

In Denial of
Shame &
Altruism: a
Case Study

Catch-22

The 'Purpose' of Denial, of Shame and Altruism, of
'Interdependence,' internal and mutual Control

Vs: vz

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Introduction;

*Human social 'work' in time at Bijlmermeer suburb, Amsterdam and
Excerpts of S. Freud (1913/19) Totem and Taboo, (1919/23) Civilization and its
Discontents, A+M Mitscherlich (1956/68) Society without the Father, (trl: E.
Mosbacher) and E T Hall (1959) The Silent Language. and several other gods*

for Bertie Kaal PhD, my sister.

Contents

| | |
|--|--------|
| Copycats: me too? | 2 |
| Territorial Instinct | 3 |
| Kyrie Eleison | 5 |
| Look-alikes, Figurations and Interest-groups | 7 |
| Freud vs. Marx | 8 |
| Back to Business | 9 |
| Advice for sociologists and anthropologists | 10 |
| Knowledge or Power | 11 |
| Reification, Verification, Identification | 11 |
| Theses: Political Correctness and expected identification as figuration | 12 |
| Cooley, Blumer, Elias, Goffman | 15 |
| The long-term process | 17 |
| Dichotomies | 17 |
| Emotions | 17 |
| Biasses | 19 |
| Control-freaks we are! | 22 |
| Descriptive ‘Conclusion’ | 22 |
| Our ongoing ‘struggle’ | 23 |
| Responsibility and self-consciousness | 23 |
| | |
| Addenda | |
| I Christie A (1955) Hickory Dickory Dock | 24 |
| U Anna Freud (1933-35) The Ego and The Mechanisms of Defense | 25 |
| UI Melanie Klein (1932/51) Children’s Analysis | 27 |
| IV Freud S (1930) Civilization and Discontents | 30 |
| V Caren Horney C(1951) Neurosis and Human Growth (Ch.6) | 32 |
| VI Freud, S (1916/25) The Uncanny | 32 |
| VII Mitscherlich, A+M (1956/68) Society Without the Father, trln. By E Mosbacher | 33 |
| Notes/Index of names | 97/101 |
| VIII Hall, E T (1959) The Silent Language | 104 |
| Notes/Index | 126 |
| Bibliography | 128 |

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Copycats, me too, or Catch-22, Introduction. Something girls seem to know by heritage or disposition and subconsciously, as ‘intuition,’ but most boys don’t and if they do, unconsciously, as an ongoing ambition, but it is also often ‘egged-on’ by competing ‘mother-figures’, i.e: *Vertebrates, including ‘us,’ compete with and in each-others named ‘identity-group’ for status, whether sex, ‘gender,’ family, clan, ‘social sta-*

tus,’ team, crew or ‘body,’ that they usher each other to ‘identify’ with and recognize, at any meeting (unless ‘keeping a low profile’). Compare the tone of their/our ‘greetings,’ to confirm this. From when mom told us what to do. What is this ‘identification?’ We will need to dig into psychoanalysis to find out. We limit and negotiate (with) each-other in choice and acceptance of status therein. Elias (1939/65) describes a

process of 'Zwang zur Selbstzwang' in his preface, but did he mean as in an obsession i.e: With no real self-interest, or might this have to do with evolution (or creation and theft), and is this all about gossip? Yes, but both theories are true and not mutually exclusive, i.e., Every 'day' of 'creation,' or the 'big bang,' may have taken about half a billion years. So we're living in the seventh 'day,' us men and women, or on (sunday) vacation from competition. But not as much so among solidary figuration-members, like family, friends, colleagues and ideally, here's the catch, even less, among 'partners' and 'lovers.' 'Mums the word.' But we know better and accept another as 'good sports,' if we don't 'betray' each-others supposed 'group,' and make a show of loyalty to 'our group.'

We have our 'dispositions' from S. Freud (1924/76) and as he said in 'An autobiographical Study' ('35/59 p.125): '*Hypnosis is the formation of a group of two.*' Even if it is taboo to the 8th original sin (lying about others) and state Law (discrimination), we need not be ashamed of such conduct as long as we keep within 'secret' and often unconscious conduct-limiting rules and don't compete too openly or harshly. Competition and laughter happens all the time, a 'good sport' is accepted, overt 'fun' in pairs or singly is just that. We are no different in this respect, just more or less obsessed. This in-/excluding is also a form of co-operation, 'help,' and control, expected in identification, including 'our defense,' towards competing others, identities and figurations. We usually have an 'us 'n them' attitude towards each other, before we have chosen to 'comply,' whether we realize it, like it, or not. There's been a lot of research and speculation on 'us' and our '*competitive identification*' conduct, which is also part and parcel (the advertisement) in 'our' co-operation rites. It was J. Huizinga (1919/25) *The Waning of the Middle-Ages*, who showed us the preposterous ambitions which abide and who proved this our 'winning mood' well and who summarized this in his (1938/55) *Homo Ludens*, where he claims games to be 'without material gain,' which is also a denial of our sexual and identity-game (impressing-) functions. J. O. y Gasset in (1946/'58) *The Idea of Theatre*, and (1922/'46) *Idea and Belief*, also demonstrated the significance of impression management. E. Goffman (1956), in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* and N. Elias (1959/65) in *The Established and the Outsiders*, (books.Google.nl starting p.89), and countless more, among which the 4 Gospels and St. Paul's letters in the New Testa-

ment, describe this antagonistic normality and advise us to be 'tolerant' and helpful. They endlessly teach/tell us, to 'love' sinners, the sick, strangers, neighbors, even other 'nations,' which did not exist then as we know them. No mean feat and emanating from temple cultures repetitive praying by harims (women), and including their analysis and their 'intentions,' laws and wishful commandments, they hoped to, did and still do 'keep' in 'their' homes. These remnants of matriarchy persist as men 'emancipate.' The 'game' usually seems on, whether in a 'formal,' (the rules are enforced by officials) or 'informal' (just by the housekeepers') situation. So, to demonstrate I will write about 'us and them' and make clear which 'them' is meant in all this positive (our heroes), and negative ('cowards,' derision and schadenfreude) gossip. It's not easy to accept or believe that 'our world' (situation) is actually told and kept this way in parlors, papers, on radio or watching TV, in playgrounds, clubs, shops, schools and churches. We have Youtube, Twitter and Facebook now, to enforce all this figurational naming-pride, and popular TV-series like Clash of Clans, Teletubbies and last but not least: sit-coms, 'reality-' or talk-shows and the national and local 'news-' presenters who pretend to be familiar with us and their 'correspondents' by first-name use, 'welcoming to the club' and thus to be part of 'our home,' too, albeit 'just in a name,' which may be so because we live somewhere, in a shared territory, but also a recognized or known named 'figuration,' like 'L,' 'G,' 'B' or 'T.' They present supposed 'us 'n them-' conflicts as 'news' in 'groups' or parties: 'The medium' is the message we all seem to be longing for. We need this 'hypnotization,' these rites, to work and collaborate, it seems, like horses in a herd, baboons in a pack, or as so-called 'patients.'

Territorial Instinct

In the huge south-east estate of Amsterdam, built as high-rise in the 1960-ties and later in the 70-ties as lower-rise, called 'Bijlmermeer,' many tens of thousands of people from our former colony Surinam came to live with their families, if they were up to it and already earned wages (many 'educated' civil servants). The Bijlmermeer was a community-housing project, meant for the babyboomers and later also for migrant workers invited here. It was not popular among Amsterdammers, only partly inhabited and a financial loss to the city's housing corporations. So these Surinamers were given these large flats, on a subsidized rent, but

few other people wanted to live there, and those who did were mostly on the dole or a pension, also on subsidized rent. They had little choice either and 'we' were not expecting such an invasion. Surinamers had been to Dutch-speaking schools and churches. They now (2014) have 'nationalized' in larger Dutch families than others. Migrants from north- and west-Africa or Turkey are the other half of the population, and all still only seem to know 'orders,' they do not bargain among each-other about and take less responsibility (and pay) at work, though the young are getting better at this.

The old 'whites' hardly attend a mass or 'services' in the churches built for them, subsidized by the municipality as well and are still 'ruled' by an 'old' Dutch elite of 'friends' from political parties and municipal 'services.' Their figurations and municipally subsidized dependents such as the few church-officials have quasi-elites, that still form the board of the trust that owns and exploits the main church-buildings that are both deemed both protestant and Catholic. There are also a few mosques, housed in subsidized or 'lent' buildings and controlled by a municipal or old-boys 'board.' The church-brands and hard-won franchises are 'kidnapped' slowly by 'worldly powers,' like private buildings by civil-servants 'regulation' and taxes. To 'us Christians,' whether from the few 'old' whites left or from the many Surinam (parents) that live here for more than 40 years now, this should seem a God-given blessing. We worry about 'our' church-finances little, unless 'we' have a part-time subsidized job with the landlord-trust. And the Surinam parents or their kids make little use of this 'blessing in disguise,' while their church-attendance is much higher. The 'old' white and poorer 'crew' never understood much of their formerly Surinam competitors, were afraid, or refused to be interested. 'Them' (from Surinam), grew larger families and were in a job all this time, which the 'old crew,' who are still on the dole, were not. So there's a lot of envious gossip about kids and cars going on and likely the ex-Surinam families don't think much of their 'old' counterparts, are proud of what they've achieved and rightly so. They had 'their own' church built, which mostly 'houses' the more blackish former Surinam families, including the many black Catholics among them, gotten 'out of the Surinam jungle long ago. The more Indian-looking ex-Surinamers form a large minority (1/3-1/2). After the slave-trade was more or less ended in the Caribbean, Indian, Chinese and

Javanese 'coolies,' were hired in Surinam at the end of the 19th century, replacing the slaves that ran away when competed by 'British' (and 'Dutch') 'coolies.' The Surinam families invested and spent to build 'their own' church, called 'Wi Eegi Kerki' (Our Own Church), which is exploited by the Evangelical Hernhüter or E.B.G, also extant in Surinam. They 'ask' a 10% fee as church-tax from their 'flock' ('our' church-services are practically free), or at least to buy a lot every week at E25, and they do a lot of beneficial social work, from lunch for their single-mum-families, at least every Sunday, to rapping-sessions for youths and also in 'our slavery-past' work-out classes. Now we all started out as little 'slave-toddlers' when first 'disciplined,' so such a 'class,' or figuration, can seem to be an emancipator to anyone. Apparently 'they' do all this with their own 'cultural' signs, rites and communicational rules of thumb. The 'young' whites, of whom there are not so many and the many single mums from former Surinam parents can well use such simple 'social' support. The E.B.G.-church does a lot for these mums and their kids, at a price, but the 'old' or even 'new whites' do not, they hardly attend Church anymore. Little in the way of kids-housekeeping or feeding or playing opportunities there. There is a kids-service planned, but few make use of it, finding it boring or too 'disciplined.' Only in the old Dui-vendrecht-Church of St. Urbanus, which is situated centrally, but in a different municipality, some ex-Surinam kids (but not the 'black' ones) attend, but they are not the many now mixed black (formerly) Catholic kids we could expect, while there's a large estate with many of them close-by, across a railway-levy, called Venserpolder. The kids in these side-shows make a lot of noise and produce little more than pre-printed color-in cartoons, when led back into and at the end of Mass. It could seem that all this was planned by vicious 'old cronies,' but it is a hopeful beginning, even if blacks are not welcomed with lunch, like at the E.B.G.-services. It's not 'cool' to be victimized, so that this is even denied by the victims, who may be doing fine, but should long have been 'integrated better,' in school and job-opportunities. Their fathers and mothers were most of the proud, taxed earners these forty years at Bijlmermeer, whose parents were often civil-servants in Surinam, even if there are the by now 'old' drop-outs on barbiturates (nighttime) and pep or methadone (mornings) from municipal 'mental services.' Like everyone else nowadays with a

'PTSS' diagnosis, they feel robbed, as no 'cures' are on offer: A dead-end street-feeling of being cancelled-out pervades. This 'feeling' is also 'played-out.' Heroes are only recognized when they are anti-social-hierarchy (The establishment), although many also, have 'done' quite well in the mean time. The mostly of mixed blood Surinamers, who call themselves 'Hindu' and attend mass with 'us.' They look in many ways like Europeans and Indians. The 'black' ones, the creoles, as they are still called in Surinam, but the part-indians hate to be called 'coolies,' as their colonial elites used to, but are often rather dark or very white ('patats'), which suggests that they still discriminate strongly in their partner-choices. It is well known that the level of single mothers is very high too, which suggests less strong family-ties and more 'social injustice' in this rather visible 'black' and difficult to 'place' portion of those, who lack a recognized 'identity' or figuration among themselves. In the anti-discrimination policies of the end of the 20th Century they did well as nurses and bus-drivers, as they were often already families in civil-service in Surinam. They have their 'own' choir and 'volunteers' in church, but 'We,' us (whites), turn away from any blacks and Africans usually and do not consider 'them' up to scratch and envy their families and wealth all the same. Practically all the ensuing gossip to and from has to pass through school-class-kids or playground-kids and (single) mums, in bars, 'social media' and church sports-talk-shops, including the pestering of each other with denunciation and the self-appraisal that is usual among kids and women. These 'ideas' are long-standing and do not seem to change overtly while they are denied. They do however need to be replenished for any 'group-pride'-to stay. Now the 'old' whites are dying out and the better-off ex-Surinam families are leaving the field and thus also becoming less here. Church and church-

exploitation is shrinking and 'us whites' are beginning to realize the only way to keep the churches going is to 'modernize,' or 'be different.' 'Blacks' are considered, but still not the Surinamers, who are doing fine, even if there is hatred at school, especially between north-African Berbers and Surinamers pestering each other, it's diminishing, 'relations' are accepted. Some Ghanaians are welcomed, in a politically correct good effort made. I've been singing in four church-choirs the 12 years I lived here and have learnt to cooperate with several 'thems,' whether from Surinam, elsewhere, the other sex, or both. We take care together, from wherever 'one' is. At the same time the buildings-exploiters and their subsidized cronies, complain about 'their' attendance and likely also 'our' dwindling turnover. But they begin to realize and fear the necessary inclusion of former Surinam families, who have shamed them and of whom many, probably about half were Catholics in Surinam, but not in 'our church-society,' where they should be a large majority by now. A controversial missal with prayers and hymns by an ex-communicated Catholic priest who has gone commercial on his own in 'The New Love,' is permanently used, but is not appropriate to needs and problems of successful or one-parent, former Surinam-families and makes mockery of Mass. Children's-play is not allowed, even after Mass and lunch may be essential, but it is forbidden to cook in the well fitted-out kitchens. We all have sorrow, anger and frustration in common, which is never addressed, except for the 'old gossip,' which is out of date by now (in the 3rd generation), but has kept up its typical 'behind-the-scenes' denunciation, always denied in public: 'up-stage,' as E Goffman would have it. This is only 'suspicious' to a few. At least in Church some 'blacks' (to the 'whites'), who consider themselves 'Hindu,' come and are treated politely, but not out in the streets. Whether the blacks or 'Hindus' actually



Queuing up at McDonalds diner with many Surinamers: chatting patiently, February 2015.

feel shame I couldn't say, they do behave shyly, usually deferent, when bluffingly (not nicely) greeted, as kids and (not so) young girls do. Now last year the Catholic Church ordained four young priests from east-Asia and appointed some new assistants to a much larger area and population including all of 'East-

Amsterdam,' which is partly 19th C. and partly newbuilt (on water), but almost as populated as 'our Bijlmermeer' area. 'We' see the young priests seldomly. They live at the Urbanus church and understandably have other things to do apart from showing 'face' in the 'old' Bijlmermeer, where almost everything is run

by municipally subsidized ‘volunteers,’ with their own cash-flows in choirs, meals after service, lotteries, collections and outings by bus (including meals). We do however, practically only ‘get’ masses now by ‘old’ former priests who can’t sing or ‘follow’ the ‘service-headers’ and pictures, that are projected behind them with a beamer by the ‘volunteers.’ This disappoints with distracting ‘mistakes’ and also reassures the ‘old-crony’ pride, but not that of the ‘Hindus,’ who ‘stay mum.’ We had a few months weekly Wednesday-evening ‘vespers,’ last spring, where the choir sang and its conductor read lectures on the ‘shamefulness of Jesus’ nakedness,’ and ‘our own.’ An interesting topic maybe but nobody attended, it cost a lot of effort and left ‘priest’ and choir without an audience. A social engineer at work? The wife maybe? The more authoritarians, including Surinam Christians and Muslim ‘believers,’ reject such comparisons, to name but a few ‘figurations.’

The weekly ‘bazaar’ (jumble-sale) is organized by a foundation and former politician and makes more money than all weekly church-collections combined. It’s a great meeting place for old cronies, who have their scheduled meetings for each ‘sub-group,’ according to denominations and locations. They keep no financial



2nd generation Muslima in the church-bazaar, chatting with volunteer salesperson, March 2015.

attracts muslima mothers to the bazaar in church every week. ‘Groupwise’ this still seems a ‘problem,’ but in practice it is not, even if ‘they’ seem a little ‘shy’ and do not join ‘us’ with meals ‘behind-the-scenes,’ which ‘formally’ they could, as they are advertised during the Bazaar. The ‘volunteers’ are not interested in shame, but only in pride and certainly deny their own shaming. They get irritated if reminded of it. We must be careful ascribing ‘feelings’ to participants, they were already traumatized, may be feigning, or inferencing. **We compete**, and so does the gossip, also in the many ‘new’ churches catering for ‘their believers,’ for better or for worse. By now we are practically all Dutch nationals who were educated here, so there is an opportunity to ‘make good,’ if recognized by a Church or school. Surinamers became bus-drivers or

accounts and benefit from the ‘churches’ tax-free status and their toleration by the official churches. They do a lot of good besides, but of their behind-the-scenes-meetings in ‘church,’ no-one ever hears, which gives them the power to do business as they please. All this has evolved through the years, and the ‘players’ from these ‘sub-scenes’ feel (by now) that it is ‘their’ church or job in it, and pretend this to be so even if it isn’t officially, but just practically. To an average ‘Christian,’ attending ‘Mass’ or a ‘service,’ this all seems a little unreal, with some of these hard-nosed ‘volunteers,’ running the respective shows and in a not-ordinary way being ‘modern,’ but alienating any ‘out-group’ including the by now ‘old’ Surinamers, who have already built their own church but who may well feel betrayed or ‘left out,’ Catholic or Protestant. It is useful and normal that people swap household goods and share cheap meals, especially those single-mums with their kids, black, ‘Hindu’ or white.

This is a normal church-service both all-over Africa and in Surinam, where this is only one of the few ‘worldly social services,’ and a separate collection is held every week for these meals in white boxes. This work always belonged to ‘the Church’ and the Mosque, maybe just not in it. But it is very beneficial, and even

nurses and did their thing, they practically all do but the young ones come to church less, unless there’s a playground or party like the St. Patrick’s sing-song, a summer barbecue or breakfast or lunch, which a few churches organize around their services. These events could well attract the (rather few) Muslim offspring who now have a hard time, being pestered in school, especially by ex-Surinam youths v.v., or at the jobs they can hardly get. Just ‘normal’ politeness is usually enough to lighten up faces and they obviously need the service, as do all the single or just lonely mums and their little ones, that may prefer to stay out of the hands of expansive ‘youth officers.’ The ‘games’ of typifying stories remain, where toddler-realm is monopoly.

Look-alikes, figurations and interest groups

So is it really 'Religion,' or is this gossip just respective interests, that seem to 'connect one' in such a 'figuration?' It is likely we are only subconsciously in a *figuration*, to many, but not to most or all anymore, as **N Elias** (1939/69) called 'it,' and **E Goffman** (1958) 'framed' it, even if many are 'in the know,' including the victimized, who also contact each other in their own 'up-stage' sub-cultures. These obsessions may even cause the victimized to take pride in 'revenge' on their pursuers, by giving a show of triumph or laughter, like teen-age girls do to whistling wannabees. It often happens that such a group hangs around at a bus-stop or park-bench and laugh at passers-by, their 'out-group,' and annoy them while being 'untouchable,' as the deriding 'meanings' are simultaneously denied, or rather, repressed, by all 'parties.' We may accept such assumptions (and insinuations) with **K Popper** ('51), as we will see shortly, but it is not, as he thought, a question of money and consumables, they are secondary, but rather of anxiety, and gratification, which we usually crave for (see 1932: **Klein M**, in Add. U). It is only through 'historicism, we can get to know our childhood memories.' **Popper** writes (1951, pp. 330ff): **Freud vs. Marx (FK)**

"No more is assumed than that the science of society must coincide with the history of the development of the economic conditions of society, usually called by Marx 'the conditions of production.' It may be noted, in parentheses, that the Marxist term 'production' was certainly intended to be used in a wide sense, covering the whole economic process, including distribution and consumption. But these latter never received much attention from Marx and the Marxists. Their prevailing interest remained production in the narrow sense of the word. This is just another example of the naive historico-genetic attitude, of the belief that science must only ask for causes, so that, even in the realm of man-made things, it must ask 'Who has made it?' and 'What is it made of?' rather than 'Who is going to use it?' and 'What for?' (---) If we now proceed to a criticism as well as to an appreciation of Marx's 'historical materialism,' or of so much of it as was presented so far, then we may distinguish two different aspects, first is historicism, the claim that the realm of social sciences coincides with that of the historical or evolutionary method, and especially with historical prophecy. This claim, I think, must be dismissed. The second is econo-

mism (or 'materialism'), i.e. the claim that the economic organization of society, the organization of our exchange of matter with nature, is fundamental for all social institutions and for their historical development. This claim, I believe, is perfectly sound, so long as we take the term 'fundamental' in an ordinary vague sense, not laying too much stress upon it. In other words, there can be no doubt that practically all social studies, whether institutional or historical, may profit if they are carried out with an eye to the 'economic conditions' of society. Even the history of an abstract science such as mathematics is no exception.' In this sense, Marx's economism can be said to represent an extremely valuable advance in the methods of social science. But, as I said before, we must not take the term 'fundamental' too seriously. Marx himself undoubtedly did so. Owing to his Hegelian upbringing, he was influenced by the ancient distinction between 'reality' and 'appearance,' a distinction between what is 'essential' and what is 'accidental.' His own improvement upon Hegel (and Kant) he was inclined to see in the identification of 'reality' with the material world (including man's metabolism), and of 'appearance' with the world of thoughts or ideas. Thus all thoughts and ideas would have to be explained by reducing them to the underlying essential reality, i.e. to economic conditions. This philosophical view is certainly not much better than any other form of essentialism. And its repercussions in the field of method must result in an over-emphasis upon economism. For although the general importance of Marx's economism can hardly be overrated, it is very easy to overrate the importance of the economic conditions in any particular case. Some knowledge of economic conditions may contribute considerably, for example, to a history of the problems of mathematics, but a knowledge of the problems of mathematics themselves is much more important for that purpose; and it is even possible to write a very good history of mathematical problems without referring at all to their 'economic background' (In my opinion, the 'economic conditions' or the 'social relations' of science are themes which can easily be overdone, and which are liable to degenerate into platitude.)

This, however, is only a minor example of the danger of overstressing economism. Often it is sweepingly interpreted as the doctrine that all social development depends upon that of economic conditions, and especially upon the de-

velopment of the physical means of production. But such a doctrine is palpably false. There is an interaction between economic conditions and ideas, and not simply a unilateral dependence of the latter on the former. If anything, we might even assert that certain 'ideas,' those which constitute our knowledge, are more fundamental than the more complex material means of production, as may be seen from the following consideration. Imagine that our economic system, including all machinery and all social organizations, was destroyed one day, but that technical and scientific knowledge was preserved. In such a case it might conceivably not take very long before it was reconstructed (on a smaller scale, and after many had starved). But imagine all knowledge of these matters to disappear, while the material things were preserved. This would be tantamount to what would happen if a savage tribe occupied a highly industrialized but deserted country. It would soon lead to the complete disappearance of all the material relics of civilization. (-) It may be noted in this connection that Marx's friend, the poet H. Heine, thought very differently about these matters. 'Mark this, ye proud men of action,' he writes; 'ye are nothing but unconscious instruments of the men of thought who, often in humblest seclusion, have appointed you to your inevitable task. Robespierre was merely the hand of Rousseau ..'15 (Something like this might perhaps be said of the relationship between Lenin and Marx.). We see that Heine was, in Marx's terminology, an idealist, and that he applied his idealistic interpretation of history to the French Revolution, which was one of the most important instances used by Marx in favour of his economism, and which indeed seemed to fit this doctrine not so badly-if we compare it now with the Russian Revolution. Yet in spite of this heresy, Heine remained Marx's friend.

Back to business

The Muslim parents seem to stay inside a lot. They were Berbers, not the Arabs who once drove them into the mountains or enslaved them, or exiles in the Balkans, from Turkey or Syria. Are these neighbors and mothers still illiterate, with their kids pestered and excluded from play at school and from the job-market? These few kids cannot be 'jihadists,' if they have not been forced to 'choose sides' by their

mums, their surrounding schoolkids, colleagues, or worse. By now there are more Surinam kids than there are Muslim at the schools. The Muslim form bands.

'We,' even less the former Surinamers, do not 'like' them and hardly communicate, *vice versa*, unless there is some 'authority' that 'tells us to.' They and their parents 'prove' and force their old toddler 'decisions' or 'conclusions' (un-) to each-other, when there is also other 'authority' that 'tells them to.' They or their parents probably learned the Q'ur-an, but possibly not to write. We see their mothers at the 'bazaar,' where we sometimes discuss what's on offer in a cheerful way. It seems some are already 'coming-out,' or rather 'in' and they speak Dutch and deserve some help, even respect and not just service-jobs or subsidized jobs as guards or police, where 'revenge' is on the rise. Only maybe a handful very obsessed ones might deserve suspicion. We're in an unplanned but nevertheless self-made figuration, in which we force each-other into respective 'roles,' 'statuses' and 'identities.' It is not just the 'old group' that has more than religious, or 'spiritual' interests. By themselves they do not try to change these childish assumptions, unless some 'higher authority,' i.e., a 'hero of the clan,' senior relative, priest, teacher, systematically de-escalates these known 'differences' and 'likes,' that are only entrenched and 'pimped' by the going gossip and in the 'social media,' that lack boundaries. 'IS' is kept 'alive' in the 'news' this way. They must be bands of exiles or refugees from the east or south, armed by oil-states. Making people here or there conscious of this, cannot be left to 'the laity,' but Church-, Mosque and Case-work must keep behind-the-scenes cronies, volunteers and 'experience-workers' in check and will have to do their jobs vocally and confidently, not leaving its 'performance' or jobs to be directed by 'volunteers.' So here is what 'charisma' entails and anybody knows the meaning of 'even-handedness,' when a 'guest' among 'other' people, nations, pride-groups, families and and identification-similar people, we call figurations. I will not start on the 'jihadi-' suspicions and fears that abide, alongside the broken dreams and the obvious anger about 'this shaming.' travelled across east and northern Africa as a kid and could then get along fine with the 'ma-



Modern temple-culture, the Rosary with 'Intentions' as enforceable rules. Church of Our Lady, January 2015.

majority kids:' They were good at soccer and I was not. They bent over backwards to play soccer with me and taught me to pass to front-runners, which was in both our interest. It was fun among Chagga's (Moshi) and Dinka or Juba (Juba) even when I had no sweets or money: We were a proud herd.

In most mosques, as in Jewish 'shuls' (except maybe 'liberal' ones), there is a separate, fenced-off and usually raised 'balcony' in the back for the women, who thus are tacitly, visually one-way, but not vocally insulated from the kneeling men. Are these women formulating their 'societies' rules, 'public opinion' (laughs, giggles) for their men only? Was this the same in Temple Culture and Court Society? I assume so, with its harims, courtesans and (regressed and traumatized) eunuchs or harlequins to keep peace among them and their distance from men, who were gathering, hunting, fighting or otherwise employed. This mechanism and its function is retained in Catholic, but more so in protestant churches, where there is no celibacy, but a 'democracy' of a few women. This 'culture' retains in NGO's, municipal, i.e., mental-, garbage, schools, hospitals, universities, police, judiciary ('Lady Justice') and also in the many small family-businesses, that are about 1/4 of net business.

Advice for sociologists and anthropologists

Two quotes, first: **M Klein** (1932) *Psychoanalysis of Children* (p. 159): 'What, as a child the individual shows us in these play phantasies will emerge in him in manhood as a necessary condition of his love life;' Second: from **N. Elias** (1965) *The Established and the Outsiders* concluding chapter:

*'There is a certain **abhorrence** (bld: FK) ..against the idea that societies or (-) the figurations which individuals form with each-other exercise some power over the individuals*

which form them and limits their freedom. Yet whatever our wishes may be, looking at available evidence, one cannot get away from the recognition that figurations limit the scope of individuals decisions and in many ways have a compelling force even though this power does not reside, as it is often made to appear, outside individuals, but merely results from the interdependence (and gossip/ FK) between individuals. They fear that one may (not so/FK) magically deprive men of their freedom merely by saying things. Not facing up to the fact, that figurations of individuals (-) have a compelling power over the individuals which form them, is one of the main factors which prevents human beings from lessening this compelling force. For it is only if we understand its nature better that we can hope to gain some control.'

For/of what might one want control? It is mostly our oedipal dispositions/intuition/figuration/ 'ambition,'/ consciences and castration-fear, not to mention penis-envy, from toddler-times, that makes us adhere to or defy a figuration. Women have intuition that keeps them 'loyal.' They are more vulnerable and 'scandal-' driven, revealing the 'markers' and behavioral rules to look for. Playing along may not seem easy when nodding and guestimating the 'self-'rules and markers of any 'figuration' to be 'respected.'

Knowledge or power

Listen to mums and kids fantasies and chat along if necessary. But those in charge had better stop anyone creating 'news' or figurations in their own interest, if not in the interest of 'their study.' That's the business of journalists. Finding the dependencies can be done with these 'institutional' sources. They are not in hiding, if a little secretive, so keep gps-stamped 'evidence,' in these stubbornly hardly changing figurations, but mind that the gossip is actually boring if you are not part and parcel of the

same game. It may seem speculative, but can be made evident: Many of us have accepted ‘figuration,’ shaming, pride and intuition, or just know better by now. Be polite, even if you think you are being taken for a ride. This is not mere journalism, but we are recording the sub-consciously but loyally copied gossip. Not to worry about wished ‘multi-cultural’ discourses. To boot I must remind you that without our monotheist religious institutions and our ‘nation-state’ and its mostly female wished-for school-order, we should still all be thugs and thieves. But we had better always ask: Who benefits by the figuration-work, or ‘Qui bono?’, when dealing with gossip or ‘news’ and we will have to make do with these ‘beliefs,’ be they ‘scientific,’ religious or ideological. Like N Elias (1939/78, Preface) warned, ‘we’ are part and parcel of ‘our own’ figurations too and like E Goffman (1956) warned: ‘we’ observers may be recognized as snoopers, snitches or spies, and cause a row. That is ordinary, but also ‘paranoia’ (Silver C 2011) and everybody reacts as-if they know these ‘mechanisms’ quite well. We are constantly overwhelmed by this dualistic party-naming and often forget the hard-wares, like the comfort: i.e., the water, fertile land, real-estate, safe sleeping-places, food and drink and the loyalty-demanding powers exerted on us, in our meetings, dilemmas, sexual encounters, failing, shaming and the hardships we endure in our lives of so plenty. It is in our ‘setting,’ where sexually frustrated ones lag behind more competitively with minority complexes, obsessive, or useful (mostly wished-for) loyalties make us compete.

Reification, Verification, Identification

We keep each-other on our feet in our herds, it seems, and on our toes, by constantly but sub-consciously and automatically testing each-

Children, light and dark, playing in back gardens



Theses: Political Correctness and expected identification as figuration.

The remnants of matriarchy do not individualize any soon, and girls fear this more than men for obvious reasons. So we always did have religion

others ‘motives:’ The markers for rules of thumb of ‘recognition,’ of ‘identification’ and ‘loyalty’ (to a supposed clan), we share. They are presented in our (body-) language and in C Darwin’s (1872) ‘Expression of the Emotions,’

and in E T Halls (1959) ‘The Silent Language’ (see p.104), initially in greetings. By doing this we urge each-other to ‘identify’ to some figuration (as N Elias called them), and to submission to its rules of thumb. We promise not to be a threat to one-anothers territory and resources, and to recognize expected loyalties. That is the **ratio** of these rituals and a responsibility for priests, volunteers and anybody even pretending ‘charisma.’ The ‘reification’ is only the pass-word (to ‘us’) or the catchword (for ‘them’) among the figurational markers, familiar names and signals, we all treat like our own furniture. The loss of which can threaten us and what we consider ‘our’ world and home and that triggers defensive, panicky, even aggressive reactions. This can happen, when entering a ‘group’ or ‘figuration,’ but a wink or nod can get you ‘in’ usually, at least as a guest for now. It happens all the time in our ‘figured groups’ and thus poses a threat to ‘our’ ‘science’ too, and The Church. We can, after all, only ‘describe.’ But descriptive parables can be revealing and can teach inclusion of ‘personalities’ and make the markets for co-operative work better and more open, but also worse and closed. We need not call this ‘theory,’ but to write or signal parables can be done truthfully and seriously.

This should not, however be done solemnly as in a ritual, except when actually ‘entering’ and staying in such a ‘group’ for a while. ‘Sociology’ should not be one of them, unless it is declared as such. We feel helpless when excluded or ignored and to be an ignoramus means death in our female dreams, yes, those too, and mine.

and ‘science,’ to help us be together more productively. The Catholic practice of Rosary-praying, like the Muslimas and Jews in the back of the Mosque or Schul, may seem monotonous, but many ‘intentions’ are negotiated during it. If we

see this coercive mechanism as continuation of Church-culture and N Elias (1927/67) 'Court Society,' it is easy to picture as continuing in a nation-state, its assurance, insurance and its monopoly on weaponry, which I hardly dare call 'progress,' but which it is.

The persons/humans will all 'individualize' and become less minority-complex-prone, but mostly they resist changes to 'the figurations' they 'belong' to. They 'anti-figurate' any perceived figuration-changes to the prides and prejudices of the figurations they 'chose' to 'identify' with. Figurations are under constant pressure from 'the media' to change 'their ways,' to 'integrate,' for instance, with a 'majority-figuration,' but they will and not necessarily only among ethnic or church-figurations, as these may well remain competing voluntary institutions, as long as they are not being subsidized by the state, which they obviously are almost everywhere.

Should we not get off our high 'scientific,' religious, 'stately,' 'medical' or otherwise 'ideological' or 'cultural' horses and start just improving the normal (closing of) business to everyone eligible, by making The Process conscious and so opening up markets, where possible. Only some of us may be in a position to do so, or contrarily to profit malignantly from the subsidies, and those are responsible. 'Lay people,' or those not 'in the know' will resist such a change while they think that is their duty, interest, loyalty or that it is their pride and belief. Bewailing the victimized 'peoples' only 'shames/derides' who one hopes to protect.

2. After many years of such ground-work, observations may be compared to debunking and satire in media of the past, such as prints, cartoons and papers and even etiquette and fashion-inquiries and to what dynasty, faction or figuration seems to wield power locally or nationally in time. Then this could add-up to become a real-life and long-term Sociology. Figuration lasts for long, and only changes in shocks with moving beneficiaries and victims, like the Moroccan and Turkish immigrants' kids in the Bijlmermeer now, who are excluded from normal 'tolerance' and contribution, which doesn't mean they need compassion or subsidies.

3. Then there is the 'morality' of all this vulnerable identification hunger: The better we know it the less vulnerable we are and the more figuration-information is spread, which is not the figurational gossip, the more 'humor' and the less figurational conflict there will be. Humor on ones figurations deficiencies and normal politeness and

recognition, promotes tolerance and lessens 'affective' tensions.

4. The above-cited '**abhorrence**' (disgust) from Elias ('67) is apparently the politically correct shame or guilt we feel, when threatening to be disloyal to the 'home-' identity or figuration: The as-always spectating, while encouraging 'ours' and booing and debunking 'theirs' and other popular out-groups during a match in the 'home-stadium.' Better take this figurationally, not 'personally,' even if our intuition scares us. It is only in the minds of a few intellectuals that any possible offending is a no-no. It is the civil-servants and priests, like police, teachers at school and all 'social' workers, that expect everybody to be politically correct anywhere, anytime. Then there is this naturally competing dichotomous(e) attitude which Elias warns us against. Were we digitized in 'the cloud' or born in it? One may know many 'figured' enormities by heart and recognize the figurational markers, but those who do, can only rarely perform the accompanying body-language signs, like 'giving' a blow instead of a handshake and a 'smile or wink,' grin, or shake of the head. Realize that, slow as The amalgam of individual Processes thru generations seems, having started pre-history, many 'know' and ignore or 'take' all sorts of figurational insults with a 'pinch of salt.' But not all can and only if relying on own resources instead of some figurational 'pride.' This parochialism is waning against resistance from a diminishing majority, not just from one figuration, or maybe just 'statistically' defined' ones.

5. The Individuation and Matriarchy are opposing Processes, it seems: The one comes at the cost of the other trend and leaves less 'room' for the other, it seems, when we consider Christianity, Islam and Court-society a continuation of what is left of Temple Matriarchy, and a means of power-exertion in a 'balancing' society. Not just religious institutions are remnants of this, but also the editing and presentation of news and educators, employed by governments, hierarchy in small firms, the Judiciary, schools, health and many political parties in 'our democracies' which Blumer H ('67) describes. The services organized are run by party-members nephews or friends. We buy what the commercials tell us to, so the pimping of brands (re)makes loyalty to old and new figurations. But most victimized figurations still oppose new allegiances and cherish 'their' rules and markers, for a long time, even at 'its,' his or her own peril, just like Elias predicted. That is 'systemic corruption.'

6. This 'Matriarchy-thing' or rather, This process,

should not be moralised positively or otherwise. It's where we are from, be it only heretically (sometimes heretically) and from toddler-education. It has been a 'cause' (in both senses), of many war, and peace-times in the past. We do recognise, however, the wide-spread feeling of loss of influence by women, especially the 'women's-libbers.' Things didn't get worse for any human 'sex,' just less hierarchical. We do still compete for one-another, but we found better ways to co-operate. The often derided meritocracy-trend gives better chances to those who are being excluded. There is as always Love, not servitude anymore, as wishful power-thinking or even partnership.

7. Matriarchy has its merits, like the making of a market for peoples functioning, that benefits families more, if not always all or even most. We better watch the 'grapevine,' excluding the continuous T.V.-repetitors and well-wishers, who out-babble real concerns. It has its functions, as do all choirs, commenters, applauses and voice-overs. Just do not let them confuse you, but do ask: Qui Bono? Why? Go and sin no-more! It's not algebra, we can find denials lurking around.

8. The 'secrecy-aspect' of all figuration-, choir-, board and backseat (women's-)opinion is part and parcel of the 'agreed' markers, so it is difficult to hear all of a figuration, just because of 'who' one looks or speaks like (accent?). Secret information is not deliberately so, but is repressed to subconscious in a 'figuration.'

9. Obsessed, digitized, dichotomous(e) analysis is 'official science' everywhere. What is conscious to us or not cannot be proven, but people just talking away playfully, in a (work-) team, only selectively remember the hierarchical 'facts.'

10. I admit it, it's as much the eye as the beholder, as any 'concluding' on our ways of life is a frame-story-frame. We 'need' common 'beliefs' and assumptions to cooperate in-stead of fight. 'Science' is just an assumption of truth. K Popper told us to declare our biases, along with his hated (Elias) 'nomenclature,' but from what we've learnt from S Freud in practice; It being all about the pleasure-unpleasure principle (see A + S Freud, 1933, Add. I + UI p26). I think it even better to 'declare,' or at least to be on the watch for what is not declared in this respect, and this is usually also the 'F-word,' in the purpose of all we all do or refrain from. We need to be very careful about all this in each-others interests and in our own competition. The purpose of this repression of oedipal and toddler-memories and protracted behavior seems obvious, but will not free us from this shame or guilt, even if laughed away. Popper

would have admitted that with hindsight it is unlikely to falsify outcomes of experiments on our past 'toddler-clan-behavior.' If, we could declare obsessions, we wouldn't go wrong anymore. Nevertheless this conundrum is neglected and repressed in 'the Humanities,' which retains ignorance. If we then consider that 40% of our working age population is in commercial work and that the other 1/2 to 2/3 are in (semi-)public service, including Universities, (mental) hospitals, on the dole, pension or other subsidies, we can estimate how 'biased' 'we' are. We can't do this away with the dichotomy: For or against 'methodical individualism,' reconciliation is required: No contradiction here. **K Horney*** ('50), the psychoanalyst, describes the obsessions of 'the west' from a behaviorist point of view: '(-) *I shall assume that the self-effacing partner is a woman and the aggressive one a man. (-) self-effacement has nothing to do with femininity or aggressive arrogance with masculinity. Both are exquisitely neurotic phenomena.*' (but) '*Her mood depends upon whether his attitude toward her is more positive or negative.*' (p247).

In (1939/59) *Female Psychology*, she adds a more real picture than Freud admittedly could:

Still these cases that emanate from an unhappy individual history of particular neurotic entanglements arise clearly from unfortunate individual development. This description might give the impression that the two sets, social and individual, are separated from each other. This is not the case. I believe I can show in each instance that the type described can develop in this direction on individual factors and I would pose that in this type of woman, which is usual, only minor personal difficulties are enough to force the girl into this feminine role. (Ch. 7-8, FK).

She poses to me a treacherous oedipal dichotomy, because some ladies pretend and I expect, from when I was a toddler in oedipal conflict, and still at 'war,' i.e: My gut-feeling.

The **11th** commandment was and is: Do not get caught leaving 'the family,' which makes it very hard for any stigma or 'Schande' to be relieved, after such a change, or to come back into a well-defined society after leaving it. Well-known exception to this rule is the parable or lesson of the Prodigal Son, Luke ch.15.11.

The **10th** commandment, from Genesis (Bible) and preceding the 10 from Deuteronomy, is or are 'Go away' and 'multiply.' Freud thought this to be a prohibition of incest, but it also has an ambivalent relation to the **11th**, which is: Thou shalt not want (from Ps.23), which encourages all women that they lack nothing. Both are not officially rec-

ognized, but everybody knows that 'going from home' is considered irreversible (so that you cannot come back), for all who were first excluded or exiled and then 'fled' or left, to slip in, in another 'figuration,' at the 'others' cost. Figuration and framing-theory may predict what will become of them, us and the figuration-work done by any 'populace,' of whichever figuration or 'situational' interdependence.

The question about usefulness and legitimacy of marked dichotomies we keep up for so long, even if unproductive, lies in its origin, oedipal conflict and identifications, over and over, from generation to generation. Also we have the fierce opposition against calling them into question. It scares any party or anyone considering him or herself part and parcel of a society, and thus, its figurations, which we all do by disposition (in the Freudian sense of our character when leaving our 'oedipal phase'). Is it our nature or nurture? Often loss will be substituted with obstinacy in a fixation. We are not the same when our interests differ: Solidarity and approval are earned. If one chooses celibacy or to live on less than they hoped for, or were able to get, whether from weakness or loyalty, they should recognize and take responsibility in these sexually or otherwise differing assumed interest-groups, where we can raise our voices beneficially to all, even without resorting to a tradition, like the Catholic or the Muslim, or 'Communications science.' These will become more individuated traditions too. But it is still irresistible to 'gloat,' to all of us and it is wise to respect another's 'pride' as long as we can't all do without it. We may tone it down a bit and have a laugh. Shames are unresolved oedipal conflicts and cannot be accounted to victimized or protected 'figurations.' **Making fun** of competing 'groups' or playing blame-games (jokes) for unlikely offences. We still seem to need to, to 'feel OK' (an 'affect') and that is often a black-and-white thing, and then another obsession: We'll do even better, as we did before, gradually, wars were always our recurrent state, also when a large stream of hardly employable men and later their (extended) family members manage to swim, hike or are 'saved' to northern Europe while in a financial crisis of zero interest, after taking the plunge. They cannot be sent or, 'come back' home.

These obsessions have had a Function in Evolution but are diminishing while being newly imported. A little cool, 'fuzzy logic' and the willingness to defend borders could make a huge difference here. There's no end to this free pension,

mental care and housing-wanting people. It is quite feasible to calculate the value of a Syrian passport and/or fleeing-story, which gets one into the EU and is for sale on any smartphone. European states will be forced by people, who were educated with the stick to be 'productive,' even if wealthier than the poorest of 'them.' Societal insurance costs half our commercial turnover in taxes, which doesn't worry civil-servants, who just see work and opportunities. It's not difficult to get the 'figurative Christian rules' or to feel sick (of poverty), or behave childishly and 'we' are very naïve by 'feeling' shame and wanting others to help. Anyone in a fast growing Central Asian, African or Middle-East-economy, finds it on their smartphone.

C Cooley, H Blumer, N Elias and E Goffman tried to explain sociology and psychology, if-only in a behaviorist sense, with our herd(y) need of hypnotization* and acknowledgement. Shame, as we know from S Freud, is negative pride, separation-fear and displaced guilty feelings of early painful and traumatic loss.

All vertebrates guard each-other jealously. Apparently, but only that, we all construct our 'self' by old digital (1/0) choices, but a summary can hide the long-term Process and its causations, even if describing all 'traumatic,' repressed or tabooed family-feuds, until now, should do. Filogenesis, similarity of human babies to adult baboons, in language and sign(al-)ing is not recognized enough, but C Darwin certainly did that, in his (1872) 'Expression of the Emotions.' The reifications mystify as far as they hide our sexual object-orientation: These dichotomies still seem 'inherent,' even if of our own making, which we both debunk and glorify.

All 'news-features' are polemized accidents, 'crises,' including those with kalashnikows and/or draught. Behaviorist observation is not enough to study mankind, there is more to know, that we have in common. There's only a few 'types.' Of us.

Certain traumata and neuroses in man are prejudiced by evolution, negatively or positively, which makes them all the more prevalent. Some even had advantages. We should have the courage to stay close to our toddler-times 'home,' and forgive the trespassers along our way, if we wish to describe them and to prescribe the better or fewer laws and companies to control our diminishing herds. Planned, in a personalized Contest, in 'democracies,' be it that all 'nominees' are said to 'represent' some 'Party' we are expected to 'identify' with (Blumer H '67). Those who were

not schooled for long and girls (not the same) know the 'Rules of Thumb' that are likely to apply: They have intuition, preliminary and mutually accepted hierarchy, but the females usually still sell the stuff the males produce. Our neuroses, normal and abnormal, define our emotions, feelings, affects. They are a communicational given, better not denied. A pity psychologists do just that, when concocting D.S.M.-quasi-diagnoses and prescribing regressive drugs and hospitalization others crave. Shame, guilt and pride are replicas of early education, but pass on to generations. M Foucault (1975/84) describes the way the 'nation-states' and all sorts of 'representatives' control their figurational herds as a spiral of control of pleasures, rewarding officials with more pleasures.

'Not because having tried to erect too rigid or (-) a barrier against sexuality, society succeeded in giving rise to a whole perverse outbreak and a long pathology of the sexual instinct. We must not imagine that the objective of saying no to all these things that were formerly tolerated attracted notice and a pejorative designation when they came to give a regulative to the one function as mechanism with types of sexuality, a double impetus: Pleasure-power that was capable of reproducing labor power and form the family. (Foucault '76, p. 47)

'Society' doing anything is an impossible reification but, from all the figurational 'work' having been done, this seems to be so. Causes and Process are represented by 'trends' and 'institutional facts.' *'(-) A world where these relations could no longer operate in the same way: The relation of superiority (-) in the household, over the wife (outside/FK) had to be associated with (-) reciprocity and equality.'* (F1984p95).

Shame is only felt in so far we've been traumatized in early life and is diminishing in western 'cultures,' but not as yet in Africa or the Middle-East. We see that this burgeoning state-control cannot go on forever because of the costs, until minorities revolt. But a new human 'species:,' 'homosexual' was 'figured,' to be controlled in a different way, i.e., medicalized. We already see this with the so-figured 'populists,' gaining ground in 'the West,' but prevalent in the (Middle) East and Africa. Pampered 'westerners' realize what's at stake, with 'freedoms' and respected privacy. Few 'trespassers' of this 'secret' (G Simmel 1906) are needed for this plight, but almost nobody dares to admit or mention it. Freudian analysts, gays and lesbians often do, if they are ambivalent about it, supporting 'refugees' and 'outsiders,' just like any woman would, usually.

It yields power, opportunities and supposed status, or 'class,' in our recognition-game of hierarchy, status and 'tolerance.'

The long-term Process

Renewed matriarchal rule and the realizing of 'self,' as idealized by Horney, 'framed' by Goffman and 'figured' by Elias as 'individualization,' is a belief that still prevails. We have similar 'inner,' toddler-conflicts. If you do not believe the theory of matriarchal history, we have all been infants and were weaker than the mums that forced our super-ego and 'conscience' onto us, when we (were) considered a part of her.

Recognition of our early mechanisms of identification and projection causes this 'individualization' in the long term, not the strictness of our superegos or 'civilization' *per se*, which are two sides of the same coin (see 1936, A Freud, next from p. 37). People are pressured a lot from infancy on, to adhere to these yes-and-no-nos, do's and don'ts, naming and shaming. They represent 'tradition.' We crave for 'freedom,' but do not understand of what or from when or whom. It is either instinct already present during infancy, or what inhibited its satisfaction and gratification. That struggle is not 'individualization,' because that could only mean struggling against one another, for pride, food, drink, shelter, like we expected, and often got, as infants. The identifications and projections, are these 'interdependencies,' which make us reinvent them, with the applying affects and anxieties. The types of possible identifications are rather limited, according to Anna Freud ('36, Add. I p26+), in their infantile scope of identifications and/or projections, positive or negative and passively or actively: our 'figured frames,' societies, communities and 'groups': religious, 'ethnic,' 'academic' and stately ones too. **'Choices' forced on us in 'education' are the scope of 'figurations.'** Its 'leaders' are considered and expected to be totalitarian as 'kings,' or the 'figuration,' 'our belief,' church, state or 'identity' will fall apart, by our own undoing, if not 'mended' or 'healed.' We all react to this, sometimes, with: **The populism.**

Nobody known as 'populist' calls himself a populist. The stigma comes by gossip: Social identification is recognition of ones identifications by the situational group and the adaptation to the advertised one of four possible and recognized identification stances. The recurring mechanism of roles and consciences 'force' us to comply to advertised dispositions, in any family or 'setting,' that will accept us only as such. We confirm and enforce each-others and our choices as toddlers.

Dichotomies and polarization

We always seem to look for causes of any harm or glory in the form of 'groups' or 'communities,' split into 'badies' and 'goodies' and I guess all of us suffer their super-ego hatred of their toddler and oedipal punishments 'away,' by glorifying them, rightly or wrongly, after all they represent kid-defeats.

Most of us repress childish memories this way or love to just laugh them off as fun. And as one can believe in a nation, some science or religion, one will have to confirm 'belief' *sui generis*, as bastardized projections and identifications, not to be 'abhorred' in moral outrage, by the same common mechanisms anymore, as they also serve competing evolutionary 'purposes.' These 'beliefs' are 'reaction formations' and stem from our own kindergarten-time or earlier, and they are not easily left behind and kept as obsessions to adhere to loyally, representing old failures, defeats and mortifications, identified with and transposed to the 'prides' that form our present-day 'selves' and, 'identities,' whether from 'religious,' 'ideological' education, fairy-tales we were told, mirroring the oedipal choices of time long passed. Even more so in 'minority-circumstances.' West, South or East, where obsessive 'failures' of old are stronger, especially if parental surveyance was less, but more severe. There is a time-lag, as growing up with less parenting traumatizes more and leaves stronger identifications (with who was 'lost'), of pride 'self' and 'ego.' The 'historical approach' is not enough; Comparisons will always have to be made with analysis of our own personal history, i.e: our filogenesis, down to our oedipal phases, where 'mine' will be a history of a 'figuration,' and the personal ones of individuals part of their first 'figurations:' their 'families,' become the wished models.

It may seem a bold conclusion, but with reading the Freuds observations in the Addenda, it will not be anymore. The mechanisms are known by our youths by now, except maybe those of minorities, (old) leaders, 'teachers,' or 'mothers,' that don't take no for an answer and who were excluded from modern peer education. Allow more personal history and less rules to comply with in humanity-papers, with more sympathy for writers toddler-memories and of solving of our mystery-conflicts. That requires determination, fuzzy logic, honesty and tolerance. When looking for freedom, inspiration, our 'soul,' humor, liberation, nostalgia, psychology, theology, pathology, esotery, religion, the occult, sociology, spirituality, love, togetherness, warmth,

dreams, fun and games, glory, morality, romance, pride and even for a 'strategy,' conversion, amazement, change, heaven, enlightenment, and respect, we are usually only after our own identifications in our own oedipal figuration as our would-be 'collective' childhoods. To be reminded, zap Comedy Central to Disney for a while and observe the 'comedy,' cartoons, drama, horror and sci-fi. Look at your e-mail, sms, twitter and do listen to our gutturals: ha-has, a-ahs, aus, screams, wows, aarghs, tschs, eeks, (o)ohs and ahs, hoarseness and our sometimes distorted voices and musical instruments: Like screaming toddlers, Neanderthals, and chimps. We often, refer to each-other now 'informally,' a distinction phased out of the English language and any slang. On 'the continent,' we said 'thou' to each-other in any meeting, but it's fading there too. This probably means that we are getting more conscious of these internalized, wished relations, our intuition/ambition, and are controlling them better as a result, with a guilty 'feeling' of loss or 'shame.' *Wer die Sehnsucht* (longing, yearning) *kennt, weiss* (knows, knows) *was ich leide,* (suffer) said J von Goethe (1821). We address each-other increasingly again as-if we are brothers and sisters, whatever we suffered as toddlers, as still usual in clubs, sports parties, Church, rural places and small business, where hierarchy thrives. Dichotomies we love so much, we handle them unconsciously, but they should not be ignored or rejected for they are reflections of past choices, not voluntarily made, if we still wish for them. We expect and accept to be 'medicalized,' when anxious. We know from marketing and clinical psychology research, that decisions are usually already made when we find rationalizations for them. They are 'figurational memories' we cling to as-if they were our hometowns and families, where we revisit and wonder whether we belong there or if it all (still) belongs to us. If we' admit it proudly, or not (shamefully), 'we,' (mankind at least and not just me) 'need' to 'belong' to a named 'world,' if only at least a wished and 'figured' one. With Anna Freud (1932) we cannot deny any longer that sexual life begins long before puberty, which makes the organization we want reidentification or reintrojection with, passively or actively, positively or negatively by the pleasure-principle and whichever gave most e(pre-) oedipally, then. Confirm this from experience with 'national-socialism,' when Germans felt robbed between the wars (with 'Versailles'). We feel securer now than ever, so our educators can afford the passive introjection, at others expense, which we 'love.'

Emotions

Alice Miller (1980-83), the German psychoanalyst, etc. wrote on 'roots of violence':

"The parents, faultless while they were alive, are automatically promoted to angels upon their death, leaving a hell of self-reproach as a legacy to their children. Since it is unlikely that anyone these children-knew will confirm their earlier negative impressions of their parents, they must keep them to themselves and think themselves very wicked for having them. It would have been no different for the thirteen-year-old Hitler when he lost his father. (-) Who would have acknowledged to the boy his fathers (or his mother's/FK) cruelty and brutality then, if even today biographers still attempt to describe those regular beatings as (..well-meant). Since Klara, his mother extended her reverence for her husband even after his death to her pipes, we can scarcely imagine that her son would have been allowed to confide his true feelings to her" (or later anyone else/FK).

Dump the pride and gain the 'self-confidence' from kindergarten, accept humiliations, necessary self-control and 'hate of superego' (guilt), reality from then!

We can thus distinguish 2^{3/2} expected types of figurations: s(traight), g+l, and t+b and: 'outsiders' These (land-)markers we all distinguish are ambivalent, can change around, sometimes at will, be multi-poled or feigned. They are not 'groups' with 'rights' to be allocated to as such, because they are not static, sometimes malleable and always part of a game. The 'dialectics' of Hegel, Heidegger and Merton (1949-68) are reinvented from within ourselves, and typical of all human choices. All mammals tend to notice extremes better. We all had to make choices, always a gamble, including our oedipal ones: **There are 3 digital (1/0) and only one analog dimensions to 'figurations': Relative pride, ambivalence.**

Observe that: *The 'g+l' or gay and lesbian-orientated persons and 'groups' are more **ambivalent and more hierarchical** than their 'straight' counterparts, despite their 'humour' and railing over what they 'love' and that they dominate media 'narrative,' with first names use, wigs, and constant pouting (with teeth), as-if all contestants and their 'public' were all siblings. All relation-types usually 'espouse' an active and a passive partner. 'G+l's' are feared and resented as 'liberated,' mostly for their seeming promiscuity and 'happiness.'* (Horney K (1951) *The 'wowand Xfactor: huge, strong, delightful, is the same. Women are more competitive, think they are 'worse off.' The 2nd and 3rd worlds have more*

'l+g' combos/ singles than the 1st, even if suppressed by Judiciary, police, (church) and mosque. All we see is what it looks like; The 'l+g-' combo's were there before the 'straight' duos. 'Straight' evolved to be less hierarchical. 'L+g's' then, are the immanent upcoming heterosexuals of their future, that needs not be in 'the west.' 'West-' or 'northpeople' will not insure 'l+g's' from 'south' or 'east,' and that would not do them any good. This 'helping' with such 'good' intentions has caused many wars in the past. All 'we' can do is help 'them' with more commerce over there and more tolerance. They will have to 'fight-out' their ambivalence and repress it with their 'civilization,' as 'we' did. This applies increasingly to women in general, 2nd and 3rd world people and the other mammals. Hierarchy, or 'devotion,' which is diminishing fast, is what all long for, 'romance,' call it 'love.' We may conclude that the 'g+l' combo's and groups were there first, as ongoing love/hate fights, from which the now prevalent, less ambivalent, hierarchical and sadomasochist relations evolved. Consequently the 'l+g' combos are both more prevalent and more subdued than in 'the west.' The limit-less urge to be 'respected,' is a post-poned oedipal choice,' westerners cannot resolve. They 'want' more, or think they 'deserve' even more, than 'us' rich, zealous 'westerners.' Dichotomies? Interesting! Love, destiny, sociology, humanities, anthropology, etc.!

Do we ever grow up? Who is 'responsible?' Lies, lies and it's no-one in particular. In a 'democracy,' 'bosses' of utilities, can deny their clients services they've already paid taxes for, or admit others to compete for 'free.' That power has its limits, where the 'bosses' are always part of a sort of a 'court' of assumed bosses and/or their spouses, like party-members who obtained a civil position in the past, whose parties may have lost their mandate, i.e. in a municipal board. In the end, it will only be those in a 'court of military power,' a medical function, in schools, providers of shelter or police, who can threaten or extort the taxed to let them 'do' more, as we know from Elias introduction (1969): 'State-formation.' Are appointed 'bosses' in their 'courts' 'grown-up?' Not if they 'believe.' With J O y Gasset (1922), 'theatre,' movies and stories are only accepted as such when written from a recognised oedipal toddler scope, of which there are only 4, if dominant/active vs. deferent/passive is not counted as a 'typical relation,' because it always is, or male/female, which is a static given, not a choice. In Church only 2 are allowed and respected ('holy trinity'), or we wouldn't know what to expect

in our agreed 'belief' or social rules. We call 'scientific,' objective, or 'nonfiction' only so if they are made by one of them, lesbian or gay, i.e, one of the regular 'outsiders.' They are less than 1/5th of all, but 'growing,' if taken very broadly and include the 'manifest,' who don't qualify when their wish is 'only just' a 'figured' family. At puberty there is no such 'choice' anymore, except with a painstaking analysis, with no success or definitive 'choice' guaranteed and much insecurity of 'identity.' Judging from our youths dressing-habits, nowadays, with lots of color, accessories, torn (off) trousers and strange haircuts. The availability-signals and 'markers' still stay the same all over the world. Youngsters are more free to express and 'play on' sexual orientation or preference.

The question: What's in a name? gives: 'Claimants oedipal appearance as kings, queens or ('good') beggars; which it's all about in games of attainment, where ambivalence reigns. State, Church and Islam, are long-term solutions for our castration-complexes. Me too! Men incorporated their mothers complexes in their super-egos by her disciplining education.

Two biases are usually found in surveys:

1. **Survivor bias**, which 'advises' positively on policies: Firms that do not survive raised minimum wages are not likely to 'advise' against them; and 2. **twofold bias**, which erroneously advises against policies: Many 'markers' of 'groups' often coincide, like being 'white,' blond and blue-eyed. Deduction is digital choice by assumed rule, of which many seem to 'even-out,' but 'subjectivity' can never be all wrong and statistical 'proof' certainly can be. 'Homosexual' is a vague wording.

There is no such thing as black or white here. Everybody and at least the large majority think possible or 'true' what they 'like.' That's 'The Process:' We evolve and compete, in the dichotomies we always had to 'choose' from, to be 'understood.' It is not more state or conscience, but more consciousness of our own childhood memories and knowledge and acceptance of ours and those of others. Wishful thinking is what it usually is and we're all guilty as sin. Shame is gossip. All this dichotomous wishful thinking results in a vain hobby, call it a 'wish,' to make 'decisions' about anything we have little control of: 'power?' We're only prone to what hurt us before, and to its dichotomies, even if we have suppress(ed) those 'bad' memories with their associated names. And that's 'the News,' or, it is just considered as such and 'gets its value' at market.

To judge any ('in power'), we must compare our own private toddler (hi-)stories, when everything we see is Plato's 'appearance-reality,' or what we subconsciously crave for and want, which is not Aristotle 'matter-reality,' and which requires psycho-analytical self-inspection, for which the Freuds, Sigmund and Anna, gave us the tools a century ago, suppressed by our educators for laughing-stock reasons, of which all can be read, after the next Agatha Christie citations. In the mean-time we're still being extorted and given what we 'believe' we 'want,' by 'the services.' History does repeat itself. We wish dreams were common, but they're not that common. Girls and boys want different things. Sometimes you win, sometimes you lose, but you get to play at 'The 4-Clicks,' (styles), incl. 'the familiar 'us and them;'' But barking dogs don't bite and a miss is as good as a (s)mile. Here our 'sexual drive' surfaces, always shamefully and derisive.

Start by always distinguishing **threes**, or more opportunities as in 'The Holy Trinity,' and stop seeing only bifurcal extremes, that seem so lucid and 'brilliant.' There are so many less discriminating 'theories,' always! Sexes are sentenced to and against each-other in our herds, but luckily We have always had Religions and a host of ideologies, 'fake-news,' propaganda and 'parties-representatives,' vying for our 'support,' which buys them influence. Like it or not, beauty doesn't count for as much anymore, men are emancipating too. It is not just a theory, that even those neuroses (and frustration) have a function: Girls mother boys and force do's and don'ts, consciences, 'super-ego' in them, but not so much in their girls. Girls identify to do and want their mothers tasks and so 'help' to help her and anybody she might want to depend on her. So the men keep competing as to 'raise' the statuses of their moms and spouses and do so all their lives in 'love-' relations, which all women seem to 'love' (or prefer). This 'authoritative mechanism' spirals and keeps us doing whatever it takes to 'come,' 'get off' **and** have a 'home.' The youngsters in The North-West, seem to 'even-out' in this respect, but we must not assume men and women want the same at the same price. Women are again more outspoken (loud, 'confident,' superior), dress colourfully and revealingly and **act** regressively, or 'flirt' (eyeball), which 'charms' the guys. They're only fighting their untold 1 of 8 corners as they've always done. Actually they are just still hooked on their own consciences: The girls are 'fighting back,' now they are again expected to earn their own living (and housing). This is not new, women have had

to do this with their spouses absent, hunting or gathering, if (avail-)able. Men 'respect' this, but (l)earn to overcome their (female) consciences, whilst recognizing their interdependence, a liberation. These 'traditions,' or perks, do not change easily. Why should we give them up?: Elias 'process of individualization,' and interdependence, in the long term, the human condition, dynamically showing its source: The mutual development of the sexes. You and I worry about the 'morality' in this. We have: The 10 Commandments, 'State laws,' gossip, easy vengeance, as laughs, crying, shame, some control of each-other and some desperate people; Freuds never ending pleasure-unpleasure principle guiding our future worlds and making most 'activism' detrimental to some or all, but they know that. Adam Smiths 'invisible hand,' will make us all the work and make the most of it. The '8th click'-person (incl. the passive and the active), is the real 'victim' and is controlled and 'cared for' in the NW, at a terribly forbidding cost to the economies and its taxpayers, but the 'Nr. 8s,' or the '7s,' do not anymore always comply, they wear their typically yellow shirts, just as many of their 'helpers' do professionally and protest against these supposed 'helpers.' I'll not expand on all 'clicks,' as they are all well-known and often resented by the Nr. 1s, the bulk of the tax-payers in all societies. The civil-servant 'helpers,' often posing as 'volunteers,' **and** their 'clients,' all wearing yellow shirts in their 'demonstrations,' are a divided bunch, which explains the violent eruptions at rallies. 'They' have even succeeded in presenting themselves as 'politically correct' in the media, and in getting funded by the state. The supposedly benefitting 'outsiders' (silly, stranger, black, cripple, girl, 'mad,' etc.), are subjected to a very complicated and very 'legal' regime. They are certainly not free to enterprise or work where they want to or could or at what (De Swaan 1988). Everyone's 'click,' style or 'class' is defined by early identification choices, which were then gambled, switched and digital choices, to adhere to a few recognizable markers, like charitability, 'altruism,' and/or competing as a general tool to one's pleasure seeking and stress-avoiding strategy, which is then recognized, or not as female, male, good, bad or a bit of both. During our young lives we are advertising these 'choices,' also roles and 'beliefs,' which can stay volatile or 'plastic,' depending on the prides and their ambivalences of our own conscience and compliance. Villages, city-states, 'grew' from carers and their 'cared' in hostels or inns, on

through roads between cities. So did hospitals and the utilities we depend on. We control each-other by charming, attracting, withholding care and 'overwhelming' with 'confident' ordering about, to the 'choices' we make. Not everyone complies. You can fool some people sometimes, but not all the time: Dichotomies are not an inductive choice, they are named analyses.

* **Control-freaks we are**

We are used to being 'patronized,' us humans actually want to be (yelled at): We 'feel safe,' 'at ease' and 'looked after,' by (mostly female) control freaks, as they are familiar (our mothers) and what we craved for as toddlers. Recognize this? Any addiction is unconscious craving for relief from our suppressed, feelingly remembered directives from our keeper, then. All's fair in Love, but not as hierarchical, with every one-in-eight a stylish 'click.' Wished for parent(s), yet still we 'want out.' Everyone has their traumas and losses, if long 'forgotten.' No reason(n for 'shame,' except for the gossip, which we 'don't do:' Guilt from loss exists, as the Freuds observed. Accept the pig in the poke you are, me too, be proud, there's always some pleasure to be gained. Beware of the always wishful 'truth,' do not flee from it. Give me the Christian treatment anytime, it's good for you, supposedly harmless and if it hadn't been invented it would be, which it is, everywhere. The analytic, dichotomic and bipartisan or disectic approach to any question or curiosity is the most primitive intellectual tool with a phylogenetic and inherited origin. Nature and consequently a lot of nurture too, in our case. It's relatively coarse and requires a 'theory,' guess or gamble, i.e. the 'framework,' angle or dimension of approach, to execute. We are mostly raised by mothers and female carers and that turns out to be a burden on the boys as guardians of their carers 'status,' 'respect' or freedom from 'shame.' They still consider them a part of themselves and carriers of their 'status,' which seems low to them. Question of 'deserving' better. This 'pride-thing' keeps everybody fighting and surviving. Dichotomies tend to specify and average out communicated observations, if the analyzed 'facts' (of life) are at all remembered. No need to begrudge the forgotten facts, or the 'theories' invented to sustain them. Only the wished-for 'goodies' really count, even if (funny) 'bad news' and 'pride.' What if we did not have our proud and caring women, and their figuration, the largest of all? Created dichotomies are our named 'communities' for survival in all competitions. 'Wrong' ones get corrected. Dichotomies

are its markers with distinguishing ‘theories,’ that preserve society and thus they are figured.

Descriptive ‘Conclusion’

Created dichotomies are supposed and wished, but also real survival, in these ‘supposed’ competitions; ‘wrong-,’ choice ones usually get corrected, or are ‘relearned,’ but some are retained obsessively. They are **the traditions**, with names; often of territories, ‘homes’ and places, or ‘local’ heroes or ‘icons.’ They are also our childish and gossipy ‘figurations’ and can be collected in larger, more abstract ones, like competitive clubs, nation-states or religions. These dichotomies carry a negative or positive valuation, i.e.: praise/blame, idylle/scandal, alive/dead, love/hate, white/ black (skin), left/ right, huge/tiny, abstract/nitty-gritty, digital/analog, hard-working/lazy, open/closed, wow/disgust, hairy/bald, ugly/beautiful (‘sexy’), awed/derised, winner/loser, ‘sport’/addict, icon/ nobody, ‘on-top’/hurt, green/red, black/white, expensive/cheap, classy/dog, honored/despised, decent/shabby, right/wrong, in-/credible, wicked/boring, respected/loathed, genuine/fake (markers), ‘dis-/obeyed’ (marker-valuation), reticent/ gung-ho, compliant/maverick, introvert/extravert, un-/tidy, mighty/humble, victim/-or and fe-/male, all closely associated with ‘self-esteem.’ They are perceived as figurative rules and markers, often ambivalent and extreme in valuation, in a constant struggle, when gossiped, even if we do know better, there’s probable acception!

These conditional symbolic markers, for other dichotomic figurations, which are adopted and ‘pimped’ by ourselves, sometimes only pretending to be ‘established,’ or ‘respected: Essential for wannabees and ‘how one/it looks,’ to others. Moreover, by associating a negatively pimped dichotomy to another more positive one, or vice versa, it is possible, if pimped enough, to assign or swap the second valuation for the first in the supposed ‘general’ perception. A ‘bad’ figuration for a good or not unknown one, or giving a good(-enough-) one a ‘bad name,’ while raising ones ‘own’ assumed figuration-standard or status within.

It is perceived as ‘rule of law,’ by many and a way to exert power over and to ‘discipline’ others, debunk, ‘throw them out,’ or to ‘keep them within’ and to promote one in/of ones figuration. By default we’re always biased when part of a ‘figured’ culture. With the conditional nickname, people identify ‘gut-feeling,’ which is kept ‘unconscious’ or ‘secret’, even denied and not said aloud, but demonstrated and communicated

clearly nonetheless by pouts (There are so many, it’s a language in itself, either ‘open’ or ‘closed’), to nod, wink, frown, crackle, growl, nudge, gesticulate, point (/no), hand-wave, shrug, ‘kick’, ‘roll’ hands-in the air, thumb nose, point, gasp, look at, scratch, roll eyes, breathe-talk, smile (anticipated glory or threat), bow, shake, pirouette, crooked pout, showing off the size of something and making a humble or victorious impression accordingly; and all the gutterals mentioned on p.18, etc, etc; Women, again mostly, but always denied, and men too, that do not have a clue. People depend emotionally on conditional obsessions in the long-term. ‘Owned’ figurations are considered ‘life-savers,’ keepers of competition-parties, our strength and ‘togetherness,’ and are also our ‘tools’ for ‘clever’ communicators or ‘snitches.’ We are so suggestible along these ‘scopes,’ which are usually no more than a handful of loyally kept dichotomy-theories with their ‘added value(s), like The Ten Commandments.’ Only when dealing with M.D.-s or lawyers and maybe some hobby-figurations and, last but not least: lover-pairs (‘a group of two’ and ‘hypnosis,’ by S. Freud/’21-2), these ‘rules-of-thumb’ can get legion and very complicated to analyse.

Our ongoing struggle.

In the mass-media, it’s how the ‘cookie crumbles,’ it’s entertaining to most of us, interdependently not feeling ‘alone’ or ‘ashamed’ (being gossiped about), in our ‘herds’ and supposed ‘communities,’ a term often misused by statisticians and mass-media analysts, as-if they are actors or representatives of ‘them,’ although ambitious ‘leaders’ may well act as such and get away with it, or be ‘blamed’ for its ‘faults,’ in a recurring ‘blame-game.’ In a figuration ‘in crisis’ (unemployment, plague), this rule/ marker-dependency may get so widespread, that people massively feel afraid of losing their ‘respect,’ or ‘home,’ and unconsciously in retrospect and fantasy, being castrated (again) and becoming more prone to marker-redirecting or manipulation by others introducing and pimping ‘new rules,’ associated dichotomies and/or values. This can and does thus provide primary or secondary illness-gain for those benefit in ‘influence’, by keeping a figurative balance, as in the neuroses the Freuds (S and A), described for individuals, and persons as soon as they are ‘identified.’ We are all ‘proud’ of something; it is expected of us: Divide and rule (eat, caress, fuck). We are held responsible.’ and we do all this, sometimes consciously planned, but mostly not, Deo Volente! The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog;

and: 'take the lead,' or 'charge,' by introducing a competition, figuration or 'theme.' Try it with a bunch of kids and start by asking them a question. Do they answer? We're all prone to this 'intimidation.' (sic!)

The dichotomies of 'the sexes' are the largest, most prominent, but also mostly denied 'identity.' As a figuration, though and as a 'marker,' it is considered a legitimization (or v.v.), in most popular 'clubs.' It must be an extreme, or undivided 'name.' You're someone or you don't exist and are likely not to be 'tolerated.' All this, provided one 'tries' to be 'respected,' or 'belong' and defers to the supposed 'named' rules, at the risk of being contested mostly by women, in the 'female role,' when they 'take charge;' easy.., or if only by their interdependent, longing and deferring 'spouse-roles,' doing them a 'favor,' showing their 'admiration.' Don't let your people down, only likely enemies, but be praised, when you feel shame or loss.

It's only human but no different than in any herd. Oh there's always discussion, and fun about these situations of being 'recognized,' or not. In 'our' plague/pandemic, one must show deference too and is legitimately surveyed by (mostly) women, as it's their 'prerogative'. We've all been disci-

Muslimas at Church-bazaar, searching for clothes to wear. Look at their pouts: Desire, excitement, guilt?



ADDENDUM I: **Christie Agatha**

(1955) **Hickory Dickory Dock**(p43)

He found her in an avuncular manner.

'Well, there's no need to worry anymore.' Rising to his feet he drew Celia's hand through his arm and looked sternly at Mrs. Hubbard.

'I hope now,' he said, 'that there'll be no more foolish talk of calling the police. Nothing's been stolen of any real worth, and what has been taken Celia will return.'

'I can't return the bracelet and the powder compact,' said Celia anxiously. 'I pushed them down a gutter. But I'll buy new ones.'

'And the stethoscope?' said Poirot. 'Where did you put that?'

Celia flushed. 'I never took any stethoscope. What could I want with a silly old stethoscope?' Her flush deepened. 'And it wasn't me who spilt ink all over Elizabeth's papers. I'd never do a malicious thing like

plined, once, by our mothers, 'them.' It seems to be their last strand, when they cannot rely on automatic respect for 'beauty' or their laughter, these trying days, when nobody bothers about the economy, productivity. Money is printed digitally nowadays and who do you think you are? Charisma, authority?

Guilty feelings are real or supposed losses, like the 'castration' of women, which they are often teased or derided with. The men, of-course, need encouragement (not laughter) too, from and like women, to make shure they will not be 'castrated' (again).

How 'possible is all this? Where's roof? I promise, I've seen/heard it all in my 69 years on the planet and: Figurations ARE old identifications and dichotomies, v.v; always!

We name anything we could 'own' and wish for. The name spreads and according to our wishes and a language emerges. 'Knowledge' is power. We analyze and 'ask' for a cause! Both your home-made dichotomy AND 'theory.' If associated long-enough AND tested for nonsense, some practical truth might emerge.

Thanks and congratulations for bearing with me, Frits Kaal and Kaalboek at Academia.edu

that.'

'Yet you cut and slashed miss Hobhouse's scarf, mademoiselle.'

Celia looked uncomfortable. She said rather uncertainly: 'That was different. I mean – Valerie didn't mind.'

'And the rucksack?'

'Oh I didn't cut that up. That was just temper.'

Poirot took out the list he had copied from miss Hubbard's little book. 'Tell me,' he said, 'and this time it must be the truth. What are you or are you not responsible for of these happenings?'

Celia glanced down the list and her answer came at once. 'I don't know anything about the rucksack, or the electric bulbs, or boracic or bath-salts, and the ring was just a mistake. When I realized it was valuable I returned it.'

'I see.'

'Because really I didn't want to be dishonest. It was

only—'

'Only what?'

A faintly wary look came into Celia's eyes. 'I don't know -really I don't. I'm all mixed up.'

Colin cut in a preemptory manner: 'I'll be thankful if you'll not catechize her. I can promise you that there will be no recurrence of this business. From now on I'll definitely make myself responsible for her.'

'Oh, Colin, you *are* good to me.'

'I'd like you to tell me a great deal about yourself, Celia.

Your early home life for instance. Did your father and mother get on well together?'

'Oh no, it was *awful* -at home ---'

'Precisely. And ---'

Mrs. Hubbard cut in. She spoke with the voice of authority. 'That will do now, both of you. I'm glad Celia, that you've come and owned up. You've caused a great deal of worry and anxiety, though, and you ought to be ashamed of yourself. But I'll say this. I'll accept your word that you didn't spill ink deliberately on Elizabeth's notes. I don't believe you'd do a thing like that. Now take yourself off, you and Colin. I've had enough of you both for this evening.'

As the door closed behind them, Mrs. Hubbard drew a deep breath. 'Well,' she said, 'what do you think of that?'

A twinkle in Hercule Poirot's eye. He said: 'I think - that we have assisted at a love scene - modern style.'

Mrs. Hubbard made an ejaculation of disapproval.

('nh'okh')

'*Autres temps, autres moeurs*,' murmured Poirot. 'In my young days the young men lent the girls books on theosophy or discussed Maeterdink's "Bluebird." All was sentiment and high ideas. Nowadays it is the maladjusted lives and the complexes which bring boy and a girl together.'

'All such nonsense,' said Mrs. Hubbard.

Poirot dissented. 'No it is not nonsense. The underlying principles are sound enough - but when one is an earnest young researcher like Colin one sees nothing *but* complexes and victims unhappy home life.'

'Celia's father died when she was four years old,'

said Mrs. Hubbard. 'And she's had a very agreeable childhood with a nice but stupid mother.'

'Ah, but she is wise enough not to say so to the young McNabb! She will say what he wants to hear. She is very much in love.'

'Do you believe all this hooy, M. Poirot?'

'I do not believe that Celia had a Cinderella complex or that she stole things without knowing what she was doing. I think she took the risk of stealing unimportant trifles with the object of attracting the attention of earnest Colin McNabb - in which object she has been successful. Had she remained a pretty shy ordinary girl he might never have looked at her. In my

opinion,' said Poirot, 'a girl is entitled to attempt desperate measures to get her man.'

'I shouldn't have thought she had the brains to think it up,' said Mrs. Hubbard. Poirot did not reply. He frowned. Mrs. Hubbard went on: 'So the whole thing's been a mare's nest! I really do apologise, Mr. Poirot, for taking up your time over such a trivial business. Anyway, all's well that ends well.'

'No, no.' Poirot shook his head. 'I do not think we are at the end yet. We have cleared out of the way something rather trivial that was at the front of the picture. But there are things that are not explained; and me, I have the impression that we have here something serious - really serious.'

Mrs. Hubbard's face clouded over again. 'Oh, Mr. Poirot, do you really think so?'

'It is my impression ... I wonder Madame, If I could speak to miss Patricia Lane. I would like to examine the ring that was stolen.' 'Why, of course, Mr. Poirot. I'll go down and send her up to you. I want to speak to Len Bateson about something.'

Patricia Lane came in shortly afterwards with an inquiring look on her face.

'I am so sorry to disturb you, Miss Lane.'

'Oh, that's all right, I wasn't busy. Mrs. Hubbard said you wanted to see my ring.' She slipped it off her finger and held it out to him. 'It's quite a large diamond really, but of course it's an old-fashioned setting. It was my mother's engagement ring.'

Poirot, who was examining the ring, nodded his head.

'She is alive still, your mother?'

'No, both my parents are dead..'

'That is sad.'

'Yes. They were both very nice people but somehow I was never quite so close to them as I ought to have been. One regrets that, afterwards. My mother wanted a frivolous pretty daughter, a daughter who was fond of clothes and social things. She was very disappointed when I took up archeology.'

'You have always been a serious turn of mind?'

'I think so, really one feels life is so short one ought really to be doing something worth-while.'

Poirot looked at her thoughtfully. Patricia Lane was, he guessed, in her early thirties. Apart from a smear of lipstick, carelessly applied, she wore no make-up. Her mouse-coloured hair was combed back from her face and arranged without artifice. Her quite pleasant Blue eyes looked at you seriously through glasses.

'No allure, *bon Dieu*,' said Poirot to himself with feeling.

'and her clothes! What is it they say? Dragged through a hedge backwards? *Ma foi*, that expresses it exactly!' He was disapproving. He found Patricia's well-bred unaccented tones wearisome to the ear.

'She is intelligent and cultured, this girl,' he said to himself, 'and, alas, every year she will grow more boring! —' In old age his mind darted for a fleeting

moment to the memory of the Countess Vera Rossakoff. What exotic splendor there, even in decay!

These girls nowadays — ‘But that is because I grow old,’ said Poirot.

‘Even this excellent girl may appear a veritable Venus to some man.’ But he doubted that. (-p52)

(p. 181-) ‘Yes,’ said Poirot, ‘I thought so.’ ‘And now — ‘I will come to the purpose of my call to you. You are the solicitors who drew-up Arthur Stanley’s will. You are, perhaps, his executor.’

‘Arthur Stanley had a son. The son quarreled with his father at the time of his mother’s death. Quarreled with him and left home. He even went so far as to change his name.’

‘That I didn’t know, what’s he calling himself?’

‘We shall come to that. Before we do I am going to make an assumption. If I am right, perhaps you will admit the fact. I think that Arthur Stanley left a sealed letter with you, to be opened under certain circumstances or after his death.’

‘Really, Poirot! In the middle ages you would certainly have been burnt at the stake. How can you possibly know the things you do?’

‘I am right then? I think there was an alternative in the letter. Its contents were either to be destroyed — or you were to take a certain course of action.’ He paused, the other did not speak. ‘*Bon Dieu*,’ Poirot said, with alarm, ‘you have not already destroyed —?’ He broke off in relief as M. Endicott slowly shook his head in negation.

‘We never act in haste,’ he said reprovingly. ‘I have to make full inquiries — to satisfy myself absolutely —’ He paused, ‘This matter,’ he said severely, ‘is highly confidential. Even to you Poi-rot.’ He shook his head. ‘And if I gave you good cause why you should speak?’

‘That is up to you. I cannot conceive how you can possibly know anything at all that is relevant to the matter that we are discussing.’

‘I do not *know* — (-but-) If I guess correctly —?’

‘Highly unlikely,’ said Mr. Endicott, with a wave of his hand.

Poirot drew a deep breath. ‘Very well then. It is in my mind that your instructions are as follows. In the event of Sir Arthurs death, you are to trace his son Nigel, to ascertain where he is living and how and particularly whether he is or has been engaged in any criminal activity whatsoever.’

(A huge amount of dichotomic guesses with an analogous end!//FK)

ADDENDUM UFreud, Anna (1935-6) The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, Ch.9 Identification with the Aggressor

It is comparatively easy to discover the defense mechanisms to which the ego habitually resorts, so long as each is employed separately and only in con-

flict with some specific danger. When we find denial, we know that it is a reaction to external danger; when repression takes place, the ego is struggling with instinctual stimuli. The strong outward resemblance between inhibition and ego restriction makes it less certain whether these processes are part of an external or an internal conflict. The matter is still more intricate when defensive measures are combined when the same mechanism is employed sometimes against an internal and some-times against an external force. We have an excellent illustration of both these complications in the process of identification. Since it is one of the factors in the development of the superego, it contributes to the mastery of instinct. But, as I hope to show in what follows, There are occasions when it combine with other mechanisms to form one of the ego’s most potent weapons in its dealings with external objects which arouse anxiety. August Aichorn relates that, when he was giving advice on a child guidance committee, he had to deal with the case of a boy at an elementary school, who was brought to him because of a habit of making faces. The master complained that the boy’s behavior, when he was blamed or reprovved, was quite abnormal. On such occasions he made faces which caused the whole class to burst out laughing. The masters view was that either the boy was consciously making fun of him or else the twitching of his face must be due to some kind of tic. His report was at once corroborated, for the boy began to make faces during the consultation, but, when master, pupil and psychologist were together, the situation was explained. Observing the two, Aichorn saw that the boy’s grimaces were simply a caricature of the angry expression of the teacher and that , when he had to face a scolding by the latter, he tried to master his anxiety by involuntarily imitating him. The boy identified himself with the teachers anger and copied his expression, though the imitation was not recognized. Through his grimaces he was assimilating himself to or identifying himself with the dreaded external object.

My readers will remember the case of the little girl who tried by means of magic gestures to get over the mortification associated with her penis envy. This child was purposely and consciously making use of a mechanism to which the boy resorted involuntarily. At home she was afraid to cross the hall in the dark, because she had a dread of seeing ghosts. However, she hit on a device which enabled her to do it: she would run across the hall, making all sorts of peculiar gestures as she went. Before long, she triumphantly told her little brother the secret of how she had got over her anxiety. “there’s no need to be afraid in the hall,” she said, “you just have to pretend that you’re the ghost who might meet you.”

This shows that her magic gestures represented the movements she imagined ghosts would make.

We might be inclined to regard this kind of conduct as an idiosyncrasy in the two children whose cases I have quoted, but it is really one of the most natural and most widespread modes of behavior on the part of the primitive ego and has long been familiar to those who have made a study of primitive methods of invoking and exorcising spirits and of primitive religious ceremonies. Moreover, there are many children's games in which through the metamorphosis of the subject into a dreaded object anxiety is converted into pleasurable security. Here is another angle from which to study the games of impersonation which children love to play.

Now the physical imitation of an antagonist represents the assimilation of only one part of a composite anxiety experience. We learn from observation that the other elements also have to be mastered. The six-year old patient to whom I have several times alluded had to pay a series of visits to a dentist. At first everything went spleen didly; the treatment did not hurt him and he was triumphant and made merry over the idea of anyone's being afraid of the dentist. But there came a time when my little patient arrived at my house in an extremely bad temper. The dentist had just hurt him. He was cross and unfriendly and vented his feelings on the things in my room. His first victim was a piece of India rubber. He wanted me to give it to him and, when I refused, he took a knife and tried to cut it in half. Next, he coveted a large ball of string. He wanted me to give him that too, and painted me a vivid picture of what a good leash it would make for his animals. When I refused to give him the whole ball, he took his knife again and secured a large piece of the string. But he did not use it; instead, he began, after a few minutes to cut it into tiny pieces. Finally, he threw away the string too, turned his attention to some pencils, and went on indefatigably sharpening them, breaking off the points, and sharpening them again. It would not be correct to say that he was playing at "dentists." There was no actual impersonation of the dentist. The child was identifying himself not with the aggressor but with his aggression.

On another occasion this little boy came to me just after he had had a slight accident. He had been joining in an outdoor game at school and had run full tilt against the fist of the games master, which the latter happened to be holding up in front of him. My little patient's lip was bleeding and his face tear-stained, and he tried to conceal both facts by putting up his hand as a screen. I endeavored to comfort and reassure him. He was in a woebegone condition when he left me, but next day he appeared holding himself very erect and dressed in full armor. On his head he wore a military cap and he had a toy sword at his side and a pistol in his hand. When he saw my surprise at this transformation, he simply said, "I just wanted to have these things on when I was playing with you."

He did not, however, play, instead, he sat down and wrote a letter to his mother: "Dear Mummy, please, please, please send me the pocketknife you promised me and don't wait till Easter!" Here again we cannot say that, in order to master the anxiety experience of the previous day, he was impersonating the teacher with whom he had collided. Nor, in this instance, was he imitating the latter's aggression. The weapons and armor, being manly attributes, evidently symbolized the teacher's strength and, like the attributes of the father in the animal fantasies, helped to identify with the adult and so to defend him against the narcissistic mortification or actual mishaps.

The examples which I have so far cited illustrate a process with which we are quite familiar. A child introjects some characteristic of an anxiety object and so assimilates an anxiety experience which he has just undergone. Here, the mechanism of identification or introjection is combined with a second important mechanism. By impersonating the aggressor, assuming his attributes or imitating his aggression, the child transforms himself from the person threatened into the person who makes the threat. In "*Beyond the Pleasure Principle*" (1920, Freud S) the significance of this change from the passive to the active role as a means of assimilating unpleasant or traumatic experiences in infancy is discussed in detail: "If the doctor looks down a child's throat or carries out some small operation, we may be quite sure that the frightening experiences will be the subject of the next game; but we must not in that connection overlook the fact that there is a yield of pleasure from another source. As the child passes over from the passivity of the experience to the activity in the game, he hands the disagreeable experience to one of his playmates and in this way revenges himself on a substitute. (p.17).

What is true of play is equally true of other behavior in children. In the cases of the boy who made faces against and the little girl who practiced magic, it is not clear what finally became of the threat with which they identified themselves, but in the boy's ill temper the aggression taken over from the dentist and the games master was directed against the world at large. This process of transformation strikes us as more curious when the anxiety relates not to some event in the past but to something expected in the future. I remember a boy who had the habit of furiously pulling the bell of the children's home where he lived. As soon as the door was opened, he would scold the housemaid loudly for being so slow and not listening for the bell. In the interval between pulling the bell and flying into a rage he experienced anxiety lest he should be reproved for his lack of consideration in ringing so loudly. He upbraided the servant before she had time to complain of his conduct. The vehemence with which he scolded her—a prophylactic measure—indicated the intensity of his anxiety. The ag-

gressiveness turned against the actual person from whom he expected aggression, not against some substitute. The reversal of roles of attacker and attacked was in this case carried to its logical conclusion. Jenny Waelder has given a vivid picture of this process in a five-year old boy whom she treated. When his analysis was about to touch on the material connected with masturbation and the fantasies associated with it, this little boy, who was actually shy and inhibited, became fiercely aggressive. His habitually passive attitude disappeared and there was no trace left of his feminine characteristics. In the analytic hour he pretended to be a roaring lion and attacked the analyst. He carried a rod about with him and played at “Krampus” (a devil/AF), i.e., he laid about him with it on the stairs, in his own house, and in my room. His grandmother and mother complained that he tried to strike them in the face. His mother’s uneasiness reached climax when he took to brandishing kitchen knives. Analysis showed that the child’s aggressiveness could not be construed as indicating that some inhibition on his instinctual impulses had been lifted. The release of his masculine tendencies was still a long way off. He was simply suffering from anxiety. The bringing into consciousness and the necessary confession of his former and recent sexual activities aroused in him the expectation of punishment. According to his experience, grown-up people were angry when they discovered a child indulging in such practices. They shouted at him, checked him with a box on the ears or beat him with a rod; perhaps they would even cut off some part of him with a knife. When my little patient assumed the active role, roaring like a lion and laying about him with the rod and the knife, he was dramatizing and forestalling the punishment which he feared. He had introjected the aggression of the adults in whose eyes he felt guilty and, having exchanged the passive for the active part, he directed his own aggressive acts against those same people. Every time that he found himself on the verge of communicating to me what he regarded as dangerous material, his aggressiveness increased. But directly (after /FK) his forbidden thoughts and feelings broke through and had been discussed and interpreted, he felt no further need of the “Krampus” rod, which till then he had constantly carried about with him, and he left it at my house. His compulsion to beat other people disappeared simultaneously with his expectation of being beaten. In the “identification with the aggressor” we recognize a by no means uncommon stage in the normal development of the superego.

When the two boys whose cases I have just described, who identified themselves with their elders’ threats of punishment, they were taking an important step toward the formation of that institution: they were internalizing other people’s criticism of their behavior.

When a child constantly repeats this process of internalization and projects the qualities of those responsible for him, making their characteristics and opinions his own, he is providing material from which the superego may take shape. But at this point children are not quite whole-hearted in acknowledging that institution. Internalized criticism is not yet immediately transformed to self-criticism. As we have seen in the examples, it is dissociated from the child’s own activity and turned back on the outside world. By means of a defensive process, identification with the aggressor is succeeded by an assault on the outside world.

In certain phases of resistance a young patient used bitterly to reproach her analyst with being secretive. She complained that the analyst was too reserved and she would torment her with questions on personal matters and be miserable when she received no answer. Then the reproaches would cease only to begin after a short time, always in the same stereotyped and, as it were, automatic fashion. In this case again we can detect two phases in the psychic process. From time to time, because of a certain inhibition which prevented her speaking out, the patient herself consciously suppressed some very private material. She knew that she was thereby breaking the fundamental rule of analysis and she expected the analyst to rebuke her. She introjected the fantasied rebuke and, adopting an active role, applied the accusation to the analyst.

Her phases of aggression exactly coincided in time with her phases of secretiveness. She criticized analyst for the very fault of which she herself was guilty. Her own secretive behavior was perceived reprehensible on the analyst’s part. (-).

These three (*two/FK*) examples have given us some idea of the origin of this particular phase in the development of function of the superego.

Even when the external criticism has been introjected, the threat of punishment and the offense committed have not been connected up in the patient’s mind. The moment the criticism is internalized, the offense is externalized. This means that the mechanism of identification with the aggressor is supplemented by another defensive measure, namely the projection of guilt.

An ego which with the aid of the defense mechanism of projection develops along this particular line introjects the authorities, to whose criticism it is exposed and incorporates them in the superego. It is then able to project impulses outward. Its intolerance of other people precedes its severity to itself. It learns what is regarded as blameworthy but protects itself by this defense mechanism from unpleasant self-criticism. (-)

Ch. 10 *A form of altruism*

The effect of the mechanism of projection is to break the connection between the ideational representatives of the dangerous instinctual impulses and the ego. In

this it resembles most closely the process of repression. Other defensive processes, such as displacement, reversal or turning around upon the self, affect the instinctual process itself: repression and projection merely prevent its being perceived. In repression the objectionable idea is thrust back into the id, while in projection it is displaced into the outside world. Another point in which projection resembles repression is that it is not associated with any particular anxiety situation but may be motivated equally by objective anxiety, superego anxiety, and instinctual anxiety. Writers of the English school of psychoanalysis maintain that in the earliest months of life, before any repression has taken place, the infant already projects its first aggressive impulses and that this process is of crucial importance for the picture which the child forms of the world around him and the way in which his personality develops.

At all events the use of the mechanism of projection is quite natural to the ego of little children throughout the earliest period of development. They employ it as a means of repudiating their own activities and wishes when these become dangerous and of laying the responsibility for them at the door of some external agent. A "strange child," an animal, even inanimate objects are all equally useful to the infantile ego for the purpose of disposing of its own faults. It is normal for it constantly to get rid of prohibited impulses and wishes in this way, handing them over in full measure to other people. If these wishes entail punishment by authorities, the ego puts forward as whipping boys the persons upon whom it has projected them; If the projection was prompted by a sense of guilt, instead of criticizing itself, it accuses others. In either case it dissociates itself from its proxies and is excessively intolerant in its judgment of them.

The mechanism of projection disturbs our human relations when we project our jealousy and attribute to other people our aggressive acts. But it may work in another way as well, enabling us to form valuable positive attachments and so to consolidate our relations with one another. This normal and less conspicuous form of projection might be described as "altruistic surrender" of our own instinctual impulses in favor of other people. The following is an example of what I mean:

A young governess reported in her analysis that, as a child, she was possessed by two ideas: she wanted to have beautiful clothes and a number of children. In her fantasies she was almost obsessively absorbed in picturing the fulfillment of these wishes. But there were a great many other things she demanded as well: she wished to have and to do everything better than her much older playmates had and did—indeed, she wanted to do everything better than they and to be admired for her cleverness. Her everlasting cry of "Me too!" was a nuisance to her elders. It was charac-

teristic of her desires that they were at once urgent and insatiable.

What chiefly struck one about her as an adult was her unassuming character and the modesty of the demands which she made on life. When she came to be analyzed, she was unmarried and childless and her dress was rather shabby and inconspicuous. She showed little sign of envy or ambition and would compete with other people only if she were forced to by external circumstances. One's first impression was that, as so often happens, she had developed in exactly the opposite direction from what her childhood would have led one to expect and that her wishes had been repressed and replaced in consciousness by reaction formations (unobtrusiveness instead of a craving for admiration and unassumingness instead of ambition). One would have expected to find that the repression was caused by a prohibition of sexuality, extending from her exhibitionistic impulses and the desire for children to the whole of her instinctual life.

But there were features in her behavior at the time when I knew her which contradicted this impression.

When her life was examined in more detail, it was clear that her original wishes were affirmed in a manner which seemed scarcely possible if repression had taken place. The repudiation of her own sexuality did not prevent her from taking an affectionate interest in the love life of her women friends and colleagues. She was an enthusiastic matchmaker and many love affairs were confided to her. Although she took no trouble about her own dress, she displayed a lively interest in her friends' clothes. Childless herself, she was devoted to other people's children, as was indicated by her profession. She might be said to display an unusual degree of concern about her friends' having pretty clothes, being admired, and having children. Similarly, in spite of her own retiring behavior, she was ambitious for the men whom she loved and followed their careers with the utmost interest. It looked as if her own life had been emptied of interests and wishes; up to the time of her analysis it was almost entirely uneventful. Instead of exerting herself to achieve any aims of her own, she expended all her energy in sympathizing with the experiences of people she cared for. She lived in lives of other people, instead of having her own. The analysis of her infantile relations to her mother and father revealed clearly the nature of her inner transformation which had taken place. Her early renunciation of instinct had resulted in the formation of an exceptionally severe superego, which made it impossible for her to gratify her own wishes. Her penis wish, with its offshoots in the shape of ambitious masculine fantasies, was prohibited, so too her feminine wish for children and the desire to display herself, naked or in beautiful clothes, to

her father, and to win his admiration. But these impulses were not repressed: she found some proxy in the outside world to serve as a repository for each of them. The vanity of her women friends provided, as it were, a foothold for the projection of her own vanity, while her libidinal wishes and ambitious fantasies were likewise deposited in the outside world. She projected her prohibited instinctual impulses onto other people, just as the patients did whose cases I quoted in the last chapter. The only difference lay in the way in which these impulses were subsequently dealt with. The patient did not dissociate herself from her proxies but identified herself with them. She showed her sympathy with their wishes and felt that there was an extraordinary strong bond between the people and herself. Her superego, which condemned a particular instinctual impulse when it related to her own ego, was surprisingly tolerant of it in other people. She gratified her own instincts by sharing in the gratification of others, employing for this purpose the mechanism of projection and identification. The retiring attitude which the prohibition of her impulses caused her to adopt where she herself was concerned vanished when it was a question of fulfilling the same wishes after they had been projected unto someone else. The surrender of her instinctual impulses in favor of other people had thus an egoistic significance, but in her efforts to gratify the impulses of others. Her behavior could only be called altruistic. (-)

Any number of cases similar to those which I have quoted can be observed in everyday life, when once our attention has been called to this combination of projection and identification for purposes of defense. For instance, a young girl, who had scruples of conscience about marrying herself, did all she could to encourage her sisters engagement. A patient, who suffered from obsessional inhibitions in spending any money on herself, had no hesitation in spending lavishly on presents. Another patient, who was prevented by anxiety from carrying out her plans for travel, was quite unexpectedly pressing in her advice to her friends to do so. In all these cases the patients identification of herself with a sister, a friend, or the recipient of a gift betrayed itself by a sudden warm sense of a bond between them, which lasted as long as her own wish was being vicariously fulfilled. Jokes about "matchmaking old maids" and "meddlesome onlookers, for whom no stakes are too high," are perennial. The surrender of one's own wishes to another person and the attempt to secure their fulfillment thus vicariously are comparable to the interest and pleasure with which one watches a game in which one has no stake ('sports'/FK).

This defensive process, serves two purposes. On the one hand it enables subject to take a friendly interest in the gratification of other peoples' instincts. And so, indirectly and in spite of the superegos' prohibition,

to gratify his own, while, on the other, it liberates the inhibited activity and aggression primarily designed to secure the fulfillment of the instinctual wishes in their original relation to himself.

The patient who could not lift a finger to gratify her own oral impulses could feel indignant at the mothers' refusal to indulge her child, i.e., at oral renunciation imposed on someone else. The daughter-in-law who was prohibited from claiming the rights of the dead wife, felt it permissible to defend the symbolic right of another with the full force of her aggression. An employee who would never venture to ask for a raise in salary for herself suddenly besieged the manageress that one of her fellow workers should have her rights. Analysis of such situations shows that the defensive process has its origin in the infantile conflict with parental authority about some form of instinctual gratification. Aggressive impulses against the mother, prohibited so long as it is a question of fulfilling the subjects' own wishes, are given rein when the wishes are ostensibly those of someone else. The most familiar representative of this kind of person is the public benefactor, who with the utmost aggressiveness and energy demands money from one set of people in order to give it to another ('socialists'/FK). Perhaps the most extreme instance is that of the assassin who, in the name of the oppressed, murders the oppressor. The object against which the liberated aggression is directed is invariably the representative of the authority which imposed the renunciation of instinct in infancy.

Various factors determine the selection of the object in favor of whom instinctual impulses are surrendered. Possibly the perception of the prohibited impulse in another person is sufficient to suggest to the ego that here is an opportunity for projection. In the case of the patient, who assisted in disposal of her mother-in-law's property, the fact that the vicarious figure was not a near relation was a guarantee of the harmlessness of the wish which, when cherished, by the patient mastering anxieties that belong to it more strongly than the boy does. Very often, too, she adopts the masculine mode of mastering anxiety. We shall see in the next chapter why it is more difficult for her to establish the feminine position than it is for the boy to establish the male one, as herself, represented by her incestuous impulses. In most cases the substitute has once been the object of envy. The altruistic governess in my first example displaced her ambitious fantasies onto her men friends and her libidinal wishes unto her women friends. The former succeeded to her affection for her father, and her big brother, both of whom had been the object of her penis envy, while the latter represented the sister upon whom, at a rather later period of childhood, that envy was displaced into envy of her beauty. The patient felt

that the fact that she was a girl prevented her from achieving her ambition and, at the same time, that she was not even a pretty enough girl really to be attractive to men. In her disappointment with herself she displaced her wishes onto objects who she felt were better qualified to fulfill them. Her men friends were vicariously to achieve for her in professional life what she could never achieve, and the girls who were better looking than herself were to do the same in the sphere of love. Her altruistic surrender was a method of overcoming her narcissistic mortification. This surrender of instinctual wishes to an object better qualified to fulfill them often determines the relation of a girl to some man who she chooses to represent her — to the detriment of any true object relation. On the grounds of this “altruistic” attachment she expects him to carry out the projects in which she believes herself to be handicapped by her sex: for instance, she wants him to lead the life of a student or to adopt a particular profession or to become famous or rich in her place. In such cases egoism and altruism may be blended in very various proportions. We know that parents sometimes delegate to their children their projects for their own lives, in a manner at once altruistic and egoistic. It is as if they hoped through the child, whom they regard better qualified for the purpose than themselves, to wrestle from life the fulfillment of the ambitions which they themselves have failed to realize. (-) A man’s success in life does, indeed, go far to compensate the women of his family for the renunciation of their own ambition (-) when his impulses have been surrendered in favor of other people, their lives become precious rather than his own. (-). It was only after analysis, when she happened to fall ill, that the young governess discovered that the thought of dying was painful to her. To her own surprise she found that she ardently desired to live long enough to furnish her new home and to pass an examination which would secure her promotion in her profession. (-) *She goes on showing these early types of decisions being repeated according to the then pleasure-unpleasure principle, that ‘formed’ our ‘worlds,’ ‘cultures,’ ‘discourses,’ ‘narratives,’ ‘frames,’ ‘selves,’ ‘ethnicities,’ all ‘figurat-ed’ along. (FK).*

ADDENDUM III **Melanie Klein** (1932) **Children’s Analysis** (p. 262, 4)

It is here that his activities and achievements come in. By means of those achievements, whether in the physical or the mental field, which call for courage, endurance, strength and enterprise he proves himself, among other things, that the castration he dreads so much has not happened to him. His achievements also gratify his reactive tendencies and allay his sense of guilt. They show him that his constructive capacities outweigh his destructive tendencies, and they repre-

sent restitution done towards his objects. By giving him these assurances they greatly add to the gratification they afford him. The allayment of his anxiety and sense of guilt, which in the latency period he has found in the successful pursuit of his activities in so far as they are made ego-syntonic by the approval of his environment, must in the period of puberty come from the value which his performances and achievements have for him.

We must now give a brief consideration in which the girl deals with her anxiety-situations at puberty. At this age she normally preserves the aims of the latency period and the modes of masculine one. The erection of standards and ideals which take place in the boy at puberty, plays an important part in her development also, but it takes a more subjective and personal form and she sets less store by abstract principles. Her desire to please her objects extends to mental pursuits as well and plays part even in her highest intellectual achievements. Her attitude to her work, in so far as the masculine components are not predominantly involved, corresponds to her attitude towards her own body; and her activities in relation to these two interests are largely concerned with dealing with her specific anxiety situations. A beautiful body or a perfect piece of work provide the growing girl with the same counter-proofs as she had need of a child—namely, that the inside of her body has not been destroyed by her mother, and that the children have not been taken out of it. As a grown woman, her relation to her child, which often takes the place of her relation to her work, is a very great help to her in dealing with anxiety. To have it and nurse it and watch it grow and thrive—these things provide her, exactly as in the case of the little girl and her dolls, with ever renewed proofs that her possession of a child is not endangered, and serve to allay her sense of guilt. (-) Similarly, her relation to her home, which is equivalent to her own body, has a special importance for the feminine mode of mastering anxiety, and has, besides, another and more direct connection with her early anxiety-situation. As we have seen, the little girl’s rivalry with her mother finds utterance, among other things, in phantasies of driving her out and taking her place as mistress of the house. An important part of this anxiety-situation for children of both sexes, but more especially for girls, consists in the fear of being turned out of the house and being left homeless. Their contentment with their own home is always partly based on its value as a refutation of this element in their anxiety situations. Her relation to men, furthermore, is largely determined by her need to convince herself through their admiration of the intactness of her body. Her narcissism, therefore, plays a great part in her mastery of anxiety. It is as a result of this feminine mode of mastering anxiety that women are so much more dependent on the love and

approval of men—and of objects in general—than men are upon women. But men, too, extract from their love-relations tranquillization of their anxiety which contributes no little to the sexual gratification they get from them.

The normal process of mastering anxiety seems to be conditional upon a number of factors, in which the specific methods employed act in conjunction with quantitative elements, such as the amount of sadism and anxiety present and the degree of capacity possessed by the ego to tolerate anxiety. If these interactive factors attain a certain optimum, it appears that the individual is able to modify quite successfully even large quantities of anxiety, to develop his ego in a satisfactory manner and even well above the average, and to achieve mental health. The conditions under which he can master anxiety are as specific as the conditions under which he can love, and are, as far as can be seen, very intimately bound up with them. In some cases, best typified in the age of puberty, the condition for mastering anxiety is that the individual shall face especially difficult circumstances, such as give rise to strong fear; in others, it is that he shall avoid as far as he can—and even in extreme cases, in a phobic way—all such circumstances. Between these two extremes is situated what can be regarded a normal impulsion to obtain pleasure from the overcoming of anxiety-situations that are associated with not too much anxiety.

ADDENDUM IV: Sigmund Freud (1930) **Civilization and its Discontents** (Ch. U)

Wer Wissenschaft und Kunst besitzt, hat auch Religion;

Wer jene beide nicht besitzt, der habe Religion!

(He who possesses science and art also has religion; but he who possesses neither, let him have religion! *Goethe, Zahme Xenien IX*)

This saying on the one hand draws an antithesis between religion and the two highest achievements of man, and on the other, asserts that, as regards their value in life, those achievements and religion can represent or replace each other. If we also set out to deprive the common man, (who has neither science or art) of his religion, we shall clearly not have the poets authority on our side. Life, as we find it, is too hard for us; it brings us too many pains, disappointments and impossible tasks. In order to bear it we cannot dispense with palliative measures. (-) There are perhaps three such measures: powerful deflections, cause us to make light out of our misery; substitute satisfactions, which diminish it; and intoxicating substances, which make us insensitive to it. Something of the kind is indispensable. Voltaire has deflections in mind when he ends *Candide* with the advice

to ‘cultivate one’s garden;’ and scientific activity is of this kind too. (-)

Ch VU. Having reached the end of this journey, (I) ask (my) readers’ forgiveness for not having been a more skillful guide and for not having spared him empty stretches of road and troublesome *detours*. It could have been done better.

In the first place, I suspect that the reader has the impression that our discussions on the sense of guilt disrupts the framework of this essay: that they take up too much space, so that the rest of the subject-matter, with which they are not always closely connected, is pushed to one side. This may have spoiled the structure of my paper; but it corresponds faithfully to my intention to represent the sense of guilt as the most important problem in the development and to show that the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt. Anything that still sounds strange about this statement, which is the final conclusion of our investigation, can probably be traced to the quite peculiar relationship – as yet completely unexplained – which the sense of guilt has to our consciousness. In the common case of remorse, which we regard as normal, this feeling makes itself clearly enough perceptible to consciousness. Indeed, we are accustomed to speak of a ‘consciousness of guilt’ instead of a ‘sense of guilt.’ Our study of the neuroses, to which, after all, we owe the most valuable pointers to an understanding of normal conditions, brings us up against some contradictions. In one of those affections, obsessional neuroses, the sense of guilt makes itself noisily heard in consciousness; it dominates the clinical picture and the patient’s life as well, and it hardly allows anything else to appear alongside of it. But in most other cases and forms of neurosis it remains completely unconscious, without on that account producing any less important effects. Our patients do not believe us when we attribute an ‘unconscious sense of guilt’ to them. In order to make ourselves at all intelligible to them, we tell them of an unconscious need for punishment, in which the sense of guilt finds expression. But its connection with a particular form of neurosis must not be over-estimated. Even in obsessional neurosis there are types of patients who are not aware of their sense of guilt, or who feel it as a tormenting uneasiness, a kind of anxiety, if they are prevented from carrying out certain actions. It ought to be possible eventually to understand these things; but as yet we cannot. Here perhaps we may be glad to have it pointed out that the sense of guilt is at bottom nothing else but a topographic variety of anxiety; in its later phases it coincides completely with *fear of the super-ego*. And the relations of anxiety to consciousness exhibit the same extraordinary variations. Anxiety is always present somewhere or other behind every symptom; but at one time it takes noisy possession of the whole

of consciousness, while at another it conceals itself so completely that we are obliged to speak of unconscious anxiety or, if we want to have a cleaner psychological conscience, since anxiety is in the first instance simply a feeling, of possibilities of anxiety. Consequently it is very conceivable that the sense of guilt produced by civilization is not perceived as such either and remains to a large extent unconscious, or appears as a sort of *malaise*, a dissatisfaction, for which people seek other motivations. Religions at any rate, have never overlooked the part played in civilization by a sense of guilt. Furthermore – a point which I failed to appreciate elsewhere – they claim to redeem mankind from this sense of guilt, which they call sin. From the manner in which, in Christianity, this redemption is achieved – by the sacrificial death of a single person, who in this manner takes upon himself a guilt that is common to everyone we have inferred what the first occasion may have been on which this primal guilt, which was the beginning of civilization, was acquired.

Though it cannot be of great importance, it may not be superfluous to elucidate the meaning of a few words such as ‘super ego,’ ‘conscience,’ ‘sense of guilt,’ ‘need for punishment’ and ‘remorse,’ which we have often used, perhaps too loosely and interchangeably. They all relate to the same state of affairs, but denote different aspects of it. The super-ego is an agency which has been inferred by us, and conscience is a function we ascribe, among other functions, to that agency. This function consists in keeping a watch over the actions and intentions of the ego and judging them, in exercising a censorship. This sense of guilt, the harshness of the super-ego, is thus the same thing as the severity of the conscience. It is the perception which the ego has of being watched over, the assessment of the tension between its own strivings and the demands of the super-ego. The fear of this critical agency (a fear which is at bottom of the relationship), the need for punishment, is an instinctual manifestation on the part of the ego, which has become masochistic under the influence of a sadistic super-ego; it is a portion, that is to say, of the instinct towards internal destruction present in the ego, employed for forming an erotic attachment to the super-ego. We ought not to speak of a conscience until a super-ego is demonstrably present. As to a sense of guilt, we must admit that it is in existence before the super-ego, and therefore before conscience too. At that time it is the immediate expression of fear of the external authority, a recognition of the tension between the ego and that authority. It is the direct derivative of the conflict between the need for authority’s love and the urge towards instinctual satisfaction, whose inhibition produces the inclination to aggression. The superimposition of these two strata of the sense of guilt – one coming from the *external* authority, the other from

fear of the *internal* authority – has hampered our insight into the position of conscience in a number of ways. Remorse is a general term for the ego’s reaction in a case of sense of guilt. It contains, in little altered form, the sensory material of the anxiety which is operating behind the sense of guilt; it is itself a punishment and can include the need for punishment. Thus remorse, too, can be older than conscience. Nor will it do any harm if we once more review the contradictions which have for a while perplexed us during our inquiry. Thus, at one point the sense of guilt was the consequence of acts of aggression that had been abstained from; but at another point – and that is precisely at its historical beginning, – the killing of the father – it was the consequence of an act of aggression that had been carried out.

But a way out of this difficulty was found. For the institution of the internal authority, the super-ego, altered the situation radically. Before this, the sense of guilt coincided with remorse. (We may remark, incidentally, that the term ‘remorse’ should be reserved for the reaction after an act of aggression has actually been carried out.) After this, owing to the omniscience of the super-ego, the difference between an aggression intended and an aggression carried out lost its force. Henceforward a sense of guilt could be produced not only by an act of violence that is actually carried out (as all the world knows), but also by one that is merely intended (as psychoanalysis has discovered). Irrespective of this alteration in the psychological situation, the conflict arising from ambivalence – the conflict between the two instincts – leaves the same result behind. We are tempted to look here for the solution of the problem of the varying relation in which the sense of guilt stands to consciousness. It might be thought that a sense of guilt arising from remorse for an evil *deed* must always be conscious, whereas a sense of guilt arising from a perception of an evil *impulse* may remain unconscious. But the answer is not so simple. Obsessional neurosis speaks against it.

The second contradiction concerned the aggressive energy with which we suppose the super-ego to have been endowed. According to one view, that energy merely carries on the punitive energy of the external authority and keeps it alive in the mind; while, according to another view, it consists, on the contrary, of one’s own aggressive energy which has not been used and which one now directs against that inhibiting authority. The first view seemed to fit in better with the *history*, and the second with the *theory* of the sense of guilt. Closer selection resolved this apparently irreconcilable contradiction. The common factor was that we were dealing with an aggressiveness which was displaced inwards. Clinical observation, allows us to distinguish two sources for the aggressiveness which we attribute to the super-ego; one or

the other exercises the stronger effect, but generally they operate in unison.’

ADDENDUM V: Caren Horney (1951) Neurosis and Human Growth (Ch.6)

Up to this point pride acts as a kind of censorship, encouraging or forbidding feelings to come to awareness. But it may govern feelings in a still more basic way. The more pride has taken over, the more a person can respond emotionally to life only with his pride. It is as if he had shut away his real self in a soundproof room and could hear the sound of pride alone. His feeling satisfied or dissatisfied, dejected or elated, his likes or dislikes of people, then, are mainly pride responses. Likewise the suffering he consciously feels is mainly a suffering of his pride. This is not apparent on the surface. It feels convincingly real to him that he suffers from failures, from feelings of guilt (*loss/FK*), loneliness, unrequited love. And he does indeed. But the question is: who suffers? In analysis it turns out that it is mainly his proud self. He does indeed. But the question is: who suffers? In analysis it turns out that it is mainly his proud self. He suffers because he feels that he has failed to achieve attractiveness as to be sought out always, to make everybody love him. Or he suffers because he feels entiattractiveness as to be sought out always, to make everybody love him. Or he suffers because he feels entitled to success, popularity, etc., which is not forthcoming.

Only when the pride-system is considerably undermined does he begin to feel true suffering. Only then can he feel sympathy for this suffering self of his (*to mourn/FK*), a sympathy that can move him to do something constructive for himself. The self-pity he felt before was rather a maudlin writhing of the proud self for feeling abused. He who has not experienced the difference may shrug his shoulders and think that it is irrelevant: that suffering is suffering. But it is true that suffering alone has the power to broaden and deepen our range of feelings and to open our hearts for the suffering of others. In *De Profundis* Oscar Wilde has described the liberation he felt when, instead of suffering from injured vanity, he started to experience real suffering.

(Needless to say, all this ‘suffering’ we hear from in the media, or most of ‘our own’, is not that real anymore: It is our un-grieved over, not-worked-through Eudipus-complexes and still-existing castration-fear left-over. /FK)

ADDENDUM VI Sigmund Freud (1916/25) The Uncanny

We have already asked why it is that the severed hand in the story of the treasure of Rhainpsenitus has no uncanny effect in the way that Hauff’s story of the severed hand has. The question seems to us to have gained in importance now that we have recognized that class of the uncanny which proceeds from repressed complexes to be the more durable of the two. The answer is easy. In the Herodotus story our thoughts are concentrated much more on the superior cunning of the master-thief than on the feelings of the princess. The princess may well have had an uncanny feeling, indeed she very probably fell into a swoon; but we have no such sensations, for we put ourselves in the thief’s place, not in hers. In Nestroy’s farce, *Der Zerrissene*, another means is used to avoid any impression of the uncanny in the scene in which the fleeing man, convinced that he is a murderer, lifts up one trapdoor after another and each time sees what he takes to be the ghost of his victim rising up out of it. He calls out in despair, “But I’ve only killed one man. Why this horrid multiplication?” We know the truth and do not share the error of the Zerrissener, so what must be uncanny to him has an irresistibly comic effect on us. Even a “real” ghost, as in Oscar Wilde’s *Canterville Ghost*, loses all power of arousing at any rate an uncanny horror in us as soon as the author begins to amuse himself at its expense and allows liberties to be taken with it. Thus we see how independent emotional effects can be of the actual subject matter in the world of fiction. In fairy-stories feelings of fear— 20 including uncanny sensations—are ruled out altogether. We understand this, and that is why we ignore the opportunities we find for any development of a feeling of this kind. Concerning the factors of silence, solitude and darkness, we can only say that they are actually elements in the production of that infantile morbid anxiety from which the majority of human beings have never become quite free. This problem has been discussed from a psychoanalytical point of view in another place.

ADDENDUM VII

A+M Mitscherlich (1956/68)

Society without the Father

A Contribution to Social Psychology

By A+M Mitscherlich (1956/68)

Translated from the German by Eric Mosbacher

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Contents

I Introductory: The Dynamics of Adaptation

- The long years of childhood* (35)
- Development of aptiniJes anJ social environment*
- Adaptations closed and open* (36)
- Adaptation is not progress* (37)
- Cultural adapiation° a process of selective accommodation*
- Four basic components of adapf:ation to t iC human environment* (37)
- The limits of social tolerance* (38)
- 113** *The dynamics of human adaptation* (38)
- A new function, extension of consciousness* (39)

II Adaptation and Insight

- Social renunciation and instinctual surplus aggressivity Growth and educationA co-ordinateJ search*
- Three levels of education Dialectical function of educa'nonThe OCquisition Of education*
- Social education*
- Composite nature of education Af-fects and defence against the alien*
- Historical change and the drive for k owk dge*
- III Insufficiency of Instinct** (39) **36**

- Evolution of the conscious* (39)
- Mythokgy v. science* (40)
- TO consciousus and social integration* (40)
- Evolution becomes conscious of itself* (41)
- Converging sciences*
- The Protestant line* (42)
- Lack of sharp outline of human roles* (43)
- Possessions as Signals* (44)
- The Individual as role* (44)
- The enemy of understanding* (45)
- Precariousness of learnt role behavior* (45)
- Transfiguration of the past*
- The overburdened mother* (49)

IV The Precariousness of Moralities (50)

- The creation of identity* (52)
- Satisfying renunciation* (56)
- Unsatisfying renunciation* (57)
- Collect:ive changes in self-awareness* (58)
- Problems of Socialization* (59)
- Problems of quaziRationalisation or fatalism* (59)
- Cultural pressure to curtural evil ((60)*
- Hope as part of man's 'openness'* (60)
- Dynamics of the Drive* (62)
- Drives and fulfillment*
 - forms of-*
 - Confluence of instincts*
- Identification and moral incapacity*
- Ambivalence and discord affects* (63)
- Ego and Ego Ideal* (63)
- Good examples and bad effects* (63)
- Doubtful ancestor cults* (63)
- ConConflicts of motivation* (64)
- How to erode the common* (64)
- Double Standards* (65)
- The ego as energy transformer* (66)
- T he necessity of empathy(67)*
- The passengers* (68)
- A product of paternalism* (69)
- Ego ideal in tired open social* (69)
- The need for good counsel* (71)
- The enlightened official* (72)
- Fathers who can learn from their sons(73)*
- Ego-strengthening education* (74)
- Creating the behaviour repertoire* (74)
- Affective and object-related alienationMagiCol thought and C0ft\$Crva'usm Authorityf lO\$Cs its su si:aHCC*
- Classless mass man*
 - The father as bogey man*
 - Conflictss of ambivalence of the social-climbing mania*
 - Unassuaged thirst for identification and prolonged adolescence*
 - Fatherlessness in an over-organized society*
- i. *Obedience, Autonomy, Anarchy*

Obedience to instinct

Learnt obedience

Ambivalence

After-effects of punishment

Rigidity or openness to development?

Sublimation and ego development

Reflection compulsion

Regressive idealization

The seat of piety

Incillation of fear as a method of control

Obedience to the ego

Empathy and detachment

*Education for insecurity, and some thoughts on
of political utility*

Postscript to the disciplined body

ii. Taboo (75)

Roles (78)

Worse than ideal (78)

Searching for new collective attitudes(79)

Group need of a boundary line

Mass regression (80)

Managers and apparatchiks (80)

Readiness to obey and the trend to terrorism ((82)

A disappointment (83)

The parish-pump outlook (83)

Enlightenment up-to-date Cast-iron (86)

Transcending roles (87)

Prejudices and Their Manipulation (87)

Human rights v. prejudices (89)

Obedience to prejudice Pseudo-rationalism (91)

Influencing the man in the street (92)

sacrifice of the intellect (95)

From divine state to divine bureaucracy (96)

Blows to pride and the response (97)

*Prejudice and conscience on being confronted with
prejudice about oneself* ((99)

Two Kinds of Fatherlessness (99)

From Oedipal rivalry to sibling envy

The interested agents(100)

Loveless childhood and lifeless old age

The detachment effect

*Encroachment on territory and disassociation of
instinct*

*Fatherlessness of the first and second degree Chimerical
ego ideal*

Disappearance without trace of the Fulirer

Military digression

The economic significance of idols

A successful compromise

Sibling fear of ties

Epilogue

Emancipation Remarks on method

Detachment v. alienation

Brief apologia for gossip (102)

NOTES (104)

INDEX OF NAMES (105)

INDEX OF SUBJECTS (105)

Introductory

The Dynamics of Adaptation

The long years of childhood

Man comes into the world unadapted and untrained, and he remains in the nest for a very long time; and the end of the process of human maturation, in contrast to that of animals who spend a long time in the nest (or take off quickly), is not a perfect representative of the species, but an individual moulded by a learning process and familiarized to a greater or lesser extent with social forms. In many situations he is faced with decisions of which no one will relieve him. All the same, he is relieved of a great deal, because for the most part he makes decisions in accordance with patterns imbibed from his family environment, social status, or culture. His equipment of innate patterns of behaviour is only rudimentary. To mention only a few striking examples, he has no hereditary, ritualized, courtship or mating behaviour, and his knowledge of how to recognize enemies or nurture the young is not innate.

Development of aptitudes and sort of environment

How much human behaviour is innate is unknown; all we can be sure of is that it is far from adequate for the regulation of life among our fellows. The real regulator, our code of behaviour, is learnt slowly. Constitutional factors and acquired aptitudes interact. The geneticist knows, for instance, that uniovular twins greatly resemble each other in appearance, and also in aptitudes and social character. But in such extreme instances — in this case the effect of sharing the same genes one is apt to overlook how much more complicated is the interplay between individuals, each of whom brings variable

hereditary factors into the world, and their environment. The extent to which aptitudes which we

Adaptation, closed and open

so readily take to be hereditary and unalterable can be encouraged or inhibited by environment is shown by a study by Freeman and his colleagues of two pairs of Siblings who were separated at an average age of five and a half, one of each pair being brought up in a foster-home. At the time of the study the separation had lasted for five or ten years or more. Normal siblings have a 'similarity' ratio of 0-D, but the figure for these children was only 0-2D. This 'showed the extent to which children's capacities can be influenced by environmental differences'.

In this connection a significant observation is reported by Margaret Mead. 'Among the Mundugumor people of New Guinea, children born with the umbilical cord wound around their necks are singled out as of nature and indisputable right artists.' In this case a culture has 'arbitrarily associated, in an artificial way, two completely unrelated points: manner of birth and an ability to paint intricate designs upon pieces of bark'. Mrs Mead continues: 'When we learn further that so firmly is this association insisted upon that only those who are so born can paint good pictures, while the man born without a strangulating cord labors humble and unarrogant, and never attains any virtuosity, we see the strength that lies in such irrelevant associations once they are firmly embedded in the culture.' Thus it is not only the intimate family environment, such as that which an adopted child may chance to enter, that has variable effects on the development of capacities; there is also the factor of collective social behaviour. The expectations of a social group can powerfully promote potential aptitudes in one individual and inhibit them in another.

Such social assumptions are of course not completely unknown in our own culture. In families of long-established social status, craftsmen or peasants, for instance, to say nothing of the aristocracy, it is more or less taken for granted that the eldest son will step into his father's shoes; and indeed he very often does so, adapting himself with varying degrees of success and with varying degrees of reluctance, but yielding to the pressure of an environment that has brought him up and trained him to do so. Examples such as these show the importance of the part played by social environment in the development of human character and aptitudes, in the whole formation of the individual. The more flexible a society is, the greater its division of labour and freedom from property ties, and the more mobile it is in consequence, the greater is the individual's chance

of being able to follow his own proclivities in the development of his capacities. Indeed, it is only in such a society that the problem of individual proclivities arises. Our own culture offers some scope in this respect, though not nearly so much as is often suggested, but we should not deceive ourselves about our own history or about the situation in many other cultures, in which the social situation of the individual is strictly laid down in advance and his behaviour is prescribed in every detail.

The immediate social environment in which the individual is embedded affects not only his vital decisions, scale of values, and behaviour but also the forms taken by failure to meet social demands. Many illnesses, for instance, are not precipitated by constitution and the effects of nature alone; the social environment also plays its part. This is particularly true of neurotic and psychosomatic illness, which we have learnt to recognize as an attempt, though an unsuccessful one, to solve an individual conflict.° The x•ery thorough work of Theodore Lidz' has shown the influence of the family environment on schizophrenia, hitherto regarded predominantly from the hereditary aspect. As Luxenburger put it, heredity is not fate, but the threat of fate. It is the social environment that, to an extent we cannot yet measure, determines whether the threat becomes reality. It can help the individual to integrate constitutional socially disruptive trends into his total personality and hold them in check, or it may help the opposite process, encourage antisocial or asocial behaviour or lead to 'illness'.

Here we can only touch on the question of the influence of heredity on all the problems we have mentioned, but there is one fact which we shall bear in mind. One of the peculiarities of man is obviously that he does not possess a single and definite hereditary way of adapting himself to his environment. On the contrary, he has an extraordinary ability to adapt himself to very different and changing, sometimes swiftly changing, social environments.

As in the course of this book we shall be considering the process of adaptation chiefly from these social points of view, concentrating, that is to say, on only one aspect of this ability, it will be as well to inquire straight away what is meant by adaptation in the broader biological content. Let us take as an example the well-known engineering feats of the beaver, which dams flowing water in such a way as to keep the level above that of the entrances to its burrow, thus protecting the occupants from their natural enemies. These dams are constructed with great artifice and skill, and systems are known which have been maintained for more than seventy years by thirty generations of beavers.⁵ Biology offers us theories which more or less satisfy individual workers in the field and state the physical or

organic assumptions necessary to explain such performances. They may depend, for instance, on the extent of development of the cerebral cortex. Further, the relatively young science of hereditary genetics has shown that certain capacities — in fact, the ways of behaviour characteristic of a species are anchored in the genes and their arrangement in the chromosomes. We know that the living organism is essentially a system directed to the maintenance of its own equilibrium (a homeostatic system), with innumerable feedback mechanisms and reciprocal influencing of the organic functions. Since Norbert Wiener we have talked of 'cybernetic systems', but even in Pavlov's theories the interaction of the neural stimulation and inhibition processes plays a central role.

All this enables a living organism to adapt itself to a specific environment and at the same time — at any rate to some extent — to adapt its environment to itself. Instead of the ingenious beaver, we might have cited the no less astonishing examples of the web-spinning spider or the insects that live in highly socialized communities. In all these cases life seeks to remain constant within the environment peculiar to the species (J. von Uexküll). During this process of adaptation the living creature acquires aptitudes which it uses to try actively to improve its environmental conditions. All these processes of biological adaptation — which certainly represent only one vital process, but a highly important one, as we have believed since Darwin — have one thing in common. They take place extraordinarily slowly and, as has been shown by the Belgian palaeontologist Luis Dollo, are irreversible. Once a process of adaptation, whether physical or of hereditary ways of behaviour, has been completed, there can be no despecialization. In the event of an unfavourable change in the environment to which an organism has adapted itself over the ages (presumably by mutations), it cannot backpedal and start again, but in extreme cases it will die out and become extinct.

Adaptation is not progress

All these theories are very persuasive; no better explanations of many processes of adaptation are available. But we should free ourselves of one idea that the nineteenth century seized on with premature optimism and prized highly, namely, that Darwin's evolution implies progress. That is typical anthropomorphism transferring to life processes in general ideas that we have formed for use in our own particular social environment. Upward! Progress! Evolution! Even today the 'common man', in so far as he accepts evolution, probably does so because the theory rides on the coat-tails of that most popular

of all gods, Progress. But 'is evolution progress,' asks Garrett Hardin in an excellent chapter of his *Name and Man's* Note. He continues: 'Bertrand Russell has wryly remarked: "A process which led from amoeba to man appeared to the philosophers to be obviously progress — though whether the amoeba would agree with this opinion is not known."' Flies which have 'adapted' themselves to DDT are genetically different from the type that prevailed before the introduction of the poison. Are the resistant strains better? They have merely acquired different characteristics in response to an environmental change.

Cultural adaptation: A process of selective accommodation

Let us now leave the problem of the adaptation of the living creature to its environment and the hereditary ways of behaviour peculiar to its species and look at the human problem of cultural adaptation. Here again the question may be asked: Which is the better adapted, the 'primitive' or the advanced, 'highly **civilized**' man? And what do we mean by primitive and advanced? We can only counter with the opposite questions: Adapted to what? And what does primitiveness consist of? In the defective adaptation to his environment of a Central European white-collar worker with a two-room flat and typical consumer habits? In what way is he less primitive than an Arawak from the mountains of New Guinea, that is, a man who belongs to a culture we regard as characteristically 'primitive' and full of hazards? Is either of them better adapted? In fact we are asking the wrong questions. Both, like all mankind, live in *selective* adjustment to their environment. Naturally, as von Uexküll points out, an Indian on the Orinoco lives in a world the contents of which are quite different from those of our highly technical and specialized industrial civilisation. Both primitives and ourselves are similarly adapted to the environment — and have characteristic deficiencies in adaptation to it.

Every adaptation to any given natural or cultural circumstances involves both development and inhibition of aptitudes. Our culture has made tremendous advances in mastering the forces of nature. But can it claim similar advances in knowledge of the natural forces inside ourselves? What we regard as primitive is not seldom merely the unknown, or rather the not understood, those things in other people we are unable to project ourselves into and understand the spirit of. It is not only savages who strike us as being primitive in this way, but also many members of our own culture; and we ourselves are in return regarded in the same way by others. •

Four basic components of adaptation to the human environment

For the purpose of constructing a model enabling us to visualize what is involved, we can distinguish four basic components in adaptation to the human environment:

I. Passive adaptation to existing conditions. This process is obviously associated with the learning of rules, prohibitions, symbols, and in particular speech.

II. As a reflection of this passive adaptation to social life we carry out a similar adaptation within; that is, we adapt our impulses and satisfactions to the requirements of the outside world. 'Passive' in this sense means that we do not just release the impulses that arise in us egoistically and autistically, but shape them in accordance with a pre-existent pattern of behaviour, in which renunciation, postponement, and disguise of aims are often called for.

III. We achieve active adaptation if we succeed in bringing our environment into such harmony with ourselves that our purposes actively contribute to shaping the resultant situations.

IV Active adaptation also has its inner counterpart. We do not blindly and passively take over prescribed forms of behaviour, but modify them. Certain impulses towards certain individuals in our environment may not fit in with the ideal standards of our society, but we nevertheless permit ourselves to feel and recognize and even express them. Thus we assume the initiative and with it a twofold responsibility — both to ourselves and to our social environment. For society can tolerate only a moderate amount of initiative in our total behaviour if its cohesion is not to be destroyed.

The limits of social tolerance

Thus life in society is dominated by these two antagonistic trends. Instead of active and passive they can equally well be called assimilative and integrative. We assimilate our social environment. If we **carry** too far the trend to fuse our initiatives completely with the standards of social behaviour, we develop into social automatons. If we engage in activity that to a greater or lesser extent conflicts with those standards but is nevertheless accepted by our fellows, we are behaving integratively. Activity that meets with no such echo, that ruthlessly ignores standards and offends the susceptibilities of others, is isolated and antisocial.

The transitions between instinctual behaviour, behaviour in conformity with social norms, and behaviour guided by the ego are fluid. The sequence makes increasing demands on the integra-

tive capacity. Individuals with basic urges and perhaps also ego qualities of different strength develop different capacities for integration and different degrees of inflexibility, adherence to taboos, or readiness for change. A decisive influence is exercised in this respect by the prevailing degree of intolerance, insistence on rigid adherence to norms or 'anomy' (Durkheim), lack of leadership or genuine tolerance for individual expressions of life; and the sector in which the basic drives of the individual find one answer or the other is also a factor.

The dynamics of human adaptation

In view of the enormous number of past cultures and the number that still exist today, it is obvious that the mode and dynamics of adaptation developed by man differ from those of other social animals. Human

specialization has avoided developing specialized

tools for a special environment such as flippers or fins; instead man has specialized in non-specialization (K. Lorenz). In other words, his speciality is a 'tool-making brain', an inventiveness that compensates for his failure to develop hereditary bodily tools and ways of behaviour. Also these capacities are associated with achievements of the conscious mind, though these are not the work of conscious mind only, as is shown by every spontaneous idea.

It is also evident that, in comparison with the specializations of other species, which are permanently anchored in the genes, the processes of adaptation in human history take place with very great rapidity; and they can crumble and give way to new forms with the same rapidity. In other words, the processes of human adaptation of affective human behaviour both in social forms and in social styles of mastering the natural environment are incomparably more superficial and transitory than those of the animals. • The only characteristic man never shakes off is his biologically determined lack of adaptation, and that seems to be his specialization. But whether this should be regarded as progress in the evolutionary sense, that is, tending to maintain his *trna quo*, is at least an open question, particularly when the possibilities of destruction that have arisen from our 'tool-making' is taken into account.

We can of course never detach ourselves so completely from our subjective human situation as to be able to look impartially at our life, whether biological or intellectual. We cannot avoid judgements of value about ourselves and others, or prejudices about relatively known or relatively or completely unknown features of our own culture, or others that

are remote in space or time. But in discussing, as we are trying to do here, the specifically human insecurities arising from man's basic lack of adaptation, we should do well to exercise the utmost tolerance. Tolerance as a method of approach is not merely taking relativity into account and is not apologetic. We can be happy and guilty only in our own culture. But perhaps we can gain knowledge of the particular weaknesses and insecurities to which we are subject, and find ways and means of coping with them to some extent, when we have learnt more from the facts, in particular the fact that there is no such thing as a 'best' human culture, one in which man can finally flourish, and that that culture is certainly not the individual's own. In the sense of Dollo's law, the die is cast. We are fated to be specialists in imperfection. Man does not come into the world with an inherited way of behaviour that in all important matters co-ordinates him with a specific environment, but, as we said at the outset, is born unadapted and untrained. Every one of his cultures he enters as a novice. That is a fact of natural history. Perhaps realization of the necessity of putting up with (cultural) difference was made possible only by the cultural cosmopolitanism of our time, which as a result of the technical development of communications and the imposition by machinery of a uniformity of production and consumption has brought into functional relationship with each other human groupings with totally different histories. Mankind's original social form was that of the 'closed or exclusive group, the horde or clan. The closed group has — or once had — an "ideal standard" different from those of every other group. Only members of the group are initiated into these ideal human standards, they alone have the task of fulfilling the mission of humanity. The Eskimos' name for themselves, for instance, is *Inuit*, which means "we, the most human of all". While the members of the exclusive group are representatives of the ideal standard, all others suffer the opprobrium of non-worth; they are ignorant of, or do not fulfil, the true mission of life. The epithets "barbarian", "heretic", "pagan" — to say nothing of modern, generally politically coloured, examples — express the antithesis to the ideal standard, the "non-worth standard".¹⁰ Since in our fantasy ideas we all persist in our ethnocentric or group-centred ways of thought, one of the 'humiliations' with which we have to cope is that Negroes, Chinese, Jews, and Communists all have the same sense of being in possession of the ideal standard and are inclined to despise us accordingly. Racial characteristics seem more and more to be losing importance as indications of membership of an exclusive group — the internationalization of athletic

competition has been one factor in this. The question of what marks of exclusivity will maintain their taboo character in the future, and how the function of the former spatially closed group or clan will be carried over into cosmopolitan industrial civilization, remains entirely open. For it is not to be expected that in these historically entirely novel conditions agreement on a single common standard will come about by general consent. For one thing, the excess of affect that provides the motive force of the perpetual reconstruction of the social world always needs an 'enemy'. Hitherto in human history the perpetual search for an outlet for the impulses condemned to suppression by civilized social life has discharged itself in the most appalling mutual persecutions. It is not easy to see why a single civilization — that is to say, a uniform, world-wide technology and the adaptations imposed by it — should bring about any change in man's primary nature.

A new function, the extension of consciousness

Man has developed a new function — that of acquiring an understanding of himself enabling him to control, guide, and shape his actions. That puts the conscious into a dialectical relationship with older biological functions, the hereditary nature of which explains unconscious behaviour which imposes itself as a matter of course. How far the conscious extends is obviously not fixed; it varies from individual to individual, from culture to culture, but it can hardly be doubted that in the course of observable history it has encroached on the realm of unconscious mental processes, and has made its greatest advances where, as Alfred Weber says, civilization has gone furthest in covering up the natural with a technical environment, thus creating a 'second natural environment'.

III

Insufficiency of Instinct

Evolution of Conscience

The problem of human freedom raised at the end of the last chapter seemed in the past to be a philosophical or ethical one. For all the traditional respect paid to philosophy, however, in many fields of social life more powerful influences were at work, and it was ignored; things took their course unhampered by ivory tower reflections. In recent years, however, the problem has suddenly become topical and more difficult to ignore. Scientific developments directly connected with questions of life or death have assumed a leading role in our society and make a far more immediate impact on our social consciousness;

or, to state it more cautiously, they are more alarming to the latter, because the problems involved are manifestly connected with survival.

From the scientific viewpoint, and that of the theory of evolution in particular, the ability to exercise conscious choice about his way of living that developed in man is so significant because it marks a new stage in evolution. It seems no exaggeration to say that old theological descriptions of man as made in God's image have been reformulated within the framework of scientific theories in which questions of freedom and responsibility are also involved. The picture has changed greatly since the days of the drab, mechanistic interpretations of evolutionary theory characteristic of the turn of the century. Biological modifications having made possible a conscious orientation to life accompanied by release from genetically fixed behaviour patterns, the consequence is that a great burden of responsibility, that of guiding and controlling human behaviour, has devolved upon that conscious orientation. Looking at the situation more closely, it can be seen that a consistent, historically traceable process has been at work in which responsibility has developed into a consciousness of responsibility dependent on itself alone. It is legitimate to talk of increased responsibility, because the theory of evolution as part of an analytical science is hardly reconcilable with the idea of a personal God as handed down by the traditional religions. It must be emphasized that in the present sociopsychological context we are not concerned with theological or philosophical subtleties, but only with the form in which religious ideas affect the general social consciousness. What we are concerned with here, that is to say, is the religious feelings of the man in the street, the extent to which these are genuinely felt by him and how they affect his behaviour; and in this context it can hardly be doubted that the God he is taught to believe in is a personal God.

Mythology v. science

If scientific evidence and scientific theories about the development of life up to the moment when it became conscious of itself are taken seriously, it is impossible, except at the cost of a split personality, simultaneously to believe in a mythological theory of creation. The dilemma is faced with admirable courage by theologians of the type of Teilhard de Chardin. The psychological difficulty with which science confronts us lies in the impossibility of projecting responsibility upon an anthropomorphic God. For all the emphasis laid by theologians on the absolute and on the absolute otherness of God, the psychological reality remained that God was a

being who could be spoken to, that is, was in some way similar to ourselves. The approach to Him by way of speech — chiefly in the form of prayer — and with it the delegation of responsibility on the pattern of the child-father or child-parent relationship has become impossible, and the disillusionment has not been compensated for by the appearance of new precepts for behaviour on which total reliance can be placed. To the majority this is such an oppressive situation that they seek to evade it regressively — in a word, irrationally. They resign themselves to the dilemma, on the one hand accepting the benefits derived from the untheological scientific outlook, the achievements of which in some cases they actively promote, while on the other they acquiesce apparently uncritically in a moral code and in beliefs that cannot be confirmed by rational experience. Now, *credo quia absurdum* is certainly no modern paradox; the modern sense of humility in the face of the vastness of the universe is increased rather than diminished by our increased knowledge of it. It is not that the paradox applies, but to a complex claim to social authority, the duty of believing in a doctrine of salvation that forms an essential part of the dominant system.

The conscious and social integration

Two consequences follow from this situation. In the first place, rationalism is continually invading new fields, and even the nature of man, his social institutions and values, turn out to be accessible to rational analysis. The knowledge thus acquired has permanently affected our attitude to the world in which we live. Implicit in all statements based on the rationalist principle is that they can be tested and corrected by observation. The process of rational discovery is dynamic and never-ending. The critical method takes the ground from under the feet of the social authoritarianism that claims an absolute validity that must not be submitted to examination. In accordance with the claim to represent truths immune from criticism, authoritarian institutions resting on this principle have always tended to trace their genealogy back to divine actions. Criticism of them has been treated as sacrilege, and to anticipate conflict in this field educational practice has sought to impose inhibitions on the freedom of thought.

The second consequence concerns affective behaviour. Rational criticism is not, as neo-mythologists have claimed, hostile to affect. Understanding is not an enemy of the 'feelings', but it does stand in the way of emotional logic. Metaphysically based authoritarianism uses this emotional logic; in other words, it admits rationalization to the service of its own interests. Critical rationalism has no metaphysical certitudes to

offer, but it is capable of striving for understanding in fields in which powerful instinctual wishes or guilty fears are at work and behaviour that — in the general view — may seem natural, even though crude and repellent, may be near the point of discharge. Its potentialities for exercising such control should not be underrated as a factor in social security. What all this leads to is the question of how man will manage without projecting his group-specific social organizations — the family structure based on undisputed paternal authority, for instance — on a world scale. What will a society that in this sense will be fatherless, that is, not controlled by a mythical father and his terrestrial representatives, look like? The question could be more confidently left for the future if in the long history of paternalism societies so much instinctual life had not been treated repressively; instinctual wishes thus removed from the influence of the critical ego periodically broke through the social framework with varying degrees of murderousness and destructivity. This method of socialization, associated with present-day technical aids, may cost the life of the whole human species. That is why the split-mindedness mentioned above is now a major source of danger. To deny this would be a neurotic response to the situation rather than an attitude worthy of the critical conscious. Thus everything depends on whether the forces of consciousness developed by the evolutionary process can reach full development before the simultaneously produced release of instinctual drives results in catastrophe.

In a less repressive society, less subject to magical modes of thought, better integrated, and with a more fully developed conscious, the authority of the code of behaviour will have a form and function different from any that we can yet imagine. We, however, are concerned with the social order, not just from the point of view of the historical process in the narrower sense, but from that of the development of life as a whole. The authority of the mythical traditions is no longer sufficient to bring about a social integration of mass society; its ultimate outcome is (not?/FK) always dictatorship.

Evolution becomes conscious of itself

Let us therefore spend a little more time seeing what evolutionary theory has to suggest on the subject. First of all it must be borne in mind that 'the notion of evolution is by now not solely a theory about certain processes which may go on in the living world, but is one of the essential dimensions within which biological thought must take place'.¹ Julian Huxley considers that there have been 'two critical points in the past of evolution ... the first was marked by the passage from the inorganic phase to the biological, the second by that from the biological

to the psycho-social'. First, in the sub-human sphere, theretook place the formation of patterns of behaviour innate and specific to the species — what used to be called instincts — and then man appeared with his conscious and his individual learning of a social pattern of behaviour. 'Today, in the twentieth century, the evolutionary process is at last becoming conscious of itself, and is beginning to study itself with a view to directing its future course.'² This stage is plainly marked by consciously purposive tendencies, while the finality of development of the non-human evolutionary processes remains subject to dispute. If human evolution becomes conscious and within limits controllable, scepticism about teleological thinking, at any rate so far as this sphere of life is concerned, loses its justification. On the contrary, full attention must be paid to its aims. Responsibility grows with increased awareness of the consequences involved.

Heredity, like education, can be regarded functionally as an information transmission system. 'In the sub-human world this transmission of what we may call, in a general sense, "information", is carried out by the passing on of hereditary units or genes contained in the germ cells. Man, alone among animals, has developed this extra-genetic mode of transmission to a state where it rivals and indeed exceeds the genetic mode in importance.'³ Waddington, like Portmann, uses the ability to fry to illustrate the transition from one method to the other. 'Man acquired the ability to fly not by any noteworthy change in the store of genes available to the species, but by the transmission of information through the cumulative mechanism of social teaching and learning.' Consequently he 'developed a socio-genetic or psychosocial mechanism of evolution which overlies, and often overrides, the biological mechanism depending solely on genes. Man is not merely an animal which reasons and talks, and has therefore developed a rational mentality which other animals lack. His faculty for conceptual thinking and communication has provided him with what amounts to a completely new mechanism for the most fundamental process of all, that of evolution.' Thus release from genetically anchored information and development of 'socio-genetic transmission of information by teaching and learning'⁴ mark a third critical phase in the evolutionary process.

In other words, the solution of this truly vital problem is associated with the process of civilization, that is, progressively conscious control of socio-genetic behaviour.

Two converging sciences

It is interesting to note how findings in different scientific fields are beginning to converge. Freud's dynamic psychology fits in admirably with the views of the evolutionists. His view that the ego developed out of the id is a statement about evolution. The id, the whole field of unconscious mental activity, belongs historically to the sub-human phase of psycho-social development, in which behaviour is determined by genetically transmitted information of an instinctual nature. But the appearance of the ego, the supervention of the conscious mind, did not take place at one blow, nor did the new method of transmitting information eliminate its historical predecessor. The ego functions superimposed themselves upon the existing systems very slowly, and partially changed them in the process. In this connection Freud's observation that the nucleus of the ego remains unconscious is of great importance. The social learning processes take place to a great extent below the threshold of consciousness; above all, they begin in infancy, when the conscious critical faculties are still very weak. On top of that it must be borne in mind that the factors we have summarized under the heading of affective and social education have an inherent tendency to fall into stereotyped patterns, to automatization. Thus they relapse into the preconscious or completely unconscious field and are to a greater or lesser degree beyond the influence of the critical conscious. The super-ego, or ego ideal, which Freud once called a stage towards the ego,⁵ is a kind of precipitate of the experience of social authority and a centre of behavioural integration which receives and transmits information to a large extent unconsciously. This preliminary stage of the ego is also very difficult to influence consciously.

Opposite forces are at work at two levels. The intellectual achievements of the ego have created powerful aids for humanity. For the first time in history technology has made it possible for men to live in increasing freedom from material want. This creates conditions that allow the critical ego to bind an increasing proportion of instinctual energy and subject it to its aims. On the other hand, the technical aids themselves become powerful allies of impulses alien to the ego. This is all too evident in the political methods of threat and deterrence.

The same opposite tendencies reappear at the level of the super-ego; here too impulses are bound and directed to social aims and behavior patterns. Without inner guidance the promptings of which seem patently right we should hardly be able to orient ourselves among our fellow-men. But the patent rightness of this guidance hobbles us

when it succeeds in enlisting us for destructive trends when these arise in our society, and our sense of adherence to the community (the result of the influence of the super-ego) turns us into dangerous aids of impulses alien to the ego. The outcome of all this is that we have to accept as a fact the coexistence of levels of organization in our behaviour and selffeeling that derive from different stages of evolution. But we must try to admit this to ourselves as plainly as possible.

The protestant line

Nevertheless we must not overlook the fact that our historical period confronts us with special tasks. One of them is facing on a reality basis new situations for which there is either no historical precedent or — just as important — for which traditional solutions are inapplicable if immeasurable disaster is not to ensue. Thus the extension of our critical conscious is our most urgent need. A larger proportion of our behaviour must be determined by insight and reflection than has hitherto been the case in social life as a whole.

This can be brought about only by education. The striking feature of the situation is that the great obstacle in the path of an extension of our conscious is traditional education — its deficiencies in the affective field in comparison with its high development in that of imparting knowledge. Social education is to a large extent dominated by archaic models. This involves the ascendancy of stereotyped values and expressions of affect in the very field in which examination of the facts and of the self are becoming increasingly indispensable. The highly respected institutions that transmit such systems of orientation bar the way to awareness of the altered situation. The historical form that they took has — like an inherited behaviour pattern anchored in the genes — proved to be incapable of adapting itself to new conditions; and this is another instance in which a return to a condition of greater plasticity and a fresh start seem impossible. Like a sense organ that has lost the capacity to adapt itself to a new kind of stimulus, their sensibility is blind to the substance of the new conflicts. Just as the eye reacts only to a limited range of light waves, so the historically developed organs of society perceive only a limited range of the factors and combinations of factors that govern human behaviour in the social field and in relation to themselves.

Ever increasing density of population imposes functional conformities in everyday life. But at the level of decision that goes beyond (though it reacts on) everyday life the cultivation of a protestant spirit among the majority is required in order to counteract the inertia of social institutions. A

protestant spirit in this context means the determination to defend a newly acquired scrap of critical freedom of thought against external pressure to conform and internal fear. That was the distinguishing feature of Protestantism when the word and the thing entered history, and there is no reason why the same term should not be applied to later stages of the development of the conscious. As in the age of religious protestants, we are concerned with enlightenment — the words *post tenebras lux* are inscribed over the tiny window of the protestant chapel at Les Baux — and with the incursion of personal responsibility into spheres previously left to authority, whether that of a personal deity, a divinely approved social system, or a father or father-figure who is above criticism.

After a brief reevaluation during the fifties, two words have again acquired distinctly derogatory associations in our country; these are 'liberal' and 'rational', and this applies particularly when the function of reason is being discussed and the word 'rational' is used. The levels of the personality that are older in the evolutionary scale gladly take their stand on 'brains' in so far as the individual's career and personal prestige are concerned, but they do not take kindly to thought. It is, however, to these older levels of experience that the formation of social character is left; individuals come to terms with each other, and society comes to terms with them, at a level of simpler psychical processes, a level of fantasy. The critical testing of reality is neglected, consciously by-passed, or for unconscious reasons avoided. It is rational to apply the critical conscious to information communicated by dream or faith; it is irrational, and dangerously misleading, to fail to see that the nonrational attitude to life is a fact of the greatest importance in man's historical development. At this point liberalism comes into play. There are obviously many and various beliefs that man acquired nonrationally. To be tolerant of them is liberal; to adopt a critical attitude towards them, or at any rate to claim the right to do so, is rational. In the critical phase of evolution through which we are passing it is hard to see what other attitude to adopt to the multiplicity of demands on our belief and the survival and coexistence of many different outlooks. The often individual, often institutional, and in the recent past socially imposed discrimination against liberalism and the rational examination of reality (including self-examination) will not deter us from applying both to the field of social psychology.

Lack of sharp outline of human roles

From the long-range view of evolution let us now return to the immediate social environment. The picture as seen by the participant is often bewilderingly complicated and at the same time monotonous. It is bewildering because of the continual surprise effects of actual situations. On the one hand, widespread freedom from obligatory behaviour patterns allows divergencies of impulse, interest, belief, feelings, opinion, and prejudice to arise in inexhaustible variety. On the other, the extent to which the actors are bound to their roles contributes to the monotony; they are bound to them to a far greater extent than their self-esteem relishes.

The interest of both theoretical and empirical sociologists has in recent years to a large extent been concentrated on the roles, role stereotypes, role status, and other aspects of behaviour arising from imitation, identification, or, as it is often called in the latest literature, introjection. Our purpose is to try to understand the ontogenetic processes involved in assuming roles, that is, to analyse the part played by them in human life. We shall be able to look at a few examples only, and it will be left to the reader to supplement them from his own experience; also to a certain extent we shall inevitably be steering a zigzag course between human and animal role behaviour.

The lack of definition of human role behaviour will be reflected in our survey. It is tempting to say that fixity of role is in inverse proportion to humanity; that the more human behaviour is, the less it consists of mere role fulfilment. But that would be a misleading generalization. For even the human freedom to attain critical detachment is not absolute; it has to be attained from the standpoint of some role. Maturity of the ego presupposes adaptation.

Roles as signals

This will be shown by our first example. The individual may gain a distinct sense of freedom from the decisions and choices he makes in the course of his work or in satisfying his consumer needs. In politics people show much less freedom; they are less flexible, and their opinions are more tied to their environment, while, so far as religion is concerned, in the great majority of cases the individual remains in the religion into which he was born. But, apart from the objective limitations of his income, there may be restrictions on his freedom of choice even among the wealth of consumer goods at his disposal. The head of a big hospital, for instance, for many years drove a car in the middle price range, while his assistants drove cheaper models. When he at last decided to buy a car that accorded with the consumption standards of his social status, his sub-

ordinates sighed with relief, because they were at last able to buy the cars in the middle price range that seemed appropriate to them. In the United States, where a secularized industrial society is still characterized by a strict Puritan class hierarchy, it is taken for granted that directors' secretaries buy their clothes from the best store in town, while the secretaries of heads of departments buy theirs from the next best, and so on. Thus the new status levels are strictly reflected in the field of prestige consumption goods. This goes much deeper than is implied by the saying that 'clothes make the man'; cars, clubs, restaurants, residential neighbourhoods, are not only amenities but also essential elements in the individual's self-regard. They define his status in his own eyes as well as in those of others.

It is not easy in the course of everyday life to tell where individual freedom and independence begins and role-dictated behaviour ends; it depends on what is meant by freedom and independence. Our definition is that it is the ability before deciding and acting to detach oneself from role demands, demarcations, valuations, etc., even under the pressure of affect. It should be added that detachment is also required in relation to our own feelings; we must, for instance, be able to admit the anxiety that divergent behaviour is capable of rousing in us.

In the choices we make in the course of everyday life we seldom or never have a simple, one-dimensional relationship to the environment. The head of the hospital who came to the reasonable conclusion that a cheap car was good enough for him may at the same time have

established another status privilege for himself by way of 'non-verbal communication', indicating that it would be inappropriate for his subordinate colleagues to own cars more expensive than his, for this would have disturbed the ranking order. Alternatively, if cars were not associated in his mind with prestige and seniority and the whole thing was a matter of total indifference to him, his colleagues were unable to claim the same scrap of freedom for themselves by choosing cars that accorded with their tastes and income.

Possessions as signals

The world of consumer goods is new territory that is being perpetually extended. It is evident enough that the libidinal cathexis of these goods is high and that they are felt to be an enrichment of the individual's self-regard. It is also evident that to the ego this new territory plays the same part as historically older forms of possession, that is, is associated with the

individual's status and ranking order. Whether his extracting their full practical value from these new possessions makes him freer is at least open to question. The domestic use of electric light, for instance, being available to everybody at a cost well within his means, has lost its status-signalling value and has become purely a matter of convenience. But that cannot be said of innumerable other so-called consumer goods (cars, carpets, one's residential neighbourhood, etc.); and it seems Utopian to look forward to a technical Elysium in which the libidinal cathexis of such things will have been so reduced that all the products of industry will provide a similarly unnoticed background.

The development of industrial society in fact shows a trend in the opposite direction. Powerful social forces take hold of these new goods and superimpose on their utilitarian value a symbolic meaning indicating status and social role. There are, of course, natural differences between men, their natural abilities vary, and in particular their capacity to develop. The latter means making an advance in freedom, and advice or instruction on how to achieve or practise that can hardly be given (though it cannot be achieved except against the background of the social context). But there seems no doubt that even the idea of individuality is extremely rare. Most men's view of their own identity is completely governed by their role; freed of the attributes of their role and their prestige possessions, their concept of themselves turns out to be very vague indeed. The significance of role behaviour and of the external attributes of roles as guiding lines for the formation of self-feeling can hardly be exaggerated.

The individual as role

This problem, strangely enough, tends to be evaded by social psychology. The only conclusion to which examination of it leads is that the sense of individuality cultivated by our culture is a highly idealized and actually hollow one. The key question is: What is the social function of this idealization? The answer is that it is to reassure the individual by suborning him into acceptance of group standards, saturating him, often corrupting him, with the possessions or power that give status and prestige within the group. The mere fact that those who live lives relatively independent of the group tend to be dismissed as oddities, outsiders, Bohemians, ascetics, etc., in other words persons of doubtful conformity, points to the difficulty of solutions adequate to the ego.

Individuals who become heroes are in the last resort invariably stylized as servants of society, even though they suffered painfully under it dur-

ing their lifetime. Hofstätter" paraphrases as follows the previously mentioned observation by Gardner Murphy⁷: 'We might perhaps arrive at a definition of individuality within the framework of social connections; the individual would then be a knot or relatively outstanding point in a supra-individual network. But such an attitude is remote from our present cultural inclinations.' Science can hardly allow itself to be guided by what is pleasing to our 'inclinations', that is, our group habits of mind. If the question is subjected to closer examination, as it has been, and very effectively, by industrial psychologists, for instance, the proposition that Hofstätter and Murphy cautiously stated in the conditional is confirmed. The 'man in the street' is very remote indeed from the ideal of himself projected by bourgeois individualism. He is group-guided in every facet of his affective attitudes, is satisfied with his role as agent of various group requirements, and has neither inclination for nor understanding of making independent decisions. • The reason why social psychologists are so hesitant to advance into this field may lie chiefly in the fact that the artificiality of the ideal superstructure (the individual has normally been exhaustively described when all the groups to which he belongs are known) points inevitably to its lack of substance; and this ideal superstructure is also specific to the group. No one willingly exposes himself to the charge of making such 'destructive' criticism, because ostracism has lost none of its terrors in modern times. Nevertheless the situation is that the fragile achievements of the ego are possible in the last resort only in a relatively free society in which it is permissible to criticize not only objective situations but also the taboos that aspire to no less than prescribing the self's own attitude to the self.

Roles as the enemy of understanding

It follows from what we have said about the third critical phase of evolution, the step from the sub-human socio-genetic mechanism of behaviour control to the conscious level, that the identification with our roles to which we are all more or less subject indicates the survival of ties with older forms of organization. But for the possibility of conscious orientation, the challenge arising from the development of life itself, human society would not be what it is. Nevertheless role-ridden individual life leaves open a gap in communication. A striking instance of this, illustrating what we mean better than any abstract description, is provided by typical conversation between adults and children.

The child is not yet familiar with social roles, and is therefore far more individual than the adults

surrounding it. The fashion in which the latter bend down and talk to it often shows a shattering lack of capacity for intuitive understanding, empathy. They project upon the living creature confronting them a role image of the child as transmitted by society. The artificial tone of voice, the demonstrative display of affection, the false identification with the child's interests and its play world, are all intended to overcome the actual inability to communicate; and the negative look in the child's eyes, its non-comprehension, is misinterpreted also.

At the same time the child, who has to learn social forms in order to bridge the gap in understanding between it and its environment, is thrown back on these models. It *has* to identify itself with them, and thus increasingly loses its spirit of free quest.

At the same time, over and above its inner struggles with its introjected behaviour patterns, there remains a sense of frustration, a feeling that something is lacking. Adults in speaking of their youth often say they never really knew their father or their mother, or both. Even in the intimacy of the home, role behaviour often stands in the way of understanding the child's more individual characteristics, the searching, uncertain, immature, or sometimes selfish and rebellious behaviour by which it seeks to establish itself in relation both to itself and to others. These outbursts are either all too quickly dovetailed into role stereotypes, or suppressed, or — which is just as bad — passively and impotently accepted by the parents, or not noticed by them. The possibilities of misunderstanding range all the way from brutal repression to unobservant indifference. The father may represent stern or mild authority to the child, but his ideas, anxieties or failures, the temptations he succumbs to or resists, are practically never discussed between parents and children, because such subjects are 'unsuitable' for the latter, and their discussion is regarded as inconsistent with the parental role. Instead the model held out for the fallible individual to follow is of a mythical, idealized father, immune to error, temptation, anxiety, etc., with a resultant loss of contact, or at any rate silence where there should be speech, and loss of knowledge which the individual badly needs for his self-orientation, as is made only too plain from his retrospective regret. There is, however, also another factor which is lost sight of, namely, that the lack of hereditary co-ordinated behaviour inevitably leads to misunderstandings. The tendency to assume social roles, like the learning tendency, compensates for the lack of innate behaviour patterns. As we have mentioned, in the animal world these patterns, in so far as they relate to social behaviour, are genetically fixed. The animal's learning capacity does not extend into

the social sphere, and misunderstandings are rare, though they occur; the male and female common raven, for instance, have identical plumage, and sometimes a male makes advances to another male by mistake. Conversely, in the human world many roles have become ossified for the purpose of preventing intuitive understanding in situations in which this might lead to confusion and disarray. This applies to all rigidly disciplined organizations, and also in diplomacy. The incumbent of the role is expected to experience the actual situation schematically. He reacts to any diversion from the prescribed pattern of behaviour by others in accordance with the prescribed ritual, imposes conformity, hands out punishments, makes *demarches*, etc., etc. Thus in these fields the learning process ends by abolishing itself.

Precariousness of learnt role behaviour

If the word 'instinct' is used in the vague sense of ordinary speech ('my instinct tells me that ...'), it can be stated that this instinct imposes upon men the direction of their object choice, but is not geared to that of the other party. Sometimes we read in the newspaper of a child beaten to death by its parent or parents, or left to starve or die, and indignantly we ask ourselves how such things can be possible. Such extreme cases are of course rare, and it is hard to understand how a mother — even more than a father — can offend so deeply against her 'natural' feelings or be so lacking in them as to be untouched by her child's plight and not rush to its protection. But, if we consider the innumerable situations in which children are harshly told to keep quiet, or have obedience imposed on them by threats or blows, or are subjected to adults' irritable moods, and if we also consider that hardly any adults are completely innocent of this abuse of their power, it becomes clear that there is a whole range of affective outbursts leading up to such extremes. The latter are singled out by the penal code, but they have much in common with the ordinary experiences of a large number of children. And it must be added in this connection that lack of guidance for the child, parental indifference or passive non-understanding, leads to just as pathological a condition, to the development of the same asocial characteristics, as does authoritarian intimidation. The attitude of parents is a permanent source of danger to the child far exceeding that of chance external accident. Violence or unobservant self-absorption on the part of the adult disturbs the equitable, protective, emotional relationship on which human beings depend during their prolonged childhood. The remnants of the innate nursing instinct that

manifest themselves in love of the child can, as experience demonstrates, easily be overpowered by other drives, which may turn the child into an object of unbridled hate or cause it to be neglected in a spirit of deep indifference. To appreciate the chaos of contradictory impulses to which man is subject we need only recall Rousseau, the prophet of the Enlightenment and of the return to nature, who is said to have handed over six of his children to a foundling hospital.⁹ Those who have frequent occasion to listen to people talking of their childhood see how the experiences of that time are reflected in them. They frequently have to listen, for instance, to stories of fearful paternal punishments for minor misdemeanours, many of which enter the victims' memory like brutal execution scenes. In its impotence the child experiences the punishment as overwhelming proof of its guilt and shame; it feels expelled, robbed of its parents' love and protection. The parent who inflicts the punishment — if it is the mother, the effect on the young child is even greater — assumes in the child's mind a violent, inhuman, demonic form. If one learns this from the child and later has the opportunity of discussing the incident with the parents, it is easy to decide that the real picture was far more innocuous. But that would be a mistake. The child cannot feel its way into the adult world, for it lacks the experience; the adult, though generally only with difficulty, can feel his way back into the world of the child. The latter is still ignorant of the grown-up world and its motivations, all it experiences is the immediate situation, the enormous disparity between its own and adult strength, which indeed, as we know, can in extreme cases lead to the death of the weaker. In the brutal process of punishment the child feels a direct and immediate fear of death which the **angry** parents totally fail to take into account; alternatively they soothe their conscience by saying that that was the last thing they intended. But their true intentions are undiscoverable to a child confronted with a grown-up who is 'beside himself'; all he is aware of is the state of 'being beside oneself', and a parent in this state is no longer the known, familiar figure, but a demonic stranger who strikes terror, the terror of death; and the terror is further intensified by the fact that the child's natural refuge when it is afraid, its parents, have now been suddenly transformed into this alien shape.

The effect on the child of this alienation in affective excitation is that the familiar role identification is split; the familiar individual has been suddenly transformed into a terrifying stranger. The child is still far from secure in his role identifications; one has only to recall the simple measures needed to dis-

guise oneself from a child and become unrecognizable to it.

This affective alienation is a highly important basic social experience for the child, who for its normal development requires constancy of aspect in the individuals in close contact with it. If they periodically become alien under the influence of certain stimuli, the child will introject the split as part of the identification process — another instance of how tradition can be unconsciously passed on. The consequences are grave. The child will be no less terrified by the suddenness and strangeness of its own impulses and physical experiences (of pain, for instance) than by affective **storms** from without. The process of fitting the former into a 'body ego' (like that of adaptation to the rules of the group) has not yet been completed; the limited experience appropriate to its age makes them **seem just as** terrifying and **uncanny as many** of the non-understood events in the outside world. The introjects of its inconstant models associate themselves in its unconscious with its own frightening physical experiences. Thus the adult who 'loses control of himself' becomes the model for the primitive role behaviour by which the child tries to discharge its own impulses. But there is another social rule which says *guod licec govi non licec govi*, and the child is punished for this assimilation.

The Roles and Masks

A role, in short, is a pattern of behaviour in relation to others. Every role is to an extent a mask, a prefabricated one, that the individual either actively assimilates or passively adapts himself to. There are circumstances of two different kinds in which he may drop the mask: i) when he is overcome by affect, or impulses representing it; and (u) in a conflict situation when his conscience and individual ego attainments, that is, his critical conscious, cause him to step out from behind it and respond to a situation in a spontaneous and improvised fashion, whether mastering it or being mastered by it. In the first case the controls (which we attribute to the ego) vanish and impulses previously fought off upset the role pattern of behaviour, while in the second case the ego succeeds in bringing about a change in preconscious and unconscious patterns of stimulation and response, both in values and in action. An important place in all the conceivable combinations and forms of assimilation between individual characteristics and pre-existing role patterns is occupied by the accuracy of the information-processing of which the individual is capable — that is to say, the firmness of his sense of identity in the environment to which he belongs. We must be careful, however, not to oversimplify the picture. Firmness of identity can be bought at the cost of great sacrifice of the individual's inner organiza-

tion. This is always the case when he has to defend his identity, his self, against violent impulses (and their organization by primitive introjects). In this event adherence to 'roles' must be regarded as an equally primitive form of defence; the role patterns then used generally include the judgements of value, the prejudices, needed by the ego to keep down the unruly impulses disapproved of by convention, and the forces of the ego are completely used up in the task of stabilizing such compulsive role behaviour. Compulsive behaviour (even when inwardly directed in the form of obsessional ideas and fantasies) is a caricature of the kind of role behaviour that succeeds both in warding off and satisfying inner drives. A functional unity of anxiety and repetition-compulsion is a distortion of the latter. True, it is the deepest motivation of any role, but it is also that of the innumerable pathological obsessional features encountered in daily life, ranging all the way to obsessional illness. On the other hand, unreliability and outbursts of affect point to weak ego control, and thus to a fragmentary identity. The reality-testing ego is easily submerged in a 'pleasure ego', which in a stimulus situation yields to impulses regardless of social considerations.

Compulsive role playing in the service of an (unconscious) super-ego and compulsive drives practically unhampered by consideration for others often coexist in the same person. Abrupt transitions from one to the other (from behaviour guided by the super-ego to that guided by the id) endanger the smooth development of the ego during the natural crises of the phases of growth; and the danger is increased when this coexistence achieves social recognition and general approval as a respected type of role. The imago of the authoritarian personality, the perverted form of author that is so widespread, is marked by this alternation between compulsive behaviour and outbursts of affect; and when the two characteristics are idealized by society, one as just severity and the other as strength, a most unfavourable climate has been established for development of the capacities of the ego. Looking back at the stages of evolution, it can be said that patterns of behaviour were encouraged that became structuralized unconsciously. Regressions to this state and survivals of such archaic regulation of social behaviour are numerous both in individual and in collective history. The character-development that takes in these **circumstances** is only partially or not at all ego-syntonic; strictly speaking, it is role-syntonic.

We cannot here digress to the extent of giving a full picture of the processes of mental development that take place under the influence of an authoritarian environment. Psycho-analysis has shown that in these circumstances infantile paranoid anxieties receive a strong

charge of affect from alienating models and enter the character as fixed attitudes to life. The consequence of this is that infantile defence measures against an alien and threatening inner and outer world cannot be given up, perhaps for a whole lifetime. An important method of getting rid of these anxieties is similarly infantile, namely, projecting disturbing or dangerous feelings into the outside world. Here lie the roots of prejudice.

Transfiguration of the past

An ideal relationship between child and adults would thus be free from excessively abrupt changes of mood and affective action on the one hand and from strained rigidity of attitude on the other. It is an ideal which can never be completely attained. Fortunately, the child has plenty of toleration for variations in the affective climate, though these are not helpful to the establishment of the atmosphere of intimacy and confidence which is indispensable to the development of what Erik Erikson calls the 'basic trust'^o which the child needs as the background of all its future ventures into the world.

There is one symptom of a disturbance of this basic trust that can readily be perceived. Many people speak of their childhood as of a golden age. There are, of course, plenty of people who really had a predominantly happy childhood, which invariably means that their parents felt their way into their world, interests, needs, and anxieties, and treated them understandingly. But those who propagate the myth of their conflict-free childhood are often persons of striking rigidity of character who have all sorts of difficulties in life and suffer from anxieties and physical complaints — in short, are unhappy and discontented. Their story does not ring true and, if one probes deeper, quite a different picture emerges, often very slowly and accompanied by great anxiety and guilt, and it appears that in their childhood they suffered from severity, lack of understanding, and loneliness. Such was their plight that in retrospect it had to be repudiated, denied, idealized, transfigured.

The child and later the adult sought to obtain relief by thus distorting reality, identifying himself in his helplessness with the hostile and infinitely stronger punishing agency. In this situation the child feels himself to be worthless and bad and his severe parents to be good. They tell him innumerable times that their intentions are for the best and, indeed, according to their lights that may be true, and the child ends by rejecting all memory of the times when he was alone and his parents filled him with mortal fear instead of coming to his aid.

He feels himself to be bad, to have deserved his parents' severity. If they punished him, it was because he was bad, disobedient, lazy, careless. They were right. In the next phase of memory distortion, the child has become the good child his parents wanted him to be, with the result that they had no need ever to be angry with him.

This enforced harmony does the child no good. Of course his conflicts seem to have been resolved; if one had good parents and was oneself good and obedient, one's childhood must have been happy. All memory of suffering fades from the mind, or is repressed. But the reality of those early experiences, which make an impact the magnitude of which it is almost impossible to exaggerate, continues to exercise its baneful effect. It remains as a memory-trace behind the 'identification with the aggressor'," and determines, not only the psychical defence mechanisms which enable the growing personality to conceal from itself the anxiety and impotent hate feelings of its childhood, but also and above all its pattern of expectation. Whenever in later life the individual is confronted with superiors or interiors, his old, now hidden experiences, the fears he never overcame, his disturbing wishes, will seek to emerge. Thus history repeats itself. It is truly a vicious circle. For the adult who was so treated in childhood will, without being conscious of it — and it is not so easy for him to become conscious of it — 'avenge himself' on his own children for his childhood sufferings, which is precisely what his own parents did to him. Once again we are brought face to face with the traditional nature of affective patterns of behaviour. Having been imposed too early in the child's development, subsequently they cling too firmly, and in many circumstances are unshakable. The ego has learnt to submit to them.

The overburdened mother

Thus the relative underdevelopment of hereditary patterns of social behaviour in man makes it possible for misunderstandings to occur even in the primary relationship between mother and child. When there is a clash between the maternal and other, particularly narcissistic, impulses, the conflict is especially deep. The idealization of the maternal role in society's taboos indicates that in the interest of the survival of the species the mother-child relationship has to be buttressed by social regulation, and also that this is often not sufficient, and that deficiencies have therefore to be covered up by idealization.

There is also the consideration that the mother-child relationship is being loosened by social developments. The continually increasing employ-

ment of women in industry and mounting standards of living are not the only factors. This process has long since been motivated not only by practical considerations but also to a large extent by conformist pressures to establish status; the signalling of this by the possession of prestige-giving consumer goods is thus a contributory factor. The shift of emphasis from the possession of land to the possession of mobile consumer goods throughout the population has been accompanied by the transformation of family relationships under the influence of industrial production and urbanization. A small family, consisting of parents and children only, normally lives in a confined, relatively isolated, cell-like space, side by side with similar families in similar accommodation. This means that members of the family are more closely penned up together than in the past, which puts a greater strain on emotional relations between mother and child. In comparison with village conditions, which (without showing them in an unduly favourable light) can be said to have offered a relatively constant environment for thousands of years, the area of the known and emotionally familiar has notably shrunk so far as the town child is concerned. Opportunities of escape to other members of the family are more restricted. In other words, the whole ambivalent emotional tension of the child is predominantly concentrated on the mother, who often feels overburdened by this and feels more ambivalently towards the child in consequence. Also having children involves giving up work, reduces the family earning power, puts the mother back into a position of greater financial dependence, and subjects her to ties which, in view of the social trend to freedom of choice (in consumption and use of leisure), she feels to be a great and often unfair sacrifice. To a greater or lesser extent the child becomes the object on which she discharges her unpleasure tensions. Making light of the overcharging of the mother-child relationship inherent in our social development, or putting on a Madonna-like pedestal the often impatient, irritable mother who feels chained to her duties, may suffice for the aims of idealism and wishful thinking, but makes life easier neither for mothers nor for children. True, it saves society the feeling that it should change itself.

It would, however, be oversimplifying matters to relate the tensions between mother or parents and child only to present environmental changes, though these are no doubt becoming more acute. In relation to the child's insatiable demands, failures of parental response are inevitable, and the best and the most unselfish parents must be expected to be endowed with some 'bad' aspects in the

child's fantasy world. The overpermissiveness with which some parents treat their children in order to reassure themselves hampers the process of social maturation no less than does neglect.

Animals and men

Let us return to the observation with which we began this chapter. In the field of sub-human evolution the fixed regulatory mechanisms of instinctual behaviour are related to a relatively constant environment, or rather they developed in such an environment. With man the capacity actively to transform the environment appeared on the scene. In recent years this has been making advances with explosive speed. Unstable regulation of inner drives, conscious understanding of reality, the 'tool brain' and with it the ability to bring about controlled change of the environment, all interact. Experiments with animals make shatteringly clear the disturbances of biophysical equilibrium which are henceforward inevitable. Cultural patterns of behaviour provide safeguards against excessive dissociation between individuals with insecure drives and their environment. When an experimenter arbitrarily changes an animal's environment, which the animal is not capable of doing itself, he artificially establishes such dissociation; in other words, he establishes a situation of human type; and it is astonishing to see primates, for instance, producing reactions familiar to us from human psychopathology, that is to say, demonstrating abnormal mental behaviour which can be regarded as an attempt to cope with intolerable psychological stress. When a human child is overwhelmed by fear and despair at a stage at which its cerebral maturation and hence the approach to higher levels of mental development are still in a fluid state, its reactions are very similar to those of animals at a comparable stage of development. In the animal kingdom this occurs only when a human experimenter disturbs the natural environment, while in human development it occurs naturally, that is to say, inevitably, as the result of cultural conditions.

The experiments with rhesus monkeys carried out by the American psychologist Harry F. Harlow² have shown this in most interesting fashion. He demonstrated the basic drive that sends the young animal to its mother when it feels in danger, but his experiments went far beyond that familiar fact. He either completely separated young monkeys from their mother at birth or gave them surrogate mothers. The latter were 'welded wire cylindrical forms with the nipple of the feeding-bottle protruding from its "breast" and with a wooden head sur-

mounting it'. Some of the surrogate mothers were 'cosier', covered with terry towelling. The infants developed a strong attachment to the cloth mothers, and took no notice of the wire mothers as long as the former had milk. When it ran out, they would go to the wire mothers to feed, but soon returned. They also always returned to the cloth mothers after expeditions round the cage, especially when something happened to startle them. It could also be shown that the permanent tie was the warm, fur-like feel of the cloth, not the feeding experience, because, when the monkeys were frightened after the cloth mother had been removed from the cage, they never ran to the wire mother, but simply froze in a crouching position. These observations, Harlow says, suggest that man too cannot live on milk alone. In fact, monkeys reared with wire mothers alone never fled to them and their nipples in moments of fear, but threw themselves on the ground, hid their faces in their arms, and shrieked with despair. The warmth and protection of the 'social womb' is essential for normal development.

Harlow's experiments went further, however. Rhesus monkeys reared without mothers or mother-surrogates until they were eight months old did not react to a cloth mother when one was offered to them. This leads to the conclusion that the possibility of the development of the specific affective social contact that we call 'mother love' exists only in a limited, definite period of time. For rhesus monkeys, according to Harlow, the critical period is between the third and the sixth month, and the corresponding period in the human infant is between the sixth and the twelfth month. Subsequently this kind of 'imprinting', as was first demonstrated by Konrad Lorenz in his experiments with ducks, is no longer possible. 'If the child has not learnt to love in this period, it will never learn.' This correspondence of affective needs in the human and animal infant world is supported by observations made by Rene Spitz³ before Harlow's experiments. He observed infants under the age of one brought up in a foundling hospital (in a country which for reasons of discretion we shall not specify). So far as dietetic and hygienic conditions were concerned, there could be no criticism of their treatment, but there were no mothers or mother-surrogates. Each nurse had twenty babies to look after, so that she had no time to establish 'affective contact' with them. They were never picked up, carried out, or rocked, and no one talked to them soothingly and lovingly before and after feedings.

It seems hardly possible to doubt that there was a causal connection between this state of affairs and the shockingly high death rate, the incidence of reactive (anaclitic) depression and of general retardation of development that were to be noted. It seems evident

that during the period of what Portmann calls the 'extra-uterine spring' no problem of 'spoiling' exists. During this period the infant is entitled to ask for everything and need do nothing in return. Premature training routines on the reward-and-punishment principle do harm at this stage. By reason of its exceptionally early birth the human infant needs care and attention that quickly gets rid of unpleasure tensions by many routes. The human mother, like the rhesus mother, must always be available as a refuge when the infant experiences unpleasure, otherwise the consequence is mistrust. Only by the satisfaction of its needs in the 'primary love' relationship between mother and child does the latter acquire the fundamental experience of social 'basic trust' as the deepest foundation for its experience of life.

Erik Erikson⁴ regards dealing with this 'conflict between basic trust and basic mistrust' as a task with which man in his struggle with his environment is confronted throughout his life. Only when a secure foundation of basic trust enables him to resolve the conflict can his affective relationships, in psychoanalytic terminology his object relationships, be firm and stable; and it provides the most favourable conditions for an unhampered development of the intelligence and the ego and for an attitude of curiosity that will persist in adult life. However, 'the sum of the trust derived from the child's earliest experiences does not seem to depend only on the quantity of food and love, but also on the quality of the bond with the mother. A trustful attitude will be aroused by care which combines sympathetic satisfaction of the baby's individual needs with a strong sense of the mother's personal dependability within the tried and tested framework of her environment. The basis of a feeling of identity forms here.'⁵ Those who have not had this experience of dependability clearly have great difficulty in gaining a growing understanding of their own identity through the turbulent years of development. Harlow's and Spitz's observations make it plain that deprivations of social and emotional exchange in infancy not only create a real danger of collapse of the psychosomatic regulators, of emotional death by starvation, but also, even when this extreme situation does not ensue, cause irreparable damage to the capacity for making human contact. Monkeys that grew up under quasi-human conditions to the extent that they survived the loss of their mother (which in their natural environment would not occur), or were thrown back on an artificial mother-surrogate, which can be regarded as the equivalent of a human mother alienated from her child, subsequently developed defective reactions exactly equivalent to those of their human counterparts. It should be added that in human beings these defects cannot be remedied by specifically ego attainments,

for instance, intelligence and understanding. Intelligence and understanding are impotent against such damage. Harlow's further observations supply direct experimental confirmation of the psycho-analytic theories that postulate the formative significance of early emotional experiences for the whole of subsequent mental development. This was of course for long regarded as absurd, the more so the more the regulative force of unconscious mental processes was denied. But since Harlow's experiments scepticism about the psycho-analytic theory of infantile traumatization as the foundation of subsequent psychic and psychosomatic disturbance can hardly be maintained.

Meanwhile Harlow's rhesus monkeys, as he has reported,⁷ have grown into mature animals in the best of physical condition. In spite of that, they show no inclination whatever to normal mating behaviour. Even when introduced into a larger group of animals that grew up in normal conditions, their attitude of total uninterest remains unchanged. They neither show any spontaneous sexual interest of their own, nor do they respond adequately to the advances of other animals. Harlow's theory that the child must learn to love in early infancy in order to be capable of love in later life is confirmed by the consistent absence of sexual excitability in the sexually mature animal. Harlow assumes this to be a consequence of its motherlessness. He states that the mother must have some subtle way of communicating the ability to indulge in normal sexual behaviour.' And that is not all. It appears from a preliminary communication by Harlow (1961) that a female monkey brought up in a wire cage without a mother and several brought up with surrogate mothers were finally induced to mate, though their behaviour did not resemble that of wild monkeys. So far two of them had produced offspring. But both the motherless female and the female brought up with the surrogate mother responded abnormally; their reactions ranged from 'indifference to outright abuse', or they 'reacted not at all to their newborn infant, though the latter reacted normally to them'. They never looked at it, but 'stared into space'. The motherless female removed the child from her belly or back with the same indifference with which she would remove a fly, and her behaviour displayed a striking resemblance to that of a completely affect-free human schizophrenic.

Thus, as we have said, Harlow artificially reproduced the process of dissociation that follows interference with instinctive behaviour patterns, here that between mother and child. In the animal kingdom this dissociation does not occur naturally. In the human field it is natural, and is corrected by the social pattern of behaviour, but not in a fashion so unambiguous that misunderstandings are excluded, and also not in

any consistent fashion. The standards of infant care change from place to place and from time to time. Bearing in mind Harlow's experiments and Spitz's observations, it must again be emphasized that innate regulatory patterns are sufficient in the case of animals, but not of man. A glance at the multiplicity of disturbances, ranging all the way to the perversions, to which the human capacity for love is subject, at the outbreaks of aggressive anti-social behaviour and the devious paths taken by it, in short, at the amount of neurotic and psychoac illness, reveals how exposed to danger is the human condition in the situation into which it has manoeuvred itself. The challenge of self-awareness thus includes comprehension of the earliest stages of human life, when only one of the parties concerned, the adult, is capable of acting with understanding and insight. Individuals who have suffered the disaster of early deprivation — for instance, neurotic mothers who, because of what went wrong with their own 'imprinting', are unable to understand their own child — by no means constitute the whole of the problem. Standards of behaviour specific to a culture can lead to neurotic distortions en masse. If these make a great impact on the very first social contacts — as by insistence on premature training in cleanliness and punishment in the event of failure — the imprinting effect is practically ineradicable. In the absence of the experience of tenderness the sublimation of aggressive and sexual trends can be attained only with difficulty in later years. Sometimes a person is said, for instance, not to have been granted the gift of tenderness; it was withheld, however, not by nature, but by the human environment.

It is this that so often leads to the failure of later missionary attempts at re-education, whether individual or collective. Rationally it is intelligible enough that it should have been desired to concert a nation that had been capable of the most appalling excesses to a less blind living out of the obviously insatiable urges of its internal cultural tensions. But when one considers the condescension and contempt with which the re-education attempted in Germany some twenty years ago is nowadays referred to, both in public and in private, the truly tragic impotence of mind against non-mind is borne in upon one. In this arrogance which is again springing up everywhere there is no sign of any insight into the motives of the collective trance of those earlier years, which is made the more puzzling by the fact that it so successfully harnessed technical intelligence to its murderous aims. People simply say that no one has any right to teach us anything, they would do better to look to their own middens. It probably cannot even be claimed that this pride is a psychological reaction-formation to the humiliation of total defeat. As in the case of Harlow's motherless monkeys, there seem to be collective character imprints that make people totally unfeeling and insensitive to

wide areas of social reality. The individual is inaccessible to the affective appeal coming from groups that have been ideologically damned; he simply remains blind to their plight. Yet we talk of hard-heartedness when we recall the horrors of the early stages of the industrial revolution, when no objection was taken, for instance, to ten-year-olds being made to work for ten or twelve hours a day.¹⁰ But in the course of time such defects in the social system have been corrected. Slavery, and what is similar to it, the exploitation of women in many patriarchal societies, are receding into the past, though in large areas of the world they still survive. Though the enslavement of the ideologically damned has frequently taken the place of formal slavery, it is to be expected that this kind of social disregard for the plight of others will not continue to be rationalized and defended for long. True, the key factor in the growth of humanitarianism towards the weak has been not so much increased sensibility on the part of ruling groups as economic and social developments. Housemaids enjoyed little consideration so long as there was a country proletariat from which they could be drawn, but when the demand for domestic help exceeded the supply a change came about in their pay and conditions; in this instance the new attitude was enforced before any subjective need was felt to treat the individuals concerned more heedfully. The question indeed arises whether real changes in attitude to the underdog do not always first arise from an improvement in the latter's power position. If one does not conceal from oneself such phenomena in one's own society, one begins properly to appreciate the difficulties of any far-reaching re-education. We know from psychoanalysis the amount of patience, time, experience, and therapeutic skill that are necessary to bring about changes in the character structure of a single individual, and indeed it would all be labour in vain if the patient's suffering did not provide him with a powerful motive to seek a cure. But in a community a painful symptom, an agonizing sense of irremediable failure, can be warded off if its members identify themselves with their defects and elevate them into virtues. We have already cited the instance of the authoritarian personality whose uncontrolled affect and obsessional cruelty are misinterpreted as signs of strength of character and ability to rule. Another was the complacency with which we Germans rejected the attempts to reeducate us made by the victorious powers. In doing so we forget (i) that their reality calculations were better than ours, otherwise they would not have been victorious; (u) that their social conscience was more developed than ours, or they would not have been able to resist the impulse to exterminate us as we set about exterminating Jewish and Slavonic 'sub-men'; and (ui) that we were the oppressors, and the victim has a longer memory than his oppressor. The reason for this

last phenomenon is that the oppressor, so long as he is able to preserve his position, is confirmed in his identity, while that of his victim suffers a cruel blow. Since the failure of re-education the old identity has sprung up again from the ruins. Nothing seems able to shake the traditional way of feeling and the ways in which it manifests itself. We select a few nationally widespread traits: *itaiNnre* in relation to the self, cringingness in defeat, energy and practical efficiency, anxiety in the face of ridicule because of a lack of irony in relation to the self, sentimentality, deadly earnestness in convictions (roles), fascination by naked power. Leaving aside the practical efficiency, these tendencies make it plain that the predominant moods and feelings are infantile, that is, are not affected by the conscious, by cool criticism, by sober realization of the relativity of one's own abilities. Self-feeling and feeling about the outside world easily merge into fantasies of omnipotence, and only the extreme sensitivity to criticism (as exemplified by the reaction to the attempted re-education) shows the weakness of an identity that is more an aspiration than an attainment. All attempts to pinpoint 'national characteristics' are of course crude oversimplifications. We are not here attempting a full description of a culture. We are trying to find clues to the constancy of certain reactions that have shown themselves to be dangerous, or at least disturbing in everyday life and in international contacts, and obviously cannot be influenced by learning processes. Before we go any further, let us quote an example to show that there are collective attitudes that have been susceptible to easier and more rapid change; perhaps the contrast will be helpful to understanding. The Victorian age was dominated by a prudishness that to us today seems as hard to understand as does the wholesale **massacre** of defenceless people carried out in our lifetime by our own countrymen, the Germans. The collective sensibility was moulded to react with as much repugnance to anything reminiscent of sensuality as it was recently in our country to 'sub-men'; so much was this the case that most individuals felt these reactions to be completely natural and self-evident. 'The Victorians ... regarded themselves as more civilized than the men of the preceding century',²⁰ and they based this opinion on their contempt for sex. Thus we are confronted with the paradox of a high degree of self-feeling with a crude condemnation of sexual intercourse, which was deprived of all possibility of intimacy, affection, and human understanding. 'Animals must rut, but man — noble, brave, rational — should be able to procreate without descending to such uncivilized contortions. In short, the Victorian saw sex not so much as something sinful, but as something bestial, something disgusting.'²¹ This attitude has passed away. The reaction came in the hectic sexual anarchy of the 'roar-

ing twenties', and has now subsided partly into a petty bourgeois morality and partly into a state of mind in which sexual pleasure rates rather like that to be obtained from other consumer goods, neither poetically transfigured nor associated with a guilty conscience, but merely boring. The picture as a whole does not suggest a very high culture of sexual relations, but in the course of a few decades it has changed completely. G. Rattray Taylor is no doubt correct in connecting this with changes in the paternalist structure of society. The Victorian bourgeois, in accordance with the role imposed on him, identified himself with his father. This involved him in the conflict with his mother that Freud described as the Oedipus complex. 'He feels that she has betrayed him sexually by her relationship with his father. The mediaeval paternalist met this by postulating a completely pure, ideal mother who never had sexual relations and urged all other women to a like purity. He wanted them to be virgins, but suspected them of being witches. The Victorian paternalist felt the same conflict. But, as he was no longer disposed to solve it by postulating a divine virgin, he was forced to divide the female sex into two categories: "good" women, who had no sexual feelings, and "bad" women, who had them.'²² Taylor produces a quotation from medical literature that illustrates how so-called scientific objectivity can be riddled with collective prejudice. In his book on the functions and disturbances of the organs of reproduction W. Acton stated that it was a 'vile calumny' to suggest that women were capable of sexual feeling. What are we to conclude from this example of a rigid collective attitude that so demonstratively turned out to be subject to change? The Victorians denied the evidence of genital sexuality; reactionformations prevented them from seeing a reality that belongs to a full experience of life. It was the unresolved conflict with the father for possession of the mother that led to that odd state of mind. This conflict, arising out of the individual's relations with his first love objects, is ever-present, but trends must have been at work in society that greatly intensified it at that time. Perhaps the explanation is to be sought in the anarchical intensification of competition brought about by industrial development and the anxiety associated with it, which made the son-father rivalry unconsciously seem especially dangerous, with the result that the libidinally cathected object of the rivalry, the mother and wife, was subjected to taboo. By this compromise the conflict was superficially resolved, but no progress in understanding was brought about. The tabooing of the love object was the more necessary as with puberty and the attainment of genital maturity the fixation reappeared, and with it a whole chain of neurotic defence mechanisms dating from infancy. The Victorian repudiation

of sex was essentially a collective sexual neurosis of the hysterical type. The disappointment of infantile sexual wishes turned into fixed attitudes and expectations with which later experiences of a sexual nature were met.

Apart from the symptoms of hysteria, there is no doubt that the whole social structure also showed signs of pregenital (anal) neurosis. It can be observed that under stress refuge was sought by retreating from one neurotic attitude to the other. The neurotic suffering of the age lay in its preoccupation with money and sex. The desire for money compensated for the repudiation of sex, and the acquisition of money made it possible to enjoy the possession of 'bad' women.

The national characteristic of covering up callousness with sentiment which we mentioned above must have other, older, and more direct roots in unconscious processes that cannot be so easily modified by history; in other words, the traumatic influences must lie in the period preceding the age of five or six, the heyday of the Oedipal conflict. We do not claim to have any certain evidence of this, but psycho-analytic experience gives us good reason to seek the explanation in very early experiences which recur with relative uniformity among a large number of individuals in our national social culture. These must be considered in relation to patterns of behaviour that are so much taken for granted that they have hitherto escaped critical examination. Let us recall Harlow's observation that rhesus monkeys brought up without parents later do not assume the maternal role; in other words, that any affective exchange, even the primary relationship between mother and child, has to be learnt, and that deprivation of maternal care makes the young animal subsequently incapable of responding and reacting to sex, and actually insensitive to the approaches, even the existence, of its own young. From this it seems reasonable to assume that human patterns of behaviour that later turn out to be unmodifiable are the results of missed learning experiences that can take place only at a definite stage of development and cannot be compensated for later. As we have said, we are here drawing conclusions about collective patterns of behaviour from animal experiments and experience with individual human patients. We cannot produce convincing evidence to satisfy the critic who rejects these theories as speculation. As Freud said with characteristic caution, 'these are only analogies, by the help of which we endeavour to understand a social phenomenon; the pathology of the individual does not supply us with a fully valid

Counterpart.

The experiment — if one wants to call it an experiment — that we suggest is a change in early upbringing in the direction of consancy of affective approach. That would amount to a humanization increased awareness of the individuality of the other party, in this case the child — in affectively guided behaviour. There must be no rationalizing of deviations from this course, for all we know for certain is that no abruptly or carelessly or casually taken affective decision is without consequences, perhaps permanent consequences.

The anthropologists have made us acquainted with euphoric and depressive, open-handed and paranoiacally mistrustful cultures, and our psychological knowledge suggests that these variations of social environment are the result, apart from material conditions, of the customs prevalent in those cultures, particularly those connected with the upbringing of children. We have mentioned the dissociation of subject and object in conscious life. Though the nursing instinct is relatively one of the strongest in human nature, it is not adequately secured against the influence of the social atmosphere and conflicts with other emotional drives. In cultures with a strong community life the relationship between mother and child, and between the child and other members of the family unit, predominantly accords with the community pattern. In these circumstances the individual can hardly avoid traumatizing factors inherent in the social pattern. With the increasing fragmentation of the family there is no protection against individual neurotic influences, because the security provided by collectively practised methods is lacking. The corrective against isolation is increasingly becoming the dissemination of scientific knowledge; nowadays the young mother is told how to handle her baby, not by other members of the family, but by a book or a counselling centre. But scientific views are subject to rapid change, and in the anthropological field are certainly not free of status prejudices, as can be shown by many instances besides William Acton's statement about the sexual feelings of women which we quoted above.

As it is a mistake to identify the fragmentation of our society with individualism, meaning by that a strengthening of the ego functions in relation to the emotional drives, the situation is more critical than it was in the days of closed family, clan, or provincial cultures. David Riesman² applies the term 'other-directedness' to the tendency of modern communities to be guided by fashionable emotional trends. The uncertainty of orientation expressed in continual adaptation to rapid changes of convention seems an inevitable form of cultural transition. In a rapidly changing environment stability can be

found only in genuine individualization, that is, stabilization of the critical ego faculties. If our theory of the guiding evolutionary role that henceforth devolves upon the conscious is correct, the latter must learn to see and judge what it does to itself in the educative process at a stage when it is present only as a potentiality in early childhood.

The embryonic organization of the psyche seems as susceptible to toxic influences as is the embryonic physical organism. Many kinds of upbringing obviously have toxic influences. Man's instinctual behaviour is not sufficient to guide him through life, and the large amount of social behaviour he acquires does not protect him from disastrous acts of folly. When it is borne in mind that the imprinting that takes place in the 'extra-uterine spring' determines the basic inhibitions and imperatives that continue to work in all subsequent stages of development, and that human destiny is thus settled at this very early stage, it is evident that any attempt at adult re-education is doomed to failure, however humanitarian in intention it may be. It is also evident that collective standards and prejudices in general, in so far as these are related to the early genesis of character development, are exceedingly hard to correct. The choice now before us is whether revolutions bearing the stamp of the mythical parricide — processes, that is to say, that make a deep mark on the psychical life of the community — can result in a strengthening of the ego functions, or whether the level of consciousness so far attained is sufficient to assure a gradual, progressive development of the integrating reason — before an increase in radioactivity brought about by *Homo sapiens* either exterminates him or does irreparable damage to his genetic substance. It is a race with time.

Whether the partial socialization of humanity that the patriarchal age achieved will be strong enough to neutralize the surplus aggression that present forms of culture generate is impossible to foresee.

IV

The Precariousness of Moralities

The creation of identity

The strengthening of the ego capacities to which we have just referred implies a process of maturation. With it the individual's identity feeling develops, and the consequence is that his memory of himself is not so easily overborne by external stimuli and the eruption of powerful impulses in himself. We

have described this acquisition of control over our impulses in the bulfettings of social life as affective education. The less our affects succeed in evading the ego and thus directly influencing our actions, the greater is our self-knowledge. To the extent that the integrative power of the ego prevails, one does not lose one's head; that is, one is able to remain true to oneself in one's behaviour, no matter how different or stimulating or disturbing may be the situation in which one finds oneself. Identity is thus stability both of social behaviour and of self-

knowledge. All attempts at clarification such as this, however, remain incomplete and abstract in the absence of yardsticks enabling us to distinguish between genuine identity and its spurious forms. It is not always easy in ordinary life to differentiate between blind and non-understanding consistency, that is, inflexibility, born of the fear of being driven into an unknown darkness by internal pressures and external seductions, and consistent, considered behaviour that does not have to shut its eyes and stop up its ears to be able to decide which course to follow. Thus identity also implies a capacity for adaptation by the integration of new experiences.

Earlier we briefly mentioned man's perpetual restlessness due to the permanent threat to his stability caused by his inner urges. Instincts, we said, quoting Freud, have their vicissitudes. What happens to them at turning-points in individual development is especially important. The attainment of genital maturity, for instance, calls for new modes of control by the ego, to which there correspond new demands for adaptation on the part of the environment. One of the necessary conditions for the formation of identity is that, as Erik Erikson puts it, the young person should feel 'responded to, and that society is attributing a function and station to him as a person whose gradual growth has meaning — and this above all in the eyes of people who are beginning to have meaning for him.'

The rapid dispelling of unpleasure characteristic of infancy remains unforgotten. Slowly, often not slowly enough, the environment exerts its pressure, calling on the child to learn to tolerate unpleasure, to conceive of non-immediate aims that promise satisfaction and adhere to them even when quicker but prohibited pleasure-gain beckons.

Such training in the postponement of instinctual satisfactions, in asceticism of varying degrees of severity — for that is what civilization is — would be inconceivable, because unnecessary, for an individual living in solitude. Renunciation is called for solely by the necessity of living with others. But renunciation can have meaning, can itself be a

source of satisfaction, only if his environment has meaning to the individual or, to put it bluntly, if he has had reason to love someone. The concrete foundations of an experience in which so many deep contradictions are united cannot be argued or idealized away. Your truly civilized man is not exclusively in love with humanity or a party or some other abstraction, or with the Virgin Mary or some other numinous figure, but has first of all been able to love one other human being, in spite of all the tensions of ambivalent experience inevitably involved.

Satisfying renunciation

The vicissitudes of the instincts we have just described throw light on one aspect of human nature. I am able to attain relief from tension in spite of the renunciation of selfish instinctual satisfaction, but only by the route of sharing with a person whom I love. I am able to feel by identification and yet with detachment what the latter gains from my renunciation, and that is the only kind of renunciation that yields satisfaction. It may indeed be the key experience in any real love. Love can, however, be described the other way about; it can be said that I fall in love with someone who seems to fulfil an ideal pre-existent in my fantasy. In so far as I succeed in securing co-operation from the love object within the sphere of my experience, the latter only strengthens me in my fantasy and becomes the means and object of my satisfaction. But if my partner begins making independent demands on me, the feeling of being in love often vanishes quickly enough.

Unsatisfying renunciation

It is as well, however, to be tolerant about these distinctions and differences. Even in a mature individual who is capable of love there is a mixture of primary, selfish aims and subsequently acquired ones; a natural and proper tendency to seek satisfaction for his own wishes works in tolerable harmony with respect for the wishes of the other. It is excessive altruism that is suspect, as well as obvious narcissism. In the instinct-regulated animal kingdom the problem of instinctual control does not arise. Apart from the ritualized behaviour in caring for the young, opportunities for gaining satisfaction are governed by the individual's ranking order in the group. The regulative agency is strength; the weaker have to wait their turn.

It can hardly be denied that, in spite of the revolutionary advance to consciousness, human group behaviour continues to be riddled with the powerful

inheritance of this regulatory principle of sub-human social organization. Civilization has succeeded only to a limited extent in enforcing instinctual renunciation and endowing it with a sense of social purpose. Moralities on the one hand call for a great deal of masochistic perversion, and on the other yield considerable gains of sadistic satisfaction wherever prevailing precepts impose the duty of loving, respecting, honouring, obeying, and so on and so forth, implying the right to impose obedience by force, for instance. But if I have never felt that anyone has ever renounced anything because of a sympathetic understanding of me that was at the same time meaningful to himself, I am unable to feel as much respect for him as the moral code tells me I should. So I am thrown back on learning the painful consequences of defying the power principle, and this I respect, out of fear. I refrain from stealing or destroying only because I fear the threat of being destroyed myself. The fact that the penal law is still governed by the retributive principle shows the strength of sub-human instinctive urges in law-breakers and guardians of the law alike. It also shows how poor in love is the human environment as a whole, that is, society.

Renunciation imposed by force cannot give satisfaction; it produces temporary compliance, and that is all. The proposition we are trying to establish is that deprivation of love on this scale should not be accepted as a fact of life as unalterable as a natural law. On the contrary, the predominance of loveless force belongs rather to an environment in which a shortage of vital necessities prevails and the great majority live periodically or permanently in a state of material want. Poverty is the product of partial cultural development.

Collective structural changes in self-awareness

The continuous social revolutions of our time are connected with the technical possibility of doing away with want; they are also directed against privileges of rank that date from times of poverty and emerged in the social order as the result of force. On closer inspection the processes involved in the structural change in collective self-awareness characteristic of our age turn out to be much more complicated than mere struggles for primacy between old power groups and new aspiring ones. The technical, affluent society needs a new moral orientation. The necessities that led to archaic moral codes have to a large extent been superseded. Freedom from hunger, epidemics, back-breaking labour, and the pressure the higher classes used to exercise on the lower certainly have a euphoric effect, but the frequent appearance in one and the same person of the wild

behaviour characteristic of puberty, but in a permanent form, combined with a tendency to make anarchical demands and anxious adaptation to new status habits, appears to indicate, not just the decline in moral standards that is the subject of everrecurring complaint, but that things are in a state of flux at a deep level underlying that of the existing moralities. In view of the relatively loose association between 'instinct' and ('satisfaction'-promising) object in human nature, any disturbance of customs can be met only by trial and error on a broad front before there can be any assurance in new ones. For even the socially overadapted individual at the height of his self-satisfaction is not able to decide 'so clearly and so free of doubt'³ as our moral guardians proclaim. The burden imposed on societies that leap from purely agrarian forms of social organization to the possession of modern technical aids — that is, entirely without historical preparation — can hardly be overestimated. Their unreadiness for this drastic change means that the danger of irrational reactions mounts with the expansion of rational techniques. Hence the increasing political concern of the leading technical powers with the periphery of their spheres of influence. The European has had centuries in which to habituate himself to the spread of rational processes in his social field (and his landscapes); in an irrational pattern of living he was given a sense of security by magical certitudes which he has now lost, but he has had time to come to terms with the loss. Max Weber accurately observed this habituation to rational processes. But to the individual they are becoming ever stranger and more bewildering. Max Weber wrote: 'No ordinary consumer has the slightest knowledge of the techniques by which his everyday consumption goods are produced; generally he does not even know of what materials they are made or which industry produced them. All he is interested in is the performance of these artifacts' — whether, for instance, the engine of his car is likely to fail on a motorway. 'The "savage" knows infinitely more than the ordinary "civilized" man about the economic and social conditions that govern his existence.' More recently, however, tendencies have appeared that help to overcome anxiety about the mysterious products of civilization. The consumer is beginning to demand information about the raw materials and manufacturing processes of the goods he buys.

The technological and scientific society has set in train a dialectical process. On the one hand, constant advances are made in the rationalization of every field of commerce and industry, administration and research, and on the other the resulting rationalized productive, administrative, legislative, etc., structures become increasingly 'alienated'

from the individual's field of experience. He obeys the instructions, and wonders whether there is anyone who really understands the processes at work. (This state of mind is very evident in the attitude to the traffic problem, for instance.) Probably, indeed, such understanding is possible only to a limited extent, for the processes of our civilization take place on a scale of anonymous self-regulation, rather like those of nature.

Problems of socialization

This over dimensional scale creates the basic problem for the socialization of man in rational society. After the passage quoted above, Max Weber continues: 'And it is by no means always true that the actions of the "civilized" man are subjectively rational. This varies in different spheres of activity, a problem in itself.'

In societies that depend on magical modes of thought the instinctual element in behaviour is caught up and ritualized by tradition, and the processes of adaptation to these take place within a relatively stable framework. But what happens in a technological, rationalized mass society sharply divided between a working life, the tools of which behave with total predictability, and a 'private life' of emotionally determined decisions, which are also supposed to take place within a framework of predictability but the meaning of which is hard to see? The contents of the latter have to a large extent been taken over from magically oriented historical conditions.

To illustrate the conflicting calls made on the individual, let us compare two injunctions both of which he is supposed to follow. In the first place, there is the virtue of thrift. This could become a collective virtue only when as a consequence of economic developments a relatively broad section of society had been assured of the essentials for the maintenance and reproduction of life, that is, in 'classical' bourgeois society. Whatever may be the motivation of thrift in individual cases, it always includes a desire to provide for a 'rainy day'; it is, so to speak, a premium paid to ensure the independence that has been so painfully acquired. In middle-income groups money was also saved for the purpose of acquiring durable goods, involving renunciation of the satisfaction of minor, immediate needs; and employers saved to accumulate capital for expansion, that is, the production of more goods. Thus a vital interest in acquiring and multiplying possessions led to the traditional bourgeois trinity of virtues, namely, respect for acquisition, respect for

property, and the precept of thrift. On top of this there was the bourgeois 'anal preoccupation' with property (preceded of course by the aspiration for it). The precept of thrift still survives as part of the bourgeois tradition, and it is used to teach the growing child renunciation of immediate instinctual satisfaction. But the greater the emphasis placed on renunciation, the more the idea of saving is overlaid by that of self-sacrifice, and it ends by being totally repressed by it.

The attitude described here and the thrift precept, though obviously still valuable to the individual, run counter to the interests of the economy and thus of present-day society. It is a primary factor retarding the welfare state and the principle of full employment, which necessarily require a high rate of personal expenditure. Saving is selfish and against the general interest — or so at any rate it seems. If the investment made possible by savings contributes to increasing productivity, the rate of increase of production calls for the exact opposite of saving. This points in the direction of making a virtue of extravagance, because only rapid consumption can keep pace with production, and it is production that provides mass society with its livelihood. Thus surrender to consumption in all its aspects not only satisfies the individual's worldly appetites but is also considered to be moral, since it promotes the general prosperity. The possibility of adequate food, housing, and education for the masses is inseparably connected with their prosperity, that is, the production of non-essential goods. Thus security of livelihood for the masses comes into sharp conflict with the individual's moral salvation — at any rate, according to his world-denying religious code.

This brings us to one aspect of the personality splitting, schizophrenic trend, inherent in the coexistence of new and traditional codes. No less disquieting is the fact that the spheres of action related to the individual's picture of himself and the fulfilment of his ego ideal are to a large extent still occupied by much older, sub-human fantasies of violence and omnipotence. The new field in which this inner constitution finds expression in a social role is that of the technicians of the great administrative structures, the 'managers'.

Rationalisation or fatalism?

Such fantasies do not, of course, rise to the conscious level; should the individual by any chance catch a fleeting glimpse of them in the twilight background of his self-awareness, rationalization, in the psychoanalytic **sense of the term**, steps in. It simply **means** embellishment. Apparently conclusive ar-

guments in harmony with the traditional moral code are promptly found to justify what is in reality action based on an inner drive. A man who uses doubtful methods to secure an advantage over his competitors excuses himself to his conscience by appealing to the Darwinian principle of the survival of the fittest; alternatively he may fall back on the Puritan principle that success is a sign of God's grace. In either case it is merely camouflage for the power principle of the horde adapted to a society organized on bureaucratic lines. The pseudo-rational superstructure of such behaviour puts the critical conscious in a position of impotence which idealistic assurances do little to help, because they serve only as a deodorant.

Prevalent morality is deeply imbued with the (largely unconscious) purpose of lending an appearance of justice to existing power privileges. Looked at from the point of view of the critical reason, morality in action behaves very atavistically. The questionable actions committed by the individual find him well prepared, for he has an effective defensive routine to protect him against a bad conscience, and he can always appeal to the double standards that are widely current. The only rational reaction to this, and the only one open to those with deeper understanding, may often be the stoical one expressed in the saying: Do not be angry, only surprised.

This capacity to tolerate, not fatalistically but calmly, is one of the ascetic characteristics of the more civilized man. He does not deny the existence of the deeper drives and their demands, and he does not idealize them into aesthetic innocence, but he doubts whether existing forms of social organization offer them the best possible outlets for obtaining satisfaction. It is only in appearance that his attitude is fatalistic, and his aspiration for more human, that is, more conscious, control of forms of association in the affective field are not Utopian. Also the implications of his asceticism must be made clear. He does not extol renunciation for the sake of fulfilment in the next world, but is concerned with the renunciation of cheap satisfactions in this world obtained at the cost of the rights of others, and also at the cost of discriminating self-knowledge.

If the 'civilized' man accepts an often hardly tolerable impotence in order to avoid more brutal and disreputable alternatives, he can of course do so in obedience to religious principles. But in this connection a concomitant phenomenon of religion must be recalled. Those of other faiths, non-believers, etc., are presented to the masses as sub-standard human beings, in relation to whom the precept to respect one's fellowmen does not fully apply. The question

arises whether a form of organization based on obedience, original sin, and fear of outlawry does not inherently require a scapegoat, because of the unattainable degree of instinctual renunciation called for and imposed, particularly in the sexual sphere, and because of the down-grading of the deeper, instinctual side of man's nature into something essentially dirty and evil. In this connection we must again recall that, though it would be easy to quote theological trends running counter to this 'excommunication' of the deeper instincts, these are irrelevant in the present context. What we are concerned with is that at any rate in recent centuries such milder views have made little impact on the broad social consciousness. In response to the dirty drive the dirty 'object' duly makes its appearance, the scapegoat, the culturally despised minority, the uncivilized 'savage', the 'bad woman', etc., etc. In this connection an example that is slowly passing into history may be recalled that of the lazy worker. He had to be lazy and stupid, otherwise he could not so easily have been exploited without a twinge of conscience. Also there was no alternative for him but to be 'lazy', that is, uninterested, because it was his only defence against exploitation.

Cultural pressure to evil

Thus a first step towards a contemporary morality would lie in education in restraint from cheap instinctual satisfactions. This could be achieved only if the human instinctual constitution were regarded with less prejudice in the collective mind, and if the methods of force and humiliation were not regarded as the primary methods of civilizing it. Such a new morality should also try to overcome the traditional and paradoxical fear of prosperity, the belief that 'poverty ennobles'. It should show the way to deal rationally with affluence, because (always assuming that the world's population increase does not overtake its food production capacity) technology has made it possible to provide everyone with essentials without depriving anyone else. The new morality will no longer be able to justify renunciation either on the ground of other people's poverty or on the devaluation of instinctual urges. As no one has any experience of a society that has carried out the changes in living conditions that technology has brought within our reach, the morality of such a society is hard to foresee. Presumably it will be based more strongly than in the past on the recognition of the individuality of one's fellowmen. In other words, a higher degree of self-awareness will be a guiding factor, side by side with awareness of role.

The more obscure the rationale of the processes of civilization are, the less helpful are taboos and

moral injunctions that condemn man's instinctual nature and impute to him little capacity for self-responsibility. Such taboos were practicable in small and supervisable groups in which they could be enforced. The only way of making meaningful the renunciations necessary in relation to one's fellow-men in conditions of affluence, in the 'city jungle', is the direct appeal to the principle of humanity. Such humanity is attainable, but it presupposes the ability to learn to see things and oneself differently, and depends chiefly on the education of the ego in the understanding of man's instinctual nature, on man's being on a better footing with himself as a creature of instinctual needs arid being able to recognize that others are the same.

It is of course easy to preach mildness, gentleness, which is obviously more peaceable than its opposite. But is it known how it is attainable? And what of all the rewards for aggressivity that are simultaneously and alluringly displayed * Since the days of the Amphictyones, the early Greek semi-religious, semi-political bands who swore to observe chivalry in battle and spare the lives of defeated enemies, attempts to fuse the erotic and the aggressive drives have always been broken down by processes of dissociation which have destroyed whole societies or made social life a torment. Gentleness, tenderness, is an early, pregenital form of sexuality, which must be taught and learnt in earliest infancy. It is the very first form of sexual expression, and is thus associated in the process of development with primitive aggression; the two together make possible the further satisfactory development of the child. The subsequent capacity to attain a proper understanding of the world instead of merely learning conditioned reflexes depends on the combination, experience of which constitutes the basis without which there can be no future stable link or combination between the two. The stability of this link is always threatened; it has to be rediscovered and re-established at every phase of development.

The dissociation of inner drives is always a sign of disturbed maturation, which implies a growing ability to integrate both fundamental components into an increasing number of behaviour patterns and the beliefs and attitudes and judgements underlying them. If in the individual's ordinary living conditions one of the two components has to be renounced, it cannot be lived and experienced and has to be fended off, repressed. But society itself uses similarly anonymous compensatory mechanisms to create situations which permit the repressed to be lived out. Aggression against the authority of the group is always severely penalized, but similar aggression against the authority of alien, hostile groups is, if it is successful, applauded and acclaimed. Such situations

are inevitable if society imposes excessive repression and thus deprives the ego of the possibility of guiding its deeper impulses. Thus, if these drives were insufficiently associated in the first place or if they become dissociated under the influence of strong excitation, the phenomenon is in either case to be regarded, not as a sign of man's natural, innate wickedness, but as a result of disturbance of maturation under the influence of social usages.

The number of persons constitutionally incapable of adapting themselves to the demands of society seems incomparably smaller than that of those who would be incapable of living outside their social framework. In the affective field the possibility of learning — gentleness, for instance, and the choice of that way of behaviour in dealing with objects — is obviously restricted to certain definite early periods of life. As is amply shown by our own experiences, if these imprinting periods are allowed to pass unused, there are many things that cannot be learnt later. Expectations in relation to the objects of the outside world have then been so thoroughly established that fundamental character changes are almost impossible. Above all, they are not desired by the individual himself, because he has identified himself with his adaptation to the world, even if he is not in every respect satisfied with his adaptation.

The development of these preliminary stages to identity-formation is by no means clear in detail, but we have obtained some insight into the process. The vial experience of tenderness is certainly first experienced through the skin. In infancy the skin is a highly cathected organ of communication (Freud calls it the erogenous zone *par excellence*)

By means of it the infant feels the pleasure and unpleasure that to a large extent constitute its knowledge of the world. Additional confirmation of this biological function of the skin is provided by Harlow's experiments with monkeys. It is through the skin that the infant acquires its basic experience of being soothed, warmed, protected; and its experiences of unpleasure and pain, and of loneliness when neglected or approached unfeelingly, come to it by the same channel. If the infant experiences more painful unpleasure than pleasurable protection in this way, the experience of reality imprinted on it will grossly affect later calls on it to develop gentle, considerate, social behaviour. At best it will be possible to impose on the individual a facade of instinctual fusion which in situations of conflict will easily collapse.

Moral codes provide the framework for instinctual behaviour. When they crudely ignore the biological phases of development, they are necessarily disordered. Not only that; deficiencies in the early satis-

factions deprive the mental processes that set in later — the development of the conscious ego capacities — of the vital foundation of experience of a situation in which conflicting instinctual impulses can be satisfactorily fused. To regard the discord thus brought about in human beings as an innate defect is fatalism based on false premises; the argument that because of their innate violence men can be kept in order only by force is based on this fallacy.

It follows that man's identity feeling is not constitutional or innate; it develops in the cultural context. When the group or the social order strongly disparages the senses and displays this attitude towards the pregenital phase of instinctual expression, because it regards aggression and libido as permissible only in connection with definite role privileges and most definitely impermissible in the child, who must be sexless and pure if he is not to grow up spoiled and uncontrolled, the adult has great difficulty in associating his drives with his identity feelings; and he has difficulty in attaining any lasting memory of his real instinctual conduct. For from the beginning of his life, that is, his phase of pregenital sexuality, he will have received no proper guidance to socially approved behaviour enabling him to find a satisfactory and acceptable outlet for his instinctual trends.

True unification of the personality depends on incorporation of instinctual experiences into the identity feelings; it is this alone that makes it possible among the temptations of everyday life to prevent behaviour from ending in real guilt, contempt, callousness, anti-social behaviour, or 'killing with a good conscience'. It is guilt and fear of tabooed instinctual drives that prepare the way for these destructive trends, for denying the essential drives brings about not integration but disintegration of the identity, and forces them to seek satisfaction by circuitous routes; some of these circuitous routes may be valuable, but others are inevitably the violent and fearful ones from which humanity suffers. Denial of the instinctual drives permits only a partial civilization of man, and — to reiterate it yet again — the unsocialized part, so far from being his 'real nature', is the part distorted by cultural **pressures**.

Also the denial of instinctual urges that is to a large extent imposed by our morality is not identical with the renunciation of urges necessary to civilization. It is infantile to deny something on the ground that 'what ought not to be, cannot be'. The impact of the moral codes as they are broadly experienced is to keep man psychically infantile in order to make renunciation easier for him. It is more than doubtful whether humanity will be able

to master the crises of the future on this basis, for it is too tightly chained to the compulsion to do evil. Thus our task is to show that the socio-genetic process of evolution requires a moral code directed to the growth of ego responsibility instead of adherence to the demands of the super-ego.

Hope as part of man's 'openness'

To the sceptic who rejects this train of thought on the ground that the only tried and tested means of maintaining social order is force, and that it is Utopian to believe in the possibility of a civilization more conscious both of love and of violence, the only possible reply is the principle of hope.⁶ For hope is the psychological counterpart to the biological openness of human nature. Hope too must be subject to doubt, for it is an open question whether the voice of reason is capable of exercising a formative influence on self-activating social processes (such as the increasing division of labour, for instance, and the concomitant diminution of the sense of individual responsibility). Only if we hold fast to our original idea that it is possible to combine a rational order with understanding of its meaning are we protected against the pseudo-rationalism that would dismiss the purpose of life as being obedient service to some political system. The driving force of history has always been the association of the powerless under the principle of hope. Only enforced emotional perversion can transfigure impotence and hopelessness into a destiny ennobling to its victims, though that is a line of argument that appeals to those who have received a harsh early imprint and are tempted to react to it by simply regarding force with contempt. The paradox that ideas move the world, but that force is devoid of ideas does the same, cannot be resolved by withdrawing from the world into any kind of cloister. 'Though it certainly conflicts with many deep-seated assumptions in Germany, the sociologist cannot avoid feeling that ideas in themselves have little chance. They need men for their dissemination, to help them to impose themselves, and again to co-ordinate their impact. The purely literary activities of writing and reading have only secondary significance. Notions such as that the ideas of Rousseau or Voltaire "spread in France" and finally "led to the revolution" are alien to reality and support the fallacy, as if the real motive forces of history were writers. One must always look for the actual groups of men who propagated, imposed, and demonstrated the ideas.'⁷

The approach to the problems of human association based on the principle of rational insight into the constitution of the human psyche is a late-

comer in the field, and not a little patience is called for in consequence. In our analysis we constantly come across psychical defence mechanisms against infantile lesions which continue to exercise their effect; inhibitions of thought which have become automatic, for instance, and fixed prejudices (particularly when the individual feels moral certitude) which are totally immune to argument. Like neurotic developments in the individual, the fixed patterns of taboo and prejudice imposed by society are to be regarded as collective attempts to compensate for the traumatic damage inflicted by society on its members at the very beginning of their lives. Under these compulsions the ego, if it does not develop a consummate mastery in completely denying or totally misunderstanding its own instinctual impulses, brings them to consciousness in the most complexly distorted fashion. This diminishes tensions neither in society nor in the individual, but more or less suffices to complete the process of learning the contents and the behaviour patterns of the social code. Of all the possible ways of rational approach in this field, only those that serve socially predetermined ends are socially recognized.

The many beliefs that society imposes are taboo to rational criticism; they are expected to be apprehended by other psychical faculties, such as the heart, the soul, or racial, national, or class feeling, and so on and so forth. My racial or national or religious feeling dictates to me how I am to see, interpret, and judge both myself and others, and that with absolute certainty and finality. This state of being closed to divergent experiences is a sign of the survival of infantile defence attitudes **against** reality. The original insensitivity of children to racial characteristics is well known. An unfavourable cultural influence that associates racial differences with differences of value and links these with revulsion, fear, or hatred can easily cause the child to see what had hitherto been friendly relations with members of a different race only through the distorting lens of this evaluation, and the change can take place overnight. The change of attitude must be regarded as a surrender to social pressure. Its disastrous permanence can be established only where the instinctual life has been subjected to severe and non-understanding repressions, in other words, when close human intimacy has been either unknown or evanescent. When such experiences fall within the 'imprinting period' we have described, their effects are permanent; credulity and superstition, prejudices and many other ineradicable character traits stem from that time. They are the psychical response to external pressure, the typical reactions of a psychical apparatus that has not yet achieved complete differentiation but seeks equi-

librium between demands from within and demands from without with the means available to it. If the situation is unfavourable, the 'openness' of human nature of which we have spoken fails to develop, the 'principle of hope' remains restricted to vain and unreal fantasies, and only a limited sector of reality is available to help in the orientation of behaviour. It is limited to the perception of what is collectively prescribed, and hope too is then aimed and domesticated and not binding.

VI

Ego and Ego Ideal

Good examples and bad effects

'Do you wish to become a universal right-seeing eye? Then you must do so as one who has passed through many individuals, the last of whom uses all the previous ones as functions.' Friedrich Nietzsche

Doubtful ancestor cults

Our brief survey of the instincts enables us now to go a little more deeply into the processes of identification. We do not live in a stagnant, predominantly tradition-directed society, and that is bound to influence these processes. Nor do we live in a society which can be seen comprehensively, whose social processes work regulatively and permanently in a fixed area. On the contrary, the influence of subcultures continually overflows their original boundaries one has only to recall the spread of jazz, for instance. This, together with continual technical and economic developments, brings about a permanent relativization of group-specific traditions. Orientation on the pattern of earlier generations, which took place as a matter of course in a tradition-directed society, is hardly possible. In a stable society one reason for clinging to tradition was the practical aid it provided in daily living, but in present-day conditions traditional methods often break down and hamper understanding of the requirements of the day. The various nationalisms, for instance, are a serious obstacle to trends that seek to go beyond them. Adherence to traditions that are losing their relationship to the rhythm of life and are increasingly assuming the character of fixed obsessional ritual tends to be increasingly motivated by fear of a profoundly changed environment. An outlook based on the past, on history, has been made vastly more diffi-

cult by the upheavals which have brought about radical changes in every field, not in the political field alone, for instance. Moreover, the peculiarity of all the abounding 'novelties' of our civilization is that they recall either not at all or only very remotely the once familiar working tools of the past. A power station means something totally different in human experience from the mill by the **stream**, though both use **water** power, and a car wheel is quite different from that of a donkey cart. Turbines, refrigerators, radio sets, have no history, but they absorb the attention of mankind, which has a history, a history of production and use. In drawing attention to the gap that divides the social furniture characteristic of the permanent technical revolution with that which preceded it, we are not to be taken as advocating shallow traditionlessness. Such a state of affairs indeed arose in the pioneering age in North America, for instance, where the 'unlimited' possibilities could be exploited because few traditions and institutions stood in the way. But this 'activity without history' (and the partially instinctual and ego-remote satisfactions associated with it) has long since invaded the older cultural areas and everywhere else where industrial and technical concentration has developed and set its stamp on town, landscape, and people. We are witnessing a slow change of this 'factory and management culture' by processes the yardstick of which is the aesthetic production of goods, which no longer takes place in reliance on the **familiar**. The lamentations about the loss of tradition that came from the old country, the 'olden days', at first reached neither the captains of industry whose smoke-stacks darkened the sky nor the workers who lived and worked in their shadow. The disastrous distinction between civilization (for the uneducated masses) and culture (for the educated few) dates from that time; and the retreat into romantic aestheticism — as symbolized by the museum — is essentially nothing but a confession of the loss of tradition in real, everyday life. The same probably applies to Sunday church attendance; a religious museum is attended for reasons of status. Goethe's injunction, *Wem du ererbt von deinen Hâtern hash, erwirb es um es zu besiegen* ('If you are to possess what you inherited from your forefathers, you **must first** earn it'), nowadays requires the exercise of discretion, for first it is necessary to establish how many of the tangible and intangible possessions of the past are indeed inheritable and worth inheriting, what part of them has real value and is capable of yielding a good return, and what is likely to be a millstone round one's neck. We shall answer the question briefly. The traditional possessions, both

material and mental, which we previously described as 'signal' possessions, are continually changing, being redistributed and — destroyed. This process is taking place very vigorously before our eyes, so there is little stability in such inheritance. Guidance from history must therefore be sought in a different direction; it is obtainable only by examination of previous experience in the resolution of historically constant conflicts. The storehouse of experience is what we have described as affective and social education. Where success has manifestly and unmistakably been achieved in subordinating man's instinctual nature to his ego nature, history has present guidance for us. The past is of course capable of imposing itself in many other ways through traditional institutions, but these are hardly likely to lead to adequate solutions.

St Paul may be recalled here: 'Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal.'^o

There is a Jewish proverb with a similar implication: 'If someone says slay or I shall slay you, let yourself be slain.' Both quotations are timeless statements of the responsibility of the ego.

Appealing to such tradition is not retrospective romanticism — a critic might call it mere Utopianism — but it does not contain the whole truth either. The whole truth is that — our education being what it is at present — pressures to conform tend so to determine the structure of the individual character that the ego's power of resistance to collective states of mind and collective actions is no more effective than it is against his own instinctual trends. We have already discussed the individual as a creature of role in Chapter UI,¹ and we shall now carry the subject further. We shall maintain our concern with the typical. Discerning the pathological element in the typical is the social psychologist's privilege, and he will defend his position with the anthropological theory that he believes to be correct.

Conflicts of motivation

We now turn our attention to conflicts of motivation arising from the coexistence of ancient traditional practices with ways of life that are entirely new, and also from the extension of knowledge about the ways of life of neighbouring or distant social groups. In this respect the idea of distance has also been relativized, for the strange and the familiar are drawing closer to each other, and the challenge to compare them, however unpractised in the matter we may be, is no longer so easy to evade. Where we see a community in which we could live differently without falling short of the

accepted standards, our interest is first attracted by the things that are permitted in the alien group and are forbidden in our own. The title of the film *An American in Paris* neatly sums up this situation, but the passion for Italy that dominated the bourgeois cenniry falls in the same category. The collapse of morals (continually lamented by the purists) that tends to follow cultural syncretism is the result of the disappearance of traditional conditions and society's consequent loss of ability to impose 'renunciations' on its members to which they had obviously not been deeply reconciled. This relativity of morals demonstrates the 'openness' of the human constitution, which can go all the way to a chaotic loss of orienation; that is to say, new mental equilibriums are sought and formed which may be freer or may be rigidly formal or wildly inconsistent, or for longer or shorter periods in the life of individuals or groups or society as a whole equilibrium can be totally lost. In Germany a 'post-collapse' phase has occurred twice in a lifetime.

What light do these considerations throw on our theme, which is still the importance of the influence of inner objects on character development and hence on action? The child's first identifications are with persons in its immediate environment; later, of course, it identifies with heroes of all kinds (from Werther to pin-up girls), but these later identifications never attain the overriding significance of the first flesh-and-blood models. But these too are characterized by imperfect taming of the instinctual trends; were such taming complete, it would mean that 'every instinct is brought completely into the harmony of the ego and becomes accessible to all the influences of the other trends in the ego and no longer seeks to go its independent way'. But such perfection is not attained by mankind. Even our greatest heroes, unless we idealize them, are able to achieve it only in part. Their character, in fact, includes defence mechanisms against instinctual trends entered on at an early age, that is, automatism of action and judgement deficient in thorough knowledge of reality, whether of their own inner instinctual trends or of the outside world. Nietzsche's remark that every man is most distant from himself is worth remembering in this context. To a greater or lesser extent all our behaviour contains an element of double standards. We fulfil our own instinctual wishes with objects in a manner that is not moral, but disapprove of the same thing in others (our children, for instance) of whom total morality is demanded.

Double Standards

The variations of these double standards are inexhaustible. The elimination of doubtfully moral or undoubtedly immoral behaviour from our conscious self-valuation has one especially disagreeable consequence. In the processes of introjection and identification which determine the growing child's behaviour, it internalizes, not only the super-ego and ego components of a model — that is, the model of ourselves that we want the child to see — but the model's whole pattern of behaviour as the child experiences it. Thus, if the model's double standards are very pronounced — if the part of the personality that ignores its professed standards and seeks direct instinctual satisfaction remains evident even though the ego **refuses to** accept this or tries to gloss it over — this aspect of the model, though kept out of his conscious, is introjected no less than is the 'official' aspect. In fact, something very disagreeable occurs: this aspect is seized on with special avidity. This is readily intelligible, for in it the young individual finds a powerful ally for his own pre-cultural trends. These, restricted by morality as they are, find a key to the circumvention of the latter in the way in which the model himself does forbidden things. The father who preaches good manners and self-restraint to his children but keeps the best bits at table for himself teaches them two things, both the code and how to evade it. This explains the persistence of identifications with what (from the point of view of the social code) are the model's negative traits. Careful scrutiny of one's own behaviour will often reveal the inclusion of traits taken over from one's father which the latter found particularly objectionable; for in its impotence the child hates this double standard without being able to avoid it in himself. But he also hates the prohibiting side of his inner objects and is alarmed by his own instinctual trends, which threaten to bring him into conflict with the official code. The unnamed instinctual aspect of the model involuntarily comes to his aid in coping with this anxiety, for the model's actions proclaim that, if you go about things the right way, you will be able to get a bit of pleasure too. That, in a nutshell, is why good models sometimes have bad consequences. The idea that one is a good model may derive from an interpretation of the self in which the truth is very well concealed; it may be confirmed by neighbours, colleagues, seniors, and the parish priest, because social contact with them is restricted to the 'official' level. But members of a man's family and his close friends often have a picture of him quite different from that which he himself and the world at large have of him.

This double chain of motivation of our behaviour, the conscious and the unconscious, increases the burden of knowledge it is incumbent on us to acquire.

To the conscious, with its desire to confirm that all is well, it is painful to realize that the conflict between pre-social, egoistical trends and moral, conformist behaviour is not capable of permanent resolution. It costs not a little effort and courage to have continually to recall this even when — and particularly when — the rightness of our behaviour strikes us as being especially self-evident. Only this exceedingly uncomfortable practice in relation to oneself can put us in a position of relative freedom of choice. Those who believe that freedom is not a potentiality of man's late development, but an innate and sovereign human characteristic, will of course be offended at our doubts about the inevitability of his maturation to freedom. But for those who refuse to sacrifice an unprejudiced view of reality for the sake of preserving an article of faith it is impossible to doubt how hard it is for all of us to bring about some degree of harmony between the demands of external authority and those of the internal authority of the super-ego. Habit, including the habit of self-deception, covers up a great deal; the truth is that the harmony is always partial. Distaste for such realism has contributed to the innumerable misrepresentations of psycho-analysis because of its refusal to underrate the instinctual component in human nature.'

There remains the question of what psychical capacities there are on which the individual can take his stand, that is, exert authority in

the shaping of his thoughts, decisions, and actions. There must be some detached, Archimedean fulcrum through which leverage can be applied. We attribute this function to the ego, to which we concede the right and the ability to intervene. We shall now complete our survey of instinctual theory by considering some aspects of ego psychology without which our sketch of human behaviour would be very incomplete.

The ego as energy transformer

The id is certainly a more fundamental phenomenon in life than the super-ego or the still younger ego with its faculty of conscious decision. The achievements of civilization are associated with the functions of the ego and the super-ego, but both these 'organized'* components of the psyche are linked with the id, which supplies the energy for all the work of the psyche. In a description of the functions of the ego Freud states the situation as follows: 'The ego controls the approaches to motility under the id's orders but between a need and an action it has interposed a postponement in the form of the activity of thought, during which it

makes use of the mnemonic residues of experience. In that way it has dethroned the pleasure principle which dominates the course of events in the id without any restriction and it has replaced it by the reality principle, which promises more certainty and greater success ... But what distinguishes the ego from the id quite especially is a tendency to synthesis in its contents. The ego develops from perceiving the instincts to controlling them; but this last is only achieved by the [psychical] representative of the instinct being allotted its proper place in a considerable assemblage, by its being taken up into a coherent context."

However the energy processes of the psyche are conceived of, they are components of the living organism and thus of its total store of energy. As the task of organization devolves on the ego, it must have its own sources of energy, relatively independent of the processes of the id, if it is to fulfil this function. In other words, it must be able to deploy its own forces against the id. To erect a defence mechanism energy is needed, just as it is to integrate and organize. The many observations of this function of the ego have only recently been systematized into a theory. H. Hartmann" postulates that neutralized libidinal and aggressive energy is available to the ego for its work of mediation between the instinctual trends of the id, the demands of the super-ego, and the demands of the self to develop itself. The word 'neutralization' indicates a freer availability of the energy. It is released from the task of securing the quickest possible satisfaction for libidinal and aggressive trends; instead, the ego uses it for testing reality, detaching itself from external and internal stimuli. It is this detachment that results in a broader vision that makes possible a better, freer understanding of others, whom I am able to regard as other selves and no longer naively connect merely with my own narcissistic wishes. Thus the energies tied up in the ego obtain satisfactory discharge in spite of the renunciation of older forms of satisfaction. It is this that we previously referred to as renunciation that satisfies.⁹

As in the case of other human capacities, we must assume innate constitutional variations in the capacity for ego development. Whether the ego finds it easier or more difficult to appropriate and neutralize energy for itself in its own 'field' will depend on this innate potential. 'The ego is not the product of experience alone, but of experience acting on a prepared organism.'⁰ The social psychologist, however, is concerned with the 'heredity' of psychical ability only to the extent that it cooperates with social influences. He is interested in pinpointing the social conditions that aid or hamper

maturation of the ego. Though we are very well aware that we do not know nearly enough about this, we can nevertheless make some significant assumptions about conditions that work one way or the other.

We cannot see the ego; we merely assume its existence from what it does. Its central characteristic is the capacity for seeing cause and effect and for productive organization. The latter means that conflicts are experienced consciously and not disposed of without regard for the consequences. If a scientist, committed to the principle of causal logic, believes in a revealed religion such as Christianity without any sense of conflict, it means that his ego is not capable of coping with it. An unconscious component of his ego wards off the conflict, which is a permanent source of anxiety, denies it, and satisfies itself with the unprovable assumption that a reality beyond his empirical experience requires belief in the existence of a paradise. The outcome is an Orwellian double-think that keeps the two areas of experience in separate compartments having no contact with each other. Awareness of the presence of a conflict and ability to live with it even though unable to find a solution would be the sign of mature ego development.

The necessity of empathy

Psycho-analytic observations have established that an essential condition for maturation to genital sexuality is a not too seriously disturbed progress through its pregenital phases. We also know that certain experiences are essential for the maturation of the ego capacities, and that pregenital satisfactions are among them. As for the ego functions that influence individual behaviour in the social conflicts that are always possible, we can say of them that their development is influenced by the nature of the inter-human relationships in which everyone is involved during the infantile period when we are most subject to imprinting. Let us try to identify three important phases:

3. In the first place we must ask ourselves whether the child's closest relationships with people and things in its environment, its libidinal object cathexes, are encouraged by the emotional attitude of those with whom it is in contact, and whether these are at the same time able to tolerate its aggressive trends. What love really means to a child can be stated in psychological terms to be empathy, intuitive understanding of its needs. This enables the adult to compensate for the inevitable demands and prohibitions imposed on the child and at the same time to keep his own affective excitation under control. An essential condition for the

proper development of the ego functions is the co-operation of education and self-education.

4. Only this tolerance, undisturbed by any excessive admixture of unrecognized, unsatisfied aggressive trends on the adult's part, makes possible introjections that do not demonize the child's natural sense of impotence. In other words, the super-ego must not impose itself terroristically; it must leave the ego elbow room for ambivalence and not enforce upon it traumatic fixations on definite defence mechanisms. The result will then be that excessive energy will not be absorbed in counter-cathexes against the threat of its inner trends. Instead, the organization of the ego will remain plastic, accessible to new experiences.

5. If this condition is fulfilled, the differentiation between the ego and the id will not widen into an unbridgeable gulf. Instead, the demands of the super-ego and the trends of the id will remain related, or at any rate not totally irreconcilable.

In these circumstances perception, thought, and the memory — the reality-testing functions — will not be excessively disturbed by the instinctual trends that may at any time be uppermost or by the injunctions of the super-ego. The ego will be able to bind energy for its specific tasks, and it will be able to use its capacity for libidinal object cathexis for integrative purposes. In other words, an individual who tackles difficult tasks with 'passion' or lasting interest and at the same time is properly adjusted to reality can gain pleasure, and specifically ego pleasure, from these activities and, when postponement of satisfaction is necessary, will be able better to accept the temporary unpleasure of the id. A good example of the opposite sort of situation is provided by the learning difficulties experienced by many children. They do not succeed in producing 'interest', that is, in organizing their curiosity into their ego and guiding it past the rocks of the unpleasure of the effort of learning. An insufficient libidinal cathexis of the ego capacities comes about; the gap between the wishes of the id that demand immediate satisfaction and the demands of the super-ego that call for renunciation and the unpleasure involved in learning is too wide. The ego is unable to mediate between the two functions; it has obviously failed to neutralize and appropriate sufficient psychical energy, but has submitted to the demands of the representatives of the primary trends. The distaste for 'work' in children can be very directly observed in their day-dreaming, dawdling, and aimless distraction. The explanation may be a dictatorial super-ego that has not been internalized but is embodied in a person in authority and is effective only so long as that

person is actually exercising supervision. Alternatively, it may be due to neglect; the child may never have experienced enough libidinal attention to have enabled it to learn to assume unpleasure for itself for another's sake, which is the essential condition for the development of a tolerant or reliable super-ego structure. Often the two harmful factors co-operate. The inevitable identification with the negative component in the child's model then weakens the early stages of ego development in advance and prevents the development of a productive internal organization of the ego and the id and the ego and the super-ego.

Thus our attention is concentrated on the dialectical relationship between instinctual and ego forces. Each is helpless without the other, though in a different way. Very primitive ego capacities can be sufficient to enable an individual to 'function' socially in an unobtrusive manner; he is able to satisfy his instinctual needs quite well. It was this that led to the bitter observation by that great psychologist Nietzsche that 'most men obviously do not regard themselves as individuals; that is demonstrated by their lives'." In Nietzsche's vocabulary an individual is a man capable of thinking for himself and making independent decisions — in other words, a man who has achieved successful ego development. But if most men are not individuals, what are they? The answer can only be mass men functioning with varying degrees of efficiency, but totally at a loss when cut off from their frames of reference. The world in general, their environment, and the various kinds of pressure to which they are inwardly subject and the resultant anxiety and guilt feelings keep them so under their thumb that they shrink back from any independent thought about their situation. Being only passively adapted to the group, if its code falters or is faced with crises they are incapable of contributing to the search for rational solutions. They are passengers and, as is demonstrated by the history of all the ages, remain passengers, even to the point of a paroxysm of unreason.¹²

What is unreason? It is the predominance of the primary processes without the blessing of reality control. Cultures, in spite of obvious signs of rational achievement, are at many moments in history unable to provide the guidance in bringing instinctual wishes into tolerable harmony with real conditions which individual upbringing is capable of providing for the child. When disintegration of weak ego capacities takes place in the group in which political decisions are made, the same process takes place among the masses.

The most jeopardized area of the psyche remains the ego. At such times the temptation to be or to become a passenger is if possible even more irresistible than any individual temptation to infringe the common code — to steal, for instance. There is perceptible in this a compulsive behaviour trait common to all living creatures that live in groups, whether human or animal. The threat of loss of contact with the group is frightening; it leads to panic fear and a frantic effort to re-establish contact at all costs. What it does not lead to is cool and detached consideration of the situation. Such consideration would only intensify the conflict of the individual who does not approve of the behaviour of his fellows. Voluntary self-isolation from the group in the spirit of the inscription on the tomb of Friedrich Adolf von der Marwitz, who 'chose disfavour when obedience would have brought no honour' — or at any rate withdrawal from the affective excitation of others, is obviously one of the ego's hardest control functions.¹³ The medieval punishment of outlawry shows that to the individual loss of group membership is equivalent to death, as is well understood by those skilled in manipulation of the masses.

A product of paternalism

The withering of ego capacities under the pressure of strong excitation, particularly when it is collectively communicated, has long been observed and deplored. Le Bon's *The Crowd* is based on this indisputable fact, but only since Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego** have we begun to gain a better understanding of the dynamic laws behind the phenomenon. If, as a result of intimidation and deficient empathy with childish needs, the ego has developed only weakly, any strengthening of outside authority, or equally well any promise of pleasure gain by repudiation of authority, can cripple its integration. The degree of vulnerability of the individual and of the community to such regressions to a primitive level of organization indicates the degree of cultural adaptation attained. Now, the traditional paternalist societies, that is, the existing cultural patterns, seem to favour early introjects that lead to primitive reactions such as aggression, flight, obedience, or asocial egoism when moderate excitations are aroused.

The average level of ego maturity reached in the process of socialization is low, and so is the ego's threshold of resistance to being overwhelmed by inner instinctual trends and dictation from outside. The explanation should be sought, not in nature, man's natural 'ego weakness', but in the conditions created for the development of the ego by the social-

ly prevalent relationship between rulers and ruled all the way from the typical family to huge disciplined organizations administered

on the largest scale. The 'irresponsible' character of mass man, the leading strings on which he is kept, are not, however, the result of a one-sided relationship of cause and effect; he is given orders because his powers of decision and criticism are weak. Also he is kept weak so that he can be given orders. Even the idea of any other kind of communal life meets with resistance, for it implies laying impious fingers on man's most sacred possessions, for example, the belief that the strong have the right to exploit and impose their will on the weak. That can easily be shown to be the guiding principle of typical reactions in the individual's character. These alone, however, are not enough to permit conclusions about his essential nature; first one must know something about the mental image he has of himself, and how he arrived at it.

In ordinary, non-scientific usage the word 'character' is often associated with ideas of heredity and of innate strength or weakness. Freud, however, points out that "what is known as "character", a thing so hard to define, is to be ascribed entirely to the province of the ego'." Character is not something that just grows, like the thickness of the hair or the colour of the eyes; at most it is 'potential destiny'.

Ego ideal in the open social field

Everyone, besides being what he is, also has a picture of himself, relatively blurred or relatively distinct, of what he would like to be, his ideal self. This again makes it possible to discern the nature of his adaptation. In one case the salient feature may be the self-indulgence the individual feels ought to be the reward of his passive submission — the ideal is to harvest the fruits of his conformism; in another the ideal may be to secure the approbation of his fellow-men by unusual achievement, enterprise, or energy. The ideal may be realistic, or it may be fed by infantile fantasies of omnipotence. In his ego ideal man lives in fantasy a future in which his unfulfilled wishes come true and his deprivations and strivings are rewarded. This process of forming ideals begins in early childhood, when the son wants to be like his father and the daughter like her mother. Ideals are later adapted to a large extent to those of the social class to which the individual belongs. Individuals belonging to a vital, lower social class which is on the way up will, however, include in their ego ideal many features

taken from the image of the upper classes as they perceive it.

The importance of the ideal that the individual has of himself is to be judged by whether or not it has a noticeable influence — and if so what sort of influence — on the constant pattern of behaviour that we call his character. Or, to state the question in terms of the dynamics of behaviour: is the ideal closely related to the specifically organizing capacities of the ego and does it result in aims appropriate both to reality and to the ego, or do these fantasies cover representations of primary processes very remote from the ego, and are they thus an indication of the weakness of the organizing ego? The ideal of a member of a small community may be to be efficient at his job, enjoy a satisfactory sex life, and be the father of healthy children and a respected member of the community. His ideal follows the beaten track. Conflicts of development in his childhood have not led to a retreat from the reality offered him and a non-attainable fantasy substitute. But if he follows the drift to the big city, imagining he must seek his fortune in distant parts, in a vague fantasy of wealth that will secure him continual satisfaction of all his wishes, this betrays the formation and persistence of an infantile ego ideal that is a blueprint for failure unless his ego is capable of reality adaptation to the new environment.

There are, of course, any number of possible variations. Let us suppose that the member of our small community is a Greek fisherman. No amount of skill at his trade will help him if the fishing grounds are exhausted. If he decides to emigrate, the decision may be in perfect harmony with a high valuation of courage in his ego ideal. An ideal specific to a group that an individual makes his ego ideal can be acquired in very primitive and simple social circumstances. It can continue to have meaning and significance to an individual who moves from a fishing village to Coventry or Detroit, and the stronger the structure of his reality-testing ego functions is, the freer his ego is to learn and adapt itself actively and passively in the process of learning, the more significance it will have. If all this fails, however, in situations of temptation and adversity the ego will disintegrate; the super-ego will emerge as a rigid authority which in situations of conflict will not be able to indicate to the ego a decision in harmony either with traditional moral standards on the one hand or with the new group standards on the other. In these circumstances the ego ideal will be relegated to the role of a dispenser of fantasy consolations and unreal wishful dreams.

This example is not intended to do more than make it plain that ego ideal and super-ego are not identi-

cal. The latter is formed out of the demands of society and calls for these to be followed as closely as possible. The ego ideal can anticipate this state of affairs. Its chief role is satisfying the individual's self-respect in a role he has himself chosen within the horizon of his experience. In a society which has crystallized into a relatively small number of traditional roles, the formation of the ego ideal presents few difficulties. In societies with a wide range of occupational and social roles and big differences of status the situation is different.

Role differentiation in our society is associated with differences of natural endowment. Liberation from economic want and groupcentred and group-imposed habits of mind has given impetus and social prestige to a wide variety of aptitudes. A static social structure that had to be fatalistically accepted encountered a dynamic counter-trend that has opened up a relatively wide choice of roles. But this has made formation of the ego ideal no easier. True, everyone has a field-marshal's baton in his knapsack, which in contemporary terms means he has a chance of aspiring to any level of the 'establishment'; but the chances of failure are also greater than they used to be. Failure to attain the envisaged ideal strengthens the regressive trend present in every ego ideal, the trend to turn away from reality. The counterpart of a fantasy ideal remote from reality is invariably resentment, which is yet another factor that prevents the attainment of the attainable.

As this vicious circle — resulting from an ideal yoked to passive fantasies of surrogate satisfactions instead of being a blueprint for active, reality-adapted 'self-realization' able to face all the disappointments on the way — is an important ingredient in neurotic character formation, let us illustrate it by two examples. They throw light on (i) social conditions that lead to failures of adaptation, and (u) some of the factors that so often result in good models having bad consequences.

The need for good counsel

The following examples are not intended to throw light on individual cases, with which this book is not concerned. They are intended to show how social antagonisms can be reflected in psychical structure.

A forty-year-old hairdresser with a prosperous business, in the eyes of his neighbours a good father and husband, felt a compulsion to injure his customers with his razor or scissors. Fear of these unintelligible impulses made it almost impossible for him to carry on his trade, and he increasingly took refuge from his distress in drink. The first

thing he told the physician after describing his trouble sounded odd; he ascribed his whole illness to the circumstance that, being a hairdresser's oldest son, by unanimous decision of the family he had had to carry on the family business, though he had wanted to be an engine driver. This last was of course no unusual aspiration for a boy; others want to be foresters, pastry-cooks, sea captains, or space-ship pilots. But a man still brooding over this ambition at the age of forty was a rather different matter, particularly as it turned out that he could quite well have achieved it 'if only he had seriously set his mind to it'. But what did that phrase mean? It assumed a 'will-power' that the patient had failed to show. He was by no means lacking in energy in the occupation that had been imposed upon him, so he was not really lacking in 'will-power'. But those words, that come so trippingly to the tongue to condemn people, tell us very little. What had happened in reality when one traced back this man's story? He recalled his parents in an almost impersonal manner, using words like 'strict', 'tidy', 'religious'; they were perpetually working, and had had little time for their children; he seemed to have had no experience of the fact that parents and children are capable of deriving pleasure from each other's company. The strangeness and inaccessibility of his parents to him was repeated in the structure of his super-ego. The inner authority that dictated his decisions was as alien and as dictatorial to him as his parents had been during his childhood. He could not remove himself from its sway, and it had trampled on his 'life's ambition' to become an engine driver, just as they had trampled on it. The harmony between their demands and those of his super-ego was far greater than that between his super-ego and himself as represented by the beginnings of an independent organization of the ego reflected in the engine driver ideal. At the same time there was nothing eccentric about this ideal; engine driving was a respectable calling, at the same social level as his father's. But in spite of that he had been unable to assert himself against what he felt to be the united front of adult interests. The wish to be an engine driver went as far back in his childhood as he could remember; this made plain the 'hallucinatory' component of his tie to that role — in his fantasy being an engine driver was equivalent to being himself. The role expressed his identification in fantasy with a big, powerful figure in secure control of powerful forces; in fact, a more powerful figure than his father. So it could be concluded that the child had transformed his real experience of impotence and total subjection to his father's orders into a fantasy experience of tremendous power. To put it pictorially, the engine-driver image was the

outcome of a whole stream of forgotten and repressed fantasies, expressing the very essence of the child's resistance. It was the result of his working up these fantasies to enable them to stand up in his self-esteem.

The symptom of his illness, the impulse to wound, perhaps kill, his customers, represented the return of the repressed content. It was yet another confirmation of the assumption that an impulse rejected by the ego does not for that reason lose its energy as long as it has not attained its goal. It also threw light on two other things: on why the patient had not forgotten and had been unable to give up his childish ambition, and why he had not been able to accomplish it. The working up of all his rebellious (Oedipal) wishes into the engine-driver ego ideal had been a notable achievement, an attempt to make himself acceptable in a social role. There was reason to believe that, had the patient's family shown understanding, had they supported his ambition, he would have been more successful in taming his instinctual trends and would have been able to live without the agonizing experience of being overwhelmed from within by impulses totally alien to his ego. But the rigid demands made on him by his group, its lack of empathy, had frustrated this. The ego ideal survived, because it was the form of organization in which the hostile, aggressive, socially still untamed id wishes remained alive under the burden of unforgiven and unforgivable frustrations, but transformed into a socially productive role; they were driven to conceal themselves behind the shield of that rational and reasonable ideal.

But the patient had been unable to attain his ideal, and thus integrate his id wishes, because the blank wall of refusal that he met had increased his unconscious guilt feelings. To state it in a very oversimplified form, what the refusal to allow him to become an engine driver meant to him was that he was not loved because of his aggressivity; for even the attempt to tame this in his engine-driver ideal had been rejected. The ambition was the symbol of liberation from the domination of primary impulses and guilt-rousing introjects, and it was here that the patient failed. To minimize his unconscious guilt feelings he yielded to his parents' wishes and followed the career they chose for him. His submissiveness further strengthened his super-ego as an alien power reigning supreme over his ego. Instead of helping him to strengthen his ego by the organization of his id impulses, the behaviour of his group, in the fashion of these impersonal contacts, caused him to set up and obey inexorable commands from his super-ego in order to preserve his qualifications for membership of the group.

Thus the result was the apparent paradox that it was his own guilt feelings brought about by his super-ego that forbade him to become an engine driver. When we say his own guilt feelings, we are of course making plain the weakness of the ego in his total personality. What Freud calls the 'incorporation of the early parental authority as super-ego' proved to be the irresistibly powerful agent of an inner alienation. His parents were long since dead, their authority had long since vanished, but the patient could still not free himself from their domination, which had become a structural component of his character.

This is certainly not an unusual example of the unintended effect of 'well-intentioned' models. But it also makes plain the genetic principle of character formation as such. For it is in this way and no other that the stabilization of affective relations takes place between human beings. In the disastrous combination of his personal ego characteristics with the all too harsh pressure of his family group our patient was a borderline case, but his character structure provides a model of the educational process in an authoritarian social group.

In Chapter I we mentioned pairs of siblings who grew up in different social environments. It is conceivable that in an environment in which there was a lesser predominance of impersonal, collective standards our patient would not have been reduced to such a state of helpless suffering. There is a Jewish proverb which says that the best horse needs a whip, the cleverest man good counsel.* It was good counsel that the patient lacked; or more specifically an upbringing that provided good counsel and guidance for his ego instead of merely reinforcing his super-ego.

The enlightened official

That is why we quoted this case history. It is intended as an example of how socialization of behaviour can be imposed in a fashion entirely inadequate to the demands of our society. When we consider that authoritarianism in upbringing is repeated with variations in innumerable families, it is clear that the fact that it has this effect is far from insignificant. Such authoritarianism belongs to a thoroughly paternalist tradition associated with a relatively high degree of independence based on land ownership. In modern social conditions it is obsolete, that is, it is no preparation for dealing with the sources of conflict that arise in a mobile social order characterized by a relatively high degree of interdependence. Power is in the hands of officials, trade union leaders, party leaders, etc. Even if this new type of leader often still confuses functional power with feudal power in his personal manner, this is an

anachronism. In their self-regard the key figures in our technical mass civilization must be guided, not by a modified form of more or less enlightened absolutism, but by a historically totally new imago, that of the enlightened official.

Two trends are discernible in the followable course of history: increase of population (in geometrical progression), and the much slower growth of the share of the ego in the psychical sphere. We may describe the ego as the faculty that enables us to find our way in strange situations — which applies increasingly to life lived among strangers at the present time. Development of the ego forces has always been a greater necessity for the ruling group than for the masses; it took place at the expense of the masses. Today mass man needs a capacity for self-orientation instead of blind or fatalistic loyalty to the imagos of paternal figures who in the present structure of society can no longer possess the overriding authority attributed to them by conservative fantasy.

The ego is not only indispensable for taming instinctual forces that have outgrown the behaviour patterns of pre-industrial times; it must also mediate with the inhibiting force of reason between the sources of energy that have become available and their exploitation by the primary trends. Fear of the atomic extinction of mankind is only one side of the coin; the other, hidden side is the pleasure, the intoxicating power, of being able to bring it about. Tremendous goals beckon to the aggressive tendencies. Those who have seen whole countries reduced to rubble while men fought to the last round abjure the hope that intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity have made the id sensibly friendlier to reality. The oldest and deepest foundation of the psyche is still the force of the instinctual trends that try to reach their aims by short **circuit** — circumventing the ego. Moreover, the hope that ego and id had drawn closer to each other was based on false premises. For our culture acts as before with deficient understanding of the instinctual trends; it alternates between provoking infantile defence mechanisms against them and approving their primitive satisfaction. No earlier form of society possessed power comparable with our own, and none had such urgent need of reason, that is, developed ego capacities, in all its members. It is this difference between us and the past that makes orientation by traditional forms of organization seem to be of very limited utility.

Thus we are led to the conclusion that a style of education must be developed that will accept the ego needs of the individual in the very early stages of his development. The psycho-analytic contribution to knowledge in the social sciences is the for-

mulation of the necessity of taking into account the strength of the instinctual trends and the way in which they seek to attain their aims, and hence the necessity of social compulsions in order to make social group life possible. The question is what kind of social compulsions must be opposed to the instinctual compulsions. The vital factor is not so much the nature and the quantity of these compulsions as the amount of insight that is associated with them and can develop in spite of them. Are they to remain external, of the carrot and the stick type, with their counterpart of inner compulsions reflecting and continuing the same pattern, or is the aim to be the compulsion of insight, that is, acquisition of the power of meaningful, rational decision based on the ego capacities? We believe the historical challenge involved in the evolution towards consciousness is to achieve this development. Many of our traditional patterns of behaviour have become anachronistic from this point of view. Social reality differs from the ideologically coloured pictures of it we are offered. They stem from a past that is so dead that appealing to it no longer serves to throw light on the present, but is equivalent rather to an anxious erection of defence mechanisms against reality. The rapid advances of technology in unforeseeable directions, the political and social upheavals of our time, are alarming, but the withering away of unambiguous role models and the chaotic effect of irreconcilable introjects are just as alarming. The seat of anxiety, according to Freud, is the ego, which will have to be very strong indeed to deal with these sources of anxiety. But that remains the only hope.

Fathers who can learn from their sons

If the needs and capacities of the ego are to be promoted, the dynamics of the group, its methods of social education, the way in which it establishes its equilibrium, integrates the primary, egoistical, asocial interests of its members, will certainly differ from those that may have been adequate hitherto, even though they failed to prevent dreadful breakthroughs of the death wish. That is the conclusion we may draw from another, happier case history that contrasts with the one we described above.

A motor mechanic had a son whose passion was books and study; manual dexterity did not come nearly so easily to him as to his father. If the son's inclinations and the ego ideal associated with them were to be taken seriously, a process of active adaptation was required of both. The father had to see and to recognize the different nature of his son's interests, no easy task if he had his own plans for the boy. His own ego ideal knew nothing of the satisfactions drawn by his son from poring over his

books. For his part the son was faced with a no less difficult task. He had to learn to accept the fact that in many respects he could not compete with his father's strengths, as he would naturally have liked to do, and also he had to learn how to fulfil his own ideal in practice. Did his aspiration to autonomy involve breaking the tie with his group? On the contrary, the mutual respect of father and son for each other strengthened the libidinal tie, and with it the family equilibrium. The father's good will in respecting his son's initiative and autonomy promoted the ego maturation of both; both solved their own problems in accordance with their respective degrees of maturity, the son by finding his own ego ideal as an outcome of his previous character formation, the father by learning not to regard his child as a function of his own narcissistic desires but as a human being with his own individuality. By doing so he strengthened both his own and his son's sense of responsibility more than he could have done by any amount of lecturing and injunctions based on his own experience, which in his son's actual situation would have been of no use to him. The father's authority, to mention one feature only, was better manifested in the reliability and equilibrium he showed in his work than by trying to bully his son into following in his footsteps. Identification with the trait of dependability is better assured when the choice of object on which to demonstrate his own dependability is left to the child. Thus upbringing aided a process of maturation that prevented the super-ego from developing a preponderance that left the young person no freedom of manoeuvre, as occurred in the history of our frustrated engine driver.

This educational process calls for an inner detachment from one's own aspirations. In less mobile cultures, with less occupational and status differentiation than ours, this task of resisting one's own impulses in order to leave the way open to others to lead the life of their choice does not arise with such acuteness. In these the taking over by the son of the external marks of his father's role takes place much more unquestioningly. But our culture has still to fashion a pattern of social behaviour based on a new insight: the necessity of perceiving and recognizing the autonomy of the individual from the outset. Preparedness to do this must be consolidated into a socially established parental role. Mere permissiveness, leaving the child alone — that is, completely passive socially integrative behaviour on the part of the parents — should not be confused with the task of aiding and promoting its ego development. The great variety of potential aptitudes present in people before they are developed in the innumerable fields of cultural **activity** in most cases

makes the old form of parental model obsolete. Men can no longer learn their trade from their father; instead, they can learn from him the basis and essentials of dependable behaviour in whatever field it may happen to be. The happy relationship between father and son in the instance we have quoted was based on the father's ability to be a model independently of the content of any particular role. The experience of feeling that his ego needs were understood, in spite of the difference between the things in which he and his father were interested, gave the son a foundation of security which would stand him in good stead in dealing with any occupational or social situation and, last but not least, would one day preserve him from using all sorts of rational-sounding but in reality rationalizing arguments in an effort to deny his children what he did not have himself.

Ego-strengthening education

There can be no doubt that the sum-total of the traditional and presently effective stereotypes of our society perform the task of education in strengthening the ego very feebly indeed. That is not contradicted by the cult of popular idols who are taken to represent the maximum achievable human happiness. These idols have too many marks of autocracy, eccentricity, or sheer rebelliousness to be regarded as successful examples of ego maturity achieved in cooperation with the instinctual trends. Too much unresolved infantilism attaches to them to justify the continued evocation of their names in tones of heartfelt cultural responsibility. 'There are problem characters,' Goethe wrote, 'who are not adequate to any situation in which they find themselves and are not satisfied by any. That is the origin of the tremendous strife that causes life to be used up without pleasure.'⁷ Many of these 'problem characters' have laid claim to the highest distinction as personalities, and their claim has been accepted. Yet many have turned out to be monsters, in the family, at work, in school, and in the state. That ought to provide food for thought.

Under the educational conditions that prevail in our country it may be true that in innumerable cases neurotic illnesses such as those of our hairdresser represent 'the mildest possible outcome of the situation'.¹ If he had had grandiose ideas to which a whole nation paid homage, and these had resulted in his being put in a position in which he need have no scruples about the impulses he felt in relation to his customers, the outcome would have been less mild. For where did the organizers and executors of Hitler's terror come from, whether they were commercial travellers or professors, if not the army of neurotically sick

who were enabled by circumstances to shake off their painfully maintained cultural hypocrisy? The terrifying number of such evil consequences of 'good' models casts doubt on their utility. Such doubt is no sacrilege when one contemplates the cemeteries of Europe.

It is obvious that the technical miracles that we produce do not suffice to consolidate our love ties with each other. It would be reckless optimism to believe that the development of inhuman reactions, some of the breeding grounds of which we have tried to throw light on in this chapter, will not again grow on the soil of the customs and habits that we take for granted; and they will continue to do so so long as we have not explored them with our ego capacities. Social psychology can make no small contribution to this task. It tells us that a start must be made, not on a mass scale, not from above, but by ourselves, in the way in which we so love and so tolerate our children that they will love us in a better way and tolerate us in a less embittered and uneasy way than we have hitherto enabled them to do. That is a not insignificant field of action in which we can correct destiny.

IX

Taboo

'Taboo' is a Polynesian and thus a very foreign word. Since words cannot be imported like pepper or bananas, it was only to be expected that it should have undergone a change of meaning in everyday speech. It means holy, untouchable, an idea as familiar to us as it is to all other cultures. Infringing a taboo is an outrage, a sacrilegious act. Perhaps the reason why this fascinating-sounding word has been adopted by all the languages of the Western world is that it provides a strange sound to describe a strange and uncanny experience. Its opposite, the word '*noa*' — meaning the profane, the familiar, the everyday — failed to enter our vocabulary in spite of Gauguin, probably because everyday life in Oklahoma or West Kensington does not possess those specific qualities. But 'taboo' is 'taboo' everywhere, even though the things that are tabooed vary very greatly.

When the medical student for the first time enters the dissecting hall with its display of dismembered corpses, the feeling of nausea and faintness with which he has to struggle testifies to the fact that he is infringing a taboo, though he knows that it is expected of him. He is infringing the 'holy dread' of death, though from the highest motive that of making it useful to the living. But it is by no means certain that his conscious intentions will get the better of

his primitive emotional impulses. What is holy is obviously also dangerous, and what is dangerous is also tempting. Freud points out that 'touching is the first step towards obtaining any sort of control over, or attempting to make use of, a person or object'.¹ When the first human couple picked the apple, they broke a taboo. The marking off of a forbidden, sacred precinct is as ancient a feature of man's life as is the wish to penetrate into the holy of holies. 'Taboo is a primeval prohibition forcibly imposed (by some authority) from outside, and directed against the most powerful longings to which human beings are subject. The desire to violate it persists in the unconscious; those who obey the taboo have an ambivalent attitude to what the taboo prohibits.' Freud here describes a process to which it is difficult to gain conscious access. When the medical student goes deathly pale at the sight of opened abdominal cavities, exposed nerves and organs, it is easier to dismiss him as a 'sensitive soul' than to recognize the racing feelings and fantasies with which his faintness or sensation of sickness is associated. He does not recognize them himself; all he is aware of is that something is happening that is too much for him. But he is not just a victim of weak nerves, for even those stronger and more experienced than he have to fight the same revulsion and fear; the difference is merely that they are better able to conceal them. No human being has ever approached the dead body of a man or woman with the intention of laying hands on it without a sensation of the uncanny, fear of the wrath of God or of the gods, of retribution for an impious act that will turn him into a corpse himself.

In due course the student becomes a doctor, perhaps a surgeon. In the latter event his primary act of impiety is itself subjected to taboo, for no one other than himself is allowed without penalty to infringe the taboo on 'inflicting bodily injury' (in this case, performing an operation). The rational argument that he had acquired the skill necessary to estimate the dangers correctly and is therefore worthy of the privilege is valid enough; it refers to the formal, technical contents of the process. But one has only to recall those who would have liked to become doctors and had the necessary intelligence and skill, but were unable to cross the threshold of anatomy because they were prevented by an inner resistance, to realize that here a different system of selection is at work. Because another factor besides ability and experience is required — courage and determination to defy the taboo to secure membership of a group which not only forgives the infringement but also unconsciously transfers to it a degree of pleasure in so doing. The same thing also applies to the 'discoverers sailing unknown seas' of the past

and to the space travellers of the future. Those who first violate a taboo are always a socially by no means highly regarded group who drive away the demons from the taboo precinct and make it safe enough for the majority to dare to follow them. This involves an extremely interesting socio-psychological process. Those who remain in passive dread are able to go on infringing the taboo in their unconscious fantasy, while those who do so in fact have consciously to accept these instinctual impulses and successfully control them by standards of reality. It is only this reciprocal relationship between the passive observance of the taboo by some and the active violation of it by others that makes possible the step of defying an originally universal taboo and simultaneously establishing a socially demarcated new one. The instinctual forces that are simultaneously so alarming and so alluring to our conscious are, however, never satisfied. In many cases when a surgeon is faced with a difficult decision regarding whether to operate or not, the question is decided by what is called his temperament or, to state it more accurately, his ability or lack of it to make a reality-based decision in spite of his instinctual trends. How essential is the social control of historically attained liberties in relation to the infringement of ancient taboos is demonstrated by the crimes of the Nazi régime, when unpenalized violation of taboo led to a collective break-through of destructive fantasies. An individual like Dr Rascher, who at Dachau made pseudo-rational excuses for committing murders the course of which he described in full medical detail, was able to carry out such outrages in defiance of taboos only so long as the pleasure of so doing was made possible and shared in by a criminal community which, like all human communities, immediately created new taboos, the sacrosanct figure of the Führer or the blood barrier by which it tabooed its vicars. For, like many primal words, of which it must surely be one, taboo also means its opposite; the unclean is taboo as well as the holy. The emperor on the throne of Byzantium or Peking was 'untouchable', like the Indian outcaste. It is also of the essence of primal words that they can never be fully defined, though one 'knows', or rather feels, their meaning. They always communicate something extra that cannot be paraphrased; they are witnesses to the survival of magic, animistic modes of thought.

Thus taboos never coincide exactly with laws and usages. All effective social ties contain some element of the mysterious, fearprovoking quality inherent in a taboo. 'Edquette', a code of good manners, is not a taboo in the strict sense of the word, though it has a great deal in common with it; people are offended, for instance, even by an unwitting in-

fringement due to ignorance. Purely administrative law, far from being closely associated with taboo, while so-called natural law is very close to it.

Apart from the incest taboo, which is universal, though even here there are wide differences in the degree and criminality of prohibited unions, very different things are covered by taboo in different cultures. The only possible explanation is that there is only one basic restriction on man's 'strongest appetites', but that his instincts are not tied to definite objects and are not cyclically regulated; he lives from one historical adaptation to the next, creating new living conditions in response to the challenge of adaptation. Looked at from the outside, taboos may seem repellent or comic, but if one impinges on them the fun stops immediately, and we note the appearance in every individual of the dangerously destructive trends contained in the rituals intended to cleanse them of the taboo object. These rituals may involve the strangest sacrifices and compromises and remain unintelligible to the outsider, but they nevertheless help to preserve the psychical equilibrium of those who observe them. The multitude of neurotic symptoms echoes on the individual scale the collective practices associated with taboo.

When we consider with detachment the 'racial madness' of the Nazis or the revolting arrogance of the *apartheid* policy, we are indifferent or hostile to the taboos involved, as in Hans Andersen's tale about the emperor's new clothes. We are able to look at this particular sector of reality unthreatened and free of its demons, but that does not mean we are able to look at the whole world with the same detachment. He who simply denies the existence of taboos is a fool who has not learnt the meaning of fear and does not understand the world; or probably it would be truer to say that he cannot allow himself to feel fear at any price, because it would sweep his weak ego away in panic. Criticism of reality based on cool consideration of the evidence inevitably finds itself quickly trespassing on taboos. Even thinking about forbidden things causes a shock of anxiety; imagining the infringement of a taboo in advance often calls for more courage than the act itself.

Utopians are great dreamers, often childish ones, who charge headlong into enclosed areas and act as if that justified them in behaving as if they owned them. Thus Henry Miller, writing as if dreams were not a cunning device by which our instinctual nature both presents and conceals itself from consciousness but were straightforward revelations of ultimate truth, says: 'In dream it is the Adamic man, one with the earth, one with the stars, who comes to life, who roams through past, present and future with equal freedom. For him there are no taboos, no laws, no

conventions. Pursuing his way, he is unimpeded by time, space, physical obstacles or moral considerations. He sleeps with his mother as naturally as with another. If it be with an animal of the field he satisfies his desire, he feels no revolt. He can take his own daughter with equal enjoyment and satisfaction." The most interesting thing about such visions is their stereotyped nature. They reappear in masked form in all eschatologies. Both the Anabaptists and the Russian revolutionaries believed themselves to be on the threshold of Adamic man. Utopians dream of the stars, but what they want here below is the disappearance of sexual taboos; in the case of our much-read contemporary Henry Miller, the taboos in question are those on incest and sodomy. Never mind how often they may have been violated, they have nevertheless survived ages and cultures as restrictions on unbridled fantasies closely related to the primary processes and heedless of the terrestrial consequences. They are basic human taboos. How deep is the miswist of the consequences of their infringement is shown by the symbolism of the Oedipus story. Even unwitting transgression is felt to be no protection from the inevitable punishment, for the real enemy against whom the ban is directed is the unbridled instinctual urge that lays down its arms neither before one's mother nor the life of one's father. The Utopia of the tabooless society breaks down on the fact that it is the vision of men who have instincts for the satisfaction of which — as we have seen — there are no firmly established boundaries. The necessity of restricting them in order to make social life possible is simply denied. Man as he was before the fall (or is conceived to be after the redemption) is not man, however. Happiness and trespass lie very close to each other; often they are so fused as to be inseparable. This is reflected in the experience of doubt, conflict, ambivalence. 'It can easily be shown that the psychical value of erotic need is reduced as soon as its satisfaction becomes easy,' Freud remarks, rather surprisingly perhaps to those who think of him only as a destroyer of Victorian sexual taboos. 'In times in which there were no difficulties sanding in the way of sexual satisfaction, such as perhaps during the decline of the ancient civilizations, love became worthless and life empty, and strong reaction-formations were required to restore indispensable affective values. In this connection it may be claimed that the ascetic current in Christianity created psychical values for love which pagan antiquity was never able to confer on it.'•

We have seen waves of enlightenment in which it became evident that taboos, in spite of their claim to divine origin, derive from counterforces in ourselves opposed to the instinctual forces, which resent such restriction. But increasing secularization, with

the knowledge we have of the innumerable taboos that have existed all over the world in the course of history, does not diminish the compulsion to obey our own taboos. That only makes plainer the tragedy of the human situation a tragedy inseparable from comedy as well as from mere sadness. Satisfaction in the absence of inhibition leads to unhappiness, inhibition without satisfaction does the same, and the dogmatically or ideologically assumed possibility of a satisfactory balance between them carries with it the dreadful imprint of boredom, and so cannot be regarded as a state of pure happiness.

A glance at history, at the spatial and temporal limitations of most taboos, makes something else clear. Any particular taboo is a component of a social order, is part of its conscience. Though conscience is said to represent irrefutable certitude, this is so only in relation to other certitudes, a system of knowledge into which one has to be initiated. This is provided by the family, clan, or the religious or ideological community. According to Mr J. W. Studebaker, United States Commissioner of Education, the chief concern of a country's educational system must be the implanting of beliefs. This is perhaps the only practice common to the post-Columbian inhabitants of the United States and the tribal cultures that preceded them. But when one considers, for instance, the sexual taboos that are legally anchored in the California penal code, where does the borderline between illusion and reality lie?

Even the briefest survey of the taboo phenomenon cannot omit reference to the fact that it exists, not just as a prohibition in the mind, but also as a human function that is exercised in practice. The basic purpose of a taboo being to prevent wishes from being carried out, power necessarily accrues to those who ensure that it is observed. It is noteworthy that the most ancient social institutions are associated with taboos. Priests presided over ritual cleansing, and the exclusive power to free men from the burden of sin eventually devolved upon them. The more inevitable infringements of bans are, the greater the power of the priesthood. As we live both in the shadow of tradition and in a mass society that has no historical precedent, we are surrounded by taboos in historical layers. The smallness of the change that has taken place in the way that power is exercised is illustrated by the resemblance between the trials of heretics in the Middle Ages and the terrorist methods of the present day. The more the individual is hopelessly caught up in a tangle of interdependences, the greater his dependence on taboos. The consumer society has its own taboos and, however profane they may be, it is dangerous to infringe them. As these taboos are sub-

ject to rapid change, 'adaptation' has itself become a supreme taboo, supervised by the Argus eyes of the communications system. One of the most shattering discoveries — often one is not sure whether to call it comforting or terrifying — is that men understand each other incomparably more quickly, immediately, and dependably byway of the similarity of their taboos than by that of critical judgement. Amid the press of surrogate satisfactions, the perpetual stimulus of insatiable instinctual trends, and the cartelized or monopolized processes of establishing taboos, the matter-of-course way in which even shortlived ones are accepted is an indication of the effectiveness of the unconscious, the task of dealing with which has become no easier in consequence. Those who want light to spread must nourish the hope that a new taboo will be established, namely, tolerance. But that will be difficult, because taboo and tolerance seem mutually exclusive. So we can only hope that this unification of opposites will take place at least for a few happy moments.

Roles

Worse than death

Psychologically it is not hard to see why taboos and rules are obeyed and actively maintained, once they have been established, even though the logic behind them may not be at all clear to the outsider. Groups who are engaged in the same activity or share common aims or ideals are held together by identification. One might speak of an 'adhesiveness' of roles. The school child only reluctantly gives up the pre-school-age habits to which it is used. The ageing often die when their role habits suddenly become functionless on their retirement. They find it as hard to adapt themselves to freedom as the young do to adapt themselves to work; in both cases the new role is unfamiliar. New identifications involve a change in the unstable equilibrium between the id, the superego, and the ego; the challenge offered by a new role must also be reconcilable with the ego ideal, must open up a 'future'. The superindividual 'style factor' in behaviour is far more obscure to us than is the process by which the individual assumes and discards roles, and we also have no adequate knowledge yet of the extent to which the social style influences the individual's self-awareness. A young married woman had three children. During her fourth pregnancy her husband was arrested for political reasons and sent to prison. She fled with the children, spent years in camps, suffered all sorts of indignities and injustices. Eventually her hus-

band returned, and with great energy and industry the two built up a new life for themselves. The woman suffered, however, from her husband's sexual indifference. It was impossible for her to tell him this, or to make advances to him herself. 'It is improper for a woman to offer herself to a man,' she said. All the external sufferings that had failed to alienate the two from each other had not helped them to achieve sexual intimacy. The role stereotype of how a woman should behave as a woman was an insuperable obstacle; an impersonal social principle and this woman's self-awareness had fused into an indivisible entity.

A girl student slept with her boy-friend, who also slept with other girls. They discussed these incidents in great detail. The language they used, as was the fashion at the time among their contemporaries, was that of pimps and prostitutes. The code that governed their behaviour during these conversations was reminiscent of that of Red Indians being tortured at the stake; honour required that, however great the agony, not a muscle must twitch.

These two violent extremes of behaviour have one thing in common; they are not individual, but are dictated by roles. The feelings that a woman is allowed to display in her role as a woman may change, but not the overriding compulsion of the role itself. We have previously drawn attention to the fact that this clinging to roles hampers empathy in relation to the other party. The first woman's husband was obviously also fulfilling a role with which he had his own individual conflicts. Thus there was a double clinging to roles in this instance that made empathy between the two parties impossible.

In comparison with the multiplicity of our feelings, ideas, wishes, role behaviour is very restricted; it permits us to display only what is collectively prescribed as appropriate to the situation. If an individual's behaviour is governed by his role to such an extent that he cannot show feelings that compete or contrast with it, that is a pointer to an immature personality unable to break through the infantile compulsion to identification and attain individual self-expression. The more the tabooed area of 'honour' is involved in a personal conflict, the less room is generally left for individuality. To revert to the two women mentioned above, the feeling that their honour would be irretrievably stained (in the case of the first if she 'offered herself' and in the case of the second if she showed the slightest sign of revulsion or distress) struck at the very heart of their self-feeling and self-awareness; their self-knowledge, identity, self-esteem, were threatened with collapse. We are confronted with the apparent paradox that in one case infringing a taboo in order to take a step to obtain a freer understanding in

sexual matters and in the other a retreat to intimacy from a remorseless banalization of the sex act were both impossible for the same reason — the ego ideal did not permit it. In both cases the ego ideal coincided with the type of role prescribed by the group. This was taken up into the super-ego where, alien as it was (because of its inaccessibility), it nevertheless exercised the function of dictating what the self should be. Many group moralities encourage this by declaring that the group (clan, race, nation) is everything and the individual nothing. Thus the individual must develop no critical ego; instead, he must identify himself completely with his role, for taking any other course would bring him only harm.

Searching for new collective attitudes

We have quoted examples of what two groups have recognized as typical feminine behaviour. Their repertoire of roles of course included corresponding patterns of behaviour for 'husband' and 'lover', and in both cases the male and female patterns geared into and supported each other. A much more obscure question — to reiterate — is that of how role patterns originate. Why was a collective taboo that restricted sexuality followed within such a short space of time by another that called for promiscuity? When the life of an individual is looked at a little more closely, all theories based on 'a swing of the pendulum' turn out to apply to no more than a single component of the situation, for both patterns of behaviour reveal a deficient capacity so to incorporate biological needs into the ego as to establish an equilibrium enabling the individual to cope with her situation in life. It should be added that both women became neurotically ill as a verifiable consequence of the irreconcilability of the requirements of their role with the demands of their critical ego. The latter had manifested themselves during their development, but had never been able properly to break through. The resulting neurotic illness can thus be regarded as a protest — an unsuccessful one — against a mutilation inflicted by society, its imposition of a role. So far as the symptoms are concerned, it was regressive, but in so far as it was a protest that brought about the conflict, it was progressive. An apparently 'better adapted' individual would not have experienced it; he would have shared in the collective neurosis without showing any sign of personal discomfort.

However, the sum-total of the frustrations not consciously articulated in the ego of the members of the group expresses itself in an attitude of

collective quest, a readiness to accept new binding collective patterns. That is one of the reasons for the dropping of accustomed patterns of behaviour and the adoption of new. If the social processes as a whole are relatively stable, if they cause little unrest, psychical frustrations can be tolerated for long periods without breaking through traditional forms; but if the basic economic structure, the conditions of production, are shaken, the resulting insecurity can easily set changes of behaviour in train. These considerations make the process to some **extent** intelligible (but not self-evident, which really means not understood). The rise and fall of large groups involved in radical changes in the productive process are bound to cause anxiety on the one hand and tremendous libidinal expectations on the other. We have identified the tendencies to make increasing demands and to press for immediate instinctual satisfaction, and manifestations of elementary fear, as collective id and primitive ego reactions in the constitution of our society.

Group need of a boundary

Many new groups and sub-cultures succeed in developing traditions and surviving for generations; many quickly collapse, and many are variations on the same theme, such as adolescence. Adolescent groups dissolve as their members are absorbed by other groups; as soon as a new generation is faced with the same problems, the accent shifts and the implied **comment** on life changes. **But** all these group formations, whether big or small, invariably feel the need clearly to mark themselves off in some way from outsiders. In this respect the interesting psychological fact deserves to be noted that it is only in appearance that the demarcation line is laid down in relation to the outside world. Incorporation into the group also means recognition of a demarcation line within the individual, separating the part of himself that he keeps for himself from the part that is in contact with the group. The two women mentioned above could not reveal to their partners inner needs of theirs which were out of harmony with their group's role stereotype. An intense fear of being too real made them conceal that part of themselves that could not be fitted into the role, and this made that part of their personality an alien, disturbing factor.

Groups that have developed over a length of time and acquired a strong collective identity have little tolerance for ways of life that diverge from their own. They generally develop great intolerance for and a collective fear of contact with outside groups. Alien ways of behaviour are disapproved of and tacitly result in exclusion. Also there is a great deal of watchfulness for signs of that part of the per-

sonality of members of the group that does not fit in with recognized group behaviour. The arrangement of mirrors which used to enable one to look out of the window from behind the curtains and see what was going on in the street outside — it is still occasionally to be seen in Switzerland — was a symbol of this continual watchfulness. Orwell's 'Big Brother' is no fiction; he has always existed. Sometimes he is only a harmless nuisance, but at other times he and his obvious paranoia grow to enormous proportions within a group. To quote an innocuous example, in the United States milk consumption is one of the behaviour patterns by which virtue is publicly displayed and judged. But what is a family to do when all its members — father, mother, and child, even the dog — dislike milk and never drink it * The obligatory bottle nevertheless appears on the doorstep every morning. What happens if father finally pulls himself together and cancels the order? The expression of disapproval on the milkman's face is identical with that of the head of a strict religious community faced with the apostasy of a hitherto respected member. A subversive character has revealed himself; one knows what to think of such an individual in future.

In old-established groups newcomers are accepted only after a long period of mistrust. Being accepted by the group implies readiness to discard previous orientations to newcomers and to identify with them; and even then a residue of contempt for the 'naturalized' remains. Few social organizations have succeeded in bringing about real tolerance between neighbouring self-centred groups within the framework of a larger unity. In these cases selfishness and group-centred orientation have to be overcome by overriding agreement on aims important to all. This process can be seen in the development from ethnocentric patriotism to federalism. But new frontiers of alienation form between the larger units.

As the reaction of social fear of contact is practically ubiquitous, its motivation is to be sought, not in the peculiarity or special characteristics of the things to which the individual has to adapt himself, but in the process of adaptation through which the novice has to pass. Xenophobia is based on the fact that divergent opinions and ways of life threaten to disturb the uneasily maintained equilibrium between the prohibitions and concessions in force in one's own social order. Marriage outside one's own social group, or earning a living in a way considered inconsistent with one's status, meets with especial disapproval, for instance.² The strong inner coherence of castes, classes, religious denominations, and also of occupational groups with long traditions — to say nothing of linguistic groups — creates a sense of security. Only the sensitivity displayed towards divergencies betrays some part of the effort it cost to

establish self-identity by way of conformity. The alien is not only without, he is also permanently present within. The trouble **taken** by the tone-setting classes to influence the young by way of education and to indoctrinate them with the approved morality and code of behaviour shows us that conditioned reflexes are involved in this process of cultural adaptation; and this can mean only the organization of the individual on a psychical level that to a large extent excludes the critical ego. The potential ego of every individual is thus declared to be an enemy alien, and every step taken by it in the direction of 'enlightenment' begins by running up against the resistance of accepted opinion.

Mass regression

Every new street or traffic artery, every new in-

dustry or administrative centre, makes revolutionary inroads into the statics of group orientation. Behaviour once aboed becomes ubiquitous, and new taboos compete with the old. The loss of validity of established patterns and rituals has, however, indisputably resulted in signs of disorientation. When we recall that man's instinctual structure remains unchanged in spite of all the cultural changes that it feeds, these signs of disintegration will direct our attention to the biological levels of regulation. The specific ties to behaviour patterns associated with definite roles that exist in every group are obviously the expression of a biological law in human life. All the ways by which non-human forms of life establish and seek to maintain co-operation and coexistence also apply to that social animal, man; the only difference is that in the human case the tie to those laws is looser. The collapse of the delicate and more sensitive structure manifested in the individual by regressive, primitive behaviour is also discernible in regressions at group level, all the way from the primitivization of ideas in disciplined bodies down to the formation of gangs and the increasing narrowing of horizons to selfish group interests. The strange thing is that this orientation by the 'hand-to-mouth' principle is perfectly compatible with far-reaching bureaucratization. Bureaucracies are formal organizations; however hard they try to conceal their techniques from public view (as Max Weber saw so clearly³) and develop an autonomy of their own, they remain administrative bodies and no more. They merely administer; the 'capital' comes from elsewhere. They are therefore able to serve a terrorist régime just as well as a freer society. As their growth has more than kept pace with the growth of societies and their functions, the secret influence that they exercise has grown enormously. Hence the desire of politi-

cians and governments, not just to control them, but to secure their absolute loyalty.

Managers and apparatchiks

We have said that on the biological plane the historically constant factor that causes unsettlement is the fragmentation of the instinctual equipment, corresponding to which on the psychical plane there are ego capacities of very different kinds. We shall now take a closer look at one of these, namely the 'tool brain'. **Culture**, including language, is always tool culture. In contrast to earlier cultural phases, the phase of industrial development has led to a chain reaction, an extraordinary increase in the interdependence of man's tools. Industrial production assumes the existence of a tool-making industry, an ever-increasing number of tools that make other tools. Their total availability represents the degree of the industrialization a **country** has attained. The reification of man runs parallel with the specialization of technical production (and of course the scientific research that precedes it). Physical and human productivity are planned by the same tool brain.

The repercussions of the self-generating process of technological advance on existing social relations were neither intended nor foreseen. The displacement of old social arrangements by new ones does not, however, take place rapidly or at once, even when imposed by ruthless methods of dictatorship, as is shown by the modern history of Russia. The attack on private property as a means of signalling status turned out to be a double-edged enterprise. Whatever socially pathological paths property relations may have entered upon in the course of the feudal and bourgeois ages, however provocative the situation was and still may be, property is an offspring of the biological function that causes the more highly organized members of the animal kingdom to express their individuality by marking off their 'own' territory. This cannot be abolished by decree; on the contrary, the primary social reaction to the infringement of an established property system is the fight-flight reaction. • Even when an upheaval leads to the overthrow of existing property relations, this is immediately followed by new arrangements, a new distribution of territory. The increasing disappearance of visible property as a sign of power has by no means led to a diminution of the aspiration for possession and power. Power no longer goes with the passive possession of land, but with the functional possession of administrative position. In the Western world the characteristic man in possession is the manager, in the east he is the *apparatchik*, the party bureaucrat. The tool that he uses and ap-

plies his intelligence to perfecting is a bureaucracy.

When a social upheaval begins, the traditional social groups and their institutions resist it, or try to transfer the old relations between governors and governed to the new forms of production. In our world this first phase is by no means concluded. In countries such as Saudi Arabia or those of South America the process has been retarded at the cost of increasing social disintegration. The self-feeling of the men employed in industrial production stubbornly insists on their right to have their say. At the same time the newly established relationships always fall short of the ideal that led to their establishment. But new forms of bondage are easier to associate with men's self-feelings, because the new privileged caste that proceeds to establish itself has emerged from their own ranks and its exercise of power has no flavour of alien rule. The ruling classes in the days of feudal society and of the capitalist-imperialist bourgeoisie had that flavour because of the social fear of contact that they showed.

Readiness to obey and the trend to terrorism

The formulation of this new self-feeling and its claims is influenced by ideologies that have grown with the growth of science and industrialization and preside over the shifts in power positions that have taken place in the guise of attempts to give them meaning. As industrial technique irresistibly displaces not only the traditional techniques of producing and using tools but also the techniques of socialization of the obsolete social order, and as it gives rise to great new power conflicts, a new sense of power has developed among the masses and a sense of impotence among those still loyal to the ideas associated with the old order. New experiences of unpleasure are also associated with this self-feeling; and not the least of the functions of the ideologies (as of the traditional religions) is to help to deny these or hold out the promise that things will be better in the future.

We use the ominous word 'masses' here only to indicate the quantitative increase in population without any qualitative implications. Masses on this scale are a new historical phenomenon. They make new demands on the tool brain; new techniques are required to provide for their needs. Thus concern for the special forms taken by traditional styles takes second place to overall conformist planning.

Shop-window displays provide an environment very different from the 'local colour' of the past. The guiding principle is planning, in which the individual appears as a numerical unit, at best as a

type, a typical representative of an income bracket. It has been shown that the masses can be split up into categories on the basis of which the individual can be 'objectively' planned for, whether as a consumer or a voter. This puts new power into the hands of the mass planners of all kinds, which is then reflected in the ideology of the moment. Nevertheless it is impossible to shut one's eyes to the fact that all this planning is based on little historical experience. The best technical planning cannot do everything; its imperfection is reflected in a sense of insecurity, often obscurely felt and in any case hard to express in words, that has led to a regressive willingness to obey on the one hand and a similarly regressive trend to terrorism on the other. The appearance of archaic forms of rule by violence, equipped with the most modern tools and accompanied by the apotheosis of a leader and the demonization of competing outside groups, is tangible evidence of this regressive social trend, one of the concomitant phenomena of which may well be the successful carrying out of a huge electrification programme.

We deliberately conduct this survey in abstract terms, without quoting controversial examples. As we are trying to gain a clearer view of at any rate some of the determining factors involved in the interaction between the constitution of society and that of its members, we must try to maintain critical detachment from conflicts conducted at a higher level of emotional excitement. Our principal theme throughout is that the challenge that proceeds from the evolution towards consciousness is inherent in all the gropings towards a new order, and the development of the tool brain is one of the elements in this process. At the same time we cannot conceal from ourselves the dimensions of the opposite trends. The self-awareness that enables us to organize our conduct independently of orientation by social role, that is, reveals a degree of insight into the dynamics of the psychological processes, plays a feeble part in world events, as it always has done. Optimism on this score would be wishful thinking, a distortion of reality. Freud described the situation as follows: 'Each individual is a component part of numerous groups, he is bound by ties of identification in many directions, and he has built up his ego ideal upon the most various models. Each individual therefore has a share in numerous group minds — those of his race, of his class, of his creed, of his nationality, etc. — and he should also raise himself above them to the extent of having a scrap of independence and originality.'

II Disappointment

The great disappointment of the twentieth century is the realization that technical progress, though it brings with it many conveniences and 'freedoms from' — leisure, for instance, freedom from work nevertheless fails to provide that 'scrap of independence'. To revert once more to the two women we mentioned above, the student displayed an extraordinary freedom from inhibition in relation to the long-tabooed field of sexuality; the wife and mother, barely ten years her senior, might well envy her this. But the younger woman had unexpectedly succumbed to a new bondage to roles which helped her not one whit towards independence — towards 'freedom to'. 'Freedom from' brought no relief to the ego, which should have been free to make its choice.

Thus we see that the possibility of advance to critical awareness of one's situation is continually sacrificed to the assumption of roles and stereotyped prejudices. The compulsions at work here derive from older levels of evolution and long historical ages; they provide overpowering competition for the more conscious level of decision. The sense of the danger we experience when we lose contact with the group as soon as we behave reluctantly and more independently is based on preexperiences that made their imprint at the time when our psychical personality was being built up. The predominant role played by our super-ego in making decisions in the social field bears witness to this. It issues its orders unconsciously and rapidly, overwhelming the ego, which in any case is more slow-moving, because it has to find its way between alternatives and contradictions, which in collective stereotypes and patterns of action are not felt, or not yet.

Also life is made harder for our contemporaries by their situation between a past and a future. On the one hand adaptation to the conditions of an industrialized mass culture is forced on them by the social equilibrium in which they live, while on the other they are still partially tied to traditional values and the organizations whose task it is to maintain them. This increases the inner incoherence of the individuals on whom the burden of decision in this phase of history lies. The naive assumption that because the individual is a somatic unity he is also a psychical unity can lead us hopelessly astray. Great and small alike take refuge in appalling oversimplifications, idealization, and demonization. The idea that there are 'two souls' in the human breast is inadequate to describe the situation. Perhaps we shall come closer to the truth if we speak of the 'momentary personalities' with whom we are frequently confronted who borrow their impulses from the immediate situation and change these in a fashion as protean as the situation itself without the individual moments ever

growing into a uniform history. History assumes memory; under the pressure of our mass civilization this seems to be restricted to specialist knowledge; there is no similarly sharpened memory for one's own affective structure, for the self and the inevitable crises and breaks in its development.

The parish-pump outlook

It would be an undue restriction of the concept of the role if we refused to concede that it can be functionally associated with the 'scrap of independence and originality' which, when it is attained, makes detached insight possible. Insight into the possibility of different choices does not necessarily disturb integration into a role. No role can without violation of the truth hope to offer the key to all the possible situations concealed in it. Anyone who tries to hide behind his role in this way ends by concealing his own self in the role. This concealment of the self is sometimes displayed in grossly distorted form in the role of the judge, who sees himself defined in his legal code and bends reality accordingly. But the uncertainty of role behaviour in a world of unforeseen conflict situations encourages anxious withdrawal into stereotyped action and opinion distressingly deficient in originality.

The extraordinary lack of friction in mass societies controlled by huge bureaucracies is a frequent subject of complaint. What this reveals, however, is a poverty of experience in handling new situations; satisfaction with roles in this context indicates an increased fear of responsibility, which is vaguely delegated 'upwards'. This encourages a poverty of imagination to which consideration of a better way of responding to problems does not occur.

At the higher level — where a similar tendency, this time to 'pass the buck' downwards is possible, prevails — answers tend to be sought along the lines of the tried and tested 'parish-pump' traditions of the past. Control of public expenditure, as was demonstrated recently by Hellmut Becker and Alexander Kluge• in their study of its effects on cultural policy, follows the principles of the absolutist petty state of the past, and this in turn follows the pattern of the domestic economy of an old-fashioned paternalist household. Every society must of course budget properly, but forms of decentralized control are conceivable that would result in a great diminution of friction. That would involve greater responsibility at the horizontal level, however, and in particular much greater openness about the control of expenditure and responsibility for it. Both are repugnant to a hierarchical bureaucracy, in which there survives so stubbornly the paternalist form of organization, the relationship of dependence on a father who can give or withhold at his pleasure and

whose resources and income are kept more or less secret from the rest of the family. To the public, parliamentary budget debates rather suggest dependence on the good or bad moods of the paternalist 'state' (that is, the bureaucracy), which enhances its power by allowing the various groups to compete for its favour like hostile brothers. Should a budgetary expert dismiss as childish this outline of the emotional side of an administrative system that claims to be completely objective, we should not allow ourselves to be misled by his skill at preparing financial estimates but should, instead, find out something about him as an individual. We should very much like to know about his feelings when he negotiates with claimants, for instance; a sense of paternal responsibility is certainly involved, but there must also be a sense of pleasure in the exercise of his power. There is no need to go to the top or even the senior level; every official who possesses and exercises the right to inquire whether this or that telephone conversation was really necessary is exercising paternal supervision. That is the only way by which order is established and people are educated to responsibility or held blameworthy. But the 'parish-pump' conditions of the relatively poverty-stricken states of the past are transferred to an affluent society whose 'impoverishment' lies elsewhere, for instance, in the excessive pressure on the people at the top; the secret satisfactions that derive from identification with a powerful father are the most effective defence against a more efficient distribution of responsibilities.

It is well known that the huge bureaucratic apparatus of the paternalist state and all the private apparatuses erected on its pattern conceal an enormous amount of waste, the result of a smoothly operated system of avoiding responsibility that evades control. Intelligent understanding is the weaker partner; there is no experience of the possible satisfactions that would be obtainable by a redistribution of roles in harmony with the demands of the situation. Merely imagining an adult society — a society organized on the principle of equal responsibility — makes one dizzy; and, as it makes one dizzy, the idea must be a fraud and a swindle. This is another manifestation of the fear of losing contact in an environment that requires fundamental emotional reorientation. The primitive pattern of education — that of obedience to paternal commands — has left too deep an imprint on the ego ideal of every individual.

Having been accustomed throughout his lifetime to hierarchical conditions, he can conceive himself only in the role of 'ruler' in his turn, and he tries as hard as he can to live up to it. The paths that he follows are well trodden. The idea that society might

move up the ladder of maturity from the paternal family pattern to the stage of adult agreed decision has only very rudimentary achievements to its credit. The violence of the opposition encountered by the trade union movement (even among the working class) is attributable not only to economic reasons but also to the shock to the sense of order of the bourgeois leaders of society (and the self-ideal of the lower classes based on that pattern) caused by the idea of 'brothers' uniting against the father. We may suspect that the acquisition of equal rights by women — their acquisition of a collective role imprint really equal to that of men — will deal paternalism its death blow. But only if early upbringing is no longer overshadowed by the father-figure — from whose shadow women have hitherto never escaped — will it be possible for the paternal role not to be imitated in every sphere of life, but for authority to arise from a horizontal balance of forces. In any case, the attitude of claim and protest directed to an authority above is now directed at a fiction, because the man who exercises authority is not 'the owner' but an official who, when he surrenders or loses office, is a human being of exactly the same proportions as those who 'threaten' him, to use the animal behaviourists' term.

Enlightenment up-to-date

Our previous observations can be summed up by saying that old role patterns have shown a durability that has survived far-reaching changes in social reality. Though they serve the needs of a dead order and fail to serve those of the living one, they are still adhered to, because the unpleasure of experiencing the new and the disturbing extinguishes curiosity. And not only that. Roles have a protective function which the individual cannot do without so long as the world outside his familiar surroundings remains alien and threatening. Role behaviour causes curiosity to fade, and is often suppressed by certitudes dictated from above. In firmly established social orders roles can be well adapted and appropriate; but when the foundations are shattered the strangest behaviour patterns emerge, in which diminution of anxiety is sought regressively. The consequence is that, just at the time when social experimentation, a firm step forward, is called for, the institutions in whose hands decision lies adhere to the old pattern while unrest is aimlessly wasted in ties to fugitive roles. At all events, much more originality is expended on atoms than on human emotions. The tool brain prevails at the expense of insight into the self. Here lies the great division that used to run between man's instinctual nature and his conscience. Now it runs right through the

field of action of the ego itself. Once more we see how emotional maturation has failed to keep pace with man's technology and his mastery of nature. The decisions we make under the influence of the new social reality bring us remorselessly closer to the key issue. Do they increase our awareness of our self or do they conceal it from us? Do they promote or hinder the trend to consciousness?

Evolution to consciousness is enlightenment. The implications of the word have greatly changed. It used to foreshadow the reign of a sovereign 'reason'. Looked at in retrospect, the sovereignty of reason to which the men of the age of Enlightenment looked forward (like the sovereignty of mind of the German idealists) seems very much tied to its time, influenced by the idea of the sovereign, the absolute ruler. Similarly, our view of man must be influenced by the social situation, among other things by the growing consensus that society can be kept alive only by the functional interdependence of all its productive elements. We therefore do not take refuge in any **abstract** concept of reason, but speak of an ego capable of attaining critical self-awareness in relation both to what it has learnt and to what it perceives and feels in the self. The ego has its own history, in which it has continually opposed the instinctual forces, making use of social rules and injunctions in the process, and it has often suffered defeat and passed through long periods of subservience before being again able to take the initiative. To think of reason as a human characteristic with a process of maturation leading to a fixed goal is to us a romantic dream. It is a monumental error that survives in many theological propositions and above all, to our misfortune, in the field of jurisprudence, which is the reason why jurisprudence has contributed and still contributes little to the integration of a new society but a great deal to its state of disintegration and confusion. The administration of justice is in the hands of a bureaucracy that works, not for the maintenance of the **state**, but for the maintenance of itself, and it is the most dangerous of all bureaucracies, as has been demonstrated. It no longer possesses the creative power of making explicit the social sense of justice, putting it into words, and, instead of searching for the fundamental rights and wrongs of the case at issue, administers a fictitious justice dictated by prevalent ideologies and propositions regarded as self-evident.

Thus enlightenment, enlightenment about the nature of man,

contemporary terms means insight into the dependence of human decisions on the basic facts of man's instinctual constitution and the destinies of the basic instinctual

drives as shaped by the conditions of the social environment. Consequently, instead of relying on the self-realizing power of reason, the task is patiently to investigate how much reason man's actual environment permits him to show. The great regulators are still the prevalent role patterns, the type of equilibrium prevailing between instinctual demands and the countervailing social necessities — or what are regarded as social necessities at any particular time. Role behaviour thus depends on a continual resort to prejudices. This makes it incumbent on us as far as possible to make accessible to understanding the dynamic processes involved in assuming a role and the prejudices associated with it.

The term 'social role pattern' as used in the modern social sciences refers to a complicated pattern of obedience. When assuming a role we receive a system of guidance to the social world and of binding instructions on how to behave in it. 'The functioning of society depends upon the presence of patterns for reciprocal behaviour between individuals or groups of individuals. Patterns for reciprocal behaviour are institutionalized (formalized) as status roles." The concept of status role originates with Talcott Parsons." Status is defined as a 'position in a definite social pattern ... as distinct from the individual who may occupy it ... a collection of rights and duties'." R.K. Merton uses the term 'status set' for the various social positions that an individual holds at the same time, and the term 'status sequence' for the various positions he may successively occupy in the course of his lifetime. 'Status in action' thus amounts to playing a role or, alternatively, to put it in a less friendly-sounding way, 'normative behaviour' that accentuates the 'dressing up' element involved and the element of dignity the role confers. The more successfully this normative behaviour acts as a social regulator, the better it succeeds in settling all sorts of conflicts; the less the friction that arises in reciprocal role behaviour, the more stable will be the social situation as a whole. The problem presented by the evolution to consciousness and the impossibility of obtaining a comprehensive view of the determining influences in our mass societies can be stated in a nutshell as follows: How can an interlocking system of roles and status positions be established that will not solely or predominantly follow the hierarchical pattern? As we have seen, the one-way system of orders from above and obedience from below is no longer adequate. The alternative principle would be far greater initiative at all levels in contributing to the formation of standards and the attainment of integration by consent. This assumes a change in the self and in the sense of responsibility of every member of the group. Stated in psychodynamic terms, it means a diminution of the absolutism of

the super-ego, in relation to whose commands the ego plays the part of a disciplined and unquestioning subordinate; a strengthening of the ego capacities, both in dealing with the instinctual impulses and their derivatives, the affects; and the ability to respond adequately to the demands of the environment without blind obedience to its taboos. This, however, assumes education for independence; and included in what we mean by independence is a capacity for intuitively understanding others instead of primarily seeing in them of their roles and allowing them to act as triggers for the release of our own affective behaviour.

We cannot leave the sociological definition of role without some further comment. Psychologically the discussion of roles is incomplete without recalling the 'double roles' that we continually play. It is not only spies and agents, intriguers and hypocrites, who play double roles. What we have in mind will become clear if we consider the way in which a role can be used as an alibi. The police officer who carried out his duties in an exemplary manner and in the course of them murdered a thousand 'enemies of the state' with his own hands was, during the period of his life in question, swimming on the crest of the wave of his time and not, as moralists have subsequently tried to persuade us, in the scum in its wake. The use of roles for the satisfaction of eccentric appetites is a constant temptation; at many moments in history it has made a wholesale breakthrough at all levels. A field-marshal, a man of great taste and sensitivity, who took his staff on a tour of the cathedrals of France and acted as an expert guide for their benefit, was capable of signing (even if he did not draft) the following army order: 'In the eastern area the soldier is not only a warrior who fights according to the rules of war, but also the representative of an inexorable national idea and an avenger of all bestialities committed on the German and related nationalities. Therefore he must have full understanding of the necessity of severe but just retribution on Jewish subhumanity.'

When a temptation offered by a role is succumbed to, a step is taken into the pathological. The fragility of a role's purpose is much greater than we admit. It is in institutionalized roles that preverbal brutality finds its organ of speech. However far removed our way of thinking may be from its primitive origins, we must never fail to take into account the unchanging nature of instinctual forces beneath the surface of civilization; privilege is primarily based on physical prestige, with intelligence trailing a long way behind. Those who have been only partially and imperfectly socialized have been 'groomed for barbarism', as Jürgen Habermas says, are ready when a 'changing of the guard' takes place to avenge themselves for the frustrations

imposed on their instinctual impulses by reason. But the objectives and the methods chosen by the vengeance for which man's indomitable instinctual nature yearns are prescribed by the restrictions, the cruelty, inherent in society itself. The repetition-compulsion of history is based on the chain of reaction by which cruelty, whether in open or clandestine fashion, is handed on. This explains the twin roles which the 'momentary personality' is able to play in such conflict-free fashion. In one role, as a member of a disciplined body, he submits to the most severe restrictions, and in the other he gives way to unbridled destructivity, and he rationalizes both with idealistic pathos. The instinctual renunciations imposed in one field are compensated for by unrestricted instinctual satisfaction in the other. If his own face vanishes in the uniformed ranks, so does the reality of the victims of his billings and violence; it becomes merely a fetish object for his own autistic drive.

Transcending roles

Such a solid bond between id and super-ego is established in these masochistic and sadistic automatisms that all that is left over for the ego is the humble task of devising plausible excuses. But, as regressions of this kind are not conceivable without a predisposition of the personality brought about by education, it is a mistake to concentrate only on the psychopathology of the individuals concerned. The collective responsibility of the society in which such things take place cannot be evaded. Its system produced these personalities.¹⁰ Their excesses are comparable to an inflation; the currency remains the same.

At the other end of the scale of possible patterns of behaviour is the possibility of acquiring ego control. The human being can identify only with objects with which the outside world presents him. He must be taught how this process, which originally takes place without the intervention of the ego, can be brought to the level of conscious reflection so that it may be accepted or rejected. He must be taught how to assume a status and exercise a role in such a way that his 'scrap of independence' can become a firm possession on which he can build. The rational-sounding argument that under a reign of terror our critical independence is weak and fearful is beside the point. When independence is a functional element in society and hierarchical compulsions are resisted in 'peace time', we can count on 'excuses' for the blind outbreak of instinctual nature having smaller chances of acceptance, though this assumes that such independence will be accompanied by a diminution of the fear of man's instinctual nature. Where there has been education to independence,

intuitive understanding, empathy, is possible, because the overriding compulsion of taboos has been broken. When empathy is encouraged, tolerance follows as a consequence of insight. When insight is possible, it will include insight into man's instinctual nature and exclude man's self-idealization as a being who should be free of the instinctual urges he describes as 'base' and 'sinful'.

Realization of the fashion in which we are tied to roles can lead to our making a distinction between our public and private roles. But what is the meaning of the latter? 'Private' roles are also socially prescribed. With more development conscious reflection becomes 'engaged', and our 'scrap of independence' surrenders to the resistance of our role behaviour. Thus the role is further consolidated, and at best the fusion of role and understanding becomes a model.

Transcending the roles and sets of roles that we fulfil assumes a lifelong effort on our part, for we are never fully aware of the influence on apparently totally unconnected 'private' decisions of trends that we develop in exercising our roles. A questionnaire about the death penalty was sent to all the professors of surgery at German universities, and the replies were unanimously in favour of it. The reaction that that was only to be expected shows that unconsciously we do not underrate the influence of an individual's main role, and grant that it allows little elbow room for his individuality — that is, provided that one is not the individual referred to. We are not concerned here with the rightness or wrongness of the death penalty, but with the unanimity of the replies. Why should the choice of the profession of surgery determine in advance its members' attitude to the question of the appropriate penalty for an act of grave asocial aggression? However 'natural' and 'obvious' the outcome of the questionnaire may seem to us to have been, no pressure in favour of unanimity seems to have been at work in this instance. What the unanimity illustrated was the overriding imprinting power of roles. The objection that surgery is chosen as a profession only by a certain character type is not very convincing either. It is possible that those who later become surgeons are psychogenetically characterized by a strong attitude of curiosity and have strong constitutional aggressive impulses, and that in the course of a long learning process they succeed in converting their aggression into the specific skill required by their role. Why should this learning capacity end with the 'delicacy of touch' required of surgeons and the taming of their aggressive trends in diagnostic precision * An alternative suggestion seems not too far-fetched. Their unanimity in favour of the death penalty seems to point to a strong counter-cathexis of the

ego against the pressure of aggressive trends. In their professional role those trends have to be rigidly controlled. But the idea of the death penalty for murderers provides an opportunity for a scrap of satisfaction for presocial instinctual trends by guiltless (because socially sanctioned) identification in fantasy with the executioner. If we assume the validity of this interpretation, we have yet further corroboration of the universal presence of the basic infrastructure beneath the level of social status attained.

Roles, apart from leading to group formation, provide ready-made techniques for controlling instinctual impulses in social life. At the same time, however, they perform a kind of 'blind eye' function, for they provide outlets for crude, selfish, instinctual wishes to emerge under respectable moral auspices. That is not the least of the reasons for the satisfaction that men find in them. Greater awareness of the extent to which we are acting roles or being our true 'selves', and of the strength of the temptation to use the role as an excuse, is certainly bound in many situations to increase the number of renunciations imposed on us. This process can be successful only if the renunciations are of a type capable of yielding satisfaction. There is no doubt that the possibility is largely dependent on the way in which we are initiated into our roles.

XI

Prejudices and Their Manipulation

*'Freedom is a very great reality.
But it means, above all things, freedom from lies.'*

D. H. LAWRENCE

Human rights v. prejudices

So enormous is the power of prejudice that any attempt to gauge its influence is bound to fall short of the reality. Every psychological theory of prejudice fails to do justice to the extent of the phenomenon; the reality is always far worse. Exaggeration is unfortunately practically impossible in this connection. Our daily lives are filled with choices imposed by prejudice. The gulf between a conceivable and desirable reality in which men had succeeded in overcoming the prejudices that divide them and reality as we know it is obvious if we glance at the constitutions of modern states. The fundamental rights proclaimed in them are in striking contrast to the tradition of prevailing prejudices. Article III of the Basic Law of the German Federal

Republic, for instance, states: '(i) All men are equal before the law. (u) Men and women have equal rights. (ui) No one shall suffer disadvantage or advantage by reason of his sex, extraction, race, language, birthplace or origin, faith, or religious or political views.' A state that declares its basic principle to be such freedom from prejudice thereby proclaims itself to be the enemy of all traditional prejudices. The fundamental rights of which it becomes the guardian have a double function, however, the protection of prejudice and the prevention of its unjustifiable application. While having prejudices is no crime, their **militant** propagation at the expense of others is an illegitimate incursion into the others' freedom. The Brockhaus Encyclopaedia defines fundamental rights as the 'unassailable and inalienable right to freedom from state intervention or compulsion that everyone possesses by reason of his human nature; these rights are not granted or lent by the state, but must be acknowledged and guaranteed by it'.

But to what extent do the representatives of the state act on these principles, and to what extent do its citizens act in conscious awareness of such freedom and obligation to tolerance? Or do the constitutions of states tell us, not so much about what happens in practice, as about the moments of insight in which the 'founding fathers' allowed themselves to be guided by their critical ego and their intuitive understanding of the reality of others? Are these solemn declarations not similar to those of a conclave, made far from the tumult of the world and having no real impact on contemporary passions? The power of interests, which are much closer to the instinctual infrastructure of mankind, easily reduces such basic principles to scraps of paper. The discrepancy between the intellectual efforts of the drafters of constitutions and the slight proclivity of the common man to behave in a manner appropriate to the ego and defy prejudices and selfish behaviour even when the latter threaten their long-term interests can only be sorrowfully noted. No alternative to this remains open to us. In justice to the ego, we must accept things as they are without discouragement and stick to our aims through phases of frustration. We are ourselves part of the state, even though its actual as distinct from its paper constitution increasingly excludes us from involvement in its affairs. Nevertheless it is in our power to observe its basic principles, and thus help to influence the degree of self-awareness in which society lives, for that is the real social medium. The basic concept underlying the legal constitution of the state is on a higher level, its ideal being the overcoming of selfcentredness. Whether this is to remain empty verbiage or to become a principle of self-orientation depends on the friendliness or hostility to consciousness of the groups that

constitute the state. If the structure of the state is authoritarian, awareness of prejudices is difficult to come by, because to a large extent they coincide with the dictates of authority about which no doubts are permitted.

The proposition that all men are equal is itself a prize example of a prejudice. But the principle that they should enjoy equality before the law is an achievement which required the breaking down of a whole chain of dominant prejudices dating back to primitive antiquity. It demonstrates the strength of the evolutionary growth of consciousness. The principle of equality before the law throws light on the distance that separates human from animal societies. It took thousands of years for it to be enshrined in legislation. Not until 1861 did Tsar Alexander II grant personal freedom to twenty-three million serfs who, with their children and children's children, had hitherto been the personal property of their landlord, who was also their judge. In Germany serfdom was abolished in Baden in 1783, before the French Revolution, but it was not finally abolished until the revolution of 1848. In countries in which an absolutist feudal aristocracy still prevails the slave trade still survives, in spite of all declarations of human rights.

It is a long road that leads from the death of Spartacus (70 B.C.) by way of Magna Carta (1215), the Habeas Corpus Act (1679), the Bill of Rights (1689) — in which equality and liberty were first stated to be innate and inalienable human rights — and the French Revolution to our own Basic Law. That the struggle to ensure these rights is not yet over is reflected by the abstention of the Soviet Union and other states from the vote for the Declaration of the Rights of Man at the United Nations on December 10, 1948.

A prejudice can be plainly seen to be a prejudice only when its origin has been discovered. The principle of equality before the law can be established only when the reasons given to justify the previous inequality have become manifestly untenable. To those privileged under the old system (by God's grace, by reason of their birth), this means an upheaval of the whole social order that guarantees them preferential treatment before the law. Thus establishing the principle of equality involves a major struggle for power and is associated with a whole history of revolutions and counter-revolutions. Every conflict of collectively shared prejudices is, however, a grim struggle, not only for external power, but also for inner certitudes. Those who adhere to group prejudices gain certitude from them, inner certitude about the 'higher' order on which their claims to power and social status depend, whether they rely on the mythical advantages of their family tree, fair hair, or any other characteristic that appears to demonstrate their

manifest superiority, while the same prejudices compel the unprivileged to reconcile themselves to the marks of their inferiority.

From the psychological point of view, we must distinguish between two aspects of prejudice. The first is the economic function it fulfils in mental life. The relationship of senior and subordinate that is established between a prejudice and the ego reflects an actual power relationship in the outside world. The prejudice ensures frictionless adaptation to the hierarchy of subordination, sparing the ego the conflict involved in deviation or revolt. Secondly, there is the part played by prejudice in the guidance of psychodynamic processes. By that is meant the part it plays in the stabilization of psychical equilibrium. A prejudice spread throughout a community will have a similar effect on many of its members but a different effect on some. In one instance it may associate itself with other prejudices or with instinctual surpluses seeking discharge, while in another it may remain relatively unattached and have little practical importance.

The relatively stable cathexis that accrues to a group's central prejudices and the reactions that this leads to in character formation often provide sure clues to the group's trends. The way authority is exercised in it, the extent of its tolerance, its severity, its restrictions, its repudiations of instinctual drive, are all more or less deeply implanted in the character structure of its members, enabling one to say: 'Tell me what your prejudices are, and I'll tell you in what kind of political system you feel at home.' Thus prejudices represent an important aspect of obedience, an aspect that extends deep into the sphere of unconscious psychic regulation.

Obedience to prejudice

Picking up the thread of our earlier reflections, we can recognize engulfment in prejudice as the result of learnt obedience and obedience to conscience. Associated with every firmly established prejudice is the tendency to react in the manner dictated by it. Prejudice treats its object as one familiar to it from its own experience, though in reality the process is prescribed by external or introjected authorities. All doubt about whether they are right is stifled. Where certitude prevails doubt is excluded, and this *limitation of the possible* is the essence of the matter. We are guided by such certitudes in innumerable situations. We experience the world piecemeal in a series of *o priori* prejudices. 'Certitude' gets the better of critical judgement — often in spite of directly conflicting experience. A **familiar** example is the anti-Semite who will not allow anyone to say anything against his only Jewish friend, though this does not in any way affect his overriding anti-Semitism. The pseudo-logic with which such inconsistency is defended lies behind the saying that there is an exception to every rule. What can certainly be

described as prejudice is surrounded by a wide and hazy marginal area; superstition and articles of faith, illusory ideas and lofty ideals, and not least scientific first principles, should all be examined with the same open-mindedness.

Thus the prejudices it obeys reveal something of a society's state of psychological equilibrium and the means by which it maintains this, particularly through the concomitant affects. Adherence to prejudice can be consistent both with peaceability and with destructive aggressivity; thus it makes a great difference whether prejudices are cathected by libidinal or aggressive instinctual components, and also whether a prejudiced attitude (for instance, a principle of absolute non-violence associated with metaphysical rewards and punishments) binds the two instinctual components or tends to dissociate them. Does the nonviolence taboo, for instance, involve violent repression of the aggressive side instead of integrating it.* In general it would seem that the process of dissociation prevails and fans the unrest in the world. The extent to which the prejudice-guided mode of thought is able to impose itself in mass societies largely suppresses the impulse to objective judgement, and this applies at all status levels. The concomitant emotions are left unquestioned too, because the valuation contained in the prejudice makes them seem self-evident. Great alertness is required to detect the situations in which we can be misled by prejudice — and that cannot be expected of everyone; nor can it be held against him that he does not feel under an obligation to be completely honest with himself and does not, what with manipulated information and the gaps in it, follow a path other than that which is suggested to him. Nor is it evidence of limited intelligence; rather, it is evidence of deficient education in making use of it.

One of the psychodynamic characteristics of prejudices is their power of permanently binding cathected energy to the ideas contained in them. The libidinal component is undoubtedly deeply involved — we are fond of our prejudices and are reluctant to give them up; but this libidinal cathexis frequently opens the way to aggression. The object associated with the prejudice can then easily become an object of hatred, of surplus aggressivity looking for something on which to discharge itself. From the aspect of narcissistic instinctual satisfaction, prejudices often turn out to be a positively ideal solution of the economic problem; both instinctual components obtain satisfaction, though at the expense of the object distorted and alienated by the prejudice.

This gives us an important criterion. If we adopt an opinion based on prejudice, we may merely have made a mistake. If we are able to discover

and correct it, we did not so much succumb to a prejudice as jump prematurely to a conclusion. Our opinion was not cathected with instinctual energy, and it played no significant part in our internal economy. But ridding our mind of error begins to grow difficult when our prestige is involved in the erroneous view, that is, when our narcissistic cathexis is faced with the threat of a humiliation.

Distinguishing between the functions of objective judgement and those of prejudice is even more difficult in the daily business of the courts. Our law books are riddled with prejudices which have nothing to do with principles of justice — on the lines of our Basic Law, for instance — but everything to do with the psychological economy of the groups who succeeded in codifying their prejudices into law. The grotesque sexual bans imposed under Puritan influence, which were carried to such extremes that in some places kissing a girl in public was a punishable offence, show that collective neuroses, and even perversions, can be given legal sanction. There would be no difficulty in demonstrating the absurdity of many prejudices enshrined in our legislation and showing them to be what they are, but that would bring us into conflict, not only with unwritten taboos, but also with taboos written into the legal code, which is the greatest reinforcement that prejudice can have. Once more we may recall Pascal's remark that the greatest crimes have been considered meritorious by those who committed them, and that it is 'custom alone that decides what is right', for it is custom that provides the 'mythical foundation of its authority'. A prejudice can be very accurately defined as an accepted opinion based on insufficient evidence, sometimes associated with a system of punishments and penalties. Prejudices that leave a mark are the result of the compulsion to use neurotically fixed defence mechanisms. Even the most absurd laws in their way contribute to maintaining equilibrium, and this makes it difficult to disentangle them from the rational elements with which they are intertwined.

Thus cathected prejudices are components of the mechanism by which the ego seeks to come to terms both with the way in which authority is exercised in the social world and with the domination of the instincts. It is a primitive method, on the level of that of neurotic symptom formation. The most important consequence is that the ego weakens itself in defence mechanisms instead of strengthening itself by integration. Warding off what is hidden behind prejudice, avoiding anxiety-rousing insight into reality, which is always strange on first acquaintance, weakens the forces of the ego and makes it doubly reluctant to bring the concealed to

light. It is a vicious circle. The history of science, with its long struggle against mythical authority, demonstrates the power of the ego to destroy customary modes of thought (and thus undermine social orders); that is, the power of the ego when it begins 'analysing' instead of using up its strength in defence mechanisms. Those who loudly proclaim their hostility to any kind of analysis of human behaviour (which is of course yet another prejudice) generally omit to mention that the results of analysis generally point to the necessity of a new order. But it is easier and more comfortable to use the ego defensively than to apply its forces to the investigation of reality, particularly when the nature of man himself is concerned.

Granted the human sense of strangeness in the world, the comfort of the certitude that prejudice provides is indispensable in the long period of individual growth and development, and if the analogy does not seem too bold we may assume the same to be true of the youth of humanity as a whole. To put the most favourable construction on the phenomenon, we may say that prejudices are like certain drugs; in moderate doses they provide relief, but in toxic doses they ruin the lives of those who indulge in them. But it is far harder for the psychologist and the sociologist than it is for the pharmacologist to determine the toxic dose, for they have to estimate this, not from the relatively easily ascertainable variations of physiological reaction, but from the extremely fluid relations of interdependence that prevail in individual societies. The Areopagus of extinct gods who have been worshipped in the course of the ages shows that men have always been conscious of their weakness; but the ways in which they have sought to cope with the unknown and the terrible have varied between the extremes of fearless inquiry on the one hand and concealment by projection on the other, between gentleness and charitableness and draconian severity, both to themselves and to others. It seems reasonable to conclude from this that none of the solutions to the human problem that have been offered can or should be universally applied. The difficulty of the task cannot be evaded. But condescending contemplation of the prejudices of the past is insufficient preparation for the careful study of those in which we ourselves have taken or still take pleasure.²

George Bernard Shaw, speaking in a voice very different from that of the preambles to our modern constitutions, said: 'We must face the fact that society is founded on intolerance. There are glaring cases of the abuse of intolerance; but they are quite as characteristic of our own age as of the Middle Ages.'³ Intolerance and ignorance go hand in hand; and sometimes, as we have pointed out, they establish a vicious circle, one continually reinforcing the

other. Human societies are so intolerant because they are so ignorant about themselves, and keep themselves so ignorant. As we have pointed out, the importance of intolerance to the social economy can be traced back to a biological root; it helps to maintain group equilibrium, and without such equilibrium social life relapses into anarchy. The purpose of any particular prejudice is to safeguard its holders against disturbance from the alien outer and inner world. This is generally brought about, not just by one prejudice, but by a whole set, originating in the processes of identification by which we adapt ourselves to our environment. Freud describes identification as 'the assimilation of one ego to another one, as a result of which the first ego behaves like the second in certain respects, imitates it and in a sense takes it up into itself'.• Identifications are indispensable for finding one's own identity but, if the ego becomes so firmly tied to another ego that the tie cannot be undone, a false identity, a false personality, is formed whose further development is blocked. The word 'false' should be treated with caution, however. We all have unresolved ties resulting from identifications. Our objective is to establish the neurotic, diseased form of tie, the total subjection that expresses itself in prejudices we are unable to shake off.

Pseudo-rationalism

The arsenal of arguments with which prejudices are defended is virtually inexhaustible. Often they are used with an agility and resourcefulness that takes the ground from under the critic's feet. The skilful demagogue is often a past master of this art; he has the laughter on his side, and uses it to spare his audience the unpleasure of examining reality and give them the pleasure of being able to identify themselves with the 'winning' side. This sharp-wittedness, which is often nothing of the sort but really its opposite, is an extraordinary phenomenon, after all; it strikes us as so natural because we are so easily able to practise it ourselves, or at any rate to appreciate it in others. Everyone can recall his astonishment at the fertility of his own imagination in inventing excuses in an emergency in his school days; necessity is the mother of invention. How does that come about? As we have previously mentioned, fear paralyses the more differentiated psychological processes and provokes primitive reactions such as aggression or flight, or in extreme cases panic, a pattern reminiscent of the tropism of the simplest forms of life. Here, however, we see fear stimulating the ego to considerable feats of ingenuity in the invention of plausible excuses. The paradox can be explained. The lie invented by the ego

— and the content of many collective prejudices is a lie — corresponds, not with the facts of reality, but with wishes and ideas about reality as it might be. If the premise that I was the victim of aggression were correct, the conclusion (that I had to defend myself, and that it was as a consequence of this that the other party got a black eye) would incontrovertibly establish my complete innocence in the matter. But that is generally not the situation when pseudo-rationalism sets out to buttress prejudice. Where prejudices are at work the ego is faced with the task of warding off guilt and fear of retribution. What takes place is comparable with motoric flight. The ego is subjected to ruthless instinctual wishes and has to bring what actually happened (or is going to happen) into harmony with the standards of reality. Thus there are two sources of fear that have to be avoided; fear of internal impulses and fear of external sanctions. In this situation the prejudice brings notable relief. It permits a certain amount of instinctual satisfaction at the expense of, say, an outcast or some subordinate, and explains why this is innocent, not punishable. Prejudices that perform this function spare the ego a lot of defence work and help it in its task of securing pleasure and avoiding unpleasure. The disastrous result is that they strengthen self-feeling without strengthening the ego. The ego does something of which it is capable, namely thinking, not in its own cause, however, but in that of an unconscious motive and, so to speak, in a 'predigested', collectively accepted, secret language. We have already come across the several instances of such servile ego work.

The situation is aggravated by the interpretation put upon reality by the convincing though unsound arguments used to buttress the prejudice. These serve the need to cover up and obscure the desire for unilateral, selfish instinctual satisfaction and ward off retribution, felt to be just retribution for real guilt. In doing this the ego may have recourse to whole sets of prejudices that mutually support each other in a chain of so-called evidence. The more self-evident these prejudices seem to us to be when they are presented to our minds, the more easily this can happen, and this will always be the case when they enjoy wide collective dissemination and are linked with approved affect directed at approved objects.

Influencing the man in the street

If we were in a position to be able to consider everything objectively before making up our minds, there would be no prejudice. Our capacity for objective judgement is, however, limited in two respects. We live in a world in which an incalculable number of choices have continually to be made, and if we subjected everything to objective scrutiny we

should get nowhere. Even in our own personal lives we find ourselves confronted with unprecedented situations in which we have to make up our minds, though very well aware that we have never been in such a situation before and lack the capacity for judging it objectively. Also it is not rare for us to lack the courage to use the capacity even if we possess it. Courage in this context means solidity of ego structure, the ego's ability to hold fast to its object in spite of the intervention of the super-ego and the id (and also of course intimidation from the social environment) and the ability to deal with it according to its own standards. In making most of our decisions, however, as we saw in Chapter I, we inevitably fall back on conventions, customs, the experience and opinions of specialists, and hand over responsibility to them. We put our trust in accustomed rules and signals and try to make surprising and unfamiliar situations less alarming thereby. That does not necessarily mean that we are led into error, though of course this can occur. Factual opinions that I take over from others put me in a position of dependence on them, of course, but that is inevitable in a world in which the division of labour prevails. But when I take over other people's affective judgements the danger of being led astray increases rapidly. The division of labour necessarily involves reliance on the experience and opinions of others. But the combination of this with the frequent necessity of the wholesale taking over of affective attitudes is the most dangerous conceivable social constellation. It is the situation in which we live.

The other limitation of our power of judgement, contrasting with the multiplicity of outside influences to which we are subjected, derives from the relative monotony of our instinctual trends and the paths by which we seek their satisfaction or repression as the case may be. Here the issue of courage arises again. We do not dare admit to ourselves the motivations of our actions, and consequently we project them on other men and institutions. We displace into the outside world the terrifying insights we catch brief glimpses of in ourselves, and then note with relief that it is not ourselves but others who are capable of such brutal, barbarous, and disgraceful impulses. Not content with cleansing our self-image by projection, we further buttress ourselves by identifying our purified self-ideal with individual or corporate models and believe them to be capable of sweet reason totally uninfluenced by emotion. This defence against critical observation both of the self and of others is a more frequent and more permanent element in our lives than considered reflection.

It is a truism to say that we do not like looking men and things courageously in the eye, but there is more to it than that when we discover the reason. Our capacity for critical assessment is entwined in affective judge-

ments, emotionally charged prejudices, which we cannot give up without experiencing acute anxiety. Even the first step generally fails, namely, the realization that the anxiety stems from intimidations and threats of punishment dating from childhood, and that the reality of the situation that rouses it may not be dangerous at all. The taboos and fears that we carry about with us from childhood contain a lot of magical ideas. They are still cathected, and their irrationality continues unchanged to hamper our capacity for critical thought as soon as the latter approaches them. As we have seen, however, the form taken by our defence against the instinctual side of our nature is moulded by the existing system of social values. As infringement (often only in thought) of stereotyped judgements threatens a loss of status and prestige and hence of self-valuation, the ego withdraws from the test of such dangerous reality and seeks security in prejudices. If magical threats involving a great deal of anxiety are implicated, the prejudices condense into the great taboos.

The ego carries out yet another task. It has to preserve its self-respect in the face of this feeble retreat. This it does by an ingenious step in adaptation — it adopts the taboos as its ideal. That is the trick performed by subservient reason in order to restore the pleasure principle. It would seem not impossible with the aid of critical insight to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the problem of sharing out property and responsibility, or of freeing the racial and minority problems that exist in many societies from the projections with which they are burdened; it would seem not impossible to devise ways and means of coping with the effects of irrational events, for instance, to consider the most sensible frontiers to establish after a lost war with a view to avoiding involvement in new projections and counter-projections which must eventually erupt in further violence. The reason why these things do not happen is that prejudice is quicker than thought. It is formed before thought can intervene. The affective attitude to these problems follows selfish principles, even though the tribute it thus pays to the pleasure principle is exceedingly short-sighted. Thus, when we accept the views we are offered in such situations, we can be certain that they will not be detached and objective, but one-sided and fallacious. It must of course be admitted that, when once powerful collective moods have developed, testing reality can be a task that makes heroic demands on the individual, and in practice it may be condemned to futility over long periods.

The pseudo-rationalism of toxic prejudices is an instrument of government. The primitive subsoil, inimical to consciousness, from which they grow should never be lost sight of and its influence never be underrated. Relations between rulers and ruled

are power relations, and as such are by no means tied to enlightened understanding. The ancient sign language of power is still at work in the most complicated social organizations just as it once was in the horde or clan, and determines who is the stronger and who the weaker. Pseudo-rationalism works in favour of the group which in existing conditions enjoys a preferential position for fulfilling its instinctual wishes; the manipulation of prejudices serves to protect its members from the resentment of their unprivileged fellows. As this process of manipulation goes far deeper than the level of conscious calculation, it would be wrong to describe it as a tactical method; it is, rather, a dynamic process that runs through history like a thread.

We must be prepared for the criticism that our analysis fails to do justice to the mind and spirit of man, and that we are on the way to reducing him to a creature of mere instinct, making history only a business of drives and being driven. The word 'reducing' must be accepted, in the sense that any analysis of complex facts is likely to hit on a new and unsuspected system of cause and effect — in the present context the permanent involvement of instinctual forces far removed from consciousness. They are the biological foundations of our life, and only a part of them can be transposed into conscious freedom. The animal part is generally despised and looked down on (generally in pre-conscious dependence on the established régime, as exemplified in ideas about being 'the agents of civilization', for instance); even among those who proudly withdraw themselves from earthly instincts and talk of mind, spirit, purpose, and other such things, as if these were freely available, the situation is not much better. The inevitable relapse comes when these high-minded gentry feel it to be their self-evident duty to behave like 'strong' and 'valiant' beasts of prey, slaughtering their fellow-men in the service of the 'spirit' and for a 'just cause'. This behaviour turns out to be compatible with their honour. We do not accept the invitation to regard mind and spirit of this kind, either in one way or in the other, as being immune from having political and social consequences, even though this should earn us the rebuke of undervaluing it in our balance sheet. If we are following a single thread, it means that we are trying to throw light on a single factor, with no megalomaniac pretensions to explaining everything. It is not always night, after all, and it is impossible to say that there will never be a state of freer interdependence between older levels of organization and historically younger ones which will enable a balance to be struck that it will be possible to regard as 'right' after critical examination and not

merely because it accords with ideological wishful thinking.

The obverse side of the proud emblem of 'the free spirit of man' is lamentation about the impotence of the human spirit. That is a venerable paradox, but it should not be taken as being necessarily true for all eternity. What is required instead is the development of a methodology, a system of purely pragmatical rules, enabling us to distinguish between pseudo-rationalism and the genuine article. Social order is a necessity, but there is no such thing as the best social system for mankind; a society that came close to this ideal would permit a great deal of critical ego, would know how to track down and expose defence mechanisms, and would give ego obedience precedence over the taboos. With these rudiments of a methodology for unmasking questionable claims to authority (and equally questionable surrender to illusory beliefs in other, consolatory worlds) we are searching for the principles of a socio-psychological method of analysis which purely empirical investigation is unable to supply. In social philosophy idealism and pessimism have come to terms. 'Pessimism became a rationalization of the disquieting state of reality. It helped to shift the blame for the absence of the benefits expected from technological process on to the nature of the world instead of attributing the source of the growing evil to a social organization in which technology has shot up over man's head.'• The development of technology has changed man's self-awareness only to the extent that it has increased his feeling of power. The sensitive pressure on the accelerator pedal that causes the horsepower to spring to life is an experience closely related to that of flying dreams. Insight into the motives by which the individual has always been guided and his behaviour determined is not increased by these mechanical aids. On the contrary, the danger of self-deception has if anything been increased, because the techniques of handling human beings have grown side by side with industrial techniques. The persuaders threaten the critical ego in old roles and new; equipped with the findings of behaviour research and dynamic psychology, they keep the individual tractable. Knowledge is of course not the sole privilege of pure intellect; it is not seldom a professional secret of skilful incumbents of roles.

The more realistic the anthropology on which the methods of the manipulators are based, the better they are able to manipulate prejudices. That has now become a matter of general knowledge among managers of all kinds; here psychology has made a really epoch-making breakthrough. To the unpractised ego plausible presentation brings darkness just where light ought to be shed; this makes the real world as inac-

cessible to it as did the demonology of the old days with its sacred, unenterable precincts. Nevertheless the possibility of evading these conscious or unconscious traps exists. It lies in the development of the critical ego capacities and their coherent organization, which provides the only means of seeing through the taboos in which pseudo-rationalism wraps up the facts. The points must be established at which the umbilical cord of interests joins the similarly shadowless world of conformities. The art of measuring the rationalizations of prejudice against reason can, however, be most successfully practised in the observation of one's own behaviour. This again assumes society's teaching the individual how and when to give up identifications, and which ones, and how they should be transcended in order, as Nietzsche put it, to become a 'universally right-seeing eye.'

Vulnerability to prejudice is no less a problem than that of giving it up. If it is encouraged in the early years while the child, still a stranger in the world, is naturally thrown back on identifications, social standards extinguish the sense that one could become a self, or even that one ought to. The greater the fear of the model that identifications have to diminish, the more powerful they are. Thus the greatest tendency to prejudice exists among communities based on fear. Toxic and ineradicable prejudices can consequently be described as the result of over-identification. Even the slightest degree of uncertainty causes unpleasure, in which the individual regresses to mimicry, to identification with the model. If he has not been taught how to tolerate unpleasure, or if all non-conformity is threatened with severe punishment, relapse into prejudice is the only way left of saving some rudiments of the pleasure principle.

Whenever one is faced with a decision the initial reaction is unsureness. But this unsureness, this ignorance, alienates us from the majority to whom the situation obviously presents no problem. Fear of inferiority is a strong (if not one of the strongest) motives that cause one to take refuge in the conflict-sparing certitude of prejudice. 'Men seem to carry about an agonizing fear of the "I don't know" inside themselves,' says Hofstutter in describing this situation, 'as if hardly anything were so painful as having to admit to ignorance. I believe that that brings us to the root of that strange phenomenon, public opinion. Inner tensions associated with the state of suspension involved in not knowing are at once greatly diminished when a patent remedy is hit on.' Prejudice releases us from this 'state of undifferentiated tension' 7 it gives us irection, and a pattern for action in emergencies. Unsatisfied trends which have been looking for an object immediately bind them-

selves to the certitudes and hopes that the prejudice promises, and anxiety is diminished. Hence the method of the demagogue, as Hofst atter points out, is artificially to increase the sense of uncertainty before offering his solution. Intensified anxiety lowers the threshold of regression, and the tendency to identification increases to the point of psychical symbiosis.

Sacrifice of the intellect

The paternalist society made ample use of prejudice. Its socially formative certitudes converged in the belief in a father God by whom these certitudes were consecrated. The distinction between profane knowledge, which was liable to correction, and sacred knowledge, which required the sacrifice of the intellect in this world, is not an ancient one. Until the advent of the great discoverers of scientific laws, profane knowledge took second place. The highest prestige was enjoyed by the incumbents of roles which by virtue of the divine blessing or birth put them closer to the father God than ordinary mortals. This is not the place to discuss the subterranean survival of this hierarchical pattern of authority since the Reformation, the American Declaration of Independence, the French Revolution, and through the permanent scientific revolution of our time. The fact remains that the decline in the prestige of sacred knowledge and its representatives continues irresistibly.

The scene has changed to the extent that rebellion against the father has lost its central importance. Religious tyranny gave birth to religious heresies — going all the way to fanatical atheism — which yielded nothing to it in intolerance. When we come across this antithesis to paternal absolutism nowadays it is no more than an anachronism. The social processes that led to the growth and development of industrial mass society continually and often unintentionally eroded the image of the venerable, omniscient, omnipotent father. There is every sign that paternalist ideas in church and state hardly affect the lives of the masses and have ceased to awaken any response in them. True, residues of magical modes of thought have been greatly reinforced in our time. Sectarianism as an expression of group neurosis and over-dimensional ideals that can also be regarded as group neurosis still hold many under their spell, some permanently, some only briefly." But in populations counted in millions many are still only few. The 'grey' masses of our huge, amorphous cities are indifferent to all claims based on paternalist authority.

The nation is still referred to out of habit as *to patrie*, the fatherland, land of our fathers, etc., but the passive, demanding attitude to it betrays a deeper

tie; it is nuzzled against as if it were a mother goddess with innumerable breasts. As national and private undertakings grow more closely interlinked and those in positions of responsibility grow more and more remote, the technical landscape takes the place of mother nature. Booms and crises are only superficially regarded as 'artificial', the result of decisions made within society; in the fantasy world of the salary and wage-earner they have a quality resembling that of the vagaries of the weather. They are accepted rather like the fat years and lean years distributed by the mother goddess, and are responded to either euphorically or dysphorically instead of being taken as a challenge to social criticism as in the age of class struggles. The concentration is on technical development, not on bringing about a change in men's minds; technology is relied on to bring about incubator conditions. Only a few regard this, as Henry Miller does, as an air-conditioned nightmare.

From divine state to divine bureaucracy

However hard politicians and employers may try to keep the paternalist principle alive — and the trade unions need it too in their role as contracting parties — the millions are no longer interested, their frame of mind is quite different. To their basic expectations the idea that the chief aims in life are independence and aggressive competition are totally alien; and conditions are such that for most of them these are very unrealistic aims in any case. That is why campaigns for higher wages, for instance, no longer resemble a fierce conflict with a severe father figure; regression has gone deeper than that and left the structure of the super-ego, the sense of duty, responsibility, and self-restraint behind. Production is lavish, they drink lavishly from the mother's breasts, and the objective is the somnolence of society. Demands and claims are made on a level that makes a differentiated experience of life superfluous. The state of mind we are describing has a vague quality, it is in the air, but we cannot localize it like a pin-prick. All the same, these intangible moods are basic; they make us see the world with different eyes, they make the world itself seem different. They are an all-pervading phenomenon, specific and at the same time non-specific (that is, not localized) reactions to environmental conditions as a whole. They originate in a 'processing of information' about inner needs and outside conditions, which are worked up into a total impression, a complex of feelings that awaken echoes of affects and hopes. Circular arguments of course establish themselves in the process, giving greater clarity and durability to the moods and helping to stabilize them. The paranoid, euphoric, depressive,

aggressive, total climate of the culture is easy to detect but harder to describe convincingly. The fundamental mood of regressive, passive expectation of happiness is not dissipated just because activity and initiative appear in places. Only in extreme cases is the depressive individual completely paralysed by his state of mind; in ordinary circumstances, though shadowed by depression, he takes an active part in life, but his activity and capacity for experience are coloured by depression, despondency, and complaint.

The dissemination of an infantile demanding attitude, the withdrawal from the paternal world of articulated effort and its risks, can — if it develops into a salient collective characteristic — have no cause other than the devaluation of all the characteristics that the paternalist culture once had. When social processes as a whole allow few opportunities for initiative because the productive apparatus requires and produces un-independent masses, the spirit of rivalry (to take just one point) can no longer be satisfied by the development of the individual's initiative, but turns into envy and 'begging behaviour' resembling that of nestlings on the approach of their parents bringing food. This may have been the plight of members of hierarchical bureaucracies ever since hierarchical bureaucracies began, but now it is the plight of the bureaucratized, administered masses. It is not just one type of human destiny among others that influences the general mood; it has become the general destiny. This has brought about a fundamental change of scene.

The development of this new homogenized state of dependence has run parallel with the break-up of the paternalist world and all its apparatus. The latter has been replaced by a 'park' of independently producing machines; the sources of energy that guide the whole thing and keep it going remain hazy. The suckling gets its milk, but cannot ask where it comes from. All it insists on is that it should get it, and it does so imperiously. It would be easy to dismiss this as a cheap analogy, but that would be underrating the continuity of psychical processes. Regression is a harking back to patterns of experience that remain alive beneath later ones by which they have been overlaid. If the individual is driven back to them in an emergency, they are fully revived. Regression serves to evade reality, but it leads to a resuscitation of realities that were once experienced and are now emotionally relived. This leads to a vigorous double life. At the conscious level argument takes place with the more or less rational symbols of everyday speech, but expectations are simultaneously awakened that do not derive from rational calculation. Susceptibility to prejudice and emotional pliability are ruthlessly exploited, for in-

stance, in campaigns for higher wages or higher sales: the practitioners of the art have learnt skilfully to adapt themselves to the now general expectation of compensation in this world for the unpleasure experienced in it.

As we mentioned in the chapter on the 'invisible father', we are far from overlooking the effects of our constitution on the sheer increase in population and the adaptation that has had to be made to industrial civilization. The survival of institutions such as the family, the churches, and national units as guardians of order cannot blind us to the fact that they are no longer central to people's lives. Their libidinal cathexis is steadily approaching zero. We are told, for instance, that barely one per cent of the German Protestant population goes to church on Sunday. The modern forms of propaganda used by the churches or the army do nothing to change the situation; they arouse no deeper interest than propaganda of other kinds, though the great majority of church members take incomparably more pleasure in a well-written report on the test of a new car model than they do in a Sunday sermon. We state this without irony and without pleasure, but we state it; it is, indeed, a fact familiar to everybody, though it has not, apart from some expressions of backward-looking wishful thinking, received the attention it deserves.

Blows to pride and the response

The new **patterns** of prejudice illustrate the

'oral' character of the regression that has taken place (in succession to the characteristic striving for 'anal' security of the paternalist society, with its approval of possessions acquired as the result of hard work). They circle round the 'standard of living' complex and everything associated with it. As against the ascetic, anti-self-indulgent trend of the bourgeoisie, with its concentration on percentage yields, the emphasis on consumption has brought a more cheerful, more relaxed note into daily life. After successive waves of destruction and devaluation, the moral considerations associated with the values of the traditional paternalist society, in which the head of the family ensured its security, are no longer listened to. Widespread dependence on allowances and pensions gives the state a primary maternal aura, and a complaisance towards its bidings is therefore expected which would be more in place in the nursery. In bourgeois society conflict centred round succession; the younger generation struggled with the older for accession to the latter's authority, its role privileges, of which the greatest was the control of its property. In industrial mass society the struggle is for a permanent security of quite

a different type; permanent security means being looked after for life. This is producing a completely different view of what success consists of— namely, securing oneself a place at the breasts of the administrative goddess as early in life as possible. This necessarily brings about a new kind of 'good behaviour' which did not exist in a society in which feudal and aristocratic, bourgeois and proletarian claims to authority conflicted with each other.

This revolution is as plainly reflected in the cathected content of old prejudices as it is in the nature of the new. One no longer attaches oneself to anything that does not in some way give physical satisfaction or partake of the nature of a toy. When a new technical gadget is successfully launched with the aid of the prejudice mechanism, prestige is associated with the toy, whether it be a camera or a private bar or a private swimming-pool. But, in accordance with the satisfaction curve, satisfaction of the impulse predictably leads to loss of interest, which has to be stimulated afresh by the offer of something new." This is an striking contrast to the paternalist society, with its ideal of stability accompanied by simultaneous frustration of physical sensual pleasure. In the consumer society prejudices change continually in accordance with fashion, but they are continually renewed. They do not go deep, but the readiness to follow them remains constant. Hectic mobility in the search for satisfaction and boredom when it has been obtained are the two poles between which the consumer oscillates as soon as he is released from the unpleasure of production.

Here, then, we have a psychical condition characterized by the fact that the greater part of its content is introduced from outside and also by a far-reaching withdrawal of the libido to a narcissistic cathexis of the physical self. We set out on this survey of it in order once more to illustrate the extent of the regression that has taken place. This regression is a consequence of the loss within a few decades of an environment by which many generations were formed. We are not here concerned with investigating the type of character formation associated with the age before the population explosion and the development of modern science and its exploitation, that is, the character structure of the paternalist society; we are concerned with the relative consistency of the response to the new fundamental conditions of life, which have produced a new type recognizable over and above all individual variations. Numinous and profane forms of authority formed a unity that left no one unaffected. The age of the Enlightenment in all its manifold aspects shattered that unity which, so far as the masses are concerned, has left behind nothing but puzzling traces expressed in an almost unintelligible language. Attempts to re-

vive the past are bound to fail, for the evolutionary step towards greater consciousness is irreversible. The symbolic language hitherto used by religion has ceased to be intelligible in a world in which the outlook from which the images stemmed has disappeared. It does not follow, however, that the area of experience that has hitherto been covered by the word 'religion' is being buried by this. That depends on other lines of development which are not regressive but provide a means of expression for the growth of consciousness. Science has not only made man more confident and given him independence, it has also struck blows at his deepest feelings. Freud¹⁰ mentioned three such blows to pride that broke through powerful barriers of prejudice. These were (i) the cosmological blow administered by Copernicus, who removed the earth from its central position in the universe; (ii) the biological blow struck by Darwin with his discovery that man is 'of animal descent, being more or less closely related to some species and more distantly to others'; and finally (iii) the psychological blow involved in the discovery of unconscious mental activity that disputes the rational ego's authority over the self. 'For this mind is not a simple thing; on the contrary, it is a hierarchy of super-ordinated and subordinated agencies, a labyrinth of impulses striving independently of one another towards action, corresponding with the multiplicity of instincts and of relations with the external world, many of which are antagonistic to one another and incompatible.' This succession of narcissistic blows had to be coped with, and we can observe regressive and progressive attempts to do so taking place side by side. The validity of science is simply denied, or the distinction between science on the one hand and religion on the other is persisted in, or the human state is philosophically exalted. The challenging discoveries of science are made to seem innocuous by the defence mechanism of encapsulating and isolating them, regarding them as having no bearing on our knowledge as a whole, or solace is found in phoney attempts to demonstrate that there is no inconsistency between science and traditional religion of the type of *The Bible as history*. Another, and the most common, form of defence is withdrawal of interest from the disputed area, indifference to all attempts to find a unifying principle of order in the universe. This appears in the attitude of passive, vegetative dependence we have described, combined with the anarchical protest that breaks out when the sources of satisfaction do not flow with sufficient abundance. It is also reflected in behaviour during the crises of adolescence. The uncontrolled oscillations of mood and affect familiar to us at the age of puberty sometimes take the form of blind

group tantrums characteristic of infantile protest behaviour.

Coping progressively with the humiliating blows to human pride calls for a new approach recognizing both the limitations and the infinity of the knowable. There is certainly no need for any sacrifice of the intellect. As an example of responsible faith we may quote one of the last letters of the physicist Max Planck, written on **June 18, 1947** 'I can assure you that I have always been of a deeply religious disposition,' he wrote, 'though I have never believed in a personal God, let alone a Christian God.'¹ After what has gone before, it cannot be regarded as a disparagement of religious experience if we describe the doctrine of men being the children of God as childish. The child experiences a preverbal sense of security with its mother, and then another, associated with the business of practical living, with its father. In both cases the sense of security is embodied in real persons, but there is nothing to show that the 'world' is governed in a fashion analogous to that of the human family. Our first experiences of order are associated with human social arrangements; we have, indeed, constantly reiterated, in the light of social trends that are causing them to disappear, how essential to the satisfactory development of the child the two parents are in their different roles.

No one who has not had direct experience of security in the person of a model can learn to tolerate the greater doubts and uncertainties that result from conscious thought. This conscious thought must renounce identification of the unknown and the unknowable with the authority of an omniscient father. It must renounce security by prejudice. 'In the struggle for the good,' Einstein wrote, 'teachers of religion must have inner greatness and drop the doctrine of a personal God, that is, renounce the well-spring of fear and hope from which the priests of old derived such tremendous power.' Since the liberation from serfdom a struggle has been in progress for man's religious liberation, and the indifference of the masses to religion shows the difficulty of the task. Max Planck's and Einstein's religious attitude derived, not from obedience to conscience, but from obedience to the ego. Undoubtedly this represents an advance towards the fatherless society; not to a society obliged to kill the father in order to establish itself, but sufficiently adult to be able to leave him in order to stand on its own feet.

Here too we must be careful not to suffuse the word 'progress' with any optimistic glow. It is meaningless to say that being adult is better than being a child. First one is one and then the other, each in its own due time. If we look at the pathological symptoms of our society as dispassionately

as we look at ancient times, we shall be able to distinguish between two types of fatherlessness. In the first the fatherfigure is lost at the time when the child vitally needs him for the building up of its identity (in his absence it becomes dependent on the mother for the whole of its lifetime). In the second the father has not been lost, but the individual has achieved a self-identity that enables him to shake off the father-figure and think not exclusively in categories of paternal authority. Only a society in which this second type prevails will be able to enter fields of development in which it feels itself to be responsibly adult and independently inquiring.

PreJudice and conscience

Let us once more revert to the prejudices that are tied to the conscience.

A study of four hundred students quoted by Gordon W. Allport in his book on the nature of prejudice² showed that among those in whose education religion played a big part there was a much greater tendency to prejudices in general — in relation to race or minorities, for instance — than among those in whose childhood religion played a smaller part or none at all. Allport gives a warning against generalizations, however, for a strong tendency to (genuinely Christian) tolerance was also present among those brought up on traditional religious lines. Further investigation was therefore required to establish whether the prejudices concerned were included 'undogmatically' in a peaceable character or were a pretext for sadistic aggressivity.

Broadly speaking, however, the predominant feature in religious education to absolute obedience was the threat of merciless punishment. This is bound to lead to a traumatic fixation on infantile defence measures with the consequent trend, which we have by now sufficiently emphasized, to crude and aggressive acting out.

The obverse side of this religious authoritarian style of socializing human beings is that it cannot teach them to accommodate themselves to the ambivalence of their feelings. Integration of the instincts into the ego is hampered by the more archaic form of defence against them, by the mechanisms of repression, denial, and projection. These mechanisms are consolidated before the maturation of the ego and remain out of its reach. This type of religion has paid heavily for this. **Apart** from its promises of salvation, in the past it provided an outlet for brutality in the practices of the institutions that supervised religious taboos.

The modern secular religions, the state ideologies, have given a new lease of life to this process. They are very successful in manipulating people, because

they take into account the individual's state of dependence in a culture in which the division of labour is highly developed. By sanctioning the release of repressed and therefore blind aggression against a scapegoat they give the tamed, passive citizen the sense that his ideal of being strong, active, and independent is attainable after all. The enthusiasm, or rather the self-sacrificing devotion to the requirements of their leaders, that German soldiers showed in two world wars must have been rooted in a surfeit of peace-time experiences in which so much passive submission was required without the stimulus of adventure, that is, without the possibility of maturation by way of protest. The need for adventure and risk-taking was the more frustrated as new relationships of dependence were very effectively combined with still intact paternal authoritarianism. Martin Wagh³ has drawn attention to the specific consequences of deprivation of the father who is idealized because he is on active service followed by the severe narcissistic blow that ensues when he returns home in the role of vanquished instead of victor. He quotes a study by Leslie T. Wilkins[•] 'which shows statistically that British children who were aged from three to five during the worst war years had a delinquency rate nearly

4 per cent higher than corresponding peace-time generations at the age of seven and between the ages of sixteen to twenty'. If this point to increased difficulty in social adaptation, to disturbances in the build-

ing up the super-ego, it follows that this generation will, in the event of economic crises, show a great proclivity to prejudices, though for reasons quite different from those of individuals subjected to a sadistic super-ego. The content of these prejudices will offer them the prospect of wiping out the narcissistic blow represented by the humiliation of their national pride incarnated in their father.

On being confronted with prejudice about oneself

One cannot want to have prejudices; at most one can want not to have them. One has them before one is aware of it. The psychical processes of identification that lead to them are older than the capacity for critical reflection, and they continue after the critical conscious has developed. Prejudices complete passive adaptation to the forms of instinctual outlet prescribed by the social environment. When the ego impinges on the decrees of prejudice, unpleasure and fear are experienced, depending on the amount of cathected energy tied up in them. The point at which harm is done is reached when efforts to attain an independent orientation to reality are hampered by anxiety. The trends of the developing individual

are met by prejudice (and still more by a set of interconnected prejudices) in two respects. All patterns of behaviour acquired through identification contain a variegated mixture of practical knowledge and group-specific and individual prejudices taken over from the model. Their adoption establishes affective undersanding with the model figures in the individual's immediate environment and with the members of the group in general. Adhering to them protects the child, whose critical faculties are still weak, from hostile impulses from the environment. Prejudices set limits to spontaneous reactions and provide guidance for practical action. They do nothing to strengthen the critical capacities of the ego, but reinforce self-feeling because of the appreciation that is shown when the individual does what is generally approved and is considered right and proper. If there is no education in asking questions about the world, that is, if the models are themselves not capable of asking such questions, an obedience to prejudice sets in that cuts short the process of maturation, and adaptation follows the path of social automatism.

That is one possible line of development. Another use of prejudice is to provide an outlet for the discharge of the surplus instinctual energy accumulated by repression resulting from the group's standards of behaviour. With a certitude similar to that of magical modes of thought, prejudices create the feeling, not only of what is right and good that is incorporated into the ego ideal, but also of the evil that is characteristic of alien objects. The surplus affect that cannot be openly tied to objects within the group, let alone ruthlessly satisfied by them, can be uninhibitedly lived out upon these alien objects. Perfectly mild and civil individuals of whom, as the saying is, one would never believe such a thing, often turn out to be capable of performing unbelievable horrors upon aliens who have been declared to be evil. Our age has not been spared instances of this.

From the psychological point of view, the most important feature in this is the process by which objects are alienated by prejudice. They can be alienated in the hostile sense, but they can also be alienated by idealization. They may perhaps be strange or different from what one is used to, but without the obstacle of the prejudice it would be possible to get to know and understand them better. That, however, is not allowed to happen, because they have become a means to an end. But for their aura of dangerous and incalculable hostility, one's aggressivity would lose the prospect of satisfaction. The fantasy is free to indulge in acts of cruelty against the alien object. As the two antipodes of instinctual life, Libido and Destrudo,

never completely lose connection with each other even when dissociated (which gives precedence to the aggression arising from frustration), and as they are directed at the same object, sexual desire distorted into hatred is found to be the other surplus driving force." There is a reciprocal relationship between the extent to which unworth is attributed to strangers, 'out-groups', and the accumulation of surplus instinct brought about by restrictions within the 'in-group'. The amount of uncompensatable frustration within the in-group determines the strength of the surplus aggression and the need to bind it to something ('if there were no Jews, it would be necessary to invent them'). A dialectical process takes place. One group of prejudices enforces repression and creates the surplus drive excluded from satisfactions; a second group creates surrogate objects for its satisfaction and channels the instinctual surplus in their direction. The same economic principles also apply to surplus libido. Unsatisfied needs for tenderness and genital sexuality easily become bound to surrogate objects which are 'alienated' from their true nature and given another similar to one's own. Anyone who has observed how a dog or cat can satisfy the emotional needs of its owner and has listened to the way in which the animal is talked to will know what is meant. Both the sentimental humanization of pets and the aggressive, destructive alienation of 'out-groups' are misconstructions based on the same dynamics of prejudice. Finally we come to the highly cathected prejudices, those associated with strong affect and tied to the conscience. They are closely connected with the feeling of identity, the inner perception of ourselves that tells us: This is I, and this I shall remain. The individual grows up with these prejudice structures, which enjoy social respect and mutually support each other, and he often does so without difficulty or objection and takes a great deal of satisfaction in the behaviour that they call for. Perhaps no one is **unfamiliar** with the vague sense of inner emptiness and helplessness that sets in when some encounter or experience puts us on the trail of some central prejudice by which we are bound. If our thinking ego is able to face the arguments that have shattered our previous certainty and allows itself to be convinced by them, the anxious void — in which one feels oneself to have been robbed — is succeeded by a new sense of liberation and identity.

The formation of identity depends on the individual's self-feeling; it does not without previous inspection adopt a social identity, meaning by that inconspicuous adaptation, undisturbed capacity for work and pleasure, and whatever other factors may be statistically taken into account in defining the socially healthy. Successful conformity certainly creates a feeling of self and identify, but this is the first stage

in the individual's life history. The identity required of the mature individual is the result of *active* adaptation both to the outside world and to the world within. This means that the forces of the id and the acquired stereotypes of value and behaviour have to be subjected to active critical control and as a consequence either modified or given up. But, as life is a state of unstable equilibrium in time, or, in other words, readaptation has to take place in each of its phases, this can be successful only if the stabilities attained can be carried over into new ones that have to be established. The sense of security derived from infantile defence mechanisms and the identity feeling which derives from them — and at that phase is inevitable — has to be sacrificed to the unstable equilibriums of an ego development which sometimes finds itself running into culs-de-sac and sometimes proceeds continuously. Identification with the father has to be found, to be supplemented and superseded in its turn by identifications at the horizontal level; and finally the 'scrap of independence and originality' will demand its appropriate place in self-awareness and hope for recognition and friendly reception.

Not that the ego can or should shake off all the habits that originated in identification, but it should progressively gain an influence over them. Where parts or central areas of the character remain excluded from the development of this increasing sensitivity of perception both of the self and of others, and are unable to meet the challenge of adequate adaptation, a partial stoppage of development can be said to have taken place, a toxic immobilization arising out of prejudice.

Our character, that is, the characteristic behaviour we display to the world, is determined by the work of integration done by the ego as a whole, its unconscious as well as its (more meagre) conscious components. Self-perception and perception of the outside world are interconnected; the accuracy of our perception of the human environment depends on that of our self-perception. A distorted picture of the human environment is always the result of a refusal to believe in processes inside ourselves; instead, we delude ourselves that they are at work in others. No one escapes the anxiety experienced on realizing the uncanny fact of affective distortion of perception. This anxiety derives from resistance, dealing with which is the central content of psycho-analytic treatment. Confrontation with the self-deception resulting from prejudice is often signalled by so much anxiety that massive resistance blocks all attempts to break through to it — yet another illustration of the tremendous influence that prejudices have on the human internal economy. Those who are contemplating subjecting themselves to analysis

invariably express fear of loss of the self, that is, their identity. 'What will become of me *' they say. 'What sort of unknown person will it turn me into?'

This is only one example among many, though it is an impressive one, because the psycho-analytic objective is obviously to help an individual who desires to be freed from restricting or morbid disturbances. Similar anxieties are, however, felt by most people, particularly the young, when considering what career to adopt. The choice is often very difficult, especially if practical considerations can be left temporarily out of account. The individual is then faced with the ordeal of choosing what in many respects is a permanent identity and of accepting limits on his self-ideal without surrendering himself in the process. What he is in search of is a new identity which, though distinct from the old, nevertheless leaves the latter with all its value, and it is far harder to find this than to dismiss what he does not want. Often it is restrictions as such that are shunned, because these are felt hitherto to have been repressive to the self. To many the idea of entering the Society of Jesus, say, or a military academy, or the state administration, is intolerable, for they resent the discipline that would be required of them; in psychological terms, they resent the interference with their identity involved in moulding it in accordance with a model, an ideal type. In the three examples we mentioned the values and the freedom of action that is permissible are indeed to a large extent prescribed, and the individual is expected to find his identity within firmly established guiding lines. The so-called liberal professions promise far more 'freedom'. 'The psychological poverty of groups'⁶ begins where restriction of freedom in a tedious job allows little elbow room for self-discovery. The individual is then robbed of his 'nature' without the consolation of identification with a group that gives him social prestige. Exclusion from groups — and hence also from the prejudices that they vigorously defend — sets other prejudices in motion. Those who reject groups as incompatible with their identity tend to succumb to the prejudice of condemning them out of hand. All Jesuits tend to be regarded as crafty and capable of anything, all officers as presumptuous and obedient dummies, all administrators as dry-as-dust bureaucrats tied up in red tape. When one examines these prejudice-based aversions a little more closely, it is surprising to find that objective considerations based on the undeniable restrictions involved in joining a strict religious order, for instance, play a very minor part in their motivation in comparison with phobic anxieties dating from traumatic experiences in childhood. It is like going down into the cellar, which was such a

frightening experience in childhood that one avoids doing it even as a grown-up; moreover, everything associated with it is avoided as being dangerous. It should, incidentally, be added that we do not deny the unpleasing and pathological deformations of character that can be brought about by membership in orders, cliques, and so-called elites. These dangers arise, however, only in cases where infantile experiences fuse with existing collective prejudices.

Brief apologia for gossip

Obviously we can escape prejudice only by resolutely mustering all our counter-forces, but nothing in the world is so deadly earnest that it cannot be the subject of satire. That is the function of gossip.

The less power we feel in ourselves to free ourselves from conventions, the more devious are the routes by which we avenge ourselves on them. One of these routes is gossip. When we gossip we are concerned, not so much with the facts as with the affects that they rouse in us; we are concerned with the gaining, not of knowledge, but of pleasure. We are concerned with establishing, not the true nature of the object of our gossip, but with enjoying what he is believed to be capable of. Prejudice helps in this process.

Pleasure in gossip is the obverse side of our insuperable disappointment at all the thrills, the exciting playing with danger, that have eluded us in life; when we have found a suitable hook, we can use it to hang all our unpleasure on; also it gives us the prestige of being 'better' than the victim, because we do not dare do what he did or is alleged to have done. The need to devise platforms of prestige which can be used to transform disappointment into a sense of power is positively inexhaustible. These platforms have to be continually invented and enjoyed; one instance is the official receiving a caller who is seeking something from him; he sits without raising his eyes from his desk for a moment, as if the caller were a beggar. If the latter falls for the bait and gets angry, the pleasure is increased. Gossiping is one of these ways of gaining enjoyment for one's pride for which there are no opportunities in actuality.

The 'fundamental democratization' of our times expresses itself in, among other things, unlimited curiosity. Gossip has long since been commercialized and sold as a 'service'; it has become part of the communications industry. This reflects the survival of a timeless need adapted to the process of urbanization. Passers-by and neighbours have become so anonymous that it is impossible to gossip about them, though the village and small town still provide opportunities. But, in spite of all the gossip in the press, spontaneous gossip still flourishes undiminished in offices and groups

of all kinds. The alienation to which the major scapegoats are subjected takes place here on a minor and more subtle scale. All breaches of social rules — or what can be interpreted as such — are greedily seized on and, with the aid of the aggressivity that is always lying in wait, are used for delivering 'pin-pricks'. The vocabulary of popular characterology seems to have been ready made for the expression of prejudice; ambition, craftiness, cowardice, and so on become the total verdicts on those who become the targets of gossip.

Gossiping is generally thought of as an especially feminine characteristic, but those who have ears to hear will recognize this as a male projection; men and women are equally susceptible to its attractions. Both sexes alike desire, at any rate in fantasy, to share in the forbidden and the sinful and in the pleasure of punishing it. Though gossip may sometimes be troublesome, and sometimes poisonous and dangerous to the extent that it may ruin a reputation, it is nevertheless an indispensable safety valve for those held in the bondage of society, and it prevents worse, the complete unison of prejudice. It should also be recalled that there is an idealizing kind of gossip, arising from and promoting a collective popularity. This is by no means confined to girls' boarding-schools; enthusiastic multipliers of the phenomenon are ready and waiting.

The tendency to aggressive gossip thrives most luxuriantly in 'closed' groups the members of which have ample opportunity for keeping an eye on each other and observing how they keep to the rules, that is to say, in village communities, long-established urban residential areas, and in sects, orders, and offices. What the actual content of the gossip is basically does not matter; the essential thing is that there should be a common victim on whom it can be centred. The intensity of participation runs parallel to the affective frustration that the group as a whole does not admit but cannot escape. Assiduous gossip is a way of temporarily forgetting one's miseries. The power of the powerless is that of taking people's characters away. Where the ego has been strengthened by libidinal fulfilment and the primary instinctual wishes have been reasonably satisfied, the need for the aggressive conspiracy of gossip diminishes. Thus it constantly happens that it is the freer individual who falls victim to gossip.

The relative harmlessness of ordinary gossip lies in the fact that the victims are not fixed, do not have the permanence of the major scapegoats. Gossip gives everyone the pleasure of a fleeting reinforcement of the feeling of being a member of an in-group ('we are better than others') and the

opportunity of emotional discharge in moderate doses; he can also temporarily be a victim himself. This easily rousable susceptibility to prejudice is to be encountered everywhere; it prevails naked and unashamed even in the most distinguished assemblies. In the form of snobbishness and the sarcastic witticism it produces a notable increase in narcissistic pleasure and — if one possesses the art of getting the laugh on one's own side — results in an increase of prestige. Here too the ego becomes the willing servant of the pleasure principle.

As we have already observed, successful adaptation by way of general education to an intellectually demanding environment by no means necessarily involves affective maturation or increased self-perception. The ineradicability of gossip provides confirmation of our view of the character as a very loose association of vectors of potential reactions. In the eyes of the observer (and most certainly also in those of sharpened self-perception) these often seem not at all to fit in with each other. They mark levels of development reached in periods of life that lay very far apart from each other. The pleasure we all take in gossip illustrates our regressive proclivity to give up the more rational forms of human coexistence in favour of more primitive pleasures; and, as we all enjoy it so much, it is doubtful whether we really wish to be so adult as to give it up altogether. That would involve the sacrifice of too much pleasure. Quoted by Peter R. Hofstätter, *Psychologie*

NOTES

Divide pagenumbers by 2 and add ~30pp for guestimate of pagenumber

Chapter I

2. Margaret Mead, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*, New York, London, 1931.
3. See the detailed study by Manfred Pflanz, *Sozialer Wandel und Krankheit*, Stuttgart 62.
- g. Theodore Lidz, *Zur Familienumwelt des Schizophrenen*, Stuttgart, i p59.
- G. Pilleri, 'Biber', *Umschau*, 60 (i 960),
6. On the wider question of the extent to which the development of human and animal behaviour overlaps and similar genetic factors are common to both, see Konrad Lorenz, 'Die angeborenen Formen möglicher Erfahrung', *Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie!* (1943) > Otto Köhler, 'Vorformen menschlicher Ausdrucksmittel im Tierreich', *Universitas* (1954-59)
- 7 Garrett Hardin, *Nature and Man's fore* (New York, 1959; London, 1960), pp. 66 .
3. Thus the word 'primitive' is yet another of the expressions of social unworth which we shall discuss later. See p. i z.

4. In speaking here or later of 'animals' as such, we are aware of the danger of such simplifications. There is no such thing as 'the animal', which is a very unbiological construction of the human mind, meaning merely the opposite of 'human'. (Rudolf Schenkel, 'Lebensformen im sozialen Feld und menschliche Sprache', *Homo* 10 [1959], 110.)

1 O. Rudolf Schenkel, *ibid.*, p. 110.

Chapter II

r. Theodor W. Adorno, 'Meinung, Wahn, Gesellschaft', *Der Monat*, 1 (1949)

Sigmund Freud, *Thoughts on War and Death* Standard Ed., XIV, 284-5: 'Thus there are very many more cultural hypocrites than truly civilized — indeed, it is a debatable point whether a certain degree of cultural hypocrisy is not indispensable for the maintenance of civilization, because the susceptibility to culture which has hitherto been organized in the mind of part-day men would perhaps not prove

p. Romain Rolland, Paris, 1915.

6. Karl Jaspers, *MW and in M Age of construction*, London, 'psychotherapy', *Psyche*, Vol. YUI (1949); C. de Bm, 'Widerstände gegen die psychosomatische Behandlung', Vol. (1948).

in B. Pasumanich, S. Dinitz, and L. S. Lefson, 'Psychiatric Orientation and Its Relationship to Diagnosis and Treatment in a Mental Hospital', *J. Nerv. Ment. Dis.*, Vol. 116, 1949 (quoted from M. P. Szariz,

i. S. Adolf Portmann, *Tierfigur & Tierregime* *Bird vom Tierregime* Vortrag Regime, 1948.

i. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XV, 110.

7. I of course not a 'mental' agency totally divorced from the physical. The **gain** of vital processes into aspects of the **we gain** seems to consist rather of biological process (development of constitutional character and the physical development conscious and unconscious processes (correlation of which to physiological processes remains to a large extent obscure). It is this interaction between the hereditary constitutional factors and the **integrity** work of the psyche to which Freud refers.

'One is to make the first choice of the instincts responsible for the second — the modification of the ego, but it is that the latter has its own aetiology and indeed it must be adorned.

i. , 19 Adolf Portmann, *op. cit.*

Chapter III

• C. H. Waddington, 'The Human Animal', *Zur Zoologie* (edited by Julian Huxley) (London, 1961; New York, 1962). See also

Papers, V, 321-2). The ego bears traces of its origins in the id — 'id and his detailed discussion in *The Extent of the Ego*, London, 1961; New York, 1961.

z. Julian Huxley, *ibid.*, p. 2.

3. C. H. Waddington, *ibid.*, p. 70.

C. H. Waddington, *ibid.*, p. 73.

J. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XV, 110.

6. Peter R. Hofstätter, *Ein Vortrag in der Sitzung der Psychoanalytischen Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart/

1949), 33 -

2. Gardner Murphy, *Psychoanalytische Grundlagen*, New York, 1942.

q. Ferdinand Lion, *Die Entwicklung der Seele* (Zürich, 1948)

io. Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society*, New York, 1950.

ii. Anna Freud, (1936) *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*.

in Harry F. Harlow, 'Basic Social Capacity of Primates', in *Evolution of Man's Care for Cattle* (ed. J. N. Spuhler), Detroit,

13. R. A. Spitz, 'Anaclitic Depression',

IQ Michael Balint, 'The Three Areas of the Mind',

ii. Erik H. Erikson, 'Growth and Crises of the Healthy Personality', in

Milton Senn, *Symposium on the Healey Personality*, Macy Foundation

1949, *Archives of Experimental Medicine and Biology*, Vol. 1, 1961.

8. Cf. W. Rudolf's contribution in *Methodical Psychology*, Vol. 1, 1961. See Helmut Moll,

'Kinderarbeit im 19. Jahrhundert',

G. R. Taylor, *Psychische Störungen* (London, 1949)

z3. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., 43.

Oavid Oman, *TOZM* by reference, New Haven,

Chapter IV

i. Ch. U., p. 110.

Erik H. Erikson, 'The Problem of Ego Identity', *Psychological Issues*, New York, 1954.

3. Georg Büchmann, *Geflügelte Worte*, * 79-

4. Max Weber, 'Über einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie', in *Soziologische Analysen, Politik* (ed. J. Winckelmann)

(Stuttgart, 1949).

j. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., V, 110.

6. See Ernst Bloch, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* Frankfurt, 1961, and from a more clinical and pragmatic viewpoint Alexander Mitscherlich, 'Die Chronifizierung psychosomatischen Leidens', *Psyche*, XV (1961), 1-11.

7. Arnold Gehlen, *Anthropologische Forschung* (Hamburg, 1949), '77-

Chapter V

i. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XIV, 110.

2. S. L. Rubinstein, *Grundlagen der allgemeinen Psychologie* (Berlin [East],

3. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XXU, 7.

4. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XIV, 110.

5. The 'central and vital factor' in tenderness seems to lie in the 'comforting, protective presence that reassures the child; because this is manifested primarily and most directly by physical contact and also in speech, it is the former that takes the first place among the factors by which the need for tenderness is met. This also determines the choice of the organs of contact: the mouth and the hands ... and feeding as the most vital function for the maintenance of life indisputably plays a part in the oral function.' Hans Kunz, *Die Aggressivität und die Zärtlichkeit* (Benn, 6. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XXUI, 22\$.
7. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XI, 3-8.
10. Sigmund Freud Standard Ed., XVI, * i. In *Handbook of Social Psychology*, U, *47i z. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., VU, ° 7-
13. Cf. Horst-Eberhard Richter, *Eltern, Kind und Neurone*, Stuttgart, i p63. Richter traces the process of parental projection on the child, of which he gives striking examples.
14. Edith Weigert, 'Die Rolle der Sympathie in der Kunst der Psychotherapie', *Psyche*, XVI (i p6z).
17. König, 'Soziologie der Familie', in Gehlen, Schelsky, *Soziologie* (Düsseldorf, P *49 See Hans Kunz, op. cit., or Peter Brückner, *Indizierung und Verfaßanalyse im Rorschachversuch* (Cologne, i9J 8), pp49 \$-
- See Alexander Mitscherlich, 'Aggression und Anpassung I', *Psych*, Vol. X (i 9f6), and 'Aggression und Anpassung U', *Psyche*, Vol. XU (i9f8), where the problem is dealt with more fully.
- z8. Bronislaw Malinowski, *A Sociological Theory of Culture*, Chapel Hill, '944-zp. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XXI, i Jy
15. Chapter VI
- i. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Unschuld des Werdens*, U, Stuttgart, °9f7> §I Corinthians i j, i.
4. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XXUI, zz }.
- f. See, for instance, Peter R. Hofstätter, *Emulierung in die Sozialpsychologie*, op. cit., p. zzq: 'When Freud saw his patients, there was no food shortage among higher society in Vienna. There was food and drink, tobacco and fuel, only in the sexual respect was there an occasional emergency. That was the situation from which the theory of the libido originated, it made the only shortage from which one definite section of the population was suffering the driving force of life as a whole. Today we can only regard this as an absurd generalisation, which nobody would dare offer the starving masses in Asia.' After what has already been said above, the reader may be left to decide for himself what is absurd or not.
6. Of the defence work of the ego — for instance, repression Freud says that the essential fact is 'that the ego is an organization, and the id is not. The ego is, indeed, the organized portion of the id' (Standard Ed., XX, 97) He goes on to indicate the different functions of the psychical processes. Unconscious processes close to the instinctual source are reflex-like, tend to immediate discharge, while testing reality is the result of processes (perception, thought, learning, memory) which are of quite a different nature and do not try to help an instinctual tension predominant at a particular moment to achieve satisfaction regardless of the whole. The task of the ego capacities is rather to integrate the instinctual trends into the total process of living. They nevertheless remain in close functional association with the processes of the id. 'The apparent contradiction is due to our having taken abstractions too rigidly and attended exclusively now to the one side and now to the other of what is in fact a complicated state of affairs'.
7. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XXU, 7i f
8. Heinz Hartmann, 'The Mutual Influences in the Development of Ego and Id', *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, Vol. VU (uy z).
9. See pP7*.-°-
10. Calvin S. Hall, op. cit.
11. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Wir Philosophen* (Stuttgart, p. 53}.
- See Alexander Mitscherlich, *Leitwert Pflicht Gehorsam*, in Hartenstein and Schubert, *Mitlaufen oder Mitbestimmen*, Frankfurt, 1963.
- See Alexander Mitscherlich, 'Meditationen zu einer Lebenslehre der modernen Massen', *Merkur*, Munich, March and April, i9i7-
14. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XVUI, 6p. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XXU, pi.
16. Sholom Aleichem, *Tewje der Milchmann* (Wiesbaden, i p60), p. q3.
17. *Sprüche in Prosa*, Part U.
18. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XI, i }o.
- Chapter VII
- Erik H. Erikson, 'Growth and Crises of the Healthy Personality', op. cit.
- z. Karl Bednarik, *Der junge Arbeiter heute* (Stuttgart, u} z), p. }o.
- j. Geoffrey Gorer, *The American People*, New York (TS) *Americans*, (London) i pq8.
4. See also Franz L. Neumann, *Angst und Politik*, Tübingen, 954 Ludwig Binswanger, 'Erfahren, Verstehen, Deuten in der Psychoanalyse', *Almanach der Psychoanalyse*.
6. Gorer, op. cit.

7Ibid., p. 30.

8. John Gunther, den *U.S.A.*, New York, *947-

9. Ernst Michel, 'Das Vaterproblem heute in soziologischer Sicht', *P schein*, VUI (iqyq).

10. David Riesman, *The Zonefy Crowd* (New

11. Haven, i pyo), p. zz. David Riesman, Joces

12. *ist rie Crowd* (New Haven, n} z), p. 5.

Ibid.} P4 5-

13. Carl J. Burckhardt, *über den Begriff <L:r Heimat*, address delivered in

St Paul's Church, Frankfurt, z6.p. i pyç.

14. Gerhard Wurzbacher, *Leitbilder gegenwärtigen dem:schen* Nomifienu3eni, znd ed.

(Stuttgart, i p5q), p. zi }.

15. Alexander Mitscherlich, 'Odipus und Kaspar Hauser', *Der Monat*,

Kaspar Hauser (i8 i z?— i83 j) wit s a German foundling raised in solitary confinement until picked up by police in i8z8.

i6. Karl Bednarik, op. cit., p. •o.

17. Fischer Bucherei,

No. it 3,

Chapter VIII

i. Martin Luther, *Tischreden* Blatt 66.

z. Ibid., Blatt ddzb.

3. Ibid., Blatt 457b. Quoted from Dr Martin Luther, *Pädagogische Schriften* (ed. J. C. G.

4. Schumann) (Vienna/Leipzig, i 88d), pP 73

Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XX °4 -7-

5. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XN . 93-

6. Hans Thomae, *Der Mensch in der Entscheidung*, Munich, Ip6o.

7 Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XIV, qi.

8. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XXU, 6y.

q. Robert Waelder, *Basic Theory of Psychoanalysis* (New York, iq6o),

fO. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XX, qy.

See Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XX, *4 'Anxiety is an affective state and as such can, of course, only be felt by the ego. The id cannot have anxiety as the ego can; for it is not an organization and cannot

make a judgement about situations of danger. On the other hand it very often happens that processes take place or begin to take place in the id which cause the ego to produce anxiety. Indeed, it is probable that the earliest repressions as well as most of the later ones are motivated by an ego-anxiety of this sort in regard to particular processes in the id.' Freud also states that 'there is no reason to assign any manifestation of anxiety to the super-ego'.

Erich von Holst, 'Probleme der modernen Instinktforschung', *Merkur*

*3. Wolfgang Hochheimer, 'Probleme einer politischen Psychologie',

P tche, xvi (q6z), 6.

14. Cf. Sigmund Freud, Standard E<L, XXI, q8:

'When a man has once brought himself to accept uncritically all the absurdities that religious doctrines put before him and even to over-

look the contradictions between them, we need not be greatly surprised at the weakness of his intelligence. But we need have no other means of controlling our instinctual nature but our intelligence. How can we expect people who are under the dominance of prohibitions of thought to attain the psychological ideal, the primacy of the intelligence *' The same applies to the inhibition of children's curiosity about sex, which is so important psychopathologically. The difference between the sexes is one of the first burning problems the child comes across when it begins its exploration of the world. If its curiosity is not satisfied with intuitive understanding of its needs, and if instead it is frightened off by prohibitions and their attendant anxieties, this will have far-reaching consequences on its capacity to use and develop its intelligence in orienting itself to its environment.

i }. Goethe to Knebel, 8.d.i8 i z, quoted from J. W.

Goethe, *Briefe* (Munich, iq58), p. 66z.

i6. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Menschliches*, U (Stuttgart,

*9f 4), °°4-

*7 Berthlt Brecht, *Der Jasager. Der Neinsager* (Frankfurt, 1911) } P 84

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Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XIII It 33 4-

b. Ibid., P34-

d. Henry Miller, *The World of Sex* (Olympia Press, Paris), p. izz.

d. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XI, i87 } i88.

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8. Cf. Ch. UI, 4 'Perhaps, however, in the midst of the reconstruction of the social scene we should keep open a dialectical way out for ourselves. The interest in past or obsolescent systems, even when these have no immediate relevance or validity for ourselves, helps to sharpen our view of order in human life.

3. Max Weber, *Wirischafc und Gesellschafti* (Tübingen, 1922). P75-

4 Wilfred R. Bion, *Experunces in Groups* London and New York,

5. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XVUI, i zp.

6. Hellmut Becker and Alexander Kluge, *Kulturpolicik und Ausgabenkontrolle*, Frankfurt, iq6i.

7 William F. Knopf, *American Journal «f Psychoanalysis!* :x *7 (9 '1, IOIO.

8. Talcott Parsons, *Social Syscem*, Glencoe,

9. Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York,

io. Cf. introduction by Alexander Mitscherlich to Mitscherlich and Mielke, stehen ohne *MenschlicMeic*, Fischer Bücherei, NO. 332.

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- . *propo of Lady Chatterlef's Lover ond Other holidays* (London, Iq6z ,p. 8i.
- z. In an age of intense competition between political systems and the prejudices associated with them the individual can easily find himself involved in conflicts with disastrous results to himseY. Margret Boveri has amply documented this in her *Der terror inn JJ. /Nrâw frrt*, Vols. I—N, Hamburg, iqf8-ip6o.
- (i) George Bernard Shaw, introduction to *St. Joan*.
- (ii) Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XXU, d3
- j. Max Horkheimer, 'Schopenhauer und die Gesellschaft', in Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Sociologyica*, U (Frankfurt, iq6z),
6. Peter R. Hofstätter, *Die Psychologie der ä ent-15. lichen Meinung* (Vienna, 949) P3-7Ibid., p. p.
8. 'Nor is it hard to see that ties that bind people to mystico-religious or philosophico-religious sects and communities are expressions of crooked cures of all kinds of neurosis. All of this is correlated with the contrast between directly sexual impulses and those which are inhibited in their aims.' Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XVU , *4°-

- q. See Alexander Mitscherlich, 'Die Metapsychologie des Comforts', *BaUnst und Werkform*, April, 1954-f. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XVU, 13Q f.
- t I. Quoted by Alfred Krämer, *NrJiliche Mit-te 'Hunger! 4* (s*•)*.
- >*1. Gordon W. Allport, *The Narure of Prejudice* (Cambridge, Mass.,
- *3. Martin Wagh, 'Psychoanalytische Betrachtungen zur Dynamik und Genese des Vorurteils, des Antisemitismus und des Nazismus', *P fcd*, XVI(w*^), 73 4-
- '4. Leslie T. Wilkins, *Deliuqueni Ge erations*. Home Office Studies in the Causes of Delinquency and the Treatment of Offenders, H.M.S.O., London, 1p6o.
15. See, for instance, Aldous Huxley, *The Dev'im of London* (London and New York, up z), or the ample material in G. Rattray Taylor, *Sex in History* (London, iq}3).
16. Sigmund Freud, Standard Ed., XXI, uf.

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- i. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Gesellschaft und Freiheit* 2.(Munich, i q6i), pp. 3zi ff. Ibid.
- IV Carl Liefert, 'Unbekümmerte **Besitzer**, oder: Wie lebt **man** von Ansprüchen?' *Der Monat!* *4 (*9 °) 7-
- V K. H. Stauder, 'Über den Pensionierungsbankrott', *Pyc3e*, IX (1955),
- j. Peter R. Hofstätter, op. cit.; cf. Chapter XI, p. z5 i.
6. Ralf Dahrendorf, op. eit., § 3497• Ibid.

8. Carl Linfert, op. cit., p. i i.
- q. Alexander Mitscherlich, 'Niemandskinder', *Wir Neue Fernzug*, \$. .iqy6.
10. Ralf Dahrendorf, O . eit., 344-
9. Léon Poliakov and Josef Wulf, *Das Dritte Reich und die Juden* (Berlin,
- *. See, for instance, Jürgen Habermas, 'Gedrillt zur Barbarei' *tDie Zeit*, 7 9 *9di): 'Our society is structurally adapted to certain humanitarian rules — it cannot in the long run afford the breeding of terrorist subcultures. There is no such thing as barbarism in instalments. If permitted in one sphere, it will spread to them all.'
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- '9• Ibid., p. i i6.
- zo. Kurt Lukasczyk, 'Zur Theorie der Führer-Rolle', *P cholo Rundschau*, XI (1960), 185.
- Margaret Mead, 'Collective Guilt', International Conference on Medical Psychotherapy, August, 1928.
- Robert Heiss, *Allgemeine Tiefenpsychologie* (Berln, Paul Fedem, 'Zur Psychologie der Revolution: Die vaterlose Gesellschaft', *Der äscererichoclie VolLswi•n ! •• (•9'9)* *4. *Hiscoria Mundi*, Vol. XI (*Das ip. and no. falirhunderc*). Paul Federn, op. cix

Chapter XIII

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Index of Names

Divide pagenumbers by 2 and add 30 pp. for guestimate of pagenumber

- Acton, William, 66, 68 Adler, Alfred, 9•
- Adorno, Theodor W., 3zi
- Aleichem, Sholem, 318 Allport, Gordon W..
- 59 Andersen, Hans Christian, zi i xxx
- Balint, Michael, 31 } Becker, Hellmut, zz6, 320 Beckett, Samuel, zq8 Bednarik, Karl, 163—4. 3'
- Binswanger, Ludwfg, i 318
- Bion, WiJfred R., 3zo

- Bloch, EtISt, 316
 Bolk, L., 34. 3' i
 Boveri, Margret, 3zo
 Brecht, Bertolt, z , 3lo—I i, 32Ot 322
 Brückner, Peter, 3i . 3'7Buñuel, L llis.
 Burckhardt, Carl Jakob, i }O, 3i8
 Columbus, Christopher, i6z, 203Copemicus,
 Dahrendorf, Ralf, *7 ° 5> 3°Darwin,
 Charles, J, y, z 6 Dinitz, S., 3+4
 Dollo, L * . 4. 9
 Durkheim, E.. 7
 Einstein, Albert, z }8
 Engels, Friedrich, **322**
 Erikson, Erik H., z§, i4. 59> °3> °4°.
 * 'i } 3+4> 3^i } 3+ @
 Federn, Paul, 3oo, 3za
 Franck, Hans, zqç Freeman, F. N., z
 Freud, Annä, 31 \$
 Freud, Sigmund, 2O 3ft 33—4> 4+> s.
 7. 7 , 8o, 85. 9* . 99. ' • • , °5>
 "A *9,*4-T }3°,'33,'39°W }
 i 47> i 77> i 8 i, i 8d, i 86, i 9o, zo8—9,
 212—13, 224, 243, 256, 292, 3oo,
 Gauguin, P., zo8 GeMen, Arnold,
 3t6
 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang v • . ° +4>' 15>
 Gorer, Geoffrey, 47— . 3• @
 Göring, Hermann, z88
 Gunther, John, iq8, 318
 Habermas, Jürgen, z32, 3zz
 Hall, Calvia . 99> ^* • 3 8
 Hardin, Garrett, 5. 3'3
 Härlin, Peter, 3zz
 Harlow, Harry F., 58—6§. 7> • f }
 Hartmann, Heinz, i i9-zo, i6p, 3i8
 Hauser, Kaspar, i6o-3,
 Heiss, Robert, °9* . 3°°
 Hider, Adolf, I§3, 288 300 322
 Hochheimer, Wolfgana. '9° 3> 3'9
 Hofstätter, Peter R.. 47. i +, 3 3 }
 3' f } 3'7> 321
 Holst, Erich von, °9'. 3'9 Horkheimer,
 Max, 3zi Huxley, Aldous, 3zi Huxley,
 Ionesco, Eugene, *4. 17 2 O
 Julian, 3Q—do, 3i }
 Kluge, Alexander, z26, 32OKnoll, Wil-
 liam F., Izo Köhler, Otto, yi 3,
 König, René, 3.7 Krämer, Alfred, 32I
 Kunz, Han5t 3* } 3.7
 Lawrence, D. H., z36
 Le Bon, Gusave, i24. °7Leñion, Id., 3^4
 Lidx, Theodor, 3, z8, Hj Liebknecht,
 Karl, zq9-3ooLiefert, Carl, 3zi
 Linton, Ralph, **320**
 Lion, Ferdinand, 3i 5Locke, John, i6
 Lorenz, Konrad, 7—*. 59> IO2, i U t **313**
 Lukasczyk, Kurt, 3zz
 Luther, Mdftin, elf, 7 } 3'9
 Luxemburg, ROSS, °99'3°°
 Luxenburger, H. 3
 Maunowski, Bronislaw, I z I, 3.7Mannheim,
 Manstein, Field-Marshal von, z87
 Marwitz, Friedrich Adolf von der, °4
 Marx, Karl, i 88, 30} 322
 Mauss, Marcel, 3i 5
 Mend, Margaret, z. °94. 97> 3°3• 3°°Merton, Robert
 K., zO4> °3°
 Michel, Ernst *4 } 3Mielke, F., 3zO
 Miller, Henry, zi i—i z, 2§ 2.3.20 Mitscherlich, Alex-
 ander, 3*4. 3+7, 318,
 Moll, Helmut, 3i \$
 Murphy, Gardner, °7. 47. 3*4> 3 f
 Neumann, Franz L , 318
 Nietzsche, Friedrich, iq, zi, i13, +7>
 123, 199, 25o, 284, 285, 313, 317,
 Orwell, George, i zo, i 5q, zoy, ziq
 Parsons, Talcott, **z30, 320**
 Pasamanick, B., 3*4
 Pascal, Blaise, zi, iO4. 77> °4* } 314
 Paul, Saint, i i \$
 Pavlov, * , 4
 Pflanz, Manfred, j 13Pilleri, G., 313
 Planck, MdX, 2f7 — Poliakov, L., j22
 Portmann, Adolf, 3.2, 3§—5, }p, j I§-I f
 Rascher, Dr, no Rauschning, Hermann, 3.22
 Reichenau, Field-Marshal VOfl, 37Richter, H-E., 316
 Riesman, David, 68, i IO, I 4U \$O ib3' } f } 3'
 Rolland, Romain, z . +77. 3*4Rousseau, J. J., 5o, 83,
 3i } Rubinstein, S. L., 3i 6
 Rudolf, W., 31 }
 Russell, Bertrand, 5
 Schelsky, i <7
 Schenkel, Rudolf, 313 Schumann, J. C. G .
 3.9Shaw, Bernard, *43> \$20Spartacus, z38
 Spitz, René A., 5q—61, 3.1 } Salin, Joseph,
 3oo Standen, K. H., 3z i
 Taylor, G. Rattray, 65—6, 3 i , 3z i Teilhard de Char-
 din, Pierre, i7 Thomae, Han5. 3'9
 Uexküll, Jakob von, q, 6
 Voltaire, 83
 Waddington, C. H.. 4°. 3.5Waelder, Robert, iqo, 3
 iq
 Wangh, Martfnt 2 j 21Weber, Alfred, io
 Weber, Max. 74 i . • , 9 , 3 } 3 Weigert, Edith, 3i 6
 Weizsäcker, Victor von, 306
 Wiener, Norbert. 4 Wilkins, Leslie T., z6o,
 3zi Wulf, Josef, 3zz
 Wurzbacher, Gerhard, i 58, j i 8

Index of Subjects

**Divide pagenumbers by 2 and add ~30 pp
for guestimate of pagenumber**

active/passive, 101, 106, and attitudes,

asimilative, 7

components of, 6

cultural, 5-6

integrative, 7

over-adaptation, 201,

regressive, 306

addiction, 74

adolescence, pubertal crisis affect(s)

alienation of, 5 i

as defence against alien. 3° loss of in infancy, 60

affective education, i 5— i, 246

aggression, 80

horizontal 74

aggressivity, . •79 surplus, 69

alienation, 5 i, i y8, a6i alienation effect, i

ambivalence, • 3—4. 73.1

anarchy, • 4

animals

and men, i7

s« oho behaviour, animal, anomy,

anxiety. •9 •

Arapesh, J—6

basic trust/mistrust, f4, jç•-òò, yoj, 14 >

behaviour Tecúve,

compulsive, 53 guided by ego, 7

instinctual, see instinct(s)

tender, 94

behaviour patterns, i—z, y, i8—iq, jz—3,

34 > 9 > 37

dictated by roles, z• i—*7 bisexualuy, 3oi—z

character, i z5

child/adult relationship. 4 f•f > 7 > 3

see also father/child, mother/child,

parent/child communication

nonverbal > 4* conflict

conscious or denied, i zo of motivation, i i6

of rival obediences, +7+

conformity. 43 conscience, and mater-

nal conflict, and prejudice, zJ8

conscienteni. 'bad'/'good', *79 personal, *97

see <idio morality

consciousness

and social integration, 3

by reward and punishment, •7 definition, i j

dialectical function, •f—*7 early beginning of, i 3

for independence, z3i

of affects, i J—°3 > *7 >)2t 7 > °4

as man's life-function, io

evolution to cards, 36, 39.

consumer society, zJ 5—6

corruption, in modem Societies > 7 counter-

cathexis, icry

crowd, melting into, 27s

see nfro masses

Crusoe, Robinson, i6z, iqq curiosiry, 33

cybernetics. 4

defence mechanisms, 95

see aho ego denial '9, deprivation,

destrudo,

detachment

from crowds, °73 4. 7

of psycho-analyst, 3 i i

dictatorship, z8I, ° 4 disobedience

constructive, •94—Iright to, i66

domestication, i6i

Don Juanism, 302

double roles, •3 •. °33 drives, 85—i i z

aggressive and libidinal 93—4 fixation of, 88,

sec nfro instinct(s)

echo effect, 73./75 education, i 3—*7,

and ego development, ••• *3i and extension of

coRsciousness, 4• and indoctrination, qo

and social obedience, nt and sublimation,

i8z

as co-ordinated S6&fch, 13

as imparting of knowledge, 7, 4

self-education, i 3 social, i J, z3—7

ego, 7®. 33 4 > *3 3

and fusion of instincts, 8i

and id, qd—5, i zz

and puberty CciSiS, i i 4 and reality adapta-

tion, i z6 and subUmAtiOfI, I °4

and work of integration, z63 as energy trans-

former, i i 9-zo

development of, 60, 8i, i zOt 13 Ifunctions of, zo,

68, 37, 122 obedience to,

4 responsibility of, i i 5

ego ideal, q i, l2\$—)3 ego psychology, npt

emancipation, 73, 3°5w

empathy, i •. *7°. *97 aenlightenment, zz9-3o

environment, social

adapatiofl tO, 3

and early experiences. * ®7—* and ego-

development. 7—*. 9iw and illness, 3

and obedience, >7 envy, z6

of siblings, z69, revolution,

and consciousness of itself, 39—4 and progress, 5

psycho-social mechanism of, 41 third critical

phase of, 4

towards consciousness, 3

zq, z38

'extra-uterine spring', is. 9

Falsaff, father

absent, 'invisible', •4* •st. s

identification, i J. 44. 4*. 99 > *

'socialized hatred' of, idi working environ-

ment of, i 5

father/child relationship, i 33—q, iq5 , i 5M

ambivalence in, I }3—6

homosexual, 301

identity, 5z—3› 7o—i› 8o—i› i53—4 and prejudice, 26z
 and psycho-analysis, zq -3oo
 as founded on 'basic trust',
 collective, z5
 n America, ^47-
 in industrial society. 4*. iW
set also child/adult, mother/child,
 parent/child
 fear, as method Of contrOl, '9*. °°
 federalism, zoz
 fixation, ion-z, i:ry—8 freedom, set emancipa-
 tion
 gang leadership. *4°—3 God, see religion
 gossip, z65
 groups, zoz—3, zI }, zI7—zO and choice of
 leader, zqo and intolerance, zq3
 and prejudice, •i9. 4—5
 closed, q
 group psychology, i zq in schools, zq
 ace euro masses
 guilty anxiety, ®7—
 Habermas COTQuS 23 hero wOrs P. 9°
HerJensbildung, z i historical change, 33
 home, sense of, i 55
 homeostasis, 4
 homosexual tendencies, 30i
 hope, 8•—4
 hypocrisy, cultural, zo, 3i, i3}, i86
 of humaniw. 94 of the past, 5q—5 regression

id, see instinct(s)

idealization, 47, 104, 183—4, 291

ideal standard, 181
 genuine/spur " lideology, i z, i6, top
 idols, 183 imagos, it
 imi:imprinting, 59, 62, 81, 84, 108, 121
 social, 138, 196
 individuali w› 47
 inner-directed type, i Sq, z8
 insight. 9'
 instinct(s)
 aggressive, i i—i z, g3—¢, zoo and anxiety,
 \$7
 and identity, 8i—z
 and introjects, io8
 and mas• › 76 'blind', 85—6 con-
 servatism of, q8
 control over, i8—iq. i *› 7 °› 94›
 defence against, z5q
 diversion of, against foreign groups,
 hostility to, q5—6\
 obedience to, i6
 object of, renunciation of 70—3. 77
 transformation of, 97 unchanging
 nature of, z3z vicissitudes of, *see also*
 drives intolerance,
 introjection, d8—9, io8—9, izi, iqz
 labour, division of, 27a
 leader

idealization of, z9i
 in Britain, •94—i
 in German education, •4—5
 identification with, z8i, z8
see also gang leadership
 libido, 8i, 9°. 93. *°3› °5 › *** , *7
 magical interpretation of reality, i83 magical
 thinking, 7. ++th, • managers, zzi
 masks, stt roles
 masses, i zq—J, z68, z79—8i
 regressive› •97
 sense of power of, a23
 tyranny over, **military** mentality, z86-8
 model, etc pattern momenmry personalities,
 zz5 monarchy, British, •9m
 money, preoccupation with. 7i monkeys, exri-
 ments with,,
 60—i, 8i, a8J moral anxiety.
 moral injunctions, ioo-i
 double standards of, . +7
 in affluent society, 73 precariousness of, 3*.
 7 4*see also* conscience
 mother/child relationship, G-Hi, io6,
see also child/adult, father/child, parent/child
 MunduguTlto, mythology, see religion
 in the consumer society, a56
 secondary. 97
 national individuality, xm-a
 Na? •*, *4 neutralized energy, i69 non-


participatiOft, I°3 4
 obedience, i6 f W3. °93 and fear, i9o-i
 and repetition compulsi • *4 emotional. 9'
 religious, 205, 259
 slavish, ao2
 to instinct, i6 o
 to the ego, iqJ . *73 object, qq, ioG-9
 ambivalence towards, *73 sec afio part-
 objects
 oedipal conflict, 6}—6, i}q—5, i6i, z6Q old age, fear
 of,
 other-directed cype, *3› ^4@f › ^ *›
 parent/child relations P. 4 i°. if ioi—5
 see udio child/adult, father/child, mother/child
 part-objects, io8—9 passengers, I°3 4
 pattern, i—z,
 see nfso behaviour patterns persecution of heretics,
 i i i—i a physical self, narcissistic cathenis of,
 popular idol, i3
 possessions
 as sign of power, as status-signal, 46—7
 prejudice(s) and gossip, z65
 and human rights, °37W and identifica-
 tion, zoo-i and identity, **z62-3**
 and ignorance, z• {3Æ
 and passive adapation, z6n—i and psychical
 equilibrium, z3q as defence mechanism, zgd—

economic function of, z3 , a6i indispensability
of, during growth, 2•t2—3
obedience to, z3 @z
pseudo-rationalism of,
—2. z49security in, •47'
renunciation, *see* instinct(s), renunciation ofreprepe-
tition-compulsiot2, }3, I }t 301
repression, •9. 9*. •f9responsibility,
and active participation, in Britain, •95
awakening sense of, •7
retirement bankrupt<W> °7°
return of the repressed, 7
revolutions, •9W3°°
primary love', i9 primary processes, i i zprivate
roles, °33 projection, i i i
Protestant
pseudo-rationalism
psycho-analysis,
and identity
skin, as erogenous zone, 80
slavery, 63
societies, tee groups specialization, irreversible,
subümaóon, 9', i8z—y
super-ego, ql—z, 87, Hoo, z lo, 1 Ip,
psycho-analytic situation, 3 —IOpubertal crisis, i
punishment. *7f—*
rationality, 38, •◁5. °°M3°
rationalization, i9. 7fW

reaction-formation, io6 reality-testing,
re-education, failure of, 6z-qregressionat group
level, azo-i religion, 3W . 77 *. cfs
s<:apegoat(s), 78, i i z, zo6, a6G-2schizophrenia, a
science(s), 37—*. 4•self-awareness, zz
as basis of new morali. 79collective, 73
s« also consciousness
sexuality, repudiation of, 66. 9i. 97
siblings riV > *74
definition of, z96
of fatherless world, 3o1of society97
technological **society, di, 74'J** zdq
television, z8othrift, 7f
tolerance, 8, zI, 30
tool-making brain, 8. 35tradition, 22
and behaviour patterns, and super-ego, i86
group-specific, 113
mythical, 3Q tzadiüonal codes> 7+
tradiüon-dicected type, y zo, ¥zj z§p
traditionlessn••. •*4>
ti°dtUàt g3t I*•. *f9. **f
traumatizaóon, iz, 56—8, 88
twins, 1—2
United Nations, zoi, a38
upbúnging
need for change of, 5y•-8 *see also* education
Victorians, 65—6, 95
wishful thinking, 183

APPENDIX VIII The Silent Language (1959)

E. T. Hall



CONTENTS **105**

INTRODUCTION **105**

chapter one The Voices of TIME

chapter two What is Cultures?

Chapter three Vocabulary of Culture

The Major Triad

Culture is Communication

Chapter eight The organic pattern

Time talks: American Accents **107**

Formal time: Sets, Isolates, Patterns **108**

Space talks: American accents **116**

Chapter eleven Loosening the grip

Space talks

How different cultures define space **119**

Forms of space patterns **123**

How space communicates **124**

Formal space matters **123**

Loosening the grip **126**

Introduction

congruence than others will strive strongly to reduce tensions induced by incongruity. Indeed, it is this tremendous sensitivity to pattern incongruity that the artist brings to his work. Life has a highly developed sense for working within patterns, making the most of them, pushing and stretching their foundations but never crossing them, so that thing can well be maintained and not proven. The artist likes to play with patterns and to find out what really can be done with the material at hand. He often does this in the context of small groups of projections within or without in areas of cultura stress, tension, and change. Because many artists are

participating in variants of the overall patterns that are not wildly shared stricticity of ten live thing reputation for setting things apart for everyone else. They are credited with “creating” new patterns. Yet most artists know that what greatness they have lies in being able to make meaningful statements about what is going on around them. They say what others have tried to say but say it more simply, more simply and more accurately.

The artist does not take cultures or create pat-terns; he holds up a mirror for society to see things it might not otherwise see. Proof with a fetish of the cuture and the things of the artist can do little by simply evoking through any reasonably well-shocked

insinuation or by looking at the unjust traditions in contemporary art works.

The “rule” of congruence, or style in the broadest sense, pervades not only the world of art but all kinds of communication. The present state of our understanding of how congruence works is so rudimentary, however, that we are barely able to provide evidence of faulty concerns, unconscious nuance, *less* specify what the faults may be.

TIME

TALKS

AMERICAN ACCENTS

At the beginning of this book I offered a cursory analysis of time as an element of culture which communicates as powerfully as language. Since my conceptual scheme had not yet been developed in detail at that point my survey was of necessity rather sketchy. Now that I have presented the technical tools for probing the secrets of culture, I return to time again. Here I shall consider the way Americans use time and communicate by it, stressing the details and the subtleties which in close analysis turns up. Some of the points I make may arouse a shock of recognition, a feeling that here is something which the reader knew all along. This is the way it should be. The analysis of one's own culture simply makes explicit the many things we take for granted in our everyday lives. Talking about them, however, changes our relation with them. We move into an active and understanding correspondence with those aspects of our existence which are all too frequently taken for granted or which sometimes weigh heavily on

its. Talking about them frees us from their restraint.

A well-known authority on children in the United States once stated that it took the average child a little more than twelve years to master time. This estimate is probably somewhat conservative. Young people of this age know how our basic time system works but do not yet seem to have fully internalized either the details or the emotional overtones of the formal time system.

Why does it take a child so long to learn time? The answer is not simple. In fact, when one begins to discover how many complications are involved he may wonder whether the full subtleties of time can be mastered at all.

The three systems I have discussed—formal, informal, technical—often use identical items of vocabulary. This does not make it any easier for the child, or the foreigner, to learn them. The year, for instance, is a formal or traditional part of our time system. It means three hundred sixty-five days plus one fourth day which is accounted for by inserting leap year. It can also mean twelve months, as well as fifty-two weeks.

Uniformally, we may say, “Oh, it takes years to get that done.” You have to be there and know the person and the background of the remark before you know exactly what his word “years” means. It may be a matter of minutes, weeks, or actual years. Technically, the year is quite another thing again. Not only is it counted in days, hours, minutes, seconds, but there are different types of years of different minutes, hours, months, and weeks are also used in all three contexts. It is only the total context that tells which type of time is being referred to.

Almost anyone can recapture that moment of his childhood when the day was almost spent and Mother was asked, “Mommy, how long will it be before we get home? I'm tired.” And Mother replies, “Just a little while, dear, for you just be good and before you know it

we'll be home." "How long is a while?" "It's hard to say, Year." "Is a while five minutes, Mommy?" "Sometimes, dear, but not always. In this case it will be a little longer than five minutes." "Oh."

At this point the child gives up—for the time being at least,

not only are there three different categories of time, but each has its own subdivisions; its sets, its isolates, and its patterns, which make nine different types of time found for our culture. Fortunately, to simplify matters, the layman need not know the whole technical system in order to get along. Yet he depends upon others to know it.

The layman, for example, thinking he is getting technical, may ask an astronomer exactly how long a year is. At which point he discovers his own ignorance by being asked what kind of year he has in mind—the tropical or solar year (365 days, 8 hours, 48 minutes, 46 seconds plus a fraction); the sidereal year (365 days, 6 hours, 9 minutes, 9.6 seconds); or the anomalistic year (365 days, 6 hours, 13 minutes, 33.2 seconds).

Our formal time system is that part of the over-all system which we would not change and don't want others tampering with. Yet this formal system we take so much for granted was once a technical system known only to a few priests along the Nile who had perfected it in response to a need to forecast annual floods more accurately.

FORMAL TIME: Sets, Isolates, Patterns

A quick way to discover how our European time sets operate is to teach them to children. The day is a formal set deeply rooted in the past. It has two primary isolates, day and night, and is further broken down into morning and afternoon, punctuated by meals and naps, and other recurrent occasions. There are seven different categories of days: Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, etc. They are valued differently, Sunday being set apart. The child is usually in control of these notions by the age of six. At eight most children learn to tell

time by the clock. This process can be simplified for them if it is explained that there are two types of time (two categories of sets): hours and minutes. The hours—one to twelve—have to be learned so well that recognition is instantaneous. Before learning the minutes the child learns that the quarter hour is the isolate most useful to him. He can grasp these quite quickly: five-fifteen, five-thirty, and five forty-five begin to make sense. Minutes should not be taught as isolates first but as sets, of which there are sixty. However, to make life a little simpler since the child can't perceive a minute, these cluster together in five-minute periods; five, ten, and fifteen after the hour, right on up to five fifty-five. Finally, the two sets of sets are blended into one system.

In America any Easterner or urban middle westerner conversant with the way his own culture values time can perceive that five minutes is different from ten minutes.

That is, the five-minute period is the smallest formal set. It has only recently crossed the boundary from isolate to set.

Twenty years ago the five-minute period was an isolate of a particular type that went to make up the quarter hour. Now people are aware of whether they are five minutes late or not, no-one will apologise.

In Utah the Mormons have developed promptness to a degree that is unknown in the rest of the country. In their system the minutes would seem to be an inviolate set. On the northwest coast the traditional feelings about time are altered and are not experienced in as pressing a manner as they are elsewhere. The Northwest uses the same time structure as the rest of the country, but nobody seems particularly driven by it. The main difference is that they lack the informal isolate of urgency.

Above the five-minute period there is the ten-minute period, the quarter hour, the half hour, and the hour. Then there is the morning divided into early, middle, and late; the noon hour; early, mid and late afternoon; and evening, as well as similar divisions for the night time.

Formally, our day starts at midnight. The periods set off by meals and by sleeping and waking.

These are probably the earliest of the perceived temporal sets for children. television is speeding up the process of helping children to notice the

difference between, say, five o'clock and six o'clock, since these are the times when their pet programs come on.

The week is also a set, introduced as a part of the Egyptian's technical time system. It is not, however, universally grasped. The term fortnight, like many other Anglo-Saxon survivals, remains present in the system, a reminder of earlier times. It is still used as the pay period in the government and as a publication period for certain periodicals. It is, however, a bit archaic and is slowly falling into disuse. The month, like the day, is a set that has been established as a component in our time system for a long time. It is used for payments and rendering of accounts, reports of almost every type, and jail sentences.

The season is too a formal set and an informal one. It is probably one of the oldest of our sets. It used to mark plowing, planting, cultivating and harvesting time, as well *evaluation* is expressed in our attitude that time itself is valuable and should not be wasted.

Punctuality is expressed in the fact that we consider time is a commodity. It can be bought, sold, saved, spent, wasted, lost, made up, and measured.

For people raised in the European tradition time is something that occurs between two points. Duration is the most widely shared implicit assumption concerning the nature of time in the Western world. It seems inconceivable to those of us who have learned to take this one isolate so much for granted that it would be possible to organize life in any other way. Set one of the miracles of human existence is the tremendous variety that occurs in such basic matters as this. For instance, the Hopi are separated from us by a tremendous cultural gulf. Time, for example, is not duration but many different things for them. It is not fixed or measurable as we think of it, nor is it a quantity. It is what happens when the corn matures or a sheep grows up—a characteristic sequence of events. It is the natural process that takes place while living substance acts out its life drama. Therefore, there is a different time for everything which can be altered by circumstances. One used to see Hopi houses that were in

the process of being built for years and years. Apparently the Indians had no idea that a house could or should be built in a given length of time since they could not attribute to it its own inherent time system such as the corn and the sheep had. This way of looking at time cost the government untold thousands of dollars on construction projects because the Hopi could not conceive of there being a fixed time in which a dam or a road was supposed to be built. Attempts to get them to meet a schedule were interpreted as browbeating and only made things worse.

It was mentioned earlier that in contrast to some of the African systems, the components of American time—the time when the soil could rest, how, of course, there are hunting, fishing, skunk, tourist, or Christmas seasons, as well as the traditional summer, fall, winter, spring class of sets. The season and the quarter are probably related, although the quarter is tied to the calendar while the season, being older, is rooted in climatic changes and activities associated with agriculture. Formal isolates are difficult to pin down. Like all isolates, they are abstractions, yet because they are formal abstractions which seem right and proper little attention has been paid to them. They are often overlooked because they seem so "natural." The list of true isolates which follows is undoubtedly incomplete. It includes what I call ordering, cyclicity, synthesisity, valuation, tangibility, duration, and depth.

The week is the week not only because it has seven days but because they are in a fixed *order*. Ordering as a formal isolate would seem to be an expression of order as in the laws of order, selection, and congruence. The western world has elaborated this to some extent. That is, we keep constant track of all sorts of things which are otherwise identical and *only distinguished when* their order. The six millionth Ford built becomes a milestone, as does the fifty millionth passenger-mile flown by an airline. The firstborn, first president, first position, the number-two man, the tenth in a class of one thousand assume meaning because of their order. The

seventh day is different from the first day; the middle of the week is different from the end, and so on. For most temporal events the cyclic element is taken for granted. One day follows the next, as does the week, month, year, and century. The common cycles are limited in number. The sixty-cycle series (minutes and seconds) the seven-day week, and the twelve-month year, minutes, the hours—have to add up. Americans start with the assumption that they are working with a system. Radically the reason why time has to add up is that we start with the assumption that we are dealing with a system and that there is order in the universe. We feel it is man's job to discover the order and to create intellectual models that reflect it. We are driven by our own way of looking at things to synthesize almost everything. Whenever we have to deal with people whose time systems lack this isolate of synthesisity we experience great difficulty. To us it's almost as if they were missing one of their senses and were therefore unaware of nature. The synthesisity isolate is basic to most if not all of our appraisal of life around this. Americans consider death as a necessary component of time; that is, there is a past on which the present rests. Yet we have not elaborated the depth isolate to the extent that this has been done in the middle East and South Asia. The Arab looks back two to six thousand years for his own origins. History is used as the basis for almost any modern action. The chances are that an Arab won't start a talk or a speech or analyze a problem without first developing the historical aspects of his subject. The American assumes that time has depth but he takes this for granted. Most of the formal patterns of time in the United States will seem immediately obvious to the American reader though he may not have taken the trouble to think about them. They would not be formal patterns if they were not so easily recognized. But for the benefit of the foreign reader I will summarize briefly the American formal pattern. The American never questions the fact that time should be planned and future events fitted into a schedule. He thinks that people should look forward to the

future and not dwell too much on the past. His future is not very far ahead of him. Results must be obtained in the foreseeable future, one or two years or, at the most, five or ten. Promises to meet deadlines and appointments are taken very seriously. There are real penalties for being late and for not keeping commitments in time. From this it can be surmised that the American thinks it is natural to quantify time. To fail to do so is unthinkable. The American specifies how much time it requires to do everything. "I'll be there in ten minutes." "It will take six months to finish that job." "I was in the Army for four and a half years."

The Americans, like so many other people, also use time as a link that chains events together. *Post hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc* (after the fact, therefore because of the fact) is still an integral part of the traditional structure of our culture. The occurrence of one event on the heels of another results inevitably in attempts on our part to attribute the second to the first and to find a causal relationship between them. If A is seen in the vicinity of B's murder shortly after the crime has been committed we automatically form a connection between A and B. Conversely, events which are separated by too much time are difficult for us to connect in our minds. This makes it almost impossible for us as a nation to engage in long-range planning.

INFORMAL TIME: SETS, ISOLATES AND PATTERNS

To complicate matters for the young who are trying to learn the culture and the scientist who is trying to analyze it, the vocabulary of informal time is often identical with that of technical and formal time. words such as minute, second, year are common to all three. The context usually tells the hearer which level of discourse is being used. There are, of course, words which are typically informal and are recognized as such (a while, later, a long time, etc.). In describing informal time we begin with the sets, because it is the set that is most easily perceived. When a person says, "It'll take a while," you have to know him personally and also a good deal about the total context of the remark before you can say what the term "a while" means. Actually, it is not as vague as it

seems at first, and people who have this information can usually tell what is meant. What is more, if a man whose normal "while" is thirty to forty-five minutes returns to his office after an hour, having said he would only be gone for "a while," he will usually apologise or make some remark about having been gone longer than he expected. This proves that he realised that there was a limit to the degree to which you stretch "a while." The basic vocabulary of informal time is simple. There are only eight or nine different distinctions made by Americans. It is as if we measured informal time with a rubber ruler which could be infinitely expanded or compressed but which would still maintain the integrity of the basic relationships. The shortest time on the informal scale is the "instantaneous event." The following additional distinctions are interposed between 'instantaneous event' and "forever": Very short duration, short duration, neutral duration (neither noticeably short (nor long) long duration, very long duration, and impossibly long duration. This is sometimes indistinguishable from "forever."

In general, informal time is quite vague because it is situational in character. The circumstances vary, hence the measured time varies: The "longest time," "forever," and "an eternity" are all words or expressions which are used to describe any time which is experienced as being excessively drawn out. Depending on circumstances, "eternity" may be the time it takes to hit the water when one jumps from a high diving board for the first time, or it may be a month or two spent overseas away from one's family.

Informally, for important daytime business appointments in the eastern United States between equals, there are eight time sets in regard to punctuality and length of appointments: on time, five, ten, fifteen, twenty, thirty, forty-five minutes, and one hour early or late. Keeping in mind that situations vary, there is a slightly different behavior pattern for each point, and each point on the scale has a different meaning. As for the length of appointments an hour with an important person is different from thirty minutes with that same person. Ponder the significance of the remark, "He spent over an hour closeted with the President." Everyone knows the business must have been important. Or consider, "I could only spare ten minutes, so we didn't get much

accomplished." Time then becomes a message as eloquently direct as if words were used. As for punctuality no right-minded American would think of keeping a business associate waiting for an hour; it would be too insulting. No matter what is said in apology, there is little that can remove the impact of an hour's heel-cooling in an outer office.

Even the five-minute period has its significant subdivisions. When equals meet, one will generally be aware of being two minutes early or late but will say nothing, since the time in this case is not significant. At three minutes a person will still not apologise or feel that it is necessary to say anything (three is the first significant number in the one-to-five series); at five minutes there is usually a short apology; and at four minutes before or after the hour the person will mutter something, although he will seldom complete the muttered sentence. The importance of making detailed observations on these aspects of informal culture is driven home if one pictures an actual situation. An American ambassador in an unnamed country interpreted incorrectly the significance of time as it was used in visits by local diplomats. An hour's tardiness in their system is equivalent to five minutes by ours, fifty to fifty-five minutes to four minutes, forty-five minutes to three minutes, and so on for daytime official visits. By their standards the local diplomats felt they couldn't arrive exactly on time; this punctuality might be interpreted locally as an act relinquishing their freedom of action to the United States. But they didn't want to be insulting—an hour late would be too late—so they arrived fifty minutes late. As a consequence the ambassador said, "How can you depend on these people when they arrive an hour late for an appointment and then just mutter something? They don't even give you a full sentence of apology!" He couldn't help feeling this way, because in American time fifty to fifty-five minutes late is the insult period, at the extreme end of the duration scale; yet in the country we are speaking of it's just right.

For another way of apportioning informal time consider the eastern Mediterranean Arab. He makes fewer distinctions than we do. His scale has

only three discernible points to our eight. His sets seem to be: no time at all; now (or present), which is of varying duration; and forever (too long). In the Arab world it is almost impossible to get someone to experience the difference between waiting a long time and a very long time. Arabs simply do not make this temporal distinction.

Informal time isolates will be more significant to the reader if he will sit back for a minute and think in some detail about times when he was aware that time was either passing very rapidly or else dragging. It may even be helpful if he will note what it was in the situation that made time behave the way it did. If he goes even further and thinks at length about how he was able to distinguish between a very short time and a long time regardless of the clock time, he will be well on the road to understanding how the American system works.

What follows below merely attempts to simply put into words things that people know but have not formulated precisely.

Four isolates enable people to distinguish between the duration sets mentioned above. The most difficult of all to characterise, they are: urgency, inochronism, activity, and variety.

The impression of time as passing rapidly or slowly is related to *urgency*. The more urgent the need, the more time appears to drag. This applies to everything from basic physiological needs to culturally derived needs. A man who has an urgent need to succeed and reach the top will experience the passage of time on the way up with more anguish than will another man who is more relaxed about success. The parent with a sick child desperately in need of medical attention feels time moving very slowly; so does the farmer whose crops are withering for lack of rain. One could list many more examples. However, more to the point is what is not included when we consider urgency as an informal temporal isolate: First, urgency on different levels of analysis is both a set and a pattern. Second, our own variety of urgency distinguishes us from the rest of western European culture. A lack of a sense of ur-

gency has been very apparent to Americans traveling abroad.

Even physiological urgency is handled quite differently by people around the world. In many countries people need less of what Americans would call ur-

gency in order to discharge a tension. In the United States the need must be highly critical before people act.

The distribution of public toilets in America reflects our tendency to deny the existence of urgency even with normal physiological needs. I know of no other place in the world where anyone leaving home or office is put to periodic torture because great pains have been taken to hide the location of rest rooms. Yet Americans are the people who judge the advancement of others by their plumbing. You can almost hear the architect and owner discussing a new store's rest room. Owner: "Say, this is nice! But why did you hide it? You'd need a map to find it." Architect: "I'm glad you like it. We went all out on this washroom, had a lot of trouble getting that tile to match. Did you notice the anti-splash-aerated faucets on the wash basins? Yes, it would be a little hard to find, but we figure people wouldn't rise it unless they had to, and then they could ask a clerk or something."

Monochronism means doing one thing at a time. American culture is characteristically monochronic. As Americans we find it disconcerting to enter an office overseas with an appointment only to discover that other matters require the attention of the man we are to meet. Our ideal is to center the attention first on one thing and then move on to something else. North Europeans and those of us who share in this culture make a distinction between whether or not a person is engaged in an *activity*. In fact, we distinguish between the "active" and "dormant" phases of everything.

I therefore refer to this isolate, in terms of its Latin root, as an *ogeric* isolate (from mere, to act). Just plain sitting, trying to capture a sense of self, is not considered to be *doing anything*. I fence, such remarks as, "You didn't seem to be doing anything, so I thought I would stop in and

talk to you for a while." The exception is, of course, prayer, which has special and easily identified postures associated with it.

In a number of other cultures, including the Navaho, Trukese, eastern mediterranean Arab cultures, Japanese, and many of those of India, just plain sitting is doing something. The distinction of being active or not is not made.

Thus there are ager cultures and non-ager cultures. A culture is non-ager if, in the process of handling the matter of "becoming later," it makes no difference whether you do something or not. With us, we have to work to get ahead.

We do not get ahead automatically. In the cultures mentioned above, this is not nearly so important.

Variety enables us to distinguish between intervals such as short duration and long duration, or long duration and very long duration. Variety is a factor in boredom, while the degree of boredom experienced depends on how rapidly time passes.

We look for variety in occupations, careers and hobbies. Our public "demands" a variety of material objects, food, clothing, and so forth. Consider for a

moment the fact that few of us can say what we are going to have for lunch or dinner three days from now, let alone next year. Yet there are millions of people in the world who know exactly what they are going to have, if they are to have anything at all. They will eat the same thing they had today, yesterday, and the day before.

For us it is a matter of importance whether or not there is variety in life. Take the teen-age girl who complains to her mother that there weren't any boys at the dance, meaning that there weren't any new boys. Our demand for variety and for something new would seem to exceed that of almost any other culture in the world today. It is necessary to an economy like ours. Without constant innovation we could never keep our industrial plant expanding. On the informal level of time the basic distinction is between sameness and variety. With variety, time moves more rapidly. People who are imprisoned away from light where they

cannot tell whether it is day or not apparently lose practically all sense of the passage of time. They become disoriented and if kept away long enough they may "lose their minds."

As was the case with activity, we associate variety with external events. maturing and aging—just getting old—are not considered by us to constitute variety except in someone else, so that we will say, "My, he certainly has aged a lot since I last saw him." To the Pueblo of New Mexico, however, aging is something to be experienced. It means increased stature in the community and a greater part in decision making. variety, from this point of view, is a natural part of living, and an inherent aspect of the self, providing a basically different view of life from our own.

To summarize this discussion of informal time isolates we can say that Americans determine relative duration by their means: degree of urgency, whether they are trying to do more than one thing at a time, whether they are busy or not, and the degree of variety that enters into the situation. In the informal isolates of a culture, one finds the building blocks of time that go to make up the values and driving forces which characterize a culture.

The informal patterning of time is one of the most consistently overlooked aspects of culture. This is not because men are blind or stupid or pigheaded, although their capacity to hold on to informal patterns in the face of weighty evidence sometimes makes them appear to be so. It seems that it is impossible to participate in two different patterns at the same time. As I will illustrate below, a person has to stop using one in order to take up another. Furthermore, patterns are anchored, when they are being learned and forever after, in the behavior of groups and institutions. They are the ways of doing things that one learns early in life and for which one is rewarded or punished. Hence, it is no wonder that people hold on to them so tenaciously and look askance at all other patterns.

Formal patterns are seldom, if ever, made explicit. They exist like the air around us. They are either familiar and comfortable, or if unfamiliar, wrong. Deviations from the pattern are usually greeted with highly charged emotion because people are not doing things our way.

“Our way” is, of course, almost invariably supported or reinforced by a technical rationalization such as the following: “If you are five minutes late for a meeting and have kept ten people waiting, you have therefore wasted almost an hour of their time.”

in the United States the nature of the points on a time scale is a matter of patterning, as is the handling of the interval between them. By and large, the space between the points is inviolate. That is, compared to some other systems, there is only a limited amount of stretching or distortion of the interval that is permissible. Conditioning for this way of conceiving time begins very early for us. A mother says, “I thought I told you you could play with Susan until five o’clock. What do you mean by staying over there until almost suppertime?” Later in life we hear Father saying to a friend, “I promised to spend an hour with Johnny working on his tree house, and I can’t very well get off with much less.” And in adult life, “But not once, this is the third time Mr. Brown has tried to see you, and you promised to spend at least thirty minutes going over those specifications with him.”

Our pattern allows very little switching of the position of “intervals” once they are set in a schedule, nor does it allow for much tampering with either the content or the position of the points on the time scale. An appointment to talk about a contract scheduled to begin at ten o’clock and end at eleven o’clock is not easily moved, nor can you talk about anything but the contract without offending people. Once set, the schedule is almost sacred, so that not only is it wrong, accent.

Wording to the formal dictates of our culture, to be late, but it is a violation of the informal patterns to keep changing schedules or appointments or to deviate from the agenda. How much this is a factor in other cultures has not been determined precisely. There are cases, however, where the content or “agenda” of a given period of time is handled quite differently. In the middle East, again, refusal of one party to come to the point and discuss the topic of a meeting often means he cannot agree to your terms but doesn’t want to turn you down, or simply that he cannot

discuss the matters under consideration because the time is not yet ripe.

He will not, moreover, feel it is improper to meet without ever touching on the topic of the meeting.

Our pattern calls for the fixing of the agenda informally beforehand. We do not, as a whole, feel too comfortable trying to operate in a semi-public situation, hammering out an agenda, the way the Russians do. We prefer to assume that both parties want to talk about the subject, otherwise they wouldn’t be there; and that they are sufficiently involved in the topic to make it worth their while. With the Russians there is some indication that, while this is true, negotiation over the separate points of the agenda signals to the other side how the opponent is going to react during the actual conference. Softness on our part in early negotiation, because we do not technically fix the agenda but agree informally about what should be taken up, is often interpreted as weakness. Or it may give the impression that we are going to give in on certain points when we aren’t at all.

Earlier it was mentioned that the content and limits of a period of time were sacrosanct. If, whenever, the topic for discussion is completed satisfactorily, or it is apparent that no progress can be made, then the meeting or visit may be cut short. This often leaves people feeling a little funny. By and large, the overriding pattern with us is that once you...

TIME

TALKS:

AMERICAN ACCENTS

... have scheduled the time, you have to use it as designated, even when it turns out that this is not necessary or advantageous.

All of which seems strange to the Arab.

He starts at one point and goes until he is finished or until something intervenes. Time is what occurs before or after a given point. The thing to remember in contrasting the two systems is that Americans cannot shift

the partitions of schedules without violating a norm; Arabs can. With us the compartments are sacred. If we have allocated so much time to a certain activity, we can change it once, or maybe twice, when we are trying to discover the amount of time for the activity.

We cannot continually move the walls of our time compartments back and forth, even though an activity may actually call for such flexibility. The pattern of the immovable time applies in most situations, even long periods of time, such as how long it takes to complete a college career.

It is not necessary to leave the country to encounter significantly different time patterns. There are differences between families and differences between men and women; occupational differences, status differences, and regional differences. In addition there are two basic American patterns that often conflict. I have termed these the "diffused point pattern" and the "displaced point pattern." The difference between them has to do with whether the leeway is on one side of the point or is diffused around it.

Contrasting the behavior of two groups of people participating in the two patterns, one observes the following: Taking 8:30 a.m. as the point, participants in the "displaced point" pattern will arrive ahead of time anywhere from 8:00 or to 8:27 (cutting it fine), with the majority arriving around 8:20 A.M. Diffused point people will arrive anywhere from 8:20 to 8:40 a.m. As can be seen, there is practically no overlap between these two groups.

The reader can recall his own behavior during evening engagements. A person asked to spend the evening and arrive about "nine-ish," wouldn't think of using the daytime "diffused point" pattern. The "displaced point" pattern is mandatory, usually at least ten or fifteen minutes after the hour but not more than thirty-five or forty minutes. If asked for dinner, with cocktails before, the leeway is much less. It is permissible to arrive for a seven o'clock engagement at 7:5 but not much later than 7:10. The "mutter something" period starts at 7:20 and by 7:30, people are looking around and

saying, "I wonder what's happened to the Smiths!"

The hostess may have a roast in the oven. In New York City there is a big difference between a "7 to 8" cocktail-party, when people arrive between 6 and 7:30 to stay for hours, and dinner-party time when ten minutes late is the most allowed.

In these terms, the actual displacement of the point is a function of three things: (a) the type of social occasion and what is being served; (b) the status of the individual who is being met or visited; (c) the individual's own way of handling time.

When a shift occurs in an office from diffused point to displaced point, people feel strongly about it. The diffused point people never really feel comfortable with the other pattern. Such shifts are often interpreted as robbing professional people of status. That is, they feel they have been lowered in the esteem of the loss. This is because of the use of this same pattern when meeting dignitaries and when great social distance exists between individuals. The displaced pointers, on the other hand, regard everyone else as very unbusinesslike, sloppy, and as having poor organizational morale. They feel the lack of control and are distrustful of the academic types who are so cavalier about being "on time." Persistent efforts to restrict scientists to the distress placed point pattern by enforcing rigid schedules is one of the many things that helped drive many scientists from government work in the last few years.

Regionally in the United States there are seemingly endless variations in the way time is handled. These variations, however, are comparable to the variations in the details of speech associated with the different parts of the country. Everybody participates in the over-all pattern which makes it possible for us to be mutually understood wherever we go. In Utah, where the Mormons at first got somewhat technical about time and later developed strong formal systems emphasizing promptness, you find the displaced point pattern with very little leeway. That is, the attempt is made to arrive "on time," which means a little before the hour and no more

than one minute late. Since, according to their system, it's worse to be late than early, they arrive on the early side of the point, just as military personnel to what this communicates to other Americans is that Mormons are more serious about their work than the average American.

The northwest coastal region of the United States does some very strange things with time, when looked at in terms of the rest of the country. They will ask a person for 6 p.m.; if they want him to arrive by 6:30 p.m., and then hope that he gets there. The detail of uttering an apology after four minutes is quite uncommon and is decried by many.

The more traditional part of the South, on the other hand, seems to behave pretty much as predicted; people slow things down by allowing leeway in both patterns. One finds a greater permissible spread, or a wider range of deviation from the point, than in the urban Northeast. The same could be said for the Old West.

SPACE

SPEAKS

Every living thing has a physical boundary that separates it from its external environment. Beginning with the bacteria and the simple cell and ending with man, every organism has a detectable limit which marks where it begins and ends. A short distance up the phylogenetic scale, however, another, non-physical boundary appears that exists outside the physical one. This new boundary is harder to delimit than the first but is just as real. We call this the "organisms' territory." The act of laying claim to and defending a territory is termed territoriality. It is territoriality with which this chapter is most concerned. In man, it becomes highly elaborated, as well as being very greatly differentiated from culture to culture.

Anyone who has had experience with dogs, particularly in a rural setting such as on ranches and farms, is familiar with the way in which the dog handles

space. In the first place, the dog knows the limits of his master's "yard" and will defend it against encroachment. There are also certain places where he sleeps: a spot next to the fireplace, a spot in the kitchen, or one in the dining room if he is allowed there. In short, a dog has fixed points to which he returns time after time, depending upon the occasion. One can also observe that dogs create zones around them. Depending upon his relationship to the dog and the one he is in, a trespasser can evoke different behavior when he crosses the invisible lines which are meaningful to the dog.

This is particularly noticeable in females with puppies. A mother who has a new litter in a little-used barn will claim the barn as her territory. When the door opens she may make a slight movement or stirring in one corner. Nothing else may happen as the intruder moves ten or fifteen feet into the barn. Then the dog may raise her head or get up, circle about, and lie down as another invisible boundary is crossed. One can tell about where the line is by withdrawing and watching when her head goes down. As additional lines are crossed, there will be other signals, a thumping of the tail, a moan or a growl.

One can observe comparable behavior in other vertebrates—fish, birds, and mammals. Birds have well-developed territoriality, areas which they defend as their own and which they return to year after year. To those who have seen a robin come back to the same nest each year this will come as no surprise. Seals, dolphins, and whales are known to use the same breeding grounds. Individual seals have been known to come back to the same rock year after year.

Man has developed his territoriality to an almost unbelievable extent. Yet we treat space somewhat as we treat sex. It is there but we don't talk about it. And if we do, we certainly are not expected to get technical or serious about it. The man of the house is always somewhat apologetic about "his chair." How many people have had the experience of coming into a room, seeing a Big comfortable chair and heading for it, only to

pull themselves up short, or pause and turn to the man and say, "Oh, was I about to sit in your chair?" The reply, of course, is usually polite. Imagine the effect if the host were to give vent to his true feelings and say, "Hell, yes, you're sitting in my chair, and I don't like anybody sitting in my chair!" For some unknown reason, our culture has tended to play down or cause us to repress and dissociate the feelings we have about space. We relegate it to the informal and are likely to feel guilty whenever we find ourselves getting angry because someone has taken our place. Territoriality is established so rapidly that even the second session in a series of lectures is sufficient to send a significant proportion of most audiences back in the same seats. What's more, if one has been sitting in a particular seat and someone else occupies it, one can notice a fleeting irritation. There is the remnant of an old urge to throw out the interloper. The interloper knows this too, because he will turn around or look up and say, "Have I got your seat?" at which point you lie and say, "Oh no, I was going to move anyway."

Once while talking on this subject to a group of Americans who were going overseas, one very nice, exceedingly mild-mannered woman raised her hand and said, "You mean it's natural for me to feel irritated when another woman takes over my kitchen?" Answer: "Not only is it natural, but most American women have very strong feelings about their kitchens. Even a mother can't come in and wash the dishes in her daughter's kitchen without annoying her. The kitchen is the place where 'who will dominate' is settled. All women know this, and some can even talk about it. Daughters who can't keep control of their kitchen will be forever under the thumb of any woman who can move into this area."

The questioner continued: "You know that makes me feel so relieved. I have three older sisters and a mother, and every time they come to soon they march right into the kitchen and take over. I want to tell them to

stay out of my kitchen, that they have their own kitchens and this is my kitchen, but I always thought I was having unkind thoughts about my mother and sisters, thoughts I wasn't supposed to have. This relieves me so much, because now I know I was right."

Father's shop is, of course, another sacred territory and best kept that way. The same applies to his study, if he has one.

As one travels abroad and examines the ways in which space is handled, startling variations are discovered—differences which we react to vigorously. Since none of us is taught to look at space as isolated from other associations, feelings cued by the handling of space are often attributed to something else. In growing up people learn literally thousands of spatial cues, all of which have their own meaning in their own context. These cues "release" responses already established in much the same way as Pavlov's bells started his dogs salivating. Just how accurate a spatial memory is has never been completely tested. There are indications, however, that it is exceedingly persistent. Literally thousands of experiences teach us unconsciously that space communicates. Yet this fact would probably never have been brought to the level of consciousness if it had not been realized that space is organized differently in each culture. The associations and feelings that are released in a member of one culture almost invariably mean something else in the next. When we say that some foreigners are "pushy," all this means is that their handling of space releases this association in our minds.

What gets overlooked is that the response is there in toto and has been there all along. There is no point in well-meaning people feeling guilty because they get angry when a foreigner presents them with a spatial cue that releases anger or aggression. The main thing is to know what is happening and try to find out which cue was responsible. The next step is to discover, if possible, whether

the person really intended to release this particular feeling or whether he intended to engender a different reaction. Uncovering the specific cries in a foreign culture is a painstaking and laborious process. Usually it is easier for the newcomer to listen to the observations of old-timers and then test these observations against his own experience. At first he may hear, "You're going to have a hard time getting used to the way these people crowd you. Why, when you are trying to buy a theater ticket, instead of standing in line and waiting their turn they all try to reach in and get their money to the ticket seller at once. It's just terrible the way you have to push and shove just to keep your place. "Why, the last time I got to the ticket window of the theater and poked my head up to the opening, there were five arms and hands reaching over my shoulder saying money." Or you may hear the following: "It's as much as your life is worth to ride the streetcars. They're worse than our subways. What's more, these people don't seem to mind it at all." Some of this stems from the fact that, as Americans we have a pattern which discourages touching, except in moments of intimacy.

When we ride on a streetcar or crowded elevator we will "hold ourselves in," having been taught from early childhood to avoid bodily contact with strangers. Abroad, it's confusing when conflicting feelings are being released at the same time. Our senses are bombarded by a strange language, different smells, and gestures, as well as a host of signs and symbols. However, the fact that those who have been in a foreign country for some time talk about these things provides the newcomer with advance warning. Getting over a spatial accent is just as important, sometimes more so, than eliminating a spoken one. Advice to the newcomer might be: watch where people stand, and don't back up. You will feel funny doing it, but it's amazing how much difference it makes in people's attitudes toward you.

HOW DIFFERENT CULTURES USE SPACE

Several years ago a magazine published a map of the United States as the average New Yorker sees it. The details of New York were quite clear and the suburbs to the north were also accurately shown. Hollywood appeared in some detail while the space in between New York and Hollywood was almost a total blank. Places like Phoenix, Albuquerque, the Grand Canyon, and Taos, New Mexico, were all crowded into a hopeless jumble. It was easy to see that the average New Yorker knew little and cared less for what went on in the rest of the country. To the geographer the map was a distortion of the worst kind. Yet to the student of culture it was surprisingly accurate. It showed the informal images that many people have of the rest of the country.

As a graduate student I lived in New York, and my landlord was a first-generation American of European extraction who had lived in New York all his life. At the end of the academic year as I was leaving, the landlord came down to watch me load my car. When I said good-bye, he remarked, "well, one of these Sunday afternoons I put my family in the car and we drive out to New Mexico and see you."

The map and the landlord's comment illustrate how Americans treat space as highly personalized. We visualize the relationship between places we know by personal experience. Places which we haven't been to and with which we are not personally identified tend to remain confused. Traditionally American space begins with

"a place." It is one of the oldest sets, comparable to, but not quite the same as, the Spanish *lugar*. The reader will have no difficulty thinking up ways in which place is used: "He found a place in her heart," "He has a place in the mountains," "I am tired of this place," and so on. Those who have children know how difficult it is to get across to them the whole concept of place—like Washington, or

Boston, or Philadelphia, and so on. An American child

requires between six and seven years before he has begun to master the basic concepts of place. Our culture provides for a great variety of places, including different classes of places.

Contrasted with the Middle East, our system characterized by fine gradations as one moves from

one category to the next. In the world of the Arab there are villages and cities. That is about all. Most nomadic Arabs think of themselves as villagers. The actual villages are of varying population, from a few families up to several thousands. The smallest place category in the United States is not covered by a term like hamlet, village, or town. It is immediately recognizable as a territorial entity, nevertheless, because such places are always named. They are areas with no recognizable center, where a number of families live—like Dogpatch of the funny papers.

Our Dogpatches present the basic American pattern in uncomplicated form. They have scattered residences with no concentration of buildings in one spot. Like time, place with us is diffused, so that you never quite know where its center is.

Beyond this the naming of place categories begins with the “crossroads store” or “corner” and continues with the small shopping center, the “county seat,” the “small town,” “large town,” “metropolitan center,” “city,” and “metropolis.” Like much of the rest of our culture, including the social ranking system, there are no clear gradations as one moves from one category to the next. The “points” are of varying sizes, and there are no linguistic cues indicating the size of the place we are talking about. The United States, New Mexico, Albuquerque, Pecos are all said the same way and used the same way in sentences. The child who is learning the language has no way of distinguishing one space category from another by listening to others talk. The miracle is that children eventually are able to sort out and pin down the different space terms from the meager cues provided by others. Try telling a five-year-old the difference between where you live in the suburbs and the town where your wife goes to shop. It will be a frustrating task, since the child, at that age, only comprehends where *he* lives. His room, his house, his place at the table are the places that are learned early.

The reason most Americans have difficulty in school with geography or geometry stems from the fact that space as an informal cultural system is different from space as it is technically elaborated by classroom geography and mathematics. It must be said in fairness to ourselves

that other cultures have similar problems. Only the very perceptive adult realizes that there is anything really difficult for the child to learn about space. In reality, he has to take what is literally a spatial blur and isolate the significant points that adults talk about. Sometimes adults are unnecessarily impatient with children because they don't catch on. People do not realize that the child has heard older people talking about different places and is trying to figure out, from what he hears, the difference between this place and that. In this regard it should be pointed out that the first clues which suggest to children that one thing is different from another come from shifts in tone of voice which direct attention in very subtle but important ways. Speaking a fully developed language as we do, it is hard to remember that there was a time when we could not speak at all and when the whole communicative process was carried on by means of variations in the voice tone. This early language is lost to consciousness and functions out of awareness, so that we tend to forget the very great role it plays in the learning process. To continue our analysis of the way a child learns about space, let us turn to his conception of a road. At first a road is whatever he happens to be driving on. This doesn't mean that he can't tell when you take a wrong turn. He can, and often will even correct a mistake which is made. It only means that he has not yet broken the road down into its components and that he makes the distinction between this road and that road in just the same way that he learns to distinguish between the phoneme *d* and the phoneme *b* in initial position in the spoken language.

Using roads for cross-cultural contrast, the reader will recall that Paris, being an old city as well as a French city, has a street-naming system that puzzles most Americans. Street names shift as one progresses. Take Rue St.-Honore, for example, which becomes Rue du Faubourg St.-Honore, Avenue des Ternes, and Avenue du Roule. A child growing up in Paris, however, has no more difficulty learning his system than one of our children learning ours. We teach ours to watch the intersections and the di-

rections and that when something happens—that is, when there is a change of course at one of these points—you can expect the name to change. In Paris the child learns that as he passes certain landmarks—like buildings that are well known, or statues—the name of the street changes.

It is interesting and informative to watch very young children as they learn their culture.

They quickly pick up the fact that we have names for some things and not for others. First, they identify the whole object or the set—a room, for instance; then they begin to fixate on certain other discrete objects like books, ashtrays, letter openers, tables, and pencils. By so doing they accomplish two things. First, they find out how far down the scale they have to go in identifying things. Second, they learn what are the isolates and patterns for handling space and object nomenclature. First children are often better subjects than second children, because, having learned the hard way, the first one will teach the second one without involving the parents. The child will ask, “What’s this?” pointing to a pencil.

You reply, “A pencil.” The child is not satisfied and says, “to, this,” pointing to the shaft of the pencil and making clear that she means the shaft. So you say, “Oh, that’s the shaft of the pencil.” Then the child moves her finger one quarter inch and says, “What’s this?” and you say, “The shaft.” This process is repeated and you say, “That’s still the shaft; and this is the shaft, and this is the shaft. It’s all the shaft of the pencil. This is the shaft, this is the point, and this is the eraser, and this is the little tin thing that holds the eraser on.” Then she may point to the eraser, and you discover that she is still trying to find out where the dividing lines are. She manages to worm out the fact that the eraser has a top and sides but no more. She also learns that there is no way to tell the difference between one side and the next and that no labels are pinned on parts of the point, even though distinctions are made between the lead and the rest of the pencil. She may glean from this that materials make a difference some of the time and some of the time they do not. Areas where things begin and end are apt to be important, while the points in between are often ignored.

The significance of all this would undoubtedly have escaped me if it hadn’t been for an experience on the atoll of Truk. In a rather detailed series of studies in technology I had pro-

gressed to the point of having to obtain the nomenclature of the canoe and the wooden food bowl. At this point it was necessary for me to go through what children go through—that is, point to various parts after I thought I had the pattern and ask if I had the name right. As I soon discovered, their system of carving up microspace was radically different from our own. The Trukese treat open spaces, without dividing lines (as we know them), as completely distinct. Each area has a name. On the other hand, they have not developed a nomenclature for the edges of objects as elaborately as Westerners have done. The reader has only to think of rims of cups and the number of different ways in which these can be referred to. There is the rim itself. It can be square or round or elliptical in cross section; straight, flared, or curved inward; plain or decorated, and wavy or straight. This doesn’t mean that the Trukese don’t elaborate rims. They do; it just means that we have ways of talking about what we do and not as many ways of talking about what happens to an open area as they do. The Trukese separate parts which we think of as being ‘built in’ to the object.

A certain decoration or carving at either end of a canoes shaped food bowl is thought of as being separate or distinct from the rim in which it has been carved. It has an essence of its own. Along the keel of the canoe the carving, called the *chunef atch*, has characteristics with which it endows the canoe. The canoe is one thing, the *chunef atch* something else. Open spaces without obvious markers on the side of the bowl have names. Such distinctions in the dividing up of space make the settling of land claims unbelievably complicated in these islands. Trees, for instance, are considered separate from the soil out of which they grow. One may own the trees, another the soil below.

Benjamin Whorf, describing how Hopi concepts of space are reflected in the language, mentions the absence of terms for interior three-dimensional spaces, such as words for room, chamber, hall, passage, interior, cell, crypt, cellar, attic, loft, and vault. This does not alter the fact that the Hopi have multi-room dwellings and even use the rooms for special purposes such as storage, grinding corn, and the like.

Whorf also notes the fact that it is impossible

for the Hopi to add a possessive pronoun to the word for room and that in the Hopi scheme of things a room in the strict sense of the word is not a noun and does not act like a noun. Since there is a wealth of data on how strongly the Hopi feel about holding onto things which are theirs, one has to rule out possessive factor in Whorf's references to their inability to say "my room."

It's just that their language is different. One might be led to assume by this that the Hopi would then lack a sense of territoriality. Again, nothing could be farther from the truth. They just use and conceive of space differently.

We work from points and along lines. They apparently do not, while seemingly inconsequential, these differences cause innumerable headaches to the white supervisors who used to run the Hopi reservation in the first part of this century.

I will never forget driving over to one of the villages at the end of a mesa and discovering that someone was building a house in the middle of the road. It later developed that the culprit (in my eyes) was a man I had known for some time. I said, "Paul, why are you building your house in the middle of the road? There are lots of good places on either side of the road. This way people have to knock the bottoms out of their cars driving around on the rocks to get to the village." His reply was short and to the point: "I know, but it's my right." He did have a right to a certain area laid down long before there was a road. The fact that the road had been used for many years meant nothing to him. Use and Misuse of space in our terms had nothing to do with his ideas of possession.

SPACE AS A FACTOR IN CULTURE CONTACT

Whenever an American moves overseas, he suffers from a condition known as "culture shock." Culture shock is simply a removal or distortion of many of the familiar cues one encounters at home and the substitution for them of other cues which are strange. A good deal of what occurs in the organization and use of space provides important leads as to the specific cues responsible for culture shock.

The Latin house is often built around a patio that is

next to the sidewalk and hidden from outsiders behind a wall. It is not easy to describe the degree to which small architectural differences such as this affect outsiders. American Point Four

technicians living in Latin America used to complain that they felt "left out" of things, that they were "shut off." Others kept wondering what was going on "behind those walls." In the United States, on the other hand, propinquity is the basis of a good many relationships. To us the neighbor is actually quite close. Being a neighbor endows one with certain rights and privileges, also responsibilities. You can borrow things, including food and drink, but you also have to take your neighbor to the hospital in an emergency. In this regard he has almost as much claim on you as a cousin. For these and other reasons the American tries to pick his neighborhood carefully, because he knows that he is going to be thrown into intimate contact with people. We do not understand why it is that when we live next to people abroad, the sharing of adjacent space does not always conform to our own pattern. In France and England, for instance, the relations between neighbors are apt to be cooler than in the United States. Mere propinquity does not tie people together. In England neighbor children do not play as they do in our neighborhoods. When they do play, arrangements are sometimes made a month in advance as though they were coming from the other side of town.

Another example has to do with the arrangement of offices. In this case one notices great contrast between ourselves and the French. Part of our over-all pattern in the United States is to take a given amount of space and divide it up equally. When a new person is added in an office, almost everyone will move his desk so that the newcomer will have his share of the space. This may mean moving from positions that have been occupied for a long time and away from favorite views from the window. The point is that the office force will make its own adjustments voluntarily. In fact, it is a signal that they have acknowledged the presence of the new person when they start rearranging the furniture. Until this has happened, the boss can be sure that the new person has not been integrated into the group.

Given a large enough room, Americans will distribute themselves around the walls, leaving the center open for group activities such as conferences. That is, the center belongs to the group and is often marked off by a table or some object placed there both to use and save the space. Lacking a conference table, members

will move their chairs away from their desks to form a "huddle" in the middle. The pattern of moving from one's place to huddle is symbolized in our language by such expressions as, "I had to take a new position on that point," or "The position of the office on this point is . . ." The French, by contrast, do not make way for each other in the unspoken, taken-for-granted way that we do. They do not divide up the space with a new colleague. Instead they may grudgingly give him a small desk in a dark corner looking toward the wall. This action speaks eloquently to Americans who have found themselves working for the French. We feel that not to "make a place" accents status differences. If the rearrangement which says, "how we admit you to the group, and you are going to stay," fails to take place, Americans are likely to feel perilously insecure. In French offices the key figure is the man in the middle, who has his fingers on everything so that all runs smoothly. There is a centralized control. The French educational system runs from the middle, so that all students all over France take the same class at the same time.

It has already been mentioned that ordering is an important element in American patterns. As a general rule, whenever services are involved we feel that people should queue up in order of arrival. This reflects the basic equalitarianism of our culture. In cultures where a class system or its remnants exist, such ordinality may not exist. That is, where society assigns rank for certain purposes, or wherever ranking is involved, the handling of space will reflect this. To us it is regarded as a democratic virtue for people to be served without reference to the rank they hold in their occupational group. The rich and poor alike are accorded equal opportunity to buy and be waited upon in the order of arrival. In a line at the theater Mrs. Cotrocks is no better than anyone else. However, apart from the English, whose equating patterns we share, many Europeans are likely to look upon standing in line as a violation of their individuality. I am reminded of a Pole who reacted this way. He characterized Americans as sheep, and the mere thought of such passiveness was likely to set him crashing into a line at whatever point he pleased. Such people can't stand the idea of being held down by group conformity as if they were an automaton. Americans watching the Pole thought he was "pushy." He didn't bother to hide the fact that he thought

we were much too subdued. He used to say, "What does it matter if there is a little confusion and some people get served before others?"

FORMS OF SPACE PATTERNS

Depending upon the culture in question, the formal patterning of space can take on varying degrees of importance and complexity. In America, for example, no one direction takes precedence over another except in a technical or utilitarian sense. In other cultures one quickly discovers that some directions are sacred or preferred. In Havana doors must face east, the mosques of the Moslems must be oriented toward Mecca, the sacred rivers of India flow south. Americans pay attention to direction in a technical sense, but formally and informally they have no preference. Since our space is largely laid out by technical people, houses, towns, and main arteries are usually oriented according to one of the points of the compass. The same applies to roads and main highways when the topography allows, as it does in the flat expanses of Indiana and Kansas. This technical patterning allows us to locate places by co-ordinates (a point on the line). "He lives at 321 K Street, N. 13." tells us that he lives in the northwest part of town in the thirteenth block west of the line dividing the town into east-west halves and eleven blocks north of the line dividing the town into north-south halves, on the left side of the street, about one quarter of the way up the block.

In the country we will say, "Go out of town ten miles west on Highway 66 until you get to the first paved road turning north. Turn right on that road and go seven miles. It's the second farm on your left. You can't miss it."

Our concept of space makes use of the edges of things. If there aren't any edges, we make them by creating artificial lines (five miles west and two miles north). Space is treated in terms of a co-ordinate system. In contrast, the Japanese and many other people work within areas. They name "spaces" and distinguish between one space and the next or parts of a space. To us a space is empty—one gets into it by intersecting it with lines.

A technical pattern which may have grown out of an informal base is that of positional value or ranking. We have canonized the idea of the positional value in almost every aspect of our lives, so much so that even children four years old are frilly aware of its implications and are apt to fight with each other as to who will be first.

In addition to positional value, the American pattern emphasizes equality and standardization of the segments which are used for measuring space or into which space is divided, be it a ruler or a suburban subdivision. We like our components to be standard and equal. American city blocks tend to have uniform dimensions whereas towns in many other parts of the world are laid out with unequal blocks. This suggests that it was no accident that mass production, made possible by the standardization of parts, had its origins in the United States. There are those who would argue that there are compelling technological reasons for both mass production and parts standardization. However, an examination of actual practice indicates that Europeans have produced automobiles in the past—and very good ones too—in which the cylinders were all of different sizes. The difference in dimensions was not great, of course, a matter of a very few thousandths of an inch. This, however, was enough to cause the car to make noise and use too much oil, if it was repaired by an American mechanic unfamiliar with the European patterns that lack the uniformity isolate.

Japan, too, has a passion for uniformity, though it is somewhat different from ours. All mats (*tatami*) on the floors of Japanese houses and all windows, doors, and panels are usually of identical dimensions in a given district. In newspaper advertisements of houses for sale or rent the dimensions are visually given in terms of the number of mats of a specific area. Despite this example of uniformity, the Japanese differ from us in a way which can have considerable economic results. In one case, for example, they manufactured a very large order of electronics parts according to rigid specifications which they were quite able to meet. When the product arrived in the United States, it was discovered that there were differences between various batches of these parts. The customer subsequently discovered that while the whole internal process of manufacture had been controlled, the Japanese had failed to

standardize their gauges! It is no accident that in the United States there is a Bureau of Standards. Much of the success of this country's technical skill and productivity, which we are trying to pass on to other nations, rests on these and similar unstated patterns.

HOW SPACE COMMUNICATES

Spatial changes give a tone to a communication, accent it, and at times even override the spoken word. The flow and shift of distance between people as they interact with each other is part and parcel of the communication process. The normal conversational distance between strangers illustrates how important are the dynamics of space interaction. If a person gets too close, the reaction is instantaneous and automatic—the other person backs up. And if he gets too much the idea of being held down by group conformity as if they were an automaton. Americans watching the Pole thought he was “pushy.” He didn't bother to hide the fact that he thought we were much too subdued. He used to say, “What does it matter if there is a little confusion and some people get served before others?”

FORMAL SPACE MATTERS

Depending upon the culture in question, the formal patterning of space can take on varying degrees of importance and complexity. In America, for example, no one direction takes precedence over another except in a technical or utilitarian sense. In other cultures one quickly discovers that some directions are sacred or preferred. In Japan doors must face east, the mosques of the Muslims must be oriented toward Mecca, the sacred rivers of India flow south. Americans pay attention to direction in a technical sense, but formally and informally they have no preference. Since our space is largely laid out by technical people, houses, towns, and main arteries are usually oriented according to one of the points of the compass. The same applies to roads and main highways when the topography allows, as it does in the flat expanses of Indiana and Kansas. This technical patterning allows us to locate places by co-ordinates (a point on the line). “He lives at 321 K Street, h.” tells us that he lives in the northwest part of town in the thirteenth

block west of the line dividing the town into east-west halves and eleven blocks north of the line dividing the town into north-south halves, on the left side of the street, about one quarter of the way up the block.

In the country we will say, "Go out of town ten miles west on Highway 66 until you get to the first paved road turning close again, back we go again. I have observed an American Packing up the entire length of a long corridor while a foreigner whom he considers pushy tries to retch tip wait h him. This scene has been enacted thousands and thousands of times—one person trying to increase the distance in order to be at ease, while the other tries to decrease it for the same reason, neither one being aware of what is going on. We have here an example of the tremendous depth to which culture can condition behavior.

One thing that does confuse us and gets in the way of understanding cultural differences is that there are times in our own culture when people are either distant or pushy in their use of space. We, therefore, simply associate the foreigner with the familiar; namely those people who have acted in such a way that our attention was drawn to their actions. The error is in jumping to the conclusion that the foreigner feels the same way the American does even though his overt acts are identical.

This was all suddenly brought into focus one time when I had the good fortune to be visited by a very distinguished and learned man who had been for many years a top-ranking diplomat representing a foreign country. After meeting him a number of times, I had become impressed with his extraordinary sensitivity to the small details of behavior that are so significant in the interaction process. Dr. X was interested in some of the work several of us were doing at the time and asked permission to attend one of my lectures. He came to the front of the class at the end of the lecture to talk over a number of points made in the preceding hour. While talking he became quite involved in the implications of the lecture as well as what he was saying. We started out facing each other and as he talked I became dimly aware that he was standing a little too close and that I was beginning to back up. Fortunately I was able to suppress my ignorance of both hydroponics and florist shops made me feel somewhat ill at ease, so that I did not com-

municate in the manner that I use when I am speaking on a familiar subject in a familiar setting. The role that distance plays in a communication situation was brought home to me when I entered a shop in which the floor was filled with benches spaced at about twenty-inch intervals. On the other side of the benches was the female proprietor of the shop. As I entered, she craned her neck as though to reach over the benches, raised her voice slightly to bring it up to the proper level, and said, "What was it you wanted?" I tried once. "What I'm looking for is a hydrosotic flowerpot." "What kind of flowerpot?" still with the neck craned. At this point I found myself climbing over benches in an effort to close up the space. It was simply impossible for me to talk about such a subject in a setting of this sort at a distance of fifteen feet. It wasn't until I got to within three feet that I was able to speak with some degree of comfort. Another example is one that will be familiar to millions of civilians who served in the Army during World War II. The Army, in its need to get technical about matters that are usually handled informally, made a mistake in the regulations on distance required for reporting to a superior officer. Everyone knows that the relationship between officers and men has certain elements which require distance and impersonality. This applied to officers of different ranks when they were in command relationship to each other. Instructions for reporting to a superior officer were that the junior officer was to proceed up to a point three paces in front of the officer's desk, stop, salute, and state his rank, his name, and his business: "Lieutenant X, reporting as ordered, sir." How, what cultural norms does this procedure violate, and what does it communicate? It violates the conventions for the use of space. The distance is too great, by first impulse and remain stationary because there was nothing to communicate aggression in his behavior except the conversational distance. His voice was eager, his manner intent, the set of his body communicated only interest and eagerness to talk. It also came to me in a flash that someone who had been so successful in the old school of diplomacy could not possibly let himself communicate something offensive to the other person except outside of his highly trained awareness.

By experimenting I was able to observe that

as I moved, away slightly, there was an associated shift in the pattern of interaction. He had more trouble expressing himself. If I shifted to where I felt comfortable (about twenty-one inches), he looked somewhat perplexed and hurt, almost as though he were saying: "Why is he acting that way? Here I am doing everything I can to talk to him in a friendly manner and he suddenly withdraws. Have I done anything wrong? Said something that I shouldn't?" Having ascertained that distance had a direct effect on his conversation, I stood my ground, letting him set the distance.

Not only is a vocal message qualified by the handling of distance, but the substance of a conversation can often demand special handling of space. There are certain things which are difficult to talk about unless one is within the proper conversational tone.

Not long ago I received a present of some seeds and chemicals along with the information that if I planted the seeds the chemicals would make them grow. Knowing little about hydroponics except that the plants should be suspended above the fluid in which chemicals are dissolved, I set out to find a suitable flowerpot. At every flower shop I was

met with incredulity and forced to go through a routine involving a detailed explanation of just what it was I wanted and how hydroponics worked.

at least two feet, and does not fit the situation. The normal speaking distance for business matters, where impersonality is involved at the beginning of the conversation, is five and a half to eight feet. The distance required by the army regulations borders on the edge of what we would call "far." It evokes an automatic response to shout. This detracts from the respect which is supposed to be shown to the superior officer. There are, of course, many subjects which it is almost impossible to talk about at this distance, and individual officers recognize this by putting soldiers and junior officers at ease, asking them to sit down or permitting them to come closer. However, the first impression was that the Army was doing things the hard way.

For Americans the following shifts in voice are associated with specific ranges of distances:

| | |
|---|---|
| i. Very close (8 in. to 6 in.) | Soft whisper; top secret |
| 2. Close (8 in. to 60 cm.) | Audible whisper; very confidential |
| 3. 2-5 ft. (60 cm. to 1 m.) | Indoors, soft voice; outdoors, full voice; confidential |
| 4. Neutral 3-4,5 ft. (1 m. to 1,5 m.) to 6 ft. (1,5 m to 2 m.) | Soft voice, low volume; personal subject matter |
| 5. Neutral (4½ ft.) | Full voice; information of non-personal matter |
| 6. Public Distance (3 2 ft. to 8 ft.) | Full voice with slight over loudness; public information for others to hear |
| 7. Across the room | Loud voice; talking to a group 20 ft. to 30 ft. indoors; up to 100 ft. outdoors; hailing distance, departures |
| 8. | |
| 9. Stretching the limits of distance | |

In Latin America the interaction distance is much less than it is in the United States. Indeed, people cannot talk comfortably with one another unless they are very close to the distance that evokes either sexual or hostile feelings in the North American. The result is that when they move close, we withdraw and back away. As a consequence, they think we are distant or cold, withdrawn and unfriendly. We, on the other hand, are constantly accusing them of breathing down our necks, crowding us, and spraying our faces. Americans who have spent some time in Latin America without learning these space considerations make other adaptations, like barricading themselves behind their desks, using chairs and typewriter tables to keep the Latin American at what is to us a comfortable distance. The result is that the Latin American may even climb over the obstacles until he has achieved a distance at which he can comfortably talk

LOOSENING THE GRIP

The first profound scientific understanding of the nature of culture dates back almost a hundred years. Yet to this day the concept of culture is resisted or ignored by a world which has accepted many more abstract and complex notions.

Why? Oddly enough it is not the differences between cultures that breeds resistance. These are usually acceptable. Rather, years of experience in trying to communicate the basic discoveries about culture have taught me that the resistance one meets has a great deal in common with the resistance to psychoanalysis which was so strong in its early days. Though the concepts of culture (like those of psychoanalysis) are abstract, they turn out, in fact, to be highly relevant to the deepest personal concerns. They touch upon such intimate matters that they are often brushed aside at the very point where people begin to comprehend their implications. Full acceptance of the reality of culture would have revolutionary consequences.

As a means of handling the complex data with which culture confronts us, I have treated culture as communication. This approach has broad implications for future study, but it offers no quick road to complete understanding. The universe does not yield its secrets easily, and culture is no exception. Yet this insistence on culture as communication has

its practical aspects. Most people's difficulties with each other can be traced to distortions in communication. Good will, which is so often relied upon to solve problems, is often needlessly dissipated because of the failure to understand what is being communicated.

By broadening his conception of the forces that make up and control his life, the average person can never again be completely caught in the grip of patterned behavior of which he has no awareness. Lionel Trilling once likened culture to a prison. It is in fact a prison unless one knows that there is a key to unlock it. While it is true that culture binds human beings in many unknown ways, the restraint it exercises is the groove of habit and nothing more. Man did not evolve culture as a means of smothering himself but as a medium in which to move, live, breathe, and develop his own uniqueness. In order to exploit it he needs to know much more about it.

The realization that formal culture can exert a stabilizing influence on our lives should not be mistaken for conservatism. In fact, an appreciation of the nature and purpose of formal culture should eventually prevent our blind acceptance of the teachings of psychologists and educators who, in their zeal to correct past faults in the system, insist that we spoil our children by not setting any limits and being overly permissive. This permissiveness only means that somebody else, perhaps a policeman or a judge, has to define the limits in life beyond which people simply cannot be permitted to go. We must realize that each child must learn the limits just as he must learn that there are certain things upon which he can ways depend real understanding of what culture is should rekindle our interest in life, an interest which is often sorely lacking. It will help people learn where they are and who they are. It will prevent them from being pushed around by the more voracious, predatory, and opportunistic of their fellow men who take advantage of the fact that the public is not usually aware of those shared formal norms which give coherence to our society. These social misfits who lack the security of support which formal culture provides, want to destroy things and build power around themselves. The case of the late Senator McCarthy was a classic example of this type of opportunism. If the American public had greater realization that formal norms are not individual but shared, they might save themselves from McCarthyism in any of its future manifestations,

Probably the most difficult point to make and make clearly is that not only is culture imposed upon man but it is man in a greatly expanded sense. Culture is the link between human beings and the means they have of interacting with others. The meaningful richness of human life is the result of the millions of possible combinations involved in a complex culture.

As I mentioned in the Introduction, the analogy with music is useful in understanding culture. A musical score is comparable to the technical descriptions of culture that the anthropologist is beginning to make. In both cases, the notation system, i.e., the vocabulary, enables people to talk about what they do. Usually, the process of making shorthand notes does not diminish the artist in any way. It simply enables him to transmit to others who are not present what he does when he plays. In music it enables us to share and preserve the genius that would ordinarily only reach those who were in the physical presence of the artist. Bach, Beethoven, and Brahms would have been lost to us if they had not had the means for writing music.

Like the creative composer, some people are more gifted at living than others. They do have an effect on those around them, but the process stops there because there is no way of describing in technical terms just what it is they do, most of which is out of awareness. Some time in the future, a long, long time from now when culture is more completely explored, there will be the equivalent of musical scores that can be learned, each for a different type of man or woman in different types of jobs and relationships, for time, space, work, and play. To see people who are successful and happy today, who have jobs which are rewarding and productive. What are the sets, isolates, and patterns that differentiate their lives from those of the less fortunate? The need to have a means for making life a little less haphazard and more enjoyable. Actually, we as Americans have progressed quite a long way on this road, compared with people of the Arab middle East and Turkey, for example. Professor Daniel Lerner, a sociologist at M.I.T., discovered when he interviewed villagers in Turkey that the idea of achieving happiness did not mean anything to them. It had never entered their mind that happiness was one of the things you had a right to expect from life and might strive to achieve. This does not mean that these villagers never have happy moments. Quite to the contrary. It just means that their culture does not include this isolate. All cultures have developed values in regard to what I

have called Primary message Systems. For example, the values in bisexuality center around preferred and not preferred types of men and women, idealized models for the children of each sex to follow. Most of these models are formal, some are informal. However, what most cultures do not do is provide anything more than models for the different types of males or females who are the models for their children. Modern society has complicated matters because of the increased number of alternatives that are provided the young. If one considers the Comanche of the early western plains, by way of contrast to present-day Americans, it is possible to get some idea of how increasingly complex life has become. A young Comanche boy knew that he had only two alternatives. He could grow up to be a warrior or a transvestite, the term used for a man who wears women's clothes and does women's work. Everyone had a clear idea of what it meant to be a warrior and the qualities that went with it. If for some reason or other a boy lacked the bravado and bravery necessary to be a good warrior and he was afraid he would fail, his alternative was to put on the dress of a woman and take up bead work. There were in Comanche life only two models for adults; warriors and women. Life in American culture is not that simple. There is not even a satisfactory inventory of the categories of males and females for American culture, although some of the types are reasonably well known because of a persistent interest in this subject on the part of contemporary novelists, not only must we know more about the alternatives that confront each of us in our daily lives, but we must also know the overall pattern of life as well.

For the layman and scientist alike I would like to say that I feel very strongly that we must recognize and understand the cultural process. We don't need more missiles and U-bombs nearly so much as we need more specific knowledge of ourselves as participants in culture.

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Architecture," *infernafional jounal o{ American*
LingLus-ties, X*o1. iQ, h'O. 2, April iQy
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Review, Vol. XLU, No. 6, April iQqo

INDEX

affect, 97—iii Anasawi, ww8—3w Afghanistan, 3Q.
qo, qI anthropologists, 3—\$o, \$w, Africa, 3q, 1 O8.
71 80 8\$, 86, i w\$, 1.26, 144

155, 212-13 or, iq6
16, 153, 160, 155, 49, 74, 70, 77a 'o' w, 107, 128-29, 132, 144-45,
American culture, qq-q, \$3-\$q, 1-5, 21, 172, w176, 178, 183,
up ij6, ig, wip wwj-wp \$s u: :o
i q—\$o, i \$i, wi q, wi ; bar-

Japanese, 16-17, 38, 46, 49-50,
60, 64, 71, 72, 74, 77, 99, 102,
103-4, 130-31, 133-34, 149-
50, 178, 203-4

55, Middle East
bargaining pattern, iwQ, i yr— 3;
architecture, i8, i \$q, 177-7concept of lan', 1O
S*7

dating, iQQ i qq—q ;
egalitarianism, 2, 28, 81,
analysis, U. S. Army
nor; formal patterns, p\$, Q6,
art, i 60-6w i \$o—\$i; humor, 7S:

43, illness in, association, 6w—6q, 1;
learning, 6 -74a 9, 7al, labor, 6
order,
Aswan Dam,
polarity in thinking, aw'areness, q8, \$i, 95-97, 214;
86-8y; relativ-

ranking sets, i 30—3q,
formal. a -a6:
cept, 67, 211; source of stabil-; religiolt, 76, q8; Sulli-
van's concept, 8q—8\$, space, i 88—go, *s—s so
ttechnical, s7
woQ; status, 6\$, 1 \$9 \$O, 201-
Awtecs, i o3

family, 145
technical competence, iow;
time, wj— i, 3\$, \$q, y\$, i 6y—
Bac h, Beethoven, BrahmS, 21.4
bargaining patterns, lwQ, i \$i-
American Indians, 4 -q6, y\$, \$
io 3, i w\$. See also Comanche, 227
Batt, 4, 115, 18, 225
Hopi, fiavajo, Pueblo, San
Benedict, Ruth, gq-80
Ildefonso,
Sioux, Taos, Wuni
biobasic culture, 60

Hopi, Americans overseas, i 3-i q, \$q- 144-45,
bisexuality, 6w, 6\$-68, wi q-i 212;
bo, b , 1O}, 1.6 '7 6,
Black brass, 1 \$6
' 77. iqo-iq w, i qq;
need forBoas, "ranw, i 2 selection and
training, i 3—i y, Bohannon, Paul, 38 27-28,
q8—\$o, \$q—6o, io 174-75;

Latin, British. See England, problems in: Afghani-
Hopi, stan, 3, 198-99; England, 200;
Catholicism, q8-
France, woo-i; Greece, i i6;
change, examples of, ww\$-3w; in
Iran, 63qo, Japan, i 6. 7j the formal, io i—q; in the
in LatuAmerica, w6—w8, 6y, 66—
formal, ioq7i n the techni-

i QQ—woQj Middle East, cat, io8—iw;
introduction of, i 6, 2b, 1 1— \$; South Pacific, i i
8; process of, i i w—i 8, ww\$—
Chapman, Kenneth, i i o
analysis of culture,
ommunication, \$i-\$w, u9-w6; as culture, \$m\$w, It q—w6, wi
w—i q, wi 2; information theory, i i q—wo; hon-verbal, i q, i W€-wi ;
out of awareness, systems, i2w; using space,
dissociation, 8q-8\$, 86
Dobwhausky, Theodosius, th, i i 8
Dogpatch, i Q3
Doyle, Sir Arthur Conan, S7
dress, a \$8, 1 \$g
On Bois, Cora, ij6

education, i8,
Communists, 7congruence,
Egypt,
cultural indeterminacy, i 36, wi8 cultural relativity, i \$, wi8
culture, i 8, q j-\$\$, wi i-i8; anal-
ogy to music, i8-âQ, wi 3-iq;
Einstein, Albert, i i6
Englarid, q6, i i W. *S7. OO, 20\$,
**ç-*8
English language, Qg, i wi, i w3, as communication,
i p*6, wi*-ia,
ww\$—26; Old English, i \$6
Eskimo, i w9-3o, i a
binding force, ws. 4 .
Evans, John, iow-
experience, 3o,
biological base,
building bloeks,
\$Q, \$O, 6t, 6y rat, i*\$w6; compkxity, 8o-8i,

6i—6w; diffusion, ww\$; indeterminacy, • 3*. wi8; language ol,
yr, yy, Iww; learning about,
\$3-yy, 6i, i9 \$ 98; materials,
79i ml CrociitUrc, *i 8;
ity, i q\$, wi 8; resistance to con-
t , wi8; resistance to conity for man, wip—i j; teaching,
q ß—yo, 6i; theory, q i, q8, yo, i, 6o, B\$; three levels of, \$ i, 83-i
i8, u\$, an; two levels of, 8\$—86

culture change. See change
culture shœ]c, rgg
Darwin, Charles, i i6 Darrow, Clarence, 79o
exploitatori, 6w, 28-8i
FarRau 7&
first naming, Q3
Foreign Service of the U. S., 6, 49, 176
formal, informal, technical triad,
informal cultural systems, 87a*

wta, wt j, wa6, ""7, wj1 France, tp\$, too—1, ww\$-w6
Freud, Sigmund, \$y, 83-86, i i \$ Fomm, Edch, io
Geermany, p, t \$oC•illin, John, 7* Girard case,
Greece, i y-i6
Haiti, yy

Holmes, Sherlock, \$2—\$8, 6o
7 '98—qqH ubbell, I orenwo,
humor, 75, 16o

inn plicit-explicit culture, 8\$-86 Indian Ser vice of the U. S., q \$-
French, i y\$; l'arsi, go; Spanish, i go;

Trukese, '97-9
Latin America, w6—w9, 6\$, 66-
67, 74a 98, 10-p 7. 'o "4-
ic 3i9% 9
India, i J8, wow
la w, 26,
learning, 6w
Indonesians, ioQ

informal cultural systems, 82—
91, 92-93, 95, 96-97, 99,
'° 4-7" j.18, i i

information theory 10

infra-culture, 60-62 interaction, 6w

introduction of v into English,
ww-w6

Iran, 3Q—o, 67

isolates, So, 8Q, i ww, i wq, i 3\$-
41, 214, 217-18

jokes. Sge humor

Junod, Henri Alexandre, 3Q

Kennard, Edward A., i oKenya, 6q

Kinsey, Alfred, Q3

Kluckliolin, Clyde, q8, 8 \$Korean 4Var, 77-7

Kroeber, A. L., 8

language, \$i, 60, 123-26,
135-47, q8, 145-149, 156; learn-
ing, 6i, 7*. relation to materials, 2Q, 8o
as adaptive mechanism, 6Q,
io i; cross-cultural, i w8; drive,

languages, Arabic, 131, 132;
English, 99, 121, 123, 131-pace, Q \$; in animals, 6q-20; in
32, 139-41, 154-57, 225-26;
dren, 7°-74a 9. i oo, i Q 6, wi w-i ; inornat, 2 Hw-Q 3,
Q \$; William, 227-28 55, 109
technical, 91, 93, 94, 95; the-communication using, 24,
Of, 71*72 37, 139, 143, 193, 214,

Leighton, Alexander, iow

Lerner, Daniel, 21 \$I.eivis, Ralph Kepler, i oLiberia, i
3w

Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, 227

Linton, Ralph, Q, io, 6, 86, i 6 159
Lorenw, KOTIf2d, 6 227

Malinou'ski, Bronislasv, 6.8
Marius, i oQ
map of culture, www-w3
Maria, ioQ-i i
hlarr}u2nd, J. P., Qy
Massie Case, q8
ñlCart hy, Senator Joseph, w1 3Mend, ñlargaret, 22, i oq medi-
cine, 7* 77 9'
metric s}stem, 2.28
ivlexico, i i o

Middle East, i 6, w6, 76, i oi-w,
128-29, 144-45, 151-53, 172,
iy6, iy8, i8w, i8y q, wig,
224-25 Missionary Moses, i7

Prisoners of wsr,
Mogollon, ww8-3wMormons, i 6Q, i8 \$Moses, Artie, 38

Mossadegh, 6y

Murdock, George P., i i \$ music, analogy to culture, i 8-
řava|O, \$2-\$\$. S . 49s 76, 77•

Psychiatry, i 8, 8 -86

psychoanalysis, 8q, 83, 86, i i 3-
16, 211

psychology, 44, 63, 71, 83-86,
ç 6, ww-

Pueblo Indians, i 3w, 7, iog—
11, 157, 180, 228

ranking, 65, 130, 132-34, 157,
2.01, 20s, 22@

ncu osis, 9697

Religion, 76-77/ Catholic, q8;
Christian,

Newton, Sir Isaac, i i 6
76, wcw

Nigeria, 38pile, i 6y

ntimbers,
overt-covert culture, 8\$, 86

pattern, l ww-w3, i wq, i w6, i a8
30, 132-33, 134, 135, 137, yo, i \$ \$; informal, i 80-8 i; laws
139-41, 143-63, 214, 217;

governing, i qq, i \$ \$—y6; order ñli, i SS 57 1 \$8; Sélection in,
157-59

Pavlov, Ivan, i Qo

peck order in chiCkens, 6. 3Persia. See Iran

Rice man, David, i oRussia. See L .S.S.R.

San lldcfonso, i oQ—i i3apir, Edward, 8

science, go, i 6,
screw thread, ww6-w8

SCJCCtiOn, 2 S S. '57-59

Sellers,
semantics, 1 \$
scts, 122-2 \$, 1.24, 7 }\$, 1 /,
categoriwation, i 3w, i 6;
sex, 67-68, 7s. v*g , i i },
i \$8. See dieu bisexuality

Sioux, , 36
skung *7 @9

phoneme, i wy-w6, i 8 play, 6w. 7, 7S, 1 \$8, 2lq

PMS (Primory Message Systems), yw, 6i-8i, wi q, wig-

Point IV. See technical assistance programs

Polish culture, woi-w

pottery rim king, ioQ-i i, ww8-3 wpremarital chastity, ii —i \$
Smith, Henry Lee, io

social science, i 8, , \$o, w, i i , i ww, wi 7-i 8, wwo

Soutll AmeriCa, See Latin Amer-

South Asia, o, South Pacific, w\$, q6,

space, w, 69, '87-w9' 2lg; woq-Q; cultural concept of

Turks, y8, alq

Tyler, R B., qq

variabies, ç jgUwla. 37• 3@
uncertainty principle, i 36 Hawaiian-bloodedness, @-7°
unconicious, concept Of, qa, 3- H4itworth, Joseph,*7
United States. See Americaa sistenoc
culture World V'sr I,

United Stntes Ar= 77°94
woy-B

Useeni, John, io, wyU.S.S.R., y6, i8w

Venewa*^• '3°

World War U end of war, yy,
anthropologist,
Benjamin,

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