the State Leadership Council, in June 1965, has become the President of South Viet Nam for two successive terms; Tran Thien Khiem has been nominated as Premier, to say nothing of many other Catholic generals and ministers. Thirty per cent of the members of the Saigon regular army are Catholics, placed under the spiritual direction of 22 chaplains. In the 1967-1971 mandate, Catholics held 40 of the 60 seats in the Senate and 40 of the 135 seats in the Lower House. At present they constitute the majority in both houses.

Priests of sinister reputation—who had collaborated with the French—such as Hoang Quynh and Tran Du—bring together former members of Diem's Can Lao Party and other reactionary elements in the movement of "Great Union Forces" (Luc Luong Doan Ket), 1972; the Popular Socialist Party (Nhan Xa Dang), 1968; the People's Front Against the Communist Aggressors (Mat Tran Nhan Dan Chong Cong San Xam Lang), 1972, and the Democratic Party (Dang Dan Chu) headed by Thieu in person. The Catholic Clergy also rules over the Council of Religions (Hoi Dong Ton Giao) (1965) now dubbed Joint Council for National Relief, National Defence and Reconstruction (Hoi Dong Hon Hop Cuu Tro, Phong Ve Va Tai Thiet Quoc Gia), and plants its men in the former Dai Viet and Quoc Dan Dang parties. A Saigon congressman remarked:

The Saigon regime is now more Catholic than it was under Ngo Dinh Diem... The Christian community is the only prop of this regime because, however efficacious the American support may be, it depends largely on the attitude of the Vietnamese clergy.⁵⁸

With thinly-veiled official encouragement, the religious community is experiencing a new vigour. Since Diem's downfall, four new dioceses have been created: Da Nang, Ban Me Thuot, Xuan Loc and Phu Cuong which, together with the 10 former ones, belong to two centres: Hue and Saigon. According to the 1973 figures, the clergy comprises, apart from two archbishops and 13 bishops, 2,036 priests (double the number in 1955) of different orders and parishes, twice as many priests (15 orders) and nuns (20 orders), and 1,849,252 lay people. In social sciences, 25 per cent of the professors are Catholic while in natural sciences, the figure is five per cent. The Catholic population is grouped in 16 communities led by four committees. One-third of this mass, constituted by 676,000 Northern "refugees", live in

communities of some 10,000 each in the Saigon area, in some cities and land development centres. All this constitutes an excellent prop for the regime.

With generous funds in its possession, the Catholic Church has not ceased expanding its material organization. It has 14,000 places of worship (including 30 A-category churches built at the cost of 50 million Saigon piastres each), 125 monasteries (25 of A-category), the Pius X Institute in Dalat for the training of Bachelors of Theology, four hospitals and many charity establishments. It runs two universities, in Dalat and Saigon (Minh Duc) with 4,000 Catholic and non-religious students, and two-thirds of all private primary and secondary schools (one half of their number of pupils). There are 15 Catholic secondary schools in Saigon and four in Hue. Economically, the Church owns vast land estates; the Saigon diocese runs a bank (Dai Nam) and a big hotel (the Caravelle). Catholic newspapers, publications and printing houses are on the increase.

US aid—overt or covert—plays no small part in the prosperity of the church. Let us mention, for instance, the contributions made by the American Catholic clergy, the favours granted by American officers who give and transport materials for the building of churches, etc.

Panegyric of the US-Thieu Regime

The ultra-Catholics, supporters of US armed intervention, have in their ranks four bishops and about one-fifth of the priests. They constitute a very influential minority because their bishops enjoy a great prestige in the episcopal council, their priests are dynamic elements in politico-social organizations, they hold in hand the mass of North Vietnamese "refugees" and most of the Catholic organs of information and opinion, to say nothing of the decisive support of the Americans and the regime:

The Catholics accepted the Americans and seek their support in Viet Nam in the anti-communist fight... We accept the presence of the GIs in Viet Nam: they help us resist the communists... We are prepared to collaborate with the American troops, we sincerely assist the Americans in carrying out their strategy... We are profoundly grateful to the Americans; we are ready to serve them as a horse or a buffalo to repay them for their contribution to the great cause...⁵⁹

Thus fanaticism has suffocated all national pride and prefers the foreign yoke to the freedom of the country. This is basically the continuation of the blind anti-communism expressed in the "Circular Letter of the Vietnamese bishops" (Nov. 1951)⁶⁰, a

59. Tran Huu Thanh, *op. cit.*

60. In its appeal of Nov. 4, 1973, the Third International Assembly of Christians in Solidarity with the Peoples of Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia held in Turin considered the spirit of this letter to be outmoded, and appealed to the Vietnamese clergy to work for national concord in accordance with the Paris agreement and cease prohibiting the Catholics from cooperating with the communists, that is, in fact, with those who have assumed the essential part of the national liberation movement.

61. Some noisy anti-Thieu demonstrations organized

profession of faith inspired by the papal nuncio Dooley: Catholics were forbidden to collaborate with "the Viet Minh saboteurs of religion and opponents of the French." Any violation of this ban would bring excommunication. Today these Catholics declare themselves enemies of the NFL and of the patriots as a whole, while the new protectors of the faith are the Americans. "defenders of the civilization of the empire of Heaven" in the words of Cardinal Spellman at Christmas 1966. Another argument in favour of Catholic collusion with the US-Diem administration arising from this theological sophism is that it is necessary to support any regime which supports Catholicism, however corrupt it may be.⁶¹

Thus in spite of the Appeal of the Third International Assembly of Christians in Solidarity with the Peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, the ultra-Catholics have not calmed down following the signing of the Paris Agreement. They keep calling the communists "demons, vipers", and accusing them of being "aggressors" in their own country. Is it necessary to recall that, in violation of the spirit of Vatican II, Father Nguyen Khac Ngu urged that the words "against the atheistic communists" be recorded in the resolution of the Asian Synod (Nov. 1970). Father Tran Du came out against the Appeal for Peace in Viet Nam launched by Pope Paul VI. Efforts were made to launch a movement for emigration to Australia and South America right after the first session of the Four Party Conference in Paris. Pressure was brought to bear on a bishop to compel him to withdraw his statement: "In any circumstances, the Vietnamese Catholics will remain in Viet Nam". Priests who translated the documents of the 1971 World Synod and had them published in the magazine *Chon* (Choice) were rebuked vigorously. Father Nguyen Viet Khai was dismissed for having preached national concord: his Vinh Thanh parish has been placed under "local interdiction" for having supported him in the struggle against exploitation and oppression.

The Archbishop of Saigon, Nguyen Van Binh, has taken up the cudgels for the Thieu regime in the matter of the political prisoners and that of the five leaders of the young Workers' movement. Against the assertions of Bishop Gumbleton in the *National Catholic Reporter*, May 11, 1973, he has tried to justify the arbitrary detention of civilians, going to lengths in denying the existence of 200,000 political prisoners incarcerated by the regime.⁶²

The ultra Catholics want to delay as long as possible the application of the decision of Vatican II. They pretend that these decisions are not necessary in Viet Nam where the phenomena of

by the ultra-Catholics are merely demagogic masquerades to disavow a US agent who has become too discredited.

62. Cf. appeal of the Turin Third International Assembly of Christians of Nov. 1973: "In South Viet Nam, the US government and the Saigon administration are responsible for the worsening situation because they have particularly refused to recognize the Third Force and set free 200,000 political prisoners whose only guilt is to want peace and the restoration of democratic liberties in the country."

Catholics leaving the church and of atheism are not so serious as they have been in Europe or America. Renovation is thus carried out only for form's sake; employment of Vietnamese in ceremonies, simplification of rites, exemption from kneeling during services. Several years after Vatican II, its documents have yet to be translated and submitted for discussion among the masses of believers.

Nevertheless, the identification of the spiritual with the temporal, especially with American domination and Saigon's bellicose anti-communism, in the long run presents a deadly danger for Catholicism. This is just what a clear-sighted section of the Vietnamese clergy has come to realize. So there have arisen more flexible tendencies of all shades, some of which are genuinely progressive. Besides those who struggle in the ranks of the NFL, there are those of the Third Force, the radical intellectuals who want to enter into a sincere dialogue with the other sides, particularly the Viet Nam cong giao (Catholic Vietnamese) group.⁶³

The cultural fascistization by "political warfare," the Americanization of higher education and the exploitation of religious faith are part and parcel of global neocolonialist strategy. The cultural resistance in the zone controlled by Saigon as well as in the liberated zone is developing in strength, especially in this period of "half war, half peace," when cultural confrontation is no less important than military confrontation. The position of the patriots can be summed up in this point of the Programme of Action of the PRG of the RSVN:

"To combat the enslaving and depraved US-oriented culture and education which are impairing our people's fine cultural traditions. To build a national and democratic culture and education, to develop science and technique...To raise the cultural standards of the people..."

**Carol Brightman
Michael Klare**

SOCIAL RESEARCH AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE SCIENCE OF NEOCOLONIALISM

(USA, 1970)

RESEARCH TASKS

The university and think-tank professors, the foreign area specialists and intelligence gatherers, and the private researchers who comprise the counter-insurgency research network currently perform five basic tasks for the U.S. government.

At the top of the list is the investigation of the social factors which may in turn precipitate or preclude insurgency, particularly in agrarian societies where the "social controls" built into advanced industrial countries are weak or altogether absent. Second is the development of operational "models" (usually through historical analogue) which identify those aspects of an actual state of insurgency most susceptible to military control. The third task brings the research network into the forefront of psychological warfare operations. Like the first, it is based on a thoroughgoing investigation of the social underpinnings of the target culture—although here attention is focused on those values, social relations and communications institutions which lend themselves to external manipulation in the interests of U.S. military policies. The fourth task entails the production of anthropological and sociological information which can be used by the U.S. to intervene in the political and social processes of the host country. In particular it involves the production of "elite studies" and studies of minorities which enable the U.S. to play off the classes and sectors of the host country population against each other in the interest of U.S. hegemony. Finally, there is a fifth task, which to a large extent underlies and shapes the other four: the development of political-military strategies for the maintenance of U.S. power in the world arena. Using elaborate war games, computer simulation techniques and mathematical model-building, teams of social scientists plot the strategic scenarios which in turn guide the mechanisms of intervention with which the U.S. pursues its imperial interests in the Third World.

I. SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE

Insurgency, by official definition, exploits indigenous conditions: it draws its *legitimacy* from popu-

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63. The usual term is Nguoi cong giao Viet Nam (Vietnamese Catholics); in Nguoi Viet Nam cong giao (Catholic Vietnamese) the inversion is not simply a play upon words, but a desire to put emphasis on the nation.

lar discontent with the established order, and its *force* from collective, local struggle. Hence the first requirement of counterinsurgency research is to locate and identify the conditions which breed insurgency so that it will be possible to neutralize them or channel them into manageable forms of protest. A preliminary announcement of Project Camelot by the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of the American University stated that the Army had agreed to fund the project because of "the recognition at the highest levels of the defense establishment of the fact that relatively little is known, with a high degree of surety, about the social processes which must be understood in order to deal effectively with problems of insurgency."¹ Project Camelot was to have filled that gap in our knowledge by identifying the "preconditions and precipitants of internal conflict and the effects of indigenous government actions on those verbalizing conditions."²

With the demise of Project Camelot in 1966 it became necessary to institute a substitute program of research in this area. In order to forestall renewed criticism, Camelot's tasks were broken down into separate research projects and distributed to a number of universities and think-tanks; most of this work, however, was retained by the Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS), the successor to SORO. The CRESS Work Program Fiscal Year 1967 lists several projects which are clearly related to the original Camelot program. One study, entitled "A Survey and Formalization of Theories and Propositions Relevant to Revolutionary Social Processes," was designed to "produce a codified and readily retrievable system of knowledge, facts and theory relevant to revolutionary potential and related social processes—preconditions, precipitants, forms and consequences."³ A second CRESS project on "World Patterns of Civil Violence" was intended "to increase understanding of the conditions under which violence enters into the political process by making exploratory tests across polities of multivariate predictive models of the incidence of political violence in developing areas."⁴

As the war in Vietnam increased in intensity, the U.S. became increasingly concerned with the sociological and psychological characteristics of guerrilla organizations. In particular, the Pentagon sought to identify the factors which led peasants in underdeveloped societies to give their loyalty to an underground political organization at the risk of their lives. In this way, it was hoped that the U.S. would be able to develop mechanisms for breaking down these patterns of loyalty and securing popular

support for our client governments. An early SORO study of "Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare," prepared by Andrew Molnar in 1963, begins with the statement that: "...it is vital to U.S. defense interests, particularly those of the U.S. Army, to have as complete an understanding as possible about the nature of undergrounds — their origins, membership, organization, missions, strategies, methods of action and relationships to other elements of the total revolutionary movement, such as guerrilla units." In 1966 Molnar began work on a project entitled "The Communist Movement in South Vietnam: A Case Study in Organization and Strategy." In announcing this project CRESS indicated that

this study will consist of a detailed analysis of captured enemy documents and literature, and broadcasts, disseminated from relevant Communist Bloc and uncommitted nations during the years 1957-65. Included in the analysis will be: (1) the Lao Dong (People's Revolutionary Party) (2) the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam, and its associated mass organizations and administrative responsibilities, and (3) the military forces.

The RAND Corporation has conducted several classified studies of "Viet Cong Motivation and Morale" for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. As part of this effort, J.J. Zasloff of RAND in 1966 prepared a study entitled "Political Motivation of the Viet Cong: The Vietnam Regroupees." An abstract of the study indicates:

This memorandum draws mainly on 71 exhaustive interviews that RAND's field team conducted in 1964-65 with captives and defectors among the regroupees, the Southern Communist troops who were moved to North Vietnam after 1954 and were later trained and re-filtered in large numbers to serve as cadres in the current struggle. The study seeks to illustrate the thinking and morale of these regroupees by quoting extensively from their own statements.

II. COUNTERINSURGENCY MODELS

The second category of counterinsurgency "software" research is oriented towards the solution of paramilitary problems through the projection of historical or predictive "models" which delineate the stages of insurgency and probable outcome of various government countermeasures at each of these stages. In a discussion of this kind of research, CRESS stated in 1966 that "The Subcommittee on Behavioral Sciences of the Defense Science Board last year called for more application of operations research methods in the behavioral and social sciences, including the need for 'a study effort to determine the feasibility of applying the currently developing techniques of social systems modeling and simulation to the exploration of the parameters of the insurgency/counterinsurgency problem.'"⁵ In response to this need, CRESS proposed a study of "The Development of Analytic Models of Social Processes." The CRESS study, conducted by Robert Boguslaw and Charles Windle, was designed to "develop a prototype simulation of a society undergoing rapid political, social, or economic change in

1. SORO press release, Dec. 4, 1964, from Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot*, Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1967, pp. 47-9.

2. SORO press release, June 15, 1965, from Horowitz, pp. 60-67.

3. American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, *Work Program for Fiscal Year 1967*, Washington, D.C., The American University, 1966, p.47. (Hereinafter cited as *Work Program 1967*.)

4. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

order to ... create a test environment for assessing the impact of alternative political, economic, or military actions taken within or with respect to such societies."⁶

The most extensive program of research on the application of social systems modeling to the problem of countering insurgency was undertaken in 1965 by Abt Associates of Cambridge, Mass. In response to a request from the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), Abt developed several manual counterinsurgency games, in which human players represented insurgents, villagers and government troops in simulated exercises of various counterinsurgency strategies. These games included "AGILE-COIN", a counterinsurgency game; "URB-COIN", an urban counterinsurgency game, and "POLITICA", a manual "countersubversion and counterconspiracy game". In a theoretical discussion of this mode of analysis, Abt researcher Holly J. Kinley, explained:

The study of insurgency involves the consideration of a great many complicated variables interacting with each other. Clearly the insurgency process involves an intricate web of political, military and economic factors whose parameters and interactions are known intermittently and imprecisely at best.

In circumstances where a process so little understood and so complex is to be analyzed, it is often fruitful to proceed by means of modeling and simulation. A model may be defined as a simplified representation of a process (usually a complicated process), and a simulation as the exercise of operation of that model. By these definitions a simulation presupposes the existence of a model, and implies that the model's variables are given particular (though not necessarily precisely known) values for the purpose. The model may then be exercised, that is, the simulation may be carried out, using human players (a manual game), or an electronic computer (a computer simulation), or a combination of both...

...[This] technique provides a vehicle to assist the transition from the qualitative to the quantitative, and from subjective impressions to objective analysis. It permits the consideration of a dynamic process as an integrated whole, whereas separate examination of each element might suggest a totally misleading picture of the overall process.⁷

Theoretical exercises of this sort require a great quantity of raw data on historical instances of insurgent and counterinsurgent warfare. Not surprisingly, the Pentagon has shown particular interest in the experience of the European colonial powers in fighting anti-guerrilla wars against liberation movements in Africa and Asia following World War II. In the early 1960s, the Department of Defense commissioned a comprehensive series of studies of the French-Indochinese War (1946-54), the French-Algerian War (1954-1960), and the British anti-guerrilla war in Malaya (1947-1960). These earlier struggles for national liberation anticipated many of the features of the present conflict in Southeast Asia,

6. *Ibid.*

7. Holly J. Kinley, "Development of Strategies in a Simulation of Internal Revolutionary Conflict," *The American Behavioral Scientist*, Nov., 1966, 5-6.

8. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Documentation Center, *Technical Abstract Bulletin*, May 15, 1967. (This periodical hereinafter cited as TAB.)

and the Pentagon's strategists have studied them closely to develop tactics for the U.S. military effort in Vietnam.

Riley Sunderland of the RAND Corporation prepared a number of studies in Malaya, including: "Army Operations in Malaya, 1947-60", "Anti-guerrilla Intelligence in Malaya", and "Resettlement and Food Control in Malaya, 1948-1960". These reports, all highly classified, were based on secret British military documents. While all of these studies are relevant to the conflict in Vietnam, the U.S. has shown particular interest in the British resettlement program in Malaya; it is a well-known fact that the U.S. "strategic hamlet" program in Vietnam was based on the British effort in Malaya. The Algerian war has also served as a model for U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. The Research Analysis Corporation (RAC) prepared a report on "Helicopter Operations in the French-Algerian War", and David Galula of RAND contributed a study of "Pacification in Algeria, 1956-58".

The Atlantic Research Corporation of Alexandria, Va., was commissioned by ARPA to conduct a series of studies on insurgency and counterinsurgency in Latin America. An early study, entitled "A Historical Survey of Patterns and Techniques of Insurgency Conflicts in Post-1900 Latin America" was designed to "identify patterns and techniques of national and lower-scale insurgency conflicts in Latin America since 1900 in order to derive data of assistance to U.S. planning for research and development requirements of military counterinsurgency operations in Latin America". The Georgetown Research Project of Atlantic Research subsequently prepared a series of detailed reports on counterinsurgency activities in selected Latin American countries as part of Project Agile. These studies included "A Depth Study of Communist Insurgency and Government Counteraction in Colombia", and "A Study of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Operations and Techniques in Venezuela, 1960-64."

Even the experiences of the Axis Powers during World War II have been studied in this drive to accumulate information on the tactics of counterinsurgency warfare. In 1966, Chong Sik Lee of the RAND Corporation completed a report on "Counterinsurgency in Manchuria: The Japanese Experience, 1931-1940." According to the author, this study consisted of

an examination of the methods used by the Japanese in the successful suppression of insurgency in Manchuria in the 1930s. The Japanese official documents translated for this study comprise a report on collective hamlets published by the Manchukuo Ministry of Defense Advisory Department, an organization charged with the ultimate security of Manchuria, and eight documents on selected aspects of Japanese operations, particularly reports on pacification, propaganda and Communist organization. The documents, selected for their relevance to problems encountered in other counterinsurgencies, are supplemented by a commentary that analyzes the problems faced and the solutions found. [Emphasis added]⁸

III. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

The third task performed by social scientists on behalf of U.S. counterinsurgency programs is the development of techniques and materials for psychological warfare operations. Research on psychological operations (or, in military jargon, PSYOPS) actually involves two kinds of tasks: first, basic research on the mechanisms of "attitude change" and persuasion, and second, anthropological and sociological research on specific societies to determine the symbols and arguments that will be most effective in producing certain attitudes in the target population. (At this point it should be noted that the U.S. government does not encourage the use of the word "propaganda" in discussions of the Pentagon's psychological warfare programs; we shall see however, that the distinction between U.S. programs in "intercultural communication"—the approved terminology—and classical propaganda activities is non-existent.)

Basic research on the mechanisms of attitude change is now being conducted by several American universities under contract to the Department of Defense. Elliott McGinnies of the University of Maryland holds a Navy contract for work on a "Cross-Cultural Investigation of Some Factors in Persuasion and Attitude Change." This ongoing project, according to McGinnies, is designed "to evaluate the effects of several methods of assessing and influencing attitudes in general cultural environments." As part of his work, McGinnies in 1966 prepared a report on "Involvement and Source Credibility as Variables in Persuasion with Japanese Students," which described "five experiments conducted in major Tokyo universities to assess the significance of source credibility and personal involvement as factors in the persuasibility of Japanese students." In a follow-up report, "Factors Involved in Modifying Hostile Attitudes," McGinnies will describe his study of "the factors which determine whether attitude change of Far East groups is based on persuasive communications on strategic issues."⁹ McGinnies' work is augmented by an Air Force-sponsored study of "Cross-Cultural Studies in Persuasion" being conducted by J.C. Whittaker of North Dakota State College.¹⁰

The Special Operations Research Office was originally set up to perform research on psychological warfare, and this work continues to be a major responsibility of CRESS. As part of an ongoing program in "Intercultural Communications," CRESS is required to produce "Intercultural Communications Guides" for all Third World countries where the U.S. Army engages in PSYOPS. Since the program began in 1957, SORO-

9. "Policy Planning Studies with Foreign Policy Implications," *Congressional Record—Senate* (May 1, 1969), p. S4418. Table of research projects inserted by Sen. J. William Fulbright. (Hereinafter cited as "Policy Planning Studies.")

10. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Internal Organizations and Movements, *Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive*. Hearings, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. IX, p. 147.

11. *Ibid.*, Pt. VIII, p. 1086.

12. *Work Program 1967*, p. 17.

CRESS has produced 25 of these guides, which were formerly known as Psychological Operations Handbooks. In testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Relations, SORO stated in 1964 that:

Each handbook provides appeals and symbols of tested persuasiveness for communicating messages to specific audiences in a given country. Each study further seeks to identify various groupings in the population—ethnic, geographic, economic, social, etc.—and their attitudes and probable behaviour toward the United States. The studies assess the susceptibility of the various audiences to persuasion and their effectiveness or influence in their own society....A number of 'appeal ideas' which could be used in specific situations to influence specific audiences in the desired direction are suggested. In addition, each study contains the latest available data on communication facilities within the country and on cultural factors relevant to communications. [Emphasis added]¹¹

CRESS has already published Intercultural Communications Guides for Afghanistan, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Colombia, The Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Vietnam, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. All of these documents are classified.

A second CRESS program in PSYOPS, "Characteristics of Communist Societies Relevant to U.S. Military Interests," is designed to "identify and describe characteristics of the social systems of Communist countries pertinent to military planning." A 1966 description of this project, which was originally called "Sociological and Psychological Vulnerabilities of Hostile and Potential Hostile States," states that "there is a need for knowledge about the weaknesses and conflicts in values, beliefs, and motivations concerning various parts of the social, political, administrative, military, and other structures within a country so that potential and actual schisms may be anticipated."¹² CRESS has already produced secret reports on the "Psychological Vulnerabilities" of the Soviet Union, Cuba, Thailand and North Vietnam.

CRESS has conducted similar research on more primitive societies in Third World areas where the U.S. seeks to extend its hegemony. An outstanding example of this kind of work, and one that has become the source of considerable controversy in the United States Senate, is a 1964 CRESS study of "Witchcraft, Sorcery, Magic and Other Psychological Phenomena and Their Implications for Military and Paramilitary Operations in the Congo." According to its authors, James R. Price and Paul Jureidini:

This report has been prepared in response to a Defense Department query regarding the purported use of witchcraft, sorcery and magic by insurgent elements in the Republic of the Congo (Leop.). Magical practices are said to be effective in conditioning dissident elements and their followers to do battle with government troops. Rebel tribesmen seem to have been persuaded that they can be made magically impervious to Congolese Army firepower. Their fear of government forces diminished, and conversely, fear of the rebels grew within army ranks. A review of available literature indicates that in Africa, uprisings embodying supernatural practices have tended to occur generally

whenever the continued physical safety of internal power structure of a tribe or tribes have been seriously threatened.... To determine the degree to which such a generalization is applicable to the current situation in the Congo, a brief recapitulation of certain aspects of recent Congolese history serves as a useful point of departure.¹³

Since the onset of the Vietnam war, CRESS' major responsibility in the area of PSYOPS has logically been the preparation of psychological warfare materials for the U.S. war effort in Southeast Asia. In June 1964, Andrew D. Sens and Joseph M. Macrum completed a study of "Psychological Opportunities in the Republic of Vietnam." A 1965 Pentagon research inventory indicates that this report "was developed in response to a request for information on those social, economic, political, military, and ideological circumstances or conditions within the Republic of Vietnam that could be exploited for psychological purposes. Specifically, an historical summary is provided and possible psychological opportunities and vulnerabilities are suggested. The material presented has been selected as a point of departure and as a thought stimulant for those engaged in planning and implementing actual psychological operations in Vietnam."¹⁴ CRESS has continued this work without interruption to the present time.

IV. MINORITIES AND ELITES

As noted above, a major objective of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy is to mobilize certain elements of foreign populations in the struggle against insurgent movements within their own borders. U.S. military assistance programs, foreign aid, and import subsidies are all designed to create a client population that is dependent upon continued U.S. beneficence for their prosperity, and can thus be compelled to assist the U.S. in the continued exploitation and oppression of their fellow countrymen. This process has been particularly pronounced in Vietnam, where U.S. aid has created a new, Western-oriented bureaucracy in Saigon to replace the traditional Mandarin aristocracy and the French colonial civil service. The U.S. has also attempted on various occasions to obtain the support of other classes or groups in the population which, for various historical, economic or political reasons, are vulnerable to U.S. psychological operations. It follows from all this that a major task of the counterinsurgent social scientist is to identify those classes, elites, nationalities and ethnic groups in a

13. TAB, July 15, 1965.

14. TAB, Aug. 1, 1965. A complete list of SORO/CRESS psychological warfare studies on South Vietnam appears in U.S. House of Representatives, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1970*. Part V, p. 184. (Hereinafter cited as *Hearings 1970*.)

15. *Work Program 1967*, p. 21.

16. "Department of Defense Social/Behavioral Science Research Projects Using Information About Foreign Areas," *Congressional Record-Senate* (May 1, 1969), p. S4422. Table inserted by Sen. J. William Fulbright. (Hereinafter cited as "Social/Behavioral Projects".)

given country that can be co-opted or otherwise manipulated in the interest of continued U.S. hegemony in their country.

Because of their central role in U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, the group of greatest interest to Washington is the native military. The Pentagon needs to know if the indigenous military can be relied upon to take to the fields against guerrilla formations, and if they can be persuaded to perform a "modernizing" role in their society (be engaging in civic action programs) and thus circumvent traditional popular antipathy to the military establishment. The major research effort in this area is an ongoing CRESS study of "The Changing Role of the Military in the Contemporary World." The aim of this project, according to CRESS, "is to develop knowledge about the changing nature of the political, social, economic, and cultural roles and functions of military establishments in the contemporary world. Particular emphasis is placed upon the relationship of military roles to processes of social change and the connection between developmental trends and changing military structure and functions." This study is particularly relevant, CRESS explains, because "the Department of the Army requires detailed information on the changing character of military roles in order to guide U.S. military assistance, advisory, and civic action programs."¹⁵

Certain aspects of the CRESS program on foreign military elites have been subcontracted to researchers at other universities in the U.S. Thus Lyle McAlister of the University of Florida was commissioned to conduct a study of "The Changing Roles of the Military in Latin America," based on case studies of the military establishments in Colombia, Peru, Argentina and Mexico. The University of Chicago, meanwhile, received a CRESS subcontract to prepare a series of "Studies in Military Sociology." The Chicago team, headed by Morris Janowitz, studied military elites in East Africa, Egypt and the Middle East. The work at Chicago includes a study of "Public Order and the Military in Africa: East Africa Examples," by Henry Eisen, and one by Lou Cantori of "Political Development and the Role of the Military in Modern Egypt." Janowitz himself has published a study of "The Military in the Political Development of New Nations."

Additional studies of foreign military elites are being conducted by several private research organizations. G.J. Pauker of the RAND Corporation currently holds an Air Force contract for research on "The Role of the Military in Indonesia." In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, this RAND project is described as "an analysis in support of Air Force plans and intelligence of the role of the military in the developing political economic, and defense structure of Indonesia, and the probable role of Indonesia in the larger context of U.S. security interests in Southeast Asia."¹⁶ At the same time, Amos Perlmutter of Operations and Policy Research, Inc.—a CIA-linked organization based in Washington, D.C.—is engaged in a study of "The Political Functions of the Military in the Middle East and North Africa." Perlmutter's study, which is being financed by the Air Force Office of

Scientific Research (AFOSR), is designed to provide an "improved understanding of the role of foreign military forces in the stabilization of the Middle East."¹⁷

Complementing these studies of foreign military establishments are a series of Pentagon-financed investigations of other social formations which play a key role in underdeveloped societies—particularly students, urban intellectuals, and native entrepreneurs. In 1965, for instance, the Air Force awarded several contracts to a group of sociologists at the University of California in Berkeley for research on Latin American elites. Seymour Martin Lipset received a \$75,000 AFOSR contract for a study of "The Implications of National Development for Military Planning." Lipset's tasks included an analysis of the extent to which students contribute to the relative stability or instability of certain Latin American countries. When Lipset moved to Harvard University in 1967, he received another AFOSR contract worth \$97,947 for research on "Emergent Leaders in Developing Nations." Another member of the Berkeley group was David Apter, who prepared a study of "The Politics of Modernization in Latin America." The RAND Corporation, meanwhile, received similar Air Force contracts for research on the elites of selected Southeast Asian societies. In 1960, for example, J.M. Halpern of RAND completed a report entitled "The Lao Elite: A Study of Tradition and Innovation." Halpern's report constituted "an attempt to define the Lao elite and show their relationship to other groups in the population." In unusually frank language, Halpern explained that "An understanding of the cultural attitudes and social values of the elite might aid in the development of a group that can exert effective local leadership towards goals compatible with Western interests and values."¹⁸

In the past few years, the Pentagon has begun a major effort to fill the gaps in its knowledge of African society, in order to keep pace with the rapid pace of U.S. economic penetration of that continent. In the announcement of a major study of "African Groups Relevant to U.S. Military Decision-Making," CRESS states the reasons for increased Pentagon concern with social conditions in Africa:

The new states of independent Black Africa are undergoing rapid sociocultural and political change. The peaceful evolutionary transfer of sovereignty is now being followed by revolutionary upheavals and coups d'etat.... It is likely that direct or indirect [U.S.] military and ancillary aid will in the future frequently be required or requested in increasing amounts by friendly African governments. This eventually will make it

17. "Policy Planning Studies," p. S4420.

18. RAND Corporation, *Selected RAND Abstracts*, vol. 1 (1963), p. 109.

19. *Work Program 1967*, pp. 49-50.

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 51. Lt. Gen. Austin W. Betts later told the Department of Defense Subcommittee of the House of Appropriations Committee that "The research on African groups focused on the independent countries of black Africa. The primary objective was to provide information to

necessary for a judgement to be made as to the advisability of such aid, the form it should take, and the problems of its administration by agencies of the Department of Defense. Thus, there are clear and current policy needs for research designed to provide military decision-makers and administrators with relevant information and concepts on the urban, intellectual, and military subcommunities and leaders.¹⁹

In essence, CRESS is saying that there is inadequate intelligence on the loyalties and political orientations of key African groups. In order "to fill these enormous gaps in vital information and conceptualization concerning Africa," CRESS was commissioned by the U.S. Strike Command to prepare "descriptions and analyses of the three most relevant target groups and their leaders: the urban, the intellectual, and the military."²⁰ These three "foci of change and unrest" were selected because:

(1) Urban communities were the centers of African nationalist activity and now are the setting for the intense frustration and potential violent manifestations of unrest....

(2) Students are important because of their political involvement, intellectual resources, and prestigious status among the masses. Since there are few university-educated people in the new states of Africa, students help to fill a vacuum, and as a consequence they have a magnified political role. Many of them will be active in the leadership of any insurgency because of their oppositional mentality....

(3) Military take-overs in Africa reflect urban and intellectual discontent, as well as a vacuum of rational political power. But they are also a product of the particular military organizations and leaders of the new states of Africa, as well as of the organizational and infrastructural underdevelopment characteristic of many states.²¹

In fulfillment of this undertaking, CRESS is working on reports concerning: "Community Leadership in Urban Africa," "Student Movements in Africa," "Student Leadership in Africa," "Indigenous Military Activities in Africa," and "Indigenous Military Leadership in Africa."²²

Pentagon-sponsored studies of foreign elites are complemented by a similar program of research on religious, ethnic and social minorities. Here too, the objective is to identify social formations within a society that can be manipulated to the advantage of U.S. strategic interests. Such research also performs an intelligence function, by determining whether an oppressed minority is likely to resort to armed force if its grievances are not redressed. The Pentagon's concern with this problem is clearly enunciated in a report by the Research Analysis Corporation (RAC) on "The Mobilization and Utilization of Minority Groups for Counterinsurgency." The RAC report

U.S. Strike Command and concerned [personnel] on the sociopolitical structures and dynamics as well as those aspects of leadership resources that would be of significance to military operations.... The U.S. Strike Command has advised that the report is valuable for their contingency planning.... Although it is of limited present use except for planning purposes, it is their judgment that if the need arises for substantial U.S. military presence in these countries the information contained in the document will be of great value." See *Hearings 1970*, Pt. V, p. 182.

concludes:

Recent counterinsurgent operations in Southeast Asia have pointed up the importance of tribal and other minority groups in underdeveloped countries susceptible to communist-inspired insurgency. Such groups, because of either (1) a history of hostility between them and the dominant ethnic group; (2) their location in remote areas and consequently their lack of close contact with the national government and its representatives; or (3) the fact that they occupy terrain of strategic importance both to insurgent and government forces; or (4) a combination of these reasons, will probably constitute primary targets for subversion in future communist wars of 'national liberation.'²³

Research on minority groups in Southeast Asia has been the responsibility of SORO-CRESS, the RAND Corporation, and a number of American universities. In February 1966, CRESS completed a comprehensive survey of "Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam." According to the report's authors, this study "was designed to be useful to military and other personnel who need a convenient compilation of basic facts about the social, economic and political institutions and practices of minority groups in the Republic of Vietnam. The study seeks to present as full and as balanced an integrated exposition on selected tribal and other minority groups, as limitations on space and research time permit."²⁴ This report was followed by a CRESS program of research on specific Vietnamese minorities, known as the "Ethnographic Studies Series." As part of this work, Marilou Fromme prepared a report entitled "Brief Notes on the Tahoi, Pocoh and Phuong Tribes of the Republic of Vietnam," and Skaidrite Maliks Fallah conducted a study of "The Customs and Taboos of Selected Tribes Residing Along the Western Border of the Republic of Vietnam."²⁵

The RAND Corporation, meanwhile, contributed a study of "The Major Ethnic Groups of the South Vietnamese Highlands", which was clearly linked to the U.S. Special Forces' effort to mobilize the Vietnamese Montagnards for service in the Saigon regime's "irregular defense forces". According to the author of this study, Gerald C. Hickey, the RAND report contained detailed information on "the settlement pattern, social organization, and religious practices" of each major group.

V. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES

Under the heading "Counterinsurgency Models", we described U.S. research on recent guerrilla struggles and the development of predictive models of insurgent behavior. It is now time to

23. TAB, June 5, 1967.

24. TAB, June 1, 1967.

25. TAB, May 1, and June 1, 1967. For a complete list of SORO/CRESS ethnographic studies on South Vietnam, see *Hearings 1970*, pp. 183-4.

26. For a complete list, see the quarterly list of *AID-Financed University Contracts* published by the U.S. Department of State.

27. The Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building, *A Review of Phase I, 1964-1968*, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh, 1968, p. 4.

consider the use to which such studies are put in the development of strategic guidelines for intervention, counterrevolution and counterinsurgency. The theoretical models produced as a result of historical research frequently delineate various "stages" of insurgency, usually beginning with terrorism and strikes, and proceeding to guerrilla warfare and finally conventional warfare; the strategic research programs, on the other hand, identify the most effective combination of countermeasures for defeating an insurgency at each of these stages.

At the earliest stage of intervention, before armed struggle has broken out but during a period of discontent and unrest, current U.S. strategy calls for the creation of new social, economic and political institutions with a Western orientation. These new institutions, which adopt modern capitalist modes of organization and management, are designed to channel, co-opt and pacify popular antagonism to surviving feudal and colonial institutions. Such efforts, which usually fall under the heading of "nation-building", "institution-building", or simply modernization, are usually carried out through the foreign aid program. Consequently, most research in this area is conducted under the auspices of the Agency for International Development (AID).

The Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building, inaugurated in 1964, is an example of the many university research products being conducted with AID funds.²⁶ The program has received a \$158,380 grant from AID for the preparation of a series of reports on "The Process of Institution-Building." These studies are being conducted by a group of social scientists at Pittsburgh, Indiana, Syracuse and Michigan State Universities; Milton Esman and Joseph Eaton of Pittsburgh are coordinating the program. According to a 1968 progress report on the project, the participating scientists will investigate the development of new organizations in the developing countries, and record "their modes of counteracting opposition and the circumstances that support or retard their institutionalization."²⁷ A related project at Cornell University, entitled "A Comparative Study of Social and Cultural Change", received AID grants worth a total of \$521,772 between 1963 and 1966. During this period, a research team consisting of Allan R. Holmberg, Morris E. Opler and Lauriston Sharp produced reports on "Methods for Analyzing Cultural Change" and "Strategic Intervention in the Cultural Change Process."

The Pentagon has occasionally supported research in this field in order to complement the work being done under AID sponsorship. Thus in 1965 Harry Eckstein of Princeton University received a Navy contract to study "The Social Bases of Stable Political Systems". According to Eckstein, the project was oriented toward "the discovery of actions required to make political systems more stable and more resistant to insurgency; the work being done [is] based on the belief that the reduction of internal war (insurgency) potential often becomes possible by adjustment in regimes and forms of rule so as to allow an increase in their legitimacy and effectiveness relative to expectations."

Once an insurgency has broken out, U.S. strategy calls for its containment at the lowest possible level of violence and mass participation. The Pentagon is therefore investigating a variety of techniques for "low intensity" counterinsurgency warfare. There is, for example, a secret Army-sponsored study of "The Employment of Military Units in Show-of-Force Operations". This project, being conducted by John R. Thomas of the Research Analysis Corporation; encompasses "a case-by-case analysis of instances of the employment of military units of all nations ... in show-of-force operations." The study is designed to "(a) determine a precise definition of, and valid operational parameters for, the military show-of-force type operation; (b) determine a technique spectrum, e.g., demonstrations, strategic mobility exercises, etc., for military show-of-force employment in instances of actual or potential tension."

Many CRESS studies are designed to develop operational guidelines for the early containment and defeat of insurgent movements. Adrian Jones heads an ongoing CRESS study of "Internal Security" which is intended to "assist in formulating doctrine on internal security problems of civil and paramilitary forces related to the prevention and countering of insurgency in developing nations." This project, originally entitled "An Analysis of Military Operations in Support of Internal Security in Developing Nations", is concentrating on "the organization, operations, and techniques of internal security forces in combatting subversive organizations and maintaining public security, both prior to and during insurgency." As part of this effort, Jones in 1966 prepared a manual of techniques for "Combatting Subversively Manipulated Civil Disturbances". The same research team conducted a "Study of Threats and Terror" in order to help "legal governments with minimum security forces" — e.g., the U.S.-sponsored regime in Saigon — "instill a feeling of security from terrorism within the general populace". The project's approach was "to analyze historical accounts of terrorist organizations and operations in order to formulate a theory of effective countermeasures".

A second CRESS research team has been engaged in a study of "The Nonmilitary Effects of Physical Force by Counter-insurgency Military Units in Phase 1 Low Intensity Warfare." This study of "the dynamics of political violence as a manipulative force in conflict management" was designed to prevent the spread of an insurgency because of insufficient or excessive use of force in quelling demonstrations. According to project director Edward Gude, the study would offer "guidance for program planners charged with deciding the use of force concerning the likely reactions of significant noncombattant groups as well as the insurgents."²⁸

The third kind of strategic planning is concerned

28. *Latin American Research Review*, II, Fall, 1966, p. 94.

29. "Social/Behavioral Projects," p. S4422.

30. *Ibid.*

31. "Policy Planning Studies," p. S4419.

32. TAB, June 15, 1967.

with the defeat of full-scale guerrilla warfare and "peoples war" as practiced by the NLF in South Vietnam. In the past few years, such research has concentrated on the problem of preventing "more Vietnams"—i.e., protracted struggles which require the intervention of large numbers of U.S. ground troops. Thus the RAND Corporation is conducting an ongoing study of "Insurgent Forces" which is described as an "analysis of certain U.S. experiences in Vietnam, aiming at generalization applicable to future U.S. policymaking."²⁹ Another RAND project, "Alternative Strategies for Insurgent Conflicts," involves the development of "U.S. policy alternatives which might reduce budgetary and human costs."³⁰

The Office of Naval Research (ONR) has sponsored several related studies on the role of U.S. Naval and Marine forces in future Vietnam-type wars. Westwood Research, Inc., of Los Angeles, Calif., received an ONR contract in 1965 to conduct a study "Seapower in Special Warfare." Human Sciences Research, Inc., a McLean, Virginia firm which has worked on Project Agile, recently received an ONR contract to research on "The Development of U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action Capabilities for Vietnam and Future Contingencies." According to ONR, this project is designed to "provide information useful to the USMC in developing pacification or 'other war' capabilities to be utilized in limited or small war situations."³¹

Although it is still desperately bogged down in Vietnam, the U.S. Department of Defense is already planning for the counterinsurgency wars of the decade 1970-1980. Thus in 1966 the Systems Engineering Evaluation and Research Division of the Radio Corporation of America was awarded a Pentagon contract to study "Limited War Prospects 1970-80." According to RCA, "This study investigates the effect of environmental, technological or doctrinal change on the forms and forces of limited warfare in the 1970-80 decade."³²

AFTERWORD

The social science research projects described above represent only a small percentage of U.S. research on counterinsurgency. Hopefully, they provide the reader with a balanced sampling of the kinds of research presently being performed at American universities and think tanks.

At this point, it is perhaps appropriate to reflect for a moment on the fact that in Vietnam the most elaborate counterinsurgency strategies have gone up in smoke. Throughout the entire conflict, and after spending millions of dollars on sociological studies and surveys, the U.S. command still lacks any comprehension of what motivates the revolutionary forces. Equally fragile have been the working propositions of what can motivate the Saigon forces to be "as loyal, as effective, and as energetic" as the NLF. Henry Cabot Lodge's observation of Vietnamese character in the fall of 1965 stands as a classic example of this incomprehension: the then Ambassador to South Vietnam said that he would know that the war had been won "when one

morning the young man who's been in the Vietcong wakes up and says, 'I am not going back today and the reason I'm not going back is (a) I think I'll get killed, and (b) I look around me and I see the rice and fish and the ducks and the coconuts, the pineapples, American aid coming in and life looks pretty good right here.'³³

What remains to United States strategy is the incredible force and persistence of American bombs—incendiary bombs, chemical bombs, anti-personal bombs, high explosive bombs—and the self-sustaining momentum of the vast military machine which converts every random piece of intelligence into a 'target of opportunity' for new bombing missions in a desperate effort to cover up the defeat of the neo-colonial alternative to true liberation.

Armand Mattelart.

NOTES ON THE IDEOLOGY OF THE MILITARY STATE

(France, 1978)

"Not the exception
But the state of exception*
Confirms the Rule.
What rule?
In order not to
Answer this question
One proclaims the state of exception."

Erich Fried, *The Rule*

The image of the Latin-American dictatorships is generally associated with that of the capricious and cruel "caudillos," for whom power is an orgiastic function. In the last four years, three of Latin America's most renowned authors have written novels in which the main character is a dictator living and imposing a daily legality of excess and extravagance: the Cuban, Alejo Carpentier, *Reasons of State (El Recurso del Metodo)*, the Colombian, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, *Autumn of the Patriarch (El Otono del Patriarco)*, and the Paraguayan, Augusto Roa Bastos, *Yo el Supremo*. These works, undoubtedly inspired by a Latin-American reality fallen prey to despotic governments, nevertheless portray a species which is rapidly becoming extinct. The characters set upon the stages of these novels hardly subsist anywhere on the Latin American continent, and where they do exist it is with rather insipid features, as in Haiti, Paraguay, and Nicaragua. In the latter, the Sandinista Front is threatening the seemingly ageless Somoza dynasty.

In literature, this reliance on the past can guarantee a return to the most profound meaning of

* [Translator's note] We have decided to keep the term *State of Exception*, which is a literal translation of the Spanish term *Estado de Excepcion*. This generic expression is used to designate the various forms which the suspension of fundamental liberties and constitutional guarantees may take in the Latin American countries. The State of Exception actually includes two procedures. Under the first, the State of Siege (*Estado de Sitio*) the entire country is submitted to military jurisdiction and a strict night curfew is maintained. (In Chile the State of Siege lasted from 11 September 1973 to 11 March 1978). Under the second, the State of Emergency, (*Estado de Urgencia*), the ordinary civil justice courts, recuperate part of their authority; the curfew becomes a "restriction of nighttime movement". The forced exile or internal confinement of individuals to certain areas can only be ordered by the courts, and no longer by a unilateral decision of the military authorities. Those arrested may not be detained for more than five-days in areas that are not recognized as prisons, etc. Neverthe-

This text was translated from the French by Colleen Roach. English translation Copyright International General 1978. This is its first publication.

these processes and events. Indeed, this permits approaching ambiances and mechanisms which might otherwise escape time's scrutiny. However, when the press makes use of this same recourse and becomes addicted to the past, it is to the detriment of history.

By constantly referring to the continuing excesses of the generals in power, by insisting on their chronic instability, and continually predicting their imminent fall, the press would like to convince its readers that the era of traditional tyrants is not yet over. It is as if the big capitalist press has felt it necessary to "padlock" analysis, and stave off its possible dangers, as if they feared having to extrapolate its lessons and applying them to their own, more "normal" realities. By confining the exploits of the Latin-American dictatorships to the framework of a memory accustomed to "retro" stereotypes, the press takes as gospel truth the dictatorial decrees proclaiming the "State of Exception." Isn't "the exception" synonymous with "transitory" and "ephemeral"? One might think that "the exception" protects these States against acquiring a desire to prevail, to become permanent, but in Brazil, this "exception" has lasted for almost fourteen years.

For having understood that the exception tends to become the rule, that it only exists in order to announce a new reality and tolls the bells for the past, General Prats, faithful companion of Salvador Allende during the Popular Unity period, was assassinated in Buenos Aires, one year after the *coup d'Etat* of 11 September 1973, by the intelligence services of the Chilean dictatorship. The same fate was reserved for Orlando Letelier, the former Minister of Defense under Allende, who was also assassinated two years later in the very center of Washington.

In his diary, published posthumously in Mexico (1977) as *Una vida por la legalidad*, on the 26th of October 1973, Prats made the following entry:

The permanence of execution posts and the prohibition of all political parties supporting the Allende government, accompanied by grandiose declarations proclaiming the end of "partisan politics" and "playing politics", demonstrates just how mistaken were those who believed in a *coup d'Etat* "à la chilienne", after which "we would all become friends again," and at which time we could once again have elections, candidates and parliamentary politics. No! The unexpected and atypical violence of the coup and the methods used show that we are in the presence of a new phenomenon in Chile and perhaps in all of Latin America: a "fascistoid" militarism, of U.S. inspiration.

less, in many cases, even though the legislation in these countries makes a clear distinction between the State of Siege and the State of Emergency, in practice, there is not much difference, and the limitations imposed under the State of Siege also continue under the State of Exception. (Restrictions on the freedom of press and assembly, and trade union rights). Thus, any military official can continue to prohibit the publication of any "unpatriotic" news, or may decide upon the complete or partial evacuation of neighborhoods and entire regions, in order to "defend the civilian population". The change-over from one State to another is often decided by the dictatorships in order to defuse international pressure. The State of Emergency, which may seem less restrictive, in fact, is a way of

The last few years in Latin America have given birth to a new type of authoritarian regime. After Brazil, countries such as Chile, Uruguay, Argentina and Bolivia, have contradicted the folklore of the despots, by installing a new form of military government.

The "personalism" of the caudillos is replaced by a bureaucracy. The military institution no longer accepts the role assigned to it by the bourgeois State's liberal democratic institutions. This role was primarily that of arbitrator for the conflicts arising between various fractions of the bourgeoisie, without having its mediation result in the elimination of these fractions, and, at the same time, defending national territory against foreign threats or aggression. The Armed Forces no longer accept the limitations of their traditional mission and have now taken control of the entire State apparatus, which they are attempting to form in their own image and likeness. The military institution assumes power, and military values are substituted for civilian principles for organizing society. The "civis", base of *civilization* is being replaced by a veritable "Garrison" state, by militarization. The new parameters defining this process of the global reorganization of society have been codified in what is known as the *National Security Doctrine*. This is a war doctrine, the first effect of which is to identify friendly and enemy camps, and to elaborate, vis à vis these camps, a strategic means of approach.

This doctrine founds the new State, the military State, and sanctions the changes which have taken place in the relations maintained between the Armed Forces and the rest of society. What are the contents of this doctrine? What does this doctrine owe to what may be called the military philosophy, forged during the last century in very different regions, and which constitutes the theory, the acquired knowledge, and the jurisprudence of the military institution? What are the circumstances which allow this doctrine to become installed as a State-norm in the countries of the Southern Cone? What sort of strategy for indoctrinating the various social classes does it inspire?

In defining the nature of the military State, our interest is centered on the situation in Latin America. However, we are not unaware that other peoples in the Third World also live under similar military regimes. Nor are we unconscious of the fact that in certain advanced capitalist societies, there is also a generalization of "exceptional" jurisdiction, even though it is maintained within the framework of civil society.¹ This is what is presently happening in the

answering the accusations made concerning human rights' violations.

1. See Robert Boure's text, *Les interdictions professionnelles en Allemagne Fédérale*, Paris, Maspero, 1978, and the numerous articles and dossiers published in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, especially that of H. Gollwitzer and A. Menne, "Des nouvelles restrictions aux libertés en Allemagne de l'Ouest", March 1978. On recent developments concerning exceptional legislation in France, see Jacques Isnard, "Le Secrétariat Général revise les procédures de protection intérieure à appliquer en cas de crise", *Le Monde*, 14 December 1977, p. 18. See also the issues of *L'Humanité* and *Rouge* of the same date.

Federal Republic of Germany, for example, where, since 1972, more than 30 amendments to the constitution have legalized increasingly severe restrictions on individual liberties. It is even being asked if this "everyday totalitarianism" which is being installed in this country is not a premonitory sign of a process which risks being extended to other countries in Europe. However, besides the fact that the realities in which these national security laws emerge are different, and the fact that they are in keeping with dissimilar levels of capitalist development, and reflect other class relations, another element prevents us from systematically treating all of the military regimes in the same way. This element is the fact that the conception of national security in all of the regimes which subscribe to it on a *de facto* basis has not yet been formalized in an explicit doctrine. The prevailing laws of exception in many military realities have not yet been linked to local reflections and theorization. In contrast to these realities, the Armed Forces in Latin America, also dependent on basic theoretical nucleuses such as the Pentagon, are nonetheless equipped with ideologues who elaborate the frames of reference in which the practices of military power are exercised, and in which a specific model for society is applied.

But the differences stop there. For beyond these dissimilarities, there is a profound line of continuity between all of the authoritarian regimes distributed in different latitudes. Their emergence is in keeping with the present crisis that the world capitalist economy is undergoing, a crisis of the historic form of the accumulation of capital. The military State apparatus, in fact, is part of these new political, ideological and cultural forms which are intended to remedy the precarious nature of the balance permitting the bourgeoisie's maintenance in power. In this sense, the militarization of the State should be considered as the paroxysmic phase of a global process assuring the re-deployment of the capitalist system, which demands the reinforcement of social control. Within this range of authoritarian revival, there are other, similar, less spectacular signs of this vast operation for remodelling the State and economic apparatuses of big capital. One example is the austerity policies well-known to many advanced capitalist democracies, in a context characterized by the acceleration of the process of monopolization of power in all of its forms. Additional evidence of this reorganization is found in the conceptions of the "internal enemy" that these democracies impose, by skillfully seizing upon the pretext of terrorism and by revising the "procedures of internal protection to apply in case of crisis." The project for a capitalist Europe with a unified judicial and police network, as recently shown in the Schleyer kidnapping affair, the

multiplication of manhunts for possible suspects, the reinforcement of search procedures, the multinational exchange of police files, appeals for organized denunciation, requisitioning, limits on the right-to-strike, in short, all political forms of exception or emergency — are these not so many attempts to immunize the existing order against the risks of "a destabilized society and universe, which might react in a disorderly or anarchic fashion," to use the terms of the French government's project for reorganizing territorial security? The insertion of concepts such as the "exceptional State," and the "reinforced exceptional State" in the legislation of capitalist Europe, attempts to bridge the gap between the "State of Emergency" and the "State of Siege", and evokes the desire of the ruling power to circumscribe, in an increasingly precise fashion, the "hot spots," and the "sensitive areas" of internal security that are capable of placing the "integrity of national structures" in danger. This internationalization of repression is one more reason to persist in our efforts to perceive universal constants in the "national security" ideologies underlying the foundations of the military States in the Southern Cone of Latin America.

All of these mediated tendencies and realities restricting liberties in advanced capitalist societies reflect the trials and errors of the bourgeoisie, in quest of new mechanisms for political and economic domination. Of course, the owners of the means of production continue to speak of representative democracy, of electoral processes, and the principle of "political alternance," but their minds and bodies are elsewhere, so concerned are they with finding a substitute for the "traditional means of social control." (Moreover, is it not paradoxical that left forces increasingly revere the mechanisms of this formal democracy, now in a state of crisis, in order to assure the triumph of their own project for structural changes?) How else can one interpret the diagnosis made by the General Staff of the big capitalist countries mobilized to handle the crisis, otherwise known as the Trilateral Commission? In the report drawn up by its experts in 1975² we may read in black and white what the ruling forces of "democracy-in-crisis" actually think:

The contextual challenges differ, as we have seen, for each society. Variations in the nature of the particular democratic institutions and processes in each society may also make some types of intrinsic challenges more prominent in one society than in another. But, overall, the intrinsic threats are general ones which are in some degree common to the operation of all democratic systems. The more democratic a system is, indeed, the more likely it is to be endangered by intrinsic threats. Intrinsic challenges are, in this sense, more serious than

of America, Exxon, Caterpillar, Lehman Brothers, Sears & Roebuck, Fiat, Dunlop, Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann, Royal Dutch Shell, Sony, Toyota, etc. Before his election as president of the United States, Jimmy Carter was amongst the notable politicians and Raymond Barre, the French Prime Minister, is an active member of the group. For a critical analysis of this report, see Claude Julien, "Les sociétés libérales victimes d'elles-mêmes", *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Paris), March 1976.

2. See *The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission*, New York, University Press, 1975. The Trilateral Commission, a group of private citizens, founded in 1973 on the initiative of David Rockefeller, president of Chase Manhattan Bank, is made up of more than 200 corporation executives and political personalities from the United States, Western Europe and Japan. Amongst these VIPs of the business world, one finds the presidents of Coca Cola, Bendix, Bank

extrinsic ones. Democracies may be able to avoid, moderate, or learn to live with contextual challenges to their viability. There is deeper reason for pessimism if the threats to democracy arise ineluctably from the inherent workings of the democratic process itself. Yet, in recent years, the operations of the democratic process do indeed appear to have generated a breakdown of traditional means of social control, a delegitimation of political and other forms of authority, and an overload of demands on government, exceeding its capacity to respond.

The report continues:

The effective operation of a democratic political system usually requires some measure of apathy and noninvolvement on the part of some individuals and groups. In the past, every democratic society has had a marginal population, of greater or lesser size, which has not actively participated in politics. In itself, this marginality on the part of some groups is inherently undemocratic, but it has also been one of the factors which has enabled democracy to function effectively. Marginal social groups, as in the case of the blacks, are now becoming full participants in the political system. Yet the danger of overloading the political system with demands which extend its functions and undermine its authority still remains. Less marginality on the part of some groups thus needs to be replaced by more self-restraint on the part of all groups.

The final conclusions of this part of the report are as follows:

The vulnerability of democratic government in the United States thus comes not primarily from external threats, though such threats are real, nor from internal subversion from the left or the right, although both possibilities could exist, but rather from the internal dynamics of democracy itself in a highly educated, mobilized, and participant society. "Democracy never lasts long," John Adams observed. "It soon wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide." That suicide is more likely to be the product of overindulgence than of any other cause. A value which is normally good in itself is not necessarily optimized when it is maximized. We have come to recognize that there are potentially desirable limits to economic growth. There are also potentially desirable limits to the indefinite extension of political democracy. Democracy will have a longer life if it has a more balanced existence.

And, in the field that is of special concern here, another judgement of these experts shows how the liberal principle of information is challenged, a principle which, through the "abuses" committed in the name of the freedom of the press, would "provoke attitudes unfavorable to the official institutions and a decline in the confidence accorded to governments."

In due course, beginning with the Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act, measures had to be taken to regulate the new industrial centers of power and to define their relations to the rest of society. Something comparable appears to be now needed with respect to

3. Editora Jose Olympio, Rio de Janeiro, 1967. For more recent texts, see Jose Alfredo Amaral Gurgel, *Segurança e Democracia*, Jose Olympio, 1975; General Meira Mattos, *Brasil: Geopolítica e destino*, Jose Olympio, 1975. In other countries such as Uruguay, the military does

the media. Specifically, there is a need to insure to the press its right to print what it wants without prior restraint except in most unusual circumstances. But there is also the need to assure to the government the right and the ability to withhold information at the source.

By a strange coincidence, which obviously is not coincidental, the first decree limiting the liberal principle of the freedom of enterprise was passed by Congress in 1887, in the midst of the first big international recession of the capitalist economy and at the dawn of the appearance of the first monopolies. This measure, officially known as the Interstate Commerce Act, had as its main objective the regulation of the major railroad companies' operations. This legislation symbolized and foreshadowed the present necessity for the construction of these other communication networks, the means of communication. We thus have two historical moments which allow us to perceive a radical transformation of the capitalist mode of production, of the exchange and circulation of commodities, messages and people.

A NEW DOCTRINE FOR A NEW KIND OF WAR

"War is much too important to be left entirely in the hands of Generals." Clemenceau's observation undoubtedly has often been interpreted in military circles as an expression of the civilian desire to exclude them from war preparation and liquidation, so as to confine them to its execution, the only constitutional speciality for which they are trained and equipped. In order to make this remark inoperative, all that was necessary was to change the definition of war. The new war now confronting the military powers is very different from the bellicose conflicts of former times. In developing a new definition of war, the military institution is thus legitimizing its new function in relation to the State. This change is reflected both in theory and in practice. Even if Chile, for example, cannot present a theoretical apparatus as developed as that of the Brazilian generals, its practice can go far beyond that of this country. One will recall that Brazil was the first nation in Latin America to be ruled by the new martial laws, put into effect after the *coup d'Etat* that toppled the constitutional President Goulart in April 1964.

The individual who has contributed the most to the elaboration of this National Security Doctrine is without a doubt the Brazilian General Golbery do Couto e Silva. He now serves as adviser to President Geisel, and was the founder of the National Intelligence Service. The latter is part of the military intelligence apparatus, which is the backbone of all internal security policies. His treatise on geopolitics (*Geopolítica do Brasil*)³ was published in Rio de

not hesitate to call upon more time-worn precepts of "national order" for criticizing the liberal doctrine of democracy: "the liberal doctrines of popular sovereignty, the people's will, universal suffrage, the necessity of political parties, and the "liberty-equality-brotherhood" slogan are

Janeiro in 1967, but the basic concepts had already been presented in the form of articles at the end of the fifties. From the very first pages of this treatise, Golbery specifies what is meant by this new definition of war: "From a strictly military conception, war has now been converted into *total war*, a war that is economic, financial, political, psychological, and scientific, as well as being a war of armies, naval forces, and aviation; from total war to *global war*, and from global war to indivisible war, and why not admit it, permanent war." Golbery adds—and it is easy to believe as one reads the news coming from the Southern Cone—that he is referring to an "apocalyptic war."

This is a total war because it concerns all individuals: "men from all latitudes, of all races, of all ages, of all professions, and of the most diversified beliefs." It is a total war because it does away with the previous distinction made between civilian and military categories. All of society has become a battlefield and every individual is in the camp of the combatants, either for or against. It is a total war because the battlefields and the arms used pertain to all levels of individual and community life, and because this war does not allow the very slightest space to escape from the gravitational pull of the conflict. The arms are very diverse in nature: political, economic, psycho-social, and military. They also include diplomatic negotiations, alliances and counter-alliances, agreements or treaties with public or secret clauses, commercial sanctions, loans, capital investment, embargoes, boycotts, and dumping, as well as propaganda and counter-propaganda, suggestive slogans for internal or external use, means of persuasion, blackmail, threats, and even terrorism. This is a total war because the distinction between peace-time and war-time has disappeared, and the war is now permanent. This permanent, cold war is at the center of the irremediable conflict between the "Christian Western" world and the "Communist Eastern" world. This is a global war because what is at stake are all of the values founded by this occidental civilization, viewed as the birthplace of freedom.

For a total war, there must be a total response. In order to counterattack in this war, it is necessary to mobilize and integrate the living forces of the nation into the struggle. Golbery refers to this potential force as the "national power." These national forces, this national power, are made up of all of the physical and human resources each nation has at its disposal. These include a nation's entire spiritual and material potential, and all of the economic, political, psycho-social and military means available.

So that the basic requirements of this doctrine might be fulfilled, it is the responsibility of the State and each citizen to accumulate as much force as possible to conquer the enemy. "Maximizing National Power so as to meet the demands imposed

expressions of a mythical democracy....Such a conception of democracy coincides with "pure democracy", which Aristotle and St. Thomas designated as a corrupt form...As a consequence, it is not surprising if "pure" democracy leads on the one hand, to demagoguery and on the other, to socialism and communism." (These citations were taken

by the phantom of war that is pursuing us — this is a duty that must be fulfilled by all nations concerned about the rapidly approaching future."

A myriad of concepts flow from this totalitarian definition of war, in the most mechanistic fashion possible. These concepts are known as national objectives, or national projects. All of them codify and canonize a hierarchy for the aims, interests, and aspirations of the military State. At the very summit of these objectives, merging with the concept of total strategy, one finds the *national security policy*, which is set up as an absolute value, recognizing no limits.

This policy provides the direction for all of the specific strategies formed. Concluding the section on "national security and total strategy for a total war," General Golbery asserts the following:

At the summit of National Security, we thus have one Strategy, designated as the Overall or General Strategy. This strategy is an art which is exclusively dependent upon the government for its execution. It coordinates, within a fundamental strategic concept, all political, economic, psycho-social, and military activities which propose, in unison, to achieve the objectives that will fulfill national ambitions for unity, security, and growing prosperity. Thus, one finds that Military, Economic, Political and Psycho-social Strategy are all subordinate to this Strategy. These specific strategies may be distinguished from one another by their different fields of application and by their particular instruments for action. However, they are always solidly linked together, either in time or in space. If this were not so, the General Strategy would not be indivisible and total, like the war.

Field Marshal Castelo Branco was much more abstract when in 1967 (he was then President of Brazil) he defined the concept of national security. He compared it with the traditional definition of national defense:

The traditional concept of national defense places the accent upon the military aspects of security, and consequently, emphasizes the problems of foreign aggression. The concept of national security, is much more complete. It includes global defense of institutions, and takes into consideration psycho-social aspects, preservation of development and internal political stability. In addition, the concept of security, much more explicit than that of defense, takes into account internal aggression, manifested through infiltration, ideological subversion, and guerilla movements. All of these forms of conflict are much more likely to occur than foreign aggression.

One of the consequences of the colonization of all sectors of society by national security policies is that the notions of development and security are regarded as being equivalent. However, this observation should be viewed within the context of a very precise, geo-political, and neo-colonial schema. (We will return to the basic elements of this concept at a later stage). It redefines national sovereignty by situating it within the framework of necessary and natural alliances, such as the fundamental alliance

from "Sociology Programs" for students of secondary education, and were originally cited in an editorial of 3 November 1976 in the newspaper *El Pais*, published in Montevideo.) On the National Security Doctrine in Chile, see *Fuerzas Armadas y Seguridad Nacional*, Santiago du Chili; Portada, 1973.

linking the Latin-American sub-continent to the United States. The idea of *inter-dependence* is thus used to balance out nationalist rhetoric: "The rigid, orthodox concept of national sovereignty," stated the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1965, "was formulated at a time when nations did not consider themselves as part of a community, with the same objectives, and responsibilities as the individual nations....The geographic frontiers between American countries have been done away with: the critical nature of the present moment demands that we sacrifice a part of our national sovereignty. Inter-dependence should replace independence."⁴

Renunciation of national independence is not the only sacrifice necessary for conquering the enemy. The dictatorships of the Southern Cone have sanctified the expression of "social cost" and have imposed this as a necessity for the nation. All of the political, economic, cultural, and military endeavours demand that the entire population, submitted to the same dangers, make the same sacrifices, and renounce the same liberties, many of which are part of the country's traditions. This is all done for the benefit of the State, the "all-powerful warlord". "Security and well-being, and on a higher level, security and freedom, are decisive dilemmas which humanity has always had to confront, but never like today, in such dramatic and urgent circumstances." (Golbery)

COMMUNICATION, AN ACT OF SUBVERSION

This National Security Doctrine, which presides over the break-up of the democratic and republican State, thus reversing the balance of power established by the Constitution, is concretely expressed by the hegemony of the military-police machinery within the entire State apparatus. The executive power is transferred to the State National Security Council, upon which the intelligence agencies, and the so-called "political" police, such as the Chilean DINA, are directly dependent. These agencies answer only to the Head of State, and their mission is based on three objectives: 1) to coordinate the activities of the other intelligence branches of the Armed Forces; 2) to carry out arrests that are related to internal State Security; and 3) to provide the *President of the Republic with information on every aspect of daily life that is necessary for planning, development and national security*. In point of fact, this last clause legitimizes the power of control which the State intelligence apparatus exercises over the other State organs. Legislative power, if not simply abolished, becomes a mere decorative element. The judiciary system can only handle unimportant cases, since exceptional jurisdiction protects the order defined by national security. The changeover to a new state of law, which has since become classic, is

4. See the dossier published in the July 1975 issue of *Le Monde Diplomatique*. For the declaration made by Castelo Branco, see General Meira Mattos, *op.cit.*

5. See J.L. Weil, *Brésil 76, Prisonniers Politiques et Etat d'exception*, Brussels, Editions de l'Association Internationale des Juristes Démocrates, March 1976.

precisely what justifies, or attempts to justify, the expressions of "State of War", "State of Exception," "State of Siege", and "State of Emergency". This extra-constitutional legislation eliminates or controls political parties, the press and trade unions, and abolishes all basic social, civil and political rights. It also permits the reorganisation of education, and obliges it to serve "national objectives".

The common juridical expression of this doctrine, which sanctions its pure arbitrary nature under the cover of a pseudo-legality, is summarized in the articles of this so-called decree-law on national security. Promulgated in 1969, this decree still constitutes, in present-day Brazil, the basic text of the regime. In addition, it has served as a guide for other Latin-American military States.⁵

Article 1: "Every physical or moral being is responsible for national security, within the limits defined by the law".

Article 2: "National security provides the guarantee for carrying out national objectives against opposing factors, both internal and external."

Article 3: "National security is essentially comprised of the means intended to preserve external and internal security, and includes prevention and repression of adverse psychological warfare, as well as revolutionary or subversive war".

Paragraph 1: "Internal security, an integral part of national security, should deal with the adversary's threats and pressure, manifested or producing an effect in the country, no matter what their origin, form or nature may be."

Paragraph 2: "Adverse psychological warfare may be defined as the use of propaganda or counter-propaganda, and all political, economic, psycho-social and military activity which attempts to influence or provoke the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of foreign, enemy, neutral, or friendly groups against the realization of national objectives."

Paragraph 3: "Revolutionary war is an internal conflict, generally inspired by a certain ideology, or assisted from the outside. It attempts to conquer power subversively, through the progressive control of the nation."

The decree-law then enumerates, in a series of articles, an entire list of crimes against National Security, and the new sentences to be applied. Thus *Article 16* defines the crime of illegal propaganda as "disseminating by any means of social communication, false or biased news, or even a real event, that is presented in such an altered or deformed fashion that it incites, or attempts to incite uneasiness, directed against the people and the government."

In *Article 34*, a "subversive act" is defined as "morally offending an authority by factiousness or social non-conformism."

Article 45 defines "subversive propaganda" in the following terms: "the use of any means of social communication, such as newspapers, journals, periodicals, books, bulletins, tracts, radio, television, cinema, theater and other means as propaganda vehicles for adverse psychological war, or revolutionary or subversive war....Meetings at workplaces....The constitution of committees,

public reunions, parades or demonstrations out-lauded strikes insults, slander or libel directed at a public authority in the exercise of his duties...."

These basic provisions are completed by certain decrees which confer police powers on specific sectors, such as the university, which has the right to expel a student or teacher for subversive activities, carried out either on or off the university campus.

The National Security Doctrine which we have just outlined is elaborated on the basis of a common conceptual body, but nonetheless takes into account, depending on the country under consideration, the specific characteristics reflected by the different historic trajectories. Thus the rhetoric of the extreme-right, Catholic, Integrist movement is reflected to a greater degree in the discourse of the Chilean generals, strongly influenced by a theological view of society, than in that of their more secularized Brazilian counterparts. This is true, even though at one time or another in the development of these dictatorships, they were both equally obsessed with defending occidental and Christian civilization.

The Chilean Junta's "Declaration of Principles", made in 1974, sheds light upon the confessional aura surrounding the pronouncement of its National Security Doctrine. In this document, the dictatorship gives its definition of national security:

National Security is the responsibility of each and every Chilean. It is therefore necessary to inculcate this concept in all of the socio-economic strata, through concrete instruction dealing with civic obligations, both general and specific, which are related to internal security. This may be achieved by expanding the range of patriotic values, by disseminating the cultural advances which constitute our own patrimony in autochthonous art, and by following the direction of the historical traditions and the respect for symbols representing the Fatherland.⁶

The Junta also proclaims *urbi et orbi* that it is guided by the Christian conception of man and society. "Man has natural rights which are anterior and superior to the State. These rights proceed from the very nature of human beings, because they originate from the Creator. The State should recognize them and regulate their exercise." Adopting the old principles expressed by the theologian-economist Malthus, almost two centuries ago, the Junta members, behind their egalitarian parody, are actually justifying social inequality. "An urgent obligation of modern times is to transform equality before the law into a veritable equality of opportunities in life, by refusing to admit other sources of inequality amongst human beings than those which come from the Creator, and from the greater or lesser merit of each individual." This conception of

6. For an analysis of the "Declaración de principios del gobierno", see Armand Mattelart, "Un fascisme créole en quête d'idéologues", *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Paris), July 1974. Numerous other passages from this declaration clearly show the influence of Francoism. In the large-circulation magazine of the Chilean Opus Dei (*Que Pasa*) the ideologues of this movement laid claim to the concept of *life style*, refusing to use the term "ideology" for referring to their doctrine of "Chilean nationalism". They have put forth the idea that the concept of *life style* (as banal as this may seem) has its source in the doctrine of the Falange's founder, José Antonio Primo de Rivera.

natural law from a divine source also inspires the justification of the sacredness of the right to property, and the Junta's denunciation of abortion. In spite of this position, sterilization of women from subaltern classes has, since this proclamation was made, been intensified, thus widening the already substantial gap between principles and reality. This limitation of the demographic growth seems even more paradoxical, given the fact that the geopolitical plans of the dictatorship are marked by expansionist projects.

This return to the "Christian tradition of the Fatherland" cannot be dissociated from the return to the "Hispanic tradition." The two go hand in hand, and become synonymous. This same "Hispanity" concept was also part of the Franco definition of power. The only difference was that this was elaborated within the dominant pole, that of the former colonizer, while, with the Junta, it is accepted by the dependent society. As other authors have demonstrated, the concept of "Hispanity", close to Mussolini's idea of *Imperium*, is closely connected to racist postulates, characteristic of Nazism. In Chile, such a concept explicitly leads to a rejection of *mestizaje* (mixed blood) and the presence of an indigenous population throughout the country's history. Moreover, through a series of permutations, this concept also means that only a rarefied nucleus of decadent aristocrats are considered to uphold these Hispanic values. Therefore, the working people are eliminated from the body of individuals included in this concept of nation.

Finally, the society that the Junta pretends to install is presented as *surmounting the capitalist-communist dilemma*, a theme which is invariably found in all fascist ideologies.

This definition reflects a conception of the Common Good which differs both from that supported by liberal individualism and totalitarian collectivism.... The veritable idea of the Common Good is far from these two extremes, and surpasses them. On the one hand, the possibility of a Marxist-oriented society must be rejected for Chile, given the totalitarian nature of this doctrine, which destroys the human being, and contradicts our Christian and Hispanic tradition. On the other hand, Western developed societies, even though they have a more acceptable character than the Marxist societies, have resulted in a materialism that suffocates man and reduces his spirit to slavery.

Based on such proclamations, the Latin American military regimes have been too often mechanically assimilated to the different brands of European fascism. At a later stage, we will see that the question is much more complex than this.

FROM GEOPOLITICS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE

The Latin-American version of the "national security" doctrine was developed in a very particular locale. To be more specific, it was the Brazilian Staff College which gave birth to this doctrine. This institution, pompously baptized the "Brazilian Sorbonne," was founded after World War II by the officers who had participated in the Brazilian expeditionary force in Italy. This first real contact with the Armed Forces of the United States, without a doubt, greatly

contributed to their adoption of the U.S. model. As a matter of fact, in 1968 General Golbery admitted this to a U.S. sociologist: "The fact that the members of the Brazilian Expeditionary Forces had travelled to the United States, where they were the direct witnesses of the development of a large industrial and democratic power, was undoubtedly of the greatest importance. Their horizons were thus considerably broadened. I myself also went there and was very impressed. I was struck by the fact that a nation which was a pioneer of free enterprise had succeeded in becoming a large industrial power."⁷ Nevertheless, it would be too simplistic to assert that this ideological filiation was due to one specific case of rapprochement. It is certainly true that relations between the U.S. and Latin-American military have been enhanced by many living experiences that the Latin American officers have shared with their U.S. colleagues, possible thanks to the technical assistance projects and numerous courses offered in the Panama Canal Zone, or in the metropolis. However, even though the main function of the military States at the present time is to protect the interests of U.S. imperialism in different regions of the globe, the theory of the military State is the result of practices and doctrines that do not refer exclusively to the Pentagon's military praxis and philosophy. The National Security Doctrine seems to be much more the result of various practices of imperialist warfare during the course of the last century. The concepts which make up this doctrine have a definite history, which is a history of adventures, failures, missionary conquests, or punitive expeditions. These concepts represent the heritage left by many different armies and nations, which evoke the larger problem of the army as a means of repression within the capitalist State.

Furthermore, it is fundamental to insist upon the fact that the recognition of an ideological filiation between the doctrine elaborated by the generals of the Southern Cone and that of the Imperialist armies cannot be interpreted as a mechanical transposition of ideologies. To begin with, the concept of ideological dependence only has meaning if we take into account the two poles of the relationship maintained between the imperial and local realities. Each army in these countries of the Southern Cone reflects a specific social composition and expresses its own trajectory for functioning within the capitalist State. The fact that certain Latin American armies have established their own centres for elaborating specific doctrines and theories, is one sign amongst many others, of a certain local dynamic and of the necessity felt for a re-elaboration of Imperial ideology. (In

7. As quoted in Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics. Changing Patterns in Brazil*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1971.

8. Augusto Pinochet, *Geopolítica*, Santiago du Chile, Andres Bello, 1974. Up until the eve of World War II, European military experts were primarily responsible for establishing training missions for Latin American soldiers and officers. Chile was the first country on the continent (1890) to modernize and assure professional formation for its army, by calling upon the services of the captain of the Prussian army, Emil Korner. The results of this were soon

1943, Argentina founded the Centro de Altos Estudios del Ejercito Argentino; Brazil, the Escuela Superior de Guerra, in 1949; and Peru, the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares in 1950. The most recent creation was the Academia Superior de Seguridad Nacional, established in 1974 in Chile. Equator and Bolivia also host similar centers.)

Moreover, we would be adopting an idealistic viewpoint if we believed that it were possible to inject ideologies and doctrines from the outside. In order for these concepts to take root, there must be a terrain where they can germinate and meet with local necessities. Although it is certain that the theoretical works of the Brazilian military are largely nourished by metropolis sources, it is also true that the practices of the Armed Forces in this country allow the military to play an important role in advancing and perfecting the National Security Doctrine. In this sense, the doctrine, as reformulated and materialized under each of the dictatorships, is also the result of the history of the Armed Forces in these particular social formations. This is a contradictory history of dependence, a history of a practice and concept of army "neutrality", a history replete with putsches or attempted putsches and the direct participation in the repression of the workers and peasantry, but also a history which has even witnessed the presence of certain fractions of revolutionary officers. However, our purpose here is not to trace the history of each of these armies, based on the history of each social formation.

Before dealing with an examination of ideological filiations, it seems necessary to insist and elaborate upon the elements just mentioned.

The oldest ideological strata present in the National Security Doctrine is undoubtedly that which emanates from Prussian and Nazi *geopolitics*. The fact that this term figures in so many titles of the military treatises written by the Generals of the Southern Cone, is but one indication that all of these Generals, without exception, rely heavily upon the teachings of the German school of geopolitics: Ratzel and his theory of vital space (*Lebensraum*), the father of Pan-Germanism, Rudolf Kjellen (of Swedish nationality), and General Haushoffer, who applied the lessons learned from his teachers to the doctrines of national socialism. All of these spiritual antecedents have been revitalized and when necessary, criticized by the new geopoliticians. Much like Haushoffer, who defined geopolitics as "a guide, the political conscience of the State", they view it as the founding science of the new State. It takes the place of philosophy, and in claiming to be more universal, it aspires towards a global definition of man. Pinochet himself wrote: "It is the branch of political science which, based on historical, economic, strategic and political knowledge of the past and present, studies all of human life organized within a given space, in order to achieve the future well-being of mankind."⁸ Golbery is less ambitious. After having used numerous pages to set forth the concept of the French, German, and Franco schools of geopolitics or political geography, he contents himself with the following definition: "It is the discipline which studies how geography and space distribution

impose, or at least suggest, definite State policies."

The Nazi connotation which remained attached to the concept of geopolitics was responsible for the fact that the U.S. authorities eliminated it from their military vocabulary, from the very first years of World War II. It is therefore not surprising to observe, when consulting the post-1945 editions of the *Military Review* (the official journal of the U.S. Army's General Staff), that none of the Pentagon's

apparent. Captain Korner, hero of the Franco-Prussian war, led a fierce campaign against President Balmaceda's supporters, who had the audacity to want to recuperate from the British the national resources of nitrates and other minerals. As of 1891, the Chilean officers earned their stripes in the ranks of the Prussian army.

During this same period, Argentina, seduced by the brilliant results of its neighbors across the Andes, also called upon the services of a German training mission. Bolivia and Uruguay soon followed suit. However, in these countries the German influence was somewhat countered by the French missions. The growth of these missions, which corresponded to the modernization and professional formation of the army, was accelerated after World War I. The Latin American military forces were anxious to make use of the innovations which had proved their worth during this global conflict. However, this factor was not as important as the pressure coming from the vast sectors of the growing middle classes, who, since they hoped to have military careers that were unhindered by unprofessional arbitrary rules, had a strong desire for a professional army. France's influence was apparent in Peru, Guatemala and Brazil. During these years, on the threshold of their "professionalization" certain Latin American armies began to demonstrate an interest in the relationship between politics and the military institution.

The way this subject was approached explains why, in a given country, certain metropolises were more influential than others. For example, Brazil requested the assistance of a French mission when faced with protests from certain lieutenants hostile to the ideas about an apolitical and neutral military brought back from Germany by their colleagues. This choice was far from innocent. As a Brazilian sociologist noted, "it was motivated by the idea that the French example of the 'big mute' could make the army a docile instrument in the hands of the ruling power". Shortly after its arrival, the French mission witnessed two waves of revolutionary protests. Mussolini's officers trained the Air Force of Venezuela, which previously, like Paraguay, Ecuador and Colombia, had relied upon German assistance. The Chileans themselves exported the ideology and organizational model of the Prussian Army, by becoming instructors in countries such as Nicaragua and El Salvador. Their war academy in Santiago, founded by Korner, opened its doors to officers from the entire Southern Hemisphere.

The struggle against the axis powers forced a reevaluation of these alliances. Even within the rather restricted context of actual dependence, the relationship that the Latin American nations maintained with the European powers nevertheless left them a certain autonomy. The services rendered were not necessarily repaid by a direct participation in a system of imperialist alliances. Moreover, many Latin American countries which received French missions, such as Peru, accused the latter of having a perspective that was too tactical, and not sufficiently strategic.

World War II, which resulted in much closer relations between the U.S. and Latin America, brought strategy to the forefront. As of 1938, a permanent liaison committee was established between the U.S. metropolis and the Latin American republics. "Principles of solidarity and inter-

theoreticians make use of this concept. The only articles in this journal which adopt this notion and develop it, are all signed by officers from the Franco or Salazar regimes, or by Brazilians. Of course, this does not prevent the U.S. military from having its own geopolitical viewpoint and theory, which in reality is just as imperialistic as that espoused by the Prussian/Nazi army, as for example, the U.S. doctrine of *manifest destiny*. Furthermore, the

national cooperation" were put into practice. The specific objectives were as follows: to eliminate the threat of Nazi subversion in the Western Hemisphere; to use the military potential of the various countries on the sub-continent for defensive purposes; to use naval and air bases as relays against the enemy; to allow the U.S. direct access to the raw materials necessary for the war, and finally, to assure the stability of each country, so that they did not become fertile terrain for subversion. In 1941, military missions were installed in all of the Latin American capitals, where they assured a permanent liaison between the local armed forces and those of the United States, and the training of certain officers. In addition, the *Lend-Lease Act* permitted shipment of U.S. military equipment to the Southern Hemisphere. In 1942, with the founding of the Inter-American Defense Board, the first step in building an inter-American structure was taken. This board was composed of high-ranking military officers from each of the twenty one Latin American republics. In attempting to assure the defense of the hemisphere, the concept of "hemispheric defense" was born along with a related body of theory whose basic lines of action were as follows:

1. Standardization of the war material of the armed forces so as to facilitate their combined use.
2. Standardization of the organization and training of the combined forces along United States lines.
3. Teaching of hemispheric languages in military schools.

Between 1943 and 1945, the first Latin American military officers followed courses at the school established in the Panama Canal Zone. During this period, 423 students, from eleven different countries, passed through this school. However, there was not unanimous agreement about the inter-American collaboration. Brazil was perfectly willing to send an expeditionary force to accompany the U.S. Fifth Army in Italy, but Chile and Argentina, for example, where Nazi parties had meanwhile been created, had a very cautious attitude.

At the end of World War II, the Cold War reinforced a permanent alliance. The maintenance of hemispheric security demanded shared responsibilities, vis à vis a common enemy: the communist threat.

This was a time of victory for the intervention principle. Two laws voted in the U.S. Congress sealed the U.S./Latin American military pact: the law of Reciprocal Assistance for Defense (1949) and the Mutual Security Act (1951). Thanks to the bilateral agreements established by these laws, military experts and materials were in abundance, and the officers and non-commissioned officers from Latin America were able to familiarize themselves with a "modern" army.

The mechanisms of ideological and material dependence have been refined over the years. The inter-American organisms discovered increasingly flexible ways of integrating the Latin American armies into the defense of the continent. The army, the air force and the navy each had its own network of mutual cooperation. In 1949, the U.S. Army Caribbean School at Fort Gulick was established in the Panama Canal Zone. In the very beginning, this school was primarily responsible for training U.S. officers bound for territories where the U.S. empire played an active role. During its first year, it trained 743 U.S. officers, and 195

concept of hemispheric defense, base of the multilateral system of defense for the Americas, created by Nicholas Spykman⁹ at the eve of the U.S. entry into World War II, and which has been used by the Brazilians for legitimizing interdependence for the benefit of the United States, is founded upon a strategic vision which is very close to considerations of geopolitics.

We should note that the Praetorians of South America rely upon the concept of geopolitics and its correlate, geostrategy, as a basis for analyzing what they consider to be the main conflict, that between East and West, between Communist and Christian civilizations. This concept also provides a justification for the sub-imperialist designs of Brasilia, which invokes the "manifest....inalienable destiny...marked out by nature itself on the map of the South Atlantic." (Golbery)

Another strata of the National Security Doctrine encompasses the historical experience of the U.S. imperialist State. The first National Security State was, in fact, that installed by the United States within its own frontiers, at the end of World War II. Its legal expression was the *National Security Act* of 1947. So as to prevent demobilization, which might risk repeating the crisis situation of the pre-war years, the military-industrial complex decided to maintain the high pressure achieved by exceptional war-time mobilization. This was the real reason for maintaining mobilization, and not the threat of a third world war, to be triggered by Stalin,

Latin Americans. Scarcely four years later, the majority of students came from Latin America, and in 1956 all of the English language instruction was eliminated. Only Mexico, Haiti and Costa Rica were not involved in this training program.

Despite this intensive partitioning, the Cuban Revolution triumphed and its success marked the beginning of another stage, which has as its main objective the establishment of a military apparatus that would be effective against a new kind of enemy, the guerrillas, the internal enemy. A symbol of this change was the metamorphosis of the U.S. Caribbean School into the U.S. Army School of the Americas. The practice and theory of the training changed, even though this school continued to make the students more aware of anti-communism than democracy.

A new element was added to the means for perfecting senior officers. In 1962 the Inter-American Defense College was founded in Washington. It followed the model of the U.S. National War College and the "Collège de la Défense de l'OTAN." The director of the Inter-American defense College is a U.S. officer and the assistant-director a member of the Latin American armed forces. (In 1977, the assistant-director was General Meira Maltos, author of *Brasil—Geopolítica e Destino*).

In addition to these principal schools, there are peripheral schools, that are no less decisive in the formation of a military mentality for the entire continent. For example, one has Fort Bragg, where the U.S. Army's School of Psychological Warfare operates, and the famous U.S. Army Special Warfare Center.

Mechanisms for consultation have also been set up, such as the "Annual Conference of American Armies", founded in 1960. This conference brings together the Latin American general Staffs and the Pentagon officers. During one of these early conferences, the question of the role of the army in contemporary society was discussed for the very first time.

as the government led everyone to believe.¹⁰

The National Security Act justified war-time institutions and made the war priorities of this period also peace-time priorities. Its preamble presented two basic objectives: (1) to provide an integrated program for the future security of the U.S. and (2) to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures...relating to national security." James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy at that time, specified the meaning of this before the U.S. Senate: "This bill provides....for the coordination of the three armed services, but what is to me even more important, it provides for the integration of foreign policy with national policy, the integration of our civil economy with military obligations; it provides for continual advances in the field of research and applied services."¹¹ Concretely, this act established the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, two organisms which were placed beyond the reach of traditional powers. Although Congress and the Supreme Court maintained certain constitutional prerogatives as far as internal policies were concerned, the CIA and the National Security Council had almost exclusive control over defense and foreign policy. It was during this period that the foundations were laid for permanent collaboration between the large private corporations and the Pentagon, between industrial production and military research, and between university research and that necessary for national security. Each year, the RDTE (Research, Develop-

Joint maneuvers, such as the Unitas operations, which every year since 1960 have brought together the U.S. Navy and the Latin American fleets, brings to an end this exposé on the values and teachings of the "American way of war." (For additional reading on this subject, see, amongst others, the numerous articles which have appeared since 1950 in the *Military Review*; Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America*, New York, Praeger, 1960; Michael Klare, *War Without End*, New York, Vintage Books, 1972. For a Latin American view of this question, see José Nun's text, "A Latin American Phenomenon: the Middle Class Military Coup," which appeared in James Petras, Maurice Zeitlin (eds.), *Latin America, Reform or Revolution? A Reader*, New York, Fawcett, 1968; Edmundo Campos Coelho, *Em busca de identidade: o Exército e a Política na Sociedade Brasileira*, Rio de Janeiro, Forense-Universitaria, 1976; Victor Villanueva, *EL CAEM y la Revolución de las Fuerzas Armadas*, Lima, Campodonico Editores, 1972.

9. Nicholas Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1942.

10. One sign of this: between 1940 and 1945, the labour force went from 47 million to 55 million. More than 6 million people found employment in the defense industry. The war mobilization was able to make up for what the New Deal politicians were unable to do in order to resolve the economic crisis of the thirties. During this same period, agriculture was just recuperating from a crisis that has lasted since the twenties. (Consult Morris, Greenleaf, Ferrell, *A History of the People America*, New York, Rand McNally, 1971.)

11. On the history of the National Security Act, consult Leonard S. Rodbert and Derek Shearer (eds.), *The Pentagon Watchers*, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday Anchor, 1970. For an analysis of the consequences of this type of State on the models of technology, see Armand Mattelart, *Multinationales et systèmes de communication*, Paris, Anthropos, 1976.

ment, Testing and Evaluation) contracts, as well as the "procurement" contracts granted by the Pentagon institutionalized this continuous cooperation. Permanent liaison committees between the manufacturers of technology and the Armed Forces assured the proper planning of civilian supply and military demand. The very existence of the CIA introduced and sanctified secret activities and surveillance as standard State policies. These policies were connected to national security needs for protecting the rapport between industry and the military establishment. The legislation which dealt with the specific mission of the CIA was later adopted in Latin America, where it was reflected in the various decrees, which instituted local intelligence agencies, directly attached to the National Security Council.

It was within this context of concern for national security, during the McCarthy period, that the first anti-communist legislation in the metropolis was enacted (such as the Internal Security Act in 1950, and the Communist Control Act in 1954). Amongst other provisions, this legislation permitted control of the loyalty of government employees, by stipulating that they might be dismissed from their jobs "in the interest of national security." It also allowed the authorities to suppress "propaganda that consciously and voluntarily advocates the overthrow of the federal government by violence and force." In the introduction to the Communist Control Act of 1954, which outlawed the Communist Party, the enemy is clearly identified: "There is a world-wide revolutionary communist movement which is trying to set up a totalitarian communist dictatorship in the world and it is no longer up to Congress to establish the appropriate measures for recognizing the existence of this world conspiracy and to try and prevent it from achieving its aims." Certain observers have seen in such commentary, which illustrates the relative obsolescence of legislative power, the premises of the modern National Security Doctrine.¹²

The report published in 1976 by the U.S. Senate's investigating committee on the activities of civilian and military intelligence agencies confirms what everyone already knew: the ambiguity of the basic concepts behind this exceptional legislation. Concerning the use of electronic technology for the surveillance of U.S. citizens, one finds the following confession:

The imprecision and manipulation of labels such as "national security", "domestic activity", "subversive activities", and "foreign intelligence", have led to unjustified use of these techniques: Using labels such as "national security" and "foreign intelligence," intel-

12. See the analysis of Judge Senese, "The Transformation of Juridical Structures in Latin America", a report presented at the Bertrand Russell Tribunal, Rome, January 1976, published in *LARU Working Papers* (Toronto), 16, June 1976, pp. 64-97.

13. U.S. Senate, *Foreign and Military Intelligence, Final Report*, 94th Congress, April 26, 1976, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.

14. See *Multinationales et systèmes de communication*, op. cit.

15. George Kelly, "Revolutionary war and psychological action", *Military Review*, October 1960.

ligence agencies have directed their highly intrusive techniques against individuals and organizations who were suspected of no criminal activity and who posed no genuine threat to the national security. In the absence of precise standards and effective outside control, the selection of American citizens as targets has at times been predicated on grounds no more substantial than their lawful protests or their non-conformist philosophies.¹³

A simple reading of the national security decrees promulgated by the military dictatorships of the Southern Cone reveals the elasticity of these concepts. They enable the heirs of Hobbes to make every citizen a suspect at first glance, and make man a wolf, hunting down his fellow man, according to the Master's expression.

In the metropolis, the excesses of McCarthyism may have been curbed (although it should be pointed out that those who were the children of the cold war later became the combatants of the South-East Asian Wars!) but the kind of State apparatus sponsored by national security still exists, as do the principal models for advanced technology, whose dynamics have been marked by the objectives of war. And, as we have previously pointed out, it is no wonder that this advanced technology for social control, like the multi-use satellite systems, land first of all in regimes where the opposition has been muzzled, such as Brazil, Iran and Indonesia. In these extreme realities, these large communication systems are called upon to reinforce the centralizing and totalitarian nature of the State apparatus which precedes them. Under the cover of technological progress, they accelerate the State's neocolonial modernization process, which converges with military efficiency and profitability.¹⁴

COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Another obligatory point of reference for the military leaders of the Southern Cone is the long experience of the French army in Algeria and Indochina. "The French army is practically the only one to have encountered communism in action in a vast land war of a nature and amplitude previously unknown. It can, therefore, serve as a great aid in opening the debate on the form of future war." This was written at the end of the fifties in the *Revue de la Défense Nationale* by an ex-colonel who had served in Indochina. All of the U.S. officers recognize the value of this experience, and agree on the following point: in this period, when no one was speaking in terms of nuclear conflicts, the French military, based on its colonial war experience, was the first to formulate a theory on the struggle against subversion, the *revolutionary war*. Therefore, one is hardly surprised to find in the U.S. Army's abstracts of this period, an article written by an assistant of Kissinger at Harvard, wherein "the most qualified military experts" are exhorted to thoroughly review "all of the lessons left by the French experience."¹⁵ The projects, theories, and operations designed by colonels Godard and Trinquier, the two artisans of the "pacification" program in the Casbah in Algiers, as well as the comments of Colonel Lacheroy, were closely examined.

Even before the Kennedy-McNamara team, foreseeing the rise of national liberation wars, redefined the organization of the Defense Department, and recommended that officers read guerilla war classics so as to be better able to combat this kind of war, the French officers were already familiar with Mao's "fish-in-water" doctrine. As a lieutenant-colonel in the U.S. Army wrote in 1967,

For, when most of the world was focused on traditional ideas of general war and its doctrine of massive retaliation, the French were in Indochina struggling with Ho Chi Minh's inheritance from Mao Tse-Tung—the war of "national liberation," the Communist revolution. It should be remembered that most of the world, the United States in particular, has only recently become aware of the nature of wars of liberation. It wasn't until Nikita Khrushchev's speech in January 1961 and President J.F. Kennedy's reaction to the latter during the Vienna summit, that the highest echelons of the U.S. government began to pay serious attention to these kinds of struggle.¹⁶

As soon as Colonel Trinquier's work *La Guerre Moderne*, was published in French it was translated into English and distributed by a publishing house which, at the time had connections with the different government intelligence agencies (Praeger).¹⁷ It wasn't long before this classic on the struggle against subversion was translated into Spanish and published in Buenos Aires. There, it quickly became the catechism of the local "witch hunters." The fact that, in this respect, the French were ahead of their U.S. companions in arms was especially unbelievable to the latter, given that they had inaugurated these types of irregular struggle in winning their own independence. In addition, the struggle to put down the Huks in the Philippines was still a relatively recent affair. Of course, military analysts in the Pentagon made passing reference to armed exploits, and guerillas in Burma and Greece. However, only one amongst them, John E. Beebe, a former assistant to General Douglas McArthur (who was later quoted by Trinquier in his book), had, in 1955, systematically analyzed his anti-guerilla campaign during the Korean war.¹⁸

Trinquier defined subversion in the following terms: "An ensemble of actions, of every possible nature (political, economic, psychological, armed, etc...) which aim both at taking power and replacing the established system by another." Furthermore, in assimilating subversion and modern war, he pinpointed the way in which the new enemies were to be

16. Lieutenant Colonel Donn A. Starry, "La guerre révolutionnaire", *Military Review*, February 1967.

17. Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare, A French View of Counterinsurgency*, New York, Praeger, 1964. Besides *La Guerre Moderne*, Trinquier's most revealing work on counter-revolutionary strategies is undoubtedly that in which he recounts his "pacification" experiences in Indochina: *Les maquis d'Indochine*, Paris, Editions Albatros, 1952-54; republished in 1976).

18. John E. Beebe, "Beating the guerilla", *Military Review*, December 1955. On the struggles of the Philippine guerillas, see the texts and testimony of William J. Pomeroy, in particular *Guerrilla and Counter Guerrilla Warfare*, New York, International Publishers, 1964. (Pomeroy, who participated in the Huks guerilla

defined:

In modern war, the enemy is especially difficult to define. There is no physical frontier separating the two camps. The line between friends and enemies is drawn within the same nation, within the same village, and sometimes even within the same family. It is often an ideological, immaterial frontier, but which must necessarily be established if we are to be sure of overtaking and vanquishing our adversary.

Having studied the failures of an army equipped only for national defense against a foreign aggressor, Trinquier stresses the new requirements for warfare implied by the new nature of

the aggressor, who attempts to exploit the internal tensions of the country under attack, such as the political, ideological, social, religious and economic conflicts...Military academies teaching classical war doctrines generally take into account many different factors used in decision-making: the mission, the enemy, the terrain, and the means available. However, a factor which is usually disregarded, but which is an essential element of modern warfare is the inhabitant...Control of the masses by a strict hierarchy, or often even by several parallel hierarchies is the master weapon of modern war.

The masses which must be rallied to the counter-revolutionary cause, according to Trinquier's definition, are amorphous. "These masses are there for the taking" said Lacheroy, former head of the Department of Psychological Action. "How are they to be taken?" By force or by brain washing. The concept of *psychological action* appeared side by side with that of *psychological warfare*, which was formulated at the beginning of World War I, and which owed its greatest theoretical triumph to the influence of national socialism and behaviorism. In the capitalist countries, the army instruction manuals¹⁹ first of all defined psychological warfare in tautological fashion as "the application of the science of psychology to the conduct of warfare." Further on, it is defined in operational terms. "It is a supplement to the physical weapons used against the enemy. It seeks to reduce the enemy's will and ability to work and to fight, by creating new attitudes which destroy his morale. It represents persuasion by non-violent means, the use of propaganda." Propaganda which, in turn, is defined as "the systematically organized and planned use of any form of communication designed to affect the feelings, thoughts and actions of a group of individuals in a definite direction and for a given purpose."

movement was condemned to a life sentence in prison, but was freed after 10 years). His diary, which recounts his daily experiences as a guerilla fighter was published in New York in 1963, under the title of *The Forest*. It was translated into Spanish by the Cubans, and during the sixties was the bible for many Latin American revolutionaries.

19. *Extension Course of the Psychological Warfare School, U.S. Army*. See also Murray Dyer, *The Weapon on the Wall, Rethinking Psychological Warfare*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959; William Dougherty (in collaboration with Morris Janowitz), *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 4th Edition, 1968. See also General Victor Werner (ed.), *La communication sociale et la guerre*, Brussels, Institut de Sociologie, Centre de Sociologie de la guerre, 1974.

Military psychologists distinguish between five different kinds of propaganda: *overt propaganda* (when the source is recognized); *covert propaganda* (when the source is not revealed, and disguised in such a way that one believes it comes from the enemy); *strategic propaganda* (when the objectives are of a general, long-term nature, and attempt to reach the entire population); *tactical propaganda* (which is destined for a particular group of individuals, and has a definite, specific objective), and *counter propaganda* (which combats and neutralizes the effect of the enemy's propaganda).

The Nazis were the first ones to use a modern approach to psychological warfare. It was applied to their own people, in order to develop conformist attitudes. Hitler himself dedicated many pages to this concept in *Mein Kampf*, where he referred to it as "the war with intellectual weapons." In other western armies, psychological warfare was traditionally designed for confronting a foreign enemy. This is well illustrated by the charters of the U.S. government's propaganda agencies, such as the former Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), amongst others, which specify that this type of activity must be conducted outside of the national territory. The

20. See Armand Mattelart, "Firmes multinationales et syndicalisme jaune dans le contre-insurrection", *Les temps modernes* (Paris), January 1975, and the various texts of Michael Klare.

The CHAIRMAN*. These distinctions, I confess, are extremely difficult to make, the distinction between information and propaganda. They are not only theoretically difficult to make, but it is also practically difficult to draw the line.

The staff gave me this memorandum, which says we ought to come to grips with this question. I have tried this before and it isn't very easy but I thought perhaps you could help us.

If we look at the word "information" in the dictionary, the American Heritage Dictionary says this:

(1) The act of informing or the condition of being informed; communication of knowledge. (2) Knowledge derived from study, experience, or instruction.

And the term "propaganda" is defined as:

(1) The systematic propagation of a given doctrine or of allegations reflecting its views and interests. (2) Material disseminated by the proselytizers of a doctrine.

Within which of those definitions, granted that the precise lines are difficult to draw, does your purpose fall?

Mr. SHAKESPEARE.** You know, Mr Chairman, in the past, in public when I have been asked, "Is the USIA a propaganda agency?" I have answered "Yes", but then I have clarified it. What I have said and what I believe is that if you use what has been the historical definition of propaganda before it was cluttered up by Goebbels and others in the 1930's as the dissemination of information, then

manuals on psychological warfare specifically mention the need for working on allied populations, and even baptize this kind of action with the name of "consolidation operations." However, in practice, these actions are most often purely superstructural in nature, and in fact, constitute a sort of rear-guard combat, in relation to that carried out against the foreign enemy. One had to wait for the "vietnamization" phase of the South-East Asian War to witness a new approach to civilian populations by the Pentagon's "counterinsurgency research" specialists.²⁰

As far as the new psychological perspective of the French officers was concerned, it was a question of transforming this rear-guard combat into an *avant-garde combat*. Psychological action poses the global question of the ideological control of "friendly" (no one is to be trusted!) or neutral populations, and attempts to formulate a scientific approach to this problem.

Psychological action constitutes a veritable "pacification" doctrine, a term which the Pentagon theoreticians borrowed from the French. We are already familiar with the application of the "pacification" program in Vietnam, as part of the *Phoenix* operations. Three new elements appear in this modern form of psychological warfare, directed against the internal enemy as well as "friends." The first new element is that of *population transfers*, which were first attempted on a large scale by the British, who successfully used this operation against

that is what this agency does.

Propaganda has become a scare word which has very sensitive connotations.

If you are asking me whether I would agree that the USIA mission is propaganda in the sense in which you have just described it, the answer, sir, is "No." It would be much more, much closer to the definition that you gave of the word "information."

Really, what it is is the dissemination of information about U.S. policies and about the United States society worldwide.

The CHAIRMAN. The systematic propagation of a given doctrine or of allegations reflecting its views and interests is certainly not the same as the spreading of information. I mean a doctrine and information are not necessarily the same. They are not the same generally; are they? You may have information without a doctrine?

Mr. SHAKESPEARE. Of course; that is precisely why I said that. I would say that in the context in which you have described the word "propaganda" it does not apply.

The CHAIRMAN. It isn't my language; that was the description of the dictionary.

I will come to the next question that bothers me very much.

* U.S. Senator J.W. Fulbright

** Director of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA)

Source: "USIA Appropriations Authorization, Fiscal Year 1973", *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate*, 92nd Congress, March 20, 21 and 23, 1972, pp. 7-8.

the Malaysian guerillas. In Algeria, the local population was installed in partitioned villages, "compartmentalized and cleansed" according to the expression of the French paratrooper General Massu. He justified their existence by claiming that they constituted a protection against a "minority of outlaws who are responsible for a reign of terror and who impose their own will upon an immense majority of good citizens." In Algeria, this structure of territorial and administrative control, for reasons of internal security, permitted shifting about one and one-half million people.

The second new element is the *systematization of the population's political indoctrination*. It is a well known fact that the most virulent advocates of this policy were officers who spent long months of captivity in the prison camps of the Viet-Minh, where they were forced to take re-education courses. Both seduced and unnerved by the militant practices of their adversaries, as Hitler had been by Soviet revolutionary practice in 1917, they tried to use enemy tactics for other purposes. In order to perfect this part of the psychological action, numerous theories on handling crowds were studied. Amongst these, the most important were the theories of Gustave Le Bon, Goebbels and Hitler. However, they also studied the theories of mass action of Lenin, Trotsky, and Chakotin. After defeat at Dien Bien Phu, many officers were sent to the universities to prepare diplomas in psychology and sociology. (During the same period, the anthropologists in the Pentagon were still a long way from imagining their future science of counter-insurrection, which was developed around 1965). On the Algerian battlefield, companies of soldiers supplied with loud speakers and tracts were responsible for applying the teachings of their master thinkers. A French army weekly *Le Bled* (with a circulation of 350,000) fought against defeatist propaganda coming from the metropolis. Finally, the paramilitary specialized bodies SAS (Specialized Administrative Section), SAU (Urban Administrative Section), while constructing schools and clinics, and giving out food or technical assistance, also were attempting to rally the local population to their cause.

Third element: *for the first time, the use of torture was systematized in a global theory of information*. (Trinquier wrote an eloquent chapter on the necessity of this practice). Torture is not only considered as a means for obtaining information on clandestine networks, *at any price*, but also as a means for destroying every individual who is captured, as well as his or her sense of solidarity with an organization or community.

The principle theoreticians of modern war and the struggle against subversion were relegated to a marginal position by the later developments in the

21. The penetration of military doctrines from France's extreme right in certain sectors of the armed forces in the Southern Cone should not obscure the influence of the French and Franco Integrist movements. What we have, in effect, is a double front: military and religious. In 1966, General Ongania in Argentina, a follower of Opus Dei, was the best example of this combined front. Pinochet's counsellors, followers of the same movement, are more laicized,

Algerian conflict. After the *coup d'Etat* of Algiers on 22 April 1961, a good many of them were to be found in the extreme-right group, the OAS (Secret Army Organization), or in exile in Katanga (Ex-Belgian Congo). Later, some of them also turned up in Argentina, where the paramilitary groups provided them with opportunities to put their ideas into practice.²¹

The Pentagon officers were conscious of the fact that the strategy for reducing the internal enemy proposed by the pro-fascist elements in the French army implied a certain challenge to normal relations between the army and the State, i.e., that the military wanted to assume the principal role at all stages of the battle. The U.S. military certainly gained valuable knowledge from French theory and practice of modern war. The U.S. contribution to French military efforts in Indochina, which was more than \$2.5 billion, and which represented 80% of the cost of the war, was certainly not a gratuitous act.²² However, their reservations were clearly expressed:

It is significant that throughout the empires, republics, restorations, and governments that rose and fell, the army remained loyal to France. The French army avoided politics, and was generally contemptuous of the government, but quite unwilling to take positive action against it. *La guerre révolutionnaire*, as they came to understand it, challenged the very core of the profession.... This is a method inimical to the structure of liberal democracy. Armed forces can surely fight against the effect of subversion, but military force in a democracy is not the proper agent to deal with the causes of subversion.²³

Therefore, what they could not allow to be written in black and white was that the army should cease to play the role of "*la grande muette*." ("The big mute," a term earned during World War I, when the French army abstained from any political intervention).

Nevertheless, different means were employed to arrive at the same result. The U.S. military refused to adopt a strategy that obviously advocated sedition, such as that recommended by the extreme-right officers from Algiers. U.S. General Staff officers preferred a strategy that respected the tradition of smooth transition towards the militarization of the State, as well illustrated by the enacting of the *National Security Act*.

CIVIC ACTION

The advance of the Armed Forces towards the founding of military States in Latin America, and in many Third World nations, was therefore carried out through intermediary phases. Before these armies were converted into occupation forces within their own frontiers, the Pentagon, through numerous technical and ideological assistance programs, first of all facilitated other forms of military participation in the development of their countries.

although they do profess the same theological convictions. On this subject, consult Ignacio Barker's very interesting essay "Las fuerzas armadas y el cristianismo en algunos países de America Latin", *Mensaje* (Santiago du Chili), June, 1977.

22. Given by Michael Klare, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

23. Starry, *art. cit.*

According to the Pentagon's analysts, the theory and practice of modern war, as developed by the French, had certain limits. These limits were viewed primarily as being the result of the colonial framework within which the Indo-Chinese and Algerian conflicts developed.

Further complicating the problem of countering *la guerre révolutionnaire* is the fact that in the contemporary world most such wars will be conducted inside the border of another sovereign State. The French, at least, were in the position of a colonial power with initial access to the area and some degree of administrative control. The problem we shall face increasingly is how to come to the aid of those governments faced with insurgency, without seeming to interfere in the internal affairs of other States... Truly the U.S. military profession may be said to be in its period of meditation — searching for theory and doctrine.²⁴

The problem consisted of redefining and justifying a new means of intervention, adapted to the neo-colonial context which characterized relations between Third World countries and the United States. The elaboration of this "doctrine" and "theory" followed the rhythm of the major events of the sixties, and prepared the terrain for the extreme situation of the military State, where the so-called national armed forces were transformed into occupation troops within their own territories.

In 1960, the era of the Alliance for Progress was ushered in. In response to the Cuban challenge, Washington abandoned its policy of supporting traditional dictatorships, and began to encourage moderate reform movements. At a later stage, the regime of Eduardo Frei became the showcase for this new doctrine. With Kennedy's "New Frontier" policy came the penetration of the ideology and practice of community development, which implied a mass line for the middle-class parties. This was basically a matter of making the population participate in its own development. Grassroots committees organized national mobilization at the level of the factories, neighborhood and leisure centers, cooperatives, and mothers' and womens' clubs. In this connection, the army also had a mission to fulfill, namely to come out of the barracks, and, within the renewed context of liberal democracy, become involved with the concrete tasks of national development. The new role of the armed forces was described by a term which was first used in the fifties, during the struggle to put down the Huks guerillas in the Philippines: *civic action*.

From 1961 onwards, the Kennedy team gave the green light to the Pentagon for launching the first assistance programs of this kind, for use in the Armed Forces of Third World countries. The concept of civic action was christened at the Inter-American Army Conference held in Panama, in 1961. The

24. Starry, *art. cit.*

25. Raymond A. Moore, "Toward a definition of military nationbuilding", *Military Review*, July 1973.

26. General Mercado, *La Política y la estrategia militar en la guerra contrasubversiva en América Latina*, Lima, 1967. (Condensed and published by the *Military Review*, March 1969).

same year it was endorsed by Congress and taken up again in the Foreign Assistance Act. In 1962, the Defense Department granted this concept official status in its glossary, where the following definition was given:

The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.²⁵

The use of civic action, or its equivalent (the peaceful use of the Armed Forces) as means of preventive struggle against subversion did not develop within the idyllic context that Kennedy had foreseen. The emergence of centers of guerilla operations in Latin America accelerated the application of this kind of civic action, but at the same time revealed how it served as logistic support for the counter-revolutionary war. In 1967, in the journal *Military Review*, Peruvian General Edgardo Mercado Jarrin theorized on his experience fighting against the guerillas in his country:

The struggle against insurgency has imposed upon the armed forces of Latin America a new function of assisting national development. In addition to the traditional defense role, the armed forces can contribute to construction of communication lines and cooperate in settlement programs. Also, by means of training and instruction given on the military posts, they can help diminish the skilled labor shortage and assist in creating the psychological receptivity for a "technical environment" which the countries need for industrial development. This new function of the armed forces has required them to emerge from the confinements of their barracks, where they had stayed for decades, to come into ever-increasing contact with the socio-economic problems of the country and to direct their attention to the internal front.²⁶

Shortly afterwards, when the constitutional President Belaunde was overthrown in Peru, this same general became the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the military government which installed a progressive version of the military State, lasting until 1976.

The struggle against guerilla movements convinced the military that the politicians were incompetent. In 1967, the article written by the Peruvian general mentioned above, had a certain quality of premonition, as shown in the following passage: "The relationship between politics and military strategy often results in antagonistic positions in the struggle against Communist insurgency, creating tensions detrimental to the unity which must exist between the two."

At this time, Brazil, the oldest military State in Latin America, had already moved well beyond this concept of civic action. The Brazilian leaders even questioned its validity in front of their Latin-American colleagues:

The doctrine on the so-called uselessness of armies is so persuasive that many of us, doubting our own destiny, cannot justify our role, and act as if already we were no longer indispensable to our nation's security. I believe that this is one of the reasons why we have emphasized

what is known as "civic action," which is not always sincere, and which is often carried out to disguise or compensate for what we really should be doing (excerpt from a speech given on 3 November 1966 by Colonel Octavio Costa, at the Conference of American Armies in Buenos Aires).

Did the sociologists and anthropologists in the Pentagon also foresee that this civic action was in reality nothing more than a tactic for gradually bringing the military institution to power? In answering this query, it should be recalled that, as of 1961 they were already developing a theory for arranging the transition from a civilian and peaceful use of the armed forces to a military use, that is to say, from association with a civilian government's tasks to direct intervention of the armed forces in the State apparatus. Thus was born the theory of *military nation-building*:

Nation-building... is presumably a metaphoric rubric for the social process or processes by which a national consciousness appears in certain groups and, which, through a more or less institutionalized social structure, act to attain political autonomy for their society.²⁷

In the minds of these social scientists, the military possessed certain qualities which made it the obvious choice as the group which had this national consciousness and thus should be responsible for this nation-building. These qualities are as follows: expertise, equipment, manpower, coercive sanctions, and the capacity to serve as models for emulation. In 1961, Lucien Pye, a well known U.S. sociologist, undertook a series of studies for the U.S. military which were prefaced by the following comment: "There is a need for systematic research into potentialities of military establishments for guiding economic development and assisting in the administration of national policies."²⁸

The basis for legitimizing the doctrine on the manifest destiny of the military institution, the *technocratic elite*, according to Golbery, was thus being established. And, at the same time, the stage was being set for the emergence of the modern military regime.

A STATE FOR THE MULTINATIONALS

The Latin-American version of the National Security Doctrine, like any ideology, only provides the rationalization for a real process. It reflects the changing elements in the model defining the existence and expansion of capital in these countries. *The military State answers the need to resolve the global crisis affecting these societies, the crisis of the populist State, its class alliances and its way of development*. In the thirties, when faced with the world-wide economic crisis, in order to overcome their

27. David Wilson, "Nation-building and revolutionary wars", in: K.W. Deutsch and W.J. Foltz (eds.), *Nation-Building*, New York, Atherton Press, 1963.

28. Reprinted in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, J.J. Johnson, ed., Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1962.

29. On the concept of *military party*, see Roberto Guevara's analyses in a paper presented at the Latin American Week, Belgrade, 7-14 November 1977, and the discussions they prompted (Forthcoming).

problems, Latin-American countries began a process of industrialization by import substitution. (However, this substitution was very relative, since, in the majority of cases, it was necessary to continue importing machines for manufacturing locally textiles, electrical appliances, and other consumption goods.) This substitution process contributed to the rise of an industrial bourgeoisie, and, in conjunction with this, to the growth of the proletarian class. The populist State was born from the industrial bourgeoisie's need of support from the workers and peasants to wrest hegemonic control from the commercial and landowning oligarchy. For three decades, so-called "middle class" governments administered the populist State in the name of this class alliance.

The massive penetration of multinational firms, which began just after the Korean War, accelerated a process of monopolization and denationalization of local economies, and profoundly changed the conditions responsible for the formation of this alliance. Industry has been divided up, and only the fraction of the bourgeoisie that is connected to foreign capital can adapt to these new dynamics. The struggle is accentuated between these two models of accumulation of capital, that is, between the model of big, international, monopoly capital, and the old model, based on the internal market, and the fractions of the bourgeoisie they represent. It was precisely these contradictions within the dominant class that facilitated, for example, in Chile, the rise of a popular government, whose project was to offer an alternative to this crisis of hegemony. Indeed, these disputes within the bourgeois class, which were due to the radicalization of the class struggle under the reformism of the Christian Democratic President, Eduardo Frei, explain why a divided bourgeoisie presented two candidates to run against Allende in 1970. It was only after the elections which brought Allende to power, and thanks to a common enemy, that class unity and the formation of a social bloc were reconstituted within the opposition. This reconstitution was realized under the leadership of the employers' trade associations of the monopoly bourgeoisie and imperialism, and with the reinforcements and ramparts of the petite bourgeoisie. In view of the Popular Unity's incapacity to install the hegemony of the working class as a solution to the crisis, the *coup d'Etat* established the monopolistic model as the inevitable alternative. This hegemonic crisis in the bourgeois system of domination, could not have been surmounted by any fraction of the bourgeoisie by preserving intact traditional democratic mechanisms. The intervention of the Armed Forces made up for this inability to act. The military institution, by imposing its own forms for organizing power, *transformed itself into a veritable party of the dominant class*,²⁹ which was more than happy to renew capital expansion.

The model sponsored by the military State for producing and realising surplus value brings into play the strategy of big, international capital and resolves the hegemonic crisis in its favor. The fraction of the bourgeoisie that is subordinate to this big, international capital draws a direct advantage

from this development model. The other fractions of this class try, somehow or other, to adapt to and profit from the exceptional situation for extracting surplus value. These fractions, knowing very well that there is no longer a place for the older model, do not challenge the basis of the model implanted by the dictatorship. They only question the manner in which it is applied. The establishment of the military State, which confirms the hegemony of the monopolistic project, does not necessarily do away with the contradictions and disputes between the fractions of the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, these contradictions represent the only area where open political struggle can still take place.

The State of Exception guarantees the conditions necessary both for the penetration of foreign capital and the establishment of an economy directed towards foreign markets. Many measures have been taken which open the doors of the national economy to multinational firms. These measures are often to the detriment of previous agreements signed by members of the continent's common markets: elimination of tariff barriers, preferential tariffs, special privileges for profit repatriation, and heavy indemnisation payments. The militarization of the State permits the *over-exploitation* of workers by setting up profitability criteria that are incomparably higher than those permitted under normal conditions in a liberal-Democratic state.³⁰ The liquidation of the trade unions intends to reduce any pressure which might result in a reduction of the multinationals' rate of profit.

The evolution of the Chilean branch of RCA (Radio Corporation of America) provides us with a most striking example of how a production model based on internal markets has been abandoned, for the benefit of an economy directed towards foreign markets. During the thirties recession, when firms such as ITT and General Electric were engaged in similar decentralizing activities, RCA, with the assistance of the Chilean government, installed the first factory manufacturing electric appliances, radios, phonographs, etc. These items, which formerly had been produced in the metropolis and exported to Chile, were thus manufactured locally. In 1971, with the agreement of the parent establishment, the Popular Unity Government nationalized the RCA branch in Chile. In 1975, the military dictatorship sold all of RCA's stock to a multinational American-Brazilian firm. Even though Chile itself does not yet have a color television network, this factory now produces color television sets for massive exportation. This new production model, which is destroying the structural basis of the previous economic regime, has also been adopted by the Argentinian generals, who have followed the

30. There are many signs of this over-exploitation. The rate of accidents at the workplace for Brazil is one example amongst others. In 1971, 18% of the insured working population had an accident, and in 1974 this figure had reached 21 to 22%. Within this 22% the rate of mortal accidents also grew at an increasingly rapid rhythm. The decrease in net earnings is another sign. In Brazil the net earnings have decreased 40% since the *coup d'Etat*. In Argentina, they have also fallen by 40%, but in less than one

example of their Chilean counterparts. Uruguay and Bolivia, although handicapped by a lower rate of industrialization, are also attempting to set up a similar system. After the *coup d'Etat* in 1964, Brazil did not forsake the former model, based on the internal market, which, even though it only accounted for 20% of the population, was still made up of 20 million consumers. The military regime called upon the multinationals to denationalize its economy, and thus perfect this mode of capital accumulation. It was only after 1970, when there were clear signs that the model was losing its vitality, and when myth of the "Brazilian miracle" was deflating to the rhythm of the internal market's saturation, that the military dictatorship tried to institute a development strategy based on both internal and foreign markets.

The adoption of a new model for the accumulation of capital also modifies, in the long run, the class structure of these societies. The proletariat and the peasantry are undergoing a process of "pauperization", along with substantial sectors of the petite bourgeoisie.

The rupture both in the social structure and the model of economic development is perfectly illustrated by the problem the mass media—part of national "psychosocial power", according to Golbery—are confronted with in dealing with the change-over from an economy based on the internal market to an export-oriented economy. For the vast majority of consumers, this signifies an economic recession. Mass culture, as diffused by the press, television and radio, in the last ten years has been perfectly consistent with the rise of the middle class and its accession to the ranks of the so-called consumer society. Today there is a striking discrepancy between the images of this superstructure presented on the television and in the cinema, and the absence of the social classes to whom the message of this superstructure is destined. A Uruguayan exile recently expressed the essence of this contradiction by pointing out that in his country advertising was still directed at the middle class, when in point of fact, this class is rapidly becoming extinct.

In the field of education, the policy for selecting students is a direct reflection of the stakes involved in the military dictatorship's economic projects, as well as the different alliances behind these projects. In Chile, for example, the Junta recently made severe cuts in government subsidies to the universities. Up until 1973, a series of reforms had allowed children from petite bourgeoisie families to better their social position by gaining access to higher education. Since 1973, the students must finance their own studies. An entirely new policy has been instituted: a part of the university budget will depend on the agreements reached between different faculties and private

year. In Chile, the figures for reductions in net earnings are very similar to those for Argentina: they have decreased by 50% since September 1973, and at the present time earnings represent scarcely one third of what they were in 1972. (See André Gunder Frank, "Dinámica de dominación del capitalismo mundial en América Latina", a paper presented at the Latin American Week, Belgrade, 7-14 November 1977).

enterprise.

Another measure intended to transform the social fabric of the societies governed by military States is the wholesale import-export of populations. The forced exile of opponents, internal population transfers within national territories, intended to assure partitioning and to disorganize possible centers of subversion, the sterilization of proletarian masses—all are products of the same strategic design for suppressing the *internal enemy*. Another important element of this strategy is the racist immigration of Apartheid settlers, already seasoned in virulent anti-communism. This phenomenon has recently been noted in Bolivia, Argentina and Uruguay, which have begun receiving white settlers from Rhodesia and Namibia. The objectives that give definite direction to the "demographic" policies, otherwise known as policies for the "circulation" of people, of these regimes consist of the destruction of social sectors that precipitated a crisis in the former capitalist model, and the fashioning of a made-to-order population, corresponding to the new model of accumulation.

FASCISM AND MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS

The Latin American military States places us in the presence of regimes that are reminiscent of European fascism. However, although they have adopted the same basic concepts and practices of European fascism, the nature of the Latin American regimes is profoundly different. Indeed, these authoritarian States *are constructed on the basis of fundamentally different types of class alliances*, which have alienated the largest sectors of the population, and have precluded the possibility of constructing a solid social base. Within the petite bourgeoisie, only the relatively limited, modern sector, in the service of the monopolies, was immediately won over to the regimes. As for the proletariat's situation in the Southern Cone countries, it is hardly the same as what it was in Italy and Germany at the dawn of fascism. Hitler and Mussolini were faced with a worker's movement that was disoriented, and in a position of a retreat. However, when the Latin American Praetorians came to power in the Southern Cone, the worker's movement had already made great strides in consolidating its positions. In addition, it should be remembered that the assault by the Italian and German fascist parties was launched from outside of the State apparatus, while the military take-overs in Latin America were realized from the inside of this apparatus, as the Armed Forces already occupied a privileged position in the State.

The weaknesses of the alliances introduce another contradiction in the national projects of the military States. For example, the Chilean Junta's declarations of principles, as well as its outline for a new constitution, represent models for a fascist

31. On the alliance of the petite bourgeoisie's guilds with those of the big bourgeoisie in the opposition to Allende, see Armand Mattelart, "Mass media et 'ligne de masse' de la bourgeoisie", in *Mass media, idéologies et mouvement révolutionnaire*, Paris, Anthropos, 1974.

organization of social relations. Its projected society is made up of a myriad of control relays which, through grassroots organizations, assure communication between the central seat of power and the neighborhoods, the work places, corporatist professional associations, and women's and children's clubs. However, for an appreciation of the utopian nature of this project, one only has to recall the tension that broke out over the economic-development model, amongst the different trade guilds of the petite bourgeoisie, such as the truck owners and shopkeepers, who took to the streets to bring down Allende, and the large monopoly trade associations, who were and still remain the only valid interlocutors and partners of the dictatorship.³¹

The class alliances formed by the military dictatorships in Latin America undoubtedly constitute the most important distinction between these regimes and European fascism. However, this is not the only difference. Unlike European fascism, which reflected the interests of a bourgeoisie searching for a new world-wide distribution of markets, the "national projects" of the military States are developed within a context of increased dependence on the metropolis. This brings us to the role these military States play in imperialist strategy.

These regimes are in perfect harmony with the vast re-deployment of the international capitalist economy, now undergoing a severe structural crisis, accelerated by the rising tide of national liberation movements. The famous interdependence which the Brazilian generals spoke of has a very concrete application in readjusting the global balance of power. In order to face the crisis, a new international division of labor has emerged from within the capitalist camp. This new strategy, formalized by the Trilateral Commission, tightens the links between advanced capitalist countries, and attempts to put an end to "uncontrolled competition", so that together, the capitalist bloc is in a stronger position vis à vis the Third World, especially oil-exporting countries.

The Trilateral strategy accords Japan and other European capitalist countries their own zones of influence, establishing them as secondary imperialist powers, with the most stable regions and countries, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, benefitting from a privileged status. One of the most obvious examples of this decentralization is furnished by the increasingly aggressive role played by France in the designs of the capitalist camp in Africa. (dispatching of troops and military experts to Shaba (Zaire), Chad, and Mauritania during the war waged against the Saharan people). This policy of military intervention, is accompanied by an offensive of France's multinationals in all of the neo-colonial regimes of this continent (exploiting markets for nuclear reactors and arms in South Africa, and assisting in the modernization of the telecommunication systems in Zaire, and Western Africa). It goes without saying that while this redistributive process is going on, the secondary contradictions amongst the various metropolises have a tendency to become accentuated. The recent remodelling of the steel industry on a world-wide scale, testifies as to the conflicts of interest amongst the central powers

(France vs. Japan, Japan vs. the U.S., the U.S. vs. the Federal Republic of Germany, etc.)

Another less well-known aspect of this strategy is its attempt to decentralize the imperialist domination of the United States. This involves creating "sub-imperialist" centers that will liberate the United States from some of its world-police duties, which it is finding increasingly difficult to handle. These sub-imperialist regional centers are currently ruled by Brazil, Iran, Indonesia and Nigeria. Operating as relay stations, they not only assure economic decentralization through the multinational corporations, but also allow the U.S. to avoid direct intervention for political and military control of the countries located in these different regions. (The participation of the Brazilian military in the *coups d'Etat* in Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay provides an example of this strategy). Of course, this control must also ensure that these countries continue to provide raw materials, house the decentralized polluting industries, and direct their economies towards foreign markets. The latter is possible thanks to the low cost of labor, which is necessarily linked to political "stability", assured by repression.

The new international division of labor, which characterizes the restructuring of world-wide capitalism's economic apparatus, has, as a consequence, the exacerbation of differences existing between the various Third World countries. Certain observers are already designating this differentiation process by referring to the emergence of a "Fourth or Fifth World". Indeed, a brief overview of some of these countries demonstrates the diverse nature of their participation in the new international division of labor. Nations such as Brazil and Israel have become manufacturers of producers' goods and more especially, devoted to propagating the avionics/defense-electronics industry.³² Certain other countries try to specialize in the exportation of agricultural products. This is the case for Argentina, which is attempting to export principally cereals and meat, thus reversing a 30-year old policy of industrialization based on import substitution. Many others, such as Taiwan and South Korea are limited to assembling products manufactured elsewhere, or else concentrate their industrial production on consumer goods (also for exportation).

The decentralization of U.S. supremacy also means that the ideological class struggle has moved on to another front. Relayed by secondary

32. Roughly 40% of the Israeli military sales go for export to Latin America, Taiwan, South Africa and Singapore. Less than a decade ago, this fledgling industry was primarily a manufacturer, under license, of equipment developed by U.S. and French companies. Today it is producing airborne and surface-based radars, digital computers, radio-communication and electronic-warfare equipment that was designed in the country. A similar situation exists in Brazil. In addition to aeronautics and military naval production under license, it already has national aeronautics and military naval construction industries. It also manufactures combat vehicles and its military electronics industry is now getting started. Between 1972 and 1976, Brazil exported aeronautics equipment and combat vehicles towards the other Latin American

imperialist powers and sub-imperialist forces which relieve it from direct repressive tasks, the U.S., through Carter's moral evangelism, has adopted the pleasing facade of reformism. Thus, the U.S. is attempting to reestablish its legitimacy, virtue, and international image, all of which were badly tarnished by the war in Vietnam, Watergate, and the recent revelations concerning the U.S. role in the overthrow of Allende. Appropriating and benefitting from the human rights issue, it defines the frontiers and the terms of discussion for questioning certain realities in socialist countries. The myth of the "end of ideologies", which obviously inspires the Carter team, thus coincides with the religious and humanist impulses of those, such as the "New Philosophers", who confine themselves to a rightist critique of marxism. The monopoly that the United States tries to exercise in the field of human rights also allows it to boost its credibility, as it is not obliged to pay heed to the criticism of the Southern Cone generals, who would like the metropolis to return to the openly anti-Communist policies of the Cold War.

INFORMATION AND CLASS ALLIANCES

The absence of a broad-based system of class alliances is particularly patent when one examines the problems which must be confronted by the military dictatorships in operating the mass media apparatus. This specific field also allows one to apprehend how the concept of permanent war, which is the guiding principle for these States, has infiltrated all institutions.

The necessity of conquering the worker and peasant enemy, and the impossibility of rallying the entire petite bourgeoisie to their "national project" has doubled the stakes of the program for controlling "hearts and minds". A new reality is imposed, that of psychological warfare. By bludgeoning from on high, this warfare attempts to make up for the lack of consensus at the base. An examination of advertising expenditures in present-day Chile clearly supports this observation. In 1975, the advertising agencies located in Santiago declared a gross income that was ten times superior to that declared two years earlier. The revenue of the largest agency in the capital, connected with *El Mercurio*, went from \$274,000 to more than \$2.5 million in 1975, and approached the figure of \$3.5 million in 1976.³³ In addition, there was a return *en masse* of the branches of U.S. agencies that had preferred to move back to Madison Avenue under the Popular Unity

countries, Togo, Qatar and Libya. In the Third World, only India produces military equipment that is equally diversified. However, for the same period India only exported aeronautics material to Nepal. (See Philip J. Klass, "Special Series: Israeli Avionics", *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 10 April 1978; Alain Cadix, "De nouveaux exportateurs d'armements, les pays du tiers-monde", *Le Monde*, 3 May 1978).

33. Data was taken from *Advertising Age* (the trade journal of U.S. advertising agencies), 18 April 1977. For an analysis of the strategy of another ideological apparatus, that of education, see Tomas Vasconi, Inés Cristina Reca and Beatriz Pedrano, "La militarización de la Universidad en America del Sur", a paper presented at the International Conference on Cultural Imperialism, Algiers, 11-15

government. Thus, J. Walter Thompson, which left Chile in 1970 when Allende came to power, came back to resettle in Santiago. Another indication of the reinforcement of the propaganda apparatus is the multiplication of the Gallup public opinion polls in a country where "freedom of opinion" no longer exists.

This increase in advertising expenditures contradicts the status-quo economists, who claim that a rising curve for money received and spent on advertising is always associated with a rise in the population's standard of living!

Confronted with the absence of massive support and the impossibility of continually relying on the outer trappings of fascist pomp, the propaganda loud speakers are filling the gaping holes with the noise of slogans. These campaigns, launched under the banner of "depoliticization" and the celebration of "national values" attempt to make up for the absence of grass-roots organizations, which are necessary circuits for transmitting totalitarian indoctrination.

In order to demoralize and discredit the "internal enemy", psychological warfare enthrone a new arm, a new communication channel that is just as important as the media's technological apparatus: the rumour. (In fact, if need be, this channel may even merge with the apparatus). The definition given by the Chilean Army's textbook is as follows:

A rumour is news given out by the same milieu as that to which it is addressed; its authenticity is doubtful and its origin is impossible to verify. Once started, the rumour will spread rapidly, as long as it evokes certain basic feelings, such as: dread, fear, hope, desire, and hate. In

October 1977.

The increase in advertising expenditures, obviously, comes from the increase in the State's expenditures and that of the private monopolies. To get an idea of the complex mechanisms at play between the military states and advertising, here is an extract from an article written by the advertising analyst of *O Globo*, one of Brazil's biggest dailies, where he attempts to explain, in his way, why the advertising business in Brazil has become the fastest growing sector of the economy:

What happened? First, most advertisers reacted to a year of bad omens in 1977 by increasing advertising expenditure. Brazil, which imports over 70% of its oil needs, was hard hit by higher OPEC prices, and renewed inflation (an old ever-menacing friend) prompted the Brazilian government to take a number of unpopular measures which had unfavorable echoes in consumer's expenditures.

As the cruzeiro became more difficult to get, most companies operating in Brazil decided to put some fancy marketing in action to fight hard for it, and advertising was their chief weapon. (*Advertising Age*, 12 June 1978)

This commentary shows us that the way the advertising system adapts itself to the political reality is far from being unilateral, and surpasses, by far, the limited field of an implicit participation to that of a higher level of official and planned propaganda. The simple fact of promoting implicitly a model of development and society imposed by the dictatorship through the advertising of a monopoly product is often enough to participate in the reproduction of the ideological conditions which legitimate these regimes. This simple participation is sufficient to transform these firms

order for the rumour to be efficient, it should be simple and short, yet embellished with certain details that will make an impression on the imagination or memory. It must be circulated with a certain know-how, and should be presented as a fact, appealing to the most well-known emotions and feelings of the public or the "all and sundry" to whom it is destined.³⁴

The rehabilitation of the rumour in this period of war (the general rumour and General Rumour), which institutionalizes the lie as an obligatory recourse for the information-giver is thus a basic element of the psycho-political approach to handling the population. Moreover, the rumour is also the dialectical fruit of the new forms of struggle adopted by left forces in clandestinity. The dictatorship's manipulation of this concept also constitutes an attempt to recuperate, and to undermine the new means of giving out information created by resistance forces which are deprived of all access to a technological apparatus. While systematically programming these rumour campaigns, both using the "word of mouth" method as well as the media, the theoreticians of psychological warfare are also denying the enemy any possibility of gaining truthful information. The reason for this is obviously that the enemy does not have access to the only "authentic" source of information, those in power. Amongst examples given in the Chilean manual as illustrations of rumours started by the enemy, one finds the following: "Thousands of bodies are floating in the Mapocho River". "When soldiers conduct house searches, they rob and steal," and "Women are raped and murdered."

Furthermore, this publication redefines the

into indirect agents in the psychological repression of the internal enemy. It is also evident that certain firms are not just content with this indirect complicity. We will return to this when we analyse their active role in the public relations campaigns of these dictatorships. Concerning the advertising industry in the Argentine reality, here is an extract from an article by an Argentine journalist:

Buenos Aires—Advertising in Argentine, which nearly met its Waterloo in the early 1970s, has been showing steady improvement since 1976.

The turnaround is being sparked by "unofficial" government sanction, a spurt in advertising by financial institutions and a stronger business activity which has been held in abeyance by spiraling inflation.

The advertising profession, shackled by the public notion that fostering the consumption of goods is a waste of money, got relief from this negative public attitude when General Videla, the country's president, spoke during the International Advertising Assn's 25th World Advertising Congress in Buenos Aires in 1976. His mere presence lent support to the industry.

A stronger business climate during 1977 enabled advertisers to top expenditures for 1976, a year in which investment in advertising grew 60% in real terms over 1975.

Ad expenditures in Argentina during 1978 are expected to return to the magnitude of 1970 expenditures when advertisers doled out \$285,000,000 on advertising. Expenditures had steadily decreased from 1970 until rallying in 1976, when an estimated \$200,000,000 was spent. (*Advertising Age*, 15 May 1978, p.77)

34. *Fuerzas armadas y carabineros, los cien combates de una batalla*, Santiago du Chile, September 1973.

function of information, and the necessity both of reducing the liberalism in which it has been steeped, and of discrediting news coming from the enemy:

War demands that nations make a series of sacrifices. One of these sacrifices is the restriction of information. The threat which hangs over a given country makes it necessary for this country to ensure its own safety by adopting exceptional measures destined to prevent successful enemy action.... One of these measures consists of providing information in such a way that the news given out does not strengthen the views of those who are combatting the Fatherland. Unfortunately, this measure also provokes certain negative reactions. When the information monopoly becomes an unmistakably evident, a natural reaction, but one which the enemy uses in a very opportunistic fashion, consists of seeking out other sources of information that are not related to the "official source", or which at least, express a different opinion. In this way, without any organic direction, a clandestine information network is organized, wherein the news is transmitted by "word of mouth." In former times, when there were no other means of diffusing information, the transmission of news by word of mouth was a very trustworthy system. However, modern means of communication have all but destroyed this "art". Thus, when news is now transmitted by marginal channels, it is generally characterized by the adoption of a "meaning that contrasts with official news", which gives its content a certain passionate quality. This, added to the natural exaggeration which becomes necessary when confronting the official news-diffusion apparatus with its aura of credibility and authority, means that oral information, commonly referred to as "rumours," is generally inexact and immensely magnified... Therefore, in our society, oral information suffers from lack of truthfulness in relation to the facts. It becomes an element of disinformation, and can exercise a pernicious influence, if manipulated by those attempting to use it for indirect aggression.

Under all of the states of exception existing in the Southern Cone, the decrees which establish the standards for so-called national security always attribute the initiative for psychological warfare to the partisans of "revolutionary war", in other words, to "subversive elements" (See the previously cited extract from the Brazilian decree on communication).

CIVIL SOCIETY AND MILITARIZATION

The rationality of war is at loggerheads with that of mass culture.

Before the advent of the military regimes in Latin America, the mass communication apparatus functioned as a part of what Gramsci called "civil society", which also included the school, the family, the system of political parties, trade-unions etc. As part of the State apparatus, it fulfilled a role of mediation, and masked the ruling class's monopoly of brutal force. The way in which the means of communication are organized during social peace-time relies upon the same principles of organisation as official representative organisms. The same theory of public opinion that legitimizes the functioning of the communication apparatus also legitimizes that of Parliament.

35. Colonel Louis Berteil, *De Clausewitz à la guerre froide*, Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1949.

At the present time, when the ruling classes are incapable of assuring their hegemony over all of the other classes, of creating a "collective will", and assuming their role of intellectual and moral direction, they abandon the function of mediation, characteristic of the liberal State, and as a consequence, these apparatuses of civil society enter into conflict with military standards.

It is no longer a question, as in the sixties, of making the populations participate in a model of consumption and expectations, a model which had as principal reference and target, the middle classes, representing the great utopia of the Alliance for Progress and the regimes that accompanied it. What is now at hand, as in any war, is the destruction of the enemy.

War necessarily has as a target a person or group suspected of being the enemy, or of being likely to pass over to the enemy's ranks. The notion of hostility or aggression is the corner stone of psychological war. As recognized by its theoreticians, "the feeling of hostility is the only feeling that is offensive. Patriotism and the feeling of defending the best cause are essentially defensive and there must be evidence of aggression for them to become dynamic".³⁵ During the evolution of European fascism, which took place within relatively closed spaces, Goebbels was able to bar Mickey Mouse from entering Germany. This character, created only ten years previously, was referred to by Goebbels as "the most wretched ideal ever to walk the face of the earth". Times have changed. Military dictatorships are developing at another moment in the internationalization of cultural merchandise, at another stage in mass culture. At present, it is much more difficult to close off the theater of psychological operations. News agency despatches, television series, magazines and comic strips exported from other realities, and created under the conditions of "civil society", continue to circulate in these countries. It is interesting to note that although the military authorities have imposed a permanent state of siege, they have been unable to extend the State of Exception to their cultural exchanges with the metropolis.

Mass culture has been designed from within a very specific system of class alliances which is consistent with the norms and legality of liberal representative democracy. It has been designed to fulfill, undoubtedly in a very illusive way, the need for democratizing access to leisure and spiritual goods, as well as the need for extending the range of themes and concerns of so-called public opinion. Through their democratizing proposals, which appeal to all classes, the media and the mass-culture messages, in fact, are one of the few arenas, along with that of ecclesiastical institutions, where, despite the censure, certain social contradictions can still be publicly expressed. In the absence of consensus, political parties, or parliament, the media must provide the military dictatorship with its "organic intellectual". The media also are an area where the dictatorship confronts both a cultural investment representing another form of power organization inherited from the liberal State, and the rupture

existing between overt propaganda operations, and the covert, metabiological action of ideology. This diffuse role of ideology in the liberal State is exactly what allows Gramsci to characterize this State as the educator *par excellence*, and organizer of consensus. This conflict is expressed in a very evident way in Chile and Brazil, for example, through the following phenomenon: the most virulent corporatist professional associations are those of the journalists, which definitely are not always in agreement with the military conception of the press.³⁶ At the international level, an organization such as the IAPA, the Inter-American Press Association (which reunites the owners of the press in the two Americas), although having played an active role in the anti-Allende campaign, nevertheless registered official protests with Brasilia and Santiago concerning violations of the freedom of press, and the repression directed against liberal journalists.

In Brazil, where the pressure for the liberalization of the regime is getting stronger and stronger, the corset represented by the constraints to the liberty of expression is more and more contested by the advertising agencies also. In spite of the impressive jump in advertising expenditures in the last eight years (total advertising volume in Brazil is expected to reach at least \$1.8 billion in 1978, or some 50% more than the 1977 total. In 1971, it was \$154 million and in 1975, \$497 million), the advertising industry considers that it is still limited in its actions. In an article published by *Advertising Age* on 15 May 1978, under the suggestive title "Brazil admen seek civil guarantees", it was reported that the "Sao Paulo delegates at the third Advertising Congress of Brazil held here in late April made a bold appeal to the military government by urging free elections and a return of civil guarantees suspended since 1968. The delegates also requested that the government end its prior censorship policy, now compulsory for all ads on radio, TV and cinema."

The need to abolish the media's internal contradictions has created pressure for the creation of productions that are more in keeping with the countries' fascist regression. It also means that imported mass-culture programs that are more compatible with the values and attitudes promoted in the generals' militarization projects must be selected. The increase in the amount of television time devoted to sports programs, games and soap operas, (*telenovelas*), produced locally or imported from other Latin American countries (the production of these serials has doubled or tripled in recent years, and more and more countries of South America are becoming involved in such ventures) indicates the need felt to rise to the challenge of furnishing new means of mass indoctrination. It is paradoxical that these nations, which represent the very height, the very quintessence of a State dedicated to the aims and views of the multinationals, in the middle of a

36. See, on this question, the position presented in the Chilean magazine *Mensaje* (Santiago), June 1977. ("Medios de comunicación social y bien comun").

37. Ramona Bechtos, "Undercover admen: JWT linked to CIA Front", *Advertising Age* (New York), 2 March 1975.

period of increased internationalization of capital, should express the need for "nationalizing" (in the sense of making it more local, more Creole) their culture. The real contradiction lies in the fact that their culture must provide the consensus for a development model operating for the benefit of foreign capital: This is the basis for a very strong argument against the thesis of the "planetaryization" of mass culture in the multinational era.

The information theme cannot be evoked in the Southern Cone without making allusion to the use of torture, which is also part of the vast system for producing information. In referring to psychological warfare in *Mein Kampf*, Hitler wrote the following: "Our strategy consists of destroying the enemy from inside, and making him the instrument of his own conquest." Even if the information that the individual might surrender is already known to the torturer, the confession that is extracted contributes to his or her psychological destruction. This is achieved by making the victim feel guilty, and by making him or her lose any feeling of identification with a group. Today, in the Southern Cone countries, which are attempting to design a concept of psychological warfare based on the practices of imperialist armies, the systematic destruction of individuals has become standard operating procedure for the State. The systematization of torture is based on the necessity of returning to the model of exaggerated individualism called for by the over-exploitation of the workers and peasants.

PUBLIC RELATIONS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

The increase in advertising expenses in military States cannot just be explained by the demands of psychological repression against the "internal enemy". It may also be explained by the necessity for propaganda directed at the "free world" countries, who are repulsed by the idea of having to traffic with regimes who openly and scandalously violate human rights. In order to fight against an international image tarnished by excessive repression, the governments in the Southern Cone are making use of public relations techniques and are calling upon the assistance of agencies that specialize in this field.

In August 1974, the Junta in Santiago asked Dialog, the public relations branch of the advertising agency, J. Walter Thompson, to submit a project for cleaning up its international image. The Dialog team stayed for one month in Santiago and since then, the responses given by the Junta's Minister of the Interior to letters protesting against torture and disappearance have all followed the same courteous formula. By a strange coincidence, in December 1967, the director of Dialog had signed the same type of contract with the Greek colonels in Athens.³⁷

In 1976, the Argentine government followed suit, and solicited the advice and services of another U.S. firm, Burson-Marsteller. In a first phase, this marketing research agency carried out an international survey in eight countries (Benelux, Canada, the United States, England, the Netherlands, Japan and Mexico) so as to evaluate the attitudes of the

government authorities towards Argentina. The conclusion of this survey, presented to the Buenos Aires authorities, was extremely precise:

If the Videla government wants to achieve its objectives of accelerating industrial and agricultural development, and increasing international trade, tourism, security and progress in the political order, then it must project a new, progressive and stable image throughout the world. The key word is *stability*. Survey after survey, the question that was rarely asked, but which was constantly present in the minds of those who responded, was: "Where is the country really going?" No matter what kind of communication program is launched, the question of *stability* must be treated.

After this first diagnosis, the Burson-Marsteller experts proposed a "crash" treatment by affirming, from the very beginning of their report, the following position: "We believe that all of the elements are present for carrying out one of the most efficient international public relations campaigns that has ever been attempted." It is worthwhile to examine the confidential plan elaborated by this Madison Avenue firm.

Having eliminated from its field of action the category of irrecoverable individuals, that is, those who are radically opposed to the Videla government, the public relations agency defined its targets: *those who influence ways of thinking* (the press, government authorities and educators); *those who influence investments* (key people in banks and businesses, investment advisers; public authorities in charge of international trade, businessmen and management advisers); *and those who influence tourism* (travel agencies, specialized journalists, airlines personnel, tour and excursion organizers). Next comes the procedures to be followed for reaching these individuals. For each of the eight countries chosen, there is a list of press. "V.I.P.s", likely to make a decisive contribution to the campaign. Each name is accompanied by commentary on the positions of each of the journalists and publicity agents. We will cite, at random, several examples:

"William Rusher, journalist, employed at the U.S. weekly magazine, *National Review*. Politically, is extremely conservative. He follows the "liberal" school of economics, and is a partisan of XIXth-century style free enterprise. *National Review* is considered as republican, right-of-center, and has supporters in conservative circles throughout the country.

Ms. Betty Ross, author of travel books. Has published articles in all of the most widely-read specialized magazines. She has already begun to sound out various authors on their interest in writing articles on tourism in Argentina. Has already analysed; with our Washington office; the possibility of organising a special tour in Argentina for journalists working in her field.

J.M. Van Der Dussen, head of the foreign-affairs section of *La Libre Belgique*, a conservative, Catholic newspaper, read by the upper classes and merchants. Is politically situated between the right and Christian-Democratic sectors of the center. Van Der Dussen has already spent some time in Argentina

and intends to write a book on this country.

Novedades newspaper, Mexico. The invitation should be sent directly to the journalist Romulo O'Farrill (owner of *Novedades*), who will designate a representative. Nevertheless, we will see to it that the person chosen will be the same one we are in contact with."

Contacts with the most important magazines, newspapers, radio and television stations in the eight countries chosen are thus reviewed. This is one more example of the transfer of standards and practices of official intelligence agencies to the private business sector, a phenomenon which is becoming increasingly common as State monopoly capitalism matures.

The command post for the campaign is located in the Burson-Marsteller office in New York, which is in direct and permanent contact with the Minister of Information (Secretaría de Información), in Buenos Aires. This office centralizes all of the instructions, designs and puts together all of the printed and audiovisual material, and sends it out to each of the firm's foreign branches. Thus, every branch disposes of basic material, made up of a collection of Argentinian newspapers and magazines, a set of reference works on the country, archives of photographs and films, and file of influential figures in the governmental, commercial and tourist sectors. However, this alliance does not stop here. In order to carry out its job as a specialist in public relations, the U.S. firm has devised, with the Argentinian State apparatus, a new kind of multinational relation between the private and public sectors. *This multinational firm thus becomes a kind of sub-ministry of foreign relations in the Videla government.* Indeed, in every country where it is in charge of the campaign, the firm offers its advice to Argentinian authorities representing their country in diplomatic and consular capacities. It helps these officials to write their speeches, to canvass potential supporters, and recommends themes for approaching the public. In each country, along with the ambassadors, the U.S. firm chooses the VIPs to be invited to Argentina, so that, during a tour organized with the Argentinian authorities, they may observe the reigning "normality" in the country. Through special seminars (offered in three central areas: New York, Los Angeles, and Brussels), Burson-Marsteller assures the training—in Spanish—of personnel working at the embassies and consulates. On a larger scale, training is also provided for the personnel in charge of information problems for the entire Argentinian government. When these seminars are offered, these government officials even travel to one of the three designated areas. Representatives of the Argentinian Chamber of Commerce and Airlines also assist at these work sessions. During these intensive seminars, these government authorities learn both how to "react to criticism as well as how to take the offensive." Amongst the themes and practical exercises proposed in the report one finds the following: "how to handle local, national or international groups, such as Amnesty International, which is carrying out an anti-Argentina campaign". Or, "how to

constitute information archives reflecting the needs of the public in the countries in which one is located". The section entitled "Implications of Terrorism in Communication" is undoubtedly one of the most revealing, as far as the significance and limits of these public relations strategies are concerned. The experts from the U.S. agency do not hide from the dictatorship the difficulty of battling a negative image when, in certain cases, there can be no doubt about the reality of its brutal repression. Also, while recognizing that the government is exposed to an "extremely well financed campaign of international subversion", in their preliminary advice, the public relations specialists point out that it is urgent that, parallel to the campaign programmed by Burson, the government "demonstrate that it treats all kinds of terrorism, either from the right or the left, in the same way, by avoiding violations of civil rights." Then follows a long list of recommendations intended to set right the information on Argentina: some of the items given in this confidential report are as follows:

- placing the accent on economic information.
- communicating the fact that terrorism is not universal in the country. It is necessary to search for and diffuse accounts on the possibilities of tourism; on cultural themes and other news that does not have anything to do with terrorism.
- publish a "white book" on the activities undertaken to combat terrorism. It should demonstrate that the government controls the police and is suppressing rightist terrorism.
- increase the amount of information on terrorist activities, so that the public is convinced of the absolute necessity for completely eliminating these activities from Argentinian society. (This obvious contradiction with the second point exists as such in the text). There is no better way to win support than that which consists of providing living proof of the brutality of guerrillas and terrorists.
- at an opportune time, an international commission should be invited to visit Argentina. (In its own time, the Nigerian government accepted a similar proposition, which was made during the war against Biafra, to fight against the accusation of widespread genocide.)
- in the shortest possible time, see to it that the government is visibly identified with the problems of the poor. It is too often accused of considering as Communist anyone who wishes to help the poor.
- through diplomatic channels, try to obtain the cooperation of other governments in the free world, so that an international meeting can be held which will examine terrorism and how to eradicate it.
- see to it that the mass media are informed about the personalities and families of the governing

38. *Business Week*, 21 November 1977.

39. UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). Report made in 1977 by B. Epstein, a U.S. economist and Kurt Rudolf Mirow, director of a Brazilian electrical equipment firm. Mirow is also the author of a book on the dictatorship of cartels, a work that has been forbidden by the Brazilian generals. (*A diadema dos cartéis*, Rio de Janeiro, Ed. Civilizacao Brasileira, 1977).

authorities; this will humanize them in the public mind.

The world soccer championship, conceived of as a propaganda operation, undoubtedly has accelerated the momentum of this campaign, and has been a powerful factor in the development of the Argentinian government's communication networks. For this occasion, the Argentinian dictatorship has equipped the country with a color television network and has spent a considerable amount of funds on the modernization of its communication satellites. (The organization of the World Cup cost the Argentine people \$700 million, that is, \$200 million more than the total value of the last wheat harvest, \$370 million more than the annual public health budget, and \$557 million more than the budget for scientific and technical research.)

Burson-Marsteller's recommendations may seem ludicrous when one knows the extent of the dictatorship's crimes, as denounced by Amnesty International and UN commissions. However, the disastrous results of this advertising campaign are already apparent. In March 1978, the Argentinian government announced that the massacre at the Villa-Devoto prison in Buenos Aires had been provoked by "common law prisoners", and the big international press acquiesced to this official version of events. It only published a few lines on this "clean-up operation, directed against political prisoners", occurring most opportunely before the arrival of the throngs for the world soccer championship, and before the international commissions make their inspection visits.

THE PRIVILEGES OF THE DATA-PROCESSING INDUSTRY

Only one sector of the economy seems to escape from the process of accelerated denationalization, that of the data-processing industry. It is well known that in the rest of the economy, a "laissez-faire, laissez-passer" policy prevails, and gradually the multinationals are gaining control of areas as vital and strategic as the agro-business and mining industries. The Argentinian government, which has the right of inspection or absolute ownership of 747 businesses, in 1977 divested itself of 49 of these enterprises. Its aim was to preserve control over only 40 to 60 firms, those "that promote essential services", such as telephones, electricity, rails, and shipping, as well as petroleum and steel companies.³⁸ The situation is not any better in Brazil. As a recent UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development) report points out, at the beginning of the seventies, the multinationals systematically decimated the local electrical equipment industry. Eight foreign companies (AEG, ITEL, Brown-Boveri, ACEC (a partly Belgian branch of Westinghouse), ASEA, Siemens, General Electric (GE), Hitachi) working together through the "Brazilian Institute of Studies on the Development of Exportation", succeeded in weakening local producers to such a point that most of them either sold their businesses or declared bankruptcy.³⁹ In order to achieve this result, the multinationals simply applied

the regulations controlling manufactured equipment, imposed by the international cartel of electrical material (International Electrical Association, IEA), of which they are all members. Their objective was obviously to replace national production with the importation of more perfected, foreign material. The result of this strategy is that the volume of Brazilian imports of electrical equipment went from \$74 million in 1964 to \$533 million in 1974. In Chile, it is hard to keep track of the offers for joint ventures and the number of mines that are being put up for sale. (For example, Exxon recently diversified its activities and acquired ownership over the "La Disputada" mine.)

However, in the domain of the data-processing industry—as in the nuclear domain—it seems that the imperatives of national security, defined in strictly nationalist terms, are attempting to dictate their own laws. Nevertheless, it should be specified that all of the military dictatorships do not have the means for carrying out such a policy. At the present time, in spite of the other military regimes' wishes, the Brazilian dictatorship is the only one to have spent a great deal of energy in the field of data-processing. At least this would seem to be the case, judging from Brasilia's recent decisions aimed at recuperating the mini-computer industry. In 1972, the government founded the State Data-Processing Company (COBRA, Companhia Brasileira de Automacao), and when first getting started, imported technology from the English Ferranti firm, while at the same time involving the universities and the Ministry of the Navy. Shortly afterwards, the Federal Commission for the Coordination of Electronic Data-Processing Activities (CAPRE) was established, which brought together the different ministries involved in the consumption and production of data (Ministry of Finance, Planning, Industry, Trade, Culture and Interior), the various organisms of the General Staff, and the Council on Scientific Research. In 1977, the government publicly requested bids for the development of a local mini-computer industry.⁴⁰ All of the biggest manufacturers of data-processing equipment already implanted in Brazil answered the call, most of them being U.S. firms, such as IBM, TRW, Burroughs, NCR, Basic/Four, Four-Phase Systems, and the Italian Olivetti firm. It is hardly surprising that the data-processing market in Brazil was dominated by three of these firms (Olivetti, 33.9%; Burroughs, 41.7%; IBM, 14.2%). To the dismay of these multinationals, the dictatorship gave three Brazilian firms the job of laying the foundations, with COBRA, for a national mini-computer industry. To carry out this project, the government chose to call upon the technology of three foreign firms, solidly implanted in their own countries: the Japanese computer producer, Fijitsu Ltd., the French firm, Logabax;

40. *Business Week* (New York), 16 January 1978, 20 February 1978.

41. "Minicomputadores: Utopia ou realidade", *BANAS*, 3-16 October 1977.

42. R. Barquin, T. Nishimura and K. Whitney, "Model for Progress in Developing Nations", *Datamation*, September 1976.

specializing in data-processing, and the German firm, Nixdorf. The latter produced the most perfected police-data system in the world (located in Berlin), which is now in the process of being adopted by the entire Federal Republic of Germany. All of the three companies accepted a rapid transfer of their "know-how", a principle which the US companies have been more reluctant to admit.

When this decision was made, the generals, usually somewhat hesitant to make declarations on this topic (since secrecy is the guiding principle of the National Security society), nevertheless revealed the logic behind their choice. The rapid transfer of technology, declared the Admiral-President of COBRA, "is what the General Staff of the Armed Forces desires. The reason for this is first of all, because Brazil is considered to be one of the largest markets for mini-computers in the world, and secondly because the General Staff is concerned with assuring national sovereignty." A commentator from the regime added: "This sovereignty implies providing all of the Brazilian Navy's warships with computers that have been produced within the country. In this same perspective, this sovereignty serves as a framework for the model of development we have chosen for the future. Digital electronics serves as an infrastructure for nuclear factories, telecommunication networks, aviation and public transportation". Another COBRA official concluded with the following remark: "The definition of COBRA as an enterprise was born from the consciousness that exists at the various government levels."⁴¹

According to a study carried out by experts from IBM and the Japanese firm, Mitsubishi, one and a half years before this recent decision to nationalize mini-data-processing, Brazil, along with Israel, was already far ahead of other developing countries, in having achieved a high level of data-processing equipment. Commenting on the situation of these two countries, they were classified as undergoing the *operational-to-advanced* phase:

The operational-to-advanced transition is characterized as a period when integration of the disparate elements of the dp industry takes place in the national context. Countries having a very large number of computers installed, including some functional national prototypes usually of small systems. This is the case of Brazil with over 3,500 installations, and a national manufacturing operation in COBRA.

Universities offer a wide range of theoretical and applied courses giving both graduate and undergraduate degrees in areas of the computer sciences, including selected doctoral programs. Computer hardware design starts in earnest, usually with government backing and participation.... Most major governmental administrative work is being done by computers, and interagency integration begins. Social applications are constantly projected.... Planning and policy for the dp industry are seen, as major concerns by government, and considerable research is done on the matter.... Of the countries included in this group, Israel is probably the most advanced, due not only to its pressing national security requirements, but also to its high educational level.⁴²

Within this same categorization scheme, the IBM and Mitsubishi experts classified Argentina at

the second level, termed *Operational*. Chile and Uruguay were at the fourth level (*Basic*), on the same footing as Iran. The characteristics of this last category were defined as follows:

The basic phase is depicted by the proliferation of machines and installations. There is a quantum jump in volume and applications.... Data processing education now enters the universities in earnest.... In some countries, formal degrees are offered, such as in Chile.... Government awareness of the dp industry as an entity in itself appears. Increasing amounts of information processing generate concern, which is usually followed by some monitoring activity taking varied forms... ECOM has this function in Chile. In almost all cases, it involves attempts to control the diffusion of computers in government to avoid under use and duplication... The manufacturers now start to sell more advanced systems on a regular basis, and assistance is provided to government and universities in systems integration and planning.

Another report published in *Computer Decisions* specified the functions fulfilled by these computers. After having described in detail the present system used in Chile, the authors of this article cite a case of "computer internationalism":

...dossiers are shared among the police forces of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil. The most detailed report of the use of computer-generated information during a police interrogation comes from a clergyman. He entered Uruguay and was picked up by the police there for questioning. During the ordeal the police tried to get him to talk about a Catholic priest they were investigating. When detained for questioning, the clergyman was presented with a computer printout describing the details of the career of his colleague. On the printouts were all the addresses at which the sought-after priest had lived, his salary at each point in his career, his telephone numbers and his relations with other Catholics in Uruguay. The interrogated clergyman said that the most incredible thing about the questioning was that, as far as he could tell, the man the police sought had never been in Uruguay.⁴³

The maturing of the police-information system under these military regimes has been in preparation for many years, through the numerous technical assistance projects furnished by organisms such as AID, involved in training the local police forces for the struggle against subversion. Dan Mitrione, executed in Uruguay by the Tupamaros, was an expiatory victim.

Since 1962, the Office of Public Safety (OPS), a division of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), and the Inter-American Police Academy, which later changed its name to the International Police Academy, provided the Third World police with technical assistance, either in the metropolis or in the field, by sending equipment such as radios, mobil units, and computers. Under the auspices of the Public Safety Programs, the U.S. has thus helped form more than a million policemen

43. Laurie Nadel and Hesh Wiener, "Would You Sell a Computer to Hitler?", *Computer Decisions*, February 1977.

44. See *The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove: An Analysis of the U.S. Police*, Berkeley, Center for Research on Criminal Justice, 1975.

throughout the world.⁴⁴ In Brazil alone, more than 100,000 policemen have attended classes where the practice of military States demonstrates, in the most crystal clear fashion, how multifaceted "information" functions in this phase of accumulation of capital as a global means for controlling and subduing bodies and minds.

APPENDICES

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APPENDIX: SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following selected bibliography is intended to assist the reader who wants to study in detail the different aspects of capitalism/imperialism's communication apparatus, ideology and "mass culture", which were analyzed in the first volume of this anthology.

This bibliography includes 500 entries: books, anthologies, and pamphlets written from marxist and progressive perspectives in English, French, Spanish, Italian and German from 1844 through 1978. Unfortunately, due to space limitations, it does not include any individual articles nor mimeographed or unpublished manuscripts, of which there is a virtually unlimited production.

The entries are listed alphabetically by author or title under the three sections and related subsections indicated below. Each entry follows standard bibliographic form, with anthologies indicated by an asterisk "*" preceding the author or title.

The principal section of the bibliography is organized in the same way as were the contents in the first volume of the anthology itself. In addition, there is a list of relevant bibliographies, and a list of relevant reviews concerned with communication, ideology and culture (with addresses if currently published):

- I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES
- II. BOOKS, ANTHOLOGIES, AND PAMPHLETS
 - A. Basic Analytic Works
 - B. The Bourgeois Ideology of Communication
 - C. The Formation of the Capitalist Mode of Communication
 - D. Monopoly Capitalism/Imperialism and Global Ideological Control
- III. REVIEWS
 - Communication
 - Ideology and Culture

The entries, selected by the editors, Armand Mattelart and Seth Siegelau, for the most part have been drawn from the extensive documentation files and research library of the International Mass Media Research Center, and also, from its ongoing publication, *Marxism and the Mass Media: Towards a Basic Bibliography*.

For the reader searching additional information about these books and publications, the entries ending with a 'CN' number indicates that they have already been annotated and can be found in an issue of the *Marxism and the Mass Media* bibliography. Furthermore, if the reader is searching a copy of the book or publication itself—often Left publications on communications are not purchased by libraries—he or she can write to the research center in Bagnolet, France, where many of these documents can be consulted at the library by appointment.

Lastly, this bibliography is not a "finished", "definitive" product intended for passive consumption. We hope it will stimulate the reader's own work

and thus develop marxist communication theory and political practice. For our small part, we welcome information concerning forthcoming publications or material we may have overlooked, so we can improve our work and include this new information when the next edition of this anthology is published.

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III. REVIEWS

COMMUNICATION

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- Cahiers du Cinéma*, 9, passage de la Boule-Blanche (50 rue du Faubourg-Saint Antoine), 75012 Paris, France.
- Camerawork*, Half Moon Photography Workshop, 119-121 Roman Road, London E2, UK.
- Cine Cubano* (Havana, Cuba).
- Cine-Tracts*, 4227 Esplanade Ave., Montreal, Quebec H2W 1T1, Canada.
- Cinearabe*, 22 rue d'Artois, 75008 Paris, France.
- Cineaste*, 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10014, U.S.A.
- Comunicación*, O'Donnell, 27, Madrid 9, Spain.
- Comunicación y Cultura; La comunicación masiva en el proceso político latinoamericano*, Apartado postal 600, Mexico 1, D.F., Mexico.
- Communication Perspectives*, Institute of Communications Research, 222B Armory, University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois 61820, USA.
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- Screen Education and Screen*, SEFT, 29 Old Compton Street, London W1V 5PL, UK.
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IDEOLOGY & CULTURE

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- Vietnamese Studies*, 46 Tran Hung Dao, Hanoi, S.R. Vietnam.
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APPENDIX: NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

LEONARDO ACOSTA was born in Cuba, and is a musician and writer. He has written many articles on culture, and is a regular contributor to a number of Cuban reviews, such as *Cine Cubano*, *Casa de las Americas*, and *Caiman Barbudo*. In 1967, he published a collection of short stories entitled *Paisajes del hombre*, and he has been the editor of the review *Revolución y cultura*. Presently, he works at the Instituto Cubano del Libro in Havana.

JAMES ARONSON studied at Harvard College, and the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism, and has had more than thirty years of experience as a reporter and editor. In 1948 he co-founded the *National Guardian* which he edited for more than ten years. In addition to his articles on the media for many radical journals, he is the author of *The Press and the Cold War*, 1970; *Packaging the News*, 1971; and *Deadline for the Media*, 1972. Presently, he teaches in the Department of Communication at Hunter College, and is preparing a history of the *National Guardian*.

MARY C. AXTMANN, the translator of many of the French and Spanish texts in this anthology, was born in New York City in 1952. She has studied literature in the U.S. and in France, where she is currently working on a doctoral thesis on the sociology of literature at the Université de Paris VIII (Vincennes), and is also engaged in a study group on literature and dependency in Latin America at the Ecole Pratique de Hautes Etudes in Paris. ARTURO I. TORRECILLA, who assisted in the translation of the Spanish texts, was born in Puerto Rico in 1950. He did his post-graduate studies in sociology at the Université de Paris I (Sorbonne), and currently, he is working on a doctoral thesis on social classes and State apparatuses in the Department of Sociology at the Université de Paris VIII (Vincennes).

John Desmond BERNAL was born in Nenagh, Ireland in 1901, and attended school at Stoneyhurst and Bedford, and studied physics at Cambridge, where he graduated in 1922. In 1937 he was appointed Professor of Physics at Birkbeck College, University of London, and during World War II he was scientific advisor to the Air Ministry. Among his many responsibilities, he was President of the Association of Scientific Workers (1947-49); Member of the Council of Royal Society (1947-49); Chairman of the Presidential Committee of the World Council of Peace (1959-65); and President of the Marx Memorial Library, London, from 1952 until his death in 1971. In addition, he has written more than 300 scientific papers, and fifteen books, including *The Social Function of Science*, 1939; *Marx and Science*, 1952; *Science and Industry in the Nineteenth Century*, 1953; *Science in History*, 4 volumes, 1954; and *The Origin of Life*, 1967.

ROSALIND BOEHLINGER, who assisted in the final proof-reading of this anthology, was born in San Mateo, California in 1944, and attended Stanford University. She has been a musician, and since 1966 has worked in the publishing industry in France. Recently, she co-edited and published a bibliography, *Marxist Readings: I*, and she is the director of Critiques Livres, a distributor of Left books.

ROBERTO BONCHIO is the theater critic for *L'Unità*, a member of the Central Press and Propaganda Section of the Italian Communist Party, and on the board of directors of the daily newspaper *Paese Sera* (Rome). In addition to being a regular contributor to numerous daily newspapers and periodicals, he is also the editor of

Documenti sulla rivoluzione cinese, 1954, and *Le storia delle rivoluzioni del XX secolo*, 1966. Since 1953, he has been the director of the publishing house, Editori Riuniti.

PIERRE BOURDIEU was born in Denguin, France in 1930, and studied at the Ecole Normale Supérieure where he graduated as an *agregé* in philosophy in 1954. Among his numerous articles and books are *The Algerians*, 1962; *Un art moyen*, 1965; with J.C. Chamboredon and J.C. Passeron, *Le métier de sociologue*, 1968; with J.C. Passeron, *Le reproduction*, 1970 (*Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, 1977); and *Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique*, 1972 (*Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 1977). Since 1965 he has been a Director of Studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes, Paris, and since 1975, the editor of the review *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*. The text published here is related to another work of the author: "Les doxosophes", *Minuit* (Paris), 1, 1973, pp. 26-45.

ROBERT A. BRADY, at the time of the publication of his *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism* in 1937, was an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of California. He is also the author of *Business as a System of Power*, 1943, and *Organization, Automation and Society: The Scientific Revolution in Industry*, 1961.

CAROL BRIGHTMAN and MICHAEL KLARE are researchers and active members of the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), a U.S. organization founded in November 1966 to help prevent the Vietnamization of Latin America.

AMILCAR CABRAL studied engineering in Portugal, and was also a poet. With other revolutionaries from the Portuguese colonies, including Agostinho Neto, in 1952 he founded the Center for African Studies in Lisbon, which was a melting-pot for cultural confrontation and a prelude to the armed struggle for the liberation of the Portuguese colonies. He was a founder, and then Secretary General of the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), until his assassination in 1973. Despite the importance of his work, only two collections of his writings have been published so far in English: *Revolution in Guinea: An African People's Struggle*, 1969; and *Return to the Source: Selected Speeches*, 1974.

JEAN-MICHEL CAROIT was born in Paris in 1951, and studied Political Science and Law. From 1970 to 1974 he was a teacher and translator, first in the United States, and then, in Algeria, as part of the "cooperation" program. Since July 1975, he is a journalist and works at the foreign desk at Agence France-Presse.

RENATO CONSTANTINO was born in the Philippines, and has been a diplomat, writer, teacher, and museum curator. He is the editor of *The Recto Papers*, and the author of *The United Nations, The Filipinos in the Philippines*, and recently, *Neocolonial Identity and Counter-consciousness*, 1977.

NOOBAR RETHEOS DANIELIAN, at the time of the publication of his *A.T. & T.: The Story of Industrial Conquest* in 1939, had been an instructor in Economics at Harvard University, and Utility Expert for the Federal Communications Commission. He had also written for numerous periodicals, including *Atlantic Monthly*, and *Harper's Magazine*, as well as contributed to the Twentieth Century Fund's *The Security Markets*.

YVES DE LA HAYE is a *maitre-assistant* in the Department of Mass Communication Sociology at the Université de Grenoble. Presently, he is preparing a study and selection of Marx and Engels' writings on the communication process, which will be published in late 1978 under the tentative title *Marx and Engels On The Means of Communication*.

RAFAEL DRINOT SILVA was born in Lima, Peru in 1947, and is a sociologist. In addition to writing poetry and making films, from 1973 to 1975 he was the head of the Mass

Communication Analysis and Evaluation Section of the Peruvian Ministry of Education. Presently, he is doing research in Paris.

ROBERT ESCARPIT was born in Saint-Macaire, France in 1918, and studied English literature at the Université de Bordeaux, and at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris in 1938. During World War II he was active in the Resistance, and afterwards taught in Paris, and in 1955, became Professor at the Université de Bordeaux. In 1958 he founded the Centre de Sociologie des Faits Littéraires, which, in 1965, became the Institut de Littérature et de Techniques Artistiques de Masse. Since 1975 he is President of the Université de Bordeaux 3. In addition to his daily column in *Le Monde*, he has also written over 40 novels, essays and scientific studies, the most recent being *Théorie générale de l'information et de la communication*, 1976.

STUART EWEN was born in New York City in 1945, and studied at the University of Wisconsin, University of Rochester, and the State University of New York (SUNY), where he received a Ph.D. in history. He has taught history and social theory at SUNY, and presently, he teaches in the Department of Communication at Hunter College. His writings have appeared in numerous publications and he is the author of *Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of the Consumer Culture*, 1976. Currently, he is working on a broad social-cultural history of the United States.

SYDNEY FINKELSTEIN has written extensively on literature and culture, and in addition to his *Sense and Nonsense of McLuhan*, he is also the author of *Art and Society*, 1947; *Jazz: A People's Music*, 1948; *How Music Expresses Ideas*, 1952; *Realism in Art*, 1954; *Existentialism and Alienation in American Literature*, 1965; and *Who Needs Shakespeare?*, 1973.

PIERRE FREDERIX was born in France and worked his entire life as a journalist and researcher at Agence Havas, which after World War II became Agence France-Presse (AFP). In the context of his work, he was the first researcher to have access to the archives of the Agence Havas.

The FREE COMMUNICATIONS GROUP was a London-based organization of Left and progressive journalists and communication workers active from 1968 through about 1972. In addition to publishing its own review, *Open Secret*, it also was an active force in stimulating other progressive media criticism and action, both within the media industry itself, as well as by the general public.

ANTONIO GRAMSCI was born in Ales, Sardinia in 1891 and died in Rome in 1937. He grew up in poverty and his childhood was marked by bad health, which later resulted in him becoming hunch-backed and having grave health problems. With the aid of a scholarship he was able to attend the University of Turin where he studied linguistics and philology, and later, began his political commitment to the working-class movement. He was a leader in the 1917 Turin anti-war insurrection, and also during the same period, the drama critic for the Socialist Party newspaper *Avanti*. After the struggles of the Factory Council movement in Turin, in 1919 he founded the newspaper *Ordine Nuovo*, and with the split in the Socialist Party, he became one of the founders of the Italian Communist Party in 1921. In 1926, he was arrested by the Fascists and the unusually difficult conditions of his imprisonment led to his death shortly after his release in 1935. His principal body of work, which is especially concerned with the bourgeois State hegemonic apparatus, and cultural practice, is called the *Prison Notebooks*, but so far, only selections have been published in English.

THOMAS H. GUBACK has written extensively on the U.S. motion picture industry, and especially its trade practices, economic structure, and international distribu-

tion, and he is the author of *The International Film Industry*, 1969. Since 1966 he has taught at the University of Illinois, where he is now Research Professor of Communications teaching the political economy of communications.

JURGEN HABERMAS was born in 1929, and has written on the social sciences, philosophy and politics, and he is the author of *Das absolute und die Geschichte*, 1954; *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*, 1962; *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften*, 1967; *Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie*, 1968; and published in English, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, 1971; *Towards a Rational Society*, 1971; and *Theory and Practice*, 1974. He has been Professor of Philosophy and Sociology at the Universität Heidelberg, and at the Universität Frankfurt.

HENRI LEFEBVRE was born in France at the turn of the century, and during the 1920s he was active in the surrealist movement and joined the French Communist Party, which he left in 1958 after the invasion of Hungary. During the 1960s he was professor at the Université de Strasbourg and participated in the situationist movement. In 1965 he became professor at the Université de Nanterre, and in 1968 was connected to the "Mouvement du 22 Mars", the prelude to May '68. Among his more than thirty books are *Critique de la vie quotidienne*, 1958; *Pour connaître la pensée de Lenine*, 1957; *La vie quotidienne dans le monde moderne (Everyday Life in the Modern World)*, 1971; *La production de l'espace*; and *De L'Etat*, 4 volumes, 1977.

VLADIMIR ILLITCH LENIN was born in Simbirsk, Russia in 1870 and died in the Soviet Union in 1924. He was raised in a progressive, modest family, and he studied law at Kazan University, and although he was expelled in 1887, he later finished his studies at St. Petersburg University. In St. Petersburg he became active in revolutionary circles and was arrested in 1896, and exiled to Siberia in 1897. In 1900 he left Russia, but continued to be very active in the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party. In addition to editing the newspaper *Iskra*, and working to change the Labor Party into a vanguard political party, he also did much theoretical research, especially concerning the nature of the State, and the development of monopoly capitalism/imperialism. Between 1900 and 1917 he lived and worked throughout Europe and in 1917 he returned to Russia and played a central role in the October Revolution, and the early years of the Soviet government. His complete works have been published in English in 45 volumes.

ROLF LINDNER studied sociology, journalism and psychology at the Freie Universität, Berlin. He has written numerous articles on media theory, advertising and culture, and is the author of *Das Gefühl von Freiheit und Abenteuer: Ideologie und Praxis der Werbung*, 1977. Presently, he teaches at the Institut für Soziologie at the Freie Universität, and is also an editor of the review *Asthetik und Kommunikation*.

MAO TSE-TUNG was born in the village of Shao Shan, Hunan province, China in 1893 and died in Peking in 1976. He studied in Changsha, and at Peking University, where he became a library assistant in 1918, and was active in Marxist study groups and in the student protest movement. After working in the labor movement, in 1921, he participated in the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. In the 1920s he was an organizer of the peasant movement in Hunan, and active in the development of the Communist Party, and in 1931 he was elected chairman of the newly-formed Chinese Soviet Republic. During the 1930s and 1940s he played a central role in the struggles against Japan and the Nationalists in the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, and then afterwards, in its socialist development. His works have been published in English in 5 volumes.

KARL MARX was born in Trier, Germany in 1818, and died in London in 1883. As a youth he studied literature, law, history and philosophy in Bonn and Berlin, and later,

worked as a journalist in Cologne and Paris, where in 1844 he met FRÉDERICK ENGELS (1820-1895) with whom he worked closely until his death in 1883. Together they formulated the basic principles of historical materialism, a revolutionary theory of society centered on the interrelationship, and contradictions, between society's economic structure, social classes, and the political, legal, and ideological superstructure. In 1849, Marx was expelled from Germany and settled in London, where although aided by Engels, he and his family lived in poverty. From 1864 to 1872, Marx played a leading part in the International Working Men's Association. Together they wrote *The Holy Family*, 1844; *The German Ideology*, 1845; and *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*, 1848. Marx's works include *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, 1844; *Wage-Labour and Capital*, 1847; *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, 1852; *Grundrisse*, 1857; *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, 1859; *Theories of Surplus Value*, 1861-3; and his major work, *Capital*, 1867, part of which was published after his death in 1885 and 1894. Engels' works include *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, 1844; *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany*, 1851; *The Housing Question*, 1872; *Anti-Duhring*, 1876; *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, 1880; *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, 1884; and *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, 1886. The first complete English edition of their works is now in progress, and will consist of 50 volumes when completed.

MICHELE MATTELART was born in France in 1943, and is a sociologist. She worked for many years in Latin America, and particularly, in Chile, where she was professor and researcher at the Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Nacional, and also, a member of the program committee of the national television network during the Popular Unity government. In addition to her many articles, she is the co-author of *Los medios de comunicación de masas: la ideología de la prensa liberal en Chile*, 1970; and *Frentes culturales y movilización de masas*, 1977, and author of *La cultura de la opresión femenina*, 1977. Presently, she lives in Paris where she is the editor of a news magazine on Latin America, *Urgent Amérique Latine*.

FRANZ MEHRING was born in Germany in 1846 and died in 1919. He was an important leader and theoretician of the Left wing of the German Social-Democratic movement, as well as an historian, literary critic and journalist. He was a leader of the Spartacus League and played an important part in the founding of the German Communist Party in 1918-1919. He is the author of *The Lessing Legend*, and *Karl Marx: The Story of His Life*.

ROBIN MURRAY was on the board of the May Day Manifesto, and is presently a lecturer at the London Business School, and TOM WENGRAF was the secretary of the May Day Manifesto, and formerly on the editorial board of the New Left Review. Presently, he is a lecturer on sociology at Middlesex Polytechnic at Enfield, and is currently working on problems of cultural warfare.

MAOLSHEACHLAINN O CAOLLAI was born in Dundalk, Ireland in 1939, and studied at University College, Dublin, where he received a Degree in Commerce in 1964. He was president of Conradh na Gaeilge (a mass movement begun in 1893) from 1968-1974, and is chairman of its sub-committee on broadcasting. From 1973-1975 he was a leader in the successful campaign against the re-broadcast of British television in Ireland, and he is also joint secretary of the Citizens for Better Broadcasting and collaborated on their *Aspects of RTE Television Broadcasting*, 1976. In addition, he has also written "Open Broadcasting, A Recipe for Extinction," 1974, and "Open Broadcasting, An Alternative," 1974.

CARLOS ORTEGA was born in Peru in 1940, and studied journalism and social communication. He has been

editor of the Peruvian journals *Oiga*, *Gestos*, and *Dominical*, among others, and has been a correspondent for numerous news agencies and magazines. In addition to representing Peru in many Latin American communication meetings, he is the author of *América y la Revolución Peruana*, 1971. Presently he is preparing a work entitled *La experiencia peruana en comunicación social: acceso y participación*. CARLOS ROMERO was born in Peru in 1937 and received a degree in Electronic Engineering in 1961 from the Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería, Lima. From 1962, he was a researcher at the Instituto Geofísico del Perú, and in 1970 he was appointed Director of Telecommunications in the Ministry of Communications and Transportation. In 1977 he became General Director of the Instituto Nacional de Investigación y Capacitación de Telecomunicaciones, and he has represented Peru in many international communication conferences, in addition to his work as a Professor of Engineering at the Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería.

LOUIS A. PEREZ, JR. was born in New York City in 1943, and studied at New York University, Pace University, University of Arizona, and at the University of New Mexico where he received a Ph.D in history in 1970. His numerous articles have been published in *Science and Society*, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, and *Journal of Communication*, among others, and he is the author of *The Cuban Revolutionary War, 1953-1958: A Bibliography*, 1976. Presently he is Associate Professor of History at the University of South Florida.

SAMUEL PEREZ BARRETO was born in Lima, Peru in 1921, and studied at the Universidad de San Marco, and Universidad Católica in Lima. From 1972-1975 he was Director of Social Communication in the Peruvian Ministry of Education.

The REVOLUTIONARY LEFT MOVEMENT (MIR, MOVIMIENTO IZQUIERDA REVOLUCIONARIA) is a Marxist political party whose founding was inspired by the Cuban Revolution. It was formed in 1965 by the fusion of several far-left groups (former militants of the Socialist Party, Communist Party, and Maoist and Trotskyite movements) at the Universidad de Concepción in Chile. Although it did not participate in the Popular Unity program, it gave its critical and active support to the Allende government.

COLLEEN ROACH, the translator of some of the French texts in this anthology, graduated from the University of Michigan with a Bachelor of Arts in Spanish and English literature. She has been living in Paris since 1972, where she has been active in groups working for the defense of political prisoners in Latin America, notably, the Argentinian and Uruguayan Coordination Groups of Amnesty International. Recently, she completed a Master's thesis on "The Ideology of the *New York Times* as Reflected Through its Coverage of the Coup d'Etat in Chile", at the Institut des Hautes Etudes de l'Amérique Latine, Paris.

HERBERT I. SCHILLER was born in the United States, and has taught at Pratt Institute in Brooklyn, New York, and at the University of Illinois, where he was Professor of Economics and Communications, and editor of the *Quarterly Review of Economics and Business*. In addition to his numerous articles, he has written *Mass Communications and American Empire*, 1971; *The Mind Managers*, 1973; and *Communication and Cultural Domination*, 1976. Since 1970, he has been Professor of Communication at the Third College at the University of California at San Diego.

SCIENCE FOR THE PEOPLE is a radical organization of scientists, engineers, students, teachers and technicians founded in the United States in the late 1960s. It is made up of approximately forty separate chapters located throughout the U.S., and it also has chapters in other countries. Through its actions and publishing program, including pamphlets and a journal, *Science for the People*, it

seeks to develop criticism of the existing social-economic basis of science and technology, provide assistance to other political groups, and organize scientific and technical workers.

DALLAS W. SMYTHE was born in Canada and has been head of the Graduate Program in Communication at the University of Illinois, and at one time, was chief economist for the Federal Communications Commission. He has written extensively on all aspects of communications, especially the radio, and international communications. Presently, he is preparing a book on communications and the capitalist process, and until recently he was chairman of the Department of Communication Studies at Simon Fraser University in Burnaby, Canada.

JUDY STRASSER was a graduate student in communication research at Stanford University, and has been active in the anti-war, land reform, and women's movements in the United States, as well as a founding member of the Pacific Studies Center in California. She is a free-lance writer, and her articles have appeared in *Science for the People*, and *Communities*, as well as in *New Times*, and *The Christian Science Monitor*. She presently lives in Madison, Wisconsin, and produces news and public affairs programs for WORT, a listener-sponsored community radio station.

RAYMOND WILLIAMS was born in Pandy, Wales in 1921, and studied at Abergavenny Grammar School and Trinity College, Cambridge. During World War II he was an anti-tank captain, and afterwards, he was a tutor in the Oxford University Delegacy for Extra-Mural Studies. In 1961 he was elected Fellow at Jesus College, Cambridge, and university lecturer in English. In 1974, he was appointed Professor of Drama. His numerous books include *Culture and Society*, *Communications*, *The Long Revolution*, *The Country and The City*, and *Keywords*.

Lee Baxandall, Stefan Morawski, eds.

MARX & ENGELS ON LITERATURE AND ART: A Selection of Writings

1974, 1977, 192pp,
Hardcover: 0-88477-000-1, US\$7.50
Paperback: 0-88477-001-X, US\$3.25

This collection of Marx and Engels *On Literature and Art* is the first English edition to be published in almost thirty years. Edited by Lee Baxandall and Stefan Morawski, it is a concise selection containing all Marx's and Engels' basic aesthetic writings, organized to reflect the principal themes underlying their thought on literature and art: "capitalist alienation," "communism," "class values," "realism," and "form and style," among others. It contains many new translations, and includes a major introductory essay by Polish aesthetician Stefan Morawski. In addition, it includes a full bibliography of marxist books in the English language on aesthetics. This is the second printing.

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Ariel Dorfman, Armand Mattelart HOW TO READ DONALD DUCK: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic

1975, 112pp, Illustrations,
Paperback, 0-88477-003-6, US\$3.75

This book was first published in Chile 1971 as part of a Popular Unity government study to develop a new education policy, and since the fascist coup in 1973, it has been banned and burned there with other literature. In 1975, in the U.S., the English edition was seized and banned for more than a year by the U.S. government. A product of the political struggle, *How to Read Donald Duck* is a profound and imaginative critique of how the Disney fantasy world reproduces the "American Dream" fantasy world, and the disastrous effect of Disney comics and other "mass" cultural merchandise on the development of the Third World. Published in hundreds of thousands of copies in more than 10 languages, this book has already become the popular classic study on cultural imperialism, and children's literature. In comic book format, with cartoon examples, translation and introduction by David Kunzle, a new preface by the authors, and an annotated bibliography of marxist writings on cultural imperialism, and the comics.

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France-Soir (Paris)

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The second volume, 2. LIBERATION, SOCIALISM, will be published in 1980, and will analyse the development of popular and working-class communication practice and theory. Contents: A. The Development of a Marxist Communication Theory; B. Working Class Communication Practice; C. The Struggle Within the Capitalist Communication Industry; D. Cultural Resistance; E. The Struggle Against Colonialism and Imperialism; F. Communications in a Period of Rupture; G. Socialist Construction.

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